UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Populism, nationalism, and hegemonic struggles over trade and economic liberalization in Taiwan Hsu, Szu-Yun 2019

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
24-ubc_2019_may_hsu_szu-yun.pdf [ 3.81MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 24-1.0377580.json
JSON-LD: 24-1.0377580-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 24-1.0377580-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 24-1.0377580-rdf.json
Turtle: 24-1.0377580-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 24-1.0377580-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 24-1.0377580-source.json
Full Text
24-1.0377580-fulltext.txt
Citation
24-1.0377580.ris

Full Text

	POPULISM, NATIONALISM, AND HEGEMONIC STRUGGLES OVER  TRADE AND ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IN TAIWAN   by   SZU-YUN HSU B.Sc., National Cheng-Kung University, 2000 M.Sc., National Taiwan University, 2004 M.Sc., London School of Economics and Political Science, 2008     A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY   in   THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES  (Geography)       THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA  (Vancouver)      March 2019   © Szu-Yun Hsu, 2019 	 ii	The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the dissertation entitled:  Populism, Nationalism, and Hegemonic Struggles over Trade and Economic Liberalization in Taiwan  submitted by Szu-Yun Hsu  in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Geography  Examining Committee: Jim Glassman, Geography, UBC Supervisor  Merje Kuus, Geography, UBC Supervisory Committee Member  Luke Bergmann, Geography, UBC University Examiner John Roosa, History, UBC University Examiner   Additional Supervisory Committee Members: Abidin Kusno, Environmental Studies, York University Supervisory Committee Member    	 iii	Abstract	 This research examines trade and economic liberalization in Taiwan in relation to crisis and hegemonic restructuring. Drawing on Gramscian scholarship, postcolonial theory, and critical geopolitics, the analysis expounds on the multiple crises facing Taiwan since the 1980s, documents the trade-related social and political struggles, and illustrates their profound implications to neoliberalization. The first half of the dissertation tackles emerging populist politics along with democratization, the challenges it presented to state control of trade and capital flow, and the rise of economic deterritorialization as a consequence. It then explains how the state transformed itself into a populist authoritarian regime by articulating a deterritorialized national economy, which consisted of a neoliberal regionalist initiative and a series of geoeconomic maneuvers that variously invoked the people and the nation to regain leadership and legitimacy. The second half of the dissertation illustrates the ways in which the neoliberalist agenda has advanced since the 2000s, a non-hegemonic era marked by unfettered outward investment, polarized party politics, and broiling nationalist disputes. The prevalence of financial nationalism and the subsequent turn to embracing cross-Strait economic liberalization after 2008 are the foci of analysis. My dissertation concludes with a note on the 2014 Sunflower Movement, a populist frenzy opposing cross-Strait service trade liberalization. The study investigates the re-articulation of “the nation-people” through the movement and discusses its potentials and limits of challenging the trend of neoliberalization. Eventually, the analysis unravels the dialectical relationship between political democratization and economic liberalization, highlights the centrality of trade and economic liberalization in the hegemonic struggles, and indicates the fundamental role of nationalism and populism in shaping and conditioning the path to neoliberalization in Taiwan. My research contributes to the existing literature by highlighting the usefulness of conjunctural analysis and its theoretical implications. It demonstrates that neoliberalism neither presents a strong discourse nor a consistent policy regime. Rather, it is contingent and speculative in nature, articulating with different forms of populist and nationalist politics at particular historical conjunctures and advancing through the moments of crisis along the course of hegemonic restructuring.  	 iv	 Lay Summary  This research examines trade and economic liberalization in Taiwan in relation to political transformation since its democratization to date. The analysis expounds on the multiple crises facing Taiwan since the 1980s, documents the trade-related social and political disputes, and illustrates their profound implications to the long course of economic neoliberalization. They include early tariff and foreign exchange control-focused trade and economic liberalization, the pursuit of regionalism, the proposal of multiple waves of geoeconomic maneuvers, liberalization of cross-Strait investment, and ultimately, financialization. It unravels the dialectical relationship between political democratization and economic liberalization, highlights the centrality of trade and economic liberalization in the democratization era, and indicates the fundamental role of nationalism and populism in shaping and conditioning the path to neoliberalization in Taiwan.      	 v	 Preface  This dissertation is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, Szu-Yun Hsu.     	 vi	Table of Contents   Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iii	Lay Summary ............................................................................................................................... iv	Preface ............................................................................................................................................ v	Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... vi List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... ix	Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ x	Glossary of Chinese Names ......................................................................................................... xi	Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... xiii	 Chapter 1	Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1	I.   Rethinking Trade and Economic Liberalization in Taiwan ......................................................................1	II.  Theoretical Orientation ............................................................................................................................3	III. Research Agenda ...................................................................................................................................16	IV. Methodology ..........................................................................................................................................23	V.  Organization of the Chapters .................................................................................................................28	 Chapter 2	Democratization, Populism, and Taiwan’s Early Trade and Economic Liberalization ...... 31	I.   Introduction ............................................................................................................................................31	II.  Liberalization of Trade and Foreign Economic Policies in Taiwan: the Statist Approach and Its  Critique ...................................................................................................................................................32	III. Early Trade and Economic Liberalization: A Paradigm Shift ...............................................................36	IV. The Joys and Dilemmas of National Wealth .........................................................................................39	V.  Politicization of Foreign-Exchange Control ..........................................................................................45	VI. Outward Investment Deregulation in the Name of the “People” ..........................................................54	 Chapter 3	Twist and Turns to Trade Liberalization: Populism, Nationalism, and Embracing Free Trade ............................................................................................................................................ 62		 vii	I.   Introduction ............................................................................................................................................62	II.  Taiwan’s Trade Liberalization under US Hegemony: Popular Explanations and Beyond ....................63	III. A Paradigm Shift and the Populist Origin of Trade Liberalization .......................................................68	IV. The Bilateral Trade Agreement Between the US and ROC (Taiwan) ...................................................78	V.  Currency Dispute and the Nationalist Embracement of Free Trade Regime .........................................85	 Chapter 4	Re-articulating the Nation-People Nexus in the Outward Economy I: Populist Authoritarianism and Neoliberal Regionalism ........................................................................ 92	I.   Introduction ............................................................................................................................................92	II.  Theoretical Recalibration: Nationalism, Populism, and Neoliberalism .................................................93	III. Nationalism and Trade Politics in Taiwan: A Critical Review ..............................................................97	IV. Reconstructing the Nation-state through Neoliberal Regionalism ......................................................104	V.  APROC and Populist Authoritarianism ...............................................................................................111	 Chapter 5	Rearticulating the Nation-People Nexus in the Outward Economy II:  Geopolitical-economy and the Neoliberal Excursion ................................................................................... 122	I.   Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................122	II.  Theorizing Overseas Investment and the Restructuring of the Nation-state ........................................124	III. The First Wave Southward Policy and the Constitution of Populist Authoritarianism .......................131	IV. Deterritorialized National Economy Reconsidered .............................................................................144	V.  The Second Wave Southbound Policy and Overseas Neoliberal Ventures .........................................152	 Chapter 6	Contesting Financial Nationalism(s) in the Globalization Era ............................................. 162	I.   Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................162	II.  Globalization Strategy under the DPP Regime ....................................................................................165	III. Restaging Protectionist Financial Nationalism under “Effective Management” .................................174	IV. The Emergence and Transformation of Neoliberal Financial Nationalism .........................................181	V.  Repositioning Taishang in the Financial Nationalist Agenda .............................................................185	VI. Intensified Geopolitical-geoeconomic Struggles; Uncertain Future for Cross-Strait Financial and Economic Liberalization ......................................................................................................................195	 		 viii	Chapter 7	When Neoliberalism Meets Cross-Strait Geopolitical Economy: Advances, Disturbances, and Contentions ........................................................................................................................ 204	I.   Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................204	II.  Constructing the Neoliberal Regime ....................................................................................................206	III. Advancing Neoliberal Trade Agendas .................................................................................................212	IV. Disturbance: When Neoliberalism Meets Geopolitical Struggles .......................................................227	V.  Disruption: The Service Trade Pact and the Sunflower Movement ....................................................241	 Chapter 8	Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 255	 References  ................................................................................................................................. 263	 	 ix	List of Figures   Figure 2.1   Analytical Frameworks to Economic Liberalization in Taiwan  ............................................ 33 Figure 2.2   Foreign Exchange Reserve, Taiwan, R.O.C.  ......................................................................... 41 Figure 2.3   Exchange Rate between NTD and USD  ................................................................................ 49 Figure 3.1   Number of Items Granted Tariff Reduction in R.O.C., 1978-89  .......................................... 67 Figure 3.2   Annual Nominal and Effective Tariff Rates in Taiwan  ......................................................... 67 Figure 3.3   Economic Growth Rate in Taiwan, 1960-1990  ..................................................................... 69 Figure 3.4   Average Tariff Burden in Taiwan (NTD)  ............................................................................. 69 Figure 5.1   Dynamics between Domestic Political-economic Restructuring and Foreign Economic and Trade Policy Orientation in the 1990s  ................................................................................. 130 Figure 7.1   Opinion Poll on the Pace of Cross-Strait Interactions  ......................................................... 211 Figure 7.2   Government Propaganda of ECFA, “Strengthening Taiwan, Securing Sovereignty”; “Open                      the Door; We’ll Guard Our Home”  .................................................................................... 225 Figure 7.3   Top Four Foreign Claims on Taiwanese Domestic Banks  .................................................. 236 Figure 7.4   Banners Advocating “Independence for Taiwan” at the front of the Legislative Yuan ....... 247 Figure 7.5   “Overthrow the R.O.C. Colonial Regime; Terminate the 400-year External Domination”  247    	 x	Abbreviations 			 AIT American Institute in Taiwan ×@B51† APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation NÔ©6†ö ARTS Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (PRC) £1† CCP The Chinese Communist Party @(¸Ģ CEPA Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement $Cߥ¨ē~īÖ[Ôûē¿Ww CEPD Council for Economic Planning and Development Ôi† DPP Democratic Progressive Party ›ĄĢ EADS East Asian developmental state Œ½aG@Z ECFA cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement &cÔ©6–1ö FDI Foreign direct investment _KÃxtü FSC Financial Supervisory Commission ċìÁÄεR;† ICC United State Council of the International Chamber of Commerce ×@@ė<† ICDF The International Cooperation and Development Fund  ùA¡@ė6½aHċ† ICT Information and communication technology üă︕ IPE International political economy @ė{ Ô©U IPO Initial Public Offer  И'đ/Ü IR International Relations  @ėē KMT Kuomintang @›Ģ MAC Mainland Affairs Council LĖR;† MOU Memorandum of Understanding 6"lč NCC National Communications Commission @Zăï#yR;† NICs Newly industrialized countries }àf•@ OBU Offshore banking unit JKċì•-*í OECF Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund  Ô©ć£KÔ©6½aHċεR;† PoEs Party-owned enterprises Ģ±• QDII Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors 6J$—–tüÚ ROA Return on assets ü¸Iĉ² R.O.C. Republic of China (Taiwan) ã›@ SARS Severe acute respiratory syndrome >Ċmn:9ÏÓÕ6» SEF Strait Exchange Foundation (Taiwan) £H† SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises `• SoEs State-owned enterprises '±• TDR Taiwan Depository Receipts 5«Sñqõ TSU Taiwan Solidarity Union  5«AÒÛÀ 	 xi	Glossary of Chinese Names   Chao, Yao-tung Āٌ Minister of the Council for Economic Planning and Development (1984-1988) Chen, Po-chih  ĕ2k  Minister of the Council of Economic Planning and Development (2000-2002) Chen, Shui-bian  ĕœs Taipei City Mayor (1996-2000) President (2000-2008) Chen, Tien-jye ĕ¤Ž Minister of the Council for Economic Planning and Development (2008-2009) Chen, Yun-lin ĕ̍ Chairman of ARATS (2008-2013) Chiang, Pin-kung  žF Minister of Economic Affairs (1993-1996) Chairman of SEF (2008-2012) Chiang, Shou-chieh çÇ! Director of the Chinese Economic Research Institute, Disciple of the liberal economist Friedrich von Hayek Gou, Terry Ĉ5Č CEO of Foxconn Hao, Bo-chun Ć‹ Premier (199--1993) Hu, Jintao Ýďª President of the People’s Republic of China (2003-2013) Hsieh, Chang-ting ôĐh Premier (2005-2006) Jia, Qinglin ýp Chairman of the National Committee of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (2003-2013) Jiang, ZeMin ž§› General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (1989-2002) Kong, Jaw-sheng ģ¯. Chairman of Financial Supervisory Commission (2004-2006) Koo, Chen-fu Ăv¹ President of the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce, Taiwan (1961-1994) Chairman of SEF (1991-2005) Lee, Chih-chu ŠÐ´ Vice Chairman of the FSC (2008-2013) Li, Deng-hui Š¼ā President of R.O.C. (1984-2000) Lin, Chuan % Minister of Finance (2002-2006);  Prime Minister (2016-2017) Lin, Hsin-i  Ø Minister of Economic Affairs (2000-2002) Lu, Min-ren Ė› Chair of the Department of Economics at National Chengchi University Ma, Ying-jeou ğâ President of R.O.C. (2008-2016) Schive, Chi é¶ Deputy Minister of CEPD (1993-2000) Shu, Shin-liang  ò á Chairman of DPP (1992-1993; 1996-1998) Soong, James X”· Governor of the “Taiwan Province” (1993-1998) Su, Tseng-chang ë÷€ Premier (2006-2007) Sun, Chen Tě Principal of National Taiwan University (1984-1993) Deputy Minister of CEPD (1973-1984) Tsai, Eng-meng æî CEO of Want-Want Group Tsai, Ying-wen æâ| Minister of Mainland Affairs Council (2000-2004) Chairperson of DPP (2014-2018) President of R.O.C. (2014-) Siew, Wan-chang èäĐ Direct General of the Bureau of Foreign Trade (1982-1988) Ministry of Economic Affairs (1990-1993) Minister of Mainland Affairs Council (1994-1995) 	 xii	Premier (1997-2000) Vice President (2008-2012) Wang, Yi ³š Director of Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC (2008-2013) Wang, Yung-ching ³p President of the Formosa Plastic and Petrol Group Wea, Chi-lin  Ġ= Administrative Deputy Secretary-General (2000) Wu, Mei-chun 8’‹ Administrative Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs (1982-1986) Yu, Kuo-hwa @ã Premier (1984-1989) 	  	  	 xiii	 Acknowledgements 	  I would like to express the deepest appreciation to everyone who has helped me through the journey to achieving my doctoral degree. First, I would like to express my gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Jim Glassman, whose critical scholarship, commitment to various forms of knowledge, and enthusiasm in life have set a model for me. As a supervisor, Jim has inspired me to explore the unknown and has always been ready for help. Not only his guidance and support over the years have been instrumental to my intellectual development, but his trust in me has taught me to become an independent researcher. I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Merje Kuus and Dr. Abidin Kusno, who have been illuminating to my professional development. Merje’s practical and poignant advices have always been timely whenever I encountered research obstacles. Abidin’s warm encouragement and deep understanding of my research agenda enabled me to embrace my original aspiration despite the ups and downs of this journey. I am deeply indebted to their patience and understanding.  The help I received from the professors I had worked with from National Taiwan University, including Tsung-yi Huang and Jinn-yuh Hsu from the Department of Geography, Hung-kai Wang from the Graduate Institute of Building and Planning, and many others, has been invaluable. They had aroused my interest in critical thinking, provided generous help when needed, and kept faith in me and my academic pursuit.  Of course, without the unconditional support from my dear family and countless help from my loyal friends at UBC, back in Taiwan, and in New York, I could not have overcome the difficulties along the way and accomplished the journey. I feel deeply beloved and forever grateful.  	 1	Chapter 1 Introduction  I.  Rethinking Trade and Economic Liberalization in Taiwan  Taiwan depends greatly on trade for its economic development and has faced numerous disputes over trade and broader economic liberalization in the last few decades. Controversies over market opening in the 1980s, the social dispute over manufacturing’s outward investment in the 1990s, and the political contentions surrounding regulations put on the high-tech industry’s westward migration to mainland China during the 2000s, all underscore the centrality of trade in Taiwan’s political, economic and social struggles in relation to the broader world political economy.   A particularly unsettling period arose when the KMT (Kuomintang political party) accelerated liberalization of cross-Strait trade and economic relations after it resumed power in 2008, generating both anxiety and approval within Taiwanese society. The new regime’s propaganda celebrating the prosperity brought by cross-Strait trade and economic liberalization prevailed in stark contrast to surging social discontent, and heated public debate became a fixation in the media. In debating the social, political and economic impacts of cross-Strait trade and liberalization policies, oppositional voices ultimately coalesced into a huge social movement in the spring of 2014, where hundreds of mostly students occupied Parliament for twenty-four days and half million protesters took the street protesting against the signing of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement—events later known as the “Sunflower Movement.” The defeat of the KMT in the 2016 general election was commonly seen as the consequence of the far-reaching influence of the Movement.  Facing social and political turmoil, a variety of scholarly disciplines have explored the causes, dynamics, and implications of the recent trade disputes to Taiwanese society at large. Economists busied themselves comparing different free trade regimes and infrastructures as a way to diagnose the cause of disputes and to prescribe solutions; economic sociologists drew on globalization, neoliberalism, and their contestation to make sense of the disputes; international scholars tackled 	 2	the issue of sovereignty, nationalism, and security in relation to the changing cross-Strait geopolitical economy; political scientists and sociologists focused on the implications this incident brought to democratization and the reshaping of civil society in Taiwan.  However, the fact that scholars, despite their disciplinary divisions and research agendas, have commonly framed these recent social upheavals in Taiwan as key moments and a critical break from previous developments, unintentionally prohibits us from critically evaluating the historical development of trade and economic liberalization in Taiwan. A number of questions loom large: In what sense are the recent disputes over trade and economic liberalization different from the previous ones? Are trade disputes only a matter by and of themselves, or do they indicate a deeper crisis of Taiwan’s political economy at large? If it is the latter, how can we grasp the changing relations between state, capitalism, and society through the lens of trade and foreign economic policies? What is the proper time-frame for probing such questions? When should the analysis begin, and where shall the story end?  These questions eventually led to my commitment to pursue a history-oriented research project. In order to comprehend the proliferating and ever-changing disputes over trade and economic liberalization in Taiwan, I decided to trace the long-standing crisis facing Taiwan’s political economy back to the 1980s. It was an unsettling era where the social relations of production underpinning Taiwan’s SME-led export-oriented economic miracle in the post-War era had experienced fundamental challenges from restructuring of the international political economy. The disputes over trade liberalization arose almost synchronously with political democratization movement at home and the end of the Cold War in the international arena. Thus my project seeks to make sense of the logic between economic and political struggles and to tell a story about Taiwan’s liberalizing political economy in relation to the global economic restructuring through trade.   Theoretically, I will demonstrate that Gramscian scholarship, especially its critical engagement with the debate on neoliberalism, helps shed an alternative light on the existing literature of Taiwan’s trade disputes. I will first locate my research problematic in the debate on Gramscian hegemony theory and its wider application to the study of neoliberalism. Following the criticism, 	 3	I will identify a number of alternative approaches proposed by Gramsci-inspired scholars. I will then plot my major research themes and explicate the methodology and research methods that I will utilize to operate such a research project accordingly. Lastly, I will illustrate the contour of the chapters that constitute my dissertation.     II.  Theoretical Orientation  Tackling trade and economic liberalization in Taiwan, it would be natural for my research project to be conceived as part of the plethoric dialogue on “neoliberalism” or “neoliberalization,” especially when the construction and expansion of free-trade in the post-war era has been the center of the literature on hegemonic neoliberalism, although with different regional or institutional focuses. However, applying the theoretical framework of neoliberalism to the study of Taiwan’s trade liberalization inevitably encounters the problems of definition and periodization. Given that Taiwan has long been incorporated in the post-War free-trade regime led by the US and then institutionalized in WTO, when did the policy embracing trade and economic liberalization turn “neoliberal?” Is neoliberalism merely a new manifestation of the earlier pursuit of economic liberalism? Has neoliberalism ever become a hegemonic ideology in guiding trade and market liberalization measures in Taiwan? To address these questions, and to construct the analytical framework of my research project, I draw on insights from Gramscian theory and specifically locate the aforementioned questions in the existing scholarly debate on hegemony and neoliberalism. After proposing some possible theoretical interventions, I will also explain how my inquiries can be advanced with the aid of geopolitical economy and critical geopolitics, which tackle neoliberalism from the perspectives of sovereignty, security, and territoriality. This scholarship contains diverse analytical strengths for making sense of the world’s political economy and international politics that Taiwan is situated in.   Hegemony and Neoliberalism: A Theoretical Engagement  Gramscian theory on hegemony introduces a non-reductionist and non-essentialist approach to class relations and social struggles in the holistic dynamics between politics, ideology, and economics. The Gramscian notion of hegemony, after its introduction to Western academia in the 	 4	1980s, has enriched various scholarly works in cultural studies, international political economy (IPE), and other academic approaches (Glassman 2009). While the neo-Gramscian school pioneered by Cox in IPE utilizes the notion of hegemony to capture the world order underpinned by the formation of a transnational historical bloc, the concept is adopted by British scholars to account for the rise of neoliberal Thatcherism in the late 1970s and 1980s in the UK. However, British Gramscian scholars are rife with disagreement on how hegemony theory should be applied to the analysis of neoliberalism. While studies led by Stuart Hall accentuate the ideological production and overdetermined outcome of neoliberalism—known as the cultural studies camp, the work spearheaded by Bob Jessop emphasizes state restructuring in the face of crises in capital accumulation—known as the school of critical political economy.   Although the debate on hegemony and neoliberalism originated from the British context in the 1980s, it is the expansion of neoliberal agendas across the world in the post-Cold War era, i.e. the dismantling of the Communist World, the expansion of free trade regimes, the rise of international financial organizations, and the prevalence of structural adjustment programs in the 1990s, that contributed to a surge of scholarly interest in applying hegemony theory to the study of neoliberalism (Howson & Smith 2008; Worth 2015). Besides the more generic use of the notion of hegemony in IPE and international relations (IR), many neo-Gramscian scholars also deploy the notions of historical bloc, leadership, coercion, and consent to account for the global stretch of free-market economy. In such conceptualizations, neoliberalism is often portrayed as either an omnipresent ideology derived from the hegemon or a structurally coherent, class-based project that seeks to achieve hegemonic status in the post-Cold War global economy through constructing interstate alliances. Such a process is argued to serve the interest of transnational elites and materialize through US-led international institutions such as World Bank, IMF, and WTO with their local collaborators. As such, the combined notion of “neoliberalism hegemony” has become prevalent in many studies of the contemporary political economy above, at, and below the state scale.   But it is not only the concepts of “neoliberalism” and “hegemony” that have received extensive reflexivity on their own terms; the popular trend of bundling these two questionable concepts together, which is increasingly common in IR and IPE studies, further raised great concerns and 	 5	skepticism. The most direct criticism holds that neoliberalism, even in its heyday, never achieved homogeneous and stable hegemonic status either at domestic or international levels. Rather, it remains a failing hegemonic project that constantly requires different forms of intervention to save it from collapsing the entire market economy (Jessop 2013). What is often portrayed as “hegemonic neoliberalism” is in effect a set of ad hoc, opportunistic accommodations to the unstable dynamics of social change, rather than the outcome of highly coherent political-ideological projects (Barnette 2005, p. 10). A number of Gramscian-inspired scholars also lament how such a notion has been misused at the current moment because the forging of the notion “neoliberal hegemony” has been underpinned by superficial adoption of hegemony theory and de-historicized interpretations of Gramsci’s intellectual legacy (Howson and Smith 2008; Worth 2008, 2011).  In addressing conceptual shortcomings, scholarly endeavors take two general approaches: the refashioning of “neoliberalism” as an analytical concept and the revisiting of Gramsci’s fundamental concepts in hegemony theory. First, questioning the proposition that neoliberalism has ever become hegemonic, the “Regulation Approach (RA)” studies different social regulatory norms, institutions, and technological networks across historical and geographical contexts that manifest the rather opportunist, improvised, and heterogeneous landscapes of neoliberal processes and their outcomes—a messy reality coined as “actually existing neoliberalisms” and “variegated neoliberalizations” by regulation theorists (Brenner et al. 2010a, 2010b; Peck 2013). However, the solution proposed by the regulation school is conceived insufficient among other Gramscian scholars. Pointing out the regulation approach’s over-emphasis on the economic aspects of regulation, its overlook of the ethical-political dimensions of regulation, and its methodological inability to address ideological struggles, Sum & Jessop (2013) proposes the concept of “cultural political economy”—a cultural turn to critical political economy—as a way to “move beyond the Regulation Approach.”  Perhaps the full-scale criticism of the theoretical marriage between hegemony and neoliberalism comes from the cultural studies camp. Barnett’s (2005, 2010) criticism of the analytical applicability, theoretical desirability, and the political effects of such theoretical linking is most exemplary. On the one hand, Barnett (2010) criticizes the classic political economists’ 	 6	conceptualization of neoliberalism as a hegemonic “common sense.” Harvey for instance, simply conceives neoliberalism as a process translating the abstract theorization of free market ideology into reality. Such conceptualization not only leaves the “mechanism of naturalization” opaque and unexplained but also sees the political connotations carried by neoliberal ideology, i.e. freedom and liberty, as mere “rhetoric” that serve to cover up its material consequences. On the other hand, Barnett contends that RA similarly assumes geographical diffusion of neoliberalism from its “heartland” of North America and Western Europe to the periphery of the world, although attending to its uneven geographical outcomes and the “variations” and contingencies of when, where, and how they combine other domestic forces to produce distinctive manifestations (Barnette 2005, p. 8). Therefore, the regulation approach’s proposal of neoliberalization presents nothing more than a meta-theory that throws “local factors” into the “contextualizing mill” (Barnett 2010). The controversy over the hasty combination of neoliberalism and hegemony led Barnett to provocatively suggest that we should stop thinking of neoliberalism as a hegemonic project altogether, for it “pays little attention to the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in provoking changes in modes of governance, policy, and regulation.” The factors driving the ongoing changes of “neoliberalization” involve variegated social forces that add up to much more dispersed populist reorientation in policies and politics rather than one-dimensional hegemonic subjugation to market forces (Barnett 2005, p. 10).   Despite Barnett’s provocative proposition, there have been alternative ways to address the pitfalls of the theoretical construction of “neoliberal hegemony” without “throwing the baby out with the bathwater” proposed from within the Gramscian scholarship. These scholarly endeavors seek to retain the analytical strength of hegemony in capturing the neoliberalized global present by focusing on political dimensions of the hegemony theory and its intrinsic connection to other fields of scholarship. Among these endeavors, two approaches are pertinent to my research initiatives and will thus be discussed at length. The first approach is to critically revisit Gramscian theory by heeding to crisis, conjunctures, and hegemonic restructuring in the modern capitalist world; the second approach appropriates postcolonial theories to examine the “political” that mediates the processes and outcomes of neoliberalization, with the political subject of the nation and the people presented as critical sites of theoretical intervention.  	 7	 Crisis, Conjunctures, and Hegemony Restructuring One way to address the conceptual problem of “neoliberal hegemony” not only recognizes the ad hoc, temporary and variegated enactment of neoliberalization but also highlights the intrinsic relationship between crisis, the social struggles it entails, and their implications to hegemonic restructuring. Rather than seeing neoliberalism as having reached a stable hegemonic state, neoliberalism as a hegemonic project is always crisis-prone and requires constant reworking. Crisis, ruptures and the subsequent settlements are therefore the focus of analysis. While crisis theory has played the central role within Marxist scholarship, it is beyond my intention to engage with the sea of literature and debates on this matter. Instead, I focus on the Gramscian perspective of crisis. Two different forms of crisis—conjunctural crisis and organic crisis—are featured by Gramsci: While conjunctural crisis refers to miscellaneous ruptures in the social relations of production and oppositional forces to maintain the status quo, organic crisis denotes a far more comprehensive situation, where the society, after periods of struggles, fails to achieve a consensus in terms of how to stabilize the ruptures and reconstitutes a new form of state-societal relations to regenerate the process of capital accumulation. The nature of organic crisis is therefore economic, political, social as well as ideological, and the evolution from conjunctural crisis to organic crisis inevitably indicates a legitimacy crisis of the hegemonic rule.   However, despite highlighting the crisis-prone nature of neoliberalism, Gramscian scholars once again diverge in terms of what accounts for “crisis” and how to study it. This discrepancy continues from the different accounts for Thatcherism to the 2008 financial “crisis” and its aftermath. For critical political economists, neoliberalism is conceived as a political project that seeks to reconcile, contain, defer, or displace crisis arising in post-War capitalist accumulation (Jessop 2013). By “placing neoliberalism in its place”, Jessop identifies at least four models of such development and their respective crisis-prone tendencies: Atlantic Fordism, import-substitution industrialization in Latin America, export-oriented growth in East Asia, and state socialism in the Soviet bloc, China and Indo-China. In other words, the variation of neoliberal outcomes across the world derives from the distinctive position each state occupies in the world economy and the ways in which their distinctive crisis-prone tendencies are addressed.  	 8	Despite accentuating the nature of capital accumulation as the initial roots of crisis, the critical political economy camp also emphasizes the conjunctural nature of crisis itself. For instance, in analyzing the recent issue of Brexit where Britain voted to leave the European Union, Jessop (2017) traces the conjunctural domestic and international intersecting threads—including the protracted crisis facing Britain’s Atlantic Fordist model of accumulation, the subsequent failure of state strategies in adopting a knowledge-based economy and financialization, and the crisis of the Eurozone project marked by fiscal deficit. These conjunctural crises and the following neoliberal remedy only worked to worsen polarization, sustained uneven development, and consequently generated wider social discontent in the UK. Brexit therefore presents itself as the populist outlet of such sentiments. In conclusion, Jessop maintains that the choice offered in the referendum was “ill-defined,” for it should have been the choice between in or out of neoliberalism instead of in or out of the European Union.   Although similarly emphasizing conjuncture, accounts of crisis for cultural studies scholars differ from those of the modified regulation school in a number of ways. First, in the eye of critical political economists, a crisis is initially structurally induced and overdetermined (in Althusser’s sense) by the distinct mode and dynamics of capital accumulation a particular state is endowed with, or a crisis in accumulation at multiple scales. As such, social, cultural and political elements are seen as institutional “variables” mediating the ways in which the crisis is tackled, and due to historical and geographic specific contexts, it inevitably generates a variety of neoliberal outcomes. In the same vein, its political contentions and social resistance are conceived of as reactions to such outcomes. Therefore, it is argued by cultural studies scholars that the “historicity of politics” is presented as nothing more than a ramification of the history of capitalism without adequate theorization. Moreover, unwilling to attribute economics as the single initiation of crisis, some cultural studies scholars maintain that the causal conception of chains of crisis as an organic transformation from crisis in capital accumulation to the legitimacy crisis of the state is at best “instructive.” Instead, the question of how different forms of crisis are connected/articulated/translated from one to another should occupy the center of inquiry (Clarke 2010).  	 9	For example, against the rising trend of viewing the 2008 financial crisis exclusively in economic terms—be it the consequence of deregulation and financialization of debt—, the cultural studies approach highlights the complex moments and multiple origins from which the crisis forms to avoid “falling back on economic determinism” and to move beyond the model of “economic crisis-plus-its-ramifications” (Hall & Massey 2010).  That approach maintains that the 2008 financial crisis has economic, political and ideological roots, and the crisis should be addressed “as a whole.” The crisis caused by financial deregulation only reveals the accumulation of antagonism and contradictions that may not be reducible to economic dynamics of crisis but leads instead to the formation of the classless “property-owning democracy,” the rise of anti-state sentiment, and the racial tensions produced in the postcolonial condition (Clarke 2010; Hall & Massey 2010). Hall and Massey (2010) further contend that the “economic” has been successfully separated from the “ideological” and the “political” origins of the crisis, that the entire political discourse about public interest, inequality and wealth redistribution has been “cleansed,” and that all the remedies proposed to “re-regulate” the financial sector can only work to help business “back to normal” without generating transformative outcomes.  Interestingly, Jessop (2010) also makes a very similar comment regarding how the 2007 crisis is selectively read as a crisis in a financial-led accumulation regime, and the function of the market economy can therefore be restored simply by imposing stricter regulation. In the methodology of cultural political economy, the notion of “strategic selectivity” is highlighted to capture the initial step of how certain discourses are preferred and strengthened while others are eliminated. This problematic resonates well with the cultural studies camp’s agenda, which utilizes discourse analysis to unpack “what social forces have been made visible in the crisis, and how are they represented?” (Clarke 2010, p. 345). As such, the two camps, despite their unresolved disagreements, demonstrate a merging path in grasping the conjunctural nature of neoliberalism, crisis, and management of its aftermath.  The Politics of Hegemonic Struggle: The Nation, the People, and the Postcolonial  To avoid the “sophisticated version of reductionism” in tracing the various forms of neoliberalization (Barnett 2010), another critical intervention highlights the necessary attention paid to “the political.”  This approach emerges from the general concerns of the undertheorized 	 10	“political” aspect in the political economy literature. The expansive interrogation of “the political” is based on Gramsci’s conception of the “integral state” or “the integral politics,” where the state does not exclusively denote formal and institutionalized forms of politics (the “political society” in Gramsci’s notion) as opposed to the civilian sphere in the capitalist society, but embodies a dialectical unity of “political society” and “civil society.” (Gramsci 1971; Jessop 1997; Thomas 2009). Given such inclusive reading of the state, the political terrain extends well beyond the governmental apparatus to realms such as representational politics, religions, schools, and family lives through which social classes compete with one another to establish hegemony.   Although claiming to embrace the encompassing conception of the state, the regulation school’s account of neoliberalism and its institutional ensembles does not fully embody Gramsci’s inclusive and dialectical notion of “the political.” Specifically, it is criticized for its narrow understanding of “politics” and its restricted recognition of the “political moments” in theorizing neoliberalism as a “political project” (Barnett 2010). Focusing on elites and their alliances as the primary agent providing “direction and decision” and guiding social change, the regulation school not only falls short in capturing how contemporary forms of democratic politics—representative democracy premised on the territorially constrained electoral system—mediate the neoliberalization forms and outcomes, it also risks “de-politicizing” politics as its consequence (ibid.).   Contrarily, the proposal to refocus on the political treats seriously how political forces, formed in particular historical and social relations mostly pre-dating neoliberal restructuring, shape, give meaning, and mediate struggles of neoliberal economic agendas. It therefore presents a challenge to the a-historical ideal-typical explanation of the politics involving neoliberalism and its counter-movements. It maintains that not only seeking a more generalizable model of neoliberalism is analytically impossible, but framing its counterforce as “anti-neoliberal” is politically undesirable. After all, it represents nothing but a wishful thinking from the radical leftists without understanding the conjunctural forces of destabilization at work and is therefore unable to fulfill the organic intellectual’s task of invoking progressive social change (Hart 2008; Barnett 2005, 2010).  One of such key political dynamics in the Western context is the birth and transformation of bourgeois democracy—a social and political norm emerging from the dialectical relationship 	 11	between political liberalism and economic liberalization. In explaining how neoliberalism took hold in Britain, Hall (2011) delineates how the classic idea of political liberalism, born in the wake of industrialization and established by the bourgeoisie class in England, has gradually been harnessed and reduced to the notion of economic (neo)liberalism—a process along with the rise of merchant and liberal imperialist classes as the British Empire expanded to the rest of the world. Tracing the convoluted relationship between political and economic liberalism and its evolution in the post-war political economy thus occupies the core of the study of neoliberalization in the UK. Such a research agenda is further operationalized by Barnette (2008, 2010), who foregrounds the importance of political logic in the Western liberal democratic regime, such as party politics, territorialized electoral institutions, and parliament procedures in tackling the ways in which neoliberal agendas are negotiated, contested, and mitigated in the UK and beyond.   Highlighting the historically formed bourgeois democracy as the political crucible that shaped particular neoliberalizing outcomes in the UK also implies “provincializing” the British experience. Such a proposal resonates well with a surging call to move beyond Euro-American confinement in explaining the political by bringing insights from postcolonial studies to Gramscian theory. Gramsci’s proposition of the “Southern question” in Italy manifests a postcolonial moment in hegemony theory. The broader Gramscian scholarship, with its engagement with imperialism and uneven development, its conceptualization of subalternity, and its focus on the “national-popular” in the counter-hegemonic political strategy, further generates constructive dialogues with postcolonial theories (Rosengarten 2009; San Juan Jr. 2009; Bhattacharya & Srivastava 2012; Kipfer & Hart 2013).  Putting neoliberalism in the postcolonial historical geography, two interrelated political subjects and the politics invoked in their name writ large: the nation/nationalism, and the people /populism. Postcolonial theories have extensively unraveled the enduring social and political dynamics inherited from the colonial legacies, including the remaining racial and ethnic conflicts and the nationalist identity struggles. However, nationalism in the postcolonial states is not just about ethnic politics and identity struggles—although in most cases it is unavoidably fraught with these dynamics. What is more, with its promises of economic development and political liberation from the exploitive and oppressive colonial regime, postcolonial nationalism inevitably invokes a 	 12	corresponding reconfiguration of economic, social, and political relations in pursuit of moral legitimacy. While postcolonial nationalism can take the form of top-down passive revolution, with official nationalism being summoned by the (postcolonial) ruling class to consolidate the existing power structure or to accommodate surging requests for change, it can also invoke radical transformation (anti-imperialism). Much postcolonial research has shown that postcolonial societies often manifest dynamic connections and struggles between these varied nationalist projects, and the material outcomes are far from fixed. In any event, postcolonial nationalism entails the production of new forms of territoriality and space of “national economy,” through which social and political relations are reconfigured (Goswami 2004).   Besides nation and nationalism, people and populist politics are also pertinent to understanding postcolonial political economy. The politics of the people manifests in different ways in Gramscian scholarship—as the national-popular being the crucial mechanism in establishing full hegemony proposed by Gramsci, as a political subject formed through articulating various identities opposed to the dominant bloc (Laclau 2005), and as the bearer of popular sovereignty upon which the modern state is premised (Chatterjee 2004). In the postcolonial context, invocation of the political subject of the “people” usually comes with the promise of democracy and emancipation as the source of governing legitimacy. However, the notion of “democracy” proves to be highly contested and politically charged, and the politics in the name of the people usually forms an uneasy relationship with postcolonial democracy. It is because the relationship between the postcolonial state and the people is not simply defined by bourgeoisie democracy based on civil right or constituted through antagonistic tensions; it is also bounded by a moral tie that entails complicated and dynamic negotiation between the state and the political society to meet the material needs of the governed (Chatterjee 2004, 2011). The liberal democratic model is thus hard-pressed to come to grips with the public perception of “democracy” and its discursive effects in the postcolonial or post-authoritarian society, the symbolic meaning and social mobilization capacity of electoral politics, and the moral weight endowed in the notion of popular sovereignty.  Rethinking economic liberalization and neoliberalization through a postcolonial Gramscian perspective has yielded fruitful results across different historical-geographies. Although without direct citation of “neoliberalism,” Chatterjee’s (2011) account on how India’s postcolonial 	 13	capitalism substantiated by electoral democracy and passive revolution from the landed elites has transformed class relations and associated political dynamics in the globalization era provides another vivid demonstration. The dismantling of the license regime, greater entry granted for foreign capital, and liberalization of state-monopolized sectors have contributed to the rise of a transnational urban bourgeoisie less dependent on electoral mobilization in gaining governing legitimacy. Such transformation consequently reconfigured the domain and operating logic of the political society—the social space where subalterns negotiated with the postcolonial bourgeois nation-state for livelihood survival—now resorting to individualized distributive justice. Built on Gramsci’s insight on passive revolution and Chatterjee’s study on the state-society relationship in democratic India, Corbridge and Harris’s (2013) detailed research on the reinvention of India aptly documents the co-construction of Hindu nationalism and economic liberalization.   In the appeal to decolonize “actually existing neoliberalism,” Goldstein (2012) contends that the different forms of neoliberalism are not just “variegated local manifestations” of globally diffused ideas or economic paradigm, but are actually lived realities from local history, much of which is shaped by colonialism and its aftermath (p. 305). Goldstein’s study on neoliberalism and its contestation in Bolivia trenchantly demonstrates how the notion of “neoliberalism” is tactically equated with the continuation of colonial dominance—a social force predating the introduction of “neoliberalism” by a regime that claimed to represent Bolivian indigenous socialism and yet continued to exercise neoliberal-oriented policies.   Combining Gramscian and postcolonial theories, Hart’s (2014) analysis of South Africa’s post-apartheid globalization and economic neoliberalization experiences yields a sophisticated analysis of racial politics, nationalism, and capitalism. As Hart maintains, the hegemonic project of the African National Congress (ANC) in the post-apartheid South Africa has to be comprehended through the dialectical processes of de-nationalization—where corporate capital sought to set itself free from the operation and constraint of national economy and to connect with the financialized global economy—and re-nationalization—where ANC paradoxically conjured up racial nationalism with bourgeois democracy to win its legitimacy. The result is a highly unstable articulation between racial nationalism-bourgeois democracy-globalized capitalism—a formula full of tensions and contradictions. 	 14	 Research as such demonstrates that neoliberalization in postcolonial societies does not just render another case study for the concept of variegated neoliberalism. Rather, focusing on the forms and logic of postcolonial politics, the birth of the postcolonial political subjects, the volatile articulation of the nation-people-state, and the contested terrain of ideology and political economy in hegemonic struggles generate far more productive analytical outcomes. I will build on these theoretical insights to unpack trade and economic liberalization in Taiwana country undergoing multiple colonialisms and still embroiled in postcolonial struggles. Utilizing Taiwan’s experiences, I will argue that multiplying the tripartite relationship of state-capital-society by the unsettling formula of nation-people-state in postcolonial societies has the potential to shed an alternative light on what we know about hegemony and neoliberalism.   Geopolitical Economy, Critical Geopolitics, and Territoriality While most of my focus remains situated in the dialogue between hegemony theory and neoliberalism, I also draw on other forms of knowledge pertinent to my research project: critical geopolitics and geopolitical economy. The connection of these bodies of scholarship to my research subject is apparent. Hegemonic struggles in relation to trade and economic liberalization in Taiwan are fundamentally informed by broader geopolitical economic contexts, with US-led global free trade regime and post-war geopolitical order on the one hand, and China’s market reform since the 1980s and its growing influence on the world political economy on the other. Being situated between these two power hegemons makes Taiwan’s case particularly exemplary of struggles over trade and economic liberalization elsewhere in the world.   The empirical significance also indicates the usefulness in utilizing associated theoretical lenses in this regard. First, the literature on geopolitical economy, emphasizing the intertwined nature of geopolitics and geoeconomics, serves as an important source to examine structural forces and crises in neoliberal conjunctures (Agnew & Corbridge 2002; Glassman 2018; Sparke 2018). Literature as such provides an analytical framework to tackle the complicated ways in which geopolitical and geoeconomic forces and domestic politics are intertwined. The decline of US hegemony worldwide and its transformation into a “global market-access regime” came synchronically with China’s fast-changing economic development in the market reform era. Thus, 	 15	the reordering of Pax Americana in East Asia, along with China’s fundamental influence on the regional economy, have greatly restructured social, political, and economic relations and conditioned the ways in which hegemonic struggles over neoliberalization took place in Taiwan.   Second, critical geopolitics scholarship, with its emphasis on security, sovereignty and territoriality, demonstrates a variety of insightful approaches in grasping the symbolic, institutional, and material composition of the state in the global political economy. These approaches include studies on the neoliberalized institutional changes that blend state and non-state institutions and domestic and international realms in governing global economic affairs and their crises (Kuus 2018), on the geopolitics of border control over people, goods, and gradually unfettered financial capital (Sparke 1998; Coleman 2005), and on the operation of war on terror that are intrinsic to the ascendency of neoliberalism globally (Cowen & Smith 2009). The intervention critical geopolitics provides to the study of neoliberalism also includes unpacking geopolitical discourses and examining how they create meanings, generate fears and hopes, and mobilize identity politics associated with economic liberalization (Sparke 2007).   Another conceptual question regards the transformation of state sovereignty and territoriality in the globalization era, with the problematic of deterritorialization at the core of its inquiry (Tuathail 1998, 1999; Agnew & Corbridge 2002). It is now all too common to define neoliberalism as the replacement of state with market and the loss of territorial controls over economic activities leading to erosion of state sovereignty. In that, territory simply became an obsolete concept for the neoliberalized world economy. However, this take on territoriality paradoxically demonstrates the flip side of the “territorial trap” cautioned by Agnew (2010).  Imagining a totally deterritorialized and borderless world with diminishing state sovereignty is simply avoiding the “territorial trap” by ignoring it (Newman 2010). Seeing territory as a spatial manifestation of effective sovereignty, critical scholarship has proposed a more nuanced understanding of the spatial workings of sovereignty in the globalization era. For instance, the idea of “graduated sovereignty” (Ong 2000) denotes that yielding control in certain segments of the population and the territorial space to facilitate capital accumulation can, in effect, serve to reassert sovereignty. Similarly, the prevalence of the offshore economy and the international operation of Sovereign Wealth Funds can be seen as another mutation of effective sovereignty and the reconfiguration of territoriality in 	 16	the neoliberalized global economy (Agnew 2009). The territorial logic of economic liberalization thus involves far more complicated workings of state power within, along, and across the borders.   Although territoriality implies various logics, forms and scales of spatial organization of state power in the globalization era, my use of the notion will focus on its role in the nation-building and state-making project and accentuate its way of articulation with the “national economy.” Critical approaches to territoriality have freed our conception of the “national economy” from physically-defined territorial boundaries and enabled a more nuanced understanding of what it constitutes, how it is defined, and where it operates. The reworking of territoriality of the national economy in the globalization era therefore not only invokes rearrangement/rescaling of the “effective sovereignty,” but also involves geographical re-imagination of the terrain across which it is exercised and reconstruction of the subject position it bears.                                                            The vast body of critical geopolitics and geopolitical economy scholarship—as well as its potential contributions to the study of neoliberalism—defies full illustration in such limited space. While charting out the overall implications of these studies to my research on trade and economic liberalization in Taiwan, I will also discuss in more detail how they inform my analysis of particular themes in the coming chapters.  III.  Research Agenda   Charting out the intellectual terrain on hegemony and neoliberalism, especially recognizing the discrepancies between different factions within the Gramscian school in tackling these issues, it is certainly beyond my intention to side with a particular position, nor do I seek to engage in the debate in an abstract manner. Rather, I will demonstrate how these approaches, endowed with different analytical strengths, inform my research project and equip me with better tools. Based on the preceding theoretical discussion, I propose three major themes that I seek to engage with in my investigation of the hegemonic struggles over trade and economic liberalization in Taiwan. They are the dialectical relationship between political democratization and economic liberalization; the multifaceted populist and nationalist politics and their contingent articulation with 	 17	neoliberalization; and the centrality of trade and economic liberalization in hegemonic reconstruction in Taiwan since the 1980s.   Political Democratization and Economic Liberalization: A Dialectical Process  As discussed above, a historically-grounded examination of the evolving relationship between political liberalism and economic (neo)liberalism is key to understanding the process of neoliberalization, both in the Western and in the postcolonial contexts. Here, I seek to trace the particular ways in which these two forces took shape and entangled in Taiwan. My analysis starts from the critical era of the 1980s, where Taiwan began to encounter crisis in both political and economic realms. On the one hand, the anti-authoritarian democratization movements emerged in the 1970s began to prevail, challenging the legitimacy of the KMT regime which had held power since 1949; On the other, Taiwan’s post-war growth model was in deep crisis due to the fall of the SME-led export-oriented accumulation regime, leading to calls for economic liberalization to tackle the gradually stagnant economy.   Despite their synchronistic nature, political democratization and economic liberalization in Taiwan are largely studied as two separate issues by different disciplines. When considered together, they are usually assumed to have a fundamentally causal and fatalistic relationship. It is argued that democracy in Taiwan favors the market economy as the guiding principle over state intervention in the economic life and therefore unavoidably contributes to the unsuccessful transformation of the developmental state and the ascendancy of neoliberalism (Chu 2011). It was because democratization movement in Taiwan was characteristic of partisan ways of resource distribution and driven by anti-state sentiment and national identity-focused politics, which fundamentally impaired the state capacity to form effective economic policies. However, instead of “victimizing the state” and denoting a stable and causal relationship between political democratization and economic liberalization, my research project seeks to demonstrate a dialectical and highly volatile relationship between the two.  Such a research project first requires situating economic liberalization in the broader process of passive revolution in Taiwan, where the KMT regime deployed both ideological and material means to realign social, political, and economic forces in order to maintain its governing 	 18	legitimacy in light of multiple crises (Chuang 2013). I will, therefore, attempt a more nuanced reading of the political attack against the KMT-led party-state-capitalism and its complicated transformation. I will seek to demonstrate that the state did not just passively accommodate bottom-up social requests for economic liberalization but actively appropriated the appeal and reshaped the agenda toward its own end. The research also calls for a critical examination of the dialectical relationship between the external liberalization (tariff removal, liberalization of currency control, deregulation of capital flow, etc.) and internal liberalization (liberalization of state-monopolized economy, privatization of state-owned enterprises tax cut, etc.), which has been largely overlooked in the theorization of neoliberalism in Taiwan and beyond. In a nutshell, the state-capital-society relationship is far from fixed, as is the dynamic between political democratization and economic liberalization.  Populism, Nationalisms, and Neoliberalization Second, I seek to contribute to the debate on hegemony and neoliberalism by attending to the political dynamics mediating hegemonic struggles over neoliberalization, where populism and nationalism unavoidably come to the fore in the postcolonial context. I maintain that a historically grounded understanding of nationalism and populism—as well as their articulation with the concurrent social forces at a particular historical conjuncture—is imperative in understanding how various neoliberal agendas are framed, conceived, and contested.   Nationalism in Taiwan is known for its polarized identity politics charged with ethnic tensions (Wu & Chang 1993; Wu 1996; Shih 2007; Wang 2008). While official Chinese nationalism was imposed by the KMT government in Taiwan after its defeat in the Chinese civil war and further embraced by its followers who immigrated from the mainland (wai sheng ren), Taiwanese nationalism was seen as a counter-identity that emerged among the indigenous (Han) Taiwanese people (ben sheng ren) along with the democratization movement. This complex identity-ethnic antagonism was formed in a postcolonial context, where KMT’s settler regime (a minority) sought to maintain its hegemony and leadership via both violent and non-violent measures. Due to the memory of white terror and state oppression and because of the systematically implemented discriminating policies regarding language, education, political opportunities, access to government jobs, and social status based on the ethnic divide, the entire Taiwanese society is left 	 19	with distrust between indigenous Han Taiwanese and mainlanders. Although recent research on national identity and popular struggles illustrates a far more ambivalent picture than the usually told black-and-white story of ethnic divide, social distrust continues to thrive, and ethnic-centered discourse still dominates the narrations of nationalist contestation, of the democratization movement, and of state-society relations until the opposition party DPP gained power in the 21st century.   Nonetheless, nationalism and populism are not simply about identity politics; these two concepts are also extensively deployed by the existing literature in tackling trade disputes and economic liberalization in Taiwan. However, due to the entrenched ethnic politics, their meanings are usually presented as either transcendental or completely ungrounded in these studies: Nationalism is either conceived as a dominant ideology enjoying moral supremacy and guiding developmental practices for the governing elites (Chu 2009; Hsu 2017), or is conflated with a discursively constructed identity which invokes politics in its name with no or limited material base in critical IR and IPE (C. Chen 2010; Lin 2016). Likewise, populism is reduced to either an irrational anti-state sentiment preferring free-market solutions to state intervention in the economic arena (Chu 2011) or is conceived as a paradoxical combination of market principle and distributive politics for the regime to earn popular support (Hsu 2009). Most of this literature on nationalism and populism captures their manifestations from a particular time period and projects them to the analysis of a specific dispute over trade or economic policy, without providing a more historicized analysis of the political evolution of “the people” and “the nation” in relation to the state situated in the changing social relations of production. In other words, the “transformation” of variegated forms nationalism and populism should be treated as the key question to tackle, not the contextual variations.   Such a problem can be further unpacked through the following interrogation. Given Taiwan’s “atypical” postcolonial conditions,1 nationalist and populist politics and their relationship with the state have proven to be far from stable. Indeed, the articulation between the “nation” and the “people” has been highly volatile. The rule of the KMT authoritarian settler state following the 																																																								1		To	date,	scholars	are	still	debating	whether	and	to	what	extent	the	notion	of	“settler	colonialism”	or	“neo-colonialism”	can	be	applied	to	explain	the	nature	of	the	KMT	regime	in	Taiwan.	See	Wang	(2015).		 20	end of Japanese colonization imposed both anti-communist Chinese nationalism and discriminatory ethnic policies on the island, leading to persistent ethnic tensions under the “One-China” flag. The rise of popular society and the anti-authoritarian democratization movement during the 1980s was followed by the popularization of Taiwanese nationalism, both of which posed challenges to the governing legitimacy of the authoritarian party-state. The subsequent indigenization of the KMT and its invocation of the “new Taiwanese people” in the 1990s did not last long before turning to re-embrace the One-China principle in alliance with CCP as a way to deter the growing political influence of the pro-independence camp on the island. The subject position of the “people” and the contesting nationalist projects appearing in different historical conjunctures also indicate a rather complicated mechanism for the postcolonial state to build its leadership and maintain its legitimacy.   Furthermore, the analysis of populist and nationalist politics has to be rooted in the particular class project emerged in Taiwan. Different from South Korea, class consciousness has been rather ambiguous in Taiwan, where the majority of the population conceive themselves as “middle class” or “middle-lower class” instead of “working class” (Hsueh 1997). Such a distinct class consciousness arose from Taiwan’s SME-dominated, export-driven and light manufacturing-oriented post-War economy. As factory owners also perform labor in their own shops, the line between “workers” and “petit capitalists” has been rather ambiguous. This distinct class project is well demonstrated in Shieh Guo-hsiung’s (1989) illustration of the highly fluid class mobility in Taiwan’s SME-dominated manufacturing industry and Hsiung Ping-chun’s (1996) exploration of how typical Taiwanese households’ living rooms were turned into factories in the SME-led, family-centered light manufacturing system. Given their huge success in the export market, the hundreds of thousands SMEs, rather than the subject position of workers, were constructed as the key to such a class project as well as the historical agent demanding changes in trade and economic policies.   However, the SME-centered class project also evolved against fast-changing capital relations within Taiwan and across Asia. South Korea has constructed a solid “Korean Inc.” between state, chaebol, and society since the 1970s, and the subsequent politics over globalization can thus be attributed to the struggles between transnational corporates and labor (Woo & Woo-Cumings 	 21	1991). In Taiwan, capital relations have undergone fundamental restructuring since the 1990s. Not only big corporations have surpassed SMEs in Taiwan’s export sector in the mid-1990s, but different forms of capitals have been constantly competing in both export and domestic economies. Capital factions consisting of SMEs, industrial capitalists, state-franchised business, state-owned enterprises, and newly booming hi-tech industries were all in dynamic competition to influence state policies. Therefore, the analysis of Taiwan’s trade liberalization, or neoliberalization at large, has to accentuate the contingent articulation between nationalist and populist politics and evolving material forces. As such, my research will investigate social struggles over trade and economic liberalization by shedding light on the multiple courses of political subject formation of “the nation,” “the people,” and the politics in their name as the way to link conjunctural crisis and contesting capital relations across different time periods.   Hegemonic Struggles over Trade Liberalization and Economic Deterritorialization The last theme my research seeks to explore is the centrality of trade and economic liberalization to the hegemonic struggles in Taiwan. It is therefore not just a study of trade and economic policies per se but also an inquiry through which to unravel the unsettling social forces and conflicts in Taiwan from the 1980s onwards. The changing course of trade policies vividly demarcates the reconfiguration of social relations of production in Taiwan, and such social relations of production were also deeply embedded in the evolving geopolitical/geoeconomic dynamics that shot through the island.   Moreover, hegemonic struggles over trade and economic liberalization since the 1980s are highly spatial in nature. As discussed in the theoretical section, much literature on geopolitical economy and critical geopolitics has probed into the production of territoriality intrinsic to the hegemonic project that works beyond the boundary of the sovereign state and can therefore successfully avoid the “territorial trap” (Agnew & Corbridge 2002; Agnew 2009; Cowen & Smith 2009; Moisio & Paasi 2013; Lee et al. 2018). Utilizing a postcolonial Gramscian perspective and the theoretical lens of space production of the nation, Hart (2014) also provides a sophisticated account of how a postcolonial state located at the periphery of global capitalism, i.e. South Africa, struggles with economic denationalization led by multinational corporations’ (MNCs) capital flight on the one hand and “rebounding the nation” via conjuring the rainbow nation and yet tightening immigration 	 22	control on the other. In other words, deterritorialization in the economic arena was accompanied by reproduction of the national space through ethnic and cultural policies.  Using a similar focus on postcolonial struggles over economic deterritorialization and nationalist politics in the globalization era, I seek to further unpack the relationship between territoriality and the national economy in such dynamics. In Taiwan’s case, I propose the concept of “deterritorialization of the national economy” to capture the spatial dynamic of struggles over trade and economic liberalization and to further question in what sense such a deterritorialized economy is still “national.” I will argue that, in Taiwan, the construction of the new nation in the face of economic globalization does not necessarily mean “rebounding the national space” in the cultural and ethnic senses; it can also indicate articulating a “deterritorialized national economy” materially, institutionally, and discursively.  This proposal is indebted to critical geopolitics on the transformation of territoriality and sovereignty, on the geoeconomic reasoning of national survival, wealth, and security, and on the politics of geoeconomic subject formation in the neoliberalized global economy. Specifically, if we bridge the insight of critical geopolitics on territoriality and state sovereignty with Gramscian analysis of hegemonic struggles of the state (as a social relation of production embedded in international political economy), we begin to see a far more complicated picture of how multiple forms of territoriality are produced along with the changing nature of the state in the globalization era.   It is in this sense that I seek to engage with Chen Kwan-Shin’s (1994, 2000) renowned criticism of Taiwan’s overseas economic expansion since the 1990s as an “sub-empire.” In that, Chen denotes a tripartite hegemonic project—state restructuring, capital expansion, and the invoking of Taiwanese nationalism—that underpins Taiwan’s imperial-like economic expansionism. Rather than portraying a winning hegemonic project underpinned by a coherent set of capital-state-nation relations, however, I will demonstrate that deterritorialization of Taiwan’s national economy is in effect a complex process driven by fractured capital, discrepant agents, a range of desires and aspirations, and contesting political agendas. Therefore, the “hegemonic moment” manifest in Taiwan’s economic deterritorialization is never free from ideological and material contradictions. 	 23	Studying the articulation between materiality and discourse in the production of the deterritorialized national economy at different historical conjunctures also enables us to grasp the ways in which different forms of economic deterritorialization—market opening, outward FDI, regionalism, and financial liberalization—are associated with the hegemonic restructuring project in Taiwan.   IV.  Methodology  Articulation and Conjunctural Analysis Drawing on Gramscian theory to illuminate hegemonic struggles over trade and economic liberalization that have spanned over three decades in Taiwan, my research project is grounded in historicism as its epistemology. Specifically, I will employ conjunctural analysis. Originally proposed by Althusser and Gramsci, the method of conjunctural analysis has been extensively elaborated by a number of contemporary scholars in terms of what consists of a “conjuncture,” where to start the analysis, and how to operationalize it. According to Hall and Massey (2010, p. 57), a conjuncture is “a period during which the different social, political, economic and ideological contradictions that are at work in society come together to give it a specific and distinctive shape.” Different from pursuing a general theory, or so-called “epochal mode of analysis,” conjunctural analysis presents itself as an authentic historical analysis which does not seek to define the dominant features of a particular system, but traces the process through which different forces struggle to “contain, displace, neutralize or incorporate” the residual and the emergent social forces, a process rife with slippages, openings, and contradictions (Williams 1977; Clarke 2008, 2010; Grossberg 2010; Hart 2018).   Moreover, historicism-based research is intrinsically about explicating continuity and social change over time. It differs from a linear progress viewpoint; indeed, the view of time for conjectural analysis’ is multiple, emerging and contingent. While pinpointing a particular time or event as the turning point of the historical process is nearly impossible, conjunctural analysis presents an alternative approach to historical periodization, which highlights the co-existence of “multiple temporalities” (Clarke 2010, 2014, 2015; Jessop 2012; Spielman 2018). Similarly, 	 24	Jessop (2012) maintains that conjunctural analysis focuses on the articulation between different periodizations, which can include structural-oriented accumulation crises, election cycles, tides of imperialism, etc.  To conduct a thorough conjunctural analysis, it is imperative to attend to the notion of articulation. Although working across the epistemological, political and strategical levels, articulation represents a common method deployed by cultural studies. As a research method, it provides a way of “contextualizing” the object of one’s analysis (Slack 2006, p. 113) while treating context as emerging forces instead of backgrounds (or known as radical contextualization). The method of articulation concentrates on how vast numbers of events, forces, contradictions and antagonisms across time are connected together in a conjunctural moment and perceived as a continuation.   Nonetheless, Hart’s (2007) genealogical tracing of the concept points out that articulation not only denotes the practice of “connecting together,” but also “giving expression to,” where language plays a crucial role in meaning making. This second aspect is fully elaborated by Stuart Hall (1985), who interprets Althusser’s approach to “articulation” in a non-determinist and non-structuralist manner. As Hall (2001) clearly explicates, articulation entails a double process of “decoding/encoding.” As such, the method of articulation is both about deconstruction and reconstruction; the former discovering the heterogeneous, fragments and differences in the whole, whereas the latter making linkages, building narratives and giving meaning to reconnect the fragments (Grossberg 2010).  Connecting fragments and expressing heterogeneity in a coherent unity, articulation inevitably occupies the center of Gramsci’s theory on hegemony. Besides Hall’s emphasis of its theoretical centrality in analyzing ideology and dominance, Laclau (2005) also foregrounds the notion of articulation in his analysis of hegemonic struggleseither the formation of a historical bloc to achieve hegemony or the attempt seeking to challenge such status. Despite bearing the criticism of taking an extreme post-structural stance to discourse, Laclau’s approach to articulation nonetheless provides a toolkit for interrogating such dynamics and identifying the emerging political subject in particular historical conjunctures.  	 25	As such, conjunctural analysis, with specific attention paid to dominant forms of articulation, constitutes the methodological underpinning of my research. I will proceed to illustrate how such a research method will be operationalized against Taiwan’s context of hegemonic struggles.  Research Methods To conduct empirical research on hegemonic struggles over trade and economic liberalization in Taiwan, I draw on a variety of sources as the materials of analysis. They encompass official policies, government propaganda, professional knowledge production, and public opinion. The wide range and diverse types of data sources embodied in my research aim to go beyond state centrism and to avoid economic determinism in tackling the aforementioned issues. Together, they help to trace how particular trade policies are formed, interpreted, connected and contested in a broader social and political context from the 1980s to the present.  In terms of official policies and government propaganda, I rely on resources such as the Presidential Office Gazette, policy reports from different governmental sectors, and government online databases to capture the official narratives regarding trade issues. Specifically established in 1991 to take charge of cross-Strait political and economic affairs, the Mainland Affairs Council provides an online database which documents official propaganda related to cross-Strait affairs on a monthly basis and therefore serves as a rich source to track the (trans)formation of geopolitical and geoeconomic rationales of the state. The data range from presidential speeches at various occasions and policy measures announced by associated government agencies to departmental press release addressing particular issues. Recognizing that the “state” is not a monolithic entity with unified policy rationales, these multiple sources help portray a complicated and sometimes ambivalent picture of the “state rationale.”   Moreover, the study of official policies and associated discourses is supplemented by “expert opinions.” This includes research projects and policy evaluations done by semi-official think tanks (i.e. Chung-hua Institute for Economic Research) and party-affiliated research institutes or foundations (i.e. KMT-associated National Policy Foundation and Taiwan Foundation for Democracy established by the DPP government), professional journals targeting specific issues, and government publications with first-hand insider research outcomes. This includes Central 	 26	Bank Quarterly Bulletin, Economic Research published by the Council for Economic Planning and Development, annual White Papers on SMEs by the Small and Medium Enterprise Administration, and Securities & Futures Monthly published by the Financial Supervisory Commission, etc.   Perhaps the biggest challenge to my research is to represent “public opinions” associated with trade and economic liberalization and to unpack their ideological underpinning and discursive effects. Both hegemony theory and critical geopolitics have cautioned about the inclination to state-centrism. It is therefore pertinent to notice how trade-associated ideas are circulated, contested, and resurrected both within and beyond statecraft and become “common sense.”  To reconstruct the vibrant social dynamics and to capture the prevailing popular discourses, I utilize multiple resources interest-group lobbying, media reports, social protests, straw polls, and election campaigns.   First, representative politics plays an initial role in delivering filtered “public opinions.” Thanks to democratization, the role of Parliament (or the “Legislative Yuan”) in Taiwan has changed from a “rubber stamp” of the state to a crucial channel through which voices and interests from civil society are voiced (Liao 2005). This transformation took place when many “outside-the-party” political figures started to gain access to formal politics due to the early-stage passive revolution initiated by the KMT to secure legitimacy after losing its Westphalian sovereignty in the 1970s. The well-documented Legislative Yuan Gazette encompassing legislative interpellation, notes for standing and special committees, public hearings, and the National Conference minutes provides a systematic resource to grasp how particular interest groups conduct lobbying for certain trade and economic liberalization policies and how popular appeals reverberate in official politics.  Second, I draw on media as a vital resource to illustrate divergent social opinions. Although the government had had significant influence over major media houses under authoritarian rule via cultivating patron-client relations with the private press, the worsening legitimacy crisis of the KMT regime and growing populist appeal for the press to reflect true social opinions in the decade before democratization gradual dismantled that cozy relationship (Lin 2000). While the KMT-run news press Central Daily News (OI) continued to perform as the official platform to convey 	 27	state ideologies, other major private presses had already begun to take a more neutral stance and incorporate many discordant opinions, not to mention the “outside-the-party” press and magazines which were never shy about criticism. The newspaper reports from the 1980s, therefore, serve as an effective lens to peep into the social and political dynamics of the time. In is also noted that in the post-democratization era, the growing competition between political parties also reflected on the polarized standpoints taken by different media: Some take pro-business stances; 2  others represent a clear party inclination in their political orientation.3 While recognizing a variety of styles due to different political affiliations or social positions across the media landscape, the main purpose of my research is to identify prevailing discursive structures and to portray general trends of social forces instead of conducting a micro-level semiotic analysis of the media.   Last but not least, in order to capture the voices from the “civil society,” I also draw on different kinds of resources and references. While business magazines (i.e. Commonwealth Magazine and Business Today) represent the popular opinions of the business community and echo voices from the managerial class, NGO’s conference minutes, online fora, and press releases provide alternative perspectives to those of political and economic elites. Moreover, I draw on second-hand polls and surveys to indicate the general trend of popular attitudes towards certain issues. For instance, the longitudinal survey conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University provides reliable documentation of the long-term transformation of national and party identifications in Taiwan; the Mainland Affairs Council also conducts surveys both on long-term public attitudes toward cross-Strait political and economic affairs and short-term social responses to particular incidents. Together, they provide indications of the ways in which geopolitical and geoeconomic situations are perceived in Taiwanese society.   The variety of resources helps me develop a comprehensive understanding of the complex articulation between specific incidents, agencies, and discourses that formed particular historical conjunctures. By doing so, I seek to provide a genuine politics-centered account of hegemonic struggles over trade and economic liberalization in Taiwan. Rather than relying on idealized 																																																								2	Commercial	Times	and	Economic	Daily	News	are	the	two	major	pro-business	newspapers.		3	While	The	China	Times	and	United	Daily	News	are	affiliated	with	KMT,	The	Liberty	Times	and	Independent	Evening	News	are	the	platform	for	anti-KMT	or	pro-DPP	voices.		 28	theories to trim the reality, the story I am going to tell is full of contingencies, contradictions, and messiness.   V.  Organization of the Chapters  Following the introductory chapter, my research themes will unfold in the proceeding chapters: Chapter 2, titled Democratization, Populism, and Taiwan’s Early Trade and Economic Liberalization, traces the origin of trade and economic liberalization in Taiwan from the mid-1980s when post-war hegemony was undergoing a series of conjunctural crises. They include the crisis in SME-led export-oriented accumulation regime due to global economic restructuring, geoeconomic pressures from the US for tariff reduction and New Taiwan Dollar currency appreciation, and rising populism coupled with the pro-democratization movement that challenged the legitimacy of KMT authoritarian regime which had remained in power since 1949. Highlighting the dialectical dynamics between political democratization and economic liberalization, it explains how the emergence of populist politics mediated the ways in which the structural crisis was addressed. The state decision to let go of foreign-exchange controls and launch top-down democratization in 1987 kicked off a massive outward investment trend. Further articulation between populist struggles and post-Cold War geopolitical dynamics also led to decriminalization and deregulation of outward investment in China.  Chapter 3, Twist and Turns to Trade Liberalization: Populism, Nationalism, and Embracing Free Trade, traces the populist and nationalist politics surrounding trade and the subsequent rise of the free-trade regime in Taiwan. It seeks to provide a dialectical account between market-led US hegemonic expansion and domestic struggles against party-state-capitalism – a process full of contradictions, paradoxes, and unexpectedness. It first portrays the populist appeal of revoking tariff protection for franchised markets and infant industries in the name of meeting the economic well-being of the people in the face of a failed “managed liberalization strategy” proposed by developmentalist bureaucrats from the mid-1980s. It then discusses how the decision of NTD-currency appreciation under US pressure ironically contributed to advocacy for further market opening as a way to save Taiwan’s export-oriented SMEs. The ambivalence in the official endorsement of the multilateral free-trade regime (GATT/WTO) as a nationalist call to resume 	 29	sovereignty against US hegemony and champion international recognition of Taiwan will be discussed in a critical manner.  Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 explore the centrality of trade liberalization and economic deterritorialization in the hegemonic restructuring of the post-democratization era of the 1990s. Chapter 4, Re-articulating the Nation-people Nexus in the Deterritorialized Economy I: Populist Authoritarianism and Neoliberal Regionalism, delineates the relationship between early neoliberalization and the rise of populist authoritarianism driven by KMT’s indigenization in Taiwan. Specifically, it unravels the conjunctures from which the populist authoritarian regime formed a contingent alliance with the neoliberalists in promoting economic regionalism along with the construction of the post-democratization nation-state. I will follow the story of reconstructing official nationalism, from resorting to orthodox Chinese nationalism to embracing Chinese-Taiwanese dual identity, coupled with the invocation of “liberalized people” in creating the new nation-state. The proposals for the “Greater China Economic Circle” and “Asian Pacific Operational Center (APROC)” show that these are key to the promotion of neoliberal regionalism.   Chapter 5, Re-articulating the Nation-people Nexus in the Deterritorialized Economy II:  Geopolitical Economy and the Neoliberal Excursion, further illustrates how hegemonic restructuring of the state is achieved through articulation with the increasingly deterritorialized economy, which produced the passive revolution in response to the growing populist attack on the party-state-capitalism under KMT. The analysis first unravels the divergent forces, multiple agencies, and capital fractions contributing to such development and then describes how the state reconstituted its leadership against this backdrop by discursively articulating a unified notion of “outward national economy.” Furthermore, by focusing on the targets of the geoeconomic proposals involved in the process—from the first Southward Policy (1994), to the “invest Taiwan” advocacy (1996), to the second Southward Policy (1998)—the chapter argues that the most crucial implications for hegemonic reconstruction do not lie in the cultivation of anti-China, pro-independent Taiwanese nationalism or imperialist overseas capitalist expansion but in the changing social relations of production (i.e. the fall of SMEs and the rising importance of business conglomeration in trade) and in the long-term implications for neoliberalization – a process too often buried under the framework of geopolitical and nationalist dispute.  	 30	 Chapter 6, Contesting Financial Nationalism in the Globalization Era, traces both the structural factors and conjunctures that contributed to the surge of financial neoliberalism during the 2000s, the time when the opposition party, DPP, unexpectedly came to power for the first time after democratization in 1987. The chapter first explains how, as a failed hegemonic project, the DPP regime struggled to propose the globalization agenda as a strategy to resolve escalating tensions between neoliberal and protectionist camps on the issue of further de/regulation of cross-Strait investment conducted by a growing important business community—Taishang (Taiwanese businessmen who conduct business overseas). It documents the emergence of and contestation among different forms of financial nationalism as a result of the struggles targeting Taishang’s capital flight and repatriation. Lastly, it identifies the fast-changing cross-Strait geopolitical dynamics during DPP’s second presidency (2004-2008) and their influence on the proposed course of financial neoliberalization.    Chapter 7, When Neoliberalism Meets the United Front Strategies: Advances, Disturbances, and Ruptures, tackles the gradually intricate dynamics between neoliberalization and cross-Strait geopolitical economy. It first identifies multiple factors—both external and internal, economic and political—that contributed to the temporary hegemonic consensus on cross-Strait economic liberalization along with KMT’s return to power in 2008.  It proceeds to depict how the KMT regime launched a full-blown neoliberal agenda, from cross-Strait financial deregulation to signing up comprehensive bilateral free trade agreement (ECFA) by appropriating the very same (Taiwanese) nationalist and populist discourses that had prevailed under the DPP. However, far from assuming neoliberalism has finally reached hegemonic status, I unravel a number of key sites of struggles and the ways in which nationalism and populism mediated these struggles. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the Sunflower Movement in 2014, focusing on the rise of popular sovereignty and the reconstruction of the “nation-people.” This revitalized entity will help negotiate the state’s trade and economic liberalization measures with China in particular and embrace a deterritorialized national economy in general. While discussing the limits of such a strategy, it also sheds light on the persistent effects and potential of the populist intervention in the course of neoliberalization henceforward.   	 31	Chapter 2 Democratization, Populism, and Taiwan’s Early Trade and Economic Liberalization   I.  Introduction  Conjunctural analysis has proved to be productive in studying hegemonic crisis and path to neoliberalization across different historical and geographical contexts. Originated from Gramscian theory, conjunctural analysis investigates neoliberalism as a political project transcoding long existing social, economic and political forces, imaginaries, and practices within and across hegemonic groups through multiple forms of crisis, especially in its transnational articulation. It also attends to variegated, sometimes contradictory, discursive practices at multiple sites in a particular historical moment and therefore illustrates rather contingent outcomes of neoliberalization.  For societies caught in the postcolonial conditions, populist and nationalist politics plays a crucial role in such a project, where impulses of economic liberalization often come in tandem with emerging struggles for democratization and reconfiguration of nationalist politics within society. To many East Asian states, democratization and economic liberalization also indicate a challenge to the “developmental state”—a growth model underpinned by the social relations of production largely orchestrated by the state. The particularity of Taiwan’s history situates at the intersections of both of the dynamics. As such, the ways in which these evolving social and political trends articulated with liberalization impulses, as well as their distinct outcomes, present a rather complicated story to tell.  In this chapter, I seek to demonstrate the conjunctural origin of Taiwan’s early trade and economic liberalization in relation to the process of hegemonic restructuring of Taiwan since the 1980s. To illustrate the process, I examine the ways in which emerging political forces—oppositional movement and populist politics—reshaped the official economic agenda and redirected policy orientation. The analysis will start with a review of the existing literature on the initiation of 	 32	Taiwan’s economic liberalization. The review sheds light on the statist tendency dominating prevailing analyses of trade and foreign economic liberalization and hints at the shortcomings of this statism. I examine the precursor of trade and economic liberalization in Taiwan, foreign exchange reserves and its deregulation. Specifically, I illustrate how foreign exchange was transformed from an issue of internal struggles within the governing regime to a populist concern, against the backdrop of a rising popular movement whose project was made more convoluted by the force of NTD currency adjustment. The social responses this entailed not only challenged the moral ground of the state’s restrictive monetary policy but also contributed to the birth of a new political subject—the people—that has driven further liberalization of trade and foreign economic policies in Taiwan.    II.  Liberalization of Trade and Foreign Economic Policies in Taiwan: the Statist Approach and Its Critique  Economic liberalization refers to a wide array of policy initiatives ranging from privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the opening of domestic market, to the pursuit of financial deregulation. In the real world, these policies are usually implemented in a discrepant manner as a result of complex dynamics between external and internal forces at particular historical conjunctures. While Taiwan makes no exception in this regard, the existing literature on Taiwan’s economic liberalization bifurcates between studies on domestic realm and on foreign economic affairs and approach them separately. These approaches not only yield discrepant evaluations of policy outcomes and their implications to state capacity, but also utilize very different analytical lenses in explicating their drivers (see Figure 2.1).       	 33	Figure 2.1   Analytical Frameworks to Economic Liberalization in Taiwan  State autonomy Policy domain Driving force Ideological underpinning Domestic economic realm Weakened state autonomy with a variety of neoliberal outcomes  • Privatization of SoEs • Liberalization of State-franchised and state-controlled industries  Endogenous • Rearrangement of state-society relationship • Political democratization The rise of populist Taiwanese nationalism Foreign economic policies Strong state bureaucrats adopting “liberalization plus” strategy to  utilize market forces • Proactive selectivity of FDI • Paced trade liberalization  • Financial surveillance • Strong trade-industry policy nexus Exogenous • US market-access hegemony   • Economic nationalism  • Neomercantilism     The literature focusing on the domestic realm largely draws on privatization of state-owned enterprises (SoEs) and liberalization of the state-franchised or state-controlled economic arena since the late 1980s as proof of the prevalence of neoliberalism in Taiwan. Despite discrepant outcomes in different policy domains and the dichotomous assessment of their influence on the autonomy and capacity of the developmental state, they are commonly attributed to endogenous forces working to restructure internal state-society relations, with the capital class gradually dominating the policy forming procedure. As to cultural and ideological underpinnings, the rise of populist politics and Taiwanese nationalism are usually highlighted as forces contesting state autonomy (Tsai 2001; Chang 2008; Lin 2008; Chu 2009; Hsu 2009; Chen & Li 2012; Wang 2012).   On the contrary, research on liberalization of trade and foreign economic policies usually draws on the theoretical framework of neoliberal hegemony, where neoliberalization is deemed exogenous and materialized in the rise of US market-access hegemony (Li 1990; Tsai 2001; Dent 2003a). Scholarship of this kind largely holds a firmer stance on the persistence of state autonomy and capacity in accommodating, harnessing, and utilizing externally imposed neoliberal forces for its own benefit against pressure from the US to liberalize. The Taiwanese government’s proactive selectivity of inward foreign direct investment (FDI), its pacing of trade liberalization, its weakening yet enduring financial surveillance, and its capacity to utilize global markets to enhance 	 34	the competitiveness of domestic business are highlighted in these arguments (Dent 2003; Thurbon & Weiss 2006; Chu 2007).  Neoliberal hegemony from afar and proactive adaptation by bureaucrats from within has become the dominant explanatory framework in the literature on liberalization of trade and foreign economic policies, where the state is viewed as the active agent responding to external hegemonic forces for marketization. Scholarship of this kind shares the following theoretical presumptions: it conceives neoliberal hegemony as emanating from a single source—Western economic doctrine—with local adaptations, it emphasizes the oppressive nature of neoliberal hegemony, and it sees the state as the major site from which to confront externally imposed neoliberal forces, in which political elites and state bureaucrats serve as the major agents. Such a stance is manifest in Dent’s (2003) justification of focusing on the state bureaucrats to interrogate trade and foreign economic policy liberalization in Taiwan. Foreign economic policies contain greater knowledge barriers and therefore seem opaque to the populace, and state bureaucrats continued to enjoy autonomy because corporatism was effectively curbed to avoid its influence in central decision-making processes, and Taiwanese civil society had not yet developed the capacity to challenge state-business relationships.   Despite the emphasis put on institutional and regulatory change (or persistence) in Taiwan’s trade and economic liberalization, the statist approach hints at an enduring trait of “economic nationalism” of the techno-bureaucrats as the cultural and ideological underpinnings of such an economic paradigm. However, their approach to economic nationalism is rather instrumentalist (Crane 1998). While emphasizing the role of the state in reorganizing social and economic relationships by invoking nationalist discourses, it leaves the notions of the “nation,” “national identity” and “national economy” largely unexplained. As a consequence, it not only ends up reproducing the discourse coined by official nationalism—or nationalism from above—but also obscures the significant role nationalist politics might have played in Taiwan’s initiation of economic and trade liberalization.  Moreover, the statist approach obscures as much as it reveals about the ascendency of neoliberalism in a particular space-time and its underpinning political forces. As Barnett (2005, p. 	 35	10) reminds us, “[r]ecent theories of ‘neoliberalism’ have retreated from the appreciation of the long-term rhythms of socio-cultural change, which Stuart Hall once developed in his influential account of Thatcherism as a variant of authoritarian populism. Instead, they favor elite-focused analyses of state bureaucracies, policy networks, and the like.” It is because the statist approach conceives “society” as the residual of bureaucratic governance or simply the derivative expression of power struggles between a set of given interest groups or classes, that the political analysis it yields is rather partial. What is missing in such conceptualization of the “social” is the long evolution of bottom-up populist politics and the ways in which it works to re-orientate trade and foreign economic policies.   Addressing such an analytical bias is of particular importance when investigating Taiwan’s early trade and economic liberalization, for the decade of the 1980s not only witnessed the initiation of trade and economic liberalization in Taiwan, but also underwent boiling social, cultural and political contestations challenging state hegemony. The domestic turmoil originated in fast-changing international dynamics of the 1970s, when the One-China policy and the official Chinese nationalism imposed by the KMT regime after its retreat to Taiwan in 1949 began to face fundamental legitimacy crises. It was the time when the international community was shifting its recognition to CCP’s sovereignty; the subsequent oppositional movements following the 1979 Formosa incident4 had escalated to its peak when thousands of opponents emerged to openly confront the KMT’s authoritarian regime and contributed to the abolishing of martial law in 1987. More importantly, the political dissidents arising from the democratization movement managed to make their way into the parliament via election with limited seats open to indigenous Taiwanese. Facing legitimacy crises in both the political and cultural arenas, the KMT was forced to launch indigenization, which on the one hand contributed to the “Taiwanization of the R.O.C. regime” (Wakabayashi 2014) and on the other caused a bifurcation between the faction that upheld a status quo cross-strait relationship and one that embraced irredentism. These internal cultural-political struggles were further convoluted with the fast-changing international economic environment, 																																																								4	Also	known	as	the	“Kaohsiung	incident,”	the	Formosa	incident	refers	to	the	political	event	that	happened	in	December	10,	1979,	when	the	authoritarian	state	arrested	a	number	of	oppositional	political	leaders	in	the	name	of	insurrection.	Most	of	these	political	leaders	were	founders	of	the	Formosa	Magazine,	which	promoted	democracy	and	freedom	against	the	authoritarian	KMT	regime	that	imposed	martial	law	in	Taiwan.		 36	including the rise and transformation of US market-access hegemony and China’s economic reform, creating complicated intersections between geopolitics and geoeconomics as a result.  By deploying a more rigorous understanding of “social” and “political” forces, I seek to provide an alternative account of trade and economic liberalization in Taiwan that challenges the prevailing “neoliberal hegemony versus developmental state” analytical nexus. Rather than being preoccupied with policy discourses from political elites and bureaucrats, I draw on news threads and editorials in the newspapers, social commentaries from economic magazines, and the legislative interpellation records as ways to capture the populist discourses and imaginaries “from below.” In doing so, I trace the initiation of trade and economic liberalization to the politicization of foreign exchange reserves and their control during the mid-1980s, from which the story unfolds.   III. Early Trade and Economic Liberalization: A Paradigm Shift    Taiwan’s economy experienced growth in the 1950s after World War II. Yet it was the 1960s when the Taiwanese state began to adopt export-oriented industrialization under the US’s Cold War regional geoeconomic deployment that its economy started to boom in an unprecedented fashion. The growth model, although it won a renowned reputation of “economic miracle” for Taiwan for its great success, encountered fundamental challenges in the 1980s. On the one hand, the SME-driven export business experienced a decline in international competitiveness due to a rise in labor costs; the domestic economy also showed stagnation in investment with excessive savings, hinting at a serious imbalance of money supply. On the other hand, the rise of US protectionism from the late 1970s led to measures to address the trade deficit and trade sanctions against the East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs), making Taiwanese exporters’ heavy reliance on the US market difficult to sustain. These internal and external forces together slowed down the growth engine to a great extent, challenging the efficacy of the development model that underpinned Taiwan’s post-war economy.  In response to the structural crisis, the Taiwanese government developed in 1984 new guidelines for future economic development—“liberalization, internationalization and institutionalization.” 	 37	The Economic Reform Committee was subsequently created in May 1985 with the aim of paving substantial paths for total economic restructuring. It was co-convened by three prestigious figures of the time—Chao Yao-Tung (Āٌ), Minister of the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), Chiang Shou-Chieh (çÇ!), Director of the Chinese Economic Research Institute, who was also a disciple of the well-known liberal economist Friedrich von Hayek, and Koo Chen-Fu (Ăv¹), President of the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce, Taiwan. Noticeably, the Committee was teamed up with dozens of business tycoons, including Wang Yung-Ching (³p), President of the Formosa Plastic and Petrol Group. Inauguration of the Committee marked a significant restructuring of the ruling coalition in Taiwan from the 1980s, where for the first time academic elites and business representatives were incorporated in the top decision-making mechanism of the government. Tightening the relationships between the state, academics, and economic elites also served as a strategy for the KMT regime to strengthen its governing legitimacy in the face of its loss of Westphalian sovereignty while at the same time accommodating growing appeals for democratization—a political maneuver termed by Wang “the backward legitimation” (1989).   Guided by the overarching principle of liberalization, the Committee spent six months conducting a thorough review of five major economic areas: finance, fiscal and taxation, trade, industrial plans, and economic administration. It concluded with fifty-six detailed proposals for different government branches to carry out economic reform initiatives. Although the consensus achieved by different committee members represents a paradigm shift to economic liberalization among the ruling class, the proposed measures are characteristic of being careful and gradual, rather than a prompt pursuit of drastic liberalization.   Such a liberalizing scheme based on a sense of practicability also reflects on the proposal for trade and foreign economic liberalization. In its Report released in 1985, the Committee advocated for market principles to replace state control over trade, including further tariff reduction; it also proposed non-orthodox free trade means such as encouraging countertrade practices.5 As to the 																																																								5	Countertrade	denotes	a	reciprocal	form	of	international	trade	practice	where	goods	and	services	are	exchanged	between	two	or	multiple	countries	without	using	hard	currencies,	which	includes	barter,	switch	trading,	counter	purchase,	buyback,	etc.		 38	trade-related foreign exchange policies, despite proffering a number of liberalizing measures such as allowing firms to retain a certain amount of foreign currency for trading expenses, the Committee stated firmly that “due to our country’s particular political situation, there is still necessity to reserve foreign exchange control” (The Executive Yuan 1985, p. 55), with an instruction to the Central Bank to “adequately intervene in the foreign exchange market” (ibid p. 125-26). The emphasis on practicability in policy enforcement and active intervention of the foreign exchange market render Taiwan’s early liberalization experience far from the ideology of orthodox neoliberalism.  Interestingly, in just two years’ time, the Taiwanese government’s foreign exchange policy based on the principle of “adequate deregulation” shifted fundamentally. In 1986, foreign exchange control based on an approval system—enforced since World War II—was terminated, replaced by a spontaneous report system. Moreover, in 1987, the “amended bill for Foreign Exchange Control Act” was passed in Parliament, marking a nearly total deregulation of foreign exchange control. Even the policy review published by the Committee in 1988 expressed surprise at the extent to which liberalization of foreign exchange control had been accomplished by the Central Bank compared to other liberalization measures—many of which were halfheartedly implemented due to institutional path dependence. Such a policy shift yielded significant implications for Taiwan’s foreign economic policies as a whole: It not only unfettered cross-border capital flow but also triggered persisting waves of outward investment of Taiwanese capital for the ensuing two decades, which was not even conceived of in the Committee’s reform scheme. Apparently, such unprecedented transformation is not explicable solely by the paradigm shift among the governing elites or power restructuring of the ruling class. One has to look elsewhere to find better explanations. It is where the page turns.     	 39	IV. The Joys and Dilemmas of National Wealth  Foreign Exchange Reserves as a Form of National Wealth  Although the Taiwanese governing elites had reached a consensus about the scope, scale and pace of liberalization for various economic fields by the mid-1980s, mounting foreign exchange reserves and their control emerged unexpectedly as a highly debated issue. Too often bypassed in the analysis of Taiwan’s export-oriented development mechanism are the strict monetary policies it is premised on, where foreign exchange and currency control served as the major means to assist expansion of exportism (Wade 1990; Gold 2015). Under such a policy rationale, all the overseas profits made by private business in the form of foreign currency were required to be sold back to the Central Bank in exchange for New Taiwan Dollars, and monetary outflow was highly restricted. This stood in sharp contrast with the loosely controlled inward FDI policy initiatives implemented by the Taiwanese government from the post-War era,  commonly referred to as “welcome the inflow; curbing the outflow” (Î)ÎĄ) FDI policy. Such a mandate was also an outcome of the lingering War legacy, where monetary outflow was deemed as “shaking the foundation of the country” for it reduced state capacity for war preparation and economic stabilization—the lesson learned by the KMT government after losing control of mainland China.   When the Republic of China in Taiwan lost its UN membership in 1971, it was subsequently disqualified from participating in international financial organizations such as the World Bank and IMF. Ever since then, foreign exchange reserves developed much broader symbolic power than as merely the basis for war preparation by the state. It includes the capability of repaying foreign debt, determines the purchasing power of the state, and serves as an overall emblem of the economic power of a nation. Together, these concerns contributed to the Taiwanese government’s obsession with holding foreign exchange reserves as a way to redeem its insecure sovereign status in the international political economy.  The excessive trade surplus brought by exportism, mediated by the mechanism of foreign exchange control, ultimately contributed to the consistent growth of foreign exchange reserves from the early 1980s in Taiwan (see Figure 2.2). After the mid-1980s, it further grew exponentially until the year 1987. The mounting foreign exchange reserves subsequently became the symbol of 	 40	national wealth, as Taiwan became the 6th ranked state in foreign exchange reserves and the highest ranked in per capita terms. Such an unprecedented accumulation of national wealth was hence hailed by the Taiwanese government as the demonstration of its efficacy in guiding the economic development of the entire country—especially in comparison with developing countries mired in huge amounts of foreign debt, South Korea in particular.  However, the joys of “national wealth” concomitantly brought dilemmas to the Taiwanese state. Apprehension regarding the role of the Central Bank and the negative effects its stringent foreign exchange control might cause arose among the Western-trained liberal economists and business leaders, both of whom were gaining prestige in the ruling class. While scholars from the official think-tank Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (ãÔ©ÅÊĔ) cautioned that the Central Bank’s manipulation of foreign exchange and currency markets would eventually lead to inflation and exacerbate trade imbalances, the business leaders, President of the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce (Taiwan) Koo Chen-Fu (Ăv¹) for instance, also publicly warned against the potential consequences mounting foreign exchange reserves might bring, including insufficient domestic investment and deteriorating business environment. Such warnings first forced the Central Bank to promise suspension of massive surveillance for illegal evasion of foreign exchange.6 The voices were later incorporated in the government’s decision-making process by bringing liberal economists and business leaders to form the Economic Reform Committee in 1985, where the principle of “adequate deregulation” of foreign exchange control was officially proposed.  																																																								6	Benevolent	Measure	Will	Be	Employed	for	Foreign	Exchange	Control.	(1984,	April	1).	Economic	Daily,	01.		 41	 Figure 2.2   Foreign Exchange Reserve, Taiwan, R.O.C. Data source: Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan)  Contesting Imaginaries of National Economy among the Ruling Class The mounting foreign exchange reserve not only evoked apprehension over its potential side effects but also opened up the space for variegated—and sometimes contradictory—economic discourses and strategies from different strata of the ruling class, who competed over control of the “national economy.” Opinions varied between developmentalist bureaucrats, traditional industrial sector, and the growing influence of the international trade and commerce authority. Different opinions within the government body also resonated with the highly divergent voices from scholars who occupied important positions in providing policy advice to the state. The competing voices thus manifested internal struggles among the ruling class over the economy.  First, proponents of the traditional developmental state model, Minister of Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) Chao Yao-Tung (Āٌ) and Principal of National Taiwan University, Sun Chen (Tě), for instance, emphasized the role of the state in utilizing the accumulated wealth for the good of the entire nation. They believed that the core problem of the mounting foreign exchange reserve was not financial or trade induced and therefore could not be 0100002000030000400005000060000700008000090000USD	(million)	 42	solved via trade or financial means alone. Rather, it signaled a quandary of the old development model based on light manufacturing; only industrial upgrades could help with the situation. Their prescribed diagnosis ranged from a Keynesian model of expanding public expenditure to cultivating strategic industries, but the latter had to compete with liberalization appeals which advocated for termination of tariff protection implemented in the name of cultivating “national industry.”7 Hence automobile and aviation industrial plans failed due to severe internal opposition. Against this backdrop, in 1986, the government initiated a fourteen-item development project and promoted high-tech industry with the aid of inward FDI—a brand new industrial sector that was able to escape internal political struggles over the vested interest of the “protected sectors.” Its subsequent success drove the second wave of Taiwan’s economic growth in the 1990s, but the continuing growth of foreign exchange reserves was stills a pressing issue for the government to tackle in the mid to late 1980s.  As a result, there was growing advocacy for trade and economic liberalization as a means to address the problem associated with mounting foreign exchange reserve—an equally influential policy initiative that is often neglected in industry-focused developmental state analysis. Such advocacy ranged from further opening of domestic markets to deregulation of foreign exchange control. Advocates of the former consisted of liberal economists from different academic institutions, including Chiang Shou-Chieh (çÇ!), Director of the Chinese Economic Research Institute, Lu Min-Ren (Ė›), Chair of the Department of Economics at National Chengchi University, etc.. For them, the nature of the phenomenon was mainly a trade imbalance caused by the government’s blind pursuit of exportism and its mal-intervention in the free market economy. Trade liberalization was therefore endorsed as a way to restore market principle. Such advocacy gained much currency as liberal economists were gradually incorporated in the ruling alliance in the 1980s, and, as early as 1985, the Economic Reform Committee proposed large-scale tariff reductions.   Nevertheless, proponents of the latter regarded the foreign exchange reserve as a form of “idle capital” that could only be best utilized via deregulation. Such an appeal, however, was supported 																																																								7	The	populist	political	rationale	opposing	the	development	of	the	“national	industry”	will	be	discussed	in	greater	detail	in	the	following	section.		 43	by two camps with very different imaginaries of the “national” economy—direct overseas investment and indirect offshore financial capitalism. The first stance was advocated by the Administrative Deputy Minister of the Economic Affairs Wu Mei-Chun (8’‹), who was also hailed as the “Father of Economic Processing Zones in Taiwan.” This camp promoted the Japanese model of moving the less competitive industries overseas in pursuit of greater market share and secure resources.8 This viewpoint was echoed by a number of business leaders from the traditional industries, along with legislators, who industriously urged the government to adopt a more flexible outward investment policy. Yet the government abruptly rejected the proposal, insisting that to avoid capital drain, overseas investment should not be hastily deregulated or even encouraged.  Meanwhile, campaigners for “indirect financial investment” argued that none of the above-mentioned policy initiatives—strengthening domestic investment and industrial upgrading, opening import markets to re-balance trade, and encouraging direct overseas investment—would “solve the problem” from its core. Instead, the only effective measure was to “learn from Singapore and Hong Kong” in turning the idle money into internationally operated financial capitalism. This novel advocacy was acclaimed under the banner of “turning Taiwan from a big country of exportation to a great country of investment,”9 including investing in foreign stock markets, purchasing foreign high-tech companies, setting up bank branches worldwide, and investing in overseas real estate. These ideas were embraced by a number of business leaders, Koo Chen-Fu for instance. However, given the fact that the financial industry was highly controlled by the government at the time, no effective pressure group was able to form to push through the ideas, and the proposals were easily turned down by the government out of concern for capital outflow and sustaining “economic security.”    																																																								8	Best	Way	to	Utilize	Foreign	Exchange	Reserve:	Overseas	Investment.	(1984,	July	24).	Economic	Daily,	01.9	Cheng,	Chu-Yuan.	(1986,	June	9).	From	A	Big	Country	of	Exportation	to	a	Great	Country	of	Investment.	United	Daily	News,	02.		 44	Institutional Response: Gradual Deregulation with a Managerial Approach The preceding section noted a proliferation of imaginings of the foreign exchange reserve as a form of “national wealth.” The discussion around how to best utilize the national wealth subsequently triggered “problematization” of the existing restrictive foreign exchange policy based on the logic of monetary control. Most importantly, discrepant opinions regarding the foreign exchange reserve and its deregulation remained an internal struggle over different development paths by different strata of the ruling class and therefore was still rendered a top-down reform initiative.   Facing a variety of advocates for deregulating foreign exchange control, the governing authority—including Premier Yu Kuo-Hwa (@ã), who used to be the Governor of the Central Bank before succeeding to his new position—and the Central Bank continued to respond with a lukewarm tone, insisting on the necessity of maintaining large foreign exchange reserves in the name of the nation’s political and economic security. Two international incidents of financial crisis taking place in 1985 were repeatedly drawn on to justify the rationale of foreign exchange control—the foreign debt crisis in South Africa due to massive withdraw of FDI in the face of political upheaval, and China’s being short of foreign exchange as a result of abrupt economic reform. The discourse of security was so prevalent that it outdid other competing discourses from different strata of the government. Personnel hiring between governing agencies relevant to monetary policies together with the discourse of security manifest significant elements of institutional continuity regarding the decision for foreign exchange control.  Nonetheless, growing involvement of economists and business representatives in the policy-making mechanism transformed the standpoint held by the conservative monetary regulatory regime piece by piece. Under guidelines provided by the Economic Reform Committee, the Central Bank launched a series of policy adjustments gearing towards “adequate deregulation” of foreign exchange control, including lifting the limit of personal foreign exchange settlement by forty percent compared to that in 1984, increasing the upper limit for outward money remittance, facilitating public and private enterprises to accelerate their repayment schedule for foreign debts, and amending its Foreign Exchange Control Act from an approval system to spontaneous report system. In a nutshell, owing to both the institutional continuity and political compromise achieved 	 45	through extending corporatism, the government was able to take a managerial and piecemeal approach to address the liberalization appeal from within the ruling class.   V.  Politicization of Foreign-Exchange Control  The Richest Poor? Popular Reinterpretation of the “National Wealth” The extraordinary growth of Taiwan’s foreign exchange reserve not only drew attention from the governing elites but also became a general concern among the populace thanks to the loosening of the “client press” system and the more balanced stance media reporting took in the mid-1980s (Lin 2000). At the early stage of the media’s growth, business pages from all the mainstream newspapers began to update the foreign-exchange numbers on a monthly basis. Such marathon-like reporting continued through the coming years, with social commentaries about what to do with the “national wealth” constantly making headlines. As Taiwan bypassed Japan and became the third largest foreign-exchange-reserve holding country in the world in 198610, the business magazines—most of which came into existence in the 1980s as a result of the emerging entrepreneurial social atmosphere and political democratization—started to jump on the bandwagon of social criticism. For instance, one of the leading enterprising magazines, the Commonwealth (MĘó), which served as a pioneer promoting liberal economic thought in Taiwan since the early 1980s, utilized sensational headlines such as “Money Worries” and “It’s More Difficult to Spend Money” in its series reports on the issue of the mounting foreign exchange reserve.  With the aid of media, the issue of escalating foreign exchange reserves was rapidly popularized and then problematized among the public. Social critique started to term such a big fortune “the idle money,” commenting that Taiwan was suffering from the illness of prosperity (\úº). Popularization of self-parody capturing this unprecedented phenomenon—from “scrooge” (VùP), “the riches poor” (…‡Ď¿Ë), “begging with a golden bowl” (uåċĝÆð), and “money flood” (Ϧ­o), to “confined in the golden mountain” (E?ċb)—soon stirred up 																																																								10	Taiwan	was	ranked	first	in	Foreign	Exchange	Reserve	per	capita.		 46	doubt about the government’s insistence on maintaining excessive foreign exchange reserves as a form of “national wealth.” Moreover, social criticism also made its way into the representative politics as a number of legislators started to argue that the Central Bank’s conservative foreign reserve policy was nothing more than a superstitious belief in hoarding money. A number of legislators even utilized patriotic rhetoric by contending that depositing the money in foreign banks without using it was simply like helping other countries with their own economic development.  The aforementioned social commentaries began to question the adequacy of the state’s foreign exchange policy. The question of excessive foreign exchange reserve no longer remained a problem exclusive to the ruling elites but had become a concern among the public, mediated through the loosening of media environment and the burgeoning business press. Specifically, the discourses surrounding “the richest poor” and the like served to question the appropriateness of state control over the national wealth and therefore provided a competing discourse against “the success of planned-market economy” that had long been hailed by the KMT regime. However, despite the fact that deregulation of the foreign exchange reserve was from time to time mentioned in these social commentaries, “the state” was still conceived as the main agency to reform itself in pursuit of a more liberal foreign exchange policy.   The Turning Point: The Currency War The government’s managerial adjustment of its foreign exchange control policy did not face severe challenges until mid-1986, when the issue of the foreign exchange reserve was connected with the currency adjustment measure—a turning point that officially transformed the nature of the dispute from questioning the state’s “appropriateness of control” over foreign exchange reserve to challenging the legitimacy of its attempts to sustain control over the reserve at large. In this transformation, pressure from the US served as the major—although not the only—driver.  In the mid-1980s, Taiwan faced a gradual slow-down in its economic growth as a consequence of the aforementioned structural constraints. Following industrial and trade measures, the efficacy of adopting currency adjustment as a means of boosting Taiwan’s economy came under the spotlight among the governing elites. Yet, advice regarding how to employ currency measures to address the problem bifurcated among the ruling class. While the liberal economists and some industrialists 	 47	emphasized market logic instead of “inappropriate” government intervention in guiding the economy, most of the export-oriented business representatives, with the support of Koo Chen-Fu, advocated gradual NTD depreciation as a way to enhance further exports. 11  However, such advocacy unavoidably drew attention from the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). AIT severely denounced the proposal for NTD depreciation in news reports by commenting that “with such a huge amount of foreign exchange reserve, how could Taiwan dare think of depreciating its currency?”12  AIT’s forbidding condemnation had its political roots back home. The year 1985 witnessed a strong return of US trade protectionism after years of recession as a consequence of USD over-appreciation. In September 1985, the US reached the Plaza Accord with Japan, Western Germany, France and the United Kingdom to depreciate the USD against major currencies as a way to address its trade deficit and the rising protectionist appeal from the domestic environment. Its influence was worldwide though. In Taiwan, the pace of USD depreciation became so drastic and deep—a drop of nearly ten percent within a week—that the Central Bank in Taiwan had to intervene in the currency market by buying more USD in order to peg the currency rate. However, such conduct would not only exacerbate the problem of large foreign exchange reserves that had haunted the Bank from the beginning of the 1980s but also raise concerns from US authorities. Therefore, the Bank decided to let the NTD gradually appreciate in the long run—a maneuver that was designed to buy time for domestic industries to make necessary adjustments. This move effectively slowed down the pace and scope of NTD appreciation against the USD in the months to come, which turned out to increase only five percent over half a year (from 1:40.5 to 1:38).  The Central Bank’s intervention was generally applauded by the public, and it was commonly believed that the scale of NTD appreciation was enough to withstand the pressure from the US. However, at the end of 1986, US protectionism turned its claws directly towards Taiwan. In the past, the US market hegemony exercised its power over Taiwan primarily through the mechanism of “issue linkage,” meaning to manipulate discrepant interest structures among different trade items in order to pursue specific sectoral interests in the process of trade negotiations (Li 1990). 																																																								11	Discrepancy	on	Whether	NTD	Should	Go	through	Deep	Depreciation.	(1985,	July	16).	United	Daily	News,	02.	12	AIT	Agreed	that	NTD	Should	Not	Depreciate	Extensively.	(1985,	August	4).	Economic	Daily,	02.		 48	Yet in 1986, the US started to utilize what are regarded as “non-traditional” trade means—currency-exchange rates—to pursue its goals. At the US-ROC trade negotiations held at the end of 1986, the US authority made a strong comment that Taiwan’s great success in its foreign exchange reserve was at the expense of extensive job losses for the American people. In the hearings for the US Trade Act held in 1987, a number of politicians and business representatives—including IBM—expressed their concern that the structural cause for Taiwan’s over-accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and trade surplus against the US was the purposely de-valued NT dollars. Spreading through domestic news reports, these messages not only aroused huge anxiety among the Taiwanese populace but signaled deepening trade sanctions for the Taiwanese government.  The external pressure from the US came along with the growing internal challenge of monetary over-supply attributed to both the Central Bank’s previous intervention in the currency market and the persistent trade surplus Taiwan generated against the US. Facing tremendous pressure, different government sectors between the Central Bank, Economic Bureau and Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) in Taiwan reached an agreement that the government for the first time would adopt market forces in currency appreciation as a means to collectively address joint issues including mounting foreign exchange reserves, trade imbalances, and excess money supply. The Bank’s previous intervention policy led society to anticipate a mild adjustment in currency exchange rate, but to the surprise of many, the government eventually decided to step aside, causing the NTD to appreciate against the USD by 20% from 1986 to 1987 (see Figure 2.3). Facing numerous social questions about the possible scope of NTD appreciation, the Central Bank responded that “we do not set any bar to the ‘reasonable range’ of NTD appreciation this time. Rather, we will respect market forces in determining the currency value.” 13  This seemingly “irresistible” choice made by the government had unexpected political consequences that were soon to come: the articulation of currency issues and foreign exchange control, and the total politicization of these issues by invoking the antagonistic relationship 																																																								13		NTD	to	USD	Continues	to	Appreciate:	Central	Bank	Shows	Respect	to	Market	Force.	(1986,	February	25).	United	Daily	News,	02.		 49	between the “people” and the “state.” This impetus not only made inroads into the state’s long-existing foreign exchange control regime but also challenged the state’s foreign trade and economic policies in general. Yet before explicating the ways in which the notion of the “people” was mobilized to contest the government’s foreign economic policies, I will shed some light on the social and political context that enabled such a political movement in Taiwan: the burgeoning oppositional movement against KMT rule and the rise of popular society.   Figure 2.3   Exchange Rate between NTD and USD Data source: Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan)  Oppositional Movement and the Rise of Popular Society The late 1980s witnessed the intensification of a political liberalization movement in Taiwan. After nearly four decades of political control, the Taiwanese state declared termination of martial law in 1987, a law that had been enforced by the KMT regime right after its retreat to Taiwan in 1949 as the legal basis for suppressing political dissidents. Such a transformation did not happen overnight though. It can be attributed to the ceaseless oppositional movement organized by the pro-independence dissidents and various new social movements rising in the 1970s through the 1980s, all of which surged as a response to the legitimacy crisis of the KMT regime after its loss of the 20.000	25.000	30.000	35.000	40.000	45.000	1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995NTD/USD	 50	UN membership in 1971, its diplomatic severance with the US in 1979, and its inability to deal with economic stagnation in the 1980s.  As the authoritarian state faced futility in containing these surging forces via oppressive means, it transformed itself to soft authoritarianism, a governing mechanism to incorporate varied “social voices” by tightening relationships with local business elites and bringing “additional legislators” into the parliament—most of them of Taiwanese ethnicity. It was with this opportunity that some of the political dissidents organized themselves to form the oppositional party, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 198614 and made their way into formal politics by sending a number of candidates into the legislative Yuan via election.   While the progress of the anti-KMT oppositional movement is widely believed to be the main cause of change in the ensuing policy-making processes, this claim deserves a second look. As the political economist Wang Jenn-hwan (1989) trenchantly points out, at the end of the 1980s, the pro-independence democratization movement was still considered marginal among the populace, and the DPP legislators only gained twenty-two percent of the total votes in the election for the additional legislators, not to mention it’s minimal veto power in the Legislative Yuan given only a few seats they held at the time. Clearly, DPP in the Parliament alone could not move the government as a whole. It was the general rise of multiple forms of social movements as the expression of collective social discontent that besieged the state.    Progressive scholars at the time turned to the idea of “popular society” to account for the real political force of change. The idea of popular society has its particular term in Chinese—the “min-jian society” (›ĒȆ). While it is sometimes translated into “civil society” ('›È†) in English, Taiwanese intellectuals of the time clearly noticed the difference between the two concepts. According to Mu (1987a), civil society is a notion based on modern, liberal Western political philosophy. The concept of popular society is indebted to Gramsci’s understanding of political society, Laclau’s theory of dominance and liberation, as well as Urry’s criticism of class-based orthodox Marxism. In Taiwan’s context, popular society characterizes an oppositional 																																																								14		Although	established	in	1986,	the	official	registration	of	DDP	was	in	1987,	the	year	when	martial	law	was	lifted.		 51	relationship between “the authoritarian party-state” and the oppressed people, and the self-awareness of society in light of the pastoral power of the state. Its appeal to liberalization, both in the political and economic arena, therefore, carries a moral bearing and implies birth of a new political subject—the people (Mu 1987b, Jiang and Mu 1987). In practice, although popular society in Taiwan held an ambivalent relationship with the oppositional movements that prioritized the goal of independence—the major force causing its later split—it nevertheless sympathized with their democratization appeal to dismantle party-state authoritarianism (Chang 1994).  The People vs. the State in the Economic Realm In the rise of the popular society, the antagonistic relationship between the state and the people is both political and economic in nature. In the progressive intellectuals’ theoretical construction of the “party-state-capitalism” (Ģ@ü‰Ø) framework, the dominant structure consists of a tri-lateral relationship between “state-party,” “state-economy” and “party-economy.” Each pair denotes different forms of domination and therefore requires respective frontlines for social struggles (Mu 1987a). However, it was the notion of the “party-state-capitalism” itself that was widely circulated and gained momentum in the oppositional movement targeting the KMT regime. Such a populist appeal not only denounced the authoritarian party-state regime that had ruled oppressively on the island for decades in the name of counter communist insurgency, but also disapproved of the economic base through which the regime endured.   What lies at the center of the critique is the populist account of the duo-economic system between an extensive economic arena controlled by the government, and the rest, left to the people (Chen et al. 1991). In such a dual system, the state-owned enterprises monopolized the domestic market and utilized a number of franchise businesses to secure clientelism, where thousands of SMEs were left to seek survival in the risky international export market without any aid from the state (Y. Wu 2004). Driven by antagonistic framing between the authoritarian party-state and the oppressed people, the severe attack on state’s infringement of the private economic arena eventually contributed to a wide-scale liberalization in the domestic economic arena in the 1990s, including liberalizing the financial sector and marketization of state-owned enterprises. However, before the populist force extensively changed the landscape of the domestic economy, it made inroads into foreign economic policies with foreign-exchange control serving as its initial target. 	 52	 “Leave Wealth with the People”: Foreign Exchange Deregulation  At the end of 1986, the government made the decision to let go of its long-existing intervention in the foreign-exchange market, causing the NTD to appreciate to an unexpected degree. Since nearly ninety percent of Taiwan’s foreign exchange reserve was deposited in the form of US dollars at the time, the immediate consequence of NTD currency appreciation against the USD was its sharp devaluation, with an estimated two billion NTD loss. Although the government unceasingly noted that it was a mere paper loss, it nonetheless instigated resentment against the government’s inappropriate programs, in the previous years, that had contributed to such a dire situation. Social criticism soon turned to challenging the state’s legitimacy in managing foreign exchange control for state security, thus triggering total politicization of the issue.   First, the Control Yuan15 announced that it would launch an investigation regarding whether the Central Bank’s foreign exchange control measures were “appropriate.” Social critique subsequently revolved around the boiling resentment over people’s hard-earned money being wasted by the government. Such a populist impulse further materialized in struggles within representational politics. A number of legislators—not limited to those from the oppositional camps—ceaselessly reproached the government’s misconduct as a moral flaw, not only because it had done harm to the people’s well-being but also because the state should not compete with the people in terms of profit-making. The parliament, therefore, reached an agreement to urge the Central Bank to “leave wealth with the people (ê\~›)” through foreign exchange deregulation. Such an appeal was also endorsed by business and industrial leaders, who proposed that the government should transfer the foreign exchange reserve to the hands of the people for their own use as a way to develop a “true people’s foreign exchange reserve.”16   What makes the appeal politically significant is that social critique and legislative interpellation for the first time mobilized antagonistic conceptualizations of “the state” and “the people” 																																																								15			The	Control	Yuan	is	an	independent	investigatory	agency	that	belongs	to	the	top	five	branches	of	the	Government	of	the	Republic	of	China	(Taiwan).	Set	up	according	to	the	Constitution	law	of	R.O.C.,	it	monitors	the	other	branches	of	government	on	behalf	of	the	people	and	exercises	the	power	of	impeachment,	censure,	and	audit.		16			Does	the	Government	Have	to	Play	the	Doorman?	(1987,	Jan	25).	United	Daily	News,	02.		 53	regarding foreign economic policies. In the past, the foreign exchange reserve was deemed the collective wealth of the entire nation, and the final authority over the national wealth resided in the state. However, as the populist appeal made its way into formal politics, the legislators started to assert that the foreign exchange reserve belonged to “the people,” whereas the government only had temporary responsibility to take care of it. Therefore, the people have the right to withdraw it when necessary, not to mention when the government infringes upon people’s assets.   Power Struggle between Legislative and Executive Authorities The mounting public pressure finally precipitated an abrupt deregulation of foreign exchange control in the summer of 1987. In the legislative amendment process, however, whether the final say about the foreign exchange reserves should belong to “the people” or “the state” continued to be a matter of struggle between the executive authority and the rising legislative power. As the Executive Yuan proposed to maintain the authority to suspend the law of deregulation in the face of “emergent circumstances” in its amendment draft, it infuriated both society and the Legislative Yuan as a whole. For instance, a journalist’s commentary cautioned that this design not only signaled the over-expansion of administrative power but also revealed that the government considered deregulation nothing but an act of benevolence to the people that could be withdrawn at any time.17 In the Parliament, thirty-one legislators from different political stances initiated a collective demand, insisting that only through authorization of the Legislative Yuan would the Executive Yuan declare suspension of foreign exchange deregulation. The ultimate triumph of legislative power, although it cannot be easily concluded to represent the loss of state capacity in monitoring foreign exchange activities (Dent 2003), symbolized the rise of the “people” as the political subject that worked to redefine the bearers of the national economy.     																																																								17		Reconsider	Criterion	for	Suspending	Foreign	Exchange	Reserve.	(1987,	May	14).	Economic	Daily,	02.		 54	VI.  Outward Investment Deregulation in the Name of the “People”  Contesting Outward Investment Regulation via the Duo Construction of “Political Liberation–Economic Liberalization”  The day of July 15th in 1987 marks a threshold in Taiwan’s political and economic history. It is the official date for abolition of both martial law and deregulation of foreign exchange control. Their synchronic arrival subsequently infused an overall sense of freedom in the social atmosphere, as if the long existing political and economic fetters imposed on Taiwanese society were finally removed. In the social commentary, the analogy between “political liberation” and “economic liberalization” prevailed in popular discourses, forming a coupling narration between the two. Employing such a discursive coupling, a number of legislators from both the KMT and DPP sides started to campaign to “lift the economic martial law,” pushing the government to eliminate “unnecessary” economic controls and amend outdated economic laws to catch up with the pace of political liberation.18 This discursive practice gained so much momentum from populist supporters that it served as the engine for both internal economic liberalization and liberalization of foreign economic policies related to trade and investment, but struggles over liberalizing outward investment manifests the case in point.  As illustrated in the previous section, the conflict between the state and the people on trade and investment liberalization first revolved around the issue of foreign exchange control. As soon as its deregulation occurred, public discontent moved to challenge the state’s outward investment policies, which imposed strict limitations on outward investment of the private sector. What the popular forces confronted was a state still fundamentally occupied with concerns of capital drain. As the logic of trade diplomacy dominated the Taiwanese government’s outward investment policies after its exit from the UN (Dent 2003), the only form of outward investment encouraged by the government was that which served the diplomatic purpose of the state, where the Taiwanese government’s first-ever outward investment policy initiative, “Strengthening trade and economic cooperation with the Central American countries,” plotted in 1984 provides a case in point. Despite the deregulation of foreign exchange control in 1987, the state still held a nonchalant attitude 																																																								18		Legislative	Yuan	Gazette	(1987).	Vol.	76,	No.	56,	pp.	97-98,	114-115,	125;	Legislative	Yuan	Gazette	(1988).	Vol.	77,	No.	4,	pp.	106-107.		 55	towards the public appeal for loosening outward investment restrictions, not to mention providing assistance or policy incentives for this.19   However, popular society did not simply comply with the state’s logic of trade diplomacy, nor did it endorse the moral underpinning of such a policy rationale. As the NTD appreciated more than forty percent during the years 1986 through 1988, numerous export-oriented SMEs—with an average profitability as low as five to six percent—went bankrupt. As an economic sector consisting of ninety-seven percent of all firms and more than eighty percent of the total employment in Taiwan, the currency appreciation problem facing the SMEs ultimately evoked an enormous crisis for the society as a whole. Populist resentment subsequently surged, asserting that the state’s willful decision was at the expense of SMEs’ survival.   The tension between the state and popular society—as embodied in the state attitude towards the SMEs—was further amplified by the state’s discriminative industrial-upgrading policy favoring FDI and big capitalists while excluding the local SMEs from its tax credit program, all of which fueled the populist view that the government was nonchalant towards the populace’s wellbeing. It was against this backdrop that the appeal for outward investment deregulation won its moral legitimacy: If the state could not guarantee sustenance of the SMEs at home, it at least should let go and allow them to seek survival abroad. In reality, numerous SMEs had already migrated overseas via informal channels since 1987—most of which were through personal remittance. It was estimated by the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research that within the single year of 1989, the amount of outward investment had already surpassed that of the total amount in the previous thirty years (Shi 2003). Witnessing such an unorganized yet large-scale social phenomenon, a reporter from Commonwealth Magazine even described their rashness as “exodus” rather than “outward investment.” 20 It was not until 1989 that the Taiwanese state decided to face squarely such an undeniable fact through further deregulation of companies eligible for outward investment and their scope of investment.     																																																								19		Legislative	Yuan	Gazette	(1988).	Vol.	77,	No.	65,	p.	17.	20		Hu,	Rong-Chiao	(1989).	Exodus	or	Outward	Investment?	The	Commonwealth,	96,	pp.	180-183.		 56	Business Tour to Moscow and Soviet Fever The disagreement between the state’s foreign economic policy and the populist appeal manifests in their discrepant attitudes towards outward investment in the Communist world, which was undergoing substantial transformation in the 1980s. In Taiwan, under the state’s enduring Cold War geopolitical policies, any business contact with its communist counterparts was sanctioned due to the anti-communist campaign of the KMT regime. However, in the late 1980s, the Soviet world was experiencing a trend of economic reform, where some of the Soviet allies began to show interest in establishing economic relationships with the capitalist world. This subsequently posed great attractions for Taiwanese firms, which were seeking alternative markets to avoid rising US trade protectionism.   The ensuing pressure on the government to relax trade restrictions with the Soviet world came both from the top down and the bottom up. While it was the pro-business, high-ranking officers who initiated gradual de-regulation of trade towards some parts of the communist world after several informal business trips to Eastern Europe (Tubilewicz 2007), the Parliament also played a key role in endorsing such a trend by “representing the people’s voice,” where legislators from both DPP and KMT urged the government to adopt the principle of “separating trade from politics” ({Ô*ę) by loosening its trade restrictions against communist countries. In doing so, DPP legislators continued to mobilize moral reasoning to compete with the state’s security discourse underpinning trade sanctions against the communist world. They highlighted the unfavorable situations facing SMEs as a result of the malicious state policy, hence requesting that the state abandon its groundless fear of Communism and actively assist SME’s outward investment as a form of compensation.21   The discursive struggle between “national security” and “people’s wellbeing” is vividly shown in the intriguing development of a political dispute over an “unauthorized” business trip to the Soviet Union in October 1988. Organized by the Import-Export Association of Taiwan, the visiting group consisted of fifty-eight business delegates from various industries who met with trade officers in Moscow. This tour thus marked Taiwan’s first contact with the Soviet Union after decades of Cold 																																																								21		Legislative	Yuan	Gazette	(1988).	Vol.	77,	No.	90,	pp.	89-90.		 57	War antagonism—still without official permission from the Taiwanese state. Because of its controversial nature, it inevitably aroused a stormy political dispute back home. The Executive Yuan was requested to provide a thorough review of its negligence by the anti-communist politicians in KMT, but such a mandate was contested by the Parliament. Legislators from both KMT and DPP highlighted the positive effects such “unofficial interaction” would bring to the society, and argued that the government’s resistant and passive attitude towards its people’s appeal would only exacerbate underground economic activities and leave Taiwanese enterprises to conduct business in a risky environment. The high pressure from the Parliament eventually caused the Deputy Secretary-general of the Presidential Office, Shen Chang-hwan (Ÿ€®), a politician known for his outspoken anti-communist ideology, to step down from his position. Henceforth, a new wave of “Soviet fever” followed, with a number of important industrial associations—including the Taiwan Textile Federation, the Taiwan Association of Machine Industry, and the Computer Association—organizing business tours for SMEs to explore opportunities in the Soviet Union one after another.   In 1990, the Taiwanese state reached the decision to allow direct trade and economic interactions with the communist world. It was noted that the time for Taiwan to deregulate its trade restrictions with the Soviet Union was before the official dissolution of the USSR in the winter of 1991. As demonstrated above, besides the external pulls, it was driven by the transforming economic and political forces in Taiwan. The long path of passive revolution, including the turning to the soft authoritarianism of the party-state, the forced indigenization of the KMT regime, and the growing association between high-ranking officers and corporations, all contributed to such a trend. Nonetheless, it was the discourse of “people’s economic well-being” that was constantly drawn on to challenge the notion of “national security” inherited from the Cold War ideology and ultimately contributed to its transformation.    The “People” in the Trade and Investment Deregulation with mainland China Compared to trading with the USSR, what triggered more political nervousness on the part of the Taiwanese state was the issue of economic interaction with mainland China. In 1948, the National Assembly under the KMT regime had passed “The Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion (,;rƒˆÞƒ“™)” to suspend the ROC’s constitution in 	 58	order to counter Communist insurgency. This Provision remained effective after the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949 and served as the overarching legislation for the enforcement of martial law. Under such a counter-communist campaign, the KMT regime in Taiwan continued to practice the “Three-Nos Principle” ({Í)—no contact, no negotiation, no compromise—by which any forms of contact with Communist China was sanctioned. It was under such a special law that trading with the Communist counterpart was criminalized; hundreds of suspects were even sentenced to death by Chiang’s authority in the name of  “financing the enemy” (ü0) at the early stages of ROC rule on Taiwan.  However, China’s economic reform in 1979, along with Taiwan’s deregulation of foreign exchange control in 1987, challenged the state’s agenda of containing Communism by trade sanction. Facing ceaseless appeal from academia and legislators to loosen control of cross-Strait economic interactions and to take a more active position in assisting SME investment in mainland China,22 the top administrative officials kept reiterating the position of banning trade for security reasons, with a blind eye turned to indirect trade made via third parties such as Hong Kong. It was not until 1989, that the government finally recognized the existence of massive capital outmigration via irregular channels and its significant influence on Taiwan’s economy. When this happened, indirect trade and investment with the mainland was for the first time allowed by the Taiwanese state. By October 1990, the Economic Bureau formulated “Regulations on Managing Indirect Investment or Technological Cooperation in the Mainland Area,” marking the first time that Taiwan’s outward investment in mainland China was incorporated into the government’s regulations.   In accounting for the initial shift in Taiwan’s trade policies towards Communist China at the turn of the 1990s, many analysts highlight the changing nature of the authoritarian regime as the driver. Such arguments emphasize the symbolic struggle internal to the party-state as the major cause, including indigenization of the KMT regime since the 1970s and the intensifying tension between the “mainstream faction” (¢) led by the first Taiwanese ethnic President of ROC, Lee Teng-																																																								22		Legislative	Yuan	Gazette	(1988).	Vol.	77,	No.	3,	pp.	66-67.	 59	hui (Š¼ā),23 and the “non-mainstream faction” (Ĝ¢) led by mainlander politicians within the ruling party towards the end of 1980s. It was the rising power of the mainstream faction in the KMT relative to its non-mainstream counterpart after Chiang Ching-Kuo’s death in 1988 that loosened the KMT’s Cold War geopolitical antagonism against the Communist world, with deregulation of trade and investment in mainland China following suit. A political economic analysis further contributes to the argument by adding that it was the business leaders’ growing influence on the state, which sought wider legitimacy by drawing support from business elites that eventually pushed the government to amend its trade policy towards mainland China.      While the aforementioned arguments portray a top-down force of change, I argue that the persistent populist movement played a far more profound role in this transformation. Despite being discouraged by the state, thousands of Taiwanese SMEs had gone through irregular channels to either trade with or invest in China, at the risk of breaking the law. Clearly, the government’s insistence on restricting people’s trade activities with the mainland did not win it moral leadership or substantial support from the populace. In May 1988, two Taiwanese traders were indicted and sentenced to five years by the High Court for “financing the enemy” simply for purchasing fry directly from mainland China. Such a high-profile incident quickly ignited public criticism about the appropriateness of the government prosecuting its people in the name of security, especially after the rescinding of martial law. Not only DPP legislators openly protested against the decision made by the court, but also KMT legislators condemned the existing law, arguing that it no longer addressed the reality of the cross-Strait relationship. What is more, this incident stood in contrast with the Central Bank’s proposal to fund mainland China via the Asian Development Bank around the same period of time. The double-standard illustrated by the two instances was thus reproached by DPP legislators through recourse to the well-known Chinese proverb: “The magistrates are free to burn down the houses, while the people are forbidden to light their own lamps” (4òeYz¬Ĥò¾Q °).   All the contention revolving around the illegality of trade with mainland China and the subsequent discontent about the state’s restrictive attitude towards cross-Strait economic interactions took 																																																								23		The	designation	of	the	Taiwanese	ethnic	Lee	Teng-hui	as	the	successor	of	Chiang	Ching-Kuo	itself	is	widely	considered	by	scholars	as	part	of	the	outcome	of	KMT’s	indigenization.	 60	place simultaneously with the furious democratization movement in the street. In the spring of 1990, nearly six thousand students occupied the Chiang Kai Shek Memorial Hall, demanding acceleration of political reform. Later named the “Wild Lily Movement,” the protestors’ appeal called for termination of the “Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion” and restoration of the Constitution. Caught in a power struggle with the “non-mainstream” KMT faction—which mostly consisted of mainlander politicians benefiting from the existing political system—President Lee Teng-hui soon decided to ride with the tide by promising to honor the appeals of the students.  Although mainly targeting internal political reform, the democratization movement nonetheless had a profound effect on the reshaping of the Taiwanese government’s cross-Strait policy towards mainland China. It marked an official end of civil war as a condition for ROC rule in Taiwan and also opened up space for a more active cross-Strait policy to replace the “Three-Nos Principle.” The establishment of institutions specializing in cross-Strait affairs, including trade issues, was then proposed by the government: the Mainland Affair Council (MAC, í{ĔLĖR;†) under the Executive Yuan as the chief authority in charge of cross-Strait affairs, and the non-government Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF, £d&c¢Hċ†) supervised by MAC as the executive body and the mediating organization to circumvent official contact with Beijing. In terms of trade and economic affairs, this process symbolized decriminalization, institutionalization and official recognition of Taiwanese outward investment in China—although with the “indirect” principle remaining intact.   Meanwhile, the notion of popular sovereignty nurtured by the democratization movement appeared for the first time in the Parliament, in reference to cross-Strait economic policy. In the midst of political upheaval and the government’s proposal for reforming its cross-Strait policies in 1990, a number of DPP legislators jointly petitioned the government to “develop a cross-Strait trade and economy policy on the premise of people’s consent and national security.”24 In this appeal, the legislators from the opposition party insisted that cross-Strait economic policy had to 																																																								24		Legislative	Yuan	Gazette	(1990).	Vol.	79,	No.	26,	pp.	199-200.			 61	be formed through democratic procedures, and its operation should be put under the supervision of Parliament.  However, the notion of the “people” began to bifurcate as the government sought to act “on behalf of the people” via setting up a non-governmental “civil” organization to address peoples’ needs in cross-Strait interactions. Operated on half government funds and half business donations, the Straits Exchange Foundation was designed to comprise forty-three non-official economic elites from mostly big corporations as its board members, with Koo Chen-Fu, President of the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce in Taiwan, serving as the Chairman. With such a design, the Foundation was expected to function as the mediating channel of cross-Strait affairs to bypass sensitive sovereignty issues and to speak “on behalf of” the peoples’ interest, including enhancing cross-Strait business exchange and negotiating business disputes. Despite ostensible protest from the DPP over its monopolizing and undemocratic nature and the grievances expressed by SMEs for their under-representation, the government insisted on its right to endorse the Foundation as soon as possible by appropriating a populist appeal to address the peoples’ wellbeing urgently.   The political consequences of such an institutional design are multiple. On the one hand, by delegating business leaders to govern cross-Strait affairs on behalf of the state, it works to blur the demarcation between the public and the private; on the other hand, by conflating “economic interest” with “the people,” it monopolizes the interpretation of what constitutes this subject position. As a result, the people—as represented by a group of business leaders—denotes the non-official, economic-oriented and, most importantly, de-politicized arena. The tension between “the people” and “the state” in the trade and economic arena was thus temporarily glossed over, yet the distrust between the populace and the post-democratization KMT regime remained. It was not until the second wave of KMT’s indigenization, launched in the mid-1990s, that the state-people relation was reconstructed. How such a hegemonic restructuring process realized via invoking a new form of nationalism and rearranging the social-economic relations will be the analytical focus of Chapter 4 and 5. But before that, we shall turn to another aspect of trade liberalization of the same period—the tariff war—for illustration.   	 62	Chapter 3 Twist and Turns to Trade Liberalization: Populism, Nationalism, and Embracing Free Trade  I. Introduction  As analyzed in the previous chapter, the rise of US trade protectionism in the 1980s, along with its adoption of currency measures in the trade negotiation with NICs, marked a critical moment for Taiwan when it deregulated its previously highly controlled foreign exchange and liberalized outbound investment. The reconfiguration of the state-society relationship in the domestic environment, as characterized by intensification of the opposition movement and the rise of minjian society (›ĒȆ), served as the crucial mechanism to accommodate such an exogenous force. Consequently, it turned the pressure into a populist critique of the state regarding the moral underpinning of the official notion of “national economy” and the legitimacy of its foreign economic policy.   What is more, the articulation between external geoeconomic forces and social-political impulses from within had not only kicked off deregulation of foreign reserve control and outward investment but generated profound influence on the inauguration of trade liberalization and its transformation in Taiwan during the decade ahead. Utilizing Taiwan’s path to trade liberalization and further consolidation of the free trade regime as the case in point, this chapter seeks to explicate that Taiwan’s pursuit of trade liberalization is inherited from the convoluted historical conjunctures of the 1980s, where trade liberalization had achieved a great level of “consent” among an array of liberal technocrats and economists, transnational business elites, politicians from different political spectrum, and the general public—involvement of each rests upon different types of interests, ideologies and social and economic structures. Together they formed a temporary historical bloc that provided the prerequisite for free trade hegemony to take shape in Taiwan.  As the analysis proceeds, attention will be paid to the role of ideas, discourses, and aspirations in constituting temporary “consent” for trade liberalization. The notion of “liberalization” will be 	 63	highlighted, as it consists of a set of malleable discourse modalities that are able to articulate with a wide range of social strata and political dynamics under different contexts and circumstances. Such articulation materialized in the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral trade liberalization agendas at multiple historical conjunctures and ultimately contributed to the seemingly “gradual yet persistent” pursuit of trade liberalization in Taiwan. I am thus seeking to provide a more historically-grounded and dialectical account of trade liberalization in Taiwan as an alternative to the prevailing account of US hegemony.   II. Taiwan’s Trade Liberalization under US Hegemony: Popular Explanations and Beyond  Ever since the US shifted its diplomatic recognition from ROC (Taiwan) to PRC and its subsequent passing of the US-Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, the “Sino-US trade negotiation” mechanism was formed as the de facto platform for the two governments to negotiate over a variety of economic and trade matters (Baldwin et al. 1995). Important issues to be negotiated ranged from tariff rate, Taiwan’s procurement from the US, industrial cooperation through investment, and annual negotiation about importation quotas of Taiwanese products to the US market such as textile, shoes and color TV. Although facing increased pressure from the US to address the issue of trade surplus, under the principle of “mutual benefit” promised by the US and the Taiwanese government’s inauguration of public procurement from the US of a variety of goods from agricultural products to military equipment as a way to show its “sincerity” to tackle the problem of Taiwan’s trade surplus, the annual negotiation in the early years was generally considered “smooth” and result relatively “successful.”25   Nonetheless, the rise of US trade protectionism during the second Reagan administration, along with the expansion of the market-access regime in the name of “reciprocity” and “fair trade” after the conclusion of the Trade and Tariff Act in 1984, marked a threshold of US foreign trade policy. 																																																								25		Sino-US	Trade	Negotiation	Successfully	Concluded	(1979,	Oct	5).	Central	Daily	News,	07;	Sino-US	Trade	Negotiation	Reached	Agreement	for	Mutual	Tariff	Reduction	(1979,	Oct	5).	Central	Daily	News,	03;	Sino-US	Trade	Negotiation	Concluded	with	Mutual	Satisfactory	of	Honest	Communication	(1982,	Oct	23).	Central	Daily	News,	03.		 64	It further framed the mounting trade surplus the newly industrialized countries held against the US as the consequence of unfair dumping on the US market. Among the NICs, Taiwan was particularly targeted, not only because it ranked as the 7th largest trading partner of the US26 and held the 3rd largest trade surplus against the US in 1985 but also because of the disproportional number of foreign exchange reserves Taiwan possessed compared to other NICs. To address the trade deficit problem, the US government requested Taiwan to launch unilateral trade liberalization, including measures ranging from tariff concessions, non-tariff trade barrier removal, and the enforcement of unconventional trade issues such as intelligence protection.  In response to the growing pressure from the US, the Taiwanese government appointed a “Special Taskforce of Sino-American Trade” (×û‚^‘`Ñ) by interdepartmental ministers under the lead of the Council for Economic Planning and Development in 1983, to further augment public procurement from the US and encourage investment in the US as the major means to address trade requests from the US (Chen 2001).27 Despite administrative measures taken under advice from the Special Taskforce, the asymmetrical bargaining power Taiwan held against the US unavoidably resulted in its defeat in almost every round of trade negotiation. In 1984, the US-Taiwan Rice Agreement initiated by the US to limit Taiwan’s rice export to the global market was signed. Under the constant threat of Section 301 and its subsequent amendments, the Taiwanese government terminated its long-existing state-monopolized tobacco and alcohol system for foreign import in 1986, followed by opening of the domestic market for import of sensitive agricultural products and liberalization of financial markets for foreign investment in 1988. These came along with multiple waves of drastic tariff modification launched by the Taiwanese government—both through legislation and administrative decree—with sizable tariff concessions being granted to US imports.  The extent to which trade liberalization was launched in Taiwan during the 1980s seems to reflect the transforming nature of US hegemony, where addressing trade and budget deficit loomed as the major concern for US’s foreign policy rationale (Corbridge & Agnew 1991; Gill 1993; Agnew & 																																																								26		During	the	1980s,	Taiwan	was	the	second	largest	trading	partner	of	the	US	in	East	Asia,	next	to	Japan.	27		The	Special	Taskforce	on	Sino-American	Trade	Decided	Yesterday	to	Enhance	US	Procurement	(1984,	Jan	01).	Economic	Daily,	01.		 65	Corbridge 1995; Glassman 2005). In the trade arena, expansion of the market-access regime put East Asian countries, including Japan and NICs, at the center of the storm. Given the great amount of trade surplus Japan and NICs accumulated against the US, the excessive means the US deployed to address this issue led to a considerable amount of literature concluding that trade liberalization in NICs was primarily a result of the “aggressive unilateralism” imposed by the US in the name of “reciprocity” and “fair trade” (Haggard & Cheng 1989; Baldwin et al. 1995; Chen & Liu 1997; Huang 2009).   While portraying a general trend of US hegemonic expansion via market-access regime in East Asia, some scholars have pointed out the different responses by South Korea and Taiwan. South Korea took a more protectionist stance and was more reluctant to accommodate the US compared to Taiwan (Haggard & Cheng 1989). In Taiwan’s case, the total tariff cut and market opening throughout the 1980s was much greater in scale and scope compared to either the number of items the US requested for tariff concession or the number granted by the Taiwanese government (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Spontaneous trade liberalization along with Taiwan's active pursuit of international free trade since the late 1980s renders a far more complex picture of what is generally suggested in the conceptualization of Pax Americana in East Asia. As such, an overall account of the ubiquity of the US power in world trade arrangements and the monolithic effect it generated across different geographical contexts may not be able to explain discrepant receptions and responses among the NICs. Reducing Taiwan’s early trade liberalization to a single exogenous factor risks obscuring rather than revealing what drove the development at large.  In order to capture the sources of discrepant responses among NIC countries, a number of scholars have adopted a state-centered approach by looking at the fundamental role each state played in shaping the trade regime and foreign economic policies in the face of external geopolitical and geoeconomic forces (Baldwin et al. 1995; Dent 2003). Scholarship of this kind puts an emphasis on state autonomy in setting the foreign economic agenda and its capacity for policy implementation. However, overemphasizing state autonomy or the persistent bureaucratic or institutional structuring that underpins state actions, rather than situating the state in the evolving social and political dynamics, can hardly avoid the criticism of the territorial trap and state-centrism that has mired international relations scholarship for long (Agnew & Corbridge 1995). 	 66	 Nonetheless, a number of scholars began to look from “inside-out” for an alternative explanation to conventional hegemony theory or a state-centered approach in accounting for Taiwan’s fervent pursuit of trade liberalization. Similar to the literature on the liberalization of the domestic economy, the political democratization of the 1980s is commonly ascribed by this scholarship as the internal drive for trade liberalization in Taiwan and beyond (Chen 2001; Mai & Shih 2001; Milner & Kubota 2005). Analysis largely attributes trade liberalization to the expansion of political representation of interest groups and their lobbying power in policy-making as a result of democratization. Yet simply denoting the impact of democratization to the rising influence of interest groups and the decline of state autonomy in policy setting provides a rather functionalist view of the restructuring of state-society relationship, leaving the question of modes of intersubjective reasoning, moral credibility, and struggle for political legitimacy among a variety of historically rooted social relations underlying trade policies untouched.   Viewed in a different light, the following sections illustrate trade and economic neoliberalization in Taiwan as a cumulative process that transformed from a locally initiated unilateral project to a fervent pursuit of bilateral and multilateral free trade at multiple historical conjunctures. With careful attention paid to the tendency to move from crisis to crisis and the legitimacy problem of the state, I examine the articulation between a paradigm shift in governance, rising populism, and changing nationalist politics. Against the backdrop of political democratization, I present the ways in which the trade liberalization agenda developed to form free-trade hegemony in Taiwan.    	 67	 Round Requested by the US Granted by Taiwan Total Items of Tariff Reduction in Taiwan 1978 339 339 983 1979 - - 432  1980 - - 4,000 1981 49 28  1982 - - 498 1983 - - 1200 1984 109 59 280 1985 174 112 1163 1986 71 58 777  1987 (April) 1987 (August) 66 267 62 239 1699  862 (April) 332 (May) 1988 174 51 3575  1989 558 366 4840 Figure 3.1   Number of Items Granted Tariff Reduction in R.O.C., 1978-89 Source: Chen, Tain-Jy and Liu, Meng-Chun (1997). Bilateral Negotiations and Multilateral Trade: The Case of Taiwan-US Trade Talks. In Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger (Eds)., Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade Arrangements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 		Figure 3.2   Annual Nominal and Effective Tariff Rates in Taiwan Source: Hsu, Chen-Min (2004). Unemployment, Inflation and Financial Policies. Taipei: Linking Books. p.38.     	     	  gD]þÉø gD7ÂɲNominal Tariff Rate %Effective	Tariff	Rate	%			 68	 III.  A Paradigm Shift and the Populist Origin of Trade Liberalization   As shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the 1980s in Taiwan not only witnessed multiple waves of significant tariff reduction but also experienced a stable drop of the average tariff rate. As explained in the previous section, the scale and scope of such trade liberalization should not be attributed solely to US pressure. However, when looking at the internal impetus for trade liberalization, it would be equally incorrect to ascribe this liberalizing trend either to a single policy rationale or to a particular agent or to one underlying ideology.   The following section seeks to illuminate the intersection of multiple economic, political and social forces that have contributed to Taiwan’s persistent pursuit of trade liberalization. Specifically, it involves a paradigm shift within the governing regime that sought to reverse the centrality of tariff and exportism in reviving a “national economy” that had been in crisis since the early 1980s and to address the increasing populist attacks on the legitimacy of tariff protection for cultivating “national industries” in the name of consumers’ rights.  Paradigm Shift in Tariff Policy and Exportism The launch of trade liberalization and tariff reduction in Taiwan in the 1980s characterizes a significant paradigm shift within the governing regime in the broader context of economic reform and industrial restructuring (Chu 2001). This reform was aimed at stimulating the slowing-down of Taiwan’s export-driven economy. Based on labor-intensive light manufacturing industries, such an economy experienced the first long-term decline in growth rate since the 1960s (see Figure 3.3, with the sudden drop during the oil crisis in 1974 as an exception). Besides introducing high-tech industries, as manifested in the establishment of the Hsin-Chu Science Park in 1979, such top-down economic reform was largely centered on the agenda of tariff and trade, for they served as keys to reshaping the contour of the “national economy.” This tariff and trade centered reform indicated a paradigm shift encompassing a whole set of ideational and institutional changes, which are embodied in two arenas: the re-engineering of a tariff-based fiscal regime and the reorientation of exportism.  	 69	 Figure 3.3   Economic Growth Rate in Taiwan, 1960-1990 Data source: Direct-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC (Taiwan)   Since KMT retreated to Taiwan from mainland China, tariff policy has been central to almost every aspect of the state apparatus. It is the key domain where the state expressed its sovereignty on custom and border control (Lee 2009); it functioned as the fundamental mechanism of cultivating national industries (Sun 1982; Liu et al. 1988); moreover, it is the epitome of the operation of the entire “authoritarian fiscal regime” formed in the context of the Cold War (T. Wu 2003, 2004). However, the 1980s marked a consistent decline of the importance of tariffs to the state policy at large. Specifically, given that custom duties had served as one of the major sources for state-level revenue, the overall reduction of the tariff rate would impact the state’s total tax revenue hard. Figure 3.4 shows a steady decline of the ratio of tariffs to national total tax revenue—from one-third in the early 1980s to 16.2% in 1990 and further down to 10.4% at the turn of 2000. By the time Taiwan joined the WTO in 2002, the tariff ratio had already dropped to 8.8%.  Figure 3.4   Average Tariff Burden in Taiwan (NTD) Source: Online Database, Ministry of Finance, R.O.C  Year Total National Tax Total Custom Duties Tariff/Total State Revenue (%)     1983 171,792,731 55,570,058 32.3 1984 194,064,192 67,622,010 34.8 1985 200,768,130 66,873,026 33.3 1986 195,790,502 63,838,386 32.6 1987 226,311,087 76,267,153 33.7 02468101214161960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990%		 70	1988 286,232,151 78,582,859 27.5 1989 361,427,124 89,387,037 24.7 1990 505,926,124 81,879,616 16.2 1991 442,353,038 79,269,295 17.9 1992 473,256,118 88,429,283 18.7 1993 515,164,134 99,928,304 19.4 1994 571,480,938 102,940,698 18.0 1995 662,201,162 115,366,387 17.4 1996 661,414,262 104,805,585 15.8 1997 706,199,942 103,405,990 14.6 1998 808,297,696 114,330,914 14.1 1999 788,391,984 106,044,622 13.1 2000 1513,155,017 156,815,025 10.4 2001 997,265,845 92,557,766 9.3 2002 981,609,508 85,900,543 8.8  Why, then, would the Taiwanese government launch massive tariff cuts and have to deal with the revenue loss? Such a drop in customs-duty ratio in the state-level revenue was an element of a tariff reform scheme that was part of a broader fiscal reform launched in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Proposed by the governing elites, this full-scale reform targeted modernization of the custom and tariff system and covered a wide range of policies from the employment of a complex tariff schedule to the abandonment of the export-tax rebate system. 28  Most importantly, it shouldered the task of re-engineering the tariff policy rationale from “fiscal responsibility” to “economic purpose.” In such policy reorientation, the role of tariffs was no longer viewed as the key source for revenue collection but as a tool serving the need for further economic development. The perceived benefits of tariff reform were manifold. Economically, by mitigating the tariff burden of the industrialists, specifically that of the cost of machinery, raw material and intermediate goods, it was hoped to encourage investment, enhance industrial competitiveness in exportation, and instigate industrial upgrading (Chen & Liu 1997). Fiscally, the loss of state revenue would be compensated for by the revenue restructuring, which gave more credibility to direct tax (e.g. income tax) than indirect tax (e.g. tariff). Socially, the burgeoning smuggling 																																																								28		Tax	Reform:	Economic	Thought	and	Practice	of	Chiang	Kai-shek	(1983	Oct	31).	Economic	Daily,14.		 71	problem could be curbed by mitigating the huge price gap between goods sold on international and on domestic markets.29  The economic-oriented tariff-reform scheme, although first driven by the developmentalist mindset in the early 1980s, was gradually dovetailed with liberal reformists’ appeal for trade liberalization by the mid-1980s, when the guiding principle for economic development changed gears to embrace “internationalization, liberalization, and institutionalization” (see discussion in Chapter 2). From the liberal reformists’ perspective, the new phase of economic development in