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Freedom from the fortress : the role of human rights in marine conservation Singleton, Rebecca Louise 2018

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i  FREEDOM FROM THE FORTRESS: THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN MARINE CONSERVATION  by  Rebecca Louise Singleton  M.Sc., The University of York, 2013  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Resource Management and Environmental Studies)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  September 2018  © Rebecca Louise Singleton, 2018  ii  The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the dissertation entitled:  Freedom from the Fortress: The role of human rights in marine conservation  submitted by Rebecca Louise Singleton  in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Resource Management and Environmental Studies  Examining Committee: Ussif Rashid Sumaila Supervisor  Edward Allison Supervisory Committee Member  Vinay Kamat Supervisory Committee Member Leila Harris University Examiner Les Lavkulich University Examiner   Additional Supervisory Committee Members: Philippe Le Billon Supervisory Committee Member  iii  Abstract Globally, marine resources are in decline, and urgent action is required. However, conservation measures must account for the needs of small-scale fishers, who depend on the sea for food and employment, or else be beset by conflict, resistance and international censure.  Yet, attempts by international environmental NGOs (“ENGOs”) to provide conservation and development benefits simultaneously have had limited success. As the Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries (“SSF-Guidelines”) shine a spotlight on small-scale fishers’ human rights, I explore the role of human rights in improving outcomes of marine conservation for fishers and fish. To date, high-level commitments to human rights by ENGOs have made little real difference to their work. To address this, I define the elements of a human rights-based approach to marine conservation, including practical guidelines for implementation by ENGOs. I then review the economic basis for the approach, distinguishing it from the more familiar property rights-based fisheries management. I describe how the two approaches may complement each other, by reducing the vulnerability and discount rates of many small-scale fishers whilst limiting profit-seeking, non-cooperative behaviour.  I also contribute empirical evidence on the relationship between human rights and conservation/ development outcomes by evaluating the initiatives of an ENGO, Blue Ventures, in south-west Madagascar. I show that respect for and fulfilment of select human rights can enhance ENGO-community relations and improve socioeconomic conditions, but also increase fishing pressure in the short term. To reduce vulnerability and enhance resource stewardship, a comprehensive and systematic human rights-based approach is required.  Attention to overriding principles, iv  especially equality, highlights how schemes to incentivize conservation could be more effective if ENGOs were proactive in protecting small-scale fishers’ human rights against powerful corporate and state interests.  This thesis begins to address the critical need for evidence to determine if, and how, realisation of human rights can enable sustainable small-scale fisheries. In doing so, it describes a role for ENGOs in implementing the SSF-Guidelines. By critically evaluating their own impact on small-scale fishers’ human rights, and influencing other key players to do the same, they can advance marine conservation that is genuinely supportive of small-scale fishers.     v  Lay Summary Globally, marine resources are in decline, and action is urgently required. However, in the past, conservation efforts have failed to account for the needs of local fishing communities who rely on marine resources for food and employment. This thesis explains how international marine conservation NGOs can ensure that their work respects, protects and fulfils the human rights of local and indigenous fishing communities. It shows that, by doing so, they can improve the living standards of fishers, but may support an increase in fishing in the short term. To enable fishers to become responsible resource stewards, NGOs must take action to influence corporations and Governments to respect rights too, so that fishers receive a fair share of the benefits from their management efforts.   vi  Preface I wrote this thesis with guidance from my supervisor, Professor U.R. Sumaila. I am the primary author for all of the Chapters and led the design and implementation of the research and analysis.  A version of Chapter 2 has been published as: Singleton RL, Allison EH, Le Billon P and Sumaila UR. Conservation and the right to fish: International conservation NGOs and the implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines for securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries. Marine Policy. 84: 22-32. The complete manuscript was written and researched by me with support from UR Sumaila. All co-authors provided comments for improvement of the final version. Chapter 3 was presented at the MARE: People and the Sea conference in Amsterdam in July 2017. A version is under review with a peer-reviewed journal with UR Sumaila as co-author. The complete manuscript was written and researched by me with guidance and comments from UR Sumaila, particularly in respect of development of the index. Chapter 4 is also under review with a peer-reviewed journal with co-authors EH Allison, C Gough, V Kamat, P Le Billon, L Robson and UR Sumaila. I developed the methodology and gathered the data, with advice on choice of methods and comments on draft survey instruments from EH Allison, V Kamat, P Le Billon, and UR Sumaila. The questionnaire used was developed in consultation with Blue Ventures’ programme managers and based on Blue Ventures’ first draft (which I modified and added to). C Gough advised on development of the survey instruments and assisted with pre-testing in the field. L Robson advised on evaluation of uptake of contraception and fertility rate. C Gough and L Robson advised on the use of Theories vii  of Change by Blue Ventures and the NGO community. I analysed the data, with the assistance of Adrian Jones, a graduate student with UBC’s Short Term Statistical Consulting service, who calculated weights for survey data and advised on the specific form of coding to be used with weighted data in the R statistical software package. L Anderson, an independent consultant working for Blue Ventures, also provided comments on initial statistical models. I wrote the manuscript, and all co-authors provided comments on drafts. Chapter 5 is being prepared for submission to a peer-reviewed journal with co-authors EH Allison, C Gough, V Kamat, P Le Billon, and UR Sumaila. I researched and wrote the manuscript. The co-authors provided support in designing and implementing the field survey as described for Chapter 4, and the weights calculated by Adrian Jones were again used in the analysis. All co-authors provided comments on the draft manuscript.  Blue Ventures funded my evaluation of its initiatives in south-west Madagascar, using grants received from the Population Reference Bureau, the Balcombe Charitable Trust and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. I obtained ethics approval for this thesis from UBC’s Behavioural Research Ethics Board, Certificate Number: H15-02122 viii  Table of Contents  Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iii Lay Summary .................................................................................................................................v Preface ........................................................................................................................................... vi List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. xiv List of Figures ...............................................................................................................................xv List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................. xvi Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... xvii Dedication ................................................................................................................................... xix Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................1 1.1 Conservation with development: A chequered history ................................................... 2 1.2 Objective and research questions .................................................................................... 7 1.3 Human rights-based approach to conservation: A brief introduction ............................. 7 1.4 Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries (“SSF-Guidelines”) .............................................................................................................................. 11 1.5 Gathering evidence: A note on human rights-based impact evaluation ....................... 12 1.6 Case study: Blue Ventures, a small to medium sized, international, marine conservation NGO operating in Madagascar ............................................................................ 14 1.7 Case study: Madagascar ................................................................................................ 15 1.8 A brief note on positionality ......................................................................................... 16 1.9 Thesis overview and scope of the study ....................................................................... 18 ix  Chapter 2: Conservation and the Right to Fish – ENGOs and the implementation of the SSF-Guidelines .............................................................................................................................20 2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 20 2.2 Human rights in marine conservation: The story so far ................................................ 23 2.2.1 Cross-over of human rights from development to conservation ............................... 23 2.2.2 Implementation of the Conservation Initiative on Human Rights ............................ 25 2.3 Incentives to engage with the human rights-based approach in the Small-Scale Fisheries Guidelines .................................................................................................................. 34 2.3.1 Disincentives - Relationship with authorities and room for manoeuvre ................... 34 2.3.2 Negative incentives –Conservation conflict, legal obligations and reputational risk 34 2.3.3 Positive incentives – A need for evidence ................................................................ 41 2.4 ENGOs as a catalyst for the SSF-Guidelines: A proposal ............................................ 42 2.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 48 Chapter 3: Discount the fishers, discount the fishery - The economic basis for human rights in small-scale fisheries management ..........................................................................................50 3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 50 3.2 Discounting and human rights: A review ..................................................................... 53 3.2.1 An overview of discounting, uncertainty and human rights ..................................... 53 3.2.2 Discounting and certainty ......................................................................................... 55 3.2.3 Discounting and the right to education ..................................................................... 62 3.2.4 Discounting and the right to health ........................................................................... 63 3.2.5 Discounting and the right to a decent standard of living .......................................... 65 Discounting and the right to adequate food ...................................................... 65 x Discounting and the right to adequate shelter ................................................... 67 3.2.6 Discounting and the right to decent work ................................................................. 68 3.2.7 Discounting and the principle of equality and non-discrimination ........................... 72 3.2.8 Right to participation in decision making and management ..................................... 74 3.2.9 Women’s rights ......................................................................................................... 75 3.3 An index for preliminary assessment of human rights and sustainability .................... 77 3.3.1 A note on human rights indicators ............................................................................ 77 3.3.2 A combined human rights and discounting index..................................................... 79 3.3.3 Example .................................................................................................................... 82 3.4 Conclusions and future directions ................................................................................. 83 Chapter 4: Conservation, contraception and controversy: Supporting human rights to enable sustainable fisheries .........................................................................................................85 4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 85 4.2 Theories of change for PHE programmes ..................................................................... 88 4.2.1 ‘Goodwill effect' ....................................................................................................... 89 4.2.2 'Fertility effect' .......................................................................................................... 92 4.2.3 'Empowerment effect': .............................................................................................. 93 4.3 Methods......................................................................................................................... 94 4.3.1 Case study: Blue Ventures and the Velondriake Locally Managed Marine Area (“LMMA”), south-west Madagascar .................................................................................... 94 4.3.2 Data collection and analysis...................................................................................... 95 4.4 Results ........................................................................................................................... 98 4.4.1 ‘Goodwill effect’ ....................................................................................................... 98 xi How is family planning received when provided by an ENGO? ...................... 98 Is family planning a point of introduction to, and/or selling point for, Blue Ventures? .......................................................................................................................... 99 Is family planning use associated with improved environmental stewardship? 102 4.4.2 ‘Fertility effect’ ....................................................................................................... 103 Does the provision of family planning lead to a reduction in population growth, and does this lead to less direct pressure on resources?.................................................. 103 Does family planning promote investment in children, making them less likely to become fishers?........................................................................................................... 106 4.4.3 ‘Empowerment effect’ ............................................................................................ 107 Are women who use family planning “empowered” (more time, health, money) to pursue alternative livelihoods and engage in marine management? ........................... 107 Do women who use family planning have greater control over their lives? .. 109 4.5 Discussion: Contraception, conservation and human rights ....................................... 114 4.5.1 BV’s provision of family planning: Respect for and fulfilment of reproductive rights 114 4.5.2 Consequences for conservation and development of strengthening reproductive rights 116 ‘Goodwill effect’ ............................................................................................. 116 ‘Fertility’ effect ............................................................................................... 118 ‘Empowerment’ effect .................................................................................... 119 4.5.3 Towards a human rights-based approach to conservation? .................................... 121 xii  Chapter 5: Economics with equality: The role of human rights in the new conservation paradigm .....................................................................................................................................128 5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 128 5.2 Analysis....................................................................................................................... 132 5.2.1 Working more closely with corporations: Implications for equality ...................... 132 ENGOs working with corporations: Seaweed farming as an alternative livelihood ........................................................................................................................ 134 ENGOs influencing corporations: The role of certification schemes ............. 143 5.2.2 Ensuring people benefit: Negotiations between ENGOs and communities ........... 146 Negotiations in Integrated Conservation Development Projects (“ICDPs”): The rise of participation ......................................................................................................... 146 Negotiations in the neo-liberal conservation era ............................................ 151 5.3 Policy proposal............................................................................................................ 154 5.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 156 Chapter 6: Conclusion ...............................................................................................................161 6.1 Human rights: Towards people-centric conservation? ............................................... 163 6.2 Tough questions surrounding a human rights-based approach to conservation: Limitations of this study and directions for future research ................................................... 166 6.3 Policy recommendations ............................................................................................. 171 Bibliography ...............................................................................................................................175 Appendices ..................................................................................................................................201 Appendix A Supplemental information for Table 2.1and Table 2.2 ...................................... 201 Appendix B Blue Ventures’ Family Planning Intervention Theory of Change ...................... 213 xiii  Appendix C Sampling protocol and weighting of data ........................................................... 214  xiv  List of Tables  Table 2.1 Implementation of a human rights-based approach at an operational (programmatic) level by five ENGOs ..................................................................................................................... 27 Table 2.2 Implementation of a human rights-based approach at the institutional level by five ENGOs .......................................................................................................................................... 28 Table 2.3 Relevance of human rights principles to marine conservation ..................................... 36 Table 3.1 Summary of the impact of human rights realisation on discount rates and sustainable fishing ........................................................................................................................................... 58 Table 4.1 Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (“CPR”) in the Velondriake LMMA .......................... 99 Table 4.2 Relationship of family planning use with environmental stewardship ....................... 102 Table 4.3 Empowerment of women to become better resource stewards ................................... 108  xv  List of Figures  Figure 4.1 Summary of common Theories of Change (“ToC”) in family planning-environment programmes................................................................................................................................... 91 Figure 4.2 Summary of positive and negative comments made about BV's family planning programme .................................................................................................................................... 98 Figure 4.3 Points of introduction to BV...................................................................................... 100 Figure 4.4 BV projects with significant impacts on the lives of people in Velondriake ............ 101 Figure 4.5 BV projects with significant impacts on the lives of people in Velondriake (prompted)..................................................................................................................................................... 101 Figure 4.6 Reasons for declining marine resources in Velondriake LMMA .............................. 103 Figure 4.7 Population pyramids for the Velondriake LMMA and Madagascar ......................... 104 Figure 4.8 Attendance, participation and influence in natural resource management meetings 113 Figure 4.9 The common family planning-environment Theories of Change (“ToC”s) modified to reflect the results of my evaluation ............................................................................................. 124 Figure 5.1 A summary of the priority concerns of adults living in the Velondriake LMMA .... 135 Figure 5.2 BV projects with significant impacts on the lives of people in Velondriake ............ 136 Figure 5.3 Percentage of different demographic groups who speak at natural resource management meetings in Velondriake LMMA, always, sometimes or never ............................ 147 Figure 5.4 The percentage of different demographic groups who participate in Blue Ventures’ income generating projects ......................................................................................................... 148  xvi  List of Abbreviations BV – Blue Ventures CIHR – Conservation Initiative on Human Rights CPR – Contraceptive Prevalence Rate ENGO – International Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FPIC – Free, Prior, Informed Consent ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICDP – Integrated Conservation Development Programme ICESC – International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ILO – International Labour Organization IUCN – International Union for Conservation of Nature LMMA – Locally Managed Marine Area MPA – Marine Protected Area MSC – Most Significant Change (Chapter 4) and Marine Stewardship Council (Chapter 5) OHCHR – Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights RBM - Property rights-based management SSF-Guidelines – Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the   context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication ToC – Theory of Change UDHR – Universal Declaration on Human Rights   xvii  Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Rashid Sumaila, for providing wise counsel, endless support and most of all, for cheering me on when I wanted to give up. I thank my committee Eddie Allison, Vinay Kamat and Philippe Le Billon for their inexhaustible knowledge and advice and for always being kind in their criticism.  I thank my friends and colleagues at Blue Ventures and in Andavadoaka, who brought this thesis to life in so many ways. I especially thank: Simonnette Rasoanantenaina, Thierry Nohasiarivelo, George ‘Bic’ Manahira, Michel ‘Goff’ Strongoff, Habrestok ‘Bris’ Naze Marie , Caroline Savitzky and Liz Day for their support in the field; My survey team Lahiniriko François , Zafy Maharesy Dieu Donne, Victor Jean, Leopold Clement Andrianjohary, Jean-Luc Ramahavelo, Bemana Njara Jose Ranaivoson, Henriette Germaine, Joelinne Jeanbatiste, Bienvenue Ninah Donah and Dantese Takantera for being the finest and funniest crew of researchers; and finally Charlie Gough, for her kindness, support and endless geeky chats about Excel, Madagascar and unicorns.  I thank the students, staff and faculty of UBC Fishery Centre, now the Institute of Oceans and Fisheries, for sharing their knowledge, friendship and support throughout my PhD. Thanks also to my long-suffering friend Uli Forster, for bringing the beach tent, and encouraging me throughout. Finally, the biggest thanks, love and appreciation go to my family. To Alfred, for keeping me company and making me go for walks during the writing process. To my beautiful son Gawen, xviii  who motivated me to finish in good time. And to my husband Andrew, for encouraging me always to be Yorkshire-Plus, and making everything seem possible and worthwhile. xix  Dedication  For Gawen.  1  Chapter 1: Introduction The declining state of global marine resources is now widely acknowledged, and a suite of conservation measures deployed in response (FAO, 2016a). Frequently, the need for conservation is promoted with the greatest urgency in relation to tropical regions, often in developing countries, where communities are highly dependent on marine resources for their livelihoods and well-being (Coulthard et al., 2011; FAO, 2016a; L. C. L. Teh & Sumaila, 2013). This dependence brings into sharp focus the question of how to prioritise the needs of one group over another, whether this be global vs. local, one resource user vs. another, or the long-term needs of future generations vs. the more immediate needs of today’s population (Balmford & Whitten, 2003; Béné et al., 2009; Cheung & Sumaila, 2008; Ferraro, 2002; Holmes & Cavanagh, 2016; Leadley et al., 2013; Neudert et al., 2017; Oleson et al., 2015; Sumaila, 2004; Sumaila & Walters, 2005). Where international environmental NGOs (“ENGOs”) implementing conservation measures have failed to find the right balance, or failed even to consider the implications of where the costs and benefits of conservation fall, local conflict and resistance have ensued and undermined conservation outcomes (Allison et al., 2012; Bennett & Dearden, 2014; Christie, 2004; Kamat, 2014; Mcclanahan et al., 2015; Mwaipopo, 2008). Over the last few decades, ENGOs have made intermittent efforts to address the immediate needs of developing-country communities targeted by their initiatives, through the integration of poverty alleviation measures within conservation programming initiatives (D. C. Miller, 2014; Roe, 2008). This thesis is concerned with these initiatives, and the problems that ENGOs have encountered when implementing them. I ask what role human rights can play in addressing these problems. To understand why this question arises, a brief history of conservation and 2  development is required. 1.1 Conservation with development: A chequered history The classic “fortress” approach to conservation, which paints local people as the main threat to nature and promotes their exclusion from protected areas, gave way in the 1980s and early 1990s to a rash of community-based integrated conservation and development programmes (“ICDPs”) (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Alpert, 1996; M. P. Wells & Brandon, 1993). As ENGOs recognised that strict enforcement of protected areas in developing countries was neither morally nor practically viable, ICDPs were intended primarily to offset the local costs of conservation, in order to gain the support of affected communities. As such, most ICDPs focused on income-generating initiatives, although some provided other key benefits such as schools and improved water supply (Alpert, 1996; M. P. Wells & Brandon, 1993). The rise of ICDPs tapped into growing support for sustainable development, boosted by the Brundtland Report (1987) and the Rio Conference on Environment and Development in 1992.  The common suggestion by ENGOs that participation in ICDPs would “empower” communities to manage their own resources  (Barrett & Arcese, 1995), also reflected the rise of participation and decentralized governance in development projects (Ellis & Biggs, 2001).  After several years of ICDP implementation, the absence of demonstrable benefits for conservation and/or development raised a question mark over their effectiveness (Barrett & Arcese, 1995; Kremen et al., 1994; M. P. Wells et al., 1992). This lack of quick, positive results fuelled a backlash against ICDPs in the ENGO community, and a return to protectionism (critiqued by (Hutton et al., 2005; Wilshusen et al., 2002). Researchers proposed more constructive responses to understand the mechanisms through which ICDPs worked or did not, 3  including: better monitoring and evaluation of the social and ecological impacts of ICDPs; (Barrett & Arcese, 1995; Kremen et al., 1994); the use of conceptual frameworks to explore linkages between livelihoods and conservation (Salafsky & Wollenberg, 2000); greater appreciation of differences and power dynamics within communities, and their influences on “empowerment” and “participation” (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Brown, 2002); and, more generally, improved understanding of the social and political contexts in which ICDPs were implemented (Brechin et al., 2002). The last two suggestions echoed contemporaneous work in the sustainable development field that highlighted the influence of institutions (rules and norms) on the outcomes of community-based projects (Leach et al., 1997, 1999; Scoones, 1998). A human rights-based approach was posited as a means to bring the required political focus to development (DFID, 1997; Moser & Norton, 2001). The return to protectionism by ENGOs in the late 1990s was not absolute. Two major factors came to bear to prevent ENGOs from reverting entirely to the conservation of biodiversity at the expense of local people: The prioritization of poverty reduction in international aid, which kept people-centric conservation on the funding agenda for ENGOs; and, the strengthening of the indigenous rights movement (Roe, 2008). The contributions of indigenous peoples to the 5th IUCN World Parks Congress in 2003 resulted in the adoption of the Durban Accord and Durban Action Plan, and theoretically marked the beginning of a paradigm shift towards a “new” conservation that respected the rights of indigenous and local communities (Freudenthal et al., 2012; IUCN, 2011; Stephens, 2012). As a result of the Durban Accord, and inspired by human rights-based approaches to development, the major ENGOs ultimately committed to a human 4  rights-based approach to conservation in 20091 (as described in section 1.3 below). Yet, despite this, human rights have not been accorded the central role that was anticipated in the new conservation movement. Rather, the paradigm now represents a more generalized concept of people-friendly conservation (Kareiva, 2014; Kareiva et al., 2012; Marvier, 2014; Soulé, 2014). Over the last decade or so, market-based, neoliberal approaches have come to dominate conservation. They blend the protectionist and community-based approaches of the past. Whilst many aim to provide benefits to local communities, they do so by selling an image of pristine nature, in order to create value in non-extractive uses such as tourism and payment for ecosystem services (Arsel & Buscher, 2012; Büscher et al., 2012; Igoe & Brockington, 2007). As ICDPs have morphed into market-based, neoliberal approaches in the “new conservation” era, there are still few examples of initiatives that work for both poverty alleviation and enhancement of conservation at the same time (Carneiro, 2011; L. Evans et al., 2011; Gurney et al., 2014; Leisher et al., 2010; Mascia et al., 2010; Salafsky, 2011; Tallis et al., 2009). In fact, in blending protectionism with community-based approaches, the recent efforts have reinvigorated the problems of both (Holmes & Cavanagh, 2016): Some have provided new mechanisms to dispossess communities of resources (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Bennett et al., 2015); while others are plagued by the same problems as the ICDPs of the early 1990s, including benefits captured by elites, the burden of costs borne disproportionately by marginalized groups, and a consequent lack of local engagement with resource management (Béné et al., 2009; Bennett & Dearden, 2014; Blom et al., 2010; Christie, 2004; Clifton, 2013; Leisher et al., 2010;                                                  1 The major international environmental NGOs have entered into an accord to respect, protect and fulfil human rights – The Conservation Initiative on Human Rights, and the Conservation and Human Rights Framework that was agreed under that umbrella.  5  Matsue et al., 2014).  Through the changing fashions in conservation, the same problems have recurred because lessons have not been learned. The social impacts of projects are still poorly monitored (de Lange et al., 2016; Woodhouse et al., 2015) and, ENGOs have largely failed to pay heed to calls to consider context and institutions (Christie et al., 2009; Scoones, 2009). In fact, this last may be deliberate, in order to create the simple, powerful images that are essential to sell investment in neoliberal conservation (Büscher et al., 2012). As ideas about conservation have become more abstract and detached from people and place (Büscher, 2013; Sullivan, 2009), politics and power have slipped further from view, allowing inequality to fester and undermine initiatives on the ground (Holmes & Cavanagh, 2016).  Human rights shine a spotlight on inequality and marginalization.  As such, if applied in the spirit that they were first introduced to development and conservation, they have the potential to address the persistent problems of combining the two (Campese et al., 2009; Johnson & Forsyth, 2002; Moser & Norton, 2001; Oviedo & Puschkarsky, 2012; Scoones, 2009).  However, ENGO’s have so far failed to adequately engage with a human rights-based approach, especially its political aspect, reducing human rights to just another flavour of rhetoric. While many ENGOs have committed to advance human rights, when they advocate a “rights-based approach” to conservation it is often unclear whether they are referring to human rights, property rights, market rights, or some bastardized combination of them all, with definitions frequently conflated. The problem is particularly acute in the marine conservation sector. In fisheries management, “rights-based approach” has always referred to the restriction of access to a fishery by the allocation of property rights (Allison et al., 2012; Béné, Hersoug, et al., 2010; Ratner et 6  al., 2014; Sharma, 2011; Sumaila, 2010; TNI et al., 2013); Now, the Small-Scale Fisheries Guidelines2 (“SSF-Guidelines”) aim to establish a human-rights based regime for the management of small-scale fisheries (FAO, 2015b; Jentoft, 2014). Advocates for this new approach contend that it is being watered-down and undermined by those who use new human rights-based rhetoric, whilst clinging to the old, property-based ideals (TNI et al., 2013). Underlying this cavalier use of terminology is another significant obstacle to the introduction of a human rights-based approach in conservation: There is limited evidence that promotion of human rights leads to, or even enables, sustainable resource management or environmental benefits (Ruddle & Davis, 2013). Indeed, as is often argued in relation to conservation-with-development more generally, a human rights-based approach could undermine conservation of biodiversity (Salafsky, 2011; Soulé, 2014). Unless and until the implications for conservation are better enunciated, it will be difficult for ENGOs to wholeheartedly commit to a human rights-based approach. In this thesis, I analyse the evolution of the incorporation of human rights into aspects of the work of ENGOs. Focusing on marine conservation where the lack of clarity surrounding the approach is most acute, I will define more clearly what a human rights-based approach means, suggest how it can be practically applied by ENGOs, and weigh the potential consequences for modern conservation practice.                                                  2 Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the context of Food Security and Poverty Alleviation, FAO, 2015. 7  1.2 Objective and research questions The SSF-Guidelines advocate a movement towards improved human rights for small-scale fishers, suggesting that this is a necessary pre-condition for sustainable development of their fisheries and communities. Given the influential role that international marine conservation NGOs play in both fisheries management and development in small-scale fishing communities, it is important to understand their role in supporting and/or undermining this human rights-based movement, and that is the primary goal of this thesis. Specifically, this thesis: i) Investigates the current and future application of the SSF-Guidelines, and the human rights-based approach they endorse, by ENGOs; ii) Considers incentives and disincentives for ENGOs to engage further with a human rights-based approach to marine conservation, by evaluating the economic basis for a human rights-based approach to small-scale fisheries management; iii) Contributes empirical evidence on how some of the actions of an ENGO to respect, protect and fulfil human rights might influence its impacts on conservation and people;  iv) Advances human rights-based policy recommendations to improve the practices of ENGOs in the marine conservation sector. 1.3 Human rights-based approach to conservation: A brief introduction A human rights-based approach has long been advocated in development work and has been applied by a number of UN agencies (e.g. UNDP, UNICEF), development NGOs (e.g. Oxfam, CARE, ActionAid) and Government funding agencies (e.g. the UK’s DFID). Human rights underpin both the Millennium Development Goals and now the Sustainable Development Goals 8  (OHCHR, 2018; UNDP, 2007). Although ill-defined even in the development sector, basic elements of a human rights-based approach are: (i) Explicit reference to human rights, as set out in international treaties, including economic, social and cultural rights. Human rights are universal and inalienable (apply to everyone and cannot be taken away), indivisible (no right is more important than another) and interrelated (the fulfilment of one right often depends on another); (ii) Attention to the overriding principles of human rights, which (in addition to universality, indivisibility and interrelatedness) are non-discrimination and equality, participation and inclusion, and accountability (United Nations, 2003).  As such, the main differences between a human rights-based approach and other approaches to development are that: aid interventions are provided as of right, rather than charitable gift, with a recognizable duty-bearer that can be held accountable if rights are not respected, protected and fulfilled; and, it is inherently political in nature, involving challenges to existing institutions and power, and thereby aiming to address the underlying causes of poverty rather than a temporary alleviation of its symptoms (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Hamm, 2001; Uvin, 2007).  As noted in the introductory paragraphs, there was considerable overlap between ICDPs and sustainable development initiatives (especially sustainable livelihoods approaches) in the late1990s/ early 2000s and thinking in both fields was pointing to a need for greater attention to context, institutions and marginalized groups. The emergence of a rights-based approach to address these points in development suggested the potential of the approach in the conservation sector. Calls for a human rights-based approach to conservation crystallised at the 5th IUCN World Parks Congress in Durban in 2003, where a strong presence of indigenous peoples 9  demanded that ENGOs be held to account for breaches of their rights (Roe, 2008). The Congress re-focused attention on the human rights abuses of “fortress” conservation (Roe, 2008) with fresh examples emerging of forced evictions and economic displacement due to protected areas (Brockington & Igoe, 2006; Cernea, 2006; Igoe, 2006; Rangarajan & Shahabuddin, 2006; West et al., 2006). Following further IUCN resolutions, and increased international attention to the human rights of indigenous peoples brought by a UN Declaration3, eight major ENGOs made a formal statement in 2009 that they would respect, protect and fulfil human rights: The Conservation Initiative on Human Rights (“CIHR”) (Campese et al., 2009; CIHR, 2014; Roe, 2008).  In the wake of the high-level commitment that the major conservation NGOs made to human rights almost ten years ago, limited research has been done on if and how they are applying human rights to their work, and what works in what circumstances. I explore the evidence base in detail in Chapter 2. In brief, the signing of the CIHR heralded a flurry of activity on rights-based approaches to conservation, including the publication of a scoping paper (Springer et al., 2011) and two IUCN reviews (Campese et al., 2009; Greiber et al., 2009). Campese et al. draw on limited case studies to identify common themes emerging from rights-based approaches to conservation, including: A pervasive focus on participation and tenure rights, with broader economic, social and cultural rights underrepresented; the potential for synergies between fulfilment of rights and conservation goals, but also the importance of not limiting rights-based approaches to cases where these synergies exist; the value of considering political, social and                                                  3 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted in 2007. 10  cultural context and identifying power differentials within communities; the need for disaggregated data to enable identification of marginalized groups; and, the lack of a systematic approach to the application and evaluation of rights-based approaches. Springer et al. (2011) and Greiber et al. (2009) address this latter point by offering some practical guidance for implementation, with Greiber proposing a rigorous step-wise methodology for implementing rights-based approaches going forwards.  Despite the above analyses and proposals, progress towards understanding and implementing rights-based approaches has been modest. Most academic research that touches on human rights and conservation continues to flag dispossession of resource users, often violent (Agrawal & Redford, 2009; Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Bennett et al., 2015; Goldman, 2011; Jonas et al., 2014; Ratner et al., 2014).  Within ENGOs, efforts to implement a human rights-based approach have primarily resulted in policy statements (CIHR, 2014), Chapter 2). There are examples of initiatives that target marginalized groups (women, indigenous peoples), and efforts to improve community consultation in line with human rights principles4. However, these measures are somewhat arbitrary, rather than the result of systematic identification of rights-based issues, and ENGOs do not monitor and evaluate their impacts on human rights; Although the evaluation of the social impacts of conservation is improving, in terms of rigour and breadth of focus, human wellbeing frameworks are preferred over human rights, neatly side-stepping questions of power, politics and responsibility (CIHR, 2014; de Lange et al., 2016; Glew et al., 2012; Leisher et al., 2013; Mckinnon et al., 2015, 2016; Woodhouse et al., 2015).                                                   4 The principles of free, prior and informed consent set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 11  Overall, there seems to be a sense amongst ENGOs that, as they move away from “fortress” conservation towards more people-centric approaches, human rights concerns are taken care of (CIHR, 2014) and Chapter 2).This is understandable, given the focus of academic critiques, but misconceived. Although the mechanisms have changed, marginalization of local communities still prevails in “new conservation” (Holmes & Cavanagh, 2016). Understanding and addressing its root causes will be critical to the success of sustainable development endeavours, and could be advanced through greater attention to human rights (Campese et al., 2009; Johnson & Forsyth, 2002; Leach et al., 1997, 1999; Moser & Norton, 2001; Oviedo & Puschkarsky, 2012; Scoones, 2009). It is time to re-consider the application of human rights to marine conservation work, as the SSF-Guidelines put human rights firmly back on the table in the small-scale fisheries sector. 1.4 Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries (“SSF-Guidelines”) The SSF-Guidelines set out a clear human rights-based agenda (FAO, 2015b; Jentoft, 2014). By adopting them in 2014, 143 countries endorsed an approach to safeguard the human rights of small-scale fishing communities in the face of the many threats to their existence, in order to promote sustainable fisheries management. The SSF-Guidelines are not limited to the most egregious abuses of human rights – slavery, eviction, bodily harm – but extend to economic, social and cultural rights, following research and advocacy stressing the importance of this broader focus (Allison, 2011; Allison et al., 2012; Béné, Hersoug, et al., 2010; Sharma, 2011; Sowman et al., 2012, 2014). The SSF-Guidelines are addressed primarily to national governments, as primary human rights duty-bearers and members of the FAO, and most implementation work to date has operated at this level. However, many of the guidelines are also 12  aimed at “other parties”/ “stakeholders”, and successful implementation will require a concerted effort between governments, small-scale fishers and civil society organisations. With this in mind, my thesis commences with a consideration of the potential role of ENGOs in implementing the SSF-Guidelines, before moving on to consider, and add to, the empirical evidence that indicates whether, and how, they could play this role. 1.5 Gathering evidence: A note on human rights-based impact evaluation In order to evaluate whether ENGOs are respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights, and the consequences for conservation and people, a special form of assessment is required. Human rights-based impact assessments are becoming increasingly common to measure the impact of development and corporate projects (Harrison, 2011, 2013; Rights & Democracy, 2007; Ruggie, 2008, 2011; Watson et al., 2013). However, they have not yet been widely applied to conservation work – perhaps unsurprising, as the assessment of socio-economic impacts more generally is a relatively new field in conservation (Carneiro, 2011; de Lange et al., 2016) A human rights-based impact assessment involves six key stages (Walker, 2009; World Bank, 2013): i) Preparation – During which the assessor clarifies the relevant legal, regulatory, economic, environmental and social context of the assessment, to establish its outer parameters; ii) Screening – Where the scope of the assessment is narrowed in terms of: the activities, projects or policies that will be assessed; the human rights that are at play; and the stakeholders who are affected. 13  iii) Scoping – Involves determining how the human rights issues identified in the first stages might be explored, including choosing methods and determining indicators to be used. In terms of methods choice, human rights methodology draws on a broad range of methods used in the social sciences.  iv) Evidence gathering – At this stage, the methodological tools identified above are used to gather evidence of impact of the project(s) under study. v) Consultation – In order to respect the human rights principles of participation and transparency, human rights impact assessments are expected to involve a broad level of consultation throughout the process of assessment, and during feedback and interpretation of results. vi) Analysis – An essential feature of analysis in a human rights-based evaluation is that it is conducted in reference to human rights norms and standards. On many occasions, it is the use of this lens at the analysis stage that differentiates a human rights-based assessment from other assessments of socioeconomic impact. As part of this thesis, I have conducted a human rights-based impact evaluation of the work of Blue Ventures (“BV”), which I will introduce below.  The methods I used are described in more detail in Chapter 4. Briefly, I employed a household and individual survey to collect data on socioeconomic conditions and human rights in the Velondriake LMMA and the impact of BV’s programmes on both. The survey incorporated a series of open, qualitative questions based on the Most Significant Change (“MSC”) methodology (R. Davies & Dart, 2005). The latter was included as the main method to assess impact, given a deficit of baseline and control data for many topics.  14  1.6 Case study: Blue Ventures, a small to medium sized, international, marine conservation NGO operating in Madagascar Blue Ventures (“BV”) is a British NGO that works in Madagascar, Belize and Timor- Leste, and is in the process of partnering with organisations in other countries. It started out as an ecotourism operator in 2003, based in one village, Andavadoaka, in South-West Madagascar. It has since expanded both its sites and its work programmes, with the latter now including marine closures (temporary and permanent), gear restrictions and other fisheries regulations, a health programme (originally focusing on the provision of family planning services, but now expanded to address other health issues), education, alternative livelihoods (seaweed and sea cucumber aquaculture, eco-tourism), and a mangrove carbon credit scheme. My field site was the Velondriake Locally Managed Marine Area (“LMMA”) in south-west Madagascar. The LMMA acts as an umbrella for all of BV’s activities in the region. The Government of Madagascar has legally devolved management of the LMMA to the Velondriake committee (a committee of elected local representatives) and BV as co-managers.  The LMMA was designated in 2006 and covers 32 villages, with a total population of 7,806 individuals (BV unpublished data). Most people in the coastal LMMA are small-scale fishers (70% of the adult population) or work in related operations such as fish salting. 50% of women state that octopus gleaning is their main occupation.  The region is arid and isolated, with very limited access to health, education and other public services.  Andavadoaka is the largest village in the region and operates as a hub for services. It has a modern, Italian-operated hospital facility, and two schools. Although Andavadoaka also hosts agricultural markets, for fisheries the major market is mobile: Two Malagasy corporations, one with part French ownership 15  (Copefrito), and one with part Mauritian ownership (Murex), employ a network of “sous-collectors” to collect fish and octopus from local fishers, which are then collected regularly by camions operated by the companies. I chose BV as a case study because it is an ENGO focused on marine conservation, which integrates aspects of development within its conservation initiatives. In addition, BV was keen to assess its socioeconomic impacts in more depth, immediately bringing an applied element to my thesis.  1.7 Case study: Madagascar Madagascar is rich in terms of biodiversity, but poor in terms of human development: It ranks 154th out of 188 countries in the UN’s Human Development Index. It is politically unstable, with the most recent military-backed coup occurring in 2009 following which there was a 5 year “transition” period before the current President was democratically elected in 2014. This situation has led to reluctance of overseas funders to provide aid, and frequent disturbances to Madagascar’s burgeoning ecotourism industry (Dewar et al., 2013). However, it does not seem to have deterred foreign businesses seeking to exploit Madagascar’s natural resources, including in the fisheries sector, with particular recent interest from Chinese industry (Dewar et al., 2013; Le Manach et al., 2013)  Madagascar is a signatory to the SSF-Guidelines, and has also ratified the major international human rights conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in 1971), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1971), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1989).  That 16  said, on the ground it has a poor record on human rights with pervasive corruption, unlawful killings and violence by security forces, issues surrounding freedom of the press and access to justice, and widespread sexual exploitation of young women and children (US Department of State, 2015). Remote communities are somewhat removed from national government and legal mechanisms. Against this background, it is clear that if any implementation of the SSF-Guidelines is to take place, ENGOS will need to be involved to some degree. 1.8 A brief note on positionality Positionality of the author I conducted my evaluation of BV’s initiatives as both a PhD student and an employee of BV. My employment was a condition initially placed on the collaboration by BV, partly due to logistical and safety reasons (BV was responsible for me at a remote field site) and partly because my role included “non-research” activities such as training staff, managing budgets and producing lay summaries of my work. I satisfied UBC’s research ethics board that my position did not represent a conflict of interest, since I was paid only a basic salary, and my research agreement with BV does not give the organization powers of veto or other extensive editorial rights over what I publish. Throughout, BV staff have been fully supportive of my evaluation, including potential “negative” findings, which they are using to adapt their work programmes.   In the field, I took steps to reduce positive and social desirability bias that might have resulted from working closely with BV. These included: the use of indirect, non-leading questions; actively seeking negative opinions; probing responses that seemed inconsistent with what I observed in the communities; obtaining multiple translations of some results to test for translator 17  bias; working with a predominantly local survey team who, for the most part, did not work regularly with BV; and triangulating information through multiple data collection methods.  Positionality of translators and other field researchers Translators and survey teams can also influence the outcomes of field research and I took some precautions against undue influence. All focus groups were led by Blue Ventures’ Malagasy social scientist (Simonnette Rasoanantenaina), who was hired initially to conduct this work and, whilst experienced in this type of work, had no prior affiliation to BV. I supervised the focus groups conducted in 2016 (the majority of focus groups relied upon), which were translated “live” for me by a translator, enabling me to make detailed notes. They were also recorded, transcribed and translated by a different translator to check for translator bias. I was not able to personally attend the follow-up focus groups, conducted in late 2017, as I was pregnant at the time. However, I am confident that Simonnette conducted these focus groups with the same impeccable professionalism that she applied in her work with me. Focus group participants were selected by village presidents, out of respect for their authority. The presidents were asked to suggest participants who would have some experience of BV’s projects, but were not unduly close with BV. Participants in household/ individual surveys, including the Most Significant Change interviews described in Chapter 4, were selected randomly. A census conducted shortly before the survey was used as the sampling frame.   18  1.9 Thesis overview and scope of the study This thesis contains four main research chapters, book-ended by chapters that introduce the objectives and draw conclusions.  ENGOs play a significant role in the management of small-scale fisheries in developing countries, working in co-management arrangements with fishing communities and often replacing the function of the State. Given this role, in Chapter 2 I consider the part that they might play in implementing the SSF-Guidelines, by exploring how they have applied a human rights based-approach to date. As with other development measures, the question of what impact a human rights-based approach will have on conservation practice is likely to be a critical question for ENGOs, and I devote the rest of my thesis to starting to answer this question.    In Chapter 3 I evaluate the economic basis for human rights in small-scale fisheries management. Economic arguments have often proved influential in the sector but have been used to suggest that strengthening human rights could undermine sustainability, by guaranteeing too many fishers the right to fish (TNI et al., 2013). I consider small-scale fishers’ propensity to discount future benefits when they are vulnerable and explore how strengthening human rights might reduce this propensity and enable better fisheries stewardship.  In Chapters 4 and 5, I use a case study to provide empirical evidence (albeit modest) that explores the evolution and potential application of a human rights-based approach in relation to some aspects of the work of ENGOs. Specifically, I use a human rights lens to evaluate the impacts of some of the initiatives of an ENGO, Blue Ventures, on fishers in South-West Madagascar.  19  In Chapter 4, I focus on BV’s provision of family planning services in conjunction with its marine management programmes. Such programmes have been heavily criticized in the past for failing to respect women’s and reproductive rights. They are accused of seeking to control human populations to achieve environmental conservation. I evaluate whether BV’s programme respects women’s and reproductive rights, and if it goes further to fulfil aspects of human rights. I then assess the consequences of BV’s approach for its conservation goals. Finally, I discuss the implications of this study for the application of a more comprehensive human rights-based approach by ENGOs, and for the implementation of the SSF-Guidelines.  In Chapter 5, I focus on the protection of human rights by ENGOs (in other words, their actions to influence the human rights impacts of others). Looking at four specific examples of ENGO practice, I consider how the overriding principles of human rights (specifically a focus on equality and power imbalances) have been applied to date. I also suggest how this application could be modified going forwards, in conjunction with other human rights-based mechanisms, to improve integrated conservation and development practice. The Chapter includes a policy agenda summarizing these recommendations. 20  Chapter 2: Conservation and the Right to Fish – ENGOs and the implementation of the SSF-Guidelines  2.1  Introduction The contributions of small-scale fishers are still undervalued, underreported, and consequently overlooked in fisheries policy, despite recent efforts to address this (Andrew et al., 2007; Chuenpagdee et al., 2006; Mills et al., 2011; L. C. L. Teh & Sumaila, 2013). In 2014, the  Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries (the “SSF-Guidelines”) were introduced as a potential game-changer, with ambitious goals to promote and support the development of small-scale fishing communities in a manner that is both environmentally and socially sustainable (FAO, 2015b). The SSF-Guidelines propose a human rights-based approach to achieve this. The adoption of the SSF-Guidelines was the result of widespread international agreement amongst states, but also represented the culmination of many years of “bottom-up” consultation, involving representatives of small-scale fishers, fish workers, researchers, Government, CSOs, NGOs and others (FAO, 2015b; Sowman et al., 2014). Both the FAO, who facilitated the creation of the guidelines, and members of the research community now suggest that this collaborative effort (in particular the participation of small-scale fishers and fish workers themselves) must continue in order for the SSF- Guidelines to be successfully implemented and remain relevant to the fishing communities that they aim to benefit (Franz et al., 2014; Franz & Jentoft, 2016; Jentoft, 2014). Although efforts are beginning to exchange knowledge and success stories between communities, to date most actions to implement the SSF-Guidelines have centred on their 21  incorporation into regional guidance and national legislation (Franz & Jentoft, 2016; WFFP et al., 2017). This is of course essential for their long-term enforceability and reflects the mandate and intergovernmental approach of the FAO. Yet, one of the main reasons small-scale fishing communities have been overlooked in the past is their isolation from, and lack of access to, national Government and the law (Jentoft, 2014; Ratner et al., 2014).  Therefore, if the SSF-Guidelines are to have relevance to and material impact on the lives of small-scale fishers, it is vital that more attention is urgently paid to implementation from the ground up, and to linking national, international and regional efforts with such efforts in small-scale fishing communities. The question then arises: How can this be achieved with any expediency, when national Governments (especially in developing countries, where most small-scale fisheries are located) are unlikely to be able to divert time and resources, and may not have the necessary relationships of trust, to start working with small-scale fishing communities overnight?  ENGOs have been working in (albeit, not necessarily with) small-scale fishing communities in developing countries for several decades. Typically, they also have existing relationships with national Governments, and larger NGOs have a voice in the international policy arena. In recent years, many ENGOs have also been building relationships with corporations, which act either as funders or partners (Holmes, 2012; Jacquet et al., 2009). This Chapter therefore starts with the proposition that, due to their existing relationships and position, ENGOs could play an important role in the implementation of the SSF-Guidelines at community level, and in forging links between the different organizational levels at which the SSF-Guidelines are being implemented. In doing so, they would provide an important bridge between two scales of governance: ‘customary’ governance at community level, and a ‘legal/formal’ governance at national and 22  international level. Yet, ENGOs have more frequently been associated with human rights transgressions than crusades (Agrawal & Redford, 2009; Brockington et al., 2006; Brockington & Igoe, 2006; Duffy, 2014; Goldman, 2011; Igoe, 2007; Jonas et al., 2014). This presents a significant barrier to them fulfilling the role of facilitator of the SSF-Guidelines. ENGOs may not only have lost the trust of communities, but they may also be reluctant to promote the human-rights based approach taken by the SSF-Guidelines. This barrier may not, however, be insurmountable.  In the past decade, ENGOs have shown willingness to change their ways. Most now have  stated aims of implementing conservation measures that are both environmentally and socially sustainable, and have been adding elements of development to their programs for many years (Roe, 2008). Small-scale fisheries are at the nexus of such conservation and development work, with small-scale fishers in developing countries the target of many a conservation initiative and complementary, or compensatory, development scheme. Given the stated objectives of the SSF-Guidelines to promote socially and environmentally sustainable development of small-scale fisheries, facilitating their implementation falls well within the remit of the current mission statements of most marine conservation NGOs. Indeed, a number of ENGOs have already committed to taking the human rights-based approach that is a fundamental element of the SSF-Guidelines. For some of the larger NGOS, this commitment is enshrined in the form of the Conservation Initiative on Human Rights, and the Conservation and Human Rights Framework that was agreed under that umbrella (collectively, the “CIHR”).  In theory, then, the stage is set for ENGOs to assist in implementing the SSF-Guidelines. However, ongoing initiatives to set minimum human rights standards for ENGOs show that there 23  is still work to be done, especially in terms of translating theory and rhetoric into practice (Jonas et al., 2014). The following section takes a closer look at how the commitment of ENGOs to human rights has played out so far in practice, and what action this suggests in order for them to play a useful role in implementation of the SSF-Guidelines. 2.2 Human rights in marine conservation: The story so far 2.2.1 Cross-over of human rights from development to conservation The story of human rights and ENGOs has its origins partly in a different sector: In the development sector, an explicit human rights-based approach to development crystallized in the late 1990s/early 2000s. It was the product of international recognition of the importance of human rights to development (for example, at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993) and a broadening of the concept of development from being purely about economic growth to being a more holistic idea of enhancing peoples’ basic freedoms and capabilities – an idea in line with human rights thinking (Hamm, 2001; Sen, 2005; Uvin, 2007). By the turn of the century, a number of UN agencies (e.g. UNDP, UNICEF), development NGOs (e.g. Oxfam, CARE, ActionAid) and Government funding agencies (e.g. the UK’s DFID) had committed to a “human rights based approach” to development (H. Miller, 2015). Although the exact elements of such an approach were (and are) ill-defined, common features include: (i) Explicit reference to human rights, as set out in international treaties, and including the economic, social and cultural rights that had previously been treated with scepticism by Western powers; (ii) non-discrimination, including a focus on marginalized groups (such as women and children) and more equal distribution of resources; (iii) participation as an empowering process; and (iv) accountability and the rule of law (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Hamm, 2001; UNDP, 24  2003). Of these, the grounding in an international legal framework stands out as a major difference between the human rights-based approach and other approaches to development. In theory, the universal framework, to which a majority of states have consented, provides a common understanding for what development should entail, and a legal basis from which to confront power imbalances and inequality and re-politicize development work (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Gready, 2009; Hamm, 2001; Uvin, 2007). The extent to which the human rights-based approach to development has lived up to this promise or, indeed, changed anything about development at all, is frequently questioned, as discussed below in relation to the challenges facing a rights-based approach to conservation.  The human rights- based approach to development blossomed at a time of turbulent relations between conservation and development practitioners. Despite a burgeoning “sustainable development” dialogue, the two sectors were diverging. In development, an increased emphasis on developing country ownership of the agenda had shifted funds away from conservation projects; at the same time, conservation practitioners were starting to become disillusioned with working with people, as practices of community conservation were labelled as ineffective for achieving conservation goals (Roe, 2008, 2010). This divergence reignited a longstanding debate over the relative importance of conservation and poverty relief at both international and local scales -  a debate that came to a head at the 5th IUCN World Parks Congress in Durban in 2003 (Roe, 2008). The Congress was well attended by community and indigenous groups, who took the opportunity to secure preliminary commitments from conservation organizations to respect their human rights and promote development alongside conservation work (CIHR, 2014). Following further revelations of human rights transgressions in conservation, and a number of 25  subsequent IUCN resolutions dealing with rights-related issues, the discussions of human rights that had begun at the Congress resulted in a firm commitment in 2009 to a human rights-based approach by the eight biggest conservation organizations: the Conservation Initiative on Human Rights (“CIHR”) (Campese et al., 2009; CIHR, 2014; Roe, 2008). The CIHR was conceived by Nick Winer, an ex-employee of Oxfam (IIED, n.d.). This, together with collaborations with the development sector (e.g. WWF-CARE alliance) and increasing funder requirements for conservation to make a tangible contribution to poverty reduction, has brought the experiences of the human rights-based approach in development to the conservation world (CIHR, 2014; Roe, 2010) 2.2.2 Implementation of the Conservation Initiative on Human Rights In development, a human rights-based approach has always meant different things in different organizations (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004). Even a cursory review of the public statements made by the largest conservation NGOs in relation to the CIHR and human rights shows that, in conservation too, there is no unified view of what a human rights based approach entails – hence the ongoing efforts to define how human rights should be applied in conservation in more detail (Jonas et al., 2014). Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 summarise the publicly stated approaches of the five ENGOs who are both party to the CIHR and include marine conservation/fisheries in their remit. The collection of information consisted of an extensive consultation of public documents available from the ENGOs, including a systematic review of their websites and other publications relating to the CIHR, including a recent White Paper on implementation (CIHR, 2014)) (see Supplemental Materials in Appendix A  for further description of the review process and links to the material relied upon).The review was 26  conducted with a specific focus on the ENGOs’ application of the rights-based approach in the fisheries sector to date. The purpose is to consider the readiness of the international conservation NGO sector to engage with the implementation of the SSF- Guidelines, and highlight current gaps, whilst acknowledging that the implementation of a comprehensive human rights-based approach cannot happen overnight and the ENGOs in question may already be taking steps to address these apparent gaps. The Table includes, at both an institutional and operational level, actions to respect, fulfil and protect human rights. This is the tripartite obligation of a human rights duty-bearer under international law, and one that was accepted by the ENGOs in the CIHR.  Briefly, respect for human rights means that the duty-bearer should ensure that it does not itself infringe human rights principles (this is addressed more fully in the section on incentives, below). To fulfil human rights, the duty-bearer must go a step further and actively promote the realization of substantive human rights and their principles. Finally, to protect human rights, the duty bearer must ensure that third parties are not infringing human rights. The duties to respect and protect are immediate, whereas fulfilment may be realized progressively in line with means. Despite good progress by most of the ENGOs in drafting policies and guidelines that promote various aspects of human rights, the review summarized in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 highlights key challenges that will need to be addressed before ENGOs can fulfil their potential as would-be facilitators of the SSF-Guidelines (Table 2.1 and Table 2.2). 27   Table 2.1 Implementation of a human rights-based approach at an operational (programmatic) level by five ENGOs       Operational (Programme) Level: On the ground, conservation initiatives should respect and, where possible, promote both substantive human rights and human rights principles. This should include building the capacity of affected communities to recognize and claim their rights  Promotion of human rights in field programmes       Denotes global people/community priorities stated by ENGOs (note: most are not described explicitly in human rights terms, and many human rights themes are absent). Only those for which examples in a fisheries context are given included.  Work to raise awareness of human rights in communities  Builds accountability of ENGO and partners  Gender   Participatory Management   Indigenous peoples’ rights   Livelihoods   Land/ resource access rights           = No evidence of activities to raise awareness of rights  = Awareness may be raised incidentally by other capacity building activities  = Specific rights-related training for communities Conservation International (CI)       WWF        Fauna and Flora International (FFI)       Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS)       The Nature Conservancy (TNC)       28  Table 2.2 Implementation of a human rights-based approach at the institutional level by five ENGOs   Institutional Level: Systems should be put into place in ENGOs to ensure consistent respect for/ fulfilment of human rights across the organisation. Such systems should raise organisational awareness of human rights (e.g. staff training) and promote accountability (e.g. monitoring and evaluation, processes for effective consultation and dispute resolution). Work to protect human rights might include encouraging partners (corporate partners, funders or consultants) to apply the same human rights-based approach as the organization. It might also include lobbying or assisting other duty-bearers such as Nation States to enhance their human rights capacity)  Level Human rights-based approach  Policies on human rights Monitoring and evaluation  Staff training on human rights Consultation processes Grievance mechanisms  Due diligence of corporate partners Influencing third parties  = None  = None, or very limited = No social impact monitoring = None, or no details available = No policy on free, prior and informed consent = No details of grievance mechanisms = No information on due diligence = No evidence of lobbying on human rights issues  = Reference to CIHR or other statement of commitment to human rights = Some human rights specific policies = Social impact monitoring by reference to non-human rights framework = Co-ordinated approach to work with communities, but not human rights specific or limited organisation-wide training = Policy on free, prior and informed consent = Grievance mechanisms, but may not be accessible to remote communities = Due diligence, but not human rights based or no public examples = Limited lobbying of governments on human rights issues  = Explicit rights-based approach = Extensive = Human rights-based monitoring and evaluation = Human rights-based knowledge development and training = Policy on free, prior and informed consent, with examples of application = Accessible and effective grievance mechanisms = Human rights based due diligence with examples of application = Evidence of lobbying governments on multiple human rights issues Implementation by ENGOs CI         WWF         FFI         WCS         TNC         29  These are: i) Explicit human rights focus: With the exception of Conservation International, the ENGOs do not explicitly organize their work around human rights, nor refer to the international legal framework (beyond their commitment to the CIHR). All of the ENGOs highlight some people-related priorities in their field programmes, which are strikingly similar across the organisations (Table 2.1). However, much of the language they use is the same language that they have been using for many years, and is not human rights specific (for example, talk of livelihoods, but not the right to decent work; education, but in relation to the environment, not basic primary education; food security, but not the right to food; participation, but without the stress on the right to participation that is active, free and meaningful). This is reminiscent of a criticism levelled at the human rights based approach to development – that it is merely a cosmetic change but otherwise business as usual or, as Uvin eloquently puts it, “old wine in new bottles”(Uvin, 2007). For fisheries, such “human rights-washing” of language is perhaps most evident in a conflation of human rights with property rights, as discussed further in point (iv) below.  Although Uvin notes that a change in discourse can be helpful in achieving long-term realignment of values, he and others stress that the dilution and misappropriation of human rights language is dangerous. It risks losing sight of the political nature of human rights, which aim to challenge existing power structures and shift emphasis from the charitable or moral desire of international NGOs and donors to help developing communities and respect their wishes, to a legally recognized obligation to do so (Charlesworth, 2005; Gready, 2009; H. Miller, 2015). This crucial difference is being played out in current proceedings against WWF at the OECD, in 30  which WWF has questioned the appropriateness of applying the OECD Guidelines, used primarily for corporations, to the work of ENGOs (Barkham, 2017). ii) Global priorities: In their programmatic work to promote (fulfil) human rights, the ENGOs have a dominant focus on gender and indigenous rights. Of course, these are extremely important areas for the application of human rights, and ENGOs need to start somewhere. Although human rights are “indivisible” (or, should be ranked equally) under international law, the concept of progressive realization recognizes that resource constraints may prevent all rights from being promoted at once, and allows for some prioritization (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Hunt et al., 2004). It makes sense for ENGOs, given their mandates, to place emphasis on the rights of women and indigenous peoples, since both groups are commonly expected to bolster conservation (Agarwal, 2009; Agrawal & Gibson, 1999) However, prioritization must accord with human rights principles such as non-discrimination, and this global strategizing of ENGOs not only risks the neglect of other vulnerable groups (such as small-scale fishers, migrants, the elderly), but is also lacking in input from affected communities. As Uvin, Cornwall and others note, a successful human rights-based movement must come from the people, not be dictated by “pious ideals” in US board rooms (Allison et al., 2012; Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Uvin, 2007). In this respect, one should recall that the SSF-Guidelines are just that: Guidelines. They are not a prescription setting out the specific matters and rights that will be at issue in any particular fishing community. Therefore, implementation of the SSF-Guidelines must steer a difficult course between applying recognizable international human rights principles (not watered down versions, as discussed in (i)), whilst being sensitive to 31  context  (Gready, 2009; H. Miller, 2015). This can only be achieved by fostering genuine local input, and with a willingness to challenge the dominant Western agendas in some contexts.  iii) Awareness of rights and accountability: It is difficult for a human rights-based movement to come “from the people” if the people are not aware of their rights. Without an awareness of their rights, affected people will also be unable to hold ENGOs to account for breaches of their rights where they occur, and will not be able to participate in conservation initiatives or consultations in an appropriately informed manner (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Hamm, 2001). Associations representing small-scale fishers have emphasized the need for awareness-raising to be top of the agenda in implementation of the SSF-Guidelines (TNI et al., 2013). This is an area where ENGOs, with their extensive reach, could play a crucial role. However, at the moment, despite much talk of participation, initiatives to raise awareness of rights in communities appear uncommon. This is also true of other mechanisms that could improve accountability, including: human rights specific monitoring and evaluation; dispute resolution procedures that operate effectively at a community level; and due diligence and advocacy policies that openly investigate and influence the human rights records of partners (whether they be funders, Governments or corporate partners). This echoes yet another criticism of rights-based approaches in development:  a lack of real intention to challenge power imbalances and the established world order, and an especially marked reluctance to apply an introspective lens that interrogates NGOs’ own power and ability to influence decisions in developing communities (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004) iv) Rights in fisheries: Finally, and most importantly for this analysis, the work of ENGOs in the fisheries sector appears to be lagging behind that in some other areas, particularly forests, 32  with respect to the application of human rights. Examples of a human rights-based approach being implemented in relation to fisheries projects are limited. This might in part reflect the tendency of conservation organizations to focus their human rights-based approach in indigenous communities’ rights claims, and in particular their claims for land title (see Table 2.1 and (Brockington et al., 2006)). The nomadic or semi-nomadic nature of many fishing people makes it more difficult for many to be recognized as part of an indigenous group, or to claim tenure over specific areas of sea (where tenure claims are in any case less clear than on land) (Allison & Ellis, 2001; Hitchcock, 1994) . Perversely, the assertion of rights may also have presented a barrier to the rise of human rights in fisheries management and marine conservation: Typically, a “rights-based approach” to fisheries refers not to human rights, but to restriction of access to a fishery via the allocation of property rights (Allison et al., 2012; Béné, Hersoug, et al., 2010; Pinkerton & Edwards, 2009; Ratner et al., 2014; Sharma, 2011; Sumaila, 2010; TNI et al., 2013). At around the same time that marine conservation NGOs were endorsing the CIHR, influential papers were being published about the power of a property rights based approach to achieve sustainable fisheries by maximizing economic efficiency and conservation gains (Costello et al., 2008; TNI et al., 2013). In 2012, the World Bank published its Sunken Billions report, following which the property rights based approach was enthusiastically embraced by many ENGOs, under increasing pressure to demonstrate value for money in conservation  (Ferraro & Pattanayak, 2006; Kelleher et al., 2009; World Bank, 2015). Many commentators have highlighted the differences between property and human rights in fisheries management, and flagged how the former can be detrimental to the latter (chiefly, by excluding vulnerable groups from fisheries and concentrating fisheries benefits in the hands of a few) (Allison et al., 2012; Béné, Hersoug, et al., 2010; Copes, 1986; Sharma, 2011; Sowman et 33  al., 2014; Sumaila, 2010; WFFP & WFF, 2013).However, property rights continue to be presented alongside, or even as part of a human rights approach by the big ENGOs: see for example WWF’s inclusion of a (property) rights based approach document on its “human rights” web page (WWF, 2017b). This obfuscates the ENGOs’ true goals and progress. There is some concern that a similar sleight of hand in terms of rights based approaches might be occurring with the SSF-Guidelines – the authors of the recent report on “Human rights vs. Property Rights” suggest competing human rights and property rights agendas in FAO implementation forums (TNI et al., 2013). It seems that, in fisheries and marine/aquatic conservation, as in development, if human rights have nothing to say about economics (or at least, conservation benefits), they risk being side-lined for approaches that are more attractive to Western donors and organisations (Gready, 2009; Seymour & Pincus, 2008). In light of this, it would be naïve to propose action points for ENGOs to better implement the human rights-based approach espoused in the SSF-Guidelines without first considering whether there is any political will amongst ENGOs to do more. Therefore, before looking at action points suggested by the gaps in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, the next section reviews the incentives and disincentives for marine conservation NGOs to engage in implementing the SSF-Guidelines, and specifically the human rights based approach espoused therein. 34  2.3 Incentives to engage with the human rights-based approach in the Small-Scale Fisheries Guidelines 2.3.1 Disincentives - Relationship with authorities and room for manoeuvre  There are two major disincentives for ENGOs to espouse a human rights-based approach. The first is the possibility that human rights promotion will create tensions with host authorities and powerful interest groups. This is particularly the case in contexts of discriminatory and repressive governance (at both national or local levels), where the beneficiary communities are historically marginalized or considered a security threat by authorities (e.g. 'pirates'), and where powerful business interests are at stake. Concerns for the approval of authorities (e.g. work visas, project authorizations) and support from powerful groups (e.g. transport logistics) can drive ENGOs away from (openly) supporting human rights. The second disincentive is the risk that a human rights-based approach will narrow the range of policies and practices that can be deployed for conservation purposes. Such risk not only applies to on-going projects, but also long-term options, as rights awareness can be transformative for communities and power-relations. There may be a lurking suspicion in some quarters that the promotion of human rights, like other development, may also come with costs for conservation - fuelled by the controversy around the “right to fish” in South Africa, for example (Sowman et al., 2014). Fear of opening the 'Pandora’s box' of rights can deter initial engagement with a human rights-based approach. 2.3.2 Negative incentives –Conservation conflict, legal obligations and reputational risk The most frequently cited reasons for ENGOs to take note of human rights are negative ones: That is, if they don’t take note, bad things will happen. For ENGOs, first and foremost amongst 35  these “bad things” must be negative impacts upon conservation efforts. A string of examples illustrates how a lack of respect for human rights principles has undermined management and conservation efforts in small-scale fisheries. These include: lack of compliance with marine protected areas because of a lack of alternative food source; failure of alternative livelihoods schemes because they do not constitute decent work; and lack of engagement with conservation initiatives where meaningful participation has been prohibited by a lack of transparency and access to information (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Elliott et al., 2001; Kamat, 2014). These examples and others are elaborated in  Table 2.3.36   Table 2.3 Relevance of human rights principles to marine conservation A lack of attention to key human rights principles can undermine fisheries management efforts (note: fishing access rights of indigenous peoples are not included in this review as they have been covered extensively by others, especially (Capistrano & Charles, 2012; Davis & Jentoft, 2001; C. Smith & Dodson, 2010; TNI et al., 2013) Right or Group of Rights Explanation of rights and relevance to marine conservation Right to participation in decision making and management Arts. 19 and 21 UDHR; Arts. 19 and 25 ICCPR; Arts. 3.1, 5.15 to 5.18 and 8.2 SSF-Guidelines.  Small-scale fishers have a right to participate in public affairs, including management of resources, in a way that is active, free and meaningful. The importance of participation to marine conservation has long been recognised, but where it falls short of these rights the legitimacy and effectiveness of management measures is undermined, and non-compliance and conflict result (Bennett & Dearden, 2014; Ferse et al., 2010; Pollnac et al., 2001). Commonly cited short-comings include:  - Outsiders seeking to implement conservation measures have viewed consultations as a chance to educate, influence and, ultimately, dictate policy to local resource users, rather than a genuine negotiation with rights-holders (Clifton, 2009; Ferse et al., 2010; Katikiro et al., 2015).  - A lack of access to information has prevented fishers from getting involved in management (Elliott et al., 2001).  - Key user groups have been overlooked in participatory processes, for a variety of reasons: inability to attend meetings (time and cost constraints); social norms constraining active participation in meetings and/or resource management; perceived lack of relevance of meetings; illiteracy. Often these users are from marginalised groups in the community (e.g. women, migrants). (Katikiro et al., 2015; Matsue et al., 2014; Njock et al., 2009) 37  Right to equality and non-discrimination (marginalised groups within small-scale fishing communities) Arts. 1 and 2 UDHR; Arts. 2 and 3 ICCPR; Arts. 2 and 3 ICESC; Arts 3.1, 8 SSF-Guidelines, plus references to vulnerable and marginalised groups throughout. Rights apply equally to all, with no discrimination based on race, sex or other grounds. Commonly marginalised groups in small-scale fishing communities include women, migrants, fishers who do not own gear and the elderly (Barratt & Allison, 2014; Njock et al., 2009; Sharma, 2011; Sowman et al., 2012). As discussed above, this marginalisation can lead to groups being excluded from resource management decisions and from receiving benefits designed to compensate for the conservation measure (Béné et al., 2009; Fabinyi et al., 2010; Leisher et al., 2010; S. Singleton, 2009; Sowman et al., 2014). This may lead to increased insecurity and infringement of these individuals’ other rights (E.g. right to food), plus non-compliance with management measures and conflict (Kamat, 2014). Right to equality and non-discrimination (beyond the community, global) Arts. 1 and 2 UDHR; Arts. 2 and 3 ICCPR; Arts. 2 and 3 ICESC; Arts 3.1, 5.9, 7.10, 8 SSF-Guidelines Global inequality has left many small-scale fishers disadvantaged by international trade in seafood, jeopardising their rights to food and decent working conditions (Béné, Lawton, et al., 2010; M. D. Smith et al., 2010). Unequal bargaining power in international trade has also had adverse effects on marine resources, as with EU-African Fishing Agreements, and the recent surging demand for shark fins, live reef fish and sea cucumbers from China (Alder & Sumaila, 2004; Crona et al., 2015; Le Manach et al., 2013). As conservation groups broker access to global markets for small-scale fishers as part of integrated conservation-development projects, consideration should be given to whether adequate human rights and governance structures are in place to avoid elite capture of benefits and increased marginalisation of certain groups (Allison et al., 2012; Crona et al., 2015).  Right to basic services and decent standard of living Arts. 25 and 26 UDHR; Arts. 11 to 14 ICESC; Art. 6.2 (services), All (food) SSF-Guidelines. Small-scale fishers have the right to basic services, such as education and healthcare, and a decent standard of living, including adequate housing, food and clothing. A lack of education is a commonly cited barrier (or perceived barrier) that prevents fishers from claiming other rights, participating in resource management and accessing alternative livelihoods (Allison & Ellis, 2001; Cinner et al., 2009; FAO, 2015a; Isaacs, 2012; Muallil et al., 2011; Mwaipopo, 2008; Pomeroy et al., 2006; Ratner et al., 2014; L. S. L. Teh et al., 2008). Poor healthcare, and high instances of diseases such as HIV in fishing communities, also increase vulnerability and uncertainty, which does not harbour sustainable behaviour (Allison & Seeley, 2004; Barratt & Allison, 2014). Similarly, basic needs for food and shelter drive an immediate need to fish that takes precedence over management measures (Kamat, 2014). 38  Right to decent work Arts. 4, 23 and 24 UDHR; Art. 8 ICCPR; Arts. 6 to 9 ICESC; Art. 6 SSF-Guidelines. Decent work in small-scale fisheries includes the right to adequate living income, unforced labour, health and safety at work, security and stability, and rest time (FAO, 2015a). Many egregious violations of the right to decent work in fisheries have been highlighted in recent work on “seafood slavery” (Lawrence, 2014; McDowell et al., 2015; Ratner et al., 2014; Urbina, 2015). Such forced labour is recognised as contrary to sustainability in fisheries (MSC, 2014).  However, receiving less attention are those violations of the rights to decent work that at first seem more minor, but adversely affect the lives of many small-scale fishers and undermine resource management and alternative livelihood initiatives. For example: a lack of free time amongst women is cited as one factor preventing them from attending resource management meetings (Matsue et al., 2014); schemes to promote more sustainable fishing practices have failed due to not taking into account the increased hours of labour required from fishers (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012); child labour in fisheries is widespread, but is often overlooked in resource management (Mcmanus, 1996); relationships between fishers and their patrons are frequently exploitative and may also drive over-fishing (Allison & Ellis, 2001; Crona et al., 2010; Fabinyi, 2013; Minarro et al., 2016; Sharma, 2011); the dangerous nature of fishing contributes to insecurity and “fast-living” that undermines sustainable management (Barratt & Allison, 2014). Access to justice and the right to an effective remedy Art. 8 UDHR; Art. 2 ICCPR; Art. 5.11 SSF-Guidelines. In many cases, small-scale fishers lack access to legal redress for infringement of their rights, which undermines all other rights discussed above (Allison et al., 2012). Lack of conflict resolution mechanisms has also been shown to undermine conservation efforts ((Bennett & Dearden, 2014; Christie, 2004). 39  The second “negative incentive” to play a role in implementing the SSF-Guidelines is legal obligation. For ENGOs, it is unclear whether human rights law or the SSF-Guidelines apply directly, both being addressed primarily to the nation states that have endorsed them (Jonas et al., 2014). That said, ENGOs are increasingly entering into co-management arrangements, through which some of the responsibilities of the State in relation to managing small-scale fisheries are devolved to the ENGO alongside communities (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005; L. Evans et al., 2011). The devolution of natural resource management powers from the State often comes with duties under national law. These might include some devolution of the role of “duty bearer” in respect to relevant human rights including, for ENGOs working in small-scale fishing communities, those encapsulated in the SSF-Guidelines.  Beyond devolution of power and responsibility in co-management arrangements, there is increasing recognition that actors such as multi-national corporations and ENGOs are often better financed, more powerful, and every bit as capable of influencing human rights as States, especially in developing countries, and should therefore be held to account under human rights standards - by their own Governments and third parties, if necessary. Many trans-national corporations, including those working in natural-resource based industries (especially energy and mining), are already being called to submit to assessments of their projects’ impacts on human rights in developing countries (Harrison, 2013; Kemp & Vanclay, 2013; Ruggie, 2008; World Bank, 2013). Trans-national fishing companies and others in the international fisheries supply chain are likely to face increased pressure to adhere to human rights standards after recent exposés of abuses in the sector (Lawrence, 2014; McDowell et al., 2015; Urbina, 2015). ENGOs have already been active in highlighting human rights transgressions in fishing, particularly in 40  relation to illegal, unregulated and unreported activities (WWF, 2017c). However, it seems inevitable that they will also soon have to take an introspective view and apply human rights standards to their own activities, given the criticisms they have faced (Campese et al., 2009; Igoe, 2007; Jonas et al., 2014). As a bare minimum, ENGOs operating under social licence, have a responsibility to “do no harm” to the populations they are working with or, in other words, to respect human rights (Adger et al., 2001; Jonas et al., 2014; Mulrennan et al., 2012; Sowman et al., 2012). However, as discussed above, the big ENGOs have, to a certain extent, anticipated a move towards human rights standards through self-regulation, and in so doing have voluntarily accepted more onerous obligations to protect and fulfil human rights (CIHR and (Jonas et al., 2014)).  By ensuring that their own activities comply with the SSF-Guidelines (and the human rights-based approach they espouse), marine conservation NGOs could affirm existing commitments to human rights and ethical, post-colonial approaches to conservation. Even where the role of ENGOs as “duty-bearer” is established, international human rights law is rarely likely to be invoked to force their compliance with standards. It is frequently criticized as being “unenforceable” even between States, with compliance down to a complex mix of power, self-interest, national identity and national law (Gready, 2008; Hamm, 2001; Koh, 1998). In addition, in the context of conservation and small-scale fisheries, those with causes of action under human rights law are often based in remote communities, without means or access to bring a claim. This is not good news for the SSF-Guidelines – officially “voluntary” and reliant on international human rights law, in which they are grounded, to give them an air of legal enforceability (Jentoft, 2014). However, regardless of ultimate enforceability, the mere hanging threat of legal action may be incentive enough for ENGOs to comply, due to the third and final 41  negative incentive: reputational damage. Following the “fortress conservation” scandals of the past, where ENGOs were associated with forced evictions and economic displacement (Agrawal & Redford, 2009; Brockington & Igoe, 2006; Goldman, 2011), they cannot afford for their brands to be tarnished by any association with other human rights transgressions such as seafood slavery, child labour or other human rights abuses coming to the fore in fisheries (Marschke & Vandergeest, 2016; Ratner et al., 2014; Sutton & Siciliano, 2016). Critical conservation literature, such as that cited in Table 2.3, has already done much to encourage ENGOs to shift towards more people-oriented conservation and, given the significance of such “naming and shaming” in human rights work, it is likely to continue to be an important watchdog, keeping the SSF-Guidelines honest for small-scale fishing communities (Jacquet, 2016).  While the “negative incentives” flagged above provide excellent reasons for ENGOs to endorse the SSF-Guidelines, they may not be enough to inspire them to active implementation. They are somewhat uncertain and are countered by the disincentives described. Without more certainty around the costs of implementing or not implementing the SSF-Guidelines, or more concrete benefits for conservation weighing in the balance for implementation, progress is likely to be slow and/or superficial.  What is needed is more evidence on the relationship between human rights and conservation, in a small-scale fisheries context.  2.3.3 Positive incentives – A need for evidence Previous work has suggested that, only if the basic needs of small-scale fishers are first satisfied, will they be in a position to sustainably manage their marine resources (Allison et al., 2012; Ratner et al., 2014; Sowman et al., 2012). Indeed, this is the premise behind the human rights based approach in the SSF- Guidelines (FAO, 2015b).  However, so far there is little proof that 42  promotion of human rights enables, or indeed promotes, sustainable resource management and environmental benefits, or even development (Gready, 2009; Ratner et al., 2014). Indeed, one can easily construct arguments that, in the short term, promotion of some rights (e.g. the right to food) could undermine conservation efforts (e.g. to limit fishing). Although that is an overly simplistic and short-term view of human rights, it is nevertheless the case that further research is required. This does not excuse inaction on the part of ENGOs, who have long promoted the mantra that conservation cannot wait for better evidence. Rather, it suggests a tentative entry point for implementation of the SSF-Guidelines by ENGOs. Human-rights based evaluations of NGO work to date, to highlight conflicts and synergies between the ENGOs’ different goals, would provide much of the evidence that is missing. The concluding section of this Chapter elaborates on this and other action points.  2.4 ENGOs as a catalyst for the SSF-Guidelines: A proposal Management of small-scale fisheries that is sustainable both for people and fish stocks is no easy feat. It will require communication between actors with different world views, at different organizational levels and in different places. It will require a genuine exchange of ideas and innovation. Most importantly, it will require the input and collaboration of those who will be most affected – the small-scale fishers. This Chapter has reviewed the readiness of international conservation NGOs to play a role in implementing the SSF-Guidelines and hinted at what that role might be. The following is a more specific proposal for how ENGOs might play their part in implementing the SSF-Guidelines, including suggestions for improving current human rights-based approaches, based on the review in this Chapter and the author’s own experience of working with ENGOs:  43  1) Ensuring respect for human rights in all conservation work in small-scale fishing communities The SSF-Guidelines call, first and foremost, for respect for the rights of small scale fishers. When implementing fisheries management or conservation measures in small-scale fishing communities, ENGOs must take precautions to ensure that human rights are respected, whether it be the right to food in the face of restricted fishing or the right for community members to have their say (directly or through adequate representation) in the management process.  Ensuring respect for rights will first of all involve identifying potential transgressions, through human rights focused monitoring and evaluation. Human rights based evaluations have been used in both the corporate sector and development, and these could provide models for the approach (Harrison, 2011, 2013; Watson et al., 2013)  Bringing human rights to conservation evaluation may require some move away from the log-frames of basic numerical indicators that have come to dominate in recent times. Human rights impacts can be complex, hard to quantify and emerge over much longer timeframes than the indicators of success currently favoured by funders (L. Evans et al., 2011; Gready, 2009; Smyth, 2007; Woodhouse et al., 2015). Human rights evaluation should include dissemination of results to affected communities to increase transparency and accountability, which are also essential to ensure that ENGOs are respecting human rights. Better communication with communities generally is also required to increase transparency and accountability. Community members must be able to understand the proposed and ongoing activities of ENGOs and participate or challenge them as they see fit. As discussed in Table 2.3, lack of transparency and poor communication have often undermined participation in marine 44  conservation projects. Information should be accessible in a form that is readily understandable by community members and forums for consultation should consider power imbalances and be inclusive (e.g. large community meetings may not enable participation by vulnerable groups).   Some of the major ENGOs have already taken steps towards greater accountability by implementing dispute resolution procedures. However, given the remoteness of many small-scale fishing communities, and other barriers such as low literacy, much work could be done to make these more accessible to those in affected communities. Ideally, they should also involve review by an independent third party, and anonymity, otherwise community members may be deterred from filing complaints for fear of adverse consequences (e.g. no further work or project funding from the ENGO).  A final point on accountability and respect for rights is that ENGOs can be somewhat disjointed organisations, with field offices operating with considerable independence of global headquarters. Efforts to improve internal communications and internal accountability for applying human rights in project work will enhance any rights-based approach. The easiest way of implementing the latter would be to ensure that human rights related goals are incorporated in monitoring and evaluation and reports to funders.  Of course, before community members can effectively challenge activities, they must be aware of their rights, which brings us to the next step for implementation. 2) Raising awareness of rights in small-scale fishing communities This is vital if community members are to be able to hold ENGOs to account in respecting human rights, and also to participate fully in dialogue about fisheries management (Isaacs, 2006). 45  Lessons could be learned from both CARE and ActionAid, who have been taking initiatives to raise awareness of rights since the late 1990s, with ActionAid making this central to its work (Nyamu-musembi & Cornwall, 2004). ENGOs have already, in some cases, formed partnerships with these organizations, and are well placed to increase the reach of their human rights awareness programs by bringing them to remote small-scale fishing communities that are less frequently prioritized in development work (WWF, 2017a). Another option to raise awareness is exchange programmes between more rights-aware fishing communities and others (Thompson et al., 2016). Raising awareness of rights will also require increasing knowledge of human rights amongst ENGO staff, especially field staff. Measures might include: hiring key staff with human rights expertise; partnering in-country with human rights organizations; and human rights training programs (including e-learning to facilitate wider reach across an organization). CI is already leading the way in development of such staff training programs. Finally, whilst a basic awareness of rights is important, it cannot replace access to independent legal counsel in major community consultations where rights are at stake (e.g. negotiation of conservation contracts).  3) Amplifying the voice of small-scale fishing communities  The proposals in (1) and (2) above are about ensuring respect for human rights, or “doing no harm”. It is widely accepted that this is a minimum requirement for the continued work of international NGOs in developing countries. However, this is a rather limited vision for implementation of the SSF-Guidelines. ENGOs also have a pivotal role to play in actively 46  promoting the realization of human rights, and in influencing third parties (Governments, corporations) to provide greater protection for rights.  Firstly, ENGOs can use their connections to act as a conduit for the views of members of small-scale fishing communities. Globally determined human rights and conservation priorities may not match those of affected communities and may therefore not represent the best approach to meet the basic needs of as many people as possible. With their geographical reach and involvement at different administrative levels, ENGOs are in an ideal position to listen to small-scale fishing community members and help to incorporate their ideas into international and national policy. That said, this is not how things have worked in the past, with ENGO priorities and influence tending to operate at the global level (N. Gray, 2010; Halpern et al., 2006; Silver et al., 2015). In order to improve, priorities should be set in consultation with communities. A determination of the human rights issues that are of greatest cause for concern in a given context is one of the early steps of the monitoring and evaluation approaches described in (1) above.  In addition, larger ENGOs must focus on improving internal communications, so that the results of community consultations are fed back to those who are determining strategy and writing funding proposals.  Of course, there also needs to be a political will to listen to the views of community members, from both ENGOs and their funders. This will require both evidence and influence. 4) Gathering evidence to elucidate the links between human rights and sustainable fisheries As discussed earlier in this Chapter, it will be difficult for ENGOs to wholeheartedly embrace the human rights-based approach of the SSF-Guidelines until there is further evidence 47  elucidating the links between human rights and sustainable fisheries. ENGOs can play a significant role in gathering this evidence, both through human rights specific data collection (as described in (1) above) and through influencing the research questions posed by the academic community. 5) Changing the global discourse on marine conservation, small-scale fisheries and human rights by influencing others Like it or not, in today’s globalized world international NGOs are powerful players and exert great policy influence (Campese et al., 2009; Hamm, 2001; TNI et al., 2013). The partnerships they make, and the influence they exert over partners (or not), will shape resource management in small-scale fishing communities, no matter what. A major step towards implementing the SSF-Guidelines will therefore be to encourage ENGOs to apply their influence in line with human rights principles. This includes not turning a blind eye to the actions or inactions of would-be partners, nor taking advantage of unjust laws and Government regimes that nevertheless further conservation. This in turn requires due diligence of partners that fully considers human rights. In theory, this should be eminently possible, given that corporate partners and Governments are held to the same or higher human rights standards as ENGOs (Jonas et al., 2014; Ruggie, 2008). In reality, conducting due diligence of the human rights position of partners, and certainly flagging issues, has the potential to create tension, given the name-and-shame culture of human rights discussed above. Perhaps this is why such due diligence is either not done, or not widely disclosed by prospective ENGO partners. Yet, no matter how uncomfortable, one of the core reasons for the existence of NGOs is to investigate, challenge and attempt to influence the positions of Governments and corporations. Again, one can look to CARE for examples of holding third parties to account (Cornwall & Nyamu-48  Musembi, 2004). Beyond corporate partners and Governments, it is perhaps even more important for the success of the SSF-Guidelines that funders are brought on board at an early stage. Support from funders is needed both to create space for reflection, and to allow re-alignment of priorities with those of communities. Undertaking to improve human rights of small scale fishing communities is a long-term commitment, which requires genuine community participation and outcomes that are uncertain and difficult to measure (Gready, 2009). As discussed above, in the short-term at least, it is easy to conceive how a “success” for human rights may be viewed as a “failure” for conservation. This does not sit well with the current approach to funding, where grants are short term, tend to emphasize either development or conservation, and demand easily quantifiable results (Bottrill et al., 2011; D. C. Miller, 2014). The current approach propagates an ethos of “doing” rather than “thinking” in ENGO practice on the ground, which can undermine the use of participatory approaches in both project implementation and evaluation. It is certainly not conducive to a model of exercising caution and taking time to learn about rights and ensure they are respected.  2.5 Conclusion With their geographical reach and influence, international conservation NGOs have great potential to facilitate the implementation of the SSF-Guidelines and boost progress towards small-scale fisheries practices that are both socially and environmentally sustainable. However, in order to play the role of facilitator, ENGOs must have the trust of all parties, which will require their own commitment to the human rights approach espoused in the SSF-Guidelines to be beyond question. Despite their commitments in recent years to achieve conservation with, or 49  even for, people, a suspicion still hangs over ENGOs that they would prioritize conservation measures over the basic human rights of people affected.   True implementation of a human rights-based approach at all levels of a large, multi-jurisdictional organization is not a simple task, and not something that can be done overnight. However, by working towards the suggested plan of action above, ENGOs can not only dispel the lingering doubts over their motives, but also contribute to the much-needed evidence base for better achieving small-scale fisheries that are sustainable both in environmental and human terms.50  Chapter 3: Discount the fishers, discount the fishery - The economic basis for human rights in small-scale fisheries management 3.1 Introduction Marine conservation is increasingly promoted for its benefits to people as well as biodiversity (Reuchlin-Hugenholtz & McKenzie, 2015; Spalding et al., 2016). Globally, sustainable fisheries management is needed for the long-term food and economic security of many fishing communities (FAO, 2016a; Garcia & Rosenberg, 2010; Srinivasan et al., 2010; L. C. L. Teh & Sumaila, 2013; World Bank, 2017c). Yet, despite the potential benefits, tools for marine conservation have been criticised for social injustices caused to small-scale fishers. Firstly, they can place too much reliance on “trickle-down” economics to distribute benefits, leaving small-scale fishers without a fair share. Many property rights-based management schemes have resulted in the concentration of quota in the hands of industrial fishing concerns (Sumaila, 2010); while benefits of marine protected areas, such as ecotourism revenues, frequently fail to reach the local community (Christie, 2004; Leisher et al., 2010; Walley, 2004). Another concern for social justice is timescales. Marine conservation measures may bring long-term increases in fisheries productivity but require an immediate reduction in fishing to do so, with detrimental impacts on the livelihoods and well-being of local communities in the short-term (Balmford & Whitten, 2003; Worm et al., 2009). Many small-scale fishers live in compromised circumstances and are too vulnerable to withstand these short-term costs while they wait for the long-term benefits. 51  The Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries (“the SSF-Guidelines”)5 aim to promote sustainable fisheries by tackling the social injustices faced by small-scale fishers, enabling them to share in the benefits of good management and become forward-thinking resource stewards (FAO, 2015b; Jentoft, 2014). The guidelines advocate for a human rights-based approach, which places emphasis on tackling inequality and power imbalances. In doing so, they support measures that seek to achieve more sustainable global fisheries by redistributing benefits to small-scale fishers: For example, by reducing subsidies to industrial vessels (Schuhbauer et al., 2017); strengthening small-scale fishers’ tenure rights (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Bennett et al., 2015); and improving fisheries governance (Béné, Hersoug, et al., 2010). A human rights-based approach also calls for a reduction in the vulnerability of small-scale fishers, and I focus primarily on this aspect in this Chapter and consider its implications for sustainable fisheries. Proponents of the SSF-Guidelines and a human rights-based approach to fisheries management suggest that reducing the vulnerability of small-scale fishers will enable better stewardship of fisheries (Allison et al., 2012; Jentoft, 2014; Sharma, 2011; TNI et al., 2013). At first glance, this appears to run contrary to established principles of fisheries management: Guaranteeing human rights to decent work and food might also mean awarding a large group of fishers the right to fish, and seems difficult to reconcile with long-established theory that limiting access is the key to both economic and conservation benefits (Cunningham et al., 2009; Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968; Sowman et al., 2014). However, limiting access relies on strict compliance or                                                  5 Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the context of food security and poverty eradication. (Food and Agriculture Organisation, Rome). 52  enforcement, which is often not possible in developing contexts due to weak institutions and the high dependence of fishers on the fishery for immediate survival needs (Béné, Hersoug, et al., 2010). Further, in applying bioeconomic theory, it is important to remember that a sustainable outcome also hinges on the fishers who remain in the fishery having a long-term outlook, motivated by future returns (Sumaila, 2010; Sumaila & Walters, 2005). If this is not the case (in economic terms, they heavily “discount” future benefits or have a high discount rate) then even if there is only one fisher it may well make economic sense for him to over-exploit the resource, possibly to the point of extinction (Clark, 1973). The same is true of the economic benefits of marine protected areas (“MPAs”): A recent study showing that economic benefits outweigh costs relied on resource users having a low (3%) discount rate (Brander et al., 2015; Reuchlin-Hugenholtz & McKenzie, 2015).  The vulnerability and uncertainties faced by small-scale fishers means that their discount rates are often very high – sometimes as great as 200% (Oleson et al., 2015; L. S. L. Teh et al., 2014) There are many sources of uncertainty in the lives of these fishers - including ill-health, extreme weather, physical danger and insecure access rights – and until their future is secure, they are unlikely to defer fishing today for fishing tomorrow (Allison et al., 2012). In this Chapter, I propose that a human rights-based approach could complement established measures such as MPAs and property rights-based management (“RBM”) by reducing vulnerability of small-scale fishers, and thereby lowering their discount rates to a level that is conducive to effective fisheries management. In making this proposal, I follow others who have suggested that management measures will only succeed in small-scale fisheries if applied under appropriate macroeconomic and institutional conditions (Allison et al., 2012; Béné, Hersoug, et al., 2010).  53  I begin by reviewing the economic literature to explore the links between the uncertainties faced by small-scale fishers, their human rights, and discounting behaviour and look for evidence to support the notion that improved realisation of human rights might correspond with a lower discounting rate and more environmentally sustainable behaviour. Based on this review, I then propose a combined index for rapid, high-level assessment of both the human rights situation in a small-scale fishing community and the likelihood of unsustainable behaviour (high discounting rates). This could be used to identify situations where poor realization of human rights is creating insecure conditions that are not conducive to sustainability, and that must be addressed in conjunction with, or as a pre-requisite for, effective fisheries management.  3.2 Discounting and human rights: A review 3.2.1 An overview of discounting, uncertainty and human rights In economics, discount rates are used in cost-benefit analyses to capture the idea that people prefer to receive their benefits sooner rather than later, and therefore place greater value on immediate benefits (Sumaila, 2004). The higher the discount rate, the more the future benefits are discounted (reduced) in value compared to benefits received today. The rationale for discounting is two-fold:  (1) Investment: $10 received today is more valuable than $10 received in a year because it can be invested. In a year, the invested sum will then be worth more than $10, with the exact value depending on the market rate of interest (this is also the reason why the current market rate of interest is often chosen to represent the discount rate in calculations); 54  (2) Time preference: This captures both human impatience (Barratt, 2009; Markandya & Pearce, 1988) and the risk and unreliability surrounding benefits that accrue in the future, arising from uncertainties in physical, social or political conditions  (Gattig, 2007; Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Sumaila & Domínguez-Torreiro, 2010). Differing levels of uncertainty cause individuals to apply different discount rates (Gattig, 2002; Sumaila & Walters, 2005). Those living in poverty have a particularly vulnerable and uncertain situation, and behavioural economists have begun to link many of the facets of poverty (e.g. low income, lack of education, poor health) with high discount rates (Bauer & Chytilová, 2010; Chao et al., 2009; Damon et al., 2015; Holden et al., 1998; Lawrance, 1991). While many approaches to development target these symptoms of poverty, a human rights-based approach goes further by addressing the underlying causes – imbalances in power, inequality, weak institutions of accountability – and thus seeks to secure more long-term improvement in socioeconomic conditions (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Uvin, 2007). As such, it asks not merely whether socioeconomic conditions are satisfactory, but whether the continuation of those satisfactory condition is guaranteed by right, with an identifiable duty holder that can be held to account for a decline in circumstances. In doing so, I suggest it does more than other approaches to tackle the uncertainty created by conditions of poverty and can therefore gain greater traction in reducing discount rates and promoting sustainability. In my review of the literature I consider the effect on discount rates of both a long-term improvement in socioeconomic conditions promoted by individual rights, and an increase in certainty promoted by all rights. I focus on conditions and associated rights that are commonly compromised in small-scale fishing communities.   55  Before continuing my discussion of the relationship between discounting, certainty and human rights, I return briefly to the more pervasive rights in fisheries management – property rights – and head off the argument that property rights alone create certainty, could lower discount rates and therefore render attention to human rights superfluous. I reiterate Colin Clark’s caution that, even where property rights are assigned and a fishery is restricted to a few owners (or even to one), it is still possible to envisage scenarios (e.g. slow growing fish) where the discount rates of those few owners exceeds the growth rate of the fish in question, and where consequently it makes perfect economic sense to overexploit that fish, possibly to the point of extinction (Clark, 1973). In other words, even where property rights guarantee some certainty, further guarantees of certainty and reductions in discount rate are still helpful. In many situations, property rights do not guarantee certainty over future fish catches, they merely guarantee the right to go fishing (Allison et al., 2012; Bromley, 2016; Sumaila, 2010). The catch itself remains uncertain due to other threats to the fish (e.g. climate change, pollution) and to the fishers (e.g. the human rights related concerns I discuss in this Chapter). Therefore, property rights alone cannot generate sufficient certainty to lower discount rates, especially for vulnerable fishers.    3.2.2 Discounting and certainty Social theorists have long recognised that those living under risky and uncertain conditions place less value on savings and future benefits (see (Frederick et al., 2002) citing Rae (1834) and (Allison et al., 2012) citing John Stuart Mill). More recently, this idea has been articulated in terms of discount rates: People discount future benefits partly because the benefits are less certain (Becker & Mulligan, 1997; Benzion et al., 1989; Halevy, 2008; S. S. Hanna, 1998; Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Markandya & Pearce, 1988). Keren and Roelofsma distinguish between 56  external sources of uncertainty (e.g. political instability), which they suggest can be allayed by institutional guarantees, and internal sources of uncertainty (e.g. sickness, risk of death) which they argue can only be overcome through immediate spending. I dispute the latter conclusion in the context of rights, since guarantees to provide health services by a duty-holder might give an individual more certainty that they will overcome their sickness. Markandya and Pearce (1988) identify three categories of uncertainty that may affect discount rate: risk-of-death (uncertainty about whether an individual will be alive in the future to claim benefits); uncertainty over an individual’s future preferences; and uncertainty about the size of future costs and benefits. There is little doubt that an individual will always prefer to have their basic needs (food, shelter etc.) fulfilled, so uncertainty over future preferences is not relevant to a discussion of rights and discounting. Hanna (1998) further delineates the uncertainty over size of future costs and benefits in the context of fisheries, identifying uncertainty caused by a lack of knowledge of the state of resources and uncertainty over tenure as major factors. Again, both sources of uncertainty may be reduced by the realization of rights (specifically, rights to access information and tenure rights). All the sources of uncertainty cited above are frequently pronounced in small-scale fisheries, with implications for discounting, as I will discuss in relation to specific rights below.  The link between discounting and uncertainty has been demonstrated through correlation with risk aversion: If uncertainty tends to increase discount rates, those with less tolerance for uncertainty (greater aversion to risk) are likely to demonstrate an even more marked preference to take their benefits now, and an even higher discount rate (Anderhub et al., 2001; Benzion et al., 2007; Cassar et al., 2017; Tanaka et al., 2016). The rural poor tend to be more risk averse, 57  often with the paradoxical result of reinforcing their status of poverty due to their reluctance to challenge the status quo by investing in new technologies or more profitable crops, or leaving unfair business relationships (Perrings, 1989; Wood, 2001, 2003). This risk aversion makes sense, given that risky investments can threaten survival (Perrings, 1989). Improved human rights would lower the stakes by providing a State-led security buffer, with the likely consequence of lowering risk aversion amongst the poor and reducing discount rates. Other studies have shown directly that those living under uncertain conditions have higher discount rates and/or shorter time horizons, including those subject to: i) Income shocks (Di Falco et al., 2011; Haushofer et al., 2013; Holden, 2013); ii) Increased risk of mortality (Carstensen, 2006; Chao et al., 2009; Damon et al., 2015; Wilson & Daly, 1997) iii) Threats to physical security ((Dasgupta, 1996; Lahav et al., 2011; Warner & Pleeter, 2001) iv) Threats to livelihood (Curtis, 2001); v) Political instability (Goel et al., 2013). Many of these risks are common in small-scale fishing communities, as I will now discuss in relation to specific human rights. My review is summarised in  Table 3.158  Table 3.1 Summary of the impact of human rights realisation on discount rates and sustainable fishing “Positive impact’ indicates that when the right is strengthened discount rates are likely to be lower/ fishing more sustainable. Rights where the balance of the evidence points to a positive impact are shaded green, negative impact shaded red and uncertain impact shaded yellow. Human Right Impact on discounting and fisheries sustainability Evidence Education Positive: Better educated individuals have a lower discount rate (Bauer & Chytilová, 2010; Becker & Mulligan, 1997; Kirby et al., 2002)  Positive: Increased adaptability and enhanced economic security  (Allison et al., 2009; Maddox & Overa, 2009; Pollnac & Poggie, 1978; Pomeroy et al., 2006; L. S. L. Teh et al., 2011; Westaway et al., 2009)  Positive: Increased engagement with conservation initiatives (Allison & Ellis, 2001; Asrat et al., 2004; Cinner et al., 2009; FAO, 2015a; Maddox & Overa, 2009; Muallil et al., 2011; Mwaipopo, 2008; Ratner et al., 2014; L. S. L. Teh et al., 2008)  Negative: Incentive to fish harder and exit fishery (Barratt & Allison, 2014) Health Positive in many developing contexts: Where families are young and large; Mortality is high; and health conditions poor, the prevailing effect of realising the right to health is likely to be a decrease in health shocks, increase in life certainty and a decrease in discount rates. (Barratt & Allison, 2014; Becker & Mulligan, 1997; Chao et al., 2009; Damon et al., 2015; Njock et al., 2009) Living standard: Food Positive: Those facing food shortages have higher discount rates (Bardhan, 1996, Lumley, 1997 and Murphree, 1993 cited in Moseley, 2001;Di Falco et al., 2011)  Negative (short-term): Coping strategies suggest lower discount rates for those facing short-term food shortages (Barratt & Allison, 2014; Geheb et al., 2008; Moseley, 2001) 59  Human Right Impact on discounting and fisheries sustainability Evidence     Negative (short-term): Realisation of the right to food might mean guaranteeing the right to fish for local communities who are highly dependent on the resource. This could result in increased fishing unless and until external threats (e.g. industrial fishing) are addressed. (Béné et al., 2007; Charles, 2011; De Schutter, 2012; Foale et al., 2013; Kamat, 2014; Sharma, 2011; M. D. Smith et al., 2010; Sumaila et al., 2010) Living standard: Shelter Positive: Guaranteeing shelter could lower discount rates, as evidenced by the effect of a major threat to shelter (extreme weather events) on discount rates (Cassar et al., 2017) Decent work: No child labour Positive: Lower child labour is likely to coincide with higher education levels See Right to education above  Negative: Child labour contributes to economic security (Chuenpagdee & Juntarashote, 2011; Islam, 2011; Westaway et al., 2009) Decent work: No forced labour Positive: Where labour is forced by debts, fishers can fish harder than otherwise to service the debt  (Allison & Ellis, 2001; Crona et al., 2010; Minarro et al., 2016; Pender, 1996).  Positive (context specific): Labour freedom (boat ownership) associated with low discount rates (Barratt & Allison, 2014; Pollnac & Poggie, 1978; L. S. L. Teh et al., 2011). Decent work: Living income Positive: Income poverty associated with high discount rates (Holden et al., 1998; Lawrance, 1991  Positive: Social security schemes enable long-term resource management (Sharma, 2011). 60  Human Right Impact on discounting and fisheries sustainability Evidence Decent work: Employment security Positive (context specific): Boat ownership associated with low discount rates (Barratt & Allison, 2014; Pollnac & Poggie, 1978; L. S. L. Teh et al., 2011). Decent work: Occupational health and safety Positive: Reduction of physical risk and mortality decreases discount rate (Barratt & Allison, 2014; Chao et al., 2009; Dasgupta, 1996; Lahav et al., 2011; Voors et al., 2012; Warner & Pleeter, 2001) Equality and non-discrimination Positive: Inequality (a few wealthy/powerful individuals, within or outside a fishing community) may drive unsustainable fishing if they seek short-term profits from the fishery. (Béné, Lawton, et al., 2010; Crona et al., 2010, 2015; Minarro et al., 2016; Sharma, 2011; Sumaila et al., 2010; S. Wells, 2009).    Negative: Inequality (a few wealthy/powerful individuals) may drive sustainable fishing if the wealthy are inclined to environmental protection.  (Scruggs, 1998)  Positive: Inequality undermines conservation and cooperative tendencies.  (Allison et al., 2012; Béné et al., 2009; Bennett & Dearden, 2014; Christie, 2004; FAO, 2006; Leisher et al., 2010; S. Lumley, 1997; Rosenbaum et al., 2016; L. S. L. Teh et al., 2011).  Negative: Inequality associated with lower discount rates (Voors et al., 2012). Participation in decision-making and management Positive: Lack of effective participation leads to lack of critical social services, which can impact other rights (Keefer & Khemani, 2005; Njock et al., 2009  Positive: Disengagement and lack of access to information increase uncertainty over the state of the fishing resource (Bennett & Dearden, 2014; Elliott et al., 2001; S. S. Hanna, 1998; L. S. L. Teh et al., 2011). 61  Human Right Impact on discounting and fisheries sustainability Evidence Women's rights Positive: Women who control their own finances invest in the long-term, particularly the health, food security and education of their children. (Blumberg, 1988; Geheb et al., 2008)  None: No significant difference between the discount rates of men and women. (Holden et al., 1998; Kirby et al., 2002; Pender, 1996)  Positive: Women with children have lower discount rates than men/other women. (Barratt & Allison, 2014; Bauer & Chytilová, 2013; Blumberg, 1988).  Negative (Short term): As women have fewer children/ greater independence from men, they may initially experience greater economic insecurity and higher discount rates. This may be mitigated through increased fishing activity and other environmentally unsustainable behaviour. (Blumberg, 1988; Fraser, 1999) 62   3.2.3 Discounting and the right to education  The right to education (specifically, Art. 26 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (“UDHR”) and Arts. 13 and 14 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (“ICESC”) obliges Governments and other duty-bearers to progressively improve access to quality education for all. It also encompasses a more pressing imperative for States to provide free primary education. Small-scale fishing communities have notoriously poor standards of education and, along with other rural populations, they often suffer lower standards than their urban counterparts, implying a violation of the right through discrimination (Khan, 2000; Lewin, 2007; Maddox et al., 2009). Inability to pay fees, and financial and social pressures to fish rather than attend school, also play a part in limiting small-scale fishers’ access to education, which might be improved if free education and support for other rights (specifically, decent work) were available (Maddox & Overa, 2009; Muallil et al., 2011; Westaway et al., 2009). Free primary education might also lighten the childcare burden for women, enhancing their ability to work, their well-being and their sense of economic and social security, and reducing inequalities between rich and poor women (Folbre, 2006; Hendra et al., 2013; Kleiber et al., 2014). Other sources of vulnerability and uncertainty are likely to be exacerbated when the right to education is compromised. Adverse effects on economic security are the most obvious, with limited formal education and vocational skills training reducing employment security (Maddox & Overa, 2009; Pollnac & Poggie, 1978; L. S. L. Teh et al., 2011; Westaway et al., 2009).  Lack of education has also been suggested to undermine adaptability to climate change and recovery from extreme weather events (Allison et al., 2009; Pomeroy et al., 2006). Such increases in 63  uncertainty are likely to be associated with increased discount rates, although there is also more direct evidence of an association between poor education and high discount rates. Education indicates that an individual has invested in their future, and has acquired the skills to plan for it, so one might expect, everything being equal, a more highly educated individual to have a lower discount rate (Becker & Mulligan, 1997). This has been confirmed experimentally in developing contexts (Bauer & Chytilová, 2010; Kirby et al., 2002). In addition, more educated individuals have been shown to be more willing to engage in conservation behaviour, suggesting lower discount rates (Asrat et al., 2004), whilst limited education has been cited as both a barrier to engagement in fisheries management and to taking advantage of alternative livelihood opportunities (Allison & Ellis, 2001; Cinner et al., 2009; FAO, 2015a; Maddox & Overa, 2009; Muallil et al., 2011; Mwaipopo, 2008; Ratner et al., 2014; L. S. L. Teh et al., 2008). Complications exist. Firstly, women who spend less time caring for children may spend more time fishing. Secondly, if education enables mobility out of the fishery, it may incentivise a short-term approach by those not expecting to remain dependent on the fishery for long, and possibly even looking to finance their exit (Barratt & Allison, 2014). Ultimately though, this scenario would result in people leaving the fishery and reducing pressure on resources.  Similarly, it has been suggested that education promotes a more modern and impatient approach to life, but this is associated with the movement of people from rural to urban environments (D’Exelle et al., 2012).  3.2.4 Discounting and the right to health The Right to Health (Art. 12 ICESC) encompasses the right to have access to health facilities and essential medicines, but also rights to other basic services that support good health, such as 64  sanitation and safe drinking water (OHCHR, 2008). The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stressed the importance of the provision of these services to vulnerable and marginalised groups, such as small-scale fishing communities. Here, as with education, access is a concern, due to poor provision of facilities in remote rural areas (for both healthcare and sanitation) and failure to meet the needs of nomadic and semi-nomadic fishing populations (Barratt & Allison, 2014; Béné & Friend, 2011; Heck et al., 2007; Njock et al., 2009; Nunan, 2010; Westaway et al., 2007). Poor healthcare and hygiene means fishers can anticipate frequent disruptions to their work due to ill-health, heightening economic uncertainty (Béné & Friend, 2011; Mills et al., 2011). Migratory lifestyles in small-scale fishing communities have also contributed to elevated incidences of HIV (Allison & Seeley, 2004; Appleton, 2000; Njock et al., 2009; Nunan, 2010; Westaway et al., 2007). This, and the high-risk nature of fishing as an occupation, increase expected mortality for fishers, and economic uncertainty for their dependents (Barratt & Allison, 2014; Njock et al., 2009).  Mortality is commonly used as an indicator of a population’s health (see, for example, the Human Development Index). Higher mortality (greater chance of death) is predicted to result in a higher discount rate: It is the rational choice to take benefits today, if an individual is uncertain that they will see tomorrow (Becker & Mulligan, 1997).  In reality, the relationship between health and discounting is not so simple. Damon  confirms that one effect of health shocks (specifically related to HIV/AIDS) is to increase discount rates, leading to unsustainable resource use (Damon et al., 2015). However, she also notes the ambiguities surrounding the theoretical impact of health shocks on natural resource use: On the one hand, improved health, decreased morbidity and an increased human population could put more pressure on natural resources; on 65  the other hand, health problems could raise discount rates or undermine incentives to conserve in other ways, such as placing greater demands on household finances to pay for medicine, or reducing household finances through reduced employment. Her study in Kenya suggests that the effect of improved health in practice depends on household demographics. Larger, younger families are less likely to suffer a decrease in productive labour from health shocks, meaning that as health improves, the lowering of the households’ discount rates will outweigh increases in productivity/ resource consumption by the family, resulting in an overall improvement in conservation.  Chao et al. find a U-shaped relationship for mortality and other indicators of health with discounting (Chao et al., 2009). Their findings confirm my tentative hypothesis that improving health will decrease discount rates, but only to a point, after which further realisation of the right to health will no longer lower, but may raise, discount rates. However, for the most marginalised groups such as many small-scale fishers where current health standards are low, the immediate effect of realisation of the right is likely to be a lowering of discount rates. 3.2.5 Discounting and the right to a decent standard of living  The right to a decent standard of living may be further broken down into rights to adequate food and shelter (Art 11 ICESC). Discounting and the right to adequate food Realisation of the right to food requires more than the status of being food secure, which may be transient. It requires a guarantee of regular, permanent, unrestricted access to adequate food (Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 1999). There is limited literature testing 66  links between the right to food, or food security, and discounting. Kirby finds no relationship between nutritional status of individuals and discount rate, although Di Falco shows that income shocks (and related food shortages) caused by drought can raise discount rates (Di Falco et al., 2011; Kirby et al., 2002). It is commonly reasoned, however, that people facing food shortages have high discount rates as they are more concerned about their immediate needs than about saving for the future (Bardhan, 1996, Lumley, 1997 and Murphree, 1993 cited in (Moseley, 2001). Moseley presents an alternative view: Coping strategies in rural Africa demonstrate that, in times of food shortage, households are extremely reluctant to sell productive assets such as ploughs and livestock and prefer to go hungry in the short term. Similar coping and savings strategies have been observed in small-scale fishing communities, as have instances of women going hungry in order to invest in their children’s food, education and clothing (Barratt & Allison, 2014; Geheb et al., 2008). From these forward-looking outlooks, Moseley and Barratt infer that discounting rates may be lower amongst food insecure households than had been previously supposed. However, Moseley acknowledges that these coping strategies are employed in the short-term, often in known seasons of shortage, and cannot be maintained indefinitely. In other words, where the right to food is not realised and there is no certainty that periods of food insecurity will be brief and temporary, discount rates are likely to be higher.  Other literature describes rural populations (including some small-scale fishers) who are highly dependent on one resource for food and income, without guarantees of an alternative, and are therefore unable to participate in any long-term management of the resource that might disrupt immediate food supplies (Kamat, 2014; Reardon & Vosti, 1995).  Similarly, where individuals have limited assets available, they are likely to invest these assets in satisfying short term needs 67  for food, rather than invest in conservation initiatives such as alternative livelihoods and soil conservation (Mills et al., 2011; Reardon & Vosti, 1995). It is apparent from the above literature that conservation practices that do not factor in respect for the right to food stand little chance of success. The literature also suggests that, in theory, realisation of the right to food should reduce uncertainty in the lives of small-scale fishers and enable them to take a more long-term, sustainable approach to fisheries management. Tension arises because a principal mechanism for realising the right to food for small-scale fishers is to ensure their continued access to the fishing resource, which may limit the scope to implement sustainable management measures (e.g. MPAs and RBM) (De Schutter, 2012). There are other mechanisms to secure the right to food with more obvious synergies with sustainable management, including limiting competition from industrial fisheries and regulating international exports which might drive over-exploitation and price fishers out of buying the most nutritious fish for food (Béné et al., 2007; Charles, 2011; De Schutter, 2012; Foale et al., 2013; Sharma, 2011; M. D. Smith et al., 2010; Sumaila et al., 2010). However, given that short-term enjoyment of the right may, in some instances, conflict with measures for sustainability, it will be difficult to draw inferences about discounting behaviour and sustainability from simple indicators of the enjoyment of the right to food, which is important for the index discussed in the second half of this Chapter. Discounting and the right to adequate shelter Besides income poverty, possibly the biggest threat to shelter in small-scale fishing communities is extreme weather events, bringing physical danger for people, their property and livelihoods and having long-term impacts on the availability of social services (Barratt & Allison, 2014; 68  Pomeroy et al., 2006). The potential for corruption and elite capture of aid, in violation of rights, is high in disaster relief situations, and can further undermine trust and certainty (Berke et al., 2008; Luna, 2001; Mahmud & Prowse, 2012; Willitts-King & Harvey, 2005).  Cassar et al. demonstrate that villagers affected by the 2004 tsunami in Thailand show increased risk aversion, and increased discounting rates, compared to those who were not affected (Cassar et al., 2017). They also cite experimental and survey evidence from Cameron and Shah (2010) in support of this finding.  3.2.6 Discounting and the right to decent work Article 7 ICESC enshrines the right to decent work. The FAO has identified six priority dimensions of decent work in small-scale fishing communities based on the standards of the ILO, each of which can be related to the literature on discounting and sustainable behaviour (FAO, 2015a): (i) Respects the core standards as defined in ILO conventions (no child labour, no forced labour, freedom of association and collective bargaining, no discrimination);  Although it has not been linked directly to discount rates, the presence of child labour in a community is associated with poor school attendance (either through choice or a lack of access) (Nankhuni & Findeis, 2004). The links between poor education and high discount rates are discussed above. Both child labour, and its adverse impacts on education, are common in small-scale fishing communities (Chuenpagdee & Juntarashote, 2011; Islam, 2011; Westaway et al., 2009) although, as these authors all point out, child labour also contributes to the short-term economic security of children and their households.  69  The issue of forced labour has been brought to the fore in fisheries recently through exposés of slavery in Thailand (Lawrence, 2014; Marschke & Vandergeest, 2016; McDowell et al., 2015; Sutton & Siciliano, 2016; Urbina, 2015). This ‘forced fishing’ is in part enabled by other compromised rights and associated high discount rates. Many fishers from Myanmar initially join the labour force in Thailand voluntarily to improve their prospects, before becoming trapped (Marschke & Vandergeest, 2016). There are other less egregious and more common examples of forced labour in small-scale fisheries, for example where a fisher is indebted to a patron, boat owner or fish buyer/ processor, and is forced to fish harder to service that debt in addition to making a living and regardless of what the resource can bear (Allison & Ellis, 2001; Crona et al., 2010; Minarro et al., 2016). Interest rates for such debts are often excessively high, and the higher the rate of interest the higher the discount rate is likely to be (Pender, 1996). Middlemen also seek higher rates of return from the fishery than fishers themselves would, as the middlemen are commonly not dependent on the fishery in the long-term (Crona et al., 2010). Conversely, boat ownership (ownership of means of production), representing both labour freedom and a long-term investment in the fishery, is associated with lower discount rates/ deferred economic gratification (Barratt & Allison, 2014; Pollnac & Poggie, 1978; L. S. L. Teh et al., 2011).  The ability to participate in collective bargaining also suggests that fishers have more control over their livelihood, and better means to procure an adequate income from it. Pollnac and Poggie note that greater economic/ livelihood security is associated with deferred economic gratification (Pollnac & Poggie, 1978).   70   (ii) Provides an adequate living income;  An adequate living income suggests an individual may be able to satisfy many of the other rights discussed here (e.g. health, education). In addition, income poverty has been associated with high discounting in many studies (Holden et al., 1998; Lawrance, 1991). The guarantee of an adequate living income also raises the prospect of social security schemes for fishers (recognised specifically in Article 9 ICESC), providing a safety net for fishers and their families and giving them room to make more long-term decisions about resource management (Sharma, 2011). (iii) Entails an adequate degree of employment security and stability;  As discussed above, Pollnac and Poggie indicate that boat ownership is associated with deferred economic gratification (a related concept to discounting). Boat owners not only have a more secure means of making a living but have invested in the fishery and are more likely to be interested in its long-term future (L. S. L. Teh et al., 2011). That said, these studies show that the relationship between boat ownership and discounting is site specific. Teh et al. also hypothesize that livelihood diversification strategies may enhance overall livelihood security and be associated with lower discounting rates. Although they did not find evidence to support this, Curtis does, finding that fishermen may be more willing to participate in conservation schemes if alternative sources of income are available to lower their risk of participation (Curtis, 2001).  (iv) Adopts minimum occupational safety and health measures, which are adapted to address sector-specific risks and hazards; Small-scale fishers in developing countries are subject to a variety of physical risks, including the inherent danger of fishing (FAO, 2015a). Small-scale fishing is often more dangerous than 71  other fisheries, due to a variety of factors including poor equipment and training, remoteness and vulnerability to violent conflict and lawlessness (Ben Yami, 2000). In addition to the study of Chao et al. cited above that shows that greater risk of mortality is associated with higher discount rates, other studies indicate that a greater perception of physical danger increases discounting rate. Lahav et al. find soldiers’ discount rates to be higher than students’ in Israel,  and hypothesize that this may be due to heightened risk of mortality (Lahav et al., 2011). Warner and Pleeter also find high discount rates in enlisted US army personnel (Warner & Pleeter, 2001).  Voors et al. conducted a study of discounting rates and violence in villages in Burundi and found that individuals with greater exposure to violence and danger had higher discount rates (Voors et al., 2012). Finally, Dasgupta notes that conflict also creates uncertainty around resource ownership that  tends to undermine investment in environmental protection (Dasgupta, 1996). So, the dangers associated with small-scale fishing, and the associated uncertainty, are likely to raise the discount rates of fishers, and also their dependents (Barratt & Allison, 2014). (v) Avoids excessive working hours and allows sufficient time for rest;  The ability to take a break from work suggests that an individual has greater economic security and is not living hand-to-mouth. Thus, taking leisure time is indicative of a lower discount rate.  (vi) Promotes access to adapted technical and vocational training. As discussed in relation to the right to education above, it is not just formal education but also vocational training that is lacking in small-scale fishing communities, placing limitations on livelihood prospects, and promoting uncertainty and high discount rates. 72  3.2.7 Discounting and the principle of equality and non-discrimination  A fundamental principle underlying all human rights is non-discrimination. The realisation of human rights implies a move towards equality, through re-distribution of power, assets and resources if necessary (Gready, 2009; Uvin, 2007). The likely effects of increased equality of wealth on discount rates and sustainability in small scale fishing communities are difficult to predict. At its simplest, high inequality is indicative of a privileged few, with the majority living under uncertain conditions and with high discount rates. If it is in the interests of the wealthy few that fishers fish hard (perhaps because they are patrons wishing to maximise their profits), and if those wealthy few can escape the consequences of degrading the fishery (e.g. through diversification of their business), then they may use their wealth and power to influence the rest of the community to degrade the fishery (Boyce, 1994). For example, they might encourage unsustainable fishing activity to suit their own short-term interests by influencing local resource management decisions and/or by subsidising fishing equipment for the fishers, through loans or capital payments (Crona et al., 2010; Minarro et al., 2016; Sumaila et al., 2010; S. Wells, 2009). In an alternative scenario, the wealthy may be more inclined towards environmental protection (especially if their business is either independent of the fishery or dependent on its long-term health), and use their influence to encourage conservation (Scruggs, 1998).  Another factor to consider is the effect of inequality on the fishers: Will there be an effect of “keeping up with the Jones’s”, whereby fishers aspire to the status of the wealthy individuals and fish harder to get there? Certainly, where the aspirations of the fishers lead them to diversify out of fishing entirely, this has been shown to result in a lack of regard for the longevity of the resource and over-exploitation (Barratt & Allison, 2014). 73  Although from the above it seems most likely that inequality will drive unsustainable fishing, and be associated with high discount rates, there is limited evidence from the field to help determine which hypotheses are correct. In a land-based example, Voors finds lower discount rates in villages in Burundi with greater inequality in their land holdings, but does not explore why (Voors et al., 2012). Turning to studies that consider inequality and sustainable behaviour but do not directly measure discounting, Lumley finds better results in a soil conservation programme in villages in the Philippines with greater equality (S. Lumley, 1997). Rosenbaum et al. conduct a meta-analysis showing a strong negative correlation between income inequality (Gini coefficient) and co-operative tendencies across 32 developing countries (Rosenbaum et al., 2016). Although this does not directly link inequality with discounting, co-operative tendencies and social cohesion have separately been correlated with sustainable behaviour (FAO, 2006). In small-scale fishing communities, Teh et al. also show that low discount rates are significantly associated with a place that has co-operatively implemented a protection initiative (L. S. L. Teh et al., 2011). There are also numerous examples in small-scale fishing communities where inequality and elite capture of benefits have undermined marine conservation initiatives (Allison et al., 2012; Béné et al., 2009; Bennett & Dearden, 2014; Christie, 2004; Leisher et al., 2010).  Finally, one must consider not only the effects of inequality within fishing communities but also the inequality between the community and the rest of the nation (or world). In small-scale fisheries, external influences such as international markets frequently come into play, with small-scale fishers either unable to resist the actions of industrial and/or foreign fisheries, or unable to benefit from relationships with international buyers due to uneven bargaining power and elite capture of benefits (Alder & Sumaila, 2004; Béné, Lawton, et al., 2010; Charles, 2011; Crona et 74  al., 2015; Österblom et al., 2015; M. D. Smith et al., 2010). This kind of global inequality is likely to drive unsustainable fishing in a manner akin to the first scenario above, where the wealthy individual (this time, foreign fishing companies or buyers) is motivated to fish hard and move on, and encourages these practices within the small-scale fishery (Béné, Lawton, et al., 2010; Crona et al., 2015; Sharma, 2011).   3.2.8 Right to participation in decision making and management  Human rights legislation guarantees the right to participation in public affairs. It is important to remember that this may be through adequate representation in Government rather than the direct involvement in resource management that is more commonly promoted by development and conservation projects, yet often falls far short of ensuring democratic rights (Art. 21 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (“UDHR”) (Walley, 2004; Williams, 2004). The right also promotes enabling factors, such as access to information, transparency of process and the rule of law. Many small-scale fishing communities have limited ability to participate in public affairs and influence their national Government, either due to their remoteness (lack of access to information and/or ability to vote), migratory behaviour, lack of recognition of their economic contribution (especially viz a viz industrial fisheries and export markets), political imperfections (such as corruption) or all of the above (Allison et al., 2012; Béné et al., 2009). This lack of effective participation often translates into a lack of critical social services, with negative impacts for all of the rights discussed above (health, education, work, etc.) and an overall increase in uncertainty (Keefer & Khemani, 2005; Njock et al., 2009). A general distrust of Government, perhaps due to corruption or because members of Government do not adequately represent the community, is also likely to lead to uncertainty, higher discount rates and/ or unwillingness to 75  invest in conservation or participate in community management or consultations (Allison et al., 2012; Farzin & Bond, 2005; Goel et al., 2013; Keefer & Khemani, 2005). In small-scale fishing communities, distrust of the local leaders of co-management initiatives may be just as applicable, and just as damaging (Barratt et al., 2015). Disengagement of small-scale fishers from community management or consultation, and other failures in their right to access information about the resource, can also lead to uncertainty about the state of the resource, a key factor that raises discount rates and undermines investment in conservation (Bennett & Dearden, 2014; Elliott et al., 2001; S. S. Hanna, 1998; L. S. L. Teh et al., 2011). 3.2.9 Women’s rights Although equality and non-discrimination are pervasive principles in human rights, women’s equality is the subject of specific rights and deserves special mention here, especially given the growing awareness of the role and marginalisation of women in small-scale fisheries (Harper et al., 2013; Kleiber et al., 2014).  Many NGO projects in fisheries and other sectors invest in women’s equality on the premise that it will bolster development and/or environmental sustainability, albeit with mixed results (Agarwal, 2009; Al-Azzawi, 2013; Mayoux, 1995). In particular, it is often suggested that, if women have control over their own finances, they will tend to invest their money in their children’s health, food security and education (Blumberg, 1988; Geheb et al., 2008). This implies not only that they have a lower discount rate than men in general (investing in their children’s future instead of spending money rashly) but their children may in turn have lower discount rates based on improvements in the other rights discussed in this section (Barratt & Allison, 2014; Bauer & Chytilová, 2013; Blumberg, 1988; Geheb et al., 2008).  76  There is little direct evidence that investing in women’s equality automatically lowers discount rates or enhances conservation, and caution against generalisations is required (Al-Azzawi, 2013). Most studies that have looked at discounting rates of women and men in the developing context find no significant difference (Holden et al., 1998; Kirby et al., 2002; Pender, 1996). Those studies that do find lower discounting rates in women find them in women who are caring for children (Barratt & Allison, 2014; Bauer & Chytilová, 2013; Blumberg, 1988). This may be because these women care about their child’s future, or it may be that they have greater certainty about their own - children can secure the economic support of husbands or be care providers in old age. In other words, the tendency of women to invest more in their children and home than men do may say as much about their role in society and sources of economic security as their inherent altruism. Otherwise, women in developing countries and fishing communities can be just as frivolous with money as men, frequently spending on items such as jewellery or clothes (although, where they are economically dependent on men, this may also be considered a future oriented investment) (Barratt, 2009; Blumberg, 1988). The process of women’s emancipation is never a smooth one and as women start to become financially independent and to have fewer children they may suffer short-term increases in uncertainty and discount rate (Fraser, 1999). That is not to say that enhancing women’s rights is contrary to securing environmental sustainability. Ultimately it is likely to increase women’s independence and security and lower discount rates. However, as with many other rights, this will be a lengthy process and may have to be conducted in conjunction with fisheries management measures rather than prior to them. Progress towards women’s equality is also likely to proceed along different paths in different contexts, with different consequences for 77  conservation and sustainability, and a lack of patience or appreciation for nuance may produce unexpected results. For example, where men have controlled the purse strings of development initiatives, women have preferred to continue with their existing work than become poorly paid employees of their husband (Blumberg, 1988), and one can imagine a similar scenario leading to reluctance to participate in alternative livelihood projects in the environment sector. In other examples, attempts to involve women in resource management have foundered due to cultural barriers to their speaking in public meetings (Walley, 2004).  This complexity suggests that it will be difficult to find a generic indicator of “women’s equality” that also indicates lower discounting rates and better environmental protection. Rather, it is important to ensure that we assess the standards of each of the other human rights as they are experienced by women, to ensure that all are progressing towards decreased vulnerability.   I now discuss the use of socioeconomic indicators to make inferences about both human rights standards and discount rate/ likelihood of sustainable behaviour. An index that combines a measure of human rights/ vulnerability and discounting/ uncertainty could be used to identify situations where rights below a minimum standard are creating insecure conditions that are not conducive to sustainability, and that must be addressed alongside (or in some cases as a pre-requisite) implementation of fisheries management measures.  3.3 An index for preliminary assessment of human rights and sustainability 3.3.1 A note on human rights indicators Human rights indicators tend to be complex and multi-faceted, with few that are universally agreed upon (Green, 2001). In its recent report setting out criteria for human rights indicators, the 78  OHCHR suggests a combination of structural, process and outcome indicators (OHCHR, 2012). Structural indicators represent a State (or other duty bearer’s) commitment to human rights, through the ratification and adoption of legal instruments and institutional mechanisms. They might include number of treaties ratified or relevant legislation adopted. Process indicators measure a Duty Bearer’s practical efforts to implement human rights, through policy changes on the ground. Indicators might include budget allocation and coverage of target populations. Finally, outcome indicators measure a State’s results in the realisation of human rights. They typically resemble other socioeconomic indicators used in development (e.g. literacy rates for the right to education or life expectancy for health). As may be evident from these descriptions, human rights indicators frequently combine qualitative and quantitative elements.   Economic, social and cultural rights are subject to the principle of progressive realisation6, so the OHCHR and others have deemed it inappropriate to set absolute benchmarks of achievement that facilitate comparison between States, since each State is expected to make progress only in accordance with its available means. Instead, indicators focus on measuring progress made by individual duty-bearers, considering whether it is adequate given their available resources, and ensuring no regression of rights. Commentators have pointed out that this makes it exceptionally difficult to determine whether Economic, Social and Cultural rights have been violated, and have suggested that minimum core obligations should be outlined for each right (Kalantry et al.,                                                  6 Although human rights are “indivisible” (or, should be ranked equally) under international law, the concept of progressive realization recognizes that resource constraints may prevent all rights from being promoted at once, and allows for some prioritization (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Hunt et al., 2004) 79  2010). I follow this suggestion in proposing my rapid assessment index, although it could also be used to measure progress over time.  3.3.2 A combined human rights and discounting index Given the relatively good availability of information on socioeconomic factors from global development indices, and the correspondence between improvements in some of these factors and decreases in discount rate highlighted in this Chapter, I see a number of options for including human rights “outcome” indicators in an index to gauge both the achievement of human rights and associated improvements in environmental sustainability. Specifically, given the review in this Chapter, I suggest that indicators of health, education and decent work fulfil this dual function (leaving aside for now indicators of fulfilment of the right to food, due to complexities described earlier). This immediately suggests the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) as a foundation. The HDI measures health (life expectancy at birth), education (years of schooling for adults over 25) and standard of living (gross national income per capita) (although the latter could also be used as a proxy for decent work and adequate living wage).  An alternative approach to using the HDI as the “outcome” element of the index would be a focus on the international poverty line. Sumaila has previously proposed an economic measure of sustainability based on discounting and the poverty line (Sumaila, 2003).  Based on the observation that high discounting rates are associated with extreme poverty and/or high levels of debt, the index measures how far below the poverty line individual fishers are, and therefore how high their discounting rates are likely to be, and how unsustainable their behaviour. The index can be summarized with this equation: 80  Poverty Index =  IncomeFishing community  IncomePoverty line⁄  Where IncomeFishing community denotes the average income in a fishing community7, and Incomepoverty line is the income below which a person is deemed to be below the poverty line for a given country. Although described in monetary terms, the poverty line accounts for the ability of an individual to pay for items that are key to achieving a basic standard of living, namely adequate food, clothing and shelter. It could be adapted to take into account other key outcomes of realising human rights such as the costs of health and education (World Bank, 2017a, 2017b). Before my index can signal how far below the “human rights line” fishers are, and their associated likelihood of participating in unsustainable behaviour, it needs some additional elements: “Structural” and “process” indicators (discussed above), and a measure of non-discrimination and equality. Stated generically, my proposed index would be as follows: = √[𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟][𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟][𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟][𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟]4  It contains each of the four indicator types mentioned above. Each would be expressed on a scale of 0 to 1 (with 1 indicating the aspirational goal performance), and then a geometric mean of the different indicators taken (the geometric mean reflects directly poor performance in any of the indicators and reduces substitutability between them, and for this reason the same process is used to produce combined indices such as the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2017)).                                                   7 In future iterations, it may be beneficial to differentiate between boat owners and crew (capital and labour) in the fishing community because, as discussed in this Chapter, they may have very different discount rates. 81  The exact nature of each indicator will vary depending upon the duty bearer under consideration. For a State, an appropriate structural indicator might be the proportion of key international human rights instruments that the State has ratified, or a measure of the extent to which these have been incorporated in national law. However, for an NGO looking to measure their impact on human rights and sustainability, a more appropriate measure might be the strength of their own dedication to respecting and/ or fulfilling the right in question, scored in terms of internal policy and funding commitments. For process indicators, a measure of budget spent relative to available budget is often considered appropriate (OCHCR, 2008). For a Government, this might be money spent on realizing human rights as a proportion of total State budget. For an NGO, it could be percentage of the NGO’s total funding that is allocated to ensuring the respect or promotion of rights.  Finally, to measure inequality, if Sumaila’s poverty index is used to measure “outcome” indicators, it could be combined with the Gini coefficient to measure inequality of wealth distribution in the study population (inverted, so that 1 represents the aspirational goal of perfect equality, rather than perfect inequality as is normally the case). Alternatively, if the HDI is used for outcomes, it could be used in one of its disaggregated forms (the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index or the Gender Development Index) to incorporate a measure of inequality. I have proposed here a global form of the index, aimed at providing a rapid snapshot of the status of human rights and propensity towards sustainable behaviour. It could be modified to consider only some rights, as would likely be necessary for use by NGOs who may not impact the full range of rights. This could be done by using selected outcome indicators for each right, as recommended in the OCHCR’s Guide, plus process and structural indicators as discussed above, 82  plus a measure of inequality that looks at the relative proportions of different population groups affected.  3.3.3 Example Two fishing communities have income that is five times greater than the poverty line, suggesting comparable sustainable behaviour according to the Poverty Index. However, village A has free access to primary education and basic healthcare, while the inhabitants of village B spend half of their income on transport and fees to access these services, giving them a much lower ‘outcome’ indicator (5 for village A, 2.5 for village B, since outcome indicator is:  IncomeFishing community − Costs of health and education IncomePoverty line⁄  Village B is also in a country that has only ratified two out of seven major human rights treaties (Structural indicator: 0.3); Spends a nominal amount on implementing human rights (Process indicator: 0.1); and has high levels of inequality (Inverted Gini coefficient of 0.2). Village A is in a country with better realisation of human rights and consequently scores higher in terms of structural, process and equality indicators (0.4; 0.5 and 0.3 respectively).  Fishers’ rights index Village A =  √[5][0.4][0.5][0.3]4  = 0.74 Fishers’ rights index Village B =  √[2.5][0.3][0.1][0.2]4  = 0.35 When I consider human rights as well as financial poverty, village B is likely to have much higher discount rates and less sustainable behaviour than village A.   83  3.4 Conclusions and future directions There are promising indications that strengthening human rights may, in many circumstances, promote lower discount rates among small-scale fishers, and more sustainable fishing behaviour. However, much further research is needed to advance a more compelling conclusion:  (i) Relatively few experimental studies link discounting with the socioeconomic attributes of poverty. Still fewer consider the relationship between discounting and the root causes of poverty, such as inequality and weak institutions. This means that the evidence I have reviewed here is sometimes contradictory, and it is difficult to predict how discounting behaviour might differ in different contexts. Further discounting studies are required to resolve this; (ii) Beyond the above work to link the disparate outcomes of a human rights-based approach with discounting behaviour, it would also be useful to test the general relationship. In other words, do fishers living under stronger human rights regimes have lower discount rates? (iii) To bolster the overall argument that stronger human rights support lower discount rates and therefore more sustainable behaviour, research is required to test empirically whether strengthening of human rights (individually and collectively) does in fact lead to more sustainable fisheries management; (iv) The proposed rapid assessment index to measure human rights and sustainability should be tested and refined in situ, where it can be compared to more rigorous assessments of both human rights and sustainability to gauge its accuracy and usefulness.   84  In addition to the theoretical research agenda proposed above, my final recommendation is a practical one. As I have touched on throughout this Chapter, full realisation of human rights is a slow and process. In the short-term, stronger rights may undermine sustainability: For example, where the right to food guarantees fishing rights for small-scale fishers. In the long-term, stronger rights might not directly result in sustainable behaviour, but merely provide the conditions that enable it. As the vulnerability and discount rates of small-scale fishers are reduced overall, there will still be those who wish to exploit the resource for a quick profit and leave. Here I reiterate that a human rights-based approach should complement, not replace, other fisheries management tools. Although I suggest the approach is necessary to provide enabling conditions for these tools, they will likely have to be implemented in tandem, rather than sequentially, since sustainable fisheries management is needed urgently and cannot wait for full realisation of human rights. That does not mean human rights can be put on the back-burner. They must inform other measures to avoid the social injustices of the past and ensure that benefits reach small-scale fishers. For example, property rights-based management should be applied in a way that counters, rather than propagates, inequality and power imbalances, restricting access to those who are least vulnerable first. Working out the details of how a human rights-based approach can be integrated with existing measures for fisheries management is the most pressing research need and will be pivotal to the success of the SSF-Guidelines.  85  Chapter 4: Conservation, contraception and controversy: Supporting human rights to enable sustainable fisheries 4.1 Introduction Contraception and conservation have always been uncomfortable bedfellows. Although human overpopulation is a critical issue affecting biodiversity loss it has been dealt with somewhat crudely by environmentalists, often portrayed as a problem of developing countries, with the significance of differing per capita consumption between developed and developing countries ignored (Bongaarts, 2016; L. C. Gray & Moseley, 2005; Hartmann, 2014; Meffe et al., 1993; Robbins, 2012). This is especially the case in marine conservation where the Malthusian over-fishing narrative is pervasive, but ill-used8, miscited as support for a “universal truth” that population growth amongst the poor is to blame for fisheries degradation, without adequate exploration of other drivers (Finkbeiner et al., 2017).  This insensitive handling of the issue has no doubt revived memories of coercive family planning in developing countries, and stoked lingering suspicions that aid programmes providing medicine, and particularly contraceptives, aim to control, depress and oppress populations (Bongaarts, 2016; Harris et al., 2012; Kaler, 2004, 2009).   Against this background of controversy, and in the face of potential criticisms that they are disrespecting women’s and reproductive rights, many international environmental NGOs                                                  8 Pauly’s original statement of Malthusian overfishing in 1988, describes it as “…what occurs when poor fishermen faced with declining catches and lacking any other alternative initiate wholesale resource destruction in an effort to maintain their incomes…” due to “…too many fishermen chasing too few fish…”, but does not identify expanding poor populations as the primary cause of the problem (Pauly, 1988). 86  (“ENGOS”) have shied away from population issues. Whilst many have initiatives focused on women, family planning remains a rare inclusion alongside environmental programmes (Agarwal, 2009; R. Evans, 2016; Harris et al., 2012; Newman et al., 2014; R. L. Singleton et al., 2017). However, I argue here that truly people-centric conservation requires a more nuanced approach than blanket dismissal (or implementation) of certain interventions. As Newman et al. observe, it is deeply ironic that efforts to be more conscious of human rights and move away from coercive population control policies have actually resulted in a downgrading of women’s reproductive and sexual health rights on the international agenda (Newman et al., 2014; R. L. Singleton et al., 2017). Indeed, those ENGOs who are implementing family planning initiatives suggest that, not only can they be implemented in a way that both respects and fulfils human rights, but also that this may have conservation benefits beyond Malthusian population control (R. Evans, 2016; Fraser, 1999; Hahn et al., 2011; G. Miller, 2009; Oldham, 2006; Robson et al., 2017). They have set out “theories of change” (“ToC”)9 explaining how the strengthening of women’s and reproductive rights might bolster conservation efforts. Although enthusiastically promoted by advocates, the ToCs linking reproductive rights with conservation benefits remain largely untested and unsubstantiated (Yavinsky et al., 2015). As with all integrated conservation and development projects, this raises the spectre that a “win-win” scenario is wishful thinking, and support for people might undermine conservation                                                  9 ToC describe how conservation actions are intended to bring about desired project outcomes, and are typically presented as a causal chain showing how direct threats, conservation actions and other contributing factors are expected to affect biodiversity targets (Salafsky et al., 2008). More recently, ToC have also included human-related targets, although there is some debate about whether these should contribute to, or be separate from, biodiversity targets (Salafsky, 2011). Building and testing ToC can help to identify what is working and what is not in a given project, and allow for comparison between different projects (Baylis et al., 2016). 87  (Salafsky, 2011). Poorly defined project mechanisms also leave ENGOs open to the allegation that, where goals conflict, they will prioritise conservation, and are secretly still pursuing Malthusian population control, regardless of what they say about rights (Oldham, 2006). ENGOs do not help themselves here. The linkage between increasing population and environmental degradation remains both dominant and assumed in most initiatives that combine reproductive rights and the environment, and family planning is a consistent feature of all “Population, Health and Environment” (“PHE”) programmes (Honzak et al., 2012).  To move beyond blanket dismissal or implementation of family planning programmes by ENGOs, and enhance respect for, and fulfilment of, women’s and reproductive rights, we need to understand better the links between strengthening these rights and conservation. To do so, I aim to test the most commonly cited alternative ToCs for combined family planning-environment projects, plus the more entrenched ToC that links population growth with environmental degradation. I use a case study from the field of marine conservation, where the relationship between human rights and sustainable fishing is currently under the spotlight due to the Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries Guidelines (Allison et al., 2012; FAO, 2015b; Jentoft, 2014; R. L. Singleton et al., 2017). In doing so, I also seek to comment on the broader human rights-sustainable fisheries relationship, and so contribute to the debate around implementation of the Guidelines. My evaluation looks at the work of Blue Ventures (“BV”) a British ENGO, with operations in Madagascar, Belize and Timor L’este, and partnerships with NGOs in other tropical coastal communities internationally 88  (https://blueventures.org). BV integrates marine conservation with development work, and has been providing family planning services in Madagascar for 10 years (Harris et al., 2012)10.  After reviewing the most commonly stated ToCs in family planning-environment (“PHE”) initiatives, I use them as a guide to evaluate: (i) The extent to which BV’s provision of family planning services respects and fulfils women’s and reproductive rights;  (ii) The impact of this respect/fulfilment of rights on development and conservation; (iii) Implications for the broader relationship between human rights and sustainable fishing, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Fisheries Guidelines. 4.2 Theories of change for PHE programmes I set out below a synthesis of common PHE ToCs, and evidence to support or refute them. The models are based primarily on those of BV, which explicitly enunciates its programme goals using ToCs. However, they are sufficiently generic to capture, and enable testing of, hypotheses that are either expressly stated (see especially Honzak et al. 2012, pg. 6 and 7 in relation to WWF; and Stem and Margoluis (2004) summarizing PHE practice) or implicit across other PHE projects (as I will demonstrate by reference to the literature). The ToCs are summarized in Fig. 4.1. I do not include here the practical benefits of integrating family planning and environment programming; namely, that ENGOs are often already working in remote areas and so can                                                  10 I use “development” throughout this Chapter in its modern sense, that is broader and more holistic than economic growth (as per the Sustainable Development Goals and Human Development Index). BV’s development initiatives include alternative livelihoods, payment for ecosystem services, health and education.  89  provide health services to these regions and/or enable health providers to reach them more cheaply than independent providers operating alone, increasing geographical coverage (Hahn et al., 2011; Harris et al., 2012; Lopez-carr & Ervin, 2017). Although this may amplify the impact of the other ToCs discussed, it does not constitute a separate mechanism of action.  4.2.1 ‘Goodwill effect' Provision of vital health services increases community goodwill towards conservation NGOs and projects, encouraging communities to engage with the NGO and its initiatives11 A major motivation for conservation NGOs to promote development initiatives is to overcome local opposition to, and generate engagement with, their conservation work.  Even where project participants in developing countries are receptive to conservation in theory, they often cannot afford to put it into practice, prioritizing their livelihoods, income and food security (Lopez-carr & Ervin, 2017; Marcus, 2001). By providing family planning services to communities that would otherwise have limited access, ENGOs could engender goodwill towards themselves and their conservation activities, and/or create an entry point to talk about environmental issues (Gonsalves et al., 2015; Harris et al., 2012; Honzak et al., 2012; Lopez-carr & Ervin, 2017; Sinaga et al., 2015; Stem & Margoluis, 2004). However, target communities must first associate the family planning service with the ENGO (Honzak et al., 2012). It is also important that the provision of family planning does not trigger negative feelings and suspicion, as outlined in the introduction. Although ENGOs have observed anecdotally that the provision of family planning                                                  11 See Honzak et. al (2012) Hypothesis 3, pg. 7 and 14; Stem and Margoluis (2004), Chain 4.2, pg. 27; and BV ToC Appendix B. 90  has generated goodwill for their environmental work, more rigorous assessment is required, including documentation of negative  and ambivalent reactions (Honzak et al., 2012; Lopez-carr & Ervin, 2017). 91       People choose to have fewer children Positive goodwill towards ENGOResistance towards activities of ENGO and/or environmental management Less fishing Negative goodwill towards ENGO Increased engagement with environmental management/ concern for environment ToC 1 -'Goodwill effect':  Provision of vital health services increases community goodwill towards conservation NGOs and projects, encouraging communities to engage with the ENGO and its initiatives. ToC 2: 'Fertility effect': Satisfying unmet need for family planning services reduces the number of unintended pregnancies, leading to reduced population and reduced demand on natural resources  Provision of family planning Provision of family planning Reduced population growth Parents invest more time and resources into their other children Healthier/ better educated children pursue alternative livelihoods to fishing and/or engage more in natural resource management Figure 4.1 Summary of common Theories of Change (“ToC”) in family planning-environment programmes ToC 3 - 'Empowerment effect': Users of family planning have fewer children, with empowering results for women. Relieved of childcare burdens, they may gain time, education and confidence to pursue alternative employment outside of the resource extraction sector and/or participate in environmental management, leading to a reduction in resource extraction.    Decreased pressure on resources Women pursue alternative livelihoods  Women engage in environmental management Provision of family planning   Women have more time People choose to have fewer children 92  4.2.2 'Fertility effect' Addressing unmet need for family planning services reduces the number of unintended pregnancies, leading to reduced population growth and reduced demand on natural resources12 This link between family planning and environment is the most frequently cited in the literature and by project staff (D’Agnes et al., 2010; Hahn et al., 2011; Hoke et al., 2015; Honzak et al., 2012; Stem & Margoluis, 2004; Torell et al., 2012). The theory can be sub-divided into two different pathways:  a) Reduction in population growth leads to less direct pressure on resources; b) Longer-term impacts: With fewer children, parents invest more in the future of the children they have, making them healthier, better educated and, ultimately, less dependent on fishing.  For most organizations implementing the PHE model, the assumption that reducing the number of children people have reduces environmental impacts is rarely questioned and has not been tested (Finkbeiner et al., 2017; Harris et al., 2012; Honzak et al., 2012). Regarding the longer-term effects, most of the integrated initiatives have not operated and/or collected data over a sufficient period to test this and it is in any case difficult due to the number of potential confounding factors and intervening steps (e.g. lack of social mobility; capital; family or cultural ties to geographical area or livelihood).                                                   12 See Honzak et al. (2012) Hypothesis 1, pg. 6 and 10; Stem and Margoluis (2004), Chains 1.6 to 1.9, pg. 6 and 7; BV ToC, Appendix B. 93  4.2.3 'Empowerment effect':  Users of family planning choose to have fewer children/more spaced births, with empowering results for women. Relieved of childcare burdens, they may gain time, education and confidence to pursue alternative employment outside of the resource extraction sector and/or participate in environmental management13. In PHE, “empowerment” is frequently equated with women having more time because they have fewer children to care for, although improvements in health, wealth and status are also cited (D’Agnes et al., 2010; Honzak et al., 2012; Stem & Margoluis, 2004). Women are assumed to spend their additional time on either: (1) alternative income generating activities to resource extraction; or (2) involvement in managing resources and conservation. The counter-theory that women may spend their additional time on resource extraction activities is rarely mentioned, and not explored. Although some of the integrated projects cited above report increases in women’s involvement in alternative livelihoods and improvements in environmental management, none have linked these improvements specifically to the provision of family planning (as opposed to the environmental initiatives being implemented in tandem).  The quick, tangible results of family planning may also give participants a greater sense of control over their lives, which translates into increased agency in other areas, including resource management (Harris et al., 2012; Mohan & Shellard, 2014; Pielemeier et al., 2007). Again, I could not find any evaluations that provide evidence, beyond the uptake of family planning services, that women are experiencing tangible benefits from family planning, nor of the                                                  13 See Honzak et. al (2012) Hypothesis 2, pg. 6 and 11; Stem and Margoluis (2004), Chain 1.10, pg. 7 and 8; and BV ToC Appendix B. 94  consequences of this for their sense of empowerment and engagement in environmental management.   In summary, although pathways have been proposed to explain how integrated programmes simultaneously advance conservation and women’s rights, the evidence supporting these ToC is limited, particularly in relation to environmental impacts and to the synergistic effects of providing health and environment programmes together, rather than separately. This is largely because these pathways operate over the long-term and are complex, making it difficult to test them, especially in the context of relatively short-term NGO interventions.   4.3 Methods 4.3.1 Case study: Blue Ventures and the Velondriake Locally Managed Marine Area (“LMMA”), south-west Madagascar This study evaluates the impacts of BV’s family planning initiative in the Velondriake LMMA.  The LMMA was designated in 2006 and covers 32 villages, with a total population of 7,806 individuals (BV unpublished data). The Government of Madagascar has legally devolved management of the LMMA to a committee of elected local representatives, with BV as co-managers. Most people in the coastal LMMA are traditional small-scale fishers (70% of the adult population) or work in related operations such as fish salting. 50% of women state that octopus gleaning is their main occupation.  The region is arid and isolated, with very limited access to health, education and other public services.  At the time of this study, BV’s activities include implementation of marine closures (temporary and permanent), gear restrictions and other fisheries regulations, a health programme (originally focusing on the provision of family planning services, but now expanded to address other health issues), education, alternative 95  livelihoods (seaweed and sea cucumber aquaculture, eco-tourism), and a mangrove carbon credit scheme. BV has been integrating the provision of family planning services with its environmental/ livelihood programming since 2007/2008 (Harris et al., 2012). It started providing family planning services in one village, eventually expanding to cover the whole of the LMMA and other sites in Madagascar from 2013 (Mohan & Shellard, 2014; Robson et al., 2017). Family planning services are provided primarily by local women trained to offer counselling and contraceptives (condoms, combined oral contraceptive pills, and Depo-Provera injections). Long-acting reversible contraceptives (Implanon implants and copper intrauterine devices) are also offered in collaboration with mobile outreach teams from Marie Stopes International. Finally, condoms are distributed to men in bars, although community discussions suggest that the use of condoms by men is low and associated with prevention of STDs rather than ‘family planning’ (Robson, L and Reed-Krase, N – pers. comm). BV staff also conduct integrated outreach, combining messages about health and family planning with environmental education.  4.3.2 Data collection and analysis The primary data collection instrument was a combined household and individual survey, used to collect data on socioeconomic conditions and human rights in the Velondriake LMMA and the impact of BV’s programmes on both. The survey incorporated quantitative and closed-answer qualitative questions, and was combined with a series of open, qualitative questions based on the Most Significant Change (“MSC”) methodology (R. Davies & Dart, 2005). The latter was included in the survey as the main method to assess impact, given a deficit of baseline and control data for many variables.  96  The content of the survey was designed with input from: (i) villagers, on socioeconomic conditions, potential human rights issues and BV’s impact on these, expressed during 12 focus groups conducted from March to May 2016; and (ii) BV’s programme leads, expressed in individual interviews. Following translation, the survey instrument was pre-tested, firstly with local staff members’ and secondly with villagers (37 households/ individuals).  A representative sample of 297 households/ individuals was surveyed, being approximately 20% of the households in coastal Velondriake (1311 households total) and 9% of the adult population (3273 total). The sampling protocol is described in detail in the Supplemental Methods, Appendix B  . The survey was conducted in the period June to July 2016, in the local Malagasy dialect, Vezo, by a survey team composed primarily of local people. This aided respondents’ understanding of questions and reduced the likelihood of positive bias associated with being interviewed by BV’s staff about BV’s projects. Further efforts were made to reduce positive bias by explaining carefully at the start of each interview that there were no “right” answers, and that BV was very interested in negative feedback to help improve its projects. Surveyors were also trained to probe answers that seemed illogical or without basis.  I analysed quantitative data by producing weighted summary statistics (using the Horvitz-Thompson estimator) and weighted models and statistical tests (conducted using the “Survey” package in R (T. Lumley, 2017; R core team, 2016). Answers to the open MSC questions were coded and analysed using NVIVO Pro 11 software (QSR International Pty. Ltd, 2016). In this Chapter, Table 4.1 to Table 4.3 and Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.8 represent summaries of data from the closed questions in the household/ individual survey, while Figure 4.2 to Figure 4.5 represent summaries of the coded responses to the open, MSC questions. Although all individuals who responded to the closed answer questions also answered the MSC questions, the number of 97  respondents varies for each MSC summary, since the questions were open, and some survey respondents may not have commented on the topic being summarized (e.g. positive and negative impacts of family planning). For statistical models comparing family planning users with non-users (Table 4.2 and 4.3) I included only women of reproductive age (15 to 49 years) since they are the main beneficiaries of BV’s family planning service14.  Finally, BV’s Malagasy social scientist conducted two follow-up focus groups with women in November 2017 to discuss barriers to women participating in marine management meetings.                                                  14 As noted in the case study description, few men consider themselves to be users of family planning, even if they are using condoms provided by BV’s team. 98  4.4 Results 4.4.1 ‘Goodwill effect’ How is family planning received when provided by an ENGO? Most of the reported impacts of BV’s family planning programme were positive (Figure 4.2).  Figure 4.2 Summary of positive and negative comments made about BV's family planning programme (Source: Open-answer interviews (n=80 (women= 56, men=24), weighted to represent % of total population of Velondriake). Although “choose fewer children” and “more fishing” are sub-categories of “can choose when to have children” and “more time” respectively, the % still represent % of total respondents, not % of the parent category The positive reception of BV’s family planning services is also demonstrated by the uptake of contraception. BV reports the contraceptive prevalence rate (“CPR”) for all women of reproductive age (irrespective of marital status) who are sexually active (Robson et al, 2017).  As Robson et al. observe, use of contraception in Velondriake more than doubled from 2009 to 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100Total mixed (positive and negative) commentsTotal negative commentsTotal positive commentsIMPACT SUMMARYContraception is bad for my healthPeople need more children to care for them in old ageProject does not provide additional incomeNEGATIVE IMPACTSLess pressure on resourcesSense of empowermentImproved mental and/or physical healthMore moneyI am able to care financially for the children I haveImproved food securityMore fishingMore time = more workChoose fewer childrenCan choose when to have children/ how manyPOSITIVE IMPACTS% of men % of women99  2013. The CPR is slightly lower in 2016 compared to 2013, although the change is not significant (Table 4.1). Table 4.1 Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (“CPR”) in the Velondriake LMMA Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (“CPR”) (weighted) in the Velondriake LMMA since 2009. CPR for 2009 to 2013 reproduced from Robson et al. (2017). Source for 2016 data: Individual, closed survey.   2009 2011 2013 2016 % change 2009 to 2016 % change 2013 to 2016 Contraceptive prevalence rate (% of sexually active women, aged 15-49, using modern method of contraception) 24.9 34.4 58.9 51.7 26.8,  p= 5.7 x 10-10 -7.2, p= 0.14    National CPR is reported only for women who are married or in union, with the assumption that this group is sexually active (United Nations, 2015). In Madagascar, CPR is 36.9% nationally (United Nations, 2015). In Velondriake, 33% of women of reproductive age (aged 15 to 49) who are married or in union, and who also reported being sexually active, are using contraception. Is family planning a point of introduction to, and/or selling point for, Blue Ventures? Family planning serves as a more common point of introduction to BV for women (21%) than men (1%) (Figure 4.3). For both, it ranks behind income-generating initiatives (short-term octopus closures and aquaculture).  100   Figure 4.3 Points of introduction to BV Respondents explained how they first came to know BV, with answers here categorized by the different BV initiatives referred to (Source: Open-answer interview, n=297 (male = 139, female = 158) weighted to represent the population of Velondriake). % do not add to 100 as some participants mentioned more than one project.  When respondents were asked to discuss how their lives would be different without BV, 32% of men and 40% of women stated that BV projects had no impact on their life (Figure 4.4). For those who had experienced significant impact, men highlighted income generating projects (aquaculture, octopus closures) and marine management measures. For women, income generating projects were also important, but family planning was mentioned as frequently as aquaculture and more often than short-term octopus closures. Subsequently, when asked if they had participated in each of BV’s initiatives and then asked the same question regarding project impacts on their lives, family planning was more commonly discussed by both men (13%) and women (30%), whereas the number discussing octopus closures and marine management drops dramatically (Figure 4.5).  0 5 10 15 20 25 30Velondriake committeeWorks with BVLiteracy and financialHealth educationATMMangrovesDon't know BVEducationPermanent reserveMarine managementExpeditionsNon-specificFamily planningOctopusAquaculture% of men % of women101   Figure 4.4 BV projects with significant impacts on the lives of people in Velondriake (Source: Open-answer interviews, (n=297 (male = 139, female = 158) weighted to represent the population of Velondriake)   Figure 4.5 BV projects with significant impacts on the lives of people in Velondriake (prompted) Projects named after participants were shown a list of BV projects and asked which they participated in (Source: Open-answer interview, n=297 (male = 139, female = 158) weighted to represent the population of Velondriake)  0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40BV (non-specific)OctopusMarine managementPermanent reserveHygiene educationVelondriake committeeWorks with BVFinancial/literacy trainingEcotourismWomen's groupScholarshipAquacultureNo impactFamily planning% of men (weighted) % of women (weighted)0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45Velondriake committeeWomen's groupMangrovesEcotourismWorks with BVBV (non-specific)Permanent reserveSaturday schoolHygiene educationMarine managementScholarshipOctopusFamily planningAquacultureNo impact% of men (weighted) % of women (weighted)102 Is family planning use associated with improved environmental stewardship? In Velondriake, few respondents reported worries over declining marine resources (9% in total, compared to 35% who were most concerned about having enough money to survive tomorrow). Family planning users were no more concerned about declining marine resources than non-users (Table 4.2). Family planning users also did not show a significantly different level of support for management measures than non-users (Table 4.2).  Table 4.2 Relationship of family planning use with environmental stewardship Results are for women of reproductive age (15 to 49 years) only (Source: Individual, closed survey. n=131). ** Significant at the 95% level, * Significant at the 90% level. Variable Family planning t-value† or χ-squared‡ p-value User Non-user Proportion of group who say their priority concern is declining marine resources (%) 8 10 0.47‡ 0.49 Average marine management approval score15 3 3 -0.49† 0.63 People in Velondriake do blame population pressures (more people in the village or more people fishing) for declining marine resources, together with destructive fishing methods and an increased number of commercial buyers (Figure 4.6). Men tend to think in terms of there being too many fishers, while most women who noticed a decline in marine resources (30%) think there are too many people generally. However, this concern does not seem to motivate their use of family planning: Reducing pressure on resources did not feature as a commonly cited benefit                                                  15 Respondents were asked a series of questions (6 in total) about whether they wanted to see increases or decreases in various aspects of resource management being applied in Velondriake. For each question, a score of +1 was awarded for increases (taken as approval), -1 for decreases (disapproval) and 0 for ambivalence. The lowest score possible is -6 (disapproves of all measures mentioned) and the highest +6 (approves of all measures mentioned). Here a weighted mean score has been calculated. 103  of BV’s family planning programme (Figure 4.2). Only one respondent (a young man) describes the benefits of family planning in these terms: “There would be more children in each household without family planning. The resources in the sea would disappear.” (Teenage male, Antsatsamoroy)  Figure 4.6 Reasons for declining marine resources in Velondriake LMMA Overall, 61% of people in Velondriake perceived a decline in marine resources since they were a child (Source: individual, closed survey, n=297 (male = 139, female = 158) weighted to represent the population of Velondriake). Of those who observed a decline, the % of men and women that attributed it to different causes is shown above. 4.4.2 ‘Fertility effect’ Does the provision of family planning lead to a reduction in population growth, and does this lead to less direct pressure on resources? The census of Velondriake conducted by BV prior to this evaluation revealed an indented population pyramid, with fewer children under 5 than one would normally expect (usually, this is the largest age group in developing country contexts, as is the case for Madagascar) (Figure 4.7). Death rate was not measured in the census, so this indent could represent exceptionally high 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40Bad weatherGodNot enough fishing gearBecause of the reserveDon't knowBad luckForeigners do not respect traditionsMore buyersMore peopleDestructive fishingMore fishersMen % Women %104  child mortality. However, the downward trend in fertility rate in Velondriake reported by Robson et al. (2017)16 supports a slowing of population growth rate.   (a) Velondriake population pyramid   (b) Madagascar population pyramid  Figure 4.7 Population pyramids for the Velondriake LMMA and Madagascar (a) A population pyramid of the Velondriake LMMA, with age in 5 year intervals. Note that age data was collected in categories: Under 5, 5 to 14, 15 to 24, 25 to 49 and 50+ and it is not possible to disaggregate these categories as many participants did not know and provide a precise age. An even distribution has been assumed within these categories (Source: BV census data); (b) Population pyramid for Madagascar, using the same categories as Velondriake (Source: CIA World Factbook, 2016 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ma.html).                                                  16 Robson et al. report General Fertility rate: the number of live births per 1000 women. We observed a continuation in the decline they report, from 142.9 live births per 1000 women in 2013 to 89 in 2016. However, the % change was not significant (p= 0.12).  -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10Young child (under 5)Older child (5 to 14)Teenage (15 to 24)Adult (25 to 49)Senior (50+)% of population% female% male-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10Young child (under 5)Older child (5 to 14)Teenage (15 to 24)Adult (25 to 49)Senior (50+)% male% female105  Further, the most cited benefit of family planning is the ability to choose when to have children and how many to have, with most of these respondents specifying that family planning enables them to have fewer children (Figure 4.2).  Many go on to discuss the improvement in their ability to provide for their families when they have fewer children, including feeding their families more easily (39% men, 44% women) and having more money available (28% men, 44% women) (Figure 4.2):  “If I had more children, I would have difficulties in life because I can't buy enough food for my family and look after them.” (Adult male, Ankindranoke) “Family planning is important for me because I'm poor and [it] can decrease the number of my children. It makes my life easy because with fewer children I can work more. I do not have gear for fishing, so it is difficult to get a lot of fish to feed my family. When the number of people in my household is fewer, it is easy to take care of them.” (Adult male, Ankitambagna) “Without family planning I would have more children, and I would not have enough money to feed them all.” (Adult female, Andavadoaka) Regarding the effect of these smaller families on resource use, no interviewees suggested that with family planning they have an excess of food or money available and can therefore fish less. Indeed, many participants suggested that, with more time available, they would fish more, as discussed in relation to ToC 3 below. 106 Does family planning promote investment in children, making them less likely to become fishers? Respondents do report that a major benefit of family planning and having fewer children is that this enables them to care better for the children that they have (60% men, 34% women) (Figure 4.2):  “If I had more children, I would not be able to make a good life for the children I have now. Life is difficult.” (Adult female, Andavadoaka) “Family planning is important for me because it's good that we can care for the children we have. My wife can work.” (Adult male, Belavenoke) Of the women who reported having more money available due to family planning use, 20% said they would spend some of that money on school fees: “It is a little bit easier for me to pay my children's school fees because they are few; It would be difficult for me if they are more.” (Adult female, Ambolimoke) This investment in education appears to be motivated by a desire for their children to exit the fishery:  “My children are in high school. Work in the sea is very difficult, and they will get other work that gives them a salary.” (Adult male, Nosy Andambatihy) 107  4.4.3 ‘Empowerment effect’ Are women who use family planning “empowered” (more time, health, money) to pursue alternative livelihoods and engage in marine management? The second most commonly reported benefit of using family planning and having fewer children is having more time to work (47% men, 69% women) (Figure 4.2).  “Before I carried one child on the back, and one on the front. Now it is different because I can do other work.” (Teenage female, Antserananangy) As well as more child-free time, women (41%) also report better mental and physical health as factors that contribute both to their overall wellbeing and their ability to do more: “During 8 years, I have used [family planning] and it has made me stronger and I am healthier” (Adult female, Bevato). “If we had a lot of children, it would be difficult for us to get food and to take care of them. Now, I have a good health, my mind is calm.” (Adult female, Belavenoke) “I get good health from family planning. With good health I can do other things. I am not worrying about my children all the time. I do coffee selling and seaweed farming because I have more time.” (Teenage female, Tampolove) Being able to work more appears to lead to greater economic security. Family planning users have higher income than non-users, and this finding is robust even when other factors such as age, education and access to markets are controlled for (Table 4.3).  108  Table 4.3 Empowerment of women to become better resource stewards Results are for women of reproductive age (15 to 49 years) only (Source: Individual, closed survey. n=131). ** Significant at the 95% level, * Significant at the 90% level.  Variable Family planning t-value† or χ-squared‡ p-value User Non-user Average weekly individual income ($, PPP, 2015) 28 11 2.18†17 3.14†18 0.03** 0.002** Proportion of group that attends natural resource management meetings (%) 67 67 0.0039‡ 0.95 Proportion of group that speaks at natural resource management meetings (%) 20 16 1.48‡ 0.22 Proportion of group that feels they can influence decisions at natural resource management meetings (%) 30 24 2.31‡ 0.13 Proportion of group with long-term priorities (%)19 41 33 2.97‡ 0.08*  However, the emancipatory benefits of family planning are not translating into environmental stewardship gains. Many of those who stated they had more time to work specified that they (or                                                  17 Family planning users had a higher income than non-users according to a weighted Wilcoxon rank sum test. The influence of other factors was then investigated using GLMs (see footnote 18, below). 18 Family planning use was also a significant predictor of higher individual income in a multi-variate GLM. The full model investigated the influence of the following variables on the individual income of women of reproductive age: Region (North, South, Central Velondriake); Habitat type (mangrove, coastal, island); Age; Education; Participant in BV’s family planning programme (yes/no); BV participant (number of projects). Individual income was transformed before inclusion in the model: ln (income +1) used. Other significant predictors in the final reduced model were: Region; and age category. R2 for the model = 0.30.  19 Participants were asked “What do you worry about the most?” in order to assess their general needs and priorities. Responses were then coded as immediate needs (e.g. having insufficient food to feed family, having insufficient money to survive tomorrow, immediate concerns over job security) or more long-term needs (e.g. concerns over the future of fish stocks, worrying about how to afford luxury items, worrying about how to build a better house or find a wife).  109  their partners) could go fishing more (89% of men who discussed the benefit of having more time related this to more fishing, while 54% of women did so): “I can work easily. I have peace of mind. I am keen to work. And I see that I am strong. And when I work there are no babies to bother me. I can go out to sea and work.” (Adult female, Ankitambagna)  “Now my wife can work with me fishing because we don't have more children. We would also have difficulties looking after our children. We can wait to have more children, and in the meantime go on fishing migration to the North.” (Adult male, Belavenoke). Others discussed work such as making a selling business. In Velondriake where the dominant livelihood is fishing, this may involve selling fish. Only 8% of women with more time, and no men, report increased participation in BV’s aquaculture alternative livelihood project. No respondents mention that they use their increased time to more actively engage with natural resource management. Further, women who use family planning are no more likely to attend, speak at or influence decisions at natural resource management meetings than women who don’t (Table 4.3). Do women who use family planning have greater control over their lives? Generally, people in Velondriake have precarious existences focused on short-term needs, with 63% highlighting immediate problems as their priority concerns (including having enough food to feed their family, finding work and having enough money for immediate survival).  There is some suggestion that family planning users have a longer-term outlook (an indicator of reduced vulnerability) compared to non-users (significant at the less stringent 10% level), although I 110  cannot say if this is a consequence or determinant of family planning use (Table 4.3). Focus groups suggest that the decision to have fewer children may, in this context, be considered a short-sighted reaction to immediate needs which decreases certainty for the future. Although children are considered a burden in the short-term, in the long-term having more is seen to be beneficial. “It's good to have a lot of children, because when they're older they can help out with work, and you end up with a good amount of income.” [Female focus group participant, Agnolignoly].  “When they're still young they can be a hassle, but when they're older they can help you out.” [Female focus group participant 2, Agnolignoly]. “I have 13 children, and they suffered when they were younger, but I raised them all, and now I don't have to buy clothes anymore, my son-in-law buys all my clothes.  They help me out with food if I don't go fishing. If I have a problem, they help me.” [Female focus group participant 3, Agnolignoly]. This attitude is further reflected by MSC interviewees discussing BV’s education project, many of whom state that they want their child to get a good education to provide for their parents: “It is important to me that my kids should go to school and finish studying because then they can get work and money to help their parents and themselves.” (Adult male, Andavadoaka) One interviewee also describes the long-term insecurity associated with fewer children as a negative impact of BV’s family planning programme (Figure 4.2).  111  Gender inequalities persist despite the provision of family planning. Velondriake is a traditional patriarchal society, where women are expected to care for the house and the children, while men are the main breadwinners. Women earn significantly less than men: Average weekly income for women is $18.68 (PPP, 2015) and for men is $50.39 (PPP, 2015) (Wilcoxon rank sum test: t= 7.12, p= 8.178e-12). Another common measure of the status of women in a community is attitudes to violence (Upadhyay & Karasek, 2010). In Velondriake, 43% of people approve of violence towards women. The figure is higher amongst women than men (52% vs. 32%).  In this environment, more work and income for women does not necessarily equate to financial independence and empowerment. Comments made by family planning users in interviews alluded to a continued dependence on men for support and livelihoods: “Now I can have less children and look after my household, and help my husband with his work in the sea…Now, I spend my time working (in the sea), not caring for my children.” (Teenage female, Belavenoke) “[BV’s family planning programme is important to me] because I am still young, and not ready to care for a child. I'm jobless and don’t have a husband.” (Teenage female, Andavadoaka) “I can look after myself to make my life good. I am big and fat because I use family planning - much better than before! Before my husband was sad that I was skinny.” (Adult female, Agnolignoly) Women’s lack of agency is evident in natural resource management, with men dominating meetings (Figure 4.8). Whilst women may attend meetings, few voice opinions at them, and few are confident that they have influence, refuting any suggestion that men are representing them. 112   Figure 4.8.1: People who attend natural resource management meetings always, sometimes or never.   Figure 4.8.2:  People who speak at natural resource management meetings always, sometimes or never.  0102030405060708090100teenagefemaleteenage male adult female adult male senior female senior male all female all male% of demographic groupalways sometimes never0102030405060708090100teenagefemaleteenagemaleadult female adult male seniorfemalesenior male ALL female ALL male% of demographic groupalways sometimes never113   Figure 4.8.3 People who feel they can influence natural resource management meetings Figure 4.8 Attendance, participation and influence in natural resource management meetings (Source: Individual, closed survey, n=297 (male = 139, female = 158) weighted to represent the population of Velondriake).  In follow-up focus groups, women stated three main reasons for their lack of active participation in natural resource management meetings: (i) their opinion is not respected in the presence of ‘nahodas’ (older men); (ii) they were too busy caring for their husband and children or working to attend; and, (iii) they did not understand the topics under discussion (due to dialect used by educated BV staff, as well as content). 0102030405060708090100teenagefemaleteenagemaleadult female adult male seniorfemalesenior male ALL female ALL male% of demographic groupYes No Don't know114  4.5 Discussion: Contraception, conservation and human rights 4.5.1 BV’s provision of family planning: Respect for and fulfilment of reproductive rights  ENGOs providing family planning (including BV) stress their role in supporting women’s and reproductive rights and avoid suggestions of population control. However, in a critical review of PHE projects, Oldham submits that this is merely rhetoric, disguising an underlying assumption that population growth is the root cause of environmental degradation and family planning is the answer (Oldham, 2006). This, he asserts, results in a pre-determined strategy to provide family planning to communities (albeit on a voluntary basis) rather than a willingness to explore other health and development options that the community might desire. This singular focus on family planning and health, with perhaps a cursory consideration of livelihoods, is likely to miss other human rights issues that are critical to understanding the human-environment link and addressing the real problems. I address these points here, with the latter considered in 4.5.3 below.  BV’s family planning programme began at the suggestion of people in Velondriake, rather than as an externally conceived idea. In 2007, BV was a small organisation, focused primarily on eco-tourism. Community members approached BV’s expedition medic for help with a suspected cholera outbreak, which sparked further discussions about health needs in the community. As well as family planning (which was articulated as the most pressing need), sanitation, hygiene and child and maternal health were flagged as priorities (V. Mohan – pers. comm).  Family planning was originally provided by the expedition medic and had no external funding (the first substantial grant was received in 2010 – V. Mohan, pers. comm). The initiative later expanded to 115  the provision of other health services in Velondriake and is part of a broader programme addressing community needs such as livelihoods.  The unmet need for family planning identified by BV was clearly genuine, as demonstrated by uptake since the commencement of the programme. Prior to the introduction of BV’s family planning programme in the Velondriake LMMA, women here had at best limited, but more commonly no, access to family planning and reproductive health services (Mohan & Shellard, 2014). Access and uptake is now on a par with the rest of Madagascar. Without the involvement of an ENGO, it is highly unlikely that this service would have been provided by a health NGO or the Government in such a remote region at the time it was provided, given the unstable political situation in Madagascar and the related decline in healthcare provision20 (Mohan & Shellard, 2014; Robson et al., 2017). Indeed, BV only took the decision to provide the service itself after potential healthcare partners had declined to do so (V. Mohan – pers. comm).  Participants in BV’s family planning programme overwhelmingly talk about choice and the benefits of the programme, and there is no indication that they feel compelled to use contraception to service an environmental agenda of BV’s. Indeed, few link their participation in family planning with environmental concerns, which is a separate challenge for BV that I address below. Although BV has not targeted a reduction in population by coercing families to use family planning, there has in the past been a Malthusian assumption in the organization that a reduced population might be a by-product of the programme, and that reduced population growth would reduce environmental pressure (Harris et al., 2012). However, BV staff have been fully                                                  20 As political stability and funding are now improving in Madagascar, there would likely be some healthcare provision in the region today without BV’s intervention. 116  supportive of this present evaluation, which challenges the simplistic link between population and environment and is taking steps to adapt its programmes accordingly.  A final criticism that has been levelled at family planning provided by ENGOs is that it creates community dependency, which can undermine reproductive rights if the service is suddenly withdrawn at the end of a grant (Oldham, 2006). BV continues to secure funding for family planning provision, despite a downturn in international funding for PHE initiatives that has led to other environmental organisations losing interest (V. Mohan – pers. comm). It is also working actively with the Malagasy Ministry of Public Health and local public health centre staff towards full government ownership and supervision of the programme. Its actions are consistent with the recognition of reproductive rights in that, having once provided a core service, BV is committed to continue to do so21. 4.5.2 Consequences for conservation and development of strengthening reproductive rights  ‘Goodwill effect’ The uptake of contraception in Velondriake, and overwhelmingly positive reaction to BV’s programme, demonstrates that family planning services provided by an ENGO can be well-received. BV did have to build trust to overcome initial hostility and suspicions surrounding its motives for providing family planning (Harris et al., 2012). Others have been less successful: Lopez-Carr et al. report a CPR of just 11% after several years of funding for another ENGO-led                                                  21 A key element of the human rights-based approach is that a duty-bearer accepts continued responsibility for fulfilment of a right, rather than providing voluntary aid that can be withdrawn at any time. In addition, the principle of progressive realization states that a duty bearer must not regress in its level of service provision in fulfilment of a right (Singleton et al., 2017). 117  family planning programme in a similarly arid and remote region of Madagascar: (Lopez-carr & Ervin, 2017).  The positive reception of BV’s family planning programme may now be generating good feelings towards BV in Velondriake. For some women, it has operated as a point of introduction to BV and had a significant impact on their lives, although for men the project barely registers. For both men and women, income generating projects are more likely than family planning services to act as a point of introduction to BV, and to have an important impact on their lives, echoing findings by others (Lopez-carr & Ervin, 2017). Marine environmental initiatives are also common points of introduction and importance for men (less so women), although this and the renown of octopus closures could also reflect the earlier origins of these projects.  More interview participants (male and female) cited family planning as an important BV initiative once they were reminded that the programme was part of BV’s portfolio. This could suggest that people do not immediately associate the service with BV - a potential barrier to family planning generating goodwill for the organization and its other projects – which may be a consequence of services being delivered primarily by local women trained as community health workers, not BV’s staff. The increased prominence of family planning in the second, prompted responses could also reflect its secondary importance to income-generating projects, or a social desirability bias (participants feeling the need to discuss a beneficial project, after stating that BV made no difference to their lives in the first round).  Critically, although the family planning programme may have generated some goodwill for BV, there is no sign that family planning use is associated with increased support for conservation. My results show that women who use family planning are no more concerned about the 118  environment or supportive of marine management measures than those who do not. Further, while Velondriake community members do blame rising populations for declining resources, they are not in practice choosing to use family planning because of a heightened concern for the environment. As stated in the results, only one interviewee (a young man) cites reduced environmental impact as a benefit of family planning. Others focus on its ability to help with more tangible, immediate concerns (lack of money, food and other basic needs). This echoes findings in other small-scale fishing communities where, despite high dependency on fish as a resource, factors such as poor health, poor access to capital, food insecurity and extreme weather events are of more concern to fishers than threats to fisheries resources (Barratt & Allison, 2014; Mills et al., 2011; Schwarz et al., 2011).  ‘Fertility’ effect  My results suggest that couples are using family planning to have fewer children, reducing overall population growth. This has likely contributed to the lower proportion of children under-5 in the Velondriake population pyramid, as compared to the pyramid for Madagascar. However, there is no evidence that this is lessening pressure on resources, at least not in the short-term. Respondents suggest that, with fewer children, they will continue to fish the same, at least until all of their basic needs are satisfied, and probably until they can establish a more lucrative livelihood and higher standard of living. Some note that the fishing they do is now “enough” for their smaller family, whilst others talk about having spare income to use for other things (including better houses and luxury items). Indeed, family planning use may be increasing fishing pressure in the short-term, with respondents saying that having fewer children frees up their time to fish more (discussed further in relation to ‘empowerment’).  119  In the long-term, couples having fewer children overall are investing more in the children that they have, including their education, and this may ultimately reduce fishing pressure by enabling children to pursue alternative livelihoods. However, in order to fulfil this long-term reduction in fishing pressure, and counter the short-term increase, BV will need to put increased effort into securing alternative livelihoods and food sources for fishers22. Currently, in an arid region like Velondriake, where fishing provides almost the only source of food and income, even if life becomes a little easier, people can still not necessarily afford the “luxury” of conservation (Lopez-carr & Ervin, 2017; Marcus, 2001).  ‘Empowerment’ effect By enabling women to have fewer children, the provision of family planning is giving women in Velondriake more time and better health to work, and increased income.  Such improvements in socioeconomic conditions can lead to reduced vulnerability, greater life certainty and lower discount rates in individuals (Barratt, 2009; Becker & Mulligan, 1997; Holden et al., 1998; Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Markandya & Pearce, 1988; Pender, 1996; Singleton and Sumaila - in prep). Lower discount rates indicate a willingness to invest in future benefits, and so can be associated with better environmental stewardship (Clark, 1973; Sumaila, 2004; Sumaila & Domínguez-Torreiro, 2010). They may be reflected in the apparent longer-term priorities of women using family planning in Velondriake, although the priorities cited are predominantly                                                  22 BV provides both an alternative livelihood scheme (aquaculture) and an education scholarship which have the potential to address some of the constraints identified in this ToC. However, these projects are currently quite localized to a few major villages in Velondriake. 120  materialistic so could also indicate a tendency towards increasing per capita consumption and continued high discount rates.   Although family planning use is leading to quick, tangible benefits for women, after 10 years of service provision this has not translated into greater agency in public affairs and resource management: Women who use family planning are no more likely to actively participate in meetings than those who do not. Nor has it otherwise lead to increased concern for marine resources or engagement with marine management, as discussed in the “goodwill” ToC. In fact, women are using their increased time and better health to go fishing more. I suggest that this may be because while use of family planning is providing immediate alleviation of some of the symptoms of poverty, it is not addressing the underlying causes of vulnerability and fisheries dependence. Where this is the case, the improvements in socioeconomic conditions are unlikely to be associated with a lowering of discount rate or more sustainable fishing. Indeed, family planning use may be associated with increased vulnerability providing immediate poverty relief at the expense of long-term security. In regions such as this, where social security is absent, larger families have traditionally provided essential economic support and care for elders and sick relatives (Caldwell et al., 1992; Knodel et al., 1992; Walley, 2004).   Other vulnerability persists in the form of gender inequality. Velondriake is characterized by a patriarchal, unequal society, where women earn significantly less than men and violence towards women is socially acceptable. The high approval of violence among women indicates that they have internalized the dominant cultural norm of the patriarchy. In this context, it is not surprising that they are not engaging in environmental management through traditional means (meetings organized to discuss natural resources, dominated by older men).  Gender inequality may also be undermining the potential of family planning to generate financial security for women. Although 121  they are working more, many are currently supporting their husbands’ endeavours, with men particularly keen for both themselves and their wives to fish more when they have more time. Women remain financially dependent on men, and mired in domestic chores, with comments touching on the importance of having a husband and keeping him happy.  Like others involved in PHE, BV has found that conducting environmental outreach in fora that are organized primarily to discuss family planning, and primarily for women, can enable women to engage with natural resource management (D’Agnes et al., 2010; Gonsalves et al., 2015; Honzak et al., 2012; Pielemeier, 2005). Although this does not tackle inequality directly, it may negate some of its effects. Attention also needs to be paid to other marginalized groups. Younger, poorer and less educated people may also be prevented from participating in natural resource management by power imbalances, which manifest not only in reluctance to express themselves at meetings, but also in very practical barriers such as being unable to afford time off work to attend, and/or to follow the discussions.  4.5.3 Towards a human rights-based approach to conservation? This study forms part of a larger evaluation of BV’s impacts on human rights, which was in part motivated by the SSF-Guidelines and their suggestion that support for the human rights of small-scale fishers will make them less vulnerable, and better able to be forward-thinking resource stewards (Allison et al., 2012; FAO, 2015; Jentoft, 2014; Singleton et al., 2017). I therefore conclude by considering the implications of this study for ENGOs implementing a human rights-based approach to fisheries management, as advocated by the Guidelines and their proponents. In Figure 4.9 I show the PHE ToCs as modified by my evaluation. Focusing only on the causal links in the pathways, the provision of family planning does not appear to lead directly to 122  improved resource management and can lead to increased fishing. Stark choices emerge: Either “trading off” the development benefits of family planning against its conservation costs (dropping the programme) (M. P. Wells & Mcshane, 2004); or promoting greater issue linkage (for example, by tying the use of contraception to improved conservation behaviour through conservation agreements) (Salafsky, 2011; Salafsky & Wollenberg, 2000). This is where theory of change analysis has proved unhelpful in integrating conservation and development, as its logical input-output-outcome reasoning promotes over-simplification. In particular, institutions (rules and norms) that influence how theories of change play out in practice are ignored (Béné et al., 2009; Leach et al., 1997, 1999, Scoones, 1998, 2009). This encourages unrealistic expectations of quick successes, and suggests limited options when these are not met, resulting in the kind of polarised, reactive decision making exhibited in the family planning-conservation debate that serves only to make fishers more vulnerable and less cooperative.    123                  Provision of family planning Reduced population growth People choose to have fewer children Women invest more time and resources into their other children Less fishing Healthier/ better educated children pursue alternative livelihoods to fishing and/or engage more in natural resource management Care for extended family in absence of social security may limit earning opportunities/ available income Access to basic services (health, education etc)? More time = more fishing (see ‘empowerment’ ToC) Access to viable alternative livelihoods? Do they constitute “decent work”?  Positive goodwill towards ENGOToC 1: ‘Goodwill’ effect Negative goodwill towards ENGO Increased engagement with environmental management/ concern for environment Provision of family planning Who makes decision to provide family planning? Resistance towards activities of NGO and/or environmental management ToC2:’Fertility’ effect 124                Figure 4.9 The common family planning-environment Theories of Change (“ToC”s) modified to reflect the results of my evaluation Additional pathways identified shown in green, pathways contradicted by the evidence in this context are hatched, pathways for which I have insufficient evidence in grey/dashed line. I also note key points where a human rights-based approach has bearing in red.  Women have more time Women pursue alternative livelihoods Provision of family planning People choose to have fewer children Access to viable alternative livelihoods? Do they constitute “decent work”? Access to information about environmental management? Do cultural norms prevent certain groups from speaking/ influencing decisions? Women fish more Increased pressure on resources Decreased pressure on resources Increased engagement of women in environmental management ToC 3: ‘Empowerment’ effect 125  Respect for reproductive rights wards against the harsh “solutions” posed above, since they attempt to limit reproductive choice. However, as my evaluation shows, respect for and fulfilment of one right can only go so far to reduce the vulnerability of small-scale fishers, and therefore may have limited traction in enhancing resource stewardship. A true human rights-based approach requires consideration of other relevant rights23. In Velondriake, the right to food and decent work are likely to be at issue. Critically, the approach also re-frames the problems of conservation and development by re-directing attention to the underlying causes of poverty, which may lie outside small-scale fishing communities, as opposed to its symptoms that lie within (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Gready, 2009; Uvin, 2007). By targeting inequality and discrimination, and the power imbalances and institutions that propagate them, a human rights-based approach has the potential to address the deficits in the over-simplified past approaches to integrating conservation and development (Béné et al., 2009; Campese et al., 2009; DFID, 1997; Moser & Norton, 2001; Oviedo & Puschkarsky, 2012).   Applying this thinking to my evaluation (Figure 4.9), we see that local institutions and inequalities in Velondriake have prevented key fisher groups (including women and young men) from accessing information about, and influencing decisions on, fisheries management. Without greater agency, past experience shows they are unlikely to become fully-engaged resource stewards (Berkes, 2004; Blom et al., 2010; Boissiere et al., 2009; Ferse et al., 2010; M. P. Wells & Mcshane, 2004; White, 1996; Williams, 2004). By examining the power-laden assumption that population growth amongst the poor is the main cause of resource degradation, we discover                                                  23 A human rights-based approach is grounded in the framework of human rights defined by international treaties and requires adherence to the overriding principle that rights are indivisible and interrelated (i.e. no right is more important than another, and the fulfilment of one right often depends on another). 126  that it is not just mouths to feed that drive fishing, but lack of social security, education, health care and viable alternative livelihoods.  We begin to identify other groups to hold to account or  ‘blame’ (e.g. commercial buyers, the Government) and other potential solutions (e.g. measures to ensure that small-scale fishers receive a greater share of the profit from national fisheries and aquaculture) (Le Manach et al., 2013; Schuhbauer et al., 2017).  Finally, a human rights-based approach calls for ENGOs to re-examine their own position of power in relation to small-scale fishing communities24 (WFFP, 2017). This might mean modifying pre-determined strategies so that the most critical issues are addressed, regardless of their popularity with funders. It will mean discussing these strategies in an open, accessible manner, that encourages communities to challenge them, and again promotes greater agency.  Ultimately, it will involve relinquishing control, and accepting that the realisation of human rights may not automatically enhance conservation, but can still enable it by focusing on the gradual removal of barriers to engagement, alongside management measures (Allison et al., 2012; FAO, 2015b; Jentoft, 2014; R. L. Singleton et al., 2017). A human rights-based approach to conservation, when properly applied, is not an easy option. In challenging established institutions and elites, ENGOS will encounter powerful opposition, including within their own ranks. This could undermine sources of funding and operational relationships with Governments and community leaders (R. L. Singleton et al., 2017). It does not promise simple, guaranteed outcomes, which could prove difficult in a funding landscape that                                                  24 This is specifically called for by small-scale fishers’ organisations, who note that: “… the turn towards ‘multistakeholderism’ has further diluted the responsibilities of states, by glossing over the inherent power imbalances in neoliberal society” (WFFP, 2017). 127  has come to expect proof of concept and quick, cost-effective, and measurable results (Salafsky, 2011). However, it will help to move beyond empty rhetoric, community conflict and reactive decisions, and therefore represents progress towards truly people-centric conservation. 128  Chapter 5: Economics with equality: The role of human rights in the new conservation paradigm 5.1 Introduction Inequality defines our world today, undermining social stability and mobility, hampering economic growth, and breeding discontent (Atems & Jones, 2015; Cingano, 2014; Oxfam, 2017) as evidenced by the divisive politics of Brexit and Trump. The World Bank and World Economic Forum have identified inequality as a major risk to social and economic stability that should be addressed urgently (World Bank, 2016; World Economic Forum, 2012). Inequality has also long been recognized as a source of disruption and, ultimately, failure in conservation work. The costs and benefits of conservation fall to different parties, heightening resistance from those with the raw end of the deal, both globally (Balmford & Whitten, 2003; Ferraro, 2002; Neudert et al., 2017) and locally (Balmford & Whitten, 2003; Béné et al., 2009; Fabinyi et al., 2015; Holmes & Cavanagh, 2016).  Inequality also undermines co-operation, which is essential amongst resource users for management in all contexts (Sumaila, 2013), especially developing countries (Rosenbaum et al., 2016). Given these implications for conservation, it is not surprising that international environmental NGOs (“ENGOs”) have turned their attention to inequality.   The “new conservation” paradigm emphasizes the protection of nature for the benefit of people25. It seeks to shift the focus of conservation away from the protection of species and                                                  25 The “paradigm shift” of new conservation is often traced back to the IUCN World Parks Congress in 2003, where the Durban Accord and Durban Action Plan respecting the rights of indigenous peoples was adopted, and to its subsequent recognition by the Conference of the Parties of the CBD (Freudenthal et al., 2012; IUCN, 2011; Stephens, 2012). The new paradigm has to a certain extent been recharacterized in a “people vs. parks” debate in the literature between Soulé and Kareiva, as detailed in the text above. 129  ecosystems at the expense of local human populations,  towards conservation that embraces “economic development for all” (Kareiva, 2014; Kareiva et al., 2012). ENGOs championing the approach (most notably, The Nature Conservancy) contend that it will enhance support for conservation, from donors, resource extracting corporations and local communities alike (Kareiva, 2014). They suggest that “new conservation” requires people-friendly strategies to complement traditional protected areas, specifically strategies that : (1) Require NGOs to work more closely with corporations; and, (2) Ensure that people (especially poor and marginalized groups) benefit from conservation (Kareiva, 2014; Marvier, 2014; Soulé, 2014). I suggest, therefore, that older incarnations of the “new paradigm” would be integrated conservation-development projects (“ICDPs”), such as eco-tourism and alternative livelihood schemes (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Alpert, 1996; M. P. Wells & Mcshane, 2004). In more recent terms, the “new paradigm” would be synonymous, or at least overlap substantially, with the more commonly cited “neoliberal conservation” interventions, including market-based schemes such as payment for ecosystem services and eco-labelling (Büscher et al., 2012; Dempsey, 2016). Others have delineated the new paradigm in similar terms (Brown, 2003; Holmes et al., 2016; Wright et al., 2015).  Whether through ecotourism initiatives or payments for ecosystem services, the “new paradigm” has seen ENGOs facilitating a connection between, on the one hand, resource users in sites targeted for conservation in developing countries, and, on the other, donors and consumers in developed markets. Their aim in doing so is to channel incentives to the former to encourage sustainable behaviour. This link has the potential to address the uneven global distribution of the costs and benefits of conservation discussed above. Leaving aside for now the reproaches that 130  conservation should not concern itself with people at all (Soulé, 2014), the new conservation paradigm has been criticized because, far from fulfilling a redistributive function, both traditional ICDPs and neo-liberal conservation approaches have fuelled inequality. For ICDPs, inequality is a commonly cited reason for failure,  where elite capture of project benefits engenders jealousy and resentment in target communities, and leads to a lack of buy-in and/or active resistance to conservation (Béné et al., 2009; Bennett & Dearden, 2014; Christie, 2004; Holmes & Cavanagh, 2016; Leisher et al., 2010; Ratner & Allison, 2012; Walley, 2004); Neoliberal conservation schemes have further exacerbated these inequalities, as the commodification of nature creates new benefits to be captured, higher barriers to access benefits, and an even greater removal of ENGOs from communities, heightening the tendency to work with a small number of influential players (Arsel & Buscher, 2012; Blom et al., 2010; Büscher et al., 2012; Büscher & Fletcher, 2015; Holmes, 2011; Holmes & Cavanagh, 2016; Igoe & Brockington, 2007; Kumi et al., 2015; Milne & Adams, 2012). In light of the above, for both traditional ICDPs and neoliberal conservation, commentators have noted the need to address explicitly issues of inequality and power imbalance, rather than assume that they will be resolved automatically (see Leach, Mearns, & Scoones, 1999; Scoones, 2009 on ICDPS; and Kumi, Arhin, & Yeboah, 2015 on neo-liberal conservation). This brings us to another emerging trend in conservation: The human rights-based approach. ENGOs were first urged to consider the impact of their work on the human rights of indigenous and local communities through criticism of the “old conservation paradigm” – in particular, forced eviction of people to make way for protected areas (Agrawal & Redford, 2009; Brockington & Igoe, 2006; Goldman, 2011). Many have now accepted the responsibility (CIHR, 2014; R. L. 131  Singleton et al., 2017). However, I argue that a human rights-based approach is just as relevant to the “new” conservation paradigm as the old one, especially given the obligation that human rights brings to address power imbalances, discrimination and inequality (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Gready, 2009; Hamm, 2001; Uvin, 2007).  In this Chapter, I first consider some of the processes through which inequality and power imbalances are propagated in the new conservation paradigm, and then propose human rights-based mechanisms for improvement. By keeping the emphasis on human rights alive as approaches to conservation change, I aim to suggest how conservation can truly involve “economic development for all”. I will focus on marine conservation and fisheries, where the question of how to implement a human rights-based approach is particularly pertinent, following the recent endorsement of the Small Scale Fisheries Guidelines (FAO, 2015b; Jentoft, 2014). Others have also shown that inequality is a particular pre-occupation of small-scale fishers, which is undermining management efforts (Fabinyi et al., 2015). I will draw on a case study in this sector, the work of marine conservation NGO Blue Ventures (“BV”)26 in the Velondriake Locally Managed Marine Area (“LMMA”) South-West Madagascar, which incorporates elements of both more traditional ICDPs and market-based conservation, together with other examples from the literature. Despite the fisheries sector focus, this work also makes a                                                  26Blue Ventures and its initiatives are described fully in the previous chapter. The examples used here come from survey work in Madagascar, the methodology for which is also described in the previous chapter. Specifically, quotes come from short, structured interviews using an adapted version of the Most Significant Change methodology (R. Davies & Dart, 2005); Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.4  are derived from the same interviews following coding of the answers in NVIVO; and Figure 5.1 and  Figure 5.3 show data from the closed-question section of the individual survey conducted in the Velondriake LMMA.  132  constructive contribution to the wider debate on how sustainable development policy (specifically, the Sustainable Development Goals) can become more inclusive (Kumi et al., 2015; Pouw & Gupta, 2017). I use Kareiva’s two-part characterization of the “new conservation” paradigm – ‘working more closely with corporations’ and ‘ensuring that people benefit’ to structure my analysis. 5.2 Analysis 5.2.1 Working more closely with corporations: Implications for equality Since the 1990s, ENGOs have worked with corporate partners to implement their initiatives, with promotion of local enterprise forming the basis for many ICDPs. Eco-tourism was a particularly popular early intervention, championed by the likes of WWF and Conservation International (Butcher, 2006; Conservation International, 2013; Kiss, 2004; Plumpton, 2015).  Other non-extractive, “alternative” livelihoods have also been promoted by ENGOs since this time, ranging from honey production to seaweed farming (Roe et al., 2015). In these projects, ENGOS have exhibited varying levels of involvement with the corporate sector: From preparing the ground for ecotourism and trade by publicly supporting the concepts (Plumpton, 2015; WWF Arctic Programme, 2006); to funding start-up costs and training for local seaweed producers (Blue Ventures, 2017a; Msuya, 2013; Neish, 2013) and, in some cases, directly facilitating sales, whether as investors in ecotourism enterprises (Salafsky et al., 2001) or by brokering deals with companies further up the value chain (Blue Ventures, 2017a; Hurtado, 2013). With the advent of global, market-based approaches to conservation, ENGOs also began to work with trans-national corporations to develop sustainability policies and certification schemes such as the Marine 133  Stewardship Council (“MSC”) scheme (Conservation International, 2013; Constance & Bonanno, 2000; Kareiva, 2014). Kareiva states that the benefit of working with (rather than lobbying against) companies is greater influence over their actions. However, critics assert that influence has flowed in the opposite direction, through corporate funding for ENGOs and corporate domination of their boards (Holmes, 2011). Consequently, ENGOs have become ever more reluctant to criticize corporations and capitalism, whilst corporations are able to shape ENGO policy to suit their purposes, including gaining access to emerging markets and to reputational boons through “greenwashing” of their business (Boström & Hallström, 2010; Holmes, 2011, 2012). As the conservation world has been influenced by corporate funding and thinking, ENGOs have also become more global in their approach, more supportive of market-based mechanisms and reduced involvement of the State, and more detached from the communities affected by their interventions (Büscher et al., 2012; Büscher & Fletcher, 2015; Dauvergne & LeBaron, 2014; Holmes, 2011). As such, they are perhaps more likely than ever to focus on hazily defined “economic benefits” of conservation, without considering who is receiving those benefits, or why, or whether they are in fact the benefits that community members most need. Although neoliberal conservation often promises the triple-benefit of economic growth, conservation, and benefits to communities (Holmes & Cavanagh, 2016), the latter seems ripe for neglect, as the first two are prioritized by the corporate and ENGO partners respectively. Indeed, as I will discuss further below, ENGOs’ attempts to influence corporate policy to date have largely been limited to issues concerning environmental sustainability, rather than people (Conservation International, 2013; Kareiva, 2014; R. L. Singleton et al., 2017).   134  In this section, I consider issues arising due to the imbalance of power between communities on the front line of conservation and resource extraction, and their developed world market partners, where ENGOs have facilitated corporate-community interactions. I use two examples from the fisheries sector, one a more traditional ICDP approach (seaweed farming as an alternative livelihood), the other a new, market-based initiative (Marine Stewardship Council certification). I highlight the potential impacts on environmental sustainability, and how ENGOs could take greater action to influence their corporate partners to protect human rights. ENGOs working with corporations: Seaweed farming as an alternative livelihood Livelihoods have long been one of the most popular “development” features of integrated conservation-development work (Roe et al., 2015; Wright et al., 2015). This may in part be due to a longstanding and continued focus of conservation practitioners on economic aspects of poverty and development, as opposed to broader definitions that take in human well-being and rights (Adams et al., 2004; Milner-Gulland et al., 2014). However, it is also in part driven by what communities want. Studies with fishing communities have highlighted their prioritization of basic human needs, such as access to cash and food, ahead of concern over fishing resources (Mills et al., 2011; Schwarz et al., 2011). Likewise, the fishing communities in South-West Madagascar with whom BV works show a strong preference for cash and immediate needs (Figure 5.1): 135   Figure 5.1 A summary of the priority concerns of adults living in the Velondriake LMMA Source: individual, closed survey, n=297 (male = 139, female = 158) weighted to represent the population of Velondriake.   These results immediately suggest the potential value of income-generating interventions to communities. This is confirmed by the apparent popularity of livelihood initiatives in some contexts. Seaweed farming is a common livelihood option promoted as an “alternative” to marine resource extraction (Roe et al., 2015). It has been rapidly taken up as a livelihood in the Philippines and Indonesia (Sievanen et al., 2005); Tanzania (Bryceson, 2002); and other countries (FAO, 2013). In South-West Madagascar, BV includes seaweed farming and other 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40waterothersecuritysaving against shockshealthpersonal relationshipsno worriesfish stocks (immediate concern)educationfish stocks (future concern)foodhousegood lifejob securitymoney% of adults in Velondriake (weighted)136  income-generating interventions in its integrated conservation-development approach27. Of all BV’s programmes in Velondriake, these income-generating initiatives were most frequently cited as having a significant impact on peoples’ lives (Figure 5.2). The aquaculture (seaweed and sea cucumber) livelihood project was ranked highest, despite its relatively small scale (confined to a few major villages in the region) compared to other projects, such as short-term octopus closures and health.   Figure 5.2 BV projects with significant impacts on the lives of people in Velondriake Source: Open-answer interviews, (n=297, weighted to represent the population of Velondriake                                                  27 Blue Ventures’ aquaculture alternative livelihood scheme currently focuses on sea cucumbers, as they very recently handed over the running of the seaweed initiative to a part-French owned corporation, Ocean Farmers)(Blue Ventures, 2017a). The handover was done primarily for logistical reasons, since the corporation was running similar projects in other locations and was seen to have better resources in terms of staff, equipment and transportation. Blue Ventures’ staff anticipated that the transfer would ensure the project was supported in the long term, without continued reliance on aid, although perhaps the negative consequences of corporate handover could also have been anticipated. The other main income generating intervention involves short-term closures of the octopus fishery to temporarily boost productivity (discussed further below). 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40Velondriake committeeWomens' groupMangrove reserveBV (non-specific)Saturday schoolWorks with BVHygiene educationEcotourismScholarshipPermanent reserveFamily planningMarine managementOctopusAquacultureNo impact% of adults in Velondriake (weighted)137  The above demonstrates the redistributive potential of the new conservation paradigm. By working with corporations to bring livelihood initiatives to communities and/or provide a market for the initiatives, ENGOs could bring welcome benefits and potentially mitigate some of the local costs of conservation and reduce opposition. However, although widely implemented, alternative livelihood schemes have been much criticized for failing to produce conservation benefits, and I suggest that this may be a consequence of their failure to fully examine issues of power and equality and ensure that redistributive potential is realized.  The main criticism of alternative livelihood projects in terms of conservation impact is that instead of switching to conservation-friendly, “alternative” livelihood activities, participants simply add them to their portfolio of existing activities and do not reduce resource extraction (Roe et al., 2015)28. Certainly, in many fishing communities in developing countries, individuals have a diverse portfolio of livelihood activities (Allison & Ellis, 2001). Studies of seaweed farming suggest that people in target communities prefer to strengthen existing livelihoods (sometimes using the proceeds from seaweed farming to invest in fishing gear), or diversify their portfolio of livelihoods, rather than switch to a brand new one (Hill et al., 2011; Sievanen et al., 2005; Torell et al., 2010). In coastal Velondriake, the dominant livelihood is fishing (70% of adults are fishers). 84% of participants in the seaweed aquaculture project saw it as an additional, rather than an alternative, livelihood (Source: MSC open-answer interviews). A desire to strengthen existing livelihoods (namely, fishing) was also shown by the community. Of the people who raised concerns over job security (see Figure 5.1), 65% of them specifically cited                                                  28 Whilst noting the prevalence of this criticism, a review of available evidence by Roe et al. finds insufficient evidence to confirm or allay concerns.  138  concerns about how they could obtain more fishing gear, and the majority of people in Velondriake (72%) suggested that, if they oversaw fisheries management in the region, their priority would be to hand out fishing gear (Source: individual, closed-question survey). Only 3% suggested implementing alternative livelihood schemes. However, rather than suggest this is a failure for conservation, or an unavoidable fact of life in impoverished communities, I contend that these responses to alternative livelihood projects are both understandable, and a consequence of the unequal relationship between developing country producers and developed world markets: Inequality that the new conservation paradigm not only fails to consider but may actively avoid dealing with.  Firstly, problems arise due to a failure to account for unequal ability to access finance between farmers and buyers, including loans and cash flow. Despite their relatively poor financial position, seaweed farmers are often asked to bear the upfront costs of farming. Yet, delayed receipt of income is a reason often given for participants’ reluctance to switch fully to an alternative livelihood. Seaweed farming cannot provide daily income (the norm for many small-scale fishers) due to seaweed growing time (Hurtado, 2013; Krishnan & Narayanakumar, 2013). As such, seaweed farming activities are often viewed as a source of “bonus” cash to cover irregular expenses such as school fees, and/or to shore up existing fishing activities through the purchase of gear, rather than as a viable replacement for daily income from fishing (Brock, 2013; Hill, Rowcliffe, & Koldewey, 2011; Sievanen, Crawford, Pollnac, & Lowe, 2005; Torell, Crawford, Kotowicz, Herrera, & Tobey, 2010; Blue Ventures, unpublished data). Delayed receipt of income, and other upfront costs, can also act as a barrier to any participation in seaweed farming schemes (Sievanen et al., 2005). Reasons given for not participating in seaweed 139  farming in Velondriake included that individuals could not afford to take time away from their other work to get seaweed farming started, could not afford the necessary equipment, or could not wait for the first harvest to receive income.  “I want to participate in the seaweed aquaculture, but I don’t have time to do it. If I don’t go fishing, I will have no food. So I have to go fishing”. (Senior male, Agnolignoly). “I want to be involved in seaweed farming, but it is very hard to do that. I can't buy the lines, or the seedlings. [The Company] and BV gave some line to some people, but the seedlings you have to buy, and I can't afford to because I am poor. I also worry that someone would steal them at night.” (Adult female, Ankindranoke). “I participate in seaweed aquaculture, but it hasn't helped me. It has made me unhappy because I still do not get money every day – I have to wait for the seaweed to grow and dry, so it's a long time until I get money. If I do not get money every day, the seaweed aquaculture cannot help me with urgent problems.” (Teenage female aquaculture participant, Ankindranoke). In the developed world, the use of start-up funding to enable new businesses is common practice, and the concept has been applied by ENGOs in seaweed farming initiatives to provide initial funding, either as a grant or micro-finance arrangement (Blue Ventures, 2017a; Msuya, 2013; Neish, 2013; Torell et al., 2010). However, such payments are often not well thought out, being insufficient to cover the costs of start-up  (Torell et al., 2010) (including, I suggest, household expenses while regular livelihoods are suspended) and/or with repayments due before income is available from the project (Brock, 2013). Micro-finance initiatives have also been criticized for getting participants into debt that they cannot afford to repay, and/or not being paired with 140  sufficient financial training for participants to manage the money appropriately (Brock, 2013). Further, loans can prove an additional barrier to participation in livelihood schemes, rather than a tool to overcome existing ones. Poorer community members may not be able to access finance due to a lack of collateral (Neish, 2013) and/or a reluctance to take on the extra risk (Torell et al., 2010). Where start-up funding is provided by purchaser corporations, this has been exploited to further limit the bargaining power of producers, since producers are commonly tied to sell to the company that provided the finance or equipment (Msuya, 2013). Seaweed farming schemes have also typically failed to address the inequality between farmers and corporate buyers in terms of their capacity to deal with risk. Seaweed farming is often unreliable. Projects are commonly disrupted by seaweed disease, fluctuations in market price of seaweed, and sudden withdrawal of project funding by ENGO and/or corporate sponsors (Cai, Hishamunda, & Ridler, 2013; Sievanen, Crawford, Pollnac, & Lowe, 2005; Valderrama, 2012; Blue Ventures, unpublished data). Yet, despite the fact that corporations might access insurance, and seaweed farmers cannot, participants are asked to bear the risk.  Finally, inequalities in bargaining power are evident in the unilateral, profit-seeking behaviour exhibited by purchaser corporations, able to behave in a monopsonistic manner and dictate low prices to producers, and further undermining local trust in the viability of such schemes (Bryceson, 2002; Cai et al., 2013; Msuya, 2013; Rönnbäck et al., 2002). In Velondriake, participants noted that when a corporation took over the running of the project from BV, sites and/or individuals were excluded from participation for failing to be sufficiently productive and profitable: 141  “Before I did the seaweed aquaculture, now we don’t do it in Ankitambagna. [The company] stopped this work because in Ankitambagna the current is very strong. We can’t produce enough seaweed. Everyone had to give back their rope to [the company]” (Senior male, Ankitambagna). I have depicted highly uneven contractual relationships between aquaculture farmers and the corporations that represent developed markets, with producers being asked to bear all of the upfront costs and risk yet take a limited share in the profits. Presented with this prospect, it is little wonder that participants mitigate their risks by diversifying rather than switching livelihoods. I suggest that the application of human rights could further benefit both conservation and people through a focus on decent labour standards for seaweed farmers, giving them a stronger hand to negotiate with corporations. The typical classification of farmers as “contract producers” rather than employees, negates these protections and implies that farmers can negotiate terms on an equal footing, which is inappropriate given their bargaining power. However, in proposing enhanced labour standards, I acknowledge the attractiveness of cheap and unregulated labour to global corporations (Newell, 2005). The situation faced by seaweed farmers, inappropriately placed outside of the protection of employment relationships, is not dissimilar to the situation faced by immigrant labourers in agriculture and fisheries (Barrientos, 2008; Marschke & Vandergeest, 2016) or, indeed, workers in the “gig economy” in the developed world (De Stefano, 2016; Faraday, 2017; Minter, 2017)). Further, a failure to uphold workers’ rights, both in and out of employment relationships, is a common consequence of globalization in developing countries, where competition to attract the business of transnational corporations is spurring a global “race to the bottom” in labour standards (R. B. Davies & Vadlamannati, 2013; Oxfam, 2017). As such, corporations are not likely to lead the charge to 142  improve the position of seaweed farmers (Newell, 2005), and with it conservation outcomes. I suggest that this task must fall to ENGOs. Of course, ENGOs are not always or even primarily responsible for facilitating contractual relationships between fishers in developing countries and global corporations. Often the corporations seek out these relationships directly, or via middlemen in-country (Cai et al., 2013; Crona et al., 2010; Msuya, 2013; Zamroni & Yamao, 2013). However, where ENGOs are increasingly facilitating links between fishers and developed markets, I argue that they have a duty to ensure these links are not exploitative. A human rights-based approach to conservation specifically requires ENGOs to exert influence over third parties (including corporations) to “protect” human rights (Campese et al., 2009; CIHR, 2014; Jonas et al., 2014; R. L. Singleton et al., 2017). In the fisheries sector, ENGOs have played a part in highlighting “seafood slavery” (forced labour conditions contravening human rights) in the IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) fishing sector (Gianni & Simpson, 2005). However, they have been less proactive in exploring and protecting human rights in their working relationships with corporate partners (R. L. Singleton et al., 2017). In some cases, by providing start-up funding for aquaculture farmers whose profits are ultimately commandeered by transnational corporations, ENGOs may even have unwittingly used aid money to subsidise questionable business practices. As outlined above, not only has the inaction of ENGOs allowed workers’ rights to be undermined, but in turn this is likely to have undermined the likelihood of fishers switching to alternative livelihoods and reducing resource extraction.   143  In the following section, I will consider more closely how ENGOs have sought to influence corporations to date, and in particular what further actions they have taken, or could take, to address inequalities in bargaining power between global corporations and local fishers. ENGOs influencing corporations: The role of certification schemes All of the major ENGOs now work with transnational companies to influence their behaviour (Conservation International, 2013; Flora and Fauna International, 2017; Kareiva, 2014; WCS, 2017; WWF-US, 2014). All of them focus primarily on reducing the environmental impact of the companies that they work with, rather than social safeguards for affected communities, although these are arguably equally relevant to achieving “sustainable” business practices. In the marine conservation sector this focus is particularly evident in the approach of the main sustainability certification body, the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). The MSC certification scheme started as a collaboration between WWF and Unilever but later became independent (Potts & Haward, 2007). Its purpose is to incentivize sustainable practices at all levels of the fisheries supply chain, by attracting a premium for MSC certified products (MSC, 2018c). It has to date struggled to include small-scale fisheries in the certification scheme due to the preclusive costs and technical expertise required to achieve certification, and the difficulties of obtaining fisheries data in contexts where there is little existing infrastructure in place for monitoring or ensuring supply-chain traceability (Bush et al., 2013; Jacquet & Pauly, 2008). The MSC now provides grants and has developed toolkits and simplified standards to enable assessment of data deficient fisheries, in an effort to make the certification scheme more accessible to small-scale fishers (Bush et al., 2013; MSC, 2016, 2018a, 2018d). However, it is 144  still difficult to see how certification could be achieved for most small-scale fisheries in developing countries without external assistance.  ENGOs are in some cases providing the necessary assistance to make MSC certification more accessible, by supporting “Fisheries Improvement Projects” (FIPs) in developing country small-scale fisheries (Bush et al., 2013; Deighan & Jenkins, 2015; Sampson et al., 2015). For example, BV is a recipient of the MSC’s Global Sustainability Fund grant and is using the funding to explore certification of the small-scale octopus fishery in South-West Madagascar (Long, 2017). It is well-placed not only to facilitate funding, and cooperation between Government, industry and other partners, but also to gather the requisite fisheries data.  The octopus fishery has for over 10 years been the subject of BV’s temporary closure initiative, aimed at catalysing conservation by producing quick, tangible boosts to the productivity of the octopus fishery (Blue Ventures, 2017b; Oliver et al., 2015).  Even where MSC certification is achieved by a small-scale fishery, there are currently no safeguards in place to ensure that the premiums paid for MSC products ultimately make their way back to small-scale fishers, or to ensure that the fishers’ working conditions are decent, representing not only an ethical problem but a flaw in the incentivization of sustainable behaviour (Ponte, 2012). This omission, together with recent scandals about seafood slavery, has led to calls for greater consideration of social impacts in fisheries sustainability work (Bailey et al., 2016; Kittinger et al., 2017). The MSC has instigated a consultation process to consider how it might incorporate some social safeguards into its certification, with the specific goal of disassociating itself from recent forced and child labour scandals (Marschke & Vandergeest, 2016; MSC, 2018b). It notes specifically that it will not be becoming a “social standard”(MSC, 145  2018b)29. I suggest that the MSC’s attention to human rights purely to avoid reputational damage does not go far enough. Less egregious breaches of human rights to both decent work and equality also play a major role in undermining the ability of small-scale fishers to engage in, and benefit from, sustainable fishing practices (Kittinger et al., 2017; Marschke & Vandergeest, 2016).  The MSC’s consultation is drawing on other mechanisms for implementing social safeguards in supply chains, including Fair Trade USA’s certification process, which has extended its reach to fisheries relatively recently (Bailey et al., 2016; Whittle, 2017). Fair Trade USA’s standard incorporates human rights measures, and the FAO has also put considerable work into defining acceptable working conditions for fishers using the human rights concept of decent work (Fair Trade USA, 2018; FAO, 2015a, 2015b). I suggest therefore that, as part of both their commitment to a human rights-based approach and to sustainability, and specifically with an eye to the indivisibility of human rights30, ENGOs should be doing more to encourage their corporate partners and standard setting bodies such as the MSC to abide by the full range of human rights standards, not just the most egregious  (R. L. Singleton et al., 2017). In doing so, they could make significant strides towards the second element of Kareiva’s “new conservation” approach –                                                  29 In response to the frequently asked question “Is the MSC becoming a social standard” the MSC states: “No – this project is not designed to solve labour issues in fisheries and seafood supply chains, but to reduce reputational risk, offer some assurance to the public and most importantly, give the MSC a way to disassociate itself from entities with forced labour violations.” 30 Although the principle of indivisibility suggests that all rights should be ranked equally, in practice Western economies have been criticized for prioritizing civil and political rights (Kirkup & Evans, 2009), to the chagrin of developing countries who press for greater justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights and the “right to development” (Uvin, 2007) 146  ensuring that people benefit – by ensuring that the benefits of market-based schemes reach small-scale fishers, and that their working standards improve in the process.  In the sections above, I have considered how the first aspect of the new conservation paradigm – working with corporations – is not being implemented in a way to fulfil the second aspect – ensuring that people benefit. Having considered the influence of ENGOs over corporate-community relations, I now consider direct relationships between ENGOs and communities, and whether they are implemented in a way to ensure people benefit.   5.2.2 Ensuring people benefit: Negotiations between ENGOs and communities Negotiations in Integrated Conservation Development Projects (“ICDPs”): The rise of participation The promotion of community participation was a central tenet of the early push for people-centric conservation (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Roe, 2008). This coincided with a vogue for participatory development, and the same criticisms levelled in development circles apply to conservation: That participation is often superficial, and de-politicises NGO-community relations by marshalling the voice of “the community” in support of the positions of NGOs and/or community elites (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Ferse et al., 2010; M. P. Wells & Mcshane, 2004; White, 1996; Williams, 2004). This marshalling may not always be deliberate, but result from power imbalances and inequalities that go unexamined (Williams, 2004). It is easier for ENGOs to view a community as a homogenous whole, and work with a few key players who are deemed to represent “community opinion”, rather than acknowledge and attempt to address different needs and opinions within a community (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Chuenpagdee et al., 2013; Ferse et al., 2010; S. Singleton, 2009).  Less prominent and/or educated members of the 147  community may then not receive adequate information to contribute to environmental management and/or may be excluded from project benefits (Béné et al., 2009; Elliott et al., 2001; Gurney et al., 2015; Holmes & Cavanagh, 2016). These effects are in evidence in Velondriake, with older men dominating both meetings about natural resource management and participation in income generating projects (Figures 5.3 and 5.4 respectively).   Figure 5.3 Percentage of different demographic groups who speak at natural resource management meetings in Velondriake LMMA, always, sometimes or never Source: individual, closed survey, n=297, weighted to represent the population of Velondriake.  0102030405060708090100teenagefemaleteenagemaleadult female adult male seniorfemalesenior male ALL female ALL male% of demographic groupalways sometimes never148   Figure 5.4 The percentage of different demographic groups who participate in Blue Ventures’ income generating projects Source: Open-answer interview, n=297 (weighted to represent the population of Velondriake.  In addition to glossing over intra-community differences, ENGOs have also often failed to acknowledge their own position of power in relation to communities when implementing participatory processes (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Uvin, 2007; Williams, 2004). Typically, ENGOs control funding, information and external communications relating to a project, and community members lack education and awareness of their rights, giving communities little scope or ability to negotiate their own visions of conservation and development (Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Hamm, 2001; Williams, 2004). 010203040506070TeenagefemaleTeenagemaleAdult female Adult male SeniorfermaleSenior male FEMALETOTALMALE TOTAL% of demogaphic group149  Although imperfect participatory processes may result in community “agreement” for conservation projects in the first instance, this is a house of cards that can fall apart as those who were not consulted or did not agree resist and challenge the project (Ferse et al., 2010). In Velondriake, when asked directly about their perception of conservation initiatives, community members expressed overwhelming support: 74% approved overall of marine management31. However, vigilance for more subtle “everyday resistance” is still required (Holmes, 2007). Other unprompted responses indicate some ambivalence towards marine management in the region: 37% of people in Velondriake stated that BV has had no significant impact on their lives, compared to 11% who highlighted marine management measures and 7% permanent reserves (Figure 5.2). Similarly, it is not uncommon for some community members to attend resource management meetings only to collect per diems and sleep. The problem is particularly acute for women attendees, despite active efforts to encourage the participation of women in resource management, and recent success in increasing the number of female participants in the Velondriake management committee. Other actions go beyond ambivalence towards a lack of respect for, or sabotage of, marine management efforts: Community members cite theft of sea cucumbers as a significant barrier to the success of the alternative livelihood project in some locations:                                                  31 Respondents were asked a series of questions (6 in total) about whether they wanted to see increases or decreases in various aspects of resource management being applied in Velondriake. For each question, a score of +1 was awarded for increases (taken as approval), -1 for decreases (disapproval) and 0 for ambivalence. The lowest score possible is -6 (disapproves of all measures mentioned) and the highest +6 (approves of all measures mentioned). Here a weighted percentage has been calculated for all those with a positive score. 150  “We had someone stealing our sea cucumbers. The people doing sea cucumber farming started to accuse each other of stealing. That's why I left the project.” (Adult male, Ambolimoke) Others report a lack of respect for temporary octopus closures: “Sometimes I go gleaning and get nothing still, just like before. The reserve is prone to stealing, so it doesn't work and should be stopped” (Senior female, Andavadoaka). Yet, enforcement of the DINA (local laws) preventing these actions is rare and haphazard.  Taking a human rights-based approach encourages ENGOs to identify those who are marginalized in the communities where they work and act to address this marginalization. For example, having identified that women and young people are being overlooked in resource management meetings and, consequently, beneficial projects, BV is now taking active steps to find alternative ways to work with these groups. There may be more appetite for this kind of innovation across the conservation sector with the rise of the “social entrepreneur” movement (of which BV is part). Driven by venture capitalists and tech billionaires, the approach stresses rapid adoption of new ideas and work with “change makers” and “early adopters” to achieve this (Buschke, 2014; Holmes, 2012; Moody, 2008). It has great potential to bring new, traditionally less powerful, voices to the conservation policy arena (Buschke, 2014) and, on the ground, enable more rigorous consultation, wider participation in projects that bring benefits, and perhaps greater support for conservation. However, some caution is required to ensure old powers are not simply replaced by new ones, and new marginalized groups created. 151 Negotiations in the neo-liberal conservation era Addressing power imbalances has become increasingly inconvenient for a neo-liberalising conservation movement. As global approaches remove ENGOs further from communities and their politics, the temptation to treat communities as homogenous – globally and locally – becomes greater (Büscher et al., 2012; Holmes, 2011; Holmes & Cavanagh, 2016). ENGOs are also less likely to want to examine their own positions of power relative to communities as the need to achieve quick consensus and scale-up projects to new locations increases. Perhaps this is why ENGOs are now moving away from community based management (Roe, 2008), or endorsing increased participation without questioning its politics (Ferse et al., 2010; Williams, 2004). However, even as ENGOs distance themselves from “community based” rhetoric, the success of market based approaches such as REDD+ still ultimately depend on community buy-in and experience similar pitfalls to ICDPs in their implementation (Blom et al., 2010).Therefore, implying that issues of politics and power no longer apply is avoiding the reality, and is unlikely to lead to conservation success.  The marine conservation sector tends to take its lead from terrestrial conservation, and it has perhaps not yet moved so far away from community-based management efforts (for example, BV’s initiatives are still very much grounded at community level). However, neoliberal approaches are on the rise in marine conservation, such as BV’s REDD+ style “Blue Carbon” mangrove conservation scheme in Madagascar. As such, the efforts made by ENGOs in terrestrial conservation to address the inherent power imbalances and inequalities between themselves and communities in negotiations, and their adequacy as a human rights-based approach, are relevant here. ENGOs have begun to apply human rights principles in REDD+ 152  carbon credit schemes, and specifically in the negotiation of conservation agreements related to those schemes, by seeking “Free, Prior and Informed Consent” (“FPIC”)32, with Conservation International leading these efforts (Campese et al., 2009; Mckeehan & Buppert, 2014; R. L. Singleton et al., 2017).  Conservation agreements certainly have the potential to increase the flow of benefits to marginalized communities, and therefore contribute to the redistribution of costs and benefits globally. However, unresolved questions surround the approach. Firstly, whilst indigenous groups contend that the requirement for “consent” gives them the right to veto a project33, those implementing voluntary FPIC processes (including Governments, companies and ENGOs) prefer the interpretation that consent must be sought but not necessarily obtained (Barelli, 2009; P. Hanna & Vanclay, 2013; Mckeehan & Buppert, 2014; Papillon & Rodon, 2017). Problems also emerge in defining the “community” and who should give consent. Often, efficiency and politics dictate that negotiations take place with community elites, but this can undermine the agreement where they do not legitimately represent community interests and/ or where the majority of the community is inadequately informed about what they have consented to (Buxton & Wilson, 2013; P. Hanna & Vanclay, 2013; Krause et al., 2013; Lawlor et al., 2010; Milne & Adams, 2012; Milne & Niesten, 2009; Papillon & Rodon, 2017).                                                   32 The UN’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“the Declaration”) and the International Labour Organization’s (“ILO”) Convention No. 169 require States to obtain the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples to the development, utilization and exploitation of natural resources on their land. 33 This was the main reason cited by the 4 objecting states for not endorsing the declaration (P. Hanna & Vanclay, 2013) 153  Finally, the increased use of private law to regulate ENGO-community relations raises particular concerns, similar to those seen in FPIC negotiations between transnational corporations and communities (Affolder, 2012; St-Laurent & Le Billon, 2015). Many conservation agreements are negotiated in developing country contexts, where weak governance and legal infrastructure may mean that inadequate safeguards are in place to protect the weaker negotiating party. Contract law per se rarely respects the “fairness” of a deal that is struck (Affolder, 2012) although many developed countries provide protection (aside from FPIC) for vulnerable parties, such as consumer protection laws and access to legal advice. Individuals in developing countries are also less likely to be aware of their rights, be free to organize in protest, have the support of civil rights groups and be able to access judicial remedies than aboriginal groups in developed countries (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007; O’Faircheallaigh, 2010). All of these problems are exacerbated by the use of confidentiality and no-challenge clauses in agreements, which limits the potential for external scrutiny (including adverse publicity, a key aspect of community leverage over corporations and ENGOs) and support for contesting the legitimacy of agreements where a poor deal has been struck (Affolder, 2012; O’Faircheallaigh, 2010; Papillon & Rodon, 2017). Ultimately, where FPIC has no teeth, many communities are reduced to the status of contract service provider, at the mercy of the service purchaser (the ENGO) who brings the money (Milne & Adams, 2012). Meanwhile, the role of the State is reduced to private contract enforcer, with its duty to protect the interests of indigenous communities undermined (St-Laurent & Le Billon, 2015) In summary, while FPIC processes may in theory give indigenous communities a greater ability to be heard and some increased leverage in negotiations, a lack of clarity and enforceability 154  leaves FPIC inadequate for now to address the underlying power imbalances that exist in community-ENGO relations. While powerful organisations may enter into negotiations with communities voluntarily, they are unlikely to cede power and put themselves into an unfavourable bargaining position unless their hand is forced (Newell, 2005). This limits the potential of FPIC to more evenly distribute benefits to communities and generate more universal acceptance of conservation projects. Ironically, rather than advancing human rights, the consent process may have become a tool of neoliberalism by legitimating conservation initiatives and branding them “ethical” without addressing human rights and equality issues adequately.  In the last section of this Chapter, I put forward a policy proposal for applying a human rights-based approach to the new conservation paradigm, and thereby addressing the inherent inequalities that currently undermine conservation. In doing so, I focus on the defining difference between a human rights-based approach to conservation and other approaches – that is, a focus on rights and accountability, rather than charity and claims. 5.3 Policy proposal In order to improve attention to social impacts (including the application of human rights) in marine conservation work, others have suggested the creation of a code of conduct for marine conservation NGOs (Bennett et al., 2017). Whilst I agree that social impacts and human rights are still often overlooked in conservation, especially in the marine sector, I note that marine conservation NGOs are already party to a number of high level, voluntary commitments to human rights (and therefore social standards) (R. L. Singleton et al., 2017). In addition, each time human rights law is re-interpreted into guidance documents, it risks being watered down and losing its effectiveness  (Uvin, 2007). I suggest, therefore, that rather than high-level 155  guidance and codes, what is needed is more practical detail on how the new conservation paradigm can be implemented in line with human rights, including mechanisms for accountability.  Specifically, I propose: - For alternative livelihood schemes, the creation of template agreements, governing relationships between corporations and communities. Although these could be amended to suit specific situations, they should include standard clauses protecting labour rights. For example, following ILO Labour Standards (ILO, 2014) and the recommendations of the FAO (FAO, 2015a), contracts might include provisions for a living wage (including requirements for corporations to procure insurance and bear upfront costs), decent working hours, safe working conditions, and recognize the right to collective bargaining. They would prohibit the inclusion of clauses that might lead to forced labour (e.g. onerous requirements to pay back the cost of equipment) and prohibit the procurement of child labour. - The inclusion of human rights safeguards in all sustainability schemes created with corporations. These might incorporate the standards developed to implement the Ruggie report on business and human rights (Ruggie, 2008, 2011). - Tools to train communities in awareness of human rights, such as those developed by Equitas (Equitas, 2018), coupled with a scheme to provide independent legal advisers to communities for negotiations over resources (see, for example, Lawyers Without Borders). - Tools for conducting human rights-based impact assessment for ENGOs and their corporate partners, to increase transparency by identifying all potential breaches of 156  human rights standards, not just the most egregious. For example, the human rights impact assessment tool developed by Rights and Democracy, and applied by Oxfam (Rights & Democracy, 2007; Watson et al., 2013). - Greater advocacy for the rights of small-scale fishers (including support for the measures above), from ENGOs. To be effective, this will require better lines of communication with grassroots CSOs, who remain independent and grounded in community concerns (see discussion in conclusion, below). - An independent complaints commission to monitor (and enforce) compliance of ENGOs with human rights standards. Currently, some ENGOs have their own complaints procedures in place (R. L. Singleton et al., 2017). However, independent commissions are deemed an essential aspect of enforcing standards in other sectors, from the police to the press, and are I suggest preferable. 5.4 Conclusion On its surface, the new conservation paradigm is an attractive proposition for redistributing the costs and benefits of conservation. By working closely with transnational corporations, ENGOs not only create an opportunity to encourage their sustainable behaviour, but also to channel investment to populations in developing countries on the front line of conservation. However, I have demonstrated not only that imbalances of power persist in the new conservation paradigm, but that they are essential to it.  Whilst global corporations are taking an increasing interest in their ethical reputation, ultimately their goal remains the generation of profit. Therefore, as others have observed, their primary interest in investing in conservation in developing countries (whether it be REDD+ schemes or 157  alternative livelihoods), is access to cheaper resources, land and labour than are available in developed countries, giving them a vested interest not to improve the economic conditions (Arsel & Buscher, 2012). Voluntary corporate social responsibility schemes are unlikely to be sufficient to keep corporations honest (Barrientos, 2008; Newell, 2005). Often, sites of conservation in developing countries are remote and poorly connected, and where the actions of global corporations are invisible to the world, they generally lack motivation to be philanthropic (Newell, 2005). Even where one corporation opts to behave ethically, if there is profit to be made, another less scrupulous company might take its place (Büscher et al., 2012). Given the lack of capacity in communities to hold corporate partners to account, one cannot safely assume that the benefits of new conservation will trickle down to all, or any, small-scale fishers without more proactive management by ENGOs (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Clifton, 2013; Duffy, 2009; Walley, 2004; Wieland et al., 2016) .  Throughout this Chapter, I have suggested that ENGOs should use a human rights-based approach to highlight and address the problems that prevent local people from benefiting from new conservation. Otherwise, the existing inequalities that undermine conservation efforts will persist (Chuenpagdee et al., 2013; S. Singleton, 2009). I conclude by examining more closely the suitability of ENGOs for this role. ENGOs are in some senses in a good position to challenge the practices of both corporations and governments. They have a seat at the table in international, multi-stakeholder forums that dictate funding and policy, and a trusted brand that corporations and governments want to be associated with, and which can therefore be used to incentivize their actions (Boström & Hallström, 2010; Büscher et al., 2012; Ford, 2003). However, there are many examples of ENGOs being passively 158  complicit as powerful state actors use conservation to justify grabs of local resources (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Johnson & Forsyth, 2002; Peluso, 1993; Walley, 2004). As state power has given way somewhat to corporate influence in the neoliberal era, ENGOs have also not been proactive in taking corporations to task, as my analysis in this chapter has shown. The power that ENGOs have both nationally and within global institutions is in fact very limited. They are dependent on corporations and government for funding and operational goodwill respectively (Holmes, 2012; R. L. Singleton et al., 2017), and have comparatively few resources, meaning they must work within the established order (Boström & Hallström, 2010; Ford, 2003). Typically, they propose technical solutions that do not question the status quo (Büscher et al., 2012).  The influence that ENGOs do have is dependent on their ability to create strong and simple messages, which reinforce both the urgency and importance of their work, and their status as experts that speak for many communities globally (Boström & Hallström, 2010). Yet, this idea that ENGOs speak for communities is dangerous: At best, despite good intentions, they are often out of touch with what is happening on the ground, or inappropriately make light of contextual differences in their quest for simple messages; At worst, this over-simplification is a deliberate ploy to cover up problems and silence resistance to conservation (Büscher et al., 2012; Büscher & Fletcher, 2015). Either way, the moderate nature of  ENGOs’ participation in international forums, and of their engagement with corporate partners, combined with their apparent representation of communities, currently serves to legitimize rather than question existing global power structures and inequality.  159  In this chapter, I have highlighted the imbalances of power that propagate inequality in the new conservation paradigm. Others have stressed the need for a similar focus in the implementation of the sustainable development goals (Kumi et al., 2015). However, whilst recognizing imbalance of powers is an important step towards improving equality in conservation, I suggest that it is separation of powers that will bring change. The separation of powers is an important concept in all democratic systems, whereby governing institutions operate independently in order to provide effective checks and balances on each other’s power.  The concept has been eroded in the market-based, neoliberal system of conservation, where decentralization and deregulation have somewhat neutralized the State, and ENGOs cannot effectively challenge corporations on whom they depend for funding and facilitation of business-oriented schemes (Béné et al., 2009; Holmes, 2012; Milne & Adams, 2012). Where corporate, State, or even ENGO domination goes unchecked, it will continue to be difficult for marginalized communities to find a seat at the table, and room to pursue their own vision of development.  A human rights-based approach by ENGOs could help to level the playing field by providing immediate checks and balances on the most powerful players (Johnson & Forsyth, 2002; Oviedo & Puschkarsky, 2012). However, in order for it to be implemented effectively and address the inequalities that undermine conservation, ENGOs will need to regain their independence from governments and corporations and devote more energy to championing the cause of the fishers they claim to seek to empower. The separation may need to go further, with ENGOs supporting schemes to raise awareness of rights and independent representation for small-scale fishers, so that they may become equal parties in negotiations. Given the extent to which they have been institutionalized in the neoliberal system, it is unlikely that ENGOs can or will achieve the 160  necessary level of separation to challenge corporate and government power by themselves. Rather, effective civil society opposition will involve a spectrum of NGOs, from grass roots organisations that remain grounded in community affairs and at arms-length from corporate interests, to big ENGOs who have more influence on the global scale, but need to be reminded to use it (Ford, 2003). The end result is likely to involve small-scale fishers challenging ENGO and corporate visions of conservation and development. Ultimately, then, new conservationists will be required to put their money where their mouths are and ensure that their schemes yield sufficient “economic benefits for all” that small-scale fishers will want to engage voluntarily.    161  Chapter 6: Conclusion This study describes in detail how ENGOs can respect, protect and fulfil human rights in marine conservation initiatives. It also considers why they might do so, beyond moral and legal imperative, by making a first  attempt at evaluating the implications of a human rights based-approach for conservation practice.  This work is important because the conservation sector has in the past struggled to implement conservation measures in a manner that respects and engages local people. In marine conservation, now is an opportune moment to consider new approaches, or improvements to old ones, as the SSF-Guidelines have re-emphasized small-scale fishers’ rights and re-opened debates about how to manage fisheries in a way that is both environmentally sustainable and socially just.   To date, high-level commitments to human rights have resulted in the liberal use of rights-based rhetoric by ENGOs but made little practical difference to their work (Chapter 2). In part, this is due to a lack of understanding of what a human rights-based approach to conservation involves. ENGOs can help remedy this by organizing their work around the human rights-framework, raising awareness of rights among staff and communities, and regularly evaluating the impact of their initiatives on the human rights of fishers. However, currently the willingness to understand better and fully embrace human rights is absent due to a lack of evidence on how strengthening human rights might impact conservation.    Economic evidence is particularly valued by a conservation sector that is keen to demonstrate its benefits to people – globally and locally – beyond the preservation of biodiversity for nature’s sake. Previously, economics has acted as a barrier to implementation of a human rights-based approach. Bioeconomic theory has been used by ENGOs to justify blanket demands to reduce 162  fisher numbers in all contexts. This is difficult to reconcile with an approach that seeks to guarantee fishers’ human rights to decent work and food, and therefore possibly a right to fish. However, in Chapter 3, I show that management measures that seek to limit access to a fishery are unlikely to succeed in a context where fishers place limited value on (heavily discount) future fisheries benefits because their own future is insecure. Measures to strengthen human rights could therefore complement fisheries management measures by reducing vulnerability, uncertainty and therefore discount rates of small-scale fishers.   Empirical evidence is also required to demonstrate the consequences of a human rights-based approach for people and conservation. Without it, critics will continue to doubt that ENGOs can deliver conservation initiatives in a manner that respects people, while conservationists will query whether their efforts should go beyond a passive respect towards active fulfilment and protection of rights. Chapters 4 and 5 contribute to the extremely limited evidence base presented in Chapters 1 and 2. In the contexts where the evidence was gathered, they show that attention to isolated human rights by ENGOs can reduce the vulnerability of small-scale fishers. Chapter 4 describes a family planning programme implemented in a manner that respects and goes some way to fulfil women’s and reproductive rights. The programme leads to improvement in health and finances. Chapter 5 gives examples of how equality can be neglected in modern conservation practices and suggests  how greater attention to equality in community-corporate and community-NGO relations could bring increased economic benefits and security. Preliminary findings from this work are that, whilst concerted action to strengthen human rights and reduce vulnerability could enable sustainable behaviour in the long-term, it is unlikely to bring quick, or guaranteed, benefits in terms of reduced fishing effort. Attention to the overriding human rights 163  principles, especially a focus on addressing power imbalances and reducing inequality, shows the most promise to create big, positive shifts in the impacts of ENGOs for conservation and people, but also involves the biggest challenges, as I will now discuss. 6.1 Human rights: Towards people-centric conservation? For many years, there have been calls for more people-centric conservation (Roe, 2008). Although there is much debate over whether poverty alleviation supports biodiversity conservation, or vice versa, there is general agreement that there is a link, and that one will not work without the other (Roe et al., 2013; Salafsky & Wollenberg, 2000). One of the main challenges that has faced attempts to integrate conservation and development initiatives has been a tendency to oversimplify the relationship (Scoones, 2009). Firstly, using overly-simplistic models to describe the pathways through which initiatives operate can result in inflated expectations of success, and limited options to address failure (see discussion in Chapter 4). This in turn can lead to abrupt changes in strategy, that do nothing to promote life certainty and commitment to resource stewardship amongst fishers. Secondly, an overly-simplistic view of “communities” as a homogenous entity has led to a lack of attention to whether the benefits of development are received by those who bear the costs of conservation, as has the assumption that benefits generated by the economic activity of the most powerful will trickle down to the most marginalized (discussed in Chapters 3 and 5). Combined, these simplistic views of problems and solutions fuel the “spectacle” of neoliberal conservation, in which ENGOs working in harmony with corporations claim to save, rather than undermine, pristine ecosystems (espoused by (Kareiva, 2014) and critiqued by (Büscher et al., 2012; Igoe & Brockington, 2007).  The vaunted “triple-benefits” of people-centric conservation (economic growth; conservation; 164  and, benefits for communities) remain elusive (Holmes & Cavanagh, 2016). The examples discussed in Chapter 5 suggest that, in some aspects of ENGO practice,  the latter two goals have become subservient to the first. I follow others in suggesting that greater attention to institutions will bring the necessary appreciation of complexity to integrated conservation-development policy and open up new avenues for improvement (Leach et al., 1997, 1999); and in suggesting that the lens of human rights could ensure that this focus is applied (Campese et al., 2009; Moser & Norton, 2001; Oviedo & Puschkarsky, 2012).  Beyond providing a new way to think about conservation and development work, and suggesting new solutions to old problems, I propose that the value of a human rights-based approach lies in its requirement for ENGOs to re-politicise and challenge the status quo, reconsidering their relationships with others. To ensure small-scale fishers receive a greater share of the benefits from conservation initiatives, ENGOs need to regain their independence and leverage their influence over states and corporations to address human rights concerns of small-scale fishers. ENGOs might also accept responsibility towards small-scale fishers themselves as a human rights duty-bearer, especially where they have accepted the delegation of power to manage natural resources. Finally, ENGOs could equip small-scale fishers with the tools to protect their own rights, by raising awareness and providing legal advice.  All of this, I submit, could over the long-term reduce the vulnerability of small-scale fishers and create an environment that is more conducive to sustainable fisheries management (Chapter 3). However, in the short-term, it does not represent quick conservation wins or the path of least resistance for ENGOs, and they are unlikely to follow it without themselves being held to account. Progress towards better understanding and implementing a human rights-based 165  approach will be stifled if, whilst proceeding about their business as usual, ENGOs continue to co-opt the language of human rights to build a false image of success in people-centric conservation, fuelling the arguments of those who claim that the human rights-based approach amounts to a neoliberal trojan horse34 (Ruddle & Davis, 2013). Here the role of smaller, grassroots CSOs will be vital to progress the application of human rights in conservation. Groups such as the World Forum of Fisher-people (WFFP), the World Forum of Fish Harvesters and Fish-workers (WFF), Masifundise, and the International Collective of Fish-workers (ICSF) played an essential part in calling for a human rights-based approach to small-scale fisheries management, and enabling small-scale fishers to contribute to the SSF-Guidelines, lending the guidelines legitimacy and support (ICSF & WFFP, 2009; WFFP, 2015).  As implementation of the SSF-Guidelines proceeds, ENGOs have an important role to play in bridging the gap between these groups and more powerful players but cannot replace them as spokesperson for an abstract “small-scale fishing community”. In this respect, and given the power of simple, global messages, grassroots CSOs would be well advised to continue to work together to identify genuine commonalities and causes for action between communities. So far, issues that they have highlighted in this way include: Labour rights of small-scale fishers (including safety at sea and                                                  34 In casting human rights as a tool of neoliberalism, most of the objections that Ruddle and Davis’ raise to a human rights-based approach in fisheries amount to criticisms of the way the approach has been implemented by organisations such as the World Bank (and, I would add, ENGOs), rather than to problems with a human rights based-approach per se. For example, they criticize: the selective emphasis of rights-based themes (good governance, rather than economic, social and cultural rights); a depoliticized approach that does not interrogate power and equality; a lack of awareness and application of human rights in remote fishing communities; and a lack of state enforcement of rights. These are all things I have addressed in this thesis. Ironically, in criticizing others for failing to understand human rights, Ruddle and Davis also seem to inappropriately conflate property rights with human rights and fail to adequately acknowledge that many human rights instruments (especially UNDRIP and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights) make space for collective, rather than individual, rights. Finally, they do not recognize that many of the calls for human rights-based approaches have come from small-scale fishers’ groups, not world powers, as discussed in the main text. 166  challenges faced by migrant workers) (ICSF, 2018a; ICSF & WFFP, 2009); women in fisheries (FAO, 2016b; ICSF, 2018b; ICSF & WFFP, 2009); and, resistance to global ocean grabs, often including support for tenure rights for small-scale fishing communities (Masifundise, 2013; TNI et al., 2013, 2014; WFF, 2015; WFFP & WFF, 2013). Grassroots collaborations between small-scale fishers may be fostered by new forms of communication and entrepreneurial funding (Buschke, 2014), although caution is required as I will discuss below.   There are many tough questions still to be answered before a human rights-based approach to conservation is likely to be implemented by ENGOs. In order to progress the debate, I now pose some of these questions and, in suggesting tentative answers, acknowledge the limitations of this study and identify avenues for future research. 6.2 Tough questions surrounding a human rights-based approach to conservation: Limitations of this study and directions for future research • Are human rights standards too difficult to meet/ only aspirational in nature? Does a human rights-based approach mean that conservation NGOs need to find solutions to all human rights related problems in a community before they can implement conservation solutions?  Chapter 4 looks at a narrow selection of human rights, and in so doing demonstrates that attention to one right at a time will often not be sufficient to lower the vulnerability of fisherfolk to a level that is favourable for implementing resource management measures. It is impossible to say how much attention to rights, and over what period, will be enough – partly because this is context specific and partly because there is very little research focusing on the human rights 167  impacts of ENGOs, other than the most egregious breaches (e.g. forced evictions) (Jonas et al., 2014). More case studies looking at other rights are needed. Tools such as the index proposed in Chapter 3 will help to judge how vulnerable a community is and whether/ to what extent it is appropriate to start implementing resource management measures. This tool needs to be tested, including through more research on the relationship between discount rates and human rights, and more like it developed.  In the meantime, provided ENGOs are respecting all rights, the principle of progressive realization allows that they can prioritise which rights they choose to fulfil, provided the prioritization is done in a manner that is in keeping with human rights principles (e.g. it is non-discriminatory). For example, they might choose to focus on the right to decent work to make sure alternative livelihood schemes are viable, but in doing so will need to make sure that the most vulnerable in the community are able to take advantage of the schemes. Current approaches that place an arbitrary focus on one group e.g. women, due to a generalized idea that this will benefit the environment, are unlikely to accord with rights-based principles or produce successful conservation outcomes (Chapters 2 and 4). However, before abruptly changing strategy again, further research is required to understand why ENGOs are prioritizing particular groups in this way – is it driven by funders or by observations from the field that are not being well-documented? The evidence in Chapters 3 and 4 starts to suggest that a human rights-based approach can exist alongside, and complement, fisheries management measures. To identify the most appropriate course of action and remain alert to human rights problems as they implement fisheries management measures, ENGOs will need to conduct human rights-based impact evaluations, and 168  the development of standard tools that combine human rights with environmental impact assessment will help. Here a significant limitation of my study is that it uses the perceptions and stated intentions of resource users to assess their engagement with environmental management and does not attempt to quantify the environmental impacts of an ENGO’s support for human rights. For example, in Chapter 4, I do not quantify the relative impacts on fisheries of reduced population growth vs. increased fishing due to increased child-free time. I do not address these issues due to insufficient fisheries data covering the period over which BV’s initiatives have operated, and support others in calling for increased data collection in small-scale fisheries and efforts to integrate social and ecological research (Chuenpagdee, 2012; Kittinger et al., 2013). • What if evidence emerges that a human rights-based approach is undermining conservation efforts? Can the ENGO drop the approach? This question arises in the evaluation in Chapter 4. Although the principle of progressive realization allows some flexibility on which rights an ENGO chooses to fulfil, once they have committed to fulfil a right the principle does not allow regression. This means that longer-term commitment to initiatives is required than current funding models allow for. Funding for conservation efforts is a hot research topic (at the time of writing, a special issue of Marine Policy has been commissioned on “Funding for ocean conservation and sustainable fisheries”) and I suggest that in future some of this work should focus on the impact of funding models on local communities, and particularly the impacts of short-term grants and abrupt changes in strategy on rights and vulnerability in communities. This is particularly salient now, as traditional sources of funding dwindle and “new philanthropists” take over (Büscher & Fletcher, 2015; Holmes, 2012). Coming from the worlds of venture capital and tech start-ups, they fund 169  innovative approaches that can quickly be scaled up when proven, and have clear exit strategies for investors (Moody, 2008). Such entrepreneurial approaches to funding may provide support for grassroots CSOs and assist them in countering dominant ENGO narratives and supporting small-scale fishers’ human rights. They may also enable enduring, self-supporting initiatives, that are not abandoned when funding runs out, and are therefore more compatible with the progressive realization of human rights. Alternatively, with their expectation of quick results, preference to work with influential “change makers”, and push to rapidly replicate successful models in new places, they may promote even greater flux and uncertainty in conservation and further undermine human rights. The detrimental consequences of BV handing over its seaweed farming project to a corporation (Chapter 5), act as a reminder that the human rights implications of “exit strategies”, as well as projects, should be carefully weighed.    • What if a national Government/ corporate partner is committing human rights abuses – should the ENGO refuse to work with them to avoid being accused of “turning a blind eye”? Should they highlight the abuse and risk being asked to leave the country/ lose funding?  As discussed in Chapter 5, a human rights-based approach requires ENGOs to challenge the status quo. This could mean risking their licence to operate in a country, or their sources of funding. Many NGOs focused on human rights (e.g. Amnesty) successfully operate in countries where they are highlighting abuses, and a first step towards answering this question would be to investigate the approaches they use.  Corporations are increasingly being held to account by statute and civil society for the impacts of 170  their practices on human rights (Harrison, 2013; Marschke & Vandergeest, 2016; Watson et al., 2013). As others have noted, further work is needed to review how ENGOs can tap into this work to bring social standards to environmental sustainability schemes in the fisheries sector, such as MSC certification (Kittinger et al., 2017).  • What if existing norms in communities run contrary to human rights? (e.g. child labour, inequality of women)? Should the ENGO refuse to work with that community? Should the ENGO try to change the social norms? What problems might this create for its conservation work? Chapters 4 and 5 highlight existing social norms that contravene human rights, and undermine conservation, by excluding many of those who fish most actively from resource management and project benefits. However, the argument that human rights are a Western construct, and should not be imposed in other cultural contexts, resurfaces regularly (Sen, 2005). Firstly, I note that Madagascar, where my case study is based, has, along with most other countries, acceded to the main human rights treaties. Secondly, as Sen (2005:162) puts it: “What are taken to be ‘foreign’ criticisms often correspond to internal criticisms from non-mainstream groups.” I submit that cultural sensitivity should not be taken as an excuse to ignore basic rights. As with corporations and Governments though, challenging existing community elites may make implementing conservation initiatives more difficult in the short term. • If ENGOs raise awareness of rights in communities, is this likely to make programme implementation more difficult? The short answer is “yes”. For example, raising awareness might lead to community members 171  demanding a decent wage for participating in management efforts, or demanding information on project finance and how it is being spent under principles of transparency and accountability. However, accepting this difficulty goes to the core of promoting genuinely people-centric conservation, in which those bearing the costs have greater agency. Without this, past experience shows that small-scale fishers are unlikely to become fully-engaged resource stewards (Berkes, 2004; Blom et al., 2010; Boissiere et al., 2009; Ferse et al., 2010; M. P. Wells & Mcshane, 2004; White, 1996; Williams, 2004). • In light of all of these difficulties, why would an ENGO commit to a human rights-based approach?  I do not pretend to offer adequate answers to all of the difficult questions I raise. However, this does not mean that a human rights-based approach should be dismissed without further investigation – after all, existing approaches to conservation and development are also falling short. The most important thing is that the difficult questions continue to be asked, rather than the current approach where ENGOs gloss over the potential problems and promote the “win-win” of conservation and human rights to the public, whilst making (conscious or unconscious) decision to prioritize conservation behind the scenes (Chapter 2). 6.3 Policy recommendations Based on the work in this thesis, I make the following final recommendations for ENGO leadership and other policy makers looking to implement a human rights-based approach to conservation: (1) Dialogue: Due to their geographical and political reach, ENGOs have a key role to play 172  in implementing the SSF-Guidelines, and thereby making progress towards management of small-scale fisheries that is environmentally sustainable and socially just. The SSF-Guidelines could be used as the basis for a difficult conversation amongst ENGOs that acknowledges and begins to address the challenges involved in implementing a human rights-based approach. (2) Trials to yield evidence: Any measures to strengthen the human rights of small-scale fishers will need to be implemented alongside measures for fisheries management, but further evidence is needed to determine how best to integrate the two. To build this evidence base, ENGOs would need to submit to human rights-based impact evaluations of their own work. Corporate evaluations are also useful, but should be applied to corporate partners, not just corporations that operate at arms-length and against environmental interests.   (3) Tools to enable adoption of a human rights-based approach: Practical tools to implement a human rights-based approach in the field, combined with independent oversight, would remove some of the ambiguity around what the approach entails. Mechanisms that could be developed include: A combined human rights/ environment evaluation protocol; Template contracts that ensure the rights of small-scale fishers are protected when they engage in alternative livelihoods; Training tools, and legal aid to raise awareness of rights; and, an independent complaints commission. (4) Promote human rights among host states and corporations: A true human rights- based approach would involve ENGOs critically evaluating their relationships with host states and corporations, asking not just whether they further conservation but also whether they 173  support the rights of small-scale fishers. Human rights-based due diligence at the outset of relationships, and ENGO staff who are alert to human rights issues could help to achieve this. However, this should not just be about avoidance of toxic associations: ENGOs should consider devoting more of their budget to interventions that support local communities but operate at national and international scales (e.g. political lobbying on issues such as subsidies, fisheries exports and workers’ rights). (5) Foster demand for human rights-based conservation among fishing communities: Ultimately, demand for a human rights-based approach must come from communities affected by conservation measures. However, to hold ENGOs to account and ensure that a human rights-based approach is implemented, communities need first to be aware of their rights, and in a position to call for them to be respected. Raising awareness, providing legal assistance and creating a complaints commission (see above) will be a good start. However, ENGOs should also focus on building long term relationships in communities, with transparent exchange of information, to foster an environment of trust and greater certainty. This will require a move away from the current ethos of short-term grants and quick results. ENGO relationships with communities may also be best mediated through grassroots CSOs who, by remaining independent and critical of ENGOs, business and governments, can be better placed to represent small-scale fishers’ interests. (6) Renewed commitment: A renewed commitment to the Conservation Initiative on Human Rights, ten years on from the original, would provide a useful opportunity to mark the relevance of human rights to “new” conservation initiatives as well as old, and make it 174  clear that attention to economic, social and cultural rights is needed in conservation just as much as attention to political and civil rights.  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This should include building the capacity of affected communities to recognize and claim their rights  Promotion of human rights in field programmes Global people/community priorities stated by NGOs (note: most are not described explicitly in human rights terms, and many human rights themes are absent). Only those for which examples in a fisheries context are given included. Work to raise awareness of human rights in communities  Builds accountability of NGO and partners Conservation International35 Stated human rights priorities 1) Gender3637 e.g. women’s savings schemes in Cambodia and Ecuador; e.g. focus on removing barriers to participation in resource management for women (household duties, access to information, domestic violence) in Timor-Leste and Ecuador. 2) Free, Prior, Informed Consent (“FPIC”), especially for indigenous peoples38 e.g. negotiation of a conservation agreement with fishing communities in the Amazon Basin using free, prior, informed consent principles. Other “people” priorities: 1) Livelihoods Many communities included in FPIC case studies already had strong awareness of rights (e.g. in South Africa). No information found on how awareness of rights is promoted if not already present.                                                   35 http://www.conservation.org/How/Pages/Respecting-human-rights-in-conservation.aspx and http://www.conservation.org/projects/pages/Policy-Center-for-Environment-and-Peace.aspx  and https://sites.google.com/a/conservation.org/rights-based-approach/case-studies accessed on 21 December 2016 36 CI Fact sheet, Gender and Fisheries Conservation available at https://sites.google.com/a/conservation.org/rights-based-approach/factsheets/gender and accessed on 21 December 2016 37 http://blog.conservation.org/2014/12/lobsters-conflict-and-the-invisible-work-of-women-in-coastal-ecuador/ accessed on 21 December 2016 38 CI Case study of The Use of Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the implementation of conservation agreements to protect freshwater ecosystems in the Colombian Amazon basin, Jan 2013 available at https://sites.google.com/a/conservation.org/rights-based-approach/case-studies and accessed on 21 December 2016 202  e.g. providing jobs to local fishermen in Brazil39 WWF40  1) Indigenous peoples (inc. tenure rights)41 e.g. partnership with Alaska Native tribes to protect salmon; e.g. partnership with Candoshi people to manage fisheries in Lake Rimachi, Peruvian Amazon.  e.g. Quirimbas, Mozambique – access rights 2) Gender42 e.g. involvement of women in participatory monitoring and conservation planning for marine resources in Senegal and Solomon islands; e.g. alternative livelihoods and business initiatives targeted at women including freshwater aquaculture (Cuba), handicrafts (Kenya), eco-tourism (Costa Rica), seaweed farming (Tanzania), micro-finance (Senegal). e.g. school scholarships for girls (Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique). 3) Livelihoods and economies (including Community-based natural resource management). e.g. supporting locally managed marine areas in Fiji (participation, recognition of traditional rights and knowledge) e.g. community management of the Quirimbas National Park, Mozambique, including a variety of community rights such as exclusive rights to harvest some resources and first refusal of tourism jobs (although n.b. these rights are imposed by park authorities).43 4) Enhancing civil society capacity e.g. provision of training in political analysis, advocacy and lobbying to CSOs in Tanzania so that they can better influence policy on natural resource management (including fisheries).  5) Education (environmental) (No fisheries examples found). 6) Disaster risk reduction (inc. re-building homes after disasters) (no fisheries examples found) Works to enhance civil society capacity. Seems to be primarily focussed on environmental lobbying, not human rights, although WWF flags an example of coalition building in Ugandan forestry work that “promotes popular participation in government decision making processes” and “accountability for [government] duty-bearers.44                                                  39 http://www.conservation.org/projects/pages/supporting-smallholder-fishing-in-brazil.aspx accessed on 19 June 2017 40 http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/how_we_work/people_and_conservation/our_work/ accessed on 22 December 2016 41 Engaging the Stewards of Nature: Partnering with Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities, WWF, Jan 2009 available at http://www.worldwildlife.org/publications/engaging-the-stewards-of-nature-partnering-with-indigenous-peoples-and-local-communities and accessed on 5 January 2017. 42 Empowering women in coastal communities, WWF, undated and Fisheries Management and Gender, WWF, 2012 available at http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/how_we_work/people_and_conservation/our_work/gender_and_conservation/ and accessed on 6 January 2017 43 http://wwf.panda.org/who_we_are/wwf_offices/mozambique/wwf_mozambique__our_solutions/projects/index.cfm?uProjectID=MZ0017  44 WWF submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, 5 October 2016 available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/SubmissionsBiodiversity.aspx and accessed on 23 January 2017 203  Fauna and Flora International4546 1) Securing land and resource rights; e.g. establishing and strengthening community-based institutions in Kenya,  e.g. securing access rights in Central America including community-based “Responsible Fishing Areas” in Costa Rica. 2) Addressing gender issues; 3) Helping develop sustainable economic opportunities; e.g. eco-tourism in Cape Verde and Turkey. 4) Recognising the multiple values of nature e.g. supporting indigenous management of ancestral waters, Philippines. 5) Participatory approaches  e.g. Participatory/ community management initiatives in Kenya, Honduras, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Cape Verde, Liberia (primarily “participatory management plans”). Capacity building programme focusses on “conservation leadership skills”, rather than human rights.47 Wildlife Conservation Society48 1) Governance that is accountable, transparent and democratic e.g. Fiji ridge-to-reef management plan. Includes incorporating traditional management and local knowledge, improving community-community and community-Government communication; and community-based monitoring (participation)49 2) Women’s rights50  e.g. Alternative livelihoods for women (such as bee-keeping, handicrafts) in Belize, Fiji, Madagascar. e.g. Resource management (MPA advisory committee in Belize, “informal” involvement in Fiji). 3) Livelihoods (inc. health, education, access to markets). e.g. conservation enterprise programme (grants/loans and business skills training) – no fisheries examples cited. A 2007 WCS briefing note on Rights and Conservation includes a checklist of how to assess stakeholder rights capacity51. There are no case studies explaining if and how this has been applied.                                                   45 http://www.fauna-flora.org/initiative/livelihoods-and-governance/ accessed on 23 December 2016 46 http://www.fauna-flora.org/explore/marine/#coordinated-community-conservation-for-marine-and-coastal-resources accessed on 23 December 2016 47 http://www.fauna-flora.org/initiative/developing-capacity/ accessed on 23 December 2016 48 https://globalinitiatives.wcs.org/Communities/Livelihoods-and-Conservation.aspx accessed on 16 January 2017 49 Govan, H (2011) Good Coastal Management Practices in the Pacific: Experiences from the Field, Apia, Samoa – SPREP 2011. 50 Matthews, Elizabeth, Jamie Bechtel, Easkey Britton, Karl Morrison and Caleb McClennen (2012). A Gender Perspective on Securing Livelihoods and Nutrition in Fish-dependent Coastal Communities. Report to The Rockefeller Foundation from Wildlife Conservation Society, Bronx, NY available at https://globalinitiatives.wcs.org/Communities/Women-and-Conservation.aspx and accessed on 16 January 2017.   51 Svadlenak-Gomez, K (2007) Integrating Human Rights in Conservation Programming, USAID/ WCS available at https://library.wcs.org/doi/ctl/view/mid/33065/pubid/DMX521200000.aspx and accessed on 16 January 2017. 204  e.g. alternative livelihood programmes (see “women’s rights” above). The Nature Conservancy 1) Secure land and resource rights52 e.g. supporting Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) in Chile 2) Support improved governance and local institutions e.g. Consultation with communities on MPAs in Raja Ampat (education = raising awareness of marine resources). e.g. Co-operative fisheries management (Tuungane project in Tanzania) 3) Assist in natural resource mapping, planning and management e.g. Participatory stock assessment – Palau, Indonesia, Tanzania. e.g. Participatory mapping of fishing sites/ sea use/ environmental protection – Solomon islands. 4) Strengthen livelihoods and sustainable economic development e.g. access to markets, reproductive health services, and food security initiative (Tuungane project in Tanzania) No information found on human rights, or other, capacity building in communities.                                                    52 The link to human rights, and these priorities, are listed in relation to “lands” and “indigenous peoples”. They find echoes in TNC’s web page on oceans, but without the express link to the CIHR and human rights http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/urgentissues/land-conservation/indigenouspeoples/index.htm and https://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/habitats/oceanscoasts/index.htm accessed on 17 January 2017 205  Supplemental Information Table 2.2: Implementation of a human rights-based approach at the institutional level by 5 major conservation NGOs that are party to the Conservation Initiative on Human Rights (CI= Conservation International; WWF= World Wildlife Fund; FFI= Fauna and Flora International; WCS=Wildlife Conservation Society; TNC = The Nature Conservancy) – Fully referenced version.  Institutional Level: Systems should be put into place in conservation NGOs to ensure consistent respect for/ fulfilment of human rights across the organisation. Such systems should raise organisational awareness of human rights (e.g. staff training) and promote accountability (e.g. monitoring and evaluation, processes for effective consultation and dispute resolution). Work to protect human rights might include encouraging partners (corporate partners, funders or consultants) to apply the same human rights-based approach as the organization. It might also include lobbying or assisting other duty-bearers such as Nation States to enhance their human rights capacity) Conservation organisation Human rights-based approach Policies on human rights Monitoring and evaluation Staff training on human rights Consultation processes Grievance mechanisms Due diligence of corporate partners   Influencing third parties Conservation International CI launched an explicit “rights-based approach” in 2012 (IUCN White Paper, 2014), with a dedicated web-portal53   Policies on:  1. Gender 2. Involuntary resettlement 3. Protection of vulnerable populations 4. Indigenous peoples 5. Partnerships 6. Research ethics54 Guidelines on incorporating gender into monitoring and evaluation (including gender-sensitive indicators and guidance on conducting a Specific advisory unit:  Policy Center for Environment and Peace, and Indigenous Advisory Group.  Extensive guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent is a major focus of CI’s rights-based approach. Most case studies concern indigenous peoples and CI has an Accountability and Grievance mechanism in place, as a requirement of its work with GEF61. Not clear how complaints are lodged at the community level. CI has a due diligence process for corporate partners, with a specific “rights-based” partnership policy.62 No examples of No information on advocating for human rights with government partners.                                                  53 https://sites.google.com/a/conservation.org/rights-based-approach/home accessed on 21 December 2016 54 https://sites.google.com/a/conservation.org/rights-based-approach/rba-policies accessed on 21 December 2016 61 Policy available at http://www.conservation.org/publications/Documents/CI-GEF_Accountability-Grievance-Mechanism.pdf and accessed on 21 December 2016 62 Due diligence process referenced here: http://www.conservation.org/NewsRoom/pressreleases/Pages/Partnerships_for_the_Planet_Why_We_Must_Engage_Corporations.aspx , Rights-based partnership policy available here: https://sites.google.com/a/conservation.org/rights-based-approach/rba-policies/partnerships and accessed on 23 December 2016. 206  gender analysis).55  A recent review of CI’s impact evaluation processes makes no mention of conducting human-rights based evaluations56 A recent social impact monitoring collaboration with WWF and TNC focuses on human well-being (see below). integrating gender and Free, Prior, Informed Consent into conservation programming and grant proposals.57  Workshops on the Rights-Based Approach provided to staff by Social Policy and Practice team. An e-course on the RBA is in development.58  Women’s Leadership Fund and land-based conservation.60   how human rights have been investigated in due diligence.                                                    55 Guidelines available at https://sites.google.com/a/conservation.org/rights-based-approach/tools-and-guidelines/gender-integration accessed on 22 December 2016 56 M.C. Mckinnon, M.B. Mascia, W. Yang, W.R. Turner, C. Bonham, Impact evaluation to communicate and improve conservation non-governmental organization performance: the case of Conservation International, Philos. Trans. R. Soc. London B. 370 (2015) 20140282. doi:10.1098/rstb.2014.0282. 57 Guidelines available at https://sites.google.com/a/conservation.org/rights-based-approach/tools-and-guidelines accessed on 22 December 2016 58 CI’s submission to John Knox, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, 30 October 2015 available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Environment/ImplementationReport/Conservation%20International.pdf and accessed on 30 January 2017 60 Case studies available at https://sites.google.com/a/conservation.org/rights-based-approach/case-studies and accessed on 21 December 2016 207  Indigenous Peoples Conservation Fellowship Programme.59 WWF References CIHR 1. Statement of Principles on Indigenous Peoples and Conservation 2. Principles and Guidelines on Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas 3. Gender policy WWF’s recent social impact monitoring (in collaboration with CI and TNC) focuses on measures of human well-being, that are related to but not directly grounded in, human rights64 WWF’s Social Development For Conservation (“SD4C”) team works on linking development and conservation issues across WWF’s global network. No specific human rights focus.65 WWF recognises the right of indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed consent in its Statement of Principles on Indigenous People and Conservation. It has produced Guidelines on WWF has a project complaints resolution policy. Not clear how this is accessible to those in remote communities without access to mail or e-mail. Process is also not anonymous.6768  WWF has produced due diligence guidelines for financial investors in forest products but does not clearly outline its own processes for due diligence of partners.69 At a global level, WWF has been active in raising awareness of human rights issues related to Fisheries Crime70.                                                  59 https://sites.google.com/a/conservation.org/rights-based-approach/rba-in-action accessed on 22 December 2016. 64 Glew, L., M.B. Mascia and F. Pakiding (2012). Solving the Mystery of MPA Performance: monitoring social impacts. Field Manual (version 1.0). World Wildlife Fund and Universitas Negeri Papua, Washington D.C. and Manokwari, Indonesia available at http://www.worldwildlife.org/pages/solving-the-mystery-of-mpa-performance-resources and accessed on 23 January 2017  65 http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/how_we_work/people_and_conservation/who_we_are/ accessed on 23 December 2016 67 Policy available at http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/21/files/original/WWF_Project_Complaints_Resolution_Policy_-_Public_Revision_May_13_2013.pdf?1368650034 and accessed on 23 January 2017 68 WWF submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, 5 October 2016 available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/SubmissionsBiodiversity.aspx and accessed on 30 January 2017 69 Forest investment guidelines available at http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/deforestation/forest_sector_transformation/forestfinance/financialinstitutions/investmentcriteria/index.cfm and accessed on 23 January 2017 70 WWF submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, 5 October 2016 available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/SubmissionsBiodiversity.aspx and accessed on 30 January 2017 208  4. Policy on Poverty and Conservation63 FPIC in relation to REDD+.66      Fauna and Flora International References CIHR FFI’s position statement on Conservation, Livelihoods and Governance commits to respecting human rights.71 No information on human rights specific policies. FFI’s guide to social impact assessment is one of its “lessons learned from REDD+” documents.72  Uses Sustainable Livelihoods Approach – related, but not based on human rights framework. Conservation, Livelihoods and Governance programme that supports FFI staff to work effectively with local people and to understand and integrate their needs and rights within conservation initiatives. No specific reference to human rights.   FFI has produced a series of “lessons learned FFI has produced a series of “lessons learned from REDD+” fact sheets that are relevant to human rights, and include guidance on free, prior and informed consent.    FFI has produced a factsheet on grievance mechanisms in the context of REDD+ forest schemes. No details on the application of grievance mechanisms in practice, especially not in relation to fisheries. Human rights are investigated during FFI’s corporate due diligence processes include human rights review74. No details available for any of these review processes.    No information on advocating for human rights with government partners.                                                  63 Policies available at http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/how_we_work/people_and_conservation/wwf_social_policies/ and accessed on 6 January 2017 66 Guidelines available at http://d2ouvy59p0dg6k.cloudfront.net/downloads/fpic_working_paper_01_10_14.pdf and accessed on 6 January 2017. 71 Available at http://www.fauna-flora.org/wp-content/uploads/FFIs-position-and-approach-to-conservation-livelihoods-and-governance.pdf and accessed on 9 January 2017 72 Available at http://www.fauna-flora.org/wp-content/uploads/Social-Impact-Assessment1.pdf and accessed on 10 January 2017 74 CIHR, Human Rights in Conservation: Progress since Durban, White Pap. (2014). 209  from REDD+” fact sheets that are relevant to human rights, including: free prior and informed consent, gender, sustainable livelihoods, tenure and resource use rights, grievance mechanisms and equitable benefits sharing. It also has a number of participatory tools, including for mapping stakeholder interests and rights. No details given on how these have been used in the field.73 Wildlife Conservation Society References CIHR WCS had a policy on human USAID Basic necessities survey to check No information found on staff capacity No information found suggesting that No information found on dispute resolution. WCS Business and Conservation No information found on                                                  73 http://www.fauna-flora.org/initiatives/livelihoods-and-governance-library/#tools  210  displacement, although not clear if this is still in force75 ((Campese et al., 2009)Roe, in Campese 2009).  people have access to essentials.76 USAID Natural Resource Governance tool to assess transparency and accountability of Governance.77 Rapid Gender Assessment in fisheries (notes that few field sites collect gender disaggregated data, and many do not have women specific programmes). WCS conducting a review of human rights building or support in relation to human rights. WCS has a specific policy on free, prior informed consent. Approach does not reference human rights related due diligence procedures.79   advocating for human rights with government partners.                                                  75 Roe, D in J. Campese, T.C.H. Sunderland, T. Greiber, G. Oviedo, Rights-based approaches: Exploring issues and opportunities for conservation, Bogor, Indonesia, 2009.. 76 https://global.wcs.org/Our-Impact/Livelihoods.aspx accessed on 10 January 2017 77 https://globalinitiatives.wcs.org/Communities/Governance-and-Conservation.aspx accessed on 10 January 2017 79 https://programs.wcs.org/carbon/Business-and-Conservation/Our-Approach.aspx accessed on 10 January 2017 211  issues across field sites.78  The Nature Conservancy References CIHR  Guiding Principles for Indigenous and Communal Conservation (incorporating CIHR)80  TNC is working on a systematic approach to incorporate human well-being into its M & E, as evident in its recent social impact monitoring collaboration with WWF and CI81 TNC’s Indigenous and Communal Conservation programme co-ordinates its work with indigenous and local communities.  No information found on staff capacity training in human rights.  The Conservancy notes its support for FPIC in both the CIHR and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance’s REDD+ Guidelines.82   No reference to project dispute resolution in TNC’s Accountability statement.83 Principles of Corporate Engagement policy notes that corporate partners must not pose a risk to TNC’s reputation, including by having committed human rights abuses.84   Indigenous and Communal Conservation programme states that it conducts advocacy on human rights issues (no details).85 In 2011,  TNC’s own staff called for greater human rights advocacy in conservation, but there is                                                  78 See note 39 80 Guiding Principles for Indigenous and Communal Conservation (incorporating CIHR) available at https://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/urgentissues/human-rights-pamphlet.pdf?redirect=https-301 and accessed on 18 January 2017 81 See footnote 29 and C. Leisher, L.H. Samberg, P. van Beukering, M. Sanjayan, Focal areas for measuring the human well-being impacts of a conservation initiative, Sustain. 5 (2013) 997–1010. doi:10.3390/su5030997. 82 TNC’s submission to Professor John Knox, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, dated 14 October 2016 available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/SubmissionsBiodiversity.aspx and accessed on 30 January 2017 83 Available at http://www.nature.org/about-us/our-accountability/index.htm?intc=nature.tnav.about and accessed on 18 January 2017 84 Available at https://www.nature.org/about-us/working-with-companies/how-we-work/principles-of-corporate-engagement.pdf and accessed on 18 January 2017 85 http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/urgentissues/land-conservation/indigenouspeoples/icc-fact-sheet-pdf-11102014.pdf accessed on 18 January 2017 212  little evidence that this has led to more active engagement.86                                                  86 http://blog.nature.org/conservancy/2011/02/28/conservation-human-rights-freedom-rob-mcdonald/ accessed on 18 January 2017. 213  Appendix B  Blue Ventures’ Family Planning Intervention Theory of Change   214  Appendix C  Sampling protocol and weighting of data I aimed to sample 40 households and individuals in each region of Velondriake, although in some regions sufficient households/ individuals were not available. Regions were characterised following Barnes-Mauthe et al. (2013) according to geographical location (North, Central or South Velondriake) and habitat type (coastal, mangrove, island, or inland) for the reasons explained by those authors (Barnes-Mauthe et al., 2013). 8 regions were sampled in total: Coastal North; Coastal Central; Coastal South; Mangrove North; Mangrove Central; Mangrove South; Island North; and Island Central (there are no island villages in the South of Velondriake, and inland villages were excluded from the survey since the focus of this work is small-scale fishing communities).  Within each of the 8 regions, villages were selected using Probability Proportional to Size (“PPS”) selection (United Nations, 2005) with sampling units of 20 households/ individuals being selected per village (due to the nature of PPS sampling, 2 units or 40 households/ individuals were selected in some larger villages, and in regions with very small villages (less than 20 households in total) multiple villages were surveyed to reach the 40 household/ individual requirement). Survey responses that were broadly representative of the population across the whole Velondriake LMMA were targeted by sampling individuals within each village in six different age/ sex demographics: Males and females, in age categories Teenage (age 15 to 24), Adult (25 to 49) and Seniors (50+). Individuals were randomly selected for interview in numbers approximately proportionate to the size of each age/sex demographic in the total population. Census data collected by Blue Ventures in the period October to December 2015 was used as a sampling frame (Blue Ventures, unpublished data). For each individual selected for 215  interview, a responsible adult in the same household (typically the male or female household head) was asked some additional questions about the whole household, primarily concerning household income, assets and food security. A total of 297 households/ individuals were surveyed, representing just over 20% of the households in coastal Velondriake (1311 households total) and 9% of the adult population (3273 total). To ensure results more accurately represented the whole population of the Velondriake LMMA, individual data was weighted by calculating the probability of selecting each village sampled, and the probability of selecting each individual sampled within that village to calculate a weight for each respondent (weight= 1/ probability). This has enabled the calculation of weighted summary statistics (using the Horvitz-Thompson estimator) and the production of weighted models and statistical tests (conducted using the “Survey” package in R (T. Lumley, 2017; R core team, 2016). For household data, I have assumed that each household had approximately the same chance of being selected and was therefore representative of households in its region, enabling extrapolation from the survey sample to the total population using the methods described by Barnes-Mauthe et al. 2013.  


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