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A rogue consensus : a limit to US foreign policy polarization? Kotb, Shereen 2019

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 i   A ROGUE CONSENSUS:  A LIMIT TO US FOREIGN POLICY POLARIZATION? by  Shereen Kotb  B.A., University of British Columbia, 2016  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF ARTS  in  THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES  (Political Science)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  April 2019    © Shereen Kotb, 2019     ii   The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, a thesis/dissertation entitled:  A Rogue Consensus: A Limit to US Foreign Policy Polarization?   submitted by Shereen Kotb in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts  in Political Science   Examining Committee: Dr. Gyung-Ho Jeong Supervisor  Dr. Arjun Chowdhury  Additional Examiner       iii   Abstract   The leading prognosis of US foreign policymaking since the Vietnam War has been that ideology and partisanship have driven a wedge between American policymakers, causing them to have increasingly polarized foreign policy views and positions. The purpose of this study is to conduct a unique investigation of the effect of these factors in shaping foreign policymaking towards rogue states. In an attempt to test the limits of US polarization, this paper aims to investigate the patterns of legislative behavior towards rogue states in the US Senate from 1991 to 2017. This paper uses logistic and zero-inflated Poisson estimations on an original dataset to test the impact of ideology and partisanship on two areas of legislative behaviour: voting on legislation targeting rogue states and the sponsorship and cosponsorship of these bills. The former tests whether there exist differences in policy preferences towards rogues, while the latter tests whether there are differences in the level of engagement on the issue. The results of the paper reveal a surprisingly high degree of consensus among policymakers in their voting behaviour; most bills brought to a vote are passed with unanimous or almost-unanimous consensus. Meanwhile, an examination of the sponsorship and cosponsorship of these bills indicates that Republicans and conservatives are more active in proposing rogue-related legislation than Democrats and liberals. The results suggest that while partisanship and ideology may create differences in policy preferences on issues relating to rogue states, Republicans and conservatives are more active in crafting legislation. At the same time, their Democratic and liberal counterparts face few incentives to vote against them.            iv   Lay Summary  Since the Vietnam War, policymakers in the US have disagreed about how the country should engage in international affairs. In particular, there has been a partisan divide between Republicans and Democrats and an ideological divide between conservatives and liberals on US foreign policy. The purpose of this study is to investigate the extent to which this division extends to national security issues. The paper asks: to what extent are policymakers divided on US policy towards enemy states, or “rogue states.” The study examines all legislation related to rogue states that has been proposed or voted on in the Senate between 1991 to 2017 and finds that while Republicans and conservatives are more engaged with these issues, there is a surprisingly high degree of consensus among policymakers in the way they vote. Most of the bills that are brought to a vote are passed with unanimous or almost-unanimous consensus.         v   Preface This thesis is the original, unpublished work of the author, Shereen Kotb.      vi   Table of Contents  Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iii Lay Summary ................................................................................................................................ iv Preface ............................................................................................................................................ v Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................... vi List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ vii List of Figures ............................................................................................................................. viii Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... ix Dedication ....................................................................................................................................... x Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 2: The Determinants of Legislative Behaviour ............................................................ 5 Chapter 3: Partisan and Ideological Polarization on Foreign Policy ....................................... 7 Chapter 4: Legislative Behaviour and Rogue States .................................................................. 9 4.1 Differences in Preferences .............................................................................................. 9 4.2 Different Levels of Engagement .................................................................................... 12 Chapter 5: Methodology ............................................................................................................. 16 Chapter 6: Results ....................................................................................................................... 22 6.1 Model 1: Voting Behaviour ........................................................................................... 22 6.2 Model 2: Sponsorship and Cosponsorship .................................................................... 24 Chapter 7: Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 29 Chapter 8: Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 36 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 39 Appendix ...................................................................................................................................... 42      vii   List of Tables  Table 6.1 Logistic regression of bipartisanship on legislation related to rogue states……….….24  Table 6.2 ZIP regression of sponsorship on legislation related to rogue states………………….25    Table 6.3 ZIP analysis of ideology and sponsorship on rogue legislation by congress………….28  Table 6.4 ZIP analysis of partisanship and sponsorship on rogue legislation by congress……….28         viii  List of Figures  Figure 6.1 The percentage of bipartisan votes on legislation related to rogue states…………...…23 Figure 6.2 Ideology and the predicted number of sponsorships of rogue-related legislation…….26 Figure 6.3 Partisanship and the predicted number of sponsorships of rogue-related legislation….26         ix   Acknowledgements  I would like to start by offering my gratitude to my supervisor, Gyung-Ho Jeong, for his unwavering support and guidance through the many stages of the thesis writing process. The intellectual support I received from him has been invaluable. It was through our numerous discussions that the idea for this work was inspired, and through his pointed feedback that the work was developed and refined. Within the Department, I owe particular thanks to Arjun Chowdhury for taking a keen interest in this paper and readily agreeing to be my second reader, and to Alan Jacobs, who has been an important source of intellectual guidance and inspiration throughout my academic career.      A special thanks to my friends who have anchored me throughout this process. To Kaelin and David, who have patiently and carefully listened to my ramblings and helped me clarify my thoughts into coherent ideas. To Mariam and Noor, for keeping me sane and being my voice of reason.      And finally, to my family. Any and all achievements I have in life are owed to them. To Mazen, who developed a program that literally saved me from days of data collection. To Mom and Dad, for their unwavering love and boundless wisdom. And to Jude, who always knows how to make me smile.       x   Dedication     To my family – to whom I owe everything.      1   Chapter 1: Introduction   The fall of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new security paradigm in the United States. In an uncertain security environment, the US began to focus on what it perceived as new threats posed by emerging adversarial states. The Cold War rivalry between the USSR and the US was replaced by the Rogue Doctrine, a strategic framework that viewed “rogue states” as the primary threat to international security. Historically, these states have been labelled rogue due to their perceived violation of core international norms. According to consecutive US administrations, a state earned the rogue label if it posed stringent opposition to the US and its allies, severely restricted basic human rights, sponsored terrorism, and pursued the acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).1     It has long been established that foreign policy in the US has witnessed increasing polarization since the Vietnam War, which marked an end to the bipartisan consensus that had characterized the Cold War. However, it is unclear the extent to which such polarization extends to the issue of rogue states. Much like the Soviet Union, rogue regimes exist at the margins of the international community, seemingly posing an extreme threat to the international order and American interests. As suggested by one commentator, “in much of American strategic thinking, the ‘Rogues’ have supplanted the ‘Reds’.”2 Therefore, we should expect US policymakers to exhibit a high degree of political consensus on policy towards them. However, issues such as the Iraq War and the Iran nuclear deal have provoked unprecedented levels of partisan and ideological polarization in Congress.                                                          1 Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States." Foreign Affairs (1994): 45-55. 2 Paul D Hoyt, "The ‘Rogue State’ Image in American Foreign Policy." Global Society 14, no. 2 (2000): 297-310.     2     Despite significant historical analysis of US foreign policy towards rogue states, there remains an absence of systematic and comparative investigation of the drivers of congressional policymaking towards such states. The current literature lacks a test of the mechanisms thought to drive a wedge between policymakers, namely ideological and partisan difference. Thus, this paper is designed to test the proposition that these factors influence congressional foreign policymaking in polarizing ways. Specifically, this paper uses logistic and zero-inflated Poisson estimations on an original dataset to test the impact of ideology and partisanship on two areas of legislative behaviour: voting on legislation targeting rogue states and the sponsorship and cosponsorship of these bills. The former tests whether there exist differences in policy preferences towards rogues, while the latter tests whether there are differences in the level of engagement on the issue. Such an investigation contributes to a comprehensive understanding of the ways ideology and partisanship influence US foreign policy, as well as to our understanding of the cleavages and intersections between the two dominant ideological and partisan camps in the US.   The results of the paper reveal a surprisingly high degree of consensus among policymakers in their voting behaviour on rogue-related legislation; most bills brought to a vote are passed with unanimous or almost-unanimous consensus. Meanwhile, an examination of the sponsorship and cosponsorship of these bills indicates that Republicans and conservatives are more active in proposing rogue-related legislation than Democrats and liberals. The results suggest that while partisanship and ideology may create differences in policy preferences on issues relating to rogue states, Republicans and conservatives are more active in crafting legislation. At the same time, their Democratic and liberal counterparts face few incentives to vote against them.        3    The scope of the study will cover the period starting from 1991, the year that marked the beginning of the post-Cold War period, until the end of the most recently concluded Congress in 2017. Thus, the investigation will cover the 102nd to the 114th Congresses. In analyzing legislative behaviour towards rogue states, the paper focuses on Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea. While other states, such as Venezuela, Sudan, and Syria, have at various times been considered rogue regimes or have been described as exhibiting “roguish” behaviour, this paper will focus on states that have clearly and consistently been identified as rogue by the US administration in the post-Cold War era. Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea were the first to be identified as rogue regimes in a Foreign Affairs article published by US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in 1994 and have since consistently held this label by consecutive administrations until recent years.3 Iraq was the first to lose its rogue status ten years after Lake’s article following the ouster of the Ba’athist regime in 2003. Meanwhile, Libya and Cuba have not been considered rogue since the US reestablished diplomatic relations with them in 2006 and 2011 respectively.4 Iran and North Korea continue to be considered rogue today.    It should be noted that the rogue state category is a highly subjective, selectively applied, and politically motivated category. This critique has been made extensively in the literature.5 However, the purpose of this paper is not to contribute to or directly address this argument. The study is designed to empirically investigate legislative behaviour towards states considered “rogue” by the US. Thus, the paper adopts the categorization used by the US administration, not                                                         3 Lake, "Confronting Backlash States." 4 Matthew Wald, “U.S. drops Libya from list of terrorist countries.” The New York Times. July 7, 2006. https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/07/world/africa/07iht-libya.2143377.html  Simon Tisdall, "Obama taking Cuba off terror list signals end for dated idea of rogue states." The Guardian. April 15, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/15/president-obama-cuba-us-rogue-state-sponsor-terrorism  5 Noam Chomsky, Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs (Haymarket Books, 2015); W. G. Werner, W. M. Wagner, and M. Onderco, Deviance in International Relations (Palgrave Studies in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2014); Hoyt, “The 'Rogue State' Image.”     4   because it is viewed as correct by some measure, rather because the paper aims to investigate how a policymaker behaves when they perceive a state as rogue.       The structure of the paper is as follows. First, the paper will examine the literature on the primary determinants of legislative behaviour, namely ideology and partisanship, and then provide an overview of how these factors have affected US policymaking in recent history. Second, the paper will turn to the way these factors are thought to influence legislative behaviour on the issue of rogue states. Third, the paper will lay out the methodology used in this study, followed by a test of the effects of ideology and partisanship on voting and sponsorship behaviour. Finally, the paper will conclude with an analysis of the findings.        5   Chapter 2: The Determinants of Legislative Behaviour   The scholarly literature on congressional behaviour has found that legislators are driven by several factors in their foreign policy views and positions, including the preferences and interests of their constituencies, party pressure, and their own ideology. Congressional records in the US have allowed scholars to test the relative importance of these factors in shaping political behaviour. In particular, roll-call data has been used extensively to test these theories, as such votes require legislators to take a meaningful stand on political issues. More recently, studies have also begun using data on the sponsorship and cosponsorship of legislation to measure differences in levels of political engagement across policy areas.6    The literature has found that the effect of constituents on foreign policy is generally weak. Conventional political science knowledge predicts that electoral competition in a democracy will drive legislators to respond strongly to the policy preferences of the public. According to this line of thinking, policymakers respond to public opinion in order to avoid electoral punishment or are voted out of office for being unresponsive.7 Later studies found that since international affairs are remote from most Americans’ lives, public opinion tends to lack focus, attentiveness, and coherence on foreign policy issues. As a result, public opinion generally has little effect on the political positions of legislators, unless foreign policy issues are highly salient or relate to mobilized interest groups.8                                                         6 Benjamin O Fordham, "Economic Interests and Congressional Voting on Security Issues." Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 5 (2008): 625. 7 Anthony Downs, "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy." Journal of Political Economy 65, no. 2 (1957): 135-50.  8 For example, see: Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, "Who Influences US Foreign Policy?." American Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005): 107-123.; Benjamin I. Page, and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy." American Political Science Review 77, no. 1 (1983): 175-190.; Trevor Rubenzer, "Campaign     6     Instead, research has found that partisanship and ideology are the main drivers of legislative behaviour, with the latter having a stronger effect than the former. Studies have found that party affiliation and ideology are particularly strong determinants of congressional voting behaviour on foreign policy and national security issues. 9 With the exception of highly salient security issues, the internal dispositions of legislators and pressures to toe the party line appear to be more important factors in this policy arena.                                                             Contributions and US Foreign Policy Outcomes: An Analysis of Cuban American Interests." American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 1 (2011): 105-116. 9 Steven D Levitt, "How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology." The American Economic Review (1996): 425-441.; Ole R Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (University of Michigan Press, 2004), 191.      7   Chapter 3: Partisan and Ideological Polarization on Foreign Policy    Much of the scholarship on trends in US policymaking finds that there has been a notable rise in ideological and political polarization since the Vietnam War. Between the 1940s and 1970s, US foreign policymaking was characterized by high levels of bipartisanship. In the face of the Soviet Union, policymakers formed a united front behind the president in what came to be known as the “Cold War consensus.” During this period, policymakers generally agreed that the US should take an active role in international affairs.10 The extent of bipartisan consensus led to the articulation of the well-known “two presidencies” thesis, in which Aaron Wildavsky demonstrated that presidents receive significantly greater congressional support for their foreign policy positions than their domestic ones.11    Later studies of congressional voting behaviour overwhelmingly indicated that this consensus fell during the Vietnam War, as the two dominant parties in the US became ideologically distinct and diverged in their perspectives over the appropriate role of the state in foreign affairs.12 Recent analysis of DW-NOMINATE scores reinforces the apparent trend of polarization by demonstrating that the ideological gap between Republicans and Democrats has reached its greatest point since the Reconstruction era.13 In fact, Peter Beinart has argued that not only has the                                                         10 Richard A Melanson, American Foreign Policy Since the Vietnam War: The Search for Consensus from Nixon to Clinton (Routledge, 2015). 11 Wildavsky, Aaron, “The Two Presidencies.” Society 35, no. 2 (1998): 23-31. 12 For example, see: George C. Edwards, "The 2 Presidencies-A Reevaluation." American Politics Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1986): 247-263.; Charles A. Kupchan, and Peter L. Trubowitz, "Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States." International Security 32, no. 2 (2007): 7-44. 13 Steven Hurst and Andrew Wroe, "Partisan Polarization and US Foreign Policy: Is the Centre Dead or Holding?" International Politics 53, no. 5 (2016): 666-682.     8   bipartisan consensus ended, but that foreign policy has emerged as the most polarizing issue in American politics.14   Since the fall of the bipartisan consensus, the parties’ perceptions of world affairs and their preferred policy approaches have diverged. Notably, policymakers split over the desirability of using military force to pursue American interests abroad. While both conservative and liberal elites have generally supported international engagement, conservatives tend to support tougher, more militant foreign policies than liberals, who favor more cooperative forms of engagement and resist militant internationalism.15   Despite the widespread conclusion that American politics is becoming increasingly polarized, few studies have looked at the trends in polarization within different foreign policy issues. It is unlikely that policymakers will be uniformly polarized across all issues; some difference should be expected. In fact, studies have found that much in the same way that policymakers united against a common enemy during the Cold War, when the public and politicians believe that the nation faces imminent threat to its security, political polarization decreases.16 Following a similar logic, this paper seeks to examine the extent to which the trend in polarization extends to policymaking towards rogue states, resulting in large differences in legislative behaviour.                                                            14 Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady, eds. Red and Blue Nation?: Consequences and Correction of America's Polarized Politics. Vol. 2.2. (Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 152. 15 Peter Gries, The Politics of American Foreign Policy: How Ideology Divides Liberals and Conservatives over Foreign Affairs. (Stanford University Press, 2014). 16 Karl K. Schonberg, "Paradigm Regained: The New Consensus in US Foreign Policy." Security Dialogue 32, no. 4 (2001): 439-452.     9   Chapter 4: Legislative Behaviour and Rogue States 4.1 Differences in Preferences   Past scholarship examining the effect of ideology and partisanship on legislative outcomes related to rogue states provides mixed suggestions on the question of polarization. While it appears that the two dominant camps in the US share a similar conceptualization of the enemy and support a general policy of containment, they diverge in their preferences of specific policy prescriptions.   Conceptually, there appears to be a broad agreement among policymakers regarding what constitutes a rogue state. First defined by US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, a rogue regime is one which pursues weapons of mass destruction (WMD), supports or sponsors international terrorism, exhibits violations of basic human rights, and presents stringent opposition towards the US political and social order.17 In an empirical investigation of public statements made by key US foreign policy decision makers, O’Reilly finds support for this conceptualized rogue image. His research indicates that policymakers associate rogue states with aggressive behavior that threatens the international community, and that they primarily attribute policies of WMD development and sponsorship of terrorism to such states. Further, his analysis reveals that this rogue image has remained relatively fixed and stable over time amongst key US decision-makers.18                                                           17 Lake, "Confronting Backlash States." Alex Miles, US Foreign Policy and the Rogue State Doctrine (Routledge, 2012). K. P. O’Reilly, "A Rogue Doctrine?: The Role of Strategic Culture on US Foreign Policy Behavior." Foreign Policy Analysis 9, no. 1 (2013): 57-77. Hoyt, The 'Rogue State' Image. 18 K. P. O'Reilly, "Perceiving Rogue States: The Use of the “Rogue State” Concept by US Foreign Policy Elites." Foreign Policy Analysis 3, no. 4 (2007): 295-315.     10    The application of the rogue image to foreign countries has also been done with little apparent disparity among policymakers. The primary rogue states historically identified by the US are Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Cuba.19 It is important to note that while a fixed and stable conceptualization of the rogue image has existed in the US, this does not mean that it has been objectively and consistently applied. In fact, many scholars have pointed out that the application of the rogue label by policymakers has been selective and politically motivated.20    Research finds that the strategic framework underpinning the Rogue Doctrine has had a lasting influence on policymakers’ perceptions and preferences. An analysis of the operational codes of former Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush found that the US leaders internalized the Rogue Doctrine. Rogue states were viewed by Clinton and Bush as less capable of cooperation and far more prone to hostility than non-rogue states. The internalization of the doctrine also transformed the way the US leaders viewed themselves in relation to such states, causing them to exhibit a significantly more confrontational self-identity, with a greater willingness to employ the use of force than to cooperate.21 Scholarship on the Rogue Doctrine has also found continuity in the general US policy approach towards rogue regimes, with a predisposition towards policies associated with a containment strategy rather than an offensive policy posture.22   However, research has found conflicting perceptions among policymakers on the nature of rogue states. For example, scholars have suggested that there is a fundamental difference between the way that Bush and Clinton perceived North Korea. Bush has viewed North Korea as an inherently aggressive and expansionist state, while Clinton has understood its roguish behavior in                                                         19 Lake, "Confronting Backlash States"; Miles, US Foreign Policy. 20 Chomsky, Rogue States.; Werner, Wagner, and Onderco, Theorizing Deviance.; Hoyt, The 'Rogue State' Image. 21 O’Reilly, “A Rogue Doctrine”, 57-77. 22 O’Reilly, “Perceiving Rogue States”, 309.     11   terms of a security dilemma.23 Such a perception gap has similarly been expressed by Miles, who found that Clinton viewed rogue states as capable of being rehabilitated into the international community, while the Republican party, particularly those right-wing elements, viewed them as inherently revisionist and undeterrable.24 Additionally, while a general policy approach of containment has been pursued by successive administrations, different views on the nature of rogue states has led them to diverge on specific policy prescriptions.   A historical examination of policymaking towards rogue states indicates that it has been marked by conflict along partisan and ideological lines. The Democratic presidencies of Clinton and Obama have traditionally favoured an approach that is characterized by multilateral punitive measures coupled with limited engagement and incentives for behavioural changes. At times, Clinton and Obama actively pursued rapprochement with the rogue states.25 However, both presidents faced significant opposition from right-wing members of Congress and at various points were pressured into adopting a more hardline approach. In many cases, hardliners pushed for a more confrontational US posture, additional unilateral sanctions, and even regime change.26 Legislative struggles over policymaking were especially heightened following the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress during Clinton’s presidency and over highly controversial policies, such as the Iran nuclear deal that was spearheaded by Obama.27                                                           23 Jihwan Hwang, "Realism and US Foreign Policy toward North Korea: The Clinton and Bush Administrations in Comparative Perspective." World Affairs 167, no. 1 (2004): 17. 24 Miles, US Foreign Policy. 25 Miles, US Foreign Policy. 26 Ibid., 56. 27 Ibid.; Chintamani Mahapatra, "US–Iran Nuclear Deal: Cohorts and Challenger." Contemporary Review of the Middle East 3, no. 1 (2016): 36-46.     12    Contrastingly, the Bush administration adopted a more hardline approach towards rogue regimes, favouring regime change and unilateral sanctions, criticizing diplomatic efforts as a form of appeasement.28 While the Democrats in Congress generally opposed this approach, the scholarly literature indicates that during the period following the September 11 attacks, political polarization briefly declined, as Republicans and Democrats united behind the president to respond to the national security crisis.29 Research indicates that Democrats were less supportive of the War on Terror and the Iraq invasion, but stood behind the president out of fear of appearing too dovish in the face of a national crisis.30 However, the bipartisanship was short-lived, as Bush’s poor performance in Iraq led to the resurgence of legislative conflict over policy.31 Therefore, based on the literature, the following is expected:  Hypothesis 1: Legislators will be polarized in their voting on legislation related to rogue states along partisan and ideological lines.   4.2 Different Levels of Engagement    Past scholarship suggests that not only should there be partisan and ideological differences in the policy preferences of legislators, but that there should also be differences in the levels that legislators engage with rogue state issues. Although the literature lacks studies that directly test this proposition, research provides some suggestion that different levels of engagement should be expected.                                                          28 Miles, US Foreign Policy. 29 Schonberg, “Paradigm Regained”. 30 Shana Kushner Gadarian, "Foreign Policy at The Ballot Box: How Citizens Use Foreign Policy to Judge and Choose Candidates." The Journal of Politics 72, no. 4 (2010): 1046. 31 Miles, US Foreign Policy.     13     In his analysis of polarization in US politics, Beinart argues that in the realm of foreign policy, Republicans have primarily focused on national security threats while Democrats have been more concerned with economic and humanitarian issues.32 As such, national security is a policy area that has generally been “owned” by the Republican Party. The theory of issue ownership argues that over time, citizens developed beliefs about the relative capability of each party in managing certain issues as a result of its historical record in these policy areas. A favourable record in a policy area endows the party with a set of “handling advantages,” whereby it gains a reputation that it is more capable of handling these political issues than other parties.33    Research has found that due to the makeup of the Republican Party’s constituent base and the historical record of its incumbents on national security, it has developed a strategic advantage over this policy area and thus gained ownership of it.34 As a result, issues regarding security and terrorism have historically advantaged the Republican Party in elections. According to research by Egan, the American public has consistently trusted Republicans to handle foreign policy and terrorism more than they have Democrats.35 Therefore, as Gadarian has argued, in so far as national security is salient during an election, the Republican Party is more likely to electorally benefit.36    As a party gains a handling advantage over a policy area, it is also more likely to focus its political activities on that area than other parties. For example, according to Gadarian, political                                                         32 Nivola and Brady, Red and Blue Nation?, 151. 33 John R. Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study." American Journal of Political Science (1996): 825-850.; Gadarian, “Foreign Policy at The Ballot Box”. 34 Gadarian, “Foreign Policy at the Ballot Box”, 1049. 35 Patrick Egan, Issue Ownership and Representation in the United States: A Theory of Legislative Response to Constituency Opinion. Working paper. New York University, 2009. 36 Gadarian, “Foreign Policy at the Ballot Box”.     14   candidates will engage in efforts to emphasize “owned” issues during elections and avoid issues that advantage candidates from other parties.37 Similarly, during non-election periods, political figures are more likely to engage with owned issues than non-owned issues in order to maintain their comparative advantage and signal to the electorate their continued focus on these issues. Thus, the difference in issue focus between the two parties suggests that Republicans should have higher levels of engagement with legislation relating to rogue states than Democrats, due to the national security threat that such states pose to US.   The issue ownership literature lacks an evaluation of issues owned by the two main ideological camps in the US. However, like Republicans, conservatives have historically focused on national security matters and have been viewed by the electorate as more effective at handling this policy area than liberals, who tend to be viewed as too dovish. Therefore, it is expected that conservatives similarly “own” the issue of security and as a result will be more likely to engage with legislation related to rogue states than liberals.   One way of engaging with an issue is through the sponsorship and cosponsorship of related legislation. Rosenson, Oldmixon and Wald claim that legislators use the sponsorship and cosponsorship of bills as an opportunity to signal their engagement on legislation of interest to their constituents.38 However, the theory of issue ownership suggests that such engagement is not equally utilized by political officials, as they are not equally rewarded for such behaviour. Legislators face greater electoral incentives to sponsor or cosponsor legislation that relate to issues                                                         37 Ibid. 38 Beth A. Rosenson, Elizabeth A. Oldmixon, and Kenneth D. Wald, "US Senators' Support for Israel Examined Through Sponsorship/Cosponsorship Decisions, 1993–2002: The Influence of Elite and Constituent Factors." Foreign Policy Analysis 5, no. 1 (2009): 85.     15   owned by their respective parties than those that they do not own. Based on the literature, the following is expected:   Hypothesis 2: Republican legislators are more likely to sponsor rogue related legislation than their Democratic counterparts.    Hypothesis 3: Conservative legislators are more likely to sponsor rogue related legislation than their liberal counterparts.         16   Chapter 5: Methodology   In attempting to measure differences in legislative behaviour on issues pertaining to rogue states, this paper will examine both legislative voting and sponsorship behaviour. While the former tests levels of polarization, the latter tests levels of engagement with rogue related policy matters.    In analyzing voting behaviour, this paper will examine whether legislators differ in the way they vote on legislation targeting rogue states along partisan and ideological lines. To do this, I will apply a common indicator of bipartisanship, which measures the percentage of times in each Congress between the 102nd and the 114th that a majority of Democrats voted in the same direction as a Republican majority. Observing a significant difference in voting behaviour would lend support to Hypothesis 1, suggesting high levels of polarization on how the US should engage with rogue states. Similar voting behaviour would undermine the hypothesis and indicate that there is a high level of consensus between policymakers on the issue.    A similar approach can be applied for ideology. A binary variable was constructed from the DW-NOMINATE, which places legislators on a scale of -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative). All legislators with a score less than 0 were coded as liberal, while those with a score greater than 0 were coded as conservative. This variable can be used to construct an indicator of ideological consensus measuring the percentage of times in each Congress that a majority of liberals vote in the same direction as a majority of conservatives. However, a review of the data reveals that such analysis is unnecessary, providing virtually the same results as the bipartisanship measure. While considerable variation along the ideological spectrum exists within the two parties, this variation disappears once a binary variable is constructed from the continuous DW-    17   NOMINATE scale. Out of all of the Democrats in the dataset, only 1% are categorized as ideologically conservative while less than 1% of Republicans are liberal. Thus, the results of the bipartisanship indicator will be used to derive estimates of both partisan and ideological polarization.    Before conducting the analysis, certain parameters should be established to deem the test falsifiable. Previous studies of polarization have discussed the difficulty of establishing an objective level at which Congress can be said to be polarized or bipartisan.39 Steven Hurst and Andrew Wroe argue that it would be just as arbitrary to consider Congress polarized if parties vote against each other half the time as if they vote against each other on 40 or 60 percent of votes.40 Scholars testing Wildavsky’s two presidencies thesis have traditionally solved this problem by constructing an indicator that measures polarization on foreign policy issues relative to polarization on domestic ones. If votes on foreign policy issues are less polarized than those on domestic ones at a statistically significant level, Congress is said to be bipartisan on foreign policy.41    However, as this paper does not directly test Wildavsky’s thesis, a comparison of polarization on foreign and domestic policy would not represent an appropriate measure. Still, the logic behind Wildavsky’s thesis can be utilized to construct an indicator of polarization. According to his findings, presidents received congressional support for their foreign policy positions 70 percent of the time during the age of bipartisan consensus.42 Since then, research has found that                                                         39 Hurst and Wroe, “Partisan Polarization”; Marc J. Hetherington, "Putting Polarization in Perspective." British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 2 (2009): 413-448. 40 Hurst and Wroe, “Partisan Polarization”, 670.  41 Ibid., 671. 42 Wildavsky, “The Two Presidencies”.     18   bipartisanship has fallen, as the degree of congressional deference to the president on foreign policy matters declined. These findings can be used to establish a benchmark for bipartisanship. Congress can be said to have similar levels of bipartisanship as it did between the 1940s and 1970s if the two major parties vote in the same direction at least 70 percent of the time. Contrastingly, Congress will be considered polarized if the parties vote in the same direction less than 70 percent of the time.    For this analysis, an original dataset was constructed, whereby all bills directly relating to any of the rogue states individually or collectively between 1991 and 2017 were gathered. Due to sheer number of bills that relate to rogue states, both directly and indirectly, this paper focuses on those that primarily relate to rogue states, i.e. only legislation that directly refers to the rogue state(s) in the title of the bill. Resolutions, amendments, and procedural votes related to these states were also included. For this model, only legislation that has been voted on in the Senate was included in the analysis, irrespective of its chamber of origin. A similar analysis can also be conducted for the House of Representatives. However, the paper focuses on analyzing legislative behaviour in the Senate, as it tends to play a greater role in foreign policymaking due to the significant oversight responsibilities that it is granted by the constitution over this policy area.   A total of 191 bills were collected, some of which are symbolic, representing the “sense of the Senate” or condemning human rights abuses by rogue regimes, while others are substantive measures, including bills demanding more stringent sanctions or authorizing the use of military force. In measuring the bipartisanship of the bills, a binary variable was constructed, whereby a bipartisan bill in which a majority of Democrats and Republicans vote in the same direction was     19   coded as 1, and a polarized bill in which they vote in opposite directions was coded as 0. For each Congress, the proportion of bipartisan to polarized bills was calculated.    Aside from examining the overall trends of bipartisanship and polarization, logistic regression analysis was conducted to investigate how levels of consensus vary. The literature indicates that at various times, Congress conflicted over policy approaches towards rogue regimes, although it does not directly describe which rogues were more polarizing than others. Therefore, controlling for the different rogue states would contribute to the literature. I also control for type of legislation. I expect that bills dealing with human rights abuses would generate greater consensus than those dealing with sanctions or military action, which tend to be more controversial. A dummy variable was constructed, where humanitarian bills were coded as 1 and non-humanitarian ones were coded as 0.    The second test that the paper will conduct examines whether legislators exhibit different levels of engagement with issues concerning rogue states. While an examination of voting behaviour measures differences in policy preferences, an analysis of sponsorship patterns captures the level of engagement legislators have on these issues. Higher levels of sponsorship and cosponsorship of rogue-related bills by a party or ideological orientation would indicate that legislators of these groups have higher levels of engagement with the issue. Specifically, higher levels of legislation sponsorship by Republicans and conservatives would lend support for Hypotheses 2 and 3, while higher levels by Democrats and liberals would undermine them.    As with the first test, all bills directly relating to any of the rogue states individually or collectively between 1991 and 2017 were gathered. Unlike the model relating to voting behaviour,     20   this model will only examine bills originating from the Senate, as those from the House are sponsored by Representatives rather than Senators. Additionally, the scope of the data will be expanded to also include legislation that was introduced in the Senate but not voted on, rather than restricting it to only those bills that were put to a vote. This is because all bills, including those that were not voted on, are sponsored by a legislator.    In collecting the data for the dependent variable, 450 bills, resolutions, and amendments targeting rogue states originating from the Senate between the 102nd through the 114th Congresses were identified. The dependent variable measures the number of times a Senator sponsored or cosponsored legislation targeting rogue states, with higher counts reflecting greater engagement. A zero-inflated Poisson regression model was used to derive the estimates from the data, as the dependent variable is a count with excess zeros. A model-fit test was conducted and confirmed that the zero-inflated Poisson is more appropriate than the standard Poisson model, as the latter has smaller AIC and BIC values.    In the sponsorship model, I run two separate tests, one examining the effect of partisanship on sponsorship levels and the other examining the effect of ideology. The two variables are not included in the same model due to the issue of multicollinearity between party affiliation and ideology, which are highly related to one another. Conservative legislators tend to be Republicans, while liberals tend to be Democrats. In order to measure the Senators’ party identification, a dummy variable is used, where Democrat is coded as 0 and Republican is coded as 1. The ideological orientation of a Senator was measured using the continuous DW-NOMINATE scale.       21    In the sponsorship model, Senate committee membership is controlled for. Members of the Foreign Relations and Armed Forces Committees are more likely to sponsor legislation related to rogue states than legislators that do not belong to these committees. Members of these committees are likely to gain interest and expertise through their involvement in the committees. Additionally, legislators may self-select into these committees out of interest in international relations and security issues. A dummy variable was constructed, where a legislator’s involvement in either or both committees in a given Congress is coded as 1, and their lack of membership in either is coded as 0.         22   Chapter 6: Results 6.1 Model 1: Voting Behaviour    A simple count of the data reveals that only 12% of rogue-related legislation is polarized, while 88% is bipartisan. Additionally, the vast majority of bipartisan legislation is passed with unanimous consent or almost unanimous consent.43 These findings do not provide support for Hypothesis 1. Instead, they indicate that policymaking towards rogue states between 1991 and 2017 has been marked by a high level of consensus that is comparable to the Cold War consensus.    Figure 6.1 plots the percentage of bipartisan votes on legislation related to rogue states between the 102nd and 114th Congresses to illustrate trends in consensus over time. The graph shows that although there has been a high level of bipartisanship overall, there are variations between Congresses. The highest levels of bipartisanship on rogue state legislation appear in the 103rd, 108th, 110th and 113th Congresses. In these Congresses, all rogue state legislation put to a vote were bipartisan. Meanwhile, the highest levels of polarization on these issues appear in the 107th, 109th, and the 114th Congresses. In these Congresses, a majority of Democrats and Republicans voted in the same direction on issues relating to rogue states less than 80% of the time. The graph also indicates that policymaking has experienced a steady decline in consensus since the development of the Rogue Doctrine (red line). In the 114th Congress, legislators are predicted to vote in a bipartisan manner on approximately 10% less legislation than in the 102nd Congress.                                                            43 A bill is considered “almost unanimous” if it passes by a voice vote or is opposed by less than 5% of Senators.     23   Figure 6.1: The percentage of bipartisan votes on legislation related to rogue states    Table 6.1 provides the results of the regression analysis for the relationship between the level of bipartisanship and various indicators. The findings of this analysis indicate that bipartisanship is higher on legislation related to humanitarian issues than non-humanitarian issues. This supports the prediction that humanitarian bills tend to be less polarizing. Historically, both Democrats and Republicans have demonstrated an interest in condemning human rights violations committed by other countries. As such, members of both parties are more cooperative on such bills than on those related to more punitive measures, such as sanctions and military action. Additionally, legislation relating to Cuba appears to be the most polarizing while those relating to Libya are the most bipartisan. In fact, all votes relating to Libya are bipartisan. In this analysis, Iran is set as the baseline of comparison. The distinctively low degree of consensus on Cuba-related issues is likely due to the hardline anti-communist Republican posture. This drives Republican legislators to propose stringent measures against Cuba and oppose any legislation that     24   attempts to alleviate sanctions or normalize relations. A more comprehensive examination of this trend will be explored in the discussion section of the paper.     Table 6.1: Logistic regression of bipartisanship on legislation related to rogue states    Predictor Coefficient  Humanitarian bills   2.21** (1.06) Cuba  -1.23** (0.60)  Iraq -0.33 (0.69)  Libya   -   North Korea  -0.48 (0.70)  constant 2.10*** (0.44) Observations  169  *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, two-tailed test  6.2 Model 2: Sponsorship and Cosponsorship    Table 6.2 provides the results of the Poisson analysis for the relationship between ideology and partisanship and the sponsorship of rogue state legislation, controlling for the effect of committee membership. The findings of this model provide support for Hypotheses 2 and 3. For each unit increase in the ideological conservatism of a Senator, the expected log count of sponsoring rogue legislation increases by 0.314. As for partisanship, Republicans have a higher expected log count of legislative sponsorship by 0.167 than Democrats. The inflate coefficient for     25   the committee membership variable is negative and statistically significant, which indicates that committee members are more likely to propose rogue state legislation than non-committee members at a statistically significant level.   Table 6.2: ZIP regression of sponsorship on legislation related to rogue states    Predictor Ideology Partisanship  Ideology   0.32*** (0.04)   Republican  0.17*** (0.03)  constant 1.36*** (0.02) 1.30*** (0.02) inflate Committee    -0.75*** (0.21)      -0.74*** (0.20) constant -1.67*** (0.10) -1.65*** (0.10) Observations  1,330 1,323  *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, two-tailed test    The predicted values of these relationships have been graphed to illustrate the model. Figure 6.2 graphs the expected counts of sponsorships for values of ideology from -1 (least conservative) to 1 (most conservative) for both committee and non-committee members. The graph illustrates that the expected counts of sponsorship increases exponentially as ideological conservative goes up. This trend is observed for both committee members and non-members. According to the graph, the most ideologically conservative Senator is expected to sponsor between 4 to 5 bills targeting rogue states in a given Congress, regardless of whether or not the Senator is a committee member. Meanwhile, the most ideologically liberal Senator is expected to sponsor between 2 to 3 similar bills in a given Senate. Figure 6.3 shows that the expected count     26   for the number of bills sponsored by Republicans is higher than Democrats for both committee members and non-members. The expected count of sponsorship is highest for Republican committee members at almost 4 and is lowest for non-committee Democrats at about 3.   Figure 6.2: Ideology and the predicted number of sponsorships of rogue-related legislation  Figure 6.3: Partisanship and the predicted number of sponsorships of rogue-related legislation   Table 6.3 provides a breakdown of the effect of ideology on levels of sponsorship by Congress to illustrate trends over time. The effect of ideology is positive and significant in 6 of the     27   13 congresses: the 102nd to the 105th and the 113th to the 114th. Table 6.4 provides the results of the analysis for the relationship between partisanship and rogue-related legislation sponsorship by Congress. The results show that partisanship has a positive and statistically significant effect on sponsorship levels in 5 of the 13 congresses. Partisanship displays a similar effect on sponsorship levels as ideology, except for the 103rd Congress, in which the effect is not significant.    The findings of the analyses continue to provide support for Hypotheses 2 and 3. For each variable, it is only in the 106th and 107th Congresses that an inverse and statistically significant relationship is exhibited. This means that Senator identification as Republican and higher levels of ideological conservatism tend to be associated with higher levels of rogue legislation sponsorship. For example, in the 104th Congress, being a Republican increases the log count of sponsorship by 0.8. Similarly, in the same Congress, a one unit increase in the level of the ideological conservatism of a Senator is expected to be associated with an increase in the log count of sponsoring or cosponsoring of legislation targeting rogue states by 1.2.      28   Table 6.3: ZIP analysis of ideology and sponsorship on rogue related legislation by congress from the 102nd to the 114th Congresses    Congress 102nd  103rd  104th  105th  106th  107th  108th  109th  110th  111th  112th  113th  114th   Ideological conservatism    0.58***   0.51*   1.20***   0.56***   -0.61**   -0.29*   0.245   -0.15   -0.15   0.19   0.03   0.89***   0.51***  constant  1.54*** 0.50*** -0.89*** 1.09*** 0.88*** 1.15*** 0.94*** 1.44*** 1.21*** 1.42*** 1.89*** 1.22*** 1.77***               inflate cmt  22.00  -1.81*  -0.35  11.90  1.21**  -17.00  0.14  0.09  -18.26  -0.32  -16.65  32.37  16.46               constant -2.67** -0.32 -0.73** -27.90 -0.26 -2.36*** -2.84*** -2.18*** -2.83*** -2.39*** -2.11*** -4.34** -4.86** *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, two-tailed test  Table 6.4: ZIP analysis of partisanship and sponsorship on rogue related legislation by congress from the 102nd to the 114th Congresses    Congress 102nd  103rd  104th  105th  106th  107th  108th  109th  110th  111th  112th  113th  114th   Republican    0.37***   0.30   0.80***   0.33***   -0.57***   -0.39***   0.00   -0.15   -0.11   0.10   0.05   0.89***   0.43***  constant  1.37*** 0.37** 0.55*** 0.95*** 1.14*** 1.32*** 0.95*** 1.51*** 1.26*** 1.38*** 1.88*** 0.55*** 1.60*** Inflate cmt  -17.13  -1.81*  0.40  -12.73  -1.22**  -18.34  0.26  0.09  -20.34  -0.35  -25.79  16.10  -16.61 constant -2.66*** -0.30 -0.66** -27.37 -0.28 -2.58*** -2.92*** -2.19*** -2.80*** -2.34*** -2.09*** -3.85*** -4.59*** *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, two-tailed test    29   Chapter 7: Analysis   The analysis conducted reveals that there is a high level of consensus in voting on legislation targeting rogue states as well as some partisan and ideological difference in sponsorship levels, although this pattern is not consistent over time. What do these findings reveal about US policymaking towards rogue states?     The literature indicates that there should be a difference in the way that Republicans and Democrats vote on issues concerning rogue states. Specifically, research suggests that Republicans should be more likely to support more punitive and hawkish policy options than their Democratic counterparts. The results of the analysis of voting patterns on these issues raises the following question: What accounts for the observed voting consensus?    One possibility is that Democrats and Republicans may not actually have discernible differences in their policy preferences on issues related to rogue states. However, such an explanation would dismiss the numerous legislative conflicts on the matter that ran throughout consecutive administrations since the Clinton presidency. A more plausible explanation is that although differences in preferences have existed, they do not always translate into differences in voting. While the scholarship overwhelmingly finds that ideology and partisanship determine a legislator’s political views and preferences, in some cases, electoral considerations may constrain legislative voting behaviour.    Gadarian finds that “in a threatening environment, Americans reward candidates and parties perceived to hold hawkish positions but even more severely punish candidates perceived     30   to be dovish.”44 When Democrats are forced to take position on a national security issue, such as during an election when the issue is salient, the political rhetoric of Democrats tends to converge on the more hawkish rhetoric of Republicans. Similarly, Americans perceive relations with rogue states as operating under highly threatening conditions. As most rogue-related legislation introduced in Congress is punitive and represents anti-rogue sentiment, the literature suggests that that not only should voting be polarized, but that Republicans should be more likely to support such bills than Democrats. However, when forced to take a position during a legislative vote, Democrats may be incentivized to converge on the policy preferences of the Republican Party so as not to appear weak on national security.    The most well-known example of this is the Iraq War and more generally the War on Terror. Beinart illustrates that Republicans were significantly stronger supporters of going to war against Iraq than Democrats, and that on questions related to the War on Terror, Democrats were comparatively much more dovish and isolationist.45 However, in voting on legislation authorizing the use of force against Iraq, Democrats were pressured to vote with Republicans out of fear of electoral punishment.46    However, this only explains the overall high level of consensus witnessed between the 102nd to the 114th Congress. It fails to explain the observed variation in the levels of consensus over time. In particular, the 107th, 109th, and 114th Congresses witness particularly low levels of consensus. A closer examination of the legislation put to a vote during these Congresses suggests that consensus breaks down when controversial policies that veer away from the containment                                                         44 Gadarian, “Foreign Policy at the Ballot Box”, 1046. 45 Nivola and Brady, Red and Blue Nation?, 162. 46 Miles, US Foreign Policy, 121.      31   framework are pursued. As previously mentioned, since the birth of the Rogue Doctrine, the US has generally opted for a policy of containment towards rogue states that sought to curb their regional influence, primarily through sanctions.    There are a few instances in which the US government broke away from the containment framework and pursued policies outside of it. The most pronounced of these policies are the Iraq War and the Iran nuclear deal. The pre-emptive nature of the US invasion of Iraq represented an aggressive and offensive posture that marked a break from the more defensive nature of the containment framework. Meanwhile, the Iran nuclear deal was perceived by many legislators, particularly Republicans and conservatives, as a form of appeasement that removed long-standing economic sanctions on Iran without sufficiently constraining its potential to develop a nuclear weapon.47    An examination of the data reveals that it is in the Congresses in which the US invaded Iraq (107th) and debated a nuclear deal with Iran (114th) that voting on the issue of rogue states was most polarized. In the 107th Congress, 75 percent of the polarized bills were related to the scope of US engagement in the Iraq War. In particular, the bills debated the nature of the threat posed by Iraq, a termination date for the military engagement, and procedures for the extension of such a date. Meanwhile, all of the polarized bills during the 114th Congress related to the Iran nuclear deal. Specifically, these bills debated whether the deal should be considered a treaty subject to the consent of the Senate and whether the president should have the authority to remove sanctions from Iran more generally.                                                           47 Mahapatra, “US–Iran Nuclear Deal”, 41.     32    As for sponsorship levels, the literature indicates that differences should be expected along partisan and ideological lines, with Republicans and conservatives being more likely to sponsor legislation than Democrats and liberals. The results of the sponsorship analysis find that this pattern is observed, although not consistently. In about half of the Congresses under analysis, there is no statistically significant difference in sponsorship levels between the dominant partisan and ideological camps. However, when there is a statistically significant difference in engagement, it is predominantly in the expected direction. Republicans and conservatives tend to exhibit higher levels of sponsorship than Democrats and liberals.    The lack of statistically significant findings between the 108th and 112th Congresses may also be at least partly explained by the theory of issue ownership. While this theory suggests that we should generally find higher sponsorship levels among Republicans and conservatives, one study by Goble and Holm indicates that the ownership of this issue has not been stable over time. The study finds that while American voters consistently viewed Republicans as far more capable of handling national security affairs through the 1990s and early 2000s, Bush’s poor performance in Iraq after the 2003 invasion diminished the reputational advantage that the Republicans had over national security. By 2007, nearly 50 percent of voters had more trust in the Democrats to handle national security policy than in the Republicans.48    As the Republican Party lost its comparative advantage over the national security arena, they faced less electoral incentives to engage with this policy area than they had previously, while Democrats had more of an incentive to do so. This may in part explain the disappearance of a                                                         48 Hannah Goble and Peter M. Holm, "Breaking Bonds? The Iraq War and the Loss of Republican Dominance in National Security." Political Research Quarterly 62, no. 2 (2009): 218.     33   statistically significant difference in sponsorship levels between the two groups starting in the 108th Congress (2001-2003). In the 113th and 114th Congresses, a statistically significant difference re-appears, with Republicans and conservatives sponsoring legislation at higher rates than their counterparts. This suggests that during Obama’s second presidential term, Republicans and conservatives regained, or attempted to regain, ownership over this issue area.  This may be related to the overall performance of the Democratic government in foreign affairs. In his first presidential term, Obama’s approval rating in foreign policy was strong. Ending the war in Iraq and capturing Osama bin Laden were among the foreign policy achievements that increased his administration’s popularity.49 Contrastingly, Obama’s foreign policy witnessed a significant decline in public approval in his second term.50 Such a development may have galvanized Republicans to capitalize on public disapproval, encouraging them to reclaim their control over national security policymaking. The findings from both the Obama and Bush administrations suggest a correlation between public approval and issue ownership that should be explored at greater lengths in future research.     Furthermore, the 106th and 107th Congresses remain a puzzling finding, as they represent an anomaly in the sponsorship analysis. In these Congresses, Democrats and liberals are found to have a greater likelihood of sponsoring legislation targeting rogue states than Republicans and conservatives at a statistically significant level. An examination of the bills sponsored during these Congresses was conducted to see which ones exhibit greater numbers of Democratic sponsors and cosponsors than Republicans. During both of the Congresses, Democrats sponsored some human rights bills at higher levels than Republicans, such as those condemning human rights abuses by                                                         49 Harry Enten, "Americans Sour on Obama’s Foreign Policy." FiveThirtyEight. June 06, 2014. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americans-sour-on-obamas-foreign-policy/ 50 Ibid.     34   Iran and those calling for justice for the victims of the Pan Am 103 flight that was linked to Libyan terrorists.    However, the largest difference between the parties was on bills relating to Cuba. In particular, Democrats were the dominant sponsors of bills that attempted to relieve some of the punitive measures applied on Cuba. In the 106th Congress, bill S.2617 aimed to begin a process of trade normalization with Cuba and was sponsored by 6 Democrats compared to only 1 Republican, while bill S.926 was designed to exempt food and medicine from the Cuban trade embargo. This bill was sponsored by 16 Democrats and only 9 Republicans. In the 107th Congress, the Bridges to the Cuban People Act of 2001 (S.1017) also aimed to exempt food and medicine from the Cuban sanctions, as well as prohibit the US president from regulating travel of American nationals to Cuba. This bill was sponsored by 4 times as many Democrats – 20 – as Republicans – 5.    This finding suggests that bills related to Cuba have the greatest difference in sponsorship levels along partisan and ideological lines. This echoes the earlier finding that Cuba is the rogue state that causes the highest levels of polarization in congressional voting. Why might Cuba cause the greatest difference in legislative behaviour? One possibility is the precarious position of Cuba on the list of rogue states. Cuba was considered a rogue state alongside Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea due to pressures from the Cuban American community, despite failing to satisfy key elements of the rogue criteria initially outlined by the Clinton administration. In the post-Cold War era, the Castro regime had not aimed to acquire WMDs, nor did it provide active support for terrorism. Additionally, despite the fact that it was a communist regime, many commentators have pointed out that Cuba does not actually pose a military threat to US national security.51                                                          51 Miles, US Foreign Policy, 29.     35     As such, despite being included on the list of rogue states, in the minds of many Americans, Cuba does not pose a threat to the US in the same way that other rogue states do. The aforementioned examination of Cuba-related bills indicates that it is Democrats and liberals that demonstrate a greater propensity to sponsor and support bills that ease sanctions and restrictions on Cuba. The examination also reveals that Cuba appears to be the only rogue state for which there are some non-punitive bills. Therefore, US policymaking towards its adversaries appears to vary according to how closely the state fits the rogue criteria. In this case, policymaking towards Cuba elicits higher levels of polarization than policymaking towards other states that more clearly fit the rogue criteria.         36   Chapter 8: Conclusion   The leading prognosis of US foreign policymaking since the Vietnam War has been that ideology and partisanship have driven a wedge between American policymakers, causing them to have increasingly polarized foreign policy views and positions. The purpose of this study was to conduct a unique investigation of the effect of these factors in shaping foreign policymaking towards rogue states.    This paper makes several contributions to our understanding of the influence of ideology and partisanship on US foreign policy. First, the paper finds that policymaking on the issue of rogue states exhibits a distinctive degree of consensus, running counter to the broad trend of polarization in US politics. Not only are the vast majority of rogue-related bills bipartisan, but most of them pass with unanimous or almost-unanimous consensus.    Rather than dismissing the evidence in the literature that policymakers do have differences in their views and policy preferences, the findings of the paper suggest that another factor constrains ideological and partisan differences, namely electoral considerations. Given the hostile nature of US relations with rogue states and the threatening environment under which such relations operate, the findings of the paper suggest that Democrats and liberals converge on the more hawkish and punitive policy positions of Republicans and conservatives. Failing to do so would risk the electoral cost of appearing too dovish on national security issues.    Second, the paper corroborates previous literature that suggests that Republicans and conservatives are more engaged on the issue of rogue states. While a difference in sponsorship     37   levels along partisan and ideological lines does not always appear, when there is an observed difference, it is predominantly in the expected direction. Right-wing and Republican elements of Congress exhibit higher rates of sponsoring rogue-related legislation. The results also suggest that sponsorship behaviour is shaped by electoral considerations. Legislators are incentivized to engage with a policy issue when the public perceives them to have a handling advantage over the issue and are less likely to do so when they lose their comparative advantage.   Finally, the paper finds that legislative behaviour towards rogue states is not uniform across states. Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Cuba and Libya exhibit different levels of threat to US security, and as such, American policymakers view them differently. As Cuba fails to meet fundamental rogue state criteria, policymaking towards the communist state is the most polarized. Cuba-related bills are the least bipartisan and distinctively include measures that aim to reduce sanctions and begin a process of normalizing relations. Further research would benefit from investigating legislative behaviour towards states that have even more precariously held the rogue title, such as Syria, Venezuela, and Sudan. While this paper offers a first look into the policymaking process in the US towards rogue states, an analysis of “rogue-like” regimes would further extend our understanding of the relationship between the rogue label and policymaking.    It is worth noting that as several original members of the rogue category have lost their rogue designation after normalizing relations with the US, this has signaled to many the end of the rogue state concept.52 However, the analysis should not stop here. The Rogue Doctrine has continued to shape America’s foreign policy approach even after some states lost their rogue status and after the term fell out of US policy lexicon during the Obama administration. In fact, the term                                                         52 Tisdall, "Obama taking Cuba off terror list.”     38   has experienced a revival under US President Donald Trump, who singled out Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, and Syria as rogue regimes in his address to the United Nations in 2017, marking the continuation of the doctrine and the addition of two new members to the list.53 Moreover, the US is entering a distinct phase of renewed isolationism under the Trump presidency, a foreign policy approach that marks a rift from the tradition of internationalism that has guided US policy for decades.54 It is unclear just yet how such an approach will affect US policymaking towards its adversaries. 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"US Senators' Support for Israel Examined Through Sponsorship/Cosponsorship Decisions, 1993–2002: The Influence of Elite and Constituent Factors." Foreign Policy Analysis 5, no. 1 (2009): 73-91. Schonberg, Karl K. "Paradigm Regained: The New Consensus in US Foreign Policy." Security Dialogue 32, no. 4 (2001): 439-452.     41   Tisdall, Simon, "Obama taking Cuba off terror list signals end for dated idea of rogue states." The Guardian. April 15, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/15/president-obama-cuba-us-rogue-state-sponsor-terrorism “Trump at UN: Which ‘rogue states’ are in new axis of evil?” The BBC. September 19, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-41310859/trump-at-un-which-rogue-states-are-in-new-axis-of-evil Wald, Matthew. “U.S. drops Libya from list of terrorist countries.” The New York Times. July 7, 2006. https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/07/world/africa/07iht-libya.2143377.html  Werner, W. G., W. M. Wagner, and M. Onderco. "Theorizing Deviance in International Relations." (2013). Wildavsky, Aaron. “The Two Presidencies.” Society 35, no. 2 (1998): 23-31.      42   Appendix  List of Rogue-Related Legislation used in Analysis    102nd Congress (1991-1992)  Legislation Number Title S.Amdt. 3333 (H.R. 5368) To terminate U.S. assistance for Russia unless Russia ceases its military and military-related efforts to Iran. S.Amdt. 3098 (S. 3114) To establish a U.S. policy to oppose any transfer to Iran or Iraq of any goods or technology wherever that transfer could contribute to either country's acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons. S.Con.Res. 43 A concurrent resolution concerning the emancipation of the Baha'i community of Iran. S. 2543 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 S.J.Res. 94 A joint resolution relative to Iraq. S.Res. 99 A resolution concerning the protection of refugees in Iraq. S.J.Res. 1 A joint resolution regarding United States policy to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. S.J.Res. 2 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution S.Con.Res. 4 A concurrent resolution condemning Iraq's unprovoked attack on Israel. S.Con.Res. 5 A concurrent resolution demanding that the Government of Iraq abide by the Geneva Convention regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. S.Con.Res. 8 A concurrent resolution demanding that the International Committee of the Red Cross by given access to prisoners of war held in Iraq. S.Amdt. 1222 (H.R. 2521) To bar imports from companies that assisted Iraq in developing weapons of mass destruction. S.Amdt. 35 (S. 578) To assure that U.S. tax dollars are not used for the rebuilding of Iraq. S.Amdt. 36 (S. 578) To express the sense of the Senate that none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by any provision of law may be obligated or expended for the purpose of rebuilding Iraq while Saddam Hussein remains in power in Iraq. S.Amdt. 9 (S. 320) To prohibit foreign persons that violate the United Nations embargo against Iraq from acquiring property in the United States. S.Amdt. 1040 (S. 1507) To support the use of all necessary means to accomplish the elimination of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capability.     43   S.Amdt. 1041 (S. 1507) Expressing Congressional support for the use of all necessary means to protect Iraq's Kurdish minority, consistent with the relevant United Nations Resolutions and the authorities contained in P.L. 102-1. S.Amdt. 3098 (S. 3114) To establish a U.S. policy to oppose any transfer to Iran or Iraq of any goods or technology wherever that transfer could contribute to either country's acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons. S.Con.Res. 108 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress regarding the Kurds in northern Iraq. S. 2543 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 S.J.Res. 75 A joint resolution pertaining to U.S. economic sanctions against Iraq. S.Res. 8 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that Congress must approve any offensive military action against Iraq. S.J.Res. 10 A joint resolution declaring the policy of the Congress that military force be used against Iraq only as a last resort and then only in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United States. S.Res. 69 A resolution calling for the establishment of an international tribunal with jurisdiction to judge and punish the war crimes committed by the political and military leadership of Iraq. S. 563 Persian Gulf Conflict Burden-Sharing Act of 1991 S.Res. 285 A resolution calling for compliance with United Nations sanctions against Libya for harboring the suspects in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, and for other purposes. S.Res. 65 A resolution condemning Cuba'a human rights violations, and commending the United Nations Human Rights Commission for its attention to the human rights situation in Cuba. S.Amdt. 3185 (S. 3114) To disallow any deductions allocable to subpart F income from Cuba. S.Amdt. 860 (S. 1435) To prohibit certain transactions between certain United States firms and Cuba. S.Amdt. 2724 (S. 2532) To urge the President to obtain commitments and facilitate the withdrawal of Russian military personnel from Cuba. S.Amdt. 803 (S. 1367) To require the President to certify that China has made significant progress in reducing assistance to Cuba. S.Amdt. 2676 (S. 2532) To provide assurances that nuclear fuel rods will not be provided to Cuba unless certain compliances are met. S.Amdt. 3079 (S. 3114) To promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba through the application of appropriate pressures on the Cuban Government and support for the Cuban people.     44   S.Amdt. 816 (S. 1435) Providing that none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by the Act shall be available to the Soviet Union unless the President has certified that the Soviet Union has ceased all direct or indirect military or economic assistance to Cuba. S.Res. 63 A resolution condemning Cuba's human rights violations, and commending the United Nations Human Rights Commission for its attention to the human rights situation in Cuba. S. 2197 Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 S. 2918 Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 HR6297 To reauthorize the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.   103rd Congress (1993-1994)  S.Amdt. 1296 (S. 1281) To provide sanctions against third parties who assist Iran or Iraq in their ongoing efforts to build conventional weapons. S. 1583 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act of 1993 S. 1172 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Amendments of 1993 S.Res. 167 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate concerning the Iraqi Government's campaign against the Marsh Arabs of southern Iraq. S.Amdt. 1296 (S. 1281) To provide sanctions against third parties who assist Iran or Iraq in their ongoing efforts to build conventional weapons. S. 1401 Iraq Claims Act of 1993 S. 1172 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Amendments of 1993 S.Res. 165 A resolution to state the sense of the Senate with respect to the compliance of Libya with United Nations Security Council Resolutions. S.Res. 68 A resolution urging the President of the United States to seek an international oil embargo through the United Nations against Libya because of its refusal to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748 concerning the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. S.Res. 92 A resolution condemning the proposed withdrawal of North Korea from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and for other purposes. S.Amdt. 2511 (H.R. 4650) To prohibit the availability of any funds for North Korea unless certain conditions are met. S.Amdt. 1848 (S. 2182) To require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress on POW/MIA matters concerning North Korea. S.Amdt. 1331 (S. 1281) To express the sense of Congress regarding United States policy toward the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea. S.Amdt. 1257 (S. 1281) To state the sense of the Senate on United States policy concerning nuclear weapons proliferation by the Government of North Korea.     45   S.Amdt. 1333 (S. 1281) To urge the President to prepare to reintroduce United States tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula, in full coordination with United States allies in the region, should North Korea not return to, and fully comply with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. S.Con.Res. 19 A concurrent resolution condemning North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. S.Res. 76 A resolution urging the member nations of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to support a resolution on human rights in Cuba. S.Amdt. 943 (H.R. 2295) To withhold funds from Russia if that country has recently provided assistance to Cuba. S.Amdt. 2367 (H.R. 4603) Expressing the sense of the Senate condemning the sinking of the "13th of March" by the Government of Cuba. S.Amdt. 2366 (H.R. 4603) To express the sense of the Senate condemning the sinking of the "13th of March" by the Government of Cuba. HR4426 To restrict the use of available funds to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea until the President certifies and reports to Congress that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea does not possess nuclear weapons, has halted its nuclear weapons program, and has not exported weapons-grade plutonium.   104th Congress (1995-1996)  S.Amdt. 2108 (S. 1026) To provide for Iran and Iraq arms non-proliferation measures. S.Amdt. 5062 (H.R. 3540) To state the sense of the Senate on the delivery by the People's Republic of China of cruise missiles to Iran. S.Amdt. 2719 (H.R. 1868) To require certification by the Secretary of the State that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has not approved any loans to Iran. S. 1228 Iran Oil Sanctions Act of 1995 S. 838 Radio Free Iran Act S. 277 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act of 1995 S. 630 Iran Foreign Sanctions Act of 1995 S.Res. 105 A resolution condemning Iran for the violent suppression of a protest in Teheran. S. 726 A bill to amend the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 to revise the sanctions applicable to violations of that Act, and for other purposes. S.Con.Res. 16 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the Russian Federation should be strongly condemned for its plan to provide nuclear tecnology to Iran, and that such nuclear transfer would make Russia ineligible under terms of the Freedom Support Act.     46   S.Amdt. 411 (S. 219) To condemn the conviction and sentencing of American citizens held in Iraq. S.Amdt. 3106 (S. 1228) To deter investment in the development of Libya's petroleum resources. S.Amdt. 4588 (H.R. 3107) To make sanctions against investments that contribute to the development of Libya's petroleum resources mandatory rather than discretionary. S.J.Res. 29 A joint resolution expressing the sense of Congress with respect to North-South dialogue on the Korean Peninsula and the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework. S.Amdt. 328 (H.R. 889) To restrict the availability of funds for North Korea. S.Amdt. 5089 (H.R. 3540) To provide conditions for funding North Korea's implementation of the nuclear framework agreement. S.Con.Res. 4 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to North-South dialogue on the Korean Peninsula and the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework. S. 1293 Authorization for Implementation of the Agreed Framework Between the United States and North Korea Act S.Amdt. 2934 (H.R. 927) To protect the constitutional right of Americans to travel to Cuba. S.Amdt. 2906 (H.R. 927) To seek international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to plan for support of a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and for other purposes. S.Amdt. 2898 (H.R. 927) To strengthen international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to develop a plan to support a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and for other purposes. S.Amdt. 2936 (H.R. 927) To strengthen international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to develop a plan to support a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and for other purposes. S.Amdt. 3760 (S. 1664) To condition the repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act on a democratically elected government in Cuba being in power. S. 925 A bill to impose congressional notification and reporting requirements on any negotiations or other discussions between the United States and Cuba with respect to normalization of relations. S. 381 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995 S.Amdt. 326 (H.R. 889) To strengthen international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to develop a plan to support a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and for other purposes.     47   S.Amdt. 2728 (H.R. 1868) To allow residents of the United States to send to their immediate family members in Cuba small amounts of money to pay for basic necessities such as food, clothing, and medical care. S.Amdt. 2731 (H.R. 1868) To allow residents of the United States to send to their immediate family members in Cuba small amounts of money to pay for basic necessities such as food, clothing, and medical care. HR927 A bill to seek international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to plan for support of a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and for other purposes. HR927 A bill to seek international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to plan for support of a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and for other purposes.   105th Congress (1997-1998)  S.Amdt. 392 (S. 903) To express the sense of the Senate on enforcement of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 with respect to the acquisition by Iran of C-802 cruise missiles. S.Amdt. 2444 (H.R. 2709) To change the date of behavior subject to sanctions relating to Iran missile proliferation. S.Amdt. 905 (S. 955) To prohibit assistance to Russia unless Russia terminates activities relating to ballistic missile or nuclear programs in Iran. S.Amdt. 3528 (S. 2334) To express the finding of the Senate that according to the Department of State, Iran continues to support international terrorism, providing training, financing and weapons to such terrorist groups as Hizballah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas. S.Con.Res. 48 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress regarding proliferation of missile technology from Russia to Iran. S. 1311 Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997 S.Res. 82 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate to urge the Clinton Administration to enforce the provisions of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 with respect to the acquisition by Iran of C-802 cruise missiles. S. 1387 Iran Missile Protection Act of 1997 S.Con.Res. 25 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the Russian Federation should be strongly condemned for its plan to provide nuclear technology to Iran, and that such nuclear transfer would make Russia ineligible under terms for the Freedom Support Act.     48   S.J.Res. 54 A joint resolution finding the Government of Iraq in unacceptable and material breach of its international obligations. S.Amdt. 2076 (S. 1768) To provide additional support for Democratic opposition in Iraq, and to provide for the establishment of Radio Free Iraq. S.Amdt. 3512 (S. 2334) To provide support for the conduct of activities by the the Iraqi Democratic opposition inside Iraq. S.Con.Res. 71 A concurrent resolution condemning Iraq's threat to international peace and security. S. 2525 Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 S. 856 A bill to provide for the adjudication and payment of certain claims against the Government of Iraq. S.Con.Res. 76 A concurrent resolution enforcing the embargo on the export of oil from Iraq. S.Res. 82 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate to urge the Clinton Administration to enforce the provisions of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 with respect to the acquisition by Iran of C-802 cruise missiles. S.Amdt. 909 (S. 955) To withhold assistance to countries that are violating United Nations sanctions against Libya. S.Amdt. 3501 (S. 2334) To state the sense of Congress regarding ballistic missile development by North Korea. S.Amdt. 894 (S. 955) To provide conditions for funding North Korea's implementation of the nuclear framework agreement. S. 2080 Cuban Solidarity (SOLIDARIDAD) Act of 1998 S. 1391 Cuban Women and Children Humanitarian Relief Act S.Amdt. 895 (S. 955) To restore to U.S. citizens and residents the right of travel to Cuba. HR2709 To impose certain sanctions on foreign persons who transfer items contributing to Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or produce ballistic missiles. S955 To provide for Cuban-American family humanitarian support and compassionate travel.   106th Congress (1999-2000)   S.Amdt. 1319 (S. 1217) Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding Iran. S.Amdt. 112 (S. 544) To express the sense of the Senate that a pending sale of wheat and other agricultural commodities to Iran be approved.     49   S.Amdt. 724 (S. 544) To express the sense of the Congress regarding the treatment of religious minorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and particularly the recent arrests of members of that country's Jewish community. S.Amdt. 1139 (S. 1234) To provide that certain funds that are allocated for assistance for the Central Government of Russia, 50 percent of shall be withheld from obligation until the President determines and certifies in writing to the Committees on Appropriations that The Government of Russia has terminated implementation of arrangements to provide Iran with technical expertise, training, technology, or equipment necessary to develop a nuclear reator, related nuclear reasearch facilities or programs, or ballistic missile capability. S.Con.Res. 83 A concurrent resolution commending the people of Iran for their commitment to the democratic process and positive political reform on the occasion of Iran's parliamentary elections. S.Con.Res. 109 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress regarding the ongoing persecution of 13 members of Iran's Jewish community. S.Con.Res. 39 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress regarding the treatment of religious minorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and particularly the recent arrests of members of that country's Jewish community. S. 2947 A bill to encourage respect for the rights of religious and ethnic minorities in Iran, and to deter Iran from supporting international terrorism, and from furthering its weapons of mass destruction programs. S.Con.Res. 50 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress concerning teh continuous repression of freedom of expression and assembly, and of individual human rights, in Iran, as exemplified by the recent repression of the democratic movement of Iran. S. 834 Iran Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1999 S.Con.Res. 104 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress regarding the ongoing prosecution of 13 members of Iran's Jewish community. S.Con.Res. 41 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress regarding the treatment of religious minorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and particularly the recent arrests of members of that country's Jewish community. S.Con.Res. 124 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress with regard to Iraq's failure to provide the fullest possible accounting of the United States Navy Commander Michael Scott Speicher and prisoners of war from Kuwait and nine other nations in violation of international agreements. S.Amdt. 1181 (S. 1234) To allocate funds for the Iraq Foundation. S.Res. 287 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding U. S. policy toward Libya. S.Amdt. 442 (S. 1059) To express the sense of Congress regarding the continuation of sanctions against Libya.     50   S. 1352 North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 S. 2752 Accountability to Congress for Nuclear Transfers to North Korea Act of 2000 S.Res. 57 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the human rights situation in Cuba. S.Amdt. 3475 (S. 1059) To establish a National Bipartisan Commission on Cuba to evaluate United States policy with respect to Cuba. S.Amdt. 1157 (S. 1234) To terminate prohibitions and restrictions on travel to Cuba. S.Amdt. 3588 (S. 2522) To make available up to $1,000,000 to fund the Secretary of Defense to work with the appropriate authorities of the Cuban government to provide for greater cooperation, coordination,and other assistance in the interdiction of illicit drugs being transported over Cuba airspace and waters. S. 2617 Trade Normalization With Cuba Act S. 2896 United States-Cuba Trade Act of 2000 S. 1919 Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2000 S.Res. 289 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the human rights situation in Cuba. S.Con.Res. 79 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that Elian Gonzalez should be reunited with his father, Juan Gonzalez of Cuba. S. 926 Cuban Food and Medicine Security Act of 1999 S. 1829 Castro Bailout Prohibition Act of 1999 S.Amdt. 3267 (S. 2549) To establish a National Bipartisan Commission on Cuba to evaluate United States policy with respect to Cuba. S.Amdt. 1182 (S. 1234) To terminate prohibitions and restrictions on travel to Cuba. HR1883 To provide for the application of measures to foreign persons who transfer to Iran certain goods, services, or technology, and for other purposes.; Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000   107th Congress (2001-2002)  S. 1218 ILSA Extension Act of 2001 S. 994 Iran and Libya Sanctions Extension Act of 2001 S. 1877 A bill to clarify and reaffirm a cause of action and Federal court jurisdiction for certain claims against the Government of Iran. S.Res. 306 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate concerning the continuous repression of freedoms within Iran and of individual human rights abuses, particularly with regard to women.     51   S. 171 A bill to repeal certain travel provisions with respect to Cuba and certain trade sanctions with respect to Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan, and for other purposes. S.Amdt. 4865 (S.J.Res. 45) To amend the authorization for the use of the Armed Forces to cover an imminent threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction rather than the continuing threat posed by Iraq. S.Amdt. 3159 (S. 517) To make the United States' energy policy toward Iraq consistent with the national security policies of the United States. S.Amdt. 4868 (S.J.Res. 45) To provide statutory construction that constitutional authorities remain unaffected and that no additional grant of authority is made to the President not directly related to the existing threat posed by Iraq. S.Amdt. 4862 (S.J.Res. 45) To authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces, pursuant to a new resolution of the United Nations Security Council, to destroy, remove, or render harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons-usable material, long-range ballistic missiles, and related facilities, and for other purposes. S.J.Res. 45 Further Resolution on Iraq S.J.Res. 46 Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq S. 1170 Iraq Petroleum Import Restriction Act of 2001 S.J.Res. 41 A joint resolution calling for Congress to consider and vote on a resolution for the use of force by the United States Armed Forces against Iraq before such force is deployed. S.Con.Res. 133 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should not use force against Iraq, outside of the existing Rules of Engagement, without specific statutory authorization or a declaration of war under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution of the United States. S.Amdt. 1154 (S. 1218) To make the United States' energy policy toward Iraq consistent with the national security policies of the United States. S.Con.Res. 23 Justice for the Victims of Pan Am 103 Resolution of 2001 S. 244 Justice for the Victims of Pan Am 103 Act of 2001 S.Con.Res. 90 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress regarding the efforts of people of the unitedStates of Korean ancestry to reunite with their family members in North Korea. S. 171 A bill to repeal certain travel provisions with respect to Cuba and certain trade sanctions with respect to Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan, and for other purposes. S.Amdt. 2596 (S. 1731) To provide for Presidential certification that the government of Cuba is not involved in the support for acts of international terrorism as a condition precedent to agricultural trade with Cuba. S. 400 Free Trade With Cuba Act     52   S. 401 United States-Cuba Trade Act of 2001 S. 239 Cuba Food and Medicine Access Act of 2001 S.Res. 62 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the human rights situation in Cuba. S. 1017 Bridges to the Cuban People Act of 2001 S. 402 Cuban Humanitarian Trade Act of 2001 S. 894 SOLIDARIDAD Act of 2001 S.Amdt. 3439 (H.R. 3009) To permit private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba. S.Amdt. 2597 (S. 1731) To provide for Presidential certification that all convicted felons who are living as fugitives in Cuba have been returned to the United States prior to the amendments relating to agricultural trade with Cuba  becoming effective. HJRES114 A joint resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq. SJRES45 In the nature of a substitute. SJRES45 To provide a termination date for the authorization of the use of the Armed Forces of the United States, together with procedures for the extension of such date unless Congress disapproves the extension. SJRES45 To provide substitute language that includes an authorization for the use of the United States Armed Forces to defend the national security of the United States against the threat posed by certain foreign terrorist organizations.   108th Congress (2003-2004)  S.Res. 304 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should not support the February 20, 2004, elections in Iran and that the United States should advocate democratic government in Iran that will restore freedom to the Iranian people and will abandon terrorism. S.Amdt. 1145 (S. 925) To provide support for democracy in Iran. S.Amdt. 2015 (H.R. 2800) To express the sense of the Senate on the development of democracy in Iran. S.Amdt. 1630 (H.R. 2660) To provide protection for nationals and residents of the Islamic Republic of Iran who are targets of persecution. S.Amdt. 2014 (H.R. 2800) To set aside an amount for grants to media organizations to support broadcasting that promotes human rights and democracy in Iran. S.Con.Res. 81 A concurrent resolution expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means to produce nuclear weapons.     53   S.Con.Res. 73 A concurrent resolution expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons. S.Res. 302 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should not support the February 20, 2004, elections in Iran and that the United States should seek a genuine democratic government in Iran that will restore freedom to the Iranian people and will abandon terrorism. S. 1082 Iran Democracy Act  S. 2681 Iran Freedom and Support Act of 2004 S.Res. 81 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate  concerning the continuous repression of freedoms within Iran and of individual human rights abuses, particularly with regard to women. S.Res. 82 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate concerning the continuos repression of freedoms within Iran and of individual human rights abuses, particularly with regard to women. S.Con.Res. 13 A concurrent resolution condemning the selection of Libya to chair the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and for other purposes. S.Amdt. 57 (H.J.Res. 2) To express the sense of the Senate with respect to North Korea. S.Amdt. 1173 (S. 925) Requirement for report on the role of North Korea in the trafficking of illegal narcotics. S. 145 North Korea Democracy Act of 2003 S. 1903 North Korean Freedom Act of 2003 S.Res. 328 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the continued human rights violations committed by Fidel Castro and the Government of Cuba. S.Res. 62 A resolution calling upon the Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Union, and human rights activists throughout the world to take certain actions in regard to the human rights situation in Cuba. S.Amdt. 1900 (H.R. 2989) To prohibit the enforcement of the ban on travel to Cuba. S.Amdt. 2018 (H.R. 2800) To make available funds to support democracy- building efforts for Cuba. S. 950 Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2003 S. 403 United States-Cuba Trade Act of 2003 S. 1089 Cuba Transition Act of 2003 S. 2449 Cuba Sanctions Reform Act of 2004     54   S. 2002 United States-Cuba Trademark Protection Act of 2003   109th Congress (2005-2006)  S.Res. 62 A resolution condemning the conference denying that the Holocaust occurred to be held by the Government of Iran and its President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. S.Res. 292 A resolution calling on the President to condemn the anti-Israel sentiments expressed by the President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, on October 26, 2005. S.Res. 337 A resolution to condemn the harmful, destructive, and anti-Semitic statements of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the President of Iran, and to demand an apology for those statements of hate and animosity towards all Jewish people of the world. S.Amdt. 4337 (S. 2766) Relating to intelligence on Iran. S.Amdt. 4234 (S. 2766) To authorize, with an offset, assistance for prodemocracy programs and activities inside and outside Iran, to make clear that the United States supports the ability of the people of Iran to exercise self-determination over their form of government, and to make enhancements to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. S.Amdt. 4257 (S. 2766) To state the policy of the United States on the nuclear programs of Iran. S.Amdt. 5187 (S. 3709) To make the waiver authority of the President contingent upon a certification that India has agreed to suspend military-to-military cooperation with Iran, including training exercises, until such time as Iran is no longer designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. S.Amdt. 5173 (S. 3709) To make the waiver authority of the President contingent upon a determination that India is fully and actively participating in United States and international efforts to dissuade, sanction, and contain Iran for its nuclear program consistent with United Nations Security Council resolutions. S.Con.Res. 78 A concurrent resolution condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts to report Iran to the United Nations Security Counsel. S. 1713 Iran Nonproliferation Amendments Act of 2005 S.Res. 349 A resolution condemning the Government of Iran for violating the terms of the 2004 Paris Agreement, and expressing support for efforts to refer Iran to the United Nations Security Council for its noncompliance with International Atomic Energy Agency obligations.     55   S.Res. 587 A resolution expressing concern relating to the threatening behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the ideological alliance that exists between the countries of Cuba and Venezuela, and supporting the people of Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela in the quest of those peoples to achieve a truly democratic form of government. S. 3971 Iran Freedom Support Act S. 3870 Iran Human Rights Act of 2006 S. 4032 Iran Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 2006 S. 333 Iran Freedom and Support Act of 2005 S. 3536 Iran Intelligence Oversight Act S. 2657 Iran Sanctions Extension Act of 2006 S.Res. 351 A resolution responding to the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program. S. 299 Investor in Iran Accountability Act of 2005 S. 1976 Iran Nonproliferation Enforcement Act of 2005 S. 2279 Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Enforcement Act of 2006 S. 3994 A bill to extend the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. S.Con.Res. 76 A concurrent resolution condemning the Government of Iran for its flagrant violations of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and calling for certain actions in response to such violations. S.Res. 436 A resolution urging the Federation Internationale de Football Association to prevent persons or groups representing the Islamic Republic of Iran from participating in sanctioned soccer matches. S.Res. 336 A resolution to condemn the harmful, destructive, and anti-Semitic statements of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the President of Iran, and to demand an apology for those statements of hate and animosity towards all Jewish people of the world. S.Res. 442 A resolution expressing the deep disappointment of the Senate with respect to the election of Iran to a leadership position in the United Nations Disarmament Commission and requesting the President to withhold funding to the United Nations unless credible reforms are made. S. 1737 Iranian Nuclear Trade Prohibition Act of 2005 S.Amdt. 3640 (H.R. 4939) To increase by $12,500,000 the amount appropriated for the Broadcasting Board of Governors, to increase by $12,500,000 the amount appropriated for the Department of State for the Democracy Fund, to provide that such funds shall be made available for democracy programs and activities in Iran, and to provide an offset.     56   S.Res. 504 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the President should not accept the credentials of any representative of the Government of Libya without the expressed understanding that the Government of Libya will continue to work in good faith to resolve outstanding cases of United States victims of terrorism sponsored or supported by Libya, including the settlement of cases arising from the Pan Am Flight 103 and LaBelle Discotheque bombings. S.Amdt. 1231 (H.R. 3057) To provide an exception for activities of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in Libya. S.Amdt. 1496 (S. 1042) To prohibit the use of funds for normalizing relations with Libya pending resolution with Libya of certain claims relating to the bombing of the LaBelle Discotheque in Berlin, Germany. S. 3728 North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2006 S.Amdt. 4307 (S. 2766) Relating to North Korea. S. 3667 North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2006 S. 4052 North Korea Refugee Relief and Reconstruction Act of 2006 S.Res. 140 A resolution expressing support for the historic meeting in Havana of the Assembly to Promote the Civil Society in Cuba on May 20, 2005, as well as to all those courageous individuals who continue to advance liberty and democracy for the Cuban people. S.Amdt. 284 (S. 600) To prohibit funds from being used for television broadcasting to Cuba. S. 3769 Cuba Transition Act of 2006 S. 894 Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2005 S. 2795 A bill to exclude from admission to the United States aliens who have made investments contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum resources, and for other purposes. S. 2682 A bill to exclude from admission to the United States aliens who have made investments directly and significantly contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum resources, and for other purposes. S. 634 A bill to amend the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 to clarify allowable payment terms for sales of agricultural commodities and products to Cuba. S.Amdt. 4853 (H.R. 5631) To appropriate funds for a Cuba Fund for a Democratic Future to promote democratic transition in Cuba. S.Amdt. 1059 (H.R. 2361) To facilitate family travel to Cuba in humanitarian circumstances. S.Amdt. 2133 (H.R. 3058) To restrict enforcement of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations with respect to travel to Cuba.     57   S.Amdt. 319 (S. 600) To encourage multilateral cooperation and authorize a program of assistance to facilitate a peaceful transition in Cuba, and for other purposes. S.Amdt. 281 (S. 600) To facilitate the sale of United States agricultural products to Cuba, as authorized by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. S.Amdt. 475 (H.R. 1268) To limit the use of funds to restrict the issuance of general licenses for travel to Cuba in connection with authorized sales activities, and for other purposes. HR2361 To facilitate family travel to Cuba in humanitarian circumstances.   110th Congress (2007-2008)  S.Res. 214 A resolution calling upon the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to immediately release Dr. Haleh Esfandiari. S.Amdt. 3017 (H.R. 1585) To express the sense of the Senate regarding Iran. S.Amdt. 2691 (H.R. 2764) To provide that, of the amount appropriated or otherwise made available for the Economic Support Fund, $75,000,000 shall be made avilable for programs of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs of the Department of State to support democracy, the rule of law, and the governance in Iran. S. 3227 Iran Sanctions Act of 2008 S. 970 Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007 S. 1534 Iran Human Rights Act of 2007 S. 3445 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2008 S.Con.Res. 19 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress on the nuclear program of Iran. S. 759 A bill to prohibit the use of funds for military operations in Iran. S.Res. 580 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate on preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. S. 527 Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Enforcement Act of 2007 S. 3578 A bill to establish a commission to assess the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. S.Con.Res. 13 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the President should not initiate military action against Iran without first obtaining authorization from Congress. S. 1430 Iran Sanctions Enabling Act S. 387 Stop Arming Iran Act S.Res. 356 A resolution affirming that any offensive military action taken against Iran must be explicitly approved by Congress before such action may be initiated.     58   S.J.Res. 23 A joint resolution clarifying that the use of force against Iran is not authorized by the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq, any resolution previously adopted, or any other provision of law. S.Res. 449 A resolution condemning in the strongest possible terms President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's statements regarding the State of Israel and the Holocaust and calling for all member States of the United Nations to do the same. S.Con.Res. 106 A concurrent resolution commending the Government of Switzerland for ongoing assistance in the case of Robert Levinson, urging the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to intensify cooperation with the Government of Switzerland and the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the case of Robert Levinson, and expressing sympathy to the family of Robert Levinson. S.Amdt. 692 (H.R. 1591) To prohibit the use of funds for military operations in Iran. S. 1839 A bill to require periodic reports on claims related to acts of terrorism against Americans perpetrated or supported by the Government of Libya. S. 3370 Libyan Claims Resolution Act S.Amdt. 2767 (H.R. 2764) To provide continued support for informal dialogue relating to North Korea. S.Amdt. 3076 (H.R. 1585) To require a report on family reunions between United States citizens and their relatives in North Korea. S.Res. 399 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that certain benchmarks must be met before certain restrictions against the Government of North Korea are lifted, and that the United States Government should not provide any financial assistance to North Korea until the Secretary of State makes certain certifications regarding the submission of applications for refugee status. S. 527 Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Enforcement Act of 2007 S. 3103 International Space Station Payments Act of 2008 S.Res. 573 A resolution recognizing Cuba Solidarity Day and the struggle of the Cuban people as they continue to fight for freedom. S.Amdt. 2694 (H.R. 2764) To promote democracy in Cuba. S. 721 Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2007 S. 1673 Promoting American Agricultural and Medical Exports to Cuba Act of 2007 S. 876 A bill to exclude from admission to the United States aliens who have made investments contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum resources, and for other purposes. S. 2503 A bill to exclude from admission to the United States aliens who have directly and significantly contributed to the ability of Cuba to develop its petroleum resources, and for other purposes.     59   S. 2777 A bill to award a Congressional Gold Medal to Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, in recognition of his courageous and unwavering commitment to democracy, human rights, and peaceful change in Cuba. S.Amdt. 2695 (H.R. 2764) To increase the funding for broadcasts to Cuba and to provide an offset. HR1585 To require a report on support provided by the Government of Iran for attacks against coalition forces in Iraq. HR1585 To state the policy of the United States on the protection of the United States and its allies against Iranian ballistic missiles.   111th Congress (2009-2010)  S.Res. 551 A resolution marking the one year anniversary of the June 12, 2009, presidential election in Iran, and condemning ongoing human rights abuses in Iran. S.Res. 71 A resolution condemning the Government of Iran for its state-sponsored persecution of the Baha'i minority in Iran and its continued violation of the International Covenants on Human Rights. S.Res. 196 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate on freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of expression in Iran. S.Res. 415 A resolution calling for a renewed focus on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran's violations of internationally-recognized human rights as found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. S.Res. 386 A resolution condemning the Government of Iran for restricting and suppressing freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly, and for its human rights abuses, and for other purposes. S.Res. 604 A resolution urging the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to immediately and unconditionally release Sarah Shourd, Joshua Fattal, and Shane Bauer on humanitarian grounds. S.Res. 355 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has systematically violated its obligations to uphold human rights provided for under its constitution and international law. S.Con.Res. 45 A concurrent resolution encouraging the Government of Iran to allow Joshua Fattal, Shane Bauer, and Sarah Shourd to reunite with their families in the United States as soon as possible. S.Amdt. 1697 (S. 1390) To require a biennial report on the military power of Iran.     60   S.Amdt. 980 (S.Con.Res. 13) To deny funding for federal government expenditures to companies that are obtaining at least $1,000,000 in revenue from the sale of goods or services to or investment in Iran's energy sector, including, but not limited to: the exploration, development or exploitation of Iran's natural gas or crude oil fields; the import of refined petroleum products, including but limited to liquefied natural gas and petroleum bi-products into Iran; the enhancment or maintenance of Iran's oil refineries; and assistance in the import or export of energy products to or from Iran, including the provision of shipment, insurance, and reinsurance services. S.Amdt. 1628 (S. 1390) To express the sense of the Senate on imposing sanctions with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran. S.Amdt. 634 (H.R. 1105) To prohibit the expenditure of amounts made available under this Act in a contract with any company that has a business presence in Iran's energy sector. S.Amdt. 1892 (H.R. 3183) To prohibit funds appropriated for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve from being made available to any person that has engaged in certain activities with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran. S.Amdt. 1775 (S. 1390) To support freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly in Iran, to support the Iranian people as they seek, receive, and impart information and promote ideas in writing, in print, or through any media without interference, and for other purposes. S.Con.Res. 4 A concurrent resolution calling on the President and the allies of the United States to raise the case of Robert Levinson with officials of the Government of Iran at every level and opportunity, and urging officials of the Government of Iran to fulfill their promises of assistance to the family of Robert Levinson and to share information on the investigation into the disappearance of Robert Levinson with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. S. 2799 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009 S.Res. 694 A resolution condemning the Government of Iran for its state-sponsored persecution of religious minorities in Iran and its continued violation of the International Covenant on Human Rights. S. 908 Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act S. 4008 Stop Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program Act of 2010 S. 3008 Iran Democratic Transition Act of 2010 S. 3022 Iran Human Rights Sanctions Act S. 1065 Iran Sanctions Enabling Act of 2009 S. 3810 Gulf Security and Iran Sanctions Enforcement Act S.Con.Res. 40 A concurrent resolution encouraging the Government of Iran to grant consular access by the Government of Switzerland to Joshua Fattal, Shane Bauer, and Sarah Shourd, and to allow the 3 young people to reunite with their families in the United States as soon as possible.     61   S. 18 No Entry for Supporters of the Iranian Regime Act of 2010 S. 1475 Reduce Iranian Cyber-Suppression Act S.Amdt. 665 (H.R. 1105) To require the Secretary of State to issue a report on investments by foreign companies in the energy sector of Iran. S.Amdt. 1147 (H.R. 2346) To prohibit funds made available for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to be made available to any person that has engaged in certain activities with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran. S.Res. 253 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the Government of Libya should apologize for the welcome home ceremony held to celebrate the release of convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdel Baset al-Megrahi. S.Amdt. 1761 (S. 1390) To express the sense of the Senate that the United States should fully enforce existing sanctions, and should explore additional sanctions, with respect to North Korea and to require a review to determine whether North Korea should be re-listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. S.Amdt. 1597 (S. 1390) To express the sense of the Senate that the Secretary of State should redesignate North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. S. 1416 North Korea Accountability Act of 2009 S. 837 North Korea Sanctions Act of 2009 S. 3156 North Korean Refugee Adoption Act of 2010 S.Res. 149 A resolution expressing solidarity with the writers, journalists, and librarians of Cuba on World Press Freedom Day and calling for the immediate release of citizens of Cuba imprisoned for exercising rights associated with freedom of the press. S.Con.Res. 54 A concurrent resolution recognizing the life of Orlando Zapata Tamayo, who died on February 23, 2010, in the custody of the Government of Cuba, and calling for a continued focus on the promotion of internationally recognized human rights, listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in Cuba. S.Amdt. 1535 (S. 1390) To require the Director of National Intelligence to report on Cuba and Cuba's relations with other countries. S.Amdt. 3552 (S.Con.Res. 54) Recognizing the life of Orlando Zapata Tamayo, who died on February 23, 2010, in the custody of the Government of Cuba, and calling for a continued focus on the promotion of internationally recognized human rights, listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in Cuba. S. 428 Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act S. 1089 Promoting American Agricultural and Medical Exports to Cuba Act of 2009 HR2194 To amend the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 to enhance United States diplomatic efforts with respect to Iran by expanding economic sanctions against Iran.   112th Congress (2011-2012)      62   S.Res. 80 A resolution condemning the Government of Iran for its state-sponsored persecution of its Baha'i minority and its continued violation of the International Covenants on Human Rights. S.Res. 386 A resolution calling for free and fair elections in Iran, and for other purposes. S.Amdt. 1414 (S. 1867) To require the imposition of sanctions with respect to the financial sector of Iran, including the Central Bank of Iran. S.Amdt. 3232 (S. 3254) To enhance sanctions imposed with respect to Iran. S.J.Res. 41 A joint resolution expressing the sense of Congress regarding the nuclear program of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. S. 2101 Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Human Rights Act of 2012 S. 879 Iran Human Rights and Democracy Promotion Act of 2011 S. 1048 Iran, North Korea, and Syria Sanctions Consolidation Act of 2011 S.Res. 380 A resolution to express the sense of the Senate regarding the importance of preventing the Government of Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. S.Res. 385 A resolution condemning the Government of Iran for its continued persecution, imprisonment, and sentencing of Youcef Nadarkhani on the charge of apostasy. S.Res. 574 A resolution calling on the United Nations to take concerted actions against leaders in Iran for their statements calling for the destruction of another United Nations Member State, Israel. S. 366 Iran Transparency and Accountability Act of 2011 S.Amdt. 1292 (S. 1867) To require the President to impose sanctions with respect to the Central Bank of Iran if the President determines that the Central Bank of Iran has engaged in conduct that threatens the national security of the United States or allies of the United States. S.Amdt. 1084 (S. 1867) To require the President to impose sanctions on foreign financial institutions that conduct transactions with the Central Bank of Iran. S.Res. 85 A resolution strongly condemning the gross and systematic violations of human rights in Libya, including violent attacks on protesters demanding democratic reforms, and for other purposes. S.Res. 148 A resolution calling on the President to submit to Congress a detailed description of United States policy objectives in Libya, both during and after Muammar Qaddafi's rule, and a plan to achieve them, and to seek congressional authorization for the use of military force against Libya.     63   S.Res. 146 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that it is not in the vital interest of the United States to intervene militarily in Libya, calling on NATO to ensure that member states dedicate the resources necessary to ensure that objectives as outlined in the United Nations Resolutions 1970 and 1973 are accomplished, and to urge members of the Arab League who have yet to participate in operations over Libya to provide additional military and financial assistance. S.Res. 194 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate on United States military operations in Libya. S.J.Res. 20 A joint resolution authorizing the limited use of the United States Armed Forces in support of the NATO mission in Libya. S.Res. 317 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the liberation of Libya from the dictatorship led by Muammar Qaddafi. S.J.Res. 14 A joint resolution declaring that the President has exceeded his authority under the War Powers Resolution as it pertains to the ongoing military engagement in Libya. S.J.Res. 16 A joint resolution declaring that the President has exceeded his authority under the War Powers Resolution as it pertains to the ongoing military engagement in Libya. S.J.Res. 13 A joint resolution declaring that a state of war exists between the Government of Libya and the Government and people of the United States, and making provision to prosecute the same. S.J.Res. 18 A joint resolution prohibiting the deployment, establishment, or maintenance of a presence of units and members of the United States Armed Forces on the ground in Libya, and for other purposes. S.J.Res. 15 A joint resolution declaring that a state of war exists between the Government of Libya and the Government and the people of the United States, and making provision to prosecute the same. S.Res. 594 A resolution establishing a select committee of the Senate to make a thorough and complete investigation of the facts and circumstances surrounding, and the response of the United States Government to, the September 11, 2012, terrorist attacks against the United States consulate and personnel in Benghazi, Libya, and to make recommendations to prevent similar attacks in the future. S. 1180 Libyan Assets for Humanitarian Relief Act of 2011 S.Amdt. 2354 (S. 3240) To prohibit assistance to North Korea under title II of the Food for Peace Act. S.Amdt. 2454 (S. 3240) To prohibit assistance to North Korea under title II of the Food for Peace Act unless the President issues a national interest waiver. S. 1048 Iran, North Korea, and Syria Sanctions Consolidation Act of 2011 S. 1496 Ethical Shipping Inspections Act of 2011     64   S. 416 North Korean Refugee Adoption Act of 2011 S.Res. 609 A resolution calling for the immediate and unconditional release of United States citizen Alan Phillip Gross from detention in Cuba and urging the Government of Cuba to address his medical issues. S.Amdt. 2740 (S.Res. 525) To condemn the Government of Cuba for the detention of nearly 50 pro-democracy activists following the memorial service for Oswaldo Paya Sardinas.   113th Congress (2013-2014)  S.Res. 154 A resolution calling for free and fair elections in Iran, and for other purposes. S.Res. 75 A resolution condemning the Government of Iran for its state-sponsored persecution of its Baha'i minority and its continued violation of the International Covenants on Human Rights. S.Res. 65 A resolution strongly supporting the full implementation of United States and international sanctions on Iran and urging the President to continue to strengthen enforcement of sanctions legislation. S.Res. 284 A resolution calling on the Government of Iran to immediately release Saeed Abedini and all other individuals detained on account of their religious beliefs. S.Res. 312 A resolution urging the Government of Iran to fulfill their promises of assistance in this case of Robert Levinson, one of the longest held United States civilians in our Nation's history. S.Amdt. 671 (S.Con.Res. 8) To establish a deficit-neutral reserve fund relating to sanctions with respect to Iran. S.Res. 252 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate on steps the Government of Iran must take before President Obama meets with the President of Iran. S.Res. 328 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate on steps the Government of Iran must take before further bilateral negotiations between the Government of Iran and the United States Government occur. S. 1765 Iran Nuclear Compliance Act of 2013 S. 1881 Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2013 S. 2585 Iran Human Rights Accountability Act of 2014 S. 1001 Iran Export Embargo Act S. 2650 Iran Nuclear Negotiations Act of 2014 S. 559 Justice for Former American Hostages in Iran Act of 2013 S. 892 Iran Sanctions Loophole Elimination Act of 2013 S. 965 Iran Sanctions Implementation Act of 2013     65   S.Res. 269 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate on United States policy regarding possession of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities by the Islamic Republic of Iran. S. 2672 SISA Act S. 2667 Iranian Sanctions Relief Certification Act of 2014 S. 298 North Korea Nonproliferation and Accountability Act of 2013 S. 3012 North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2014 S.Res. 587 A resolution encouraging reunions of Korean-Americans who were divided by the Korean War from their relatives in North Korea.   114th Congress (2015-2016)  S.Res. 148 A resolution condemning the Government of Iran's state-sponsored persecution of its Baha'i minority and its continued violation of the International Covenants on Human Rights. S.Res. 99 A resolution calling on the Government of Iran to follow through on repeated promises of assistance in the case of Robert Levinson, the longest held United States civilian in our Nation's history. S.Amdt. 1147 (H.R. 1191) To require a certification that Iran has not directly supported or carried out an act of terrorism against the United States or a United States person anywhere in the world. S.Amdt. 1150 (H.R. 1191) To declare that any agreement reached by the President relating to the nuclear program of Iran is deemed a treaty that is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. S. 2452 A bill to prohibit the use of funds to make payments to Iran relating to the settlement of claims brought before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal until Iran has paid certain compensatory damages awarded to United States persons by United States courts. S.Con.Res. 14 A concurrent resolution providing that the President may not provide sanctions relief to Iran until certain United States citizens are released from Iran. S. 2988 A bill to extend the sunset of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 in order to effectuate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in guaranteeing that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities. S.Res. 238 A resolution expressing the determination of the Senate that the 60-calendar day period for congressional review of the nuclear agreement with Iran did not begin with the transmittal of the agreement on July 19, 2015, because that transmittal did not include all materials required to be transmitted pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015.     66   S. 3518 Nonnuclear Iran Sanctions Act of 2016 S. 792 Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2015 S. 615 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 S. 269 Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2015 S. 2485 North Korea and Iran Sanctions Act S. 625 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 S. 1682 Iran Sanctions Relief Oversight Act of 2015 S.Res. 251 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the congressional review provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 does not apply to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action announced on July 14, 2015, because the President failed to transmit the entire agreement as required by such Act, and that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action would only preempt existing Iran sanctions laws as "the supreme Law of the Land" if ratified by the Senate as a treaty with the concurrence of two thirds of the Senators present pursuant to Article II, section 2, clause 2, of the Constitution or if Congress were to enact new implementing legislation that supersedes the mandatory statutory sanctions that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action announced on July 14, 2015, purports to supersede. S. 2725 Iran Ballistic Missile Sanctions Act of 2016 S. 2119 Iran Policy Oversight Act of 2015 S. 2429 Ending Iran's Nuclear Weapon Program Before Sanctions Relief Act of 2015 S. 3138 No Ex-Im Financing for Iran Act S. 2726 Iran Terrorism and Human Rights Sanctions Act of 2016 S. 2757 Iran Financial System Access Limitation Act of 2016 S. 669 Iran Congressional Oversight Act of 2015 S.Con.Res. 26 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress regarding the right of States and local governments to maintain economic sanctions against Iran. S.Res. 40 A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding efforts by the United States and others to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. S. 3281 A bill to extend the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996. S. 1853 Block Arms to Iran Act of 2015 S. 2752 Preventing Iran's Access to United States Dollars Act of 2016 S.Con.Res. 16 A concurrent resolution stating the policy of the United States regarding the release of United States citizens in Iran. S.Res. 529 A resolution calling upon the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to release Iranian-Americans Siamak Namazi and his father, Baquer Namazi. S. 2756 Iran Cyber Sanctions Act of 2016 S. 825 SISA Act S. 2086 Justice for Victims of Iranian Terrorism Act     67   S. 3267 Countering Iranian Threats Act of 2016 S. 3285 No Ransom Payments Act of 2016 S. 2094 IRGC Terrorist Designation Act S. 3286 Keeping Aircraft Away from Terrorists Act of 2016 S. 2984 No Impunity for Iranian Aggression at Sea Act of 2016 S.Amdt. 1155 (H.R. 1191) To extend the requirement for annual Department of Defense reports on the military power of Iran. S.Amdt. 1198 (H.R. 1191) To require a certification that Iran's leaders have publically accepted Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state. S.Amdt. 1186 (H.R. 1191) To require an assessment of inadequacies in the international monitoring and verification system as they relate to a nuclear agreement with Iran. S.Amdt. 2656 (H.J.Res. 61) To prohibit the President from waiving, suspending, reducing, providing relief from, or otherwise limiting the application of sanctions pursuant to an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran. S. 1747 North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015 S. 2144 North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2015 S.Res. 564 A resolution condemning North Korea's fifth nuclear test on September 9, 2016. S. 2485 North Korea and Iran Sanctions Act S.Res. 190 A resolution encouraging reunions of Korean Americans who were divided by the Korean War from relatives in North Korea. S. 2657 A bill to require consultations on reuniting Korean Americans with family members in North Korea. S. 1389 Cuba DATA Act S. 1543 Cuba Trade Act of 2015 S. 491 Freedom to Export to Cuba Act of 2015 S. 1388 Cuba Normalization Accountability Act of 2015 S. 299 Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2015 S.Res. 584 A resolution acknowledging the peaceful hunger strike of Guillermo "El Coco" Farinas, a political dissident in Cuba, applauding his bravery and commitment to human rights, and expressing solidarity with him and his cause. S.Res. 26 A resolution commending Pope Francis for his leadership in helping to secure the release of Alan Gross and for working with the Governments of the United States and Cuba to achieve a more positive relationship. S. 3289 Cuban Airport Security Act of 2016 HR757 A bill to improve the enforcement of sanctions against the Government of North Korea, and for other purposes.     68   HR1191 A bill to provide for congressional review and oversight of agreements relating to Iran's nuclear program, and for other purposes. SCONRES16 A concurrent resolution stating the policy of the United States regarding the release of United States citizens in Iran. SCONRES11 To establish a deficit-neutral reserve fund relating to reimposing waived sanctions and imposing new sanctions against Iran for violations of the Joint Plan of Action or a comprehensive nuclear agreement. HJRES61 To prohibit the President from waiving, suspending, reducing, providing relief from, or otherwise limiting the application of sanctions pursuant to an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran.   

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