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The securitization of free trade in Northeast Asia Kennedy, Trevor Patrick 2016

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   THE SECURITIZATION OF FREE TRADE IN NORTHEAST ASIA  by Trevor Patrick Kennedy B.A., St. Thomas University, 2011   A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF   MASTER OF ARTS  in  THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Asia Pacific Policy Studies)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)   August 2016  © Trevor Patrick Kennedy, 2016 ii  Abstract  This research considers the rise of bilateral free trade agreements and regional trade agreements in Northeast Asia and their impact on regional security policies, through an analysis of securitization at the government level in China, Japan, and South Korea under current governments/administrations. This thesis finds that the approach to securitization and subsequent policy formulation in the region is diverging between Japan, which seeks to promote and use free trade agreements to bolster ties with regionally important countries in a bid to reduce reliance and the likelihood of Chinese economic dependency, and China and South Korea, which are both promoting regionally inclusive trade ties as a means to promote economic interdependence and stability.    The methods of investigation employed in this thesis are both qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative analysis is based on merchandise trade data, demonstrating the importance of trade among the aforementioned countries. Polling data is also used to illustrate current attitudes towards neighbours. Qualitative analysis relies on a mix of economic and international relations literature on subjects related to trade and security, including securitization. Analysis is also based on government policy documents, speeches, and journalistic articles.       iii  Preface   This entire thesis is unpublished and was produced independently and originally.                        iv  Table of Contents Abstract ..................................................................................................................... ii Preface ..................................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents .................................................................................................... iv List of Tables ........................................................................................................... vi Chapter  1: Hot Economics, Cool Politics .............................................................. 1 1.1 Current Order ............................................................................................... 1 1.2 Literature Review ......................................................................................... 3 1.3 Consociational Security Order ..................................................................... 3 1.4 Regional vs. Multilateral Order ..................................................................... 5 1.5 Trade Diversion ............................................................................................ 8 1.6 Trade Creation ............................................................................................. 9 1.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 10 Chapter  2: Dependency, Interdependence, Functionalism, and the Securitization of Free Trade .......................................................................................................... 12 2.1 Dependency and Interdependence ............................................................ 12 2.2 Functionalism ............................................................................................. 16 2.3 Summary of Literature ............................................................................... 17 2.4 Securitization ............................................................................................. 18 2.5 Connecting Theories .................................................................................. 21 Chapter  3: The Securitization of Free Trade in Northeast Asia ......................... 22 3.1 The Securitization of Free Trade in China ................................................. 23 3.2 China’s Referent Objects ........................................................................... 25 3.3 China’s Securitizing Actors ........................................................................ 27 v  3.4 China’s Audience Acceptance ................................................................... 30 3.5 The Securitization of Free Trade in Japan ................................................. 31 3.6 Japan’s Referent Objects ........................................................................... 32 3.7 Japan’s Securitizing Actors ........................................................................ 33 3.8 Japan’s Audience Acceptance ................................................................... 37 3.9 The Securitization of Free Trade in South Korea ....................................... 38 3.10 South Korea’s Referent Object .................................................................. 40 3.11 South Korea’s Securitizing Actors .............................................................. 40 3.12 South Korea’s Audience acceptance ......................................................... 44 Chapter  4: Conclusion .......................................................................................... 46 Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 49              vi  List of Tables  Table 1.1    Total Merchandise Trade by Partner in $USD Billions (2015) ................. 2 Table 1.2    Percent of Respondents with Unfavourable Views of Neighbouring NEA Countries .................................................................................................................... 3 Table 1.3    Change in Percent of Total Merchandise Trade (2005-2015) ................. 5                  1  Chapter 1: Hot Economics, Cool Politics  Economic ties have underpinned peaceful relations in Northeast Asia (NEA) among China, Japan, and South Korea throughout much of the post-World War II period. However, as trade flows shift and economic imbalances grow, it is unclear if economic interdependence will continue to serve as a stabilizing force. Furthermore, the rise of regional trade agreements (RTA) and bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) in the post-Doha world may serve to reinforce or compromise important economic ties among the aforementioned countries. The current generation of leaders in China, Japan, and South Korea have sought to address the changing nature of trade brought on by RTAs and FTAs, by securitizing trade agreements, albeit from different vantage points.   The following chapters will evaluate the securitization of free trade in NEA by considering relevant qualitative and quantitative factors. Through a comprehensive analysis, this paper aims to paint a clear picture of how RTAs and FTAs are impacting the vision of a security order in contemporary Northeast Asia.   1.1 Current Order The current security order in NEA has developed in part, as a positive externality of strong economic relations among regional powers. Relations between regional powers are often characterized as a mix of strong economic relations, with neighbours representing important trade and investment partners, and tepid or cold political/security relations. Trade, in recent history, has been particularly significant. In 2015, Japan’s first and third largest merchandise trade partners were China and South Korea, respectively, with the United States, a non-Asian regional power, representing Japan’s second 2  largest trade partner. For China, its third and fourth largest trade partners count Japan and South Korea, with the U.S. representing China’s largest trade relationship. As for South Korea, the same trend is true, with China and Japan making up South Korea’s first and third largest trade relationship, with the U.S. representing the second largest trade relationship. Despite high levels of economic integration, large segments of civil society and political leaders in the region view one another with suspicion. For example, the Pew Research Center study, How Asia-Pacific Publics See Each Other and Their National Leaders in 2015, found that a majority or a large minority of respondents in China, Japan, and South Korea, had negative views of their neighbours. Beyond perception, security tensions have also been on the rise among the aforementioned trade partners, resulting in an odd arrangement of close economic ties, but poor foreign/security relations.  Total Merchandise Trade by Partner in $USD Billions (2015) Rank\Reporting Country China  Japan  South Korea  1. United States  554 China  269 China  227 2. Hong Kong  340 United States  192 United States  113 3. Japan 278 South Korea  70 Japan 71 4. South Korea  275 Taiwan 60  Vietnam  37 5. Taiwan 189 Thailand  48 Hong Kong  31  Table 1.1 Total Merchandise Trade by Partner in $USD Billions1                                                               1 Data sourced from Global Trade Atlas 3   Percent of Respondents with Unfavourable Views of Neighbouring NEA Countries Reporter\Country  Japan China South Korea Japan  89% 75% China 81%  41% South Korea 73% 37%  Table 1.2 Percent of Respondents with Unfavourable Views of Neighbouring NEA Countries2  1.2 Literature Review Colloquially, the arrangement in NEA has been referred to as ‘hot economics, cool politics.’ The existence of poor political relations coexisting along with economic interdependence has resulted in a relative, but tenuous peace among NEA states within the trade equilibrium. Various theoretical explanations have been posited to explain this type of security order.      1.3 Consociational Security Order An interesting, but unconventional explanation for the current order in NEA is Acharya’s Consociational Security Order (CSO). Acharya defines the CSO as a, “relationship of mutual accommodation among unequal and culturally diverse groups that preserves each group’s relative autonomy and prevents the hegemony of any particular group/s” (2014). this arrangement relies on a number of factors, including, “interdependence, equilibrium, institutions under shared leadership, and elite restraint.” With this definition in mind, this chapter will review the importance of economic interdependence as a factor responsible for sustaining the region order.                                                            2 Data sourced from Pew Research Center report How Asia-Pacific Publics See Each Other and their National Leaders 2015 4  Economic interdependence has developed largely by regional proximity, with global value chains extending throughout the region. However, Acharya notes that, “Further growth of economic interdependence in Asia is constrained by concerns about unequal benefits of regional trade agreements, fear of Chinese dominance, the rise of bilateral trade arrangements, and the launching of a separate trade liberalization track by the United States, the Trans-Pacific Partnership” (2014). Acharya is not immediately concerned with the diminishing of economic interdependence, but warns that if trends continue, the collapse of economic interdependence could limit the sustainability of the CSO in the region.  While recently signed multilateral agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), or ratified bilateral agreements (Japan-Australia FTA, China-Korea FTA, etc.) are too new to observe their long-term impact on regional trade flows, states have already begun to diversify their trade away from one another. From 2005-2015, China (from 13% to 7%) and South Korea (from 13% to 7%) witnessed a 44% decline in their trade reliance on Japan. Japan (from 6% to 5%) and China (from 8% to 7%) also experienced a decline in their trade reliance with South Korea during the same time period. While trade reliance on South Korea and Japan waned, both Japan and South Korea became more economically dependent on China.   The signing of bilateral or regional trade agreements (RTA) excluding Japan, China, or South Korea could lead to further trade divergence, decreasing economic interdependence. The increasing dependence on China, on the other hand, risks curtailing the existence of a CSO, as it may place a disproportionate amount of economic power within China’s hands, to the detriment of South Korea and Japan. If 5  this trend continues, China may evolve into a hegemonic power, resulting from Japan and South Korea’s economic dependence on China, ending the consociational nature of Acharya’s CSO model.  Decreasing trade reliance on China may be viewed constructively within the context of the CSO. Adjusting South Korean and Japanese trade reliance to levels proportional to China’s reliance on South Korea and Japan could strengthen equilibrium, reducing the likeliness of a hegemonic Chinese economic relationship emerging.  Change in Percent of Total Merchandise Trade (2005-2015) Reporter\Trade Partner  Japan  China  South Korea  Japan   +25% -12% China  -44%  -9% South Korea  -44% +28%  Table 1.3 Change in Percent of Total Merchandise Trade (2005-2015)3 1.4 Regional vs. Multilateral Trade In recent history, RTAs and bilateral FTAs have grown out of stalled trade developments in multilateral/plurilateral forums. As exclusionary regional and bilateral agreements continue to proliferate, in lieu of World Trade Organization (WTO) development, there is a greater potential that trade policies will have an impact on security. According to Kent Jones, “RTAs reveal the propensity of governments to play favorites and play politics in trade policy” (2015). In Jones’ framework, countries often decide to pursue free trade agreements based on factors beyond the pursuit of trade liberalization. These types of agreements have been most prominent in the “Pacific region,” and “the growth and spread of regional supply chains has reinforced their                                                           3 Data sourced from Global Trade Atlas 6  popularity.” To ensure that non-members do not gain a backdoor into a trade area, restrictive rules of origin (ROO) are often set, to deter circumvention, but can also act as a protectionist measure to exclude supply chains connecting to non-member economies.  RTAs established among regional political rivals can be implemented to strengthen economic interdependence, yet they can also be established in a manner that discriminates trade against non-members. The China-Japan-Korea FTA is an example of an inclusive agreement capable of strengthening value chains and commerce between its members. It could also exacerbate the growing economic dependence on China for South Korea and Japan. Another inclusive FTA, but with a wider regional focus is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).  RCEP includes all three NEA economies as well as a host of economies in Asia and Australia. RCEP could increase economic dependence on China while at the same time decreasing economic dependence on the United States (a non-member to RCEP negotiations).  The aforementioned agreements are at very early stages and may never be concluded. Less regionally inclusive agreements, on the other hand, have already been signed and will likely be ratified. For example, South Korea and China have concluded and signed the China-Korea FTA. This agreement excludes Japan, and Japan does not have any similar bilateral agreements with either China or South Korea. The China-Korea FTA has been observed as an FTA with political overtones. Cimino-Isaacs, et al, analyzed the agreement and concluded that, the “Korea-China FTA disappointed both business leaders and trade experts, who had expected the deal to both bolster commercial ties and set a new standard for Chinese trade liberalization. But political 7  interests trumped economic objectives” (2015). The China-Korea FTA may result in further decreasing Japan’s economic interdependence with China and South Korea and with ROO set at a high range of 60-40%; it is unlikely that Japanese trade may access the free trade area through a backdoor.  Japan too, has signed an FTA, which excludes South Korea and China, the TPP. The TPP is an RTA boasting the membership of 12 economies bordering the Pacific Ocean. Officially, membership to the agreement was open to any Asia Pacific economy willing to negotiate an ambitious and comprehensive agreement. Member countries, during negotiation, would also have had to have scored a passing mark in the American Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP). Under the amended Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), fast-track authority cannot be granted when negotiating with countries that failed to place above tier 3 on the TIP. TPA stipulates that Congress cannot authorize the executive to negotiate an FTA with a country in the following scenario: with a country to which the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking are applicable and the government of which does not fully comply with such standards and is not making significant efforts to bring the country into compliance (commonly referred to as a “tier 3” country), as determined in the most recent annual report on trafficking in persons. (S.995 - Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015) While this amendment barred Thailand (Rosenberg, Cochrane, 2015) from joining the TPP negotiation, Japan (tier 2), South Korea (tier 1), and China (tier 2 watch list) all passed the minimum standard required to negotiate in an agreement with which the United States is party. This alludes, in the case of China and South Korea, to either a political exclusion or exclusion based on a low level of ambition.  8  South Korea and China may join the TPP at a later date, but if they don’t, it may drive an economic wedge between South Korea and China, and Japan and TPP members. 1.5 Trade Diversion  The creation of customs unions or other trade arrangements that are exclusionary may lead to an increase in trade among members and trade away from non-members. Viner found that trade agreements can either create new trade (trade creation), which is a positive externality of trade liberalization, or they can divert trade (trade diversion), a negative externality of trade liberalization (1950). Trade creation may increase trade dependency among members, and decrease dependency on non-members due to a relative slowing or trade growth. Trade diversion, on the other hand, leads to non-members losing trade to members, rather than new trade being creating as a result of trade liberalization. Favouritism among members increases economic interdependence, while decreasing economic interdependence among non-members. Applying this theory to the European Economic Community (EEC), Balassa found that both trade creation—among members—and trade diversion—among non-members, had occurred within the early years of the EEC (1967).  Observing the same trends with new RTAs, the World Bank Group in its January 2015 Global Economic Prospects report found that it is likely that non-members of the TPP, within the region, will suffer from limited trade diversion effects. The authors of the report found that among TPP non-members:  Trade diversion effects could be limited. Non-discriminatory liberalization effects (positive spillovers) account for 21 percent of the gains of members and 42 9  percent of estimated global gains, reflecting improved regulatory processes and the streamlining and harmonization of NTMs (non-tariff measures) and investment barriers among TPP members. As a result, aggregate GDP losses to non-members could be of limited size (0.1 percent by 2030). Only in Korea, Thailand and some other Asian countries, the estimated GDP losses would exceed 0.3 percent of GDP since they would lose competitiveness in TPP members (2015). The impact to current trade flows is expected to be minimal. However, this analysis is based on the TPP in its current form. The TPP contains an accession clause in Chapter 30: Final Provisions, which could open the door to any non-members that are also members of the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) and to any other state that is a non-member of APEC, so long as the existing parties to the party agree. The TPP may also undergo a series of modernizations, which could have a dramatic effect on existing trade flows between members and non-members. The long-term entrenchment of overlapping RTAs could have a discernable impact on trade flows between Japan, South Korea, and China.  1.6 Trade Creation  As mentioned before, Viner’s work on customs unions found that trade agreements can create new trade between partners, and not merely reroute existing trade away from non-members to members. Trade creation, if possible, could have an equally disruptive impact on existing levels of economic interdependence among NEA states. Testing whether or not bilateral FTAs (as a case study) increase bilateral trade between partners, Baier and Bergstrand found that bilateral FTAs have a positive impact creating new trade among partners (2007). According to the authors’ research, “an FTA approximately doubles two members' bilateral trade after 10 years.” The positive impact can be lessened if tariffs and technical barriers to trade are already 10  minimal. However, their research still finds clear economic gains in the first decade of an FTA entering into force.    Not only do FTAs have a positive relationship creating new trade, but they also often have a positive relationship generating overall economic growth in the partner countries, albeit on an uneven basis. Hur and Park, based on their research on FTAs and levels of members’ economic growth find that positive effects are slow to materialize. More particularly:  An FTA has an insignificant effect in the one-to-10-year period after the launch of the FTA. However, more importantly we have found an upward trend in the gap between the growth rates of per capita GDP among countries within an FTA. This implies that uneven FTA effects exist across countries within an FTA. (2012) Their finding echoes Helpman and Grossman’s discovery that economic growth between countries within an FTA can expect varying levels of economic growth resulting from the FTA (1991). The determining factor is often whether or not R&D transfers freely between states, resulting in product improvement, etc.  1.7 Conclusion  The beginning of this chapter outlines the current state of affairs in NEA as an economic environment in flux. Even without new trade agreements causing disruption, Japan and South Korea are having a steadily smaller economic impact on one another and on China. At the same time, China is gradually representing a larger role in South Korea’s and Japan’s total trade. The risk of this shift lies with Japanese, and to a lesser extent, South Korean discomfort with Chinese economic hegemony. The waning of economic interdependence among NEA states may herald a security dilemma as the regional losses its CSO, which is reliant in part on present levels of economic interaction.  11  Further literature presented in this chapter posits various challenges and opportunities that free trade policy could have on either limiting or exacerbating the decline of economic interdependence. The rise of RTAs and bilateral FTAs, for one, have become synonymous with each respective countries’ regional political interests, rather than considering the merits of free trade on the basis on each agreement’s economic potential alone. While the political impact of free trade is often implied, it is not explained within the framework of the economic literature on the subject matter. Trade diversion and trade creation are important phenomenon. Should a free trade agreement redirect trade flows, say from an unfriendly country to a friendly country, the trade agreement will result in shifting level of economic interdependence. The same is true for trade creation, as newly created growth between partners may relatively diminish the level of economic interdependence between non-members.  Chapter 2: Dependency, Interdependence, Functionalism, and the Securitization of Free Trade will further examine how free trade agreements have been securitized, by examining the literature on securitization theory as well as international relations theories related to economic dependence, interdependence, and functionalism.         12  Chapter 2: Dependency, Interdependence, Functionalism, and the Securitization of Free Trade The basis for most of the literature on connecting trade and security is based on the assumption that economic interdependence or dependence creates an opportunity cost in the advent of a conflict. If the economic cost of military action outweighs the potential reward, states will forego hostile action. This line of thought has shaped various international policies. For example, the inspiration for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community was based in part on the desire to draw the economies of France and Germany into an economically interdependent relationship, by virtue of interdependent supply chains. However, for the purpose of this paper, the discussion of economic interdependence will rely on analysis based on modern trade agreements (free trade agreements) with particular focus on their effect on the direction of trade flows resulting from such agreements and the subsequent impact on the security order in Northeast Asia.    2.1 Dependency and Interdependence  Norman Angell sowed the seeds of dependency/interdependence theory in his seminal book, The Great Illusion (1913). In his book, Angell argues that economic interdependence at the turn of the century would deter states from engaging in an armed conflict. The opportunity cost of conflict would outweigh any possible gains derived from conflict. While the First World War challenged his notion, similar assumptions have continued to develop beyond both world wars. In a modern application, Richard Katz in his article Mutual Assured Production, posits that, “China needs to buy Japanese products as much as Japan needs to sell them” and that as a result, “China could not boycott Japan, let alone precipitate an actual conflict, without 13  stymieing the export-fueled economic miracle that underpins Communist Party rule” (2013). Katz recognizes the limitations of his assumption by evoking the emergence of the First World War. However, while he argues that economic interdependence may fail to deter conflict, it increases the cost of engaging in conflict with economies on which they depend.  Dependence and interdependence as distinctive scenarios are important considerations when observing the impact of trade on security. David Baldwin provides a definition for dependence in the context of international relations, as the, “external reliance on other actors” (1980). Within his definition, varieties of dependence extend beyond economics. For example, a nation may be dependent on another nation for its security or it may rely on a state for access to important resources such as food, energy, or finished products. While these considerations are important for a broader conversation on security, for the purposes of this paper, dependence focuses on the external economic reliance on another NEA actors’ market.  Interdependence, on the other hand, is a situation where, there are significant “exit costs for any two states vis-à-vis their economic relationship” (Crescenzi, 2005), which constrain policy options for either state. Within this framework, an interdependent relationship does not guarantee peace, but it does place a significant mutual cost on exiting a relationship. Interdependence is increasingly complicated because it is rare for parties to be equally interdependent on one another, which presents differing costs of exit. In an economic context, it is essentially guaranteed that both states will not be equally dependent on one another, as most modern states have several of important 14  trade partners. Yet, parties still recognize the importance of compromising a trade relationship with an important economy.  A rich academic debate surrounding economic interdependence/dependence and security emerged in the post-Second World War period, with Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane positing that economic interdependence deters conflict, while Kenneth Waltz rejected the notion that economic interdependence has any significant impact on deterring conflict.  The basis for Nye and Keohane’s argument in Power and Interdependence was the acknowledgment that security considerations extended well beyond “military-security concerns” (1977, pg. 5). Increasingly complex relations between states have complicated notions of security to extend beyond militaries and the hard power derived therein. In Transnational Relations and World Politics, they identify, “economic, social and ecological” (1972, pg. 4) variables among nation states as factors responsible for shaping security concerns. However, the authors acknowledge that economic interdependence’s impact on security is limited, recognizing that, “military power dominates economic power in the sense that economic means alone are likely to be ineffective against the serious use of military force” (1977, pg. 16-17).  Nevertheless, they also point out that economic power can be more effective than military power at achieving certain ends.  In a review of their work, Nye and Keohane claim that, since first publishing Power and Interdependence, “it is now conventional to analyze interdependence as a political, as well as an economic, phenomenon, and to examine patterns of 15  interdependence by issue-area” (1987, pg. 752). The conventional acceptance of their perspective may have a positive relationship with the securitization of free trade policy. As an ideal type, Nye and Keohane also introduced the liberal concept of “complex interdependence.” The basis for this form of interdependence is requires three factors: State policy goals are not arranged in stable hierarchies, but are subject to trade-offs; the existence of multiple channels of contact among societies expands the range of policy instruments, thus limiting the ability of foreign offices tightly to control governments’ foreign relations; and military force is largely irrelevant. (1977, pg. 37) As a normative concept, Nye and Keohane recognized that the aforementioned arrangement did not reflect the world as it was/is, but how it could/should be. However, fitting with their second factor, trade policy could be one of the policy instruments responsible for shaping a complex interdependent relationship today.  Kenneth Waltz provided the most prominent rebuttal to Nye and Keohane’s claims regarding economic interdependence and security. While Waltz acknowledges that Nye and Keohane’s assumptions became widely accepted, he disagrees that the nature of international relations had changed in the advent of interdependence tightening “its grip” (2000, pg. 6).  Waltz believes that interdependence may promote peace through increased contact and a heightened level of mutual understanding. However, he also argues that interdependence may also promote war. The only important consideration from an interdependent relationship is that states can hardly ignore how their actions affect other states. Waltz explains close interdependence as:  A condition in which one party can scarcely move without jostling others; a small push ripples through society. The closer the social bonds, the more extreme the 16  effect becomes, and one cannot sensibly pursue an interest without taking others’ interests into account. (pg. 14) Overall, Waltz does not consider interdependence to be a major force in international politics. He is focused more on the uneven nature of relationships, recognizing that states are never equal. On this basis, Waltz disagrees with the use of interdependence because it obscures the dependent nature of states on one another and how uneven relationships shape each respective state’s power. Waltz explains:  Interdependence suggests a condition of roughly equal dependence of parties on one another. Omitting the word “dependence” blunts the inequalities that mark the relations of states and makes them all seem to be on the same footing. Much of international, as of national, politics is about inequalities. (pg. 16) Even with disagreements over whether trade and economics create dependence or interdependence, both reviewed theoretical lenses recognize a positive relationship between economics (trade) and security, albeit from different perspectives.  2.2 Functionalism The debate over interdependence/dependence and security has been largely divided between liberal writers, defending that interdependence creates mutual security, and realist writers, identifying dependency and its impact on security in unequal relationships. Long before the aforementioned debate, policy makers applied a variation of the concept of interdependence to the European integration model. David Mitrany and Ernst B. Haas sought to apply and defend the merits of economic interaction as a stabilizing force in international relations. Their work is characterized as ‘functionalism,’ in reference to the functional role that economics plays in creating mutual self-interest through economic integration.  17  Functionalism, due to its focus on institutions, is not easily applicable to contemporary NEA as liberal or realist theories, as trade in NEA presently lacks an institutional foundation. Nonetheless, because securitization, which will be discussed later in this chapter, is a social construct, functionalist theory may have been factored into the decision making process of states with regard to their present and forthcoming trade policies in the Asia Pacific region.  2.3 Summary of Literature  Based on the previous sections, three possible explanations exist to explain how trade and security intersect at international level. The first and least applicable to the East Asian context is functionalism, which is witnessed in the EU context as an institution where economic interests are intertwined and interests of the states are focused into a supranational or a semi-supranational organization. The second is economic interdependence, which would lead to states coexisting peacefully out of the basis of a healthy, mutually beneficial, and essential trade relationship between the parties. States, in this scenario would avoid conflict out of the interest of preserving their economic wellbeing. The final scenario is dependence, which unlike interdependence, one state or states are less dependent on the economic relationship than others. The uneven balance of power elevates the power of economically less dependent states, to the detriment of more dependent states. Stronger states may use economic coercion to control weaker states and weaker states may bandwagon or seek to hedge to improve their respective security.  The next section will cover literature on securitization theory, which explains the incorporation of non-traditional security matters into the realm of traditional security. The 18  securitization of trade in NEA relies on the perceptions of its impact on security, which have largely been covered in the previous sections of this paper.  2.4 Securitization   Buzan, Waever, and Japp de Wilde largely formulated the theory of securitization in their seminal book Security: A New Framework for Analysis. The authors identify five sectors of security, military, political, economic, environmental, and societal. Their framework expands beyond more traditional conceptualizations of security, which are often limited to military concerns. The authors define the connections between each sector and security with the following:  The military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, production, and finance; the societal sector is about relationships of collective identify; and the environmental sector is about the relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere. (1998, pg. 7) For these sectors to become securitized, they require that there is an effort to securitize them and that the effort to securitize is accepted by a target audience.   Before explaining the process of securitization, it is important to distinguish between securitization and politicization. A securitized issue requires that it be, “presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measure and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (pg. 23-24). Politicised issues, on the other hand, are important and are a part of public discourse, but are not represented as existential threats and can be addressed with normal political actions.  Desecuritization is the opposite of securitization, moving an issue from the security realm to the political realm. Anthony, Emmers, and Acharya explain 19  desecuritization as, “the reverse process. It involves the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere” (2006). Some actors may show a preference to shape the perception of an issue to either the security or political realm. Trade, being a part of a non-traditional analysis of security, could be subject to either securitization or desecuritization.  The process of securitization requires three components, a referent object, securitizing actors, and functional actors. Buzan, Waever and Jaap de Wilde define referent objects as, “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival” (1998, pg. 36). Referent objects can be country specific as well as systematic. In a domestic setting, a referent object could be a natural disaster, or a political crisis. These crises could affect a larger region or the international system through contagion, but have been identified as a domestic security crisis. Systematic referent objects transcend the state and could be something as large as the global economy in the midst of a global economic crisis. The authors provide examples such as, “the liberal world economy” and “free trade” (pg. 38) as potential of referent objects within the economic realm. While they provide these examples, they note that, economic issues, in particular, are difficult to identify (pg. 22). Additional economic issues, such as income inequality, household debt, a takeover of a domestic firm by a foreign company could be securitized as well, so long as they are presented as existential threats requiring special action.   Referent objects require an actor or actors to identify them and shape how they are perceived. The actors that are responsible for securitizing an issue are known as securitizing actors. Buzan, Waever, and Jaap de Wilde define a securitizing actor as, 20  “actors who securitize issues by declaring something—a referent object—existentially threatened” (1998). These actors may be politicians, government officials, civil society groups, or any individual with the capacity to affect the conceptualization of security at a subnational, national, or international level. For a securitizing actor to make an effort to securitize an issue, they must use a, “security speech act” (Buzan, Waever, Jaap de Wilde, 1998, pg. 40).  A security speech act is an effort to securitize a politicized matter. However, security speech acts are not always successful at securitizing. For example, according to the authors, “a discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object is not by itself securitization—this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such” (pg. 25). If a securitizing move is successful, the audience accepts the identified existential threat. To address the threat, emergency action is accepted and that there are “effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules” (pg. 26). While this framework requires a subjective analysis, it is a valuable litmus test to make an effort to distinguish between politicized and securitized issues.  The final component of Buzan, Waever and Jaap de Wilde’s securitization theory concerns functional actors. The authors define functional actors as:  Actors who affect the dynamics of a sector. Without being the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security. (pg. 36) Functional actors, as stakeholders may have an impact on securitization. However, for the purpose of this paper, the focus will remain on the two more directly significant components of securitization, referent objects and securitizing actors.   21  2.5 Connecting Theories   This chapter has sought to connect theories related to economics and security as well as theories related to securitization. The presentation of interdependence, dependence, and functionalism are all theoretical approaches used to explain the connectivity between trade policy and security. There isn’t a correct or incorrect approach, within the context of this paper, as all three perspectives could form basis of a securitizing act in the Asia Pacific region.   The following operative chapter will aim to identify and analyze bilateral and regional trade agreements in NEA to consider whether agreements have become securitized and by whom, how, and why have they been securitized.                          22  Chapter 3: The Securitization of Free Trade in Northeast Asia   Since the stalling of multilateral trade liberalization at the WTO, nations have sought to further their trade liberalization agenda at the bilateral and regional level. As discussed in previous chapters, the region where new trading arrangements have proliferated most regularly has been in the Asia Pacific region. Most significantly, the Asia Pacific has been at the centre of a number of new, forthcoming, and proposed regional free trade agreements.    Originally, the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), proposed in Hanoi at the 2006 APEC Leaders’ Summit, was meant to serve as the single free trade area covering most of this region. FTAAP would include members of APEC, covering nearly universal membership in North and Southeast Asia, as well as several key economies in the Americas and Oceania. However, while FTAAP continues to represent some nations’ eventual trade liberalization goal for the region, progress towards launching negotiations has stalled. Due to its early status and uncertain future, the focus of this chapter will remain primarily on more advanced regional and bilateral agreements. The TPP and RCEP, in particular, feature most prominently in conversations on Asia-centric RTAs.   This chapter will review the country-specific securitization approaches of policymakers in China, Japan, and South Korea to bilateral and regional trade agreements. As discussed in Chapter 1, there is a strong economic case that bilateral and regional economic agreements have a capacity to shape trade flows either by creating or diverting trade towards member countries. Third party economies may suffer from a trade diversion effect as a result of being left out of an agreement. By analysing 23  current trade data, it is clear that among Japan, China, and South Korea, that trade flows are mutually significant, but susceptible to change. Trade agreements, due to their ability to direct trade flows, may alter the total level of trade between regional powers.   By connecting the economic literature and data to international relations literature on dependency, interdependence, and functionalism, there is a likely relationship between economics (trade in the case of this paper) and security, even if the aforementioned theories disagree to which extent and to whom security is affected.  Providing various perspectives within the context of securitization is important, because varying perspectives factor intro various approaches taken by securitizing actors in their securitizing act. This paper seeks to first, to demonstrate that trade has been and continues to be securitized in Northeast Asia, and that the securitization explains a great deal about national motivations to pursue certain arrangements. Ultimately, continued securitization may cause a security dilemma, or it may help avoid a security dilemma if the resulting arrangement improves or sustains the regional security order.  The following three sections will analyse the securitization of free trade in China, Japan, and South Korea, respectively.  3.1 The Securitization of Free Trade in China   China’s securitization of bilateral FTAs and RTAs in the Asia Pacific under Xi Jinping’s leadership has been focused on ensuring that the resulting regional trade order includes China and other NEA powers. Regional agreements that exclude key regional powers are considered a risk. Xi’s concern is that that a ‘spaghetti bowl effect’ caused by overlapping and exclusionary agreements, could lead to trade fragmentation in the emerging regional economic order. His assumption follows Viner’s theory of trade 24  creation/diversion, insofar that Xi believes that agreements have the power to direct trade flows. Xi’s security concern in this situation is based on the understanding that trade flows may affect the economic security of states involved, through economic dependence/interdependence.   In general, under Xi, security in the Asia Pacific has been based on three pillars, common security, comprehensive security, and cooperative security. This three-pronged approach has been encapsulated into China’s Asian Security Concept (2014).  The Asian Security Concept was introduced by Xi during his keynote address at the 2014 Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). During his speech, he provided the following definitions for common, comprehensive, and cooperative security:  Common security means respecting and ensuring the security of each and every country.  Comprehensive security means upholding security in both traditional and non-traditional fields.  Cooperative security means promoting the security of both individual countries and the region as a whole through dialogue and cooperation. (Xi, 2014)  Xi makes the point that regional economic collaboration has been at the basis for much of Asia’s present cooperation. It has also led to the development of security cooperation, albeit in a more fragmented form. Building upon existing and developing ties could be the basis for future security cooperation, particularly if a security order can be developed on the foundations of an inclusive regional trade order, replacing an old, fragmented, security order based on the United States.    Xi’s vision of a future security order in Asia built on economic ties is based in part, on interdependence theory. While Xi hints that economic ties have created common security in the region, he does not explicitly identify the cost of engaging in 25  conflict with an economic partner as the basis for security. Rather, Xi uses his speech act to make the claim that economic ties have worked in building trust among trade partners, similar to a complex interdependence model. Closer engagement on an economic front later leads to closer collaboration over security, etc. Nonetheless, Xi recognizes that the region is currently peaceful because of its strong economic ties. These economic ties have created a situation of economic dependence/interdependence, which acts to sustain the peace that Xi wishes to continue to build upon in an inclusive manner.   Xi’s polices have largely followed the framework outlined in his 2014 speech. Overall, China, under Xi, has remained consistent in its concern for a fragmented regional trade regime. Terms such as the ‘spaghetti bowl effect’ have been repeated by Xi and by other senior government officials, as a warning to the dangers of trade fragmentation. China remains open to RTAs so long as the ultimate goal is region-wide membership.  3.2 China’s Referent Objects   The referent object for Xi’s China has been regional cooperation, based on foundation of close economic ties. The possibility of a long-term fragmentation of trade flows, resulting from bilateral FTAs and RTAs, is presented as a security threat. The policy response to China’s securitizing act ensures that first; China aggressively pursues bilateral FTAs with important regional partners. Secondly, it has begun to champion RCEP, while remaining open to joining the TPP. Ultimately, China’s has sought to sign a more inclusive regional agreement such as FTAAP, which would address most of China’s concerns regarding trade agreement overlaps and 26  fragmentation. If possible, it also would welcome a multilateral solution derived from advancing the WTO.  China has taken other initiatives beyond trade liberalization, such as the development of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and New Development Bank (NDB), with conceivably similar objectives—directly or indirectly—facilitating more trade among partners by improving trade readiness through infrastructure and economic development in the region.   China’s pursuit of RTAs and bilateral FTAs in the Asia Pacific region has been and continues to be ambitious. According to the Ministry of Commerce of the Government of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM), the ministry responsible for China’s international trade agenda, China is currently a member of twelve FTAs, with all but three falling within the Asia Pacific region. All of China’s agreements, barring the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic and Partnership Arrangement (2003) and the Mainland and Macau Closer Economic and Partnership Arrangement (2003) were signed on or after 2005 signifying a shift in policy in the aftermath of failed Doha round negotiations. Further, including modernizations, five of its eight ongoing free trade negotiations are with partners in the Asia Pacific region. China also identifies six trade agreements under consideration, four of which are within the Asia Pacific.   If all of China’s current and prospective regional economic agreements are factored in, virtually the entire region will be covered by a bilateral or regional agreement. The ambition to sign so many agreements with so many partners demonstrates a significant policy shift from China’s pre-2005 trade agenda, which relied on the WTO.  27   It remains unclear whether or not China views trade and security within the context of its own economic security as the referent object, with a focus on regime security, or whether it sees economic integration on a regional level as a systematic referent object. True intentions aside, rhetorically, China has securitized via the latter conceptualization, the region. While this perspective may be accepted by audiences in China, some regional powers may view the situation differently with concerns that increased Chinese dependency, resulting from China-centric trade, may provide a security dilemma for their respective nations or for the region. China may also be exclusively interested in its own security, via the region, by desiring a relationship where trade and security revolves around China, by virtue of each country’s dependence on China.  3.3 China’s Securitizing Actors  China’s primary securitizing actor has been Xi Jinping.  Xi, as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, President of the People’s Republic of China, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Chairman of the National Security Commission of the Communist Party of China, and General Secretary of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China, he is the most powerful and influential leader in contemporary China. As a result of his influence over state policy, Xi remains at the centre of the analysis of current efforts to securitize China’s trade agenda in the Asia Pacific. Xi has used speeches at domestic and international forums to discuss his views on trade and security, referencing relevant conceptualizations of regional security, such as the Asian Security Concept.  28  However, Xi is not the only actor working to securitize China’s regional trade policy. Senior government officials from relevant ministries have often spoken, using identical or near identical terminology used by Xi, to securitize trade. Li Keqiang, current Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, has spoken at international forums crediting mutual economic development in Asia for helping to sustain peace among states. At the 18th ASEAN Plus China, Japan and ROK Summit, Li made the following remark, lauding regional economic development: With rising regional hot-spot issues and local conflicts, the international community faces challenges from such non-traditional security threats as terrorism, refugee crisis and natural disasters. Against this backdrop, economic development in East Asia has maintained its upward trajectory, making it one of the most dynamic and promising regions in the world. This is attributable to the peaceful and stable  regional environment, the emphasis that countries have placed on economic development and improvement of people's lives, and the concerted efforts made by countries in the region to strengthen dialogue, consultation and regional cooperation. (2015)  While Li does not explicitly make the connection between FTAs and RTAs in his speech, he does praise economic vitality, which has been enabled by healthy intraregional trade. A fragmentation of trade could compromise the economic development of isolated economies, to the detriment of their economic development, and regional security. The selection of countries in attendance to his speech is also noteworthy, as virtually the every East and Southeast Asian economy was present for Li’s securitizing act.   Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin made a more direct connection between trade and security in his speech at the Xiangshan Forum. Liu’s speech was titled Laying the Foundations of Peace and Stability for An Asian Community of Shared Destiny and focused heavily on emphasising the importance of regional economic development in 29  promoting regional stability. At one point in his speech he indirectly referenced the importance of economic interdependence by stating that, “Asian countries should complement each other's strengths through cooperation and tighten the bond of common interests and economic integration” (2014). The audience for Liu’s securitizing act was both domestic and international. The Xiangshan Forum is defined on its homepage as a, “track 1.5 high-end dialogue platform on Asian Security and defense issues” (2015). Further, on an associated webpage introducing the purpose and history of the forum, attendees from “relevant countries” (2016) are invited to attend. While the attendance list is unpublished, the information on the 2014 forum details speeches given by present and past government officials as well as academics from a vast array of regional countries, including, Singapore, Malaysia, etc. (2016) Considering that Chinese officials have largely mirrored the same viewpoint as their executive when discussing regional trade, it is possible that the intended audience of Liu’s speech and securitizing act was the international attendees  As a final example of a Chinese government official under Xi’s presidency securitizing regional trade agreements, Zhang Jun, Director-General of the Department of International Economic Affairs at Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote an op-ed for the South China Morning Post (SCMP), titled Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area: The Road to Better Economic Integration in the Region. In his piece, Zhang makes a direct security-related case against exclusive regional trade agreements, warning that with the, “spaghetti bowl effect of the various overlapping regional trade arrangements, there is a risk of fragmentation” (2015). He goes on to state that the TPP and to a lesser extent, RCEP, “will inevitably affect the process and direction of Asia-Pacific economic 30  integration” (2015). To address the perceived risk of overlapping and exclusive FTAs and their impact on trade flows, Zhang recommends advancing the FTAAP, to “promote coordination and synergy among different free trade arrangements to achieve win-win cooperation, so as to avoid fragmentation, conglomeration and politicisation of regional economic cooperation” (2015). In this final phrase Zhang uses one of Xi’s adages, ‘win-win cooperation’ and echoes previous points made by Xi and other government officials. Zhang seeks to promote the FTAAP over less inclusive RTAs, as a means to promote regional security. Based on the subject of Zhang’s article and the readership of the SCMP, the target audience is likely foreign government officials and academics, rather than a domestic Chinese audience.  This instance would not be the first time that China, under Xi’s administration, has used media outlets outside of Mainland China to convey political messages to foreign policy makers. However, the efficacy of China taking a media-based approach to promote its policies remains unclear.   3.4 China’s Audience Acceptance The audience for much of China's securitization of free trade has been international, rather than domestic. China’s act to securitize regional and bilateral trade agreements in the Asia Pacific has followed two points, one, that economic integration is one of the key pillars to stability and mutual security. Two, free trade agreements, if not inclusive, may lead to fragmentation of trade flows, compromising the stability sustained through economic integration. The policy prescription, in light of the TPP being concluded, is to treat forthcoming RTAs (TPP and RCEP) as stepping stones towards the eventual goal set out in APEC’s Bogor Goals, the FTAAP. While China 31  does a good job remaining consistent in the messaging of its securitizing act, it is quite difficult at present to judge whether or not the target audience of its securitizing act has accepted its message.  As for the TPP, domestic concerns surrounding certain provisions continue to bog down the ratification process. Based the TPP’s Chapter 30: Final Provisions in Article 30.5 Entry into Force, states have two years+60 days after February 4th, 2016, the day the TPP was signed by parties, to notify the depositary of their completion of the domestic ratification process. The window for ratification will go onward until:   At least six of the original signatories, which together account for at least 85 per  cent of the combined gross domestic product of the original signatories in 2013   have notified the Depositary in writing of the completion of their applicable legal  procedures within this period. (2015)  Without major economies such as the United States and Japan, it will be impossible, under the current negotiated text, to ratify the agreement for any member states. Concerns related to gains in security resulting from the agreement may be accepted among policymakers, but these concerns are an afterthought to domestic audiences resistant to the ratification the agreement. If similar obstacles emerge for forthcoming RTAs, Xi’s attempts to securitize trade through the Asian Security Concept may falter in the face of domestic opposition in China and in partner economies.  3.5 The Securitization of Free Trade in Japan  Japan, under Abe Shinzo, has placed the conclusion and ratification of the TPP, as well as other RTAs and FTAs at the centre of its regional security policy. The development this policy builds upon a plan he initially laid out in his 2012 article for The Project Syndicate, Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond. In this 2012 article, Abe made a case for inviting powers outside of NEA to play a larger role in shaping regional 32  security. Particularly, Japan mentioned that while it can and should continue to work with China, it benefits from creation of an Asia Pacific community extending across the Pacific Ocean. Abe directly outlines Japan’s economic dilemma and desired policy response in the following passage: I, for one, admit that Japan’s relationship with its biggest neighbor, China, is vital to the well-being of many Japanese. Yet, to improve Sino-Japanese relations, Japan must first anchor its ties on the other side of the Pacific. (2012)   At the point of publishing, Abe remained ambivalent towards the TPP, as the 2012 general election had just concluded and the agreement was/remains sensitive with various segments of the Japanese electorate. However, by April 22, 2013, Japan had formally been invited to join TPP negotiations, becoming the second largest economy in the bloc and drastically increased the profile of the then prospective agreement (2013). Soon thereafter, Abe began to champion the TPP as the basis for his vision for a larger, more inclusive Asia Pacific region.  3.6 Japan’s Referent Objects   Japan’s referent object in the securitization of RTAs and FTAs is regional security, derived from economic interdependence, based on the desire to buttress against the potential for Chinese economic and military hegemony in the Asia Pacific region. As Abe highlighted in Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond, Abe was concerned with China’s increasing military capability and its ability to throw its military and economic weight around to coerce Japan and its neighbours alike. RTAs, specifically the TPP, provide Japan with a potential solution with the opportunity to invite America back into the region, helping to hedge China’s economic and military prowess. The TPP also rests at the centre of Abe’s initiative to develop closer security ties with other Asia 33  Pacific economies, built upon the foundations of economic interdependency resulting from membership.  3.7 Japan’s Securitizing Actors   Much like with China, Japan’s executive, Abe, focuses on the securitization of its trade policy by communicating to external actors. He has remained consistent in his messaging over the TPP, insofar that he sees the agreement’s value exceeding beyond simply providing additional market access. Abe rarely makes this point when speaking to domestic audience. When speaking to a domestic audience, Abe often forgoes discussion of the regional security benefits derived from the successful ratification of the agreement. Rather, Abe defends the economic merits of the agreement for Japanese consumers, businesses, and for his regional revitalization plan. For example, in a speech directed at the Keidanren (Japanese Business Federation) on June 2, 2016, Abe discussed the TPP within the context of the agreement's regulatory benefits. He promoted the TPP as a “measure to build a free and fair economic zone, between nations that share the same basic values” (2016). While this statement, without context, may be perceived as a reference to his security agenda, Abe goes on to clarify that the aforementioned values are related to rule of law and the promotion of a predictable business environment. In another domestically focused speech presented to the Prime Minister’s TPP Task Force, a group designed to promote the TPP domestically, he focused his entire speech on the economic merits of the agreement, focusing on the lifting of tariffs on “99.9%” of import tariffs on Japanese goods destined for TPP economies, as well as “investments, services, intellectual property, and e-commerce, all of which help make it smoother for companies to do business overseas” (2015). These 34  speeches and others like it focus on selling the agreement, based entirely on its economic merits to a lukewarm domestic audience cautious about opening up sensitive sectors.   In contrast, when speaking to international audiences, Abe has consistently reiterated the same points regarding the TPP, stating its importance in promoting stability in the Asia Pacific region. Most notable of such speeches was his address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress, on April 29, 2015. His speech was titled Toward an Alliance of Hope and directly referenced the importance of the TPP within the context of security. Abe made a direct reference to the TPP’s security implications in the following passage: The TPP goes far beyond just economic benefits. It is also about our security. Long-term, its strategic value is awesome. We should never forget that. The TPP covers an area that accounts for 40 per cent of the world economy, and one third of global trade. We must turn the area into a region for lasting peace and prosperity. (2015)  In this instance, Abe securitized the TPP to an audience of policymakers who might otherwise be focused purely on the economic dimensions of the agreement.   Another notable speech that securitized the TPP was Abe’s 2014 keynote speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue. During this time and with such a regionally diverse audience, Abe took a less direct path towards the securitization of the TPP. He spoke of the TPP as a mechanism to help sustain growth and to help ensure that growth is shared by members of the agreement. Harkening back to his idea of a group of likeminded democracies working together, Abe credited economic growth with bringing, “freedom of thought and religion and checks and balances to the political systems, even though the speed of these changes varies from country to country” (2014). Abe’s 35  decision to discuss the TPP at the Shangri-La Dialogue, considering its purpose as a security forum, highlights the importance that Abe attaches to the TPP in sustaining regional security.    While Abe has been Japan’s most visible securitizing actor, he has also regularly utilised various cabinet ministers to reiterate the same points presented in his international speeches. In particular, Kishida Fumio, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, has been actively promoting synonymy between the TPP and regional security. As foreign minister, Kishida has served as a securitizing actor through press conferences, op-eds, and speeches, utilizing similar language to Abe. During a press conference on October 6, 2015, a day after TPP negotiations concluded, Kishida securitized the agreement during a response to a question regarding the agreement and its possible impact on Japanese diplomacy. Kishida explained that the TPP has, “strategic significance on the diplomacy front, because the establishment of the TPP agreement will also contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region.” Kishida did not further explain his understanding of the security merits of the TPP in this instance. Nevertheless, his position echoes that of the Prime Minister and follows a line of similar statements from other member of his cabinet. Soon thereafter, Kishida went further in his explanation of the security implication of the TPP in an interview with The Australian, an Australian national newspaper, on November 21, 2015. Kishida made the follow statement regarding the TPP during his interview:  I would also like to emphasise that in strategic terms, deepening economic interdependency among countries that hold the same basic values is of immense importance to ensuring not just the prosperity, but also the stability of the region. (Sheridan, 2015)  36  The usage of the term interdependence is particularly valuable in the study of Japan’s securitization. As discussed in Chapter 2, interdependence theory is a specific theoretical perspective and, in the case of Japan, is an ideal outcome derived by signing the TPP.   In addition to Kishida, the former minister of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Miyazawa Yoichi, made a speech securitizing the TPP on October 6, 2015. In his address to mark the conclusion of the agreement, Miyazawa posited that: This Agreement is one of the key pillars of Japan’s growth strategy as well as an important framework that will contribute to the growth, prosperity, and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and I am extremely pleased with this agreement in principle. (2015)  Miyazawa, as minister of METI, making a statement referencing the agreement and its ability to promote regional stability is important insofar that it maintains consistent messaging among two separate, but important ministries. METI is significant in the Japanese discussion of trade and security as serves as the ministry responsible for negotiating economic agreements.   Finally, Nakatani Gen, former Japanese Minister of Defence also held a press conference on October 6, 2015, to address the conclusion of the TPP. When asked by a reporter if the minister believed the TPP would have security ramifications, the minster responded with the following statement:  Security should be considered not simply in terms of its military aspect but from a variety of aspects comprehensively, including the economic, political, and diplomatic aspects. In particular, the economic situation is a critical factor in security. Minister Amari stated that the TPP has great significance also for security. Secretary Carter as well stated that the TPP is very significant for security. I share the view that the liberalization of the economy and the conclusion of agreements among countries have tremendous significance for the stability, peace, and prosperity of the Trans-Pacific region. (2015)  37  Nakatani’s commentary is consistent with that of other government ministers and is significant considering the ministry he oversaw. MOFA, METI, and Ministry of Defence are among the most powerful of Japan’s various ministries and form the trinity of Japanese ministries involved in foreign affairs.   Abe and his cabinet, representing the three most important ministries required to securitize the TPP, have maintained a consistent line of messaging when discussing security implications of the agreement. Statements pertaining to regional security tend to come after discussion of economic merits and tend to focus on the value of interdependence as a means to maintain peace and stability in the region. China, which is currently not a member of the TPP, may be resisted by Japan on this basis, as securitizing actors have made multiple references to cultivating economic interdependence among like-minded states. It is unclear if China would fit into Abe’s plan for a security architecture based on the TPP. China’s exclusion may also be intentional as the agreement drives a wedge between China and other Asia Pacific nations.  3.8 Japan’s Audience Acceptance   Much like in the Chinese case, it is difficult to recognize whether or not Japan’s various audiences have accepted its securitizing act. Since Japan has directed much of its advocacy towards other TPP members, ratification may serve as a litmus test for acceptance. However, as witnessed in U.S. and elsewhere, economic issues related to the agreement appear to have superseded security considerations. Using the U.S. as an example, presidential nominees, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have both expressed interest in abandoning the agreement, should they be elected president. 38  Clinton, based on her platform on Make it in America, “will oppose trade agreements, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, that do not meet her high standards for creating good jobs, raising wages, and enhancing our national security” (2016). Likewise, Trump has committed to oppose the agreement in an op-ed in USA Today titled, Job-killing Trans-Pacific Partnership must be stopped. While it’s possible that either candidate may favour the TPP for its security merits after the election, it will be politically difficult to manage such a radical shift in policy. And unfortunately for Japan, without the U.S. ratifying the agreement, the TPP cannot come into force, opening the door to RCEP or FTAAP and compromising Abe’s approach to securitization.  3.9 The Securitization of Free Trade in South Korea   South Korea has been more direct than either China or Japan in its messaging regarding the securitization of RTAs in the Asia Pacific region. It has taken a consistent stance that trade fragmentation would be a risk to regional security and that economic interdependence is an important prerequisite for peace in the region. South Korea’s executive, President Park Geun-hye, has championing this message. Park’s regional vision is enshrined in the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI), a proposal she introduced during the beginning of her tenure as president.  The NAPCI is unique among the aforementioned security concepts insofar that it sees economic interdependence merely as a means not an end. Defining the cool politics, hot economics situation in the region, she coined the term, ‘Asia’s Paradox.’ During a speech to a joint session of the U.S. congress in 2013, she explained her understanding of Asia’s unique status:  39  Asia suffers from what I call "Asia's paradox," the disconnect between growing economic interdependence on the one hand, and backward political, security cooperation on the other. How we manage this paradox -- this will determine the shape of a new order in Asia. (2013)  The basis of Park’s NAPCI in relation to Asia’s Paradox is based heavily on comparisons to post-war European cooperation. The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in its publication, Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative 2015, notes that, “multilateral security cooperation in Europe also began with economic affairs and later expanded little by little to encompass a wide range of issues” (2015, pg. 29). Park has repeatedly made comparisons to Europe in her comments on cooperation in Northeast Asia, often making a case that trust can be built gradually among Asian powers if they continue to build on strong economic ties. She argues that history related to European integration can serve as a roadmap towards ending strategic mistrust among regional powers. Park mentioned the European Coal and Steel Community in her discussion of Asia’s Paradox in 2013, crediting trade cooperation and the subsequent functional relationship derived from trade as an example for Asian cooperation. She believes this early, “European experience provides nations in Northeast Asia with numerous lessons” (2013). The goal from this experience is to develop a common market, based on the EU model.  Park’s NAPCI is a multitier initiative, with various steps. It currently lists 5 steps:   Proceed at a pace comfortable for all participants  Complement existing mechanisms for cooperation   Pursue multi-layered and multi-dimensional cooperation  Promote open dialogue and cooperation   Enhance participating countries’ sense of ownership over the process (2014)  The plan to complement existing mechanisms mentions various ongoing region conceptualizations, including, “President Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia,’ President Xi Jinping’s 40  ‘Chinese Dream,’ and President Putin’s policy for strengthening Russia’s presence in the Asia Pacific” (2014). The omission of Abe’s Democratic Diamond is interesting, but not necessarily problematic, considering its exclusive, rather than inclusive model.  3.10 South Korea’s Referent Objects  South Korea’s referent object, under the Park Administration has been focused on the risk of continued economic interdependence without political cooperation. The noted deterioration between states, particularly between Japan and China, creates a risk of conflict, or at least disruption to the economic status quo. Therefore, Park has sought to build trust and cooperation upon current economic ties. The cultivation of regional institutions is seen as one way to address the deficit in trust. Further economic development may assist in developing such institutions. Park’s ultimate goal is to guarantee regional security through an EU-styled Northeast Asian Union.  3.11 South Korea’s Securitizing Actors   As in Japan and China, South Korea’s executive, President Park, is the most significant securitizing actor in the bid to securitize regional trade. Park has used opportunities to speak at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and in front of a joint session of the U.S. Congress to convey her concern for Asia’s Paradox. In her 2015 UNGA address, she expressed concern for a worsening of the paradox, explaining that, “in Northeast Asia, we see a deepening of the Asia paradox phenomenon, where political and security cooperation lags behind the high-degree of economic interdependence among the countries in the region.” The decision to discuss Asia’s Paradox at UNGA is significant insofar that is reached such a widespread audience comprised of many heads of state and high ranking government officials.  41   While the former speeches were directed at foreign audiences, Park has also used large domestic venues to share her concern for the region. In her national address to mark the 68th anniversary of liberation, Park expressed her concern and vision for the region:  I hope that we will be able to realize peace and common prosperity in Northeast Asia together. The present situation is a paradoxical one, in which the level of economic interdependence in the region is growing even as the tensions surrounding historical and territorial issues continue to rise. The Northeast Asian Peace Initiative that I introduced seeks to overcome this challenge by providing a framework for multilateral dialogue that begins to implement cooperation and dialogue in the areas where this is currently possible and later expands the scope of cooperation to different areas such as security. (2013)  In the following year in her national address to mark the 69th anniversary, Park reiterated her concern for the region: In the Northeast Asian region, conflicts and confrontations have been transpiring at levels unseen since the end of the Cold War. Tensions surrounding historical and territorial issues are intensifying and new seeds of distrust are being sown in the political, economic and military sectors. Depending on how we respond, however, the challenges before us can become opportunities. (2014)  In her latter address, Park incorporated her proposal to consider the European model to solve the systematic distrust she sees in the region.   Finally, Park has used the opportunity to speak at much smaller forums to discuss her regional security concept. During her speech at the 2013 International Conference on Global Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia, Park discussed the possibility of using various RTAs to create a single Eurasia-Pacific trade area: With the EU in the west, ASEAN in the south and NAFTA across the Pacific, Eurasia has already been equipped with a foundation to create a single market geographically. We have to accelerate the negotiations for trade liberalization such as ongoing talks for the conclusion of the Korea-China-Japan FTA. If we connect these negotiations with trade agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 42  Agreement (TPP), which involve countries inside and outside of Eurasia, it would be possible to create a huge single market.   More specific to NEA, at the 2013 Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) Conference on Global Affairs, hosted by The Korea National Diplomatic Academy, Park proposed that, “Northeast Asia could become a single market similar to the European Union.” In an effort to achieve her goal, she has discussed various ongoing regional agreements as productive so long as they result in the creation of a single, inclusive market. However, she noted that Asia’s Paradox is a “stumbling block” towards further regional integration. The use of a track 1.5 meeting to further her message underscores an ideological consistency applied across various audiences.   While Park has been the most significant securitizing actor for this issue, she has also employed the use of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea to further reinforce her securitizing act. President Park’s foreign minister, Yun Byung-se, has been among the most prominent securitizing actors supporting Park’s policy. At the 12th Asia-Europe Meeting Foreign Ministers meeting, Yun evoked Park’s Asia Paradox in a speech discussing the TPP and other Asia-focused RTAs. In this speech, Yun adopted a Chinese-styled approach to the TPP, viewing the agreement as a stepping-stone towards eventual regional integration, rather than the final mechanism for regional economic integration. Yun also posits that the TPP may create momentum, pushing for the conclusion of other RTAs:   As for East Asia as a whole, an important motivation to resolve political and  security issues has been the region’s dynamic and ever-deepening economic  interdependence. Recently, the TPP deal is galvanizing similar negotiations  such as RCEP through the ASEAN+6. (2015)   43  This latest speech, taking place post-TPP conclusion signifies the adaptation of China’s official line of region trade and security. As noted in Park’s NAPCI, a goal is to find policy continuity among regional powers. From this position, both China and South Korea wish to see the TPP serve to push for further, more inclusive economic integration, rather than promoting regional trade flows among select nations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, quoted Yun in its press release for the 25th APEC Ministerial Meeting, as stating:   Regional economic integration efforts, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership  (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), should  be neither mutually competitive nor mutually exclusive; and such agreements  should not be a stumbling block to but a building block for the envisioned FTAAP.  (2013)  Based on the evolution of South Korea’s position under Park, two diverging positions regarding security and trade have taken hold in Northeast Asia.   Finally, as mentioned above, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, has been actively employed in the promotion of Park’s securitization of free trade, NAPCI. Uniquely, they have published two lengthy policy documents outlining the NAPCI. While the NAPCI details more than trade, it is prefaced with Asia’s Paradox, with direct reference to economic interdependence. Officially, the ministry believes cooperation based on a number of soft issues, will lead to greater cooperation. Using European integration as a case study, the ministry defends the merits of pursuing and economic policy focused on integration. Expanding upon the quote from earlier, the NAPCI policy states:   The cooperation on soft security issues in the pursuit of NAPCI will ultimately  help to ease tensions and contribute to the restoring of mutual trust which is the  key in addressing hard security issues. Multilateral security cooperation in  Europe also began with economic affairs and later expanded little by little to 44   encompass a wide range of issues even including disarmament, which is one of  the most sensitive hard security issues. This was the result of concerted efforts  by regional countries to resolve political tension and military conflict and take the  path of coexistence. (2015)  Economic integration serves as the basis for cooperation and also the precursor for further cooperation on mutually relevant issues, including the environment, etc.   South Korea, much like China and Japan has managed to sustain policy consistency among various levels of government, with policy makers in ministries following the lead of the executive. 3.12 South Korea’s Audience Acceptance  Park has already gained some audience acceptance, if the objective was ultimately to sway regional powers. In a joint address issued at the Sixth Trilateral Summit between Japan, China, and South Korea, the nations recognized Asia’s Paradox. The joint address states:    We reached the common recognition that the situation in which economic  interdependence and political/security tensions coexist must be overcome in  order to build permanent peace, stability and co-prosperity in the region, and to  continue to develop trilateral cooperation unwaveringly. (2015)  However, apart from this address, it is unclear that Japan has accepted this vision in its policy formulation. It continues to champion the TPP, while South Korea and China continue to aspire for options beyond the TPP.   South Korea, while rhetorically consistent regarding interdependence and security, may be acting in a manner contradictory to its message. If trade diversion holds true and that while interdependence does not guarantee security, it can assist in developing security, the conclusion of the Korea-China FTA works against the interest of the NAPCI. If the TPP comes into force and South Korea and China remain outside 45  of this regional arrangement trade may be fragmented between two rival economic blocs, hardly a constructive arrangement to address Asia’s Paradox.    However, as with the previous analyses, consideration of audience acceptance is premature. Further, with renewed pressure for FTAAP, South Korea may ultimately realize the creation of an inclusive trade regime from which further institutions can be built. Inevitability Park’s term as President will come to an end in 2018. She is constitutionally limited to a single term in office, and her Saenuri Party lost control of the National Assembly to the Minjoo Party in April 2016. This electoral result effectively leaves Park as a lame duck president. If a Saenuri candidate manages to hold the Blue House in 2018 or a Minjoo candidate wins the presidency, it is unclear if Park’s NAPCI will survive the transition, despites its modest success as a concept.              46  Chapter 4: Conclusion  Based on the analysis of securitizing acts in Chapter 3, it is apparent that two rivalling conceptualizations of trade and security have emerged during the current generation of executives in China, Japan, and South Korea.   China and South Korea both see the development of the TPP as a step towards the eventual realization of a more inclusive regional arrangement, FTAAP. The economic interdependence derived from concluding the FTAAP remains crucial to sustain peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region. China and South Korea, however, approach this issue from different perspectives.  Park envisions an EU-styled institutional arrangement for Northeast Asia, built upon economic interdependence. The theoretical origin of Park’s NAPCI arrangement follows more closely to that of Hass and Mitrany in their theories related to functionalism as applied to the European case study rather than to dependence and interdependence theory. Park would ideally prefer to cultivate a functional relationship among states through economics, which would have spillover effects into other areas of cooperation.   China, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with trade as an end in itself. Whether the resulting relationship is dependence, with countries reliant on China, or interdependence, where countries mutually rely on one another, China views trade flows as a force for stability in the Asia Pacific region. The TPP, if it serves as final product for an Asian RTA, would be a security risk insofar that it would focus trade flows among members states, to the detriment of non-members, including China. It would also strengthen the United States’ (China’s primary strategic rival) economic engagement with the region relative to China. FTAAP based on its inclusive 47  membership and with China potentially at the economic and geographic center, would benefit from its resulting security dimensions. This strategic goal, based on either an interdependence of dependence foundation serves as China’s ultimate goal when considering trade and regional security.  Japan, has taken a unique approach towards trade and regional security. It has been vocal in its support of the TPP as a mechanism to bolster its regional alliances, particularly, but not exclusively with the United States. Japan has also strengthened its security ties with TPP member states, including Australia and Vietnam. Japan sees the value in promoting economic interdependence and engagement among allies and seeks to reduce overreliance on China. Officially, Japan remains supportive of non-members acceding to the agreement, including China, but may take comfort in the agreement’s high ambition exceeding beyond what China could currently palatably sign.  If the TPP fails to come into fruition, which depends greatly on the result of U.S. presidential election, Japan may be forced to reconsider its RTA approach. It may also have to accept a trade order based on RCEP or FTAAP out of economic necessity. However, concluding an alternative RTA in the event that the TPP fails may be difficult, especially for TPP countries where negotiations were domestically challenging. If the legacy of a failed TPP negotiation sours support for a more inclusive RTA, at least in the short-term, it may not be in China’s favour and certainly not in South Korea’s, as both envision an inclusive regional security order built upon the foundations of an RTA. In lieu of the TPP, FTAs could serve as replacement for Japan, but these FTAs may vary significantly in ambition and could fail to create a community of friendly nations commensurate with an RTA like the TPP. This result may also drive Japan to make 48  more direct overtures to countries it wishes to develop stronger security ties, which would heighten tensions with China and leave South Korea in limbo as it struggles to remain neutral between China, a key economic partner, and the U.S. (and Japan by virtue of proximity and common regional objectives) a treaty ally and guarantor of its security. Regardless of the future outcome, the failure to conclude an RTA in the Asia Pacific would be detrimental to all the various conceptualizations of regional security presented by contemporary leaders in NEA countries.   While all three countries have taken slightly different approaches to the issue, it is evident, through speech acts that the current generation of leaders in China, Japan, and South Korea have acted to securitize free trade in Northeast Asia. 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