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The Bulgarian Horrors : culture and the international history of the Great Eastern Crisis, 1876-1878 Whitehead, Cameron Ean Alfred 2014

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THE BULGARIAN HORRORS: CULTURE AND THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF THE GREAT EASTERN CRISIS, 1876-1878 by Cameron Ean Alfred Whitehead M.A., University of Victoria, 2007 B.A., University of Victoria, 2006   A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in The Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies (History)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  April 2014   © Cameron Ean Alfred Whitehead, 2014 ii  Abstract In the wake of alleged Ottoman atrocities in Bulgaria, the new geopolitical order created at the 1878 Congress of Berlin was demarcated largely along Western cultural prejudices. Using a cultural approach that appreciates both “macro” material structures and “micro” cultural processes in Bulgaria, Britain, and the Ottoman Empire, this study offers an alternative framework for understanding this period. It employs community-level evidence (petitions, public meetings, provincial journalism) alongside the diplomatic record; moreover, it uses the diaries, writings, and the marginalia within the personal readings of important policy-makers as pivotal intermediaries between cultural discourses, material structures, and individual agency. Diverging from previous narratives, which hold that the Great Powers altruistically responded to barbaric atrocities perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire against their European Christian subjects, I argue that solidifying conceptions of racially-based national self-determination and nonconformist evangelicalism were crucial within humanitarian protest, the diplomatic decision-making process, military objectives during the Russo-Turkish War, and the resolution of the Great Eastern Crisis. Western cultural preconceptions, propagated, negotiated, and reified throughout this process, were thus transformative in the construction of the new, unstable Balkan geopolitical order that contributed to the outbreak of the First World War and the remaking of the modern world.   iii  Preface This dissertation is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, C. Whitehead.    iv  Table of Contents  Abstract ..................................................................................................................................................................... ii Preface ...................................................................................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................................. iv List of Figures ....................................................................................................................................................... vii Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................................... viii Dedication ............................................................................................................................................................... xi 1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 1 Methodology and Historiography: Renovating the Practice of International History ........... 7 Analytical Frameworks: Constructivism, Culture, and Structuration ....................................... 18 Scope and Focus: Britain, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1878 ............................. 29 Section Summaries ........................................................................................................................................ 37 2. The Bulgarian Revolution: Reconceptualizing the April Uprising ............................................. 42 The Ottoman Historical Context and the Spread of Nationalism ................................................ 45 Origins of Revolutionary Bulgarian Nationalism .......................................................................... 56 Revolutionary Nationalism and the Origins of the April Uprising ............................................. 61 The Ottoman Default (1875) ................................................................................................................ 65 The April Uprising and the Bulgarian Horrors ................................................................................... 68 Revolutionary Bulgarian Sources ....................................................................................................... 80 Robert College and Initial Reports of the April Uprising ........................................................... 84 Revolutionary Bulgarian Delegates in Britain ............................................................................... 87 Codification of the Bulgarian National Narrative .............................................................................. 91 The 2007 Batak Massacre Controversy .......................................................................................... 100 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................................... 109 3. “What a Glorious Opportunity for Attacking the Devil”: Cultural Preconceptions, New Journalism, and the Origins of the Bulgarian Agitation .................................................................... 114 British Historiography of the Great Eastern Crisis and the Bulgarian Agitation ................ 119 Antecedents to Agitation: Patterns of Perception in British Newspapers, 1870 to June 1876 .................................................................................................................................................................. 124 Attacking the Devil: W.T. Stead and the Northern Echo ............................................................... 130 v  Competing Conservative Views of the Eastern Question, January to June 1876 ................ 135 Between the Outbreak of Rebellion and its Fallout: June 1876 ................................................. 139 “Moslem Atrocities in Bulgaria”: 23 June 1876 ........................................................................... 144 Racialized Discourses of the Agitation ............................................................................................ 155 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................................... 163 4. A Politics of Righteous Passion: Community Level Political Action during the Bulgarian Agitation, 1876-1877 ...................................................................................................................................... 166 Petitions Campaigns in British Historiography ............................................................................... 169 Horror and Indignation: The Bulgarian Agitation Petition Campaign, July to October 1876 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 178 British Investigations into the Bulgarian Horrors .......................................................................... 186 Eugene Schuyler and Januarius MacGahan’s Reports ............................................................... 187 Culturally Imagined Narratives into Perceived Material Facts ............................................. 194 Explosion of the Agitation: Public Meetings and the Petition Campaign, August-October 1876 .................................................................................................................................................................. 199 The Impact of Eugene Schuyler’s Report ....................................................................................... 206 Public Meetings and Petitions ............................................................................................................ 207 The Baring Report, September 1876 ................................................................................................... 216 “Gladstone to the Front!” Stead, Gladstone, and the Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East, September 1876 ........................................................................................................................ 218 Gauging the Importance of the Bulgarian Agitation ...................................................................... 230 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................................... 237 5. Reading Beside the Lines: Marginalia, W. E. Gladstone, and the Bulgarian Horrors......... 240 Adopting Methods for Marginalia ......................................................................................................... 243 Before the Horrors: Gladstone’s Background Reading ................................................................. 250 The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East ..................................................................... 261 Beyond the Lion and the Unicorn: The Agitation and International History ....................... 266 Gladstone’s Later Readings (1877-1878) ...................................................................................... 280 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................................... 284 6. The Russo-Turkish War and the Congress of Berlin, 1877-78 .................................................. 286 Recent Historiography ............................................................................................................................... 288 vi  From the Bulgarian Agitation to the Descent into War ................................................................ 293 The Russo-Turkish War and its Consequences ................................................................................ 295 Balkan Geopolitical Implications ....................................................................................................... 295 National Identity and the War of Bulgarian Liberation ............................................................ 298 The Ottoman Empire: The Birth and Death of the First Constitutional Era ..................... 300 Civilian Casualties, Forced Migration, and a Herald of Modern Warfare .......................... 303 Britain: the Bulgarian Agitation, Jingoism, and the “War in the East,” 1877-1878. ...... 308 The Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878) ....................................................................................... 317 The Congress of Berlin (13 June to 13 July 1878) .......................................................................... 319 Legacies of the Treaty of Berlin .............................................................................................................. 322 From “Peace with Honour” to the Midlothian Campaign: Britain 1878-1880 ................ 323 “A Rickety Sort of Rule”: The Dismembering of the Ottoman Empire ................................ 325 Frustrated Nationalism and the Creation of the Modern Balkans ....................................... 328 The “Stillborn Child” of San Stefano: Bulgaria ............................................................................. 329 Conclusions: “Some Damned Foolish Thing in the Balkans” and the Origins of the First World War ...................................................................................................................................................... 332 7. Conclusion: Making Meaning out of the Great Eastern Crisis .................................................... 338 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................................... 345    vii  List of Figures Figure 2.11: “османската империя отива на виенската изложба със своите щастливи поданици, т. е. съ Антима ІV и Антима І,” (“The Ottoman Empire Going to the Vienna Exposition with his Happy Subjects, Antim I and Antim IV”) Будилник (“Alarm”), 1 May 1873. ....................................................................................................................................................................... 64 Figure 4.32: John Tenniel. “No Mistake!” Punch No. 0, 25 November 1876. ............................ 157 Figure 4.13: John Tenniel, “The Sphinx is Silent,” Punch, 15 July 1876, Volume 71, p. 19. . 183 Figure 4.24: John Tenniel, “Neutrality Under Difficulties,” Punch, 5 August 1876, Volume 71, p. 51 ....................................................................................................................................................................... 184 Figure 4.46: John Tenniel, “The Turkish Bath,” Punch, 5 October 1876. .................................... 225 Figure 4.57: Konstantin Makovski. The Bulgarian Martryesses. Oil on Canvas. 1877. ......... 234 Figure 5.18: Map of the South Slavonic Countries [map]. In: A.P. Irby and G. Muir Mackenzie, Travels in the Slavonic Provinces of Turkey-in-Europe. London: Daldy, Isbister, and Co., 1877. Fold-out flyleaf. .................................................................................................................................... 257   viii  Acknowledgements   The completion of this dissertation could not have been possible without the generous financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the University of British Columbia and its History Department, the Consular Corps of British Columbia, and the Liu Institute for Global Issues. I would also like to acknowledge the extremely supportive staff at Gladstone’s Library at Hawarden, who provided a generous scholarship and invaluable assistance in using their extraordinary resources. The staff at Koerner Library, the National Archives of the United Kingdom, the Royal Archives, the British Library, the University College of London School of Slavonic and East European Studies Library, University of Victoria Library and Centre for Global Studies, New Bulgarian University, the St. Cyril and Methodius National Library, and Bulgarian Historical Archives also deserve special recognition.   I would like to thank my supervisor, Eagle Glassheim, and my committee members, Joy Dixon and Steven Lee, for all their guidance, patience, and understanding over the years. Their mentorship has been invaluable. For their helpful outside feedback and encouragement, I would like to thank my thesis prospectus chair Robert MacDonald and comprehensive exams chair Bill French. Michel Ducharme, my comprehensive exam supervisor, has also offered timely, practical advice for grant-writing and establishing an academic career. Chris Friedrichs has been generous in both time and encouragement. Boyan Aleksov of the University College of London kindly offered his time to serve as a sponsor and research contact for my extended fieldwork the United Kingdom and Bulgaria.  Sinan Kuneralp of Isis Publishing in Istanbul was especially helpful providing me with invaluable Ottoman archival material, which is in the process of being published in ix  several volumes. Anne Summers graciously supplied me with an advance copy of her excellent chapter on women and British foreign policy now published in David Feldman and Jon Lawrence’s 2011 Structures and Transformations. I am in great debt to Vania Racheva for her kind encouragement for such an inexperienced student of the Bulgarian language and for providing copies of Bulgarian scholarship that would otherwise be inaccessible. Tchavdar Marinov helpfully sorted through Bulgarian scholarship and suggested avenues of research to avoid the traditional pitfalls of diplomatic history. Patrick Finney of Aberystwyth University gave me inspiration to study Balkan history as a specialization.  I am privileged to have been surrounded by such prodigious friends and colleagues. I would like to thank Laura Madokoro and Erica German in particular for reading and commenting on parts of my dissertation as well as for their continuing friendship and support. Jill Campbell-Miller of Waterloo University provided helpful commentary on an early version of Section 5. Jamie Sedgwick, Brendan Wright, Chelsea Horton, Kelly Cairns, Patrick Slaney, Tom Peotto, Phil Van Huizen, Mea Geizhals, Bill Reimer, David Meola, and Jan Friedrichs have all contributed invaluable conversations that have found form in various ways throughout this dissertation. The invaluable camaraderie and commiseration from all those above, as well as countless other graduate students at UBC, past and present, including Birga Meyer, Henry Trim, Noa Grass, Anna Belogurova, Eva Prkachin, Phil Dunlop, Della Roussin, Ken Corbett, Frederick Vermote, Meghan Longstaffe, Stefanie Ickert, Soma Banerjee, Mel Garipoglu, Geoff Bill, Mike Morris, Heidi Kong, Stephen Hay, Sandy Chang, Eric Johnson, Desmond Cheung, Gabriela Aceves-Sepulveda, Nick Simon, and Martin McCarvill, have been essential for my completion of this dissertation. My close friends, x  especially Eric Regehr, Shaun and Robin Kiernan, and Dave and Jana Russell-Loewen, have supported me in innumerable ways during such strange, difficult, and wonderful years.  Finally, yet most importantly, my family has been the overriding source of strength and purpose in my life. This has been especially so during the many challenges that I have faced since I began this program. My parents have always supported artistic and independent thought, and they encouraged my passionate (if sometimes idealistic) way of seeing the world. They have been the source of strength and support from which I have been able to continue along this path. Their loving, untold assistance defies any words of gratitude I can express here. My brother Mike has been a source of guidance and critique as well as an example of hard work, creativity, and integrity that has helped shape my own life. My brother Sam showed me the importance of winning the daily struggle to get out of bed in the morning in order to make a positive contribution to those around you. His legacy of selflessness and compassion is the reason for my completion of this dissertation. Melissa Welsh has been a constant and energetic supporter of my work. She is a steady source of creativity and encouragement and an indescribably positive part of my life. Mike and Marlene Welsh have supported our family immeasurably over the last few years. Finally, my son Oliver contributes joy, sleepless nights, welcome distractions, and yet another, incontrovertible reason to change the world for the better.  xi  Dedication       For Sam      1  1. Introduction  The Great Eastern Crisis was a fulcrum for the creation of the modern world order. This period, between 1875 and 1878, marked a climax of the decades-long Eastern Question, or the process by which the European Great Powers (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Austria-Hungary) responded to a perceived decline of Ottoman authority on the Balkan Peninsula. A number of Western-educated and ambitious Bulgarian elites organized a short-lived nationalist rebellion against the Ottoman Empire in April 1876. Its utter failure nevertheless spread news of alleged Ottoman atrocities against Christians, which was transmitted and circulated along clearly perceptible languages of cultural understanding. Events were framed as the “Bulgarian Horrors,” in which innocent and industrious Christian races were helplessly slaughtered by barbarous Muslim Turks. This perception, disseminated through newspapers, pamphlets, public meetings, petitions, and powerful public protest, interacted with and transformed the material, institutional, and geopolitical interests of Britain and supported a foreign policy based upon racial and religious ideals of civilizational progress and humanitarianism. Public dissidence, in limiting the scope of acceptable actions, prevented Britain’s traditional military support of the Ottoman Empire, resulting in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and the subsequent Berlin peace process in 1878. This conference, in partially adopting the principles of national self-determination with hopes of securing lasting peace in the Balkans, granted independence to the new Balkan states of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro and represented a fundamental reordering of fin-de-siècle international relations. The compromise reached to satisfy Great Power imperial ambitions as well as the creation of new, “national” states frustrated irredentist Balkan nationalists. The inherent instabilities 2  of this compromise contributed to the construction of the infamous “powder keg” that precipitated the Balkan Wars, the triggering of the First World War, and the pernicious nationalist legacies that continue into the twenty-first century.  The Great Eastern Crisis was neither caused nor resolved simply through impersonal structural forces of macroeconomics, warfare, peace conferences, and high-level diplomacy as has been traditionally presumed. Cultural factors, particularly Christian evangelism, liberal moralism, and racial determinism, underwrote the construction and resolution of the international crisis, as these factors affected individual behaviours and also collective actions on a large scale. Bulgarian revolutionaries, capitalizing on increasingly entrenched notions of nationalism throughout European populations, adopted and effectively negotiated these cultural preconceptions to eventually secure their own political power and the ultimate autonomy of the Bulgarian state. A remarkably small number of Western-educated revolutionaries organized ambitious campaigns of rebellion against Ottoman authority, some hoping to spur international involvement and the liberation of the Bulgarian people from what they considered to be the unnatural “yoke” of Ottoman administration. While these revolts utterly failed in their objectives to remove Ottoman authority by popular insurrection, they nevertheless succeeded in attracting international intervention and in fostering a self-fulfilling prophecy of Bulgarian nationalism that has shaped subsequent historiographies.  In Britain, powerful cultural languages also served as major conduits of public dissatisfaction against the realist foreign policy of Conservative Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli. During the so-called “Bulgarian Horrors” of 1876, it was widely reported that the 3  Ottoman Empire was barbarically massacring Christians in its European territories. Perceptions of atrocities against industrious European Christians by brutal Muslim Turks were fostered and solidified in the British public sphere by enthusiastic, evangelizing journalists and political dissenters who censured Britain for neglecting its duty to defend Western civilizational progress against degenerate Eastern tyranny. British civil society, including the newly expanded electorate, as well as women and other disenfranchised subjects, packed town hall meetings, drafted resolutions, signed petitions, wrote pamphlets, organized and supported aid campaigns, and publicly demonstrated against the traditional British foreign policy of supporting economic interests above all other concerns.  British community level political activism, promoted and enforced by the newspaper media and religious organizations and focused in meetings, petitions, and demonstrations, effectively overturned the traditional British support of the Ottoman Empire as a necessary bulwark against Russian expansion. Just two decades previously, Britain was allied to the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War in a costly war against the Tsar. Yet after the Bulgarian Horrors, the support of apparent Oriental oppression against its European Christian population became unacceptable in the eyes of a vastly expanded British electorate, even at the expense of British material interests. Public opposition pushed statesmen such as William Gladstone to harness such public indignation into powerful political dissidence and convinced the Foreign Secretary Lord Derby to drastically alter British foreign policy towards the partition of the Ottoman Empire’s European territories despite his own Prime Minister’s opposition. Conservatives as well as Liberals abandoned or resisted Disraeli and Queen Victoria’s traditional imperial vision towards one which embraced the “principles of humanity”—an ideological foreign policy to 4  preserve the “moral superiority” of Britain as the defender of Western Civilization and Christendom. This unprecedented public outcry over the Bulgarian Horrors not only pressured Disraeli to call a formal inquiry into the massacre of the inhabitants of a foreign empire (a novel phenomenon at the time); it also forced Britain to stand neutral as Russia waged war on her traditional Ottoman ally; it persuaded her to support the independence of new Balkan states; and it contributed to the overwhelming defeat of Disraeli’s Conservative government in the 1880 general election.  The Great Eastern Crisis is an excellent microcosmic study of the intrinsic—yet only recently acknowledged—relationship between cultural forces and the course of international history. Underpinning the assumptions of Bulgarian nationalist revolutionaries, vocal British dissidents and statesmen, Ottoman elites, and European plenipotentiaries were powerful discourses of race and religion. Drawing from influential hierarchies of civilizational progress, religious enlightenment, and racial superiority, individuals based their opinions and actions on perceived ideals of injustice or righteousness. Bulgarian revolutionaries adapted  Western ideals of nationalism to argue that their unique language, history, and religion necessitated an independent Bulgarian state to be obtained by any means necessary. Liberal Ottoman elites rejected what they saw as clear double standards in Western claims of their savagery, their inability to modernize or reform, their racial degeneracy, and their civilizational backwardness. Conservative Ottomans flipped these discursive dichotomies on their heads to favour Islam, Ottoman traditions, and the Ottoman administrative system. British Palmerstonian Conservatives emphasized material relationships, class hierarchies, fiscal discipline, and geopolitical strategies for the benefit of Britain’s Imperial Interests. Politically engaged British women 5  argued for the protection of helpless women abroad and lobbied their Queen to act on behalf of their sex in the realm of international politics. But it was the liberal, Whiggish, and evangelical nonconformist interpretations of events in Britain that caused the greatest changes to the course of international history during this period. The emphasis on European Christian superiority versus Oriental Muslim degeneracy filtered information of the Ottoman suppression of the Bulgarian rebellion, embellished the scope of the crisis, and fostered the imaginative invention of a narrative of unnatural, unholy, and unsustainable oppression of Christians by vampiric Muslims in the Balkans. It resulted in major changes to British policy, the onset of the Russo-Turkish War, and the creation of the modern Balkans negotiated along nationalist principles at the Congress of Berlin. Although the Congress stopped short of wholly adopting national self-determination, its resolutions nevertheless reified self-fulfilling prophecies of Balkan national self-determination and encouraged the aggressive irredentism of the new Balkan states that contributed to the outbreak of catastrophic war in 1914. This international crisis also deeply entrenched an enduring, pernicious legacy of anti-Ottoman, “Turkophobe,” and negative “Orientalist” attitudes that shaped both lay and scholarly approaches to Ottoman and Middle Eastern histories well into the twentieth century.  The construction of the new, late nineteenth-century geopolitical order and the demarcation of the modern Balkan states, while precipitated and shaped by Balkan revolutionaries, were significantly shaped by Western cultural values. Both liberals and conservatives in Britain fundamentally agreed on the declining efficacy and the inherent degeneracy of the Turkish state as well as the need for increased autonomy for their 6  subject “Christian races” in Turkey-in-Europe—a conception increasingly built upon categories of supposedly scientific racial determinism and religious dogma rather than material and strategic values. On the contrary, this period actually highlights the role of non-rationality in the construction of foreign policy—a realm much more dependent upon cultural perceptions than material facts. Discursive categories of racial, religious, national, and imperial knowledge, gendered against the supposedly sexually-perverse Ottoman Empire, guided decisions and the influence of cultural and political agents. This is especially true of journalists such as William Thomas Stead, Januarius MacGahan, Eugene Schuyler, and Antonio Gallenga, community leaders and organizers such as Anthony Mundella, Joseph Chamberlain, Lady Strangford, and William Morris, as well as important policy makers such as Lord Derby, Benjamin Disraeli, Queen Victoria, Henry Elliot, Austen Henry Layard, and William Ewart Gladstone. The precise way that these discursive categories of knowledge influenced behaviour was neither deterministic nor predictable, yet they nevertheless normalized individuals’ understandings of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour.  Considering the remarkably limited material significance of the April Uprising in 1876, Great Power reactions to the Bulgarian Horrors and their ultimately counterproductive solutions to the Great Eastern Crisis were thus precipitated and greatly shaped by vocabularies of cultural understanding. The application of an increasingly widespread Western principle of national self-determination—religiously and scientifically justified—divided imagined racial groups along national lines. In the heterogeneous ethnic landscape of Southeastern Europe, this self-fulfilling prophesy unleashed violence and 7  fundamental tensions that would survive into the twenty-first century. By focussing on the cultural production of international relations, we may unravel the tacit values that underwrote the way diplomacy was conducted, wars were fought, peace treaties were signed, borders were drawn, and national identities were constructed. This process offers the opportunity to fully understand, address, and eventually resolve, lasting tensions that threaten international security in the modern era. Methodology and Historiography: Renovating the Practice of International History  In arguing for a transnational appreciation of cultural forces during the Great Eastern Crisis, this study emphasizes the need to re-examine this critical event and supports the ongoing renovation of the practice of international history. This study demonstrates that the international historiography of these events, constructed through out-dated historical methodologies that neglect critical cultural analysis, has been fundamentally distorted by the same cultural forces that shaped the resolution of the crisis. Bulgarian historiography has been infused with powerful nationalist mythology since its inception during the National Revival, a period of increasing national awareness from the late eighteenth century to Bulgarian autonomy in 1878. This ingrained nationalist mythology has stymied critical analysis of the April Uprising and the formation of the early Bulgarian state, as will be discussed in the following chapter. British historiography, discussed at length in Section 3, has similarly supported the liberal interpretation of events: that the British public responded to Turkish atrocities by rallying against unfeeling and venal conservatives to change foreign policy along moral lines in order to liberate Christian nations from the backward and barbarous Ottoman Empire. These 8  historiographies are as skewed as they are historically powerful. Both British and Bulgarian historiographies have overwhelmingly overlooked the frailty of Bulgarian national consciousness, the limited nature and the utter failure of the actual April Uprising, and the degree to which Western Europeans misunderstood and categorically denigrated the Ottoman Empire. They neglect the growing power of supposedly scientific racial determinism, the role of religious conviction and solidarity in the defence of fellow Christians, the limited British knowledge of Southeastern Europe (even amongst self-purported specialists) and the growing influence of nationalism within international relations. Perhaps most importantly, however, previous narratives have ignored the profound consequences to the international geopolitical order that these cultural processes had in producing the resolution of this crisis.  Neglect of culturally-constructed influences on international relations has characterized the study of the Great Eastern Crisis as it has the traditional practice of international history. From the 1970s until quite recently, international history as a sub-discipline has been in transition. When in 1980 Charles S. Maier lamented that the history of international relations “cannot, alas, be counted among the pioneering fields of the discipline during the 1970s... it has become a stepchild … [without an] acknowledged master,”1 his jeremiad both summarized a growing intellectual dissatisfaction with entrenched research traditions and marked a period of major self-examination for                                                         1 Charles Maier, “Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations,” in Michael Kammen (Ed.), The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980): 355–82. Maier was certainly not the first to express anxiety over the future of the discipline; see: Ernest R. May, “The Decline of Diplomatic History,” in George Billias and Gerald Grob (Eds.)American History: Retrospect and Prospect, (New York: Macmillan, 1971).  9  diplomatic history.2 Maier echoed many who feared that the “methodological democratization”3 typical of other areas of the humanities and social sciences was especially difficult in a field so heavily tied to the state, elites, and “Rankean exegesis”4 as its basis of methodology. A reluctance to grapple with this quandary left a core of practitioners insulated and resistant to theoretical innovations that had proven so profitable in many other areas. Major works from outside the field scripted a turn away from a traditional focus on elites, politics and diplomacy,5 leaving the impression that diplomatic historians were seen by others as “something like … the crocodile, the armadillo, and the cockroach … still rather primitive and, for that reason, not very interesting,”6 raising fears that the purpose of the field was being eroded by a wider compass,7 and discouraging new research in areas perceived to be state-centric, Western-biased, and old-fashioned.                                                          2 This period marked several ideological crises across the historical discipline. The long Marxist and labour-centered traditions (particularly in the United Kingdom) feared redundancy with the collapse of the Soviet Union and fundamental challenges posed by poststructuralists who rejected any historical metanarrative. Canadian historiography was also abuzz with activity after the publication of J. Granatstein’s Who Killed Canadian History? (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1998), which singled out social historians (particularly Marxists and feminists, among a laundry list of co-conspirators) for fragmenting and distorting the study of history in that country over the previous three decades. 3 Maier, “Marking Time,” 356. 4 Maier, “Marking Time,” 357. 5 Including E.P. Thompson, The Making of the Working Class (London: Pelican, 1963), Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), and Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Vintage, 1978), and the publications of the third generation of the Annales School (such as Fernand Braudel Civilisation Matérielle, Economie et Capitalisme XVe–XVIIIe Siècle (“Capitalism and Material Life”) (Paris: Armand Colin, 1997 [1979]), the second generation of the Frankfurt School (Jürgen Habermas’s 1962 Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit (Trans. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere Cambridge: Polity, 1989[1962]), and the first generation of the American “New History” (Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States (New York: HarperCollins, 1980). Also see: Peter Burke, “Overture: The New History, its Past and its Future,” in Peter Burke (Ed.) New Perspectives on Historical Writing, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992). 6 John Lewis Gaddis, “New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic History 14 (1990): 406. 7 For instance, Frank Ninkovich, “The End of Diplomatic History?” Diplomatic History 15, 2 (1991): 439-48. 10  Indeed, the Eastern Question was a topic left “to wither on the vine”8 for decades, with the assumption that everything that could be said about the topic already had been. The subject never regained its central political importance of the interwar period. In the context of Britain’s absorption of formerly Ottoman Middle-Eastern mandates after the First World War, the role of the British Empire in the region was of prime scholarly interest. R.W. Seton-Watson’s seminal Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics (1935) continues to be the scholarly backbone of all diplomatic histories of the period. It is also the source material for contemporary international relations theorists, who have since used the Bulgarian Horrors as a critical example of developing norms of international humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention.9 Seton-Watson’s study exhaustively employs the traditional sources of history: diplomatic records and correspondences between statesmen, elites, diplomats, and plenipotentiaries. Yet Seton-Watson’s masterfully researched book is guided by the same cultural prejudices that manifest themselves during the period that he studied. Convinced of the “prophetic vision”10 of Gladstone for seeing that “the future lay with the nations whom Ottoman tyranny had so long submerged,”11 Seton-Watson chastises Disraeli and Queen Victoria’s defence of Turkey and selfish “British interests” in contrast to Gladstone’s                                                         8 Michelle Tusan, “Britain and the Middle East: New Historical Perspectives on the Eastern Question,” History Compass 8, 3 (2010): 213. 9 For example, Martha Finnemore’s chapter “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention” in Peter Katzenstein’s formative 1996 volume The Culture of National Security cites the “Bulgarian agitation” as a central example of humanitarian action in the nineteenth century using Seton-Watson’s work (and other older publications) as cited evidence. According to Google Scholar, this book has been cited by at least 1982 subsequent publications. 10 Robert W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics, (New York: Norton, 1972 [1935]), ix. 11 Seton-Watson, Disraeli, 570. 11  heroic appeal to “civilization and humanity.”12 British mismanagement of the Eastern Crisis under Disraeli—more centrally the rejection of total national self-determination13—he argues, bears a “heavy moral responsibility for subsequent developments” in the region including further Ottoman decline, the Armenian massacres, and the ongoing “Balkan problem” that spiraled into the First World War.14 In adopting the normative framework of Liberal/nationalist righteousness versus Conservative/imperialist superciliousness, however, Seton-Watson is blind to the cultural constructions of nationalism and the material consequences of privileging such an ideology.  Richard Shannon resurrected the topic nearly three decades later in his 1963 book Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation to address the subject of “public opinion” and this episode of foreign policy (a question first addressed by G. Carslake Thompson’s 1886 book, Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield and expanded by David Harris’s 1939 book, Britain and the Bulgarian Horrors of 1876). Shannon’s appreciation of the Bulgarian Agitation as a fundamental shift in British domestic politics around a question of foreign policy is entirely based on British archival sources (petitions, personal correspondence, and diaries) and the diplomatic evidence provided by Seton-Watson. Shannon’s research thus focuses exclusively on the British causes and consequences of the Agitation with little analysis of the subject’s international character and consequences. Shannon reproduces Seton-                                                        12 Seton-Watson, Disraeli, 178, 184, 566. Seton-Watson’s earlier book, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans, directly echoes the Agitation in his condemnation of the Ottoman Empire as “essentially a barbarous Power cemented by military organizations and an insatiable lust for conquest”; whose people “have never shown a trace of creative genius”; and whose “savage and incompetent” government was “like a vampire… it could only flourish by draining the lifeblood of its [Christian] victims.” R. W. Seton-Watson, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1918 [1917]), 6-24. 13 Seton-Watson was a passionate advocate for the national self-determination of Central and Southeastern European nations throughout his life, attending the Paris peace conference in 1919 as a private delegate to advise on the border between Italy and Yugoslavia. 14 Seton-Watson, Nationality in the Balkans, 84-86.  12  Watson’s biases against Ottoman degeneracy and Disraelian malfeasance, while venerating Gladstone and the Agitation’s visions of a humanitarian foreign policy.15 While Shannon’s more recent books on Gladstone himself are more nuanced and authoritative, Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation propagates an Anglo-centric and triumphant version of the Great Eastern Crisis within English historiography. Diplomatic historians confronted the challenges of the cultural turn in the humanities during the 1990s,16 yet these attempts to consolidate and renew interest in the field tended to merely justify a slightly-modified status quo.17 Treatises during this period, therefore, were almost as a rule separated between new “micro” and old “macro” studies, separated by local/cultural versus international/political emphases.18 Ann Pottinger Saab’s 1991 book, Reluctant Icon: Gladstone, Bulgaria, and the Working Classes, for example, shifts focus from “high politics” and elites towards domestic social structures and collective behaviour. Utilizing Neil Smelser’s sociological theory of collective action, quantitative analysis of petitions to Parliament and the Foreign Office, and an able appreciation of                                                         15 Shannon, in a thoroughly negative 1991 review of Ann Pottinger Saab’s Reluctant Icon, recalls how he wrote his first book “as a leftish young New Zealander convinced of Gladstone’s greatness and Disraeli’s villainy” (Richard Shannon, [Review], English Historical Review, 435 (1995): 230-1.  16 This includes Akira Iriye’s “Culture and International History,” in M. Hogan and T. Paterson (Eds.), Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991): 241–56. For a general history of the “postmodern” challenge to historiography, see: Ernst Breisach, On the Future of History: The Postmodernist Challenge and Its Aftermath (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 17 In her keynote address to the 1997 SHAFR conference, for example, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman described inroads towards a “New Diplomatic History,” but essentially remained within the state-elite macronarrative framework and traditional archival methodology in her call to “write a global American history” that is “flavo[ured]” by “cultural mores ... and social history” (“Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life: Towards a Global American History,” Diplomatic History 21, 4 (1997): 501). Also see the conclusion of Frank Ninkovich’s “No Post-Mortems for Postmodernism, Please,” Diplomatic History 22, 3 (1998): 451-66. Ninkovich recommends attention to postmodernism by diplomatic historians because it is, quoting Michael Walzer, “importantly wrong” (462), yet helpful in certain circumstances in viewing non-political episodes as “interesting, perhaps, though ultimately insignificant precisely because they were deviant” (465).  18 A notable exception has been the work of Akira Iriye; see: “Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations,” Diplomatic History 3, 2 (1979): 115-28 and Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).  13  Victorian categories of race, gender, class, and religion, Saab concludes that the greatest significance of British protest over foreign policy “was domestic.”19 Saab, who prefaces the book with her disenchantment with “the classical tradition of diplomatic history … [and its] narrow, artificially rational focus,” therefore inadvertently reinforces Shannon’s narrow focus with regards to the Eastern Question by exclusively addressing the British context.  Davide Rodogno, in his 2012 Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire 1815-1914, attempts to transcend national boundaries in his study of British and French responses to humanitarian crises. Rodogno succeeds in addressing the long legacies of often-forgotten nineteenth century humanitarian impulses. It is an able account of the development of humanitarian norms that occurred more than a century before the so-called “humanitarian decade” of the 1990s, and of the political and legal statuses of the Ottoman Empire within European prejudices. But Rodogno’s ambitious study unavoidably relies upon the flawed or incorrect assertions of events relating to the Bulgarian Horrors constructed by his secondary evidence.20 His conclusions therefore rest upon unstable foundations and are drawn towards the predilections of past historians towards the immediate material consequences of the crisis’s diplomatic history, as drawn exclusively from Western European sources. Conspicuously absent from Rodogno’s analysis are Bulgarian or Ottoman perspectives, a careful critique of previous historiographies, or an attempt to theoretically reconcile local histories with his international scope. This leads to Rodogno’s assumption of widespread Bulgarian national identity, which I problematize in Section 2. This also privileges Western sources such as                                                         19 Ann Pottinger Saab, Reluctant Icon: Gladstone, Bulgaria and the Working Classes, 1856-1878, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 196. 20 His account of the April Uprising is scant, for example, citing only the Baring’s Report as his source of “the British government’s official statistics” (147) that asserted the destruction of sixty villages and 12,000 people.  14  contemporary government reports, memoirs, and journalistic accounts, which I will show to be largely inaccurate. Rodogno’s ambitious work perhaps unavoidably overgeneralizes complex cultural processes that occurred in multiple countries over one hundred years.  The historiography of the Great Eastern Crisis, therefore, has been characterized by its inability to move beyond insular “sectional identifications”21 and national boundaries, which reflects the struggle of the discipline itself to reconcile major theoretical changes in the last three decades. Elsewhere across the social sciences and humanities, on the other hand, a new generation of scholars has adapted to paradigmatic shifts and integrated theoretical innovation within their respective disciplines, which offers important lessons for the international historian. International relations theorists and political scientists, for example, have grappled with similar problems of how to adequately represent and reassess international relations’ state-centric focus. Alexander Wendt’s 1992 article in International Organization is the most frequently cited example of the budding idea of social constructivism in international relations theory, which criticizes the “realist” assumptions that “material interests,” “security,” or even “power politics” are straightforward and unproblematic.22 Wendt and other “constructivists” argue that these values are instead constructed of social realities such as cultures, identities, goals, fears, norms, ideologies, and other elements of a society expressed through language, discourse, and social                                                         21 Tony Judt, Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century (New York: Penguin, 2009), 389. “We are all familiar with intellectuals who speak only on behalf of their country, class, religion, ‘race,’ ‘gender,’ or ‘sexual orientation,’ and who shape their opinions according to what they take to be the interest of their affinity of birth or predilection. But the distinctive feature of the liberal intellectual in past times was precisely the striving for universality; not the unworldly or disingenuous denial of sectional identification but the sustained effort to transcend that identification in search of truth or the general interest.”  22 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, 2 (1992): 391-425, later expanded into his book Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 15  practice.23 While the theory of constructivism is essentially taken as a given by cultural historians, it took many years of impassioned argument within journals of international relations to establish its credibility and analytical usefulness.24 This debate engendered a wider understanding of the relationship between cultural influences and the conduct of international relations that has been only recently—although profitably—adapted to the practice of international history, albeit overwhelmingly in the twentieth century context.25  Several scholars have ambitiously addressed the fundamental debates about the practice of international history. This includes Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher’s edited volume 2003 Culture and International History and Patrick Finney’s 2006 collection of articles Palgrave Advances in International History. Some scholars have advocated a reinvigorated diplomatic history as the “Next Big Thing,”26 and Society for                                                         23 A particularly important edited volume for constructivism is Peter Katzenstein’s The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). See also: Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, (Eds.), State Sovereignty As Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Rodney Bruce Hall, National Collective Identity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). The theoretical grappling with constructivism continued well into the new millennium: Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  See also the debate in Review of International Studies, 30 (2004). 24 For more on the differences between diplomatic historians and scholars of international politics, see: Robert Jervis “International Politics and Diplomatic History: Fruitful Differences,” Keynote Address, H-Diplo Conference on New Scholarship in American Foreign Relations, 17-18 April 2009. Accessed 10 June 2010 at <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/williams2009>. See also: Beate Jahn, The Cultural Construction of International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2000). See also the chapters by Jervis, Gerhard Weinberg, Edward Ingram, John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Schroeder in C. Elman and M. Elman (eds.), Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists and the Study of International Relations (London: MIT Press, 2001).  25 Examples of this positive trend are SHAFR book-prize winners such as Paul Kramer’s The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, The United States, and The Philippines, Mary Renda’s Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940, Penny Von Eschen’s Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957, and Joseph Henning’s Outposts of Civilization: Race, Religion, and the Formative Years of American-Japanese Relations.  26 Michael J. Hogan, “The ‘Next Big Thing’: The Future of Diplomatic History in a Global Age,” Diplomatic History  28, 1 (2004): 1–21. 16  Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)27 scholars even questioned if diplomatic historians’ new, often transnational, approaches should be reflected by changing the American-centric name of their society and narrow-sounding name of their journal Diplomatic History.28 A lively debate ensued both in the 2009 SHAFR annual conference and on the forums of H-Diplo during the spring of that year, which highlighted both the prevalent terminological flexibility of key concepts and a lack of methodological standardization. It also generated a general consensus dismissing the idea of “crisis” within the field and expressing confidence in the current vitality of the subject.29 The recent “transnational turn,”30 for example, was viewed neither as irreconcilable with state-focused studies nor as anything particularly revolutionary. It was observed that the transnational concept was first developed in 1916 and much debated over the last century.31 Overwhelmingly, recent authors have been concerned with the quality of argument, sources, and subject of new works rather than a dogged fixation on theoretical frameworks or methodology, suggesting an acceptance of multiple research traditions and disciplinary approaches in the study of international history.                                                           27 Founded in 1967, SHAFR publishes the most prestigious journal in the historical field of international relations: Diplomatic History. 28 The consensus that eventually emerged was that the society’s statement of purpose already encompassed new theoretical and topical emphases, and that a change of name would be superficial. Sally Marks similarly asserted that “diplomatic history” and “international history” are “respectively the American and British terms for the same thing.” Marks further asserted: “If those who apparently distinguish between the two mean that the first is bilateral and the second multilateral, I can only say that multinational history has been the norm among the diplomatic historians I have known for at least 40 years.” S. Marks, “Terminology—Diplomatic History, International History, and Transnationalism,” 19 March 2009, H-Diplo, accessed 1 June 2010 at    <http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=0903&week=c&msg=RWOhObKQ1Y16VmJxi%2bOMXg&user=&pw=>. 29 These responses may all be found on H-Diplo’s monthly discussion for May, 2009 at <http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=lx&list=H-Diplo&user=&pw=&month=0904>. 30 See: William I. Robinson, “Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies” Sociological Forum 13, 4 (1998): 561–594, and Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology,” International Migration Review 37 3(2003): 576-611. 31 See: Akira Iriye, “The Transnational Turn,” Diplomatic History 31, 3 (2007): 373-6 and Randolph Bourne, “Trans-National America,” Atlantic Monthly, 118 (1916): 86-97. 17  In order to contribute to the ongoing renovation of the field, this dissertation engages recent avenues of theoretical innovation while critically re-evaluating the international history of Great Eastern Crisis. It problematizes the use of cultural approaches without reciprocal attention to material structures or without critical appreciation of collective behaviour and the conceptual framework of “culture” itself. The most recent historiographical shift of emphasis towards a more pluralistic, humanistic, and eclectic version of international history comes with opportunity, but also challenges that must be addressed lest the change be one more erratic swing of the theoretical pendulum or simply a return to worn styles of historical inquiry with a glossy new veneer. The cultural turn amongst international historians may represent, as Patrick Finney suggests, “the means whereby the flesh wounds inflicted by postmodernism have been sutured and a return to business (more or less) as usual has been facilitated,”32 but without substantial critical reflection as to the purpose, objectives, and direction of future scholarship, the shift may simply be a new language for answering old questions for old reasons. In the historical study of international relations, critical appreciation of the culturally constructed yet reciprocal process of foreign policy and diplomacy replaces the “realist” theories of material power left over from the cold war. Cultural approaches to topics in international history, carefully examined and weighed in relation to other material and structural forces, have the ability to transcend one-sided research traditions to better reveal the breadth of human experience.                                                          32 Patrick Finney, “Introduction: What is International History?” in Finney (Ed.), Palgrave Advances in International History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 19.  18  Analytical Frameworks: Constructivism, Culture, and Structuration Cultures, identities, and belief systems are now intermingled and widely analyzed as equal to military prowess, state institutions, geopolitics, economic wealth, intellectual history, and political campaigns. While classic, “realist” theorists attribute cultural conflicts to humankind’s inherent differences of race, nation, religion, and “civilization”33—as opposed to the materially-based, rational, and secular construction of states—recent “constructivist” theories of international relations (IR) assert that all actors, collective identities and their respective values are culturally constructed without such natural laws. As Alexander Wendt asserts, states and their interests are socially constructed; therefore, international “anarchy is what states make of it.”34 If all international institutions are socially constructed and the actors and policies which guide international relations are bound by cultural structures such as race, religion, class, or gender, then “culture, here, is truly ‘part and parcel’ of the discipline of international relations; it is the defining characteristic of the discipline’s subject matter.”35  Although historians have typically addressed traditional subjects through cultural lenses (such as “Americanization” or cultural diplomacy during the cold war) to broaden or problematize the historical record, political scientists and IR theorists have approached the cultural construction of international normative frameworks such as “security” as a major source of new research. As such, the diplomatic history of the Eastern Question may be utterly re-envisioned through a careful appreciation of the cultural frameworks that                                                         33 Most famous of these assertions is Samuel P. Huntington’s in his article, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (1993): 22-49.  34 Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” 391. 35 Beate Jahn, “The Power of Culture in International Relations,” in Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (Eds.), Culture and International History (Oxford: Berghahn, 2004), 28. 19  shaped behaviours, policies, and events: the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was hardly a result of some inveterate propensity for decline—it was forced upon the Ottomans by condescending and predatory Great Powers. The Bulgarian uprising was not an inevitable result of the “awakening” of nations nor was it materially significant within contemporary realpolitik international relations. Western cultural values, however, propelled the Bulgarian question to the forefront of international affairs: observers perceived that the suppressed Christian races were yearning to be free from Ottoman oppression. The Great Eastern Crisis, therefore, was not a material crisis dealing with Balkan revolutionaries and the collapse and partition of the Ottoman Empire; it was a cultural event that gave importance to perceived realities and created and sustained a diplomatic and material crisis.     The now ubiquitous use of culture as a broad category of analysis, however, is not without its own pitfalls. Culture is frequently employed unproblematically with little in the way of precise definition, yet the understanding of the term itself has drastically changed over time. In the nineteenth century culture denoted high civilization, literature, music, art, philosophy, or as Matthew Arnold explained, the “pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matter which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world,”36 as opposed to anarchy, disorder, and “natural” states of being. The discipline of international relations, institutionally founded in the immediate aftermath of the First World War,37 was formed with this humanist conception of culture. This understanding greatly shifted over the next few decades to a general understanding of                                                         36 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994 [1869]), 5. 37 The first department of international politics was founded in 1919 at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. 20  culture in its anthropological sense, essentially that “we are our culture,”38 or the amalgamation of a people’s history, language, customs, and beliefs. The meaning of the word, however, retained mixed connotations depending on the context and a multitude of sometimes conflicting denotations. By as early as 1952, Alfred Louis Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn documented a list of 164 definitions of “culture.”39 Clifford Geertz famously defined culture as “a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which people communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life,”40 modifying the anthropological definition by including the dynamic methods by which cultural symbols are created, expressed, and renegotiated. But by the turn of the millennium, Julie Reeves noted that the humanist idea of culture had been almost universally replaced by a simplistic anthropological concept in international relations literature: that a culture is defined by the attributes of its people.41  In her thorough critique of this ubiquitous anthropological understanding of culture, Julie Reeves notes that, too frequently, a particular culture is defined by a list of differences and understood as if “there is something profound driving and determining these differences behind the scenes.”42 This idea, that culture is a “given” amidst a particular group within defined boundaries, and that each culture is in itself a source of difference presupposes an essentialist understanding of the concept. Maintaining that cultures create differences and that these differences are evidence of cultural difference is tautological.                                                         38 Margaret Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist Looks at America (New York: William Morrow, 1942/1943), 21. Emphasis in the original. 39 Alfred L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952). 40 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic, 1973), 89.  41 Julie Reeves, Culture and International Relations: Narratives, Natives and Tourists (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 5-6. 42 Reeves, Culture and International Relations, 76. 21  That there are differing behaviours between groups of people does not necessarily mean that they were caused by different cultural understandings—they may just as easily be caused by different political, economic, demographic, environmental, or a large number of other social circumstances. Using her hypothetical categories of “natives” and “tourists” to explore the logical conclusions of commonplace cultural understanding, Reeves observes that these essentialist notions of culture as pre-determined, irreconcilable with other cultures, and deterministic in terms of individual or group behaviour are “functionally equivalent with race theory” in that the tourist remains impure, unable to comprehend or assimilate fully into the pure, authentic native culture.43 Thus, a simplistic, anthropological analytical framework of culture within international history has unpalatable consequences in that “we cannot become culturally otherwise and remain forever excluded from and isolated by the native culture”—something that Reeves, quite rightfully, finds “not only socially unacceptable but also politically disturbing.”44 Reeve’s observations are critically important for analysis of cultural processes within the Great Eastern Crisis—as they are for all cultural topics of international history. International historiography of the period is almost entirely shaped by essentialist readings of national identity, derived from categories of race or culture. “Bulgarians,” “Turks,” “Circassians,” “Greeks,” and other collective identities have been homogenously conceived since the crisis, which has shaped historical narratives along nationalistic lines. The Bulgarian National Renaissance and the April Uprising, it follows, are foreign and                                                         43 Reeves, Culture and International Relations, 82.  44 Essentially, the idea “that we cannot become culturally otherwise and remain forever excluded from and isolated by the native culture is not only socially unacceptable but also politically disturbing.” Reeves, Culture and International Relations, 12. 22  incomprehensible to the scholarly “tourist.”45 English and Bulgarian historiographies would be similarly incompatible, with no possibility of meaningful integration and generalization given inherent and unbridgeable cultural differences. Without a thorough critique of such supposedly intrinsic racial, cultural, and national differences, future historiography will continue to reinforce such essentialism.  In order to rescue the concept of culture from such an essentialist, racial framework, Reeves promotes Brian Street’s attractive argument that “culture is a verb,”46 not a static, passive noun. The influence of culture on history, therefore, is the active processes of meaning-making and contests over definitions over time amongst groups with dynamic conceptual boundaries: Anti-essentialism is much more than a methodological shift; it is a profound epistemological and ontological shift. Anti-essentialists accept that there is no such thing as the culture, as in an underpinning essence or ‘authentic set of exclusive/discrete meanings’…‘culture’ is about strategies of interaction and intersubjectivity, which are necessarily open-ended, subject to a wide range of influences; none of which is predictable. Otherness and meaning are taken as constitutive elements in the same process; neither are presumed to be enduring—people can and regularly do learn new habits and tell new stories about themselves. In an anti-essentialist sense, we all have ‘culture’ no matter                                                         45 Bulgarian revolutionary historian and memoirist Zahari Stoyanov, in his Materials of the Bulgarian Uprising (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1976[1884-1892]), supported this scepticism regarding the interest of foreign scholars: “Няма съмнение, че както по другите ни работи, така и по народните ни движения най-напред ще да се заинтересуват спекулантите чужденци … Чужденецът- българофил ще кръстоса страната направо и наляво (гдето има само железници и шосе, забележете), ще да се срещне той със самохвалствующите се първенци, със заинтересуваните началници и кметове, както в турско време с мюдюрите и владиците, ще поразпита надве-натри, па за останалото: да живеят библиотеките и официалните статистики. Пътувание по славянските земи , Нова България или Три месеца в България титулира своята книга "скъпият ни гост", пълна с лъжи и фабрикосани факти, написани тенденциозно за в полза на партията и на обществото, което е изпратило пътешественика от неговото отечество.” (“No doubt our popular movement will interest foreign speculators… This foreigner—Bulgarophile—will cross the country back and forth (only where rail and road will take him)… and visit only libraries and speak to relevant officials and mayors, the Turkish, and bishops half-carelessly and use only official statistics… Our dear guest will title his book… “Three months in Bulgaria”; full of lies and facts fabricated for the benefit of the party of society from which he came.) 46 Brian Street, “Culture is a Verb: Anthropological Aspects of Language and Cultural Process,” In David Graddol and Linda and Mike Byram (Eds.), Language and Culture (Clevedon: British Association of Applied Linguistics, 1993), 25.  23  what has come and gone over the years and irrespective of where we actually are. Under anti-essentialism, ‘the tourists’ must be considered along with ‘the natives.’47  Historians of the Great Eastern Crisis must therefore disentangle and denaturalize cultural identities and constituent meanings previously taken for granted. It is therefore both possible and necessary to dissolve the sectional and national identifications that otherwise isolate the past from the present, others from ourselves, or “natives” from “tourists.” Aside from the frequently amorphous uses of culture and their worrying implications—namely the potential for reifying racist discourses—little has been written on the definite mechanisms by which policy is influenced by supposedly omnipresent cultural influences. While discourse analysis is frequently employed to understand the prejudices and predispositions of certain groups towards others, the methods by which this is employed are unsystematic and the relationships between these preconceptions and policy creation are typically unexplained.48 It is widely assumed that cultural processes have a direct, linear relationship with policy formation at the domestic and international levels, with the implication that the study of culture on its own is sufficient to understand the rationale for policy decisions and the narration of history. Since the cultural turn, authors have followed the lead of Edward Said to define and critique pernicious “Orientalist” discourses that have long dominated Western perceptions of Middle Eastern and Balkan inhabitants since at least the late sixteenth century. In the Balkan context, Robert Hayden, Milicia Bakić-Hayden, and Maria Todorova have adopted Said’s concept to the Balkan context as “Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkans’” and “Balkanism”                                                         47 Reeves, Culture and International Relations, 84. Emphases in original. 48 See: Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 30. 24  respectively, essentially arguing that Balkan inhabitants are characterized not simply as alien “other,” but more precisely as a primitive version of the “self”; as Todorova notes, “the Balkans are left in Europe’s thrall, anti-civilization, alter ego, the dark side within.”49 Whereas these works have predominantly focussed on the discursive power of these pejorative analytical frameworks and their contemporary relevance—leaving the political implications unspecified—this dissertation investigates the conceptual origins of these frameworks and evaluates how they manifested into concrete policies that shaped specific events during the Great Eastern Crisis.  I argue that the linkages between cultural processes and international relations are by no means straightforward. In fact, institutional biases may have as much or more influence on policy creation, and individual understandings of cultural norms may vary widely from person to person and even from event to event with the same individual.50 During the Great Eastern Crisis, Balkanist discourses actually helped the case for the creation of modern Balkan states. Images of struggling and downtrodden Christian races forced into servitude,