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Walking the talk? Examining the EU and China's claims to climate leadership in the negotiation and implementation… Chapman, Alexandra 2020

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WALKING THE TALK? EXAMINING THE EU AND CHINA’S CLAIMS TO CLIMATE LEADERSHIP IN THE NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT by  Alexandra Chapman  LLB., The University of Bristol, 2011  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF LAWS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES   THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  June 2020  © Alexandra Chapman, 2020   ii  The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the thesis entitled:  Walking the Talk? Examining the EU and China's claims to Climate Leadership in the Negotiation and Implementation of the Paris Agreement   submitted by Alexandra Chapman in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws in Law  Examining Committee: Stepan Wood, Peter A. Allard School of Law Supervisor  Maziar Peihani, Peter A. Allard School of Law Supervisory Committee Member  iii  Abstract  We are in the midst of a climate emergency: the necessity for global cooperation to ensure that the world succeeds in limiting global warming has never been clearer. Through the adoption of the Paris Agreement, 197 parties signalled their commitment to decisive action on climate change. But its success will depend on how this momentum can be carried forward. In light of a U.S. withdrawal in 2020, the EU and China have sought to promote their credibility as climate leaders on the world stage. The objective of this thesis is to assess the claims of the EU and China to climate leadership, in both the negotiation and implementation of the Paris Agreement. Drawing from leadership theory, I argue that a strengthened partnership between the two will be beneficial for both in terms of their capability and credibility. China possesses the structural power that the EU no longer enjoys, but the EU, by virtue of its leadership experience, holds the credibility for unilateral and intellectual leadership that China is lacking as an emerging leader. In the latter half of the paper, I extend my application of leadership theory to the leadership role of the EU and China in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Drawing from the regime effectiveness literature, I suggest approaches for measuring the goal achievement of leaders in implementation. My research shows that leadership by example will be necessary due to the design of the implementation mechanisms, but that measuring goal achievement presents challenges. Illustrative of this, an assessment of the EU and China’s Nationally Determined Contributions demonstrates that they are at best “insufficient” to meet the 1.5°C goal of the Paris Agreement.  This thesis responds to a gap in the literature on leadership which focuses on regime formation, but not regime implementation. It also contributes towards literature that has begun to understand the role of multiple leadership actors. How the Paris Agreement will ensure successful global action on climate change is a critical question for our generation. It is important that putative climate leaders are held to account for their role in this by the academic community.      iv  Lay Summary  We are currently living through a climate emergency. We urgently need governments around the globe to act on the commitments they made in the Paris Agreement to reduce global warming. But the United States will withdraw from the agreement in 2020. As the U.S. exits, the importance of the EU and China as leaders in the climate regime increases. Recently, they have publicly stated their intention to continue and strengthen their leadership roles. This thesis examines what these statements mean, firstly, by examining if and how the EU and China have shown leadership on climate previously; and secondly, by exploring what climate leadership will look like as the Paris Agreement is implemented. This paper contributes towards research that is investigating how the Paris Agreement will ensure successful action on climate change. Given the magnitude of the task facing us, it is important that those claiming leadership are held to account. v   Preface  This thesis is the original, unpublished, independent work of Alexandra Chapman. vi  Table of Contents  Abstract ....................................................................................................................................................... iii  Lay Summary .............................................................................................................................................. iv  Preface ......................................................................................................................................................... v  Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................................... vi  List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................. x Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................... xi  CHAPTER 1: The Puzzle of Climate Leadership ...................................................................................... 1 1.1 Introduction: Collective Action in the Face of Climate Emergency .............................................. 1 1.2 Investigating Climate Leadership ................................................................................................ 6 1.2.1 Research Questions ................................................................................................................ 7 1.2.2 Breaking New Ground ............................................................................................................. 8 1.2.2.1 Leadership in Implementation ........................................................................................ 8 1.2.2.2 Joint Leadership ............................................................................................................. 9 1.2.2.3 Interdisciplinary Approach .............................................................................................. 9 1.2.2.4 Timeliness ..................................................................................................................... 10 1.2.3 A Renewable Energy Focus .................................................................................................. 11 1.3 Outline of the Thesis .................................................................................................................. 11  CHAPTER 2: Theory .................................................................................................................................. 14  2.1 Introduction: The Nature of Global Public Goods ...................................................................... 14 2.2 Part I: A Brief History of Collective Action Theory ..................................................................... 16 2.2.1 Garett Hardin ......................................................................................................................... 16  2.2.2 Mancur Olson ........................................................................................................................ 17 2.2.3 The Free-Rider Problem ........................................................................................................ 18 2.3 Application to the Climate Regime: the Kyoto Protocol ............................................................. 19 2.4 Elinor Ostrom and the Paris Agreement .................................................................................... 21 2.5 Part II: Leadership theory .......................................................................................................... 24  vii  2.5.1 Introduction: What Role does Leadership play in Regime Formation? ................................. 24 2.5.2 The Definition of Leadership ................................................................................................. 25 2.5.3 The Leader ............................................................................................................................ 26  2.5.4 The Followers ........................................................................................................................ 27  2.5.5 The Objective or Goal of Leadership .................................................................................... 27 2.6 Leadership Modes ..................................................................................................................... 28  2.6.1 Structural Leadership ............................................................................................................ 31  2.6.2 Entrepreneurial Leadership ................................................................................................... 32 2.6.3 Intellectual Leadership .......................................................................................................... 33 2.6.4 Leadership Through Unilateral Action ................................................................................... 35 2.6.5 A Note on Credibility and Capability ...................................................................................... 35 CHAPTER 3: How Was Leadership Exercised in the Negotiation of the Paris Agreement? ............. 38 3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 38  3.2 Part I: UNFCCCC and the Kyoto Protocol ................................................................................. 40 3.2.1 EU leadership 1990 – 2009 ................................................................................................... 40 3.2.2 China’s Presence in the International Climate Regime 1990s - 2009................................... 45 3.3 Part II: From Copenhagen to Paris ............................................................................................ 48 3.3.1 The Copenhagen Accord ...................................................................................................... 48 3.3.2 The EU in Paris ..................................................................................................................... 50 3.3.3 China in Paris ........................................................................................................................ 55  3.4 Part III: Leadership by Example (Unilateral Leadership) ........................................................... 57 3.4.1 EU Renewable Energy Law and Policy ................................................................................. 57 3.4.1.1 The Renewable Energy Directive 2009/2001/EU ......................................................... 60 3.4.2 China’s Renewable Energy Law and Policy .......................................................................... 61 3.4.2.1 The ‘Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China (Renewable Energy Law) 63 3.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 65  CHAPTER 4: Leadership in the Implementation of the Paris Agreement ........................................... 68 viii  4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 68  4.2 Part I: Credibility: Insights from a Study on Climate Followers .................................................. 69 4.3 Current Capability and Credibility of the EU and China ............................................................ 71 4.3.1 The Evolution of the EU’s Climate Leadership as a Mature Climate Leader ........................ 71 4.3.1.1 Declining Structural leadership ..................................................................................... 71 4.3.1.2 Strong intellectual leadership ....................................................................................... 72 4.3.1.3 Improved Entrepreneurial Leadership .......................................................................... 73 4.3.1.4 Strong Unilateral Leadership ........................................................................................ 73 4.3.2 Emergence of China’s leadership ......................................................................................... 74 4.3.2.1 Evolving Structural Leadership ..................................................................................... 74 4.3.2.2 Intellectual Leadership of Developing Countries .......................................................... 75 4.3.2.3 From Laggard to Leader in Entrepreneurial Leadership .............................................. 75 4.3.2.4 Emerging Unilateral Leadership ................................................................................... 76 4.3.3 Towards Joint Leadership? ................................................................................................... 77 4.3.3.1 Summary of Capability and Credibility .......................................................................... 77 4.3.3.2 Signs of a strengthened partnership since Paris? ........................................................ 79 4.4 Part II: Leadership in Implementation: Which Leadership Modes will be Most Effective? ........ 80 4.4.1 The Structure of Paris Agreement: Which Parts are Key to Implementation? ...................... 81 4.4.2 Nationally Determined Contributions ..................................................................................... 82 4.4.2.1 Leadership in Nationally Determined Contributions ..................................................... 83 4.4.3 Ratcheting up NDCs: Global Stocktake and Article 4 Interaction ......................................... 84 4.4.3.1 The Global Stocktake ................................................................................................... 85 4.4.3.2 Leadership in the Global Stocktake .............................................................................. 86 4.5 How Should Goal Achievement of Climate Leadership be Assessed in Regime implementation?...................................................................................................................................... 88  4.5.1 The Concept of ‘Directness’ .................................................................................................. 90 4.6 Part III: Measuring the Actions of the EU and China Since the Paris Agreement ..................... 90 4.6.1 Climate Action Tracker .......................................................................................................... 91 ix  4.6.2 Intellectual Leadership in the Green Energy Revolution ....................................................... 93 4.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 96  CHAPTER 5: Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 97  5.1 Contributions to the Literature ................................................................................................... 98 5.2 Concluding Remarks ................................................................................................................. 99  Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................ 102   x  List of Abbreviations  BASIC  Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, India and China CAT  Climate Action Tracker CCP  Chinese Communist Party CMA  Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement CO2  Carbon dioxide COP  Conference of Parties °C  Degrees Celsius EPA  Environmental Protection Agency  EU   European Union GHG  Greenhouse Gas  GtCO2e Gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent GST  Global Stocktake IPCC   Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  IRENA  International Renewable Energy Association NDC  Nationally Determined Contribution NDRC  National Development and Reform Commission NGO  Non-Governmental Organization NPC  National People’s Congress RED  Renewable Energy Directive UN  United Nations UNEP  United Nations Environment Program UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change U.S.  United States    xi  Acknowledgements  I would like to thank my supervisor, Stepan Wood, for his invaluable comments and suggestions over the last year and a half. I am also grateful to my second reader Maziar Peihani for his insightful remarks.    I am deeply appreciative of the faculty and staff at the Peter A. Allard School of Law, in particular Michelle LeBaron and Joanne Chung. I am also very grateful to my fellow course mates, Oludolapo Makinde, Carmelle Dieleman, Kaitlyn Cumming and Shannon Russell – thanks for a great year of learning!  I am extremely thankful for funding I received from the H M Hubbard Law Scholarship and the Peter A. Allard School of Law Graduate Scholarship.   Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their constant love and support in all my endeavours, and last (but most definitely not least) Tom, for being by my side every step of the way.     1   CHAPTER 1: The Puzzle of Climate Leadership “The EU and China consider climate action and the clean energy transition an imperative more important than ever. They confirm their commitments under the historic 2015 Paris Agreement and step up their co-operation to enhance its implementation.” EU-CHINA LEADERS’ STATEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLEAN ENERGY  Beijing, 16 July 20181  1.1 Introduction: Collective Action in the Face of Climate Emergency We are in the midst of a climate emergency. According to the most recent estimates by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), even if every state were to fully implement its pledges under the Paris Agreement,2 emissions would still be on track to reach 56 GtCO2e by 2030.3 This translates to a warming of 3.2°C above pre-industrial levels, over twice the aspirational goal of the Paris Agreement.4 Even half a degree of warming above that goal will significantly increase the risks of floods, drought, extreme heat and poverty for millions of people.5 To remain within 1.5°C of warming, the estimated “safe” limit using the best available science,6 global emissions need to be reduced by 7.6% every year from now until 2030.7  The IPCC Special Report released in October 8 2018 responded to an invitation from national governments at the twenty-first Conference of Parties (COP21) to assess the impacts of global  1 The European Commission, ‘EU-China Leader’s Statement on Climate Change and Energy’, (2018), online: EEAS <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/news/20180713_statement_en.pdf> accessed 24 June 2020. 2 Paris Agreement (Dec. 13, 2015), UNFCCC, COP Report No. 21, Addendum, at 21, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add, 1 (Jan. 29, 2016) [The Paris Agreement]. 3 United Nations Environment Programme, Emissions Gap Report 2019 (Nairobi, 2019) at XVIII. 4 Ibid at XIII. 5 Jonathan Watts, ‘We have 12 years to limit climate change catastophe, warns UN’, The Guardian (8 October 2018), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/08/global-warming-must-not-exceed-15c-warns-landmark-un-report> accessed 24 June 2020. 6 Matt McGrath, ‘What does 1.5C mean in a warming world?’, BBC News (2 October 2018), online: <https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-45678338> accessed 24 June 2020. 7 United Nations Environment Programme, supra note 3 at XIII. Note: this reduction needs to be at least 2.7°C per year to remain within 2°C of warming, historically considered the safe threshold of warming for human existence.  2  warming and related global greenhouse emission pathways.8 The findings of the report detailed to a degree never-before comprehended, the difference between a world at 1.5°C warming and a world at 2°C warming. A world in which coral reefs and all-year round Arctic ice are expected to exist, or a world in which they are not.9 The necessity for global cooperation to ensure that the world succeeds in limiting global warming has never been clearer. But that 1.5°C target already seems unlikely.10 To limit warming to within even 2°C requires a rapid and fundamental overhaul of our global energy system to take place within the next ten years and counting.11 A significant part of this revolution will necessitate an urgent switch from our dependence on fossil fuels towards energy from sustainable sources. As the IPCC reports, “In 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot, renewables are projected to supply 70–85% (interquartile range) of electricity in 2050 (high confidence).”12 But there is still time, just. Civil society has rallied behind activists such as Greta Thunberg and Extinction Rebellion with a renewed fervor, and national and sub-national governments around the world have finally begun to raise the alarm.13 Whether or not the 1.5°C goal is achieved, it has provided a  8 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to (Switzerland, 2018) [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield (eds.)]. 9 Note: The Arctic Ocean being completely bare of sea ice in summer would be a once per century likelihood at 1.5°C but this leaps to a once a decade likelihood at 2°C, see: Brad Plumer & Nadja Popvich, ‘Why Half a Degree of Global Warming Is a Big Deal’, The New York Times (7 October 2018), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/07/climate/ipcc-report-half-degree.html> accessed 24 June 2020.  10 Damian Carrington, ‘“Brutal news”: global carbon emissions jumps to all-time high in 2018’, The Guardian (5 December 2018), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/dec/05/brutal-news-global-carbon-emissions-jump-to-all-time-high-in-2018%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 11 (IPCC), supra note 8; Diego Arguedas Ortiz, ‘Ten simple ways to act on climate change’, BBC news (4 November 2018), online: <http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20181102-what-can-i-do-about-climate-change> accessed 24 June 2020. 12 (IPCC), supra note 8 at 15. 13 Cedemia, ‘Climate emergency declarations in 1,496 jurisdictions and local governments cover 820 million citizens’, (2020), online: Climate Emergency Declaration <https://climateemergencydeclaration.org/climate-emergency-declarations-cover-15-million-citizens/%0D>. accessed 24 June 2020 3  “potent rallying cry for activists and a basis to push states and other actors to take stronger action”.14 At a speech made in at Davos in early 2019, Greta Thunberg called on leaders to “start acting as you would in a crisis…to act as if our house is on fire”.15 Amongst International Relations scholars, it is widely understood that leadership matters most in the time of a crisis, and that those crises “often act as catalysts for institutional innovation”.16 Through the Paris Agreement, adopted during COP21, 197 parties have signaled their commitment to decisive action on climate change, confirming the direction of international cooperation on reducing global warming and promoting low carbon development.17 Its success will rely on how this reignited momentum can be “harnessed and carried forward”.18 The Paris Agreement has been heralded and criticized for its ambition and its limitations; as with all international law, the Paris Agreement suffers from questions of enforceability and effectiveness.19 Numerous scholars have sought to analyze the legal content of the Paris Agreement and some have concluded that it has no teeth.20 As Karlsson-vinkhuyzen et al explain, “there is no mandate for sanctions or similar enforcement measures that many would associate with legal obligations, as typically found in national contexts”.21 There is also no international ruler to enforce such legal obligations, as we have become accustomed to in the national context.  14 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?’ (2016) 110:269 The American Journal of International Law 288 at 303. 15 Greta Thunberg, ‘“Our house is on fire”: Greta Thunberg, 16, urges leaders to act on climate’, The Guardian (January), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/jan/25/our-house-is-on-fire-greta-thunberg16-urges-leaders-to-act-on-climate%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 16 Katherine Morton, ‘Political Leadership and Global Governance: Structural Power Versus Custodial Leadership’ (2017) 2:4 Chinese Political Science Review 477 at 477 & 479. 17 Zhang Yong-xiang et al, ‘The Withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement and its Impact on Global Climate Change governance’ (2017) 8:4 Advances in Climate Change Research 213, online: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accre.2017.08.005> at 214. 18 Bodansky, supra note 14 at 291. 19 Oran R Young, ‘The Paris agreement: Destined to succeed or doomed to fail?’ (2016) 4:3 Politics and Governance 124. 20 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The legal character of the Paris agreement’ (2016) 25:2 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 142; Sebastian Oberthür & Ralph Bodle, ‘Legal Form and Nature of the Paris Outcome’ (2016) 6:1–2 Climate Law 40. 21 Sylvia I Karlsson-vinkhuyzen et al, ‘Entry into force and then? The Paris agreement and state accountability’ (2018) 18:593–599 Climate Policy at 594. 4  Instead, implementation is mandated through “naming and encouraging”,22 the effectiveness of which remains to be proved.23 As posed by Druzin: “The question at the heart of the ecological crisis before us is essentially this: how can the international community successfully coordinate without a dominant coercive authority to keep states in line?”24 In traditional economic and social scientific theory, climate change is a classic collective action problem.25 It can only be solved if all states, or at least the major greenhouse gas emitters, cooperate.26 As there is no global government, to date we have relied on willing cooperation between states to advance collective goals.27 Through the creation of international regimes and common rules and norms, international environmental law plays a role in facilitating such collaboration.28 Various studies have shown that voluntary international agreements can significantly strengthen the incentives of states to cooperate.29 The Paris Agreement is the most recent iteration of this effort in the climate change regime. As with all collective action issues, the biggest threat to the Paris Agreement is freeriders. In collective action theory, free-riding, or the fear that other states will not cooperate fully in the agreement,  22 Pamela Falk, ‘Climate negotiators strike deal to slow global warming’, CBS News (12 December 2015), online: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cop21-climate-change-conference-final-draft-historic-plan/> accessed 24 June 2020. Note: Though countries are asked to report on the measures they have taken every 5 years, there is no penalty mechanism contained in NDCs. Janos Pastor, the UN assistant secretary-general on climate change told CBS news, “Whatever they commit to is not legally binding but they have to report…it is not name and shame, it is name and encourage”. 23 Meinhard Doelle, ‘The Paris Agreement: Historic Breakthrough or High Stakes Experiment?’ (2016) 6:1–2 Climate Law 1; Behnam Taebi & Azar Safari, ‘On Effectiveness and Legitimacy of “Shaming” as a Strategy for Combatting Climate Change’ (2017) 23:5 Science and Engineering Ethics 1289. 24 Bryan H Druzin, ‘The Parched Earth of Cooperation: How to solve the ragedy of the Commons in International Environmental Governance’ (2016) 101:2016 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 73 at 105. 25 Jutta Brunnée & Stephen Toope, ‘Climate change: building a global legal regime’ in Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 126 at 126–127. 26 Ibid at 126. 27 Gregory Shaffer, ‘International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist World’ (2012) 23:3 European Journal of International Law 669 at 675. 28 Jutta Brunnée, Acid Rain and Ozone Layer Depletion: International Law and Regulation (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1988) at 264; Shaffer, supra note 27 at 675. 29 Arild Underdal, ‘Complexity and challenges of long-term environmental governance’ (2010) 20:3 Global Environmental Change 386 at 389. 5  is seen as the principal driver of uncooperative behavior.30 Despite gaining near universal membership of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), as President Trump has demonstrated,31 if the political will of a country changes, there is no mechanism to stop a country from withdrawing from the agreement, potentially “nothing to constrain a climate laggard".32 As touched upon previously, there are no legal sanctions for such withdrawal, or indeed for failure to abide by agreed rules. Furthermore, there are fears that the exit of one party “could trigger others to free-ride or withdraw”.33 This fear is particularly justified in the case of the U.S and China, which account for approximately 40% of the total greenhouse gas emissions of the planet. Without the commitment of at least one of them, the foundations of the Paris Agreement are in serious jeopardy.34 Historically, the two states have been reluctant to act without the commitment of the other, so following Trump’s announcement of his intention to withdraw the U.S. from the agreement in June 2017, the world watched apprehensively for China's reaction. Yet China - perhaps unexpectedly - responded by positioning itself, alongside the EU, to take a leading role in action on climate change.35 As I will describe further in Chapters 3 and 4, over the course of the last twenty years the EU has been relegated from a position of dominance in climate leadership to a leadership role that requires a reliance on its exercise of mediation skills.36 This trajectory has resulted from its decline in structural  30 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965); Shaffer, supra note 27 at 674.  31 Druzin, supra note 24. 32 Frederic Gilles Sourgens, ‘Climate Commons Law: The Transformative Force of the Paris Agreement’ (2018) 50:1 International Law and Politics 885 at 891. 33 Luke Kemp, ‘Better Out than In’ (2017) 7 Nature Climate Change at 458; See also, Hayley Walker & Katja Biedenkopf, ‘The Historical Evolution of EU Climate Leadership and Four Scenarios for its Future’ in Stephen Minas & Vassilis Ntousas, eds, EU Climate Diplomacy: Politics, Law and Negotiations, 1st Editio ed (London: Routledge, 2018) 33; Druzin, supra note 24. 34 For example, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said “…without the largest economy in the world, it’s very, very hard to talk about any kind of climate agreement” see, Ariel Cohen, ‘U.S. Withdraws From Paris Accord, Ceding Leadership to China.’, Forbes (7 November 2019), online: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/11/07/us-withdraws-from-paris-accord-ceding-leadership-to-china/#1a664cfd73c1> accessed 24 June 2020. 35 Edward Wong, ‘China Poised to Take Lead on Climate After Trump’s Move to Undo Policies’, The New York Times (29 March 2017) A1, online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/world/asia/trump-climate-change-paris-china.html> accessed 24 June 2020. 36 Sebastian Oberthür & Lisanne Groen, ‘The European Union and the Paris Agreement: leader, mediator, or bystander?’ (2017) 8:1 Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 1. 6  power. China on the other hand has moved from a position of relative apathy for the climate cause to a position of reluctant leadership, bolstered by status since 2008 as the world’s largest GHG emitter. 1.2 Investigating Climate Leadership In light of the likely withdrawal of the world’s second largest GHG emitter from the framework in 2020, the potential for climate change leaders to steer the course of the remaining 196 signatories could be vital to the agreement’s continuance. As will be explored in Chapters 2 and 3, leadership can be demonstrated at various points in the policy process, including “agenda setting, norm setting and actual implementation”.37 To date, scholars have focussed on the potential for climate leadership by the EU, the U.S., and increasingly China; as the three largest emitters, these are logical targets of enquiry. Until relatively recently, the EU was unchallenged in its self-professed claims to climate leadership.38 It was therefore the focus of the majority of scholarship in this area.  However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15), in 2009, saw an unprecedented marginalisation of the EU. The final agreement– the Copenhagen Accord - was negotiated in secret between the U.S. and the BASIC countries (Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, India and China), causing scholars to question the viability of the EU’s future climate leadership. 39 Six years later, COP21 saw the return of the EU to the forefront of climate diplomacy. The EU, and in particular the French presidency, has been widely commended for its role in  37 Joyeeta Gupta & Nicolien van der Grijp, ‘Perceptions of the EU’s role: Is the EU a leader?’ in Joyeeta Gupta & Michael Grubb, eds, Climate Change and European Leadership: A Sustainable Role for Europe? Environment & Policy, vol 27, 1st ed (Springer, Dordrecht, 2000) 67 at 68. 38 Michael Grubb & Joyeeta Gupta, ‘Climate change, leadership and the EU’ in Michael Grubb & Joyeeta Gupta, eds, Climate Change and European Leadership: A Sustainable Role for Europe? Environment & Policy, vol 27, 1st ed (Springer, Dordrecht, 2000) 3 at 4. 39 Sebastian Oberthür & Claire Dupont, ‘The Council, the European Council and international climate policy: from symbolic leadership to leadership by example’ in Rüdiger K W Wurzel & J Connelly, eds, The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics (London: Routledge, 2010) 74 at 82; Stavros Afionis, ‘The European Union as a negotiator in the international climate change regime’ (2011) 11:4 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 341 at 358. 7  the negotiation of the Paris Agreement.40 At the same time, China emerged with a “reputation for climate cooperation”.41 1.2.1 Research Questions Since the announcement of the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement in June 2017, the EU and China have sought to promote their credibility as climate change leaders on the world stage. European and Chinese leaders issued a statement on climate change and clean energy in Beijing in July 2018.42 European Commission President Juncker said of this statement, "We have underlined our joint, strong determination to fight climate change and demonstrate global leadership.”43 My objective is to assess the EU’s and China’s claims to climate leadership during the negotiation of the Paris Agreement and what this means for their role in its implementation. To achieve this objective, I investigate two research questions, one backward-looking, the second forward-looking:  1. How was leadership exercised in the negotiation of the Paris Agreement, and was it effective?  2. How can leadership be exercised in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, and how should its effectiveness be determined?  Effective leadership requires capabilities and credibility.44 Thus, in order to answer my research questions, I must evaluate the capability and credibility of China and the EU in relation to climate change. In Chapter 2 I outline my theoretical framework to assess these elements, based on contemporary leadership theory. In Chapter 3, I examine European and Chinese climate leadership up to the adoption  40 Marjan Peeters, ‘An EU Law Perspective on the Paris Agreement: Will the EU Consider Strengthening its Mitigation Effort?’ (2016) 6:1–2 Climate Law 182 at 182. 41 Isabel Hilton & Oliver Kerr, ‘The Paris Agreement: China’s “New Normal” role in international climate negotiations’ (2017) 17:1 Climate Policy 48 at 49. 42 European Commission, supra note 1. 43 European Commission, ‘EU and China step up cooperation on climate change and clean energy’, online: Energy, Climate change, Environment: Climate Action <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/eu-and-china-step-cooperation-climate-change-and-clean-energy_en%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 44 Charles Parker & Christer Karlsson, ‘Leadership and International Cooperation’ in R A W Rhodes & Paul ’T Hart, eds, Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 587. 8  of the Paris Agreement, against the framework outlined in the previous chapter. In Chapter 4 I extend the application of the framework to the role of the EU and China in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. This part of the analysis is mostly forward looking, suggesting ways in which the trajectory of China and EU leadership could progress. Towards the end of the chapter I suggest methods for assessing the effectiveness of leadership in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, drawing on insights from the literature on regime effectiveness. My conceptual framework draws upon scholarship in international relations (in particular climate leadership), as well as international law (in particular ‘soft law’). I also touch upon research from the social sciences and economics, particularly in my explanation of collective action theory in Chapter 2. 1.2.2 Breaking New Ground This research makes an original contribution to the climate leadership scholarship in four ways. 1.2.2.1 Leadership in Implementation My thesis responds to a gap in the literature on leadership, which focuses on regime formation, but not regime implementation.45 Following the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015, much of the initial attention in this area was directed at the parties’ success in reaching an agreement, and at identifying which actors were instrumental in that success.46 However, due to the nature of international environmental agreements - and in particular the Paris Agreement –the measurement of its success cannot only be in its establishment. In order to reach the stated goals of the agreement, the commitments of the parties must be ‘ratcheted up’ over the course of the next few decades. For this reason, the role of climate leaders will be just as critical in its implementation, if not more so. To date, leadership theory has developed around the exercise of leadership in negotiation. The literature in this field has not yet addressed how the effectiveness of leadership should be assessed in the implementation phase.  45 Ibid at 592. 46 Radoslav S Dimitrov, ‘The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Behind Closed Doors’ (2016) 16:August Global Environmental Politics 1; Robert Falkner, ‘The Paris agreement and the new logic of international climate politics’ (2016) 92:5 International Affairs 1107. 9  1.2.2.2 Joint Leadership  In examining the EU and China simultaneously, I will contribute to literature that has begun to observe and understand the role of multiple leadership actors. As Parker et al explain, “previous research has, with few exceptions, tended to focus on one leader at a time”.47 I will argue that a strengthened partnership between the EU and China will provide credibility to both their ongoing leadership claims.48 This is because each is able to offer the other credibility in an area of leadership that the other is lacking.   1.2.2.3 Interdisciplinary Approach Notwithstanding its status as a treaty within the definition of the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties,49 not every provision of the Paris Agreement creates a legal obligation; in fact, “it contains a mix of mandatory and non-mandatory provisions”.50 As Bodansky explains, the legal nature of a provision does not guarantee its effectiveness, so although legal character is important, “[it] is only one factor in assessing the significance of the Paris outcome.”51 A lot can be learnt by looking beyond “law on the books” to “examine the real behavior of people occupying important law-making…roles.”52 The effectiveness of public and peer pressure as an accountability mechanism has been debated in soft law literature.53 Such pressure is the main device for holding states to account under the Paris Agreement. Moving away from a positive doctrinal approach to international law allows for an examination of other factors, actors and influences that impact whether international law is- and will continue to be – binding and effective.54 In the absence of a formal regime of sanctions and of any overriding authority to enforce commitments, the success of the Paris Agreement will rely, in part, on the ability of actors to  47 Charles F Parker et al, ‘Fragmented climate change leadership: making sense of the ambiguous outcome of COP-15’ (2012) 21:2 Environmental Politics 268 at 269. 48 Charles F Parker, Christer Karlsson & Mattias Hjerpe, ‘Assessing the European Union’s global climate change leadership: from Copenhagen to the Paris Agreement’ (2017) 39:2 Journal of European Integration 239 at 242. 49 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155,  331,online:<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf>accessed 24 June 2020  50 Bodansky, supra note 20 at 150. 51 Ibid. 52 Penelope Canan & Nancy Reichman, ‘Lessons Learned’ in Penelope Canan & Nancy Reichman, eds, Ozone Connections: Expert Networks in Global Environmental Governance (London: Routledge, 2002) 182 at 192. 53 Bodansky, supra note 14 at 311. 54 Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J Toope, ‘International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law’ (2000) 39:19 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 20 at 22–23. 10  “encourage”55 or even to “shame”56 states into strengthening and fulfilling their commitments. What effect leaders may have in this process is yet to be seen.   1.2.2.4 Timeliness There has been a “general academic skepticism” about the efficacy of UN climate diplomacy in recent years, resulting from failed or disappointing COPs combined with relatively little progress toward climate goals.57  However, the perceived success of COP21 partially changed this narrative; as Dimitrov explains, “This diplomatic breakthrough raises the need to explain the switch from failure to success in regime formation.”58 This thesis sits within the body of research investigating whether and how the Paris Agreement will ensure successful global action on climate change upon coming into force, responding to the “clarion call for a variety of different types of actors at both global and national levels to engage in ensuring that states keep the promises they made in the Paris Agreement”.59 Scholars often discuss the ability of environmental leaders to shape international environmental agendas.60 Furthermore, some states are politically motivated to assert such influence.61 But these often self-proclaimed leadership credentials cannot go unchecked: it is important that putative climate leaders are held to account by the academic community.  This in turn can provide a “rallying cry” for activists and civil society to demand stronger action on climate goals.62  The scholarship on leadership theory is also important for national leaders and diplomats engaging in future climate change negotiations. Insights from leadership theory can help identify the capabilities required for leaders, strategies available to them and ideas as to how these two can interact to affect outcomes.    55 Falk, supra note 22.  56 Taebi & Safari, supra note 23. 57 Dimitrov, supra note 46 at 9. 58 Ibid. 59 Karlsson-vinkhuyzen et al, supra note 21 at 593. 60 Sanja Bogojević, ‘Climate Change Law and Policy in the European Union’ in Kevin R Gray, Richard Tarasofsky & Cinnamon Carlane, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 671 at 672; Sebastian Oberthür, ‘Where to go from Paris? The European Union in climate geopolitics’ (2016) 2:2 Global Affairs 119; Sophia Kalantzakos, The EU, US and China Tackling Climate Change (2017). 61 Bogojević, supra note 60 at 672. 62 Bodansky, supra note 14 at 303. 11  1.2.3 A Renewable Energy Focus In Chapter 3, I examine the exercise and credibility of Chinese and EU leadership.  Part of this task involves examining the ways in which the EU and China have sought to be pioneers in their climate policy making.63. To produce a comprehensive outline of all climate policy implemented in these two states since the international climate regime began is beyond the scope of this thesis.64 Therefore, to narrow the focus I have decided to concentrate on renewable energy, which is a key policy domain for reducing GHG emissions. As highlighted in Section 1.1, a sustainable energy transition is fundamental to the avoidance of catastrophic global warming. As Kulovesi et al describe, “Renewable energy has the potential to turn the climate goals agreed in Paris into reality.”65 A focus on renewable energy has the dual purpose of narrowing my research scope and providing a focus in which the leadership of China and the EU can clearly be demonstrated.  1.3 Outline of the Thesis Having contextualized the topic in this chapter, I proceed in Chapter 2 to introduce the theory I rely on for my three remaining chapters. I examine collective action and leadership theories to expound the place of the latter within classic collective action problems; in particular, the quandary of climate change. The conventional theories of Garrett Hardin and Mancur Olson have come to be known by two “iconic phrases”’:66 “tragedy of the commons” and “logic of collective action”. In discussing these theories, I seek  63 Diarmuid Torney, ‘Follow the leader? Conceptualising the relationship between leaders and followers in polycentric climate governance’ (2019) 28:1 Environmental Politics 167. 64 For example, “today there are now over 1,200 climate change or climate change-relevant laws in place worldwide: a twentyfold increase over 20 years when compared with 1997 when there were just 60 such laws in place”, see: Michal Nachmany et al, Global trends in climate change legislation and litigation (2017) onine: <http://archive.ipu.org/pdf/publications/global.pdf> accessed 24 June 2020 at 4. 65 Kati Kulovesi, Seita Romppanen & Yulia Yamineva, ‘Introduction to Climate Law’s Special Issue on Renewable-Energy Law’ (2016) 6:3–4 Climate Law 227 at 230. 66 Anne van Aaken, ‘Behavioral Aspects of the International Law of Global Public Goods and Common Pool Resources’ (2018) 112:1 The American Society of International Law 67 at 68. 12  to highlight “why international cooperation and the development of robust international law on climate change - or, more precisely, international action to do something about it -remain extremely difficult”.67    Subsequent to this discussion, I will consider briefly how collective action theory has evolved following insights into how rational self-interest operates in group dynamics such that some common resources can be managed sustainably.  These observations will act as a gateway to my discussion of the role of leaders in regime formation.  The second part of Chapter 2 follows recent attempts to conceptualize leadership, focusing on four key components: leaders, followers, leadership modes and leadership goals. Recognizing the importance to leadership theory of the contributions of Arild Underdal and Oran Young, I propose a theoretical framework which includes a combination of their theorization of leadership modes. These modes form the building blocks for my exploration of the exercise and credibility of European and Chinese leadership in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3 I investigate the leadership of the EU and China from the negotiation of the 1992 UNFCCC to the conclusion of the Paris Agreement. I use the leadership modes described in Chapter 2 as a basis for determining whether evidence of their climate leadership can be supported through theory. A key objective of this exercise is to assess the credibility of European and Chinese claims to climate leadership. This paves the way for my discussion of their roles in the implementation of the Paris Agreement in Chapter 4. In the final third of the chapter, I concentrate on renewable energy policy and legislation implemented by the EU and China. This serves to narrow the reach of my enquiry, whilst being a key climate policy consideration.  In Chapter 4 I focus on the role of the EU and China in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The chapter begins with a summary of the current capability and credibility of the EU and China based on the analysis set out in Chapter 3, focusing on the evolution of the EU as a mature climate leader and China’s rise as an emerging leader. Following this, I examine evidence of a strengthened EU-China partnership since the signing of the Paris Agreement. In the second half of the chapter I explore the  67 Paul G Harris, ‘Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime Failure’ (2007) 47:1 Natural Resources Journal 195 at 199. 13  place of leadership in the implementation of the Paris Agreement through an examination of its key implementation mechanisms. In this section I extend the analytical framework proposed in Chapter 2 beyond regime formation to regime implementation. A key consideration here is how the effectiveness of leadership should be measured in this phase. The final chapter draws upon the insights gleaned from Chapters 3 and 4 to sum up how climate leadership should be assessed in the negotiation and implementation of the Paris Agreement. I also offer a view as to whether my analysis could be applied outside of the context of the Paris Agreement. In concluding, I point to future research opportunities, as well as addressing the limitations of the present research.     14   CHAPTER 2: Theory “Why should we care if global public goods are provided? We should care because our wellbeing, the wellbeing of future generations, and even the fate of the Earth depends on them being provided.”68 “Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, said countries “must honor our commitments and follow through on the Paris Agreement,” in a clear jibe at the Trump administration. “The withdrawal of certain parties will not shake the collective goal of the world community,” Mr. Yi said, to applause.”69 2.1 Introduction: The Nature of Global Public Goods Dangerous anthropogenic climate change is a quintessential example of a global public “bad”.70 Conversely, the need to prevent dangerous anthropogenic climate change is an archetypal example of a global public good.71 Every country across the globe emits greenhouse gases. Those GHGs cross national borders unhindered, accumulating in the atmosphere and contributing towards the warming of the earth.72 Over the past few hundred years, through “an extraordinarily large number of actions taken at multiple scales”,73 millions of actors have contributed to the problem of climate change and we continue to do so.74 To tackle the harmful consequences will require cooperation on an international scale by states with competing “interests, priorities and circumstances”.75 Although the sources and effects of cumulative GHG emissions will not be evenly distributed,76 each country bears a rational self interest in protecting  68 Scott Barrett, ‘Introduction: the incentives to supply global public goods’ in Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods (Oxford University Press, 2007) 1 at 1. 69 Zamira Rahim, ‘Trump mocks Greta Thunberg after emotional UN speech: “Such a happy young girl”’, The Independent online (24 September 2019), online: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-greta-thunberg-un-summit-speech-climate-change-protest-twitter-a9117681.html?fbclid=IwAR3x15Nx-q7TiTjz402hbxs1euuKNMN7ffVkPZIqu3qz6-PnzG1J5hiOe5A>accessed 24 June 2020. 70 Harris, supra note 67 at 201. 71 Elinor Ostrom, ‘A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change’ (2014) 15:1 Annals of Economics and Finance 97 at 100. 72 Thomas Bernauer et al, ‘Unilateral or Reciprocal Climate Policy? Experimental Evidence from China’ (2016) 4:3 Politics and Governance 152 at 153. 73 Ostrom, supra note 71 at 106. 74 Harris, supra note 67 at 196. 75 Bodansky, supra note 20 at 147. 76 See, Harris, supra note 67 at 196. 15  against the negative effects of global heating. Afterall, a safe climate is beneficial to everyone on the planet.77 Yet, due to nature of global public goods, “no party can be excluded from the benefit[s] regardless of its own actions”.78 Thus, the economics of climate change are such that, unless the vast majority of countries cooperate to reduce emissions, there is little incentive for individual nations to cease emitting. As Ostrom comments, “[i]f only one country in the world tried to solve climate change…this would be a grossly inadequate effort”.79  This conundrum presents a classic collective action problem.80 In fact, climate change has been categorized as a “super wicked problem”,81 due to “its even further exacerbating features”82 such as the disparity of its causes and effects throughout time, their distribution, complexity and the sheer number of interconnected issues.83  This chapter lays the foundation for assessing the effectiveness of leadership in the international climate change regime. The first half will examine climate change in light of collective action theory. As the quotation from Scott Barrett at the beginning of this chapter demonstrates, the need for collective action on climate to provide public goods is essential to the fate of the earth. Thus, understanding the obstacles that a leader must overcome is important in understanding how and whether a leader promotes cooperation.84  I will begin with Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons”85 and Olson’s “Logic of Collective action”,86 considered the epicenter of conventional collective action theory. Over the years, mitigation of free riders has been a central concern of scholars examining collective action theory. This chapter will present the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement as a problem of free riding.87 This  77 Robert O Keohane & David G Victor, ‘Cooperation and discord in global climate policy’ (2016) 6:June Nature Climate Change 570 at 570. 78 Ibid. 79 Ostrom, supra note 71 at 98. 80 Brunnée & Toope, supra note 25 at 126–127. 81 Richard J Lazarus, ‘Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future’ (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 1153 at 1160. 82 Ibid. 83 For a more detailed explanation of the categorisation of climate change as a ‘super wicked problem’ see, Lazarus, Ibid at 1159–1161. 84 Ulrike Saul & Christian Seidel, ‘Does leadership promote cooperation in climate change mitigation policy?’ (2011) 11:2 Climate Policy 901 at 905. 85 Garett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162:3859 Science 1243. 86 Olson, supra note 30. 87 Joan Esteban & Esther Hauk, Leadership in Collective Action (Barcelona GSE, 2009) at 1. 16  context is significant for two reasons: firstly, collective action theory lays the groundwork for my discussion of the importance of leaders in the latter half of the chapter. Secondly, it contextualizes my thesis within the global political situation. The risk of the U.S. free riding on others’ climate commitments threatens the stability of the Paris Agreement. It is also the reason why the U.S. cannot credibly be considered a climate leader on the global stage for the foreseeable future88 (an idea I will explore further in the third chapter).  The second half of the chapter will examine leadership theory as a response to the issues created by collective action problems. In so doing I will not be suggesting that leadership is a solution in itself, but that leaders can help to catalyze global collective action. To be an effective leader requires capabilities and credibility.89 To assess the effectiveness of the EU and China, I will examine four elements that constitute leadership: leaders, followers, leadership modes and leadership goals.  This exploration forms the basis of the analysis in my third and fourth chapters. 2.2 Part I: A Brief History of Collective Action Theory 2.2.1 Garett Hardin Perhaps the most famous illustration of collective action theory is Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons”.90 He originally wrote the piece as a metaphor for the problem of overpopulation; however, in recent times the analogy has frequently been used to depict the climate crisis.91 Hardin uses the example of over-grazing by a group of farmers on a piece of common land. The farmers are aware that the common land has a finite capacity to support grazing. Yet, the logic of rational self-interest dictates that despite this knowledge, each farmer will seek to maximize their own personal gain by grazing as many of their own livestock as possible.92 The farmer enjoys the full profit of each additional animal he adds to his herd, but shares the additional cost of the degradation of the common pasture with other herders. Due to the  88 Hai Bin Zhang et al, ‘U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: Reasons, impacts, and China’s response’ (2017) 8:4 Advances in Climate Change Research 220. 89 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 44 at 586. 90 Hardin, supra note 85. 91 Katrina Brown, W Neil Adger & Joshua E Cinner, ‘Moving climate change beyond the tragedy of the commons’ (2019) 54 Global Environmental Change 61 at 61. 92 Hardin, supra note 85 at 1244. 17  mismatch between the individual benefit gained for the farmer in grazing additional cattle and the portion of the overall cost it will bear for the overuse of the land,93 collective or collaborative action is not incentivized and a “get it while you can” mindset prevails.94  Eventually, each farmer will increase its herd until the land is no longer capable of supporting any cattle through overuse. As Druzin explains, a key factor in this situation is the lack of trust between the farmers, each believing that the others will seek to overexploit the resource. Rather than risk personally losing from this prospect, the farmers hedge their bets by increasing their herd, which “invariably triggers a destructive race to the bottom”.95  In the global warming context, the analogy can be used to demonstrate the problem of the over-exploitation of fossil fuels: “The true ‘tragedy’ in the tragedy of the commons is that actors otherwise willing to husband a resource are forced by rational self-interest to ‘grab what they can’. Global warming and our inability to halt it is perhaps the ultimate example of a tragedy of the commons on a truly massive scale.”96  2.2.2 Mancur Olson Around the same time that Hardin wrote ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Mancur Olson was developing a related theory, which he published in, ‘The Logic of Collective Action’. Olson also recognized the irrationality of collective behavior, and through his work upset the historically accepted narrative that groups of individuals with common interests will seek to maximize those common interests as a group, just as single individuals will seek to maximize their personal interests.97 “The idea that groups tend to act in support of their group interests is supposed to follow logically from this widely accepted premise of rational, self-interested behavior. In other words, if the members of some group have a common interest or object, and if they would all be better off if that objective were achieved, it has been thought to follow logically that the individuals in that group would, if they were rational and self-interested, act to achieve that objective”.98   93 Ibid. 94 Druzin, supra note 24 at 79. 95 Ibid at 75. 96 Ibid at 75–76. 97 Olson, supra note 30 at 1 & 65. 98 Ibid at 1. 18   Whilst Olson’s findings differentiated depending on the size of the group, his main argument was premised on the notion that if a person cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of a collective good once it has been produced, there will very little incentive for him to contribute voluntarily to its provision in the first place.99  Scholars became fascinated with the paradox that actions taken by rational individuals lead, in collective scenarios, to irrational outcomes.100 A public good is defined by two characteristics – non-excludability and non-rivalry.101 As described, pure public goods are non-excludable because practically, no-one can be excluded from the using or consuming the good.102 They are also non-rival, meaning one person’s consumption of the good does not diminish its availability to others.103 In the case of climate change, “the joint “good” is reducing a joint “bad” caused by increased emissions of greenhouse gases”.104 A stable climate system is therefore both non-excludable and non-rival.   2.2.3 The Free-Rider Problem  Applying Hardin’s and Olson’s theory to the problem of climate change illuminates the fundamental issue with collective action on climate change: freeriders.105 The inability or impracticality of excluding parties from sharing in the benefits that others provide became known as the problem of “free riding”, and is central to the tragedy of the commons and the logic of collective action.106 The problem is particularly problematic in the context of public goods: individuals who benefit from public goods (i.e. everyone) is disincentivized from acting to supply or conserve the goods, instead relying on others’ efforts to do so. In  99 Elinor Ostrom, ‘Reflections on the commons’ in Governing the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 1 at 6. 100 Ibid at 5. 101 Daniel Bodansky, ‘What’s in a Concept? Global Public Goods, International Law, and Legitimacy’ (2012) 23:3 The European Journal of International Law 651 at 652. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Ostrom, supra note 71 at 102. 105 “International action over the environment typically concerns the provision of nonexcludable benefits… Because of non-excludability some nations may find it rational to free-ride on others’ efforts, because they can get benefits even though they do not bear costs themselves”, see Frank Grundig & Hugh Ward, ‘Structural Group Leadership and Regime Effectiveness’ (2015) 63:1 Political Studies 221 at 222. 106 Ostrom, supra note 99 at 6. 19  the climate change context, the efforts to reduce or prevent emission of greenhouse gases, or climate mitigation, is a collective action problem. The rationale for all states to act is apparent, emissions reductions provide a global public good.107 However, at the global level, both individuals and states have incentives to free ride on others’ commitments.108 As Ostrom explains: “All benefit from reduced greenhouse gas emissions, but the problem is they benefit whether or not they pay any of the costs. In other words, beneficiaries cannot be excluded from the benefit of cleaner air.”109 Just as the herdsman in Hardin’s pasture makes a calculation between his individual benefit for continued use of the public good and the portion of the cost it will bear for its overuse, a party to an international environmental agreement could make this calculation on a global scale and withdraw themselves from the agreement in order to continue exploiting fossil fuels.110 The interesting conundrum is that, just like in Hardin’s pasture, if countries do continue to exploit fossil fuels we will eventually reach the point of system collapse, at which point fewer and fewer people will benefit from overexploitation. The further down the path of global warming that we go, the more apparent and prescient this eventuality becomes.111  2.3 Application to the Climate Regime: the Kyoto Protocol Hardin proposed two ways in which the tragedy of the commons could be prevented: privatizing the resource, or some form of government regulation through “mutually agreed coercion”.112 Olson came to the conclusion that coercion or some other device must be present in order for a group of individuals to act in their common interest.113 The far-reaching influence of their conclusions came to dominate  107 Bodansky, supra note 101. 108 Fabrizio Cafaggi & David D Caron, ‘Global Public Goods amidst a Plurality of Legal Orders: A symposium’ (2012) 23:3 European Journal of International Law 643 at 644. 109 Ostrom, supra note 71 at 100. 110 For example, “[T]he U.S. will essentially be free-riding on other countries; mitigation efforts if it fails to achieve its NDCs”, see Zhang et al, supra note 88 at 222. 111 An added complication of the western democratic system in countries such as the U.S. and the EU is that they face competing priorities between long term climate goals and immediate re-election, with the latter predominantly winning. Thus, even if countries are not motivated to ‘free-ride’ on others’ commitments, it is politically challenging for them to think long term.  112 Hardin, supra note 85 at 1247. 113 Olson, supra note 30 at 2. 20  academic thought and public policy, leading to a general assumption that individuals cannot and will not organize to overcome collective action problems without “externally enforced rules”.114 Their conclusions are problematic for international law in general and suggest a bleak outlook for the international climate regime in particular. As Van Aaken observes, “Neither [scholar] is particularly optimistic about the prospect for interstate cooperation”.115  One of the ways in which the global community attempts to address international collective action problems is through the creation of regimes, such as the international climate change regime. Krasner defines a regime as, “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decisions making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”.116 The approach that was taken towards the Kyoto was motivated by the logic of global public goods.117 As Doelle describes, it was “[b]ased on the assumption that nation-states predominantly act in their self-interest” and so required an agreement that aligned, “their self-interest with the global interest through binding commitments and strong compliance”.118 It was designed with the free-rider problem in mind, on the proposition that sovereign states are more likely to take action in the collective interest if they are assured that other countries will do the same.119 This assurance came in the form of legally binding ambitious targets that were internationally negotiated between developed countries, and agreed to on the condition that other Annex I nations would be undertaking similar commitments (also referred to as a ‘top-down’ approach).120 Trust between the parties was thought to be promoted through the imposition of binding targets and the use of transparency mechanisms to ensure compliance; both of which were considered key to the agreement’s prosperity. Despite its limited success in Europe, ultimately, the collective benefits promised by the Protocol failed to come to fruition. This is largely due to the knock-on effects of the  114 Elinor Ostrom, ‘Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms’ (2000) 14:3 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 137 at 137. 115 van Aaken, supra note 66 at 68. 116 Stephen D Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’ (1982) 36:2 International Organization 185 at 185. 117 Bernauer et al, supra note 72 at 153. 118 Doelle, supra note 23 at 3–4. 119 Druzin, supra note 24 at 105.  120 For a list of the Annex I Parties see, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [the Kyoto Protocol]. 21  United States failing to ratify the Protocol, who disagreed with the ability of developing countries such as China and India to increase their emissions unchecked. Ultimately, many countries did not view Kyoto as aligned with their interests and declined a second implementation period. 121 2.4 Elinor Ostrom and the Paris Agreement Elinor Ostrom’s work challenged the view that individuals cannot overcome collective action problems and achieve their long-term collective interest without external influences.122 Ostrom was influenced by the conventional theories, and recognized the, “rich field of theoretical and empirical work”123 that Olson opened up;124 however, she rejected the oversimplification of the power of rational self-interest and began working with other scholars against what she deemed the “sweeping conclusions of the first variants of this theory”.125 Ostrom’s work advanced and applied the rational choice model of political science in various ways. From her extensive empirical research throughout the 1980s she observed that everyday situations can provide examples of individuals voluntarily organizing themselves, including to protect natural resources.126 From a policy perspective, she questioned the reliability of the Hardin/Olson conception of collective action, arguing that the theory was underdeveloped and generally in need of updating in order to be a useful tool for future policy analysis.127 Eventually, she came to the conclusion that trying to build a single theory of collective action was counterproductive128 and that that rational  121 Doelle, supra note 23 at 4; Michael Grubb, ‘Full legal compliance with the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period – some lessons’ (2016) 16:6 Climate Policy 673. 122 Ostrom, supra note 114 at 137. 123 Elinor Ostrom, ‘How types of goods and property rights jointly affect collective action’ (2003) 15:3 Journal of Theoretical Politics 239 at 239. 124 Ibid. 125 Ostrom, supra note 99 at 7. 126 Ostrom, supra note 99. 127 Ostrom, supra note 71 at 103. 128 Ostrom, supra note 123 at 242. 22  choice theory is just “one model in a family of models” (emphasis in original).129 Overall, Ostrom argued that is it important for us to move on from purely rationalist conceptions of human behavior.130  Although Ostrom’s earlier work did not focus primarily on climate change, towards the end of her career she prepared a background paper for the “2010 World Development Report on Climate Change”131  warning against designing future policies on the basis of traditional collective action theory, which she proved “has not received strong empirical support”.132 Her research showed that, contrary to the conventional narrative, in settings with certain common characteristics, the assumption against cooperation occurring should be reversed. She sought to categorize variables present that tended to lean towards success for groups of different levels and sizes through numerous field studies.133 She found that necessary factors include the following: “1. Many of those affected have agreed on the need for changes in behavior and see themselves as jointly sharing responsibility for future outcomes. 2. The reliability and frequency of information about the phenomena of concern are relatively high. 3. Participants know who else has agreed to change behavior and that their performance is being monitored.  4. Communication occurs among at least subsets of participants.”134 Like Olson,135 Ostrom documented that the larger the group, the less likely it was to self-organize effectively for collective action. Thus, the thrust of her argument was against only relying on the  129 Amy R Poteete, Marco A Janssen & Elinor Ostrom, ‘Pushing the Frontiers of the Theory of Collective Action and the Commons’ in Working Together, Collective Action, the Commons and Multiple Methods in Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010) 215 at 221. 130 Elinor Ostrom, ‘A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997’ (1998) 92:1 American Political Science Review 1 at 3. 131 The World Bank, World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010). 132 Ostrom, supra note 71 at 103. 133 Poteete, Janssen & Ostrom, supra note 129; Elinor Ostrom, ‘A General Framework for Analysing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems’ (2009) 325:5939 Science 419. 134 Ostrom, supra note 71 at 105. 135 Olson, supra note 30 at 35. 23  negotiation and implementation of a global agreement, and in favor of effective action on multiple levels and scales.  It is interesting to observe though, how the legal provisions of the Paris Agreement framework echo many of the factors that Ostrom outlined. The Paris Agreement marks a departure from the Kyoto Protocol as it requires all Parties to commit - as opposed to just Annex I parties -suggesting that the majority of countries now recognize their joint responsibility to address the climate issue (see the first of Ostrom’s factors listed above). The Paris Agreement also moves away from substantive legally binding targets for parties, as NDCs are not legally binding in the sense that there is no obligation that they must be achieved. Furthermore, substantive commitments to reduce emissions are not internationally negotiated, but instead determined nationally and communicated to other parties (referred to as a ‘bottom up’ approach).136 This “voluntary” approach is thought to give more flexibility to parties, as Doelle explains, “[i]t is based on the idea that self-imposed, voluntary commitments are more likely to be met than those imposed by the global community”.137 Arguably, this more closely aligns with Ostrom’s findings that predictions of resource collapse can be avoided where participants and leaders are able and willing to self-organize effective rules.138 In line with Ostrom’s third limb, there is “[a]n emphasis on transparency rather than legal bindingness as the engine to promote ambition and accountability”,139 which is implemented through the enhanced transparency framework and the global stocktake.140 The key aim of these provisions is to promote openness and trust between countries and ultimately, to eliminate the temptation to free-ride. “The crucial factor is that a combination of structural features leads many of those affected to trust one another and to be willing to do an agreed-upon action that adds to their own short-term  136 Not all scholars agree that the Paris Agreement represented a fundamental shift from “top-down” to “bottom-up” commitments, for a discussion of this distinction see Grubb, supra note 121. 137 Doelle, supra note 23 at 3. 138 Ostrom, supra note 133 at 419.  139 Lavanya Rajamani & Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Paris rulebook: Balancing international prescriptiveness with national discretion’ (2019) 68:4 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1023 at 1024. 140  The Paris Agreement, supra note 2 at Article 13 & 14. For a more detailed description of these provisions see Chapter 4; Sebastian Oberthür & Ralph Bodle, ‘Legal Form and Nature of the Paris Outcome’ (2016) 6:1–2 Climate Law 40 at 42. 24  costs because they do see a long-term benefit for themselves and others and they believe that most others are complying.”141 Both Olson and Ostrom acknowledged that presence of an effective leader could help to circumvent collective action problems, though neither of them developed this idea further.142 Theories on the role of leaders have been described as “not contradictory but largely complementary” to Olson’s theory of collective action.143 2.5 Part II: Leadership theory 2.5.1 Introduction: What Role does Leadership play in Regime Formation? Research into how leadership dynamics impact international cooperation primarily originated from international relations literature concerning transnational cooperation, negotiations, regimes and institutions.144 As Grubb and Gupta describe,  “Regimes are important as a concept since they explain the relatively cooperative behavior of countries under circumstances in which rational choice, prisoner’s dilemma, collective goods and global commons theories would predict non-cooperation with a worse outcome overall”.145 Depending on the strand of international relations theory, academics adopt positions with varying degrees of optimism for the ability of states to reach international consensus.146 For the climate change regime, scholars have sought to examine whether and how leadership affects such consensus.147 Leadership has  141 Ostrom, supra note 71 at 105. 142 Ibid; Olson, supra note 30.  143 Josep M Colomer, Leadership Games in Collective Action (1995) at 226. 144 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 44 at 580. 145 Michael Grubb & Joyeeta Gupta, ‘Leadership’ in Michael Grubb & Joyeeta Gupta, eds, Climate Change and European Leadership: A Sustainable Role for Europe? Environment & Policy, vol 27 (Springer Dordrecht, 2000) 15 at 16. 146 Arild Underdal, ‘Climate Change and International Relations (After Kyoto)’ (2017) 20 The Annual Review of Political Science 169; Yoshiki Yamagata, Jue Yang & Joseph Galaskiewicz, ‘A contingency theory of policy innovation : how different theories explain the ratification of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol’ (2013) 13 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 251; For discussion on realism, constructivist divides in leadership modes see, Rüdiger K W Wurzel, Duncan Liefferink & James Connelly, ‘Conclusion: Re- assessing European Union climate leadership’ in Rüdiger K W Wurzel, Duncan Liefferink & James Connelly, eds, The European Union in International Climate Change Politics: Still Taking a Lead? (London: Routledge, 2016) 287. 147 Saul & Seidel, supra note 84 at 902. 25  been described as “crucial” in situations where collective action concerns can cause blocks in agreement to act.148 Some have asserted that the free-rider problem can be resolved through leadership.149 The importance of the role of leadership is thought to increase as the complexity of the negotiation increases. Here, we observe a correlation between the need for leadership and the likelihood of collective action occurring. As touched upon previously, Ostrom and Olson observed that as the size of a group increases, the chance of voluntary collective action occurring decreases. However, Underdal theorizes that “the larger the number of actors and the number and “intricacy of issues”, the more “critical” leadership becomes to a successful outcome. 150 For this reason, leadership theory has been widely studied by scholars in international relations, and more recently by climate change scholars. It is worth noting that although both Young and Underdal consider that leadership is necessary for success in institutional bargaining at the international level, it is not sufficient to guarantee success.151 In other words, although leadership can be a catalyst to collective action solutions, it is not the solution itself.  2.5.2 The Definition of Leadership The most commonly used definitions of leadership in the international relations sphere emanate from the work of Oran Young and Arild Underdal.152 Underdal describes leadership as “an asymmetrical relationship of influence in which one actor guides or directs the behavior of others toward a certain goal”.153 Young posits that leadership refers to the action of individuals who “endeavor to solve or circumvent the collective action problems that plague the efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in processes of institutional bargaining”.154 Central to both theories is the idea that leadership must be  148 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 44 at 581. 149 Colomer, supra note 143 at 243. 150 Arild Underdal, ‘Leadership Theory: Rediscovering the Arts of Management’ in William Zartman, ed, International Multilateral Negociation Approaches to the Management of Complexity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994) 178. 151 Oran R Young, ‘Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society’ (1991) 45:3 International Society 281 at 302. 152 Young, supra note 151; Underdal, supra note 150. 153 Underdal, supra note 150 at 178. 154 Young, supra note 151 at 285. 26  associated with the achievement of a joint purpose or collective action.155 Successful leaders are able to “cultivate” this platform of “shared values interests and beliefs”.156 From an international relations perspective, Young develops his argument that leadership is, “a critical determinant of success or failure in the processes of institutional bargaining that dominate efforts to form…institutional arrangements in international society.”157 He defines institutional bargaining as the endeavors by individual actors to secure consensus on the terms of constitutional contracts or connected rules and interests to govern their future interactions.158 Essentially, he is concerned with the formation of international agreements and regimes. Underdal agrees that leadership is a crucial element of multilateral negotiations.159 He refers to the actions of influential actors such as the United States in the Montreal Protocol to illustrate how collective action at the international level can be facilitated by a leading nation.160 Recent attempts to conceptualize the key components of the definition of leadership have focussed on four elements: the leaders, the followers, the mode of leadership and the goal of leadership.161 Together these elements determine the capability and credibility of a leader.  2.5.3 The Leader In the international relations context, when describing an actor as a leader, most often we are referring to collective entities, such as states.162 The traditional theories make it clear that individuals play an important role in the negotiation setting,163 but it is important to remember the bargaining position of the individual. As Underdal explains, though individuals exercise leadership in international relations, “these individuals act as representatives of states and organizations”.164 For this reason, the analysis in this paper focuses mainly on the actions of the EU and China as state entities, as opposed to individual actors  155 Underdal, supra note 150 at 178. 156 Ibid at 179.  157 Young, supra note 151 at 281. 158 Ibid at 282. 159 Underdal, supra note 150 at 191. 160 Ibid at 179. 161 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 44 at 582. 162 Ibid at 583. 163 Young, supra note 151 at 282. 164 Underdal, supra note 150 at 180. 27  within those states. In order to be considered worthy of study, leadership cannot just be shown on one occasion, it “must be a fairly consistent pattern of interaction extending throughout a certain period of time”.165 2.5.4 The Followers Underdal suggests that in order to be considered a leader in any meaningful sense, one must have followers.166 Despite having been recognized as a key element of leadership theory, there has been comparatively little attention given to the issue of followers in climate leadership literature.167 However, it is clearly important to consider followers when assessing the effectiveness of a particular leader, as Parker et al explain,  “it is axiomatic that the effectiveness of leadership efforts will be seriously undermined if an actor who aspires to be a leader fails to be recognized as such”.168 Because leadership is a relational concept, leadership is most effective when demand matches supply.169 2.5.5 The Objective or Goal of Leadership  As Oberthur et al explain, “[t]he extent to which a state’s policy objectives are reflected in the outcome of negotiations is firmly established as an important benchmark in the literature on the EU’s effectiveness and performance in international institutions and negotiations”.170 It follows that establishing goal achievement by itself cannot be equated with the ‘effectiveness’ of a leader, but is an important factor to consider when evaluating the capability and credibility of a given leader.171  165 Ibid at 179. 166 Ibid at 185. 167 Torney, supra note 63 at 167. 168 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 44 at 583. 169 Underdal, supra note 150 at 181; Charles F Parker & Christer Karlsson, ‘The UN climate change negotiations and the role of the United States: assessing American leadership from Copenhagen to Paris’ (2018) 27:3 Environmental Politics 519 at 521. 170 Sebastian Oberthür & Lisanne Groen, ‘Explaining goal achievement in international negotiations: the EU and the Paris Agreement on climate change’ (2018) 25:5 Journal of European Public Policy 708 at 710. 171 Ibid. 28  There is some disagreement amongst scholars regarding the extent to which a leader’s goals must be for the collective good, or whether they can be borne of self-interest.172 As Parker et al point out, a narrow conception of leadership as “the exercise of influence to set and achieve goals” does not require focus on a ‘collective good’.173 Saul et al suggest that a leader’s motivations for solving a collective problem are irrelevant, as long as she tries to solve it; however, a leader’s intention must involve wanting to contribute to the solution of a collective action problem, as well as wanting others to contribute.174 Distinguishing a leader’s true motivations behind the pursuit of its collective action goals is a complicated and potentially fruitless task. Perhaps then, what is most important is the leader’s ability to attract followers. A recent study undertaken by Parker et al highlighted that in the minds of potential climate change followers, the perception that the leader is genuinely trying to tackle the issue of climate change is important in whether they are regarded as a leader.175 For the purposes of discussion, I will rely on these results in my analysis and deduce that a leader’s motivation is to some extent important to potential followers in the climate regime, particularly as the overall objective of climate change action is overtly normative.  Another separate but related concept is the notion of negative leadership or being a “laggard”. Laggardship equates to pursuing action which is contrary to the collective action goals of leadership, such as the lowering of climate policy ambition.176 Although a laggard may attract followers, this will not be considered leadership for the purposes of my analysis. Underdal explains that, “a leader is supposed to exercise what might be called positive influence, guiding rather than vetoing collective action”.177 2.6 Leadership Modes Leadership modes are the conceptualization of the behavior that a leader exerts in order to guide or direct the behavior of others, determining an actor’s capability as a leader. Young establishes that in order to  172 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 44 at 584. 173 Ibid at 585. 174 Saul & Seidel, supra note 84 at 902 & 904. 175 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 169 at 527. 176 Walker & Biedenkopf, supra note 33 at 34. 177 Underdal, supra note 150. 29  avoid drawing flawed conclusions, the analysis of leadership behavior must be decoupled from outcomes.178 Hence, just because there is evidence of a successful outcome and the presence of a leader is identified as influential, it does not follow that the leader caused the successful outcome.179 This is an issue I will return to in Chapter 4.   Young recognized three forms of leadership: structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual.180 Following Young’s lead, Underdal developed his theory of leadership based on three different modes: leadership through unilateral action, leadership by means of coercion, and instrumental leadership.181 Most recent conceptualizations of leadership amalgamate the work of both scholars to discern four distinct types: structural, entrepreneurial, intellectual, and unilateral leadership.182 This thesis will also theorize four leadership types, as further described in the proceeding sections. 1. Structural (/Coercive - Underdal) 2. Entrepreneurial (/Instrumental – Underdal) 3. Intellectual (no Underdal equivalent) 4. Unilateral (no Young equivalent) Of these modes, Young’s structural leadership roughly correlates to Underdal’s coercive leadership and Underdal’s instrumental leadership roughly equates to include Young’s entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership.183 Structural leadership can take place either inside or outside of the negotiation process,184 and is more concerned with the relative hegemonic power of a given actor to effect change.185 Entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership are more likely to take place within the negotiation setting and  178 Young, supra note 151 at 286. 179 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 44 at 583. 180 Young, supra note 151. 181 Underdal, supra note 150 at 183. 182 Walker & Biedenkopf, supra note 33 at 34. 183 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 44 at 584–585. 184 Underdal, supra note 150 at 183. 185 Walker & Biedenkopf, supra note 33 at 33–34; See also, Young, supra note 151 at 297. Young distinguishes the concept of hegemony from leadership throughout his discussion, on hegemony he states, “[t]hose who talk of hegemony necessarily restrict leadership to the actions of a single dominant state” such as the U.S. or Great Britain.  30  involve influencing others to adopt ambitious measures using negotiation skills.186 Unilateral action takes place outside of the negotiation framework187 and involves setting an example through implementing ambitious measures.188 Unilateral and structural are what Underdal refers to as “power-based”, whereas instrumental leadership is built on ideas.189   Underdal describes how, “Leadership modes can be distinguished inter alia by the mechanism(s) through which they work as well as by the kind of capabilities required to succeed.”190 He outlines two questions that underlie much of the leadership scholarship: 1. “Which are the primary sources from which (a position of) leadership can be derived?”191  2. “How (through which strategies and tactics) is leadership exercised or how can it be?”192 In the next section I use these questions as the basis for my description of each leadership mode, the first pertaining to ‘capabilities’, and the second ‘mechanisms’. It is not my intention to provide a comprehensive list of all capabilities and mechanisms required for each of the four leadership types, but rather to give an idea of the distinctions between the four types. The distinctions described are “analytic in nature”193 Both Underdal and Young perceive that in real life negotiation settings, successful leadership is likely to involve a combination of at least two of the leadership modes described.194 Therefore, the potential exists for some overlap between the capabilities required and mechanisms used for each of the modes. In order to make the distinction between the capabilities clearer I have borrowed from transnational governance literature. Wood et al define regulatory capacities to “include symbolic and  186 Underdal, supra note 150 at 183. 187 Ibid. 188 Walker & Biedenkopf, supra note 33 at 33–34. 189 Underdal, supra note 150 at 192. 190 Ibid at 183. 191 Ibid at 181. 192 Ibid. 193 Young, supra note 151 at 288. 194 Underdal, supra note 150 at 183. 31  material resources”195. I find this distinction helpful and have included it in my explanation of the capabilities required for the leadership modes. 2.6.1 Structural Leadership  Young describes structural leaders as, “experts in translating the possession of material resources into bargaining leverage”;196 however, the types of material resources that are considered to carry weight in the bargaining process will depend on the “issues at stake”.197 Wood et al describe how material resources can include, “technology, equipment, supplies, physical facilities and finances”.198 In the field of climate change, Wurzel et al suggest that, “structural leadership rests primarily on economic power”.199 This gives the U.S., the EU, China and increasingly, India “considerable leverage in global climate politics”.200 In the climate regime, structural power also results from a country’s present and potential emissions, as well as the resources they are willing and able to provide to address such emissions (e.g. economic, technological).201 Young describes how structural leadership is also particularly sensitive to the relative bargaining positions of the individuals, and the exploitation of this by one party over another.202 Nowadays, almost every state is able to exert some influence over the behavior of others, thus structural leaders are most often those states with in a dominant position in activities or subject matter to which the negotiations relate.203 At the extreme end this mode ties in with hegemonic theories of single dominant  195 Stepan Wood et al, ‘Transnational business governance interactions, regulatory quality and marginalized actors: An introduction’ in Stepan Wood et al, eds, Transnational Business Governance Interactions: Advancing Marginalized Actors and Enhancing Regulatory Quality (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2019) 28 at 1. 196 Young, supra note 151 at 288. 197 Ibid. 198 Wood et al, supra note 195 at 9. 199 Rüdiger K W Wurzel, Duncan Liefferink & James Connelly, ‘Introduction: European Union climate leadership’ in Rüdiger K W Wurzel, Duncan Liefferink & James Connelly, eds, The European Union in International Climate Change Politics: Still Taking a Lead? (London: Routledge, 2016) 3 at 9. 200 Wurzel, Liefferink & Connelly, supra note 146 at 294. 201 Grubb & Gupta, supra note 145 at 19. 202 Young, supra note 151 at 289. 203 Underdal, supra note 150. 32  state, but as Grubb and Gupta acknowledge, “[t]he global and long-term nature of the climate change problem means that pure hegemony is not relevant to climate change.”204 Structural leaders are adept at using their political and economic weight to obtain an advantage in negotiations.205 Using a “sticks and carrots” approach,206 structural leaders seek to alter the behavior of other actors,  through the use of promises and/or threats to encourage or influence the behavior of other nations.207 Timing, reputation and ability to tactically employ power resources is important if they are to be considered credible.208 For example, as Underdal states, “In tactical diplomacy an actor may promise or threaten to do things it would not contemplate except for the purpose of influencing the behavior of others”.209  2.6.2 Entrepreneurial Leadership  Young describes the source of the entrepreneurial leader’s capability as, “the existence of a bargainer’s surplus” in tandem with “collective action problems” which are frustrating the parties’ efforts to find a bargain in order to reap the surplus.210 A “bargainers surplus” will exist where there is potential for an identifiable set of parties to achieve joint benefits through coordination of their behavior, in a manner agreeable to all.211 Young recognizes that this scenario will often arise in the supply of public goods, but this is not the only situation.212 Unlike structural leadership, though the backing of a “powerful state” is useful in exercising entrepreneurial leadership, “such backing is not a necessary condition” of this  204 Grubb & Gupta, supra note 145 at 19; See also, Morton, supra note 16 at 481. She describes how, “leadership seen as a social process of bargaining, negotiation, and persuasion to achieve a common goal” moves away from the idea that “institutions merely act as a function of the prevailing power hierarchy…or are created by dominant powers during periods of hegemony”. 205 Young, supra note 151 at 289. 206 Underdal, supra note 150 at 186. 207 Ibid. 208 Young, supra note 151 at 290. 209 Underdal, supra note 150 at 186. 210 Young, supra note 151 at 293. 211 Ibid. Note: Young further describes how conventional theories of bargaining may assume that rational parties would be able to find agreement in these circumstances without the need for an entrepreneurial leader. 212 Ibid at 294. 33  leadership mode.213 This suggests that entrepreneurial leaders can draw either from material or symbolic resources to strengthen their negotiating position (I describe symbolic sources further in my explanation of intellectual leadership at 2.6.3 below).   So how does an entrepreneurial leader help parties to “reap the bargainer’s surplus” in negotiation settings?214 Wurzel et al describe how, “entrepreneurial leadership involves diplomatic, negotiating and bargaining efforts which are necessary for finding compromise solutions in climate change negotiations.”215 Often, entrepreneurial leaders will act as “agenda setters” during the detailed stages of negotiation.216 They will use their negotiating skill during the back-and-forth of the debate to find agreement and compromise in areas where participants might otherwise have fallen short.217 They do this through devising “innovative policy options” and brokering deals to line up support for viable paths forward.218 Other participants put their faith in the entrepreneurial leader’s ability to “find the way”219 for example by drawing attention to the most important issues in an agenda.220 In general, entrepreneurial leadership is more concerned with the immediate negotiating skill and style of the actor. As such, the credibility of an entrepreneurial leader is measured by their ability to achieve deals in negotiation settings.  Young suggests that there is “no barrier” to the emergence of multiple entrepreneurial leaders.221 2.6.3 Intellectual Leadership  The capability of the intellectual leader stems from her ability to use “the power of ideas to shape the intellectual capital available to those engaged in institutional bargaining.”222 By bringing new knowledge to bear on a particular problem and illustrating the effects of inaction or failure to find a solution, a leader can  213 Ibid at 295. 214 Ibid at 294. 215 Wurzel, Liefferink & Connelly, supra note 199 at 10. 216 Young, supra note 151 at 294. 217 Ibid at 293. 218 Ibid at 294. 219 Underdal, supra note 150 at 187. 220 Young, supra note 151 at 294. 221 Ibid at 297. 222 Ibid at 300. 34  try to change the positions of the other parties.223 In transnational governance literature, this may be thought of as “symbolic resources”, which include “knowledge, skill, expertise, motivation and commitment”.224 This method of leadership has been described as “consciousness raising”.225 Young refers expressly to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ when considering the role of instrumental leaders, highlighting the importance of this mode of leadership throughout the twentieth century to reframe debates based on ‘bigger picture’ ideals surrounding issues such as resource collapse.226  In contrast to the entrepreneurial leader’s focus on negotiating skill to reap the bargainer’s surplus, the intellectual leader is a “thinker” who looks to articulate “systems of thought”.227 These systems of thought form the “substratum” underlying the rationale on which the bargaining takes place. As such, the intellectual leader generates ideas that are often built upon by entrepreneurial leaders.228 Young therefore also distinguishes the two by timescales; if we are to consider the role of the entrepreneurial leader as shorter term and confined to the negotiation process, the role of the intellectual leader is likely to be on a longer timescale and involves shaping the perspectives of participants over periods that could span many years.229 For example, in the case of the Montreal Protocol, the UNEP had been working to garner political and public interest for over a decade before the agreement was finally signed.230   The mechanisms through which this mode works can include persuasion through expertise, scientific and experiential knowledge.231 By identifying problems and promoting solutions, the intellectual leader seeks to alter the negotiating positions and behavior of other actors over the entire course of the negotiation process and her credibility is judged by how successfully this is achieved.  223 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 44 at 585. 224 Wood et al, supra note 195 at 9. 225 Raino Malnes, ‘“Leader” and “Entrepreneur” in International Negotiations: A Conceptual Analysis’ (1995) 1:1 European Journal of International Relations 87 at 101. 226 Young, supra note 151 at 299. 227 Ibid at 300–301. 228 Ibid. 229 Ibid at 298. 230 Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 40. 231 Wurzel, Liefferink & Connelly, supra note 146 at 292. 35  2.6.4 Leadership Through Unilateral Action Unilateral leadership involves leading by example. In setting the pace, unilateral leaders hope to demonstrate the effectiveness of a solution to a collective problem and thereby encourage others to follow.232  Oftentimes, this involves the adoption of a particular policy to prove its viability and potential to address the problem at hand.233 It can also take the form of social persuasion.234 In demonstrating unilateral leadership, again, credibility is key. Underdal points out that, “‘Cheap’ acts may not do, though: the moral significance of a move will often depend, inter alia, on the amount of sacrifice incurred by the actor.”235  Saul et al elaborate that one important way for unilateral leaders to demonstrate credibility is through achieving their “self-imposed goals”.236 This concept of leading by example is advocated by some groups of environmentalists who perceive that government’s taking unilateral action on environmental concerns such as pollution can help strengthen demand in other countries for similar standards.237  2.6.5 A Note on Credibility and Capability As we can see from the analysis of the different leadership modes set out above, each leadership mode is exerted by drawing from different capabilities, through various mechanisms and is dependent on different types of credibility. For example, the unilateral leader demonstrating the feasibility of a certain policy option must have the know-how to design and implement an innovative policy option i.e. the capability. But to demonstrate credibility, she must also be able to show that such a policy option works.  On the other hand, a structural leader must not only have the capability to offer incentives or issue threats, but also the political will (credibility) to follow through on her word.238 Consequently, the two concepts are clearly linked, as to exert a particular mode of leadership demands the ability to  232 Underdal, supra note 150 at 183–184. 233 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 44 at 584. 234 Underdal, supra note 150. 235 Ibid at 185. 236 Saul & Seidel, supra note 84 at 902. 237 Underdal, supra note 150 at 185. 238 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 44 at 586. 36  demonstrate the capabilities and mechanisms described, which in turn provides credibility, and vice versa. Again, this is analogous to transnational governance literature, in which resources are “capacities that regulators mobilize to achieve their goals”, but conversely, “resources are also the rewards regulators reap when they achieve their goals”.239 As set out above, in leadership theory, capability and credibility are also linked to goal achievement. Returning to the example of the unilateral leader, the credibility that a unilateral leader gains from demonstrating a policy option works (the reward), makes her more able to exert social persuasion (capabilities) and gain more credibility. 2.7 Conclusion  “Effective global cooperation on climate change is ultimately about motivating nation-states to take action beyond what they would consider to be in their national interest in the absence of global cooperation”240 The Paris Agreement represents one of the most ambitious collective actions that has been attempted in human history and “it appears to command universal, or near universal, acceptance”241. The act of 197 nations signing the Paris Agreement will not by itself avert the worst of the global crisis facing us,242 but it has the potential to catalyze the level of response that is needed.243 This chapter has presented the problem of climate change as a collective action problem. Through this, I have shown that the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement presents a very real threat to the climate regime, both in theory and in practice; however, it does not necessarily spell the demise of the agreement. Fortunately, through insights from scholars such as Ostrom, we have moved away from the conventional theories of  239 Stepan Wood et al, ‘Harnessing TBGIs to advance regulatory quality and marginalised actors’ in Stepan Wood et al, eds, Transnational Business Governance Interactions: Advancing Marginalized Actors and Enhancing Regulatory Quality (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2019) 363 at 370. 240 Doelle, supra note 23 at 2–3. 241 Bodansky, supra note 14 at 291. 242 Hilton & Kerr, supra note 41 at 55. 243 Robert O Keohane & Michael Oppenheimer, ‘Paris: Beyond the Climate Dead End through Pledge and Review?’ (2016) 4:3 Politics and Governance 142; David G Victor, ‘What the Framework Convention on Climate Change Teaches Us About Cooperation on Climate Change’ (2016) 4:3 Politics and Governance 133 at 138; Bodansky, supra note 14 at 290. 37  collective action which “assumed that management of any shared natural resource could be modeled as a single-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma”.244 In the next chapter I will explore the role leadership has to play in response to the problems presented by collective action on climate change. Leadership theory holds that, although leadership is not in and of itself a solution, effective leadership can assist in the formation of international regimes and the establishment of the leadership credibility of an actor. The next chapter aims to shed light on the extent to which the EU and China have exercised leadership in the climate regime to date. This involves an explanatory analysis of their capability and credibility based on the criteria outlined above, paying particular attention to the exercise of the leadership modes described.  244 A Prisoner’s Dilemma is a situation where the circumstances are such that an individual is incentivised to choose an option which is less optimal than if he cooperated with another individual. Often it is framed in terms of two prisoners and their incentives to confess. For an example of its application to climate change see, Tim Harford, ‘Climate change and the prisoner’s dilemma’, The Financial Times (23 January 2020), online: <https://www.ft.com/content/5312691c-3d3c-11ea-b232-000f4477fbca%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 38   CHAPTER 3: How Was Leadership Exercised in the Negotiation of the Paris Agreement? 3.1 Introduction  The previous chapter outlined the theory behind the role of leadership in facilitating international cooperation. A specialized field of this research has concentrated on the role of leadership in the area of climate change: the most challenging collective action problem of our time. Different versions of collective action theory have conceptualized the difficulty in mobilizing countries to act on international climate agreements, when it is perceived to be in their best interest to free ride on the commitments of other states.245 As was shown in the previous chapter, the influence of a leader can greatly assist in the creation of international regimes. Parker et al explain that, “[s]cholarship on international cooperation has posited that leadership is a crucial determinant in overcoming obstacles associated with reaching international agreements and establishing international institutions.”246 As mentioned in the first chapter, there have historically been three main players in the field of climate change leadership: the EU, the U.S. and with increasing frequency, China. The EU is generally considered to be the most well-established leader in this sphere and is therefore the most common focus of research. The EU began promoting itself as a leadership candidate in climate change matters before the turn of the century, since then it has been regarded as “a leading force in the development of the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change regime” by numerous practitioners and scholars.247 In the early years, its leadership title was predominantly self-declared and largely unchallenged by other nations.248  However, as this chapter will explore, in recent years it has been necessary for the EU to adjust its strategy in order to maintain its credibility to leadership claims, particularly in the wake of the “bitter disappointment” of COP 15 in Copenhagen.249 This is partly due to of  245 Shaffer, supra note 27 at 681; Keohane & Victor, supra note 77. 246 Parker et al, supra note 47 at 268. 247 Afionis, supra note 39 at 341. 248 Diarmuid Torney, ‘Conclusion’ in European Climate Leadership in Question: Policies toward China and India (London, England: MIT Press, 2015) 183 at 183. 249 Bodansky, supra note 20 at 143. 39  the temporary reappearance in the spotlight of the United States and the steadily increasing engagement of China. During the Obama administration, the United States returned to the forefront of climate diplomacy and embarked on a strengthened bilateral relationship with China.250 However, as noted previously, the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement under the Trump administration plainly puts U.S. claims to climate leadership to rest until at least the next US election in late 2020.251 Still, as I will explore in the first and second sections of this chapter, the actions of the United States have heavily influenced both the trajectory of the climate regime and the actions of the EU and China, and therefore deserve attention. Over the course of the climate regime, China’s reputation has evolved from that of a climate laggard to a more prominent cooperator. China is not subject to the same level of domestic political constraints as democratic countries such as the U.S. when it comes to climate change discussions, and the rhetoric of the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP) suggests its climate leadership ambitions are more likely to be permanent.  Hilton and Kerr predict that China’s shift to “a more positive stance in climate negotiations is intended to be both structural and long term.”252 In this chapter, I apply leadership theory to the EU and China to analyze their leadership throughout the climate regime. The focus of this chapter is explanatory, reviewing primary and secondary literature to identify the exercise of leadership behavior by China and the EU. The objective of this exercise is two-fold. Firstly, by identifying leadership behavior one can establish whether an actor has necessary capabilities to exert a particular style of leadership. Secondly, in identifying such capabilities,  250 Johannes Urpelainen & Thijs Van De Graaf, ‘United States non-cooperation and the Paris agreement’ (2018) 18:7 839 at 841. 251 Although beyond the scope of this thesis, an interesting point of future research could examine the extent to which the withdrawal of the U.S. has influenced states and sub-state actors to step-up to demonstrate climate leadership. For example, the “United States Climate Alliance” represents almost half of the states in the U.S. and 55% of the U.S. population. Members of the alliance have declared that they intend to meet the targets of the Paris Agreement despite the withdrawal of the U.S. See United States Climate Alliance, ‘States United for Climate Action’ United States Climate Alliance online:< http://www.usclimatealliance.org/> accessed 24 June 2020 252 Hilton & Kerr, supra note 41 at 55. 40  we can begin to determine the leadership credibility of that actor. As described in the previous chapter, the two characteristics are mutually reinforcing. Part of the focus with regards credibility will also involve an assessment of goal achievement by each of the actors to determine to what extent the outcomes of negotiations reflected their individual policy objectives.  The chapter is divided into three parts: in the first section, I set out a brief history of climate change leadership, from the UNFCCC until the Copenhagen Accord. The second and third parts of this chapter form the main focus of my enquiry into the leadership modes described in chapter two: structural, entrepreneurial, intellectual and unilateral. In part II, I examine the roles of the EU and China in the build up to and throughout the negotiation of the Paris Agreement. Being the most recent international climate agreement, this provides the most contemporary negotiation setting within which to analyze the actions of each actor. In turn, this provides justification for my focus on the EU and China in Chapter 4. The final third of the chapter focusses on unilateral leadership, specifically with regards to renewable energy laws and policy of the EU and China. As unilateral leadership is concerned with establishing a track record over time, this section of the chapter will cover the period from the implementation of the UNFCCC through until the Paris Agreement.   3.2 Part I: UNFCCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 3.2.1 EU leadership 1990 – 2009 Scientists began to raise the alarm about the existence of climate change in the 1970s, but it was not until the 1990s that the need for international global action on climate change was officially recognized on the world stage. In 1990, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 45/212, beginning formal negotiations for an international climate change treaty. In the early stages of the climate regime, the EU began to exert intellectual leadership with comparatively less weight in unilateral, entrepreneurial and structural leadership.253 The Dublin European Council was the first to explicitly identify European leadership in 1990, where at the time it was seen as a popular means to improve the European  253 Walker & Biedenkopf, supra note 33 at 34. 41  integration process.254 Protection of the environment was explicitly identified in the Maastricht Treaty (Article 2)255 but it was not until the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 that a specific climate change mandate was included:256 “ENVIRONMENT (CLIMATE CHANGE) 143) Article 174 shall be amended as follows: (a) in paragraph 1, the fourth indent shall be replaced by the following: ‘—promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change.’;”257 Demonstrating intellectual leadership, the EU first began pushing for legally binding targets to limit GHG emissions during the negotiations for the UNFCCC.258  As Bäckstrand and Elgström explain, “[t]he EU’s vision of a future climate governance order [was] a legally binding regime with medium and long- term cuts in emissions of [GHGs] negotiated”.259 Its insistence on legally binding targets and strong compliance mechanisms was reflective of its internal institutional workings.260 By advocating for a system which in many ways represented the EU’s internal experience of multilateralism, the EU was exerting entrepreneurial leadership by pushing for a ‘vision’, supported by symbolic resources such as expertise and knowledge.  However, the relative structural power of the U.S. and the EU played a key role in the regime negotiations for the UNFCCC, with the U.S. holding the more dominant position.261 Thus, due to  254 Torney, supra note 248; Sebastian Oberthür & Claire Roche Kelly, ‘EU leadership in international climate policy: Achievements and challenges?’ (2008) 43:3 International Spectator 35. 255 Council of the European Union, ‘How Maastricht changed Europe: New tools for a new European agenda’, online: Council of the European Union <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/maastricht-treaty/%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 256 European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community 2007/C 306/01 (entered into force 13 December 2007), [Lisbon Treaty] Article 143,  257 ibid. 258 Oberthür & Groen, supra note 170 at 709. 259 Karin Bäckstrand & Ole Elgström, ‘The EU’s role in climate change negotiations: from leader to “leadiator”’ (2013) 20:10 Journal of European Public Policy 1359 at 1371. 260 Ibid. 261 Cinnamon Carlarne, Kevin R Gray & Richard Tarasofsky, ‘International Climate Change Law: Mapping The Field’ in Kevin R Gray, Richard Tarasofsky & Cinnamon Carlane, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 1 at 8. 42  opposition by the U.S. (amongst other developed countries), the aspiration for emissions targets was codified as a non-binding aim in Article 4.2 of the treaty, rather than as a legal obligation.262 Debates about the legal character of targets have been a recurrent theme to this day in the history of the climate regime, as I will explore further in Chapter 4.  The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted in 1992, and formally came into force on 21 March 1994. Today, it holds near universal membership, with 197 Parties to the agreement.  The UNFCCC is a framework document, which outlines the parameters within which states define their roles and commitments. As such, the convention itself does not set out measures for regulating climate change, but rather creates a basis for negotiating multilateral solutions. The first variant of this was set out in the Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted in 1997 and came into force in 2005. From the outset, the architecture of the Kyoto Protocol was also heavily influenced by the United States.263 As shown earlier, being the largest net global greenhouse gas emitter, it was understood that problems of legitimacy and free-riding would be amplified without the contribution of the U.S.264 Furthermore, the protocol was being negotiated in the wake of the Montreal Protocol, considered the most successful environmental agreement to date, in which the U.S. took a pivotal role.265 Consequently, in order to ensure that the U.S. became a party, the EU was required to exercise entrepreneurial leadership by making concessions and finding compromise during the negotiations.  For example, the EU submitted to the U.S.’ position on the Clean Development Mechanism, but  in exchange, the EU’s vision of legally binding targets was codified in the Kyoto Protocol.266 Here, we see the EU drawing upon both material and symbolic resources in order to exert entrepreneurial leadership. On the one hand, its position as the second largest GHG emitter (hence possession of material resource) enabled it to bargain  262 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102–38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [the UNFCCC], Article 4.2; for commentary, see also, Bodansky, supra note 20 at 143. 263 Oberthür & Kelly, supra note 254 at 36. 264 Carlarne, Gray & Tarasofsky, supra note 261 at 8. 265 Karin Bäckstrand & Ole Elgström, ‘The EU’s role in climate change negotiations: from leader to “leadiator”’ (2013) 20:10 Journal of European Public Policy 1359 at 1374; see also, John Vogler & Charlotte Bretherton, ‘The European Union as a Protagonist to United States on Climate Change’ (2006) 7:1 International Studies Perspectives 1 at 2. 266 As Walker & Biedenkopf describe, this “allowed wealthy developed nations to purchase emission reduction credits from other parts of the world instead of reducing their own emissions”, see Walker & Biedenkopf, supra note 33 at 35. 43  with the largest emitter, but on the other, it drew upon symbolic resources such as commitment and motivation to push through its vision of legally binding targets. This also demonstrates the different timescales involved in entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership discussed in the previous chapter. Although in this example, the EU played both roles, the EU as an entrepreneurial leader in the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol drew upon the ideas created in its role as an intellectual leader in the lead up to the UNFCCC, to ensure that eventually, its ideas were accepted.  As Bäckstrand and Elgström explain: “Its insistence on legally binding targets, as expressed by the Kyoto Protocol, and on strong compliance mechanisms may be seen as a reflection of its own internal experiences. The EU’s vision of a future climate governance order is a legally binding regime with medium and long- term cuts in emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) negotiated... It advocates clearly defined targets and timetables that are based upon sound science, and has over the years made unilateral pledges to reduce its own emissions.”267 Article three sets out that all Annex I parties, (meaning those developed countries listed in Annex I), are required to reduce their emissions of anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) in line with the commitments set out in Annex B:   Article 3 “The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.” Unlike the UNFCCC, the Protocol imposes binding emissions reductions targets on developed states to be achieved in phase one (2008-2012) and phase two (2013-2020). Targets are to be met by the implementation of domestic policies.268   267 Bäckstrand & Elgström, supra note 259 at 1371. 268 Stuart Bruce, ‘The Sustainable Energy Transition through International and EU Law’ in Stephen Minas & Vassilis Ntousas, eds, EU Climate Diplomacy: Politics, Law and Negotiations, 1st Edition (London: Routledge, 2018) 67 at 70. 44  As was later mirrored in the ratification provisions of the Paris Agreement, the Protocol required the “ratification, acceptance or approval”269 of at least 55 countries, representing 55% of the world’s emissions in 1990 for it to come into force, in accordance with Article 25.270 The U.S. signed the agreement on 12 November 1998,271 but delayed ratification of the agreement, in part due its internal political situation. Meeting the threshold without the participation of the United States was particularly challenging given that in 2001, the U.S. represented 23.5% of CO2 emissions.272 Lamentably, the U.S. formally withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, after the inauguration of President George W. Bush.273 Scholars have noted the “catalytic impact” of this decision on EU climate diplomacy.274 In response, the EU and its member states moved to increase the number of ratifications by other signatories, to ensure the 55% threshold was met.275 Walker and Biedenkopf describe how the departure of the U.S. created “a vacuum that the EU filled by ramping up its entrepreneurial leadership”.276 This was evidenced by the credit it is given for its role in securing the positive outcome of the Marrakesh Accords in 2001, in which the implementation rules were determined.277 For example, Oberthür and Dupont describe how the EU strengthened its diplomatic effort by “sending missions to key countries”, demonstrating its determination to find compromise and agreement.278 In fact, during this period, the EU employed various different leadership modes to step up and fill the hole that the United States left.279 Demonstrating unilateral leadership, the European Council pledged that the EU would reach its Kyoto target unilaterally,  269 The Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Article 4 270 UNFCCC, ‘The Kyoto Protocol - Status of Ratification’, online: UNFCCC <https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol/status-of-ratification%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 271 United Nations, ‘Status of Treaties: Depositary’, online: United Nations Treaty Collection <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-a&chapter=27&clang=_en#3%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 272 Hannah Ritchie & Max Roser, ‘CO2 and Greenhouse Gas Emissions’, (2017), online: Our World in Data <https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions> accessed 24 June 2020. 273 Paul Reynolds, ‘Kyoto: Why did the US pull out?’, BBC News (30 March 2001), online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1248757.stm> accessed 24 June 2020. 274 Torney, supra note 248. 275 Carlarne, Gray & Tarasofsky, supra note 261 at 9. 276 Walker & Biedenkopf, supra note 33 at 35. 277 Ibid. 278 Oberthür & Dupont, supra note 39 at 79. 279 Bogojević, supra note 60 at 673. 45  regardless of the progress of other Parties.280 In doing so, the EU showed its readiness to ‘lead by example’ and achieve the goals it had set for itself, two traits that are important for a unilateral leader. Then, in 2004, the EU used its structural bargaining power to gain Russia’s ratification of the protocol.281 This was achieved by drawing on its material resource in the form of “support of Russia’s candidacy for membership of the World Trade Organization”, which was duly given in exchange for Russia’s Kyoto membership.282 This pact ensured the satisfaction of the Article 25 provisions,283 following which, the Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005.284 The EU is widely credited with ‘saving’ the protocol.285 3.2.2 China’s Presence in the International Climate Regime 1990s - 2009 China became party to the UNFCCC in June 1992, formally ratifying the treaty in January 1993, during what Wang describes as China’s “learning phase” of climate response.286 At this stage, climate change featured relatively lowly in the domestic development priorities of China, and this was evident in its international negotiation style, as well as its internal arrangements for climate change negotiations.287 The first time we see China flexing its structural power and intellectual leadership in the climate regime is as a representative of developing countries. Before entering the UNFCCC negotiations, China spent time and resource on formulating its internal unified negotiating position.288 Once this position was established, it began work on discerning a set of common principles to unite and guide the developing world in the negotiations.289   280 Oberthür & Dupont, supra note 39 at 79. 281 Walker & Biedenkopf, supra note 33 at 35–36. 282 Bäckstrand & Elgström, supra note 259 at 1376. 283 Ibid. 284 UNFCCC, supra note 259. 285 Oberthür & Kelly, supra note 254 at 36; Walker & Biedenkopf, supra note 33 at 35. 286Wang considers the ‘learning phase’ to have lasted from 1989 to 1995. See, Alex Wang, ‘Climate Change Policy and Law in China’ in Kevin R Gray, Richard Tarasofsky & Cinnamon Carlane, eds, The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 636 at 640.  287 Ibid. 288 Michael T Hatch, ‘Chinese politics, energy policy, and the international climate change negotiations’ (2003) Global Warming and East Asia: The Domestic and International Politics of Climate Change 43 at 51. 289 Ibid. 46  Throughout the negotiation of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, China sought to ensure that developing countries would not be subject to binding emissions targets.290 China’s aversion to such a cap on its emissions was two-fold. Firstly, it held the view that the historical responsibility of developing countries for their contribution to climate change over the previous two centuries meant that developed countries had the duty to act first in redressing the problem.291 Secondly, any cap on China’s emissions had the potential to inhibit its right to develop, a right that industrialized nations had enjoyed unhindered by environmental responsibility.  These objections were embodied in the two limbs of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in Article 3 to the UNFCCC and Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol:  Article 3 PRINCIPLES “In their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention and to implement its provisions, the Parties shall be guided, inter alia, by the following:  1. The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” The entrenchment of this ‘vision’ as a principle has often been emphasized by Chinese negotiators in subsequent negotiations.292  Other core elements of China’s original negotiating position included: a reliance on the uncertainty of the science surrounding the climate change debate; opposing any conditions that might be placed on aid or development financing for developing countries (in relation to climate change action); and requesting that developed countries should transfer new funding and technology to developing countries to help them combat climate change.293  290 Bernauer et al, supra note 72 at 155. 291 Hatch, supra note 288 at 50. 292 Wang, supra note 286 at 640. 293 Hatch, supra note 288 at 50. 47  China actively participated in the negotiations that led to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Due to concerns that this would lead to targets for developing countries, China was initially reluctant to accept any form of binding emissions targets for developed countries. However, as Hatch explains, “Once it was clear that this possibility was off the negotiating table, China accepted the position put forward in an Indian draft specifying that only developed nations would be bound by emissions targets.”294 Consequently, China was designated a non-Annex I country without binding emissions reduction targets,295 it ratified the Protocol on 30 August 2002.296 China’s unwillingness to accept binding emissions targets shaped its negotiating position throughout the early stages of the climate change regime.297 However, maintaining this position became gradually more perverse when in 2006, China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases.298 As a result, China’s energy intensive development pathway increasingly came under international scrutiny.299 Bodansky explains that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities was never perfectly reflected in the UNFCCC’s annex, but as globalization took hold, it became ever more outdated.300  As Chinese emissions grew, it became more and more difficult for China to use per capita emissions totals as a basis for differential treatment. 301  294 Ibid at 51. 295 Kyoto Protocol supra note 118, Annex I. 296 United Nations, supra note 271. 297 Carlarne, Gray & Tarasofsky, supra note 261 at 10. 298 In 2006, China had surpassed the United States as the largest national emitter of greenhouse gases. However, Chinese per capita emissions remain far lower than those of the United States. See The New York Times, ‘China overtakes U.S. in greenhouse gas emissions’, The New York Times (20 June 2007), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-emit.1.6227564.html> accessed 24 June 2020. 299 Bernauer et al, supra note 72 at 155. 300 See, Bodansky, supra note 14 at 298. He describes how rapidly newly industrialised nations such as Qatar and Singapore were in theory still ‘developing countries’ under the UNFCCC, despite being the richest in the world.  301 Miranda A Schreurs, ‘The paris climate agreement and the three largest emitters: China, the United States, and the European union’ (2016) 4:3 Politics and Governance. 48  3.3 Part II: From Copenhagen to Paris 3.3.1 The Copenhagen Accord  In the period from 2006-2009 the positions of the two largest emitting nations started to evolve. China showed readiness to welcome a more comprehensive engagement on climate change both domestically and internationally around the time of the UN Climate Conference in Bali in 2007.302 In 2008, Obama won the U.S. election. Upon entering office in 2009, Obama signaled his intention for the U.S. to take a leading role in climate change. A primary strategy for achieving this was through its improved bilateral relationship with China.303 By the time the parties came to the negotiating table at Copenhagen in 2009, China (along with other BASIC countries) had signposted that they would be willing to change their negotiation stance on binding emissions.304 However, the Copenhagen Accord was widely regarded as a failure. In the run up to COP15, the EU had announced its desire to “’[lead] global action’ against climate change ‘to 2020 and beyond’”. 305 But the EU’s failure to exercise effective entrepreneurial leadership left it “somewhat marginalized in Copenhagen”.306 Despite showing unilateral leadership in enacting the 20-20-20 targets307 (discussed further in Part III below) and intellectual leadership in advocating for one of the most ambitious positions in the negotiations (a legally binding agreement, peaking of global emissions by 2020 and global emissions reductions by 50% on 1990 levels by 2050),308 it relied too heavily on these leadership modes to try to influence the outcome of the debates. Its ambitious visions were not shared by other parties and it failed to effectively employ entrepreneurial leadership mechanisms such as negotiation and bargaining efforts to influence them during the negotiation process.309  The EU’s attempts  302 Wang, supra note 286 at 640. 303 Schreurs, supra note 301 at 221. 304 Carlarne, Gray & Tarasofsky, supra note 261 at 10. 305 Parker, Karlsson & Hjerpe, supra note 48 at 240. 306 Parker et al, supra note 47 at 281. 307 European Commission, ‘2020 climate & energy package’, (2020), online: Climate Strategies and Targets <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020_en%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 308 Walker & Biedenkopf, supra note 33 at 36. 309 Oberthür & Dupont, supra note 39 at 84–85. 49  to use structural leadership were also in vain. It had offered incentives to developing countries in the form of financing mitigation actions in exchange for their support of the EU’s vision for Copenhagen; but ultimately these ‘carrots’ were unsuccessful in gaining followers.310 Hence, although it arguably still held some material resources to mobilize as a structural leader (in the form of finance and emissions status),311 it was unable to strategically mobilize these resources to influence other states’ behavior. Further, when compared to the relative structural power of the U.S. and China, the EU’s influence with respect current and future GHG emissions had been steadily declining.312  For example, in 2012, EU CO2 emissions accounted for 10% of the global share, whereas the US and China accounted for 15% and 27% respectively.313  At Copenhagen, China moved to exercise its structural power as a key “veto player”314 to block progress towards a comprehensive treaty with legally binding emissions, maintaining its earlier position with regards the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities that targets should only apply to developed states.315 The U.S. on the other hand, would only accept a legal agreement if targets were to apply equally to all nations.316 Seeing that China and India would block a deal containing specific targets for developing nations, the U.S. took the initiative in the negotiation process and sought to strike a deal with China and the other BASIC countries during the course of a private meeting, excluding the input of the EU.317 Regardless of high expectations for what could be achieved, a binding global treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol failed to materialize. Instead, the result was the “disappointing” Copenhagen Accord:  310 Parker, Karlsson & Hjerpe, supra note 48 at 246–247. 311 For comparison with the 2012 figures below and to demonstrate the EU’s historical weight, it is interesting to note that cumulative statistics stood at China 11%, USA 27% and the EU 25%, see Ritchie & Roser, supra note 272. 312 Oberthür & Groen, supra note 170 at 711; Parker et al, supra note 47 at 281. 313 Ritchie & Roser, supra note 272. 314 Bäckstrand & Elgström, supra note 259 at 1373. 315 Bodansky, supra note 70; "The official position of the Chinese Government was explicitly outlined in the document ‘Implementation of the Bali Roadmap: China’s Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (PMPRCUN, 2009)’, which specified four guiding principles. The second of these guiding principles was 'the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities'” See Paul Howard, ‘From “Harmony” to a “Dream”: China’s Evolving Position on Climate Change’ in Moazzem Hossain, Robert Hales & Tapan Sarker, eds, Pathways to a Sustainable Economy: Bridging the Gap between Paris Climate Change Commitments and Net Zero Emissions (2017) 1 at 131. 316 Bodansky, supra note 14 at 295. 317 Afionis, supra note 39 at 342. 50  an interim political, rather than legal agreement,318 which, in spite of fostering agreement between leaders representing all of the world’s major economies, did not win universal acceptance from the conference.319  For this reason, the Accord was only “take[n] note” 320 of by the UNFCCC through decision 2/CP.15., rather than officially adopted by the [Conference of] Parties.321 As Torney describes, “[t]he result was a strikingly minimalist final agreement that contrasted sharply with the EU’s preferred approach to global climate governance”, illustrative of the EU’s failed attempts at entrepreneurial leadership.322   The success of the Paris Agreement is often framed in hindsight of what went wrong at COP15. On reflection, Underdal [and others] propose that the memory of Copenhagen set the scene for more receptive attendees, who were much more eager to entertain the French hosts’ approach.323 In many ways, despite justified criticism, COP15 marked a “pivotal moment” in the progression of the international climate regime.324 3.3.2 The EU in Paris The process of turning the tide was formally put in motion in Durban in 2011.325 Following its unprecedented marginalisation during the Copenhagen Accord negotiations, the EU rethought its approach to negotiations in the run up to the Conference of Parties in Paris.326 “Recognizing its failure to act as an entrepreneurial leader” (as described above in section 3.3.1), the EU realized the importance of  318 Parker et al, supra note 47 at 278; Bodansky, supra note 14 at 292. 319 Bodansky, supra note 14 at 292. 320 Note: in order to be adopted, a decision must receive unanimous consent from all parties, see Jacob Werksman, ‘“Taking Note” of the Copenhagen Accord: What It Means’, (2009), online: World Resources Institute <https://www.wri.org/blog/2009/12/taking-note-copenhagen-accord-what-it-means> accessed 24 June 2020. 321 UNFCCC “Report of the Conference of Parties on its fifteenth session, held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009: Addendum: Decisions adopted by the Conference of Parties” FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010) online:<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf> accessed 24 June 2020. 322 Diarmuid Torney, ‘Introduction’ in European Climate Leadership in Question: Policies toward China and India (London, England: MIT Press, 2015) 1 at 2. 323 Underdal, supra note 146 at 180. 324 Peter Christoff, ‘The promissory note: COP 21 and the Paris Climate Agreement’ (2016) 25:5 Environmental Politics 765 at 767. 325 Doelle, supra note 23 at 6. 326 Oberthür & Groen, supra note 36 at 1. 51  working on its external facing diplomacy and making an effort to grasp the “new world order”.327 This included an emphasis on understanding and processing the divergent negotiating positions of other parties and bridge building as a means to find a progressive common ground between actors in advance of the conference start.328 For example, member states of the EU and the European Commission improved their bilateral diplomacy, forming ties with countries such as China and Brazil,329 resulting in ‘The Brazilian-German Joint Statement on Climate Change – Brasilia, August 20,2015’ and the ‘China and France Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change Beijing 2 November 2015’.330 Oberthür et al describe how the EU focussed on amassing a broad coalition of parties sharing the same ambition across the developed-developing divide in order to find the bargainer’s surplus,331 which this time round meant seeking out those areas of climate diplomacy upon which parties’ could agree, as opposed to steadfastly sticking to a pre-determined negotiating position. The EU’s role in building the “Coalition of High Ambition” became a defining point of the EU’s successful entrepreneurial leadership .332 The coalition was credited with playing a crucial part in shaping the Paris Agreement.333 The group fashioned an alliance between developing and developed countries to focus on key issues of commonality, many of which were included in the final agreement.334 Migues Arias Cañete, the EU Climate Action and Energy Commissioner described how, “a sentiment of frustration, and  327 Afionis, supra note 39 at 342; Walker & Biedenkopf, supra note 33 at 37. 328 Oberthür & Groen, supra note 36 at 2; Oberthür, supra note 60 at 122. 329 Oberthür, supra note 60 at 122. 330 Brasil Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Brazilian-German Joint Statement on Climate Change – Brasília, August 20,2015’, (2015), online: Brasil Ministry of Foreign Affairs <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/press-releases/10945-brazilian-german-joint-statement-on-climate-change> accessed 24 June 2020; Ministère de l’europe et des affaires Étrangères, ‘China and France Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change (Beijing, 2 November 2015)’, (2015), online: France in the United Kingdom: French Embassy in London <https://uk.ambafrance.org/France-and-China-issue-joint-statement-on-climate-action> accessed 24 June 2020. 331 Oberthür & Groen, supra note 36 at 1. 332 Parker, Karlsson & Hjerpe, supra note 48 at 248. 333 The European Commission, ‘COP24: EU and allies in breakthrough agreement to step up ambition’, (2018), online: European Commission <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/cop24-eu-and-allies-breakthrough-agreement-step-ambition_en%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 334 Christoff, supra note 324 at 772. 52  even political humiliation” was felt by many European delegates after Copenhagen.335 He explained that, in forming the High Ambition Coalition, Europe sought to reassert its ambition in climate negotiations. The coalition was supported financially and diplomatically by the EU and in advance of the COP21 showing the EU’s reliance on material (financial) and symbolic (expertise) resources to exert its entrepreneurial leadership. Cañete and the head, Tony de Brum (Foreign Minister of the Marshall Islands) travelled around the world in order to garner support for its goals.336 On 8 December, the EU announced:  “As UN climate negotiations enter their final days, the European Union and the group of 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States today stressed their shared commitment for an ambitious and binding global climate deal to be agreed in Paris”.337 In particular, the group agreed upon four key issues for inclusion in the final agreement: first, a scientific-based long term goal on global temperature increase; second, a five year review mechanism; third, a universal system to track state’s progress on implementing their NDCs and finally, that it would be legally binding.338 All of these demands were eventually included in the agreement, demonstrating effective entrepreneurial leadership in drawing attention to these issues during the agenda of the conference. The result also represents strong goal achievement on behalf of the EU.   In terms of its approach to the negotiations at COP21, having learnt from its experience at COP15, the EU was more flexible when approaching its demands, maintaining realistic expectations of what could be achieved and planning for things to go wrong.339 Although the EU came to the negotiating table with policy objectives that it had “significantly scaled down after Copenhagen”,340 in the build-up to the Paris Agreement, the EU again took a leading role in pushing for mandatory and quantified national  335 Miguel Arias Cañete, ‘EU Climate Commissioner: How we formed the High Ambition Coalition’, online: Business Green <https://www.businessgreen.com/opinion/2439215/eu-climate-commissioner-how-we-formed-the-high-ambition-coalition> accessed 24 June 2020. 336 Parker, Karlsson & Hjerpe, supra note 48 at 248. 337 The European Commission, ‘EU and 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries join forces for ambitious global climate deal’, (2015), online: European Commission <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2015120802_en> accessed 24 June 2020. 338 Karl Mathiesen & Fiona Harvey, ‘Climate coalition breaks cover in Paris to push for binding and ambitious deal’, The Guardian (8 December 2015), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/08/coalition-paris-push-for-binding-ambitious-climate-change-deal> accessed 24 June 2020; European Commission, supra note 121. 339 Victor, supra note 243 at 136; Oberthür, supra note 60. 340 Oberthür, supra note 60 at 122. 53  mitigation policies, alongside the High Ambition Coalition.341 However, due to strong pushback from the U.S., the decision was taken to abandon this demand, for fear that the U.S. would withdraw completely from the agreement.342 Scholars have noted its “decision to compromise” on the top-down design343 of the deal as evidence that it had adjusted its approach to entrepreneurial leadership since Copenhagen, and was determined not to ‘fall short’ in reaching a meaningful agreement this time round.344 However, the EU continued to push for an ambitious Paris outcome, including by early on in the process submitting its own relatively high GHG emission reduction target of at least 40% by 2030 from 1990 levels. The performance of the French hosts throughout the preparation for, and in particular during the fortnight of, the Paris Agreement negotiations has been heralded as “masterful” and “exceptional”.345 Diplomats have noted the effectiveness of the organization at COP21.346 Focused on success, and demonstrating entrepreneurial leadership, the Chair began work on the diplomatic strategy at least 18 months before parties met in Paris. With a view to finding the bargainer’s surplus, he held a series of consultations with important actors and major players to gain an understanding of domestic priorities as well as potential obstacles to reaching agreement.347 Such efforts in advance of the start of the process launched the formal negotiations onto a promising trajectory from the outset.348  The French were strategic in exercising leadership. By conducting much of the negotiations in secrecy, the hosts were able to reduce the number of actors involved with each decision.349 As a result, only key actors were consulted when a contentious issue arose.350 The French Minister also relied on the Indaba method, a negotiation technique originating from the Zulu and Xhosa people of South Africa, that had been introduced at the Durban conference.351. The overall tactic appeared to be to shut down  341 Dimitrov, supra note 46 at 3. 342 Ibid. 343 See Section 2.3 for a further explanation of ‘top-down’.  344 Parker, Karlsson & Hjerpe, supra note 48 at 247. 345 Bodansky, supra note 14 at 294. 346 Dimitrov, supra note 46 at 9.  347 Hilton & Kerr, supra note 41 at 54. 348 Dimitrov, supra note 46 at 9.  349 Ibid at 2–3. 350 Ibid at 6. 351 Bodansky, supra note 14 at 294. 54  opportunity for disagreement or to reopen issues in both the early and late stages of negotiation.352 Throughout the process, the French team kept control of the text and the drafting, but also an open door to hear concerns of delegations.353 Commentators have described how the spirit in the final week of the conference was “remarkably positive” in comparison to earlier COPs.354 Negotiations continued right up until the final hour, with states conducting bilateral and other small group meetings to iron out the final sticking points. Dimitrov describes how diplomats were repeatedly told that the final text was “’take it or leave it’”.355 Diplomats were also reminded of the consequence and magnitude of not reaching a deal:356 “‘What happens in Paris will be in the history books for a long time. Let’s not give any historian a reason to write that we ruined the global response to climate change’ (personal notes)”357. Negotiators around the world were conscious that a repeated failure to reach a meaningful agreement would threaten the foundations of the UNFCCC.358 In acting as COP President, Laurent Fabius steadfastly maintained the impartiality demanded of a COP President.359 Thus, the actions and successes of the French should not automatically be attributed to the EU as a climate change actor. However, the two cannot be completely separated either. Scholars have noted that the effectiveness of the French leadership made room for the reception of the EU’s diplomacy in creating the “High Ambition Coalition” (described in section 3.3.2 above).360  Furthermore, the emergence of the coalition enabled the French presidency in “erring towards ambition in its final compromise proposal”.361  It is not necessarily clear-cut where actions of specific member states end and the role of the EU begins, which is characteristic of the EU as a complex actor.362  An example of this can  352 Ibid. 353 Ibid. 354 Ibid. 355 Dimitrov, supra note 46 at 6. 356 Underdal, supra note 146. 357 Dimitrov, supra note 46 at 4. 358 Christoff, supra note 324 at 766. 359 Oberthür & Groen, supra note 170 at 717–718. 360 Oberthür, supra note 60 at 122. 361 Ibid. 362 Parker, Karlsson & Hjerpe, supra note 48 at 249. 55  be seen in the joint statements between Germany-Brazil and France-China363. Furthermore, the French hosts cannot be completely removed from their history and context, as Peeters recognizes, “[the] high awareness of the need to address climate change in the European Union may have contributed to the efforts of the French leadership to move the international climate negotiations forward”.364 Interestingly, in a study that I will discuss further in the next chapter, Parker et al have observed that the success of the French hosts likely detracted from the EU’s overall recognition as a climate change leader in the minds of delegates who were present at the COP21.365   3.3.3 China in Paris In many ways, China can perhaps be seen to have achieved what it set out to at Copenhagen, as Hilton describes, “China [was] expert at blocking negotiations”.366 However, it is doubtful whether “blocking negotiations” can be considered to be leadership.367 China was aware of the increased global attention that surrounded the Copenhagen Accord, as well as the disappointment at the lack of a new legal agreement that was reached.368 In the lead up to the signing of the agreement, Li Shou commented that, “China realizes its growing responsibility and is reacting to global expectations”.369 Subsequently, China became a more “positive participant in the international climate change negotiations”.370 Ahead of COP21, China exercised diplomacy on climate issues, releasing joint declarations with the EU (2014), France (2015), Brazil (2015), India (2015) and the U.S. (2014 and 2015)371, the latter is a move which is identified as an “important catalyst” in generating momentum for the Paris Agreement, and proved its willingness to seek the ‘bargainer’s surplus’.372 President Obama and President Xi Jinping formed close ties in advance  363 Referenced earlier in this section. 364 Peeters, supra note 40 at 183. 365 Parker, Karlsson & Hjerpe, supra note 48 at 249. 366 Isabel Hilton et al, ‘Is China a Leader or Laggard on Climate Change?’, online: ChinaFile <https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/china-leader-or-laggard-climate-change%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 367 Walker & Biedenkopf, supra note 33 at 34. 368 Li Yanfang & Cao Wei, ‘Framework of Laws and Policies on Renewable Energy and Relevant Systems in China under the Background of Climate Change’ (2012) 13 Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 824 at 838. 369 Hilton et al, supra note 366. 370 Hilton & Kerr, supra note 41 at 48. 371 Yun Gao, ‘China’s response to climate change issues after Paris Climate Change Conference’ (2016) 7:4 Advances in Climate Change Research 235 at 239. 372 Urpelainen & Graaf, supra note 250 at 841. 56  of Paris, marked by the release of the U.S-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change in November 2014 and the US-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change in September 2015.373 Demonstrating entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership, the 2014 Statement read: “The United States and China hope that by announcing these targets now, they can inject momentum into the global climate negotiations and inspire other countries to join in coming forward with ambitious actions as soon as possible, preferably by the first quarter of 2015. The two Presidents resolved to work closely together over the next year to address major impediments to reaching a successful global climate agreement in Paris.” To begin the process, the United States pledged to cut its emission by 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025. In exchange, China vowed to peak its emissions by 2030, with the aim of doing so earlier, and to increase its share of energy from non-fossil fuels to 20%. Here, we see China drawing on symbolic resources such as motivation and commitment to demonstrate its readiness to find compromise.  In the time between the first and second statements, Christoff describes how the U.S. and China entered into a “virtuous competition” to reach common ground.374 One of the proposals that played a vital part in progressing discussions was the tweaking of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility to add the phrase, “in the light of different national circumstances”, demonstrating an evolution in China’s vision with regards intellectual leadership.375 This new wording is included in the preamble of the Paris Agreement.376 Alongside this, China for the first time pledged an absolute emissions target of lowering “carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 60% to 65% from the 2005 level by 2030”.377 This was significant, as until Paris, Chinese negotiators had been careful not to link domestic action on climate change to any presumptions of international obligation. Schreurs explains how  373 The White House, ‘U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change’, (2014), online: The White House: Office of the Press Secretary <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change%0D> accessed 24 June 2020; The White House, ‘U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change’, (2015), online: The White House: Office of the Press Secretary <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/us-china-joint-presidential-statement-climate-change%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 374 Christoff, supra note 324 at 771. 375 Bodansky, supra note 14 at 299. 376 Paris Agreement preamble 377 The White House, supra note 373. 57  this preparedness to “take serious steps to address their domestic GHG emissions” helped to break the long-standing impasse on historic responsibility.378  In terms of China’s ability to show entrepreneurial leadership throughout the negotiations themselves, a clear evolution can be seen from Copenhagen to Paris. As Howard describes, “In those six years, China moved from an environmentally defensive stance to one of effectively taking a leading role in supporting and even bettering ambitious targets”.379 In contrast to Copenhagen where, despite advance promises to support an agreement, “China seemed unable or unwilling to bring new ideas to the table to overcome the impasses”,380 at COP21 China In Paris, China was recognized as playing a much more constructive role in the negotiations.381 3.4 Part III: Leadership by Example (Unilateral Leadership) 3.4.1 EU Renewable Energy Law and Policy As the previous two parts have shown, both the EU and China have at different times exerted entrepreneurial, structural and intellectual leadership throughout the course of the climate regime.  The final third of this chapter focus exclusively on unilateral leadership, specifically with regards to the renewable energy laws and policies of the EU and China. As unilateral leadership is concerned with establishing a track record of setting an example -and following through on policy implementation- this section of the chapter will cover the period from the founding of the UNFCCC through to the present day. My aim is to examine the degree to which these actors have exerted unilateral leadership in climate change matters through their renewable energy policy and law-making. Since the climate change regime began to take shape in the 1990s, the EU has assumed a leading part in the development of renewable energy laws, regulations and policies. The EU embarked on this role in the early 1990s, through a Community- wide strategy for limiting carbon dioxide emissions and  378 Schreurs, supra note 301 at 221. 379 Howard, supra note 315 at 131. 380 Hilton et al, supra note 366. 381 Hilton & Kerr, supra note 41 at 49. 58  improving energy efficiency.382 Over the past thirty years it has implemented legal frameworks, policies and regulatory measures to encourage investment in renewable energy, including the setting of targets.383 In setting legally binding targets for clean energy the EU has influenced the direction of investment through clear, long-term signaling to investors. The EU has been recognized as a “pioneer” of green energy and was one of the earliest actors to begin the promotion of renewables within its energy policy.384 In response to growing environmental concerns in the 1970s, the Council issued the ‘Community Programme of Action on the Environment’ which began efforts to coordinate the EU’s response to environmental protection.385 As early as 1986, promotion of renewable energy was listed amongst the Council’s objectives.386 But it was not until 1997 - with the issuance of the ‘White Paper for a Community Strategy and Action Plan’ on renewable sources of energy (the White Paper)- that the EU began to seriously explore the need for a comprehensive community strategy to promote renewables.387 The paper was published in the run up to the third COP in Kyoto in December 1997. The driving factors for the Council’s promotion of renewable energy were not just emissions related, though the Council explicitly recognized the potential for renewables to drastically reduce CO2 emissions (a key consideration for the Council, given that the EU was proposing to attend the conference with a negotiating position that pushed for strong emissions reductions targets by 2010).388 The promotion of sustainability and safeguarding security of supply were also key considerations.389 For example, the Whitepaper noted that, “The EU’s dependence on energy imports is already 50% and is expected to rise over the coming years if no action is taken, reaching 70% by  382 Cinnamon P Carlane, ‘Law and Policy in the European Union’ in Climate Change Law and Policy: EU and US Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 143 at 164. 383 Bruce, supra note 268 at 77. 384 Rainer Hinrichs-Rahlwes, ‘Energy Policies at Crossroads − Will Europe’s 2030 targets and framework be in line with the Paris Climate Agreement?’ (2019) 4:2019 Renewable Energy and Environmental Sustainability 4 at 1. 385 Carlane, supra note 382 at 152. 386 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission: Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy–White Paper for a Community Strategy and Action Plan’ (1997) 97 Com (97) 599 53, online: <http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Communication+from+the+Commission+ENERGY+FOR+THE+FUTURE+:+RENEWABLE+SOURCES+OF+ENERGY+White+Paper+for+a+Community+Strategy+and+Action+Plan#0> accessed 24 June 2020 at 6. 387 European Commission, supra note 386. 388 Ibid at 12. 389 Carlane, supra note 382 at 168. 59  2020”.390 It was reasoned that the promotion of renewable energy at the community level through commitments to specific targets was a promising way to ensure penetration of renewable energy into the EU’s energy mix. The signing of the Kyoto Protocol directly influenced EU renewable energy policy. Article 2 1(a)(iv) of the Protocol specifically contemplates the development of renewable forms of energy, calling on parties to: “Implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its national circumstances, such as: …Research on, and promotion, development and increased use of, new and renewable forms of energy, of carbon dioxide sequestration technologies and of advanced and innovative environmentally sound technologies”. 391 Following signature of the Kyoto Protocol, the European Climate Change Programme was established by the European Commission. Its immediate goal was to help ensure that emissions reduction targets under the Protocol were met, through building on previous emissions-related activities such as initiatives in the field of renewable energy.392 The Renewable Energy Directive is the principal mechanism by which renewable energy sources are regulated in Europe.393 The Directive was created in 2001,394 and subsequently amended in 2003, 2009 and most recently 2018, though the 2018 directive is not fully transposed yet. The purpose of the directive is to establish “a common framework for the promotion of renewable energy from renewable sources".395 In its first iteration, it set indicative targets for member states to reach the 12% Kyoto target  390 European Commission, supra note 386 at 5. 391 The Kyoto Protocol supra note 120 Art 2.1 (a)(iv)  392 ‘European Climate Change Programme’, online: European Commission <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eccp_en%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 393 Bruce, supra note 268 at 77. 394 Council Directive (EC) 2001/77 of 27 September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market [2001] Official Journal L283/0033 online:<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32001L0077> accessed 24 June 2020. 395 Council Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast) Official Journal of the European Union L328/82 online:<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018L2001&from=EN> accessed 24 June 2020. 60  by 2010. Targets ranged from a goal of 6% penetration of renewables for Belgium to 78.1% for Austria. In 2003 it was modified to include the use of biofuels and other renewable fuels for transport. 3.4.1.1 The Renewable Energy Directive 2009/2001/EU The Renewable Energy Directive 2009 (RED 2009) came into effect in June 2009, with the requirement that it be transposed into law of each member state by December 2010.396 The effect of the directive was to repeal the 2001 and 2003 Directives. It is valid until 30 June 2021, where it will be replaced by the transposition of the 2018 Directive. It requires the EU to fulfill at least 20% of its total energy needs with renewables by 2020.397 The EU’s 20-20-20 targets were announced in late 2008. The 20-20-20 stood for 20% reduction in GHG emissions, 20% of final energy consumption to be generated from renewable energy sources and energy efficiency improvements amounting to 20%. The passing of the RED 2009 has been described by commentators as a “watershed” moment in eliminating the EU’s climate policy credibility gap.398 Parker et al have commented, “By passing the world’s most ambitious legislative package aimed at greenhouse gas reductions the EU attempted to prove it really meant business, and since then the EU has continued to work towards the goal of establishing itself as a, if not the, global leader in the fight to combat climate change.”399 The RED 2009 sets binding targets for renewable energy as a percentage of the overall national energy mix for each member state to achieve. Targets are based upon “starting points” of countries, as well as their “overall potential for new renewables” and differ for each member state.400 The highest target is 49% for Sweden, followed by 40% for Latvia and 38% for Finland. The lowest targets are 10% and 11% for Malta and Luxemburg respectively. Each member state is required to “equal or exceed” their national  396 Council Directive (EC) 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC Official Journal of the European Union L140/16 online:<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32009L0028&from=EN> accessed 24 June 2020. 397 ibid 398 Oberthür & Kelly, supra note 254 at 41. 399 Charles F Parker & Christer Karlsson, ‘The European Union as a global climate leader: confronting aspiration with evidence’ (2017) 17:4 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 445 at 446. 400 Council Directive (EC) 2009/28/EC supra note 391. 61  targets through schemes of their own volition. Member states can choose to enter into cooperative measures to achieve their targets such as joint support schemes and renewable energy sharing among member states.401 Targets must be reported to the European Commission through a ‘National Renewable Energy Action Plan’, which is to be renewed every two years.402 Member States must also be able to guarantee the origins of renewable energy supplied. As will be explored in the next chapter, the EU is on track to achieve and surpass these goals.  3.4.2 China’s Renewable Energy Law and Policy It is predicted that China will install over one third of all renewable energy investment from 2015-2021, a feat that would have been almost unimaginable less than twenty years ago.403 China began developing its renewable energy resources in the 1980s, but it has only recently gained prominence with regards climate and environmental policy. This quest for modernity has brought immense progress in terms of economic growth, but also a profound dependence on energy. As Freeman explains: “China’s rise, especially in economic terms, has made it one of the most important actors in the global geopolitics of energy. From the international perspective, China constitutes a list of energy superlatives: as a state it is the world’s single largest consumer and producer of energy, the biggest consumer and importer of oil, the largest producer, consumer and importer of coal, and by consequence also the biggest emitter of CO2 (EIA 2015).”404 It is difficult to explain the evolution of China’s renewable energy laws without addressing the context of China’s rapid development. In the thirty years following Chairman Mao’s death in 1976, China boasted annual economic growth figures of nearly 10 percent each year, transforming it very rapidly from a predominantly agrarian society to a newly industrialized nation, under the guidance of the CCP.405 As the energy intensity of the economy grew, energy shortages occurred, particularly in the years from 2002- 401 Bruce, supra note 268 at 78. 402 Suriya Evans-Pritchard Jayanti, ‘Learning from the Leader: The European Union’s Renewable Energy Mandates as a Blueprint for American Environmental Federalism’ (2015) 65:1 Rutgers Law Review 173 at 202. 403 Tim Buckley & Simon Nicholas, China’s Global Renewable Energy Expansion (2017) at 2; Li Shou, ‘China eyes an opportunity to take ownership of climate change fight’, The Guardian (20 January 2017). 404 Duncan Freeman, ‘China and Renewables: The Priority of Economics over Geopolitics’ in Daniel Scholten, ed, The Geopolitics of Renewables (Springer International Publishing, 2018) 187 at 187. 405 1976 marked the end of Mao’s cultural revolution. 62  2004.406 Due to the necessity of its supply for modernization, and the potential for unrest if it is in short supply, energy has long been regarded as an issue of Chinese national security.407 China’s dependence on coal for up to 60% of its energy supply has led to huge smogs comparable to those experienced in the UK in the 1950s and, in turn, deteriorating public health.408 In 2013, Tsinghua University and the Asian Development bank reported that 7 out of 10 of the most polluted cities in the world were in China,409 and a recent poll by the Pew Research Centre in Washington found that 76% of the population consider air pollution to be the second biggest societal concern facing Chinese citizens.410 As public awareness of these public health issues has grown,411 reports of rising civil unrest have led commentators to acknowledge the potential for this newfound environmental awareness to shape the political priorities of China.412   Against this backdrop, China began to develop its renewable energy laws. As Yanfang and Wei describe, three major factors contributed to the development of China’s renewable energy from the early 1990s. Alongside China’s signature of the UNFCCC and the rapid rise in air pollution described above, China began to promote a market-oriented economy.413 However, particularly in the early stages, China’s  406 Torney, supra note 248. 407 Ibid at 11; Freeman, supra note 404 at 189. 408 For a discussion of what China can learn from the Great Smog of 1950s London, See Dongyong Zhang, Junjuan Liu & Bingjun Li, ‘Tackling air pollution in China-What do we learn from the Great Smog of 1950s in London’ (2014) 6:8 Sustainability (Switzerland) 5322.  409 Dominic Chiu, ‘The East Is Green: China’s Global Leadership in Renewable Energy’ (2017) 13 New Perspectivews in Foreign Policy 3. 410 George Gao, ‘As smog hangs over Beijing, Chinese cite air pollution as major concern’, (2015), online: Pew Research Center: Fact Tank <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/10/as-smog-hangs-over-beijing-chinese-cite-air-pollution-as-major-concern/%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 411 For an example of this growing awareness, see Louisa Lim, ‘Air Pollution Grows in Tandem with China’s Economy’, NPR (17 May 2007), online: <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10221268> accessed 24 June 2020. 412 Associated Press in Beijing, ‘Chinese protestors clash with police over power plant’, The Guardian (22 October 2012), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/22/chinese-protesters-power-plant> accessed 24 June 2020; Chiu, supra note 407. 413 Yanfang & Wei, supra note 368 at 828. 63  policies and laws have been described as ‘sporadic’ and focused primarily on addressing air pollution concerns, as well as rural energy supply.414 3.4.2.1 The ‘Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China (Renewable Energy Law) The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) promulgated its first comprehensive renewable energy law in February 2005, less than half a month after the Chinese ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The law became effective on January 1 2006 (NPC, 2005),415  ‘kickstarting’ China’s efforts to increase its use of renewable energy by creating a national framework for promoting renewables in China. The stated aims of the renewable energy law were set out in Article 1:  “This Law is enacted for the purpose of promoting the development and utilization of renewable energy, increasing the supply of energy, improving the structure of energy, safeguarding the safety of energy, (protecting [the]environment and realizing a sustainable economic and social development”.416 Article 4 sets out that the state will give priority to the development and utilization of renewable energy: “The state shall give priority to the development and utilization of renewable energy in energy development and promote the establishment and development of the renewable energy market by setting an overall target for the development and utilization of renewable energy and adopting corresponding measures.”417 The Renewable Energy Law was designed taking into account legislation and experience of developed countries,418 including in the design of the “quantity target” system. It established four key mechanisms: a national renewable energy target and central and local renewable energy development and utilization  414 Ibid at 830. 415 Sara Schuman & Alvin Lin, ‘China’s Renewable Energy Law and its impact on renewable power in China: Progress, challenges and recommendations for improving implementation’ (2012) 51 Energy Policy 89 at 90. 416 MOFCOM (Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China). (2013). Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China. Online: <http://englisfh.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201312/20131200432160> accessed 24 June 2020, Article 1 417 Ibid. Article 4 418 Yanfang & Wei, supra note 368 at 844. 64  planning; a mandatory connection and purchase policy; an on-grid electricity price for renewables; and a cost-sharing mechanism.419 As required under the provisions of the Renewable Energy Law, the “Renewable Energy Medium- and Long-Term Development Plan” in August 2007 was published in 2007 by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The plan stipulated an objective of 10% of energy consumption to be from renewable sources by 2010, and 15% by 2020.420 China officially pledged this second target on the international stage at Copenhagen, from a starting point of 9.9% penetration of renewables.421 Another overarching aim of the Medium and Long Term Renewable Energy Development Plan was to ensure that Chinese manufacturing and innovation of renewable technology was largely independent and domestic by 2020,422 to achieve this the CCP put in place, “production capacity targets, mandated market shares for energy companies and established a series of economic measures to develop and protect domestic manufacturing capacities”.423 The Renewable Energy Law was amended in 2009 to address some of the challenges the law had faced,424 the amended version further requires:  “[T]he proportion of renewable energy power generation in the total power generation, which shall be reached during the planning period, is determined by the energy authority of the State Council, together with the national power supervisory institution, and the financial authority of the State Council in accordance with the nation-wide planning for development and utilization of renewable energy.”425  419 Schuman & Lin, supra note 415 at 91. 420 Yanfang & Wei, supra note 368 at 845. 421 Schuman & Lin, supra note 415 at 92. 422 Olivia Gippner & Diarmuid Torney, ‘Shifting Policy Priorities in EU-China Energy Relations: Implications for Chinese Energy investments in Europe’ (2017) 101 Energy Policy 649 at 652. 423 Coraline Goron & Duncan Freeman, ‘Industrial Policy and Climate Change Strategy: Comparing China and the European Union’s path to the Paris 2015 United Nations Conference Agreement’ in Mario Telò, Ding Chun & Zhang Xiotong, eds, Deepening the EU-China Partnership: Bridging Institutional and Ideational Differences in an Unstable World (London: Routledge, 2017) at 217. 424 Schuman & Lin, supra note 415. 425 Yanfang & Wei, supra note 368 at 845. 65  The 12th Five-Year Plan covered the period from 2011-2015, a section on green development was included and the renewables sector was listed as a strategic emerging growth industry.426 Goron et al describe how this “spurred unprecedented levels of industrial policies and the ramping up of investment in technological research and development”.427 China’s 13th Five-Year plan for Electricity, covering the period from 2016-2020 aims to raise the non-fossil fuel share of China’s energy mix from 35% to 39% by 2050.428 The 13th Five-Year Plan also announced the planned investment of 2.5 trillion yuan into green energy by 2020.429  As this part has shown, the drive for Chinese renewable energy laws and policies has undoubtedly been tied up in domestic concerns, as opposed to a pure desire to ‘lead by example’. At the opening ceremony of the COP21 President Xi Jinping said: “In the past few decades, China has seen rapid economic growth and significant improvement in people's life. However, this has taken a toll on the environment and resources. Having learned the lesson, China is vigorously making ecological endeavors to promote green, circular and low-carbon growth”.430 Similarly, the EU has for many years recognized renewables as an area in which to achieve market dominance, as a mechanism for ‘green growth’. To what extent these intentions compliment Chinese and European claims to unilateral leadership, and what this means for future climate leadership will be explored in Chapter 4. 3.5 Conclusion At the close of COP 21 in Paris in 2015, there was credible argument to recognize the EU, the U.S. and China as leaders in the international climate regime. However, as history portrays, the politics of the U.S.  426 Duncan Freeman, ‘The EU-US-China triangles and the Paris Agreement: A clash of orders?’ in Jing Men, Simon Schunz & Duncan Freeman, eds, The Evolving Relationship between China, the EU and the USA: A New Global Order? (London: Routledge, 2019); Goron & Freeman, supra note 423. 427 Goron & Freeman, supra note 423 at 217. 428 Ibid. 429 Ibid. 430 Gao, supra note 371 at 238. 66  has always played a huge part in its recognition as a leader in this field.431 Previously, the withdrawal of the U.S. from an international climate agreement would likely have meant the withdrawal of China. However, in the wake of climate apathy of the current American presidency, China is positioning itself to take on a leadership role alongside the incumbent leader, the EU. In this chapter I have examined how the EU and China have sought to exert climate leadership throughout the climate change regime through an exploration of the leadership theory described in Chapter 2. Part I and Part II of this chapter focussed on the exercise of intellectual, structural and entrepreneurial leadership from the UNFCCC through to the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015, shedding light on the capability and credibility of each state. As I have shown, in an attempt to maintain its leadership title, the EU has adjusted its strategy over time to account for changing global dynamics. China on the other hand, has evolved from a climate laggard to a more constructive and prominent contributor to the climate regime, purportedly recognizing its responsibility on the international stage. Part III sought to describe the unilateral leadership of the EU and China through an examination of their renewable energy laws and policy. The EU has adopted some of the most ambitious renewable energy legislation of any nation to date, consequently achieving investment in renewables that was more rapid and far-reaching than any member state predicted. More recently, China has emerged as the world’s leading producer of many renewable energy technologies, due to its focus on green energy as an area for market growth and the accompanying laws and policies.432 In the next chapter I draw together the insight gained from this exploration with the actions of the EU and China since the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015. Afterall, it is through its implementation that the success of the Paris Agreement will ultimately be judged.433 With this in mind, I will analyze the credibility of their continued claims to climate leadership, individually and as a partnership. It seems that the two were able to work together more effectively (albeit with U.S. assistance) to achieve the Paris Agreement, but I will argue that this will need to continue through to implementation to ensure its  431 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 169 at 525; Zhang et al, supra note 88 at 221; Bäckstrand & Elgström, supra note 259 at 1374. 432 Dominic Dudley, ‘China Is Set To Become The World’s Renewable Energy Superpower, According To New Report’, online: Forbes <https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2019/01/11/china-renewable-energy-superpower/#6055ab0c745a%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 433 Karlsson-vinkhuyzen et al, supra note 21 at 594. 67  effectiveness. The recent Joint Leader’s Statement pays lip-service to this goal, but it remains to be seen how this will be put into action. 434    434 European Commission, supra note 1. 68   CHAPTER 4: Leadership in the Implementation of the Paris Agreement  “With the implementation of the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change still quite uncertain and its dependence on ever-increasing ambition levels from all countries, the demand for climate leadership has never been higher.”435 4.1 Introduction As I set out in Chapter 1, to date, there has been little attention devoted to the issues of joint leadership, or leadership in regime implementation. In this chapter I focus on the EU and China’s potential for joint climate leadership in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, firstly by analyzing their credibility as leaders, then by analyzing the mechanisms of the agreement itself.  Scholars such as Parker et al have noted that as a result of its declining structural power, the “ideal” leadership solution for the EU is to form a coalition with an actor such as China.436 On the other hand, Zhang et al have noted that  China is neither “well positioned”, nor “capable” of singlehandedly filling the leadership vacuum left by the U.S.437 Having examined the evolution of  the EU and China’s leadership behavior in Chapter 3, Part I begins with an overview of their current capability and credibility. This overview will lead into an analysis of their potential for joint leadership, including some observations on signs of enhanced cooperation between the two since the adoption of the agreement.  I argue an enhanced collaboration between the two would be beneficial to both in terms of their capabilities and credibility. Recognizing that a key aspect of establishing credibility involves the ability to attract followers, in Part I I begin by reviewing a recent study of climate followers. The object of this exercise is to reach a foundational understanding of the extent to which the EU and China are recognized as leaders by potential followers.  In Part II I examine the implementation mechanisms of the Paris Agreement. Gupta et al explain that once a regime is “well developed” implementation begins to take care of itself, as the institutions  435 Walker & Biedenkopf, supra note 33 at 33. 436 Parker et al, supra note 47 at 281. 437 Zhang et al, supra note 88 at 223. 69  established under the treaty mature with “a life and dynamism of their own”.438 In this chapter I argue that due to the design of the Paris Agreement’s mechanisms, there will always be an opportunity for leadership in its implementation. In extending the application of leadership theory outlined in Chapter 2, I provide an analysis of which leadership styles show the potential to be most effective, based on an assessment of the capabilities and credibility required for each mechanism. I also discuss how ‘goal achievement’ should be measured during implementation, drawing insight from literature on regime effectiveness. Although this section does not offer a concrete answer to this question, it offers suggestions for the future direction of research in this area.  In the final third of this Chapter I attempt to draw together the analysis from the previous two parts to determine whether and how the EU and China have exerted leadership in the implementation of the Paris Agreement to date. Although the Paris Agreement does not officially come into force until 2020, it has been over four years since it was signed (at the time of writing). Parties have been submitting (and resubmitting) NDCs in advance of the first commitment period, providing a preliminary source by which to assess whether they are intending to ‘walk the walk’ as well as ‘talk the talk’.  4.2 Part I: Credibility: Insights from a Study on Climate Followers Despite having been recognized as a key element of leadership theory by Underdal, there has been comparatively little attention given to the issue of followers in climate leadership literature.439 Until relatively recently, the majority of scholarship has focussed on the supply of leadership, for example by examining achievements and challenges in spreading policy goals.440 A recent study by Parker et al sought to expand understanding of climate leaders by examining the demand side. They achieved this by undertaking empirical evidence gathering at eight consecutive COPs from 2008 to 2015. The study enables leadership candidates to be measured against a dataset that tracks contemporaneous international negotiations; therefore, allowing researchers to gain further insight into the successes and  438 Grubb & Gupta, supra note 145 at 17. 439 Torney, supra note 63. 440 Parker et al, supra note 47 at 269; Oberthür & Kelly, supra note 254. 70  failures of a particular leadership strategy and an actor’s credibility. The question asked in the survey was open-ended: “Which countries, party groupings and/or organizations have, in your view, a leading role in climate negotiations?”441 The response was phrased deliberately to allow for more than one party to be selected by the respondent. The overall response rate has been around 65%.442 Over the course of eight years, the team collected 3557 completed surveys, of which roughly 42% of the respondents in the final sample were delegates and 58% were observers.443 The data collected offers quantitative empirical insight into the recognition of leaders by parties who were present at (and had an interest in) the negotiations. The overall trend shows that the EU’s recognition as a climate leader has decreased since its high of 62% in 2008. There is a notable dip around the time of the Copenhagen accord, and again at COP 21 in Paris.444 Overall, China’s record shows a marginal increase over time, consistent with its engagement in climate politics. Interestingly, China appears to have been perceived as a leader by many developing countries ahead of its recognition by developed countries.445 The U.S. shows the greatest overall change in leadership recognition, partly owing to its particularly low figures in Poznan where it was recognized at a leader by just 27% of respondents. The increase in figures also reflects the U.S.’ political situation, as the data tracks the period in which the Obama administration set out to establish itself as a world leader on climate change.446 In general, the data shows that “no leader was consistently able to register over 50% support from potential followers”.447 However, there are three conclusions to be drawn from this study that are relevant to this thesis. Firstly, and importantly, the results do suggest that the perception of followers  441 Parker, Karlsson & Hjerpe, supra note 48 at 243. 442 Ibid. 443 Ibid. 444 Parker el al suggest that this dip in Paris could be partially explained by the increasing recognition of ‘France’ as a leadership candidate, as explained in Chapter 3, section 3.3.2, see .Ibid at 249. 445 Ibid at 244. 446 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 169. 447 Ibid at 535. 71  accords with our understanding that there are three main players in the field of climate leadership. Secondly, they suggest that the EU, the U.S. and China enjoy credibility beyond a theoretical analysis of leadership behavior. Finally, given that there is no “single undisputed leader”, the results strengthen the case for exploring the role of multiple leadership actors.448 Perhaps this explains why recent scholarship has begun to move in this direction.449  4.3 Current Capability and Credibility of the EU and China 4.3.1 The Evolution of the EU’s Climate Leadership as a Mature Climate Leader 4.3.1.1 Declining Structural leadership As the relative emissions of the EU have decreased over the last twenty years, the EU’s ability to employ structural leadership has also decreased. As mentioned in Chapter 2 (Section 2.6.1), structural leadership is linked to a country’s present and potential emissions, as well as the material resources they are willing and able to provide to address such emissions (e.g. economic, technological).450 As touched upon in Chapter 3, by 2012, the EU represented 10% of global emissions share, whereas the U.S. and China accounted for 15% and 27%.451 By 2017, those figures were 9%, 14% and 27% respectively. If we compare this to the 1990 data: EU 20%, U.S. 23%, and China 10%, we can see a significant change in the sources of structural power. This development was reflected in how strongly each actor’s competing vision influenced the outcomes of Kyoto -where the EU played a significant role - versus Copenhagen, where the EU was overshadowed by China and the U.S.452 Afionis describes how the results of COP15 “led a number of analysts to talk of the coming of a new world order,” recognizing the likely influence of China (and the U.S.) in shaping future climate diplomacy.453  448 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 44; See also, Parker et al, supra note 47 at 281; Charles F Parker & Christer Karlsson, ‘The European Union as a global climate leader: confronting aspiration with evidence’ (2017) 17:4 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 445. 449 Torney, supra note 248; Zhang et al, supra note 88; Geert De Cock, ‘The European Union as a Bilateral “Norm Leader” on Climate Change vis-à-vis China’ (2011) 16:1 European Foreign Affairs Review 89. 450 Grubb & Gupta, supra note 145 at 19. 451 Ritchie & Roser, supra note 272. 452 Grubb & Gupta, supra note 145 at 19. 453 Afionis, supra note 39. 72  The decline in the EU’s share of GHGs is not solely as a result of the increase in emissions by other countries now further along their development path (although clearly this is a factor). 454 In this sense, structural leadership in the climate regime presents a juxtaposition as, “the more the leaders lead, the less direct relevance they have to the climate problem.”455 However, as Oberthür observes, another form of structural power is likely to become increasingly important as the world aims for decarbonization, in the form of “low emissions capacity”.456 Although structural leadership is linked to a country’s emissions, it is also based upon technological resources they are willing to provide towards finding a solution. Thus, a decline in EU emissions share alongside a track record of efforts to deploy resources to reduce emissions, demonstrates a proficiency for low emission capacity; a capacity that “is set to grow in importance for players’ power, attractiveness and influence in climate geopolitics.”457   4.3.1.2 Strong intellectual leadership As set out in the previous chapter, throughout the history of the climate regime negotiations, one of the main pillars of the EU’s intellectual leadership has been its push for binding emissions targets. Torney observes that this vision reflected the EU’s own circumstances and internal experience of multilateral cooperation and governance.458 It was also thought to be the most effective way to hold feet “to the fire”.459 The EU was successful in having its vision included in the Kyoto Protocol, having failed in the negotiations for the UNFCCC. However, its insistence on legally binding targets and “unrealistic refusal to consider alternatives” at COP15 contributed to its diplomatic marginalisation.460 During the Paris conference, it eventually modified its stance upon realizing that it risked a repeat of Kyoto with regards the U.S.461 This departure from its insistence on legally binding targets may provide opportunities for the   454 Wurzel, Liefferink & Connelly, supra note 146 at 290. 455 David G Victor, ‘We Have Climate Leaders. Now We Need Followers.’, The New York Times (13 December 2019), online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/13/opinion/climate-change-madrid.html?login=smartlock&auth=login-smartlock%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 456 Oberthür, supra note 60 at 123. 457 Ibid. 458 Torney, supra note 248 at 14. 459 Victor, supra note 243 at 134. 460 Parker, Karlsson & Hjerpe, supra note 48 at 247. 461 Dimitrov, supra note 46 at 3. 73  EU to promote a new ‘vision’ for its intellectual leadership, by reasserting its importance through its green energy credentials. This is a point I will explore further in Section 4.6.2 below. 4.3.1.3 Improved Entrepreneurial Leadership  As described in Chapter 3, in the early years of the climate regime, the EU was a competent entrepreneurial leader; for example, following the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. However, the EU had to rethink its approach to entrepreneurial leadership following its marginalisation in Copenhagen, allowing for more flexibility in its negotiation stance.462 It appears to have been successful in this approach, and is widely credited with effective entrepreneurial leadership in the build up to (and during) the Paris negotiations.  Key to its strategy was coalition building, for example ‘the High Ambition Coalition’ as well as improved bilateral relationships with other major powers.463 These coalitions proved crucial to the EU’s goal achievement in Paris and it is likely to be a strategy that the EU continues to rely on. 4.3.1.4 Strong Unilateral Leadership The EU’s aspiration for leadership in renewable energy began in the early 1990s. Through credible unilateral leadership, it has acquired a world-renowned reputation in this field. As Bruce describes, “[t]he EU’s legal frameworks and policies on sustainable energy are among the most progressive and influential”.464 Since 2001, the EU’s renewable energy law has primarily been set out in the Renewable Energy Directive. One of the bloc’s main tools for encouraging investment has been through the use of renewable energy targets and associated policies. Although EU member states were not the first to introduce renewable energy targets, they were the catalyst for the widespread adoption of the measures in the 2000s.465 Since then, “the EU has assumed a leading position worldwide with its ambitious energy and climate targets”.466 As noted in Chapter 2, to be considered a credible unilateral leader an actor must  462 Parker, Karlsson & Hjerpe, supra note 48 at 249. 463 Ibid at 242. 464 Bruce, supra note 268 at 77. 465 International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Renewable Energy Target Setting (2015) at 21. 466 Ibid. 74  demonstrate their commitment to act, and not just “engag[e] in cheap talk”.467 The EU met its Kyoto target of 12% renewable energy by 2010, but it was not until the implementation of the 20-20-20 targets that questions regarding the EU’s credibility were quelled.468 Reports suggest the EU has already met its 20% emissions reduction target.469 It is also on track to achieve its 20% renewable target, despite it requiring member states to implement some of the most stringent and comprehensive laws and policies when considering specificity, measurability and binding character (as ranked by the International Renewable Energy Association (IRENA)).470  4.3.2 Emergence of China’s leadership 4.3.2.1 Evolving Structural Leadership The realization of China’s importance on the world stage coincided with its steady industrialization throughout the 2000s. By 2006, its had surpassed the U.S. as the world’s largest GHG emitter and inevitably became subject to increasing international scrutiny. At COP15, China exercised “structural leadership to block progress” towards a binding agreement and was accused of “dragging its feet” during the negotiations.471 This was the first time that China -instead of the U.S.-was widely blamed for the  467 Parker et al, supra note 47 at 271; Underdal, supra note 150 at 185. 468 Oberthür & Kelly, supra note 254 at 41. 469 Kashyap Raibagi, ‘EU set to meet its climate change targets’, (2019), online: Data Journalism Network <https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/eng/News/Data-news/EU-set-to-meet-its-climate-change-targets%0D> accessed 24 June 2020; " In 2008, EU member states agreed on the 2020 Energy and Climate Package that included a number of measures to implement a 20% reduction of emissions. The EU reached the emissions reduction target for 2020 six years early and reduced emissions by over 23% between 1990 and 2017", Climate Action Tracker, ‘EU’, (2020), online: Climate Action Tracker <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/eu/pledges-and-targets/> accessed 24 June 2020. 470 European Commission, ‘Latest Eurostat data confirm that the EU is on track to meet its 2020 Renewable energy target’, (2019), online: European Commission <https://ec.europa.eu/luxembourg/news/latest-eurostat-data-confirm-eu-track-meet-its-2020-renewable-energy-target_fr> accessed 24 June 2020; see also, ‘Figure 5: Renewable Electricity Generation Targets by Target Date for Selected Countries Along Spectrum', International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), supra note 465 at 25. 471 Parker et al, supra note 47 at 281; Xinlei Li, ‘China: From a marginalized follower to an emerging leader in climate politics’ in Rudiger KW Wurzel, James Connelly & Duncan Liefferink, eds, The European Union in International Climate Change Politics: Still Taking a Lead? (London: Routledge, 2016) 254 at 260; Mark Lynas, ‘How do I know China wrecked the Copenhagen deal? I was in the room’, The Guardian (22 December 2009), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-change-mark-lynas> accessed 24 June 2020. 75  failure of a climate conference.472 In the years between Copenhagen and Paris we see China begin emerging as a leader. As Victor comments, “[p]erhaps the most pivotal nation in making Paris feasible was China: a nation that has now become much more willing to engage with global agreements if they are framed in China-friendly ways.”473 4.3.2.2 Intellectual Leadership of Developing Countries Before 2009, China acted as an intellectual leader with regards developing countries by championing the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility”.474 The dataset analyzed above suggests that this influence has continued to be recognized to a degree. As Parker & Karlsson explain: “[T]he recognition of China as a leading actor has been relatively stable. China’s leadership recognition peaked in Cancún 2010 at 51%, and was second only to the US in Paris where 46% of the delegates viewed China as playing a leading role in the negotiations. These results reflect China’s leadership role among developing countries and major emerging economies in the UNFCCC and its ideational leadership is particularly prominent on issues of development, financing, equity, and common but differentiated responsibilities.”475   Despite engaging in domestic action on climate change, it was careful not to link any such action “to any presumptions of international obligation”.476 But this stance became difficult to maintain as its structural power grew, as outlined above. Consequently, it softened this position in advance of Paris. As described in Section 3.3.3, wording to recognize this newly grasped compromise was included in the preamble of the Paris Agreement.  4.3.2.3 From Laggard to Leader in Entrepreneurial Leadership China’s willingness to engage in more effective entrepreneurial leadership was evidenced early in the Paris Conference by the Chinese President in a speech made at the opening ceremony. President Xi Jinping reaffirmed China’s commitment to its Intended National Determined Contribution, as well as to the  472 Li, supra note 471 at 260; Hilton et al, supra note 366. 473 Victor, supra note 243 at 138. 474 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2  475 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 169 at 531. 476 Hilton & Kerr, supra note 41. 76  commitments made in its bilateral statement with the U.S.477 This was also the first time that a President of China had attended a Conference of Parties, which in itself was symbolic.478 Hilton et al explain how COP21 was the first time that “China was willing to commit to an absolute cap on emissions subject to international measurement, reporting and verification.”479 In contrast to COP15, at the close of the Paris negotiations, China was widely described as “increasingly cooperative”, but as Hilton and Kerr point out, in order to reach the 2 degrees Paris goal, China will need to become “increasingly proactive on the international stage.”480 4.3.2.4 Emerging Unilateral Leadership Although China’s drive for leadership in renewable energy laws and policies has undoubtedly been tied up in domestic concerns, the results of the followers survey discussed above suggest that the China’s motivations for leadership don’t appear to have affected its recognition as a leader, particularly amongst developing countries. Furthermore, its leadership seems set to continue with developing countries. As Li suggests, in recent years, China has begun promoting “‘clean energy’ South- South cooperation”. 481 By sharing its renewable energy best practices and experience with other developing countries, China has demonstrated “leadership by example”.482  As is consistent with China’s exercise of other leadership modes, China’s potential for unilateral leadership in renewable energy has improved in recent years. One of China’s most impressive feats in its climate change journey is how quickly it has ramped-up its production of renewables. Having surpassed the investment of the U.S. in 2009, by 2017 more than half of global renewable energy investment came from China, and China’s investment in renewables was approximately three times that of the U.S. A report by the ‘Global Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation’ stated that, “No country  477 Gao, supra note 371 at 236. 478 Ibid. 479 Hilton & Kerr, supra note 41. 480 Ibid at 55. 481 Li, supra note 471 at 255. 482 Ibid. 77  has put itself in a better position to become the world’s renewable energy superpower than China.”483  Like the EU, China has partially achieved this progress through the adoption of renewable energy targets. China currently holds the largest renewable energy target, and though not as stringent as the EU, is ranked 3 out of 4 on IRENA’s scale.484 4.3.3 Towards Joint Leadership?  4.3.3.1 Summary of Capability and Credibility Underdal suggests that in some cases, the diverse capabilities required to exercise each different leadership mode may be stark enough that for one leader to combine them all would be difficult, if not impossible.485 Perhaps this is the stage we have reached in the case of climate change. The analysis above demonstrates how over time, the credibility of the EU and China has changed as their position in global climate politics has evolved. Each actor’s ability to exert leadership is also, to some extent, determined by the other.  Over the past twenty years the EU has moved from its predominantly unchallenged position of climate leader to a more marginalized role. As the EU has improved its emissions reductions, it has on the one hand proved its credibility in unilateral leadership, but on the other, lost some of its structural power (in the traditional sense). This position has been exacerbated by the rise of emissions from developing countries, of which China has been the clearest example. As the EU’s structural power has declined, it has had to adjust its approach to entrepreneurial leadership, a reality that is likely to continue should it wish to continue exerting this leadership mode. As Bäckstrand and Ole Elgström describe,  483 The Global Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation, A New World: The Geopolitics of the Energy Transition (2019) at 40. 484 See ‘Figure 5: Renewable Electricity Generation Targets by Target Date for Selected Countries Along Spectrum’, International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), supra note 465 at 25. 485 Underdal, supra note 150. 78  “The Union now had to come to terms with the fact that the distribution of power in climate change negotiations had changed, resulting in a need for strategic coalition building and a new type of leadership.”486 Its improved entrepreneurial diplomacy was displayed in the Paris negotiations, demonstrating its ability to form important alliances with other nations to achieve consensus. Currently, the EU’s strengths appear to lie in its unilateral leadership and intellectual leadership. As described in the previous chapter, it has been at the forefront of pioneering new policies and technologies and pushing for world changing ideas.487   China on the other hand, has emerged in recent years as perhaps a ‘reluctant leader’. Its early intellectual leadership was shaped by its view that developed countries must act first to address GHG emissions, whilst allowing industrializing nations to continue their paths of development unhindered. This outlook ‘came under fire’ following Copenhagen, and a more nuanced principle has emerged which better accounts for China’s new political position. China’s rise has dramatically changed climate politics, thrusting structural power onto China and bolstering its status as a key veto player (together with the U.S.).488 However, alongside this China’s unilateral leadership in renewable energy has been growing, recognized in IRENA’s assessment of their renewable energy target (as set out in Section 4.3.2.4 above).   Many have observed the “leadership deficit” that U.S. withdrawal presents.489 Given the global political order, it seems natural to look to the EU and China to see what comes next.490 On the one hand, there are concerns that “a US exit could trigger others to free-ride or withdraw”491 or cause parties to “water down their commitments in return, undermining the pledge-and-review system”, threatening the appearance of freeriding as outlined in Chapter 2.492  On the other hand, some have recognized it could  486 Bäckstrand & Elgström, supra note 259 at 1380. 487 Hinrichs-Rahlwes, supra note 384 at 1. 488 Bäckstrand & Elgström, supra note 259 at 1373 & 1379. 489 Zhang et al, supra note 88 at 222. 490 Walker & Biedenkopf, supra note 33 at 33. 491 Kemp, supra note 33 at 459. 492 Urpelainen & Graaf, supra note 250 at 841. 79  “embolden” others to show leadership493 or  to “step up to replace US climate leadership”.494 Neither the EU,495 nor China face political institutional hurdles on climate that are as profound as those that the U.S. faces, and therefore “can offer far more decisive and ambitious leadership.”496 4.3.3.2 Signs of a strengthened partnership since Paris? The official rhetoric of the EU and China appears to suggest positive signs of a strengthened EU-China partnership and an intention to improve ambition, despite the position of the U.S.497 Since 2015, the commitment to climate change has been reiterated through the EU-China 2015 Statement and the EU-and China Roadmap on Energy Cooperation in 2016. In 2018, The EU-China Joint statement on China was released which includes statements of “their highest political commitment to the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement in all its aspects.”498 These most recent commitments are particularly significant in the wake of President’s Trump’s notice of withdrawal in June 2017. As Freeman describes, “Energy and climate have been a major element of the EU relationship with China.”499 The partnership on climate change was established in 2005, and has become a key focus of the EU-China summit, the 22nd of which was due to take place in September 2020, but has been postponed due to COVID-19. Ahead of this meeting, the French President has reportedly visited China to  493 Kemp, supra note 33 at 459. 494 Urpelainen & Graaf, supra note 250 at 840; Kemp, supra note 33; Yong-xiang et al, supra note 17 at 221. 495 Note: though the EU undoubtedly does face internal institutional hurdles, it has learnt to “speak with one voice” See Afionis, supra note 39. 496 Kemp, supra note 33 at 459–460. 497 “With an obstructive US administration in place, many have worried that momentum for countries to increase this ambition would be lost. Instead, the EU and China have committed to “forge ahead with further policies” and strengthen ambition, to publish new mid-century decarbonisation plans by 2020 and to agree new goals for climate financing for developing countries through until 2025”, Jonathan Gaventa, ‘EU-China climate statement is a manifesto for a new global order’, (2017), online: Climate Home News <https://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/06/02/eu-china-statement-manifesto-new-global-order/%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 498 The European Commission, ‘EU-China Leader’s Statement on Climate Change and Energy’, (2018), online: EEAS <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/news/20180713_statement_en.pdf> at 3; Note: the statement was substantially drafted in 2017, but it was not signed due to a collapse of talks between the EU and China due to disagreement on trade. See Soila Apparicio & Karl Mathiesen, ‘EU and China agree sweeping joint statement on climate action’, (2018), online: Climate Home News <https://www.climatechangenews.com/2018/07/16/eu-china-agree-sweeping-joint-statement-climate-action/%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 499 Freeman, supra note 426 at 178. 80  further the prospects of a bilateral agreement.500 The summit was due to take place in advance of the climate talks in Glasgow, where Parties will reveal their updated (or recommunicated) NDCs. It is also strategic as China will be finalizing its sixth five-year plan in the latter half 2020.  This builds on the previous summit in which the 2018 statement was released.  In summary, an analysis of the EU and China’s climate leadership shows that theoretically, China holds the credibility for structural leadership that the EU no longer enjoys (particularly in the light of the withdrawal of the U.S.); whereas the EU provides credibility in the other leadership modes that China is ‘lacking’ by virtue of its status as an emerging leader. Recent official statements suggest an improved EU-China relationship, and the desire to “jointly drive the climate governance process forward”, at a time when this leadership is very much needed.501  4.4 Part II: Leadership in Implementation: Which Leadership Modes will be Most Effective? It is evident that whilst regimes are still being articulated and there remain details to be agreed, “there is a clear role for leadership”.502 Though the Paris Agreement was adopted on 12 December 2015, this did not conclude the negotiations. There was still a great need for diplomacy in the “after Paris process”.503 Many of the substantive details for how the various mechanisms would be implemented were deferred; such as the “fleshing out a system for transparency” in the detailed design of the rulebook.504 Whilst negotiations are ongoing in implementation, the analysis provided so far on credibility and capability continues to be relevant. However, in the next section I am concerned with the exercise of leadership in implementation once formal negotiations have concluded. With the exception of market mechanisms under Article 6, the design of the rulebook concluded in 2019.505 As Rajamani and Bodansky explain, having followed a  500 Chloé Farand, ‘EU plots climate deal with China’, (2019), online: Climate Home News <https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/11/11/eu-plots-climate-deal-china/%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 501 Apparicio & Karl Mathiesen, supra note 498. 502 Grubb & Gupta, supra note 145 at 17. 503 Victor, supra note 243 at 140. 504 Ibid at 137. 505 Simon Evans & Josh Gabbitas, ‘COP25: Key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Madrid’, (2019), online: Carbon Brief <https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop25-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-madrid%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 81  process of near continuous negotiations since 2007, “[w]ith the adoption of most elements of the Paris Rulebook, the UN climate change regime can now focus on implementation of the Paris Agreement.”506  4.4.1 The Structure of Paris Agreement: Which Parts are Key to Implementation? The Paris Agreement represents a new direction in global climate diplomacy. As described in Chapter 2, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, where parties’ commitments were negotiated and agreed upon at the international level, under the Paris Agreement pledges are agreed upon at the national level and communicated to the other parties.507 The commitments are ‘housed’ outside of the agreement, once communicated to the UNFCCC Secretariat, they are published on the UNFCCC website.508  This structure presents new opportunities for parties to demonstrate leadership. It was thought by policy makers that the top-down approach of the Kyoto Protocol -with strict emissions targets and timetables enshrined in binding law -would ensure that Parties, “feet would be held to the fire”.509 However, this approach did not prove effective, as evidenced by the poor performance of the protocol.510 Hence, the pledge-and-review system of the Paris Agreement was considered a politically more acceptable option.511 Scholars have noted that this manner promises, “more potential to achieve collective climate action than the binding emission reduction regime”.512 Instead of relying on the primacy of binding law to ensure policy ambition, the Paris Agreement is contingent on the degree to which the voluntary approach will spur countries to put forward their best efforts, marking a significant departure  506 Rajamani & Bodansky, supra note 139 at 1025. 507 See Section 2.3 for an explanation of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches 508 UNFCCC, ‘NDC Registry’, (2020), online: NDC Registry (Interim) <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/Pages/LatestSubmissions.aspx%0D> accessed 24 June 2020. 509 Victor, supra note 243 at 134. 510 Duncan Clark, ‘Has the Kyoto protocol made any difference to carbon emissions?’, The Guardian (26 November 2012), online: <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2012/nov/26/kyoto-protocol-carbon-emissions> accessed 24 June 2020. 511 Manjana Milkoreit & Kate Haapala, ‘The global stocktake : design lessons for a new review and ambition mechanism in the international climate regime’ (2019) 19:1 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 89 at 91. 512 Jutta Brunnée, ‘Procedure and substance in international environmental law and the protection of the global commons’ in The Commons and a New Global Governance (2018) 291 at 308–309. 82  from the approach of the Kyoto Protocol.513 It is plainly still up for debate as to whether this framework can deliver on the Paris goals.514   4.4.2 Nationally Determined Contributions Whereas mitigation under the Kyoto Protocol was primarily addressed through agreed emissions reduction targets, in the Paris Agreement mitigation is addressed through NDCs. NDCs are the mechanism by which states make pledges towards their fulfilment of the Paris Agreement goals.515 Though not binding in substance, the procedure by which members are required to submit declarations is binding on Paris signatories. The content and intensity of each NDC is decided by individual states at a domestic level. Thus, reflecting the move towards a bottom-up approach discussed above, in which Parties are given the autonomy to decide the best use of their resources to achieve the Paris Goals. Unlike its predecessor, the Paris Agreement mandates that all parties make pledges based on national circumstances.516 The Intended Nationally Determined Contributions submitted in advance of COP21 became binding upon ratification and represent the floor of nations’ climate change commitments. Parties have been invited to submit new NDCs by the end of 2020 (when the agreement takes effect) but this is not required, Parties are entitled to just “recommunicate” their NDCs.517 Most requirements for the functioning of NDCs are incorporated in Article 4. Article 4 (2) states that each Party must “prepare, communicate and maintain” successive nationally determined contributions, setting out the objectives that it intends to achieve through domestic mitigation measures. Each consecutive NDC must embody progress on the previous NDC, and “reflect its highest possible ambition”.518 Article 4(9) mandates that  513 Falkner, supra note 46 at 1115. 514 Milkoreit & Haapala, supra note 511 at 91. 515 The Paris Agreement supra note 2, Article 4(2) 516 The Paris Agreement supra note 2, Article 4 517 Evans & Gabbitas, supra note 505. 518 The Paris Agreement supra note 2, Article 4(3)  83  states communicate an enhanced NDC every five years,519 based upon the outcome of the global stocktake.520  4.4.2.1 Leadership in Nationally Determined Contributions “The bottom-up approach in the Paris Agreement relies on strong leadership that leads by example to achieve compliance, in contrast with the top-down approach by which parties face more stringent constraints.” 521 NDCs are designed in a way that facilitates ambitious nations “taking the lead”. Indeed, it is envisioned that developed countries should ‘continue’ to do so by setting and undertaking economy-wide, absolute emissions reduction targets.522 Whereas developing countries are only “encourag[ed]” to move towards economy-wide targets over time.523 Of the four leadership modes discussed, this mechanism best provides opportunity for leadership through unilateral action. This is because unilateral leadership involves setting the pace for others to follow, through the implementation of pioneering and innovative policies. In submitting NDCs, parties quantify and describe their “ambitious efforts” to meet the Paris Agreement goals, communicating them to other parties at regular stages of the agreement. The hope is that this will inspire enhanced commitment from others. NDCs also offer an opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of leading-edge policies. As Hermwille et al point out, “[a]nother useful benchmark would be to identify and showcase particularly ambitious NDCs or policies and measures taken to date.”524 Countries such as the EU and China have the credibility to demonstrate leadership in this process, particularly in the field of renewable energy. Indeed, without the commitment of these two  519 “in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement” The Paris Agreement supra note 2, Article 4(9) 520 The Paris Agreement supra note 2, Article 14(3) 521 Zhang et al, supra note 88 at 222. 522 The Paris Agreement supra note 2, Article 4(4) 523 The Paris Agreement supra note 2, Article 4(4); Note: this is a concession to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.  524 Lukas Hermwille et al, ‘Catalyzing mitigation ambition under the Paris Agreement : elements for an effective Global Stocktake Catalyzing mitigation ambition under the Paris Agreement : elements for an e ff ective Global Stocktake’ (2019) 3062 at 991–992. 84  Parties it is hard to see how climate laggards will be motivated to comply. The hope is that, by striving for strengthened emissions reductions policies and measures, these actors can demonstrate their commitment to the Paris Agreement goals, “remov[ing] uncertainty about whether the leader is actually devoted to the undertaking” and thus minimizing concerns of free-riding mentioned previously.525  It may also spark a “race to the top” as nations feel pressured to keep up with or perhaps exceed others’ commitments. 526 This dynamic plays into states’ soft power concerns.527 Credibility is critical in this regard: whether a country’s NDCs are regarded as ambitious enough will affect their perception in the eyes of other Parties. And further down the line, countries will need to achieve their “self-imposed goals”.528 To date, the EU has exerted this unilateral leadership in renewable energy by setting stringent targets and related policies, and successfully implementing them. China also has a significant economic and technological advantage in this area, which could prove persuasive in demonstrating technological potential of renewable technologies. As I will explore further in the next chapter, both the EU and China have included a form of renewable energy target in their initial NDCs. 4.4.3 Ratcheting up NDCs: Global Stocktake and Article 4 Interaction “It is therefore necessary that the level of ambition of NDCs is increased considerably in subsequent iterations of the NDC cycle.”529 Another key instrument of the Paris Agreement is the ‘ratchet-up’ mechanism.  Many scholars have noted its importance, given that the first round of NDCs, if implemented fully, would likely still lead to 2.7 degrees of warming.530 The idea behind this mechanism is that it will “promote progressively stronger NDCs over time”531 and therefore, “galvanize collective action toward achieving global goals”.532 The mechanism operates on a five-year cycle and includes three elements:  525 Parker et al, supra note 47 at 271. 526 Hilton & Kerr, supra note 41 at 54. 527 Keohane & Victor, supra note 77 at 573. 528 Saul & Seidel, supra note 84 at 902. 529 Hermwille et al, supra note 524 at 989. 530 Ibid; Milkoreit & Haapala, supra note 511 at 90 & 92. 531 Bodansky, supra note 14 at 306. 532 Milkoreit & Haapala, supra note 511 at 92. 85  1. Global Stocktakes (Article 14.2): every 5 years, unless the CMA decides otherwise (Article 14.1 & 14.2) 2. Obligation that each state communicates an NDC every 5 years, informed by outcomes of global stocktake (Article 4.9) 3. An expectation that each party’s successive NDC represents a progression beyond its previous NDC and reflect its “highest possible ambition” (Article 4.3) Read together these elements demonstrate the interaction between Parties’ individually stated NDCs (under Article 4) and one of the key mechanisms for strengthening and reviewing these: the global stocktake under Article 14.  4.4.3.1 The Global Stocktake It became apparent at an early stage in the negotiations for the Paris Agreement that the focus of the compliance mechanisms would be facilitation as opposed to enforcement.533 As NDCs are not legally binding, the transparency framework and Global Stocktake is the main mechanism by which states will be held to account for meeting their pledges. Article 14(1) establishes that a global stocktake will take place to assess “the collective progress towards achieving the purpose” of the Agreement. This process is to occur every five years, beginning in 2023, and the outcome of the stocktake will inform Parties “in updating and enhancing” their actions.534 The provision has been considered to implement a “type of collective, peer review forum” for states to hold each other to account.535  The ultimate aim of which is to increase ambition over time.536 The ‘transparency’ element of the peer review forum is in part achieved through the establishment of the enhanced transparency framework in Article 13, the purpose of which is to determine  533 Oberthür & Bodle, supra note 20 at 55. 534 The Paris Agreement supra note 2, Article 14(2) & Article 14(3) 535 Karlsson-vinkhuyzen et al, supra note 21 at 594. 536  Milkoreit & Haapala, supra note 511 at 92.; Note: the Paris Agreement additionally prescribes a review framework of progress towards the global goals every five years, assessing “collective progress towards achieving the purpose… and its long-term goal”, the Paris Agreement supra note 2, Article 14(1) 86  progress towards the Paris Agreement goals, including tracking progress towards NDCs and informing the global stocktake. As Falkner explains,  “the Paris Agreement makes transparency a key regulatory instrument aimed at building trust between the parties and enabling them to review the implementation of national pledges.”537 As was established in Chapter 2, trust is a key condition for overcoming collective action concerns. That principle is echoed here. By ensuring transparency, parties are reassured by their ability to determine whether other parties are following through on the actions they pledge. 4.4.3.2 Leadership in the Global Stocktake “The premise is that peer and public pressure can be as effective as legal obligation in influencing behavior, an issue that has long been debated in the literature on soft law”.538 Public pressure is a key tool in monitoring state’s compliance with their commitments, as it can act as a catalyst to hold states to account on the international stage through ‘naming and shaming’ of non-compliant states by NGOs. Scholars have understandably focussed on transparency as a key element in order for this process to work, particularly with regards to the ‘naming’ part.539 The potential effectiveness of this avenue is difficult to determine. Afterall, the enhanced transparency framework is designed to be “be implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of national sovereignty”.540 This means it is unlikely that there will ever be a formal ‘naming and shaming process’, for example via official reports by UNFCCC bodies.541 Further, due to fears of politicization, non-state actors are unlikely to be substantially involved in the formal review processes, which could “remove[s] some of the reputational incentives through which ambition could be increased”.542   537 Falkner, supra note 46 at 1115–1116. 538 Bodansky, supra note 14 at 311. 539 Hermwille et al, supra note 524 at 991. 540 The Paris Agreement supra note 2, Article 13.3. 541 Romain Weikmans et al, ‘Transparency requirements under the Paris Agreement and their ( un ) likely impact on strengthening the ambition of nationally determined contributions ( NDCs ) Transparency requirements under the Paris Agreement nd their’ (2020) 3062 at 521. 542 Ibid. 87  On shaming, Falkner identifies two ways in which the review mechanism is likely to affect states’ behavior: peer pressure among parties, and naming and shaming by civil society.543  Pazstor described the reporting mechanism of the agreement as “name and encourage”, as opposed to “name and shame”.544 But how will this ‘naming and encouraging’ be effective? It seems clear that there is a role for leadership here, but it begs the question as to how likely states will be challenge others ambition in any meaningful way.545 The idea that peer pressure could be effective in pushing countries to increase their ambition rests on the notion that, “states care about collective judgment of their conduct because they have an interest in reciprocal compliance by and future cooperation with others”.546 As Chayes and Chayes established, states are required to remain in “good standing in [regimes] that [make] up the substance of international life”.547 In this way, the social persuasion element of unilateral leadership is crucial.  However, in order to be effective, the ‘naming and encouraging’ element of the global stocktake is likely to require some structural power on behalf of the ‘namer’. This is because, unless there are at least some actors with a credible amount of structural leadership taking part in the regime, other nations will not be persuaded to follow. In the case of climate change, without the commitment of the major emitters, laggards will be disincentivized from following due to the nature of global public goods and competing political priorities.548 Another way in which leadership could be shown in the global stocktake is by leaders volunteering themselves for higher scrutiny. Victor suggests it “will be important for some countries to volunteer them-selves for careful review—to lead the way”, particularly as the intricacies of the review mechanisms are being worked out.549  543 Falkner, supra note 46 at 1122. 544 Falk, supra note 22. 545 Weikmans et al, supra note 541 at 521. 546 Johnstone, 2005 as quoted by Ibid at 513. 547 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty : Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) at 27. 548 Described further in Chapter 2. 549 Victor, supra note 243 at 137. 88  4.5  How Should Goal Achievement of Climate Leadership be Assessed in Regime implementation?  One of the most important benchmarks of credibility in climate leadership literature is the reflection of an actor’s policy objectives in the result of negotiations.550 Although establishing goal achievement by itself cannot be equated with effectiveness of a leader, it is a significant factor to consider when evaluating their capability and credibility.551  Establishing goal achievement in this way cannot work for regime implementation once negotiations between parties have concluded. The theory of how this should be assessed once a regime is established, is a question to which I now turn. Perhaps the most instinctive measurement of goal achievement in implementation is the effect of the regime on the problem it is seeking to address. One may then presume that to measure a leader’s effectiveness in implementation requires an assessment of their effect on the goals of the regime. However, as many scholars have pointed out, measuring the impact of a condition (leadership) on the impact of a regime (e.g. the 1.5°C aspirational goal of the Paris Agreement) is difficult, if not impossible to do.552 Scholars have built upon David Easton’s assertion of the need to distinguish between outputs, outcomes and impacts when investigating the consequences of political systems.553 In summary, the impact of a regime on the underlying issues which it is intended to address is caused by outcomes, such as changes in behavior, which in turn is caused by outputs, such as the regulations and policy instruments that result from the implementation of the regime.554 Below, I  briefly describe the difference between the three concepts: 1. Impacts: social, economic, environmental or other conditions  550 Oberthür & Groen, supra note 170 at 710. 551 Ibid. 552 Milkoreit & Haapala, supra note 511 at 95. 553 Wood et al, supra note 195 at 7. 554 Ibid. 89  When studying the impact(s) of a regime, one studies how effective the regime has been at solving the underlying problem which the regime was designed to address.555 2. Outcomes: changes in behavior If assessing outcomes, one would be concerned with the extent to which the regime has affected the behavior of regime members.556 3. Outputs: regulations and other policy instruments Studying outputs includes reviewing regulations and rules that have been designed and implemented by parties to guide behavior of key actors in the regime.557 Applying this schema to the Paris Agreement framework, the overall impact that we are concerned with is the collective action issue of global warming. This goal is embodied in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, as “well below 2 degrees temperature increase above pre-industrial levels”.558  As described, this is the limit that the best science we have tells us is “safe”. If we were concerned with impacts in assessing regime effectiveness, we would measure to what extent the Paris Agreement has affected the slowing of global temperature rise. If we were concerned with behavior change of parties to the Paris Agreement (and those within their jurisdiction) we would measure outcomes. The sorts of questions we may be concerned with is whether the behavior of regime members has changed following the adoption of the agreement. For example, have nations begun to favor the use of renewable energy sources in their policy? If we were concerned with outputs of the Paris Agreement, we would examine the effectiveness of the regulations that nations have implemented following the adoption of the regime.   555 Oran R Young, ‘The Consequences of International Regimes’ in Arild Underdal & Oran R Young, eds, Regime Consequences: Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004) 3 at 12–13. 556 Ibid. 557 Ibid. 558 The Paris Agreement supra note 2, Article 2(1)(a)  90  4.5.1 The Concept of ‘Directness’ As we move from outputs through outcomes to impacts, causation becomes increasingly difficult to measure.559 The concept of “directness” comes from an examination of the “length of the causal chain” which connects the operation of regime and its effect on the problem to be solved.560 The further apart these two variables are (and the longer the causal chain), the harder it is to measure.561 Demonstrating causal links is key to research in this area, but it can prove very difficult to do.562 By involving leadership as a condition in regime effectiveness, we are including an additional link in the causal chain.563 Thus, attempting to answer the question of the overall impact that the actions of a particular leader had on the 1.5°C aspirational goal of the Paris Agreement might be a step too far in the causal chain to be meaningful. However, a more targeted question such as how compatible a leader’s NDCs are with the aspirational target of the 1.5°C target may offer some insight into this first question, but is more easily measured, as I will explore in the next section. 4.6 Part III: Measuring the Actions of the EU and China Since the Paris Agreement So far, I have discussed how leadership can be shown in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, and how this may be measured. In the next section I attempt to draw together this analysis to determine to what extent the EU and China have shown leadership in their actions since the adoption of the Paris Agreement. I will do this by reviewing Climate Action Tracker (CAT)’s assessment of the EU and China’s NDC pledges.564 My analysis determined that unilateral leadership will be most effective in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. In order to demonstrate credibility in unilateral leadership, “cheap  559 Wood et al, supra note 195 at 7. 560 Young, supra note 555 at 7. 561 Ibid. 562 Ibid at 15. 563 Young, supra note 19. 564 Climate Action Tracker, ‘Climate Action Tracker’, (2020), online: Climate Action Tracker <https://climateactiontracker.org/> accessed 24 June 2020. 91  acts may not do”565 and unilateral leaders must ‘set the pace’ for others to follow. I will conclude with some thoughts on the EU and China’s intellectual leadership in the ‘green energy revolution’. 4.6.1 Climate Action Tracker  It has been well documented that the first round of NDCs by almost all nations are in need of rapid improvement if we are to meet the Paris Agreement goals.566 CAT has produced a ‘Climate Target Update Tracker’ to track the commitments of Parties as they submit and update their NDCs. According to CAT’s estimates, current pledges are insufficient to prevent global temperatures from rising beyond 2°C; indeed, they are projected to lead to global warming of 2.7°C or more. CAT ranks Parties’ NDCs on a six-part scale from ‘Critically Insufficient’ (compatible with a +4°C world e.g. U.S. and Russia) to ‘Role Model’ (compatible with a -1.5°C world, a category in which no country currently sits). The best-in-class example is currently Morocco, at ‘1.5°C Paris Agreement compatible’, the second of the six categories.  The EU’s current NDC is rated as “Insufficient”, whereas China’s is categorized as “Highly Insufficient”.567 From the outset, it is difficult to see how NDCs rated as “Insufficient” and “Highly Insufficient” demonstrate the that the EU and China are “setting the pace” in implementation of the Paris Agreement. Setting aside the analytical challenge of assessing goal achievement in regime implementation leadership, a simple analysis of the EU and China’s NDC against outputs, outcomes and impacts points to their ineffectiveness. On impacts, both pledges are, “not consistent with holding warming below 2°C let alone with the Paris Agreement’s stronger 1.5°C limit”.568 If all governments were in the “insufficient range”, warming would reach “over 2°C and up to 3°C.” The picture is even bleaker for the “highly insufficient range”, where those numbers move to between 3°C and up to 4°C. Thus, it would be farcical to claim that either NDC could be seen as effective from an impact perspective. Looking at outcomes, CAT determines that for both countries, the policies that they currently have in place at  565 Underdal, supra note 150 at 185. 566 Joeri Rogelj et al, ‘Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep warming well below 2 ° C’ (2016) 534:7609 Nature 631, online: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature18307> accessed 24 June 2020; Schreurs, supra note 299 at 222. 567 Climate Action Tracker, supra note 469. 568 Ibid. 92  national level are already ahead of the ambition in their NDCs. Existing EU policy puts the EU on track to meet its 40% emissions reduction target, and China’s domestic policies would edge it into the “insufficient” category. This seems to suggest that relatively little behavioral change has taken place as a result of the signing of the Paris Agreement.  In terms of measuring output, one example of renewable energy legislation that has been implemented at EU level since the signing of the Paris Agreement is the revised Renewable Energy Directive, which entered into force in December 2018 (RED 2018). As part of the clean energy for all Europeans package, its stated aim is to ensure the EU remains “a global leader in renewables”, under the broader objective of meeting the EU’s emissions reduction commitments under the Paris Agreement. Suggestive of the EU having changed its output following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the renewables target was increased from a proposed 27% in 2014, to 32% in 2018.569 There remains the possibility for upwards revision by 2023. RED 2018 requires EU countries to draft ten year ‘National Energy and Climate Plans’ for 2021-2030, outlining how they will meet the new 2030 targets for renewable energy.570 Drafts were required to be submitted by 31 December 2018, with the final plans being submitted by 31 December 2019.571 The remaining elements of the directive must be transposed into national law of each Member State by 30 June 2021, the date upon which the 2009 Directive expires.572 Unlike the RED 2009, the RED 2018 will not mandate binding legal targets for member states at national level. Instead, each member state will set its own self-imposed commitment.573 This means that under the 2030 framework, the responsibility for meeting the 32% target for renewable energy is at EU-level, but responsibility to implement measures to meet the target is still at member state level.574 The message that this sends is thus confusing, on the one hand the upwards revisions suggests an  569 Bruce, supra note 268 at 77. 570 European Council Directive (EU) 2018/2001 supra note 395 571 Ibid.  572 Ibid. 573 Karina Veum & Dierk Bauknecht, ‘How to Reach the EU Renewables Target by 2030? An Analysis of the Governance Framework’ (2019) 127:4 Energy Policy 299 at 299. 574 Ibid. 93  improvement of output and thus effectiveness. But on the other, does the move away from nationally binding targets also represent a lessening of ambition?575 There appears to be at least two arguments in this regard. The transition to an EU-level target may make it more difficult to hold member states to account. However, this change may also be representative of a wider enlightenment on the part of the EU. Echoing the model and philosophy of the Paris Agreement, the EU may have accepted the wisdom of moving away from legally binding targets as a means to ensure ambition and compliance, towards a more “voluntary model”. The effectiveness of which is yet to be proved.576 4.6.2 Intellectual Leadership in the Green Energy Revolution Scholars have noted the effect of the Paris Agreement on institutionalizing the concept of green growth, as a means to meeting the Paris goals.577 To some degree this acceptance is articulated in the text of the Paris Agreement. Article 6.4 establishes a mechanism to “promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while fostering sustainable development”.578 Furthermore, Hermwille et al see another opportunity that the global stocktake presents with regards the formulation of the ideas and values, “[t]hrough periodic goal setting and benchmarking the GST can drive normalization of ambitious climate action and shift expectations of stakeholders across all governance levels” 579. Many scholars have noted the impact that the “signal function” of the Paris Agreement will have in terms of indicating to business the likely direction of travel for future energy policy.580 Unlike the Kyoto protocol, the Paris Agreement includes a long-term temperature target.581 This goal this sends a clearer message to investors for the likely direction of travel for government policy which ultimately will be critical in its implementation.582 As Falkner argues,   575 Hinrichs-Rahlwes, supra note 384. 576 Doelle, supra note 23. 577 Freeman, supra note 404 at 196; Christoff, supra note 324 at 782. 578 The Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Article 6(4); see also Bodansky, supra note 14 at 307. 579 Hermwille et al, supra note 524 at 992. 580 Ibid. 581 The Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Article 2.1(a) 582 Falkner, supra note 46 at 1115. 94  “Finally, given that the decarbonization of the global economy will be down to decisions by economic actors, the Paris Agreement will ultimately be judged by the effect it has on global markets. International regimes and governmental regulation can provide a supportive regulatory framework, but it is companies that decide on the direction of technological innovation, R&D expenditure and investment flows. In this context, an international treaty such as the Paris Agreement can hope to shape business decisions in three ways: it can send a signal to markets about the international community’s long-term political objectives; it can put in place governance mechanisms that create incentives for low-carbon business decisions; and it can encourage and support voluntary efforts by private actors. …By strengthening the temperature target and adopting carbon neutrality as the long-term goal, the Paris Agreement does indeed send a clear signal to global markets, marking out the long-term direction of travel for the global economy.”583 This paradigm of “green growth”584 provides another avenue in which to exert intellectual leadership. Perhaps two of the actors pushing this concept hardest have been the EU and China. The EU has been recognized as a pioneer of green energy.585 As described in Chapter 3, it has been leading the way on renewable energy policy over the course of the last thirty years. In recent years it has managed to decouple economic growth from GHG emissions through the implementation of a number of successful measures including mandated renewable energy targets, renewable energy subsidies and policies to transition away from fossil fuels.586 China on the other hand has displayed an impressive and unmatched growth in the production of renewable energy technologies. China is now the world’s largest producer of renewable energy technology and has played a key role in the push for the green economy.587 Freeman describes how, “renewables have not only been central to China’s climate and energy policy, but also industrial policy”.588 Due to the size of China’s emissions and evolving geopolitical position, China’s outlook on renewables will not only influence the green energy sector, but also related sectors such as oil and gas.589 For this reason, “the geopolitics of renewables will become manifest through the actions of China”. 590  583 Ibid at 1123. 584 Freeman, supra note 404 at 193. 585 Hinrichs-Rahlwes, supra note 384 at 1. 586 Georgios Amanatidis, Briefing: European policies on climate and energy towards 2020, 2030 and 2050 (2019). 587 Zhang et al, supra note 88 at 223. 588 Freeman, supra note 404 at 196. 589 Ibid. 590 Ibid at 188. 95  This push for green growth shows intellectual leadership on the part of the EU and China. As Wurzel et al describe, “the EU forged alliances with developing countries (entrepreneurial leadership) by emphasizing the importance of equity issues and economic advantages in the move towards a low- carbon economy driven by renewable energy ([intellectual] leadership). It could be argued that while the EU’s structural leadership capacities are declining its entrepreneurial and particularly its [intellectual] leadership capabilities are becoming increasingly more important for achieving its goals in international climate change politics.”591 Over time, the narrative of the both the EU and China has modified to fit this “vision” of green growth. Torney at al suggest that the “framing” of Chinese and European energy issues has converged in recent years, seeing a move by the Chinese from a focus on affordability and availability to stewardship and the obverse for the EU.592 In the EU, the concept of a low-carbon economy represents an evolution of the concept of “ecological modernization”, a concept that was first introduced in the 1980s and reframes the problem of climate change as an opportunity to modernize economy as well as a threat to the environment.593 In China we see the concept of “Ecological Civilization” taking hold, a concept that entered CCP rhetoric in 2007,594 it is regarded as the next stage of human progress following the industrial era.595  Whether green growth can really achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement remains to be seen. Many are skeptical of the movement as an institutionalization of “business as usual”, when what the planet really needs – if we are serious about meeting the Paris Agreement goals – is a fundamental overhaul of our economic and political system.596 Whatever the outcome, it is clear from the rhetoric of the EU and China that clean energy is intended to form a major part of their ongoing climate change policy  591 Wurzel, Liefferink & Connelly, supra note 146 at 294. 592 Olivia Gippner & Diarmuid Torney, ‘Shifting Policy Priorities in EU-China Energy Relations: Implications for Chinese Energy investments in Europe’ (2017) 101 Energy Policy 649 at 655; See also,  Sebastian Oberthür & Claire Dupont, ‘The Council, the European Council and international climate policy: from symbolic leadership to leadership by example’ in Rüdiger K W Wurzel & J Connelly, eds, The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics (London: Routledge, 2010) 74 at 80. 593 Wurzel, Liefferink & Connelly, supra note 146 at 295. 594 Rachel E Stern, ‘The Political Logic of China’s New Environmental Courts’ (2014) 72 The China Journal 53 at 56. 595 Ibid. 596 Clive L Spash, ‘This Changes Nothing: The Paris Agreement to Ignore Reality’ (2016) 13:6 Globalizations 928. 96  and strengthened partnership, and represents another way in which they will attempt to exert climate leadership.597 4.7 Conclusion Young’s theory of leadership concludes with the observation that leadership is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for regime formation.598 In a later paper, Young describes how the emergence of “effective leadership” in implementation suggests “all the more reason to anticipate success”.599 Perhaps the question to be asked then, is whether leadership is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for regime implementation? In the context of the Paris Agreement, the analysis above shows leadership likely will be necessary, due to the design of the implementation mechanisms. But whether this analysis can be extended beyond the Paris Agreement to other regimes is situational to each regime, and beyond the scope of this paper. In this chapter I have analyzed the leadership credibility and capability of the EU and China, as joint leaders, as well as the potential for leadership based on an analysis of the Paris Agreement’s implementation mechanisms. In Part III l examined the actions taken by the EU and China since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, to determine whether their behavior matches up to leadership behavior discussed.     597 European Commission, supra note 1; European Commission, supra note 43. 598 Young, supra note 19 at 308. 599 Ibid at 129. 97   CHAPTER 5: Conclusion The adoption of the Paris Agreement marked a historic move in international action to combat global warming. COP21 was thought to be “make-or-break” for UN attempts to reach global consensus on collective action on climate change.600 The result was a legally binding agreement with many non-legal provisions. This approach was considered the “only politically feasible one at the time” and relies on the power of “soft law” and “flexibility” to ensure commitment.601 This dynamic is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in its key mitigation obligations – NDCs – which, though binding in procedure, are voluntary in substance (as discussed in the previous chapter). As with all international law, there is no overriding authority to enforce commitments. The success of the Paris Agreement will therefore rely, in part, on the ability of actors to “peer pressure” other participating states to strengthen and fulfil their commitments.602 Thus, to be effective, collective action on climate change requires the cooperation of the globe’s top emitters: China, the U.S. and the EU.603 As with all collective action problems, freeriders are a threat to the stability of the agreement. President Trump is due to withdraw the U.S. from the agreement on November 4th 2020, the day after the next U.S. election. As the world’s second largest GHG emitter, this decision could impact the likelihood of other laggards seeing their commitments through.604 It is within this context that the focus of this thesis was conceived: the role of climate change leaders in the success of the Paris Agreement. In light of a U.S. withdrawal, my objective was to assess the EU and China’s claims to climate leadership during the negotiation of the Paris Agreement and what this means for their role in its implementation. My conceptual framework, as set out in the second chapter, is founded on traditional leadership theory of Young and Underdal. In the third chapter I looked at the role  600 Fiona Harvey, ‘Paris climate change agreement: the world’s greatest diplomatic success’, The Guardian (14 December 2015), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/13/paris-climate-deal-cop-diplomacy-developing-united-nations> accessed 24 June 2020. 601 Peter Lawrence & Daryl Wong, ‘Soft law in the Paris Climate Agreement: Strength or weakness?’ (2017) 26:3 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 276 at 277. 602 Karlsson-vinkhuyzen et al, supra note 21 at 594. 603 Parker, Karlsson & Hjerpe, supra note 48 at 250. 604 However, see my earlier comment at footnote 251 concerning initiatives such as the United States Climate Alliance. 98  of the EU and China throughout the climate regime from the creation of the UNFCCC through until the Paris Agreement, to determine how these actors exercised leadership, and whether this leadership was effective. Drawing on primary and secondary sources, I examined their exercise of structural, entrepreneurial, intellectual and unilateral leadership.   In the fourth chapter I built upon this analysis to assess the current strengths of the EU and China with regards to their leadership. I argue that a strengthened partnership between the two will be beneficial for both in terms of their capability and credibility. As the world’s largest GHG emitter and with the second biggest economy, China possesses the structural power that the EU no longer enjoys as a result of its gradual decline in GHG emissions share and its position as a “medium-sized power in dynamic multipolar climate geopolitics.”605 On the other hand, the EU, by virtue of its leadership experience, holds the credibility for unilateral and intellectual leadership that China is lacking as an emerging leader. Through my analysis of the leadership and the mechanisms of the Paris Agreement in Chapter 4, I identified that unilateral and structural leadership will be key in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Leading by example in setting and meeting targets within NDCs will be important to encourage the scaling up of ambition that is needed to bring NDCs in line with the 1.5˚C aspirational goal. But structural leadership is needed to demonstrate that enough of the biggest emitters are doing their fair share for laggards to be motivated to do theirs. In the second half of the chapter I explored ways in which goal achievement of leaders in implementation could be measured, borrowing ideas from regime implementation literature.  5.1 Contributions to the Literature  It is my hope that in examining joint leadership and leadership in implementation, this thesis has contributed towards two areas of leadership literature that scholars have identified as being in need of further research.606 Future research could expand on leadership in implementation, for example by  605 Oberthür, supra note 60 at 127. 606 Parker & Karlsson, supra note 44 at 592; Parker et al, supra note 47 at 269. 99  exploring whether my observations regarding the importance of unilateral and structural leadership in regime implementation are specific to the Paris Agreement, or whether they could be applied to other international agreements. The area of goal achievement of leaders within regime implementation is also in need of further research, to determine whether goal achievement is an appropriate measure by which to assess the effectiveness of leadership. In terms of joint implementation, the relationship between the EU and China during the implementation of the Paris Agreement will likely also be an area of fruitful research, particularly in the wake of the results of the next U.S. election, and what this will mean for the agreement.607 It will be interesting to explore whether their claims to a strengthened partnership extend beyond government rhetoric, and from a normative perspective what action they should take to strengthen their partnership.   Another key theme of my research has been the importance of renewable energy in achieving the sustainable energy transition that the Paris Agreement requires. As Falkner describes, “much will depend on whether climate leaders are willing and able to push for more ambitious policies, invest in green technologies and chart the way into a low-carbon economic future.”608 I examined the unilateral leadership of China and the EU by exploring their promulgation of renewable energy law and policy. My research showed that interestingly, this field appears to be another arena in which the EU and China are showing intellectual leadership, by driving the ‘green revolution’ narrative. Only time will tell whether this drive will continue, and how effective it will be in meeting the Paris Agreement goals. 5.2 Concluding Remarks I concluded my fourth chapter by assessing the actions taken by the EU and China since the conclusion of the Paris Agreement. My research suggests that neither actor has submitted an NDC that accords with their intention to show leadership. CAT has ranked their contributions as “insufficient” at best and has emphasized the need for both to be ratcheted up as quickly as possible. However, this is an ongoing  607 An incoming president could reverse Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. The U.S. will not formally withdraw until the day after the next U.S. election. 608 Falkner, supra note 46. 100  dialogue and there are suggestions that the EU and China were intending to submit more ambitious NDCs before the end of 2020. The 22nd China-EU summit which was due to take place in September 2020 was highlighted as a key forum in which the two actors could meet to strengthen their ambition.609  The summit has now been postponed due to COVID-19, as has COP26 which was due to take place in Glasgow in December.   As I write this conclusion, we are in the midst of global pandemic, resulting from the spread of COVID-19. There are various links between the crisis we are currently facing and the climate crisis that we will soon be unable to ignore.610 Many have pointed out that the two are likely connected, with our destruction of nature being responsible in some part for the increased likelihood of the virus coming into contact with humans in the first place.611 But how we react to this pandemic could be influential in how we react to the impending climate crisis. As Ecojustice suggest, there are lessons that we are learning in responding to COVID-19 which “can be applied to efforts to tackle climate change.”612 Whether we learn these lessons and respond in time remains to be seen. I noted at the beginning of Chapter 1 that strong leadership becomes more important in times of crisis and that crises are also often a catalyst for real change. Christiana Figueres identifies the opportunity that the current pandemic presents to begin pushing for a green, low carbon future.613 As we think about how to rebuild our society in the wake of COVID-19, populations throughout the world have experienced the regenerating potential of nature allowed by the lock-downs to combat the spread of the  609 Farand, supra note 500. 610 Thomas Gunton, ‘COVID-19 has laid bare how unprepared we are for crises — and climate change will test us even more No Title’, CBC News (5 May 2020), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/covid-19-climate-change-crisis-opinion-1.5554971> accessed 24 June 2020. 611 John Vidal, ‘“Tip of the iceberg”: is our destruction of nature responsible for Covid-19?’, The Guardian (18 March 2020), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/mar/18/tip-of-the-iceberg-is-our-destruction-of-nature-responsible-for-covid-19-aoe> accessed 24 June 2020. 612 Alan Andrews, ‘Canada’s coronavirus response a blueprint for climate action’, (2020), online: Ecojustice <https://www.ecojustice.ca/canadas-covid-19-response-a-blueprint-for-climate-action/> accessed 24 June 2020. 613 Christiana Figueres, ‘Covid-19 has given us the chance to build a low-carbon future’, The Guardian (1 June 2020), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/01/covid-low-carbon-future-lockdown-pandemic-green-economy> accessed 24 June 2020. 101  virus.614 Clearly, these measures are not sustainable in their current form, but it has allowed us to glimpse what is possible for nature if our leaders were to follow through with serious and meaningful collective action on climate change.     614 Nick Clark, ‘The Green Read: Will coronavirus help nature reclaim the Earth?’, Aljazeera (29 April 2020), online: <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/green-read-coronavirus-nature-reclaim-earth-200429062358033.html>accessed June 24 2020; Steven Morris, ‘Rare UK wildlife thriving in lockdown, reveals National Trust’, The Guardian (20 May 2020), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/may/20/rare-uk-wildlife-thriving-in-lockdown-reveals-national-trust> accessed June 24 2020. 102   Bibliography Legislation and Directives Council Directive (EC) 2001/77 of 27 September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market [2001] Official Journal L283/0033  Council Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast) Official Journal of the European Union L328/82  Council Directive (EC) 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC Official Journal of the European Union L140/16  European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community 2007/C 306/01 (entered into force 13 December 2007), [Lisbon Treaty]  MOFCOM (Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China). 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