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Faustian bargain: how the academics in Turkey dealt with university purges, 1960s-1980s Kayir, Gül Banu 2020

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			Faustian Bargain: How the Academics in Turkey Dealt with University Purges, 1960s-1980s by  Gül Banu Kayır  B.A., Ankara University, 2014  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (History)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  November 2020  © Gül Banu Kayır, 2020		i	The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the thesis entitled:  Faustian Bargain: How the Academics in Turkey Dealt with University Purges, 1960s-1980s  submitted by Gül Banu Kayır in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History  Examining Committee: Alexei Kojevnikov, Professor, Department of History, UBC Supervisor  Sanem Güvenç-Salgırlı, Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Culture and Community, Emily Carr University of Art + Design Supervisory Committee Member  Pheroze Unwalla, Instructor, Department of History, UBC Supervisory Committee Member               		ii	Abstract  Academic purges have been a recurrent phenomenon in the political life of the Turkish Republic. This study argues that academics, who are usually seen as primary victims of state persecution, also played important roles as instigators and willing contributors to the purges. This understanding emerges from a close examination of academic removals that took place in Turkey after the 1960 and 1980 military coups. The analysis of the views, discourses, and actions of academics reveals their complicity in the normalization of dismissals of other university members in the 1960s, which also affected the subsequent major academic purge in 1983.   Some senior academics saw the Turkey’s first military coup, which took place on May 27, 1960, as an efficient and fast way to remove a political enemy. These academics, who legitimized the coup, hoped that they would increase their control over the university thanks to their support of the junta. Contrary to this expectation, young academics seized the opportunity and collaborated with the junta to eliminate decades-long inequalities at the university. They purged some of their senior colleagues and moved into the vacant positions.  University officials took note of the success of scholars who initiated the previous purge. During the academic purges in 1983, senior academics such as rectors and deans attempted to redesign universities by launching an unofficial dismissal campaign. The official purge list with fewer than a hundred names unofficially expanded to over a thousand. Together, these two purges and the role academics played in them weakened universities’ resistance to purges and helped them to become a regular feature of the political life in Turkey. 		iii	Lay Summary  This study examines the role of university members in academic purges in Turkey. By analyzing the views, discourses, and actions of university members about the 1960 and 1983 purges, this paper has shown that academics normalized the purge for various reasons and began to see the dismissals as a tool to redesign the university. As a natural result of this development, universities’ resistance against the expulsions was broken, making it easier for academic purges to become an accepted norm of political life in the country.                 		iv	Preface: This thesis is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, Gül Banu Kayır.                    		v	Table of Contents  Abstract ......................................................................................................................... ii Lay Summary ............................................................................................................... iii Preface .......................................................................................................................... iv Table of Contents .......................................................................................................... v List of Figures.............................................................................................................. vii	Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... viii Introduction................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: The 1960s, Where It All Started ................................................................ 9  From the 50s to the 60s: The Rise and Fall of the Democrat Party .................... 9                 The Coup ....................................................................................................... 17  Reasons Behind the Purge .............................................................................. 19                 The Purge of 1960 ......................................................................................... 22                 The Gift of the Purge ..................................................................................... 30	Chapter 2: The 1980s, When It Was Not Ended ........................................................ 33  The Days of Anarchy, and Just Another Coup ................................................ 33                 In the Eyes of the Junta: Students, Professors, and the University .................. 36  Inflating the Numbers Before the Purge ......................................................... 44                 The Purge of 1983 ......................................................................................... 46                 Completing the Purge Process ........................................................................ 52 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 55 Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 60 		vi	Appendices .................................................................................................................. 64 Appendix A: Partial Background of the Removed Scholars ....................................... 64 Appendix B: Official List of the 1960 Purge .............................................................. 66 Appendix C: List of the 1983 Academic Purge .......................................................... 68 	                		vii	List of Figures Figure 1.1 Turan Emeksiz in the Center, carried by other students, 28 April 1960 ......... 15 Figure 1.2 Istanbul University Law Professors .............................................................. 21 Figure 2.1 Istanbul University, Faculty of Law presents an honorary doctorate to Kenan Evren ............................................................................................................................ 43                     		viii	Acknowledgments I would like to thank my supervisor, Alexei Kojevnikov, who helped me in every step of this project. Our conversations on a wide variety of topics and challenging questions that followed were the best guidance I could ever hope for. I also would like to thank my committee members, Sanem Güvenç Salgırlı, who offered her kind support whenever I needed it and Pheroze Unwalla, who offered generous insight to bring clarity to my work.   Thanks to John Roosa, who saw the first version of this project and kindly helped me to imagine the shape it could take. Tracy Lord, who supported me without hesitation year after year, project after project. Joan Eroncel and Stefanie Ickert, who patiently edited this work. Jason Wu, who kindly offered administrative assistance. Ergun Türkcan, who shared both his wisdom and humor while we talked about the blocked routes that my project should avoid. Mehmet Ulusel and Fahri Aral for their memories that made me reconsider the role of the students during the period I examine. Yücel Demirel, who shared his magazine collection with me and was a constant source of support as always.   Thanks to my cohort, who soothed the gloom of the rainy mornings with friendly conversations. Especially, Sarah, Mercedes, and Nila, who were so generous, steady, and kind in their support. I was incredibly lucky with my roommates: Nathan, Amber, Emily, and Bronwen. They were the ones who made me see the sunny sides of Vancouver. I owe my thanks to Ata, Kylie, Nathan G., Lui Xia, Zoeyn, Rosie, and Peter, who helped me in different and sometimes most needed ways. Thanks to Zhanara, and Yeerem for sharing the happy corners of Vancouver with me.   I owe my biggest thanks to my partner, Kaan Üçsu, who patiently and tenderly supported me while I was trying to complete this thesis at the height of the pandemic. I 		ix	also owe thanks to my parents. They patiently listened and tried to understand this story even when it was no more than fragments and snippets of thoughts.                    		1	Introduction Universities in Turkey suffered a major purge in 2016 that resulted in the removal of thousands of academics.1 Although the 2016 purge is unique in size, the purges (especially after turbulent periods such as coups or coup attempts) are not unexpected events for those familiar with Turkey’s history.2 While historians have written on this topic, they have yet to reach a consensus on how far back in time the history of purges goes. The first university of the country, Darülfünun, was founded in 1870 (during the imperial period) in Istanbul. According to Mete Tunçay, the first academic purge occurred one year later, with the dismissal of the rector Yanyalı Hoca Tahsin Efendi, which was followed by the closure of Darülfünun.3   As can be understood from Tunçay’s assessment, an academic purge does not have to be of a large quantitative size. Tunçay classified this incident as a purge because of its qualitative similarities with the future purges (a scholar was fired upon complaints, his displacement was a harbinger of the deterioration of the university, etc.). In this regard, it seems logical for Tunçay to consider the removal of a single person from the university as the beginning of the history of the purges. According to Tunçay’s definition, three academic purges (1871, 1909, 1919) occurred in the almost half a century between the establishment of Darülfünun and the foundation of the Republic.  																																																								1 “With the emergency state decree no.667 issued in July 23, 2016, 15 universities were closed; 5,644 academics have been dismissed with all decrees issued to date; when the employees of these closed universities are included, this figure exceeded 7,800 people.” Bilim Akademisi, Bilim Akademisi Akademik Özgürlükler Raporu:2016-2017, (Aug 9, 2017), 3. https://bilimakademisi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/bilim-akademisi-akademik-ozgurlukler-raporu-2016-2017-agustos-9.pdf Accessed Sept. 20, 2020. 2 From the foundation of the Republic to the present, there have been at least seven purges realized in the following years: 1933, 1948, 1960, 1971, 1983, 1997, 2016.  3 Mete Tunçay and Haldun Özen, “Osmanlı Darülfünunu’ndan Yök Darülfünunu’na” Yarın, Oct. 1984. p.7. 		2	For Emre Dölen, the dismissal of Yanyalı Hoca Tahsin does not qualify as a purge. The incident Dölen regarded as the first purge was the renewal of the Imperial School of Medicine’s cadre (Mektebi Tıbbıye-i Şahane) in 1908 on the initiative of Cemil Topuzlu, Süleyman Numan, and Asaf Derviş Pashas, who were physicians themselves.4 Nurşen Mazıcı, who studied the 1933 and 1947 purges, omitted 1871 and also chose 1908 as the date of the first purge.5 Since Turkey’s academic purges have varied from small to very large, Dölen’s and Mazıcı’s omission of Yanyalı Tahsin’s dismissal in 1871 from the history of purges raises a question about the criteria, especially as academics collectively agree that a purge occurred in 1947, which only removed a small group of well-known, leftist academics.6 As in Yanyalı Tahsin’s case, the 1947 purge was important not so much due to its scale, but as a symbolic act with the intention to demonstrate that universities had closed their doors to leftist faculty members and their ideologies.7  Although this study is not about the first purge, it has a similar approach to that of Mete Tunçay in terms of historiography. Thus, it accepts that each removal is part of a larger web that forms the tradition of academic purges in Turkey, and it focuses on similarities between the incidents to reveal their common patterns. The government’s use of academic purges for ideological purposes is one of such recurring elements that this 																																																								4  Mektebi Tıbbıye-i Şahane was affiliated with Darülfünun. Emre Dölen, “II. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Darülfünun” Osmanlı Bilimi Araştırmaları X-I (2008) p. 19. 5 Mazıcı, Nurşen. “Öncesi ve Sonrasıyla 1933 Üniversite Reformu”, Birikim, Vol. 76, Aug., 1995. Accessed Sept. 15, 2020.  6 Muzaffer Şerif Başoğlu, Pertev Naili Boratav, Behice Boran, and Niyazi Berkes were among those who were dismissed. 7 Mete Tunçay and Haldun Özen, “Osmanlı Darülfünunu’ndan Yök Darülfünunu’na”, Yarın, Oct., 1984. p.7. It is a common view among researchers that the cause of universities’ exlusion of the leftist ideologies in the late 1940s was Turkey’s rapproachment with the USA after World War II. Mete Çetik, “Üniversitede Cadı Avı: 1948 DTCF Tasfiyesi ve P.N. Boratav’ın Müdafaası”, (Ankara: Dipnot, 2008). pp.11-13.  		3	study takes notice of and some of the historians agreed on. Tunçay and Mazıcı, for instance, consider the Turkish Historical Congress (Türk Tarih Kongresi) in 1932 as the start of the first academic purge after the founding of the Republic of Turkey.8 During the Congress, Darülfünun professor Zeki Velidi Togan presented historical findings that contradicted the unfounded claims of the official state ideology about the historical roots of the Turkish people. Togan was forced to resign due to public pressure after the event. Darülfünun was accused of falling behind the revolution and of not supporting the movements of language and history to which Atatürk had attributed great importance. 9  Increasing criticisms resulted in the permanent closure of Darülfünun and the opening of Istanbul University in its place. While the new university took over all physical assets from Darülfünun, it was required to leave behind some of the human capital of the old institution. By the order of the Minister of Education, Reşit Galip, 157 Darülfünun professors did not receive an invitation to join the new university.10   The Togan incident was important as it provided the government with an excuse for the purge. However, the fact that all new governments in Turkey, including the single-party government of 1933, tried to demonstrate their control of the university cannot be explained solely by the presence of a handful of academics who disagreed with the state ideology. The history of tensions between the government and the universities is long. One of the main reasons for this tension is the fact that, until 1984, the privilege of funding universities in Turkey belonged solely to the state. Although universities had their own 																																																								8 Mete Tunçay and Haldun Özen, “1933 Darülfünun Tasfiyesi veya Bir Tek-Parti Politikacısının Önlenemez Yükselişi ve Düşüşü”, Tarih ve Toplum, Oct., 1984, p. 11. 9 Mete Tunçay and Haldun Özen, “1933 Darülfünun Tasfiyesi veya Bir Tek-Parti Politikacısının Önlenemez Yükselişi ve Düşüşü” Tarih ve Toplum, Oct, 1984, p.11. 10Emre Dölen, Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi Vol. 4 (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), p. 2. 		4	regulations, academics were considered civil servants and were expected to comply with the rules followed by other state employees.11 The state interpreted universities’ demands for autonomy, which had been growing since 1919, as an attempt by state institutions to escape from government control. Understanding academic purges as a state response to the universities’ demands for autonomy may explain the frequency of the purges and why the dismissed academics were not permanently removed but were able to return to the universities after the purges had achieved their goals.12  Calls for university autonomy were often expressed together with other demands by the academics for the improvement of their working conditions. In 1930, Darülfünun prepared a project for its own reform.13 But instead of realizing this plan, Darülfünun was subjected to a completely different reform, which included a purge. Similarly, towards the end of the 1950s, academics expressed many demands for changes. The government responded with a proposal to transfer control of the universities to the Ministry of Education.14 But before the government was able to follow through on its proposal, a military intervention took place. The junta seized power and initiated an academic purge, pretending that this was the much-needed reform. Academics’ requests for change were often seen by the governments (civilian and military alike) as opportunities and pretexts to 																																																								11 See Law No. 4964, Article 47. T.C. Resmi Gazete, June 18, 1946. Law No. 114, Article 3. T.C. Resmi Gazete, Oct. 28, 1960. Law No. 1750, Article 59. T.C. Resmi Gazete, July 7, 1973.  12 In 1955, Adnan Adıvar stated that the government’s decision to kick out a few academics from Ankara University was the first hit to the university’s autonomy. Mete Çetik, “Pertev Naili Borarav: Bir Akademisyen ve Düşünce Adamı” (Istanbul: İletişim, 2019), p. 93.  13 Mete Tunçay and Haldun Özen, “1933 Darülfünun Tasfiyesi veya Bir Tek-Parti Politikacısının Önlenemez Yükselişi ve Düşüşü”, Tarih ve Toplum, Oct., 1984, p. 9. 14 “Millet Meclisinde Dün Üniversite Muhtariyeti Münakaşa Edildi”, Cumhuriyet, Feb. 27, 1956. 		5	curb the autonomy of universities. This did not prevent academics from continuing to seek change and even, on occasion, led them to support the purges.  The complicity of academics in the purges is a topic that researchers are often aware of but tend to ignore or only mention in brief. The existing descriptions of academic purges tend to single out the government as the perpetrator, while the roles of university officials and academic collaborators have not been properly analyzed. Haldun Özen’s work on the purge of 1980 insists that the junta waged a relentless war on the university. By reading the testimonies that he used as sources for his book, one can find indications that academics played various tricks to get rid of their colleagues. However, the academics still remained in the background as Özen’s main focus was on the junta that came to power with the 1980 coup.15 Tahir Hatiboğlu’s book, which deals with the same period as Özen’s, criticizes the academic members of the Council of Higher Education (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu, YÖK) (CoHE), which was established through the junta directive to control the universities.16 Hatiboğlu’s analysis, however, often excludes ‘ordinary’ academics who were not members of the CoHE but were still involved in the purge. Mete Tunçay’s writings cite examples of academics denouncing their own colleagues, but likewise do not focus much attention on these incidents.17 Tanıl Bora’s long interview with Ömer Ulusoy describes internal conflicts at the university, which in some cases caused the removal of professors.18 Bora and Ulusoy’s article compares the purges of 1983 and 2016 and while the complicity 																																																								15 Haldun Özen, Entelektüelin Dramı: 12 Eylül Cadı Kazanı (Ankara: Imge, 2002), pp. 34-37, 56. 16 Tahir Hatiboğlu, Eylül Üniversitesi (Ankara: Selvi Yayınları, 1990). 17 Mete Tunçay and Haldun Özen, “Osmanlı Darülfünunu’ndan Yök Darülfünunu’na”, Yarın, Oct., 1984. p.7 18 Interviewee Ulusoy, Ömer. “1402’den KHK’lara: KHK’lılar – Bir Muhasebe (1)” Interview by Bora, Tanıl. Birikim, Oct. 15, 2019. Accessed Aug. 1, 2020. https://www.birikimdergisi.com/guncel/9726/1402-den-khk-lara-khk-lilar-bir-muhasebe-1 		6	of the academics is evident in both instances, the issue remains secondary. The role and active participation of academics in the purges have not been studied as a problem on its own. This thesis aims to fill this gap. For those working on the history of academic removals, the early Republican period has always been the most popular choice. This is a result, in part, of the natural appeal of reformist periods for researchers as well as easier access to archival documents, in comparison with the more recent period. As researchers move closer to the present, accompanying pressures and censorship due to the political nature of the dismissals have also probably played a role in restricting their interest mostly to the 1933 and 1947 purges. By choosing a period that is less studied and also closer to the present, this study will examine the academic purges of 1960 and 1983, both of which were carried out by military governments. This research will also briefly refer to the purge of 1971 that relied on different tactics in the absence of an official purge list.  This thesis consists of two parts. The first chapter focuses on the 1950s and examines how academics engaged with partisan politics. It then moves to the 1960 coup and explores the reasons behind the junta’s decision to initiate an academic purge despite universities’ support for the military intervention into state politics. The chapter analyzes justifications used by academics during the purge that explains their embrace of the purge practices. The second chapter starts by looking briefly at the 1971 coup and the purge that followed. This provides the background for the subsequent coup of 1980 and the junta’s reasons for carrying out an academic purge in 1983. The analysis reveals that the junta’s official purge list was unofficially and substantially expanded by the contributions from 		7	academics looking to get rid of their colleagues. The study concludes with a discussion of the impact of academics’ support of the purges on the status of universities and academic freedom in Turkey. 		8	The following chapter will discuss the mercurial 1950s when Turkey experienced the tremors of a transition to a multiple-party system. Unsure of its own stability, the new government attacked sites of political production including the universities. In the face of increasing pressure, professors opted for supporting military intervention. The predisposition of academics to solve problems by radical means was crystallized with this choice and triggered purges that were realized with the help of university members.                  		9	Chapter 1: The 1960s, Where It All Started  He loved to create polemics, and would persistently break the University Ordinance that prohibited professors from commenting on political controversies. Menderes government had to take him away from his duty for awhile. They reinstated him but his grudge never died. (Purged professor Ali Fuad Başgil, on the removal of his colleague Hüseyin Nail Kubalı) Ali Fuad Başgil, 27 Mayıs İhtilali ve Sebepleri19      From the 50s to the 60s: The Rise and Fall of the Democrat Party Between 1923 and 1945, Turkey experienced single-party rule, during which time the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) (RPP) governed the country and fended off any attempts to transition to a multi-party system. However, after the victory of the democracies in the Second World War, Turkey was forced into transitioning to a multi-party system.20 Thus, in 1946, the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti) (DP) was founded. Its first attempt to participate in election was rigged and plagued with bureaucratic obstacles. The DP was deprived of using the radio to convey its message, was forced to participate in a snap election that reduced its chances to reach voters in advance, and was expected to accept the results of a vote count handled in secret. 21  The public perceived these developments as a continuation of the RPP’s previous attempts to curb freedoms and enforce its will, which created growing resentment among Turkish citizens.  One-party rule ended when the DP came to power in 1950. It relied on the support of multiple parties and groups with conflicting agendas that were unsatisfied with the RPP 																																																								19 Ali Fuad Başgil, 27 Mayıs İhtilali ve Sebepleri (Istanbul: Kubbealtı, 2017), 125. 20 Kemal Karpat cites domestic reasons for the transition but adds that the change became imminent by external factors such as the signing of the United Nations Charter in 1945. Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multiple Party System (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 137-168. 21 Işıl Tuna, Türkiye’de İktidar Muhalefet İlişkileri 1946-1960 (Istanbul: Libra 2018), 43, 47, 53. 		10	government.22 While a scarcity of alternatives helped the DP in the beginning, this inflation in supporters also caused problems for the party. Accommodating the desires of such a large base proved itself a hard task. The DP was not particularly committed to novelty or flexibility while it built its political legacy. It quickly became apparent that the party could not honestly expect to meet the diverse expectations of its supporters. To the disappointment of many, the party started to shape a political environment that was similar to the previous regime and broke many of the promises that had helped its ascend to power. Succumbing to authoritarianism, the DP became intent on maintaining control of the political sphere by suppressing those voices that spoke outside of parliament.23  The DP’s conflicts with the politicized scholars started from early on. In 1951, the party tried to exclude scholars from the political sphere. 24  This was followed by an extensive political ban targeting academics, ranging from restrictions on writing articles to 																																																								22 The DP supporters and their motivations varied in an interesting way. The press was in search of more freedom. Işıl Tuna, Türkiye’de İktidar Muhalefet İlişkileri 1946-1960 (Istanbul: Libra, 2018), 169. The army was in search of consolidating its power. Ümit Özdağ, Menderes Döneminde Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali (Istanbul: Boyut. 1997), 21. The landlords in East and Southeastern Anatolia were trying to block the RPP’s long-planned land reform that threatened their interests. (Going one step further, Behice Boran asserts that the DP was actually the direct product of the landlords, who founded the party to look after their interests. Behice Boran, Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları (Istanbul: Gün Yayınları, 1986) 36. The minorities, who experienced instability and violence during the RPP years, were in search of an alternative that would establish a different social environment. Consequently, the DP dominated the ballots in the cities where the Kurdish population was in the majority (Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Muş, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli, and Van) except in Tunceli where the DP received 42.5% of the total votes and the RPP reached 48.8%) T.C. Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 1950-1970 Yılları Arası Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri. http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/1950-1977-yillari-arasi-milletvekili-genel-secimleri/3007. The same was true for the cities with major Alevi population (Tokat, Sivas, Erzurum, Maraş). T.C. Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 1950-1970 Yılları Arası Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri. http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/1950-1977-yillari-arasi-milletvekili-genel-secimleri/3007. For cities where the Kurdish population was in the majority in the 1950s, see, Fuat Dündar, Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar (Istanbul: Çiviyazıları, 2000), 107.  23 In 1954, the DP proposed a purge targeting civil servants, particularly the judges and professors, who ‘meddled in politics’. “Memurları Tasfiye Kanun Teklifi Millet Meclisinde”, Cumhuriyet July 3, 1954.   24 The academics, who were elected as members of parliament, were forced to resign from the university. “Milletvekili Veya Vali Olan Profesörler”, Cumhuriyet May 21, 1951.  		11	the ability to maintain a career in politics.25 Narrowing down the opportunities for political engagement encouraged the invention of new channels for expressing dissenting views. Students clubs mushroomed and provided arenas where certain professors could publicly express their opinions.26 In 1956, the students of the Political Sciences Faculty of Ankara University (Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi) organized a panel, at which participating professors openly criticized the DP.27 Menderes immediately reacted with a declaration: Yesterday’s conference showed the sparks of a united movement against the government. The line was crossed when they claimed that the DP replaced education with persecution. The people who said this and more are all members of the RPP, and they conspire with the press. The government will not be a spectator to all these; it will take the necessary measures.28  As Menderes promised, the party’s attack on universities intensified. Starting in 1956, DP deputies pressed for removing the autonomy of universities.29 A well-known dissident, 																																																								25 Law Decree No. 6185 (Change Regarding Article 46, sub-section d of the University Law), issued on 21/7/1953 (Üniversiteler Kanununun 46 nci maddesinin (d) fıkrasının değiştirilmesi hakkında Kanun, Kanun No : 6185 , Kabul tarihi : 21/7/1953). 26 Student clubs created a curious contradiction for professors. While the academics benefitted from the space the students enabled, they were against the politicized students acting on their own account. Whenever the students broke out of their roles as fervent audience members and actively engaged in politics, the university reacted against them. Rector Sıddık Sami Onar’s advice to the students, for instance, was “Do not politicize the student associations.” “Yeni Rektörün Talebelere Verdiği İlk Nasihat”, Cumhuriyet, Jun. 27, 1956. 27  Firdes Temizgüney, “1960 Darbesine Giden Süreçte Önemli Bir Kesit: İstanbul Öğrenci Olayları.” Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi 7 (2018): 186. 28 “Menderesin Matbuata ve Üniversiteye Hücumları”, Cumhuriyet Jan. 25, 1956. 29  The DP offered to put universities under the order of the Ministry of Education. “Millet Meclisinde Dün Üniversite Muhtariyeti Münakaşa Edildi”, Cumhuriyet, Feb. 27, 1956. “Üniversite Muhtariyetini Tahdide Matuf D.P. Teklifi”, Cumhuriyet, Dec 30. 1959. The attack by the DP against the autonomy of the university created dissidence even among the professors who supported the party. Professor of Geography Ali Tanoğlu, for instance, clashed with the DP because of his notions of the self-governing university. Süha Göney. “Üniversite Tarihinde Ellili Yıllar ve 27 Mayıs İhtilalinin Etkileri.” Sosyoloji Dergisi 3, No. 23 (2011), 268. 		12	Prof. Hüseyin Nail Kubalı, criticized these attempts in a newspaper article, stating that, “Whether it was done by a single person or a delegation, attempting to reject or limit the autonomy of the university (therefore the public) would result in a government without restraint.”30 Prof. Kubalı continued to condemn the government’s actions,31 which led to his removal from the university. After the story was published in Time Magazine, he was reappointed, and the responsibility of punishing Kubalı was handed over to the university.32 Istanbul University gave Prof. Kubalı a disciplinary penalty and banned him from teaching for a month.33 The decision was protested by students, who left the lecture hall en masse, aggravating the matter further in the eyes of the DP.34 Seeing that professors were drawing power from their identity as scholars,35 the party began aggressively pushing certain academics outside of academia, as in the case of 																																																								30 “Üniversitelerimize Yapılan İthamlar ve Neşriyata Bir Profesörün Verdiği Cevab”, Cumhuriyet, Jan. 23, 1956.  31 In this period, Prof. Kubalı’s lectures began appearing in newspapers, where he made biting remarks such as: “In orientalist democracies one-party rule dominates the whole system. There is no designated space for the opposition; if there is, it is artificial and weak.” “Batı ve Doğu Demokrasileri Arasındaki Fark”, Cumhuriyet, Apr. 3, 1957. But the last straw was his critique of the laws prohibiting the freedom of the press. “Hukuk Otoriteleri Fikirlerini Söylüyorlar: Meclis İçtüzüğü Kanun Değildir!” Cumhuriyet, Jan. 2, 1958.   32 “Silence, Please.” Time Magazine, Feb. 17, 1958, Vol. 71, Issue. 7, 29-30. The rumor regarding Kubalı’s reappointment took place immediately after the article. “Kubalı Tekrar Vazifesine İade mi Ediliyor?” Cumhuriyet, Feb. 27, 1958. Actual reappointment was realized on April 9, 1958. “Profesör Nail Kubalı Dün Kürsüsüne İade Edildi”, Cumhuriyet, Apr. 10, 1958.   33 “Senato Dün Prof. Kubalı’ya Ceza Verdi”, Cumhuriyet, Apr. 13, 1958. This was not the first attempt of the university regarding damage control. The day after the Time’s article, the university promised to throw a banquet for the Prime Minister. “Üniversite de Başbakana Bir Ziyafet Verecek”, Cumhuriyet, Feb. 18,1958. 34 “Üniversitede Dün Cereyan Eden Hadiseler”, Cumhuriyet, Apr. 16, 1958. Prime Minister Menderes visited the university after the incident. The newpaper observing the matter commented on the upset state of the professors, who left the university after briefing the PM. “Vilâyette Dün Geceki Toplantı”, Cumhuriyet, Apr. 16, 1958. 35  Prof. Kubalı’s resistance, for instance, was immediately romanticized by his students, who chanted: “Servants of the science shall live forever!” “Üniversitede Dün Cereyan Eden Hadiseler”, Cumhuriyet, Apr. 16, 1958. In 1959, Istanbul University Law Professor Regıp Sarıca gave a lecture on the necessity of an autonomous university, where he claimed that: “Professors are like secular prophets. If we claim that they should have patrons, that means the science they produced would be the patrons’ science.” “Üniversite Hocaları Laik Birer Peygambere Benzer”, Cumhuriyet, Apr. 28, 1959.  İlhan Tekeli argues that this solidarity 		13	Professor Turhan Feyzioğlu. Professor Feyzioğlu criticized the DP government during the opening ceremony for the new term in 1957. When the media published his talk, he was forced to leave the university and, as a response, joined the RPP as a politician.36 As the university was dealing with these incidents and started to brace for impending reform, the DP founded a Committee of Inquest on April 18.37 The committee embraced executive, legislative, and judicial powers to undertake an investigation of the media and the RPP, confirming fears of the DP’s authoritarian tendencies.38  These conditions laid the background for the first student protest that erupted on April 27, 1960.	39 On the second day of protests, the rector of Istanbul University, Sıddık Sami Onar, tried to prevent police officers entering the university. He was slapped by a police officer who accused him of provoking the students.40 The rector was dragged into a 																																																								between the students and professors, and the joint resistance they presented against the DP was the result of the fact that class consciousness had not yet completely emerged. İlhan Tekeli. Tarihsel Bağlamı İçinde Türkiye’de Yükseköğretimin ve YÖK’ün Tarihi. (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları) 172. 36 Parliamentary Report Regarding 27 May, p. 74 (TBMM 27 Mayıs Raporu). 37 In late March, opposition leader İnönü visited Istanbul, where he met with Istanbul University professors (Prof. Kubalı and Prof. Onar were among them). Giving a press conference, the RPP leader promised to remove the current laws that restrained the freedom of the press. A large group of university students (a magazine cited that the crowd reached 1,000 people) answered this activity by gathering in front of the RPP’s headquarters to show their support. These developments were not missed by the DP and were answered in the following month. “C.H.P. İktidarda Olarak” Kim, March 23, 1960. 6-12. 38  The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Commission Report for the Investigation of Coups, Sub-Commission for the Investigation of the 1960 Coup and the 1971 Military Memorandum, 2012. 1-2 (TBMM Darbeleri Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu, 1960 Darbesi ve 1971 Muhtırasını İnceleme Alt Komisyonu, 2012. 1-2).  39 The tension between the police force and the university students, who were against Menderes’ government, was palpable, and the clashes were present before 28 April. “Polis, İrticiaı Tel’in İçin Üniversite Bahçesinde Toplanan Gençleri Dağıttı”, Cumhuriyet, Jan. 10, 1960.  40 According to Prof. Mina Urgan: “Police officers did not settle for firing and throwing tear gas at students in Beyazıt Square. They dived into the university with two jeeps under Bumin Yamanoğlu’s command. When Rector Sıddık Sami Onar and professor Sulhi Dönmezer said that nobody called for their help and they had no right to do such a thing, a policeman named Zeki Şahin yelled, “Shut up! You are the ones provoking them! He threw the professors to the ground with a slap. Officers dragged the rector, who had a slight slash on the forehead and had a bloodied shirt on his back.” Urgan, Mîna. Bir Dinozorun Anıları. Beyoğlu, İstanbul: YKY, 2000. 262. 		14	police vehicle and taken away from the scene. After his injury was dressed, Prof. Onar returned to the university and asked students to leave the campus peacefully.41 Students dispersed only to gather again in Beyazıt Square. The two-day protests resulted in police officers firing into the crowd, killing a student, Turan Emeksiz, and severely injuring two others.   																																																								41 In his memoir, Prof. Ali Fuad Başgil accused the rector of returning to the university on purpose to display his injury, which would provoke the students. “When his injury was dressed, he returned to the university (…). I saw him from afar, his face was bandaged. (In his absence) the students were calmed down and on the brink of dispersing. I found his choice of showing up in front of the students with bandages faulty. The rector told students that everything was alright and they needed to silently leave. I cannot say the rector’s actions were deliberate, but it was obvious that he was oblivious to the psychology of the young people gathered in crowds. Indeed, the youth dispersed only to meet in Beyazıt. The second incident that was worse than the first occurred there (…). What is done, is done. Yet, I am sure that if the rector did not act as he did, these events would not have occurred. This was a mistake.” Ali Fuad Başgil. Hâtıralar (İstanbul: Kubbealtı, 2016), 73-74. While Prof. Onar did not leave an account of his time under police supervision, it might be reasonable to think that he was released by the police to return the university and convince the students to leave. 		15	 Fig. 1.1: Turan Emeksiz in the center, carried by other students, 28 April 1960.42  Behavior of the police during the student protests aggravated fears that the DP intended to rely on an armed force other than the army.43 The DP was not alone in developing strategies against the Turkish army’s presence in the political scene. The fact that the army was an autonomous political player in its own right with its own political views and no permanent loyalty to either side pushed both the RPP and the DP to devise 																																																								42 Güçer, Deniz. “Tarihi Değiştiren Fotoğraflar!” Vatan, March 18, 2013. 43  “Emniyet Siyasallaştı.” Milliyet, November 6, 1998. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/the-others/emniyet-siyasallasti-5342825. Echoes of the fears regarding the DP’s involvement with securing an armed force could be seen in the unfounded headlines that appeared after the coup. Some headlines claimed that thousands of guns and military equipment were seized. “Parayla Tutulmuş Adamlara Dağıtılmak Üzere 7 Bin Silah ve Asker Elbisesi Ele Geçti”, Ulus, May. 30, 1960.  		16	different strategies.44 While the RPP tried to overcome the problem by agreeing with the army’s red lines, the DP established a close relationship with the police as a countermove.45 However, this formula backlashed after the police killed Turan Emeksiz. The public perception of a close relationship between the DP and the police forces (who lacked the historical authority or political agency of the army) shifted the responsibility for the killing from the police to the DP government.46 Prime Minister Menderes responded to the student revolt by addressing his supporters in a public speech on May 18, 1960.47 To the crowd listening he said,  Where were these professors in 1946 (during the dubious elections)? I will apologize to the professors screaming freedom now if they can prove that they were teaching freedom and democracy to the students back then. They think the university is a place surrounded by the Great Wall of China. No. If it is seen that they are acting against the law and harming the country, we will enter the 																																																								44 There is a well-established opinion among researchers that the army and the RPP cooperated for decades without a true exception in its history. However, relatively recent studies show that the situation is more complex than that. Ümit Özdağ argues that the army reacted against the RPP’s strategy of weakening the army’s presence in politics and started to support the DP. Ümit Özdağ, Menderes Döneminde Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali (Istanbul: Boyut, 1997), 21. Işıl Tuna posits that the army supported the DP from its formation to the beginning of its second term (roughly from 1946 to 1954). Işıl Tuna, Türkiye’de İktidar Muhalefet İlişkileri 1946-1960 (Istanbul: Libra, 2018) 60. While there was a ban on the active involvement of army personnel with political parties, and its breach could result in up to five years of imprisonment, the army was still vocal about its support. The National Unity Committee member (NUC), Major Muzaffer Kara, for instance, mentioned his open support of the DP up until 1954. “Binbaşı Muzaffer Karan’la Görüşme” Cumhuriyet, Aug. 5, 1960. Military Penal Code, Article 148. Issued on 22.05.1930 (Askeri Ceza Kanunu 148. Madde). 45 The DP could not follow the RPP’s as it would run the risk of losing its supporters, who would refuse to support an imitation of the RPP and its army-laced politics. 46 On May 5, the students encircled Menderes’ car and shouted “resign”. The Prime Minister dashed out of the car and yelled with frustration; “What do you want from me? Kill me, then.” Students claimed, “They are not murderers unlike the government.”  Mina Urgan, Bir Dinozorun Anıları (Istanbul: YKY, 2000), 272. Meriç, Sercan. “Bir Başkaldırının Öyküsü: 555K” Sözcü, May 5, 2019.  47 May 19 was an official holiday for the Commemoration of Atatürk, Youth and Sports Day. The Prime Minister gave a warning to the youth by giving this speech, instead of celebrating their holiday. 		17	university. (...). And for the students, their attempts will be for naught. They should not forget that with these actions they are attacking the will of the nation, not Adnan Menderes. They will not find only Adnan Menderes or the DP government raising against these actions; they will find the entire Turkish nation.48 Unbeknownst to the DP, the military bureaucracy, who viewed modernization as a vital element in reinforcing the state structure since the imperial period, was collecting evidence of the government’s violation of this well-established principle, building a strong pretext for a seizure of power.49 Nine days after the acrimonious Turgutlu speech, the coup of May 27 occurred.  The Coup The first coup of the Republic of Turkey, or the Gentle Revolt as the British Daily Express called it at the time50, was staged on 27 May 1960.  As a matter of fact, the coup was not gentle at all; it resulted in a death sentence for 15 individuals, all members or supporters of the DP. Three of these were actually carried out, for the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan.51 The junta rule, under the National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi) (NUC) tried to justify the military intervention by claiming the ousted government had massacred countless youths and hidden their bodies.52 While these horrifying stories were 																																																								48 “Başbakan, Üniversite Profesör ve Öğrencilerine Sert Bir Lisanla Çattı”, Cumhuriyet, May. 19, 1960.  49 Kemal H. Karpat, Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Asker ve Siyaset (Istanbul: Timaş, 2015). pp.8-10. 50 “Gentle Revolt.” Daily Express, May 28, 1960. 51 “T. C. Millî Birlik Komitesi Kararı” T.C. Resmi Gazete, No. 10908, September 16, 1961.  52 “Milli Birlik Komitesinin, Ölen ve Kaybolan Gençler Hakkındaki Tebliği” T.C. Resmi Gazete, No. 10545. 		18	simply not true, their inspiration possibly came from the bloody clashes between the police and the university students.  Traumatized by the killing of a student, the ill-treatment of several others, and the beating of a rector, the universities were already the center of attention. Using this prominent platform, professors from Istanbul University published a report immediately after the coup, stating that:  The kind of pressure previously only felt by the dissidents (of the DP) has started to affect the whole university. (The government) allowed the use of lethal force that resulted in the death and injury of the students. This is a fact no law or administrative science or a state regime that is subject to law can accept. (The government) thought that it can keep its power by beating and injuring the professors, deans, and rectors. A coterie that can decide the execution of such actions can no longer be counted as a social institution (…). This incident proves that the government lost its status as a social and national institution and became an instrument for personal ambitions.53 The academics justified the coup on the grounds that the government transgressed against the university. They calculated that the junta rule would be more sympathetic to their cause than the DP, who saw the university as a political player and determined to crush it. Such calculations, however, would soon be proven wrong, as the academics did not foresee that the junta would adopt policies analogous to those by the DP, and for similar reasons. The 																																																								53 28 Mayıs 1960 Tarihli Tutanak, Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, April 29, 1966. 187 Kemal Karpat compared this statement of the academics with the old fetvas that were given by the Şeyhulislam to legitimize grand changes in the system. Kemal Karpat, “Political Developments in Turkey, 1950-70” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, Oct.1972, 358. Feroz Ahmad argued that this was the moment the coup changed form and became a revolution. Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975 (London: C.Hurst & Company, 1977), 162. 		19	university’s decision to support the coup54 in the hopes of escaping the rule of a populist party that had been moving towards authoritarianism resulted in a series of farcical events. Shortly after the coup, some academics became victims of a purge of the kind they had hoped to evade by supporting the coup. The rest continued to work with the awareness that their very existence in the university had become precarious.   Reasons Behind the Purge Like similar incidents in the future, the purge of 1960 was designed as a broad attack on state organizations, targeting the police forces, the military, and academic institutions. The first two had the privilege of bearing arms, which posed a risk for the NUC. Academia was a different kind of beast. In 1960, Turkey had six universities in total.55 Most members of the university, whether they were professors, associate professors or lecturers, enjoyed tenure track positions56 and significant economic privilege.57 The academics felt secure enough to expand their sphere of influence. Towards the 1960s, when the university started to attract attention for its unregulated political production, professors 																																																								54 The Rector of Istanbul University, Sıddık Sami Onar, allegedly said, ““The revolution of May 27 was achieved with the cooperation of the Turkish military and Istanbul University.” Ecevit, Bülent. “Devrimin Ulusallığı ve Ord. Prof. Onar’ın Sözleri”, Günaydın, Sep 17, 1960 in Bülent Ecevit’in Köşe Yazıları http://ecevityazilari.org/items/show/1241 Accessed July 14, 2020.  55 The foundation of these universities occurred in the following order: Istanbul (1933), Istanbul Technical (1944), Ankara (1946), Ege (1955), Karadeniz Technical (1955), Middle East Technical (1956), and Atatürk (1957). Günay, Durmuş and Günay, Aslı. “1933’den Günümüze Türk Yükseköğretiminde Niceliksel Gelişmeler.” Yükseköğretim ve Bilim Dergisi 1 (April 2011), DOI: 10.5961/jhes.2011.001. 56 The university law issued in 1946 defined only two cases that could lead to the dismissal of a university member: negligence of duties and unethical practices. Law Decree No. 4936, Section 6 (University Law, Disciplinary Regulation). Issued in 18/6/1946 (4936 Sayılı Üniversiteler Kanunu Altıncı Bölüm Disiplin İşleri). 57 A background check for the 50 professors (chosen by their order of appearance in the purge list) showed that 19 out of 50 had parents who held exceptional positions, ranging from ambassadors to pashas to medical doctors. For the list, see Appendix A. 		20	who were combining wealth with cultural capital and had easy access to the younger generations also fell under scrutiny. The DP tried to solve this issue by banning the political activities of academics. When the scholars resisted and challenged Menderes,58 they also became a target for the future junta that was watching the developments closely.59  As masters of a highly valuable trade, the scholars were frequently placed directly in the eye of the storm. The military regime knew from day one that they needed to dress their rushed enterprise with properly detailed roadmap, which required qualified experts. Accordingly, Cemal Gürsel, who after the coup became the new President of the country, declared to the law professors whom he invited to Ankara on May 27 that the junta trusts the university: “Not only that, but we also have utmost faith in the university. We call you to say this: Make us a new constitution immediately… We do not want to have any influence over the constitution you prepare… Make such a constitution that it will not be violated again.”60 Istanbul University echoed the sentiment. Rector Sıddık Sami Onar gave a speech at Istanbul University on June 14, claiming: “Thanks to the benevolent hands of the noble Turkish army, our university has opened its doors once again (…). Our greatest consolation (against the attacks on the university) was the reaction of the army. We sent our gratitude to them.”61 Despite this vocal cooperation, the junta was not happy about its need for an interpreter of its constitution, especially considering that the middleman it 																																																								58 During the final years of the DP, interviews and lectures of dissident professors appeared quite frequently in newspapers. “Ord. Prof. Sıddık Saminin Dünkü Enteresan Dersi”, Cumhuriyet, Nov. 28, 1957. “Hukuk Devleti Nazariyesi” Cumhuriyet, Dec 13, 1957 “Bir Profesörün İrtica ile İlgili Konuşması” Cumhuriyet Jan 28, 1960.  59 Orhan Erkanlı cited the articles that the coup plotters had agreed upon before the coup. The tenth article was the following; “Starting from fundamental institutions such as the armed forces, university, press, and state agencies, all institutions giving public services will be reorganized.” Orhan Erkanlı, Anılar... Sorunlar.... Sorumlular... (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1972), 15. 60 Yeşilyurt, Ercan. “Anayasayı Kim Yapar?”, Cumhuriyet, Sep. 29, 2013.  61 “Üniversite Açıldı, Dünkü Tarihî Miting”, Cumhuriyet, June 14, 1960. 		21	assigned to the job was attempting to become master of the whole campaign and limit the power of the junta to re-establish democratic rule.62 Consequently, academics had to pay the price for their nuanced cooperation with the NUC.  Fig. 1.2: Istanbul University Law Professors (from left) (İsmet Giritli, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Hüseyin Nail Kubalı, Sıddık Sami Onar, Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Naci Şensoy, Ragıp Sarıca). Preparing the New Constitution for the NUC.63 Professors İsmet Giritli and Tarık Zafer Tunaya were among the 147, Professor Sıddık Sami Onar later resigned to protest academic purges. 																																																								62 Major Orhan Erkanlı expressed this sentiment as the following: “Professors led us to a dead-end from day one (…) With the new law, the NUC limited its own power and established an odd version of a parliamentary government instead of a junta rule. We understood our mistake, but it was too late. This law had been the first (bitter) gift of our professors to us.”  Orhan Erkanlı, Anılar... Sorunlar.... Sorumlular... (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1972) pp. 22-23.   63  “Osmanlı'dan 15 Temmuz'a Türkiye'nin Darbeler Tarihi.” CNNTURK, July 13, 2017. https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/osmanlidan-15-temmuza-turkiyenin-darbeler-tarihi?page=1. 		22	 The Purge of 1960 While the NUC had the motivation to initiate an academic purge, the unfamiliarity of the army with the university hindered their attempts.64 Due to the complex and alien constitution of the academy, the military committee tasked with composing and confirming the dismissal list decided to collaborate with academics.65 At the time, universities were already dealing with serious clashes between academics, with letters of accusations flying around.66 The NUC presented a golden opportunity to younger academics, who believed that their chances in career advancement were stymied by senior colleagues. 67  In September, junior scholars published a report pushing for the flattening of the advantages that the older academics gained in recent years.68 Moreover, they wanted a sharp, swift, 																																																								64 During the 1960s, military officers were banned from attending universities. While a few of them were eager enough to break the law and registered anyway, the illegal nature of their studentship hindered them from properly working out the dynamics of the university. Orhan Erkanlı, Anılar... Sorunlar.... Sorumlular... (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1972) 44. 65 Some of the collaborators were chosen because of their personal ties with the military, while others had reached the junta themselves through letters to participate in the process. Emre Dölen. Türkiye üniversite Tarihi. Vol. 5. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010. p.191. 66 Academics of the time were well-acquainted with receiving and sending letters of complaint. These were letters accusing certain scholars of illegal actions such as espionage or Communist propaganda. Even when the accusations were glaringly unfounded, accused professors were still investigated and in some cases relieved from certain duties. Istanbul University Faculty of Letters Dean Ali Tanoğlu and the former Dean Şevket İpşiroğlu were removed from the dean’s office for such accusations. In short, the university was aware of the effectiveness of this method before the NUC rule. BCA, 30-1-0-0/90-562-10 (31.10.1952).    67 Aware of the increasing population of academic institutions, senior academics favored opening more universities to decrease the tensions. In 1956, Prof. Tevfik Remzi Kazancıgil published a booklet discussing the problem. He built his solution on the foundation of new universities away from the center; particularly on the eastern side of the country. Tevfik Remzi Kazancıgil. Üniversitelerimiz. (Istanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları 1956) 22-26. 68 The report demanded a ban on receiving additional jobs from outside of the university and opening a private practice. It also pressed for turning the ordinarius title into a solely symbolic one. “Üniversiteler Kanununun Değiştirilmesi İsteniyor”, Cumhuriyet, Sep. 2, 1960. All of these were perks the older academics commonly enjoyed. Younger scholars, on the other hand, frequently paid the bills for the additional jobs the professors were taking outside. In his complaint letter dated 1962, for instance, Assoc. Prof. Abdullah Kızılırmak wrote that, “70% of the academics in our faculty have additional jobs outside of the academy, it 		23	and just purge in the university immediately.69 Prior to the dismissals, a young academic with first-hand knowledge warned senior professors Sıddık Sami Onar and Naci Şensoy about the cooperation between the junta and younger academics. Onar and Şensoy refused to act on this information since they believed the junta, whom they previously helped, would not act without first consulting them.70   Taking advantage of this tactical mistake made by senior professors, others joined in and collaborated with the junta in an effort to get rid of those who were seen as particularly talentless or an academic powerhouses. 71  Taking advantage of the inexperience of the NUC, the academics, who were originally chosen to be mere helpers, began trying to direct the process.72 After a short struggle, more than 150 names were collected.73 147 of these were purged from higher education with a law issued on October 27, 1960.74  																																																								would be better if (the energy that was spent on this) can be transferred to the university.” BCA 30-1-0-0/ 91-570-6 (04.07.1962). Professors evasion form their duties was mostly due to structural problems. As the young population of the grew, increasing the number of new attendees of universities became a method to secure the popular vote. Without a linear improvement in human resources or proper infrastructural preparation, the issue resulted in the professors, who became overstrained, to neglect their duties and exploit their assistants to solve the problem. Weiker, Walter F., “Academic Freedom and Problems of Higher Education”, Middle East Journal 16, Summer 1962, 288-290. 69 Assoc. Prof. Sami Zan’s private letter to the NUC members quoted in Ümit Özdağ. Menderes Döneminde Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali (Istanbul: Boyut. 1997) 357. Unless stated otherwise, all italizations in the work belong to me. 70 Memduh Eren. 27-28 Nisan 1960 Gençlik Eylemi Işığında 27 Mayıs (Istanbul: Kardeşler Matbaası, 1996), 62.  71 Emre Dölen. Türkiye üniversite Tarihi. Vol. 5. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010. p.191. Mustafa Gündüz, “Akademiyi Anımsamak: Anılarda Üniversite Sorunları Ve Eleştiriler.” Yükseköğretim Ve Bilim Dergisi 3 (April 2013). p. 22, https://doi.org/10.5961/jhes.2013.055. 72 Orhan Erkanlı,  Anılar... Sorunlar.... Sorumlular... (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1972) 47. 73  Orhan Erkanlı wrote that the list held more than 147 names. After seeing some names he became accustomed to after the coup, he felt free to remove those. Orhan Erkanlı, Anılar... Sorunlar.... Sorumlular... (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1972) 46. 74 Üniversiteler Öğretim Üyelerinden Bazılarının Vazifelerinden Affına ve Bazılarının Diğer Fakülte ve Yüksek Okullara Nakline Dair Kanun. Kanun No. 114. Oct. 27, 1960. 		24	Senior academics who were used to have the upper hand reacted badly against their younger colleagues’ moves to change the status quo. The rector of Istanbul University, Sıddık Sami Onar, who was also the head of the commission that was tasked with the preparation of the new constitution, condemned the purges by claiming that he was against such things as a matter of principle, and resigned	.75 The rector’s protest did not last long. Although he had risen to the status of a hero during the student protests,76 Prof. Onar probably realized that his place might not be as secure as he had once hoped and the NUC would have no problem finding a replacement if necessary. Upon his return, the rector gave an interview during which he was asked about the undeserving academics that clung to the university. Dropping his previous attitude aside, Prof. Onar replied, “We will diagnose (the problem) and carry out an operation.”77 With this, the rector de-facto admitted that his protest against the purges had been caused not so much by the injustices, but by him excluded from controlling the process.78 Prof. Onar felt he was losing power, just like the other senior professors, and reacted against it. The junta did not particularly concerned about particular professors-senior or not-who ended up on the list. As the NUC member Orhan Erkanlı expressed in his memoir, “The NUC knew very few of the professors, what we knew about their scientific and moral 																																																								75 Realizing the high volume of reaction the purge drew, the NUC held a conference to discuss the issue with the academics, hoping that they could find grounds for a bargain that both sides could benefit from. Prof. Sıddık Sami Onar was invited to attend the talks but refused to be involved. Okan, Sezai. “Üniversitelerimiz”, Milliyet, June 1, 1989, in Tahir Hatiboğlu, Eylül Üniversitesi. Ankara: Selvi, 1990. 269.  76 “Gençlik: İnandılar, Öldüler” Kim, (May 30, 1960). 77 “Üniversitelerde Rektör Seçimi Yapıldı”, Cumhuriyet, Nov. 5, 1960. 78 The statements of the rector in the following years also support this opinion. Three years after the coup, Prof. Onar went as far as criticizing the intervention attempts that failed to be more militant. When talking about the challenges hindering democracy in Turkey, he argued, “Our failure stemmed from our inability in eliminating the old, degenerated establishments (…).“Prof. Onar Demokrasiyi Anlattı”, Cumhuriyet, May 26, 1963. 		25	qualities was based on hearsay. A three-month examination was carried out and some conclusions were drawn. In the end, the committee had to evaluate the information and results, which were (readily) presented to them.”79 While hastily prepared, the list was still enough to reach the two primary objectives of the junta: punishing academics for their display of power and showing the regime change in a public space so citizens would be aware of and responsive to it. The removals were put into action without further ado. The apathy of the NUC regarding the list and the selection principles behind it caused some serious problems later. Post factum, the media started questioning the criteria and the dynamics behind the list,80 to which the junta could not provide a convincing answer. When questioned about who exactly was displaced and why, the NUC listed traditional ideological enemies of the political establishment, as well as, some individuals accused of lacking professional ethics: “Communists, masons, Kurdish separatists, homosexuals, absentees, plagiarists…”81 With such a list of offenders, the junta wanted to assure the public that there were indeed criteria, definitions, and limits for the purges, and that they were looking for individual transgressors. But, instead of calming nerves, their answer created even more discomfort as it was found willfully vague.82 																																																								79 Erkanlı, Orhan. Anılar... Sorunlar.... Sorumlular... İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1972. 45. 80 Just after the purge, an article was published under a fake name that reflected surprise and anxiety regarding the purge, “I cannot find the starting point of the purge. I cannot predict why it is done. I cannot comprehend the purpose of the NUC, which I committed to walking this path together with a complete intellectual unity… (Where can we find the fault?) Is it science? There are worldwide scientists on the list. Is it age? There are people younger than forty. Is it conviction pure for the revolution? There are those who are actively involved in the revolution that led the youth and prepared a declaration of support. Is it published works? There are also those who have written books reaching to the ceiling.” “Üniversitede Fırtına”, Cumhuriyet, Oct. 31, 1960. 81 Said interview was given to a newspaper on Nov. 2, 1960. Dölen Emre. Türkiye üniversite Tarihi. Vol. 5. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010. 192. 82 “İleri, Geri ve Uyutmamak Üstüne”, Cumhuriyet, Nov. 13, 1960. 		26	Considering the number of the professores ordinarii that made it onto the list, the younger academics seemed to come out of the process partly victorious at this juncture.83 Some of the associate professors, who allegedly cooperated with the junta, such as Cihat Abaoğlu, even were promoted to professors during this period.84 However, the purged scholars were not willing to give up yet; one of them went on a search and, having finally seen the original document outlining the purge list, reported his findings to the public. According to this unnamed scholar; “This was a file missing half of its top cover. Three or four sheets of paper were spilling over the upper and lower sides of it. The names of the purged academics were listed one after another, short and false accusations (such as gossip or sycophant) were written next to them.”85 Students lost their patience in the face of this glaringly careless process and reacted by sending letters of complaint to the NUC.86 The NUC members visited the universities and tried to win over the students, who previously supported the junta and whose political agency gained momentum recently. Major İrfan 																																																								83 Purge list had 28 scholars who carried the ordinarius title. 22 of them gained their ordinarius title during the DP rule. BCA 30-11-1-0/231-15-3 (07.07.1952), BCA 30-11-1-0/232-18-10 (17.07.1952), BCA 30-11-1-0/236-2-19 (29.01.1953), BCA 30-11-1-0/266-25-38 (10.10.1957), BCA 30-11-1-0/252-26-3 (26.07.1955), BCA 30-11-1-0/232-18-11 (17.07.1952), BCA 30-11-1-0/231-12-15 (02.06.1952), BCA 30-11-1-0/254-43-1 (24.11.1955), BCA 30-11-1-0/265-23-5(11.09.1957), BCA 30-11-1-0/266-25-39 (10.10.1957), BCA 30-11-1-0/252-26-2 (26.07.1955), BCA 30-11-1-0/274-2-20 (28.01.1959), BCA 30-11-1-0/268-2-18 (13.01.1958), BCA 30-11-1-0/ 249-5-11 (24.02.1955), BCA 30-11-1-0/263-2-12 (26.01.1957), BCA 30-11-1-0/259-30-3 (18.06.1956), BCA 30-11-1-0/ 257-19-12 (14.03.1956). “Yeni  Ordinaryüs Profesörlerimiz: İhsan Ş. Aksel ve Fahri Arel”, Cumhuriyet, Jul. 27, 1952. Only Prof. Başgil, Prof. Göknil, and Prof. Birsen earned their ordinarius title before 1950. “Akademi Fikir Hareketleri”, Cumhuriyet, July 18, 1946. “Ankara Dün Geldi”, Cumhuriyet, Sep. 13, 1949. “Ord. Prof. Kemalettin Birsen Vefat Etti”, Cumhuriyet, Feb. 13, 1969. Prof. Kazancıgil, Prof. Güçhan and Prof. İncedayı were given the title during the last months of the RPP rule. BCA 30-11-1-0/212-7-7 (23.02.1950), BCA 30-11-1-0/212-8-16 (02.03.1950).   84 According to Memduh Eren, Cihat Abaoğlu was complicit in the 1960 purge.  Memduh Eren. 27-28 Nisan 1960 Gençlik Eylemi Işığında 27 Mayıs (Istanbul: Kardeşler Matbaası, 1996), 62.  BCA 30-11-1-0/286-18-6 (10.07.1961). 85 “Yurtta Olup Bitenler: Müşküllerin Kaynağı”, Akis, Vol. 337, Dec. 12, 1960. 15.  86 Both Istanbul and Ankara University Student Confederations wrote and mass signed these letters. 147’ler? (Istanbul: Kervan Matbaası, 1961), 15. İsmail Selçuk Erez, 147’ler Meselesinin İç Yüzü... (Istanbul: Sıralar Matbaası, 1961), 7. 		27	Solmazer, for instance, met with students and had a tragicomic conversation with them, during which he argued, “There might be some inaccuracies with these 147 academics. However, the important thing in military service is to hit the mark nine out of ten times.” When the students criticized Solmazer, the Major claimed that the professors they were defending were traitors.”87 The result of these theatrics was a growing distrust between the students and the junta.  It was not possible for the NUC to come clean by admitting the chaotic dynamics behind the process, in part, because the junta itself was under an illusion regarding its own operations. Leading up to the coup, there was an understanding among the conspirators regarding the need for restructuring state organizations; however, the methods to achieve this goal were not clear.88 When asked about his solution to the problems with education, a junta member, Major Orhan Erkanlı, said: “The matter of education is not a ministerial problem, it is a national one. The priority should be given to national education.”89 This vague reply was an example of the NUC’s awareness of the shortcomings of the old system.90 However, formulating solutions was an intricate job they were unable to manage and, correspondingly, they resorted to offering stereotypical statements with vague and idealistic promises of recovery. The contrast between grand intentions and rushed measures led to some serious criticisms against the junta, which extracted some compromises and confessions from the 																																																								87 147’ler? (Istanbul: Kervan Matbaası, 1961), 16-17. 88 Major Orhan Erkanlı confessed that the group did not prepare detailed plans for the future system that they were trying to establish. The only mental map they possessed was comprised of the few articles they agreed upon beforehand. Orhan Erkanlı, Anılar... Sorunlar.... Sorumlular... (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1972), 16.  89 “Binbaşı Orhan Erkanlı ile Görüşme”, Cumhuriyet, July 20, 1960 90 When asked, the NUC member Major Muzaffer Karahan listed the problems at once for the press. As for the solutions, he added reform in every article he listed; land reform, educational reform, tax reform, etc., “Binbaşı Muzaffer Karan’la Görüşme”, Cumhuriyet, Aug. 5, 1960. 		28	NUC. A month after the purge, President Cemal Gürsel admitted that, “The NUC acted upon the information presented to them. Criticisms regarding the list showed that there might be some mistakes in the information previously received. The NUC believes that correcting a mistake is a virtue.”91 President Gürsel’s half-hearted offer indicated that the junta did not condemn the overall action. Although the absurdity of the list was becoming painfully obvious, the NUC was still insisted on the efficacy and necessity of the purge. Under pressure, it was also willing to reinstate some of the academics. While the bold notions of the pre-coup days continued to define the NUC’s mental framework, justifications for the purge did not come from a naïve desire to stick with the romantic conceptions of earlier days. The NUC already relied on experts to build a complex political design. Still, the radical discourse continued to provide support for the extreme steps they took. The result was a grotesque hybrid of elegant theories92 with rushed actions. Throughout it all, academics remained in the middle of it, assuming they would come through without being greatly affected. In the hope that they could redirect the country’s course, the scholars took on the duty of systematizing the junta’s amorphous goals. This meant a dangerous saturation of the narratives, where the academics fell prey to destructive junta rhetoric. Meanwhile, the purge created enough discord to enter into parliamentary debates.93 The members of the 																																																								91 “Üniversitelerden Tasfiye Edilecek Üyeler”, Cumhuriyet, Nov. 2, 1960. 92 Accordingly, the new constitution that brought “explicit guarantees of freedom of thought, expression, association, and publication, as well as other democratic liberties” was born into a political atmosphere, where the junta rule and its implications were still in operation. Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975 (London: C.Hurst & Company, 1977), 186.   93 Bülent Ecevit brought up the subject by stating that, “The Minister seems to regret that the matter (of the purge) has not been closed yet. He should be happy about this. If 147 professors would be sent away in Turkey without showing a reason and the case closed and forgotten, then we would have the reason to be crestfallen. This matter should not be forgotten, it needs to be solved.” T.C. Kurucu Meclis Tutanak Dergisi (Fifth Session) Feb. 24, 1961.  260. 		29	Constituent Assembly of Turkey, who were appointed by the NUC, tackled the issue. During the talks, Prof. Muammer Aksoy claimed:  The root of the problems lies in the national education. No political power (that will be elected) in the future can solve this. If this revolution is not just a coup, it surely had to enforce some practices of purging. If the old government is illegitimate, if some institutions are destroyed and damaged, the purge, of course, will visit the courthouse and the university.  However, (some) decisions taken at the time of the revolution might also be wrong (…). Lawmakers of our time, should not go down in history as people who have undermined the autonomy of the university.94  The goal of Prof. Aksoy’s speech was simple; to show solidarity with the NUC by confirming the validity of an already executed purge and to solicit the autonomy of the university that was still on the horizon. A similar rhetoric was used by others, too. Journalist Nadir Nadi, for instance, wrote:  There is no doubt that the new university law is much better than the old one. Under the light of this law, we can expect that science production in this country will gain a dynamic and creative quality. Those who issued the law were right and proved that they miss scientific freedom wholeheartedly. Along with such a law that would bring fresh air to our universities, a purge of the academics is unsurprising.95  Curiously, neither Aksoy nor Nadi considered their compromise (permitting the forceful removal of academics in order to achieve the autonomous university) paradoxical. 96 																																																								94 “147’ler Meselesi”, Cumhuriyet, Feb. 25, 1961 95 “Doğru ve Yerinde Bir Karar”, Cumhuriyet, Nov. 2, 1960. 96 The paradoxical state of affairs was obvious for some. A student interviewer asked the professors whether the academic autonomy would still be possible after the purge. 8 out of 13 academics expressed that the autonomy was destroyed or damaged. 147’ler? (Istanbul: Kervan Matbaası, 1961), 18-23. 		30	Through discussions regarding the ideal purge that took place in the same period,97 these purge practices became validated. As the Chief Inspector of the Ministry of Education, Osman Horasanlı, expressed in his praise of the purge of 1933, a flawless removal was only a matter of careful operation, and needed to be free from the negative influences of certain people.98    The Gift of the Purge The NUC trusted that the collaborating academics would be prudent enough to provide only the names of those who were ‘obviously’ guilty.99 The collaborating scholars, on the other hand, acted boldly and eliminated whomever they regarded as rivals. The clumsiness of the process prompted NUC efforts to mend the list instead of a principled rejection. Envisioning the successful purge, the press, academics, and statesmen thoroughly validated the process. The fact that the 1960 purge was ultimately incomplete, and the academics returned to their posts, was not important compared to the experience gained from this experiment. The junta learned that they could find support for an attack on universities. Their collaborators, on the other hand, removed the people they desired from the academy for three years and came out of it unscathed. The main result of 1960 																																																								97 “Normale Doğru”, Cumhuriyet, Nov. 18, 1960. 98 “In this reform (1933) hundreds of professors were forced to leave the chairs they had occupied for at least 20 years, and neither the professors nor the press or intellectuals raised an overt objection. What was the reason for this? These unfortunate professors, who were many, were silent in the face of their fate because the operation was accurate and without a single flaw…Looking at the (contemporary) list that was enacted by the NUC, it is necessary to admit that suggestions coming from the university circles played a role in this. Yet, noone can doubt the goodwill of the NUC and their sincere wish to establish an autonomous university.” Osman Horasanlı. “M. Birlik Komitesi ve Üniversite”, Cumhuriyet, Nov. 6, 1960. 99 Major Orhan Erkanlı expressed this sentiment plainly; “We enacted purge at full speed since the subject was beyond our expertise and we fully believed in the scholars who helped us. (…) Our advisors deceived us. (…) Some professors removed invaluable scholars to become rector, dean, or faculty chair and made us do it.” Orhan Erkanlı, Anılar... Sorunlar.... Sorumlular... (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1972), 44, 47.  		31	was that the purge became broadly accepted practice; the only remaining question was to find out who would have the dexterity to use this crude but already legitimized tool. This was the destructive knowledge inherited by the universities of the 1980s.                     		32	The second part takes this story to the 1980s. This chapter will first briefly visit the 1970s and the ‘silent’ purge of 1971. Then, it will focus on the 1980s and examine the reasons behind the junta’s decision for an academic purge. It will discuss how the academics took over the process and why the junta agreed to it. This study will conclude with a brief overview of the state of the university that weathered the purges, and the development of peculiar and persistent problems in the aftermath.                    		33	Chapter 2: The 1980s, When It Was Not Ended  The list of things that academics would be punished for was so long that it covered 13 pages in the smallest font (…) and was driving me into a terrible rage.  Gencay Gürsoy. Bir Resimaltı100  The Days of Anarchy, and Just Another Coup The dismantling of the Democrat Party after the coup of 1960 was followed by the founding of the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) (JP).101  With its populist approach, conservative politics, and economic liberalism, the JP inherited the DP’s supporters and gained the majority of the votes in 1965.102 However, despite its mass support, the JP could not enjoy stable ground due to the strained atmosphere of the 1960s. Rising inflation and unemployment were grave enough matters already. When combined with the Cyprus crisis,103 which triggered Turkey’s long-standing fears of isolation, the will for radical change and calls to save the country by patriotic and decisive action came to the fore once again. In addition, May ‘68 arrived in Turkey. Universities and student intellectuals were 																																																								100 Gencay Gürsoy. Bir Resimaltı (Broy Yayınları, 1991), pp. 70, 72.  101 Turkey has a long history with party closures, which made the country the graveyard of political parties. Two main justifications for the closures were the violation of secularism (by Islamists) and violation of national unity (by Kurdish left). Ödül Calep, “The Political Causes of Party Closures in Turkey”, Parliamentary Affairs 67, March 2012. Accessed Oct 15, 2020.  102 Former supporters of the DP joined the JP, which promoted the connection between the two. Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975 (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977), p. 234. 103 After the British rule of Cyprus ended in 1960, the tensions between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities grew. Once the conflict between the two communities turned violent, Turkey wanted to intervene, which was refused by the international community. Feroz Ahmad, Modern Türkiye’nin Oluşumu (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999), pp. 167-168. 		34	leading a movement that located the roots of the country’s problems in a class-based society and promised to solve the problem with a revolution.104  In the first weeks of June 1968, students occupied various faculties of Ankara University. 105  Student protests immediately spread to other universities. 106  The RPP encouraged the JP to instigate university reform in order to suppress the events.107 In order to quell the protests, university senates accepted some student demands, but important issues such as the abolition of hierarchy among professors and the ban on academic staff work outside the university were postponed.108 In other words, some of the demands of the students were found acceptable while the requests of the young academics were rejected. Upon this development, assistant professors started a long-lasting resistance movement. Young academics implored the Istanbul University senate, which mostly consisted of senior professors, to make these necessary changes.109 However, the senate postponed the matter as long as it could, leading to more student protests and resignations from the university.110 Having not yet responded to the universities’ desire for change, on June 5, 1969 the JP government finally declared that it was working on an entirely new university reform.111 Following this statement from the government, student protests intensified. On 																																																								104 Ömer Laçiner, “Bir Aydınlanma ve Aydın Hareketi Olarak ‘68”, Birikim 109, May 1998. Accessed Sep. 25, 2020.  105 “Öğrenci Hareketleri Genişliyor: Hukuk Fakültesi de İşgal Edildi”, Cumhuriyet, June 12, 1968.  106 “Teknik Üniversite de İşgal Edildi”, Cumhuriyet, June 18, 1968.  107 “Öktem: Üniversiteden Reformcu Hamleler Bekliyoruz Dedi”, Cumhuriyet, June 14, 1968.  108  “Öğrencilerin Bir Çok İsteği Kabul Ediliyor”, Cumhuriyet, June 18, 1968. For young academics (especially in the medical school), the freedom to work outside meant that their senior colleagues could work in their private practices while assigning their university responsibilities to those who were lower in the hierarchy.  109 “Öğretim Üyeleri Reform İsteğine Eğilmeyen Üniversite Senatosunu Uyardı”, Cumhuriyet, Nov. 22, 1968. 110 “Üniversite Süresiz Kapatıldı”, Cumhuriyet, Dec. 27, 1968. 111 “Milli Eğitim Bakanı Ertem’in Demeci: Yeni Bir Üniversite Kuracağız”, Cumhuriyet, June 5, 1969.  		35	June 11, nearly a hundred students and a dozen police officers were injured in the clashes.112 This was the beginning of a particularly turbulent era for the country that resulted in the March 12, 1971 Turkish military memorandum.  Citing the growing anarchy and social and economic unrest, the army once again intervened in politics and forced the prime minister from the JP to resign.113 Despite the uncertain political climate, young academics were still determined to solve their own problems. Two weeks after the memorandum, the union of university assistants issued a statement declaring that they would support a university reform if their demands for a fully autonomous university and their rights to participate in its administration were met.114 In the meantime, student protests were continued. The new government, founded with the approval of the army responded to these developments with mass arrests of university students and academics.115 Senior professors, such as Mümtaz Soysal, Muammer Aksoy, Bahri Savcı, and Sadun Aren, were arrested on charges such as propagating communism and Kurdishism.116  Meanwhile, young, reformist academics were dismissed from the university in small numbers until 1975.117  Military intervention did not help to solve the problems that had created the chaotic atmosphere in the country. On the contrary, mass arrests, censorship, and repression obstructed the channels of dialogue and increased political tension. These developments 																																																								112 “Üniversite’de Savaş: 14 Polis, 100’e Yakın Öğrenci Yaralandı”, Cumhuriyet, June 11, 1969. 113 Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975 (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977), pp. 288-289. 114 “Asistanlar Sendikası Hükümetin Reformcu Olduğu Konusunda Kuşkulu”, Cumhuriyet, Mar. 28, 1971.  115 “Erim: Yasalar Dışında İşleme Müsaade Edemeyiz”, Cumhuriyet, May 27, 1971.  116  “Profesör Muammer Aksoy Tutuklandı”, Cumhuriyet, July 27, 1971. “Askerî Mahkeme Soysal Hakkındaki Kararında Israr Etti”, Cumhuriyet, April 27, 1972. “TİP Yöneticileri Hakkında Dava Açıldı” Cumhuriyet, April 17, 1971. 117 Uğur Mumcu, “Özerklik Adına” Cumhuriyet, Aug. 2, 1975. 		36	ratcheted up hostilities between the political camps that were divided between right and left factions.118 While acts of terrorism became frequent, the country took a grave and final wound from the Taksim Square Massacre. On May 1, 1977, unidentified individuals fired into the crowd that was celebrating Labor Day. Due to the attack and the panic it caused, 34 people died and over 100 people were injured. 119  The state was regarded as the perpetrator by the public, which eroded the little remaining trust that citizens had in state organizations. 120  Soon enough, the chaotic atmosphere resulted in further military intervention. On September 12, 1980, the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi) (NSC) announced a coup d’etat, and under the command of General Kenan Evren, junta rule in the country began.  In the Eyes of the Junta: Students, Professors, and the University The coup leader, Kenan Evren, seems to have felt obliged to fabricate a source of legitimacy for his rule other than brute force. Accordingly, in his memoirs, support of the crowd and the opinion of the majority appear as key factors in determining validity. The first sentence of the radio message Evren sent to the army after the coup reflects this sentiment. Evren stated that the army seized control of the country doing just what “the vast majority of the nation expected with hope and longing”.121 However, the same claim did not appear in the NSC’s long radio message announcing the coup d’etat to the public,122 showing that the junta were aware they did not have the unconditional support of the public. 																																																								118 Feroz Ahmad, Modern Türkiye’nin Oluşumu, (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999) 180-181. 119 Çalışlar, İpek and Kızıldemir, Güldal. “1 Mayıs 1977: Kanlı Bayram” Bianet, May 06, 2012. 120 Feroz Ahmad, Modern Türkiye’nin Oluşumu, (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999), 201. 121 Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anıları, Vol.1 (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 548. 122 Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anıları Vol.1 (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 546-547. 		37	At some point, Evren acknowledged the existence of dissenters, “who asserted that Turkey’s issues could be solved within the democratic system”. After considering the issue, Evren employed his usual rationale that “the majority of the nation did not agree with these dissenting views.”123 The same train of thought is woven throughout Evren’s book.124 He used the same reasoning when he contemplated his decision to shut down the newspaper Cumhuriyet: “Some might think that I was wrong about closing the newspaper. After all, despite all (human) brains being identical in their outward constitution, they still differ inwardly. Even so, what matters is what the majority thinks.”125  With its relatively insignificant student population,126 when the yearly entrants were around 40 thousand in a country of almost 45 million,127 Turkey’s universities in the 1980s did not seem to fit Evren’s concerns with maintaining majority support. Nevertheless, Evren still found the universities significant enough to mention them frequently. Exploring Evren’s own writings might provide a clue about the underlying reason for his interest in academia. In Evren’s writings, university students seem to be grouped with the workers. Often, one shows up only to be followed by the other. For instance, when Evren mentioned the upheaval before the coup, he wrote:  																																																								123 Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anıları Vol.2 (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları. 1990), 176. 124 Kenan Evren. Kenan Evren’in Anıları (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), see 459, 504, 529 in Vol.1 and 66, 120, 154, 176 in Vol.2. 125 Kenan Evren. Kenan Evren’in Anıları, vol.2 (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 147. 126 For instance, in 1980, France’s population was around 53 million, while the total number of students was more than a million. “Composantes de la croissance demographique, France metropolitane, 1980” Institut national de la statistique et des etudes economiques. Accessed June 13, 2020. https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/1892117?sommaire=1912926, Statista. Accessed June 13, 2020. https://www.statista.com/statistics/779600/number-of-higher-education-students-schools-france/  Germany follows a similar trend in 1980 with a 60 million population to more than 1 million university students. https://www.daad.de/medien/der-daad/analysen-studien/daad-kommentierte_grafiken_2016.pdf  127 Gözler, Kemal. “Üniversitelerde Öğrenci Fazlalığı”, Cumhuriyet, Oct. 10, 1989. 2.  		38	Anarchists and terrorists, university students and workers stirred up trouble in these cities every day by killing people, abducting a consul, robbing banks, holding public demonstrations. The head of the government goaded protesting miners by scorning them, the opposition parties encouraged workers and students to occupy and boycott.128 Similar statements linking the universities with factories pop up throughout Evren’s memoirs.129 This association between university students and workers was a direct result of the solidarity between the two groups during the 1968 protests.130 Evren was reflecting on old fears regarding a potential social upheaval produced by cooperation between them.131  Consequently, although modest in numbers, students were still deemed important since the NSC saw them as a dynamic part of the country pushing for political change. As for the universities, they were considered a breeding ground for disorder due to their autonomy. The professors, whose numbers were even more modest compared to the 																																																								128 Kenan Evren. Kenan Evren’in Anıları, Vol. 1 (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 149. 129 Kenan Evren. Kenan Evren’in Anıları, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), see 170, 218, 280 in Vol. 1. and 40, 75, 402 in Vol. 2.  130 When workers started protesting against the syndicate policies of a rubber factory, the university students, who were already carrying out their own demonstrations pressing for university reform, immediately joined the protests. This was the first one of a chain of protests that continued into the 1980s. Gökhan Atılgan, Behice Boran: Öğretim Üyesi, Siyasetçi, Kuramcı (İstanbul: Yordam, 2007), 196. Ege University students, for instance, joined the protests against TARİŞ (Union of Agricultural Cooperatives) that occurred in January 1980. Students supported the workers, who were boycotting mass layoffs, by deserting their classes altogether. Ertuğrul Mavioğlu, Asılmayıp Beslenenler (İstanbul: Sel, 2019), 238. Consequentially, Ege University became one of the places that suffered most from the 1980 purge.  131 Uneasiness of the army regarding the cooperation between the students and the workers was not new. A year before the coup, the martial law commander who was responsible for Istanbul suggested regulation of the syndicate activities of the university students. Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anıları, Vol. 1 (Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 323. 		39	students,132 found their place in this equation primarily because of their link with the students. Evren’s few words directly addressing professors did not focus on any individuals. Instead, he frequently mentioned them as a group,133 which he labeled as either useless because of their inefficacy or as having a negative influence over students.134 Academics were depicted as incompetent or malicious guardians rather than daring intellectuals.  Evren’s attention dwelt on the administrative problems rather than the controversial ideas of scholars. This was a deviation from practices in 1948, for instance, when academics had been punished for their opinions.135 Ignoring their identities and opinions, Evren simply placed the responsibility of professors within broken hierarchical systems:  Unfortunately, despite the growing incidents in the universities, some of the rectors insisted on not letting the security forces inside the campus. They were referring to the constitution to defend the fact that security forces could not enter the university ground without the rectorate’s permission. This problematic approach escalated the incidents to a point where those thugs (students) gained the power to force professors out of classrooms.136 																																																								132 In 1981, the total number of academics was around 21 thousand. “409 Bin Öğretmen, 62 Bin Öğretim Görevlisi Var”, Cumhuriyet, Feb. 02, 1981.  133 The only professor Evren mentioned by name was Prof. Cavit Orhan Tütengil, who was killed in a terrorist act in pre-coup days. Beyond being a reminder of the old, chaotic days, Prof. Tütengil’s name was not mentioned in any other context. Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anıları Vol.1 (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990) 328 and Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anıları Vol.2 (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 157. 134 Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anıları, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları. 1990) 150 in vol.1 and 37 in vol.2. 135 In 1945, Professors Behice Boran, Pertev Naili Boratav, Niyazi Berkes and Mediha Esenel were purged for the pretext of writing articles for a controversial journal, and Muzaffer Şerif Başoğlu was arrested soon after. When the court repealed the purge, the parliament decided to remove the cadres of the said people altogether and closed the department of folklore studies. Uğur Mumcu, 40'ların Cadı Kazanı (Ankara: um:ag, 2018), 88-93. 136 Kenan Evren. Kenan Evren’in Anıları, Vol.1 (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 141-142.   		40	Evren’s focus here was deliberately on the question of authority, which was more easily and visibly controllable than regulating opinions.  In the vocabulary of the NSC, autonomy was synonymous with anarchy.137 The NSC believed that autonomy created irregularities, which in turn aggravated the challenge of controlling universities externally. To solve the issue of autonomy, the NSC instituted a regulatory system in 1981, which would be known as the Council of Higher Education (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu) (CoHE). In a meeting held for the new members of the CoHE, Evren adapted his usual lines on the validating power of the majority to the question of autonomy, and delivered the following lines:  We (the NSC) have not said anything against the scientific autonomy of the universities. However, you need to take into consideration that there are no state institutions that can regulate or govern the issues related to the 19 universities that use a budget equal to 7 or 8 ministries (…). Imagine a president that is chosen by the vote of the whole nation or by the deputies of that nation. Despite that, you do not rely on he who occupies an office representing 45 million. You insist on trusting this decision with the university itself. I wholeheartedly believe that the CoHE will erase these kinds of propaganda with the work it will conduct. And I believe that this will be for the benefit of both the nation and the universities.138  																																																								137 Four days after the coup, Evren gave a public talk which was attended by the members of the NSC and followed by the press. In his speech, Evren underlined that; “Anarchy will not be allowed to spread neither in schools nor in universities or unions under the name of freedom and independence.” Kenan Evren. Kenan Evren’in Anıları, Vol. 2 (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 40. 138 Kenan Evren. Kenan Evren’in Anıları, Vol. 2 (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 486. 		41	Just as the NSC hoped, the foundation of the CoHE leveled the differences between university policies by removing institutional autonomy.139  The CoHE was a major step in controlling universities, but it was not the only one. The NSC was aware of the fact that universities were both political and performative spaces that had influence over the country. Accordingly, Evren stated that the incidents that took place in the universities were echoing throughout the country.140 The NSC was also aware that while the visibility of the universities could work to their disadvantage, as had happened when the students used it to spread their message during the 1968 student boycotts,141 it could also work to their gain. In a speech he gave at the university, Evren expressed his discomfort about the counter-use of the universities by claiming that the universities were the arsonists that triggered terror and anarchy.142 He also indicated that the NSC could not afford to leave this space unattended. Universities were low-cost spaces that the junta did not have to spend much energy to occupy. Furthermore, they were visible enough to show the public who held the power. The NSC was aware that the time for enforcing and establishing their rule was limited since in addition to anti-coup civilians, there was also the possibility of other factions in the army overriding the coup.143 Consequently, the junta began using the universities to broadcast 																																																								139  While the CoHE introduced itself as a medium for the coordination between the universities, the professors saw themselves under constant surveillance. A decade after the coup, for instance, a couple of professors gathered together to discuss the problems of academia in Ankara. The fear of being watched by the CoHE was the main topic of discussion among the few academics who attended the meeting. Tahir Hatiboğlu. Doğranan Üniversite (Ankara: Selvi Yayınları, 1994), 24.  140 Kenan Evren. Kenan Evren’in Anıları, Vol.1 (İstanbul Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 281. 141 Zafer Toprak, “1968-1969 İstanbul Üniversitesi Boykot ve İşgalleri”, Toplumsal Tarih No:293, May 2018. 72-82. 142 Yalçın Doğan, “Evren: ABD Kongresi Bize Karşı”, Cumhuriyet, Oct. 2, 1984.  143 While Evren sneered at the possiblity of another group taking control of the army, he still was unsettled regarding the gossip about it. Kenan Evren. Kenan Evren’in Anıları, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 548 in Vol.1 and 28, 83 in Vol. 2. The NSC was aware of the past conflict between the young officers and the 		42	their messages immediately after the coup. Two months after the coup, the NSC members visited several universities to attend the ceremonies held for the anniversary of the passing of Kemal Atatürk.144 The junta members continued to appear in universities to show the public that the university was now their domain. They gave public announcements in universities or observed the intellectual productions that the university was putting forward, which were consistent with the ideology of the NSC. 145  The spaces and organizations that students used for their own political production and activities such as student representatives were banned.146 Instead, the NSC entrusted this remaining space to professors, whose activities were more easily monitored and who seemed to be vying for favors from the NSC. When Istanbul University awarded Kenan Evren an honorary doctorate, rectors from all 27 universities attended the ceremony. During the event, Evren declined the honorary doctorates that were offered by other universities, stating that one was enough.147  Despite all the efforts by universities, pleasing the NSC proved to be a difficult job. Attending ceremonies or stating approval of the coup was not enough. The NSC expected full cooperation and submission from the professors. In 1981, Karadeniz Technical University Rector Erdem Aksoy presented a report to Kenan Evren that defended the 																																																								higher-ranking ones, which had seen its height a few years back, during the 1971 military memorandum. Cengiz Sunay, Türk Siyasetinde Sivil-Asker İlişkileri: 27 Mayıs-12 Mart-12 Eylül ve Sonrası (Ankara: Orion Kitabevi, 2010), 164.  144 “Ata’yı Andık”, Cumhuriyet, Nov. 11, 1980.  145 Müşerref Hekimoğlu, “Evrensel Bir Öykü ve Yorumlar”, Cumhuriyet, July 23, 1981.   146  Berkay Orhaner. “Türkiye Üniversitelerinde Öğrenci Temsiliyetinin Durumu ve Geleceği” Birikim. March 22, 2008. Accessed June 16, 2020. 147 In 2011, a previous dean of the faculty of law admitted that the honorary doctorate was granted with the expectation of funding. Ocak, Serkan. “Cübbeyi Para İçin Verdik”, Radikal, Oct. 8, 2011. Accessed June 19, 2020. Cumhuriyet wrote that while Istanbul University orchestrated the event, all universities agreed on giving the honorary doctorate to Evren. “Cumhurbaşkanı Evren’e Bugün Fahri Üniversite Profesörlüğü Ünvanı Verilecek”, Cumhuriyet, Jan. 14, 1983. 		43	autonomy of universities. He suggested a two-step process for assigning rectors and deans. The first step was an internal election, followed by the approval of the head of the state. While Aksoy stated that all universities approved and celebrated the coup and left the final decision for managing the university to the state, two years later he was removed from the university.148  Fig. 2.1: Istanbul University, Faculty of Law presents an honorary doctorate to Kenan Evren (from left) (CoHE President Prof. İhsan Doğramacı, Kenan Evren, and Istanbul University Rector Mehmet Cem’i Demiroğlu)149  (02.12.1982)150  																																																								148 Ömer Güner, “Evren’e Rapor: Rektör ve Dekanlar Öğretim Üyelerince Seçilmeli”, Cumhuriyet, July 26, 1981.     149  Serkan Ocak, “Evren’den O Cüppeyi Geri Alın!” Radikal, Oct. 6, 2011. Accessed June 19, 2020, http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/evrenden-o-cuppeyi-geri-alin-1065466/ 150  Istanbul University. List of Honorary Doctorates. Accessed June 19, 2020,  https://ogrenci.istanbul.edu.tr/tr/content/fahri-doktora/fahri-doktora 		44	 Inflating the Numbers Before the Purge Once the dust settled and the NSC was sure of its power, it focused on minimizing the influence of universities.151 To achieve this, the NSC followed a seemingly paradoxical method. Under Evren’s rule, Turkey added eight new universities to its inventory, bringing the total number of universities to 27. 152  The number of both the academics 153  and university students154 also increased. However, inflating the number of academics a few years before a purge was not a new practice; the three decades of Stalin’s academic purges followed a similar formula.155 The NSC were keenly aware of the mistakes of the 1960 purge, which had left important academic vacancies unfulfilled and the 1960 junta vulnerable, ultimately causing the return of the professors.156 By expanding the overall numbers, the NSC was avoiding the grave mistake of leaving vacant spots in the 																																																								151 The NSC was interested in a full university reform from the start. The public signal of the change came three weeks after the coup when Professor Altan Günal declared the need for a ‘radical reform’ in the university. Regardless, the NSC bid its time before undertaking such a task. “Üniversitelerarası Kurul Başkanı Prof. Altan Günalp: Eğitim Sisteminde Yurt İhtiyaçlarına Dönük Köklü Reformlara Gerek Var”, Cumhuriyet, Oct. 06, 1980. 152 Durmuş Günay and Aslı Günay. “1933’ten Günümüze Türk Yükseköğretiminde Niceliksel Gelişmeler”. Accessed June 15, 2020. Journal of Higher Education and Science, Vol. 1, No. 1, http://higheredu-sci.beun.edu.tr/text.php3?id=1517. 153  The total number of academics was around 11,000 in 1974, “785 Bin Çocuk Okuldan Yoksun”, Cumhuriyet, June 25, 1974. The number reached 21,000 in 1981. In 1984, the number of academics did not show a striking drop and remained around 20,000, even after the purge, mass resignations, and forced retirements occurred at the time. “Eğitim Elemanı Sayısı Raporu 1984”, https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/. Accessed June 26, 2020.  154 In 1983, the number of newly admitted students skyrocketed to 110,000. This was almost three times more than the numbers of 1980. Kemal Gözler, “Üniversitelerde Öğrenci Fazlalığı”, Cumhuriyet, Oct. 10, 1989. Meanwhile, the number of university students in total reached more than 300,000. “Öğrenci İstatistikleri, 1983-1984” Yükseköğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi. Accessed June 13, 2020. https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/.  155 Richard Beyler, Alexei Kojevnikov, and Jessica Wang. “Purges in Comparative Perspective: Rules for Exclusion and Inclusion in the Scientific Community under Political Pressure”, Osiris 20 (2005), 31, 32. 156 Evren believed that the fiasco of the previous purge was caused by the overwhelming reactions from the press. Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anıları, Vol.1 (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 126. 		45	universities after a purge and the risk of possible accusations of ineptitude later. Moreover, the expansion was used to cover up the assault on particular faculties. While some faculties thrived under Evren’s rule, others were significantly cut. Ankara University’s Faculty of Law, for instance, recognizably shrank between 1981 and 1989.157  Overall statistics, however, still showed aggressive academic growth rather than obvious reduction.158  The expansion of the university was also an efficient way of transforming it. The NSC filled universities with young academics not only to fill the vacant spots but also to disrupt traditional dynamics and break the already weakening solidarity among the academics. To implement the premature rise of the young academics, the CoHE rewrote the rules and invented a title that would allow assistants to give lectures.159 Since neither the NSC nor the CoHE trusted the gratitude they would receive from young academics, they simply subjected the new title to constant renewal. The precarious nature of the position therefore encouraged cooperation and subordination. The individuals, who earned their places with this arrangement not only suffered from job insecurity but also from the suspicion of the old cadre, who found the subordination of the younger generation 																																																								157 Ankara University’s Faculty of Law was known for its dissenting scholars. Unsurprisingly it frequently became target of the purges. In 1981, the total number of professors and instructors in the faculty was 45. The year 1989 saw the number drop to 37. Similarly, the number of research assistants was 22 in 1981 and only 11 by 1989. Kemal Gözler. “Üniversitelerde Öğrenci Fazlalığı”, Cumhuriyet, Oct. 10, 1989. 158 While Turkey’s aspirations for joining the European Union were historically turbulent, becoming a part of the EU remained on the agenda for a long time. When Turkey’s relations with the EU were suspended after the coup, the NSC was left figuring out a solution for this setback. Opening new universities was low-hanging fruit; it was a way of displaying progress while the strict control of the NSC stayed intact. Accordingly, the NSC tried to benefit from the ensuing domestic and international publicity. 159 Law No. 2547 introduced the assistant professor title in 1981. Hatipoğlu, Tahir. “Yardımcı Doçentlik”, Cumhuriyet, 30.12.2017. Before 1981, the assistants also had a temporal place in the university, but their duties were especially limited with trivial things, and they were accepted as daily helpers. The new law issued enabled the assistants, who had gained their doctorates but did not qualify for the associate professor title yet, to give lectures. Emre Dölen, Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi, Vol. 5 (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları), 30. 		46	dangerous and pitiful.160 In addition to these tensions, the rapid advancement of young academics also caused further disputes as it overrode traditional hierarchies. The split between the old and young caused a long-standing conflict within the university and undermined active solidarity.   The Purge of 1983 The purge of 1983 occurred shortly after the foundation of the new universities. The law that enabled the purges161 vaguely defined who would be sent away, which resulted in the removal of almost 5,000 civil servants.162 Thanks to the NSC’s insistence on keeping up appearances, academics constituted only a small percentage of this massive removal.163 The critical damage to universities came from the expulsion of 18,000 students within one year,164 and from the resignations of academics, which pushed the number of scholars that were driven away from the university from 80 to more than 1,000.165  																																																								160  Tahir Hatiboğlu, Yaşanan Üniversite ve Sorunları (Ankara: TÜMOD, 1998), 54. Haldun Özen, Entelektüelin Dramı: 12 Eylül Cadı Kazanı (Ankara: Imge, 2002), 226. 161 Law No. 1402, Article 2 stated that, “Formal requests of military commanders in charge of the martial law, for reappointment of civil servants, whose services are deemed to be unfit or futile in their locations due to general security, public peace and order concerns, to a position out of the martial law zone or of dismissal for reappointment thereof, shall be promptly executed by the relevant institutions and agencies.” The same law also indefinitely banned civil servants from taking any other job in the public sector.   162 Çelik, Aziz. “1402’likler, tasfiyeler ve ILO normları”, Birgün, Sept. 30, 2016. 163 Different sources mention different numbers regarding purged academics but the commonly cited number was less than 80. The difference in numbers is especially present between the sources published before and after 1983. For instance, in 1983, Cumhuriyet (newspaper) wrote that the number of purged scholars had reached 148. “12 Eylül 1980 – 7 Aralık 1983”, Cumhuriyet, Dec. 12, 1983. Professor Oya Köymen, who was among the purged academics, used a list published in a magazine in 1984 and stated that the total number of the removed academics was more than a thousand. Only 75 scholars were officially purged. Oya Köymen, Kapitalizm ve Köylülük: Ağalar, Üretenler, Patronlar (Istanbul: Yordam, 2008), 195-204. For a list of the names, see Appendix C. 164 The mentioned number indicates the number of students who were expelled during the academic year of 1984-85. “Öğrenciler Sınavlarda Başarısız Oldukları İçin Atılıyor”, Cumhuriyet, Jan. 02, 1986. 165 Bilim ve Sanat, Vol. 40, April 1984, pp. 4-7 quoted in Oya Köymen, Kapitalizm ve Köylülük: Ağalar, Üretenler, Patronlar (Istanbul: Yordam, 2008), 289. 		47	Allegedly, the official purge list was produced in three steps. Academic higher-ups (deans, rectors, etc.) submitted the names of professors for background checks.166 The intelligence agency then went over the names and reported back to the NSC. When a name did not pass the process for various reasons, the NSC sent the infamous yellow envelope that delivered the verdict of dismissal.167 Out of thousands, only a few dozen academics received the yellow envelope, not because all the others had passed the test, but because the names on the official list earned the right to be made public. It has long been argued that the crucial point regarding this list was the dominant presence of leftist-oriented academics.168 While that is true, the reader needs to be reminded that the label of leftist used to band together these scholars was a delightfully broad classification for the NSC. One could find Marxists like Prof. Rona Serozan on the list, as well as mild democrats like Prof. Yavuz Aksu.169 Still, there were important common behaviors that could often be found in these scholars; they tended to publish their work, hold meetings, sign controversial 																																																								166 After the coup, a flurry of reports was sent to the intelligence agency from all kinds of institutions including the universities at the time. In 1983, the volume of information reached a level that blocked the daily operations of the National Intelligence Organization (NIL) and caused a new government circular banning the informative traffic from the institutions. Dinç, Güney. “Güvensizlik Üçgeni: 1402’likler, Fişleme, Güvenlik Soruşturması”, Istanbul: Say, 1987. 64. The letters that were sent to the NIL were two kinds: the institutional letters requesting a background check of their members and informative letters that were sent to get rid of particular individuals. Universities frequently sent both kinds of letters. Prof. Erol Mavi claimed that the informative letters were the main reason for the names getting onto the purge list. “Prof. Dr. Erol Mavi ile Söyleşi” https://www.izmirpediatri.org/2014/11/25/97/ Accessed July 2, 2020.  167 Uğur Mumcu, Tarikat, Siyaset, Ticaret (Ankara: UM:AG, 2018), 22 and Güney Dinç, Güvensizlik Üçgeni: 1402’likler, Fişleme, Güvenlik Soruşturması (Istanbul: Say, 1987), 62-63 and Tahir Hatiboğlu, Eylül Üniversitesi (Ankara: Selvi, 1990), 120. 168 Prof. Oya Köymen, for instance, claimed that the few people who were not leftist but still made it onto the list were accidentially put on there. Oya Köymen, Sermaye Birikirken: Osmanlı, Türkiye, Dünya (Istanbul: Yordam, 2007), 133. Another purged academic, Prof. Yakup Kepenek, asserted that the reason behind the academic purge was sending the leftists, who were especially disfavored with the start of the cold war, away from the universities. Nurcan Gökdemir “Yaşananların 12 Eylül’ü Çağrıştırması Rastlantı Değil” Birgün Sep 13, 2016.  169  Malik Dülgeroğlu, “Prof. Dr. Yavuz Aksu’nun Ardından”, Bilim Teknik (news supplement) in Cumhuriyet, Jan. 29, 2000. 		48	petitions,170 and write for newspapers.171 All these activities boil down to a simple fact; these academics had higher public visibility than their colleagues. By reserving the official punishment only for these scholars, the NSC simply announced the red lines for the academics and left the universities to use this guidebook to weed out their own members.  Official purges continued to occur although seldomly. Ege University and Ankara University experienced their fair share of purges, which increased the feeling of terror. Ege University’s Faculty of Medicine was purged especially thoroughly. The dean of the faculty, Prof. Yavuz Aksu, supported the democratic management of the university, which essentially meant allowing the young assistants to become a part of administrative decisions.172 Prof. Aksu was purged and lost the rights he was entitled to after a long career in the university. With this move, the NSC significantly decreased the purged scholars’ chances of survival. After a short while, the junta doubled its assault by blocking the mobility of academics by refusing to issue passports. Witnessing these developments, some 																																																								170 In 1969, the Turkish Teachers’ Syndicate (TTS) (Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası) (TÖS) started a boycott to improve the situation of the teachers and to protect their syndicate rights. A group of academics signed a report supporting the teachers’ rights to unionize and boycott. In 1971, an incomplete list of the supporters was published, showing 62 names in total, 12 of them were the ones who would be purged in 1983 (Alpaslan Işıklı, Aydın Aybay, Bahri Savcı, Cem Eroğul, Cevat Geray, Kurthan Fişek, Mete Tunçay, Murat Sarıca, Nuri Karacan, Rona Aybay, Server Tanelli, Tuncer Bulutay). While 12 out of 62 show that signing a petition more than a decade earlier was not a cardinal sin in the eyes of the NSC, the number still seems high enough to indicate intention rather than coincidence. “Öğretmenler Boykotu ve Kamu Görevlilerinin Grev Hakkı Konusunda Rapor” Türkiye Mühendislik Haberleri, Vol.190, Jan. 1971. Similarly, when Prof. Server Tanilli’s book was prosecuted with the accusation of being communist propaganda in 1975, the following names (who were later purged) were among the hundreds who had protested the incident: Alpaslan Işıklı, Aydın Aybay, Bahri Savcı, Bülent Tanör, Cem Eroğul, Cevat Geray, Cumhur Ertekin, Erol Mavi, Korkut Boratav, Kurthan Fişek, Mete Tunçay, Metin Özek, Rona Serozan, Tuncer Bulutay, Veli Lök, Yavuz Aksu. “Bilimsel Yayın Hakkında Dayanaksız İhbarlarla Kovuşturma Açılması Bilim Özgürlüğüne Aykırıdır”, Cumhuriyet, Mar. 20, 1976.  171 For the publishing activities of said academics, see Appendix C. 172  Malik Dülgeroğlu, “Prof. Dr. Yavuz Aksu’nun Ardından”, Bilim Teknik (news supplement) in Cumhuriyet, Jan. 29, 2000. 		49	scholars decided to leave the university before they were fired.173 Others, who were still intent on staying, were invited to attend private conversations in the rectors’ or deans’ offices. In these sessions, the same script was played out; the administration claimed that they had received a document requesting the purging of a certain somebody; however, they would delay the process for a short while so the academic in question could resign before the process began. Many scholars did not want to risk a purge and agreed to leave because of these fabricated ‘purge papers’.174 In Ankara University, the year ended with a striking number of resignations from various departments.175 In Ege University, the NSC was directly involved in the matter. The Martial Law Commander who was responsible for Izmir where Ege University is located, personally invited academics to resign. As a result, five academics agreed to quit their jobs.176 As the span of the purge stretched indefinitely, the universities got more creative with their own purge processes. Ege University sent four assistants away without even bothering to convince them to leave beforehand. Instead, it dismissed the scholars without any external request and claimed departmental closure to 																																																								173 Professor Emre Kongar’s resignation from Hacettepe University, for instance, was taken after the perfect combination of disappointment, fear, and exhaustion came together. The disappointment was about the university management who did not protect the professors, the fear was from the possibility of further restriction of movement that would come with being officially purged, and the exasperation was born out of the enforcement of ridiculous rules, such as the newly installed shaving rule (supporting a full beard was considered an Islamic style choice and was banned). Kongar, Emre. “Unutamadıklarım”, Cumhuriyet, Feb. 19, 2017, Kongar, Emre. “Ecevitlere Veda Ettiğimiz Gün”, Cumhuriyet, Nov. 29, 2016. 174 Güney Dinç, Güvensizlik Üçgeni: 1402’likler, Fişleme, Güvenlik Soruşturması (Istanbul: Say, 1987), 46. 175  From Ankara University alone, over a hundred academics quit their jobs. The resignations were predominantly from the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Political Science. “Üniversiteden ayrılanlar ve ayırılanlar”, Cumhuriyet, Oct. 4, 1985. 176 Tahir Hatiboğlu, Doğranan Üniversite (Ankara: Selvi Yayınları 1994), 207. 		50	avoid legal responsibility.177 After this period, the total number of academics that left their institutions all over the country reached 1188.178 Despite the willingness of the NSC to remove the unwanted scholars, the activity itself carried less importance than the grander goal of subjugating the university. For example, when the young academics in Ankara University became visibly troubled by the dismissal of the professors from the Faculty of Political Science and discussed to resign, Dean Necdet Serin warned them against it. Apparently, the ones that dared to resign in the absence of an external request would be treated just like the purged scholars (i.e., they would lose the rights they earned in government service).179 In short, the NSC could permit the scholars to resign out of fear, but not out of protest.180  These schemes executed by the university itself meant the destruction of what little trust was left within academia. The academics’ fears regarding their colleagues, which was partly inherited from the purge of 1960,181 was kindled again in full force, particularly 																																																								177 Tahir Hatiboğlu, Doğranan Üniversite (Ankara: Selvi Yayınları 1994), 211. This was not the first time that universities attempted to remove their own academics. In 1982, a small-scale incident took place, where almost 50 professors from various universities were sent away due a non-renewal of contract. “YÖK Yasası Uyarınca Öğretim Üyelerinin İşlerine Son Verilmeğe Başlandı”, Cumhuriyet, Nov. 6, 1982. 178 Numbers quoted by purged academic Güney Gönenç in Haldun Özen, Entelektüelin Dramı: 12 Eylül Cadı Kazanı (Ankara: Imge, 2002), 218. 179 Haldun Özen, Entelektüelin Dramı: 12 Eylül Cadı Kazanı (Ankara: Imge, 2002), 70. 180 A comparatively small number of academics still resigned in protest. Haldun Özen cited less than a dozen names in his book. However, the said list was designed as a narrative tool rather than a complete breakdown of the matter. Haldun Özen, Entelektüelin Dramı: 12 Eylül Cadı Kazanı (Ankara: Imge, 2002), 159-198. 181 The academics experienced and expressed similar feelings during the 1960s. “There is no trust left in professors against each other. Everyone doubts one another. The university has such a horrible atmosphere that we almost envy the 147 academics who are at least not forced to inhale this ill air. Maybe five or ten people had a finger in the preparation of the purge list. Yet, now, the names circulating are far more than that. Behind every door, rumors are growing. Everyone is suspected. A name suddenly appears (thought to be a co-conspirator). That name becomes the enemy of some. Others try to befriend the suspected person to protect themselves. This friendship policy immediately turns into sycophancy. Little to no one continue to carry about their duties. Everyone is alone. There is gossip instead of lecture, mistrust instead of camaraderie.” Özcan Ergüder, “Üniversite Mesullerinin Dikkatine”, Dec. 1, 1960 in İsmail Selçuk Erez, 147’ler Meselesinin İç Yüzü... (Istanbul: Sıralar Matbaası, 1961), 10. 		51	because the individuals, who were at the beginning of their careers in the purge of 1960, were there to witness the purge of 1980. In rare cases, this meant certain individuals were forced out of the academy for a second time, as happened to Professor Tarık Zafer Tunaya.182 However, it also meant a different kind of continuity for the ones who chose to cooperate with the Junta. For example, Professor Ayhan Songar, who was allegedly among the academics that helped prepare the 1960 purge list,183 reappeared in 1980 with a full-fledged career, which he continued to develop during the 1980s with his unethical research on political prisoners.184 Professor Sami Zan, who urged the junta for a swift purge in 1960s, kept his seat as the head of the department of anatomy in Istanbul University after the 1980 coup.185 Another alleged collaborator, Professor Recep Doksat, was appointed to a sport academy’s board of directors in December 1980.186 These developments meant that scholars had to consider cooperation with the external forces not only as a means to avoid suffering, but also as a potentially rewarding career move in both the short and long-term. Even if the practice of cooperation was not widely in employed, the information on its rewarding nature was enough to feed the wariness of academics about their colleagues.187    																																																								182 Prof. Tunaya was purged in 1963 and retired in 1983 under pressure from the military regime. Feroz Ahmad. “Tarik Zafer Tunaya”, Middle East Association Bulletin, Vol. 25 No. 2 (December 1991), 305. 183 Memduh Eren. 27-28 Nisan 1960 Gençlik Eylemi Işığında 27 Mayıs (Istanbul: Kardeşler Matbaası, 1996), 62. 184 Alper Turgut. “Düzenle Hiç Uzlaşamadık”, Cumhuriyet, Dec. 27, 2009. 185 “Profesör Zan Toprağa Verildi”, Cumhuriyet, Dec. 27, 1984. 186 “Spor Akademisini Spor Dışı Kişiler Yönetiyor”, Cumhuriyet, Dec. 17, 1980. 187 There was a shared awareness about the informant colleagues in the 1980s. Aydın Aybay, who was the vice-dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences in the Istanbul University when he was purged, for instance, claimed that academics were profiling other academics and providing information to the government. Haldun Özen, Entelektüelin Dramı: 12 Eylül’ün Cadı Kazanı (Ankara: İmge, 2002), 71. 		52	Completing the purge process  While the purge was effective in creating an unsettling environment, it was just one tactic the NSC used to control the university, and it was not a particularly efficient one due to the rogue elements and new issues it created. The NSC aimed to solve the former by financially punishing the purged scholars, which would limit the kind of mobility the junta perceived as a threat.188 However, the latter was more difficult to manage due to its complex nature. Even after the employment of young academics and outside professionals, 189  the university continued to experience setbacks from the removals. Peripheral universities in particular took a massive hit as they were already in a desperate state before the coup. Some of these universities did not even have a single tenured professor.190 Fearing the concentration of opponents on the periphery,191 the NSC opted to fill vacant positions by recycling those tenured professors who were in the center, rather than sending willing applicants.192 Consequently, the periphery was condemned to depend on convincing the few professors from the center to give lectures, while the tenured professors in the center were forced to take on more responsibilities without compensation.193 In order to ensure the success of the new system and to increase the control over the university, the NSC enforced strict lecture attendance for both the students 																																																								188 Uğur Mumcu “Kanayan Yara”, Cumhuriyet, July 2, 1986. 189 Old bureaucrats started to attend classes in the absence of academics. “Öğrenci Affı YÖK’ün İflasıdır”, Cumhuriyet, Jan. 2, 1986. 190 Raşit Kısacık. “İnönü Üniversitesi’nde Profesör de Doçent de Yok”, Cumhuriyet, Jan. 16, 1980. 191 In 1982, the CoHE sent an internal memo to the universities, stating that they would not permit academics who were applying to the periphery universities for ideological reasons. Güney Dinç. Güvensizlik Üçgeni: 1402’likler, Fişleme, Güvenlik Soruşturması (Istanbul: Say, 1987), 62. 192 The periphery universities reported 303 vacant spots, the number of volunteers who applied for these places was 350. Baskın Oran. “Doğramacı & Doğramacı”, Radikal, Mar. 7, 2010. 193 During his visit to the periphery universities, Kenan Evren threatened the professors who refused to give lectures in the peripheral universities for the salary NSC determined. Kenan Evren. Kenan Evren’in Anıları, Vol. 2 (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 432. 		53	and the professors.194 Although this development was something young academics had longed for at least two decades to level the conditions with their senior colleagues, the result served to foster inequalities in favor of the few people and worsened the pressure on university members.195 Academics were expected to be present at the university from nine to five. Eight hours of absence was punishable with a pay cut, and 40 hours was enough of a reason for termination of the contract.196 The junta referred to anarchy and acts of terror as the reasons for controlling students’ dwelling habits.197 For the professors, the pretext was preventing the misconduct of the academics, who did not teach the classes for which they were paid.198 With this regulation, the NSC practically cut the alternative financial resources of both the students199 and the professors.  The temporal placement of the scholars on the periphery and the overall instability of both the students and the academics in the university represented the model of academia the NSC was aiming for. While the civil governments reappeared, the junta model persisted, and the institutions established during the junta years, like the CoHE, survived. The universities were forced to recognize outside organizations as the ultimate hierarchical 																																																								194 Students were also living under strict rules in their dormitories, which, for instance, banned meetings, enforced dress codes, etc., Asiye Uysal. “Kurallar İçinde Boğuluyoruz”, Cumhuriyet, Jan. 2, 1986. Evren’s playbook of the coup, which contained several articles revealing the steps that would be taken once the coup occurred, stated; “Professors will be forced to attend classes.” Kenan Evren. Kenan Evren’in Anıları Vol.1 (İstanbul, Milliyet Yayınları. 1990), 503  195 Recep Doksat, who allegedly helped preparing the 1960 purge list, was given compensation for working full-time in university despite his private practice was well-known by the public. “Spor Akademisini Spor Dışı Kişiler Yönetiyor”, Cumhuriyet, Dec. 17, 1980 196 Gencay Gürsoy. Bir Resimaltı (Broy Yayınları, 1991), 76. 197 Kenan Evren. Kenan Evren’in Anıları, Vol.2 (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 40. The NSC even planned to send the university students to military camps in the summer months to solve the problem of the free time the youth would have. Kenan Evren. Kenan Evren’in Anıları, Vol.1. (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 326.  198 Kenan Evren. Kenan Evren’in Anıları Vol.2 (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 374.  199 Enforcing attendance was also an effective way to dominate the low-income students, who needed to work to live. These students had to be especially careful about their actions since they were already on thin ice.  		54	authority, which created a kind of academia that was overly sensitive to the fluctuating policies of successive governments.                       		55	Conclusion Purges are usually assumed to be extraordinary events that occur in rare, extraordinary situations. In addition to textbook examples from the twentieth-century history of the USSR, USA, and China, one can think in this regard of the attempt in Greece to purge Nazi collaborators from the university after the Second World War, Argentina’s 1946-1947 purge that sought to ‘neutralize’ universities politically after the 1943 coup, or the Red Purge in occupied Japan in 1948, as well as comparable cases from many other countries. 200  Some of the Turkish cases also fit the pattern of academic purges in exceptional times, but Turkey also managed to normalize this questionable practice, creating a repetitive routine that continued well after the 1950s all the way into the present. To understand this peculiarity of modern Turkey’s history, a brief comparative account of the country’s purges is necessary.   Turkey’s first academic expulsion coincided with the establishment of the country’s first university. The victim of the first purge attracted public criticism for giving lectures that were perceived as contrary to the religious sensibilities of the people. The method of removing controversial elements who were perceived as a threat to the authority and the ‘common sense’ was further adopted and applied by subsequent governments. Major structural and political transformations, such as the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the 																																																								200 The purges mentioned here yielded results that differed from their original intentions. Instead of helping the purges, academics in Greece sabotaged the process by using delaying tactics. The purges in Japan evolved from being ideological to practical and turned into a performance-based elimination. The purges in Argentina that developed under the rule of General Edelmiro Farell reached shocking numbers, and 1,250 academics were expelled directly or were forced to resign. Nayla Pis Diez, “La Política Universitaria Peronista y el Movimiento Estudiantil Reformista: Actores, Conflictos y Visiones Opuestas (1943-1955)”, Los Trabajos y Los Días Vol.4 No.3 (2012), Procopis Papastratis, “Purging the University after Liberation” in After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation and State in Greece, 1943-1960. (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). Hans Martin Krämer, “Just Who Reversed the Course? The Red Purge in Higher Education during the Occupation of Japan”, Social Science Japan Journal Vol. 8 No. 1 (Nov, 2004). 		56	transition to the Republican regime, or the coups of 1960, 1971, and 1980 all resorted to the use of purges as an instrument of declaring certain ideologies undesirable. With the expansion of the system of higher education over the decades and with the growing aspirations for university autonomy, the purges acquired an additional function and became a warning to universities not to break away from state control. Academic purges in Turkey thus frequently functioned as a multipurpose regulatory mechanism. The availability and effectiveness of this mechanism were not overlooked by academics who were trying to organize the university to fit their own interests and purposes. This thesis has revealed the problematic seduction of academics by this readily available temptation and how it has affected Turkish universities in the post-World War II era. The 1960s was a turning point in the academics’ complicity in the purges. During the previous decade, young academics experienced multiple problems. They were overburdened with professorial duties, and their voices remained unheard by the university senates that were dominated by their senior colleagues. While the latter could enjoy their honorary ranks, the former were not able to rise quickly in their profession due to the scarcity of available vacancies in universities. The younger academics eventually saw an opportunity in the 1960 purge announced by the junta and tried to manipulate the process to their own advantage, thus acquiring, for the first time, a direct impact on the process of purges.  By the 1980s, the limited agency that the young academics could exert during the 1960s gave way to the increased power of university officials, rectors, and deans, who were confident enough to carry out their own small-scale purges. And instead of trying to use the purge as a solution to structural problems, high ranking academics of the 1980s 		57	manipulated it for their own careerist ends and to redesign the university as they saw fit.  This thesis is not trying to justify the practical goals of the 1960s academics in comparison with the selfish arbitrariness of their colleagues’ actions in the 1980s. On the contrary, it argues that the complicity and involvement of university members in the purges during the 1960s contributed to the institutionalization and acceptance of the purges and was thus one of the factors that made the events of the 1980s possible.    The interpretation developed in this study analyzed academic purges as systems with reflexity, or a feedback loop. Although academics were not initiators of the purges and were supposed to be their targets, they actively contributed to the process and had an impact on the results. A comparison with the contrasting example of Fascist Italy would be useful here. Due to the passive resistance by the academics, the National Fascist Party (Partito Nazionale Fascista) (PNF) was forced to settle for a gradual transformation until a more reliable body of scholars could be formed. Thus, academic purges were conducted at intervals and in small numbers.201 The case of Turkey turns Italy’s example upside down. Purges have gathered momentum in Turkey over time, in part because some academics shared similar interventionist beliefs and saw the purges as a useful instrument for regulation. In particular, ever since the 1960s, academics have shared responsibility for the normalization and routinization of the country’s tradition of purges.  As the title of this work suggests, academics in Turkey sacrificed something invaluable by giving up the autonomy of their universities in exchange for short-term 																																																								201 Although only 12 professors out of 1,250 refused to take an oath of fidelity to the fascist regime in 1931, academics had different reasons behind their decision. While some supported the fascist ideology, most cooperated to prevent the university from completely falling into the hands of ‘the barbarians’ or to prevent their own dismissal. Valero, Francisco Morente. “La Universidad En Los Regímenes Fascistas: La Depuración Del Profesorado En Alemania, España e Italia.” Historia Social 54 (2006). pp. 65-68. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40340982.  		58	political and personal goals. However, without fully understanding the conditions under which they arrived at this decision, criticism of academics could turn into condemnation. Civilian or military, regardless of the type of administration, governments in Turkey has put continuous effort to take control of the country’s universities. The roots of this attitude go way further back than the Republican period itself. Turkey’s experience of higher education started with the imperial era’s vocational and technical schools such as the Imperial School of Medicine (Mekteb-i Tıbbiyye) and the Imperial School of Political Science (Mekteb-i Mülkiyye). These institutions were established for practical reasons and aimed to train professionals in areas that the state deemed necessary. Turkey’s perception of higher education was primarily influenced by this utilitarian model. Even though the establishment of universities did not manifest this pragmatism in theory, the state perceived them in a similar fashion and expected them to train staff to carry out bureaucratic affairs of the government and fulfill other technical needs for the country.202   Subsequent governments, civil and military alike, inherited this mentality. They shared the motives of not wasting valuable human resources and preventing them from working against ‘the state’, but the methods they employed to reach these goals showed some variability. In chaotic times, such as post-coup periods, when the constitution was abolished, brutal methods such as academic purges were initiated. When the country was on a more stable footing, civil governments such as the DP and the JP tried to subject universities to control by the state by the ministry of education, so universities could be 																																																								202 In the minds of the early Republic’s statesmen, the notion of the university was not distinguished from higher education. In 1924, for instance, Teachers’ College (Yüksek Muallim Mektebi) was affiliated with the university (Darülfünun) by the government. Similarly, translation duties from foreign languages were given to the university after the Translation Office was closed down with the end of the imperial rule. Emre Dölen, Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi Vol. 2 (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), pp. 38-39. 		59	transformed into institutions where Turkey’s mandarins, as well as technicians, were trained.  In short, while discussing the complicity of academics in the dismissals, it should be remembered that scholars in Turkey made their choices under the onslaught that continued for decades, not just during short, intermittent periods, and that constant pressure inevitably influenced their views and perceptions of the academic life. It should also not be forgotten that the attitude of scholars regarding purges was much more varied and complex than what could be discussed in this thesis. A more comprehensive analysis of Turkey’s tradition of academic purges and diverse decisions of academics would also require taking into consideration the purges of 1997 and 2016, which I hope to undertake in due course.              		60	 Bibliography  1) Primary Sources a) Archival Materials:  30-1-0-0, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Cumhuriyet Arşivi (BCA), Istanbul, Turkey. 30-11-1-0, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Cumhuriyet Arşivi (BCA), Istanbul, Turkey. T.C. Kurucu Meclis Tutanak Dergisi 5, (Feb 24, 1961).  b) Newspapers:   Cumhuriyet Daily Express Milliyet Resmi Gazete Ulus  2) Secondary Sources a) Newspapers: Bianet Birgün   CNNTurk Radikal Vatan  b) Articles & Books: “C.H.P. 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(Inspector-Finance) F. Hakkı Saymen     - Fahri Arel     P.O. (High Ranking Officer) Feridun Ansan     - Fuat Sezgin     - Halil Arslanlı     P.O. (Judge) Hilmi İleri     P.O. (High Ranking Officer, M.’s Side)  Hıfzı Timur     P.O. (Merchant) İhsan Şükrü Aksel    - Kâmil Akol     - Kâzım İsmail Gürkan    P.S. Kemalettin Birsen    - Kenan Tüker(l)     - 																																																								203 I took three indicators to assess the professors’ exceptional wealth: their parent’s occupation (father’s or mother’s father’s occupation), whether they went to private high school, and whether they got a diploma from a high school in a foreign country. (Since the government sent university students to abroad with state scholarship I didn’t include university education). P.O.: Parent’s Occupation, P.S.: Private School, H.S.F.: High School Education Completed in a Foreign Country     		65	Kudret Mavitan     - M. Sabahattin Eyüpoğlu    P.O. (MP) Mazhar Nedim Göknil    - Mazhar Şevket Ipşiroğlu    P.O. (High Ranking Military Officer) Mina Irgat     P.S. Müfide Küley     P.O. (Doctor) Muhittin Binan     - Muhterem Gökmen    - Muzaffer Esat Güçhan    - Naci Bengisu     P.O. (Pharmacist) Naşit Erez     - Necmettin Polvan    - Nurettin Çuhadar     - Ömer Özek     - Orhan Safa                               P.O. (Ambassador) Osman Cevdet Çubukçu    P.O. (Merchant) Râtıp Berker     P.S. Recai Galip Okandan    - Sabri Oran     -  Şevket Soysal     - Şinasi Hakkı Erel     P.O. (Ministry of Health Commission Head) Süheyla Bayrav     P.S. Takiyittin Mengüşoğlu    - Tarık Zafer Tunaya    P.S. Tevfik Remzi Kazancıgil    P.O. (Doctor) Üveis Maskar     - Zeki Zeren     - Ziya Öktem     - 		66	Appendix B: Official List of the 1960 Purge     		67	  		68	Appendix C: The List of the 1983 Academic Purge* 1. Abdülkadir Ateş  2. Abdülkadir Karahan  (p)**  3. Abdullah Kızılırmak  (p) 4. Ahmet Terek  5. Alpaslan Işıklı  (p) 6. Arif Bilgen (p)  7. Ataman Tangör (p) 8. Ateş Akyurtlu  9. Aydın Aybay  (p) yy 10. Bahri Savcı  (p) yy 11. Baskın Oran  (p) 12. Bülent Pekerten  13. Bülent Tanör (p) 14. Bülent Zeren  15. Burhan Cahit Ünal (p) 16. Cengiz Pınar  (p) 17. Cem Eroğul  (p) 18. Cemal Koç  (p)  19. Cevat Geray  (p) 20. Cumhur Ertekin  (p) 21. Dündar Berkan  (p) 22. Erdem Aksoy  (p) 23. Erdinç Gönenç (p)  24. Erol Mavi  (p) 25. Fuat Bozkurt  26. Gencay Gürsoy (p) 27. Gültekin Oransay (p) 28. Güney Gönenç (p) 29. Günsel Koptagel İlal (p) 30. Haldun Özen (p) 31. Haluk Gerger (p)  32. Hüseyin Güney 33. Hayrullah Kocaoğlu 34. Hüseyin Hatemi (p)  35. Hüseyin Tural (p)  36. Hüseyin Yıldırım (p) 37. İdris Küçükömer (p) 38. İhsan Kara 39. İlker Turnalı (?)*** 40. İsmet Özkut 41. Jale Akyurtlu 42. Kıvanç Ertop (p) 43. Korkut Boratav (p)  44. Kurthan Fişek (p)  45. Malik Dülgeroğlu 46. Mete Tunçay (p)  47. Metin Özek (p)  		69	48. Murat Sarıca (p) 49. Nazif Tepedelenlioğlu (p) 50. Nuri Karacan (p) 51. Nurkut İnan (p) 52. Oya Köymen 53. Oya Tangör (tıp) 54. Ömer Kuleli (p) 55. Özgönül Aksoy (p) 56. Ramazan Abay  57. Rennan Pekünlü   58. Rona Aybay (p) 59. Rona Serozan (p)  60. Sencer Divitçioğlu (p) 61. Server Tanilli (p) 62. Servet Armağan (p) 63. Şükrü Bozkurt 64. Tahir Hatiboğlu (p) 65. Tahsin Yılmaz (p) 66. Tayyar Bora (p) 67. Tuncer Bulutay (p)  68. Türkan Süren  69. Ünal Nalbantoğlu  70. Üstün Korugan (p) 71. Veli Lök (p) 72. Yakup Kepenek (p) 73. Yalçın Küçük  (p) 74. Yavuz Aksu  (p)  75. Yeter Göksu (p) 76. Yıldırım Koç  (p) 77. Yılmaz Akyüz  (p) 78. Yücel Sayman     * Unlike the purge list of 1960, which appeared officially and all at once, the names of 1983 came at intervals. In the absence of an official, compact list, purged academics pieced the names together and published their list, however, it was not accepted by all. Some sources differed in numbers and cited few academics who resigned or retired due to the pressure as officially purged. When forming the list above I used the ones Oya Köymen204 and Tahir Hatiboğlu205 published in their books. I also used an article from Cumhuriyet newspaper206 to cross-check the names and took into account the personal statements of the academics.  ** Publishing doctoral thesis in book format was the standard for the academics. The (p) mark only indicates who published more than a book (in their own field or not), and/or showed high activity in newspapers/journals before 1983 (either by writing columns or being mentioned by them), and/or signing petitions that were published in newspapers. 																																																								204 Oya Köymen, Kapitalizm ve Köylülük: Ağalar, Üretenler, Patronlar (Istanbul: Yordam, 2008). 205 Tahir Hatiboğlu, Eylül Üniversitesi (Ankara: Selvi Yayınları, 1990). 206 “Üniversiteden ayrılanlar ve ayırılanlar” Cumhuriyet, Oct 04,1985. 		70	***The surname was unreadable in Cumhuriyet, Köymen’s list only gave the first initial and Hatiboğlu’s list did not include the name.          		

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