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Supranational authority : the role of the United Nations secretariat in the expansion of the departments… Almehairbi, Mohamed 2018

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   SUPRANATIONAL AUTHORITY: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT IN THE EXPANSION OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS by Mohamed Almehairbi BSc, The University of British Columbia, 2008  A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Political Science) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) May 2018  © Mohamed Almehairbi, 2018 ii The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the dissertation entitled:  Supranational Authority: The Role of the United Nations Secretariat in the Expansion of the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs  submitted by Mohamed Almehairbi  in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science  Examining Committee: Katharina Coleman Supervisor      Richard Price Supervisory Committee Member  Brian Job Supervisory Committee Member Peter Dauvergne University Examiner Steven Lee University Examiner     iii Abstract Why do member states generously finance some departments within an International Organisation, while others are starved for resources? Why do funding allocations shift over time? What role do bureaucrats themselves play in processes that influence this variation?  For the most part, for example, the UN regular budget varies only slightly from one biennium to the next, but occasionally, there are sudden increases in the resources of a particular department.  This project seeks to explain why.   This thesis asserts that the UN Secretariat, and the Secretary-General in particular, can strategically utilise their expertise-based and principle-based authority in order to persuade member states to provide more resources to particular departments.  I study the UN budget process to illustrate the avenues available for influence by the Secretary-General and other bureaucrats. I explore two in-depth case studies, drawing on extensive primary documents and sixteen expert interviews, to examine the actions of the Secretariat in the years leading up to the changes in both departments. These two moments of dramatic change were the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 2000/2001, and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) from 2005 to 2008.  In both, the Secretariat was able to leverage its informal authority to increase its resources, but only when the arguments they put forward accorded both with their type of authority, and with the values held by the audience; this persuasion was also only possible when member state blocs were not entrenched in opposition to each other on a related issue.  The Secretariat used three strategies to achieve this: i) agenda setting, ii) initiating and expanding operations, and iii) multiplying authority by creating like-minded expert panels.  iv Lay Summary This project studies whether the bureaucracy of an international organisation, such as the United Nations, is able to persuade member states to increase the resources they give to that bureaucracy.  I study this in two cases, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), in the early-mid 2000s.  I argue that, despite the fact that they do not have the material power to influence member states, they do have forms of authority because they are viewed as being experts or because they are viewed as highly principled individuals.  They can use those types of authority to persuade states to give them more resources.     v Preface  The design, conduct, and analysis of the research in this project was conducted by myself, Mohamed Almehairbi, with advice from my advisor Katharina Coleman, and my committee members Richard Price and Brian Job.  Ethics approval was given by the UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board, certificate number: H14-01595.  The project title was IO Secretariat Study.    vi Table of Contents Abstract	.............................................................................................................................................	iii	Lay	Summary	....................................................................................................................................	iv	Preface	................................................................................................................................................	v	Table	of	Contents	............................................................................................................................	vi	List	of	Tables	......................................................................................................................................x	List	of	Figures	...................................................................................................................................	xi	Acknowledgements	.......................................................................................................................	xii	Chapter	1:	Introduction..................................................................................................................	1	1.1	Project	outline	......................................................................................................................................	1	1.2	Dag	Hammarskjöld	and	the	early	years	of	peacekeeping	........................................................	6	1.3	Methodology	.......................................................................................................................................17	1.3.1	Choice	of	method	.....................................................................................................................................................	17	1.3.2	Case	selection	............................................................................................................................................................	21	1.3.3	Evidence	and	measurement	..............................................................................................................................	27	1.4	Conclusion	and	roadmap	.................................................................................................................32	Chapter	2:	Conceptual	Framework	-	A	Persuasive	Secretariat	.........................................	33	2.1	Summary	of	argument	......................................................................................................................33	2.2	Core	concepts	and	theoretical	framework	.................................................................................36	2.2.1	International	organisations	(IOs)	...................................................................................................................	36	2.2.2	Authority	......................................................................................................................................................................	44	2.2.3	Persuasion...................................................................................................................................................................	50	 vii 2.2.4	Strategies	.....................................................................................................................................................................	68	2.3	Alternative	explanations	.................................................................................................................84	2.4	Observable	implications	..................................................................................................................97	Chapter	3:	The	UN,	the	Secretary-General,	and	the	Budgetary	Process	......................	101	3.1	Introduction	.....................................................................................................................................	101	3.2	The	Secretary-General	..................................................................................................................	101	3.3	The	UN	regular	budget	..................................................................................................................	104	3.4	The	four	stages	of	the	budget	......................................................................................................	109	3.4.1	Stage	1:	General	Assembly	resolutions	and	the	Strategic	Framework......................................	109	3.4.2	Stage	2:	Committee	for	Programme	and	Coordination	(CPC)	........................................................	111	3.4.3	Stage	3:	Advisory	Committee	on	Administrative	and	Budgetary	Questions	(ACABQ)	.....	113	3.4.4	Stage	4:	The	Fifth	Committee	..........................................................................................................................	115	3.5	Voting	blocs	......................................................................................................................................	118	3.6	The	US-UN	relationship	.................................................................................................................	121	3.7	Conclusion	........................................................................................................................................	122	Chapter	4:	UN	Department	of	Peacekeeping	Operations	.................................................	124	4.1	Introduction	.....................................................................................................................................	124	4.2	Definitions:	peacekeeping	and	peace	operations	..................................................................	126	4.3	The	challenge	of	peacekeeping	operations	reform...............................................................	128	4.3.1	Divisions	at	the	UN	...............................................................................................................................................	128	4.3.2	Disillusionment	and	failures	...........................................................................................................................	132	4.4	The	authority	of	Secretary-General	Kofi	Annan	in	UN	peacekeeping	..............................	142	4.4.1	Formal	authority....................................................................................................................................................	142	4.4.2	Informal	authority	................................................................................................................................................	143	 viii 4.5	Targeted	persuasion	......................................................................................................................	151	4.6	Strategies	..........................................................................................................................................	154	4.6.1	Agenda	setting	........................................................................................................................................................	154	4.6.2	Initiating	or	expanding	operations	..............................................................................................................	162	4.6.3	Multiplying	authority	..........................................................................................................................................	178	4.7	Conclusion	........................................................................................................................................	193	Chapter	5:	UN	Department	of	Political	Affairs	(DPA)........................................................	197	5.1	Introduction	.....................................................................................................................................	197	5.2	Strategies	..........................................................................................................................................	202	5.2.1	Agenda	setting:	The	narrative	of	prevention	1992-2003	................................................................	202	5.2.2	Initiating	and	expanding	SPMs	.......................................................................................................................	205	5.2.3	Multiplying	authority:	High-Level	Panel	and	the	2005	summit	...................................................	216	5.2.4	Post	2005	summit:	formal	authority	...........................................................................................................	220	5.2.5	Post-2005	summit:	principled	and	expertise-based	arguments		.................................................	224	5.2.6	Post	2005	summit:	strategic	persuasion...................................................................................................	225	5.2.7	Post-2005	Summit:	multiplying	authority	...............................................................................................	227	5.3	Ban	Ki-Moon	and	the	shift	towards	an	emphasis	on	formal	authority	............................	228	5.4	December	2008:	the	strengthening	...........................................................................................	235	5.5	Post-December	2008:	Bloc	entrenchment...............................................................................	238	5.6	Conclusion	........................................................................................................................................	249	Chapter	6:	Conclusion	................................................................................................................	251	6.1	Empirical	findings	..........................................................................................................................	251	Informal	authority	............................................................................................................................................................	252	Persuasion	............................................................................................................................................................................	253	 ix Agenda	setting	....................................................................................................................................................................	255	Operational	influence	.....................................................................................................................................................	256	Multiplying	authority	......................................................................................................................................................	258	Alternative	explanations:	establishing	parameters	to	Secretariat	influence	....................................	258	6.2	Contribution	and	limitations	.......................................................................................................	262	6.3	Future	research	...............................................................................................................................	263	Bibliography	.................................................................................................................................	268	Appendix	I	.....................................................................................................................................	297	     x List of Tables Table 1: Persuasion categorised by number of speakers and listeners ........................................ 54	Table 2: Elements to large group persuasion ............................................................................. 63	Table 3: Number of Field-based Special Political Missions by year. ........................................ 205	Table 4: Annual SPM appropriation, 2002-2008...................................................................... 239	     xi List of Figures Figure 1: Persuasion and social influence .................................................................................. 57	Figure 2: UN Peacekeepers: Total troop count by year ............................................................ 140	Figure 3: Current SPM locations, as of March 2017 ................................................................ 199	Figure 4: Total number of Field Special Political Missions, and total number of mandates assigned to Field Special Political Missions, 1993-2011. ................................................. 216	    xii Acknowledgements  I wish to acknowledge, first and foremost, my academic advisor Katharina Coleman.  Professor Coleman’s encyclopaedic knowledge of the theory and empirics of both peace operations and international organisations made her my first and only choice for academic advisor.  I will always be grateful that she accepted, and for her boundless patience, remarkable attention to detail, and frequent encouragement, without which this dissertation would never have been completed.  I am also deeply indebted to my committee members Richard Price and Brian Job, for their sterling advice, keen insight, and willingness to point out any nonsensical or irrelevant claims that filtered their way into this dissertation.  All three of my committee members taught me a great deal throughout this process. I am also eternally grateful to my sponsors, the United Arab Emirates government, for their generous financial support. I also acknowledge the enduring support of my wonderful wife, Cheralyn Coles, and my three children, Jayed, Jaslyn and Jayla, who were always willing to try to persuade me to stop working when they thought it was time for me to take a break. 1 Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Project outline Every intergovernmental organisation has established procedures for discussing and enacting institutional change.  Those procedures typically include proposals drafted by member states, reviews by intergovernmental committees, and some form of (at least partially) democratic process in which only member states hold the votes.  It is thus easy to understand why outside observers may assume that all institutional changes in an organisation such as the UN are initiated, decided upon, and enacted by member states alone.   However, even when member states ostensibly pioneer those changes, they often do so only after being persuaded by non-state actors.  This phenomenon has, in the past, been more commonly associated with NGOs.  As Alex Neve, Secretary-General of Amnesty International, said in a speech in October 2016, non-state actors such as he can successfully “cajole”, “embarrass”, and “push governments into taking leadership”.1  His specific choice of words was revealing; at first glance, states often seem to be leading an issue, but that overlooks the prior influence of non-state actors.  This project asserts that such influence also resides with key actors within IO Secretariats. Within Political Science, one of the reasons for overlooking this influence stems from the underlying assumptions of some popular meta-theories. At the boundaries between opposing approaches to studying international relations lies an ontological question: which actors should be studied as the main political actors?  Neorealism famously limits its scope to state actors, justifying that ontology with a focus on material wealth and military power, and the related                                                1 Neve 2016.  2 assumption that only actors with those sources of power can affect change.  Neoliberal Institutionalism adopts a similarly state-centric approach, but with more nuanced explanations for international cooperation.  However, over the last two decades in particular, several persuasive challenges to both sets of theories have broadened that focus to include other actors, which, it is claimed, are equally worthy of study for many reasons, one of which being that in some circumstances, they can exercise authority over states and influence their decisions. One crucial arena of Secretariat influence that statist perspectives overlook is the budgetary process in which states ostensibly control the finances of that Secretariat.  This research was motivated by a question in this area: what explains the variation in the delegation of additional resources within existing international organization (IO) bureaucracies, and what role does the bureaucracy play in processes that influence that variation? Barnett and Finnemore (2004) identified several forms of authority in the Secretariats of international organisations, and as they conclude their work, they briefly suggest that the expansion of the mandate and capabilities of IO bureaucracies may be influenced, and even directed, by those bureaucracies,2 but this is not the focus of their work and no evidence is provided to support it.  This project explores this last claim, whether the Secretariat can strategically utilise their authority in order to strengthen two characteristics that enable them to act politically: their mandates and their material resources.   My proximate objective is to focus narrowly on a particular form of influence that IO Secretariats have: the ability to persuade member states to increase the resources given to a part of that Secretariat.  This focus allows me to add a valuable factor to theories of IO institutional                                                2 Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 158-161.  3 change that frequently underestimate the role of the bureaucracy.  A broader objective for this and further research is to develop a theoretical framework to explain the influence of Secretariat members, or indeed any individual imbued with informal authority over actors with substantially more material power and the ability to make decisions affecting the Secretariat’s resources.  Barnett and Finnemore (2004) and Avant et al. (2010) lay the groundwork for this broader objective, although I take the next step by parsing out informal from formal authority, and by studying the specific strategies through which informal authority is used to influence member states. The exploration of the mechanisms of persuasion, the different forms of authority, how they are perceived, and how those with informal authority use strategies to magnify their influence, are used in this project to build such a theoretical framework.  While I narrowly focus on the two UN cases here, I illustrate other valid applications of this framework in the concluding chapter. I argue that IO Secretariat actors can leverage their informal authority (both expertise-based and principle-based) to persuade member states to devote additional resources to a part of the Secretariat, using three strategies: i) Agenda setting, in which the Secretariat ensures that member states devote more time and energy to debating a particular issue.  I detail the ability of the Secretariat to place issues before the Security Council and General Assembly, and to persuade the plenary assembly that a crisis point has been reached which demands immediate member state support for certain policy and budget changes. ii) Initiating or expanding operations, in which the Secretariat can initiate activities that then provide the justification for additional resources.  In peacekeeping, I consider a single key  4 case, that of East Timor, to demonstrate that operations, considered to be the external stimuli that led to greater state confidence in UN peacekeeping, were rather created almost entirely as a result of actions by the Secretariat.  In political missions, I review the origins of existing field missions, focusing on two forms that in particular lead to greater and more long-term resources for the Secretariat, which I term embryonic and embassy Special Political Missions (SPMs). iii) Multiplying authority, in which the Secretariat establishes independent, yet similarly minded panels that then serve as additional expert authorities to influence member states.  The process of multiplying authority then extends beyond the findings of those panels and includes strategies through which the Secretariat draws upon elements of the findings to construct arguments tailored to influence the relevant audiences.  The causality implied in the argument is to some extent necessarily over-simplified.  The process I focus on is only one strand in a tapestry of relationships leading to budgetary changes. There are also conditions that constrain this process.  For example, a relatively unified plenary assembly is necessary, because consensus-based UN budgetary institutional arrangements ensure that voting blocs, when entrenched in opposition to each other, obstruct almost any reforms on an issue.   I follow this particular strand of influence, originating with the Secretariat, in the context of the UN Departments of Peacekeeping and Political Affairs.  In the late 1990s, member states were openly hostile to the idea of UN peacekeeping and political missions; this makes the puzzle of why those states reversed their position to support a strengthening of the DPKO in 2000, and the DPA half a decade later, all the more interesting.  Since the early 1990’s, the UN secretariat staff were key actors encouraging a normative shift towards the concept of conditional sovereignty, a concept that was consciously and deeply  5 intertwined with a perceived need for UN intervention.  There is a direct causal connection, albeit delayed, between the recognition of the need for UN intervention, and the need to devote resources to support that activity.   In 1992, Secretary-General (SG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali famously stated in the context of a demand for more robust peacekeeping efforts that, “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed”.3  Secretary-General Kofi Annan later voiced a plea at the 1999 General Assembly for a framework that would allow a swift response to incidents of genocide,4 inspiring the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to generate the 2001 ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) framework.5  Given that Secretaries-General seemed to be at the forefront of arguments suggesting that there were obligations to international peace and security that supersede state sovereignty, particularly over a period in which states increasingly accepted that proposition,6 one must at least consider the possibility that their arguments were influential. My project thus hopes to address a gap in both IR theory and empirical research, in that it investigates whether, when, and how, these informal forms of authority influence state decision-making over the issue of IO bureaucracy mandates and resources.  The claim is not that IO bureaucratic actors act strategically against the preferences of states,7 but that they are able to change the preferences of states in order to strengthen themselves.                                                 3 Boutros-Ghali 1992, Para 17. 4 Annan 1999a, para 9.  5 ICISS 2001.  6 Dijkstra 2012. 7 See Alter 1998 for this claim applied to the ECJ.  6 1.2 Dag Hammarskjöld and the early years of peacekeeping This section is an introductory narrative detailing the role of second UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in UN peacekeeping.  It illustrates that the Secretariat have played an active and influential role, initiating and shaping UN peace operations from their earliest beginnings.  The UN Charter mentions neither peacekeeping nor Secretariat-managed diplomatic missions.  The founders of the United Nations envisioned three mechanisms for resolving conflicts.  The International Court of Justice (ICJ) can arbitrate disputes and issue binding decisions.8  The Security Council can investigate any situation and then insist that the parties to a dispute engage in a particular resolution mechanism, such as judicial arbitration, Council mediation, or via regional institutions.9  The Security Council can also impose sanctions, and “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”.10    All of these mechanisms envisaged state governments to be both the parties to a dispute, and those attempting to resolve it.  This follows from the bedrock principle of the Charter, being the sovereign equality of states, and the related principle of non-intervention.  The document states that, “[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”.11                                                8 UN. UN Charter. Chapter XIV. 9 UN. UN Charter. Pacific Settlement of Disputes.  Chapter VI. 10 UN. UN Charter. Chapter VI. Article 42. 11 UN. UN Charter. Article 2:7.  7 Hammarskjöld has since been recognised as an influential, independent and effective political agent,12 but this was not the role expected of him prior to his appointment.  Sir Brian Urquhart, former Under-Secretary-General (USG) and leading member of the British delegation to the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations that designed the original formal institutions of the UN in 1945, observed that member states assumed that Secretary-General Hammarskjöld would play the role expected from a deferential Swedish career civil servant, little more than “a cautious, safe and non-political technocrat”.13  However, there is considerable evidence of Hammarskjöld’s informal authority, primarily observed in the deference afforded him by materially far more powerful actors, including at times, even the world’s two superpowers, despite the absence of any formal authority he had over them. Hammarskjöld was explicitly aware of the potential of his informal authority.  He argued with increasing frequency that his office was more an institution than a person,14 and that he had, morally and legally, an “exclusively international obligation under the Charter” to address threats to international peace even when powerful members of the Security Council would rather he take no action,15 a bold claim at the height of the Cold War.  He often cited Article 99 of the Charter which he claimed not only required him to inform member states of threats to peace, but also “that this right carries with it, by necessary implication, a broad discretion to conduct inquiries and engage in informal diplomatic activity”.16 Hammarskjöld asserted that as Secretary-General,                                                12 For example, Rovine 1970; Meisler 1995; Chesterman 2007; Kille 2006. 13 Urquart 1987, 124. 14 Hammarskjöld 1960, 80-82. 15 Ibid., 88-91. 16 Hammarskjöld 1961, 96-99.  8 he was a “servant of the principles of the Charter, and its aims must ultimately determine for him what is right and wrong”.17   Hammarskjöld frequently reminded the member states of “the responsibility of the United Nations to make all efforts to live up to the purpose and principles of the Charter”,18 and powerful states increasingly acknowledged Hammarskjöld’s informal authority.  In 1960, after he claimed that he had both an obligation and a right to engage in independent action that superseded any wishes of even the US and USSR, those countries and others on the Security Council conceded.19   Hammarskjöld’s informal authority was also widely acknowledged by his colleagues. Brian Urquhart frequently reiterated the impression others around him had of Hammarskjöld.  The Secretary-General was widely viewed as having “impressive energy and expertise”, “relentless high intellectual and ethical standards”, and as being “deeply committed” to the United Nations and “supremely qualified in a wide variety of disciplines-law, economics, diplomacy, and politics in particular”.20  While his broad political expertise was already clear before his appointment, his principle-based authority21 grew rapidly afterwards, as he became associated with the UN as an institution, and, as Urquhart describes, “he identified himself more and more with the objectives and ideals of the Charter”.22 Initially, many key states became irritated when Hammarskjöld adopted the role of a                                                17 Hammarskjöld, 1956, 120-121. 18 UN Security Council. Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. 16 July 1958 to 15 July 1959. (A/4190). Para 76. 19 Ibid.; UN Security Council 1959. 20 Urquhart 1987, 124-127. 21 Avant et al. 2010. Principle-based authority is based upon the adherence of an actor to a set of rules, principles, values or morals considered legitimate by the particular audience.  22 Ibid., 124-125.  9 “dynamic and charismatic world leader”.23  Their irritation subsided when he independently initiated and managed a careful negotiation process that secured the release of seventeen US airmen who had, in January 1953, during the Korean War, made a forced landing in China.24  The Secretary-General could have advocated one of the state-led conflict resolution mechanisms that would have involved the Security Council, the General Assembly, or key powerful states, but he chose to interpret the UN Charter in a way that suggested that he could act autonomously to maintain international peace, a process that afterwards came to be known as the “Peking formula”. He achieved this diplomatic feat despite the extremely obstructive political conditions of the McCarthy era, in which the US Congress, steeped in anti-Communist rhetoric, was forcefully trying to insist that President Eisenhower resort to overwhelming military retaliation.25  While the US Ambassador was composing a resolution to condemn China’s decision to try the airmen as spies, Hammarskjöld persuaded him to add two phrases: firstly, that the Secretary-General should act “in the name of the United Nations” and secondly, that he should use “the means most appropriate in his judgement”.26  When the resolution was passed, Hammarskjöld then interpreted his own additions to the resolution as approval for him to adopt a mandate to act independently. His success in China demonstrated to many the value of an independent Secretary-General.  It led member states and UN staff to “strengthen the Office [of the Secretary-General]                                                23 Urquart 2007, 19. 24 Ibid., 20. 25 Rovine,1970, 279-282.  See Meisler 1995, 86-87. 26 Meisler 1995, 87.  10 and [it] led to many more significant grants of power to the Secretary-General”.27  Hammarskjöld was permitted to add two new Under-Secretaries-General (USGs) for special political affairs, each with their own support staff.28  The catchphrase “leave it to Dag” became a common refrain when crises arose, not only in the international press, but also even in the Security Council. This phenomenon contradicts the expectations of many Realist political theories of international organisations, in which states delegate authority to a Secretariat only for non-salient issues, or only when those states lack the expertise to achieve the goal themselves. UN peacekeeping, both as a concept and practice, was born in 1956 during the Suez Crisis. The processes that led to the first mission illustrate member states’ recognition of the expertise and principle-based authority of the Secretary-General.  On 1 November, after discussing the idea with the initially reluctant Hammarskjöld, Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson proposed to the General Assembly the inter-position of an impartial, “international police force” to separate Israel and Egypt.29  After three days deliberation, the General Assembly agreed.   Remarkably, the General Assembly and Security Council then both agreed to pass all the responsibility for the planning and administering of this unprecedented international venture to the Secretary-General.30  As academics at the time observed, this was “a very substantial increase in the Secretary-General's authority”.31  They gave him forty-eight hours to construct a plan, but Hammarskjöld immediately began working with Ralph Bunche and Sir Brian Urquhart, and they                                                27 Ibid., 282. 28 Mackinlay and Chopra 1993, 134. 29 UN General Assembly 1956a, 36.  See also Harrelson 1989, 89. Jolly, Emmerij, and Weiss 2009, 172. 30 UN General Assembly 1956c.  31 Lentner 1965, 840.  11 completed the plan outline in a mere seven hours.32  The Secretary-General returned to the General Assembly emergency session to explain the plan later the same day, 4th November,33 and the detailed plan was approved three days later.34 The Secretary-General and his staff closely managed the mission, and in the short and medium terms at least, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) achieved its objectives.  It deployed on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal, allowing French, British, and later, Israeli forces to withdraw.  Throughout the complex negotiations between all of the interested parties, the Secretary-General “was the focal point for the process of international bargaining that went on through the period of crisis and was able to press particular positions and formulations not altogether pleasing to any of the parties, but without at any time losing their confidence”.35  The mission continued to stabilise the region for a decade until the Egyptian government ordered its withdrawal in 1967, and Israel unfortunately refused to allow them to relocate to the other side of the border.36 In 1958, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld published a comprehensive review of the UNEF mission that would profoundly influence all later peacekeeping missions.37  In it, he put forward a set of principles that he and Bunche had applied to this mission, principles that he claimed should be a guide for all similar missions in the future.  Some recommendations were practical responses to the political reality of the Cold War, such as that no member of the P5 should contribute troops, as they would usually be considered severely biased by at least one                                                32 Rovine 1970, 289. 33 UN Secretary General 1956a. 1956b.   34 UN General Assembly 1956b.  35 Rovine 1970, 292. 36 UN DPKO.  UNEF I Background. 37 UN Secretary General 1958.  12 other Security Council P5 member.38 However, the more lasting legacy of that document lay with three principles in particular: the consent of member states, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defence.39 These became the foundations and parameters for traditional peacekeeping, and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations still affirms them today as the fundamental defining features of a peacekeeping operation.40 Earlier histories of peacekeeping tend to conflate all Cold War era operations as “first generation peacekeeping”.  However, Hatto (2013) demonstrates not only that this is misleading, as there were many changes and exceptions during that period, but also that it is an unhelpful oversimplification to conceive of peacekeeping as an evolutionary progression from one generation to the next.41  For example, one of the most dramatic departures from the simple interposition of traditional peacekeepers, the 1960s United Nations Organisation in the Congo (UNOC), had a robust mandate that contradicted the principles of impartiality and the minimal use of force; it was explicitly permitted to use force to prevent the resource-wealthy Eastern province, Katanga, from seceding and becoming an independent state.42  UNOC was also instrumental in designing and creating new domestic government institutions. The origins of the UNOC mission provide additional evidence of the influence of the Secretariat.  The request for UN intervention arose initially from private communication between the Secretary-General and the Congolese government.  The latter was being advised by his Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, and Special Representative of the Secretary-                                               38 The decision to avoid direct involvement by the great powers was one originally made by the General Assembly in the debate that led up to the resolution adopted on 4 November 1956 (A/3276). 39 Ibid., see in particular, paras 156, 157, 166, 167, 179. 40 UN DPKO Principles of Peacekeeping Operations.  41 Hatto 2013; Hatto draws on Wiseman 1983.  See also Williams (with Stuart Griffin) 2010, 17. 42 UN Security Council 1961.  13 General in the Congo, Ralph J. Bunche.43  Bunche had overseen UNEF in the Suez crisis, and his unique expertise in UN peacekeeping was greatly respected by member states.  The Congolese government originally intended only to appeal to either the US or USSR for great power assistance, but Bunche persuaded them to also formally appeal to the UN Secretary-General. Explicitly invoking Article 99, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld convened an emergency session of the Security Council.44   As the US delegation pointed out in that meeting, he did so on his own authority, as the “Government of the Republic of the Congo has not asked for a meeting of the Security Council”.45  The session almost immediately disintegrated into a long, bickering debate between the US and the USSR, with each repeatedly criticising even the simplest and briefest of statements made by the other.  The USSR attempted to postpone the debate on procedural grounds, insisting that a Congolese representative be present.  This was understandable, given that while Congo had not been invited, Belgium had been; Belgium, the former colonial power, had triggered the crisis when it re-deployed its military to the recently independent proto-state against the wishes of the Congolese government.  This tied in to the continued insistence of the USSR to jointly associate both the US and Belgium with “Western Imperialism”.   The US accused the USSR of lying after almost every Soviet statement.  However, despite this animosity, both the US and USSR agreed to allow a resolution after the Secretary-General insisted that the Council side-line any procedural criticisms, given that they were bound by a moral imperative to allow a UN military intervention to take place immediately.46                                                  43 UN Security Council 1960b, para 2-5. 44 UN Secretary-General 1960b. 45 UN Security Council. 1960a, para 10. 46 UN Security Council. 1960a.  14 The text of the subsequent resolution authorising an intervention was extremely brief, and included no details beyond stating that the Secretary-General was authorised to independently create a force to provide the Congo government with military assistance to establish security.47  With hindsight, this latitude can best be explained by what has since become a well-known phenomenon.  Observers of the UN have seen numerous times that an inability of the Security Council or General Assembly to agree on specifics frequently leads to vague resolutions as a means to form some kind of consensus, on the assumption, perhaps, that any agreement is better than no agreement at all. The Secretary-General drew upon the formal authority provided by the resolution, and using moral arguments emphasising the urgency of the situation, persuaded member states to provide troops with a speed that is truly remarkable in comparison to almost every UN mission since; less than four days after the Security Council Resolution there were over 3,500 UN troops on the ground in the Congo.48  Even sooner than that, he had persuaded the US, UK, Canada and the USSR to provide airplanes to start airlifting in food and medical supplies.49 The Secretary-General also persuaded his home country, Sweden, to send a Brigade, and to allow him to appoint Major-General Carl von Horn (Sweden) as Supreme Commander of the Force. 50 General von Horn had for three years commanded the UN Treaty Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in Israel/Palestine, and as the Secretary-General reiterated, was widely recognized by member states as having “considerable experience as a senior military representative of the United Nations.”51  Until General von Horn was able to arrive, the Secretary-General unilaterally                                                47 UN Security Council 1960b.  48 UN Secretary-General 1960a.  49 Ibid., 11. 50 Ibid., 9. 51 Ibid., 9.  15 appointed Bunche as Commander ad interim of the Force.52  Throughout the creation and early days of UNOC, Hammarskjöld and Bunche almost exclusively managed both relations with the Congolese government and the initial military operations of the Force.  The autonomy allowed the Secretariat could be at least partially explained by the views member states had of the Secretary-General and USG Bunche. By 1960, in the estimation of member states, Hammarskjöld had “become a world leader of outstanding distinction”.53  The esteem in which he was held by almost all world leaders was reflected in the nature of his re-election as Secretary-General in 1958.  The Security Council debate on the issue of the choice of the next Secretary-General was extremely brief, and support for him was unanimous.54  The General Assembly then confirmed his re-election with no debate at all and no need even to refer the decision to a committee.55 Bunche had a similar reputation.  During the Security Council meeting (13-14 July 1960) that authorised UNOC, the US Ambassador described Bunche as “respected throughout the world for his devotion to peace and to the goals of the United Nations”.56  In the same meeting, the Ambassador from Italy praised, in his words, “the splendid work performed in the Republic of the Congo by the Under-Secretary of the United Nations, Mr. Ralph Bunche, with great sacrifice, endurance, intelligence and in full independence of action, for the pursuance of the aims of our Organization in that territory.”  This helps to explain the flexibility afforded the Secretariat in designing the peacekeeping mission then authorized under Resolution 143 (1960),                                                52 Ibid., 10. 53 Rovine 1970, 283. 54 UN Security Council 1958, Paras 464-465. 55 UN General Assembly 1957. 56  UN Security Council 1960a Para 114, page 22.  16 and the freedom USG Bunche and the Secretary-General were permitted to engage in extensive technical assistance in what amounted to an unprecedented state-building exercise.   Despite later concerns over its inability to stabilise the region, UNOC initially laid the foundations for other politically ambitious UN missions.  For example, in 1962, the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) was established in Western New Guinea, with a broad mandate that included, for the first time, UN executive authority over a region and the creation of a police force.57   This brief historical review serves to illustrate the historical role of the Secretariat.  From 1956 until the late 1980’s, peacekeeping remained a sporadic, ad hoc process, with several extended periods of inactivity when the superpowers were particularly mutually obstructive. While the initial impetus of state actors such as Lester Pearson was crucial to the development of UN peacekeeping as a practice, Cold War peacekeeping missions, when they did take place, were influenced by the Secretariat as much as by powerful states, and this expansion of UN peacekeeping activity led to a significant increase in resources for the Secretariat.  As mentioned above, the Secretary-General’s staff was expanded considerably on his request, with the creation of two additional USG posts and their corresponding staff, specifically mandated to support his efforts to independently create and manage political interventions into international conflicts. This mini-case study into Hammarskjöld and the early days of peacekeeping illustrates the potential for exceptional informal authority on the part of the Secretary-General.  However, there are arguably several conditions that persisted at the time that may have affected this, conditions no longer present.  For example, the growing Cold War animosity and global                                                57 UN DPKO. Western Guinea – Mission Background. See also United Nations 1996, 625.    17 polarisation may have necessitated delegation to the Secretariat, as neither side would trust the other to manage an intervention.  The uncertainty of a new international venture, the first peacekeeping efforts, may also have played a role.  Thus, while this is a useful indicator of the mechanisms of influence by informal authority, I focus on two case studies that took place after the end of the Cold War, and after the Organisation’s members had a wealth of experience to draw upon, to demonstrate that that Hammarskjöld’s authority was not a unique event. 1.3 Methodology This argument is fundamentally about persuasion of member states by a Secretariat.  To substantiate this argument, I explored the various strategies used by the Secretariat to influence member state policies.  In Chapter three, I examine the UN budgetary processes to clarify why different actors at different stages of the budgetary process respond in different ways to the particular arguments and strategies of persuasion.  In this section I discuss the qualitative document and interview research necessary to elucidate both the strategies and the institutions through which they operate. 1.3.1 Choice of method  The study of political persuasion is rife with methodological challenges.   In any social environment, persuasion can operate simultaneously on multiple levels of analysis, from one-on-one interactions within small groups, to large-group persuasion though mass media and publications.  Causal relationships can also be complex and multidirectional.  They are also influenced by underlying power relationships and by the extent to which parties to a discussion may individually, or as a group, be sincerely willing to alter their views based on reasoned arguments.  Persuasion is a dynamic process, and one in which all actors potentially persuade all  18 others, and in which even those who have been persuaded might be unaware of the source of their change in attitude towards a particular concept. I use the case study method because my intention is to examine some of the mechanisms that lead to the delegation of additional formal authority or resources to IO bureaucracies, and this method is the most effective tool for doing so. Large-n quantitative studies are exceptionally useful for establishing the presence and strength of correlations between variables, but more in depth case studies are required to explore the complex chains of events between one variable and another.   In the last few decades of the 20th century, advocates for case study methods came under increasing pressure to justify and clarify their approach.  Lijphart (1971) famously ranked three methodological approaches, with experiments as the most superior, statistics as a close second, and with case studies as the weakest tool.58  Lieberson (1991) similarly claimed that comparative historical techniques, ostensibly based on Mill’s methods of agreement and disagreement, are only applicable in small-n research where several highly unlikely assumptions hold: a deterministic relationship, no measurement error, a single cause, and no interaction effects.59  The pressure peaked with King, Keohane and Verba’s (KKV) (1994) text, in which they argued that the objective of social scientific research is to measure correlations in order to estimate the realised causal effect, the mean change in a dependent variable for a given change in the independent.60                                                   58 Lijphart 1971. 59 Lieberson 1991. 60 King, Keohane, and Verba 1994.  19 KKV have since inspired over two decades of reflexive and rigorous clarification of the case study method, and those reactions persuasively indicate that a quantitative approach would be almost impossible to apply effectively to my theory.  For one challenge, one would need to quantify the various forms of informal authority.  It may be possible to identify some indicators, such as the number of times actors describe the person in question as being authoritative, but this would be highly problematic and inaccurate.  The case study method has an advantage in tracing causal mechanisms between variables through an approach that Peter Hall calls systematic process analysis,61 or what others such as Jeffrey Checkel, Andrew Bennett and Alexander George call process tracing,62 unlike correlational analysis which only seeks causal effects.  As is now widely recognised in the social sciences, correlation does not equal causation, and authors such as George and Bennett claim that while statistical analysis can be effective at establishing how much a variable mattered, the case study method is far better at clarifying whether and how it mattered.63  I would concur with the “how”, although correlative studies can persuasively establish “whether” a factor mattered. In order to clarify the mechanisms leading to the formal delegation of authority or increased resources, my method will centre on what Collier, Brady and Seawright (2004) call causal process observations (CPOs), which they contrast with data-set observations as understood by statisticians.  They describe CPOs as incidences of an “insight or piece of data that provides information about context or mechanism” that provides inferential leverage for the                                                61 Hall 2003.  62 Bennett 2010; George and Bennett 2005.  63 George and Bennett 2005.  20 theory as a whole.64  These observations “focus on ideas or priorities that must be held by actors in order for the hypothesis associated with the data-set observations to be correct”.65   Alan Jacobs refers to these as the observable implications (OIs) of an argument, and I follow that terminology.  The process of seeking multiple OIs within a single case (a case being defined as a spatiotemporally bounded instance of a phenomenon) overcomes what KKV considered to be a degrees of freedom problem in case studies.66   One or two cases can generate many of these OIs, each of which provide additional tests for a hypothesis.  Each OI can include elements of one or more ideal types.67   For example, many are straw-in-the-wind tests, which provide some evidence, but are not necessarily unique to the theory being postulated; nor are they certain to be observed if the theory is correct.  Slightly more useful are hoop test OIs, which must be observed for the theory to be true, but which could also have other explanatory factors.  More valuable yet is the smoking-gun OI, which is unique to the theory in question; it may not be observed, so while it’s absence neither confirms nor disconfirms the theory, it’s presence firmly confirms the theory.  Finally, the perfect OI is double decisive, an incidence that, if viewed, confirms the theory, and if not viewed, established the theory as false.  I therefore formulated OIs with two objectives: first, they are what I would expect to see if my argument is correct, second, they are phenomena that alternative theories would not expect.  While my intent is to build rather than test theory, carefully constructed OIs can help to do both.  As Van Evera (1997) suggests, I will consider                                                64 Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004, 184-185; this collected text was intended explicitly as a response to the claims made in King, Keohane and Verba 1994.  65 Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004, 191. 66 King, Keohane, and Verba 1994. 67 Van Evera 1997.  21 both how unique each expected observation is to my argument vis-à-vis other theories and how certain it is to be seen if my argument is correct.68  Naturally, any methodological decision involves trade-offs.  The most conspicuous one here is that between accuracy and generalisability.  By examining in detail the mechanisms involved, process tracing has the potential to significantly improve the accuracy of the findings; however, given the small number of cases, the ability to generalise from our findings to a wider population of potential cases is weakened.69  I would like to strike a tentative balance by initially choosing two cases to study in depth; in doing so, I hope to form a framework that I, or others, can apply to other cases. 1.3.2 Case selection For this dissertation, I focus on the UN for several reasons.  The UN is the broadest contemporary international organization, both in terms of scope and membership, and is arguably the most complex and influential.  It was therefore a logical forum in which to explore the possibility of a previously unexamined mechanism between IO Secretariats and member states.  My specific case selection was informed by six considerations: i) Number of cases: I focus on two cases to strike a balance between accuracy and generalisability.   A clear picture of the mechanisms I have studied requires detail and accuracy in each case, posing considerable time and resource constraints.    However, two cases are the bare minimum.  I look forward to the opportunity, after this dissertation, to develop this research program and choose additional cases to either improve the generalisability of my argument or determine the range of cases to which it is applicable.  I intend to examine two more UN cases,                                                68 Ibid. 69 Przeworski and Teune 1970, 17-30.  22 in the areas of development and climate change, before moving on to examine other international organisations. ii) Holding institutional factors constant:  I chose two cases within the UN in order to hold fairly constant many of the institutional factors commonly used to explain variation in delegation (such as membership, scope, mandate, and power relations amongst states).  By holding these constant as potential causes of the moments of additional delegation, I can focus on explanations based on ideational factors and related persuasion mechanisms.  Of all the alternative, realist or institutional explanations, power politics is the one factor that cannot be held completely constant; while the relative power of each state may not vary over each case study, the variation within each state’s foreign policy priorities from year to year can depend on the individual preferences of elected officials, and remains a plausible alternative explanation that I try to consider. iii) Likely source of informal authority: One of the reasons I narrowed the set of potential cases to within UN institutions is that as the global organisation with the broadest membership, and with greater visibility than other IOs in the same issue areas, it is reasonable to assume that it at least may have centres of expertise-based/principle-based authority within its bureaucracy. Despite the fact that global politics is replete with regime complexity, with multiple centres of authority in each issue area, many specific global issues are commonly widely associated with no more than one or two intergovernmental organisations.   On the issue of IO military intervention, only NATO potentially rivals the UN DPKO, and on the issue of IO political intervention, the DPA is the dominant non-state actor, along with the inter-related activities of the Office of the UN Secretary-General.   However, while the UN may be viewed by states as the dominant IO actor in both military and political intervention, the Secretariat itself  23 has very little formal authority, unlike IOs based almost purely on expertise, such as the IMF or the World Bank.  This relative lack of formal authority makes influence by the UN Secretariat all the more intriguing. iv) Variation on the DV: I also chose these cases, across a time period of several years each, because doing so allows for a range of values on the outcome of interest.  The DPKO budget remained largely constant both before and after the sudden 2001/2 increase, despite changing external conditions typically cited as causes for institutional change. The DPA begins with slow growth, increases sharply in 2005 and 2008 following efforts by the UN bureaucracy, but stagnates from 2009 until the present, during which its economic autonomy is sharply curtailed with more detailed micromanagement of its budget by states.  I acknowledge that this selection approach is considerably at odds with selection advice based on correlational logic.  For example, KKV recommend not just selecting a range of values of the DV, but also preferably selecting cases with a large variation on the IV, in which the researcher has no prior knowledge of the DV.  As with their preference for large-n, this suggestion is less applicable to my project.  Here, as in many of the most useful comparative studies, the objective is to understand the mechanisms leading to a particular outcome, not the correlations.   With many of the most profoundly significant outcomes studied by social scientists, such as war, democracy, capitalism, or state formation, the outcome is usually apparent before the research has begun, but it is the origins and complex paths to those social and political outcomes which fascinate and often elude us.  For this, it makes sense both to begin with selections based on the outcome, and then to use a process tracing method to work back to identify the influential variables.    24 v) Availability of data: Another reason I selected these cases was the availability of data.  The UN makes some academic resources available, and processes for engagement with the public are in place, which makes the UN a practical and manageable first step into the exploration of my hypothesised relationship between different forms of IO Secretariat authority and member state behaviour.  The UN keeps extensive records of debates, negotiations, speeches, decisions, and institutional changes, all of which are usually available, and in most if not all of the six UN languages.70  This is not the case in some other IOs, particularly non-Western regional organisations, which can be opaque by comparison. I am conscious of the resultant selection bias.  Nevertheless, this project establishes a framework which can be applied to all IOs, including those that at first glance require a different approach to gathering the internal data.  I will investigate options for considering less accessible IOs in future research, in order to further clarify the applicable domain for the mechanisms being postulated here. vi) Most influential case: Seawright and Gerring (2008) argue that there are seven categories of cases considered amenable to process tracing for varying reasons: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, different , most similar, and most influential cases.71   This is primarily an influential pair of cases.  The United Nations system is the most comprehensive IO yet created, in terms of membership, institutional design, the ambition of its objectives, and the range and scope of the issues it attempts to address.  With the exception of trade, it is the primary set of institutions for attempting to resolve almost any international challenge.  While in some ways, this is because it has become an umbrella system for an expanding and inter-related set of                                                70 A notable UN exception is the ACABQ, which does not release any details of their deliberations. 71 Seawright and Gerring 2008.   25 numerous international institutions, it is nonetheless the most influential IO in the context of this study. vii) Comparing theories: As stated above, I do not seek to test competing theories.  However, in order to strengthen my argument, I am sensitive to the contrary expectations of more materialist theories, such as those based upon neo-realist foundations.  The DPA and DPKO are particularly useful cases for considering those alternative theories.  Seminal scholars of small-n comparative politics, such as Harry Eckstein and George and Bennett, advocate examining the most likely and least likely cases.72  My cases could fit into either, depending on one’s theoretical standpoint.   Given my assumption that influence over member states is not solely due to material factors, and that non-state actors, without the ability to coerce or leverage material resources, can exert significant influence through the propagation of ideas, the UN Secretary-General and the heads of the DPA and DPKO could be likely sources of informal authority.  The Secretary-General in particular should be associated with the ideals of the UN Charter, and the DPA and DPKO include some of the world’s leading experts in international political and military intervention.  Thus if you accept my claim that informal authority can alter the behaviour of states, then these seem like most-likely cases. However, from Realist perspectives, that informal authority should be irrelevant.  The mandates of the DPA and DPKO departments encompass activities traditionally considered the exclusive purview of powerful states.  The DPA, and the Special Political Missions (SPMs) it manages, constitute a diplomatic network of staff instructed by the Secretary-General to interfere                                                72 Eckstein 1975; George and Bennett 2005.  26 in domestic issues with limited policy oversight by those powerful states (although current Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, is from the US).  The DPKO, even more contentiously, recommends, plans, and manages military interventions within and across state borders.  Thus, from a materialist, statist perspective, in which state power and authority, particularly on military issues, is an end sought by all states, these cases provide a hard case for my argument, in which additional delegation and resources for the bureaucracy would be unlikely. An institutionalist perspective makes delegation more explicable, but it fails to explain why powerful states in my case studies decided that it was in their interests to give greater resources and control to a Secretariat over the management of political and military interventions, given that historically, all the military and political expertise and capacity has resided with states.   One possible institutionalist answer is that delegating the activity to the UN was viewed as economically more efficient in the long term.  Indeed, the Secretary-General did argue that investing in preventative measures such as political missions would be more cost-effective, saving member states from later expending far more resources on reactive measures such as peacekeeping missions.  However, he provided no empirical evidence for the claim, and consistently increasing costs for both peacekeeping operations and special political missions over the last fifteen years, as yet, refute his claim.  27 1.3.3 Evidence and measurement Evidence types 1: documents73 This study draws partly on secondary sources, defined as those authored by observers, rather than directly involved actors, including peer-reviewed articles and texts, magazine articles, histories, and commentaries.  The majority of the data is drawn from primary sources, authored by directly involved actors in both official and unofficial documents.  I define official documents as those that are published with the formal consent of the government or organisation in which the author is employed, including broad publications, internal documents, and speeches.  Unofficial primary sources include manuscripts, diaries, letters, autobiographies, and interviews by/with those actors.  This study assembled UN official documents using the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (www.unbisnet.un.org) and the United Nations Official Documents System (www.documents.un.org).   Each type of evidence had its own advantages and disadvantages.  Throughout this research, I combined official and unofficial data to gain a more accurate picture.  Booth and Glynn (1979) showed that official records such as government cabinet “minutes can be misleading, inaccurate, and an incomplete reflexion of Cabinet discussion”, and that even dramatic or controversial dialogue can be excluded from the record, sometimes because it is dramatic and controversial; they also show the importance of the informal “chat in the corridor” in the taking of decisions, opinion formation, and the channelling of information.74                                                 73 For a useful and concise discussion of document research, albeit in the context of historical studies, see Trachtenberg 2006,140-168. 74 Booth and Glynn 1979.  28 Official documents produced at (or near) the heads of governments or IOs were typically the result of a process of multiple reviews and edits, and thus less prone to individual biases, although bias at the institutional level was a consideration.  Another advantage of high level, official documents is that they tended to be supported by greater resources, and as such were capable of greater accuracy.   However, these documents also had some disadvantages. One disadvantage was that the processes of official document production, while often more transparent, can generate somewhat sterile documents, partly because, as Weber discussed, bureaucratic authority is based on a reputation of rational, dispassionate, and rule orientated behaviour.75  Thus, while this made it easier to identify decisions and political outcomes, it also made it more difficult to ascertain the motives behind the claims in official documents.  This difficulty was exacerbated by the processes of negotiation and political compromise that UN official document creation involves, between different parts of the secretariat as well as with states.  Another disadvantage for official documents, unpacked by Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 2004), is that ostensibly rule-orientated behaviour can nonetheless produce quite dysfunctional and narrow-minded decision-making procedures.   Unofficial documents were more individually subjective, but they also illuminated the informal processes and power relations not discussed in official documents.  The comparative politics literature on informal institutions implies that an analysis of authority in IOs should consider how informal norms, rules, and procedures interact with formal ones.  These interactions may be complementary, accommodating, substituting, or competing, depending on whether the outcomes of formal and informal institutions converge or diverge, and whether the                                                75 Mowat 1971, 68. Mowat demonstrates that cabinet minutes do not help illuminate “motives or passions”.  29 formal institutions are effective.76  For Helmke and Levitsky, actors create informal institutions when formal rules are incomplete, unattainable, or not publicly acceptable.  These informal institutions change not only when formal institutions change, but also as societal values evolve, and as the status quo conditions that support them change. These ideas are only rarely applied to IOs; Barnett and Finnemore’s (2004) exploration of IO bureaucratic culture is an important exception.  As with any piece of informal evidence, of course, one needs to consider the motives the author may have to portray themselves or others in a flattering or derogatory light.  With all articulated claims and preferences, in documents as in speeches and interviews, I considered the intended audience and the preferences of that audience, and the motives an author may have to tailor claims in light of that audience.  Those motives can, in some cases, be quite profound.  For example, in the months leading up to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein repeatedly turned down opportunities to reveal convincingly to international actors that he did not have “WMD”, because his regime stability depended upon both domestic (Shi’a) and international (Iran, Israel) actors believing that there existed a credible threat that he would use extreme measures to both repel external threats and to suppress domestic dissent.77  Thus, audience preferences must be broadly understood in order to identify the strategic motives an actor may have to misrepresent their position.   Types of evidence 2: interviews Interviews data began with interviews at UN Headquarters, New York, in June 2015, and then with occasional phone interviews in the following two years.  I interviewed sixteen                                                76 Lauth 2000; Helmke and Levitsky 2004; see also O’Donnell 1996; O’Donnell 1994. 77 Tariq Aziz, former Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, cited in Annan 2012, 344.  30 individuals.  Of the ten state representatives, one was a former Ambassador, three were currently Fifth Committee members, one was a current member of the ACABQ, two were assigned to the Security Council, one to the CPC, and two were advisors on issues that included peace operations.  Of the six Secretariat staff, two were assigned to the ACABQ, two at the DPA, and two to the Fifth Committee.   All but one, the retired UN Ambassador, were currently working at the UN when interviewed.  I therefore interviewed both state and IO bureaucratic actors directly involved in various stages of the budget process, both in order to better understand that process, and to understand extent to which different actors are able to influence the budget.  I also did so to broadly investigate the informal as well as formal institutions and relationships amongst key actors.  For all the interviews, an underlying objective was to clarify the sequence of events in each case, including the identities, roles and actions of the relevant actors, and any instance in which changes in policy preferences took place.   Interviews did suffer from similar weaknesses to those found in informal documents, but the validity was superior, as lines of inquiry in an interview were tailored specifically to address the research question, rather than inferred indirectly from documents that may not have explicitly or directly addressed the issues of interest.  When, as is the case with this project, the objective includes understanding the private attitudes and motives of actors, and how they interpret a certain series of events, then interview data can be far more effective than document research.78   Preparing and conducting interviews  Interviewees were chosen on the basis of their proximity of each to the mechanisms sought, and their level of access to the relevant information.  Most interviewees held positions at                                                78 Aberbach and Rockman 2002.  31 or near the heads of their respective departments.  Each signed, in advance, a consent form including a choice for the interviewee as to whether they would allow me to record the interview.  The majority agreed to be recorded, but almost all selected one of the two most restrictive confidentiality preferences, preventing citation by name, and in some cases even prohibiting direct quotes that could lead them to be identified by any well-informed observer.  Six interviewees permitted audio recordings of the interviews.  All interviewees were offered the opportunity to review the relevant sections before final publication. Interviews were semi-structured to allow the interviewee to introduce events, i.e. potentially omitted variables, that had not previously have occurred to me.  I tried to remain focused on the line of questioning, however, acknowledging that the “valuable flexibility of open-ended questioning exacerbates the validity and reliability issues”.79   Almost all interviewees were willing to converse for at least an hour, even when the interview was scheduled for a far shorter time.  I was sensitive to potential biases generated by the specific perspective of the interviewees, or the possibility that they might exaggerate their own role,80 and these biases were mitigated through triangulation with other sources of evidence.  I transcribed each interview as soon as possible and triangulated that interview data with official and unofficial document data.81   The nature of the interviews was such that there were no significant ethical issues; I adhered to the initial contact protocols, all requests for interviews were passed through official channels in writing, records were kept of all correspondence, and all interview data has been stored securely.                                                79 Berry 2002. 80 Berry 2002, 681. 81 Davies 2001.  32 1.4 Conclusion and roadmap This chapter has provided a brief overview of the theoretical argument, sought to establish its plausibility with an early historical example, and provided an overview of the methodological choices made in the dissertation.  Chapter 2 expands the theoretical account of the processes involved, with two objectives.  One is to refute materialist views that persuasion using ideational arguments are ineffective, by discussing some social and psychological theories concerning the process of persuasion itself.  The other objective is to explore the three strategies through which the Secretariat can persuade member states to alter their preferences. Chapter 3 explores the UN budgetary process and outlines the relationships between all the key actors and voting blocs in the UN.  This provides the necessary background to understand the case studies, but it also illustrates the institutional avenues for influence by the Secretariat, and the types of argument that are more effective at different veto points in the budget process.  Chapters 4 and 5 are the case studies, examining changes to the budgets of the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (2000-2001) and Political Missions (2005-2008) respectively.  Chapter 6 will conclude the dissertation, summarising and further analysing the findings.     33 Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework - A Persuasive Secretariat  2.1 Summary of argument This dissertation argues that members of the Secretariat of an international organisation can use their informal authority, rooted in the perceptions others have of their expertise or adherence to a set of principles, to persuade member states to increase resources for a part of that Secretariat.  I do not discount the role of hard power politics or state actions based on material preferences; rather, I add to these factors an understudied, yet crucial factor in explaining these increases in IO bureaucracy resources.  This chapter lays out the conceptual foundation for this claim.   International organisations are social environments, and as such, the behaviour and ideas of some actors can affect the behaviour and ideas of others, even without any change in the material conditions and incentives.  Under such a social environment, the authority of particular actors can magnify their ability to persuade others.  The efficacy of such efforts at persuasion is contingent upon several factors.  There must be a reasonable degree of congruence between the speaker’s authority type, the issue area, the content and form of the argument, and the values and beliefs of the audience. A second necessary precondition is a lack of entrenched veto groups within the audience in opposition to each other on the issue.    Given these conditions, group persuasion by the Secretariat is possible.  I define IO large group persuasion as an activity in which an actor directs an argument towards the entire plenary assembly, or towards groups of influential members of the international community.  These efforts take the form of both written and spoken arguments, which overlap given that speeches are regularly transcribed and published in written form.  The complex decision-making processes of both individuals and groups allow for the preferences and beliefs of member states to be  34 influenced by an actor viewed as authoritative.  These processes of persuasion and subsequent policy change can take several years for institutional reasons such as lengthy budget cycles, but also for individual and group cognitive obstacles as outlined in the section on persuasion below.  The three strategies through which group persuasion is applied do not each correspond to stages, given that they often overlap and do not necessarily take place is a given order. The first strategy is agenda setting.  In order for changes to take place in the UN, the plenary assembly needs to come to believe that the issue under consideration has reached a crisis point, such that it needs to be earnestly and urgently debated.  I refer to processes leading to this realisation, and the associated strategy of the Secretariat in encouraging that realisation, as agenda setting.  Only after this commitment of member states is established can further strategic persuasive efforts be used to convince states that the successful resolution of that crisis requires the delegation of additional resources.   However, this is not a stage to come before other strategies, as the two other strategies below can make agenda setting easier. The second strategy is operation initiation and/or expansion, defined as the act of initiating activities that as a consequence will require that member states provide additional resources, to the Secretariat as well as to the specific mission.  While the budgetary processes of international organisations are heavily influenced by the political relationships between blocs of states, they are also guided by the practical necessity of providing at least minimally sufficient funds to undertake the tasks previously assigned by member states.  If a member of the Secretariat can begin by motivating states to endow the organisation with additional mandates, those mandates then provide the justification for additional resources, not just for the operations, but also for the Secretariat departments that managed those operations.    35 The third strategy is the multiplication of informal authority.  In this strategy the Secretariat initiates the formation of autonomous actors whose tasks include firstly, analysing the activities that the Secretariat believes are under-resourced, and then secondly, providing recommendations for improving the efficacy of those activities.  Members of these groups are specifically chosen because they are considered by member states to be authoritative in the relevant issue area.  While the Secretariat may not directly control the outcome of such groups, they can take efforts to provide the group with all the data that may support the position of the Secretariat.  This theory chapter is structured along the lines of this argument.  I discuss each core concept in turn: i) the social interaction of member states within international organisations, ii) informal authority, iii) the psychology of persuasion, iv) agenda setting, v) strategic persuasion, vi) operation initiation, and vii) multiplying authority.  I then consider alternative explanations for delegation, rooted in neorealist and functionalist theories.  I argue that statist ontological assumptions render these incomplete tools for studying the mechanisms leading to delegation of resources in international organisations. For some, small aspects of this chapter, I intentionally delve into slightly more detail than that ostensibly justified by the evidence in the case studies.  This is because the primary purpose of this project is not to test theories, but to build a theoretical framework that i) balances both accuracy and generalisability, and ii) could be applied additional case studies at any IO, on any issue, and at any level of analysis.  This dissertation considers, as an audience, the entire plenary assembly of the United Nations, but additional research could apply this theoretical framework on a much smaller scale, even limiting a study to the gradual shift in preferences of an individual  36 key representative within that assembly.  The depth of this theory chapter accounts for such additional projects.  As I work through the theory below, I draw attention to a series of observable implications [OIs] that I then seek, within the case studies, to provide evidence in support of or in opposition to that hypothesis.  The ideal OI includes elements that are a) implied by my theory, and b) not expected by the alternative theories being considered.  Conversely, I will also explicitly note some of the counter observable implications [COIs] expected by those opposing theoretical claims.  I include these implications where relevant, and then provide a complete list at the end of this chapter.   The final chapter of the dissertation then includes a comprehensive table summarising the findings in both case studies for each OI. 2.2 Core concepts and theoretical framework  2.2.1 International organisations (IOs) In this section, I define IOs, discuss the social nature of state behaviour within them, and the possibility of influential shaming.  States are far more constrained by IO institutions than state-centric analyses acknowledge.  This acknowledgement of the nature of the IO environment is essential for a more complete understanding of why the persuasion of states by non-state actors is possible. For the purposes of this study, I use the term IO to refer to any formal intergovernmental organisation formed through a Charter between three or more states, with a physical headquarters, permanent staff, and regular meetings between member states.82   The terms Secretariat and IO bureaucracy will be used interchangeably to refer to the personnel throughout                                                82 Coleman 2007, 6-7.  37 an IO who are organisationally separate from the plenary assemblies, and whose primary formal role is to administer the organisation and to enact mandates set by member states.  These international civil servants formally hold a professional allegiance to the IO, and to the departments in which they are employed, and not to their respective member states.  Examples from the UN include employees of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office of the Secretary-General (OSG).  My focus will be on the heads of departments, and on the Secretary-General, who is the focal point for the ideas and arguments intended to influence state behaviour.  He is also the potential source of a great deal of informal authority, and thus is a conduit through which the influence of the Secretariat might be brought to bear on others.  However, as is discussed in more detail in the case study chapters, the Secretary-General is both influenced, and supported in his persuasive efforts, by other actors within the UN.  These other actors are primarily members of the Secretariat, but they also include some state actors. IOs are social environments, as Johnston (2001) discussed.  However, while Johnston predominantly focused on interactions amongst states, these social environments also include individuals from within the bureaucracy, from various related agencies and NGOs, and other permitted observers, who all engage with each other as well as with those representing member states.  Often, these same individuals interact regularly for many years.  Bureaucrats can be lifetime employees, and member state delegation staff are typically stationed at an IO for several years at least.   The design of an IO, in terms of their charter, rules of procedure, and membership, is to a considerable degree a reflection of the set of power relationships amongst founding member states.  John Mearsheimer (1995) concisely restated the Realist position that “institutions are  38 basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world.  They are based on the self-interested calculation of the great powers”.83  I concur, and the design of the UN Security Council, with the veto power control of the Organisation by the victorious great powers of WWII, provides a supporting example.  However, Mearsheimer immediately goes on to say that institutions therefore “have no independent effect on state behaviour”.84  This claim can only be asserted if one assumes an extremely narrow, statist ontology combined with assumptions of purely materialist motives and purely material sources of influence.   On the contrary, international organisations are constituted by sets of institutions that, even after created by power states, can constrain or limit the policy choices of even the most powerful actors.  Douglass North (1990) famously defined institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction”, including “both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)”.85  Key to this definition is the recognition that, institutions, once established, influence and sometimes rigidly restrict the range of permissible actions for those operating within, sometimes for decades afterwards.  Within an IO, these constraining informal institutions manifest as sets of ideas, which can influence states and Secretariats as well as the perceptions of material concerns emphasised by neorealists.86  This understanding of institutions is relevant here because in an IO, the Secretary-General informally but explicitly adopts the role of guardian of those institutions.  For example,                                                83 Mearsheimer 1995, 7. 84 Ibid. 85 North 1991; for more details and evidence, see North 1990.  86 See, for example, Rueschemeyer 2006, 227-251; Price 2006, 252-265. Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Jervis 1976; Schmidt 2008; Howorth 2004.  39 the consideration in the case study chapters of how the Secretary-General’s authority is perceived by others shows that a Secretary-General can be identified as the spokesman, not just for the administration of the Organisation, but also the principles upon which it was founded.  Those principles, codified in the UN Charter and reaffirmed in numerous subsequent resolutions, include commitments by member states to “maintain international peace and security”, promote “the economic and social advancement of all peoples”, to support “fundamental human rights” and ensure “the equal rights of men and women”.87    Some Secretaries-General often publicly identified and shamed states that did not adhere or aspire to those ideals, ideals to which member states have arguably committed themselves by virtue of membership in the United Nations, and as signatories to many resolutions that espouse those ideals.  The concept of shaming is useful here for two reasons: one is to help counter materialist, rationalist assumptions that state preferences are derived exclusively from their material needs and their desire to improve their relative power; the other is to illustrate one of the mechanisms by which an actor with little or no material power can persuade more powerful actors to adjust their policies.  Shaming can motivate states to change their behaviour because, as emphasised by the English school, the state is a social as well as a political entity, operating in a wider community of states.  Bull and Watson (1984) define international society as “a groups of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their                                                87 UN. UN Charter. Preamble.  40 relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements”.88  States that commit transgressions of those rules can be subjected to chastisement both by other states and the Secretariat.   Shaming by a non-state actor can incur costs however, if the target of shaming can leverage political resources to retaliate.  An example would be after 2003, when Kofi Annan declared the US occupation of Iraq to be illegal under international law, and contrary to the principles of the UN.  However, shaming states with less material influence, and less influence over UN institutions, such as with Indonesia in the DPKO chapter, can be effective in altering state behaviour. There is considerable theoretical and empirical evidence that shaming can be effective.  DeMeritt (2012) uses Principal-Agent (P-A) sub-theories to support the claim that by “calling attention to abusive states, human rights NGOs and the United Nations can reduce both the likelihood and severity of state-sponsored murder”.89  Franklin (2008) used a large-n study and found similar results, that shaming reduced human rights violations, but with some qualifications; effects typically lasted less than six months, and they were more pronounced when there were stronger economic ties between the perpetrators and the actors or organisations orchestrating the shaming.90  Krain (2012) studied incidences of genocide from 1976-2008 to show that naming and shaming significantly reduced the intensity of these occurrences.91  Lebovic and Voeten (2006) examined the efficacy of the UN Commission on Human Rights shaming over a similar time period, 1977-2001, showing that it did have a significant effect, and                                                88 Bull and Watson 1984, 271-272. 89 DeMeritt 2012. 90 Franklin 2008.  91 Krain 2012.   41 that, intriguingly, it became far more effective after the end of the Cold War, when its pronouncements ceased to appear as though entirely motivated by ideological bias.92  States are thus both enabled and constrained by various formal and informal institutions that constitute their social community. I turn now to one more related issue, the extent to which states can be considered to be unitary actors. For the sake of simplicity, I refer frequently to a state or bloc of states within that community as though it were a coherent unit.  However, the foreign policy apparatus alone of any state will have numerous actors with varying sets of incentives.  At the very least, a state will have an Ambassador at an IO, who would answer to a Foreign Minister (or an equivalent) and a Head of State.  There can be significant differences between the perspectives and priorities of state representatives stationed in IOs and the governments they represent.  Representatives, typically stationed at an IO for at least two to four years, develop more detailed knowledge of the inner workings of the IO than their superiors, and as a consequence develop stronger and more detailed opinions than their superiors as to how the organisation could be made more effective. Pouliot (2016) argued that there are professional and academic reasons to treat Ambassadors, as professional spokesman, and their respective states, as coherent, unitary actors.93  However, there are several interrelated reasons that lead me to suspect that in addition to advocating for policies that their respective governments support, Ambassadors may also seek reforms that they feel better enable the organisation to achieve its mandates.  By virtue of their expertise relative to their superiors, and their physical distance from their home countries (making direct supervision of Ambassadors challenging) they can in theoretical terms be                                                92 Lebovic and Voeten 2006. 93 Pouliot 2016.  42 considered to be an agent to the principal, their own government.  Principal-Agent sub-theories expect a divergence of preferences between Ambassadors and their governments.  There is also considerable empirical evidence that professionalism leads individuals not only to seek to improve their own work environment, but also to contribute more to their work environment than can be explained using a rationalist framework.94 This project found some evidence to support this claim.  For example, three of the delegates to the UN Fifth Committee or the ACABQ interviewed by this author, at several points in our conversations, responded to a question by offering two responses.  They first stated the formal position of those they represented, but then clarified that they personally believed that efficacy in the relevant issue area could be improved by responding differently.95  More specifically, two of those interviewees privately expressed the opinion that, contrary to the official positions of their governments, they believed there would be considerable benefits to greater autonomy and/or resources for the Secretariat in specific issue areas.  However, both saw the political debate in the Fifth Committee as a potentially insurmountable obstacle to realising those benefits.  One identified a source of tension within democratic governments in that UN Fifth Committee delegates “are still in the situation whereby their governments are being forced by the taxpayers to conduct their business in a much leaner way and that logic should apply to the organisation, the United Nations, as well”.96                                                  94 DellaVigna 2009. 95 Interviews with Fifth Committee delegates A, B, and C, and ACABQ member A, with this author, June 2015.   This phenomenon was more complex with a delegate from an EU country, who indicated that his formal position was one agreed upon at the EU level, and that it was not only less effective than other possible policies in terms of efficiency at the UN, but that it was also not always the policy ideally preferred by his own country. 96 Interview with Fifth Committee delegate A, with this author, June 2015.  43 This difference in preferences between ambassadors and their member states could be more pronounced with representatives from less wealthy countries.  These states are typically unable to maintain a large diplomatic staff both at home and at the IO, leading to a condition where representatives are as likely to rely on information from the Secretariat as from as their superiors back in their home states.97   The variance in staff numbers at UN Permanent Missions can be substantial.  For example, the US Mission has 203 professional (excluding secretarial and custodial) staff, Russia 93, China 82, the UK 47, and France 46.98    Each of those states is thus able to form teams to focus on each issue area. In contrast, Andorra has only two staff, and the majority of smaller states have between five and eight staff in total, with each individual typically fulfilling several roles.99 A final point on international organisations important in the context of changes to the budget of the Secretariat is that, when either formal or informal institutions change within IOs, they usually do so gradually, and are resistant to change in the short term for at least four reasons.  In terms of the logic of consequences,100 one reason is that actors acting within institutions will have invested time and resources in utility-seeking strategies that take those institutions into account.  Any change in those institutions would then result in wasted resources and/or a need to invest additional time and effort to adapt; as a result, they resist efforts at change.101  A second reason, in terms of the logic of appropriateness, is that formal institutions are reflections of prior social rules of behaviour that “are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and                                                97 Interviews with Fifth Committee delegates A and B with this author, June 2015.  However, both were representatives of at least middle power states. 98 UN. Protocol and Liaison Service: Permanent Missions. 99 Ibid. 100 March and Olsen 2006.  101 North 1990; Hall and Taylor 1996; Pierson 2004.   44 legitimate”, and those rules of behaviour are slow to change.102  A third reason is procedural; IO budget cycles can be lengthy, as discussed in Chapter 3, such that in the UN, there can be a gap of two years or more between the General Assembly passing a resolution adding a mandate to a department, and the corresponding change in the budget.   Finally, as discussed in the persuasion section below, individuals and groups face cognitive obstacles and delays to changing their beliefs and preferences, even in the face of accurate contrary information. 2.2.2 Authority There are many sources of authority that over the last two decades have increasingly been identified and studied amongst non-state actors.  Utilising a sociological institutionalist (also called organisational sociology) approach, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) provided persuasive evidence for several arguments.  Namely: i) IOs have a space for action that is autonomous from member states; ii) applying Weber’s thoughts on authority, IO actors use rational-legal authority, moral authority, and/or a reputation for expertise, to independently influence state behaviour; and iii) that IO bureaucracies can exhibit certain pathologies.103  I build upon their work by arguing more specifically that that informal authority, which is largely beyond the control of member states, can be used to persuade member states to devote more resources to the bureaucracy. I define authority as a socially accepted power or right to issue instructions, such that authority induces deference in a particular audience within a particular bounded institutional and issue context.104  There are two broad categories of authority: formal and informal.  Formal authority is a hierarchical relationship codified in law.  Informal authority is derived from                                                102 March and Olsen 2006, 2. 103 Barnett and Finnemore 1999; 2004.  104 This definition is composed from common knowledge, and from the general discussion of authority in Avant et al. 2010, 9-11.  45 subjective perceptions of the characteristics of the speaker, and is not codified through a formal hierarchy.   There are several forms of authority within each of these two categories.  Avant et al. (2010), expanding upon Barnett and Finnemore (2004), posit a typology of five sources of authority: institutional, expertise-based, principle-based, delegated and capacity-based.105  This is an excellent point of departure, although they do not parse formal from informal for analytical purposes as I do. The last two of Avant et al.’s forms of authority, delegated and capacity-based, are externally controlled and formal, in that they are delineated in legal intergovernmental documents such as, in the UN case, the UN Charter and subsequent UN Resolutions, in particular those relating to the UN budget.  At first glance, capacity-based authority, derived from the perception that the actor has the capacity required to effectively act to achieve a solution to a particular issue, is subjective in nature and potentially informal.  However, if one parses from this category all of the other forms of authority Avant et al. list, one is left with the material, tangible resources available to the actor, spelled out in the IO budget and formally and legally delegated by member states; for this reason I identify it as a formal source of authority.  In contrast, the first three forms of authority, institutional, expertise-based, and principle-based are                                                105 Avant et al. 2010.  Their five categories of authority are: Institutional authority is a consequence of holding a position in an organisation, and is limited by the rules and purposes of that organisation. Expertise-based authority is based on experience and specialised knowledge. Principle-based authority is based upon the adherence of an actor to a set of rules, principles, values or morals considered legitimate by the particular audience.   Formal delegated authority consists of rules agreed by organisation members concerning the mandate of an IO bureaucracy, over issues such as agenda setting, mediation, legal assistance, compliance monitoring, and information provision.  Capacity-based authority derives from the perception that the actor has the capacity required to effectively act to achieve (socially acceptable) solutions to a particular issue.  For the audience, the focus is on the task, and who can best achieve it.   46 informal, to the extent that they are not delegated, but rather stem from the subjective perceptions others have of certain characteristics of the speaker that justify deference on certain issues.   Formal authority can always develop from informal.  Just as any informal institution can become codified in law over time, powerful actors such as member states may choose to formally delegate authority to those they perceive to have the necessary characteristics.  However, while informal can occasionally transition into formal, in the short-to-medium term, they can be differentiated from each other reasonably well. Many UN resolutions over the years authorising the Secretariat to create, orchestrate or manage new activities only take place as a result of a concerted, prior effort by the Secretariat, utilising its informal authority, to claim that these changes need to take place.  The formal authorities of the Secretariat, and of the Secretary-General in particular, are delineated by the UN Charter and the various Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions over the years.  Resolutions are often preceded by Secretary-General reports drawing member states’ attention to an issue, although the relative influence of the Secretary-General can only be elucidated through an in depth case study of each decision.  It is my contention, at many points in this dissertation, that  It is the influence of these informal forms of authority that this project focuses upon.  In addition to parsing formal from informal, I make one other significant departure from Avant et al.’s typology; I conflate institutional with principle-based authority.  This is in large part due to the fact that both case studies used in this study are located within the United Nations.  In the UN, the principle-based authority of the Secretary-General is closely intertwined with his institutional authority, because the principles perceived as adhered to by that actor form, and are  47 derived from, the formal objectives of the Organisation as a whole, namely furthering international peace, human rights, and the alleviation of suffering and poverty.  In applications of this theory to other institutions, it may well be possible and/or necessary to consider institutional authority separately from principle-based, but in the UN, these two forms are too interdependent to do so. I therefore consider there to be two forms, or categories of informal authority. Expertise-based authority is based on experience and specialised knowledge.106  As P-A theorists highlight, the specialised knowledge of an agent provides one of the key motives for principals to delegate activities to them.  On an individual level, perceptions of expertise depend on the speaker’s professional history and qualifications, but also on their access to political information.  The Secretary-General and key Secretariat actors are well placed at the nexus of world politics to directly access that information.   The UN Secretary-General can be perceived by many in the addressed audience to have a unique form of expertise authority, as an elected governor of the international community of states.  Thus, even in addressing a large forum with conditions vastly different to those Johnston and Checkel envisioned as benefitting persuasion, a Secretary-General might be able to influence the attitudes of many states on one specific, but widely influential issue: the appropriate relationship between a state and the Organisation as a whole.  Principle-based authority is based upon the perception of adherence by an actor to a set of rules, principles, values or morals considered legitimate by the particular audience.107  I                                                106 Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 24-25; Avant et al. 2010, 12-13. 107 Avant et al. 2010, 13.  48 conceive of a slightly broader category than that discussed in Avant et al., such that I would also include Weber’s rational-legal authority here as a form of authority derived from being perceived as adhering to bureaucratic and legal rules.  Other examples of perceived principles could include humanity, globalism and political neutrality. There are two kinds of evidence for identifying informal authority.  Firstly, evidence is found in the manner in which listeners describe the attributes of the speaker.  For example, if states (and other observers) perceive an IO bureaucrat to be endowed with expertise-based authority, they may make requests to that person for technical advice, and/or make references to the specialised knowledge of the actor as reason for deference to their instructions.  If an IO bureaucrat is perceived to be endowed with principle-based authority, states may describe the principles, values or morals held by that IO bureaucratic actor as legitimate and worthwhile pursuits, and/or cite those principles and values as reason for deference.   Secondly, there is indirect evidence in the form of deference, which is only present if an IO actor actively and strategically choses to draw upon their authority in order to attempt to change the behaviour of others.  This deference includes changes in the articulated preferences of member states to more closely accord with the expressed preferences of the Secretariat, but also an increasing tendency to repeat arguments previously articulated by the Secretariat actor viewed as authoritative.  These informal forms of authority relate closely to the concept of soft power, typically applied only to states.  Soft power is the ability to change the behaviour of others by attraction or  49 co-optation in a way that excludes coercion or material incentives.108  The process I postulate, between IO informal authority, argumentative and rhetorical persuasion, and the changes in state attitudes towards the IO, fits into this definition.  While I rarely talk of the power of Secretariat, given how loaded the term “power” is, my argument could potentially be restated as a claim that a Secretariat can use their soft power as a means to increase their hard power.  Similarly, the argument could be stated as an explanation of how informal authority could be used to increase one’s formal authority. The influence of informal authority depends not only on the characteristics of the speaker, but also on their diplomatic skill, and their conscious decision to strategically apply that skill to intervene in member state affairs. All Secretaries-General thus far, with the exception of Annan, had extensive foreign ministry experience, and Annan had many years experience in the UN at the nexus of international diplomacy.  Of all the Secretaries-General, Hammarskjöld and Annan conspicuously stand out as intentionally and explicitly adopting a more diplomatically active role.  Secretary-General Ban’s approach was more directed towards backroom diplomacy than the bully pulpit, and his strategies focused on his formal rather than informal authority, but was no less active. Studies of the authority of IO bureaucracies thus far have not explored the specific mechanism considered in this project.  For example, Finnemore (1993), Barnett and Finnemore (2004), and Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009) are focused on the influence that authority can                                                108 Nye 1990, 2004 discusses the concept of soft power, commonly applied only to states, as the ability to change the behaviour of others by attraction or co-optation in a way that excludes coercion or material incentives. The process between IO informal authority, persuasion, and the changes in state attitudes towards the IO, fits into this definition.  My argument could be restated as a claim that a Secretariat can use their soft power as a means to increase their hard power, but given how loaded the term “power” is, I chose avoid such a claim.   50 have on state domestic policies, specifically science, fiscal, and environmental policy respectively. For this project, it is the changes in states’ foreign policy back towards the IO, and more specifically towards changes in the resources of the IO bureaucracy, which interest me. OI 1: If an IO bureaucrat is perceived to be endowed with expertise-based authority, states may a) make requests for technical advice to the IO bureaucratic actor, and/or b) make references to the specialised knowledge of the IO bureaucratic actor as reason for deference to their instructions. OI 2: If an IO bureaucrat is perceived to be endowed with principle-based authority, states may a) describe the principles, values or morals held by the IO bureaucratic actor as legitimate and worthwhile pursuits, and/ or b) cite those principles and values as reason for deference.   2.2.3 Persuasion In this section, I cover three sub-topics related to persuasion.  First, I broadly define and describe the act of persuasion, particularly as it has been discussed by IR scholars.  I then explore both the psychological and institutional reasons for the gradual nature of persuasion in an IO setting; this nature explains why the changes I study in both case studies take place over several years.  Finally, I discuss the conditions under which persuasion is effective, both on an individual level, and when large groups are being addressed, in order to support my claims that the efficacy of persuasion is dependent upon the relationships between the character or authority of the speaker, the form of the argument, and the character or identity of the audience. While the empirical parts of this dissertation do not delve into the individual psychological processes of persuasion, I explore them here for several reasons.  One is that there is a fundamental, implicit assumption in much of the rationalist, materialist literature that the  51 causes of state preference changes within an IO must be due to exogenous factors that influence the benefits that each particular state will receive as a result of a particular policy change.  In contrast, my project assumes that other ideational factors occasionally take precedence, and influence individual psychological responses to particular social problems, such that some member states can thus be persuaded to contribute resources to Secretariat activities that do not directly provide those states with any clear material benefits.   A second reason for laying the foundations of persuasion at the individual level is the consideration of further research after this dissertation.  A valuable further study would be to identify key individuals in the audiences addressed by the Secretaries-General, and examine, in depth, their changes in attitudes towards issues surrounding greater resources for the Secretariat.  Therefore, in order to lay the foundations, both for my theoretical assumptions that challenge the alternative materialist views, and in order to offer a framework that will allow the incorporation of individual-level analyses, I outline, in fairly simple terms, the psychological mechanisms of persuasion. What is persuasion? I define persuasion as the act of causing another to alter his or her attitude or behaviour towards an issue or concept through reasoning or argument, in the absence of overt material or mental coercion.109  While my definition of persuasion cites both attitude change and behaviour as indicators, I focus my attention only on behaviour and not the underlying attitude changes.  This is primarily for methodological reasons surrounding the difficulty of attitude measurements.                                                 109 A similar formulation is used by Johnston 2001, 496.  I am also influenced by the definition widely used in psychology, where persuasion is the use of symbols by one social actor for the purpose of changing or maintaining another social actor’s opinion or behaviour; see, for example Dillard 2010, 203.  52 The experimental study of persuasion is plagued by what is termed the attitude-behaviour problem.110  This is the phenomenon whereby a disjuncture exists between the change in a person’s attitude towards a concept (often measured by questionnaire) and their observed behaviour on directly related issues.  Debates ensue as to whether this disjuncture is the result of a failure to measure attitudes accurately (given that individuals may not be willing or able to honestly answer questions on the subject), or a lack of understanding as to how attitudes affect behaviour.111  Even if there were accepted, reliable measures of attitude change, I would need to persuade Heads of State and Ambassadors to allow themselves to be subjected to in-depth psychological questionnaires, an unlikely if academically intriguing prospect.  Therefore, while it is an implicit element of the mechanisms leading to the behaviour change of the member states in an IO, I do not seek to directly measure attitude change.   A common early framework in psychology posits three interacting cognitive elements from which a person develops or changes an attitude, defined as a cognitive/affective attraction or repulsion reaction towards any particular object/concept:112 these are information, beliefs, and values.  Information includes data claims, such as the number of dead/injured/displaced as a result of a particular conflict.  Beliefs are convictions concerning the causal relationships in the social world, e.g. that military might is required to end conflicts, or conversely that diplomacy is more effective than military intervention, that deterrence is effective against aggressors, etc.  Values are social concepts considered to be worthwhile ends, (e.g. equality, justice, order, state                                                110 Liska 1975; Miller 1980a, 1980b. 111 Cushman 1980. 112 Crasno and Prislin 2006, 347.  53 sovereignty, globalism, efficiency, human rights).  Values inform broad sets of goals across a range of issues, influencing (or providing parameters for) both attitudes and beliefs.    It is through these tinted lenses of values and beliefs that states or their representatives interpret new information in order to form an attitude. The complex combinations of attitudes that every individual holds enable them to draw meaning from aspects of the world around them.113  I believe that what Barnett and Finnemore (2004) would call bureaucratic or organisational culture can be discussed more systematically if one considers each given culture as embodying a particular set of values and beliefs, a set that can be inferred from the discourse generated by and within an organisation.   While there are three components to the formation of attitudes, there are two processes of attitude change.  While there are many specific differences in the terminology used by various psychologists writing on the subject, there is widespread acceptance of some form of dual-process attitude change.  The first process is an emotional response to a concept, based on innate,114 cultural, or intuitive ideas.115  This is rapid, requires little effort, but is more subject to systematic biases.  The second process is a more active, effortful, and time-consuming deliberation, in which the actor is motivated to re-evaluate their prior understandings of the relevant information, causal connections, and, given time, even their values. Persuasion includes both argumentation and rhetorical persuasion. In rhetorical persuasion, the speaker has fixed preferences and merely seeks to alter those of another.  However, in argumentation, actors sincerely engage in truth seeking, and as such are open to                                                113 Rhodes and Ewoldsen 2013, 54. 114 Marcus 2004. 115 Graham et al. 2012.   54 changing their preferences, causal beliefs, and even, to a lesser extent, their principled beliefs/values and shared understandings of norms and identities.  Risse (2000) adds argumentation to two other frequently articulated mechanisms for affecting behaviour change: i) strategic bargaining, based on the logic of consequences, in which rational choice scholars assume fixed preferences, and ii) rule-guided behaviour, based on the logic of appropriateness, in which actions are guided by social norms.116   However, as Risse acknowledges, the logics of consequences, appropriateness and argumentation are ideal types; any political interaction in reality involves a combination thereof.   Persuasion is the mechanism by which the independent variable, informal authority, influences the dependent variable, Secretariat resources.  If one categorises persuasive relationships by the number of speakers and listeners, there are several different scenarios.  Each can be considered separately as shown below.     Small audience Large audience One or few speakers Persuasion Large Group persuasion Large number of speakers Social influence Table 1: Persuasion categorised by number of speakers and listeners  I parse out persuasion in this way to consider the different processes by which an entire international community of states can shift position on an issue, and to draw attention to a specific, less studied mechanism, large group persuasion.   This framework also allows one to                                                116 Risse 2000.  55 begin to consolidate the invaluable insights of two approaches: one the one hand, Checkel (2005) and Johnston’s (2001) studies of persuasion and social influence, and on the other hand, studies of the efficacy of norm entrepreneurs, Finnemore and Sikkink (2005) in particular. Checkel (2005) and Johnston (2001) have provided evidence of the link between authority and persuasion.  They divide the mechanisms of socialisation into two categories: persuasion and social influence.117  Each process is considered to be more likely under different conditions.  For Johnston, persuasion is more effective when some actors have a special authority or special relationship to the audience, an observation that I build upon.  He also notes that persuasion is more likely when most actors involved are fairly autonomous agents, and when the group is small and uses deliberative, consensus-based decision-making.  Checkel focuses more closely on actors than institutional conditions, considering the specific qualities of individuals involved; he again cites the special authority of the persuader, but also the openness (lack of ingrained beliefs) of the persuadee, the extent to which the latter is in a novel environment, and whether the argument accords with what is considered to be socially appropriate behaviour.  So in terms of the table above, for both Checkel and Johnston, attitude change by persuasion is more likely in a small audience, and change by social influence typically requires a large group advocating conformity by a smaller subset of that group.   Johnston and Checkel’s observations are extremely useful for this project, but there are several explanatory factors and conditions relevant to my case studies that are not included in these particular studies.  For one, they primarily assume that the sources of persuasion and social influence in international institutions originate with other states, where I contend that those                                                117 Checkel, 2005; Johnston 2001.  56 sources can also be found in the bureaucracy itself.  Also, neither considers the relevance of the content of the message itself, and how that might interact with the characteristics of the audience.   Large group persuasion Describing socialisation as including only one or both of the two categories used by Johnston and Checkel, persuasion and social influence, overlooks the ability of individual norm entrepreneurs in key institutional positions to shift mass attitudes in a large group.   In exploring that ability, my project is akin to a closer examination of the first stage in Finnemore and Sikkink’s (2005) norm life cycle, that which takes place after the first efforts of norm entrepreneurs and before the subsequent norm cascade.118  Therefore, I add a third category, building upon their work and the literature on rhetoric: large group persuasion, in which a single actor can, by virtue of special authority and/or institutional position, influence the policies of many individuals in a large group. Successful persuasion at a forum such as the UN requires large group persuasion, the concurrent persuasion of a large audience by a small number of speakers.  Some of the following literature on persuasion is based on individual-level psychological processes, and the application of these theories of persuasion to a large audience may seem problematic. However, two considerations make this translation across levels of analysis manageable.  First, psychologists have increasingly come to recognise that individuals they must be studied almost as though they were a composite audience with numerous individuals.  This is because, like a composite audience, individuals can have a range of partially conflicting beliefs and values that inform their attitudes towards a concept.119   This can be because some attitudes are context dependent, but                                                118 Finnemore and Sikkink 2005. 119 Wood 2000, 548-551.  57 others enduring.120  Some attitudes are derived from social norms, and others from expectations of personal benefits.121  Even when thinking is dominated by the logic of consequences, one attitude towards an object may be derived from short-term benefits, and another from the long-term.122  The second reason is that the process of large group persuasion is, in the context of Secretary-General speeches and written reports, an aggregation of many concurrent attempts at persuasion.  As the diagram below reflects, the Secretary-General can attempt to separately persuade numerous actors, while they simultaneously engage in social influence amongst themselves, as indicated by the horizontal arrows.  Therefore, by influencing some, or even just one key state, he indirectly influences others.  The cumulative effect of group persuasion will thus be to move the mean position of the audience in the desired direction.               Figure 1: Persuasion and social influence Periods of persuasion by norm entrepreneurs can thus be followed by, and intertwined with, periods of social influence amongst states.  When Bearce and Bondanella (2007) observed state preference convergence amongst states that share memberships in multiple formal IOs, they attributed that convergence to socialisation.123  However, their large-n study did not consider                                                120 McConnell, Leibold and Sherman 1997.  121 March and Olsen. 2006. 122 Richard, Van der Pligt, and De Vries 1996. 123 Bearce and Bondanella. 2007.   Secretary-General  State State State State State  58 another possibility that would explain their observations, that IO bureaucracies influence that convergence.   Social influence assumes that the majority in a community already hold a particular set of normative values.  If that is not the case, then norm entrepreneurs either have to persuade individuals and small groups, or attempt to engage in large group persuasion in order to influence many members of the international community simultaneously.  Social influence may thus play a significant role in the later stages, but only after a norm has been successfully pioneered in a community.   Why is persuasion in IOs so slow? The three elements that influence both individual and group attitudes towards a concept, information, beliefs and values, do change, but to varying extents and only gradually, for both psychological and institutional reasons.  The classic conditioning model, common in rational choice theorising, assumes that preferences change only in response to new information, but that underlying beliefs and values, or fundamental desires, remain constant.124   An opposing view is the generalised conditioning model of preference change, which also allows for changes in both values and beliefs.  The middle ground, known as the Jeffrey conditioning model, allows for belief change, but not values.125    In the short term, values are relatively stable.  However, beliefs and values do not need to alter dramatically in order for an attitude on a particular issue to change substantially; all that is necessary is a reprioritisation amongst existing beliefs and values.  In any individual or group,                                                124 For this discussion on different approaches to decision-making, see Bradley 2009.  125 Jeffrey 1992.  59 there are many competing values and potential inconsistencies between partially contradictory beliefs, even when considering the single precise concept or policy under consideration.126   There is considerable empirical evidence showing that an individual can often hold multiple attitudes towards a particular object, in the same way that a composite audience is likely to do so.127   This can be for several reasons.  Some attitudes are context dependent, while others are more fundamental and endure regardless of context, often unreasonably.128  Some attitudes are derived from social norms, and others from expectations of material benefits.129  Even when thinking is dominated by the logic of material consequences, one attitude towards an object may be derived from short-term benefits, and a contrary attitude from the long-term.130   Given this multiplicity of internal influences on an entity’s attitude, if a state holds two or more potentially conflicting values (e.g. justice and peace, sovereignty and human rights, or democracy and capitalism), and where neither is consistently dominant, then they might be persuaded, over time, that one is more appropriate than another in a given circumstance.  Therefore, I consider beliefs, value prioritisation, and subsequent attitude changes to be subject to persuasion, but only gradually. Another related complex set of reasons for the gradual nature of these changes is found in the empirically demonstrated inability of human beings to rationally and swiftly incorporate new information into their decision-making.   There are many different ways in which individuals have been observed rigorously adhering to type 1 cognitive processes despite evidence that                                                126 See, for example, Jervis 2006, 646-650. 127 Wood 2000, 548-551. 128 McConnell, Leibold, and Sherman 1997. 129 March and Olsen. 2006. 130 Richard, Van der Pligt, De Vries 1996.  60 should motivate type 2 thinking and a change in attitude.  For example, individuals often only accept evidence that is consistent with prior beliefs, and are sometimes reluctant to make a trade-off between competing values or goals.131  As Alan Jacobs (2009) persuasively argues, even when actors are both able and willing to objectively analyse new data, “existing beliefs, ideologies, and worldviews” can “direct actors’ attention in the course of decision making”, especially when faced with “overwhelming causal and informational complexity”.132  There are other cognitive mechanisms that inhibit the slower and more deliberative, considered, type 2 reasoning and attitude changes.  Individuals typically exhibit a status quo bias, even when a change in policy would be materially beneficial; there are competing explanations as to why, from economics, psychology, and decision theory.133  Individuals are also skewed in favour of the short-term,134 and as prospect theory discusses, are affected by whether the issue is perceived as being in a domain of loss or gain.135  Individuals also have limited attention, use a range of heuristics such as excessive diversification, exhibit preferences for the familiar or salient, and for avoiding choices altogether.136  However, while these cognitive failures slow attitude change, they do not entirely preclude the possibility of persuasion.  In some cases, a speaker hoping to persuade can take advantage of them.  For example, arguments that are strategically tailored to praise the values of the listener, or to use those values as justification for specific actions, are more effective.137                                                 131 Jervis 1976. 132 Jacobs 2009, 253. 133 Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988.  134 Lowenstein and Prelec 1992. 135 Kahneman and Tversky 1979; O’Keefe 2011. For underlying principles of this argument, see Mercer 2005. 136 Ibid. 137 Burke 1969, Billig 2003.  61 While this becomes more challenging with larger and more heterogeneous groups, such as the UN General Assembly, an actor skilled in persuasion can still use a combination of different messages to persuade a “composite audience”.138   The process of persuasion in political arenas is thus a dynamic, gradual process, in which: i) an audience receives persuasive information, ii) there are then, in the short term, incremental changes in attitudes, behaviours, and norms, iii) these attitude, behaviour, and norm changes then feedback into the cognitive processes of audience members, along with additional persuasive information, such that, iv) in the long term, there is a larger shift in those aspects of the audience.139   While they did not discuss attitude change in these terms, Bearce and Bondanella (2007) similarly observed that the convergence of attitudes amongst member states in IOs was a gradual, long-term process.140  These cognitive processes could help to explain why that is the case. It is for these reasons, and for institutional delays discussed in Chapter 3, that my research takes a mid-to-long-range view.  I did not expect to often (or ever) find that a particular member state, on listening to a specific message from the Secretariat, suddenly reverses their view on the topic being expounded.  Rather, I expect a shift amongst all member states that is only apparent as a dramatic change if measured over a period of several years.  Successful persuasion at the UN: congruence between speaker, message, and audience  For Secretariat arguments to be successful, the speaker not only needs to be perceived as authoritative, but their authority and their specific message must accord with the values                                                138 Myers 1999, Billig 2003. 139 Arpan, Rhodes, and Roskos-Ewoldsen. 2007; Rhodes and Ewoldsen 2013, 63-64. 140 Bearce and Bondanella 2007.   62 previously articulated by states.  Hullett (2002) demonstrated empirically that listeners are more likely to consider the possibility that their own attitudes should be changed in response to an argument if the argument accords with their prior values.141  Audiences also seek to improve the perceptions of others that they do act in accordance with their expressed values.142 Therefore, when a state is particularly concerned with their identity as a member of a group of states, then an argument specifying the appropriateness of a given value or end in that group might be more effective. If a state values effectiveness, or efficiency above the social appropriateness of an action, an argument emphasising those values would be more successful.  In summary, arguments tailored to the motives, values and beliefs of a state are likely to be more successful.   The underlying principle to the necessity of congruity between an argument and the values of the audience is well established in antiquity.  Using Socrates’ voice, Plato argued this in 360BCE:  Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and therefore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls-they are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man and man. Having proceeded thus far in his analysis, he will next divide speeches into their different classes: -“Such and such persons,” he will say, “are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way,” … when he understands what persons are persuaded by what arguments, and sees the person about whom he was speaking in the abstract actually before him, and knows that it is he, and can say to himself, “This is the man or this is the character who ought to have a                                                141 Hullett 2002.  142 Wood 2000, 541.  63 certain argument applied to him in order to convince him of a certain opinion”; -he who knows all this, and knows also when he should speak and when he should refrain, and when he should use pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, sensational effects, and all the other modes of speech which he has learned;-when, I say, he knows the times and seasons of all these things, then, and not till then, he is a perfect master of his art”.143 European studies of rhetoric and oratory began with observers of the sophists of Ancient Greece, and many of the ideas articulated then still underpin much of the modern theory on the subject.  Aristotle suggested that the efficacy of persuasion depends on the three factors: i) ethos, the perceived character of the speaker, which I think of in terms of informal authority,144 ii) logos, the actual argument, and iii) pathos, the emotional/cognitive state of the listener, which I think of in terms of the constellation of interrelated beliefs and values of the audience.145   I begin with this enduring framework because Aristotle was specifically focused on instances in which a single speaker addresses a large group, either through speeches or published documents.  Ethos Logos Pathos Concept Informal Authority of speaker Argument / narrative characteristics Audience identity Constituents Perceived expertise and principles of speaker Argument based on, e.g. self-interest, new information, efficiency, efficacy.  Narrative based on previous events, social ideals, emotion. Audience self-perception as upholding certain ideals, and sets of causal beliefs and values. Table 2: Elements to large group persuasion                                                143 Plato (360BCE) 2000, 36. 144 Psychologists term this credibility.  A widely accepted definition in that field originates in McCroskey 1997, in which credibility is defined as “the attitude towards a source of communication held at a given time by a receiver”.  Perloff 2003, 159, confirms that this concept is derived from Aristotle’s ethos. 145 Aristotle. Rhetorica.  64 For psychologists, ethos, or credibility, is composed of perceptions of the expertise, trustworthiness, and goodwill of the speaker.146    As such, it can be closely equated with the informal authority of that speaker.  The psychology theories discussed above posit that a person’s attitude towards an object is a function of three factors: information, beliefs, and values.  However, in the context of persuasion, this excludes another factor essential to understanding why attitudes change: the characteristics and strategies of the speaker.  This factor has long been included in research into the efficacy of rhetorical speeches, and was re-introduced as a relevant factor in IOs by Johnston (2001). Ethos is usually established gradually over time and through repeated interactions between speaker and audience; I thus usually expect perceptions of the principled authority of a member of the UN Secretariat to increase slowly.  However, it can occasionally be sharply increased through strategic symbolic action.  One such action might be to defy expectations of bias. An example of this from the UN is from Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s first year in office.  As a career UN bureaucrat, some observers might have assumed, as P-A theorists would, that he would have consistent preferences to increase the manpower and resources of that bureaucracy.  For example, as Barbara Crossette of the New York Times observed in an article that was otherwise notably positive and complimentary about the recently elected Kofi Annan, “Mr. Annan's talents as a reformer are not as well established, however. He spent much of his career in administration during years when the organization was growing in every direction and developing a reputation for waste and mismanagement”.147  However, Annan’s first wave of                                                146 Discussed in Perloff (2003), examples of experimental psychological and sociological experiments supporting this are: Berlo, Lemert, and Mertz 1969; McCroskey and Young 1981.  147 Crossette 1996.  65 reforms, begun in 1997, significantly reduced UN permanent staff.  This may have been designed strategically to garner additional support from the US, which had been pushing for streamlining the bureaucracy, or perhaps under pressure from them, or perhaps simply because Annan believed that this was the most efficient allocation of resources.  Regardless of his motives, this could have dramatically improved his credibility as an expert and impartial actor who prioritised efficacy, efficiency, and the needs of member states, above those of a bureaucracy assumed to seek self-aggrandisement.   While steps can be thus be taken to improve the ethos of the speaker, the majority of the strategies available relate to the choice of audience, and the choice of argument deliberately tailored to appeal to each audience. The logos, or argument itself, is constituted by three facets: structure, content, and language.148  The structure can alter the efficacy of an argument in different ways; for example, a message that ostensibly considers both sides of an argument is more persuasive than one that only takes one side,149 and one that specifies a clear conclusion and recommendation is more persuasive that one that allows an audience to draw their own conclusions.150  Reynolds and Reynolds (2002) confirm that evidence, in the form of factual assertions, narrative reports or testimonials, is more persuasive when each piece of evidence originates with a source considered by the audience to be credible.151  This claim is supported by the evidence in the case studies indicating the efficacy of the multiplication of authority strategy described in the following section.                                                148 Perloff 2003, 177. 149 Allen 1998; O’Keefe 1999. 150 O’Keefe 1997.  151 This rather self-evident assertion has been confirmed by Reynolds and Reynolds 2002.  66 Language and tone can also influence the effectiveness of an argument.  Some audiences may be more disposed to accept assertive and dominant arguments, but others, especially those who consider themselves to be in positions of power, might prefer requests from a position of deference.  A Secretariat member addressing member states must walk a fine line in order to be persuasive; the argument must be put forward with confidence, but many member states prefer to hear the Secretariat acknowledge the need to defer to member states with whom the decision-making power ultimately lies.152  Logos can also include narratives rather than arguments.  Where an argument is a series of related syllogisms, a narrative is a symbolic representation of events as they have occurred in the past.153  In a narrative, intense language can be more persuasive, such as using the term genocide rather than killings, mass rape rather than sexual assaults, and so on.154  These narratives are extremely common tools for nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International; examples within the UN include most publications by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and Secretary-General Annan’s (1999) reports on Rwanda and Srebrenica.155 Pathos is constituted by the facets of an audience’s cognitive processes that influence how they incorporate information (observed data, or in this case, the logos), as discussed.  These facets are their beliefs (often named means-ends or causal beliefs), and their values (sometimes called principled beliefs or fundamental values).156  As both the following chapter studying the                                                152 Hamilton and Hunter 1998. 153 Abbott 2002. 154 Hamilton and Hunter 1998. 155 UN General Assembly 1999b; UN Secretary-General 1999c.  156 Bradley 2009.  67 UN budget process, and the case studies show, different UN intergovernmental organs respond quite differently to particular types of arguments. There are thus reasons to believe that successful arguments need to take into consideration the culture of a collective, as well as an individual audience.157   For example, social norms within an audience, be that an individual, organisation or state, can dictate the parameters for acceptable behaviour.158  Those parameters may limit policy choices to a narrow range, even if, as Barnett and Finnemore discussed in the context of the IMF, those policy choices have demonstrably led to repeated failures in the past.159  Barnett and Finnemore’s (2004) observations on this point are a more recent incarnation of the “groupthink” phenomenon observed by Irving Janis in 1972.160   These tendencies are particularly pronounced if an organisation or department consistently attracts a particular kind of member, such that alternative potential courses of action are ignored, outside expert opinions are not sought, insiders exhibit a strong selective bias against the types of information they assimilate from others, and contingencies against possible failure are not formed.161  A complication arises where the pathos of a large audience is not coherent, such that any message cannot be tailored to the whole audience with a single message.  The UN plenary assembly, as with any large group, will contain multiple attitudes on a single issue.  Some variation in the audience need not inhibit persuasion, so long as the speaker’s form of authority, and his or her message, can accord with some aspect of the pathos of the audience that is widely                                                157 I accept one of the Oxford Dictionary definitions of culture as the ideas, customs, and social behaviour of a particular people or society. 158 March and Olsen 2006. 159 Barnett and Finnemore 2004. 160 Janis 1972; 1982. 161 Ibid.  68 shared.  However, if an audience is so divided on an issue that different sub-groups become entrenched in opposition to each other, a speaker may be unable to craft a message with sufficient congruence between the three factors to persuade the group as a whole. OI 3: A request by a member of an IO Secretariat for greater resources will be more effective if the logos/content of the argument (information, beliefs, values) is closely related to the ethos, the form of informal authority with which the audience perceives that Secretariat member to be endowed. i.e. information with relevant expertise, values with principles of the speaker. OI 4: A request by a member of an IO Secretariat for greater resources will be more effective if the logos/content of the argument (information, beliefs, values) is in congruence with the pathos, the beliefs and values of the audience. OI 5: A request by a member of an IO Secretariat for greater resources will be most effective if the informal authority of the speaker, the content of the message, and the identity (beliefs and values) of the audience all accord with each other. OI 6: On issues where a plenary assembly is strongly divided in beliefs and values, and to the extent that the decision making process requires consensus by member states, the IO bureaucracy will be less able to successfully encourage institutional change. 2.2.4 Strategies Merely possessing authority, formal or informal, in any context, is insufficient to affect change; that authority must be applied through various strategies.  The efficacy of persuasive efforts is dependent upon the choice of strategies taken by the IO bureaucratic actor.  Over the last seventy years, different Secretaries-General have adopted very different strategies, motivated  69 by their personal characteristics as well as political necessity.162  The Secretariat predominantly uses three long-term, interrelated and overlapping strategies to influence states: agenda setting, operational influence, and the multiplication of authority.  Integral to each and all strategies, the Secretariat targets specific audiences, which I briefly address first before discussing the strategies.    Targeting specific audiences A recurring theme in this dissertation is that it is the relationships between the three factors, ethos, logos, and pathos that are vital, rather than the particular types of each.  The form of authority needs to be relevant to the context of the argument in order to be influential, and the type of argument needs to match a certain audience’s identity to be effective.  In any IO, an experienced member of the Secretariat attempting to affect institutional change will target particular actors.   As George Tsebelis (1995) observed, many systems include veto players, the individual or collective actors whose agreement is required for a policy decision.163 A similar, equally useful, prior formulation is Ellen Immergut’s (1990) veto points, where each institutional design offers particular avenues of access, though which outside actors may have the opportunity to intervene to prevent change.164  Each veto player audience will have specific attitudes, beliefs and values.  This is as true of collective audiences such as intergovernmental committees mandated to deliberate on budget changes, as it is as of the individual representatives of powerful member states.                                                162 Rovine 1970; Meisler 1995; Chesterman 2007; Kille 2006. 163 Tsebelis1995; 2002. 164 Immergut 1990.  70 Each state or group will have its own starting preferences, some closer to, and some further from those of the Secretariat, and the efforts at persuasion will be more effective with some audiences than with others.  Under consensus decision-making, it may often seem logical to directly target audiences whose positions are furthest from those of the Secretariat.  However, targeting groups that already agree can also be useful.  Gerald Miller (1980) demonstrated that when arguments continue to be directed towards those who already agree, that part of the audience could strengthen their attitudes.165  In an IO context, targeting states who already concur with the Secretariat’s claims could be a deliberate and effective strategy, especially if that state is then more likely to participate in mechanisms of social influence vis-à-vis states who disagree with the Secretariat’s position.   Given that the consensus-based budgetary processes in an organisation such as the UN require that large numbers of member states would need to be persuaded if a significant change in the budget were to take place, it is strategically wise to encourage other state actors to influence broader patterns of social influence. When constructing arguments, the Secretariat is more likely to influence state or group attitudes if it takes into account the pathos of that audience.   An audience such as the UN General Assembly is composed of representatives who view themselves as holding identities with a combination of several key objectives and values.  These can include individual professional interests in improving the work environment, individual state national interests, voting bloc interests, and a range of global social, political and economic ideals such as sovereignty, equality, non-intervention, and/or liberalism.  Smaller and more focused committees can emphasise different, specific values; for example, the ACABQ primarily emphasises                                                165 Miller 1980.  71 economic efficacy and efficiency, while balancing that with a strong, if implicit, ideal of political pragmatism, given that they know that their recommendations are then passed on for debate at the General Assembly.166  The ACABQ also views its function as ensuring that the mandates set for the Organisation are adequately funded.  For this reason, the Secretariat is careful to include, in its proposals to the ACABQ, numerous General Assembly resolutions or decisions by other UN committees as justification for budget changes.  The Secretariat uses a specific strategy of sequenced targeted persuasion to increase the number of resolutions that can be drawn upon in support of those justifications.  As discussed in the case studies, the Secretary-General will typically put an issue forward for consideration by the General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights, or the Security Council.  The most common response is a vague, non-binding declaration of support, in principle, for the issue.  The Secretary-General will then often cite a declaration of support in one forum when addressing another, and then cite as many as possible when talking to the ACABQ, giving the impression of a wealth of member state support for a particular change.  There are thus numerous instances in which the Secretary-General cites numerous vague or tangential expressions of support by member states for one of his reports as evidence of a specific mandate for him or the Secretariat.  Citations such as this are necessary for the progress of any changes through many intergovernmental or administrative UN bodies such as the ACABQ, which requires state directed mandates for changes to the budget. The likelihood that targeted persuasion will be successful is dependent upon the congruity or harmony between the three factors discussed above: the informal authority of the                                                166 Mselle 2011.  72 speaker, the content of the argument, and self-identity of the audience.  A speaker whose informal authority is principle based, such as the Secretary-General, will be more likely to persuade an audience if the argument used emphasises principles such as adherence to ideals and responsibilities associated with his role, such as the UN Charter and GA Resolutions, and even more so if the audience either identifies itself as guided by those ideals, or seeks to be viewed by others as identifying with them.  If, however, the audience views itself as primarily technocratic and expertise-based, such as the ACABQ, then a speaker would have more success using arguments that a) cite actors the audience recognises as having expertise in the relevant field, and b) emphasise efficiency and efficacy, rather than ideals.   However, identifying the pathos of the audience becomes more complicated where the audience is heterogeneous in terms of values and beliefs.  The audience in a global IO such as the UN, including representatives from every recognised state, is complicated by the existence of at least several blocs, each with its own dominant beliefs and value priorities, as discussed in the following chapter.   Aristotle, like Plato, described how different audiences would be more amenable to different types of arguments, but he did not, to my knowledge, discuss how a speaker might address such heterogeneity.167   There are several strategies that a speaker can use, when faced with a heterogeneous audience, although each of these strategies has limits, and none can necessarily overcome deep divisions in an audience.168  A speaker can focus on the interests of a core group, or to sequentially appeal to each bloc in turn, or interweave appeals to the different values prioritised by different blocs.  He or she could also emphasise a less specific, loosely related group of                                                167 Aristotle, On Rhetoric 1991, Book 2, Chapters 12-17, 164-72.   168 Myers 1999.   73 values that are shared by the audience as a whole.  Any two blocs might have different priorities amongst that group, or intractable conflicts of interest on other issues, but if the debate is kept within the context of that agreed group of values, there is a greater chance that the audience could be encouraged to come to an agreement.169 Under different institutional contexts, a divided audience could provide either advantages for, or obstacles to, influence by an external speaker such as an IO Secretariat member.   On the one hand, when tensions exist between different values and beliefs, in both individuals and groups, those tensions can open up more space for debate, and thus opportunities for successful persuasion.170  Therefore, the less coherent the value/belief sets of the audience, the more opportunities there are for changes in preferences.  However, in IOs, certain institutional arrangements could cause the opposite effect.  If, for example, a particular institutional change required consensus in a particular committee, then tensions between different sets of values or beliefs could render progress impossible.  At certain times, and on certain specific issues, this proved to be the case in both the DPKO and DPA case studies. Agenda setting I define agenda setting as the act of influencing the choice of topics discussed, their relative importance (inferred from sequence and/or the relative amounts of space or time devoted to them), how they are presented, and conversely, what issues are moved to the background or excluded.171   In the social sciences, the term agenda setting is most commonly used to refer to                                                169 Ibid. 170 Billig et al. 1988. 171 Chandler and Munday.   74 the ability of the news media to focus the attention of their audiences on particular issues.172  For example, all news media with an online presence categorise their articles; typical categories are Politics, Economy, Science, Health, Sport, and so on.  However, when examined repeatedly over 2016, media network Fox News chose to consistently begin its list of US News categorises with Crime, Terrorism, Immigration, and Disasters,173 both directing viewers’ attention to those particular issues, and framing current affairs issues in terms of direct threats to the viewer.  Fox News’ format has changed since then, but their prioritisation of those issues at the forefront of their website and TV coverage has not.  Agenda setting does not in itself tell listeners how to respond to an issue, but it does tell them what issues they should be responding to, amongst the many issues they may otherwise be interested in.   Any individual or group audience will have a range of issues they are prepared to discuss.  Any speaker addressing that group can use selective arguments to take advantage of those multiple attitudes.  By considering “interattitudinal relations and plac[ing] an issue or object in the context of other attitude issues, values and goals”,174 an audience can be persuaded not necessarily to respond in a particular way, but to decide that some issues require a more urgent response than others.  IO bureaucracies frequently engage in agenda setting and shaping the debates held by member states.  For example, Derek Beach (2004) identifies the leadership resources and strategies of the EU Council Secretariat that enabled them to influence treaty negotiations, even                                                172 This idea was first developed by Lippmann 1922.  Other key articles, among a vast range of related literature, include Funkhouser 1973; Brosius and Kepplinger 1990; Lang and Lang 1981; Gitlin 1980. 173 Fox News.  US News. NOTE: When this was confirmed on 23 February 2017, the category Economy had been inserted into this group. 174 Wood 2000, 55.  75 when the states involved in those negotiations had strong preferences, and when member states ostensibly managed the process in detail.175  Beach demonstrated that a bureaucracy could set the agenda, as well as other strategies to influence member states, such as brokering agreements, and taking advantage of an informational advantage vis-à-vis states, especially with complex issues. Agenda setting can be accomplished through either formal or informal mechanisms.  Formal agenda setting is the use of established procedural rules, such as the administrative role of the UN Secretariat as loosely defined under the Charter.  In the UN, the Office of the Secretary-General has considerable influence on the list of topics to be discussed by member states during the plenary sessions.  In both the UN and the EU, the Secretariat has the formal authority to both schedule debates on specific issues and organise larger conferences, which all members, and sometimes many Heads of State, attend.  As a delegate to the Fifth Committee said in interview: “the same kinds of issues come up every year in the General Assembly, but at the start of each session, the Secretary-General puts some of those issues out front, and they tend to get more time”.176 Informal agenda setting requires the strategic application of informal authority to draw the attention of member states to an issue.  The interest of states can be aroused by stressing particular issues in speeches and published reports, or by direct contact with veto players within the IO or member state governments.  Informal agenda setting commonly involves efforts to frame an issue through “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action”.177                                                  175 Beach 2004.  176 Delegate B to Fifth Committee in interview June 2015. 177 McAdam, McCarthy, and. Zald, eds. 1996, 6.  76 These claims for collective action can involve the dissemination of information, such as data concerning numbers of civilians affected by conflict, but they are also commonly justified with assertions of urgent, moral necessity and an appeal to values often argued to be universal.  Agenda setting at the UN can be a powerful tool to influence the international community.  As Risse and Sikkink (1999) argue, the UN “General Assembly’s agenda has a “collective legitimization function.” It defines what actions governments ought to engage in and what actions they ought to abstain from in the international arena”.178  Placing an issue for deliberation by the General Assembly often leads, at the very least, to a vague resolution in support of collective action to address an issue, if not to action itself.  That resolution then provides a mandate for continued efforts by the Secretariat, and sometimes justification for expanding certain UN activities. Agenda setting, especially informal agenda setting, can be a gradual process.  Merely placing an issue on a list of topics for discussion does not ensure that truth-seeking argumentation takes place intended to resolve that issue.  In order for many member states to overcome the material and political obstacles to change, particularly budgetary increases in an IO, they must be convinced that their beliefs and values demand that they resolve an issue.   Establishing that conviction, that a crisis has been reached, can take time, and can require a lengthy process of informal agenda setting before it can be productive to formally place it on the agenda for debate. OI 8: IO bureaucratic actors can leverage their informal authority, in circumstances beyond and in addition to those formally mandated to them, to raise the profile of certain issues,                                                178 Risse and Sikkink 1999, 88.  77 and encourage states to acknowledge that they have an urgent obligation to deliberate and resolve those issues. Operational initiation and/or expansion  In the context of IO Secretariats, I define operational initiation as the act of instigating new activities that as a consequence will require additional resources.  This strategy always requires consent by some key member states, but it is my contention that the Secretariat is able to persuade member states, and in particular the Security Council, to approve the creation or expansion of UN operations.  As with agenda setting, this can stem from the formal authority to do so, such as that defined by Article 99 of the UN Charter, in which the UN Secretary-General can bring issues to the attention of the Security Council.  In practice the Secretary-General not only points out issues, but also typically advocates for, or at least suggests, specific courses of action for consideration by the Council.  The Secretariat can also use informal routes to create operations, such as contact, by telephone or in person, with heads of state or other key actors within the UN system, to persuade them to take action on an issue, or to formally request the assistance of the UN.  The case studies show that the Secretary-General frequently steps far beyond his formal mandate, adopting a conscious and prominent role as an authoritative political actor in encouraging the creation of new UN mandates. This strategy is useful because while decision-making in intergovernmental areas of an IO tend to be dominated by the political relationships amongst states, there are other veto points in the institution which are more technocratic in nature.  Those areas, such as the UN ACABQ, require clearly specified arguments demonstrating an increase in mandates and activities before they concur with a Secretariat request for more staff and financial resources.  The most effective technique to lay the foundations for a persuasive argument under those circumstances would be  78 to increase the operational activities of the department in question, regardless of its current resource capacity.  I stress here that I do not suggest that the Secretariat would initiate or encourage operations purely to justify budget increases.  I merely suggest that if the Secretariat believed that the Organisation was ethically and or legally obligated to engage in certain activities, they would seek to expand related operations even when their current material capacity to backstop additional actions was insufficient. The ability to drive specific budgetary expansion by forming new activities was further enabled by a shift in the underlying philosophy of the UN budgetary process, led by the Secretary-General.  In 1997, the recently elected Secretary-General Kofi Annan introduced his vision for widespread reform of the UN system, in which he suggested a shift in the general approach to planning and budgeting from input accounting, where states begin the process by deciding how many funds are to be given to each part of the budget, on the assumption that the various activities will then just have to do the best they can with the resources allocated, to results-based budgeting, in which the states are obliged first to estimate the requirements of each mandate previously assigned to the various departments, (with the assistance of the Secretariat) and then provide sufficient funds to achieve those objectives.  The justification the Secretary-General gave for the change was that it would achieve greater “cooperation, transparency, and accountability”.179   These three features are traditional and frequent demands made of the Secretariat from all quarters of the General Assembly.  This altered budget process would slightly constrain the tendency of member states to micromanage the Secretariat through the                                                179 UN Secretary-General 1997c, para 240-241.  79 budget, as the focus would be on matching funds to the outputs, rather than the processes used to achieve them.   In the years since Secretary-General Annan’s 1997 reform proposal “Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform”, there has been a gradual acceptance of results-based budgeting as the SG envisioned it.  The General Assembly endorsed the concept in 2000,180 and various departments such as the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) then began reflexively considering how the concept should be applied, offering broad and conceptual recommendations, such as to advocate that lines of accountability and the responsibilities of certain actors, be clarified.181  The results-based budgeting concept has had an impact on budget processes, but those changes seem to be a work in progress.  The Secretariat continually revises and clarifies the concept, but member states are not yet fully satisfied, and the ACABQ, for example, “has, on numerous occasions, pointed out the need for further development of results-based management and the tools to relate to results”.182  This shift in budget management is almost entirely unstudied, and both academic and media attention on this early period of reform in Annan’s early years seems to focus on more politically dramatic changes, such as the shrinking of the staff, the creation of a cabinet-style organisation to assist the Secretary-General in governing the UN system, or the increase in funds for development.  A worthwhile secondary study following this dissertation would be to take a closer look at the role of the Secretariat in the evolution of results-based management.  Nonetheless, this approach to budgets has strengthened the ability of the                                                180 UN Secretary-General. 2002c, Para 154. 181 UN Joint Inspection Unit 2002; 2004a 2004b. 182 UN ACABQ 2006d, Para 7.  80 Secretariat to drive expansion by first increasing operational activities, and then insisting that sufficient funds be provided to enable those activities.    OI 9: Where a particular reform, particularly increasing resources, would need to be justified by increased operational activity, an IO bureaucratic actor can a) persuade states whose approval is required that a particular operation must be created though the IO, and b) persuade the relevant states to accept operations on their sovereign soil. Multiplying authority Observers have long described the Secretary-General strategy of gathering other actors to help pursue a particular issue.  When these actors include a group of states that are motivated to engage the issue, they are termed a Group of Friends. Teresa Whitfield (2007) concisely summarises the impact such a group can have: Groups may reinforce or multiply the limited leverage that the Secretary-General or his or her representative brings to the table, with the involvement of interested states from the region and elsewhere increasing the international credibility of the effort.  The can help coordinate action within the Security Council and provide the Secretary-General with assistance of all kinds.  Friends may be able to provide information, expertise, and resources with a speed and flexibility that is difficult to achieve within the UN system.183 However, there is another similar strategy that does not include state actors. The multiplication of authority, a concept I introduce here, is the ability of an IO Secretariat to form groups of individuals considered to be authoritative, direct them to address a                                                183 Whitfield 2007,101.  81 particular issue, contribute to their sources of information, and then draw upon the authority of those groups to pursue a given agenda. The intended audience of member states views those groups as authoritative and more impartial than the bureaucracy.  The combination of the informal authority of both the Secretariat and these autonomous, secondary authority centres is then more persuasive than that of the Secretariat alone.  Reynolds and Reynolds (2002) show that evidence from any source is considered more legitimate, and will be paid more attention, if it has been considered, analysed, and approved by a separate, trusted forum.184  The multiplication of authority seeks to take advantage of this phenomenon.    This strategy can help counter obstacles to reforms that stem from perceptions that the Secretariat is inherently biased in favour of expansion, particularly when an IO bureaucracy is arguing that the most effective way to address an issue is to significantly increase the resources for part of that bureaucracy.  Principal-agent theories suggest that member states delegate to Secretariats in order to reduce costs, but often also because the latter are viewed as relatively unbiased experts in particular fields,185 but that overlooks this specific expected form of bias.  I contend that the Secretariat can create additional authority centres considered to be both expert and unbiased.  While not being able to fully control those new authority centres, because that control would create the impression that those centres are biased, key IO Secretariat actors can influence their outcomes by first establishing the parameters for these groups, and then ensuring that the Secretariat is the primary source of information on which the group will base its recommendations.                                                184 Reynolds and Reynolds 2002.  185 Abbott and Snidal 1998; Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney (Eds.) 2006.  82 Therefore, if the Secretary-General’s informal authority is necessary, but not sufficient to change state behaviour, he/she appoints authoritative representatives or panels to study issues that he/she has placed on the agenda, and then asks them to make recommendations for reforms.  The Secretary-General can set the objective of the panel as being to determine how to improve the efficacy of a particular activity.  Individuals can be chosen for the panel can be those who are motivated by the intention to make a particular activity more effective, rather than those who might question the need for such activities as some states might.  This ensures that when published, their results neatly set aside a question member states might have: whether it is worthwhile for the IO to be engaging in that activity at all.  Therefore, by offering the report for deliberation by states, they are moved swiftly into a debate that has as its premise the need to improve the activity.  There are several key examples of such panels in the case studies. On a small scale, IO Secretariats have been known to appoint representatives with some form of authority or celebrity, typically in order to raise the profile either of the organisation as a whole, or of particular issues or activities.  The UN Messengers of Peace program, begun in1997 by Kofi Annan, is a conspicuous example.186   Other UN Agencies have since also independently appoint their own Goodwill Ambassadors; by 2006, there were more than four hundred such Ambassadors,187 and at the time of writing, UNICEF alone has over three hundred.188  However, while the proliferation of other Ambassadors, and their relative lack of activity, diluted their influence, Annan repeatedly supported and drew attention to the Messengers of Peace, hosting the first meeting of the Messengers, including 48 high-profile celebrities, in October 2000 at the UN Headquarters in New York, during the General Assembly debates on peacekeeping reforms                                                186 Lim 2014. 187 Ibid., 191. 188 UN UNICEF. Goodwill Ambassadors & Advocates.   83 addressed by the DPKO case study chapter.  Annan encouraged the Messengers to publicly explain what the UN does, and how important its work is.189  A Secretary-General can also influence key states by making strategic appointments to leadership positions in the Secretariat.  Certain positions are coveted, both by powerful states and weak, which both seek to have more influence or control in the IO.  A member of the Secretariat typically has little in the way of rewards and punishments with which to leverage state behaviour, but by appointing or recommending a citizen of a conspicuous veto player member state to a key position, a Secretariat head can establish the political capital to help pursue other reforms.   Some Secretaries-General, such as Kofi Annan, conspicuously appointed vocal and bold individuals who were passionate about expanding and strengthening the role of the UN in areas such as human rights and political intervention.  One example is Annan’s appointment of Mary Robinson, then President of Ireland, as High Commissioner for Human Rights.190  Another could be the appointment of the former US diplomat Jeffrey Feltman as the head of the DPA in 2007.  While I have no direct evidence of a causal link, in the budget following the appointment, the US reversed its long-standing position on zero-growth budgets and agreed to the largest expansion in the DPA’s history.  There are many other possible contributing factors to that particular influence, however, including USG Feltman’s diplomatic expertise, professionalism and commitment, as well as his nationality.  More conspicuous examples become clear in the case study chapters. OI 9: An IO plenary assembly will be more likely to accept a request from the IO bureaucracy for additional resources if that request has been scrutinised and approved by a                                                189 UN Joint Inspection Unit 2006; Reuters 2000, UN Press Release Oct. 23, 2000. 190 Williams 2000.  84 body external to the bureaucracy, such as an intergovernmental committee or independent panel.  Given that knowledge, the Secretariat will seek to create such groups. 2.3 Alternative explanations In this section I address the alternative expectations of several bodies of literature, neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and principal-agent theory (P-A).  I detail the expectations of each, and then identify reasons why I believe they are insufficient to address my research question.  Neorealism For many rationalist, materialist approaches to IR, transnational institutions are epiphenomenal to inter-state interactions, and thus when discussed, the features of IOs are usually treated as dependent variables.  While there is considerable variation within those approaches in the extent to which non-state actors such as IO bureaucracies are accepted as influential actors, they commonly build on the analytical foundations laid by neorealism.   Neorealism presents the most academically conspicuous challenge to my argument.  For neorealists, any international action by states, whether within IOs or elsewhere, is done in an attempt to maximise relative material power, given the uncertainty about the intentions of other states who all have some military power, and the anarchic nature of international relations.191 For neorealists, international institutions reflect the interests of great powers,192 and the interests of powerful domestic actors,193 but themselves have no credible promises or threats with which to                                                191 Mearsheimer 1995, 9-12; Waltz 1979. 192 Gilpin 1981; Mearsheimer 1994.  193 Drezner 2007.  85 exert independent political leverage.194  IOs are viewed as tools for states to share burdens, pool resources (potentially in order to balance against external threats),195 and reduce the political costs of foreign policy decisions.196   In this framework, member states increase the resources of an IO bureaucracy only when they believe that it is in their material interest to do so, if they consider the issue not to be salient,197 or if they believe that they can subsequently ensure that the Secretariat acts in their interests.  Weaker states might also advocate doing so if the costs of IO Secretariat activities were borne predominantly by economically more powerful states.  Conversely, neorealists would expect states to oppose the delegation of resources and responsibilities to the Secretariat if they believe that others would materially benefit more than they, so wealthier states might oppose resources intended to help develop weaker states.  Politically weaker states might oppose delegation to a Secretariat if it was staffed, located within, and/or informally controlled by more powerful states.  To some extent, these expectations are found in the case studies following, but there are many reasons to consider these explanations incomplete.  When studying authority in IOs, neorealism is analytically constrained by a statist ontology and materialist focus.  This simplification may have seemed analytically acceptable at its origins during the superpower tensions and great power politics at the height of Cold War.  However, as Tallberg (2001) observes when specifically discussing delegation to supranational institutions, the “growth of governance beyond the national state is one of the most pronounced                                                194 Touval 1994. 195 Posen 2006 . 196 Thompson 2006.  197 Krasner 1983.  86 political trends in recent decades”.198  The proliferation and expansion of purposeful, (at least partially) autonomous, influential, non-state actors in recent decades, empowered as much by ideas as by material resources, has rendered neorealism an increasingly insufficient tool for studying IOs. 199   Likewise, the neorealist assumption that anarchy is the ordering principle of the international system, makes it impossible for neorealists to study authority in IO Secretariats because they fundamentally assume that no authority exists above the nation state.  Their conception is based implicitly upon the observation that there is no global government, modelled on the Weberian state, with formal authority over states.200 However, while no global state such as this exists, global governance is characterised by informally authoritative actors throughout IOs, decentralised networks,201 transnational advocacy networks,202 epistemic communities,203 transnational private corporations, NGOs, and global governors,204 who create, monitor and sometimes enforce international rules.  None of these actors require a Weberian monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force in order to draw upon their principle-based or expertise authority to influence other actors.   Realist approaches thus typically dismiss the agency, authority, and persuasiveness of these non-state actors as a factor even before beginning any analysis; as such, their theories are not viable tools for analysing the potential for influence in IOs by non-state actors.  Any                                                198 Tallberg 2002.  199 Risse 2002; Haas1992.  200 Milner 1991. 201 For key early applications in international relations, see Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 1998; for more recent application and review, see Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery 2009.  202 Keck and Sikkink 1998.  203 Haas 1992. 204 Avant et al., 2010.  87 persuasive explanation of state actions in recent years must at least account for the potential impact of these changing realities.  For this reason, I find the “post-anarchy” strand of constructivist thought to be persuasive in this context, more so than the “conventional” stand, which still accepts and works within the Realist and Neoliberal assumption of global anarchy.205 There are also reasons to question more specific neorealist expectations such as that states will not delegate to IO Secretariats on salient issues.206  One reason is that they do not consider the possibility that non-state actors can persuade states that some issues should be more salient than others, a central tenet of this dissertation.  Another consideration is that common models of persuasion in psychology suggest a different reaction to salient issues.  Dual-process attitude change, the dominant current model in psychology mentioned above, provides strong support for the claim that the more an issue is considered salient, the more an audience will be motivated to use the second more deliberative process, and to be open to arguments that are “well-reasoned, data-based, and logical”.207  Alternatively, this model finds, when the audience does not consider the issue salient, they are more likely to rely on heuristics or peripheral cues.   Intuitively, this seems logical, and there are two processes relevant to this study that draw upon this observation.  The first is that member states can gradually come to consider a particular issue to be more salient.   This ties directly into the processes of agenda setting, in which the Secretariat can persuade states that an issue is extremely salient, causing states to rely less on heuristics, and become more accepting of detailed, logical arguments, both by the Secretariat and by other authoritative bodies.                                                  205 Hurd 2008, 309. 206 Krasner 1983. 207 Crasno and Prislin, 348.  88 A related process is that issues such as peacekeeping, the military and political intervention into the domestic affairs of member states, are already amongst the most salient at the UN.  This was asserted by Realist scholar Stephen Krasner,208 who had previously pioneered the argument that increased political salience inhibited delegation to outsiders.  However, the case studies describe the increased delegation to the Secretariat of resources for peacekeeping and political missions, activities that necessarily and overtly intervene in the domestic affairs of other states.  This is puzzling from a neorealist standpoint, and these instances constitute a useful, hard case to test to examine why states decide to empower an IO bureaucracy.   This consideration of neorealist expectations strongly suggests that a theoretically eclectic approach would have considerable benefits.  Often, factors emphasised by neorealist explanations, such as the material motives and concerns over relative power, are important to understanding state motives, but a greater focus on ideas as well as material factors, and non-state actors as well as state actors, substantially improves the accuracy of any explanation of delegation to IO Secretariats.  Social constructivist theories do so, and they also help us to unpack why states define certain material benefits as being more important than others, and how national interest is perceived in terms of ideals and identities as well as material benefits.209  As Price and Tannewald identified in the context of the norm of non-use of nuclear weapons, “it is not that realist deterrence theory is entirely wrong as it is uninterested in the kinds of questions necessary for a full understanding of the phenomenon”.210  Risse and Sikkink similarly state that they “do not argue in terms of simple dichotomies such as “power versus norms” or “norms versus interests””, but rather that they “are interested in the interaction among these various                                                208 Krasner 1999, 20-25. 209 Risse and Sikkink 1999, 7. 210 Price, Tannenwald, and Katzenstein 1996, 115.  89 factors”.211   This approach is necessary with the shifting patterns of state behaviour studied in this project.  To reiterate, I do not discount the factors Realists emphasise, such as the relative material power of the various state actors, but I do view them as incomplete.  Institutionalism and P-A approaches Neoliberal institutionalist scholars envisage a slightly broader range of motives for delegation than do Realists, although these are still incomplete, and they likewise fail to provide convincing explanations for IO Secretariat budget increases in the absence of material benefits for states.  In the 1980s, institutionalists took a step away from the conclusions of neorealists, while retaining similar ontological assumptions. Building upon Coase’s (1937) ideas in organisational economics,212 Robert Keohane articulated a functionalist view of IOs, which in his view are designed by states to facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation by providing information and by monitoring compliance in order to reduce transaction costs and uncertainty.213 Koremenos et al. (2001) and Martin (1992), amongst other, built upon this approach, explaining the variation in IO institutional design by the prior preferences of states and the intended functions and the type of cooperation problem states sought to address, in a framework in which states are assumed to be materialist, rational, utility maximisers.214 They thus expect delegation of authority to a new institutional arrangement only when states expect to reap material gains as a consequence.  While these rational design approaches provide persuasive, if arguably over-simplified and ahistorical explanations for the initial creation of an IO, they are less persuasive when                                                211 Risse and Sikkink 1999.  212 Coase 1937. 213 Keohane 1982; Keohane 1984.  214 Martin 1992; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal. 2001.   90 attempting to explain later changes to existing IOs for several reasons.  Institutionalist frameworks build upon economic theories, and are implicitly intended to explain international economic agreements.  In order to use them to explain the delegation of resources one would need to identify the material benefits to states of increasing the budget of a department such as the UN Department of Political Affairs.  Neoliberal institutionalism is useful when evaluating states seeking to cooperate to achieve benefits for themselves, but less so when evaluating how a group of powerful states reach an agreement that would ostensibly only materially benefit other, less powerful states, many of whom are excluded from the debate.  Any consideration of the motives for reaching such an agreement must take into account the influence of intangible, yet influential, ideational justifications for redistributing resources.  As Tallberg (2001) observes in studies of delegation to IOs, particularly the EU, which dominates the field as an object of study, “existing literature shares a common anchoring in rational choice institutionalism in general, and principal-agent (P-A) in particular”.215   The P-A approach shares many features with neoliberal institutionalism.216   It is assumed that agents usually possess an informational advantage vis à vis their principals on certain issues, an idea drawn from Weber’s view of bureaucratic expertise.217  Principals and agents are assumed to have different preferences.  Principals delegate authority to an agent in order to further their own interests because they lack the time or specialised knowledge to satisfy their preferences; they may also delegate in order to overcome collective action problems.218 Agents are expected to seek self-aggrandisement, and in response, principals use incentive mechanisms to ensure that                                                215 Tallberg 2001, 24. 216 For excellent review of P-A theory, see Miller 2005. 217 Weber 1958.  218 Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991.  91 the latter act in their interests.  In general terms, the various measures used to do so are classed as i) contract design, including carefully delineated parameters and tasks, and rules or rewards for desired behaviour, ii) screening and selection mechanisms, iii) monitoring, accountability and reporting requirements, and iv) institutional checks, such as multiple agents.219   While most of this literature has focused on the domestic level, there have been several fruitful applications to IOs.220  In that context, P-A approaches are adept at identifying some benefits to delegation, such as specialisation, facilitating collective decision-making, enhancing credibility, locking-in policies, and resolving disputes,221 and they also persuasively explain why delegation tends to be gradual and closely monitored. There is some evidence for this in the UN cases; states prefer increasing temporary posts through the annual support account for peacekeeping, rather than more permanent posts though the regular budget of the DPKO, despite repeated claims by the DPKO and independent panels that increasing regular budget staff improves job security, staff experience, and productivity. However, as with neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists, P-A approaches emphasise state preferences as the source of any institutional change, and as a consequence, the agency of the Secretariat is often understated or oversimplified.  They also insufficiently unpack those state preferences, commonly assuming materialist motives for preference change.222  On the contrary, states are influenced not just by hopes of material gain, but also by their norms, principles/values, and causal beliefs, all of which contribute towards their attitudes towards policies affecting IO Secretariat resources.  While they may approach issues with a consideration                                                219 Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 27-34. 220 Abbott and Snidal 1998; Hawkins et al. 2006; Tallberg 2002; Nielson and Tierney 2003. 221 Hawkins et al. 2006, 3-38. 222 With some exceptions, such as Goldstein and Keohane, eds. (1993).  92 of the actors and type of cooperation problem, they are also constrained or guided by these non-material factors, by their domestic social and political institutions (both formal and informal), and their shared history.223   The common institutionalist preference to not unpack state preferences also makes it almost impossible to study whether changes in those preferences are the result of non-state actors as well as non-material factors.  As a result, they infer state delegation policies using post hoc ergo propter hoc arguments, in essence claiming that states chose to delegate to the IO because they have since valued the outcome.224 An example is Hylke Dijkstra’s (2012) explanation of variation in the delegation of authority to the UN Secretariat in peacekeeping.  While a useful and concise general review of that variation over the prior two decades, the argument boils down to the claim that the variation was due to the fact that at one time, sovereignty was valued over efficiency, but that later, the reverse was true, allowing greater delegation.225 Dijkstra does not unpack how or why those states chose to reprioritise their values, a central objective for my project.  Another weakness in applying P-A approaches to delegation to Secretariats is that P-A expectations under conditions of multiple principals are not borne out empirically in international organisations.   Terry Moe (1984, 1985) argues that multiple principles lead to a strengthened agent,226 and seminal P-A theorists Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) cite Moe when similarly suggesting that the presence of multiple principals gives an agent the ability to “strategically                                                223 Acharya and Johnston 2007.  224 Duffield 2003. 225 Dijkstra 2012. 226 Moe 1984; 1985.  93 manipulate the decision-making process of the collective principal”.227  However, Moe’s observations are less applicable to IOs.   Moe was examining federal appointments to vacancies in the US National Labour Relations Board (NLRB).  In that case, Congress and the Presidency are aware that they have to eventually agree on a candidate, so they compromise on a technocratic and bureaucratic, rather than a political choice, thus benefitting their agents.  In contrast, in the case of budget changes in an IO such as the UN, the default compromise, if there is no agreement on a reform, is simply to leave that budget section unchanged, an extremely common occurrence.  Contrary to Moe’s observations, conflicting preferences in the UN amongst principals in the UN tends to result in institutional deadlock that prevents anyone, agents in the Secretariat included, from achieving any reforms.  This phenomenon is also particularly acute in the UN because the budget process includes several fora with consensus decision-making processes.  This phenomenon has, however, been considered briefly in some P-A approaches, which are more accurate in the IO context if they consider an intervening variable: the intensity of opposing preferences in IO budgetary Committees.  In a rigorous model based on P-A theories, Shipan (2004) echoes Moe’s findings about multiple principals, but takes care to note that it is only when opposing principals’ preferences are moderate that the bureaucracy has more opportunities for exercising its own discretion.228 There is another significant amendment to P-A approaches that would need to be employed in the analysis of delegation to IOs: the potential for cooperation between principal and agent.  John Scholz (1991) persuasively argues that this cooperation, a possibility almost                                                227 Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 27. 228 Shipan 2004.   94 universally excluded amongst P-A theorists, can benefit both parties.229  Likewise, Roy Radner (1985) had previously applied the logic of the Folk Theorem, demonstrating that if the shadow of the future is long enough, iterative P-A interactions move the outcome from sub-optimal strategic competition to more efficient and mutually beneficial arrangements.230  These findings shift the underlying assumptions of the relationship between states, as the principals, and the Secretariat, as the agents, from a zero-sum game to one in which both recognise the mutual gains of cooperation.  There is another complication when applying P-A analytical principles to the relationships between IO member states and the Secretariat, in that there is a commonly overlooked principal other than states.  Article 100 of the UN Charter states the following: In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.  This can, without too much imagination, be interpreted as stating that the principal to whom the Secretariat is ultimately responsible is the UN Organisation and its founding principles, and that the short-term preferences of member states are only a secondary concern.  In effect, the Charter suggests that the UN Secretary-General answers to a “higher authority” than even the most powerful of states, as Hammarskjöld explicitly claimed, and as discussed in                                                229 Scholz 1991.  230 Radner 1985.  95 chapter one.  That authority is the set of documents and mandates that member states have collectively agreed to in the past. In summary, then, for my purposes, P-A theories are incomplete, and empirical studies of international organisations close to my field of study have confirmed this.  For example, Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009) demonstrate that the variation in the influence exerted by international environmental bureaucracies over states cannot be explained by differing institutional characteristics or the configurations of member states, as P-A approaches typically assert,231 but rather by the variation in the issue characteristics, institutional resources, staff qualities, and leadership.232 I concur with their findings; however, unlike Biermann and Siebenhüner who examine only environmental IOs, I consider security issues, a domain in which state actors are typically considered dominant, and thus a harder case for my argument.  Also, they cover ten IOs, spending as little as ten to twelve pages on each; thus, while they are able to identify correlations that support their claims, and while their ability to generalise is greater, the lack of depth precludes any substantive examination of the mechanisms of influence, a focus of my project. I also add to Biermann and Siebenhüner’s discussion by parsing out and focussing one of their variables.  The explanatory factors they posit essentially cover almost every aspect of an IO, from its resources, to the personnel, to the choices of its leadership, and even the issue being considered.  In contrast, I consider how a narrow subset of those variables, in particular those related to Secretariat leadership and authority, can influence other variables, such as resources                                                231 For application of PA theory to IO delegation, see Hawkins et al. 2006. 232 Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009.   96 and staff.   Also, they claim to use the “autonomous influence” of the IO as the outcome of interest, but they use, as an indicator for that influence, the efficacy of the organisation, perhaps for normative reasons conflating the concept of an influential environmental IO with an effective one.  I retain a narrow focus on the evolving capacity of the IO bureaucracies, in terms of its mandate and resources, regardless of the extent to which the organisation is effective.  However, while they are incomplete for my purposes, I do not reject P-A theories outright.  Reinalda and Verbeek (2004) persuasively argue that they can be combined with sociological institutionalist approaches.233 Reinalda and Verbeek suggest that the P-A relationship, (as with other rationalist tools), can analytically be treated as a baseline, an explanation of how institutional factors and the preferences of actors interact to influence the range of autonomous action of IO bureaucracies.  Then, constructivist explorations of the preferences of both states and the bureaucracy can more accurately explain how that baseline moves, and why states alter their preferences of the balance between delegation and control.  Goldstein and Keohane (1993) had previously used a similar blend of materialist rationalism and ideational factors, showing that changes in ideas at three levels - world views (rarely), principle beliefs (such as human rights) and specific causal beliefs - can alter the preferences of state actors without a corresponding change in material conditions.234   This introduction of ideas substantially improves the accuracy and explanatory power of the neoliberal institutionalist framework.   However, Goldstein and Keohane, and to a lesser extent, Reinalda and Verbeek, tend to analytically incorporate ideas only to fill in the gaps or remedy false expectations generated by                                                233 Reinalda and Verbeek 2004. 234 Goldstein and Keohane, eds.  1993.  97 their primary explanatory variables, material interests.  In contrast, I hold ideas to be logically, chronologically, and analytically prior to the formation of material preferences.  With any material choice, trade-offs need to be made, and the values that influence decisions over those trade-offs are socially determined by the interaction of ideas within and between individuals and groups.  Thus, while I will accept that individuals (boundedly) rationally pursue their interests, I choose to unpack those interests by studying the social, ideational processes of preference formation that define the parameters of that pursuit. COI 1: Member states oppose the delegation of responsibility and resources to a part of the Secretariat when i) they consider the issue salient, ii) when they believe doing so would restrict their foreign policy options, and/or iii) if there are no means by which they can subsequently control the policies of that bureaucracy, either through formal or informal means. COI 2: States will be more likely to advocate additional mandates and/or the delegation of additional resources to a part of the Secretariat when they expect to gain net material benefits from that change. COI 3: Any instances studied in which member states give the Secretariat additional resources and/or an expanded mandate would be accompanied by institutional changes that restrict the autonomy of the corresponding Secretariat actors.  2.4 Observable implications i) Informal authority OI 1: If an IO bureaucrat is perceived to be endowed with expertise-based authority, states may a) make requests for technical advice to the IO bureaucratic actor, and/or b) make  98 references to the specialised knowledge of the IO bureaucratic actor as reason for deference to their instructions. OI 2: If an IO bureaucrat is perceived to be endowed with principle-based authority, states may a) describe the principles, values or morals held by the IO bureaucratic actor as legitimate and worthwhile pursuits, and/ or b) cite those principles and values as reason for deference.   ii) Persuasion  OI 3: A request by a member of an IO Secretariat for greater resources will be more effective if the logos/content of the argument (information, beliefs, values) is closely related to the ethos, the form of informal authority with which the audience perceives that Secretariat member to be endowed. i.e. information with relevant expertise, values with principles of the speaker. OI 4: A request by a member of an IO Secretariat for greater resources will be more effective if the logos/content of the argument (information, beliefs, values) is in congruence with the pathos, the beliefs and values of the audience. OI 5: A request by a member of an IO Secretariat for greater resources will be most effective if the informal authority of the speaker, the content of the message, and the identity (beliefs and values) of the audience all accord with each other. OI 6: On issues where a plenary assembly is strongly divided in beliefs and values, and to the extent that the decision making process requires consensus by member states, the IO bureaucracy will be less able to successfully encourage institutional change.  99 iv) Agenda setting OI 7: IO bureaucratic actors can leverage their informal authority, in circumstances beyond and in addition to those formally mandated to them, to raise the profile of certain issues, and encourage states to acknowledge that they have an urgent obligation to deliberate and resolve those issues. v) Operational influence OI 8: Where a particular reform, particularly increasing resources, would need to be justified by increased operational activity, an IO bureaucratic actor can a) persuade states whose approval is required that a particular operation must be created though the IO, and b) persuade the relevant states to accept operations on their sovereign soil. vi) Multiplying authority OI 9: An IO plenary assembly will be more likely to accept a request from the IO bureaucracy for additional resources if that request has been scrutinised and approved by a body external to the bureaucracy, such as an intergovernmental committee or independent expert panel.  Given that knowledge, the Secretariat will seek to create such groups. vii) Alternative explanations COI 1: Member states oppose the delegation of responsibility and resources to a part of the Secretariat when i) they consider the issue salient, ii) when they believe doing so would restrict their foreign policy options, and/or iii) if there are no means by which they can subsequently control the policies of that bureaucracy, either through formal or informal means.  100 COI 2: States will be more likely to advocate additional mandates and/or the delegation of additional resources to a part of the Secretariat when they expect to gain net material benefits from that change. COI 3: Any instances studied in which member states give the Secretariat additional resources and/or an expanded mandate would be accompanied by institutional changes that restrict the autonomy of the corresponding Secretariat actors.    101 Chapter 3: The UN, the Secretary-General, and the Budgetary Process 3.1 Introduction At its core, Chapter two explored the idea that successful persuasion required that an actor, viewed as having a particular type of authority, offers a particular type of message to a particular type of audience.  A speaker has to tailor their message to draw upon their own authority, and they have to tailor it to accord with the characteristics of their audience.  This chapter thus begins the research portion of this dissertation by exploring the speakers, messages, and audiences in the United Nations.  I have parsed this out from the case studies because the relationships elucidated here are applicable to both cases. This chapter begins by discussing the key speaker in the case studies, the UN Secretary-General.  I then work through the various stages of the UN budget process for two reasons: one is to clarify the various veto players and veto points; the second is to clarify the characteristics of each forum that render them more or less receptive to different types of argument, and different forms of authority. 3.2 The Secretary-General  Throughout this dissertation, I frequently emphasise the Secretary-General as the most politically conspicuous, and arguably the individual with the most informal authority within the Secretariat.  This is in part because the Office of the Secretary-General is the channel for many of the ideas and preferences of others in the Secretariat.  It is also the role of the Office of the Secretary-General (OSG) to author reports from the perspective of the Organisation as a whole, although many of those reports involve input and feedback gathered from various actors within the UN system.  As such, the relative influence of different actors over a particular report can be  102 extraordinarily difficult to determine from an outside perspective.  The focus on the Secretary-General is thus a useful and often necessary simplification. There are many individuals who: a) provide support and ideas that enable, constrain and otherwise influence the Secretary-General, and b) are key actors that take up the Secretary-General’s ideas and influence subsequent policy changes.  The influence of the Secretariat is thus spread amongst many individuals.  For example, in the context of the DPKO, the ideas propagated by the Secretary-General were both influenced and expounded by many others, particularly those with experience in the DPKO and in field missions in the early 1990s.  Many of these individuals had migrated into the higher echelons of the UN staff, some of them brought by Kofi Annan to the Office of the Secretary-General in 1997.   Key amongst them was Iqbal Riza, former Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) in the DPKO, whom Kofi Annan appointed as his Chef de Cabinet.235   Annan also hired likeminded speechwriters, and his relationship to them was commonly a mutually influential one.  For example, in early 1998, he hired Edward Mortimer of the Financial Times as his chief speechwriter.  Mortimer had recently written a paper on humanitarian intervention for the International Peace Academy.236  In these and many other examples, Secretary-General Annan strategically, “used staff appointments throughout his tenure to bolster his potential influence”.237 A key example of the influence other actors had on the formation of the Secretary-General’s position is Francis M. Deng’s (1993) understanding of sovereignty as responsibility,                                                235 Dallaire 2003, 48-50, and Traub 2006, 230-231 for the working relationship between Kofi Annan and Iqbal Riza. 236 Eckhard, 105; Traub, 2006, 91. 237 Kille 2006, 179-180.  103 an early example of the gradually shifting norm towards incorporating human rights into a concept of conditional sovereignty.238  Deng regularly discussed these ideas with Annan while serving as Special Advisor on the prevention of genocide and as the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons from 1992 to 2004.239   Another example of a (related) set of influential ideas taken up by the Secretary-General was the concept of human security, first articulated in the United Nations Development Project’s (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report.240  This focus on prioritising the needs of individuals over those of governments became a dominant theme throughout Annan’s subsequent publications and speeches.   The identification of the Secretary-General as the key agent of change on the part of the Secretariat is complicated by the fact that his network of like-minded supporters include those who at different stages in their careers also worked as representatives of states.  In particular, there have been many state actors with previous experience working with the DPKO or DPA who harboured a passionate desire to remedy the failures of UN peace operations in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia.241  For example, Jordanian diplomat Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al Hussein joined his country’s Permanent Mission as Deputy Permanent Representative in 1996, after spending years as a Political Officer in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia.  His passionate intent to address the failures he had seen, particularly in Srebrenica, led him to persuade the Secretary-General not only to initiate a review of that incident, but also to                                                238 Deng. 1993; 1996; 2008; 2009,191-213. 239 For further brief discussion, see Weiss. 2010, 270-271. 240 UNDP 1994. 241 Benner, Mergenthaler, & Rotmann 2011, 26; 33.  104 ensure that the report include open self-criticism, and then to ensure that it be widely published.242  Al Hussein has since risen to become UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Thus, the Secretary-General did not create the key ideas relevant to the case studies, those of the moral imperative and potential efficacy of UN political and military intervention, in a vacuum.  They were formed by interactions amongst individuals, and also by interactions between those individuals and more structural factors such as changing geopolitical conditions, and by the institutions and norms through which they act.  While for this project, my focus is on particular agents such as the Secretary-General, and the influence those agents can have on political institutions, I recognise the existence of a pre-existing network of ideas that contributed to the ideas the Secretary-General was articulating.  Despite this, it is useful and accurate to discuss the Secretary-General in particular because individual authority, both formal and informal, is a critical factor in determining whether a person’s ideas influence others; even though ideas may have originated elsewhere, it is the authority of key individuals such as the Secretary-General that enable the Secretariat to convince others to adopt those ideas. 3.3 The UN regular budget Any reforms the Secretary-General may hope to enact in the UN, driven by ideas he or she attempts to promulgate, involve changes to the budget.  Therefore, I work through the budget process here in order to clarify opportunities and obstacles for reform in departments such as the DPKO and DPA, and in particular to highlight potential points of influence by the Secretary-General and his staff.                                                 242 Ibid., 33; Traub 2006, 112.  For the final report, see: US Secretary-General 1999b.   105 There are two sections to the UN budget.  The UN Regular budget covers almost all UN activities, and is funded by contributions by all member states, using a scale of assessments largely determined by the economic strength of each state.  The US pays the greatest share at 22%, Japan 9.7%, China 7.9%, and Germany at 6.3%.  Most countries of the world pay less than 0.1% each.243  The one most significant area not covered by the regular budget is the peacekeeping budget.  Unlike the regular budget, which is agreed to every two years and begins at the start of each calendar year, the peacekeeping budget is entirely separate, and is assessed annually starting on 1 July.  Crucially, the scale of assessments is different for the peacekeeping budget, such that level A states, a category that includes only the P5, pay a higher percentage, and other wealthier states in level B pay a slightly higher percentage.  The US, for example, pays 28%, Japan 10.8%, China 10.2%, and so on.244  Aside from these two budgets, various UN agencies do attract extrabudgetary resources by soliciting donations from member states, with social and developmental agencies typically attracting the largest funds. In the words of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the UN budget “process is seriously flawed: it is complex, protracted, disjointed, time-consuming, and rigid”.245   Independent studies of the budget process,246 and interviewed Secretariat staff and delegates involved in the budget process, all agreed.  The development of the biennial regular budget is a lengthy process, with four stages that take place over several years.  It involves General Assembly Resolutions, the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC), the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), and the Fifth Committee in                                                243 UN Secretary-General 2017. 244 UN Secretary-General 2015. 245 UN Secretary-General 2002a, para157. Interviews with this author in June 2015, ACABQ Secretariat staff, ACABQ members, and Fifth Committee delegates agreed with this diagnosis. 246 Independent expert panel report 2014.  106 the General Assembly.  The complexity of the budget is such that, from an academic perspective, collecting and aggregating budget totals from different parts of the organisation is a challenging process, because any given item, for example, travel expenses, will be defined differently in many different parts of the organisation, and then defined differently from year to year.247  Parts of a budget item also move from one part of the budget to another without explanation.  A single item can thus appear to half from one budget to the next, then double to return to the original level the year after, not because there are actually any changes in resources, but only because part of that item has been temporarily assigned to a different department.  Nonetheless, the budget is one of the few areas in this project in which measurements are quantifiable, while other measurements, such as perceptions of authority, can only be assessed using qualitative means.  The monetary value of the budget of a particular Secretariat sub-unit, and its changes over time, is an effective, tangible, and credible measurement of the member states’ commitment to the capacity-based authority of that part of an IO bureaucracy.  The regular UN budget also often provides details of changes of formal delegated authority, when new mandates/IO sub-units/processes are added or deleted from one budget to the next.   The budget also provides evidence of IO bureaucracy autonomy, or the lack thereof.  When funding is allotted to broad categories with the details left to the bureaucracy, it suggests a more autonomous agent, but when the budget is broken down into detailed sub-categories, each with its own restricted budget and prohibitions against redistributing resources, it implies the opposite.  Similarly, the movement of specific budget items can be moved from one budget section to another can indicate shifting desires on the part of member states to micromanage                                                247 ACABQ Senior staff in interview, June 2015.  107 those items, as some sections formally require detailed management by states, while others do not.  In the early days of the United Nations, the budget was, by today’s standards, far simpler.  Its relative brevity, and a UN membership less than a quarter of its current size, made detailed control of the budget by all member states a more manageable prospect.  It was assumed that member states could rapidly respond to changing circumstances if need be, such that in November 1947, it seemed unproblematic that General Assembly resolution 166 severely restricted the Secretary-General’s ability to transfer funds from one section to another.248  As the membership, budget, mandates and structure of the UN has grown over the years, it has been increasingly challenging for (now 193) states to rapidly agree on urgent changes.  In response, beginning in 2002, the Secretary-General began requesting greater flexibility, and the ability at least to move up to 10% of a budget section to another section within the same part of the budget.249  This has not been approved.  The response of the ACABQ to this request, as it is on many subjects raised by the Secretary-General, is that it had “studied the proposals of the Secretary-General”, but that it was, “of the opinion that the current proposals of the Secretary-General lack sufficient clarity and detail to be ripe for consideration at the present stage”.250  The ACABQ also stated that, “additional flexibility must be accompanied by a comprehensive and effective system of accountability… This includes the accountability of the Secretary-General to Member                                                248 UN General Assembly 1947. 249 UN Secretary-General 2002., para 167; UN Secretary-General 2006a, paras 9-19. 250 ACABQ 2006c, paras 29-31.  108 States, bearing in mind that it is the General Assembly which continues to exercise overall authority over the finances of the Organization.”   Ten days after this particular response, the Secretary-General published a framework for accountability, with a hierarchy from the General Assembly at the top (accountable to the UN Charter), then the Secretary-General, then Department Heads, then Directors, then Supervisors, and finally other staff.  For each level he concisely indicated responsibilities and authority, as well as the matters on which each was accountable to the level above.  The Secretary-General conceived of the General Assembly’s role as somewhat akin to that of a CEO, confirming or commenting on the Secretary-General’s strategic framework, and providing: “mandates and overall policy guidance to the Secretary-General for the execution of these mandates as well as those given to the Secretary-General directly by the Charter of the United Nations”.251  The document clearly assigns no authority to the General Assembly for management of financial details, unlike the Secretary-General, who it states should not only attend to the “management of department, and the effective management of human and financial resources”, but even has the authority to delegate the management of financial resources to subordinates such as the Under-Secretary for Management.252  This framework was acknowledged, but not approved. The complexity of the UN budget process allows for multiple points of influence by the Secretariat.  To illustrate this, I summarise the salient points of each of the four stages of the budget, and then I briefly discuss several political facets of the process that influence the                                                251 UN Secretary-General 2006a, 15. 252 Ibid.  109 strategies that the Secretariat can use in attempting to alter member state positions on budgetary issues. 3.4 The four stages of the budget In a general sense, the evolution of the regular budget reflects the long history of General Assembly resolutions that assign tasks to the Organisation.  In a more proximate sense, however, the Secretary-General spends six months preparing documents for the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC), which confirms the various mandates of different parts of the UN.  The CPC then spends six months working through those with the Secretariat to produce the budget outline.  The Secretariat then spends another six months turning that outline into a detailed proposed budget, and then the ACABQ spends four months debating that before passing it on to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, who spend the last two months of the year in an intense series of meetings making numerous relatively small changes to the budget before the biennium begins in January, when the Secretary-General immediately begins the two-year process again. This section provides evidence for OI – 4, whereby different audiences can be seen to react differently to different types of arguments. Note that at the time of writing, this process may be shortened considerably.  At the end of the General Assembly session in December 2017, the Assembly agreed to one of Secretary-General António Guterres’s recommendations, and beginning in 2020, for a trial period, the budget will be shortened from a biennial to an annual process.  This will condense all of the processes described below.    3.4.1 Stage 1: General Assembly resolutions and the Strategic Framework In a very long-term view, the budget begins with General Assembly resolutions, which, while non-binding on members, do establish mandates for the various parts of the organisation.   110 The Assembly now typically passes over three hundred resolutions each session.  While there are some issues on which there are sharp divisions between voting blocs, such as human rights, or the Israel-Palestine conflict, many resolutions are passed fairly easily and unanimously.  One of the reasons for this is that the language in the resolutions is typically designed specifically to elicit the maximum breadth of support.  Unfortunately, this often means crafting resolutions that are deliberately vague or ambiguous.253  Another reason, as mentioned, is that the resolutions are non-binding, so even if the details of a resolution contradict the perceived self-interest of particular states, they might still choose not to publicly oppose it.   While many of these resolutions do not directly address budget changes, they provide the basis for subsequent budget recommendations on the basis that they alter the mandates assigned to the Organisation by member states. The Secretariat has three key roles in the formation of General Assembly resolutions.  The first is purely administrative; the Secretariat is responsible for translations, transcriptions, and other similar supporting tasks for all the intergovernmental bodies in the UN, including the General Assembly.  The second is information; the Secretariat provides data and background information on any issue, sometimes in response to specific requests by member states, and sometimes independently.  The final role is to set the broader agenda; the Secretary-General addresses the beginning of each General Assembly session in a speech that typically establishes several key issues to be prioritised by the Assembly.  The Secretary-General also, on a continuous basis, notifies both the General Assembly and Security Council of any global events                                                253 High ranking Secretariat staff in interviews, 23-26 June 2015.  111 that the Secretary-General considers to be a threat to global peace and security, sometimes forming global conferences to address an issue. The biennial budgetary cycle begins when the Office of the Secretary-General spends six months creating a Strategic Framework outlining the programs and objectives of the UN system.  In doing so, each Framework builds upon the decades of General Assembly Resolutions, on the Framework for the previous year, on programmes that were under financial strain in the previous budget, and on any particular issues that the Secretary-General and other members of the Secretariat choose to bring to the fore.  This Framework is then passed on to the CPC. 3.4.2 Stage 2: Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC) The various Resolutions passed by the General Assembly and Security Council over the years are then taken into consideration during the next stage.  More than two years before the beginning of a biennium, the Secretary-General drafts a Strategic Framework detailing the mandates assigned by member states to the various parts of the UN.254  The Secretary-General then provides that, along with supporting documents such as relevant reports by various intergovernmental bodies and Secretariat departments, to the CPC,255 a body with 34 member state representatives.256  A dialogue between the CPC and the Secretariat then ensues, with the                                                254 From 1974 until 2003, the SG produced the Medium Term Plan, which offered a four-year outline for the activities of the Organisation.  In 2003, GA Resolution 58/269 changed this to the Strategic Framework, Part One of which outlines the long-term objectives of the UN, and Part Two of which involves a plan to cover the next two years.  Part One has yet to be agreed upon by the GA. 255 GA Resolution 31/93 established the three related roles of the CPC:  1) Review in depth, on a selective basis, the major programmes of the medium-term plan and to recommend any necessary amendments to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. 2) To determine which programmes, sub-programmes or programme elements are obsolete, or marginal usefulness or ineffective and to recommend, as appropriate, their curtailment or termination. 3) To assess the degree of substantive co-ordination of selected programme within the United Nations system and to recommend the appropriate action thereon. 256 Since 1988, the 34 member states in the CPC have been elected for three-year terms on a geographically equitable basis: 9 African States; 7 Asia-Pacific States; 7 Latin American and Caribbean States; 7 Western European and other States, 4 Eastern European States.   112 objective of the process being the outlining of all the current mandates and programmes within the UN, and all changes mandated by decisions of the intergovernmental committees, so that following budgetary processes can then consider what activities there are that require funding.  The various intergovernmental bodies that provided the supporting documents often do not have the time and/or inclination to substantively review the sections given to them.  Rather, they receive and concur with the recommendations of the Secretary-General, and then often provide only editorial comments.257  Oversight is thus relatively weak.  Once the process is complete, the CPC makes revisions it deems necessary, and the Strategic Framework is passed to the General Assembly.    Almost all individuals interviewed by this author at the United Nations, including one who had previously served as a member of the CPC, believe that the CPC should be abolished, and that it achieves nothing more than significant delays for the budget process.258   A 2002 review of the budgetary process led by Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette had come to that same conclusion.259  Those who were willing to speculate as to why it had not been dissolved, claim that resistance came from the G77, who view the CPC as one of the few veto points at which they can exert influence over the course of the Organisation.260  When asked why budgetary process reforms, including the CPC, never seemed to take place, a senior member of the Secretariat told this author that, “the budget process is like this because member states want it like this.  If they wanted it simpler, it would be simpler”.261                                                257 Interview with Senior Secretariat staff, Fifth Committee delegate, and former member of CPC, June 2015. 258 Ibid. 259 ACABQ member A in interview, June 2015. 260 Ibid.  Note that I do not have a comment from a member of the G77 on this question. 261 Interview with senior ACABQ Secretariat member, June 2015.  113 3.4.3 Stage 3: Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) The Secretary-General then draws upon the outcomes of the CPC discussions and creates a Programme Budget Proposal, which he offers, along with supporting documents, to the ACABQ, a geographically representative body of sixteen member state representatives, elected by the General Assembly.  Officially, ACABQ members are independent from their respective states.  Their nameplates show only their names, and not their countries, and their debates are not overtly political.  However, each member is influenced by the economic and political culture of his or her home state, and many of them have previously served in the Fifth Committee, so a political subtext is inevitable; as a current ACABQ member discussed, “maybe 12 or 13 of the 16 members have come straight from the fifth committee, and they have brought all of their working practices, and their allegiances and the group politics from there.  And so that's why, more than ever, we are reflecting the fifth committee”.262   The ACABQ Secretariat explains that ACABQ members “are elected by the General Assembly. The General Assembly is a purely political body. So the people who are elected by the General Assembly to the ACABQ are in the political world”.263 The Proposed Budget uses the previous budget as a starting point, and is then amended based on the Secretary-General’s interpretation of subsequent General Assembly Resolutions and changing global circumstances. The ACABQ scrutinises the budget proposal, demanding further details and justifications from the Secretary-General, particularly on any differences between the current proposal and the previous budget.  Representatives of the Secretary-General, and of                                                262 ACABQ Secretariat staff and ACABQ members in interviews conducted on 24-25 June 2015. 263 ACABQ Senior Secretariat Staff in interview, June 2015.  114 various UN departments, are frequently summoned to explain parts of the proposal to the Committee.   During these interviews, and in the proposed budget, the Office of the Secretary-General commonly cites, as evidence of new mandates for him or the Secretariat, parts of General Assembly Resolutions that, on close analysis, offer only vague support for Secretariat activities such as conflict resolution. Finally, the ACABQ sends a revised proposal, designed to maximise agreement, to the Fifth Committee, the General Assembly budgetary subcommittee with representatives from all member states.  The ACABQ attempts to be politically sensitive to the climate and debates in the General Assembly, to reduce the likelihood that the budget proposal be rejected by the General Assembly, delaying the process, creating more work, and diminishing the apparent authority of the ACABQ.264 From 1974 to 2003, the ACABQ had a single chairman, Ambassador Conrad S. M. Mselle (Tanzania).  Under his stewardship, the ACABQ came to be perceived by member states as authoritative, impartial experts on financial management, and ACABQ recommendations were afforded considerable respect by the General Assembly.265  Since 2003, however, the ACABQ has come to be perceived as less authoritative, and as a consequence, the Fifth Committee has spent more and more time scrutinising and altering their recommendations.  Having said that, some Fifth Committee delegates, including one interviewed, say that many member states rely heavily on the ACABQ reports because they take complicated, technical issues and give them to the Fifth Committee in “a more digestible form”.266  From the perspective of the General                                                264 Ibid., ACABQ member A in interview, June 2015. 265 Interviews with this author: Senior Secretariat staff and current ACABQ member, June 2015.  See also Mselle 2011. 266 Delegate B to Fifth Committee in interview with this author, June 2015.  115 Assembly, especially those countries who do not have citizens serving in the ACABQ, ACABQ deliberations can be opaque.  The meetings are always closed-door, even to other related parts of the organisation.  As one Fifth Committee delegate said in interview: “the ACABQ is for us, for me, it's a bit invisible actually, what happens there”.267 In discussions with the Secretariat, the ACABQ responds more positively to precise and detailed technical arguments that argue that specific mandates assigned by the General Assembly or Security Council require more resources.  The ACABQ members reject, and indeed get openly irritated by, arguments that focus on the ideals of the UN Charter, or the suggestion that a particular department should be given a particular new role, especially if there is no resolution to show that states had assigned a new mandate.268  Despite the obvious programmatic implications of their deliberations, the ACABQ sees programmatic changes as outside their purview, as a technical accounting, and not (overtly) political body.269   3.4.4 Stage 4: The Fifth Committee The fourth stage is the debate in the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee.  Over the last ten years, that debate has become more protracted and intense, as the authority of the ACABQ has waned.  Since 2003, the ACABQ has had five Chairs, and rather than accepting ACABQ recommendations as authoritative, the Fifth Committee tends to duplicate much of the technical review process that used to be the exclusive purview of the ACABQ.270  Despite this, the                                                267 Delegate B to Fifth Committee in interview with this author, June 2015. 268 Current ACABQ member, in interview with this author, June 2015.  Senior ACABQ Secretariat member, in interview with this author, June 2015.  269 Current ACABQ member, in interview with this author, June 2015.   270 Because Process Matters. Para 146  116 ACABQ recommendations are still typically viewed as the default position, such that 80-90% of the Fifth Committee’s final decisions reflect the ACABQ’s position.271    The debate in the Fifth Committee is further complicated by the fact that many member states will argue passionately and at length over individual posts, rather than discussing the budget at a more strategic level.272   As a delegate to the Fifth Committee put it in interview, “[t]hat's the main problem in terms of UN financing. Everything is a priority for somebody”.273  The process is simplified, however, by voting blocs, who agree on a joint position.  As one delegate to the Fifth Committee explained it: “the informal consultations are in theory between all the member states but in practice the blocs are in fact the most important way to negotiate; I think it would be impossible to negotiate with 193 countries so actually it is EU, the G 77, Russia, CANZ, and the US of course, Japan, Switzerland”.274    While blocs are the primary negotiating units, influence within them varies considerably, and the level of influence is not necessarily a reflection of the power of their home state.  Influence also depends, to a great extent, on the perceived qualities of the individual delegate.  One delegate described this in the context of his first impressions of the Fifth Committee, in terms that resonated with my interest in informal authority: I was a bit surprised, at the beginning, that some quite small countries were very important in the whole debate, simply because they're just good delegates.  It’s not very important if you’re from Nigeria or from Togo, but if the delegates from those countries                                                271 Current ACABQ member, in interview with this author, June 2015.   272 Because Process Matters. Para 104.  Fifth Committee members A and B in interview with this author, June 2015. 273 Delegate A to Fifth Committee, in interview with this author, June 2015. 274 Delegate B to Fifth Committee in interview with this author, June 2015.  117 are really talented and well-informed then they are powerful. So influence depends more on the particular delegate than the country within the block.275 Senior Secretariat staff made similar comments in interviews about the ACABQ, the Fifth Committee, and the organisation as a whole: “At the end of the day it very much depends on who is strongest, who can convince, who has a handle on the data, who's got the stamina, who knows how to negotiate”.276 Within the Fifth Committee there are several hidden layers of negotiations.277  If agreement is not reached in formal negotiations, the “formal informal” processes begin; a Coordinator is chosen by the Chairperson to accept suggestions by interested states, and then propose a compromise solution.  If this fails, the “informal, informal” negotiations begin, where small groups break off to try to resolve particular issues before returning to the Coordinator.  Where this too is unable to generate consensus, the “least formal” negotiations take place, anywhere from the various offices of the UN Headquarters to the Vienna Café in the UN North Lawn building.  Finally, if deadlocks remain, “political meetings” take place between Ambassadors.   Even back in 2001, when, in comparison with today, the Fifth Committee was more likely to accept ACABQ recommendations with little argument, the Fifth Committee required a total of 401 meetings to reach agreement on the budget for 2002-2003.  The costs of the administrative support alone for those meetings exceeded US$10.3 million.278  Of all of these levels, published records are available only for the first, formal negotiations.  For the other levels, constituting the vast majority of the debates, the Secretariat                                                275 Delegate B to Fifth Committee in interview with this author, June 2015. 276 Senior ACABQ Secretariat staff A, interview in June 2015. 277 Schlesinger 2002. 278 Ibid.  118 only retains incomplete, unpublished memos and notes written by the staff assigned to provide legal and administrative support to negotiators.  Thomas Schlesinger, former Fifth Committee member representing Austria, and Coordinator of the many informal meetings in 2001, stated that if, “scholars or academics want to find out how decisions are taken in the Fifth Committee, they clearly are at a disadvantage, because what they see from summary records - first, there is a formal meeting where delegations have opposing views and no consent, but miraculously, after one, two, three months, a decision is reached again in a formal meeting [sic]”.279  The Fifth Committee forms the final stage of the budgetary process, but this section also introduces one of several other key aspects to the process, that of voting blocs and the relationships between them. 3.5 Voting blocs In any international organisation in which at least some decisions are agreed by voting, blocs of states develop on any given set of issues.  The UN is no exception.  There are many groupings, such as the US (often a bloc unto itself), the EU, CANZ (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), Japan, the G77, China, the Rio group (Latin America and some Caribbean states), and the Africa Group.  Engagement via blocs requires some sacrifice on the part of individual states, but there can be substantial benefits.  One delegate to the Fifth Committee explained: “Of course we have our own national priorities, but we negotiate about our national priorities within the [bloc] context and we think it's important that we are part of an entity of countries.  That's especially true for smaller countries; we’re not so small, but we are quite small. It's a good way to bring your priorities forward to make a difference”.280                                                279 Ibid. 280 Delegate B to Fifth Committee in interview with this author, June 2015.  119 On many issues, particularly with the budget, the most basic divide in the General Assembly is between developed and developing states, with the various smaller blocs aligning with one or the other with reasonable consistency.  Developed states, and the US in particular, have historically expressed a preference for a zero-growth budget that emphasises fiscal discipline and efficiency.  Over recent years, the financial circumstances in Europe have led EU countries to articulate this position even more frequently than the US.281  As a means to achieve these efficiencies, developed states are potentially more willing to advocate or allow selective delegation of authority to the Secretariat, if it seems that a greater flexibility and autonomy for the Secretary-General will lower costs overall. In contrast, developing nations, routinely using one state as a spokesperson for the G77, consistently emphasise the inadequacy of funds for development, and the disproportionate control over some UN institutions by developed states.  They therefore often advocate increasing resources for much of the UN, but they are less willing to delegate authority to it, preferring to assign fine-grained decision-making to the General Assembly.282 These bloc divisions are most pronounced in the General Assembly Fifth Committee.  There, highly technical arguments tend not to be scrutinised in detail, and successful arguments are rather those that carefully take into account political realities and the possibility of compromise.283  Arguments based on the principles of the UN Charter are superficially well received, but are ineffective if they do not take into account the fact that, for example, many G77 states like to see reforms that result in more (regionally distributed) posts, and thus will reject the                                                281 Interview with Fifth Committee delegate A, June 2015 (member of the EU). 282 Ibid. 283 Fifth Committee delegate A and Fifth Committee delegate B, in interview with this author, June 2015.  120 consolidation of different departments because that would reduce the number of veto points to which less powerful states have access.284   Meanwhile, the US, UK, and CANZ, while in principle opposing increased costs, will support additional posts and corresponding costs, if it means that HQ in New York can exercise greater oversight and control over peacekeeping and political missions around the world, many of whom are primarily staffed by G77 civilians and troops.285    When voting blocs become entrenched on an issue, particularly along the ideological divide between the Global North and South, the ability of the Secretariat or a bloc of states to push through reforms is extremely limited.  As Coleman (2017) discusses, a critical factor in the likelihood that peacekeeping reforms will be successful is the “extent to which the proposal avoids inflaming the divisions among member states”.286   An underlying reason for this is that so many of the UN budgetary stages work in principle by consensus.  On the most contentious issues, therefore, there are several veto points where those firmly opposed to reform can easily obstruct its passage.  An example from the DPKO chapter is the issue of the creation of a strategic planning and analysis unit close to the Secretary-General.  The G77 have always expressed concerns that such a unit would enable Western states to essentially establish a global military intelligence cell that could conduct what they view as espionage.287 Conversely, when that divide does not exist, and even if almost all states are initially against strengthening a part of the Secretariat, the SG can more easily shift the preferences of the                                                284 Senior member of UN Secretariat, in interview with this author; ACABQ member, in interview with this author; Fifth Committee delegate A, in interview with this author. 285 ACABQ member, in interview with this author.  286 Coleman 2017. 287 Interviews with Fifth Committee delegates A and B, DPA staff B, June 2015.  121 entire community of member states in favour of the provision of significant additional resources.  As discussed in the previous chapter, this is counterintuitive from the perspective of principal-agent theory, which might suggest that there would be more room for manoeuvre on the part of the Secretariat when states are divided, and less so when states are united against a part of that bureaucracy.   3.6 The US-UN relationship The relationship between the largest financial contributor to the UN and the Fifth Committee has historically been an antagonistic one, particularly since the global wave of decolonisation swelled the ranks of UN membership with less developed states that had different priorities for the Organisation.  Beginning in 1980, the US began withholding contributions for specific programs it disapproved of, such as the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), the Addis Ababa conference centre, the Second Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, the implementation of General Assembly Resolution 3379 (Zionism equals racism), and the Preparatory Commission for the Law of the Sea.   In the mid-1980’s, the US Congress became increasingly frustrated that despite paying a quarter of the UN budget, it’s attempts to guide the evolution of the Organisation were frequently frustrated by the G77, which opposed and outvoted the US in the General Assembly, and in the Fifth committee in particular.  In response, the US withheld even more of its contributions. Then in 1995 it unilaterally limited its peacekeeping contribution to 25% of the budget (from a UN assessment of 26.7%), and in a deal with the other UN member states in 1999, limited its contribution to the regular budget to 22%.    122 In an attempt to reduce conflict in the Fifth Committee, and in order to further avoid being outvoted by the G77, the US began advocating consensus decision-making as a principle for debates on budgetary matters.  This was a compromise position.  In 1986 US Congress refused to approve payments of more than 20% of the UN regular budget unless budget decisions be weighted by the size of assessment; this would have given the US more voting power than the poorest one hundred countries combined.  The G77 were furious,288 but were willing to accept a compromise put forward by the Reagan administration, in which budgetary decisions in the future would be made by consensus. With few exceptions, budgets since the mid/late-1990’s have been politically successful in that they have (eventually) been agreed by consensus; however, consensus decision-making presents two obvious challenges: it has made deliberations slower and more complex, and the resultant status quo bias has significantly decreased the likelihood that radical changes can make it through the committee.  The budget is thus typically slow to change from one biennium to the next.  Gradual increases over the years seem primarily to reflect inflationary changes and the path-dependent tendencies of institutions that, once created, resist efforts made to remove them. 3.7 Conclusion The UN budget is slow to change.  Any changes that do occur require the consent of several intergovernmental and technical bodies in which voting blocs can clash, preventing reforms when consensus is required.  The General Assembly requires that any changes take into account political realities, the ACABQ demands that changes are justified by mandates established by the General Assembly and/or Security Council.  The strategies employed by a                                                288 UN General Assembly 1986.  123 Secretary-General to change the budget, require influence at several different points.  Issues must be raised higher on the agenda throughout the UN system, from the CPC to the General Assembly.  The Assembly and Security Council must be persuaded to adopt resolutions that establish new or expanded mandates for parts of the Organisation.  The ACABQ, and then the Fifth Committee, must also be persuaded that achieving those mandates requires greater resources.  The case studies now explore those processes, in the cases of UN peacekeeping and political missions.     124 Chapter 4: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 4.1 Introduction By 1997, member states of the United Nations (UN) had come to overtly reject the practice of UN peacekeeping.  Their opposition to providing more resources to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) seemed intractable.  However, three years later, states chose to greatly strengthen that department’s manpower and resources.289  From 2001 to 2003, the number of regular posts in the DPKO rose from 310 to 528.290  Prior to this change, from 1995 until 2001, and afterwards, from the end of 2003 until today, the number of regular posts in the DPKO has been almost static.291   In 2001, states also delegated additional control to the DPKO, such as the authority to select and hire peacekeeping staff without the delays incurred by member state oversight.292  Over Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s ten years in office another seventeen peace operations would be launched.293   No global geopolitical change explains this, as is the case with the surge in peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War.  This is the puzzle I explore in this chapter. This shift is not problematized in recent peacekeeping literature, which tends to focus on the controversy surrounding peace enforcement and a shift towards including the protection of civilians as a core mission mandate.  This body of literature overlooks the far more fundamental, prior change in member state attitudes: the shift to reconsidering the UN as the most legitimate and effective venue through which to organise and supervise peacekeeping operations.  It was as                                                289 UN Secretary-General 2004a, paras 6-8. 290 Data for annual changes to DPKO staff numbers compiled from annual Composition of the Secretariat reports prepared by the Office of the Secretary-General. 291 Ibid. 292 Jonah. 2007, 165. 293 Meisler 2007, 316.  125 a consequence of these mediating conditions that states came to believe that it was not only worthwhile to redirect their efforts through the UN, but that they should devote more resources to the Secretariat in doing so. I argue that the Secretary-General and his staff were able to significantly influence this change in the preferences of member states.  Secretary-General Kofi Annan leveraged his informal authority to influence the opinions of key member states, and also of the international community of states as a whole.  The Secretariat was able to apply his informal authority through three strategies to influence UN member states’ policies towards peacekeeping.  The first was agenda setting, which led states to reprioritise issues for debate within UN forums, and more specifically to increasingly adopt the idea that UN intervention in domestic security crises was a moral imperative if a state was unable or unwilling to protect its own citizens.  The second was the initiation or expansion of UN operations necessary to justify greater resources for support at the DPKO.  The third was the multiplication of authority by the Secretariat, in which the Secretariat formed expert panels to assist with agenda setting and to shift states’ policies closer towards the preferences of the Secretary-General.  I begin this chapter with a brief discussion of some key definitions, and then I offer some observations that demonstrate how challenging any peace operations reforms are in the UN, in order to illustrate the magnitude of the achieved budgetary changes.  I also demonstrate that the conditions facing the Secretariat at the beginning of this case’s time period were particularly hostile to the idea of DPKO expansion, making the subsequent reversal of member state attitudes towards UN peacekeeping all the more worthy of study.   I then describe how Secretary-General Kofi Annan and others perceived his informal authority in the context of UN peacekeeping, before moving on to details of his influence.  With  126 the case study, I describe evidence for the pattern of persuasion by the Secretariat.  The pattern, as described in chapter two, consists of strategic persuasion through three inter-related, overlapping, and non-sequential strategies: agenda setting, initiating operations, and the multiplication of authority.   4.2 Definitions: peacekeeping and peace operations Any academic discussion of UN-mandated interventions in conflicts around the world is complicated by a lack of consensus on definitions of even the most common terms, such as peacekeeping and peace operations.  Following the 2015 High Level Panel on Peace Operations, I consider peace operations to include both military and diplomatic efforts to prevent or resolve conflict.  For the panel, the term peace operations “denote[s] the full spectrum of United Nations peace and security missions and initiatives… as well as more flexible tools and instruments, such as the use of small teams of experts and peace and development advisers.”294 This inclusive definition of peace operations is a logical one, given that both peacekeeping operations and Special Political Missions (SPMs) have a great deal in common, despite the conspicuous lack of a military component in the latter.  For one, they share a similar objective: peace and political stability.  Also, both are initiated and designed using similar political processes by the same set of key actors, and they operate in similar (often the same) environments.  There has thus been a great deal of overlap between the two over the last twenty years, both practically and conceptually, to the extent that it has sometimes been difficult for the UN Secretariat to clearly explain the criteria used to decide whether to allocate a particular mission to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or to the Department of Political                                                294 High Level International Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), 2015, 28.   127 Affairs.295  Therefore, while some eminent scholars still limit the term “peace operations” to military actions, such as Paul Diehl’s (2008) Peace Operations, in which there is no mention at all of either non-military methods of conflict resolution or of the UN Department of Political Affairs,296 I do include those additional strategies for achieving peace. I use the term peacekeeping, as is now widely accepted, as an umbrella term to describe all UN peace operations with a military component, “designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers”.297  This includes, at its core, elements of traditional peacekeeping, the inter-position of troops wearing UN insignia between hostile militaries belonging to different states, after a ceasefire has been arranged, in order to allow the political space for dialogue with the hope that a more lasting agreement can be reached.298  However, second generation peacekeeping has increasingly included other peace operation strategies, such as conflict prevention,299 peace-making,300 peace enforcement,301 and peacebuilding.302  The DPKO                                                295 UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 2006, paras 9-15. 296 Diehl 2008.  297 DPKO 2008 UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. 7-8. Also initially known as the Capstone Doctrine. 298 I derived this definition from common knowledge, and from descriptions of traditional peacekeeping, such as: UN DPKO. What is Peacekeeping? http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml.  Accessed 7 April 2016.  Also considered was a broad description of traditional peacekeeping in Diehl 2008, 4-5, and a definition in Bellamy and Williams 2010, 8. 299 Structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict, building on early warning, information gathering, conflict analysis, the use of the Secretary- General’s “good offices,” preventive deployment and confidence-building measures. Definition from DPKO 2008, 7-8.  300 Diplomatic measures to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement, including the exercise of the Secretary-General’s “good offices”. Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organizations, and/or the United Nations, and may also involve unofficial and non-governmental groups, or a prominent personality. Definition from DPKO 2008, 7-8. 301 The application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force by the UN or regional organizations and agencies, to restore international peace and security. Definition from DPKO 2008, 7-8. 302 Complex, long-term measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening the state’s capacities at all levels for its core functions, most notably conflict management and  128 includes in their definition of peacekeeping, extensive lists of the various diplomatic, developmental and governance tasks that have been assigned to peacekeepers and those working alongside them in complex, multidimensional operations, particularly those of the last twenty years.303  4.3 The challenge of peacekeeping operations reform  4.3.1 Divisions at the UN Before discussing the authority of the Secretary-General and his attempts to reform the DPKO after assuming the post in 1997, it is important to understand the institutional barriers to achieving any peacekeeping reforms within the UN, such that the full magnitude of the accomplishment be recognised.  As Dijkstra suggests in a broader context, these barriers are primarily due to the divergence of interests between the different blocs of states and the different parts of the Secretariat.304  There are several key divisions within the UN that make agreement on peacekeeping reform extremely challenging, particularly in budgetary committees that require consensus decision-making.   First, the North-South divide, common on so many issues debated in the UN, is particularly prominent in peacekeeping.305  Powerful Western states are ostensibly inspired by liberal ideas of the value of promoting democracy and liberalism around the world, but the G77                                                development, and comprehensively addressing underlying, structural causes of violent conflict. Definition from DPKO. 2008, 7-8. 303 DPKO 2003. Handbook, 2-3.  Modern complex peacekeeping missions have been categorised by the various elements of their mandates; for example, see: Durch and Berkman 2006, 5-9.  See also Diehl, Druckman and Wall 1998; Diehl 2008, 12-17.  Their mandates are: i) Traditional peacekeeping, ii) observation, iii) election supervision, iv) arms control verification, v) humanitarian assistance during conflict, vi) preventive deployment, vii) state/nation building, viii) pacification, ix) protective services, x) intervention in support of democracy, xi) sanctions enforcement, and xii) collective enforcement. 304 Dijkstra 2015, 26.  The following several points above are taken from this useful summary. 305 For an excellent summary of the North-South divide, and the distrust between the UN voting blocs, see Swart and Lund 2010, 121-148.  129 states, motivated by a history of colonialism, supported by China and Russia in the Security Council, are more strongly opposed to the idea of robust mandates and the failure to prioritise state sovereignty.306  The G77 also objects to the fact that the most powerful and some of the wealthiest states, in the Security Council, can initiate peace operations without the consent of the vast majority of member states.307  Secondly, there is a division within the Security Council.  Even after the end of the Cold War, there often remained a lack of consensus on security issues within the Security Council, and Council members “have found it much easier to agree on a more limited set of objectives than on an overall political strategy aimed at addressing underlying causes and drivers of conflict”. 308  Any possibility of negotiated compromise is further inhibited by the fact that most, if not all, states are reluctant to formalise a peacekeeping doctrine that might later reduce their political room for manoeuvre.309  Indeed the attempt made by the DPKO to outline such a set of ideas in 2008 had to be renamed, from The Capstone Doctrine, the title of the document up until its third draft, to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, in the face of opposition by many member states simply to the word “doctrine”.310  As the drafts were revised in response to feedback from member states, the tone of the document tempered considerably from one of proscriptive requirements and instructions for member states to a descriptive summary of contemporary peacekeeping.311                                                306 Lipson 2010; Benner, Mergenthaler and Rotmann  2011, 18-21; Dijkstra 2015, 26. Annan 2012, 63-64. 307 Senior UN Official in interview with this author June 2015; UN mission advisor on Security Council issues in interview with this author June 2015. 308 Berdal and. Ucko 2014. 309 Senior UN Official in interview with this author June 2015; Fifth Committee member in interview with this author June 2015; UN mission advisor on Security Council issues in interview with this author June 2015. 310 Bellamy and Williams 2010, 141-142. 311 Ibid.  130 Thirdly, there is also a divide in operational preferences between those who can control whether or not to initiate a mission (the Security Council, and the P5 in particular), and the troop contributing countries (TCCs).  TCCs understandably prefer not to insert their troops into situations where they are likely to incur many casualties, and when they do insert, they wish to have all the backstopping support from UN HQ and other related agencies required to ensure their safety.312   Developed states, which bear the economic burden of funding missions, have different priorities. While they feel political pressure from the Secretary-General and the international community to respond to crises, they prefer smaller, less expensive missions, particularly in regions where they have no particular national interest in resolving a conflict.313 This creates a situation where the Secretariat can find it very difficult to find sufficient troops, even after the Security Council has authorised an urgent mission.  Overall, despite the fact that all the risk lies with the TCCs, the Security Council, which can initiate peace operations without their consent, or that of the rest of the member states, has yet to institutionalise any consultation mechanism between the Security Council and TCCs; this is a source of tension between the two groups.314 This situation despite calls from the Secretariat for such mechanisms for nearly two decades. And finally, parts of the Secretariat have their own preferences that can conflict with those of member states. DPKO staff, for example, may have several inter-related motives underlying the reforms they support: i) they may wish to demonstrate their status as experts in their field by achieving success in their operations, ii) they can exhibit an altruistic desire to                                                312 Breakley and Dekker 2014, 313; Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) 2014; Dijkstra 2015, 26; Cunliffe 2009. 313 Allen and Yuen 2014, 623-624.   314 Senior UN Official in interview with this author June 2015; UN Permanent Mission advisor on Security Council issues in interview with this author June 2015.  131 achieve peace and alleviate suffering,315 and iii) they, along with other parts of the Secretariat and the TCCs, seek “clear, credible and achievable mandates”.316   The Secretariat, and the Secretary-General and DPKO in particular, have a strong professional interest in the success of UN peacekeeping operations.  These preferences can clash with the Security Council, where sharp divisions in preferences between different members of the Council on specific issues combine with the social pressure to do something rather than nothing, typically lead them to create vague resolutions.317 The institutional features of the UN peacekeeping operations planning and execution processes accentuate these various divisions, further obstructing the passage of reforms through the UN.  These dominant feature is the large number of veto players, each of which are able to independently limit operations to the principles of more traditional peacekeeping.318  The veto players include the Security Council (P5 in particular), the Secretariat (including the DPKO, DFS and the SG), the force command, the troop contributor countries (TCCs), and individual troops.319  Each and any of these can independently either obstruct the creation of a mission or, after it has been created, ensure that the mission becomes more conservative and risk-averse mission (risk averse for peacekeepers, not civilians) than envisioned.  These actors often have incentives to do so.  For the P5, more traditional peacekeeping is less expensive than more complex operations; for the DPKO, traditional peacekeeping is more likely to succeed than operations in areas where not all combatant groups agree to UN intervention; for the TCCs and                                                315 Allen and Yuen 2014, 58; 621–632. Allen and Yuen build upon Gould 2006. 316 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000, paras 56-64.  Useful discussion of the background to this issue in Durch et al. 2004, 17-19. 317 Allen and Yuen 2014, 624. 318 Breakey and Dekker 2014. For discussion of veto players, see Tsebelis 2002 .  319 Ibid.  132 commanders, traditional peacekeeping reduces the likelihood of casualties, and individual soldiers know that they are less likely to risk their own lives and those of their colleagues if they adopt a more neutral, passive tactical response to any given scenario. Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams (2004) observed the limits to UN peace operations reform in the context of the developments that followed the Brahimi Report: The political, decision-making and operational aspects of the Brahimi Report have been sidelined from the agenda. The implementation reports make no mention of proposed reforms to the way that the Security Council mandates operations. Nor has there been significant progress towards institutionalizing coordination between troop contributors, the DPKO and the Security Council, despite Annan identifying this as a priority.320   These divisions with the UN thus make successful moments of peacekeeping reform particularly puzzling and worthy of study. 4.3.2 Disillusionment and failures The end of the Cold war, as a global systemic change, opened the political space for more frequent military and political intervention via the UN system.  However, the initial optimism was followed by a series of dramatic failures that convinced many member states that the UN should not engage in peacekeeping missions.  Understanding the extent of the hostility of member states to the mere idea of UN peacekeeping in 1997 makes the puzzle of why those states decided to reverse their position and support a strengthening of the DPKO in 2000 all the more interesting.                                                 320 Bellamy and Williams 2004, 185; Gray 2001.   133 On 7 December 1988, President Mikhail Gorbachev addressed the General Assembly, announcing the withdrawal of many Soviet forces from outside Russia, and a massive reduction in the total manpower of the Soviet military.321  In the same speech, Gorbachev expressed a hope that the UN would become a more coherent and proactive actor in resolving international conflicts.  To some extent, this had already begun to take place.  A few months earlier the Nobel Peace Prize had been awarded to all contemporaneous and previous peacekeeping troops.322  Two peacekeeping missions had already been established in 1988,323 to be followed by three more the following year, 324 and then another fifteen from 1991 to 1993.325  Throughout the first forty-two years of the existence of the United Nations, an average of one mission had been launched every three years.  From 1987 to 1993, the rate was an average of one every three months.326    These new missions also became more complex than most of their predecessors.  For example, the mandate for the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) in 1989 included electoral supervision and managing legal reforms for the newly independent country.327  The optimism and enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping reached unprecedented heights, and in 1990 US President George H.W. Bush announced the arrival of a “New World Order”, in which the UN would not hesitate to successfully intervene to end conflicts within as well as between states.328                                                  321 UN Security Council 1988, 27-28. 322 The Nobel Peace Prize Committee 1988.  323 UN DPA. The Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 324 UN DPA. The UN Angola Verification Mission I; UN DPA. UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG); UN DPA UN Observer Group in Central America. 325 UN DPKO. List of Peacekeeping Missions.  326 Sidhu 2007, 220. 327 UN DPKO. UNTAG. 328 Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress, 11 September 1990.   134 However, the global geopolitical changes that led to more permissive conditions in the UN Security Council also changed the nature of the threats to peace and security around the world.  The financial, political and military withdrawal of the US and USSR from much of the “third” or non-aligned world allowed previously supported, weak, post-colonial regimes to fail, and while inter-state war remained rare, there was a significant increase in the number and complexity of civil conflicts.329   These new conflicts were very different from those being considered when Hammarskjöld first articulated the three principles of peacekeeping.  In these recent civil conflicts, combatant groups were often led by sub-state actors, the number of factions was typically greater, consent was fractured and precarious, and there were often no clear battle lines along which an interposition of troops could be made.  Civilians were also more commonly deliberately targeted, such that peacekeepers felt a tension between the minimal use of force and their ethical obligations to protect those civilians.330  It made little moral sense to claim to be impartial when one or more groups were openly committing large-scale atrocities against unarmed civilians. In 1992, several months after the establishment of the DPKO, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali published Agenda for Peace,331 a broad strokes strategy for conflict prevention and resolution.  Imbued with the aforementioned sense of post-Cold War optimism that had gripped the Organisation, it suggested a stronger role for peacekeeping as the primary means for the UN to fulfil its core mandate.  It famously included a single word that implied that the principle of                                                329 Hannay 2008; Kaplan 1993. 330 Chojnacki  2006; UN DPKO. History of Peacekeeping: Post Cold War surge.  331 UN Secretary-General 1992a.  135 consent was no longer inviolable.  He stated that, “[p]eace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned [emphasis added]”.332    In case this wasn’t explicit enough, Boutros-Ghali stated that the “time of absolute sovereignty and exclusive sovereignty…has passed; its theory was never matched by reality”.333  While he did not further develop this thought, or try to clarify the conditions under which sovereignty could or should be set aside, his proposals were bold, including the formation of standing UN peace enforcement units ready to intervene if peacekeeping troops were unable to maintain or establish peace.334  This was an example of the shift towards the idea of conditional sovereignty that Secretary-General Annan would take up in more specific terms later to persuade states to reengage with UN peacekeeping. However, the following three years saw several tragedies. While somewhat reluctant to deviate from the principles of traditional peacekeeping, member states were willing, in the early 1990’s, to send what have been termed “second generation multinational operations” into increasingly challenging environments.335  For the first time since peacekeeping began, the Security Council achieved a consensus that interventions could include elements of what is now called peace enforcement, where peacekeepers can use greater force than that solely needed for self-defence.336  However, an incongruity between the challenging environments into which new                                                332 Ibid., para 20. 333 Ibid., 4. 334 Ibid., para 44. 335 Mackinlay and Chopra 1993, 9-10. 336 Rikhye 2000, 10.  136 missions were being inserted, and the restrictive principles of traditional peacekeeping, led to significant failings in Somalia, Rwanda, and Former Yugoslavia.  The “Blackhawk down” event in Somalia led the US legislature to obstruct any US support for UN peacekeeping.  During the Cold War, both the US and the USSR had seen Somalia as strategically significant, and both sporadically invested resources there.  When over 1989-1991 both sides withdrew, Somalia began to collapse as a state.   In April 1992, the UN set up a small observation mission to protect UN staff and assist humanitarian efforts.337  President George H.W. Bush offered a substantial US force to work alongside, but not subordinate to, that mission.  Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali foresaw problems with a dual command, but he felt obliged to pass on the offer to the UNSC, which accepted.338  The US troops were extremely effective at first, helping to rapidly stabilise the country, but in October 1993, US Special Forces attempted, without the knowledge of the UN, to capture a prominent warlord, General Mohammad Farrah Aidid.  During the operation, two US helicopters were shot down and 18 US soldiers killed, with public broadcasts in the US showing the body of one of them being dragged and carried through the streets by a jubilant crowd.339  The recently elected President Clinton, faced with a horrified electorate and a populist Congress, pulled out the US troops, effectively ending the mission.340 The withdrawal of the military with the greatest global logistical capacity, most substantial resources, and amongst the most advanced military technologies, weakened UN peacekeeping.                                                337 UN DPKO. Somalia UNOSOM I: Mandate.  338 Eckhard, 47.  339 PBS Frontline. Ambush in Mogadishu: Synopsis. 340 Clinton.  Address on Somalia 7 October 1993; White House Press Briefing by Secretary of State Christopher, 7 October 1993.   137 From April to June 1994, an estimated 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed in Rwanda.  Almost four months before it began, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) Commander, General Roméo Dallaire (Canada), had reported to ASG Iqbal Riza at the DPKO that an informant had evidence that militias were arming themselves with the intent of beginning widespread attacks.341  Dallaire asserted that with UN approval, he could raid at least one arms cache, and with increased support, he could reduce the likelihood of future attacks.342  However, the Office of the Secretary-General and staff at the DPKO were convinced that only three months after “Blackhawk Down”, the P5, and the US in particular, would strongly object to any proposal for another mission.343  They therefore did not initially recommend strengthening UNAMIR or extending their mandate.   During the genocide, the few UN troops were directed to focus almost exclusively on evacuating foreign nationals.  In one instance, they were instructed to abandon efforts to protect a large group of Rwandans in the Ecole Technique Officielle; when they did so, all two thousand were subsequently slaughtered.344  Only after the genocide was almost complete in June did more UN troops begin arriving, although their mandate was still fairly limited.345  The failure of the UN to prevent the atrocity, or to respond in a timely manner, contributed to a great deal of passionate introspection over the coming years.346  The sentiment being articulated with increasing frequency was that the international community was incapable of addressing complex crises such as these through the UN Security Council.                                                341 Dallaire. Code Cable to DPKO. Although dated 11 January1994, this fax was received on the evening of the 12th in New York. 342 Ibid., paragraphs 8-11. 343 Meisler, 94. 344 Melvern 2004. 345 Grunfeld and Huijboom 2007); Dallaire and Dupuis 2007. 346 See for example UN Security Council 1999b.  138 In 1995 a similar tragedy took place in Bosnia, albeit on a smaller scale.  In 1992, the year after the former Yugoslavia began to fracture, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had declared independence in a referendum rejected by the Serbian minority.  Bosnian Serb militias, supported by the Serbian government under President Slobodan Milosevic, attempted to seize control and engaged in ethnic cleansing within areas under their control.  In 1993, in accordance with established traditional peacekeeping practices, UNPROFOR declared the town of Srebrenica to be one of three safe zones; Srebrenica would be a haven within which Bosniaks could shelter unharmed.  In previous interventions where all combatant leaders had consented to a UN role, these safe havens had always been sacrosanct.  However, in June 1995, the Serbian militias that had been besieging the town were directed to attack.  The 400 Dutch peacekeepers were unable to repel them or protect the Bosniaks, and over 8,000 civilians were massacred.347   Again, observers were left with the impression that UN peacekeepers were ineffectual, leading states to be further disinclined to support those efforts.  These incidents radically altered the perspectives of both states and Secretariat.  In early 1995, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali published his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, a document with a far more cautious tone than in Agenda for Peace.348  Supplement articulated observations about changing global conflict conditions, now widely taken for granted, that orbited the recognition that “many of today’s conflicts are within States rather than between States”.349  Supplement also explicitly identified the incongruity between the political and military premises of traditional peacekeeping and those of peace enforcement.350  The tools and                                                347 Rohde 1998; UN General Assembly 1999b. 348 UN Secretary-General 1995a. 349 Ibid., para 10. 350 Ibid., para 35.  139 principles of the former had, he argued, been inappropriately applied to environments that demanded elements of the latter.  He argued for greater clarity, a more conservative approach, and for UN troops to be given the resources and mandates appropriate to the mission objectives and conditions.  Supplement signalled the beginning of a conviction by the international community that the United Nations was unable to use peacekeeping tools to resolve many threats to international peace.   Thereafter followed a lull in peacekeeping for several years, as shown by Graph 1 below.   In 1995, the UN had 64,000 peacekeepers in action around the world.  By 1998, this had dropped to less than 14,000.351  In an article Kofi Annan published in 1998, he admitted that now the “conventional wisdom, arising primarily from the difficulties encountered by two operations (in Bosnia and Somalia), is that the organization should do less peacekeeping, either by not getting involved at all in certain conflicts or by working only at their margins”.352  The following year Edward Luttwak published an article expressing that sentiment, entitled “Give War a Chance”, arguing that UN interventions prolong, rather than resolve conflicts.353                                                  351 UN DPKO. Monthly summary of military and civilan police contributions; UN DPKO. Surge in Uniformed UN Peacekeeping Personnel from 1991- Present.  http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/chart.pdf. Last accessed 9 November 2015. 352 Annan 1998,169. 353 Luttwak 1999.  140  Figure 2: UN Peacekeepers: Total troop count by year354 These were the conditions facing Kofi Annan as he became Secretary-General.  By 1997, the Financial Times (UK) observed that no-one, “dares propose a new UN peacekeeping force anywhere, since the US administration would rather use its veto than have to justify such an operation before Congress”; the same article pointed out that the “policing role has largely been taken over by regional organisations with one powerful state in control: Nigeria in West Africa, Russia in the former Soviet Union, the US from Bosnia to Haiti”.355  It was even suggested that the UN no longer needed a separate department to oversee peacekeeping operations.356  As Martin Barber, veteran UN Humanitarian Coordinator and Special Representative of the                                                354 Data from 31 December each year unless indicated otherwise; compiled by author from 25 annual documents, beginning with: UN DPKO. Summary of Peacekeeping forces by country as at 30 November 1990. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/1990/1990.zip, and ending with: UN DPKO. Summary of Peacekeeping forces by country as at 31 December 2014. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2014/country.zip 355 Lambert, and Mortimer 1997.   356 Brahimi 2001. Speech at the Berliner Colloquium; this speech is cited in Mahn 2007, 40.  However, I have as yet been unable to access the text of the speech to confirm this citation. 020,00040,00060,00080,000100,000120,0001990	(30	Nov) 1992 1994 19961998	(30	Nov) 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014UN	Peacekeeping	Troop	numbersTroop	numbers 141 Secretary-General (SRSG) stated, the “most immediate challenge facing Mr Annan in 1997 was to rescue the reputation of the UN’s peacekeeping arm from the horrors of the previous four years”.357   Between 1997 and 2001, member states of the United Nations gradually reversed their views on UN peace operations.  The inviolability of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of member states, enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter,358 was increasingly being challenged by the idea that sovereignty should be conditional on the human rights of the population.359  Not only were states increasingly prepared to allow new, larger and more complex UN missions to take place, but they also came to consider UN peacekeeping reforms to be one of the most pressing issues of the time.   This was not due to a global geopolitical change, as can be argued with the expansion at the end of the Cold War.  The increase in missions from 1989-1995 can in part be explained by the more cooperative attitude demonstrated by both superpowers in the Security Council.  However, using the number of Security Council vetoes each year as an indicator for obstructionism in the Council, it is clear that no such change took place soon before or during my case time period.360  From 1992-2017, there has been a consistent rate of 1-2 vetoes per year (with three vetoes in 1997 and 2004 only), with almost all limited to US vetoes of resolutions concerning Israel, and Russian vetoes of resolutions concerning former Yugoslavia or Syria.                                                 357 Barber 2009, 388. 358 UN. United Nations Charter. Article 2(7): Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 359 This idea is now associated with the ICISS’s Responsibility to Protect Report. However, as discussed below, the core ideas underlying that report evolved over the 1990’s, with actors at the UN being key proponents. 360 UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research Guides. UN Security Council Vetoes.   142 This contrasts sharply with Cold War era patterns; for example, in 1982 and 1986, there were eight vetoes throughout each year, and the annual variation from 1960 to 1986, with only a few exceptions, was 2-8 per year. 4.4 The authority of Secretary-General Kofi Annan in UN peacekeeping 4.4.1 Formal authority In the context of UN peacekeeping, the Secretary-General of the United Nations enjoys both formal and informal authority.  As noted in chapter 2, through Article 99, the “Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security”.361  While Article 99 is rarely explicitly invoked, the Secretary-General routinely and frequently informs the Security Council of worsening security situations such as widespread human rights violations.  He does so both in informal settings and in official letters, typically including specific proposals for a UN response when raising a new issue. The brevity of the relevant Charter articles has left the actual political duties of the Secretary-General somewhat open to interpretation. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld argued that Article 99 grants the Secretary-General, “a broad discretion to conduct inquiries and engage in informal diplomatic activity”.362  Likewise, former Under-Secretary-General (USG) Ramesh Thakur states that, “article 99 confers on the SG both a broad reservoir of authority and a wide margin of discretion”.363  Members of the UN Secretariat and some external observers have further argued that Article 99 implies that the Secretary-General should have the                                                361 UN. UN Charter, Article 99. 362 Hammarskjöld 1961, 335. Tharoor 2007, 34. 363 Thakur 2003.    143 information gathering and analysis capability necessary to make informed and timely recommendations to the Council.  While this discretion is argued by some to be implied by the Charter as the source of his formal authority, the ability of a Secretary-General to apply that discretion, and the response of member states when he is doing so, can be indications that his/her informal authority is recognised and influential.  However, not all member states would agree that this discretion exists at all, and both the US and Russia have typically expressed a strong preference for a Secretary-General that is more Secretary than General.364   4.4.2 Informal authority This section focuses on evidence for OI -1365 and OI -2,366 in which the Secretary-General is viewed by various audiences as being endowed with expertise-based or principle-based authority.  To illustrate informal authority, I identify key groups that acknowledged Annan’s expertise, and who increasingly described Annan as a principle-based authority during his tenure.  These groups include his colleagues, member state representatives at the UN, and then finally outside observers.  The subjective perceptions others had provide significant evidence of his informal authority.  Annan’s expertise authority was widely acknowledged before his appointment, but his principle-based authority more conspicuously grew over time.                                                364 See, for example, Cockayne and Malone 2006; Chesterman and Franck 2006, 233-234; Chesterman 2015, 508.  365 OI 1: If an IO bureaucrat is perceived to be endowed with expertise-based authority, states may a) make requests for technical advice to the IO bureaucratic actor, and/or b) make references to the specialised knowledge of the IO bureaucratic actor as reason for deference to their instructions. 366 OI 2: If an IO bureaucrat is perceived to be endowed with principle-based authority, states may a) describe the principles, values or morals held by the IO bureaucratic actor as legitimate and worthwhile pursuits, and/ or b) cite those principles and values as reason for deference.    144 4.4.2.1 Expertise-based authority367 Like Hammarskjöld, Annan was agreed upon by member states because, amongst other reasons, he seemed at first to be inoffensive.  The US “fought for Annan because he appeared suited to effecting a low-profile stewardship of the UN organisation; someone, above all, who would work better as a manager of the institution and not a maker of diplomatic waves”.368  He was initially seen as apolitical, and someone who did not offend any of the P5 enough for them to veto.  France initially and briefly opposed his appointment, but it was widely assumed that this was only a diplomatic retaliation for the US having vetoed Boutros-Ghali’s reappointment.369    While Secretary-General Annan was considered to be a quiet, inoffensive choice, he was perceived to embody expertise-based authority, particularly as the former head of the DPKO and as a lifelong employee of the United Nations.  By 1997, he had spent thirty-five years working within the United Nations, rising to lead the Department of Peacekeeping Operations from 1992-1995 during its unprecedented burst of activity.  As the New York Times stated shortly after he took office, “Mr. Annan, an experienced man of proven managerial ability, is up to the job. He has the executive and diplomatic skills to reform the U.N.”.370  Annan initially focused narrowly on this particular area in which he was considered an expert.  His first wide-ranging and extensive reform proposals, Renewing the United Nations, was almost exclusively a programme of managerial and administrative reforms, with no suggestions for strengthening or altering the                                                367 OI 1: If an IO bureaucrat is perceived to be endowed with expertise-based authority, states may a) make requests for technical advice to the IO bureaucratic actor, and/or b) make references to the specialised knowledge of the IO bureaucratic actor as reason for deference to their instructions. 368 Usborne 1998.  369 Crossette 1996. 370 New York Times 1997.  145 DPKO.371  Those reforms, which included drastic cuts to Secretariat staff, strongly suggested that Annan prioritised efficiency above strengthening the bureaucracy. Sergei Lavrov, Permanent Representative to the UN for Russia from 1994-2004, later acknowledged the expertise of the Secretary-General, stating that one of his greatest achievements was his, “sweeping reform of UN peacekeeping, a subject he knew well from his years at the head of the peacekeeping department”.372  John Hume, former member of both Westminster (UK) and European parliaments, and the only person to have been awarded the three global peace awards, the Nobel Peace prize, the Gandhi peace prize, and the Martin Luther King award, spoke of Annan’s, “unquestionable expertise” in the field of peacekeeping.373 Anecdotal evidence abounds for Secretary-General Annan’s ability to leverage the different aspects of informal authority, such as his expertise in UN management, to persuade others to shift their views.  For example, Annan’s numerous visits to the veto players in Washington D.C. during his first year were instrumental in softening the positions of hardliner anti-UN legislators such as North Carolina Senator (R) and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Jesse Helms, allowing a deal that ensured that the US would begin paying more of its arrears to the UN.374  There is some evidence that Senator Helms was more influenced by the expertise-based rather than the principle-based authority of the Secretary-General.  For example, Helms was well known as a long-time critic of the UN as a whole, so when he addressed the Security Council in                                                371 UN Secretary-General 1997c. Paras 63-67 are the only comments on peace and security, and they contain no specific proposals. 372 Eckhard, 248. 373 Hume 2013.  374 Mouat, 310; she cites as evidence Lambert and Mortimer, 1997, although they are less clear on whether the SG was instrumental in the change in Senate policy.  See also Meisler 2007, 149; Eckhard 73.  146 January 2000, he was predictably critical of the Organisation, describing it as ineffectual and as an unnecessary strain on the US taxpayer.375  This suggests that Helms was either not impressed by the principles underlying the UN system, or saw those principles as currently absent in the Organisation.  However, in the same speech, he specifically praised Secretary-General Kofi Annan.  Helms lauded the Secretary-General’s arguments at the opening of the General Assembly “in which he challenged all of us to grapple with issues on humanitarian intervention or risk rendering this organization irrelevant”, and in which the Secretary-General “launched a much-needed debate on our fundamental peace and security mandate”.376    There is thus some, albeit extremely tentative evidence that he afforded the Secretary-General forms of authority that he did not see in the Organisation as a whole. 4.4.2.2 Principle-based authority377 Annan exhibited principle-based authority, based in perceptions that he served, “widely accepted set of principles, morals or values”378 that broadly related to United Nations ideals, and specifically related to United Nations military and diplomatic intervention.   Those perceptions increased over time.  As with Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, Annan increasingly self-identified as the representative not only of an organisation designed to mediate and facilitate state action, but also as a representative of and advocate for the set of ideals embraced in the UN Charter.  Both Secretaries-General were primarily considered experts when first appointed, one in diplomacy, and the other in UN administration, but it was after they consciously and vocally                                                375 Senator Jesse Helms address to Security Council January 20-21 2000. 376 Ibid. 377 OI 2: If an IO bureaucrat is perceived to be endowed with principle-based authority, states may a) describe the principles, values or morals held by the IO bureaucratic actor as legitimate and worthwhile pursuits, and/ or b) cite those principles and values as reason for deference.   378 Avant et al. 2010, 13.  147 chose to identify with the Charter that member states increasingly acknowledged their principle-based authority.  The perception that Kofi Annan was motivated principally by the principles of the UN Charter enabled him to exert influence over others.  This role was one Annan vocally embraced, and one that is reflected in the descriptions others had of him. Kofi Annan frequently and increasingly emphasised his moral authority as the Secretary-General, claiming that, “a Secretary-General must be judged by his fidelity to the principles of the Charter, and his advancement of the ideals they embody”.379  He also claimed that “the end of the cold war transformed the moral promise of the role of the Secretary-General”, allowing “him to place the United Nations at the service of the universal values of the Charter, without the constraints of ideology or particular interests”.380  Secretary-General Annan described his role as a moral authority as having been, “entrusted to him by the Charter”,381 and he stated that his authority and views are based on his “own conscience and convictions, and on [his] understanding of the Charter of the United Nations whose principles and purposes it is [his] duty to promote”.382  Secretary-General Annan also asserted that the “UN’s influence derives not from power but from the values it represents, its role in helping to set and sustain global norms, its ability to stimulate global concern and action, and the trust inspired by its practical work to improve people’s lives”.383 His colleagues increasingly came to acknowledge and emphasise the Secretary-General’s principle-based authority.  Former ASG and renowned academic John Ruggie described Kofi                                                379 UN Press Release 1999. Secretary-General address to Council on Foreign Relations; Johnstone 2007, 123. 380 UN Press Release 1999.  381 Ibid. 382 UN Secretary-General 2005b, para 4. 383 Williams 2000.  148 Annan as a norm entrepreneur, saying that, “he realized that the UN in and of itself doesn’t have power and it doesn’t have major resources, but what it does have is the ability to shape thinking and to give voice to aspirations and to legitimize certain norms or help delegitimize certain other norms or practices”.384  Former ASG Ramesh Thakur described the Secretary-General as being “the personification of the international interest and the custodian of the world conscience”,385 and that the, “single most important political role of the SG is to provide leadership: the elusive ability to make others connect emotionally and intellectually to a larger cause that transcends their immediate self interest…Annan reminds the world often that the UN is a unique font of international legitimacy.  No person is in a better position to reflect that international legitimacy in his public statements than the SG”.386  Thakur claims that any “SG can interpret the dignity so conferred on his office to claim a responsibility to uphold the principles and purposes of the Charter independently of the UNSC and the UNGA”.387   Sir Brian Urquhart said of Kofi Annan that he “has taken seriously the idea of being a conscience for the international community.  He has used the office to push some very important ideas”.388 Member states also increasingly concurred with this image of the Secretary-General as someone who spoke for the ideals of the UN Charter.  Richard Holbrook, US Ambassador to the UN, 1999-2001, observed that Kofi Annan, “understood the bully pulpit aspect of the UN”, and that he, “inspired and still inspires millions of people around the world, who think he’s a beacon of moral authority”.389  He also explicitly stated that “Annan has tested the limits of the job,                                                384 Eckhard, 68. 385 Thakur 2003.   386 Thakur 2006, 333. 387 Thakur. 2003.   388 Williams 2000, 20. 389 Eckhard, 234.   149 accumulating more authority--one cannot use the word power, given the constraints the U.N. system places on him--than any of his predecessors”.390  In 2006, U.S. President G.W. Bush, in a brief statement of only a few paragraphs, immediately after an informal conversation, referred repeatedly to the leadership of the Secretary-General, on specific issues such as Darfur, but also on “U.N. reform, structural reform, management reform, as well as the reform of the Human Rights Commission”.391  While these references do not definitively indicate a recognition of authority, they offer additional evidence, particularly when juxtaposed with concurrent agreement by states such as the US to devote more resources to parts of the Secretariat responsible for managing political intervention.  Sergei Lavrov, having left the post of UN Ambassador to become Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2004, believes that Kofi Annan’s “greatest accomplishment as Secretary-General was his aspiration to strictly abide by the principles of international law, respect for the UN Charter, and implementation of UN organ’s decisions”.392  Brigadier General Romeo Dallaire wrote in his haunting memoirs of his experiences in Rwanda, that, “Annan projected a humanism and dedication to the plight of others that I have rarely experienced”, and that Annan was “genuinely, even religiously, dedicated to the founding principles of the UN”.393  External students and observers of the UN express similar views.  William Shawcross, Times journalist, author, and member of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Informal Advisory Group from 1995 to 2000, describes how the Secretary-General could leverage his moral authority to influence others, saying that he had “an unusual “presence” and a way of                                                390 Holbrooke 2004, 50.  391 Bush 2006, 234-235. 392 Eckhard, 247. 393 Dallaire, 2003, 50, 92; Meisler, 91.  150 dealing with people in a familiar but persuasive way”,394 and that the Secretary-General was in many ways equated with, “the United Nations and its ideas, which Kofi Annan has come to personify”.395  Biographer Stanley Meisler described how, “[in] his understated way, he struck many as a man of consistency, reason, integrity, and peace”,396 and that, “he has a deep sense of moral integrity, of duty to the United Nations and its Charter”.397 Journalist, biographer, and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, James Traub, says that the Secretary-General, “believed devoutly in what he took to be the universal principles of human rights and humanitarianism and in the use of force against evil, so long as the force was mustered collectively and in conformity with international law”.398   Traub also describes the influence this had, writing that “because Annan’s dedication to principle was so sincere, and so selfless, people wanted to help him succeed, to vindicate his faith in them and the world”.399  Jim Goodale, lawyer and Vice Chairman of the New York Times similarly stated that Annan, “ never wavered in his belief in the principles on which the UN was founded and never wavered in telling the world why he thought so”.400  In summary, indirect evidence abounds for the widespread perception that Secretary-General Kofi Annan not only possessed expertise in UN management, but also principled authority associated with the ideals of the UN Charter. Annan leveraged his authority to attempt to persuade states to enhance DPKO resources. In doing so, he employed several of the mechanisms discussed in Chapter 2: agenda setting, operation initiation or expansion, and the multiplication of authority.   Before addressing those                                                394 Mouat, 309.  Shawcross 2000, 217. 395 Shawcross, 2000, 26. 396 Meisler, 180. 397 Meisler, 241. 398 Traub, 2006, 145. 399 Traub 2006, 233. 400 Eckhard, 234.   151 mechanisms, I consider some of the strategic ways in which those efforts were directed at specific actors using targeted persuasion. 4.5 Targeted persuasion401 Kofi Annan explained that he had quickly learned that, “a secretary-general’s effectiveness comes from his ability to convince others of the justice and urgency of his cause”.402  He knew that acts of persuasion had to be carefully strategic, and that in his words, he, “learned how to ask, what buttons to push, and, importantly, how to listen and judge [his] response”, and also, “whom to ask, because sometimes it is a bureaucrat rather than the minister or even the head of state who can get resources moving”.403  He could take advantage of his location at the, “nerve centre of a sensitive communications network”, in which he, “can and generally does speak directly to governments, civil society representatives and business leaders”.404  Annan took every opportunity to engage with key international actors and to continually articulate his views.   The UN Charter states that the Secretary-General is officially responsible only to the UN, and not to individual states, no matter how powerful.405  However, early Secretaries-General struggled with the narrow space afforded them, on issues that were not considered the core interests of one or both of the Cold War superpowers.  The experiences of the last four Secretaries-General and the parameters of their autonomy have similarly been defined by their relationships to the remaining superpower.  Throughout this period of reform, Kofi Annan was                                                401 OI 4: A request by a member of an IO Secretariat for greater resources will be more effective if the logos/content of the argument (information, beliefs, values) is in congruence with the pathos, the beliefs and values of the audience. 402 Annan 2012, 139. 403 Annan 2012, 140. 404 Thakur 2003.  405 UN. UN Charter, Article 100.  152 always careful to give the permanent members of the Security Council, in particular the US, the time and attention they felt they deserved.  Indeed, other non-permanent members of the Security Council frequently became irritated because it was often clear in Council sessions that the Secretary-General had previously given the P5 more information and time than he had the other members.406 Kofi Annan visited each of the heads of state of the P5 at least once a year, often scheduling additional stops at London, Beijing, Moscow or Paris while en route to another task.407  He frequently travelled from the UN HQ in New York to Washington, D.C., spending at least as much time with the legislators who control the funds the US devotes to IOs such as the UN, as he did with the President or the State Department.  Annan also spread his influence far and wide; as he says: “from my very first month in the job, I began reaching out to other players on the international scene. The first of these lay in international civil society: charities and other non-governmental organisations,” because, “it is from people, not governments, that all power is ultimately derived”.408 Annan also believed that he could influence the most intractable and belligerent of leaders.  When discussing leaders such as Saddam Hussein, he described how the “French have a word, you have to get them engagé and persuade them that it’s in their self-interest to do what you want them to do.  Self-interest propels them, so you need to find out what is important for them and then place it in the broader picture of what you’re trying to do”.409  While the                                                406 Interview with Paul Heinbeker, former Canadian Ambassador to the UN and representative on the Security Council in 2000.  3 December 2015.  This relationship changed with Kofi Annan’s reaction to US foreign policy in 2003, but that is beyond the scope of this chapter. 407 Eckhard, 65. 408 Annan 2012, 216. 409 Shawcross 2000, 278.  153 agreement with Iraq later failed, key US actors including President Clinton, Secretary Albright, and Senator Jesse Helms acknowledged how remarkable it was that Annan persuaded Saddam Hussein to make the concessions that he did.410 While the relationship with the US is almost certainly the most significant in the sense that the US has a considerable ability to prevent any changes in the Council and the budget, there are many other relationships that the Secretary-General attended to. As USG Ramesh Thakur details, if he/she seeks, “to maximise his influence and expand his role, the SG must also be attentive and sensitive to five key constituencies”: i) the corps of international civil servants who make up the Secretariat, ii) the GA majority (G77), iii) those who provide most of the resources (such as the US and Japan), iv) the P5, and v) global civil society.411  If the Secretary-General is perceived as prioritising one group, as he very often is, he risks alienating others.  Prior to his appointment, Annan was supported by many African states, who believed that he would represent their interests.  However, he was also supported by the US, who viewed his approach to UN management as one that concurred with their interests.  Given the frequent clashes in preferences between these two groups, Kofi Annan was acutely aware of this balance.   The Secretary-General actively sought a range of avenues of influence amongst member states.  He requested and accepted invitations to numerous international events, such as at the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, or the Organization of African Unity (OAU), (now African Union) summit.  At each, he would spend as much time as possible talking to heads of state and other key actors, as he says, “especially in private sessions, to learn more about the                                                410 Traub 1998. 411 Thakur 2003.    154 leaders, listen to their problems, and nudge them in the right directions”.412  In New York, he and his wife Nane accepted countless invitations to social events, despite their personal inclinations towards a quieter social life, and despite his challenging work schedule.413  In summary, then, Secretary-General Annan took every opportunity to engage with the veto players in the UN system.  I now move on to discuss the three strategies Annan used to persuade member states on the issue of UN peacekeeping.   4.6 Strategies 4.6.1 Agenda setting414  Agenda setting by the Secretary-General can involve gradual processes that are often overlooked by many observers who are inclined to focus on more dramatic events.  Some of the most conspicuous political moments of Secretary-General Annan’s tenure are those in conflict with powerful states. Commentaries on those moments, such as with the Secretary-General’s failure to dissuade the US from invading Iraq in 2003, typically emphasise the limits to the extent to which a Secretary-General can use his principle-based and expertise-based authority to influence state behaviour.  However, this obscures the incremental ways in which a Secretary-General and his staff can influence states in momentous, if gradual, ways over time.  If one draws back from the dramatic brief moments of conflict, and takes a longer view, one can identify the ability of the Secretary-General to shape the global discourse or steer the course of debate in a way that shifts the preferences of many member states over time.415                                                  412 Meisler 2007, 225. 413 Eckhard, 60-64. 414 OI 7: IO bureaucratic actors can leverage their informal authority, in circumstances beyond and in addition to those formally mandated to them, to raise the profile of certain issues, and encourage states to acknowledge that they have an urgent obligation to deliberate and resolve those issues. 415 Trinh, 2007, 105; 11.  155 Critical to this ability to shape global discourse was the Secretary-General’s power to set the international agenda at UN intergovernmental forums.   For example, he typically opens any new debate at the Security Council and the beginning of every General Assembly session, setting the tone, and expressing his opinions as to the issues that should be prioritised.416  Secretary-General Annan very deliberately set the agenda over the period of this case study.   When SG Kofi Annan felt that member states were approaching an issue, such as civil conflicts, in an unproductive way, he could, in his words, “use [his] position to change the debate”.417  In the context of UN peacekeeping, Annan used formal documents, independent publications, and speeches, to identify and articulate the problems to be prioritised and addressed by the international community, and thereby to set the agenda for the UN.  I discuss these in turn, drawing attention to the explicit manner in which Annan drew on the informal authority that he derived primarily from perceptions of his adherence to the principles of the UN Charter.  Annan’s use of formal UN documents was very effective in directing the debate.  As Ramesh Thakur argues, “the annual report on the work of the organisation and the many special reports have been important instruments in the progressive universalisation of the human rights norm and the construction of national and international human rights machinery”.418  Despite being faced with the depths of the lull in peacekeeping, in September 1997 Annan used the annual report to argue that it was “crucial to maintain and improve the Organization’s ability to plan, manage and conduct peacekeeping missions”, and to detail many forms which those improvements might take.419   The following year Annan moved peacekeeping from the last item                                                416 UN Permanent Mission Advisor on Security Council matters in interview, June 2015. 417 Annan 2012, 178. 418 Thakur, 2003.   419 UN Secretary-General 1997e; UN General Assembly 1997, para 117.  156 of the Annual report to the first, and doubled the length of the section, despite the fact that there were no more peacekeepers in the field than the previous two years.420   Secretary-General Annan published numerous other documents that helped to push peacekeeping to the top of the agenda.  In April 1998, while international confidence in the idea of UN conflict resolution was at a historical low point, the Secretary-General released the first of series of documents entitled “The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa”.421  This document emphasised a gross failure of the international community to prevent increasingly common incidents where combatants deliberately targeted civilians, including women and children.422  The document also asserted that member states had explicit obligations to prevent such acts, and that the concepts of peacekeeping and human rights should be integrated.  These reports, and others with a similar theme, were acknowledged and cited by the Security Council in the following years with increasing frequency.423  The Secretary-General also used speeches to set the agenda, arguing that the UN should re-engage in peacekeeping, and that it should have the resources to do so.  In June 1998, in Ditchley Park, Oxford, Kofi Annan gave a landmark speech to the foreign policy elite of the UK.  This speech was reprinted in numerous UN documents. The theme was the role of the UN, the international community, and the urgent need to intervene to prevent harm to civilians.  He presented an argument that, as he admitted, seemed at odds both with his personal origins as a citizen in a former colony, which might encourage a preference for non-intervention, and his                                                420 UN Secretary-General 1998c.  421 UN Secretary-General 1998a. 422 Ibid., para 49-50.  423 Johnstone. 2007, 134-135.  157 position as Secretary-General of the United Nations.  He had recently chosen Edward Mortimer to be his speechwriter, partly because Mortimer had previously written on the need for the international community to adopt some framework on which to base humanitarian intervention.  Mortimer based initial drafts of the speech on statements Annan had made during the NATO handover in Sarajevo in 1995.424   Evidence for the influence of that speech can be seen in its echoes in later intergovernmental publications that at first glance are assumed to be separate from the UN Secretariat.  For example, in the Ditchley speech Annan articulated arguably all of the fundamental ideas that underpinned the later Responsibility to Protect Report: i) governments must protect their own civilians, but when they are unable or unwilling to do so, intervention was not only justified but morally obligated, ii) that preventative measures, including diplomacy, should be attempted where possible, and that force, while a last resort, should be applied swiftly if there is a possibility that a genocide or serious crime against humanity could take place, and iii) the UN Security Council was the sole legal mechanism for the coordination of these interventions. In the Ditchley Park speech, Annan applied Frances M. Deng’s framing of sovereignty as responsibility, albeit with a stronger emphasis on the role of the UN system as the primary mechanism for enforcement.  He asserted that the UN “Charter protects the sovereignty of peoples.  It was never meant as a licence for governments to trample on human rights and human dignity.  Sovereignty implies responsibility, not just power”.425    [OI – 3: relationship between                                                424 Eckhard 2012, 105. 425 Ibid.  158 authority and argument] He argued that UN member states were obligated to intervene, politically and/or militarily, only with UN Security Council agreement, when widespread human rights violations were taking place.   He claimed that the United Nations’, “job is to intervene: to prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it when it has broken out, or-when neither of these things is possible-at least to contain it and prevent it from spreading”.426  Sovereignty was of course important, but “national sovereignty can be set aside if it stands in the way of the Security Council’s overriding duty to preserve international peace and security”, and “state frontiers…should never be seen as a watertight protection for war criminals and mass murderers”.427  [OI – 4: relationship between argument and audience values] In these arguments and emotive narratives in the Ditchley speech, Annan explicitly drew upon the UN Charter as the basis for his moral authority.  He continued to draw on this authority in other instances, even where the Security Council failed to agree on the need for intervention.  In 1999, days after the NATO bombing of Kosovo began, he argued that, “if we allow the United Nations to become the refuge of an ‘ethnic cleanser’ or mass murderer, we will betray the very ideals that inspired the founding of the United Nations”.428  In accord with the arguments Annan and others in the UN Secretariat had put forward, the NATO intervention came to be seen as legitimate, despite being illegal under international law,429 although Russia continued to voice disagreement.  Annan argued that it was extremely urgent that, as the only legitimate forum for authorising military intervention, the UN Security Council changes its practices in order to allow                                                426 Annan 1998. Ditchley; See also, Meisler 173-4 for discussion.  Also in UN Secretary-General. 1999b. 427 Ibid. 428 Weiss 2010, 297-308. 429 Coleman 2007, 214-237; especially 222-223.  159 for more interventions.  In 1998 he had stated that “it will only be a matter of time before a great power comes to the Security Council seeking official blessing for its intervention, is denied this blessing, and takes unilateral action”.430  The Secretary-General continued to imbue his reports on a range of issues with a sense of moral urgency for states to revive and reform UN peacekeeping.  In 1999, the SG published two self-critical reports that drew this issue of peacekeeping reforms further up the agenda of member states, one on UN operations in Rwanda,431 and the other on Srebrenica.432  Amongst the many criticisms of both member states and the Secretariat, the reports expressed three recurring themes: i) peacekeepers must have the resources and equipment required to achieve their mandates, and member states must provide the political will to ensure that a peacekeeping mission has those resources, ii) the protection of civilians was paramount, and iii) with certain reforms, member states could ensure that these horrific incidents never be repeated.  The Secretary-General sustained continuous efforts to raise the issue of UN peacekeeping reforms.   In other 1999 speeches in Geneva, New York, and Washington D.C. to influential policy actors within both member states and the Secretariat, he reiterated and further developed the argument not just that member states were obliged to formulate some new mechanisms for intervention, but also that the UN system was, for moral and practical reasons, the ideal institution for managing that intervention.  He asserted that member states were morally and legally obligated to intervene when human rights are being violated, saying that, “unless the Security Council can unite around the aim of confronting massive human rights violations on the                                                430 Annan 1998a, 170. 431 UN Secretary-General 1999h. 432 UN Secretary-General 1999e.   160 scale of Kosovo, then we will betray the very ideals that inspired the founding of the UN Charter”.433   [OI – 5: relationship between authority, argument and audience values – although this shows the attempt, not the degree of success] Annan and his appointees and colleagues strongly emphasised the moral and legal obligations, of the Security Council in particular, to use the UN to engage in humanitarian intervention.  For example, in 1998, Annan appointed Brazilian UN diplomat Sérgio Vieira de Mello, widely admired and respected during his long career in the UN, to the position of USG for Humanitarian Affairs.  Vieira de Mello’s initial role, similar to that of the Secretary-General under Article 99, was only to brief the Security Council on specific crises as they arose.  However, after discussion with Annan and his colleagues, on 21 January 1999, Vieira de Mello addressed the Security Council on the broader subject of the moral imperative of the UN to intervene when civilians were being harmed in conflict zones.  He also pointed specifically to the reluctance of the Security Council to entrust the UN with new operations after incidents such as Somalia outlined above.434  There was a considerable element of shaming in his address to the Council.  This meeting sparked a more inclusive debate in the Security Council a few weeks later on the same subject.  On 12 February 1999, with Lloyd Axworthy, Foreign Minister of Canada, presiding over the Council, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Olara Otunnu, with support and impassioned pleas from Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the ICRC, and Carol Bellamy of UNICEF, challenged the Security Council, in the strongest terms, to justify inaction when civilians, and children in particular, suffered horrific conditions in combat zones.                                                 433 UN Secretary-General 1999i. 434 Barber 2009, 387-409; 395-396.  161 As a result of this meeting, the Security Council turned to the Secretary-General and asked him to provide recommendations for a framework for protecting civilians caught in armed conflict [OI – 5].435 They asked for these recommendations to be given by September 1999, a deadline Annan then used in his address to the General Assembly to argue for greater support for UN intervention.  In the months preceding the deadline, Annan and Vieira de Mello, (with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) worked with all the relevant departments, DPA, DPKO, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, and UNIFEM, to develop a coherent set of proposals for UN humanitarian intervention.436  While this may not have been the intention at the time, these proposals for when and how the UN could and should intervene were later available for independent panels such as the Brahimi Panel and ICISS panels discussed below.  Those panels, as we shall see, in many respects simply repeated the conclusions of the Secretariat. Throughout this process, the Secretary-General and his staff not only argued for more intervention in general, but specifically that it should be conducted by the UN.  In his own words, Kofi Annan “sought to match the unique authority of the United Nations as the sole, truly universal organization of states with the credibility of seeing that rights were defended, suffering alleviated, and lives saved”.437  He also expounded the claim that the UN would have to “respond to the needs of individuals, and stand for the principle that national sovereignty could never be used as a shield for genocide or gross violations of human rights”.438  The famous 1999 speech to the UN General Assembly, in which the Secretary-General repeated all these assertions,                                                435 OI 5: A request by a member of an IO Secretariat for greater resources will be most effective if the informal authority of the speaker, the content of the message, and the identity (beliefs and values) of the audience all accord with each other. 436 Barber 2009; Otunnu 1999. UN Security Council, 1999a; UN General Assembly 1999a. 437 Annan 2012, 12. 438 Ibid., 13.  162 referenced the UN Charter ten times as the source of a moral and legal obligation for member states to prioritise the human rights of all peoples over state sovereignty.439  As Shashi Thuroor and Sam Daws described soon afterwards, “a debate has been raging in international circles ever since Kofi Annan spoke those words”.440  By the end of the 1999 General Assembly session, peacekeeping had been firmly raised to the top of the UN General Assembly agenda, and in the words of a current member of the ACABQ who was in the General Assembly at the time, “everyone now bought the idea that there was a problem which had to be fixed”.441  [OI – 5;442 OI – 7].443 4.6.2 Initiating or expanding operations444   Secretary-General Annan not only set the agenda for UN debates; he also directly influenced the creation of new missions, even when powerful member states were reluctant to allow UN intervention. I focus on mission creation in this section in order to respond to a common perception that while the “SG can unquestionably use the office as an international pulpit to shape policy and shift norms”, “the latitude and impact will usually depend as much on exogenous forces beyond the SG’s control”.445   In exploring what are considered exogenous forces, many attribute the increase in peacekeeping to increased demand, in the form two non-                                               439 UN Secretary-General 1999a.  440 Tharoor and Daws 2001, 21–30.  441 ACABQ member and former Fifth committee delegate in interview, June 2015. 442 OI 5: A request by a member of an IO Secretariat for greater resources will be most effective if the informal authority of the speaker, the content of the message, and the identity (beliefs and values) of the audience all accord with each other. 443 OI 7: IO bureaucratic actors can leverage their informal authority, in circumstances beyond and in addition to those formally mandated to them, to raise the profile of certain issues, and encourage states to acknowledge that they have an urgent obligation to deliberate and resolve those issues. 444 OI 8: Where a particular reform, particularly increasing resources, would need to be justified by increased operational activity, an IO bureaucratic actor can a) persuade states whose approval is required that a particular operation must be created though the IO, and b) persuade the relevant states to accept operations on their sovereign soil. 445 Thakur 2006, 341.  163 UN interventions, Australia in East Timor (later Timor Leste),446 and NATO in Kosovo.447  Bellamy and Williams (2010), for example, claim that these state-led “operations created a demand for two new UN peace operations”,448 as though there was little or no agency on the part of the UN Secretariat. It is certainly correct that one of the most persuasive factors that led to the recognition that the DPKO was under-funded was the struggles they had achieving their mandates in those missions with their limited resources; however, the idea that these crises can be identified as the primary cause for the resurgence in UN operations is deeply flawed.  Evidence for one transparent weakness in that argument is that there had been many equally dramatic developments in preceding years that elicited no response from member states via the UN.  In the preceding few years, from 1995-1999, there had been numerous civil wars in locations such as Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Burundi, Chechnya, Iraq (Kurdish territory), Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cambodia, Nepal, Albania, and Guinea-Bissau.  However, none of these caused member states to significantly redirect peacekeeping efforts through the UN.  It is also important to note that between 1996 and 1999, there had been no lull in peacekeeping or the demand for it around the world; indeed there was a slight rise in global peacekeeping troops over that time.449  However, these missions were almost all created and managed by individual states, regional organisations, or coalitions of states, and not by the UN.450   The widespread conviction held by member states was not against intervention, although for some, particularly within the G77, that                                                446 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor established on 25 October 1999.  447 United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo established 10 June 1999. 448 Bellamy and Williams 2010, 121-122. 449 Daniel, Taft, and Wiharta 2008,17. 450 Ibid.  164 was also the case, but more specifically it was against that idea that the United Nations was the appropriate mechanism through which intervention should be organised.  Of the two developments, Kosovo and Timor Leste, only the latter offered any latitude for the Secretary-General; as discussed in Chapter 2, the authority of the Secretary-General has very little influence if voting blocs are entrenched in opposition, and particularly when an intergovernmental forum requires consensus for certain decisions.  Given Russia’s historic ethnic and political ties to the Serbian regime, there was no possibility that they would agree to intervention.  Despite this, Annan did try to persuade members of the Council that the UN should intervene.  For example, in the Ditchley speech, four months before the NATO intervention began without Security Council approval, Annan made a powerful, moral argument for intervention: A great deal is at stake in Kosovo today -- for the people of Kosovo themselves; for the overall stability of the Balkans; and for the credibility and legitimacy of all our words and deeds in pursuit of collective security. All our professions of regret; all our expressions of determination to never again permit another Bosnia; all our hopes for a peaceful future for the Balkans will be cruelly mocked if we allow Kosovo to become another killing field… When people are in danger, everyone has a duty to speak out. No one has a right to pass by on the other side. If we are tempted to do so, we should call to mind the unforgettable warning of Martin Niemoller, the German Protestant theologian who lived through the Nazi persecution: “In Germany they came first for the Communists. And I did not speak up because I was not a Communist. Then they came for the Jews. And I did not speak up, because I  165 was not a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists. And I did not speak up, because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics. And I did not speak up, because I was a Protestant. Then they came for me. And by that time there was no one left to speak up”.451 This speech drew on powerfully persuasive narratives surrounding the Holocaust, and regret over more recent incidents in Rwanda and Bosnia, to insist that member states had a moral obligation to engage more in UN peacekeeping in general, and in Kosovo in particular.452 There are thus preliminary indications that Annan may have played a part in encouraging intervention in Kosovo, but ultimately only NATO partners concurred with his view.  I have seen no evidence that Annan directly sought to influence Russia on this issue, but given the extent of the entrenchment, it is unlikely that he could have persuaded them to allow a UN peacekeeping mission. I therefore chose Timor Leste as a case study to argue that by keeping Timor Leste on the agenda, and by persuading states to conduct or allow the intervention, Annan helped to revive the concept of humanitarian intervention, and to re-establish the UN as the dominant actor in that field, and thereby worthy of additional resources.   As with agenda setting, the emphasis is not the mission or change itself, but rather on the processes in the preceding months and even years before the mission, during which the Secretary-General and his colleagues worked to encourage the idea of intervention in East Timor.  This is an important case because the mission provided a                                                451 Annan, Kofi. 1998b. Ditchley. 452 OI 3: A request by a member of an IO Secretariat for greater resources will be more effective if the logos/content of the argument (information, beliefs, values) is closely related to the ethos, the form of informal authority with which the audience perceives that Secretariat member to be endowed. i.e. information with relevant expertise, values with principles of the speaker.  166 convincing argument for more resources for the DPKO.  While Australian forces initially controlled the insertion of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) mission, this was only the case for a few months from September 1999 to February 2000, after which the DPKO took over and henceforth managed the most complex and comprehensive multidimensional peace operation yet created.453  The mission was later to provide an influential justification for additional resources for the DPKO for mission support. The Secretary-General applied both his formal and informal authority in several ways in order to create and influence this UN operation.  The first approach was though direct conversations with heads of state or other policy-makers.  The second was via the bully pulpit, in which the SG used his position to bring attention to a particular issue, and/or to name-and-shame.454  The third was the use of special envoys and representatives, and the fourth was the formation of Groups of Friends, to harness the power of states in order to affect change in the international community.  As these approaches often coincide or overlap, I do not address them individually, but work through the use of these strategies chronologically. A narrow focus on state interests might suggest that proximate causes to the intervention were the national interests of Australia, which eventually provided the troops for the intervention,455 and the pressure of the international community, and the P5 in particular, for Indonesia to respect the human rights of its citizens and to allow military intervention.  However, a closer look at the political processes preceding the intervention shows that the influence of the Secretariat was significant, and possibly the most crucial determining factor in the intervention.                                                  453 UN DPKO. East Timor News 23 February 2000.  454 Trinh 2007, 102-120. 455 Leaver 2001; Coleman 2007, 242.  167 In the preceding months and years, the vast majority of the international community, including the powerful states involved, had prioritised Indonesia’s sovereignty over the rights of the East Timorese.   Every state that advocated intervention did so only after the Secretary-General and key members of his staff intensely and consistently encourage them to do so.    Secretary-General Annan made consistent efforts to raise the issue of East Timor on the international agenda.  This is one of many instances of overlap between the different mechanisms of influence, in this case operational initiation and agenda setting.  Sir Kieran Prendergast, USG for Political Affairs from 1997-2005, recalls that after taking office in 1997, Secretary-General Annan selected several long-term conflicts around the globe on which to focus his efforts, one of which was East Timor.456  This region had been occupied by Indonesia since the former colonial power, Portugal, withdrew in 1975.  A month after taking office, Secretary-General Annan asked his friend, former colleague, and skilled negotiator, Ambassador Jamsheed Marker (Pakistan), to act as his Special Representative for East Timor.  He instructed Marker to revive a peace process that, in the absence of interest by the international community, in Marker’s words, had been reduced to “proceeding in a somewhat desultory fashion over a series of inconclusive biannual meetings between the Secretary-General and the two foreign ministers” of Indonesia and Portugal.457  Marker, who was then involved in every step of the negotiations from February 1997 until East Timor’s independence, insists that, “Kofi Annan’s role in the East Timor negotiations was absolutely crucial, and its importance cannot be emphasized enough”.458  The Secretary-General frequently met with both foreign ministers,459 and in his own words, he                                                456 Marker, 10; Eckhard 109. 457 Marker 2003, 10. 458 Ibid., 11. 459 Meisler 2007, 181.  168 established himself as the “central node of communication between the various parties to the conflict”.460 The issue was re-introduced into the agenda of UN member states only by a concerted effort on the part of the Secretary-General.   Less than two weeks after appointing Jamsheed Marker, he sent a report to the Commission on Human Rights, stressing the rights violations and escalating violence in East Timor.461  Three months later, on 21 May 1997, he sent a more detailed report to the General Assembly, citing the support of the Commission for his previous report.462  Annan then invited the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Portugal for a series of personal meetings with him, which began on 19 and 20 June 1997.  From then on, he sent reports to the Commission on Human Rights or the General Assembly at least once a month, detailing evidence from Portugal and Indonesia, as well as reports from NGOs such as Amnesty International that the Secretary-General had previously requested.463   In May 1998, Suharto resigned and Vice-President B. J. Habibie became President.  The following month, the Secretary-General announced to the press that he was calling on President Habibie to sincerely re-engage with him to resolve the tensions in East Timor.464   During another round of negotiations on 4-5 August, closely managed by the Secretary-General, Foreign Minister Jaime Gama of Portugal described the influence of the Secretary-General, stating that both sides, “have moved from the principal positions [they] keep to a common ground for negotiating those particular matters under the leadership of the Secretary-                                               460 Annan 2012, 106. See Traub 2006, 102-109 for concise summary of SG’s involvement in East Timor. 461 UN Secretary-General 1997d. 462 UN Secretary-General. 1997a, para 49; UN Secretary-General 1997f.  463 See, for example, UN Secretary-General. 1997b; UN Secretary-General. 1998b. 464 UN Press Release 1998a.   169 General”.465  His counterpart Foreign Minister Ali Alatas of Indonesia expressed similar sentiments, saying, “Mr. Secretary-General I, too, would like to join my colleague in first of all thanking you, Sir, for the role that you have played in making this progress possible”.466   Amid rising tensions in East Timor, the Secretary-General arranged another round of negotiations from 6-8 October. In early 1999, Annan convinced Indonesia’s President Habibie to allow a UN-managed referendum (Indonesia required the term “popular consultation”, rather than referendum), in East Timor.  Most observers explain this by assuming that Habibie had a misconceived preconception that he could easily win such a referendum.  Throughout the year, between that decision and the referendum, Annan’s phone calls to Habibie became more and more frequent, and by August, they spoke every day.467 On September 4, the results were announced. 98.6% of the electorate voted, with 78.5% rejecting the offer of partial autonomy in favour of independence. Pro-Indonesia militias immediately launched a campaign of unrestrained violence against the East Timorese and their property, and the Secretary-General then, “saw his task as coaxing Habibie toward accepting intervention, by means of both private persuasion and public exhortation”.468  Habibie had come to trust Annan’s advice and believed Annan’s claims that Habibie’s own forces were complicit in human rights violations, even over the contrary denials from his own security staff.469   The day after the election, Annan used his long nightly phone call to try to persuade Habibie that a military intervention was necessary to restore order.470                                                  465 UN Press Release 1998b. 466 Ibid. 467 Annan 2012, 103. 468 Shawcross 2000, 392. 469 Ibid. 470 Annan 2012, 108.  170 This was not an easy argument to make. Throughout the Indonesian government and military, there was still an absolute rejection of the idea of outside intervention, UN or otherwise.  As late as 7 September, after a representative of the Secretary-General suggested that military intervention might be necessary if Indonesia was unable to restore order, Foreign Minister Alatas announced that any peacekeeping force would have to “shoot its way into East Timor”.471  That night, Kofi Annan spoke at length with President Habibie, and felt that the latter’s position was softening.  Thereafter followed night after night of long phone conversations between the two men.472  As Annan’s spokesman Frederick Eckhard says of Kofi Annan, he, “didn’t invent telephone diplomacy, but he turned it into a fine art”.473  Between 3-15th September, the Secretary-General made 111 calls regarding East Timor, a quarter of which were to Habibie.474  [This and other examples of the interactions between Annan and Habibie speak to OI – 2, the influence of principle-based authority, and OI – 3, the relationship between the authority of the speaker and the content of the message; it would also provide partial evidence for OI – 5, the relationships between speaker’s authority, message content and audience values, but only if Habibie either a) identified with values prioritising human rights over national or security interests, or b) wished to be viewed by others as identifying with those values]. Without the Secretary-General’s influence over Habibie, the intervention would almost certainly never have taken place.  President Habibie’s consent was essential, because while almost all key states expressed the need for the Indonesian government to improve the human                                                471 Marker 2003, 198. 472 The calls took place at night only due to the time difference between New York and Indonesia. 473 Eckhard, 11; 110. 474 Pour 1999. Jago 2010, 377-394. 381.  171 rights situation, they, without exception, demonstrated far more support for the sovereignty of Indonesia than for the self-determination of the East Timorese.  The US was still opposed to any mission that lacked the consent of all parties, including Indonesia,475 and as a US diplomat told the Financial Times at the time, “the dilemma is that Indonesia matters and East Timor doesn't”.476 As late as 3rd September, the US was still rejecting the idea of a UN peacekeeping mission, calling on Indonesia to address its own security issues in the region.477   Many other influential states also felt the same way;478 China and Russia had made it clear that they were prepared to veto any intervention without Indonesia’s consent.479  Other ASEAN states were unwilling to criticise Indonesia, as ASEAN’s most powerful member, and up until, “the United Nations-sponsored ballot in August 1999, ASEAN adhered to its long-standing position that East Timor was purely an Indonesian domestic matter”.480  Japan, another regional power, held a similar position.   While Australian Prime Minister John Howard had told Secretary-General Annan that he might be prepared to supply troops for an intervention, Australian foreign policy was influenced by several factors that ensured that they would help only with Indonesia’s explicit permission. Australia had a close relationship with Indonesia; indeed they were the only Western state to have recognized de jure that East Timor was a part of Indonesia, and not merely under occupation.481  As Coleman (2007) illustrates, Australia also felt a powerful need for any intervention to be considered legitimate by the international community, and in this context, UN                                                475 Meisler 2007, 183. 476 Shawcross, 2000, 394. 477 Kahn 2015. 478 Meisler 2007, 182. 479 Eckhard, 110. 480 Dupont 2000, 163. Weinlich 2014, 94. 481 Cotton 1999, 237-46.  Weinlich 2014, 95.  172 Security Council authorisation was the necessary source of legitimacy.482  As Marianne Jago (2010) summarises, “without Habibie’s consent to the operation the Security Council would not have authorized it and East Timor would almost certainly have been left to the continuing wrath of a vengeful Indonesian military and its hired thugs”.483 When some member states began putting more pressure on Indonesia in early 1999, they did so only after specific strategic efforts at organization and persuasion by the UN Secretariat, and the prior creation, by that Secretariat, of a Group of Friends.  Kofi Annan, Kieran Prendergast, and the Asia/Pacific regional director in Political Affairs, Francesc Vendrell, had previously met in 1998 to strategize how best to mobilise the international community on the issue.  Vendrell had been at least as passionate as Annan about trying to get states to pay more attention to East Timor.484   They decided to form two Groups of Friends to pressure Habibie. They formed one larger, gradually expanding group, that initially included over twenty states, to help to set the agenda at the UN, and a smaller, less public, but more active core group of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the US and the UK, to directly influence the relevant actors.485  The Secretary-General and Prendergast also decided to raise the profile of the issue at the Security Council, which only became involved after the Secretary-General sent them a compelling report on human rights abuses in East Timor in May 1999.486  The fact-finding mission the Council then sent to East Timor drew additional international attention to the impending crisis.  The Secretary-General also made an impassioned call to President Clinton for                                                482 Coleman 2007, 240-277. 483 Jago 2010, 377. 484 Whitfield 2007, 97. 485 Whitfield 2007, 200.  Weinlich 2014, 103. 486 UN Secretary-General 1999b.   173 the US to intervene using other means; immediately afterwards, the US decided to use the threat of a de facto veto at the IMF as leverage to persuade Indonesia.487  Also, while Australia may have had motives of its own to support an intervention, they too expressed a willingness to supply troops only after a concerted effort by the Secretary-General to persuade them to do so, long before the elections took place.488   Kofi Annan (1998) had previously argued that, “inducing consent”, using both positive and coercive measures, may be necessary to encourage states to allow intervention in their domestic affairs,489 and this was an example of that principle playing out in international politics.  Stanley Meisler described how “[p]ersuading Habibie to hold the referendum and then to invite foreign troops to quell the disorders was an extraordinary feat of diplomacy. Galvanizing the Security Council into action in only a few days astounded UN-watchers….Persuading the Security Council to intervene with force is an extraordinarily difficult task.  Persuading a government to accept the intervention without resistance is just as difficult.  Annan managed to do both with skill and patience”.490  Sir Kieran Prendergast, having a lifetime of experience within the UN since its creation, similarly said that this act of persuasion “was a fantastic feat, and I still don’t know how he managed to do it”.491   In addition to the persistent telephone diplomacy, on 11 September, Annan used the bully pulpit to publicly suggest that any refusal on the part of Habibie’s to refuse entry to a UN mission would amount to a war crime, and that the Indonesian state government’s identity as a                                                487 Shawcross 2000, 395.  Direct causation between Annan’s phone call and the US change in policy has not been definitively established.  President Clinton and his former Chief of Staff have thus far declined to be interviewed. 488 Jago 2010, 380. 489 Annan 1998, 172-177. 490 Meisler, 185. 491 Eckhard, 110.  174 legitimate member of the international community of states was at risk if they did not allow an intervention.492  [OI – 2].493  The following day, Habibie publicly agreed to a UN force, telling the Secretary-General later that day that it felt good that he, and Indonesia, had Kofi Annan as a friend.494  On the 20th, the Australian led force began arriving.   Secretary-General Annan swiftly capitalised on the