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Coping with resource curse : examining the case of extractive industry transparency initiative of Mongolia Batdorj, Bulgan 2018

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Coping with Resource Curse: Examining the Case of Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative of Mongolia by   Bulgan Batdorj   MBA, Cecos London College, 2008 BA., Munkh Anu College, 2006   A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF   MASTER OF APPLIED SCIENCE  in  THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES  (Mining Engineering)   THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA  (Vancouver)   May 2018  © Bulgan Batdorj, 2018 ii  Abstract  This study examines the case of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative of Mongolia (EITIM) through the lens of collaborative governance theory as a coping mechanism for a type of wicked problem known as the resource curse phenomenon. Wicked problems are problems with no definitive solutions that cannot be traced to source causes. They often encompass a set of interlocking issues that are changing constantly. The resource curse is the paradox of mineral wealth leading to poor development outcomes in developing countries (Auty 1993), and is characteristic of a wicked problem.  This case study employs a mixed method approach in understanding how and why the EITIM has been successful. The methodology and conceptual framework are grounded in holism, mutual causality, and interdependence theory. Descriptive analysis, quantitative analysis, and social network analysis were applied to examine the four components of the conceptual framework: system context, institutional design, collaborative process, and performance productivity.  Key contributions from this work include: extracting key factors contributing to the successful practice of collaborative governance, expansion of the resource curse phenomenon and wicked problem theories, and establishing the importance of recognizing the resource curse as a wicked problem. This perspective shifts the approach, strategy and expectations around how to approach and resolve the resource curse phenomenon. It’s problem-solving approach, strategy and expectations are embraced in the research design and provide new insight into effective strategies for collaborative governance. iii  Lay Summary  The paradox that mineral-led economies lead to poor development outcomes under certain conditions is a riddle for academia and a serious challenge for countries affected by this so-called “resource curse” phenomenon. Although, a great deal of literature is dedicated to understanding and resolving the curse as the practical, applied solutions to date have been largely unsuccessful.  To help formulate a resolution, this research reframes the resource curse phenomenon as a “wicked problem”. Wicked problems have no definitive formulation, no stopping rule, and no test for a solution. To resolve (rather than cope with) the wicked problem, this study examines a successful case of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative in Mongolia (EITIM) and asks how and why the EITIM’s collaborative strategy was effective in resolving the resource curse. The study findings indicate that leadership, ownership, legitimacy, and maturity helped to maintain the EITIM’s resilience in the face of the wicked problem’s constant change. Measuring of the impact of the EITIM’s collaborative governance strategy against expected theories of change, as well as by assessing their big picture context in a quantitative sense, highlights the challenges posed by the constantly changing wicked problem, as well as how collaborative governance may help to mitigate them. iv  Preface  I, Bulgan Batdorj, am responsible for the identification, design, and analysis for this research. The literature review, research design, data collection, data analysis and interpretation of the analysis were performed by me throughout the different stages of the thesis. v  Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ii Lay Summary ............................................................................................................................... iii Preface ........................................................................................................................................... iv Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... v List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ ix List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. x List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................... xi Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... xii Dedication ................................................................................................................................... xiv Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Problem and its Significance .......................................................................................... 1 1.2 Justification of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative in Mongolia ................ 3 1.3 Research Question and Objectives.................................................................................. 4 1.4 Summary and Thesis Outline .......................................................................................... 5 Chapter 2: Literature Review ....................................................................................................... 6 2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 6 2.2 Topical Motivation .......................................................................................................... 7 2.2.1 Setting the Scene – “Resource Curse” ........................................................................ 7 2.2.2 Setting the Scene – “Wicked Problem” .................................................................... 11 2.2.3 Need for Collaboration in Mining Governance ........................................................ 13 2.3 Theoretical Motivation .................................................................................................. 15 2.3.1 Collaborative Governance Theory over Stakeholder Theory ................................... 15 vi  2.3.2 Transformational value of Collaborative Governance .............................................. 20 2.4 Summary of the Literature Review ............................................................................... 23 Chapter 3: Research Design ........................................................................................................ 24 3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 24 3.2 Research Paradigm – The Matters of Ontology and Epistemology .............................. 25 3.2.1 Ontological Perspective ............................................................................................ 25 3.2.2 Epistemology of the Research ................................................................................... 27 3.3 Case Study Methodology .............................................................................................. 29 3.4 Data Analysis: Grounded Theory and Inductive Approach .......................................... 30 3.5 Data Collection ............................................................................................................. 31 3.6 The Conceptual Framework .......................................................................................... 34 3.7 Summary of the Research Design ................................................................................. 38 Chapter 4: Context Analysis of the EITIM Case ...................................................................... 39 4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 39 4.2 Inception and Evolution of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative ................ 40 4.3 PESTLE Analysis of Mongolia .................................................................................... 45 4.3.1 Political Factors ........................................................................................................ 45 4.3.2 Economic Factors ...................................................................................................... 48 4.3.3 Social Factors ............................................................................................................ 50 4.3.4 Social Perception of Corruption ................................................................................ 50 4.3.5 Technological Factors ............................................................................................... 51 4.3.6 Legal Environments – Extractive Industry ............................................................... 52 4.3.7 Environmental Factors .............................................................................................. 54 vii  4.4 Summary of the Case Context and Background ........................................................... 54 Chapter 5: EITIM Institutional Design – Descriptive Analysis .............................................. 56 5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 56 5.2 The case of EITIM ........................................................................................................ 57 5.3 Procedural Aspects ........................................................................................................ 60 5.4 Structural Aspects ......................................................................................................... 63 5.5 Summary of EITIM Institutional Design – Findings .................................................... 66 Chapter 6: Performance Productivity Findings........................................................................ 69 6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 69 6.2 Output productivity ....................................................................................................... 71 6.3 Outcome Productivity ................................................................................................... 71 6.4 Big Picture Indicators ................................................................................................... 75 Chapter 7: Process Productivity - Social Network Analysis Findings .................................... 79 7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 79 7.1.1 Social Network Analysis – Method and Mechanisms .............................................. 79 7.1.2 Data Description and Network Boundaries .............................................................. 85 7.1.3 Data Visualization and Analysis – UCINET and NetDraw ...................................... 89 7.2 Analysis – Whole Network ........................................................................................... 89 7.3 Analysis - Network Cohesion ....................................................................................... 91 7.4 Analysis – Individual and Organization Level – Centrality ......................................... 93 7.5 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 94 Chapter 8: Convergence of Findings .......................................................................................... 96 8.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 96 viii  8.2 Characteristics of the System Context .......................................................................... 97 8.3 Characteristics of the Institutional Design .................................................................... 98 8.4 Characteristics of the Performance Productivity .......................................................... 99 8.5 Characteristics of the Collaborative Process ............................................................... 100 8.6 Summary ..................................................................................................................... 102 Chapter 9: Contribution, Limitation, and Conclusion ........................................................... 105 9.1 Academic and applied contributions ........................................................................... 105 9.1.1 Theory Development Contributions – Resource Curse and Wicked Problem .... 105 9.1.2 Methodological Contributions ............................................................................ 108 9.1.3 Practical Contributions........................................................................................ 109 9.2 Limitations and Further Research ............................................................................... 109 9.2.1 Data source .......................................................................................................... 110 9.2.2 Data analysis ....................................................................................................... 111 9.2.3 Case Study .......................................................................................................... 113 9.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 113 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 115 ix  List of Tables  Table 1. Worldview Descriptors Eric Dent (1999) ................................................................... 18  Table 2. Stakeholder Theory versus Collaborative Governance Theory ............................... 24  Table 3. Chronology of EITI from 2003-2016 .......................................................................... 48  Table 4: The list of laws regulating the Extractive Industry .................................................. 59  Table 5. Descriptive analysis checklist ...................................................................................... 62  Table 6. EITI indicators at three levels ..................................................................................... 76  Table 7. Performance productivity at output level .................................................................. 78  Table 8: Typology of research on consequence of network factors ........................................ 87  Table 9. Network properties – their definition and formula ................................................... 88  Table 10. Number of actors of core entities of EITIM ............................................................ 91  Table 11. Roles and Responsibilities and SNA data of EITIM entities .................................. 91  Table 12. The number of individuals and attendance record of each constituencies. .......... 94  Table 13. Network cohesion ....................................................................................................... 97  Table 14. Cohesiveness metrics of the three constituencies in MSWG .................................. 97  Table 15. SNA actor level centrality measures of top 11 actors ............................................. 99 x  List of Figures Figure 1: IAPP Public Participation Spectrum ........................................................................ 25 Figure 2: Research Design – Iterative cycle between these components. .............................. 30 Figure 3. Epistemologies with Positive and Interpretivist Influence ..................................... 34 Figure 4. Basic types of designs for case studies ...................................................................... 36 Figure 5. A Model of Collaborative Governance ..................................................................... 41 Figure 6: The Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance .................................. 42 Figure 7: Research Conceptual Framework ............................................................................ 43 Figure 8. The EITI Standard 2013 ............................................................................................ 50 Figure 9. Mongolian Political Cycle of Parliament, President and Cabinet .......................... 52 Figure 10. Economic Impact of Mining .................................................................................... 55 Figure 11. Number of Internet Subscribers 2009-2016 ........................................................... 57 Figure 12. Reconciliation gap between government and company reporting ....................... 79 Figure 13. Number of companies registered, reporting and reported by government ........ 79 Figure 14. EITIM First Validation by EITI Secretariat (2010) .............................................. 80 Figure 15. Mongolia Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).......................... 83 Figure 16. CPI Mongolia from 2006 to 2017 ............................................................................ 84 Figure 17. Structure of the core entities of EITIM .................................................................. 90 Figure 18. MSWG structure as of 2012 .................................................................................... 93 Figure 19. 33 MSWG organizational membership since 2012 ................................................ 93 Figure 20. EITIM MSWG meeting attendance by type of organization ............................... 95 Figure 21. Bipartite graph of the 42 EITIMSWG ................................................................... 96 xi  List of Abbreviations  CSO Civil Society Organization EI Extractive Industry EITI Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative EITIM Mongolian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative GDP Gross Domestic Products GIO Gross Industrial Outcome IFIs International Financial Institutions MSWG Multistakeholder Working Group NGO Natural Resources Governance Institute NRGI Non-Governmental Organization OSF Open Society Forum PWYP Publish What You Pay WB World Bank xii  Acknowledgements  I received help from many people in this journey of learning. My profound appreciation goes to my supervisors, Dr. Nadja Kunz and Dr. Bern Klein. I am indebted to Dr. Kunz for showing me the world of academia through the eyes of passion and actions of inspiration. Your practical advice, generous support and mentorship helped my learning process immensely both in academy and practice. Starting this journey of learning would not have been possible without the support of Dr. Bern Klein. You speak quietly, and you ask questions that keep me exploring and understanding further. I deeply respect your intellectual gravity. To my supervisory committee, Dr. Julian Dierkes and Dr. Andre Xavier, I extend my gratitude. Julian, you supported my living and learning unconditionally. You have truly empowered me. Andre, you were my source of wisdom during painful times of growing. Your friendship is the magic ingredient for overcoming the different challenges I faced over the past four years.  Many professors have helped me along the way. I want to thank Dr. John Steen, who guided me into an advanced dialogue on social network analysis; Dr. Marcello Veiga, for always provoking the “box” and simulating reality in the study; Dr. Malcolm Scoble, for caring and asking about my family; Dr. Dirk Van Zyl, for always being interested in learning what I was up to; and Dr. Aftab Erfan, for opening the door for collaboration and facilitation. I also want to thank Dr. Michael Hitch and Dr. Dawn Mills, both of whom hold significant roles at different stages of my learning. I also thank Ms. Lucia Chavez, Mr. Leonardo Barroilhet, Mr. Bo Wang, Ambassador Gregory Goldhawk, Ms. Maria Barrados, Ms. Delgermaa Boldbaatar, Ms. Bat-Oyun Sanj, Ms. Ariunaa Ulziitogtokh, and Ms. Ariunaa Nominkhuu for your friendship. xiii  I thank Dr. Marie-Luise Ermisch, for enriching my world with her kindness, genuineness, and generosity. You are a special friend. Another special friend I have gained through my study at UBC is Dr. Jocelyn Fraser. I am humbled by your sensitivity towards culture, and your genuine compassion and respect for others. I make my obeisance to your wisdom and inquisitiveness.  I am grateful as well for my Mongolian community here in UBC: Ms. Bolor Buyan, who extends her friendship and takes care of my daughters like my sisters would do – for this I love you as my sister, and Mr. Mendee Jargalsaikhan, who advises generously like an elder brother would do – you are our elder brother. Another sister I gained is Ms. Yuliana Nugroho – your honesty, companionship and discussions were always timely and insightful. My friends at the UBC Mongolian Student and Alumni club further enriched my experience here in UBC and Canada. So, this little community is my big family in UBC – I am grateful to everyone.  I am grateful to the Canadian International Resource Development Institute, Integrated Mineral Resources Initiative of GIZ in Mongolia. Erdene Resources Development Corporations, and Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative of Mongolia for their partnerships.  To my great-grandfather, Lunkhuu, who always told me to learn as much as I can – I hope I make you proud. Most of all, I am grateful to my mom and dad for always believing in me. I want to thank my siblings for looking after the elders back home, and I am grateful for my mother and sister-in-law for helping us to raise our family. To my daughters, Gegeenasralt and Gegeenenerelt, mommy loves you and thanks you for being joyful and happy. Last of all, this thesis is dedicated to my husband Zorigoo who has stood up for me and taken charge of all obligations to help me complete my study. xiv  Dedication                To Zorigtkhuu Bat-Erdene  For your love, patience and the promise you kept 1  Chapter 1: Introduction  1.1 Problem and its Significance  “We eat mines, and mines eat us.” June C. Nash (1979)   The extractive sector environment is complex, multifaceted, and divisive. Even though minerals (and therefore mining) play a crucial role in the welfare of humankind and its endeavor of development, the magnitude of mining’s impacts on environment, society, and economy is irreversible. Actors (e.g. government, civil society organizations, industry, local citizens, international financial institutions, and donors) approach this issue with different knowledge, power, expectations, beliefs, and worldviews creating lack of consensus and common misunderstandings about the impacts of mining. Some of the negative impacts of mining materialize as slow development, a hindrance to institution building, as well as conflict, corruption, and dependence in some countries (Evans 2012; International Council on Mining and Metals 2015; Kemp et al. 2011).  These impacts can be explained through a phenomenon called a “resource curse” (Auty 1993). The central thesis of the resource curse is that countries with large endowments of non- renewable natural resources fail to translate such wealth into sustained prosperity. A multitude of solutions have been proposed for developing countries to overcome the resource curse (Dobbs et al. 2013; Gilberthorpe and Rajak 2017; Williams 2011), which focus primarily on strengthening the institutions, improving fiscal management, and bettering the legal environment and policies to avoid or overcome the resource curse. 2  This thesis approaches the resource curse as a “wicked problem” (Rittel and Webber 1973), a situation that involves many actors with conflicting worldviews, such that information and knowledge have no consensus. Interventions to resolve wicked problems therefore often result in worse outcomes than before such interventions (Churchman West 1967; Conklin and Weil 1998; Rittel and Webber 1973; Robinson and Wilkinson 1995). However, in an effort to resolve wicked problems, scholars and practitioners strongly agree in adopting collaboration as a strategy to cope with the wicked problems (Ostrom 2000; Rich and Moberg 2015; Roberts 2000)  Collaboration work between diverse parties is not an easy process. The complexity of the collaborative process is eloquently captured by Kadal Asmal (while he was chairing the World Commission on Dams): "A parting warning: doing so (collaboration) is never a neat, organized, tidy concerto. More often, the process becomes a messy, loose knit, exasperating, sprawling cacophony. Like pluralist democracy, it is the absolute worst form of consensus building except for all the others" (UNEP 2002).  A representative case of collaboration, Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative in Mongolia (EITIM) is examined in this research as a successful collaborative initiative. Although in examining the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, this research does not engage in the discussion for or against the transparency per se. Often the researches on the EITI makes assessment based on the transparency literatures and there are equal amounts of literature both making the case of effectiveness of transparency and critiquing it. However, this research explores the collaborative aspect of the EITIM, with the assumption that the case is a successful one and offers insights in examining the qualities it possesses. 3  1.2 Justification of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative in Mongolia  The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative in Mongolia (EITIM) was selected as a case study because of its unique revelatory nature. In addition, EITIM fits into the theoretical definition of collaborative governance (further explained in Chapter 2) and has a relatively rich history of overcoming many challenges and gaining legitimacy in the extractive sector. As well, the country context of Mongolia – a young democracy, rich with mineral resources– and the challenges it faces are similar to many other resource-driven and developing countries, which are emerging as new players in the resource economy.   One of the earliest commitments Mongolia made to limit the negative impacts of mining development was joining the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives (EITI) in 2006. EITIM has made significant advances in disclosing data in an extractive sector over the last 11 years. The International Secretariat of EITI validated this success. Mongolia was awarded twice with the EITI Chair’s award and recognized as a pioneer country in successfully implementing the EITI International Standard.  The EITI process in Mongolia was initiated by the Government of Mongolia and involves civil society organizations, mining companies, and government agencies since 2006. Meetings with the various actors are conducted formally and collectively, and decisions are made based on consensus. The theory of change which the EITIM sets for itself is to improve the governance of the extractive sector in Mongolia. 4  Finally, Mongolia has been relatively less obscured by different factors of political regime, cultural diversity, and conflict which could increase the generalization or transfer findings of the research. The case analysis of the multi-stakeholder Working Group of EITI, from 2006-2017 thus provides a rich context for evaluating collaborative governance initiatives.   1.3 Research Question and Objectives  This research is conducted with the assumption that the case of EITIM is a successful collaborative initiative. Therefore, the Mongolia case offers a unique insight into understanding the factors which contribute to success. The overarching question of the research is:  How and why the case of Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative in Mongolia is successful?  This question is investigated using a conceptual framework, which consists of system context analysis, EITIM institutional design, performance productivity and collaborative process (Chapter 4.6 The Conceptual Framework). The range of variables within collective governance was fully examined in the EITIM case in order to better understand and identify the characteristics that led to its success.  The findings from this research may be used in designing future successful collaborative governance initiatives and could assist in combatting the complex problems that can arise from the natural resource sector. The findings from this research are especially applicable to countries that share similar contexts to Mongolia, namely an abundance of mineral resources, vulnerable ecology, immature democracy, small economy, and young population. 5  1.4 Summary and Thesis Outline  A strong degree of urgency, as well as a need to build consensus, trust, and mutual understanding, are required in resolving wicked problems, such as the resource curse. These problems endanger the economy, environment, and society at all levels. As the traditional, technocratic, and professional interceptions to these problems fail to provide resolutions, scholars and practitioners are tapping into collective power, wisdom, and strength to cope with these challenges.  This thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter 2 expands the topical and theoretical significance of the research based on the current literature. Chapter 3 frames the research design, research paradigm, and the choice of methodology. Chapter 4 discusses the system context of the collaborative governance. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 present the reader with an analysis of the institutional design, performance productivity and collaborative process productivity of the EITIM. Chapter 8 converges the findings of the case. Chapter 9 offers reflections on the applied and academic contributions, and limitations and proposes a direction for further study. 6  Chapter 2: Literature Review  2.1 Introduction  A rich set of literature, such as that of natural resources, should be examined by discussing the past practices, present challenges, and future outlooks. Although literature specific to the resource, wicked problem, and worldview shift were reviewed in detail, the abundance of relevant literature from the wider natural resources industry deserves an introduction. The depletion of natural resources, growing population and changing climate calls for collective action, but leads to much debate. The literature underpinning this stream of a debate can be chased back to Aristotle: “what is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest” (Ostrom 1999). However, more recent literature could be traced to “the tragedy of the commons”, referenced by Garrett Hardin (1968). In the essay of the tragedy of the commons, Hardin (1998) used an example of herdsman depleting the pasture in his interest to have more animals in his herds while exceeding the carrying capacity of the pasture. He explains “… the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another .... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited.” This stream of literature was also informed and shaped by the Malthusian theory of population growth (Malthus 1798), which identify resource limitations to support the growing population, and crises resulting from the gap between the population growth and lack of food supply (1798). 7  In response to the Tragedy of commons, collective action theories have emerged. In collective action and collectivism literatures, the work of Mancur Olson’s “The Logic of Collective Action – Public Goods and the Theory of Groups” have inspired the nobel prize work “Governing the Commons” by Elinor Ostrom (1990).  The set of literature on “sustainability” is not discussed at length, but it bears a place in the thinking and shaping of this research. The wicked problem literature to a minor extent fills the absence of sustainability literature. Because sustainability literatures roots in the so-called sustainability challenges, i.e., climate change, poverty, resources depletion, and environmental deterioration and proposes means to cope with these problems globally. In practice, harnessing natural resources wealth opens opportunities for developing countries not only to cope with the sustainability challenges but also progress its development (Batbold and Officer 2013; ICMM 2012; Kirsch 2010; Labonne 2002).  2.2 Topical Motivation  2.2.1 Setting the Scene – “Resource Curse”  Many developing countries with an abundance of mineral wealth are struggling to translate their wealth into meaningful, long-term development outcomes. This phenomenon is explained through the “resource curse” theory (Auty, 1993). Natural Resource Governance Institute (2015) defines that “resource curse (also known as the paradox of plenty) refers to the failure of many resource- rich countries to benefit fully from their natural resource wealth, and for governments in these countries to respond effectively to public welfare needs. While one might expect to see better development outcomes after countries discover natural resources, resource-rich countries tend to 8  have higher rates of conflict and authoritarianism, and lower rates of economic stability and economic growth, compared to their non-resource-rich neighbors.”  Resource curse encompasses political, economic and social challenges. The characteristics of the resource curse captured by the NRGI (2015) is as follows:  1. Decline in democracy – because of increased income from the extractive industry and as governments become less reliant on the taxes from the citizen the accountability is reduced. 2. Increase in conflict – natural resources trigger and maintain internal conflicts among different groups of stakeholders. Many countries, such as Democratic Republic of Congo, the Niger Delta, Iraq, Libya, and Angola are examples of countries affected by internal conflict, civil war due to its natural resources. 3. Inefficient spending and borrowing – The fluctuating revenue from the mineral resources often translate into short term investments or over-borrow by governments which are trapped in boom-bust cycles. 4. Dutch disease – refers the high inflation, exchange rate, shift of labor and capital from the non-resource sector to the extractive industry thus hurting the other sectors. 5. Patriarchy and gender-based challenges – this tendency is explained that the Dutch disease, prevents other industries to succeed where woman has easier access to employment. 6. Natural resource wealth seems to disproportionately impact women. Recent research indicates that oil-rich countries tend to have fewer women in the workforce and a smaller representation of women in government. One explanation for this is that industries that are usually easier for women to enter, such as export-oriented manufacturing, are less likely to succeed in resource-rich countries because of Dutch disease 9  7. Limited government capture of benefits - is explained that many fiscal regimes, rules about how to split the profits between companies and governments, fail to compensate the state and communities for depleting their resources and related environmental damage or loss of livelihood. 8. Weaker institutional development – This theory refers the elites in the society to keep control of the revenue from the mining sector thus disables end discourages institutional development. 9. Social and environmental problems – the mining activities can create conflict between the mining companies and the communities. The use of land, water, energy can be the common themes of these conflict. Also, the increase of the human habitats around the mining activities can stress the social, cultural and economic dynamics of the community.  The proliferation of studies on the “resource curse” have mustered many political and policy prescriptions and many more international, national, and local initiatives to combat the negative side effects resulting from mining activities. Developing countries are generally advised by the international financial institutions (IFIs) to strengthen their institutions, improve fiscal management, and strengthen their legal frameworks and policies. Despite these advices and consultations, many developing countries are still trapped in the curse. Recent data provided by the McKinsey Global Institute, identifies 81 countries where the oil, gas and mineral sectors play a dominant role. However, almost 80% of those countries have per capita income below the global average, and since 1995 more than half have failed to match the global average growth rate (Dobbs et al. 2013). 10  There seem to be a great many stumbling blocks in curbing, if not curing the resource curse. The three pillars of sustainable development (Dryzek 2013) - economic justice, societal equity and environmental wellbeing - each scrutinize the morality, value, and implications of extractive development, weigh its past through contemporary lenses, and challenge the mining sector and the governments to change its course to align with the global call for sustainable development.  The extractive sector is complex, multifaceted, and divisive. Actors' knowledge, power, and expectation vary drastically thus lacking consensus and common understanding (Owen and Kemp 2013; Scerri and James 2009; Turner 2009). This lack of consensus and common understanding leads to the search for “truth” based on differing worldviews held by the parties and actors involved making it challenging to address the resource curse. Consequently, the formulation of solutions to overcome resource curses, and the championing of these solutions, are often competing. This leads to conflict, project suspension and loss of reputation, mistrust, and and loss of economic opportunities for all those involved (Evans 2012; International Council on Mining and Metals 2015; Kemp et al. 2011). Problem solving is further hindered by changes in the country’s resources and political ramifications (Roberts, 2000) and complicated by actors who “come and go, change their minds, fail to communicate, or otherwise change the rules by which the problem must be solved” (Conklin and Weil, 1998).  In short, the resource curse is a complex issue. Seeking a cure, many scholars, practitioners and institutions are working with nation-states and devising various treatment plans, but there is not an identified treatment that has worked successfully in multiple developing countries that are in abundance of mineral resources. 11  2.2.2 Setting the Scene – “Wicked Problem”  Problems that have no definitive formulation, no stopping rule, and no test for a solution are called “wicked problems.” This term was first described by Professors Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber at University of California in 1973. Their article “Dilemmas in General Theory of Planning” (Rittel and Webber 1973), argued that conventional methods of technical, linear and analytical resolutions worked only on those problems which were definable, understandable and consensual – “tame” problems as the authors called it. The “wicked problem” however refers to problems where the information has no consensus and involves many actors with conflicting worldviews. Thus, these inputs often result in worse than before outputs and outcomes (Conklin and Weil 1998). “Tackling Wicked Problems – Public Policy Perspective” (Commission 2012) characterizes the wicked problems as difficult (if not impossible) to define, we do not know what is (or are) causes of the problem hence the wicked problems are a set of multi-causal interdependent in nature therefore attempts to address these problems often results an unforeseen consequences. The chronic policy failures are also indication of the wicked problem which is the case of extractive sector policies in the case of Mongolia (Mendee 2015). In examining the roots of this so called “wicked” problem, complexity science was briefly examined. A multitude of factors contribute to the wicked problem and it is difficult to identify a single source. However, one such source, changing worldview perspectives of and its characteristics, corresponds well with the “wicked problem” and the “tame problem” as described by Eric B. Dent (1999). Dent compares the difference between “traditional worldview” (TWV) and “emerging worldview” (EWV), which is embraced as the source of “tame” and “wicked” problems. Dent defines complexity science – the discipline he represents – as “an approach to 12  research, study, and perspective that makes the philosophical assumptions of the emerging worldview which he differentiates from the traditional worldview” (Dent 1999).  Table 1. Worldview Descriptors for “Tame” and “Wicked” Problems adopted from Eric Dent (1999)  Traditional Worldview Descriptors for “Tame  Problems”   Reductionism  Linear causality  Objective reality  Observer outside the observation  Determinism  “Survival of the fittest”, “lead or seed” (Resnick, 1994)  Focus on discrete entities  Monological research methods (Wilber, 1998)  Linear relationships and marginal increases  Either/or thinking (Johnson, 1992)  Focus on directives  Newtonian physics perspectives: influence occurs as direct result of force exerted from one person to another; expecting the world to be predictable  Modern  Differentiation  Focus on hierarchy between levels  Prediction  Patriarchy Yang dominance (Fondas, 1997)  Language as representation  Logic  Based on nineteenth-century physics: equilibrium, stability, deterministic dynamics  Focus on pace (Bailey, 1996)  Focus on averages  Global control  Behavior specified from top down  Metaphor of assembly  Focus on results or outcomes  Specialist  Easy transference of models Emerging Worldview Descriptors for “Wicked Problems  ”   Holism  Mutual causality  Perspectival reality  Observer in the observation  Indeterminism  Adaptive self-organization  Focus on the relationship between entities  Dialogical research methods  Nonlinear relationships  Critical mass thresholds  Polarity thinking  Focus on feedback  Quantum physics perspectives: influence occurs through iterative non-linear feedback; the world is novel and probabilistic  Postmodern  Dedifferentiation  Focus on heterarchy (within level)  Understanding/sensitivity analysis/explanation  Equality Yin/yang balance  Language as action (Gergen and Thatchenkery, 1996)  Paradox  Based on biology: structure, pattern, self- organization, lifecycle  Focus on patterns  Focus on variation  Local control  Behavior emerges from bottom up  Metaphor of morphogenesis  Focus on ongoing behavior  Generalist  Little or no transference of models 13   Theory is widely applicable  Transmission of symbols  Matter creates mind (Harman, 1998)  The theory is narrowly applicable  Generation of symbols  Mind creates matter    This framework of worldviews (Table 1) is also helpful to understand the challenges and identify approaches to cope with sustainability issues. The solution(s) to the wicked problem lies in seeing the holism, interdependence, mutual causality and non-linear relationships between entities therefore it is necessary to embrace the emerging worldview to understand and cope with a wicked problem. The discussion is not to discount the traditional sciences of reductionism, logic, control, objective reality and linear relationships between entities, however the shift could be described as a stage of growth. The existence of EWV is seeded on the maturity of TWV, in other words.  2.2.3 Need for Collaboration in Mining Governance  The “resource curse” is a “wicked problem” because it fails to be resolved through traditional strategies of economism, scientism, and technocracy (Ludwig 2001). There is a stong agreement among scholars to use collaboration as a strategy in coping with the wicked problems (Commission 2012; Conklin et al. 1998; Ferlie et al. 2011). However, Nancy Roberts (2000) proposes two alternative strategies in addition to collaboration. Those are 1) authoritative and 2) competitive.  According to Roberts (2000), authoritative strategies are used to diminish the level of conflict inherent in wicked problems by putting problem-solving into the hands of a few stakeholders who have the authority to define a problem and come up with a solution. Competitive strategies to deal with wicked problems are defined by Roberts as the search for power. To the extent a competitor can build  a power base  larger  than his/her opponents, using whatever tactics his/her ethics  and 14  morality permit, s/he can increase his/her chances to win and define the problem and solutions in a way s/he sees fit.  The general argument against the competitive strategy is that it reinforces the vicious cycle of competition between different interests and further alienates those perspectives and interests. Stakeholders are charged with winning the competition, and thus have the power and resources to protect their interests (Roberts 2000).  On the other hand, the authoritative strategy could be applied in countries and institutions that have strong authoritarian regimes. According to an annual report published by Freedom House (2016) world freedom is declining for the 10th consecutive year; however, out of the 195 countries studied, 50 are designated as not-free, meaning they are authoritarian states. Despite the decline in the quality of democracy, the sentiments of “freedom” and diversity are not reversible in this age of globalization; thus with this assumption, my research will examine the alternative approach of “collaboration.”  The notion of collaboration is gaining momentum in a wide array of disciplines. In efforts to mitigate the negative impacts of the so-called “resources curse” and enforce the sustainable development aspirations, collaborative initiatives at international, regional, national and local scales have been increasing. Examples include the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative in Mongolia, Open Government Partnership, and Africa Mining Vision plus, amongst others. These initiatives encourage partnership, participation, dialogue, conflict prevention and consensus- building among actors involved. 15  Collaboration can arise in many different forms, including partnership, participation, consultation, engagement, dialogue, and multi-stakeholder initiatives. The wide-ranging differences in the dynamics, context, objectives, and design of the collaborative process also make it difficult to engineer in a single way or construct a generic model which could transform the way we solve our complex problems.  In short, the resource curse is a wicked problem. The difference in views of natural resource governance excites reactions and prompts conflict, triggering competition in formulating the problem, and further fragmenting parties involved. The platform of collaboration, however, can assimilate those conflicting concerns and seek integrated and innovative solutions, which can lead to consensus-based decision-making. In the next part, I will examine the collaborative governance theory and its competing theory.  2.3 Theoretical Motivation  2.3.1 Collaborative Governance Theory over Stakeholder Theory  Scholars and practitioners are increasingly emphasizing collaborative strategies as a response to the wake of increasingly complex and “wicked problems” (Commission 2012; Ferlie et al. 2011) Forms of deliberative democracy, multi-partner initiatives, co-management regimes, participatory governance, and civic engagement forums are being experimented with to resolve complex, multi- dimensional and multi-jurisdictional challenges. Especially the case of extractive industry – the fact that it brings the financial leverage for those developing countries to fast forward its development on the other hand it imposes environmental and social challenges therefore spurring multi-dimensional debates and conflicts. 16  Given the complex nature and divided views of the actors in the natural resources context, collaborative initiatives are well-studied. The theoretical accounts of collaboration in natural resources management however are often centered around the stakeholder theory and propose to manage the challenges within the realm of natural resources.  Stakeholder theory examines the case from the agency’s perspective, with the agency investing in relationships with identified stakeholders, and who has a degree of power, influence, and interest in the success of the business. The most widely accepted definition of stakeholder is formulated by R. Edward Freeman (1984) in his landmark book “Strategic Management – Stakeholder Approach” where he states that “stakeholders are groups and individuals who can affect or are affected by, the achievement of an organization’s mission”.  In the case of natural resource management, stakeholder dialogue could potentially enhance understanding, generate new options, and decrease hostility and aggressive attitudes among actors. It could also be used to explore new problem framings, enlighten policymakers, produce competent, fair and optimized solution packages and facilitate consensus, with tolerated consensus and compromise being a diagnostic need in the natural resources management.  Scholars Susanne Stoll-Kleeman and Martin Welp (2006) proposed “stakeholder dialogue” as a deliberative analytic process “which a structured exchange of views and reflection on values of stakeholders can take place.” Another much-cited book, examining a large number of case studies in natural resources management, “Making Collaboration Work: Lessons from Innovation in Natural Resources Management” by Julia Wondolleck, and Steven Yaffee (2000) enumerates the successes and challenges of collaboration. 17  These and other examples from the natural resource management literature, however, are somewhat limited in their response to complex “wicked problems.” They share the sentiment that a complex challenge cannot be managed, controlled, or manipulated.  The second argument is that these definitions were based on the stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984), which places limited capacity in building relationships that can increase the quality of the social capital, i.e. trust, social learning, innovation. Ansell and Gash (2015) developed collaborative governance theory and examined 137 cases with the objective to define a common mode of governance in a wide array of sectors. They define the theory as follows:  Collaborative governance is defined as a collaborative arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-stake stakeholders in a collective decision-making process, that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or public programs or assets. (Ansell and Gash 2015, p544)   Their definition also establishes 6 criteria of collaboration:   public agencies or institutions initiate the forum   participants in the forum include nonstate actors   participants engage directly in decision making   the forum is formally organized and meets collectively   the forum aims to make decisions by consensus   the focus of collaboration is on public policy or public management.  In contrast to rather mature and widely applied “stakeholder theory”, the collaborative governance theory is only emerging in use in examining collaborative initiatives. 18  While stakeholder theory has been widely successful in advancing the conversation of the organization’s role in society, it is often critiqued for enhancing the corporate mission to “divide and conquer” the different stakeholders. Therefore the theory is seen as being used as an instrument by the industry to survive and develop business, not foster collaboration (Bonnafous-Boucher and Dahl Rendtor 2016; Donaldson and Preston 1995; Key 1999).  Table 2 presents the key differences between stakeholder theory (Bonnafous-Boucher and Dahl Rendtor 2016; Donaldson and Preston 1995; Key 1999) and collaborative governance theory (Ansell and Gash n.d.), for the objective of rationalizing the advantage of the collaborative governance theory.  Table 2. Stakeholder Theory versus Collaborative Governance Theory  № Criteria Stakeholder Theory Collaborative Governance Theory 1 Initiating body Firm, NGOs, government Public agencies and institutions 2 Goal of  engagement Inform, consult, negotiate Involve, collaborate, empower 3 Participants Varies based on interest and  power of the actors Must include non-state actors 4 Form of engagement Stakeholders and stakeholder groups engaged individually Formally organized and meets collectively 19  5 Deliberation Decisions are made based on negotiation and trade- offs Aim to make decisions by consensus 6 Focus of  engagement Varies from corporate  strategy to project scale Public policy, public management and  public assets The difference of the two theories on the spectrum of public participation (Figure 1) developed by the International Association for Public Participation (2006) however suggests that collaborative governance theory could be regarded as an evolution of stakeholder theory depending on the complexity of the issue at hand.                    Figure 1: International Association of Public Participation’s Public Participation Spectrum In short, collaborative governance theory is a relatively emerging theory, in contrast to the widely applied stakeholder theory in natural resources management. For this research, collaborative 20  governance theory is selected for this research to examine the case because, although stakeholder theory is essential in recognizing the diversity of power and interests, collaborative governance theory offers a platform to build shared meaning among the participant based on the objective of consensus. Therefore, it is a better strategy for dealing with “resource curse” than stakeholder theory. In the next section, I will examine the dynamics of the collaboration and its role in the determining the outcome of the collaboration. 2.3.2 Transformational value of Collaborative Governance  In coping with the “wicked problems,” cross-boundary collaboration is prescribed. Nevertheless, scholars concocting the dynamics of collaboration and examining its impact are facing certain dilemma (C. W. Thomas and Evans n.d.). Though getting the people into the same room have its functional benefits (i.e. better coordination of activities, better knowledge management), it cannot be assumed that it will result in an increase in intrinsic value or social capital (i.e., trust, innovation, and learning).  It is a commonly accepted notion that people have different opinions, ideologies, and worldviews, which are conscious, subconscious, and even unconscious, formulated through our individual experiences. However, when one’s beliefs are challenged, we knowingly or unknowingly defend what we see as the truth. Further complicating the conversation, the “power” and “interest” of those individuals play a significant role in establishing common ground. Therefore, having multi- stakeholders with mostly adversarial purposes and values, in a room could not be assumed to automatically produce trust, learning, and understanding.  In trying to understand ways in which we can move the conversation forward, to a place where people would listen and speak with intention, integrating their knowledge and experience, and 21  building “consensus”, the form of discipline on “dialogue” was examined. Many thinkers have shared their thoughts on “dialogue”, creating and contributing a new field of study. Many practitioners have joined the conversation from the field of “facilitation”. David Bohm (1990.) explains an illustration of the intricacies of a group, in his pondering “on dialogue”:  Different people coming from different backgrounds typically have different basic assumptions and opinions. In a group you will probably find a great many different assumptions and opinions of which we are not aware at the moment. That is generally so in any group. It is a matter of culture. In the overall culture there are vast numbers of opinions and assumptions which help make up that culture. There are also sub-cultures that are somewhat different from one another according to ethic group or to economic situation, or to race, religion, or thousands of other things. People will come to a gathering like this from somewhat different cultures or sub-cultures, with different assumptions and opinions. And they may not realize it, but they have some tendency to defend their assumptions and opinions reactively against evidence that they are not right, or simply a similar tendency to defend them against somebody who has another opinion. (Bohm 1990, p3)   Adhering to rules of respect and listening are the challenges in collaborative initiatives, especially in environments which are conflicted and with participants who hold different values, principles, purposes, and power. The challenge of building that intrinsic value cannot easily be broken down into practical steps and structure. However, these intrinsic values can be evaluated based on the relationships among the people and the institutions.  The notion of “relationship” as the center of the collaborative governance is echoed by the scholars of “dialogue.” For David Bohm (1990), dialogue is shared thinking in the course of which a valuable form of relationship could emerge and thus can make the society more coherent. In contrast, however, Glenn Sigurdson (Cormick et al. 1996) sees that relationships are an outcome of shared thinking, if the environment of the collective initiative is highly conflicted, and where 22  there are not existing relationships. The scholars also emphasize that dialectic between the relationship and dialogue is dynamic, iterative and fluid.  As much as there are benefits of collaboration, there are significant challenges in achieving collaboration. Researchers and practitioners agree that making collaboration is difficult if not impossible(Ansell and Gash 2015; Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 2014; Hemmati 2002). As emphasized earlier, it should not be a surprise that at the heart of the collaboration mechanism is the human factors individually and in a group context is leveraged.  The barriers to collaboration and its success can be generalized into three factors: 1. Systemic, 2. Institutional, and 3. Human factors. The systemic factors include the social, political, ecological and economic contexts at different levels, i.e. local to global discourses of society, politics, economy and ecology in recognition of the mutual causality between these factors. Secondly, the institutional design accounts for the structure and governing mechanisms of the collaboration. It includes the timeframe, funding of the collaboration, the incentives of participation, the links to decision-making process. Thirdly, the human factors can include the commitment, willingness to listen, understand, cooperate and build trust for the common good. In summary, cross-boundary collaboration is often prescribed to resolve the multi-dimensional, multi-actor, and complex problem not only in natural resources management but across multiple sectors. In this conflicted adversarial scenario, assuming in the organic emergence of trust, understanding and knowledge integration could undermine the resolution. However, in examining the potential for trust and understanding, the collaborative process can be evaluated based on the strength and coherence of the relationships built among actors and institutions. 23  2.4 Summary of the Literature Review  Drawing from the literature review, this research asks:  How and why has the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative in Mongolia (EITIM) has been successful? This research is conducted with the assumption that the case of EITIM is a successful collaborative initiative, explained in the analysis that follows. In the process of this analysis, the research frames the success, and list out the factors which contribute to the maintenance of the collaboration. It is the objective of this research to troubleshoot the practical challenges that can arising during collaborative governance, using academic research tools to make a contribution both in applied and academic terms.  Reviewing the literature of collaborative governance and the wicked problem, anchored by complexity science and emerging worldview notions, require sound methodological design, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 24  Chapter 3: Research Design  3.1 Introduction  It is proposed that collaborative governance initiatives are the antidotes for complex problems. In reversing this logic, collaborative governance is more that if not equally complex with the challenges prescribed. In this line the research design uses the emerging worldview and complex system as the criteria with which to align the research paradigm, and therefore the research methodology.  The qualitative investigation of this inquiry dictated the research to undergo many changes, as expected of the nature of qualitative research. This iterative, fluid process is often encouraged as there is “not a linear and arranged relationship among the components of a design” (Maxwell 2011). In anticipation of new developments during the data collection and literature review, the data analysis, methods, and research questions were modified and reconsidered to reflect these new developments. Although the research has a relatively vague design depository, the final research design is a product of these multiple iterations. Figure 2: Research Design – Iterative cycle between these components. 25    The research process also aimed to examine the case as holistically as possible, in order to identify the factors which lead to collaborative governance success.  As previously established, the research asks: how and why has the case of Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative in Mongolia (EITIM), has been successful? To explore this question, the research investigated the case’s regarding its system context, institutional design, productivity performance and collaborative process. The research methodology was also influenced by the fields of ontology and epistemology, using a case study approach, which is operationalized by mixed methods of descriptive, social network analysis, political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental analysis.  These methods and analysis strategies were chosen based on their shared characteristics of holism, mutual causality, structure, and pattern. These characteristics are also found in the frameworks and models of collaborative initiatives. Beyond the case study methodology, grounded theory and inductive approach are used as strategies to synthesizes the findings through the conceptual framework (Chapter 3.4The Conceptual Framework).  3.2 Research Paradigm – The Matters of Ontology and Epistemology  3.2.1 Ontological Perspective  The subjective ontological stance conveniently aligns with complexity science and therefore wicked problem. This stance is described by O’Gorman and MacIntosh (O’Gorman and MacIntosh 2012): “a subjective perspective looks at reality as made up of the perceptions and interactions of living subjects.” Furthermore, the subjective ontological stance assumes that: 26  - our perceptions shape reality;  - facts are culturally and historically located;  - facts are subject to behaviors, attitudes, experiences, and interpretations of both observer and observed; - reality is multiple in the sense that each experience their place and time in the world differently. Dent (Dent 1999) defined complexity science as: “an approach to research, study and perspective that makes the philosophical assumptions of the emerging worldview – these include holism, perspectival observation, mutual causation, relationship as unit of analysis, and others.”  Dr. William C. Wimsatt (Wimsatt 1994) claims that foundationalist or reductionist concerns have deflected our attention from higher-level ontological features, such as perspectives and causal thickets. He believes that “ontological scrap-heap” made of noisy residua or “error analysis” was holding the keys (data, structure, and new-found status) to explaining the fractal phenomenon and more generally, the non-linear dynamics emerging from the so-called “exact sciences.”  Despite the alignment and affirmation, however, making a strong claim of specific ontological stance may seem naïve given that both non-linear and linear dynamics are seemingly at interplay and thus have no particular boundaries. Therefore, this also makes it possible for those who are creative and critical in making arguments against the ontology of choice. Despite this concern, the research problem, objective and literature review seemingly aligns and posits the research in the subjective ontological paradigm based on its definition. 27  3.2.2 Epistemology of the Research  Epistemology is a way of understanding and explaining how we know what we know (Crotty 1998). Equally eloquently, Maynard (Maynard 1994) stated that “Epistemology is concerned with providing a philosophical grounding for deciding what kinds of knowledge are possible and how can we ensure that they are both adequate and legitimate.” The literature on this topic is rich, offering ranging and diverse stances of explaining how we know what we know.  Within the boundaries of subjective ontology, my research theoretical stance conforms to the interpretivist paradigm epistemologically. Max Weber, an influential sociologist and political economist, is recognized as a key proponent of interpretivism. His tenets in seeing human and human experience as subjective (both in terms of the observed and the observer), and thus needing a subjective approach to understanding the social phenomena (Reynard and Weber 1925). 28    Figure 3. Epistemologies with Positive and Interpretivist Influence   Source: (O’Gorman and MacIntosh 2012)  The positivist and interpretivist paradigms are compared in Figure 3. Unlike positivism, interpretive paradigm aims to understand, not measure the social phenomena. Interpretive paradigm also takes into account the multiple realities, which are inevitably revealed by the perspectives of the different individual(s), the context of the phenomenon under investigation, the contextual understanding, interpretation of the collected data, and nature and depth of the researcher’s involvement (O’Gorman and MacIntosh 2012).  In summary, my research is based in subjective ontology and the interpretive epistemology research paradigm. The variety of ontological and epistemological stances, and their intellectually fascinating and tumultuous “fine lines,” demanded me to further investigate beyond this research. Nonetheless, characteristics of interpretive epistemology frame my choice of methodology, data collection, and data analysis processes, which will be discussed in the following section. 29    3.3 Case Study Methodology  The objective of employing the case study approach is to understand and interpret the individual cases thoroughly in their particular context and to find information concerning the dynamics and the processes (Encyclopedia of Case Study Research Case Study as a Methodological Approach 2010) this is the instance for my research. A case study approach was apriority, given my endeavors to understand the collective governance process of EITIM and use a series of “how” and “why” questions. Yin (Yin 2015.) defines a case study as “a study (that) investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and its real-world context.” He goes on to explain the definition is two-fold:  1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that: a. Investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real- world context, especially when b. The boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident. 2. A case study inquiry a. Copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result b. Relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result c. Benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis. (Yin 2015, p15)  Yin’s definition of the case study frames the boundary and scope of this research and my research follow Yin’s case study designs. Specifically, he categorizes the case study into four designs, based on two dimensions: whether the case is holistic (single unit of analysis) or embedded (multiple units of analysis) and whether it is single-case or multiple-case design (see Figure 4). 30    Figure 4. Basic types of designs for case studies Source: Yin (2015)  In consistency with the above framework (Figure 4), this research follows an embedded, single- case design   3.4 Data Analysis: Grounded Theory and Inductive Approach  Within complexity and the emerging worldview perspective, one of the commonly used descriptors is that theories are narrowly applicable, and behaviour in fact emerges from the bottom up. Grounded theory was first detailed as a research method by Glaser & Strauss (1967). Grounded theory is defined as an inductive method, in which the researcher seeks patterns in the data that leads to the development of theory. 31  Yin (n.d.) also sees value in employing a ground-up procedure, stressing that the data collected by case studies is quantitative and benefits from the ground-up inductive approach. First, he proposes that data may cover the behavior and events that your case study is trying to explain. Secondly, the data may be related to an embedded unit of analysis within your broader case study. Furthermore, in case study research, grounded theory and inductive approach also helps to generalize a case study finding (Johansson 2003).  The process of converging the recurrence and repetition of patterns benefits this case study, as it applies different methods in thoroughly examining the variables of collective governance. As well, examining the behavior of the collaborative governance initiative is important, and the process is complex. Lastly, the inductive approach provide a simple, straightforward approach for deriving findings in the context of focused evaluation questions (D. R. Thomas 2006).  3.5 Data Collection  According to case study researchers (Johansson 2003; Yin 2015), the advantage of a case study approach is that a case can be examined holistically using a wide range of data sources. A database for this research was developed from rigorous examination of EITIM documents (either in English and Mongolian) sourced from the EITIM website, EITI international website, blogs, government sites and various other sources (see Bibliography). The primary source of data for building the social network structures were the 42 minutes of the meeting of the EITIM Multi- stakeholder Working Group since its inception in 2006 to the end of 2017. 32  In addition to the online documents analyzed, the 10 years of print data also provides valuable insight in evaluating the collaborative initiative dynamics of EITIM. Examples of the documents collected for analysis include:  - # 6 Mongolian Government Resolution on EITIM;  - # 4 Mongolian Prime Minister’s Order on EITIM Working Group Membership;  - # 11 EITIM reconciliation report;  - # 3 EITIM validation report;  - # 5 EITIM work plan;  In trying to determine the probable causes and effects on the collaborative governance structure from the external context, information on Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal and Environmental (PESTLE) issues as it relates to EITIM was reviewed at the country level. Additionally, the inception and evolution of the EITI were chronicled as it is assumed that there is a potential cause and effect relationship with our case. The information was sourced from public records.  Adding to the primary and secondary sources of data, the case study analysis is also informed by my personal field experience in getting involved with the EITIM before and during my academic career. Before joining the Master of Applied Sciences program at Norman B. Keevil Institute of Mining Engineering, I participated in the Asia Pacific Policy Project 2014. I was part of their field trip to Mongolia and in sharing their findings and policy recommendation with the EITIM and Mongolian Government Officials. The Asia Pacific Policy Project is a joint initiative of the Institute of Asian Research and the Norman B. Keevil Institute of Mining Engineering at the University of British Columbia. 33  In Asia Pacific Policy Project 2015, I was involved in carrying out a comparative study between the EITI countries and their efforts in localizing the EITI reporting, with a focus on identifying good practices and sharing it with the Mongolian audiences. The results and findings of the study were shared with the Mongolian government officials, EITIM National Council and Working Group, and media. The research findings were published in Mongolian Mining Journal (2015). During the week-long program, The Asia Pacific Policy Project 2015 team had a series of meetings with different stakeholders and a roundtable with the working group. The data pool and data analysis of my current research were enriched by my direct observation of the case during these two field trips.  The EITIM Communication Officer B. Delgermaa, also enriched this research with the stories about EITIM she shared with me during her fellowship at the Liu Institute of Global Affairs of UBC in summer 2017. Lastly, but not least, I have been given the opportunity to present to the EITIM working group and get their feedback on my research findings on March 23, 2018. Their feedback also informs my discussion and helps validate the results.  In my research, the sheer number of valuable information available and accessible online on the EITIM caught me by surprise. All of the EITI meeting minutes were available online, detailing the exact time the meeting started, people who attended, and the topics of discussion and dialogue captured word-by-word. In addition to the meeting minutes, I could access the annual work plans, implementation reports, and financial documents regarding the EITIM operation. However, for my research, reviewing financial documents was not required.  The advantages, and yet vulnerabilities of case study data collection, are whether it relies on a single source or multiple sources. For my research, using systematically-collected source of 34  evidence strengthened my findings, through the process of triangulation: 1) to produce a complete picture of the investigated phenomena and 2) as a process of cumulative validation (Hitch 2006). For clarity, triangulation refers to the use of more than one approach to the investigation of a research question to enhance confidence in the ensuing findings (Bryman 2011).  Had time and resources not been limiting factors, I would have generated a new set of data by conducting interviews and carrying out surveys with existing professional and academic connections with the EITIM Secretariat and some members of the working group. However, I am satisfied with the ability to process the substantial amount of data readily available and appreciate these sources’ transparency and efforts to better systems and governance. 3.6 The Conceptual Framework  The conceptual model used in the research was developed from a synthesis of two models. The first was a “model of collaborative governance” developed by Chris Ansell and Alison Gash (Ansell and Gash n.d.). This model (see Figure 4) was built through four-rounds of successive approximation on 137 case studies of co-management, public participation, and alternative dispute resolution to elicit the key variables of collaborative governance.  As shown in Figure 5, this model illustrates four broad variables: starting conditions, institutional design, leadership and collaborative process. The Collaborative Process is the core of the model, while the starting conditions, institutional design, and facilitative leadership play a critical role and provide context for the collaborative process in producing the outcome. 35  Figure 5. A Model of Collaborative Governance  Source: Ansell and Gash (2012)  The authors share the overwhelm experienced when confronting the complexity of collaborative governance initiates, and the number of variables and causal relationships they present. However, as a tool for the practitioner, academia and policy makers, the variables and relationships were simplified as much as possible.  The second model used in this research was developed by Kirk Emerson, Tina Nabatchi and Stephen Balogh (2011), illustrated in Figure 6. The framework starts with a system context, which includes myriad political, legal, socioeconomic, environmental, and other influences that affect and are affected by the collabortive governance regimes. According to the authors, this system context creates opportunities and constraints that shape the dynamic and process 36  performance of collaboration at the outset, such as uncertainty, consequential incentives, and initiating leadership.  Figure 6: The Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance    Source: Emerson et al. (2011)  In the middle of this model is the collaboration dynamic, which includes the three interdependent mechanisms, principled engagement, shared motivation and capacity for joint action. The principled engagement encompasses the initiation, definition, deliberation, and determinations under the set theory of change. Secondly, the shared motivation captures the relational component of the collaboration, meaning trust, mutual understanding, internal legitimacy and shared commitment. The third component is the collaboration dynamics, a more functional component, which captures the procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, 37  knowledge, and resources. These three elements work together interactively, iteratively and interdependently to maintain and sustain the collaboration.  From these two models, my research adopted the system context (from the integrative framework as seen in Figure 6, given the significance it places on maintaining collaboration and the volatile nature of the extractive industry governance. More specifically, the chronological and descriptive analyses were employed to examine the EITI inception and evolution in addition to the political, economic, social, technological, legislative and environmental analysis of Mongolia.  Figure 7: Research Conceptual Framework       The framework (Figure 7) includes an institutional design, which has both procedural and functional components collaborative institution and captures the components addressed in the models examined. In examining the collaborative process, research employed a specific 38  relational method of Social Network Analysis. The “leadership” component was integrated and looked at in the collaborative process component. Lastly but not least, the performance of the collaboration was enumerated at three levels following the outcome and performance indicator developed by the EITI. 3.7 Summary of the Research Design  The research design presented in this chapter is the result of an evolving research process. Despite the slow and iterative process of the research, non-fixed, non-linear, and open concept design helped me to best investigate the case of EITIM and its collaborative governance initiative from different angles and aspects.  The research design was anchored in the complexity science and emerging worldview concepts, with the assumption that the “wicked problem” and collaborative governance model have organic, living, and evolving behaviors that require methods which captures those characteristics.  In addition the introduction and rationale of each method are described prior to the analysis in Chapters 4 to 7 for practical reasons as there are different methods employed in examining each components of the conceptual framework. 39  Chapter 4: Context Analysis of the EITIM Case  4.1 Introduction  The research has dedicated an extensive effort in building the context surrounding the EITIM case selected, with the view that context is complex and multifaceted versus seeing the context “as a set of interfering variables that need controlling” (Harvey and Myers 1995) or treating the context as measurable and exogenous variable hinders theorizing (Poulis, Poulis, and Plakoyiannaki 2013).  The extensive description of the case’s context was driven by an objective to understand the complex case in depth. The EITIM case is an international initiative, being implemented at national and sub-national levels. Therefore, “the matters of environmental heterogeneity, institutional variation, cultural plurality in markets or workplaces and, all these context-related terms are inherently more complex and multi-dimensional in an international or cross-cultural setting” (Poulis, Poulis, and Plakoyiannaki 2013).  In the sections that follow, the descriptive analysis of the context is provided in two dimensions:  - Firstly, EITI’s inception and evolution chronicling the changes of policy from 2006 to 2017. Secondly, analysis of the national context regarding political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental factors (PESTLE) in the extractive industry and transparency.  The PESTLE analytical framework is applied to Mongolia to examine and elaborate issues that are relevant to our main “case” of EITI in Mongolia and to help understand the “big picture” 40  context (“PEST Analysis - 2017). The PESTLE analysis provides a holistic understanding of the case and industry at hand. It often appears in management, marketing, and business strategy literature, where it is used to evaluate the potential risks and opportunities in any given context, in which the business operates (Witcher and Chau 2010). 4.2 Inception and Evolution of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative   The literature of mineral resources that highlighted its negative impacts on development in development countries started to draw the attention of nations with large mineral endowments. For instance, Richard Auty coined the term “resource curse” in his Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The resource curse thesis (1993). Terry Lynn Karl echoed the negative developmental outcome in oil states in her Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and the Petro States (1997). Following the formation of the “resource curse” concept, scholars prescribed “transparency” and “good governance” as means to mitigate the problem.  The objective of the EITI Reconciliation Report aims to reduce corruption by disclosure from both government and company, which then will be assessed by the independent auditor. Therefore, the indicators of transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector aligns with the mandate of the EITI  The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) emerged in 2002 as a mechanism to counter the challenges of corruption, conflict, and deteriorating democracy in the countries that have a large mineral endowment. The EITI was launched at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in September 2002 by the United Kingdom’s then Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Following the launch of EITI, the objectives, principles and agreed-upon actions 41  were formalized by the governments, companies, civil society organizations and the investors present at the London Summit of Sustainable Development in 2003 (EITI: Statement of Principles and Agreed Actions Statement of Principles and Agreed Actions I. Objective 2003).  According to the Statement of Principles and Agreed Actions (EITI, 2003), the EITI’s objective is to increase transparency around payments and revenues in the extractives sector, specifically in countries heavily dependent on these resources. The underlying belief of the objective is that if managed wisely, mineral wealth has the potential to provide the basis for sustainable economic growth and development in these resource-rich countries. The Statement of Principles and Agreed Actions (EITI, 2003) was signed by 20 governments, 22 industry representatives, 10 civil society organization, 40 investors and 5 international organizations including UNDP, World Bank, OECD.  EITI embraced a multi-stakeholder process of governance in settings its principles. The 12 principles agreed upon by all stakeholders includes the that the “prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable development and poverty reduction” and lists out principles which dictates transparency, accountability and the implementing mechanism based on principles of multi- stakeholders ranging governments and their agencies, extractive industry companies, service companies, multilateral organizations, financial organizations, investors and non-governmental organizations (see full list Statement of Principles and Agreed Actions Statement of Principles and Agreed Actions, EITI 2003). 42  To deliver on the principles agreed upon by all stakeholders, mechanisms of multi-stakeholder process and collaborative governance at the national level have been used. It has been a process of learning by doing. In embracing the lessons from the EITI states, the EITI doctrine evolved from 2003-2016, improving and extending its responsibility from narrowly defined transparency indicators in extractive industry to a global standard for the good governance of oil, gas and mineral resources. This evolution is further explained in Table 3, below.    Table 3. Chronology of EITI from 2003-2016  Time Location Events and Milestones June 2003 London Summit - Statement of Principles and Agreed Actions were produced; - Four countries are piloted for EITI. March 2005 London Conference - Announced the establishment of International Advisory Board consist of different stakeholders; - Identified the need for international criteria and standard thus established 6 criteria as the “rule of the game”; - The initiative did not meet expectations to evolve into a voluntary corporate social responsibility standard for companies. October 2006 Oslo Conference - International EITI Board was formed, followed by the establishment of the International Secretariat in Oslo. February 2009 Global Conference in Doha - EITI validation guide (2008) replaced by EITI rules for countries to grant compliance status; - EITI rules instigate the need for the independent auditor to reconcile the disclosed reports. April 2011 Global Conference in Paris - Right Honorable Claire Short was named EITI Chair; - EITI evaluation by Scanteam was published and the conclusion was that EITI’s narrow focus was not systematically delivering on the Principles established in 2003. 43  May 2013 Global Conference in Sydney - 21 requirements from the EITI rules reduced to 7 concise requirements and renamed as the EITI standard; - Three main challenges were identified and addressed in the EITI standard: o How to ensure that the EITI provided more intelligible, comprehensive and reliable information; o How to ground the process in a national dialogue about natural resource governance, i.e. linking the EITI with broader government processes around tax collection, extractive policy, and budget arrangements; o How to incentivize continuous progress beyond compliance. February 2016 Global Conference in Lima - Fredrik Reinfeldt was named EITI Chair; - EITI Standard 2016 was launched: o The Standard encouraged countries to build on their existing reporting systems and practices for EITI data collection; and o Aimed to develop the EITI’s growing status as a platform for progress that was bringing greater transparency and accountability to all aspects of natural resource management, including tax transparency, commodity trading and licensing; - The 2016 Standard included disclosure requirements on beneficial ownership, aiming a full disclosure by 2020. Following this evolution of policies, the most recent EITI Standard 2016 (EITI 2016) proposes to “see results from natural resources,” and the whole value chain of the extractive industry is to be examined to deliver the benefits of natural resources to the public. The latest standard also stresses the need to reduce “red tape” by encouraging countries to build on their existing reporting systems and practices for EITI data collection, in order to provide timely, reliable and accessible data in a more cost-effective and efficient manner. Finally, the EITI change logic of EITI Standard (2016) also loops in the importance of stimulating public debates and policy recommendation to strengthen the good governance of oil, gas and mineral resources. 44  Figure 8. The EITI Standard 2013    The multi-stakeholder approach is at the heart of the EITI principles and is embedded in the governance and implementation of the EITI at the country levels. EITI standard mandates baseline principles in the multi-stakeholder engagement requiring full, free, active and effective engagement by government, companies and civil societies. Globally, there are 51 resource-rich countries implementing EITI initiatives as of November 2, 2017, as the United States government declared to discontinue its EITI implementation on that day (EITI Secretariat 2017) 45  The EITI is a process which has been evolving over the last 15 years. Due to its promises, potential and efforts, there is a growing interest in the world of academia to tap into the EITI experience to further their knowledge (Carter 2014; Haufler 2010; Ianchovichina and Gooptu 2007; Index 2013; Rustad, Le Billon, and Lujala 2017; Williams 2011).  4.3 PESTLE Analysis of Mongolia  Mongolia is a small land-locked country with a relatively young democracy and an abundance of mineral resources. The country rose to the middle-income threshold in 2012 from the lower- income country. and experienced democratic advancements in a relatively short period of time. There are however, significant vulnerabilities associated with the country’s environment, governance and economy, amplified by the increasing activities in the extractive sector. So, following is the PESTLE analysis to better understand the macro context in which the EITIM operates.  4.3.1 Political Factors  Mongolia declared its democracy and moved to a multi-party and market economy in 1990 after a peaceful transition from communism. Since 1990, Mongolia has had seven parliamentary elections and gone through many reforms (see Figure 9). The current government structure is a unicameral parliamentary system (the State Great Khural), with 76 seats and chaired by the Speaker of the Parliament. It elects its members every four years by general elections and the next election will take place in 2020. By constitution, the head of the state is the President, who is directly elected by the public. The current President, Kh. Battulga was elected in 2017 from one of the two major parties, the Democratic Party. The head of government, the Prime Minister, is appointed by the State Great Khural’s membership. 46      Figure 9. Mongolian Political Cycle of Parliament, President and Cabinet   Although Mongolia is praised as a beacon of democracy (Landman, Larizza, and Mcevoy n.d.) the instability of its political environment hinders effective policy making (Figure 9). Mongolian scholar, Mendee Jargalsaikhan (2015), examined the mining policy failures in Mongolia and concluded there is an absence of political will to uphold the rule of law and institution building. The political parties, Mongolian People’s Party and Mongolian Democratic Party, have adopted a “let’s change it” approach or “syndrome” to policy-making, whereby critical views and proper implementation processes are not embedded in the policy-making, thus causing “mistrust among all actors, including policymakers” which creates a “vicious cycle of cheating and competition” (Mendee 2015). The rivaling politics and changes have caused significant instability in the political environment and therefore in Mongolia’s economy and society. 47  “Politbarometer 2017”, a well-reputed perception in Mongolia conducted by the Sant Maral Foundation (2017), revealed a staggering 94 % of participants responded that government fails (always 57%, often 27.7%, and sometimes 9.3%) to solve Mongolia’s most important problems. With respect to the public’s perception of government policy since its formation, 42.3% of respondents nationwide selected “Self-interested politicians and lack of concern for society at large” and 23.6% selected “Support for the rich (for example through preferential fiscal and land ownership policy that benefit mostly the rich people)”. Contrasingtly, few respondents believed that policies were in “support for middle class” (4.4%) or that government offered “support for the poor (for example through “child money” and other welfare programs that benefit mostly the poor people)” (8.2%). Few respondents also shared “I think that policies were fair and for the benefit of all people” (7.9%) (Sumati L 2017).  On the one hand the survey responses validate the demagoguery politics; on the other hand, these results show that the Mongolian democracy is in need of a greater accountability system to revive its policymaking. Within democracies, it is the people who should have the power to grant and withdraw political power to officials through the constitutional arrangements (Монгол Улсын Үндсэн Хууль 1992).  In 2014, Mongolian Parliament adopted a new state policy on the minerals sector (Mongolian State Policy on Minerals Sector 2014). This policy document spans the years 2014-2025, encompassing a short medium term vision of the state with respect to its minerals sector. The policy aims to strengthen private sector development; establish a stable investment environment; improve innovation in mineral exploration, mining, and processing; encourage the use of modern, environmentally friendly technologies; and strengthen the international competitiveness 48  of Mongolia’s mining industry (Otgochuluu 2016). In addition, the policy calls to foster greater openness and transparency in the extractive sector. The Government’s Action Plan 2016 to 2020 (2016) also pledges to create a favorable environment for investments in geological and mining, to create stable development for the mining sector, and increase the competitiveness of Mongolia for international market of minerals.  4.3.2 Economic Factors  Following the successful democratic revolution in 1990, Mongolia chose reform its centrally- planned economy to a market-oriented economy. The transition was described as “relatively smooth compared with other transition economies, probably due to the combined effects of its relatively under-industrialized economy prior to the transition, a peaceful and relatively stable social and political environment, and sound economic policies” (Cheng et al. 2003).  In recent years, Mongolian economic growth has made headlines in domestic and international media for both “good” and “bad” stories. The country reached 17% of economic growth in 2011 and 1% in 2016 and shifted between the statuses of lower income, lower middle income, upper middle income, and again back to lower middle income as ranked by the World Bank’s country status (2016). This volatility of economic status has a strong correlation with global commodity prices, and therefore exposes Mongolia’s economic vulnerability and its high dependence on mining. The country’s abundant mineral endowment and global commodity boom cycle enabled the national economy to grow, hitting double digits in 2011, 2012, and 2013. The extractive sector is the backbone of Mongolian economy, and it represented 16.7% of GDP and earned USD 4.1 billion in exports, some 88% of total exports for the year in 2015 (). 49  Figure 10. Economic Impact of Mining     Source: http://invest.mrpam.gov.mn  The extractive sector, on a three-year average, constituted 52% (which represents 26%, 20.1% of the budget in 2014) of total national tax revenues, almost 90% of the total export, and 70% of the gross industrial output (GIO) of the country (Figure 10). Due to the country’s high dependency on mining, “the sharp decline (of) commodity prices from 2011 onward severely affected the balance of payments and fiscal position” (IMF 2017) therefore the country’s public debt increase. By the end of 2016, the large fiscal deficit combined with the depreciation of the currency pushed general government debt up to nearly 90 percent of GDP (IMF Executive Board Approves Financial Arrangement for Mongolia 2017).  The mineral dependency of the Mongolian economy bears its marks on the country’s social development, including the public’s perception of mining related corruption and weakening institutional capacities, which will be explored further in section 4.3.3. 50  4.3.3 Social Factors  Mongolia has a total population of 3.119935 million and over 65% of the population is under the age of 40 (National Statistics Office). Over half of the population resides in the capital city, Ulaanbaatar. According to the earlier mentioned Politbarometer 2017, the top problems of Mongolia were perecieved to be unemployment (43.3% respondents) and poverty (15.7% respondents). The country’s other challenges such as the economy, inflation, education, law enforcement, social justice, state administration, mining, environment and agriculture rates were ranked by survey respondents in single digits.  Mining employs 3.7% of the Mongolian workforce, while agriculture and animal husbandry at 28% are the main employment sectors in rural Mongolia (National Statistics Office 2017). 68% of the total population lives in the urban areas (Ulaanbaatar, aimag centers and townships) and 32% live in rural areas (National Statistical Office of Mongolia 2017). This is often explained as being caused by dissolution of the traditional herding due to ecological deterioration (climate change, desertification, human-caused impacts, i.e., overgrazing, mining), which increases the unemployment of the rural population and encourages their migration to urban cities.  4.3.4 Social Perception of Corruption  The threat of corruption leverages the initiatives of transparency, and collaborative governance initiatives aim to increase accountability. The corruption perception in Mongolia has not shifted significantly in the last 12 years, according to the Survey on Perception and Knowledge of Corruption of Mongolia (The Asia Foundation 2017). For example, a great majority of 91.2% of the survey respondents agreed to the statement that “corruption is a common practice in our 51  country” in 2006. The trend shifted by a mere 4.5%, with 86.7% of the population agreeing with this statement in 2017 (The Asia Foundation 2017).  In the same survey, the “mining sector” was evaluated as one of the most corrupt sector in Mongolia, ranking in the top three corrupt sectors from 2006 to 2017. A study carried out by the Independent Research Institution of Mongolia (IRIM) at the request by the UNDP, assessed corruption in the mining sector, identifying 15 different types of major corruption risks mapped on the mine lifecycle phases(Independent Research Institute of Mongolia 2016).  All in all, these surveys and studies show that corruption is identified as a common enemy in Mongolia and the extractive sector is blamed by the public for playing a substantial role in the government’s efforts to combat it.  4.3.5 Technological Factors  Mongolia is well-connected through the use of mobile phones and internet connection. According to the Communications Regulatory Commission of Mongolia, internet penetration reached 86% of the population or 2.6 million by the end of 2016 (CRC, Annual Report 2016). Figure 11. Number of Internet Subscribers 2009-2016  Source: CRC website http://crc.gov.mn/ 52  This connectivity is also credited to the rise of mobile and smartphone subscribers and the relatively young population. The total population of Mongolia is 3.119935 million people and the mobile subscription counts were at 3.4094 million at the end of 2016. Consequently, the social media usage is also high in Mongolia. 4.3.6 Legal Environments – Extractive Industry  The land, its subsoil, forests, water, fauna, flora, and other natural assets in Mongolia shall be subject to the people's authority and under the protection of the State. Article 6.1 – Constitution of Mongolia   There are approximately 30 laws and more than 40 procedures that regulate Mongolia’s mining sector. Since 2008, the Minerals Law 2006 has been amended every year which can suggest that the legal environment in Mongolia is evolving rapidly through many trials and errors. Another explanation is that the legislation was not well thought out in the first place.  Currently, there is a draft law on Mining being proposed to regulate the extractive industry in Mongolia replacing the Minerals Law (2006). The draft law has integrated mine safety, health, rescue measures, the environment, rehabilitation, mine closure, transparency, and management as well as the core issues of financing, feasibility, and development of the mine and adjunct facilities such as refinery, waste treatment, and processing plants. The ministry in charge of mining (Ministry of Mining and Heavy Industry) proclaims that the draft law will ensure clarity and stability of the mining industry, thus improving the investment climate. In addition to the Minerals Law in force, there are 33 laws regulates the relations of the extractive industry in Mongolia. 53  Table 4: The list of laws regulating the Extractive Industry  The List of Minerals Law in effect in Mongolia 1. The Minerals Law, 2006 2. The Law on Widespread Minerals, 2014 3. The Amendments to the Minerals Law, 2015 4. The Petroleum Law, 2014 5. The Petroleum Products Law, 2005 6. The Licensing Law, 2001 7. The Law on Water Pollution Fee, 2012 8. The Law on Prohibiting Mineral Exploration and Production Near Water Sources, Protected Areas and Forests, 2009 9. The Amendment to the Law on Rule for the Compliance of the Law on Prohibiting Mineral Exploration and Production Near Water Sources, Protected Areas and Forests, 2015 10. The Law on the Prevention of Conflict of Interest and the Regulation of Public and Private Interests in the Public Services, 2012 11. The Audit Law, 1997, 2015 12. The Accounting Law, 2001, 2015 13. The General Tax Law, 2008 14. The Investment Law, 2013 15. The Law on Economic Entity and Organization Income Tax, 2006 16. The Law on Air Pollution Payments, 2010 17. The Law on Environmental Protection, 1995 18. The Law on Environmental Impact Assessment, 2012 19. The Law on Natural Resource Use Fee, 2012 20. The Law on Customs Tariff and Customs Duty, 2008 21. The Law on Exemption of Customs Duty, 2008 22. The Law on Exemption of Customs Duty and Value Added Tax, 2012 23. The Underground Resource Law, 1988 24. The Land Law, 2002 25. The Law on Land Fees, 1997 26. The Law on Value Added Tax, 2006, 2015 27. The Law on Forest, 2012 28. The Immovable Property Taxation Law, 2000 29. The Law on Nuclear Energy, 2009 30. The Future Heritage Fund Law, 2016 31. The Fiscal Stability Law, 2010 32. The Law on Development Policy Planning, 2015 33. The Government Resolution #179 of 2016 and a template for the Local Cooperation Agreement Source: Reconciliation Report 2017, Mongolia 54  4.3.7 Environmental Factors  Global climate change poses further challenges to Mongolia: extreme climate, low precipitation and fragile ecosystem, desertification, overgrazing of the livestock and un-reclaimed mining sites present new problems of water shortage, air and soil pollution, and loss of biodiversity in the rural environment. Climate change in the last 60 years in Mongolia is reached 2.1 %, three times the global climate change average. The precipitation in spring and summer has been reduced from 9.1% to 3%, while the precipitation in autumn and winter increased by 5.2-0.7% in 2011-2030 (Dagvadorj et all 2014). In addition, a drastic increase in the livestock (over 56 million in 2015) after the fall of communism threatens the sustainability of the country’s pastureland.  4.4 Summary of the Case Context and Background  Since its inception, EITI has been evolving continuously to meet the demand of its member countries, while maintaining and mandating a global standard. Although there are many critics, the sound legitimacy of the EITI could be credited to its ability to recreate its relevance to its countries and the extractive sector (Alstine 2017; Fenton and Papyrakis 2017; Graaf, Sovacool, and Andrews 2016).  Mongolia is a young democracy struggling to build its institution. However, the challenges are exacerbated by a strong dependence on mining income, weak policy-making and lack of accountability. The election-cycle of politics poses a barrier to implementing mid and long-term policies, which fuels the discussion around the benefit of natural resources to the general public. The public also perceives strong ties between corruption and mining. Although the people of Mongolia are increasingly connected on the internet through different platforms, mobile phone, smartphone and social media, this connectivity can have an adverse 55  impact. The public perception is vulnerable to information fatigue, and only the stories of extremity could, therefore, have the potential to be heard.  The vulnerable and deteriorating ecology of Mongolia adds another dimension to the system’s context, as these environmental changes threaten the traditional lifestyle of herding. The stories of environmental degradation, loss of livelihoods and demagoguery politics fuel public outrage and often targets the extractive sector as the source of problems, despite the sector’s contribution to the national economy.  All in all, the system context presents a highly uncertain environment, given the volatile resource-dependent economy, unstable legislative environment, and political changes. Despite the potential of the system context, its uncertainty can pose degree of challenges. However, EITI also offers incentives to its members to engage in the initiatives on a continuous basis, because there is not any other institutionalized platform which these stakeholders could engage formally. In the social context, transparency is proposed as the best treatment for corruption (Collier 2007; Öge 2016; Warner 2013)– however, despite the maturity of the EITI and disclosure, the perception of corruption in Mongolia is holding strong root. 56  Chapter 5: EITIM Institutional Design – Descriptive Analysis  5.1 Introduction  In the effort to create a systematic overview of the institutional design of EITIM, this research adopts the case study framework set forward in the book Multi-stakeholder Process for Governance and Sustainability (Hemmati 2002). This book is one of the early books, which examined the collaborative initiative as a mechanism to overcome the challenges of sustainability, by engaging stakeholders in a new form of communication and decision-finding process.  The descriptive method of a case study on collaborative governance consists of three parts: 1. general information, 2. procedural aspects and 3. structural design. Each part has a set of characteristics, to diagnose the collaborative initiative as an aspired design of a collective initiative (Table 4).  Table 5. Descriptive analysis checklist  General Information Procedural aspects Structural Design 1. Name 2. Issues 3. Objectives 4. Participants 5. Scope 6. Time lines 7. Contact details/URL 1. Designing the multi- stakeholder process 2. Identifying stakeholders 3. Identifying participants 4. Setting the goals 5. Setting the agenda 6. Setting the timetable 7. Preparatory process 8. Communication 9. Dealing with power gaps 10. Decision-making/ procedures of agreement 1. Institutional back-up 2. Facilitation 3. Documentation 4. Relating to non- participating stakeholders 5. Relating to the general public 6. Linkage into official decision-making 7. Funding 57   11. Implementation 12. Closure  Source: Adopted from Minu Hemmatti (2002)  5.2 The case of EITIM  Issues: International standard of transparency applied at the national context to reduce negative impacts of mining and increase accountability by stimulating public debates thus strengthening policy decisions.  Objectives: The objective of the EITIM was to implement the EITI standards (rules as previously known until 2016). The objectives of abiding to the international standards were to mitigate measures of resource curse and increase foreign direct investment.  The national stakeholders (civil society organizations, company representation and government officials) quoted different visions based on the nature of their interests. In 2015, however, the vision was defined through an interactive-facilitated workshop as follows:  “To increase the accountability of the stakeholders and strengthen good governance in spending and investing the income from the minerals sector (mining, oil and gas) for the good of the public by disclosing it.” (source EITIM website - https://eitimongolia.mn/en)  Participants: Three multi-stakeholder groups at the national level, the National Council and Multi-Stakeholder Working Group, and sub-national committees consisting of different government agencies, industry representatives and associations, and a variety of civil society organizations with equal representation from each constituency. A coordinating body, the EITIM secretariat comprised of a team of four people also participated. 58  Timelines: In October 2005, a Joint Session of Standing Committees of State Great Hural (Parliament) on budget and economy supported Mongolia’s possible adherence to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and instructed the Government to join this initiative (EITIM 2017). The Government approved adhesion to EITI at their cabinet meeting and issued Resolution #1 in January of 2006. Mongolia achieved compliant country status in 2009 and as of December 2017, Mongolia issued its 11th Reconciliation Report. The current funding of the EITIM secretariat and its activities comes from the Trust Fund of World Bank, which will expire in December 2018. The draft law of EITI was submitted to the Parliament of Mongolia (which facilitates the EITI secretariat budget to transfer to the Mongolian Government’s budget) however due to the change of parliament during the 2016 election, the draft law was not discussed and was withdrawn.   2006  o January - The Government approved adherence to EITI at their Cabinet meeting. o March - Multi-Stakeholders’ Working Group (MSWG), which has the ability to implement EITI, was established. o July - Amendment to Minerals Law of Mongolia (48.10) mandating companies having licenses to disclose and publish paid taxes and payments  2007  o March - Government Resolution #80 endorsed and defined functions and responsibilities of government institutions in relation to EITI o April - Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding signed o April - The EITI reporting templates numbers 1-4 were endorsed by joint order of Chairman of National Statistical Committee and Minister of Finance. o June – Mongolia EITI Secretariat was established by the Prime Minister under Decree No. 62, and given the role of day-to-day coordination of EITI o October - Mongolia has designated as Candidate Country   o May - Produced first Mongolia EITI Reconcilation report.   2008  2009 59  o December - The EITI Validation was undertaken by a consortium led by Coffey International Development in association with Dalaivan Audit LLC.  2010  o June - The Mongolia EITI mid-term strategy 2010-2014 was endorsed by National Council. o October - Mongolia achieves Compliant Status by the transparency standard EITI   o March - At the 5th EITI Global Conference held in Paris, France in March,  reporting  2012  o 2012 Annual Workplan developed. o July - Resolution #222, endorsed by the Government of Mongolia on July 4, 2012, which gives clear specification of which functions and tasks are assigned to state central and local administrative bodies.  2013  o 2013 Annual Workplan developed. o August to November - Mongolia EITI Secretariat organized four "EITI Regional Conferences" at Khovd, Khentii, Darhan-Uul aimags and Ulaanbaatar. The conferences were attended by over 600 local representatives and it covered 20 out of 21 aimags.  2014 o 2014 Annual Workplan developed. o e-Reporting system was developed with the support of EBRD and Adam Smith International o Draft law on Transparency of Mineral Resources Sector submitted to Parliament.  o 2014 Implementation Report published. o 2015 Annual Workplan developed. o e-Reporting system launched and 922 companies send their 2014 report electronically. o EITI 1st National Forum was organized.  o 2015 Implementation Report published. o 2016 Annual Workplan developed. o February – 7th Global Conference of EITI Mongolia was awarded with the EITI Chair’s Award for its improvements in making data available. o Draft law on Transparency of Mineral Resources sector was withdrawn due to the change in parliament as a result of parliamentary election. o October The EITI Second Validation Report was published with 17 recommendations to the secretariat EITI.  2011 Mongolia received the Chair’s Awards for consistent improvement in EITI  2015  2016 60   2017 o January - Roadmap for Beneficial Owners Disclosure 2017-2020 o September – Government issued a resolution addressing some activities in ensuring the EITIM. This document also commits the Government of Mongolia to including the budget of the subnational EITI committee lines in the Government’s 2019 Budget. o The Draft Law of Mining of Mongolia is being proposed. Some provisions regarding the extractive sector transparency are included in the new draft law.    5.3 Procedural Aspects  Designing of the procedure: The national council, the multi-stakeholder group is designated to design the process of EITI Mongolia within the boundaries set forward by the EITI Standard 2016 (previously known as rules). EITI Standard 2016 governs the oversight by a multi- stakeholder group, disclosure on matters of the legal and institutional framework, exploration production, revenue collection and allocations, social and economic spending, outcomes and impact along with the compliance and deadlines.  Identifying the issues: Following discussion at parliament in late 2005, government agreed to adhere to EITI principles on the basis that, first of all, greater transparency would prevent potential corruption (and resource curse) in Mongolia, and secondly, it could be a valuable tool in attracting foreign investment in Mongolia’s mining sector. The Majority of EITIM targets, such as the establishment of sub-national committees, e-reporting systems, and beneficial ownership standards came from the EITI International Office.  Identifying relevant stakeholders: Three broad categories of stakeholders are identified: 1. the governments and their agencies, 2. extractive industry companies, service companies and 3. civil society. These categories are the founding members of the multi-stakeholder process governed 61  by EITI Principles. Other stakeholders, such as multilateral organizations, financial organizations, investors and non-governmental organizations were also invited to participate the meetings. Initially, EITIM involved stakeholders such as Mongolian Professional Association of Accounting, Association of Geology, and Employers Union in the initiative. Over time the stakeholder group has evolved, and these original organizations were removed.  Identifying participants: Each constituency identifies the members which to represent the constituency in the EITIM. The Mongolian Mining Association coordinates the company constituency membership, the Publish What You Pay Coalition of Mongolia manages civil society constituency membership and Government Constituency is organized by the Prime Minister’s office.  Setting the goals: The EITIM has formulated two different mid-term plans. The first is the Mid- term Strategy 2010-2014, which pledged for full adherence of the EITI principles and proposed building legal formalization of EITI through adaptation of EITI law in Mongolia. The second mid-term document is the Roadmap for Beneficial Owners Disclosure within the EITI standard 2017-2020. The goal of this document is “to increase general public monitoring and owners’ accountability through disclosing Beneficial Owners of a corporate entity(is) that bid for, operate or invest in the extractive sector.” With respect to short-term goals, the EITIM has developed annual action plans. For the purposes of this research, the last five annual plans (2012-2017) were accessible. These plans delegate activities to the National Council, Working Group, their sub-committees and Secretariat and the last two reports (2015, 2016) contains Mongolia specific slogans, calling to build capacities of the subnational committees or increase awareness of the disclosed information in the public. 62  Setting the agenda: EITIM has been guided by their action plans, which all the constituencies have agreed to implement at the level of the national council, working group, sub-groups, EITIM sub-national committees, and secretariat. There are activities planned for in the annual plans from 2015 and 2016 that were not implemented for reasons of finance, resources, and time. For instance, the plan execution was rated as 65% in 2016 and major activities which were not completed were transferred to the year 2017.  Setting the timetable: There is a deadline to produce a reconciliation report, declared by the EITI International Secretariat. As well, the EITI International Secretariat carries out scheduled “validations” to see whether the countries are operating at the level of the international standard set forth. As for the EITIM National Council meeting and EITIM Working Group, meetings have a relatively irregular schedule and the annual action plan is developed by contributions from each constituency.  Communication: EITIM uses a variety of communication platforms to reach out to its internal and external stakeholders. This includes: email, telephone, social media (Facebook page, Twitter, and Flickr) and face-to-face meetings. Also, EITIM distributes a newsletter monthly via email to over 400 subscribers and uses SMS broadcast system to share important messages. The EITIM website is updated and regularly maintained to communicate, update, inform, and probe the stakeholders for action. The EITIM website and the data portal, and its regular communications, also serve as an archive of extractive industry transparency, enlisting data from 2006 to present. Implementation: EITIM is a implementation-driven initiative. The reporting takes place at the national and sub-national level. The rate of implementation in the stream of disclosure is significantly high. For example, the reconciliation reports present sector coverage of 97.9% in 63  2015, 98.8% in 2014 and 97.3% in 2013. The quality of reporting is regarded as high by the EITI International secretariat as it contains thorough reports like environmental rehabilitation and social expenditures (Combe 2010).  Closure: The EITI International Secretariat does not have a fixed closure date; however, the closure condition is that the “secretariat should remain open until it is no longer required.” There is an ongoing discussion at the EITI International Secretariat as to whether the countries that produce reliable, timely, comprehensive report should be excused or “graduate” from producing specific EITI reports (Rich and Moberg n.d.). Mongolia’s prospect of graduating from the EITI reporting is possible, considering its relative positive recognition by the EITI. However, the closure of EITIM could be imposed earlier if funds required to run the initiative run out. As well, Parliament’s failure to pass the draft law on Extractive Industry means that the EITIM Secretariat in Mongolia is on a “life-support” fund from World Bank, ending in December 2018. Beyond the issues of funding, the structure, obligations, and mechanisms which were to enforce transparency were all included in the draft law of Extractive Industry Transparency Law.  5.4 Structural Aspects  Institutional back-up: EITIM Secretariat facilitates the process in consultation with the Mongolian Prime Minister and his senior advisor, as well as all the other constituencies. However, due to the constant change of Prime Ministers and staff, the EITIM Secretariat is not well positioned to leverage sustained support and advocacy in the policy arena. Perhaps, significant proof of weakened support from government is that the draft law of EITIM was not passed. Despite being submitted and passed during the first reading at the Standing Committee of the Economy in 2015, the draft law was not discussed at parliament until the 2016 election. In 64  addition, government participation in the consultation process is rated as “inadequate” according to findings from the 2016 Validation Report.  Facilitation: The Prime Minister of Mongolia heads up the EITIM National Council and its meetings. The Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister chairs the EITIM Multi-Stakeholder Working Group (MSWG) and members have equal opportunity to speak. The EITIM Secretariat administers duties for these meetings and are often asked to answer questions related to the functions of the EITIM.  Documentation: The growing sophistication of planning and reporting indicates the EITIM’s institutional stability. In 2010, the EITIM produced a mid-term strategy for 2010 to 2014. Since 2012, the EITIM has produced an annual work plan with specific deliverables, output and expected goals the institution hopes to achieve for the year. As well, since 2014, the EITIM reports on the work plan execution. In addition, the EITIM Secretariat publishes the meeting minutes providing further transparency and credibility to the process. All related documents (e.g. annual work plan, activity reports, summary reports of the EITI reconciliation reports, full reconciliation reports, EITIM related legislative documents, government resolutions, prime minister’s decree) are accessible through the EITIM website (https://eitimongolia.mn/en) .  Non-participating stakeholders: First, non-participating stakeholders can access the meetings of the National Council and the MSWG by request or by invitation. There are cases of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in Mongolia, officials from National Statistics Office of Mongolia, and different development aid organizations participating in the meetings. However, the formalized process in which the non-participating stakeholders can express their interest and attend the meetings of the EITIM were not traceable in the documents reviewed. 65  Second, non-participating stakeholders can access information. All 11 reconciliation reports (full and short versionsof the reports are avaliabme in English and Mongolia) from 2006 to 2017 and extensive data about the mining industry (i.e. number of licenses the companies hold, the amount of tax paid in specific lines, and amount of the mineral resources extracted) are all accessible through the EITIM’s e-portal and website in Mongolian and in some cases in English.  Third, the focus of the EITIM and a sub-national committee was to increase awareness at local level. As a result, many scheduled workshops and open days were organized to reach out to the non-participating stakeholders, i.e., local communities, media, and public.  In general, information produced by EITIM is publicly available and accessible to other non- participating stakeholders, and the objective of EITIM is to stimulate public discussion on the reports. thus, informing and strengthening the policy regulating the extractive industry.  Relating to the public: Information is prepared in visual forms, such as infographics, charts, and graphs to inform the public and induce dialogue and discussion on the governance of revenues paid to the governments from the extractive industry sector. The National Forum was organized in 2016 to engage non-participating stakeholders and the public. Although, EITIM reports were established as a main data source and frequently cited in studies conducted on the extractive sector in Mongolia, the record of public debate and its potential impact on policy changes could not be found at this stage.  Linkage into official decision-making: The EITIM is linked to the official decision-making process through the Prime Minister’s office. The major decisions of the National Council are formalized through Government’s resolution or Prime Minister’s decree. Duties are then 66  delegates to the ministries and government agencies. A more strategic effort to link the EITIM into government decision-making was proposed in the Draft Law on EI; unfortunately, it has not been successfully passed in Parliament. However, in the Draft Law of Mining (2017), some provisions of EI transparency are included. Although the current Minerals Law (2006, amended 2014) contains transparency and obligations of companies to report, there is not a regulation to sufficiently enforce these specific provisions.  Funding: The Government of Mongolia funded five Reconciliation Reports (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015), with funding totalling 925.5 million MNT. In addition, the Mongolian government issued Resolution #263 issued in 2017), which dictates that the subnational committees of EITIM must be included in the local government’s budget lines from 2019. However, the EITIM Secretariat expenses (fixed and non-fixed) are funded by the World Bank since 2006, which expires in December 2018.  5.5 Summary of EITIM Institutional Design – Findings  Evaluating the on-the-ground experience of EITIM against the Minu Hematti’s descriptive analysis checklist has provided a good starting point, as it offers a systematic overview, identifying the challenges and strength of the institutional design with respect to the initiative’s procedure, structure, and of the case.  Finding 1: Ownership  In 2015, EITIM multi-stakeholder group formulated the change theory, which is significant evidence of process ownership. The EITIM is implementation-driven in nature; therefore, having a theory of change serves as a shared vision and shows maturity of the process ownership. 67  Finding 2: Leadership  The leadership, in the case of EITIM, is the Prime Minister of Mongolia, who plays an important role. In analyzing this initiative using the descriptive analysis framework (Hemmatti), facilitation, linkage into official decision-making, and institutional back-up call into question the commitment of the Prime Minister and other stakeholders’ leadership. Even though the legal enforcement of companies to report is weak, the great majority of companies submit their reports and cooperate in reconciliation. This is also the case for the government organizations. Through a decree and resolution from the Mongolian government, line ministries are also mandated to participate and engage in the multi-stakeholder initiative. Therefore, the Prime Minister’s office does play an important role in the success of the initiative, give it strong linkage into to the official decision-making body and institutional support. The Prime Minister office’s commitment also plays a significant role in the legitimacy of the initiative, and how it appears to both internal and external audiences. According to the 2016 EITI Validation Report of Mongolia, state participation in the Initiative was rated “inadequate”, potentially the trust and ownership of the initiative.  Finding 3: “Funding” and “Closure”  As part of the EITIM Mid-Term Strategy 2010-2014, the Law on Transparency of Extractive Sector was drafted and submitted to parliament in 2015. This draft law had articles which legalized the EITIM. The draft was withdrawn in 2016 due to the parliamentary election and subsequent change of parliament. This legislation would have ensured that the budget of the EITIM Secretariat would be included in the government budget. Since the establishment of the EITIM secretariat in 2007, fixed and non-fixed expenses (office, salary, workshop and other 68  activities) were funded by the IFIs, such as World Bank, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, and International Financial Corporation. As previously established, current funding of the EITIM Secretariat from the World Bank will conclude on December 31, 2018. The Secretariat is a four-person structure which is responsible for the necessary coordination, communication (website, social media), planning and many of the implementation of initiative’s activities.  Considering this uncertainty, the matter of “closure” surfaces. This notion could weaken the commitment of the multi-stakeholders, and thus their ownership of the initiative. 69  Chapter 6: Performance Productivity Findings  6.1 Introduction  The objective of the EITI or any collaborative governance initiative is to make a change, meaning produce a positive outcome. The question of how to measure and outcome and what to measure is an interesting topic of discussion, especially in the context of collaborative governance or complex system realm. It is also the objective of my research.  The challenges of evaluating the outcomes or the “results on the ground” of a collaborative governance initiative are a big topic of discussion and come with many questions (i.e. who should evaluate, how should the initiative be evaluated, and what should be evaluated?). There does not seem to be a single answer to these questions, although all seem to agree that collaborative governance initiative outcomes should be evaluated regardless (Ansell and Gash n.d.; Conley and Moote n.d.; Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh n.d.; Hemmati 2002). These challenges and questions about outcome are relevant to the EITI and its member countries.  Although there are many studies evaluating the EITI against its declared objectives, there is a great deal of debate as to the use of specific methodology and varying data, spurring questions of validity and accuracy of the results of those researchers (Oge 2016; Rustad, Le Billon, and Lujala 2017). In the absence of agreed-upon measurements of outcome in the academic field, I am referencing and adopting the indicators from the “Process and Outcome Indicators” which was commissioned by EITI Board in 2009 (EITI 2010).  The “Process and Outcome Indicators” propose to measure EITI indicators at three levels: output, outcome and impact levels, as shown in Table 5. 70  Table 6. EITI indicators at three levels  Level Output Outcomes Impact – Big picture Indicators 1. Publications, including website, notes, and reports; 2. Validation reports reviewed; 3. Reconciliation reports reviewed; 4. Meetings organized; 5. # of people trained; 6. # of countries visited; 7. Disclosure Revenues a. # of EITI reports b. # of EITI reports with disaggregated information c. Sector coverage (percentage) d. The regularity of EITI disclosure e. Compliance participating in EITI Reporting 1. # of compliant countries 2. # of candidate countries 3. # of supporting companies 4. # of supporting investors 5. # of supporting countries 6. # of completed validations 7. Communications and awareness raising a. Users of EITI website b. Articles published about EITI c. References of EITI in articles, news items, and blogs. d. Subscribers to EITI’s newsletter 8. Reporting a. # of reports b. Sector coverage c. Regularity in EITI disclosure d. Companies participation 1. Disclosure Index Measure from WBDBR 2. Credit Ratings 3. World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 4. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 5. UNDP Human Development Index 6. UN GINI coefficient 7. GDP growth 8. Global Integrity Indexes (specific four scores) 9. Open Budget Index 10. Freedom in the World Report by Freedom House Note: highlighted indicators were adopted for the research  In picking the indicators which were applicable to our case, a matrix was developed to capture the output level of indicators. At the outcome level a qualitative examination of those output indicators was embraced. Under the big picture indicator, a longitudinal data was used to develop a graph of the indicators to examine, compare, and contrast trends. At the output level, a quantitative examination of documents and meetings published from the EITIM was completed, as captured in the Table 7, Output Indicator of EITIM from 2006 to 2017. The outcome level of assessment examines the quality of the reconciliation reports, in particular assessing the reporting gap between the companies and governments, as well as the number of 71  companies that are reporting and are reported by government. The highlighted big picture indicators in Table 6 were used to assess whether the collaborative initiative had any impact on “moving the needle” in a positive direction. 6.2 Output productivity  1. Findings: Maturity  Evaluating the performance productivity at the output level (Table 7) shows the EITIM’s institutional maturity and its adaptability, as the EITIM met all reporting requirements and implemented all standards, as the EITI International Standards expanded and changed. For instance, the EITIM has produced nine reconciliation reports since 2008, gone through two scheduled validation processes, produced five annual plans since 2012 to 2017, and has been reporting on its implementation of activities since 2014. Also, since the enactment of the initiative, there has been regular face-to-face dialogue at the Multi-Stakeholder Working Group level with a minimum of 2 meetings and maximum of 6 meetings annually. At the National Council level, at least one meeting took place each year with the exception of 2014, where there was not a single meeting held at that level.  2. Findings: Weakening Leadership commitment  For the 4-year period from 2013 to 2016, there were not any resolutions or decrees issued by the Government of Mongolia and the Prime Minister’s office. Although, there were changes related to the EITI membership, which were formalized through a decree or resolution prior to 2013 or after 2016. The absence of these documents could indicate a lack of commitment from the Prime Minister and Prime Minister’s office during this period. 72  Table 7. Performance productivity at output level          #  Year  Reconciliation Reports  Validation reports  Short term plan  Report on implementation  Medium term plan  Government Resolution  Prime Minister Decree National Council Meeting Working Group Meeting 0 2017 - - Yes - Yes R-263 D-142 1 3 1 2016 Yes Yes Yes Yes NA NA NA 1 3 2 2015 Yes NA Yes Yes NA NA NA 3 3 3 2014 Yes NA Yes Yes Yes NA NA 0 2 4 2013 Yes NA Yes NA Yes NA NA 1 5 5 2012 Yes NA Yes NA Yes R-222 D-62 2 5 6 2011 Yes NA NA NA Yes NA NA 1 3 7 2010 Yes NA NA NA Yes R-190 NA 2 5 8 2009 Yes Yes NA NA NA R-84 D-28 1 6 9 2008 Yes NA NA NA NA NA NA 2 5 10 2007 NA NA NA NA NA R-80 D-62 1 3  11 2006 NA NA NA NA NA R1, R296 D33; D115  1  2 6.3 Outcome Productivity  1. Findings: Reconciliation Reports shows success and threat to the collaboration  In March 2011, Mongolia was awarded an EITI Chair’s Award for making consistent improvements in its reporting. In the 2010 Reconciliation Report, the gap between the company and the government reporting has come to 0.3 million MNT from 4 million in 2006 (see Figure 11). While this gap gradually increased, the number of companies that started reporting has significantly increased. 73  EITI Reconciliation Gap (MNT in Million) ₮ 4,000.0 ₮ 775.0 ₮ 420.0 ₮ 360.9 ₮ 581.0 ₮ 112.0 EITI # of company reporting 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Mineral license holding companies registered with the State Number of companies that Government Reported on Numer of companies submitted report Figure 12. Reconciliation gap between government and company reporting                  ₮ 58.1 ₮ 0.3 ₮ 75.0  ₮ 37.0  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Gap 2012 2013 2014 2015   There was a significant increase in the number of companies being reported on and reporting in 2012 (see Figure 12). The gradual decline since 2012, the companies reporting should be taken seriously as it indicates a threat to the collaborative process. Figure 13. Number of companies registered, reporting and reported by government               2. Findings: Validation report confirms the lack of leadership and threat of suspension of compliant country status 74  The validation process is an important part of ensuring the EITI International Standard is met on- the-ground: “The process aims to provide an independent assessment of the progress achieved in implementing the EITI and what measures (are) required to make better and faster progress” (Combe 2010). Two validations of the process have been conducted under different regulations, one under the EITI rules (2010) and the other was conducted under the new validation guide as approved by the EITI board in 2016. The last validation assessment was not satisfactory; secondary assessment and corrective measures are required.    In the first validation, Mongolia was assessed to have completed all EITI International Standard, as deemed by an independent validator.  Figure 14. EITIM First Validation by EITI Secretariat (2010)   The second scheduled validation was conducted in 2016 and was concluded by the EITI Board in January 2017. According to the EITI Board’s decision, Mongolia did not make satisfactory 75  progress on 10 of the 34 requirements; and therefore, was asked to implement corrective measures and go through a second validation, commencing on January 11, 2018.  In the second assessment, the International Secretariat noted that “the early stages of the EITI in Mongolia were characterized by momentum and inclusiveness. More recently, particularly since 2012, attendance by designated MSWG and National Council members has been less consistent” and lacking engagement from the Prime Minister at National Council and Prime Minister’s Senior Advisor at the MSWG. The attitude of the leadership was questioned since hostile, undermining exchanges took place earlier in the MSWG meeting (meeting in April 2014). It was decided that Mongolia’s EITI compliant country status would be suspended if the EITIM did not make satisfactory progress with considerable improvements on the ten requirements which were assessed poorly ((Group 2016)  6.4 Big Picture Indicators  The Big Picture Indicators are a means to assess whether the change theory of the EITI and EITIM meets the expected results. It is to be warned that these national rankings and indicators are often a culmination of a web of issues and could not be a direct result of a single event or process. The indicators enlisted in the EITI outcome and process were collected for the period of EITI establishment in Mongolia in 2006 up until 2016 and 2017 and where the data was available.  1. Findings: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, World Bank  There are three main dimensions examined in the transparency, accountability, and corruption of the public sector: 1. Accountability of the executive to oversee institutions and of public 76  employees for their performance, 2. Access of civil society to information on public affairs and 3. State capture by narrow vested interests. The objective of the EITI Reconciliation Report aims to reduce corruption by disclosure from both government and company, which then will be assessed by the independent auditor. Therefore, the indicators of transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector aligns with the mandate of the EITI.  The second “Big Picture” indicator is: Macroeconomic management assesses the monetary, exchange rate and aggregate demand policy framework. Although the sub-objective of EITIM is to increase foreign investment to the national economy, there is not any evidence that EITI played a significant role in attracting and attaining investment to the country. Therefore, this indicator is not well-suited in establishing the cause and effect of the EITIM.  The third indicator is: equity of public resource use to assess the extent to which the pattern from public expenditures and revenue collection affects the poor and is consistent with national poverty reduction priorities. Although, the findings from the Reconciliation Report include creating public awareness of better resource management, there are no records that indicate public debate impacts wealth distribution decisions. 77  Figure 15. Mongolia Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)   The EITI indicator specifies three CPIA Macroeconomic management, Equity of Public Use and Transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public-sector ratings. Interestingly, these three indicators tell a conflicting story (see Figure 14). Mongolia’s score of all indicators decreased, increased, and plateaued from 2006 to 2016. The assessment of Mongolia’s transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector indicated progress, improving from 2.5 to 3.5 over the 10 years of EITI implementation. The strengthened scores were maintained for four years in the first increase, and six years in the second increase. However, Mongolia’s macroeconomic management rating contradicts this progress, as the score in this area decreased from 4.0 to 3.0. Conversely, the country’s Equity of Public Use rating has increased by 0.5 from 3.0 to 3.5 in the years 2006 to 2007; the score stayed the same for the next ten years.  2. Findings: Corruption Perception Index - decreased perception of the level of corruption  Mongolia Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 6 5 4 3 2 1 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016  Transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating Equity of public resource use rating Macroeconomic management rating High Low 78  The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is produced annually by Transparency International and ranks the countries “by their perceived level of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys.” In their terms, corruption is defined as “the misuse of public power for private benefit” (Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 Long Methodological Brief 2009). In contrast to the mandate of the EITI, transparency – or disclosure – is used to disinfect the agenda of corruption. Mongolia’s rating has bettered by 8 points, from 2006 to 2017 (see Figure 15). Figure 16. CPI Mongolia from 2006 to 2017                       In the ranking in 2017, Mongolia ranks at 103 out of 180 countries, which the New Zealand tops the list with the score of 89 while Somalia has score of 9 and is ranked in the 180. Although Mongolia’s improvement of the corruption perception score is slow, the positive trend could be comforting. The EITI, through disclosure of government industry transactions within the extractives industry, could positively contribute to the public perception of corruption and ultimately serve the interests of the government and the industry. 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 27 27 27 30 30 28 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 36 38 39 39 38 36 45 40 Mongolia Corruption Perception Index (2006-2017) Least Corrupt Score 100 79  Chapter 7: Process Productivity - Social Network Analysis Findings  7.1 Introduction  The collaborative process is characterized by individual and group behavior, complex dynamics, different motivations, interests, knowledge and uncertainties. This nonlinear, complex, and iterative structure is the heart of collaboration. Thus, any advancement in understanding collaborative process functionality could help to resolve many “wicked problems” human societies are challenged by today.  In analysing the structure of a collaborative process such as the EITIM case, a network analysis approach is adopted. The objective of adopting this analysis method is to examine the network properties of the EITIM Multi-Stakeholder Working Group (MSWG) and explain how and why the network conditions of this case may lead to ongoing successful maintenance and implementation of EITIM. The secondary research question therefore is: What are the characteristics of the EITIM MSWG social network structure? How does it affect the success and maintenance of the EITIM?  Before adding how and why the specific structural properties influence the collaborative governance process and outcome, I will first address “what” is Structural Network Analysis (SNA) and define its properties. 7.1.1 Social Network Analysis – Method and Mechanisms According to Steven Borgatti (2011), “a network consists of a set of actors or nodes along with a set of ties of a specified type that link them.” These “ties interconnect through shared end points to form paths that indirectly link nodes that are not directly tied.” These nodes could be individuals, an organization, community, or groups. The ties or relations among the nodes are 80  examined to identify structural patterns that may be formed among these actors. This is important because the “structural patterns of relations of a social network can have a significant impact on how actors actually behave” (Bodin and Crona 2009)  The following perspectives are of importance when discussing and applying SNA:   Focus on relationships between actors rather than attributes of actors;   The sense of interdependence: a molecular rather atomistic view;   Structure affects substantive outcomes;   Emergent effects (Stephen P Borgatti 2005).  Although in terms of empirical research on natural resources governance, applying quantitative network analysis is under development, the basic tenets embraced in this research come from Bodin & Crona (2009), who reviewed and synthesized the empirical studies of social network structures in natural resources governance. They question: “the role of social networks in natural resource governance: What relational patterns make a difference?” They also explore network properties of the density of relations, the degree of cohesiveness, subgroup interconnectivity, the degree of network centralizations, and mirrored differences in governance processes and outcome.  In explaining the mechanisms of SNA, Borgatti and Foster (2003)developed a two-by-two table explicating two dimensions, explanatory goals, and explanatory mechanisms. The first dimension is a “goal” level, consisting of performance and homogeneity. The performance is evaluative and individual-oriented, whereas the homogeneity stream focuses on the process of social influence. Homogeneity or diffusion study also implicitly inquires how the network changes the actor(s). The second dimension of the mechanism is divided into two: structuralist 81  versus connectionist, referring to the nature of the ties and their functions. The connectionist treats the ties as conduits, whereas the structuralist looks for patterns of interconnection (Borgatti & Foster, 2003).  The difference between these two mechanisms can be exemplified in the research case study: if the EITIM MSWG has a strongly coherent and diverse set of members, then the mechanisms which I draw on to explain is that the diverse set of actors attend the meeting and provides an opportunity for face-to-face dialogue. This should lead to increased trust and knowledge integration, prevent conflict, and promote cooperation. On the other hand, the structuralist mechanism could be used to explain the structural similarities and differences of the EITIM MSWG, and how a group or individual could have similar positions even without any conduits between them. This two-dimensional table could be used for comparing different networks, however, in my research, I use the explanatory goal of diffusion on connectionist mechanisms to explaining the consequences of the network.  Table 8: Typology of research on consequence of network factors   Source: Borgatti and Foster (2003, p6)  By definition, mutual understanding is “joint attention to thoughts, feelings, intentions, and motives between individuals but also between groups” (Scheff 1994). This definition also highlights the importance of solidarity and cohesion in a group. Multiple empirical studies of 82  cohesion and its impacts on collaboration provide evidence that groups with higher cohesion are generally more effective at achieving whatever goals the group adopts (Bodin and Crona 2009; Stephen P. Borgatti and Foster 2003; Hanaki et al. 2007; Leahy and Anderson 2010; Prell, Hubacek, and Reed 2009; Stoll-Kleemann and Welp 2006). Although in literature of collaborative governance, absolute cohesion entails “group think” and “vacuum” , potentially hindering and presenting challenges to innovation, adaptability, and progress (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015.; Markovsky and Lawler 1994). A popular means of conceptualizing and measuring cohesion is through the calculation of cohesive subgroup and utilizing metrics of density (Bodin and Crona 2009).  Secondly, the position of the actor(s) in network structure play an important role in maintaining or hindering the collaborative governance process. There are a few properties which examine the actor’s position in the network, namely centrality, bridge, or whether the actor is in the core or periphery. This position in the network determines the speed, scope, and strength that the actor has over the network (Stephen P. Borgatti and Foster 2003; Stephen P Borgatti 2005; Cross, Borgatti, and Parker 2002).  Table 9. Network properties – their definition and formula  Network concept and formula Definition 83    Density Density compared among the constituencies Density counts how many actual ties exist in a network and expresses this number as a proportion of the potential ties that could exist in a network.  𝑛 ∗ (𝑛 − 1) 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 2  “n” is the number of nodes in the network   𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠      Eigenvector Centrality A central actor is connected to other central actors.  The centrality of each vertex is proportional to the sum of the centralities of its neighbors. 𝐶𝑒 = 1 ∑ 𝑦 𝑐𝑒 𝑖 𝛾  𝑗:𝑗≠𝑖 𝑖,𝑗 𝑗    Radius The radius of a network is the minimum eccentricity over all the actors of the network. Trivially, in a graph G, diam(G) ≤ 2 rad(G). When there is more than one component in a network, its diameter and radius are defined to be infinity.   Diameter The diameter of a network is the maximum eccentricity over all the actors of the network, i.e. the largest geodesic distance in the (connected) network (if the network is not connected, the largest distance is infinity).  The diameter of a network gives the number of steps that are sufficient to go from any node to any other node (i.e. the minimum path length that can connect any pair of nodes in the network).   84  Path length A path is a walk in which each actor (and therefore each relation) in the graph may use at most once 85    Although the process of calculations was automatic from the software program UCINET, acknowledgment of the mathematical rigor of the method following table is presented.   7.1.2 Data Description and Network Boundaries  The question of defining the network boundaries is an important task, which could pose certain challenges as the boundary of the set of actors may be difficult to determine as the social world consists of many (perhaps infinite) links of connection (Wasserman and Faust 1994). In this research, a population was described, and sampling of the network was identified in order to define the boundaries. In identifying the population, the research referred to the structure of the EITI in Mongolia and their current membership. The current EITIM structure is depicted in Figure 16. Figure 17. Structure of the core entities of EITIM  86  There is a great degree of overlap in the membership of National Council and Working Group at the organization level, but the representation differs at the level of the actor. Senior ranking representation from the public service in the National Council is compared to that of the Working Group in Table 10.  Table 10. Number of actors of core entities of EITIM  # Current Structure Actors (members) 1 National Council Total of 30 members, equal participation of each constituency of government, company, and CSOs. 2 Working Group Total of 33 actors, equal participation of each constituency of government, company, and CSOs. 3 Secretariat 5 actors including the coordinator, communications officer, IT expert and financial officer. 4 Sub-national committees 18 sub-committees provinces and one sub-committee in the capital city. 5 Population: 106 actors The main criteria applied in selecting the sampling was based on the roles and responsibilities of the bodies in the structure. According to the Terms of References of each body, it was quickly identified that the Multi-Stakeholder Working Group has the more functional role in maintaining the EITIM compared to the other entities (Table 10). Table 11. Roles and Responsibilities and SNA data of EITIM entities  # Entities Roles and Responsibilities 1 National Council The National Council committed with a duty to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in Mongolia and is the consultative entity with equal representation of Government, Extractive Industries and Civil Society (TOR National Council). 87  2 Working Group Multi-Stakeholders’ Working Group committed to implementing Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and is a democratic constitution consisted of Tripartite (Government, Company, Civil Society) consultative body with functions to prepare, organize, and coordinate the implementation of EITI in Mongolia (TOR MSWG) 3 Secretariat The objective of the Secretariat Office is to ensure preparations for implementation of the basic principles of the initiative, to provide assistance to the National Council and the Working Group in stabilization, and to implement decisions of the Council efficiently and effectively (PM Resolution 81 – Statute of EITI Secretariat of Mongolia). 4 Sub-national committees The sub-council’s purpose is to organize, monitor and regulate the implementation of EITI related laws, international principles and requirements (in their respective local areas) (Charter of the Sub- national council to implement EITI in the local area). 88  Figure 18. MSWG structure as of 2012  The MSWG organizational structure (see Figure 17) shows that it is led by the Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister. The EITIM Secretariat functions as the organization’s secretary and MSWG members have equal representation from the Government, CSO and Industry (Figure 18). Figure 19. 33 MSWG organizational membership since 2012   Chair of the MSWG Senior Advisor to PM Secretary of MSWG Head of EITI secreteriat Members of WG Government (10 orgs) CSOs (11) Industry (11) National Taxation Authority* PMA Anticorruption Agency MoF MoM MoE State Specialized Inspection Agency MRAM Petroleum Authority Parliament Selenge Deputy Governor Government Coordinator of Coalitions of NGOs* Step without borders Ariun Suvraga Transparency Mongolia Responsible Mining Initiatives Il Tod San Center of Human rights and Development Minii Mongoliin Gazar Shoroo Movement Civil Council for Environment Open Society Forum Publish What You Pay Civil Society Organizations Mongolian National Mining Association* Gold Producers Union Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi LLC Baganuur LLC Oyu Tolgoi LLC Boroo Gold LLC Southgobi Sands LLC CGBM LLC Areva Mongol LLC Petro Matad LLC Petrochina Dachin Tamsag LLC Industry Representation 89  7.1.3 Data Visualization and Analysis – UCINET and NetDraw  UCINET is a comprehensive social network analysis software that reads different forms of files, including text and Excel format (S P Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). UCINET was used in this research to explore the identified metrics. The visualization of the network was done using NetDraw (NetDraw 2010), a part of UCINET package.  Network graphs are often two-dimensional and subjective, based on the algorithm that is deployed. In this research, a significant number of graphs were examined to identify a pattern in the EITIM MSWG structure. However, a majority were not included based on their relevance (or lack thereof) to the research question. SNA graphs come with the power of “a thousand words”, making the invisible patterns visible.  7.2 Analysis – Whole Network  The entries of 1 or 0 represent the presence or absence of meeting attendance on 2 two-mode (person verus meetings) meetings. A matrix was created based on the meeting minutes of EITIM MSWG from 2006 to 2017. This matrix consists of 212 actors representing 54 organizations in 42 meetings and stretching over 11 years (see Table 12).  Table 12. The number of individuals and attendance record of each constituencies.        EITIM secretariat plays a key role in coordinating and organizing the meetings of MSWG. There has not been a change of organization or actor in coordinating. With respect to the constituency # Constituency Organizations Individuals Ratio Individual: Org # of Attendance 1 Government 13 94 7.230769 296 2 Industry 23 75 3.26087 214 3 Civil Society 17 42 2.470588 223 4 EITI secretariat 1 1 1 40 5 Total number 54 212 3.925926 773  90  of government, membership has not evolved significantly as the number of the organization represented at MSWG remains at 13. Its membership includes ministries, implementing agencies, local government and cabinet secretariat. However, the number of actors representing one organization on average is 7.23, a significantly higher turnout than the other constituencies. The contrasting qualities of the numbers are interesting features of the EITIM MSWG meetings. The column chart, shown in Figure 19, displays, the attendance of different organizations by meeting. and converted to one-mode data as the analytical interests lies in examining the actors and the relationship.  Figure 20. EITIM MSWG meeting attendance by type of organization   Source: EITIM meeting minutes from 2006 to 2017 91  Figure 21. Spring-embedding representation of a bipartite graph of the 42 EITIMSWG meetings (blue) and actors (red)  Source: EITIM meeting minutes from 2006 to 2017  The visual representation of the EITIM organizational structure (Figure 20) shows a high centrality of few actors in the central of the graph. Many of the actors have attended just one meeting (displayed by red nodes with only one edge).  7.3 Analysis - Network Cohesion  To establish each stakeholder’s cumulative impact on the network cohesion, each constituency’s actors were removed from the network, and their proportion of ties that are presented in the network were calculated (Table 12). The whole network density is calculated as 0.139. By removing the EITIM Secretariat, the network coordinating agency becomes the most contrasting impact on the network. The impact yields a slightly reduced density. However when the EITIM 92  Secretariat is removed, the average path distance increases, meaning traffic within the network will require more travel in distributing information and knowledge. The indicators of radius and diameter also expand without the EITIM secretariat.  Table 13. Network cohesion  Networks measured Density Avg Dist Radius Diameter EITIMSWG network    0.139 2.98 2 4 EITIMSWG network without NCA    0.132 3.008 3 6 EITIMSWG network without GOV    0.156 2.786 2 4 EITIMSWG network without IND    0.149 2.859 2 4 EITIMSWG network without CSO    0.128 2.943 2 4  (Note: NCA stands for network coordinating agency, Gov stands for Government, IND stands for Industry, and CSO is civil society organization)  The government and industry constituencies have a negative impact on the network cohesion. The calculation of network density without the government and industry actors resulted in a higher level of density and less distance for traffic flow in the network. In contrast, the calculation without the Civil Society Organizations (CSO) produced the least dense structure, with density of 0.128. This leads to further examination of each constituency’s cohesion.  Table 14. Cohesiveness metrics of the three constituencies in MSWG.  Constituencies Density Avg Dist Radius Diameter Fragmentation Industry 0.068 3.797 1 10 0.051 Government 0.075 3.417 3 6 0 Civil Society Organizations 0.143 2.458 2 4 0    The metrics of cohesion can be translated to understand where the commitment and ownership of the process lies. This is a critical variable in explaining the success of the collaboration (Ansell 93  and Gash 2015). The comparative metrics of cohesion of each participating stakeholder also have significant implications. The number of ties formed within the industry actors is lowest, whereas civil society organization has the highest number of density, twice denser than that of the government. The government players’ sparse network is affected by constant turnover because of government restructuring and change of political powers. Although this is a factor outside of the collaborative initiative’s control, mitigative measures should be established to maintain the collaboration in a meaningful way. The commitment of the industry, at the general level, needs to be investigated closely as it plays a role in fragmenting the network to a degree.  7.4 Analysis – Individual and Organization Level – Centrality  Centrality measures who occupy a central position in a network. These centrally-located individuals play key roles in dissemination, steering and leading the network (Stephen P Borgatti 2005). Three different centrality measures were produced using UCINET (S P Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). The 11 actors with the highest degree, eigenvector, and “betweenness” centrality are shown in Table 14 below. The cells are color-coded to distinguish the constituencies. The threshold of the cutoff point for individuals was based on a distribution score of Betweenness Centrality 0.01 score. The centrality table (see Table 14) also shows that the actors with the highest scores carry the top position across all three measures. This centrality measure validates our findings that the number of civil society actors is playing a core role in holding together the network; and the EITIM Secretariat (as identified earlier in the density measure) would have the most damage if not present. Another distinct finding is that despite the overall low score of density of the industry actors, there is a presence of industry. Although, further investigation of industry participation in the EITIM SWG is essential, much work could 94  be done in improving the commitment of the industry players. The strong presence of the umbrella organization, Mongolian National Mining Association from the industry assures the fact that it enables internal and external legitimacy in the short term. Table 15. SNA actor level centrality measures of top 11 actors   Names Degree   Names Eigenvect   Names Between 1 Sh. Tsolmon 1  1 Sh. Tsolmon 0.42  1 Sh. Tsolmon 0.21 2 E. Sumiya 0.81  2 E. Sumiya 0.353  2 E. Sumiya 0.12 3 D. Tserenjav 0.643  3 D. Tserenjav 0.299  3 D. Tserenjav 0.077 4 N. Algaa 0.571  4 N. Algaa 0.262  5 B. Batbold 0.074 5 B. Batbold 0.571  5 B. Batbold 0.252  7 N. Bayarsaikhan 0.04 6 N. Dorjdari 0.5  6 N. Dorjdari 0.225  4 N. Algaa 0.04 7 N. Bayarsaikhan 0.476  7 N. Bayarsaikhan 0.223  6 N. Dorjdari 0.033 8 D. Enkhtuya 0.357  8 D. Enkhtuya 0.177  8 D. Enkhtuya 0.022 9 G. Zulai 0.333  9 G. Zulai 0.151  11 B. Narantsetseg 0.014 10 E. Sarangerel 0.31  10 E. Sarangerel 0.139  9 G. Zulai 0.013 11 B. Narantsetseg 0.31  12 D. Sengelmaa 0.137  14 B. Boldbaatar 0.01  (Note: CSO in green, Industry in yellow, Government in Red and EITI secretariat in Blue)  7.5 Summary  The network structure of the EITIM shows that the structure is held together by few actors in its core. The centrality measure shows that there is a representation of each constituency and the EITIM Secretariat plays a strong role in holding together the network. In addition to the EITIM Secretariat, the civil society constituency and civil society organizations have permanent representation at the meetings, thus also playing significant roles in holding the structure together.  Conversely, although at the organization level the government organizations are committed, the high turnover of staff negatively impacts the density of the collaborative process. At the individual level, few government officials are positioned centrally. This positioning impacts the 95  type and amount of information, knowledge, and innovation that would be transmitted through these actors.  The representation from the companies, on the other hand, requires a closer look, as the interests of the company are conveyed by the singuilar Mongolian National Mining Association at the central level. Although the association offers a strong legitimacy, the dependence on one particular individual makes the network and collaboration vulnerable.  The exploration of the SNA and its graph offers unique insights and interceptions for correction if there are specific vulnerabilities. In the case of the EITIM, the constant turnover of the government representation and the low attendance from industry could be strategically remedied to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Although EITIM MSWG would not have control in preventing changes in public servants, they could more effectively bring the new staff into the structure by informing and educating the incoming staff on how to improve the initiatives link to their own decision making and implementation efforts. The comparatively low attendance from the company could be addressed through excercises which could reframe the relevance of the EITIM for the companies especially the leverage of investment prospects. 96  Chapter 8: Convergence of Findings   8.1 Introduction  This thesis considers the overarching research question of how and why the case of the EITIM has been successful in resolving the resource curse. The EITIM is a collaborative governance initiative that holds promise for resolving the wicked problem presented by the resource curse phenomenon. Wicked problems cannot be solved using traditional linear problem-solving, which progresses in order through data gathering, data analysis, solution formulation, and implementation stages (Conklin and Weil n.d.). Wicked problem solving requires an approach that iteratively factors in the progress made in understanding the problem itself. In other words, eloquently put by Canadian scholar Lawrence J. Peter, “some problems are so complex that you have to be highly intelligent and well informed just to be undecided about them.”  There is general agreement in the literature on collective governance, or collective processes, that although theoretically promising, they often fail to deliver desired outcomes in practice (Hanleybrown, Kania, & Kramer, 2012; Ostrom, 2000; Rich & Moberg, n.d.). The discussion of how the collaborative process and its achievements could best be measured is an engaging and interesting one, which this thesis addresses in its research design.  Given the EITIM’s economically, environmentally, politically and socially unstable environment, achieving international recognition, and sustaining political and financial relevance are important denominators of successful collaborative governance in a real world context. Athough arguments could be made that the future prospective of the EITIM’s future is uncertain, 97  these measurable deliverables defined and examined in this research nevertheless justify it as a successful case.  Analysis of the EITM case involves a mixed methods approach, using both qualitative and quantitative measures. The conceptual framework (Chapter 4.6) developed for this research examines collaborative governance from four perspectives: 1. System Context, 2. Institutional Design, 3. Performance Productivity and 4. Collaborative Process to address the research question of how and why the case of EITIM was successful. Adopting these diverse methods enabled this study to triangulate its findings and grant confidence to its conclusions. This section reviews and reflects on each of the four components studied.  8.2 Characteristics of the System Context  The EITIM’s system context examination (Chapter 5:) was twofold, including both the inception and evolution of the EITI into a global standard for extractive industry sector (EITI International Secretariat, 2016), and the country context of Mongolia through the PESTLE lenses.  Characteristic findings of the system context assessment showed that the EITI global secretariat demonstrated strong leadership and ability to renew and maintain the initiative’s relevance in national and subnational levels. These characteristics are important because EITI member countries are diverse, and represent heterogeneous forms of governance, socioeconomic conditions, and geographic and geopolitical representations. Under this logic, examining Mongolia’s specific country context helps pinpoint specific factors within the initiative that influenced its success across such a diverse stakeholder array. 98  Mongolia’s country context appears uncertain. During its 4-year election cycle, competition between political parties contributes to weak policy-making and unstable legislative environments. The constant changes to policies and legislation impact an already vulnerable extractive dependent economy. Social discourse about the extractive industry is often framed using stories of environmental degradation and corruption that are often dismissive of the contribution mining provides to the national economy.  Mongolia’s social dimensions illustrate why the resource curse is characteristic of a wicked problem, presenting challenges of non-linear and interlocked sets of social issues. The Politbarometer perception survey suggests that basic needs of survival, namely unemployment (43.3%) and poverty (15.7%) are in the front and center in the minds of the public (Sumati, 2017). The traditional economic pillar, animal husbandry has been marginalized as a result of climate change, pasture deterioration, overgrazing, and related factors. Migration from rural to urban areas is increasing drastically, which adds further challenges to the social dimension. Although advancements in technology and population connectedness are high, these achievements have not translated into a critical mass of informed citizens on the topic of extractive sector.  8.3 Characteristics of the Institutional Design  “Hemmatti’s (2002) framework was applied to examine the EITIM’s institutional, procedural, and structural design as a mechanism fo deliver the theory of change the organization set forward. Examining the collaborative initiative’s procedural aspects (Chapter 5.3) revealed that the EITIM has a functional set of procedures for the institution to apply in all areas prescribed in the framework. Despite this framework, the structural design examination found that the 99  initiative’s effectiveness was subject to external conditions. In general, characteristics of the EITIM’s institutional design have a strong procedural design for achieving the theory of change. However, the structural design is regularly interrupted by the system context. For instance, frequent political competition and Prime Minister office and staff changes impaired the EITIM’s effectiveness in terms of both available institutional support and quality of facilitation.  The Prime Minister is the senior government body in charge of the EITI, and has the most prominent role in achieving the EITIM’s transformational goal to increase accountability and strengthen revenue management in mining to benefit the public. The withdrawn draft of the Extractive Industry Transparency Law in 2016 is a good example of the influence political context has on the EITIM’s efficacy. The Prime Minister’s constant changes make it hard for the EITIM to sustain the interest, commitment, and support needed for policy making. Even though the draft law was the product of the EITIM mid-term strategy of 2010-2014, made it into parliament, and passed its first reading, it was not passed into legislation.  8.4 Characteristics of the Performance Productivity  Performance productivity was measured by three levels: output, outcome and “big picture” as proposed in the “Process and Outcome Indicator” (EITI, 2010) guideline. The big picture impacts highlight the complex web of interrelated issues and challenges facing performance productivity. For example, three of the proposed set of CPIA of Mongolia indicators have conflicting trends. Macroeconomic ratings decrease, but transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public-sector ratings increase, while equity of public resource use ratings remained between 2006 and 2016. The indicator data was useful in understanding the general trends in Mongolia’s country context; however, it was limited in explaining the EITIM’s 100  contributions because the indicators capture wide array of economic, social and political variables from the context.  On the other hand, output and outcome indicators did contribute to understanding the initiative. The EITIM showed high productivity in completing short-term deliverables, and meeting report deadlines, targets, and plans. In assessing the quality of these outputs, the outcome level of sample indicators suggests that performance productivity is not mechanistic. On the contrary, output quantity does not necessarily translate to qualitative characteristics, even though the EITI’s recommended and mandated standards (EITI International Secretariat, 2016) maintain a high level of the quality throughout the validation process.  However, these findings contribute in understanding the collective performance productivity and strength of the EITIM’s short term productivity and their ability to further the mid-term productivity. On the other hand, the analysis identifies the shortcomings of the initiative, such as the vulnerability of the performance productivity at the outcome level in the faces of the changes in the leadership.    8.5 Characteristics of the Collaborative Process  Positive characteristics of the collaborative process are at the heart of any successful collaborative governance initiative. The SNA method gave a snapshot of the EITIM MSWG structure. Through analyzing attendance at 42 meetings, it was possible to see who shows up for face-to-face dialogue and how frequently – therefore reflecting commitment to the process. In network literature, face-to-face dialogue is said to build trust, respect, understanding, internal 101  legitimacy and commitment (Ansell & Gash, n.d.; Emerson et al., n.d.). While not a sufficient condition for effective governance, it can be argued that face-to-face dialogue is a necessary starting point.  The EITIM MSWG network structure shows both strengths and vulnerabilities. The center is dominated by a handful of individuals. Although each of the three constituencies – government, civil society organizations, and extractive industry companies – are represented, the majority of attendees belong to civil society organizations. At the constituency level, the network analysis thus reveals that civil society organizations form denser structures than the other two constituencies. The extractive industry representation is centralized by the Mongolian National Mining Association, which may be said to speak on behalf of its constituencies and thus have legitimacy among industrial players. The remaining members representing the extractive industry constituency comprise of companies, with specialists primarily in finance and tax.  At first glance, government representation appears to have strong organizational commitment, but this data is likely due to the fact that each organization is mandated to be involved in the EITIM. At the individual level, the structure hangs on 3 individuals, representing the Office of the Prime Minister, the General Taxation Authority and the Mineral Resources Authority. This structure creates vulnerability for mutual trust, understanding, and respect, because these essential criteria hang on only a small number of individuals.  Another key finding was that the EITIM coordinating agency holds a central role in bringing the network together. From the perspective of network governance, the coordinating body is responsible for governing the network and its activities (Provan & Kenis, n.d.). 102  8.6 Summary  In general, the reasons why and how EITIM was a successful case of collaborative governance can be summarized as follows:  1. Institutional maturity: In checking boxes of the institutional design, it was clear that the EITIM have matured the collective process. This conclusion could be triangulated by the collective performance outcomes at the output and outcome level. Specifically, over the years the number of collective outputs increased, more strategic efforts, such as mid-term strategies, were developed, and, in an effort to embed the institution as a relevant governing body, a draft law was made. Although the draft law did not materialize, it could serve as a lesson learned and further optimizations could be conceived and mapped at the strategic level.  2. Leadership: The lead organization or actor assumes the most strategic and practical voice in advancing collective objectives. Weakened commitment from leadership, in this case the Prime Minister of Mongolia, did not hinder collective productivity at the output level, although leadership absence played a significant role at the outcome level. The validation process is considered as the outcome variable, which recorded passive engagement for the government organizations in the EITIM. Poor leadership undermines trust between stakeholders. The Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister, the Chair of the MSWG have said:  “I see the villain is CSO. CSO is a network of non transparency. Why did you establish NGO? I love my country is not an explanation.”  (MSWG Meeting Minute of April 22, 2016) 103  Although such disrespectful language was only occasionally observed in the minutes, there were records of many uncomfortable exchanges involving the CSO. The appointed leadership (Prime Minister) is not permanent, yet it is mandated the political position attitude, and character of these individuals play an important role in facilitating the collaborative process.  3. Ownership: The structure of the collaborative process and its ownership is an important factor in explaining the success of EITIM. The social network analysis revealed that commitment from stakeholders is diverse, and driven by individuals, rather than organizations, at the core. This finding is important because the diffusion of trust, attitude, knowledge, and cooperation is only catalyzed at the human level. Although sustained cooperation from government organizations did not occur at the decision-making level, it was observed at the implementation level. Further investigation could be deployed to inquire whether or not EITI operations are streamlined in the functions of government organizations. Although in the system context, it is no secret that public service positions at the decision-making level are often vulnerable to changes in political cycles, this rotation could also contribute sustained attendance from the government organizations.  4. Legitimacy: Legitimacy ensures the sustainability of a collaborative initiative. The EITIM’s effort and performances are mentioned as playing an important role in corruption prevention and natural resource governance (OECD 2015, NRGI 2015). Their legitimacy is indicated by external perception and recognition of the process by relevant organization, leaders, and the public. In addition to written confirmations, the EITIM has been able to obtain buy-in, attention, and interest from International Organizations. This success is evidenced by the funding support 104  from different IFIs, such as WB, EBRD, ADB, IFC and international donor organizations such as GIZ.  5. Resilience: The EITIM is characteristic of a complex adaptive system, given that it overcame near constant political changes and pooled its efforts in correcting weak areas identified in the validation over a short period. Not only did it overcome these challenges, but the EITIM also actively championed the EITI agenda in Mongolia at the subnational and community level to improve disclosure.  Upon integrating the findings, several factors have emerged that can be said to have contributed to the EITIM’s success. Its current success is maintained through the strong enforcement of the EITI standard by the global EITI secretariat, and the EITIM’s sound institutional design. On the other hand, the vulnerability of the public service to political changes ripples in all examined areas of the EITIM, and limits its progress. Constant changes to the individuals of government organizations, as well as the short cycle of appointments for those who have potential to either reinforce stereotypes or increase antagonism and mutual disrespect are also contributing factors. Therefore, the system context is an important factor in maintaining the progress (or lack thereof) of collaborative governance initiatives when public agencies and public servants are subject to the political changes. 105  Chapter 9: Contribution, Limitation, and Conclusion  9.1 Academic and applied contributions  This research is written for the partial fulfillment of a Master of Applied Science degree. Applied science aims to achieve practical or useful results through the scientific process and operational knowledge. The following sections detail this thesis’ contributions to academia and practice of collaborative governance in extractive industry.  9.1.1 Theory Development Contributions – Resource Curse and Wicked Problem  The paradox that mineral led economies lead to poor development outcomes under certain conditions is an interesting problem for academia and serious challenge for countries affected by this so called “resource curse” phenomenon. Although, a volume of literature is dedicated in understanding and resolving the resource curse, there is no definitive measure of a successful solution. This thesis explicitly proposes that that “resource curse” phenomenon is a “wicked problem”, or, in other words, “a class of social system problems which are ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many clients and decision makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly confusing” (Churchman West 1967). By recognizing the resource curse as a wicked problem, the approach, strategy and expectations for what approaches to take towards resolving the problem shift focus. The major challenge with wicked problems is that linear methods of resolving them are inadequate.  Conklin (1998) argues that traditional problem solving approaches are rooted in a linear and mechanistic view of the universe. In considering the question of what view of the universe should be used to root the wicked problem-solving approach, this research put forward the 106  “emerging worldview” defined by Eric Dent (1999). The emerging worldview emphasizes non- linearity, mutual causality, interdependent and holistic solutions compared to the traditional linear and mechanistic view. After framing the resource curse as a wicked problem, and the emerging worldview as a paradigm for developing and applying solutions, it became possible for the study to move into the discussion of what to do about the wicked problem.  In resolving the wicked problem, three strategies have been proposed: authoritarian, competitive and collaborative (Roberts 2000). The authoritarian strategy proposes to hand over the problem to the hands of the technocracy – or professionals and experts. The benefit of this approach is that many impacted stakeholders would be removed from the problem-solving process, thereby reducing potential disagreements regarding problem definition. The competitive strategy, on the other hand, is to compete for the power base which can enable the winners’ chances to define the problem and address the problem. This approach is often described as win – lose mindset which stimulates power discourse in the politic, economy and society. In this research, the effectiveness of these strategies were deduced based on the case study country of Mongolia.  Over the course of time, Mongolia experienced the authoritarian strategy under communism. However, Mongolia’s transition to democracy in 1990 facilitated a shift in its historical problem- solving framework to a competitive strategy. The efficiency, or rather deficiency, of the competitive strategy in Mongolia is evidenced by the conflicts between political parties fighting for power. During this time, wicked problems were defined and resolutions were attempted differently, such as a pro-mining and anti-mining agenda employed in different political cycles, but still without progress. These competitive political discourses were perceived by the public to be no better than those from the authoritarian regimes in Mongolia, where politicians proposed to 107  centralize political power similarly to its neighbors, Russia and China. Therefore both authoritarian and competitive experiences of Mongolia validates the viscous cycle of why the wicked problem could not get resolved in the cases where the problem is implicated by different stakeholders, different interests and uncommon definition of the problem.  In rationalizing the merits of a collaborative response to resolving wicked problems, Roberts (2000) asserts that a precondition for successful collaborative strategies is that there should have first been a prior failure from the two strategies, authoritarian and competitive. This context creates an environment wherein people learned from the disadvantages of those strategies and thus became willing to try collaboration and be tolerant to the disadvantages of collaboration. Also, the expectation of the collaborative strategy is to better understand and learn the “wicked problem”, and thus it differs from the “tame” problem which can be more easily resolved. In other words, collaborative strategies have qualitative impact, the assessment of the collaborative strategy and initiatives should emphasize both qualitative and quantitative objectives of it – as embraced in the research design.  The research establishes that Mongolia had both the pre-requisites (authoritarian and competitive experience) of dealing with wicked problem thus historically to set the stage for EITIM to be successful. Thus validating the Roberts’ (2000) observations in a real world setting. The implication of this findings also informs the design and implementation of the collaborative governance initiatives against the resource curse – that collaborative governance is an interception if the problem could not be resolved through either technocratic or competitive strategies. 108  9.1.2 Methodological Contributions  The research design including the assumptions, questions, research conceptual framework and methods were chosen to reflect the mutual causality, interdependence, and holism that are characteristic of wicked problems, and thus the resource curse phenomena, as well as appropriate strategies for resolution.  This research advocates for “collaborative governance theory”, rationalizing its alignment with the collaborative strategy as a framework for resolving wicked problems. Although stakeholder theory is a popular lens in the practice of multi-stakeholder initiatives, changing the frame of thinking about wicked problems can be significant in both academia and practice. On the one hand, although stakeholder theory is rooted in diversity its anecdotal motto is to “divide and conquer”. On the other hand, collaborative governance theory aims for transformation, or to “unite and conquer.” The change of focus is important in building a consensus of the problem rather than negotiate the consensus of the problem. Grounded in the theory of choice, the study’s conceptual framework was developed by examining two recent frameworks derived from collaborative governance theory. The conceptual framework embraced both quantitative and qualitative examinations of four components of the collaborative governance initiative: system context, institutional design, performance productivity, and collaborative process. These components were examined in the context of a detailed case study using descriptive analysis, PESTLE analysis, chronology, social network analysis, performance productivity evaluation in the case of the EITIM.  The strength of a mixed method approach is that the findings converge to create a bigger, fuller picture of the phenomenon. In particular, the social network analysis provided unique insight 109  into who maintains the EITIM’s MSWG, and how and why it was successful. The performance productivity evaluation further showed the institution’s maturity over the years, supported by its sound procedural design. Although these components are harmonious in design, the ramifications of a constantly changing political, economic, and social landscape upends the political will and commitment necessary to see them operate effectively.  On their own, these analyses would have significant limitations in examining the wicked problem. The mixed method design creates a better integrated picture of the resource curse phenomenon that future research can rely on to develop new solutions to the wicked problem.  9.1.3 Practical Contributions  Examining the EITIM through the lens of collaborative governance theory (Ansell & Gash, n.d.) in the context of the wicked problem shifts the assessment from how it is not delivering against its idealistic objective to its quality as a collaborative process. Much of the existing literature on EITI is based on a linear mechanistic view that seeks to correlate the EITI’s implementation to the issues of corruption and policy making (Adivilah 2017; Magno and Gatmaytan 2017; Phillips and Whiting 2016; Rita et al. 2016; Rustad, Le Billon, and Lujala 2017; Sturesson and Zobel 2015). This thesis is therefore unique in seeking to understand the reasons behind the success of EITIM as a collaborative governance process.  10.2 Limitations and Further Research The discussion of the limitations of the research is staged into three points of the research process. First, the data collection process is addressed in strengthening and enriching the study, compliment the secondary source of data with primary source of data. Secondly, the extent of the data analysis and different methods which are identified to strengthen and direct the future 110  research. Thirdly, the generalization process could benefit from additional comparative cases to develop theory.   9.2.1 Data source  A general limitation of this study is that research is based on secondary sources of data. Therefore, the data may not represent all populations of the research because majority of it was produced by the EITIM or partner organizations which may challenge its validity. This limitation was addressed throughout the research process (reflected in Chapter 4.5)  In the earlier phase of the research, the researcher took part in the multidisciplinary team investigating global practices of EITI’s local applications which was presented to the EITIM in the May of 2015. Another opportunity to engage directly with participants of the EITIM took place during the summer of 2017 through the discussions with EITIM communications officer B. Delgermaa, during her fellowship at the University of British Columbia.  During the final stage of research, results were presented to the EITIM aiming to validate and receive feedback on the research. The event held on March 23, 2018 was attended by eight persons representing seven organizations including the EITIM secretariat, civil society, industry representation and international organizations. There was a strong consensus on the findings which gives the author confidence in the overall conclusions. Most notably, attendees confirmed that civil society organizations are indeed dominant in the meetings, that constant changes in the individuals representing government organization create challenges for the collaborative process and the significance of few individuals in the success of the initiatives. 111    9.2.2 Data analysis  The mixed-method research design yeilded a comprehensive data analysis that was triangulated with theoretical and case study analysis findings. However, the study’s breadth limited its methodological depth. This was especially the case for the SNA used to investigate the dynamics of the collaborative process. Although 10 years of meeting minutes were used, their data was conflated into a single network, therefore neglecting the influence of time. During analysis, an attempt was made to correlate changes in network structure with the attainment of specific outcomes, namely increased transparency and award attainment of awards; however, these attempts did not reveal significant findings. It was concluded that it may not be possible or logical to attempt to correlate outcomes with changes in the network. The complexity of the collaborative process itself may mean there is a delay in how changes in network structure contribute to changes in achievement that would not be observable using SNA.  One way to improve the SNA would be to apply Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM) (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) to analyze the dataset longitudinally. This approach would allow network change hypotheses to be tested. While considered, ERGM not pursued because it would have changed the research focus to understanding which factors lead to changes in network structure, whereas the objective of this thesis was to identify which network features contributed to the EITIM’s success. The SNA could also have been improved with primary data collection that could directly measure relationships between actors with respect to ‘trust,’ ‘respect,’ and ‘mutual understanding’, for example, rather than using meeting attendance as a proxy. 112  When presenting the findings of this research to the EITIM and affiliated stakeholders, interesting directions for future research were identified in relation to the SNA analysis. The SNA results triggered debates within the audience on whether the EITIM’s membership of civil society organizations should change or not. The general conclusion was that civil society organizations were key to preventing the high turnover of individuals representing government organizations and the initiative’s loss of industry attendance.  An interesting line for future research could thus be to consider what type of network is the most desirable for EITIM success. Although there is no perfect network structure in natural resource management settings, previous studies have identified the role of social networks (Bodin and Crona 2009). According to Bodin and Crona (2009) study, network density, degree of cohesiveness, subgroup interconnectivity and degree of network centralization all had effects on the governance process. The best way to test the most desirable structure for EITIM success would be to analyze the network over time, or to compare the network with another EITI process.  The possibility of a comparative case study was suggested by a member of the EITIM Secretariat who proposed that a comparative case of EITI in the Philippines would be interesting due to its similar abundance of mineral resources, developing status, and democratic government. The Philippines was also the first successful country to have passed the EITI’s validation (Mongolia was the second country to pass the EITI validation). This kind of study would compare the differences and similarities of network structure between the two initiatives. It would also be based on primary data to understand how and why those structures help to harness the mutual trust, respect, understanding and integrated knowledge that characterize the collective process. 113  9.2.3 Case Study  One of the major limitations of a single case study is that developing theoretical generalizations raises questions of validity. This concern is reduced through the increased internal validation that triangulating different methods, including feedback from the EITIM, provides. However, the question of generalization to other cases is a long-standing challenge in case study methodology, especially when utilizing a limited number of cases (Yin 2009). Despite these limitations, the study findings could transfer to other politically uncertain, developing democracies, and help those countries, or practitioners involved in planning and designing relevant policy initiatives, to identify opportunities and integrate mitigation strategies for their own wicked problems, like the resource curse. Another transferable finding could be the stable representation of coordinating agency, secretariat. The secretariat is a neutral body that helps facilitate and coordinate the collaborative process while maintaining the delivery of performance products on a short-term basis. In the context of political uncertainty and high turnover, the secretariat of EITIM has played significant role in mediating and maintaining the neutrality of the collaboration. The agenda of the EITIM was maintained and advocated with the new coming Prime Ministers through the secretariat.  9.3 Conclusion  This research asks, “How and why the case of Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, a collaborative governance mechanism, in Mongolia is successful?”. The answering the question, research examines the need of collaborative governance and environment which the collaboration materializes. First of all, implementing effective collaborative governance initiatives demands an understanding of the causality and complexity of various interactive 114  components. Framing the resource curse as a wicked problem has instrumental value in understanding and coping with the issues it creates. This research employs mixed method design anchored by a conceptual framework based in holism, mutual causality and interdependence. The examination of the EITIM’s system context, institutional design, collaborative process and performance productivity demonstrates the deep interdependence of each component. Understanding that the system context is significantly influenced by an uncertain political, economic and social context provided key insights into how and why the EITIM’s collaborative governance strategy was successful and what specific factors impeded the initiative. The knowledge of how civil society organizations play an important role in holding the collaborative process together, a process that otherwise would have fragmented due to high government representative turnover and minimal company attendance, is an asset for future initiatives. 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