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A decolonial critique of metaphysics in counselling psychology education Clegg, Daniel John 2020

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A DECOLONIAL CRITIQUE OF METAPHYSICS IN COUNSELLING PSYCHOLOGY EDUCATIONbyDANIEL JOHN CLEGGB.A., The University of the Fraser Valley, 2009M.A., The Adler School of Professional Psychology, 2012A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHYinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES(Counselling Psychology)THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA(Vancouver)August 2020© Daniel John Clegg, 2020The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the dissertation entitled:A Decolonial Critique of Metaphysics in Counselling Psychology Educationsubmitted by Daniel John Clegg in partial fulfillment of the requirements forthe degree of Doctor of Philosophyin Counselling PsychologyExamining Committee:William Borgen, Counselling PsychologySupervisor Ishu Ishiyama, Counselling PsychologySupervisory Committee Member Michael Marker, Educational StudiesSupervisory Committee MemberMarla Buchanan, Counselling PsychologyUniversity ExaminerDonal O’Donoghue, Curriculum & PedagogyUniversity ExaminerNancy Arthur, University of South AustraliaExternal ExamineriiAbstractHow can we listen to Indigenous Knowledges about our relationships with land? This dissertation offers three examples of how Canadian counsellor education and counselling psychology programs can be truly open to the ecological and theoretical gifts that Indigenous Knowledges offer academia—open in ways that align with our core values of listening, respect, relationality, healing, and holistic well-being. Each of the three projects provokes our assumptions about the relationship between ourselves and the land. The first project challenges Western disciplinary histories and asks us to listen to the history of education that has had its being in this land for millennia. The second challenges our science of intelligence and invites us to listen to land-based, experiential realities of cognition. The third investigates nonindigenous counselling students' ways of being in places of schooling where their worldview does not match their institution's. It challenges the assumption that students' minds are simply broadened by coming to university, and opens us up to students' existing relationships to land through the lens of Indigenous Knowledges. This dissertation shows that there is room for, strategic places of insertion of, and student willingness to absorb decolonized curriculum and pedagogy in Canadian counsellor education and Canadian counselling psychology generally. Indigenous Knowledges benefit the field by broadening the conceptions of humanity we use to educate our students and clients, and by deepening our stories of what counselling education is and has been.iiiLay SummaryHow can we listen to Indigenous Knowledges about our relationships with land? In line with the value of listening are three projects that show how graduate programs that educate counsellors and counselling psychologists in Canada can be open to the gifts that Indigenous Knowledges offer. The first challenges the field's history and asks us to listen to the history of Indigenous educational traditions that have existed on the land for millennia. The second challenges the science of intelligence and invites us to listen to Indigenous ways of thinking through experience on the land. The third studies the experiences of nonindigenous counselling students whose worldviews do not match the worldviews of their schools. This project listens to these students' existing relationships to land through the lens of Indigenous Knowledges. These projects show how this field can be open to a wider idea of what it means to be human.ivPrefaceThis dissertation comprises an introduction, three project manuscripts, and an overall conclusion. All parts' design, analysis, and writing are my original, unpublished work with the following qualifications. In the first project on teaching history, committee member M. Marker will be a co-author for a later journal submission. He contributed background ideas and motivations for the article in his teaching capacity in coursework, as well as editing and feedback on the manuscript and a few limited passages of original writing. For this project the vast majority of writing was my own and the intellectual content is my original application of scholarship from Dr. Marker's field to the field of counselling psychology. Dr. A. Goodwill, now of Simon Fraser University, was a member of the committee before moving to SFU and provided valuable early feedback on this manuscript. She has declined co-authorship on a publication derived from this project as she did not make a substantial contribution to the original writing.The second project is an original elaboration and application of prior work of Dr. S. Rocha and myself, as is noted in the chapter. A publication may be derived from this work at a later date.The third project on students' worldviews was subject to UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board approval with the title “Developing World-View in Place and Meeting World-Views in Places of Counselling Psychology Education, a Decolonial Hermeneutic Exploration” and UBC BREB number H18-01797. Publications may be derived from this chapter at a later date.vTable of ContentsAbstract.....................................................................................................................................iiiLay Summary............................................................................................................................ivPreface........................................................................................................................................vTable of Contents......................................................................................................................viList of Figures...........................................................................................................................ixAcknowledgement.....................................................................................................................xDedication.................................................................................................................................xiGeneral Introduction..................................................................................................................1My Communities...................................................................................................................3How I Got Interested.............................................................................................................3Relationship Between Projects..............................................................................................6General Theoretical Positions...............................................................................................7First Project.........................................................................................................................12Second Project.....................................................................................................................12Third Project........................................................................................................................13Project 1: The Metaphysics of Counselling History on Colonized Land.................................14Abstract...............................................................................................................................14Information about Collaborators.........................................................................................14Introduction.........................................................................................................................15Audience, Disciplines, and Language Sets.........................................................................16Why Do We Want to Listen?...............................................................................................16An Act of Listening.............................................................................................................27A Shift to Being...................................................................................................................28Counselling as Human Development and Healing Education............................................30A Place-Based History.........................................................................................................32First Voices in Healing Education.......................................................................................32Second Voices in Healing Education...................................................................................35An Invitation to Engage......................................................................................................39viProject 2: Cognitive Imperialism in the Metaphysics of Intelligence......................................41Abstract...............................................................................................................................41Introduction.........................................................................................................................41A Brief History of Traditions..............................................................................................42Is Metaphysics Foreign to the Science of Intelligence?......................................................45The Psychologist's Fallacy, James' Transmission, and Psychologism................................52Cognitive Imperialism in Intelligence Theory....................................................................61Knowledge Less Conceptual...............................................................................................66Teaching and Researching Intelligence...............................................................................75Project 3: Meeting Worldviews in Places of Counsellor Education and Counselling Psychology Programs...............................................................................................................77Abstract...............................................................................................................................77Background.........................................................................................................................77Metaphysics and Worldview...............................................................................................80Immigrants and Settler-Immigrants as Newcomers............................................................81Rationale..............................................................................................................................83An Origin Story of Western Counselling: Situating the Field.............................................91Situating Myself..................................................................................................................93Research Questions.............................................................................................................95Gadamerian Hermeneutic Epistemology.............................................................................95Methodology & Method......................................................................................................96Results...............................................................................................................................110Expert Consultation...........................................................................................................149Discussion.........................................................................................................................150Conclusion.........................................................................................................................160Limitations........................................................................................................................163Researcher's Future Questions..........................................................................................165Participants' Recommendations for Research and Curricula............................................166General Conclusion................................................................................................................169The Project Overall and Benefits for Educators................................................................169viiReflections on the Process.................................................................................................171Parting Message................................................................................................................173References..............................................................................................................................174Appendices.............................................................................................................................198Appendix A: Project 3: Technical Definitions...................................................................198Appendix B: Project 3: Technical Information on Decolonial Imperatives......................204Appendix C: Project 3: Interview Guide...........................................................................205Appendix D: Project 3: Technical Details of Expert Consultation....................................208Appendix E: Project 3: Technical Details of Gadamerian Hermeneutics Under Indigenous Decolonial Ontology.........................................................................................................210Appendix F: Project 3: Expanded and Technical Discussion of Metaphysics and Worldview.........................................................................................................................216viiiList of FiguresFigure 1 Procedure Flow Chart ................................................................................ 168ixAcknowledgementI am grateful for all the kind and supportive people who have worked with me on these projects, and who have made this difficult journey full of its own richness. I would like to say a particular thank you to the endless kindness and encouragement of my supervisor Dr. William Borgen, for the passion, knowledge, and courage of my committee member Dr. Michael Marker, for the joy, open mindedness, and warm hospitality of my committee member Dr. Ishu Ishiyama, for Dr. Samuel Rocha who believed in me and gave me the power to not be afraid of anyone's thinking, for Dr. William Valley, who gave me a chance at learning to teach and treated me as an equal, for Dr. Pam Hirakata, who showed me what care and creativity can look like in the presence of intelligence, for Karen Yan for her compassion and tireless assistance, for Dr. Fred Chou for his humour, challenges, and personal support at countless times, for my good friends Andre Gerard and Margo Lillie for facilitating my connection to the city and land here in Vancouver while I made a rough transition in lifestyle, to my good friend Robin Munshaw who took me outdoors regularly until I began dissertation writing, to my lovely wife Kara Shin for her wisdom and inspirational work ethic as well as for tolerating my frayed edges, and for my parents, Richard and Daphne Clegg, and family in Chilliwack who motivated all these considerations of land in the largest sense, giving me a traditional upbringing and welcoming me back for every visit.xDedicationTo my family . . .xiGeneral IntroductionHow can we listen to Indigenous Knowledges about our relationships with land? This dissertation will help unwrap this question in a particular way within the field of counsellor education and counselling psychology.I extend my invitation to the reader and to the field to deeply listen, according to our time-honoured traditions of respect in relationships and of learning in conversation about what we do not yet know. The legacy of Carl Rogers (O’Hara, 1989) carries weight in our field and in our identity as counsellors. His core values of radical listening, empathy, and love, often in the face of relationships that we find challenging, guide our hearts toward a greater openness and a greater humanity. One of the radical aspects of Rogers' sense of listening is that the reality of the other person is not to be subsumed under our own techniques and categories, but rather must transform them and make a genuinely lasting impression on us that reflects the depth of the other's wisdom and the truth of their suffering. Here I invite the reader to apply our listening traditions to our colonial relationships with Indigenous peoples of this land, especially as they occur within academic walls. Rauna Kuokkanen (2008), a Sámi scholar and UBC alumni, lays out the history of ignorance of Indigenous epistemologies in academia:programs and services for indigenous students have been set up on the premise that they need special assistance to adapt to the academy. I argue, however, that it is the academy that is responsible for ‘‘doing its homework’’ and addressing its ignorance so it can give an ‘‘unconditional welcome’’ not only to indigenous people but also to their epistemes [(knowledges)], without insisting on translation. Instead of assuming the need to ‘‘bridge’’ the gulf between the cultures of indigenous students and that of the institution, or help students make the transition from their cultures to the academic ‘‘culture,’’ . . . we need to focus on the academy itself; that the academy must take a critical look at its own discourses and assumptions and address the sanctioned epistemic ignorance that prevails in the institution. (p. 60)Cree education scholar Dwayne Donald (2009) also looks forward to “a provocative interpretive engagement” (p. 8) between traditions, seeing that “texts and stories that emphasize human connectivity can complexify understandings of the significance of living 1together that traverse perceived frontiers of difference” (p. 8). Whereas colonial histories emphasize a natural and eternal otherness of Indigenous Knowledges, many Indigenous scholars emphasize the need for respectful learning between traditions (Marker, 2015). This dissertation invites scholars and counsellors to begin to engage with Indigenous Knowledges as the philosophical, theoretical, critical, and complementary gifts that they are (Kuokkanen, 2008). In these times of global warming, famine, pestilence, and pandemic, people are knitting together a common sense of humanity. While it is imperative to guard against cultural appropriation and research-based exploitation, it can also be problematic to construct an artificial barrier between academia and Indigenous Knowledges at this critical point. Both authors in Western traditions (Berry, 1998; Naess, 2010; Or, 1991) and in Indigenous traditions point us toward a greater togetherness in our theorizing in order to meet our common ecological-political challenges. Kawagley and Barnhardt (1998) wrote some time ago that “there is a growing awareness of the depth and breadth of knowledge that is extant in many Native societies, and of its potential value in addressing issues of contemporary concern” (p. 119). They point out that humanity in general can benefit from listening to how Indigenous peoples integrate traditional ecological intelligence with Western knowledge to confront contemporary contexts:as this transition evolves, it is not only indigenous people who will be the beneficiaries, however, since many of the issues that are being addressed are of equal significance in nonindigenous contexts (Nader 1996). Many of the problems that originated under conditions of marginalization have gravitated from the periphery to the center of industrial societies, so the pedagogical solutions that are emerging in indigenous societies may be of equal benefit to the broader educational community. (Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998, p. 121)This dissertation sought to demonstrate that listening to Indigenous Knowledges helps us clarify what counselling is and has been, and helps us avoid unnecessary commitments that cause us problems. For example, while cognitive science offers our field many insights, we do not have to be beholden to the worldview underlying the field of intelligence assessment. Listening to Indigenous traditions opens up our views of what thought can be and how it can relate to experience and to land (Marker, 2018). To take another example, we 2often feel that we must somehow have committed ourselves to some kind of vaguely real-seeming scientific methodological viewpoint just by being involved in the academy as counsellors, or counselling psychologists. While it is true that we are committed to a diligent pursuit of knowledge, this dissertation lets us off the hook of the assumed exclusive reliance on Western social science methodology as the sole story of our history and purpose. We can be open to so much more in the way we tell the story of counselling to our clients, to our students, and to the public. Our field can be defined not primarily by John Watson's (1913) totalizing and reductive vision of scientific psychology, but by open minded and open hearted figures like Carl Rogers (O’Hara, 1989) and William James (1897) who, like Indigenous authors (e.g., Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998), are radically empirical in other ways.My CommunitiesTo introduce myself, I am a fourth generation descendent of Irish, Manx, and English immigrants, working academically within counselling psychology in light of decolonial critiques which I arrived at because of my own history with different worldviews and metaphysics. My communities include rural Euro-Canadians in Chilliwack, BC, my family, and the Mennonite community I was brought up among, all of which have their own complicated histories of interface with Stó:lō Nations. I also have an extended family throughout rural British Columbia with their own complex histories of engagement with First Nations (similar to Furniss, 1997). I have formal and informal academic communities at UBC on Musqueam territory, which have their own involvements with decolonial politics in various ways. My primary connection to land remains the Chilliwack River Valley and the Fraser Valley (Stó:lō territory), including many sites and activities. I include these references to avoid silencing the identity of these unceded lands and to highlight the complicated and at times problematic relational context of myself and my communities.How I Got InterestedBelow I tell a brief story of what got me interested, academically and passionately, in challenging narrow and Western ways of thinking in our field. Early in my childhood and youth I was deeply connected to land and plant life in the Chilliwack River Valley watershed. Later on, in my adolescence and young adulthood, I became a very analytical thinker—very logical positivist in character. I studied logic, mathematics, philosophy, and programming and 3worked in this area. Eventually, I arrived at Christianity after a long search for truth that took me through my studies in the sciences and mathematics. I was introduced to the liberation theology movement (Gutiérrez, 2014) by my mother through our Mennonite community, presumably due to their migration routes through South and Central America. Eventually I converted from an avowed atheist to an ecumenical Christian. In addition to my father's passion for justice, being raised in a Mennonite community taught me the values of social justice and liberation (Gutiérrez, 2014). For example, the prophet Amos speaks in the voice of God,even though you offer me your burnt offerings and grain offerings, I will not accept them; and the offerings of well-being of your fatted animals I will not look upon. Take away from me the noise of your songs; I will not listen to the melody of your harps. But let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream. (Amos, NRSV, 22-24)Having found the limits of the sciences and of mathematics and having been introduced to issues of social justice, I left my career and turned to working with people and with the deeper meanings they found in their lives, their struggles, and their worldviews. I was interested in interfaith and social justice, was studying diverse religions and philosophies, and was aware of psychology's reputation for having a narrow worldview. As an illustration, during my earlier studies I had taken an introductory course in psychology. The professor stood at the board and stated, “this is the definition of intelligence.” I don't remember the definition but I remember incredulously commiserating with a student of colour beside me at the blatantly reductive conception and utterly tacit assumption of universality. I dropped the class that day. The experience was disappointing, and unfortunately emblematic of the decade of education in psychology and counselling that I have subsequently pursued.The values of justice and truth motivated me to work with people through their times of suffering. This led me to choose the profession of counselling and so to begin studying psychology. Knowing psychology would be reductive, I got through those aspects of the degree, but hoped counselling education would be different. I wanted to go into counselling to be able to work with people's meaning in life without doing violence to their knowledges 4and worldviews—I wanted to be deeply open to listening to people at the level of worldview and metaphysics. I came into counselling thinking of humanity, suffering, justice, and compassion, but as someone who had studied the limits and ends of the natural sciences, math, and logic (Hofstadter, 1999; Unamuno, 1954), I was often disappointed to find a technique and evidence-focused discipline of social science bent on recapitulating the ethnocentric and positivistic errors other sciences had put in the past (Meehl, 1989).During my undergraduate degree in psychology and into my master's degree in counselling psychology I was interested in interfaith dialogue, and particularly with inter-cultural metaphysics. Arriving at the end of my master's degree at a focus on multicultural psychotherapy (Comas-Díaz, 2010) and feminist and social justice traditions in counselling, I was well situated in the present-day discourses in Canadian counselling psychology (Arthur & Collins, 2015; Beatch et al., 2009). Throughout my education in psychology and counselling, some institutions and professors have had very wide viewpoints and have encouraged critical and social justice perspectives in their curricula. However, others have been much more excluding. I have been told I was in the wrong program. I have been told “we're not going to talk about that in this class,” that my comments were out of scope or were confusing to those just trying to get their grade, have been rebuffed for the suggestion that a dominant theory could be reductive, have been informed that my critiques of racism in psychological history are irrelevant because European settlers “were just trying to protect their culture,” have repeatedly been given the impression that philosophical concerns are not appropriate for discussions in graduate degrees in counselling. Mostly, I just know not to bring things up from my upbringing, culture, philosophy, theology, or scientific and mathematical training. These experiences are just one facet of very complex educational environments, and I have had many positive experiences that I do not include here. My experiences are also vastly offset by other privileges I experience, but I mention them here to explain my motivation for my interest in issues of education and worldview.During my master's and in the beginning of my doctoral studies, I recovered my own traditions as a Mennonite Christian and learned about the colonial history of Canada. As I studied decolonial, critical, and feminist thought with Drs. Clelland, Mozol, and Thira at the 5Adler School of Professional Psychology, and with Drs. Marker and Goodwill at UBC, I learned that uncritical liberation paradigms and good multicultural intentions have been used against Indigenous peoples and against Indigenous Knowledges (Marker, 2006b; St. Denis, 2011). In our own field, uncritical multiculturalism dominates discussions of Indigeneity, disabling claims to land, politics, history, and theory (R. D. Goodman & Gorski, 2015; Stewart et al., 2017). This surprise motivated me to listen deeper to Indigenous scholars' analyses of Western education and to their sovereign and pre-existing knowledge traditions. Relationship Between ProjectsThe purpose of this dissertation is to help clear the path forward for decolonizing counsellor education and counselling psychology programs by removing hegemonic epistemological barriers that make it difficult for counsellors and educators to introduce different ways of thinking. My intention was to identify and to start the process of removing barriers that prevent them from being open to listening to Indigenous values of land, history, and justice. The three projects of this dissertation suggest a new vision of the historical, intelligent, cultural, and landed being of the counsellor.Three questions frame the components of this manuscript dissertation: How can we teach counselling psychology in historical context in light of decolonial imperatives? How can we shift away from colonial metaphysical baggage in concepts of intelligence as a central defining aspect of humanness? How do counselling graduate students navigate existing educational structures with reference to their own metaphysical positions? All three projects use a metaphysical level of analysis to help to answer the question of how we can relate to land in academia and specifically in counsellor education and counselling psychology education. Each project treats a different, yet related, facet of the general research program: a decolonial critique of metaphysics in counsellor education and counselling psychology education.Throughout this dissertation we listen to Indigenous Knowledges of the living landscape. Each of the three projects provokes our seemingly steadfast assumptions about the relationship between ourselves and the land. The first project challenges Western disciplinary histories and asks us to listen to the history of education that has had its being in this land for millennia. The second challenges our science of intelligence and invites us to listen to land-6based experiential realities of cognition. The third challenges the idea that students' minds are simply broadened by coming to university, and asks us to open our eyes to students' existing relationships to land through the lens of Indigenous Knowledges. These three projects offer examples of how we can be truly open to the ecological and relational gifts that Indigenous values offer academia and our field specifically, in ways that align with our most core values of listening, respect, relationality, healing, and holistic well-being.General Theoretical PositionsAudiences, Disciplines, and Language SetsEach of the three projects contains its own description of its intended audience. They differ in audience due to differences in subject matter, in types of academic discourses engaged, and language sets employed. Overall, the audiences are counsellor educators, counselling psychologists, and counsellors, as well as those with interests in philosophy of science, cross-cultural psychology, and decolonization of social sciences.One of the unique features of this dissertation is the use of Indigenous decolonial ontology and priorities in addressing the general field of Canadian counselling psychology including its nonindigenous students. As such, this is one of the language sets encountered in every project, and it is introduced and described wherever necessary.Counselling Psychology and Educational TheoryFrom my perspective, Canadian counselling psychology is defined by its interests in justice and culture, and these defy an easy boundary of theory between professional clinical service delivery on the one hand, and clinical supervision and education of counsellor-trainees on the other (Arthur & Collins, 2015; Beatch et al., 2009; cf. Bernard & Goodyear, 2013). Furthermore, counselling psychology has roots in education, is housed in faculties of education, and has a role in society as an educational force (Arthur & Collins, 2015; Beatch et al., 2009; Van Hesteren, 1971). Counselling psychology educates through embedded curricula of psychotherapy, through explicit psycho-education and community education work, and through its explicit and implicit education of graduate students (Arthur & Collins, 2015; Beatch et al., 2009; Duran, 2006; Freire, 1970). For instance, Furr and Bacharach (2013) contextualize the importance of psychometrics by stating that “our society receives information and recommendations based on research findings” (p. 3), a characterization that 7is very telling within a modernist scientistic culture (Illich, 1973/2001; Shin, 1994). For these reasons, it is fruitful for counselling psychology training and practice to be informed by educational theory and to be analysed through an educational lens.Educational theory has engaged with the same questions that counselling psychology has struggled with such as how to actualize multiculturalism and social justice (Battiste, 1998; Brayboy & Maughn, 2009; Marker, 2006b; Smith, 2012a). Nevertheless, concerns of injustices against Indigenous peoples and Indigenous lands are not subsumed under these paradigms, and an exclusive focus on multiculturalism and social justice as progressive forces within counselling reduces Indigenous priorities and realities to merely relative cultural positions and disables prior claims to stolen lands (R. D. Goodman & Gorski, 2015; Stewart et al., 2017).Indigenous Decolonial ScholarshipThroughout the present dissertation projects, a decolonial lens (Battiste, 1998; Smith, 2012a) motivates the selection of research questions and subject matter at a philosophical level. This lens, and Indigenous scholarship in general, is selected for its temporal precedence in this place and its millennia of development of ontological knowledge about being, land, and human wellness (Stewart et al., 2017). Violence against the being of the land and against peoples of the land, and the necessity of respecting the knowledge-holders in our place call us to use the power of our institutions not for re-inscribing anti-Indigenous sentiment but to build new relationships with land, Indigenous host peoples, and diverse ways of life. To give a brief snapshot of the flavour of Indigenous scholars' decolonial critiques I cite from Marie Battiste:Indigenous Knowledge is far more than the binary opposite of western knowledge. As a concept, Indigenous Knowledge benchmarks the limitations of Eurocentric theory—its methodology, evidence, and conclusions—reconceptualizes the resilience and self-reliance of Indigenous peoples, and underscores the importance of their own philosophies, heritages, and educational processes. Indigenous Knowledge fills the ethical and knowledge gaps in Eurocentric education, research, and scholarship. By animating the voices and experiences of the cognitive “other” and integrating them into educational processes, it creates a new, balanced centre and a fresh vantage point 8from which to analyze Eurocentric education and its pedagogies. (as cited in Brayboy & Maughn, 2009, p. 5)Studying in this area has led me to the intersection of educational philosophy with decolonial theory, and to contested histories and ontologies in Indigenous-settler relations in educational spaces (Marker, 2006b). To that end, I cite from several key works in the area of decolonial thought within educational theory, and I am informed by selected readings arising out of decolonial and counter-imperial discourses in (colonially named) Canada (Furniss, 1997; Haig-Brown, 2009), the United States (Brayboy & Maughn, 2009; Duran, 2006; Marker, 2006b), Latin America (Blaser, 2009; Freire, 1971, 1968/2000, 1970; Gutiérrez, 2014; Illich, 1971/2000, 1973/2001), and New Zealand (Smith, 2012a). On one hand, Indigenous counselling psychology programs exist in Canada, such as at the University of Victoria (Indigenous Communities Counselling Psychology, n.d.), and creating space in educational environments to support Indigenous Knowledge Systems (Brayboy & Maughn, 2009) is indeed important for the sake of Indigenous students (Grande, 2008; Smith, 2012a). On the other hand, my interest is in a complementary but markedly different project, still grounded in decolonization, which is focused on the general Canadian counselling discipline per se, including nonindigenous students, professors, and professionals (Kuokkanen, 2008).Dr. Alanaise Goodwill asks, “how can counselling psychology scholars approach this work in a power-sensitive manner and appreciate the specific roles and responsibilities Indigenous peoples carry in terms of remaining the holders of metaphysical (read: spiritual) knowledge?” (personal communication, August 29, 2017). The present focus on metaphysics, and particularly on the metaphysics of being in relation to land (Wildcat & Deloria, 2001), responds to gaps in the multicultural counselling literature (R. D. Goodman & Gorski, 2015). Developments in decolonial values in educational theory inform my work in counselling psychology on the significance of land for cognition, history, and counsellor development (Ahenakew, 2014; Barman, 1995; Brayboy & Maughn, 2009; Freire, 1968/2000, 1970; Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998). I hope that projects such as these will help lead counselling theory and training toward a two-way dialogue with Indigenous Knowledge systems and with other diverse 9knowledge traditions on theoretical and practical levels (Brayboy & Maughn, 2009; Freire, 1968/2000). My focus is on the application of the noted areas of educational theory to counselling psychology, and particularly to the pedagogy and curriculum of counselling psychology graduate training. Accordingly, I am interested in the role in counselling training of listening both to Indigenous Knowledges and to the worldview, history, and politics of diverse counselling graduate students (R. D. Goodman & Gorski, 2015), and the movement from one-way education of students and clients to two-way dialogue (Bauder, 2011; Buber, 2004; Freire, 1968/2000; Gantt, 2000). The aim of this work is to promote an idea of counselling training that can serve all students during the educational segment of their professional careers as opposed to debilitating career decisions through suppression of histories and worldviews (Arthur & Collins, 2015; Blustein, 2006; Marker, 2006b; Stewart & Marshall, 2017; Wong et al., 2013). The present dissertation projects demonstrate the fruitfulness of decolonial thought in achieving these goals.Metaphysics and OntologyThe choice of the word metaphysics instead of the word ontology clarifies a distancing from an anthropological sense of ontology as cultural artifact which renders political-historical claims as relative and subjective. Using the term metaphysics focuses us on the imperative of listening to the significance of the claims of the other about the nature of the world and the nature of humans, rather than simply letting us be entertained by what we can safely presume are anachronistic beliefs stemming from cultural so-called backgrounds. The anthropological sense has its own strengths, as I have written about elsewhere (Clegg & Rocha, 2018), and it is used by Indigenous authors as well.An engagement with colonial history highlights metaphysics as a lens that focuses on the moral and intellectual imperatives arising from an interface between mainstream pedagogy and a decolonial critique. We are led, then, to ask difficult and sometimes nebulous questions of the field. How can we move forward discourses in Canadian counselling psychology in order to shift from relativistic paralysis, and isolation from learning from other traditions, towards an ethic of listening and responsibility for responding to the reality of the histories, politics, and ontologies of our clients and students? How can decolonial theory inform and critique how Canadian counsellor education and counselling psychology 10programs can engage with these questions of history, politics, ontologies, and land?NewcomersOne of the features of a decolonial critique is that it deconstructs typical conceptions of colonial state citizenship as natural and immutable (Furniss, 1997; Haig-Brown, 2009; Smith, 2012a). The term immigrant means different things in light of this critique, often including settler-immigrants and a sense of immigrant-hood attributed to descendants, highlighting the ongoing, and relatively brief, welcome and hosting of settlers by Indigenous peoples. In the present research, I use an expanded concept of newcomer to ground a conception of nonindigenous peoples that includes different migratory pathways. I should note that there are clearly nuances and exceptions to any such paradigm, and here slavery and other forced migrations must be kept in mind.Decoloniality and Psychology of WorkingThe psychology of working (Blustein, 2006) helps to frame my overall research program by focusing on the material processes of access to opportunity and therefore to distribution of wealth. I have also chosen this lens because of counselling's history in the nexus of career guidance and education (Beatch et al., 2009; Blustein, 2006). Blustein (2006, e.g., p. 156) identifies education as a stage in working, and one in which critical traditions such as feminism, critical race theory, and liberation theory identify barriers to working. I am using this foundational assumption in my work, that professional education is a stage of work-life, one in which career decisions must be made as professional identity is built. Presently, there appears to be a lack of scholarship at the interface of decoloniality and career theory. Other critical traditions in career theory appear to be the closest avenue through which it seriously entertains discrepant worldviews on par with its own. While Blustein (2006) does make use of anti-imperial theorists from Latin American liberatory traditions (Freire, 1968/2000; Martín-Baró, 1996), some of the unique metaphysical contributions of these traditions can be lost along the way. Applying an explicitly decolonial critique to this career lens offers a framework that can focus on the material and metaphysical consequences of marginalization of students' worldviews during the educational stage of their career development.11First ProjectIn the first project, The Metaphysics of Counselling History on Colonized Land, I demonstrate that a metaphysical level of analysis leads us to appreciate the primacy of the being of Indigenous healing education in this place, and the necessity of situating later Euro-American disciplinary histories in context of this prior history on the land.This project builds a new way to tell the history of our field within the land in which we find ourselves practicing. It is a theoretical work that orients us to Indigenous histories, but specifically to metaphysics as a central organizing principle of worldview which contextualizes and provides depth to discrete healing acts—both within Indigenous Knowledge systems and Western traditions. It advocates a practical way of teaching the history of counselling psychology from place-based values responsive to land, history, power, and intersecting knowledge traditions. This work is of article length and will be submitted to a journal. It is aimed at any counselling psychologist or counsellor who orients people to our field through the telling of its history. Second ProjectIn the second project, Cognitive Imperialism in the Metaphysics of Intelligence, I identify problems in the psychological tradition of intelligence research which open up space for land-based experiential modes of cognition. I argue for a broader conception of cognition reflecting this reality, which affects our field due to the central curricular presence of intelligence theory as a tacit definition of humanness.This project is also theoretical. It is situated within the larger discipline of psychology, and aims at narrow conceptions of human cognition with the intelligence research community. It argues that landed cognition has been wrongly disparaged and that Indigenous metaphysics of thinking with the land leads to a broader and more human notion of thought. Methodologically, philosophical fallacies in metaphysical reasoning are traced through Western sources to identify places where the case against landed thinking becomes inadequate. This paper is oriented towards more philosophical and theoretical issues. It uses more philosophy of science terminology than the other projects. The paper is longer than article 12length and will be translated into a publication at a later date.Third ProjectThe third project, Meeting Worldviews in Places of Counsellor Education and Counselling Psychology Programs, investigates nonindigenous counsellor education and counselling psychology students' ways of being in places of schooling where their worldview does not match their institutions' worldview. This study involves students who have immigrated to Canada as well as students whose families have been in Canada for a number of generations.This project is qualitative and hermeneutic, focusing on Canadian counselling students who are nonindigenous and who self-identify as having a worldview different from their institution. I use the term worldview as a proxy for metaphysics within interviews and analysis as it is easier for participants and a general audience to relate to. The project aims to understand the experiences of students in their development of worldview in places, their interface with institutional realities, and the role of place and land in these concerns, with an eye toward access to opportunity (Arthur et al., 2013; Blustein, 2006).Results include that students developed worldview through family, culture, place, and travelling. They strategically managed their ways of being in the face of invalidation in education in order to succeed, while supplementing with much of their own learning about cultural and Indigeneity competence. Their careers and counselling orientations related to their worldviews, and migration and relating to land featured in these connections.The audience of this piece is the field of counsellor education as well as instructors and curriculum developers in psychology and counselling psychology more generally. This final study can be seen as an example of the application of the overall dissertation's body of theory. It is presented in a comprehensive format which will be used for publication extracts at a later date.13Project 1:The Metaphysics of Counselling History on Colonized LandAbstractHere we offer a conceptual analysis of how Canadian counsellor education and counselling psychology can respond to colonial history through the teaching of its own history. Drawing on literature in counselling, education, and decolonial Indigenous scholarship, we work toward a positive and practical way to teach history that addresses power, colonization, and Indigenous intellectual traditions. When those in Canadian counsellor education and counselling psychology really listen to Indigenous intellectual traditions too often silenced in Western academic institutions, one of the first things heard is a concern for the beingness of things over and above methods of knowing. They are invited by many Indigenous theorists to expand their exclusive focus on epistemology into an appreciation of metaphysics (Marker, 2006b; Mika, 2012; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). To move to a place of listening on the level of being, this means that we must ask what counselling really is, rather than how it has been known through scientific epistemology (Duran, 2006). We claim that this focus on being leads to a broadened horizon of counselling as healing education. In listening to Indigenous traditions, counselling is also invited into the fundamentality of place or land in understanding what is. To tell the story of the field with historical fidelity gives rise to the opportunity to respond to colonization by re-evaluating the way we trace the lineage of the field, and by shifting towards a place-centred pedagogy of history (Marker, 2011). This situates and re-frames the arrival of Western accounts of healing education as hosted within this deeper history (Haig-Brown, 2009). It yields a radically different and markedly more humble and pluralistic pedagogy of the history of our field—one that is grounded within the reality of the land.Information about CollaboratorsThe primary author, Daniel Clegg, is an Irish-, Manx- and English-Canadian born in Chilliwack on unceded Stó:lō territory, and is a PhD candidate in the department of 14Educational and Counselling Psychology, and Special Education, University of British Columbia. Michael Marker is an Indigenous faculty in the Department of Educational Studies, Faculty of Education, UBC, who contributed to this work. We are also grateful for the guidance of Alanaise Goodwill, Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University, member of Sandy Bay Ojibway First Nation, Manitoba.IntroductionToday Canadian counsellors and counselling psychologists have an opportunity to deepen their engagement with history in the Canadian landscapes in which they teach and practice. Here we offer a conceptual analysis of how Canadian counsellor education and counselling psychology can respond to colonial history through the teaching of its own history. Valuable work in our field elaborates Indigenous counselling paradigms for Indigenous peoples specifically (e.g., Duran, 2006; Stewart et al., 2017). Yet we rather re-examine the pedagogy of history in the discipline of Canadian counsellor education and counselling psychology as a whole (R. D. Goodman & Gorski, 2015; Hogan & Vaccaro, 2006; Moghaddam & Lee, 2006; Watts, 2004). We build on previous decolonial work in counsellor education and counselling psychology (e.g., Duran, 2006; R. D. Goodman & Gorski, 2015; Stewart et al., 2017), in critical and Indigenous psychologies (e.g., Fanon, 1952/2008; Pe-Pua, 2006), and in dialogues between Indigenous and Western knowledges occurring in philosophy (Dallmayr, 1993; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001), science (Bang et al., 2013; Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998), and education (Donald, 2009; Furniss, 1997; Haig-Brown, 2009; Mika, 2012). These demonstrate that scholars across traditions are finding value in what each other are doing and that there are opportunities for the field as a whole to engage more fully. Our contribution is in applying these domains of knowledge to a philosophical focus on metaphysics of history pedagogy specifically in the field of counsellor education and counselling psychology. We are bringing into conversation Western scientific psychology and certain Indigenous intellectual traditions, especially their critiques of psychology and accounts of Indigenous worldview and human development (e.g., Peacock & Wisuri, 2006). Here we outline the division between these traditions, we identify why engagement is important, and we enumerate a few false steps. We encourage an engagement at a more foundational level 15through an act of listening, and we work toward a positive and practical way to teach history that addresses power, colonization, and Indigenous intellectual traditions. We argue that a pedagogical shift can be achieved by switching from a disciplinary history of epistemology to what counselling is in itself—to a place-based story of what is—and by situating Western disciplinary knowledge in the context of the first voices of Indigenous Knowledges in this place of Canada.Audience, Disciplines, and Language SetsOur intended audience is those who teach the history of counselling in Canada. However, we consider this very broadly in terms of how undergraduate students explain their studies in helping skills, how counsellors educate the public about counselling, how counsellors situate their field when explaining counselling to new clients, and how educators fix curricula, deliver pedagogy, and govern students' discourse in and out of class in ways that depend on concepts of history and discipline. Methodologically, we attempt to avoid cultural appropriation through a number of measures. We developed the article through a three-year collaboration between the two authors and with input from Indigenous counselling scholar Alanaise Goodwill. We respond to existing Indigenous critiques of Western institutions and to explicit requests for cross-cultural engagement. We use public-facing sources from Indigenous scholars. We also advocate that nonindigenous counsellors should first listen to the depth of Indigenous worldviews rather than extracting discrete ceremonial practices and appropriating them for other purposes out of context. Marker (1998) writes that nonindigenous folks should attend to the critiques of contemporary society stemming from Indigenous worldview rather than exoticizing practices to create a superficial appropriated shamanism (also see Stewart et al., 2017). This paper is more of a general call to listen than a programmatic prescription—further pedagogical work could go deeper into specific histories and languages in local areas.Why Do We Want to Listen?Counselling as a profession and as part of public Canadian institutions holds an important voice in Canadian society on fundamental metaphysical beliefs about what it means to be human, to be healthy, and to have correct thinking and worldview (Comas-Díaz, 2010; Cushman, 1992; Leahey, 2009). These are both theoretical influences and practical, as 16counsellors implement ideas in therapy, public mental health advocacy, court reports and testimony, school curricular additions, and parenting workshops. Yet Western social sciences such as psychology and counselling psychology have been criticized for their insularity, elitist locus of knowledge production, and naive universalization of a Euro-American worldview (Moghaddam & Lee, 2006; Norsworthy & Khuankaew, 2006; Staeuble, 2006; Suzuki et al., 1996). Counselling psychology's promotion of dominant models of humanness as superior to local and traditional knowledges damages its relationship with Indigenous peoples, among others (Battiste, 1998; Danziger, 2006; Duran, 2006; Fanon, 1952/2008).So why should Canadian counselling psychology engage more seriously with Indigenous intellectual traditions, such that they might alter the foundations of the field? It is easy to cite a moral duty for reconciliation, put one tradition beside another, and then opt-out with an easy gloss of multiculturalism that leaves our own assumptions and the telling of the history of our field intact. We must move beyond this facile relativism (R. D. Goodman & Gorski, 2015). Kurt Danziger, an historian of psychology recognized in Canada and internationally, writes that “the tendency to conceptualize social context solely in terms of 'culture' almost invariably goes hand in hand with a tendency to overlook the importance of power relationships” (Danziger, 2006, p. 222). So why should counsellors listen more seriously? Historical accuracy, the scientific search for truth, the desire for a fulsome and fecund curriculum recognizing a diverse world, and the recognition of Indigenous peoples as harbouring an authoritative and original voice on what it means to be human and what it means to be in relations with other developing humans are all good reasons.Nationalist HistoriesThe history of Canadian counselling is situated within the larger history of Canadian national histories and global histories of colonization. Māori decolonial theorist Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012b) relates that “European powers had by the nineteenth century already established systems of rule and forms of social relations which governed interaction with the indigenous peoples being colonized” (p. 27). One of these forms of relations is “to consider indigenous peoples as not fully human, or not human at all” (p. 27) which implies not “being capable of creating history, knowledge and society” (p. 27), and which “justified various policies of either extermination or domestication” (p. 27). These distortions create lacunae in 17our received historical education that set the stage for nationalist histories such as those of Canada.Canadian national histories tend to be oriented towards European origins, and these form public consciousness of citizenship. Anthropologist Elizabeth Furniss (1997) of the University of Calgary argues that by contrast, Indigenous peoples are cast into “supporting characters in a larger historical script” (p. 18), leaving Indigenous histories only acknowledged as a natural backdrop to the cumulative progress of individual civilized European men. She writes that “histories commemorating the arrival of early non-Native explorers, settlers, missionaries, and industries in the remote regions of Canada constitute the master narratives of Canadian nationalism” (p. 7). This one-sided view is “produced and communicated in the most significant of public domains, . . . [e.g.,] public schools . . . and . . . plays a vital role in rationalizing past and present social institutions” (Furniss, 1997, p. 7). These histories create a “master narrative of Canadian nationalism” (p. 11) that operates on the levels of language, symbols, and intuition, such that merely saying the word pioneer “evokes images of settlers arriving in remote regions, . . . struggling against the forces of nature and, at times, 'hostile' Indians, and 'opening up' the wilderness for the advancement of civilization” (Furniss, 1997, p. 11).The genesis of the social sciences themselves is tied up with the ideological divide between allegedly developed modern and undeveloped pre-modern peoples: "disciplinary boundaries were established between, on the one hand, the study of European modernity in national economy, sociology, and political science and, on the other hand, the study of 'pre-modern' cultures in anthropology and ethnology (Wallerstein et al. 1996; Conrad and Randeria 2002)" (Staeuble, 2006, pp. 193–194). Gulerce (2006; also Moghaddam & Lee, 2006; Staeuble, 2006) considers the ramifications of international dissemination of social sciences along channels of power, writing that psychology's “internationalization in particular, just as globalization in general, is understood as its dissemination from the Western center toward the periphery. This, too, is itself a major modernist bias” (p. 91)—modernist bias meaning a prejudice among industrialized nations that they are intellectually superior. The histories of developmental psychologies are tied up with the history of exploitative use of social sciences for the so-called development of so-called third-world 18peoples. The strong American position in the politics of post-World War II international relations led to American psychology's international dissemination (Staeuble, 2006). In the Canadian context, being an enduring settler-colonial state, this type of foreign dissemination turned homeward into an internal dissemination because Indigenous peoples are often in nation-to-nation relations with the Canadian state and are treated as so-called developing peoples by the state (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2012).Disciplinary HistoriesWe can see the parallel attitude in disciplinary stories of discovery of psychological principles and of the universal light of science's conquest of the pernicious darkness of localized superstitions. A Canadian introductory psychology professor once proudly announced, pointing to the chalkboard, “this is the definition of intelligence!” This hubris is not just an endearing academic peculiarity, but rather a superficial scientific fundamentalism that is an unacknowledged function of the Canadian colonial project. In colonial history-telling the “frontier encounter is characterized by moral opposition, conflict, and struggle . . . resolved through domination and conquest. Ultimately, settlers reemerge from the frontier experience transformed and upholding the values of self-reliance, democracy, competition, and freedom” (Furniss, 1997, p. 9; Donald, 2009). Within Canadian colonial histories, “the frontier myth is drawn upon . . . to provide a metaphysical understanding of the nature of history, individual agency, and humankind's ongoing relationship to the social and natural world” (Furniss, 1997, p. 10). In the Canadian context, psychology and counselling psychology's standard positivist pedagogical trope of science pressing back the dogmatism of religion and the subjectivity of spirituality recapitulates the colonial repression of metaphysical thought in Indigenous intellectual traditions and Indigenous sciences (Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998; Stewart et al., 2017). In contrast to the diffuse cloud of favoured philosophies in counselling psychology, non-European intellectual traditions are, with few exceptions, slotted into the categories of mere culture, unreal spirituality, and naturally occurring cognitive behaviours—against which transcendental European-Canadian reason struggles in the search for autonomy and truth.The Need for Indigenous HistoriesSmith (2012b) writes, “having been immersed in the Western academy which claims 19theory as thoroughly Western, which has constructed all the rules by which the indigenous world has been theorized, indigenous voices have been overwhelmingly silenced” (p. 30). Indigenous perspectives have hit hidden institutional walls, and when admitted by Westerners, have been “defiled by a dissecting and shelving of entities and phenomena. Indigenous experiences were mutilated by a scientific classificatory matter-of-fact-ness that refused the metaphysical imperative” (Marker, 2018, p. 6). Therefore, a critical analysis of power and history as they impact metaphysics is key to an engagement (Danziger, 2006).The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada reported that “Canadians have been denied a full and proper education as to . . . the history of the relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples.” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2012, p. 25). It noted that the earlier Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples called for “a new relationship between Canada and Aboriginal peoples” based on “mutual recognition, mutual respect, sharing, and mutual responsibility” (p. 23). Although the present paper is not limited to the discourse of reconciliation, this call for sharing contains an important spirit with which counselling can pursue relations in education, as “the Canadian school system has a major role to play in re-educating the country about this part of our long-term, shared history, with its present-day implications” (p. 9). Pedagogical Restriction of Theoretical OrientationsUnderstanding The GoalsTo understand the history of colonization and the impacts on relationships with Indigenous Knowledges, we have to understand the ends (teleologies) toward which counselling ideologies are directed (Marker, 2015). One place to examine counselling psychology ideology is in what are called theoretical orientations. Theoretical orientations are not simply low-level behavioural theories of counselling skills, nor mid-level psychological theories of limited scope, as they are said to be by some professors of counselling psychology. These orientations explicitly stem from whole-sale worldviews and epistemological (knowledge-making) packages well known to the rest of the world, and training explicitly necessitates that new practitioners school clients in these views as well as personally take on these positions themselves (personal reflections being graded objectively, cf. Ruitenberg, 2011). An example of this today is Irvin Yalom's influential brand of 20existential psychotherapy which explicitly instructs counselling students to forcibly reeducate their clients to believe that experiences of spirituality and thoughts of the afterlife are silly defence mechanisms to be eradicated (Overholser, 2005; Yalom & Josselson, 2011). Our sanction of these ideas is not neutral—“academic writing . . . privileges sets of texts, views about the history of an idea, what issues count as significant; . . . we too can render indigenous writers invisible or unimportant while reinforcing the validity of other writers” (Smith, 2012b, p. 38).The Language of SchoolsThe theoretical orientations of counselling psychology are representatives of what we refer to as schools of thought within psychology, and in turn, these schools of thought implement worldviews that differ on what it is to be human and on the very subject matter of psychology: Danziger (2006) writes that the historical origin of “the language of 'schools'” (p. 211), during psychology's North American development before World War II, was a way of obscuring “the fact that there was fundamental disagreement about the subject matter of psychology and the appropriate way of studying it” (p. 211). This language of schools has persisted to the present, as a device for a limited plurality it is true, but also as a device for obscuring important philosophical discussions which then defer to dominant positivist metaphysics (Leahey, 1980). At present in Canada, the table of available theoretical options is not set with what is available in the history of the land. Nor is it set with what is available in the full range of the field. Rather it is set by arrangements of disciplinary boundaries that are expressions of power over epistemology (forms of knowledge). The table is set for diverse students to eat a rehearsal of compliance to dominant worldviews (cf. Ruitenberg, 2011). As this restriction excludes Indigenous worldviews, counselling recapitulates centuries of settler educational colonialism that eradicated these worldviews from places of epistemological authority (Rosaldo, 1989). Add to this that counselling psychology programs are professional programs that control access to employment in settler wealth-accumulation economies (Blustein, 2006), and that universities often require a stay away from home, and we have a disturbing resonance with Canada's histories of residential schools (Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 2006). As Smith (2012b) summarizes, “Indigenous peoples have been, in many ways, oppressed by theory” (p. 39).21Theory Versus CultureThe zeitgeist of counselling psychology, while it now interfaces with diversity in new ways, still largely sees Indigenous Knowledges as related to counselling only through the lens of uncritical multiculturalism and furthermore sees multicultural competence as a specialized feature of professional practice to be pulled out with ethnically defined others. Students are required to learn a Euro-American orientation as their model for professional thought, then only learn to practice sensitivity to other worldviews for the sake of the individual client. To our knowledge, the reverse does not occur. Critical multicultural counselling perspectives (e.g., R. D. Goodman & Gorski, 2015) often are seen as optional specializations or fringe elements and not taken as the foundation of psychological discourse. Even in classes which integrate these perspectives, they are often not the framing model of the field but are rather lines for future development and areas for self-directed study on one's own time by interested students—which is code for niche or minority students. Students get the message that they can make it through to their professional careers without a functional grasp of these topics. Additionally, there may be a lack of faculty interested in teaching such material, students may not have room for elective courses among mandatory courses, and elective courses may then be cancelled due to low enrolment. Rauna Kuokkanen (2008) argues that these lapses are “not limited to merely not-knowing or lack of understanding” (p. 63) but actually result from “practices and discourses that actively foreclose other than dominant epistemes [(knowledges)] and refuse to seriously contemplate their existence” (p. 63), and in so doing render their metaphysical underpinnings silent. We argue that in counselling psychology this seems to be achieved through the invisible bifurcation of theoretical orientations from cultural competency specializations—clearly in this split the latter do not count as the former, and do not contribute to theorizing unless they are secularized, dehistoricized, and appropriated (Deloria, 1999b; Paranjpe, 2006; Taiana, 2006). These curricular observations uncover normative assumptions about the mainstream that are fundamental in the educational system despite any aspirational gloss (Moghaddam & Lee, 2006).On the Fringes22This situation in counselling education parallels the delivery of so-called psycho-education to counselling clients who must find supposedly alternative services if they wish to get culturally safe counselling, and it parallels the history of public education in Canada as well. Furniss (1997) notes that in “1995 the BC provincial government created a province-wide Grade 12 elective course: BC First Nations Studies” (p. 19) but that this simply characterizes the inertia of colonial curriculum: “challenges to the dominant nationalist histories are being introduced on the fringes of the educational system: in supplementary curriculum rather than in official textbooks, and in optional electives rather than in standard academic subjects” (p. 20). Although some progress has been made in public education, the same phenomenon is still visible in psychology. Ojibway counselling psychologist Alanaise Goodwill argues that part of the inertia comes from “exclusionary institutions where counselling psychology is taught that have been ignorant to Indigenous Knowledges or have silenced Indigenous voices" (personal communication, Oct 20, 2019). While there have been rare and important inroads for Indigenous graduate students specifically (e.g., Marshall et al., 2017), Goodwill points out that more generally, “there is no mandatory course content attending to decolonization of our knowledge systems in counselling psychology” and there is no inherent “mechanism in our training programs or supervision models to disrupt this inevitable way of reproducing ourselves” as colonially-minded scholars and practitioners.Counselling as a European-Canadian Specialty?Here we are interested in reformulating the field as a whole. One way towards this would be to recast what is now Canadian counselling psychology as a European-Canadian settler cultural specialization, but this would then immediately beg the same question of what the overarching field is beyond such cultural specialization (Danziger, 2006; Moghaddam & Lee, 2006). Some authors might favour no overarching field, but as one is in power we will speak to it. In addition, seeing Canadian counselling psychology as directly representing the cultures of all European-Canadians is also problematic, and while many Euro-Canadians may find more purchase in an education designed for participation in homogenized visions of human psychological functioning and of global neoliberal citizenship, it may be more useful to pit both Euro-Canadians and Indigenous peoples against these unquestioned universals (Cushman, 1992; Escobar, 2004; Illich, 1971/2000, 1973/2001; Pidgeon et al., 2013; Stewart 23et al., 2017). In counselling psychology this line of thought aims critique at familiar concepts such as adaptation and adjustment (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and economically uncritical career engagement (e.g., DeBell, 2006, p. 326; cf. Adamuti‐Trache et al., 2013; Coutinho & Blustein, 2014; Ellis & Chen, 2013).One-Way EducationListening to history is central because it sheds light on interrelations across boundaries (Donald, 2009), and because it explains the secondary status accorded to Indigenous Knowledges as an intentional product of societal operations. Kawagley and Barnhardt (1998) write that “the tendency in most of the literature on Native education is to focus on how to get Native people to understand the Western/scientific view of the world” (p. 126). For instance, career counselling theorist Camille DeBell (2006) says that lack of “'mental' infrastructure (e.g., the willingness to adopt a scientific paradigm)” is “directly linked” to “the turmoil in many emerging nation–states” (p. 326). Conversely, “there is very little literature that addresses how to get Western scientists and educators to understand Native worldviews. . . . Non-Native people, too, need to recognize the existence of multiple worldviews and knowledge systems” (Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998, p. 126).Problems With MulticulturalismIn some ways, a reimagining of counselling has already been undertaken by multicultural counselling movements which have improved cultural responsiveness towards students and clients (R. D. Goodman & Gorski, 2015). These efforts are immensely important. However, there are problems with multiculturalism when harnessed superficially in service of the status quo. For instance, they sometimes remain reduced to, and arbited by, established interests and paradigms (R. D. Goodman & Gorski, 2015; Marker, 2006b; St. Denis, 2011; Tuck & Yang, 2012). Marker (2006b) points out the reductive nature of democratic pluralist notions of multiculturalism which operate by reducing all parties' histories and politics down to merely relative and subjective positions. This is problematic for racialized people, immigrants, and Indigenous peoples alike because of the central relevance of their different-but-objective histories of struggle with colonial society (St. Denis, 2011). Sweeping these under the rug as quaint-but-harmless cultural beliefs is not only patronizing but deeply unjust. Yet this is the foundation of Canadian multiculturalism. As Marker notes, 24Canadian prime minister Pierre Trudeau's White Paper of 1969 attempted to reduce Indigenous peoples' claims to national sovereignty, lands, and recompense to just this kind of relativistic and powerless subjective position in the name of multicultural equality (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1969)—an equality based on individual economic participation. This government paper, incidentally, included career counselling in its proposed process of assimilating Indigenous people into the Canadian economy. Moodley (2007) rhetorically asks, can a “multiculturalism that is often politically powerless . . . and socially neutral . . . articulate a meaningful analysis of many of the traumatic experiences that clients face on a day to day level, such as racism, sexism, misogyny, homophobia and economic oppression?” (p. 3).At risk of being occluded are the histories of violence against Indigenous Peoples and Indigenous Knowledge Systems (Brayboy & Maughn, 2009). These include the forced removal of many Indigenous peoples from their networks of relationships with the beings of the ecosystem, subsequent degradation of the being of the land itself (Marker, 2017), as well as cultural genocide specifically targeting Indigenous metaphysics, knowledge systems, and life-ways (Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 2006). The idea of violence being metaphysical, or to do with being, may be understood in two connected ways. On the one hand it can mean violence against intellectual traditions which contain metaphysical views, to repress these views and quell political opposition. On the other hand, it can mean violence against being itself, such as the removal of Indigenous children from the land of which they are an integral part. Entangled in these are the roles played by colonial settler European systems of education and medicine (roots of our field), which may continue to this day in parallel colonial structures embedded in professional higher education training programs (Barman, 1995; Wong et al., 2013).There are, however, critical and Indigenous counselling scholars who interface with different groups on a dignified level, recognizing autonomy, intellectual tradition, and epistemology and metaphysics (Brock, 2006a; Duran, 2006; R. D. Goodman & Gorski, 2015; Stewart et al., 2017). As important as these are, we suspect they have not been able to alter the core organizing principles of the field to date. Due to the power of the institution, these efforts to make counselling relevant to a multitude of groups have been received by the field 25as a project for these groups and not for the edification of the general field about what counselling could be (Moghaddam & Lee, 2006). Granted, various sanctioned theoretical orientations pose differing metaphysics and epistemologies, but as I have illustrated above, the pedagogical expedience which selects a subset of these positions often more readily reasserts the field's perspectives than broadens them (Moodley, 2007). Because of this, what these orientations possess in terms of foundational philosophy or worldview is almost never explored in counselling training even when students are explicitly instructed to explore underlying philosophies of their orientations. The impact remains shallow under the edifice of a superficial North American scientific psychological fundamentalism (Giorgi, 1981) and under the pressures on students to conform to become registered professionals (Blustein, 2006; Ruitenberg, 2011). This inevitably reproduces structures of power and epistemology, as well as metaphysics. This paper instead articulates an avenue for engagement with real claims between sovereign intellectual traditions.Why Indigenous Concerns Particularly?The experiences of Indigenous peoples are particularly important to bring into conversation with Western traditions of counselling psychology because of the large discrepancy in worldviews and their unique histories with settler-colonization (St. Denis, 2011; Tuck & Yang, 2012). Many immigrant and minority groups have very tragic histories with Canadian governments and Western institutions. For instance, Canadian governments marginalized, oppressed, displaced, and unjustly interned immigrants and racialized minorities, with historical markers such as the Komagata Maru for Sikhs and others, and the Japanese Canadian internment standing out as cultural soul wounds, if we can borrow that word from Duran's (2006) use with Indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, the histories of millennia of relationship with the land—this land—and of ecological and metaphysical knowledge of the land, then dispossession and genocide through legal, medical, and academic abuses, create a unique backdrop to current relationships between Indigenous peoples and Western institutions. Additionally, many Indigenous peoples find their worldviews and epistemologies fundamentally at odds with Western institutions in many ways, although not all ways (Coombes, 2012; Deloria, 1975; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). For instance, there is a critical disjuncture between the goals of homogenized colonial education 26and the goals of Indigenous place-based perspectives on personhood, being, and ecology (Marker, 2018; also see Moghaddam & Lee, 2006; Staeuble, 2006).For the above reasons, Indigenous peoples are an important conversation partner for a Canadian counselling psychology that wants to be more responsive to the diversity of worldviews in Canada (e.g., Moodley, 2007). Indeed, Celia Haig-Brown (2009) writes of how understanding the relationship between settler colonists and the history and politics of Indigenous peoples is an important vehicle through which immigrants can more subtly decipher their own positioning in Canadian society. An Act of ListeningHow can those in counselling psychology teach the history of the field in light of Canadian settler-colonization? The field can face this colonial history as an opportunity for recognizing, listening to, and learning from the unjust exercises of power and the resulting repression of intellectual traditions of Indigenous peoples (Battiste, 1998; Brayboy & Maughn, 2009). First and foremost in this recognition is the necessity of taking a back seat in framing these traditions—suspending disciplinary lenses—and instead engaging through a radical act of listening (Mika, 2016a). Only by first taking a step back can the field further bilateral conversations which can advance learning. There are many ways of listening. A naive realist or positivist perspective would suggest simply submitting our experiences of group differences to empirical investigation within established paradigms of psychological science which just happen to be materially and behaviourally reductive. This is clearly insufficient, and it should be noted that it does not capture with any depth the tradition of Western science itself (Rocha & Clegg, 2017), nor does it represent the plurality of viewpoints that make counselling psychology and Canadian counselling psychology unique, such as their inclusion of “a range of qualitative approaches and critical perspectives” (Sinacore et al., 2011, p. 283). On the other hand, a radical relativism fails to recognize a shared world where contested claims of metaphysics, history, and politics matter to other parties.However, counselling psychology can have a dialogue motivated by the hope that mutual learning can happen through different intellectual traditions which each contribute uniquely. Such a dialogue would have to afford respect toward shared and contested 27metaphysical positions, intellectual traditions and life-ways, notions of humanness, selfhood, and health (Illich, 1971/2000; Martín-Baró, 1996), and historical and political realities (Blaser, 2014; Stewart et al., 2017). From within the field, Roy Moodley (2007) of OISE envisions a new critical multicultural counselling psychology as comprising “a place of intersections, interconnections and cultural interpretations—where dominant hegemonic cultural meanings could be interrogated and reinscribed to empower marginalised voices” (p. 9).A Shift to BeingWhen those in counselling psychology listen openly to Indigenous intellectual traditions, one of the first things heard is a concern for the beings of things over and above methodological procedures of knowing. They are invited by many Indigenous theorists to expand their exclusive focus on epistemology (the study of knowing) into an appreciation of ontology (the study of being). Although many Indigenous authors use the term ontology, here we use the word metaphysics to stress the relevance ontologies have for mutual learning between peoples (Marker, 2006b; Mika, 2012; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). To move to a place of listening on the level of being, this means that counsellors must ask what counselling is in its being, rather than how it has been known through scientific epistemology (Duran, 2006; Heidegger, 1927/2010). Honoured Canadian historian of psychology Kurt Danziger (2006) writes cogently on epistemologically-oriented history in a way that echoes these Indigenous concerns:[a] powerful convention of the traditional historiography of psychology is its marked disciplinary focus. The history of modern psychology is commonly identified with the history of the discipline of psychology, where the boundaries of the discipline are defined by academic and professional organizational structures, not by the subject matter. (p. 222)Similarly, Canadian scholar of Argentina Cecilia Taiana (2006) analyzes the history of shifting Argentinian ideas of what constitutes knowledge and how these ideas “operated as a conceptual paradigm or discursive framework. . . . conceptual paradigms decide what counts as knowledge at any given moment and are, therefore, decisive in admitting into evidence or rejecting new data and theories” (p. 35). Taiana describes Argentina as using a European 28point of reference for its scientific identity, maintaining “close cultural and scientific ties with Europe” (p. 36); European culture “provided the 'mirror' into which the Argentinean secular and republican intelligentsia gazed to confirm its identity and destiny” (p. 36), satisfying this New World nation's “search for a lost, but desired, shattered” (p. 49) European identity. This “imaginary identity guided Argentineans' intellectual choices throughout the century and became a form of cultural filter for transatlantic migrating discourses in the disciplines of the mind” (p. 36). We argue that Canada, like Argentina, has used European and then American worldview as a cultural filter during the same time that it attempted to purge Indigenous intellectual traditions from the Canadian landscape.We argue that this Western modernist cultural filter includes a progressivist or "whig approach to history that views later developments as superior to earlier ones" (Paranjpe, 2006, p. 56; Leahey, 2009). Old is automatically bad in this worldview, and "pre-modern psychology is often deemed to be philosophy" (p. 56). In direct contrast to this kind of modernist history of psychology, Canadian psychology professor emeritus Anand Paranjpe (2006) describes ancient South Asian texts, often called religious or philosophical, as "significant contributions to psychological thinking" (p. 56) that have "set the tone for an uninterrupted intellectual tradition" (p. 57) of psychology. Aydan Gulerce (2006), writing on Turkish history of psychology, identifies the transition point in this attitude: “Turkish psychologists do not get to study systematically and think about the long historical period prior to the common celebratory historical marker of the establishment of a Western chair of experimental psychology” (p. 76). Does old equal bad in psychology as a consequence of the application of natural science methods to changing social phenomena? Or is this an intentional anti-traditional and ethnocentric stance stemming from Western enlightenment philosophy? Marker (2011) writes, “too often the history of Aboriginal-white relations in Canada is presented as a melodramatic morality play casting the Native people as victims of progress and as unwilling to adapt to the social transformations of the nineteenth century” (p. 109). And what about “change?” It is common to conceive of counselling as essentially about change, without a serious consideration of the metaphysics of change. However, Heidegger's (1927/2010) deconstruction of the concepts of presence and present moment 29sheds light on the sacrosanct idea of change. Māori professor of educational philosophy Carl Te Hira Mika (2015) writes that “Heidegger sketches a useful critique for a Māori approach to a problem that colonization itself does not want us to think about” (p. 4). Within the Western modernist context, change too easily leads to the connotation that one is changing from one present state of being, or even neurological state, at one present time to another present state of being or material condition at another present time (Heidegger, 1927/2010). Even without the reduction to changing neurological states, this way of seeing change forecloses on the metaphysics of diverse groups in favour of a linear progression of present “nows” in which, sliced thin, immediately present states are all that is. This negates the legitimacy of both phenomenological (Wildcat & Deloria, 2001) and some Indigenous (Mika, 2015) accounts of being in relation to developmental course, ancestors, and traditions—that is, of metaphysically being in relationship with past and future. We argue that there is more to learning from each other than is contained in overly familiar terms such as change. As Mika (2015) puts it, “it is possibly the darkness behind the glaringly evident object that draws us on to continue thinking” (p. 11), or as Melville's Captain Ahab orates, “all visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard masks. . . . some unknown but still reasoning thing puts forth the mouldings of its features from behind the unreasoning mask. If man will strike, strike through the mask!” (Melville, 1851, p. 181).Counselling as Human Development and Healing EducationCounselling as EducationWe all are familiar with the textbook definitions of counselling psychology as a technical problem management system. Certainly such a system can be of use within counselling, but is it what counselling is? These descriptions often fail to capture what practitioners know to be the case about the being of counselling for a variety of reasons, some emotional and aesthetic if not spiritual, some embodied and relational, and some counter-imperial. When we hear these descriptions of counselling we have a gut reaction as people who have sat with others in pain, knowing that the being of this type of relationship, whatever it is, has been covered over (Rocha, 2015). Education is a fitting lens for a few commonly cited reasons: the educational roots of counselling's history, the academic education of counsellors, and the education of society and 30clients with respect to mind, action, identity, personhood, and thinking. Besides these, we would like to add a more existential reason. If we see suffering as meaningful and as the human condition (Unamuno, 1954), then existing through suffering becomes an essential element of the human story—that is, a central aspect of human development. Therefore, counselling as being with people living through suffering means counselling as being part of human development, and this in turn means that counselling is education in the fullest sense of education as building and forming, leading and pulling out the humanity and the character of the person (Rocha, 2015).A Whole Worldview ApproachWhen those in Canadian counselling psychology think about Indigenous healing traditions, an obvious parallel to counselling interventions seems to be individual healing ceremonies and practices. Yet, in Western traditions, individual Western healing activities find their places inside Freudian, Eriksonian, neuro-cognitive, or Humanistic accounts of human development which serve as master-templates or worldviews. Similarly, Indigenous healing ceremonies and healing actions depend on larger Indigenous developmental cultural contexts and worldviews, without which they can easily be misunderstood, appropriated, or used dangerously (Duran, 2006; Kuokkanen, 2008; Waterfall et al., 2017). We acknowledge the traditional knowledge holders of human healing education. Listening to these Indigenous intellectual traditions means taking them not as ethnographic data, not as strictly of clinical relevance, and not as merely religious, but rather as developmental accounts of human life. We must frame this dialogue as an inquiry between developmental accounts from sovereign intellectual traditions rather than engaging only through the proxies of appropriated and secularized cultural products obtained through the resource extraction mentality of colonialism (Kuokkanen, 2008). In sum, we argue that we can take a broader look at counselling by considering it as an educational endeavour based on different accounts of human development. Counselling as healing education should first listen to developmental traditions which are the lifeblood of more specific healing interventions. It is towards this first step of listening to philosophy of being, existence, and meaning that is of utmost importance—that is, listening to metaphysics.31A Place-Based HistoryIn listening to Indigenous traditions, Canadian counselling psychology is invited into the fundamentality of place or land in understanding what is. Many Indigenous intellectual traditions are based on histories and knowledges embedded in places on the land (Brayboy & Maughn, 2009) where land comprises the ecosystem of experiential connections between human beings and non-human beings in local contexts (Marker, 2018; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). Land, in this sense, is a fundamental organizing principle of all subsequent being and knowledge. In contrast, when we tell the story of our field, we typically trace our history horizontally to European and Euro-American philosophies and sciences which have arisen in other places (Leahey, 2009). To tell the story of the field with historical fidelity to land means responding to colonization by re-evaluating the way we trace the lineage of the field, and by shifting towards a place-centered pedagogy of history (Marker, 2011). A common form of introduction for a multicultural paper in counselling psychology reads along these lines: “changing demographics in the USA have heightened the need to attend to cultural issues” (Soheilian et al., 2014, p. 379). While we recognize how important it is to disrupt a white monocultural narrative, there was no time where culture was in fact monolithic in North America. From Indigenous peoples to slavery and Asian labour to the establishment of an ethnically diverse European settler community with racist immigration policies (Dorfman, 1982), diverse peoples and viewpoints have always existed here. Therefore, it is erroneous to frame a discussion along the lines that recent immigration somehow increases our moral duty to not silence non-Northern European-North American voices. In addition, we argue that diverse voices have bearing on theory, not just on implementation concerns.First Voices in Healing EducationCombining this view of counselling as healing education with a place-based analysis of history, the field can teach from the question, what is the history of healing education in this place? In light of settler colonization and the coordinated repression of Indigenous Knowledges, Canadian counselling psychology can respond by acknowledging Indigenous peoples as first voices of healing education on this land (Deloria, 1999b; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). Within a realist framework, this is then an opportunity for deeper learning. The field 32can use its pedagogy of history to tell the truths of power and its abuse (Stewart et al., 2017), and to appreciate the role Indigenous peoples have in remaining the holders of deep knowledge of the being of this land and of human development on it.Cree education scholar Dwayne Donald (2009) strikes a cautiously positive chord that we can apply to counselling—he looks forward to “a provocative interpretive engagement” (p. 8) and believes that “the creation of texts and stories that emphasize human connectivity can complexify understandings of the significance of living together that traverse perceived frontiers of difference” (p. 8). Analyzing power can actually benefit integration as it is easy to get preoccupied with philosophical differences between traditions rather than appreciate the potential contribution for each other that has been blocked by colonial history (Marker, 2015). Similarly, Marker (2019) encourages us to “avoid presuming the incommensurability [(incompatibility)] of Western and Indigenous knowledge” (p. 11).The histories of Indigenous healing and educational traditions are as diverse as Indigenous peoples, and yet there are commonalities as well (Reeves & Stewart, 2017). Here we will offer a glimpse of one tradition, and the reader is directed to sources such as Reeves and Stewart (2017) for more. In their book The Four Hills of Life, Elder and former professor Thomas Peacock and author and artist Marlene Wisuri (2006) provide a traditional Ojibwe developmental philosophy or “teaching about the sacred journey of life and its purpose” (p. 9). They quote Lakota medicine man Black Elk's explanation of this journey's form: “everything the power of the world does is done in a circle. . . . The life of a man is a circle from childhood to childhood, and so it is in everything where power moves” (Black Elk & Neihardt, 1961, pp. 198–199; Peacock & Wisuri, 2006). All four of the hills of life relate to being and becoming: “in their beginnings, all things are nothing but a possibility. Then they are conceived and take on form and being” (Peacock & Wisuri, 2006, p. 21). Everything that comes into being has its own special purpose and meaning, including stars, mountains, and people—babies are “sacred gifts from the Creator” (p. 33). The first hill of life starts with the challenge of birth, and the “first responsibility was simply to be someone's baby and to be loved” (p. 33).The second hill of life is “a time for play, for education and acquiring the skills 33needed for adulthood, and for moral training to ensure we fulfill obligations to others” (Peacock & Wisuri, 2006, p. 47). Grandparents and parents help raise youth according to “the values of minobimaadiziwin (the Good Path) . . . honor the Creator; honor the elders, honor women, honor the elder brothers (plants and animals), be peaceful, keep promises, be kind, be courageous, and be moderate” (p. 52). Later on, ceremonies helped young people to find their life's purpose.The third hill of adulthood is long and complicated by “the burdens and duties of parenthood” and “the weight and uncertainties of leadership” (Johnston as cited in Peacock & Wisuri, 2006, p. 71). Nevertheless, “while men and women contend with the struggles in the physical order, they must live out their visions” (Peacock & Wisuri, 2006, p. 83). As we travel over the third hill, “we are surrounded by teachers—elders, peers, our partners, even the animal brothers. And lessons are everywhere—in the stars and the ripples of water, . . . on the petals of each flower” (p. 80). The journey over the fourth hill contains old age, grand-parenthood, the role of Elder, and the transition to death. Elders know cultural and community histories, are teachers and caregivers, sit on governing councils, and “were considered the voices of reason” (Peacock & Wisuri, 2006, p. 97). They conducted ceremonies including “burial rites for persons who walked on to the spirit world” (p. 98). Elders “had lived long enough and had had a path to follow, and were deemed to possess the qualities for teaching—wisdom, knowledge, patience and generosity” (Johnston as cited in Peacock & Wisuri, 2006, p. 99). Although “we exist to live out . . . our vision” (p. 105), “to live out our vision, we must ultimately follow the Good Path” (p. 106). The educational role of elders in the lives of youth connects the circle; “one circle is our own. Other circles hold everything else that exists before and after us” (p. 113).Although we are talking about Indigenous first voices in healing education, we are not positing a linear chronological history of counselling so much as a cyclical layering and mixing (Marker, 2019). According to some Indigenous writers, education as formation of the human person is also cyclically organized and oriented toward the center of one's being rather than a linear progression: human development is development of the spiritual self-in-community (Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998): “the central drawing force is the self. The self is grounded in the profound silence of the universe—its sustenance is spiritual, it is love, it is a 34sense of belonging to a tribe, belonging to the universe, belonging to something greater than one’s self” (p. 128).Second Voices in Healing EducationThe second story of healing education in northern North America is a layering and mixing of traditions—European, African, Asian, and so on. Celia Haig-Brown (2009) of York University explains that even early European-North Americans were not a homogeneous group:many people came for better lives, to escape war and famine, to seek freedom, to start anew in a country that was advertised as terra nullius, empty land, there for the asking. They came through being enticed by those who were finding the First Nations labour force less than cooperative and who were seeking to occupy “Indian” lands as a way of claiming them and their resources while simultaneously developing a market for the goods Europe was producing. (p. 9)Similarly, when European sciences began to filter over they were not simply the installation of a prepackaged product, but rather the contextual nexus of ideas reinterpreted in a particular place (Brock, 2006b; Taiana, 2006). Thus, the second voices of healing education are not one but many, and the Euro-American stories below are but a few of these.Origin Stories of Western CounsellingWhile we go into these stories, keep in mind the earlier and contemporaneous backdrop of educational theory. Genevan Jean-Jacques Rousseau's 18th century naturalism, for instance, promoted an individual developmental approach to vocational selection, and notably, American G. Stanley Hall's 19th century child study movement cast education as a biologically conceived developmental psychology (Van Hesteren, 1971). Laid over these, Euro-American scientific psychology has many origin stories (Leahey, 2009), counselling psychology has its own, and Canadian counselling psychology more still (Sinacore et al., 2011). Here we will quickly look at counselling's origins in the United States, from which Canadian counselling draws influence (Van Hesteren, 1971). The purpose here is not to do justice to a history of counselling, but rather to demonstrate a contextualization of one origin story in relationship with another. Vocational Guidance35Vocational guidance arose in the late 19th century and into the 20th in the United States (Herr, 2013). Industrialization and urbanization of work shifted 19th century options toward jobs that were displaced from local understanding of opportunities (Leahey, 2009). The United States also desired immigrants who would “contribute as new entries in the labour force” (Herr, 2013, p. 279). Immigrant integration implied some manner of orientation (Herr, 2013), and this posed an opportunity for psychological testing, although problematic ethnic immigration politics is involved here (Dorfman, 1982; Goddard, 1917).Standing somewhat outside the field of psychology and closer to education, the vocational guidance counsellor was to advance a humanitarian cause—that of alleviating unemployment and facilitating the careers of disadvantaged students. The vocational guidance counsellor was an adjunct role to vocational education which was a public school curriculum inserted to orient lower-class folk to practical, non-academic education that ostensibly would advance their employment options (Herr, 2013). They were “a new type of educator/counselor who would help students to interpret the new testing data in order to make an occupational choice” (p. 279). In so much as this was a project of advancing the standing of the lower classes, vocational guidance was a counter-cultural movement (B. Borgen, personal communication, January 14, 2019). However, within the United States, the humanitarian ideal was also tempered by a class-stratified system. Herr (2013) writes that “counselors were taught that vocational education was for those who were to enter the working class, not college” (p. 279). African American historian Carter G. Woodson (1933) commented on the Black experience with vocational guidance during this period: “in view of the Negro's economic plight most of the schools are now worked up over what is called 'vocational guidance' . . . To what, however, are they to guide their Negro students?” (p. 157). Education in practical trades is not necessarily a liberating force, Woodson argued. He wrote that “our schools are daily teaching Negroes what they can never apply in life or what is no longer profitable because of the revolution of industry” (p. 157) such as “individual garment making” (p. 157). Yet, the problem was not simply outdated curriculum but rather a lack of economic opportunity due to racism and the legacy of race-slavery;there can be no such thing as vocational guidance. Such an effort implies an 36objective; and in the present plight of economic dependence there is no occupation for which the Negro may prepare himself with the assurance that he will find employment. (p. 159) Mental TestingMeanwhile in the late 19th century, psychology was developing tests of mental abilities (Van Hesteren, 1971). In Germany, Wilhelm Wundt pushed for a scientific basis of psychology following the natural sciences. The British psychologist Francis Galton (1883) coined the English word eugenics (from Greek eugenes) to articulate his purpose of giving “the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily” (p. 25). He pursued this through statistically testing differences in allegedly heritable intelligence (Van Hesteren, 1971). Influenced by both, James Cattell brought mental testing to the United States as a quantitative science. In France, Alfred Binet developed age-graded intelligence tests for educational placement, and Henry Goddard and Lewis Terman applied this to the American context. American mental testing was employed successfully during World War I, subsequent educational positivists like Edward Thorndike proliferated the movement, and vocational guidance used it to mine for individual differences (Van Hesteren, 1971).Mental HygieneInfluenced by psychiatry and psychology, the mental hygiene movement began as an effort to improve the treatment of the mentally ill in the United States in 1908, and quickly spread to Canada (Van Hesteren, 1971). In 1918 the Canadian National Committee for Mental Hygiene was formed. By 1920, psychologists and teachers were involved in school-based mental hygiene education and the focus turned to prevention of “mental disease, mental defect, delinquency, and the many milder forms of social maladjustment and inefficiency” (Bridges, as cited in Van Hesteren, 1971, p. 49). The movement eventually began to merge with vocational guidance as a profession, informing it of “personal, social, and emotional problems” (Van Hesteren, 1971, pp. 57–58).Hosting Guidance in PlaceVocational guidance was a field predicated on placement. Here we are stretching the term placement to allude to the Indigenous and Marxist theme of how newcomers can gain a sense of place amid industrial and capitalist dislocation (Alexander, 2000; Deloria, 1975). We 37argue that vocational guidance sought to return people to a sense of place after migration—from rural communities, across the oceans, or through race-slavery. Granted, this sometimes reinscribed the proper “place” of the African-American and the so-called “feeble-minded” ethnic immigrant as working class or worse (Dorfman, 1982), but on the other hand it answered a need for placement in a physical sense and in a social sense in a post-industrialized metropolis where place no longer came naturally. In this limited way, within the tradition of vocational guidance we can see a healing education that places one's self into the landscape. Following our method of reading this second voice of vocational guidance through the hosting of Indigenous first voices of healing education, we would like to “make sure that education becomes realigned with the common philosophical thread, or the 'distant memory' of the ecological perspective. All peoples of the earth began from this vista” (Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998, p. 133). Here the distant memory of place among European, African, and Asian newcomers to North America is as powerful as the desire for a sense of place in the new landscape.Immigration of TheoryJumping forward to the late 20th century, various bodies of theory migrate into the field of counselling psychology—sometimes with sources acknowledged and sometimes without. Sometimes immigrated theory is seen as cross-culturally transferable and sometimes not. An example would be the use of Brazilian adult educator Paulo Freire's (1968/2000) concept of conscientização (conscientisation) within Blustein's (2006) Psychology of Working as a human process instead of an exclusively Latin American cultural phenomenon (Coombes, 2012). Ishu Ishiyama (2003) introduced multicultural counselling psychology to Japanese Morita therapy, arguing that it is “a viable and complementary helping model for other Asian and Western clients” (p. 217). In other contexts, theorists appreciate intellectual traditions of other cultures as supplying “culturally embedded model[s] of mental health” (Ishiyama, 2003, p. 217) which recognize “the positive value and cultural compatibility of indigenous therapies for working with the same culture members” (Ishiyama, 2003, p. 216; S. Sue & Zane, 2009). Appropriation38Unfortunately in some cases, theorists demarcate what is seen as real science or theory from the mere culture of other traditions (e.g., American Psychiatric Association, 2000). At times, theory has been appropriated by treating traditional knowledge as raw natural material to be discovered by a transcendental and dispassionate science (Marker, 1998). Without suggesting any conclusion here, consider the “striking similarities” (Hofmann, 2008, p. 284) between Japanese Morita therapy and the newer Acceptance and Commitment Therapy in the USA. Ironically, a culture's ideas can be appropriated as ethnographic data, secularized and reduced, established under a new name within psychology and counselling, and then educated back to the same cultural group as glossy science.Plural Roots Without Plural IdentityWhile this paints a pluralistic picture of second voices in the field, the practical day-to-day reality in educational and professional spaces is far from it. When counsellors are not faced with outright bias towards manualized treatments and randomized controlled trials with questionable ecological validity, they are commonly reminded that an imagined unitary Western model of scientific psychology remains the epistemological and metaphysical gold standard, while other incursions of theory are to be ghettoized by a tokenizing multiculturalism. Unfortunately, the diversity of immigrated bodies of theory does not represent what the field of psychology or even Canadian counselling psychology sees as its foundation. This situation non-metaphorically parallels the experiences of immigrants themselves. Indeed, common features of both immigration of theory and immigration of peoples are that their realities are denied full access to the discussion while simultaneously being told there is no equity problem in multicultural Canada or Canadian counselling psychology. In both contexts, problematic assumptions represent the interests of a previous generation of immigrant settlers who are unsure of the ramifications of acknowledging other peoples and perspectives—even while using them.An Invitation to EngageWe have argued that Canadian counselling psychology can listen to Indigenous intellectual traditions as a way to respond to colonial history. We found that this leads to a concern for questions of being, orienting us to the being of counselling as healing education, and to the being of history as based in the land. Rich traditions of healing education thereby 39come into focus as they layer and interact in Canadian lands. Educators want concrete suggestions for practice, and counsellors want to get their hands on individual healing practices. Learning through first-person experience is laudable. However, from an Indigenous perspective, metaphysically permeated worldviews taught by the land are of greater concreteness than any superficially appropriated ceremony abstracted away from place. It is to these bedrock understandings that the field's attention should first be drawn. Ongoing conversations between Western and Indigenous traditions will continue within Canadian counselling psychology, yet whether these reach places of epistemological and metaphysical authority remains to be seen. We are neither hopeful nor despairing, but are watchful, noticing any moves that create change in this complex situation.40Project 2:Cognitive Imperialism in the Metaphysics of IntelligenceAbstractThis theoretical paper identifies problems of metaphysics in the psychological tradition of intelligence research which open up space for land-based experiential modes of cognition. Situated within the general psychology discipline, it brings Western intellectual traditions into conversation with Indigenous scholarship. The paper argues that landed cognition has been wrongly disparaged and that Indigenous metaphysics of thinking with the land leads to a broader and more human notion of thought. The nature of conceptual thought is examined across these traditions, and prejudices about abstract thought are identified. Methodologically, philosophical fallacies in metaphysical reasoning are traced through Western sources to identify places where the case against landed thinking becomes inadequate. The paper consequently argues for a broader conception of cognition as a defining feature of humanness, and calls for reflection of this reality within central curricula in fields such as counselling psychology and counsellor education. Implications for teaching and researching intelligence theory through a decolonial lens are discussed.Introduction“We lie in the lap of immense intelligence, which makes us receivers of its truth and organs of its activity. When we discern justice, when we discern truth, we do nothing of ourselves, but allow a passage to its beams” (Emerson, 1841, para. 21). When the New England transcendentalist philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson penned this passage in 1841 he expressed a fresh American philosophy of thought and intelligence, but also one that harked back to European phenomenology and, as we will see here, one that resonates in particular ways with some Indigenous Knowledge traditions. On the other hand, contemporary mainstream psychology of intelligence, that is, American scientific psychology (e.g., Schneider & McGrew, 2012; regarding mainstream distinction, see Battiste, 1998; Danziger, 2006; Moghaddam & Lee, 2006), differs widely 41from many traditional Indigenous views on the nature of intelligence, cognition, and thought. Many rural and religious folks similarly differ from mainstream psychology in their philosophies of intelligence. Here I will bring together a sampling of these intellectual traditions and invite them into conversation through textual examination and an exchange of theoretical ideas. I will introduce the subject of metaphysics in intelligence research, and I will investigate embedded philosophical positions about the nature of reality within Western psychology of intelligence. I will describe three false steps of reasoning that psychologists can easily find themselves walking into in intelligence research, through which researchers can become more aware of metaphysical positions they are unknowingly assuming and promoting. I will employ these in analyzing prejudices about what constitutes cognition in intelligence literature, taking up the particular case of experiential knowledge of land. Finally, I will offer suggestions for how teachers and researchers of cognition can avoid marginalization of Indigenous, rural, and religious knowledges in their work. I hope to engage academic and clinical educators in psychology, counselling psychology, counsellor education, and related fields in the nuances of what it can mean to think and function cognitively in the world.A Brief History of TraditionsThe intellectual history of European and American intelligence testing originates with a social desire for a scientific and psychological understanding of individual differences and their potential role in facilitating educational placements (T. B. Rogers, 1995). In the 1860s in the United States, Seguin advanced psychological treatment and special education for cognitively disabled people, and in Europe Wundt established testing methods for individual differences in speed of thought (Gregory, 2007). In London, Galton further established the Individual differences approach in psychology, argued for a hereditary view of intelligence, and coined the term eugenics in 1883 (Gregory, 2007). Galton believed that intelligence helped “give to the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable than they otherwise would have had” (Levine, 2005, para. 14). Carrell worked with Galton in the 1880's and then landed a position at Columbia University in the US in the 1890's where his student Wissler began correlating academic standing with cognitive measures (Gregory, 2007). Back in Europe in 1905, at the request of the French 42state, Binet and Simon famously developed an intelligence scale for the humanitarian treatment of disabled students, identification of learning disabilities, and special educational placement. This was quickly appropriated by the psychologist and eugenicist Henry Goddard and put to use for the United States' program of immigrant ethnic profiling and deportation at port of entry (Dorfman, 1982; Gregory, 2007). Mental hygiene, eugenics, and sterilization were also strong Canadian interests. For instance, Alberta and British Columbia passed sterilization acts in 1928 and 1933 respectively. When Alberta's was repealed in 1972, “2,822 Albertans had been sterilized for reasons varying from possessing a 'low IQ to apparent promiscuity.'” (Levine, 2005, para. 32). Today after much technological and theoretical development, Western psychological intelligence testing is both ubiquitous and contested, at times actualizing humanitarian actions such as special education and government benefits, at times embroiled in debates of race and justice (Gottfredson, 1997).In contrast to the universalizing intent of the Western scientific approach to understanding intelligence, many traditional Indigenous Knowledge Systems focus on knowledges that originate within particular community contexts and ecosystems (Brayboy & Maughn, 2009; Marker, 2006b; Smith, 2012a). Micmac scholar Marie Battiste (1998) describes how Indigenous education “draws from the ecological context of the people, their social and cultural frames of reference, embodying their philosophical foundations of spiritual interconnected realities, and building on the enriched experiences and gifts of their people and their current needs for economic development and change” (p. 21). Both Western and Indigenous intellectual traditions of intelligence are rooted in the need to make social decisions about gifts, talents, or aptitudes, as is well argued by Canadian psychologist Tim Rogers (1995).Indigenous philosopher and theologian Vine Deloria Jr. (1999b), as well as other Indigenous scholars (Marker, 2018), explain how ecological community knowledge is the origin of traditional Indigenous senses of cognitive ability; this extends to the view that socially important cognitive abilities such as thinking and learning are intimately connected to particular landscapes and landscape features, with connections to these passed down 43through generations of cultural transmission. With a local history of many millennia, Indigenous groups' understandings of intelligence comprise experiential leanings through spiritual relationships within the ecosystem that enable continued survival (Battiste, 1998). Use, experience, relationship, and the transmission of these through culture are therefore some of the primary features that characterize many of these Indigenous intellectual traditions (Marker, 2006b; T. B. Rogers, 1995). As we will see below, these features suggest different ways of discussing intelligence research in psychology.In the present paper I will show these two streams converging. It would be easier to work within a single literature and tradition. However, as far as I am aware, a single body of literature does not exist on the metaphysics of these issues, and so this is part of my addition. Consequently, I cite back and forth in order to bring these widely differing traditions together to have a conversation, and while there may be no easy conclusions, we can at least appreciate that there are huge bodies of writing on these common topics, and that many fruitful mutual discussions can take place.As a guide to the terrain over which the following arguments take their course, Marker describes four zones of dissonance between Indigenous Knowledges and Western traditions that are caused by colonization (Marker, 2006a). First, Indigenous ways of knowing are derived from experience with land rather than from logical abstractions. Second, the history of colonization is a gnarled and complex story of adaptation rather than a binary opposition, and it is never simple to define. Third, racism against Indigenous peoples is often founded on resource contentions which become complex cross-cultural collisions because of narratives and perceptions (for an illustration see Blaser, 2009; Marker, 2006b). Finally, Indigenous peoples have experience of a sustained and systemic schooling for eradication of their identity as peoples. Residential schools were a massive and militantly mobilized effort. These dimensions will reiterate as we see the significance of land in our discussion of intelligence below.To be open to appreciation of other traditions requires us to loosen some preconceptions about other traditions. It asks us to consider Indigenous Knowledges not as myth (in the derogative sense) but as science (Bang et al., 2013; Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998). Conversely, it asks us to understand the mythos and cultural frame of Western science 44(Bang et al., 2013; Mika, 2016a). This allows Indigenous Knowledges to speak to us, as a science speaking to a science, inviting a curiosity and an exchange of ideas.A Note on AppropriationWith respect to the issue of appropriation of Indigenous culture in this article, I defer to the descriptions of how this issue has been dealt with in the source materials I draw from here, one example of which is the following: “elders were consulted and the text was carefully chosen so as to not reveal knowledge protected by community protocols” (Marker, 2011, p. 106). Having used sources thus vetted themselves, I am providing an analysis here based on what has been deemed appropriate to share in academic circles. Furthermore, my critique here goes not that far into Indigenous culture, but just far enough to establish an alternate account of metaphysics underlying cognition, a goal which has been advocated for by these same sources. This is to my benefit to the extent that it helps support the common cause of rural and religious folks' struggles with secular modernist psychology and its imperial effects.Importantly, I acknowledge the role of European religion in aligning and supporting white supremacy and anti-Indigenous action (Deloria, 1975; e.g., Heidegger, 1927/2010). While there may be important anti-colonial threads within these traditions, and while many Indigenous peoples have made productive use of them, these points of contact do not excuse in any way the role of Western religion in justifying genocide and psychological exploitation (Battiste, 1986).Is Metaphysics Foreign to the Science of Intelligence?Mays (1954) asserted that intelligence and intelligence testing “is a field which comes within the purview of philosophy as well as psychology” (p. 231). Metaphysics refers to a branch of philosophy that deals with, among other things, the topic of being and what kinds of things are real in what ways—what a thing is, what existence is, and so on (van Inwagen & Sullivan, 2015). This is only part of metaphysics, the part called ontology, but I will use the term metaphysics here as ontology is too easily confused with culturally relativity in the social sciences (Battiste, 1998; cf. Blaser, 2014). Also, in contrast to the colloquial meaning of metaphysical as denoting something specifically spiritual, the usage here is a technical philosophical meaning which focuses on all claims about our shared reality, material and 45spiritual alike (Aristotle, 350 B.C.E./1984; van Inwagen & Sullivan, 2015). Different authors understand the word and topic of metaphysics in different ways (Blaser, 2014; Clegg & Rocha, 2018; Hegel, 1807/1979; Rocha, 2015). Suffice it to say, when someone goes beyond the more familiar “how we know stuff” to the less familiar “what makes a stuff a real stuff and what is realness,” then we are squarely in metaphysical territory, whether we like it or not. It is important for psychologists to know that it is OK to participate in metaphysical talk, partly because it is important, and partly because otherwise we just do it unintentionally. Many scholars (Danziger, 2006; Hegel, 1807/1979; Husserl, 1931/1993; Mays, 1954; Shin, 1994) point out that while any field of scientific study has merit in its own right, it always remains defined, in its meaning and validity, in relationship to its philosophical foundations, or starting principles and viewpoints. To the degree that these starting principles are ambiguous, out of date with scientific developments, or simply not what we think they are, all of our produced material retains the caveat of this rocky foundation (McPherson, 1949). At best, a science should continually re-examine its foundations in order to maintain its relevance and to conduct investigations with increasing degrees of validity (Heidegger, 1927/1962; Shin, 1994). As an aside, I acknowledge Heidegger's Nazism, and the white supremacy associated with it. I cite him as a Western critic of Western philosophy and as such he is useful in restoring a richer Western worldview in some particular respects. However, his philosophy is of limited further use in creating intercultural dialogue due to his history and his embedded anti-Indigenous prejudices (Heidegger, 1927/2010, pp. 49-50/50-51, 80-81/81-82, 395/415; Mika, 2016a), although some scholars of Indigeneity have critically interfaced with his ideas (Basso, 1996; Mika, 2016a, 2016b).Not Simply Anti-PositivistMany authors critical of mainstream social sciences target materialism and positivism, and undoubtedly many have good reasons to. Indeed, many mainstream researchers seem to feel that an unquestioned presumption of a secular and materialist account of what is real (i.e. patterns in matter observed through the senses) is not only the most appropriate, but the only way to go (Leahey, 2009). Questioning this status-quo in science has been called the “crime of metaphysics” (Leahey, 1980, p. 128), despite the fact 46that positing a narrow and exclusive conception of material reality is itself just as much a metaphysical claim as any other (Hegel, 1807/1979; Leahey, 1980; cf. DeLanda & Harman, 2017). This exclusionary foreclosure on a single very specific worldview limits our scientific freedom of inquiry and what we can learn about the mind. However, while discussions within psychology about positivism and realism more generally (believing in a real universe we share) are relevant to the points I make in this paper, I am not simply discouraging their use. In fact, researchers and teachers representing diverse groups' worldviews should not foreclose on the utility of realism (Campbell, 1998; Sayer, 2000) coupled with a radical empiricism that is open to different groups' metaphysical values (e.g., Goodwill & Ishiyama, 2016; for discussion of radical empiricism see James, 1897). Realism exists as an important tradition within Indigenous, religious, and rural communities as well (Thiselton, 1995; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). For instance, Wildcat and Deloria describe Indigenous philosophy as based on a “phenomenological critical realism” (p. 115; also see Battiste, 1986, pp. 25, 27).Echoing this non-naive realism, the Western post-positivist tradition is also a self-reflective one. So realism and even post-positivism by themselves are not targets of critique here. However, when post-positivist psychology slips away from its metaphysically agnostic roots and assumes the mistaken educational task of promoting specific exclusionary materialist worldviews, then we arrive at a problem. A radical social constructionist philosophy of mind, on the other extreme, leaves us without the common ground of a shared reality in which to discuss the mainstream intelligence industry's material effects on culturally safe educational policy and psychological services (Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). I wish to be clear here that the issues I am raising go beyond the tired cliché of attacking positivism in psychology, and my position actually remains within a realist framework.Psychology houses many different streams such as critical psychology (Arthur et al., 2013) and Indigenous and decolonial psychologies (Pe-Pua, 2006). Yet the focus of this article is not on diversifying these streams but rather on enriching the mainstream account of scientific psychology (Battiste, 1998; Danziger, 2006). As such, we can focus on the mainstream conceptions of cognition and broaden these through a recognition that philosophy of science changes over time and that as a science, psychology is responsive to 47developments in philosophy of science. This means that even within a materialist and positivist psychology, the foundation ebbs and flows as scientists explore the meaning of material and experience in light of new developments (DeLanda & Harman, 2017). Therefore, as representatives of the psychology of intelligence, we can acknowledge this reflexivity between psychology and science: when science changes, psychology must change too—with changing concepts of time and space, changing from a Newtonian-Euclidean worldview to a view characterized by uncertainty, relativity, duality, incompleteness, and chaos (Hofstadter, 1999; Lea & Burke, 1996; e.g., Krieshok et al., 2009). This leads us, even within mainstream scientific psychology, towards a space of humility and a recognition of the flux in science and its epistemic stances.Psychological Literature on Philosophy of IntelligenceThe present paper's argumentative trajectory is different from the debates within intelligence psychology about multiple intelligences (Visser et al., 2006), practical intelligence (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2004), cross-culturally universal intelligence (Gottfredson, 1997), and cultural response processes (Hill et al., 2010). The present paper aims to enter into a conversation around expanding the metaphysics of intelligence psychology per se, not proposing a new and different type of intelligence to be added on to an unquestioned mainstream cognition (Battiste, 1998). Nevertheless, one prominent place that psychologists run into the topic of philosophy of intelligence is in studies of cultural beliefs about intelligence. Simulating a psychologist's cursory and non-exhaustive examination of philosophy in intelligence research, I performed a search of English-language journal articles in PsycINFO, using terms such as philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, indigenous, decolonial, and imperial, which returned 22 articles. Because the present article focuses on mainstream psychology's conception of intelligence, I selected the search results that addressed mainstream contemporary psychological research on intelligence in some way.A number of these studies proceeded along the lines of cultural beliefs about intelligence, and did not problematize mainstream intelligence theory. This can be seen in Klein, Freeman, Spring, Nerlove, and Yarbrough's (1976) correlational work between mainstream and rural Guatemalan conceptions of intelligence, and that of Bråten and 48Strømsø (2005) who examined cultural differences in beliefs about intelligence and epistemology in a Norwegian context.On the other hand, the following seven articles addressed philosophical aspects of mainstream intelligence theory itself, or critiqued mainstream theory based on alternative values, rather than viewing lay theories of intelligence as merely cultural phenomena (Battiste, 1986, 1998). Mays (1954) commented on the metaphysics of abstract thought and identified a number of philosophical problems in intelligence research such as equating abstract logic with human intelligence. McPherson (1949) provided a Soviet analysis of the historical idealist and materialist philosophical forces that affected early psychological theory and which continue to have an unacknowledged influence. Spiker and McCandless (1954) outlined the application of positivist metaphysical positions in intelligence research. Schiele (1991) discussed African-American epistemology as a source of critique of mainstream intelligence theory. Yang and Sternberg (1997) reported on ancient Chinese Confucian and Taoist conceptions of intelligence and read these against Western philosophical roots of mainstream contemporary intelligence theory. Sterrett (2002) offered a philosophical analysis of intelligence and “the relationship between instinct and reason,” (p. 40) arising from such figures as Descartes, James, and Turing. Most recently, and in a similar vein to the present project, Nsamenang (2006) critiqued ethnocentrism in mainstream intelligence theory through an examination of participatory cultural socialization of human development among Indigenous Nso people in Cameroon. The present paper shares common ground with these latter papers, as it also analyzes Western intellectual history (Mays, 1954; McPherson, 1949; Sterrett, 2002; S. Yang & Sternberg, 1997), and uses Indigenous ecological, contextual, and developmental thought to critique mainstream intelligence theory (Nsamenang, 2006; Schiele, 1991). Examples of Embedded Metaphysics in Mainstream Intelligence ResearchBesides this explicit literature search, we can also look deeper into very commonplace intelligence literature for examples of embedded metaphysical claims. This demonstrates in a stronger way the operation of metaphysical positions in the construction of ideas about cognition. Let us work with a few concrete examples. But first we must contextualize a prominent figure.49A Little HistoryThe high-profile academic Linda Gottfredson (2008), now professor emeritus at the University of Delaware, has been embroiled in political controversy over her positions on natural race differences in intelligence (Cross et al., 1999). To illustrate, the abstract of her 1998 article in Intelligence describes it as being about “biologically - rooted diversity in intellect” (Gottfredson, 1998b, p. 291). In this article, she asserts that “the unwelcome truth is that human freedom will never produce equality of outcome because people differ in native ability” (p. 298) and that “it is all the more disturbing to Americans to contemplate that some group differences in outcome may be natural under conditions of equal opportunity” (p. 298). In this same article, she praises a researcher for claiming that “average racial differences in IQ are probably partly genetic” (p. 292), and her own interest in specifically racial group differences is apparent in her claims such as “more g-loaded settings are ones where racial differences can be expected to be especially striking” (p. 295). She maintains that “group differences in g have a biological reality and social importance” (p. 293), ostensibly “when schooling, jobs, or life tasks are more complex” (p. 295) and in such areas as “personnel selection” (p. 295). Gottfredson has been involved in important labour politics in the United States (Lynn, 2001). The British-born Richard Lynn, formerly psychology professor emeritus, was recently defrocked by Ulster University in Northern Ireland (BBC, 2018). Lynn published a history of an organization called the Pioneer Fund which was approved by the Fund's president, Harry Weyher: "this book by professor Richard Lynn tells the true story of the Pioneer Fund" (from Preface by Weyher, Lynn, 2001, p. xi). This history reveals that the certificate of incorporation of the Pioneer Fund, Inc. states that its purpose is “to conduct or aid in conducting study and research into the problems of heredity and eugenics in the human race generally” (Lynn, 2001, p. 559). It also relates how Wickliffe Draper, who “decided to set up and endow” (p. 14) the organization, and who "had sparkling blue eyes" (p. xiv), believed the United States “should retain its predominantly Western cultural heritage” (p. 15) and guided the Pioneer Fund's directors with his view that "a selection between human stocks must occur whether left to chance or planned by man. I believe in planning" (p. 16). Two of its other founders “had also been prominent leaders in the pre-war eugenics movement in the United 50States” (p. xli). Lynn's history documents that Gottfredson's work has been bankrolled by the Pioneer Fund: "in 1986 Linda Gottfredson left Johns Hopkins to take up an appointment in the department of educational studies at the University of Delaware. Her work at Delaware was supported by the Pioneer Fund from 1986 onwards" (Lynn, 2001, p. 500). Consequently, folks such as the Southern Poverty Law Center have taken an interest in her career (Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d.) and I would also direct the reader to Miller's more independent history (1994).Metaphysical ClaimsWith that bit of history in mind, turning now to her metaphysical claims, we can appreciate why Gottfredson is interested in the view of intelligence as a biological reality due to her interest in genetic heritability (1998b). In a volume on the professional use of The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children: Fourth Edition (WISC-IV), one of the most professionally prevalent IQ measures for children (Prifitera et al., 2008), Gottfredson demands that we reflect on the constructs of intelligence, and decries critics that say that IQ is tautological—that is, that the tests only test test-taking ability. However, within a page she immediately steps into her own tautology on the reality of intelligence: “intelligence is, in fact, much like heat. . . . Both continua exist in nature, ready to be measured” (Gottfredson, 2008, pp. 547–548). Here she has attempted to justify the material existence of intelligence by simply asserting it, relying on the apparent obviousness of a popular scientific narrative. I argue that we need to recognize the metaphysical nature of such statements as: “empirical phenomena are not defined into existence, but described once known” (Gottfredson, 2008, p. 547). For Gottfredson, according to these statements, general intelligence itself, as a continuum of mental functioning, is real and in the world beyond our subjective perception, and ready to be measured independent of cultural construction. And yet, although having explained why g is empirically supported and explicitly not a statistical artifact, Gottfredson states that “g is certainly not a thing” (p. 550). These are clearly metaphysical positions which, to her credit, she takes very explicitly. A Second ExampleAgain taking another concrete example, in Joel Schneider and Kevin McGrew's 51(2012) popular account of the Cattell-Horn-Carroll Tri-Stratum theory of intelligence, we read that it is appropriate to remain agnostic about the metaphysical status of the g general intelligence factor as a real thing: “CHC theory incorporates Carroll's (1993) notion of g, but users are encouraged to ignore it if they do not believe that theoretical g has merit, particularly in applied clinical assessment contexts” (Schneider & McGrew, 2012, p. 111; McPherson, 1949; Spiker & McCandless, 1954). What I would like to draw attention to is the metaphysical nature of the claim, which is that the realness of g is in question. The above points are not to argue the particularities of these authors' claims, but rather to indicate the role of metaphysics in intelligence research. They illustrate and direct attention back to the subject of metaphysics as central to understanding our research and teaching projects (Hegel, 1807/1979; Heidegger, 1927/1962). Without some minimal mutual understanding of what makes something real, makes something a thing, and makes a construct representative of a real thing, and so on, little can be gained from arguments among researchers or even among parts of a single paper (Tracey & Glidden-Tracey, 1999), let alone among students in a seminar (Bang et al., 2013). Psychologists, researchers and teachers, should become aware of metaphysical positions taken by themselves, their participants, clients, or students, and by their publications and curricula. This requires deliberate interest (e.g., Horn & Blankson, 2012).One might object that different epistemologies at different levels of theory, hypothesis, methodology, and analysis is commonplace and even necessary to some degree. However, it remains the case that these different levels of the research project—theory, method, analysis—absolutely must bear a logical relationship between them such that the reader can understand and assess the progression of ideas through these layers and see the overall consistency in purpose (Tracey & Glidden-Tracey, 1999). At this point we will take a step further into metaphysics by looking at three particular ways we can get into trouble in studying cognitive function.The Psychologist's Fallacy, James' Transmission, and PsychologismPhenomenological psychologist Amedeo Giorgi stated in 1981 that “there is a crisis of foundations; . . . there is no basic agreement among a majority of psychologists with respect to the fundamental concepts and methods psychologists are to employ, and there is even 52doubt with respect to the very meaning of psychology and how to specify its subject matter” (p. 75). Whether or not one agrees with this statement today, and whether or not such a condition is perpetually inevitable (Heidegger, 1927/1962), I hope the reader can agree that we should always seek to improve the clarity and mutual understanding of the terms of operation of our field—clarity of the selection of its subject matter and clarity in its methods of access to this. This same concern over foundations has driven various theorists to critique false steps in defining the field of psychology. Below we will visit three critiques of such false steps, the psychologist's fallacy, William James' transmissive mental function, and Edmund Husserl's critique of psychologism (Leahey, 2009; Rocha & Clegg, 2017). The connections among these have been treated in another more philosophical work on which the present paper's theoretical position is built (Rocha & Clegg, 2017), and in turn on the work of Giorgi (1981). Here I offer an account that is more accessible and tailored to the field of mainstream psychology of intelligence research. I illustrate with specific citations of familiar researchers, and I focus specifically on prejudice against rural, Indigenous, and religious folks' metaphysical claims.The Psychologist's FallacyWarren (as cited in Giorgi, 1981) defines the psychologist's fallacy as,an error of method and interpretation which consists in attributing to a mental process all the characteristics which seem to the psychologist to be logically necessary from his [sic] knowledge of the relations of the process, the psychologist thus confusing his own knowledge about the process with the subject's direct experience during the process. (p. 76)In Giorgi's (1981) words, the psychologist's fallacy (and psychologism below) is “a confusion of standpoints, presumably provoked by the fact that the subject matter of psychology is the experience or behavior, or both, of living organisms” (p. 78), by which I infer he is indicating the confusion arising from conscious beings studying the consciousness of other conscious beings. While all these cautions apply to psychological research that is not focused on intelligence or cognitive function, they are doubly hazardous when psychology treats intelligence itself for this reason, and even more so when treating executive functions as the 53subset of intelligence which are most centrally associated with the will and the subject's conscious control (e.g., Diamond, 2013).A False Assumption of Correspondence of StandpointsOne version of the psychologist's fallacy occurs when the researcher assumes that because they experience their research phenomenon in a certain way, that the subject of their research must also be experiencing it in such a way. This leads the researcher to falsely assume that the subject is responding to her manipulation in the first place, and then to falsely assume she can describe her own experience of the stimulus as if it was the subjects' own (Giorgi, 1981). An example would be the assumption that subjects experience test items in the same manner in which the publisher or administrator of the items experiences them (e.g., Hill et al., 2010). This form of the psychologist's fallacy applies to the subtle case of a researcher falsely believing that their apparent observation of a subject-object dichotomy between the participant's mind and the stimulus actually proves that there is this dichotomy between self and object of consciousness. An example is Schneider and McGrew's (2012) differentiation of types of memory: “what distinguishes Gsm tests from Glr tests is that in Gsm tests there is a continuous attempt to maintain awareness of [emphasis added] that information” (p. 116). Here he is implying a subject-object dichotomy between the mind and the mental contents of the mind—a metaphysical issue coincidentally familiar to religious intellectual traditions (e.g., Augustine, 400CE/2007). Diamond's (2013) account of executive cognitive functions shows the same assumed dichotomy; “'interference control' (selective attention and cognitive inhibition) . . . [, in other words,] focusing on information held in working memory [,] might as easily be called keeping your attention focused on those mental contents” (Diamond, 2013, p. 156). In both sources we see an unsupported assumption of a subject-object dichotomy between attention and the contents of attention when in reality the mind may or may not be separated as such.A Part-Whole FallacyAnother version of the psychologist's fallacy is to take part of what the subject is thinking about and mistakenly think this represents the whole of the thought (Giorgi, 1981). Put in another way, we must not mistake “the topic of thought for the object of thought” 54(James, as cited in Giorgi, 1981, p. 81)—that is, how we describe a subject's thought does not necessarily capture the actual thought, nor the object thought about. In a related vein, we should not confuse the details of experience with the abstractions of scientific theory. Experience, “when properly described, contains expressions that exceed the categories of the standpoints of scientific psychology” (Giorgi, 1981, p. 82), and scientific theories reach across disconnected sensory experiences to create an abstract explanation which is not necessarily experienced (Hegel, 1807/1979; Mays, 1954). This means that an abstract law of psychology does not necessitate a corresponding conscious or unconscious mental representation, and thought is not necessarily what is captured in psychological theory.In sum, the critique of the psychologist's fallacy tells us that we should be careful of our standpoints when describing psychological phenomena and should not make assumptions from one standpoint about the nature of phenomena experienced from another. This is not an argument for radical cultural relativism but rather for scientific precision and metaphysical humility.James' Prism and the Transmissive FunctionSome see the American psychologist and philosopher William James as a founder of Western empirical psychology; “it was upon his text [Principles of Psychology] that American psychology built for years to come” (Leahey, 2009, p. 200). James cautions us that just because we observe evidence of individual subjects thinking inside their heads, we are not justified in assuming that inside-the-head phenomena are all there is to thought. That is, we are not justified in assuming that thought is contained within the individual with the only exception being the intrusion of sense-data (James, 1897; Rocha & Clegg, 2017). James names two functions of the brain that this inside-the-head view of thought involves: the productive function, where the brain operates on its stored memory and sense-data to produce new cognitions, and the permissive function, where the brain permits or blocks cognitions. However, James additionally points out that the existence of these two functions does not logically preclude a third that he calls the transmissive function (1897). James says that even if we see, simply for the sake of argument, the mind as only the workings of a physical brain, “in the world of physical nature productive function . . . is not the only kind of function with which we are familiar. We also have releasing or permissive function; and we have 55transmissive function” (James, 1897, p. 13). To explain the transmissive function, James uses the analogies of “a coloured glass, a prism, or a refracting lens, . . . [or] the keys of an organ” (James, 1897, p. 14). Transmissive thought is when the brain acts as a prism by refracting thought from non-personal or non-cognitive/sensory sources such as those innate in reality (e.g., mathematical, logical, possibly theological, Descartes, 1641/1993; Rocha & Clegg, 2017), those originating in contact with others and with spiritual realms (Descartes, 1641/1993; Hegel, 1807/1979; James, 1897, p. 17), and those arising from sharing experiences of reality (e.g., reading a love story; Duarte, 2015; Rocha, 2015; Rocha & Clegg, 2017). James (1897) intends to describe how, from outside ourselves, “glows of feeling, glimpses of insight, and streams of knowledge and perception float into” (p. 16) our minds, even if we maintain a popular neurophysiological metaphysics of the brain.An ExampleAn influential contemporary figure in intelligence research, Adele Diamond (2013), affirms that executive functions (EF) are the concepts in cognitive theory which are most closely associated with the will and with intentional control, and through which “we have the possibility to exercise choice and control over what we do” (p. 156). According to James' critique, this mainstream account of executive functions relies on the permissive and productive functions but not the transmissive. Diamond's inhibitory processes map exclusively onto James' “releasing or permissive function” (James, 1897, p. 13). As an example of the permissive function, she theorizes that “another aspect of interference control is suppressing prepotent mental representations (cognitive inhibition). This involves resisting extraneous or unwanted thoughts or memories” (Diamond, 2013, p. 137). Her description of working memory, on the other hand, makes use of what looks like James' productive function—in James' words, “that notion being that all brain-action, without exception, is due to a prior action, immediate or remote, of the bodily sense-organs on the brain” (James, 1897, p. 25). This latter is very much the case in Diamond's description of working memory which “enables us to bring conceptual knowledge and not just perceptual input to bear on our decisions” (Diamond, 2013, p. 143)—wherein, for her, conceptual knowledge simply means “information no longer perceptually present” (p. 142).56Totalizing AccountsThey key then, is whether this account of executive functioning which is centred on material impingement on the brain, and subsequent processing within the brain, is intended by intelligence researchers to be an exhaustive account of the functions of the mind (James, 1897). Diamond's (2013) account of executive function, in the very mainstream Annual Review of Psychology, certainly appears to be intended in such a totalizing way, in both goal and mode of presentation (in this totalizing vein also see Ryan & Deci, 2000). Diamond discusses effort, control, and choice using these as non-psychological, plain-English terms, not technical cognitive psychology constructs, presumably indicating that this account of executive function provides the linkage between our everyday experiences of said phenomena and their scientific explanation in cognitive psychology. However, nowhere is anything resembling transmission treated, and it is yet discouraged by fiat rather than evidence or reasoning. Thought and the BrainInvolving a transmissive function of the brain means that even if the brain is a neurological substrate which achieves the function of transmission of thought (as James' prism does), it does not impart the same physical class to the thought that is transmitted (as light is, in his metaphor, waves propagating through electromagnetic fields in the prism). All we can derive from the materiality of his account of transmission, is that even if thought is mediated by material neurology, it is not necessarily to be identified with it, let alone the object of thought. This is in line with Husserl's criticism, as we will see below, of the false assumption of “a strong corresponding metaphysics” (Rocha & Clegg, 2017, p. 117; Sterrett, 2002) between thoughts and the mind, which is to say, thoughts and the mind are not necessarily of the same type of thing or physical thing, even if we hold, as James (1897) did for the sake of argument, that “thought is a function of the brain” (p. 12). This is heavy stuff, but these tools will allow us to open up the tradition of mainstream intelligence theory and allow it to enter conversation with other views of cognition.Husserl's Critique of PsychologismThe German philosopher Edmund Husserl, who in some ways established phenomenology, was influenced by James and developed a critique of metaphysical mistakes 57in approaching the study of cognition which he called psychologism (Rocha & Clegg, 2017). Giorgi (1981) explains that psychologism “essentially boils down to the view that says that all the operations and products of thought and knowledge are reducible to psychological laws (e.g., laws of association, perception, etc.)” (p. 78), and that therefore, because all scientists are thinking beings themselves, all science reduces fundamentally to psychological laws. That is, all of anyone's knowledge of anything is reducible to psychological principles—that psychological principles are the only real knowledge we have.Husserl had a problem with this, following Hegel (1807/1979) among others, because he saw consciousness, and therefore thought or cognition, as intentionally directed toward outside objects rather than operating in a separate inner space that can be captured by natural science-style analysis of cause and effect (Husserl, 1931/1993; Lea & Burke, 1996). For Husserl, what creates thought is not necessarily other thought. This means that when we study intelligence and arrive at an empirically supported theory of the mental phenomena we observe signs of, we are not safe in concluding that the theory is itself a thought in the subject's mind or even safe in assuming they are of the same kind of thing. This connects with the same sentiment that arose above in discussion of the psychologist's fallacy (Giorgi, 1981; Rocha & Clegg, 2017). A psychological theory may be a thought in our minds as psychologists, and it may statistically and even parsimoniously explain the observed variance in our data, but it does not mean that the subject was thinking this thought as the cause of the behaviours we observed in them as subject, nor does it follow that their mind was directed unconsciously by this dictum. Even if this was the case, the object of thought is not captured by the law of the mind (Giorgi, 1981). Rather, it means merely that a pattern was observed in behaviour regardless of the metaphysics of the cause or source. In Leahey's (1980) review of the history of positivism in psychology he points out that operationalization of constructs does not simply do away with this open door to additional metaphysical causes of cognition, and he specifically cites James' empiricism which includes the subject's experience. It may be that other thoughts in the mind of the subject caused what we observed, or it may have been thoughts in another's mind, or it may be that things other than thought were the causes. For Husserl and James both, it is 58“unacceptable to limit our ideas of thought to that produced within our own minds through operations performed only on the prior cognitions of our own minds or [on] purely externalized sense impressions” (Rocha & Clegg, 2017, p. 119). Both Husserl and James leave the door open to other types of causes of thought, and to reiterate the point from above, there is no necessity for thoughts and the mind to be the same type of entity, thing, or physical thing. This may sound mystical to some readers, but it is made clearer by understanding the tradition these figures are working in. In many ways they are involved with philosophical idealism, which holds that material things are influenced by, or are the instantiations of, a realm of ideas which are the more fundamental ground of reality than physical material (e.g., Plato, 1999; Leahey, 2009; McPherson, 1949). For the thinkers presented here, Hegel (1807/1979) and Descartes (1641/1993) are influential sources of a particular form and character of idealism and of phenomenology which draws from it (James, 1897, n. 5). Simply put, these figures are hesitant to agree to any narrowly conceived material worldview as this excludes the role of ideas, in the idealist sense, in mental activity or conscious life. Herein we find a limited similarity with some Indigenous Knowledges which hold that cognition is directly affected by experiential and spiritual forces and beings that exceed the individuality of the person (Battiste, 1998; Duran, 2006). On the other hand, many Indigenous scholars are uncomfortable with the intellectual heritage of idealism and phenomenology such as some aspects of the rationalism of Descartes (e.g., Smith, 2012a, p. 50).Let us take up an example rooted in contemporary intelligence research. In attempting to neurologically define inhibitory control, Diamond (2013) circularly evokes voluntary control and choice, the very human experiences she is trying to explain scientifically: Inhibitory control (one of the core EFs) involves being able to control one’s attention, behavior, thoughts, and/or emotions to override a strong internal predisposition or external lure, and instead do what’s more appropriate or needed. . . . inhibitory control makes it possible for us to change and for us to choose how we react . . . the ability to exercise inhibitory control creates the possibility of change and choice. (Diamond, 2013, p. 137)She performs a quick two-step move here: she reifies a psychological construct made to 59explain a phenomena, and then she immediately reduces the phenomenon to the freshly minted construct. To paraphrase the circular essence of her statement, she is saying that the construct of inhibitory control was created to study conscious control of the mind, and then, that conscious control owes its existence to the now suddenly more real entity of inhibitory control. A fast switch from the general English word control to a psychological construct—inhibitory control—with the subtle effect of thereby limiting the metaphysical options at hand for understanding consciousness. In a few lines she tautologically and almost imperceptibly defines out of lay grasp and out of existence the broader significance of one's control of one's mind and one's faculty of choice as living realities. This is used to promote a substrate underpinning the will that is somehow neurological and therefore more real, but we can see through its circularity that this account fails to establish a psychological entity different from the general human experience of will—an example of psychologism due to its attempted transfer of metaphysical status from existential will down to psychological law. This is a subtle move, but one very common in psychology.Implication for Researchers and TeachersPsychologists would do well to recognize that their subject matter's metaphysical status is not scientifically determined by methodological metaphysical assumptions. They are two different levels of analysis, or more accurately, the methodological level and the subject matter level are not related metaphysically by any necessity—any scientific claim, tacit or explicit, to the contrary is a non sequitur. This means, when psychologically studying the mind's ability to perform in the world (intelligence), one's methodological assumptions (e.g., behaviourist materialism) are only assumptions and as such are not proven conclusions, and do not in any logically necessary way apply outside of the study's methodology as valid assumptions about the studied mind or the world it interfaces with. An awareness of psychologism and the psychologist's fallacy helps us determine where these embedded metaphysics get inserted fallaciously or extraneously. The take-home message here is when using an empirical or materialist metaphysics, as is the case in the majority of psychological reports and pedagogy, psychologists should not unnecessarily restrict the breadth of the conception of the material or empirical world (DeLanda & Harman, 2017; James, 1897).60Cognitive Imperialism in Intelligence TheoryIntelligence and HumannessWhy do these technical philosophical problems have any practical significance outside the research context? And why is the general controversy over the nature of intelligence so heated? According to some, the public may be misinformed about intelligence and some of their political fears may be unfounded (Gottfredson, 1997, 1998a; cf. Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d.). Yet there is another concern that is not assuaged by better education around intelligence: the narrowing of the meaning of thought through powerful embedded metaphysics that casts out all other ideas. A critical approach to the metaphysics of cognitive function is important because for many people, Indigenous (Bang et al., 2013; Battiste, 1998; T. B. Rogers, 1995) religious (e.g., Hebrews 4:12, SBL Greek New Testament), rural (Clegg & Rocha, 2018), and academic alike, intelligence (or reason) is essential to an account of what it is to be human (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Smith, 2012b). Even when specifying humanness as partly emotional, intelligence researchers are quick to point out the necessity of analytical intelligence for the status of humanness in no uncertain terms: “humans are not, in any practical sense, predominantly rational beings, nor are they predominantly emotional beings. They are both [emphasis added].” (Salovey et al., 2008, p. 535). One may say that this is just a Western idea (Sternberg, 2014; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2004; cf. McPherson, 1949). Indeed “philosophers and scientists (psychologists included) have relied on and glorified analytic intelligence throughout much of Western history” (Salovey et al., 2008, p. 534; Descartes, 1641/1993) and reason has been associated with human sovereignty for thousands of years (Daniel 4, NJB). But this is precisely the point. Analytical ability is central to a Western account of humanness (as it is to other accounts as well; McPherson, 1949). Yet this account is widely relevant because Western ideals of humanness are globally imperial in their cultural action (Battiste, 1998; Carnoy, 1974; Illich, 1971/2000); virtually all groups relate to a dominant Western account of humanness in some way because of its material and intellectual power (Abdi, 2017; Fanon, 1952/2008; Smith, 2012b; Thiong’o, 1986). It is a direct affront to many peoples that their views of the general human faculties of will and choice are, through psychologism, narrowed 61away as irrelevant and invalid, or alternatively, as mere culture.Cognitive ImperialismMicmac scholar Marie Battiste (1986) is known for her analysis of the colonial mismanagement and maleficence of Indigenous education by the colonial English-Canadian state. She coined the term cognitive imperialism to addressa form of cognitive manipulation used to discredit other knowledge bases and values and seeks to validate one source of knowledge and empower it through public education (Battiste, 1986). It has been the means by which the rich diversity of peoples have been denied inclusion in public education while only a privileged group have defined themselves as inclusive, normative, and ideal. . . . This has been singularly achieved through education. (Battiste, 1998, p. 20)Cognitive imperialism can happen unknowingly as “most teachers believe they are helping the colonized, by providing them with better (i.e., informed, educated, superior, etc.) beliefs and patterns of action that improve their ability to accommodate or cope successfully with the colonial situation” (Battiste, 2016, p. 183). Her critique of cognitive imperialism analyzes the convergence of history, power, and culture that sets in motion an educational tidal wave of falsely universalized European knowledges that erodes diverse intellectual traditions of mind and thought.Battiste (2016) highlights that cognitive imperialism focuses on change in “consciousness and knowledge systems, rather than in culture” (p. 183) writ large. She developed this concept from decolonial scholars such as Carnoy (1974), who draws on Illich (1971/2000), Freire (1970), Fanon (1952/2008), among others. It is a form of the more general concepts of cognitive colonization and colonization of the mind which indicate the psychological aspects of colonial subjugation (Abdi, 2017; Fanon, 1952/2008; Thiong’o, 1986), and epistemic violence which denotes the wilful destruction of another people's knowledge traditions and worldview (Marker, 2003). Cognitive imperialism may also remind the reader of Bourdeau's (2002) symbolic violence in which cognition is covertly usurped by dominating social forces. While these concepts share a lot of ground, I chose cognitive imperialism here as it clearly addresses the nature of cognition and directly connects this to dominating educational actions in a Canadian context. For further exploration see Smith's 62(2012b) discussion of imperialism, colonialism, and cognitive imperialism (particularly, pp. 22-25), or Carnoy's (1974) discussion of how these relate to education.Battiste cautions that in the typical case, “mainstream knowledge has not been questioned or reconsidered; rather, the Other is acknowledged as a knowledge, not the knowledge” (Battiste, 1998, p. 21). In a very real way, such groups are tired of having the phenomena central to their lives and worldviews being treated as error variance—dismissed as unexplainable noise or developmental delay on the one hand (Hill et al., 2010; Moghaddam & Lee, 2006), and dismissed as scientifically irrelevant cultural phenomenon on the other (Battiste, 1986). To be clear here, I am not advocating that researchers include “culture as an independent variable” (ojalehto & Medin, 2015, p. 267; Moghaddam & Lee, 2006; Danziger, 2006; Moodley, 2007) but rather that they avoid embedding unnecessarily exclusive metaphysics in their interpretations.This paper acknowledges a confluence of interests among various groups such as some Indigenous, rural, and religious peoples. This cause is to critique embedded exclusionary metaphysics in Euro-American psychology (Brock, 2006a) and advance common claims to a metaphysics of our shared universe that acknowledge a richer reality of the mind (Battiste, 1998; DeLanda & Harman, 2017; Duran, 2006; Thiong’o, 1986; Thiselton, 1995). Battiste (2016) herself notes that cognitive imperialism is enacted on various groups in addition to Indigenous peoples: “cognitive imperialism is about the diminishment, devaluation, and marginalization of many knowledge systems of other diverse peoples around the earth, who find their knowledges, voices, experience, spiritualities, imaginations, and creativity marginalized, eroded, or erased” (p. 185). Eroding Human StatusEroding the key indicators of the human status of a people, such as is done in cognitive imperialism, is a key method for maintaining dominance (Fanon, 1952/2008; Smith, 2012b). As explained in Haslam and Loughnan's (2014) review, dehumanization regularly involves denial of desired characteristics of the minds of a people;When individuals are denied human uniqueness, they should be seen as lacking refinement, self-control, intelligence, and rationality, and subtly or overtly likened to animals. . . . this 'animalistic' form of dehumanization captures phenomena ranging 63from the most blatant genocidal labelling of people as vermin through to the subtlety of infrahumanization [(casting as less human)]. (p. 403)This is also bound up with colonial devaluation of animals and inanimate classes of objects, such that dehumanization takes the form of degrading people through comparisons to the allegedly inferior classes of animal and inanimate matter (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). These judgments are opposite to the views of some Indigenous peoples who consider humans younger relatives of other beings. Regardless, the denying of human characteristics to humans is indeed egregious, and as Haslam and Loughnan note above, it involves denying the possession of rationality. In the end the significance is that, “dehumanization enables a disengagement of the aggressor’s moral self-sanctions” (p. 401).Maori researcher and decolonial theorist Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012a) seems to concur with this analysis of dehumanization and adds historical context, writing that “ideas about what counted as human in association with the power to define people as human or not human were already encoded in imperial and colonial discourses” (p. 26), and thatEuropean powers had by the nineteenth century already established systems of rule and forms of social relations which governed interaction with the indigenous peoples being colonized. . . . To consider indigenous peoples as not fully human, or not human at all, enabled distance to be maintained and justified various policies of either extermination or domestication. Some indigenous peoples (‘not human’), were hunted and killed like vermin, others (‘partially human’), were rounded up and put in reserves like creatures to be broken in, branded and put to work. (p. 27)Consequently, she relates, “the struggle to assert and claim humanity has been a consistent thread of anti-colonial discourses . . . [and] has generally been framed within the wider discourse of humanism, . . . and the connections between being human and being capable of creating history, knowledge and society” (p. 27).That mainstream intelligence research is involved in educational curricula, evaluation, and pedagogy is beyond dispute, and I hope that by this point it is becoming apparent how intelligence research aids in disseminating through public educational institutions a damaging and hegemonic metaphysical account of cognition (Battiste, 1986, 1998)—an account that is limited to James' permissive and productive functions of the mind. Many Indigenous peoples 64embody a metaphysics of cognition that is discrepant from the secular modernist, and permissive-productivist, view. For Battiste (1998), “fundamental to Aboriginal knowledge is the awareness that beyond the immediate sensible world of perception, memory, imagination, and feelings lies another world from which knowledge, power, or medicine is derived from which the Aboriginal peoples will survive and flourish.” (p. 18). Within the Western canon this account seems to map directly onto James' transmissive function.People of faith have worldviews similarly discrepant from that assumed within mainstream psychology (Thiselton, 1995; Hegel, 1807/1979). Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (1807/1979), leaving its anti-Indigenous sentiments aside for a moment, displays a transcendental cognition that is not contained within the individual's mind. For Hegel, cognition is the process of the ultimate Spirit becoming self-conscious as objective substance:nothing is known that is not in experience, . . . that is not felt to be true, not given as an inwardly revealed external verity, as something sacred that is believed . . . For experience is just this, that the content—which is Spirit—is in itself substance, and therefore an object of consciousness. But this substance which is Spirit is the process in which Spirit becomes what it is in itself; and it is only as this process of reflecting itself into itself that it is in itself truly Spirit. It is in itself the movement which is cognition—the transforming of that in-itself into that which is for itself, of Substance into Subject. (para. 802)In fact, both some Indigenous and some Abrahamic traditions see natural objects as more-than-material, alive, and relational beings (Brayboy & Maughn, 2009; Hegel, 1807/1979; Marker, 2006b). A couple illustrative quotes from the Hebrew Bible are as follows; “Then what is left of Jacob, surrounded by many peoples, will be like a dew from Yahweh, like showers on the grass, which do not depend on human agency and are beyond human control” (Micah 5:6, NJB); “For ye shall go out with joy, And be led forth with peace; The mountains and the hills shall break forth before you into singing, And all the trees of the field shall clap their hands” (Isaiah 55:12, JPS). The sources of influence on human mind and action here echo both James' and some Indigenous viewpoints on cognition. Again, Isaiah says, foreshadowing Descartes' Meditations, “he shall sense the truth by his reverence for the 65LORD: He shall not judge by what his eyes behold, Nor decide by what his ears perceive” (Isaiah 11:3, JPS). Battiste (1986) similarly points out other points of compatibility between these spiritual traditions.Researchers and teachers should determine which metaphysical positions are necessary to the conduct of their work (and communicate these, as attempted by Gottfredson, 2008), and which are extraneous and only serve to rehearse hegemony and alienate diverse groups. Where it seems necessary to use a dominant metaphysics in formulating theory despite the worldviews of subjects, or in teaching theory despite views of students, researchers and teachers should remain hesitant with this apparent necessity and encourage critical debate and mutual understanding. Above all, seek humility begetting a scientific precision that does not overstep in interpretation and pedagogy into reckless cultural repression. Knowledge Less ConceptualAs we saw above, one form of the psychologist's fallacy was the false assumption of correspondence of the standpoints of the researcher and of the subject matter. Let us focus on an instance of this fallacy to demonstrate the operation of cognitive imperialism—the important case of the devaluation of knowledge learned on the land, and from the land, as somehow less conceptual and more concrete or practical in a subtly pejorative sense (e.g., Flynn, 2013). As we will see, this is very much at odds with some Indigenous and faith-based intellectual traditions which see these kinds of learning as inherently conceptual as well as grounded in experience (Battiste, 1998; Brayboy & Maughn, 2009; Marker, 2006b, 2017; McPherson, 1949, p. 231; Rocha, 2012). The Ordering of SocietiesTo illustrate, let us consider the figure of Robert Sternberg (2012), a famously influential American theorist of cognition. In his promotion of culturally diverse practical intelligence, Sternberg misses that by removing practical intelligence from the analytical category of intelligence, he is tacitly making the statement that this knowledge is non-conceptual and therefore simply behavioural: “in a study of Yup’ik Eskimo children in southwestern Alaska . . . many of the children had tremendous practical knowledge . . . such as how to travel from one village to another in the winter on a dogsled in the absence of 66landmarks that would have been recognizable to the teachers (or to us). We assessed the importance of academic and practical intelligence in rural and urban Alaskan communities.” (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2004, p. 1430). In a more recent chapter, Sternberg shows the same tendency more clearly;“Different contextual milieus may result in the development of different mental abilities. . . . This greater development is presumed to be due to the greater need the Aboriginal children have for using spatial skills in their everyday lives. In contrast, members of Western societies probably develop their abilities for thinking abstractly to a greater degree than do members of societies in which concepts are rarely dealt with outside their concrete manifestations in the objects of the everyday environment” (Sternberg, 2012, p. 163). While these passages importantly recognize landed knowledges as legitimate, they clearly accord them a second-class status; here landed knowledge is “acknowledged as a knowledge, not the knowledge” (Battiste, 1998, p. 21), and landed knowledge is distanced from “academic” (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2004, p. 1430) or conceptual intelligence. A powerful Western theorist of cognition, who has a strong influence on the education of intelligence theory, rationalizing how rural and Indigenous Knowledges are conceptually inferior to those of European-based societies seems to fit the definition of cognitive imperialism (Battiste, 1998, 2016; Smith, 2012a; Thiong’o, 1986). The presumption that land-based concrete experience is necessarily non-conceptual is also a non sequitur, of the psychologists' fallacy variety. The methodological assumptions about the nature of concepts and on the separation of subject and object have been unnecessarily imported, not into interpretation of data, but into interpretation of the data-source's subjectivity of it's own subject matter—tacit axioms have been mistaken for empirically derived descriptions of the subject's experience of the world.It may seem incidental that intelligence researchers make specific comments and comparisons with Indigenous cognition. However, decolonial scholar Linda Tuhiwai Te Rina Smith (2012a) of New Zealand provides context;During the nineteenth century this [(sociology's)] view of the individual and society became heavily influenced by social Darwinism. This meant, for example, that a 67society could be viewed as a 'species' of people with biological traits. 'Primitive' societies could be ranked according to these traits, predictions could be made about their survival and ideological justifications could be made about their treatment. Early sociology came to focus on the belief systems of these 'primitive' people and the extent to which they were capable of thought . . . showing how simple societies developed the building blocks of classification systems and modes of thought. (p. 52).As we can see from Sternberg's work above, this sociological dynamic appears to parallel a psychological one. To be deliberate, I will point out that Smith's history explicitly critiques the ranking of societies based on alleged capacity or incapacity for thought as allegedly evidenced by use of classification systems—all features found directly in the above-quoted intelligence research.A Prejudice Against UseAnother example in this vein is particularly clear. James Flynn, also of New Zealand, is an intelligence researcher famous for his identification of historically rising IQ scores (Flynn, 2013; Nisbett et al., 2012). In his tellingly titled book, Intelligence and Human Progress: The Story of What was Hidden in our Genes, Flynn (2013) makes a series of claims that sound a familiar note. I will quote at length here because of the centrality of this example for illustrating the metaphysics of cognitive imperialism:The record of how human beings have performed on IQ tests . . . provides priceless artifacts about how our minds have adapted from a simpler world to the world of modernity. We went from a society that posed mainly problems of how to manipulate the concrete world of everyday life for advantage (the utilitarian attitude) toward a society that expected us to classify, analyze abstract concepts, and take hypothetical situations seriously (the scientific attitude). . . . our minds have altered under the influence of modern schooling and the totality of the industrial revolution. (p. 3)Flynn continues with a passage that motivated me to write this paper,When Luria interviewed preindustrial peasants in Russia in the 1920s . . . They did not classify. When he asked what a fish and a crow had in common, they would not say that they were animals. One swims, one flies, you can eat one and not the other. They should not be lumped together because as objects in the concrete world, we use 68them differently. If you asked someone in 1900 what a rabbit and dog had in common, you use dogs to hunt rabbits. The fact that they were mammals was too incidental to be worthy of notice. . . . When he asked them to reason about abstractions . . . they stayed firmly rooted in their experience of the concrete world. . . . We take classification, the hypothetical, reasoning about the abstract for granted. How do these new habits of mind explain how we function in the modern world? (pp. 3-4)Let us get past the clear problem that he dates the origins of Western rationality to a century ago instead of at the very least attributing it to many centuries of Western history (Descartes, 1641/1993; McPherson, 1949). Rather, let us focus on the claim that rural peoples and peoples of the land are societally and intellectually undeveloped, unable to think with concepts, and only able to see what is in their immediate environment (e.g., Flynn, 2013)—apparently, “much of the world is still in the doldrums” (p. 6). People of the land are supposedly less conceptual because they talk of experiences of living in the world which indicates poor familiarity with the supposedly more real categories of an enlightened and abstract science (e.g., Flynn, 2013). However, the recourse to scientific taxonomy as more real than the uses of natural things is a non sequitur, and even within the Western intellectual tradition finds its opponents. From a Heideggerian (1927/1962), as well as from a Marxist point of view (McPherson, 1949, particularly p. 234), the rural understanding's rootedness in the experience of use in the world is more real. Taking this argument to an extreme, definition through experiential action proves similar to scientific operationalization (Leahey, 1980). If we consider use as our most foundational access to reality, we find some major turbulence with early intelligence testing's explicit denial of this metaphysics during Goddard's shoddy ethnic profiling of immigrants at Ellis Island:To [test the ability to] define common terms better than by "use" . . . Only 40 per cent pass this test, the rest define a "table" as "something to eat on"; or a "fork", "it is to eat with"; a "horse", "is to ride" and so on. It cannot but give us something of a shock to realize that 60 per cent of this group of immigrants do not define common objects better than to mention the most obvious use for them. (Goddard, 1917, pp. 249–250)69Some of these abuses of intelligence theory have been explicitly problematic, such as Goddard finding, with purported scientific empiricism, that on Ellis Island, “83% of the Jews, 80% of the Hungarians, 79% of the Italians, and 87% of the Russians were 'feeble-minded'” (Goddard’s 1917 table summarized by Kamin, 1974, p. 16; Dorfman, 1982). Goddard (1917) used these figures to establish as "fact that a surprisingly large percentage of immigrants are of relatively low mentality" (p. 269), and argued that, if "morons beget morons" (p. 270), this then leads to an economic opportunity for the United States: "It is perfectly true that there is an immense amount of drudgery to be done . . . May it be that possibly the moron has his place?" (p. 269). While Goddard is an explicitly problematic figure, the difficulties of other chapters of intelligence testing history are more subtle and implicit as we are demonstrating here in the case of embedded exclusionary metaphysics. I agree with Gregory (2007) that “the history of testing serves as a reminder that even well-meaning persons operating within generally accepted social norms can misuse psychological tests. We need be ever mindful that disinterested 'science' can be harnessed to the goals of a pernicious social ideology” (p. 75). Battiste's (2016) definition of cognitive imperialism shares this concern with apparently well-meaning actors.The prejudice against use is not a phenomenon of the past; it continues to be an implicit and embedded metaphysical position. For instance, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Fifth Edition (Wechsler, 2014), is a cognitive testing battery widely used in educational settings today. In one of its tests, children are instructed to explain similarities between two words read to them. A Western taxonomic response that notes a common major classification, such as both being birds (a fictitious example here) is “pertinent” (p. 91) and gets full marks. In contrast, an ecological observation of what both birds might do, or a functional and experiential similarity such as both being sources of food, is considered “minor or less pertinent” (p. 91) and is marked down by 50%. Responses are explicitly described as ranging “from relatively inferior to more creditable” (p. 90) and instructions to markers are clear that “the degree of abstraction of a response is an important score determinant” (p. 91). Abstraction is clearly set up in opposition to “a more concrete problem-solving approach” (p. 91), which “merits no or only partial credit” (p. 91). This suggests that in some aspects of common intelligence testing during children's development and education, 70knowledges to do with context and use are graded down 50% and seen as “inferior” (p. 90), “minor” (p. 91), and “less pertinent” (p. 91) to intelligence—in this instance at least, only Western scientific taxonomy is intelligent.A Confusion of StandpointsIn this example we again see a creeping psychologists' fallacy, or a confusion of standpoints (Giorgi, 1981; Rocha & Clegg, 2017) between the metaphysical status of the subject's world, the metaphysical status of the subject's mind, the metaphysical status of the subject's behaviour, the metaphysical assumptions of the researcher's methodology, and the metaphysical positions espoused in the resulting research report's conclusions. There appears to be a jump between the first and last of these levels, between the nature of the world comprehended by the subject and the tacit metaphysical positions embedded in the research report that do not necessarily even reflect methodological assumptions. This jump constitutes one of the most important instances of the psychologists' fallacy and its hidden curriculum of cognitive imperialism in this central branch of psychology—a branch that explains an important center of our experience as conscious beings.Let us now take this interest in use and in scientific taxonomy and head down an Indigenous and rural river of thought. We will examine the dismissal of these intellectual traditions and then examine in more detail claims around cognition's context, land, and experiential knowledge. To take an example of the dismissal of the metaphysical complexity of these knowledges, Tim Rogers (1995) makes subtle society-ranking moves in his cross-cultural discussion of social role decisions: “when we look at role-assignment practices in more complex cultures than the Ojibway [emphasis added], we begin to see some interesting developments” (p. 92). Vine Deloria Jr. (1999a) directly acknowledges the notion of conceptually inferior cultures as a central modernist narrative that misconstrues the nature of Indigenous Knowledge: Non-Western knowledge is believed to originate from primitive efforts to explain a mysterious universe. In this view, the alleged failure of primitive/tribal man to control nature mechanically is evidence of his ignorance and his inability to conceive of abstract general principles and concepts. (p. 41)In fact, even within the discipline of mainstream psychology, others have departed from this 71prejudice, as ojalehto and Medin's (2015) article in the Annual Review of Psychology makes clear,although broad similarities in folk taxonomic categories are now well documented cross-culturally (Atran & Medin 2008, Berlin 1992), there is considerable cultural divergence in how knowledge about these categories is organized (Levin & Unsworth 2013). Depending on their culture and expertise, individuals tend to privilege either taxonomic similarities (e.g., European American individuals) or ecological relations (e.g., indigenous individuals) when reasoning about biological phenomena (Medin et al. 2006). (p. 259)Conceptual KnowledgesIndeed, Indigenous Knowledges are formed in connection with experiences with real entities in actual places but this does not by any means negate the conceptual nature of these knowledges (Marker, 2018; drawing on Deloria, 1999b). Entering now into a confluence of the Western stream with Indigenous philosophy, I argue that mainstream cognitive psychology's use of the term conceptual may relate more to the phenomenological terms of mere appearance, inadequate idea, or imagination than to the tradition of concepts found in Western sources such as Descartes (1641/1993), Spinoza (1677/2001), and others (e.g., Hegel, 1807/1979). This is the case even despite the presence of idealist and derivative philosophies in the history of psychology (McPherson, 1949; Taiana, 2006). While describing a point of confluence between Indigenous and phenomenological traditions below, I do acknowledge that some Indigenous writers critique or wholly reject some idealist and phenomenological figures such as Hegel, Descartes, and Heidegger, and I also acknowledge these figures' anti-Indigenous sentiments (cf. Mika, 2016a). As I proceed, then, it is with the understanding that there are divergent voices and complex considerations within and between all traditions.I argue that the direct experiential and relational passing of knowledge between species about particular inner dynamics and ecological relationships is not an inadequately conceptual mode of cognition (Deloria, 1999a; Marker, 2018)—in the traditional phenomenological sense noted above, it may be more conceptual than the contemporary account of propositionally encoded hypotheses about sensory data (cf. Kawagley & 72Barnhardt, 1998). Wildcat (Wildcat & Deloria, 2001) describes Indigenous Knowledges as embodying a “phenomenological critical realism” (p. 115), and Battiste (1986) discusses idealism which, as I have noted, is a root of phenomenology (Hegel, 1807/1979). The difference may be that the conceptual objects of knowledge in some Indigenous traditions may be evolving contextual processes rather than depersonalized and static universal laws or purely abstract ideas. Moving back into the Indigenous stream, from Alaska, Kawagley and Barnhardt (1998) reiterate the rootedness of this conceptual knowledge:While Western science and education tend to emphasize compartmentalized knowledge which is often decontextualized and taught in the detached setting of a classroom or laboratory, Native people have traditionally acquired their knowledge through direct experience in the natural environment. For them, the particulars come to be understood in relation to the whole, and the “laws” are continually tested in the context of everyday survival. (p. 118)Many Indigenous intellectual systems maintain ancient traditions of experiential observation through relationships within the ecosystem of all living beings around them, including landscape elements such as rocks and water (Bang et al., 2013; Blackstock, 2001; Deloria, 1975; Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998; Marker, 2018). Accordingly, I argue that Indigenous metaphysics of thought is not limited to the productive and permissive functions, and is not limited to laws derived from purely material phenomena (cf. DeLanda & Harman, 2017). A couple passages from Michael Blackstock's (2001) ethnographic work with Indigenous Elders in British Columbia, Canada demonstrates a metaphysics of mental activity that includes non-material access to the spirits of other beings: “the Elders I interviewed emphasized how important it was to understand the spirituality of water; water has a spirit that they converse with and pray to” (p. 5). Bang and colleagues (2013; also see Blackstock, 2001; Deloria, 1999b) summarize Blackstock's comparison of Western scientific classification with an Indigenous metaphysics:Blackstock’s research locates water as the center of life, connecting all things (see also Pierotti, 2010). . . . Blackstock (2001) writes that ‘the Elders believe water is alive or biotic’ (p. 12). This view is fundamentally different from that privileged in 73Western science and based in analysis of the physical and chemical properties of water (Blackstock, 2001). (pp. 306-307)With these worldviews in mind, we then can appreciate what can be lost in, and often has been extinguished by, a dominant secular Western metaphysics and its resulting educational system (Bang et al., 2013).Ojalehto and Medin (2015) summarize their review of psychological literature on culture and conceptualization by noting that “the emerging consensus across these diverse approaches is that culture and conceptual behavior are inseparable” (p. 252), and that “just as concepts interact with language, language itself is situated within and responsive to cultural forces” (p. 257). To take their analysis a step further, within Indigenous intellectual traditions culture is not simply behavioural (Battiste, 1986) as there is the added connection between culture and the real universe as culture arises fromthe land and their ancestors’ relationships to the ecology of that land; it is intimate, mythic, and sacred without being abstract. Indigenous knowledge is “based on a recognition that human interactions with places give rise to and define cultures and community” (Cajete, 1999, p. 193). (Marker, 2006b, p. 491)While we are acknowledging the cultural nature of all knowledge, we are not suggesting that adding a comment about cultural context to a research paper nullifies the culturally dominating effects of its unfounded assumptions or conclusions, particularly if the paper still implies universal application elsewhere or participates in a mainstream that clearly is used universally. The real take-home is that researchers and teachers should not use exclusionary metaphysics and disseminate knowledge through globally influential channels like psychology while simultaneously paying lip-service to the cultural contextualization of all intelligence research. When a researcher or teacher has reason to work within a metaphysical position that is known to be at odds with the metaphysical positions of their subjects as a group, it is better to state outright the universalizing intent of the research (e.g., “these structures are presumed to be invariant across normal humans,” Schneider & McGrew, 2012, p. 135) and take responsibility for its effects on diverse groups (Neisser et al., 1996). Rocha (2017) writes that “when a cautionary note fails to inspire caution then it is really just a cheap escape route from anticipated criticism, not a serious pause” (para. 15).74Teaching and Researching IntelligenceTo see this essay as a demand for scientific psychology to uncritically capitulate to the philosophical positions of marginalized groups simply because they are marginalized would be to entirely miss the point. Rather, as someone within the mainstream of psychology, I am arguing that we should consider whether we need to marginalize in the first place—is it even central to the particular project? I am arguing that we consider the metaphysical claims of other groups, using our faculties of reason, and with reference to our shared universe. By more clearly defining the project with which we are engaged, we narrow our aim logically and methodologically, which increases our awareness of our position, and provides transparency to our readers and students. Such a procedural and inferential narrowing can also humble us to a wider meaning of the subject matter itself. The application to teaching here may be obscure until one realizes that my critique is not disassembling the mainstream but rather opening it up. The points and citations I make in this work identify problems and issues that are solvable—mainly through intellectual humility and dialogue. The solution for overtly racist figures is to teach them critically—they are important to understand, critically. However, the main consequence for teaching is that I am not suggesting that we abandon the huge river of academic work on mainstream intelligence; rather, I am advocating that our teaching listens to these Indigenous and other channels of thought with respect to “the knowledge” (Battiste, 2016, p. 21) and its metaphysics. This is a way of engaging with claims about reality that have real-world consequences. The metaphysical hidden curriculum in mainstream intelligence theory does not follow from empirical findings due to the false steps identified here. Yet these powerful Western narratives drive curriculum addressing central aspects of personhood, forcing students' performance of sanctioned worldviews for survival, imperially educating therapy clients at vulnerable points in life, explicitly psycho-educating groups, and shaping larger societal narratives in public schooling and in public-facing media (e.g., Gottfredson, 1998a). We have travelled down the convergence of two great rivers of scholarship, and have swirled through some of the dangerous and exciting turbulence that occurs between these great rivers intertwining. Their interpenetration has proved revealing for our science 75(Brayboy & Maughn, 2009; Deloria, 1999a; Marker, 2018). Rather than staying unthreatened by treating other traditions as irrelevant to the mainstream, the realist engagement here yields a critique of what mainstream intelligence theory is actually measuring. It opens up a scientific scrutiny of the interpretations and assumptions used to make meaning of mainstream intelligence theory's findings. It is not a full-scale rejection, it is not an argument for absolute cultural relativity. It is an argument for a different and broader conversation about the meaning of cognition as analyzed in the main stream. This can only lead, in a scientific spirit of curiosity, to a greater openness and humility to the nature of cognition. It will certainly lead to more logically consistent research reports and more ethical curricula.76Project 3:Meeting Worldviews in Places of Counsellor Educationand Counselling Psychology ProgramsAbstractWhile some scholars have advanced models of counselling practice and education based on Indigenous philosophy specifically for the sake of counselling and training Indigenous peoples, there remains unfinished work in building Canadian counsellor education and counselling psychology programs' critical reflexivity in the face of histories of Indigenous dispossession and educational exclusion. This project draws on Indigenous decolonial philosophy to analyze Canadian counsellor education and counselling psychology's professional educational curriculum and pedagogy, particularly in the area of embedded worldviews and students' experiences of these. The project foregrounds an Indigenous philosophy of place in understanding how nonindigenous students develop worldview and experience differences in worldview in institutional settings. The study serves as a qualitative exploration of how nonindigenous students experience land and develop worldview, in order to inform future projects of decolonizing curriculum and pedagogy in this field. Eight nonindigenous counsellor education or counselling psychology graduate students in Canada who self-identified as having a worldview different from their institution were interviewed using a guided hermeneutic method. Across-participant thematic analysis and further hermeneutic interpretations yielded three categories of themes: connection to place, migration, and relating to land; lack of support for diversity and cultural competence; and one's own culture or diversity and its relationship with counselling and orientations. BackgroundThe University of British Columbia ContextThis project begins within the history of land at the University of British Columbia, where the present author writes from. UBC has instituted a practice of acknowledging Indigenous history on this land. Through policy, UBC is recognizing this history and the philosophy of Indigenous experience, peoples, learning systems, and lands, and welcomes 77this to academia (The University of British Columbia & Musqueam Indian Band, 2006). The question then becomes, what do we do with elders' narratives of place as being, as identity, as psychology, and as meaning (Marker, 2004)? Indigenous philosophies often hold that worldview develops within communities that include relationships with particular places and landscapes (Deloria, 1975, 1999b; Thiong’o, 1986; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). If the work of counselling is to assist individuals to find meaning (Frankl, 1988, 1997), then Indigenous intellectual traditions of having one's being in relationship with place becomes a valuable theoretical lens (Marker, 2017; Tuck & Yang, 2012; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). Indigenous decolonial philosophy denotes a body of Indigenous scholars working within a recognized intellectual tradition and engaged in decolonial analysis of Western modernist and colonial institutions, particularly as they relate to politics of land dispossession and educational oppression enacted through fundamental beliefs about reality and knowledge (Grande, 2008; Smith, 2012a; Tuck & Yang, 2012; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). Following UBC's acknowledgement and welcome of Indigenous philosophy and learning systems, the present work begins with this framework as a set of starting assumptions (Martin et al., 2015; e.g., The University of British Columbia & Musqueam Indian Band, 2006). By making these starting assumptions explicit, we help to define our research conceptualization, as the reader will see more fully below (Ponterotto, 2005; Tracey & Glidden-Tracey, 1999). Please refer to the glossary in Appendix A for more definitions and differentiations.Audiences and Language SetsI am targeting two main audiences with this work. The first audience comprises those involved in curriculum and pedagogy of counsellor education (Martin et al., 2015). The second audience are Indigenous scholars and students interested in decolonization of educational spaces within counsellor education and counselling psychology programs (e.g., R. D. Goodman & Gorski, 2015). I will assume these parties are familiar with psychological and social science terms as well as terms common in discussions of philosophy of science and theory in these fields (e.g., Leahey, 2009; Martin et al., 2015). I will signal to the reader when shifting into language that is used in ways that Indigenous scholars talk with which social scientists may be unfamiliar.78Two Types of Projects to DistinguishThe present work represents one of two different types of research that take their orientation from Indigenous decolonial philosophy, and it is important to position this work with respect to these two types of research in order to understand what the present project is hoping to achieve. The first type of research is involved in the struggle for Indigenous control of Indigenous-specific education, and for the resurgence of Indigenous epistemologies for the sake of Indigenous communities themselves (Duran, 2006; Pidgeon et al., 2013; Smith, 2012a). On the other hand is research focused on Canadian counselling per se; there is a moral, historical, intellectual, and ontological imperative that Canadian education and research respond to realities of colonization and hegemony within Canadian society and Canadian educational spaces for the sake of a broadened intellectual horizon, for the inclusion of diverse Indigenous and nonindigenous students, and to prepare the way for a decolonization of curriculum and pedagogy (Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 2006; Haig-Brown, 2009; Illich, 1971/2000; Martin et al., 2015).The present work is placed squarely in the latter position. This is critical in understanding why I use Indigenous decolonial philosophy as an orienting framework with nonindigenous participants. Marker provides a succinct location for this general decolonial project, noting that the present “work is located in a kind of methodological interstitial zone such that you are exploring and analyzing expanded ontological approaches for psychology that would draw upon Indigenous considerations” (M. Marker, personal communication, August 4, 2017). Due to this choice of a general subject matter of the project, I will not be engaged in an “ethnographic project with a specific Indigenous community” (M. Marker, personal communication, August 4, 2017) as is common in decolonial research focused on Indigenous communities (Smith, 2012a). As Marker notes elsewhere, an “Aboriginal perspective—and critique—on mainstream educational content and goals is not only for Aboriginal students. It is both a tonic—and a polemic—that needs to be engaged with throughout the university” (Marker, 2004, p. 108).Nevertheless, I am working in conjunction with, and in response to, a member of my committee who is an Indigenous decolonial researcher (Marker, 2006b), and members who are multicultural and social justice researchers (Borgen et al., 2015; Ishiyama, 2003). I am 79also in study relationships outside my committee (Rocha, 2015; Rocha & Clegg, 2017; Shin, 1994), and continue my own landed learning through my own traditions and relationships in Chilliwack, BC. I am grateful, in addition, for the advising and support of Indigenous counselling psychology scholar Alanaise Goodwill (e.g., Goodwill & Ishiyama, 2016).Metaphysics and WorldviewHere I will offer a brief accessible overview of metaphysics and worldview as they pertain to this project. For an expanded and more philosophically technical discussion please see Appendix F. Metaphysics denotes foundational philosophical premises about our shared world, being, and reality. As metaphysics is somewhat of an unfamiliar term for many people, we must find another way to access it with research participants in the following work. The author has chosen to broaden the frame of interviewing and analysis to the concept of worldview as this seems to be well-understood and more intuitive to engage with. For the present purposes, I will define worldview as a more holistic general view of the world that includes a metaphysics as part of that view. Both metaphysics and worldviews can occur explicitly or implicitly, with awareness or without, and can be held by people or communities, or embedded in texts, discourses, and educational programs (Hegel, 1807/1979; Heidegger, 1927/2010; Thiong’o, 1986; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). The Importance of MetaphysicsIn educational theory, Vine Deloria Jr. and Daniel Wildcat (2001) point out that metaphysics is the appropriate point of entry for a discussion of the differences in intellectual traditions between Western science and Indigenous Knowledge systems. By examining foundational assumptions about our shared world we can arrive at a more informed understanding than can be achieved by keeping cultural values completely separate (cf. Blaser, 2014; also see Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998). This project is in some ways related to previous research on clinical supervision and multiculturalism (Wong et al., 2013). However, the present project is concerned with the subject matter of experiences of educational environments more generally beyond clinical supervision as one component, and it uses an Indigenous decolonial orienting philosophy and an Indigenous analysis of place (Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). This work also fills a gap in the research by focusing not on culture per se (e.g., Wong et al., 2013) but rather on worldview, 80and within worldview specifically on the aspects of metaphysics and conflicts in metaphysics experienced by students in training. Indigenous Place-Based MetaphysicsIndigenous peoples' metaphysics often focuses on experiential relationships with particular more-than-human entities such as flora, fauna, landscapes, and landscape features, and their appearances in particular places in particular inter-relationships with other beings (Deloria, 1999b; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). For many Indigenous peoples, human personhood and a person's worldview arises from a network or community of relationships with diverse human and non-human peoples in a particular place, landscape, and ecology (Cruikshank, 2006; Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998; Thiong’o, 1986; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). Colonization and globalization have had negative impacts on land and well-being for both Indigenous and nonindigenous peoples (Berry, 1998; Deloria, 1999b; Easterly, 2002; Escobar, 2004; Illich, 1973/2001; Sage, 2011). For examples of embedded pro-globalization stances see DeBell (2006) and also the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations' report, The State of Agriculture and Food in 2017, In Brief (2017).This leads us to a metaphysical imperative to consider the primacy of land and our relationship to land in order to understand ourselves in terms of identity, community, and connection to place (Alexander, 2000; Berry, 1998; Blaser, 2009; Haig-Brown, 2009; Marker, 2006b, 2017; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001).Many Indigenous philosophies have points of possible compatibility with strands of Western philosophy such as phenomenology (Hegel, 1807/1979; Mika, 2015) and deep ecology (Naess, 2010). Indigenous scholars have analyzed these areas of connection, demonstrating the incorrectness of an assumption of complete separateness of traditions (Donald, 2009; Grande, 2008; Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998; Marker, 2004; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001).Immigrants and Settler-Immigrants as NewcomersWhile this work takes its orientation from Indigenous decolonial philosophy, it is focused on Canadian education per se, as opposed to on Indigenous-specific education (Pidgeon et al., 2013). Therefore, it is important to understand that the current study takes a decolonial perspective specifically on nonindigenous students, rather than Indigenous 81students, in Canada. The present decolonial analysis provides a unifying focus for the current study by identifying a common newcomer category denoting the population of nonindigenous students of various migratory and settler histories (Deloria, 1975; for a diverging and nuanced account see Tuck & Yang, 2012). The term immigrant is subject to processes of social construction and involved in social categorization and othering of migrant people (Bauder, 2011; McWhirter et al., 2013; Tuck & Yang, 2012). Within the unifying concept of newcomers, Indigenous decolonial philosophy frames nonindigenous people in Canada as settler-colonizing immigrants and as other immigrant peoples (Deloria, 1975; cf. Tuck & Yang, 2012). Settlers are immigrants who are, perhaps tacitly, participating in the goal and ideology of material dispossession of Indigenous peoples (Tuck & Yang, 2012). Their descendants, myself included, are considered within this lineage and politics of land-relations (Furniss, 1997). On the other hand, Indigenous decolonial writers frame many other immigrant groups within the broader context of the settler-colonizing state and its history and politics (Haig-Brown, 2009; cf. Tuck & Yang, 2012). Some Indigenous decolonial writers frame their ongoing welcome of newcomers within their own histories of welcoming traditions which in turn arise from their connections to the land (Fast, 2016; Furniss, 1997; Haig-Brown, 2009; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). Diverse newcomers share the commonality of having ancestors from another place and also of now convening together at the new place of the Canadian university. This population also then shares the politics of being welcomed by Indigenous peoples in these respective places throughout their families' various journeys (Deloria, 1975). For instance, on one side, my great-grandparents immigrated to Treaty #6 land on the Canadian prairies, my grandparents moved to British Columbia in Syilx territory near Keremeos (cf. Furniss, 1997), my parents to the Chilliwack River Valley watershed, on Soowahlie traditional territory (cf. Marker, 2015), and now I encounter Euro-American ideas of counselling in university on Musqueam territory.I am drawing on students who self-identify (through recruitment materials' descriptions of the study) as having a difference in worldview between themselves and their institutions. I am thereby open to including students diverse in, for example, migration 82histories and religious traditions. Therefore, there is a common theoretical space between my population of study (who have worldview difference) and Indigenous peoples in Western education (which have well-documented experiences of worldview difference). Another way of expressing this is through the term cognitive imperialism, which indicates the oppressive dominance of Western modernist philosophy in education (Battiste, 1998; Brayboy & Maughn, 2009; Dallmayr, 1993; Marker, 2006b; Thiong’o, 1986). A concrete example is a story told by Bang, Warren, Roesbery, and Medin (2013). A student from a culture that values various living natural entities asks during a science class, how the sun can be said to be not alive when it generates all life. This student is then subtly and implicitly reeducated not only to know that the sun is not alive, but that his intellectual tradition at the core of his culture is not valid. This is an example of imperial imposition of a worldview in an educational setting.However, this should not equate the struggles for educational inclusion between Indigenous and nonindigenous groups (Tuck & Yang, 2012). The common theoretical space does, however, let us productively use an Indigenous lens to understand embedded metaphysics in education experienced by nonindigenous students. The subject matter of the study is initially defined as the development of worldview with respect to land, place, and institutional worldview. As Belgrave, Zablotsky, and Guadagno (2002) relate, “quantitative reviewers think in terms of drawing a sample . . . from a defined population, whereas we [(qualitative researchers)] are more likely to focus on a social world or phenomenon” (p. 1431). To avoid a rough gear change between Indigenous and newcomer, it is worth reiterating here the distinction between the role of Indigenous decolonial philosophy as orienting theoretical framework on the one hand, and newcomers as a category defining my social phenomenon of study according to which I recruit participants. RationaleThe current study investigates nonindigenous students' development of worldview in relationship to land and of experiencing different worldviews in different places, and particularly within the Canadian counsellor education and counselling psychology context. I chose counsellor education and counselling psychology due to the strong influence the institutions of psychology have in society as I will detail below in the section titled social 83influence, and I focused on the educational stage of work life (Blustein, 2006) due to it being a critical site of reproduction of ideology of future professionals (Illich, 1971/2000; Marker, 2004). The study examines counsellor education and counselling psychology students enrolled in (including alumni) Canadian graduate programs—people who are in (or who can speak to) the educational stage of their careers (Blustein, 2006; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001)—and asks how they make their way through professional educational environments while maintaining or changing vocational aspirations and their own worldviews. This research will seek to understand how these people interface with demands for rehearsal of professional viewpoints that are different from their own worldviews (Martin et al., 2015). The study will serve as an empirical exploration of other scholars' theorizing of how nonindigenous students experience land and develop worldview (Deloria, 1975; Tuck & Yang, 2012; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). More specifically, during Fellner's (2016) dissertation defence, she identified the need for decolonized counsellor education to work with nonindigenous counselling students from where students found themselves in their journeys of identity. Similarly, Haig-Brown (2009) advocates a critical reflexivity of the theorizing of one's field based on the dialectic between understanding where one has come from and where decolonizing efforts may lead. As such, the current study aims to help clarify where nonindigenous students and institutions are at with respect to their interface with land and worldview. This information then, in turn, will inform and enable future projects of decolonizing curriculum and pedagogy within Canadian counsellor education and counselling psychology institutions for the sake of the edification and moral conscience of the field itself beyond the very real and related-but-separate need for responsiveness to Indigenous students. As noted by Martin (as cited in Martin et al., 2015), “theoretical psychologists have an obligation to interpret and critique specific applications of psychological science that seem not to acknowledge important moral and political aspects of psychological practice” (p. 7).Access to EmploymentEducation in counsellor education and counselling psychology programs can at times tacitly view trainees' cultures as error variance to be controlled for or, at best, social locations 84which trainees' must gain awareness of in order to avoid biasing their learning of established paradigms of helping, and in order to avoid culturally influencing their clients (e.g., Bernard & Goodyear, 2013; c.f. Wong et al., 2013; cf. Freire, 1970). This denies the intellectual traditions inherent in these cultures, and denies any role of such intellectual traditions within academic training (Marker, 2004). Ishu Ishiyama remarks that “perhaps academia is inevitably conservative, validating its own reason for being and serving the needs of those in power and authority (similar to a racist or sexist institutional system which is highly resistant to change and punitive to those who challenge the foundational and unconscious assumptions held among those in power/authority)” (personal communication, July 18, 2018). Denying intellectual traditions within cultures is also consistent with a modernist perspective that assumes Western society to be unique in having a free and rational intellectual tradition (science) above and beyond mere culture, whereas non-Western, or so-called ethnic peoples simply have non-intellectual cultural habits (Marker, 2004; Martin et al., 2015; Smith, 2012a). This clarifies why studying students' diverse worldviews and their intellectual agency with respect to these is both important to appreciate in light of a decolonial critique (Smith, 2012a), and why it is fruitful to investigate the metaphysical core of students' intellectual traditions (Blaser, 2009, 2014) as opposed to treating culture as simply a unitary and auxiliary variable to be controlled for.Training in professional education programs involves interfacing with worldviews (and hence metaphysics) embedded in curriculum and pedagogy (Battiste, 1998; Martin et al., 2015; Phillips & Clarke, 2012; Rowe & Rocha, 2015; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001); these interfaces can occur in diverse facets of the university experience such as: academic atmosphere, academic freedom in coursework, interactions with supervisors, the parameters of permissible in-class discourse, the bounds of acceptable philosophies of science, the sanctioning of a certain set of clinical theoretical orientations, the curricula within courses and that which drives selection of mandated courses, and limits on scholarly inquiry corresponding to normative assumptions about what constitutes the field (Bernard & Goodyear, 2013; Martin et al., 2015; Phillips & Clarke, 2012; Ruitenberg, 2011; Scott & Rodriguez, 2015; Tillson, 2017; Wong et al., 2013). The professional aspect of these education programs demands extra layers of mandated views within professional dispositions 85and ethics codes, required courses, sanctioned selections of theoretical orientations, professional norms and customs, and so on, that pervade the graduate education experience (e.g., Bernard & Goodyear, 2013; e.g., Egan, 2013; Ruitenberg, 2011). One particularly salient difference in metaphysics between students and their education in counselling is highlighted by Indigenous senses of learning from the sentient landscape (Blaser, 2009; Brayboy & Maughn, 2009; Deloria, 1999b). Western scientific approaches to knowledge deny the relevance of learning gained through relationship with a sentient landscape—through these landscapes here. This scratches the surface of a metaphysically relevant power-differential not only enacted on Indigenous students (Battiste, 1998; Marker, 2006b; Smith, 2012a) but other students who hold differing metaphysical views with respect to land and nature specifically, such as religious students (Tillich, as cited in Deloria, 1975, p. 94; Heidegger, 1927/2010; Shin, 1994; Thiselton, 1995; cf. Tuck & Yang, 2012). These power differentials have the possible effect of suppressing in-class dialogue and self-representation, restricting the range of meaning of humanness in student and clinical work, and threatening career advance in the case of non-compliance (Marker, 2006b; Phillips & Clarke, 2012; Ruitenberg, 2011; St. Denis, 2011). At times, one's own knowledges are not permitted in educational discourse at all (Bang et al., 2013; Marker, 2006b). Particularly, students who are from diverse cultures can find their voices silenced in such educational spaces (Bang et al., 2013; Illich, 1971/2000, 1973/2001; Marker, 2006b; Phillips & Clarke, 2012; Wong et al., 2013). As Bang, Warren, Roesbery, and Medin (2013) put it, “normative descriptions of discipline-specific subject matter in schools shaped by settled expectations tend to restrict the intellectual and expressive opportunities youth have in school and thereby reproduce the privileging of whiteness” (p. 303). They also note that these “expectations are implicit and associated with blindness to institutionalized privilege and associated ontological and epistemological constructs” (p. 303). Even within a multicultural paradigm, Indigenous students' intellectual traditions can still be threatening to the established classroom (Marker, 2006b; St. Denis, 2011).Simultaneously, it is axiomatic in counsellor education and counselling psychology that the counsellor must buy in, do the job authentically, or in words that focus on the 86metaphysical, integrate the prescribed ideas into one's being (C. R. Rogers, 1961; Ruitenberg, 2011). Authenticity and parallel processes between the counsellor-trainee and the supervisor are hallmarks of counselling training and practice (Bernard & Goodyear, 2013; Corsini & Wedding, 2010). And yet, as Ruitenberg (2011) examines in a parallel field, this personal journey of assimilation into mandated performance is graded objectively (also see Tillson, 2017). Ruitenberg's work has differentiated professionally required dispositions from personal beliefs and has highlighted the conflation of these two in professional higher educational programs—students' personal journeys are highly scrutinized for compliance to required dispositions (see also Tillson, 2017). Ishiyama (personal communication, July 18, 2018) comments that “this epitomizes the paradox of encouraging freedom, creativity, and diversity and measuring and grading such qualities with numbers and normal distribution curves.”To be sure, professional dispositions and ethics codes are instituted specifically because of the concern that practitioners would not naturally act in accordance with sound principles. This is a valid basis for these guiding constraints. Nevertheless, having been institutionalized is no guarantee of being just on the one hand, and on the other, there can be embedded metaphysics in such institutionalizations that are extraneous to their intended purposes. The ethics of the field is a topic of ongoing academic conversation, and rightly so (e.g., Burgard, 2013; Martin et al., 2015).I argue that there is also a danger of having one's freedom of academic inquiry in scholarly work infringed upon by implicit demands to display evidence of absorption of required professional positions in non-clinical course-work. The student must persist, sometimes unsuccessfully, in clarifying whether a course assignment is intended to demonstrate professional or scholarly work—that is, whether any sense of academic freedom applies. In the local context, UBC has recently reaffirmed a commitment to academic freedom in response to having been found by an independent investigating Queen's Counsel that “UBC did not live up to its responsibility to protect and support the academic freedom of one of its faculty members” (Smith, Q.C., 2015, p. 6).The situations outlined above set up potential assimilative pressures on diverse students for rehearsal of particular embedded worldviews which are graded objectively in 87order to access employment through graduation (from the medical field, see Phillips & Clarke, 2012). This secures the relevance of a work life perspective in analyzing these phenomena from a concrete opportunity-based perspective (Blustein, 2006).Social Influence and Globalization of PsychologyThese concerns also locate counsellor-trainee socialization as a key element of the larger societal process of psychology's imperial influence through globalized culture (Brock, 2006b; R. D. Goodman & Gorski, 2015; Lee & Wong, 1995; Marker, 2004; Martin et al., 2015; Smith, 2012a). Consider the importance even domestic society imbues in graduated psychological professionals as a source of worldview to be sought after in diverse-yet-profound domains such as child-rearing (Santrock et al., 2008), living in community (Carlson et al., 2005; J. Yang et al., 2009), thinking correctly about the world (Corsini & Wedding, 2010), understanding the correct meaning of death (Yalom & Josselson, 2011, 2011), knowing oneself and governing oneself and others (Martin et al., 2015), and so on. That these topics can be seen through the eyes of Western modern culture as specialized, technologically advanced professional scientific domains rather than aspects of worldview is not because of any escape to philosophical neutrality but is rather the very point of intervention by critical scholars of Western modernity (Freire, 1970; Heidegger, 1927/2010; Illich, 1973/2001; Shin, 1994; Smith, 2012a; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). Subject, Object, and PlaceWildcat (Wildcat & Deloria, 2001) indicates the disconnection from place and place-based metaphysics inherent in mainstream physical and social sciences:the problem of professional education in institutions of higher education is that 'expertise' is thought of as culture-free or value-neutral. . . . professional education and the resulting 'expertise' are implicitly value-laden and reflective of the schizophrenic metaphysics of Western society. (p. 114)This disconnection arises from the devaluation and separation of internal experience from material reality:We are surrounded by a society of metaphysical schizophrenics: people who do not see the phenomenal world for what it is—a living, complex reality with multiple dimensions. A good number of these metaphysical schizophrenics are scientists and 88engineers who have, with considerable harm to their person (or personality) as human beings, convinced themselves that their feelings or emotions have no place in their objective science. This is the metaphysics of the world writ large. (Wildcat & Deloria, 2001, p. 116)This quote illustrates the common decolonial priority of establishing worldviews that do not participate in the Western dichotomy of subject and object. From the Indigenous perspective there is the added focus on specific environments: “an introduction to most American institutions of higher education should predictably result in disorientation to any person who understands their personality as emergent from a specific environment or place” (Wildcat & Deloria, 2001, p. 114).Educational PerpetuationOf issue are the nature and source of the particular worldviews promulgated—particularly Eurocentric and neoliberal views (Cushman, 1992), as well as views that reduce everything to processes of lifeless physical matter (e.g., neurobiology) or to abstract theoretical laws of psychology (Giorgi, 1981) which tend to explicitly marginalize voices of those from diverse intellectual traditions such as people of religious and non-Western cultural groups. Martin, Sugarman, and Slaney (2015) review how psychology's “most cherished assumptions and aspirations as a hegemonic social science capable of empirically explicating human experience and action through tightly controlled experimentation and psychometric measurement became the focus of a wide variety of theoretical and philosophical analyses” (p. 5). In light of these critiques, it is worth considering that students diverse in incoming worldview, on their entry to society after graduation, may participate in imperially globalizing these homogenized Western ideals of health and humanness (Illich, 1971/2000; Martin et al., 2015; Martín-Baró, 1996; Thiong’o, 1986). Taking together the pressure for rehearsal of worldview during education and the perpetuation of worldview after graduation, we can see that the educational segment of the career journey (Blustein, 2006) involves metaphysics within the context of diverse power differentials. With respect to land, we can theorize that students of diverse relationships with land may be excluded from educational discourses (Marker, 2006b), and that students learning an outdated western scientific understanding of space may perpetuate this in a public 89sphere without qualifications as physicists, western or otherwise (DeLanda & Harman, 2017; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). Such perpetuation could support the ideology of land as blank space (Euclidean/Cartesian) that has arguably undergirded the very imposition of the present university on Musqueam land (DeLanda & Harman, 2017; The University of British Columbia & Musqueam Indian Band, 2006; UBC Vancouver Aboriginal Portal, n.d.; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001), and equally support a modernist metaphysics of relationship to land through a psychology that continues to prevent Western minds from finding connection with ecology (Berry, 1998; Duran, 2006; Rowe & Rocha, 2015; Sage, 2011; Tuck & Yang, 2012). While Indigenous scholars have clarified some of these dynamics as they are experienced by Indigenous students, the experiences of nonindigenous students have been less explored from this angle. Additionally, the dimension of relationship to land within these politicized arenas for metaphysics has not, to the author's knowledge, been explored among nonindigenous counselling students (Fellner, 2016; Haig-Brown, 2009; Harper, 2000). Again, it is useful here to take an Indigenous decolonial lens in analyzing these issues due to the intellectual imperative to examine alternative viewpoints and the positive steps taken by UBC in partnership with Indigenous peoples to this effect (The University of British Columbia & Musqueam Indian Band, 2006), the moral imperative to respond to objective history of oppression of Indigenous Knowledges systems (Marker, 2015), and the fact that Indigenous Knowledge Systems have focused on worldview and place for millennia in this place which indicate their suitability for the present work (Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001).Always Already Related to PlaceThe above-noted politics and history of land and newcomers relates directly to our present work in understanding differences between students' and institutions' metaphysics. For some Indigenous decolonial theorists of place (e.g., Marker, 2006b), the locations on land in which students encounter scholarly discourses sit in context of the histories of education in those places (Malone & Osbeck, 2015; Marker, 2004). This then is one of the ways in which Indigenous, settler-immigrant, and immigrant counselling students are already related to land in their professional development; that is, by either appreciating or covering over these histories, knowingly or unknowingly. In the unknowing case, this relation still stands in the 90real world as a relation between a real history and a person's non-awareness (Hegel, 1807/1979; Heidegger, 1927/2010; Spinoza & Hampshire, 1677/2005).Newcomers, whether settler immigrants, their descendants, or other immigrants, relate to scholarly discourses they find in this place, and these discourses themselves have their own migration histories (Foucault, 1961/2013; Taiana, 2006). The dynamics between welcomer-to-place and welcomed-in-place then are recapitulated in university where students are welcomed-to-place by the university, but also welcomed to the ideas of the field which come from some place (in theology see Fast, 2016). As conscious and embodied beings, students then are always interacting in a place with a professional ideology or learning that comes from a place.This is not about a metaphorical or subjective place of ideas (Tuck & Yang, 2012; cf. Plato, 1999), but rather the concrete place people are from, the concrete place in which they encounter ideas (campus, department, classroom), and the concrete places from which these ideas themselves originate (Deloria, 1975). Largely, these ideas encountered in university are nonindigenous, and as such, not from this landscape. This corresponds to a prejudice against ideas arising from the sentient landscape, as Indigenous authors describe (Cruikshank, 2006; Deloria, 1975, 1999b; Marker, 2006b): a prejudice that arose from a dis-placed sense of nonindigenous Canadian identity (Alexander, 2000; Deloria, 1975, Chapters 4, 5; Smith, 2012a) supported by concrete historical events such as the ban of the west-coast Potlatch ceremony by the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa in 1884 (An Act Further to Amend ‘The Indian Act 1880’, 1884).An Origin Story of Western Counselling: Situating the FieldThis does not deny counselling's own roots as a movement counter to power. In order to tell one of many possible origin stories of counselling, we can look to the beginning of the migration journey of vocational guidance, one of the progenitors of the counselling field as we know it today. This history comes from a person in a particular place: Frank Parsons in Boston, USA. Herr (2013) situates Parsons' work in the context of changes in American production and education: “vocational guidance arose in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as a partner to vocational education. In these years, the world of work and the world of career interventions changed dramatically” (p. 278). Herr describes Frank Parsons as “a 91lawyer and an engineer” (p. 278) who,was considered the dominant visionary and architect of vocational guidance and vocational education. Parsons . . . had been highly involved with immigrant settlement along the north-eastern coast of the United States, especially in the Boston area. . . . Parsons worked to provide a scientific basis for assisting immigrants and others to develop effective techniques for choosing specific work. An outspoken critic of the Boston public school system and a major advocate of educational reform, he was concerned that children were not getting training in the technical skills of the day. . . . Parsons also saw the process of adapting vocational guidance to the school as completely relevant to educational reform. (p. 278)Space permits only this brief glimpse, but suffice to say that vocational guidance is one of the important wellsprings of counselling's disciplinary identity, and continues to be represented by critical theories such as Blustein's psychology of working (Arthur et al., 2013; Blustein, 2006; Blustein et al., 2005). Through this example, we can see that counselling as a discipline is in a way inherently counter-cultural, which could mitigate concerns about the hegemony of mainstream psychology (Martín-Baró, 1996). Counselling, through its social justice roots and current identity (L. A. Goodman et al., 2004), particularly in Canada (Sinacore et al., 2011), critiques power (Blustein et al., 2005). But it also arguably enjoys power as a discipline underlying a paid profession in a Western society delivering Western conceptualizations of humanness to an assumed Western audience (Illich, 1971/2000, 1973/2001). Being counter-cultural is no guarantee of cultural neutrality (Freire, 1970), and as such, counselling still represents a cultural stance, and one that could be seen through a decolonial lens as problematically Western and modernist in its anti-traditionalism (Deloria, 1999b; Grande, 2008; Heidegger, 1927/2010; Smith, 2012a). Indeed, as Marker notes,although non-Native students might experience the challenge to their world view as an iconoclastic pressure and a sometimes painful widening of their horizons, Native students experience such education as assimilation and nullification of their own identity. . . . the 'transformation' of attending university is not an expanding of intellectual possibilities, but a space of alienation that lures Aboriginal students away 92from community and a sense of place to a kind of nowhere metropolis where they wander as strangers through a maze of careers and 'choices.'” (Marker, 2004, p. 105)Although Marker is talking about Indigenous university students, his comments equally apply to some other nonindigenous university students as well as to some university students' future clients as ideas are professionally promulgated (Duran, 2006).Following this historical thread of vocational psychology, the current study utilizes a psychology of working perspective (Blustein, 2006) which itself has affinity with other critical theorists of work life (Arthur et al., 2013; Arthur & McMahon, 2005; Fouad, 2006). Following this model, and the example of a study by Stebleton (2012), the present project uses a qualitative methodology, attends to historical and political context, and understands work-life very broadly. I consider work life to include the training and educational stage of one's career development, as is explicitly put forth in Blustein's (2006) psychology of working. Deloria and Wildcat also affirm the necessity of a critical examination of “professional education” (p. 110) and its “coherent internal logics” (p. 110) with respect to the preservation and use of land and survival of tribal peoples. They also, corresponding to Blustein, specifically ask these questions “during the educational years of training” (p. 111) in professional education programs.Situating MyselfTo very briefly own my own position on entering this work, I identify as a descendant of settler immigrant ancestors, specifically of the fourth generation. My family immigrated to Canada from the Isle of Mann, Ireland, and Lancashire in England, settler-homesteaded in the Canadian prairies for a generation and moved west to British Columbia (for context, see Furniss, 1997). Our heritage and continuing intellectual tradition is Protestant Christian (e.g., Quaker, and more recently, Mennonite), and our culture tends toward a pre-modern rural farming ethos (similar to other Anabaptists mentioned by Deloria, 1975). I was born on Stó:lō territory, and raised specifically on Soowahlie traditional territory. I have an extensive personal and familial tradition of connection to land in the Chilliwack River valley (and Fraser valley floodplain) through recreation, fishing and foraging, woodwork, ecological knowledge, and landscape-based art. And yet this is also limited to a few generations' accumulation in this particular landscape (Deloria, 1975) and, 93despite my parents' excellent tutelage in the forest, hampered by modernist educational foreclosures on transmission of experiential knowledge of ecology and community, as well as by our sequential displacement and consequent loss of intergenerational cultural transmission since our ancestors' departure from Europe (Furniss, 1997). In Vancouver for my eighth year now, I was a TA for three years in the Faculty of Land and Food Systems teaching a critical systems perspective on Land, Food, and Community. On the other hand, I also recognize the risk of “settler adoption fantasies” (Tuck & Yang, 2012, p. 13; and superficial co-opting in general, Deloria, 1975), such as believing that I have become Indigenous, that I have fully understood these traditions particularly outside of ceremonial practice or community membership, or that I have somehow earned the right to represent these viewpoints and traditions as an insider. I mitigate these risks by an extensive project of digging into my own complex and complicit cultural sources, intellectual traditions, and histories while also reading Indigenous scholarship and being in conversation with Indigenous scholars about my process (Clegg, 2017, 2018a; Rocha & Clegg, 2018).I have previously spoken and written on my experience of discrepancies in worldview between my tradition as a rural religious person and my educational experience in light of existing in a colonial history of Canada with its own ontological violences (Clegg, 2016; Clegg & Rocha, 2018; Fast, 2016). This is a complex work and impossible to summarize here without providing many more preparatory remarks, but please refer to the related published work of others such as Fast (2016) on my Mennonite roots, Furnis (1997) on family histories of settler pioneers in British Columbia, and Haig-Brown on understanding the land as an immigrant group (Haig-Brown, 2009). Ishiyama (personal communication, July 18, 2018) provides a succinct analysis: “interestingly, people who were caught between two (often conflicting/dichotomous) cultures and social paradigms end up going through a profound and frustratingly long process of self-and-other questioning and self-searching, as if such dissonance experiences serve as fuel for future inquiries and inner identity development to be free from the spell of the external culture and society.” This has matured into the present decolonial motivations as well as helped me establish collaborative relationships with Indigenous decolonial scholars in academia. As a religious and somewhat traditional person undergoing secular modernist education in counselling psychology, this author is located 94inside the participant group of students diverse in worldview and will therefore be conducting insider research (Coghlan & Shani, 2008). My position shapes this research. By recognizing the moral and intellectual need for response to Indigenous subjugation by my own people, I turn toward the wisdom traditions that we attempted to silence and use my complicit privilege as an avenue for being responsive to Indigenous scholars wishing to decolonize academic fields that exert powerful social forces on society (Duran, 2006; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). These, in turn, emphasize the metaphysical as the point of departure for articulating a level of analysis with which to create positive change in educational theory (Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). This accords well with my religious heritage as we have common ground in recognizing intellectual traditions outside the modernist and postmodernist philosophies of science of contemporary social sciences (Battiste, 1986; Thiselton, 1995). My own experience of being raised on the land (and educated on and by it in family and community), while related to Mennonite, Stoic, and Quaker traditions, provides for a powerful common cause in centering place in the analysis of worldview and education.Research QuestionsDue to the inherent connection between metaphysics and place in the orienting philosophy, the present research extends two separate-but-related research questions as follows:1. How do nonindigenous graduate students in professional counsellor education and counselling psychology programs in Canada experience differences between their own worldviews and those of the educational institution in which they are or were enrolled?2. How does land or place relate to students' worldviews and to their interactions with different institutional worldviews?Gadamerian Hermeneutic EpistemologyFollowing precedent in the counselling literature (Arthur et al., 2013; Stebleton, 2012), and in consultation with a committee which included, at the time of proposal, two Indigenous scholars (Goodwill & Ishiyama, 2016; Marker, 2017), I use a Gadamerian hermeneutic epistemology because of its strategic fit with Indigenous decolonial theory for 95the purposes of the present work and context—in other words this is a “strategic and contingent collaboration” (Tuck & Yang, 2012, p. 28). The researcher's context and positionality, choice of research questions and motivations for them, and initial presuppositions and preconceptions are not seen as sources of bias but of involvement which must be understood in order to “secure” the “hermeneutical situation” (Heidegger, 1927/2010, p. 222). Gadamerian philosophy is a suitable aid to the Indigenous decolonial orientation here because the present project is aimed at the field in general, as opposed to other projects of Indigenous research conducted within Indigenous communities for Indigenous consumption which might opt for decolonized methodologies more singly (M. Marker, personal communication, August 4, 2017; Smith, 2012a). Empirical studies certainly have used Gadamerian epistemology with nonindigenous participants (e.g., Fleming, 2003), yet the present work may be unique in that it uses Indigenous decolonial philosophy as orienting framework within which Gadamerian hermeneutic methodology is implemented to investigate nonindigenous experiences. For more thorough technical discussion of epistemological issues, see Appendix E.Methodology & MethodGadamerian Methodology Within Psychology and Social SciencesJack Martin (2002), a psychologist and philosopher, has established a paradigm of Gadamerian hermeneutic research within psychology by articulating the same core Gadamerian philosophy outlined above, but within the bounds of the psychology discipline. His work provides for a link of continuity between philosophical sources on the one hand, and applied method papers in psychology and the social sciences on the other. He identifies some methodological work that has been done on the practical side within psychology, but I find the most direct and cogent treatment to come out of nursing literature as this field has made much use of Gadamer (Debesay et al., 2008; Fleming, 2003; Fleming et al., 2003; Gabrielsen et al., 2013). Therefore, I followed Fleming, Gaidys, and Robb's (2003) guidance for Gadamerian hermeneutic methodology. They organize their presentation around five steps of research which I will use as headings below.96Deciding Upon a QuestionThis first stage was completed prior to conducting the study as detailed above. The desire is to “achieve a deep understanding of a phenomenon. The essence of the question, according to Gadamer (1990), leads to the opening up of possibilities for this understanding” (Fleming et al., 2003, p. 117). Fleming notes that the researcher uses these questions throughout the work to orient themselves and the participants to the phenomenon.Identification of Pre-Understandings Fleming (2003) describes a set of guiding directions and practices that identify, understand, and continually reflect on preunderstandings throughout the project:pre-understandings become discernible through confrontation with different beliefs such as opinions of other researchers, colleagues or traditional texts . . . Reflecting upon these will enable them to move beyond their preunderstandings to understand the phenomenon and so transcend their horizon. . . . Researchers' pre-understandings, . . . should then be described and analysed in the research report. . . . By thus explicating and periodically reviewing their pre-understandings, researchers are enabled to enter the hermeneutic circle (Geanellos 2000) and remain oriented to the phenomenon. (p. 117)The present research report constitutes an initial documentation of the iterative development of my preunderstandings which continued with ongoing documentation and reflection in response to dialogues with participants and data analysis. Please see the results section for a delineation of additional preunderstandings.Gaining Understanding Through Dialogue With ParticipantsMerging HorizonsThe term “gaining understanding” is the Gadamerian version of data collection which includes dialogical conversation (Buber, 2004; Dallmayr, 1993; Fleming et al., 2003, p. 117). In this stage I sought to establish a shared viewpoint with participants during interviews (a merged horizon), so that what was talked about together (the dialogue as a text, if you will) could be understood from this shared viewpoint. It is important to distinguish this from taking the perspective of the participant, as an exclusively other-directed attention prevents the researcher's horizon from being able to merge with the participants, providing a new 97understanding of the phenomenon: “it is thus important that the researcher does not attempt to see through the eyes of the participants to understand the phenomenon of interest. Instead they work together to reach a shared understanding” (Fleming et al., 2003, p. 117). To reiterate this critical point, Martin (2002) provides an essential epistemological differentiation between the typical qualitative approach to the use of empathy and the Gadamerian stance on merging horizons and gaining understanding:The critical insight is that reaching an understanding with another is not a matter of empathically reconstructing the other's mental processes and private experiences, but of being open to, and integrating another's horizon in such a way that one's own perspective is altered in the process. Inevitably, such a process also involves some greater degree of critical penetration of one's own background of preunderstanding and prejudice (p. 107).Dallmayr (1993) explains how Gadamer's fusion of horizons does not simply mean consensus, replication, or agreement: “Notions like the 'fusion of horizons' discussed in Truth and Method, he [(Gadamer)] added, should not be taken in the sense of a complete merger or a Hegelian synthesis, but in that of an engaged dialogical encounter: 'I am not referring to an abiding or identifiable “oneness,” but just to what happens in conversation as it proceeds'” (p. 516).While the above sounds like a repudiation of the role of empathy or perspective-taking in communication, it is rather a different viewpoint on how this occurs from a metaphysical and epistemological perspective. One might ask, why is taking on the participant's perspective detrimental or counterproductive in this methodology? Without knowing the other person's perspective first through a dialogical communication, wouldn't it be difficult for you to merge with it? In this methodology, understanding is always of the real subject matter in the world between people, and as such, looking solely inside the subjectivity of one person for the answer to even their own perspective is misguided, and the priority is rather put on meeting together in dialogue about the real. One is still very interested in the other person's thoughts, but in this view, one simply does not bracket off one's own understanding in order to reach a merged understanding—this is in contrast to the bracketing model of Husserl (1931/1993) in earlier phenomenological theory. It is not that 98empathy is not often useful, but rather that the danger of losing one's self in the process, or losing sight of the common object of interest is highlighted here.The Hermeneutic CircleFleming (2003) insists on multiple interview encounters in order to engage participants in a hermeneutic circle. However, I find this analysis problematic in that it assumes that the circle is not inherently operative within a single interview, between participants, researcher, and produced text (conversation), particularly during a longer interview. I concur with Debesay, Nåden, and Slettebø (2008) that “the most important factor must be the centrality of the phenomenon: . . . the extent to which the researcher gains an accurate understanding . . . It can hardly, therefore, be the [case] that one has an absolute need for several interviews with informants” (p. 64). Nevertheless, in the current study I returned to participants for continuing conversation after initial interviews and analysis. Additionally, I brought an expert into conversation with the themes that arose from analysis. These stages all increased the opportunity for the operation of the hermeneutic circle, that is, the unfolding of understandings in conversation (Fleming et al., 2003).Interview Format Following Fleming's (2003) own articulation of the Gadamerian methodology, “all data were collected by means of unstructured interviews, with one key question starting the discussion . . . Interviews . . . took the form of free-flowing conversations” (Fleming et al., 2003, p. 577). I began interviews with a brief orientation comprising the information that was present on recruitment flyers such as the research topic and an initial provisional definition of worldview. After orientation, the interview format consisted of posing and briefly clarifying main interview questions, open conversation around the participants' responses to gain a shared understanding, and reiterations of interview questions to ensure we stayed on topic (Fleming et al., 2003). Please see Appendix C for details of the interview guide.Dialogical Mode of ConversationAlthough Gadamerian hermeneutics required me to involve my pre-understandings in conversation with the participant to arrive at a new understanding (Fleming et al., 2003; Shin, 1994), in this project I erred towards the side of caution and let my orientation, posed research questions, and brief clarification largely suffice as representatives of my pre-99understandings in the dialogues with participants so as not to insert my own views too forcefully onto the participant and destroy the dialogical nature of the conversation (Buber, 2004; Fleming et al., 2003). Gadamerian epistemology is very sensitive to both the risks of merely taking on the participant's perspective on the one hand, and forcing my own on the other. Neither results in the desired merging of horizons and both prevent a new understanding from emerging (Dallmayr, 1993, 2009; Fleming et al., 2003). Dallmayr (1993) makes this point eloquently in discussing the Gadamerian approach to understanding the texts of poetry—where instead of poems, here read objects in the world and the texts of our conversations:Poems [/objects in the world], in Gadamer's view, are not simply self-contained art-objects but acquire their proper status only through dialogical exchange with readers. What a poem is offering or intimating, he writes, every reader “has to supplement from his/her own experience. This is what 'understanding' a poem means.” . . . Hermeneutics from this angle is not a synonym for subjectivism and willful appropriation, but for a sustained, dialogical learning process. Subjective impressions, Gadamer insists, are "no interpretation at all"; they are, rather, "a betrayal of exegesis [(interpretation)] as such." The common source of exegetic [(interpretive)] failure resides in unwillingness (or lack of good will) to face up to the text's appeal, including its possibly encoded message in the bottle; such unwillingness surfaces in the imposition of extrinsic frameworks or criteria and, more generally, in the obstinate clinging to private feelings: “This kind of understanding remains captive to subjectivism.” Preferable to this type of approach is recognition of the radical otherness of the text and the simple admission of non-understanding. (pp. 513-514)This passage makes it clear that I must avoid both the danger of failing to face the text of the other (here both objects in the world and texts of conversations), and the danger of applying a rigid methodological approach to guarantee production of truth (Fleming et al., 2003; Shin, 1994). The latter was the rationale for the unstructured interview format used in this study.Iterations of the Hermeneutic CircleI interviewed participants individually for an hour to two hours. I used audio-taping and verbatim transcription to increase fidelity to the conversations (Fleming et al., 2003) and 100honour the voices of participants (Belgrave et al., 2002; Braun & Clarke, 2013). After analysis (as detailed in the next step below) I engaged participants again with the analysis and the understandings we took from the prior meeting. We continued the conversation to deepen understanding and reiterate the hermeneutic circle (Debesay et al., 2008). Importantly, this was not a participant check on accuracy, but rather a continuation of conversation and hermeneutic circle (Fleming et al., 2003).After these conversations with participants, I engaged in conversation around the interpretation with a scholar knowledgeable about the methodology in educational research. I framed this not as an expert check but as a continuing conversation that shone  more light on the subject matter (Fleming et al., 2003).Gaining Understanding Through Dialogue With Text  This step constitutes what would usually be described as data analysis. In the present methodology, my dialogue with text occurred and recurred after each major stage of conversations with participants or other parties (Fleming et al., 2003). Fleming et al. provide for four stages of this step. Meaning of the WholeIn the first stage, I interpreted the meaning of the whole, which in this case is the current set of interviews and their transcripts and audiotapes: “texts should be examined to find an expression that reflects the fundamental meaning of the text as a whole. . . . influenced by . . . [the] preunderstanding of the researcher” (Fleming et al., 2003, p. 118). Individual PassagesThe second stage was to examine individual sentences or sections for how they informed the meaning of the subject matter as a whole. This stage involved thematizing these individual meanings (Braun & Clarke, 2006). I read and re-read transcripts to obtain a thorough familiarity. I proceeded with initial coding at the level of the sentence or paragraph, depending on the loquaciousness of the participant, and aimed to concisely summarize the sentiment conveyed using as close to the text's own words as possible (Belgrave et al., 2002). According to the research goal and philosophy (Malpas, 2016), and using Braun and Clarke's (2006) method of thematic analysis, I identified categories across participants among codes based on similar language and sentiments spontaneously being identified by participants, and 101based on my interpretation of the meaning and similarity between codes (Belgrave et al., 2002). Names, descriptions, and exemplars of themes were my interpretations at this point. The individual meanings and thematization then can “be challenged by, and in turn, challenge the researcher's preunderstandings” (Fleming et al., 2003, p. 118). I recorded such processes in a researcher's journal that provided another potential text for analysis (Fleming et al., 2003).Back to the WholeThe third stage goes back to the whole to expand its meaning. I examined each individual thematized element from the previous stage with respect to the meaning of the whole. To expand on Fleming et al.'s description, I quote from Aristotle on the generation of story and on wholes:Just as in the other imitative arts the single imitation is of a single thing, so also the story, since it is an imitation of action, ought to be of one action, and this a whole. And the parts of the events ought to have been put together so that when a part is transposed or removed, the whole becomes different and changes. For whatever makes no noticeable difference if it is added or not added is no proper part of the whole. (Aristotle et al., 335 B.C.E./2002, p. 1451a)And again I quote Aristotle on the relationship between historical fact and future possibility:It is also apparent . . . that this too is not the task of the poet, i.e., to speak of what has come to be, but rather to speak of what sort of things would come to be, i.e., of what is possible according to the likely or the necessary. For the historian and the poet do not differ by speaking either in meters or without meters . . . But they differ in this: the one speaks of what has come to be while the other speaks of what sort would come to be. Therefore poiêsis is more philosophic and of more stature than history. . . . with [the genre of] tragedy they cling to actual names. The cause of this is that the possible is persuasive. Just as, then, we do not [fully] trust to be possible things that have not yet come to be, so it is evident that the things that came to be are possible, for otherwise they would not have come to be if they were impossible. (Aristotle et al., 335 B.C.E./2002, pp. 1451a–1451b)The connection with Aristotle as a theorist of poiêsis is established within the 102phenomenological tradition that Gadamer emerges from by Rocha (2015) in his work on folk phenomenology. This view of the relation between history and possibility helps us approach the later topic of transferability of the wholes we identify in qualitative research. In the current study, three wholes are represented by meta-themes as detailed in the results, and further overarching holistic analysis can be found in discussion and conclusion sections.Illustrative SegmentsThe fourth stage is the selection of illustrative segments of interview texts that show “shared understandings between the researcher and participants . . . that may appear in the research report . . . give the reader insight into that aspect of the phenomenon” (Fleming et al., 2003, p. 118). Throughout these four stages, I directed my attention assiduously to transcript texts and audiotapes “where the two partners are working together to create a common understanding” (Fleming et al., 2003, p. 118). I conducted all analysis of transcripts and thematization using ATLAS.ti Scientific Software to aid in the work-flow of importing plain-text transcript data, coding transcript excerpts, and aggregating these codes into interpretive categories.Establishing Trustworthiness I addressed rigour or trustworthiness in a variety of ways. First is the conversational mode of deepening understanding within the interviews with participants, according to Gadamerian hermeneutic and Indigenous epistemology (Gabrielsen et al., 2013; Malpas, 2016; Smith, 2012a). Gabrielsen, Lindstorm, and Nåden (2013) describe how the “hermeneutical approach is uniquely configured in the dialogic encounter itself” (p. 65), meaning that “the task for the hermeneutical researcher is not to develop a single method for understanding, but, on the contrary, to clarify the conditions in which understanding takes place” (p. 65). They define horizon as “the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point” (p. 66). Gadamer maintains that “working out the hermeneutical situation means acquiring the right horizon of inquiry for the questions evoked by the encounter with tradition [(read: the world)]” (as cited by Gabrielsen et al., 2013, p. 66). Accordingly, signs of trustworthy Gadamerian hermeneutic research interviews include a focus on the subject matter, a fusion of horizons that illuminate the subject matter, the possibility of new horizons emerging that illuminate the subject matter, and a conversation 103that mutually illuminates a new understanding (Gabrielsen et al., 2013). Even while participants “represent only a small part of the universal understanding of the phenomenon, the researcher should point to a more universal meaning” (Gabrielsen et al., 2013, p. 68), and “what is crucial for the understanding is the internal coherence between the particular and universal understanding” (Gadamer as cited in Gabrielsen et al., 2013, p. 68). This ontological concern with being able to link to particulars of experience resonates with some Indigenous decolonial demands for attention to experience in theorizing (Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). Fleming et al. (2003) note that Clayton and Thorne's ideas of credibility and confirmability apply, where credibility can be met in part by clear representation of participants' voices through direct quotations, and confirmability by returning to participants with interpretations. I included these in this methodology as stated here, and again, they are consistent with the decolonial consideration of voice, and to some extent power as well. To reiterate, I consulted participants on how data has been transcribed and understood on the individual level and the interpreted themes were brought into conversation with my supervisor and expert consultant. I framed these interactions not as checks but as a continuing conversation that shed more light on the subject matter according to the main methodology articulated by (Fleming et al., 2003). Again, this methodology was repeated with these new sources of data as part of the main procedure and analysis. This repetition of conversation was necessary to close the Gadamerian hermeneutic circle between myself and conversation partners iteratively (Debesay et al., 2008; Fleming et al., 2003). However, it must be remembered that the very core of Gadamerian epistemology is the Greek concept of ἀλήθεια (aletheia, truth) which means a partial uncovering of reality rather than a disconnected conceptual correspondence (Heidegger, 1927/2010, p. 30; Shin, 1994; see section II, def. IV, Spinoza, 1677/2001)—truth is never seen as guaranteed or total, but rather partial and involved with our engagement with the world with each other (Fleming et al., 2003).I engaged in reflexivity through my prior and ongoing scholarship in this area (Clegg, 2018a; Rocha & Clegg, 2018), through my positioning of myself, through my articulation of my own rationale for beginning this work, and through my articulation of my pre-104understandings later in this document (Fleming et al., 2003; Heidegger, 1927/1962; Shin, 1994). This reflexivity “is a strength that attends to the rigour of the work” (E. Bennett, personal communication, February 6, 2018).I also have “a purposefully selected and accessible sample [/group of participants] that will allow [me] to answer my research questions, to make meaningful claims about the phenomenon under study, and which will likely yield rich data” (E. Bennett, personal communication, February 6, 2018). These points, covered elsewhere in this document, enhanced the rigour of the work. Suitability of the MethodologyA qualitative approach to these questions was appropriate because the goal was to gain a rich understanding of the meaning of the phenomena in a particular context that could speak to others in contexts related through common meaning (Braun & Clarke, 2013). As detailed above, I used Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutic methodology according to the specifications noted by Fleming, Gaidys, & Robb (2003) within the Gadamerian paradigm in psychology described by Martin (2002). This methodology was suitable to the project because I was open to reevaluating the research question itself through iterative dialogue with participants wherein we mutually ascertained what meanings could be revealed about the phenomenon. Gadamerian philosophy and methodology allows for this reevaluation and establishes a basis for meaning emerging between the interaction between participant and researcher that nevertheless makes a claim on our shared historical world (i.e., isn’t radically relativistic; again see page 30 of Being and Time for the central explanation of this; Heidegger, 1927/2010). Sambrano and Cox's (2013) rationale for selecting Gadamerian methodology is appropriate here as well: “Gadamer . . . was chosen specifically because he argued that it is within the context of language and history that meaning is discovered. . . In order to discover the meaning of this experience, placing it within the context of history was essential” (p. 523). For the strategic connection between Indigenous decolonial philosophy and Gadamerian hermeneutics, see the  epistemology section above.ParticipantsDescription of ParticipantsThis study involved nonindigenous graduate students enrolled or previously enrolled 105in professional counsellor education and counselling psychology programs in Canada, who self-identified as having differences in worldview between themselves and their institutions of study (recruitment materials used the same descriptor when asking for participants, so I assumed participants agreed with the descriptor and could explain their own perspective on it). The decision to select nonindigenous students again reaches back to the definition of the type of decolonial research I am involved in here, which is research oriented toward the general field's institutions and students, and toward the goal of decolonizing education (see section near the beginning on two types of projects to distinguish). Similarly, my selection of counsellor education and counselling psychology graduate students was due to the focus on the perpetuation of professional ideology by graduate professionals in society (Cushman, 1992; Illich, 1971/2000). Participants that I obtained in the course of the recruitment additionally can be contextualized as follows. The group included men, women, and gender diverse individuals, and their ages ranged roughly from their 20's to 40's. They were situated in institutions in western Canada by definition, but a large number were from the western side of western Canada. Many lived off campus. Participants had diverse migratory pathways—some were first-generation Canadians and some had families that had been in Canada for multiple generations. Participants were diverse in race, ethnicity, and culture, notably including a number of participants with cultural backgrounds from different areas within the continent of Asia. There were a smaller number of white participants as well. Some identified with traditional cultures. Others had previous generations that were traditional, but themselves grew up in non-traditional community contexts and did not identify as culturally traditional. The group included working class and professional class backgrounds. All were current students, in both master's and doctoral programs, and many had previous university training in disciplines outside of counselling and psychology.An expert consultant was also obtained, with the inclusion criteria that they held knowledge relevant to the subject of interest. The exclusion criteria for experts was that there was no conflict of interest present with the researchers. My research question relates to worldview in relation to place, and particularly the place of graduate education, and as my participants are graduate students (or previous 106graduate students) in a particular place (Canadian graduate counsellor education and counselling psychology institutions), they allowed a close examination of this very particular context and phenomena, as the research question is directly equivalent to these criteria.The only exclusion criterion was for students who have been taught or supervised by this author (Daniel Clegg) or the supervisor (Dr. William Borgen) of this research due to conflict of interest and risk of poor quality data—students who would have felt an institutional dual relationship here may not have felt open to discussing problematics of their institutional experiences or may have worried about being evaluated for compliance to ideology (Phillips & Clarke, 2012; Ruitenberg, 2011; Wong et al., 2013).Recruitment MethodsIn addition to the participant description above (similar to criterion sampling in experimental research), I recruited from existing networks of relationships (similar to convenience sampling and snowball sampling methods, Braun & Clarke, 2013). I selected sites pragmatically due to the feasibility of this approach and the rapport with sites and students this afforded (Belgrave et al., 2002). This approach was necessary because of the possible difficulty in recruiting participants as a result of limited engagement with institutional-appearing initiatives on the part of potentially marginalized students, and a possible perceived risk of disclosure of worldview discrepancy to the institution (Du Bois, 1903/1994). In this situation, peer-to-peer connections proved fruitful. I recruited students who had been enrolled for at least one term, and was open to a broad variability in duration of enrolment including participants who were no longer enrolled but had previously been enrolled. The relevance of variability in duration of enrolment, and indeed in other ways as well such as variability in institution, while not strictly necessary, was to shed light on the common phenomena from different perspectives in conversation together rather than for the purpose of analyzing variance (Belgrave et al., 2002; Fleming et al., 2003).I used participants who I could conveniently identify, contact, and provide with advertising materials with which they could refer additional participants they knew to contact me to participate as well. Where potential participants were known through the researcher’s “personal and professional networks” (Wong et al., 2013, p. 70), they were recruited through in-person, 107email, or social media (see below) presentations. Third-parties were advised to supply potential participants with the research flyer so they were able to contact the researcher themselves should they wish. Participants were also recruited through institutional and student-maintained listservs and social media sites, and through university posters and flyers (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 60). The expert consultant was recruited in the same manner explained above for primary participants, but did not sign a consent form. I invited prospective experts to take part in the study through emailing a template letter. The expert's agreement to take part in the interview and their email correspondence were accepted and retained as consent. Article 10.2 of TCPS2 states that “In certain cases, consent can be inferred by the participant’s agreeing to interact with the researcher for the purposes of research. This would be true in cases where the participant holds a position of power or routinely engages with those involved in the research by virtue of their position or profession . . . In this type of research, where a prospective participant agrees to be interviewed on the basis of sufficient information provided by the researcher, it may be sufficient for the participant to signify consent to participate in the research” (Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics, 2019).Number of ParticipantsI secured 8 participants, similar to previous Gadamerian research (n = 4, Fleming, 2003; n ~= 4, Limacher, 2008; n = 4, Moules, 2009; n = 12, Osuji & Hirst, 2013; n = 3, Sambrano & Cox, 2013; n = 7, Stebleton, 2012; n = 8, Tofthagen et al., 2017), in order to offer a rich account of the phenomena in question and insight into categories of experience reaching across participants (Braun & Clarke, 2013). The study was exploratory, not high-stakes, and was open to categories with non-unanimous participant representation: “goals are inductive, goals of discovery and interpretation, rather than of hypothesis testing” (Belgrave et al., 2002, p. 1431). The aim was not a representative sample as broad generalizability was not a goal but rather contextual interpretation (Belgrave et al., 2002; Malpas, 2016). Neither did this study attempt to secure a complete and definitive account of commonalities between participants' reports, nor did it interface with notions of saturation, as both of these goals are inappropriate for the Gadamerian hermeneutic methodology (Shin, 1994) which sees method as heuristic, and truth as always partial. Individual participants' ideas, within this paradigm, 108may well have represented the phenomena as well as common themes. This reasoning is based on this particular pedigree of philosophy of language (Hegel, 1807/1979; Heidegger, 1927/2010; Shin, 1994; Thiong’o, 1986). Yet, the main reason for analysis across categories was to thoroughly anonymize participants' accounts rather than to define the experience through unanimity.Ethical ConcernsI put participants in a position to comment on their experiences within structures and with people who have had the upper hand in power differentials. Students needed to get grades and graduate, and informed consent had to be very transparent about who would be reading their material and how it would be anonymized at different stages of the process. Balancing this concern was the opportunity to give voice to these students should they have had experiences that they otherwise found unactionable in redressing structurally.Related to this is my own investment in the very institutions which I allowed participants to critique. As such, I may have represented one of the upper hands of the power differentials noted above, and this necessitated a certain amount of caution on my part in terms of not forcing from participants information they were not prepared to put on record. I did not, for instance, repeatedly press participants for information that was not forthcoming beyond a couple invitations to expand, and the consent process explicitly outlined the degree of anonymity and the nature of records kept.Throughout this research, utilizing Indigenous philosophy ran the risk of cultural appropriation (Smith, 2012a; Tuck & Yang, 2012). The main way I saw of avoiding this was to not run afoul of co-opting decolonization, which means that I had to remain focused on land and power as subject matters and conceptualize these within specific histories of Indigenous dispossession (Tuck & Yang, 2012). Secondarily, in terms of use of cultural material by a White author, I guarded against appropriation by interfacing with Indigenous philosophical work that is consciously public-facing and intended as tools for a not-necessarily-Indigenous readership to use to problematize their own practices and proceed in acting in ways suitable to further decolonial priorities (Grande, 2008; Smith, 2012a; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). To take an illustrative example, in the present case, extensive details of private Indigenous rituals would have been inappropriate to disclose, but Deloria and 109Wildcat's philosophical analysis of essential metaphysical differences between Indigenous and Western knowledge systems was appropriate. The Indigenous Knowledges I used comprise a set of public-facing Indigenous critiques of Western philosophy and science—they are not extensive exhibitions of secret practices, and the sources themselves delineate this boundary (Deloria, 1975; Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998; Smith, 2012a). Remaining focused on the subject matter—a decolonial analysis of Canadian counsellor education and counselling psychology education, rather than on esoteric practices of Indigenous peoples was one measure I used to avoid cultural appropriation. Significantly, the sense in which I have worked from an Indigenous orienting philosophy stems directly from repeated calls from highly respected Indigenous scholars for solidarity with nonindigenous scholars (Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998; Smith, 2012a; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001).ResultsAdditional Researcher's Pre-UnderstandingsAccording to Gadamerian epistemology (Heidegger, 1927/2010; Malpas, 2016; Shin, 1994), as part of the process of engaging in research through my own particular context, I acknowledged questions I brought to the subject matter. There were many questions I did not include in the interview protocol as they would have been too leading for the participants and I wished to leave the space as wide open for their responses as practicable. Following are questions which both demonstrate my own thinking process prior to the interviews, and serve as discussion points should themes have been found that relate to them. They are phrased as unasked questions to the participant: As a religious, spiritual, traditional, cultural, or philosophical person, how do you use these traditions to interface with, negotiate, or navigate institutionally sanctioned theoretical orientations? How can you relate your religious and spiritual traditions and worldviews to these sanctioned orientations? How do you make choices of orientation with reference to these traditions? How have you conceptualized your career trajectories and professional roles through the lenses of these traditions and consequently chosen orientations? How do you reconcile any modes of helping you bring from your culture with those mandated by the institution? How do students engage their educational system, engage with their peers, or make transformative change among themselves in order to navigate or negotiate their educational paths in light of different 110worldviews? How do you relate to the predominant ideologies of what it means to be a thinking being, and how do you relate to the necessity of working to promote to clients institutionally sanctioned models of what it means to be a thinking being? How do you negotiate the requirements in coursework and clinical practice that stem from opposing worldviews from your own? How do you experience the relationship between mandated professional dispositions and academic freedom?Following are some possibilities I had identified for how participants may have experienced worldview differences that arose from various literatures: compatibilities (additive or multiplicative), incompatibilities (conflictual or non-conflictual), co-existence of personal and professional worldviews, and context-specific salience of different worldviews simultaneously held (Clegg, 2012) .Following are some possibilities I had identified for how participants may have framed place that arose from literature: in terms of the places participants had lived, the places of their education, and the places from which academic ideas originated; and these all with respect to abstract spatial definition (e.g., province, geometric planes; Deloria, 1975), abstractly defined community (conceptual space inhabited by counsellors), merely as resources and property relations (Tuck & Yang, 2012), or concrete relationships with particular landscapes and ecosystems (Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). Fleming, Gaidys, and Robb (2003) state that “one appropriate approach to provoking one’s pre-understanding is a conversation with a colleague” (p. 117). My supervisor and I had a conversation about whether and how nonindigenous people, including ourselves, engage in relationship with land and place. Working from the Indigenous literature, we discussed critiques of displacement due to capitalism and modernity that prevent people from developing relationship with land (Alexander, 2000; Deloria, 1975; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001), and the possibility that modernist cultures themselves disable people from building relationship with land. We then discussed counterfactuals to that in our own experiences and traditions and instances in which we could envision established immigrant-descendants and new immigrants relating to land in diverse ways (Furniss, 1997; Haig-Brown, 2009). I also participated in a critical dialogue on the place of the person in Indigenous metaphysics in which we discussed divergences and compatibilities between Western 111metaphysical traditions and Indigenous Knowledge Systems (Rocha & Clegg, 2018; also Clegg, 2017, 2018a; Clegg & Rocha, 2018). Particularly, in this vein, the history of Western philosophy's treatments of relationship to nature is foundational for our understanding of the contemporary nonindigenous attitude towards place in my view (Rocha, 2017).I have also reflected on this question throughout three years of TA work in the faculty of Land and Food Systems in the course Land, Food, and Community in which we discussed Western ideas of land and also Indigenous food sovereignty. In brief summary, my preunderstanding was that nonindigenous peoples understand and relate to land in very diverse ways and some of this is represented in philosophies of science, theology, and philosophy, and particularly that continental philosophy may contain seeds of strategic alliances with Indigenous metaphysics of place.On further and more pessimistic reflection, I came to realize before conducting the research that I believed participants would tell me they were connected to place, that they were very environmental and connected to nature and other common socially desirable characterizations. I expect that their accounts would be metaphysical in level of analysis, whether this meant new age, secular, deep ecology, or religious, cultural, or pseudo-indigenous (Tuck & Yang, 2012). There remained the possibility that many would have a thin veneer of ecological mindedness and of place attachment, that would appear to extend to the metaphysical in verbiage but not in embodied experience, and if actually lived as this latter, would not extend to politically problematizing their relations with private property or participation in exploitative institutions and ideologies (Deloria, 1975; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). I expected that, if the latter, they would probably stay within the modern dialectic between positivism and postmodernism (Smith, 2012a). To the extent that they would touch on Indigenous metaphysics they would engage in superficial and co-opting positions as articulated by Tuck and Yang (Tuck & Yang, 2012).This process of evolving my understandings carried from these preunderstandings through to the end of the research and intermittent notes were taken in a research journal which is not reproduced here.112Further Developments of Hermeneutic ProcedureNote On Summaries and Metasummary It became clear through the process of the research that in order to have participants be further involved in another iteration of the hermeneutic circle, that is, to give further thoughts on their earlier conversations, a summary of their first conversations with the researcher was necessary to produce. These I produced hermeneutically from the transcripts, one per participant, and they comprised organized excerpts of transcript material with a few interjected connections I wrote. Participants were given the opportunity to offer further thoughts on the subject matter based on these individual summaries. Participants were largely happy with the existing accounts and did not add any further comments—a few participants clarified one or two specific points with minor elaborations that did not change the overall tenor of the original accounts.After I integrated these further conversations back into the original transcripts, I created an overall metasummary across participants which constituted a record of my evolving understanding, and also provided another source of input to sthe conceptualization of the thematic analysis. It turned out that this metasummary had very little effect on the final thematic analysis because metasummary information was either redundant, extraneous, or erroneous after the close work of my reading of transcripts against tapes and producing the themes.Development of the Object of StudyAgain due to the methodology, the object of study became clearer through the merging of horizons and the new understanding emerging about students' being in this particular political, historical, and landed context. The object of study was the being-in-place and being-in-context of students diverse in worldview in Western Canadian graduate counsellor education and counselling psychology programs surrounding the approximate time period of 2017-2019. In more casual language, the object of study was what it is like to be a counselling student with a diverse worldview at place of professional schooling which holds a worldview different from one's own. Notably the object of study was this general 113object and phenomena, not the specific group of participants. The object of study was also refined through later hermeneutic interactions between produced texts and the researcher. According to the phenomenological philosophy (Shin, 1994), results then are a text that was made through a translation (hermeneutic) of showings (phenomena) of the real object noted above.The subject matter and present analysis was by necessity treated in a homogenizing manner which left out many details and conflicting viewpoints. Participants reading this report will find items they will disagree with as representations of their views. However, again, due to the necessity of an across-participants analysis for anonymity, and due to noted methodological and philosophical reasons, the present account was not intended as a representation of each participant's views directly. Again, the account produced is a hermeneutic product achieved through discourse (logos) between the world, participants, and myself the researcher. To participants who feel that this analysis has missed important aspects of their own experience or puts forward something they disagree with, I apologize for the limitations of this research and say that I have done my best to provide something useful, and I hope there are other aspects of the findings that ring true for them.Mode of Theme PresentationAccording to the Gadamerian epistemology and ontology and also the expert's philosophical consultation, the themes below are described in realist language. As noted above, the object of study was not participants' subjective experiences but rather the being in place and in context of diverse students generally. Therefore, themes concern students' being in relation to the greater social and historical realities that they inhabited. The resulting theme descriptions are expressed as speaking directly to these realities, using language such as “students found that the program did X” or “the institution was Y.” The reader is reminded that whereas other epistemologies use notions of subjectivity and generalizability, or experiences of specific participants, here the limitations of the current study are expressed in Gadamerian terms of revealing partial truths, according to the notion of truth as an uncovering of what is. Again, this methodology and consequent mode of presentation was selected for its realism in addressing historical and political realities to accord with priorities in Indigenous decolonial literature—Deloria and Wildcat (2001), for instance, describing 114Indigenous philosophy as a “phenomenological critical realism” (p. 115). Similarly, I quote from the textual hermeneutic product that reflected our conversations together, and so I quote from a produced text about the realities uncovered. As such, I quote without participant names or pseudonyms, as the realities uncovered are not understood here to be particular to an individual, and the analysis is explicitly cross-participant (similarly to Marshall et al., 2017). The reader can understand that the quotes are characteristic of the object of study, that is, diverse nonindigenous counselling students' realities of being. Again, this is both a methodological limitation and a strength. This extra layer of anonymity also goes beyond pseudonyms for the reason that it could be possible to triangulate backwards to students' true identities, and considering their present student status in small academic communities and the sensitive nature of the material, this measure was deemed appropriate. For all these reasons I introduce quotes as being spoken by a generic diverse student or students.Although an aggregation across participants, or more accurately, a hermeneutically developed understanding of the world, participants' quotes are used heavily in the theme descriptions. This is to show the understanding that developed between participants, the various texts, and the researcher. The quotes are not only “raw data,” but are also fully developed analyses representing the uncovered phenomena of study and as such supply a large part of the thematic description itself—being that they are theoretical and theorized themselves. This also provides more transparency and credibility to the interpretations. This is particular to the present Gadamerian hermeneutics. The reader will notice a heavy use of quotations for these reasons, and also will notice they are not pulled out in block quotes as they are considered part of the researcher's analysis and reporting. Themes follow below under eponymous headings with number of quotes coded and number of participants coded (out of 8) supplied in curly braces purely for informational purposes—the methodology does not depend on any numerical evaluation or notion of unanimity.Connection to Place, Migration, and Relating to LandAwareness of Colonial History and Indigenous LandThis theme contained three subthemes, now related in turn. Students had an awareness of Indigenous land and of Indigenous philosophies of land {32-6}. Students 115brought up and discussed Indigenous land and territory, demonstrating their awareness of it: “I’m starting to understand how these theoretical orientations, . . . or the people that I work with understand land. How they situate themselves within that land, not place, but the land and . . . I’m becoming more cognizant of my own worldview. . . . vicariously I’m starting to think about Indigenous land.” Students had begun to understand what land means to Indigenous peoples, sometimes finding commonalities within their own cultural views: “for people to feel comfortable and healthy and in the state of well-being they do need to feel connected to that land.” They demonstrated an awareness of Indigenous understandings of land: “from my understanding . . . land within an Indigenous conception isn’t owned . . . , it’s a reciprocal relation, in reciprocal relation with the people living on it. And I see that as kind of a different and opposing worldview about land is.” They understood that Indigenous peoples are “seeing it as not a resource necessarily, but as an entity in and of itself” which is “to be respected in a way that is . . . inherently different than something that is viewed as a pile of resources.” Students were tentative and modest about their degree of understanding of Indigenous viewpoints, but were also glad for their growing awareness: “I’m only someone who’s been fortunate to sometimes receive teachings on Indigenous experiences, but how I’ve learned about like their relationship to the land is that it’s both physical and spiritual.”Students demonstrated awareness of historical, political and legal aspects of living on Indigenous land {23-4}. They thought of Indigenous land in terms of acknowledging it themselves and hearing it acknowledged in school, issues of the ownership of the land, their and others' privilege of, and guilt for being on such a land, and the power-relations of Indigenous land. Students asked themselves about “the history of . . . what was this land before? Who was on this land before? What was it used for? What became eradicated? What was given up? What were the traditions?” as well as “who owns it, . . . who has control over it?” Students often felt the privilege of living on the land while also feeling guilt: “where I live is a privilege and it was, you know, the historical roots of how indigenous people were uprooted from their homes and, . . . there’s some guilt coloured into these lenses and just being able to live here.” Students were aware of their families' histories in this regard: “I do my best as a, like as a visitor on this land to be conscious about the ways that I try to like not be perpetuating my family’s history, . . . I have a bit of understanding of . . . how I as a person 116who’s a visitor and a colonizer . . . , I’m not necessarily entitled to the land that I occupy.” This was a difficult emotional and political situation to exist in, a “really uncomfortable tension . . . I’m still choosing to be a participant in this like capitalist system we're in, . . . on the micro-level an active participant in colonization, . . . in the . . . continued acquisition of land and ownership and the investment in that, and then sort of in a zoomed out sense, . . . I feel very strongly that this whole thing we've done is very bad, and has had really horrific consequences”—and yet “there's that self serving element of like yeah I'm still a person who needs to survive in this world.”As alluded to above, students were aware of, and were learning about, our colonial past and present {28-5}. Students related their knowledge of displacement, residential schools, and environmental destruction: “you know what their grandparents went through, when, like when they went to residential schools or when they were kicked off their land, or when they had to like move, . . . I have some friends you know who’s families, you know, they try to live off the land but with so much pollution, like fishing is an issue, or lack of fish.” Students “think of land in terms of like Indigenous struggles quite a bit, in what land means in that context” and they spoke of specifics such as the “the unceded Coast Salish territories that we’re on,” acknowledging that “the history [is] also happening now, not necessarily just in the past.” Students “see the world through the lens of post-colonialism to a large extent,” and felt a personal responsibility in light of this history: “I’ve definitely thought a lot about land, I think it’s my responsibility to do that as a settler/colonizer, . . . I didn’t personally settle or colonize but I am of that background, that’s my family absolutely did, . . . I do my best as a, like as a visitor on this land to be conscious about the ways that I try to like not be perpetuating my family’s history, . . . it’s impossible not to, . . . we are still in a colonized world right now.”Belonging in Place {28-7}As students diverse in worldview in one way or another, belonging in a place was a significant aspect of being a person and a counselling student. This theme includes the overlapping sentiments of belonging in place, home being where one is, finding your place of belonging as a minority, and a growing sense of place and community. For many students, home was a place, not so much a particular land, and was identified with something more 117personal or social, “for me home is just wherever I am.” Finding a sense of community was important: “I got out of undergrad and, discovering the world, and just trying to learn where my place was.” When first arriving at school, belonging was a concern: “Like my people—I’m here and I’m like 'Oh, where are they? Where are my people?” Being a cultural minority or even an ideological minority had its effects on belonging: “so [Canadian university] is still my home, [Canadian city] is still my home, I love it. It’s a beautiful city, but do I like feel like this is sort of my culture? . . . probably not. . . . I have cultural acquaintances, I have friends . . . at the cultural level, but like ideologically, . . . I think I’m a minority.” Yet this could grow as well: “I recently . . . moved . . . perhaps as I live in my home in [urban city], this feeling of place . . . might also grow with time.” For diverse students, the university was also a site of belonging: “[I] also have a close group of friends who I feel I can share stories and, . . . that also increases my sense of belonging and . . . my ideas being valued”—“all those things, make, kind of help me have sense of being valued, being useful, and being part of the campus, being part of the [university].” Belonging to Land {55-6}In this theme, students valued nature, respected nature, understood that human life comes from the land, found their bodies in connection to land, saw health as necessitating connection to land, and longed for a belonging-to-land.Beyond socially defined places, students saw land and nature as something to be valued and respected: “there’s this place aspect of it. So place—at [university], places downtown, or near where I live—and then there’s the land with the places, the areas that I go to to get in touch with the nature.” This also could be aspirational—“I don’t feel attached to it like emotionally but I want to respect it”—even for future generations: “I want, you know, for future generations, I want them to be able to enjoy this not as a wasteland.”Students understood that human life comes from land: “I know that in Bronfenbrenner’s model it is you first in the centre of the circle, surrounded by all these different contexts . . . , but without the outer context I would not really exist, and so I think about it in terms of just being held, supported by earth first of all.” This went beyond physical sustenance as well: “when you relate to the land more, at least for me, if I'm really spend it with the land more, which also means I spend time with myself more.” Students 118learned from Indigenous worldviews about relating to land: “I’m only someone who’s been fortunate to sometimes receive teachings on Indigenous experiences but how I’ve learned about like their relationship to the land is that it’s both physical and spiritual. And . . . seeing us as people on earth as well, . . . I also have that relation to the land, not an Indigenous one, but one where I have like both a physical relationship to land, as well as one that is spiritual or made by meaning or that’s like in my head, you know that I’ve created somehow.”Students discussed how they find their own bodies or their relationship to their own physicality in their relationships with land. For example, students who have migrated might find themselves considering “how much you’re eating certain food because the climate changed and you have to feed your body differently.” These changes “make me look into like my own body and myself to actually think about what is my relationship with my body.”More broadly, students found that health necessitated being in connection to land. Illustrations of this view of health can be seen in statements such as: “in my worldview, when I think about health, a big part of it is getting connected with nature, with land;” “for people to feel comfortable and healthy and in the state of well being they do need to feel connected to that land;” “in [country] nature involves the human nature as well as the environmental nature;” and “nature help me to regulate my emotion, and the health, physical health as well [as] mental.” Therapeutically, this meant “helping that human nature get access to nature as well” and “thinking of our clients and their healing process in terms of nature rather than talking about it in terms of we’re going to do an intervention where humans have created this specific program that we’re going to implement and change you. . . . We think about the natural process people go through.”Students longed for a sense of belonging to the land: “there’s like a longing in memory for this, this thing that’s never existed which is a somewhere else, is a, is like a belonging-to-land somewhere, or belonging-to-place, and I think that that comes from that feeling of like being held here, not wanting to be here, not feeling like that sense of belonging, . . . but then . . . there’s that longing for that thing that doesn’t, that I don’t know.” They described this poetically—“there’s like the [language] word about like longing for a love you never had, but that’s in the romantic sense. This is, it’s the closest I can get to that”—and emotionally: “it’s an emotional feeling of like a longing for, a belonging to a 119place that I don’t know;” “it’s almost as though in that context place and land would line up.” Students did not know whether this was a universal sentiment or experience: “perhaps it’s just part of the human condition of never being satisfied.” Nevertheless, there was also the growing sense of belonging among students: “I’m starting to really own my identity here, in south-east [city].”Relationships With Distant Places {27-7}Students maintained relationships with places they had lived in—both the places themselves, and the people and family that remain there. They were also connected to their memories of these places, and had taken these with them. The countries where students were born or grew up were still a part of them—“I just think the whole country really is part of me, you know, my, my nationality was [ethnicity], right, before it was Canadian.” They went back to places they had lived, noting the contrasts: “I sort of knew I was coming from one place and really living in a different place. So that was interesting, and then growing up, contrasting the two was cool too because I would go back and forth every few years.” They visited parents in their old country—“every few summers it’d be nice to drop by and visit family.” Intergenerational differences in relationships to land and place became evident as students became more aware of their own worldview: “my parents are immigrants and for them place and land means very different things and so part of my worldview is coloured by you know, being brought up by them and like what home means for them.” Earlier generations sometimes had a connection to prior lands that current students found missing: “my parents' identity is much more rooted in their place and land than I am. . . . for me place and land is like, is very open, it’s very accepting of all cultures and people.” Sometimes this suggested a non-material-place-based rather than land-based concept of selfhood; parents had “like something that felt more like home and for me home is just wherever I am.”There were instances where commonalities between places impressed themselves upon students. “When I arrived to Canada, it was remarkable how familiar it felt. The land was new; the smell, the city, the buildings, the earth, the water. The place, the integrated [ethnicity] and Western community felt very familiar. I had not experienced that unique co-existence since I left [area] as a young child.”120Students maintained relationships to places separated by distance in different ways. For instance, “often these are places that you end up taking with you right?” Sometimes places become represented by social circles of people: “I still get to see them. . . . even the ones that have gone to other institutions now, we’re still connected.” Other times, a worldview is held in common that comes from a common place: "my parents and my cousins, and all my family and all of these sources, haven’t changed their worldview, even though they’ve moved around a lot;” “the cool thing is . . . I’ve had a chance to go back every few years growing up, so I’ve been sort of tight with the culture in that sense.”Students also had relationships to memories of places. A place “exists in memory in a way that land doesn’t,” and even when “the land isn’t the same anymore, . . . it’s really more like connections to memories.” Even in one place, as it changes, one can remain connected to the memory of it: “so like [restaurant] isn’t there anymore, . . . the things on campus look different, but . . . the reason it feels like home is that it’s like driving to a memory. So even though things look different than they are in my head there’s still that connection.”Institutional Relationship to Land {32-7}In their institutions' relationships to land, students found different aspects of connection, such as the treatment of parks and the promotion of Indigenous culture in locations on campus, and of disconnection, such as campus construction and an impersonal feeling of campus, and artificial acknowledgement of Indigeneity.Students found facets of connection between institutions and land. Students “go take advantage of [university]’s some gardens and parks, . . . I also see how [university] treating those parks, it kind of reflect, I mean I do appreciate how [university], you know, really put . . . money into maintain this beautiful campus.” This was “reflecting what ideology [university] is promoting, specifically the ideology of human-nature relationship.”Students also found facets of disconnection between land and institution. For instance, while being a place, their institution was disconnected from land: “being kind of a commuter school, . . . going to school feels like a place, . . . there’s no real . . . connection to the land.” Construction was a source of a disconnected feeling between land and institution: “it’s more of a place, it just keeps on changing, and buildings are changing and construction is everywhere”— “that’s where I lived and worked for so long. . . . when there’s new 121construction on campus and it like changes the map in my head and the routes change, then I get pissed off, I’m like 'No!'” The institutional land felt remote and impersonal, as if the university's place in the landscape demonstrated an elitist self-removal: “almost like I got subsumed in not just the physical land, right, but even hearing my clients saying 'oh, I got lost, I couldn’t find the parking . . . ,' I go 'yeah I know, I feel all that'. . . . I . . . felt a bit of detachment from the, the, the person to person contact. Impersonal, it felt impersonal.” The land itself was “quite removed away. . . . I don’t like it when someone feels that they’re better than someone else because at the end of the day it removes itself from a commonness in our humanity. And with [university] it, this world-class institution that’s separate from the rest of [city], . . . it just seems . . . hoity-toity.” The external skin of new institutional buildings paradoxically demonstrated an underlying disconnection: “I went 'Oh OK. You guys are really into that branding . . . ' So I see that and then the glass, the, the new buildings have so much glass and its updated look . . . it’s all glass, it’s all transparency, which is funny because there’s issues of transparency.”Despite these instances of disconnection, students were able to find caring people: “despite the artificialness of that skin that’s developing it, I do believe that within [university] you have pockets of people who do really care, . . . you have the ones that are caring but I can't extrapolate that out to the greater institution.” The same bifurcation of connection and disconnection was also felt by students in their institutions' awareness and acknowledgement of Indigenous land. Disconnection featured heavily. The “[university] talks a lot about thanking the people for the land and . . . before everything . . . there’s that blurb, . . . but like, what are you really doing to . . . teach students about you know, why that’s relevant”—“there's the acknowledgments but . . . it just felt very artificial you know? . . . it felt like it was for show. . . . what are you actually doing in terms of reconciliation with the people and the land? Aside from building more on it, . . . there was nothing in my curriculum.” Students found a lack of historical context: “if you want the students to be invested in that land . . . and really emotionally acknowledge the significance of you know how privileged we are to be on that land, to learn on that land, . . . there’s no history lesson there. You know for an international student coming, they don’t know what you’re talking about.” However, there was also a facet of connection here as well: 122“the museum, . . . they display lots of First Nation arts and they have activities there, they have workshops . . . to promote Indigenous [culture] . . . , seeing [university]’s promoting those cultural definitely reduce the difference, bring me and [university] closer.”Not Rooted in Place and Land {28-5}Students felt a lack of connection to place and land, a lack of rootedness, and even a seemingly paradoxical entrapment in land because of poverty—difficult relationships with, or the absence of relationship with land. Diverse counselling students had diverse backgrounds and histories, and as such, had diverse ways in which they felt a lack of connection to place or land. This was expressed as lack of attachment: “I’ve moved around a lot and so I don’t feel particular attachments to a place or a land.” It was seen as a lack of rootedness: “my parents' identity is much more rooted in their place and land than I am;” “it’s weird because I don’t feel rooted so place and land doesn’t, . . . I feel like it's something that should kind of have some weight for people but like I’ve lived [in many places].” It was also expressed as a lack of imprinting: “I also wonder too if that sense of land isn’t necessarily formulated because we are such a moving . . . globalization, so the sense of place and time isn’t necessarily, isn’t necessarily imprinted in, at least, our culture.”There were also sentiments of being without land—not just disconnected from land, but also not having land to connect with: students may be “feeling kind of inherently landless? . . . land is something that other people have.” This could have been due to class: “speaking about being unlanded, you know. I think that this department . . . are pretty middle class and I don’t feel–, like I’m trying to climb my way in;” “surrounded by . . . most of my peers, . . . not to say that they all own land but it, it feels a bit more within their trajectory.” One can try to escape unlandedness for security: “living usually below the poverty line . . . , money was a really big thing and it was a big part of shaping my worldview . . . , the way that we tend to see the world when like survival is still, . . . we’re not at the stage of getting to focus too much on anything other than feeling secure, cause things often didn’t feel secure. . . . that was a big part of my relationship to land.” Poverty could make a student locked to land in an undesirable way: “I’ve felt sort of weirdly stuck in [city] in part because my [family member] is here and it’s hard to shift things like that around. But it, it’s also a hard place to live when you’re not making tons of money so my relationship with, with [city] has felt 123fraught with the land, the land itself.”Place is Personal and Social Connection Whereas Land is Location, Earth, or Soil {40-7}Students differentiated between the concepts of place and land. Place was a personal or social connection or meaning, which could be linked to a location or could be transitory or metaphorical. It had an emotional aspect: “there's that that emotional piece, that certain places have an effect on people right, some places touch people. . . . I feel an affinities for certain places . . . they take on I guess like a mental space as a place.” Ideally, this emotional connection to something went together with belonging; students longed for a place that “occupied mental emotional space and also that I was able to belong to.” In some ways, students thought of places as related to social or human environments: “so [country] was very much a metropolitan place that was just changing all the time. So, . . . I don’t know if I associate very well in terms of land with it there;” “if I had the opportunity to go out maybe more of the nature, . . . —I connect land with more the nature part. And I didn’t get to do that there or much in [country] as well, so I think about them much more so in terms of place.” In contrast, land was a location, is earth, is soil: “land is very, like, kind of like more actual soil and like, like whatever everything is on, but I think place, place for me is like you know it can be a home, it can be a place, a vacation place, it can be workplace;” “I think places can be a bit more transient.” Purpose intersected with location in this understanding of place: “when I think of place I think, . . . your place . . . in the world . . . the different ways that we create meaning about where we are, and what we’re doing . . . when I think of a place in the world I think of personally the sense of purpose that I’ve created in my life. Which is related to where I am, in a literal place sense but also my sense of place and my sense of like being somewhere that I’m supposed to be or not supposed to be.” Land was related in that “if you put it on a scale, . . . land will be on one end and place will be” on the other; “they’re definitely overlapping each other.”Place formed students' worldview and culture: “my worldview comes from the places that I’ve been in, including the institutions that I’ve been in;” “I think you probably like learn culture through your place of origin in a lot of ways, and each place has its own culture.” The corollary of this was that place as personal meaning or connection was not just a personal 124subjective experience, but rather something shared to some extent: “you can't experience a place exactly the same way as somebody else because you’re always bringing your own self to it. But I think that there is a certain amount of it that can be shared.”Taught by Migration {52-7}Students had migrated and moved at different times in life, they travelled to old lands, and these experiences all taught them.Students had often grown up in different areas, moved around a lot, and attended different school systems: “talking about worldview from . . . the different nations that I lived in, the different countries that I’ve lived in, including their cultural background, maybe even religious, spiritual background, and . . . the different schools that I attended based on these different countries.” They had to adapt to different lands and places: “growing up in these different contexts one of the most important concepts that I had learned was to learn to adapt as much as possible. And so there’s this touch and go basis of what’s your thought of the worldview, what is acceptable for you, what is okay for me to talk about. . . . like I had to just kind of go with the flow.” It was necessary “to adapt, I didn’t have a choice, . . . I could just throw a tantrum but at the end of the day I still needed to survive, socially speaking.”Travelling to old lands also figured in students' lives: “I sort of grew up asking a lot of questions about myself and my culture to begin with because I sort of knew I was coming from one place and really living in a different place. . . . contrasting the two was cool too because I would go back and forth every few years and . . . that going back and forth action really was, . . . the core of it all because I, now . . . identify like very biculturally.”These experiences of migration and travel all taught them and affected their worldview: “my worldview comes from the places that I’ve been in, including the institutions that I’ve been in;” with the “change of location definitely, change of culture, . . . [the meaning of] land definitely really, really evolved, so I transplanted here . . . and in terms of worldview that, that was major change. Reconstruction.”Lack of Support for Diversity and Cultural CompetenceCurricular Lack of Cultural CompetenceStudents expected more cultural and contextual sensitivity, they were not given the tools for this, and they desired this training.125Students came to school expecting their counselling program be more sensitive to culture and context than it was {15-4}: “I honestly thought it would be more sensitive to cultures. . . . a lot of the curriculum that we’ve been taught, it was all very individualist centered;” “I thought, I mean given that [university] is, I mean where it is and the, the student population that it has, like I thought that it would be a bit more multicultural.” This was also expressed in terms of context: “the question I had in mind beginning the program was you know like a lot of the determinants of mental health come out of your context, and how do we like account for that in counselling? And I was hearing a lot more about . . . ways to deal with the internal and not, not as much in terms of like how do I help people navigate the context of their life.” The lack was sometimes due to the institution's own self-descriptions: “yeah, there’s a chapter that you talk about. . . . Great, I feel so multiculturally competent. . . . And I think it bills itself like that a little bit. . . . I certainly got that sense and then I got here and it was like 'oh, OK.'” Again, “I think really goes against what [university] advertises it’s program is representing.”Students were not given the tools for cultural sensitivity, curriculum lacks cultural perspectives, lip service is paid to culture, and there was often no schedule time for cultural electives {35-5}. Students were not given the tools to respond with sensitivity and competence to culture and context: “I mean we kind of talked about cultural sensitivity here and there in bits and pieces, and there’s the odd article, really, but, I mean—;” “we kind of talked about it briefly like you know, 'try to understand the other person’s point of view,' you know, 'try to put yourself in their shoes.' How do you do that if you have no context?” Beyond cultural sensitivity, there was a lack of cultural perspectives themselves: “I remember . . . being taught 'oh, if you want to be a culturally sensitive counsellor just, you know, learn from your clients, . . . but don’t expect them to teach you everything,' and it was just like, but, but I think maybe something to teach me more about different cultures would’ve been helpful.” There was a lack of cultural perspectives in different areas of curriculum: “we don’t have to take a course in like trauma or culture but we do have to take 2-3 courses in career which like it is a part of all of our lives, but also is like very Western approach, very like often culturally lacking approach. Yeah so you see the value system just laid out in that.” Culturally diverse students felt it was not a productive place to have conversations that go 126deeply into culture: “I just end up with me making comment and no one following up with response to anything, yeah. But it happened to other people from other, different cultures too, so. So pretty much it stopped there: 'OK, thank you for sharing your cultural knowledge, we learned stuff but we may not have things to offer you.'” Students found their institutions paid lip service to culture in curriculum: “there was the beginnings of culture sensitivity and they kind of, . . . like a lot of the other classes I took, . . . 'oh, a good counsellor is sensitive to culture,' but it almost sounded like lip service. It’s like 'ok, well, how?'” Again, “departmentally, I think I was hoping it would be a little bit more progressive than it is. . . . interested in looking at social location in terms of counselling. I think that the department pays lip service to that but doesn’t—.” This was not just in curriculum, but in other aspects: “their like mission value statement in the counselling page . . . , you kind of get out the magnifying glass and you’re like what are the clues I can extract . . . ? . . . talked about something like the importance of culture, the importance of diversity and so that was what I extracted, 'cause . . . I want to . . . graduate as like a culturally competent counsellor.'” There was also no time in students' schedules to take cultural electives: “I didn’t take the cross-cultural class which I wanted to take but it did not work with my schedule;” “there is a class called multicultural counselling but I didn’t get a chance to take it, just a schedule conflict.” This seemed to be a common phenomenon: “there was a cross cultural class that was an elective . . . Didn’t fit with my timetable and I, I don’t know anyone in my cohort who took it.”Besides a lack of cultural competency, and an expectation for competency training, there was also a desire for it; students wanted cultural and Indigeneity competency from the program {15-3}. Students were hoping for this training: “also hoping that I would, in the same way that I’m longing for meeting this multicultural education that I’m also meeting one that like brings a recognition of the unceded land that we’re on;” “I think I was hoping for a more truly intersectional lens and it didn’t exist. I think it was, it was, it was as though they were a pair of glasses that were put on at times but in general they, they weren’t there.” They thought training would be helpful: “some pointers about, even about like you know, like Indigenous people, like working with them and you know how, what their traditions are like, that would’ve been helpful.” 127Dealing With Power in the InstitutionStudents employed a variety of modulations of their ways of being in the presence of power differentials at school. Students advocated for diversity issues in class and with faculty, tried to be careful and not offend anyone, sometimes by making it personal or making it impersonal, and sometimes there was just a wall of understanding you could not get over {10-2}. For some situations it was necessary to frame a concrete objection in personal terms: “I had to think about it, . . . the authentic part of me would’ve immediately been like 'Hey! what are you doing?' But then, but having to sort of balance and weigh and figure out the politics of how to articulate that, and, and, and very much frame it in a way of 'I’m uncomfortable when—.'” On the other hand, “when it comes out in a feminist lens, like I couch it in all the gentlest language humanly possible so that it doesn’t come across as overly militant or you know like 'I really hear that perspective, it’s so interesting, have you considered—.' . . . how do I say this in a way that does not offend. . . . when I’m speaking about feminist issues I depersonalize because then . . . I’m [not] making it about me and my experiences, I’m just speaking generally.” Sometimes one just conceded to avoid a scene: “I just conceded, I was like 'OK, like it’s fine, like I don’t,' yeah, I didn’t want to waste class time on that, I didn’t want to make anyone overly uncomfortable.” At other times, peers encouraged one to speak up: “some of the younger [students] . . . they’re like 'that’s, no you don’t have to accept that,' . . . like to just have that little prod to like advocate on that, on that front.” In the end, some conversations just seem futile: “He’s like you can always find ways to make meaning, and I’m like well I think about my [family member's labour situation], how do you want her to make meaning? Like tell me. . . . , it’s like 'well there’s, you know you have to be able to,' . . . there was just a wall where you couldn’t go beyond;” “A wall of understanding, he couldn’t get past to the other side to understand that like conceptually that that was a person who existed in the world. That I wasn’t coming up with like a theoretical, hypothetical.”Students critically situated counselling curriculum and institutional worldviews within context and history {28-6}. This was expressed in terms of context, history, and society: “I think a lot of the faculty are sort of like doing the best they can given their own contexts;” “I can see the focus because it comes with history and it comes with context.” This 128included histories of the larger psychology discipline: “I can see why this is being taught the way it is. And also kind of like keeping in mind the history of psychology, and history of counselling . . . , we didn’t have a great history for . . . some things,” such as “how women historically were 'hysterical,'” and “how people with mental illnesses were treated by psychologists, psychiatrists.” They saw that institution and faculty determined curricula: “a faculty, . . . they’re trained a certain way, . . . whatever that homogeneity is, well that’s what they’re going to be focusing on for teaching . . . whenever they’re passing these new courses and stuff, they gotta have some . . . collective agreement on what’s should be taught and so that extrapolates from the shared value. But it’s a shared bias too.” This necessity of institutional and curricular orientation was seen as inevitable, and not inherently bad: “I didn’t really have like a negative reaction when there was a discrepancy, it was always just like 'OK, well, you know based on the founding father of this theory, or you know, based on where this was originated . . . in a Western context, this makes sense.'” However, students identified a certain historical determinism of institutional bias: “[university]’s just part of a system, we’re just a cog in the system. . . . the universities are just reacting to what the society is and vice versa.” This could be a cultural determinism as well: “I kind of remind myself what reality is cause the institution culture is related to the bigger Canadian cultural and political environment and there is, and statistically speaking, . . . Western culture is, European culture is the majority.” In addition, this created a certain inertia to the educational system: “every single person you’re going to try to teach this new thing to has been teaching for 30 years. So you gotta pick your battles. If this is the form that works, the process that works, until they’re receptive to doing it differently, we’re going to keep doing it the same way.”Students discussed how they interfaced with the structures of power within their institutions {12-6}. They saw a power imbalance particularly for minority students: “when there is a difference in a student's view of who they are, and how they should go about in this program and what they want, and any of those differ from the institution, or the program, I guess I wonder what the program, how much the program is willing to help that particular student. How much flexibility is allowed. . . . But I wonder if students don’t necessarily have the power to bring it up. Especially if they are in their master's program and they don’t know 129what kind of power they have and if they’re the minority.” This imbalance was also in terms of economic status: “walking out with a shit ton of student debt, and I still . . . had a bunch when I . . . [got] into this program . . . my position as someone without land puts me in a different position vis à vis my worldview within the, within the department.” For diverse students, a cultural value of not questioning one's elders was a part of these dynamics: “—the different worldview of not being able to challenge the system or challenge my elders or challenge the norm. Cause like no one stopped me from trying the things I wanted to try. But I wonder how much of that was me not trying because of how I learned education works and how I interpret the faculty-student dynamic;” “how much of my worldview is about like 'OK, if I know that [director] wants these things in a student, then I as a student am expected to deliver these things.' But I happen to know both from observation, and the literature supports, that most North American people might not interpret it that way. . . . I do notice this with my friends, and like people in the program—is like if you were born and raised in Canada and grew up in Canada, . . . pleasing your teachers isn’t the top thing you’re doing.” Students found that they must jump hoops to work with the power structure: “I think I’m able to be a bit more intentional about my use of the place and I understand the power structures a lot better so I can navigate them. I don’t think I got it [before], I didn’t get that it was a game that I had to play and jump through the hoops of it.” Desire for Diverse OrientationsStudents found a lack of, and a desire for, diverse orientations under supervision {13-2}. They were not against the curriculum so much as desired support for a broader range of orientations: “I’m not saying like . . . 'person-centered, Rogerian counselling, and . . . the ability to focus on exploring things deeply, are unimportant skills counsellors need to have,' but there are also other skills that would be nice to practice in a safe learning environment.” As it stood, students felt personally and culturally invalidated when trying to explore orientations: “it would also be nice for it to be OK for students to explore things in addition to that and not think they’re doing something wrong.” One student related the subtlety of this lack of supervisory openness: “that was feedback . . . in a practicum setting . . . the sixth or seventh session where we did [a practical activity] and it was like 'oh, maybe it was too soon for that' . . . was not deemed as good . . . but the more practical activity helped her decide . . . 130it actually helped her hit a breakthrough moment that she talked about the next session but the feedback was still 'oh that was too far too fast.'” Students specifically desired support for solution focused and practically oriented work as these are suitable for those with limited money, for those who come in wanting actionable solutions, and for those not interested in deep exploration: “I would’ve preferred to have the option to explore, I would have preferred for solution focused counselling as the evil we’re not yet allowed to touch.” Specifically, students identified their programs' bias towards a person-centered orientation {29-4}. While students definitely appreciated the person-centered orientation, they noticed a systematic programmatic focus on it, to the exclusion of other perspectives: “if we ever run out of time, it’s always like 'psychodynamic—like let's cut', . . . So it’s like the bias is clear, you know whenever we have to cut some fat it’s gotta be the Freud, the, the Adler, the, the Gestalt . . . I’m kind of self-studying on those guys cause . . . they’re important to learn.” Students were concerned that the programmatic emphasis on person-centered orientation can be at the expense of clients' needs: “if we’re so concerned about, you know, consent at the beginning of session and consent at the beginning of the process, how consensual is it to push someone to a place that they are not yet ready to explore? Where their only defence mechanism is 'I’m just going to stop this exploring process now because I’ve now gone too far.'” A student related an instance where a client had not seemed to the student to want to go deeper but had been taken through that process: “he came in the next session, he sat down, and he’s like '[trainee name], I don’t want to do this.' And I was like, 'ya, that’s totally OK.' He was like 'can I just go home.'” Diverse Faculty Protect Diverse Students Yet Non-Diverse Faculty PredominateCulturally diverse professors, and particularly supervisors, facilitated diverse students' inclusion, yet non-diverse professors predominated.Culturally diverse professors offered compatible perspectives to diverse students {33-6}. This phenomenon was in evidence in curriculum and pedagogy, with respect to epistemology, and during supervision. This was evident in cases where students felt a broad cultural similarity to diverse faculty: “there are parts of that that make sense to me based on my upbringing. . . . I remember trying to work on their emotions in order to resolve their emotions so they could move on, and that didn’t work. And so I was having this conversation 131and the person . . . had a background in [culturally diverse orientation] and he said . . . ' . . . we would say emotion’s just a emotion, . . . this is what happened to them, of course they would feel indignant . . . But they can still . . . take action in a certain way,' and that just, it was this revelation, I thought 'yeah! You’re so right.'” Beyond cultural similarity, diverse faculty brought a more holistic perspective: “certainly my time with [professor] was very different. Like he was really good about taking into account . . . the people, the relationships, the places, the things and taking kind of a more holistic perspective . . . and how do you let the person decide how to balance those values.” Diverse faculty also supported diverse epistemologies: “things that are taught in the class—I can see that he definitely have deep understanding like [of] traditional stories that I share in the class . . . as example to get my point across. . . . he was able to bring it to a . . . deep level, then I feel 'oh yes, that’s the story, that’s what the story meant,' you know, 'that’s what I wanted to say.'” These learning environments were more supportive for diverse students generally: “there was space for different worldviews. There was space for different cultures. There was space.”A supervisor's or professor's diverse orientation protected students' diverse worldviews, making a positive inclusive space {26-4}. Students' academic pathways through their programs were much easier with a supervisor paving the way in terms of orientation or cultural perspective: “my road was paved quite nicely by my supervisor who had really pushed to make sure that people understood about [orientation]. That he put research out there so that the program knew about it, . . . they felt it was something that is useful and in this program. So without him around I think I would’ve faced a lot more of a challenge in talking about [orientation] and how much evidence there is, and how applicable it is to this community here.” This protection meant that students could “feel like they belong and they can do the research that is meaningful for them in a way that is meaningful for them. In a way that makes sense to them, that is respectful to their background.” Students felt that having this “was the only time I actually felt like what I was doing wasn’t being criticized.”Yet, older and non-diverse professors predominated in students' departments {15-5}. Students acknowledged the good intentions of faculty, but identified a lack of diversity: “a lot of the faculty are sort of like doing the best they can given their own contexts. . . . come as far as they maybe can within their own consciousness.” Hiring diverse faculty seemed to be 132“not really valued because a lot of the people who did bring in diversity, or who are like maybe a bit newer to the scene and had been keeping up with the research all either left by their own choice or were not given continuing contracts and left. So we now are here with faculty where like the average age of the faculty is . . . not to say it’s age that determines, but . . maybe a theme where like we’re being fully represented by folks who . . . maybe aren’t bringing the freshest perspectives into the work, . . . that’s reflected both in the courses and in the behaviour you see happening behind the scenes.” This applied to Indigeneity as well: “even in like the alienation of like maybe some of the like—there’s very few Indigenous staff, or there are now, we have no Indigenous faculty, we did before. . . . predominantly white faculty.”Do the Learning On Your Own {47-6}.When the institution did not deliver the diversity of curriculum desired by students, “people who wanted to learn have to go out and do the learning on their own.” Unfortunately, “not everyone is going to take that step as a counsellor.” Students argued that “the school has some responsibility as they are educating counselling professionals and are in some ways the gatekeepers of those entering professions that have the potential to help or harm others. That's why I think it's important to have had more exposure to different cultures and been taught a framework/concrete example of how one could go about educating themselves about different cultures in order to better serve their clients.” Students understood that any curriculum is necessarily limited, and “if I want to really help myself grow and to connect with my cultural root, I need more than just studying here and have my degree here. I need to look for knowledge somewhere else, knowledge which is in depth. If I really want to learn what my ancestor left me 3000, 4000 years ago, I really have to go somewhere else to learn that.” Students readily identified their ongoing professional duty to do their own learning, but argued that this doesn't negate a school's responsibility: “ultimately although I do the best I can to do my own education, and of course it is my responsibility to educate myself as a practitioner, there’s like, there is an element of disappointment hoping that that could’ve been something I could’ve been like in collaboration with, with the institution I have chosen.”Students identified the need to learn on their own, supplement official curriculum, and adapt curriculum on their own to contexts diverse in culture and Indigeneity—noting that this 133was not always actualized. Students adapted curriculum on their own: “'OK, well, could I apply this to different cultures?' . . . if I could, great, if I can't, how do I adapt that.” Students did extra learning on their own: “I appreciate that there’s a scarcity of time . . . so I take what we can from class and I supplement it however I can so that for me personally as a future clinical [counsellor] I’m not that one-sided.” Extra learning came from diverse elective courses when there was schedule room for them and from other extracurricular experiences: “I’m doing my own research, I’m trying to select like media, like sometimes documentaries, different, like different movies . . . that may or may not be accurate . . . Travelling, if I can.” Extracurricular offerings of the institution were also useful here: “sitting in [professor’s diverse orientation] one-day seminar and being like, 'Oh! This makes a lot more sense.'” Students emphasized the value of critical and culturally broad perspectives they were exposed to in other programs: “I took a course [in] Black history . . . anticipated that those courses will be more culturally rich . . . and really make sense of conflicts, culture conflicts,” and these fields offered a more tolerant educational space: “it’s a program where it’s more accommodating and tolerant towards different cultures and different ideas.”Being Under the Gun {41-6}Diverse students feel like they and their worldviews were under the gun in their programs: “I have felt this especially in the coursework and practicum work that relates to individual counselling, there is a specific way of doing things and worldview … being handed down, and when I say feeling under the gun, it’s, I kind of feel like I don’t agree with that worldview… But to get the grade, to get the pass, I have to do it anyways.” Students' worldviews were inordinately challenged by faculty, and they saw a lesson for themselves in what happened to their peers: “she felt that she was being challenged a lot more by faculty members because she was doing her [program in a way] that seemed to make more sense coming from . . . her Indigenous background. . . . based on her Indigenous background she seemed to have gone through a lot of challenging from, by the faculty members who were sitting in her clinical comp. It also seems that her research was critiqued quite a bit because she was bringing in a methodology that was . . . respectful to . . . the Aboriginal background. And so she seemed to have gotten just a lot of resistance about that”—“the faculty member was suggesting that this wasn’t going to fly. It wasn’t going to work in the academic field, 134that she didn’t know enough.” Compliance to authority was scrutinized by faculty in high-stakes evaluative environments: “I did two practicum placements. The bulk in the first half was at the [site] and I’d done my clinic there and I already knew the way you get through that is 'do what [director] wants.'” This made students feel inauthentic: “I do sublimate a certain aspect of myself here where I didn’t [earlier], I was like 'no, this is who I am,' . . . and aware that possibly that’s departmental as well, there’s a bit more room for that kind of radicalism in undergraduate degrees and also in those departments.” The necessity to sublimate “was a positive thing in that like I think it got me where I wanted to go, which was through this degree with good marks and good references. . . . was it positive in terms of like feeling radically accepted and congruent if you will? No.” Inauthenticity seemed out of place as an educational product: “there’s a tiny little bit of inauthenticity that is a bit ironic to be comfortable with in a program like a counselling program where you’re trying to cultivate your authenticity.”These conditions made students feel cast out: “I think for her she felt almost expelled from the program, like she could’ve been expelled. She wasn’t but—;” “she felt that she had to find comfort and security and sense of belonging from somewhere else. . . . with the program, she felt very much outcasted.” Students felt like they were doing something wrong when they pursued diverse cultural or orientation interests: “it would also be nice for it to be OK for students to explore things in addition to that [orientation] and not think they’re doing something wrong.” Students considered whether their own expectations entering the program or their cultural orientation toward authority had become a self-fulfilling prophecy, causing their experiences of inauthenticity. Students said “you can argue maybe it’s the self fulfilling prophecy,” or that it was due to “my own perfectionism, because, but then I wonder, if the perfectionism comes from the different worldview of not being able to challenge the system or challenge my elders or challenge the norm. Cause like no one stopped me from trying the things I wanted to try. But I wonder how much of that was me not trying because of how I learned education works and how I interpret the faculty-student dynamic.” They wondered, “could I have tried to be a little bit more creative and not felt so under the gun? I don’t know, it’s kind of too late for that now.” In the end, students wanted a safe learning environment: “there are also other skills that would be nice to practice in a safe learning environment.”135Lack of Critical Context {52-6}Students noted a lack of critical contextual thinking in their programs, such as feminist and critical intersectional analyses. They found a lack of context in curriculum: “the question I had in mind beginning the program was you know like a lot of the determinants of mental health come out of your context, and how do we like account for that in counselling? And I was hearing a lot more about like you know ways to deal with the internal and not, not as much in terms of like how do I help people navigate the context of their life.” Students found a universalizing dominant account of counselling: “I was wanting to understand how these theories that seem to have been developed with like a white middle class person in mind could be generalized to other kinds of populations and whether, like whether or not they were applicable, you know. Cause it was being presented as like you can do this with anyone and I was like 'can you? Or can you do this with this percentage of the population?' . . . I heard that it is universal, but I didn’t hear how it could be universal.” Curriculum was also individualistic in its cultural orientation: “a lot of the curriculum that we’ve been taught it was all very individualist centered.” Diverse students had more contextual and holistic worldviews and corresponding desires for appreciation of context in treatment: “I’m more aware of like kind of context around an individual client. . . . how . . . they can't just do what they want to do. . . . you can't just counsel them and say you know what would be best for you, because it’s not just about them. It’s always, you know, you have to think about your family, you have to think about community . . . , the people that you’re affecting;” “I think that’s kind of frowned upon from an individualist perspective. . . . my Caucasian friends are like . . . you should just do what you want. . . . I’m like 'it’s not about me.' And so that was kind of like what I felt with the institution, . . . I was always being told to counsel . . . for, you know, what’s best for the individual.” Students, however, “don’t think one theory applies to all situations.” Students found a lack of historical discourse in their institutions: “if you want the students to be invested in that land as an, and really emotionally acknowledge the significance of you know how privileged we are to be on that land, to learn on that land, use it the way we use it, um ... there’s no history, like there’s no history lesson there. You know for an international student coming, they don’t know.” Approaches to diversity were also 136sometimes out of date: “perspectives were really dated. If you look at the multicultural counselling association, . . . they define multiculturalism as all of these different intersections in our lives, not just like our ethnicity . . . Whereas if you like encounter [the university's elective options] . . . , conveys to us that we somehow think culture and gender are different, we somehow think family and culture are different. . . . this like best practice definition of culture, . . . I don’t think the, the program represented that at all.”One's Own Culture or Diversity and its Relationship With Counselling and OrientationsBecoming Aware of Your Own Ethnicity and Diversity {16-7}Students became aware of their own ethnic and other diversities as they grew up, attended different schools, and engaged in counsellor education and counselling psychology programs: “I was so lost growing up . . . , the assumptions and all that stuff at home are so different from when I stepped outside the home. . . . I guess part of that was my reason to do psychology . . . going back and forth was kind of confusing and fun at the same time cause I got to see just two different worlds really. But growing up and learning about it like through cross-cultural psychology;” “it was sort of a moulding of the 2 for me and . . . at the end of it I really was able to figure myself out.” Students discovered how they were situated within gender and economic struggles, and learned to check their privilege: “Not just culturally but also in terms of class as well. Like I had some friends who were very, like whose families were very well off and I had some friends whose families were barely getting by or just not getting by. And so that spectrum I think really informed my worldview early on;” “it gave me a lot of perspective . . . when I have friends who, you know, they can't even afford to buy groceries, . . . you’re like, check your privilege.” This connected to land as well: “I’ve been developing this particular thought about how privileged I am to live where I am, and to grow in the socio-economic status that I am in. And to me that has to do with land, inevitably, cause if I was born somewhere else, . . . that particular land would be very different than here. . . . where I am here does influence who I am.”Becoming Bicultural and Having One's Being in Different Cultures {32-6}Diverse students had interfaced with multiple cultures growing up, in their adult life, or in their academic experience. Going between cultures was often a part of discovering one's 137biculturalism: “I sort of grew up asking a lot of questions about myself and my culture . . . I was coming from one place and really living in a different place. . . . contrasting the two was cool too because I would go back and forth every few years and . . . that going back and forth action really was . . . the core of it all because I, now, I identify like very biculturally.” They also sometimes felt like they were in a weird limbo between cultures: “I was never [ethnicity] enough to fit in with the [ethnicity] kids but I wasn’t white enough to fit in with the white kids, so I was kind of in this, like, weird like limbo.” Students found their being itself within multiple cultural knowledges including scholarly knowledges: “I’m thankful that they took me every few years back there, and taught me these languages;” “given my . . . nature of just being, in different pockets of knowledge it makes sense that I’m also in different pockets here as well right?” Students productively integrated multiple cultures: “I'm [ethnicity]-Canadian, I feel I’m part of—, and European cultural ideas [are] definitely in me;” “what I value is to be able to learn both cultures and combine them together. And if I want to do it, [university] can’t be my only source.” This gave them a certain background knowledge: “having experience and being bi-cultural, I understand . . . but if somebody were you know from, . . . a single culture I don’t think what we were taught really prepares a person to be sensitive to . . . different cultural worldviews.” Being Different and Growing Up Different {43-7}Diverse students related what it is like to be different, or to have grown up as different. Some differences were cultural: “I moved a few times there but both times I was kind of in the [national] community, or English speaking community. . . . when I moved to [country] we . . . attended a [ethnicity] school in [country] which was pretty neat for me;” “It’s a wonder that I didn’t get bullied there. The friends that I made, . . .  They were willing to accept this different odd kid.” Students differed with respect to class as well. Poorer students went through many systemic struggles: “I think things that have influenced that [worldview] also was growing up working class. . . . I thought things were going to be one way even though I kind of had in the back of my head like there were these stratified class differences that I somehow, it was somehow going to be different for me. And then I was like 'oh, no, it’s not going to be different, I’m exactly [in the same struggles.]'” Students were different in other intersectional ways as well, including critical political orientation: “it’s not 138knowledge that’s openly offered to most people but I kind of grew into my own like kind of feminist and like politically, systemically curious—, over time. . . . wanting to understand . . . why there isn’t a lot of space for, for like non-hetero and -cis people in the world, and then . . . got to university, . . . and you know encountered my first like gender studies class. That was like the coolest class I ever took.”Students related how being different made them not fit in in various environments. Sometimes this was socially, “just kind of being an outcast in a lot of ways. And I, I would go to parties and stuff and like and they just; people just didn’t want to engage. And I considered myself to be fairly friendly and outgoing, I was like, I don’t know.” Sometimes it was in educational environments growing up: “and also your home environment is different from school environment, and sometimes you can't really bridge it, so your knowledge kind of sit there . . . I didn’t know what to do with my knowledge;” “so yeah, I just kind of kept to myself, . . . now I think back it was very confusing.” Sometimes a student was on their own in an environment, and at other times they were part of a minority: “that was unique growing up cause you know like [city] 15-20 years ago was way different demographically than it is now. I was definitely a minority then, can't say I’m a minority now. . . . it was challenging . . . I’d be the only [ethnicity] kid.” Students also ran into racism and other systemic barriers: “they were yelling remarks about his like slanted eyes, or like taking up space, you know there’s that, there are some stereotypes about like Asian students.” Mingled among these accounts were elements of surviving, finding out how to fit in, and positively benefiting from differences: “I was sort of a minority, I really stuck out like a sore thumb in all of my class photos because I was the only dark skinned kid there. And that was, that was unique, but I think it gave me just more opportunity to look inwards than outwards, like I realized I didn’t really fit socially in a lot of circles so I had to really formulate things in my own head.” Students also benefited from differences: “I'm so far different from that, . . . wherever I end up at a Canadian university I’m not going to have like a one to one match. . . . frankly that’s good, I want diversity of opinion. I don’t want what I already know being thrown at me. So, yes there’s a difference, I relish in that and I just make up for the deficits wherever I see a bias.” Sometimes encountering the school's difference in worldview was a catalyst for one's own cultural development: “what I’m grateful for is this 139program is the catalyst for me realizing how different I am than most people I interact with;” one “thing that I like about this program is that I think it’s actually probably made me a little bit more [ethnicity] than I used to be.”Family Connection and Culture Forms Worldview {35-8}Students' worldviews were formed by family and by the family's culture: “you know growing up I had a certain worldview that was very much coloured by my parents;” “I believe that my mother has a very strong sense of, of humanity I guess you could say. Making sure that there’s a sense of social consideration, and I think that I got a lot of that from my mother growing up.” Values instilled by family had a lasting impact on worldview: “as a kid growing up I travelled a lot, but even so, like my parents were very good about wanting me to be exposed to different cultures and different people and different histories and traditions and stuff and so I think early on that kind of what was kind of fostered that interest in histories and people.”When growing up, many students' cultures at home were different from their friends' and families' cultures: “I think different conversations happening in my house than, than were” happening in the homes of “kids that I went to school with.” Both the home family's culture and the cultures of friends' families had an impact: “my worldview adapted given my experiences . . . especially with my peers. . . . I would go over to my friends' families' . . . homes, . . . and I would see very stark differences between like my parents' views and versus like my, my friends' parents' views.” The threshold of the door of the family home was a frequent marker of cultural difference: “I was so lost growing up . . . cause like my, the, the assumptions and all that stuff at home are so different from when I stepped outside the home.” Home itself was also a complicated notion as the parents' generation often has a different sense of home: “my parents are immigrants and for them place and land means very different things and so part of my worldview is coloured by you know, being brought up by them and like what home means for them.”Students also noted the difference in worldview between home culture and school culture. This was found in respect to public school and also found once students engaged in counsellor education and counselling psychology: “like a big source is family, . . . the process of learning . . . how to be a counsellor has been the thing that has unpacked it and allowed me 140. . . to be 'OK, this thing that I learned I wanna keep, but this thing that I learned I don’t want to keep.'”Negative Emotional Reactions to Curriculum, Theory, and Supervision {19-8}Beyond the intellectual responses students had to their institutional environments, emotional reactions played a big part in deciding what was right for students and clients: “a big part of it was becoming, not just aware of my own thought process . . . but also becoming aware of when I noticed just instinctually that something’s not right.” This was often in reaction to curriculum: “it was being in the like foundations of counselling skills class and …. Having visceral reactions to what was being said in class about what good counselling is.” For instance, “learning about family theory and family dynamics and then being like 'no!' . . . what you’re defining as healthy attachment and unhealthy attachment is not the same [culturally], because if I scan what you’re saying is unhealthy attachment, it kind of sounds like how me and my family interact.” In-class pedagogical encounters with faculty viewpoints formed major emotional upheavals for students: “It’s just like such extreme differences for me, and really like shook my, particularly shook my, my sense of—;” “it was terrifying. We all like sat there and were like 'this—,' just like 'oh, OK.'” Students attended to these reactions in their supervised work as well: “supervision . . . helped me become more aware of my reactions . . . the one that specifically I know didn’t sit well with me was CBT. . . . I like the formatting of it, I like the linearity of it, cognitively. But I realized later on that . . . perhaps it is the linearity that I have issues with. . . . I just couldn’t seem able to fit this linear model to this client’s jumble of life taking place. . . . it just didn’t sit well with me and . . . the reason why I became aware of that was . . . attending to my own reactions.”Orientation Relates to Own Worldview {20-5}Students' own worldviews related to their selections of theoretical orientations in counselling. Sometimes an orientation sat well with one emotionally because of a fit with worldview: “there are parts of that [orientation] that make sense to me based on my upbringing. . . . 'emotion’s just an emotion, . . . of course they would feel indignant . . . But they can still . . . take action in a certain way,' and that just, it was this revelation, I thought 'yeah! You’re so right;'” “when we talk about frustrating situations that we can't really do much about we say [expression], and see what else we can do despite it. And so I kind of 141grew up in that culture and I think that’s why, to me it makes sense.” Sometimes an orientation was chosen deliberately according to worldview, or certain values of one's upbringing influence clinical values: “I think . . . those different perspectives really kind of helped me in terms of developing a counselling background and trying to be like non-judgmental, and trying to . . . understand the different perspectives, . . . I think the biggest thing for me is everybody is fighting their own struggles, everybody has problems.” At other times, one's self-development through counsellor education and counselling psychology programs or clinical experience had an effect on one's own worldview: “the last several years since I started learning more about [diverse orientation], and about, about Indigenous peoples, First Nations people here too, I’m starting to understand how these theoretical orientations, or these projects, or the people that I work with understand land.. . . I’m becoming more cognizant of my own worldview. . . . vicariously I’m starting to think about Indigenous land, working with Indigenous peoples . . . who situate themselves within the land.”Other Critical Fields Inform Worldview {24-5}Students drew from different critical schools of thought in making sense of their realities, in forming their worldviews, and in informing their apprehension of theoretical models in counsellor education and counselling psychology. Students drew on traditions such as gender and women's studies, postcolonial social sciences and humanities, systems theory, social justice movements, history, and philosophy: “post colonial . . . [discipline]. . . was amazing and [it] like changed everything.” Interaction with these fields came from one's upbringing and hardships, one's public schooling, one's undergraduate disciplines, and other critical disciplinary courses and workshops taken outside of their graduate counselling programs. These fields gave students the ability and language to critique social conditions in their own lives: “I got to have more language to understand . . . things in my life, why they were hard, not just that . . . this is painful or unsettling but . . . there are systems in place that make some of these things harder for me, and some of them harder for people I know and easier for me.”Suffering Part of Life and Compassion Part of Worldview {16-3}Students' worldviews were affected by hardships and observing others' hardships and 142injustices—they saw that suffering is part of life: “it gave me a lot of perspective . . . I have friends who . . . can't even afford to buy groceries. . . . one of those moments where you’re like, check your privilege.” Injustices of class, race, and other types of diversity came together in this appreciation of suffering: “they struggled with language, and racism and different barriers as well.” The flip-side of this aspect of worldview was the compassion students developed because of seeing these injustices. This compassion meant understanding where people are coming from: “everybody struggles and there’s always a reason behind it. . . . it’s not necessarily like 'oh, that person made . . . one bad decision and now they’re on the streets.'” It meant deciding to act compassionately in one's profession: “there’s a lot of suffering . . . it’s hard enough to live as it is. . . . that influences how I go about . . . my life and why I’m in this program, . . . if I can somehow just make someone’s life a little less sucky, then I’m happy with that;” “no matter what the situation may seem like to you, their crisis is their crisis. . . . no matter how small or how big, their crisis is magnified for them. And that really made me reevaluate how I looked at people suffering, . . . At the end of the day, it doesn’t matter because that’s your frame of reference, and who am I to judge or belittle or dismiss your suffering.” This attitude extended to diversity in general, to have compassion for difference as a way of being: “the best way to treat difference is to have compassion.”Worldview Developed in Counselling Program {27-6}Students developed their worldviews and became more aware of their worldviews while in counsellor education and counselling psychology programs. Students often credited the various aspects of this education intended to foster self-awareness and cultural self-awareness: “really the biggest development for me probably happened during my master's program in counselling;” “I think that’s when I started to have to reflect on myself. . . . learning to become a counsellor is not just to help clients but to get to know yourself and so a lot of the work that was required, that was being graded, was about yourself. . . . and so I remember taking it very seriously and thinking alright let’s get down to this, how do I get it, what, what does it mean? To know about myself, to reflect on myself.” Students identified both coursework and clinical supervision in this vein: “a couple pieces that really shaped me for who I was, . . . in my master's program there’s that one part, that one year where . . . 143receive clinical supervision . . . that training was absolutely fantastic, that one year helped me realize that sometimes it’s my emotional reaction that I need, my reactions, intuitive reactions that I need to pay attention to.” This development was specifically a development of worldview: “my worldview comes from the places that I’ve been in including the institutions that I’ve been in. . . . [e.g.] counselling psychology, . . . where I have honed in my own perspective and views of myself.” Sometimes what was developed wasn't worldview so much as awareness of worldview: “I’ve had an idea . . . how, . . . why I think, feel, behave the way . . . that I do, but having . . . this program I think it’s opened my ideas. Like I think I’ve become more self-aware in terms of the different things that influence those things.” Students were grateful for this gained awareness: “what I’m grateful for is this program is the catalyst for me realizing how different I am than most people I interact with.”Worldview Guided the Choice of Counselling Career Path {14-3}Worldview guided students towards a career in counselling: “what means the most to me is . . . being vulnerable and honest and true to ourselves and learning how we can bring that into all areas of our life, which is what I think ultimately kept me forging down the path of trying to find some way to be able do that, not just myself and my life, but as a form of work, which is what lead me to counselling;” “I realized . . . this . . . path aligns much more with my interests and my values, my worldview.” There was often a process of discerning one's feelings, values, and fit within the career as one learned about it as an option and tried it out: “I just want to figure out how I can like talk to people about things that matter for a living, . . . when we live in a world that doesn’t really value that stuff . . . So in my mind that was my way, . . . I just couldn’t fathom any pathway to that other than psychology.” Students judged the alignment between their worldview and the ethos of the profession: “I found counselling as like a little bit more aligned with my worldview and that’s kind of what led me down this path. . . . It’s like always trying to find the one that gets the closest to what feels right;” “I . . . fell in love with that, which was very affirming that the path I’d kind of chosen was right.”Worldview Based on Layered Social Context {22-5}Students' worldviews were not simply a single belief position, but rather a complex set of shifting and dynamic social and ecological layers: “it’s like influenced by context, 144influenced by people around you, influenced by culture, upbringing, you know where you grew up, experiences you’ve had,” and comprised “different layers” of “who I am as a [gender] at this age, with parents who are [ethnicity] who have, who grown up in different cultures in different institutions situated in this world, this earth.” Students had different ways of articulating this multi-layered identity and worldview: “we start from maybe the largest place which is earth, and then talking about worldview from human beings going into more of the institutional, so the different nations that I lived in, the different countries that I’ve lived in, including their cultural background, maybe even religious, spiritual background, and then going in to my, the different schools that I attended based on these different countries.” Some differentiated between layers of the inner and outer self: “in two senses, the self and then the extended self. So the self I would think of as like your cultural background, your language, your family history, your family dynamics, so that’s sort of the self. And then the extended self is the self in a context . . . I would think like your community, your city, you know, your, your, your culture on your street, you know that kind of more interpersonal dynamic. . . . a combination of the two form one's worldview.” In this analysis, each aspect was “almost like a layer,” and “the two of those together form the core of a framework or a worldview through which one views the world.”Appreciation for Institutional Worldview {27-6}Students appreciated when they could fit in, they were grateful for their programs and their own development within them, and they valued their institutions' different worldview.There are times when diverse students fit in: “I have been fortunate I guess in that my relation with this program has been going well but perhaps that’s because mine has been [one of being able to] relatively fit in, . . . into this program;” “sometimes it doesn’t matter about how much differences you are experiencing, it may matter how much similarity you experience.” Some students' ability to fit in was determined by their supervisor: “my road was paved quite nicely by my supervisor who had really pushed to make sure that people understood . . . he put research out there so that the program knew about it, . . . they felt it was something that is useful and in this program. So without him around I think I would’ve faced a lot more of a challenge.” Students often expressed their gratitude for their professors: “a brilliant psychologist and an excellent supervisor;” “they realize that it’s important for 145students to develop themselves, and trainees to develop themselves as a person and they had stated that on their website, but to me . . . anybody states that. . . . so I was surprised at the degree to which they actually did care.” They were grateful for the program's ability to develop their self-awareness: “it has been an excellent experience, and it’s been nice to be juxtaposed to learn how I’m different than what I thought I was.” Given some of the critiques students have, they often acknowledged, in conjunction, their understanding that professors were well-intentioned and were doing their best: “I think a lot of the faculty are sort of like doing the best they can given their own contexts.” They understood the inevitability of programmatic and curricular biases and limitations: “I just take that and I understand it and I appreciate that there’s a scarcity of time and so . . . I take what we can from class and I supplement it however I can;” “I understand it’s important to have a core curriculum, it’s important to have competencies, it’s important to have milestones you want the students to go through.” Students appreciated the difference between their own worldview and the institution's worldview, and they integrated the two in a productive way: “[I] appreciate what . . . I can get from . . . my experience here as well, cause I have lots of privilege as well to be a [university] student right here, so that’s one way to navigate it;” “I value the differences as well;” “cause I learn from the difference, . . . if everything is the same and I will take everything for granted . . . then I’m not learning I’m just following.”Students Enjoy the Reflective Research Process {10-5}Students expressed their interest in the conversational interviews and the discussions of place and land in respect to their worldviews. Students expressed enjoyment: “that was really fun. . . . I like exercises in introspection;” “This is really neat, I didn’t actually process this before. That’s cool.” They noted that the discussions were helpful in furthering their own thinking (as they were for myself as well): “your questions really got me thinking about that, . . . I’ve started to, started to rekindle, or at least re-discovered a connection with the physical, so whether it’s writing, whether it’s pens, just something about physicality has started to really inch its way into my life, and so this whole idea of land as well is starting to develop;” “in terms of just like answering your question about land and place, it’s really forming the idea and I think those are really bringing up feeling and thoughts that have been there, but now are processed a bit better;” “well this is a really interesting thought provoking 146conversation. I appreciate like, I think I’d sort of given it some thought walking into it in terms of like why do I feel different but I don’t think I’d added the dimension of land and place into, to the same degree and it’s, I think it’s interesting to consider that as a factor.” They noted the grounding that place and land added to discussions of worldview: “I think it takes you to a deeper place almost right? Like it almost gets you out of like how you're conceptually thinking of it and it grounds you in something really interesting.” They found these discussions helped them be able to articulate their views: “those questions I never thought about, . . . I know that’s why I'm kind of doing those things, but I never putting those things in words;” “I appreciated being able to articulate it all to myself.”This concludes the reporting of primary results as pertain to the themes uncovered in the hermeneutic and thematic analysis. Metatheme summaries will be reiterated in the discussion below. Now I will turn to additional transcript excerpts to furnish material relevant to considerations of trustworthiness.Evidence of Merging Horizons Here I would like to offer some evidence of the hermeneutic merging of horizons that were reached in discussions which enabled the researcher and participants to begin to explore the subject matter with tentative common understandings. This is evidence of quality and trustworthiness particular to the present Gadamerian methodology. The excerpts are necessarily of dialogues that show a small glimpse of the interpersonal understanding that developed which is only partially able to be seen through the selected text. INTERVIEWER: . . . I have an intuitive sense of what you mean obviously, but . . . when you’re saying land in those instances what does land mean specifically?PARTICIPANT: Like do you mean like the unceded Coast Salish territories that we’re on?INTERVIEWER: . . . like physical territories kind of or yeah?. . . PARTICIPANT: . . . In the literal sense, yeah the physical land but that also I think, I mean with colonizing and settling, there’s also all of the emotional and spiritual and cultural impacts of that so I mean, physically I am on land that isn’t mine, but like on another level that’s also had like really devastating impacts for Indigenous 147communities so I think it’s more than just physical land . . .INTERVIEWER: Right, . . . the concept of land has to do with physical land and then also-PARTICIPANT: The history.INTERVIEWER: The history of dispossession and colonization.PARTICIPANT: Yeah and the history being also happening now, not necessarily just in the past.INTERVIEWER: Right, right gotcha.The growth of a tentative shared understanding is not about an accurate representation of the participant's words or even necessarily meaning, but rather something between us which allows a conversation to emerge which uncovers something about the subject matter. It necessarily involves sharing one's own understandings, although this was cautious and attenuated in the present research for reasons noted earlier: INTERVIEWER: Alright. And you yourself are a, like, moderate you said.PARTICIPANT: Yeah I appreciate both sides.INTERVIEWER: Certain conservative elements, liberal elements.PARTICIPANT: Absolutely I mean, I mean you . . .INTERVIEWER: oh yeah, oh yeah, and I have my own threads of, of this and that, come to some kind of reconciliation of those things too, yeah.PARTICIPANT: And, and at the same, again if you don’t talk that reconciliation, there’s no place for it, there’s no place for it. So we automatically just stick with what you have.INTERVIEWER: And no one, no one, people lose the ability to understand each other at all, yeah.PARTICIPANT: Yep, yep.The establishment of a merging of horizons was an iterative process, and a process that made our terms of conversation become more clear to each other:PARTICIPANT: . . . when you say the word place, things come to my mind will be my classroom, maybe my home, my workplace. Very specific and the place I go eat the most, restaurant I usually go, the shopping centre I usually go. When you say land 148it, it has a, a depth, bigger connotation. That, does it make sense?INTERVIEWER: Yeah like it’s physically bigger area you mean?PARTICIPANT: Yeah and also concept-wise it, land, we’re sharing the land with plants and trees, plants and animals.INTERVIEWER: Right, right, right, ok. Yeah and land, land has that connotation of, of ecology or all those different relationships whereas the, whereas place is more like specific, specific places. Cause land is location too, but in a larger sense, is that what you’re saying?PARTICIPANT: Yes that’s how I felt.INTERVIEWER: -lacks the specific day-to-day, isolated, individual places PARTICIPANT: yesINTERVIEWER: yeah. . . . and place doesn’t have the same connotation, relationship with animals and plants.PARTICIPANT: It can, but for me it’s more-INTERVIEWER: It can, but, but, but that makes sense.PARTICIPANT: More . . . if you put it on a scale, does it make sense? Land will be on one end and place will be-INTERVIEWER: Sure, sure just like a spectrum of-PARTICIPANT: They’re definitely overlapping each other.We can see from these examples that while the research questions were initially very open-ended, through the iterative hermeneutic conversations shared meanings became available that provided for a horizon of exploration of the topic. I should note that while the hermeneutic circle occurred here within each dialogue, it also occurs between dialogues and between stages of research more privately with the researcher after these interviews were done—the establishment of a common horizon between all dialogues was something that grew as each subsequent interview happened, but also occurred after interviews as I read back and forth between stages of analysis.Expert ConsultationA professor of educational philosophy served as an expert consultant on thematic analysis results. The expert specializes in phenomenological philosophy, and many of his 149comments relate to the methodology and reporting style as noted earlier. Please refer to Appendix D for more technical discussion of his input which has been integrated throughout.DiscussionAlanaise Goodwill (e.g., Goodwill et al., 2019), in her generous input to the design of this study, discussed how decolonizing education with nonindigenous people needs to begin with building a new relationship with land, and by building up their own sense of confidence and rootedness in who they are culturally. Therefore, decolonizing counsellor education and counselling psychology with nonindigenous people requires a knowledge of where these people are in their relationships to their own cultural roots, their existing relationships with land, and their current worldviews. The present research seeks to answer these questions among nonindigenous students in counselling who are diverse in worldview with respect to the institution's worldview. Below I consider topics from each meta-theme against literature in counselling and Indigenous decolonial theory. The reader will remember that the diverse students (or simply, the students) referred to below are: nonindigenous graduate students enrolled or previously enrolled in professional counsellor education and counselling psychology programs in Canada, who self-identify as experiencing worldview differences between themselves and their institutions of study. Again, the participants were recruited based on their self-identified worldview differences, not on a specific ethnic or migratory paradigm; therefore, the participants are not homogeneous with respect to migratory and immigration history, with some being relatively recent immigrants and others being descendants of more distantly immigrated settler colonists. The unifying category in light of the decolonial analysis here is that they are all newcomers with respect to the vast time-frame of Indigenous peoples.Connection to Place, Migration, and Relating to LandMetatheme SummaryFirst I will recapitulate with a summary of the themes in this metatheme. Diverse students had an awareness of Indigenous land, Indigenous philosophies of land, and historical, political and legal aspects of living on Indigenous land. They were aware of our colonial past and present. Belonging in a place was a significant aspect of being a counselling student. Students valued nature, understood that human life comes from land, saw health as 150necessitating connection to land, and longed for a belonging-to-land. Students maintained relationships with places they had lived in and were connected to their memories of these places. In their institutions' relationships to land, students found aspects of connection and of disconnection. Students themselves felt a lack of connection to place and land and a lack of rootedness. Students had migrated, moved, and travelled throughout life and these experiences taught them.General RemarksStudents were forthcoming about their existing relationships with land. Sometimes there was a lack of relationship to land, and this was also discussed cogently. Students were actively interested in their developing relationship with land and place, and often related their relationship to land in terms of what they had learned not only culturally from their own upbringing but also from knowledge they had about Indigenous peoples, colonial history, and Indigenous ways of relating to land. Nevertheless, these learnings were often aspirational, and students clearly stated their desire for a deeper relationship to land, community, and place, which they saw as being facilitated in part by learning from Indigenous peoples. Different nonindigenous cultures or intellectual traditions, such as Marxism or feminism, also informed the students' developing worldviews around what land was and how it should be treated, and around the politics of resource extraction, ownership, class, and land's relationship to the body. In light of this, it seems that the ground is well prepared for the reception of decolonized counsellor education and counselling psychology programs with these students. As many have written (Donald, 2009; Furniss, 1997; Haig-Brown, 2009), nonindigenous peoples often rely on falsely absolute dichotomies of Indigenous and nonindigenous such that a cultural divide is perpetuated where it is not historically accurate. With the present participants at least, it seems like with respect to land and Indigenous history, there was much appreciation and a desire for further engagement rather than any rigid notion of separation.Belonging in PlaceBelonging to place featured heavily, and obvious parallels include Indigenous senses of the relationship between personhood and place (Deloria, 1975; Marker, 2017; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001) as well as Indigenous senses of dwelling in place (Mika, 2015). Some features 151of these traditions are apparent in students' senses of belonging, such as the relationship between place and growing one's community connections, being aware of one's surroundings including ecology, and the reality of one's inner connection to place despite dominant discourses of subjective mental separation from external place. However, other features of these Indigenous literatures did not figure in students' awareness of belonging in place, such as the deeper connection between land and the actual teachings of the landscape (Marker, 2018). Students' senses of belonging appeared to differ from Indigenous senses of dwelling (Mika, 2015). For students it was often the case that "home is just wherever I am," whereas for Indigenous peoples, very specific landscapes and ecologies are often formative for worldview, cognition, and identity (Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998; Marker, 2018)—even when a set of places comprises a migratory cycle (Deloria, 1975). From Western literature, Adler (1998; Carlson et al., 2005) can be cited as a paradigmatic example of the role of belonging in community. Students clearly advocated a compatible perspective, such that belonging is foundational to existence as a person in a place. With respect to power, as defined by Wildcat and Deloria (2001) as a sum of existential and metaphysical influences in effect on a person in a given place, students seemed to advocate something with a limited resonance: "when I think of a place in the world I think of personally the sense of purpose that I’ve created in my life. Which is related to where I am, in a literal place sense but also my sense of place and my sense of like being somewhere that I’m supposed to be or not supposed to be." Here we see a perspective on place as purpose in conjunction with location that is found in some Indigenous senses of place-ness (e.g., Peacock & Wisuri, 2006), although this is without their larger metaphysical frameworks, or is associated with students' other cultural worldviews.Belonging to LandStudents' appreciation of the connection between land and human life and health seems like a point of tentative commonality with Indigenous Knowledge traditions (Brayboy & Maughn, 2009). Indeed, students credited learning about Indigenous Knowledges in developing this appreciation. I argue further that students' longing for a sense of place that lines up with a real land is an expression of a desire for social and mental connection (place) to be reunited with landscape and ecology (land), a desire that is caused by the social 152dislocation of capitalism (Alexander, 2000) and more broadly, by modernist industrialism and abstract and escapist enlightenment philosophy (Illich, 1973/2001). Indigenous authors argue that this longing is fulfilled in traditional Indigenous wisdoms and lifeways, specifically calling on nonindigenous peoples to appreciate the value of these points for their own cultural betterment and ecological sustainability (Deloria, 1975; Peacock & Wisuri, 2006). Nonindigenous authors have nascently taken these points up already (Naess, 2010). However, the degree to which spiritual power, as associated with place (Wildcat & Deloria, 2001), is appreciated by students and secular nonindigenous authors is uncertain.Institutional Relationship to LandThere was somewhat of a lesser degree of merging of horizons in this theme, and so a coherent narrative of meaning was difficult to uncover. It is possible that students coming from divergent prior schools and faculties had different points of reference. While I merged horizons with each participant during interviews, an overall merging of horizons was not achieved here, leaving a multifarious product which may or may not be informative.Place is a Personal and Social Connection Whereas Land is a Location, Earth, or SoilAgain, students detailed the inner significance of connection to places, noting their emotional aspects, how they are touched by places, how they have a mental space for them. Wildcat and Deloria's (2001) formulation of Indigenous traditions as combining a sense of place with a sense of ontological power again goes beyond what students describe, and yet students do seem to be reaching towards a deeper significance of place that transcends societal narratives of (Kantian/Cartesian) subject-object duality and mechanical views of nature. As the expert notes above, my suggestion here is an instance of analysis that goes underneath students' speech acts. Similarly, students described the intersubjectively shared aspects of place, a viewpoint compatible with phenomenological realism (Duarte, 2015; Heidegger, 1927/2010; Spinoza & Hampshire, 1677/2005), specifically the idealist Greek notion of truth as uncovering the real (which is then shared). It should be mentioned, however, that an abstract understanding of idealism is critiqued by some Indigenous authors as characteristic of Western culture (Deloria, 1999b). Nevertheless, is it notable that students here have made an observation about being through this phenomenological process, which is that place as personal connection, meaning, and emotional connection does not negate the 153social nature of place and shared experience.Taught by MigrationStudents related that being taught by migration and travel was an important way their worldviews were formed. This seems like a point where Indigenous values differ, being focused on teaching arising from specific lands one dwells in—that is, some Indigenous Knowledges concern metaphysical teachings arising from staying in one ancestral land (Deloria, 1975). Such Indigenous philosophies hold that worldview develops within communities that include relationships with particular places and landscapes (Thiong’o, 1986; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001). Even traditional tribal migrations seem to comprise a limited set of known lands. In contrast, students' identify the specifically trans-cultural experience of moving between places as instructive for their worldviews. Possibly this is a phenomenon more related to Indigenous senses of intercultural learning, cultural fluidity, and epistemological pluralism (Ahenakew, 2014). However, there may also be a commonality between diverse students' migration paths affected by social dislocation and Indigenous colonial dislocation from lands—a commonality of the effects of social dislocation.Lack of Support for Diversity and Cultural CompetenceMetatheme SummaryOn beginning their programs, students expected more cultural and contextual sensitivity from their departments than they found. Findings here suggest that they were not given the tools for this and that they desired this training. Students employed a variety of modulations of their ways of being in the presence of power differentials at school. Under supervision, students found a lack of, and a desire for, diverse orientations. Culturally diverse professors facilitated diverse students' inclusion, yet non-diverse professors predominated. Students identified a need to learn on their own, supplement official curriculum, and adapt curriculum on their own to contexts diverse in culture and Indigeneity. Diverse students felt like they and their worldviews are under the gun, which made them feel inauthentic and cast out.General RemarksResults here suggest that diverse students were engaged in different strategies to deal with a lack of cultural diversity in curriculum, faculty, theoretical orientation, and 154supervision, and that this was related to a lack of provision of cultural competency training. Students identified that this lack of cultural diversity and lack of cultural competency included a lack of Indigenous faculty and Indigeneity competency. Simply put, students wanted a culturally informed and diverse education that supplied them with the skills and knowledges to be culturally competent clinicians who are also able to work with Indigenous peoples. A decolonized counsellor education or counselling psychology program would provide Indigeneity competence alongside Indigenous curricular presence. It would, according to Indigenous modes of respectful engagement with other traditions including Indigenous epistemological pluralism (Ahenakew, 2014), provide space for diverse cultural traditions such as those brought by students. An ecology of knowledge paradigm (Naess, 2010) might also be a useful way to organize educational spaces in this vein.Nonindigenous students who are diverse in worldview with respect to their institution share some struggles with Indigenous peoples such as having one's worldview not represented in faculty and curriculum and being attacked as invalid in class and supervision (e.g., Bang et al., 2013; Wong et al., 2013). Some nonindigenous diverse students may also share with Indigenous students cultural norms of non-confrontation and respecting teachers. These norms interacted with abuses of intellectual power (Battiste, 1986, 1998; Carnoy, 1974), resulting in doubting one's culture, one's self, and feeling like an outcast. However, this may be an incorrect interpretation of these results, and as students point out, it may rather be that these cultural norms discouraged diverse students from challenging teachers in ways that would have been welcomed. However, commonalities in experiences of epistemic exclusion and power differentials between diverse nonindigenous students and Indigenous students may help support the case for a decolonization of counsellor education and counselling psychology programs. This would not be in service of a reduction of Indigenous decolonial concerns to a multicultural specialty, but rather a support for issues of land, history, worldview, and politics of Indigeneity in the curriculum. It seems possible from my research here that any such decolonization would be welcomed by diverse nonindigenous counselling students in western Canada. And again, Indigenous modes of engagement of diverse traditions would serve to provide an educational space that would benefit all parties.155Dealing With Power in the InstitutionStudents advocated for diversity issues in class and with faculty, trying to be careful and not offend anyone. Only two participants supported this advocacy subtheme with direct quotes, but I extrapolate and suggest the possibility that they helped reveal something general which was the desire to represent oneself—in this advocacy subtheme students spoke out, whereas in the other dealing-with-power subtheme students kept concerns to themselves out of cultural norms of humility or out of questioning oneself. The difference between students who spoke out and students who questioned themselves may be related to cultural norms, or it may be related to different types and amounts of power different students had in their positionality in relation to professors in terms of culture and class. Nevertheless, even among those who spoke out there was a strong feeling of unease and alienation.A cultural value of not questioning one's elders was a part of these dynamics “—the different worldview of not being able to challenge the system or challenge my elders or challenge the norm. Cause like no one stopped me from trying the things I wanted to try. But I wonder how much of that was me not trying because of how I learned education works and how I interpret the faculty-student dynamic.” Here it bears asking whether the cultural norms referred to are inserted by imperial influences to effect submission, as Bourdieau (2002) argues with respect to gender subservience norms that are “in the water” (as the expert says) of the culture. I wonder whether students may have conflated traditional cultural sources with imperial cultural effects, but it could just as easily not be the case—I am unable to say with the present methodology, as the expert notes.Desire for Diverse OrientationsDiverse students found a bias towards person-centered theory in curriculum and supervision. They also discussed political analyses of this bias, some seeing it as a reflection of an emancipatory perspective on individual rights and expression at the expense of appreciating collectivity and traditional cultures, and some seeing it as related to a conservative reluctance to deal with socio-historical context. These disparate accounts did not cohere within the analysis and so are related here in the discussion as a hypothetical synthesis; these two interpretations may share a critique of individualist anti-traditionalism, which is to say, enlightenment philosophical-political influences on psychotherapy. Both 156interpretations express a value for traditional cultures and a wish for curricular and supervisory theory that does not quash these. This is more of an extended analysis of an area where there was a lack of merging of horizons between participants in interviews, but then later a merging of horizons between myself and the texts. It is notable that Indigenous scholars have also critiqued both the notion of individual liberty within Western liberalism and enlightenment philosophy, and the notion of liberation within Western liberation movements (Grande, 2008; Smith, 2012a; cf. Duran et al., 2008).As a note on methodological rigour, one subtheme here was deleted in its entirety as it failed to demonstrate a merging of horizons and a revealing of something coherent—it contained incoherently mixed ideas of wanting solution focused counselling not to be demonized as it is more human, seeing counselling as a humanity, and curriculum missing solution focused theory due to focus on the person centered orientation. The remaining coherent subthemes were merged into the single present theme.One's Own Culture or Diversity and its Relationship With Counselling and OrientationsMetatheme SummaryDiverse students became aware of their own diversities as they grew up, and as they engaged in counsellor education and counselling psychology programs. Students' worldviews were formed by family and as students interfaced with multiple cultures throughout life. Students' worldviews related to their choices of the career of counselling and of theoretical orientations, and experiencing inner reactions played a part in these choices. Students' worldviews were affected by hardships and observing others' hardships and injustices. They drew from different critical schools of thought in forming their worldviews. They also developed their worldviews in counsellor education and counselling psychology programs. Students' worldviews were a complex set of shifting and dynamic layers. General RemarksWorldview was developed in family and by migration to and from lands. Students built worldview through their own roots and this worldview was the reason for their career choice of counselling and for their subsequent resonance or antipathy towards different theoretical orientations within counselling. Appreciating the role of students' existing 157investments in culturally informed choices of orientation will help future efforts to decolonize counsellor education and counselling psychology programs; I argue that it should be possible to build on students' cultural grounding within counselling toward increased cultural groundedness with work with other cultures and Indigenous peoples. Being more deeply rooted in one culture increases one's ability to be open to other cultures (Clegg, 2018b). This is in contrast to the mythology of Western modernity which seeks to liberate one from all culture to achieve freedom in an apparently neutral transcendence (Andreotti, 2014).It is also evident that students' worldviews were not simply a single belief position, but rather are a complex set of shifting and dynamic social and ecological layers from different cultures and lands. I note here, in tentative parallel, an Indigenous way of understanding layers of difference coexisting in a place, and the fertile mixing of differences over time—the natural phenomenon of the alluvial fan of sediments washed down a river in successive layers on its delta, bringing in new nutrients and elements, layers partly mixing, and partly remaining separate (Marker, 2019). Diverse students seem, then, to both be complex layered beings, and bring fertile new elements to any educational environment. An educational space which appreciates this (e.g., Ahenakew, 2014) would be facilitated in achieving both presence of cultural knowledges in curriculum and development of an attitude towards cross-cultural work generally, as is echoed in multicultural counselling scholarship (D. W. Sue, 1982), and as students express a desire for in this research.Appreciation for Institution's WorldviewIn coexistence with the above critiques, students also appreciated when they could fit in, they were grateful for their programs and their own development within them, and they valued their institutions' different worldviews. As the expert noted in his consultation, this is important to recognize. While the study's research questions and derived interview questions gave room for critiques of institutional realities, students frequently interspersed such notes of appreciation within their critiques. These many instances of appreciation had a similar character which is why they form a single theme in the analysis here, and yet it is a notable feature as there is a conceptual difference from the critiques. Again, the methodology is unable to distinguish how much appreciation is a result of cultural norms of acquiescence and 158politeness, or due to the power differential between participants and researcher in the interviews, or the ever present power differential between students and their institutions even given the anonymity of the study.Students Enjoy the Reflective Research ProcessThe interview guide had a final question checking in with participants about how they now understood land and place after their discussions. I found that in the interviews much productive dialogue on this subject occurred spontaneously, with students relating how questions of worldview and land had often been on their minds for some time and related to aspects of their professional and personal histories. The follow up question was very interpersonally awkward as it was obviously redundant, and I removed it from the guide. The present theme happens to answer in the affirmative the question of whether these considerations have an effect on students.Students expressed their interest in the conversational interviews and the discussions of place and land with respect to their worldviews and differences in worldviews with their institutions. The presence of this theme is not simply a demonstration of my success as an interviewer—certainly students' comments could merely be pleasantries—but rather suggests that students may find these kinds of discussions useful to them, and defrays concerns that such discussions are too vaguely framed or diffuse to be engaging. The grounding of discussions in the realities of place and land is both an affirming result with promising suggestions for decolonizing curriculum, and an affirmation of the choice of this Gadamerian epistemology to treat the realism of the issues in a way that is also not merely abstractly cognitive (Deloria, 1999a).The Importance of FeelingsDeloria (Wildcat & Deloria, 2001) argues that Western professionals who isolate their feelings from their work do injury to their personhood. This appears not to be the case with diverse students here who showed the vital role played by feelings and emotions in making major decisions about their life course such as career and theoretical orientation. Students' feelings and emotions related to many of the themes. With respect to Indigenous land and history of Indigenous dispossession, students felt guilt, a responsibility to the environment, privilege, and a connection between health and land. Belonging in place and land related to 159many feelings of connection, disconnection, longing-for-belonging, and again health. Distant places felt like home and students maintained emotional connections to places. Students felt both connections and disconnections with institutional land in relation to the institution's own relations with land. Students felt a lack of rootedness and attachment to place and land. In relation to their desire for protection of their worldviews and support for diverse orientations within the institution, students felt invalidated by the dominant environment, making them feel under the gun, scrutinized, outcasted, and inauthentic, and in turn, felt validated by diverse professors, making them feel like they belong. Students use their feelings to guide choices of career and theoretical orientation, particularly to find out when an orientation fits well with their larger cultural worldview of self and clients. It seems clear from these points that diverse counselling students are not detached from their feelings and emotions in their professional conduct.TrustworthinessFleming, Gaidys, and Robb's (2003) articulation of a Gadamerian hermeneutic method includes suggestions for establishing trustworthiness. Accordingly, the current study has mapped out procedural stages and processes (see Figure 1 at the end of this chapter) to support auditability, has provided examples of merging horizons in transcript excerpts, has extensively use participants' quotes to establish credibility, and has supported confirmability through employing iterations of the hermeneutic circle within interview conversations and through engaging participant feedback on transcript interpretations. Certain epistemological and study-specific limitations are discussed below as well as in the expert consultation above.ConclusionResults of this study have relevance to the work of scholars and practitioners who deliver and determine curriculum and pedagogy in counsellor education and counselling psychology programs (Wong et al., 2013), and more broadly to other areas of professional training such as medical education (Phillips & Clarke, 2012), and teacher education (Ruitenberg, 2011). They may also have applications in analyses of embedded metaphysics in other domains of psychology such as school psychology or clinical or experimental psychology (e.g., Hill et al., 2010). This study also informs efforts of Indigenous decolonial scholars to understand the state and character of the topology of metaphysical positions 160within our field and the ways that nonindigenous students encounter institutions. As noted at the outset, this may aid in future efforts to decolonize curriculum and pedagogy in counsellor education and counselling psychology programs. This project may also affirm, inform, and support the experiences of new students who find themselves navigating differences in worldview in their educational and career journeys.Career AccessThe results here demonstrate a significant concern with educational exclusion of non-dominant worldviews and metaphysics (Carnoy, 1974). Students diverse in worldview (and in other ways as well), documented the difficulties they must traverse intelligently and diplomatically, and related the strategies and protections that they used to survive. Students' programs were professional programs and it should not be forgotten that learning here is not a purely academic enterprise—it is a gateway to employment, and the gate is not raised unless students demonstrate compliance with dominant worldviews (for an Indigenous analysis, see Battiste, 1986, 1998). Blustein's (2006) psychology of working includes education as a stage of career development precisely because it is this gateway to employment. His critical career theory shows the social justice issues involved in educational exclusion as career exclusion. This epistemological issue is also an issue of economic justice.Cultural and Indigeneity CompetenceDiverse nonindigenous students in Canadian counsellor education and counselling psychology programs desired multicultural and Indigeneity competence as well as cultural knowledge. The need for such curriculum has been stated long ago in terms of ethnic minorities: counseling and clinical psychology . . . have failed to meet the particular mental health needs of ethnic minorities (from the Dulles Conference, 1978; Korman, 1973; and D. W. Sue, 1981). Most graduate programs give inadequate treatment to mental health issues of ethnic minorities (McFadden & Wilson, Note 2). Cultural influences affecting personality formation and the manifestation of behavior disorders are infrequently part of mental health training programs. (D. W. Sue, 1982, p. 48)Even in 1982, this call was broadened to include intersectional diversities, Indigenous peoples, and diverse practitioners (not just clients). The present research details the 161importance of support for diverse views within clinical supervision and research supervision in counsellor education and counselling psychology programs, agreeing with prior research (Wong et al., 2013). However, counsellor education and counselling psychology in some places has not heeded these calls when it comes to core curriculum, sanctioned epistemology, pedagogical environments, and development of theory (R. D. Goodman & Gorski, 2015). Multiculturalism as a solution to this has been hampered by its inclusion as a desirable but optional specialty, as students here related. Furthermore, superficial and non-critical multiculturalisms that ignore history and politics, such as those of land and Indigeneity, are impediments to true cultural presence in curriculum and to decolonization of counsellor education and counselling psychology (Stewart et al., 2017). Some may reason that decolonized curriculum may alienate students (St. Denis, 2011), yet results here show that it is students who have requested such curriculum, knowing very well that it is critical for their future being as competent and ethical practitioners—indeed it appears they have striven to do this learning on their own.Concerns of Land and BelongingThe results demonstrate that it was clearly not the case that nonindigenous diverse students had no relationship to land or did not think about relationship to land. Nor was it true that they were unaware of Indigenous peoples and issues of Indigenous land and Indigenous relationships to land. Diverse students' understandings of worldview, culture, land, and Indigeneity were critical, historically conscious, and passionately felt, even when aspirational and growing. These understandings provide strong support for subsequent programs of decolonizing education in counselling by establishing the roots and resources from which to support nonindigenous students entry into decolonial curricula as whole beings. This research supports this claim in the case of diverse students, and future research may fill in the blanks for non-diverse students. Diverse students are ready, willing, and able to build their relationships with land in new ways through desired curricular changes along decolonial and critically pluralistic lines that will increase their educational inclusion at schools, better prepare them for work across diverse groups and within Canadian landscapes.162LimitationsLimits of the HermeneuticOne central limitation of the present hermeneutic study was the across-participant analysis. Regardless of whether this is necessary for Gadamerian hermeneutics—and by my reading it was, as a specific individual was not the object of study but rather a general social phenomenon—this is the kind of hermeneutic I engaged in, and therefore there was a loss of the inclusion of rich narratives particular to each individual. One could argue that this is a part of the program of phenomenology in the tradition of Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger, but it is still a clear loss of meaningful stories.The present hermeneutic study was also not a perfect match for the Indigenous decolonial ontology. For example, the present hermeneutic's philosophy is founded on an escape from plain experience towards the transcendental idea (Hegel, 1807/1979); Indigenous Knowledge traditions seem to have a more thorough-going valuing of the details of experience (Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998). Please see Appendix E for more considerations of compatibility.While I used Fleming, Gaidys, and Robb's (2003) Gadamerian method which included a thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), it is possible that the thematic analysis was too mechanistic or methodological for Gadamer's anti-method stance (Shin, 1994).Finally, my caution in representing my own thoughts during the conversational interviews may have limited my full participation in the Gadamerian hermeneutic circle. My aim was to try to temper the already strong framing advanced on the conversation by the research milieu, recruitment materials, and interview questions. However, it might have been more fruitful of a discussion had I involved my own thoughts and experiences more fully.Truth as UncoveringThe Gadamerian position is that any truth is a partial revealing and a partial concealing of reality. As such, the present work, in line with much qualitative work (Braun & Clarke, 2013), does not seek to completely reveal a phenomenon in its entirety in a way that can allow complete prediction or control. Rather, the present epistemology is related to my own involvement and reflexivity, and produces an account that hopefully can inform ongoing development of understanding. Furthermore, without understanding the contextual nature of 163the findings related here, one could easily use these results to cover over reality in another context. Whether results are useful in other contexts is yet to be seen—for example other countries or areas, ages, or types of students. In a related vein, the phenomena of study here are all multifaceted. I make no claim to a thorough knowledge or discovery of any totality, while still attempting to describe phenomena holistically.Confirmation BiasesIn cases where I have confirmed my original suspicions, I consider the possibility of my failure to overcome my initial prejudices. For example, in my initial proposal I theorized there would be a pressure for rehearsal of worldview, and indeed this was represented in results such as in the theme of being under the gun. Whether my initial understandings were simply confirmed, or whether I failed to be adequately open to the reality of the phenomena can only be evaluated by the details provided here from my conversations with students. Whether I unintentionally and subtly persuaded students to agree with me, I cannot say, but I can say that students were clearly passionate about these topics themselves and volunteered, not only for the study, but with their emotionally charged experiences and examples with little need for invitation. Unfortunately, many identifying examples and details have been left out of the report which would make it more concrete and compelling.Conflation With Uncritical MulticulturalismAccording to the most radical voices in Indigenous decolonial literature, the present project's investigation of nonindigenous students' experiences of worldview exclusion can be seen as too close to equating the multicultural or human rights approach to educational inclusion with Indigenous decolonization, risking a metaphorization of decolonization and therefore could be invalid and counterproductive, or a tool of further settler entrenchment. Tuck and Yang (2012) point out that “describing all struggles against imperialism as ‘decolonizing’ creates a convenient ambiguity between decolonization and social justice work” (p. 17). In response to this charge, I follow Deloria's (1975; Wildcat & Deloria, 2001) account of all peoples developing relationship to land over time. I also explicitly differentiate between Indigenous and nonindigenous within the work, and while I see some similar dynamics at play in exclusion in educational settings and promulgation of globalized norms of humanness operating between the two groups, I do not equate the two classes of issues. 164Nevertheless, I think that an analysis of nonindigenous students and their experiences with Canadian education in terms of worldview, being, and metaphysics can be useful material to inform further decolonial analysis of these institutions.My Own ProcessTwo specific issues of my own process are relevant here. While this study aimed to involve the decolonial priority of the politics of specific lands including types of relationships to these, there was an ironic absence of specific lands in the necessarily cross-participant analysis and the de-identified reporting of results. These measures were taken to protect participants, but this rendered the experience of producing knowledge to be oddly land-less and de-placed. The land-based initial conversations were nicely grounded with participants, and our memories of lands served discussions well. However, not only did I not visit many of the places students talked of, I did not even visit my home lands or even my present area outside my door with as much frequency while writing—something I felt acutely as a landscape painter who temporarily swayed into portrait drawing. Similarly, while these conversations were grounded in land in a way that avoided abstract intellectualizing, the processes of analyzing and reporting caused periods of extreme abstraction in my own mind. What effects these factors have on the knowledge produced I can not say. For myself I have returned to landscape painting, but also have begun admitting human-made structures into my previously very human-less natural depiction. Perhaps this is part of my journey in reconciling land and place (e.g., Spence, 1996).Researcher's Future QuestionsParticipants saw themselves as on journeys of development or discovery of the self’s relationship to land and to histories of the land. These included aspirations to be on such a journey, and included the negative form of wishing one could discover a different relationship with land. Future work could be devoted to these topics exclusively.It would be valuable to investigate how students' longing for belonging prefigures a mode of being where place and land would line up—place as human connection and land as physical and ecological. Does this longing correspond to something realized in traditional Indigenous ways of life (Deloria, 1975; Kawagley & Barnhardt, 1998), or are these desires fundamentally different?165Future work could also study subgroups of nonindigenous diverse students such as white European-Canadian students, Asian-Canadian students, or separate those of recent migration paths from those of distant or domestic migration paths. For example, one could disentangle differences between conservative earlier generations in a family’s migration history and sometimes less traditional subsequent generations. How do these changes relate to desire for counselling orientations toward individual interior work versus navigating external contexts of life? Is it the case that some diverse students want diverse orientations for individual emancipatory reasons, whereas others want this for traditional cultural reasons? And does this difference relate to particular cultures or rather to differences in migratory pathways? How do power and oppression figure in these considerations? The present analysis was unable to answer these questions clearly.Future research could also work with students who have worldviews similar to their academy, investigating their relationships to land and development of worldview.Participants' Recommendations for Research and CurriculaIn addition to the themes reported on above which arise from the hermeneutic methodology, in our discussions students provided cogent analyses and constructive and useful points that bear repeating here as anecdotes. I make no claim to methodological rigour with respect to reporting these points, except to say that I would like to provide the space to include the voices of students where they made specifically valuable conceptual contributions in addition to the above.Students implied that they would like a critical historical lesson on land and politics of relating to land when coming to university, in part for those who aren't thinking about this yet: “if you’re actually invested, if you want the students to be invested in that land as an, and really emotionally acknowledge the significance of you know how privileged we are to be on that land, to learn on that land, use it the way we use it, um ... there’s no history, like there’s no history lesson there. You know for an international student coming, they don’t know what you’re talking about. I don’t know that they care to look it up themselves.”In addition to a desire for cultural competency and cultural perspectives in their curricula, students recommended curriculum addressing how to educate themselves about different cultures: “I believe that it is not a person of minority's responsibility to teach or 166educate counselling professionals who work with minority populations. The onus is on the counselling professional to actively seek out learning opportunities. However, I believe the school has some responsibility as they are educating counselling professionals and are in some ways the gatekeepers of those entering professions that have the potential to help or harm others. That's why I think it's important to have had more exposure to different cultures and been taught a framework/concrete example of how one could go about educating themselves about different cultures in order to better serve their clients.” Students wanted to be in partnership with their institutions in this learning: “the biggest concern [is] about . . . how it plays into the work we do. And ultimately although I do the best I can to do my own education, and of course it is my responsibility to educate myself as a practitioner, . . . hoping that that could’ve been something I could’ve been like in collaboration with, with the institution I have chosen.” They recommended such curricula address key points, cultural perspectives, and starting points for their own reading: “by virtue of the way we’ve structured our society, having universities being like this source of knowledge, this source of achievement; . . . we’ve obviously somehow decided that this is a really important part of us being able to develop as types of practitioners, as people in the world. . . . the implication is that we do need other people’s help to learn and, and that these are experts who can be helping us to learn and guiding us and directing us. And so in that sense, although yeah I have to be the one to read the paper, . . . it’d be a lot easier if I had people . . . being like 'here’s where to start, because it’s a big messy world out there,' or like 'here are a couple key things you might just want to be starting out with if you can't do everything.'”167Figure 1Procedure Flow Chart168General ConclusionThe Project Overall and Benefits for EducatorsThese three projects constitute part of a precursor to a curricular package. They are partial in that they are by no means sufficient or comprehensively representative of what a decolonization of counselling curriculum might look like, but holistic in that they each relate to the overall meaning of being a counsellor or counsellor educator. In my view, a counsellor is a being in relation to land, peoples, histories, and knowledge traditions, and is conscious of power and its abuses. This dissertation shows that there is room for, strategic places of insertion of, and student willingness to absorb decolonized curriculum and pedagogy in Canadian counsellor education and Canadian counselling psychology generally. I have aimed to show how counsellor educators and counselling psychology educators can be free from specific powerful influences that seek to determine our field for us against our values of listening, respecting, and being affected by who we are in the presence of. We are invited to receive the gift of Indigenous values, knowledges, and philosophies with gracious hospitality (Kuokkanen, 2008). These knowledges benefit us by broadening the conceptions of humanity we use to educate our students and clients, and by deepening our stories of what this education is and has been. That this can be done and should be done in the overall field, not just as a cultural specialty, is a pressing concern. I have, in each of these projects, identified places of action—action on the level of theory that is taught every day, and action on the level of pedagogical behaviour.Professors who are diverse themselves, and who can protect the diversities of students' worldviews are an important part of existing supports. However, the field itself, in general, per se, can and should decolonize its primary pedagogical and curricular operations. This can be done by listening to Indigenous scholars and to others who have recommended decolonization of the discipline for some time (Duran, 2006; R. D. Goodman & Gorski, 2015; Stewart et al., 2017), and by pursuing the avenues I have identified in this work. Part of the drive of my projects was to demonstrate that this does not, for the most part, mean turning our backs on realism, logic, philosophy of science, science itself, or other mainstays of 169disciplinary identity, but rather means broadening and deepening our ideas of them such that we understand their inherent pluralities and limitations.To be specific, I will recapitulate some take-home messages. I hope that counsellor educators and counselling psychology professors walk away from this dissertation with the following key benefits:• A release from hegemonic authorities that distort our values, such as narrow ideas of cognition in intelligence research, and outdated ethnocentric epistemological stories of the creation of our field• A loosening of the parochial, provincial, and proprietary rigidity of our notions of our disciplinary boundaries• New ways to be open to place-based metaphysics that stem from our traditions of listening rather from a distant, uncritical, and radical cultural relativism that prevents engagement• Evidence suggesting that counselling students with diverse backgrounds enter education with existing relationships with land that can be leveraged toward decolonized education, and with rich cultural tapestries that can be a boon to pluralistic educational environments and a relief from the burden of unilateral curriculum development (Freire, 1970)• An affirmation of the importance of support for diverse viewpoints in counsellor education and counselling psychology programs• A demonstration of what it can look like to deeply listen to Indigenous intellectual traditions in a way that has direct ramifications for core psychological theory and educational practice• An illustration of the usefulness of critical educational scholarship within counselling psychology and counsellor education• The insight that the Indigenous decolonial emphasis on being over epistemology yields a fruitful reinvigoration of the central concern of being that is found in sources the critical psychology of working is built on (Blustein, 2006; e.g., Freire, 1968/2000)• Specific sites of critique that educators can take action on immediately and clear ways forward from these problems toward rich educational opportunities170• The revelation that Indigenous critiques of Western education do not burden Westerners with extraneous cultural biases (St. Denis, 2011) but rather offer important gifts to the academy and solve pressing questions of professional relevance and human survival (Kuokkanen, 2008)Reflections on the ProcessMy Own ProcessDuring the process of conducting this research I both came into contact with concrete places and people and drew back from all concrete reality into an abstract mode of being. I note this because of its irony and problematics. When doing interviews, I felt very connected to the people I met and to the journeys through different lands they described. Some places were familiar to me and others wholly unknown, yet their relaying of their stories connected me to something grounded in the realities of their experiences. Even so, when I spent time selecting, researching, and justifying in writing my approaches, terminologies, and philosophies, I felt more and more disconnected from reality and living in an abstract space. I appreciated this as well at times, particularly as I got deeper into different philosophies that connected to something transcendentally real, but otherwise spent most of this time in despair at a lack of connection to land. Seeing the