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Feminist critical human security : women's (in) security and smuggling on Ecuador's borders Donoso, Claudia 2016

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 1 FEMINIST CRITICAL HUMAN SECURITY: WOMEN’S (IN) SECURITY AND SMUGGLING ON ECUADOR'S BORDERS  by  Claudia Donoso   A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY   in THE COLLEGE OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Interdisciplinary Studies)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Okanagan Campus)   November 2016  © Claudia Donoso, 2016 ii     Examination Committee  The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the College of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled:  FEMINIST CRITICAL HUMAN SECURITY: WOMEN’S (IN) SECURITY AND SMUGGLING ON ECUADOR'S BORDERS _____________________________________________________________________________ submitted by    Claudia Donoso   in partial fulfilment of the requirements of     the degree of   DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.   Dr. James Rochlin, Department of Political Science. Supervisor, Professor (please print name and faculty/school above the line) Dr. Patricia Tomic, Department of Sociology.  Supervisory Committee Member, Professor (please print name and faculty/school in the line above) Dr. Ricardo Trumper, Department of Sociology.  Supervisory Committee Member, Professor (please print name and faculty/school in the line above) Dr. Susan Frohlick, Department of Community, Culture and Global Studies. University Examiner, Professor (please print name and faculty/school in the line above)  Dr. Pablo Andrade, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Ecuador. External Examiner, Professor (please print name and university in the line above)   November, 2016 (Date Submitted to Grad Studies)   iii      Abstract   The study addresses the following central research question: What comprises the web of power relations that have led to women’s insecurity in Ecuador’s border provinces, El Oro, Carchi and Sucumbíos? A web of power relationships in those provinces has perpetuated intersectional inequalities that lead women to become smugglers. This web is supported by systems of oppression based on gender, class, race and geographical location that foster unequal access to education, paid work, health services and domestic violence, thereby aggravating women’s insecurity. Customs control, police and military subsumed under national and border security aggravate women’s security conditions. To complement this militarized response, the government of Rafael Correa launched Plan Ecuador and the Sovereign Energy Plan in 2007 and the Comprehensive Security Plan in 2011. These plans sought to confront the involvement of Ecuadorians in activities considered illegal by the security forces. While Plan Ecuador and the Integral Security Plan incorporated a multidimensional approach and a human security discourse to complement national security, they did not recognize the diversity of women's experiences of insecurity and roles at border provinces. To address this empirical case, this dissertation advances the concept of “feminist critical human security” to examine women’s security in Ecuador’s border zones, specifically in El Oro, Sucumbíos and Carchi provinces. Drawing on Black feminism’s idea of intersectionality and matrix of domination and on feminist critiques of national security, this research establishes women smugglers as referents of security rather than as criminals, as the border security discourse views them. By using a feminist critical human security lens that take into account the intersections of gender, race, class and geographical location and that includes the voices of women and their conceptions of local development and security, this research will iv     enhance the ability of governments to improve their planning and policies related to increasing the security of women in border zones.                   v     Preface   This dissertation is an original intellectual product of the author, Claudia Donoso. The fieldwork reported herein was covered by UBC Okanagan Behavioural Ethics Board and UBC Ethics Certificate number H12-02980. The results of the fieldwork were presented at the Canadian Association for Latin American and Caribbean Studies (CALACS) 2014 conference in Quebec City on May 16-18, 2014, at the Canadian Association for the Study of International Development (CASID) 2015 conference in Ottawa on June 3-5, 2015, and at the CALACS 2016 conference at the University of Calgary on June 3, 2016.               vi     Table of Contents     Examination Committee .............................................................................................................. ii Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ iii Preface ........................................................................................................................................... v Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... vi List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ ix List of Maps ................................................................................................................................... x Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... xi Dedication .................................................................................................................................... xii Chapter 1. Conceptual framework and methodology ............................................................... 1 1.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Conceptual framework.............................................................................................................. 5 1.2.1 National Security ............................................................................................................ 8 1.2.2 Human Security and Critical Human Security ............................................................. 12 1.2.3 Feminist’s critiques of national security ...................................................................... 22 1.2.4 Intersectionality and women’s insecurity ..................................................................... 28 1.2.5 Feminist critical human security .................................................................................. 36 1.2.6 Border ........................................................................................................................... 43 1.2.7 Power ............................................................................................................................ 49 1.2.7.1 Power as domination ................................................................................................. 50 1.2.7.2 Power as empowerment............................................................................................. 54 1.2.7.3 Feminist critical human security’s conception of power ........................................... 58 1.2.8 Summary of the theoretical approach ........................................................................... 61 1.3 Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 63 1.3.1 Methods ........................................................................................................................ 64 1.3.2 Quantitative and Qualitative Data ................................................................................ 70 1.3.3 Successes and problems encountered in data collection activities ............................... 71 Chapter 2. Ecuadorian Policy on Security ............................................................................... 75 2.1 National Security as viewed by the Ecuadorian state ......................................................... 75 2.1.1 The State under Rafael Correa and Methods of Security Control ................................ 90 2.1.2 New threats to Ecuador’s border security under Rafael Correa ................................... 99 2.1.3 Smuggling of fuels and propane cylinders on Ecuador’s northern and southern borders ............................................................................................................................................. 103 vii     2.2 Human Security: a new paradigm in Ecuadorian security policy? ................................... 115 2.2.1 Human Security as a complement to National Security Initiatives on Ecuador’s Borders ................................................................................................................................ 115 2.2.2 Lack of continuity within public policy and permanent shifts in security priorities .. 120 2.3 Summary of the Chapter ................................................................................................... 127 Chapter 3. Women’s Insecurity and National Security ........................................................ 128     3.1 National Security and Women Smugglers in Ecuador’s Borders Areas .......................... 128 3.2 Women’s Insecurity in Ecuador: Intersectional Inequalities ............................................ 143 3.2.1 Violence against Women............................................................................................ 149 3.2.2 Education and Women’s Security .............................................................................. 151 3.2.3 Labor Market and Women’s Security ........................................................................ 154 3.3 Planning Feminist Critical Human Security in Ecuador’s Border Zones ......................... 165 3.3.1 Gender mainstreaming vs. Intersectionality mainstreaming ...................................... 170 3.4 Intersectionality in Public Policy ...................................................................................... 176 3.5 Summary of the Chapter ................................................................................................... 182 Chapter 4. Women’s Insecurity in Carchi, Sucumbíos and El Oro ..................................... 186 4.1 Intersectionality and Women's Security in Sucumbíos, Carchi and El Oro ..................... 189 4.1.1 Northern Border ......................................................................................................... 192 4.1.1.1 Sucumbíos-Lago Agrio ........................................................................................ 196 4.1.1.2 Carchi-La Concepción -Chota Valley ................................................................. 217 4.1.1.2.1 Women’s organizations in Carchi ............................................................... 222 4.1.1.2.2 Border Security ............................................................................................ 224 4.1.1.2.3 Employment ................................................................................................. 227 4.1.1.2.4 Women and intersectional inequalities ........................................................ 229 4.1.2 Southern Border ......................................................................................................... 233 4.1.2.1 Women’s Insecurity in Huaquillas- El Oro ......................................................... 236 4.1.2.1.1 Women’s organizations in El Oro ............................................................... 239 4.1.2.1.2 Border Security ............................................................................................ 243 4.1.2.1.3 Employment ................................................................................................. 247 4.1.2.1.4 Women and intersectional inequalities ........................................................ 251 4.2 Summary of the Chapter ................................................................................................... 254 Chapter 5. Analytical Conclusions .......................................................................................... 258 5.1 Theoretical implications .................................................................................................... 258 5.2 Policy Recommendations .................................................................................................. 262 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 274 viii     Appendices ................................................................................................................................. 299 Appendix A: Contact letter for key informant ........................................................................ 299 Appendix B: Consent form for key informant ........................................................................ 300 Appendix C: Poster-Invitation for participants in workshop .................................................. 303 Appendix D: Consent form for participants in workshop ....................................................... 304 Appendix E: List of Key Informants Contacted ..................................................................... 307 Appendix F: Interview Guides for Key Informants ................................................................ 309 Appendix G: Interview Guide for Participants ....................................................................... 311 Appendix H: Certificate of Approval...................................................................................... 312                    ix     List of Tables   Table 1. Value in US dollars of Apprehensions of Merchandise in Zone 1 ………………….. 110 Table 2. Value in US dollars of Apprehensions of Merchandise in Zone 7  .............................  112 Table 3. Paid and unpaid average work hours per week by gender and ethnicity…………….. 160 Table 4. Average hours per week spent on unpaid work by gender and ethnicity……………. 161 Table 5. Work load by level of education, gender and ethnicity/ Average hours per week…... 162 Table 6. Ethnic groups in Sucumbíos, Carchi and El Oro .......................................................... 189 Table 7. Fields in which inhabitants of Sucumbíos, Carchi and El Oro work ........................... 190 Table 8. Homicide rate in the Andean Region ........................................................................... 194 Table 9. Human Insecurity Problems of Local Women from La Concepción and Chota Valley..226 Table 10. Employment problems of local women from La Concepción and Chota Valley ....... 227 Table 11. Equality demands of local women from La Concepción and Chota Valley .............. 231 Table 12. Border security demands of local women in Huaquillas ............................................ 245 Table 13. Employment demands of local women in Huaquillas ................................................ 249 Table 14. Gender equality demands of local women in Huaquillas ........................................... 253              x     List of Maps   Map 1. Ecuador's Border ............................................................................................................ 191 Map 2. Sucumbíos Province…………………………………………………………………... 197 Map 3. Carchi Province……………………………………………………………………….. 217 Map 4. La Concepción Parish…………………………………………………………………. 219 Map 5. El Oro Province……………………………………………………………………….. 237                 xi     Acknowledgements  I offer my enduring gratitude to the faculty, staff and to my fellow students at UBC-Okanagan, who inspired me to continue my work. I owe particular thanks to my supervisor, Dr. James Rochlin, to my committee members, Dr. Patricia Tomic and Dr. Ricardo Trumper, the university examiner, Dr. Susan Frohlick, and the external examiner, Dr. Pablo Andrade, for their thoughtful reading of this dissertation and their invaluable suggestions. I thank the Transition Commission to the Council of Women and Gender Equality (CDT), UN Women-Ecuador, Movimiento de Mujeres El Oro, Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Negras del Ecuador (CONAMUNE), Federación de Mujeres de Sucumbíos, and FLACSO-Ecuador for enlarging my vision of equality and human security and providing coherent answers to my endless questions.  This work was carried out with the aid of a grant from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa, Canada. Information on the Centre is available on the web at www.idrc.ca          xii      Dedication  To my sons Juancho and Nacho, my companions during this journey. To my father for his great emotional support. To my mother and all those women who inspired this research.                 1  Chapter 1. Conceptual framework and methodology 1.1 Introduction This dissertation analyzes the main critical human security problems faced by women in Ecuador’s border provinces, namely unemployment, health, a lack of access to education and training, and domestic violence. More particularly, the dissertation examines smuggling as a case study that illustrates how systems of oppression based on intersected gendered, class, race and geographical inequalities interact at the border.  My research seeks to understand what comprises the web of power relations that have led to women’s insecurity in Ecuador’s border provinces, El Oro, Carchi, and Sucumbíos?  Thus, it analyses how women’s involvement in smuggling is related to conditions of insecurity at the border. It also strives to assess the extent to which Ecuadorian public policies related to human security at its northern and southern borders encourage the security and well-being of local women, taking into consideration the intersections of gender, race, class and geographical location. Through a feminist critical human security lens, this research establishes women smugglers as referents of security rather than as criminals, as the border security discourse views them. Intersectional inequalities may lead women to become smugglers, but they can be both empowered and dominated by smuggling fuel, propane cylinders and other goods in Ecuador’s aforementioned border provinces.  My research employs the theoretical framework of critical human security and feminist security. The utility of the concept of human security from a feminist perspective is explained by first outlining the history of the concept, culminating in the concept of “feminist critical human security” drawing on the works of feminist critiques of national security. In addition, by applying Black feminist Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw’s idea of intersectionality and Patricia Hill Collins’ 2     concept of the matrix of domination to the notion of a feminist critical human security approach, it is possible to be attentive to power relations and to understand how insecurity is embedded into people’s daily lives and livelihoods in ways that are classed, gendered, racialized and geographical at Ecuador’s borders. By using a feminist critical human security lens that takes into account the intersections of gender, race, class and geographical location and that includes the voices of women and their conceptions of local development and security, this research will enhance the ability of governments to improve policies related to increasing the security of women in border zones.  The first chapter explains the conceptual framework and methodology used in this study. I begin the conceptual discussion by explaining the state-centric concept of national security through Realism as the dominant school of thought in International Relations Theory. I then discuss the concept of human security as emancipatory and focused on the security of the individual and communities rather than on the security of the state. By doing so, I question traditional constructs of national security and national interest through a critical human security approach and a feminist critique of national security that enrich the understanding of women’s security. I argue that national security, as a masculinized, racialized and militarized discourse, deploys border security practices that criminalize women smugglers. In this sense, security forces as the “knowers” of security issues have excluded the security of women.  The concept of feminist critical human security is usefully advanced when analyzing the need to transform the national security approach used by the state. In this dissertation, feminist critical human security is understood as an emancipatory approach for women and their local communities in which the intersectionality of women’s insecurity is recognized. Such a concept recognizes that the conditions of insecurity of women are aggravated by border security practices and the urban/rural dichotomy and by racial and class discrimination in Ecuadorian society. 3     Through this feminist critical human security framework, I analytically review the traditional understanding of the border and other perceptions that view the border as a space of integration where multiple identities encounter each other.  Regarding the methodological approach, in this first chapter I explain that feminist methodologies in political sciences and international relations influenced the collection of quantitative and qualitative data as well as the fieldwork carried out in Ecuador between June 2013 and May 2014, which included workshops with local women and interviews with functionaries, feminist scholars, women’s organization leaders, and local women. The fieldwork was completed by examining national statistics and census data and by conducting an analysis of Ecuadorian mass media sources at the national and local levels.  The second chapter examines the Ecuadorian policy on security through two theoretical approaches, namely national security and human security. Realism has been the dominant approach in the field of international relations; it focuses on state security and national interests. Smuggling, as an “illicit economy,” is viewed as a new threat to Ecuadorian national security; national security initiatives to tackle it are patrolling and customs surveillance.  In contrast, human security emphasizes the importance of the security of the individual and their community. In this chapter, I also reveal how Ecuadorian security policies have manipulated the concept of human security to complement national security and to maximize national interests, provoking the failure of women’s security at the borders.  In the third chapter, I take up the challenge of discussing feminist critical human security as an emancipatory approach for the wellbeing of women and their communities in three provinces on the Ecuadorian borders. The chapter studies the extent to which smuggling has become a borderland economic dynamic that empowers and dominates women. The chapter applies the concept of power as domination and empowerment from a feminist perspective. The chapter also 4     examines border concepts explained by local experts, local authorities and women’s organization leaders in order to better comprehend the debate between traditional and alternative understandings of the border. The chapter recommends that the Ecuadorian government develop feminist critical human security to emancipate local women and their communities rather than a fake alternative that “complements” its national security, ultimately regulating women’s bodies through border security practices.  Using a feminist critical human security lens, the fourth chapter assesses the extent to which the intersectionality of inequalities based on race, class, gender and geographical location at the Ecuadorian borders with Peru and Colombia has encouraged women to become involved in smuggling. The chapter also reviews security and development planning agendas in Ecuador’s border zone and the border dynamic in the three Ecuadorian provinces chosen for this study. This chapter incorporates mainstream media analysis and a significant amount of testimony collected during my fieldwork conducted in Ecuador during the summer of 2013. It also includes local women’s contributions made during workshops conducted with the support of the Women’s Movement in El Oro Province (MMO) and the Black Women’s Movement in Carchi Province (CONAMUNE). The results of the Women Federation of Sucumbíos’ agenda are also included.   Finally, the fifth chapter presents my conclusions regarding the theoretical and policy implications of my research for Ecuador, including suggestions for Ecuadorian public policy initiatives that include women's voices. It is recommended to include intersectionality mainstreaming in the policy design cycle. This chapter suggests the need for a public policy within an intersectional framework to improve women’s wellbeing in Ecuador’s border zones.   5     1.2 Conceptual framework  The main critical human security problems faced by women in Ecuador’s border provinces are unemployment, health, lack of access to education and training, and domestic violence. This dissertation analyzes smuggling as a case study that illustrates how systems of oppression based on intersected gendered, class, race and geographical inequalities interact at the border. This chapter develops the conceptual framework and methodology that contribute to the analysis of the security of local women in Ecuador’s border zones, specifically in El Oro, Sucumbíos and Carchi provinces. Such an analysis makes possible to understand what comprises the web of power relations that lead to women’s insecurity at the border and to determine whether their smuggling indicates their empowerment or domination. My research combines the theoretical framework of critical human security and feminist security. Subsequently, I propose the concept of feminist critical human security, which draws on the works of feminist critiques of national security, on Black feminist Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw’s idea of intersectionality, and on Patricia Hill Collins’ concept of the matrix of domination. A feminist critical human security allows this research to be attentive to power relations and understand how insecurity at Ecuador’s borders is rooted in people’s daily lives in ways that are classed, gendered, racialized, and discriminatory depending on geographical location. Through a feminist critical human security lens, this research establishes women who smuggle as referents of security rather than as criminals, as the border security discourse views them.   The conceptual discussion analyzes the state-centric concept of national security through Realism as the dominant school of thought in International Relations Theory. The concept of human security is then discussed as emancipatory and focused on the security of the individual and communities rather than on the security of the state. By doing so, this dissertation questions traditional constructs of national security and national interest through a critical human security 6     approach that incorporates feminist critiques of national security, in order to understand women’s security in particular. The concept of feminist critical human security is proposed to support the need to transform the national security approach used by the state. Feminist critical human security is understood as an emancipatory approach for women and their local communities in which the intersectionality of women’s insecurity is recognized. Thus, feminist critical human security recognizes that the conditions of insecurity of women are aggravated by the urban/rural dichotomy and by racial and class discrimination in Ecuadorian society in general and patriarchal and racist border security practices in particular. Through this feminist critical human security framework, I review the traditional understanding of the border and contrast it with views of borders as spaces of integration and of intersection of multiple identities.  In this first chapter, I discuss the methodological approach of my dissertation. I used feminist methodologies in political sciences and international relations to collect quantitative and qualitative data during the fieldwork that was carried out between June 2013 and May 2014. Feminist critical human security determined the methods chosen in this research, which included workshops conducted with local women in Ecuador and interviews with Ecuadorian functionaries, feminist experts and women’s organization leaders. The research topic was also approached by examining national statistics and census data and by conducting an analysis of Ecuadorian mass media sources at the national and local levels.  Even though, the women studied had not written security documents that I could read and analyze, I set out to research security from the perspective of local women. In preparing for the fieldwork, I conducted research on women’s organization in the three provinces chosen for this study. I was then able to select key organizations that, in my view, represented the different identities and interests of women at the border. To gain a better understanding of what security meant to those women, I conducted interviews and workshops with local women in the provinces 7     of Carchi, El Oro and Sucumbíos. The participants were low-income, black, Indigenous and mestizo women that suffer at least a triple discrimination.  Since they have experienced racism, sexism, and classism, their security has multiple roots within the systems of power.  This section discusses the concepts that will be applied to the empirical case studied in this dissertation. The central ideas from which I borrow to form the conceptual framework for my thesis are national security, human security, critical human security, feminist security, feminist critical human security, border and power.  I begin by explaining that, from the perspective of the realist school of thought, the state-centric concept of national security is primarily concerned with the state’s national interest and security agenda. In order to challenge this state-centric view, this dissertation discusses the concept of human security as emancipatory and focused on the security of the individual and the community rather than on the security of the state. To enrich the understanding of women’s security, I question masculinized and militarized constructs of national security and national interest through a feminist security lens. In this sense, the concept of feminist critical human security seeks to transform the national security discourse deployed by border security practices that criminalize women smugglers. This feminist critical human security framework challenges the traditional understanding of the border, questions patriarchal border security practices and locates women at the center of security concerns. By recognizing the intersectionality of women’s insecurity experiences, the feminist critical human security perspective acknowledges that the insecurity of women at the border is the result of inequalities based on race, class, gender and the urban/rural dichotomy. The feminist critical human security approach is emancipatory, as it fosters women’s empowerment and active participation in their communities.    8     1.2.1 National Security  I analyze the concept of national security through Realism, which is the mainstream theory in international relations. For Realism, states are the principal actors in global politics, emphasizing issues such as power,1 national interest and national security. International politics has been linked to the idea of human nature, where the concept of interest is defined in terms of power.2 The realist view of security emanates from the survival of the state in an anarchic international system in order to preserve a state’s sovereignty.3 For classical realism, political issues are ruled by human nature;4 anarchy, in the absence of international government, turns international relations into the realm of competition and interest. Furthermore, state behavior seeks to maximize its power so as to survive in an international anarchical system that lacks a higher authority to enforce laws. Hence, realism views military superiority as the core of power, where inter-state relationships are dominated by powerful states imposing demands on the less powerful. For realists, international relations have included an important security component sustained and supported by a state’s national interest; thus, the interrelation between a state’s security and national interest has fostered a national security approach within international relations.  A national security approach fosters a self-interested agenda in which power is viewed as the political and military manipulation of one’s own position to pressure others. In this sense, the                                                  1 From a classical realist perspective, power is located in human nature. Hans Morgenthau in particular understood power as a psychogenic and inter-subjective condition of politics. See more at Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen’, 1930 (Container 151, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC), 43. 2 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 4-5.  3 Björn Hettne, “Development and security,” Security Dialogue 41, no. 1 (2010): 33.  4 In his book “Leviathan”, Hobbes views human nature as the right of nature that allows each man to use his own power as his will to preserve his own life. This natural right of every man reveals that there is not security for any man despite its strength or wisdom. The condition of man is the condition of “warre” where every man is against the other. Every man is governed by his own reason. See Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan (London: The Guernsey Press, 1973), 66-67. 9     concept of national security is particularly important for the national interests of the state such as Ecuador. National security is a part of government policy; its objective is the creation of national and international political conditions favorable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries.5 National security includes a traditional defense policy and also the non-military actions of a state designed to ensure its total capacity to survive as a political entity in order to exert influence and to carry out its internal and international objectives.6 Nevertheless, it has been claimed that national security is an ambiguous concept that remains a “weakly conceptualized, ambiguously defined, but politically powerful concept… For practitioners of state policy, compelling reasons exist for maintaining its symbolic ambiguity… An undefined notion of national security offers scope for power-maximizing strategies to political and military elites, because of the considerable leverage over domestic affairs which can be obtained by invoking it.”7 The ambiguity of the concept of national security is related to its intrinsic subjectivity, particularly in defining threats to any nation’s security.8 A threat to national security can be defined as an action or sequence of events that threatens drastically to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to a government of a state.9 Consequently, a state’s definition of threats to national security varies according to the national and international context, encouraging the construction of self-interested security agendas and strategies based on a state’s national interests.                                                   5 Frank N. Trager and Frank L. Simonie, “An Introduction to the study of national security,” in F. N. Trager and P.S Kronenberg, National Security and American Society Theory, Process and Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973), 36.  6 Michael Louw, National Security a modern approach: (papers presented at the Symposium on national security held at Pretoria, 31 March-1 April 1977), the quote is for the introductory note titled “The purpose of the symposium.” Published 1978 by Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria. 7 Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 4, 9. 8 Joseph J. Romm, Defining National Security The Non-Military Aspects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 3-4. 9 Richard H. Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983): 133. 10     The pursuit of military and economic power has been the main motivation of a state’s national interests to protect its own national security. Military power specifically has become extremely relevant in a state’s relationship with others. Many traditional and non-traditional wars10 have been fought to increase military strength, to prevent another country from becoming stronger11 and to minimize threats to national security. A traditional understanding of security, as proposed by several feminist scholars, such as Caroline Thomas (1992), Ann Tickner (2005), and Spike Peterson (1992), emphasizes the defense of states’ territorial boundaries and the protection of their values, interests and resources.12 National security therefore accepts a permanent state of war in which a state’s interests are seen as the main issue for national and international relations.  Despite being the predominant school of thought in international relations, realism provides a limited approach to a state-centric analysis of power, international relations and security. “Naive realism” holds the view that the world is self-evident or that the facts simply “speak for themselves.”13 Realism remains fascinated with security-seeking reason, legitimizing the use of                                                  10 Traditional wars are between states, while non-traditional wars can be led by one or several states against terrorism, transnational crime and other non-state actors considered as threats for those states’ national security. Traditionally, the concept of security has referred to the security of states. In this regard, governments have defined their respective agendas based on threats from abroad, as military interventions, or those of internal origin that put at risk government institutions, as was the case of the armed movements with revolutionary intentions. For further discussion on traditional threats and non-traditional threats to states’ national security see Gerardo Rodríguez Sánchez Lara, Antiguas y Nuevas Amenazas a la Seguridad de América Latina, Fundación Preciado. 15-18. http://www.fundacionpreciado.org.mx/biencomun/bc152/gerardo_rodriguez.pdf. Also refer to Lucia Dammert. Nuevas Amenazas para la Seguridad. (Octubre 2011) ANEPE-Chile. Power point presentation. http://www.google.ca/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=5&ved=0CE0QFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.anepe.cl%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2FDammert_Anepe_Octubre2011.ppt&ei=GS5xUoHdCq_oiAKLp4GgBg&usg=AFQjCNFZl9eO4XdmMaJAr_v_ZiwnEiG31A (accessed September 13, 2013). 11 Edward Hallet Carr, Twenty Years´ Crisis 1919-1939 (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2001), 111.  12 Caroline Thomas, “Third World Security,” in International Security in the Modern World, ed. Roger Carrey and Trevor C. Salmon (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 93; Ann Tickner, “Gendering a Discipline: Some Feminist Methodological Contributions to International Relations,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 30, no. 4 (2005): 2173-2188; and V. Spike Peterson, “Security and Sovereign States: What is at stake in taking feminism seriously?” in Gendered States. Feminist (Re) Visions of International Relations Theory, edited by. V. Spike Peterson (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 31-64. 13 Klaus-John Dodds and James Sidaway, “Locating Critical Geopolitics,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 12, no. 5 (1994): 518. 11     force according to states’ territorial ambitions and predatory agendas.14 It tells us very little about non-state actors, inter-state cooperation, levels of threat perception15 or how national security initiatives affect people’s everyday lives, thereby creating more insecurity.  National security as a state-based security paradigm is failing to protect people in Ecuador’s border zones. A self-interested national security agenda does not pay enough attention to the well-being of citizens and their communities. Rather, national security involves a state-centric vision that is used to protect the state’s political and economic interests and values, using a military approach to combat local, national and regional threats. For instance, the national security approach is useful when analyzing a border security discourse that criminalizes threats to national security, such as smuggling, which has been a traditional way of living in border zones. In the Ecuadorian context, the smuggling of subsidized fuel and propane cylinders for domestic use to Colombia and Peru has come to be perceived as a threat to national security and has been made the main target of border control security practices.  As a result, national security practices criminalize individuals who become involved in smuggling activities.  This section has addressed the national security approach that views the state as the referent of security. The following section examines the concept of human security understood as a paradigm shift in security studies that gives priority to the individual as the referent of security analysis.                                                      14 Martin Griffiths, Rethinking International Relations Theory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 4; See also Kanti Bajpai. Human Security: Concept and Measurement. Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.  . http://www.ciaonet.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/wps/baj01/ (accessed July 20, 2012). 15 Griffiths, Ibid., 4.  12     1.2.2 Human Security and Critical Human Security   In the post-Cold War 90s, multidimensional security challenges and threats were re-discovered.  In fact, from the perspective of the states in general the debate over what issues constitute a threat to national security has been renewed and has mutated. The new threats to security do not come exclusively from an external enemy or from territorial conflicts; rather, they come from within the state in such form as underdevelopment, diseases, poverty, pollution, internal conflict or criminal violence. In addition, non- military problems such as economic, energy and environmental security, have become serious threats to security.16 Thus, the security discourse and agenda have widened their scope to include new actors and topics, such as gender, equity and the environment.17 This new security agenda requires preventive diplomacy and development18 and the equal participation of marginalized groups such as Indigenous peoples and women.19 New security threats occur when the state fails to protect the civilian population, 20 thereby creating human insecurity. Therefore, this shift in the security discourse recognizes that, for individuals and their communities, a feeling of insecurity arises from worries about daily life, such as food security, income security, health security or environmental security.  The 1994 Human Development Report is considered the foundational document for the new security paradigm. It emphasizes human security rather than state security.21 Human security provides an alternative approach to security studies by locating security at the personal level (and                                                  16 Joseph J. Romm, Defining National Security The Non-Military Aspects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 1-2. 17 William Bain, “Against Crusading: The Ethic of Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy 6, no.3 (1999): 86. 18 Kanti Bajpai, Human Security: Concept and Measurement. Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (August, 2000). http://www.ciaonet.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/wps/baj01/ (accessed July 20, 2012). 19 Charlotte Bunch, “Feminism, Peace, Human Rights and Human Security,” in Feminist Politics, Activism and Vision. Local and Global Challenges, ed. Luciana Ricciutelli, Angela Miles and Margaret H. McFadden. (London and New York: Zed Books, 2004), 79. 20 Pol Morillas Bassedas, “Génesis y evolución de la expresión de la seguridad humana. Un repaso histórico,” Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals 76 (2006): 48. 21 Gary King and Christopher Murray, “Rethinking Human Security,” Political Science Quarterly 116, no. 4 (2001): 589.  13     especially regarding the UN’s 2006 review of the human security approach at the community level). Traditionally, state sovereignty promotes national security practices and discourses that foster government’s control of territory and it recognition by other states. Human security, in contrast, challenges practices and institutions that give priority to “high politics” rather than to individual experiences of insecurity. By fostering the evolution of state sovereignty, it suggests that state sovereignty must serve the people from whom it draws its legitimacy.22 The human security approach argues that an exclusive emphasis on state security denies individuals’ wellbeing needs.23 Since human security challenges a state-centric approach to security based on the military defense of territory against external threats, it attempts to influence public policy to address individual’s security needs. The seven dimensions of human security (economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political) cover a wide range of issues. Thus, the 1994 Human Development Report states that human security is concerned with human life and dignity.24 It addresses all the threats to human survival, daily life and dignity because the individual must be free from want (socioeconomic rights) and fear (political and civil rights).   The idea of freedom is embedded in the human security approach of the UN Human Development Report of 1994. Development is a process of expanding individual freedoms.25 Hence, freedom involves processes of decision making and opportunities for achieving valued outcomes.26 For example, by escaping from poverty, which is as a source of un-freedom, individuals become free when they have access to social services, political participation and so on. Therefore, human security as a person-centric approach increases individuals’ freedom by                                                  22 Newman, Edward. “Critical Human Security Studies,” Review of International Studies 36, no.1 (2010): 79. 23 Newman, Ibid. 24 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 22. 25 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3. 26 Sen, Ibid., 291. 14     improving their quality of life. Freedom, from a human security perspective, is achieved when the economic and political rights of individuals and communities are continuously respected and guaranteed through effective and decentralized public policies.   Currently, there is no agreement about how broad the concept of human security should be; nor does it have a single definition. Some prefer a broad definition, but others suggest a narrow definition because they believe that this is easier to operationalize. The narrow definition of human security is more reactive in cases of human rights violations and post-conflict interventions, while the broader definition includes a preventive approach that addresses threats to human life, livelihood and the dignity of individuals, including poverty alleviation and environmental protection within an inter-sectorial policy framework. Since the 90s, Canada, Norway and Japan have become the pioneers in encouraging foreign policies based on human security. For Canadian foreign policy, both the Human Security Network27 and The Responsibility to Protect Report28 narrow the concept by requiring human security to put an emphasis on human rights. Canada’s perspective reflects a narrower focus, emphasizing antipersonnel landmines, small arms, children in armed conflict and international humanitarian and human rights law.29 Hence, it is important to be careful with the use of the narrow definition of human security, which has suffered from a tendency towards militarization in humanitarian international conflicts. This narrow definition links human security to a state-based approach that may not overcome the issues that motivated                                                  27 The Lysøen Declaration in Norway which took place in 1998 was the first step to the creation of the Human Security Network. This network is composed by 14 member countries (Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa (observer), Switzerland, and Thailand) who believe that human security has become both a new measure of global security and a new agenda for global action. 28 The Report “The Responsibility to Protect” is a response of the Government of Canada to the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan who in his Millennium Report to the General Assembly in 2000 restated the dilemma that if humanitarian intervention is an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should the international community should respond to human rights violations. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty- ICISS. The Responsibility to Protect, (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001), 2. Accessed July 29, 2012 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf 29 Gary King and Christopher Murray, “Rethinking Human Security,” Political Science Quarterly 116, no. 4 (2001): 590.  15     its creation when the concept emerged in the early 90s. In contrast, by focusing on development, Japan’s foreign policy, the Human Development Report (1994) and the Human Security Now Report (2003), foster a broader human security agenda that is more inclusive than Canada's and the above-mentioned reports. The Human Development Report of 1994, which is considered the origin of the human security approach, has been criticized for its lack of precision and its broad definition. Scholars such as Roland Paris (2001), Adrián Bonilla (2002), and Pol Morillas Bassedas (2008) claim that the seven components of human security30 examined in the Human Development Report of 1994 are too broad to be applied in practice.31 Therefore, the core task facing the human security agenda is how to delineate a narrower and more manageable approach.32 The efforts to sharpen the definition of human security encounter resistance from actors and institutions who believe that the concept's strength lies in its holism and inclusiveness.33  Attempts to narrow the concept of human security overlook the fact that a holistic approach fosters civil society participation. Furthermore, a holistic approach involves an interdisciplinary thinking34 that allows the construction of inter-sectorial policies to influence several problems simultaneously.35 Broadening securitisation will bring resources and attention to a wider range of security problems and actors, extending beyond                                                  30 The seven dimensions of human security mentioned in the United Nation Human Development Report 1994 include: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. 31 Adrián Bonilla, “Seguridad Humana en la Región Andina,” in Seguridad humana, prevención de conflictos y paz en América Latina y el Caribe. eds.  Aravena, Francisco y Goucha, Moufida (Santiago, Chile: FLACSO-Chile, 2002); Pol Morillas Bassedas, “Génesis y evolución de la expresión de la seguridad humana. Un repaso histórico,” Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals 76 (2006): 47-58; Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?,” International Security 26, no. 2 (Autumn, 2001): 87-102. 32 Pauline Ewan, “Deepening the Human Security Debate: Beyond the Politics of Conceptual Clarification,” POLITICS 27, no. 3 (2007): 183. 33 Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security 26, no. 2 (2001): 102. 34 Donna Winslow, “A Broad Concept that Encourages Interdisciplinary Thinking,” Security Dialogue 35, no.3, (2004):362. 35 Francisco Rojas Aravena y Andrea Álvarez Marín, “Seguridad Humana: un estado de arte,” in Seguridad humana, nuevos enfoques, ed. Francisco Rojas Aravena, 1ª. ed. (San José, C.R.: FLACSO, 2012): 27. 16     the state.36  The new threats to security are not only multidimensional but interdependent. For this reason, the birth of the concept of human security appeared as a critique and a challenge to a monolithic understanding of security, since it recognizes several sources of insecurity and fosters multi-sectorial coordination and intervention between the state, civil society, communities and international donors.  Human security encourages the generation of policies that include active civil society participation, because it focuses on the protection and empowerment of individuals. The recommendations of both the 2003 Human Security Now report and the 2006 United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security involve policies aimed at empowerment and protection. In particular, the 2006 United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security claims that the concept, as an interdisciplinary, people-centered, multi-sectorial, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented approach, introduces a dual focus on protection and empowerment to achieve the goal of human security.37 Moreover, this report links a protection/top -down or state-centered approach with an empowerment/bottom-up perspective that empowers the marginalized through participatory mechanisms.38 Human security emphasizes the capacities of individuals and communities to make autonomous and informed decisions. Moreover, a human security perspective in public policy design must include the demands and concerns arising from the citizens themselves and must recognize their own definitions and priorities for the risks and vulnerabilities that affect their everyday lives.  In sum, the human security discourse is a progressive approach for conducting security issues. Human security shifts the focus from the security of borders to the lives of people and                                                  36 Newman, Edward. “Critical Human Security Studies,” Review of International Studies 36, no.1 (2010): 86. 37 Human Security Unit, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, Human Security in Theory and Practice (New York: United Nations, 2006): 7-8. 38 Human Security Unit, Ibid., 9. 17     communities inside and across those borders.39 The concept of human security, therefore, stresses that all people should have the opportunity to meet their most essential needs and to earn their own living.40 Thus, human security includes more than simply protecting people; it entails empowering people and communities to fend for themselves: empowering is equivalent to emancipation.41 The inhabitants of local communities can contribute directly to identifying and implementing solutions to the quagmire of insecurity.42 Certainly, a human security approach seeks to empower people to achieve their own development, but it is mainly the responsibility of the state to contribute to people’s wellbeing. However, states’ national security interests can jeopardize the security of individuals and their communities.  Arguably, the human security agenda cannot be implemented without recognizing the particularities and needs of each region, state, or community. The seven dimensions of the human security approach, explained in the Human Development Report of 1994, include a comprehensive vision of development that can be applied in conflict regions. For instance, the Andes region has been considered by the United Nations as seriously insecure in human terms due to structural violence, chronic political instability, the exercise of violence to achieve political agendas43 and transnational crime. Implementing human security must take into account diverse and local realities, including public policy beneficiaries’ participation and their opinions about how and in which areas those policies might improve their quality of life. In my view, human security generates improvements in the quality of life of people by getting to the roots of social problems and reducing levels of violence, inequality and exclusion by breaking the patterns of domination                                                  39 Human Security Commission. Human Security Now (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003), 6. 40 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 24.  41 Human Security Commission. Ibid., 4. 42 Human Security Commission. Ibid., 6.  43 Adrián Bonilla, “Seguridad Humana en la Región Andina,” in Seguridad humana, prevención de conflictos y paz en América Latina y el Caribe. eds. Rojas Aravena, Francisco y Goucha, Moufida (Santiago, Chile: FLACSO-Chile, 2002), 361. 18     (such as those based on race, class, gender and geographical location) upon which Andean societies in the region were built. For the reasons mentioned above, in this dissertation, I utilize human security from a critical perspective. The critical school of security has found weaknesses with the original concept of human security. Critics of human security argue that it is analytically weak and primarily a hegemonic discourse used by governments to include a problem-solving approach within public policies. From a critical security studies perspective, human security’s pragmatic tendency towards finding solutions encourages the belief that the state can effectively work on people’s interests. In contrast, critical security approaches doubt state “kindness” and believe that state elites are not truly interested in or committed to promoting human welfare, because structural injustices can be found within the state.44 Edward Newman (2010) explores why human security arguments, which emphasize the individual as the referent of security analysis and seek to influence policy, have been disregarded in critical security studies. Since human security scholars want to retain their access to policy circles, they have been hesitant to explore critical security studies.45 This policy orientation of human security has made critical security scholars suspicious of human security as a hegemonic discourse used by the state. Furthermore, human security problem-solving arguments do not engage in epistemological, ontological or methodological debates.46 Therefore, human security is considered as uncritical and unsophisticated by critical security scholars.   Another weakness of the human security approach is its tendency to securitize any threat that could provoke a human impact and affect the physical integrity of the individual. Thus, nowadays almost everything is treated as a security issue, which impede good policy making and                                                  44 Edward Newman, “Critical Human Security Studies,” Review of International Studies 36 (2010): 87.  45 Newman, Ibid., 77. 46 Newman, Ibid., 77. 19     implementation by confusing the sources and consequences of insecurity.47 Critical security studies show that the human security approach has demonstrated its lack of an analytical and critical framework. Despite these critiques, the richness and popularity of the human security approach within international organizations derives precisely from its problem-solving approach, securitizing issues that were excluded from the national security discourse and its initiatives. The birth of human security appeared as a critique and a challenge to one exclusive understanding of security. Human security does not confuse sources of insecurity; it recognizes multiple sources and fosters multi-sectorial coordination and intervention.   Human security does not question the values and interests of its own initiatives. Human security scholars do not problematize the values and institutions that are currently related to human welfare and do not question the interests that are served by those institutions. Problem-solving theories are framed in previous social relationships and the institutions into which they are organized; these institutions and relationships are not questioned, because of their ability to resolve problems.48 In contrast, critical approaches question the interests that the state and institutions represent and do not unquestionably accept existing policy as legitimate.49 Therefore, from a critical security perspective, it is relevant to ask whose interests human security serves.  Who benefits from it? There is a need for a more critical human security approach. There are a number of steps in which critical and human security studies might engage. First, it is relevant to consider that both human security and critical security studies challenge the state-centric approach of conventional security, which is based on the military defense of territory and national interests against external and internal threats.50 Second, critical security studies and                                                  47 Newman, Ibid. 48 Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” Millennium 10, no.2 (1981): 126–155. 49 Newman, Ibid., 89. 50 Newman, Ibid., 77. 20     human security studies could learn more from each other; for instance, human security scholarship could be developed conceptually to overcome its analytical weaknesses, while critical security studies could become more practical, so as to have an impact upon policy.51 The normative strands of critical security studies, such as the optimistic perception of security by the Welsh School52 of critical security theorists, could engage human security as a bridge between critical security studies and policy.53 Third, exploring human agency in solutions to human security challenges is a necessary next step in the human security discourse.54 Although many threats to individual security emanate from weak or abusive states, human security scholarship still views the state as the main provider of individual security. Thus, the issue of agency requires further study. Furthermore, human security scholarship assumes that the individual-state relationship is the fundamental binary. In reality, the individual is a social animal in numerous contexts and communities, not just a member of a state.55 If these aspects are taken into consideration by critical security studies a more critical human security is possible.  For this reason, I use the broader definition of the concept of human security derived from a critical human security perspective. Critical human security (CHS) is a concept under construction that can be adapted to a particular context.56 It remains policy-relevant and views the individual as a social subject immersed in various contexts and communities.57 The critical human security                                                  51 Newman, Ibid., 91-92. 52 By using a critical approach, the Welsh School questions realist theories of security. This security theory, influenced by critical theory, is associated with the work of Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, who view security as emancipation. See more at Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” Review of International Studies 17 (1991): 314-315; Richard Wyn Jones, “Message in a Bottle'? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies,” Contemporary Security Policy 16, no.3 (1995): 310. 53 Newman, Ibid., 92. 54 Newman, Ibid., 93.  55 Newman, Ibid., 94. 56 James Rochlin and Gustavo Gallón, “Introduction,” in Profits, Security, and Human Rights in Developing Countries. Global Lessons from Canada’s Extractive Sector in Colombia (New York: Routledge, 2015), 6. 57 Newman, Ibid., 94.  21     perspective is influenced by post-development, as understood by Arturo Escobar,58 and celebrates local knowledge and a strong community participation in security planning.59 CHS embraces the concerns of the marginalized and those who lack political power60 in order to empower local women and their communities. This broader definition of human security serves as a practical guide for governmental policymaking and academic research. By integrating concern for the security of individuals and communities into public policy, a critical human security approach to security studies identifies, analyzes and addresses insecurities affecting individuals and groups in specific contexts. In the case of women’s insecurity on Ecuador’s borders, this approach includes the voices of local women in the three provinces where my study was conducted. The goal is to identify the structural inequalities that create insecurity in the communities and to find alternatives to transform current conditions of insecurity.  Human security policies must consider all the interconnected factors that create insecurity in the intervention zone. The human security agenda must find interdependent issues to be addressed, particularly in the border zones, leading to the formulation of effective policies to solve the inequalities that have provoked social, economic, cultural or environmental problems in critical contexts. For instance, gender equality must be seen as a component of human security without, however, excluding other intersecting factors of inequality such as class and race.  I use critical human security and the feminist analysis of security and international relations to challenge the state-centric concept of national security. Thus, critical human security is analyzed as an emancipatory approach for women and their local communities. In the next section, I present feminist critiques of the notion of national security. These critiques take as their starting point that                                                  58 Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).  59 James Rochlin and Gustavo Gallón. Ibid, 7. 60 James Rochlin and Gustavo Gallón. Ibid, 7.  22     the protection of the state’s boundaries and interests is limited to military terms, denying women’s security.  1.2.3 Feminist’s critiques of national security  Traditionally, security studies are informed by theories that have used positivist methods rather than post-positivist orientations. Rational choice theory, as a positivist methodology, explains states’ international behavior as rational and scientific. Thus, cooperation among states is also explained as a result of a rational self-interest.61 In contrast, post-positivist methodologies employ theoretical frameworks such as critical social theory, historical sociology, discourse analysis and postmodernism.  As a branch of critical social theory, feminist scholarship entered the study of security and international relations at the end of the 1980s, at about the same time as the third feminist wave.62 The feminist lens explores how we think, or do not think, about gender in international relations. In particular, it raises gender-sensitive critiques of security politics. Feminist security theories are concerned with the everyday politics of security.63 They emerged from ideological, trans-epistemological multi-voiced conversational debate among multiple feminisms, including liberal, empiricist, modified standpoint and qualified postmodern perspectives.64 Feminist security theories question the academic and political foundations of gendered insecurity, revealing gendered hierarchies in society and theory, and fostering alternative visions of security. Feminist understandings of security, then, seek to eliminate patriarchal structural violence. Furthermore,                                                  61 Ann Tickner, “Gendering a Discipline: Some Feminist Methodological Contributions to International Relations,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 30, no 4 (2005): 2175. 62 Tickner, Ibid., 2176. 63 Erin Blanchard, “Gender, International Relations, and the Development of Feminist Security Theory,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28, no. 4 (2003): 1294.  64Blanchard, Ibid., 1295. 23     they challenge realism by revealing its gender bias and androcentric framework,65 thereby seeking to reduce gendered global insecurities.66 The incursion of feminism into the field of security studies contests the restriction of security to “high politics” and fosters the widening of threats.  In the early 1990s, first generation international relations feminists, such as Cynthia Enloe (1989), Ann Tickner (1992), V. Spike Peterson (1992), and Christine Sylvester (1994), challenged the masculinist biases of the core concepts in the field, such as, the omission of women in the masculine discourse on national security led by the military.67 This generation, questioned state-centricity and the dependence on positivist ways of knowing.68 Many of the feminist scholars who participated in the first generation of a feminist perspective on international relations have also contributed to a second generation of international relations feminist scholarship that is more empirical.69 The second generation of international relations feminists, such as Christine Chin (1998), Elisabeth Prügl (1999), Charlotte Hooper (2001), Ann Tickner (2001) and V. Spike Peterson (2003),70 investigated a variety of empirical cases, making gender and women’s lives visible in international relations and using gender as a central category of analysis.71  Moreover,                                                  65 Blanchard, Ibid., 1305. 66 Blanchard, Ibid., 1307.  67 For further discussion, Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Relation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Ann J. Tickner, Gender in International. Relations. Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global. Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Spike Peterson. “Security and Sovereign States: What is at stake in taking feminism seriously?” In Gendered States. Feminist (Re) Visions of International Relations Theory, ed. V. Spike Peterson, 31-64. (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992); Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1994). 68 Jacqui True, Engendering international relations: What difference does second-generation feminism make? May 2002. http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/02-1.pdf (accessed on March 8, 2016), 2. 69 True, Ibid., 3. 70 Christine Chin’s In Service and Servitude: Foreign Female Domestic Workers and the Malaysian “Modernity” Project (1998) builds on Marxist/Gramscian critical theory introduced into International Relations by Robert Cox; Elisabeth Prügl’s The Global Construction of Gender: Home-Based Work in the Political Economy of the 20th Century (1999) uses linguistic constructivism, associated with the work of  Nicholas Greenwood Onuf (1989); and Charlotte Hooper’s Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics (2001) is based in political theory and textual analysis. 71 Tickner, J. Ann. “Gendering a Discipline: Some Feminist Methodological Contributions to International Relations.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 30, no. 4 (2005):  2176, 2178.  In this article Tickner recognizes that the first and second generation of IR feminism does not coincide with first and second waves of feminism. 24     these feminists utilized sociological, identity-based, interpretive or linguistic methodologies.72 Thus, these international relations feminists rectify women’s traditional exclusion by adding them to the theoretical framework and studying women’s everyday life.73 Second-generation feminists understand that to encourage feminist perspectives in international relations theory, it is important to demonstrate how research that uses gender as an analytic category can be conducted and how that research transforms our understanding of global politics.74 For example, for these feminists it is important to consider how women are affected by war or by their inclusion in conventional development models; they argue that, since women reproduce future soldiers, citizens, and workers, their contributions must be recognized. However, the second-generation does not really involve a critical perspective.  Third-generation scholars argue that women cannot simply be added to the study of global politics. Gender as the social meaning that shapes our bodies cannot be simply added to the study of international relations and to masculine constructions of world politics. According to Laura Shepherd (2010) gender is an integral part of and affects the practices of global politics.75 For this reason, third-generation scholars, such as V. Spike Peterson (2004), focus their efforts on deconstructing traditional theoretical understandings or, in more concrete terms, present a new form to interpret gender and international relations.76                                                  72 Tickner, Ibid., 2178. 73 V. Spike Peterson, “Feminist Theories Within, Invisible to, and Beyond IR,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 10, no 2 (Winter/Spring 2004): 37-38. 74 Jacqui True, Engendering international relations: What difference does second-generation feminism make? May 2002. http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/02-1.pdf (accessed on March 8, 2016), 3. 75 Laura Shepherd, “Sex or Gender? Bodies in World Politics and Why Gender Matters,” in Gender Matters in Global Politics. A Feminist Introduction to International Relations, ed. Laura J. Shepherd (New York: Routledge, 2010), 4-5. 76 V. Spike Peterson, “Feminist Theories Within, Invisible to, and Beyond IR,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 10, no 2 (Winter/Spring 2004): 39.  25      The empirical case studied in this dissertation borrows ideas from these three generations. It starts from the premise that masculine national security discourses and practices are gendered, racialized and discriminatory towards women’s everyday life experiences of insecurity in Ecuador’s borders. The influence of a feminist security analysis in this study not only attempts to make women’s insecurities visible or to recognize the ways in which women challenge traditional gender roles at the border; but it also strives to encourage the state to include women in human security planning within a framework that is sensitive to the intersections of race, class, gender and geographical location. Thus, this analysis seeks to turn the state into a competent guarantor of women’s security.  The relationship between gendered bodies and security is well documented by first generation international feminist scholars. The works of Ann Tickner (1992), Jill Steans (1998), Rebecca Grant (1991) and Christine Sylvester (1994) contribute to the understanding that national security suffers from gender blindness,77 meaning that it obscures and excludes women’s insecurity experiences. Gender matters in security studies because we theorize gender daily when we think about appropriate or inappropriate gendered behaviours at the global, national and local levels. Thus, security is studied and practiced by gendered bodies.78 Examples include masculinized bodies, such as security forces, and feminized bodies, such as women smugglers on the border. Regarding the exclusion of women in security, Cynthia Enloe (1989) argues that                                                  77 Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Jill Steans, Gender and International Relations: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Rebecca Grant,  “The Sources of Gender Bias in International Relations Theory,” in Gender and International Relations, eds. Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland  (U.K.: Open University Press, 1991); J. Ann, Tickner,  Gender in international relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).  78For specific discussion of global politics implemented by gendered bodies refer to Laura Shepherd, “Sex or Gender? Bodies in World Politics and Why Gender Matters,” 4, 6; Marysia Zalewski, “Feminist International Relations: Making Sense…” in Gender Matters in Global Politics. A Feminist Introduction to International Relations, ed. Laura J. Shepherd (New York: Routledge, 2010), 34; and Ann Tickner, You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 4 (1997): 625. 26     women’s roles in security issues have been marginalized due to male control in the field.79 Hence, a feminist approach to security dismantles mainstream understanding of security and includes women’s explanations of how their governments control their labor, hopes and fears.80 Asking how women and their communities are secured or unsecured leads us to tell the story of security in a different way. Therefore, a feminist perspective to security includes the voices of women breaking the silencing of their everyday lived experiences of insecurity on the border.  For first-generation international feminists, the traditional definition of security, which has been framed in state-centric terms, generates women’s insecurity. Military capability as an assurance against outside threats to the state frequently is antithetical to the interests of individuals, particularly to women.81 In fact, national security is a contradictory concept for women: it provokes structural gender violence and women’s insecurity as it involves unequal power relations between men and women. States implement a national security approach in order to centralize authority, to keep coercive power and to legitimize structural violence through the institutionalized patriarchal customs82 that implement national security practices. States appear as historical constructs that have been reproduced, defended, and re-legitimised socially as an episteme.83 Thus, they have become the absolute “knower” of security issues to the exclusion of other understandings of security by non-state actors. V. Spike Peterson argues persuasively that the national security approach, as a masculine discourse, constructs security based on states’ national interest and sees                                                  79Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Relation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 4. 80 Enloe, Ibid., 201. 81 Ann Tickner, “You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 4 (Dec., 1997), 625. 82 V. Spike Peterson, “Security and Sovereign States: What is at stake in taking feminism seriously?,” in Gendered States: Feminist (Re) Visions of International Relations Theory, ed. V. Spike Peterson (Bolder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 31-50. 83  R. B. J Walker, “Gender and Critique in the Theory of International Relations,” in Gendered States: Feminist (Re) Visions of International Relations Theory, ed. V. Spike Peterson (Bolder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 180. 27     males as the sole providers of protection and knowers of security issues while women are viewed as mere passive recipients of that protection84and completely ignorant of security. These masculine constructions of security are present within the security discourses and practices deployed along Ecuador’s borders, maintaining the discrimination of women, excluding them from a full exercise of their rights and impeding any improvement of their security conditions. For this reason, it is important to pay attention to the conceptions of security utilized in specific scenarios, because not all of them contribute to women’s security. These masculine discourses and constructs of security create a system of hierarchy and domination in which masculinity as an ideology reproduces structural insecurities, including the centralization of political power in men and the exploitative gender division of labor and identities. Therefore, a different and new conception of gender relations and equality is required in order to transform traditional security constructs of masculinity and femininity.  In this section, I have explained that the study of state’s security, national security and border security have dominated the understanding of what security is, limiting more comprehensive understandings that view women and their communities as referents of security. National security, defined as the protection of the state’s boundaries and interests, is limited to political and military terms. More particularly, the national security discourse is part of masculine high politics that renders women invisible.85 In contrast, feminist definitions of security and explanations of insecurity differ from the traditional understanding.86 Feminist critiques of national security are useful for my empirical case study, since they contribute to the understanding that state’s security creates insecurities for non-state actors, such as local women involved in                                                  84 Peterson, Ibid., 3-5, 34-36. 85 Erin Blanchard, “Gender, International Relations, and the Development of Feminist Security Theory,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28, no. 4 (2003): 1289, 1292. 86 J. Ann Tickner, “You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists,” International Studies Quarterly 41, No. 4 (1997): 623. 28     smuggling activities in the Ecuadorian borders. Furthermore, security has to be defined in multidimensional and multilevel terms, involving the diminution/elimination of all forms of violence to women and their communities. Feminist perspectives of security are concerned, in particular, with women’s security and the several forms of violence that women face in their everyday lives. Influenced by feminist security analysis, my study urges the state to include women within an intersectional framework in human security planning. I propose that a precondition for constituting a theoretical framework able to shed light on the question of women’s insecurity and smuggling in border zones in Ecuador is that the concept of critical human security must be informed and enriched by an intersectional feminist lens of security that considers the intersections of gender, race, class and geographical location. Intersectional analyses of inequality understand that race captures social realities affected by gender and class differences. The category of class is also connected to gendered and racialized differences. For this reason, it is important to examine interlocked inequalities that undermine women’s security.   1.2.4 Intersectionality and women’s insecurity The White feminist movement has been contested by currents of Black feminism and Third World feminism that respond to the invisibility of the particularities of women’s experiences of discrimination. The notion of “sisterhood” and the implicit feminist assumption of the existence of common interests amongst all women are, however, problematic. In feminist theory, the term intersectionality was introduced as a metaphor in 1989 and as a concept in 1991 by the Black feminist legal scholar Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, one of the founders of Critical Race Theory in the U.S. legal academy.87 However, intersectionality has a long history in Black feminism. Its                                                  87 For further discussion, see Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review. 43, no. 6 (Jul., 1991): 1241-1299; and Kimberlé 29     antecedents include the notion of “double jeopardy”88 or “multiple jeopardy.”89  It also involves the concept of “interlocking systems of oppression,” defined in a social movement context by the Combahee River Collective on “A Black Feminist Statement,” as the experience of simultaneous oppressions.90 Therefore, the idea of “intersections” to understand multiple sources of discrimination had already been circulating in earlier antiracist feminist thought.  Intersectionality emphasises the importance of including the perspectives of marginalized people. It is concerned with the experiences of discrimination of several social groups, especially women of color.91 Intersectionality also conceptualizes the relation between systems of oppression as they construct our multiple social locations in hierarchies of power and privilege.92 Because antiracism reproduces patriarchy and feminism reproduces racism, women of color cannot be limited to choosing between two inadequate analyses, because both constitute a denial of a fundamental dimension of subordination.93 Women of color are located within at least two subordinated groups that often pursue conflicting political agendas.94 In this sense, inequalities are reproduced and perpetuated within several systems of oppression. By examining gender in the                                                  Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 1989: Iss. 1, Article 8. Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1989/iss1/8 88 Frances Beal. “Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and Female,” in The Black Woman. Ed. Toni Cade Bambara. (New York: Signet, 1970). 89 Deborah K. King, “Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of a Black Feminist Ideology,” Signs 14, no. 1 (Autumn, 1988). 90 Demita Frazier, Beverly Smith, and Barbara Smith were the primary authors of the Combahee River Collective Statement in 1977. They proposed the concept of multiple oppressions in order to critique both sexual oppression in the black community and racism within the feminist movement. This document was one of the earliest explorations of the intersection of multiple oppressions, including racism and heterosexism. See more at: The Combahee River Collective, The Combahee River Collective Statement: Black Feminist Organizing in the Seventies and Eighties (Albany, New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press, 1986). 91 Hae Yeon Choo and Myra Marx Ferree, Practicing Intersectionality in Sociological Research: A critical analysis of inclusions, interactions and institutions in the study of inequalities. University of Wisconsin-Madison (September, 2009) http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mferree/documents/choo_ferree_intersectionality_final0909.pdf (accessed on June 2016). 92 Anna Carastathis, “The Concept of Intersectionality in Feminist Theory,” Philosophy Compass 9/5 (2014): 304–314.  93 Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color.” Stanford Law Review 43, no.6 (1991): 1252. 94 Crenshaw, Ibid., 1251-1252. 30     context of other social divisions, it is possible to view women’s location in multiple hierarchies. For example, gender is fundamentally affected by class, race/ethnicity and other hierarchies such as geographical location (urban/rural).  In an intersectional perspective, women may suffer at least a triple oppression based on race, gender and class. Gender, race and class cannot be analyzed separately, because they are entangled in each other, and the particular intersections produce specific effects. Thus, intersectionality studies the interaction between gender, race, class, and other categories of difference “in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power.”95 For instance, (racialized and gendered) bodies have been structured by the needs of capitalism for cheap labour or migrant labour. These systems of oppression prioritize different spheres of social relations and exist within the context of the others. Therefore, power relations and the material inequalities that constitute oppression must be taken into account in the conceptualization of racism, class exploitation and gender discrimination. Since every feminist struggle has a specific ethnic, as well as class context, the analysis of women’s security has to acknowledge these contexts, in which power relations take place.  Despite its significant contribution, the concept of intersectionality has come under criticism in feminist theory.  Marxist feminists were among the first to criticize intersectionality. Marxist approaches assert that class has priority over gender and race. Marxist feminists, therefore, disagree with intersectionality theorists’ claims that oppression is produced through the interaction of multiple and co-constitutive axes.96 In this vein, intersectionality has been criticized as nothing                                                  95 Kathy Davis, “Intersectionality as buzzword: A sociology of science perspective on what makes a feminist theory successful,” Feminist Theory 9, no.1 (2008): 68. 96 Anna Carastathis, “The Concept of Intersectionality in Feminist Theory,” Philosophy Compass 9/5 (2014): 308.  31     more than a sophisticated version of identity politics that merely undermines the class struggle. Nonetheless, the so-called oppressed working class is made up of diverse social groups such as women, Black and queer workers. When intersectionality theory was first formulated by Black feminists, it emerged as a critique of and an alternative to identity politics.97 Firstly, intersectionality questions the notion of particular aspects of identity as fixed and coherent. For instance, liberal feminism’s essentialist understandings of identity failed to address how a Black woman’s experience is inflected with a different gendered form of racism and a racialized form of sexism. Secondly, intersectionality theory is more about how systems of oppression are inseparably intertwined at a structural level rather than about the identity of the individual.98 Identity politics does not fail to recognize differences, but it frequently ignores intragroup differences.99 Controversies have emerged about whether intersectionality should be limited to studying of individual experiences, to theorizing identity, or should be understood as a property of social structures and discourses.100 In my view, if intersectionality is merely used to theorize identity it can be confused with identity politics. In contrast, intersectionality theory overcomes the limitations of identity politics by analysing systems of oppression that materially and discursively create difference and discrimination.  Another alleged weakness of the concept of intersectionality is related to its ambiguity and open-endedness. The more incoherent a theory is, the more it is argued, it will require further                                                  97 Feminist Fightback, Intersectionality another for of identity politics? January 11, 2015.  http://www.feministfightback.org.uk/is-intersectionality-just-another-form-of-identity-politics/ (accessed on May 18, 2016. 98 Feminist Fightback, Ibid. 99 Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no.6 (1991): 1242. 100 Kathy Davis, “Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science Perspective on What Makes a Feminist Theory Successful,” Feminist Theory 9, no.1 (2008): 68. 32     elaboration, combining unrelated ideas into a coherent whole that overcomes ambiguity.101 Paradoxically, its ambiguity and open-endedness make it a successful feminist theory.102 Intersectionality as broad, open-ended and inclusive is a remarkable conceptual tool for feminist analysis.103 It stimulates a process of discovery, encouraging creativity in looking for new forms of doing feminist analysis.104 Therefore, each research project allows us to adapt intersectionality to diverse contexts and to different intersections of discrimination, such as those based on gender, class, race, sexuality, age, etc.  Intersectionality is a critical feminist concept that became popular, unavoidably creating a black-boxing effect. “Black-boxing” means that concepts turn into rhetorical tools used in a decontextualized manner. Intersectionality is not an explanation in itself, so it is necessary to analyse how social categories (gender, race, class, sexuality, etc.) intra-act105 at the micro and macro social levels; otherwise these categories are reduced to a black box. If intra-acting power differentials and identity formations are not analysed in a specific context, the concept of intersectionality merely reflects a group of meaningless social categorizations (gender, race, class).106 Therefore, it is important to approach the concept of intersectionality as a nodal point and to avoid  black-boxing it by always contextualizing it.107 The concept of intersectionality viewed as a nodal point does not encourage a fixed definition; rather, intersectionality must be viewed as a discursive site where different feminist positions are in critical dialogue with each                                                  101 Murray S. Davis, ““That ‘s Classic!” The Phenomenology and Rhetoric of Successful Social Theories,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 16, no. 3 (1986), 296-297. 102 Kathy Davis, Ibid., 67; Murray S. Davis, 296-297. 103 Nina Lykke, “Intersectional Analysis Black box or useful critical feminist thinking technology,” in Framing Intersectionality, edited by Supik, Linda, Ms, Herrera Vivar, Maria Teresa, Ms, Lutz, Helma, Professor (Ashgate, December 2012), 208.  104 Kathy Davis, Ibid., 79. 105 According to Nina Lykke by replacing “interact” with the term “intra-act” it is possible to analyse how categorizations are interwoven. The notion of intra-action refers to the interplay between non-bounded phenomena that mutually transform each other while interplaying. In contrast, interaction does not generate transformations.   106 Nina Lykke, Ibid., 210.  107 Nina Lykke, Ibid., 207-208.  33     other.108 Thus, a nodal point permits a shared framework for the negotiation of conceptualizations, thereby becoming a productive concept.109 In this sense, a conceptual nodal point provides enough analytical sophistication to foster political action and solidarity.  The use of the concept of intersectionality needs to be celebrated but it also needs to be critically evaluated. By creating segmented representation in unequal societies, a misunderstanding of the achievement of equality through an intersectional perspective may obscure, and therefore reproduce, the phenomena that intersectionality seeks to illuminate and overcome. Through the study of two wildly different parties, Chile's right-wing Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and Uruguay's left-wing Frente Amplio, Juan Pablo Luna (2014) analyses the extent to which, in representative democracies, the success of a political party rests on its ability in order to engage voters in highly unequal and individualized societies. Parties simultaneously segment and strategically harmonize their linkages to appeal to different electoral bases. Electoral segmentation is structured in terms of socioeconomic categories, territorial dimensions or both. In ethnically diverse societies, this type of segmentation can also be implemented along ethnic or religious lines.110 In this vein, the massive incorporation of previously excluded groups into electoral democracy has become a relevant strategy, especially when competing in unequal social settings. Once inequality becomes politicized, it becomes feasible to shape partisan mobilization strategies. For instance, powerful non-state actors finance party–voter linkages so as to provide material patronage to supporters from other social groups or geographical areas. Representational differences have consequentially affected public policy outcomes. However, the political inclusion of the masses has not produced consistent results in reducing the                                                  108 Nina Lykke, Ibid., 208. 109 Nina Lykke, Ibid., 209. 110 Juan Pablo Luna, Segmented Representation: Political Party Strategies in Unequal Democracies. Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2014. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642649.001.0001 34     inequalities that characterize the social, political and economic landscapes of the so-called developing democratic world.111 Juan Pablo Luna’s understanding of the relation between social inequality and electoral-institutional factors in a political democracy demonstrates that, if the inclusion of social categories and territorial dimensions is used to segment representation for political gain, inequality will be perpetuated. Hence, any attempt to design and implement public policy aware of the intersections of race, gender, class, and geographical location will lose its richness. Such a segmented representation will not empower excluded populations; rather it will keep them oppressed and marginalized.  In the context of women’s insecurity, systems of inequality based on women’s identity play a significant role. The insecurities experienced by women are often shaped by other dimensions of their identities, such as race and class. Race, gender, class and other identity categories are often treated as frameworks of domination in which social power excludes and marginalizes those who are different.  For this reason, the concepts of intersectionality and matrix of domination offer a theoretical basis for understanding how different types of interconnected discriminations interact. For instance, classism, racism and sexism intersect in the lives of people. In this sense, the intersection of these identities is incorporated within systems of power, such as national and border security practices, that reproduce race, class, and gender hierarchies affecting women’s security. A matrix of domination reconceptualises race, class and gender as interlocking systems of oppression. For Patricia Hill Collins (2000) gender is not the most important category within these systems; she assigns the same level of importance to race and class. Indeed, she argues that it is important to view the power structures organized in the intersecting relations of race, class and                                                  111 Juan Pablo Luna, Ibid., 8.   35     gender that frame the social position of individuals. This matrix explains the interlocking inequalities experienced by women as gendered, raced, classed and sexualized bodies.112 An analysis of an interlocking system of inequalities, for instance, can challenge the idea that the overrepresentation of Black (or Indigenous) women in poverty statistics is due to their poor work ethic. Black women have always worked, but they have been actively restricted to jobs that kept them in poverty. In fact, employers see Black women as secondary and undesirable workers. Certainly, race limits Black women’s occupational opportunities, but it is not the only source of Black women’s struggle. In order to understand the devalued work assigned to Black women, it is necessary to analyze the racism and sexism imbricated in the occupations available to them. Thus, an approach that focuses only on the race or the gender of Black women fails to take into account intersecting systems of power.  Hill-Collins matrix of domination is useful to examine the interlocking inequalities based on race, gender and class that affect the security of local Black women, Indigenous women and mestizo women in border zones. In the Ecuadorian context, Indigenous and Black women experience racism in ways not always the same as those experienced by Indigenous and Black men, and sexism in ways not always similar to the experiences of sexism of mestizo women. The diversity of women, which depends on their particular social class, racial/ethnic and geographical identities, influences the treatment that they receive from security authorities. When race, class, gender and geographical location (urban-rural) are considered in the context of women’s insecurity and smuggling at the borders in Ecuador, intersectionality can map the ways in which racism,                                                  112 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment. (Routledge, 2000). 36     sexism and classism have shaped conceptualizations of women smugglers as criminals within the national security discourse, ignoring the unique characteristic of their interlocked inequalities.  1.2.5 Feminist critical human security  Drawing on a critical human security perspective, feminist critiques of national security, the idea of intersectionality advanced by Black feminist Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw113 and the concept of the matrix of domination of Patricia Hill Collins, the concept of feminist critical human security is proposed in this study. A feminist critical human security approach attentive to power relations understands how insecurity is related to people’s daily lives in sexist, racist, classist and geographical ways in Ecuador’s borders. The significance and originality of this dissertation lie in part in the application of this adapted approach to an under–researched case study.  By explaining the differences, similarities and complementarities of feminism and human security, the proposed concept of feminist critical human security serves to analyze the experiences of insecurity of women, specially those involved in smuggling, in Ecuador’s borders.  First, I shall mention the differences. Feminism and human security differ substantially when viewed in terms of methodology. Unlike liberal feminism, which is based on positivistic assumptions, critical and post-modern feminist scholars reject the problem-solving approach that human security entails. On the contrary, the practical implementation of human security by development institutions and non-governmental organizations worldwide is reminiscent of the problem-solving positivist approach of neorealism.114 According to realist and neorealist security politics, the state and international system reign in security studies. Since the human security                                                  113 The term intersectionality was coined by American professor Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989. The concept already existed but she put a name to it. For instance, in 1892 Anna Julia Cooper’s A Voice from the South discusses the intersections of race, class and gender of women’s discrimination. 114 Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “Paradigms in Conflict The Contested Claims of Human Security, Critical Theory and Feminism,” Cooperation and Conflict Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 41, no. 3 (2006): 298-299. 37     paradigm stands closer to Waltzian neorealism in terms of methodological issues, it is difficult for this paradigm to survive independently. In perfect harmony with the realist security perspective and in the name of policy recommendations, human security attempts to reform the existing system and supports the prevailing social order and the socially powerful rather than challenges them.115 The narrow definition of the human security approach has been usually practiced at the policy level in the form of military and humanitarian interventions.116 In contrast, my view is that a contextualized feminist critical human security approach is able to challenge the power relations intrinsic to universal “recipes” designed to solve security issues with socio-economic roots.   Another main disagreement between feminism and human security involves the critique by the former of the term “human.” A critical feminist perspective on the study of human security emphasizes the idea that the term “human” has been constructed as an exclusionary and gendered category that obscures the matrices of power that differentiate individuals socially.117 Human security, therefore, reinforces the reproduction of dominant norms and power relations118 within its liberal humanist normative intellectual heritage.119 Human security discourse humanizes security, setting fully human life conditions from a liberal point of view.120 In addition, the liberal tradition views a universal human who shares common rights and innate capabilities. The human security discourse is rooted in the capabilities approach developed by Amartya Sen.121 In that approach, the individual is constructed as an autonomous chooser that is concerned about securing                                                  115 Nuruzzaman, Ibid., 299 116 For further discussion, refer to International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty- ICISS’ The Responsibility to protect report.  117 Natasha Marhia, “Some humans are more Human than Others: Troubling the ‘human’ in human security from a critical feminist perspective,” Security Dialogue 44, no 1 (2013): 19.  118 Fiona Robinson, “The importance of care in the theory and practice of human security,” Journal of International Political Theory 4, no 2 (2008): 168.  119 Natasha Marhia, “Some humans are more Human than Others: Troubling the ‘human’ in human security from a critical feminist perspective,” Security Dialogue 44, no 1 (2013):  20. 120 Marhia, Ibid., 21. 121 Marhia, Ibid., 21. 38     his/her own life and dignity. Nevertheless, this construction fails to acknowledge that an individual’s security, well-being and capability to choose depend on its social location and its web of social relations.122 For instance, the term “human” does not overcome certain gender silences.123  Despite the inclusive nature of the human security approach, the gender dimension is overlooked, which results in only a partial understanding of security issues. Moreover, the term “human” may  camouflage the gendered foundations of security practices.124 By highlighting the need for identity politics, the ambivalence of human security as both a political project of emancipation and an analytical framework might be clarified.125 For instance, the inclusion of women as a category of identity within security studies also needs to integrate gender as a unit of analysis in order to prevent silences.126 Since gender is intertwined with other identities such as race, class and nationality, a critical feminist perspective connects individual experiences in a particular location.127  Therefore, context-based interpretations of women’s security need to recognize how their different identities affect their human security conditions. It is necessary to rethink human security in ways that assign more importance to context than to the abstract individual. In my view, this type of interpretation leads to the inclusion, protection, and empowerment of women in border zones. This study assumes that human security and feminist security, viewed from a critical perspective, are not irreconcilable standpoints. Indeed, these two approaches to security studies have similarities and complementarities. Although human security appeared as the main paradigm shift from the traditional realist security approach after 1994, mainly because of the changed nature                                                  122 Marhia, Ibid., 22. 123 Heidi Hudson, “Doing’ Security as Though Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and the Politics of Human Security,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 2 (June 2005): 155-156.  124 Hudson, Ibid., 157. 125 Hudson, Ibid., 155. 126 Hudson, Ibid., 158. 127 Hudson, Ibid., 158. 39     of threats at the end of the Cold War, feminism had previously propagated similar concepts and referents of security beginning in the 1980s.128 Feminist analysis of security also pays attention to the individual and community rather than to the state or the international system.129 From this, it can be concluded that both human security and feminism experience a deep dissatisfaction with the realist security paradigm, which interprets security through the restrictive lens of the security of the state. Such a paradigm distracts attention from the insecurities that individuals, groups and communities face in their everyday lives. Moreover, both feminism and human security encourage a multidimensional approach, broadening the threats to security. In this sense, security involves the absence of the threat of violence, discrimination, unemployment, lack of food, housing and other social and economic provisions that provide individuals and communities with decent living conditions. Therefore, from a critical viewpoint, human security and feminist security can complement each other by simultaneously being policy-relevant and normatively rich.  Both approaches have their own strengths. If these strengths are combined, it is possible to increase the normative weight of human security and the relevance of feminist security perspectives in policy.130 Feminists have made a particular contribution to gendering the human security approach. By gendering human security, it is feasible to expand the understanding of what security can and does mean131 beyond a local/civilian/bottom-up perspective. A gender-based human security analysis reveals what human security means when understood through power and practices of domination and marginalization.132 Therefore, gendering human security introduces                                                  128 Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “Paradigms in Conflict the Contested Claims of Human Security, Critical Theory and Feminism,” Cooperation and Conflict 41, no. 3. 286, 298.  129 Ann Tickner, “You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 4 (Dec., 1997), 624. 130 Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, “Gendering Human Security: how gender theory is reflected and challenged in civil-military cooperation,” 1 http://www.academia.edu/4473317/Gendering_Human_Security_how_gender_theory_is_reflected_and_challenged_in_civil-_military_cooperation (accessed on February 4, 2015). 131 A. T. R. Wibben, “Human Security: Toward an Opening,” Security Dialogue 39, no.4 (2008): 455-462. 132 Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, Ibid., 3. 40     perspectives that make explicit the role of the various actors in creating security and the power relations between them. By doing so, it offers analytical and empirical insights that release human security discourses from the influence of a state-centric perspective.133 Since human security cannot be based on state-based military measures, it needs to understand the roles and interactions of multiple actors and fronts. This understanding has become a powerful analytical tool when analyzing non-state actors within security dynamics, as well as recommendations for practices on the ground.134 Gendering human security thus contributes to policy-making and normative developments, which is vital for moving debates and practice forward.135 Since gendering human security includes a feminist position on security, it is concerned with gender inequality and the inclusion of women’s experiences in security analysis.136 If human security seeks to achieve social justice, it must reduce not only gender inequality but the multiple social inequalities experienced by women based on their race, class, gender and geographical location.  In this sense, women’s multiple experiences of inequality must be taken into consideration when formulating human security policies. Expanding the state-centric approach to security to one that includes human security inclusive of the intersections of gender, race, class and geographical location will help overcome the structural violence contained in systems of domination that naturalize inequalities and limit the achievement of justice. An intersectional perspective of the human security approach revitalizes the need of women to move from being the subjects of discussion to being agents of a transformative change. Such a human security perspective emphasizes the protection and empowerment of people through their active participation and, of course, of human agency and particularly women's agency. Human security cannot view women                                                  133 Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, Ibid., 2. 134 Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, Ibid., 4. 135 Ann Tickner, “Responsible Scholarship in International Relations: A Symposium,” International Studies Review 10 (2008): 661-666. 136 Mohammed Nuruzaman, “Paradigms in Conflict the Contested Claims of Human Security, Critical Theory and Feminism,” Cooperation and Conflict September 41 (2006): 296. 41     as passive beneficiaries of state or patriarchal benevolence, in scenarios of critical insecurity. Rather it has to see them as participants with policy inputs, knowledge, experience and other resources.137 Women’s knowledge of development, security and equality within their daily experiences, as well as their understanding of how these issues should be conducted by themselves, the state and non-state actors, needs to be taken into account. By moving the state security agenda in the direction of people's security, human security enables women sharing multiple identities to move from the margins to the center of this agenda. To make the most of the advantages of the variety of perspectives, a feminist critical human security approach is influenced by critical human security, feminist critiques of national security, the idea of intersectionality and the concept of matrix of domination of Black feminism. A feminist critical human security approach is sensitive to power relations within systems of oppression, acknowledging that insecurity is related to people’s daily lives on Ecuador’s borders based on their gender, race, class and geographical location.   The empirical case analyzed in this dissertation reveals that neither Ecuadorian security authorities nor women as an identity group living at the border represents a monolithic category of analysis. For instance, the experiences of Black women in Carchi Province differ from the experiences of Mestizo women in El Oro province or of Indigenous women in Sucumbíos Province. A feminist critical human security perspective that takes into account these intersecting conditions of inequality is useful for understanding the particularities of these women’s experiences and for influencing the design of public policy, encouraging contextualized responses to women’s security conditions to be implemented on Ecuadorian borders. Discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender and class impedes the complete fulfilment of social, political and economic opportunities, affecting deeply human security conditions.  In the case of women on the                                                  137 Viviene Taylor, “From State Security to Human Security and Gender Justice,” Agenda 59 (2004): 67. 42     borders of Ecuador, these intersecting experiences of inequality have provoked unequal access to education, healthcare and have hindered their political and economic participation, thereby undermining their security. Women’s security is assured only when they can live free of interlocked violence, exploitation and discrimination in their everyday lives.  By tackling interlocking inequalities, a feminist critical human security approach challenges an exclusive state-centric understanding of security. This approach is especially concerned with women’s daily life experiences of insecurity; it views women as “knowers” and argues that, through their local knowledge of security and development, women can achieve emancipation because they know best what is needed to improve their security conditions. Moreover, feminist critical human security is useful in approaching and analyzing the differences and similarities between local women in each of the three border provinces where this study was carried out.  The feminist critical human security perspective employs a multidimensional approach to threats to security that can affect women. Furthermore, feminist critical human security views insecurity as structural violence, involves fewer military values and adds more recognition of women’s contributions to society. It understands that a national security approach, through repressive border control, escalates complex security problems when security forces abuse the use of force to combat issues categorized as “threat” or “crime.” Moreover, traditional security approaches to smuggling, such as national security, view this activity as a crime and a threat to the state, demanding and emphasizing border security. In contrast, a feminist critical human security analysis of smuggling prioritizes the security of the individuals and establishes as referents of security those women who smuggle or who help a family or a community member to do so. Border security treats women smugglers as criminals, overlooking the circumstances that have motivated smuggling in a specific context. Therefore, the state and its border security practices neglect the voices and agency of women smugglers, whose access to alternative sources of income is limited 43     in the three provinces where this study was conducted. Moreover, the treatment that women on the border receive from the security authorities depends on their particular racial/ethnic, socio-economic and geographical identities. The feminist critical human security approach, therefore, aims to decrease women’s insecurity and to achieve equality by encouraging the elimination of power relations based on domination and subordination within state-centric perspectives of security by identifying potential feminist policy initiatives that are aware of intersectional issues within a development planning framework. This approach must pay attention at least to the intersections of race, gender, class and urban-rural dichotomy.   1.2.6 Border  In order to understand that women’s security can be undermined by national security practices that take place in border zones, it is relevant to examine several concepts of the border. The term border can refer to the physical-territorial limit or to the cultural, social or ideological boundaries that serve to highlight the differences between “us” and “the others.”  A traditional understanding, or a state-centric perspective, of the border is based on the categories of state and territory and views the border as an instrument of exclusion constructed between two or more states.138 Thus, the territorial delimitation and demarcation between states become matters of broad interest, allowing the exercise of power wherever borders have been marked. Since its territory is the space where the state exercises its sovereignty,139 states protect their borders from a standpoint of military defense. Therefore, the border, as understood by the state, is the territorial marker of the                                                  138 Chris Rumford, “Towards a Multiperspectival Study of Borders,” Geopolitics 17, no. 4 (2012): 888. 139 Juan Carlos Arriaga-Rodríguez, “Concepto jurídico de frontera,” Caribe: Economía, Política y Sociedad. Disputas, conflictos y cooperación transfronteriza, in Juan Carlos Arriaga-Rodríguez and Tania Camal-Cheluja compiladores, XII Seminario Internacional de Verano, 7 al 9 de septiembre 2011. Universidad de Quintana Roo. División de Ciencias Políticas y Humanidades. http://www.academia.edu/3840238/Concepto_juridico_de_frontera (accessed January 5, 2015).  44     limits of the sovereign political power.140 The state’s understanding of the border permits security practices that ensure the state’s survival in an anarchical self-help system,141 promoting a national security approach that identifies what, who and where the threat to the state is.  In addition, the border, as understood from a national security perspective, views human border crossings as highly selective. However, the border cannot be properly understood from a single masculinized and privileged point of view; it must be interpreted and constructed from diverse perspectives.  The border viewed solely as a dividing line serves to establish a state’s domain and sovereignty. This understanding of the border (generally by governments) offers little help to interpret the border phenomena in all theirs complexity.142 Unlike state-centric border perspectives, multiperspective border studies are critical of the idea that borders are physical dividing lines that belong to states.143 This perspective treats the border as an object of study rather than as a mere dimension of national security.144 The statist perspective of the border is contested when different interpretations of the border are presented.145 Multiperspective border studies challenge the core assumptions associated with the study of borders; these assumptions refer to the fact that states’ borders require consensus and mutual recognition in order to exist and that for a border to function properly it must be visible to all.146 However, if borders are viewed as cultural encounters, it becomes easier to study them as constructed by diverse non-state actors. By re-framing borders as cultural encounters rather than simply as mechanisms of division, the fundamental assumption of consensus is challenged.147 Borders do not always need to be visible                                                  140 Nick Vaughan-Williams, Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power (Edinburgh: University Press, 2009), 14.  141Vaughan-Williams, Ibid., 3.  142 Nilo Meza Monge, Espacios Regionales Fronterizos. Teoría, política y práctica del desarrollo y la integración fronteriza (2008) http://www.eumed.net/libros-gratis/2008b/400/index., 19-20. 143 Chris Rumford, “Towards a Multiperspectival Study of Borders,” Geopolitics 17, no. 4 (2012): 887-888.  144 Rumford, Ibid., 900. 145 Rumford, Ibid., 894. 146 Rumford, Ibid., 888. 147 Rumford, Ibid., 889. 45     or constituted through consensus.148 Therefore, the assumption that consensus and visibility must exist needs to be discarded.149 Since borders do not refer only to state borders, it is relevant to take alternative conceptions of borders seriously.   The concept of the border has also been understood as the intersection of identities and the formation of the self. For example, Gloria Anzaldúa and Ruth Behar developed feminist analyses of the border and identity in Latin America. Ruth Behar’s Translated Women (1993) portrays the story of Esperanza, a Mexican Indigenous woman from Mexquitic who became the author’s comadre. By identifying the structural inequalities of race, class and nationality that separate Esperanza and the author as women located on opposite sides of the border between the United States and Mexico, Behar frames the construction of her own identity as an academic, Cuban immigrant in New York City and victim of patriarchy like her comadre.150 At the same time, Behar recounts Esperanza’s struggles at the other side of the physical border that separates them.  In the same sense, the concept of border explored by Gloria Anzaldúa (2007) is imbued with a postcolonial feminism framework, showing the author’s inner struggle as Chicana, Latina, feminist and lesbian. Borderlands are viewed as a place simultaneously defined as safe and unsafe, distinguishing us from them.151 In Borderlands/La Frontera The New Mestiza, Anzaldúa views the border as a cultural dividing line in the sense of identity. In addition, the psychological, sexual and spiritual borderlands are seen as the space where different cultures meet each other, “where people of different races occupy the same territory, where under, lower, middle, and upper classes touch, where the space between two individuals shrinks with intimacy.”152  Specifically, women                                                  148 Rumford, Ibid., 895. 149 Rumford, Ibid., 891-892.  150 Ruth Behar, Translated Woman. Crossing the Border with Esperanza’s Story (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993), 320-342. 151 Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera. The New Mestiza. Third Edition (San Francisco, CA: Aunt Lute Books, 2007), 25. 152 Anzaldúa, Ibid., 19. 46     who live on the margins of the border permanently shift their multiple identities, because the border not only distinguishes their multiplicity of identities, it also unites and enriches the intersecting identities of the individual. Another aspect to take into account when discussing the concept of border is the idea that distance contributes to the creation of “otherness.” The distance and isolation from the state’s center of power and the sustained interactions with foreigners encourage the population of the border to think of themselves as different from the people in the state’s interior zones. Hence, borderlanders better understand racial, ethnic and cultural differences.153Many traders, furthermore, view themselves as members of a self-directed border economic community rather than as “pure” citizens of the state whose behaviour must conform strictly to national norms.154 For this reason, the population living on the border tends to ignore national laws that are unrealistic and insensitive to the cross-border reality.155 Locals do not necessarily see borders in the same way as do governments. Only border dwellers who interact with the everyday life of the border fully understand such a complex scenario. In their logic, the border is no longer just a physical line; economic and social relations are responsible for erasing this line that separates territories with common features. The border is a point of convergence of territories and populations, which include geographical, economic and social processes. The border is no longer the point of separation, it has become a place, a space and, especially, a way of life156 where migration, tourism, trade and smuggling take place as modes of interaction among the borderlanders. Therefore, the                                                  153 José Luis Gómez-Martínez, “Mestizaje y frontera como categorías culturales iberoamericanas,” Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe- EIAL (Tel Aviv) 5, no 1 (1994), 12. http://www.tau.ac.il/eial/V_1/martinez.htm  154 Martínez, Ibid., 13. 155 Martínez, Ibid., 12. 156 Martínez, Ibid., 5-19.    47     border cannot be seen as a merely physical dividing line that guards against the strange, the unknown and the dangerous.   The interaction among borderland populations through trans-boundary trade, migration, and social-cultural relationships also invites us to rethink the official understanding of the border; the border cannot serve only to limit and block. Nowadays, the border’s role should be reversed: the border is a place to unite and integrate states and the borderland populations. Understanding the border as a space of integration and social interaction recognizes its multidimensional dynamic. The idiosyncrasies of the people inhabiting the border do not view it as a dividing line; unlike the discourse of sovereignty they see it as a common history157 and as a space where multiethnic groups interact. Among the main ethnic groups who cross the border between Ecuador and Colombia or Peru are Awa, Pastos, Cofán, Siona, Otavalos, Afro-Ecuadorians, and Mestizos. The population living on the border is hybrid because it has multiple identities and flexible identities,158 such as Ecuadorian, Colombian, Peruvian, bi-national, regional and even transnational. The borderland society becomes transnational when it maintains significant ties with the neighboring nation. Through a bi-national system Ecuadorians, Peruvians, and Colombians take advantage of every opportunity to visit, shop, work, study or live on the “other side” of the border. Transnationalism is seen as the location at the edges of states where borders dissipate, mutual antagonisms are overcome and substantive social and economic interchanges begin to emerge at the common border.159The degree of transnationalism in an interdependent borderland                                                  157 Ricardo Montenegro Coral, “Frontera Colombo-Ecuatoriana: Historia y Destino Común,” Aldea Mundo Revista sobre Fronteras e Integración Año 10, no. 18 (2005): 21-22. 158 Chainarong Sretthachau, “Living Across Border: The Tactics of Everyday Life Practice of Cambodian-Lao Migrant Worker in Thailand in the Context of Mekong Regionalization of Development,” 4th Asian Rural Sociology Association (ARSA) International Conference (2010): 72; Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera. The New Mestiza. Third Edition (San Francisco, CA: Aunt Lute Books, 2007), 19-25. 159 Oscar Martinez, “The dynamics of border interaction. New Approaches to Border Analysis,” in Global Boundaries: World Boundaries volume 1, ed. Clive H. Schofield (London: Routledge, 1994), 6, 9. 48     demonstrates that stability prevails most of the time, increasing economic and social cross-border interaction and allowing significant convergence of cultures to take place. Borderlanders, moreover, carry on friendly and cooperative relationships.160 The flow of economic resources and people across the border allows the economies involved to be structurally bonded to each other. In contrast, concerns over immigration, trade competition, smuggling and ethnic nationalism compel the central governments to carefully monitor an interdependent borderland,161 mainly through patrolling, immigration control and customs. In response to excessive border security controls, bi-national human security initiatives must be carried out in interdependent borders, such as those between Ecuador and Peru or Ecuador and Colombia. In sum, what really matters is not only how the border should be conceptualized but also where boundary-producing practices are actually located. Power relations are embedded in the making of borders and in their use as ideological tools in governance and security agendas.162 Borders are not only policed lines, but also processes, social institutions and symbols. As social processes, borders are located in a number of institutionalized practices, discourses, and symbols throughout the state territory.163 According to this viewpoint, borders are an exercise of power and can be constructed as a way to protect a privileged position of security. Since borders are socially constructed through foreign policy and security discourses, they serve particular purposes and motivation that reflect power relations.164 Borders, therefore, can be labeled as discursive landscapes of social power and technical landscapes of social control. The former resonates more clearly with such notions as a nation, national identity, nationalism and memory, and the latter                                                  160 Martínez, Ibid., 3, 5. 161 Martínez, Ibid., 4-5. 162 Anssi Paasi, “Borders and Border-Crossing,” in Nuala Johnson, Richard Schein and Jamie Winders eds. Wiley Blackwell Companion to Cultural Geography (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 2,4.   163 Paasi, Ibid., 6, 15. 164 Paasi, Ibid., 8,10. 49     with state, sovereignty, citizenship, governance, security and control.165 Both landscapes have often been maintained in the name of national security.  In this dissertation, I critically analyze the state-centric understanding of the border while discussing the border security discourses and practices of Ecuadorian security forces to tackle smuggling activities. I use a multidimensional approach when referring to the locals’ understanding of the border. Such an approach views the border as a space of integration, self-directed economy, social interaction, a cultural encounter and a way of living. One way to approach intersectionality is to analyze how border security authorities and their power dynamics frame and interpret the stories of the Indigenous, Mestizo, and Black women who cross the border. Smuggling at the border creates a closer contact between the intersecting identities of local women and security forces within a national security discourse. The concepts of national security, critical human security, feminists’ critiques of national security, feminist critical human security and border contribute to developing an analytical framework that seeks to support the main argument of this research, which is the fact that a web of power relationships on the border has increased the intersectional inequalities that lead women to become smugglers.    1.2.7 Power  I have argued broadly that power relations are present in the daily interactions on the border, in conceptions of security and development and in systems of inequality base on gender, class and race.  For this reason, it is important to elaborate on the understanding of how power is going to be understood in this study and how this concept is going to influence the research question, namely what led women to become smugglers and if smuggling shows the empowerment or                                                  165 Paasi, Ibid., 15. 50     domination of women. Thus, in this section, I analyze power as domination, power as empowerment and the feminist critical human security conception of power.   1.2.7.1 Power as domination  In this section, the model of power as domination will be linked to power-knowledge regimes and to the Foucauldian early disciplinary power/docile bodies thesis. Power-knowledge regimes create dominant discourses around practices of national security deployed on Ecuador’s borders. These knowledge regimes are sustained by a disciplinary power that is essential to maintaining the status quo and monitoring women’s bodies and their practices of femininity.  I shall argue briefly, that within power-knowledge regimes, the understanding of power as domination is most commonly recognized as a relationship of domination and subordination or “power over.” From a Foucauldian perspective, relations of power are “means by which individuals try to conduct, to determine the behaviours of others.”166 The model of power as domination, which is influenced by violence, repression and discrimination, is imbued in knowledge regimes. Consequently, this model of power produces reality and rituals of truth, creates objects of analysis, forms discourses and constructs knowledge.167 Power is located in the episteme manifested in the everyday social relations or “micro-practices” that have created the politics of everyday life. This type of power is exercised in personal, social, economic and political relations between individuals and groups. Hence, power is everywhere and it is expressed through a multiplicity of force relations that are crystallized in the state’s apparatus. Power thus acts on human beings through institutions such as prisons, schools or border controls. Knowledge as                                                  166 Michael Foucault, “Ethic of Care for the Self as Practice of Freedom,” an interview translated by J Gaultier, in James Beranuer and David Rasmussen, eds., The Final Foucault (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988): 18. 167 Amy Allen, The Power of Feminist Theory (Boulder: Westview, 1999), 31-34. 51     power represents what has been decided to be true by a specific epistemic community or interest group. Thus, holistic epistemic communities perpetuate certain beliefs through social discourses.168 The role of the epistemic communities at the discursive level exerts a dominant control of “the recognized knowledge.” This ability to control gives these communities the power to impose a discourse that influences people’s understandings, desires and interests.169 In the empirical case under analysis, a power-knowledge regime creates dominant discourses around the ideas of border security and the practices of national security deployed at the borders. These discourses and practices are good ways to illustrate the powerful role of border security authorities in protecting the state’s interests. Power-knowledge regimes are also present in discourses and interactions based on gender, race and class.  Since differences between gender, race and class are defined by power knowledge regimes they are the reified effects of dominance in which a disciplinary power excludes and marginalizes those who are different and who act differently. This type of power maintains systems of dominance based on racism, sexism, and classism. These systems of dominance have many negative associations for women, such as repression, force, coercion, discrimination, and abuse. Depending on women’s social locations, power-knowledge regimes deploy different disciplinary practices, such as the kind of job or education that a woman can obtain. When, due to their different social locations, women are denied access to important rights, such as land, education, healthcare, and employment, “power over” perpetuates inequality, injustice and poverty. Since they have little knowledge of alternative models of power, individuals repeat the “power over” pattern in their personal, institutional and community relationships. Thus, different degrees of power are sustained                                                  168 Andreas Antoniades, “Epistemic Communities, Epistemes and the Construction of (World) Politics,” Global Society 17, no 1 (2003):  28. 169 Antoniades, Ibid., 29. 52     and perpetuated through social divisions such as gender, age, class, ethnicity, race and the urban-rural and north-south dichotomies. As a result, power is unequally distributed, with some individuals and social groups having greater control over the sources of power and others having little or no control.  The disciplinary model of power as domination is connected to the notion of docility. The “docile bodies” thesis is helpful in understanding the transition from sovereign/monarchical power to a modern power that involves disciplinary regimes and systems of surveillance.170 From a Foucauldian perspective, the disciplinary power centers on the body and manipulates it so that it can become useful and docile.171 Once the docile body is manipulated and trained to obey and respond172 to commands, discipline adjusts power through surveillance exercised by institutions.173  A “gentle” power is deployed with just a gaze through the Foucauldian metaphor of “the panopticon” as it produces self-monitoring subjects174 and individuals who have learned to police themselves, thus becoming their own overseers. The model of the panopticon is a compelling explanatory paradigm for women's acceptance of patriarchal standards of femininity.175 Thus, the body is under the control of a constant coercive power that imposes prohibitions and obligations on it, but that also supervises the body’s activities.176 Furthermore, a well-disciplined body makes correct use of its time, becoming useful for the system.177 This micro-                                                 170 Monique Deveaux, “Feminism and Empowerment: A Critical Reading of Foucault,” Feminist Studies 20, no. 2, Women's Agency: Empowerment and the Limits of Resistance (Summer, 1994): 224.  171 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–1976 (New York: Picador, 2003), 249.  172 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Books edition, 1979), 136. 173 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–1976 (New York: Picador, 2003), 246-250 174 Davina Cooper, “Productive, Relational and Everywhere? Conceptualizing Power and Resistance within Foucauldian Feminism,” Sociology 28, no 2 (1994): 437. 175  Monique Deveaux, “Feminism and Empowerment: A Critical Reading of Foucault,” Feminist Studies 20, no. 2, Women's Agency: Empowerment and the Limits of Resistance (Summer, 1994):  225. 176 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Books edition, 1979), 136-137. 177 Foucault, Ibid., 152. 53     physic of power understands the relation of docility-utility as one that brings a discipline that becomes a formula of domination of the docile bodies,178 such as, women’s bodies crossing the border. Thus, disciplinary power has a coercive link with the control apparatus of the state, constantly monitoring women’s existence.  Disciplinary power coerces by means of observation. Power needs to see without being seen.179 Consequently, the observatories, such as schools, hospitals, prisons or customs follow the model of a military camp, where power has a hierarchized surveillance in order to control an individual’s conduct.180 Disciplinary power prevents confusion and disorder and triggers projects of exclusion181 for the disobedient bodies. Thus, power does not only involve force; it is also a set of soft and invisible surveillance relations that operate through disciplinary practices. The disciplinary power is located at the center of a system of dividing practices that isolate those who challenge the status quo,182 such as those smugglers considered delinquents by the border security authorities. Therefore, power creates a knowledge regime materialized as a belief, a discourse, a way to know and a way to do things in a particular individual or community. The disciplined body is a believer in the truth that has been constructed by the disciplinary power. In the case of this study, this belief is related to the idea that “smugglers are criminals.” Once disciplined, the social body cannot become a threat to societal, economic or political orders. Thus, this disciplinary power is essential to maintaining the status quo. For instance, a female body that performs an emphasized femininity has become docile through the exercise of a disciplinary power. But a female body that challenges the disciplinary power embedded in border security practices and discourses is excluded, punished and discriminated against.                                                   178 Foucault, Ibid., 136-139. 179 Foucault, Ibid., 171. 180 Foucault, Ibid., 171-172. 181 Foucault, Ibid., 199. 182 Monique Deveaux, “Feminism and Empowerment: A Critical Reading of Foucault,” Feminist Studies 20, no. 2, Women's Agency: Empowerment and the Limits of Resistance (Summer, 1994): 224.  54     At this point, I would like to emphasize the fact that someone can be subordinated in one context, for instance by being a woman, and yet be dominant in another context, such as by being a white, upper-middle class and heterosexual woman. If we combine the Foucauldian idea of docile bodies subjected by discipline with Crenshaw’s conception of intersectionality and Hill Collins’ matrix of domination within systems of power such as patriarchy, capitalism and racism, it becomes easier to comprehend that, within border security discourses and practices, the social location of women influences the disciplinary treatment that they receive when crossing the border. For instance, due to her intersected social position, a poor Afro-Ecuadorian woman should not dare to challenge border security practices.   1.2.7.2 Power as empowerment   An alternative to overcome the conception of power as domination is to view power as empowerment. This type of power is associated with positive ways of expressing power, such as “power with,” “power to” and “power within.”  For instance, by building collective strength, “power with” transforms and reduces social conflict and promotes equitable relations. “Power to” refers to the potential of every person to shape his or her life. Finally, “power within” has to do with a person’s sense of self-worth, recognizing individual differences while respecting others. It affirms the common human search for dignity and fulfillment.183Power understood as empowerment can, therefore, be a product of consent and can foster feminist solidarity.184 This type of power unveils realities and creates new ones.185 In this sense, power cannot always be                                                  183 Lisa Vene Klasen and Valerie Miller, “Power and empowerment,” PLA Notes 43 (2002): 39-41. 184 Amy Allen, The Power of Feminist Theory Domination, Resistance, Solidarity (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 56. 185 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 200.  55     understood within the dominator/dominated relationship; it is also based on relations of solidarity, dignity, collaboration and agreement among actors.  Empowerment as “power with” can be perceived as a collective force within solidarity networks. I would like to refer to Arendt’s conception of power, because it involves a different orientation from the conception of power as domination, defined as the ability to get one’s commands obeyed. In particular, she identifies the type of power that humans use in the fulfillment of their distinctively human potential. According to Hannah Arendt (1970), power is not just the human ability to act, but the ability to act in concert.186 Therefore, power is not exclusively the property of an individual, but also that of a group. Power in that sense exists as long as the group remains together.187 Thus, Arendt’s concept of power understands that power appears when people act together. When people live together as an organized unit, they produce power through action.188 From an Arendtian perspective, empowerment occurs within a network of human relationships and is, therefore, a collective phenomenon. Certainly, a focus on individual capacity-building fails to recognize the extent to which the development of the individual occurs within a context of social and political relationships as well as within discourses.189An individual’s act becomes empowering as long it turns into an action that occurs within the web of human relationships.190 This Arendtian formulation of empowerment as collective power is associated with the concept of solidarity articulated by Amy Allen’s power of feminist theory. Allen defines solidarity as “the ability of a collectivity to act together for the agreed-upon end of challenging, subverting, and, ultimately,                                                  186 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), 44. 187 Arendt, Ibid., 44. 188 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 200-201. 189 Shari McDaid, “Redefining empowerment in mental health: an analysis using Hannah Arendt's power concept,” Journal of Power 3, no. 2 (2010): 212, DOI: 10.1080/17540291.2010.493701. 190 Arendt, The Human Condition, 181-184. 56     overturning a system of domination.”191 Since solidarity is a collective empowerment, it represents power with. Collective power rejects the assumption that power is always exercised in strategic ways,192 or “power over.” Power also emerges from the relationship between individuals that share a common goal,193 such as economic survival through smuggling activities that are considered illegal by border security authorities. Power as action has no physical limits in human nature; its only limitation is the existence of other people who divide power.194 Arendt’s analysis recognizes that, when power as action is fragmented, the force of collective power that can transform reality by fostering solidarity or resistance within a social group is difficult to achieve. Security practices at the border divide the power and solidarity that smugglers have as a group while crossing from one side to the other. To prevent the division of this power, in the case under study some women are able to mobilize and organize themselves in order to work together with their male counterparts.  Therefore, against the common belief of submissive and helpless women, there is a strong female agency within the smuggling networks.  The concept of power as empowerment is useful to understand women’s emerging power as agents of knowledge. Some women have internalized the values of the dominant culture. Their guilt when they deviate from the norm and their need to avoid conflict in order to accommodate and please, have prevented them from empowering themselves. Nevertheless, women cannot be genuinely empowered until we understand our own need for power and, of course, our fear of it. It is only by having power, by using it and by misusing it that we learn to know ourselves195 and to seek empowerment within the domination framework of security practices in the border and intersectional inequalities in society. In this sense, Black feminism reveals the role that knowledge                                                  191 Amy Allen, The Power of Feminist Theory Domination, Resistance, Solidarity (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 127.  192 Allen, Ibid., 82.  193 Allen, Ibid., 100.  194 Arendt, On Violence, 201. 195 Helene Moglen, “Power and Empowerment,” Women’s Studies hr. Forum, 6, no. 2 (1983): 131-134.  57     and consciousness play in empowering oppressed individuals and groups. New knowledge from subjugated groups is important for both the change of consciousness of individuals and the social transformation of the institutions that perpetuate oppression and inequality.196The conceptualization of power as empowerment is also viewed as the power of the powerless. This perspective acknowledges that empowering practices of women are still shaped by relations of domination.197 In patriarchal societies, men are in a position of dominance over women; but women choose to understand power as the ability to empower oneself, others and the world.198 Women may want to be powerful in order to simultaneously enhance rather than diminish the power of others.199  In concrete terms, power, as empowerment, is a creative ability that women have in order to pursue certain life projects.200 Therefore, this approach has a transformative component that can be understood as a process that fosters power in women for use in their own lives and in their communities. Nevertheless, power viewed as empowerment has to be aware of the social locations where relations of domination and subordination take place. Empowerment is not a universal location: some women can subordinate others201 or be more empowered than others depending on their different social locations based on their race, class, gender or location (urban-rural). An intersecting perspective recognizes that local women in border zones are a heterogeneous group who might share experiences of racist, classist and gendered oppression. Based on women’s socially constructed identities, border security discourses and practices reduce women’s lives to                                                  196 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 221–238. 197 Amy Allen, The Power of Feminist Theory: Domination, Resistance, Solidarity (Boulder, Colorado: Westview press, 1999), 24. 198 Allen, Ibid., 18.  199 Jean Baker Miller, Women and Power (Wellesley, Mass.: Stone Center for Developmental Services and Studies, Wellesley College, 1982), 247-248. 200 Allen, Ibid., 21. 201 Allen, Ibid., 25. 58     negative stereotypes that deny their agency. By understanding power as a negotiation between domination and empowerment, it is possible to visualize how women move from one context of power to the other depending on their social location. Feminist critical human security acknowledges the interplay between these two understandings of power.   1.2.7.3 Feminist critical human security’s conception of power  To effectively influence the power structures within border control and inequality systems in Ecuador, feminist critical human security acknowledges other sources and understandings of power such as resistance or empowerment. Power, as both dynamic and multidimensional, changes its expressions according to context and interests. Hence, its expressions can range from domination and resistance to collaboration and transformation.202 Despite the predominance of power as domination, feminist critical human security does not encourage women to believe that we are powerless. Women exercise power daily to resist and challenge the patriarchal, racist and classist system in border zones. In this sense, a feminist critical human security’s conception of power reveals the unequal power relations that exist in every social relation, thereby showing that subordinate forces can also exercise power.203 Thus, the viewpoint of power as an unchanging relation of domination can be overcome if power is seen as empowerment. Feminist critical human security displays a deep dissatisfaction with views of power as domination and as the punishment of “undisciplined” bodies, because these views do not take into account women’s agency and empowerment. Feminist critical human security is aware of the role of power as domination, both at the structural and discursive levels, and of the challenge of confronting power because it does not always operate in visible ways, but it nevertheless,                                                  202 Lisa Vene Klasen and Valerie Miller, “Power and empowerment,” PLA Notes 43 (2002): 39-41. 203 Davina Cooper, “Productive, Relational and Everywhere? Conceptualizing Power and Resistance within Foucauldian Feminism,” 442. 59     encourages us to view empowerment as an alternative model of power that creates more equitable relationships.  Feminist critical human security rejects the conception of power as domination/punishment imbued in the national security paradigm which interprets security through the restrictive lens of the security of the state, thereby distracting attention from the insecurities that individuals, groups and communities face in their everyday lives. Border security treats smugglers as criminals, overlooking the circumstances that have motivated smuggling in a gendered, racist, classist and geographical context of inequality. The state and its border security practices neglect the voices and agency of women smugglers, whose access to alternative sources of income is limited in the three provinces where my study was conducted. Feminist critical human security incorporates a multidimensional approach to threats to security that can affect women, but it does not involve military principles. Moreover, it prioritizes the security of the individual and establishes women smugglers as referents of security. It acknowledges the emancipatory alternatives for them, in order to ameliorate their security conditions. By tackling the interlocked inequalities that undermine women’s security, feminist critical human security contributes to giving women the tools of survival, dignity and sustainable livelihoods. In this sense, feminist critical human security emphasizes not only the protection of women but also their empowerment through their active participation in policy inputs, knowledge and experience to achieve their own development and security. The feminist critical human security approach, therefore, aims to decrease women’s insecurity and to achieve equality through feminist policy initiatives that are sensitive to intersectional issues in development planning.   This section serves to explain how the concept of power is understood in the empirical case under study. Arendt’s concept of collective power contributes to the understanding that, when women are organized, they produce power through their daily activities. In the context of women 60     on the borders, smuggling networks allow women to be powerful as a clandestine group on both sides of the border. However, the security forces’ border control practices fragment this power. In this sense, the Foucauldian conception of disciplinary power is useful to understand the discourse and practice of border security. Such a conception prevents disorder at the border by means of observation, excluding and punishing disobedient female bodies involved in smuggling. In the discourse of national security, smugglers are disempowered by the border control authorities. Women continuously move from one context of power relations to another, so they can be dominated and empowered at the same time. The understanding of power in the case under study demonstrates that smuggling can involve the empowerment or the domination of women, depending on the context in which the smuggling takes place and the social location of women who get involved in it. For this reason, from a feminist critical human security perspective, a conception of power applied to the case of women’s insecurity and smuggling on Ecuador’s borders recognizes the interplay between domination and empowerment. Such a conception recognizes domination, empowerment, resistance, and solidarity. The interest in domination focuses on the type of power consciously or unconsciously exercised over women by border control and systems of oppression based on race, class, nationality and gender, while the interest in empowerment and resistance focuses on the power that women have to act despite or in response to the particular circumstances of domination in the border provinces. Finally, the interest in solidarity focuses on the power that women exercise with each other and with men during smuggling activities in border zones as they strive to improve their economic security. It is important to recognize that, if Ecuador’s development initiatives truly want to encourage the security of local women on the border, they need to be sensitive to the diversity of women’s experiences deriving from their social location.   61     1.2.8 Summary of the theoretical approach   This chapter has provided the theoretical framework that informs the analysis of women’s security and smuggling on Ecuador’s borders. The conceptual framework that I use to analyze the empirical case recognizes that national security is a state-centric security paradigm whose main concern is to protect the state’s political and economic interests and values using a military approach to tackling threats at the local, national, regional and global levels. Nonetheless, national security’s self-interested agenda has failed to protect people, since it pays inadequate attention to the well-being of citizens and their communities. National security discourses and practices on the border criminalize women involved in smuggling activities, whereas the inhabitants of the border view smuggling as a way of life. In contrast, I use feminist critical human security as a progressive approach for understanding security issues. In order to ensure the implementation of effective policies in solving social, economic, cultural or environmental problems in critical contexts, feminist critical human security policies must consider all the interconnected factors that create insecurity in the area in question. For instance, intersecting factors of inequality, such as sexism, racism and classism, provoke women’s insecurity. Equality based on race, gender, class and geographical location must be seen as the main components of a feminist critical human security approach. For this reason, this dissertation is informed by a feminist critical human security perspective that questions the intersectional relations of domination and subordination embodied in state-centric perspectives of security. That perspective holds that an unequal access to education, healthcare and political and economic participation, combined with a traditional social construction of gender roles undermines women’s security. The achievement of material needs clearly matters, but it is not enough. It is necessary to transform the socially constructed power relations that have fostered structural inequalities and exclusion on allegedly undisciplined bodies. Women’s security, within a feminist critical human security approach, is assured only through 62     feminist policy initiatives within a context of development planning, so as to decrease the intersecting factors of inequality.  The combination of critical human security and feminist security applied in the empirical case studied in this dissertation analyzes human security as an emancipatory approach for women and their local communities in the three border provinces where the study was carried out. By using a feminist critical human security approach, the border is not viewed as a dividing line between states; rather it is understood as a space of integration, social interaction, cultural encounter and a way of life where the intersecting identities of women and security forces interconnect. The vision of development also needs to foster the inclusion of local voices of women as a precondition for successfully planning and implementing policies to improve their security.  My analysis of women’s (in) security on Ecuador’s borders posits development as a pre-condition for achieving the security of women. Feminist critical human security is an emancipatory conception that fosters strong community participation and engagement while repositioning women and their potentialities at the center of development objectives. A feminist critical human security approach can be enriched by post-development, because this understanding contributes to the construction of people-centered development and security models that appreciate local knowledge and culture. Such a conception encourages the agency of communities rooted in local identities to address their own problems. It also recognizes local women’s knowledge development in the provinces where this research was conducted. Finally, it emphasizes the idea of group solidarity as a social process that fosters women’s efforts and joint work for the benefit of 63     themselves, their families and their communities in the seven dimensions204 of the human security approach.    1.3 Methodology  Doing feminist critical human security research in women’s insecurity and smuggling in border zones involves an intersectional analysis of power relations that uncovers the hidden relationships of oppression and inequality. Acknowledging the importance of intersectionality, in the case of women’s insecurity, requires analyzing the intersection of multiple forms of discrimination based on gender, race, class, ethnicity, nationality, geography and so on. On one hand, this research is interdisciplinary and critical of the traditional understanding of security, since it implies a challenge to dominant constructions of security as predominantly masculine. On the other hand, feminist critical human security acknowledges that women within local communities must become involved when development and security plans are designed in order to identify the issues that create insecurity in specific contexts.  The methodology utilized in this dissertation is influenced and informed by a feminist critical human security approach, which focuses on the security of women and their communities on Ecuador’s border zones, specifically in El Oro, Sucumbíos and Carchi provinces. A feminist critical human security viewpoint allows this study to arrive at a different, silenced and marginalized notion of security that rejects the dominant discourses and practices on the topic.  Thus, the study addresses the following primary research question:   What comprises the web of power relations that have led to women’s insecurity in Ecuador’s border provinces of El Oro, Carchi and Sucumbíos?                                                   204 According to the 1994 UN Human Development Report, the human security approach involves seven dimensions: personal security, economic security, community security, political security, environmental security, food security and health security.  64     The study also addresses the following secondary research questions:  How is women’s involvement in smuggling related to the conditions of insecurity at the border?   To what extent do public policies related to human security on Ecuador’s northern and southern borders include a focus on women’s security and well-being that take into account the intersections of gender, race, class and geographical location?  1.3.1 Methods  The study utilizes methods for research shaped by a feminist critical human security framework that is guided by two sets of methodological approaches: a critical human security perspective and feminist approaches to the methodology for international relations and political sciences.205 These methodological approaches affect the methods chosen for this study. Thus, the study relies on the following methods for gathering information: (a) analyzing documents; (b) interviews and (c) workshops.   a) Analyzing documents At the macro level, this research reviewed a broad array of relevant secondary sources, official documents and relevant statistics in Ecuador, as well as newspaper articles.  The study analyzes several publications of experts on national security, human security, international relations feminism, gender studies, intersectionality and development theory. The                                                  205 Brooke Ackerly and Jacqui True, Doing Feminist Research in Political and Social Science (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2010); Carol Cohn, “Motives and methods: using muti-sited ethnography to study US National Security discourses,” in Feminist methodologies for International Relations. Brooke Ackerly, Maria Stern and Jacqui True editors. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006), 91-107; Maria Stern. “Racism, sexism, classism, and much more: reading security-identity in marginalized sites,” in Feminist methodologies for International Relations. Brooke Ackerly, Maria Stern and Jacqui True editors. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006), 174-198; Kleinman, Sherryl. Feminist Fieldwork Analysis. (Sage Publications: Los Angeles, 2007). 65     research also examined and analysed government documents and official sources of information given to me by governmental officials or included in web pages such as the National Agenda for Women and Gender Equality 2014-2017 (translated as Agenda Nacional de Mujeres y Equidad de Género 2014-2017), development plans such as the National Plan for Buen Vivir 2009-2013 and the National Plan for Buen Vivir 2013-2017, and security plans such as Plan Ecuador 2007 and Comprehensive Security Plan 2011.  Finally, the study systematically analyzed five daily Ecuadorian newspapers Hoy, El Comercio, El Telégrafo, El Universo and La Hora. The criteria of selection of these newspapers involved the need to analyze the content of articles in national and local newspapers (El Comercio is a national newspaper, and La Hora is a local newspaper). Over the one-year period 2013-2014, I collected and studied online newspaper articles corresponding to the period 2007-2014. The articles reviewed were retrieved using the terms “security plans at Ecuador’s border”, “smuggling of fuel and propane cylinders at the border”, “development planning at the border”, “development at the border”, “equality in Ecuador” and “gender equality in Ecuador.” This selection yielded useful information about these topics of public concern in the country as a whole and established a background for understanding the local concerns in the areas where I was working in. Thus, I was able to collect data regarding national and local authorities’ attitudes, perceptions and discourses towards particular issues, such as smuggling in the three provinces, border control and government policies on gender issues, security and development, all of which are relevant to the issue of women’s security on the border. Overall, the analysis of these articles yielded a broader understanding of smuggling as a border security concern for the Ecuadorian authorities and of women’s insecurity conditions in the Ecuadorian society.   66     b) Interviewing  At the micro level, this study involved a process of selecting participants for interviews that included those who could best address the research questions and enhance the understanding of the phenomenon under study. The criteria were based on 1) perspective (those who approved or disapproved governmental policies regarding border security, development and gender equality) and 2) diversity (middle/low class, rural/urban and Black/Indigenous/Mestizo women). Thus, this research analyzes the contents of individual semi-structured interviews, including open-ended questions, followed by a short informal discussion at the end of the interview with academics, government functionaries and leaders of women’s organizations. The research also analyzes unstructured groups interviews with local women conducted during the fieldwork. Group interviews were particularly useful with shy women. Those interviews were more social, and they resulted in collective responses and the discussion of minorities’ viewpoints about the intersecting factors of inequality in the everyday life of local women in the border provinces where this study was carried out. As I became more involved in the course of my field research, I changed some of the original questions and added new questions for my interviewees.  The first stage of my fieldwork took place in Ecuador, partly in 2013. Between June and August 2013, I conducted interviews with leaders of women’s organizations and local authorities in the three selected border provinces.206 Additional interviews were conducted in Imbabura (Ibarra) and Pichincha (Quito) provinces with feminist scholars and the representatives of the Ecuadorian government working on gender, security and development planning.  The second stage of the field work of this research was conducted in Quito on May 26, 2014 when I attended a meeting with a representative of the Transition Commission to the Council                                                  206 The three selected provinces were Carchi (La Concepción) and Sucumbíos (Lago Agrio) at the Northern border, and El Oro (Machala, Chacras, and Huaquillas) at the Southern border. 67     of Gender Equality of Ecuador in order to discuss the process of creation and the content of the National Agenda for Women and Gender Equality 2014-2017. Overall, the fieldwork involved 22 interviews, all done in person.  Each individual interview lasted between 45 and 60 minutes. The group interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. All the interviews were taped, transcribed and translated from Spanish into English. The transcribed interviews were read several times, and their content was classified by themes (gender equality, border security, development planning, inequality based on race, inequality based on class) and by location. I shared the transcripts with the interviewees who wanted a copy of the interview. In two cases,207 I was able to do follow-up interviews after studying the transcripts. In the interviews with border security authorities and leaders of women’s organizations in the three provinces and in the group interviews with local women in Huaquillas-El Oro and La Concepcion-Carchi, I learned that border security institutions in Ecuador are racialized organizations dominated by Mestizo men, and that their predominant practices of border security are affected by the gender and race of the smugglers. For instance, Black women are more often stopped by border security officers. The gendering and racialization of interactions at the border show the inequality of power in border security practices. I also learned from the interviews with the Ecuadorian authorities that there is a persistent lack of political will and budget to promote projects for women in the border.                                                      207 The follow-up interviews were with an Ecuadorian functionary working on gender equality and with a Customs officer. 68     c) Conducting workshops This research analyzes the contents of two workshops conducted with local women in two border provinces, El Oro (Huaquillas) on July 13, 2013, and Carchi (La Concepción) on August 31, 2013. Workshops were chosen as the method of data collection because they are an effective technique for achieving public participation and setting up a plan of action. Methods such as focus groups and workshops are consultative in nature. Focus groups, as a research method based on group interaction, can be viewed as a controlled discussion in which the participants collectively produce interpretations of proposed topics.208 Focus groups tend to be homogeneous in terms of demographics, typically involving between 6-10 people;209 smaller groups with four to six participants can be useful to discuss sensitive topics. A typical focus group lasts less than two hours.  Workshops, on the other hand, are extended group discussions (from three hours to one day), often with more participants than in a focus group. Generally, workshops allow more in-depth exploration of an issue than is in a focus group.210 There is the potential, as with any type of facilitated discussion, for particular interests or voices to dominate,211 but workshops offer the possibility for achieving a consensus or decision.212 They may also encourage the participants to                                                  208 Janeth Smithson, “Using and analysing focus groups: limitations and possibilities,” INT. J. SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 3, no. 2 (2000): 104-105. http://www.sfu.ca/~palys/Smithson-2000-Using&AnalysingFocusGroups.pdf (accessed in June 2016). 209 Janeth Smithson, Ibid., 106. 210The National Social Marketing Centre, Qualitative research methodologies. http://www.thensmc.com.temporarywebsiteaddress.com/oss/node/129 (accessed in June 2016). 211Collaboration and Participation.  Focus groups and workshops. http://www.tba.co.nz/kete/PDF_files/ITP206_focus_groups_and_workshops.pdf (accessed in June 2016). 212University College London-UCL, Evaluation Methods for Public Engagement Projects. https://www.ucl.ac.uk/public-engagement/documents/evaluationtoolkits/evaluationmethods/100831_Methods_for_evaluation.pdf (accessed in June 2016). 69     generate creative or new ideas,213 often ending with an action plan.214 In this study, workshops were chosen as one method of data collection because they allow the generation of information on collective views and generate a rich understanding of women's experiences of insecurity and inequality on the border as well as recommendations to improve the security conditions of women and their communities. A total of 32 women participated in the workshops. 24 participated in the workshop in La Concepción, Carchi Province, and eight in the workshop in Huaquillas, El Oro Province. Two local women organizations, El Oro Women’s Movement (MMO) in Huaquillas and the National Confederation of Black Women (CONAMUNE) in La Concepción, actively contributed to the success of the workshops. The themes to be discussed during the workshops (border security, employment and gender equality) were selected by the representatives of the women’s organizations and myself. Local women were invited by the representative of the local women’s organizations in their community. The invitation to participate in the workshops explained that the study would like to know about the participants’ security experiences as inhabitants of the border and the major problems of development and equity in their province in order to articulate a proposal for human security in the area. Each workshop lasted four hours, including 30 minutes for a lunch break. My role was to moderate the discussion and to prevent the discussion from being dominated by few participants in order to hear a range of views and to allow different opinions to be discussed fairly. The results of the workshops were taped, transcribed and translated from Spanish into English.  A total of 63 individuals participated either in the workshops or as interviewees. The invitation to the interviews and the workshops explained the objective of the research. Consent                                                  213The National Social Marketing Centre, Qualitative research methodologies. http://www.thensmc.com.temporarywebsiteaddress.com/oss/node/129 (accessed in June 2016). 214 Collaboration and Participation.  Focus groups and workshops. http://www.tba.co.nz/kete/PDF_files/ITP206_focus_groups_and_workshops.pdf (accessed in June 2016). 70     forms were submitted and explained to the participants. For further detailed information about the interviews and the workshops refer to Appendix E: List of Key Informants Contacted, Appendix F: Interview Guides for Key Informants, and Appendix G: Interview Guide for Participants.    1.3.2 Quantitative and Qualitative Data  The research utilizes quantitative data, such as national statistics, census data and confiscations data. The analysis relies on statistical data about employment rates, labor force participation rates by sex, female population, female households, single mothers, and domestic violence by province obtained from the National Institute of Statistics and Census of Ecuador (INEC). The quantitative data used in this research gave me general information about the following:  a) gallons of fuel and gas cylinders for domestic use confiscated from trans-border smugglers; b) losses to the Ecuadorian economy in millions of dollars due to fuel smuggling across the border in 2013; c) the number of women arrested for smuggling at the border in 2012-2013; d) the employment situation and access to education of women by ethnicity in Ecuador; and   e) women victims of domestic violence. The qualitative data obtained from the analysis of newspapers, interviews and workshops with local women gave me the details about:  a) local women’s experiences of discrimination due to domestic violence, economic insecurity and intersecting identities based on race, class and geographical location;  b) understandings of the border by local women and the leaders of women’s organizations;  c) perceptions of development and security by local women and the Ecuadorian authorities; 71     d) perceptions of smuggling as a crime by the local authorities and as a way of life by local women and Ecuadorian academics;  e) gender relations within smuggling activities.  1.3.3 Successes and problems encountered in data collection activities  I introduced myself as a researcher interested in women, smuggling and human security policies. Initially, given my age and gender, I looked unthreatening. But my social position as a young Mestizo middle-class woman affected my interactions with my interviewees. At the beginning of my interviews, my gender and age probably served as an icebreaker with many male government functionaries. In contrast, my status as “Ph.D. student and researcher from a Canadian university,” which enhanced my interaction with academics and experts in the fields that I was researching, did not have such a positive effect with some developing planning and border security officials. Once you put those identities together, they translate into an educated middle-class Mestizo woman who might criticize the current policies of the government. The result was varying degrees of openness in the interviews. A high percentage of the Mestizo female professional interviewees were extremely open, often revealing things that clearly would cause difficulties for them if exposed. In contrast, the government officials were unforthcoming clearly following the official position on security and development planning.    One success encountered during the fieldwork and, indeed the whole data collection process was the interest of many Ecuadorian authorities in this study, especially those working on gender equality and security, as shown by their availability to participate in interviews and their willingness to offer additional useful information. Once trust was built, “snowball sampling” became crucial, giving me more access to interviews. When a particular Customs officer, an academic on gender or woman leader of an organisation got to know me over a period of time, 72     they asked others to let me interview them. Nevertheless, the interview with two development planning officials in Ibarra involved an unexpected event, but it ended up being informative. The interview was planned for 45 minutes, but one of the (male) officials left only 15 minutes after the interview started. Specifically, he left when I started to ask why Plan Ecuador failed and whether that failure was the main reason why Plan Ecuador is now merging with SENPLADES (Secretary for National Planning and Development)? He explained that he had to leave because he had a meeting with the General Secretary for Development Planning of the northern area. The lady who stayed for the rest of the interview offered significant information regarding development planning. She also recognised that there is not currently enough of a gender focus in development planning on Ecuador’s borders. Another success was the active involvement of the members of the two women’s organisations, who participated with me in the organisation of the workshops and the group interviews. For instance, for the workshop in Huaquillas, the lawyer of the Women’s Movement El Oro (Movimiento de Mujeres de El Oro) went with her daughter door to door inviting local women to participate.  While collecting data during my fieldwork, I encountered several problems and limitations.  Principally, I was not able to conduct direct individual interviews with women smugglers. The Board of Ethics at UBC considered such interviews too risky for myself and the women smugglers. Some of the women who participated in the workshops and group interviews had been involved at least once in smuggling activities, but I did not ask direct questions about smuggling at particular persons. The discussion of smuggling was introduced by the participants themselves as a way of life for locals on the border. The participants complained about the security practices deployed on the border to tackle smuggling on the grounds that they tend to use excessive force and constitute 73     an abuse of power. An additional limitation of my study was that women who did not live in Huaquillas or in the Chota Valley were excluded from this research. Another problem that I encountered during my fieldwork was the impossibility of conducting a workshop planned in Lago Agrio, Sucumbíos Province, with members of the Women’s Federation of Sucumbíos. When I arrived at Lago Agrio to conduct interviews with two leaders of the Federation, I was told that it was not possible to conduct the workshop either in July or in August 2013, because many members were on holiday. These two leaders shared the results of a study conducted by the Federation such as the Agenda of Women of Sucumbíos in 2006, which includes the history of the province and a discussion of previous workshops. The two leaders of the Federation explained that the living conditions of many women in the area have not changed since the 2006 Agenda was created. Another limitation was the lack of feedback on the transcripts of the interviews. I interviewed not only leaders of women’s organisation but also local women who were not in leadership positions. The women in leadership positions seek to represent the needs of local women in their provinces and communities. These women reviewed the transcripts of their interviews. However, the local women in non-leadership positions, hardly wrote down their comments. This provided the main limitation to my method, given the fact that the study wanted to include the silent voices of local women unable to speak about their security experiences on a daily basis. However, this limitation was, to some extent, overcome by the discussions in the workshops and by the group interviews.  My study used mainly a qualitative approach to analyzing the content of the literature, the interviews, the mass media and the workshops, gaining a rich and complex understanding of women’s experience of insecurity and experts’ perceptions of security and inequality.  74     My research studied a marginalized social group, namely women living in three border provinces. If I were to conduct future work in this area, I would like to use a more participatory approach to try to give the group studied a voice through the collaborative design of a project for the benefit of the community to be presented to the provincial government.  My study was conducted as research about women and their security problems, rather than with these women. In more concrete terms, the local women need to be viewed as sources of information and ideas rather than merely as objects of research. I acknowledge my duty as a researcher to learn how to conduct this type of participatory research because it is important to involve the group being studied in the research, preferably at all stages, so as to avoid further marginalising its members.  Overall, the goal of my field research was to observe, read, listen and learn more about security, border dynamics, development and inequality based on the intersections of gender, race, class and location. By doing so, I was able to acquire data that demonstrate inequality within power relations in the three border provinces. By using a feminist critical human security lens, my study recommends the achievement of equality aware of the intersections of race, gender, class and geographical location as a precondition for the security of women living at the border.          75     Chapter 2. Ecuadorian Policy on Security  By analyzing two Ecuadorian policies on security, namely national security and human security, this chapter seeks to understand how national security dynamics under Rafael Correa’s government has not successfully tackled smuggling as a new threat in border zones. Thus, a self-interested national security agenda has failed to protect people.  First, I examine how the national security approach has been implemented by the Ecuadorian state since the 1920s. I then analyze how biopolitics, governmentality and other methods of internal control affecting conceptions of state security are implemented under Correa. I argue that national security discourses and practices at the border criminalize the individuals involved in smuggling activities, whereas the inhabitants of the border view smuggling as a way of life. Finally, this chapter suggests that a human security approach cannot be implemented as a mere complement to national security initiatives; rather, it has to empower individuals and their communities.   2.1 National Security as viewed by the Ecuadorian state In this section, I utilize the concept of national security. This concept, as a state-centric approach, explicates the traditional view of security in Ecuador. I will analyse the historical relationship between security and development in the Ecuadorian security agenda. I shall also examine how the Ecuadorian security policy has been influenced by a National Security Doctrine led by the US.  Finally, through the analysis of the national security approach, which is based on states’ national interests and values, I explain how Ecuador’s national security policy during the late 1990s and early 2000s has been affected by the Colombian army conflict and how this policy is currently implemented to control smuggling in Ecuador’s border zones.  76     The process of national security decision-making has developed doctrines that assume that states traditionally accept a permanent state of war where their national interests are seen as the main issue for international and national affairs. A National Security Doctrine started to be developed during the Cold War. Its formulation was led by the United States in the framework of its policy of containment of the Communism of the Soviet Union. That doctrine was imposed on the majority of Latin American countries, through such instruments as the American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the Inter-American Defense College, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the School of the Americas. From the perspective of classical realism, the United States considered that the purpose of the National Security Doctrine was to fight the Communist threat, which was the primary cause of political instability and the main threat to the security of “all” countries in the hemisphere. Therefore, the U.S. developed several mechanisms and strategies to counter the subversion and insurgency that were brewing in Latin American countries, such as aid programs, supporting military leaders and training troops through the United States Agency for Development (USAID), and the Alliance for Progress.215 With the fall of the Berlin Wall, in November 1989, the spread of Communism ceased to be a threat to American interests. In what follows, I discuss the ways in which Ecuador’s security policies were influenced by the national security discourse of the Cold War.  From a realist perspective, the National Security Doctrine during the Cold War emphasized the containment of threats to states’ national interests. Ecuador became immersed in this process by designing its National Security Doctrine embodied in the National Security Law of 1979, and by the creation of the National Security Council (COSENA), the National Directorate of                                                  215 Ministerio Coordinador de Seguridad del Ecuador, Plan de Seguridad Integral (2011), 12-13. 77     Intelligence (DNI), and the National Institute of Advanced Studies (IAEN),216 which served as instruments for the application of the doctrine, especially during the years of military dictatorships (Junta Militar, 1963-1966, and Gobierno Nacionalista y Revolucionario de las Fuerzas Armadas,  1972-1979) and the anti-subversive struggle that occurred in the country.  Before and during the Cold War, notions of external and internal security were influenced by the Ecuadorian Armed Forces’ participation in national political life as guarantors of economic and social development. Since the 1920s, the military has been influential in Ecuadorian politics due to weak civil leaderships. The relationship between internal security and politics began before the Cold War; it responded to the social and political components of an agro-export oriented economy led by an oligarchy with multiple economic and political interests. This oligarchy had little capacity to integrate politically a heterogeneous and marginalized population.217 Indeed, the military and the populist regime of Velasco Ibarra were, from the 1920s to early 1970s, perhaps the only modernizing and politically inclusive force, proposing alternatives to the economic crisis created by the oligarchic groups.218 The influence of the armed forces in Ecuadorian political affairs became even greater when the 1945 Constitution, promoted by the military and by socialist militants, stated that the army forces do not obey orders that go against the law and the Constitution.219 During the Cold War, therefore, the Ecuadorian armed forces were already extremely influential in the political realm, being able to adapt the concept of national security according to their own perspectives on possible threats to the internal order and national                                                  216 IAEN was created in 1972 during the dictatorship of General Guillermo Rodríguez (1972-1976) to prepare civil and military authorities in decision-making. Today it is a political school that prepare public servants according to ideological vision of the regime. 217 Bertha García Gallegos, “El Concepto de “Seguridad Interna” en el Marco de las Relaciones Sociedad-Fuerzas Armadas en el Ecuador,” Revista Paraguaya de Sociología no 98 (enero-abril de 1997): 192. 218 Bertha García Gallegos, Ibid., 190-192. 219 Bertha García Gallegos, Ibid., 193. 78     sovereignty.220 The Junta Militar dictatorship was strongly influenced by the ideology of the National Security Doctrine led by the US, identifying as an “internal enemy” the pro-Cuba politics promoted by President Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy and other left-wing groups.221 Throughout the Cold War era, the Ecuadorian armed forces directly engaged in the management of social and economic development through coups d'état that they justified by the inability of civilian leaders to propose alternatives to the crisis of the agro-export oriented economy and to boost industrial progress in Ecuador.222 Among these alternatives led by the military were the promotion of the import substitution model, industrial protectionism, land reform and technological development in rural areas. The doctrine of the internal enemy was combined with the rhetoric of development. In the 1967 Constitution, the dictatorship of the Military Junta defined development tasks as the new role of the armed forces;223 this constitutional mandate linked internal security to a national development doctrine.224 It is conceivable that the military’s interpretation of that constitutional mandate encouraged the 1973 coup d’état that overthrew the fifth Velasquismo. The military justified the coup by arguing that the Velasco government lacked a political project to effectively utilize new oil resources in order to overcome social injustice, to improve a poor health system and to combat illiteracy.225 This dictatorship was strongly opposed to transnational oil companies, a position strongly supported by unions and other left-wing groups. The rapid modernization of the rural-agricultural sector and the industrial momentum fostered an alliance between military, popular sectors and reformers. This alliance was, however, diluted in the second period of the                                                  220 Bertha García Gallegos, Ibid., 190. 221 Bertha García Gallegos, Ibid., 194. 222 Bertha García Gallegos, Ibid., 194. 223 Bertha García Gallegos, Ibid., 194-195. 224 Bertha García Gallegos, Ibid., 195. 225 Bertha García Gallegos, Ibid., 195. 79     military regime (1976-1979), when military factions repressed the social and political forces that demanded the return of civil power as a safe alternative to military authoritarianism.226 The return to democracy, in 1979, was essentially promoted by the so-called oligarchy, because it served the interests of the elites. Jaime Roldós Aguilera was the first democratically-elected president of Ecuador after the military dictatorship ended in 1979. This transition to democracy was, however, tightly monitored by the armed forces.    The return to democracy faced several challenges, including the end of the oil boom, the external debt crisis, the emergence of subversive groups and the resurgence of the territorial conflict with Peru. In particular, the negative effects of the external debt crisis caused the collapse of the Ecuadorian economy, severely impoverishing the middle and lower segments of society. This crisis allowed the emergence of subversive groups with greater military organization and ostensible links with guerrilla groups in the region, especially the Colombian M-19.227 Thus, in the 1980s, following the transition to democracy, Ecuador's national security efforts were oriented internally towards the “subversive” threat of groups such as the left-wing Alfaro Vive Carajo (translated as Alfaro Lives, Dammit!) founded in 1982 and externally towards the resurgence of the territorial dispute with Peru. According to Ecuador’s 2011 Comprehensive Security Plan (translated as Plan de Seguridad Integral) in the war against subversion, intelligence activities were privileged, legitimizing the persecution, harassment, arbitrary detention, torture and disappearance of people.228 Thus, the state deployed the monopoly of legitimate violence over the governed.229 In sum, in the 1980s a national security policy permitted Ecuadorian security forces                                                  226 Bertha García Gallegos, Ibid., 195. 227 Bertha García Gallegos, “El Concepto de “Seguridad Interna” en el Marco de las Relaciones Sociedad-Fuerzas Armadas en el Ecuador,” 196. 228 Ministerio Coordinador de Seguridad del Ecuador, Plan de Seguridad Integral, 13.  229 Pablo Andrade “La seguridad en las relaciones Ecuador-Colombia,” Comentario Internacional: Revista del Centro Andino de Estudios Internacionales 4 (II semestre, 2002): 81. 80     to deploy their power, understood as control and domination, to tackle both internal and external threats, negatively affecting the human rights of civilians. The end of the Cold War dismantled ideological structures, redefining the armed forces’ future tasks. From the military point of view, it was necessary to overcome the repressive behavior that emerged to control subversive groups during the León Febres Cordero administration (1984-1988).230 It was essential to find other ways of coping with potential conflicts without destroying the solidarity of civil society, which was considered as a necessary support in the event of an escalation of the conflict with Peru.231 The new military approach needed to be based on conflict prevention as a doctrine of internal security. Support for development initiatives as conflict prevention involved a set of actions in the fields of health, forestry, protection of the environment, distribution of food and medicines, construction of schools and, especially, in the field of education.232 The role of the military in development activities linked security with governance.233 Through development initiatives, the Ecuadorian Armed Forces linked security with development and strengthened their role in other realms of the public sphere. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, shifts in international and national politics redefined Ecuador’s national security agenda. In the post-Cold War period, it is clear that issues of defense and security are no longer strictly military. The security needs of society are multiple.234 The Miami Summit of December 1994 led by Democratic President Bill Clinton (1993-2001) served to define the new issues that would govern the hemispheric security agenda. These issues are drug                                                  230 Bertha García Gallegos, Ibid., 196-197. 231 Bertha García Gallegos: “Soberanía, Defensa y Seguridad”, en Tiwintza, Quito, CEDEP Fundación José Peralta, 1995. 232 Bertha García Gallegos, Ibid., 197.  233 Bertha García Gallegos, Ibid., 203. 234 Bertha García Gallegos, Ibid.,189. 81     trafficking and the fight against terrorism.235 In this context, at the beginning of 2000, the northern border with Colombia started to receive more attention from the Ecuadorian government, due to the resolution of the territorial dispute on the southern border with Peru in 1998 through the peace accords of Itamaraty-Brasilia. Moreover, Plan Colombia was launched in 2000 by the Colombian government of Andrés Pastrana with the support of the United States in an effort to combat drug trafficking and guerrilla movements such as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) (translated as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) (translated as the National Liberation Army). The initial two-year phase of Plan Colombia focused on Colombia’s southern border, provoking the spillover of the internal Colombian conflict to Ecuador.236 Andrés Pastrana’s government made a serious mistake, not only with neighboring countries, but also with Colombia, by allowing the Plan Colombia to evolve from a plan that supported peace and the negotiation process to a plan that had US rather than Colombian priorities. Moreover, the plan was going to be applied at the borders and Pastrana’s government did not considered its neighbors’ opinion.237 The fact that Ecuador shares the northern border with Colombia brought about a series of sequels related to Plan Colombia, and the conflict itself.  The geographical position of Ecuador, especially its proximity to Colombia, was seen as strategic to the United States’ counternarcotic war. In 1999, the U.S. signed a 10-year agreement with then Ecuadorian President Jamil Mahuad, that allowed the U.S to deploy its national security strategy through military surveillance in Ecuador by using Manta’s airport in the coastal Manabí province. This airport, formally known as Forward Operating Location (FOL), was used by the                                                  235US. Department of State, Declaration of Miami: First Summit of the Americas, December 11, 1994.  http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/59673.htm (accessed December 26, 2014).  236 Claudia Donoso, “La interdependencia en el área de seguridad en la frontera colombo-ecuatoriana a raíz de la implementación del Plan Colombia: propuesta de política pública de seguridad fronteriza” (master’s thesis FLACSO-Ecuador, 2004), 82.  237 Claudia Donoso, Ibid., 77. 82     Air Forces of the United States Southern Command for operations against illegal cocaine trafficking in northwestern South America, including Ecuador, Colombia and Peru. Based on Article 5 of the 2008 Constitution, which states that no foreign military bases are allowed in Ecuador, the government of Rafael Correa decided in 2009 not to renew this agreement. The above-mentioned security strategy, initially shared by the US and Ecuadorian governments, encouraged Ecuador to follow the tendency to overemphasize national self-interests to tackle drug trafficking and smuggling.  After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington, DC, terrorism came to be perceived as a global threat under Republican President George W. Bush (2001-2009). Consequently, the US government changed its non-interventionist foreign policy in the Andean countries; in particular, it merged counternarcotic and counterterrorism strategies. The debates in the US Congress prior to the approval of this combined strategy lasted about four months and suggested that drug trafficking and terrorism were two sides of the same coin, because terrorist groups finance their activities through drug trafficking. As a result, in late July 2002 the US Congress decided that the financial aid to Plan Colombia, previously restricted to the fight against drugs, must also be used in the fight against Colombian armed groups outside the law.238 The interest of the White House in strengthening cooperation between intelligence systems extended to Colombia, because Colombia had many hectares of coca, and little control over insurgent groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), all of which  were considered to be terrorists groups by the White House .239  In sum, the attacks on the twin                                                  238 Yamile León Vargas, La política exterior de Estados Unidos hacia Colombia luego del 11 de septiembre. Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar Sede Ecuador Área de Estudios Sociales y Globales, Tesis Programa de Maestría en Relaciones Internacionales Mención en Comercio e Integración. (2002): 33-38.   239 Yamile León Vargas, Ibid., 36-38. 83     towers in New York in 2001 led the U.S. Congress in 2002 to conclude that terrorism and the illicit narcotics trade in Colombia were intimately linked. Consequently, U.S. assistance to Colombia began to support Colombian President Uribe's unified campaign against narcotics and terrorism.240 Uribe administration’s democratic security policy (translated as Seguridad Democrática) was understood as the military strengthening of the Colombian state and not as the lack of socio-economic investment and social justice, which was what had created Colombia’s internal conflict, extending it to border countries.241 Thus, the armed conflict in Colombia and the implementation of Plan Colombia under the US security agenda represented serious threats to Ecuador’s national security, with the emergence of an interdependent security relationship between Ecuador and Colombia.242 Therefore, the new phase of Plan Colombia will definitely cause the northeastern sector of Ecuador's northern border to experience the consequences of military operations aimed at eradicating drug trafficking and terrorism in Colombia. As a result, the common border between Colombia and Ecuador shares security issues related to drug trafficking, fumigations and the presence of guerrillas, paramilitaries, and displaced Colombians seeking the refugee status in Ecuador.   The Ecuadorian security forces viewed Plan Colombia’s battle against terrorism and subversive groups as the main cause of the overflow of violence and insecurity to Ecuador. The border zone with Colombia began to be seen as a problematic and vulnerable area. As a result, the Ecuadorian government strengthened the presence and capacity of the operations of the armed                                                  240 During 2000, the United States responded to the Colombian government's request of the Pastrana administration for international support for Plan Colombia by providing assistance to increase Colombia's counternarcotic capabilities. See more at the Embassy of the United States in Bogota, Colombia,  http://bogota.usembassy.gov/plancolombia.html (accessed on July, 2014). 241 Interview conducted by the author on September 12, 2003 in Bogota-Colombia for her master’s thesis at FLACSO-Ecuador.  242 Claudia Donoso, “La interdependencia en el área de seguridad en la frontera colombo-ecuatoriana a raíz de la implementación del Plan Colombia: propuesta de política pública de seguridad fronteriza” (master’s thesis, FLACSO-Ecuador, 2004), 83.  84     forces in the area, as well as the number of police to control drug trafficking and mixed criminal gangs (Ecuadorian-Colombian). It is clear that the Ecuadorian security forces seek to maintain the Colombia conflict outside Ecuador’s borders.243 Thus, the Colombian conflict turned into a threat to Ecuador’s national security244 because of the presence of irregular groups that came from the Colombian conflict and the proliferation of organized crime in Ecuador.  The weak presence of the state in the border zones has merely advanced military reinforcement. The failed attempt of the (current and previous) governments to generate non-military answers to the problems in the border through strategies such as UDENOR and Plan Ecuador has resulted in a slight strengthening of the presence of some state bureaucracy, especially in the health, education, and development sectors, but with minimal results.245 In particular, at the beginning of the first term of  Correa’s administration, Plan Ecuador was launched in 2007 as a peace initiative based on human rights, as opposed to Plan Colombia. Once it failed, however, the government decided to strengthen the military presence at the border, especially after the attack in Angostura-Ecuador on March 1, 2008. Consequently, the protection of Ecuador’s sovereignty became public policy.246 This meant security and intelligence reforms.247 The commitment to the militarization of the border aimed to gain state presence and thereby to avert a potential danger arising from the violence that came from the “other side” of the border.248 This alleged presence of the state has resulted mainly in an increased number of troops to combat insecurity in the border                                                  243 Pablo Andrade, “La seguridad en las relaciones Ecuador-Colombia.” Comentario Internacional: Revista del Centro Andino de Estudios Internacionales (2002): 77-78 244 Pablo Andrade, Ibid., 77.  245 Roque Espinosa, “Ciudadanías de frontera o fronteras de la ciudadanía,” en Fernando Carrión M. Johanna Espín M. Coordinadores. Relaciones fronterizas: Encuentros y Conflictos (Quito, FLACSO-Ecuador: 2011), 42. 246 Roque Espinosa, Ibid., 47. 247 Saudia Levoyer, “Huracán de la Frontera: narcotráfico, guerrilla e inteligencia” (master’s thesis, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, 2014), 13. http://repositorio.uasb.edu.ec/bitstream/10644/4249/1/T1520-MELA-Levoyer-Huracan.pdf  248 Roque Espinosa, Ibid., 37-38, 42. 85     provinces.249 The presence of the state through a military reinforcement appears to be an exercise of sovereignty, but it fosters exclusionary tendencies in public policy. These tendencies marginalize even more border populations and restrict cross-border relations.250 In this context, the promotion of the political, economic and social inclusion of the border populations is not considered a priority. The militarization of the border zone contributes to regional segregation.251 As a result, the militarization of the border region has forced small traders to rely on established networks controlled by local powers that have turned into articulators of “contacts” on both sides of the border, such as wholesale suppliers of certain goods or simply property owners of storages facilities strategically located close to the border crossing. Cross-border trade is no longer merely considered contraband; rather, it has been labelled by the security authorities as support to drug traffickers and terrorist networks.252 Despite this militarization of the border, the locals have found ways to continue with their cross-border activities.   The inhabitants and border communities have fostered the strategy of going unnoticed in the eyes of the state in order to avoid the panoptic gaze of public institutions. This very invisibility has been a condition to ensure the survival of local dynamics and relations.253 In this sense, the border region is characterized by the presence of a web of relationships that the populations living there have established with the inhabitants of  the “other side.”254 For example, it is not feasible to understand the border realities of the provinces of Carchi, Sucumbíos and El Oro, if the social relations with the peoples of Putumayo and Nariño in Colombia and of Aguas Verdes in Peru are not taken into account. Commercial exchanges of food, clothing and products for resale - such as                                                  249 Roque Espinosa, Ibid., 37-38, 42. 250 Roque Espinosa, “Ciudadanías de frontera o fronteras de la ciudadanía,” en Fernando Carrión M. Johanna Espín M. Coordinadores. Relaciones fronterizas: Encuentros y Conflictos (Quito, FLACSO-Ecuador: 2011), 49. 251 Roque Espinosa, Ibid., 49. 252 Roque Espinosa, Ibid., 38. 253 Roque Espinosa, Ibid., 22.  254 Roque Espinosa, Ibid., 24. 86     propane cylinders, gasoline, milk, fruits, potatoes and cattle- that pass daily one side of the border to the other are a way of life for the people living in the border zones. In the provinces of the northern border, this micro-trade, especially since the implementation of Plan Colombia, is part of a regional social network that has defined the economic and political reality of the border provinces.255 This means that you can hardly understand the emergence of coca production in Colombia's Putumayo region if you do not consider the network of cross-border relations at the Ecuador-Colombia border. These regional relationships have made possible the emergence of what Roque Espinosa has called “the coca enclave.”256 The government of Ecuador has sought to deny the obvious inclusion of Ecuadorians in the coca economy, but extensive fieldwork has shown that the coca enclave exists because forces in both sides of the border have created the conditions for its emergence and development. For example, if there had been no support from the Ecuadorian side for the provision of fertilizers for growing and processing base and cocaine paste, it would not have been possible to develop the plantation and industrialization of coca in Putumayo.257 In this context, the emergence of “the coca enclave” has worsened cross-border relations that have been part of the daily life at the border.  Since national interests and national security became its exclusive preoccupation, Ecuador has ignored the multidimensional features of security issues. Indeed, national interests redefined the national security agenda. Ecuador increased its military power in order to protect its sovereignty, its border security, its key natural resources and its population. From a realist point of view, increasing the military budget and the military presence on the borders or in areas considered strategic for Ecuador’s national interests are viewed as totally genuine. In 2013,                                                  255 Roque Espinosa, Ibid., 26. 256 Roque Espinosa, Ibid., 26. 257 Roque Espinosa, Ibid., 27. 87     Ecuador deployed to the border with Colombia more than 10,000 personnel, including police and military forces, to guard and control it.258The presence of security forces on Ecuador’s border to prevent drug trafficking or the smuggling of fuel, propane cylinders and other commodities demonstrates, from a realist point of view, how a national security policy applied in a concrete scenario can contribute to the achievement of national order.   International and national order can be achieved by using a balance of power259 and cooperative security260 as security mechanisms based on the shared interests of neighboring states.  In his book The Anarchical Society, Hedley Bull’s (1977) definition of international society advances the idea that shared interests, moral rules and common values contribute to the achievement of international order. When Bull explains the concept of order further, he describes it as a behavioral pattern including goals and values such as democracy and human rights (or border security). Bull also argues that every society needs order to achieve security, to be free of violence, to ensure agreements are implemented and to maintain a certain status quo.261 Thus, order between states is defined in terms of being obedient to rules of conduct. According to Bull, achieving common goals and shared interests, requires that rules of coexistence must be respected. They include reciprocity and respect of sovereignty, but also                                                  258 El Telégrafo, “Ecuador exige otra vez a Colombia que aumente presencia militar en frontera,” Agosto 9, 2013. http://www.telegrafo.com.ec/noticias/informacion-general/item/ecuador-exige-otra-vez-a-colombia-que-aumente-presencia-militar-en-frontera.html (accesed November 26, 2013).  259 Hedley Bull argues that one function of the balance of power is to prevent imperial initiatives in a State’s international system; another function is to be protected from hegemony and to remain sovereign. See more in Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society a Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 102-105. 260 Cooperative security seeks to achieve an institutionalized security through consent among international actors involved in the international system, rather than between them using threat or use of coercive force to overcome their differences. It assumes that security objectives of the partners have been identified as common and compatible, encouraging cooperative relationships between them to achieve. See more at Ministerio Coordinador de Seguridad del Ecuador, Plan de Seguridad Integral, 15. 261 Bull, Ibid., 102-105. 88     consensus and cooperation among states.262 For instance, a stronger border security policy may include confidence-building measures through simultaneous strategic alliances at the military, political, economic, and social levels. Demining operations and the joint border demarcation, under the so-called Comisión Mixta Permanente de Fronteras Perú-Ecuador (COMPEFEP) led by the Ecuadorian and Peruvian governments, illustrates the extent to which confidence building measures contribute to maintaining the peace accord of Itamaraty-Brasilia, signed in 1998. The joint proposal of Ecuador and Colombia within the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)263 also illustrates how shared interests increased cooperation between these two states in order to create the South American Council for Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Transnational Organized Delinquency approved in the framework of the Summit of UNASUR, held in Lima on November 30, 2012.264 Evidently, these cooperative security measures illustrate how national security is the dominant approach to deal with security issues among and within states.  In Ecuador, a national security approach has constructed national borders as vulnerable areas affected by insecurity issues that come from “outside” the state. The Ecuadorian security forces justify their national security policy and their intervention in the border with Peru, but mainly in the border with Colombia, as previously mentioned, due to the spillover of its internal conflict in Ecuador’s border zones. The Presidential Declaration between Ecuador and Colombia, Vecindad para la Prosperidad y El Buen Vivir (translated as Neighborhood for Prosperity and Good Living),                                                  262 Bull, Ibid., 102-105.  263 The process of formation of the South American Community of Nations began in order to bring together two great associations such as the Andean Community (CAN) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). This significant initiative was carried out in the Third Meeting of South American Presidents in Cuzco-Peru in November 2004. This community was transformed into the South American Union of Nations in April 2007 in Margarita Island-Venezuela; it has a Technical Secretariat, a Secretary General, and its own headquarters in the city of Quito-Ecuador. 264 Presidencia de la República de Colombia, Declaración Presidencial Ecuador-Colombia “Vecindad para la Prosperidad y el Buen Vivir” Tulcán, Carchi Diciembre 11, 2012. http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2012/Diciembre/Paginas/20121211_11.aspx 89     in Tulcán, Carchi Province, on December 11, 2012, demonstrates the importance of strengthening bilateral relations through cooperation and reciprocity in order to tackle threats to security. This declaration encourages the commitment to the common border and the support of the security forces (police and military) for border control activities265 in order to protect the national interests of both states. This declaration was followed by the Meeting of Senior Officials (Ministers and Deputy Ministers) of the security and defense ministries of Ecuador and Colombia on 26-27 September 2013 in Cali, Colombia. The then Ecuadorian Minister of Defense, María Fernanda Espinosa, declared: “The Armed Forces of Ecuador maintain a permanent presence at the northern border to ensure Ecuador's national sovereignty, but it is important that Colombia also invigorates its military presence in the area.”266   The main goal of the meeting was to strengthen and increase the presence of the security forces at 11 border crossings used for illegal activities such as smuggling fuels and commodities, and for drug trafficking. The Ministry of Defense’s statement appeals to a cooperative security based on a shared interest in order to protect both states’ national interests, suggesting the need for the Colombian and Ecuadorian governments to work together in order to increase their ability to battle illicit trafficking and to improve citizen security at the common border.  In sum, realism has served to understand the concept of national security and to explain how states act according to their own national interests, deploying such security strategies as those used in the war against terrorism, drugs and smuggling. Ecuador’s security policy, which is still influenced by the Cold War security discourse, demonstrates how the joint presence of a state’s                                                  265 Presidencia de la República de Colombia. Ibid.   266 Ministerio de Defensa del Ecuador, “Ecuador promueve presencia militar activa y permanente en control de frontera norte” (Septiembre 26, 2013) http://www.defensa.gob.ec/ecuador-promueve-presencia-militar-activa-y-permanente-en-control-de-frontera-norte/  90     security and national interest has fostered a national security approach that utilizes cooperative security and links the national and global levels. Such a policy, which is a product of masculinized security institutions, is currently used to control new threats to national security such as smuggling in Ecuador’s border zones.   2.1.1 The State under Rafael Correa and Methods of Security Control   In this section, I consider it relevant to analyse the state under Rafael Correa, with particular reference to how biopolitics, governmentality and other methods of internal control affect conceptions of the state and of border security. The Correa government has been concerned with political conspiracy, weakening civil society and creating a war on free speech. Since 2009, the Government of Ecuador has reformed its military and security institutions, such as the intelligence agency. It has also “modified” the security agenda and “included” the human security approach.   Rafael Correa gained his legitimacy by winning elections that allow him to consolidate his political project. He was elected in 2006, and re-elected in 2009 and, again, in 2013. Correa’s administration has enjoyed great popularity since 2007 in spite of the authoritarian model that guides it.267 In particular, in 2006, Correa ran as the self-proclaimed leader of a “citizens’ revolution” against the partyarchy, on an anti-neoliberal stand. In 2008, Correa successfully campaigned for a referendum to approve the new constitution.268 By arguing that there is a danger of a return of the right, Correa changed the Constitution enacted by his movement in the National Assembly to allow for his re-election.269 Correa wants to consolidate his permanence in office after 2017 even though his government is characterized by a significant public investment but minimal                                                  267 Santiago Basabe and Julián Martínez, “Ecuador: cada vez menos democracia, cada vez más autoritarismo. . . con elecciones” Revista de Ciencia Política 34, no 1 (2014): 152. 268 Carlos de La Torre, “The People, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Rafael Correa’s Ecuador,” Constellations 21, no 4, 2014. file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Torre-2014-Constellations.pdf,  459. 269 Carlos de La Torre, Ibid., 459. 91     freedom of speech. Correa’s intention is to extend his rule until at least 2021.270 In general, his policies have expanded central planning, the bureaucracy and the regulation of economic, cultural, and social activities. Higher social spending and policies targeted at poverty reduction have been carried out in the midst of an oil boom: the price of oil increased from $52 per barrel in 2006 to $98 in 2013.271 In the short term, the oil and mining sectors have funded social assistance for the poor, increasing the consumption level of the middle class. Nevertheless, Correa’s tendency to favor aggressive natural-resource extraction could lead to resource exhaustion and a new rise in poverty.272 The administration has used oil revenues to encourage patronage as a reward for the constituents’ loyalty. This strategy permits the government to sustain its political power even under conditions in which the civil society has minimal participation.  Ecuador under Rafael Correa guarantees neither participation nor contestation by social actors. Correa’s administration is in conflict with social movements, so participation is reduced to voting in elections, giving the populist leader the responsibility to design policies as if he embodies the will of the people but without seeking their engagement.273  For a populist regime, “the people” is viewed as a homogeneous social group sharing the interests and identities that are embodied in a leader whose mission is to save the nation.274 The extreme concentration of power in the presidency does not permit the populist government to view citizens as a group with a plurality of opinions who deliberate in the public sphere. Furthermore, Correa’s administration is made up of experts who claim to design policies on behalf of the nation as a whole, particularly the marginalized groups, but who do not involve the citizens in the discussion and planning of the new                                                  270 Santiago Basabe and Julián Martínez, Ibid., 145-146. 271 Carlos de La Torre, “The People, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Rafael Correa’s Ecuador,” Constellations 21, no 4 (2014): 458. file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Torre-2014-Constellations.pdf 272 Carlos de La Torre, “Technocratic populism in Ecuador,” Journal of Democracy 24, no 3 (2013): 46.  273 Carlos de La Torre, “The People, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Rafael Correa’s Ecuador,” Constellations 21, no 4 (2014): 457. file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Torre-2014-Constellations.pdf 274 Carlos de La Torre, “Technocratic populism in Ecuador,” Journal of Democracy 24, no 3 (2013): 34. 92     nation.275 By assuming that the leader represents all the interests of the people, Correa’s government denies the differences among social groups and the diversity of public opinion.   Since 2007, the government of Rafael Correa has developed a substantial institutional apparatus to promote the regulation and bureaucratization of citizen participation. It has used plebiscitary strategies to discipline the sources of critical opinion and has counteracted the activism of social movements through disciplinary guidelines designed at the government level,276 facilitating a process of weakening civil society. Basically, civil society is composed of associations, organizations and movements that have emerged spontaneously. It exists when these groups can discuss issues of public interest and can operate critically. In Ecuador, an autonomous civil society has played an important democratizing role, being critical during complex political and economic scenarios. For instance, in the 1990’s, the Indigenous movement was critical to neoliberalism from an ethnic perspective, demanding a plurinational state.277 However, under Correa, all civil society organizations are forbidden to engage in politics, an activity reserved to political parties.278 To implement a policy of persecution and political intimidation Correa has relied on the criminal prosecution of those considered his “enemies.” For instance, one of the emblematic cases of persecution by the courts was that of Assemblyman Cléver Jimenez and his adviser, Fernando Villavicencio.  For the alleged crime of defamation, they were sentenced to 18 months in prison, fined 140,000 US dollars, and required to make a public apology to President Correa.279 This is just one case that shows the government strategy of persecution and intimidation                                                  275 Carlos de La Torre, “The People, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Rafael Correa’s Ecuador,” Constellations 21, no 4 (2014): 463. file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Torre-2014-Constellations.pdf 276 Andrés Ortiz Lemos. “Sociedad civil y Revolución Ciudadana en Ecuador,” Revista Mexicana de Sociología 76, no. 4 (octubre-diciembre, 2014): 583-612.  277 Ortiz Lemos, Ibid. 278 Carlos de La Torre, Ibid., 461. 279 Santiago Basabe and Julián Martínez, “Ecuador: cada vez menos democracia, cada vez más autoritarismo. . . con elecciones,” 146, 155-156. 93     of public opinion. Under Correa, such mechanisms of social control have limited civil society’s participation and criticism, decreasing political dialogue between the regime and the opposition. The 2008 Constitution established the transparency and social control functions of the Ecuadorian state. These new roles permitted the creation of institutions such as the Citizen Participation and Social Control Council (Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social –CPCCS).280 In this context, the Law of Citizen Participation was created. Both regulations were drafted using public workshops to present them as part of a consensus with citizens; but only Correa’s supporters were invited to these workshops to the exclusion of any social organization from the opposition.281 The development of these laws was configured from a particular notion of citizenship advanced by the official discourse282 that is essentially subject to the bureaucratic structure of the state.283 Correa’s self-proclaimed leftist government has taken an active stance against most organized groups of civil society: teachers, students, public employees and Indigenous organizations. The government does not consider these groups to be “real” social movements or representative of civil society. Instead, they are portrayed as privileged groups that obstruct the administration’s project to strengthen the state.284 For instance, the government’s conflicts with the main Indigenous organization, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), are rooted in strong disagreements over mineral extraction. Correa considers mining to be the country’s future and proposes to use natural resources to alleviate poverty.285 Over 200 peasant Indigenous activists face accusations of terrorism for resisting mineral resource                                                  280 Ortiz Lemos, Ibid. 281 Andrés Ortiz, La sociedad civil ecuatoriana en el laberinto de la Revolución Ciudadana. Quito: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 2013. 282 Ortiz Lemos, Ibid. 283 Ortiz Lemos, Ibid. 284 Carlos de La Torre, “The People, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Rafael Correa’s Ecuador,” Constellations 21, no 4, (2014): 460. See also Carlos de La Torre, “Technocratic Populism in Ecuador,” Journal of Democracy 24, no. 3 (2013): 40.  285 Carlos de La Torre, Ibid., 460.  94     extraction.286 Certainly, by calling Indigenous activists terrorists, the regime has misunderstood that critical dialogue is a necessary component to advance an inclusive political agenda.  In contrast, to advance their agendas some social movements led by Afro-Ecuadorians and smaller Indigenous organizations are supporting Correa. The regime’s regulation of media content has promoted the elimination of racist representations. To consolidate the power of their smaller organizations and to get resources from the state, some Indigenous leaders are supporting Correa’s confrontation with CONAIE. In this vein, Correa still sees Indigenous persons as beneficiaries of state distribution, but not as autonomous actors. For instance, when Indigenous organizations articulate their own views of development or democracy, they are stigmatized as “infantile” leftists or as being manipulated by foreign NGOs.287 Correa has completely denied the agency of civil society, ridiculing social protest. The Correa government has even confused protest with conspiracy. Using conspiracy theories has been a common strategy to consolidate and maintain power. For instance, Correa has continuously manufactured enemies. The main political rivals include traditional politicians, bankers, the privately owned media and those who lead corporatist social movements of teachers, students, Indigenous peoples, journalists and public employees.288 In this context, the government of the Citizen Revolution has mastered the art of influencing public opinion through the mass media289 to attack and delegitimize the regime’s opponents. In 2010, for instance, the government used the public media as a propaganda tool to show that a police strike was the result of a political conspiracy to overthrow Correa.290 During this strike, the National Police denounced a new law                                                  286 Carlos de La Torre, Ibid., 461. 287 Carlos de La Torre, Ibid., 461. 288 Carlos de La Torre, “Technocratic populism in Ecuador,” 37; Santiago Basabe and Julián Martínez, “Ecuador: cada vez menos democracia, cada vez más autoritarismo. . . con elecciones,” 146.  289 Catherine Conaghan, “Ecuador: Correa’s plebiscitary presidency,” Journal of Democracy 19, no.2 (2008): 47. 290 Carlos de La Torre, Ibid., 43.  95     that would have cut some benefits, such as Christmas bonuses and wage increases.291 The “conspirators” included former president Lucio Gutiérrez and his Patriotic Society political party, whose members include many former military and police officers, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador, the Indigenous party Pachakutik, petty bourgeois intellectuals and the privately owned media.292 In sum, Correa’s administration mobilizes the state-owned media to divide and disrupt political opponents and to control public opinion. Correa’s control over the media has impoverished the democratic dialogue. He uses the state-owned media to publicize his administration’s accomplishments, to attack the opposition and to respond to accusations of corruption and abuse. In this vein, journalists working in the private media are viewed with suspicion. The government uses its tax-collecting agency (SRI) to monitor the private media. For instance, Revista Vanguardia, a political magazine critical of Correa’s administration, was temporarily closed for not complying with labor laws.293 The regime does not value the freedom of the press or the independence of civil society. Consequently, the media and civil society are becoming weaker social actors. Correa has sought to consolidate his power in the foregoing way. Despite the radical opposition of various social and political sectors, by claiming that “information is a public good,” in June 2013 the National Assembly controlled by Correa approved a communication law to monitor and regulate the contents of the privately owned media294 in order to intimidate and silence critical journalists. One of the first consequences of this law was the sanctioning of the cartoonist Xavier Bonilla and the newspaper El Universo, the latter                                                  291 Carlos de La Torre, “The People, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Rafael Correa’s Ecuador,” 461. 292 Carlos de La Torre, Ibid., 461. 293 Carlos de La Torre, “Technocratic populism in Ecuador,” 43-44.  294 Carlos de La Torre, Ibid., 42; Santiago Basabe y Julián Martínez, “Ecuador: cada vez menos democracia, cada vez más autoritarismo. . . con elecciones,” 157-158.  96     being fined 2% of its turnover of the last three months.295 This law has become a method of internal control to delegitimize fundamental critical opinions that stimulate political debate.  The Government of Ecuador under Correa has also reformed its military and security institutions, such as the Intelligence agency, so as to tackle emergent multidimensional threats to the security of the state. Since the 1970s, the Ecuadorian Intelligence service has functioned without being questioned or fully reformed. The few reforms were limited to simple operative changes rather than to doctrinaire modifications.296 The bombing of the camp of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Angostura, Sucumbíos, on March 1, 2008, by the Colombian Army was the reason why the Ecuadorian government of Rafael Correa ordered the reform of the Intelligence service. The commission that investigated this event presented in November 2008 a report claiming the participation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in that bombing.297 In this vein, on June 8, 2008, by Executive Decree No. 1768, the National Intelligence Secretariat was created and on July 10, 2008, by Executive Decree No. 1828, a civil servant was appointed as Secretary of Intelligence, namely Francisco Jijón, a former adviser to the Ministry of Coordination of Internal and External Security who had actively participated in discussions of the contents of the new State and Public Safety Act (translated as Ley de Seguridad Pública y el Estado).298 The Executive submitted the draft of the State and Public Safety Act in June 3, 2009. Three months later, on September 2009, the National Assembly passed the law.299 The creation of this Act was justified by the need to renew the security doctrine of the Cold War                                                  295 Santiago Basabe y Julián Martínez, “Ecuador: cada vez menos democracia, cada vez más autoritarismo. . . con elecciones,” 157-158.  296 Fredy Rivera Vélez, “La Inteligencia ecuatoriana: tradiciones, cambios y perspectivas,” in Inteligencia estratégica y Prospectiva, edited by Fredy Rivera Vélez (Quito, FLACSO-Ecuador y Secretaria Nacional de Inteligencia-SENAIN: 2011), 47-48.   297 Saudia Levoyer, “Huracán de la Frontera: narcotráfico, guerrilla e inteligencia” (master’s thesis, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, 2014), 13. http://repositorio.uasb.edu.ec/bitstream/10644/4249/1/T1520-MELA-Levoyer-Huracan.pdf13. 298 Fredy Rivera Vélez, Ibid., 66. 299 Fredy Rivera Vélez, Ibid., 66. 97     to suit the demands of the contemporary international geopolitical environment and the 2008 constitutional framework, which necessitated a new Comprehensive Security System (translated as Sistema de Seguridad Integral).300 This need was fulfilled two years later, in 2011, when the Ministry of Security presented the National Comprehensive Security Plan, which includes the National Intelligence Agenda. In these documents, the government explains what is understood as a comprehensive security approach and how, in its view, it replaces the National Security Doctrine.301 By including the human being as a lead actor of the processes of individual and collective security,302 the government thought that it was changing the security paradigm to deal with multidimensional security issues.  The State and Public Safety Act was created to protect citizens and the sovereign interests of the nation. Following this logic, the National Intelligence Plan was developed.303 The fourth chapter of this Act sets out the duties, expenses, operations, document classification and prohibitions of the National Secretariat of Intelligence (SENAIN). The Act also specifies that the head of the Secretariat should be a civilian, not a member of the security forces as it had been traditionally.304 Having a civilian as the head of the Intelligence agency was viewed by the government as a significant step to improve civil-military relations and to transform a conventional security paradigm. Thus, the National Intelligence Secretariat became a political institution that establishes policies for national intelligence, plans, objectives and activities. The Secretariat coordinates with the government.305 For this Secretariat, security is perceived as a non-threatening                                                  300 Asamblea Nacional, Ley de Seguridad Pública y del Estado. Quito: Registro Oficial Suplemento 35 de 28 de Septiembre del 2009. 301 Saudia Levoyer, “Huracán de la Frontera: narcotráfico, guerrilla e inteligencia,” 20. 302 Ministerio de Coordinación de Seguridad, Plan Nacional de Seguridad Integral, Quito (2011), 14. 303 Francisco Jijón Calderón, El Nuevo Ecuador y la Secretaría Nacional de Inteligencia,” in Inteligencia estratégica y Prospectiva, edited by Fredy Rivera Vélez (Quito, FLACSO-Ecuador y Secretaria Nacional de Inteligencia-SENAIN: 2011), 17. 304 Fredy Rivera Vélez, Ibid., 66. 305 Francisco Jijón Calderón, Ibid., 19.  98     situation or as the possibility of carrying out security policies to efficiently anticipate and control threats and conflicting factors through safety measures. Therefore, the Intelligence service sets up guidelines, policies and measures undertaken by the state to protect its internal and external security.306 Nevertheless, even now, when important transformations have been undertaken at the legal and institutional levels, there is still uncertainty if the simple fact of having a new Act can modify behaviors and the institutional culture of the people who are part of the Intelligence system,307 such as the police and the armed forces, who maintained the state-centric national security to deal with multidimensional threats  at border zones such as fuel smuggling considered as a crime linked to drug trafficking.  The police revolt that occurred on September 30, 2010, called by the regime an attempted coup d’état, uncovered weaknesses in the Intelligence system. Such an event brought into  question the viability and relevance of the reforms, locating the Intelligence system in the center of the political debate as it failed to alert  President Rafael Correa.308 This serious internal crisis prompted a rethinking of the role of the new Intelligence Secretariat and highlighted the lack of communication between the Intelligence subsystems (police and military) as sources that could alert the political authority to the discontent of the National Police.309 This crisis was followed by the resignation of the civilian head appointed in September 2009. As a result, a military retiree was appointed as head of the SENAIN.310 While the decision appears to be supported by the criterion of the alleged military efficiency and prestige enjoyed by the Ecuadorian armed forces, it shows a return to the recent past that contrasts with the reformist intentions discursively broadcast by President Rafael Correa.                                                  306 Francisco Jijón Calderón, Ibid., 18.  307 Fredy Rivera Vélez, Ibid., 48.  308 Fredy Rivera Vélez, Ibid., 48. 309 Fredy Rivera Vélez, Ibid., 71. 310 Fredy Rivera Vélez, Ibid., 49. 99     Security and Intelligence reforms did little to change the state-centric approach to security in Ecuador. For the former civilian head of the National Intelligence Secretariat, before the reforms, the Intelligence service was implemented within a National Security Doctrine that favored the state as the exclusive referent of security. The main threats to state security came from members of Ecuadorian society such as social organizations, trade unions and political associations, potentially challenging the status quo through threatening ideologies and behaviors.311 Nonetheless, as I have previously explained in this section, under Correa’s current policy of conspiracy, civil society organizations are still viewed as potential threats to the state and especially to the political agenda of the Correismo. Thus, the state is still the exclusive referent of security and intelligence under Correa’s administration. A human security perspective is mentioned in the 2011 National Agenda of Intelligence, but none of its five policies and 13 strategies312 addresses how are they going to improve the security of individuals and their communities. Moreover, these institutional reforms have not modified how a national security approach is deployed at the borders to deal with human security issues, turning local smugglers into new enemies of the state.    2.1.2 New threats to Ecuador’s border security under Rafael Correa  The concept of security in international relations has been redefined since the end of the Cold War,313 provoking, a radical rethinking of approaches to security.314  During the Cold War period, the state in Ecuador approached security in military terms that focused on defending the state against external military threats from Peru and internal threats from subversive groups. In the post-                                                 311 Francisco Jijón Calderón, Ibid., 18. 312 Secretaría Nacional de Inteligencia-SENAIN, Agenda Nacional de Inteligencia (2011), 11, 32. https://issuu.com/micsecuador/docs/agenda_nacional_de_inteligencia (accessed on August 2016).  313 Matt McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security,” Global Society 16, no. 3 (2002): 277. 314Jill Steans, Gender and International Relations an Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 108. 100     Cold War period, international discourses about what threatens states have transformed, creating an apparently new security scenario.  In Ecuador, this scenario recognizes that many conflicts are provoked by non-traditional threats within nations rather than between nations. The non-traditional security threats included in a new security agenda cannot be dealt with nuclear and conventional weapons, alliances, balances of power and military power. Nonetheless, under this scenario, national security is still limited in military terms, but it has become a multi-sectorial sphere, that includes activities considered as crimes by the Ecuadorian security forces, such as drug trafficking, attacks on pipelines and smuggling. The demilitarization of the concept of security involves a multi-sectorial agenda. As outlined in Ecuador’s 2011 Comprehensive Security Plan, the Special Conference on Security held in Mexico in October 2003 encouraged Ecuador to discuss and adopt a new concept of state security adapted to Ecuador’s own reality and to the new international context. This new approach to national security included principles of conflict prevention, transparency in military spending, confidence-building measures between countries, no offensive military doctrines, respect for human rights, civilian control of the security forces and respect for the Constitution. In sum, the Conference of Mexico 2003 highlighted the demilitarization of the concept of security on the grounds that the threats to states are not only military but multidimensional.315 Inspired by the recommendations discussed in this conference and the new security scenario, Ecuador’s security policymakers have avoided the tendency to confuse national defense with a multi-sectorial security. Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde’s terms (1998) argue that threats distinguish multiple sectors in security analysis. First, military security is concerned with armed defensive and offensive capabilities of states. Second, political security refers to the achievement of stability within states through legitimate ideologies and systems of government. Third, economic security                                                  315 Ministerio Coordinador de Seguridad del Ecuador, Plan de Seguridad Integral (2011), 43. 101     is concerned with access to resources, finance and markets that sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Fourth, environmental security takes into account the importance of maintaining the local and the global biosphere. And fifth, societal security refers to traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, customs and national identity.316 Despite being multi-sectorial, all these dimensions of security are still state-centric or, in more concrete terms, the state is the referent object of security. Opposing those who want to widen the security agenda beyond a strictly military domain, Stephen Walt (1991) argues that doing so would eliminate security studies’ intellectual coherence, making it difficult to come up with solutions to important problems such as pollution, diseases or economic recessions.317 Walt’s point of view denies that threats can arise in diverse areas due to security’s multidimensionality. Rather, he encourages an exclusive state-centric military approach that provides a limited understanding of security issues. There is an acknowledgment of the existence of multidimensional threats, but they are still dealt with a military approach. In the Ecuadorian case, security discourses and practices require a broader framework of analysis that does not view the state as the exclusive referent of security. The inclusion of additional sectors in security studies also involves other non-state actors with empowerment abilities in the local and national agenda, such as environmentalists, human rights advocates and women’s movements. Currently, from a national security perspective, threats originating from conflicts between states are less relevant than those provoked by non-state actors. The threats to Ecuador’s national interests do not come exclusively from an enemy that is another state: Ecuadorian security authorities believe that threats come also from non-state actors, such as transnational criminals,                                                  316 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap De Wilde, Security a New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 7-8. 317 Stephen Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 35, no 2 (1991): 212-213. 102     drug traffickers, terrorists and smugglers in border zones. Since the security agenda has become multidimensional, Ecuador has identified a significant number of new and emerging threats that include: extreme poverty; inequality; social exclusion; natural disasters; environmental problems; infectious diseases; ethnic, religious, cultural, and regional identity conflicts; trade and transportation of hazardous materials; the negative effects of the Colombian conflict; uncontrolled migration; lack of resources; the possibility of interstate conflict; transnational organized crime; and the political conspiracy to destabilize and/ or overthrow a legitimate government.318  As outlined in the 2011 Comprehensive Security Plan, particular interest is devoted to criminal threats from transnational organized crime. These threats are numerous and include: drug trafficking and related crimes; money laundering; smuggling of arms, ammunition, explosives and other materials; human trafficking for different purposes; kidnapping and extortion; traffic of cultural and natural heritage; and smuggling of fuels and propane cylinders.319 Thus, smuggling gasoline, diesel and propane cylinders for domestic use to Colombia and Peru, as a new threat to Ecuador’s national security, creates an underground economy at Ecuador’s borders. Margaret Niger-Thomas (2001) defines smuggling “as the illegal transport of goods and/or persons in or out of a country to avoid taxation.”320   Despite government efforts, smuggling has not been completely eradicated. Given the multidimensional characteristics of this new security “threat,” it is being addressed by a national security approach that is insufficient to solve the roots of a complex security scenario. A military approach is still considered appropriate: Ecuador’s security forces employ such tactics as border patrolling, capture of the people involved in these activities and the confiscation of the goods that                                                  318 Ministerio Coordinador de Seguridad del Ecuador, Plan de Seguridad Integral, 44-45. 319 Ministerio Coordinador de Seguridad del Ecuador, Ibid., 44-45. 320 Margaret Niger-Thomas, “Women and the Arts of Smuggling,” African Studies Review 44, no. 2, Ways of Seeing: Beyond the New Nativism (Sep., 2001): 44. 103     were supposed to be smuggled. Since the Ecuadorian security policy views smuggling fuels and propane cylinders as a criminal activity and a threat to the state’s national security, the men and women involved in this activity are also viewed as criminals.   2.1.3 Smuggling of fuels and propane cylinders on Ecuador’s northern and southern borders   Smuggling as an informal cross-border activity has become an underground economy on Ecuador’s borders. The border economy integrates two or more asymmetric economies based on the fact that what is expensive in Ecuador is cheaper in the neighboring countries and vice-versa.  Buying a product for a lower price has been part of the Ecuadorian strategy of maximizing the value of inadequate family budgets. Ecuadorians mainly buy clothing, electronics and alcoholic beverages in Peru and Colombia,321 while goods that are subsidized in Ecuador, such as fuel and propane cylinders, are bought across the Colombian and Peruvian borders. Porous borders have led smuggling to reach higher levels. Macroeconomic policies such as the dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy since 2000 have aggravated the rise in production costs, encouraging the smuggling of agricultural products and textiles from the other side of the border322 with profound effects on the commercial, industrial and agricultural sectors.323 Additionally, smuggling affects macroeconomic factors such as the balance of payments and national production. The entry of smuggled goods into the Ecuadorian borders has directly impacted formal trade, industry and tax revenues, provoking, in Pablo Dávila’s terms (2006), unfair competition for the national productive sector. Local producers who are affected by                                                  321 Pablo Dávila Pinto, Repercusiones del Comercio Ilegal frente a la Economía Nacional. Sector Industrial y Agropecuario. Instituto de Altos Estudios Nac