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Why sovereignty matters : European populist-nationalist parties and the reconstruction of the concept… McIntyre, Michael David 2017

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  WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS: EUROPEAN POPULIST-NATIONALIST PARTIES AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY  by  Michael David McIntyre  B.A., MacEwan University, 2015  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF ARTS
 in
 THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES  (Political Science)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  October 2017  © Michael David McIntyre, 2017    ii Abstract In the recent decade or so, the western democracies have seen a rise in the fame and electoral success of populist-nationalist parties and candidates, particularly in Europe. For example, French Presidential Candidate Marine Le Pen made it to the second round of the presidential election in 2017. Often, these parties are extremely concerned about state sovereignty and mention it in electoral campaigns, documents and speeches. However, it is unclear as to what populist-nationalists mean when they use the word ‘sovereignty.’ I seek to answer this question in this work. In other words, what does sovereignty mean to populist-nationalist parties? I argue that sovereignty means something different to populist-nationalist parties than what previously conceived definitions of sovereignty can offer. Furthermore, I argue that populist-nationalist parties are reconstructing why sovereignty matters and what it means. In order to do this, I utilize a concept known as cultural sovereignty which, with some modification, accurately portrays what sovereignty means to populist-nationalists. I define cultural sovereignty, differently than previous conceptions, as the aim to benefit, protect or maintain the culture of a particular group, the nation or nation-state and retain control over this particular culture or nation-state. I accurately demonstrate this by examining previous research, party documents, interviews, statements and journalistic articles in order to discern a common narrative which I then use to prove that my version of cultural sovereignty encapsulates what these parties mean by sovereignty. My conclusions arise from four general policy areas: aversion supra-national governance (Euroscepticism mainly), anti-immigration, cultural promotion and protection policies and lastly economic nationalism. The insights put forth by this work help us understand what these parties mean and help us understand their conceptions of the world as well as governance in general.     iii Lay Summary   Populist-nationalist parties often claim that they and their policies will protect or return sovereignty to their countries. However, populist-nationalist parties never actually define what they mean by sovereignty or why it is such an important objective. This work argues that populist-nationalist parties are reconstructing why sovereignty is important and what it means. This work argues that populist-nationalist parties conceive sovereignty as ‘cultural.’ In other words, populist-nationalists believe in cultural sovereignty. This work argues that a modified concept of cultural sovereignty accurately explains and demonstrates what populist-nationalists mean by sovereignty. Largely, sovereignty here is essentially a tool which is utilized for the sake of cultural protection. Populist-nationalist parties also wish to preserve the nation-state so that it can be controlled by its own native people. Sovereignty is also retained in order to benefit native inhabitants specifically, even at the expense of others.       iv Preface This dissertation is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, Michael David McIntyre.      v Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ii	Lay Summary ............................................................................................................................... iii	Preface ........................................................................................................................................... iv	Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................... v	Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................................... viii	Dedication ..................................................................................................................................... ix	Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1	1.1 Point of Departure ................................................................................................................. 1	1.2 Previous Conceptions of Sovereignty and Issues ................................................................. 4	Chapter 2: Thesis & Layout ...................................................................................................... 10	2.1 Argument ............................................................................................................................ 10	2.2 Cultural Sovereignty: Other Applications and Previous Usage .......................................... 12	2.3 Relevance ............................................................................................................................ 13	2.4 Old is New Again ............................................................................................................... 14	2.5 Caveats ................................................................................................................................ 15	2.6 Organization ........................................................................................................................ 16	2.7 Method ................................................................................................................................ 17	Chapter 3: Definitions ................................................................................................................ 19	3.1 Populism ............................................................................................................................. 19	3.2 Nationalism ......................................................................................................................... 21	  vi 3.3 Nativism .............................................................................................................................. 22	Chapter 4: Aversion to Supra-National Governance: A Question of Who is in Control ..... 24	4.1 The Nation-State and National Governance ....................................................................... 24	4.2 A Caveat ............................................................................................................................. 25	4.3 FN ....................................................................................................................................... 26	4.4 PVV .................................................................................................................................... 28	4.5 AfD ..................................................................................................................................... 29	4.6 UKIP ................................................................................................................................... 31	4.7 FPÖ ..................................................................................................................................... 32	4.8 PiS ....................................................................................................................................... 33	4.9 Some Clarification .............................................................................................................. 34	Chapter 5: Anti-immigration: For the Sake of Cultural Protection ...................................... 35	5.1 FN ....................................................................................................................................... 35	5.2 PVV .................................................................................................................................... 36	5.3 FPÖ ..................................................................................................................................... 37	5.4 AfD ..................................................................................................................................... 38	5.5 Fidesz .................................................................................................................................. 39	5.6 PiS ....................................................................................................................................... 39	5.7 Final Points and a Caveat .................................................................................................... 40	Chapter 6: Admiration of the Nation and the Defence of Cultural Values ........................... 41	6.1 FN ....................................................................................................................................... 41	6.2 UKIP ................................................................................................................................... 43	  vii 6.3 AfD ..................................................................................................................................... 44	6.4 FPÖ ..................................................................................................................................... 46	6.5 Final Points ......................................................................................................................... 47	Chapter 7: Economic Nationalism: A Case of Who Benefits .................................................. 48	7.1 FN ....................................................................................................................................... 49	7.2 UKIP ................................................................................................................................... 50	7.3 AfD ..................................................................................................................................... 51	7.4 FPÖ ..................................................................................................................................... 52	7.5 Fidesz .................................................................................................................................. 52	7.6 PiS ....................................................................................................................................... 54	7.7 Denouement ........................................................................................................................ 54	Chapter 8: Final Conclusions .................................................................................................... 56	Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 58	   viii Acknowledgments   I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Kurt Hübner for his excellent help throughout this writing process and sharing his experience and knowledge with me. I would also like to thank Professor Antje Ellermann for chairing my committee. I would like to thank all of the wonderful friends I have made at UBC for the support and companionship as well as the faculty and staff at the UBC department of Political Science for enhancing my learning experience and making this possible. Lastly, I would like to thank those who helped me to translate many of the documents that I used.      ix Dedication  This thesis is dedicated to Patricia and Alan McIntyre as well as Marie and Mike Holowaychuk. Thank you for always having my back and believing in me, especially when I needed it most.    1 Chapter 1: Introduction  1.1 Point of Departure During the successful 2016 Brexit referendum campaign, Nigel Farage, a leading Brexiteers and former leader of the populist United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) consistently stressed the necessity to “get our country back.”1 This slogan was plastered all over busses, posters and the like to stress the idea that the British people had lost control over their country, their borders and their future as a result of the United Kingdom’s membership in the European Union (EU). Farage himself wrote that leaving the EU was a strategy and a wish of many UK nationalists to regain British independence, which he self-identifies as; “our democracy is precious and our right to self-determination is one which has been given away by the political class to the EU and bureaucrats such as Jean-Claude Juncker.”2 This type of message is not unique to UKIP. For instance, during many recent French presidential elections as well as both domestic and European parliamentary elections, France’s Front National (National Front, FN) campaigned on leaving the EU in order to regain French sovereignty. The party’s leader, Marine Le Pen proclaimed that “globalization has weaken[d] the immune defences of the nation-state.”3 Le Pen also campaigned on what she called “economic patriotism,” meaning that the French nation should regain control over its industry.4 In the Netherlands, Geert Wilder’s Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom, PVV) campaigned in the 2017 Dutch national elections on a platform of regaining                                                 1 Nigel Farage, “Why we must vote LEAVE in the EU referendum,” Express, June 21, 2016, http://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/681776/nigel-farage-eu-referendum-brexit-vote-leave-independence-ukip (accessed June 12, 2017). 2 Farage, http://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/681776/nigel-farage-eu-referendum-brexit-vote-leave-independence-ukip (accessed June 12, 2017). 3Alasdair Sandford, “What are Marine Le Pen’s policies?” Euronews, February 9, 2017, http://www.euronews.com/2017/02/09/what-do-we-know-about-marine-le-pen-s-policies (accessed June 12, 2017). 4 Sandford, http://www.euronews.com/2017/02/09/what-do-we-know-about-marine-le-pen-s-policies (accessed June 12, 2017).    2 sovereignty, most predominantly to allow the Netherlands to regain the control of its borders to prevent Muslim immigrants from seeking asylum.5 The PVV also campaigned against the EU and promised that it would call a referendum on EU membership if Wilders was elected prime minister, all in the name of sovereignty. As Wilders put it: “We'd finally get our national sovereignty back, as well as our autonomy in matters of monetary and immigration policy.”6 Eastern European populists now in power also frame EU governance as a sovereignty issue.7 This is not only a European spectacle: American President Donald Trump shares similar views. For instance, he stated that one of his reasons for pulling the United States out of the Paris Climate Accord was because the accord would “undermine [America’s] economy, hamstring [its] workers, weaken [its] sovereignty” and further suggested that “it is time to put Youngstown, Ohio, Detroit, Mich., and Pittsburgh, Pa., … before Paris, France.”8   With most populist-nationalist parties and political figures, regaining sovereignty is a central theme to their ideology, electoral platforms and goals.9 But why?  This is the fundamental question of this work. More specifically, populist-nationalist parties have long been skeptical of anything which they believe infringe the sovereignty. However, I question and thus wish to examine what exactly these parties mean when using the term ‘sovereignty.’ Secondly, why are                                                 5 Gordon Darroch, “Immigration still divides the Dutch after turning back far-right Wilders,” The Washington Times, May 16, 2017, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/16/geert-wilders-turned-back-but-immigration-still-di/ (accessed June 12, 2017). 6 Geert Wilders, “Interview with Geert Wilders: Why Dutch Populists Want to Leave the EU,” interview by Susanne Koelbl, Der Spiegel, July 1, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/dutch-populist-geert-wilders-wants-to-leave-the-eu-a-1100931.html (accessed June 12, 2017). 7 Vanessa Gera, “Poland hails the 'huge success' of Trump visiting Warsaw before Paris, Berlin, or London,” Associated Press, June 12, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-poland-hails-upcoming-trump-visit-as-a-huge-success-2017-6 (accessed August 2, 2017). 8 Evan Halper and Alexandra Zavis, “Trump quits the Paris climate accord, denouncing it as a violation of U.S. sovereignty,” The Los Angeles Times, July 1, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-paris-20170601-story.html (accessed August 2, 2017).  9 I will mostly reference the parties in question as populist-nationalist parties. All terms that I have used form other authors such as populist-right can be used interchangeably. I prefer the term ‘populist-nationalist’ as it conveys their main political commonality and ideology in best way.    3 they so focused on sovereignty, seeking to regain it and ensure that state sovereignty does not erode? In other words, why does sovereignty matter to populist-nationalist parties? I seek to answer these questions in this work.  In order to answer these questions, I will focus on the European context and I shall examine a sampling of European populist-nationalist parties from several countries. The parties examined in this work are: Front National (National Front, FN), United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom, PVV), Alternative Für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD), Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ), Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance, Fidesz) and, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice, PiS).  I have chosen these parties specifically due to the relative notoriety or in some cases the electoral success that they have received in recent years. I note though that electoral success is not the main criterion. The AfD, for example, has received far less electoral success relative to some of the other parties on this list. I have also intentionally chosen parties that are in eastern and western Europe as well as parties that are in and out of power. Generally speaking, my main criteria for comparison are ideological outlook and policy preferences; these are what binds them together under the label populist-nationalist. These parties are commonly seen as being populist and nationalist by many scholars.10 They also tend to hold similar policy preferences. Table 1 indicates the policy similarities as well as the slight differences between the parties’ policy preferences which I looked at in order to justify comparing these particular parties.                                                     10 See Cas Mudde, Populist radical right parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  Andrea L. P. Pirro, The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe: Ideology, impact, and electoral performance (New York: Routledge, 2015).   4 Table 1   Note: n/a refers to parties that are in countries outside the Eurozone 1.2 Previous Conceptions of Sovereignty and Issues  Looking through the scholarship on sovereignty which largely comes from the field of international relations, one will find that there are numerous conceptions of sovereignty but they simply do not suffice in the cases of these types of parties. Generally speaking, sovereignty has to do with control, the right to control as well as recognition of that right. However, not all conception’s deal with control only and I will cover one such conception before I move to the more control orientated conceptions. Held’s contribution to the debate is known as cosmopolitan sovereignty. Essentially, this is a set of international principles which are a common moral and political outlook that permeates the international community. They are cosmopolitan principles according to Held which “are principles that can be universally shared and can form the basis for the protection and nurturing of each person’s equal interest in the determination of the institutions that govern his or her life.”11                                                 11 David Held, “Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty,” Legal Theory 8 (2002): 24.  Party Nationalist Eurosceptic/ anti-elite Anti-Eurozone Leave the EU Anti-immigration In Power FN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No UKIP Yes Yes n/a Yes Yes No PVV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No AfD Yes Yes Yes, but try reform first No Yes No FÖ Yes Yes No No Yes No Fidesz Yes Yes n/a No Yes Yes PiS Yes Yes n/a No Yes Yes   5 Two examples of these seven principles are: equal worth and dignity as well as inclusiveness and subsidiarity.12 In general, cosmopolitan sovereignty is an even more global attitude or concept than liberal internationalism for example as it reflects global, cosmopolitan principles that the world ought to embrace or already does to an extent; the nation state almost looses primacy. “Cosmopolitan sovereignty is sovereignty stripped away from the idea of fixed borders and territories governed by states alone, and is instead thought of as frameworks of political regulatory relations and activities, shaped and formed by an overarching cosmopolitan legal framework.”13 The nation-state is only one part of sovereignty here. “States need to be articulated with and relocated within an overarching cosmopolitan framework.”14 “The claims of each person as an individual or as a member of humanity as a whole, these values espouse the idea that human beings are in a fundamental sense equal and that they deserve equal political treatment; that is, treatment based upon the equal care and consideration of their agency irrespective of the community in which they were born or brought up.”15 As will become apparent later on, populist-nationalists espouse many values which are exactly opposite to cosmopolitan sovereignty. They are opposed to equality and global values in many ways for example. Populist-nationalist parties believe that their nation and culture ought to come first which is entirely opposite of cosmopolitan sovereignty. Thus, Held’s conception cannot be used to describe what populist-nationalists mean by ‘sovereignty.’  I now turn to the more control orientated versions of sovereignty. First, there is a concept known as legal sovereignty. To pull Grimm’s definition, “sovereignty in its legal usage has a connection to rule, in the sense that it involves the right to rule, in which the holder of this right,                                                 12 Held, 24.  13 Held, 33.  14 Held, 33.  15 Held, 23.    6 as far as it extends, is controlled by no one else.”16 This is the case regarding both internal and external governmental entities. In other words, the government has the legal right to rule over its territory and external powers do not. The exception to this of course in when treaties are signed and a state willfully gives up sovereignty. The EU for instance gains legal authority over sovereign states as a result of these treaties. However, legal sovereignty alone, in my view, is not able to explain what populist-nationalists want or mean by sovereignty simply because it does not explain why they would want legal control. It cannot explain the goals of populist-nationalist parties. For example, how does legal sovereignty encapsulate why the nation-state ought to have legal control or want to regain it rather than a supra-national body once this control is legally given up? Populist-nationalists likely believe the nation-state should have legal sovereignty and that it should not be given up to supra-national bodies. However, the reasoning is missing here. Put simply, legal sovereignty alone cannot wholly explain the desires of populist-nationalist parties.  Using Hurd’s definition, sovereignty is “the entitlement to rule over a bounded territory, and the recognition of that right by other actors.”17 What is most interesting is Hurd’s characterization of what he calls sovereignty as legitimacy. Hurd argues that the rule of non-intervention (respecting sovereignty) is a “function of states pursuing their interests, where these have been conditioned by a community standard that delimits the acceptable (territorial) reach of state sovereignty.”18 Furthermore, for Hurd, “sovereignty is a feature of the international system; it is ‘an institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is based on territoriality and autonomy.’”19 Control, jurisdiction and authority are key in my project but again, control over the                                                 16 Dieter Grimm, Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 104.  17 Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” International Organization 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 393.  18 Hurd, 387.  19 Hurd, 392.    7 state is not the only issue from the perspective of a populist-nationalist. For a populist-nationalist, sovereignty is more than simply the recognition by others that they are entitled to rule over a particular territory through an international institutional relationship. This is not to say that these aspects are not present as they are important. Again, this is not to say that Hurd’s definition is not correct, it just does not work for populist-nationalist parties. I will argue there is something deeper. That is, deeper concerns which prompt a certain view of sovereignty.  Krasner’s four types of sovereignty (Westphalian, economic, domestic, and interdependence sovereignty) are quite famous and detail specific conceptions of sovereignty that are either dependant on time or where and how this control is executed. However, they do not really speak to why populist-nationalist parties care about sovereignty.20 While Krasner’s reasoning is both ideational and material, it does not seem that there is a nationalistic or symbolic reasoning for upholding them; rational choice is more central here.21 There is more of a rational reasoning and Krasner deals with where authority can be exercised. An explanation as to why sovereignty is required though is not really present. For instance, Westphalian sovereignty, which is concerned with borders, jurisdiction and legitimacy and deals with the exclusion of actors is, while relevant to my work, lacking a reasoning behind it. Is it done for the sake of itself or is something more there?22 A ‘why’ needs to be incorporated into one’s conception of sovereignty; simply having the ability to exercise a certain type of authority over a geographical area does not go far enough in my mind; one needs to know why these parties even care about having authority and control. Sovereignty means something to a particular audience or group and its definition is                                                 20 Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 24. 21 Krasner, 4.  22 Krasner, 4.    8 dependent on who is utilizing the term. This is particularly evident with European populist-nationalist parties.    Ruggie’s idea of sovereignty points more to what I am looking at. Ruggie examines the changing nature of territoriality and how the modern conception of territory came into being from the very beginning. Ruggie then quite comprehensively traces back the origins of territoriality from basic kinship to modern times. Modern territoriality is “the consolidation of all parcelized and personalized authority into one public realm.”23 An important development in my view that Ruggie highlights is the sense of difference and uniqueness; this is a sense of collective identity. However, this notion was not historically reliant on territoriality in the sense that the group was defined by themselves, not the territory that they were living on.24 The modern system however is reliant on territoriality according to Ruggie: “the distinctive feature of the modern system of rule is that it has differentiated its subject collectivity into territorially defined, fixed, and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion.”25  I push Ruggie’s ideas further and effectively suggest that, for the modern populist-nationalist parties, sovereignty is reliant on culture as well as territoriality; both are distinctive features rather than only one or the other. In my view, populist-nationalist parties certainly subscribe to this connection between land and people but it still begs the question of why? A notion of sovereignty in this context ought to demonstrate why it matters and to whom it matters. This idea of collective identity still matters in the case of nationalists: in particular, maintaining a collective identity. In the case of populist-nationalists, this collective identity is based on territory but also a common history, language, and sometimes ethnicity, all of which are included in the                                                 23 John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” International Organization 47, no. 1 (Winter,1993): 151.  24 Ruggie, 149.  25 Ruggie, 151.    9 concept of culture. Identity and sovereignty are connected deeply, but not only for the sake of exercising authority. Fear is a key motivator as well. Particular conceptions of sovereignty are context, time and perspective dependant. Consider Westphalian sovereignty in the era of globalization (interdependence sovereignty) and supra-national governance. One may conclude that Westphalian sovereignty is perhaps less relevant than it was one hundred or two hundred years ago. A sound thought. However, populist-nationalists would likely argue otherwise. What would they argue though? I seek to find a conception of sovereignty that is actually applicable to populist-nationalists’ conceptions of the world through interpreting their agendas.     10 Chapter 2: Thesis & Layout 2.1 Argument I argue that indeed, populist-nationalist parties have redefined sovereignty in their own way. That is, based on their perception of the world, sovereignty has been reconstructed. There is a symbolic nature to the idea of sovereignty in the eyes of nationalists which trumps economic prosperity, or is as at least on par. I will argue that the ultimate goal and reasoning for these types of parties is to attain what is known as cultural sovereignty.26 Culture in this case includes language, traditions, and history of a national group. It is also tied to territory. In this sense, the reasoning for maintaining sovereignty is a sort of cultural defence or protection of national identity which is made of the affirmation aspects of culture. These characteristics are at risk in the eyes of national-populist parties. In other words, I define the concept of cultural sovereignty, as I use it here, as the aim to benefit, protect or maintain the culture of a particular group, the nation or nation-state and retain control over this particular culture or nation-state.  In this work, I argue that, cultural sovereignty,27 in the way I use it, is essentially the ability to exercise authority or power over what one perceives as their culture and the area in which it is native to- the nation-state. With the FN for example, this would be perceived cultural characteristics of France or what constitutes the French nation and the territory that France occupies. Political values are often even considered to be cultural by many of these parties. Note that this concept certainly requires a degree of perception. Positions in these aforementioned policy                                                 26 I note that my version of sovereignty is not in competition with others and can certainly coexist. It is more meant to be applicable to a situation which, in my view, the other conceptions do not suffice. Thus, it can be complemented by other conceptions of sovereignty as well.  27 I purposely use the term ‘sovereignty’ here rather than ‘protection.’ Cultural protection can be applied anywhere. For example, the United Nations (UN) promotes the cultural protection of indigenous peoples throughout the world. I am specifically talking about why the nation-state must retain control or sovereignty over itself in the eyes of populist-nationalists. The word sovereignty applies much better in this specific case as control over the state is in question. For information on the aforementioned UN policies, see: United Nations, “Indigenous Peoples at the UN,” UN, https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/about-us.html (accessed September 10, 2017).    11 areas are largely reactionary and based on perception. What the AfD defines as being a characteristic of German culture or society falls into cultural sovereignty. These threats which threaten the sovereignty of a culture also come from perception. For instance, the AfD advocates against the Muslim burqa as well as Islam itself, arguing that they are not a part of German culture.28 While indeed it is not a traditional German garb nor religion, the suggestion is that Germany cannot adapt to accept it into German culture, or at least normalize it. Others may consider Muslims or other minority groups for that matter, such as Turkish immigrants, to be a part of German culture now. This is such the case when populist-nationalist parties push traditional family values, for example, the FPÖ in Austria. Some Austrians may believe that this is no longer representative of modern Austrian culture. 29 This is what I mean by perception. In this case, cultural sovereignty also requires a deep commitment to the nation-state format, at least in the European context so that the state has the ability to exclude what and who it deems as threats to its cultural sovereignty and include what and who are not perceived as threats. This includes a commitment to the territory that the nation-state is located on as well.30 The nation-state is a quintessential element to the concept of cultural sovereignty in the way I use it. As I said above, the connection between land and people is present for populist-nationalists. “The state is linked to an ethnic community, which again is linked to a certain territory.”31  The state and its nation must be protected. In fact, the nation-state and keeping it is the ideal; globalization is the enemy. Cultural sovereignty is a mean to this end. The nation-state is                                                 28 Alternative für Deutschland, “Grundsätze für Deutschland: Programm der Alternative für Deutschland-Kurzfassung," May 2016, https://www.alternative.fuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/07/2016-06-20_afd-kurzfassung_grundsatzprogramm_webversion.pdf (accessed November 25, 2016). 29 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, “Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ),” June 18, 2011, https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/www.fpoe.at/dokumente/2015/2011_graz_parteiprogramm_englisch_web.pdf 2 (accessed July 17, 2016). 30 I expand on the importance of the nation-state and what it is in section 4.1.  31  Cas Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 187.   12 more relevant than ever if one views the world through the lens of a populist-nationalist. The nation-state is perhaps becoming relevant again as mainstream parties attempt to court voters through the adoption of some populist-nationalist policies, or in some cases, when populist-nationalists gain power. Such is the case in Hungary and Poland.  Lastly, this concept encapsulates what sovereignty itself means -control or jurisdiction- and also expands it to include the cultural dimension which previous conceptions of sovereignty do not seem to cover thus making it applicable in this case.  2.2 Cultural Sovereignty: Other Applications and Previous Usage Before I move on, I would like to acknowledge that the term ‘cultural sovereignty’ has indeed been used and defined before my application of the term. For example, cultural sovereignty has been explored in the realm of indigenous studies. Largely, this term refers to the desire to regain culture that has been already eliminated and even destroyed. An example of this would be indigenous languages that have been historically systematically repressed, assimilated and nearly wiped out. Essentially this is a loss of cultural identity. Cultural sovereignty in this context has been used as a way to affirm indigenous cultural rights and assert cultural autonomy.32 I use this term with populist-nationalist parties though. The difference is that indigenous cultures are typically in the minority. The cultures that populist-nationalists want to protect are in the majority. I also apply it to the nation-state which is already established and is perceived to be in decline. Essentially, this is a larger scale. Thus, it was necessary for me to redefine the term but the moniker of cultural sovereignty works in the case of populist-nationalist parties and sovereignty. I am simply saying that I did not invent the term ‘cultural sovereignty.’ Rather I am applying it in a new context which required some definitional modification. As Cummings notes,                                                 32 Wallace Coffey and Rebecca Tsosie, “Rethinking thinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations,” Stanford Law & Policy Review 12, no, 2 (2001): 196.    13 the term ‘cultural sovereignty’ has not typically been used independent of some form of cultural imperialism, as is the case with indigenous peoples or when applied to the desires of central Asian cultures that were located in the former Soviet Union.33 I use this term in an absence of cultural imperialism thus heavily differentiating myself from previous notions and applications of this term. 2.3 Relevance Some may question the relevance of my assessment or the purpose of it. The key is to address the ideas and ideologies put forth by populist-nationalist parties, understand them and confront them. These ideological outlooks do not disappear as many might think. In many cases, it has been at least partially adopted by more mainstream parties. Thus, despite the fact that many of these nationalist-populist parties do not always gain a great deal of public support, their ideas do permeate into the policies of the major parties in order to remove their electoral edge; fringe parties and their conceptions of the world in this sense matter. The parties may disappear or remain on the fringes but their ideas do not.  There is a mainstreaming effect; the radical ideas of these parties are normalized and then adopted by mainstream or traditional parties to gain votes. This is occurring regarding policies on Islam and the burqa for example. Reportedly, German Chancellor Angela Merkel began opposing the burqa, due to the support that the populist-nationalist AfD is receiving.34 This is also such the                                                 33 Sally N. Cummings. Sovereignty After Empire: Comparing the Middle East and Central Asia (Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 201. 34 Lizzie Dearden, “German parliament votes in favour of partial burqa ban,” The Independent, April 28, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-burqa-ban-law-vote-favour-angela-merkel-islam-muslim-civil-servants-judges-military-a7706781.html (accessed August 1, 2017). Jenny Hill, “Angela Merkel endorses burka ban 'wherever legally possible,'” BBC News, December 6, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38226081 (accessed August 1, 2017).   14 case in Austria as other parties attempt to gain an edge on the FPÖ or bend to pressure from it.35 As a further example of policy creep, the now mainstream populist–nationalist and  governing Fidesz party in Hungary, currently in power with Victor Orbán as Prime Minister, has adopted policies put forth by the even more extreme far right and anti-Semitic party, Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary).36 Because of this effect, it is important to understand these types of ideas, question them and oppose them rather than simply ignoring them and allowing the problem to fester or for these types of positions or policies to become the norm or even dominant.   2.4 Old is New Again  This conception of sovereignty represents a re-positioning so to speak of why the nation-state is required. As some have pointed out, the nation-state has long been the target of liberal economists and others. Many have argued that a more global view is necessary.37 For instance, Habermas states that “while the state’s sovereignty and monopoly on violence remain formally intact, the growing interdependencies of a world society challenge the basic premise that national politics, circumscribed within a determinant national territory, is still adequate to address the actual fates of individual nation-states.”38 Globalization, international organizations and the internet have in the minds of some made the nation-state less relevant and perhaps even archaic.39 Economic                                                 35 Darko Janjevic, “Austrian parliament passes burqa ban as part of new migrant law,” Deutsche Welle, May 17, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/austrian-parliament-passes-burqa-ban-as-part-of-new-migrant-law/a-38866553 (accessed August 1, 2017). 36 Keno Verseck, “Blurring Boundaries: Hungarian Leader Adopts Policies of Far-Right,” Der Spiegel, January 30, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ruling-hungarian-fidesz-party-adopts-policies-of-far-right-jobbik-party-a-880590.html (accessed August 1, 2017). 37 See Peter Singer, One world: The ethics of globalization (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002).  Amartya Sen, The idea of justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2009).  Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, ed. and trans. Max Pensky, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).  38 Habermas, 70.  39 Dani Rodrick, “Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography— Who Needs the Nation-State?” Economic Geography 89 (2013): 1–19.   15 globalization has been particularly important and is pointed to as a mechanism that has made the nation-state less relevant.  Since the 2008 financial crisis, some individuals of multiple political persuasions have begun to question globalization, and economic globalization in particular.40 Many populist parties have subscribed to this critical narrative and are greatly skeptical towards globalization and globalists. Numerous citizens have suffered because of globalization in developing states, but for right-wing populists the focus is more on those nationals who have lost out from globalization. The FN focusses heavily and attains success in the former manufacturing regions of France which have been negatively affected by globalization.41 Thus, the withering away of the nation-state has caused hardship in the eyes of these parties and as a result, this erosion process must be reversed in order to protect the national group. “For the populist radical right two categories are particularly important in terms of identity and politics: the nation and the state.”42  2.5 Caveats Now, no doubt, there are certainly contextual elements to this, both in terms of where this nationalism takes place and the audience that it is being catered too. Populist-nationalists in Hungary are not identical to their German counterparts. For instance, some parties are far more hostile towards the EU and the Euro than others. The FN and the AfD are like this respectively. Others are much more immigration focused- such as the PVV. Precise policies and party actions are context dependant but the overall themes of policies are what I have described above. I shall                                                 40 Dani Rodrick, The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, States and Democracy Can’t Coexist  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), XIV.  41 Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, “How France’s National Front is winning working-class voters,” Financial Times, October 21, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/ad9502f4-8099-11e6-bc52-0c7211ef3198?mhq5j=e3 (accessed July 14, 2017).  42 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties is Western Europe, 64.    16 therefore extract my argument of cultural sovereignty from a selection of parties’ positions in these policy areas which will thus be applicable to all. But the reader must note that I acknowledge that there will be inconsistencies in terms of precise policy comparisons.  Context also relates to the culture of a particular state, nation or community. I am aware that perhaps culture is different for different groups but I am using the general conception of it which comes from the common understanding of culture and what it consists of mentioned above.  2.6 Organization  If one is to look at a sampling of all of these parties in Europe and their major electoral platforms, one will come to this conclusion. For them, governance is a way to save and protect their nations from perceived threats. The main positions of populist-nationalists, which forms the bulk of their electoral platforms can be generalized into four main categories which are as follows: aversion to supra-national governance (Euroscepticism mainly), anti-immigration, cultural promotion and protection policies and lastly economic nationalism.   All of these major policy areas connect to cultural sovereignty. These issues are also not necessarily independent of one another; they overlap. Cultural defence is the reasoning for these policy preferences above all else. What is necessary to this is an othering technique or a ‘them and us’ mentality. In other words, sovereignty is ‘you’: you the French people are unique and thus deserve to be sovereign and to govern or control yourselves via your own state, and those who are not like you ought not to share this sovereign nation-state and its benefits with you. ‘This club is for members only’ and there is a hierarchy even if one happens to join the club. Sovereignty is a way to retain as well as reinforce national and cultural identity. In other words, these types of parties reconstruct what sovereignty means through nationalist identity politics. That is, a common homogenous national history which is tied together through the various components of culture. Of   17 course, this is not in reality a homogenous national experience but the commonalities between members of a national group which create what we would call ‘Polishness,’ ‘Frenchness’ and so on. Even policies that seemingly would not connect, such as economics, can relate back to nationality. It is about economic prosperity for certain people or at least certain people first. Certain people matter more than others. Britons should benefit rather than Polish or Muslim immigrants. Domestic workers are more important. There is a symbolic nature to this; sovereignty ought not apply to the other. Symbolism is everywhere for populist-nationalists, but it is not always rational.  2.7 Method Lastly, in order to prove my argument, I shall examine a variety of parties or cases by means of what can be called ‘comparative dialogue.’ Rather than emphasizing causal explanations, I am interested in identifying a common narrative that helps to understand the rise of efforts to reconstruct sovereignty by the various populist-nationalist parties listed above. In this sense, I use this ‘comparative dialogue’ in order to compare various pieces of data. I will extract my evidence for my argument from policy statements, interviews, party manifestos, speeches, election campaigns as well as previous scholarly and journalistic work. I heavily rely on press articles and party documents simply because of the relatively recent success and attention that these parties have received at the time of writing. Through interpreting and combining this information, I come to the conclusion that the concept of cultural sovereignty is the concept that can explain how populist-nationalist conceive of sovereignty, why it is so important and why they want it.  Again, this is the concept of cultural sovereignty reimagined by myself.  This also means that this work is largely based on my own interpretation of the various statements, manifestos and so on produced by these parties. I do acknowledge that one may   18 interpret what I have read slightly differently. Also, the majority of the sources have been published within the last ten years at the time of writing in order to keep my analysis up to date, as the parties have evolved over time.  It is also worthwhile mentioning that many of the statements used come from the leaders of these parties. With populist-nationalist parties, the leader is often a charismatic speaker and is the face and voice of the party. They tend to receive the most press attention as well.  All of this will be conducted categorically based on the policy areas mentioned above: aversion to supra-national governance, anti-immigration, cultural promotion and protection policies as well as economic nationalism. Each category will consist of analysis of specific parties in order to prove the overall thesis; each subsection is essentially about a specific party. Dividing up the sections this way is the best way to demonstrate the positions of these parties on each particular policy issue.   Lastly, there is indeed a limit on the number of parties and documents that I was able to examine in the scope of this work. I have limited my selection to parties that have received media attention and electoral success in recent years. Of course, more work could be done with a larger scope; a greater number of parties as well as additional issues could be examined to further this research. In any case, it is my position that the amount of parties examined here demonstrates my argument well.     19 Chapter 3: Definitions In order to fully assess the topic at hand, some terms need to be defined. These terms will help in understanding what I mean when I use them and why populist-nationalist parties are defined as such. I have used the categorization and the definitions of these terms in order to interpret and understand what these parties mean.  3.1 Populism  I shall first address the concept of populism. This is a complicated term in which many scholars have contributed. Entire works are often solely dedicated to analyzing and defining the term itself. There is not really one specific political platform that populists adopt; it is not as tight a definition as is socialism or conservatism. Nevertheless, there are certain similar characteristics that these parties share, particularly populist-nationalist parties. Generally, speaking, several elements are present.   Mudde’s definition is quite encompassing. Populism is defined as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.”43 Anti-elitism and claiming to represent the people go hand in hand. Thus, large intergovernmental or supra-national organizations, including the EU and its bodies such as the EU Commission are considered to be corrupt. In the eyes of populist-nationalist parties, these EU leaders are globalists who are not representative of the nation-state nor the people in the eyes of populist-nationalist parties. Thus, they are always Eurosceptic to varying degrees.                                                  43 Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition 39, no. 4 (Autumn 2004): 543.    20 Euroscepticism also arises from an aversion to globalization and a distaste for what can be called cosmopolitanism. Identity politics plays a large role here too, as these parties claim to be the representatives of particular national and cultural identities. In particular, the notion of ‘cultural backlash’ or rejection of progressive changes in culture. A rejection of multiculturalism is an example of cultural backlash.44 This suggests that the populist right view cosmopolitanism or progressiveness as threats. Xenophobia, Euroscepticism, political correctness, and pro-immigration are all aspects of what are considered to be ‘new’ culture. This is compounded by economic factors, in particular, the negative effects of globalization. Both are seen as threats.45 Most populist-nationalist parties advocate for policies that are anti-globalization, as I have alluded to above.  What is particularly important for my purposes here is the notion of homogeneity, specifically cultural homogeneity. Populists and right wing nationalists in particular, thrive off of a degree of homogeneity, and it is a goal of these parties. For instance, anti-immigration is a large policy area which these parties adopt. Populists in turn claim to represent the entirety of this generally homogenous group. This homogenous group must be maintained and threats to it must be dealt with.46 These threats come in the form of supra-national governance, immigration and so on. Taggart describes populist as individuals which “engage in politics when they perceive crisis.”47 This could be a threat to culture for example. There are two forms of identities at play here which are utilized for political gain: national identities and those who self-identify as the                                                 44 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash” HKS Working Paper No. RWP16-026, July 29, 2016, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2818659, (accessed May 18, 2017).  45 Inglehart and Norris, 1-4. 46 Mudde (2007), 22. See also Teun Pauwels, Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 25.   47 Paul Taggart, Populism (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000), 3.    21 ‘average person’ rather than as an elite.48 Populists of the right claim to represent and protect both. This national homogenous group is thus represented by the populist party and its candidates. They represent the true people in their view. Marine Le Pen’s 2017 presidential campaign slogan was “Au nom du peuple” (in the name of the people) for example.49 In other words, they claim to represent the people, seemingly certain people. Claiming to represent the true will of the people or the nation is something that all populists do.50 This is tied to cultural sovereignty, as these parties make their arguments on behalf of their cultural group.  3.2 Nationalism Defining nationalism is necessary when examining the goals of nationalist parties. The nation is a category or form of collective identity which has given political legitimacy to the state and has been represented by the sovereign nation-state. The recognition of cultural differences has allowed for the creation of some type of independent governance structure.51 Therefore, the nation-state is based off of “the idea that there is a distinct cultural group which inhabits a distinct territory and that this group, by virtue of its cultural distinction, is entitled to recognition and some form of autonomous government.”52 Essentially, this is ethno-cultural nationalism. Nationalism is “a collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit.”53 That is, it is “primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.”54                                                  48 These are likely affluent individuals, carrier politicians, EU employees, media types, urbanites and so on.  49 Kim Wilsher, “The family name and party logo have gone but can Marine Le Pen detoxify her brand?” The Guardian, January 7, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/07/marine-le-pen-front-national-revamp-french-presidential-election (accessed July 4, 2017).  50 Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 3.  51 Erika Harris, “Nation-state and the European Union: Lost in a Battle for Identity,” Politicka Misao: Croatian Political Science Review 48, no. 2 (2011): 93. 52 Harris, 93. 53 Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 7.  54 Ernest Gellner. Nations and Nationalism. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 1.    22 All of this points to a sense of cultural sovereignty. The nation-state should essentially be a representation of the group which inhabits it. Note that this suggests that the borders of a state should be congruent with the nation. One can infer from this that those who ought to be in control of this state should be of the nation responsible for defining the area in which it is located. Territoriality is therefore key. From the nationalist point of view, Hungary for example is a state which was in general formed due to the fact that a group of individuals (Magyars in this case) inhabited a particular area and identified as having a particular identity with cultural, ethnic and linguistic connections. Consequently, the Hungarian state today is at least partially a result of a culture and a nation that is tied to an area of land. Thus, hostility to outside government is reasonable and justifiable if one subscribes to nationalism wholeheartedly. Populist-nationalist parties are thus sceptical of EU governance as well as globalization. It is likely that any negative effects caused by globalization and supra-national governance will thus be amplified due to viewing the world in this manner. However, nationalism only explains so much, because it cannot explain why immigrants are frowned upon in this context as they could become members of the nation or at least welcomed and integrated. We need nativism too. 3.3 Nativism Nativism and nationalism go hand in hand here. Nativism in particular is important when examining which citizens, the populist right actually care about. I will utilize Mudde’s definition of nativism in this case as well for the sake of consistency and the sake of quality. Mudde defines nativism as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state.”55 This is particularly important in terms of                                                 55 Mudde (2007), 19.   23 immigration policy, specifically the stances taken against Muslim immigrants. Islam is seen as being incompatible with western values including, but not limited to, individual freedom, democracy and gay rights.56 This nativism is key to cultural sovereignty as it strongly affirms that certain individuals are culturally acceptable to inhabit a particular region or state.                                                   56 Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah L. de Lange, Matthijs Rooduijn, “Inclusion and mainstreaming? Radical right-wing populist parties in the new millennium,” in Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe Into the Mainstream? ed. Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah L. de Lange, Matthijs Rooduijn, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 5.     24 Chapter 4: Aversion to Supra-National Governance: A Question of Who is in Control One of the most major policy positions that populist-nationalist parties hold is an aversion to supra-national governance. This is primarily Euroscepticism. In fact, it is largely the anti-EU policies that have increased the fame and notoriety of these parties. While there are certainly several reasons why populist-nationalist parties are opposed to the EU, including a democratic deficit, economic performance, over-regulation, perceived corruption and so on, I argue that there is a larger reason which adds a cultural dimension to the equation, a dimension that also connects to both sovereignty and governance. The key is governance and control by who. Who is in control of the nation-state is important for populist-nationalist parties. In short, I argue that populist-nationalist parties have a very nativist and nationalist conception of control in which they believe that native people/culture or the nation should have the ultimate control over a state rather than a supra-national organization. I therefore demonstrate this point in this chapter by analyzing various populist-nationalist parties individually. After all, sovereignty refers to control. 4.1 The Nation-State and National Governance  Why exactly is the term ‘nation-state’ term even used?  The notion is that it is a sovereign state that is controlled and inhabited by a relatively homogenous group. The key aspect of this is the combination of nation, sovereignty and control. Nation-states are a product of nationalism and a nationalistic effort to render the boundaries of a particular area congruent with those who inhabit this land, at least in theory. Populist-nationalist parties often use the term ‘nation-state’ in their literature and speeches. “[Nationalism] has been the founding ideology of the global division of territory into (so-called) nation-states since the late eighteenth century.”57 The nation here is therefore tied to territory. Since the eighteenth century, the nation as a category or form of                                                 57 Mudde (2007), 17.    25 collective identity has given political legitimacy to the state and has been represented by the sovereign nation-state. The traditional, European understanding of politics has been closely and intimately connected to the national cultures, national identity, national languages and the symbolism of each national community.58 No doubt, this is hardly actually true and nation-states are not homogenous entities but this homogenous or pure vison of a nation-state is generally true if or when one wholly subscribes to nationalism. In theory, France was created through the combination of French identity, the French nation and the French state. Thus, France is a nation-state. Again, there are certainly holes in this line of reasoning but it is generally true for a populist-nationalist party. Control by a particular nation or culture is what I am getting at.  I would argue that if one views the world and governance through this strict or fundamentalist nation-state type of lens, supra-national governance bodies such as the EU would be seen as being illegitimate and an infringement on the nation-state’s sovereignty. In this sense, supra-national governance can be seen as an affront to cultural governance or cultural sovereignty. It is also the case that governance should be the responsibility of the national government rather than supra-national governing body if this type of view of the world is to be wholly subscribed to. 4.2 A Caveat It should be clear that the nationalism or the notion of the nation-state which I have described is not fundamental nor is this an attempt to suggest that European states are ethnically homogeneous on my part, although perhaps some factions of certain parties wish for this to be the case. Rather, the general historical basis of the existence of the European state and therefore the nation-state’s legitimacy is based on the idea that the governance of that state is a representation of the nation or people who identify with that nation which it governs. Populist-nationalist parties                                                 58 Harris, 93.   26 and their supporters likely subscribe to this type of thought to varying degrees; the level of distain for supra-national organizations differs among parties. This is both true for ethnically based states like Hungary or civic nationalist states such as France.  4.3 FN For a populist-nationalist party like the FN in France and others, the EU is perceived as unrepresentative and a threat to the nation-state. For example, the further centralization of EU organizations is viewed by the FN as a direct attempt to replace governance by the nation and weaken the authority of the nation-based governance system.59 Essentially it is overstepping itself into a governance role.  The FN is deeply attached to the idea of the nation-state. Le Pen herself once proclaimed that “the time of the nation state is back!”60 The further centralization of EU organizations is viewed by the FN as a direct attempt to replace governance by the nation and weaken the authority of the nation-based governance system.61 The FN then wishes to remove France from the EU if this trend of ‘nation-state replacement’ continues. An example of this loss of authority would be the single EU currency. Once a state joins the monetary union of the EU, the state loses its authority over the currency it uses. The European Central Bank controls this currency, France does not. The FN advocates withdrawing from the Eurozone, as the Euro is considered by the party to be a total failure and a symbol of the federalist nature of the EU and its control over France’s monetary                                                 59 Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Carole J. Wilson, “Does left/right structure party positions on European integration?” in European Integration and Political Conflict, ed. Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen, (Cambridge, GB: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 131. 60 Angelique Chrisafis, “The nation state is back': Front National's Marine Le Pen rides on global mood,” The Guardian, September 18, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/18/nation-state-marine-le-pen-global-mood-france-brexit-trump-front-national (accessed July 17, 2017). 61 Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Carole J. Wilson, 131.   27 freedom.62 The FN wants to regain “national monetary sovereignty.”63 Nation-state or national control is key.  Le Pen’s 2017 presidential run was heavily based on a platform to remove France from the EU. The first point of her 144-point manifesto says why: “to regain our freedom and mastery of our destiny by giving back sovereignty to the French people (monetary, legislative, territorial, economic). The objective is to achieve a European project respectful of the independence of France, national sovereignties and serving the interests of the people.”64 This has control written all over; the French nation should be in control. The immigration policies of the EU have been seen as a threat to the French nation in the eyes of the FN, in particular, the open boarder policy known as the Schengen Area, which the party wishes to remove France from.65 “The Schengen Area represents a territory where the free movement of persons is guaranteed. The signatory states to the agreement have abolished all internal borders in lieu of a single external border.”66 The result of this is that France is not entirely in control of its own borders. At this stage of my work, remember that the issue of border control here is the control itself rather than what this lack of control can result in (immigration, which will be covered later) in the FN’s view. The issue of borders is twofold. It first represents a loss of authority and control from the French nation-state but it is also an enabler of what the FN sees as cultural threats such as immigration from Africa and the Middle East.                                                  62 Front National, “Euro: Une fin maitrisée pour libérer la croissance,” http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/redressement-economique-et-social/euro/, (accessed November 23, 2016).  63 Angelique Chrisafis, “Marine Le Pen rails against rampant globalisation after election success,” The Guardian, April 24, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/24/marine-le-pen-rails-against-rampant-globalisation-after-election-success (accessed July 17, 2017). 64 Front National, “144 Engagements Présidentiels,” February 2017, https://www.marine2017.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/projet-presidentiel-marine-le-pen.pdf (accessed July 5, 2017).  65 Front National, “Europe: Une Europe au service des peuples libres,” http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/politique-etrangere/europe/ (accessed November 23, 2016). 66 Access to European Law, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Al33020 (accessed July 5, 2017).    28 4.4 PVV The PVV holds a similar position. As with the FN, the PVV campaigned in 2017 on a promise that if elected, Geert Wilders would take the Netherlands out of the EU (‘Nexit’). According to Wilders “the European Union is a political bureaucratic organisation that took away our [the Netherlands’] identity and our national sovereignty.”67  Furthermore, Wilders proclaimed that he “would get rid of the European Union [so that the Netherlands could be] a nation-state again."68 Clearly, he and his party are still attached to the nation state model. The control is a key issue here. Again, who is in control is the main point. The nation state must control its own borders for the PVV. For a country to be fully sovereign, it must control its own borders for the purpose. “The EU leaves us [the Netherlands] no freedom to determine our [its] own immigration and asylum laws. That's why leaving the EU is necessary.” 69  States should have the following: “their own country, their own values. Their own money. Their own borders.”70 This seems to be a largely symbolic proposition which I argue is perfectly articulated by my reformulated conception of cultural sovereignty. The premise behind this statement is that a specific nation or culture should be in in control of itself. Thus, the control factor of sovereignty is accounted for. Those who are of a different culture ought not to control a state which is not their own and the EU is exactly this: the perception is that Brussels controls the Netherlands rather than The Hague.                                                  67 Vickiie Oliphant, “Now for NEXIT: Geert Wilders says FIRST job as PM will be to call EU referendum,” Express, February 9, 2017, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/765172/Geert-Wilders-European-Union-referendum-Nexit-Dutch-election (accessed July 12, 2017). 68 Oliphant, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/765172/Geert-Wilders-European-Union-referendum-Nexit-Dutch-election (accessed July 12, 2017). 69 Wilders, “Interview with Geert Wilders: Why Dutch Populists Want to Leave the EU,” interview by Susanne Koelbl, Der Spiegel, July 1, 2016) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/dutch-populist-geert-wilders-wants-to-leave-the-eu-a-1100931.html (accessed June 12, 2017). 70 Oliphant, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/765172/Geert-Wilders-European-Union-referendum-Nexit-Dutch-election, (accessed July 12, 2017).   29 The PVV accuses the EU of becoming a mass super-state which is on track to replace the nation-state making the Netherlands a “province” of the European state.71 They also wish to eliminate any sort of EU nationalism that is being pushed by this EU super-state.72 The PVV thus perceives this as an infringement or erosion of sovereignty which much be reversed. This is again perceived as the loss of control by the nation-state and the nation or those who are deemed deserved to be in control. 4.5 AfD The AfD in Germany subscribes to a similar type of ideology. The departure from the Eurozone is a very large issue for the AfD; since their inception, they have called for Germany to leave the monetary union. The single monetary union has been a disaster in the eyes of the AfD and is not something that can be saved. It believes that the nation-state should be the sole controller of its monetary policy. This is framed by the AfD in a somewhat less blunt manner, as they state that the economies of different countries are distinctive and thus, a single monetary system cannot adapt to these different economic conditions. Therefore, the Euro cannot be sustained in the AfD’s view. 73  “We stand for the freedom of the European nations from foreign paternalism. State-level structures, economic prosperity and a stable, performance-oriented social system are part of national responsibility.”74                                                 71 Partij voor de Vrijheid, “De agenda van hoop en optimisme Een tijd om te kiezen: PVV 2010-2015,” https://www.pvv.nl/images/stories/Webversie_VerkiezingsProgrammaPVV.pdf (accessed July 12, 2017).  72 Partij voor de Vrijheid, “De agenda van hoop en optimisme Een tijd om te kiezen: PVV 2010-2015,” https://www.pvv.nl/images/stories/Webversie_VerkiezingsProgrammaPVV.pdf (accessed July 12, 2017). 73 Alternative für Deutschland, “Courage to Stand Up for Germany. For European Diversity,” 2014, http://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2014/04/AfD-Manifesto-for-Europe-summary.pdf (accessed November 25, 2016).  74 Alternative für Deutschland, “Grundsätze für Deutschland: Programm der Alternative für Deutschland-Kurzfassung," May 2016, https://www.alternative.fuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/07/2016-06-20_afd-kurzfassung_grundsatzprogramm_webversion.pdf (accessed November 25, 2016).   30 While it is not overtly stated, it appears that the AfD believes that the single monetary policy is also an infringement on German sovereignty. For example, they assert in their 2016 manifesto several policy proposals which are related to sovereignty. They proclaim that “Europe must not become a centralized federal state [and that they wish] to return competencies to the national states [as well as] to end the Euro experiment.”75 This statement suggests that the centralization of particular areas of governance, such as monetary policy, are an infringement on sovereignty and should be returned to the control of the nation-state. This emphasis on German sovereignty and freedom from the EU seems to have ramped up in their newer manifestos and policy statements. “We reject the ‘United States of Europe’ as much as an EU as a federal state from which no exit is possible.”76 Furthermore, the AfD states: “Our goal is a sovereign Germany that guarantees the freedom and security of its citizens, promotes prosperity and contributes to a peaceful and prosperous Europe.”77  It is evident here that the party favours sovereignty and self-governance by the German state and not the centralized authority in Brussels, especially since Germany has heavily economically benefited from using the Euro; this cannot be rationalized in economic terms.78 The AfD essentially accuses the EU government of wishing to replace the national governments of EU nations, taking governance away from the European nations in those particular states. In the words of the AfD, “the vision of a European large-scale state means the inevitable loss of national                                                 75 Alternative für Deutschland, “Kernpunkte für Deutschland,“ 2016, https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/06/AfD_Faltblatt_Wahlprogr_RL.pdf (accessed November 25, 2016).  76 Alternative für Deutschland, “Grundsätze für Deutschland: Programm der Alternative für Deutschland-Kurzfassung," May 2016,  https://www.alternative.fuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/07/2016-06-20_afd-kurzfassung_grundsatzprogramm_webversion.pdf (accessed November 25, 2016). 77 Alternative für Deutschland, “Grundsätze für Deutschland: Programm der Alternative für Deutschland-Kurzfassung," May 2016,  https://www.alternative.fuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/07/2016-06-20_afd-kurzfassung_grundsatzprogramm_webversion.pdf (accessed November 25, 2016). 78 Stephen Padgett, William E. Paterson and Reimut Zohlnhöfer, “Introduction,” in Developments in German Politics 4, ed. Stephen Padgett, William E. Paterson, Reimut Zohlnhöfer, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 1.    31 sovereignty by the individual states of the EU and their peoples. But only the national democracies, created by their nations through a painful history are able to provide their citizens with the necessary and desired identification and protection spaces.”79 It is evident here that the AfD values self-governance of a nation by the nation. The party values governance of its own country by its own people; the nation-state. “The political leadership of the big EU countries wants to transform the European Union into a single state at all costs and which is against the wishes of the apparent majority of European people. Instead, we demand that the national states be preserved and be given more capabilities.”80  4.6 UKIP Again, with UKIP in Great Britain, the same themes persist: self-rule. For UKIP, the greatest achievement was Brexit and self-rule was a key aspect of this sovereignty push. The British people should govern the UK, not the EU. Former UKIP leader Nigel Farage often accused the EU of nation-state replacement and therefore the end of nation-state self-control. For example, Farage accused EU President Herman Van Rampuy of attempting to overthrow the nation-state.81 Seemingly, one of Farage’s main accomplishments was what he called “the return of nation-state democracy.”82 Essentially, Farage is suggesting that he and his party favour control by British citizen through the democratic process. The key, as always, is control by who: British citizens. Thus again, the threat of nation-state replacement and supra-national control is an issue of cultural                                                 79 Alternative für Deutschland, “Programm für Deutschland: Das Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland,” (May 2016), 17, https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/05/2016-06-27_afd-grundsatzprogramm_web-version.pdf (accessed November 25, 2016). 80 Alternative für Deutschland, “Grundsätze für Deutschland: Programm der Alternative für Deutschland-Kurzfassung," May 2016, https://www.alternative.fuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/07/2016-06-20_afd-kurzfassung_grundsatzprogramm_webversion.pdf. (accessed November 25, 2016). 81 The Guardian, “Ukip's Nigel Farage tells Van Rompuy: You have the charisma of a damp rag,” The Guardian, February 25, 2010,  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/25/nigel-farage-herman-van-rompuy-damp-rag (accessed July 16, 2017).  82 United Kingdom Independence Party, “The Democratic Revolution has just begun,” December 14, 2016, http://www.ukip.org/the_democratic_revolution_has_just_begun (accessed July 16, 2017).    32 control- a particular culture ought to control itself. Farage himself nicely projects this idea in the following statement: “the word we used to use was sovereignty. It’s about self-government. It’s about identity.”83 As a final point here, for UKIP, the case for national self-control is pushed in order for Great Britain to ‘regain’ control of their borders, mostly for the sake of controlling immigration. This is particularly evident in their 2015 manifesto.84 4.7 FPÖ  In Austria, the FPÖ is also concerned with EU governance. The party cites the cultural diversity of Europe and insinuates that the EU is putting this at risk. For example: “we are committed to a Europe of peoples and autochthonous groups of people which have developed through history, and firmly reject any artificial synchronisation of the diverse European languages.”85 Furthermore, the FPÖ is “committed to a Europe of self-determined peoples and fatherlands” believing that “sovereign member States must have absolute priority over community law.”86  Moreover, the party wishes for “renationalization of competencies - legislation can be re-transferred more strongly to the national parliaments by amending the EU treaties” thus giving power back to the nation-state.87 Lastly, the FPÖ wants “social security and justice in all Member States and are therefore committed to the preservation of our nationalized, solidarity systems and                                                 83 Leda Reynolds, “'We want our country back' Farage rallies troops ahead of 'Independence Day' Brexit vote,” Express, April 26, 2016, http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/664333/We-want-our-country-back-Farage-rallies-troops-ahead-of-Independence-Day-Brexit, (accessed July 16, 2017). 84 United Kingdom Independence Party, “Believe in Britain: UKIP Manifesto 2015,” 2015, http://www.ukip.org/manifesto2015, (accessed July 16, 2017).  85 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, “Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ),” June 18, 2011, “https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/www.fpoe.at/dokumente/2015/2011_graz_parteiprogramm_englisch_web.pdf 2 (accessed July 17, 2016). 86 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, “Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ),” June 18, 2011, “https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/www.fpoe.at/dokumente/2015/2011_graz_parteiprogramm_englisch_web.pdf 2 (accessed July 17, 2016). 87 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, “Program,” 2014, http://www.fpoe.eu/dokumente/programm/ (accessed August 2, 2017).   33 our social networks.”88 In other words, keep the power with the nation-state. The FPÖ do seem to value nation-state governance over EU governance- EU members are responsible for law rather than the EU itself for example. However, the party does no advocate for to leaving the EU. 4.8 PiS  In Poland, the ruling PiS continues with the Euroscepticism. While there is no threat to leave the EU, PiS certainly wants to temper the governance of the EU over Poland. In particular, the PiS and Brussels have been clashing over the rule of law in Poland. The controversy is over some laws passed by the PiS which give the government more control over the media. The PiS also appointed members to the Supreme Court which are friendly to the party and its values. The European commission claims that this is a danger to democracy and is contrary to the EU rule of law framework.89 Prime Minister Andrzej Duda, stated that this was a sovereignty issue and that the EU should not intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign, independent country.90  Sovereignty is key for the PiS. “Our own sovereign nation is a key value for us, because without it we cannot realize other values that we consider to be fundamental.”91 Again, a main focus here is self-control. For the goals of political, economic and cultural sovereignty to be accomplished, the Polish nation or “national community” as PiS puts it must be in control and not the EU.92 “The EU is - and must remain - an international organization; only and so far, - an                                                 88 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, “Program,” 2014, http://www.fpoe.eu/dokumente/programm/ (accessed August 2, 2017). 89 Emmet Livingstone, “Thousands take to streets to protest Poland’s Law and Justice party,” Politico, June 5, 2017, http://www.politico.eu/article/thousands-protest-against-poland-law-and-justice-party-warsaw/ (accessed July 17, 2017).  90 Deutsche Welle, “Poland defends 'sovereignty' as EU probes controversial reforms,” Deutsche Welle, January 19, 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/poland-defends-sovereignty-as-eu-probes-controversial-reforms/a-18990294 (accessed July 17, 2017).  91 Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, “Program Parwa I Wiedliwości 2014,” 2014: 12, http://pis.org.pl/dokumenty (accessed July 17, 2017).  92 Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, “Program Parwa I Wiedliwości 2014,” 2014: 13, http://pis.org.pl/dokumenty (accessed July 17, 2017).    34 international organization and therefore an association of sovereign, i.e. independent, states. An act that allows the application of EU law in Poland is the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.”93  4.9 Some Clarification  For populist nationalist-parties, control is a central issue and the ‘infringement’ by the EU is a large concern. The cultural dimension comes into play when parties use the language of ‘nation-states,’ culture and so one. As populists, they believe that they can represent the true people and as nationalists, they wish to have the nation controlled by its own culture or people. This is why populist-nationalist parties have an aversion to supra-national governance: it is all about control, control by a specific group. Therefore, this is one aspect which leads to the creation of the concept of cultural sovereignty.                                                   93 Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, “Program Parwa I Wiedliwości 2014,” 2014: 150, http://pis.org.pl/dokumenty (accessed July 17, 2017).    35 Chapter 5: Anti-immigration: For the Sake of Cultural Protection  Anti-immigration is a signature policy position adopted by populist-nationalist parties. They all share a hostility towards immigration to varying degrees. In the previous chapter, it was clear that borders were a major area in which populist-nationalist parties focus their efforts. In that chapter, it was all about control. Now, I want to emphasize why control over borders matters to these parties. It is all about controlling or even completely stopping immigration. I argue that populist-nationalist parties view general immigration and especially uncontrolled immigration, as an extreme threat to their culture and nation. New immigrants are viewed as a risk in the sense that those who do not share the culture of the native land will dilute or even eventually erase the culture of a specific nation-state. Immigration from Islamic countries in particular is heavily opposed. In this case then, cultural sovereignty applies because control is needed for the sake of cultural protection and a control over how a state’s culture evolves, or in this case, remains the same. I note that this is all perceived through the eyes of these parties and potentially their supporters. Aversion to supra-national governance applies here, as populist-nationalist parties view the EU as a threat to their nation because of what they typically deem as uncontrolled immigration. Hostility to Muslim immigration in particular is a major theme here and is seemingly what is perceived as the largest cultural threat because they are seen as unable to integrate and therefore incompatible with the cultural group that populist-nationalists claim to represent.  5.1 FN  The FN, for example, has been extremely hostile towards Muslim immigrants and Islamic culture. Le Pen still openly advocates against Muslim immigration declaring that the secularism which is crucial to French political culture has been undermined by mass Muslim immigration. The FN even goes as far as declaring that the influx of Muslim culture, such as the wide availability   36 of halal foods and the construction of mosques, are direct threats to French culture which the FN will defend against.94 The FN seeks to ensure that French society is preserved and as a result, the party is resistant to changes that it perceives will change France and its society. The conception of French society comes through the cultural development of its civilization that has occurred throughout history. This preservation that the FN seeks comes in part by borders; they believe that closing off France from external influences which are deemed as threats by the party is the way in which French traditions and culture can be preserved, unchanged and saved. The FN seeks to ensure that French society is preserved, and as a result, the party is resistant to changes that they perceive will change France and its society. For instance, in the 2017 presidential election, Le Pen proclaimed in her 144-point manifesto that she would put the “defence of the nation and the people at the heart of any public decision and above all wants the protection of [French] national identity” and argued that immigration, among other things, was a primary threat.95 96 5.2 PVV  In the Netherlands, the PVV has have been extremely hostile towards Muslims and Muslim immigrants; stopping Muslim immigration is one of the main goals of the party. Wilders has become famous essentially because of his anti-Islamic stance and extreme statements about Islam. The PVV’s 2017 manifesto suggests that an influx of Muslim immigrants and migrants will result                                                 94 Dominque Reynié, “‘Heritage Populism’ and France’s National Front,” Journal of Democracy 27 no. 2 (October 2016), 51-4. 95 Front National, “144 Engagements Présidentiels” February 2017: 2, https://www.marine2017.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/projet-presidentiel-marine-le-pen.pdf (accessed July 5, 2017).  96 Interestingly, studies have shown that the majority of FN voters believe that the French nation is under threat just as the party does. They vote specifically for the FN because of their fears that the EU is a threat to French culture and French sovereignty and believe that the FN will protect France from these perceived threats. See- Simon Bornschier, “National Political Conflict and Identity Formation: The Diverse Nature of the Threat from the Extreme Left and the Extreme Populist Right,” in Cultural Diversity, European Identity and the Legitimacy of the EU, ed. Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Kingemann (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), 185.    37 in the eventual adoption of Sharia law and the submission of the Dutch people and Dutch culture.97 Wilder’s platform included what he dubbed as plan to “de-Islamise” the Netherlands and put a halt to asylum seekers and immigration specifically from Islamic countries.98  5.3 FPÖ  In Austria, the FPÖ is very concerned with keeping Austrian culture dominant. Thus, immigration ought to be curtailed. “We are prepared to put up a resolute defence of these European values and our basic liberal-democratic order against fanaticism and extremism and to take action to maintain and develop our dominant culture and our way of life in peace and in freedom.” 99 Their party program also proclaims that “Austria is not a country of immigration.”100 Thus, they demand a stop to the “Islamification of Europe and to immigration from third-world countries [in] Africa [and] Asia.”101 At a 2017 rally, the party’s leader, Heinz Christian Strache said “let us put an end to this policy of Islamization... otherwise we Austrians, we Europeans will come to an abrupt end” and that “[Austria] need[s] zero and minus immigration.”102 Furthermore, he stated that Austria should ban “fascistic Islam” in the same manner that Nazism is banned.103                                                  97 Partij voor de Vrijheid, “De agenda van hoop en optimisme Een tijd om te kiezen: PVV 2010-2015,” https://www.pvv.nl/images/stories/Webversie_VerkiezingsProgrammaPVV.pdf (accessed July 12, 2017). 98 Partij voor de Vrijheid, “Concept- Verkiezingsprogramma PVV 2017-2021: Nederland Weer Van Ons!” 2017, https://www.pvv.nl/images/Conceptverkiezingsprogrammma.pdf (accessed July 12, 2017). 99 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, “Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ),” June 18, 2011, “https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/www.fpoe.at/dokumente/2015/2011_graz_parteiprogramm_englisch_web.pdf 2 (accessed July 17, 2016). 100 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, “Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ),” June 18, 2011, “https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/www.fpoe.at/dokumente/2015/2011_graz_parteiprogramm_englisch_web.pdf 2 (accessed July 17, 2016). 101 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, “Program,” 2014, http://www.fpoe.eu/dokumente/programm/ (accessed August 2, 2017). 102 Kirsti Knolle, “Austria's far-right Freedom Party calls for ban on 'fascistic Islam',” Reuters, January 14, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/r-austrias-far-right-freedom-party-calls-for-ban-on-fascistic-islam-2017-1 (accessed July 17, 2017). 103 Knolle, “Austria's far-right Freedom Party calls for ban on 'fascistic Islam',” http://www.businessinsider.com/r-austrias-far-right-freedom-party-calls-for-ban-on-fascistic-islam-2017-1 (accessed July 17, 2017).   38 5.4 AfD  The story is essentially the same with the AfD in Germany. It appears the AfD believes that German culture, as well as other European cultures, is under threat from foreign cultures, namely the religion of Islam, which the party sees as being incompatible with German civilization. There is a specific section of their 2016 manifesto which is entitled: “Islam does not belong to Germany.”104 This section chronicles several reasons as to why Islam is not compatible with Germany and its culture in the eyes of the AfD. For example, the party proclaims that the “Islamic practice of faith is directly against the liberal-democratic basic order, our laws, as well as against the Jewish-Christian and humanist foundations of our culture.”105 The AfD does say that they accept Muslims who have been ‘properly assimilated’ into German culture but reject those who choose not to forego their own culture in exchange for German culture. The AfD further calls for a ban on minarets, burqas and government funds used for the building of mosques.106 In order to prevent mass immigration, the party calls for the complete shutdown of EU external borders in order to temper the influx of immigrants. The AfD’s reasoning for restricting immigration is demonstrated very well by this statement: “The future of Germany and Europe must be secured in the long term. We want to leave our descendants a country that is still recognizable as our Germany.”107                                                 104 Alternative für Deutschland, “Programm für Deutschland: Das Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland,” May 2016, 17, https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/05/2016-06-27_afd-grundsatzprogramm_web-version.pdf (accessed November 25, 2016). 105 Alternative für Deutschland, “Programm für Deutschland: Das Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland,” May 2016, 17, https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/05/2016-06-27_afd-grundsatzprogramm_web-version.pdf (accessed November 25, 2016). 106 Alternative für Deutschland, “Programm für Deutschland: Das Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland,” May 2016, 17, https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/05/2016-06-27_afd-grundsatzprogramm_web-version.pdf (accessed November 25, 2016). 107Alternative für Deutschland, “Programm Für Deutschland: Wahlprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag am 24. September 2017,” April 2017, https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/06/2017-06-01_AfD-Bundestagswahlprogramm_Onlinefassung.pdf (accessed August 9, 2017).    39 5.5 Fidesz  Anti-immigration is a large issue for the populist-nationalists in power in Eastern Europe, particularly in Hungary and Poland. Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary has been particularly hostile to migrants during the past few years. The Orbán government passed a law which bars asylum seekers and migrants who have fled places, such war-torn Syria from roaming about in the country freely; they must be detained in detention camps.108 The Hungarian government has constructed a wall along its southern border for the sole purpose of keeping out migrants. Orbán has styled himself as the defender of Christian Europe. In Orbán’s words: “we cannot solve the demographic problems of the undeniably dwindling and ageing European population with the Muslim world without losing our lifestyle, security and ourselves. Those coming here have no intention of adapting to our lifestyle.”109 Clearly a fear of cultural elimination here. Orbán’s party, Fidesz also highlights its distaste for immigration.  5.6 PiS   Poland has also rejected refugees and migrants and refuses to meet the EU’s resettlement requirements for migrants as did Hungary. The reasoning was quite similar: the cultural threat. Poland is a relatively homogeneous and Catholic country and in short, the populist-nationalist government’s concern is that Poland’s population and culture will be diluted by an influx of immigrants, particularly from the Muslim world.110 PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński argued that                                                 108 Tom McTague, “Hungary hardens immigration line,” Politico, February 7, 2017, http://www.politico.eu/article/hungarys-new-hardline-immigration-scheme-viktor-orban-refugees-migration-crisis-europe/ (accessed July 18, 2017).  109 Nick Gutteridge, “The Great Wall of Europe: Hungary splits continent in two with huge fence to stop migrants,” Express, February 29, 2017, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/648269/Hungary-plan-fence-border-Romania-migrants-refugees-crisis-Viktor-Orban-Schengen (accessed July 18, 2017). 110 Jan Cienski, “Why Poland doesn’t want refugees: An ethnically homogenous nation battles EU efforts to distribute asylum seekers,” Politico, May 1, 2017, http://www.politico.eu/article/politics-nationalism-and-religion-explain-why-poland-doesnt-want-refugees/ (accessed July 18, 2017).   40 “Poland would have to completely change [its] culture and radically lower the level of safety in [it].”111 5.7 Final Points and a Caveat   What I have demonstrated here is the intense anti-immigration sentiment that populist-nationalist parties have and why they are so anti-immigrant. Their attitudes mainly target Muslim people or non-Europeans. Culture is the major concern here. This is likely due to the fact that migrants from North Africa and the Middle-East are the largest majority and they are seen to pose the largest ‘cultural threat’ from the parties’ perspective, due to their numbers but also to their different customs and religion. Sovereignty in this case then is completely cultural. It is maintained first to defend a particular culture but also to maintain it because of the perceived notion that immigrants will eventually wipe out native Europeans. Sovereignty and culture/nation are essentially one. One can certainly see how immigration, culture, border control and sovereignty are tied together by nationalist parties as well. Nativism is clearly a theme here, as per my aforementioned definition. The state is for its native inhabitants and not for people and culture that are deemed incompatible, especially if these people do not integrate.  Just as a final caveat, I note here that the migration of EU citizens is also a major issue for populist-nationalist parties but this issue, from my perspective, is more tied to economic nationalism rather than a clash of civilizations. It is also more of an issue for certain populist-nationalist parties rather than most. As a result, I shall cover that in my economic nationalism chapter.                                                    111 Cienski, http://www.politico.eu/article/politics-nationalism-and-religion-explain-why-poland-doesnt-want-refugees/ (accessed July 18, 2017).   41 Chapter 6: Admiration of the Nation and the Defence of Cultural Values In this section, I would like to demonstrate the amount of attention given to culture and even identity politics by populist-nationalist parties. The point of this chapter is to demonstrate the symbolic nature of culture and how populist-nationalists attempt and seek to mold their states into their version of a cultural haven, even if it is not always particularly rational in terms of tangible benefits or maintaining long lasting, solid international relationships. I note here that I have chosen to cover fewer parties in this section than in previous sections for the sake of not being repetitive; all of their positions here are remarkably similar. For populist-nationalists, the state should advocate for and push their native culture to ensure that it never dies. Thus, sovereignty is intended to accentuate the native culture or let it thrive. Again, this comes from a perception: the perception of populist-nationalism and its symbolic nature.  This cultural crusade also involves protection from threats, threats which mainly come from Islam and those who are not culturally similar to the majority native inhabitants. Thus, this section is very closely related to immigration. What is interesting here is the merger of rights and ensuring the rights of certain groups in the name of culture. This also includes the democratic process itself which some parties label as an endangered species with an even larger risk of disappearing due to influx of undemocratic cultures. It is rather striking how these parties connect democracy with culture.  6.1 FN The FN’s efforts are probably best example of this sort of national identity enforcement and cultural protection. After all, in one of the 2017 French presidential debates, Le Pen   42 proclaimed: “I want to protect the culture and identity of the French.”112 Furthermore, point 91 in Le Pen’s 144 point presidential manifesto states that she will “defend the national identity, values and traditions of French civilization [as well as] constitutionally enforce the defence and promotion of our historical and cultural heritage.”113 The FN projects its veneration of individuals that are considered to be national heroes, such as veterans or other heroic national figures like Joan of Arc, who have sacrificed themselves on behalf of the French nation.114 Again, in their 2017 manifesto, the FN declares that a Le Pen presidency would “revalorize veterans' pensions by reallocating available credits.”115 What is interesting is that this is written in the section of the manifesto that outlines what Le Pen would do in order to enforce French national identity. This wish to extend French national identity relates to immigration as the party wishes to “[promote] republican assimilation, [which is] a more demanding principle than integration.”116 Essentially, this demands that newcomers are forced to adopt French customs over their own. Lastly, the FN proposed eliminating the enseignement des langues et cultures d’origine (ELCO) program which allows for schools to teach in the native languages of immigrants rather than French. Learning the French language and about French culture are considered to be “fundamental” by the FN.117  Here is the cultural promotion and enforcement again.                                                  112 Marine Le Pen, Twitter Post, April 4, 2017, 3:36 p.m., https://twitter.com/MLP_officiel/status/849375127921930244.  113 Front National, “144 Engagements Présidentiels” February 2017: 2, https://www.marine2017.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/projet-presidentiel-marine-le-pen.pdf (accessed July 5, 2017).  114 Peter Davies, The National Front in France: Ideology, Discourse and Power, (London: Routledge, 1999), Davies, 19.  115 Front National, “144 Engagements Présidentiels” February 2017: 2, https://www.marine2017.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/projet-presidentiel-marine-le-pen.pdf (accessed July 5, 2017).  116 Front National, “144 Engagements Présidentiels” February 2017: 2, https://www.marine2017.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/projet-presidentiel-marine-le-pen.pdf (accessed July 5, 2017).  117 Front National, “144 Engagements Présidentiels” February 2017: 2, https://www.marine2017.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/projet-presidentiel-marine-le-pen.pdf (accessed July 5, 2017).    43  Protection comes into play largely through the aversion to Muslims. Indeed, I mentioned Muslims earlier but here I speak specifically about ‘foreign cultures’ that have already arrived. These are perceived as threats too. At a 2017 campaign rally in Lyon, Le Pen said that mosques, “prayers in the streets” and the niqab are threats to France’s culture and values and that “no French person, no Republican and no women attached to their dignity could accept it.”118 This type of rhetoric, combined with a French cultural campaign demonstrates this cultural protection crusade. There is a two-pronged approach here: to promote France and reduce the influence or ‘promotion’ of other cultures.  6.2 UKIP  UKIP does this exact thing as well. The party’s 2015 manifesto has an entire section which is dedicated to the glory of the UK. UKIP openly rejects multiculturalism believing that it has resulted in the fragmentation of British society. Furthermore, the manifesto states that “we need to take pride in our country again and claim back our heritage from the ‘chattering classes’ who have denigrated our culture, highlighted our failings as a country, rather than celebrating our successes, and tried to make us ashamed to be British.”119 “UKIP will encourage pride in Britain among our young people, who have become detached from our national cultural heritage. UKIP supports a chronological understanding of British history and achievements in the National Curriculum, which should place due emphasis on the unique influence Britain has had in shaping the modern world. ”120                                                  118 Chloe Farand, “Marine Le Pen launches presidential campaign with hardline speech,” The Independent, February 5, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/marine-le-pen-front-national-speech-campaign-launch-islamic-fundamentalism-french-elections-a7564051.html (accessed July 20, 2017).  119 United Kingdom Independence Party, “Believe in Britain: UKIP Manifesto 2015,” 2015, http://www.ukip.org/manifesto2015, (accessed July 16, 2017). 120 United Kingdom Independence Party, “Believe in Britain: UKIP Manifesto 2015,” 2015, http://www.ukip.org/manifesto2015, (accessed July 16, 2017).   44 Similarly to the FN, UKIP heavily pushes the use of English and the other languages of the British Isles over all others. For example, they want to “end the use of multi-lingual formatting on official documents. These will be published only in English and, where appropriate, Welsh and Gaelic”121 This is clearly an active effort to push a sense of patriotism on the public by the government while at the same time reducing the prevalence of other cultures.  This too is done by advocating for the ban on the Muslim veil. “UKIP will ban wearing of the niqab and the burqa in public places. Face coverings such as these are barriers to integration. We will not accept these de-humanising symbols of segregation and oppression, nor the security risks they pose.”122 Stopping immigration is simply not enough. Specific cultural values, mostly Islamic values, ought to be suppressed even if those people are British citizens. Liberty is a British cultural value and it must be maintained through the niqab ban. It seems that populist-nationalist like UKIP believe that the government of a nation-state ought to be a projector of all things British and reducing the potential of other cultural threats from people who are already likely British citizens.  6.3 AfD  In their 2013 manifesto titled Mut zu Deutschland, the AfD overtly campaigned on behalf of Germany’s national interest; the title of this manifesto roughly translates to ‘dare to stand by Germany.’ This was also their main slogan for the 2014 European parliamentary elections. This slogan is a classic, nationalist type of slogan alluding to the idea that national pride and the nation have been systematically discouraged and eroded in the modern era.123 They accuse                                                 121 United Kingdom Independence Party, “Believe in Britain: UKIP Manifesto 2015,” 2015, http://www.ukip.org/manifesto2015, (accessed July 16, 2017). 122 United Kingdom Independence Party, “Britain Together: UKIP 2017 Manifesto,” 2017, http://www.ukip.org/manifesto2017 (accessed July 16, 2017). 123 Kai Arzheimer, “The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?” West European Politics 38, no. 3 (2015), 545.   45 multiculturalism of eroding traditional German culture.124 The AfD also evoked other images of the German nation and German history. Doing so was very much a conscious effort even in the climate of Germany as nationalistic tendencies and evoking German history usually is connected to National Socialism. The party declared in the foreign policy section of the manifesto that Germany should return to the era of Otto Von Bismarck, who was considered to be the benevolent father of the nation by the party which suggested that the country should move away from its integration with the western European states such as France and harken back to the Eastern leaning posture of Prussia.125 This is a particularly odd move, and thus I would argue that it is a largely symbolic proposal given the highly integrated relationship Germany has with the EU, NATO and the West in general who are generally seen as advisories of Russia. The chairwomen of the AfD, Frauke Petry, frequently advocates for Germany to have closer ties with Russia.126  The AfD is rather unique here. One must remember that the context of this makes the effort of the AfD particularity intriguing. Usually, when a party draws on the glory and the heritage of the German nation or the German people, they are immediately met with accusations of Nazism. However, regardless of this, the AfD continues to go against the grain as they explicitly state that they wish for Germany to move beyond what this connection between German history and National Socialism which they call for in their manifesto. “The current narrowing of German memory culture to the time of National Socialism must be broken in favour of an expanded view                                                 124 Alternative Für Deutschland, “Programm Für Deutschland: Wahlprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag am 24. September 2017,” April 2017, Beschlossen auf dem Bundesparteitag in Köln am 22./23. April 2017 https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/06/2017-06-01_AfD-Bundestagswahlprogramm_Onlinefassung.pdf (accessed Augsut 9, 2017). 125 Carlo Bastasin, Saving Europe, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2014), 442.  126 Roman Goncharenko, “Moscow calling: What is AfD head Frauke Petry’s purpose in Russia?” Deutsche Welle, February 22, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/moscow-calling-what-is-afd-head-frauke-petrys-purpose-in-russia/a-37679685 (accessed July 25, 2017).    46 of history, which also includes the positive, identity-building aspects of German history.”127 This is nationalist politics in every sense. In pushing this narrative, the AfD proposes several other nationalistic policies, such as the reaffirmation of the German language. “As a key element of German identity, the German language must be defined as the state language in law [and] at the EU level, the AfD wants to ensure that the German language is equal to the English and French in everyday practices of the EU.”128 Lastly, “The AfD is committed to the German Leitkultur [guiding, common or core culture of the German nation]. This is based on the values of Christianity, antiquity, humanism and enlightenment. Apart from the German language, it also includes our customs and traditions as well as spiritual and cultural history.”129 Essentially, this is a desire to keep German culture dominant.  6.4 FPÖ Lastly, in this chapter, I will look at the FPÖ in Austria as the same themes persist through all the parties. Interestingly, the FPÖ links sovereignty and culture together in the opening of their 2011 party program stating: “We are committed to Austria's right to self-determination and to preserving and protecting our view of mankind and society that has matured in our traditions and in our history.”130Again, the FPÖ advocates for pushing Austrian and even European culture through education and in public life. “Our western culture is rich and diverse. It unites the cultural                                                 127 Alternative für Deutschland, “Programm für Deutschland: Das Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland,” May 2016, 17, https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/05/2016-06-27_afd-grundsatzprogramm_web-version.pdf (accessed November 25, 2016). 128 Alternative für Deutschland, “Programm für Deutschland: Das Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland,” May 2016, 17, https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/05/2016-06-27_afd-grundsatzprogramm_web-version.pdf (accessed November 25, 2016). 129 Alternative Für Deutschland, “Programm Für Deutschland: Wahlprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag am 24. September 2017,” April 2017 https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/06/2017-06-01_AfD-Bundestagswahlprogramm_Onlinefassung.pdf (accessed August 9, 2017).  130 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, “Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ),” June 18, 2011, “https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/www.fpoe.at/dokumente/2015/2011_graz_parteiprogramm_englisch_web.pdf 2 (accessed July 17, 2016).   47 nations of Europe. In this context, preserving our cultural heritage is extremely important for us.”131 The German language factors in here quite heavily as the party states that “the language, history and culture of Austria are German” and that “protect[ing] [Austria’s] native language is a key factor establishing [Austria’s] culture.”132 It is also stated multiple times throughout their party platform that Austria has been shaped by Christianity, enlightenment values and other waves of European philosophical developments. For the FPÖ, this cannot change. For the same reasons, the party wishes for the Muslim veil to also be prohibited. Threats from foreign cultures are to be stopped. One gets the feeling that Muslims already living within Austria, and the other European countries for that matter, are sort of the Trojan horse who are primed for a Muslim takeover of Europe if they keep their own customs and language.  6.5 Final Points  In sum, I have presented several points in this chapter. I have tried to demonstrate the efforts of populist-nationalist parties to revive and push their culture on their own population. In doing so, they have confirmed the cultural sovereignty concept. This is because they believe a state must be independent and essentially embody the culture of the national and in doing this, push this culture, defend it and ensure that it does not become diluted with foreign cultures. Pushing one’s culture while simultaneously attempting to reduce the prevalence of other cultures demonstrates this point: protection and cultivation of the national culture. Independence and the sovereignty of a nation-state is itself an act of culture for populist-nationalist parties.                                                    131 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, “Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ),” June 18, 2011, “https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/www.fpoe.at/dokumente/2015/2011_graz_parteiprogramm_englisch_web.pdf 2 (accessed July 17, 2016). 132 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, “Party Programme of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ),” June 18, 2011, “https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/www.fpoe.at/dokumente/2015/2011_graz_parteiprogramm_englisch_web.pdf 2 (accessed July 17, 2016).    48 Chapter 7: Economic Nationalism: A Case of Who Benefits  In this final chapter, I examine economic nationalism, which some parties refer to this as economic patriotism. Why would sovereignty matter so much- including economic sovereignty- if states have tended to economically benefit from EU membership? There has to be something more which trumps economic prosperity, or is at least on par. I argue that nationalistic economic policies are largely symbolic and that it matters more than a specific group benefits from economic policies over others. This is both to ensure control over the policies of nation-state as well as to protect its native inhabitants and businesses. Economic nationalism is essentially the idea that the nation-state should be in control of the economy and receive the benefits of the economic success. Protectionism and buying domestic products are the major types of nationalist economic policies, which populist-nationalist parties advocate for. In short, economic policies should benefit the nation-state and the citizens of that state, in particular, the native inhabitants of that state. Buy French in order to benefit French workers. The issue that populist-nationalist parties have with economic globalization is that jobs are lost due to cheaper products being available from abroad. Domestic citizens are viewed as the losers of globalization essentially. As a result, manufacturing of goods decreases in some areas and citizens become unemployed. This is where hatred towards globalization comes into play. Thus, a state should be able to economically benefit its own people, which is opposite of Krasner’s vision of interdependence sovereignty in a way.  There are two elements to the populist-nationalist form of economic nationalism. First, reinvigorating domestic manufacturing and employing domestic workers. Immigration also comes into play here: populist-nationalists often advocate for putting domestic workers first. Frankly, immigration at times seems to be the only issue that some of these parties even speak about regarding economics. The second element is economic self-control. This is largely connected to   49 the EU and globalization. Populist-nationalist blame the EU for removing the ability of the state to fully control its economic and industrial policy as well as allowing immigrants and countries with weaker economies to ‘take’ jobs away. I note here that indeed economic self-control was covered in section one but this was specifically in relation to the symbolic nature of nation-state control and what it means. Here, I am referring what these parties argue that economic self-control will bring to the country. That is, the results of it and the turn away from globalization and supra-national governance. The main issue here is who benefits. It is all about the nation and the native population and naturally, populist-nationalists greatly cater their economic policies to this demographic.  7.1 FN For example, one of Le Pen’s 144 commitments to the French people states that she as president would “remove …the ‘posting of workers’ directive, which creates unfair competition” and that she would “establish an additional tax on the hiring of foreign employees to ensure the national priority for employment of the French.”133 Le Pen also promised to give strategic protection to French firms as well as particular sectors of the economy through “intelligent protectionism” and taxation of foreign companies.134 This includes banning the sale of foreign products that do not comply with French standards imposed on French producers while at the same time, promoting the ‘Made in France’ logo and imposing clear origin labels on all products. This protectionism also involves preventing foreign investment when necessary.135 All of this is presented as sort of a patriotic agenda; the section is titled “a new patriotic model for                                                 133 Front National, “144 Engagements Présidentiels” February 2017: 2, https://www.marine2017.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/projet-presidentiel-marine-le-pen.pdf (accessed July 5, 2017). 134 Front National, “144 Engagements Présidentiels” February 2017: 2, https://www.marine2017.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/projet-presidentiel-marine-le-pen.pdf (accessed July 5, 2017). 135 Front National, “144 Engagements Présidentiels” February 2017: 2, https://www.marine2017.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/projet-presidentiel-marine-le-pen.pdf (accessed July 5, 2017).   50 employment.”136 It is also wrapped up in nationalistic symbolism and the idea that it is the French nation that must benefit from economic policies and industry.  7.2 UKIP This symbolism and national priority is also the case with UKIP. “UKIP is not ashamed to say it: we should be offering jobs first to our own unemployed, rather than inviting cheap labour from overseas to do the jobs British people	are perfectly able to do.”137 Furthermore, “[UKIP] will also ensure employers are legally free to choose to hire a young unemployed British person under the age of 25 ahead of a better qualified or more experienced foreign applicant.”138 They also proposed this in 2015 but were less specific simply saying that they would permit British business to employ British citizens first. This is clearly a nationalist and selective economic proposal- native workers first. It is all about who benefits first. In this case, it is a particular culture. UKIP also blamed the EU for British job losses because companies have the ability to move manufacturing to cheaper countries in Eastern Europe. EU immigration is also blamed for British workers losing their jobs to economic migrants from within and outside of the EU. UKIP, in its 2015 manifesto, said that they would “restrict access to EURES, the EU wide job portal that has become the ‘go-to’ source for employers looking for cheap labour from overseas.”139 Remember that in the case of the EU, EU citizens can move about within the EU to find work. These UKIP proposals all clearly selectively put British workers first even though EU citizens are legally allowed to work in                                                 136 Front National, “144 Engagements Présidentiels” February 2017: 2, https://www.marine2017.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/projet-presidentiel-marine-le-pen.pdf (accessed July 5, 2017). 137 United Kingdom Independence Party, “Britain Together: UKIP 2017 Manifesto,” 2017, http://www.ukip.org/manifesto2017 (accessed July 16, 2017). 138 United Kingdom Independence Party, “Britain Together: UKIP 2017 Manifesto,” 2017, http://www.ukip.org/manifesto2017 (accessed July 16, 2017). 139 United Kingdom Independence Party, “Believe in Britain: UKIP Manifesto 2015,” 2015, http://www.ukip.org/manifesto2015, (accessed July 16, 2017).   51 the UK, at least currently at the time of writing. The final Brexit negotiations may change this of course.  7.3 AfD Other parties target the EU arguing that nation-states should not be responsible for the economic blunders made by others. While less adamant about restoring German manufacturing likely because the German economy and manufacturing sector are strong, the AfD does target the Euro, arguing that it has outlived its utility. The party argues that EU “transfer payments reinforce already established economic and political tensions between the donor and recipient countries, so that the cost of maintaining the Eurozone has now far exceeded its utility and the European integration potential.”140 Not only this, but the AfD also accuses the Euro and the European Central Bank of being undemocratic. “The Euro and the associated rescue measures or even the proposals for an ‘EU economic government’ are illegal and are illegal interventions in the democratic decision-making structures of the participating national states.”141 Here is the control aspect. The party proclaims that “the legacy from the history of Europe is the democratic state of law and a peaceful coexistence of sovereign states. The installation of the Euro area is likely to destroy these cultural achievements.”142 So, in condemning the EU as being undemocratic, the AfD directly relates democracy back to culture. This is quite an interesting statement, as it combines both economic policy, control and culture: cultural sovereignty in a sense. Democratic governance is                                                 140 Alternative für Deutschland, “Programm für Deutschland: Das Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland,” May 2016, 19, https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/05/2016-06-27_afd-grundsatzprogramm_web-version.pdf (accessed November 25, 2016). 141 Alternative für Deutschland, “Programm für Deutschland: Das Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland,” May 2016, 17, https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/05/2016-06-27_afd-grundsatzprogramm_web-version.pdf (accessed November 25, 2016). 142 Alternative für Deutschland, “Programm für Deutschland: Das Grundsatzprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland,” May 2016, 17, https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/05/2016-06-27_afd-grundsatzprogramm_web-version.pdf (accessed November 25, 2016).   52 also seen as part of German culture, and thus the Euro is not in the AfD’s view. The Euro is an illegitimate institution in terms of execution and utility.  7.4 FPÖ  In Austria, the FPÖ also advocates for domestic workers first. The party puts them before both EU and non-EU immigrants. For example, they want “priority for domestic workers- limitation of the EU free movement principle by a sectoral closure of the Austrian labour market for EU citizens and non-EU citizens [as well as] effective measures against wage dumping and social upheavals caused mainly by employers from the new EU countries in Eastern Europe”143  Interestingly, the party argues that EU worker policies and social benefits which are framed as “redistribution mechanisms [which come] at the expense of Austrians.”144 7.5 Fidesz Fidesz and the Orbán government in Hungary have been on the path of economic nationalism for the last several years. According to Orbán, “national economies and the security of national economies must involve national influence. This is what [he] believe[s] is economic patriotism.”145 Firstly, Hungary has been against the intervention of supra-national bodies such as the EU but also the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For example, the Hungarian government also kicked out IMF officials in 2010 for the sake of patriotic pride.146  Secondly, Hungary has made moves to block or dissuade foreign investment. Given the relatively low amount of Hungarian domestic firms (most of the manufacturing in Hungary is done                                                 143 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, “Program,” 2014, http://www.fpoe.eu/dokumente/programm/ (accessed August 2, 2017). 144 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, “Program,” 2014, http://www.fpoe.eu/dokumente/programm/ (accessed August 2, 2017). 145 Neil Buckley, “Poland and Hungary seek more control over companies,” Financial Times, October 16, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/417e4558-4525-11e6-9b66-0712b3873ae1 (accessed July 24, 2017).  146 Verseck, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ruling-hungarian-fidesz-party-adopts-policies-of-far-right-jobbik-party-a-880590.html (accessed August 1, 2017).   53 by foreign owned companies), Fidesz has been selectively nationalist in the economic sense.147 This comes in the form of support for what banking, utility, retail and manufacturing companies Hungary does have. The government attempts to reduce the role that foreign enterprises have in these sectors.148 For example, the Orbán government has increased taxes on large, foreign owned companies. The following are the major acts passed by the Orbán government that target foreign companies:  “Act 2014:LXXIV on the modification of tax legislation in force, which increased the tax rate on advertising services from 40 to 50% for companies with a tax base of 20 billion HUF affecting exclusively foreign owned companies (e.g., RTL Hungary); Act 2014:LXXIV on the modification of tax legislation in force, which brutally increased the food chain supervision fee for undertakings selling everyday consumer products with a net annual income over 50 billion HUF affecting nearly exclusively foreign owned supermarket chains (e.g., TESCO, SPAR, AUCHAN); Act 2014:CXII modifying the Act on Commerce, which penalises undertakings selling everyday consumer products with an annual net income over 15 billion HUF which fail to report profits in two successive years with a compulsory suspension of commercial activities (affecting larger, predominantly foreign owned retail chains).”149  All of this is meant to specifically target foreign companies in order to promote domestic ones. The government has also transferred state owned enterprises to private domestic bidders at purposely low prices specifically so that domestic investors and entrepreneurs can own them.150 It seems here that foreign investment is simply not good enough. Wealth must be created in Hungary by Hungarians alone from Fidesz’s perspective. All of this is economic protectionism and                                                 147 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Hungary,” OECD, https://www.oecd.org/sti/outlook/e-outlook/sticountryprofiles/hungary.htm (accessed July 25, 2017). 148 András Tóth, “Coming to the end of the via dolorosa? The rise of selective nationalism in Hungary,” in Divisive integration. The triumph of failed ideas in Europe — revisited, ed. Steffen Lehndorff (Brussels: ETUI aisbl, 2015), 243.  149 Márton Varju, “Where will it end? Economic protectionism and exclusionarism in the regulation of the 2015 Hungarian state budget,” JTI Blog, February 20, 2015, Hungarian Academy of Sciences http://jog.tk.mta.hu/en/blog/2015/02/where-will-it-end (accessed July 25, 2017).  150 Tóth, 243-4.    54 nationalism. The Orbán government has received mountains of criticism for these economic policies.  7.6 PiS  Just like in Hungary, in Poland, the PiS controlled government has been working to implement protectionist policies, specifically to limit the number of foreign owned companies operating in the country. In 2016, the government passed tax reforms which specifically targeted foreign owned supermarkets that make up the majority of Poland’s grocery retail market. Prime Minister Duda claimed that this tax was implemented in order to support and protect Polish entrepreneurship.151 In other words, to give domestic Polish businesses an advantage. This tax would cost foreign retailers an estimated €360 million per year which would increase the cost of products causing Polish consumers to shop in cheaper domestic retailers.152 In 2015, PiS promised to also levy taxes on foreign banks which also make up the majority of banks operating in Poland.153 This tax was passed in February 2016 and was levied on foreign banks but also expanded to include both foreign lending agencies and insurance companies.154   7.7 Denouement  Overall, economic nationalism rejects economic liberalism and globalization and puts in place measures that are designed to enhance national control and domestic companies. All of this, I argue, is for the symbolic sake of the nation. What matters here the most is the state and its native inhabitants. Upon reading this, one would notice that the ways in which economic nationalism is                                                 151 Dalibor Rohac, Towards an Imperfect Union: A Conservative Case for the EU, (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield, 2016), 149. 152 Henry Foy, “Retailers brace for higher sales tax in Poland,” Financial Times, May 29, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/5e7e224c-23fe-11e6-9d4d-c11776a5124d (accessed July 27, 2017).  153 Rohac, 149.  154 Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, “Poland: Tax on financial, lending institutions and insurance companies,” KPMG, February 17, 2016, https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2016/02/tnf-poland-financial-institutions-tax.html (accessed July 27, 2017).    55 conducted or advocated for by populist-nationalist parties is highly context dependent. For instance, states which receive more immigrants tend to have populist-nationalist parties that target immigrants arguing that they stealing jobs away from native citizens (Austria, France, UK). Others wish to develop their own domestic industry if it is not as strong (Hungary and Poland). Countries which are largely strong in industrial output and have low unemployment rates tend to have populist-nationalist parties that focus their concerns more on the control factor and how the EU mismanages its currency which is a front to the cultural values of their nation.155 They also want this economic benefit to be retained rather than being shared with other states (Germany). What is common through all of this is that these policies are related back to the nation or culture in a particular way. The well-being of the nation, specifically the native inhabitants, is what is most considered. The nation also should control its own destiny essentially. Thus, we have cultural sovereignty here too. Effectively, there is a trifecta of cultural sovereignty- benefiting a culture, controlling it and protecting it. Alas, ‘the who’ is again the major issue here.                                                   155 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Data: Germany,” OECD, https://data.oecd.org/germany.htm (accessed July 30, 2017).    56 Chapter 8: Final Conclusions Throughout this work I have sought to identify what exactly populist-nationalist parties mean when they use the word ‘sovereignty.’ In order to fully and adequately answer this question, I have utilized the concept of cultural sovereignty, which I have reimagined. I have done so because I argue that no previously conceived term, cultural sovereignty or just sovereignty, has adequately encapsulated what exactly populist-nationalist parties mean and want when they say that they want their countries’ sovereignty back. Cultural sovereignty is the answer.  I have defined my version cultural sovereignty and based my own interpretation of various policies and political positions that populist-nationalist parties advocate for. This conclusion has been based on four general policy areas that these parties care about, specifically: aversion to supra-national governance (Euroscepticism mainly), anti-immigration, cultural promotion and protection policies and lastly economic nationalism. Table 2 indicates the similarities between the parties. As per my modified concept of cultural sovereignty, the central reason is as the aim to benefit, protect or maintain the culture of a particular group, the nation or nation-state and retain control over this particular culture or nation-state. In this sense, populist-nationalist parties in Europe are indeed reconstructing what sovereignty means and why it matters. Populist-nationalist parties are deeply committed to their own national and/or cultural group and seek to control what happens to it and protect it from perceived negative changes to a cultural society and to the nation-state’s political dominance. Consequently, cultural sovereignty is closely tied to the power of the nation-state to be able to include and exclude those that are deemed as threats to its culture, people and institutions.        57 Table 2                                                 156 Verseck, “Blurring Boundaries: Hungarian Leader Adopts Policies of Far-Right,” Der Spiegel, January 30, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ruling-hungarian-fidesz-party-adopts-policies-of-far-right-jobbik-party-a-880590.html (accessed August 1, 2017). Party Aversion to supra-national governance Anti-immigration Cultural promotion and protection Economic Nationalism FN Yes, leave the EU. Yes Yes Yes, against foreign workers and outsourcing. UKIP Yes, leave the EU.  Yes Yes Yes, against foreign workers and outsourcing.  PVV Yes, leave the EU.  Yes, this is main issue for the party.  Yes Yes, but this does not make up the bulk of the party platform due to the strong Dutch economy.  AfD Yes, but not enough to leave the EU without trying to reform it first. They also want to reduce EU control.  Yes Yes, they wish to look away from the Nazi era and promote German history other than this time, mainly before the Nazi regime. Historical admiration of the nation is rather unique given the German context.  Yes, but this does not make up the bulk of the party platform due to the strong German economy.  FÖ Yes, but not enough to leave the EU.   They also want to reduce EU control.  Yes Yes Yes, hire domestic, Austrian workers first.   Fidesz Yes, but not enough to leave the EU.  They also want to reduce EU control. Yes Yes, even to the point that the government erected statues of Miklós Horthy, the Leader of Hungary from 1920 to 1944, who was responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Jews.156 Yes, attempting to limit sectors from foreign companies to enhance domestic ones.    58  Now that I have established what exactly these parties mean, the question comes down to their actual grievances. Given that these parties have been gaining support in recent decades and that some of their policies are becoming mainstream, what do we do now? Of course, there will always be a radical movement in one form or another on the fringes of political life on both sides of the political spectrum. It is troubling though when some of these policies or even the parties themselves, as is the case in Poland, Hungary and even France, become mainstream. The challenge for scholars and politicians alike is to understand why people turn to movements like these and examine their grievances in order to understand them and remedy them without hurting other people or cultural groups. For instance, why do certain cultural groups who are in the majority believe that their culture is actually endangered by the influx of new immigrants? If these parties continue to gain support in Europe and elsewhere, this will be a great challenge that must be faced so that our civilization does not slip into conflict and increased political polarization and marginalization. Bibliography Access to European Law. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Al33020 (accessed July 5, 2016).  Akkerman, Tjitske, Sarah L. de Lange and Matthijs Rooduijn. “Inclusion and mainstreaming? 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