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Wandering within, against, and beyond the pathways of science education : towards heeding the call of… Higgins, Marc 2016

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 WANDERING WITHIN, AGAINST, AND BEYOND THE PATHWAYS OF SCIENCE EDUCATION: TOWARDS HEEDING THE CALL OF INDIGENOUS SCIENCE by  MARC HIGGINS  B.Sc., The University of New Brunswick, 2004 B.Ed., L’Université d’Ottawa, 2005 M.Ed., Lakehead University, 2010   A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Cross-Faculty Inquiry in Education)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)   October 2016  © Marc Higgins, 2016   ii Abstract  Often within science education, Indigenous science is either excluded or included in ways that differ from or defer its intended meanings, as well as its pedagogical potentiality for all students. The central question that guides this dissertation is How is Indigenous science to-come with/in the context of science education? This dissertation draws from decolonizing, post-colonial, post-structural, and post-humanist theory-practices to address ‘to-come’ in three ways: a) Indigenous science on its own terms as not-yet and still-to-come with/in science education; b) Indigenous science as a relationship whose indeterminate arrival invites re(con)figuring of the lived constructs, concepts, and categories of science education; and c) practices (including pedagogy) that might allow for and nurture the possibility of Indigenous science to-come in its second iteration.   To explore this triple(d) understanding of ‘to-come’, each chapter within the dissertation acts as an excursion through a path of science education. Journeying involves strategically straying off the beaten path or tactically taking the pathway in unintended ways to lose sight of the prescriptive and often problematic ways in which the path is regularly travelled. Further, each journey is iterative, travelling through, against, and/or beyond a particular path, wherein the learning is enfolded and carried forward into the next trip.  Equipped with a plethora of deconstructive tools, science education is (re)opened through (re)considering its: a) oppositional, dialectic nature; b) critical modes as protective, rather than productive, of the status quo (i.e., through mirrored correspondence); c) ontological taken-for-grantedness (e.g., through its a priori and singular positioning); and, d) responsibility, as well as ability to respond. In response, I offer a call and analytical frames for: a) dialogue; b) critique as prismatic and diffractive; c) ontological plurality and co-constitutiveness; as well as, d) response-ability, respectively. Insights produced and scholarly contributions from wandering include: a) an exploration of curricular alternatives to scientific literacy, notably Karen Barad’s agential literacy and Gregory Cajete’s ecologies of relationships; b) re(con)figuring visual pedagogies to engage in decolonizing science education. This theory-practice bridging pursues design of a pedagogy of relationally storying nature well positioned to account for and be accountable to Indigenous science to-come.    iii Preface  All research contributions herein are my own, including: the identification and design of the research program, performance of various parts of the research, as well as the analysis of the research data. This research is conducted in support of this dissertation was approved by the UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board (UBC BREB Numbers H13-00889 and H13-00890).  This dissertation contains content that is either published elsewhere or has been submitted for publication and is in the process of revision. In particular, Chapter 2 is a slightly modified version of a similarly titled paper Serious play: A (Socratic) dialogue on multicultural science education that is currently in revision. A large portion of Chapter 3 is accepted and forthcoming as manuscript titled Reconfiguring the optics of the critical gaze in science education (after the critique of critique): (Re)thinking “what counts” through Foucaultian prismatics in the journal Cultural Studies in Science Education. The remainder of Chapter 3 is included within a manuscript titled Reconfiguring the optics of the critical gaze in science education (after the critique of critique): (Re)thinking “what counts” through Baradian diffraction which is currently in revision. Chapter 4 features elements from Positing an(other) ontology within science education: Towards different practices of ethical accountability within multicultural science education which is forthcoming in Scantlebury and Milne’s edited collection Material practice and materiality: Too long ignored in science education. Chapter 6 contains elements of Chasing excess: Putting to work what photovoice theoretically is (not) which appears in the International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education as well as Rebraiding photovoice: Putting to work Indigenous conceptions of praxis and standpoint theory which appears in the Australian Journal of Indigenous Education. Chapter 6 also includes elements of De/signing research in education: Patchwork(ing) methodologies with theory which is currently in review and co-authored with Brooke Madden, Marie-France Bérard, Elsa Lenz Kothe, and Susan Nordstrom. In addition, Chapter 6 includes parts of Braiding designs for decolonizing research methodologies: Theory, practice, ethics which is currently submitted and co-authored by Heather McGregor, Brooke Madden, and Julia Ostertag. I have carried out all of the research associated with and authored all components of the two previous manuscripts that appear in the dissertation. Lastly, Chapter 7 draws from elements of Decolonizing school science: Pedagogically enacting agential literacy and ecologies of relationships which appears as a chapter in Taylor and Hughes’ edited collection Posthuman research practices in education.    iv Table of Contents  Abstract ................................................................................................................................................ ii	  Preface ................................................................................................................................................. iii	  Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................... iv	  List of Tables ..................................................................................................................................... xii	  List of Abbreviations ....................................................................................................................... xiii	  Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................ xiv	  Chapter 1: Wandering the Pathways of Science Education: Response-ability Towards Indigenous Science To-Come ............................................................................................................. 1	  1.1	   “Blackfoot Metaphysics is Waiting in the Wings”: My Relation to Indigenous Metaphysics, the Metaphysics of Modernity, and Science Education .................................................................... 2	  1.2	   First Orientation: An Introduction to Decolonizing and Postcolonial Science Education and their Relationships to Metaphysics ................................................................................................... 7	  1.2.1	   Understanding school science and its relation to Indigenous science to-come. ............... 9	  1.2.2	   Decolonizing and post-colonial responses in science education. ................................... 13	  1.2.3	   Towards wandering the pathways of science education anew. ....................................... 17	  1.3	   Second Orientation: (Re)opening Science Education to Indigenous Science To-Come through Deconstruction and Reconstruction ................................................................................... 19	  1.3.1	   Common approaches to cross-cultural methodologies in science education. ................. 20	  1.3.2	   Deconstruction and/in cross-cultural science education. ................................................ 21	  1.3.2.1	   Deconstructing Self/Other in decolonizing and postcolonial science education. .... 22	  1.3.2.2	   Deconstructing Nature/Culture in decolonizing and postcolonial science education. .  .................................................................................................................................. 24	  1.3.2.3	   Deconstructing ethical possibility/impossibility in decolonizing and postcolonial science education. ................................................................................................................... 24	    v 1.4	   Third Orientation: Structure of the Dissertation (AKA a Map to Wandering Pathways Anew)   ................................................................................................................................................ 25	  1.4.1	   Structure of the paths (i.e., chapters). ............................................................................. 26	  1.4.2	   Navigating the network of paths (i.e., dissertation). ....................................................... 28	  1.4.2.1	   Overview of arc 1: Critical possibilities and possible critiques through deconstructive play in/of the multicultural science education debate. ................................... 29	  1.4.2.2	   Overview of arc 2: Tinkering with ontology with/in the multicultural science education debate. ..................................................................................................................... 30	  1.4.2.3	   Overview of arc 3: De/signing and delivering a curriculum for Indigenous science to-come. .................................................................................................................................. 30	  Part 1: Critical Possibilities and Possible Critiques through Deconstructive Play in/of the Multicultural Science Education Debate ........................................................................................ 33	  Chapter 2: Serious play: A Literature Review of Multicultural Science Education through and for (Socratic) Dialogue ...................................................................................................................... 34	  2.1	   Prelude to (a) Serious Play ..................................................................................................... 34	  2.1.1	   Program of (a) “Serious Play” to-come .......................................................................... 38	  2.2	   Act 1: Setting the Stage for (a) “Serious Play” ...................................................................... 40	  2.2.1	   From the dialectic of discussion to Bohmian dialogue: An ethic for seriously playing together. ...................................................................................................................................... 40	  2.2.2	   The serious play of (re)signification. .............................................................................. 42	  2.2.3	   Socratic dialogue as a serious play. ................................................................................ 43	  2.3	   Act 2: The Program for (a) “Serious Play”: a Primer for Playing Along .............................. 44	  2.3.1	   Who is playing (or played)? ............................................................................................ 44	  2.3.2	   Rules for (a) serious play. ............................................................................................... 47	    vi 2.4	   Act 3: “Two Science Educators Walk into a Bar”: a Socratic Dialogue on Multicultural Science Education ........................................................................................................................... 49	  2.5	   Act 4: Playing out the (Re)Production of Knowledge ........................................................... 60	  2.5.1	   When (re)signifying is signifying again rather than anew. ............................................ 60	  2.5.2	   What continues to (not) be at play? Possibilities for further dialogue through the play of (re)signification. .......................................................................................................................... 63	  2.5.2.1	   Scientific knowledge-practices as always situated. ................................................. 65	  2.5.2.2	   Scientific knowledge-practices as culturally hybrid ................................................ 67	  2.5.2.3	   Scientific knowledge-practices as ontology situated. .............................................. 68	  2.6	   Epilogue to (a) “Serious Play”: A Call for Further Serious Play through Dialogue .............. 68	  Chapter 3: Mirrors, Prisms, and Diffraction Gratings: Placing the Optics of the Critical Gaze in Science Education Under Erasure (After the Critique of Critique) ........................................ 71	  3.1	   The Subject of Critique: My Relation to Critique in/of Science Education .......................... 72	  3.2	   The Optics of Critique: Why the Optical Configurations We (Metaphorically) Deploy Matter   ................................................................................................................................................ 74	  3.3	   Critical and Complicit (Mis)Readings of the Optics of Critique: Science Education Under Erasure ............................................................................................................................................ 76	  3.4	   Mirror upon Mirrors: Matters of Fact, Matters of Fiction, and Science Education ............... 79	  3.5	   Foucault’s Prismatic Critique: Proximal and Dispersive Critical Relationality .................... 85	  3.6	   Baradian Diffraction: Including the Critical Apparatus in the Production of Critique .......... 92	  3.7	   Conclusion: Re(con)figuring Critique in Science Education ............................................... 100	  Part 2: Tinkering with Ontology with/in the Multicultural Science Education Debate .......... 104	  Chapter 4: Tinkering with/in the Multicultural Science Education Debate: Towards Positing an Ontology ..................................................................................................................................... 105	    vii 4.1	   A Preamble on Tinkering: Derrida on the Porous Dichotomy Between Bricolage and Engineering ................................................................................................................................... 106	  4.2	   “Common sense,” Ontology and the Multicultural Science Education Debate ................... 106	  4.2.1	   Having and being had by “common sense” during a science education project in Nunavut. .................................................................................................................................... 106	  4.2.2	   What’s ontology got to do with it? Revisiting the multicultural science education debate.  ...................................................................................................................................... 109	  4.2.3	   Epistemic realism and/as “common sense?” Ontological situatedness and/in the multicultural science education debate. .................................................................................... 111	  4.2.4	   From ontological alignment to positing an ontology in science education. ................. 113	  4.2.5	   Conclusion: Positing an ontology in multicultural science education. ......................... 116	  Chapter 5: Considering Cartesianism as an Ontology Within Multicultural Science Education with Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin ............................................................................................. 119	  5.1	   Pathways of Chance: Encountering Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin. .................................. 120	  5.2	   Tinkering with/in Expert Interview: De/signing Research Methodology. ........................... 123	  5.2.1	   Before: Tinkering with/in expert interview content. .................................................... 125	  5.2.2	   During: Expert interview tinkering with/in itself. ........................................................ 126	  5.2.3	   After: Tinkering with/in expert interview (re)presentation. ......................................... 127	  5.3	   Diffracting an Interview with Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin: On the (Re)Production and Operationalization of Cartesianism and What it Produces: .......................................................... 129	  5.3.1	   First cut – Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin on Nature/Culture. ..................................... 129	  5.3.2	   First cut – Nature/Culture and the multicultural science education debate. ................. 134	  5.3.3	   Second cut – Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin on Descartes, Boyle, and Newton ......... 138	    viii 5.3.4	   Second Cut – Descartes, Boyle, Newton, and the multicultural science education debate.   ...................................................................................................................................... 140	  5.3.5	   Third cut – Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin on the enclosure, the double-sided ledger, and the laboratory. .................................................................................................................... 142	  5.3.6	   Third cut - The enclosure, the double-sided ledger, the laboratory and the multicultural science education debate. .......................................................................................................... 149	  5.3.7	   Fourth cut – Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin on the modest witness, when One Truth becomes two, and the Thirty Years’ War. ................................................................................ 152	  5.3.8	   Fourth cut – The modest witness, when One Truth becomes two, the Thirty Years’ War, and the multicultural science education debate. ....................................................................... 158	  5.4	   Conclusion: Positing, Accounting for and Being Accountable to an Ontology in Science Education ...................................................................................................................................... 160	  Part 3: De/signing and Delivering a Curriculum for Indigenous Science To-Come ................ 163	  Chapter 6: Responsibility, Response-ability, and Science Education: Towards Re(con)figuring Science Curriculum and Pedagogy ................................................................................................ 164	  6.1	   A Preamble on Considering Methodology for/at the Cultural Interface .............................. 166	  6.1.1	   Methodological-pedagogical design for/at the cultural interface:  (Re)considering decolonizing science education. ............................................................................................... 168	  6.2	   Responsibility and the Ability to Respond: How a Dissertation Defense Reminded Me of Response-Ability in/as Decolonizing Science Education ............................................................. 170	  6.2.1	   My relation to response-ability and/in decolonizing science education. ...................... 175	  6.3	   Doing the (Home)Work of Response-ability and/as Reconstructive Methodology: Working Within, Against, and Beyond ........................................................................................................ 176	  6.3.1	   Response-ability as ongoing rupturing. ........................................................................ 177	    ix 6.3.2	   Response-ability as a cross-cutting of topological reconfiguring. ................................ 179	  6.3.3	   Response-ability as the iterative reworking of im/possibility. ..................................... 181	  6.4	   Science Curriculum and Response-Ability: Re(con)figuring Scientific Literacy ............... 182	  6.4.1	   Response-ability as ongoing rupturing: Scientific literacy as central yet uncertain. .... 183	  6.4.2	   Response-ability the iterative reworking of im/possibility: Karen Barad’s shift from scientific literacy to agential literacy. ....................................................................................... 187	  6.4.3	   Response-ability as the cross-cutting of topological re(con)figuring: Gregory Cajete’s Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being and science curriculum as all my relations. ................ 189	  6.4.4	   A cautionary note on points of convergence and points of divergence: using yet refusing sameness. .................................................................................................................................. 191	  6.5	   Science Pedagogy and Response-Ability: Using and Troubling Vision ............................. 193	  6.5.1	   Vision and/in decolonizing science education pedagogy. ............................................ 194	  6.5.2	   Response-ability as ongoing rupturing: Working with/in what photovoice is (not). .... 197	  6.5.3	   Response-ability as the iterative reworking of im/possibility and as cross-cutting of topological re(con)figuring: (Mis)reading standpoint. ............................................................. 201	  6.5.3.1	   Response-ability as the iterative reworking of im/possibility: (Mis)reading standpoint as standpoints. ..................................................................................................... 202	  6.5.3.2	   Response-ability as cross-cutting of topological re(con)figuring: (Mis)reading standpoint as Indigenous standpoint. .................................................................................... 203	  6.5.4	   Response-ability as the iterative reworking of im/possibility and as cross-cutting of topological re(con)figuring: (Mis)reading praxis. .................................................................... 205	  6.5.4.1	   Response-ability as the iterative reworking of im/possibility: (Mis)reading praxis as praxis 2.0. .............................................................................................................................. 206	    x 6.5.4.2	   Response-ability as the cross-cutting of topological re(con)figuring: (Mis)reading praxis as Indigenous praxis. .................................................................................................. 207	  6.6	   Conclusion: From Designing with Response-Ability Towards a Pedagogy for/as Indigenous Science To-Come .......................................................................................................................... 208	  Chapter 7: Visually Storying Relationships to Place and/as Indigenous Science To-Come: an Open-Ended Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 211	  7.1	   Part 1: Mapping Pathways Travelled Upon and Those To-Come ....................................... 212	  7.1.1	   Chapter 2: Serious play: A literature review of multicultural science education through and for (Socratic) dialogue. ...................................................................................................... 213	  7.1.2	   Chapter 3: Mirrors, prisms, and diffraction gratings: Placing the optics of the critical gaze in science education under erasure (after the critique of critique). .................................. 215	  7.1.3	   Chapter 4: Tinkering with/in the multicultural science education debate: Towards positing an ontology. ................................................................................................................ 216	  7.1.4	   Chapter 5: Considering Cartesianism as an ontology within multicultural science education with Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin. ........................................................................ 217	  7.1.5	   Chapter 6: Responsibility, response-ability, and science education: Towards re(con)figuring science curriculum and pedagogy. .................................................................. 219	  7.2	   Part 2: Wandering Within, Against, and Beyond the Pathways of Science Education: Visually Storying Relationships with Nature ............................................................................... 220	  7.2.1	   Before Visually Storying Relationships with Nature: Storying my relation to the project.   ...................................................................................................................................... 221	  7.2.2	   During Visually Storying Relationships with Nature: Science beyond a story. ........... 224	  7.2.2.1	   (Meta)fiction and an introduction to place. ............................................................ 226	    xi 7.2.2.2	   Comic book theory, the elements of the graphic novel, and collective (mis)readings.  ................................................................................................................................ 227	  7.2.2.3	   Indigenous storywork and graphically storying significant places. ....................... 229	  7.2.3	   After Visually Storying Relationships with Nature: Narrating with everyday ecologies of relationships as/and agential literacy. ....................................................................................... 231	  7.2.3.1	   The diary of “The Diary of a Wimpy Kid”: Considering other-than-human bodies within schools. ...................................................................................................................... 231	  7.2.3.2	   Days of future past: Considering non-linear spacetime in science, technology, society, and environment issues. ........................................................................................... 234	  7.3	   Conclusion: Indigenous Metaphysics is (Still) Waiting in the Wings of Science Education ....   .............................................................................................................................................. 236	  Bibliography .................................................................................................................................... 238	  Appendices ....................................................................................................................................... 253	  Appendix A E-mail Invitation to Participate in Expert Interview ................................................ 253	  Appendix B First Expert Interview – Becoming, Being, and Doing Reverse Anthropologist ..... 254	  Appendix C Second Expert Interview – The (Re)production and Operationalization of the Nature/Culture Binary and What it Produces ............................................................................... 256	  Appendix D Third Expert Interview – From Representationalism to Performativity: Re(con)figuring and Troubling the Universality of Space, Time, and Matter .............................. 258	  Appendix E Thinking About Place: A Place that is Important to You (Activity Sheet) .............. 261	  Appendix F The Travel of “Diary of a Wimpy Kid” (Student-Produced Comic) ........................ 262 Appendix G It's Just a Dream (Student-Produced Comic) ........................................................... 267   xii List of Tables  Table 6-1 Photovoice Process (from Hergenrather et al., 2009, p. 695) ........................................... 198	     xiii List of Abbreviations  IK: Indigenous knowledge IWLN: Indigenous ways-of-living-with-nature IS: Indigenous science NOS: Nature of science TEK: Traditional ecological knowledge WMS: Western modern science    xiv Acknowledgments I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude and appreciation for the time, energy, care, and curiosity to all of those who actively participated and collaborated in the various forms of empirical research discussed herein. Particularly, I would like to thank Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin for her scholarship on, and lived practice of, keeping the spirit of the gift in circulation; the teacher with whom I collaborated, Kirk Gummow, for nurturing and being nurtured by the learning spirit; as well the students whose inquisitive and creative engagement with place was illuminating and inspiring. I would like to thank my supervisory committee – Drs. Dónal O Donoghue, Michael Marker, and Cynthia Nicol – for the guidance and support provided throughout my doctoral program. I am grateful for Donal’s generous criticality and attentiveness to the ways in which concepts differentially live alongside one another as they travel across and are translated into diverse contexts; for the lively and fierce community of decolonizing scholarship that Michael fosters that extends beyond classroom contexts; and for Cynthia’s attentiveness to the complicated space of participatory ethics that entails accounting for and being accountable to both the institutions and communities with whom we work.  I express my sincerest gratitude towards the examination committee – Drs. Vanessa Andreotti, Samson Nashon, and Megan Bang – whose generous and generative engagement made the day of the doctoral defense celebratory and memorable. The thoughtful lines of questioning made space for the complexities, contradictions, compromises, and complicities of working within and against disciplinary spaces towards decolonizing goals. I also acknowledge and appreciative the financial support that I received throughout my doctoral program from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada and from the University of British Columbia, specifically from the Faculty of Education and Cross-Faculty Inquiry in Education. I am grateful for the scholarship and friendship of the many peers, colleagues, and mentors whose presence differentially lingers in (and in-between) the lines of this work. Learning alongside Marie-France Berard, Elsa Lens Kothe, Dr. Brooke Madden, Dr. Heather McGregor, and Sam Stiegler – our own (self-styled) Thinking with Theory reading, writing, and research group – has been and continues to be a space of hospitality in which the difficult work of faltering, failing, and getting lost in educational research is met with serious playfulness. I am indebted to Masayuki   xv Iwase’s indomitable spirit, and thankful for our frequent discussions on participatory visual work, the dark hope of futurity, and post-(Earth-)coloniality.  Furthermore, I recognize the contributions of the multiple and occasionally overlapping communities of scholars whose lines of personal and professional engagement uplift my own. Here, I would like to acknowledge (in alphabetical order): Dr. Glen Aikenhead, Dr. Andrea Belczewski, Ramona Bighead, Dorothy Christian, Dr. Peter Cole, Heather Commodore, Dr. Karlee Fellner, Dr. Alecia Jackson, Dr. Lisa Korteweg, Dr. Jeannie Kerr, Kal Heer, Dr. Georgina Martin, Dr. Lisa Mazzei, Dr. Shannon Moore, Dr. Susan Nordstrom, Ingrid Olson, Dr. Julia Ostertag, Dr. Amy Parent, Marcelina Piotrowski, Dr. Emily Root, Alexa Scully, Dr. Carol Taylor, Dr. Jasmine Ulmer, Joanne Ursino, Maria Wallace, and Dr. Alannah Young. To my family, thank you for fostering an ethic of hard work and perseverance and for continuously checking-in. Lastly, I would like to thank (again) Brooke Madden whose multiple forms of partnership differentially manifest as ongoing and unwavering support and love, peppered with spirited reminders that the journey within, against, and beyond institutional pathways may not be simple but that it is a journey worthy of pursuit.   1 Chapter 1: Wandering the Pathways of Science Education: Response-ability Towards Indigenous Science To-Come This ‘beginning,’ like all beginnings, is always already threaded through with anticipation of where it is going but will never simply reach and of a past that has yet to come. It is not merely that the future and the past are not ‘there’ and never sit still, but that the present is not simply here-now. Multiply heterogeneous iterations all: past, present, and future, not in a relation of linear unfolding, but threaded through one another in a nonlinear unfolding of spacetimemattering, a topology that defies any suggestion of a smooth continuous manifold (Barad, 2010, p. 244)  As Barad (2010) reminds us, “the present is not simply here-now” (p. 244, emphasis mine). Rather, it is also a dis/continuous enfolding of heterogenous there-thens1. This is to say that the central process of this dissertation - considering the relation between Indigenous metaphysics and classical metaphysics by way of quantum metaphysics, and the ethical, epistemological, and ontological implications for science education - has and will have already begun elsewhere and elsewhen (both past and futures to-come). Then again, both quantum and Indigenous metaphysics “caus[e] trouble for the very notion of ‘from the beginning’” (Barad, 2010, p. 245; see also Cajete, 2000). On this note and nonetheless, this inquiry must begin some-where and some-time, even though these spacetime coordinates (what are conventionally referred to as history and geography, as separate and separable; see Barad, 2010) cannot be torn asunder from their co-constitutive otherness. Before “beginning,” the purpose of this chapter is to introduce the relationships between metaphysics, decolonizing and postcolonial approaches to science education, and deconstruction that are central to the work to come within this dissertation. Framing of relationships is done in three parts that provide orientations for the reading journey. The first provides an overview of some of the pathways explored with/in decolonizing science education: decolonizing and post-colonial science education in response to the metaphysics of modernity. The second unpacks deconstruction in relationship to decolonizing methodologies as well as decolonizing science education as a (meta-)methodological approach to (re)open the metaphysics of modernity. The third outlines the overall format of the dissertation which includes: an orientation to how a reader might go about reading the dissertation, as well as the three arcs which compose this work, and an overview of Chapters 2-7. In                                                 1 Within this introductory chapter, such there-thens entangled with the here-now might notably include the following SpaceTime coordinates: Calgary, Canada 2016 [Big Thinking Address at Congress]; Kalamazoo, US 1992 [first “Science Dialogues”]; diffracted through Stony Nakoda Nation (west of Calgary), Canada 1989 [Native science conference, Little Bear meets Peat and makes arrangements to meet David Bohm]; Albuquerque, US 1999 [Science dialogues continue where original funds from Fetzer institute ran out]; Ottawa, Canada 1994 [David Peat writes the introduction to the first edition of Blackfoot Physics]; Thunder Bay, Canada 2008 [I read Blackfoot Physics for the first time]; Iqaluit, Canada 2009 [I am delivering my first cross-cultural science education research project].   2 this chapter, as in those that follow, I initiate the work with a positional vignette that give glimpses of the curiosities and questions that motivate and guide my explorations and give shape to the inquiries to come. 1.1  “Blackfoot Metaphysics is Waiting in the Wings”: My Relation to Indigenous Metaphysics, the Metaphysics of Modernity, and Science Education  Because we need to “begin” some-where and some-time, let’s “begin” in Calgary, Alberta on June 1st, 2016. Blackfoot scholar Leroy Little Bear is giving a Big Thinking address at the annual Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences. The title of his talk: “Blackfoot Metaphysics is Waiting in the Wings.” Playing off the title as he walks onto the main stage, Little Bear jokes “[waiting in the wings] just like I was a few minutes ago”. This calls to mind(-body-heart-spirit) the importance of making connections through humour (see also Little Bear, 2000). Leroy Little Bear invites those in the crowded auditorium to (re)consider what Blackfoot and other differentially articulated Indigenous metaphysics (i.e., the co-constitutive space of axiology, epistemology, ontology, ethics, and cosmology) continue to offer: ways-of-knowing-in-being premised on ethics, relationality, process, flux, and renewal centering a sense of place. Furthermore, he articulates a need to consider Indigenous metaphysics in response to the metaphysics that are already and often in operation within educational spaces: “What are the metaphysics of our schools? Where are those metaphysics taking us?” Articulating a metaphysics of modernity as taken-for-granted, unquestioned, and unstated, Little Bear subtly shifts the statement that metaphysics is (i.e., singular and a priori) to one wherein metaphysics are and are in relation (i.e., plural and entangled in the world’s ongoing becoming). Furthermore, he motions that the metaphysics of modernity continues to provide some comforts (e.g., material goods), “but at what price? Is our metaphysics making us better? Happier?” he asks. In referring to this metaphysics as ours, Little Bear signals that metaphysics is not strictly a binary either/or affair, as in Indigenous or Western. Rather, metaphysics is always both/and. In other words, metaphysics are neither separate nor separable, but rather always co-constituted and co-constitutive. In turn, responsibility for the metaphysics of modernity is also shared. Making his concluding remarks, Little Bear suggested that it is time to move Blackfoot and other Indigenous metaphysics from the wings to the main stage where their contributions might significantly come to bear in generative ways.  During this address, Little Bear only hinted at the ways in which the knowledge-practices of Indigenous metaphysics come to be positioned in the wings where they have been waiting for a long   3 time. He signaled dialogues that began over 20 years ago2 between Indigenous Elders and scholars (e.g., Leroy Little Bear, Chickasaw and Cheyenne scholar Sakej Youngblood Henderson) and Western scientists and linguists (e.g., quantum physicists David Peat and David Bohm). During these dialogues, they met “to discuss the underlying principles of the cosmos, not from an adversarial point of view, but from one of mutual respect and deep listening” (Parry, 2008, p. 37). The purpose of Science Dialogues was not to work towards knowledge, but rather understanding (see Little Bear, 1994; Parry, 2008; Peat, 2002, 2007). This certainly was not the first time, nor would it be the last that such an initiative towards cross-cultural understanding would take place. Yet, despite such efforts, Indigenous metaphysics still waits in the wings. When I began graduate studies in decolonizing science education in 2008, the very first book I read was David Peat’s (2002) Blackfoot Physics (the first edition, entitled Lighting the Seventh Fire, drew from and was released two years following the 1992 Science Dialogues). While I was on the lookout for Indigenous science, Peat (2002) reminds that Indigenous metaphysics and Indigenous science are differential articulations of one another that cannot be separated (see also Cajete, 1994, 2000): As a science, [Indigenous science] is a disciplined approach to understanding and knowing, or rather, to the processes of coming to understanding and knowing. It has supporting metaphysics about the nature of reality, deals in systems of relationship, is concerned with the energies and processes of the universe, and provides a coherent scheme and basis for action. On the other hand, it is not possible to separate Indigenous science from other areas of life such as ethics, spirituality, metaphysics, social order, ceremony, and a variety of other aspects of daily existence. This it can never be a “branch” or a “department” of knowledge, but rather remains inseperable from the cohesive whole, from a way of being and of coming-to-know (p. 241, emphasis mine).  Blackfoot Physics was a powerful early read for me as it discusses the “points of resonance” between Indigenous metaphysics and quantum physics that emerged from the Science Dialogues. Holding the complexity of difference without subsuming it into sameness, Blackfoot Physics explored these two systems that diversely articulate flux and relationality concurrently, providing me with a hopeful potentiality for science education to be constituted and enacted otherwise. Notably, the possibility for respectful, relevant, and responsive science education whose pedagogical potency is enriched from cross-cultural diversity resonated with my own professional experiences of working as an informal physics and science educator in First Nations, Métis, and Inuit communities across Canada. I had witnessed and contributed to science education as plurality; science education shaped by cross-                                                2 These dialogues began in 1992 (see Little Bear, 1994; Parry, 2008; Peat, 2002, 2007) but have seemingly ceased in the last few years.   4 cultural understandings through similar, yet different, practices including language; and science education that draws strength from cultural and placed locations, instead of treating difference as an individual problem located with the one who diverges from the norm. In my experience there was no lack of respectful, reciprocal, and relational models for cross-cultural science education drawing from Indigenous traditions (e.g., Aikenhead, 1997, 2006b; Cajete, 1999).  Yet, despite science being a fruitful location for cross-cultural points of resonance, to my surprise Indigenous metaphysics was still waiting in the wings when it came to most science education spaces. Blackfoot Physics illuminated the ways in which Indigenous science was yet-to-come and productive locations to bring about that potentiality.  The following summer, I would attempt to create space for the potentiality of Indigenous metaphysics within and as science education research. I returned to Iqaluit, Nunavut in the Canadian arctic where I had previously delivered informal cross-cultural science education. My efforts took the shape of a curricular project in which Indigenous (i.e., Inuit) and non-Indigenous youth explored differential cultural constructions of local enactments of science through videography. Through this project, the youth learned and refined movie-making skills and practices in order to explore, define, and document the diverse ways-of-knowing-nature that were enacted in their community (e.g., Western modern science, Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit [i.e., Inuit traditional knowledge]). This participant-directed videography took various shapes, notably documentary-style interviews with diversely positioned community members (e.g., traditional knowledge holders, health practitioners, environmental scientists), alongside their own short movies that were a form of digital storytelling, one of which is introduced below.   Two curiosities emerged through this educational research. The first was that the co-constitutive relationship between Indigenous metaphysics and the metaphysics Western modernity was one that was complex, uneven, and unequal. In short, the pedagogical ways that I laboured towards privileging Indigenous metaphysics were exceeded and differentially constituted by the metaphysics of modernity my approach endeavored to work against. Through the process of attempting to make space for pluralism, pedagogical slippage occurred. Plugging Indigenous metaphysics into an educational framework organized by a classical Western metaphysics resulted in excess that was far too often sutured over, subsumed, and/or sublated by an approach to understanding and being with nature that could not account for the former (see Carter, 2004, 2005, 2010; Sammel, 2009; see also Ahenakew, Andreotti, Cooper, & Hireme, 2014). This is directly   5 related to the second curiousity.   The dialectic negation of Indigenous metaphysics produced a partial blindness to the ways in which it always already manifests itself despite an uneven metaphysical relation. In short, the stories that the youth told through their digital storytelling practices (e.g., of Muhaha, the aptly named traditional Inuit bedtime-story monster who chases after children to tickle them to death with his long claws) were not simply stories about place (i.e., having an Indigenous “sense of place”) but were told with place (i.e., having and being had by a “sense of place”). In the videos, place makes itself intelligible through the beings that come to constitute the ecology of relationships that make the eastern arctic a beautiful, yet dangerous place if not respected on its own terms (see Higgins, 2014a). The stories were never the students’ (and the humans they worked with) alone: the natural world always makes itself intelligible and participates in the construction of knowledge about itself (see Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Bang & Marin, 2015; Cajete, 1994, 2000)3. Now seven years later, at the (space)time of writing this dissertation (i.e., Vancouver, Canada 2016), Indigenous metaphysics’ status of “waiting in the wings”, of not yet having (fully) arrived, comes as less of a surprise (for reasons made apparent through the dissertation journey). As McKinley and Stewart (2012) state, “the aspiration of defining and understanding IK [Indigenous knowledges] (in order to place it in the science curriculum) can be likened to chasing the pot of gold                                                 3 While both curiosities are significant drivers of my work of late (e.g., Higgins, 2016a) and are both important, this dissertation focuses more firmly on the former (i.e., dialect negation of Indigenous metaphysics by Western metaphysics) than the latter (i.e., characteristics of Indigenous metaphysics). This places me firmly in a conversational relationship with the field of science education so that it might be (re)opened to the possibility of Indigenous metaphysics (to-come).   The addressee to whom the account of this work is given to is of no small significance, both in terms of what can and cannot be enunciated, as well as its possible possibilities and problematics. As Butler (2005) states,  There can be no account of myself that does not, to some extent conform to the norms that govern the humanly recognizable, or that negotiate these terms in some ways, with various risks following from that negotiation. … No account takes place outside the structure of address, even if the addressee remains implicit and unnamed, anonymous and unspecified. The address establishes the account as an account. (p. 36) Whereas I generally address my work to others already and actively engaged in processes of decolonizing education, the intended addressee in this work is, more generally, those situated in the field of science education whose consideration of decolonization and/or post-coloniality is to-come (as an unactualized potentiality and a tout-autre [wholly-other] whose voice has gone unheard because it cannot yet be heard; see Spivak, 1993/2009). This entails that, as a means of (ethically) accounting for and being accountable to this implicit addressee, I often draw from epistemic resources that may be intelligible as such (e.g., canonical science education literature and well-recognizable scholars) in my efforts to work at the limits of intelligibility (i.e., to (re)open science education to the possibility of Indigenous science to-come).  However, as Butler (2005) states, the productive necessity of giving an account over to an addressee is not without risk. Here, the most significant risks posed by this are that, first, there risks a too-easy and representational(ist) reading which produces a perception that Indigenous science wholly yet-to-come (see next footnote) or that this is a space that has not been and continues to be laboured by Indigenous and ally scholars. Secondly, working within this space of un/intelligibility nonetheless defers and differs intended meanings of Indigenous science; but how does one articulate the unarticulable within the frames that render them such? For example, an Indigenous “sense of place” (Cajete, 1994) and other lived concepts are differentially articulable and intelligible when accounting for and being accountable to this double(d) relation to science education and Indigenous science.   6 at the end of the rainbow, which remains permanently out of reach” (p. 551). Despite its “to-come” status, the potential of Indigenous metaphysics (and its differential articulation as Indigenous science) within and beyond cross-cultural science remains a central motivation that continues to drive my research agenda that is grounded in an ethical commitment towards a futurity in which Indigenous metaphysics is no longer “waiting in the wings.”   Barad (2010) suggests, “we inherit the future, not just the past” (p. 257). In considering the future, we not only inherit the future (avenir) that is the most possible possibility; one that prolongs and replicates the present condition, albeit differently, by restituting a foreclosed past that has not yet to happen (again). We also inherit futures that are yet-to-come (à-venir); those unexpected arrivals that produce a (re)opening of difference whereby possibilities and consequences are not (fully) knowable. However, “there is no inheritance without a call to responsibility” (Derrida, 1994, p. 261); a responsibility that is not only an epistemological and ontological accounting for but also an ethical accountability towards that which is yet-to-come (see also Kuokkannen, 2007; Spivak, 1994). The Other-ness that has yet-to-arrive (e.g., a future to-come where Indigenous metaphysics is no longer “waiting in the wings” of science education4), whose arrival cannot be anticipated, is entangled in what Barad (2010) refers to as “relations of obligation”: Othering, the constitution of an ‘Other,’ entails an indebtedness to the ‘Other,’ who is irreducibly and materially bound to, threaded through, the ‘self’ – a diffraction/dispersion of identity. ‘Otherness’ is an entangled relation of difference (différance). Ethicality entails noncoincidence with oneself. (p. 265)  As the future (avenir) and the to-come (à-venir) are not one and the same, the present of science education is irreducibly bound to and ethically indebted to Indigenous science to-come. This potentiality that has yet-to-come, whose arrival is unforeseeable, invites “the continual reopening and unsettling of what might yet be, of what was, and what comes to be” (Barad, 2010, p. 264, emphasis in original).  In order to engage in the work of un-settling (i.e., what I have come to understand and will present as deconstructing and decolonizing) what might yet be, what was, and what will come to be science education, the central question that guides the research presented within this dissertation is: How is Indigenous science to-come with/in the context of science education? The central question is understood and explored in this dissertation through three guiding inflections that are inseparably entangled. First, to-come signals that Indigenous metaphysics, in the context of science education,                                                 4 This is not to state that Indigenous science is flatly yet-to-come as it is a practice of living with Nature that Indigenous peoples have been enacting with/in place since time immemorial (see Cajete, 1994, 2000). Rather, it is to state that it is still (partially) “waiting in the wings” of science education (see McKinley, 2007; McKinley & Stewart, 2012).    7 has not yet (wholly) arrived. This precipitates the questions: How is it that Indigenous science is still to-come? How do the structures of science education – the assumptions, terms, categories, practices, and beliefs – contribute to exclusion of Indigenous science, as well as inclusion that disciplines, differs from, and defers Indigenous science to-come? Secondly, to-come signals ethical indebtedness; this invites the question How might the structure, culture, and discipline of science education be (re)opened and re(con)figured to receive Indigenous science to-come, on its own terms, and in ethical relation? Thirdly, to-come entails a responsibility for and towards that which is to-come. Yet, modes, practices, and enactments of responsibility cannot be prescribed when that which is to-come is never (fully) knowable and distorted by the current frames of science education. Stated otherwise, responsibility requires the occasion and ability to respond. Accordingly, I wonder: What types of practices5 might allow for and nurture the possibility of Indigenous science to-come? This final query recognizes that potentiality need not require actualization for it to be worthy of consideration.   To situate the engagement with the central questions and its different inflections, the remainder of the introductory chapter provides three orientations to guide the reader through the dissertation. Recall that the first of three introduces decolonizing and post-colonial approaches to science education, the disciplinary spaces within which I situate this work. However, as the metaphysics of modernity is often entangled with/in enactments of WMS and science education, (re)producing Indigenous science as to-come, this relation is also explored.  1.2 First Orientation: An Introduction to Decolonizing and Postcolonial Science Education and their Relationships to Metaphysics As [Derrida] develops the notion of the joyful [i.e., play-full] yet laborious strategy of rewriting the old language – a language, incidentally, we must know well – Derrida mentions the "cloture" of metaphysics. We must know that we are within the "cloture" of metaphysics, even as we attempt to undo it. It would be an historicist mistake to represent this "closure" of metaphysics as simply the temporal finishing-point of metaphysics. It is also the metaphysical desire to make the end coincide with the means, create an enclosure, make the definition coincide with the defined, the "father" with                                                 5 Practice, as enacted and discussed herein, is not strictly understood in the conventional sense (e.g., institutional teaching and learning). Rather, the practice prominently articulated and employed herein is that of decolonizing and post-colonial science education scholarship-as-practice. This is in line with decolonizing and post-colonial science education scholars who articulate that theory too is a practice (Carter, 2005; McKinley & Aikenhead, 2005), as well as recent calls in science education there is too much focus on empiricism (and in turn too much data) and not enough scholarship-as-practice (see Carter, 2010). Furthermore, it is also in line with conceptions of decolonizing and educational research which advocate for attentiveness to the practices one is already engaged in, as well as the norms through which attention is deferred elsewhere and differed: paying attention to the process without relegating its justification to the product (see Higgins, Madden, Bérard, Lenz Kothe, & Nordstrom, in press; Lenz-Taguchi, 2010; McGregor, Madden, Higgins, & Ostertag, submitted; Smith, Maxwell, Puke, & Temara, 2016; St. Pierre, 2011a, 2011b). Nonetheless, Chapters 6 and 7 explore the development and delivery of a school-based pedagogical practice.   8 the "son"; within the logic of identity to balance the equation, close the circle. Our language reflects this desire. And so it is from within this language that we must attempt an "opening."  (Spivak, 1976, p. xx)  I begin this section by asking: what does metaphysics (i.e., the co-constitutive space of epistemology, ontology, ethics, among others) have to do with science education and Indigenous science to-come? Recall, from the previous section, that Indigenous science is always already an articulation of Indigenous metaphysics and an inseparable part of the whole (see Cajete, 1994, 2000; Little Bear, 2016; Peat, 2002). However, what of Indigenous metaphysics within the Western modern science (WMS) which largely comes to inform most of science education’s school-based curricula? As Derrida (1976) offers, we are always already within the clôture (i.e., enclosure) of metaphysics: there is no outside of metaphysics (see also Spivak, 1976). Also, as stated earlier, there is no outside of the metaphysics of modernity (see also Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Carter, 2010; Little Bear, 2016; Spivak, 1976, 1993/2009, 1994, 1999).   WMS and science education too must also be within, and have, a metaphysics. Sciences, in all shapes and forms, are premised upon the ways in which Nature’s enactments (i.e., ontology) are understood through and in relation to Culture (i.e., epistemology) (see Barad, 2000; Cajete, 2000; Kirby, 2011; Latour, 1993). However, as Little Bear (2016) enunciated in his keynote address, the metaphysical relation between Nature and Culture enacted by Western modernity that informs and produces WMS is often one that assumed, presumed, and/or taken-for-granted. Thus, in response to Little Bear’s questions, “What are the metaphysics of our schools? Where are those metaphysics taking us?” and I would add, What are the metaphysics of science education?, I offer that WMS and by extension science education are articulated as transcending metaphysics (Barad, 2000, 2007; Cajete, 1994, 2000). This (self-)perceived metaphysical exclusion becomes a criticism that is levied against other ways-of-knowing-Nature (e.g., Cobern & Loving, 2001), becoming one of the ways in which Indigenous science is (yet-)to-come (McKinley, 2007). Answering (and being answer-able as form of responsibility; see Spivak, 1994) to the metaphysics of science education then becomes a question of (mis)reading science education for its subtle and lingering (neo-)colonial referents and enactments (Carter, 2004, 2005; McKinley & Aikenhead, 2005): the process of “joyful [i.e., play-full] yet laborious strategy of rewriting the old language” (Spivak, 1976, p. xx) that is deconstruction. (Re)opening science education to Indigenous science-to-come labours the structure of education between what it is, is not, and could be(come), particularly in instances when meanings   9 (and matter) are sedimented and stratified (e.g., through knowledge-practices such as science as metaphysically transcendent). Regarding the metaphysics of science education, Derrida (1976) nonetheless offers that the metaphysics of modernity are both the process and product of clôture: at once being an enclosure and a closing. This double(d) normative process can never be wholly separated from “the metaphysical desire to make the end coincide with the means” (Spivak, 1976, p. xx). In other words, the closing is naturalized, rendering the process an absent presence whose partial erasure (but irreducible presence) gives the appearance of stable, unitary, separate, and seperable epistemological and ontological units (see also Appfel-Marglin, 2011; Bang & Marin, 2015; Barad, 2007; Cajete, 1994, 2000; Latour, 1993). However, how the metaphysics of modernity are always already entangled within science education, how this entanglement is produced, as well as what it produces, and what is produceable with/in are undertakings engaged within this dissertation. If we are to (re)open science education to Indigenous science to-come, “it is from within this language that we must attempt an ‘opening’” (Spivak, 1976, p. xx), we must do so with/in science education, “a language, incidentally, we must know well” (p. xx). Thus, in the next section of this introduction onto science education, Indigenous science to-come, and metaphysics, I outline some of the features of science education and its relationship to Indigenous science.  1.2.1 Understanding school science and its relation to Indigenous science to-come. Generally speaking, within science education, “the conventional goal” is one “of thinking, behaving, and believing like a scientist” (Aikenhead & Elliot, 2010, p. 324). Currently, through the two predominant methods of teaching and learning science, this entails: coming to know what scientists know (i.e., cognitivism, intra-personal learning, scientific knowledge as representation of nature) and/or enculturation into how scientists come-to-know (i.e., socio-constructivism, inter-personal learning, scientific knowledge as representation of culture) (Aikenhead, 2006a; Erickson, 2001). Untroubled, both approaches collude and coalesce around the construction and reification of the subject position of “Scientist.” It has been argued that this subject position is emblematic of the masculine, Eurocentric, and anthropocentric subject of Western modernity through modes that enact and uphold its metaphysics (e.g., representationalism, universalism, nature/culture divide) (see Barad, 2000, 2007). This (re)produces science as a modern(ist) practice through which nature is knowable and representable (i.e., quantifiable, generalizable, and predictable; see Aikenhead & Michell, 2011; Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007), and in which neither the culture of science nor the   10 agency of nature can be (wholly) accounted for or be held accountable. Furthermore, this type of scientific literacy and its entangled culture of ‘school science’ potentially produce experiences of cultural assimilation and acculturation rather than enculturation for the vast majority of students6.   In other words, rather than a harmonious interfacing of cultures (i.e., enculturation), encounters of school science are more likely to house potential for dialectical negation that is either actualized (i.e., assimilation) or remains un-actualized through students’ complex and complicated curricular navigation (i.e., acculturation). Such dialectic negation occurs at the level of the individual, as well as the system. In reviewing literature on science education in diverse school settings, Aikenhead and Elliot (2010) state that “most students (about 90%) tend to experience school science (Grades 6–12) as a foreign culture to varying degrees, but their teachers do not treat it that way” (p. 323; see also McKinley, 2000, 2007; McKinley & Stewart, 2012)7.  For students whose daily lived experiences continue to be negatively impacted by Eurocentrism8 (re)produced with/in (and beyond) science education, learning with/in the cultural practice of ‘school science’ largely continues to be a form of epistemic violence. As such, assimilation is overwhelmingly identified as a common barrier to engagement (Aikenhead, 2006b; Barnhardt & Kawagley, 2005; Canadian Council on Learning, 2007; McKinley, 2000, 2007).  There are various ways in which this systemic problematic manifests at the level of individual students and groups. For Indigenous, diasporic, and other post-colonial students9 these include, but are not limited to: a) under-representation within science and technology occupations, b) under-representation within formal education and training that paves pathways to such occupations, c) gaps in achievement on standardized international assessment such as the Programme for International Student Assessment, and d) lower rates of graduation (Barnhardt & Kawagley, 2005;                                                 6 Potential is significant to highlight here. As Aikenhead (2006a) points out, “students and many teachers react to being placed in the political position of having to play school games” (p. 28). In turn, they often creatively subvert this positioning by playing what is called “Fatima’s game” in science education “to make it appear as if significant science learning has occurred even though it has not” (p. 28). 7 See Aikenhead and Elliot (2010) for the various qualitative and quantitative science education studies that come to inform this figure. 8 In short, Eurocentrism is a discursive force which (re)centers Western modern(ist) culture, people, places, and histories as the normative standard against which other ways-of-knowing are judged, usually as lesser and deficient (see Battiste, 2005, 2013b). It is not only the “colonizer’s model of the world” (Blaut, 1993, p. 10), but also a colonizing model of the world. Operating through diffusionism, a forced spread of culture, it erases or assimilates non-Eurocentric knowledge systems establishing “the dominant group’s knowledge, experience, culture and knowledge as the universal norm” (Battiste, 2005, p. 124). 9 I use “post-colonial student” here as a general category and concept to include other-than-Indigenous and other-than-diasporic students who might also might be negatively impacted by ongoing (neo-)colonialism and/or who are implicated and involved in the productive friction signaled by the “post” (i.e., an ever partial but nonetheless productive attempt to move beyond (neo-)coloniality).   11 Canadian Council on Learning, 2007; MacIvor, 1995; McKinley, 2007). For Indigenous, diasporic, and post-colonial students who succeed in spaces of WMS despite the odds that are stacked against them, it is often at a cost: learning science is often at the expense of one’s cultural being and belonging, becoming otherwise in the process (see Cajete, 2000; McKinley, 2005, 2007). Furthermore, as local Indigenous ways of coming-to-knowing the natural world continue to be underrepresented, misrepresented, misunderstood, and undervalued, WMS tends to be overrepresented and misrepresented (Aikenhead, 1997, 2006b; Aikenhead & Michell, 2011; Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007). As a result, many students come away from science education with an understanding of WMS that is shaped by myth (e.g., science as culturally neutral, unbiased, and thus ethical), alongside under-appreciation of what other ways-of-knowing-nature might have to offer.  This not only has an impact upon students, but also their teachers: “stereotypical views of [I]ndigenous students [and their knowledge-practices] have led to assumptions of teaching and learning for them” (p. 214, emphasis mine). In a study with science teachers of Indigenous students, Aikenhead and Huntley (1999) documented four ways that deficit thinking manifests: 1. Teachers generally viewed Western science as course content or as a way of exploring nature, not as a foreign culture as experienced by many of their students; 2. Aboriginal knowledge was respected by science teachers, but only a token amount was added onto, but not integrated with, school science; 3. Teachers thought that the act of learning science was unrelated to their students’ [Indigenous] worldviews; 4. Students’ disinterest in pursuing science careers was either unexplainable by the interviewees or was blamed on student deficits. Few teachers blamed their curriculum and teaching. (pp. 162, 164)  If science education is to be (re)opened to Indigenous science to-come, it is important to recall that the ethical imperative of education is “a responsibility to the Other (as answerability or accountability) and not for the Other (as the burden of the fittest)” (Andreotti, 2007, p. 74, emphasis mine), as well as recognition of the ongoing (re)construction, enactment, and productions that result from such positioning (see also Kuokannen, 2007, 2010; Spivak, 1994).  The ways in which Indigenous ways-of-living-with-nature (IWLN) come to be under- and misrepresented signals how dialectic negation plays out at systemic, cultural, and discursive levels. The very topic of IWLN in science education is itself subsumed within wider concepts such as multiculturalism and equity that fail to wholly account for the complexities of Indigenous-Western relationships (Carter, 2004, 2010; McKinley & Stewart, 2012). Furthermore, the term traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) that is regularly employed potentially (re)centers a Western modern(ist) notion of knowledge as a discrete unit that exists outside of and beyond the knower and its ecology of relationships (Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007; Aikenhead & Michell, 2011; McKinley,   12 2007). However, McKinley and Aikenhead (2005) state that while these concepts and conceptual locations have been problematic, they nonetheless provide productive locations to critically inhabit science education and gain leverage (see also McKinley & Stewart, 2012). Whether Indigenous science should be included or not within science education, as well as how, where, and when, has become:  …one of the largest (in terms of literature) debates in the field of culture and science education… [which has centered around] the nature of knowledge…. The relevance of this literature to schools is that a universalist understanding of science informs the assumptions implicit in school curricula about the nature of science and how science should be taught. (McKinley, 2007, p. 206)  As what is called the multicultural science education debate is of central relevance to the ways in which Indigenous science is to-come, it is revisited and explored in further depth in Chapter 2.   “Universality” (i.e., transcendental knowledge) is “achieved” when metaphysics of modernity come to mark IWLN, TEK, and WMS through systems of clôture (e.g., as either strictly similar or different), as well as when WMS reasserts itself as the (“neutral”) norm and standard against which other knowledge systems are to be judged through Eurocentrism (see Carter, 2004; Lewis & Aikenhead, 2000). On the topic of sameness and difference, McKinley (2007) states that the relationship between IWLN and WMS can be generalized into four categories: a) where Indigenous science can be explained within WMS; b) where Indigenous science could be explained through WMS, but the explanation has yet to be developed; c) where there is a link between Indigenous science and WMS’s knowledge claims, albeit through different knowledge principles and practices; d) where WMS cannot accept aspects of Indigenous science (e.g., spirituality, animism). The extent to which if and how Indigenous science is to be included within school science curriculum depends highly upon the type of Indigenous knowledge (IK) being brought in, as well as science education’s ability to ethically respond to difference (see also Kuokannen, 2007; Marker, 2006); some forms of Indigenous science are more to-come than others. As the relations of power between IWLN, TEK, and WMS are uneven and unequal, it is often the case that “those opposing the inclusion [of IK] argue that there is no place for IK unless it has been subsumed into the body of knowledge referred to as WMS, that is, unless it is made the same as WMS, in which the status quo continues” (McKinley, 2007, p. 208). Alternately, some who uphold the universality of WMS (e.g., Cobern & Loving, 2001; El-Hani & de Ferreira Bandeira, 2008) argue that the inclusion of Indigenous science is a non-issue so long as it is neither called science nor included within the science classroom (but rather as a separate subject, like art, literature, or history). However, such   13 “inclusion” fails to redress the dialectic negation of Indigenous science marked by sublation, susbsumation, or suturation, as well as masks the colonial relations of power that produce these moves (see McKinley, 2000, 2007). As mentioned early within this chapter, dialogue between Indigenous science and WMS is in a perpetual state of im/possibility as they are not and never will be (fully) commensurate; Indigenous science will always be to-come but the ethical responsibility is ever-present and irreducible. 1.2.2 Decolonizing and post-colonial responses in science education. There are growing bodies of work within science education that address Western modernity’s Eurocentric legacies that are often referred to as: decolonizing science education (e.g. Aikenhead, 2006c; Aikenhead & Elliot, 2010; Belczewski, 2009; Chinn, 2007; Higgins, 2014a) and post-colonial10 science education (e.g., Carter, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2010; McKinley, 2000, 2007; McKinley & Aikenhead, 2005; McKinley & Stewart, 2012). Battiste (2013a) describes decolonizing education as is a “two-prong process”. It entails deconstruction of (neo-)colonial11 structures and strategies, and reconstruction that centres and takes seriously Indigenous, diasporic, and other post-colonial ways-of-knowing and ways-of-being towards reshaping the place-based processes and priorities of education and educational research (see also Donald, 2011)12. Similarly, post-colonial approaches to                                                 10 Decolonizing, Indigenous, and post-colonial scholarship share many similar facets. However, as McKinley (2007) states, Postcolonialism is controversial among many groups… For many [I]ndigenous researchers [and allies] the term signals that the European imperial project, and the appropriation of the ‘Other’ as a form of knowledge, has been assigned to an historical past… This understanding is always present in postcolonialism… [However,] postcolonialism can be used to mean “beyond;” instead of arguing lineal progression of before and after a point in history, another dimension is added with this alternative meaning… “beyond” suggests that boundaries or borders have become blurred. (p. 201, emphasis in original) Most famously, Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s (1999/2012) rejection of post-colonialism (as and through its first meaning of “after” colonization) is most cited today, even if she has since revisited and revised her earlier statement to consider the second interpretation to be deeply productive in practice (see Smith, 2005). 11 With respect to coloniality, neo-coloniality, and their relationship, Spivak (1999) states the following: Let us learn to discriminate the terms colonialism – in the European formation stretching from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries – neocolonialism – dominant economic, political, and culturalist maneuvers emerging in our century after the uneven dissolution of the territorial empires – and postcolonialism – the contemporary global condition, since the first term is supposed to have passed or be passing into the second. (p. 172, emphasis in original)  By highlighting that the contemporary global post-colonial condition is supposed to have passed from colonialism to neo- colonialism, Spivak brings attention to the ways in which coloniality and neo-coloniality are bound by a relationship of constitutive exclusion. In other words, the ongoing project of territorial imperialism is never absent but always already present, even if it is increasingly tied to a project of economic imperialism. 12 Battiste’s (2013a, 2013b) framework is overarching. An implicit message throughout her scholarship is that the work of decolonizing education is multi-faceted, multi-sited, divergent, and pluralistic in nature. In turn, decolonizing education resists the notion that there is a way of doing it – that difference and diversity in positionalities, contexts, approaches, and inclinations are strengths rather than weaknesses.  This is particularly significant (in general and within this dissertation) as the metaphysics of modernity, as well as its Eurocentric and Cartesian modes are not uniform, but rather are differentially articulated across diverse locations.   14 science education13 seek to (re)open (neo-)colonial structures strategies in order to ethically respond to the Other-ness of Indigeneity. As both draw from diverging theoretical lineages and enactments of educational practice (e.g., critical pedagogy and post-structuralism respectively), there are productive points of resonance and tension between the two. Of the latter, and of particular relevance to this dissertation, are: a) the centrality of land as beyond human cultural understandings of it, and b) whether ethics is a possible possibility or not. Herein, regarding the first statement, I align with decolonizing theories who suggest that post-colonial theories’ focus on cultural hybridity, flow, and porousity do not strongly enough consider the ways in which coloniality operates and circulates beyond an anthropocentric (inter-)textuality. The critique is levied to bring attention to the ways in which (neo-)coloniality comes to problematically shape not only human cultural relations, but also those of other-than-humans, and more-than-humans who, together, come to collectively constitute the ecology of relationships that is signified by an Indigenous concept of place (Donald, 2011; Grande, 2004, 2008; Smith, 1999/2012). With respect to the latter statement, I align herein with post-colonial notions of ethics as im/possibility to push forth my own decolonizing scholarship; the discursive practices of decolonizing approaches can (but do not always) come to mask colonizing tendencies (see Carter, 2004, 2010; Subreenduth, 2006; Rhee & Subreenduth, 2006; Smith, 2005; Smith et al., 2016, Spivak, 1993/2009). Nonetheless, ethical im/possibility need not be paralyzing; Spivak (1988a, 1993/2009, 1994) reminds of the importance of persistent critical and complicit enactments that work towards “transforming the conditions of impossibility into possibility” (Spivak, 1988b, p. 201), even if/as they are never achieved. Within science education, this call has been primarily taken up by extending the openings produced through treating both science (e.g., Haraway, 1989; Latour, 1993; Traweek, 1992; see also Shapin & Schaffer, 1985) and science education (e.g., Nadeau & Désautels, 1984; O’Loughlin, 1992; Pomeroy, 199414) as problematic cultural spaces to be examined through sociological, anthropological, and cultural studies approaches. In particular, a two-pronged approach to decolonizing science education15 focuses primarily on addressing the ways in which Eurocentrism (re)produces science education as a space of cognitive and cultural imperialism (Aikenhead, 2001,                                                 13 For Spivak, education is a post-colonial site that discursively produces the very conditions of ethical im/possibility: education places teachers with (unlike) others while institutionally framing learning as knowing what is best for the other (see Andreotti, 2007; Spivak, 1993/2009). 14 In her ethnography of school-based science education, Deborah Pomeroy (1994) came to refer to the “standard account” curriculum of WMS as one of White Male Science. 15 Of course, “decolonizing school science begins at the stage of ‘acceptance’” (Aikenhead, 2006c, p. 393, emphasis in original): an acceptance of IWLN and that decolonizing school science is a goal that is worthwhile and important.   15 2006c; McKinley, 2000, 2007; Sammel, 2009) in order to make space for learning that is epistemologically diverse and pedagogically pluralistic (i.e., which recognizes that there are diverse pathways to learning about and with Nature; Aikenhead, 2006a, Barnhardt & Kawagley, 2005, 2008; McKinley, 2007; Sammel, 2009). In Canada, there have been some successes in this area. For example, there are increasingly more policy-mandated curriculums that include Indigenous perspectives on science (e.g., British Columbia Ministry of Education’s 2005 Science K to 7 and 2008 Science and Technology 11)16, general frameworks for school-based integration in place (e.g., Manitoba Education and Youth’s 2003 Integrating Aboriginal Perspectives into Curricula), as well an overall commitment from Dean’s of Faculties of Education to prepare teachers accordingly (Association of Canadian Deans of Canada, 2010).  However, given the capillary pervasiveness of Eurocentrism and its co-constitutive mechanisms (e.g., (neo-)colonialism), decolonizing science education is not simply a process of desiring it to be decolonized. Rather, it is (over-)written in a contradictory, conflicted, and contingent space in which the very processes and practices that explicitly seek to dismantle colonial logics often implicitly uphold and reinforce that which they seek to challenge (Carter, 2004, 2005, 2010; Higgins, 2014a; McKinley, 2000; McKinley & Stewart, 2012; Sammel, 2009). On this, Carter (2004) states: The inclusion of Other’s science has the potential to trouble the categories of Western science, but the processes of cultural representation and translation [i.e., differing and deferring Indigenous science] ensure Western science remains authoritative in most settings. These processes simultaneously work to separate, domesticate, and subsume, regulating the boundaries and preserving the integrity of Western science and science education. Hence, the inclusion of the Other’s science in school curricula risks an empty form of pluralism implicated… in restorationist agendas to reassert Western cultural control. (p. 832)  In other words, there needs to be a constant vigilance and (re)evaluation of decolonizing goals and processes, as  they are always in co-constitutive relation with (neo-)coloniality. As these discussions have primarily and almost exclusively focused on (a particular) epistemological grounds or locations (see Cobern & Loving, 2008; van Eijck & Roth, 2007), one problematic production is the lack of attention to ontology in science education.   On the topic of considering ontology within science education, Sammel (2009) states that “given the pervasiveness of assimilationism in Western science education” (p. 653), to only address the colonial episteme leaves the systemic strategies and structures that “push for assimilation of                                                 16 However, integration of Indigenous perspectives does not always entail or require “acceptance” (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, even an intent to accept Indigenous science is not necessarily unproblematic.    16 students into Western science ontology” (p. 653) to continue functioning implicitly (see also Carter, 2004, 2005). This is to say that to treat science education uniquely as a culture potentially masks the ways in which Culture’s Other (i.e., Nature) is implicated with/in these processes (see Barad, 2000, 2007; Latour, 1993). Again, this begets the question, What are the ways in which the absent presence of the metaphysics of modernity operate in science education? (e.g., representationalism, Nature/Culture binary; see Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Carter, 2004). While there is space for diverse ways-of-knowing through a cultural critique, Sammel (2009) invites us to consider how science pedagogies and curriculums often “include the mandate of improving scientific literacy and then proceed to define it, or refer to it by way of usual contemporary science education definition” (p. 653). This practice of scientific-literacy-as-usual positions diverse ways-of-knowing-nature that are not WMS as but different, and often lesser, ways to attain the same goal of knowing nature with/in the ontology of Western modernity (Carter, 2004, 2005; see also Latour, 199317)18. The underlying and problematic message is that ontology is a singular affair (Barad, 2007).   Cartesianism, the classical Western ontological process through which meaning and matter are individuated through separation from that which co-constitutes them (e.g. mind/body, nature/culture; Apffel-Marglin, 2011; Barad, 2007; Cajete, 2006), often becomes the (only) ontology onto which diverse ways-of-knowing differentially map. This tends to differentially re-center WMS as the meter stick against which all ways-of-knowing and ways-of-being are measured. When Cartesianism is the (only) ontology, it only makes sense that the epistemology of WMS that co-constitutes Cartesianism is best suited to work with/in this ontological configuration (see Cobern & Loving, 2008). However, to forget that it is an ontology rather than “ontology” (read: singular) when doing cross-cultural and comparative work is to position other-than-Western-modern ways-of-knowing at a taken-for-granted disadvantage, even when the intent is to make space for both positions that extends beyond inclusion and tolerance towards dialogue and collaboration. Accordingly, this also complicates the entangled relationships held with/in school science for those                                                 17 Latour (1993) refers to this as “particular univeralism”: a framework in which Nature is stable and outside of Culture in which diverse cultural positionings mediate access to knowledge about Nature, but in which “one society - and it is always the Western one - defines the general framework of Nature with respect to which the others are situated” (p. 105). In other words, it is a conceived of and enacted as an epistemic privilege. 18 This is a significant location to labour as some scholars, such as Cobern and Loving (2008), problematically articulate the corollary argument that the epistemology of WMS (i.e., epistemic realism) should be considered the best way of knowing Nature of its high level of alignment with a Cartesian ontology.   17 enacting other-than-Cartesian ways-of-being, such as Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being19, as they continue to be perceived as alternative but lesser ways of “reflecting” Nature as it is understood and enacted through (the singularity of) Cartesianism20. 1.2.3 Towards wandering the pathways of science education anew. When reaching and reading singularity, particularly singularities (e.g., Cartesianism) that impede the possibility of Indigenous science to-come, it is productive to consider Cajete’s (1994) suggestion that: “Indigenous thinking honors the reality that there are always two sides to the two sides. There are realities and realities. Learning how they interact is real understanding”  (p. 31). (Re)opening and re(con)figuring science education to be able to respond to and receive Indigenous science to-come might entail considering co-constitutive relations between what seems separate and seperable quantities marked (wholly) by relations of difference (e.g., Nature/Culture as nature-culture, decolonizing/colonizing as de/colonizing, possibility/impossibility as im/possibility). To come-to-know the “two sides to the two sides” between, amongst, and even within WMS and IWLN, it is productive to consider science education as pathways. On pathways, Cajete (1994) states that, In travelling a pathway, we make stops, encounter and overcome obstacles, recognize and interpret signs, seek answers, and follow the track of those entities that have something to teach us. We create ourselves anew. Path denotes a structure; way implies a process. (p. 54, emphasis in original)  What might appear as a sedimented and stratified path is inseperable from its enactment, its journeying, its way. Such is important in differentially enacting the double(d) closure (i.e., enclosure [noun], enclosing [verb]) of modernity’s metaphysics that seek to make the ends (i.e., the path)                                                 19 Here, I use ways-of-knowing-in-being for three interconnected reasons. First, it is a nod to the notion that learning is always already a process. As Aikenhead and Elliot (2010) suggest, “the expression Indigenous knowledge is problematic because the word knowledge is embedded in a Eurocentric epistemology” (p. 322; see also Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007). Rather, within many Indigenous languages, learning is not expressed as a product (i.e. knowledge, a noun) but rather as a process (i.e. coming-to-knowing, a verb). Peat (2002) states, “coming-to-knowing means entering into relationship with the spirit of knowledge, with plants and animals, with beings that animate dreams and visions, and with the spirit of the people” (p. 65). Second, coming-to-know is inseparable from coming-to-being. They are ongoing and interconnected epistemological and ontological processes that are deeply relational and holistically interwoven into the fabric of everyday life (Aikenhead & Michell, 2011; Cajete, 1994, 1999, 2000; Peat, 2002). Lastly, it is to signal plurality with a reminder that plurality does not entail a form of relativism (McKinley, 2007). Furthermore, as Aikenhead and Michell (2011) state, “reading a book is not adequate for understanding specific Indigenous practices (e.g., berry picking or fishing), which invariably require experiential learning” (p. xii). Rather than seeking to reach the problematic closure and containment of knowledge, they propose that appreciating might be a more apt way of approaching Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being. Not only this, as Cajete (1994) suggests of the textuality of his own work on Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being, that it is a translation with/in, as well as for, academic traditions and that it is effectively something that is differentially produced through a differential ecology of relations (partially shaped by the vales of the academy): this relationship shapes what can be said, what cannot, as well as how. 20 This argument is fleshed out in greater detail within the dissertation, particularly Chapters 3, 4, and 5.   18 congruent with the means (i.e., the way). However, when the path is revealed as but a path, a multiplicity of possibilities opens up.  As the human, other-than-human, and more-than-human worlds that constitute a(ny) path “move in never ending cycles of creation and dissolution” (p. 43), it is necessary to engage in what Cajete (1994) refers to as “creative acts of perception. A free play of thought and an opening of the field.” (p. 19). This process requires, as has been the goal in this section, realizing that there are tacit, ever shifting infrastructures (i.e., like paths) that frame what is, is not, as well as becoming possible within a field. Rather than engage in the destruction of a path (if such were even a desirable possibility21) or complicit journeying on a path as is (upholding the status quo in which Indigenous science is to-come), I see my task as one of coming-to-know the “nature” of many of the paths that lay before me and others in science education, their possibilities and problematics, and to look for different ways (and potentially (re)open new paths) to journey through this field. I consider wandering pathways anew as a process of “getting lost” within science education. Strategically straying off the beaten path or taking ‘the path’ in unintended ways is positioned “not as ‘losing one’s way’ but as losing the way— as losing any sense that just one ‘way’ could ever be prefixed and privileged by the definite article” (Gough, 2006a, p. 640, emphasis in original; see also Lather, 2007). Furthermore, as Gough (2006) states on “getting lost” in science education:  …to “wander” away from the semiotic spaces of science education textbooks and scientific media reports, and to experiment with making passages to hitherto disconnected systems of signification, is neither “haphazard” nor “careless” but a deliberate effort to unsettle boundary distinctions and presuppositions. (p. 640)  As I tactically wander within, against, and beyond the sedimented spaces of knowing in/of science education, I heed Alsop and Fawcett’s (2010) reminder that coming to know otherwise in science education requires being vulnerable and attuned to what can be known through the process of not knowing.  In the next section, I detail the methodological approach to decolonizing science education and research that guides this getting lost on the pathways of science education: deconstruction.                                                 21 Sami scholar Rauna Kuokkanen (2007) reminds of the tenuous path of critically inhabiting spaces – that one must always be critical and complicit – as to engage in destruction rather than deconstruction results (re)produces similar results albeit differently. There requires, in her words, a “subtlety and responsibility in the process of transforming the [institution of learning], … proceeding in any other way would eventually backfire and merely too tight[ly] reinforce existing structures and discourse [through]… ‘irresponsibilizing destruction’” (p. xx; see also Spivak, 1994).   19 1.3 Second Orientation: (Re)opening Science Education to Indigenous Science To-Come through Deconstruction and Reconstruction Deconstruction has been developed by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida and, very broadly, involves a critique of Western knowledge or thought. Derrida … showed how anthropological knowledge is governed by a philosophical category of the center (named Eurocentrism). The argument contends that in the last few hundred years Europe has constituted and consolidated itself as sovereign and subject by constructing the colonized according to the terms of the colonizer’s self-image. Deconstruction is the decentralization and decolonization of European thought… Hence, deconstruction is a deconstruction of the concept, the authority, and the assumed primacy of the category of “the West.” (McKinley & Aikenhead, 2005, p. 902)  Methodologically, this dissertation employs Battiste (2013a, 2013b)22 and Donald’s (2011)23 conception of decolonizing education as a “recursive process of deconstructing and then reconstructing” (Donald, 2011, p. 15) as an over-arching meta-approach to work towards Indigenous science to-come. Simultaneously, I heed the warnings of post-colonial theorists and theory that the potentiality of deconstruction and reconstruction lay in recognizing them as more-than de-construction and re-construction as forms of taking apart and putting together (see Derrida, 1976; Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, McKinley & Aikenhead, 2005). Taking apart (i.e., destruction) through criticism, as McKinley & Stewart (2012) suggest, is a “seemingly potent but ultimately counter-productive strategy” (p. 545) in science education. Rather, Battiste (2013b) argues that approaches to decolonizing education “first and foremost must be framed within concepts of dialogue, respect for educational pluralities, multiplicities, and diversities” (p. 107). However, when criticism is perceived and enacted as taking apart, colonial logics are replaced in but one sense of the word: displaced but not always disrupted (see Kuokkanen, 2007; Spivak, 1994; see Chapters 2 & 3). Deconstruction works against not only the Euro-centered through Eurocentrism, but also the centering properties of Eurocentrism through endeavouring to dismantle its logics of either/or. In turn, as post-colonial theory presents Indigenous science to-come as a persistent ethical im/possibility, this dissertation tilts more heavily on the deconstructive side, (re)considering reconstruction as inseparable from                                                 22 While Battiste (2013a, 2013b) does not come to state explicitly how she understands deconstruction or whom she draws upon, a persistent theme throughout this dissertation is generous and generative (mis)readings. Rather than criticize what some might perceive as a lack (as negation forecloses possibility), I see such indeterminacy as a gift of potentiality and of meaning that is productively on the move that might come to respond to diverse contexts (see Kuokkanen, 2007). 23 Donald’s (2011) use of deconstruction/reconstruction primarily hinges upon Indigenous-non-Indigenous relationships that are already being enacted. Here, deconstruction does not entail a destruction of the hybrid, complex, and contradictory space interfacing Indigenous and Western thought and being. Rather, it entails keeping an eye out for porous locations in order to reconfigure, rethink, and differently enact the relations that are there to create new and renewed possibilities for ethical relationality (see also Nakata, 2007a, 2007b). This metaphor is productive in differentially coming-to-understand the ways in which the post-colonial concept of de/colonizing is enacted throughout this dissertation.   20 deconstruction and as a form re(con)figuring (see Carter, 2005; see also Chapter 6). As the structure of science education is not reached and will never achieve a state of being “deconstructed,” re(con)figuring is a continued deconstruction, labouring between what a structure is, is not, and could be(come) in response to an otherness who is yet-to-come (e.g., Indigenous science to-come).  1.3.1 Common approaches to cross-cultural methodologies in science education.  Prior to tracing how deconstruction as methodological approach creates space for and supports wandering the pathways of science education anew, it is important to touch on the ways in which these problematic paths are usually journeyed upon. Just as teaching and learning in science education are increasingly considered through (socio-)cultural approaches (see Aikenhead, 2006a; Erickson, 2001), so too are its cross-cultural methodologies. As McKinley (2007) states regarding approaches to cross-cultural science education,  Dominating the field are approaches derived from anthropology, such as worldviews, collateral learning, and border crossing. The anthropological approach is a seductive one because it focuses on the culture and cultural practices of different groups and treats science as a cultural activity. (p. 220)  However, at the same time, “science educators are seldom also trained in associated disciplines, such as cultural studies” (McKinley & Stewart, 2012, p. 545). In turn, as McKinley (2000, 20007) and Carter (2004, 2005, 2010) state, culture comes to be perceived and enacted in ways that often come to reify colonial constructs that they are working against, albeit differently. For example, considering school science as having a culture does not necessarily “critique the Eurocentrism inherent in stable and unitary ideas of culture, identity, and context still to be found in some of science education’s more traditional comparative and cross-cultural studies” (Carter, 2004, p. 824). Modes such as worldview theory and border crossing might be apt for considering the experience of a student navigating between cultural spaces, but might not account for the power relations in place between these knowledge systems which occurs beyond the individual learner which produce the very borders they must cross (Carter, 2004; McKinley, 2007). However, this is not to state that culture should be jettisoned (thus reinforcing a status quo of science as a-cultural). Rather, as culture offers both methodological possibility and problematic, it is important to use and trouble this central referent to cross-cultural and multicultural science education. Deconstruction, states McKinley and Aikenhead (2005), provides such means to use and trouble culture within decolonizing and post-colonial science education methodologies as it accounts for both process and product of Eurocentrism and Cartesianism.   21 1.3.2 Deconstruction and/in cross-cultural science education. Within this dissertation, I take a deconstructive stance that might be described as an “impossible ‘no’ to a structure which one critiques, yet inhabits intimately” (Spivak, 1993/2009, p. 316). Critically inhiabiting science education entails refusing to inhabit it like that without refusing to inhabit it altogether: deconstruction is at once critical and complicit (see Chapter 3). In offering a succinct “how-to” for deconstruction24, Spivak (1976) suggests: Deconstruction in a nutshell...[is] to locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose with the positive lever of the signifier; to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is always already inscribed. (Spivak, 1976, p. lxxvii)  Spivak (1976) describes the process of bearing witness to undecidability as being on the lookout for snags in meaning when it stops working as intended, in which the absence of unified meaning might come to threaten the very structure which it occupies. In short, this entails paying attention to, and making use of, concepts and categories whose meanings vacillate between a meaning and a constitutive otherness; intentionally (mis)reading them by tinkering with meanings otherwise unintended but potentially signaled by that which is there (see Biesta, 2009; Derrida, 1976; Spivak, 1976; St. Pierre, 2011a). Echoing Spivak (1976), McKinley and Aikenhead (2005) state of deconstruction in decolonizing science education that:  …the key to deconstruction is not the identification of the dichotomy and the inversion, (although that work is necessary and we do not wish to underestimate it), but the displacement of such thinking. In other words, how does one re-think these fundamental ideas? How does one displace those assumptions that make “natural” meaning possible? Furthermore, can deconstruction as a critique lift itself off the page to have any practical application? (p. 903, emphasis in original)  Importantly, McKinley and Aikenhead (2005) remind that deconstruction should not strictly be theory for theory’s sake. Rather, as Lather (2007) states, it is important to “[put] theory to work” by using theory (e.g., deconstruction) towards and without losing sight of the critical goals that one sets out to achieve (e.g., decolonizing). Deconstruction must be always already be deconstructing the theory/practice that keep the two separate and separable (e.g., producing practice as “atheoretical,” and theory as a practice of “armchair philosophy”): “the production of theory is also a practice; the                                                 24 However, the question What is deconstruction? is always fraught; it is an approach that works against the metaphysical stasis that comes with the word “is” (see Derrida, 1976). As Spivak (1993/2009) also suggests, Derrida “does not develop a systematic description of this mode of operation. (There is, after all, no useful definition of deconstruction anywhere in Derrida’s work)” (p. 31). Thus, any account of deconstruction must always be partial as deconstruction is always already on the move; the discontinuity that is deconstruction is in itself dis/continuous such that Derrida does not have the final word on deconstruction (see Barad, 2010; Kirby, 2011).   22 opposition between ‘pure’ theory and concrete ‘applied’ practice is too quick and easy” (Spivak, 1988a, p. 275). There are three inseparable binary relations that feature strongly within this dissertation: Self/Other, Nature/Culture, and ethical possibility/impossiblility. I provide an introduction to all three in this chapter, as well as the literature that comes to inform how I wander the pathways of science education. 1.3.2.1 Deconstructing Self/Other in decolonizing and postcolonial science education. Given that cultural (re)constructions of Otherness continue to be problematic within science education such that they (re)center colonial logics and subjects, a prevalent solution is often to reverse the gaze onto the Self (i.e., the colonial subject) of colonizing relationships (see Pillow, 2003). As Tuck (2009) articulates, researchers do not need, nor should they use the suffering of Indigenous, diasporic, and other post-colonial students as evidence of colonial violence and as ethical motivation for research (see also Andreotti, forthcoming). Above and beyond providing positive representations of these students, there is always the possibility to look back at the culture of power that produces this violence. However, to (too simply) displace the gaze by reversing the hierarchy does not always disrupt it (particularly if the gaze continues to operate similarly, albeit with a different target). Here, Lather (2007) suggests a double(d) reversal of the ethnographic gaze. Such a double(d) reversal entails both the literal reversal of studying those who do the studying (i.e., in order to reverse the direction of the ethnographic gaze), as well as the study of the ways in which those who do the studying study (i.e., in order to reverse the way in which the ethnographic gaze is produced). Such deconstructive Self-reflexivity might allow for the possibility of thinking without the thing with which you think (when the thing with which you think is part of the problem), producing the possibility for alternate ways of being and becoming science educator and researcher.  To this, Andreotti (forthcoming) adds that reversing and (re)opening the production of such a Self/Other binary also invites different ways of being-in-relation: if we use the same frames of being that create violence to resist violence, we will reproduce more violence. If focusing on thinking alone is not the answer, what else can we scale up so that we can remember to listen and relate to every being, not necessarily through conceptual language, but through our bodies and our spirits? …. We can renew our relationships, not only between ourselves, but with the land, with the animals, with the standing people, and with being around us, including the colonizers (Andreotti, forthcoming, pp. 5-6)  Here, inverting the production of the gaze also entails resisting a simple displacement of colonial violence and, further, houses the potential to disrupt it. I agree with Andreotti (forthcoming) that   23 such modes honouring all my relations, which includes recognition of the difficult ones, can be at once a luxury while simultaneously being a site of potentiality. As Indigenous Elders have offered to and modeled for me, there is something important in extending a genuine invitation a relationship-to-come, even if its potentiality is not enacted (see also Kuokkanen, 2007). Herein, I work to not negate the work science educators who might disagree with the very premise of the dissertation. Rather, I extend an invitation to dialogue across difference towards them.  Lastly, in considering the Self/Other binary, I recognize that it is important to move “the postcolonial critique of Eurocentrism beyond identity politics, to the level of an epistemic challenge to science” (McKinley & Stewart, 2012, p. 551). Spivak (1993/2009) states that to reduce scholarship to identity politics can be a way which the workings of power are (re)produced:  I have long held that in the arena of decolonization proper, the call to a complete boycott of so-called Western male theories is class-interested and dangerous. For me, the agenda has been to stake out the theories’ limits, constructively to use them. (p. x)  In other words, deconstructing the colonial Self/Other binary does not preclude any one identity from participating in the workings of power, even if the circulation of power is uneven and unequal across different identity positions (see also Spivak, 1988a). Furthermore, as Spivak (1994) states,  It seems more responsible that, instead of falling back on the deceptive simplicity of a proposition [(e.g., “a complete boycott of Western male theories”)] and taking that as sufficient fulfillment of … philosophical responsibility, … [we could] philosophize with all stops pulled out, without denegating [our] complicity, to present [such proposition] as pharmakon, what could have been medicine turned into poison. (Spivak, 1994, p. 34)  To strictly operate from an identity politics position in which “Western male theorists” (such as myself) are excluded runs the risk of stating that those excluded are “inherently” Eurocentric (i.e., being) rather than shaped with/in Eurocentrism (i.e., becoming). This risks foreclosing the space of possibility to not be Eurocentric like that (and invariably, leaving particular individuals “off the hook”). In turn, the theory-practices that I employ throughout this dissertation are selected (but not “validated” as non-Eurocentric or unproblematic) for their ability to displace and disrupt the metaphysics of modernity and (re)open science education towards Indigenous science to-come. To rupture the Self/Other relationship, I turn primarily to the work of post-colonial scholars Gayatri Spivak and Jacques Derrida. Also, I employ Indigenous and decolonizing scholars Dwayne Donald and Martin Nakata’s work as it focuses specifically on the (already) interfacing of Indigenous and Western ways-of-knowing-in-being. Lastly, I also draw strongly on the work of (self-proclaimed) “reverse anthropologist” Frédérique Apffel-Marglin whose work significantly supports me in considering how one might double the reversal of the gaze onto science education   24 (see Chapter 5), as well as how science’s Other-ness includes Nature. This is, of course, in addition to science education scholars who do this work (e.g., Carter, 2004; McKinley & Aikenhead, 2005) 1.3.2.2 Deconstructing Nature/Culture in decolonizing and postcolonial science education. As Spivak (1993/2009) states, “if the lines of making sense of something are laid down in a certain way, then you are able to only do things with that something which are possible within and by the arrangement of those lines” (p. 34). Science education often dialectically subsumes, sublates, and sutures over many of the pluralities, multiplicities, and diversities called for in decolonizing and post-colonial science education. As detailed in previous (sub)sections, these enactments are achieved through an implicit and often taken-for-granted centering of Cartesianism25, while simultaneously working to erase other ontologies and Cartesianism’s own workings by presenting itself as the (only) ontology. Recall that Cartesianism is an ontological enactement through which the Nature/Culture binary is (re)produced and produceable. I endeavour to work within and against this problematic structure that (re)constitutes science education; labouring within and against the clôture of metaphysics that is (and is always becoming) singular, stable, and subsumptive. To do this work, I turn to the work of critical science studies scholars such as Karen Barad, Bruno Latour, and Vicky Kirby as they explore the ways in which Nature and Culture are always already co-constitutive and deconstructing within WMS. Also, I turn to Tewa scholar of Indigenous science Gregory Cajete who articulates that Nature and Culture were never (fully) separate or seperable within IWLN. Again, this is in addition to science education scholars who help me think this through (e.g., Bang & Marin, 2015). 1.3.2.3 Deconstructing ethical possibility/impossibility in decolonizing and postcolonial science education. To reiterate, deconstruction and reconstruction are not de-construction and re-construction (see Jackson & Mazzei, 2012); this process is not destroying and then rebuilding. Deconstruction and reconstruction invariably share a relation of co-constitution. As Spivak (1994) outlines, the very possibility of reconstruction as ethical response to a call of otherness such as Indigenous science to come is premised on responsibility. In turn, ethical responsibility is inevitably premised upon the ability to respond: It is that all action is undertaken in response to a call (or something that seems to us to resemble a call) that cannot be grasped as such. Response here involves not only “respond to,” as in “give an answer                                                 25 For example, at the time of writing, even auto-correct suggests that ontology is a singular affair (via grammatical suggestions; i.e., ontology rather than an ontology).   25 to,” but also the related situations of “answering to,” as in being responsible for a name (this brings up the question of the relationship between being responsible for/to ourselves and for/to others); of being answerable for … It is also, when it is possible for the other to be face-to-face, the task and lesson of attending to her response so that it can draw forth one's own. (Spivak, 1994, p. 22)  In its multiplicity, responsibility for Spivak calls upon the ability to respond in the moment, to take responsibility for the (inevitable) inability to respond, and to continuously be responsible towards the very (im)possibility of  responding to the other whose experiences, ways-of-knowing, and ways-of-being sit outside of the register of what we can know. The ability to respond is always, at best, partial as the Other to whom response is granted is, as Spivak (1988a) reminds, “irretrievably heterogeneous” (p. 284) and hence “non-narrativisable” (p. 284): that which is to-come can never (fully) be known as it is always already within the co-constitutive exteriority of that which can be known and responded to. However, working with purpose but without guarantee is par for the course when it comes to deconstruction: “the philosophy of Destruktion [deconstruction] cannot be used to ward off accountability, answerability, responsibility ... It can only ever be a reminder of its open-ended and irreducible risk” (Spivak, 1994, p. 27). While working towards reconstructing science education with Indigenous peoples, places, and protocols in mind, I remain hyper-vigilant: the very frames through which recognition of Indigenous science to-come occurs are differential articulations of that which makes it such that this call “cannot be grasped as such” (Spivak, 1994, p. 22). It follows that the reconstruction herein focuses largely on the ability to respond on a continued deconstruction and (re)opening of the space of response within science education towards Indigenous ways-of-knowing-in-being.  To work within and against the binary of ethics as im/possibility, I draw from post-colonial scholars Gayatri Spivak, Jacques Derrida, as well as Rauna Kuokkanen.  Also, I draw from feminist and post-structuralist scholars such as Judith Butler and Michel Foucault, as well as science education scholars who think with ethics as im/possibility (e.g., Carter, 2010). 1.4 Third Orientation: Structure of the Dissertation (AKA a Map to Wandering Pathways Anew) Within this section, I provide a map of the networks of paths constituting this dissertation so that the pathways of science education might be wandered anew. In particular, I speak to the general structure of each chapter, as well as the methodological moves I make therein (e.g., positional vignettes, differential articulation of deconstruction). Following this, I outline the overall   26 arrangement of the dissertation as a whole, as well as some recommended strategies for reading. This is supplemented by a short outline of upcoming chapters. 1.4.1 Structure of the paths (i.e., chapters). Within a larger network of paths, each chapter represents a differential hike, journey, or outing through a path of science education. Each journey is iterative, travelling through, against, and/or beyond a particular path, wherein the learning is enfolded and carried forward into the next trip. Representationally, this requires that each chapter as journey is presented as self-contained, yet interconnected. I regularly speak to the path being journeyed upon, as well as the ways in which I attempt (and encourage the reader) to “get lost” within said path to find a way back anew (see Cajete, 1994). Accordingly, each chapter generally includes its own positional piece, literature review, theoretical framework, methodology, analysis, and relational findings in a variety of forms such as open-ended questions, future orientations, and/or considerations and applications for situated practices – all of which come together giving the larger project of this dissertation shape as a network of paths towards responding to Indigenous science to-come in science education. As the network of paths come to cover a plurality of locations, this differential approach is in line with aforementioned post-colonial and decolonizing approaches to education and educational research that call for attentiveness and responsiveness to the relations that come to constitute these theoretical, methodological, and substantive sites (e.g., Battiste, 2013b; Carter, 2010; Smith, 1999/2012; Smith, Maxwell, Puke, & Temara, 2016). As this significantly inflects conventional dissertation norms (e.g., theory and methodology in separate chapters), I quickly speak to what this means for theory, methodology, and positionality. With regards to theory, I align myself with Hawaiian scholar Julie Kaomea (2001) who works against calls for theoretical purity and transcendentalism, “consistent with the logic of post-colonialism and its declining emphasis on grand theories and narratives, my hybrid methodology, and thus my story, is intentionally eclectic; mingling, combining, and synthesizing theories and techniques from disparate disciplines and paradigms” (p. 68). Complicating and challenging the “rage for unity” (Spivak, 1976, p. xvi) produced by the clôture of modern(ist) metaphysics “demand[s] such theoretical innovation and flexibility” (Kaomea, 2001, p. 69). Accordingly, I give myself permission to relationally draw from a diverse and often commensurate range of scholars who support exploration of the three inflections of how Indigenous science is to-come. This theoretical plurality is purposeful as “many of the arguments against IK inclusion in the curriculum   27 are more of a philosophical nature” (McKinley, 2007, p. 210). Thus diverse approaches are required to (re)open a seemingly ever-threatened and -shrinking landscape of plurality. I attempt to critically inhabit this process by engaging theoretically with philosophies and arguments that do not typically hold a central position within science education (e.g., post-colonialism, decolonizing)26.  On the subject of methodology (i.e., the interconnection of theory-practice-ethics), most chapters use a deconstructive approach (see Derrida, 1976). As deconstruction is always already in relation to the context in which it is being applied, articulations and enactments of deconstruction differ from chapter to chapter, often building upon one another27. In turn, it is more apt and useful to describe and situate these concepts with/in the proximal relations by which they are co-constituted.   Similarly, while it is commonplace and of importance to position oneself within decolonizing work (e.g., through identity), Carter (2004) offers that: Postcolonialism’s ability to delve into these processes, and into the deeper ravines of referents like modernity, identity, representation, and resistance underpinning many theorizations of culture and difference including those used, but underexplored, within science education, can open spaces to generate different discussions about what science education is, and could be. (p. 821)  I take up this invitation to consider the ways in which identity, representation, modernity, and (neo-)colonization are inevitably intertwined through differential articulations of metaphysics by using and troubling “position” (see also Spivak, 1988a; 1993/2009). Thus, rather than offer a positional piece here in the introduction, you will find small and partial positional vignettes at the beginning of each chapter. This approach is by design and aligns with my understanding that positionality, too, is always already in relation (and is a differential articulation of all my relations). Such positionality cannot be disclosed through the self-sameness of identity, least not in the essentialized, stable, and singular understanding of the term (i.e., position rather than positionality). Rather, positionality is always contingent, partial, plural, and emerges in relation to the “scene of address” of the account that is being represented (see Butler, 2005). Furthermore, as Wildcat (2005), drawing on the work of the late Vine Deloria, reminds, the very concepts we hold are exceeded by lived experience and shared experiences can become a site of shared meanings across difference (see also Biesta, 2004; Bohm, 1996). In turn, the vignettes are also stories of why the very concepts under exploration are                                                 26Since, as Carter (2004) suggests, there is a “paucity of this type [(i.e., post-colonial and decolonizing)] of inquiry in science education” (p. 833), many concepts may seem foreign to some science education readers. Nevertheless, an effort is made to define terms and concepts as they appear and are leveraged towards decolonial goals within the body of the text. 27 For example, in Chapter 4 and 5, the deconstructive metaphor is one of tinkering as it entails using things foreign to science education as tools to (re)open its structure. This builds upon deconstruction as the possibility, as well as intentional use of substitution as deconstructive methodology as used in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively.   28 always already deconstructing, require deconstructive engagement, and/or are productive sites of relational reconstruction. 1.4.2 Navigating the network of paths (i.e., dissertation). The dissertation as a whole invites a process of wandering the pathways of science education,   journeying the paths anew so that new pathways (e.g., Indigenous science to-come) might come to constitute the network of paths (see also Cajete, 1994; Kuokkanen, 2007). It is important to note that since the goal is to wander them deconstructively, “turn[ing] the outside in and the inside out” (Donald, 2011, p. 12, emphasis in original), each pathway presents its own challenges28. As the dissertation is not knowledge made but knowledge in the making29, reading the dissertation invites engaged, active, and relational reading.   While not wanting to be (wholly) prescriptive about how the dissertation is to be read, it has been productively suggested by readers that this work is enjoyed most when read a chapter or two at a time. Like when one approaches a network of pathways covering a large expanse of territory, only the most experienced hikers should attempt a multi-pitch hike. Furthermore, as each pathway (as process and product) builds upon the previous one, it may even be worth revisiting a path a second time before continuing on30. To assist in this process, the remainder of the dissertation is divided into two chapter arcs (discussed below) that are strongly connected to one another. Furthermore, because this dissertation is not meant to be read in a single sitting, you will find “trail markings” throughout that provide orientations through signaling preceding and forthcoming work. These may serve as a welcome reminder of where one has journeyed and where one is going.  The dissertation is broken into three two-chapter arcs as a suggested reading pace31. The first section, Critical Possibilities and Possible Critiques through Deconstructive Play in/of the                                                 28 This is particularly the case because, as the preface might come to suggest, many parts of this dissertation first came-to-be as manuscripts. While the dissertation creates a narrative across the chapters, the recommendation to read the dissertation in parts cannot be separated from the density of ideas that manifest within individual manuscripts (which each have their own theory, methodology, ethics, and substantive content). 29 I thank my supervisor Dr. Dónal O Donoghue for pointing this property of the dissertation. 30 This advice may also be considered for individual sentences which utilize the theory-practice of deconstruction to deploy ontological indeterminacy in locations that are problematically singular(izing). Much more than a stylistic choice, such deconstruction leverages open a singularizing (neo-)colonial center, which itself is always on the move (see Spivak, 1993/2009, 1999). This means that there are often multiple ways to wander the path that is a sentence and that it is productive to linger and explore its possible possibilities. 31 Note that differing chapters might be of particular importance for diverse audiences. For example: readers firmly familiar with the multicultural science education debate and its largely adversarial workings may want to forego Chapter 2; readers already familiar with the post-structural turn and the ontological turn in educational research could potentially skip Chapter 3; readers most interested in pedagogical design and delivery may be most interested in Chapters 6 and 7.   29 Multicultural Science Education Debate, works within and against the tradition of WMS-based science education that (re)produces science educator and science education as a field by critically inhabiting the multicultural science education debate and critically questioning the potency of critique when enacted through the clôture of metaphysics. In the second section Tinkering with Ontology with/in the Multicultural Science Education Debate, the insight that ontology matters in the (re)construction of norms and practices through which Indigenous science is yet-to-come is pursued. The third and final section, De/signing and Delivering a Curriculum for Indigenous Science To-Come, uses insights from previous sections and works imperfectly towards leveraging these differential (re)openings towards a re(con)figuring of science education knowledge-practices through the development and delivery of a pedagogy. A short synopsis of each chapter that appears in the remainder of the dissertation follows. 1.4.2.1 Overview of arc 1: Critical possibilities and possible critiques through deconstructive play in/of the multicultural science education debate. Within Chapter 2, the multicultural science education debate around how, when, and if TEK and IWLN are included within science education (re)presented as (a) play. However, as the debate comes to be shaped by what Moulton (1983) refers to as the “adversary method,” an invitation to (mis)read the dialectic negation of conversation as dialogue is posited in an attempt to open a different space in which cross-culturalists and universalists might come to shared meanings. A significant question emerging from shared meanings within this chapter, and revisited in the chapters following, is How might considering scientific knowledge as knowledge-practice assist us in collectively working towards the shared goal of working against scientism in science education? This is significant to the overall scope of this dissertation as scientism often comes-to-be a central mechanism (alongside exclusivity and Eurocentrism; see McKinley & Stewart, 2012) through which Indigenous science is excluded, differing, and deferred.  Within Chapter 3, the taken-for-grantedness, yet centrality, of metaphoric visuality in science is utilized as an opening to re(con)figure critique in science education. Specifically, three different optical metaphors are offered to inform gazing critically otherwise within science education: the mirror, the prism, and the diffraction grating. Drawing from the work of Latour (a critic of the mirror; 1993, 2004a), Foucault (the prism; 1979; 1997), and Barad (the diffraction grating; 2000;                                                                                                                                                              However, also note that each chapter is more than its substantive content as it also presents and builds upon methodology (i.e., theory-practice-ethics).   30 2007; 2010) each metaphoric visual technology and their relation to critique are respectively explored to inform new lines of critical questioning. Particularly, these critical metaphors are employed to ask theoretical, methodological, practical, and ethical questions of the multicultural science education debate presented within the previous chapter. 1.4.2.2 Overview of arc 2: Tinkering with ontology with/in the multicultural science education debate. Within Chapter 4, Cobern and Loving’s (2008) call to consider scientific knowledge-practice as ontologically situated (articulated in Chapter 2) is used and troubled. As they refer to this consideration as uncommon, I explore the ways in which ontology is utilized to make common a science education status quo. In turn, I tinker with/in the common/uncommon dichotomy to work within and against this problematic, yet productive, statement. Particularly, I draw from “uncommon” (to science education) work at the ontological turn to explore how “ontological alignment” might be re(con)figured when ontology is no longer a singular affair that pre-exists scientific meaning-making. Chapter 5 extends the work of Chapter 4 by positing Cartesianism as an ontology, as well as what it might mean to account for and be accountable to the ways in which this classical Western metaphysics comes to (co-)constitute knowledge-practices of WMS and science education. An interview with Dr. Frédérique Apffel-Marglin grounds this exploration. It is put into conversation with Cobern and Loving’s (2008) statement that cites “common sense” in the assertion that WMS offers an epistemologically privileged position from which to know Nature as it best aligns with ontology. Apffel-Marglin’s interview gives what she refers to as a “thumbnail account” of the birth of modernity (as an entanglement of economic, political, social, and religious forces and flows). This accounts elucidates how “common sense” has become common. Within the interview, she unpacks some of the taken-for-granted notions that are naturalized in making such a statement (e.g., values entangled with/in statements that are further entangled within a Cartesian ontology). These insights are then diffractively read through the practices of the multicultural science education debate to produce new insights, differently.  1.4.2.3 Overview of arc 3: De/signing and delivering a curriculum for Indigenous science to-come. In Chapter 6, I draw insights from the four previous chapters (i.e., Chapters 2-5) to work towards responding to Indigenous science to-come. Drawing from the concept of response-ability, I    31 (imperfectly) re(con)figure science education curriculum and pedagogy by opening it to its constitutive otherness. First, I think consider points of convergence and divergence between Karen Barad’s (2000, 2007, 2010) quantum philosophy-physics and Gregory Cajete’s (1994, 1999, 2000) Indigenous science in order to rethink scientific literacy by positing and enacting an(other) ontology. Second, I re(con)figure visual pedagogy and/in science education as a rife location to promote response-ability towards Indigenous science to-come. To achieve this, I highlight the re(con)figuration of photovoice, “a process by which people can identify, represent, and enhance their community through specific photographic technique” (Wang & Burris, 1997, p. 369) through deconstructive (mis)readings of the theories which constitute them.  In Chapter 7, I continue the re(con)figuring of science education by translating it into a context. Specifically, I identify the significant methodological moves made in order to pedagogically enact the process of “getting lost” and move towards relationally storying nature through digital-photography-assisted comics; the result of placing a re(con)figured photovoice in conversation with Indigenous storywork (e.g., Archibald, 2008) and comic book theory (e.g., McCloud, 1993). These insights coalesce to produce one possibility for school-based decolonizing science pedagogies: relationally storying nature (i.e. space, time, matter). I describe examples of the development and delivery curriculum that I designed and co-delivered with a collaborating teacher Kirk Gummow. In this curricular project, learners from two middle school classes in an urban Canadian school were encouraged not to ‘read’ nature through scientific literacy, but rather to narrate with nature as agential literacy through this pedagogical project. In other words, students differentially approached science through other-than-Cartesian ontologies, “getting lost” within/against many of the nodes of science in the process. This includes not only the relational storying of nature, but also the web of pedagogical activities that were used to engage students in further developing a relational practice and language that works towards knowing with nature within the context of their schools (e.g., mapping, sensory-affective registering of significant places, technical visual skills such as photography and digital comic mise-en-page). Furthermore, I analyze productions resulting from pedagogical design and co-delivery that work against the ontological closure of Cartesianism to produce a different horizon of possibilities for decolonizing science education. A particular focus is paid to the stories produced by/with students through reading them in ways that trouble knowing Nature (i.e., space, time, matter) through Cartesian modes (e.g., considering the agency of other-than-human agents within the school, considering non-linear space-time). This acts as a site to   32 explore the consequence for what scientific literacy is, is not, and most importantly can be in and as decolonizing and post-colonial science education.    33 Part 1: Critical Possibilities and Possible Critiques through Deconstructive Play in/of the Multicultural Science Education Debate    34 Chapter 2: Serious play: A Literature Review of Multicultural Science Education through and for (Socratic) Dialogue The purpose of this chapter is to differentially revisit the multicultural science education debate, which is a central curricular location in science education that acts as both a potential entry point and problematic gate-keeping device for Indigenous science to-come, by inflecting it with a potentially less oppositional mode of meaning-making. Within this debate, it is generally agreed upon by science educators that there is a clear moral imperative to respect students from diverse cultural backgrounds within the multicultural science education classroom32. However, what constitutes respect and how it is enacted continues to be hotly debated. A significant contributing factor is how conceptions of respect are deeply intertwined with, including influenced and impacted by, considerations of “what counts” as science. This has produced two largely incommensurable positions around the inclusion of TEK (e.g., ethnoscience, Indigenous knowledge systems, Indigenous science): those who contest its status as scientific knowledge and those who champion it. However, as the process of debate enacted is commonly one of opposition, there is little room for meaning-made across positions. Above and beyond addressing the sources of knowledge that continue to uphold this serious debate, this chapter plays with/in the debate processes as a means of opening these foreclosed spaces in science education as both form and content lead to the exclusing, differing, and deferring of Indigenous science to-come. 2.1 Prelude to (a) Serious Play  A few years ago during a graduate student conference, I was asked to take down a poster I was presenting minutes after I put it up. The campus-wide graduate research poster session had barely begun, as many graduate students hurried to hang their posters up. During this time, a member of the university’s Faculty of Science took note of my poster as he was walking through the exhibit, seemingly en route elsewhere. However, he stopped upon seeing my poster, his face reddening as his pace accelerated. “I’m going to request that you take this poster down,” he tersely demanded. Unsure as to why the request was being made, and unable to make sense of the physical cues he was exhibiting, I nervously asked, “Why?”. The point of contention, he said, was the title of the poster,                                                 32 Respecting Indigenous, diasporic, and other post-colonial students within the science education classroom is one of the key motivators within the culture of the multicultural science education debate for the inclusion of TEK. However, in classroom practices, the central focus is often on achievement; more specifically an “achievement gap” (without coming to understand the norms under which uneven scholastic achievement comes to be produced and produceable; see McKinley, 2007; McKinley & Stewart, 2012). However, as I have addressed elsewhere (Higgins, 2011, 2014a), the incorporation of TEK and IWLN within the science classroom is beneficial for all students.   35 “Shared horizons: A dialogue between Indigenous and Western science”, as well as its content below. In short, the poster highlighted my own work in cross-cultural science education in which I endeavoured to juxtapose and braid Western modern science (WMS)33 and local enactments of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK)34, namely Inuit (i.e., Indigenous) science in the circumpolar region (see Higgins, 2011, 2014a). Feeling my pulse quicken, I asked him to elaborate with                                                 33 It is generally agreed upon by science educators that perceptions of WMS are often partially (mis-)informed by particular stereotypical and monolothic images of scientists, as well as the notion that there is a way to do scientists think (e.g., the scientific method; see Aikenhead, 2006a). Nonetheless, there are still often similarities enacted across Western modern sciences with respect to beliefs about science held and enacted by many (but likely not all) scientists (see Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007; Aikenhead & Michell, 2011). These include, but are not limited to: • Nature is governed by laws that are quantifiable, generalizable, and predictable – hence – nature is knowable (or can and will be known in instances in which knowledge technology does not allow for the study of phenomena).  • Nature can be reproduced (for realists) or represented (for socio-constructionists) through scientific knowledge; • The production of scientific knowledge is embedded within social contexts. However, “the rigour of [WMS] decreases subjectivity as much as possible” (Aikenhead & Michell, 2011, p. 43, emphasis in original) to make knowledge claims (quasi-)objective;  • Because scientific knowledge reproduces or represents nature (the latter with as little social and subjective noise as possible), scientific data speaks for itself; • Constructing knowledge about the natural world (i.e., scientific knowledge) is the purview of humans and is represented or reproduced upon a static and (recti-)linear space and time. 34 Traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) is a term used by biologists and ecologists that became prevalent in the 1980s that usually signals “experience acquired over thousands of years of direct human contact with the environment” (Snively & Corsiglia, 2001, p. 11). TEK is often synonymous with terms such as ethnoscience, Indigenous or Native science, as well as Indigenous knowledge and Indigenous knowledge systems; of which, it has become the most prevalent in usage (McKinley & Stewart, 2012). These other terms are often preferred because TEK, like WMS, is a concept that is often (mis-)understood as a result of prevalent, pervasive, and problematic understandings (see previous footnote). These include “tradition” being defined in opposition to civilization and contemporaneity, “ecological” being reducible to ecology as defined by modern biology, and “knowledge” as discrete and separate not being an adequate referent for the relational knowledge processes from which TEK stem. Such mis- and missed representations are often complicated by under-representation (Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007; Aikenhead & Michell, 2011; Snively & Corsglia, 2001).  Similarly to WMS, there are many forms of TEK that are as diverse as the longstanding Indigenous peoples’ traditions from which these knowledges stem. TEK is not the binary opposite of WMS, however this is not to say that there are not significant differences between the two (Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007; Aikenhead & Michell, 2011). However, there are often some beliefs about nature that are sometimes but not always shared: • Reality is not dualistic (i.e., Cartesian) but rather monist. This entails that nature is not separate from culture, and that the physical and metaphysical are always already entangled. In turn, this entails that parts of Nature (i.e., the frequent purview of science) only make sense within and can never be separated from the whole of nature or reality. This whole can be referred to as an ecology of relationships or a “sense of place” (see Cajete, 1994, 2000).  • Knowledge of nature emerges through natural-cultural relationships with knowledge keepers who are either human (e.g., Elders) or other-than-human (e.g., plants). • Relationships entail responsibility. Accordingly, since everything is inter-related, the ecology of relationships is sustained by responsibility. • Nature, which includes space, time, and matter, is in constant flux and in a state of indeterminacy, whose indeterminacy and flux is dis/continuous (e.g., non-linear time). In turn, while nature is empirically observable, it is never fully knowable; ways-of-knowing-nature must remain open and dynamic to ongoing patterns of difference. • Models developed empirically across generations do not function as representations of nature but rather as flexible and adaptive pedagogical tools for coming-to-know nature and be relationally accountable to one’s relationships.    36 noticeable defensive and deliberate emphasis: “What is your issue with this?” The short of his response was that the friction was stemming from the cultural prepositions (i.e., Indigenous and Western) preceding the word science. In other words, as he told me, “there’s no such thing as Indigenous science, or Western science for that matter.” Agitatedly, he added, “There is only science.” Reading the issue as one of not recognizing Indigenous knowledge systems as valid and productive ways of knowing nature, I too was visibly frustrated. In an attempt to recover ground, I situated the cross-cultural work within a longstanding and ongoing conversation in science education. To this, he retorted that this type of engagement was not happening “in science”. With the tension escalating, both of us growing increasingly irritable, and neither hearing nor being heard, he repeated his demand to take down the poster. I outright refused. Our exchange ended as the faculty member went to seek out a member of the graduate student conference’s organizing committee to enforce his request.  As a science educator who has worked over ten years in Indigenous communities, making space for diverse ways-of-knowing-nature was and continues to be a commitment that is both personal and political. I could not simply take down my poster. While it cannot be stated with certainty, it is likely that the science faculty member also had his own commitments that beckoned him to firmly take the position expressed. Nonetheless, there is a part of me that wishes that this exchange could have played out differently. In hindsight, and giving the faculty member benefit of the doubt, the poster could have acted as a productive conversational pivot for both involved. What if I perceived his position of science as singular and universal as something other than a potentially disrespectful “the ends justify the means” approach to morality in teaching science? What if he perceived my position of advocating for scientific pluralism as something other than “anything goes” epistemic relativism? While I would like to think that we shared a common desire for science and science education that is rigorous and empirical engages nature yet not indoctrinating through cultural imposition, it appeared as though we had implicitly agreed to disagree before said conversation could begin. If the demand for me to take down my poster had not shut down the possibility of conversation, my reaction, rebuttal, and refusal certainly did. The act of attempting conversation further entrenched our respective positions, giving the impression that a combative and antagonistic relationship was the only type we could inhabit.  While this is but one experience from my perspective, the characteristics that mark it are not isolated. Michiel van Eijck and Wolff-Michael Roth (2007) state, “one can be surprised about the   37 fierce debate that currently shakes the foundations of science education” (pp. 927-928) and, I would add, the plurality of locations in which it is occurring. Often referred to as the multicultural science education debate35, it is not strictly isolated to a singular place but extends to plural locations that are continuously and differentially shaped by Western colonial relationships. These include locations: a) where settlers remain and have become numerically dominant (e.g., New Zealand, Australia, Canada, United States, Peru, Taiwan); b) where colonial settlers have never reached majority and/or that have undergone formal decolonizing as defined by the United Nations (e.g., India and many African nations); and c) in which displaced diasporic communities live, whose forced migration from the lands in which their cultural identity developed is the result of colonialism past and present (e.g., descendants of chattel slaves in former British and French colonies, Hmong immigrants [formerly from Thailand] in China and the US) (Aikenhead & Ogawa, 2007; McKinley, 2007).   At stake are notions of “what counts” as science within the context of the multicultural classroom36, and how their entanglement, impact, and influence constitute respect and how it is enacted towards culturally diverse students. Seemingly most polarizing, and of central significance in this inquiry, is the status of TEK as scientific knowledge (or equally valid to scientific knowledge).  I would argue that the ongoing debate is not the result of poorly formulated scholarly arguments. Rather, it is a symptom of the oppositional and antagonistic modes through which the multicultural science education debate operates (see McKinley & Stewart, 2012), such as was the case in the exchange between myself and the Faculty of Science member in the introductory vignette. For the multicultural science education debate to move towards shared meanings and                                                 35 McKinley and Stewart (2012) suggest that the topic of TEK in school science is one “that has, in the past, been subsumed under wider concepts, such as multiculturalism, equity, and the like.” (p. 541). However, as post-colonial scholars of science education, they do not dismiss the locations in which inclusion happens as solely problematic. Rather, they critically inhabit these spaces as a site of both possibility and problematics through what could be read as taking a deconstructive stance. Taking a deconstructive stance is to “persistently to critique a structure that one cannot not (wish to) inhabit” (Spivak, 1993/2009, p. 284) by critically inhabiting the practices (linguistic or otherwise) at hand that shape us while at once troubling them.  As Spivak (1976) suggests, the language we possess also possesses us; thus, too simply moving beyond is “to run the risk of forgetting the problem or believing it to be solved” (p. xv) by reproducing it elsewhere, albeit differently. Thus, while recognizing the language of multiculturalism in science as a problematic entry point to consider the inclusion of IWLN, it is nonetheless the predominant entry point into conversations of, as well as gatekeeping device for, Indigenous knowledges in the science classroom. In turn, I also use and trouble this language.  36 The occurrence and recognition of classrooms as multicultural is recent. As McKinley and Stewart (2012) state: Solid decades of economic growth, and increased sensitivity to human rights, post-World War II, supported a steady improvement in education outcomes for [I]ndigenous students. As globalisation proceeded, teachers in Western countries faced classrooms of increasing cultural diversity, and anti-ethnocentrism was one aspect of the response, with teachers challenged to overcome their own deficit thinking. (p. 546)    38 understandings, it must become and remain an open process rather than a sedimented product. Open channels of communication allow for productive engagement across and between positions, rather than a protective and prohibitive form of disengagement, such as that demonstrated within the introductory vignette. As Elizabeth St. Pierre (1997) reminds us, the goal of educational research should be to both “produce different knowledge and knowledge differently” (p. 175). As such, this chapter seriously engages both within and against the norms that shape the culture of the multicultural science education debate itself by differentially (re)presenting the multicultural science education debate literature. However, the purpose here is not to produce new knowledge through the advancement of either universalist or cross-culturalist positions as is traditionally the case. Instead, I undertake, and provide tools for readers to engage the task of producing knowledge differently through a differential critical engagement with the knowledge production process that occurs within this debate in order to move towards the possibility of shared meanings37.  2.1.1 Program of (a) “Serious Play” to-come Differential knowledge (re)production takes the form of (a) “serious play” as means of possibly working within and between the often “scripted” (i.e., well-established and entrenched) positions of universalist and cross-culturalist in order to (re)open these foreclosed38 spaces of meaning-making. In short, the “serious play” introduced here but expanded upon later signals an entangled conceptual apparatus comprising Socratic dialogue, Bohmian dialogue, and Derridean “play.” Together, these inform the textual strategies used as well as the practices of reading advocated for. There are sharp distinctions between Socratic dialogue (i.e., Platonic form of representation of live, face-to-face discussions between two “scripted” positions), and Bohmian dialogue (i.e., the stream of meaning through which something is made in common), as well as a                                                 37 This distinction is significant. For example, Cobern and Loving (2008) engage a similar representational mode (i.e., a conversation) with the explicit “intention… to present the critical arguments in common sense terms” (p. 438) and the implicit one of demonstrating that the terms of their opposition (e.g., cross-culturalism through relativism) are untenable. However, this opposition is one that is largely imagined: cross-culturalists often repeat that they are advocating for pluralism rather than relativism and that they too do not wish the latter (see McKinley, 2007; McKinley & Stewart, 2012). Furthermore, as discussed further within this chapter, discussions whose aim are to emerge victorious, rather than to listen to one another, are pyrrhic indeed. These victories not only ring hollow following the defeat of an imagined opponent, but such combativeness does not generate new and shared meanings but works towards making meaning common by suturing over other meanings. As such, these engagements always already fail in their ability to produce common grounds from which to address the complex questions of multicultural science education: they (re)produce ideological divisions which take us away from the possibility of learning from on another and working towards shared goals (see Bohm, 1996; Latour, 2004a, 2004b).  38 I borrow the use of “foreclosure” here from Spivak (1999) to signal instantiated pre-emergence of meaning. In other words, foreclosure signals the ways in which the language we possess sometimes appears as already fully formed, stable, and signifying an ontologically stable location; foreclosure as the semiotic locations which resist (re)opening due to their naturalization as closed before the fact.   39 play (i.e., theatrical drama), and Derridean play (i.e., the always already present possibility and process of (re)significiation; see Derrida, 1976). However, through (a) “serious play,” this very term takes a double(d) meaning in that it is both a theatrical drama (i.e., a play) engaging with serious topics as well as a serious commitment and engagement with the (re)signification (i.e., Derridean play) of the concepts and terms within. Similarly, while the format of Socratic dialogue traditionally represents discussions between two parties, it also acts as an invitation to the reader who is open to being in a Bohmian dialogue with the text to create movement of meaning between the two positions (re)presented.  The goal of this chapter is to encourage and invite “serious play”, which can be read in two distinct ways. On one hand, it can be understood as a call for science educators to seriously (re)engage in the drama of foreclosed conversations around notions such as ‘what counts’ as science and other hotly debated issues within multicultural science education. On the other hand, it can be interpreted as an invitation for science educators to engage with the always already possible play of (re)signification of these notions and the associated positions. Together, serious play calls for the dialogical movement of meaning that occurs through and during the possible play of (re)signification, be it between people, concepts, or (scripted) positions, in order to produce a different set of possible possibilities39 emerging from discussions such as the one at the beginning of the paper as well as the one that is mimicked within the Socratic dialogue to come. There are four ‘acts’ to this serious play. The first act sets the stage for the dialogue. I further expand upon the conceptually entangled notion of “serious play” through suggesting Bohmian dialogue as a means of working towards non-adversarialism, expanding upon the Derridean “play” of (re)signification, and proposing Socratic dialogue as a means of representing and producing this play. In the second ‘act,’ reading notes are provided. I describe the universalist and cross-culturalist positions participating within the Socratic dialogue and beyond, and also make suggestions for readers looking to engage in the serious play of Bohmian dialogue. In the third ‘act’, the Socratic dialogue on multicultural science education is “played out”. Herein, both universalist and cross-culturalist characters enunciate points of contention and agreement within multicultural science education (e.g., “what counts” as science) while providing a space for readers to potentially engage                                                 39 Possible possibilities is an expression used throughout the dissertation meant to signal that not all possibilities are possible, nor equally possible. However, as possibility and impossibility forever vacillate, possible possibilities are always on the move (Barad, 2007). However, as Apffel-Marglin (2011) importantly notes, not all possibilities are desired nor desirable.   40 in differential meaning-making around these issues. The fourth and final ‘act’ that follows the Socratic dialogue is an exploration of how knowledge is both reproduced and potentially differentially produced within the multicultural science education debate. This section also engages with recent literature that endeavours to open up multicultural science education through (re)signification of locations that threaten to foreclose the possibility of further play (i.e., those which remain unresolved and unresolvable within the debate).  2.2 Act 1: Setting the Stage for (a) “Serious Play” 2.2.1 From the dialectic of discussion to Bohmian dialogue: An ethic for seriously playing together.  The positioning and approach enacted between the Faculty of Science member and myself within the introductory vignette could be stated to be what Janice Moulton (1983) calls the “adversary method.” She characterizes it by its aim “to show that the other party is wrong, challenging them on any possible point, regardless of where the other person agrees” (p. 156). Similarly, David Bohm (1996) might qualify the above engagement between the faculty member and myself as “discussion”. Discussion, having the same suffix as percussion and concussion, evokes imagery of verbal jousting in which speakers must beat, bang, and thump one another’s arguments in order for one meaning to emerge victorious through the dialectic negation of the other. In order to achieve this, the discussant must make common their view by subsuming, sublating, or suturing over those with whom they are discussing. This “making common” is often aggressive and adversarial, the shared assumptions required to engage in conversation on common ground are rarely reached. In turn, not only is it “not a good way to convince someone who doesn’t agree with you” (Moulton, 1983, p. 156) but it also breaks down the very possibility of communication (see also Latour, 2004a; Kirby, 2011). As was the case between the faculty of science member and myself, our respective refusal to consider the other’s point of view (re)entrenched our respective positions. As Bohm (1996) asks, “how can you share if you are sure you have the truth and the other…[similarly] has the truth, and the truthes don’t agree?” (p. 43). However, this did not mean we needed to concede our respective viewpoints. While there is always moments in which one must inhabit imposed norms within communicative spaces as a necessity, such inhabitation often requires the one conforming to allow parts of themselves to be dialectically negated. This type of subsuming, sublating, and suturing over often results in either a communication (i.e., a singular imposed meaning) or a null   41 communication (in which silences are rife with meaning; see Mazzei, 2007) but not necessarily communication as an open process of back-and-forth. For these reasons, there is a call from scholars such as Bohm and Moulton for dialogue rather than the dialectic of discussion, a call to listen rather than strictly talk. While both dialectic and dialogue begin from an encounter in which two differing views on a similar or same topic encounter one another, their ethic of resolution differs. Dialogue’s Greek roots entail through (dia, as opposed to di which would simply signal two40) the meaning of the word (logos). Rather than a dialectic contest between dichotomized views, dialogue acts as a stream of meaning, a process of communication in which those engaged are not concerned with defeating propositions or in which meaning is to be made common through imposition but rather a process through which meaning is being made in common. Because it is a non-adversarial model, a process through which shared meanings are made together, it does not require that the meanings interfaced together to be negated for something new to emerge. This creates space for the possibility for meaning-making positions in-between that are often lost and foreclosed in dialectic and discussion41.  In and through dialogue, Bohm (1996) calls for “suspended action.” The suspension is a call to listen that is framed as both a listening to others and to oneself in that the act “listening” to how we listen to others can tell us much about ourselves, including the values that frame what and how                                                 40 While theories of dialogue as practice (e.g., Bohm, 1996) do not explicitly limit the number of participants involved within a dialogue to two, it implicitly groups them in and treats them as reversible communicative pairs (i.e., transmitter and receiver) in a manner similar to Socratic dialogue.  Further, note that, as Spivak (1994) states: “dialogue is, in fact, the accepted proper name of responsibility as exchange-of-responses, implicitly understood as the flow of propositions or constatations rather than responses from both sides” (p. 45). Dialogue as responsibility presents itself as a mode to be able to respond to Indigenous science to-come (see Little Bear, 1994; Parrry, 2008). 41Alternately, the process and product of dialectic and dialogue can be unpacked as mathematical operators. Consider two competing premises, positions, or postulates: A and B. When brought into proximal relation, the type of ethic of resolution (i.e., the operator x) shapes what is produced (i.e., the resultant side of the mathematical equation). Ideally, for dialectic, this interaction resembles such:  A x B = C. Here, C is a third position or statement that would be a “best of both worlds” that is developed in an equitable mode of collaboration. However, due to always uneven relations of power, this ideal is almost never achieved or achievable. In instances in which the unevenness is more pronounced, the dialectic often bears closer resemblance the following: A x B = A This is what is referred to as dialectic negation: the absorption and/or annulment of the other term (here, B).  Some respond to this by articulating an ethic of incommensurability in which: A x B = A + B This entails that the two positions do not, cannot, and/or should not enter a proximal relation of co-production.  Recognizing that relations of power are always already uneven and unequal from the get go, dialogue strives to reach shared meanings without requiring the annulment of either meanings:  A x B = A + AB + A This entails that both propositions or positions (i.e., A and B) stand while also producing a shared meaning as the multiplicative product of the two (AB).   42 we “hear.” Between the science faculty member and myself, there were diverse epistemic as well as affective cues that we could have sensed of ourselves and of the other (e.g., physical indicators of tension). They may have signaled the ways that we were being played by our respective personal assumptions. For example, if I could take my quickening pulse as an indicator of meaning on the move to partially glimpse at my then held assumption of epistemic universalism being diametrically opposed to respectful multiculturalism, perhaps I could have differently participated in the conversation. The purpose of “suspended action” is then to come to awareness, albeit partial, of how values are inflected, deferred, and deflected through our selves. It allows us to rethink the self-in-relation to the norms that shape how, who, and what we can be (see also Butler, 2005; Foucault, 1997; Mazzei, 2007; Peat, 2007). The act