Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Korean diaspora : comparing the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans on their political statuses in China and… Shim, Suhan 2017

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata


24-ubc_2017_may_shim_suhan.pdf [ 562.71kB ]
JSON: 24-1.0343991.json
JSON-LD: 24-1.0343991-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 24-1.0343991-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 24-1.0343991-rdf.json
Turtle: 24-1.0343991-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 24-1.0343991-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 24-1.0343991-source.json
Full Text

Full Text

 Korean Diaspora: Comparing the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans on their Political Statuses in China and Japan   by SUHAN SHIM B.A., McGill University, 2014  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF ARTS  in  THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Asia Pacific Policy Studies)    THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  April 2017   © Suhan Shim, 2017   ii  Abstract Many Koreans were forced to relocate to China and Japan, an involuntary diaspora, in response to the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. With the liberation of the Korean peninsula, the Japanese government sought to repatriate the Koreans to their homeland, a largely successful effort. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, however, the Korean diasporic communities in Japan and China were forced to remain in their adopted nations, eventually forming one of the oldest Korean diasporic communities around the world.  In this paper, I will discuss the involuntary Korean diaspora during the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula, distinguishing the Chosunjok in China and the Zainichi Koreans in Japan from other Korean diasporic communities around the world that have resulted from voluntary migrations. I will proceed to compare and contrast China and Japan’s post-war policies towards the Chosunjok and the Zainichi Koreans, respectively, focusing the differences between China and Japan’s citizenship and cultural/linguistic policies towards the Korean migrants, differences that resulted from disparities in territorial sizes and political systems. China, as a means to unify the country as a multi-ethnic state, established generous policies for ethnic minorities, whereas Japan maintained a restrictive policy towards Koreans, regarding them as alien residents as opposed to citizens. I will conclude the paper by exploring how the differing citizenship and cultural linguistic policies impacted the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans’ political status in respective countries.       iii    Preface This thesis is the original work by the author Suhan Shim and has never been published  iv  Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ii Preface ........................................................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................v Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................1 1.1 Research Questions ......................................................................................................... 2 1.2 Chapters .......................................................................................................................... 4 Chapter 2: Theoratical Framework .............................................................................................6 2.1 Literature Review.......................................................................................................... 10 Chapter 3: Distinguishing Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans .................................................13 3.1 Japanese Occupation ..................................................................................................... 15 3.2 Diasporic Communities ................................................................................................ 18 Chapter 4: Citizenship and Cultural/Linguistic Policies .........................................................22 4.1 Minority Nation Policy in China................................................................................... 23 4.2 Zainichi Koreans after Japanese Occupation ................................................................ 25 4.3 Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture ..................................................................... 28 4.4 Korean Ethnic Schools in Japan ................................................................................... 30 Chapter 5: Political Status ..........................................................................................................34 5.1 Chosunjok during Cultural Revolution ......................................................................... 34 5.2 Fingerpriting Refusal Movement .................................................................................. 36 Chapter 6: Conclusion .................................................................................................................37 References .....................................................................................................................................39 v  Acknowledgements  This thesis would not have been completed without the intellectual guidance of many people who have inspired me in my journey at UBC. I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to Dr. Kyung-Ae Park who has been my supervisor and mentor throughout my years at UBC. Also, I would like to thank Dr. Hyung-Gu Lynn as the second reader of my thesis. I would like to send my best to Kylie Luu who has been always by my side whenever I felt overwhelmed both academically and personally. I would also like to thank Ross S. who has been always been supportive by making me smile continually. I would also like to thank my close friends at UBC, Byung Jin Kim, Hee Jun Park and Jeong Hoon Son for cheering me up and guiding me into a broader intellectual community. I will never forget the warm memories created at the UBC Korean Student Press Corp, and graciously offering me a two year internship. Lastly, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my parents who have been my moral mentors, supporting me entirely in the pursuit of my dreams.1  Chapter 1: Introduction In this paper, I will discuss the Korean diasporic populations in China and Japan that resulted from the Japanese Occupation of Korea (1910-1945) focusing on the Chosunjok (Ethnic Korean Chinese) and the Zainichi Koreans (Resident Koreans in Japan)1, in relation to other Korean diasporic communities around the world. There were approximately seven million Koreans overseas in 2015 according to South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“Overseas Koreans"), and the ethnic homogeneity of this diaspora appears to be the only commonality among the diversity inherent in the populations of the international diasporic communities. For example, the migrants’ differing motivations, choices of destinations, and even social disparities within a single community create unique and diverse experiences. There are approximately 856,000 Koreans living in Japan, of which approximately 600,000 are Zainichi Koreans, and 2.5 million living in China, of which 2 million are Chosunjok, according to the same 2015 index. While the Chosunjok and the Zainichi Korean communities were formed because of the same events, the Japanese Occupation of Korea, they are quite distinct in many ways; both communities are one of the oldest of the Korean diaspora not only in China and Japan, but also around the world. The communities in China and Japan, however, could not be more different in regards to the diasporic Koreans’                                            1 In this paper, I use the original terms such as Zainichi and Chosunjok because Korean Japanese and Korean Chinese like we refer to Korean American and Korean Canadian may not be appropriate. Since Chosunjok is legally designated as an ethnic minority in China and Zainichi literally means alien Korean residents so as they are in more peculiar circumstances than the Koreans who have voluntarily immigrated themselves to other countries from 1950s onwards, the terms such as Korean Chinese or Korean Japanese will not be used in this paper but I will use Zainichi and Chosunjok and also use ethnic Koreans in China and resident Koreans in Japan vice versa to do its justice.  2  citizenship rights. In China, the Chosunjok hold Chinese citizenship and reside in a distinct and autonomous region in Northeastern China, whereas in Japan, the Zainichi Koreans are considered alien residents, largely deprived of citizenship rights until recently. In Japan, furthermore, there is a division based on loyalties within the Zainichi Korean community.  1.1. Research Questions Koreans who settle overseas create distinct identities and diasporic communities in the countries where they settle; each diasporic community, however, is very distinct from one another. Then, how are the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans distinct from all other diasporic Koreans? According to Floya Anthias, diasporic populations cannot be homogenized solely based on common ethnicity, the need to distinguish the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans from other voluntary diasporic Koreans must be emphasized. A comparison between the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans, based upon the host countries’ citizenship and cultural/linguistic policies, will be undertaken, referring to Erin Chung’s (2009) research on how the hosting countries’ citizenship policies impacted the Koreans’ political presences in the countries in which they chose to settle. Chung’s contention that Zainichi Koreans “have become influential as foreign citizens... native-born generations of Korean activists have used their non-citizen status as part of a strategy to gain political visibility in Japanese civil society” (Chung 2009, 166), moreover, will be referenced. Korean Americans, on the other hand, were actively engaged with independence movements in Korea during the Japanese Occupation. However, the influence of the Korean diasporic community in America began to diminish because of anti-communist McCarthyism and South Korean president Rhee’s constant surveillance of leftist Koreans (or possibly communists) in the United States after the Korean War (Ibid., 164). Those Koreans under threat had two options 3  according to Chung: “they could remain politically silent to maintain a friendly alien status, or they could naturalize and become political silent Americans” (Ibid.). Many chose the latter, and, according to Chung, the Korean-Americans chose to acquire citizenship and remained insulated, resulting in their political presence significantly diminished. She offers the example of the 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest that “demonstrated the perils of contingent citizenship” (Ibid., 165). She analyzes that the “[Korean American] community’s focus on attaining economic prosperity at the expense of political empowerment, as well as its social and cultural insularity, left its members defenseless, voiceless, and ultimately powerless (Ibid., 165). Then, how did China and Japan’s different citizenship and cultural/linguistic policies impact the political presences of the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans? Because post-war Japan had the assimilative and integrative policies towards its alien residents, they made the naturalization procedure difficult. Chung mentions (2009) that the rate of naturalization of the Zainichi Koreans is relatively lower than that of Korean Americans. Due to the restrictive citizenship and cultural/linguistic policies, Zainichi Koreans formed organizations that not concerned with Japanese domestic politics. However, because many Zainichi Koreans have remained as non-citizens and refused to assimilate, their political presence in Japanese civil society is intact whereas those of the Korean Americans significantly weakened during the Cold War era (Ibid.). On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as compensation to the Koreans in Manchuria for fighting against imperial Japan and colluding with the CCP to fight against the Nationalists (Kuomintang), granted the Chosunjok Chinese citizenship and permitted them to form an autonomous region under its Shaoshu Minzu (ethnic minority nation) policy. The policy seems to guarantee the rights of diasporic populations; in reality, 4  however, the policy not only marginalized the Chosunjok by relegating them to the geographical periphery, but also caused them from experiencing political insularity, as evidenced by their experiences during China’s Cultural Revolution.  1.2. Chapters In chapter two, I set up a theoretical framework by applying theories of the existing literature to distinguish the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans from other voluntary diasporic Koreans. I will be referencing Floya Anthias (1998) to clarify the analytical lens to distinguish the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans from other Koreans of the diaspora. I will then look at Erin Chung’s work on citizenship in order to establish a case to compare the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans. Moreover, I will do a brief literature review on the identities and origins of the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans.  In Chapter three, comparisons between the Jewish and Korean diaspora during the Japanese occupation will support the claim that the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans are distinct from other voluntary diasporic Koreans. Then, the historical account of Japanese occupation of Korea provides clearer contexts regarding the characteristics of the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans in light of Robin Cohen’s (2008) diaspora categories. In addition, I will discuss why the Koreans were dispersed to China and Japan and what happened to them during the occupation before addressing how they formed diasporic communities in their respective hosting countries after liberation.  In chapter four, I will move to post-war China and Japan in order to examine these nations’ different citizenship and cultural/linguistic policies and their effect upon the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans’ political statuses. I will address China’s minority nation (shaoshu minzu) policy and how it applied to the Chosunjok, while also analyzing Japan’s 5  naturalization procedure. I will continue by addressing the cultural and linguistic practices the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans were allowed to preserve by discussing the effect of Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in China and the assimilative and indifferent policies in Japan, focusing on the fate of Korean ethnic schools in Japan. In Chapter five, I argue because the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans experienced different citizenship and cultural/linguistic policies in China and Japan, their political presence in their respective countries differed. The Chosunjok’s political presence largely diminished because they decided to integrate, and they remained insulated due to the acquisition of citizenship and cultural/linguistic rights, as their experiences during China’s Cultural Revolution. For the Zainichi Koreans, I agree with Erin Chung’s argument that their political presence in Japanese civil society is intact and empowered because they decided to remain non-citizens emphasizing their distinct identity as alien residents as evidenced by the Fingerprinting Refusal Movement.   In conclusion, I will summarize the responses for my research questions. I will also acknowledge the limits of this research and offer some guidance for future research.   6  Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework   Rogers Brubaker discusses (2005) how “one dimension of dispersion involves the application of the term diaspora to an ever-broadening set of cases: essentially to any and every nameable population category that is to some extent dispersed in space” (3). Brubaker also mentions that the ‘term that once described Jewish, Greek and Armenian dispersion now shared meanings with a large semantic domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile community, overseas community [and] ethnic community” (ibid.). He eventually says “if everyone is diasporic, then no one is distinctively so; the term loses its discriminating power—its ability to pick out phenomena, to make distinctions” (Ibid.). The term diaspora has become overly extensive so it needs certain criteria to limit the phenomenon called diaspora, Floya Anthias argues (1998), and that the concept of diaspora easily homogenizes the population through concepts such as ethnic homogeneity. However, such populations are not homogenous because migration and settlement “may have taken place at different historical periods and for different reasons and different countries of destination provided different social conditions, opportunities and exclusion” (564). Anthias argues (1998) that common ethnicity is merely a single factor or lens through which to analyze diasporic populations, and that to categorize them based upon ethnic homogeneity alone would result in an incomplete understanding of transnational communities, especially in light of the variance of destinations, the period of relocation, the motivations for migration, and the emphasis on gender and class. She uses the example of the Greek diasporic experience to highlight her assertions: “Greeks of the diaspora [that] include those thrown out of Asia Minor in 1922 and more recent Gastarbeiters (guest workers) [in Germany] as well as Greeks still living in Turkey and Albania” are different (564). Such differences are emphasized by her series of rhetorical questions: “what do the Greeks in Germany who 7  travelled as Gastarbeiters and the Greeks of Smyrna who were forcibly expelled have in common? What do they have in common with the Greeks in London, who are mainly students, professionals or ship-owners?” (564).   A comparative analysis of the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans with other Korean Diasporas based on ethnicity alone, similarly, would yield only superficial portraits of  complex, and multifaceted communities. What do the Koreans who travelled to Germany as Gastarbeiters and the Koreans who immigrate as international students have in common? What do they have in common with the wealthy investor immigrants have in common with the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans? Even within the voluntary South Korean immigrant class, differing objectives and motivations for migration create a diversity that cannot be reduced to the common denominator of ethnicity. There are Koreans who permanently immigrate to other countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia and others as a family unit, where they find employment, open businesses, and establish homes. Migration chronology, moreover, contributes to the disparate nature of diasporic communities; for instance, during the 1970s and 80s, Koreans moved to countries with better economic and social conditions, usually in search of improved living conditions and economic opportunities. They were dissatisfied with the Korean status quo at the time due to the unstable political and economic circumstances. However, the permanent Korean immigrants who moved to these countries in the 2000s prioritized their children’s education. The two cases, despite sharing the labels of permanent voluntary migration, have chronological and objective differences and formed different diasporic communities. Also, there are South Korean young adults who temporarily relocate themselves to other countries for study and temporary work opportunities. According to Kyong Yoon (2014), “the working holiday can be considered an example of the hybrid mode of transnational mobility, since it allows its young participants 8  (usually under 30) relative freedom from career and family commitments to assume various identities as tourists, migrant workers, students and residents” (587). These Korean working holidaymakers usually head to post-industrial countries such as Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand as destinations. This example is also starkly different from the aforementioned voluntary migration of the 1970s and 80s even though the hosting countries are similar. Yoon further argues (2014) that these young Koreans create distinct identities, a hybrid between Korean and Western. On the other hand, Korean nurses and mine workers who went to Germany during the 1970s as guest workers, encouraged by the South Korean government to participate in Korea’s development plans; these Koreans can be considered as temporary diasporic populations, though some permanently settled in Germany and other European countries. Furthermore, a close examination of China’s and Japan’s policies towards foreign residents is necessary in gaining a greater understanding of the Korean diasporic communities in China and Japan. Distinguishing the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans from other diasporic Koreans, thus, establishes a case to compare based upon China and Japan’s citizenship and linguistic/cultural policies, as referred to by Erin Chung (2009) in “The Politics of Contingent Citizenship”. She mainly compares (2009) the Zainichi Koreans and Korean Americans, and how their political presences and influences in the hosting countries vary in regard to the acquisition of citizenship. She concludes (2009) that the two cases challenge our conventional understanding of citizenship, which would lead us to assume that noncitizen political activities are aimed at the acquisition of citizenship alone, and that citizenship acquisition is always politically empowering. They point to the gray areas of citizenship, where egalitarianism and particularism overlap, and where citizenship is both a source of inclusion 9  and exclusion (167). Chung further asserts that the acquisition of citizenship does not necessarily empower the foreign residents’ political status, as exemplified in the case of Korean Americans. Korean American communities were actively engaged with the independence movement during the Japanese Occupation of Korea. During the Cold War era, these communities were under surveillance by the US and South Korean governments in part due to anti-communist McCarthyism (Ibid.). Thus, many chose to naturalize and decided to be insulated culturally and socially. The Korean Americans’ political influence significantly weakened and it was evidenced in the 1992 Los Angeles riots and civil unrest, making them vulnerable targets of violence and leaving them unprotected. Japan’s post war policy on alien resident has been assimilative and naturalization was possible only when an individual determined to completely assimilate: “under the discretion of the Ministry of Justice, naturalization entailed not only the renouncement of national allegiance to the homeland but also complete cultural assimilation, [and],...until the 1980s, Justice officials frequently commented that efforts should be made to encourage Korean residents to assimilate to the point of being [indistinguishable]” (164). Many Zainichi Koreans chose to retain their non-citizenship statuses, for they were affiliated with their distinct diasporic organizations that were more concerned with their homeland politics and retaining their distinct foreign identities than Japanese domestic politics (ibid.). Chung provides a useful analytical lens on how to view citizenship issue, arguing that (2009) citizenship, as legal status, rights and responsibilities, identity and practice, is contingent in three ways (150). The first is that “citizenship policies define the categories of political membership within a nation-state and their attendant rights and duties” (ibid.). The second is, “in the process of naturalization, citizenship is contingent upon one’s ability to demonstrate 10  that he or she has met particular requirements such as knowledge of the host society’s history and language” (Ibid., 151). The third is citizenship rights and status are not inviolable; “they are contingent upon historical circumstances” (ibid., 151). Japan initially stripped Japanese citizenship from Zainichi Koreans and excluded Zainichi Koreans as political non-members and made stringent naturalization requirements. China, on the other hand, legally recognized the Chosunjok as political members of the nation and granted citizenship because the Koreans fought against imperial Japan so they not only sufficiently fulfilled the requirements, but also their citizen status was contingent upon the historical circumstance which the CCP defeated Kuomintang. Thus, Chung’s ways of defining citizenship and comparative case between Zainichi Koreans and Korean Americans solidify the ground for comparison between the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans based upon China’s and Japan’s citizenship policies. In this paper, I will extend Chung’s argument by including cultural/linguistic policies in regard to the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans.  2.1. Literature Review  When studying Korean Diaspora, the discourse of identity is foremost imperative because Koreans in China and Japan identify themselves as being ethnically Korean. Huh Myung-chul addresses (2012) how to define the ethnic identity of the Chosunjok in China; he addresses the fact there are more than 2.5 million Koreans living in China, yet they are not all Chosunjok. In terms of legal status, Huh notes that the Chosunjok are Chinese citizens who are ethnically Korean and live in a minority community in China (2012, 453). Thus, the term Chosunjok usually refers to the Korean-Chinese whose ancestors migrated to China mostly during the Japanese occupation of Korea in the first half of the twentieth century. Huh goes into detail regarding the dual identity of the Chosunjok in China (Chosŏnjok ŭi e-chungsŏng 11  tamnon) as defined by Chung Kwan-ryong (cited in Huh 2012, 457): the Chosunjok are legally Chinese citizens yet they are culturally and ethnically Koreans. Thus, Chung and Huh treat ethnic identity and legal identity separately. On the other hand, Hwang Yoo-bok refutes the dual identity of the Chosunjok on the grounds that legal citizenship and ethnic identity cannot stand as equals since, as he argues, that the state’s priorities take precedence over those of nationality or ethnicity, with merely inclusive of and inferior to the state (Ibid.). However, in this study, I basically concur with Chung and Huh regarding the dual identity of Chosunjok and refute Hwang’s claim. Thus, in this paper, ethnicity and citizenship are viewed separately, and legal citizenship does not take precedence over ethnic identity. Because China recognized ethnic minorities under its ethnic minority nation policy, state and ethnicity should be treated as separate factors. Moreover, some scholars have conducted research on the Zainichi Kankoku Chosenjin (resident South and North Koreans) in Japan whose ancestors migrated to Japan during the Japanese colonial period. In Koreans in Japan, edited by Sonia Ryang (2000), a number of scholars address the issues concerning the legal status of the Zainichi Koreans in Japan and the systematic discrimination they have encountered. This work chronologically delineates the struggle of the Zainichi Koreans regarding legal status issues. Erin Chung compares (2009) the Koreans’ political engagement in Japan and the United States, remarking how “the current Korean resident population…constitutes the oldest foreign resident community in Japan” (147). Chung also mentions that “spanning four generations, this community shows a few signs of maintaining a strong Korean socio-cultural identity through the traditional indicators of language, education and marriage” (Ibid.). Furthermore, there is a debate whether the origin of Zainichi Koreans resulted from the Japanese occupation or whether they came from Jeju Island after liberation because of the 12  Jeju Uprising.2 Goh Gwang-myung (2007) and Kim Chang-hwoo (2010) address those who are from Jeju as Jaeil Jeju people (Resident Jeju people in Japan). Kim claims (2010) that Jeju residents constantly moved to Japan, particularly to Osaka, because of the unrestricted access and direct shipping route between Jeju Island and Osaka which opened in 1922. According to Goh (2007), it is estimated that around 90,000 Zainichi Koreans came from Jeju Island in 1964. (63); however, there is some controversy regarding the number of Jeju residents who migrated to Japan because of the Jeju Uprising. Even though Moon Kyung-soo argues (2001) that around 5,000 to 10,000 Koreans from Jeju moved to Japan, this number is inaccurate, for in a later document, Moon states (2008) that this number might be less than initially suggested. Kim Chang-hwoo also argues (2010) that unless the Japanese government starts investigating the number of Koreans from Jeju, it would be difficult to gather accurate data (41). For the purpose of this paper, I will treat the majority of the Zainichi Koreans to have moved during the occupation period from many regions of Korea as well as Jeju while acknowledging that some of the Koreans from Jeju entered Japan after the Uprising.  Korean Diaspora scholars have generally conducted research on the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans separately; thus, taking a comparative perspective, specifically in relation to China and Japan’s citizenship and cultural/linguistic policies towards the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans has rarely been researched. It is the intention of this paper to fill this lacuna and contribute to the study of the Korean Diaspora.                                            2 Jeju Uprising is the insurgency in Jeju province of Korea that occurred in April 3rd, 1948 until 1949. Due to the election planned by the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, the South Korean Labor Party in Jeju Island was worried about the further division in the Korean peninsula. They reacted violently to the initial police and military attack and the conflict continued and ended in 1949.  13  Chapter 3: Distinguishing Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans from Other Korean Diasporas In the theoretical framework, I mentioned Anthia’s claim on the need to view the diverse forms of transnational migration and settlement. Initially, distinguishing the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans from other Koreans of the diaspora that resulted from voluntary migration is useful in underscoring differences. I compare the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans because they share chronological frames and historical motivations for migration. Robin Cohen provides (2008) a useful tool to “aid” in delineating the concept of diaspora and different types of diaspora (16). Cohen suggests that by using the Weberian ‘ideal types’—he wants to simplify various diasporas by typologizing and classifying them as “victim, labor, imperial, trade and de-territorialized…not by ignoring what they share in common, but by highlighting their most important characteristics” (Ibid., 16). Then, he introduces the concept of “Weberian ideal types” (Ibid., 17). Cohen elaborates that “ideal is meant to contrast with real” because “it is normal, general, indeed expected, that real diasporas will differ from their prototypical ideal types” (Ibid.). The Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans fall into Cohen’s category of “victim diaspora”,  a phenomenon of dispersion and settlement caused by external forces or violence or unforeseen circumstances (Cohen 2008, 18). The Jewish diaspora, African diaspora, Armenian diaspora, and Palestinian diaspora are the most visible and explicit examples of victim diasporas (Ibid.). Cohen argues that the victim diasporas vary in accordance with passage of time because diasporic population may “return to their homelands, assimilate in their host lands, creolize or mobilize as a diaspora” (Ibid.). The aforementioned diasporas include experiences such as genocide, mass dispersion and abolishment of homeland as “many contemporary refugee groups are incipient victim diasporas” (Ibid.). The Chosunjok 14  and Zainichi Koreans who migrated during the Japanese Occupation, similarly, experienced in terms an involuntary dispersion as well. The Jewish diaspora is an exemplary victim diaspora model. When Dufoix compares (2012) the Jewish and African Diasporas, he focuses on Jewish history from 586 B.C.E until 1948 because this was when it was the most visible (5). The loss of Jewish sovereignty and division within the state resemble the Korean diasporic experiences during the Japanese occupation. When the Davidic Kingdom failed because of a split into the northern and southern kingdoms, Jerusalem was eventually demolished by the Assyrian king Nebuchadnezzar. Many Jews were deported to Babylon and some chose not to return because they settled there (Dufoix 2012, 6). The destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem by Romans in 70 CE is often viewed as “the start of the Jewish ‘diaspora’” (Ibid.); however, the Jews mostly left the land of Israel only after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire in the fourth century (Ibid.). Then, the Jewish diasporic communities, also known as ‘hubs’, grew in size and omnipresence in the world according to Dufoix (2012, 7). Starting from the Babylonian hubs, the very first Jewish diasporic communities expanded into Arabia, Europe, Eurasia and eventually the Americas (Ibid.). There are several categories of periods in terms of the Jewish diaspora hubs by region and I will only list the most noticeable: the Bipolar world (Jews present in the land of Israel and also present in Babylon), “the shattered world” (Jews in Babylon added with “a new hub on the Iberian Peninsula”, Sephardim—the medieval Jews in Spain, and Jews who traveled from Israel through Italy to settle in France, Italy and the Rhineland—known as Ashkenazim) and the Tri-polar world added with the Russian hub (Dufoix 2012, 6-7). The extensive dispersion of Jews was mostly caused by the anti-Semitic atmosphere around the world especially in Europe resulting from the rise of Catholicism. The Alienation and marginalization of the diasporic Jews was severest in the 15  19th and 20th centuries. European Jews represented seventy-two percent of the world Jewish population in 1850, falling to thirty-two percent by the end of World War II, mostly because of the Holocaust (Dufoix 2012, 8). Due to the size and scale of the Jewish dispersion and migration, and the much longer historical timeframe, a direct comparison to the Korean diasporas is difficult; regardless, the Korean diasporas fall under the label of victim diaspora in terms of loss of sovereignty and land resulting from an involuntary dispersion.  3.1. Japanese Occupation  Having identified the Korean experiences as being victim diaspora, I will elaborate on the historical experiences during the Japanese Occupation to further distinguish the Korean Diasporas in China and Japan as distinct from other Korean diasporas. The migrant Koreans in China and Japan were largely relocated to those two countries involuntarily during the Japanese occupation of Korea because of compelling financial reasons and pressures by Japan. The Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 is the origin of the Korean Diaspora in China and Japan. When Japan seized the sovereignty of the Chosŏn dynasty, Korea’s last ruling dynasty, in 1910, the Japanese Governor General of Korea had absolute control over the domestic and international affairs of the country. The Japanese imperial government had given the governor general of Korea the administrative, legislative and judiciary authorities (Han 2013, 23). In fact, the governor general could enforce anything with the colonial policing authority (Ibid.). Following the annexation, some Koreans moved to Japan for work or study opportunities, while others fled to Manchuria to take up the independence struggle from there. Many Koreans moved to Manchuria following annexation as a result of financial difficulties caused by the Chosŏn t’oji chosa saŏp 朝鮮土地調査事業 (Japanese Imperial Land Survey of Korea). This land survey was conducted over an eight 16  year span from 1910 to 1918, costing the Japanese government about twenty million wŏn (USD 18,000) (Nam 2013, 455). The survey was undertaken not only to procure a significant amount of tax income for the new colonial regime, but also to set the groundwork for the coercive rule of the new colonial subjects by a meticulous survey of their present conditions (Nam 2013, 455). Also, it was an attempt to eradicate the traditional landlord and tenant farmer system in Korea. Both property owners and tenants became vulnerable, encountering urgent financial difficulties. The Governor General of Korea seized property to fund the construction of administrative offices and businesses. Because of this survey, many former property owners fled to Manchuria and eventually settled in the Dongbei (northeast) region of China, commonly referred to as Manchuria. From 1916 onwards, increasing numbers of Koreans migrated to Manchuria because of the sharp increase in rice prices in Korea, coupled with the completion of the land survey in 1918 (Kim et al. 2004, 33). This migrant Korean population was a mix of destitute farmers and political refugees seeking to continue the struggle for national sovereignty and independence. However, from around 1920, Japan installed its consulates in Manchuria and dispatched agents there. Japan claimed all imperial subjects were Japanese subjects, so that migrant Koreans in Manchuria were in fact Japanese and must be protected by the Japanese consulates (Ibid., 55). In the 1940s, Japan was propagandizing the slogan, “naisen ittai” 內鮮一體 (naesŏn ilch’e in Korean), literally “Japan-Korea one body,” blending their “blood and flesh together” and consolidating Korea as part of the territory of Japan (Ryang 2000, 2). Japan even encouraged Koreans to migrate to Manchuria by granting them free crossing permissions (chayu tohang heoga) because of Japanese expansionism and agricultural failures in Korea (Kim et al. 2004, 55). In this same period some pro-Japanese Koreans also migrated to Japan. During the Japanese occupation of Korea, pro-Japanese Koreans found it easier to become naturalized in 17  Japan and even acquired Japanese citizenship, as reflected in Japan’s naisen ittai policy mentioned above. In Japan, some of these migrants succeeded in becoming property owners, and some were even entitled to noble rank. However, most of the time, Koreans who were not loyal to Japan were harshly treated and discriminated against in Japan under colonial rule, especially if there were taken as labor forces and military conscripts. For example, after the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, Koreans became “the object[s] of persecution, or extermination to be precise; at least 6,000 Koreans were killed in Tokyo and Kanagawa alone (there were 20,000 Koreans living in Tokyo and Kanagawa at the time)” (Ryang 2003, 732). Some dispute such assertions, arguing that the Japanese people were friendly to Koreans during the earthquake and that the number of Koreans’ deaths has been overly exaggerated (Masataka 2015, 90). Ryang further mentions (2003) that the Japanese government initially proclaimed that there were only two to three hundred Koreans died after the earthquake (746). As the war progressed into the 1930s, Imperial Japan needed more labor forces. Inokuchi records that in 1938, the imperial government (of Japan) recruited Koreans from the Korean peninsula, relocating them as labor forces in Japan to work in mines, heavy industry, and military construction (Inokuchi 2000, 143). Thus, between 1939 and to the end of war, the Korean population in Japan sharply increased from 779,878 to around two million (Inokuchi 2000 143; Morita 1996, 71). Therefore, the relocation of Koreans to China and Japan during the colonial period has commonalities. They either migrated out of financial hardship or were relocated due to pressure by Japanese authorities. However, Korean migrants in these two countries became involved in different industries. While most Korean migrants in China were involved in agriculture, those in Japan labored primarily in the industrial and service sectors. However, the migration of Koreans during this time was mostly involuntary as evidenced by some of 18  the projects undertaken by the Japanese colonial rule such as the land survey and naisen ittai policy.  3.2. Diasporic Communities The Chosunjok and Zainichi Korean diasporic communities manifest different structures because of the differences in size and political systems of the host countries. The Chosunjok people are mostly concentrated in Northeastern provinces of China (Jilin, Liaoning and Heilongjiang), near the border between PRC and North Korea. Anthony D. Smith identifies (1987) a defining factor of common ethnic identities: constant “association with a specific territory...ties to a particular locus or territory, which they call their ‘own’; they may well reside in that territory; or the association with it may be just a potent memory” (28). Further, an ethnie needs not be in physical possession of “its territory…[but has] a symbolic geographical center, a sacred habitat, a ‘homeland’, to which it may symbolically return, even when its members are scattered across the globe and have lost their homeland centuries ago” (Ibid., 28). Though not in their homeland, the Chosunjok communities exist in geographic proximity to Korea, an association as outlined by Smith. William Safran, moreover, asserts (1991) that the “diasporic population should continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by such a relationship” (83).  The Chosunjok’s ethnic identity and practices changed after the normalization of diplomatic ties between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea in 1992 (H. Kim 2006). Prior to normalization, the Chosunjok felt a greater affiliation with North Korea because the PRC only had diplomatic ties with North Korea, united by communist ideologies and practices. Despite having strong familial ties in North Korea, the 19  Chosunjok became financially motivated to become more closely affiliated with South Korea, and migration to South Korea increased substantially. The Korean diasporic communities in Japan, similarly, had connections with both North and South Korea. However, unlike the Chosunjok who reside in an autonomous district in China, the Zainichi Korean communities formed their ethnic organizations, largely divided between pro-North and pro-South Zainichi Koreans. After the liberation, the first Korean ethnic organization in Japan, the League of Koreans (Chaeil chosŏnin yŏnmaeng in Korean), was founded and it was meant to unite all the Koreans remaining in Japan. However, the League was in partnership with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and it inclined to support North Korea. The League is technically the antecedent of the Chongryon (pro-North Korea). However, while the League was in partnership with the JCP, it could not declare its official support to North Korea (Chin 1995, 155). After the Korean War and the division of the Koreas, the Korean diasporic organizations in Japan underwent a similar schism: Chongryon (Chaeilbon Chosŏnin Ch'ongryŏnhaphoe in Korean and Zai-Nihon Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai in Japanese) and Mindan (Chae-Ilbon Taehan Min'guk Mindan in Korean and Zai-Nihon Daikanminkoku Mindan in Japanese). After ceasing the connection with the JCP, North Korea recognized Chongryon as overseas North Korean nationals residing in Japan. In terms of size and scale, Chongryon was much larger and stronger than Mindan. North Korea financially supported Chongryon from 1957 by providing them with the education support fund, sending between one to two billion yen every year since 1957, and 3.4 billion yen in 1974 (Chin 1995, 150). The education support fund was meant to provide Chongryon school students with Korean language and history education. Chin Hee Gwan argues that North Korea was economically in a better state than South Korea before the 1980s; thus, the financial support from North Korea might have 20  compelled Zainichi Koreans to offer more support for North Korea. Though North Korea’s economic downturn came in the 1990s following the death of Kim Il Sung, the founder of North Korea, 250,000 Zainichi Koreans were still affiliated with Chongryon, more if those who acquired Japanese citizenship are included (Ibid.). The situation also changed with North Korea receiving financial support from Chongryon affiliated firms; in this manner, ties to the homeland continued for the Chongryon members. Mindan was established in 1946 at the Hibiya council (日比谷 in Japanese) with 218 representatives and 2,000 Koreans remaining in Japan. After the establishment of the South Korean government in 1948, the South Korean ambassador was sent to Japan, and Mindan became the Zainichi Korean organization that officially represented and supported South Korea. Mindan attempted to return the bodies of the patriotic martyrs who fought for independence from Japan during the occupation period (Kim, “Mindan”). Mindan went to Urawa (浦和) correctional facility to find the body of Lee Bong-chang, the Korean independence activist and returned him to South Korea. From January 1946, more independence activists were returned to South Korea by Mindan in a project named samŭisa yuhae bonghwan saŏp (삼의사유해봉환사업) (Ibid.).  However, South Korea did not consistently support Mindan. Kim Tae Gi argues (2000) that President Rhee Syng-man did not care for the Korean residents remaining in Japan (62), and he did not show up when Mindan was first established. When President Park Chung Hee took power in South Korea, there was a division in Mindan between people who supported President Park’s policies and the Yu-sin Constitution3 and people who opposed the                                            3 Yu-sin is the eight constitutional amendments in South Korea. In October 1972, President Park Chung Hee declared the state of emergency and National Assembly (legislature) was dissociated. This constitution is controversial because it was done unconstitutionally. Under the constitution, a president can appoint one-third of National Assembly members. The presidential term changed into six years and one president could be elected till one’s death.  21  President and his policies (Ji 2008, 60). The tepid South Korean support of Mindan explains why it was smaller in scale and size and less influential than Chongryon.  Such loyalties and affiliations, however, were dissimilar to those exhibited on the divided peninsula, and Ryang argues (1997) that “it is true that there are two distinct organizations of North and South Korean affiliation… [but] some pay membership fees to both, for commercial or personal reasons (5). Many Mindan parents sent their children to Chongryon affiliated schools, and some high-ranking Chongryon officials are South Korean nationals with no clear-cut distinction in terms of nationality and legal status (Ibid.). After the June 15th North-South Korea Joint Declaration (6.15 nampuk kongtong sŏnŏn) which was declared in 2000 during the North-South Korea Summit Meeting, Mindan President Kim Jae-sook and Chongryon Chairperson Han Deok-Soo officially met and talked about peaceful co-existence of the two organizations.   22  Chapter 4: Citizenship and Cultural/Linguistic Policies China and Japan, moreover, have different citizenship and cultural/linguistic policies towards their migrant Korean populations and this chapter will explain how these two nations’ differing citizenship and cultural/linguistic policies impacted the Chosunjok and Zainichi politically. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in an attempt to unify the country as a multi-ethnic state with a majority of Han Chinese, decided to recognize its ethnic minorities and give them full rights as Chinese citizens, even granting them some privileges that most Han Chinese did not enjoy. This was in contrast to the Kuomintang’s attitude (Nationalist); they refused to grant ethnic minorities China citizenship, lands, rights and privileges. Thus, in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) the Chosunjok population did not struggle in regards to their legal status as the Zainichi Koreans in Japan did.4 However, China’s ethnic minority policy is not without controversy, considering the conflicts between the Chinese government and some of its ethnic minorities, such as the Tibetans, Inner Mongolians and the Islamic Uyghur population of Xinjiang. Post-war Japan’s citizenship policy towards its alien residents, on the other hand, has been mostly restricting and assimilating. According to Barabantseva and Sutherland (2011), citizenship has a close tie with nation-statehood and “it can be considered as the legal expression of national belonging” (2). They add that citizenship is a “badge of loyalty to the nation-state as exemplified in ceremonies involving oath-taking or the practice of stripping political exiles of their citizenship” (ibid.), with states that allow people to hold dual (or multiple) citizenship plays a role “in reconfiguring traditional understandings of sovereignty, nation and citizenship” (ibid.). Post-war China and Japan                                            4 Following the end of Japanese colonial rule, resident Koreans in Japan long struggled with their legal standing in Japan. A detailed examination of Japan and China’s citizenship policies will be provided later in this chapter. 23  perceived citizenship as a means of securing territories and statehood. The PRC granted the Chosunjok citizenship because the Chosunjok played a role in fighting against imperial Japan and supported the PRC against the Chinese nationalists. Japan did not grant Zainichi Koreans citizenship easily because Japan perceived them either as a security threat or aliens.  4.1 Ethnic Minority Policy of China  The legal status of China’s Chosunjok population is an indicator of how the Chinese government has treated its ethnic minorities more generously than Japan. The Chosunjok have been legally able to enjoy linguistic and administrative rights, in contrast to Zainichi Koreans. The Chosunjok people are mostly located in the Dongbei (Northeast) region, comprised of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces just above the Korean peninsula. The Chinese government decided to label Koreans in China as Chosunjok because of their national origin5. In terms of ethnic identity, the Chosunjok in China mostly acknowledge themselves as Koreans ethnically and Chinese legally. Furthermore, because the Chosunjok’s citizen identification cards indicate ethnicity, their ethnic minority status and identity in China is further consolidated. It is necessary to examine China’s ethnic minority policy in greater detail, notably regarding its citizenship policy towards the Chosunjok. Ethnic minorities in China are termed shaoshu minzu 少数民族. Minzu 民族 can be directly translated as “nationality,” but perhaps accurately as “ethnic group.” China is comprised of 56 ethnic groups, and thus can be considered a multi-ethnic state. The Chinese communist government has acknowledged the                                            5 Chosŏn was the name of Korea during the rule of the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910), which ceased to exist in 1910 with Japan’s annexation. Since Koreans moved to China during the Japanese occupation period, China called them Chosunjok (Cháoxiǎnzú in Chinese)  24  autonomy of its ethnic minorities for the sake of a unified state (B. Kim 2004, 47). After Japan’s defeat in World War II, the civil war in China continued between the Communists and the Nationalists. With the ultimate victory of the Communists, the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1948. During the Chinese civil war, Koreans in China colluded with the Chinese communists as they had been promised regional autonomy, national citizenship, and land ownership rights. Ethnic minorities that are officially recognized by China are granted the right to Chinese citizenship and self-administration (Choi 2002, 302-3). The Chinese communists technically began to acknowledge the autonomy of its ethnic minorities from 1931, including the Mongolians and the Chosunjok. This initiative was part of a strategic scheme by the Chinese communists in their struggle with the Nationalists to win over minority ethnic groups by promising them the same rights as the majority of Han Chinese and to establish a unified multi-ethnic state (B. Kim 2004, 49). In 1941, the principle of jurisdictional autonomy for minority groups was proclaimed by the Chinese Communist Party, acknowledging the religious, cultural, and linguistic rights of China’s ethnic minorities (Kim et al. 2004; B. Kim 2004, 49). There were several other amendments and annexes to the principle of ethnic minority rights before the concept was institutionally consolidated after 1948. Thus, the CCP acknowledged the rights of its ethnic minorities from quite early on, especially the Chosunjok. The Yanbian Cháoxiǎnzú Zizhizhou (Yŏnbyŏn Chosŏnjok Chach’iju in Korean, or Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in English) is a representative case of a Chinese ethnic minority’s self-governing prefecture. The Chosunjok living in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture mostly retained their Korean language, but as they acquired citizenship status and settled in the prefecture which led them to be marginalized geographically and politically.  25  4.2. Zainichi Koreans after Japanese Occupation Zainichi Koreans, in contrast, were assimilated or excluded as alien residents. Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, the Koreans in Japan could choose to either leave the country or remain, with the majority being repatriated to Korea. Some chose not return to Korea because of the dispute between the emerging regimes of North and South Korea, and some chose to return to Japan after being repatriated some chose to remain in Japan believing Korea’s ideological dispute would end soon. It is around this time that Koreans’ legal status issue arose and the Japanese government did not legally grant its Korean residents Japanese citizenship. Zainichi Koreans became stateless after the war, with Japan revoking citizenship from its previous colonial subjects. Following the end of SCAP’s rule, the Japanese government created a difficult process for its Korean residents to become naturalized Japanese citizens based upon the principle of jus sanguinis (citizenship by descent) which they had officially adopted in 1952. Ryang (2000) describes the situation for the Korean residents of Japan in detail: …the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952 guaranteed Korean independence from Japan, but the treaty and Japanese post-independence policy simultaneously deprived Korean residents in Japan of Japanese citizenship...with this, Koreans lost the rights of political participation as well as occupational and educational opportunities which were dependent on Japanese citizenship, including the licensing of certain businesses, national health insurance, and social security. (Ryang 2000, 4) The Japanese post-colonial policy violated the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees in consideration of Zainichi Koreans as refugee population. However, the international legal framework was not clearly introduced until 1979, when the United Nations 26  High Commissioner for Refugees introduced the Ratification of the International Covenants on Human rights and the United Nations Refugee Convention (Ryang 2000, 6). Zainichi Koreans in Japan had to struggle with their legal standing and rights if they wanted to naturalize because they had to culturally assimilate. Many Zainichi Koreans have adopted Japanese styled names for the purposes of employment, marriage, and integration into mainstream Japanese society when they naturalized. The criteria for naturalization are designed not to allow resident aliens living in Japan to naturalize if they are unwilling to be fully assimilated. Ryang mentions that “the members of the Communist Party and the pro-North Korea Chongryon were not allowed to naturalize” (Ryang 2000, 26). This is because naturalization is not granted to “a person who cannot be considered fully assimilated into Japanese society regarding lifestyle and in other aspects, or a person who lives in special residential area such as a Korean neighborhood” (Kim 1990, 222; Ryang 2000, 26). Moreover, as a partial fulfillment of a naturalization requirement, those wishing to naturalize were “expected to adopt names suitable for Japanese [citizens]” (Ryang 2000, 26). This was a vestige of the Sōshi kaimei (“name change”) practice of the occupation period, a policy implemented by the Japanese colonial government in an effort to integrate its new colonial subjects in Korea and Taiwan into the Japanese family registry system by having them change the pronunciation of their names to the Japanese style (Ryang 2000, 27). Further, the Korean family name does not change throughout a person’s life. Korean women do not change their surnames after marriage but maintain their original family names. However, during the Japanese Occupation, the colonial government wanted to change this practice to accord with western practices wherein the last name changes in the cases of marriage, divorce, adoption and dissolution of adoption (Koo 2005, 36). Thus, this policy of name change persisted among the Zainichi Koreans after colonial rule had ended due to security concerns 27  of the Japanese government. Since the relationship between Japan and the two Koreas was not normalized until 1965 following the end of World War II (and still have not been officially established with North Korea), they saw Zainichi Koreans as potential security threats (Ryang 2000, 27). Only Zainichi South Koreans acquired special permanent residency after the normalization of the diplomatic tie between Japan and South Korea. The legal status issue ameliorated over time, and in the 1990s, Japan eventually granted permanent residency to its resident Koreans who were affiliated with North Korea instead of labeling them as alien residents.  The opportunities for Zainichi Koreans to enter and settle in Japanese society were extremely limited and difficult even after liberation. The parents of many resident Koreans opted to send their children to Chongryon schools, North Korean based and funded ethnic educational institutions in Japan, instead of sending them to Japanese public schools. Ryang describes (2000) Zainichi Koreans were largely excluded “from voting entitlements, restrictions on overseas travel, statelessness, and occupational and educational discriminations” (5). However, Zainichi Korean organizations attempted to prevent Zainichi Koreans from attaining employment in Japanese firms. According to Michael Strausz (2006),  in 1970, a Zainichi Korean named Pak Chong-suk passed the Hitachi company entrance exam, and was offered a job, but withdrew their offer when they found out he was a Korean citizen. [However,] neither the Mindan nor Chongryon supported Pak because ‘employment in a major Japanese corporation was merely a step toward assimilation into Japanese society (649). According to Chapman (2004), a generational change in attitude occurred with the second and third generation Zainichi Koreans who were born in Japan, and that they considered themselves as long-term residents, neither completely Korean nor Japanese 28  (31). Some of the Zainichi Koreans chose to naturalize or become permanent residents, but the Zainichi Korean organizations prevented them from acquiring Japanese citizenship (Chung 2009). Japan’s assimilative citizenship policies deprived the Zainichi of citizenship rights, excluding them from Japanese domestic affairs; however, they chose to remain as alien residents, making their presence more visible and distinct in Japanese civil society.  4.3. Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture   The CCP’s cultural and linguistic policies guarantee the Chosunjok’s rights, but only superficially, for they remain marginalized and isolated, relegated to the periphery, socially and geographically. The Chosunjok population is one of the major ethnic groups in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, though there are sixteen other ethnic minority groups residing in the region (B. Kim 2004, 53). The Yanbian prefecture has eight leaders, divided into primary and secondary leaders, with six of them somewhat similar to cabinet ministers at the executive level and the primary leader represents the prefecture in the National People’s Congress as well. The prefecture has its own political and administrative institutions to manage roads, cities, and parks, as well as commercial and other administrative rights and duties. Within the prefecture, Korean is the official and primary language, and legally Korean takes precedence over Chinese in all official signage. The Yanbian region Chosunjok’s dialect has retained much of the original accent and intonation of the Korean language and they are able to effectively communicate with North/South Koreans. The Chosunjok, according to Hyejin Kim, originate from three separate regions in Korea; the Chosunjok from Hamgyŏng province in Korea (currently in North Korea) mostly live in Jilin 29  province in China, those from Phyŏng'an province mostly live in Liaoning, and those from Jeolla and Gyeongsang province (currently in South Korea) live in Heilongjiang (H. Kim 2006, 55; Go, 1993: 20). Only Yanbian University in Yanji and Minzu University in Beijing have well-established undergraduate programs in Korean language and literature, with most of the faculties in the College of Korean Studies at Yanbian University being Chosunjok who have completed their degrees in one of these two institutions. Furthermore, the Chosunjok can choose to send their children either to Korean or Chinese schools, where they are taught in Korean; the students are not taught Korean history except how the Koreans fought with the Chinese communists against the Japanese colonialists. The history curriculum largely focuses on the Korean independence movement in Manchuria because history education in particular is a constant focus of surveillance and control by the Chinese communist system. Kim Cheongeun argues (2015) that the underlying reason the Chosunjok have been able to maintain their language is China’s shaoshu minzu (ethnic minority) policy resulting from the 1988 Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefectural Chosun Language Regulation (Yŏnbyŏn Chosŏnjok Chach’iju Chosŏn ŏmun saŭp chorye) (5). This regulation was set up in order to protect the fundamental interests of the Chosunjok and to unite them as a common ethnic group (Ibid.). Another initiative to preserve and promote the Korean language is discernible in the official Chosun Language Day celebrated within the prefecture, a holiday established on March 25, 2014 at the ninth session of the Politburo Standing Committee of the fourteenth session of China’s National People’s Congress (Ibid., 8). Chosun Language Day is not only meant to institutionally secure the position of Korean language within the Chosunjok community, but also to encourage young Chosunjok students to maintain and take pride in their culture. According to Kim Soon Hee, 80.3 percent of middle school students in Jilin Province use the Korean language primarily in school, and 90.08 percent of these students 30  also speak Korean at home (Jin 2016, 322-4). Thus, the Chosunjok maintain their linguistic practices by various means made possible by their own initiatives as well as the ethnic minority policy of the Chinese government. The Chosunjok, however, do not place great importance on the Chinese government’s efforts to maintain Korean culture and language, and as such, these efforts must be considered propaganda tools for China’s shaoshu minzu policy. Moreover, despite acquiring citizenship rights, the Chosunjok have been effectively assimilated while at the same time isolated by the Chinese government.    4.4. Korean Ethnic Schools in Japan In terms of linguistic and cultural practices, Japan’s policy towards its ethnic Korean population is largely assimilative and indifferent, much like its citizenship policy. The resident Koreans’ efforts to retain their culture have been largely unrecognized; however, despite such attitude, the Zainichi sent their children to Korean ethnic schools in an attempt to preserve their culture. Such educational institutions were not officially accredited by the Japanese government after liberation, and the Zainichi faced the dilemma of either sending their kids to unaccredited Korean ethnic schools or Japanese public schools. Because Korean schools are not recognized by the Japanese government, students face difficulties in regards to university admissions and employment opportunities. Korean ethnic schools in Japan opened after the end of colonial rule, and were intended to educate Korean students in anticipation of a return to the Korean homeland. As Hiromitsu Inokuchi writes (2000), “the purpose of these schools was primarily to restore Korean culture and history and to develop Korean language proficiency” (147). In the immediate post-war years, the SCAP and the Japanese government shared a negative attitude towards the Korean ethnic schools out of concern that they might sow further social conflict and division. The SCAP especially viewed 31  the League of Koreans, also known as Chaeil chosŏnin yŏnmaeng (‘the league’/Choren/Choryon), as affiliated with the JCP and North Korea, and thus, a potential threat to America’s new containment policy regarding communism (Ibid., 149). These Korean ethnic schools were collectively funded not only by pupils’ parents, but also by community members (Ibid., 148). The League of Koreans was able to found 541 elementary schools, seven junior high schools and twenty-two adolescent schools and eight high schools in 1947 (Ibid., 149). Inokuchi provides the background for Korean ethnic schools when he describes the period between 1945 and 1952 when the Allied powers (the US) controlled Japan and managed the restructuring of the social and education systems of Japan. Initially, the Japanese government was negligent about the Korean ethnic schools around the country. Inokuchi claims that as long as Koreans self-financed their ethnic schools, the Japanese government and local governments were not largely concerned with this issue (Ibid. 147). Moreover, the Japanese government initially did not care for Korean ethnic schools because they expected that the Korean population would leave entirely in time. The SCAP, however, over time, became concerned with Korean ethnic schools, believing they might cause social dissent. First, the SCAP had not decided whether the Korean population remaining in Japan should be treated as Korean nationals or considered Japanese nationals; moreover, it tried to send as many Koreans as possible back to their homeland. After liberation, Koreans remaining in Japan were addressed as “liberated nationals” or “enemy nationals” and expected to return to their newly independent country (Ibid., 145). The SCAP eventually decided to allow the Koreans remaining in Japan to repatriate to their homeland. If they were involuntarily relocated to Japan as forced labor or military conscripts, they were prioritized for repatriation and by 1946, approximately 1.3 million Koreans remaining in Japan already returned to the 32  peninsula (Inokuchi 2000, 145; Morita 1955). Of the 640,000 registered Koreans in Japan, “79 percent expressed their wish to return to Korea” (Ibid., 146), but by the end of 1946, only around 83,000 returned to the peninsula and some of the previously repatriated Koreans re-entered Japan because “they could not sustain themselves in Korea” (Inokuchi 2000, 146; Morita 1955) because of the 1946 economic failure. The SCAP, moreover, only allowed Koreans seeking to repatriate to hold 1,000 yen, the “equivalent to twenty packs of cigarettes which would barely support a family for one week in Korea” (Morris-Suzuki 2004, 11). Also, in some cases, Korean families in Japan chose to only send one member of the family to repatriate “on the understanding that he or she would come back to collect the rest of the family if conditions in Korea seemed safe” (Ibid.). Japan’s response was to label Korean residents in Japan as Japanese nationals, forcing them to contend with the Japanese education system. In 1947, Korean ethnic schools had to be registered and approved by the prefectural educational boards via screening of educational curriculum and school staff (Inokuchi 2000, 149). If Korean ethnic schools were unwilling to follow the registration procedure, they had to accept closure or eviction orders. Many Korean ethnic schools, with the support of the League, refused to register because they had to significantly reduce Korean language instruction in the official curriculum (Ibid., 150). Protests against this order arose when the police and city government officials decided to evict Korean ethnic schools in Kobe (Ibid., 151), leading to the Kobe government withdrawing the eviction order of Korean ethnic schools. The US military commander of Kobe immediately declared a state of emergency and many Koreans and supporters of Korean ethnic schools were captured and suppressed (Ibid., 151-2). Similar incident occurred in Osaka and many Koreans were injured because of violence resulting from Koreans refusing to accept the eviction and closure orders. Thirty thousand Koreans gathered in front of the Osaka capital and the governor kept insisting 33  sending Korean children to Japanese schools because it was the directive of the SCAP (Ibid., 152). Despite these protests, many Korean ethnic schools were integrated into the Japanese education system. Those that remained open were not officially recognized by the SCAP (Ibid., 154).  After Japan gained independence in 1952, Japan no longer treated Koreans remaining in Japan as Japanese nationals and treated them as alien residents because they chose to be jus sanguinis (citizenship by descent). Korean children were no longer forced to integrate into the Japanese educational system (Ibid., 154). Parents could choose to send their children to Japanese schools, but they had to provide written consent stating that they would not complain about the educational system and curriculum that their children would receive (Ibid., 154). The constant efforts of rebuilding and reorganizing Korean ethnic schools continued after Chongryon was able to rebuild ethnic schools. Japan’s Ministry of Education accredited their institutions, yet they were only treated as “miscellaneous schools”, deprived of any public financial assistance (Ibid., 154-5).   34  Chapter 5: Cultural Revolution and Fingerprinting Refusal Movement I assert that the differences of the hosting countries’ citizenship and cultural/linguistic policies will either strengthen or weaken the political influence of diasporic populations. I initially agree with Chung’s argument (2009) that the Zainichi Koreans’ political power strengthened because they refused to integrate into Japan’s assimilative citizenship and cultural linguistic policies. However, the Chosunjok’s political influence in China weakened because they acquired citizenship rights and remained insulated both geographically and politically. The Tibetans and Uighur populations of Xinjiang remain threats to the CCP as contrast to the Chosunjok. In this chapter, I will examine the experiences that exemplify either the weakening or the strengthening of the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans’ political influences in China and Japan, respectively.  5.1. The Chosunjok during Cultural Revolution  China’s ethnic minority policy experienced setbacks during the Cultural Revolution; with a lack of primary sources, however, a comprehensive understanding of what the Chosunjok were forced to endure during these challenging times is difficult. Many scholars conclude, however, ethnic minority rights were suppressed during this time (H. Kim 2006; Cha 2012; Shin 2016). Shin Dong Jo goes on to state (2016) that the Chosunjok’s political mobilization efforts and their status as a legitimate ethnic minority group weakened significantly because of the Cultural Revolution (143). In the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture approximately four thousand Chosunjok people were executed, five thousand were injured, and many were arrested (H. Kim 2006, 56; Lee 1990, 101-102). Chosunjok students who studied in Beijing and other areas of China, being indoctrinated to sympathize with the 35  ideas of the Cultural Revolution, joined the Hóng Wèi Bīng (Red Guards). While it was possible for Ju Deok Hae, General Party Secretary for the Yanbian Prefecture, to prevent Han Chinese students from entering the prefecture, it was impossible for him to stop the Chosunjok students coming from entering (Shin 2016, 144). The order to the Chosunjok students to enter the Yanbian Prefecture originated from Mao Yuanxin, a leading figure of the Cultural Revolution particularly in Yanbian Prefecture, an active supporter of the Gang of Four and Mao Zedong’s nephew (Ibid.). The Chosunjok intellectuals and scholars who attempted to resist were captured and killed. The goals of the Cultural Revolution were to eradicate the old ideology, culture, tradition and habit; the Red Guards, including Chosunjok students, shut down many Chosunjok schools and commercial businesses such as P'yŏng-yang Inn, Ham-hŭng Restaurant, Yong-chŏng Restaurant and other businesses with Korean nomenclatures because they were perceived to symbolize Korean nationalist sentiments (Park 2013, 119). China’s Minority nation policy (shaoshu minzu) was implemented by the CCP as a peaceful and sensible means to prevent any social dissent among ethnic minorities in China or any act against Han Chinese, a means to appease 55 ethnic minorities; because of internal conflicts within the CCP, however, the policy was not fully observed during the Cultural Revolution. This experience indicates how the political presence and influence of the Chosunjok severely weakened because they remained insulated in geographical and political peripherals. The citizenship rights and self-administration are perceived to guarantee their political presence intact; however, they only functioned superficially. Also, the Chosunjok were only satisfied being allowed to form the autonomous region and never refused to integrate and formed their opinions like some other ethnic minorities of China and Zainichi Koreans.  36  5.2 Zainichi Koreans and Fingerprinting Refusal Movement Because the Zainichi Koreans refused to assimilate, opposed Japanese assimilative policies, and maintained linguistic/cultural practices after liberation, they were able to organize social movements that led to the reform of unfair Japanese legislation, such as the fingerprinting refusal movement in Japan organized largely by pro-South Korea Zainichi Koreans. This movement eventually led to the repeal of the fingerprint registration requirement for alien foreign residents in Japan, demonstrating the Zainichi Koreans’ political influence. Even though Koreans who were affiliated with South Korea were given special permanent resident status after Japan normalized the diplomatic tie with South Korea, the legal status of those who define themselves as North Koreans was relatively precarious until recently. Since many Korean alien residents did not naturalize, their fingerprints needed to be registered for any potential criminal acts or security threats. The fingerprint registration for foreign residents was organized by Japan’s Bureau of Immigration and Emigration in 1951, and remained in effect until 1993 (Strausz 2006 641). The bureau “asked the Japanese Diet for permission to fingerprint foreign resident in order to prevent fraud…and the Diet obliged this request by passing the Foreigner Registration Law (Strausz 2006, 641; Tanaka 1995, 81-2). Unless the Zainichi organized protests, the Japanese government remained apathetic towards Zainichi Koreans. The Chosunjok who were initially guaranteed rights, fared worse than the Zainichi, supporting the assertion that the acquisition of citizenship and contingent rights are always politically empowering to diasporic populations.   37  Chapter 6: Conclusion Referencing a comparative analytical model is useful in comparing similarities and differences between the Chosunjok and Zainichi, and Vartiainen posits (2002) that there are four factors that make comparative analysis credible and relevant (361). The first is “it is important to consider how units for evaluation are selected” (Ibid., 362). Vartiainen refers to Wiess when he states that scholars should decide “whether organizations should be evaluated as entities or merely on the basis of the programs they carry out” (cited by Vartiainen 2002, 362). The Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans in this case are viewed as entities for comparison in this paper because I have viewed the broader spectrum of their migration and settlement by examining their historical backgrounds and settlement after liberation. Regarding the level of comparison, Vartiainen mentions that “the scope of the evaluation and the principles by means of which the evaluation can be accomplished have to be decided” (Ibid.). The level of comparison in this paper involves different systems as I have explored China’s and Japan’s citizenship and cultural/linguistic policies towards their diasporic populations. Furthermore, the conceptual comprehension is an important criterion for a comparative analysis because the concepts should be “defined clearly so that different parties will interpret and understand the concepts involved in the same way” (Ibid 365). The concepts such as diaspora, citizenship and political status are long debated concepts among many of the aforementioned scholars. I have compared the Chosunjok and Zainichi based on the principle of diasporic communities with a particular focus on the migration and settlement in the respective host countries. In addition, the relationship between the acquisition of citizenship and diasporic populations is another conceptual framework to be used in the comparison. Finally, Vartiainen mentions the analysis of the findings of a comparative evaluation when he states that “comparative evaluation produces comparable information most efficiently when the units are analyzed are 38  as similar as possible; the assumption is based on the idea that it is easier to form reliable evaluation criteria when evaluating similar units” (Ibid., 366). The Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans are comparable units of analysis due to the congruent chronological factors and motivations of migration and settlement. Thus, Vartiainen’s criteria for comparison are useful to methodologically compare the Chosunjok and Zainichi, and I applied them to clarify concepts, scopes and units of comparative analysis. Moreover, Emmerson refers (2014) to Acharya when he states that scholars need to pay “attention to the ways in which differences are constituted and maintained not only endogenously within Southeast Asia (a particular region) but in light of the ‘borrowing and learning’ that continues to characterize the region’s relations with the wider world” (544). I attempted to broaden the scope of this paper beyond the Northeast Asian region, applying a comparative global perspective by including a discussion of diasporic Koreans around the world and Jewish diaspora.  Thus, I have distinguished the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans from other Korean diasporic populations that migrated voluntarily. Then I established the case to compare the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans based upon China’s and Japan’s different citizenship and cultural/linguistic policies and their impact on these diasporic communities. I conclude this paper by arguing the Chosunjok’s political status in China was largely diminished, having been integrated into the Chinese system by acquiring citizenship rights that the CCP initially offered after the war. However, the Zainichi Koreans’ political status in Japan remained quite intact because they remained non-citizens, choosing to remain a distinct diasporic community. The Chosunjok’s weakened political influence is exemplified by their experiences during Cultural Revolution, and their efforts of preserving their distinctive cultural and linguistic practices have merely been limited within the intellectual society and were inconsequential. On the other hand, the Zainichi Koreans’ political status increased due to their non-citizen 39  status, as evidenced by refusing to accept the Japanese educational system and refusing to comply with the alien residents fingerprinting registration requirements. However, the primary difficulty in comparing these two cases is that they are from two different countries, and it can be argued that comparing the migrant experiences in two systematically different countries is inappropriate. However, the comparative analysis of the diasporic Koreans in China and Japan, as distinguished from other Korean diasporic communities, is valuable because of their shared colonial experiences, forming the impetus for migration. While comparing cases of voluntary migration is possible, comparing the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans more challenging. In addition, it has been difficult to compare the two cases in terms of host countries’ policies because the policies cannot be compared side by side. Only the discourse of those policies can be compared by reflecting on the experiences of the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans. In terms of analyzing diasporic experiences, this study is lacking in qualitative research in regard to surveys and interviews with primary sources. Regardless, further comparative research will fill the lacuna that exists when comparing the effects of Japanese colonialism upon the Chosunjok and Zainichi Koreans.   40  References Acharya, Amitav. 2014. "Remaking Southeast Asian Studies: Doubt, Desire and the  Promise of Comparisons." Pacific Affairs 87, no. 3: 463-83.  doi:10.5509/2014873463.  Barabantseva, Elana, and Claire Sutherland. 2011. "Diaspora and  Citizenship." Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 17, no. 1: 1-13.  Cha, Hee-Jeong. 2012. "The Cultural Revolution in China and Korean Chinese's  Corresponding Actions ." Journal of Korean Literature Association(한국문학논총) 60, no. 4: 257-83.  Chapman, David. 2004. "The third way and beyond: Zainichi Korean identity and  the politics of belonging." Japanese Studies 24, no. 1: 29-44. doi:10.1080/10371390410001684697.  Cheong, Young Hun. 2001. "Crisis of the Consciousness of Homogeneous Korean."  Journal of Academy of Korean Studies (한국학중앙연구) 24, no. 1: 185-203. Accessed November 11, 2016.   Chin, Hee Gwan. 1995. “The Change in Relationship between North Korea and  Chongryon (연구논문: 북한과 조총련의 관계변화에 관한 연구).” North Korea  Studies (북한학연구) 25, no.0: 149-182.  Choi, Bong-ryong. December 2002. “The History and Current Situation of Yanbian  Korean Autonomous Prefecture and the Future (연변조선족자치주의 역사와 현황 및 그 전망).” Chosun Dankun Studies (고조선단군학) 7: 301-337.  Choi, Woo-kil. 2011. "Inter-Korean Relations and Korean Chinese: Focused on  the Consciousness Survey of Korean-Chinese Young People Staying in Korea  (남북관계와 중국 조선족 사회 - 한국체류 조선족 청년에 대한 의식조사를  중심으로)." Journal of Diaspora Studies (디아스포라연구) 5, no. 1: 21-35.  Chung, Erin Aeran. 2000. “Exercising Citizenship: Koreans Living in Japan”.  Asian Perspective 24, no. 5 Special Issue on Dysfunctional Japan: at Home and  in the World JSTOR.: 159-78. Accessed April 23, 2015.    41  Chung, Erin Aeran. 2009. "The Politics of Contingent Citizenship." In Diaspora  Without Homeland, John Lie and Sonia Ryang ed. 147-67. 1st ed. Vol. 8. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2009.  Cohen, Robin. 2010. Global Diasporas: an Introduction. Abingdon: Routledge.   Conner, Walker. 1986. ‘The Impact of Homelands upon Diasporas.’ In Modern  Diasporas in international politics, ed. Gabriel, Sheffer. 16-45. London: Croom Helm.  "Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees." UNHCR News. Accessed  April 23, 2015.  Dufoix, Stéphane. 2012. Diasporas. Berkeley: University of California Press.  Emmerson, Donald K. 2014. "The Spectrum of Comparisons: A discussion." Pacific  Affairs 87, no. 3: 539-56. doi:10.5509/2014873539.  Goh, Gwang-myung. 2008. “Lives of Jaeil Jeju People and Social Networks  (재일제주인의 삶과 사회적 네트워크)”. Journal of Modern Japanese Studies  (일본근대학연구), 22, no.0: 187-210.  Han, Seung-yeon. September 2013. “Bureaucracy of Government General of Chosun:  Focusing on its Characteristics as Emergency Governing Body (조선총독부 관료제 연구: 비상통치기구적 성격을 중심으로).” Journal of Korean Association for Public Administration (한국행정학보). 47 no.3: 23-48.  Hiroshi Tanaka. 1995. Zainichi Gaikokujin—Hô No Kabe, Kokoro No Dobu [Foreigners in  Japan—the Walls of Law, the Gutter of the Heart]. Iwanami Shinsho.   Huh, Myung-chul. 2012. "Identity Discourse of Chosun People in China (조선족  정체성 담론)." Chung-ang University Journal of History 36: 451-70. Accessed  March 15, 2015.  Inokuchi, Hiromatsu. 2000. "Korean ethnic schools in occupied Japan, 1945-52.  In Koreans in Japan, Sonia Ryang ed. 140-56. New York, NY: Routeledge.  Ji, Choongnam. 2008. “Networks of Social Organization of Korean-Japanese: Korean  Residents Union in Japan, General Association of Korean Residents and the  Associations in Japan (재일한인 사회단체 네트워크 연구: 민단, 조총련, 재일한인회를  42  중심으로)” The Journal of Korean Association of Area Studies (세계지역연구논총) 26.  no.1 57-93.  Jin, Shunji. 2016. "Eco-linguistic Factor Analysis on Language Use of Korean  Middle School Students in China (중국 조선족 중학교 학생의 언어 사용에 대한 생태 언어학적 요인 분석)." The Journal of Association of Korean Education 107, no. 0: 317-44. Accessed March 3, 2017.  Kim, Byung-Kook. 2004. "China's Minority Nation Autonomous Administrative Rules  and Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture (중국의 민족자치지방제도와 연변조선족자치주정부)." Journal of Local Administration (지방행정) 53, no. 603: 47-55.  Kim. Chang-hwoo. 2010. “4.3 Incident and Jaeil Jeju People” (4,3과 재일 제주인).  Journal of Jeju Studies (제주학회 학술발표논문집): 33-47.  Kim Cheongeun. 2015. "Current Status of Korean Language in Yanbian." Korean  Language in China.3: 5-8. 99829  Kim, In-duk. "Mindan (재일본대한민국민단 在日本大韓民國民團)." Encyclopedia of  Korean Culture. Accessed April 10, 2017.  Kim, Jong-Gon. 2014. "Zainichi and Zainichi Koreans Identity and Future Direction  (재일 그리고 조선인으로서의 정체성과 가치지향성)." Journal of Humanities for  Unification (통일인문학연구단회보) 59: 31-57.  Kim, Tae Gi. 2000. Cooperation and Conflict between South Korean Government and  Mindan (한국정부와 민단의 협력과 갈등관계). Journal of Asia Pacific Regional  Studies (아시아태평양지역연구) 3, no.1: 60-97.  Koo, Kwang-mo. December 2005. “The Name-Changing Program and the Response of  Koreans under the Japanese Colonial Government (창씨개명정책과 조선인의 대응).” Journal of Korean Association of International Studies (국제정치논총). 43  45 no. 4: 21-53.   Lee, Chaejin. 1990. "The Political Participation of Koreans in China." In Koreans in  China ed. Dae-Sook Suh and Edward J. Shultz. 93-114.  Masataka, Tanaka. 2015. “Problems and Images for the Future of the Korean Genocide  Following the Great Kanto Earthquake: Focusing on Research in Japan  (관동대지진 조선인 학살 연구의 과제와 전망 – 일본에서의 연구를 중심으로).”  Journal of Northeast Asian History Foundation (동북아역사논총) 48: 89-118.  Accessed March 6, 2017. 83533  Moon, Kyung-soo. 2001. “4.3 Incident and Jaeil Koreans (4.3사건과 재일 한국인).”  Journal of 4.3 and History (4.3 과 역사) 1: 7-16.   Moon Kyung-soo. 2008. Jeju Island 4.3 Incident (제주 4.3사건) P'yŏng-pŏm-sa.  Morris‐Suzuki, Tessa. 2004. "An act prejudicial to the occupation forces: migration  controls and Korean residents in post‐surrender Japan." Japanese Studies 24,  no. 1: 5-28. doi:10.1080/10371390410001684688.  Morita, Yoshio. 1995. Zainichi Chōsenjin shogū no suii to genjō (Changes in and the  Current Situation of the Treatment of Koreans in Japan). Tokyo: Hōmu  Kenshūjo.  Nam, Ki-hyun. 2013. “The Diversity of Korean Cadastral Survey Project Progress  Method, Comparison with Changwon County and Masan Boo Oeseo-meyon  (조선토지조사사업 진행방식의 다양성, 창원군과 마산부 비교).” Dae Dong  Cultural Studies (대동문화연구) 82, no.0: 453-91. Accessed April 10th 2017. iss2002&key=3145694   Noh, Jooeun. 2013. "The ‘Absence’ of the Great Kantō Earthquake Korean Massacres  in Modern East Asian History: A Historiography on the 90th Anniversary of the Earthquake (동아시아 근대사의 ‘공백’: 관동대지진 시기 조선인 학살 연구)." Journal of Critical Review of History (역사비평) 104: 209-42. Accessed March 12, 2015.  44  "Overseas Koreans." Korean Statistical Information Service. February 4, 2016.  Park, Jong Chol. 2015. “Sino-North Korean relations and Korean-Chinese minorities of Yanbian during the early stage of the Cultural Revolution (문화대혁명 초기 북중관계와 연변 조선족)”. The Journal of National Studies (민족연구) 63: 102-135.  Ryang, Sonia. 2000. Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin. London:  Routledge.  Ryang, Sonia. 1997. North Koreans in Japan: language, ideology, and identity.  Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press.   Ryang, Sonia. 2003. "The Great Kanto Earthquake and the Massacre of Koreans in  1923: Notes on Japan's Modern National Sovereignty." Anthropological  Quarterly 76, no. 4: 731-48. doi:10.1353/anq.2003.0061.  Safran, William. 1991. "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and  Return." Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 1, no. 1: 83-99. doi:10.1353/dsp.1991.0004.   Shin, Dong Jo. 2016. “Factional Violence and Ethnic Relations in a Korean Borderland:  Mao Yuanxin’s Cultural Revolution in Yanbian, 1966-1968. Modern China Studies 23, no.2: 141-162.  Smith, Anthony Douglas. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Basil  Blackwell.   Strausz, Michael. 2006. "Minorities and Protest in Japan: The Politics of the  Fingerprinting Refusal Movement." Pacific Affairs 79, no. 4: 641-56.  doi:10.5509/2006794641.  Vartiainen, Pirkko. 2002. "On the Principles of Comparative Evaluation." Evaluation 8,  no.3: 359-71. doi:10.1177/135638902401462484.  Yun, In-jin. "Etymology and History of Diaspora." Yeong-dae-sin-mun (영대신문).  Accessed February 15, 2017. 


Citation Scheme:


Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics



Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            async >
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:


Related Items