ACTIVISTS ACROSS ISSUES: FORUM MULTIPLYING AND THE NEW CLIMATE CHANGE ACTIVISM by Jen Iris Allan B.A., The University of Northern British Columbia, 2004 M.A., The University of Guelph, 2007 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (POLITICAL SCIENCE) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) April 2017 © Jen Iris Allan, 2017 ii Abstract To a growing class of climate change activists, climate change is not only an environmental issue – it is a labour, gender, justice, indigenous rights, and faith (to name a few) issue. All starting at roughly the same time, an influx of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) made social claims on an environmental issue and changed the politics of climate governance. Their participation to advance these social claims is costly: staff retrained; information researched, analyzed, and disseminated; and relationship building undertaken. All these costs served a new frame, linking the NGOs’ social issue to climate change. This sustained mobilization of a network of NGOs in a regime that is not their own is called forum multiplying. NGOs are surprisingly mobile, as environmentalists campaign on free trade and development issues, and unions and children’s advocates work in the context of human rights. Drawing on 72 interviews, seven social network analyses, and three years of participant observation, this research investigates the politics of forum multiplying as NGOs seek recognition within a new area of global governance. NGO networks engage in forum multiplying to contribute to solutions, recruit new allies to their cause, and avoid becoming mired in stalemates that characterize other areas of global governance. Motivation is insufficient to mobilize a network toward a collective end. I posit that two mechanisms help explain why some NGO networks undertake forum multiplying strategies and others do not. First, the ability of NGOs to capitalize on the authority that they hold in their traditional forum, and to bring that authority into the new forum helps them secure recognition for their claims. Second, NGOs’ identification of strategic entry points in the rules and norms of the new regime facilitates forum multiplying. The rules and norms of a regime can provide a discursive “hook” for the NGOs’ claims that their issue is linked to the issues of their targeted regime, showing that they belong. iii Forum multiplying pollinates new ideas into old regimes, potentially bringing the “all hands on deck” approach necessary to mobilize a sufficient response to global climate change. iv Preface I am solely responsible for the identification and design of the research program, the implementation of that program, and the analysis of the data. Errors are mine alone. Three quotes conducted in this research were used to support an argument in an article titled “Exploring the Framing Power of NGOs in Global Climate Politics” with Jennifer Hadden, which is forthcoming in Environmental Politics. This research was conducted in accordance with the TriCouncil Ethics Board’s standards. The research was approved by the UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board under certificate number H14-00026. v Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ii Preface ........................................................................................................................................... iv Table of Contents ...........................................................................................................................v List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ ix List of Figures .................................................................................................................................x List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................... xi Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... xii Dedication ................................................................................................................................... xiv Chapter 1: Activists across Issues ................................................................................................1 1.1 Contributions................................................................................................................... 8 1.2 Approach of the Dissertation ........................................................................................ 13 1.2.1 Why Climate? ............................................................................................................... 14 1.2.2 Why NGO Networks? .................................................................................................. 19 1.2.3 Key Definitions ............................................................................................................ 20 1.2.4 Methodological Approach ............................................................................................ 26 1.3 Chapter Overview ......................................................................................................... 29 Chapter 2: Forum Multiplying to New Regimes .......................................................................31 2.1 Forum Multiplying ........................................................................................................ 32 2.2 NGO Forum Multiplying Framework ........................................................................... 36 2.2.1 Motivation .................................................................................................................... 38 2.2.2 Mobilization ................................................................................................................. 40 vi 126.96.36.199 Carrying Authority to the Target Regime ......................................................... 41 188.8.131.52 Identifying Entry Points with the Target Regime’s Institutions ....................... 46 2.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 57 Chapter 3: Frames and Institutions in the Climate Change Regime ......................................59 3.1 Frames and Institutions, 1992-2005 .............................................................................. 60 3.1.1 Dominant Frames and Institutions ............................................................................... 63 3.1.2 Relationship with Observers ........................................................................................ 65 3.2 Frames and Institutions, 2006-2009 .............................................................................. 67 3.2.1 Dominant Frames and Institutions ............................................................................... 70 3.2.2 Relationship with Observers ........................................................................................ 72 3.3 Frames and Institutions, 2010-2015 .............................................................................. 74 3.3.1 Dominant Frames and Institutions ............................................................................... 76 3.3.2 Relationship with Observers ........................................................................................ 77 3.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 78 Chapter 4: Labour-Climate Network ........................................................................................79 4.1 Labour-Climate Network .............................................................................................. 81 4.2 Motivations ................................................................................................................... 85 4.3 Mobilization in the Climate Change Regime................................................................ 92 4.3.1 Carrying Authority into the Climate Change Regime ................................................ 100 184.108.40.206 Constructing the Discursive Frame ................................................................. 101 220.127.116.11 Articulators ..................................................................................................... 107 4.3.2 Leveraging Climate Institutions ................................................................................. 118 4.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 125 vii Chapter 5: Gender-Climate Network ......................................................................................127 5.1 Gender-Climate Network ............................................................................................ 128 5.2 Motivations ................................................................................................................. 135 5.3 Mobilization ................................................................................................................ 140 5.3.1 Carrying Authority into the Climate Regime ............................................................. 154 18.104.22.168 Constructing the Discursive Frame ................................................................. 154 22.214.171.124 Articulators ..................................................................................................... 161 5.3.2 Leveraging Climate Institutions ................................................................................. 177 5.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 185 Chapter 6: The Climate Justice Movement .............................................................................188 6.1 Climate Justice Network ............................................................................................. 192 6.2 Motivations ................................................................................................................. 197 6.3 Mobilization ................................................................................................................ 201 6.3.1 Carrying Authority to the Climate Regime ................................................................ 211 126.96.36.199 Constructing the Discursive Frame ................................................................. 212 188.8.131.52 Articulators ..................................................................................................... 216 6.3.2 Leveraging Climate Institutions ................................................................................. 225 6.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 235 Chapter 7: Health-Climate and Human Rights Networks .....................................................238 7.1 Human Rights-Climate and Health-Climate Networks .............................................. 240 7.2 Motivations ................................................................................................................. 244 7.3 Mobilization ................................................................................................................ 253 7.3.1 Carrying Authority into the Climate Change Regime ................................................ 257 viii 184.108.40.206 Constructing the Discursive Frame ................................................................. 257 220.127.116.11 Articulators ..................................................................................................... 262 7.3.2 Leveraging Climate Institutions ................................................................................. 269 7.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 276 Chapter 8: Socializing Climate Change ...................................................................................279 Bibliography ...............................................................................................................................296 Appendix A Multimethod Approach to Studying NGO Forum Multiplying ............................. 314 A.1 Capturing the NGO Networks .................................................................................... 315 A.2 Exploring Forum Multiplying Processes: Case Study Approach ............................... 324 Appendix B Interview respondents ............................................................................................. 328 ix List of Tables Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics of the labour-climate network ................................................... 83 Table 5-1: Descriptive statistics for the gender-climate network ............................................... 132 Table 6-1: Descriptive statistics on the climate justice network ................................................. 192 Table 7-1: Descriptive statistics on the health-climate network ................................................. 242 Table A-1: Starting points ........................................................................................................... 320 Table A-2: Data sources for coalitions for each network ........................................................... 322 Table A-3: Representativeness of the interview sample ............................................................. 325 x List of Figures Figure 1-1: NGO Participation in the UNFCCC........................................................................... 15 Figure 2-1: NGO Forum Multiplying Framework ........................................................................ 37 Figure 4-1: Labour-climate network, 2005-2008 .......................................................................... 82 Figure 4-2: Labour-climate network, 2009-2015 .......................................................................... 83 Figure 4-3: Labour unions’ participation in the UNFCCC ........................................................... 93 Figure 5-1: Gender-climate network, 2005-2008 ....................................................................... 130 Figure 5-2: Gender-climate network, 2009-2015 ....................................................................... 131 Figure 5-3: Gender NGOs’ participation in the UNFCCC ......................................................... 141 Figure 6-1 Climate justice network, 2005-2008 ......................................................................... 193 Figure 6-2 Climate justice network, 2009-2015 ......................................................................... 194 Figure 6-3: Alterglobalization movement’s participation in the UNFCCC................................ 202 Figure 7-1: Health-climate network, 2009-2015 ........................................................................ 242 Figure 7-2: Human rights NGOs’ participation in the UNFCCC ............................................... 254 Figure 7-3: Health NGOs’ participation in the UNFCCC .......................................................... 255 xi List of Abbreviations CJN! Climate Justice Now! COP Conference of the Parties GCHA Global Climate and Health Alliance GGCA Global Gender and Climate Alliance ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions ILO International Labour Organization IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ITUC International Trade Union Confederation NGO Non-governmental organization REDD+ Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation in developing countries; plus the role of conservation, sustainable forest management, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNEP United Nations Environment Programme WHO World Health Organization WTO World Trade Organization xii Acknowledgements During the process of devising and delivering this dissertation, I accrued several debts. First and foremost, I am grateful for the intellectual guidance necessary to complete this project and to navigate academic life provided by my supervisor, Dr. Peter Dauvergne, and committee members, Dr. Lisa Sundstrom and Dr. Katharina Coleman. Peter’s passion for environmental politics and critical thought – the need to speak truth to power – inspires me to ask challenging questions about the state of our environment and the politics and political economy shaping it. Lisa and Katia brought enormous dedication; the level of their collaboration and quality of their insights deepened the analytical insights of this work, and potentially, its application beyond environmental politics. I am so privileged to be part of communities replete with remarkable talented and generous people. My ENB community members never fail to amaze me with the depth of their expertise and the open and adventuresome nature of their spirit. I sincerely thank Alice Bisiaux, Beate Antonich, Elena Kosolapova, Mari Luomi, Rishikesh Ram Bhandry, Anna Schulz, Kati Kuvolesi, Virginia Wiseman, and Ash Appleton for intensive, weeks-long discussions on climate policy. I learned more during these discussions with these incredible experts than any book could teach. To Jessica Templeton, Melanie Ashton, Tallash Kantai, and Pia Kohler, I owe a similar debt of gratitude as they brought me into the chemicals and wastes community, sharing their passion and expertise regarding detoxing our world. I can’t think of better people to stay up all night with waiting for plenary to start. Extra special thanks are due to Kiara Worth, Nancy Williams and Annelies Van Gaalen for their wisdom and for the adventures we’ve had, and hopefully the ones to come. xiii My colleagues at UBC are incredible. To Sara Elder, Deb Farias, Edana Beauvais, Daniel Westlake and others, I am thankful for their comradery and support. Conrad King added much laughter, love, and adventure to the process. Yana Gorokhovskaia was unfaltering in her ability to extend empathy even while fighting her own dissertation demons. Among her many emotional and intellectual generosities, Andrea Nuesser even gave up her apartment; the early data analysis owes much to the internet-free, bucolic surroundings of Wuppertal. Jon Gamu was my first friend in the department, as is as brilliant as his sangria is potent. Justin Alger was always an ally in encouraging non-work conversation, but a great colleague for scholarly banter too. Dave Moscrop kindly offered his couch and ear when my life became a little too nomadic; the word ‘aegis’ appears in the theory chapter largely due to Dave. Kate Neville is a reason why I studied at UBC, a favour for which, perhaps surprisingly, I hold no ill will. Doctor Kate and Adventure Kate are, simply, two of the most brilliant minds and generous spirits on the planet. My family is an enormous gathering of enthusiastic cheerleaders. My brother Danny got on a plane on short notice in support while I churned some papers. My sister Shelly shows her love by helping and taking on tasks. She took on many tasks and helped immensely. My parents never failed to ask about my adventures and always assured me that, yes, my “paper” would be finished and would be great. It’s an incredible gift to have such a deep well of conviction and belief at hand in times of doubt. This research was supported by several grants for which I am grateful, including a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council grant. xiv Dedication Thanks, Dad 1 Chapter 1: Activists across Issues Copenhagen’s streets filled with activists representing the environment, human rights, labour, indigenous rights, faith, gender, youth, global justice and many more marching to demand action on climate change in 2009. As the push for climate action continued, joint letters signed by labour, environmental, development, and faith groups (but not often human rights organizations) urged action. Veterans’ associations and “queers for climate” joined climate marches in 2014 in New York, the latter explaining that “Our communities faced near extinction throughout the early HIV/AIDS crisis. Today we are all facing the grave threat of an unstable climate” (Lowder 2014). Rallying a diverse cross section of non-government organizations (NGOs) and social movements on a single issue is not unique to climate change. Indeed, for reasons discussed in this chapter, climate change is representative of other regimes that experienced an influx of unlikely NGOs. Ten years before the Copenhagen climate march, a similarly diverse group from “turtles and teamsters,” staged protests during the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings in Seattle. NGOs were largely absent during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, but later NGOs advocating health, development and environmental issues starting lobbying the WTO to minimize adverse effects on developing countries (Newell 2006, p. 117). Environmental NGOs launched campaigns to green development aid. Campaigns against development banks in the 1980s aimed to reduce the number of large-scale, environmentally-destructive projects supported by the World Bank and other multilateral development banks (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2005). Environmental groups are not the only transnational actors adept at crossing into various areas of global governance. Women’s rights became human rights after a concerted campaign by 2 women’s rights NGOs (Joachim 2004). Working within the Vienna and Beijing conferences on Women, women’s advocates successfully overcame opposition and reframed violence against women using a human rights discourse and methodology (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Brown Thompson 2002). Religious organizations, trade unions and groups working on behalf of refugees, children and youth, and the environment have been actively promoting human rights, sometimes to the benefit of those they represent (Gaer 1995). NGOs are mobile, adeptly moving across the traditional boundaries and issues of global governance. Recently, the mobility of NGOs has been evident in the context of global climate change and global efforts to address the climate crisis. Here too, an influx of new, non-environmental actors diversified the types and interests of those engaged in climate change regime. As international organizations and civil society actors that traditionally do not work on climate change related issues continue to jump on the proverbial “climate bandwagon,” there is a proliferation of ways to view the climate crisis. Such climate bandwagoning occurs as actors “discursively re-fram[e] issues in a way that foregrounds the climate benefits of the original/source issue,” and, as Jinnah (2011, p.3-4) explains, “involves the purposeful expansion of regime mission to include new climate-oriented goals that linking agents believe will further their own agendas, regardless of whether such linkages detract from the common good.” Others have sought to explain the motivations of international organizations (Hall 2015; Jinnah 2011), and some have documented the fragmentation of the civil society presence (Muñoz Cabre, 2011; Orr 2007; Unmüßig 2011). For civil society, however, the motivations are left unexplored despite the considerable influx of religious rights groups, indigenous peoples’ advocates, development NGOs, alterglobalization activists and many others to the UNFCCC. 3 NGOs, often networked together, are surprisingly mobile global governance actors. They move across the issues of their traditional areas of global governance, seeking to reframe old issues in new ways. The NGOs do not abandon their traditional causes, rather they multiply their efforts and their presence to advance their causes in new areas. This is forum multiplying strategy, or, the sustained mobilization of a group of NGOs in a new forum and regime, enabled by a discursive frame linking the NGO network’s traditional issue to the issue governed by another forum, and is evident in global governance, but unexplored. It potentially holds important implications for global governance. For some, diversity among civil society is welcome news, for others, a plethora of interests signals an impending impasse. Greater numbers of actors and multiple opinions can slow negotiations and can potentially prevent new decisions or agreements. NGOs often can add new issues to the agenda of international negotiations (Betsill and Corell 2008), meaning states have new issues to negotiate, perhaps detracting from the “core” work at hand. NGOs can also reframe states’ interests (Betsill 2002), facilitate bargaining (Arts 1998; Lisowski 2005), provide research (Chasek 2001) and mobilize public opinion. A fragmented civil society voice can pull states in different, and possibly even contradictory, directions. For others, greater diversity of opinions can breed better, more legitimate agreements (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2016; Bernauer and Gampfer 2013). Wider engagement of non-state actors can confer legitimacy on the outcome, or on the process used to reach the outcome (Nasiritousi, Hjerpe and Bäckstrand 2015). Further, engaging a more diverse range of stakeholders can bring the “all hands on deck” approach that global crises such as climate change require if a solution is to be found (Wapner 2011; Hale 2015). As Hale (2015) argues, international organizations can cultivate relationships with stakeholders, such as the private 4 sector and subnational governments, to expand the scope of actors engaging in innovation and implementation. Yet, studying international organizations’ openness to transnational actors across issues over 60 years, Tallberg et al. (2013) note that the effort of international organizations is likely in part an effort to strategically heighten their legitimacy of the organization; often, as Bäckstrand (2012) reminds, legitimacy often arises in global environmental politics by states engaged in formal decision making processes. Bond (2012) however, focuses on social movements engaging in climate change activism and calls on this “movement below” to overcome the paralysis of the global climate change talks. It seems an open debate on how and whether more or more varied non-state actors can help create better global governance outcomes. In part, it is a matter of which non-state actors one seeks to focus on, given that the term can mean everything from a multinational corporation to a social movement or city. As a greater array of non-state actors become involved, groups that never considered themselves part of a given global problem could find themselves implicated in its solutions. Their role in these solutions – and degree to which their role is encouraged by those already working on solutions – varies. By exploring a range of civil society actors, particularly social movement and NGOs representing different issues, I engage in this debate, considering the extent to which these actors are recognized and included in the community of climate change actors. There are several implications of forum multiplying strategies, for both the diversification of civil society’s voice and for global governance. This research seeks to contribute to our understanding of why and how this diversification occurs. The diversification of activists due to their migration across areas of global governance is part of the struggle for power against states. NGOs and social movements are migratory actors, 5 traversing areas of global governance to lobby for their core areas of interest in several different contexts. International regimes, often viewed as the “rules, norms, principles, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue area” (Krasner 1983, 4) are inward looking, concerned with governing a given issue. International negotiations are focal points for contention among state, business and civil society actors (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2005; Tarrow 2001). Such negotiations become important political sites where actors communicate their ideas and assumptions about global governance, and where shared ideas about standards of governance are constructed (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2016). These negotiations usually occur within one organization, a forum of the regime. By traversing the boundaries of global governance, NGOs potentially pollinate new issues into old regimes, as they engage in forum multiplying to a new, “target” regime. By forum multiplying, connected groups of NGOs – NGO networks – can continue to challenge the power and authority of the state and influence a range of governance outcomes from trade to human rights and development to climate change. Forum multiplying is not a simple, cost-free exercise. It involves more than showing up at an international negotiation if NGOs want to have any amount of political leverage. And, it seems influence is their aim; in a survey of several types of civil society actors at the WTO and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Hanegraaff (2015) found that the primary motivation was to influence the negotiations. NGOs within networks expend the time and resources to participate in a new area of global governance with the intent to influence the politics of that forum. For these newcomers, influence is a lofty and expensive goal. It requires acquiring both expertise in an issue and recognition as a member of the group of governors engaged in the 6 collective effort (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010). When in their traditional regime, NGOs carry both the recognition and expertise to advance their issues in interstate politics. For example, environmental NGOs are legitimate and long-standing actors in global environmental politics, claiming to represent a distinct public interest, directly applicable to the issues under negotiation. To support this claim, environmental NGOs can mobilize many supporters in their activism, placing these organizations at the center of world civic politics (Wapner 1996). Beyond activism, environmental NGOs leverage their expertise by fulfilling many roles, including implementation, standard setting, and research. Such expertise makes these NGOs more influential (Arts 1998). Expertise is a valuable resource to states lacking information (Chasek 2001; Raustaiia 1997), particularly in climate change negotiations which are characterized by a “respectable” politics between states and NGOs (Gough and Shackley 2001). Environmental NGOs are key private actors that can shape and share expectations of rules, norms, principles and decision-making procedures around environmental issues. When undertaking forum multiplying, NGOs and social movements lack both a recognized claim to belonging in their targeted regime, and the expertise necessary to shape states’ preferences. These necessary resources can be costly to acquire. To gain both recognition and expertise, the NGOs must climb a steep learning curve. They need to undertake research and information dissemination activities to establish the link between their traditional issue and the issue governed by their chosen forum. Staff may require retraining or reassigning from other duties to gain expertise in the intersections between the issues. International travel is a must. Procedurally, the NGO must learn how to participate, which encompasses challenges from securing accreditation to the new forum to learning the norms of interaction among delegates. NGO networks must convince those within the target forum that they belong, drawing on 7 evidence and acting as if they belong as part of the club of actors in the regime. Otherwise, NGO networks risk being labelled a “fringe group” pushing unrelated issues and wasting delegates’ time. Forum multiplying is a costly gambit, which not all NGOs undertake and some NGO groups who attempt it are indeed marginalized to the fringes among actors in the target regime. Only some NGOs undertake forum multiplying, and among those, fewer succeed, leaving a patchwork of NGO participation across regimes. Given the costs involved in forum multiplying and its uneven patterns I explore two motivating questions: 1. Why do some NGO networks expend resources to participate in negotiations on issues where they lack expertise and experience? 2. Why do some NGO networks successfully enact forum multiplying strategies and others do not? The questions are in some ways chronological. As the forum multiplying framework advanced in chapter 2 explains, I argue there are two steps involved in an NGOs’ forum multiplying strategies. First, the NGO network must have motivations to engage in a new forum, particularly given the associated costs. At this stage, several NGO networks may filter out. For others, motivation alone is insufficient. The second stage is mobilization within a forum in the target regime. Here, I argue the ability of the NGO network to carry its authority into the new regime and to align with the rules and norms of the forum are central to a successful strategy of forum multiplying. NGO networks that are able to use their authority to, as Avant, Finnemore, and Sell (2010, 6) explain, “confer deference in others” will be able to disseminate their claim to belonging and frame linking their issue with that of the target regime. Some NGOs will agree with and adopt the rules and norms governing the issue and observers’ participation. These 8 NGOs will be viewed as “one of us,” a member of the governing club, and are more likely to be heard and accepted. Others, perhaps with more critical views, often struggle. Often, the ability of NGOs to influence interstate negotiations garners scholarly attention. Questions of where and when NGOs seek to participate are theoretically interesting because we lack an explanation of NGOs’ migratory patterns across global governance forums. This research helps fill this gap. 1.1 Contributions This research offers three contributions to our current understanding of NGO politics and the politics characterizing sets of overlapping rules and norms of global governance, known as regime complexes (Orsini, Morin and Young 2013; Raustiala and Victor 2004). First, this research documents and explores forum multiplying, an evident, yet untheorized strategy of international NGOs and social movements. In so doing, this research contributes to our understanding of NGOs’ participation in global governance, whereas scholarship tends to ask questions about their influence. There are numerous studies showing NGO influence on global environmental outcomes, for issues including climate change (Betsill 2002, 2008; Ciplet 2014; Downie 2014; Lisowski 2005), biosafety (Arts and Mack 2003; Burgiel 2008), forests (Humphreys 2004, 2008), whaling (Andresen and Skodvin 2008; Sakaguchi 2013), and desertification (Corell 2008). Outside the environmental sphere, human rights NGOs have proven adept at using tactics such as shaming as a means to influence state behaviour (Murdie and Peksen 2014; Murdie and Urpelainen 2014). While much of the literature has aptly identified reasons why and how non-state actors influence global governance, there is little scholarship on the sources of their agency and authority (Nasiritousi, Hjerpe, and Linnér 2014) despite the broad trend that global governance 9 institutions have become more open to non-state actors (Tallberg et al 2013). Similarly, there is little work on NGOs’ participation. Muñoz Cabre (2011), Orr (2007) and Unmüßig (2011) discuss the participation of various NGOs in the UNFCCC, yet do not ask or explore why some NGO networks representing different issues took up the climate cause. Böhmelt, Koubi, and Bernauer (2014) explore the involvement of NGOs on national delegations, noting a contagion effect, that states central in the network of climate governors are more likely to take note of, and replicate, other states’ invitations to civil society. As noted above, others have observed the participation of NGOs representing issues other than the one governed by a forum, often as a side note. This literature asking why NGOs participate in a given area of global governance, sometimes still puts states or international organizations at the center of the analysis, or opted to document the trends, a useful precursor to ask why these trends exist. This is a notable gap because participation is often a necessary precursor for influence. Absent NGOs cannot influence interstate politics. Who participates can provide first clues about who may influence global governance and the potential issue linkages that may emerge. New non-state actors can introduce new ideas and strategies to influence global governance. Yet, we lack an account of why the roster of participants expands or contracts, or why issues cross-fertilize among global governance forums. Who participates is important to understand who influences global governance. The second contribution is to add non-state actors to the emerging literature on regime complexes. Regime complexes are, broadly, inter-related regimes with overlapping mandates and membership (Raustiala and Victor 2004). Lying between a single regime and world order writ large, regime complexes are composed of elemental regimes that are autonomous, legally equal, and interdependent. Regime complexes exist on a continuum, lying between regimes 10 nested into a hierarchical arrangement, and, at the opposite pole, unrelated regimes that do not interact (Keohane and Victor 2011). Thus far, our understanding of how international actors move between international regimes is limited to accounts of states’ strategies such as forum shopping (Busch 2007; Raustiala and Victor 2004) or forum shifting (Helfer 2004), as influenced by various attributes of the organization (Coleman 2013) in the “chessboard politics” of regime complexes (Alter and Meunier 2009). When the regime complex literature acknowledges non-state actors, they are often considered to be cooperative actors, either linking regimes, or otherwise seeking to facilitate cooperation in pursuit of their normative agendas or institutional mandates (Gómez-Mera 2015; Orsini 2013). In terms of non-state actors’ participation across regimes, there are conflicting expectations. Multiplying the number of organizations could increase the number of opportunities for a non-state actor to influence policy (Alter and Meunier 2009). Yet, more organizations also multiply the costs of participation, disadvantaging weaker actors such as non-state actors (Drezner 2009). Neglecting non-state actors overlooks important global governors. As Avant, Finnemore, and Sell (2010) argue, non-state actors possess authority that can induce deference and therefore confer power. Among the types of authority, expert-based and principled-based are most relevant for non-state actors (Stroup and Wong forthcoming). The expertise of NGOs can be particularly useful for states providing a niche that NGOs can leverage for influence (Arts 1998; Raustiala 1997). Their capacity to implement and partner for new solutions to global problems can lead to international organizations and other actors actively courting non-state actors’ involvement (Hale 2015; Tallberg et al 2013; Wapner 2011). Given the authorities and influence that NGOs hold in global governance outcomes, a state-centric regime complexity is insufficient. 11 Ignoring those that hold power in global governance means that regime complexity theory underestimates some sources of production, reproduction, or change in regime complexes. Some argue that only states’ interests and satisfaction with governance may drive change (Colgan, Keohane, and de Graaf 2011). Yet, through creating and diffusing norms, non-state actors can use their authority to create ties between regimes and in turn build or expand regime complexes. In short, if we expect that non-state actors can influence a given regime, we should anticipate that NGOs and social movements could be a route of regime complex expansion. NGOs’ participation across regimes is as valid a route of inquiry as the forum shopping and shifting patterns of states. The third contribution is to contextualize our view of NGO networks by treating them as heterogeneous groups of actors with unequal power relations. There are two tendencies prevalent in scholarship on NGOs and transnational advocacy networks. First, scholars tend to consider NGOs in their natural milieu, that is, the tendency is to study how environmental NGOs influence environmental politics and how human rights organizations influence in human rights governance. For example, in Betsill and Corell’s (2008) seminal work on NGO influence in environmental politics, all the case studies limit themselves to the influence of environmental NGOs, save one which considers the role of business groups. Business groups tend to be the foil for exploring environmental NGOs’ rhetorical strategies (Sell and Prakash 2004) and influence (Lund 2013). Yet there are non-state actors representing a range of issues. By considering the civil society actors most closely connected to the governance of the regime’s issue, the literature misses the potential ideas and influence of NGOs from other regimes. We further lack an 12 understanding of how the interplay between these networks, each striving to advance their own issues, may influence global governance outcomes. Scholarship tends to view NGO groups and transnational advocacy networks as initially proposed by Keck and Sikkink (1998), a dense network of reciprocal relationships among actors (Carpenter 2014; Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery 2009). Yet, a growing body of work shows that some actors within the network matter more than others. Carpenter (2007, 2010, 2014) argues that actors with many connections to other actors in the network can set, vet, or block the networks’ agenda. The number of ties confers advantages to some, as these “gatekeepers” can use their structural advantages to shape the advocacy agenda of the entire group (Carpenter 2007, 2014). Further, participation in multiple forums could help entrench the centrality of the gatekeeper within the network (Orsini 2013). This research instead embraces the heterogeneity of civil society actors engaged in a single issue area and regime and joins the small, but growing literature exploring inter-NGO politics. I add two nuances to this literature. I include both brokers and gatekeepers in my analysis to show the different abilities each has available to facilitate NGO participation in a new forum. I also demonstrate gatekeepers’ limits. They do not always use their connections to disseminate norms among the network regarding what issues ought to be addressed, as Carpenter (2007, 2010, 2014) suggests. Instead, they often engage in negotiations with others to develop a frame capable of entering a new regime. Gatekeepers also face limits when they seek to use their authority in other forums. In a sense, they seek to become gateopeners rather than gatekeepers. Those within the target regime may be reticent to admit entry. For their participation across forums, the politics among NGOs can matter in important ways. 13 The motivation and mobilization stages of the NGO forum multiplying framework provide insights to each of these contributions. NGO networks multiply into different regimes to advance their traditional causes, often, for normative or political reasons rather than material motives. Like states, participation in multiple regimes can serve NGOs’ interests to keep their cause alive. Their participation across regimes can also be borne of normative desire to contribute to solutions in various challenges facing humankind. In this effort, some actors are better able to open the proverbial gates of the new regime, as gatekeepers and brokers provide key material and ideational resources to the network, and attempt to extend their authority into the new regime. 1.2 Approach of the Dissertation I adopt an agent-centered approach to studying NGO forum multiplying strategies and bring together literatures from various areas of international relations and comparative politics. Often, scholars privilege the structures of global governance over the agents that design and build linkages among these structures (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010; Dellas, Pattberg and Betsill 2011; Selin and VanDeveer 2003). Global governors, or, actors that exercise power to influence international policy, are often neglected despite their role in creating issues, setting agendas, and enacting and revising outcomes (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010, 1). Here, I reverse the narrative, placing NGOs and the connections they form, use, and renegotiate at the heart of the investigation. Leveraging the insights possible by comparing across social movements (see O’Neill 2012) facilitates the contributions noted above, to help us understand how dynamics among NGOs can influence the mobility across regimes, and perhaps in turn, global governance outcomes. Here, I explain some of the key choices made in conducting research using this agent-centered approach, fundamental definitions, and implications of these 14 choices and definitions for the findings. I then briefly outline the approach to conducting the research. 1.2.1 Why Climate? Here, I use the climate change regime as the target regime of choice for several NGO networks. While there are many other documented cases of NGO networks engaging across regimes and forums within regimes, the climate change regime offers an ideal ground to explore NGO networks’ forum multiplying behaviour. First, many NGO networks engaged in the UNFCCC in recent history took on the costly act of forum multiplying. The participation of these non-climate and non-environmental NGOs started at the same time and sustained themselves over time. Muñoz Cabre (2011) documents NGOs’ “climate bandwagoning,” identifying 22 categories of NGOs accredited, that is, seeking permission to attend, since the first Conference of the Parties (COP 1) in 1995. My original database of NGO participation in the UNFCCC – which NGOs attend – further underlines the diversification of civil society engaged in climate change.1 As Figure 1 below shows, NGOs representing social issues rarely participated in the climate change negotiations before 2007. From then on, their numbers grew, nearly rivalling environmental NGOs in the lead up to the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015. 1 The database catalogues every NGO that participated in every Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC between COP 1 in 1995 and COP 21 in 2015. To determine the type of NGO, I reviewed the vision and mission statements for the organization. Environmental NGOs here are those devoted to environmental, sustainable development and forest/agriculture issues. Social NGOs are those working on indigenous rights, youth, justice, human rights, development, gender, labour, health, and religion. Few organizations cross the broad categories of environment, economic, social, climate, or other. Think tanks and universities are included in the database and excluded from Figure 1. 15 Figure 1-1: NGO Participation in the UNFCCC Whereas Muñoz Cabre (2011) argues that human rights NGOs “woke up late” to climate change, my data show that they hit the snooze button. While some human rights NGOs sought accreditation, they barely participated at all. Only Amnesty International attended two meetings, in 2009 and 2015 (see Chapter 7). Instead, gender, labour, indigenous rights, youth, and many other NGOs broadly representing “social” issues attended the UNFCCC in increasing numbers. The diversification of civil society involved in climate change as shown in Figure 1-1 provides an opportune case to explore forum multiplying strategies as a range of NGOs target the climate change regime, and the UNFCCC forum within it. I suspect that the climate change regime is in some ways a tough test for forum multiplying because the regime was in a state of stagnation at the time of NGO networks’ migration. These social NGO networks could not have participated to reap the benefits of a 0501001502002503001995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015OrganizationsEnvironmental Climate Economic Social Other16 successful regime. When the NGO network members expended scarce resources to participate, many others deemed the climate change regime as likely to fail. Grounded in the UNFCCC, the climate regime was in state of “arrested development” (Young 2010) or even “collapse” (Victor 2001, 2011), before the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015. Yet, in recent years, starting roughly 2007, NGOs working on social issues undertook activities commonly associated with influencing negotiation processes. The test is also made more difficult because there were nearly no connections between climate change and social issues at the time. Neither the Framework Convention nor the Kyoto Protocol are equipped to address social issues. Neither even contains a single mention of people, communities, populations, women, gender, or indigenous peoples. All these social NGOs had to undertake considerable efforts to link their issues to climate change, with little institutional affiliation or substantive connection already present in the UNFCCC. Scientific understanding also cannot explain the connections between disparate issues, and the involvement of NGOs across areas of global governance. For example, the Lancet (Costello et al 2009; Watts et al 2015) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (IPCC 2007a, 2007b; IPCC 2014), identified numerous ways in which climate change will threaten public health, through changing geographic patterns of vector-borne disease, worsening cardiovascular health, and rising mortality from heat-related events. According to my original database of NGO participation in every climate change conference, few health organizations participated. Similarly, only one refugee NGO and no human rights NGOs routinely participated in the UNFCCC conference, despite links between climate change and migration and human rights. A natural, or scientifically grounded affiliation between the network’s issue and climate change cannot explain the influx of NGO networks. Indeed, our 17 understanding of the interconnections between climate change and social justice may be the result of the efforts of social NGOs and social movements since the mid-2000s. What is now seen as a natural connection between climate change and social issues perhaps began as a carefully-constructed discursive frame designed to enter the climate change regime. The diversification of civil society within the climate change regime offers the opportunity to explore the dynamics within and among networks as they encounter the same set of institutions and actors. The cases2 of this research are NGO networks traditionally devoted to social issues, but engaged in climate change activism. They became participants in the climate change regime late in the regime’s development (or, in the null cases, chose or failed to become participants at a later stage). These cases lack previous experience in and knowledge of climate change issues and policy. Instead, they devoted their efforts to advance other causes, many acting to secure progress with or for marginalized groups in society. In essence, I bounce the actors in the network off the same set of rules and norms and examine the differing strategies and effects.3 This strategy enables close understanding of the approaches adopted by networks and their effects on forum multiplying efforts. It is a strong approach to examine the agency of networks and interplay with the opportunities and constraints posed by institutions. 2 This follows George and Bennet’s (2005) definition of a case as “an instance of a class of events.” Events mean an instance or phenomenon of scientific interest (George and Bennet 2005, 17-18). Or, as Gerring (2014) notes, case studies, are intensive studies of a unit with the aim of understanding similar units. It is a unit broadly understood. In other words, a case need not be a country or a regime; it can be an NGO network engaging in forum multiplying. 3 The opposite strategy would be to examine the same network across different regimes. This implicitly is the strategy adopted by Betsill and Corell (2008) in their study of NGO influence. They study environmental NGOs in the climate change, desertification, forest, whaling, and biosafety regimes. Their work is strong on the conditions under which NGOs can achieve influence and when regimes are amenable, but has less certain claims on the nature of the network that is able to influence a regime. 18 Controlling for several aspects of the regime can limit the inferences that this study can make, which I believe to be navigable. One may argue that there is something unique about climate change causing NGO networks to multiply into the regime. For example, networks multiplied to climate change because it became high on the international agenda.4 Relatedly, one could argue that there are other pull factors attracting networks, such as entering a new round of negotiations. In 2007, delegates in the climate change regime agreed to the agenda for the negotiations for a new legally-binding treaty. Given the agenda setting stage can be particularly amenable to NGO influence (Betsill and Corell 2008), NGOs may have sought out this opportunity. Yet some networks were not motivated or, if they were motivated they proved unable to participate in the climate change regime. Given this variation, such pull factors focusing on the regime are insufficient to explain the NGO forum multiplying patterns. While my research cannot directly dispute regime-centric claims because it lacks a comparative assessment of networks’ forum multiplying efforts to other regimes, it offers considerable insights into the full range of NGO forum multiplying behaviour. As previously stated, there are many cases of NGO forum multiplying, meaning that the phenomenon is not unique to climate change. My research can lend insights into why the relationships among actors within networks can influence the decision and ability of NGO networks to multiply within other regimes. 4 As one indication, Google trends reports that there were far more news headlines about climate change during 2007-2009 than ever before. The relative interest about “climate change” at the time of the various conferences (generally late November or early December) was in: 2004, 26; 2005, 28; 2006, 32; 2007, 52; 2008, 40; 2009, 86; 2010, 35; 2012, 27; 2013, 21; 2014, 26; and 2015, 32. The numbers represent the level of search interest relative to the highest point on the chart (labelled as 100) for a given time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity, and 50 means that the term is half as popular. For this search, the peak popularity of the term was in September 2014 when media coverage spiked around the UN Climate Summit and People’s Climate March, the largest climate march in history with over 2646 solidarity events in 162 countries (see http://2014.peoplesclimate.org/). 19 1.2.2 Why NGO Networks? Much of the scholarship considers transnational advocacy networks (for a few examples of this scholarship, see Carpenter 2007; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 2003). Here I focus on the NGOs in these networks. Transnational advocacy networks include a wide range of actors, such as NGOs, international organizations and local activists. These actors will have varying incentives for participation and resources to migrate to another regime. International organizations have greater resources and access to various forums, but are constrained by the mandates given by states. Individual activists may struggle to attend international meetings, perhaps prioritizing those that are geographically proximate. Here, I refer to NGO networks as groups of NGOs that communicate among one another as part of a collective effort to advance their core issues. The ties among actors form networks, constituting a layer between individual agency and macro-level social structures and processes (Diani and McAdam 2003, 284). The links among actors could take many forms, from personal relationships to information flows, which for Keck and Sikkink (1998, 27) are the “most valuable currency” of advocacy networks. For Price (2003), networks are an imagined community of actors all viewing themselves as part of a shared cause. They constitute structural building blocks for political entrepreneurship or activism by focusing on the power conferred by relationships among actors, rather than the attributes of individual actors. For the study of collective behaviour, such as social movements, networks are a more appropriate unit of analysis than individual organizations (della Porta and Tarrow 2005, 240). The structure of the network, for example, if it is highly centralized or decentralized, reflects how information flows from actor to actor. Examining networks helps elucidate who has and 20 shares information with whom. Often, advocacy networks are viewed as horizontal, made of equal actors struggling against repressive states (Keck and Sikkink 1998) or in contestation with states and UN processes (Joachim 2007). Yet, hierarchies in transnational networks are evident, as some actors are more connected than others are and as a result enjoy structural advantages. A focus on the relational ties of NGOs that enable some NGOs to select and mobilize in the new regime is better suited than solely studying the individual attributes of individual organizations. Instead, this research first considers which actors in the network have structural advantages, and explores their actions and attributes in the context of the incentives and constraints brought forth by the internal dynamics within the network. 1.2.3 Key Definitions Exploring the dynamics of NGO networks as they travel across global governance forums requires drawing upon insights from social movement theorists and international relations scholars. Four terms require definition and discussion: authority, institutions, forums, and regimes. Forum multiplying is discussed in depth in Chapter 2. The nature of authority is a central part of an agent-centered approach to global governance. Authority is the “ability to induce deference in others;” it is a social relationship embedded within the context in which actors interact (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010, 7). In part, authority stems from recognition by governors within a given context. Tacit or direct, formal or informal, recognition by others is a key precursor for authority (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010, 8). There are important implications of the context-specific nature of authority for the study of NGO forum multiplying. Authority is not an objective characteristic possessed by actors in all contexts. An authoritative actor in one area of global governance may not be authoritative in 21 another. For example, the IPCC Chair is an authoritative voice on climate science; others defer to the Chair’s report on the state of the climate. Yet, should the IPCC Chair speak on trade or other environmental issues such as hazardous waste, governors within those regimes would not defer to the Chair’s judgement or analysis. Authority does not necessarily travel. Actors seeking to use their authority must find recognition within their new context. The politics of recognition are at the core of NGO forum multiplying strategies. NGO networks strategize to use rules, relationships, and resources to improve their chances of recognition, and, in turn, authority in the new regime. Without authority, the NGO network cannot advance their cause in its new context. This new context is replete with institutions, forums, and regimes within which actors interact. Following comparative politics, institutions are broadly conceived as human-made constraints on behaviour (North 1990). I align more closely with historical institutionalists rather than sociological institutionalists. The former school views institutions as formal or informal procedures, rules, norms, routines, or conventions that are embedded within an organizational structure or political economy, while sociological institutionalists expand the definition to include symbols, cognitive scripts, and moral templates (Hall and Taylor 1996). Institutions can shape actors’ preferences and behaviour and facilitate alliances among some actors, while still allowing for agency (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Because they shape, but do not define behaviour, institutions can generate unintended consequences (Hall and Taylor 1996). They are notoriously sticky, difficult to change and can reinforce over time as actors have incentives to maintain the institution even if it is no longer an efficient solution to the problem it was designed to solve (North 1990; Pierson 2004). 22 This use differs from general practice in international relations. For international relations scholars, an institution is often used interchangeably with organization; for example, the United Nations is an international institution. Defining institutions as rules, norms, conventions or practices helps disaggregate the components of a regime. The rules, norms, principles and even decision-making procedures central to the common definition of regime are all examples of institutions. Here, international organizations are examples of forums. Forums and venues are terms often used, but rarely defined in the regime complexity literature. Alter and Meunier (2009) cite the Convention on Biological Diversity, High Commission on Refugees, and WTO as examples of forums. By forum, I mean a formal or informal arena for interstate coordination. The goal of states’ cooperation could be to negotiate or implement agreements, or informally coordinate activities such as search and rescue in the Arctic or projects to reduce indoor air pollutants. These forums become key areas for non-state actors to try to influence the agenda and process of global governance. As Tarrow (2001, 15) aptly puts it, forums are coral reefs for transnational actors. Forums will have their own institutions that may not be shared with other forums. For example, decision making rules often vary among forums; some forums may have rules facilitating majority voting while others operate on consensus, a key difference that can influence a norm entrepreneur’s decision (Coleman 2013). Forums will have their own procedural rules, such as how observers are accredited and what access they have to the negotiations. Some substantive rules could be specific to a forum, such as those specified in an international treaty negotiated and implemented under the auspices of a forum. For example, the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated under the framework of principles laid out in the UNFCCC (see Chapter 3) and has 23 specific rules mandating how much some developed countries are to reduce their emissions. These rules do not apply within other climate change forums, such as the IPCC or the Climate and Clean Air Coalition. Forums are also social environments, with their own standards of socially-acceptable behaviour. Actors vary among forums. The differing constellations of actors will form their own norms to navigate their interactions within that context. Some norms may be shared among forums in a regime, such as appropriate solutions to a given problem. Other norms could be specific to a forum, such as how observers and state delegates interact and appropriate forms of contention by civil society. This discussion intimates that regimes may have multiple forums and that the relationships among forums can vary. Some regimes may be synergistic, with one core forum and others that closely align to its norms, and at the opposite end of the spectrum are conflictive regimes characterized by unrelated forums (Biermann et al 2009). Above the level of a single forum, regimes are commonly defined by the institutions around which actors hold expectations for how to govern an issue (Krasner 1983, 4). Others’ definitions emphasize formal multilateral agreements (Haggard and Simmons 1987; Keohane 1989), social institutions (Levy, Young and Zurn 1994), and intersubjective meanings (Ruggie 1993). The actors and forums within a regime all subscribe to addressing a given issue. Ultimately the shared cause serves as the organizing principle of the regime. It is what delineates one regime from another, the trade regime from the security regime, the biodiversity regime from the hazardous waste regime. The point of the regime complex literature is that these regimes that were originally designed for different issues may overlap; for example, the interaction between the trade and biodiversity regimes on intellectual property rights (Helfer 24 2009). This shared view to addressing a given issue complicates efforts to forum multiply. The new actor must find a way to tie their issue with that addressed by the target regime, or they will not be viewed as part of that regime. What does it mean to join a regime? At a minimum, one must accede to the shared rules, norms, principles and decision-making procedures to that the regime’s actors expect. An individual can do that in the privacy of their home, yet we do not necessarily consider that individual part of a regime. Generally, states join a regime when they sign a treaty. We have no equivalent metric to determine when a non-state actor is part of a regime. Non-state actors do not sign treaties or otherwise permanently accede to multilateral law. Three aspects of a state’s ascension to a treaty stand out as transferrable to non-state actors: it is a public act, directed toward others working toward the shared cause; it commits the actors to work with or leverage the institutions of the regime for change toward that shared goal; and, it is recognized and accepted by those within regime. I suggest these aspects could signal when a non-state actor joins a regime. Non-state actors broadly include international organizations, NGOs, private sector groups, and social movements. They must undertake a public discursive act linking their work to the issue area of the regime and that act must move beyond the regular circles of the actor to address governors within the target regime. Simply issuing a press release, or giving a speech, that a given issue is important is a low bar. For an example, James Orbinski of Médecins Sans Frontières stated to the Canadian Medical Association’s General Council that climate change is a significant public health issue (Picard 2016) yet the organization has no formal position on the issue and has never 25 attended a UNFCCC meeting.5 The act was public, but directed internally – toward other medical professionals – and was not directed toward climate change governors. A public discursive act is insufficient without engagement with actors in the target regime. Second, the public act must include some commitment to the shared goals or institutions that governors within the regime already ascribe to and expect. As Chapter 2 argues, non-state actors must link their issue to the institutions of the regime. Their discursive act is a frame that links these issues, often reframing the issues “in a way that foregrounds the … benefits of the original/source issue” for the target regime’s issue (Jinnah 2011, 3). Finding institutional entry points can help a non-state actor demonstrate that their issue can help address the problems the target regime is designed to govern. Demonstrating this connection to the work of the regime helps position the non-state actor as a potential governor of the target regime – one that belongs within the regime and should participate in governance. The final aspect of joining a regime is recognition, which is particularly difficult for non-state actors. Recognition involves the identification and acceptance of a given actor as a global governor for an issue area. Others recognize the authority of that actor and tacitly agree to abide that authority. Recognition is part of states’ sovereignty. Other states and non-state actors view states as primary actors in global governance, deferring to their authority to govern domestically and speak on behalf of their citizens internationally. Recognition is implicit for states, but often becomes an explicit need for non-state actors. Because non-state actors’ authority is so closely tied to the issue that they represent, recognizing a non-state actor as a member of a group of governors in a regime involves 5 Based on the database developed for this research of all NGOs participating in every COP of the UNFCCC, Médecins Sans Frontières has not participated between 1995 and 2015. 26 recognizing their issue as a legitimate inclusion into the regime. NGOs rest their authority on their ability to showcase their expertise and make principled claims for a cause (Stroup and Wong forthcoming). NGOs cannot divorce themselves from their issue; it is the foundation of their expert and principled authority. To be recognized by those governing another issue, NGOs need their issue recognized as well. Governors within the regime need to see the NGO’s and the regime’s issues as interconnected for the incoming NGO to gain recognition. This underlines the need for NGOs undertaking forum multiplying strategies to construct a convincing discursive frame connecting their issue as a cause, consequence, or potential solution to the regime’s issue (more on this in Chapter 2). Proponents cannot control whether a frame resonates, but can take actions to increase the likelihood of recognition. The empirical chapters in this dissertation show the many strategies actors use to increase the likelihood that their frames will be recognized, from leveraging institutions to increase their visibility and access to using their brands and connections to secure introductions to key actors within the target regime. At its core, forum multiplying is about advancing NGOs’ issues and, in turn, the NGOs’ relevance and authority in global governance. The payoff could be high, perhaps high enough to justify the associated costs. Forum multiplying strategies entail identifying a target regime and a forum within that regime. To sustain the commitment, NGO networks continue efforts to mobilize. In the case of climate change, forum multiplying strategies ultimately led to the sustained rise in social NGOs and the diversification of the civil society presence at the UNFCCC. 1.2.4 Methodological Approach Above I outlined the general approach to studying the labour, gender, justice, health, and human rights networks seeking entry to the climate change regime. These five cases represent 27 significant variation. While labour, gender, and justice all managed to forum multiply, the health and human rights networks did not. This approach helps correct for the selection bias noted in scholarship on transnational advocacy networks, where work tends to focus on successful cases (Price 2004), and on international organizations, where work tends to overestimate the participatory norm in international organizations (Tallberg et al. 2013). Each network differs in its size and degree of centralization. Within the networks, some actors possessed resources useful to help carry authority into the climate change regime while in other networks, such as health and human rights, well known organizations were unmotivated to migrate. The institutional rules serving as potential entry points facilitated labour and gender, and to a lesser extent justice, while constraining the efforts of others. To explore these cases, I engaged in participant observation in the UNFCCC negotiations, conducted interviews, and completed social network analyses. As a participant in the UNFCCC, I attended 10 of the 15 meetings of the UNFCCC from 2012 to the end of 2015 (the period of negotiations for the Paris Agreement). I participated in the capacity as a writer of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin for the International Institute for Sustainable Development.6 This capacity and access embedded me within the process, providing firsthand experience with the norms of interaction among non-state observers, state delegates, and the Secretariat. Regular attendance also provided opportunities to build trust and rapport with delegates. The 72 semi-structured interviews conducted with NGOs, UNFCCC Secretariat members, other international organizations’ representatives, and state delegates help to 6 The Earth Negotiations Bulletin team has a Secretariat badge and an understanding with the Secretariat that we may attend and report from plenary sessions and contact groups. With the permission of parties, we may attend and often can report without attribution from informal negotiations, which are otherwise closed to NGOs and other observers. We also have access to press conferences, and other meetings sometimes closed to NGOs and other observers. 28 triangulate claims (see Appendix A for more information on qualitative methods). Within the NGO community, I interviewed representatives from organizations situated in various places in the network, from those on the fringes to the gatekeepers. The interviews also represent board members, policy officers and other activists holding various positions within NGOs and, as a result, different views on their organization’s strategy and motivations. I also conducted key informant interviews with the pivotal NGO delegates working to bring their issues to climate change in the mid-2000s. I chose interviews for three reasons. First, as Gamson and Meyer (1996) observe, opportunities to influence politics or mobilize a movement are shaped as much by the perception of actors as by the objective realities. Interviews provide a window into the intersubjective views of NGO delegates into what constituted a viable opening in the climate change regime, or closing doors in their traditional, “home” regime. Second, delegates were more likely to privately speak of internal rifts and negotiations within the network. Such information would not be publicly available. Third, the network itself is a form of an imagined community (Price 1998). Who is in or out of the network is a political process to control the scope of agenda (Schattschneider 1960) and belonging. Interviews also helped to confirm the findings and explore the quality of ties among actors identified by the social network analyses. Information flows are, as Keck and Sikkink (1998, 27) point out, central to advocacy networks, and for this research are uncovered through a quantitative social network analysis (see Appendix A for explanation of social network analysis methods). The social network analysis helped make these information flows visible, revealing the structure of the network and its changes over time. The networks here are labour-climate, gender-climate, justice-climate and health-climate. It was not possible to map the entire network of a given case as it exists in its 29 home regime (see Appendix A). Instead, the social network analysis shows what NGOs participated in climate change and their connections inside and outside of the climate change regime. This approach usefully embeds those engaging in forum multiplying within the network of their home regime and shows which actors in the home network did not participate in forum multiplying, while also revealing their connections within climate change as reported over time. Evidence of the information flows over time are derived from self-reported ties in the Yearbook of International Organizations and common membership in an umbrella organization devoted to the link between climate change and the social issue. Self-reported ties and common membership helps ensure the veracity of the ties, and supports the notion of the network as a shared community of actors viewing one another as part of a common endeavor. This approach also helps identify actors in the network with structural advantages. Changes over time can be difficult to research in a static snapshot of the network. To overcome this challenge, I used data from two time periods to create two views of the network, one from 2005-2008 and the other 2009-2015. The first snapshot corresponds to the network’s early efforts to forum multiply; the second captures the ensuing and sustained mobilization efforts within the climate change regime. Particularly when coupled with the interview data, this approach helped identify and confirm the arrival of new actors, the recruitment of allies within the climate change regime, and the increasing centrality of gatekeepers over time. 1.3 Chapter Overview To explore NGO forum multiplying strategies to the climate change regime, I first forward a framework to help understand forum multiplying in general terms in Chapter two. Chapter three outlines a brief history of institutional change in the UNFCCC, with particular focus on the shifts in actors’ framing of climate change and new institutions created to address 30 the new frames. Chapter three also outlines subtle shifts in institutions governing observers’ access and behaviour in the UNFCCC. Chapters four through seven present the cases of labour, gender, justice, and human rights and health, respectively. The first two NGO networks had ample motivation to engage in forum multiplying and successfully transmitted their authority and aligned with the UNFCCC’s institutions to mobilize within the climate change regime. The global justice movement, also called the alterglobalization movement, is explored in Chapter six. The movement was highly motivated to participate in climate change work and became a key component helping form the climate justice movement. The movement transmitted its authority, but to a limited audience. They used the neoliberal foundations and staid politics of the climate change regime as entry points. Unlike labour and gender advocates, the justice movement sought to overturn these substantive institutions, or as they call them “false solutions.” Ultimately, the climate justice movement lost control of its central frame, largely turning toward protest and national movement building for climate justice. Finally, human rights and health are null cases. Human rights NGOs were not motivated to undertake climate change work, leaving them at stage one of the framework. Health also struggled to motivate much of the network, leaving some environmental-health NGOs that lacked authority and alignment with the institutions to try to take up the climate cause and motivate and uninterested public health network. Chapter eight concludes and considers the implications of the findings for climate activism, for the expansion of the regime complex for climate change, and for climate action more broadly.31 Chapter 2: Forum Multiplying to New Regimes NGO networks participate in multiple forums embedded within different regimes and governing issues far outside the network’s traditional issue area. Some NGOs within a network select and mobilize in new forums, often attracting other NGOs from the network to the new regime. To mobilize and justify their participation within the new regime, the network members construct and defend discursive links between their traditional issue and the issue governed by their target regime. Developing this frame often involves negotiations among actors within the network or movement. Once decided, the network disseminates the discursive frame, and, if necessary, defends it from appropriation by others within the target regime, or other incoming networks seeking a link to facilitate their own participation in the target regime. As chapter one highlighted, scholars have identified several instances showing NGOs’ mobility, linking their issues to seemingly disparate problems governed by other regimes. Yet, we do not see all NGO networks migrating freely among regimes, and we do not see all regimes inundated with new NGO networks. For instance, the climate change regime has seen little or no participation from several networks, such as those advocating for health, human rights, refugees, peace, human security, and hazardous waste management. NGO forum multiplying entails selecting, gaining entry, and mobilizing within a new regime. Even if network members have a motivation to forum multiply, they may still be unable to successfully participate and mobilize in the new regime. The channels of migration – some networks to specific regimes – reflect the uneven patterns of NGO forum multiplying. Clearly, there are limits to the ability for NGO networks to identify, enter, and mobilize within a target regime. This chapter puts forward a framework to explain these uneven patterns of forum multiplying. The framework entails a two-step process; first, NGOs in the network must be 32 motivated to forum multiply, and decide to undertake the costly process. Yet, as many social movement scholars point out, grievance is insufficient for a movement to occur (Tarrow 1998; Tarrow and McAdam 2005). Additional factors either facilitate or constrain the mobilization of a movement. The mobilization stage suggests that networks that can carry their authority into the target regime and find institutional entry points are more likely to successfully forum multiply. In efforts to translate the authority that NGOs hold in their home regime to the target regime, it is useful for the network to rally around a single frame and for that frame to have powerful articulators that actors within the regime may listen to. Second, the network members use the institutions of the regime to find entry points for their claim to belonging in the regime. These institutional hooks can be substantive – the rules, principles, or norms of the regime – or procedural – decision-making procedures or norms related to observers. Creating or leveraging an institution as an entry point can provide a strong basis for the network’s claim to belong in the regime. These entry points help some networks gain a foothold while others remain marginalized. Both processes help the network gain recognition for their cause and for themselves, which underlines the barriers to NGO mobility across regimes, and the reasons why they are not as free to participate across areas of global governance as one may assume. The remaining sections of this chapter build this framework. First, the chapter clarifies the concept of NGO forum multiplying. Second, it turns to the NGO forum multiplying framework’s two stages: motivations and mobilization. 2.1 Forum Multiplying Forum multiplying is a necessary step toward joining a regime. As introduced in Chapter 1, NGO forum multiplying is the sustained mobilization of a group of NGOs in a new forum and 33 regime, enabled by a discursive frame linking the NGO network’s traditional issue to the issue governed by the target regime. NGO forum multiplying involves distinct activities: selecting a target regime and an appropriate forum, and mobilizing the network and, hopefully, new actors within that target regime. As discussed in chapter 1, joining a regime requires a public act directed at those within the target regime, commitment to the institutions of the regime, and recognition by others within the regime. These aspects of joining a regime can be used to spot forum multiplying when it occurs. First, the public act directed at governors of the target regime is evident in the continued participation in a forum in the regime. Participation is more than showing up at a conference: people rarely attend a meeting and speak to no one. Participating actors engage with governors in the target regime, exchanging views and information. It is a public act that is decidedly outward looking, designed to engage governors in the target regime rather than send a message to those within the network. The second aspect, commitment to work with, or leverage, the institutions of the regime for change, is evident in the discursive frame that explicitly highlights the benefits of the network’s issue for the target regime’s issue. The frame is fundamental to forum multiplying, serving as the claim for belonging in the target regime by making the case why the network’s issue is related to the institutions of the target regime. Further, the frame showcases how the network is an integral actor also committed to the shared cause of the regime. The third aspect, recognition, is something of a holy grail, the ultimate ambition of forum multiplying which is in some ways beyond the control of members of the NGO network. They cannot control if governors within the climate change regime accept them. However, network members can position themselves as integral actors to the work of the regime and in the process, 34 build new alliances. Being accepted in coalitions of other actors and having those within the target regime use the network’s frame are signals that the network has achieved recognition and found new allies in the target regime. Together, these three measures, participation, frame construction, and recognition, can qualitatively show when forum multiplying is present.1 When participating in a new forum, NGO networks do not entirely leave their home regime, where they accrued considerable resources, expertise and authority. Instead, they multiply into new forums, seeking forums to engage while remaining entrenched in their home regime. This behavior is like domestic interest groups that “spend considerable amounts of time venue shopping, looking for institutional access where they might have a competitive advantage. They often launch offenses in several venues and defend their interests in several venues simultaneously” (Weible 2007, 101). Moving across to forums that lie within a different regime, opens up multiple fronts for networks to advance their issues. It also raises the costs of participating in global governance. Forum multiplying involves an expansion of the network’s terrain. The network does not leave their traditional forums or regime, rather it multiplies the forums and regimes in which it operates. NGOs within networks do not seek to change where discussions occur, as with forum 1 A quantitative measure of forum multiplying would miss the qualitative aspects of the concept, particularly recognition and may risk over reductionism. Further, a quantitative measure is not possible due to data limitations. An absolute measure of how many NGOs or delegates participate in a given forum would ignore that some networks are larger or more geographically dispersed, which would facilitate participation at various conferences around the world. A relative measure, such as the proportion of organizations in the original network that participate in the forum in the target regime, would be more appropriate. There is no reliable and comparable way to measure the size of a network. Different social network analysts may set different boundaries to the network and use different indicators of ties among actors, which means some actors would be included by one analyst but not others (see Appendix A for a discussion of how those issues are addressed here). When looking for evidence of ties, some networks are more easily delimited. For example, labour unions, women’s rights, health, and human rights are recognized categories of organizations in the Yearbook of International Organizations. The global justice, or alterglobalization, movement is not. Without a reliable measure of the size of the original network, a proportion is impossible to ascertain, particularly one that is comparable and meaningful across cases. 35 shopping and shifting, but to proliferate the forums in which its central issue is considered. Forum multiplying is a strategy to advance NGOs’ individual and the network’s collective interests and preferences in multiple regimes, and the forums within those regimes. It entails an extension of the network’s interests into new forums, not a movement of interests from one forum and into another, or an attempt to unify various disparate forums. Forum multiplying is a mobilization to advance interests, not a fleeting engagement. By “sustained,” the definition explicates that the engagement of NGO networks cannot be a fleeting affair. The time scale is years, not single meetings or brief campaigns. Signing onto a single joint statement with a few other NGOs representing other issue areas does not constitute NGO forum multiplying. It is an effort of a group or network of NGOs collaborating and individually accepting considerable investment and effort over the medium to long term. This effort involves mobilizing around, and seeking to disseminate, a shared discursive frame. Frames enable NGO forum multiplying by linking the network’s core issues to the issue of the target regime. Frames are a popular concept in the social sciences, considered broadly as a schema of interpretation enabling actors to understand what is happening and salient in specific occurrences by simplifying and highlighting some issues over others (Goffman 1974, 21; Snow and Benford 1988). Frames are more than simple schema of interpretation residing individual’s minds, they are actively constructed to highlight some aspects of a situation over others, or are “the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 6). Frames highlight some issues over others, simplifying issues to convey meaning in events and experiences (Snow and Benford 1988). For example, women’s rights 36 advocates framed violence against women as a matter of human rights, rather than as a women’s issue (Joachim 2004). There are three aspects of frames useful to link the NGO network’s issue to the target regimes issue. Frames have diagnostic, prognostic and mobilization aspects (Benford and Snow 2000). Diagnostic aspects of frames highlight the causes of a problem. When forum multiplying, network members could highlight their issue as a cause of the target regime’s issue. This type of frame would necessitate action by governors in the target regime – to solve their problem would mean addressing the NGO network’s issue. Frames can have prognostic elements, which suggest solutions to the problem. NGO networks can highlight their issue as a new solution to the target regime’s problem. Governors can choose whether to accept this new solution as part of the solutions already included in the roster of institutions of the regime. Finally, frames serve to mobilize actors to action. This aspect is particularly useful to bring network members to the new forum, and to bring those in the target regime to ally with the network to address the intersection of issues encapsulated in the frame. This aspect of the frame can help move an NGO network from a potential fringe group to recognition within the regime. The motivational aspect of the frame is therefore necessary to mobilize network members and new allies, and proposing either a new solution or cause can help show the NGO network’s commitment to the regime’s shared cause and underline that including the network brings added value to governance efforts. The NGO forum multiplying framework below highlights the integral part of why, and whether, NGO networks forum multiply. 2.2 NGO Forum Multiplying Framework To successfully multiply the number of forums and regimes in which a NGO network participates, several favourable conditions are required. Figure 2-1 below sketches the NGO 37 forum multiplying framework in two stages. The second stage, mobilization, highlights three necessary conditions2 for successful forum multiplying by NGO networks. Figure 2-1: NGO Forum Multiplying Framework The framework proceeds in two stages. First, it explores the three motivations for NGO forum multiplying. The second stage puts sand in the proverbial wheels of NGO mobility across regimes, by highlighting two dynamics that constrain some networks while facilitating others’ efforts to forum multiply. The first suggests how intra-network dynamics can influence the ability of the network to achieve its goals. Key actors within the network use their connections and resources to help build consensus and articulate the frame. Through this, the network members can carry the authority that they have in their home regime into their target regime. Second, the network finds entry points within the institutions of the target regime. By linking their issue to the substantive rules of the regime, or by leveraging procedural institutions, networks can show that they belong in the target regime. This second dynamic is important for a 2 Necessary conditions, as Braumoeller and Goertz (2000) explain, are present when the outcome is always present (and always absent when it is the outcome does not occur), and is not trivial to the outcome (for example, gravity is always present when war occurs, but it is trivial). 38 NGO network to find recognition within the regime. This section explores each stage, motivations and mobilization, in turn. 2.2.1 Motivation Forum multiplying can serve all networks’ underlying motivation to keep their cause alive. Political motivations are relevance for their issues and, therefore, their organizations and networks. Weaker actors seek to expand the scope of conflict by bringing new allies into the fray, while powerful actors seek limit who participates in a conflict to control the scope of issues and, ultimately, the outcome (Schattschneider 1960). By forum multiplying NGOs can fulfill their role as counter-hegemonic forces, balancing the power and over-representation of states and business interests in global governance (Cox and Schechter 2002), or as the conduits of horizontal politics targeting states or corporations (Wapner 2002), and outmaneuver opponents blocking the network in their traditional regime. NGO networks can also use forum multiplying to avoid becoming embroiled in stalemates and ineffectual regimes. Stalled negotiations are problematic for NGO networks because they are unable to advance their issues, and because they no longer have ongoing conflict to generate media interest, or galvanize and mobilize supporters around. There are no longer targets for their contention, only routinized, circular discussions. Forum multiplying is a means for NGO networks to keep their movements moving forward, by remobilizing across areas of global governance. Normative and material motivations are nearly always present for NGO networks. There is an ongoing debate which is more prevalent, which in part glosses over the multifaceted and myriad reasons why actors become engaged in advocacy. Some view principled motivations as a central defining feature of a transnational advocacy network (Keck and Sikkink 1998) while others point to the political acumen of movement leaders and the professional self-interest as key 39 factors for determining which issues are selected for campaigns within NGO networks (Bob 2005; Cooley and Ron 2002). Sundstrom (2005, 2006) offers a more nuanced view, demonstrating that frames and material resources interact to influence the strategies and success of movements. Similarly, I argue that funding alone is an insufficient motivation; mobilization may be partly driven by a need to maintain funding streams, but also by a commitment to the link between issues as expressed in the discursive frame. The network could be motivated by the strategic search for material resources, and by a normative desire to continue progress on their traditional and their newly-adopted issue. Both exist in the routine politics of NGOs, making these factors less helpful to explain why networks move to some regimes over others. Material resources, such as funding, are an omnipresent need of NGOs of all sizes, and are required for stoking the ongoing conflicts for sustaining a movement and confronting traditional targets. Operating in a fiscally insecure environment can foster a competition influenced by donor demands ultimately shaping NGO strategies (Cooley and Ron 2002). Forum multiplying could enable NGOs to capitalize on new sources of funding, or to maneuver around changing donor priorities. When donor priorities change, NGOs are likely to engage in forum multiplying, linking their issue to the donor’s new priority issue. Regimes where donors funnel large sums are therefore particularly attractive. Forum multiplying can diversify the sources of funding for individual NGOs. Funding, however, plays a relatively minor role in the motivations for forum multiplying because NGOs reasonably foresee barriers to securing new funding in different regimes in which they do not participate. Donors may not recognize the NGOs as actors connected to the issue of the target regime. The NGO may not have sufficient information to know that funding 40 opportunities exist. Ideational resources, particularly a normative desire to address an important issue, also serve as motivations for forum multiplying. For several NGOs, finding ways to link their issue to a new issue governed by a different regime is also a way to advance other normatively important causes. Wanting to contribute toward a new cause, however, is not enough to motivate forum multiplying. Individual activists can identify many issues where they would prefer to see change, yet they will not view all of these issues as something that they could work on. For a normative motivation to propel forum multiplying, activists must internalize the link between the issues, that continuing to advance their traditional cause legitimately entails tackling the new issue in its regime. Members of the network may seek to help solve the issue addressed by the target regime, to be part of the solution. These three motivations – political, material, and normative – can be all be present in different combinations and to differing degrees. How the network proceeds is the subject of the next stage, mobilization. 2.2.2 Mobilization While many networks may share these motivations, only some will successfully mobilize within the chosen forum in the new regime. Mobilization has internal and external aspects. Internally, members join the effort, participating in the target regime and disseminating the linking frame. Externally, networks must gain acceptance within the target regime for their members and their frame to sustain their mobilization effort. Two factors condition the ability of NGO networks to mobilize: the ability of the network to carry their authority to the target regime; and the ability to find and leverage the target regimes’ institutions for the network’s gain. This section explains each in turn. 41 18.104.22.168 Carrying Authority to the Target Regime Not all actors gain recognition in their chosen new regime. Networks need to prove that they, and their frame, belong. Actors in the target regime are more likely to accept a linking frame when it is supported by a cohesive network able to show solidarity in support of the frame. Second, frames are more likely to resonate when they have the support of powerful articulators, actors that are central to the network, or bridge among networks. First, the support of the network in the development, dissemination, and (when necessary) defense of the frame is vital. Competition among frames linking the network’s issue to the target regime’s issue constitute a series of mixed messages that can be confusing for those within the target regime. When subsets of the network vie for attention and influence, the overall message fragments into competing frames. Competing frames enable actors within the target regime to dismiss niche claims made by portions for a divided network and perhaps undermine the chances of recognition. Disseminating the frame in a new regime requires a group effort. A single NGO, even one with a known brand and sizeable budget, cannot alone interact with all the key actors and potential allies. Speaking with one voice can amplify the frame to a volume those within the target regime are more likely to hear. Even a handful of major NGOs can pool their list of contacts to expand the number of delegates able to disseminate the frame. Solidarity within a network of NGOs can heighten the strength and distribution of the message. It also helps the network defend the message from new interlocutors seeking to co-opt or add new dimensions to the frame. Such cohesion can be difficult to achieve. The need for cohesion, perhaps even consensus, among network members can give rise to considerable negotiation within the network on how to frame its issues in the context of the new regime. One network member publicly 42 disagreeing with the frame can undermine the group’s efforts, particularly if that dissenting voice has a known brand or reputation. In this scenario, the ability of the gatekeeper or gatekeepers to convene and coordinate discussions to develop the frame is particularly useful to NGO bandwagoning. Second, frames need powerful articulators able to persuade actors in the target regime of the frame’s validity, and that the network has a valid claim to belonging in the regime. Frames and other forms of normative suasion resonate when delivered by an actor that the audience views as credible or authoritative (Checkel 2005; Gamson 1992; Benford and Snow 2000). Busby (2010) argues that the characteristics of messengers, such as familiarity, similarity, expertise or celebrity, may enhance the persuasiveness of the message, because these characteristics are used by recipients as a shortcut to decide the appropriate course of action (“this makes sense coming from her” or “if he says so”). To articulate a linking frame to a new audience requires an actor with a known brand and resources to help convince the members of the network and the target regime of the frame’s validity. The articulators have dual roles. Internally, they can help the network reach consensus on a frame. Externally, articulators are uniquely placed to help the network gain recognition within the regime. Articulators hold specific positions within the network, either as central actors within the network (gatekeepers), or as bridging actors, with connections between the network and the target regime (brokers). Connections within the network help convene discussions regarding the frame and strategy to deploy the frame in the new regime. Connections outside the frame help to provide key introductions and resources useful to gain the recognition of governors within the target regime. 43 Gatekeepers possess many connections within the network. They occupy a central place in the network which enables them to set, vet, or block the network’s agenda (Carpenter 2007, 2014). Others in the network take up these signals and accept the issue as part of their work (Bob 2005; Lake and Wong 2005). In social network terms, gatekeepers can be identified by the number of “degrees,” that is, links, to other networks. I use the average of the in-degree and out-degree to identify gatekeepers. In-degree is how many incoming ties the actor has, that is, how many actors in the network claim to have a connection with the gatekeepers (Scott 2000). The measure speaks to the prestige of the actor, how much others seek a connection or look to the actor (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). The out-degree measures how many connections the actor in question has established with others, and indicates the influence an actor may have because it can spread information to many others (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). I take the mean of these two measures because gatekeepers able to forum multiply have both prestige and influence. Prestige means others look for implicit signals or defer to the gatekeeper’s authority. Influence means that the gatekeeper can disseminate a new frame to serve as an entry ticket to a new regime. The more others interact with an actor, the more likely that they are central to the network. Here, I complement this view of structurally-advantaged actors able to unilaterally initiate and disseminate frames among network members. However, even gatekeepers face limits. When unilateral dissemination is not possible, ties within the network can facilitate intra-network negotiation. Gatekeepers can convene internal negotiations, or use their privileged amounts of information about the members’ views to build a frame that the network can rally behind. In more centralized networks, the one very well connected gatekeeper will be able to convene the networks’ internal discussions and then unilaterally disseminate the frame throughout the 44 network. Less centralized networks may have a few gatekeepers who will have to cooperate if the network is to rally around a shared frame. Such cooperation among gatekeepers may not be possible. Ideational differences and temptation to capture attention and resources could undermine the ability of the gatekeepers to work together to facilitate discussions on a shared frame, and in turn, undermine the likelihood of successful forum multiplying. Externally a gatekeeper’s many connections mean that they tend to possess brands that are known and recognizable to others (Carpenter 2007). Brands are shortcuts for the experience, expertise, and credibility of an actor. The reputation associated with the brand can signal if the gatekeeper’s claims are trustworthy or persuasive. Gatekeepers’ many connections potentially also provide information and contacts with donor agencies. Cost-benefit analyses are common tools to identify campaigns that will bring benefits with lower costs (Bob 2005; Weible 2007). Cooley and Ron (2002) underscore the fiscally-insecure environments that foster competition among NGOs. In this environment, the gatekeeper has to be not only able, but also willing to share these material resources. Gatekeepers have the connections to work with others in the network to develop a frame to link their cause with the issue governed by the target regime. Their many connections also help them gather strategic resources and information useful to gain recognition within that regime. As outsiders, gatekeepers need assistance. Brokers are necessary due to their strategic ties among networks of actors. Brokers may not have as many ties, but have connections to multiple networks, conferring the ability to choose, introduce, and diffuse new ideas, making brokers important norm entrepreneurs (Burt 2004; Goddard 2009; Granovetter 1973). Brokers can provide, or provide access to, material resources such as funding for participation or research. In social 45 network terms, brokers have a high “betweenness centrality,” a measure used to indicate the number of connections an actor has in otherwise discrete areas of the network, or between different networks. For reasons explained in Appendix B, this is not a useful indication of a broker in my network. Rather, qualitative information can be used for NGOs to identify which climate actors also worked in their regime, and provided resources, if any. Beyond funding, brokers can use their status within the target regime to facilitate accreditation and secure badges for the incoming NGOs to participate in the forum. The broker can provide the first resources for participation and initial orientation within the target regime and forum. Brokers are the first to introduce the NGO network to the new regime, and vice versa. They provide information about the target regime, from the science underpinning a given issue to the governance apparatus to address it. They can introduce the NGO network to the political history of the target regime and can signal emerging issues on the horizon. Brokers are often the first to provide a crash course in how to navigate the rules regarding observer participation, both formal and informal. Because a broker also resides in the target regime, it has information that gatekeepers will not. Like gatekeepers, brokers can lend their authority. By associating itself with the incoming network and their ideas, the broker can provide a powerful introduction to the target regime; essentially, the broker shows “they’re with me, and therefore one of us.” If the broker has authority within the target regime, if it is viewed as a trusted expert, moral leader, or competent authority, it can amplify the discursive frame beyond what an outsider could articulate on its own. Through association with the broker, the network can gain material resources and authority important to its persuasive efforts in the regime. 46 This suggests that some brokers and gatekeepers are more useful to forum multiplying than others within the network. Gatekeepers that are also well-resourced and have recognizable, trusted brands will be able to serve as persuasive articulators able to disseminate the network’s message. Brokers with authority and experience within the target regime, and preferably with resources, will similarly be particularly useful to networks undertaking forum multiplying. Not all gatekeepers and brokers can be articulators. The internal character of the network and particularly its connections with brokers to the target regime influences the network’s likelihood of successfully forum multiplying. 22.214.171.124 Identifying Entry Points with the Target Regime’s Institutions When seeking admittance, the NGOs within a network need to show that they belong in the new regime; they too ascribe to the rules, norms, principles and decision-making procedures that the target regime’s actors expect on the issue. This occurs in two areas. First, the NGOs within the network tie their claims to the substantive rules and norms of the target regime. Second, NGOs in the network maintain their traditional identities and strategies of action and seek to leverage the procedural rules of the target regime to show that network members are like those within the target regime and, therefore, belong. While there will likely be some NGOs within the network unwilling to play by the rules, overall, the network must present a public face to the regime’s governors that they and their claims belong. Network members seek to show that their issue is integral to efforts to address the target regime’s issue, to demonstrate that they belong in the regime and should be recognized. This requires fitting in, finding entry points to make claims of relevance vis-à-vis the regime’s institutions. The frame developed by the network uses a substantive rule or norm of the target regime as an entry point and institutional change can make space for new claims from new networks. 47 On substantive entry points, the network’s frame can claim political space or belonging within the target regime if it demonstrates a connection to the frames or institutions of the target regime. Making claims are central to contentious politics. Tilly and Tarrow (2015) define contention as “making claims that bear on someone else’s interests,” and “claims almost always involve at least one subject reaching visibly toward at least one object” (7-8). In forum multiplying, claims are directed toward governors in the target regime. The object sought by members of the NGO network is recognition within the target regime that their claims and their network belong. Many scholars have observed that the likelihood of advocates’ success increases when their ideas and frames align with the policymakers’ preferences or pre-conceived views. Actors strategically align their claims with policymakers’ views in a given institutional context, be it through grafting (Price 2003), congruence (Acharya 2004), or fit (Kingdon 1984). While many of these scholars underline the importance of such alignment for non-state actors influence and ability to germinate new norms, here I posit institutions as means of entry into a new regime. Identifying and leveraging entry points facilitates participation and recognition, vital precursors to influence. The NGO network cannot control if their frame will resonate with actors, many of whom they may have yet to meet. They can reasonably claim belonging in a target regime armed with a frame that links their issue to the rules and norms of the target regime. It is the proverbial foot in the door, a signal that a new claim – and its claimants – belongs in the target regime. From there, the network’s strategies to disseminate and defend their frame enhance its resonance and perhaps facilitate influence in the target regime. When seeking to multiply into a new area of global governance, the best members of the network can do is construct a frame that mobilizes their base and hooks onto the institutions of the target regime. 48 The frame central to the forum multiplying enterprise provides the initial claim of why a network belongs, and how its work links to the substantive institutions of the target regime. NGOs in the network construct a frame that at least in part foregrounds the substantive connections between the issue of the network and the institutions of the target regime. The substantive connections can be forged by proposing that the incoming issue is either a cause (prognostic framing) or solution (diagnostic framing) of the target regime’s problem, or can motivate others to work toward the target regime’s goals (motivational framing). When undertaking forum multiplying, these aspects of a frame can help connect the substance of the network and the target regime, while bringing new actors to the cause and recruiting allies. The motivational framing, therefore, is necessary. Without offering a reason to adopt the frame and join the movement, actors within an NGO network will face difficulty finding acceptance into the new regime. The motivational aspect of the frame gives governors within the target regime a reason to accept the networks’ claim to belonging. The prognostic and diagnostic elements of the frame most directly link to the substantive rules and norms of the target regime. By identifying root causes or proposing solutions, the prognostic and diagnostic elements help actors within the network highlight how their issue causes or helps solve the problem addressed by an institution in the target regime. The frame espoused by the network can show how their issue causes a problem central to the target regime, or how their issue can help solve a central problem faced by the regime. For example, framing species extinction as a matter of habitat loss implicates forests – and those working on forest conservation – in the biodiversity regime. Or, proposing that policies to protect species will be less effective without inclusion of indigenous knowledge and land tenure rights, positions indigenous peoples as central actors. Through reframing the problem and solution, the network 49 can position itself as an integral part of the regime’s efforts, bolstering their claim for acceptance in the target regime. In many ways, it is advantageous to leverage the diagnostic elements of the frame to a specific institution. First, institutions generally exist to identify, support, and implement solutions to the problem. Rules are often specified ways of reducing the magnitude or eradicating a problem. They are often solutions. Norms are also often solutions, in the form of socially acceptable standards of behaviour. There will be institutions available to network members to reframe in a way that foregrounds their issue. Second, proposing additional aspects of the solutions of the regime shows tacit acceptance of the regime’s definition of the problem and their solutions. The prognostic aspect of a frame could be used to argue for overturning the status quo of the regime, by suggesting that the regime’s governors conceive of their root causes of their problem incorrectly. Such a fundamental error would require a radical rethinking of the regime’s framing of the problem and how the regime addresses the problem. By contrast, the diagnostic aspect of a frame remains silent on the causes of a problem and seeks to add, amend, or shift the solutions in a new direction. This silence could be read by governors in the target regime as a tacit approval for the foundations of the regime. Governors share frames of the problem. If they view a new network of actors as also sharing that framing, then governors may be more willing to accept a new network. This new network aims to support, and not overturn, the regime’s efforts. By focusing on the diagnostic element of the frame, NGOs in the network position themselves as integral to the solutions, but also as like the governors of the regime and worthy of acceptance. Finding openings in the institutions and strategically constructing a frame to link to that issue in a way that maximizes the likelihood of acceptance helps explain why not all claims of 50 networks can be advanced in any regime or even a forum within that regime. NGOs consistently scan for opportunities to advance their claims in other regimes. When new frames rise and gain acceptance within a target regime, actors’ highlight different issues as causes or solutions to their multidimensional problem. For instance, framing health in terms of its prevention, leads to different understandings of public health problems and solutions. These new frames create opportunities for new claimants to participate in the climate regime. Outside actors able to capitalize on these frame shifts within a regime can lay claim to belonging in a regime from which they previously could not show they belonged. Here, these changes in the discursive and institutional foundation of the target regime are treated as exogenous sources of change. Frames could change as actors strategically link issues to expand the zone of agreement (Haas 1980), or to issue credible threats for side payments (Sell 1996), such as financial concessions in exchange for the north furthering its environmental goals (Miller 1995). In so doing, actors introduce new frames of the regimes’ issue; suddenly, an environmental issue is also about financial support and technology transfer. The actions of states, or even non-state actors, to introduce and diffuse new frames can make the regime more amicable to the claims of outside actors, unlocking potential for forum multiplying. Becoming more approachable for other actors is an unintended consequence in the discursive battle among actors within the regime, and it increases the potential scope of the regime. Rules and norms change to reflect how governors understand an issue, potentially overlapping with institutions in other regimes. When governors reframe an issue, perhaps identifying a new cause or solution, they establish new rules or disseminate new norms. For example, the ozone regime phased out hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), prompting the use of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) as an alternative that does not deplete the ozone layer. In response to 51 the rising use of HFCs, a powerful greenhouse gas, the US, Canada, and Micronesia sought to reframe the HFC problem in terms of the consequences of action taken under the Protocol (IISD 2009). As negotiations continued, HFCs were reframed. Instead of being viewed as a cost-effective alternative that were safer for the ozone layer, governors discussed the global warming potential of HFCs and the need for action to rectify a problem exacerbated by the Protocol’s action against HCFCs (IISD 2011). The frame shift led to the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol that phases down use of HFCs. Now, the same chemical is governed by two regimes. By changing how governors understand the problem, a new institution arose and created overlap between two different regimes. When frames increase regime overlap, it can potentially implicate actors from one regime in another regime’s work. An expanded roster of actors can make claims in the regime. New actors can identify a place for themselves under the auspices of an expanded discursive environment within the regime, either due to a new frame, or new institutions created to address these new frames. These actors can make claims to a place in the regime and a stake in the issue that previously seemed impossible. For instance, the proclamation of so-called “third generation” human rights by the General Assembly established new rights as parts of the human rights regime, such as the right to self-determination, healthy environment, and cultural heritage (Alston 1982). As a result, indigenous rights and environmental activists could argue their issues were human rights issues, and could engage in the human rights regime and its forums (Faruque and Begum 2004). Those advocating for specific issues can make a claim under the larger aegis of issues created by institutional change. By implication, one should observe that regimes characterized by discursive contestation among actors will be likely to attract periodic influxes of NGO networks. Disagreement over the 52 causes or solutions is ripe for actors to frame the issue in their favour, particularly during rounds of re-negotiation. Some regimes at specific time periods can be particularly conducive to NGO forum multiplying when new frames and institutions can implicate actors from other regimes. On procedural alignment, the actors in the network and their preferred means of contention can also leverage the rules and norms regarding observer behaviour to show that they belong. There is a selection effect, where governors within the target regime may be reticent to admit or recognize new claimants that seem too unlike those already within the target regime. Others have pointed to the role of political openness, or how receptive a political system is to contentious politics and the counterclaims of social movements, to explain the creation, mobilization and success of domestic social movements (see Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). While the rules of access may not help or hinder the ability of NGOs to influence the outcomes of a given negotiation (Betsill and Corell 2008), these rules and norms provide opportunities and constraints to mobilization efforts within the forum. These rules and norms are not static, and may be open to innovative incomers aiming to position themselves as like others in the target regime. The rules and norms constituting a polity’s receptiveness have varying influence on the ability of claimants to mobilize. Political openness does not create equal opportunities for all movements. For example, Tilly (1978) outlines a curvilinear relationship: well established movements involved in the political system may need to be pushed out of institutionalized politics to incite a mobilized movement while institutions may help marginalized groups gain the footholds necessary to mobilize. Political openness holds differential effects, yet these differences are poorly understood (Meyer 2004). These differences are important to explain why 53 some networks mobilize while others do not; some networks may be sifted out because they are too dissimilar, or because they are unable to use or bend the rules to their advantage. Procedural rules and norms may be open to interpretation. Actors within a network can argue that they align with a rule or norm to claim belonging and fit within the club of governors in the target regime. The procedural institutions governing observers’ access and behaviour are evident in both the written rules of procedure and the behavioral norms among actors. Written rules include both the rules for becoming accredited (meaning states agree a given NGO is allowed to participate in the forum), and the rules governing participation in the forum. Gaining physical entry can be relatively straightforward, such as filling out a form. Even such simple, initial steps require providing justifications, particularly arguments why the NGOs have relevant expertise and should be admitted.3 This is often the first step for NGOs seeking admission to make their case for belonging. Other rules and norms related to observers are less straightforward. Once in the forum, observers face rules governing their behaviours. Rules often exist stating how and how often they may make statements in plenary and which types of meetings they can attend.4 There are further rules constituting what are allowable forms of protest. As O’Neill (2004) documents the influence of the police on social movements, the security within the forum can likewise shape the strategies and outcomes of non-state actors in the regime. 3 For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the UNFCCC ask observers seeking accreditation to complete an initial form that justifies their proposal for inclusion and requests information regarding their expertise and why it is relevant to the work of the IPCC or the UNFCCC. 4 There are several types of meetings in international environmental negotiations. Plenary meetings involve all the states and observers. Contact groups are smaller settings devoted to a single issue and are open to observers (yet, often observers do not get to speak). Informal settings, called “informals” or Friends of the Chair, are closed to observers. In climate, there are “informal informals” that are smaller still, and often devoted to drafting or having blunt political discussions on controversial issues. 54 Within the climate change negotiations, the impact of security concerns has held consequences for civil society’s tactics and agency (Hadden 2015; Orr 2016). Often, observers must inform security of the time, location, and nature of the demonstration. The consequences for breaking these rules are also set out in procedural rules, and can include permanent exclusion from the forum. Within these rules regarding acceptable behaviour, there may be less room for NGO networks to maneuver to align with the rules and norms. Shifting away from traditional identities and repertoires of action could marginalize actors within the network, ultimately stymying mobilization efforts. Some NGO networks will benefit from the rules governing observer engagement within the regime, as well as norms constituting appropriate observer behaviour. These rules marginalize other networks. Networks may not conform to the rules and norms because of their identity or their repertoire of action. Traditional repertoires of action, the means that the network uses to make its claims, are defining features of a network (e.g., unions strike) (Tarrow 1998). A repertoire of action conflicting with the dominant norms of how civil society engages in a given regime will marginalize the network as inappropriate or dissimilar to other, accepted civil society governors in the target regime. Divisions among NGOs may make some more likely to be non-conformists than others. Tarrow (2005) and Smith (2008) identify divides between reform-oriented and justice-oriented “activist solitudes.” Others have focused on the tactics, dividing between insider strategies, such as lobbying, and outsider strategies, such as protest and boycotts (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Orr 2006, 2007; Ciplet 2014). For Newell (2006), such justice-based NGOs and social movements are often “outsider-outsiders” with little access to international negotiations, operating outside of the institutionalized process using tactics such as civil disobedience or protest to argue that the 55 market is the cause of environmental problems. These social and environmental NGOs are increasingly playing the role of activists in climate change negotiations and mobilizing grassroots climate campaigns (Betsill 2015; Fisher and Galli 2015). Such nonconformists will find it difficult to mobilize in the target regime because of the norms of how observers ought to behave and interact with state delegates. Questioning the status quo, and actively protesting it, is unlikely to ingratiate outsider activists to mainstream climate governors, including states. Such noncompliant, even antisocial, behaviour given the norms of the target regime could marginalize a network and undermine their acceptance within the regime. Their reform-oriented counterparts, by contrast, will encounter fewer difficulties. Many of these NGOs have adopted more corporate forms of governance and moderated their claims and means of contention (Dauvergne and LeBaron 2014). Such NGOs often serve to provide expertise and lobby delegates in the hallways through socially-acceptable means. In Newell’s (2006) schema, such “insider-insider” NGOs have preferential access to delegates and a benign view of the market, while “insider-outsiders,” have access but lie on the periphery of civil society and the negotiations in part due to their critical view of markets. Often, these NGOs take on the role of diplomat, seeking to work with countries to develop better climate politics (Betsill 2015). In insider tactics, expertise is a valuable resource to states lacking information (Chasek 2001; Raustaila 1997), opening the door for these NGOs to be viewed as welcome diplomats. Repertoires of action are deeply engrained in a movement, speak to the core of its identity, and are unlikely to change. Networks can, however, try to claim belonging and fit within other procedural institutions. In the UN system, there are also institutions about how civil society can organize within the context of a given forum. Major groups, sometimes also called constituencies, are common 56 ways to categorize civil society groups and vary across forums. These groups have preferential access to the negotiations, information and delegates. They also may receive benefits such as invitations to meetings and organizational aids, such as meeting rooms and secretariat support. Within the UNFCCC, the constituencies vary in how they organize. All constituencies have a focal point, but use different mechanisms to hold that focal point accountable to how they represent the wider group (Kuyper and Bäckstrand 2016). The rules can offer advantages to some, but not all, NGO networks, in part based on their identity and on their ability to make a claim to belonging in a constituency. To a large extent, major groups or constituencies are identity based. For example, major groups categorized in Agenda 21 include “Women,” “Children,” “Science and Technology,” and “NGOs.” These are broad categories open to interpretation. NGOs within a network could make a claim to belong within a given category. The claim would have to be accepted by the Secretariat administering the rules regarding observers and by observers in that group. Making a claim to belonging in an established group that enjoys benefits of constituency or major group membership may be a difficult task, particularly if enlarging membership spreads the resources more thinly. The rule may be open to interpretation, but claiming space under the aegis of a major group or constituency may require ingenuity and relationship building. Another strategy to align with the procedural rules and norms is to argue for the adoption of institutions from other, similar forums. This is a considerable endeavor for an incoming NGO network with members still unproven and accepted within the target regime. Perhaps counterintuitively, this strategy could help new networks find recognition. By highlighting their inclusion and alignment with procedural rules and norms in a similar forum, the NGOs in the network appear more relevant, and perhaps less foreign, to the target regime. Associating itself 57 with a similar forum and related regime could help portray the NGO network as viable member of the target regime. The ability to align with these procedural institutions is generally not an a priori factor in the decision whether to target a given regime or forum. Some of the formal rules regarding observer participation may be evident through some prior research. The informal norms can have powerful impacts, but are not knowable to an outsider than never participated in the forum. Once in the network, NGOs can seek to change some rules and norms in their favour. Therefore, one cannot assume afterward that a given network mobilized within the regime because, in retrospect, a forum was particularly receptive to the network’s participation. These rules and norms shape the efforts of networks to mobilize within the regime, providing some with advantages, but only once they’ve started participating in the forum. Therefore, there are multiple sources of data required to study how aligned a network is with procedural institutions, as with the other central claims of the NGO forum multiplying framework. 2.3 Conclusion There is motivation to expand the scope of contention and attract new audiences to advance a NGO network’s issue. Until recently, many lamented the gridlocked state of multilateralism for several issues including trade and climate change (see for example Hale, Held and Young 2011). Therefore, one may expect to see a high degree of NGO mobility as NGOs migrate from a gridlocked regime for material, political, or normative reasons. Such mobility is conditioned on the capacity of the network to carry its authority into the new regime through internal solidarity and action by articulators, and their ability to leverage the institutions of the target regime to make a claim of belonging. 58 The following empirical chapters trace motivations and mobilization of the labour, gender, justice, health, and human rights networks to engage (or not) in the climate change regime. Before outlining these cases, a brief primer on the climate change regime is necessary. The following chapter outlines the subtle and flagrant shifts in the institutions and political openness of the climate change regime, centered on its central forum, the UNFCCC. 59 Chapter 3: Frames and Institutions in the Climate Change Regime This chapter provides the historical background of the climate change regime, while also operationalizing and tracing the shifts in the climate change regime’s dominant frames and the institutions that follow those understandings. These changes, I posit here and in the subsequent empirical chapters, created opportunities or presented constraints to NGO networks’ effort to forum multiply to the climate change regime. The shifts in the dominant frames created new opportunities for NGOs within networks to claim belonging in the climate change regime. Among these institutions, are those related to observers, and the subtly shifting relationship between the UNFCCC and observers. This is a unique view of the twenty-five year backdrop of the climate change regime built from historical documentation, interviews, and participant observation; subsequent empirical chapters focus on the actions of the NGO networks and their interactions with the climate regime. The chapter divides the history of the climate change regime into three periods. The first period begins with the start of negotiations for a climate change agreement in 1990 through 2005 when the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. The second period, 2006 to 2009, involves the intense negotiations for an agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol. During this period, the climate change regime took what many call the “adaptation turn.” Those within the regime encountered the evident effects of climate change, and started to call for the need to build resilience to the effects of climate change. The final period, 2010 to 2015, traces the resurrection of the climate change regime from the failure of 2009 in Copenhagen through to the Paris Agreement. Others have divided the history of the regime in ways best suited to their inquiries (see Gupta 2014; Hadden and Busby 2014; Hadden 2015). Here, I highlight shifts in the accepted frames and institutions of the regime, while using major historical milestones as bookends for 60 each period. Primarily, I follow the history of the UNFCCC, which Biermann et al (2009) and Hoffman (2006) convincingly argue is the focal point of the climate change regime. In the first period, the dominant framing portrayed a narrow view of climate change as an economic and environmental issue, while the burgeoning regime remained open to observers’ participation and influence. Together, these factors created fertile ground for a few types of NGOs representing environmental and economic issues to participate in and influence the regime. In the second period, a new frame began to gain widespread acceptance with the adaptation turn. It is during this period that forum multiplying from other regimes intensified. In the last period, the discursive environment continued to expand, albeit at a slower pace, with one additional and still contested frame regarding irreversible effects of climate change. Some rules related to observers narrowed access in several subtle but important respects. As a result, fewer new groups of NGOs forum multiplied to the climate regime, and some of those who were present previously found the constraints imposed too burdensome and left the hallways of the UNFCCC to pursue other strategies to influence climate politic. 3.1 Frames and Institutions, 1992-2005 This period includes a rapid development of international climate change law, in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, followed by years when the regime languished waiting for the Protocol to enter into force. In this early period, the burgeoning regime was open to non-state actors providing technical and scientific advice. Yet, the regime had a limited view of the climate change problem. As a result, a limited range of non-state actors participated, mostly from businesses, and environmental groups, which, respectively, represented 34% and 48.5% of 61 NGOs participating in meetings between 1995-2004.1 Excluding universities and think tanks, all other NGOs representing different issues comprised just 1.6%.2 These actors could participate in a manner conforming to the norms of non-state actor participation, and these actors aligned with the narrow scope within which actors discussed and understood climate change. The negotiations for the UNFCCC began in 1990, and culminated at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 where state leaders signed the Convention. The Convention quickly entered into force3 on March 1994.4 Shortly after entering into force at the first Conference of the Parties held in Berlin in 1995, parties agreed that the provisions in the Convention were inadequate to meet its objective to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climatic system. The resulting Berlin Mandate launched a process to strengthen commitments of developed countries through the adoption of a protocol or another legal instrument. By 1997, parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol. In eight years, states agreed to start addressing climate change through multilateral cooperation, and negotiated two legally binding agreements, one of which entered into force. From this point on, the pace slowed. The world’s largest emitter at the time, the US, walked away from the burgeoning regime at the time when the rules became stronger. President George W. Bush rebuked the Protocol in one of his first political announcements. The main reason offered was the Protocol threatened America’s economic competitiveness vis-à-vis major economies that did not have targets under 1 This is derived from the NGO participation database. 2 This information is derived from the NGO participation database developed for this research. I calculated the number of environmental and climate NGOs as “environmental NGOs” and traditional and renewable business NGOs as “business NGOs” for this measure. 3 Entering into force is the moment when the provisions of the legal instrument become legally binding for those countries that ratified the treaty. Signing the Convention is a largely symbolic act that indicates that a country intends to ratify. Ratification means that a country uses domestic processes or measures to indicate that it intends to be bound by the provisions of the international treaty. 4 For the UNFCCC to enter into force, 50 countries had to ratify the Convention. March 21, 1994 was the ninetieth day after the fiftieth country notified the UN that they had ratified the Convention. 62 the Protocol. America’s climate abstinence created a transatlantic “climate divide,” as the US and EU took opposite approaches to the issue (Busby and Ochs 2004; Schreurs, Selin and VanDeveer 2009). The focus shifted to the “Gang of Four,” Canada, Russia, Australia and Japan that with the EU could tally enough emissions representing a sufficient share of global emissions for the Protocol to enter into force.5 The negotiations over the rulebook of the Kyoto Protocol (later known as the Marrakesh Accords) included compromises on forest sinks to appease some Gang of Four members, particularly Russia.6 The generous rules for credits from forest sinks led some NGOs to refer to the Kyoto Protocol after the 2001 Marrakesh meeting “Kyoto Lite.”7 These concessions ultimately worked. With Canada, Japan, and finally Russia’s ratification, the Protocol entered into force February 16, 2005. With the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and domestic action sprouting in some states, climate change action seemed to become reality. European legislation was in place, including the European Emissions Trading Scheme that began January 1, 2005. Carbon markets were a significant part of the cautious optimism, as the International Emissions Trading Association and the World Bank write in the State and Trends of the Carbon Market, 2005: The regulatory framework of the carbon market has solidified considerably in the past 12 months, with the start of operations of EU ETS on January 1, 2005 and the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol on February 16, 2005. While regulatory uncertainty continues, notably for the registration of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects by the CDM Executive Board, the approval of climate mitigation plans in Japan and Canada, or the allocation plans under the EU ETS for the 2008-2012 period, the very 5 To enter into force, the Protocol has a double threshold mechanism. It requires at least 50 countries, representing at least 55% of global emissions to ratify. At the time, the US represented nearly 36% of global emissions. 6 Russia at the time represented approximately 18% of global emissions. Its ratification was vital to the Protocol entering into force. 7 For one example of environmental NGOs using this frame to explain the otherwise technical issues, see the New Scientist 8 November 2003: https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg18024200-300-kyoto-lite-fails/ 63 existence of policies constraining GHG emissions up to 2012 is no longer in doubt (IETA and World Bank 2005, 3). After years of inaction, many held hope that the future of climate action had arrived in 2005. Throughout this dramatic time, those undertaking climate change policy and holding such optimism understood and discussed the problem in strictly environmental and economic terms. 3.1.1 Dominant Frames and Institutions Governors in the early regime understood climate change as an abstract, environmental issue with potential consequences for some economic sectors. Discussions of the links between climate change and social and other environmental problems were absent because these issues were not yet part of the dominant frame held by actors within the climate change regime. As an environmental issue, those within the climate change regime discussed its effects as temporally distant, possibly mitigated through reducing emissions today. The Declaration from the Conference on a Changing Atmosphere in 1988 urged that “If rapid action is not taken now by the countries of the world, these problems will become progressively more serious, more difficult to reverse, and more costly to address.” 8 Environmental NGOs supported the view that climate change could be mitigated (Betsill 2008). Mitigation, not adaptation or building resilience to climatic effects, was the dominant way climate change actors understood as the appropriate response to the issue. In the effort to mitigate, actors identified two sources of climate change: the over use and inefficient use of fossil fuels and overpopulation. At the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, many speeches by heads of state and government mentioned overpopulation, particularly in the global 8 The Toronto Declaration cited several problems associated with climate change, including threatening: human health; global food security; fresh water resources; political instability; sustainable development; species; and ecosystems’ diversity and productivity. 64 South. Yet, the UNFCCC does not mention overpopulation. As Rahman and Roncerel (1994, 244-247) explain, southern-based NGOs ultimately convinced Northern NGOs to abandon their proposals to address population growth in developing countries and to appreciate Southern NGOs’ calls for per-capita GHG entitlement. Southern NGOs taught Northern NGOs about the realities of development, arguing that right to development included access to energy, and instead urging focus on consumption. In this way, Southern NGOs “emphasized that the debate must go beyond just the discussions of climate change as a scientific issue” (Rahman and Roncerel 1994, 246). In part based on these normative calls, rather than scientific appeals, the dominant frame contracted still more, to focus primarily on the energy sectors. Climate change was also understood as an economic issue. The decision for the UN General Assembly, and not the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) or the World Meteorological Organization, to oversee the negotiations on climate change highlights how climate change was set apart from other environmental issues. Brazil, India and other developing countries argued that climate change is inherently tied to modes of production. Countries did not make a similar case for the other “Rio Conventions” under negotiation at the time under the auspices of UNEP. The texts of the Convention and the Protocol reflect how actors in the climate regime understood the causes and solutions to the problem. The market mechanisms and flexibility options were intended to ease the economic burden of mitigation for developed countries. This economic understanding was widespread, a UNFCCC delegate recalls that when the Kyoto Protocol entered into force then Executive Secretary Michael Zammit Cutajar informed then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that the world had brought about one of the most significant 65 economic treaties in recent history.9 The narrow scope of the understanding of climate change and the focus on mitigation led the regime to connect to only a few sectors, which ultimately limited the types of claims possible by non-state actors. Others involved in the global governance of social issues, or other environmental issues aside from forests, had no opening to claim a legitimate place within the regime. 3.1.2 Relationship with Observers During the formative years of the climate change regime, the rules and norms of observer participation involved rather ad hoc arrangements later concretized into a more formal system. Few types of NGOs participated, largely environmental NGOs and business and industry NGOs, in line with the two frames of climate change dominant at the time. Toward the end of this period, other groups sought entry to the climate change regime. Parties established the rules governing non-state actor’s access to the climate regime and relationship with the Secretariat during this period. According to Article 7.6 of the Convention, NGOs and other observers “which [are] qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which [have] informed the Secretariat of [their] wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object (UNFCCC 1992). The Conference of the Parties approves these applications annually, to take effect the following year. With accreditation, observers can access plenary and contact group meetings, unless one-third of parties object.10 Further benefits are available to those NGOs able to participate in a constituency. 9 Developing country delegate, Interview with author 2013. 10 Rule 7 of the UNFCCC draft rules of procedure specifies, “observers may, upon invitation of the President, participate without the right to vote in the proceedings of any session, unless at least one third of the Parties present at the session object. COP decision 18/CP.4 clarifies that this rule also applies to open-ended contact groups. 66 Constituencies are broad groups of non-state actors that choose a focal point to communicate between the group and the Secretariat. The constituency arrangement in the climate change regime started to form before Agenda 21 established “Major Groups” at the Rio Earth Summit. During the negotiations for the Convention, environmental NGOs and business and industry NGOs formed loose groupings to coordinate among themselves and with the Secretariat. Later, these groups concretized into constituencies. As a result, the UNFCCC parallels the Major Groups established in Agenda 21.11 Parties approved additional constituencies for local government and municipal authorities in 1995, indigenous peoples in 2001, and research and independent NGOs in 2003. Constituencies confer benefits for those NGOs able, and choosing, to participate in the group. The Secretariat furnishes constituencies with information before and during a meeting, time to speak to the plenary when all states are present, and invitations to Ministerial receptions, technical workshops, bilateral meetings with officials, and regular meetings with the Executive Secretary of the Convention and co-chairs of key negotiating groups. Particularly open relationships with NGOs in the early years of the regime complemented the benefits of the constituency arrangements. NGOs capitalized on opportunities presented by the norms of political openness during this time. The intergovernmental negotiating committee established a uniquely open working arrangement with NGOs, in part because the complexity of issues led many negotiators to seek out NGOs’ opinions, and to use NGOs to test out ideas. As Rahman and Roncerel (1994, 250) observe, “the most controversial issues were not even brought to the main forum of negotiations 11 The Major Groups established by Agenda 21 are: business and industry, children and youth, farmers, indigenous peoples and their communities, local authorities, non-governmental organizations, the scientific and technological community, women, and workers and trade unions 67 until after consultations between the delegates and NGOs.” In the first historical period “closed negotiation sessions [were] historically the exception rather than the rule in the UNFCCC” (Climate Action Network 2006). Environmental NGOs could use their technical expertise, and their access, to inform the debates surrounding several contentious issues, particularly carbon trading and sinks (Betsill 2002). This period established open rules and norms of NGO participation. Of the five established constituencies, environmental NGOs and business and industry NGOs, outnumbered the rest in terms of delegation size and influence. These two dominant constituencies aligned with the two understandings of climate change – as an environmental issue and an economic issue. The few links evident to other areas limited the participation of other actors in the regime. The frames used to think about climate change, and consequently the institutions to govern the issue, were soon set to expand rapidly with the negotiations for an agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol, from 2006 to 2009. 3.2 Frames and Institutions, 2006-2009 During this time, parties engaged in negotiations to replace the Kyoto Protocol with a new legally binding agreement. A new frame spurred expansion into new issues. More than ever, actors discussed climate change in terms of its consequences, and linked forests in developing countries to mitigation. The rules and norms for political openness largely remained unchanged, despite the influx of new groups, some of which used the rules to gain constituency status. Non-environmental NGOs increased their participation dramatically, from 1.6% between 1995-2004 to 27.2% of all NGOs participating between 2006 and 2009; social NGOs alone accounted for 68 much of this increase, accounting for 22% of all NGOs. During this period, environmental NGOs accounted for 50.6% and business and industry NGOs represented 22.1% of total NGOs.12 At the 2005 meeting in Montreal, parties agreed to convene a two-year series of roundtable workshops called the “Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention,” commonly referred to as the Convention Dialogue. The Convention Dialogue roundtables discussed four issues: sustainable development, adaptation, technology, and market mechanisms. The first three of these issues were central for developing countries, particularly because these issues opened negotiation space for developing countries to raise their key issues. Sustainable development at the time referred to assisting developing countries to develop in a sustainable manner (today, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development makes clear that the Sustainable Development Goals are universally applicable). Technology discussions unlocked calls for transfers of technology to developing countries. Adaptation was also viewed as a developing country issue, despite the need for all countries to undertake adaptation efforts (Schipper 2006). For civil society actors, adaptation was increasingly discussed in side events, far more than in the previous years, and by a broader range of NGOs, including by NGOs linking adaptation to social issues (Hjerpe and Buhr 2014). The fourth issue, markets, represents a shift toward embracing market mechanisms as a norm of climate governance. The Clean Development Mechanism became increasingly popular; 12 This information is derived from the NGO participation database constructed for this research. As above, environmental NGOs are environmental and climate NGOs. Business and industry NGOs are both traditional and renewable businesses. The remaining amount reported are social NGOs and other NGOs, and excludes universities and think tanks. 69 62 projects were registered in 2005 compared to 427 and 433 in 2007 and 2008, respectively.13 Countries proposed new markets, including for reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries. The idea of reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+)14 garnered significant political attention, yet countries disagreed over the use of markets (Allan and Dauvergne 2013). The Dialogue concluded in 2007, before the conference in Bali, where parties agreed to the Bali Action Plan. As one observer points out, anyone following the Convention Dialogue would have foreseen the key elements of the Bali Action Plan.15 The Bali Action Plan constituted the negotiating agenda for the legally binding agreement set to be concluded in Copenhagen in 2009. The Plan consisted of four pillars for which negotiations proceeded: mitigation, adaptation, technology, and financing. Among mitigation issues, REDD+ had a dedicated space on the agenda. The negotiations for the new agreement occurred at a feverish pace over the next two years. Parties met four times a year (twice as often as usual practice), leading into the 2009 Copenhagen conference. The Copenhagen conference – called “Hopenhagen” by some – encountered, and ultimately disappointed, very high expectations. Negotiators walked into the meeting with a roughly 200-page negotiation text, and left having taken note of a five-page political agreement called the Copenhagen Accord.16 In the Accord, each country is to put forward its pledge to 13 Derived from data publicly available at: http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/CDMinsights/index.html 14 The full name of REDD+ is reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; including the role of conservation, sustainable forest management, and enhancement of carbon stocks. In 2005, it was introduced as reducing emissions from deforestation (RED). The other elements were included in 2007 as a compromise among the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, Brazil, India, and Congo Basin countries. 15 Anonymous, Interview May 20, 2014 16 The last two pages of the Accord contain blank tables, one for developed countries to register their quantified economy-wide emission target for 2020, and the other for developing countries to register their nationally-appropriate mitigation actions. 70 reduce emissions, creating a “bottom-up” approach to climate governance. Even REDD+, which to some was the most advanced text of the agenda items laid out by the Bali Action Plan, possibly even ripe for completion,17 received only a brief paragraph with little substance. Participants, NGOs, and the media widely considered the Copenhagen conference a failure of multilateralism. Yet, the Copenhagen debacle did not roll back any of the agenda-setting gains of developing countries. The issues of adaptation, REDD+, and means of implementation remained important in the subsequent discussions of how to move forward after multilateral failure. 3.2.1 Dominant Frames and Institutions The “adaptation turn” and interest in deforestation in developing countries in climate governance during this period widened the scope of how actors understood and discussed climate change. With this new frame, those advocating for issues related to developing countries, such as poverty alleviation or social issues, such as gender inequality, envisioned a role for themselves in the climate regime. It was during this period that a former Secretariat member recalls that “the politics of international development arrived in the climate change arena, including the NGOs and international organizations [IOs]. Suddenly, development and other NGOs and IOs arrived, telling us that we weren’t discussing an environmental issue anymore.”18 There was still a strong, vested core discussing climate change in strictly environmental, mitigation-centric terms. Some environmental NGOs worried that discussing climate change as also an adaptation problem could divert attention from the need to reduce emissions, as one NGO delegate recalls: 17 Developing country delegate, Interview March 19, 2014. 18 Anonymous former Secretariat member, Interview June 11, 2015. 71 CAN [Climate Action Network] didn’t want to talk about it – they worried that if we talk about adaptation we are giving up on mitigation. I had trouble explaining to them that there isn’t choice. For the poor it’s not mitigation, it’s dealing with impacts. Adaptation matters to a vast swath of the world for whom emissions are not a problem. Emissions are confined to those who are emitting, not to those who are feeling the impacts. These are different groups of people. Reducing emissions was the first, and for a long time the only framing, where people thought climate was A. environmental B. global and C. a faraway problem.19 Yet, the Bali Action Plan ushered adaptation to the center of climate change discourse, bolstered by the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report highlighted the impacts of climate change more than ever before, providing evidence of the emerging effects on natural and human environments, such as agriculture and forest management, human health, and Arctic activities like hunting or travel over sea ice (IPCC 2007). While there had been mentions of adaptation in the past, the 2007 Bali Conference was the turning point of adaptation for many, summarized by one NGO delegate: Bali was the culmination. When it came to restructuring the overall agreement – which is what the Bali Action Plan does, it lays the architecture of the post-Kyoto regime – the two building blocks are mitigation and adaptation. It was the first time adaptation was a major building block of the negotiations. Kyoto Protocol was nearly entirely mitigation. In Bali, adaptation was elevated to the same level. It was a gigantic win for the IPCC, for the science to be policy relevant, and for the UNFCCC to eventually take up the science.20 While all countries need to take adaptation measures as seas rise, agricultural patterns change, and droughts and fires increase frequency and severity, actors in the climate change regime discussed adaptation as a developing country issue. During a high-level event convened by the UN Secretary General, several states highlighted, or expressed solidarity with, small 19 Saleemul Huq, IIED, Interview with author 2015 20 Saleemul Huq, IIED, Interview with author 2015. 72 island developing states and least developed states as those bearing the brunt of climatic effects while contributing the least to the problem; indeed, one developing country delegate underscored that “development and adaptation efforts go hand-in-hand” (UNSG 2007). The climate frame expanded to discuss the effects of climate change in developing countries side by side with the environmental impetus to reduce emissions. 3.2.2 Relationship with Observers The political openness of the climate regime remained largely unchanged during this period. The rules regarding constituencies and NGO access to negotiations did not change. Informal practices started to shift, presenting subtle challenges to new civil society actors, setting the stage for diminishing political openness in future years. The constituency system of the UNFCCC admitted new groups. Using their status as a Major Group, labour unions, women and gender organizations, youth groups, and farming organizations requested constituency status during this period. Gaining this status, based on the same norm of using the Major Group system, would not prove as easy or straightforward as it did for constituencies established during the early days of the UNFCCC. The Secretariat established a provisional process for these groups to accede to constituency status. Under the new system, the group had to first apply, and if that application was accepted, they received provisional constituency status. After two years, the group submitted another application for full constituency status. This second application was, according to several respondents,21 detailed and lengthy, including a summary of all the activities undertaken by the group over the two-year period, a list of the organizations and individuals in the proposed 21 Multiple respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the reporting requirement under the provisional system: two from the labour unions; one from youth; and two from women and gender. 73 constituency, and a nominated organization, and an individual within that organization, to serve as the focal point. Most constituencies cleared these hurdles. The Trade Union NGOs became an official constituency in 2008. The Youth NGOs, Farmers, and Women and Gender had their status approved in 2009. The Farmers constituency received provisional status, which it still holds. The difficulty for the Farmers constituency was, and remains, in part that the group is decentralized and that the focal points were individuals who have fewer resources than an organization for coordinating group activities to prove their active role in the UNFCCC.22 With these additional constituencies, there are now nine, mirroring the Major Groups while excluding others groups that are not Major Groups in the UN system. No new constituencies will be eligible. Only one group, the Climate Justice Now! (CJN!) network, managed to make room in the constituency system. By declaring themselves an environmental group, they successfully negotiated an arrangement to split the environmental NGO constituency with Climate Action Network in 2009. CJN! and Climate Action Network both communicate with the Secretariat through their respective focal points, share invitations to events and use one minute each of the two-minute speaking time in plenary. This arrangement was meant to be temporary, but remains today.23 CJN! brought protest and civil disobedience tactics into the climate regime (see Hadden 2015), challenging old norms of NGOs ought to behave. In the early years, civil society presented their ideas in side events, provided policy briefs to governments and engaged delegates in information exchange. Starting with a “die-in” at a World Bank event to announce the Forest 22 Anonymous UN employee, Interview with author 2014. 23 Anonymous UN employee, Interview with author 2014. 74 Carbon Partnership Facility (designed to fund REDD+ projects) in 2007, CJN! brought new tactics, or repertoires of action, to the climate regime. The mass mobilization at the 2009 Copenhagen conference, and further rise of civil disobedience and protest strategies sparked new, informal arrangements and tighter security at climate negotiations. The unprecedented mobilization in Copenhagen exceeded the capacity of the conference center. In response, the Danish hosts significantly curtailed civil society’s access to the negotiations. The merging of movements and poor planning by the hosts contributed to the disenfranchisement of civil society (Fischer 2010). These new informal practices and rules would present new constraints on some civil society groups in the coming years, as parties tried to resurrect the climate regime. 3.3 Frames and Institutions, 2010-2015 The failure in Copenhagen to adopt a legally binding instrument, coupled with the rampant accusations of the lack of transparency for developing countries and civil society to remain involved, derailed the climate process. After Copenhagen, parties put the process back on the proverbial track as parties agreed to restart negotiations and, ultimately, adopted a new legally binding agreement in Paris in 2015. As states negotiated long-standing issues, very little changed in how actors understood climate change. During this period, the regime’s political openness began to close. Participation remained roughly similar, with few new types of NGOs participating, but increasing engagement of organizations representing social issues that already were engaged. In terms of overall participation, as Orr (2007) also identifies, the modern period of the UNFCCC has witnessed significantly more participation by NGOs, from 506 in 2002 to over 1880 NGOs accredited. Of the participating NGOs, environmental NGOs comprised 39%, 75 business and industry NGOs were 19.2% and social NGOs represented 41.8% of total NGOs attending UNFCCC meetings between 2010 and 2015.24 The 2010 Cancun Agreements started the resurrection of the regime through an agreement that advanced issues including REDD+ and climate finance. There was still the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period in 2012, and there was no agreement in place to replace or extend it. In 2011, countries agreed to establish a second commitment period, the details of which settled through agreements in 2012. The 2011 decision in Durban also included agreement to “develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties” to be completed by 2015 and to enter into force in 2020. The negotiations for the new agreement proceeded throughout 2012 to 2015. For the first two years parties again convened in roundtable, informal discussions. This process tabled several proposals and produced the concept of intended nationally determined contributions, a new, substantive version of the pledge system established by the Copenhagen Accord. These contributions would constitute the backbone of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change adopted in 2015. The Paris Agreement on climate change sets its sights to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2⁰C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5⁰C” (UNFCCC 2015). It does so by creating a machinery propelled by two gears: contributions and transparency. Every five years, parties are to submit a 24 This information is derived from the NGO participation database constructed for this research. As above, environmental NGOs are environmental and climate NGOs, business and industry NGOs are both traditional and renewable businesses. This measure includes only social NGOs, excluding those categorized as other, universities, and think tanks. 76 nationally determined contribution that is more ambitious than the last. There is a legally binding obligation to submit a more-ambitious contribution ever five years; the content of that contribution is not legally-binding. The Agreement does not tell or expect states to live up to a particular means of reducing emissions or adapting to climate change. In terms of transparency, parties are also to report on their progress meeting their contribution, which help inform a “global stock take” of collective efforts. The reporting requirement is legally binding. All parties will report, using a common framework to facilitate aggregation and comparability. The Agreement achieves a balance between mitigation and adaptation, in terms of its political importance and funding, including setting a long-term global goal for resilience and reduced vulnerability to climate change. The enthusiasm was palpable after ten years of negotiations. Whether the fervour can spur the required, ambitious action remains an open question. 3.3.1 Dominant Frames and Institutions During this period, the frames of climate change in terms of mitigation and adaptation remained relatively stable, only adding further emphasis to the effects of climate change in the form of loss and damage. Loss and damage refers to the irrevocable effects of slow and rapid onset events caused by climate change (e.g., prolonged drought, intensified natural disasters, sea level rise). As a newer issue on the agenda, there remain conceptual differences in how actors understand loss and damage (see Huq, Roberts and Fenton 2013). For developing countries, loss and damage occurs when both mitigation and adaptation prove insufficient. For developed countries, worried about the potential for liability and compensation claims, loss and damage is a subset of adaptation efforts. This latter view is captured in the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change adopted by the UNFCCC COP in 2013. Addressing loss and damage separate from 77 adaptation remained a central demand of developing countries throughout the negotiations for the Paris Agreement, right up until the final days before adoption.25 Again, this issue revolved around compensating developing countries to cope with the slow and rapid changes wrought by climate change.26 Actors discussed climate change in roughly the same terms, albeit acknowledging the grim reality of irrevocable damage; the political openness of the regime shifted too in subtle ways. 3.3.2 Relationship with Observers The non-violent disobedience and mass attendance at the Copenhagen COP paved the way for subtle changes closing NGO access. After Copenhagen, the Secretariat made several changes to NGO access. The Secretariat now allots a set number of badges, with input from observer organizations requesting a given number, to each accredited observer organization, limiting the delegation size. In 2015, some NGO representatives organizing their participation suggested that the organizations received about 20% of the badges that they requested.27 Security around UNFCCC meetings also increased, particularly in relation to protests. Since 2010, NGOs must register their demonstrations and get the approval of Security. Failure to secure approval can have consequences, including being “debadged,” which means being asked 25 The Paris agreement addresses mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage in separate articles, creating conceptual separation between these issues. This separation was achieved through compromise, developing countries agreed to remove any reference to liability or compensation from the Agreement, and to explicitly state in the decision accompanying the Agreement explicitly excluding liability and compensation. 26 Examples of loss and damage in developed countries could include the pine beetle epidemic in British Columbia, and Hurricane Katrina or Superstorm Sandy in the US. 27 Discussion with Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC 78 to leave the conference and not being allowed back inside.28 In some cases, for particularly disruptive protests, the individuals deemed responsible lost their badges permanently.29 Further, the introduction of new forms of protest – particularly non-violent, civil disobedience outside the venue – highlighted and questioned the norm of how NGOs ought to engage in the climate process. The outsider tactics used by some movements, NGOs and individual activists were not well received by many within the climate regime. While many NGOs supported a civil society walk out of the negotiations in 2013, the Climate Action Network could not participate because some of its membership disagreed. Some Climate Action Network members even complained to the heads of some of the organizations planning the walk out, to stop it.30 The norm that NGOs in the UNFCCC should provide information and engage more muted forms of protest inside the venue facilitated the strategies of some groups, while presenting constraints to others’ organizing efforts. 3.4 Conclusion This chapter sets the stage for the following empirical chapters by outlining the changes within the climate change regime to which actors within NGO networks responded. The changes in the frames and institutions, and political openness created opportunities for some actors, while constraining others. The interplay of developments within the climate change regime, and NGO networks’ collective ability to capitalize on the opportunities, or overcome the challenges completes the narrative of NGO forum multiplying. 28 Some activists have been debadged temporarily. Others, such as Lord Monkton who is a long-attending, infamous climate denier, lost his badge permanently for impersonating a state and making an intervention during plenary. 29 In 2011, Kumi Naidoo, Executive Director of Greenpeace, lost his badge for participating in a sit in (there were questions if he actually organized it, or was a late participant). It was announced that he would be barred from the UNFCCC permanently, but this was later reversed. In 2012, Lord Christopher Monckton impersonated a party and permanently lost his ability to attend UNFCCC meetings. 30 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview March 3, 2014; Ulrike Röhr, LiFE e.V., Interview with author 2014. 79 Chapter 4: Labour-Climate Network Calls for a “just transition” and green jobs for workers started to murmur in the halls of the UNFCCC in 2005 and by 2015 were installed in some institutions of the UNFCCC, included in the Paris Agreement, and used by environmental groups and states to make the case for climate action. Labour fulfills the three aspects of forum multiplying. First, the labour movement participated in the UNFCCC in greater numbers each year, from three organizations with 31 delegates in 2006, to 12 organizations bringing 195 delegates to the Paris conference in 2015. The labour movement has undertaken a long-term engagement involving public acts of participation, working with climate governors from government ministers and civil society. Second, the just transition frame underscores a deep commitment to supporting action on climate change. It is a rallying cry meant to bring together the labour movement and help climate governors achieve their goals. The frame puts climate action at its center: at the World Congress of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) in 2014 the slogan was “there are no jobs on a dead planet.” Third, labour achieved broad recognition as a climate change governor. States created space in the response measures forum for a just transition of the workforce, and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in 2010. Among civil society, labour had a central role in the C-7, an informal coalition of high-profile NGOs campaigning on climate change, including the largest civil society organizations in the development, faith, environment, and labour sectors. The point of the C-7 is to show cross-sectoral solidarity to climate action; each of the members serves as a representative of a larger cause, be it labour, development, environment, or another issue.1 These 1 The C-7 recently expanded to include the CIDSE – the international alliance of Catholic development agencies. 80 high-level organizations forged this political alliance through mutual recognition of each other as a key organization, and interpersonal communication and trust built among the leaders of these organizations.2 By 2015, C-7 with the B Team,3 and We Mean Business4 signed declaration titled “Call for Dialogue: Climate action requires just transition.” The declaration includes calls for investment in jobs, guaranteed social protections (including income support, retraining and redeployment for workers in fossil-fuel industries), and social dialogue with all relevant parties (ITUC 2015). In short, the labour movement clearly adopted and pursued a successful forum multiplying strategy to join the climate change regime. The movement engaged in a public act, directed at the climate change governors through sustained, increased participation within the UNFCCC. It linked its core issues – workers’ rights and job creation and protection – to climate change through the just transition frame. Finally, these efforts found recognition by state and non-state actors. Labour became a recognized actor in the climate change regime. This chapter traces how and why the labour movement managed to overcome considerable initial reluctance – even outright opposition – to labour’s presence in the climate change talks. The labour movement’s migration to climate change is not an inevitable result of the impacts of the Kyoto Protocol or other climate legislation on workers; objectively, the Protocol catalyzed little action, leaving any employment repercussions unrealized. Climate policy did not cause employment impacts forcing labour to respond. Rather, the labour 2 Annabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview with author 2014 3 The B Team is a group of global business and civil society leaders, from Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland to Richard Branson, working to redefine the role of the private sector away from profit and toward social, environmental and economic benefit. 4 We Mean Business is a coalition of 372 businesses and 182 investors seeking to promote a transition to a low-carbon economy. 81 movement started work in anticipation of the challenges and opportunities that climate policy could materialize. Facilitated by the UN Environment Program in the early years, the labour movement overcame internal differences and seized upon opportunities to bring their movement and find new allies within climate politics. Labour was among the first to leverage procedural rules to their advantage, while positioning the support of labour as a powerful force to make climate action politically palatable and practically feasible. 4.1 Labour-Climate Network Trade unions hold many identities and serve several functions, as third sector organizations (Adaman and Yahya 2002), as a social partner of government and business (Pochet 2002), or as a social movement (Rucht 1999). Unions are in some ways unique, not exactly NGOs or social movements in terms of their structural place in the economy. Unlike other non-state actors, unions can withhold labour, bringing a company or a service to a halt; this power can translate into bargaining concession from businesses or governments. Yet, the international labour unions share features with the gender NGOs and justice movement explored in subsequent chapters. First, the unions are separate entities collaborating through formal and informal means to try to reconcile differences through collaboration. Second, unions represent an issue previously foreign to those within the climate regime. Unions faced the same pressure to prove that they, and labour issues, belong in the climate change regime. While international trade unions hold a different structural place in the economy than other non-state actors, they are treated as observers to the process, rendering them largely unable to exert that structural power in the UNFCCC. The network did not radically change through its engagement with climate change, yet there were individual gains made by the ITUC. Table 4-1 and figures 4-1 and 4-2 highlight three 82 aspects of the labour-climate network. First, the network grew through its engagement with climate change actors. Among the ITUC’s newer connections of the ITUC in the second period are the Climate Action Network, ActionAid, Greenpeace, and the WWF. This larger network means that information about labour issues and especially about labour and climate issues could spread to more organizations than before. The ITUC is well placed to receive and distribute this information. Figure 4-1: Labour-climate network, 2005-2008 83 Figure 4-2: Labour-climate network, 2009-2015 Measure 2005-2008 2009-2015 Size (number of nodes) 481 593 Centrality In-Degree Out-Degree Average Degree In-Degree Out-Degree Average Degree ITUC 33 81 57 43 77 60 Public Services International 10 27 18.5 10 27 18.5 European Trade Union Confederation 9 16 12.5 11 14 12.5 Building and Wood Workers Union 8 16 12 9 19 14 Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics of the labour-climate network Second, the network is centralized around the ITUC. The ITUC is both prestigious and influential both when the labour movement started to undertake its forum multiplying strategy and later, when it, and the movement, were becoming a recognized actor within the climate 84 process. This is perhaps not surprising, given the centralized nature of the movement. The transnational labour movement is comprised of trade and labour unions in a hierarchical relationship: local chapters are part of national unions, and national unions in turn are affiliates of international federations. The international federations liaise through the Council of Global Unions. Since 2006, the international movement has been largely coordinated by the ITUC which became the world’s largest trade labour union federation through the merger of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the World Confederation of Labour. The ITUC stands alone as a central actor in the network, receiving and sending information throughout the network. ITUC’s position as a peak association for labour likely facilitates the mobilization of workers more easily than less centralized networks. Unions keen to engage in the UNFCCC would not need to seek their own accreditation or devote resources to learning the procedural rules of engagement, or the substantive rules up for negotiations. Rather, affiliates of the ITUC can simply request to participate under the ITUC’s accreditation, and in the process, leverage the resources, experience, and knowledge of ITUC members already engaged. In a less centralized network, there are fewer easy routes for new organizations to undertake work in the new forum while expending fewer resources. Third, one measure of centrality increased over time. The in-degree, or prestige, of the ITUC increased as the movement’s engagement continued. In the first period, the ITUC was a central actor in part because of its position as the largest international confederation of trade unions. In the second period, its central position in the network benefitted further from connections with others that looked to the ITUC for advice, and some adopted the stances of the ITUC. The BlueGreen Alliance is an organization comprised of labour and environmental NGOs 85 based in the US. It looks to the ITUC’s for expertise and positioning on several issues in the UNFCCC.5 Within the broader labour movement, other global union federations adopted similar formulations of the just transition frame as negotiated by the ITUC members (described below), including the International Transport Workers’ Federation and the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions (Rosemberg 2010). The central position of the ITUC eliminated a need for a new alliance or secretariat devoted to the link between climate change and labour. Whereas the gender, justice and even health networks established partnerships or alliances to convene those organizations interested the links between their issues and climate change, labour did not. The ITUC could coordinate the network and establish the trade union NGO constituency in the UNFCCC without creating a new organization or loose network. For such a centralized network with a strong gatekeeper willing to devote itself to the new cause, a new venture, with the attendant startup costs would be redundant. Potentially, this may have helped the ITUC retain its central position, although there may have been few other organizations willing to take on the coordinating role, and even the focal point at the ITUC for labour “has to be diplomatic at all times” due to the differing views of how labour could and should engage on climate change policy.6 These differing views would also impact 4.2 Motivations The labour movement has a history of involvement in environmental issues. For a core group of individuals within the labour movement, there was a strong, normative motivation to 5 Ashley Huago, interview with author 2014. 6 Peter Colley, in an interview with author in 2014; anonymous labour delegate, interview with author 2014 seconded this view that the ITUC would be one of the few organizations willing and able to coordinate the labour movemet. 86 take on climate-change related work. Shifts in the mid- and late- 2000s, including the conclusion of work in other international forums, and the signals that major economies would undertake climate change policies, provided these individuals with opportunities to convince unions of their political motivations to participate in climate change work. In many ways, the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and the signals of impending climate policy served as an exogenous shock: unions had little foreknowledge of the events that held ramifications for their movement. Those normatively motivated in the network to participate in climate change efforts could use the exogenous shock to their advantage to further mobilize the network in the context of climate change. Funding, however, was of little motivation for many, in part due to the limited long-term funds available but also because unions use membership dues for much of their work. Most funding went to unions in developing countries. UNEP provided over $500,000 to SustainLabour for a project on Strengthening Union Participation in International Environmental Processes 2007-2010 (SustainLabour 2010). SustainLabour, which is devoted to capacity building among unions in developing countries to promote awareness of an action on climate change and sound chemicals management, sustained a 20% reduction in grants in 2010 and 2011 before closing in 2016 (SustainLabour 2010, 2011, n.d.). Even the ITUC finds it difficult to access climate funding. For some, using internal funds creates independence from the demands of donors: We [ITUC] don’t have much, in the way of external funds, but this also makes us more resilient. We work with membership money. Funders aren’t interested in funding us, they don’t want us, and we’ve tried. It makes us resilient because, well for other groups that focus more on an outcome-based funding, they have to prove they’ve done something to get more funding later. That logic doesn’t work for climate. It’s a generational struggle. 87 We can keep going in the struggle without proving that we’ve accomplished something over and over just to survive.7 Normative desires to take up the generational struggle were strong within a core of individuals within the labour movement. For those working on health and safety, the labour movement is also an environmental movement, 8 providing a significant group of labour activists willing to work on climate change for normative reasons. For many of those involved in the early forum multiplying efforts, the public attention for the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) published in 2007 was a turning point in the awareness of climate change issues among union affiliates. In its AR4, the IPCC declared that warming in the climate system is “unequivocal,” and cited observational evidence of the effects of global warming on various ecosystems on all continents (IPCC 2007). The IPCC provided the scientific clarion calls helpful to convince members to join the mobilization within climate change through educational programs and presentations provided (still today) to any interested union, with one underlining “when you know the science, how can you be silent?”9 There is generally a core group of unionists involved in environmental issues and it is traditionally difficult to expand an environmental issue to the wider movement.10 Political space on labour’s agenda would open up in the mid-2000s as work in other areas completed. Previously, unions were engaged at the international level working to help develop new ILO 7 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview March 3, 2014 8 Peggy Nash, MP, interview 2014; Brian Kohler, IndustriALL, interview 2014. 9 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC; Brian Kohler, IndustriALL; Philip Pearson, TUC. All were involved in the early mobilization of labour unions in the climate change regime. Ms. Rosemberg is currently responsible for training ITUC members on climate change issues. All these actors cited the IPCC as a key turning point in their thinking and desire to engage in climate change as a labour movement. 10 Peggy Nash, MP. Ms. Nash was speaking from her experience with the Canadian Auto Workers Union in the mid-2000s, when she attended climate change meetings for the union. 88 standards, while also lobbying within the WTO to protect workers’ rights. These challenges overwhelmed the attention of a labour movement that was reluctant to engage in the climate issue beyond a core group within the movement.11 Despite getting climate change on the agenda of the health and safety working group of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in 1995, there were many distractions and difficulties, as an ICFTU employee responsible for its health and safety work at the time recalls: It was heavy slogging [to get the labour movement to pay attention to climate change], it was a movement that wasn’t terribly open to the topic, and had a lot of other fish to fry. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, we saw slowly-emerging attacks on trade unions by national governments. These became a huge preoccupation. Then, in addition to these concerns were emerging trade issues, debates about the WTO, but it didn’t immediately hit home to many unions of the impacts of the new trade rules on workers within their own national borders. You had trade unions coming to occupational health and safety committee, saying that ISO [International Organization for Standardization] standards set by the ILO were attacking the OHS [occupational health and safety] standards. At least 85% of energy of the [health and safety] Committee was devoted to OHS despite the fact that we had a mandate to work on the environment.12 In the mid-2000s, much of this work ended and attention turned toward climate change. The ILO became involved in the ISO’s work to develop a standard for social responsibility. This standard was one example of the International Organization for Standardization trying to establish standards for the world of work, which potentially undercut the equal say in decision making in the ILO’s tripartite decision making system (Biondi 2015). By the mid-2000s, it was agreed that the social responsibility standard would serve as a set of guiding principles only, and an agreement was reached between the ILO and the International Organization for Standardization that recognized the ILO’s competence over labour standards (ILO n.d.). While 11 Lucien Royer, Canadian Labour Congress, interview with author 2014. 12 Lucien Royer, Canadian Labour Congress, interview with author 2014. 89 labour unions still watch the work of the International Organization for Standardization closely,13 much of the labour-related work in the Organization started to wind down, creating space to consider and act on climate change issues.14 Other political pushes were required to bring more unions on board. For those motivated by normative reasons, the space on the agenda created by decreasing work in the ILO and WTO was enough to turn their gaze to climate change work. For other unions, it took an exogenous shock capable of threatening some workers’ rights to bring other unions into the climate change arena. These signals were the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and signs that several major economies seemed poised to pass climate legislation. This put many unions in a reactionary position: Around the Montreal meeting [December 2005], unions were asked to react on climate-related things that they had not previously considered. They were being asked for their positions and their opinions on different things that had happened, especially now that the Protocol was in force and there was a discussion about starting to negotiate a new treaty. Unions needed a policy and we started building that.15 Labour members had little advance knowledge of the potential effects widespread climate policy could have for labour, positively or negatively. It sent a strong enough signal that sufficient demand among ICFTU members to agree to write a position and provide input to the first meeting of the parties of the Kyoto Protocol.16 In the scramble to formulate a policy (these internal negotiations are detailed below) some unions, particularly in the US, assumed the positions of their national governments, while others appeared to borrow their positions from 13 For example, see ITUC’s statement “ISO is Failing the Standard Test” regarding the work of the Organization to establish a standard for occupational health and safety systems. Available at: http://www.ituc-csi.org/iso-is-failing-the-standard-test?lang=en 14 Lucien Royer, interview with author 2015. 15 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview 2014 16 Lucien Royer, Canadian Labour Congress, interview with author 2015. 90 environmental groups.17 With the Bush years ending in the late 2000s, many union members anticipated a Democratic government possibly more open to climate policy.18 For American unions, the election of President Barack Obama in 2008 further signaled climate policy was on its way, which required reactions from unions on both sides of the climate issue.19 Particularly in the early years of unions’ engagement, unions fell into two camps: those that were “very anti-Kyoto, anti-climate” and those committed to the issue.20 Among American unions, there was considerable conflict about the overall stance, and some powerful unions were generally against climate change policy, or denied the existence of climate change in the early 2000s. Within these large federations, such as the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the largest federation of unions in the US, views conflicted, as some sought to fight against environmental regulation, despite the presence of some progressives within the federation.21 These unions encountered a new administration with very different views than President George W. Bush. President Obama, who had made climate change a prominent part of his campaign, spoke of a “Green New Deal” with other world leaders.22 Several credit this signal sent by the American election – and the considerable hope for change that accompanied it – with the more progressive stance taken by some American unions and the engagement of new unions. 17 Anonymous labour delegate, interview with author 2014. This delegate has written and advocated for consideration of climate change issues in his union’s work, and for technological solutions since 1992. His union has been engaged sporadically in the UNFCCC since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. 18 Anonymous, interview with author 2014. 19 Philip Pearson, TUC, interview with author 2014; Peter Colley, interview with author 2014; Ashley Haugo, interview with author 2014. 20 Anonymous labour delegate, interview with author 2014. 21 Labour union delegate who asked that these comments be off the record, interview with author 2014. 22 “Ban urges leaders at Davos to forge ‘Green New Deal’ to fight world recession.” UN News Centre; with breaking news from the UN News Service. UN News Centre, 29 Jan 2009. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29712#.Vvm4IkeYH74 91 Under the President George W. Bush’s administration, unions in the US were conflicted about their overall stance and the “miners were the tail that was wagging the dog.”23 President Obama’s election made it clear to some unions that the US was going to change its trajectory on climate change, which created optimism among unions that were for climate policy that policies were on the way.24 Others observed that “aside from Obama being more ready to engage with the climate issue, the ending of the Bush era gave unions more room to move with their own constituency and with less fear of being attacked by business.”25 Participating in climate change regime became a necessity for many unions, including those worried about their workers being pushed out of a fossil fuel-free economy and others seeking to outwit employers and secure worker’s rights in a new context. In the mid-2000s, those normatively motivated to participate in climate change policymaking were presented with a series of political motivations that would help mobilize other unions to engage in climate change. There was finally space on labour’s international agenda for these advocates to bring climate issues to the fore. They could make the case that to continue to address labour rights would require participation in new forums. At the same time, the climate change regime provided further impetus. Unions were confronted with a potential threat to jobs, or opportunities for job creation from an area of global governance about which few had experience or policy positions. In many ways, the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and the possibility of climate change policy forthcoming in major economies was an exogenous shock. Labour had little prior 23 Anonymous, interview with author 2014. 24 Ashley Haugo, interview with author 2014; Philip Pearson, TUC, interview with author 2014. Mr. Pearson was one of the central figures of the early engagement in climate change by the labour movement. He chaired several coordination meetings of the nascent trade union NGO constituency in the UNFCCC from 2007-2009. 25 Anonymous labour advocate, interview with author 2014. 92 knowledge that these events would occur and hold the potential to transform the job market. While businesses had been involved in climate change advocacy for years (see Chapter 3), labour was inexperienced and outmaneuvered. The only way to respond would be to participate in the climate change regime, and seek to influence climate policy to advance workers’ rights. While funding helped unions participate in the initial years, it was not a sustaining motivation. Labour unions forum multiplied to the climate regime for normative and political reasons. Those normatively committed to the climate cause found space for the issue when openings emerged, and others saw the necessity of addressing climate change as part of their ongoing political efforts to protect members against the exploitative business practices. 4.3 Mobilization in the Climate Change Regime Throughout the history of the UNFCCC, a small contingent of members of the labour movement would participate. As Figure 4-3 below shows, this participation rapidly and significantly increased in the mid-2000s. The figure also highlights the ability of a few associations of global unions to mobilize supporters. Throughout 2005 and 2006 a small number of unions coordinated at UNFCCC meetings, association meetings and workshops convened by UNEP (discussed more below). By 2007 at COP13, the labour movement mobilized over 80 delegates to the official negotiations and over 100 delegates overall attended the conference in Bali – roughly doubling the number of participating delegates in 2005. In 2015, 186 delegates from 12 unions officially registered in the UNFCCC and over 400 union delegates in total campaigned under the banner “there are no jobs on a dead planet.” 93 Figure 4-3: Labour unions’ participation in the UNFCCC From 2005 to 2007, there was limited participation, mostly among individuals within the labour movement who were interested in the climate issue, rather than those unionists who were opposed to climate change action. Those who were committed to the issue but were not institutionally linked to each other, or to the UNFCCC.26 Coordination and lobbying proved difficult. The ICFTU “sent one person [to the Montreal meeting in 2005] who was well informed on the content but not keyed up on the process. He meandered around the first meeting wondering what to do with this paper [an early report on green jobs] that he had.”27 Labour advocates felt like outliers; several union advocates attended, more than previously, yet as a 26 Anonymous delegate who was at the Montreal meeting. Interview May 28, 2014. 27 Lucien Royer, Interview with author 2015. Mr. Royer led the ICFTU’s work on health and safety and was a key actor advocating for the inclusion of climate change in its work. 02468101214050100150200250199519961997199819992000200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015OrganizationsDelegatesYearDelegatesOrganizations94 Canadian union delegate recalls, many wondered why they attended, unable to find an opening to approach delegates or navigate the process.28 Several ideas germinated among members of the labour movement through 2006 on how best to engage on climate change issues in a way that could be supported by all members. Within the UNFCCC, they met negative views of unions’ involvement. It became clear to many in the labour movement as early as 2006 that the perception that others within the UNFCCC had of union involvement was “very far from what we thought we were bringing.”29 Commonly, unionists would be asked “you don’t work on climate, why are you here?”30 or, more positively, “wow, why is labour interested in this?”31 Unions were confronted by negative reactions to their presence from environmental NGOs especially who worried that unions would obstruct progress in the negotiations.32 At this time, there was sensitivity to ongoing climate denial and climate governors were skeptical of the contributions the labour movement would bring. One way to combat this skepticism is with a united, progressive message, but internal rifts were an obstacle. Early formulations of climate-labour links articulated in 2006 called for “investments in a mix of clean, green and sustainable energy sources” and for the development of new technologies, including carbon capture and storage (ITUC 2006b). Despite this nod to fossil fuel industries, the internal rifts persisted and potentially helped to mobilize many unions to the climate change regime: 28 This respondent asked that these comments be kept off the record, interview with author, 2014. 29 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, interview with author 2014. Ms. Rosemberg was at the time a key member of the ITUC and SustainLabour working on the inclusion of climate change in their agenda of the international labour movement. She is currently the Policy Officer Occupational Health & Environment at ITUC and the UNFCCC focal point for the Trade Union NGO constituency. 30 Anonymous labour advocate, interview with author 2014 31 Ashley Haugo, Interview with author 2014 32 This labour advocate asked that these comments be off the record, interview with author, 2014 95 The crystallizing thing was before the Bali meeting [in 2007] - we are a large organization, but our work went unnoticed for the large part. Then information started oozing out among the affiliates. We got the attention of the coal unions in the US who really took objection to our work. This woke everyone up. We got a critical mass of trade unions, and everybody was overwhelmed by the apparent complexity of the discussions. This got a consensus that we needed to establish a working group specifically for climate change. The 2007 COP in Bali was the first major mobilization of the labour movement on climate change. The ITUC had a 91-member delegation representing 23 countries (ITUC 2007). Unions actively spread their message, including through side events, plenary statements, a joint press conference with the ILO and UNEP, a training workshop for unionists to learn more about climate change issues, and daily internal coordination meetings. ITUC organized meetings with delegations of 15 countries, and with the EU delegation to brief these delegates on labour-related issues (ITUC 2007). One of the side events featured the analyses and positions of unions from the global north and south, as well as newly courted allies such as Ministers of Environment from Spain, the UK and France, business groups in clean energy, and the Sierra Club.33 In Copenhagen, unions were a key part of the largest demonstration ever gathered to demand action on climate change. During the civil society march held December 12, union delegates and supporters marched under the banner “Unions have Solutions.” The message outside on the streets aligned with the movement’s actions inside the conference venue. Within the Bella Centre, the union presence was substantial, at over 200 participants. This turn out is particularly impressive given the difficult circumstances created by the poor organization of the conference and lack of transparency (see Chapter 3). Unions convened the inaugural “Work for 33 For a summary of one such side event titled “Green Jobs and Skills: Drivers for Climate Transitions,” see Earth Negotiations Bulletin on the Side coverage: http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop13/enbots/12dec.html 96 Work (WOW) Pavilion,” which included 28 workshops and attracted more than 1000 participants (ITUC 2009a). Labour delegates held meetings with over 19 country delegations, and ITUC reports show that several meetings with delegations were cancelled due to reduced access to the venue during the second week of the negotiations (ITUC 2009a). The response of the labour movement to the failure in Copenhagen varied. As outlined in an unpublished memo, several American groups were satisfied that developed countries did not take on targets while allowing major economies off the hook. For these unions, their concern was losing jobs to countries without climate change policies. The AFL-CIO questioned the value and legitimacy of the UN process going forward, given that a handful of states successfully blocked the adoption of the Accord.34 The ITUC was disappointed: The lack of ambition in the emission reduction targets pledged by the United States, coupled with a minimalist pledge subject to stringent conditionality for financing adaptation in developing countries, the incapacity of the European Union to move to a target of a 30% reduction in GHG emissions from 1990 levels, and in general the negative position of all developed countries to agreeing on a second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol all reinforced an environment of mistrust and conservatism on the part of the emerging economies (ITUC 2010). Despite multilateral failure, the ITUC concluded that their years of engagement in climate change had proved effective because the draft negotiation texts included references to achieving a just transition and to the creation of decent work, as well as to workforce development and vocational training in the technology transfer section.35 Less tangible gains were also reported, including strengthening relationships among climate change delegates. Other 34 Unpublished memo cited in Sweeney (2014). 35 The draft text going into the Copenhagen negotiations included references such as: assessing labour market impacts and adopting transition measures; promoting labour-management initiatives for greener workplaces; and using labour policies to create green jobs, green existing jobs, and phase out unsustainable jobs (UNFCCC 2009: 59) 97 civil society groups recognized the labour movement as a legitimate player, including by climate change NGOs and others who could consider unions’ positions conservative (ITUC 2010). At the UNFCCC meeting in Cancun in 2010 further recognition emerged. Parties established a forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures to climate change.36 One area of work in this forum was devoted to a just transition of the workforce, and the creation of decent work and quality jobs. This forum provided an opportunity for the ITUC to present its views directly to parties. While the response measures forum remained to some delegates involved in the negotiations a “negative space with some baggage”37 the labour movement used the space provided and in 2015 argued for an institutionalized process to use the information shared in the forum to inform decisions taken by the UNFCCC.38 The early wins in the Cancun Agreement proved a useful stepping stone to demand more, but fell short of the legally-binding agreement the many in the labour movement demanded. These wins were enough to stay in the climate change arena. Labour had a forum to discuss and advance workers’ rights in the context of climate change. Further, they had secured support from key actors. Ministers agreed that labour’s support was necessary for political will and NGOs started to accept labour as a positive force in the negotiations. Through 2011 to 2015, the labour movement became a mainstay of climate change activism leadership. The movement mobilized another large presence in 2011, drawing heavily from unions from South Africa, the host country.39 In 2012, the labour movement was a key 36 The response measures forum was created as a compromise to appease some countries in the Arab Group, which pushed for a discussion of the negative impacts of climate change policies on oil-producing countries. The development of a work programme remained controversial for years. 37 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview with author 2014. 38 Oral statement delivered to the SBSTA opening plenary 1 December 2015. 39 NGO participation database developed for this project. 98 organizer for the first ever public march in the history of the Qatar, the host for that year. Despite the Qatari government’s edict outlining that the march was only to speak about environmental issues, local papers reported that Sharan Burrow, the General Secretary of the ITUC spoke out on migrant rights in the context of the upcoming World Cup in Qatar and she ultimately secured a meeting with the Acting Minister of Labour.40 The location of the climate change conference provided an opportunity for the labour movement to engage on another of its key issues: abuses of migrant workers. This proved a tangible benefit of forum multiplying: by engaging on climate change, the labour movement could advance labour rights in the context of climate change and speak directly to actors they may otherwise not have access to. The next year in Warsaw civil society staged a walk out of the negotiations. The ITUC was a crucial actor in the organization and execution of the walkout on its own and as part of the C-7. WWF came to the Warsaw conference with a mandate to undertake an action such as a walkout, if the negotiations derailed – but only if other organizations, particularly the ITUC agreed to participate.41 The ITUC was seen as a linchpin because it is difficult for a large, membership-based organization to take such an unprecedented action. The sentiment seemed to be if the ITUC agreed, then action was warranted. Greenpeace was the last member of the C-7 to sign on to the walkout. The Climate Action Network did not participate, and some of its members tried to derail the walkout.42 Still, the central role of ITUC further cemented their relationships with civil society and recognition as a member of climate civil society actors. 40 Published in the Qatar Times on Monday, 3 December. 41 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, interview with author 2014; anonymous delegate from an environmental NGO, interview with author 2015. 42 The respondent asked that these comments be kept off the record, interview with author 2014. From personal observation, members of Climate Action Network continued to participated in the Warsaw climate change conference while other NGOs walked out. This led to some confusion among delegates. 99 The walkout was the first time labour unions had left any international negotiation. Rather than de-mobilize supporters uncomfortable with the new strategy, the labour movement remained mobilized. The Secretariat limited trade unions badges and the ITUC only received 65 badges to the 2014 meeting in Lima, yet 86 delegates participated inside the negotiations by sharing badges or trading with others, and 140 union delegates in total were present and many others participating through their own accredited union or on their government’s delegation.43 The ITUC continued briefing governments, but also maintained regular consultations with the other C-7 members (ITUC 2014). The labour movement maintained these strong numbers at the 2015 conference in Paris. Nearly 200 delegates attended as formal registrants. These participants arrived at the conference having already concluded that any agreement would be likely insufficient to immediate raise the ambition of climate action to a level commensurate with the crisis. The unions’ stance, which aligned with most of civil society, positioned Paris as the beginning, not the end of efforts to address climate change. In her address to the high-level segment, Burrow called on the Paris Agreement to launch “what will by necessity be the largest and most rapid systems change in human history with ambition…with civil society… we ask you to accept that this is not just an environmental agreement but a future that cannot be achieved without people” (ITUC 2015). While there is only one reference in the Paris Agreement to a just transition, union delegates viewed this as a foundation to build upon in the operationalization of the agreement, but the ITUC underlined that the Agreement only “takes us part of the way” to addressing the climate crisis (ITUC 2015). 43 The latter number of 140 is from ITUC internal documents. 100 The Paris Agreement was only part of the linkages forged between climate change and labour. Before the Paris conference convened the International Labour Organization adopted the Guidelines for a Just Transition, outlining the vision, principles, and policies and institutional arrangements, including on social dialogue and macroeconomic policies to realize the opportunities of a transition to a low-carbon, sustainable economy (ILO 2015). The Paris Agreement may have disappointed in terms of its inclusion of labour issues, but action in the labour regime provided some promise of future productive overlap between the regimes. In sum, from 31 individuals in 2006 to nearly 200 delegates nine years later, the labour movement has sustained a large union presence at climate conferences. Unlike the gender NGOs considered in the next chapter, the labour movement has had less influence in the politics of climate, but has found other benefits. From the audience with the Qatari government on migrant workers, to the ILO’s adoption of a just transition framework in 2015,44 the movement has made gains for workers and advanced labour’s thinking on how to address environmental issues. Bringing this thinking along involved a significant coordination effort to construct a discursive frame, the just transition frame, that the movement could support. 4.3.1 Carrying Authority into the Climate Change Regime Shifts in the political environment, namely the Kyoto Protocol’s entry into force and major economies’ move toward climate action, prompted union’s interest in climate change issues. At the time, holding authority in climate politics was not assured, largely due to deep internal divisions. The ITUC fulfilled its internal and external roles. ITUC is the sole gatekeeper in a centralized network, which enabled it to convene discussions on climate change and to 44 On November 5, 2015, the Governing Body of the International Labour Organization adopted a resolution called “Guidelines for a just transition towards environmentally sustainable economies and societies for all.” 101 diffuse the just transition frame throughout the network. With that frame in place the labour movement could speak with one voice in the climate change talks. Externally, the ITUC could use its brand to advocate for the just transition frame within the UNFCCC. UNEP proved a key broker, providing ideational and material resources that helped introduce the network to the UNFCCC and vice versa. With solidarity and key actors in the network in place the labour movement could successfully bring its authority into the climate change regime. 126.96.36.199 Constructing the Discursive Frame The labour movement mobilized around the just transition frame. The just transition concept was not invented for climate change, but rather was borrowed from other work linking jobs and the environment. Initially, it was used in the context of protecting workers from exposure to organochlorines and justified legal action against employers’ “pollution abuses” (Snell and Fairbrother 2013; Young 2003). In a Canadian union newsletter, the term was used in the climate context to argue for the protection of jobs and the environment (Kohler 1998). Its use increased, coinciding with the increased participation of the labour movement in the UNFCCC in 2007 (Hampton 2015, 70). The labour movement repurposed an idea that was used for a different environmental issue and made it fit for purpose in their global advocacy efforts on climate change. The just transition concept avoids diagnostic framing (identifying the problem), while stressing labour as a solution (prognostic framing) and rationale for action (motivational framing). The combination of the prognostic and motivational aspects of the frame helped position the labour movement as an integral part of the climate solution, able to help states and civil society advance the case for climate change policy. As explored below, the frame helped show labour as part of the solution to the problems of the climate change regime, and helped gain 102 the movement allies, both integral to forum multiplying efforts (this is a similar combination as the gender NGOs explored in the next chapter). When the labour movement started to mobilize large numbers of delegates at climate change conferences, the term was included in statements, but not defined. A “just transition” was used to lump together the positive and negative impacts on labour of climate change and climate change policies (see ITUC 2007b). Later, by 2009, the ITUC defined as a just transition as “a tool the trade union movement shares with the international community, aimed at smoothing the shift towards a more sustainable society and providing hope for the capacity of a green economy to sustain decent jobs and livelihoods for all” (ITUC 2009b). The frame became a concrete proposal that positioned the labour movement on the same side as other climate change governors while protecting workers’ rights and livelihoods. In 2010, ITUC World Congress members agreed “to promoting an integrated approach to sustainable development through a just transition where social progress, environmental protection and economic needs are brought into a framework of democratic governance, where labour and other human rights are respected and gender equality achieved” (ITUC 2010b). The World Congress further identified six core elements of a just transition: investment in green jobs; research and early assessment of impacts on labour; consultation and social dialogue; education and training; social protection and security; and economic diversification (ITUC 2010b). What the just transition frame does not do is propose a new cause of climate change, avoiding diagnostic framing. Those who used a just transition frame accepted that the business as usual approach to the economy based on fossil fuels constitutes the anthropogenic causes of climate change. It further accepted that some corporations have been reluctant to support climate action and change. 103 … unions are not experts about the science, so rather than argue that we should be inserting our views in areas that we do have expertise in – social policy, social justice, industry restructuring. Basically, saying to the climate negotiators “if you want to achieve such and such reduction, you need to look at these issues if you are going to achieve them.”45 Instead, the just transition frame focuses on solutions. Many of the core aspects of the just transition frame found ways to redeploy a countries’ labour force into the service of a green economy. Workers can be retrained to work in renewable energy, public transportation or other low-carbon intensive sectors. The term green jobs itself proposes a solution, because it posits a way to reposition the labour market toward jobs that also promotes environmental sustainability. Those workers in the fossil fuel industry nearing retirement can be offered an early retirement. A strong social protection net can catch workers lost in the transition, helping to provide for their families while the worker finds a new role in the new economy. Underpinning these changes is a series of dialogues with employers and employees at community and national levels to foresee and manage the transition. Many of the elements of the just transition framework propose solutions, other elements outlined by the ITUC provide powerful rational to help motivate the network and new allies toward labour’s work on climate change, by removing the possible veto labour could have over climate policy. The just transition frame highlights the inclusion of worker’s rights to secure the political support necessary to take ambitious climate change action – that workers’ support can help pass climate policies and reduce any potential risks to a politician who wishes to promote climate policies. As one of the term’s originators argues: 45 Peter Colley, Interview February 2, 2014. 104 The sequence is important. A just transition is a prerequisite to all other progress on, for example, the climate issue. Just transition measures must be in place before workers will willingly accept stringent measures to protect the climate, and while it is easy to dismiss the power of unions in many contexts, workers allied with capitalists to oppose climate measures create an insurmountable barrier to change.46 As a result, the frame motivates unions to become involved in the intersection of labour and climate issues because addressing workers’ rights can help solve climate change. The frame can also motivate climate actors to accept and mobilize on the labour-climate connection. Even climate change actors who were initially skeptical of unions’ involvement may have wanted to ally with labour, as a potentially powerful force to remove excuses for inaction on climate change. Using the just transition frame that leveraged its diagnostic and motivational aspects provided three advantages for unions seeking entry and recognition in the climate change regime. First, it solidified the link between climate change and jobs – that climate action can both cost and create jobs with a broad enough framework that can include all unions’ interests. It therefore fulfilled the first hurdle of forum multiplying – demonstrating a claim and relevance to the target regime. Unions finally had a response to the questions asking why labour is involved in climate change work while maintaining coherence in the movement. Second, the frame’s diagnostic focus on solutions helped align the labour movement with climate change governors and showed the commitment of the movement to achieving the ultimate goal of the Convention to limit dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. The just transition frame focused on solutions and assumes movement toward a low-carbon, climate-resilient future and seeks to protect workers in the transition to that future. This 46 Brian Kohler, IndustriALL, interview with author 2014. Mr. Kohler was one of the first architects of the term just transition. 105 helps silence the critics assuming the labour movement is only comprised of anti-climate change actors. The frame responded in a positive, progressive way to the claim that unions should be against climate change action, countering the claim that unions are obstructionist forces in the climate change regime. A just transition anticipates a low-carbon future and, like nearly all climate change governors, sought to help achieve it. The focus on solutions and motivation also offered to help remove political barriers to climate change inaction. Politicians ensconced in a jobs-versus-environment debate could now point to the labour movement and their support for climate change action. Jobs “versus” the environment could transform to jobs “and” the environment according to the logic of the just transition frame. The labour movement could therefore no longer be a scapegoat for politicians, and instead stood as an ally to those willing and able to act on climate change, in the remit of the just transition frame. This helped the labour movement gain several allies, outlined more below, of national cabinet members, environmental NGOs, and others. The frame helped forum multiplying and the quest for recognition by providing a discourse that could widespread support of the workforce for climate change policy. Third, the frame carved a unique role for the labour movement, separate from the interests of businesses and environmentalists and helped bring the movement together. The unique claim in the climate change regime protected labour from co-optation by employers and environmentalists. As one of the people who coined the term just transition explained: Both employers and environmentalists will try to enlist labour as allies: environmental groups will want to exploit our knowledge and political strength, while employers will want our help in fighting environmental controls on the promise of creating or preserving 106 jobs; therefore we must be prepared to steer our own course based on our own agenda or we will be steered by others. 47 The just transition concept provided protection from labour being pushed or pulled in either direction. Employers could not have claimed to be protecting jobs in the fossil fuel industry. Environmentalists could not make claims to be working for green jobs. Both employers and environmentalists would have to consult with labour before either invoked the just transition frame and claimed to represent the interests of the labour movement. The concept created political space that only labour could occupy. Therefore, the labour movement became a central hub for mobilization by anyone wanting to invoke the power of the labour movement. The broad formulation allowed the concerns of all members to be included, facilitating mobilization efforts. All unions could find a place for themselves in the frame, regardless of the different interests between unions from developed or developing countries or unions with sector-specific concerns. It further sidestepped an ongoing disagreement within the movement identified by Rosemberg (2013) regarding the extent that the just transition frame should call for paradigmatic change to develop an alternative economic model, and the extent to which this new model could include environmental issues. The broadness of the frame helped bring the network together around a shared call. The just transition link between climate change and labour fit the broader discourses between trade union engagement and climate change identified by Räthzel and Uzzell (2011): technological fix, social transformation, mutual interests and social movement. Because the frame is about a transition to a low-carbon economy, it specified provisions to modernize and transfer technologies to reduce emissions while protecting and creating jobs. Beyond the 47 Brian Kohler, IndustriALL, Interview with author 2014. 107 technological fix, the just transition frame re-envisioned the nature of jobs in the economy (social transformation), the dialogue to achieve the transition (mutual interests), and the modes of production necessary to realize a low-carbon economy (social movement). The frame was about a solutions-oriented process, which provided it the malleability to appeal to the diverse interests of the labour movement while also enabling partnerships with others within the climate change regime. The labour movement could make a claim that they were relevant, and indeed integral, to climate change solutions. They could mobilize new support from climate change governors eager to reduce the political barriers to climate action and to show widespread support, securing new allies. The frame also positioned labour as the “go to” authority on the links between labour and climate change, helping to ensure that they alone would be recognized as authoritative and their frame would remain in their control. With a frame combining diagnostic and motivational aspects, the task turned toward finding authoritative articulators able to help the movement’s forum multiplying strategy. 188.8.131.52 Articulators The international labour movement was divided on the issue of climate change, necessitating negotiations internally to develop a version of the just transition frame that network members could support. The ITUC used its position as a federation of labour organizations to convene these negotiations. Externally, the ITUC and UNEP together employed their connections to articulate and diffuse the just transition frame. On internal negotiations, climate change policy represented an opportunity to some unions, such as those representing worker in the public service or renewable energy sectors, but a threat to workers in automobile or fossil fuel extraction industries. The ITUC could convene negotiations because of its standing as a peak association for labour, with a large and global 108 membership. As such, it had internal spaces available to act as a coordinator, including regular World Congress meetings to debate positions and working group meetings to operationalize those decisions. The ITUC had a structure in place to facilitate negotiations on common positions. Roughly half of ITUC affiliates nominated a member to work on the climate change working group, which has almost equal representation from developed and developing countries.48 This group debates, drafts and approves policy statements before the UNFCCC meetings. These statements form the basis of ITUC delegates’ actions.49 Once agreed, the ITUC’s position on climate change informs their actions in the climate regime and guides the delegation’s strategy and key messages. Initially, internal discussions took place at UNFCCC meetings on the targets and the just transition frame. The targets issue dominated the discussion in the first few years. By 2010, there was little discussion of the targets, and the just transition frame became the centerpiece of union’s engagement. The negotiations for this frame occurred away from the climate change forum and within the ITUC. Unlike the gender NGOs explored in the next chapter, that coordinated at the UNFCCC in its constituency space, the labour movement had a single gatekeeper able to convene the network and agree on a frame outside the UNFCCC. Targets proved an enormously divisive issue. The ITUC strongly felt that pushing for a mitigation target was a way to gain recognition as an actor committed to advancing climate change action. Support for targets could act a signal to climate change actors of the positive 48 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, interview with author 2014. 49 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, interview with author 2014. 109 engagement of the labour movement.50 Initial discussions considered advocating for temperature goals (e.g., 2°C), acceptable levels of carbon dioxide (350 or 450 ppm), or emissions targets against a baseline year (e.g., 40% below 1990).51 The lines were drawn between the ITUC and the large American federation of unions, the AFL-CIO. The ITUC’s preferred position to support the IPCC targets of 25-40% reductions by 2020 below 1990 levels, and 85% by 2050 (ITUC 2007). The ITUC also pushed for a new post-Kyoto agreement with ambitious targets and establishing a programme of work in the UNFCCC to link “GHG prevention, reduction, stabilization or controlled increases to targets on renewable energy use, carbon capture, deforestation, and alternative transportation to a Green Job and Decent Work Programme” (ITUC 2007). The AFL-CIO could not accept that those targets and timelines. 52 It had inched nearer other unions and the ITUC by accepting that climate change was a real, anthropogenic threat, but that was a far cry from supporting substantial emissions reductions. In a report titled “Jobs and Energy for the 21st Century,” the AFL-CIO acknowledged, “human use of fossil fuels is undisputedly contributing to global warming, causing rising sea levels, changes in climate patterns and threats to coastal regions” (AFL-CIO 2007). In a memo to the ITUC, AFL-CIO acknowledged that the discussions of targets caused disagreements between the AFL-CIO and ITUC, and expressed concern that the IPCC targets were unattainable given the availability of technologies, such as carbon capture and storage (Sweeney 2014). In the first years, tensions were apparent, and even openly expressed at the UNFCCC.53 50 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC. interview with author 2014. 51 Philip Pearson, TUC, interview with author 2014 52 The labour delegate interviewed asked that this comment be kept anonymous, interview with author 2014. 53 The labour delegate interviewed asked that this comment be kept anonymous, Interview with author 2014. 110 In the lead up to the Copenhagen conference there was considerable pressure to present a united front among unions. The labour movement needed to mobilize around a shared frame to gain recognition. Continuing fractures, especially public ones, would destabilize any trust labour actors had started to build with climate governors, and undermine the movement’s chances for recognition. Climate change governors would listen to the anti-climate group of the labour movement and marginalize the entire network. In order to successfully forum multiply, the labour movement needed internal consensus on a frame in order to position the movement as a legitimate actor in the climate discussion. That we stood on the right side of history. We could not allow roaming speeches happening all over the place. The media is fantastic for noticing any differences or problems. They look to the unions for opposition to climate change and are uninterested when we’re for climate action.54 The ITUC then sought to achieve consensus internally through its World Congress. The AFL-CIO is an ITUC affiliate. Ultimately, using the internal processes within the ITUC would bring a Congress decision in 2010 on both a just transition and targets by consensus. At the ITUC’s Second World Congress in June 2010 climate change was a central issue and the weight of many unions that supported the resolutions served to marginalize the AFL-CIO. In a resolution on “combating climate change through sustainable development and a just transition,” the Congress called for “promoting an integrated approach to sustainable development through a just transition where social progress, environmental protection and economic needs are brought into a framework of democratic governance, where labour and other human rights are respected and gender equality achieved” (ITUC 2010). It was at this World Congress that the six elements of a just transition were defined. 54 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview with author 2014 111 As Rosemberg (2013) stresses, the discussions were not “hidden negotiations among a few high-powered unions.” References to democracy and human rights in the definition of a just transition were inserted by unions from developing countries.55 The Congress resolution also included language on increasing adaptation efforts in developing countries and supporting the UNFCCC’s principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (ITUC 2010). These insertions were important to keep unions from developing countries on board, particularly unions from emerging economies, which tended to follow their national government’s positions on climate change.56 With these countries’ support, there was a critical mass in favour of the resolution, including its language on targets. The ITUC reiterated its support for a limiting global temperature increase to a two-degree target, reducing global emissions to 85% by the year 2050, and setting out interim targets, including a target for developed countries of 25%-40% by 2020 compared to 1990 emissions (ITUC 2010). With the unions from developing countries and many from developed countries on board, there were few unions opposing the resolution. The support of the AFL-CIO for this resolution was surprising given their previous opposition. It was a strategic decision weighing the optics of opposing the widely-supported resolution at the international level against few domestic repercussions. The AFL-CIO did not have a change of heart. It agreed to the resolution to avoid negative reactions by its colleagues in the ITUC: The ITUC Congress adopted the IPCC target. AFL-CIO was the only major affiliate to oppose this. In 2010, they voted for it because a vote against the resolution would have called more, and unwanted, attention to the AFL-CIO. In the end, the ITUC doesn’t 55 Philip Pearson, TUC, interview with author 2014. 56 Anonymous American union delegate, interview with author 2014 112 matter because it doesn’t have authority over its members. Many national American unions are lobbying the EPA right now to dismantle its carbon regulations. Supporting the mitigation resolution avoided reputational damage while business as usual continued on the ground.57 ITUC does not, as mentioned above, hold authority over its membership. Instead, it has acted as a forum for its affiliates to negotiate a common position and to, when necessary, to pressure one another into agreement. Such a forum can create peer pressure. The AFL-CIO’s decision to support the ITUC Congress’ position on climate change was influenced by the views of other unions, particularly those from developing countries. Without the ITUC as a central forum, the AFL-CIO and perhaps other unions would have continued to take a more conservative line on climate change. For the ITUC the stakes were also high to maintain its position as a central hub in the movement. As one American delegate recalls, “the ITUC would have lost all legitimacy with unions in the South if the resolution had failed.”58 While the ITUC is a peak association in terms of its membership and many connections within the movement, it had reputational costs on the line with the resolution. With the Congress resolution in hand the ITUC could go to the UNFCCC meetings armed with several concrete calls and a broad frame. In time, the frame would overtake the concrete policy proposals, which is perhaps not surprising. Similar tensions exist at regional levels, such as in Europe where the European Trade Union Confederation also plays a coordination role: At the European level, we have time to discuss concrete proposals, such as how to implement the EU ETS [EU Emissions Trading Scheme]. The ETS could have strong impact on some sectors represented by some countries. Given the sectors, these countries 57 Anonymous American union delegate, interview with author 2014. This delegate was at the 2010 World Congress. 58 Anonymous American union delegate, interview with author 2014. 113 could be more impacted by ETS reforms. Reaching compromise with direct and concrete impacts is more difficult than general political messages.59 The frame helped mask ongoing tensions hiding under the surface of the agreement achieved at the ITUC World Congress. ITUC’s work on climate issues disseminated widely in the labour-climate network. As mentioned above, the Blue Green Alliance looked to the ITUC’s expertise on climate change issues, and other labour federations that were not involved in climate change adopted similar versions of the just transition frame. ITUC could disseminate a new norm within the network, after it convened considerable internal negotiations to define the frame and some key policy stances. The ITUC’s internal work to achieve a unified voice on climate change helped inform its external efforts to use its brand and connections to further unions’ voice on climate change issues with in the UNFCCC. The task was considerable, given the resistance by many climate governors to unions’ presence in the UNFCCC. The ITUC proved able to use the recognition of its brand and position as a peak association for the labour movement to gain recognition of the just transition frame. UNEP served as the key broker for the labour movement into the climate change regime, provided material resources and lent its credibility to the movement to help develop and disseminate the frame. The ITUC proved an effective articulator for the just transition frame to climate change governors. It used its global standing as a central labour organization to build relationships capable of confronting and ameliorating worries that labour would undermine the climate process. Labour unionists developed connections with Ministers of Environment within their 59 Benjamin Denis, ETUC, interview with author 2014. 114 countries to bypass country delegates that viewed social issues as a distraction. This strategy proved effective, because the Ministers would understand the inherently political message that labour must be on board with any future climate policies if they are to succeed. Labour delegates said that, while this strategy initially angered some state delegates – because they would be directed by their Ministers to consider labour– it successfully secured references to a just transition in climate change decisions in 2010.60 Among civil society, the ITUC translated its brand and role as the central hub for the labour movement into an influential role within the broader climate movement. A reputation among its C-7 colleagues for consistency derived from the ITUC’s coordination role among its members. Due to the internal negotiations that occur before each conference in the ITUC’s climate change working group, ITUC delegates have little room to maneuver from this position, which created the view that the labour movement was more conservative than other networks within the climate change regime.61 The ITUC carefully walked the line delineated by its membership. This means that others view the ITUC as a stable organization, but also one that has difficulty taking risks unless previously sanctioned by the leadership or membership, as the example of the walkout in Warsaw shows.62 The key broker for the labour movement was UNEP, which has an established position in the climate change regime that proved useful for the labour movement. UNEP was involved in the climate negotiations from the very beginning, before the Convention was agreed to in 1992. The organization has an established reputation on climate change issues and internal research staff and funding able to help generate data and information. Both these types of resources were 60 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview with author 2014 61 Nicola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, Interview with author 2014 62 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC. Interview with author 2014. 115 valuable for the labour movement’s entry to the climate change regime. The partnership broke down over time, but was useful in the initial years of labour’s engagement. Materially, UNEP provided training, awareness raising, research, and funding for the labour movement. UNEP reached out to ICFTU, which was one of the main global labour organizations at the time. The result was the Trade Union Assembly on Labour and the Environment (referred to as the “WILL” conference) held 15-17 January 2006 convened under the auspices of UNEP and in conjunction with several international labour organizations,63 the ILO and the World Health Organization. The conference brought together over 150 representatives of trade unions, UN agencies and sustainable development experts. Among the outcomes of the conference, the three UN bodies present committed to supporting trade union engagement on sustainable development.64 For many, engagement with UNEP at the WILL Conference, and subsequent workshops and projects in the mid-2000s constituted a turning point in the labour movement’s thinking on climate change, engaging and training dozens of new unions in climate change.65 The collaboration between unions and UNEP continued beyond the conference, providing initial evidence to support labour’s just transition frame. An ad hoc working group with the ILO, UNEP and the ITUC produced the first assessment of the implications of climate change and transitioning to a low-carbon economy for labour and, perhaps even coined the term green jobs (see UNEP 2007). For those involved in forming the early links between climate 63 Primarily these were the ICFTU, the World Confederation of Labour (WCL), the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC) and the SustainLabour Foundation. 64 Internal ICFTU briefing on the conference. 65 Lucien Royer, interview with author 2015; Philip Pearson, TUC, interview with author 2014; Anonymous labour delegate, interview with author 2014. 116 change and jobs, the work of that ad hoc group was a turning point, borne in part by the work of the labour movement to strengthen its relationship with UNEP.66 UNEP also provided resources to disseminate the frame. With SustainLabour, UNEP provided over $500,000 to SustainLabour to strengthen unions’ engagement on climate change and chemicals management issues (SustainLabour 2012). This grant included regional workshops on climate change and chemicals management in Latin America and Asia (UNEP 2006). UNEP also provided travel funding for some unions to attend the Bali Conference in 2007.67 The material resources provided were significant. Yet perhaps more fundamentally, UNEP used its brand and position in both the labour regime and the climate change regime to channel information that carried authority within both networks. UNEP’s brand travelled to both networks, signaling the viability of sustainability issues to actors in the labour regime, and the acceptability of labour issues to actors in the climate change regime. UNEP attended the founding ITUC Congress in 2006, in part to report on the outcomes of the WILL conference held earlier in the year. UNEP’s presence was a noticeable addition to the conference, demonstrating to others in the labour movement that work on sustainable development issues was a worthwhile area for the ITUC’s future efforts.68 The ITUC’s mandate coming from its founding World Congress includes environmental sustainability, unlike its predecessor organization (Rosemberg 2010). Within the climate change regime, by aligning itself publicly with the labour movement in side events and press conferences, UNEP lent its climate credentials to the labour movement at a time when many did not welcome labour’s involvement. The normative capacity of UNEP to 66 Lucien Royer, interview with author 2015; Anonymous American union delegate, Interview July 7, 2014. 67 Philip Pearson, interview with author 2014. 68 Lucien Royer, interview with author 2015. 117 frame issues and to promote specific policies disseminated the message to the climate change audience in a way that the labour unions alone could not achieve. As Sean Sweeney (2014), an American labour delegate engaged in climate change issues since the mid-2000s, including the organization of the WILL conference, observes: The partnership was consistent with the main climate and sustainability message of both the ITUC and the ILO, but UNEP’s status and reach – as well as its capacity to frame and promote policy – would amplify this message considerably. The presence of the employer’s organization, the IOE [International Organization of Employers], was politically decorative but largely superfluous (Sweeney 2014, 8). The structural position UNEP holds, with roles in both the labour and climate change regime enabled to it help foster the development and dissemination of the just transition regime. The desire to strengthen ties between UNEP and labour movement organizations ran both ways. Labour saw a need to strengthen its relationship with UNEP, as those involved in the ICFTU wanted to raise the profile of sustainable development issues. UNEP wanted to increase its engagement with the other, non-environmental Major Groups. UNEP recognized labour as potentially a powerful voice for environmental action, in part because they are well organized and active on some environmental issues at national and international levels.69 Yet, an ideological divide would ultimately soften the partnership. Unions were focused on the role of government and the public sector to protect workers’ rights and foster social dialogue to facilitate a just transition. UNEP, to some in the labour movement, seemed more focused on engaging the private sector. Further, UNEP considered labour as another civil society 69 Anonymous, Interview with author 2014. 118 actor, whereas unions sought a tripartite dialogue, with an equal place at the table as employers and governments.70 The articulators for unions achieved a great deal in the first years of unions’ engagement on climate change and set the network up for success. Within three years, the ITUC had used its connections within the network and its position as a peak association for labour to convene negotiations on the just transition frame. The frame proved powerful, positioning the labour movement as the go to experts on the link between climate change and labour issues and as positive advocates for progressive action on climate change. The material resources, information, and introductions provided by UNEP solidified these efforts. UNEP could show labour to be “one of us” at a time when many were skeptical of unions’ involvement in the UNFCCC. The articulators fulfilled both their internal and external roles, getting agreement within the network, and successfully employing their authority outside the network. Over time, the labour movement would further cement itself as a climate change actor by showing that their frame mattered for the key institutions of the climate change regime and by carving itself a place among observers. 4.3.2 Leveraging Climate Institutions The labour movement linked the just transition frame with dominant frame and institutions of climate change regime – mitigation (see Chapter 3). Labour advocates further found ways to seek institutional status and fall in step with the norms of observer participation. Despite the considerable initial pushback from climate governors, the labour movement aligned itself closely with the push for mitigation action, and positioned itself as a moderate voice abiding by norms of how observers ought to interact. 70 Anonymous American Union delegate, Interview with author 2014. 119 In terms of substantive institutions, the labour movement hooked the just transition frame onto the mitigation frame and its institutions. The frame highlighted how to transition to a low-carbon economy and how to secure the support of labour in this endeavor. Implicitly, the message of the just transition frame was “if you want to mitigate, let us how you how that is politically feasible.” The frame linked to mitigation institutions because of the labour movement’s understanding of climate change issue at the time, the concentration of research in developed countries, which were more impacted by mitigation at the time, and the identity of the labour movement as a third sector in society. As chapter 3 outlined, the period from 2005-2007 witnessed a rebirth of hopes that the climate change regime could deliver an adequate response to climate change, which was being discussed more during this period as an emerging crisis. In 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) launched. Other developed economies seemed poised to take climate action. The labour movement found a foothold for its frame in these mitigation institutions and emergent norms, largely leaving aside adaptation, finance, and other climate institutions. The focus on the mitigation institutions as an entry point was to the near exclusion of other institutions of climate governance. There was early awareness of the importance of climate adaptation, particularly among American unions after Hurricane Katrina, and among unions from developing countries. 71 Southern unions highlighted, and pushed for, adaptation as an issue for the labour movement to include. Unions in Kenya hosted roundtable meetings and discussed the climate impacts they were already experiencing in agriculture, forestry and other sectors in 2006. 71 Anonymous labour advocate, interview with author 2014; Ashley Haugo, Interview with author 2014; Philip Pearson, TUC interview with author 2014. 120 These documented effects left an impression on those unionists who previously had thought of climate change in terms of mitigation.72 While those engaged in bringing the global labour movement to climate change were empirically convinced to work on adaptation issues, one union member observed that speaking on adaptation would help achieve balance between northern and southern interests.73 Despite these strategic benefits and normative interest in adaptation issues, and opportunities presented by the adaptation turn discussed in Chapter 3, labour delegates chose to focus on mitigation institutions. Labour delegates did suggest advocating for adding consideration of worker’s rights into the drafts of the agreement on adaptation, technology transfer and other non-mitigation areas before Copenhagen. These suggestions were placeholders, meant to show the interest and commitment of the labour movement, although there was little systemic evidence connecting labour to adaptation institutions.74 The just transition frame used mitigation as an entry point in part because it reflected the movement’s understanding of the connections between labour and climate change when the network negotiated the just transition frame. Much of the efforts to collect information concentrated in organizations and unions in developed countries, many of which were anticipating or already addressing the impact of mitigation policies. The research at this time focused on job creation and the effects of various climate policies on employment across and within economic sectors. A collaborative report produced by UNEP, the ILO, the International Organization of Employers, and the ITUC in 2008 underlines that while many reports on climate 72 Philip Pearson, TUC, who attended the 2006 UNFCCC conference, and the roundtable held by Kenyan unions. Interview with author 2014. 73 Philip Pearson, TUC, interview with author 2014. 74 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, interview with author 2014. 121 change mitigation and adaptation policies “declaim a future of green jobs—but few present specifics. This is no accident. There are still huge gaps in our knowledge and available data, especially as they pertain to the developing world” (UNEP 2008, 1). Meanwhile, European Trade Union Confederation completed one of the most ambitious studies on the cross-sectoral impacts on jobs, and opportunities for jobs (ETUC 2007). The report estimated an expected 1.5% over net gain in employment by 2030 in the sectors considered a result of climate change policy (ETUC 2007). It warned, however that both the quantity and quality of these new jobs should be considered, to avoid newer jobs being of a lower quality than jobs in established sectors (ETUC 2007, 73). As discussed above, the just transition frame had several advantages for the labour movement, it was also very focused which helped hone the message. The labour movement in the early years of its engagement focused on a discrete set of institutions as an entry point rather than try to make broad claims of relevance or scatter the network among many different institutions and sets of negotiations. This helped show commitment to a foundational issue in the climate change regime, build relationships with key climate governors, and mobilize the movement around a focused frame. In its mobilization efforts, the labour movement leveraged a procedural institution, constituency status to gain recognition. At first, unions faced perhaps more resistance to their participation than other new networks. Labour activists involved in the early years felt they had to convince nearly everyone, from state delegates, to environmental NGOs, and the UNFCCC Secretariat: At its most benign, that resistance is based on the view that social policy and social justice aspects are simply complications that slow down the process of determining targets and GHG reductions in a technocratic manner. I think that was the UNFCCC 122 secretariat view, which refused to even recognize unions as a major grouping in climate negotiations until about 2008-2009.75 The labour movement’s ability to secure constituency status was a symbolic and material win that facilitated their mobilization within the climate change regime. The closing of the climate regime over time, particularly limiting the number of badges for observers, had a small influence on the ability of the labour movement to mobilize large numbers of delegates because many attend under the ITUC umbrella. Garnering constituency status involved persuasion and perseverance. The dominant perception of others within the UNFCCC was that unions were working against the aims of regime: At a Bonn meeting [an annual meeting for negotiations held between the conferences], right before Bali [the 2007 conference], I was kicked out of a CAN [Climate Action Network] meeting. I was used to other processes where the environmental NGO caucus meetings were open to many different groups. I didn’t have a sticker on my badge to show that I was a CAN member, and I was told I was not wanted, that unions are a problem. That experience motivated our push for constituency status.”76 To attain constituency status, labour delegates had to convince the UNFCCC Secretariat as the first gatekeeper to that system. As explained in Chapter 3, the constituency system mirrors the Major Groups system established by Agenda 21. Unlike the other multilateral environmental agreements established at the Rio Earth Summit, the UNFCCC does not have the same grouping and has admitted groups over time, rather than automatically providing space. Labour delegates argued that as a Major Group under Agenda 21 they should have constituency status.77 The activists sought to apply a norm established in another forum within the context of the UNFCCC. 75 Anonymous, interview with author 2014 76 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, nterview with author 2014 77 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, interview with author 2014. 123 Anabella Rosemberg recalls that the labour unions were the first to make this argument, which later helped pave the way for youth NGOs, women and gender NGOs, and other Agenda 21 Major Groups missing from the UNFCCC constituency status to make a similar claim and establish constituency status for themselves.78 The Secretariat established a provisional (or as one delegate called it, the “probation”) system, lasting two years, first for labour and later applied to all other social groupings. The system was labour intensive, and consisted of four reports detailing how many delegates attended from the labour movement, side events they hosted, and other activities they undertook. The intent was to prove that unions were valuable stakeholders, working for a positive outcome.79 For unions, constituency status was a symbol of that labour was a recognized actor in the UNFCCC. Unlike national processes, where a seat means decision-making power in a negotiation, unions recognize their seat at the climate table is that of an observer. Still, it is a symbol of recognition of unions’ place in the negotiations.80 For some, it also brought unions on equal footing to other recognized and established NGOs in the UNFCCC. This recognition proved attractive and helped the early unions attract the attention of others in the movement. As internal meeting minutes show, those involved in securing constituency status framed it as an “acknowledgement [that] signals the importance given to our priorities and our involvement in the process” (ITUC 2008). Having a seat at the table helped make the case unions had a place in the climate negotiations and a role to play in the 78 As noted in Chapter 3, indigenous peoples, local government and municipalities were established as UNFCCC constituencies before 2007 (when labour applied). These groups are also Agenda 21 Major Groups. 79 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview with author 2014; Philip Pearson, TUC, Interview with author 2014. 80 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview with author 2014. 124 negotiations, which solidified their role and helped attract new unions.81 Those involved could engage new unions working on specific issues that could be invited to the UNFCCC to speak to delegates in technical workshops. While the tensions between American and other unions to design the labour-climate link helped raise the issue within the movement, the ability to create a space for them in the UNFCCC provided a landing space for those unions become engaged in climate change-related work. Constituency status also provides material resources to help the labour movement organize and mobilize within the climate regime. Labour delegates welcomed the provision of office space, meeting times, speaking slots, invitations to workshops, and other benefits provided to constituencies. As the labour delegation grew, so did the need for coordination to keep all the members on message, and oriented in a complex negotiation process: At the COPs, which are where the global gatherings are, we have to look after our own delegation – we always seem to have new people coming in. As the delegation has grown in size, new delegates bring needs that need to be respected and need to be talked through challenges of engaging in that process.82 The UNFCCC’s practice after 2009 of limiting of badges for each organization posed a challenge for unions. Many unions sent delegates as ITUC delegates using the organization’s accreditation. Few unions hold their own accreditation. Unlike other constituencies, the limits put on delegation size can have a disproportionate impact on unions. Limits on ITUC’s delegation size left interested delegates with few other options for participation. In 2015, ITUC originally received 75 tickets; but managed to bring 190 to attend through badge sharing and other compromises. This one limitation posed by the procedural 81 Anabella Rosemberg, ITUC, Interview with author 2014. 82 Philip Pearson, TUC, Interview May 28, 2014 125 norms of the UNFCCC after 2009 still could not fully counter the mobilization of labour within the climate regime. 4.4 Conclusion Within ten years, the labour presence in the climate change regime grew exponentially, representing a relatively straightforward case of forum multiplying. This growth brought new allies to labour’s cause in the form of powerful NGOs and other climate actors also working to protect workers’ rights. Without the involvement of the labour movement in the UNFCCC, it is doubtful that members of the C-7 would make declarations for a just transition, or that powerful states would include mention of worker’s rights in the context of climate change. Recognition by powerful new allies and in UNFCCC decisions brought the labour movement into the climate fold. The labour movement proved able to carry its authority into the UNFCCC. ITUC and UNEP were important articulators, able to carry their authority into the UNFCCC by provide key ideational and material resources. UNEP provided considerable resources to bring together global unions in advance of their involvement in the UNFCCC and to provide key introductions once labour started participating. Despite internal divisions, the labour movement rallied around the just transition frame in large part due to the ITUC’s central role as the sole gatekeeper. The labour movement found key entry points within the institutions of the regime, ultimately showing that they belonged in the climate club of governors. The just transition frame aligned with mitigation institutions, trying to find ways to help countries sell mitigation action domestically by securing the support of labour. They also managed to find institutions that could support their recognition in climate politics, and gaining this constituency status proved valuable to provide further mobilization resources. As the next chapter shows, gender advocates also 126 managed to secure constituency status and the gatekeepers of that network could cooperate in their efforts to uncover gender inequalities and reconcile the neglect of gender issues in international climate policy.127 Chapter 5: Gender-Climate Network We don’t want to be mainstreamed into a polluted stream A very small contingent of women’s rights groups intermittently participated in the UNFCCC before a considerable increase in their participation in the mid-2000s. In 2007, presence of gender NGOs grew, quickly becoming a sizable and sustained mobilization. In 2005, three organizations brought 23 delegates; these NGOs described themselves as environmental NGOs employing a gender lens.1 Forum multiplying then occurred, particularly among women’s rights NGOs new to climate change issues. These numbers rose exponentially, to 16 organizations bringing 183 delegates just four years later. The women’s rights NGOs’ presence continued through 2015, pushing for climate action that is gender responsive and facilitates women’s involvement in decision making. The long-term participation was a public act, bolstered by the construction and use of a frame highlighting the disproportionate impact of climate change on women and women as important agents of climate solutions speaks directly to climate governors, showcasing gender NGOs’ commitment to the institutions of the climate change regime. This frame underscored gender NGOs’ commitment to contribute to climate solutions, to help reduce the negative impacts on women. As these activists continued to push for ambitious climate action, several recalled Bella Abzug’s statement in 1998 that: women do not want to be mainstreamed into a polluted stream. We want to clean the stream and transform it into a fresh and flowing body. One that moves in a direction – a world at peace, that respects human rights for all, renders economic justice and provides a sound and healthy environment (quoted in Moghadam 2005, 105). In their effort to push for ambitious climate change policies, gender NGOs have been among the most recognized and influential of the social NGOs engaging with climate change, the 1 Sabine Bock, WECF, interview with author 2014. 128 third aspect of forum multiplying. In total, nearly 20 decisions in the UNFCCC refer to gender, and the Lima Work Programme on Gender and Climate Change established in 2014 proved an important victory for advocates after years of effort. This victory was hard won, after some states sought to water down the decision’s language from gender equal to gender sensitive, and other delegates had once openly questioned the value of bringing a social issue into the UNFCCC negotiations. Like the labour movement, gender NGOs overcame questions posed by governors within the climate regime regarding the value of their involvement to successfully forum multiply into the climate change regime. In 2014, Wael Hmaidan, Director of the Climate Action Network would characterize gender NGOs as “one of us. They are constructively engaged, trying to solve the climate crisis.”2 This chapter outlines the journey from an at best marginal presence to an influential NGO network in the UNFCCC. Gender NGOs began divided between two groups, ultimately collaborating and building a more cohesive network. Their timing was propitious, linking to the emerging norm of adaptation and showcasing that not only were there differences in vulnerability among countries, but within countries. Using their frame, gender NGOs would find other entry points over time, and the gatekeepers in the network would collaborate to open procedural rules for the network, further entrenching their position in the UNFCCC. 5.1 Gender-Climate Network The network of NGOs working on the intersection of climate change and gender began quite divided, but grew more cohesive over time. Figures 5-1 and 5-2 show the two principal clusters that reflect two parts of the network. First is a cluster of NGOs around LIFE e.V. called 2 Interview with author 2014 129 Gender CC – women for climate justice, which views itself as a network of environmental NGOs that use gender as a lens. As one of the long-time participants explains, WECF [Women in Europe for a Common Future] has participated for so long because we have a different approach than other women’s groups, such as WEDO [Women’s Environment and Development Organization]. For us, the focus is the environment from a gender perspective. WECF is also a member of CAN [Climate Action Network]. This women’s ecology movement has its roots in the anti-nuclear movement in Europe and North America, and has engaged in the UNFCCC sporadically since the first UNFCCC conference to bring feminist critiques to climate issues.3 The second cluster includes the NGOs and international organizations involved in Global Gender and Climate Alliance (GGCA). It is centered on the WEDO, a founding member of the GGCA. The Alliance entered the UNFCCC in 2007, much later than those NGOs in the women’s ecology movement. These two principal groupings within the gender-climate network both formally launched their respective alliances within the UNFCCC and both maintained distinct, albeit highly cooperative identities through, and beyond, 2015. 3 Eva Quistrop, former member of the EU Parliament and early anti-nuclear and women’s ecology movement activist. She founded the first parallel event at COP 1 to discuss gender issues at the UNFCCC called the Solidarity of Women in the Greenhouse. 130 Figure 5-1: Gender-climate network, 2005-2008 131 Figure 5-2: Gender-climate network, 2009-2015 As the network maps in Figures 5-1 and 5-2 show, both the Gender CC and GGCA clusters grew and increased their connections with one another. While there are still distinct clusters representing the GGCA and Gender CC, there are more connections between members of the two groups. Several Gender CC members became GGCA members in the second time period and more members of both groups reported links to members of the other cluster in the Yearbook of International Organizations. As their engagement in climate change continued, the clusters within the gender-climate network grew closer together, sharing more information among members regardless of their affiliation in either alliance. 132 Measure 2005-2008 2009-2015 Size (number of nodes) 336 888 Centrality In-Degree Out-Degree Average Degree In-Degree Out-Degree Average Degree WEDO 24 49 36.5 133 141 137 Energia 24 51 37.5 97 97 97 IUCN 17 95 56 104 162 133 Population Action International 8 16 12 103 127 115 Women in Europe for a Common Future 11 23 17 100 115 107.5 Huairou Commission 17 36 26.5 100 100 100 Table 5-1: Descriptive statistics for the gender-climate network Yet, as the 2009-2015 network map shows (Figure 5-2), a new cluster of NGOs emerged, around the International Planned Parenthood Federation. This group of NGOs called themselves the Population and Climate Change Alliance and started participating in the UNFCCC in 2009.4 This Alliance argued that the vulnerabilities to climate change correlated with vulnerabilities regarding access to reproductive health and family planning and that upholding women’s rights in this could also help build resilience to climate change and mitigate emissions. This cluster did not join with the either Gender CC or GGCA, who, as described below, in some ways sought to define the gender frame in a way that excludes reproductive health issues. The multiple groups and alliances working on gender and climate change came to the issue independently, leading to a network with multiple gatekeepers. No one actor could claim sole ownership of central position of the network. As table 5-1 shows, several organizations held very similar numbers of connections. These organizations could not alone disseminate a frame throughout the network; their connections to one another also meant that no one organization could attempt a unilateral effort without the others finding out about their strategy. The multiple 4 The Population and Climate Change Alliance later changed its name to the Population and Sustainable Development Network to focus more broadly on sustainable development issues, particularly the Sustainable Development Goals and the resulting 2030 Action Agenda for Sustainable Development. 133 gatekeepers also mean that information was broadly available. In the labour-climate network, the ITUC has access to information from many organizations, far exceeding the breadth of information sources of other organizations. This would not be possible in the gender-climate network. Multiple organization have considerable sources of information and rosters of organizations to send their information to. No organization has a monopoly on information, or prestige or influence. The size of the network grew considerably, through the introduction of the Population and Climate Change Alliance, growth in the GGCA and Gender CC, and new alliances with climate change governors. In the first period, 336 organizations could directly or indirectly hear of the gender-climate linkages and choose to join the movement. Between 2009 and 2015, the network’s mobilization efforts were evident, 888 organizations either actively engaged in the UNFCCC or were a latent group that could be mobilized. Several women’s rights organizations joined and participated in the UNFCCC, including UN Women and the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Among new climate change allies, WEDO reported links to Climate Action Network, Oxfam International, World Rainforest Movement, and CGIAR Climate Change Programme.5 The central actors’ influence and prestige grew over time, another parallel to the labour network. Each solidified their centrality in the network and expanded its ability to receive information from, and hold the esteem of, multiple actors and send its information out widely. WEDO, Energia, and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) were early members of GGCA (WEDO and IUCN were two of the four founding members) and the reach of 5 CGIAR is the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research. 134 their connections grew considerably. Similarly, Women in Europe for a Common Future was a founding member of Gender CC and had worked with WEDO in the past. Women in Europe for a Common Future also became more influential and prestigious through its central role in a larger Gender CC, and its membership and connections with GGCA. Population Action International spurred the most dramatic change to its prestige and influence over time. In the first period, the organization was not involved in climate change-related work. In 2009, it received a significant grant to work on the linkages between climate change, reproductive health and population dynamics, through research, communications, and advocacy.6 The organization founded the Population and Climate Change Alliance in 2009 and used the Alliance to build a network of organizations within and outside the UNFCCC to advocate and raise awareness on the linkages between reproductive health, population dynamics and climate change.7 While Gender CC opposed collaboration with the Population and Climate Change Alliance (more on this below), Population Action International eventually joined the GGCA. Partnership development was a key advocacy strategy in Population Action International’s engagement in climate change. The strategy seems to successfully led to the organization having a wider base of knowledge and information to draw upon to help substantiate the linkages, and a larger group of organizations to send its information out to. While Population Action International had a mix of financial and normative motivations, others motives varied, including finding fresh ground for advocacy efforts to advance women’s rights. 6 Roger-Mark DeSouza, formerly with Population Action International, interview with author 2014; Kathleen Mordegaard, interview with author 2014. 7 Kathleen Mordegaard, interview with author 2014. 135 5.2 Motivations For the part of the network of organizations working on women’s rights and the environment, there were political and normative motivations to multiply into the climate change regime. For the environmental NGOs that use a gender approach, their work on climate change is in part driven by their roots in the anti-nuclear movement. In the early 2000s, there were proposals to include nuclear power generation in the Clean Development Mechanism as an eligible project. This would provide developing countries with project funding to establish nuclear power to avoid greenhouse gas emissions from other forms of energy production. To advocate against the inclusion of nuclear power in the Clean Development Mechanism, some organizations such as Women in Europe for a Common Future became involved in climate change work.8 For this group, their traditional area of contention, to fight against nuclear power and other environmental injustices, was arising in the climate change regime, and required these NGOs to follow suit. Regarding political motivations, like labour, fewer opportunities in their traditional areas of work influenced the motivations of NGOs working on women’s rights in the context of environmental issues. These NGOs, particularly WEDO, were heavily involved in areas outside of environmental regimes. WEDO used its experience in the Rio Earth Summit to inform its tactics at the Beijing Women’s conference in 1995 (Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler 1998), and participated in the reviews of the Beijing Declaration. WEDO and other women’s rights organizations participated heavily in the global trade regime, fighting against structural adjustment programs and working in the WTO to bring gender issues into conversations of 8 Sabine Bock, WECF, interview with author 2014. 136 multilateral free trade (Moghadam 2005). After the 2000s, these women’s rights organizations were also engaged to mainstream gender into the land and biodiversity regimes. Their opportunities in the land and biodiversity regimes were dwindling, while the links between climate change and water, land, and biodiversity issues were becoming more evident. Both the Convention on Biological Diversity and UN Convention to Combat Desertification include principles recognizing gender and/or women in their respective convention texts. There were entry points for gender advocates to advocate for operationalizing this language throughout implementation and policy decisions and (in the case of the biodiversity) subsequent protocols. In the early and mid-2000s, these processes were on divergent paths, neither of which proved conducive to sustaining advocacy on gender issues. In the desertification regime, the conferences of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification focused on implementation, but also struggled to reach agreement. The 2005 meeting of the convention established a working group to create a framework to enhance the implementation of the Convention but parties could not agree on other decisions regarding regional coordination (IISD 2009a). The ten-year strategic framework to enhance implementation was adopted in 2007. An extraordinary meeting of the conference of the parties was required to agree to and adopt the programme of work and budget (IISD 2009a). The CBD, by contrast, had embarked on a process to negotiate a new protocol on Access to Biological Services in 2001 and had continued to reflect gender even if sometimes the references were slow to emerge. These negotiations proved slow and heavily technical regarding 137 the legalities of various options for a protocol, concluding in 2010.9 Gender considerations were largely absent from the negotiations until the final years of the negotiations, after a country grouping called the Like-Minded in Spirit Group of Women, led by New Zealand, successfully included references to gender (IISD 2010). In part, due to the success of the gender network, and the slow pace of implementation in the desertification regime and the slow, technical negotiations in the biodiversity regime, gender advocates needed to find new opportunities. A WEDO board member and academic on the intersection of climate change and gender explains that: Originally most of the emphasis was on land, water, agriculture and resources and biodiversity related issues, mainly because after Rio’92 most of the gender and environment NGOs followed the CSD [UN Commission on Sustainable Development] process and its themes. Also, the work portfolio of many of those organizations was already quite overloaded. Around 2005, the effectiveness of putting emphasis on the CSD and CBD and UNCCD [Convention on Biological Diversity and UN Convention to Combat Desertification] processes were more and more questioned by many NGOs, so more relevant gremia and routes needed to be identified.10 There was a sense that gender advocates had few new areas to advance gender issues in the desertification and biodiversity processes. To these advocates, “there was a real sense that we had accomplished all we could [in the biodiversity and the desertification regimes]. Meanwhile, we’d always known that climate change was something of a black hole, one that was becoming increasingly too hard to ignore.”11 9 See IISD “A Brief History of the Convention on Biological Diversity” http://www.iisd.ca/process/biodiv_wildlife-cbdintro.htm. 10 Irene Dankelman, WEDO, interview with author 2014. In this context, gremia is plural of gremium, a German term for a committee or caucus. 11 Bridget Burns. Ms. Burns is the current focal point for the Women and Gender Constituency in the UNFCCC and has worked on gender and environmental issues since the mid-2000s. Interview with author 2014. 138 The migration to climate change made sense for activists who required new opportunities to advance gender issues in environmental forums. One gender advocate recalls a sense that much was achieved to bring gender considerations into those forums, while the UNFCCC remained “something of a black hole” because there was no consideration of gender in climate governance and, subsequently, the WEDO and other gender advocates left the forum out of their efforts.12 The UNFCCC had few hooks for gender activists to leverage. The Convention text and Kyoto Protocol include no reference to gender and instead focused on climate as an environmental issue, as discussed in Chapter 3. Normative motivations combined with a political need to find new areas to work, leading to renewed interest in climate change. In terms of normative motivations, many NGOs felt that climate change was an issue too important for them to ignore, and that they had something to offer to climate solutions. Many activists cited the IPCC and Stern reports in 2007 as a motivation for their climate change work, particularly the recognition of adaptation in the IPCC reports and that climate related impacts were already evident: Climate change manifested itself more and more in people’s daily lives, and was recognized as a major challenge for human wellbeing. So, it seemed obvious that several of these gender-related NGOs and groups switched their focus towards climate related gender issues, and that specific new groups and coalitions were formed around this theme.13 12 Bridget Burns, WEDO, interview with author 2014. 13 Irene Dankelman, WEDO, interview with author 2014. Several other respondents discussed the relevance of the IPCC’s focus on the impacts of climate change in the fourth Assessment Report: Ulrike Röhr, Life e.V., interview with author 2014; Roger-Mark DeSouza, formerly Population Action International, interview with author 2014. Cate Owren, interview with author 2014. 139 The networks of many of these organizations provided further evidence of climate change’s impacts in the Global South and on vulnerable populations. Taking on climate change campaigns seemed a “natural” extension of the work many NGOs were doing on land and water: WEDO wasn’t specifically doing climate at the time, growing interest was borne out of other work we’d be doing on water, land, etc. WEDO is a global advocacy org, but works on multiple levels, especially with roots in the Global South at national levels. We’d hear murmuring from networks. In meetings, partners would say there is something happening and we don’t know what to do – water supplies changing, crop calendars changing – and no one globally is paying attention to it. We’ve always focused on intersections, so our work on climate change seemed a natural evolution.14 From the murmuring in networks, alarm bells from the IPCC, dwindling opportunities in biodiversity and desertification work, and the threat of nuclear issues being raised in the context of climate change, gender NGOs started to explore opportunities to engage in the UNFCCC to contribute to solutions to climate change. Regarding financial motivations, while several underlined that participating in the climate conferences was not a complete departure from their traditional issues,15 many also highlighted the need for support for their activities. Gender work in developing countries is often funded by development donors that have priorities that “run in fads. Funding streams shift and NGOs need to adapt. It’s an ebb and flow not a clean answer. Donors became interested in the intersections between gender and climate change.”16 Some organizations, often larger organizations, continually find “niches” in donor funding, the competitive funding environment.17 In this effort, WEDO and IUCN early on secured funding for the GGCA, to continue establishing the case for 14 Cate Owren, interview with author 2014. 15 Cate Owren. interview with author 2014; Goteline Alber, Gender CC, interview with author 2014, speaking about how WEDO and others could use their experience in other multilateral environmental negotiations in the UNFCCC. 16 Cate Owren. interview with author 2014. 17 Ulrike Röhr, Life e.V., interview with author 2014. 140 gender and climate, and to ensure that their participation in the Bali conference and beyond would be successful.18 The political, normative and material motivations all aligned for the gender NGOs, particularly those working on land and biodiversity issues. Previously, there was a “division of labour” between the NGOs in the movement,19 but the shift in the motivations for WEDO and others working outside climate change brought the groups together. As the next section shows, this was not initially a harmonious regrouping. Two networks emerged with different ideologies and strategies. Over time, the network became more harmonious and continued to mobilize new support and find new allies – and influence – in the climate change regime. 5.3 Mobilization There was a small showing of gender advocates within the UNFCCC before 2007, comprised of NGOs with an “environment first” lens on the link between gender and environmental issues from the beginning of the UNFCCC. As shown by Figure 5.3 below, the introduction of the women’s rights organizations boosted the presence of gender NGOs in the UNFCCC to unprecedented numbers after the 2007 COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia. These women’s rights NGOs coordinated beforehand to mobilize and launch new alliances at the Bali Conference, which would prove a watershed moment. Figure 5-3 below confirms the importance of COP 13 in 2007 as the beginning of gender NGOs’ mobilization in climate change. The number of delegates subtly increased going into COP 13 and 14, before a rapid rise at the Copenhagen meeting. The Bali conference set the stage for the dramatic rise in gender NGOs’ 18 Ulrike Röhr, Life e.V., interview with author 2014. Cate Owren, interview with author 2014. Finland’s Sixth National Communications to the UNFCCC reports that the Government of Finland provided 6 million Euro to the Global Gender and Climate Alliance for the period of 2008-2014. Available at: http://stat.fi/tup/khkinv/fi_nc6.pdf See page 22. 19 Ulrike Röhr, Life e.V., interview with author 2014. Bridget Burns, WEDO, interview with author 2014. 141 participation. From that increase, gender NGOs’ would increase
UBC Theses and Dissertations
Activists across issues : forum multiplying and the new climate change activism Allan, Jen Iris 2017
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