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Mining power : subnational participation in social conflicts in Peru Hurtado Lozada, Enilda Veronica Beatriz 2017

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i   MINING POWER: SUBNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN PERU  by  Enilda Veronica Beatriz Hurtado Lozada  B.A., Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2013  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF ARTS  in  The Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies (Political Science)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  December 2017   © Enilda Veronica Beatriz Hurtado Lozada, 2017       ii  Abstract Rising levels of social mobilization occurred throughout the period of the recent commodity boom in the Andes (2000-2013), adding leverage to the resource curse literature. Surprisingly, the mobilizations have incorporated a new active participant: mayors and governors. They have been participating in the mobilizations, both peacefully and violently, often attracting the attention of the mass media and national authorities. The participation of subnational authorities in these mobilizations is a new phenomenon, one that has not yet been systematically studied. This research deepens our understanding of the resource curse and its impact in Latin American democracies by showing how the participation of subnational authorities in social conflicts is motivated by mining-extraction dependency and political weakness.   iii  Lay Summary The mining industry is one of the most prominent sources of economic revenue for Latin America. However, it has also become an increasing source of contention. The number of social conflicts and protests related to mining have increased considerably during the last decade, mainly mobilizing the population directly affected by the mining activity. However, the mayors and governors in office during these conflicts have also participated in the mobilizations. This research will link their participation to having low levels of popularity in their electorate, and their reliance on mining as the primary source of revenue.    iv  Preface As the author of the thesis, Enilda Veronica Beatriz Hurtado Lozada conducted all parts of the research. She identified the topic of research, designed the research project, gathered the data, and analyzed the information.       v  Table of Contents  Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii Lay Summary ................................................................................................................................. iii Preface............................................................................................................................................ iv List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ vi List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ vii 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 1.1. Extractivism in Latin America ......................................................................................... 2 1.2. Decentralization reform in Latin America ....................................................................... 5 1.3. Peru’s decentralization: a work in progress ..................................................................... 6 1.4. Mining and Social conflict in Peru ................................................................................... 8 2. Chapter I: Research proposal ................................................................................................. 15 2.1. The expectations ............................................................................................................. 15 2.2. Defining the variables .................................................................................................... 19 2.2.1. The dependent variable: participation in conflict ........................................................ 19 2.2.2. The independent variables ........................................................................................... 20 2.2.3. Control variable ........................................................................................................... 21 2.3. The hypotheses ............................................................................................................... 21 2.4. The methodology............................................................................................................ 23 2.4.1. Data gathering ......................................................................................................... 23 2.4.2. Data analysis ........................................................................................................... 24 3. Chapter II: Outcomes and implications ................................................................................. 25 3.1. The difference between not participating, participating, and violently participating in conflicts ..................................................................................................................................... 25 3.2. Testing the hypothesis .................................................................................................... 30 3.3. Discussion of the findings .............................................................................................. 33 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 35 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 37 Appendices .................................................................................................................................... 41 Appendix A: List of Sources reviewed to build the dependent variable ................................... 41  vi  List of Figures  Figure 1. Evolution of mining canon in millions of Peruvian Soles, 2002-2016 ......................... 10 Figure 2. Evolution of social conflicts, mining conflicts and mining canon in Peru, 2005-2016 12 Figure 3. Game tree representing the interaction between subnational and national government in the process of a mining conflict .................................................................................................... 18 Figure 4. Proportion of violent participation of subnational authorities, 2002-2016 ................... 26 Figure 5. Relationship between authorities’ participation in mining conflict and intensity of the conflict .......................................................................................................................................... 27              vii  List of Tables  Table 1. Payoffs by Outcomes of Subnational Authorities' Participation in Mining Conflicts .... 19 Table 2. Subnational authorities' participation in mining conflicts, by beginning of their term, 2002-2015 ..................................................................................................................................... 25 Table 3. Subnational authorities’ participation in mining conflicts and recall referendums, 2002-2016............................................................................................................................................... 28 Table 4. Difference between subnational authorities who participated and did not participate in mining conflicts in Peru, 2002-2016 ............................................................................................. 28 Table 5. Difference between subnational authorities who violently participated and those who participated peacefully in mining conflicts in Peru, 2002-2016 ................................................... 29 Table 6. Mining and political power in authorities’ participation in conflict (dichotomous) ....... 31 Table 7. Mining and political power in authorities’ participation in conflict (continuous) .......... 32    1  1. Introduction In the period 1980-2000, most Latin American countries introduced reforms designed to decentralize government and create new authorities at the subnational level. In some cases, this process was seen as the culmination of transitions to democracy. The results, however, have been uneven, especially in Peru, where political leaders have begun to call for a re-centralization of authority (Dickovick & Eaton, 2013). Why is this happening?   Decentralization can improve democracy by bringing the government officials closer to the people (Falleti, 2010), by devolving power to local governments (Snyder, 2001), and by increasing the political participation of the population (Borja, Valdes, Pozo, & Morales, 1989). However, the new decentralized authorities can also harm democracy, increasing political instability through their participation in social protests (El Comercio, 2012; Peru21, 2014; Correo, 2017; Gestion, 2017).    This research argues that subnational authorities have been participating in mining conflicts throughout the commodities boom in Latin America, and their participation has been motivated by their dependence on extractive activity, and their low political power. Through the analysis of 39 mining conflicts from 2002-2016, the thesis supports the claim that even though participation in conflict by subnational authorities is a common phenomenon, violent participation is rare and, in general, the result of both neo-extractivism and weak institutions.   The thesis is divided in three sections. First, I review the literature on the resource curse and extractivism, the role it has played in Latin America, particularly in Peru, and its relationship with decentralization. I also examine linkages between mining, weak institutions, and social conflicts in Latin America. Second, I outline the research design and methodological approach of 2  the research. Finally, I present empirical findings and discuss their implications for the understanding of subnational politics and social conflicts in Peru and other similar cases.  1.1. Extractivism in Latin America Extractivism has been described as a model of development by many scholars in the field of political science (Bebbington, Bornschlegl, & Johnson, 2013; Brand, Dietz, & Lang, 2016; Burchardt & Dietz, 2014). It is understood as a regime of wealth accumulation, a mode of regulation, and a technological paradigm (Brand, Dietz, & Lang, 2016, pp. 134-136) based on the removal of large quantities of natural resources that are not processed, mainly for its exportation (Acosta, 2013, p. 62).  Extractivism is also an historical phenomenon (Brand et. al, 2016). During colonialism (1700-1800), Latin America was considered largely a source of minerals and petroleum for the rest of the world. Despite the instability of prices, the extraction of minerals was a predominant source of economic security, and positioned itself as the most important source of revenue during the early years of agro-exporting development (1810-1930) (Brand, Dietz, & Lang, 2016, p. 14).  Later, during the period of peripheral capitalist development (1930-1970), a new regional order was constituted, leading to the emergence of developmental states. This was based on the developmentalist model of import-substitution industrialization (ISI), which promoted a nationalist or inward-oriented development instead of the exploitation of natural resources for markets in the north. However, the ISI model was ultimately exhausted in the context of a convoluted and unstable democratization process, leaving both an economic crises and social unrest (Becker, 1983). 3  In response to the dissatisfaction with the outcomes of ISI, extractivism was adopted. The current era of extractivism is based on neoliberal policies involving deregulation, liberalization of tariffs and controls on investment, privatization, and a significantly reduced role of the state especially in the area of welfare provisions (Brand, Dietz, & Lang, 2016). Two key features underpining this model are (1) the important role played by transnational corporations in the exploitation of raw materials and the appropriation of the profits, and (2) the need for a state with the capacity to promote competitiveness (Burchardt & Dietz, 2014). As a result, the private sector assumes a greater role, working closely with the political elite to influence decision-making. In exchange, the state becomes a broker that seeks to promote the continuation of the model and secure sustained economic growth.  It has been argued that a major limitation of this model arises as a result of the resource curse or the paradox of the plenty. The literature on this topic addresses countries with large natural resource wealth, showing how they tend to grow more slowly than resource-poor countries (Sachs & Warner, 2001). Resource-based economies often operate according to the logic of economic enclaves. They create isolated mining and oil industries, limiting the capacity of economic activity to generate a viable or sustainable development model. The reasons for this problem are hotly debated, and among the problems that have generated the most attention are conflicts over the redistribution of the benefits of extraction, “Dutch disease”, and conflicts generated by environmental damages (Acosta, 2013).   In an attempt to address these criticisms, pro-extractivist forces have sought to build legitimacy through such mechanisms as corporate social responsibility – CSR (Gudynas, 2015). However, CSR measures tend to be of limited scope, focusing on local development and the 4  containment of social unrest in the short-term (Kemp, 2010). Usually, these policies generate demands for systemic reforms (Haslam & Tanimoune, 2016).  In response, neo-extractivism was born. Neo-extractivism is a mild corrective to the unrestricted exploitation of resources under the previous model. The typical policies implemented under the neo-extractivist model seek to “regulate the appropriation of resources and their export by nationalising companies and raw materials, revising contracts and increasing export duties and taxes. They use surplus revenue to expand social structures that favour development” (Burchardt & Dietz, 2014, p. 470). Consequently, neo-extractivism is consistent with the partial rejection of neoliberal policies, the partial nationalization of certain industries, a stronger political control of resource appropriation and profits, and the expansion of socio-political programs (Brand, Dietz, & Lang, 2016).     In Latin America, neo-extractivism has been linked to the renaissance of the developmental state during the turn to the left in the region (Gudynas, 2016). In this model, economies of extraction are regulated by the state, which also appropriates additional revenue and mediates between diverging interests, acts as an agent of development, and addresses the social question via supporting development projects. It creates political legitimacy for itself through democratic elections and a developmentalist policy narrative (Burchardt & Dietz, 2014).  Neo-extractivism has also been associated with political projects led by populist leaders who use extraction as a source of redistribution and political legitimation. Neoextractivism entails “the justification for the exploitation of nature as a project that aims to promote national development, sovereignty, and social redistribution” (Brand, Dietz, & Lang, 2016, p. 130). Cases such as Venezuela during Hugo Chavez rule (1999-2013) or Evo Morales (2005-present) in Bolivia are clear examples. Neo-extractivism still presents many challenges, however, including 5  negative social and environmental impacts (Acosta, 2013) which are associated with a rising number of social conflicts. Additionally, it has weakened social and environmental regulations in an attempt to attract investment, and it has promoted a drastic reshaping of the territory through the massive expansion of concessions for extractive activities, the curtailment of human and environmental rights, and the narrowing of social justice to distributive economic programmes particularly those focused on economic compensation (Gudynas, 2016). This type of social and redistributive economic innovation policies promoted by the state are not effective in solving social conflicts. Without a strong foundation, and buffeted by instability, the new governance institutions created at the local or regional level face greater challenges which make it hard for them to legitimize themselves. 1.2.  Decentralization reform in Latin America  There are diverse approaches to understanding and explaining the evolution of decentralizing reforms in Latin America. Some scholars have focused on the role of party systems in the decentralization process (Willis, da C.B. Garman, & Haggard, 1999), or in the type of reform and the timing for its implementation (Falleti, 2005); others have focused on the role of extractivist economies, arguing that the economic bonanza during the early 2000s helped develop the power of subnational authorities, increasing their budgets (Ahmad & Garcia-Escribano, 2006) and, at the same time, reducing poverty levels in their territories (Loayza & Rigolini, 2016). Still others claim that the growing dependency on mineral extraction is weakening democracy at all levels (Ross, 2001; Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004).  For subnational governments, the resource curse presents particular challenges. First, it can create a perverse incentive for disputes between the government and the opposition, and this can lead to the misuse of mechanisms of accountability such as recall referendums (Welp, 2016). 6  Second, it affects social cohesion, generating grievances among the population (Haslam & Tanimoune, 2016). Third, mining companies increasingly assume governmental roles, providing basic services and developing clientelistic networks (Ponce & McClintock, 2014; Gifford & Kestler, 2008).  1.3. Peru’s decentralization: a work in progress Peru has a long history of highly centralized government. This changed somewhat in 2002, at the beginning of Alejandro Toledo’s presidency (2001-2006), as a result of his attempt to decentralize power. The decentralization reform started as a constitutional reform that was followed by a series of policies intended to distribute power at the local level. The regional president is the highest authority that was created, for he or she is the legal representative and the authority with primary responsibility for the budgets of the newly formed regional governments. Regional governments are constituted by several local governments, with mayors as their executive authorities. Local mayors were not to be held accountable to the regional or national authorities, but to their own municipal councils, over which they preside (Muñoz, 2005).   Along with greater autonomy, subnational authorities enjoy access to the economic resources of their territory. The decentralization reform introduced an increase in the regular transfers from central to local governments, and an increase of collection of taxes, among other fiscal changes. These new governance attributes have generated additional incentives for political actors to run for office at the local level (Muñoz, 2005, pp. 54-55). However, Peruvian subnational governments notoriously lack political stability. From 1997 to 2013, “there were 5303 recall procedures activated against elected authorities in 747 out of a total 1645 Peruvian municipalities (45.5%)” (Welp, 2016, p. 1162). This is a consequence of the lack of political parties in at the subnational level (and indeed, at the national level to a considerable extent), as well as the 7  institutional design of the recall referendum process. The recall referendum is a low-cost process for the opposition to carry out, and has potentially high returns, ranging from generating media attention for the opposition, to new elections that can lead to the opposition taking office (Welp, 2016).  Moreover, Peru’s subnational authorities lack strong institutional foundations. The winners of subnational elections usually win with relatively narrow majorities, usually lower than 25% of the total votes, in highly competitive environments. Winning with a low margin or with less than a third of the total votes harms the legitimacy of the newly elected authority, who must position itself against a highly popular opposition. Given the new responsibilities and benefits of being a subnational authority, the competition has increased notably. To give an example, the number of candidates applying to be the mayor of San Marcos, the subnational territory where Antamina Mine operates, has grown from four in 1998 to seventeen in 2014 (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones, 2017). This speaks to the level of political fragmentation in subnational governments, and contributes to perpetuate the low levels of percentages gotten for electoral victory.   Finally, the relationship between national and subnational governments has been tense from the beginning. National parties have been unable to translate their national success into success in the local arena, and the regional movements have been unable to acquire credibility as contenders for the presidency1. Additionally, subnational governments have been in the eye of the storm of intense corruption scandals, which have diminished their legitimacy even further.                                                           1 The most notably case is of Cesar Acuña, the leader of the party Alianza para el Progreso. His party has been successful at winning elections in the northern regions of the country, but his candidacy for presidency has filled with scandal and ended in his exclusion from the competition. 8  Allegations of corruption have opened the door to national politicians who question the efficacy subnational authorities, and call for a reversal of the process of decentralization.   In 2015, the Congress modified article 191 of the Peruvian Constitution through Law N 3035, changing the name of regional presidents to regional governors. The proposal stated that this did not constitute a change in the functions and responsibility of subnational authorities, but that it would “avoid confusions that have encouraged social conflicts.” According to some legislators, the title of regional president made subnational authorities think that they had similar powers as to the President of the Republic. The document indicates that several regional governments have exceeded the exercise of their competences, taking responsibilities that did not belong to them or claiming new ones outside their jurisdiction (Congreso de la Republica, 2015).  Furthermore, the same Law states that subnational authorities (both regional and local) cannot be re-elected (Congreso de la Republica, 2015). It is uncertain whether the new Law will have an effect on the performance of subnational authorities, and whether it will reduce corruption in the decentralized localities of Peru. However, it is certain that it adds to several challenges faced by subnational authorities. 1.4. Mining and Social conflict in Peru To understand the evolution subnational governance and the challenges facing subnational authorities in Peru, it is important to understand the role of mining industry in Peruvian economy and its linkages with patterns of social mobilization and protest.  Peru is the second largest copper, zinc, and silver producer in the world. It ranks first in Latin America in the production of gold, zinc, lead and molybdenum. It also has the largest reserves of silver in the world and leads the Latin American ranking in reserves of these metals 9  (Mining Promotion Bureau, 2017). After the return of democracy in 2000, the model of development in Peru has not been altered, and the promotion of mining investment continues to be a priority for the government (Sanborn, Ramirez, & Hurtado, 2017). This is evident in the presence of productive mining activity in 24 of the 25 administrative regions of Peru (Ministry of Energy and Mining, 2016).  For subnational authorities, the rules of the decentralization process limit their role for decision-making in the introduction or continuation of large mining projects in their territories. Regional governments have a responsibility to promote mining and energy investment, and to implement the decisions taken at the central level. However, they only have the authority to grant concessions for small and artisanal mining. Mayors have no power over the decision-making process for energy and mining industry. However, Peruvian law mentions the distribution of mining canon at the local level as one of the main tasks for subnational authorities. The canon refers to the royalties’ tax levied on a particular industry, so that there are mining, energy, and fishing canons. In the case of mining, the canon involves the devolution of revenues from this industry to subnational governments (Arellano, 2011). Figure 1 shows the evolution of the mining canon, as it is transferred to subnational governments in millions of Peruvian Soles. The greatest increase occurred during the commodities boom (2000 – 2013), but there has been an important decrease since 2014.      10  Figure 1. Evolution of mining canon in millions of Peruvian Soles, 2002-2016  Source: Ministry of Economy and Finances, Peru - 2017  Resources from the mining canon are allocated both at regional and local level, and constitute a large part of the budget of subnational authorities. They have discretionary power over the expenditure of the canon resources and, given the lack of efficient mechanisms for accountability, this can open the door to corruption, clientelism, and other problems (Arce, 2010; Levitsky, 2016). Besides the canon, the Peruvian government – in concert with the mining industry – has developed other mechanisms to transfer mining resources to subnational territories. These mechanisms have been created to win social license, and diminish the risks of social mobilization, and their design prioritizes the participation of subnational authorities. The mechanisms are: Programa Minero de Solidad con el Pueblo, Regalías Mineras, and Fondos Sociales. However, these mechanisms have also been the source of contention for some territories. This is the case of Fondo Social Michiquillay, property of the Anglo-American mining company, which offices were taken by the angry population of Cajamarca. The cajamarquinos (inhabitants of Cajamarca) 01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0002002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016MillionsMining canon11  complained about the lack of activity of the Fondo Social, and claimed that it was being used to finance the political ambitions of their subnational authorities.  Despite these attempts to build social acceptance, mining activity is still viewed with caution and even outright rejection by several sectors of the population in Peru. This is clearly shown in the increasing number of social conflicts related to the mining industry. In September 2004, there were 77 social conflicts registered by the Peruvian Ombudsman, and only four were related to the mining industry (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2004). In September 2017, there were a total of 168 social conflicts registered, where 74 cases (44%) are related to mining activity (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2017). Figure 2 shows the evolution of the degrees of social mobilization in Peru from 2005 to 2016 as it relates to the increase in mining canon resources distributed at the subnational level. Since 2008, there has been a constant increase of social conflicts in general. This tendency is replicated in mining conflicts, which account for more than half of the conflicts by 2012. Figure 2 also shows that even though it seems that a decrease in mining canon in 2008 coincides with an increase in mobilization, this is not the case for later years (2014, 2015), when the number of conflicts remained stable.       12  Figure 2. Evolution of social conflicts, mining conflicts and mining canon in Peru, 2005-2016  Source: Ministry of Economy and Finances, Peru – 2017; The Office of Public Defender of Peru – 2017 For the most part, research on the rising number of social conflicts in Peru has focused on case studies, often seeking to generate hypothesis to explain what sparks mass mobilizations. One research program has focused on how the mining industry has introduced a new set of social interactions between small communities and big companies, creating a set of tensions that can escalate into violent protests (Bebbington, Bornschlegl, & Johnson, 2013; Bury J. , 2005).  Another set of explanations focuses on the characteristic of the mining projects and companies. If the activity entails an open-pit mine, for example, it will most likely provoke environmental concerns (Bebbington A. H., 2008; Bury J. T., 2002). On the other hand, if the project is located in an area where there are limited alternatives for economic development, such as high-altitude places, the people are less willing to oppose the project  (Arellano-Yanguas, 2012).  Paul Haslam and Nasser Tanimoune (2016) have summarized the explanations generated by the 0%50%100%150%200%250%300%350%0501001502002503002005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016Total social conflicts Socio-environmental conflicts% Mining canon increase13  literature on social and economic factors2. This research highlights high volumes of resources from extraction (Bebbington & Bury, 2013), high levels of poverty (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007), a rural location (Canel, Idemudia, & North, 2010), and the lack of strong institutions (Arellano, 2011; Ponce & McClintock, 2014; Sanborn, Ramirez, & Hurtado, 2017), as conditions that foster the social mobilization.   Even though the topic of social conflict related to mining seems to have been thoroughly explored, the literature has left aside the role that subnational authorities may play in these conflicts.  Studies have been conducted about the effects of mining revenues in the expenditure capacity of subnational authorities and the development of clientelist networks (Maldonado, 2014), in the general effect mining industry has had on the increasing chances for recall referendums (Welp, 2016),  incumbency victories at subnational level (Incio & Chavarria, 2016), and the effect of institutionalized party system over social mobilization (Arce, 2010), however, the participation of subnational authorities in the social mobilizations is usually left aside as a normalized behavior in cases where mining conflict arises. Apart from emblematic cases such as Oscar Mollohuanca in Espinar, Cusco (De Echave, et al., 2009), or Gregorio Santos in Conga, Cajamarca (Li, 2015), research has neglected to study how subnational authorities are engaging in these mobilizations, even assuming roles of leadership, and sometimes reaching levels of intense violence.   Understanding the individual motivations of each subnational authority is a complex task for the researcher, one that would ideally involve in-depth analysis of each social conflict studied. Some scholars have undertaken this task through ethnographic work, conducting in-depth                                                           2 Haslam & Tanimoune (2016) present a compelling quantitative study that summarizes most of the case-study literature in mining conflict in Latin America.  14  interviews with the authorities (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011; De Echave, et al., 2009; Li, 2015; Szablowski, 2002), as part of their research on mining conflicts in general, however, these findings are case-focused and do not provide generalizable hypothesis. My study aims to provide the first systematic analysis of the role of subnational authorities in social protest associated with extractivism in Peru. 15  2. Chapter I: Research proposal 2.1. The expectations From the literature presented in the introductory chapter, I gather that there are two key aspects of subnational politics in Peru that can help understand why subnational authorities participate in mining conflicts: extractive dependency and low levels of political power. To properly link the literature about both factors, I develop a systematic narrative of the behavior of subnational authorities facing mining conflicts. In the following paragraphs, I narrate the steps of a game tree to trace how and when a subnational authority will choose to participate in a mining conflict, and when this participation can become violent.   First, the authority faces an increase of grievances among the population, who rallies against the mining investment. The nature of the grievances is not relevant to the outcome, since it could be an environmental claim or a claim regarding an increase in the revenue distribution. Given a low level of power, the authority must decide between joining the people in their claims or try to negotiate with the central government and the mining company. The authority has the choice of ignoring the problem, but that perpetuates their status quo. If the authority has a low level of political power (i.e. was elected with a low margin of victory or with percentage of the votes that accounts for less than a third of the population), and receives important economic benefits from mining activity, continuing the status quo could result in a recall referendum or possible impeachment. This is outcome I. Joining the protests as soon as they start poses two major problems for the authority First, they can be perceived as radical leaders by the central government, which might result in their judicial prosecution, which is outcome VI. Second, they may also provoke a violent response from 16  the central government to restore peace in the area. This exacerbates the already tense relationship between national and subnational authorities, which is outcome VII.   In most cases, the subnational authority will try to avoid the protest and initiate formal negotiations. If the national authority decides to negotiate, this ends the game in outcome II. However, this will depend on the abilities of the authority to present their argument to the central government. Since the game starts with a weak subnational authority, it is highly likely that the central government will not give into the negotiations and try to delay the conflict through dialogue (e.g. consultative workshops and meetings). In response, the subnational authority must decide whether to continue with the negotiations (outcome III) or, given the low level of response in the formal path, join the protests. Since waiting for the national government makes the subnational authority look weak, and lowers their political power even more, the subnational authority will most likely join the protests.  As a result, the central government must decide whether to negotiate or repress the protest.  If the government choses to negotiate and grant benefits to the population, it could endanger the development of the project and cost them political power – since it would be perceived as weak and unable to enforce their decisions by the economic elite, which is outcome IV. However, if the government decides to repress the protest it faces the problem of political instability and civilian casualties. In this scenario, the political power of the central government is crucial. It would be more likely for a weak government to engage in repression to generate an image of state capacity and military power.  This is outcome V.   Figure 3 provides an extensive form game tree that assigns different weights to the possible outcomes of the game, and Table 1 presents the outcomes. Based on the description of the game, Table 1 shows the different ranking of payoffs for subnational and national authorities. The payoffs 17  refer to the effect of the outcomes on the political power of both actors, and have been assigned based on the assumption that the subnational authority starts the game with a low level of political power, and mining is a salient issue for their electorate.  From backwards induction, we can establish that the best outcome for both players is outcome V, where subnational authorities attempt to follow a formal path of negotiation at the beginning, gathering media attention, but were dismissed by the national authority. At this point, it is more valuable for the national authority to repress and solve the conflict unilaterally, and therefore establish their political power. The outcome might not be beneficial for the population, given that their grievances are not addressed, but it is for the subnational authority. The mayor now has gathered media attention, and has gained legitimacy as a leader in their territory. 18  Figure 3. Game tree representing the interaction between subnational and national government in the process of a mining conflict   19  Table 1. Payoffs by Outcomes of Subnational Authorities' Participation in Mining Conflicts Note: Rank order of Payoffs from 1 to 6, which represent the order of preference of each outcome by both actors. To test the validity of the assumptions about the payoffs in the game tree, I will conduct a quantitative analysis that will highlight the relationship between mining dependency and low political power with the subnational authority’s participation in conflict. 2.2. Defining the variables 2.2.1. The dependent variable: participation in conflict As a dependent variable, “participation in conflict” entails any form of collective mobilization that seeks to contest a national authority’s decision regarding mining activity. This includes but is not limited to confrontation with the police or the armed forces, trespassing on or damaging private property, injuring people, and so forth. These uprisings are directed against any decision made by the national government that promotes the development of mining industry in the territory of the subnational authority. The participation of authorities in these demonstrations can be as a leader or as a follower. The role is not crucial for this research, given that the main argument is based on the sole idea of the authority’s presence and participation in these protests not the presumption that they lead them.   Outcome Description Rank for Sub-national Authority Rank for National Authority I Continuation of Status Quo 2 7 II Peaceful Negotiation 7 3 III Attempt of Re-negotiation 3 6 IV Negotiation after initial participation in conflict 6 2 V Violent repression after initial participation in conflict 4 4 VI Violent repression after violent participation in conflict 1 5 VII Negotiation after violent participation in conflict 5 1 20   For the purpose of this research the analysis will focus on participation as both a dichotomous and a continuous variable. In the dichotomous analysis, participation (engC) is differentiated from cases where the authority did not participate in the conflict (engC = 0), and where it participated regardless of the type of participation (engC = 1). On the other hand, the continuous variable seeks to capture if there is a difference between peaceful and violent participation. Here, peaceful participation (participation = 1) entails the use of informal mechanisms of protest, but that do not incur in violence participation by the subnational authority. Therefore, the conflict could have been very violent, but the authority was not part of the disturbances. Violent participation (participation = 2), on the other hand, refers to the participation of the authority in violent acts such as destruction of property, harm of civilians, etc.  2.2.2. The independent variables Extractivist dependency The literature on social mobilization in Peru suggests that increasing levels of revenue from mining are associated with protest at the subnational level. We can extrapolate this to the level of the subnational authorities, and test not only the volume of revenue received by each authority (via the canon), but also the percentage that these revenues represent in the total budget of the territory (C/B). This will provide an understanding of whether an increase in the resources is motivating the violent participation or the fact that the territory is dependent on the activity. Moreover, the thesis also tests whether the total resources transferred to the territory (in the budget) can be a trigger for the participation of mayors. It would be expected that the lower the budget, the higher the incentives the mayor has to participate in the conflicts.  21  Political power Political power is measured through margin of electoral victory (margE) and the percentage of votes obtained by the authority (winE). As mentioned in the expectations, if the authority has low political power in the context of a mining conflict, the authority will have more incentives to participate in the mobilization to promote their political career. In addition, the research tests for the share of votes obtained in the election because, in some cases, even if the margin of victory is high, the authority could have been elected with less than a third of the votes by the electorate. Therefore, they still have the incentive to promote their political career through the participation in the social mobilization. 2.2.3. Control variable:  Violence of conflict The research will control for the degree of intensity of conflict. This will allow us to compare whether the degree of violence conditions the behavior of the authority – making the participation in the mobilization more likely.   2.3. The hypotheses In answering the research question, the thesis presents two hypotheses: H1: The interaction of both a high level of mining dependency and a low level of political power will motivate the participation of subnational authorities in mining conflicts Mining dependency and low political power motivate the participation of the subnational authority because a weak subnational authority will be more interested in participating in a protest related to the most salient issue of their territory. If mining dependency is high in the territory, mining is likely to be a salient issue that shapes important the social and political dynamics. 22  Therefore, it may generate strong grievances among the population. These grievances can be related to environmental problems or the unequal distribution of economic benefits. Given the importance of the industry in the territory, the authority will most likely prioritize any issues related to it – including the problems it can have with the citizens. Consequently, the subnational authority will participate in the social conflict because it is a salient issue.  Low levels of political power limit the capacity of the subnational authorities to promote their policies. Since low levels of political power is associated with a small margin of electoral victory or a low vote percentage, it can be inferred that the opposition has the capacity to question and obstruct the actions of the elected authority. Therefore, the authority will seek to gain political power through any means at his or her disposal to prevent losing more power and even office. Therefore, participating in social mobilizations becomes an attractive option.   H2: The higher the level of mining dependency and the lower political power will motivate a more violent participation of subnational authorities in mining conflicts The intensity of the dependency and the level of political power will condition the type of participation played by the subnational authority. If the dependency is very high, and the political power is very low, we should expect that the subnational authority will/may participate in the mining conflict in a violent manner.      23  2.4. The methodology To test the three hypotheses presented above, I have conducted a quantitative analysis. I have build an original data set that gathers key information about 39 mining conflicts between the years 2002 to 2016. In this section, I will explain the process of data gathering and analysis.  2.4.1. Data gathering The conflicts have been selected from the Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros en America Latina (OCMAL) website. This dataset provided the name, dates, and location of the conflicts.  The information about presidential popularity was gathered from Pulso Peru survey, conducted by Datum International. The information about the subnational authorities in power during the conflicts was gathered from the InfoGob portal of the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones of Peru. This website provided the name of the subnational authority, their political party, their percentage of electoral victory, and the record of recall referendums against them.  The economic information about the subnational territories was collected from the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Peru. I have gathered both the budget allocation for each territory, the mining revenue transfer for it, and the proportion that the mining revenue represent over the total budget.  The degree of intensity of the conflict was collected from the Environmental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas) website. The classification of the intensity has three levels: LOW, MEDIUM and HIGH. Finally, the information about the participation of subnational authorities in social conflicts was 24  originally built from the collection of posts by social organizations, newspaper articles, and television news reports. The full list of sources can be seen in the Appendix A.  To determine whether subnational authorities participated in conflicts it was necessary to review all these sources, determining whether the authorities participated in protests or mobilizations and/or gave any statements against the central government or the company involved in the conflict. Afterwards, to determine if their participation was violent, direct evidence of property damages and/or harm of civilians was recorded by the sources reviewed.    2.4.2. Data analysis The analysis of the data involved the following steps. First, I conducted a t-test to assess the differences between the mayors that participated in social mobilizations and those that did not.    Second, to test H1, the dependent variable was treated as a categorical variable for the first analysis. Therefore, the data was analyzed through a logistic regression. I created twelve models that account for all the different measurements for the two independent variables. For mining dependency, I tested subnational budget, amount of mining canon received in the territory, and percentage of the budget corresponding to mining canon transferences.  For low levels of political power, I test margin of electoral victory and percentage of votes obtained in the election.  Third, to test H2, I treat the dependent variable as a continuous, which allows me to conduct a multivariate regression. This regression tests if higher degrees of mining dependency and lower degrees of political power account for a violent participation of subnational authorities in mining conflicts.  25  3. Chapter II: Outcomes and implications 3.1. The difference between not participating, participating, and violently participating in conflicts The data has gathered information of 177 subnational authorities who were in office during a mining conflict. Table 2 shows that from the sample, 119 mayors did not participate in mining conflicts. The Table also shows that the higher proportion of authorities who participated are those who started office in the year 2010. This can be related to both the increasing number of social conflicts and the increasing level of mining canon distributed. Table 2. Subnational authorities' participation in mining conflicts, by beginning of their term, 2002-2015       Years        2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total No participation 21 3 31 1 1 2 25 1 1 31 2 119 Participation 3 0 13 0 0 1 23 0 0 18 0 58 Total 24 3 44 1 1 3 48 1 1 49 2 177  Moreover, from the 58 who participated, only 15 participated violently in the conflicts.  Figure 4 shows the proportion of violent participation over peaceful participation by year. There appears that there has been an increase both in the number of authorities who violent participate in mining conflicts, and in the proportion of violent participation over peaceful participation in the mobilizations.       26  Figure 4. Proportion of violent participation of subnational authorities, 2002-2016  Source: Original dataset To address if the participation is related to the intensity of the conflict, Figure 5 shows the distribution of subnational authorities who participated in the social conflicts according to the degree of intensity of the conflict. From the sample, 113 authorities faced a high intensity mining conflict, and 38 of those participated in the mobilization. Moreover, the 15 authorities who violently participated in the mining conflicts are all located in the group of high intensity conflict. This suggest a strong correlation that supports the inclusion of “violence of the conflict” as a control variable.         212 1171111670%20%40%60%80%100%2002 2006 2009 2010 2014Peaceful participation Violent participation27  Figure 5. Relationship between authorities’ participation in mining conflict and intensity of the conflict  Source: Original dataset One of the core assumptions of the game tree presented in Figure 3 is that for Outcome I to occur, the subnational authority will value the status quo more than the possible profits of participating in the conflict. As mentioned in the literature review, recall referendums are a clear indicator of institutional instability at the subnational level, and represent an important motivation for authorities to mobilize. Table 3 shows that 13 of the 177 mayors faced an attempt of recall, from which 7 resulted in successful recall referendums. However, from those who participated in the mining conflict, only two mayors faced an attempt of recall, and only one was removed from office. If subnational authorities have this information, it is plausible that they associate participating in mining conflicts with a lower probability of facing a recall attempt.      93575713380 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80LowMediumHighParticipation  Yes Participation  No28  Table 3. Subnational authorities’ participation in mining conflicts and recall referendums, 2002-2016 Recall referendum Participation No participation Participation No attempt of recall 108 56 Attempt of recall 11 2 Successful recall 6 1   The thesis states that both mining dependency and low levels of political power motivate the participation of subnational authorities in mining conflicts. An initial test of this relationship is presented in Table 4, which presents a t-test conducted for the sample of subnational authorities in office during mining conflicts. The test shows that there is only a difference for the variables of income, which refers to the budget allocated to the territory, for mining canon and for percentage of electoral victory. Table 4 shows that H1 holds ground, given that the amount of mining canon is higher, and the percentage of electoral victory is lower for mayors who participated in mining conflicts.  Table 4. Difference between subnational authorities who participated and did not participate in mining conflicts in Peru, 2002-2016 Variables No participation in conflict (119) Participation in conflict (58) Difference Mining percentage over total budget (C/B) 0.29 0.27 .02 Budget of the territory 87.57 91.93 -4.35 Mining canon 85.64 93.86 -8.223 Margin of electoral victory 8.85 8.83 .3 Electoral victory 33.55 31.66 1.89 Popularity of the president 26.29 26.58 -.29 Attempt of recall 0.09 0.03 .07 Violence of the conflict 2.56 2.53 .02     Note: *p , .05; **p , .01; ***p , .001. Additionally, to test the initial assumptions of H2, Table 5 presents the difference between mayors who participated in conflict peacefully versus those who participated violently. The test 29  shows that the difference between mayors who participated violently in the conflict and those who participated peacefully is significant for mining dependency and the level of violence of the conflict. The finding contradicts H2, given that for the cases with violent participation, the mining dependency is lower than those with peaceful participation.  Nonetheless, the hypothesis is not disproved yet, given that mining canon shows a positive increase for cases where the subnational authority participated violently in the conflict.   In the case of political power, however, there seems to be contradictory findings for both the margin of electoral victory and the percentage of votes obtained in the last election. In both cases, the mayors who participated violently have higher levels than those who participated peacefully. Table 5. Difference between subnational authorities who violently participated and those who participated peacefully in mining conflicts in Peru, 2002-2016  No violent participation in conflict (43) Violent Participation in conflict (15) Difference Mining percentage over total budget (C/B) .30 .17 .26** Budget of the territory 90.42 96.27 -5.84 Mining canon 89.98 105 -15.02 Margin of electoral victory 8.46 9.85 -1.38 Electoral victory 30.94 33.70 -2.76 Popularity of the president 25.51 29.66 -4.15** Attempt of recall .05 0 .03 Violence of the conflict 2.37 3 -0.62***    Note: *p , .05; **p , .01; ***p , .001.  In conclusion, Table 4 provides support for H1, but Table 5 cast doubts about the validity of H2. To further test the hypothesis of the thesis, I will conduct two regression analyses in the following section.    30  3.2. Testing the hypothesis Hypothesis 1 has been tested through a logistic regression, and the results are presented in Table 66. As shown in the table, the hypothesis has been tested through twelve models, which incorporate the five measurements used for the two independent variables. Moreover, models 3, 4, 7, 8, 11 and 12 incorporate the control variable of intensity of conflict. Despite the results on Table 4, Table 6 suggests that there is no relationship between the independent variables and the participation of authorities in mining conflicts. The outcomes are probably the result of measuring the participation as a dichotomous variable. Coding participation only as a dummy variable can limit the analysis, since it does not capture the type of participation. After all, the thesis seeks to understand participation of subnational authorities in conflict based on the expectations that this participation can escalate into violence given the two major independent variables.     Table 7 presents some significant relationship between the independent variables of low political power and mining dependency with increase in the intensity of participation. The outcomes show that models 5 and 7 are significant. Both models present a problem for our hypothesis, given that they show that the electoral margin is positively correlated with an increase in the intensity of participation, implying that the higher the electoral margin of victory, the more violent the participation of the authority. However, the interaction term between margin of electoral victory with subnational budget follows in the expected direction because it suggests that low levels of electoral margin and low levels of subnational budget are correlated with an increase in the intensity of participation (H2).     31  Table 6. Mining and political power in authorities’ participation in conflict (dichotomous)  M 1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M 7 M 8 M 9 M 10 M 11 M 12 Mining percentage over total budget (C/B) 0.442 (0.911) 0.866 (2.429) 0.511 (0.926) 0.917 (2.426)                      Margin of electoral victory (marge) 0.018 (0.029)  0.019 (0.029)  0.059 (0.044)  0.060 (0.044)  0.017 (0.043)  0.016 (0.043)               C/B interacting with marge -0.057 (0.070)  -0.062 (0.071)                       Percentage of winning votes (wine)  -0.016 (0.025)  -0.016 (0.025)  -0.027 (0.035)  -0.027 (0.035)  -0.017 (0.038)  -0.017 (0.038)              C/B interacting with wine  -0.027 (0.072)  -0.028 (0.071)                      Budget of the territory     0.007 (0.005) -0.001 (0.012) 0.007 (0.005) -0.001 (0.012)     Budget interacting with marge     -0.001 (0.000)  -0.001 (0.000)                   Budget interacting with wine      0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)                  Mining canon         0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005          (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012) Mining canon interacting with marge         -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)               Mining canon interacting with wine          -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)              Violence of the conflict   -0.098 (0.250) -0.077 (0.248)   -0.095 (0.247) -0.084 (0.248)   -0.059 (0.244) -0.073 (0.246)              Constant -0.800** -0.157 -0.569 0.034 -1.279** 0.108 -1.056 0.333 -1.079** -0.381 -0.927 -0.192  (0.333) (0.837) (0.672) (1.037) (0.503) (1.200) (0.764) (1.376) (0.499) (1.231) (0.803) (1.387) R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 N 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 Note: *p , .05; **p , .01; ***p , .001. 32   Table 7. Mining and political power in authorities’ participation in conflict (continuous)   M 1 M 2 M 3 M 4 M 5 M 6 M 7 M 8 M 9 M 10 M 11 M 12 Mining percentage over total budget (C/B) 0.038 (0.277) 0.062 (0.723) -0.015 (0.283) -0.015 (0.727)                      Margin of electoral victory (marge) 0.009 (0.009)  0.007 (0.009)  0.025* (0.013)  0.024* (0.013)  0.013 (0.013)  0.013 (0.013)               C/B interacting with marge -0.021 (0.021)  -0.017 (0.021)                       Percentage of winning votes (wine)  -0.002 (0.008)  -0.002 (0.008)  0.000 (0.010)  0.001 (0.010)  -0.001 (0.011)  -0.001 (0.011)              C/B interacting with wine  -0.006 (0.021)  -0.004 (0.021)         Budget of the territory     0.003* 0.002 0.002* 0.002          (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)     Budget interacting with marge     -0.001* (0.000)  -0.001* (0.000)                   Budget interacting with wine      -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)                  Mining canon         0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002          (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) Mining canon interacting with marge         -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000)               Mining canon interacting with wine          -0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000) Violence of the conflict   0.071 0.079   0.065 0.073   0.079 0.074    (0.077) (0.076)   (0.076) (0.076)   (0.075) (0.075) Constant 0.394*** 0.531** 0.227 0.340 0.179 0.368 0.026 0.174 0.212 0.352 0.007 0.157  (0.102) (0.256) (0.209) (0.314) (0.148) (0.362) (0.232) (0.414) (0.149) (0.368) (0.246) (0.417) R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 N 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 Note: *p , .05; **p , .01; ***p , .001. 33  3.3. Discussion of the findings From the findings presented in the previous section, I can now revisit the game tree presented in Figure 3, asses its validity, and refer to the two hypotheses of the thesis.   Through the analysis of the data, it is clear that the degree of participation of authorities in mining conflicts is high, accounting for a third of the cases examined. This provides leverage to the establishment of tree different paths for the subnational authority: ignore, formally negotiate, or participate in the mobilization. Moreover, the findings support the assumption that not participating is related with the threat of recall referendum, as seen in Table 3. This supports the establishment of the ranks of Table 1, in which choosing to ignore the conflict is one of the worst possible outcomes for the subnational authority.   Having established these assumptions, Tables 4 and 5 provide leverage to the assumption that both extractive dependency and political power can provide explanatory value for the authority’s decision to participate in mining conflicts. In both cases, at least one of the variables considered as proxies to understand the causal mechanisms provide important differences between the group of majors who do not participate, participate peacefully, and participate violently. Afterwards, Table 6 and 7 should provide a more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between the causal mechanisms and the authorities’ participation in conflict.  As stated in the previous section, the results of Table 6 do not asses any significant relationship between extractive dependency and political power with participation in conflict. This casts doubts in our hypothesis 1, but provides a new set of questions for future research. The assumption of the thesis is that not only mining alters the dynamics of the subnational authorities, but political weakness conditions the decision to take an informal path to secure their place in office. If the political weakness is not captured by the lack of political support when elected, how 34  can we measure it for a large-n study? A new measurement of it can prove the hypothesis of the theory. In terms of the data, the possible explanations for the non-significant outcomes are that the dependent variable has been coded as dichotomous, capturing the different degree of impact of the variables. Additionally, the number of cases is also limited, with only 58 authorities participating in conflicts.   Finally, Table 7 presents one outcome that follows the logic of hypothesis 2. It shows that the lower the level of political power, along with a low subnational budget, generates the incentives to increase the degree of participation of the subnational authority. However, it is worth noting that it does not refer directly to mining dependency, but to the lack of resources of the territory. In this point, it would be useful to establish a clearer relationship between low subnational budget and high degree of mining dependency.  35  Conclusion The dynamics of subnational politics are intricate and complex, making them a rich and challenging field of study. This thesis has aimed to understand one aspect of it: the relationship between subnational authorities and social mobilization, particularly violent mobilization. It makes five main contributions.  First, the thesis maps out the possible paths taken by subnational authorities during social conflicts related to mining according to a game tree logic, shown in Figure 3. Second, the thesis has shown that there are important differences between subnational authorities who do not participate and those who participate in social conflicts. These differences are shown in Table 4.  Third, it has also shown that there are differences between those who participate violently and those who participate peacefully. Table 5 shows that mayors who participate violently in social conflicts have more percentage of the budget corresponding to mining canon. Four, the thesis has provided an initial step into understanding the motivations behind violent participation in mining conflicts. As Table 7 shows, the interaction between margin of electoral victory and budget is negatively correlated with an increase in the intensity of the subnational authority’s participation in conflict.  Five, the main contribution of the thesis project has been the construction of an original dataset that compiles information about subnational authorities and mining conflicts. Given the short period of analysis, the data remains small, but can serve as an starting point for future research on subnational politics in Latin America.   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Exige a gobierno solucionar problemas de Cairani. Retrieved from La Republica: http://larepublica.pe/archivo/614830-exige-a-gobierno-solucionar-problemas-de-cairani La Republica. (2014, 11 11). Tía María y Camilaca son proyectos mineros en peligro por los conflictos. Retrieved from La Republica: http://larepublica.pe/archivo/833394-tia-maria-y-camilaca-son-proyectos-mineros-en-peligro-por-los-conflictos La Republica. (2015, 03 21). Candarave tendría S/. 25 millones como adelanto. Retrieved from La Republica: http://larepublica.pe/archivo/864529-candarave-tendria-s-25-millones-como-adelanto La Republica. (2016, 11 10). Cusco: Chumbivilcas se levanta en contra de dos mineras. La Republica, pp. http://larepublica.pe/politica/988539-cusco-chumbivilcas-se-levanta-en-contra-de-dos-mineras. La Republica. (2017, 04 26). Alcalde de Challhuahuacho acusa a minera Las Bambas de promover su vacancia. 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Perú: Comunidad Campesina de Muylaque ratificó su rechazo a proyecto minero Rosa Roja. Retrieved from OCMAL: https://www.ocmal.org/peru-comunidad-campesina-de-muy-la-que-ratifico-su-rechazo-a-proyecto-minero-rosa-roja/ PCM. (2012, 05 22). Comisión del Ejecutivo viajará a Chumbivilcas para solucionar problemas. Retrieved from Scribd: https://www.scribd.com/document/94455738/Comision-del-Ejecutivo-viajara-a-Chumbivilcas-para-solucionar-problemas 46  Pérez Mundaca, J. (2010, 02 10). YANACOCHA: CAMBIOS Y PERMANENCIAS EN EL CONFLICTO SOCIAL MINERO. Retrieved from PUCP: http://tesis.pucp.edu.pe/repositorio/bitstream/handle/123456789/4543/PEREZ_MUNDACA_JOSE_YANACOCHA_CAMBIOS.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Pérez, M. A. (2015, 11 04). Mina Pucamarca y riesgo de contaminación del Río Usuchuma, Perú. Retrieved from EJAtlas: https://ejatlas.org/conflict/rio-usuchuma-amenazado-por-contaminacion-de-proyecto-minero-pucamarca-peru Perez, M. A. (2015, 11 25). Proyecto minero El Cofre y contaminación del río, Perú. Retrieved from EJAtlas: https://ejatlas.org/conflict/contaminacion-de-rio-por-proyecto-minero-el-cofre-peru Pérez, M. A. (2015, 11 23). Proyecto minero Huambo amenaza laguna Conococha, Perú. Retrieved from Environmental Justice Atlas: https://ejatlas.org/conflict/posible-contaminacion-de-laguna-conococha-por-proyecto-minero-huambo-peru Pérez, M. A. (2015, 11 20). Proyecto minero Kimsa Orcco y oposición de comunidades de Ccarhuarazo de Tintay, Perú. Retrieved from EJAtlas: https://ejatlas.org/conflict/comunidades-campesinas-de-ccarhuarazo-de-tintay-se-opone-a-proyecto-minero-kimsa-orcco-peru Peru21. (2013, 05 08). Apurímac: Continúan las protestas contra proyecto Los Chancas. Retrieved from Peru21: https://peru21.pe/lima/apurimac-continuan-protestas-proyecto-chancas-105513 Portafolio Periodístico .Tony Alvarado A. (2015, 11 26). El discurso de Edy Benavides Ruiz Alcalde de Bambamarca contra Yanacocha Conga. 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