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Conditions apply : non-state actors challenging state sovereignty through Intergovernmental Organizations… Lüdert, Jan 2016

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CONDITIONS APPLY: NON-STATE ACTORS  CHALLENGING STATE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS  An Analysis of National Liberation Movements and Indigenous Peoples  at the United Nations    by  Jan Lüdert    M.A., The Australian National University, Canberra (2007)  B.A., Hamburg University for Economics and Politics, Hamburg (2001)    A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of   the Requirements for the Degree of    Doctor of Philosophy   in  The Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies   (Political Science)   The University of British Columbia   (Vancouver)     August 2016  © Jan Lüdert, 2016  ii Abstract   This dissertation contributes to the study of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), such as the United Nations, and demonstrates their important function to convene multiple actors engaged in normative contestation and change. It achieves this by offering a systematic theoretical and empirical account of how non-state actors (NSAs) challenge the institution of state sovereignty. The argument offered specifically seeks to answer how and under what conditions this challenge is possible, and whether and when states respond by limiting IGOs and/or NSAs. To answer this question, the dissertation analyzes the successes and failures of two sets of non-state actors that have sought to alter prevailing conceptions of state sovereignty: national liberation movements and indigenous peoples.  The dissertation’s original contributions to existing knowledge are threefold. First, I build on existing constructivist theory to argue that state sovereignty is despite being resilient and hard to change, also a mutable and variable composite institution. I specify that state sovereignty’s variance finds its clearest expression in three international norms that makes up the institution: territoriality, non-interference and self-determination. Second, I develop and apply the significance of three explanatory factors of non-state actors using IGOs to challenge and change the composite parts of state sovereignty: a) non-state actors require meaningful access and must expand participation capabilities to relevant venues within the nested structure of the IGO; b) non-state actors rely on the often essential role of allies active in the IGO to influence venue constraints and outcomes; c) non-state actors and their allies must find, create and/or be able to change relevant venues in order to advance collective goals through persuasion and social pressure tactics. I identify a particularly critical venue type which is coined sheltered venue. Sheltered venues establish a foot in the door to the IGO through which non-state actors deepen their interaction with states. Finally, I offer a detailed empirical investigation of national liberation movements and indigenous peoples interacting with the UN. No study of these actors in comparison exists to date. I, as such, explore how decisions and outcomes that benefited national liberation movements impacted indigenous peoples’ engagement at the United Nations.     iii Preface   This is an original intellectual product of Jan Lüdert.   Research for this dissertation includes interviews that were approved by the University of British Columbia’s Behavioral Research Ethics Board (BREB), certificate No. H13-02768   iv Table of Contents   Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ii Preface ........................................................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... iv List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. viii List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................... ix Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... xi Dedication .................................................................................................................................... xii  1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 The Puzzle: Non-State Actors using the United Nations to Challenge State Sovereignty ................................................................................................................................. 2 1.2 The Argument ...................................................................................................................... 4 1.3 The Contributions of the Dissertation ............................................................................... 9 1.4 The Research Design ......................................................................................................... 10 1.5 The Plan of the Dissertation ............................................................................................. 13  2. Explaining Conditions for Challenging State Sovereignty: Conceptualizations and Theories ........................................................................................................................................ 14 2.1 Defining State Sovereignty: A resilient yet mutable composite institution .................. 14 2.1.1 Explaining Changes to State Sovereignty through its Composite Normative Parts ..... 20 2.1.1.1 The Norm of Self-Determination ............................................................................ 23 2.1.1.2 The Norm of Non-Interference ............................................................................... 26 2.1.1.3 The Territoriality Norm .......................................................................................... 32 2.2 Conceptualizing Conditions for Non-State Actors Challenging the Institution of State Sovereignty through United Nations Venues ........................................................................ 35 2.2.1 Defining Non-State Actors ............................................................................................ 36 2.2.2 Conceptualizing Non-State Actor Access and Participation ......................................... 39 2.2.2.1 Non-State Actor Access: Form and Status.............................................................. 39 2.2.2.2 The Tactical Repertoire of NSAs Participation ...................................................... 43 2.2.3 The Relevance of Venues: Stepping Stones or Veto Points.......................................... 46 2.2.4 The Essential Role of Allies .......................................................................................... 50 2.2.5 Dynamic Theory Statement ........................................................................................... 52 2.3 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 56  3. National Liberation Movements at the UN .......................................................................... 58 3.1 Introduction to the Chapter.............................................................................................. 58 3.1.1 Historical Context ......................................................................................................... 58 3.1.2 National Liberation Movements’ Challenge to State Sovereignty................................ 60  v 3.1.3 The Argument in Brief .................................................................................................. 62 3.2 Norm Emergence Phase .................................................................................................... 66 3.2.1 The National Liberation Movements Boomerang Pattern at the United Nations ......... 67 3.2.2 Norm Entrepreneurs: State Allies Using Institutional Design Venues ......................... 76 3.2.2.1 Including Self-Determination into the UN Charter ................................................ 76 3.2.2.2 Innovating Access and Participatory Mechanisms ................................................. 80 3.2.2.3 Pushing Through A Veto Point and Keeping States Accountable .......................... 84 3.4.2.3.1 Listing Trust Territories and Approving Trust Agreements Based on Self-determination ................................................................................................................... 85 3.2.2.3.2 Delegated Authority by the Secretary General: Listing Non-Self-Governing Territories and Impetus for Venue Creation .................................................................... 88 3.3 Standard Setting Phase ..................................................................................................... 96 3.3.1 National Liberation Movements Direct Challenge to State Sovereignty: Petitions and Visiting Missions from Trust Territories ............................................................................... 97 3.3.1.1 Unchartered Ground: Trusteeship Petitioning Mechanisms ................................... 99 3.3.1.1.1 National Liberation Movements’ Access and Participation Through Oral Hearings ......................................................................................................................... 101 3.3.1.1.2 National Liberation Movements’ Access and Participation Through Written Petitions ......................................................................................................................... 105 3.3.1.1.3 National Liberation Movements’ Access and Participation through Visiting Missions ......................................................................................................................... 108 3.3.2 Unifying UN Charter Obligations: State Allies Universalize Self-determination and Demand Access and Participatory Mechanisms for Non-Self Governing Territories ......... 114 3.3.2.1 Grafting the Norm of Self-Determination onto Human Rights ............................ 116 3.3.2.2 The Committee on Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories: Accountability Politics By State Allies ..................................................................................................... 122 3.5.2.2.1 Allies Influence in Connecting the Committee on Information to Self-Determination and Human Rights ................................................................................. 126 3.3.2.2.2 Allies Seeking to Extend Access and Participation to Liberation Movements in the Committee on Information ...................................................................................... 130 3.3.3 Venue Shift and Reverberation: The Non-Aligned Movement Asserting UN Relevance and Legitimizing Liberation Movements ............................................................................. 133 3.4 Normative Tipping Point ................................................................................................ 139 3.4.1 Consolidating the Challenge to State Sovereignty: The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples ................................................................ 140 3.4.2 Norm Cascading through the Decolonization Committee: An Implementation Venue .............................................................................................................................................. 147 3.4.2.1 Access and Participation by Liberation Movements through the Implementation Venue: If not by Colonial State Consent then by Proxy ................................................... 156 3.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 162  4. Indigenous Peoples at the UN .............................................................................................. 170 4.1 Introduction to the Chapter............................................................................................ 170 4.1.1 Historical Context ....................................................................................................... 170 4.1.2 Indigenous Peoples’ Challenge to State Sovereignty .................................................. 172 4.1.3 The Argument in Brief ................................................................................................ 173  vi 4.2 Norm Emergence Phase: Establishing Conditions for Access and Participation ...... 176 4.2.1 Information Politics by Norm Entrepreneurs .............................................................. 176 4.2.2 Initializing the Indigenous Peoples’ Boomerang Pattern ............................................ 182 4.2.2.1 Transnational Coalition Building .......................................................................... 183 4.2.2.2 Formal Access and Venue Shopping .................................................................... 185 4.2.3 Venue Formation and Indigenous Peoples’ Status ...................................................... 190 4.3  Standard Setting Phase in the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations: A Sheltered Venue ..................................................................................................................... 192 4.3.1 Norm Entrepreneurship: Informal Access and Participatory Capabilities .................. 194 4.3.2 The Indigenous Caucus: Deepening Indigenous Peoples’ Participation ..................... 199 4.3.2.1 Asserting Self-Definition as Peoples .................................................................... 201 4.3.2.2  Grafting a Non-Statist Conception of Self-Determination .................................. 206 4.3.2.3 The Indigenous Caucus: Influencing Norm Development in a Sheltered Venue . 207 4.3.2.4 The Role of Allies: Bridging the Impasse through Novel Modes of Deliberation 213 4.3.2.5 Finalizing the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ................ 217 4.4 Elaboration Phase in the Working Group on the Draft Declaration: A State Driven Venue ...................................................................................................................................... 224 4.4.1 Growing Institutional Interest in Indigenous Peoples’ Rights .................................... 226 4.4.2 Indigenous Peoples with Consultative Status: Shaming States to Secure Access ...... 229 4.4.3 Affirming Indigenous Peoples as Consensus Participants .......................................... 233 4.4.4 Teaching as Social Pressure: The Indigenous Caucus No Change Strategy ............... 237 4.4.5 Towards Compromise: Leverage Politics in the WGDD ............................................ 242 4.4.5.1 Abandoning the No-Change Strategy ................................................................... 243 4.4.5.2 Consensus does not mean Unanimity ................................................................... 245 4.4.5.3 Building Winning Coalitions ................................................................................ 247 4.4.5.4 Sidelining Obstructionist States ............................................................................ 249 4.4.6 From the Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council .................... 253 4.4.7 Addressing African State Sovereignty Concerns ........................................................ 256 4.4.7.1 Veto Point: The Third Committee Defers Adoption............................................. 256 4.4.7.2 The Critical Role of State Allies: Enlisting the President of the General Assembly........................................................................................................................................... 260 4.4.8 Adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ............................. 265 4.5 Implementation Phase: Indigenous Peoples Take a Permanent UN Seat .................. 270 4.5.1 Information and Symbolic Politics: The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues ................................................................................................................. 273 4.5.2 Accountability Politics: The Expert Mechanisms on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP), the Universal Periodic Review and the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ............................................................................................................... 279 4.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 287 5. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 290 5.1 Summary of the Dissertation and Findings ................................................................... 290 5.2 Theoretical Implications ................................................................................................. 297 5.3 Future Research ............................................................................................................... 305    vii Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 308 Secondary Literature ............................................................................................................ 308 Interviews ............................................................................................................................... 325 Online Resources ................................................................................................................... 326 Primary Documents ............................................................................................................... 328 United Nations Trusteeship Council .................................................................................... 337 United Nations Economic and Social Council ..................................................................... 337 United Nations General Assembly Third Committee ........................................................ 344 United Nations General Assembly Forth Committee ......................................................... 344 Other Primary Documents ................................................................................................... 346    viii List of Tables   Table 2.1 Modes of NSAs’ challenges, demands and changes to sovereignty norms………..…21 Table 2.2 Form of NSAs’ Access and Status…………………………………………..………..42      ix List of Abbreviations   The American Bar Association  ABA The African Group of States  AGS The American Indian Movement  AIM The Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network  AITPN The African Liberation Committee  ALC The African National Congress  ANC The UN Committee on The Elimination of Racial Discrimination  CERD The UN Commission on Human Rights  CHR The Consejo Indio de Sud America  CISA  The Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indegenas de la Cuenca Amazonia  COICA  The Expert Mechanism on The Rights of Indigenous Peoples  EMRIP The National Liberation Front  FNLA The Liberation Front of Mozambique  FRELIMO General Assembly  GA The Group of Latin American and Caribbean States  GRULAC  The UN Human Rights Committee  HRC The Indigenous Caucus  IC The Inuit Circumpolar Conference  ICC The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  ICCPR The International Convention on The Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination  ICERD The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights  ICESCR The Indigenous Caucus Steering Committee  ICSC Intergovernmental Organization  IGO The International Indian Treaty Council  IITC The International Indian Treaty Council Conference  IITCC  International Labor Organization  ILO  The Indian Law Resource Centre  ILRC The International Organization of Indigenous Resource Development  IOIRD The International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs  IWGIA Jeunesse Démocratique Camerounaise  JDC  Popular Movement for The Liberation of Angola  MLPA Non-governmental Organizations  NGOs The National Indian BroTherhood  NIB Non-state Actors NSA Non-Self Governing Territories  NSGTs The Organization of African Unity  OAU The Office of The High Commissioner for Human Rights  OHCHR  x Office of Strategic Services OSS The African Party for The Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde  PAIGC The South West Africa People's Organization  SWAPO Transnational Advocacy Networks TANs Tanganyika African National Union  TANU  The Union Démocratique  des Femmes Camerounaises  UDEFC Universal Declaration of Human Rights  UDHR United Nations  UN The UN Conference on Environment and Development  UNCED The UN Conference on International Organizations UNCIO The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples  UNDRIP The United National Independence Party  UNIP The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues  UNPFII The Union des Populations du Cameroun  UPC The Universal Periodic Review  UPR The World Conference on Human Rights  WCHR The World Council of Indigenous Peoples  WCIP UN Working Group on The Draft Declaration  WGDD The UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations  WGIP Zimbabwe African National Union  ZANU Zimbabwe African People’s Union  ZAPU The UN Economic and Social Council ECOSOC Canada New Zealand The United States CANZUS The President of The General Assembly PGA        xi Acknowledgements   This dissertation was written on the traditional, ancestral, unceded territory of the Musqueam Nation. I am grateful for the guidance, mentorship, and encouragement offered so generously to me over the course of my graduate degree and, especially through writing this dissertation at the University of British Columbia’s Point Grey campus. I am indebted to Katharina Coleman, my advisor, champion, and mentor, for her unwavering support. Thank you Katia! Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom and Richard Price, my committee members, have provided invaluable comments, insights, and constructive feedback and challenging critiques on my work. I am forever grateful to them also because their teaching, research rigor, sharp minds and virtue have informed this dissertation. They all continue to inspire my work.   Along with my advisor and committee members, I was privileged to be taught by faculty members who in many ways shaped the thinking, research and writing of this thesis. I am thankful to Barbara Arneil, Bruce Baum, Erin Baines, Michael Byers, Arjun Chowdhury, Peter Dauvergne, Kurt Huebner, Sheryl Lightfoot, Alan Jacobs, Laura Janara, Brian Job, Richard Johnston, Jenny Peterson, Allen Sens and Mark Warren. I also want to thank my co-workers at the UBC Center for Teaching, Learning and Technology, and especially Joseph Topornycky. I thank Kerstin Lüttich at the Institute for European Studies. I thank the Liu Institute for Global Issues at UBC for having accepted me as a Liu scholar, for connecting me with other graduate students across disciplines and for funding research visits through the Bottom Billion Fieldwork Fund. Additional grants were provided by the UBC Four Year Fellowship for PhD students, the Faculty of Arts Graduate Award, the UBC Go Global Mobility Fund, and the Department of Political Science. At UBC during course work, preparing for comprehensive exams and prospectus writing I have benefited from the support of fellow graduate students. While I cannot list them all, I must thank Andrea Nuesser, Katrina Chapelas, Serbulent Turan, Brian Peeler, Derek Kornelsen, Kate Neville, Pascale Massot, Jen Allan, Jan Boesten, Shane Barter, Adam Bower, Augustin Goenaga Orrego, Jonathan Tomm, Yana Gorokhovskaia, and Conrad King.   The United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library in New York City has offered me a workspace on research visits throughout the years. I want to thank the UN Reference Team for helping me navigate my way through the labyrinth. I also thank Roland Burke from La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia, who has graciously agreed to share with me difficult to come by archival material; while I shared my dataset with him. I thank doCip – the Indigenous Peoples’ Center for Documentation, Research and Information, and especially Nathalie Gerber McCrae. I am also grateful to Lola Garcia-Alix and Annette Kjægaard from the International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs. I thank Brenda Burns from the Academic Council on the United Nations System for her help with accreditation to the United Nations in New York City.   My greatest debt is to those outside of the university and professional setting for keeping it real and me on task. I thank my parents Birgid and KaWi Lüdert for being the best friends I have and my brothers Jens-Uwe und Jörg Lüdert and their families for their support. I thank Susan Kathleen and John Shigeo Morita for having taken me into their family here in Vancouver. I am grateful to Carl Wiebe. There are not enough words to thank Jody Morita, Leon Berzen, Simon Garrett, Wesley Bresette, Kevin Chan, Daniel Hartung, Janeece Keller, Kirsti Sampson, Megan Davis, Alex Loyd, and Grant Worth. Thank you Cara Dong - whose love I so deeply treasure.   xii          für meine Familie 1 1. Introduction   State sovereignty remains a vigorously contested concept moored in a long practical and intellectual history. Its relevance to the discipline of International Relations is central and evident in all main theoretical approaches. Different International Relations theories define state sovereignty as being weak and waning or resilient and unchanged – a bifurcation that I argue is largely unhelpful.  The former characterization proposes that issues flowing from globalization, European integration, international human rights, humanitarian intervention, global governance and regionalization are proof of the declining influence of state sovereignty. The latter maintains that little, if anything has changed and sovereign states have remained the only influential actors on the global stage. When applied in this way, neither of these arguments is satisfactory. This is because on the one hand sovereignty continues to be challenged and fought over by both state and non-state actors and on the other hand sovereignty matters because states behave as if it matters and by fostering its resilience.  This dissertation offers a systematic theoretical and empirical account of how non-state actors (NSAs) challenge prevailing conceptions of state sovereignty in the contemporary international system. I am especially interested in the conditions under which non-state actors use the United Nations, an Intergovernmental Organization, to challenge state sovereignty. The dissertation’s theoretical and empirical scope is concerned with questions of norm contestation by NSAs using IGO’s. This is to say that while this analysis does speak to larger debates on decolonization and human rights advocacy, it primarily focuses on the processes of reshaping  2 international norms undergirding the institution of sovereignty.1 More specifically I provide a comprehensive analysis on two sets of non-state actors: national liberation movements and indigenous peoples. The scope of this dissertation focuses on those movements and/or indigenous peoples that choose to use the UN in these ways, without claiming that all such groups do. Some do so by using the IGO, others choose different paths.2 Still, understanding how these actors have accessed and participated in the venues of the UN and whether or not they challenge and change the institution of state sovereignty is important to understanding the evolving field of global politics, its actors and practices.  1.1 The Puzzle: Non-State Actors using the United Nations to Challenge State Sovereignty The ambition of this dissertation is to address the puzzle of how non-state actors can use an Intergovernmental Organization to challenge a fundamental institution against the wishes and interests of dominant states. This project is inspired by a simple empirical observation: Intergovernmental Organizations are said to be state dominated, yet the United Nations from its very inception in 1945 was used by national liberation movements to challenge colonial states based on a universal demand for self-determination. These non-sate actors drew on the UN to achieve sovereign statehood during the era of decolonization as provided for in the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Moreover, indigenous peoples also contest state sovereignty at the UN. Indigenous peoples continue to work through the IGO to keep states accountable for the implementation of collective rights to land, territories and self-determination as provided for in the United Nations                                                                 1 Thus, for example, I do not claim to offer a full causal account for post-1945 decolonization, which would require a more extended discussion of the impact of the Cold War and of localized violence by some actors to achieve independence, as well as (potentially) other historical factors. Instead, I focus my argument more narrowly, and consider two specific instances of normative change engendered by NSAs using an IGO to alter prevailing conceptions of state sovereignty.  2 Such paths may include accepting the status quo, violent conflict and/or resisting engagement with states.   3 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Both of these non-state actors not only contest(ed) states domestically but decided to challenge existing conceptualizations and practices of state sovereignty through an Intergovernmental Organization.  These cases are foremost intriguing because the UN - as an organization of states - should not provide a framework within which non-state actors can challenge foundational institutions of states. Available scholarship often assumes that IGOs more generally, as established and legitimated by states, do not diverge from acting beyond limited mandates provided by states as their principals. Alternatively, they assume that IGOs act within a limited sphere of discretion because states purposefully designed them to advance state interests or make policy recommendations. Some scholars go so far as to argue that IGOs are epiphenomenal to or at best have minimal effect on state behavior and authority. If these assumptions hold, challenging sovereignty through IGOs would be an especially futile field for non-state actors to enter. Yet non-state actors do engage Intergovernmental Organizations and do so with varied success to alter the content and practices of state sovereignty. Certainly, national liberation movements and indigenous peoples encountered states’ opposition and attempts to constrain their engagement with the UN. Despite these constraints the fact that these non-state actors have used and use the UN to challenge states sovereign authority presents an important puzzle that warrants a detailed analysis.  In both cases, prevailing conceptions and practices of state sovereignty were challenged. National liberation movements used the UN to end overseas colonial rule and gain sovereign statehood and indigenous peoples have entered the UN as more permanent actors with the stated purpose to engage states to adjust states’ domestic authority structures and negotiate autonomy and self-government arrangements with indigenous peoples. Given these developments at the  4 UN, I challenge the assumption that IGOs, given their status as multilateral institutions of states, simply do not allow scrutinizing foundational institutions of the interstate system by non-state actors. I counter such arguments and investigate a particularly interesting puzzle because gaining insights into how non-state actors’ use of an IGO impacts the resilient yet mutable nature of state sovereignty is a fundamental question for the study of International Relations. If non-state actors engage Intergovernmental Organizations to challenge one of its foundational institutions, we must ask how and under what conditions this is possible and whether and when states respond by limiting IGOs and/or NSAs. My goal is to identify exactly these conditions by focusing on the types of actors discussed.  1.2 The Argument  My argument can be summarized in two points. First, I demonstrate that both national liberation movements and indigenous peoples have indeed been able to challenge and change prevailing understandings of the composite institution of state sovereignty. Their challenge is in both cases based on a demand for a universal application of self-determination for all peoples and by grafting the norm of self-determination onto human rights norms. Each of these efforts altered conceptions of sovereignty by affecting one or several of its normative components (territoriality, non-interference, and self-determination). As a result, although state sovereignty remained in place as a resilient ordering principle of global politics, the prevailing conceptions of what state sovereignty is and entails underwent a significant change that affected the range of behavior regarded as appropriate and consistent with the institution of state sovereignty.  In the case of national liberation movements, the newly formed UN provided the main forum for contesting prevailing understandings of sovereignty by offering a fertile ground to develop the ‘principle’ of self-determination into a norm applicable to all peoples. This link  5 between self-determination and human rights created the central challenge to the institution of state sovereignty. In fact, the presumption that individuals and groups of peoples possess internationally protected human rights that states are not at liberty to override is a profound post-1945 development and focus of this dissertation. The norm of self-determination so constituted limited the ability of states to uphold the norm of non-interference. Colonial states’ attempts to invoke the norm of non-interference were effectively thwarted by the growing consensus that overseas colonialism had to be brought to a swift and unconditional end. Moreover, while states could no longer effectively uphold the norm of non-interference to maintain control over their colonies - national liberation movements equally accepted that their independence would be based on existing borders, an acceptance which consequently fastened the then still developing norm of territorial integrity. As these actors sought to establish a norm-based challenge to the composite institution of state sovereignty they helped advance the process of decolonization and, consequently, contributed to globalizing a reformulated institution of state sovereignty. National liberation movements transformed their status as non-state actors, and almost overnight, turned into state diplomats. As a result, the composition of the UN rapidly enlarged from fifty-one members at inception in 1945 to 76 members by 1955, then jumping to 99 member states by 1960 to 144 members by 1976. The challenge to state sovereignty engendered by national liberation movements was thus indicative of a changing United Nations, as an IGO. This was a momentous and unexpected outcome. It was an undesired development for colonial states, which they aimed to constrain at the UN but could ultimately not avert. The United Nations established its own relevance as an important arbiter to settle the consequences for the system of sovereign states, old and new alike.   6 Indigenous peoples also actively challenged understandings and expectations about states’ authority with respect to practices affecting indigenous peoples. They used the United Nations to assert their status as “peoples” under international law which corrected integrationist terminology that labeled them “indigenous populations," a category which states had used to justify assimilationist or discriminatory policies against indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples drew on the UN to graft a “non-statist” conception of self-determination onto existing human rights. This conception of self-determination also challenges the norm of non-interference. This is because indigenous peoples’ self-determination implies that states have a normative obligation to adjust constitutional configurations and negotiate autonomy and self-government arrangements with indigenous peoples. This “non-statist” view of self-determination means that the indigenous peoples’ rights condition, but do not restrict or deny the norm of territorial integrity.  Territory is internally divisible however. States are thus challenged to not only treat indigenous peoples within their borders on the basis of equality and non-discrimination, but to adjust constitutional arrangements in order to share authority with indigenous communities. Indigenous peoples’ advocacy at the United Nations has thus far produced limited change to state practice. Still, indigenous peoples demand for self-determination must be viewed as a process that is ongoing and expansive. It is in this last context that, despite an evident gap in the domestic implementation of the rights of indigenous peoples, indigenous peoples as rights-holders continue to pursue the operationalization of their rights as active and more permanent actors through diverse UN venues and international mechanisms.  Second, both cases highlight the importance of accounting for how these non-state actors enter and participate in the UN. Indeed, the increase of their respective ability to access IGO  7 venues and capacity to participate in these venues fostered their agency and presence to achieve goals.  Non-state actors’ ability to use an IGO in order to challenge fundamental norms is based on how they access the organization as competent actors and whether or not such access enables or constrains their effective participation alongside states. This dissertation makes this argument by conceiving of two primary dimensions that relate to the access of non-state actors to the UN: the formal and informal channels by which they enter as well as the status they are able to foster in the IGO. Depending on how non-state actors gain access to the IGO their participation as deliberative actors to challenge, develop and implement fundamental norms begin to matter. Apart from their own efforts to push for improved access and participation this dissertation also draws attention to two interrelated explanatory factors: the relevance of venues and the essential role of allies active in the IGO.  The evolution of access and participation by national liberation movements was primarily a function of state allies translating existing access and participatory mechanisms and by supplying venues to national liberation movements to keep colonial states accountable. Overall, the capacity of national liberation movements to take part in the United Nations changed substantially between 1945 until the mid 1970s. At first national liberation movements were severely restricted because colonial states denied them the right to access and participate in institution building venues in San Francisco. Despite this constraint, state allies realized limited access and participatory innovations for the peoples from so-called Trust Territories to petition the Trusteeship Council and to bring forward their claims for self-determination during visiting missions by the Trusteeship Council. In a second step, and with respect to the essential role of allies, newly independent states with their own history of national liberation, opened the IGO up  8 further by creating new venues – the Committee on Information and later on the Decolonization Committee. In so doing these state allies adopted and translated available access and participatory mechanism available to the peoples from Trust Territories to the majority of colonial territories, the so-called Non-Self-Governing Territories. Alongside these changes to enter the UN the status of national liberation movements at the IGO changed also. By the early 1970s the UN came to accept national liberation movements as the only legitimate representatives of NSGTs and by granting them standing observer status until they acceded to join the organization as state actors.  Indigenous peoples on the other hand, while also relying on allies to open channels for their access and participation to UN venues, were actively and directly involved in establishing their UN presence. The access and participation by indigenous peoples to the United Nations is thus better viewed as a function of a more sustained demand to access and participate in relevant UN venues. Initially, indigenous peoples benefited from the role of independent human rights experts who set precedents for their access and participation to a sheltered venue, the Working Group on Indigenous Populations. Indigenous peoples, in turn, participated as active standard-setters in the venue to establish a norm-based challenge to state sovereignty. In a next step, indigenous peoples used the precedents practiced in the sheltered venue to demand similar access and participation modalities for venues higher up in the UN hierarchy. To date, indigenous peoples have improved their overall status at the UN as more permanent actors and by staffing several accountability venues, such as the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, responsible to follow up on the implementation of indigenous peoples’ rights.  9 1.3 The Contributions of the Dissertation This dissertation contributes to the study of Intergovernmental Organizations, such as the UN, and demonstrates their important function to convene multiple actors engaged in normative contestation, challenges and change. As this dissertation indicates the United Nations is neither epiphenomenal to the study of International Relations nor is it an irrelevant global organization. On the contrary, it proves to be an important forum for states, non-state actors, and others to deliberate and seek improved outcomes. Even so this dissertation finds that Intergovernmental Organizations are still very much controlled and dominated by states’ interests I find that such interests are subject to change, in the long duré, and the United Nations especially offers important platforms through which such change occurs. As Risse remarked in a review most empirical work on transnational non-state actors “remains rather unidirectional by looking at the impact” of non-state actors on states, IGOs and international institutions but say little “about states and international organizations enabling and/or constraining” non-state actors (Risse 2002: 259). This dissertation speaks directly to these issues. The dissertation’s original contributions to existing knowledge are threefold. First, I build on existing constructivist theory and develop a novel theory of state sovereignty as a composite institution, which I define as the legal and political practices linking intersubjective ideas of legitimate authority to three fundamental norms that are resilient yet also mutable: territoriality, non-interference and self-determination. Second, this dissertation adds to constructivist debates on the co-constitution of agency and structure by bringing into sharp focus the significance of three explanatory factors of NSAs using IGOs to challenge all three composite parts of the institution of state sovereignty: a) NSAs require forms of agency by way of gaining meaningful access and by expanding participation capabilities to relevant IGO venues; b) and related, non-state actors rely on the often essential role of allies active in the IGO (including state delegates,  10 secretariat members and independent actors acting as norm entrepreneurs) to influence venue constraints and outcomes; c) non-state actors and their allies must find, create and/or be able to change relevant venues in order to advance collective goals through persuasion and social pressure tactics. Here I identify different types of venues but foremost identify what I coin sheltered venues. They are important to non-state actors as they allow non-state actors to establish a foot in the door to the IGO through which these actors establish and deepen their engagement. Third, I offer a detailed empirical investigation of national liberation movements and indigenous peoples interacting with the UN. No study of these NSAs in comparison exists to date. I explore how decisions and outcomes that benefited national liberation movements impacted indigenous peoples subsequent UN engagement.  1.4 The Research Design  This dissertation employs a qualitative case study design and research methods. My approach here is grounded theory, or the constant comparative method both within and across cases, in order to develop theory through an iterative process of empirical and theoretical analysis (Mills, Bonner & Francis 2006). I employ process tracing techniques that proceed through a combination of induction and deduction (Bennett & Checkel 2015, Jacobs 2015). I am concerned with specifying the conditions enabling and/or constraining NSAs to challenge sovereignty through the process of altering norms undergirding the institution of sovereignty at given historical junctures. Careful description is the foundation of process tracing which includes giving close attention to sequences of independent, dependent and intervening variables (Colliers 2011).3 Accordingly I document the change (or lack thereof) in the norms of territoriality, non-                                                                3 As Collier notes: “Process tracing inherently analyzes trajectories of change and causation, but the analysis fails if the phenomena observed at each step in this trajectory are not adequately described. Hence, what in a sense is “static” description is a crucial building block in analyzing the processes being studied” (Collier 2011: 823).    11 interference and self-determination that I argue constitute the composite institution of state sovereignty, and trace the interactions of non-state actors, their secretariat allies and state actors within relevant venues of the United Nations to explain the pathway of changes. I also consider alternative explanations to verify the robustness of the three explanatory factors I propose.   I choose a case study approach because case studies are useful for the generation of new hypotheses (the "logic of discovery") as well as the confirmation of existing ones (the "logic of confirmation") (Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias 2004). This is because detailed accounts of individual cases can give insights on the precise and fine-grained mechanisms of persuasion and social pressure NSAs and their allies deploy when challenging sovereignty in conjunction with IGOs. Case studies moreover are useful for my purposes because I intend tracing causation and interactions rather than establishing correlations.  Furthermore, case comparisons allow me to gain analytical leverage by comparing across as well as within these cases (over time). Limiting my analysis to two carefully selected cases therefore allows me to trace the respective interactions between national liberation movements and indigenous peoples using particular UN venues in greater detail. Consequently, I aim to provide systematic explanations that demonstrate exactly how the three explanatory factors of NSAs access and participation, role of allies and relevance of venues work and interact.  Ultimately, I offer an argument which investigates both cases not only in terms of norm-based challenges to state sovereignty (the dependent variable) but also in terms of within cases variation of relevant venues with whom non-state actors interact when moving through the UN hierarchy. This is necessary because the UN itself is not a static forum. On the contrary, non-state actors must adjust to intervening factors flowing from organizational adaptations,  12 uncertainty and venue shift in the UN as an evolving IGO. In fact, the activities of national liberation movements at the UN themselves, as I uncover, created specific constraints indigenous peoples subsequently had to and continue to grapple with.  In terms of data collection this dissertation primarily draws on original research conducted at the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library in New York City. It also relies on other archival material especially the Indigenous Peoples’ Center for Documentation, Research and Information based in Geneva. The archival material collected has been used to organize and build a comprehensive and original database of primary documents from all relevant UN venues this dissertation investigates.4 In Chapter 3, I have also drawn on archival material, especially verbatim records from the GA Third Committee, that Roland Burke from La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia has graciously agreed to share with me while I provided my own dataset for his ongoing research. For Chapter 4, concerned with indigenous peoples, I triangulated primary and secondary sources with observations of the annual proceedings at the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues from 2009 to 2011 as well as in 2014. For this case study I also conducted seventeen semi-structured interviews with key actors.   This dissertation also brings into conversation different types of literatures. It draws on theoretical and empirical accounts of international law and international relations surrounding state sovereignty, literature concerned with Intergovernmental Organizations and their role in global governance, scholarship concerned with non-state actors and transnational movements as well as historical and personal accounts of actors involved in the process of post-1945 decolonization and indigenous peoples advocacy, respectively.                                                                   4 I used atlas.ti a qualitative data analysis and research software.   13 1.5 The Plan of the Dissertation  Four chapters follow this introduction. Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework and key conceptualizations of the dissertation. After defining the dependent variable – state sovereignty – as a composite institution I conceptualize challenges to state sovereignty as occurring through changes to its composite normative parts (self-determination, territoriality, non-interference). I develop a framework that describes the mutability of state sovereignty as a result of changes to the norm of self-determination. Alteration to the norm of self-determination created tensions and adjustments to the norm of non-interference as well as territoriality norms. Chapter 2 also introduces three explanatory factors NSAs must find, secure and expand in order to engage in these normative challenges through the UN. These three factors are related to NSAs access, and their participation capabilities, the role of allies and relevance of venues. Chapter 3 presents an empirical case study focusing in national liberation movements who used the UN to achieve independence from overseas colonialism following the Second World War. Chapter 4 offers an empirical account of indigenous peoples’ involvement in the UN. Chapter 5 summarizes the empirical findings of the previous chapters and outlines a set of implications of the dissertation’s results for three important areas of research: state sovereignty, the relevance of Intergovernmental Organizations and role of non-state actors in world politics.     14 2. Explaining Conditions for Challenging State Sovereignty: Conceptualizations and Theories  Under what conditions can non-state actors (NSAs) use the United Nations, an Intergovernmental Organization (IGO), to challenge state sovereignty? In this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework including key conceptualizations to answer this question. I introduce this framework in two steps. I first conceptualize state sovereignty as a composite institution, and outline the three central composite normative parts of the institution that are mutable: self-determination, non-interference and territoriality. In section two I identify three explanatory factors non-state actors must find, secure and expand in order to change these normative parts, namely, the key dimensions of a) access and participation by non-state actors in an IGO, b) the essential role of allies and c) relevance of venues to the former. I conclude this chapter by offering a dynamic theory statement with respect to these explanatory factors. 2.1 Defining State Sovereignty: A resilient yet mutable composite institution  Only a few decades ago, it was not uncommon for state sovereignty to be taken for granted by scholars and was not questioned because  just as we know a camel or a chair when we see one, so we know a sovereign state. It is a political entity which is treated as a sovereign state by other sovereign states (Miller 1981: 16).   A commonly cited definition of sovereignty states that it simply means, “that no final and absolute political authority exists” outside the state (Hinsley 1966: 26). For the neorealist and neoliberal schools, which focus on states as the central actors in international affairs, sovereignty has thus been seen as an ontological presupposition. States are understood to be politically independent within a given territory and that their security and survival or ability to co-operate depends on being an authoritative independent sovereign unit. Sovereignty, for these schools, is  15 an empirical and material fact that delimits the realm of international anarchy from domestic hierarchy. Sovereignty is understood as possessive in so far as a state either is or is not sovereign.  Scholars in both of these prominent theoretical traditions typically begin by specifying that sovereign states are the most relevant actors on the global stage and go on to explain that states pursue pre-given preferences by using their material capabilities. Neorealism is most clear about this as  to say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its freedom by making commitments to them (Waltz 1979: 96).5   In both schools, states are treated as rational and autonomous units that strive to maximize utility under systemic conditions of anarchy or in light of potential cooperation (interdependence under anarchy) with other states that are seeking to overcome sub-optimal outcomes. The differences between them are primarily found in a different focus on security and distributional conflicts versus the resolution of market failures and cooperation asymmetries (Krasner 1999: 45). Given their focus on the relations between states they both emphasize conditions of anarchy instead of problematizing sovereignty. These approaches are ultimately similar than because they tend to reify sovereignty. Both approaches view sovereignty as a rudimentary assumption of states as like units by ignoring its relational and historically contingent character. This view is most clear in such notorious formulation that have come to dominate the study of international affairs ever since it was declared that “a state is a state is a state” (Waltz 1979: 939). Such assumptions suffer from two key problems.                                                                  5 Waltz argues that sovereignty, within the constraints of the anarchical structure of the interstate system, means, “each state, like every other state, is a sovereign political unit” (ibid.).  16 First, if sovereignty is defined as an empirical and material fact it not only “confuses authority with power and control” but it also conflates the external and internal dimensions of state sovereignty (Aalberts 2012: 18). This conflation of ‘state’ and ‘sovereignty’ allows these theorists “to abstract, or simply ignore, problems in the domestic domain and to leave the assessment of problems of internal sovereignty to others” (Bierstecker & Weber 1996: 5). I contend that this conflation becomes even more problematic when non-state actors seek out international arenas, such Intergovernmental Organization (IGOs), to question the authority of states. Fundamentally, I posit that a fixed view of sovereignty, as absolute and indivisible, is ill-suited to explain changes that result from NSAs intentionally challenging the authority of states at the international level.6 Consequently, a key concern this dissertation seeks to address is what we can learn by appreciating that not all interesting actors active in the international arena are fully sovereign states.  Second and related, due to their preoccupation with anarchy, these scholars miss the relational aspect that sovereignty, as an institution, contributes to the achievement and maintenance of both domestic and international hierarchies (Lake 2003).7 That is to say that the relational aspect of sovereignty distinguishes - orders - those actors that are conferred with authority by others as sovereigns and those actors excluded from such recognition.8 Simply put where there are sovereigns there must be non-sovereigns. Yet who holds sovereign authority is                                                                 6 Sørensen produced an insightful treatment on sovereignty and changes in statehood but does not focus on non-state actor influence (Sørensen 2001). 7 If sovereignty is declared to mean the autonomy states possess and only states possess, sovereignty is merely an individual assertion of possession. A reification of the internal and external dimension of sovereignty overlooks the order and hierarchy present within anarchy (Wendt 1992). I also draw on the English School which finds sovereignty to be more than the demarcating line between international and domestic politics and emphasizes sovereignty as an institution that shapes the social interactions between states (See for an insightful discussion on institutions (Buzan: 2004; Bull 2002). 8 Sovereignty designates competent entities (states) that are collectively recognized and “thus involves not only possession of self and the exclusion of others but also the limitation of self in the respect of others, for its authority presupposes the recognition of others who, per force of their recognition, agree to be so excluded” (Ashley 1984: 272).  17 an empirical question that is subject to continuous challenge and potential change. I here built on David Lake who has aptly argued that we can extend the range of deviations from sovereignty  to include non-state political units – or polities – in relations of informal and formal empire and to states themselves, composed of subordinate polities of formerly or potentially sovereign units. In these cases, the relationship between a dominant and a subordinate polity is more hierarchical […], as the latter unit loses its international personality or international legal sovereignty. In this way, states themselves become problematic […] and can be understood as an extreme case of hierarchy (Lake 2003: 311).9   This means that the types of sovereign authorities states possess vary both vis-à-vis each other and towards those they govern (Lake 2003; Jackson 1990).10 These dynamics further demand analysis because states are aware of and react to these challenges. A focus on sovereignty, as this study will demonstrate, is therefore not only worth considering in light of non-state actors questioning sovereignty through IGOs but matters also because states in these forums behave as if it matters. Constructivists have problematized several key concepts in world politics including sovereignty.11 They have emphasized that sovereignty is a socially constructed trait – and better conceived of as a “social fact” (Searle 1995) or a “social kind” (Wendt 1999) – that is produced and reproduced through practice by states, and - as this dissertation proposes - also by non-state actors working through IGOs. I intend to build on scholars that argue that sovereignty is a type of                                                                 9 Formerly, relationships between polities vary along a continuum defined by the degree of hierarchy between two or more polities. The degree of hierarchy, in turn, is defined by the locus of rights of residual control, or less formally, by the decision-making authority possessed by each polity (Lake 1999: 24).  10 Jackson proposed that the post-1945 decolonization introduced a weak player into the system of sovereign states which he has called quasi-states referring to post-colonial states in Africa and Asia. Krasner in a similar vain distinguishes between for meanings of sovereignty: interdependence sovereignty which refers to the ability of states to control cross border movements of goods and services; domestic sovereignty refers to authority structures within states and the ability of these to regulate behavior effectively; Westphalian sovereignty refers to the exclusion of external sources of authority both de jure and de facto; and last international legal sovereignty which refers to international recognition (Krasner 1999).  11 These varied approaches resulted in explosive and lively debates. The prevalence of the phrase “state sovereignty” in English publications more than doubled since 1980 (https://books.google.com/ngrams/). See for instance (Bierstecker & Weber 1996; Lyons & Mastanduno 1995; Philpott 2001; Reus-Smit 2013; Sørensen 2001; Wendt 1999).  18 authority relation that determines “who has the authority to decide what” (Lake 2003: 312) and propose to treat sovereignty as a composite institution that is both resilient and mutable.  Constructivists have taken sovereignty to be more than an ontological given and understand it as a flexible institution that is constituted by the shared actions of state and non-state actors. For the constructivist, sovereignty socializes states and their identities. Sovereignty is variable because it is also dependent upon the actions and uses by different actors that make and remake it. The key to understand state sovereignty as a social construct is to appreciate that states are not fully formed agents that interact with sovereignty, taken as a fully established institution or structure. Rather, a state, “as an identity or agent, and sovereignty, as an institution or discourse” is better understood to be in a constant and transformative process of mutual constitution (Bierstecker & Weber 1996: 11).12   Sovereignty is durable because as an institution it denotes a persistent set of formal and informal norms and rules that prescribes actors with behavioral roles, constrains their activity, and shapes actors’ expectations (Keohane 1989: 3). At the factual level sovereignty as an institution establishes international order(s), provides mutual authority and recognition but consequently excludes others from such a status. I argue that it is precisely this duality of inclusion and exclusion which is the seed for contestation and points towards the potential mutability of sovereignty.13 The contestation is engendered by non-state actors who aim to wrest independence or staggered forms authority including autonomy or self-government arrangements from states. This is because sovereignty, as a social construct, is produced by the actions of powerful agents (states) and the resistance of agents located at the margins of power (non-state                                                                 12 Sovereignty is "about the social terms of individuality, not individuality per se, and in that sense it is an historically contingent [category] rather than an inherent quality of stateness" (Bierstecker & Weber 1996: 12; Wendt & Friedman 1996). See also Wendt 1999 especially Chapter 6: Three cultures of anarchy. 13 Sovereignty is a "social status that enables states as participants within a community of mutual recognition" (Strange 1996: 22) and only exists by "virtue of certain intersubjective understandings and expectations; there is no sovereignty without an other" (Wendt 1992:412).  19 actors) (Bierstecker & Weber 1996). Sovereignty is than also a mutable institution because actions and patters which flow from its persistent use are characterized and continuously judged in terms of “certain normative criteria” whose contestations function to mediate between the realm of “is” and the realm of “ought” of sovereignty (Kratochwil 1995: 21).14 I treat sovereignty accordingly as a central discursive mechanism linking intersubjective ideas of "legitimate statehood and rightful state action" with other fundamental norms (Reus-Smit 1997: 557).  To move away from issues of reification, conflation and single actor perspective I offer an alternative conceptualization of sovereignty as composite institution. Sovereignty is a primary composite institution upon which the current system of states is founded. It is also an institution, which is periodically renovated to align with new historical circumstances (Jackson 1999: 11). Like every political and legal institution, it carries the dual logic of both expected consequences and appropriateness (March & Olsen 1989). Sovereignty not only cuts across continuity and change of global politics, it also captures dimensions of the “is” and the “ought” of domestic political authority. Sovereignty as a political-legal concept is both a fact and an institution. It as such is jealously guarded by those possessing it and persistently challenged by political actors aiming to gain or fasten it.  In sum, my understanding of sovereignty as composite institution is based on processes of co-constitution between structures and agents. Constructivists focus on how interests and identities are socially constructed. Sovereignty constitutes a primary institutionalized structure of shared meanings and practices, making up distinct individual parts - states - within an                                                                 14 Like Janus, the ancient Roman deity, sovereignty is two-faced: one face points to its past - as part of an existing order - and the other, never fully realized, looks forward to new beginnings and transitions. It is both resilient - what states make of it - but also flexible in that states cannot fix it as other actors aim to capture and reformulate it.  20 international context of the society of states.15 There are also agents that operate in the structure of sovereignty with an ability to reinforce or reinterpret the identity of states. By influencing state identity, agents - including non-state actors - may change the social structures of sovereignty in which they exist (Hurd 2008: 303).16 Processes of co-constitution between agents and structures then suggests that the actions of agents - with their varying abilities - can contribute to the making and remaking of the composite institution of sovereignty. Such practices find their clearest expression in international norms that regulate the meaning of sovereignty at given historical junctures.   2.1.1 Explaining Changes to State Sovereignty through its Composite Normative Parts The variance of state sovereignty is a result of alterations to three mutable composite normative parts that make up the institution: territoriality, non-interference and self-determination.17 These norms stand in tension to each other in the context of particular challenges to sovereignty. I therefore argue that investigating the contestations and compromises to which they lead, helps to reveal how sovereignty, as a composite institution, changes. As I demonstrate these three co-varying norms have their own history and while being temporally distinct from one another they are also historically intertwined with sovereignty. In order to address such an understanding, I limit my attention to the ways that non-state actors and their allies settle challenges of state sovereignty through venues of the United Nations (UN), an Intergovernmental Organization. I do                                                                 15 Sovereignty may well be viewed as one of the most deeply embedded structural principles “implicated in the reproduction of societal totalities,” and those practices have lasting extensions across space and time (Giddens 1984: 17). It is resilient because it is a deeply embedded institution and difficult to change: it is an expression of “forms of domination and power” (Giddens 1984: 18). Yet sovereignty need not to be equated with constraint alone. As Wendt puts it: “To say that structure “constrains” actors is to say that it only has behavioral effects. To say that a structure “constructs” actors is to say that it has property effects” (Wendt 1999: 26), which means that the structure of sovereignty exists, has effects, and changes “only because of agents and their practices” (Wendt 1999: 185).  16 Here, agency refers not to the “intentions people have in doing things but to their capability of doing those things in the first place” (Giddens 1984: 9). State sovereignty constitutes, delineates and organizes territory (territoriality), population and recognition (self-determination), authority and autonomy (non-interference).  17 These norms regulate behavior - what is permissible and are constitutive in terms - of what forms of actions and status are possible (Onuf 1989: 51). Norms can thus be more generally defined as a “standard of appropriate behavior for actors of a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1999: 251).  21 so because the UN distinguishes itself as a central convener on these matters. These latter points, of who is involved and where these changes are settled, are taken up in greater detail later, but first it is incumbent on me to outline what norms and which specific changes I intend to analyze.  There have been very substantial changes to the institution of sovereignty over time and across space. I am particularly interested in two instances of change. First, changes that resulted in globalizing the institution of state sovereignty after 1945 with national liberation movements achieving independence from colonial rule. Second, changes that took place from the 1970’s onwards with indigenous peoples demanding a further differentiation of sovereignty toward achieving greater degrees of autonomy and self-government. The norms of territoriality, non-interference and self-determination in these two cases transformed in several ways.  The main normative demand pursuit by National Liberation Movements and Indigenous Peoples concerns the norm of self-determination. At the same time, and contingent on changes to self-determination, the norm of non-interference has been contested in important ways and especially as a result of obligations contesting states practices of racial discrimination and unequal entitlements to rights. The norm of territoriality has equally undergone a transformation from territorial expansionism toward the strong codification of territorial inviolability of state borders from 1945 onwards. Today the norm of territoriality, while externally fixed, points towards internal territorial divisibility in relation to groups residing in states. As a guide the chart below offers an overview of the normative challenges, demands and changes during the two cases of my study.     22 Challengers/ Sovereignty Norms Self-determination Non-interference Territoriality    Post-1945 National Liberation Movements   Challenge: Unavailability for peoples outside Europe  Demand: Universalization  Change: Self-determination without distinction  Challenge: Unequal treatment of colonized peoples Demand: Independence/Self-Government Change: Racial Discrimination inappropriate  Challenge: Territorial colonial expansionism outdated Demand: Territorial Inviolability  Change: Territorial Integrity globalizes      Post-1970 Indigenous Peoples  Challenge: Unavailability for Indigenous Peoples  Demand: Universalization & Differentiation  Change: Indigenous Peoples secure right to self-determination  Challenge: Discrimination of Indigenous Peoples (e.g. assimilation) Demand: Autonomy/Self-Government Change: Limited/Ongoing  Challenge: Internal Divisibility Demand: Territorial Divisibility Change: Limited/Ongoing  Table 2.1 Modes of NSAs’ challenges, demands and changes to sovereignty norms These modes of norm based challenge, demand and change are central to my argument and fundamental to understanding the structuration of sovereignty.18 In the case where composite norms transform it is these challenges, demands and changes which help specify the mutual constitution of structure and agency. These modes present a framework to investigate non-state actors use of opportunity structures, such as the venues of an IGO. They use these venues in                                                                 18 Analyzing structuration, Giddens argues, “means studying the modes in which such systems, grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situated actors who draw upon rules and resources in the diversity of action contexts, are produced and reproduced in interaction” (Giddens 1984: 25). According to Giddens, specifying modalities help explain the changing properties of a social structure such as the institution of sovereignty; in so far as the composite parts of sovereignty have both enabling as well as constraining qualities (Giddens 1984: 28). That is, there are limits that sovereignty norms places on agency causing states and non-state actors to behave in a certain way and at certain historical moments.  23 order to alter the composite norms that a given sovereignty complex imposes upon them. I begin by discussing the norm of self-determination.  2.1.1.1 The Norm of Self-Determination  A claim to self-determination has been the central demand for national liberation movements and indigenous peoples. Self-determination at its core relates to the relationship between peoples and governments. It requires that peoples must consent to the government under which they choose to be governed. It is a potent political idea that has become broader and deeper than it was after World War I when it was first proclaimed by Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Point speech (Manela 2007). The most momentous transformation of self-determination came after World War II, when it became a universal right for all peoples in all territories, and especially those in overseas colonial territories. Today self-determination in principle extends to all peoples suffering from oppression by subjugation or domination by others (McCorquodale 1996: 9). Self-determination is as such intimately linked with the development of human rights after 1945.  Self-determination has since been argued to constitute a precondition for all other human rights in both international human rights covenants, related treaties, optional protocols and other international declarations relating to human rights.19 This link between self-determination and human rights creates the central challenge to the institution of state sovereignty. In fact, the presumption that individuals and groups of peoples possess internationally protected human rights that states are not at liberty to override is a profound post-1945 development and focus of this dissertation.   If we want to understand how states came to accept such a challenge it is useful to understand how the development of the norm of self-determination and human rights unfolded. I                                                                 19 It is included as the first article of the two international human rights covenants: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). (See more generally for the ratification status of human rights instruments Simmons 2009: 61).  24 propose that changes to the norm of self-determination and its link to human rights are usefully explained as a process of normative grafting by non-state actors and their allies. I borrow the notion of grafting from Richard Price “to refer to the combination of active, manipulative persuasion and the contingency of genealogical heritage in norm germination” (Price 1998: 617).20 Key for my purposes is the idea of norm germination because the ‘seed’ of self-determination grew from its limited application in Europe after World War I and attained universal status during decolonization and was subsequently clarified by the United Nations to apply to indigenous peoples living within states.  This process of universalizing self-determination went hand in hand with grafting it onto human rights. Grafting is thus different from simply contesting the validity of prevailing norms as it involves displacing the scope and context, to whom and what the norm applies, and thereby 'grows' with given normative grafts. Grafting involves persuasion tactics of connecting, in incremental steps, and by associating a new norm or interpretation of an existing norm “with pre-existing norms in the same issue area, which makes a similar prohibition or injunction” (Acharya 2004: 244). Given this useful organic analogy I propose that self-determination (as a precondition) is the rootstock onto which newly developing human rights were grafted. I analyze two grafting instances in my empirical chapters.   First, allies of national liberation movements secured the inclusion of self-determination and human rights as guiding principles of the UN Charter. They thereby planted the normative seed for universalizing self-determination and grafting it onto human rights to all peoples and especially those peoples living in overseas colonies.21 The newly formed United Nations                                                                 20 See also Farrell 2001; Cortell & Davies 2000 21 I substantiate insights such as those made by Reus-Smit who also argues that anti-colonial actors in the era of nationalism “reconstructed the collective rights to self-determination, arguing that it was a necessary prerequisite for the satisfaction of individuals civil and political rights. The net result was a tectonic shift in international legitimacy.  25 provided the main venue for challenging colonial understandings and practices of state sovereignty. It offered a critical space for actors to argue against the unavailability of self-determination to peoples outside of Europe and for universalizing the norm of self-determination while grafting it onto then developing human rights. Newly independent states from Africa and Asia (which more often than not had struggled for their own national liberation) and national liberation movements asserted that the peoples in the colonies were not second-class citizens of the colonies but were entitled to self-determination on the basis of equality and non-discrimination. Gradually, the norm of self-determination so constituted supported the decolonization of overseas colonies; its application meant independence. As more states gained independence, calls for self-determination by national liberation movements grew more common until the mid 1970’s when the majority of overseas colonial territories had gained sovereign statehood.22 Second, indigenous peoples drew on the United Nations to demand a “non-statist” conception of self-determination and grafted it onto existing human rights. This second grafting moment shifted existing UN interpretations of self-determination from a right for overseas colonies to gain independence towards affirming the right of indigenous peoples living within states to plural sovereignty arrangements, including the devolution of authority from the state to the governing structures of indigenous communities. These processes corrected the exclusion of indigenous peoples from bearing self-determining rights as "peoples." States, until this point, held that self-determination was limited to national liberation movements who had been using this norm to attain independent statehood. The progressive “non-statist” conception in this                                                                                                                                                                                                               By pushing for the strong international codification of human rights, and by grafting the right to self-determination to these emergent norms post-colonial states not only reasserted this right in universal terms, they undermined the normative foundations of empire” (Reus-Smit 2013: 153). 22 I am not investigating the quality of empirical statehood which resulted from decolonization but how national liberation movements used the UN to achieve independence (see especially Jackson for the former 1990).  26 second motion was different and aimed at a conception of self-determination as the inherent right of indigenous peoples to determine their own institutions, their composition and their functions. Although this conception may encompass the possibility of choosing full independence, indigenous peoples often focus on achieving various other forms of self-determination, such as autonomy, self-government, self-management and participation within states.23  2.1.1.2 The Norm of Non-Interference  The norm of non-interference is another central composite part of sovereignty because it provides the basic element of trust between states, allowing states to enter into agreements with each other while excluding external actors from intervening in a state's domestic authority structure (Mayall 1990: 20).24  Simply put the norm of non-interference entails that no other state or actor has a right to interfere in the internal affairs of a state. Accordingly the norm of non-interference guarantees that states are nominally “free within the situation they find themselves which consists externally of other states” while also offering governments a level of autonomy to arrange political life domestically (Jackson 1990: 6).25 Historically states thus drew a clear distinction between the domestic (internal) and the international (external) faces of sovereignty. This was based on the assumption that the state offers to its peoples a supply of political goods of                                                                 23 Aldrich & Connell demonstrated that autonomy and self-government arrangements have not been an anomaly to the decolonization of Non-Self-Governing Territories either but where a frequent choice by the peoples of micro-states and small islands (Aldrich & Connell 1998). 24 The norm of non-interference was first articulated by international legal scholars (De Vattel 1852: 155). Unlike the norm of territoriality, which I discuss below, the norm of non-interference “had virtually nothing to do with the Peace of Westphalia” and “was not clearly articulated until the end of the eighteenth century” (Krasner 1999: 20). 25 Sovereign states share the interest to limit internal interference. Non-interference, in its external face, is a norm of quid pro quo between formally equal sovereignties (Sørensen 2001: 152). This is because states, as co-equals, require some kind of reciprocity for the system to be considered systemic or societal. I define reciprocity according to Keohane, as “exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others is such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad” (Keohane 1986: 8).  27 order, stability, liberty and welfare from ruler to the ruled. In short, it was understood to secure the good life for its subjects.26  In this view, sovereign states were “free political systems in the negative meaning of freedom: freedom from” external interference although enjoying such a right does not necessarily mean that that there is “positive freedom: freedom to” act without constraint or obligation (Jackson 1999b: 455). The relationship between these positive and negative freedoms were recalibrated after World War II when the norm of non-interference transformed from an assertion by states only and also became contestable. Such contestations mainly refer to human rights violations committed by a government against its population or part of its population. Human rights foremost impact state autonomy, its claim to non-interference, because these rights stand in tension with state sovereignty. This is because the rights of individuals and groups limit what a state can do in its own jurisdiction (Falk 2000: 72).27 Since then states can no longer simply declare a right to non-interference they also have duties and obligations that trump non-interference and prescribes that states must justify their behavior.28 It is these duties that provide the main challenge to the norm of non-interference and can be changed when external actors, including non-state actors using IGOs, influence the authority structures of state’s.29 As Krasner has put it:                                                                  26 There is a clear link between self-determination and non-interference. Non-interference lies at the intersection of dynastic and popular sovereignty. In the former, sovereignty was autocratic and absolutist - non-interference was predominately an assurance against outside interference. But it was the latter which challenged dynastic and absolute monarchies through expressions of self-determination (Wight 1977: 159). Popular sovereignty intimately relates to the rise of national self-determination which first began in Europe and then elsewhere (Mayall 1990: 27). 27 See also Brown 2002. 28 It was not a new norm but was used by the United States, Central and South American states to proclaim and sustain independence from their colonial sovereigns. In doing so, these newly independent states wrested independence from the European powers by, on the one hand accepting the status quo by adhering to existing colonial administrative boundaries but, on the other, “also [excluding] the rights of conquest and occupation” amongst each other (Lalonde 2002: 28). 29 Krasner (1999) is correct to note that such a challenge can be achieved through intervention (often by way of coercion) or by invitation (by way of state co-operation). I am particularly interested in the latter.  28 Global human rights norms are a direct challenge to one aspect of the authority of the state, its right to regulate relations between its subjects and their rulers free of external interference. […] Universal human rights norms […] prescribe standards that all regimes must honor. The state might be the only actor that can establish authoritative rules within its own borders, but universal human rights norms imply that it cannot set any rule that it pleases (Krasner 2001: 237).   When the ideal of state autonomy and the legitimation by its population, or part of its population, are in dispute the norm of non-interference is challenged. This is especially evident when non-state actors mobilize against gross human rights violations and when they contest the form of government as discriminatory. It is a challenge to non-interference because these actors foremost question the constitutional status of a given sovereign state. It is a challenge by non-state actors mobilizing against states to be accountable ‘from below,’ and the focus here ‘from above,’ to international human rights obligations to parts of the population (Simmons 2009, Keck & Sikkink 1998, Brysk 1993). As David Lake puts it  It is often possible to observe authority only in “out-of-equilibrium” situations when a subordinate challenges the dominant polity. But, paradoxically, it is precisely in these situations that authority has already started to break down (Lake 2003: 315).  Non-state actors challenging state sovereignty at its core comes in at least two types of interest to my study: claims by irredentist, secessionist or national liberation movements to independence and claims by ethnic minorities as well as indigenous peoples to varying forms of autonomy or self-government.30 These actors draw on the norm of self-determination (as a human right) to                                                                 30 States, in light of the primacy of safeguarding territorial integrity, have shown themselves “allergic” to allow for secession at all times (Kohen 2006: 3). Colonial subjects on the other hand were largely successful, not only because the accepted colonial borders, but also because the international context helped them to dislodge colonial attempts towards “gradual self-government” based on a “sacred trust” as unjust and outdated (Philpott 2001). Ethnic minorities claims were - especially after World War I - addressed, through limited special rights, by guaranteeing basic civil and political rights to them. States felt that minorities must be subordinated to the larger interest in “making the national state secure, and its institutions stable, even at the cost of obliterating minority cultures and imposing homogeneity upon the population” (Claude 1955: 80). Indigenous peoples’ measures at the time were largely paternalistic because indigenous groups were seen as unable to cope with the “strenuous conditions of modern life” until they were ready to stand on their own as equal and undifferentiated citizens of states (Kymlicka 2007: 32).  29 challenge the norm of non-interference domestically as well as externally, and especially through the United Nations. Yet as has been argued such claims can, but do not necessarily, change the institution of state sovereignty and depend on the legitimacy of NSAs, monitoring and enforcement procedures of the United Nations as well as the compliance by states with the IGO and NSAs (Krasner 1999: 118). The extent to whether or not a challenge to the norm of non-interference has an impact is an empirical question of norm consistent behavior.  I intend to build on insights that have demonstrated how international human rights affect domestic structural change, that is change to the norm of non-interference, via the so-called “norm life cycle” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). According to the authors the norm life cycle can be conceived of as a three-stage process. The first stage is characterized by ‘‘norm emergence,” the second stage involves broad norm acceptance, which they term a ‘‘norm cascade,” and the third stage involves the internalization and institutionalization of the norm. In the first phase a characteristic mechanism involves persuasion by norm entrepreneurs and includes that non-state actors that are repressed by a given state seek out transnational contacts and/or activate links with Intergovernmental Organizations.  When channels between the state and its domestic actors are blocked, the boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of transnational networks may occur: domestic NGOs [read non-state actors] bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside (Keck & Sikkink 1998: 12).   In the second phase norm violating states are questioned by non-state actors and their allies in the international sphere and ‘almost always’ deny or refuse to accept the validity of non-state actor claims, countering that these matters are subject to a state’s domestic jurisdiction. At this point “norm leaders” seek to socialize others at the international level to comply (Keck & Sikkink  30 1998: 902).31 In the last phase norms take on a ‘prescriptive status’ and ‘taken-for-granted’ quality and states accept their validity. This may include that states no longer denounce criticism as interference in their internal affairs and that they alter their constitution or domestic law. In this last phase states exhibit ‘norm-consistent behavior’ and implement changes that non-state actors have pursued. This, in the case of national liberation movements, meant transferring sovereignty to colonial peoples from colonial rule and in the case of indigenous peoples to establish autonomy or self-government arrangements. Importantly, the “norm life cycle” is useful for my purpose because it does not assume evolutionary progress but recognizes that individual states may regress before fully moving from one phase to the next stage. In fact, they may not progress at all.32 What is more, by focusing on these three stages I can also identify dominant modes of interaction by different states at given moments of normative challenge, demand and change. I analyze two challenges to the norm of non-interference.   Obligations stemming from non-state groups that could interfere with the internal affairs of states were largely ignored by states up until the end of World War II. This trend continued after the war and the early years in the evolution of international human rights. The sponsoring states of the United Nations ensured that the new principles of human rights did not infringe on the domestic jurisdiction of any state (Normand & Zaidi 2008: 135). Notwithstanding, beginning in the 1950s and throughout the 1960s, colonial states’ attempts to uphold the norm of non-interference were effectively thwarted by the growing consensus that colonialism had to be brought to a swift and unconditional end. As a consequence, and with the acceptance of self-determination as a human right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and more specifically the landmark Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Peoples and                                                                 31 States begin to react under international pressure and seek “cosmetic changes” by way of tactical concessions.  32 See also the “spiral model” (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999).  31 Territories in 1960, and by 1966 the two Human Rights Covenants the anti-colonial movement effectively limited the norm of non-interference colonial states had been able to uphold.  What types of human rights violations justify interference in the internal affairs of states has since been a subject of international debate, a debate that states continuously confront and especially in cases were the treatment of its population is enacted on the basis of racial discrimination and unequal availability to rights. In this way the challenge to the norm of non-interference, first engendered by national liberation movements, still persists as in the case of indigenous peoples. Especially with the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007 indigenous peoples now possess an international tool to contend that constitutional adjustments are necessary in order to overcome practices impeding on their ability to live and develop freely as distinct groups. As James Anaya the former Special-Rapporteur on the Rights on Indigenous Peoples put it:   UNDRIP conditions […] or calls upon states to exercise their sovereignty in a certain way and in this case in a way that accommodates the rights of indigenous peoples which include their own rights of self-government. [It] is an international standard from outside the domestic political domain that calls upon states to organize that domestic political domain in a way, to accommodate internal self-government of indigenous peoples. [UNDRIP] requires recognition of sovereignties of indigenous peoples in particular (Interview Anaya 2014).   My discussion up to this point established that neither self-determination nor non-interference are static norms; both have been challenged and proven mutable over time and especially since 1945.33 Moreover, taken together they pose a basic problem to investigate alterations to state sovereignty: Demands for self-determination by non-state actors engender tensions for states                                                                 33 These are not the only instances of contestations related to the norm of non-interference. For example, Cynthia Weber provided a historical analysis of the “sovereignty/intervention boundary” (Weber 1995). Discussion on the Responsibility to Protect equally throw light on these questions.    32 aiming to uphold the norm of non-interference. This tensions also impacts the third composite norm of state sovereignty: territoriality.  2.1.1.3 The Territoriality Norm  State sovereignty is often equated with a fixed conception of territorial exclusivity.34 In this extreme form, which Agnew called the territorial trap, scholars assume that states have authority - are sovereigns - over a geographically defined space within demarcated borders (Agnew 1994). State, territory and authority in these definitions are so tightly coupled that they become one and the same, they are reified. Such a view of territoriality is in my view highly problematic not because borders and political space are not important or a defining feature of states but because these accounts tell us nothing about how territoriality norms change. On the contrary my contention is that territoriality norms have changed substantially and continue to change.  First of all, to treat territoriality as a fixed characteristic of sovereignty constitutes a form of historical amnesia by obscuring how territorial exclusivity expanded outward during colonial expansion.35 This is to say that especially European states may have shared a principle of territorial exclusivity amongst each other, but they did so by ignoring the territorial claims of those whom they colonized. From this perspective territorial conquest was the rule and territorial exclusivity the exception. Apart from entailing expansive use of force, European conquest and colonization in fact raised fundamental questions on how Europeans could “lawfully claim sovereignty” over the territories of non-Europeans. Europeans justified this by treating non-                                                                34 As Krasner argues “states exist in specific territories, within which domestic political authorities are the sole arbiters of legitimate behavior” (Krasner 1999: 20). This is corroborated by arguments stating that the concept of sovereignty “altered the structure of the international system by basing political authority on the principle of territorial exclusivity” (Spruyt 1994: 3). 35 It was not until early nineteenth century that “rule came to be defined exclusively in terms of territories with boundaries between homogenous spatial authority claims” (Branch 2011: 6).    33 European territories as territorium nullius (Keal 2003: 50). Also known as terra nullius, it meant that  a tract of territory [that was judged as] not subject to any sovereignty - either because it has never been so subject, or, having once been in that condition, has been abandoned [is] open to acquisition by a process analogous to that by which property can be acquired in ownerless things (Lindley 1969: 10).  Such spurious legal claims allowed Europeans to occupy territory that was, in their minds, settled by “backward” peoples who did not conform to European understandings of sovereignty. Colonial powers later, in the nineteenth century, used the principle of terra nullius to challenge other colonial states to effectively having to occupy colonial territories. Particularly during the so-called Scramble for Africa, terra nullius served to “avoid conflict between European states” by providing a standard for having to physically occupy a given African colonial territory to claim sovereign rights to it (Keal 2003: 52). In fact, the vast majority of territorial demarcations were defined by European states in the Berlin Act of 1885 through an application of terra nullius and “drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s feet have ever trod” (quoted in Ajibola 1994: 53). Thus territoriality norms were justified through a logic of expansionism of space and not only of exclusivity per se.   Second, only by the end of the decolonization process did the norm of “territorial integrity” actually globalize for the first time when it took on a prescriptive status of who has the right to govern a given territory (Zacher 2001).36 That is the idea that peoples should have the right to choose their government (by way of self-determination) which included that they should                                                                 36 This "territorial integrity" norm was itself first articulated in the Covenant of the League of Nations after World War I and the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was the first to outlaw conquest and aggression.  34 also be free from territorial aggrandizement by other states (Antstis & Zacher 2010).37 It was ultimately the devastation of the Second World War that had rested on wars of territorial expansion, which provided the norm of territorial integrity with a defining status for the relations amongst states - notably in the UN Charter Article 2(4). This was a sea change and ended that the territoriality norm entailed a right of conquest by the strong over the weak. Moreover, it went hand in hand with a decline of terra nullius as the principle of uti possidetis, its possideatis (“as you possess, so may you possess”) was applied to determine the territorial boundaries of newly independent states. As a consequence of this application colonial boundaries in the overseas colonies became “the almost exact basis for territorial division of independent Africa which would then be fossilized” by the resolution of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1964 and further cemented in the UN Declaration on Friendly Relations and Peaceful Cooperation Amongst States in 1970 (Griffiths 1994: 51; Ayoob 1995).38 In short, newly independent states first accepted and later on cemented the inviolability of colonial borders.   Third, as a result of fixing the territoriality integrity norm in this way the cultural diversity of peoples living in these demarcated territories was largely ignored. Little attention was paid to the culturally diverse character of the indigenous peoples of the non-European world.39 Despite this it has been persuasively argued that territoriality norms do not need to be                                                                 37 The authors argue that, similar to my own argument for the first case study, that there are four norms at the heart of the international territorial order since 1945: territorial integrity, uti possidetis, self-determination and human rights (Antstis & Zacher 2010: 306). 38 Uti possidetis, its possideatis was also applied by the United States, Central and South American states to proclaim and sustain independence from their colonial sovereigns. These newly independent states wrested independence from the European powers by adhering to existing colonial administrative boundaries but also by excluding the rights of conquest and occupation amongst each other (Lalonde 2002: 28). They institutionalized that no territory could be considered terra nullius. In fact, even territories that had never been occupied were by “common consent deemed occupied in law from the first hour” (Schwarzberger 1957: 304). Uti possidetis was again applied during the decolonization of African and Asia post World War II. 39 This in turn raises questions of whether or not the principle of territorial integrity actually guarantees a less conflictual world in the future. As Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, noted in 1969: “We must be more concerned about peace and justice […] than we are about the sanctity of the boundaries we inherit” (quoted in Anstis  35 eternally fixed simply because “even where system of rule are territorial, and even where territoriality is relatively fixed" prevailing territoriality norms "need not entail mutual exclusion” (Ruggie 1993:  149). This insight can be observed domestically and internationally.  An unbundling of fixed territoriality is observable at the international level and pushed by developments making IGOs more authoritative on issues that are ultimately trans-territorial in nature. The applications of human rights regimes of indigenous peoples I am concerned with, for instance, offer evidence for “normative sovereignty as a counterpoint to the traditions of territorial sovereignty” (Falk 2000: 74). The unbundling of territoriality is equally evident in ongoing dynamics of domestic resistance by non-state actors; that is, by the dynamics of self-determination. These domestic and international developments point towards the devolution of territoriality towards non-state actors yet within a system that still maintains territorial integrity vis-à-vis other states. Such processes mean that territorial space can be divided and distributed "to create complex jurisdictional arrangements involving settlements that must be continuously renegotiated, as well as uncertainties that must be navigated by dialogue” (Inayatullah & Blaney 2004: 213). Here, although limited to date, devolving authority over territorial space to groups such as indigenous peoples, by way of differentiating sovereignty, can lead to further transformations of the norm of territorial integrity that dominates today.   2.2 Conceptualizing Conditions for Non-State Actors Challenging the Institution of State Sovereignty through United Nations Venues The explicit analytical focus of this dissertation is to develop and apply three explanatory factors that non-state actors (NSAs) must find and expand in order to challenge the institution of state                                                                                                                                                                                                               & Zacher 2010: 319). A question that the international community undoubtedly will have to consider in light of demands by sub-state groups.  36 sovereignty through the United Nations, an Intergovernmental Organization.40 This sections specifies first and foremost that non-state actors require meaningful access and participation capabilities to relevant UN venues. Second, such access and participation not only depends on non-state actors seeking access but involves the critical, even essential, role of allies and may include state diplomats, secretariat staff as well as independent experts active in the IGO. Third, non-state actors and allies’ combined agency is most salient in the nested structure of IGO’ venues. They essentially work to create and adapt venues in order to make access and participation channels available to non-state actors. This is to say that access and participation by non-state actors is a contingent function of more than their demand to access and participate in an IGO but it is also dependent on the role of allies and relates to the relevance of propitious venues in which non-state actors partake. I a) outline key terms including non-state actors, national liberation movements and indigenous peoples; b) offer conceptualizations for the dimensions of access and participation by these non-state actors; to c) address the relevance of venues in the nested structure of the UN; d) consider the specific role allies play and e) offer a dynamic theory statement of the above factors. 2.2.1 Defining Non-State Actors  Non-state actors are agents acting domestically and/or transnationally. I use the term non-state actors to denote those who mobilize in both realms and who exist within a global governance framework in order to challenge state sovereignty. This is to say, I acknowledge that not all non-state actors are transnational actors nor do they all challenge fundamental institutions. I am interested in those that do. They include actors such as citizens' movements and organized/mobilized indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They may also be individuals like human rights advocates, international lawyers,                                                                 40 These conditions may also apply to other actors interested in influencing IGO policies and institutions in general.   37 members of epistemic communities comprised of academics and scientists (Haas 1992; Risse-Kappen 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998, Barnett & Finnemore 2004).41 Whatever their differences they all interact across state borders and think and act as transnational actors with a core of set values and shared principled beliefs. As such non-state actors generally form networks of varying and overlapping types to pursue coordinated or collective action aimed at influencing international outcomes, domestic policies and state behavior and identities (Kahler 2009: 5). These networks tend to be non-hierarchical and converge around "voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange" (Keck & Sikkink 1998: 8). Apart from these basic characteristics non-state actors can aim to alter not only domestic politics but also the structure of international politics in which states, NSAs and IGOs are embedded. This latter characteristic is especially the case for the two non-state actors I am concerned with here, namely national liberation movements and indigenous peoples.  I posit that both these NSAs must be distinguished from other non-state actors such as NGOs that organize around specific issues in their purview. First and foremost, neither national liberation movements nor indigenous peoples define themselves as NGOs but seek out international contacts as groups and collectivities of “peoples” claiming rights to self-determination. Second, while they may share the organizational characteristics of other NSAs they present specific types which not only challenge the behavior of states but question and contest states’ very identity as sovereigns over them. They are, to varying degrees, moral, political and territorial contenders of state’s and as such present especially hard cases of non-                                                                41 This definition also excludes corporations and other entities such as criminal networks. They NSA’s I am concerned with can be part of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) that share specific values, principled beliefs, and a common discourse (Keck & Sikkink 1998: 2). They may also organize around authoritative claims to consensual knowledge (Haas 1992).  38 state actors challenging state sovereignty through IGOs.42 In this connection it is equally important to recognize that both national liberation movements’ and indigenous peoples’ claims rest on the legacy of European colonialism and the deeply entrenched consequences of dispossession of non-European peoples around the world.     With this in mind I throughout the remainder of this dissertation use the term national liberation movements to refer to organized groups whose goal is to achieve national liberation of their peoples and their territories from colonial control and achieve independence.43 National liberation movements lay claim to be the representatives of peoples not yet constituted as states. Critically, and important in light of my focus on the co-constitution of structure and agents, liberation movements who achieved independence therefore transitioned in status from non-state to state actors. As Clapham put it "they earned their independence, and with it the right to run the new government;" a government whose very identity was shaped by their struggle for national liberation (Clapham 2012: 3). This latter point is especially important to consider because as state diplomats of newly independent states former national liberation actors played critical roles to open the venues of the UN for other national liberation movements during the post-1945 decolonization era.   While recognizing the wide variety of definitional approaches to indigenous peoples I draw on the most widely cited and accepted working definition:  Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are                                                                 42 Other non-state actors, depending on the scope of their contestation, also challenge state sovereignty.   43 Inherent in the movements of national liberation is “the existence of an historically constituted national entity […] or the coming into existence of such an entity — through popular aspirations, forged in the struggle against an oppressive and irreducibly alien ‘Other’ (Gibson 1972: 3; See on nationalism Anderson 2006).  39 determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system (Cobo 1987: 42).  I do not intend to resolve the question of definition here.44 As the empirical chapter demonstrates I find evidence for a constructivist reading in relation to defining indigenous peoples in so far as they assert the principle of self-definition and by having gained recognition of their legal personality and moved from object to subject in international law. They are, as such, also part of a constitutive processes of international recognition. With these working definitions of liberation movements and indigenous peoples I now turn to the conditions of access.  2.2.2 Conceptualizing Non-State Actor Access and Participation  The access of non-state actors to IGOs is different from their participation in IGOs, “even if the two often go together” (Tallberg et.al 2013: 8). By access I refer to the institutional mechanisms by which NSAs enter and take part in an IGO, participation in turn denotes the discursive activities and capabilities of NSAs using specific institutional venues. At its most basic level access is dependent both on the institutional design and the ongoing adaptation of institutional design features that afford non-state actors entry into the IGO. Access thereby preconditions the actual participation of NSA’s and can be enabling or constraining.  2.2.2.1 Non-State Actor Access: Form and Status   A key condition for the ability of non-state actors to use the United Nations in order to challenge state sovereignty is based on how they access the organization as competent actors and whether or not such access enables or constrains their ability to effectively participate in IGO venues.45 I                                                                 44 I discussed the role of IGOs in the evolution of the legal category of indigenous peoples elsewhere (Lüdert 2013). 45 The number of non-state actors, especially of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), has increased tremendously in IGOs over the last decades. For example, in 1948 a total of 40 NGOs had consultative status in the  40 conceive of two primary dimensions that relate to the access of non-state actors to the UN: form and status.  By form I refer to the formal and informal channels by which NSAs enter. First, IGOs who grant institutional access to NSAs “should not be misunderstood as an exclusive focus on formal features” (Talberg et.al. 2013: 26). Rather, I agree with these scholars, and conceive of access in both formal and informal terms. Typically, IGO’s including the UN, determine the form of access to non-state actors through specific formal accreditation mechanisms (Vabulas 2011). Formal access is also often regulated by rules of procedures. Informal access is developed through customs, decisions, practices and precedent by states and authoritative actors such as chairpersons of specialized venues.  Moreover, the form of access prescribes and proscribes the field of action of non-state actors within an IGO.46 Considering the form of access is then important because states are usually the decision-makers over granting access while non-state actors are more constrained and seek "access" to information or offer information to those that make decisions. Non-state actors may also seek physical access to plenary meetings, conference halls and official meetings so they can observe, monitor, petition and interact with states and other non-state actors in these proceedings. They may seek to access administrative offices in the secretariat and other agencies. They may also aim to circulate their own documents, to participate in meetings, to have access to documents and to gain entry to informal gatherings, preparatory meetings and hearings.                                                                                                                                                                                                                UN while approximately 3.900 are accredited today (E/2013/INF/6). The UN continued to revise these relationships over the years (Ziegler 1998: 30; Stephenson 2000: 273