Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Crossing the boundaries : from "outsiders" to "insiders" in early-Tang-dynasty China Ma, Cheng 2017

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata


24-ubc_2017_november_ma_cheng.pdf [ 3.7MB ]
JSON: 24-1.0355212.json
JSON-LD: 24-1.0355212-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 24-1.0355212-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 24-1.0355212-rdf.json
Turtle: 24-1.0355212-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 24-1.0355212-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 24-1.0355212-source.json
Full Text

Full Text

 CROSSING THE BOUNDARIES: FROM “OUTSIDERS” TO “INSIDERS” IN EARLY-TANG DYNASTY CHINA  by  CHENG MA B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 2015  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (History)    THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) August 2017   © Cheng Ma, 2017       ii Abstract The Tang dynasty (618-907) captured scholars' attention as one of the most cosmopolitan empires in Chinese history because of its openness toward transcontinental and trans-regional cultural, economic, diplomatic and religious exchanges. The empire attracted a diverse group of foreign subjects within its political boundaries. To better understand the nature of the Tang dynasty, this thesis takes a close look at the dynasty’s foreign policies toward this special group of foreigners. More specifically, it examines the life trajectories of individuals who were born and originally lived outside of the boundaries of the Tang in the north and northwest but later served in very high positions in the Tang bureaucratic system.   Conventional understanding of the Tang dynasty has long included the existence of such varieties of political and ethnic groups within the Tang. However, scholars diverge on the Tang dynasty’s criteria of incorporating and treating foreigners in the regime. By scrutinizing each individuals' lives, this thesis argues that despite the emphasis on ethnic differences and political loyalty in Tang discourses, the Tang dynasty accepted foreigners primarily based on pragmatic concerns, namely, whether individuals could prove themselves useful to the dynasty. Differences in genealogy, culture and political loyalty were mainly used as rhetorical weapons against foreigners when they were no longer useful to the dynasty. Through detailed studies of individuals’ lives, this thesis points out the pragmatic nature of the Tang dynasty’s foreign policies instead of the more conventional understanding of a tributary foreign policy that greatly emphasized cultural and ethnic superiority. It points out that even though there were clear-set boundaries of political identity, it was ultimately fluid and fungible as long as individuals, regardless of ethnic or cultural backgrounds, proved themselves useful to the dynasty.          iii Lay Summary The main goal of this thesis is to understand the nature of the Tang dynasty’s foreign policy and political identity. It argues against the conventional understanding of the Tang dynasty’s foreign policy of tributary system which valued cultural and genealogical superiority. Instead, it illustrates that differences in genealogical and ancestral backgrounds were far less important for the Tang dynasty elites in terms of including people in the regime and excluding people from it. Cultural pluralism was constantly valued by the Tang elites in this regard. Also, by presenting the pragmatic side of the Tang dynasty, this thesis argues for the potential similarities shared between the Tang and its pastoral and semi-pastoral neighbors, even with clear and strict boundaries separating them.        iv Preface This thesis is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, C. Ma.         v Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii Lay Summary ..................................................................................................................... iii Preface ................................................................................................................................ iv Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ v Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ vi Introduction and Historiography ......................................................................................... 1 Context and Scope ............................................................................................................ 11 Sources and Methodology ................................................................................................. 13 Discourse on Genealogical and Cultural Differences ....................................................... 18 Discourse on Political Loyalty .......................................................................................... 25 From Outsiders to Insiders ................................................................................................ 29 Privileges and Pragmatism ................................................................................................ 58 Pragmatism vs. Genealogical and Cultural Differences ................................................... 64 Political Loyalty vs. Pragmatism ...................................................................................... 73 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 79 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 82 Appendices ........................................................................................................................ 87 Appendix A: Biographical and Literary Information About Outsiders Who Later Became Insiders ............................................................................................................ 87 Appendix B: Official Titles About Outsiders Who Later Became Insiders ................... 89         vi Acknowledgements   I offer my enduring gratitude to the faculty, staff and my fellow students at the History Department of UBC, who have supported me throughout this thesis writing process with suggestions. I owe particular thanks to my supervisor - Dr. Leo Shin, who has been so patient with me all the time. His solid ways of doing research not only inspired me on how to lay the foundation of my own research, but also showed me how to be a good scholar.   I thank Dr. Timothy Brook, who, during the time while my supervisor was away, instructed and cared for me as my own supervisor. His penetrating questions helped me think more critically from many different angles. I also thank Dr. Josephine Chiu-Duke and Dr. Bruce Rusk, who, as my thesis reviewing committee members, helped me sharpen my argument. They patiently helped me polish my thesis over and over with encouragement. Last but not least, I thank Dr. Nicolas Tackett. As my undergraduate supervisor, he inspired me to continue my work in the field of history. Even in graduate school, he continued to offer his help when I have questions.   Special thanks are owed to my parents, who have supported me throughout my years of education, both morally and financially. I also thank my husband - Yaou Duan, who has always been so supportive of my intellectual pursuit. His help and encouragement gave me strength and inspiration throughout years of graduate school.     1 Introduction and Historiography   Qibi Heli 契苾何力 (?–677) was originally a leader of the Tiele 鐵勒 tribe (located in present-day Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia), which was at the time of the Tang dynasty (618–907) a vassal of the Turkic empire. In the sixth year of the Zhenguan era (633), Qibi surrendered to the Tang court with his tribesmen and became, by all accounts, a loyal Tang subject trusted by the Tang emperor Taizong 太宗 (r. 627–649). Throughout his lifetime, Qibi developed a close relationship with the Tang emperor. According to multiple Tang dynasty sources, Emperor Taizong even applied medicine to Qibi’s wounds in person when he was wounded in a battle. The same sources also indicate that when Taizong died, Qibi tried to commit suicide out of sorrow, only to be stopped by the succeeding emperor, Gaozong 高宗 (r. 650–683), who continued to view him as a competent military general of the Tang.1 Interestingly, despite having been a foreign leader, Qibi also proudly claimed to be a Tang subject rather than someone with a mixed political identity. In the sixteenth year of the Zhenguan 貞觀 era (642), after living in the capital and serving as a Tang high court official for years, he had the opportunity to visit his tribesmen and his mother in the Northwest. However, when he arrived there, he learned that his tribesmen, originally belonging to the Tang when he and his mother surrendered in 633, were defecting to the more powerful Turkic-speaking tribe of Xueyantuo 薛延陀 in the North—one of the archenemies of the Tang. After furiously trying to stop them, he was dragged by some of his own clansmen to the tent of the khan                                                 1 JTS 109, 190b, p. 5028; Liu Su 劉肅 (ca. 820), Datang xinyu 大唐新語 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), pp. 106, 120; Li Kang 李亢 (Tang dynasty), Du yi zhi 獨異志, in Gu xiaoshuo congkan 古小說叢刊 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 卷 b.      2 of Xueyantuo. In front of the tent, Qibi sat down on the floor with his legs splayed out—a position indicating disdain2—pulled out his saber, pointed it eastward, and said: “How could it be that an honorable man of Great Tang is humiliated at a foreign court! I trust that Heaven, Earth, the Sun and the Moon would know my heart!” Following these words, Qibi employed what was understood to be a typical Turkic way of oath-making: cutting off his left ear to show his opposition to the khan of Xueyantuo.3 Qibi’s action greatly angered the khan, who would have killed Qibi if his wife had not stopped him. In the end, Emperor Taizong was confident enough of Qibi’s loyalty that he offered a Tang princess in exchange for his return to the Tang court.4   This was a dramatic and crucial episode in the history of the Tang dynasty. The main figure, Qibi Heli, was a Tiele leader from the Northwest. Although he surrendered to the Tang dynasty, he was very different from the majority of the Tang subjects. First of all, based on his official biographical information, Qibi belonged to different genealogical and political groups: The majority of Tang subjects were ethnically Han, whereas he belonged to the pastoral tribe of Tiele on the steppe. All his ancestors were Turkic-speaking rulers and likely looked different from the Han people.5 Also, he was                                                 2 The Chinese word is “ji ju” 箕踞; according to Han dian 漢典, it means sitting with legs splayed out, indicating disdain or a state of relaxation. For example: 《战国策·燕策》: 箕踞而骂; 儒林外史 第三十三回:「或據案觀書,或箕踞自適,各隨其便」. 3 Xuan Zang 玄奘 (602-664), Datang xiyu ji 大唐西域記 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1977), 48; Liu Xueyao 劉學銚, Tangdai yilai de bianjiang celue 唐代以來的邊疆策略 (Taipei: Zhizhi xueshu shubanshe, 2014), 287.  4 JTS 109: 59, p. 3292: 何力箕踞而坐,拔佩刀東向大呼曰:「豈有大唐烈士,受辱蕃庭,天地日月,願知我心!」又割左耳以明志不奪叶。可汗怒,欲殺之,為其妻所抑而止。初,太宗聞何力之延陁,明並非本意。或曰:「人心各樂其土,何力今入延陁,猶魚之得水也。」太宗曰:「不然,此人心如鐵石,必不背我」......遽遣兵部侍郎崔敦禮持節入延陁,請降公主,求何力。 5 JTS 109, P. 3291: 其先鐵勒別部之酋長也。父葛,隋大業中繼為莫賀咄特勤……至貞觀六年,隨其母率眾千餘家詣沙州,奉表內附,太宗置其部落於甘、涼二州. It is clearly shown in historical records that people during the Tang dynasty were able to distinguish ethnic differences based on physical appearance; see, for example, Tong dian 通典 197, p. 5415.     3 born and raised outside of the geographical boundaries of the Tang dynasty: According to his biographical information, his father migrated from areas near the upper Yellow River Valley to Rehai 熱海 in Inner Asia, where he spent the majority of his early years. By living outside of the geographical boundaries of the Tang, he was also considered to have lived outside of the “more-civilized” cultural sphere of the Tang dynasty.6 However, at least according to historical records, he was a loyal enough Tang subject to declare to the Xueyantuo khan that he was a subject of the Great Tang.   Qibi’s example was not a unique one. There was a substantial number of non-Han people who were born and originally lived outside of the boundaries of the Tang but later served in very high positions in the Tang bureaucratic system. However, according to the Tang Code 唐律疏議, the Tang dynasty made a clear distinction between people who were subjects of the state (hua nei ren 化內人) and people who were not (hua wai ren 化外人). The Chinese character hua 化 in this context has the meaning of “civilization,” or an elevated state of cultural accomplishments. Therefore, the literal translation of the label for people who were subjects of the state would be “people who are inside the reach of civilization,” whereas people who were not would be “people who are outside of the reach of civilization.” Thus, this thesis will translate these two legal terms as “insiders” and “outsiders.” In theory, there were clear boundaries between the two categories and normally two criteria defining who were insiders and outsiders. The first distinction was geographical: The Tang dynasty had clear geographical boundaries separating insiders from outsiders using customs entries. The Tang Code has very severe punishments for                                                 6 JTS 109: 3291: 父葛,隋大業中繼為莫賀咄特勤,以地逼吐谷渾,所居隘狹,又多瘴癘,遂入龜茲,居于熱海之上。Tang Code 唐律疏議 16: No. 232, p. 307: 化外人....謂聲教之外,四夷之人.      4 people who crossed borders on their own: Those who crossed the customs entries along the borders (yue du yuan bian guan sai 越度緣邊關塞) would be sent to prison for two years. If they conducted business with outsiders on their own (yu hua wai ren si xiang jiao yi 共化外人私相交易), even giving or taking things from outsiders, they would be subjected to severe punishments ranging from years in prison to exile, based on the amount of goods they exchanged. Also, they were not allowed to intermarry with the foreign outsiders (hua wai fan ren 化外蕃人) or interact with them in any other form on their own. Conversely, outsiders who secretly crossed the borders and interacted with insiders (hua nei ren 化內人) would be subjected to the same punishments. Only envoys could cross the borders for official duties, but even they [foreign guests] (fan ke 蕃客) were not allowed to communicate of their own accord with Tang commoners or officials (guo nei guan ren bai xing 國內官人、百姓) on the way to the imperial court.7 From this example, it is clear that the Tang had customs entries along their geographical borders. People who lived beyond the boundaries were categorized as outsiders (hua wai ren 化外人) and foreigners (fan 蕃), while people living inside the boundaries were categorized as insiders (hua nei ren 化內人) and subjects (guo nei guan ren bai xing 國內官人、百姓). To further specify who belonged to the realms of outsiders, the editors of the Tang Code (Zhangsun Wuji 長孫無忌 (594-659)  and others) explained their definition of                                                 7 The Tang Code: 8: No 88: 177. 唐律疏議 卷八 衛禁二 88: 諸越度緣邊關塞者,徒二年。共化外人私相交易,若取與者,一尺徒二年半,三疋加一等,十五疋加役流......【疏】議曰:若共化外蕃人私相交易,謂市買博易,或取蕃人之物及將物與蕃人,計贓一尺徒二年半,三疋加一等,十五疋加役流。私與禁兵器者,絞;共為婚姻者,流二千里。未入、未成者,各減三等。即因使私有交易者,準盜論......【疏】議曰:其化外人越度入境,與化內交易,得罪並與化內人越度、交易同,仍奏聽勑......【疏】議曰:「蕃客入朝,於在路不得與客交雜,亦不得令客與人言語。州、縣官人若無事,亦不得與客相見。」即是國內官人、百姓,不得與客交關。私作婚姻,同上法。     5 “outsiders” as referring to all foreign barbaric regimes (fan yi zhi guo 蕃夷之國) that had both a separate emperor or leader (bie li jun zhang 別立君長) and their own cultures (ge you feng su 各有風俗) and laws (zhi fa bu tong 制法不同). Consequently, the Tang Code states that “for all outsiders (hua wai ren 化外人), if they have conflicts among their own group (tong lei 同類), then the conflict is judged based on their own local laws (ben su fa 本俗法). If the conflicts are between different groups (yi lei異類), then it is judged based on the Tang code”. But what regimes fit more specifically into the category of outsiders? One example given by the writers of the Tang Code was Goguryeo and Baekje, which were regimes located in modern day Korean peninsula: In terms of different groups, a conflict between the peoples of Goguryeo (Gaoli 高麗) and Baekje (Baiji 百濟), for example, is judged based on the Tang Code.8 Another definition of outsiders (hua wai ren 化外人) in the Tang Code defines them as people who come from the four barbaric areas beyond the reach of Tang rituals and laws (sheng jiao zhi wai, si yi zhi ren 聲教之外,四夷之人).9 According to the definition of the Book of Rites (Li Ji 禮記), the four barbaric areas refer to the Yi 夷 people in the East, Rong 戎 people in the West, Di 狄 people in the North, and Man 蠻 people in the South.10 Because this project only focuses on people in the western and in the northern steppe regions, according to the definition of the official history of the Tang dynasty Jiu Tang shu 舊唐書, the outsiders more specifically                                                 8 The Tang Code 6: No. 48, 133. 唐律疏議 卷六 名例六 48: 諸化外人,同類自相犯者,各依本俗法;異類相犯者,以法律論......【疏】議曰:......異類相犯者,若高麗之與百濟相犯之類,皆以國家法律,論定刑名。 9 The Tang Code 16: No. 232, 307. 唐律疏議 卷第十六 擅與 232: 化外人....謂聲教之外,四夷之人.  10 The Book of Rites. 禮記 王制:中國戎夷,五皆有其性也,不可推移。东方曰夷….南方曰蛮….西方曰戎….北方曰狄….中国、夷、蛮、戎、狄,皆有安居、和味、宜服、利用、备器,五方之民,言语不通,嗜欲不同。     6 refer to the people of the Turkic regimes (Tujue 突厥), Uighurs (Huihu 回鶻), Licchavi (Nipoluo 尼婆羅), Tangut (Dangxiang 黨項), Karakhoja (Gaochang 高昌), Tuyuhun (Tuyuhun 吐谷渾), Karasahr (Yanqi 焉耆), Kucha (Qiuci 龜茲), and Shule (Shule 疏勒), among others in the west who were categorized by the Tang authors as Rong from the West (Xi rong 西戎), and Tiele (Tiele鐵勒), Khitan (Qidan 契丹), and Xi (Xi 奚), among others, who were grouped by the same authors under the heading of Di from the North (Bei di 北狄). These categories were also used frequently in the political language of the Tang ruling class, indicating that the categorization was generally accepted by the Tang elites. For example, when speaking of the Tiele tribe, Emperor Taizong would sometimes just refer to them as “Di people from the north” (Beidi 北狄).11 In summary, outsiders, as a Tang legal definition, referred to people who belonged to regimes geographically outside of Tang boundaries, which had separate rulers and were dominated by non-Han groups, cultural practices, and laws. Insiders, on the contrary, referred to people who belonged to the area that could be reached by the Tang civilization, that is, who were under the Tang emperor, dominated by Tang cultural practices and laws, and lived within the geographical boundaries of the Tang. Moreover, on a discursive level and, at least in some instances, on a practical level as well, the Tang dynasty specified and enforced severe legal consequences for people who tried to cross the boundaries from outsiders to insiders and vice versa.12                                                 11 JTS 194a、b, 195, 198, 199b.  JTS 199b: 5345.  12 Itaru Tomiya, “The Transition from the Ultimate Mutilation to the Death Penalty: A Study on Capital punishments from the Han to the Tang”, in Capital Punishment in East Asia (Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2012), pp. 1-54. In addition, the examples of Li Kailuo and Shi Siming, which are discussed later, show that the Tang Code was enforced unless there was special command from the emperor.      7  From the example of Qibi and many other people similar to him, it is obvious that the Tang boundaries were not as impermeable as the Tang Code suggests. Such cases show that even though a clear distinction between outsiders and insiders was the norm during the Tang dynasty, there were exceptions. Thus the question becomes, given that boundaries were clearly set out in the Tang Code, why did Tang rulers choose to ignore them from time to time and incorporate individual “outsiders” into the realm of “insiders”? In other words, during the Tang dynasty, what allowed certain “outsiders” to become “insiders”?  Conventional understanding of the Tang dynasty has long included the existence of such varieties of ethnic groups within the Tang. However, scholars diverge on the Tang dynasty’s criteria of incorporating and treating foreigners in the regime. Many scholars explain the Tang dynasty’s policies towards foreigners based on Sinitic primary sources, in which discourses are heavily influenced by Confucian ideas such as the superiority of the Han civilization.13 Therefore, cultural, genealogical, and ancestral differences appear to be the most important criteria in how the Tang dynasty incorporated and treated foreigners. Many scholars, influenced by the idea of a tributary system, described in Sinitic sources, in which the Tang dynasty stood as the center of Asia and all people from the outside were naturally drawn to the superior center of civilization, argue that the Tang dynasty accepted foreigners when they gradually assimilated themselves into the Chinese civilization.14 Marc Abramson is among the first scholars of the Tang                                                 13 Denis Twitchett, The Writing of Official History Under the T’ang (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 198-205. 14 Ma Chi 馬馳, Tangdai fanjiang 唐代蕃將 (Xi’an: Sanqin chubanshe, 1990); Chen Yinke/que 陳寅恪, Tangdai zhengzhishi lunshu gao 唐代政治史述論稿, from Academia Sinica (Shanghai, shangwu yinshuguan, 1944), pp. 94-116; Yan Gengwang 嚴耕望, Tangshi yanjiu conggao 唐史研究叢稿 (Hongkong: New Asia Institute of Advanced     8 dynasty to argue against this sinocentric perspective. He presents evidence showing the fascination with foreign cultures and the admiration of foreign characteristics shared among the Tang elites, at least during the early period. Moreover, he emphasizes the deliberate preservation of distinctive foreign characteristics among foreigners inhabiting the Tang territory.15 However, despite the presence of cultural pluralism in the early Tang, Abramson argues that in order for foreign inhabitants to be regarded as part of the Tang, genealogical and ancestral factors became important: In order to be part of the dynasty, they could intermarry with the Han ethnic group or find a way to change their genealogical record if they looked similar to the Han. Being ethnically non-Han, Abramson argues, could hinder individuals from upward social mobility in the Tang bureaucratic system.16 As for the later period of the Tang dynasty, Abramson’s argument is very similar to the conventional view of cultural assimilation: He characterizes the period of the Tang dynasty as the key shift from an ethnically and culturally plural empire to an ethnically and culturally exclusive empire. He argues that especially during the later period of the Tang dynasty, individuals, regardless whether Han or non-Han, had to assimilate into the Han civilization in order to be part of the dynasty. Cultural pluralism was no longer valued as the dynasty declined and gradually closed its door.17                                                  Chinese, 1969); Cen Zhongmian 岑仲勉, Tangren xingdilu 唐人行第錄 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, reprint 2004); Cen Zhongmian 岑仲勉, Sui tang shi 隋唐史 (Hebei: hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, reprint 2000); Hu Ji 胡戟 chief ed. et al. Ershi shiji tang yanjiu 二十世纪唐研究 (Beijing: shehui kexue chubanshe, 2002); Xiang Da 向达, Tangdai changan yu xiyu wenming 唐代长安与西域文明 (Hebei: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001); Li hongbin 李鸿宾, Tangchao zhongyangjiquan yu minzu guanxi 唐朝中央集权与民族关系 (Beijing: minzu chubanshe, 2003), pp. 51-67; Denis Twitchett ed. The Cambridge History of China: Volume 3, Sui and Tang China, 589-906 AD (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); For a detailed description of the tributary system, see Thomas Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757 (New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992).  15 Marc Abramson, Ethnic Identity in Tang China (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 83-107.  16 Abramson, Ethnic Identity in Tang China, pp. x, 21-22, 27, 150-178.  17 Ibid, pp. 190-191.      9  Jonathan Skaff, as a scholar capable of reading multiple Inner Asian languages, offers for the first time a completely different view of the Tang dynasty and its relation to foreign regimes and people. He boldly argues that, contrary to the conventional understanding, which holds that the steppe and sown are intrinsically different in every aspect, the Tang (sown) and the Turko-Mongol regimes (steppe) shared far more similarities than once imagined. Throughout Eurasia, empires including the Tang dynasty practiced “patrimonialism,” which refers to a patron-client relationship with reciprocal obligations in which “alliances were personal and thus political identities were too”.18 For him, despite the physical boundaries separating the Tang and other regimes, in practice, individuals’ political identities were determined by personal bonds and relationships; in other words, foreigners could become Tang subjects if they cultivated close personal relationships with, or were personally loyal to, the Tang ruling class. Wang Zhenping offers yet another interpretation of the dynasty’s policies toward foreign people. He points out that because the Tang dynasty was only one of the centers in a multipolar Asia, the underlying principles of Tang dynasty policymaking were pragmatism and adaptability to the actual circumstances that surfaced at different times and in different places.19 By pointing out the practical side of how the Tang conducted its policies, Wang revised the conventional understanding that highlights cultural, genealogical and ancestral factors.                                                  18 For conventional understanding of steppe and sown, see Joseph Fletcher, “The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives”, in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 46, No. 1 (June., 1986), pp. 11-50; Thomas Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empire and China 221 B.C to AD 1757 (New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992). Jonathan Skaff, Sui-Tang China and Its Turko-Mongol Neighbors: Culture, Power and Connections, 580-800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 4, 14. 19 Wang Zhenping, Tang China in Multi-polar Asia: A History of Diplomacy and War (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2013), p. 18.     10  This thesis participates in the discussion of the Tang dynasty in relation to foreigners in two ways. First, it argues against the conventional cultural-genealogically dominated explanation. It illustrates that differences in genealogical and ancestral backgrounds were far less important for the Tang dynasty elites in terms of including people in the regime and excluding people from it. Cultural pluralism was constantly valued by the Tang elites in this regard. Secondly, it both challenges and supplements the arguments of recent scholars, investigating Wang’s understanding of Tang foreign relationships from a different angle. Wang looks mainly at macroscale Tang dynasty foreign relations, while this thesis presents a much more detailed microscale analysis of one special group of foreigners: pastoral and semipastoral foreigners from the North and Northwest who succeeded in becoming insiders of the Tang dynasty. Wang also touches upon the potential significance of this group of people by emphasizing their important function as the bridge of communication between two regimes, but he did not explore their roles in detail.20 This thesis argues both against Skaff’s claim that in practice, there was no boundary to cross at all because Eurasia should be understood holistically and against his argument that personal relationship and loyalty were the most important criteria in determining political identity. On the other hand, this thesis supports Skaff’s argument that points out the pragmatic side of the Tang dynasty and potential similarities shared between the Tang and its pastoral and semipastoral neighbors. Through preliminary research, this thesis argues that despite the emphasis on ethnic differences and political loyalty in Tang discourses regarding insiders and outsiders, the Tang dynasty accepted outsiders into the realm of insiders primarily based on pragmatic                                                 20 Wang Zhenping, Tang China in Muti-polar Asia, p. 18.     11 concerns, namely, whether individuals could prove themselves useful to the dynasty. It should be noted that this thesis only examines the question from the Tang elites’ perspectives due to the limited extant sources: the majority of commoners were still illiterate, and the society was largely dominated by aristocracy.21   Context and Scope  Mark Edward Lewis has called the Tang dynasty one of the most “multi-ethnic” and “cosmopolitan” empires in Chinese history.22 By using the word “cosmopolitan,” Lewis correctly refers to the phenomenon that the dynasty was open to transcontinental and transregional cultural, economic, diplomatic, and religious exchanges at least until the An Lushan Rebellion (755–763), one of the most devastating rebellions for the Tang dynasty; the rebellious army even marched into the two capitals of the Tang and forced the emperor to flee south. It was only with the help of the Uighurs that the Tang managed to suppress it, and the dynasty remained greatly weakened, losing authority over many territories. Before the rebellion, because of the “cosmopolitan” nature of the dynasty, a wide variety of people who originally belonged to the group of outsiders later served inside the military and bureaucratic system of the Tang, including pastoral and semipastoral people to the north and northwest, people from the modern-day Korean peninsula and Japan to the east, Tibetans from the southwest, and many others. In this study I focus only on people from the pastoral and semipastoral steppe powers because of their more intensive interactions with the Tang. The Tang ruling family, half Han and                                                 21 Nicolas Tackett, The Destruction of the Medieval Chinese Aristocracy (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2014), pp. 3-9. 22 Mark Edward Lewis, China’s Cosmopolitan Empire: the Tang Dynasty (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009).     12 half Xianbei-Turkic, was inclusive of pastoral cultures and influences before the An Lushan rebellion. Even after the rebellion, the Tang still had to rely on the Uighurs and other steppe groups to suppress internal rebellions and threats. It should be noted that other non-Han peoples under the Tang are also an important research subject and could potentially shed light on other possible criteria in determining insiders and outsiders. Although they are not the focus of this thesis, their significance should not be overlooked.   In terms of time frame, in this study I focus on the period between the late Sui dynasty and the middle Tang dynasty. The starting point of the project is the late Sui dynasty (581–618) because many famous outsiders who later became insiders in the early Tang dynasty were born in the late Sui dynasty, and they aided the process of the establishment of the new dynasty. The endpoint of my study coincides with the end of the An Lushan Rebellion in 763, due to the lack of sources after it. The most important source this project uses is the Jiu Tang shu 舊唐書, which is the standard history of the Tang. Throughout the year, the Tang dynasty officials were supposed to record everything that happened daily within the dynasty in the form of Court Diaries (Qi ju zhu 起居注) and Administrative Records (Shi Zheng ji 時政記). Based on these sources, they would compile the Daily Calendar (Ri li 日曆) every year, the Veritable Record (Shi lu 實錄) every reign period, and the full-scale National History (Guo shi 國史) for the reigning dynasty. After the dynasty had fallen and been replaced by its successor, the National History would be re-edited and compiled into the Standard History (Zheng shi 正史) of the dynasty. All of these documents were compiled and stored mainly at the Historiographical Office (Shi guan 史館). During times of peace and prosperity, records     13 were kept daily and stored properly. However,  during times of chaos, which continued periodically after the An Lushan Rebellion, the Historiographical Office was abandoned for a few years, sometimes even decades; therefore, it would have been very difficult for historians to write, compile, and store historical records. Moreover, events such as rebellions and wars always resulted in the partial or total loss of recorded documents, especially during the An Lushan Rebellion, when many Court Diaries (Qi ju zhu 起居注) and sources were completely lost.23 Therefore, according to scholars like Denis Twitchett, sources from periods after the rebellion are scarce and randomly scattered, making general observations difficult.   Sources and Methodology   In this study I use mainly three different kinds of primary sources. The first are official sinitic historical writings written during or slightly after the Tang dynasty, such as Jiu Tang shu 舊唐書 and Tong dian 通典. As discussed earlier, even though Jiu Tang Shu was written slightly after the Tang, it mainly used extant contemporary Tang historical sources stored in the Historiographical Office. As for sources written decades or centuries after the Tang dynasty, such as Xin Tang shu 新唐書, Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑, and Cefu yuangui 冊府元龜, they are only included as supplementary sources when they provide different accounts from the sources written during or immediately after the Tang. Most of the official historical writings contain lengthy biographical information about steppe individuals under the Tang. The second set of primary sources are writings                                                 23 Denis Twitchett, The Writing of Official History Under the T’ang (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 33, 140. Charles Hartman and Anthony DeBlasi, “The Growth of Historical Method in Tang China”, in The Oxford History of Historical Writing, Volume 2: 400-1400 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 18, 27.     14 by Tang individuals, including poems, prose, memorials, edicts and biji 筆記 (usually refer to privately composed history or novels). Quan Tang shi 全唐詩, a compilation by Qing scholars of poems written by Tang people, contributes a variety of poems relating to borderlands and non-Han individuals. For prose and novels, Quan Tang wen 全唐文, Yiwen leiju 藝文類聚, and Wenyuan yinghua 文苑英華 include many prose and memorials written by Tang literati as well as edicts written by emperors. Moreover, there are also individual Biji 筆記 recording Tang literati’s imaginings and impressions of famous foreign generals living in the Tang, such as Datang xinyu 大唐新語 and Minghuang zalu 明皇雜錄. The third set of primary sources are archaeological findings such as tomb epitaphs and inscriptions of the deceased foreigners who later became Tang officials. Tangdai muzhiming huibian fukao 唐代墓誌銘彙編附考, an eighteen-volume collection of tomb epitaphs published in Taiwan by the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, offers information on excavated tomb epitaphs available in Taiwan. The two series of Tangdai muzhi huibian 唐代墓誌匯編 and Tangdai muzhi huibian xuji 唐代墓誌匯編續集 offer information on excavated tomb epitaphs mainly available on the mainland. Moreover, some epitaphs or inscribed steles were also incorporated into Quan Tang wen and Wenyuan yinghua. The three sets of primary sources represent almost all the entire extant written corpus about the Tang.   Even though this project consults all three sets of sources, it uses Jiu Tang shu as the main source because it offers the most comprehensive accounts of the lives of individuals that this project examines. The compilers of the Jiu Tang shu were eminent scholars in the Tang dynasty who, besides working in the Historiographical Office,     15 simultaneously held positions in other high official posts. Moreover, as the official history of the Tang, it went through repeated censorship to fit the political agenda of the ruling family.24 For these reasons, the Jiu Tang shu represents the voice of high court officials and the ruling class. Private writings during the Tang dynasty cover the opinions of the literati. Although they did not need to follow the court’s perspectives, the majority of the literati were part of, or had connections to, the bureaucratic system of the Tang. Regarding the writers of tomb epitaphs and stele inscriptions, they were also usually literati of high prestige in the areas in which the epitaphs or inscriptions were later excavated.25 Because this project seeks to examine Tang literati’s perspectives on outsiders who later became insiders, the perspectives presented by the three sets of primary sources fit this goal well. Moreover, recognizing the complicated political and personal investment and implications behind these written sources as well as their “constructedness,” this project does not claim to use them as accurate “truth.” Rather, they reflect what was remembered or chosen to be remembered by the Tang literati about those outsiders who later became insiders: their official positions, their marriages, their military battles and important conversations. Thus, this project will use what was remembered, real or imagined, by the Tang literati, in order to argue what they valued in those “outsiders” who later became insiders.   Methodologically, I have established a database of information on all the important steppe people serving under the Tang (Appendix A). There are two criteria in selecting these people. First of all, there must be entries about them in the Jiu Tang shu.                                                 24 Denis Twitchett, The Writing of Official History Under the T’ang.  25 Nicolas Tackett, The Destruction of the Medieval Chinese Aristocracy, pp. 13-25.     16 In order to be included in the official history of the Tang, individuals would have had to be either prominent or notorious at the level of empire.26 Secondly, individuals included in the database must have been born or raised in the steppe regions outside the geographical boundaries of the Tang and have originally served under another leader (or been the leader themselves), thus fulfilling the criteria for being an outsider first. In terms of being an insider later, the criteria are a little bit different. According to the Tang Code, insiders were people who lived within the geographical boundaries of the Tang and who were touched by Tang civilization. Because of the limited sources, it is very hard to know where those individuals actually lived throughout their lives after they surrendered to the Tang. Also, because some Tang subjects who had residences within the borders of the Tang were appointed to occasionally live in the borderland areas to supervise submissive tribes27, it is difficult to define who became insiders solely by looking at where they resided. However, for the majority of individuals in the database, there is a clear description of when they transformed from an outsider to an insider: the moment they surrendered to the Tang dynasty and served with official titles under the Tang bureaucratic system. By emphasizing that these individuals had real power over the function of the dynasty, the database excludes individuals who were either captured by the Tang (and thus lived in custody), appointed as a submissive khan under the Tang, or granted honorific titles with no real power.28 On the other hand, those individuals who were granted Tang titles with real power became part of the Tang bureaucratic system;                                                 26 Denis Twitchett, The Writing of Official History Under the T’ang. 27 For example: THY 48: 6-1, 6-2: 章敬寺: 通化門外大厤二年七月十九日內侍魚朝恩請以城東莊爲章敬皇后立為寺因拆哥舒翰宅及曲江百司看屋及觀風樓造焉.  28 For example: Ashina chebi 阿史那車鼻(being captured and lived in custody in Chang’an), Ashina Chengxian 阿史那承獻(later appointed as khan), Ashina Tunnishu 阿史德暾泥熟(granted honorific title and returned to his own territory).      17 thus, they became with no doubt insiders. It should be noted that in each individual’s biographical information, there is no mention of the exact words “insiders” or “outsiders”; these two words were Tang dynasty legal terms, whereas the detailed biographical information of each individual is mainly found in historical or literal writings. Nonetheless, the concept of “outsiders” and “insiders” existed in the Tang dynasty as political identities in legal issues. Thus, the two terms provide a perfect framework that detailed biographical information can fill in.   With the list of individual names extracted from the official history that satisfy both criteria, I utilized five different catalogues and indexes to locate sources relating to those individual figures in the three sets of primary sources. The first index is called Tang wudai renwu zhuanji ziliao zonghe suoyin 唐五代人物传记资料综合索引, which includes all major biographical information on individuals from official and unofficial historical writings. The second index is entitled Tang wudai wushier zhong biji xiaoshuo renming suoyin 唐五代五十二种笔记小说人名索引, which provides information on individuals from major literature (mainly biji) written during the Tang dynasty. The third catalogue comprises the two sets of epigraphical sources mentioned before. They contain both pinyin and stroke indexes of different individuals. The fourth index is Tang wudai wen zuozhe suoyin 唐五代文作者索引, which provides lists of literary works written by or about these individual figures. The fifth searching tool is through Scripta Sinica: typing in the names of these steppe people produces a list of all the sources in the database related to them. I use the Scripta Sinica database to supplement the previous four searching indexes. The database is also partly based on Zhang Qun’s Foreign General Chart, in which he lists all foreign generals with their birth place, military titles,     18 and the main events relating to them. However, because of the difference in scope, the sources we are looking at are significantly different; further, because he tries to list all foreign generals in the Tang dynasty, including those who were from the east, south, and southwest of the Tang as well as those without entries in the Jiu Tang shu, my database is significantly different from his. I use his chart mainly as a supplementary source to double-check my database.  Discourse on Genealogical and Cultural Differences  The main body of this thesis is divided into six parts. The first two scrutinize Tang dynasty discourses about insiders and outsiders and argue that on discourse level, differences in genealogy, ancestry, and culture as well as political loyalty were crucial in including and excluding outsiders. Parts three to six look at actual cases of individual outsiders who later became insiders; it is argued that the Tang dynasty accepted them into the realm of insiders primarily based on pragmatism. More specifically, part three first shows that they originally belonged to the realm of outsiders, then it presents evidence that they were incorporated into the Tang dynasty primarily because of their usefulness. Part four demonstrates the privileges that those who were originally outsiders enjoyed, but people who were originally insiders did not. The fifth part looks at the relationship between genealogical, ancestral, and cultural differences and pragmatism and argues that the differences could even be an asset for steppe people if they were particularly useful to the Tang. The last part focuses on the relationship between political loyalty and pragmatism and argues that even though political loyalty was highly praised, pragmatism was much more important in the process of being incorporated as an insider.      19  Although the definition of outsiders and insiders presented earlier by the Tang Code is primarily a political definition, with regard to the borders, the Tang Code specifically states that the customs entries along the borders were set to separate hua 華 from yi 夷.29 Because the meanings of the Chinese word “hua” has varied throughout history, and it is sometimes used interchangeably with another Chinese word, “han” 漢, it is necessary here to explain the meanings of these terms. During the Han dynasty (206 BC to 220) and slightly after it, the word han was a political identifier, meaning people who belonged to the dynasty; the word hua had an ethnocultural definition, carrying a sense of genealogical and cultural superiority on the Han ethnic side and a barbaric (even less than human) connotation on the foreign side. After the destruction of the Han dynasty, the word han gradually became used as a geographical label for Central States people. However, because of more intensified interaction with people from the steppe during the Northern Wei dynasty (386–534), whose leading family was the Sarbi (Xianbei 鮮卑), han evolved into an ethnic supersign, referring to people who, by descent, language, and cultural practice, were recognized as Central Plain dwellers (or their descendants). The Sarbi ruler of the Northern Wei dynasty made efforts to change the meaning of hua from an ethnocultural term to a more culturally inclined term in the hope that by assimilating to the culture of the Central Plain, they could also be regarded as part of the hua or more civilized group, rather than the more “barbaric” group of yi. However, their effort was not completely successful. In later dynasties, including the Tang, hua was still mainly used as a reference to both culture and ethnic group. When                                                 29 The Tang Code 8: No.88: 177. 唐律疏議 卷八 衛禁二 88:【疏】議曰:緣邊關塞,以隔華、夷。     20 referring to culture, it means the superior Chinese civilization and people who practiced it (in contrast to the word yi); ethnically, it refers to the Han group.30 Therefore, during the Tang dynasty, hua and han were used interchangeably in referring to people or their descendants who shared the same “superior” genealogical, ancestral, and cultural characteristics of people originally dwelling in the Central Plain.31 Since the definition of insiders was people who lived within the geographical borders of the Tang and pledged their allegiance to the Tang emperor, while outsiders were defined as people who lived outside of the boundaries of the Tang and served under foreign rulers, the Tang Code assumes an idealistic distinction between the insiders and outsiders: insiders were homogeneously Han people who practiced Chinese civilization, and outsiders were homogeneously non-Han barbarians who practiced their own cultures.   Tang officials in their discourses also expressed the similar concept that Han people should be living within the geographical boundaries of the Tang, while non-Han “barbarians” should live outside of it. During the early years of the Tang dynasty, when the Tang was stronger than the Turkic regimes, many Turkic people sought to relocate into the Tang dynasty. While some officials, such as Wen Yanbo 溫彥博, supported the relocation of Turkic people in areas south of the Yellow River because they thought it was possible to assimilate these non-Han people into Chinese civilization, officials such as Wei Zheng 魏徵 strongly opposed it: “We should deport the Turkic people back to the                                                 30 Mark Elliot, “‘Hushuo’: The Northern Other and the Naming of the Han Chinese”, in Critical Han Studies: The History, Representation, and Identity of China’s Majority (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), pp. 174, 179-185. Fei Xiaotong 費孝通, Zhonghua minzu duoyuan yiti geju 中华民族多元一体格局 (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue chubanshe, 1999), pp.245-247.  31 Examples are plenty in the Jiu Tang Shu, for example: 9: 236, 13: 395-401, 17a: 523, 30: 1091, 68: 2507, 79: 2716, 119: 3434 (然自典午覆敗,中原版蕩,戎狄亂華,衣冠遷徙,南北分裂,人多僑處), 144: 3928 (勝生異域,推位讓國,堅留宿衞,顧慕華風,居中土者,豈不思廉讓耶), 170: 4426, 197: 5286, among others.      21 north of the Yellow River, which was their homeland. Those people have faces of humans but hearts of beasts. They are not part of our group. So when they are strong, they will engage in robbery, while when they are weak, they surrender. It is just their nature to overlook grace and righteousness.”32 This argument rests heavily on genealogical and cultural differences: Wei assumed that within the boundaries of the Tang (south of the Yellow River), people were of the same group that shared similar genealogical and cultural backgrounds (zu lei 族類). Outside of the boundaries of the Tang should be the realm of those who were not of the Han ethnic group; they were barbaric, unrighteous, and even less than human. It was not acceptable to mix the Han people with the inferior non-Han. Li Daliang李大亮, a prominent Han military official who aided the founding of the Tang dynasty and served in very high military positions throughout his life, expressed similar arguments to Wei. He argued that the court should never incorporate the Turkic people into the empire: “The people in the central kingdom are like the root of all under heaven, while the barbaric people beyond the four corners are like the leaves. It is unheard of to try to seek peace by disturbing the root to benefit the leaves”. The Chinese term for barbaric people was yi 夷, which has genealogical and cultural connotations. By making a clear distinctions between “the people in the central kingdom” and “the barbaric (yi 夷) people beyond the four corners,” and by referring to the latter as "jackals and wolves,” it is clear that Li had a sense of distinction between his people and outsiders that was both geographic and ethnic.33                                                 32 TD 197: 5414-15: 即宜遣還河北,居其本土。此人面獸心,非我族類,強必寇盜,弱則卑服,不顧恩義,其本情也。 33 JTS 62:2388. 中國百姓,天下本根;四夷之人,猶於枝葉。擾於根本,以厚枝附,而求久安,未之有也......戎狄豺狼	    22  While the Tang Code and some Tang officials explicitly draw the boundaries between insiders and outsiders based on perceived genealogical and cultural distinctions, there were many Han officials who expressed distrust and caution toward those non-Han people who were already incorporated into the dynasty. The writers of the Jiu Tang shu already noticed the existence of large numbers of non-Han generals who had originally belonged to foreign regimes but were serving under the Tang dynasty, which they attributed to the chaotic era of An Lushan rebellion. The Jiu Tang shu states that since the reign periods of Wude and Zhenguan, foreign generals such as Ashina she’er and Qibi Heli, even though were both loyal and competent, were not granted the high position of Grand General, and usually trusted high officials were put in place to check them.34 Although this statement does not state explicitly who these “trusted high officials” were, and the label “Han” was not mentioned in the source, it can be argued that it refers to ethnic Han officials: the Chinese word for “foreign” generals is fan 蕃, which is a neutral word meaning foreign in terms of both political regime and ethnic groups that were different in genealogy and cultural background from the Han. If the statement represented the actual situation, which was not the case as we shall see, it would mean that these foreign generals, because of their differences in genealogy and cultural background, were not fully trusted in the early years of the Tang dynasty. Regardless of the accuracy of the situation being recorded, it shows that at least at the discursive level, the Tang dynasty was very aware of the genealogically and culturally different people living within their boundaries, and they had a cautious and reserved attitude towards them.                                                  34 JTS 106: 3239: 國家武德、貞觀已來,蕃將如阿史那社爾、契苾何力,忠孝有才略,亦不專委大將之任,多以重臣領使以制之。     23  A similar situation happened when An Lushan 安祿山 was still a Tang insider. Because he had secured tremendous military victories for the Tang dynasty, he asked the emperor for an official position. The emperor originally wanted to grant him the position; however, because Yang Guozhong 楊國忠, a famous and notorious Han official, said to the emperor, “Indeed Lushan had military achievements, but because he is illiterate, if he is granted that position, I am afraid that barbarians from beyond the four borders will look down upon the Tang,” the emperor did not agree to An’s request.35 Yang Guozhong used a common stereotype here to persuade the emperor. The Tang literati had stereotypes about foreigners that were closely linked with genealogical and cultural differences; for example, they thought Han people, being more “civilized”, were primarily good at literature, whereas foreigners, especially nomadic people from the steppe, being “primitive” and “illiterate,” were good at fighting and animal husbandry and were generally brave.36 Yang tried to block An’s position because of his personal political ambitions, but the fact that the emperor accepted his argument shows that this was a commonly agreed stereotype that had real consequences.  Not only Han officials explicitly expressed their sense of distinction between themselves and people who had different genealogical and cultural backgrounds; some non-Han officials also clearly stated the distinction, indicating that they held inferior positions within the Tang dynasty because of that difference. For example, Qibi Heli, the figure introduced at the beginning of the thesis, once was fighting the pastoral power of                                                 35 JTS 97: 3058: 天寶十三年正月,范陽節度使安祿山入朝。時祿山立破奚、契丹功,尤加寵異。祿山求帶平章事......國忠進言曰:「祿山誠立軍功,然眼不識字,制命若行,臣恐四夷輕國。」玄宗乃止,加左僕射而已。 36 Marc Abramson, Ethnic Identity in Tang Dynasty China; Yang Shaoyun, ““What Do Barbarians Know Of Gratitude?” — The Stereotype Of Barbarian Perfidy And Its Uses In Tang Foreign Policy Rhetoric”, in T’ang Studies, 31, 2013, 28-74.      24 Tuyuhun 吐谷渾 with two other Han officials, Li Daliang 李大亮 and Xue Wanjun 薛萬均. The victory was primarily Qibi’s contribution because he was very familiar with nomadic warfare strategies; however, Xue Wanjun reported to the emperor only his own contribution to the victory while slandering Qibi Heli. When the emperor later discovered the truth, he was so furious that he wanted to dismiss Xue. Heli stopped him, saying that “[Your majesty] dismissed Xue because of me. I am afraid that when other foreigners hear it, they will think that Your majesty treats foreign people better while neglecting Han people. If they spread this rumor among themselves, there will be many competitions. Also, the barbarians from outside of the borders are ignorant; they might think all Han officials are like him [Xue], and this is not a good strategy to keep the peace”.37 Qibi’s considerate suggestion reveals two things. First, he and all Han and non-Han officials serving under the Tang clearly distinguished between themselves and others based on genealogical and cultural differences. This sense of distinction was so strong and intense that if issues related to different ethnic groups were not treated properly, it could cause unrest within the Tang dynasty. Second, the proper or safest way of dealing with officials within the Tang dynasty was to treat the Han people better than the non-Han. If the description of this incident is accurate, then it would only be normal to punish the Han official Xue Wanjun and compensate Qibi if the emperor treated them equally. However, because of the ethnic tensions, the emperor did not punish Xue.   In summary of this section, for some Tang officials, ideally, differences in genealogies and cultural backgrounds were the determining factor when deciding who                                                 37 JTS 109: 3291: 七年,與涼州都督李大亮、將軍薛萬均同征吐谷渾......萬均乃排毀何力,自稱己功......太宗怒,將解其官迴授,何力固讓曰:「以臣之故而解萬均,恐諸蕃聞之,以為陛下厚蕃輕漢,轉相誣告,馳競必多。又夷狄無知,或謂漢臣皆如此輩,固非安寧之術也。」太宗乃止。     25 would be insiders and outsiders. The boundaries of the Tang dynasty should separate Han people from non-Han barbarians with little or no fluidity. In this idealistic conception, the Tang insiders would homogeneously be Han people, while outsiders would homogeneously be non-Han people. However, literati during the Tang dynasty also knew that the actual situation was different: There were substantial numbers of non-Han serving within the geographical boundaries of the Tang. For this reason, they greatly emphasized the genealogical and cultural differences in their discourses by depicting the Han people as superior and more civilized and the non-Han people as barbaric, inferior, and primitive. It is also revealed that at least in some instances, Han and non-Han people in the Tang dynasty were not treated equally. The non-Han people’s interests were sometimes sacrificed for those of the Han people. On a discursive level, it seems that genealogical and cultural differences really mattered to the Tang dynasty; even though they could not actually block outsiders from entering into the realm of insiders solely based on these differences, it was incredibly difficult for non-Han people to emigrate to the realm of insiders and be treated properly. It seems that the only easy way for non-Han people to prosper in the Tang dynasty was to intermarry with Han people and assimilate into Han civilization.  Discourse on Political Loyalty  Political loyalty was also greatly emphasized with regard to outsiders and insiders. It seems obvious that if an individual wanted to remain an insider or immigrate from outsiders to insiders, political loyalty was crucial. It should be noted that political loyalty here refers to the unflinching political loyalty (zhong 忠) emphasized by the Confucian Classics and by Chinese traditional virtues, rather than the pragmatic loyalty     26 people alleged when defecting or surrendering to a regime because it could provide them benefits. Empress Wu Zetian wrote an article called Chengui 臣軌, literally meaning the right path of officials. She was the only female emperor in Chinese history, so when she declared herself emperor during the early middle period of the Tang dynasty, she experienced tremendous opposition from Han officials who upheld the orthodox Confucian ideology of men’s superiority to women. Empress Wu wrote this article to demonstrate what were considered the official ideals of the Tang.38 This source provides a glimpse of what was ideally most valued by the Tang dynasty regarding individual subjects, and political loyalty, besides occupying the second chapter of the book, penetrates into all corners of the discourse. The first chapter discusses the importance of unity between the emperor and officials and among the officials themselves. Because of the opposition she was experiencing, it is understandable that she would make this the first chapter; however, the political loyalty of the officials is presented as a prerequisite for being united with the emperor: since the time the emperor and the family were established, loyalty and filial piety was meant to be practiced. This means that from the beginning, when the emperor ascended the throne, officials were expected to practice loyalty. Further, she used Classical references to link the unity between emperor and officials to loyalty: When loyal officials remonstrate the emperor, it is not because they want to anger their superior; rather, it is because they are united with the emperor as one body, so they are as deeply concerned and worried about peace and prosperity as the                                                 38 Wu Zhao, Chengui, prelude, 1: 故綴述所聞,以為《臣軌》一部 …… 所以發揮言行,鎔范身心。為事上之軌模,作臣下之繩準。Accessed through Ctext.      27 emperor himself.39 Chapter two is entitled Utmost Loyalty (zhi zhong 至忠). The author used many excerpts from Confucian Classics to demonstrate the ideal political loyalty that was greatly valued: Officials should serve their emperors with all their hearts and ability and even sacrifice their own interests to benefit the overall interest of the empire.40 The subsequent chapters are Keeping the Way (shou dao 守道), Justice (gong zheng 公正), Remonstration (kuang jian 匡諫), Honesty (cheng xin 誠信), Caution (shen mi 慎密), Integrity (lian jie 廉潔), Being Good Generals (liang jiang 良將) and Altruism (li ren 利人). Again, political loyalty is closely linked to most of these characteristics. For example, under honesty, political loyalty is linked with honesty by saying that honesty is part of political loyalty; officials use honesty to demonstrate their loyalty to the emperor.41 It seems obvious that unflinching, self-sacrificing political loyalty was the foundation of being a Tang official.   While Empress Wu’s Chengui mainly deals with the valued characteristics of officials, the Tang Code was written for all Tang insiders. It is also clear from the Tang Code that such unflinching political loyalty was one of the fundamental criteria if individuals wanted to be Tang insiders. If they exhibited political disloyalty, in principle they would immediately being excluded from the realm of insiders. In the Tang Code, the                                                 39 Wu Zaho, Chengui, chapter 1, 2: 夫人臣之於君也,猶四肢之載元首,耳目之為心使也 …… 故知臣以君為心,君以臣為體。心安則體安,君泰則臣泰 …… 古人所謂“共其安危,同其休戚”者,豈不信歟!; chapter 1, 2: 雖人之才能天性殊禀,或仁或智、或武或文,然非群臣同體,則不能興其業; prelude, 1; 然則君親既立,忠孝形焉; chapter 1, 2: 忠臣之獻直於君者,非願觸鱗犯上也,良由與君同體,憂患者深,志慾君之安也。 40 Wu Zhao, Chengui, chapter 2, 3: 蓋聞古之忠臣事其君也,盡心焉,盡力焉。稱才居位,稱能受祿。不面譽以求親,不愉悅以苟合。公家之利,知無不為。上足以尊主安國,下足以丰財阜人。內匡君之過,外揚君之美。不以邪損正,不為私害公......故古之忠臣,先其君而後其親,先其國而後其家。 41 Wu Zhao,  Chengui, chapter 6, 7: 故臣以信忠其君,則君臣之道逾睦。     28 most severe punishment was execution, which in most cases was used when insiders were disloyal to the Tang. Under the first section of the Tang Code, which was regarded as most important, the ten most severe crimes one could commit to the dynasty are listed, ranked according to their severity. The three most severe crimes are rebellion; destruction of the dynastic temples, tombs, and palaces; and defection to other regimes.42 Crimes one degree less severe were punished by exile. Further, the Tang Code states that the perpetrators of severe crimes would be exiled beyond the four borders (si yi 四裔) or beyond the four seas (hai wai 海外).43 Therefore, people who committed crimes one degree less severe than political disloyalty to the Tang dynasty were excluded from the realm of insiders and exiled to the realm of outsiders beyond the geographical borders of the Tang. It could be inferred that for more severe crimes such as political disloyalty to the Tang dynasty, in principle the perpetrators are also excluded from the realm of insiders and placed in the realm of enemies subjected to death penalty, instead of the more neutral areas of outsiders.   Furthermore, also in principle, if individuals rebelled against the Tang dynasty but later surrendered, they were subjected to the death penalty. For example, after Shi Siming and one of his officials, Gao Xiuyan 高秀嚴, surrendered back to the Tang dynasty after years of rebellion, the Tang emperor issued an edict starting with the following: “The integrity of officials requires them to die rather than be disloyal. [They are] bodies of the dynasty, so because they rebelled, they must be subjected to the death penalty.” Thus the                                                 42 The Tang Code 1: No. 6: 6. 唐律疏議 卷一 名例 6: 五刑之中,十惡尤切。一曰謀反。謂危社稷....謂將有逆心,而害于君父者,則必誅之....三曰謀叛。謂謀背國從偽。The Tang Code 17: No. 248: 325. 唐律疏議 卷十七 248: 諸謀叛者,絞。已上道者皆斬; No. 3: 名例冠十二篇之首,故云 「名例第一」; The Tang Code 1: 6: 6-16. 43 The Tang Code 1: No. 4: 5. 唐律疏議 卷一 4: 大罪投之四裔,或流之于海外,次九州之外,次中國之外。     29 emperor ordered eighteen rebel officials who had surrendered with Shi to be executed and seven more to commit suicide.44 The abovementioned examples clearly show that unflinching, self-sacrificing political loyalty was the foundation of being an insider. In principle, if officials were ever disloyal to the Tang dynasty, they were sentenced to death and thus permanently excluded from the realm of insiders. However, as we shall also see later, in practice the unflinching loyalty emphasized here was not decisive in incorporating outsiders as insiders: Individuals who were politically disloyal the Tang dynasty were able to switch back and forth between outsiders and insiders as long as they proved themselves useful to the Tang.   From Outsiders to Insiders  Having examined the Tang literati’s discourses on outsiders and insiders, it seems that genealogical and cultural differences as well as political loyalty were crucial for the travel of insiders and outsiders. From this section onward, the current study focuses on individual cases from the database to examine what happened “in practice” when individuals crossed the boundaries from outsider to insider. These cases are presented chronologically to give readers historical context. In order to avoid readers’ doubt about the cases’ representativeness, this section scrutinizes each individual’s life in the database to be able to present any generalization about the Tang dynasty, rather than selecting and presenting a few examples of important individuals. Again, it should be noted that this thesis does not claim to regard what was recorded by Tang literati as what really happened; however, it represents what they chose to remember, in other words, what was                                                 44 JTS 10: 250: 己丑,賊將偽范陽節度使史思明以其兵眾八萬之籍,與偽河東節度使高秀巖並表送降......人臣之節,有死無二;為國之體,叛而必誅......達奚珣等一十八人,並宜處斬;陳希烈等七人,並賜自盡.      30 important to them. This section demonstrates that outsiders were mainly incorporated into the realm of insiders because of their ability to be useful to the Tang dynasty. Lastly, it should be noted that some individuals were accepted as Tang insiders multiple times because they defected from the Tang dynasty when situations were not in their favor. This section only discusses their initial incorporation into the dynasty; their subsequent acceptance is discussed in detail below.   Towards the end of the Sui dynasty and before the founding of the Tang dynasty, local powers and bandit groups actively sought opportunities to take advantage of this chaotic era. The founding father of the Tang dynasty, Li Yuan 李淵 (566–635), was one of them. While he was on his way to eliminate all enemies and establish a new dynasty, He Panren 何潘仁 (ca. 619), a Hu 胡 from the Northwest, also took advantage of the Central Plain and established a bandit group near the city of Chang’an. One of Li Yuan’s daughters, who later became Princess Pingyang (Pingyang gong zhu 平陽公主) (?–623), saw the potential usefulness of He and his bandit group when she helped her father with the rebellious ambition. Princess Pingyang then sent her servant Ma Sanbao 馬三寶 (? –629) to persuade He to join her father’s rebellious forces. With this possibility to become the founding official of a new dynasty, He offered his over ten thousand followers to join Li Yuan’s forces. Because of his contribution to the founding of the Tang empire, he was officially admitted as a Tang insider in charge of duties related to the imperial family.45                                                 45 JTS 58: 2315: 時有胡賊何潘仁聚眾於司竹園,自稱總管,未有所屬。JTS 1: 4: 是并與太宗會。郿縣賊帥丘師利、李仲文,盩厔賊帥何潘仁等,合眾數萬來降; 58:2315: 平陽公主,高祖第三女也....公主乃歸鄠縣莊所,遂散家資,招引山中亡命,得數百人,起兵以應高祖。公主遣家僮馬三寶說以利害,潘仁攻鄠縣,陷之。三寶又說羣盜李仲文、向善志、丘師利等,各率眾數千人來會。時京師留守頻遣軍討公主,三寶、潘仁屢挫其鋒; 60: 2340. Supplementing source: CFYG 345: 4090-2.      31 Liu Jizhen 劉季真 (ca. 620) was another Hu from the Northwest who had very similar experience. When Li Yuan started to rebel against the Sui, Liu formed his own rebellious group and even took the area of Shizhou 石州 as his power base. Because his power base was adjacent to the Turkic regime, he claimed himself Tuli khan (Tuli kehan 突利可汗), becoming a constant threat to the newly established Tang dynasty. Thus, the dynasty decided to eliminate Liu’s threat. When the Tang troops were near Liu’s territory, he became afraid and surrendered to the Tang dynasty. As soon as he surrendered, he was named Grand Governor of Shizhou (Shizhou zong guan 石州總管) and Commandery Prince of Pengcheng (Pengcheng jun wang 彭城郡王), and he was granted the imperial surname Li.46 Even though we know the exact time of his incorporation, sources related to him do not have an explicit explanation for the reason he was incorporated. However, given the fact that he was made governor of Shizhou, his original base of power, it could be inferred that the newly established Tang dynasty needed his influence as a leader in Shizhou because the new dynasty was still consolidating its control over various parts of the empire. Similarly, the Turkic leader Shi Danai 史大柰 (ca. 630) was also incorporated into the realm of insiders because of his special contribution to the founding of the dynasty. During the Sui dynasty, Shi was originally an official under the Turkic regime, but he later surrendered with his leader to the Sui and fought wars for the Sui emperor. However, after the Sui became weaker, Shi, with his followers, left the Sui dynasty and established his own power in the area of Loufan. With political acumen, Shi                                                 46 JTS 56: 2281-82: 劉季真者,離石胡人也......及義師起,季真與弟六兒復舉兵為盜,引劉武周之眾攻陷石州。季真北連突厥,自稱突利可汗,以六兒為拓定王,甚為邊患......時西河公張綸、真鄉公李仲文俱以兵臨之,季真懼而來降,授石州總管,賜姓李氏,封彭城郡王。     32 immediately led his followers to aid Li Yuan’s effort to rebel against the Sui dynasty. After a victorious battle against the Sui troops, Shi was granted by the future Tang emperor an official title in the administrative system before they had even entered the capital. The Jiu Tang shu states explicitly that because of his contribution during the process of establishing the new dynasty, he was granted a substantial amount of materials as well as the surname Shi. In his later years, he continued to bring victories to the Tang dynasty against various local bandits and powers; as a consequence, he climbed the ladder of social hierarchy relatively easily to General-In-Chief of the Right Militant Guard and Duke of Dou, among other titles.47   An Xinggui 安興貴 (ca. 619) and his brother An Xiuren 安修仁 (ca. 619) were also incorporated into the newly founded Tang dynasty because of their usefulness. During the founding period of the Tang, the west of the Yellow River was occupied by another leader called Li Gui 李軌 (? –619). Both An Xinggui and An Xiuren originally lived in Liangzhou 涼州 under the power of Li Gui, outside of the geographical boundaries of the Tang. It is unclear when and how An Xinggui crossed the boundaries into the Tang dynasty, but one could assume that the early founding period was not stable, and laws and regulations would be hard to enforce. As a result, An Xinggui crossed the boundaries to the Tang and ended up in Chang’an, the capital, while his brother An Xiuren still served in high positions under Li Gui’s regime. An Xinggui, sensing that the emperor of the Tang dynasty might worry about Li Gui’s regime to the                                                 47 JTS 194b: 5180: 特勤大奈,隋大業中與曷薩那可汗同歸中國。及從煬帝討遼東,以功授金紫光祿大夫。後分其部落於樓煩......會高祖舉兵,大奈率其眾以從......隋將桑顯和襲義軍於飲馬泉,諸軍多已奔退,大奈將數百騎出顯和後,掩其不備,擊大破之,諸軍復振。拜光祿大夫......及平京城,以力戰功,賞物五千段,賜姓史氏。QTW 13: 153-2: 授武士彠等子孫官詔.      33 north, offered to help the emperor eliminate Li Gui, because his family was prominent and prestigious in Li’s territory. Returning to Liangzhou with this promise, An Xinggui and his brother An Xiuren led followers of Hu people and rebelled against Li Gui, successfully eliminating him. The Tang emperor was very pleased and immediately granted them Tang official titles of General-In-Chief and Duke of Liang, among others.48 They continued to be trusted by the Tang emperor as valuable Tang subjects for the rest of their lives and were even included as two of the most important officials to make a great contribution to the Tang dynasty.49 From the examples of He, Liu, Shi, and the An brothers during the founding era of the Tang dynasty (Wude 武德 era), it is clear that they were incorporated into the regime primarily because of their ability to benefit the dynasty. Their different genealogical, ancestral, and cultural backgrounds were not even considered. Political loyalty was not stressed because a surrendering rebellious leader like Liu or a person who had switched allegiance multiple times, such as Shi, would have had no chance of being granted an official title with real power.   The last individual incorporated during the Wude reign period was Pei Chuo 裴綽 (middle of Wude reign period), whose biographical information is very scarce. We only know that he was the king of the Shule regime, and his descendent Pei Fen was rather famous. When he had an audience with the Tang emperor during the Wude era, he stayed                                                 48 JTS 55: 2251-2252: 初,安修仁之兄興貴先在長安......高祖謂曰:「李軌據河西之地,連好吐谷渾,結援於突厥,興兵討擊,尚以為難,豈單使所能致也?」...... 興貴對曰:......臣於涼州,奕代豪望,凡厥士庶,靡不依附。臣之弟為軌所信任, 職典樞密者數十人,以此候隙圖之,易於反掌,無不濟矣。」高祖從之......興貴知軌不可動,乃與修仁等潛謀引諸胡眾起兵圖軌,將圍其城,軌率步騎千餘出城拒戰。先時,有薛舉柱國奚道宜率羌兵三百人亡奔于軌,既許其刺史而不授之,禮遇又薄, 深懷憤怨。道宜率所部共修仁擊軌,軌敗入城,引兵登陴,冀有外救; 64: 時涼州人安興貴殺賊帥李軌; 55: 2251: 河西悉平。詔授興貴右武候大將軍、上柱國,封涼國公,食實封六百戶,賜帛萬段;修仁左武候大將軍,封申國公,并給田宅,食實封六百戶.  49 QTW 53: 10973-1: 武德已來。實封陪葬配饗功臣。名跡崇高者。十一人第一等......三十四人第三等。右驍衛大將軍梁國公安興貴。右武衛大將軍申國公安修仁。     34 in the capital regions of the Tang dynasty.50 Subsequently, he seems to have assimilated himself into the Tang dynasty and Han civilization; the biographical information of Pei Fen only mentions that Pei Fen was originally from the capital regions.51 Otherwise, there is no mention of information about the individual Pei Chuo. It is reasonable to assume that he just peacefully lived out the rest of his life in the capital regions. Because there is no other mention of possible reasons that the Tang dynasty accepted him into the realm of insiders, it could be argued that the fact that he, as a ruler of another regime, was willing to stay in the Tang dynasty rather than return to his own regime could benefit the Tang in terms of fame and legitimacy, especially during the early periods of the dynasty.  The subsequent Zhenguan 貞觀 era, under Emperor Taizong, was much more stable and started to enter into a new age of expansion. During this period, outsiders were mainly incorporated into the realm of Tang insiders due to four different pragmatic aspects: their own military prowess, their ability to provide the Tang extra military resources (such as soldiers), their political and diplomatic importance, and their special contribution to the Tang dynasty. It should be noted that these pragmatic considerations overlap with each other, and some individuals were incorporated into the realm of Tang insiders because of their ability to benefit the Tang dynasty in multiple ways. The following discussion focuses mainly on the most emphasized aspects of usefulness.   Zhishi Sili 執失思力 (ca. 626) was a famous Turkic official during the Wude and Zhenguan reign periods. He originally lived in the Turkic territory, serving under the Turkic Illig Khan (Jieli kehan 頡利可汗) (579–634). During the early years of Emperor                                                 50 JTS 146: 3969: 五代祖疏勒國王綽,武德中來朝,授鷹揚大將軍,封天山郡公,因留闕下,遂為京兆人。 51 JTS 146: 3969: 裴玢,京兆人。     35 Taizong’s reign, Illig Khan was relatively strong and invaded the Tang dynasty, pushing all the way into areas near the capital. Zhishi Sili, a Turkic official at the time, was sent by Illig Khan as an envoy to the Tang dynasty with the real intension to spy on their military power. His plan was discovered, and he was temporarily held in custody by the Tang emperor. Later, when the Tang dynasty became more and more powerful and expansionist, Illig Khan was defeated by the Tang dynasty and again sent Zhishi Sili as an envoy to the Tang, requesting to be put under the suzerainty of the Tang. However, this time the Tang dynasty tricked Illig Khan by appearing to agree with Illig’s request but secretly attacking when the khan was not cautious, eliminating his regime. There is actually no direct mention of Zhishi Sili when Illig Khan’s regime was destroyed, nor of how he managed to change from an outsider who belonged to the Turkic regime to an insider who lived and served under the Tang. The next mention of him was on the battlefield, leading Tang armies against the pastoral tribe of Xueyantuo 薛延陀.52 There is no mention of difficulties due to his different genealogy and cultural background while he was being incorporated into the realm of subject. All information about him in Tang sources is related to his military victories. He led battles against various regimes such as the Xueyantuo tribe in the North, the Tibetan regime in the West, and the Turkic khan in the Northwest.53 It is clear that with each victory, he was granted higher and higher                                                 52 TD 197: 5409-10 九年七月,頡利又率十餘萬騎進寇武功,京師戒嚴......癸(5410)未,頡利遣其腹心執失思力 來朝,自張形勢,云「兵百萬今至矣」。JTS 2: 30: 癸未,突厥頡利至于渭水便橋之北,遣其酋帥執失思力入朝為覘,自張形勢,太宗命囚之。思力懼而請命,太宗縶之於門下省; 156: 4005: 頡利計窘,使執失思力入朝謝罪,請為藩臣; 197: 5411: 二月,頡利計窘,竄於鐵山,兵尚數萬,使執失思力入朝謝罪,請舉國內附; TD 197: 5411: 太宗遣鴻臚卿唐儉、將軍安修仁等持節安撫之,頡利稍自安。靖乘閒襲擊,大破之,遂滅其國,復定襄、恆安之地,斥土界至於大漠; JTS 194a: 5159; 185a: 4793: 貞觀十八年, 太宗征遼發後,薛延陀數萬騎抄河南,太宗令仁會及執失思力率兵擊破之,逐北數百里,延陀脫身走免。 53 JTS 196a: 5221. JTS 199b: 5437.      36 official titles, ranging from General-In-Chief of the Palace Guard (you ling jun da jiang jun 右領軍大將軍), which had very little power, to General-In-Chief of the Left Courageous Guard (zuo xiao wei da jiang jun 左驍衛大將軍), which had real power over the imperial troops in the capital.54 There is no doubt that he originally belonged to the realm of outsiders because he lived within the Turkic regime, outside of the geographical boundaries of the Tang dynasty, and he served under the Turkic khan. There is also no doubt that he was later incorporated into the realm of insiders, given that he lived in the Tang dynasty and served the Tang emperor. Hence, the aforementioned Jiu Tang shu comment that non-Han generals were not fully trusted with highest military titles but were constantly checked by “trusted high officials” was not true in practice. Even though the sources do not explicitly state why Zhishi was incorporated into the realm of Tang insiders, taking into account the heavy emphasis on his military achievements, it is reasonable to infer that he was kept as a Tang insider primarily because of his ability to successfully wage wars, useful to the Tang dynasty.   Qibi Heli (?–677) provides a suitable example of the incorporation into the realm of insiders based on one’s ability to bring military sources to the dynasty. Qibi lived for most of his early years outside of the geographical boundaries of the Tang dynasty and was under the rulership of the Tiele regime because his father was a leader. Because this regime was near the territory of the Tuyuhun, and because it was narrow and prone to diseases, his father moved their regime to the area of Kucha (Qiu ci 龜茲), above Rehai 熱海 in Inner Asia. Qibi was nine years old when his father passed away, and he spent                                                 54 Charles Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China (Stanford University Press, 1985), p. 3754, p. 2457.      37 the subsequent years in Inner Asia with his tribesmen, until the sixth year of the Zhenguan era (632) when he surrendered to the Tang dynasty with his mother and thousands of families from his regime. The Tang sources state very clearly that as soon as Qibi reached the capital after his surrender, he was granted the title General of the Left Palace Guard and lived his subsequent years within the Tang dynasty. Moreover, as presented earlier, Qibi also clearly stated that he was a loyal Tang subject when facing the khan of Xueyantuo. Because the offer of an official title followed immediately after his surrender, it seems obvious that there was a connection between his surrendering thousands of tribesmen and his incorporation into the realm of Tang insiders. Later on he was further promoted to positions, such as General-In-Chief of the Right Courageous Guard (you xiao wei da jiang jun 右驍衛大將軍) and Area Commander-In-Chief of the Kunshan Circuit (Kunshan dao xing jun da zong guan 崑山道行軍大總管), because of his military achievements. When he passed away, he was buried in the Tang imperial tomb of Zhaoling 昭陵 with the posthumous title Integrity (lie 烈).55 Qibi’s example illustrates my argument in three ways. First, he was originally incorporated into the realm of insiders because he could offer benefits to the Tang dynasty: By bringing in thousands of pastoral households with him, he was adding potential military forces to the Tang dynasty. Second, because of his ability to successfully fight on battlefields, he was able to move up the Tang social and military hierarchies without much difficulty. He even                                                  55 JTS 109: 3291: 契苾何力, 其先鐵勒別部之酋長也。父葛,隋大業中繼為莫賀咄特勤......以地逼吐谷渾,所居隘狹,又多瘴癘,遂入龜茲,居于熱海之上......特勤死,何力時年九歲,降號大俟利發。至貞觀六年,隨其母率眾千餘家詣沙州,奉表內附,太宗置其部落於甘、涼二州......何力至京,授左領軍將軍; JTS 109: 3292: 何力箕踞而坐,拔佩刀東向大呼曰:「豈有大唐烈士,受辱蕃庭,天地日月,願知我心!」......授鎮軍大將軍,行左衞大將軍,徙封涼國公,仍檢校右羽林軍。儀鳳二年卒,贈輔國大將軍、并州都督,陪葬昭陵,諡曰烈。Hucker, Dictionary, 3754.      38 managed to cultivate a strong personal connection to the Tang emperor and was granted the honor of being buried with him in the end. It is arguable that because he successfully demonstrated his usefulness throughout his life, he was considered a much closer, more trusted and valuable Tang insider than others who were less useful.   Another outsider, Ashina She’er 阿史那社尒 (604–655), exhibits a similar trajectory in his effort to become a Tang insider. He was a son of the Turkic Chuluo Khan (Chuluo kehan 處羅可汗) (? –620) and later became a famously brave Turkic leader respected by his tribesmen. He, like Qibi Heli, surrendered to the Tang dynasty with his followers in the ninth year of the Zhenguan era (635). Similarly, he was immediately granted the official title of General-In-Chief.56 After the initial incorporation, Ashina She’er used his military prowess against Gaochang, Liao, and the Western Turkic regime and moved up the Tang bureaucratic hierarchy without difficulties. He later was also buried in the Tang imperial tomb of Zhaoling.57 Ashina Helu 阿史那賀魯 (? –659) was also originally a Turkic khan living in the Northwest, and the Tang sources also clearly describe the connection between his incorporation as a Tang insider and his ability to bring his tribesmen with him when he surrendered.58 What is interesting about the example of Ashina Helu is that he was later removed from the realm of insiders because                                                 56 JTS 109: 3288-89: 阿史那社尔,突厥处罗可汗子也。年十一,以智勇称于本蕃,拜为拓设,建牙于碛北,与欲谷设分统铁勒、纥骨、同罗等诸部。在位十年,无所课敛。诸首领或鄙其不能富贵,社尔曰:「部落既丰,于我便足。」诸首领咸畏而爱之……九年,率众内属,拜左骑卫大将军。 57 JTS 109: 3289: 十四年,授行军总管,以平高昌......十九年,从太宗征辽,至驻跸阵,频遭流矢,拔而又进。其所部兵士,人百其勇,尽获殊勳。师旋,兼授鸿胪卿。二十一年,为崑丘道行军大总管,征龟兹。明年,军次西突厥,击处密,大破之,馀众悉降。又下龟兹大拨换城,虏龟兹王白诃黎布失毕及大臣; 3290: 3290: 六年卒,赠辅国大将军、并州都督,陪葬昭陵,起冢以象葱山,仍为立碑,諡曰元。子道真,位至左屯卫大将军。 58 TD 199: 5459: 阿史那賀魯者,曳步利設射匱特勤之子也。阿史那步真既來歸國,咄陸可汗乃立賀魯為葉護,以繼步真,居於多邏斯川,在西州直北千五百里,統處月、處密、姑蘇、葛邏祿、弩矢畢五姓之眾; JTS 194b: 5186; TD 199: 5459: 其後,咄陸西走吐火羅國,射匱可汗遣兵迫逐,賀魯不常厥居。貞觀二十三年,乃率其部落內屬,詔居庭州。尋授左驍衞將軍、瑤池都督; JTS 40: 1645.     39 of his incompetence and hence his inability to provide any benefits to the Tang dynasty. During the second year of the Yonghui era (651), he ran away from the Tang dynasty and established his own regime in the Western Regions, invading the Tang dynasty multiple times. The Tang dynasty then sent military generals like Qibi Heli and Su Dingfang 蘇定方 (592–667) to fight against him. Eventually Helu was significantly defeated by the Tang dynasty, captured, and brought to the capital. According to the Tang laws discussed above, he would have been sentenced to death. However, the Tang emperor exempted him from being executed, and there is no subsequent mention of him until he died the next year.59 It is reasonable to assume that even though he was exempted from the death penalty, he was still under some sort of punishment or custody. Helu’s example clearly illustrates pragmatism in the Tang dynasty. Like many other non-Han officials, he was accepted into the realm of Tang insiders because he benefitted the Tang dynasty by surrendering with his tribesmen. However, he was not accepted back to the regime as were many other military generals discussed later, because he was completely defeated with no troops, unable to bring them to the dynasty anymore.  Ashina Sunishi 阿史那蘇尼失 (ca. 630), Kuge 窟哥 (ca. 648), and Keduzhe 可度者 (ca. 648) all share very similar experiences to Qibi Heli and Ashina She’er: They were all incorporated into the realm of insiders primiarly because of their ability to provide the dynasty with extra military resources. Ashina Sunishi was a minor khan under the Illig Khan. When Illig Khan was defeated by the Tang troops, he escaped to Ashina Sunishi’s                                                 59 TD 199: 5459-60 永徽二年,與其子咥運率眾西遁,據咄陸可汗之地,總有西域諸部,建牙於雙河及千泉,自號沙鉢羅可汗,統攝咄陸、弩矢畢十姓......西域諸國,亦多附隸焉。賀魯尋立咥運為莫賀咄葉護,數侵擾西蕃諸部,又進寇庭州......又與蘇定方攻賀魯於碎葉水,大破之。賀魯與咥運欲投鼠耨設,至石國之蘇咄城傍,人馬飢乏,城主伊沮達官詐將酒食出迎,賀魯信其言入城,反被拘執。蕭嗣業既至石國,鼠耨設乃以賀魯屬之。俘至京師......高宗特免死...... 四年,賀魯卒,詔葬於頡利墓側,刻石以紀其事。JTS 4:68.     40 regime. Knowing that Illig Khan was one of the archenemies of the Tang, Ashina Sunishi asked his son to arrest Illig Khan. With Illig Khan at their disposal, Ashina Sunishi surrendered to the Tang dynasty with his followers. It is stated explicitly that the Emperor Taizong was very happy and granted Ashina Sunishi the official titles of General-In-Chief of the Right Guard (you wei da jiang jun 右衞大將軍) and Commandery Prince of Huaide (huai de jun wang 懷德郡王).60 The Khitan leader Kuge and the Xi leader Keduzhe also demonstrate the Tang principle of incorporating insiders: They were both immediately granted official titles with real military power over Tang troops after they managed to surrender with their own followers, thus adding military resources to the Tang dynasty.61    In some cases, the surrender of the steppe leader to the Tang dynasty was itself considered beneficial to the dynasty for diplomatic reasons, especially during the early expansionist era. The surrendering of the steppe leader not only displayed that the newly established Tang dynasty had the legitimacy to proclaim itself the ruler of all under Heaven; it could also set an example for all other independent forces along the borders. By showing that surrendered independent leaders could still gain wealth and power in the Tang dynasty, it encouraged more independent and hostile regimes to surrender without the need to fight. Ashina Simo 阿史那思摩, also known as Li Simo (?–655) was incorporated into the regime of insiders for this pragmatic reason. Li Simo 李思摩 was probably more famous for his status as a Turkic khan; he was originally a tribesman                                                 60 JTS 109: 3302: 頡利乃立蘇尼失為小可汗。及頡利為李靖所破,獨騎而投之,蘇尼失遂舉其眾歸國,因令子忠擒頡利以獻。太宗賞賜優厚,拜北寧州都督、右衞大將軍,封懷德郡王。 61 TD 200: 5487: 大唐貞觀二十二年十一月,契丹帥窟哥 率其部內屬,以契丹部為松漠都督府,拜 窟哥 為持節十州諸軍事、松漠都督於營州,兼置東夷都護,以統松漠、饒樂之地,罷護東夷校尉官; JTS 3: 61: 庚子,契丹帥窟哥 、奚帥 可度者並率其部內屬。以契丹部為松漠都督,以奚部置饒樂都督; JTS 199b: 5351, 5355.       41 under the rulership of Illig Khan. As Illig Khan’s regime became weaker and weaker, the majority of his followers surrendered to the Tang dynasty; however, Li Simo, being very loyal to Illig Khan, continued to follow him until they were both captured by the Tang dynasty. The Tang emperor, impressed by his loyalty, established him as the new leader over the troops of Illig Khan. At this stage, even though they were permitted to live south of the Yellow River, they were not yet incorporated into the Tang regime. As one official said, they were only permitted to live there temporarily until a new khan was appointed. The Tang emperor then appointed Li Simo as the new Turkic khan and ordered them to move north of the Yellow River.62 However, with over tens of thousands of followers, and because Li Simo did not physically resemble Turks (but rather Hu), he was not able to control all of them. Many of them rebelled against him and migrated south to jimi states (ji mi zhou 羈縻州). It should be noted that jimi states were not under the direct control of the Tang emperor. They were largely autonomous states under the suzerainty of the Tang; usually the leader of the jimi state was a hereditary non-Han tribal leader ruling over his original tribes with very different cultural settings and local laws. The inhabitants of these states did not keep their records in the household registration of the Tang, nor were they subject to Tang taxes or corvée labor. The Chinese word used during the Tang dynsty when referring to them was fan 蕃, which means foreign. People living in these states would not be categorized as insiders based on the definition in the Tang                                                 62 TD 197: 5416: 思摩者,頡利族人也。始畢、處羅以其貌似胡人,不類突厥,疑非阿史那族類,故歷處羅、頡利代,常為夾畢特勤,終不得典兵為設......及其國亂,諸部多歸中國,惟思摩隨逐頡利,竟與同擒......太宗遣司農卿郭嗣本賜延陁璽書曰:「前破突厥,止為頡利一人,除百姓之害,所以廢而黜之,實不貪其土地、利其人馬也。自黜廢頡利以後,恆欲更立可汗,是以所降部落等並置河南,任其放牧; TD: 197: 5415: 自結社率之反也,太宗始患之,上書者多云處突厥於中國殊謂非便,乃徙於河北,立右武候大將軍、化州都督、懷化郡王思摩為乙彌泥孰俟苾可汗,賜姓李氏,率所部建牙於河北; JTS 3:50; JTS 194a: 5163; WYYH 468: 2388-1: 賜回鶻可汗敕書; WYYH 694: 3579-1 to 3580-1: 言踈勒等凋弊疏; ZGZY 36: 242.       42 Code. For this reason, Li Simo returned to the Tang dynasty alone and was incorporated into the dynasty as an insider with official title General of the Right Militant Guard (you wu wei jiang jun 右武衞將軍).63 The Tang sources do not explain why Li Simo was accepted by the Tang dynasty. It could be argued that the surrender and subsequent incorporation of a Turkic khan into the Tang regime served diplomatic purposes as it added legitimacy and prestige to the Tang dynasty. It is also very likely that he was incorporated into the dynasty because of his ability to fight wars, as he is subsequently only described as leading armies in the Northeast with the emperor. He obviously managed to cultivate a close relationship with the emperor: When he was shot by an arrow, the Tang emperor helped him by sucking out his blood in person so he will not die out of possible poison.64   Besides Li Simo, Duomozhi 咄摩支 (ca. 646), Anshuo 菴鑠 (ca. 649), and Ashina Jieshelü 阿史那結社率 (ca. 630) were also incorporated into the realm of insiders, arguably because of their diplomatic importance. Duomozhi was originally a khan of Yantuo with over seventy thousand followers to the north of the Tang. However, he surrendered to the Tang dynasty when the Tang sent a punitive army against him; when he reached the capital, he was immediately granted an official title and residence in Chang’an.65 The Jiu Tang shu did not record specific reasons why he was accepted into                                                 63 TD 197: 5415-6: 始畢、處羅以其貌似胡人,不類突厥,疑非阿史那族類,故歷處羅、頡利代,常為夾畢特勤,終不得典兵為設......時思摩下部眾渡河者凡十萬,勝兵四萬人,思摩 不能撫眾,皆不愜服......至十七年,相率叛之,南渡河,請分處於勝、夏二州之閒,詔許之。......思摩遂輕騎入朝,尋授右武衞將軍. 64 TD 152: 3883: 大唐貞觀中,太宗親征高麗....師次白巖城,將軍李思摩中弩矢,太宗親為之吮血,由是從行文武競思奮勵; TD 197: 5416: 從征遼東. JTS 66: 2464-65, 194a: 5164-65, 199a: 5323;  WYYH 333: 1730-2: “Qi de wu” 七德舞 Bai ju yi 白居易; ZGZY 6: 168. 65 JTS 67: 2487; 199b: 咄摩支見官軍奄至,惶駭不知所為,且聞詔使蕭嗣業在迴紇中,因而請降。嗣業與之至俱至京師,詔授右武衛將軍,賜以田宅。     43 the dynasty. It could be that his followers joined the Tang dynasty with him, adding to the Tang dynasty’s military resources. Or, as explained above, it could be that his status as a leader of the archenemy of the Tang dynasty was deemed valuable and beneficial for diplomatic purposes. The Turkic outsider Anshuo provides another good example of diplomatic significance. He was one of the sons of Ashina Chebi 阿史那車鼻 (reign ca. 646–650), who had been a threat to the Tang dynasty’s northern borders but was eventually defeated. Before this happened, he had sent his son Anshuo to the Tang court. The Tang received Anshuo and granted him official titles.66 The sources stress the time period when Anshuo was incorporated: before Chebi was defeated. Hence, it can be inferred that the Tang accepted Anshuo as a form of hostage (zhi zi 質子). Because Ashina Chebi was an independent and potentially hostile regime at the northern Tang border, it would have been advantageous to the Tang dynasty to keep Chebi’s son at the capital in order to keep Chebi’s ambition in check. Ashina Jieshelü’s information was ambiguous because of the limitation of sources. He was the brother of Tuli Khan (Tuli kehan 突利可汗) (603–631). We don’t know much about him, probably because he betrayed the trust of the Tang emperor and almost killed him. It seems that after him, the whole Tang court became a little bit paranoid about the presence of Turks inside the dynasty. We only know that he was incorporated as a Tang insider during the early years of the Zhenguan era; the next description of him was in the thirteenth year of the Zhenguan era, when he rebelled against the Tang and almost killed the Tang emperor.67 It                                                 66 TD 198: 5433: 車鼻長子羯漫陁先統拔悉密部。車鼻未敗前,遣其子菴鑠入朝,太宗嘉之,拜左屯衞將軍,更置新黎州以統其眾; JTS 194a: 5166.  67 TD 197: 5413: 突利弟結社率......自結社率之反也,太宗始患之,上書者多云處突厥於中國殊謂非便.....貞觀初入朝,歷位中郎將。十三年,從幸九成宮,陰結部落,得四十餘人,并擁賀邏鶻,相與夜犯御營,踰第四重    44 can be inferred that he was initially incorporated into the regime of insiders because of his special status as the brother of Tuli Khan, who was friendly towards the Tang dynasty. By keeping Tuli’s brother in the capital and accepting him as an insider, the Tang might be able to strengthen their good relationship with the Tuli power.   People could also be particularly useful to the Tang dynasty by providing the dynasty with a special contribution; Kangsu Mi and Ashina Zhong were such examples. Kangsu mi 康蘇密 (ca. 630) was a Hu ruler under the Turkic Illig Khan during the early founding periods of the Tang dynasty. Even though the Sui dynasty had already been destroyed and the new dynasty founded, the Turkic regime was unwilling to see a prosperous and stable Central Plain. Therefore, they kept the empress of the Sui and the grandson of the last emperor of the Sui dynasty, Yang Zhengdao 楊政道, in order to incite chaos. When the Tang dynasty waged war against Illig Khan, Kangsu Mi surrendered to the Tang dynasty with the two important threats to the stability and legitimacy of the Tang dynasty: the empress of the Sui and Yang Zhengdao. As soon as Kang surrendered with these two individuals, he was accepted into the realm of insiders.68 Ashina Zhong was the son of Ashina Sunishi discussed above. He made a special contribution to the Tang dynasty when he captured the Illig Khan after his defeat, which eliminated a powerful and constant threat to the Tang dynasty borderland areas. Therefore, as soon as he reached the Tang dynasty with Illig Khan, he was accepted into                                                 幕,引弓亂發,殺衞士數十人。折衝孫武開率兵奮擊,乃退,北走渡渭水,欲奔其部落,尋皆捕斬之; JTS 194a: 5161; ZGZY 9: 242.  68 TD 197: 5411: 胡酋康蘇密等遂以隋蕭后及楊政道來降; JTS: 67: 2479: 頡利可汗不虞於靖,見官軍奄至,於是大懼,相謂曰:「唐兵若不傾國而來,靖豈敢孤軍而至。」一日數驚。靖候知之,潛令間諜離其心腹,其所親康蘇密密來降; JTS 105: 3225: 貞觀初,李靖擊破頡利可汗,胡酋康蘇密以蕭后及正道歸,授尚衣奉御。     45 the realm of insiders with official title of General, the privilege to marry a daughter of the imperial family, and the surname Shi, which together with the first name literally means loyalty.69  The reign of Empress Wu was characterized by resistance and expansion efforts. Although she proved herself to be a competent ruler by bringing prosperity to the dynasty overall, her status as the only female ruler in Chinese history dictated that she would experience tremendous pressure from within. When she first ascended to the throne, there was both discontent among court officials in the capitals and internal rebellions from the provinces. In order to suppress any potential threat to her power, she wanted to reign the empire with terror.70 Therefore, being useful under Empress Wu’s reign period included another new aspect: being able to attend Empress Wu’s special need to eliminate potential threats. Suo Yuanli 索元禮 (? –691) was particularly good at it. He was a Hu from the Northwest. It is unclear how he crossed the geographical boundaries of the Tang and made it to the Tang capital, but we know that he was officially incorporated into the realm of insiders because of his particular usefulness in this situation. After learning about Empress Wu’s needs, Suo informed her of potential threats, and he was immediately granted the title of Mobile Corps Commander (you ji jiang jun 游擊將軍). Subsequently, he started a career of informing the empress and interrogating the potential enemies. The Tang sources state very clearly that because of his ability to cruelly interrogate suspects so they would report more suspects, Suo was deeply trusted and                                                 69 JTS 109: 3302: 及頡利為李靖所破,獨騎而投之....因令子忠擒頡利以獻; JTS 109: 3290: 忠以擒頡利功,拜左屯衞將軍,妻以宗女定襄縣主,賜名為忠,單稱史氏。 70 JTS 186a: 4836: 逮則天以女主臨朝,大臣未附,委政獄吏,剪除宗枝。 JTS 186a: 4843: 光宅初,徐敬業起兵揚州,以匡復為名,則天震怒,又恐人心動搖,欲以威制天下。     46 praised by the empress. Even though the title mentioned in the Tang sources is a military position without real military powers, it is clear that he had tremendous political and social power granted by the emperor, as thousands of people were killed under him; he became one of the most notorious Tang officials in his contemporaries’ memory. According to the Jiu Tang shu, during this era, all informants were granted official titles or honorary titles, so it is curious that Suo Yuanli’s only recorded title is Mobile Corps Commander.71 If the description of the Jiu Tang shu is correct, then he definitely would have other titles. Maybe the historians were too ashamed of that period, so they refrained from writing about his other titles.    It is not known when Suo Yuanli died, but it is clear that he would no longer have been useful during the reign of the subsequent emperor, Zhongzong, who later issued an edict concerning cruel officials like Suo Yuanli: “From the Chuigong 垂拱 era onward, people like … Zhouxing 周興 (?–691) … Lai Junchen 來俊臣 (651–697), … Suo Yuanli 索元禮 have mostly killed innocent people. So all their official titles were rescinded”.72 Later, during emperor Xuanzong’s reign, further edicts concerning them ordered that those cruel officials who were still alive would be exiled to the far South. If they were                                                 71 JTS 186a: 4843: 索元禮, 胡人也......元禮探其旨告事,召見,擢為游擊將軍,令於洛州牧院推案制獄。元禮性殘忍,推一人,廣令引數十百人,衣冠震懼,甚於狼虎。則天數召見賞賜,張其權勢,凡為殺戮者數千人。於是周興、來俊臣之徒,效之而起矣。時有諸州告密人,皆給公乘,州縣護送至闕下,於賓館以廩之,稍稱旨,必授以爵賞以誘之,貴以威於遠近。元禮尋以酷毒轉甚,則天收人望而殺之。; Hucker, Dictionary, 8037; Zhang Qun 章羣, Tangdai fanjiang yanjiu 唐代蕃將研究 (Taibei: Liaojing chuban shiye gongsi, 1986), 25-26; Zhang Zhuo 张鷟 (660-740), Chaoye qianzai 朝野僉載 in Tangsong shiliao biji congkan 唐宋史料筆記叢刊 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005), 2, 補輯.   72 TD 170: 4430: 中宗神龍元年制:「以丘神勣、來子珣、周興、萬國俊、來俊臣、魚承曄、王景昭、索元禮、傅游藝、王弘義、張知默、裴籍、焦仁亶、侯思止、郭霸、李敬仁、皇甫文備、陳嘉言、劉光業、王德壽、王處貞、屈貞筠、鮑思恭等,自垂拱以來,多枉濫殺人者,所有官爵,並令追奪。」 JTS 50: 2149. JTS: 186a: 4841. QTW 16: 201-2 and 202-2: 追奪劉光業等官爵詔.      47 already dead, then their descendants were banned from taking official positions.73 Thus, it is reasonable to argue that Suo Yuanli was mainly incorporated into the realm of insiders because he was particularly useful during Empress Wu’s reign; however, when he could no longer prove himself useful to the Tang dynasty, when his cruel actions were no longer needed, he was discarded and excluded from the realm of the Tang insiders, both at the discourse level and in “practice”.   Empress Wu was also ambitious in her expansionist efforts and therefore still heavily valued military benefits with regard to pragmatic concerns. During her reign, the Khitan regime in the North posed a constant threat to the dynasty. Li Kaigu 李楷固 (656–720) and Luo Wuzheng 駱務整 (ca. 700) were both military officials under the Khitan regime and constantly fought the Tang troops on behalf of their ruler. When they were defeated by the Tang troops in the third year of the Shengli era 聖歷 (700), they surrendered to the Tang dynasty. The Tang sources do not mention Luo Wuzheng, but we know that he later became a Tang insider with the official title of General and that he fought the remnant of Khitan troops on behalf of the Tang. However, the Tang sources do have detailed information about Li Kaigu. Since they are always mentioned together in sources and had both belonged to the same regime before, it is arguable that Luo Wuzheng was incorporated into the regime under similar conditions as Li Kaigu. According to the Tang Code, the surrendered enemies would be executed without mercy, and the Tang sources indicate that indeed they were almost executed under the court                                                 73 TD 170: 4431: 周朝酷吏來子珣、京兆府萬年縣。萬國俊、荊州江陵縣。王弘義、冀州。侯思止、京兆府。郭霸、舒州同安縣。焦仁亶、蒲州河東縣。張知默、河南府緱氏縣。李敬仁、河南府河南縣。唐奉一、齊州金節縣。來俊臣、周興、丘神勣、索元禮、曹仁悊、王景昭、裴籍、李秦授、劉光業、王德壽、屈貞筠、鮑思恭、劉景陽、王處貞。以上檢州貫未獲及。右二十三人,殘害宗支,毒陷良善,情狀尤重,身在者宜長流嶺南遠處。縱身沒,子孫亦不許仕宦. JTS 7: 138. 8: JTS: 8: 187-88. JTS 186a: 4841.     48 judgement. The Jiu Tang shu states that because the famous Tang official Di Renjie 狄仁傑 (630–700) valued the talent in warfare of Li Kaigu and others (including Luo Wuzheng), he suggested exempting them and incorporating them into the insider realm of Empress Wu.74 A Tang dynasty private Biji, Chaoye qianzai 朝野僉載, records a different story. It states that Li Kaigu was extremely good at using a kind of weapon that resembled chains. It was precisely because of this ability that Empress Wu exempted him from death; she deemed it useful on the battlefield.75 Regardless of the sources, it is clear that Li Kaigu and Luo Wuzheng were initially sentenced to death by the imperial court; however, because of their potential usefulness in battle, they were not only exempted from death but also accepted as Tang insiders. However, Li Kaigu did not have a happy ending. Chaoye qianzai states that because he was avaricious and lecherous, he was later demoted to lower positions in remote areas and died from anger and resentment. It is possible that because of his avaricious and lecherous personality, he was no longer useful to the Tang dynasty. Jiu Tang shu reaches the same conclusion: When he was ordered to fight against the remnant of Khitan soldiers, he inflicted a huge defeat on the Tang side which only he himself managed to flee. Therefore, he was no longer even useful militarily. It is no surprise that he was later demoted to areas far away from the political center.76                                                  74 JTS 89: 2893: 楷固、務整,並契丹李盡忠之別帥也。初,盡忠之作亂,楷固等屢率兵以陷官軍,後兵敗來降,有司斷以極法。仁傑議以為楷固等並有驍將之才,若恕其死,必能感恩効節。又奏請授其官爵,委以專征。制並從之; QTW 242: 2451-2: 授沙叱忠義右金吾衛將軍駱務整左武威衛將軍制.  75 Zhang, Chaoye qianzai, 6, 138-139: 后時將軍李楷固,契丹人也,善用索。李盡忠之敗也,麻仁節、張玄遇等並被。 139 將鹿狐兔走馬遮截,放索之,百無一漏。鞍馬上弄弓矢矛如飛仙。天后惜其材不殺,用以為將。 76 Zhang, Chaoye, 6: 稍貪財好色出為潭州喬口鎭守將憤恚而卒; JTS 199b: 5360: 率兵討其餘黨,先破斬乞四比羽,又度天門嶺以迫祚榮。祚榮合高麗、靺鞨之眾以拒楷固,王師大敗,楷固脫身而還。      49  Emperor Xuanzong’s Kaiyuan period was marked both by its prosperity and its disaster. It was regarded as the most glorious period of the Tang dynasty. However, when An Lushan rebelled in 755, the writers of the Jiu Tang shu felt that the dynasty started to decline. Even though it existed for another hundred years, it never managed to regain its previous glory. Before An Lushan rebelled, the Tang dynasty incorporated four outsiders into the realm of insiders: Huoba Guiren 火拔歸仁 (ca. 714), Sitai 思太, Li Shi 李詩 (ca. 731) and Li Xianzhong 李獻忠 (?–753). Huoba Guiren was the brother-in-law of the Turkic Khan Mochuo 默啜 (?–716). In one battle against the Tang troops, Huoba was defeated. Afraid of going back to the Turkic regime, Huoba, with his wife, surrendered to the Tang dynasty. The Tang sources do not say why they were incorporated, but one can infer that it was primarily for diplomatic reasons. Mochuo Khan treated and exploited his vassal regimes very harshly; therefore, when the vassal states under the Mochuo Khan heard that Huoba Guiren had been accepted by the Tang dynasty with high official titles and a much better future, they all decided to defect and surrender to the Tang. Sitai was among them. Therefore, within the next year, the northern border was pacified when Li Xianzhong (also known as Abusi) surrendered with his troops.77 Here we can also see that political loyalty was not stressed because Huoba Guiren’s action can hardly be defined as “loyal,” yet he was accepted to the realm of Tang insiders. Later his actions                                                 77 TD 198: 5438-39: 右驍衞將軍郭虔瓘嬰城固守,俄而出兵擒同俄特勤於城下,斬之,虜因退縮。火拔懼不敢歸,攜其妻來奔,制授左衞大將軍,封燕北郡王,封其妻為金山公主,賜宅一區,奴婢十人,馬十匹,物千段。明年,十姓部落左廂五咄六啜、右廂五弩失畢五俟斤及子壻高麗莫離支高文簡、跌都督思太等各率其眾,相繼來降,前後總萬餘帳。令居其河南之舊地。授高文簡左衞員外大將軍,封遼西郡王;跌思太為特進、右衞員外大將軍,兼跌都督、樓煩郡公。自餘首領封拜賜物各有差。默啜女壻阿史德胡祿俄又歸朝,授以特進。其秋,默啜與九姓首領阿布思等戰於磧北,九姓大潰,人畜多死,布思率眾來降; TD 6: 3283; JTS 8: 175; QTW 21: 246-2 and 247-1: 賜高麗莫離支及吐谷渾等大首領爵賞制; CFYG 964: 11342-1 and 11342-2: 高麗吐渾等諸蕃降附制.      50 also testified to his disloyalty: When An Lushan rebelled, he captured Geshu Han, the Tang dynasty’s hope in defeating An, and surrendered to An Lushan’s force.78 Li Shi’s example demonstrates the importance of being able to provide extra military forces during the Kaiyuan reign. He was a leader of the Xi tribe, and when the Tang dynasty sent a punitive expedition against the Xi, he surrendered with five thousand tribesmen. He was immediately accepted as a Tang insider with real military powers.79   An Lushan 安祿山 (703–757) and Shi Siming’s 史思明 (703–761) rebellion marked the turning point of the Tang dynasty in many respects. However, even though they rebelled against the Tang dynasty, they still successfully immigrated from the realm of outsiders to the realm of insiders beforehand. In the case of An Lushan, he was a Hu originally from the jimi state of Yingzhou; his mother was a Turk and his father was a Hu. From his childhood, he had been living in the territory of the Turks with his mother. He later escaped from the Turkic territory to the Tang dynasty, making up his fake surname, An. He was taken in by his friend’s relative, but with the strict limitations on the unauthorized travel of outsiders and insiders, it is very likely that he stayed in the Tang dynasty illegally during his early years. When he grew up, because he understood various foreign languages, he became a broker in the borderland market. It is arguable that up until this stage, he cannot be considered as legally and officially incorporated into the realm of the Tang insiders. Later he was caught by the Military Commissioner of Youzhou, Zhang Shougui 張守珪 (684–740), when he tried to steal sheep. When Zhang                                                 78 JTS 9: 232: 辛卯,哥舒翰至潼關,為其帳下火拔歸仁以左右數十騎執之降賊,關門不守,京師大駭,河東、華陰、上洛等郡皆委城而走; 104: 3215.  79 JTS 199b: 5355-56: 二十年,信安王禕奉詔討叛奚 。 奚酋長李詩 瑣高等以其部落五千帳來降。詔封 李詩 為歸義王兼特進、左羽林軍大將軍同正,仍充歸義州都督,賜物十萬段,移其部落於幽州界安置。天寶五載,又封其王娑固為昭信王,仍授饒樂都督。     51 wanted to kill him, An Lushan yelled, “Do you want to eliminate the two foreign regimes or not? [If so], why kill me?” Because of this statement and because of his outstanding bravery and ability to fight, he was later adopted by Zhang Shougui as his son and officially granted the Tang military position of minor general (pian jiang 偏將).80 His life trajectory afterwards was relatively similar to other non-Han officials in that he was further trusted by the Tang ruler and granted higher and higher military positions. He was so trusted that when other officials reported to the emperor that he had the tendency to rebel, the emperor angrily arrested those officials and sent them to An. He even managed to enter into a personal relationship with the imperial family: Emperor Xuanzong liked and trusted him so much that he became sworn brothers with Concubine Yang and her families.81 Shi Siming’s life is very similar to An Lushan’s in that he became acquainted with An Lushan when they were both living in Yingzhou, the jimi state. Shi was a “hybrid Turkic Hu” who physically looked very different from the Han. Because of his language ability, he became a broker with An Lushan. He was later recommended by the same governor, Zhang Shougui, as a minor general as well. But unlike An Lushan, his biographical information does not specify why he was recommended and incorporated as a Tang insider in the first place. However, it is clear that, after he had an audience with the emperor, he was subsequently promoted to higher and higher military positions such                                                 80 JTS 200a: 5367: 安祿山,營州柳城雜種胡人也。本無姓氏,名軋犖山。母阿史德氏,亦突厥巫師,以卜為業; JTS 104: 3212: 祿山以思順惡翰,嘗銜之,至是忽謂翰曰:「我父是胡,母是突厥;公父是突厥,母是胡。與公族類同,何不相親乎?」; JTS 200a: 5367: 少孤,隨母在突厥....開元初,與將軍安道買男俱逃出突厥中...年十餘歲,以與其兄及延偃相攜而出,感愧之,約與思順等并為兄弟,冒姓為安.....及長,解六蕃語,為互市牙郎...二十年,張守珪為幽州節度,祿山盜羊事覺....守珪剝坐,欲棒殺之,大呼曰:「大夫不欲滅兩蕃耶?何為打殺祿山!」....守珪見其肥白,壯其言而釋之。令與鄉人史思明同捉生,行必尅獲,拔為偏將。常嫌其肥,以守珪威風素高,畏懼不敢飽食。以驍勇聞,遂養為子。 81 JTS 200 200a: 5367: 人言反者,玄宗必大怒,縛送與之。JTS 106: 3245; JTS 51: 2180: 祿山來朝,帝令貴妃姊妹與祿山結為兄弟。     52 as General (jiang jun 將軍) and General-In-Chief (da jiang jun 大將軍) based on his military achievements and his potential usefulness.82  Geshu Han 哥舒翰 was one of the most famous non-Han military generals in the Tang dynasty. Throughout his life, he brought the Tang dynasty numerous victories; even in the end, when he was severely ill, he was still appointed Marshal of the Vanguard Troops (xian feng bing ma yuan shuai 先鋒兵馬元帥) and ordered to fight against An Lushan when the Tang was desperate.83 He was originally from the Tuqishi tribe 突騎施 in the Northwest. Both of his parents were non-Han people in the steppe: His father was a Turk, and his mother was a princess from the kingdom of Khotan. He was born and raised in the Anxi Protectorate in the Kucha area, a jimi state. However, Geshu’s father died when he was forty years old, after which he went to the Tang capital Chang’an for three years. It is not recorded how he crossed the boundaries. Maybe he was invited as a guest to Chang’an; the Old Tang History states that he was not treated politely by a Chang’an official. This angered Geshu, and he decided to work hard as a new person. He went to the west of the Yellow River with his sword, working under Military Commissioner (jie du shi 節度使) Wang Chui 王倕. He was outstandingly successfully in battle while he was with Wang and was later recruited officially by Wang as a lower-ranked general (ya jiang 衙將), thus officially entering the realm of Tang insiders.84                                                 82 JTS 200a: 5376: 本名窣干,營州寧夷州突厥雜種胡人也。姿瘦,少鬚髮,鳶肩傴背,廞目側鼻....又解六蕃語,與祿山同為互市郎....天寶初,頻立戰功,至將軍,知平盧軍事。嘗入奏,玄宗賜坐,與語,甚奇之。問其年,曰「四十矣」,玄宗撫其背曰:「卿貴在後,勉之。」遷大將軍、北平太守。 83 Hucker, Dictionary, 4689; JTS 104: 3213: 及安祿山反,上以封常清、高仙芝喪敗,召翰入,拜為皇太子先鋒兵馬元帥. 84 JTS 104: 3212: 哥舒翰, 突騎施首領哥舒部落之裔也....蕃人多以部落稱姓,因以爲氏....世居安西....翰母尉遲氏,於闐之族也[XTS 135: 4579: 於闐王之女]祿山....謂翰曰:「....公父是突厥,母是胡」....年四十,遭父喪,    53 Subsequently, his entire life was connected with military affairs. At first, he mainly fought the Tibet regime and helped with the establishment of the Shenwei Army (shen wei jun 神威軍). During his later years, his health conditions deteriorated to the extent that he had to stay at home. Due to his outstanding fame as a successful military general, however, he was again granted the position of Marshal of the Vanguard Troops and, loaded with high expectations, led the Tang armies on the battlefield after they had experienced several defeats by An Lushan’s rebellious army.85 With all these military achievements, he was promoted higher and higher in Tang bureaucratic hierarchy. From his example, it is also clear that he was first officially incorporated into the realm of Tang insiders because of his outstanding military genius, and he managed to climb the Tang bureaucratic hierarchy without much difficulty because of his usefulness as a competent military general. Moreover, it is also possible that he managed to move up so quickly because of another aspect of pragmatic concerns. Li Linfu 李林甫 (683–753), a famous Tang chancellor, once stated when referring to foreign generals like Geshu Han: “If we use literati as generals, they are afraid of arrows and stones [indicating battlefield]. It would be better if we used people who come from a low social hierarchy or foreign people, because foreigners are good at fighting and are brave, while people from a low                                                 三年客居京師, 為長安尉不禮, 慨然發憤折節,仗劍之河西。初事節度使王倕.倕攻新城,使翰經略,三軍無不震慴。後節度使王忠嗣補為衙將; Hucker, Dictioanry, 777. 85 JTS 104: 3213-14: 明年,築神威軍於青海上,吐蕃至,攻破之;又築城於青海中龍駒島,有白龍見,遂名為應龍城,吐蕃屏跡不敢近青海。吐蕃保石堡城,路遠而險,久不拔。八載,以朔方、河東羣牧十萬眾委翰總統攻石堡城。翰使麾下將高秀巖、張守瑜進攻,不旬日而拔之,上錄其功,拜特進、鴻臚員外卿,與一子五品官,賜物千匹、莊宅各一所,加攝御史大夫....翰好飲酒,頗恣聲色。至土門軍,入浴室,遘風疾,絕倒良久乃蘇。因入京,廢疾于家。及安祿山反,上以封常清、高仙芝喪敗,召翰入,拜為皇太子先鋒兵馬元帥,以田良丘為御史中丞,充行軍司馬,以王思禮、鉗耳大福、李承光、蘇法鼎、管崇嗣及蕃將火拔歸仁、李武定、渾萼、契苾寧等為裨將,河隴、朔方兵及蕃兵與高仙芝舊卒共二十萬,拒賊於潼關。上御勤政樓勞遣之,百僚出餞于郊。     54 social hierarchy do not have their own clique to support them.”86 Even though Li linked foreign generals with their ability to fight, we can see that both the officials and the emperor were concerned with the powerful, entrenched aristocracy with its own power base. The majority of non-Han individuals in the database are outsiders without their own independent sources of power, so they would have been easier to control compared to insiders whose loyalties might be more divided between their own family or clique and the emperor.   Pugu Huai’en 僕固懷恩 (?–765) was another non-Han general who was pivotal to the suppression of An Lushan’s rebellion. He was a descendent of a Tiele tribe leader. In the twentieth year of the Zhenguan era, the nine leaders of the Tiele tribe surrendered to the Tang dynasty with their tribesmen and were relocated by the Tang in the northern jimi states. Pugu was born and raised in the jimi state of Xiazhou 夏州. It was also clear why he was officially incorporated into the Tang military system: The Tang sources state explicitly that he was trusted by Tang officials like Wang Zhongsi and granted a Tang military position in the army because of his ability to fight and lead wars and because of his knowledge of foreign culture.87 Later, like the majority of non-Han generals, he spent subsequent years fighting wars for the Tang dynasty in higher and higher military positions. Pugu, like Qibi Heli, explicitly stressed his position as a Tang insider. When he was accused of being rebellious by another Tang official and arguably became suspicious                                                 86 JTS 06: 3239-40: 嘗奏曰:「文士為將,怯當矢石,不如用寒族、蕃人,蕃人善戰有勇,寒族即無黨援。」自是高仙芝、哥舒翰皆專任大將,林甫利其不識文字,無入相由,然而祿山竟為亂階,由專得大將之任故也。 87 JTS 121: 3477: 僕固懷恩,鐵勒部落僕骨歌濫拔延之曾孫,語訛謂之僕固....貞觀二十年,鐵勒九姓大首領率其部落來降,分置瀚海、燕然、金微、幽陵等九都督府於夏州,別為蕃州以禦邊....拔延生乙李啜拔,乙李啜拔生懷恩,世襲都督....天寶中,加左領軍大將軍同正員、特進。歷事節度王忠嗣、安思順,皆以善格鬬,達諸蕃情,有統禦材,委之心腹。     55 in the eyes of the Tang ruler, he angrily wrote a memorial to the emperor: “Your Majesty does not think about defending against outside threat but only about internally suspecting your loyal and benevolent subject.”88 With these words, Pugu clearly marked himself as an insider and assumed that the emperor would do the same. It is clear that his ability to successfully transfer from an outsider to insider was based on the Tang dynasty’s pragmatic concerns when he proved himself useful by being able to fight and being knowledgeable about foreign culture when the Tang dynasty needed it.   Yuchi Sheng 尉遲勝 (middle of the Tianbao era) was another figure who made a contribution during the An Lushan rebellion. He was originally the leader of the Yutian 於闐 regime in the Northwest. He had an audience with the Tang emperor during the Tianbao era, and was granted Tang official titles and the honor to marry a Tang princess who was the daughter of the emperor’s clansman. He later helped the Tang dynasty in warfare and was granted higher official titles when he achieved victory. He did not yet really belong to the realm of Tang insiders because he still lived in his own regime in the Northwest. However, when An Lushan rebelled against the Tang, he entrusted leadership duties to his brother Yuchi Yao 尉遲曜 and led five thousand soldiers himself to help the Tang dynasty. The emperor Suzong was extremely happy with his action, so Yuchi Sheng was granted further official titles. When the rebellion was finally suppressed, Yuchi Sheng requested to stay in the Tang dynasty, leaving his brother Yuchi Yao to be the leader of the Yutian regime. His request was immediately granted, along with the official title Commander Unequalled in Honor (kai fu yi tong san si 開府儀同三司) and                                                 88 JTS 121: 3486: 陛下不思外禦,而乃內忌忠良.     56 Prince of Wudu(Wu du wang 武都王). He stayed in the capital for the rest of his life, ending with official positions with real power over the Tang administrative and military system, such as Vice Censor-In-Chief (yu shi zhong cheng 御史中丞) and General-In-Chief of the Awesome Guard (you wei wei da jiang jun 右威衞大將軍).89 His example also clearly shows that he was first incorporated into the realm of the Tang dynasty because he was very useful to the Tang. He brought five thousand soldiers with him to help suppress the An Lushan Rebellion. Through his close relationship with his brother, the leader of the Yutian regime, it was pragmatically useful to incorporate Yuchi Sheng into the realm of Tang insiders: The Tang might need the help of the Yutian regime later, because its power had been dramatically damaged by the rebellion.90   Bai Xiaode 白孝德 (ca. 759) was a Hu from the Anxi Protectorate, like Geshu Han, and he is also mainly recorded in conjunction with the An Lushan rebellion. He was famous for his strength and bravery even when still an outsider. It is again not specified by the Tang source how he crossed the boundary from outsider to insider, but he served under the famous Tang military official Li Guangbi 李光弼 (708–764) as a minor general (pian pi 偏裨). Since there is no transitioning between his bravery and strength and his incorporation by Li Guangbi as a Tang military official, it is reasonable to assume that he                                                 89 JTS 144: 3924-5: 尉遲勝本于闐王珪之長子,少嗣位....天寶中來朝,獻名馬、美玉,玄宗嘉之,妻以宗室女,授右威衞將軍、毗沙府都督還國....與安西節度使高仙芝同擊破薩毗播仙,以功加銀青光祿大夫、鴻臚卿,改光祿卿,皆同正....至德初,聞安祿山反,勝乃命弟曜行國事,自率兵五千赴難....特進、殿中監,驃騎大將軍、毗沙府都督....勝固請留宿衞,加開府儀同三司,封武都王,實封百戶。勝請以本國王授曜,詔從之....建中末,從幸奉天,為兼御史中丞。駕在興元,勝為右領軍將軍,俄遷右威衞大將軍,歷睦王傅......貞元十年,贈涼州都督。Hucker, Dictionary, PP. 3105, 8174, 7680 90 JTS 144: 3925: 貞元初,曜遣使上疏,稱:「有國以來,代嫡承嗣,兄勝既讓國,請傳勝子銳。」上乃以銳為檢校光祿卿兼毗沙府長史還,固辭,且言曰:「曜久行國事,人皆悅服。銳生於京華,不習國俗,不可遣往。」因授韶王諮議。兄弟讓國,人多稱之。     57 was incorporated by Li because of his outstanding name as a fighter. It is clear that he later moved upward within the Tang bureaucratic hierarchy as Military Commissioner of Fufang (Fufang Binning jie du shi 鄜坊邠寧節度使) and Commandery Prince of Changhua (Changhua jun wang 昌化郡王). In a battle against Shi Siming’s army, Bai Xiaode also explicitly emphasizes his status as a Tang insider. The enemy’s leader asks him who he is, and he replies back very clearly: “I am a grand general of the Tang dynasty.”91 Li Baochen 李寶臣 (718–781), another non-Han general of the Tang, was originally from the Xi tribe in area outside of Fanyang. He had been famous since childhood for his archery and riding ability, so he was picked by An Lushan, who was still a Tang subject then, as a military official in charge of archery.92 Similarly, Li Huaixian 李懷仙 (?–768) was a Hu from Liucheng 柳城, a jimi 羈縻 state in the North. He and his family had originally served under the Khitan regime for generations, but he later surrendered to the Tang dynasty. His biographical information does not mention why he was accepted as a Tang subject when he surrendered, but he was given the official post to supervise Yingzhou 營州, the jimi state where he came from.93 Since Yingzhou was a jimi state and his family had been serving Khitan for generations in that state, it is reasonable to assume that at least some parts of the Yingzhou area loosely belonged to the Khitan regime. Moreover, because the source does not specify his official                                                 91 JTS 109: 3301: TD 109: 3301: 白孝德,安西胡人也,驍悍有膽力。乾元中,事李光弼為偏裨; 3391: 其後,累戰功至安西北庭行營節度、鄜坊邠寧節度使,歷檢校刑部尚書,封昌化郡王....孝德息馬伺便,因瞋目曰:「賊識我乎?」龍仙曰:「誰耶?」曰:「我,國之大將白孝德也。」 92 JTS 142: 3865: 李寶臣,范陽城旁奚族也。幼善騎射,節度使安祿山選為射生官。 93 JTS 143: 3895: 李懷仙, 世事契丹,降將,守營州。     58 titles, it is very likely that he was only loosely overseeing or checking that area for the Tang dynasty. His family ties to Yingzhou made him useful to the Tang dynasty.   In summary of this section, it shows that the officials in the database first belonged to the realm of outsiders, but they all successfully crossed the boundary and became Tang insiders. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the primary reasons that these outsiders were accepted into the realm of insiders were pragmatic. Not all individuals have detailed information as to why they were accepted into the regime. However, with regard to the majority of the officials in the database, we can either explicitly see or reasonably assume the link between their ability to benefit the dynasty and their acceptance as Tang insiders. Pragmatic benefits here vary according to different historical contexts, but since the majority of these officials came from northern and northwestern steppe regions, their expertise in warfare and fighting as well as their ability to supply foreign troops, especially cavalry troops, were particularly valued. Furthermore, although the majority of outsiders remained prestigious insiders for the rest of their lives, there were a few individuals who were first accepted as insiders and later excluded, usually because they were incompetent or could not provide benefit to the dynasty anymore.   Privileges and Pragmatism  The ability to benefit the dynasty mattered not only when individuals crossed the boundaries to become a Tang insider; it was also crucial for an individual to move upward in the Tang social and bureaucratic hierarchies. Zhishi Sili, after being incorporated into the realm of subject, continued to bring victories to the Tang dynasty against Tibet, the northern pastoral clan of Xueyantuo, and various other northern     59 pastoral clans that emerged afterwards. After every victory, Zhishi was highly praised by the emperor, and we can see that his official ranking rose constantly, from the official title Grand General Commanding the Right Army (you ling jun da jiang jun 右領軍大將軍), which at times was only a sinecure for a court favorite without much power or rank, to General-In-Chief of the Left Courageous Guard (zuo xiao wei da jiang jun 左驍衛大將軍), which held power over the imperial palace under the Sixteen Guards of the capital.94 According to the Tang dynasty military system, the official title of generals did not grant individuals real military power over the troops; rather, only individuals appointed with specific orders during war time could mobilize the troops.95 Therefore, later on, when Zhishi was fighting wars against the Tibetan regime, he was appointed Area Commander-In-Chief of the Bailan Circuit (Bailan dao xing jun zong guan 白蘭道行軍總管). This shows that he was fully trusted by the Tang ruler with real military powers over the troops. Towards the last few years of his life, mention of him also includes the honorific title Duke of An (An guo gong 安國公), the third highest title of nobility, following Prince (wang 王) and Commandery Prince (jun wang 郡王).96   Similar to Zhishi Sili, most of the individuals in the database enjoyed upward social mobility almost solely for pragmatic reasons. Qibi Heli, for example, was also only granted the title General Commander of the Left Army (zuo ling jun jiang jun 左領軍將                                                94 JTS 185a: 4793: 貞觀十八年,太宗征遼發後,薛延陀數萬騎抄河南,太宗令仁會及執失思力率兵擊破之,逐北數百里,延陀脫身走免. JTS 196a: 5221: 太宗遣吏部尚書侯君集為當彌道行營大總管,右領軍大將軍執失思力為白蘭道行軍總管,左武衞將軍牛進達為闊水道行軍總管,右領軍將軍劉蘭為洮河道行軍總管,率步騎五萬以擊之。進達先鋒自松州夜襲其營,斬千餘級。弄讚大懼,引兵而退,遣使謝罪. JTS 199b: 太宗至靈州,其鐵勒諸部相繼至數千人,仍請列為州縣,北荒悉平。Charles, Hucker. A Dictionary, 2754; 2457. 95 Qun, Zhang. Tangdai fanjiang, 23.  96 JTS 196a: 5221: 右領軍大將軍執失思力為白蘭道行軍總管. Hucker, Dictionary, 7110; 3525.     60 軍) with no power over the military forces, when he was first incorporated into the realm of Tang insiders. However, with almost every single military victory over ten north and northwestern pastoral regimes, he was granted higher and higher official titles with more power, such as General-In-Chief of the Right Courageous Guard (with power over the imperial palace), General-In-Chief of the Left Courageous Guard and General-In-Chief of the Right Guard (zuo wei da jiang jun 左衛大將軍) (with power over the safety of the inner quarters of the palace). During wartime, which ran throughout the majority of his life, he was fully entrusted with tremendous military power with titles such as Grand Area Commander-In-Chief of the Gongyue Circuit (Gongyue dao xing jun da zong guan 弓月道行軍大總管) and the Kunshan Circuit (Kunshan dao xing jun da zong guan 昆山道行軍大總管), among others. With all of his military achievements, towards the last years of his life, Qibi was granted many honorific titles, such as Grand Defender-General of the Army (zhen jun da jiang jun 鎮軍大將軍) and Duke of Liang (Liang guo gong 涼國公), and he was granted the honor of being buried in the Tang imperial tomb of Zhaoling 昭陵.97 Geshu Han’s life exhibits a similar trajectory. After he was officially recruited as a Tang military official, his entire life was connected with military affairs. During his early years, he fought mainly against the Tibet regime, and he helped with the establishment of the Shenwei Army (shen wei jun 神威軍). During his late years, his health conditions deteriorated to the extent that he had to remain at home. However, based on his fame as a successful military general, when the Tang dynasty suffered                                                 97 TD: 199: 5459: 右驍衞大將軍契苾何力率燕然都護所部回紇兵五萬騎討之; JST 4: 79: 三月,以左驍衞大將軍、郕國公契苾何力往遼東經略; JTS 5: 93: 遣右衞大將軍、涼國公契苾何力; JTS 3: 60, 4: 69, 5: 93, 109: 3291, 109: 3292, 109: 3293; JTS 4: 79, 4: 81-82, 109: 3293; Hucker. Dictionary, 2754; 7661; 382.      61 several defeats by An Lushan’s rebellious army, he was again granted the position of Marshal of the Vanguard Troops (xian feng bing ma yuan shuai 先鋒兵馬元帥) to lead Tang armies into the battlefield. The position of marshal was the most prestigious category of ad hoc military duty assignments, sometimes only reserved for members of the imperial family. Appointing Geshu to this position clearly shows that he was deeply trusted for his competency. Due to his military achievements, he was promoted higher and higher in the Tang bureaucratic hierarchy to positions like Commander of Guanxi (guan xi bing ma shi 關西兵馬使), Chief Minister of the Court of State Ceremonial (hong lu qing 鴻臚卿),Duke of Liang (Liang guo gong 涼國公), Military Commissioner of Hexi (he xi jie du shi 河西節度使),Commandery Prince of Xiping (xi ping jun wang 西平郡王), and Vice Director of the Left Imperial Secretariat (shang shu zuo pu ye 尚書左僕射)98. A similar situation seems to have presented itself to all the individuals in the database who had enough information recorded; many of them are described in detail in the previous section. It is clear that after being incorporated into the realm of the Tang insiders, these people managed to move upward within the Tang bureaucratic hierarchy because of their usefulness as competent military generals.                                                  98 JTS 104: 3212-13: 明年,築神威軍於青海上,吐蕃至,攻破之;又築城於青海中龍駒島,有白龍見,遂名為應龍城,吐蕃屏跡不敢近青海。吐蕃保石堡城,路遠而險,久不拔。八載,以朔方、河東羣牧十萬眾委翰總統攻石堡城。翰使麾下將高秀巖、張守瑜進攻,不旬日而拔之,上錄其功,拜特進、鴻臚員外卿,與一子五品官,賜物千匹、莊宅各一所,加攝御史大夫….翰好飲酒,頗恣聲色。至土門軍,入浴室,遘風疾,絕倒良久乃蘇。因入京,廢疾于家….及安祿山反,上以封常清、高仙芝喪敗,召翰入,拜為皇太子先鋒兵馬元帥,以田良丘為御史中丞,充行軍司馬,以王思禮、鉗耳大福、李承光、蘇法鼎、管崇嗣及蕃將火拔歸仁、李武定、渾萼、契苾寧等為裨將,河隴、朔方兵及蕃兵與高仙芝舊卒共二十萬,拒賊於潼關。上御勤政樓勞遣之,百僚出餞于郊; Hucker, Dictionary, 4689; 4684; 2905; 777; 5052.     62  Because of their ability to constantly demonstrate their usefulness to the Tang dynasty, these officials sometimes enjoyed privileges that their contemporary counterparts who originally were insiders did not. For example, the Tang source states explicitly under the entry of Pugu Huai’en that because of his high military accomplishments, the Emperor Suzong treated him differently, with grace and caring, compared to other generals.99 Zhishi Sili had a very close relationship with Fang Yiai 房遺愛 (?–654), the son of the famous Grand Councilor Fang xuanling 房玄齡 (579–648). When Fang Yiai rebelled against the Tang dynasty, all people who were close to him were executed, among whom there was even a princess. Zhishi Sili, being so close to Fang Yiai, should have been executed; however, the Tang sources recorded that he was only exiled. Later sources such as the Xin Tang shu explain the reason for his exemption: Emperor Gaozong exempted him from the death penalty because of his substantial military achievements.100   Another privilege enjoyed by most of the officials studied was the ability to form their own clique even though they had absolutely no social links in the Tang. Because of their usefulness, they were in a much higher social and bureaucratic position compared to many original Tang insiders. Therefore, they were able to recommend other people for high positions, expecting those people to be personally loyal to them and to support them. Pugu Huai’en is a very good example. When he was sent by the Tang dynasty to suppress An Lushan Rebellion, he encountered four former officials under An Lushan: Xue Song                                                 99 JTS 121: 3479: 肅宗以懷恩功高,恩顧特異諸將,至冬,加工部尚書,敕李輔國及常參官送上,太官造食以寵之。 100 JTS 4: 71: 二月乙酉,遺愛、萬徹、令武等並伏誅;元景、恪、巴陵高陽公主並賜死....左驍衞大將軍、安國公執失思力配流巂州. XTS 110: 4117: 坐交房遺愛,高宗以其戰多,赦不誅,流巂州。     63 薛嵩 (?–773), Zhang Zhongzhi 張忠志 (Li Baochen 李寶臣), Tian Chengsi 田承嗣 (705–779), and Li Huaixian 李懷仙. The Jiu Tang shu states that just because Pugu Huai’en had recommended them they were granted official titles, thus forming his own clique. As a Tang official, Ma Sui 馬燧 noted, Pugu Huai’en managed to form his clique based solely on his military achievements. Besides these four individuals, Huai’en was able to recommended many others, such as Chen Shaoyou 陳少游 and Lu Qi 盧杞, to prominent positions because he was deeply needed by the Tang dynasty.101 Many other individuals in the database also recommended substantial numbers of other people to prominent positions. For example, Bai Xiaode recommended Xiushi, and An Lushan recommended at least seven people to prominent positions.102 However, the sources do not specify the reason they were able to recommend so many other people as the source did for Pugu Huai’en, but it is obvious that their high bureaucratic positions were part of the reason.   Therefore, to further illustrate the previous section, this section argues that after being incorporated into the Tang dynasty, the ability to demonstrate one’s usefulness (usually in the form of military achievements) was also crucial for success in the Tang dynasty. Such individuals were clearly distinguished from the rest of the Tang insiders, not because they were more loyal but because of the privileges they enjoyed due to their ability to demonstrate their usefulness. These individuals easily managed to move upward in the bureaucratic hierarchy if they constantly demonstrated their usefulness. Moreover,                                                 101 JTS 124: 3525, 3541: 至寶應元年王師平史朝義,其將薛嵩、李懷仙、田承嗣、李寶臣等受偽命分領州郡,朝廷厭兵,因僕固懷恩請,就加官爵; JTS 134: 3690: 燧因說抱玉曰:「屬者與迴紇言,燧得其情。今僕固懷恩恃功樹黨,李懷仙、張忠志、薛嵩、田承嗣分授疆土,皆出於懷恩,其子瑒佻勇不義。 JTS 126: 3563-64. 135: 3713, 143: 3895.  102 JTS 128: 3584, 200a: 5369-70, 186b: 4856-57, 76: 2660, 111: 3332, 187b: 4909, 200a: 5374-76.       64 because of pragmatic concerns, they were higher up in the social hierarchy. Being above many of the Tang officials who were originally insiders, they recommended them and recruited them into their own cliques.   Pragmatism vs. Genealogical and Cultural Differences   Previous paragraphs have demonstrated the heavy emphasis on genealogical and cultural differences in Tang literati’s discourses. On the discursive level, it seems that the Tang literati had a very clear sense of distinction between themselves and officials who were of non-Han ethnic groups. In the seemingly hostile environment presented by these discourses, it is easy to assume that it would have been tremendously difficult for non-Han people to be incorporated into the realm of insiders or to move up the bureaucratic hierarchy. With the clear and hostile attitudes of the majority of Tang high court literati, the easiest way for non-Han outsiders to be included in the realm of insiders, or to prosper within the Tang dynasty as insiders, seems to be assimilation: intermarrying with Han people and assimilating to Han civilization. The previous two sections have already demonstrated that outsiders could easily move into the realm of Tang insiders as long as they could prove themselves useful to the regime. Differences in genealogy and culture were not even brought up as an obstacle. Also, individuals, once incorporated as Tang insiders, could easily move upward in the social and bureaucratic hierarchy, even though they were of different ethnic groups. This section argues against the last assumption of the section about discourses on genealogical and cultural differences, namely that assimilation was the easiest way for non-Han outsiders to be incorporated into the realm of insiders, by closely looking at what was recorded “in practice.” It argues that on the     65 contrary, differences in genealogy and especially cultural background were valued by the Tang dynasty if they could provide benefits to the dynasty; thus, these differences usually served as an asset for outsiders seeking to immigrate into the realm of insiders. Differences in genealogy or ancestral and cultural backgrounds only became an obstacle when the individuals were no longer useful to the dynasty, or in most cases, had become harmful to the dynasty.   First of all, if we scrutinize the biographical information of these individuals in the database, it is obvious that the majority of them spent their whole life serving the dynasty in battlefields. More importantly, the majority of battles they fought were against other pastoral and semipastoral neighboring regimes beyond the north and northwest borderlands. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the Tang dynasty valued and deliberately manipulated the expertise of the newly incorporated insiders’ knowledge of steppe culture and military strategy. The Tang sources have recorded five battles fought by Zhishi Sili, namely wars with Xueyantuo, Tibet, Xueyantuo again, the north pastoral regimes in general, and Koguryo.103 Of the five battles, three were fought against pastoral regimes in the north and northwest. It should be noted that because of the emperors Taizong and Gaozong’s obsession with conquering Koguryo, almost every individual who lived in those years in the database were assigned military positions in some of the expeditions against Koguryo. Qibi Heli has twenty-two recorded battles in Tang dynasty sources against regimes such as the Ashina clan of the Turks, Kucha, Chuyue, Koguryo,                                                 103 JTS 185a: 4793; 196a: 5221; 199b: 5347; JTS 199b: 5347; QTW 7: 87-2 and 87-2: “Ming jiang zheng gao li zhao” 命將征高麗詔.      66 Tibet, Tuyuhun, Karasahr, Chumi, the nine clans in the North, and Xueyantuo.104 Even though out of the twenty-two battles, only thirteen were waged against pastoral regimes in the North and Northwest, nine battles were against Koguryo alone. In other words, besides warfare with Koguryo, thirteen out of the fourteen battles fought by Qibi Heli were against pastoral regimes. Pugu Huai’en was recorded as leading thirteen battles, and all of them were against pastoral powers in the North and Northwest. The majority of these battles were against various rebellious forces under An Lushan. It should be noted that although An Lushan temporarily became a Tang insider, when he rebelled, the majority of his forces were composed of nomadic troops from the North and Northwest. Some of the battles were against various minor pastoral powers in the North and Northwest.105 For Bai Xiaode, all four battles he fought were against pastoral powers, some of which belonged to An Lushan’s forces; some of the later ones were against Pugu Huai’en’s troops when he rebelled against the Tang using substantial numbers of nomadic troops.106 Before An Lushan rebelled against the Tang dynasty, the Tang sources recorded five battles led by him, all of which were against either the Khitan tribe or the Xi tribe in the North.107 There were only two recorded battles under Li Baochen,                                                 104 TD 199: 5459. JTS 4: 69. JTS 194 b: 5186. JTS 195: 5197; JTS 3: 60. JTS 109: 3292; JTS 4: 70. JTS 109: 3293; JTS 4: 79. JTS 4: 81-82. JTS 83: 2781. JTS 109: 3293. JTS 109: 3292. JTS 185a: 4795-96. JTS 199a: 5326-27; JTS 5: 101; JTS 109: 3291; JTS 109: 3291. JTS 198: 5295; JTS 109: 3293; JTS 109: 3293; JTS 199b: 5347. Liu Su 刘餗, Suitang jiahua 隋唐嘉話 in Tangsong shiliao biji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005), bu yi 補遺.  105 TS 121: 3477: against Shi Siming. JTS 121: 3478: against Cui Qianyou and Li Guiren. JTS 121: 3479: against An Qingxu, Zhou Yi, Shi Siming. JTS 121: 3480: against Shi Chaoyi. JTS 120: 3449-50: against Shi Siming, JTS 134: 3703: against Shi Chaoyi. JTS 143: 3895: against Shi Chaoyi. JTS 195: 5199: against Shi Chaoyi and Shi Siming; JTS 121: 3478: Tongluo clan. JTS 124: 3525: various pastoral powers. JTS 141: 3837: various pastoral powers. 106 JTS 109: 3301: Shi Siming; JTS 11: 276. its 120: 3459. JTS 196a.  107 JTS 200a: 5369. JTS 9: 225. JTS 97: 3058. JTS 99: 3099. TD: 4980-81. QTW 40: 435-1: 加證道孝德尊號大赦文.     67 one against internal rebellious groups and the other against Pugu Huai’en’s troops. There was only one battle recorded under Li Simo, which was against Koguryo.108   As for Ashina She’er, of the six battles described in Tang sources, all were battles against the steppe powers in the North and Northwest of the Kucha, Karakhoja, Liao, Kucha again, Western Turks, and Kucha.109 Although the official historical record does not contain many mentions of Ashina Zhong, his epitaph provides us detailed information of battles he fought. There were thirteen in total, recorded in both the epitaph and the Tang official source. Eight were against various steppe powers in the North and Northwest, three were against a regime in the East, possibly Korgoyo, and two were against the Tibetan regime.110 The other individuals in the database all exhibit similar characteristics. The data might accurately represent their main battles; however, it could also represent the battles remembered (or chosen to be remembered) by the literati who wrote the sources. Either way, it is demonstrated that the Tang court actually valued the genealogical and cultural backgrounds of the generals originally from the steppes and deliberately organized them in battles against other steppe groups.                                                    108 JTS 142: 3866; WYYH: 2908-1 and 2908-2; TD 197: 5416 and JTS 194a: 5164-65. 109 JTS 40: 1648, 109: 3289.  110 控帶戎夏....慰撫西域,旌懸泑澤,騎越葱河,處月焉耆,共稽 [blank] 王略。公、揚威電擊,諸戎瓦解,前庭寶馬,驅入陽關,罽賓飛鸞,將充禁衛....于時延陁犯塞,羽檄紛然;公、馳驛赴救,事寧而返,蜂蟻復集,風塵大驚, [blank] 詔率前軍,應時摧[blank word],延陁遂滅,漠北以空....契丹在白狼之東,居黃龍之右,近侵世服,外結鳥夷;公、迴師誅翦,應機殄滅,虜獲万計,三軍無私,蒙賞縑帛,仍於羽林軍檢校,鉤陳之對南宮,羽林之通北落,心膂之切,惟公是先....而有弓月扃動,吐蕃侵逼,延壽莫制,會宗告窘,以公為西域道安撫大使兼行軍大總管. JTS 198: 5304;十一年,內檢校長州都督,[blank] 聖駕雷動,問罪東夷....遼東奉見, [blank] 詔隆獎飾,仍授上柱國,侍輦幽燕,言過汾晉....屬興師遼碣,以公為使持節長岑道行軍大總管,元戎長驅, [blank] 天威遐暢,三山因之而波蕩,九種以之而震驚; 總章元年,吐蕃入寇,拜使持節青海道行軍大總管,長策遠振,群凶竄跡,武賢不捷,充國徒淹,西海諸蕃,經途萬里,而有弓月扃動,吐蕃侵逼,延壽莫制,會宗告窘,以公為西域道安撫大使兼行軍大總管- from Mao Hanguang 毛漢光 ed. Tangdai muzhiming huibian fukao 唐代墓誌銘彙編附考 (Taiwan: Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica).  JTS 198: 5304.      68  More importantly, the Tang dynasty always let the newly incorporated generals lead armies composed of non-Han from the North and Northwest, both because these generals were more familiar with the steppe ways of fighting and probably because the non-Han troops would be easier to command under a steppe general. In contrast to the description of an ethnic Han general in battle, where sources only state that he leads armies111, in terms of generals of non-Han backgrounds, it always states explicitly that they led non-Han armies composed of soldiers from the North and Northwest. Zhishi Sili used to be a trusted Turkic official; in his battle against the various northern steppe powers and Korgoyo, he is recorded to have specifically lead the Turkic soldiers.112 In Qibi Heli’s battle against the Ashina clan of the Turkic regime, he led over fifty thousand Uighur soldiers.113 The Tang Dynasty was also able to take full advantage of Pugu Huai’en’s close relationship with the Uighurs: Huai’en’s daughter was married to the Uighur’s khan, so he had a very good relationship with the Uighurs. Therefore, when the Uighurs sent troops to help the Tang dynasty suppress internal rebellions, Pugu was always put in charge to lead them. He was so close to the Uighurs that even when he rebelled, he managed to lead substantial numbers of Uighur troops with him.114 Before                                                 111 The ethnic Han general Liu Jian 劉簡 led fifty thousand infantry armies, see Cefu yuangui: 30, 11567-1. The Prince of Jiangxia (jiang xia wang 江夏王) led soldiers from the nine provinces, see Cefu, 36, 11640-2. etc.  112 JTS 199b: 5347: 二十年,太宗遣使江夏王道宗、左衛大將軍阿史那社爾為瀚海道安撫大使;右領軍大將軍執失思力領突厥兵,代州都督薛萬徹、營州都督張儉、右驍衛大將軍契苾何力各統所部兵分道並進;太宗親幸靈州,為諸軍聲援。QTW 7: 87-2: 命將征高麗詔.  113 TD 199: 5459: 三年,詔遣左武候大將軍梁建方、右驍衞大將軍契苾何力率燕然都護所部回紇兵五萬騎討之. (JTS 194b: 5186. JTS 195: 5197.) 114 JTS 121: 3480: 肅宗以寧國公主下嫁於毘伽闕可汗,毘伽闕可汗又以少子請婚,肅宗以懷恩女妻之。毘伽可汗死,少子代立,即登里可汗。登里立,以懷恩女為可敦。JTS 195: 5202-03; JTS 121: 3478: 及迴紇使葉護帝得數千騎來赴國難,南蠻、大食之卒相繼而至。肅宗乃遣廣平王為元帥,以子儀為副,而懷恩領迴紇兵從之灃水。JTS 195: 5199: 朔方左廂兵馬使僕固懷恩指迴紇馳救之,匹馬不歸,因收西京。(JTS 200a: 5382, JTS 121: 3481); JTS 121: 3489: 懷恩領迴紇及朔方之眾繼進,行至鳴沙縣,遇疾舁歸。(JTS 11: 276, 279. JTS 152: 4066, 4068. JTS 120: 3455-61. JTS 195: 5205. JTS 196a: 5239-40)     69 An Lushan rebelled, his non-Han background was also fully exploited by the Tang dynasty. It is stated that all troops under An Lushan’s command were composed of carefully selected Han and foreign soldiers. When he rebelled, he first used the excuse to kill the vicious Yang Guozhong because Yang was exploiting the dynasty for personal gains; it was also stated that he led over fifteen thousand foreign ethnic cavalry and infantry.115 An Xiuren and his brother An Xinggui first served under Li Gui’s regime in the North. Their ability to lead Hu people had already been discovered by Li Gui. When Li first declared himself emperor, he asked An specifically to lead Hu people to his aid.116 When the An brothers secretly served the Tang dynasty and sought opportunity to kill Li, An Xinggui was also recorded as leading Hu people in the process.117   The sources also reveal that the Tang elite and ruling family's decision was correct, as the steppe generals indeed could lead more successful battles against other steppe powers compared to ethnic Han officials, at least in the record. For example, during one battle against the Tuyuhun, Qibi Heli wanted to attack when the Tuyuhun tribal leader was near them. He was stopped by a Han official, Xue Wanjun, who, based on his previous military experience, argued that Qibi could never win the battle if he went out to attack the leader of the Tuyuhun. However, Qibi claimed that the Tuyuhun tribe did not have a settled fortress, so they would have to chase the source of water and grass in order to survive: “If we do not attack them by surprise, they will definitely run like scared bird and fish.” Consequently, he led thousands of soldiers to the tent of the                                                 115 JTS 187b: 4888: 祿山所統,皆蕃漢精兵,訓練已久; JTS 200a: 5370: 十一月,反于范陽,矯稱奉恩命以兵討逆賊楊國忠。以諸蕃馬步十五萬,夜半行,平明食,日六十里。(JTS 9:230. JTS 140: 3828)  116 JTS 55: 2248-49: 軌令修仁夜率諸胡入內苑城,建旗大呼,軌於郭下聚眾應之,執縛隋虎賁郎將謝統師、郡丞韋士政。軌自稱河西大涼王. 117 JTS 55: 2251: 興貴知軌不可動,乃與修仁等潛謀引諸胡眾起兵圖軌,將圍其城,軌率步騎千餘出城拒戰.     70 Tuyuhun khan, resulting in a very successful battle, killing hundreds of enemies, and even capturing the wife of the khan.118  Non-Han officials were also valued for their knowledge of the steppe cultures and, arguably, sometimes for their language ability, such that they were often used on diplomatic missions by the Tang dynasty to other steppe powers. When the nine clans in the north jimi states rebelled and attacked the Tang dynasty, Qibi Heli was ordered as Pacification Commissioner-In-Chief of the Tiele Circuit (Tiele dao an fu da shi 鐵勒道安撫大使) to punish, remonstrate, and comfort the nine clans.119 When the Tang dynasty wanted to establish good relationship with the Uighurs and possibly use their troops in the future, Pugu Huai’en was sent as a Tang envoy to the Uighur empire. After the Uighurs helped the Tang successfully suppress the An Lushan Rebellion, Pugu Huai’en was also ordered as a Tang envoy to send the Uighur khan back to his territory.120 An Lushan was also used as a Pacification Commissioner to the steppe powers in the North, both to check on them and comfort them.121 During the Zhenguan era, a tribe named Qiguligan 其骨利幹 came to send tributes to the Tang dynasty. The tribe was located in the far north, so it had not been in contact with the central kingdom for centuries. After they had come to pay tribute, Kang Sumi was sent as a Tang envoy to the far North to                                                 118 JTS 109: 3291: 時吐谷渾主在突淪川,何力復欲襲之,萬均懲其前敗,固言不可....何力曰:「賊非有城郭,逐水草以為生,若不襲其不虞,便恐鳥驚魚散....乃自選驍兵千餘騎,直入突淪川,襲破吐谷渾牙帳,斬首數千級,獲駝馬牛羊二十餘萬頭,渾主脫身以免,俘其妻子而還。 119 JTS 109: 3293: 其年,九姓叛,以何力為鐵勒道安撫大使。乃簡精騎五百馳入九姓中,賊大驚,何力乃謂曰:「國家知汝被詿誤,遂有翻動,使我捨汝等過,皆可自新。罪在酋渠,得之則已。」諸姓大喜,共擒偽葉護及設、特勤等同惡二百餘人以歸,何力數其罪而誅之。 120 JTS 121: 3482: 肅宗雖仗朔方之眾,將假蕃兵以張形勢,乃遣懷恩與燉煌王承寀使于迴紇,請兵結好。迴紇可汗遂以女妻承寀,兼請公主,遣首領隨懷恩入朝。JTS 10: 244. JTS 86:2834. JTS 195: 5199-20. JTS 200a: 5372; 121: 3482: 遂詔懷恩統可汗還蕃,遂自相州西郭口趣潞州,與迴紇可汗會,出太原之北。 121 JTS 9: 213-14: 幽州節度副使安祿山為營州刺史,充平盧軍節度副使,押兩番、渤海、黑水四府經略使。     71 comfort them.122 In Ashina Zhong's epitaph, it is also mentioned that he was appointed as Pacification Commissioner-In-Chief of the Western Regions, and it notes his mission to comfort the Western Regions.123 Thus, it is reasonable to argue that the Tang dynasty, although well aware of the ethnic differences, did not prevent these non-Han outsiders from entering the realm of insiders or their prosperity within the Tang dynasty. On the contrary, if the differences proved beneficial to the dynasty, it was more than willing to accept these non-Han generals as prosperous Tang insiders.   Differences in genealogy and cultural backgrounds, on the other hand, were mainly used derogatorily for rhetorical reasons. If non-Han generals, despite being accepted at first as insiders of the Tang, brought harm to the dynasty, they were immediately excluded from the realm of insiders, and their ethnic differences were used as a rhetorical weapon against them. For example, when describing An Lushan, the half Sogdian, half Turkic general who first received great favor from the Tang but later brought disaster to the dynasty, the Tang emperor in one edit wrote, “An Lushan was just a Yi barbarian of extremely low birth. With little military achievement, he became proud of himself, so he started to act exceedingly savagely and cruelly.”124 In a Tang tomb epitaph, the author Wang Wei 王維 (ca. 701–761), who was a famous Tang man of letter, also records the An Lushan rebellion by referring to An as a dog and a fox who used the emperor’s power to turn against the emperor.125 In Chinese characters, the word “fox”                                                 122 JTS 199b: 其骨利幹北距大海,去京師最遠,自古未通中國。貞觀中遣使來朝貢....遣雲麾將軍康蘇密往慰撫之.  123 公、銜命風馳,慰撫西域,旌懸泑澤,騎越葱河....以公為西域道安撫大使兼行軍大總管 124 JTS 10, 248: 安祿山夷羯賤類,粗立邊功,遂肆兇殘,變起倉卒,而毒流四海,塗炭萬靈. QTW 42: 458-1: 御丹鳳樓大赦制.  125 QTW 3: 3303-2: 大唐故臨汝郡太守贈祕書監京兆韋公神道碑銘.      72 (hu 狐) is homophonous with An Lushan’s ethnic group “Hu” 胡. Therefore, it is clear that the author of the epitaph so despised An that he employed ethnic derogatory words. Li Wei 李暐 (ca. 742), another Tang official, wrote in his prose that the rebellious An Lushan was just a barbaric Hu who rebelled against the court like an animal.126 Because he was so hated by Tang contemporaries, even local folklore employed ethnically derogatory words towards him: It is destined that the wild fox [indicating An Lushan] will die on the eighteenth day of the next year.127 Also, the ethnically derogatory words “yi” 夷 and “rebellious Hu” (ni hu 逆胡) are used excessively in Shi Siming’s biography; in contrast, the biographical information of other non-Han officials only contains one sentence neutrally introducing their genealogical and cultural background.128 In the commenting section of Shi’s biographical information, the historian writes, “the Rong and Jie barbarians from the North and Northwest betrayed the grace [of the emperor], suddenly running around like pigs, so jackals and pigs started to prosper in the capital …. It is only fortunate that the commoners were still missing the grace of the Han”.129 When describing Pugu Huai’en, the source explained the reason for Pugu’s rebellion: Even though he had made a great sacrifice to the Tang dynasty (forty-six of his family members died for the Tang dynasty for various reasons), because of his foreign and                                                 126 QTW 372: 3777-1: 拒賊盟詞.  127 Chen Shang jun陈尚君, Quan tang shi bu bian 全唐诗补编(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju), 58: “An qingxu jiang bai shi chen ”安慶緒將敗時讖.   128 JTS 10: 257, 10: 264, 36: 1325, 116: 3382, 121: 3483. 129 JTS 10: 264: 臣每讀詩至許穆夫人聞宗國之顛覆,周大夫傷宮室之黍離,其辭情於邑,賦諭 264 懃懇,未嘗不廢書興歎。及觀天寶失馭,流離奔播,又甚於詩人之於邑也。當其戎羯負恩,奄為豨突,豺豕遽興於轂下,胡越寧慮於舟中,借人之戈,持之反刺,變生於不意也。所幸太王去國,豳人不忘於周君;新莽據圖,黔首仍思於漢德。是以宣皇帝蒙六聖之遺業,因百姓之樂推。     73 barbaric nature, he gradually became resentful towards the Tang.130 Thus, if foreign individuals brought harm to the dynasty, rhetoric of ethnic differences could be a strong weapon against them by arguing that they were innately inferior and barbaric.   Political Loyalty vs. Pragmatism  The previous section has presented the importance of political loyalty in Tang dynasty discourses, and it seems that being politically loyal to the dynasty was a large and significant criterion for any individuals to be included in the realm of insiders. It should be noted again that there are many layers to the word loyalty, and the concept this thesis discusses refers to the unflinching, long-term political loyalty emphasized by the Han civilization, rather than the more pragmatic political loyalty of one swearing his or her allegiance to serve an individual ruler. The latter kind of loyalty is already part of the definition of being an insider, since it requires individuals to serve under the Tang ruler. This section argues that, although political loyalty was very important in the Tang dynasty and highly praised in discourse, in practice it was not as crucial as usefulness if individuals wanted to immigrate into the realm of Tang insiders, or just to prosper within the Tang dynasty.  As we have seen earlier in Shi Siming’s case, after being rebellious leaders for years, Shi Siming and other minor leaders surrendered to the Tang dynasty. The Tang emperor issued an edict condemning their disloyalty, saying that it should be expected that they all be executed without consideration. However, in practice, the situation was slightly different: Shi Siming surrendered with more than twenty people; eighteen of                                                 130 JTS 120, 3483: 懷恩以寇難已來,一門之內死王事者四十六人,女嫁絕域,再收兩京,皆導引迴紇,摧滅強敵,而為人媒孽,蕃性獷戾,怏怏不已     74 them were executed immediately that day, seven of them were ordered to commit suicide, and one was exiled. Shi Siming, being the major leader of the rebellion, was explicitly accepted back into the Tang regime. It is stated that the emperor was exceedingly happy about Shi Siming’s surrender, granting him the eminent and powerful official titles of Military Commission of Hebei (Hebei jie du shi 河北節度使), Censor-In-Chief (yu shi da fu 御史大夫), and Administrator of Fanyang (Fanyang zhang shi 范陽長使). He was also granted the honorific titles of Guiyi Prince (gui yi wang 歸義王), literally meaning “returning to the righteousness”.131 Because the minor leaders who surrendered to the Tang dynasty was of little use to the Tang, it was only convenient and beneficial for the Emperor to strongly stress their crime of disloyalty to the dynasty and execute them. On the day of the execution, officials were asked to be present and watch them, so their execution would serve as a good example and lesson for officials who had the potential thought of rebellion. However, Shi Siming, being a major leader of the rebellion, surrendered to the dynasty with eighty thousand soldiers and thirteen counties under his command. Since the Tang dynasty was in a relatively weak position after years of warfare with An Lushan’s forces, it was only beneficial for the Tang to warmly welcome Shi Siming back into the regime in exchange for peace, his troops, and his lands. Later, when Shi Siming was suspected by Tang official Li Guangbi as having the tendency to rebel again, he killed a subordinate of that official, Wu Cheng’en 烏承恩 (ca. 758). Hearing this news, the emperor, instead of scolding Siming, sent an official to comfort                                                 131 JTS 10: 250-251: JTS 10: 259-251: 達奚珣等一十八人,並宜處斬;陳希烈等七人,並賜自盡;前 251 大理卿張均特宜免死,配流合浦郡。」是日斬達奚珣等於子城西南隅獨柳樹,仍集百僚往觀之; JTS 200a: 5378-79: 李光弼使衙官敬俛招之,遂令衙官竇子昂奉表,以所管兵眾八萬人及以偽河東節度高秀巖來降。肅宗大悅,封歸義王,范陽長史、御史大夫、河北節度使; Hucker, Dictionary. 8181, 185.      75 him, saying that “both the dynasty and Li Guangbi had no such intentions [of suspecting you], this is all Cheng’en’s own actions. It is only good that you killed him”.132 Similar pragmatic concerns appear in another edict regarding the rebellion. After the rebellion was suppressed, the emperor’s edict exempted the crimes of all non-Han insiders who participated in the rebellion, saying that if they returned to the dynasty, they would all be granted high official titles.133   Li Baochen provides another good example. His original name was unclear, but he was adopted by a Tang official whose surname was Zhang, so his first recorded name is Zhang Zhongzhi 張忠志. After being incorporated as a Tang insider, he soon rebelled against the Tang dynasty with An Lushan, possibly because he was previously recommended by An to be a Tang official. An Lushan was extremely happy and adopted Zhang as his son, giving him another surname, An. Later, when the Tang dynasty was winning the war, Zhang defected and returned to the Tang dynasty with the seal of the rebellious force. He was immediately welcomed back and granted the official title Provincial Governor of Hengzhou (Hengzhou ci shi 恆州刺史). However, when Shi Siming and his force approached him, he defected again and joined the side of the rebellious force. After Shi Siming was defeated, Zhang once again returned to the Tang dynasty by rebelling against Shi Siming’s son and cooperating with the Tang dynasty. Because the Tang dynasty was devastated by the rebellions, and because Zhang                                                 132 JTS 200a: 5379: 思明集軍將官吏百姓,西向大哭曰:「臣以十三州之地、十萬眾之兵降國家,赤心不負陛下,何至殺臣!」因搒殺承恩父子,囚李思敬,遣使表其事....朝廷又令中使慰諭云:「國家與光弼無此事,乃承恩所為,殺之善也。」 133 CFYG 88: 1047-2: 廣德元年七月壬子御宣政殿下詔曰....天下所有諸色結聚羗渾黨項等但能悔過自陳各歸生業一切並捨其罪其中有頭首能勸率并束手來歸者并加官賞仍令本道防禦使并本管刺史縣令分明曉諭所有到者各具名錄奏. For similar edicts, see CFYG 139: 1681-1, 1683-2.      76 surrendered with his own troops and lands, the Tang dynasty, out of pragmatic concerns, warmly welcomed Zhang Zhongzhi even though he had acted far from loyal several times. Besides the powerful official titles that were granted to him, Zhang also received an iron ticket (tie quan 鐵券), a privilege granted to officials guaranteeing that they will not be subjected to death penalty. Furthermore, he was granted the imperial surname Li and a first name that literally means “precious official”.134 Another example regarding him also demonstrates that even though political loyalty was constantly stressed by the Tang dynasty as an essential part of being Tang insiders, it was mainly used as a rhetorical weapon. After Li Baochen passed away at his post, his son Li Weiyue 李惟岳 (?–782) rebelled against the Tang dynasty. However, he was not as successful as his father, so the rebellious force was very quickly crushed. In an edict regarding Li Baochen’s rebellious son, the emperor emphasized the point that Li Weiyue was nothing like his father, who was both loyal to the Tang dynasty and made great contributions. By rebelling against the Tang, Weiyue had disdained his father’s career and was neither loyal nor filial.135 This edict was rather ironic because obviously from Li Baochen’s example, he was anything but a loyal subject of the Tang dynasty. However, because of his                                                 134 JTS 142: 3865-6: 幼善騎射,節度使安祿山選為射生官。天寶中,隨祿山入朝,玄宗留為射生子弟,出入禁中。及祿山叛,忠志遁歸范陽....祿山喜,錄為假子,姓安,常給事帳中....九節度之師圍慶緒於相州,忠志懼,獻章歸國, 肅宗因授恆州刺史....及史思明復渡河,偽授忠志工部尚書、恆州刺史、恆趙節度使,統眾三萬守常山....及思明敗,不受朝義之命,乃開土門路以內王師....河朔平定,忠志與李懷仙、薛嵩、田承嗣各舉其地歸國,皆賜鐵券,誓以不死….因授忠志開府儀同三司、檢校禮部尚書、恆州刺史,實封二百戶,仍舊為節度使....賜姓名曰李寶臣. 135 JTS 142: 3969-70: 寶臣卒時,惟岳為行軍司馬,三軍推為留後,仍遣使上表求襲父任,朝旨不允。魏博節度使田悅上章保薦,請賜旄節,不許。惟岳乃與田悅、李正己同謀拒命,判官邵真泣諫,以為不可。惟岳暗懦,初雖聽從,終為左右所惑而止....武俊然之。三年閏正月,武俊與常寧自趙州迴戈,達明至恆,武俊子士真應於內。武俊兵突入府署,遣虞候任越劫擒惟岳,縊死於戟門外;又誅惟岳妻父鄭華及長慶、王他奴等二十餘人,傳首京師; JTS 12: 330-331: 「成德軍節度都知兵馬使、恆州刺史、襲隴西郡王李惟岳,以其父寶臣有忠勞於王室,惟岳隳墜父業,蔑棄國恩,縗絰之中,擅掌戎務。外結兇黨,益固姦謀,不孝不忠,宜肆原野。削爾在身官爵。」     77 usefulness to the Tang, he could even be regarded as a loyal subject while his son was described as neither loyal nor filial.   Another rebellious official, Li Huaixian 李懷仙, had almost the same experience as Li Baochen. He was originally a Hu in a Tang jimi state, and when An Lushan rebelled against the Tang, Huaixian became an official under An. He had been staying in the rebellious camp until the leader became Shi Siming’s son Shi Chaoyi 史朝義 (?–763). When Shi Chaoyi’s force was defeated several times by the Tang troops led by Pugu Huai’en, Li Huaixian decided to trick Shi Chaoyi and return to the Tang dynasty with Chaoyi’s head. As already argued before, because Pugu Huai’en wanted his own clique, he recommended Li Huaixian to the throne on the basis that Li would be useful. Therefore, Li was accepted back into the realm of Tang insiders and was granted numerous official titles that held tremendous power.136  Compared to the treatment Li Huaixian, Shi Siming, and Li Baochen received, He Panren’s was a totally different story. He surrendered to the Tang dynasty during the early founding period, and he never rebelled against the Tang. Later, very possibly when he passed away, one of his former officials, Li Gang 李綱 (547–631) was favored by the Tang emperor Gaozu. Emperor Gaozu asked Li Gang to be the imperial teacher of the heir apparent, but Li Gang declined the offer. The Tang emperor was greatly angered and scolded Li, saying that “you used to be Administrator (zhang shi 長使) under Panren, but                                                 136 JTS 143: 3895: 柳城胡人也。世事契丹,降將,守營州。祿山之叛,懷仙以裨將從陷河洛....寶應元年,元帥雍王統迴紇諸兵收復東都,朝義渡河北走,乃令副元帥僕固懷恩率兵追之。時羣凶瓦解,國威方振,賊黨聞懷恩至,望風納款。朝義以餘孽數千奔范陽,懷仙誘而擒之,斬首來獻....屬懷恩私欲樹黨以固兵權,乃保薦懷仙可用....代宗復授幽州大都督府長史、檢校侍中、幽州盧龍等軍節度使,與賊將薛嵩、田承嗣、張忠志等分河朔而帥之。JTS 11: 271, 12: 319, 121: 3481-82, 200a: 5382; JTS 124: 3525, 124: 3541, 134: 3690, 141: 3837, 142: 3865-66.      78 why are you ashamed now to be my Minister (shang shu 尚書)?” Li replied that “Panren is a thief (zei 賊) whose aim was to kill …. Whenever I remonstrated him, I was stopped … so I don’t feel guilty. But Your Majesty has already accomplished this grand achievement …. I am afraid that my suggestions are not accepted by the heir apparent. So if I cannot make contributions, it is better for me to draw back from the position”. The emperor was satisfied with Li’s reply.137 The Chinese word referring to He Panren by Li Gang was zei 賊. It literally means thief, but it also has meaning of traitor, or people who bring harm to the dynasty. It was also used for rebellious figures like An Lushan.138 It is curious that after Panren had helped the founding process of the Tang dynasty and was granted official titles, he was still referred to by both his previous official and the emperor as zei 賊, with derogatory connotations. The Tang sources make no other mention of him, but later sources record that He Panren was actually killed when he led a Tang punitive expedition against local bandits during the early years of the dynasty, because he had underestimated the enemy.139 From later sources, we also know that he was later granted higher official positions of General of the Right Army or General of the Left Army, depending on different sources, but the Tang contemporary sources make no mention of him afterwards. It is very likely that he was referred to in derogatory words after his death because of his incompetence in battle; moreover, it is possible that Tang                                                 137 JTS 58: 2315; 62: 2376; Hucker, Dictionary, 5042; JTS 62: 2374-75: 高祖謾罵之曰:「卿為潘仁長史,何乃羞為朕尚書?且建成在東宮,遣卿輔導,何為屢致辭乎?」綱頓首陳謝曰:「潘仁,賊也,誠在殺害,每諫便止,所活極多,為其長史,故得無愧。陛下功成業泰,頗自矜伐,臣以凡劣,才乖元凱,所言如水投石,安敢久為尚書。兼以愚臣事太子,所懷鄙見,復不採納,既無補益,所以請退。」高祖謝曰:「知公直士,勉弼我兒。」於是擢拜太子少保,尚書、詹事並如故。 138 JTS 187b: 4893: 安祿山率眾南向,無詖召募拒之。及賊陷陳留郡後,兇威轉盛,戈矛鼓角,驚駭城邑,兩宿及滎陽。乘城自墜如雨,故無詖及官吏,盡為賊所虜。賊以其將武令珣鎮之。 139 CFYG: 425: 5061-1: 何潘仁右屯衛將軍武德二年討山賊張子惠於絲竹園輕敵遇害. XTS 1: 8-9: 左屯衞將軍何潘仁及山賊張子惠戰于司竹,死之.      79 historians did not bother to include the subsequent official titles he received before he died.   From the detailed introduction of each individual in the previous paragraphs, we already know that rebellions were common during the Tang dynasty, and that many officials rebelled against the Tang and safely returned to the dynasty to lead prosperous lives. This section has scrutinized four individual figures’ examples and examined the relationship between political loyalty and pragmatism. There is no doubt that the Tang dynasty placed heavy emphasis on unflinching political loyalty, which was common for all dynasties. However, when the situation required it, or in other words, when the Tang dynasty could either benefit or avoid harm, political loyalty was put aside for pragmatic concerns. In connection with previous sections, for individuals to be accepted and even prosper in the Tang dynasty, the most important criterion was for them to successfully demonstrate their usefulness. The Tang dynasty, contrary to what was displayed at the discourse level, was essentially a pragmatic dynasty where political identity was fluid and fungible.   Conclusion  The Tang literati had mixed feelings toward the foreigners who were originally outsiders but later became insiders, especially toward foreigners from the North and Northwest. As discussed under the first section, some Tang literati looked down upon steppe foreigners based on the assumption that they were primitive, barbaric, and illiterate. However, scholars also point out some Tang elites’ fascination with exotic     80 objects, ideas, and culture.140 Moreover, because of differences in genealogy and ancestral background, some Tang literati also expressed their admiration for the much taller and physically stronger steppe individuals.141 Tang dynasty folklore concerning Geshu Han expressed their gratitude towards Geshu as he protected the borderlands from nomadic troops. Jonathan Skaff points out that based on their discourses, there were two different groups of literati at the Tang court. One group was more influenced by Confucian orthodox values, which regarded steppe people as inferior. However, another group of officials existed that was influenced by ideas similar to “realpolitik”; they were more focused on the actual benefit or harm those individuals could bring with them.142 Therefore, it is obvious that the Tang literati had complex feelings toward steppe individuals. As the variety of attitudes in Tang discourses regarding foreign individuals and cultures seem to contradict each other, this thesis seeks to uncover what was “unsaid” by the Tang literati by looking at actual cases involving different steppe individuals who were outsiders first but later became Tang insiders. It acknowledges that on a discursive level, differences in genealogy, ancestry, and cultural backgrounds seem to be one of the most important criteria for Tang literati to mark the boundaries between insiders and outsiders. Also, the unflinching loyalty emphasized by Confucian values seem to be the foundation of being regarded as Tang insiders. However, by investigating the lives of different steppe individuals, it becomes clear that they were incorporated into the realm of the Tang insiders primarily because of their “usefulness” to the dynasty. Moreover,                                                 140 Edward Schafer, The Golden Peaches of Samarkand: A Study of Tang Exotics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).  141 Marc Abramson, Ethnic Identity, pp. 84-107.  142 Jonathan Skaff, “Tang Military Culture and Its Inner Asian Influences”, in Military Culture in Imperial China, Nicola Di Cosmo, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 165-191.      81 this investigation shows that once they had been incorporated into the realm of insiders, they were able to rather easily move up the Tang social hierarchy. On the other hand, if individuals lost competence after they had been incorporated into the regime, they were most often removed from the realm of insiders. Discourses regarding the importance of ethnic differences and political loyalty, although important in some instances, were generally put aside when pragmatic needs arose. Discourse was only used to exclude outsiders from the realm of insiders when those outsiders were no longer useful.                       82 Bibliography Primary Source with List of Abbreviations:   Book of Rites Dai Sheng 戴聖 [Western Han, unknown] ed. Li ji 禮記. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,  1980.   CFYG         Wang Qinruo 王欽若 [1013], et al. Cefu yuangui 冊府元龜. 1642. Ed. 12 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1960.  Chen Gui   Wu Zhao 武曌 [624-705]. Chen gui 臣軌. Accessed via Ctext.   CYQZ     Zhang Zhuo 张鷟 [660-740], Chaoye qianzai 朝野僉載 in Tangsong shiliao biji congkan 唐宋史料筆記叢刊. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005.  DTXY     Liu Su 劉肅 [820], Datang xinyu 大唐新語. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984.  DTXYJ     Xuan Zang [602-664] 玄奘, Datang xiyu ji 大唐西域記. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1977.    DYZ      Li Kang 李亢 [Tang, unknown],  Du yu zhi 獨異志, in Gu xiaoshuo congkan 古小說叢刊. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983.   JTS             Liu Xun 劉昫 [945] et al. Jiu Tang shu 舊唐書. 16 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.  1975.   QTW      Dong Gao 董誥, et al. [1814]. Quan Tang wen 全唐文. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,  1983.       83 STJH      Liu Su 刘餗 [Tang, unknown], Suitang jiahua 隋唐嘉話 in Tangsong shiliao biji 唐宋史料筆記. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005.  Tang Code     Zhangsun wuxi 長孫無忌 [594-659] et al. Tanglǜ shuyi 唐律疏議. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983.   TD           Du You [801] 杜佑. Tong dian 通典. Edited by Wang Wenjin 王文錦 et al. 5 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1988.  THY      Wang Pu [961] 王溥. Tang hui yao 唐會要. 4 vols. Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1967.  TMH      Mao Hanguang 毛漢光 ed. Tangdai muzhiming huibian fukao 唐代墓誌銘彙編附考. Taiwan: Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica中央研究院歷史語言研究所.   WYYH      Song Bai 宋白 [933-1009] et al. Wen yuan ying hua 文苑英華. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1966.    XTS       Ouyang Xiu [1060] 歐陽修. Xin Tang shu 新唐書. 20 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,  1975.  ZZGY       Wu Jing [670-749] 吳競. Zhenguan zhengyao 貞觀政要. Edited by Wang Gui王貴. Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 1994.  Secondary Literature:  Abramson, Marc. Ethnic Identity in Tang China. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.     84  Barfield, Thomas. The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empire and China 221 B.C to AD 1757. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992.  Cen Zhongmian 岑仲勉, Tangren xingdilu 唐人行第錄. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, reprint 2004.  ————— Sui tang shi 隋唐史. Hebei: hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, reprint 2000.  Chen, Shangjun 陈尚君. Quan tang shi bu bian 全唐詩補編. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1992.   Chen, Yinke 陳寅恪. “Tangdai zhengzhishi lunshugao” 唐代政治史述論稿 in Academia Sinica 國立中央研究院歷史語言研究所專刊. Shanghai, shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館, 1944, 94-116.  Elliott, Mark. “Hushuo: The Northern Other and the Naming of the Han Chinese”, in Critical  Han Studies. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2011.  Fei Xiaotong 費孝通, Zhonghua minzu duoyuan yiti geju 中华民族多元一体格局. Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue chubanshe, 1999.  Fletcher, Joseph. “The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives”, in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 46, No.1 (June., 1986), pp. 11-50.   Hartman, Charles and DeBlasi, Anthony, “The Growth of Historical Method in Tang China”, in The Oxford History of Historical Writing, Volume 2: 400-1400. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.  Hu, Ji 胡戟 chief ed. et al. Ershi shiji Tang yanjiu 二十世纪唐研究. Beijing: shehui kexue chubanshe 社会科学出版社, 2002.      85  Hucker, Charles. A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China. Beijing: Peiking University Press, 1985.  Lewis, Mark. China’s Cosmopolitan Empire: The Tang Dynasty. Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.  Li hongbin 李鸿宾, Tangchao zhongyangjiquan yu minzu guanxi 唐朝中央集权与民族关系. Beijing: minzu chubanshe, 2003.  Liu, Xueyao 劉學銚, Tangdai yilai de banging celue 唐代以來的邊疆策略, Taibei : Zhizhixueshu  chuban she 致知學術出版社, 2013.   Ma, Chi 馬馳. Tang dai fan jiang 唐代蕃將. Xi’an: Sanqin chubanshe, 1990.  Schafer, Edward. The Golden Peaches of Samarkand. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.   Skaff, Jonathan. Sui-Tang China and Its Turko-Mongol Neighbors: Culture, Power, and Connections, 580-800. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. —————“Tang Military Culture and Its Inner Asian Influences”, in Military Cultural in Imperial China, Nicola Di Cosmo, ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009, pp. 165-191.   Tackett, Nicolas. The Destruction of the Medieval Chinese Aristocracy. Massachusetts:  Harvard University Press, 2014.  Tomiya, Itaru. Capital Punishment in East Asia. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2012.   Twichett, Denis. The Writing of Official History Under the Tang. Cambridge: Cambridge     86 University Press, 1992. —————— ed. The Cambridge History of China, Vol 3: Sui and T’ang China, 589-906 AD. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.   Wang, Zhenping. Tang China in Multi-Polar Asia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2013.   Xiang Da 向达, Tangdai changan yu xiyu wenming 唐代长安与西域文明. Hebei: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001.  Yan, Gengwang 嚴耕望. Tangshi yanjiu conggao 唐史研究叢稿. Hongkong: New Asia Institute of Advanced Chinese, 1969.  Yang Shaoyun, ““What Do Barbarians Know Of Gratitude?” — The Stereotype Of Barbarian Perfidy And Its Uses In Tang Foreign Policy Rhetoric”, in T’ang Studies, 31, 2013.   Zhang Qun 章羣, Tangdai fanjiang yanjiu 唐代蕃將研究. Taibei: Liaojing chuban shiye gongsi, 1986.                 87 Appendices Appendix A: Biographical and Literary Information About Outsiders Who Later Became Insiders       88   Note: The column headings of this appendix from left to right are the names of all the individuals, the estimated time when they were active or first appeared (following Zhang Qun’s chart) and various sources either written by them or mention them. This appendix includes historical writings such as the Jiu Tang shu and contemporary Tang literatures such as Datang xinyu and various edits as well as epigraphical sources.           89 Appendix B: Official Titles About Outsiders Who Later Became Insiders       90       91   Note: In this appendix, there are some official titles without ranks because of the scarcity of information. For example, the official title Zhe chong 折衝 could mean Shangfu zhechong 上府折衝 or Zhongfu zhechong 中府折衝 or many other official titles. So in this situation, this appendix will present the official title Zhe chong 折衝 without rank. Also, this appendix mainly uses Tang contemporary sources and JTS as the main source. It will only incorporate information from later periods when there is no record in the main source. For example, if there is a ce 冊 in the appendix, it refers to Cefu yuangui 冊府元龜. The column headings of this appendix from left to right are the names of all the individuals, their original titles before they became Tang insiders, and their various Tang official titles after they became Tang insiders. The various Tang official titles from left to right are zhi guan 職官, meaning official positions with real powers, wu san guan 武散官, meaning military official titles without real powers, jue 爵, meaning honorific titles of nobility, xun 勛, meaning official titles with no real power granted to accomplished officials, zeng guan 贈官, meaning official titles granted to deceased individuals, lin shi 臨時, meaning ad hoc military positions as well as others (mainly refer to civil official titles with no real power).    


Citation Scheme:


Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics



Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            async >
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:


Related Items