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Past, present and future of publicly-funded European Union's fishing access agreements in developing… Le Manach, Frédéric 2014

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PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF PUBLICLY-FUNDED EUROPEAN UNION'S FISHING ACCESS AGREEMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIESbyFRÉDÉRIC LE MANACHB.Sc., Université Paris-Sud 11, 2008M.Sc., University of Plymouth and Universidad de Cádiz, 2011A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHYinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES(Resource Management and Environmental Studies)THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA(Vancouver) andLA FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES(Sytèmes Intégrés en Biologie, Agronomie, Géosciences,Hydrosciences, Environnement)UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTPELLIER 2(Montpellier, France)December 2014© Frédéric Le Manach, 2014iiAbstractSince the 19th century, with the expansion and industrialization of extractive industries, maritime jurisdictions have shifted from chiefly open-access to a regime regulated by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This thesis examines fishing access agreements, i.e., legal tools that allow one country to fish in the waters of another one following mutually-agreed terms. The emphasis is on the particular fisheries access agreements funded by EU-taxpayers, and the aim is to test the common belief that their economic, social, and environmental provisions have improved over time vis-à-vis the host countries. To date, only little has been published on this topic, and thus this examination of their provisions is of paramount importance for the policy realm. Chapters 1 and 2 challenge the legal ground of such agreements, which rests on the questionable notion of fisheries 'surplus' that must be made available to other countries according to UNCLOS. Flaws in the estimation of surplus are noted: in most cases, the surplus cannot be calculated due to inaccurate catch estimates, and ceding a potential surplus to foreign countries results in hard-to-justify decreases in domestic catches. Chapter 3 argues that since their inception, the level at which these agreements have been subsidized remained extremely high (around 75%); the remainder (paid by fleets' operators) represented only a small fraction of their gross revenue, highlighting a potential imbalance in allocation of benefits. Finally, Chapter 4 demonstrates that despite advances in most social and environmental provisions, the one regarding the supervision of foreign vessels by observers (arguably the most critical provision of all) has declined. These results beg the question: how legitimate are such access agreements? While they are lauded for their transparency, they appear to remain mostly beneficial to European interests and poorly monitored. Also, due to the fishing expansion occurring in host countries and ongoing international trade reforms, one can only wonder whether such historical 'pay-fish-and-go' agreements still ought to continue.iiiPrefaceThe work presented here was conducted at the Fisheries Centre (University of British Columbia) and at the Centre de Recherche Halieutique Méditerranéenne et Tropicale (Institut de Recherche pour le Développement).A preliminary1 as well as a full version2 of Section 5 have been published. I was the lead investigator, responsible for all major areas of concept formation, as well as for collecting the data, analyzing them, and writing the core of the manuscript. My co-authors helped with analyzing and discussing the data presented in these articles. Patrick Daniel3 also informally helped improving the preliminary work, and thus, producing the full version.With regards to Sections 3, 4 and 6, I was also the lead investigator and collected the vast majority of the data, analyzed them, and wrote the majority of the text. They are not published yet (as of the thesis' submission date, but papers are in preparation and will be submitted shortly). The members of my Committee (i.e., Rashid Sumaila, Didier Gascuel, and Peter Dauvergne) have all been involved in the conceptualization and discussion of these sections. Several collaborators have also participated in the collection, analyzes, and discussion of some of the data underlying Section 4. These collaborators are (in alphabetical order): CA Abunge, P Bach, L Barret, L Boistol, A Brito, E Bultel, I Chauca, P Chavance, AM Cisneros-Montemayor, M Colléter, A Darar Djibril, B Doherty, G Duhamel, P-G Fleury, C Gough, D Guyomard, S Harper, A Harris, M Hauzer, J Herfaut, A Herman, G Hosch, F Humber, P Labrosse, A Lindop, MM McBride, TR McClanahan, A Padilla, MLD Palomares, P Pruvost, J Robinson, PS Sabarros, L Schiller, L Sousa, Y Yvergniaux, and D Zeller. All of them are first authors or co-authors of at least one of the reconstruction reports referenced throughout this section. AM Cisneros-Montemayor also helped me organizing the database and with the coding in R for Sections 5 and 6.1 Le Manach F, Andriamahefazafy M, Harper S, Harris A, Hosch G, Lange G-M, Zeller D and Sumaila UR (2013) Who gets what? Developing a more equitable framework for EU fishing agreements. Marine Policy 38: 257–266.2 Le Manach F, Chaboud C, Copeland D, Cury P, Gascuel D, Kleisner KM, Standing A, Sumaila UR, Zeller D and Pauly D (2013) European Union's public fishing access agreements in developing countries. PLOS ONE 8(11): e79899.3 European Commission, Unit B3 'Bilateral Agreements and Fisheries Control in International Waters'.ivTable of contentsAbstract iiPreface iiiTable of contents ivList of tables viList of figures viiList of acronyms xAcknowledgements xii1. Prologue 11.1. The extension of maritime jurisdictions 31.1.1. Fighting for petroleum and minerals 31.1.2. Fighting for fish 51.2. The final push of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 62. Introduction 92.1. The extent of publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements 102.2. Evolution of the fishing effort and stakeholders 132.3. Scope of the work 163. A rationale for fishing access agreements? 183.1. Maximum sustainable yield 183.1.1. The early stages of fisheries science 183.1.2. The UK-US divide 193.1.3. Surplus production models 203.2. The bio-economic model and MEY 243.3. The notion of 'surplus' and its associated issues  254. Catch reconstructions as a solution to the total catch issue  294.1. Rationale for catch reconstructions 294.2. Foreign fisheries for demersal species 314.3. Foreign fisheries for large pelagic species  324.3.1. History of the fisheries 324.3.2. Catches of foreign fleets 344.4. Domestic fisheries for large pelagic species  394.4.1. Comoros 394.4.2. Djibouti 404.4.3. Îles Éparses (France) 414.4.4. Kenya 424.4.5. Madagascar 434.4.6. Mauritius 444.4.7. Mayotte (France) 454.4.8. Mozambique 464.4.9. La Réunion (France) 47v4.4.10. The Seychelles 484.4.11. Somalia 504.4.12. South Africa 514.4.13. Tanzania 524.5. Interaction with local fisheries and implications for the negotiation of fishing access agreements 534.6. Conclusion 565. The financial aspect of publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements 575.1. Material and methods 575.2. Results 645.2.1. EU subsidies 645.2.2. EU industry fees 665.2.2.1. Tuna agreements 665.2.2.2. Mixed agreements 675.3. Discussion 685.4. Conclusion 716. Social and environmental consequences of publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements 736.1. Material and methods 736.2. Results and discussion 766.2.1. Performance by target species 766.2.2. Performance by region and country 786.2.3. Average scores... 796.2.4. ...can hide bad things 806.3. The agreements 'in reality' 816.3.1. Monitoring, control and surveillance 826.3.2. Sectoral and social development, and food security 846.4. Conclusion 867. Conclusion 877.1. The basis of the agreements and the science around them surplus versus 'fair surplus' 897.2. Accounting for unreported catches and spatial expansion 917.3. The content of the agreements 927.3.1. Shifting responsibility to the industry 927.3.2. Reinforcing the positive sides of the agreements 947.4. The future: developing local fleets and commercial partnerships? 95Bibliography 98Appendix 165List of the provisions extracted for the analysis in Section 6, as well as ranking and associated scores of their respective sub-provisions 166viList of tablesTable 1. Summary of the type of resource targeted within the framework of the 20 publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements, 1979–2020..........11Table 2. Summary of the domestic pelagic fisheries in the Western Indian Ocean, as well as potential interaction with foreign fleets ........................ 54Table 3. References used to compile information on publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements ....................................................................... 58Table 4. Correspondence between the number of vessels and GRT capacities for non-tuna vessels ................................................................................. 61Table 5. Assumptions made to fill the gaps in the CPI time-series ........................ 62Table 6. Mean level of fees received by host countries over the period of their respective agreements, as well as mean fee paid by the industry per tonne of tuna over the 2008–2012 period ................................................ 65Table 7. Baseline data and estimate of the 'total fee/gross revenue' ratio for the mixed agreement with Mauritania over the 2008–2010 period .......... 67Table 8. Provisions and sub-provisions of fishing access agreements between the EU and host countries ........................................................................ 74viiList of figuresFigure 1.   Summary of the major steps towards the extension of national maritime jurisdictions .............................................................................. 3Figure 2.   Extent of publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements with developing countries (as of September 2014) ...................................... 10Figure 3.   Number of agreements over time, 1980–2013 ..................................... 12Figure 4.   Authorized capacity over time, 1980–2013 ........................................... 14Figure 5.   Theoretical breakdown of the licenses' share allocated to EU Member Countries, 1996–2014 ............................................................ 15Figure 6.   Time-series of the catch of major tuna species by European countries in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans ......................................... 16Figure 7.   Conceptual diagram of the notion of surplus ........................................ 18Figure 8.   Conceptual model used by Chapman................................................... 20Figure 9.   Graphical representation of the logistic model developed by Verhulst (1845) ..................................................................................... 21Figure 10. Surplus-production model developed by Schaefer (1954) ................... 22Figure 11. MSY in the case of joint stocks ............................................................. 23Figure 12. The bionomic equilibrium and the concept of rent ................................ 25Figure 13. The bionomic equilibrium and the rent in case of subsidization of the fishery ............................................................................................. 25Figure 14. The case of an under-exploited stock ................................................... 26Figure 15. Loss of catch for the domestic fleets when the stock becomes fully-exploited due to the entry of foreign fleets .................................... 26Figure 16. Increase in domestic effort to maintain the domestic catch .................. 27Figure 17. Increase in foreign effort to catch the entire surplus ............................. 27Figure 18. Map of the Western Indian Ocean ........................................................ 30Figure 19. Proportion of the catch caught under drifting aggregating devices by the French and Spanish purse-seiner fleets in the Indian Ocean, 1981–2012 ............................................................................... 33Figure 20. Total foreign catch (including an estimate of discards) of large pelagics in the Western Indian Ocean,1950–2012 ............................... 34Figure 21. Country breakdown of the Asian catch in the Western Indian Ocean, 1954–2012 ............................................................................... 35Figure 22. Country breakdown of the European catch in the Western Indian Ocean, 1978–2012 ............................................................................... 35viiiFigure 23. Gear breakdown of the total foreign catch in the Western Indian Ocean, 1954–2012 ............................................................................... 36Figure 24. Taxonomic breakdown of the total foreign catch in the Western Indian Ocean, 1954–2012 ..................................................................... 36Figure 25. Species breakdown of the total foreign catch of major tunas in the Western Indian Ocean, 1954–2012 ...................................................... 37Figure 26. Species breakdown of the European catch of major tunas in the Western Indian Ocean, 1980–2012 ...................................................... 37Figure 27. Distribution of the catch of the European fleets in the Western Indian Ocean, 1979–2012 ..................................................................... 38Figure 28. Distribution of the catch of the Asian fleets in the Western Indian Ocean, 1950–2012 ............................................................................... 39Figure 29. Comoros and its EEZ............................................................................ 40Figure 30. Djibouti and its EEZ .............................................................................. 41Figure 31. The Îles Éparses and their EEZs .......................................................... 41Figure 32. Kenya and its EEZ ................................................................................ 42Figure 33. Madagascar and its EEZ ...................................................................... 43Figure 34. Mauritius and its EEZ............................................................................ 44Figure 35. Mayotte and its EEZ ............................................................................. 45Figure 36. Mozambique and its EEZ in the Indian Ocean ..................................... 46Figure 37. La Réunion and its EEZ ........................................................................ 47Figure 38. The Seychelles and its EEZ .................................................................. 49Figure 39. Somalia and its EEZ ............................................................................. 50Figure 40. South Africa and its EEZ in the Indian Ocean ...................................... 51Figure 41. Tanzania and its EEZ ............................................................................ 52Figure 42. Extent of the publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements in the Western Indian Ocean .......................................................................... 54Figure 43. Regression of Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) on Gross Tonnage (GT) ........................................................................................ 59Figure 44. Analysis of the residuals of the linear regression presented in Figure 43 ............................................................................................... 60Figure 45. Trends of EU vessels' Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) .................... 61Figure 46. Trend of EU subsidies by country ......................................................... 63Figure 47. Level of public subsidies in EU agreements ......................................... 65ixFigure 48. Cost of tuna agreements for the industry.............................................. 66Figure 49. Conceptual diagram of the database for evaluating  change in social and environmental provisions of EU fishing access agreements since 1980 ............................................................................................. 75Figure 50. Overall score by target species, 1980–2013 ........................................ 77Figure 51. Evolution of the scores by target species for each version of the CFP, 1980–2013 ................................................................................... 77Figure 52. Overall score by region, 1980–2013 ..................................................... 78Figure 53. Evolution of the scores by region for each version of the CFP, 1980–2013 ............................................................................................ 78Figure 54. Overall score by country, 1980–2013 ................................................... 79Figure 55. Evolution of overall scores, 1980–2013 ................................................ 79Figure 56. Evolution of the score of the 'Observer' provision, 1980–2013............. 80Figure 57. Evolution of the overall scores once multiplied by the 'Observation' score, 1980–2013 ................................................................................. 81xList of acronymsACP African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of Statesa-FAD Anchored Fishing Aggregating DevicesCCSBT Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin TunaCFP Common Fisheries PolicyCPI Consumer Price IndexCPUE Catch Per Unit of Effortd-FAD Drifting Fishing Aggregating DevicesDG MARE Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and FisheriesEC European CommunityEEC European Economic CommunityEEZ Exclusive Economic ZoneEPA Economic Partnership AgreementEU European UnionFAO Food and Agriculture Organization (of the United Nations)FFA (Pacific Islands) Forum Fisheries AgencyGRT Gross Registered TonnageGT Gross TonnageICCAT International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic TunasICES International Council for the Exploration of the SeaIEDOM Institut d'Emission des Départements d'Outre MerINSEE Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes EconomiquesIOTC Indian Ocean Tuna CommissionIUCN International Union for Conservation of NatureIUU Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (fisheries)LCU Local Currency UnitMEY Maximum Economic YieldMSY Maximum Sustainable YieldNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationOPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting CountriesPNA Parties to the Nauru AgreementRFMO Regional Fisheries Management OrganizationSFA Seychelles Fishing AuthoritySRFC Sub-Regional Fisheries CommissionTC Total CostsUN United NationsxiUNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the SeaUNCLOS I United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1st round)UNCLOS II United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (2nd round)UNCLOS III United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (3rd round)UNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNEP United Nations Environment ProgrammeUSAID United States Agency for International DevelopmentVMS Vessel Monitoring SystemWAMA West African Monetary AgencyWCPFC Western and Central Pacific Fisheries CommissionWTO World Trade OrganizationWWF World Wide Fund for NaturexiiAcknowledgementsI never thought I would do a PhD. So, when Daniel Pauly came to my desk one day and said "Fred, be my student next year", it took me a couple of days to make up my mind. I knew right away that I would say yes, of course, but I was afraid of making such a big decision. Daniel: I will be forever grateful to you for this amazing journey. It was extremely stimulating and exciting, and your stellar guidance, patience, and support turned me into somebody more structured, organized, and thoughtful. Of course these past three years have also been slightly challenging and frustrating at times, so I also particularly appreciated the freedom you gave me as well as our non-fisheries discussions when I needed to think about something (actually, anything!) else.I would also like to thank Philippe Cury, my co-supervisor at the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD), as well as my fantastic committee members, Peter Dauvergne, Didier Gascuel, and Rashid Sumaila, for your continuous support and guidance over the course of this thesis. I felt extremely lucky to have such internationally renowned scientists in my committee, and I truly hope my thesis lives up to your expectations. Rashid, I promise you I will 'keep pushing'.I would also like to express my gratitude to many colleagues I met at meetings, conferences, and the IRD. Mialy Andriamahefazafy, Christian Chaboud, Larry Crowder, Jean-Marc Fromentin, Alasdair Harris, Claire Nouvian, André Standing: you have all contributed something invaluable to this thesis, be it data, perspective, or simply life advice. My two External Examiners (David Fluharty and Patrice Guillotreau) and my two University Examiners (Karen Bakker and David Mouillot) have also contributed to this thesis by suggesting small but neat edits.My gratitude also goes to Didier Marty-Dessus, Bastien Mérigot, and Jennifer Phelps for helping me set up my joint-PhD agreement. I do not particularly enjoy administrative paperwork, so you have made my life much easier.As I said earlier, doing a PhD was both stimulating and exciting, but it was also challenging. So I would like to thank my awesome friends for organizing comforting dinners and countless discussions about life: Laurenne Schiller (alphabetical order would not be appropriate for you!), Leah Biery, Lisa Boonzaier, Pablo Brosset, Lucas Brotz, Elise Bultel, Andrés Cisneros-Montemayor, Marta Coll, Mathieu Colléter, Marion xiiiCuif, Beau Doherty, Lauriane Escalle, Claire Hornby, Kristin Kleisner, Alasdair Lindop, Alexandra Maufroy, 'Deng' Palomares, Amparo Pérez, Jeroen Steenbeek, Wilf Swartz, and Kyrstn Zylich. Thank you, I love you. Some of these friends also took care of me when I was (literally) living at the Fisheries Centre while I wrapped up my thesis (I was sold on the shortest commute possible). Laurenne, Wilf, Kyrstn, thank you for offering me a space on your sofas when I needed it; thank you Deng and Lucas for giving me the keys to your apartments when you were away, or… the keys to your office when you were here!Thank you all.11 PrologueThe oldest remains of hominid civilizations show that fish have always been a staple food, and that fisheries have often been at the center of many social interactions (Radcliffe 1921; Stewart 1994; Gartside and Kirkegaard 2009; Longo and Clarke 2012). Until the beginning of the 20th century, fisheries were mostly restricted to inland rivers and lakes, estuaries, and inshore areas including tidal flats, since boats were propelled solely by wind and manpower.1 Depth-wise, these fisheries were also restricted, as manpower-operated craft lines could not surpass a couple hundred meters in depth; skin divers were restricted to 20–30 meters (Gartside and Kirkegaard 2009). Until then, the ocean was consequently considered as an eternal cornucopia. In this way, Huxley (1885) said:"Are there any sea fisheries which are exhaustible […]? I believe that it may be affirmed with confidence that, in relation to our present modes of fishing, a number of the most important sea fisheries, such as the cod fishery, the herring fishery, and the mackerel fishery, are inexhaustible. And I base this conviction on two grounds, first, that the multitude of these fishes is so inconceivably great that the number we catch is relatively insignificant; and, secondly, that the magnitude of the destructive agencies at work upon them is so prodigious, that the destruction effected by the fisherman cannot sensibly increase the death-rate."However, since Huxley's inaugural statement at London's Fisheries Exhibition in 1882, the human population on Earth has undergone a five-fold increase and, subsequently, in an effort to satisfy the world's skyrocketing demand for seafood (currently often more than 30 kg/person/year in developed countries; FAO 2012), the capacity of the global fleets had to follow suit.2 The industrial changes that occurred in the late part of the 19th century through World War I resulted in new technologies such as steam engines, which were responsible for a significant shift in the relationship between humans and the ocean. This technology triggered an era of large-scale activities (switching from mostly subsistence to mostly commercial purposes), and the "present modes of fishing" in Huxley's citation radically changed, with, e.g., the use of new gears 1 However, several distant-water fisheries already existed at this time. One example is the cod fishery off the coast of eastern Canada, with  European vessels active there since the 15th century (De Loture 1949).2 Ironically, two of the three "inexhaustible" fisheries named by Huxley have collapsed since his declaration (northern cod off the east coast of Canada in 1992, and both Atlantic and Pacific anchovies in the late 1960s–early 1970s; Selak 1950; Hutchings 2000). These are only a couple examples of stock collapses that can be attributed to the industrial exploitation of fish stocks; others include Salmo salar (Atlantic salmon), Melanogrammus aeglefinus (haddock), Thunnus thynnus (Atlantic bluefin tuna), and many species of sharks and rays (see, e.g., Baum et al. 2003; Myers and Worm 2003; Safina and Klinger 2008; FAO 2012).2such as bottom trawls (Fridman 2009). Soon, this resulted in the expansion of fishing fleets towards unexplored areas farther offshore and deeper waters (Chapman 1970; Morato et al. 2006; Swartz et al. 2010a; Watson et al. 2012), in order to reach new 'commodity frontiers' (Campling 2012). In the North Atlantic, this expansion occurred in order to exploit the great stocks of cod (Hutchings and Myers 1995; Haedrich and Hamilton 2000); along southeast Asian coasts, fisheries expanded to exploit demersal stocks (Morgan and Staples 2006); fishing fleets reached the west coasts of the African continent to target shrimp, cephalopods, and small and large pelagics (Chavance 2004; Bayliff et al. 2005). Other technological improvements such as the development of echo-sounding (Zugarramurdi et al. 1995; Fridman 2009; Gartside and Kirkegaard 2009), and the invention of nylon, freezer vessels (Miyake 2005), and purse-seines (Chauveau 1989a), have also greatly influenced the capabilities and behaviour of large-scale fisheries. A second fishing revolution at the dawn of the diesel engine era occurred, and steam engines were almost entirely replaced by diesel engines by the end of World War II, a shift that further facilitated this spatial expansion. At this point, however, expansion was also linked to collapsing fish stocks in historical fishing grounds. For example, French and Spanish vessels first moved to the West coast of Africa in order to target small pelagics, after the stock of Sardina pilchardus (European pilchard) in the Bay of Biscay collapsed around the beginning of the 20th century. They then reinforced their presence there, when catches of Thunnus alalunga (albacore tuna) started to decline in the late 1950s (Chauveau 1989b; Fonteneau et al. 1993; Sahastume 2002). Overall, fishing fleets have usually followed patterns of expansion and serial depletion of stocks worldwide (Berkes et al. 2006; Swartz et al. 2010a). Presently, hardly any potential fishing grounds remain unexploited.Not only did these shifts in fishing behaviour and scope impact the marine environment, but they quickly began to alter the human dynamic of fishing as well. The ongoing exploitation of new fishing grounds resulted in increasing political tensions, which necessitated international regulations regarding maritime jurisdiction and sovereignty. Thus, this prologue presents a time-line of the evolution of maritime jurisdictions and rights regarding the exploitation of marine resources (Figure 1 summarizes the events discussed below). It leads to one outcome of these negotiations: fishing access agreements, which will be the primary component of the remainder of this thesis.31.1 The extension of maritime jurisdictions1.1.1 Fighting for petroleum and mineralsCoupled with a tremendous demand for petroleum and minerals from developed countries hoping to boost their economies in the aftermath of World War I, the spatial expansion of maritime activities triggered the first formal international negotiations regarding maritime jurisdiction and the exploitation of living and non-living marine resources.As a result of competition to access these resources, tensions between countries started to arise at the end of the 19th century and a few nations declared vast zones (beyond the customary 3-mile territorial waters) to be off-limit to others.3 This was the situation in France, Panama, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, and Venezuela for fisheries, and Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, and the United Kingdom for economic interests related to mining (Suarez 2008). In 1925, the Committee of Experts of the Council of the League of Nations appointed a sub-committee to focus on the law of the territorial sea (Liang 1947). However, no agreement was reached at the Codification Conference held in The Hague in 1929 with regard to the extent of the territorial sea. At the time, 3 The limit of 3-mile for territorial waters was used by most countries at that time. The origin of this 3-mile limit is unclear: it may be an urban legend that 3 miles roughly correspond to the range of coast gun batteries (precluding vessels from venturing closer to the shore), but other authors suggest that this distance simply corresponds to one league, i.e., a unit that was commonly used in maritime affair (Kent 1954). Beyond this 3-mile boundary, the seas were free for all, as proposed in Mare Liberum (Grotius 1609).Figure 1. Summary of the major steps towards the extension of national maritime jurisdictions.Since the end of World War I, various countries have continuously claimed ever larger portions of the sea, which pushed the United Nations (and its predecessor, the Council of the League of Nations) to seek a consensus. This consensus was reached in 1982 with the signature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (not to scale). * UNCLOS II is shown here, although it is not discussed later (it did not result in any new agreements).1945US claims entire shelf1958UNCLOS I and Geneva Convention1967Malta’s embassador calls for clearly defined jurisdictions1973UNCLOSIII1982UNCLOS is signedearly 1900sFirst official claims1925Council of the League’s Committeeof Experts1929Hague Codification Conference1947International Law Commission1953Finland/Ethiopia claim territorial waters of 12 nmPeru claims jurisdictionover 200 nm194719581st Cod War1937Salmon War19722nd Cod War19753rd Cod War1955Rome Conference1960UNCLOSII*4it was put forward that a country's marine territory should be defined as the area extending from the shore to the continental slope. This definition left irreconcilable disagreements between countries and, as a result, negotiations largely failed and no convention was signed (Liang 1947).World War II made further progress by the Territorial Sea Committee impossible, and the work of the Committee of Experts was resumed in 1947, after the newborn United Nations created the International Law Commission. Ten years later, the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) was convened. The creation of this Commission followed one of the most important steps toward the extension of maritime jurisdiction, when US President Harry S. Truman (acting on behalf of the US petroleum industry), proclaimed extended jurisdiction over all natural resources on and above the US continental shelf down to 100 fathoms (-183 m; Truman 1945). Truman argued that the continental shelf represented a submerged continuation of its land territory, and thus, that it should also benefit US citizens. In 1949, Kuwait followed suit (United Nations 1949). Two years prior, Peru became the first country to clearly define the zone under its jurisdiction at 200 nautical miles (United Nations 1947), a claim strengthened in 1952 when Chile and Ecuador did the same (United Nations 1952). The US was unimpressed with these declarations, since these new limitations effectively restricted the US fishing industry from operating freely (Selak 1950; Finley 2011).Some countries subsequently extended their territorial waters (Ethiopia, United Nations 1953a; Finland, United Nations 1953b), while others extended their continental shelf to a depth of 200 meters or deeper if technology allowed the exploitation of the seabed (Israel, United Nations 1953c; Venezuela, United Nations 1956). As noted by Suarez (2008), the advent of the concept of continental shelf was so quickly and widely accepted that it became an international standard only 13 years after the Truman Proclamation, with the Convention on the Continental Shelf being signed in Geneva (Switzerland) in 1958, at the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I; United Nations 1958a). This Convention stated that:"[The continental shelf corresponds to] the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; [and also] to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands."51.1.2 Fighting for fishIn tandem with the worldwide effort towards the extension of maritime jurisdiction, another effort to take hold of coastal fish stocks occurred. The US continued to play a prominent role.One of the major causes for this development was the expansion of the Japanese fleets towards Alaska in order to fish salmon in the 1930s and until World War II. After the war, this pushed the US to find a legal way to close some high seas areas to foreign fishing and effectively put the management of these stocks under US jurisdiction (Selak 1950; Bishop 1962; Finley 2011). As early as 1945, and in the declaration mentioned above, Truman (1945) declared that:"The Government of the United States regards it as proper to establish conservation zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States wherein fishing activities have been or in the future may be developed and maintained on a substantial scale. Where such activities have been or shall hereafter be developed and maintained by its nationals alone, the United States regards it as proper to establish explicitly bounded conservation zones in which fishing activities shall be subject to the regulation and control of the United States."Truman's justification largely correlated to the public perception that the US had to maximize its fish catch in order to increase its domestic food supply; this argument is rooted in the many developments that also occurred in the realm of fisheries science during the first half of the 20th century (see Section 3). As a result of the new technological developments linked to the fishing industry, many agreements were signed between various countries in order to manage stocks that were jointly exploited (see, e.g., Selak 1950; Bishop 1962). The culmination of the expansion of maritime jurisdictions in relation to fisheries was another convention signed in 1958 in Geneva: the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (United Nations 1958b).4 It stated that: "[The] 'conservation of the living resources of the high seas' means the aggregate of the measures rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and other marine products."4 Two other conventions were signed during UNCLOS I: the Convention on the High Seas (United Nations 1958c), and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (United Nations 1958d).6However, as noted by Bishop (1962), this Convention did not aim to restrict fishing in the High Seas through specific rules. Rather, it determined what a given country may or may not do in legal terms, to put a fishing stock or ground under its jurisdiction (such as the salmon stock off Alaska).In addition to the aforementioned 'Salmon War', another fishing dispute occurred between Iceland and the United Kingdom (both Member Countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) for cod. Other countries including France, Germany, and Norway were also involved, but their role was minor and less politicized. The first step toward this 'war' took place in 1893, when Iceland (which strongly relied on its fish stocks) informally claimed a fishing zone of 50 nm to protect its waters from the British fleets. However, tensions only began to escalate in 1958, when Iceland formally expanded its fishing zone from 4 nm to 12 nm as a consequence of UNCLOS I (Mitchell 1976; Jóhannesson 2004a). During this conflict, Icelandic gunboats were ready to shoot at any British vessels protected by the Royal Navy that were attempting to enter this zone (Mitchell 1976; Jóhannesson 2004a-b). This standoff continued for a decade until 1972, when Iceland further expanded its fishing zone to 50 nm, triggering a second 'war'. This time, no gunshots were involved, but many trawling warps were cut. The third heated dispute between these countries occurred in 1975–76, when Iceland extended its jurisdiction up to 200 nm. This feud finally ended in mid-1976, when the United Kingdom recognized Iceland's 200 nm jurisdiction after the latter threatened to close its NATO base in the case of non-recognition (Mitchell 1976).5 1.2 The final push of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the SeaThe Conventions that were signed in Geneva in 1958 were, however, later superseded with UNCLOS III being initiated in 1973, following Resolution 3067 of the 28th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 16th 1973 (United Nations 1973). UNCLOS III was held in December 1973 and resulted in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) being signed on December 5 This NATO base was of strategic importance to western countries, as its central position in the North Atlantic was crucial to monitor the activities of the USSR. The first Cod War, in 1958, had already weakened this position, as Iceland had established a trade agreement with the USSR in order to punish the United Kingdom for not recognizing its territorial claims (Mitchell 1976).710th 1982 in Montego Bay (Jamaica) by the first country (Fiji; United Nations 2013). It entered into force on November 16th 1994, after being ratified by 60 countries (with Bosnia & Herzegovina being the last on January 12th 1994; United Nations 2013). As of December 31st 2013, 166 countries had ratified UNCLOS. Noteworthy, it was only in 1998 that the European Union (EU) ratified UNCLOS, whereas the US, despite its leading role in its creation, has not yet done so (United Nations 2013). UNCLOS allowed the formalization of a number of customary laws (similar to the Common Law in the US or in Canada, i.e., a non-written law based on previous decisions made by judges in similar cases; Anon. 2014a) and rights that already existed in less formal or specific ways (e.g., territorial sea and continental shelf first defined as part of UNCLOS I and the Geneva Conventions). Of particular interest here, Article 62 stipulates that:"Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements […], give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch" (United Nations 1982).UNCLOS also included various provisions (e.g., Article 297) giving a country full sovereignty over its living marine resources in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ; Burke 1994; World Bank 2014a), thus allowing it to keep its surplus rather than to cede it to another country via an agreement. However, the author believes that a developing country will generally prefer to trade its surplus for a fee now, rather than to keep it and not earn any short-term direct income.6 This stance will be explicitly made or implied throughout this manuscript.Therefore, although fishing access agreements already existed prior to UNCLOS, they have since become a major tool for the exploitation of fish stocks throughout the world by distant-water fleets due to the legal grounds set forth by that Convention. In fact, the declaration of EEZs in the northern hemisphere effectively resulted in the fishing fleets of developed countries to move southward and negotiate fishing access agreements with developing coastal countries (Bonfil et al. 1998; Mulazzani and Malorgio 2015). This need for fishing access agreements was reinforced, e.g., in Europe, by concerns of over-capacity of the fishing fleets and over-fishing (Le Bail 1994; Anon. 2002).6 This might be due to several reasons. Some authors reported that several developing countries may have mis-interpreted UNCLOS and negotiated agreements because they thought they had to (World Bank 2014a). The author feels that it may also be because some developing countries mis-estimated the real benefits from such agreements.8With regards to highly migratory species (such as tunas), UNCLOS only stated that: "The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for […] highly migratory species […] shall cooperate directly or through appropriate international organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone" (United Nations 1982).7 It was supplemented in 1995 by the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, which entered into force in 2001 and called for straddling stocks to be managed regionally via Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMO; United Nations 1995).7 As an aside, the United States used this article to counter Pacific Islands' claim over tuna resources (Tsamenyi 1986), at least until a multi-lateral South Pacific Tuna Treaty was signed in 1987 (FFA 1987; Mack 1996).92 IntroductionIn the context of this work, fishing access agreements are defined as a written contract between two (groups of) countries, allowing one party to fish for commercial purposes in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the second party (with potential reciprocity), according to mutually-agreed terms.8 As such, deals such as 'joint ventures' (i.e., contracts allowing two entities from different countries to combine their financial and human resources to operate fishing fleets in one or the other's EEZ) and charter companies are excluded from this work. Passive or non-written fishing access agreements, e.g., allowing small-scale fishers to cross EEZ boundaries of two adjacent countries, are also excluded.In this work, the spotlight is put on publicly-funded agreements between the European Union (EU) and developing countries.9 Public agreements originating from other developed regions exist, such as with Asian countries (see, e.g., Xue 2006; Dobo 2009; Mallory 2013; and Pauly et al. 2013 on agreements with China),10 the US, and USSR/Russia.11 Some of these agreements have already been studied (i.e., the US agreements with Pacific countries; see, e.g., Bergin 1994; Barclay and Cartright 2007; Havice 2010, 2013) or are — to a large extent — not available for external examination (e.g., agreements involving East Asian countries in Africa and in the Pacific).This introduction includes a brief overview of target species, evolution of fishing effort, and involved stakeholders, and then moves onto the content of the following sections.8 Fishing access agreements involving reciprocity are generally conducted between developed countries (e.g., the US and Canada with the Pacific Salmon Treaty, signed in 1985 and renewed in 2008 until 2018; Anon. 2013a).9 'EU' is used throughout as a means of simplification. However, the correct term (retained for the citations) to designate the legal body dealing with fisheries matters was 'European Economic Community' (EEC) until November 1993, and 'European Community' (EC) from November 1993 to December 2009 (EEC 1992a; EC 2007a). 'Northern agreements' with the Faeroe Islands (www.ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/faeroe_islands), Iceland (www.ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/iceland), and Norway (www.ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/norway), are not dealt with herein. Private agreements established between host countries and fishing companies or producer organizations are also excluded.10 See also Michel and Beuret (2008) for an investigation on Chinese investments in Africa, and Anon. (2010a) for a recent example of a fishing access agreement/joint venture agreement between China and Mauritania. For some authors, the increasing role of China in Africa's economy is such a concern for historically-tied countries such as those of the EU, that it may explain in part why the EU and other countries are trying to revive their presence on the continent after decades of decreasing interest (Tull 2008).11 Very little is known about such agreements. However, agreements with Guinea-Bissau (Russian Federation 2011a), Mauritania (Russian Federation 2003), Morocco (Russian Federation 2010a), Namibia (Russian Federation 2010b), and Senegal (Russian Federation 2011b) are available at www.transparentsea.co. Other studies, e.g., Teiwaki (1987) and Greenpeace (2012), have also included some discussion on USSR/Russian agreements, but information remains scarce.102.1 The extent of publicly-funded EU fishing access agreementsIn 1976, the EU agreed that "by means of any appropriate Community agreements […] Community fishermen [shall] obtain fishing rights in the waters of third countries" (EEC 1981a). In 1979, shortly after this Council Resolution, the EU created a strategic network of publicly-funded fishing access agreements to govern access to valuable resources by its fishing industry, and to allow it to follow highly migratory species with limited administrative hassle (Lequesne 2001; Guillotreau et al. 2011; Anon. 2013b, 2014b; Figure 2). Since the first public agreement between the EU and Senegal in 1979, 19 other agreements have been signed throughout Africa and Oceania. These publicly-funded fishing access agreements are designed to target either tuna (mostly Katsuwonus pelamis [skipjack tuna] and Thunnus albacares [yellowfin tuna], but also T. alalunga [albacore tuna]  and T. obesus [bigeye tuna]) and associated large pelagic species (e.g., billfishes, sharks), or coastal and demersal species (e.g., crustaceans, cephalopods, Figure 2. Extent of publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements with developing countries (as of September 2014).The EU has signed 20 publicly-funded fishing access agreements with developing countries in Africa and the Pacific Ocean in the 1980s (red), 1990s (yellow) and 2000s (green). EU vessels also have the possibility to freely fish in EU waters (represented by grey areas, including overseas territories with the exception of the Chagos Archipelago, in cross-hatch, which is fully protected). Some of these agreements have been cancelled (Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and Gambia; highlighted with black crosses).EEZ of EUcountriesExclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) Entry into force1980s1990s2000sNegotiations Cancelled11small pelagic fish, demersal fish). Most current agreements in West Africa (Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, São Tomé & Principe, and Senegal), in East Africa (except Mozambique until 2006), and in the Pacific Ocean strictly focus on tuna species — hereafter termed 'tuna agreements'. On the other hand, early agreements with West African countries largely pertained to coastal and demersal species, typically with a small tuna component — hereafter referred to as 'mixed agreements' (Table 1).Table 1. Summary of the type of resource targeted within the framework of the 20 publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements, 1979–2020.Country Period a Demersal species Large pelagics Small pelagicsAngola 1987–1996   1996–2004   Cape Verde 1990–2004 b  2006–2014 c Comoros 1988–2006 b  2007–2016 Côte d'Ivoire 1986–1992   1991–2007   2006–2018 Equatorial Guinea 1983–1986  1994–2001 Gabon 1998–2001  2001–2005   2005–2016 b Gambia 1987–1996  Guinea 1983–2008 b   2009–2012 d Guinea-Bissau 1980–2012 b  Kiribati 2003–2015 b Madagascar 1986–1988   1988–2006  2007–2014  Mauritania 1988–1993 b    1993–1996   1996–2014 b   Mauritius 1990–2007 b  2014–2017 Micronesia 2007–2012 d Morocco 1988–1999 b    2006–2015 b   Mozambique 1987–1992   1992–1993  2003–2006   2007–2015 São Tomé & Principe 1985–2002 b  2002–2003   2003–2018 12This distinction between tuna and mixed agreements is important because tuna agreements focus on large pelagic species that seem to be less impacted by industrial fishing than demersal species (FAO 2012).12 Also, large pelagic fishes typically exhibit extensive migratory behaviour (notably crossing EEZ boundaries). Thus, these species are generally not heavily exploited by domestic fishers (Iheduru 1995), in contrast to the more sedentary demersal and coastal species that are targeted by mixed agreements (e.g., Chavance et al. 2005, 2007a; Meissa and Gascuel 2014). The number of publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements rapidly increased after the implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 1983: from two agreements between 1979–1983 (Senegal and Guinea-Bissau) to 16 in 1991 (Figure 3; Le Manach et al. 2013a). This increase coincided with the entry of Portugal and Spain to the EU in 1986 (Anon. 12 However, although most stocks of large pelagics are still 'in the green', it appears that their global biomass is trending towards the 'over-exploited' status as well (Juan-Jordá et al. 2011; FAO 2012).Table 1. Summary of the type of resource targeted within the framework of the 20 publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements, 1979–2020 (continued).Country Period a Demersal species Large pelagics Small pelagicsSenegal 1979–2006 b  2014–2020 c  The Seychelles 1985–2020 b Solomon Islands 2006–2012 a Situation as of September 2014.b May or may not have been interrupted for a few months between renewals (sometimes no documents were available for these periods, but the agreements seemed to be still ongoing). Since the focus of this work is on the content of publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements 'on paper', these gaps are not important.c New protocol from mid-2014 onward not yet initialled.d Both of these agreements have not had active protocols after 2010. However, they were still analyzed in this thesis until the end of 2012, as the focus is on the content of the agreements, not on their implementation.CFP1st reform2nd reform 3rd reformYearNumber of agreements19801601990 2000 20101284Figure 3. Number of agreements over time, 1980–2013.Trend in the number of publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements signed with developing countries in Africa and the Pacific Ocean, from 1980 to 2013. The implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and its three reforms are indicated by black arrows (the third reform was completed in December 2013 and implemented in January 2014).132013b). Subsequently, the number of agreements has oscillated between 12 and 16. However, since 2010, the total number of agreements steadily decreased to nine, notably because of difficulties to approve (e.g., Morocco, Micronesia) or renew (e.g., Mauritius, Senegal)13 some of them, but also due to political instability (e.g., agreement with Guinea suspended since 2009; Mulazzani and Malorgio 2015). However, this trend is now reversing, as some of these dormant agreements, i.e., Gabon (EU 2013a-b), Mauritius (EU 2014a-c), Morocco (EU 2013c-d), and Senegal (EU 2013e), have recently been renewed. Official documents also show that the EU will likely expand its network of tuna agreements by potentially signing new ones with the Cook Islands (Anon. 2013d; EU 2013f), Kenya (Anon. 2014c), Liberia (Anon. 2013e), and Tanzania (European Commission 2005). It is also likely that the EU will continue to phase out the demersal component within most of its mixed agreements (Dziemballa 2011).From an economic standpoint, the funds allocated by the EU to the framework of agreements also steeply rose from a few million EUR in the early 1980s, to a peak of 300 million EUR in 1997, after which it more than halved by the early 2010s (Anon. 2013b).14 These sums represent roughly a quarter of the budget of the Directorate General of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs of the European Commission (Anon. 2009a, 2010b).2.2 Evolution of the fishing effort and stakeholdersThe change in the number of agreements demonstrated a pattern similar to that of the authorized fishing capacity, which rapidly increased from 40,000 Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) annually in the early 1980s, to an average of just under 800,000 GRT/year between 1990–2012 (Figure 4). However, overall fishing capacity has declined since 2000, from over 900,000 GRT/year to slightly below 600,000 GRT/year in 2012. This decline was mainly due to the phasing out of mixed agreements, but also due to a more recent decline in the number of tuna agreements (or number of licenses available for each). The fishing capacity of the fleets involved in mixed agreements continuously declined from around 250,000 GRT/year to below 100,000 GRT/year 13 Even after the termination of the agreement with Senegal in 2006, EU pole-and-line vessels were still authorized to fish in Senegalese waters, as they were based there (Anon. 2013c).14 The declining number of agreements has a role in this decrease, but the most important factor is the phasing out of demersal agreements, which are by far the largest in terms of allocated funds (Anon. 2013b).14over the 1990–2012 period (Figure 4). The fishing capacity of the tuna fleets peaked in the early 2000s at around 750,000 GRT/year and then decreased to slightly below 500,000 GRT in 2012. Due to the aforementioned prospect of new agreements, the capacity of the tuna fleets is expected to increase again in future years.While around 15 European countries are active within these agreements (yet all EU Member Countries finance them), only three countries hold the majority (93.8%): Spain, France, and Portugal (Figure 5). This discrepancy can explain the 'Friends of Fishing' versus 'Friends of Fish' divide that is characterizing EU Member Countries (Lequesne 2001; Gorez and O'Riordan 2004).Overall, catches by European-flagged vessels in EEZs of West and East Africa, as well as in the EEZs of Pacific islands are substantial. With regards to tuna species, these EEZs represent 40–50% of the total regional catch by the EU fleets (Anon. 2013b, 2014b), while a number of assessments commissioned by the Directorate General of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs of the European Commission15 pointed out that some EEZs are of critical importance to the demersal fleets for the access to the resources living on the shelf (Anon. 2005a-b). Therefore, one can only conclude that the publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements allowing the EU fleets to access most of these EEZs are of paramount importance.16 As such, any negative criticism made toward them has traditionally not been taken well. 15  These assessments can be found at http://transparentsea.co/index.php?title=EU_Fisheries_Agreements#Ex_ante_and_ex_post_evaluations and http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/studies. It seems that some of them have not been released (e.g., Anon. 2011a talks about a "previous ex-post assessment", which could not be located). Some of the most recent ones contain redacted/deleted parts (mostly economic data; e.g., Anon. 2010c, 2011b-d). Summaries will be made available for every 'Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements' (EU 2013g).16 Only in rare instances demersal agreements are futile to the EU fleets. One example is Côte d'Ivoire, where there is almost no shelf, and thus, very little fishing opportunities (Anon. 2006a).Tuna fleetOther fleetsCFP1st reform2nd reform3rd reformYearAuthorized capacity (x103  GRT)1980 1990 2000 201010005002507500Figure 4. Authorized capacity over time, 1980–2013.Trends of the authorized capacity of the tuna fleets (dark grey) and other fleets (light grey; mostly demersal fishing as well as some non-tuna pelagic fishing). The implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and its three reforms are indicated by black arrows (the third reform was completed in December 2013 and implemented in January 2014).15France23.3%Netherlands0.8%Ireland0.6%Lithuania0.5%Latvia0.3%Germany0.1%Poland0.1%UK0.3%Portugal13.5%Spain57.1%TotalGreece1.5%Italy2.0%Malta0.0%France30.3%UK0.3%Portugal9.4%Spain59.4%Italy0.6%Large pelagicsMalta0.0%France22.8%Netherlands25.2%Ireland21.2%Lithuania13.9%Latvia8.0%Germany3.7%Poland2.0%UK2.0%Portugal1.0%Spain0.2%Small pelagicsFrance8.2%UK0.5%Portugal18.6%Spain58.7%Greece6.6%Italy7.5%Malta0.0%Demersal speciesEU Member StatesnoneShare in the available licenses10 20 30 40 60%50Figure 5. Theoretical breakdown of the licenses' share allocated to EU Member Countries, 1996–2014.Most of the fishing effort negotiated within the framework of the publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements is distributed among southwestern countries, especially Spain, France, and Portugal (jointly representing 93.8% of the total fishing effort). This is not true for the small pelagics component, in which northeastern countries have a greater interest; this component, however, only represents a small fraction of the total in terms of total available licenses (but not in terms of total catches), hence the low weight of this component in the total figure (see Table 1). The license breakdown for the small-scale component is not shown (this component only exists in the agreements with Morocco and Mauritania, and only involves Spain and Portugal). The numbers shown here are based on the breakdown provided in 'Agreements' texts (first mentioned for Guinea-Bissau and Morocco in 1995; EC 1996a-c, 1997a-b, 1998a-f, 1999a, 2000a-b, 2001a-h, 2002a-h, 2003a-c, 2004a-c, 2005a-c, 2006a-h, 2007b-e, 2008a-c, 2009a; EU 2010a-b, 2011a-e, 2012a-c, 2013h-k 2014d-e; available at: www.eur-lex.europa.eu).Catches of tuna in both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans have declined in the past decade (Figure 6). While piracy might have been the main cause of decline in the Indian Ocean (Chassot et al. 2010; Martín 2011; Anon. 2014b),17 the continuous decreasing EU fleets' size and number of tuna agreements are likely responsible for a substantial part of the decline in the Atlantic Ocean (Anon. 2005c, 2013b).17 'Piracy' from the EU's standpoint, but resulting from other kinds of piracy activities… by the EU (Waldo 2009; Diaz and Dubner 2010; Weldemichael 2012). Part of the Indian Ocean fleets has relocated to the Atlantic Ocean following these piracy events (Anon. 2013b).162.3 Scope of the workFirstly, this thesis will discuss the legal grounds of fishing access agreements in general, in order to determine the extent to which these might be (il)legitimate with regards to the host countries. Secondly, this thesis will aim to determine the degree to which publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements have improved over time, and how they can be further improved. To accomplish this goal, economic, social, and environmental aspects will be scrutinized through an analysis of all texts related to publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements made available by the EU. This work is important from both a management and a political standpoint, as it deals with the relationship between a powerful entity and smaller, less-developed individual countries throughout Africa and the Pacific Islands. Since very few studies have been carried out to determine whether these agreements meet their development goals as set by the European Union, this work is also important as it looks at multi-million euro business agreements that claim to (i) develop local fisheries and (ii) sustainably supply the European fish market.  0 100 200 300 400 500 6001950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010Total catch (thousand tonnes)Y earIndian OceanAtlantic OceanFigure 6. Time-series of the catch of major tuna species by European countries in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.Only the catch corresponding to (i) major fishing countries (i.e., France [including Mozambique Channel Islands], Italy, Portugal, and Spain), (ii) major tuna species (i.e., skipjack tuna, albacore tuna, yellowfin tuna, bigeye tuna, and Atlantic bluefin tuna), and (iii) major fishing gears (i.e., longlines, and pole-and-lines, and purse-seines) are included in this figure. Sources: nominal catch databases published by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMO; Atlantic Ocean: www.iccat.int/Data/t1nc_20131210.rar; Indian Ocean: www.iotc.org/documents/nominal-catch-species-and-gear-vessel-flag-reporting-country).17To address these topics in detail, the first chapter (Section 3) will cover specific issues associated with fishing access agreements, namely the concept of maximum sustainable yield and its application to fishing access agreements. The second chapter (Section 4) will then further explore these legal issues by focusing on the discrepancy between officially reported and reconstructed catch data. Moving onto strictly publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements, the third chapter (Section 5) will analyze the trends in the fee components (i.e., distant-water fishing country versus host country, and EU taxpayers versus EU fleets) to examine financial shortcomings related to these agreements and highlight key historical trends. Similarly, the fourth and last chapter (Section 6) will discuss in depth the non-financial provisions (i.e., environmental and social) negotiated within the framework of publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements, and link these aspects to the development status of countries hosting the EU fishing fleets. Finally, the concluding section will summarize the findings of this thesis and propose ways in which the equity aspects of these agreements could be improved, based on the inadequacies highlighted in the previous sections.Given its multi-disciplinary scope, the present work is not clearly positioned in one field or another, but rather, looks at this topic using concepts from political, social, and environmental sciences altogether.183 A rationale for fishing access agreements?3.1 Maximum sustainable yieldThe "entire allowable catch" put forth in UNCLOS is synonymous with the term 'maximum sustainable yield' (MSY), i.e., "the weight of fish the population will produce, annually on a sustainable basis when that is at its maximum level" (Chapman 1970). Thus, the surplus can be defined as the remaining fraction of MSY that is not caught by a given coastal country (Figure 7). Therefore, by estimating MSY and the related level of fishing effort (fMSY), one is theoretically able to determine, if the current effort is known, whether a stock is under-fished (i.e., has surplus available), or over-fished.The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief historical overview of the fisheries science developments that led to the mathematical models used by fisheries scientists worldwide to estimate MSY. The limitations of such models with regards to fishing access agreements will then be discussed in order to provide grounds for improvements. In particular, issues linked to the use of MSY in the case of multi-specific fisheries, as well as stocks targeted by both foreign and domestic fleets will be emphasized.3.1.1 The early stages of fisheries scienceWhile Petersen (1894) had already linked fishing intensity to the fluctuating size of a stock, the predominant notion during the first decades of fisheries science in the early 20th century, was that environmental conditions played the most important role in influencing the variation of a fish stock (Huxley 1885; Hjort 1914). However, after a hiatus from fisheries research during World War I (Graham 1954), a Russian scientist first elaborated the principles of fish stock dynamics, with his 'catch equation' (Baranov 1918). Unfortunately, Baranov's work did not have a great impact outside his country Figure 7. Conceptual diagram of the notion of surplus.The surplus is defined as the difference between maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and the total catch of a given country. This schematic does not represent how MSY is estimated, or refer to how it changes with fishing effort (see below).Maximum Sustainable YieldCatchSurplusCatch19mostly due to a language barrier, but also because the mathematic language he used was too far ahead of his time. It took more than a decade before Russell (1931) again discussed the effect of fishing on population dynamics. However, his concepts were difficult to implement in practice, as they referred only to the state of a stock at a given time. Luckily, Graham (1935) — the UK's chief fisheries scientist at the time — quickly freed the underlying ideas from other superfluous notions, and determined an effort threshold beyond which it would be worth decreasing fishing effort in order to increase the catch; this idea was further developed in his book 'The Fish Gate' (Graham 1943).Once again, World War II reduced fisheries research efforts to a minimum, and it was not until after it that Graham's new staff, two fresh graduates (Ray Beverton and Sydney Holt) and a scientist from war-time operational research (Henry Hulme), produced a general 'steady yield-per-recruit equation' that could easily be used by fisheries scientists and managers (Hulme et al. 1947; later forming the basis of Beverton and Holt 1957). This progress was advanced because World War II had a positive effect on the replenishment of stocks, so it became possible to monitor the effect of the post-War increase in fishing effort on stock size.3.1.2 The UK-US divideNonetheless, Graham's earlier catch-curve concept was used by Chapman in the late 1940s to confine Japanese vessels outside US waters, while providing the theoretical underpinning of US vessels going in foreign waters (Chapman 1949). Japan's fleets had reached Alaskan waters in 1937 to fish salmon, which pushed US scientists to find a way to avoid what they perceived as illegitimate encroachment (Finley 2011). For the public, however, the justification of this new policy was different. Thus, Chapman (1949) started his paper with:"The policy of the United States Government regarding fisheries in the high seas is to make possible the maximum production of food from the sea on a sustained basis year after year."Noteworthy, Chapman's interpretation of Fedor Baranov and Michael Graham was an enormous bluff, as the mathematical link between the evolution of the catch and fishing effort had yet to be established (Figure 8). In truth, it was not until five years later that theoretical population dynamics elaborated the required concept, through 20the 'surplus production model' developed by Schaefer (1954);18 its parabolic shape was starkly different from the Gaussian-type curve first published by Graham (1935) and re-used by Chapman (Figure 8).Chapman's conceptual model was a turning point in fisheries science. On one hand, US scientists-turned-pol i t icians providing policy-forming advice (Smith and Link 2005) who argued that total yield should be maximized, with no regards to the population structure. Conversely, UK scientists (i.e., Graham, Beverton, and Holt) argued for optimizing the yield-per-recruit (i.e., avoiding mis-exploitation of recruits, which is more conservative than aiming for MSY), and focused their work on the demographic structure of stocks. The yield-per-recruit model published by Beverton and Holt (1957) allowed scientists and managers to estimate the sustainable yield of a stock for each cohort, and to optimize the fishing effort in order for it to be maximized. However, this method did not easily produce an estimate of the total catch, which was the main interest for the US. Consequently, Chapman's paper became the basis of US fisheries regulations, and the US became a strong advocate of 'maximum sustainable yield' as a target of fisheries management. Effectively, this policy allowed the US to restrict access to their own waters by arguing that they were already fully exploited, while justifying the exploitation by their distant-water fleets of the waters of other countries.3.1.3 Surplus production modelsThe surplus-production model developed by Schaefer (1954) relies on the logistic growth model originally developed by Verhulst (1838), in which a given population can 18 Note here that the 'surplus' of UNCLOS' Article 62 and the 'surplus' in Schaefer's surplus-production model (to be introduced below) have two different meanings. Also note that the model's name suggests that populations produce a useless fraction of biomass that can be redirected towards human benefits without harming the resource.CatchWasteHarvestMaximum harvestInadequate Optimum ExcessiveFishing effortFigure 8. Conceptual model used by Chapman.The Gaussian curve resulting from his model is entirely different from the actual MSY model published by Schaefer (1954). Also note that Chapman's model had no parameters that could be estimated; it was a bluff.21only increase up to a certain level: the carrying capacity (K). The growth function of the population can be described as:X(t) = (KX0ert)/(K + X0 (ert − 1))       ...1)with the first derivative:dX/dt = rX(1 − X/K)         ...2)where X is the population size (e.g., the biomass of the fish stock); K is the carrying capacity; and r is the intrinsic growth rate of the population.Equations 1 and 2 have two key features:• The population size X asymptotically approaches a plateau corresponding to the carrying capacity of the environment (Figure 9A);• The sigmoid shape implies that the growth rate of the stock increases until the population size reaches an inflexion point when it equals K/2, after which the growth rate decreases and tends to zero and the population reaches equilibrium (i.e., K; Figure 9B). At K/2, the growth rate of the stock is maximal, and then decreases to reach zero when K is attained (i.e., dX/dt = 0 when X equals zero or K, and positive when 0 < X < K; Equation 2).Carryingcapacity (K)K2K2K= XMSYTimeBiomass (X)ABiomass (X)dX/dtBFigure 9. Graphical representation of the logistic model developed by Verhulst (1845).A) the biomass increases exponentially over time, until it reaches an inflexion point corresponding to when at half the carrying capacity, after which it asymptotically reaches the carrying capacity. B) this translates into a positive growth rate being maximal at K/2, and then decreasing to reach zero when K is reached.22Since the sustainable catch (at equilibrium) corresponds to the catch of dX/dt, the curve obtained by Schaefer (1954) is the same as the one obtained with the Equation 2) of Verhulst (1838; Figure 10A). From this model, the catch per unit of effort (CPUE) as a function of the effort can also be derived, and it linearly decreases from a maximum when the fishing effort is null, to zero when the fishing effort reaches twice that at MSY (Figure 10B; referred to as 'Schaefer's equilibrium line' below).19MSY has been regarded as the ultimate target in fisheries management for many years, although it is now increasingly seen as a limit rather than a target (Froese et al. 2011). It has been adopted by many international organizations and countries around the globe since the concept of 'optimal sustainable yield' was first included in an international regulation in the United Nations' Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (United Nations 1958b). However, since its origin, the concept of MSY has been regularly criticized for various reasons (see, e.g., Larkin 1977), although there is evidence that it works with experimental populations (Silliman and Gutsell 1958; Silliman 1971). The strongest scientifically valid objection is that there is not one MSY, as it is actually variable within the environment. Hence, 19 For purposes of simplification, this thesis will only focus on the surplus-production model developed by Schaefer (1954). Garrod (1969) and Fox (1970) have later developed the 'exponential surplus-production model', and Pella and Tomlinson (1969) produced a 'generalized surplus-production model'. However, the implications of these other models with regards to the matter discussed here are similar. Note that nowadays, fisheries scientists generally use other types of models for stock assessments, mostly virtual population analyzes, developed by Fry (1949) and applied to marine fisheries by Gulland (1965). Here again, the different methods do not impact this work. Although, most countries (especially developing ones) do not have the technical means to estimate their MSYs with such rigorous and complex scientific methods, catch data can be used as a good proxy to estimate MSY (Martell and Froese 2012; Pauly 2013; Schiller 2014).fMSYunder-exploited over-exploitedFishing effortCatchMSYAFishing effortCPUEPristine stockBFigure 10. Surplus-production model developed by Schaefer (1954).This model, published by Schaefer (1954), was the first one to mathematically estimate MSY, and consequently, the optimal fishing effort beyond which the targeted stock would become over-exploited.23using a single MSY estimate to manage a dynamic fishery is flawed. Other objections relate to the fact that MSY focuses solely on the species in question, without taking into account that fishing practices can be destructive (e.g., bottom trawls; Watling and Norse 1998) and also usually catch a fair amount of non-targeted species (the bycatch; Alverson et al. 1994; Kelleher 2005). Other issues include the inability of MSY estimates to account for the age, size, and maturity of the fish, that optimal catches may vary over time (Larkin 1977; Botsford et al. 1997), and, especially, that MSY varies with the size-selectivity of the gear (Beverton and Holt 1957; Froese et al. 2008). Another limitation of great importance with regard to fishing access agreements, is that multi-species fisheries can cause the collapse of one stock or more. For example, if two exploited species have substantially different fMSY (such as in Figure 11), the exploitation of one species at fMSY can lead to the collapse of the other. Such cases will be discussed later, but likely occurred in the multi-species fisheries of West Africa (where European vessels have operated for decades via agreements). It was also the case in the Gulf of Thailand, as Pauly (1979) emphasized examples similar to the one seen in Figure 11.Interestingly, the concept of MSY only became officially accepted in Europe as a scientific tool for political purposes over the last decade, during the third reform of the CFP. During the first historical rounds of negotiation on this topic in the 1950s, the EU was known as a fervent opponent of the MSY concept (Smith 1994; Mesnil 2012). Since the early 1970s, European scientists have always been critical of this measure, associating it with 'considerable dangers' (ICES 1976; Mesnil 2012). However, the concept of MSY was used as early as 1979, when the very first publicly-funded EU fishing access agreement was signed with Senegal (EEC 1980a). EffortCatchMSYsp.1MSYsp.2X = K Xsp.1 = 0 Xsp.2 = 0Figure 11. MSY in the case of joint stocks.This shows a hypothetical example of multispecies exploitation that would lead to the collapse of species 1: species 1 and 2 are targeted simultaneously, but the fishing effort required to reach MSY of species 2 results in the collapse of species 1.243.2 The bio-economic model and MEYIn addition to demonstrating that an intermediate level of fishing effort and biomass leads to higher catches, the Schaefer model also establishes that the maximum sustainable yield is always reached at a fishing effort greater than what is needed to attain the maximum economic yield (i.e., the catch producing the greatest value on a sustainable basis). This is one step further than previous work by Gordon (1953), which showed that only a limited-entry fishery could maximize the rent.To determine the maximum economic yield (MEY) of a fishery, Schaefer's yield curve is transformed into a value curve by multiplying the catch by its ex-vessel price. Simple models assume that the price is more or less 'constant' (i.e., independent of the quantity landed by the fishery). Thus, the yield and value curves can be superimposed. This is usually true for international markets such as those for tuna, whitefish, or shrimp. From here, the total cost (TC) of fishing is calculated:TC = fixed costs + variable costs       ...3)Fixed costs are expenses independent of the catch (e.g., mooring fees, equipment cost, and wages), while variable costs are directly related to the catch (e.g., fuel) and are based on opportunity cost, which is related to either capital (e.g., investment in a new boat) or labour (e.g., crew wages). The opportunity cost corresponds to the cost of undertaking a particular activity, including the cost of not undertaking an alternative one (Clark 1990). For the purpose of the following section, it will be assumed that fixed costs can be null (TC crosses the two axes at 0,0).20 The maximum rent (i.e., MEY at fMEY) corresponds to the total revenue minus the total cost at the tangent to the total revenue curve, parallel to the TC curve (Figure 12). The total revenue curve and the total cost curve intersect at the 'bionomic equilibrium', where all the rent is dissipated, and any marginal increase in fishing effort would result in a loss. A common mistake is to disregard such opportunity cost, which leads to the conclusion that a fishery at the bionomic equilibrium does not provide any benefits to society (e.g., in Arnason et al. 2009). This conclusion is incorrect, as 20 This assumption is reasonable in spite of the definition of 'fixed costs' as one can imagine that costs are null when there is no activity.25such fishery still provides jobs and food, for example. As such, profit is still being made at the bionomic equilibrium (otherwise, it would not be worth the effort; Clark 1973). Consequently, any rent shall be seen as a super-profit, not 'normal' profit (Piketty 2014).   Opportunity costs could decrease, for example, if subsidies were given to the fishing sector to build new boats (decreasing capital opportunity cost), or if there were fewer alternative jobs available (decreasing labour opportunity cost). In such cases, the total cost would also decrease and, therefore, the bionomic equilibrium would slide towards a biomass of the population that is null (Figure 13). Another result would be that the fishing effort that produces MEY would increase. Thus, certain types of subsidies can be responsible for stocks collapses (Munro and Sumaila 2002; Schrank 2003; Clark et al. 2005; Sumaila and Pauly 2007; Sumaila et al. 2010, 2013).3.3 The notion of 'surplus' and its associated issues Another prominent issue emerges from the use of MSY to create the basis of fishing access agreements. A simple example is that of a theoretical fish stock that is exploited by a developing country with an effort half of that at MSY (Figure 14A). Figure 14B corresponds to Schaefer's equilibrium line, which shows that as soon as there is a Catch valueMax. rentEq’fMSYfMEY’TC’Fishing effortFigure 13. The bionomic equilibrium and the rent in case of subsidization of the fishery.When subsidies are given to the fisheries sector (or when other external parameters make it more interesting to invest in fisheries), the total cost is lowered, which results in the bionomic equilibrium getting closer to the collapse of the stock (i.e., intersection with x-axis).ValueMax. rentBionomic equilibrium (Eq)fMSYfMEYTotal cost (TC)X = 0Fishing effortFigure 12. The bionomic equilibrium and the concept of rent.The bionomic equilibrium is reached when the 'total cost' and 'value' curves intersect. The 'rent' corresponds to the value minus the total cost at any given fishing effort, and is always maximal at a fishing effort lower than fMSY.26catch, the biomass X of the stock decreases to X1. This exploited biomass X1 is lower than K (more precisely, it is at 75% of K), but still higher than XMSY (i.e., K/2). If foreign fleets sought to exploit the available fishing surplus and negotiated an agreement to reach the MSY target (Figure 15A), the total CPUE of the domestic effort would decrease again, implying that the domestic CPUE would also decrease (less CPUE 'to be shared' among more users; Garcia et al. 1986; Figure 15B). Pristine stockCPUESurplusCatchFishingeffortAFishingeffortBMSYStock exploitedbelow fMSYFigure 14. The case of an under-exploited stock.A) shows the surplus that exists when domestic fleets have a fishing effort only half of that at MSY, and B) is Schaefer's equilibrium line, which shows that at fMSY/2, the CPUE is 75% of what it would be when first exploiting a pristine stock.LossStock exploitedat fMSYDomestic CPUECPUEForeigncatchCatchFishingeffortAFishingeffortB+ foreign effort + foreign effortLossMSYFigure 15. Loss of catch for the domestic fleets when the stock becomes fully-exploited due to the entry of foreign fleets.A) shows the extent of the loss to the domestic fleets when a foreign effort is introduced to attain fMSY. This is due to the CPUE that linearly decreases in function of the fishing effort, as shown in B); the catch has to be shared among more units of effort, hence the loss in A). 27Consequently, the domestic fleets should increase their effort to catch the amount they were landing prior to the entry of the foreign fleets. However, if MSY was still to be achieved, the foreign fleets should decrease their effort (Figure 16). Otherwise, if the foreign fleets also increased their effort to catch the surplus that was previously determined, the total effort would go beyond the effort at MSY, resulting in decreased catches, again, for the domestic fleets (Figure 17). As shown here, these cases always result in lower catches for at least one of the fleets, and potentially an over-exploited stock. Therefore, one can immediately question the legitimacy of fishing access agreements for the shared exploitation of a stock Stock exploitedat fMSYDomestic CPUECPUEForeigncatchCatchFishingeffortAFishingeffortB+ foreign effort + foreign effortLossMSYFigure 16. Increase in domestic effort to maintain the domestic catch.In A), the domestic effort has increased to maintain the same level of catch as in Figure 14, and as a result, the surplus that is left for the foreign fleets is smaller. In B), this translates into most of the effort associated to the CPUE at MSY being from the domestic fleet.Domestic CPUECPUEForeigncatchCatchLossFishingeffortAFishingeffortBOverfishedstock+ foreign effort + foreign effortLossFigure 17. Increase in foreign effort to catch the entire surplus.In A), the foreign fleets have increased their effort to still catch the entire surplus as in Figure 15, which results in the domestic catch to decrease once again, and furthermore, in the stock to become over-exploited (i.e., the total catch is lower than MSY). In B), the CPUE is now lower than at MSY and tends towards zero (collapsed stock).28(Garcia et al. 1986). The only case for which such agreements would not decrease the domestic catch is the one depicted in Figure 16, where only a portion of the surplus would be allocated to foreign fleets in order to allow for the domestic fleets to increase their fishing effort to suffer no loss in catch. This portion of the surplus could be called the 'fair surplus'. But even in that case, the domestic CPUE and thus the profitability of the fishery would decrease. In other words, fishing access agreements always result in losses of CPUE and/or catches for the domestic fishers, and can even lead to the over-exploitation of the targeted stock. Therefore, the financial compensation paid by foreign fleets should be calculated on the basis of the value of the catch, but should also include a compensation at least equal to the resulting losses.It should be noted that, until now, this issue did not exist for stocks that were not heavily exploited by the domestic fleet, which was largely the case in tuna agreements. However, this issue is currently becoming more prominent, as domestic fleets are increasingly targeting pelagic stocks and, therefore, are starting to compete with foreign fleets (see Section 4).It has been demonstrated in this chapter that although the concept of MSY is useful, its mis-interpretation can produce negative results. Another issue that could reinforce these negative results is that many countries also lack the capabilities to correctly estimate their total catch. This total catch is the second item needed to estimate a potential surplus to be distributed among foreign fleets via agreements (Figure 7). This issue will constitute the core of Section 4. Therefore, if the assumed total catch is erroneous, then the MSY estimate is also erroneous (as catch data are fed into production models that provide MSY estimates). As such, even when scientists think they have produced correct MSY estimates, they have not. Lastly, even if it can be assumed that both MSY and the total catch are correctly estimated, it must be realized that the resulting surplus refers to one stock that generally spans areas much larger than one single EEZ (under which the concept of surplus is applied). This is the case of the tuna agreements, which are designed to target large, migratory, pelagic species. Therefore, tools must be developed to distribute regional surpluses among the different countries of a given region (Lövin 2012), as is done in the Pacific with the vessel day scheme (Havice 2010; Shanks 2010; WCPFC 2012), and as is under discussion in the Indian Ocean with the regional allocation of quotas (similarly to the allocation in the Atlantic and Southern Oceans; Allen et al. 2010; Noye and Mfodwo 2012; IOTC 2013a).294 Catch reconstructions as a solution to the total catch issue The objectives of this chapter will be to discuss the extent to which 'total catch' estimates (based on official statistics) are biased, and to discuss the implications that this may have on the negotiations of fishing access agreements. This will be achieved by 'reconstructing' the official fisheries statistics of 13 countries located in the Western Indian Ocean, as well as discussing the recent development of their offshore pelagic fisheries, and thus, the increasing competition between them and the foreign fleets.4.1 Rationale for catch reconstructionsOfficial records of national fisheries catch statistics have been assembled since 1950 by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), with the aim of documenting the global state of stocks and fisheries (Garibaldi 2012). Typically, FAO does not have mandate to modify the statistics that they receive by Member Countries, although some adjustments are sometimes done (Anon. 2013f). Therefore, the quality of the fisheries statistics provided relies exclusively on the quality of the statistical systems in place to collect them in each country. However, estimating the total catch requires a good coverage of fisheries activities as well as an efficient statistical catch-reporting system. Given the recurrent and acute lack of adequate funding and technical/human means in developing countries (Johannes 1998), total catch estimates are generally poor — if they exist at all. In fact, the fishery sector is rarely considered as a priority by developing countries governments, except in Senegal and Kiribati, for example. Consequently, worldwide fisheries statistics often only reflect industrial or large-scale fisheries (Pauly 1997). While these operations are 'easy' to monitor, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) catches are often overlooked, and this inadequacy is widely recognized as a major barrier towards sustainable fisheries management (Sumaila et al. 2006; Agnew et al. 2009). Typically, IUU catches include a wide variety of missed information, including industrial discards, as well as small-scale fisheries landings for subsistence or recreational purposes.2121 In this work, the term 'IUU' refers to most small-scale fisheries, for the simple reason that they are generally poorly reported and/or monitored (the two 'Us'). Only the 'I' (e.g., vessels fishing illegally in a given EEZ, or targeting forbidden species) should be considered as an international issue, whereas the two 'Us' are more of a national-level management problem.30Small-scale fisheries are of critical importance in most developing coastal states (Kent 1997), and Pauly (1997) describes their lack of representation as the "marginalization of small-scale fisheries". He goes on to suggest that these discrepancies result in important fisheries sub-sectors being misrepresented in (or omitted from) policy and management. In the case of fishing access agreements, the result is a biased view of the catch (and thus also the surplus) from a given fishery, which ultimately has a detrimental effect on both the ecosystem as well as the coastal communities that rely upon the stock(s) for their livelihoods. Furthermore, even when FAO statistics do include the various fisheries sectors of a particular country, catches are generally aggregated by families or commercial groups, making it impossible to identify different fisheries sub-sectors. This is an issue, since the development of a new fishery may go unnoticed due to the declining catches of another one. This point will be particularly emphasized later in this chapter.The reconstruction methods developed around principles published in Pauly (1998), described in Zeller et al. (2007), and applied worldwide by the Sea Around Us (e.g., Zeller and Pauly 2007; Zeller and Harper 2009; Harper and Zeller 2012; Harper et al. 2012) were applied to the coastal countries and territories of the Western Indian Ocean.22 These countries and territories include Comoros, Djibouti, the Îles Éparses (France), Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mayotte (France), Mozambique, La Réunion (France), the Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, and Tanzania (Figure 18). Six of the ten countries (i.e., excluding the French territories of Îles Éparses, Mayotte, and La Réunion) are 22 These methods were actually applied to every maritime country in the world, but this was done by other people. When the author joined the Sea Around Us in September 2010, he was allocated Madagascar's reconstruction; later, he was put in charge of the supervision of the whole region, hence the case study presented here.Figure 18. Map of the Western Indian Ocean.The extent of the respective EEZs of the 13 countries and territories studied in this chapter are shown ('Îles Éparses' grouped in one territory).TanzaniaSouth AfricaKenyaSomaliaMozambiqueMadagascarDjiboutiLa RéunionMauritiusThe Seychelles1  Europa & Bassas da India (Fr.)2  Juan de Nova (Fr.)3  Mayotte (Fr.)4  Comoros5  Glorieuses (Fr.)6  Tromelin (Fr./Mauritius)12345631among the top 40 poorest countries in the world based on gross domestic product per capita between 2004–2013 (World Bank 2014b).23 Conversely, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and South Africa are all in the top half of the world's wealthiest countries (with the Seychelles being ranked 51st). The proportion of the population living below the national poverty line is also very disparate, with 74% and 59% in Madagascar and Mozambique respectively, but 'only' 13% in the Seychelles (World Bank 2014c). The Western Indian Ocean is therefore an area of deep socio-economic contrasts. Using these 13 reconstructions, the aim of this chapter is to put in perspective the development of domestic offshore fisheries with regards to foreign fleets, particularly the ones operating under the network of publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements that exist in the region (Sections 4.2 and 4.3). In contrast, the domestic fisheries and their expansion towards offshore waters to target large pelagics will be described in Section 4.4, to highlight potential future interactions with foreign fleets (Section 4.5).4.2 Foreign fisheries for demersal speciesFleets targeting demersal stocks are not of prime importance in this chapter, since European fleets have generally not targeted demersal stocks in the Indian Ocean. This can easily be explained by the topography of the area, which offers little continental shelf for demersal species to thrive. The only three cases of demersal fisheries by European fleets were found in Madagascar,24 Mauritius,25 and Mozambique.26 While shallow water shrimp species are known to have been over-exploited in Mozambique (with a potential role of the EU fleets in the late 1980s to early 1990s), none of the 2003–2006 deep-water shrimp licenses were taken due to too high costs (Anon. 2006b). Also, in Mauritius, no licenses were taken since at least 2003 with regards to line fishing vessels based in La Réunion (Anon. 2011a), and no exploratory licenses were taken either in Madagascar during 23 Somalia is probably among those countries, but the World Bank does not provide any data on this failed state.24 Shrimp fishing in the late 1960s to early 1970s before the declaration of the EEZ, crustacean and cephalopod fishing in 1986–87, and limited exploratory fishing for demersal fish from 2007 to 2012 (Bertrand 1985; EEC 1986a-b; Roos et al. 1998; EC 2007f; Méralli-Ballou 2008).25 Limited line fishing on offshore banks from 1990 to 2007, and some limited experimental fishing for crustaceans and cephalopods in 1990 (EEC 1989a-b; EC 1994a, 1997c, 2000c, 2003b, 2004d).26 Deep- and shallow-water fishing for shrimp and cephalopods from 1987 to 1991, and deep-water shrimp fishing from 2003 to 2006 (EEC 1987a-b, 1990a; EC 2003d)32the 2007–2012 agreement (Anon. 2011d). Given their small sizes, these fisheries will not be discussed further, and the rest of this chapter will focus entirely on the exploitation of large pelagics by both domestic and foreign fleets.4.3 Foreign fisheries for large pelagic species 4.3.1 History of the fisheriesUnlike century-old small-scale coastal fisheries, foreign fleets targeting large pelagics have only been present in the Western Indian Ocean for a relatively short period, as this region was considered to be too remote by fishing fleets such as those of Japan, the US, and Europe (Doumenge 1996). Japanese longliners were the first to properly explore the area, but only after a post-WWII treaty was signed with the US in 1952 (Doumenge 1996; Evano and Bourjea 2012). The Japanese longline fleet continued to expand throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and other Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and China joined in. Most of the Indian Ocean was covered by the early 1970s (Miyake 2005; Barnes and Ansell 2006; Evano and Bourjea 2012). Noteworthy, freezer longliners underwent massive technological improvements around 1970, which allowed them to shift from low-value skipjack and albacore tunas for canning, to high-value yellowfin and bigeye tunas for the sashimi market (Miyake 2005).27Another major development in terms of fishing effort goes back to the early 1980s, with the arrival of French and Spanish purse-seiners. These vessels had left their Atlantic Ocean fishing grounds due to decreasing catches (Stequert and Marsac 1983, 1989; Fonteneau 1996; Bayliff et al. 2005; Campling 2012; Marsac et al. 2014), but, also, promising exploratory fisheries (Marsac et al. 1983). The purse-seine tuna fishery is highly seasonal, with vessels moving clockwise from the eastern part of the Seychelles area during the first months of the year, to the Mozambique Channel from March-July, to the Northern part of the Western Indian Ocean until the late months of the year (Stequert and Marsac 1983). Since the beginning of the purse-seine fishery in the area, drifting aggregating devices (d-FADs; originally natural ones) have been used (Stequert and Marsac 1983, 1989; Davies et al. 2014). Man-made 27 Nowadays, part of the purse-seiners is also equipped with freezing facilities allowing them to access the sashimi market; one example is the fleet of Réunion-based SAPMER (Hamilton et al. 2011).33d-FADs (which now represent the bulk of d-FADs) were developed in the early 1990s (Bayliff et al. 2005). They are now predominantly used in the northern area during the second half of the year, whereas less man-made d-FADs are used in the Mozambique Channel due to higher occurrences of natural ones (Davies et al. 2014).28 Around 55% of the total purse-seine catch was done under d-FADs in the early 1980s, and this increased to 74% in the late 2000s/early 2010s. Focusing on European fleets, the French component has only increased its d-FAD use by 13% from the initial 57% in the early 1980s, whereas this ratio has nearly doubled with regards to the Spanish fleet (from 44% to around 80% over the same time-period; Figure 19). Spanish vessels are known to use more d-FADs because the crew wages are based on the quantity of fish caught, rather than on their value (as is the case of the French vessels; Anon. 2013b).28 The distinction between 'natural' and 'man-made' d-FAD was first made when the Japanese developed their purse-seine fleet in the region and imported man-made d-FADs from the Pacific Ocean (de Montaudoin et al. 1990). As an aside, note that the current intense use of d-FADs results in a fishing activity closer to 'gathering' than 'hunting', as it highly decreases the searching time and aggregates the fish in traceable locations. Man-made d-FADs are regularly criticized for resulting in high bycatch rates of juvenile yellowfin and bigeye tunas — reducing potential catches by the longline fleets (Bromhead et al. 2003; Miyake 2005), non-target species including at-risk shark species (Romanov 2002; Dagorn et al. 2013; Filmalter et al. 2013), and also because they may act as an 'ecological trap' by tricking tunas into non-optimal waters (Hallier and Gaertner 2008).02550751001981 1991 2001 2011Catch under d-FADs (%)Y earFranceSpainFigure 19. Proportion of the catch caught under drifting aggregating devices by the French and Spanish purse-seiner fleets in the Indian Ocean, 1981–2012.This figure is based on the spatialized dataset provided by the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC 'Task II' dataset; available at: www.iotc.org/documents/ce-purse-seine-and-bait-boat). Vessels registered in Mayotte and the Seychelles were included.344.3.2 Catches of foreign fleetsCatches of tuna, billfishes, and associated species by foreign fleets in the region that are presented here come from the global large pelagic fisheries atlas (Le Manach et al. in press-a). This atlas consists of the data reported by the five tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMO), harmonized and spatialized. The first reported catch by foreign fleets in the Western Indian Ocean29 were of 8,000 t in 1954. Overall, foreign catches (including discards) steadily increased until they peaked in 2005 at almost 650,000 t. Mainly due to Somali piracy, they have then declined by over 40% by 2009, where they have since stabilized (Figure 20). Since 1950, these foreign catches have represented over 40% of the total catch reported in the region. As mentioned previously, these catches were only made by the Asian fleet in the early time-period; mostly Japan in the first decades, and increasingly Taiwan (over 60% of the Asian catch since 2000; Figure 21). The arrival of French and Spanish purse-seiners in the early 1980s resulted in a steep increase in the total catch until the mid-2000s (from virtually nothing prior to 1980 to in excess of 390,000 t by the mid-2000s), after which they also declined to less than 300,000 t in the late 2000s for the same reason (Figure 20). 29 'Western Indian Ocean' was considered here to represent the full extent of FAO Area 51. Here, all countries without a coast in the Western Indian Ocean region were deemed 'foreign'. Furthermore, fleets of 'domestic' countries that were known to be owned by foreign interests were also considered as 'foreign'. This was the case for the Asian longliners and European purse-seiners registered in Mauritius, Mayotte, and the Seychelles. Non-foreign fleets of pole-and-lines (e.g., Maldives) and gillnets (e.g., Iran, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) were thus excluded, although they contribute to a large portion of the total catch in the region (see, e.g.,  Fonteneau 2011).DiscardsOthersWestern EuropeEast Asia04005006007001950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2010Total catch (thousand tonnes)Y ear1002003002000Figure 20. Total foreign catch (including an estimate of discards) of large pelagics in the Western Indian Ocean,1950–2012.The catch is disaggregated by origin of the fleets: East Asia (see Figure 21 for breakdown), Western Europe (see Figure 22 for breakdown), and 'Others' (including flags of convenience, USSR/Russia, and various European, African, and Asian countries with no coasts in the region). Source: Le Manach et al. (in press-a), based on 'Task I' IOTC database (www.iotc.org/data/datasets). 35France took the majority of the European catch in the 1980s, but its contribution has since steadily dropped to around 25–30% in the 2000s. Today, Spain takes the rest of the catch, as Portuguese catches are negligible; Figure 22).30 30 Purse-seines are by far the most dominant European gear, as longlines (essentially targeting swordfish) have only represented around 5% of the catch since 2000.MayotteThe SeychellesSpainFranceMauritiusOthers02550751001978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2008Contribution of countries towardsEuropean catch (%)Y ear2003Figure 22. Country breakdown of the European catch in the Western Indian Ocean, 1978–2012.This figure includes catches by European-owned but Seychelles- and Mayotte-flagged longliners and purse-seiners. Note the importance of Mauritius and 'Others' (mostly Germany at that time) during the exploratory period (i.e., before 1982). Source: Le Manach et al. (in press-a), based on 'Task I' IOTC database (www.iotc.org/data/datasets). South KoreaChinaThe SeychellesTaiwanJapan02550751001954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004Contribution of countries towardsAsian catch (%)Y earFigure 21. Country breakdown of the Asian catch in the Western Indian Ocean, 1954–2012.This figure includes catches by Asian-owned but Seychelles-flagged longliners. Source: Le Manach et al. (in press-a), based on 'Task I' IOTC database (www.iotc.org/data/datasets). 36Also, France and Spain seem to be increasingly relying on their overseas territories and countries such as the Seychelles to flag their vessels.The vast majority of foreign catches were made using longlines until the early 1980s; this gear has since represented around 30% of the total catch (the rest being taken by mostly EU purse-seiners; Figure 23).An overwhelming part of the total catch has been major tunas, whereas minor tunas, sharks and billfishes only represented a minor part of the catch (Figure 24). OthersPurse-seinesLonglines02550751001954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004Contribution of gears towardstotal catch (%)Y earFigure 23. Gear breakdown of the total foreign catch in the Western Indian Ocean, 1954–2012.'Others' includes pole-and-lines, gillnets, longlines (targeting swordfish), as well as a variety of small-scale gears. Source: Le Manach et al. (in press-a), based on 'Task I' IOTC database (www.iotc.org/data/datasets). BillfishesOther tunasMajor tunasOthers02550751001954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004Contribution of species towardstotal catch (%)Y earFigure 24. Taxonomic breakdown of the total foreign catch in the Western Indian Ocean, 1954–2012.'Others' includes minor tunas and various other tuna-like species, Elasmobranchii, and other undetermined pelagic species. Source: Le Manach et al. (in press-a), based on 'Task I' IOTC database (www.iotc.org/data/datasets). 37Within the major tunas, yellowfin tuna was the most prominent species with almost 43% of the 1954–2012 catch, whereas skipjack tuna (which only started to be targeted with the arrival of the EU fleet of purse-seiners in the early 1980s) has represented around 37% of the catch since 1984 (and increasing), and almost 33% overall (Figure 25). Focusing on the European catch, these ratios were slightly different, as skipjack and yellowfin tunas have represented around 49% and 43% of the catch, respectively, since the early 1980s (Figure 26). This more important proportion of skipjack can be explained by the dominance of purse-seines (surface gears), which target species that live more at the surface (e.g., skipjack tuna) than longlines, predominantly used by the Asian fleets and targeting deeper species (e.g., bigeye tuna).Albacore tuna Bigeye tunaSkipjack tunaYellowfin tuna02550751001954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004Contribution of species towardscatch of major tunas  (%)Y earFigure 25. Species breakdown of the total foreign catch of major tunas in the Western Indian Ocean, 1954–2012. Source: Le Manach et al. (in press-a), based on 'Task I' IOTC database (www.iotc.org/data/datasets). Albacore tunaBigeye tunaSkipjack tunaYellowfin tuna02550751001980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2010Contribution of species towardsEuropean catch of major tunas (%)Y ear2005Figure 26. Species breakdown of the European catch of major tunas in the Western Indian Ocean, 1980–2012. Source: Le Manach et al. (in press-a), based on 'Task I' IOTC database (www.iotc.org/data/datasets). 38Since the arrival of European vessels in the region in the early 1980s, the majority of the European purse-seine catch was made in the area between 20°S and 10°N, west of 60°E (i.e., northern Mozambique Channel, the Seychelles' EEZ, and High Seas between the Seychelles and Somalia), while the most productive zones for the European longline fleets were located east of Madagascar and southwest of La Réunion (Figure 27). The pattern for the Asian fleets was slightly different, with most of the purse-seine catches occurring east of Somalia, but north of the Seychelles (i.e., further north compared to the EU). Catches of the longline fleets showed no particular pattern, with several fishing grounds scattered in the area (Figure 28).60°E40°E0°20°S60°E40°E0°20°SA BFigure 27. Distribution of the catch of the European fleets in the Western Indian Ocean, 1979–2012.A) shows the main fishing grounds of the European fleets of purse-seiners, whereas B) shows those of the European longline fleets. Catches increase with darker shades of red. The method used here is the 'natural neighbour' interpolation (default parameters; five natural breaks) of the cumulative catch by statistical cell. The transparent blue polygon represents the EEZs of the countries with which the EU has concluded publicly-funded fishing access agreements. Source: Le Manach et al. (in press-a), based on 'Tasks I and II' IOTC databases (www.iotc.org/data/datasets). 394.4 Domestic fisheries for large pelagic species The following paragraphs are based on the reconstructions of marine fisheries since 1950 in the study area, and provide a brief overview of each of the countries and territories. They include a description of their large pelagic fisheries (if any), in order to highlight the potential interactions (or lack thereof) with the foreign fleets described above, and in particular those coming from Europe.4.4.1 ComorosThe Union of Comoros (referred to here as 'Comoros') is part of an archipelago located between Madagascar and Mozambique, and is composed of the islands of Ngazidja, Ndzuwani, and Mwali (Figure 29). Contrary to its neighbouring country, Mayotte, Comoros voted for independence from its ruler (France) in a 1976 referendum (Dumas 2009). Today, it is one of the poorest countries in the world, with its citizens relying heavily on the exploitation of natural resources for their livelihoods (similarly to other poor countries in the region, including Madagascar and Mozambique). 60°E40°E0°20°S60°E40°E0°20°SA BFigure 28. Distribution of the catch of the Asian fleets in the Western Indian Ocean, 1950–2012.A) shows the main fishing grounds of the Asian fleets of purse-seiners, whereas B) shows those of the Asian longline fleets. Catches increase with darker shades of red. The method used here is the 'natural neighbour' interpolation (default parameters; five natural breaks) of the cumulative catch by statistical cell. The transparent blue polygon represents the EEZs of the countries with which the EU has concluded publicly-funded fishing access agreements. Source: Le Manach et al. (in press-a), based on 'Tasks I and II' IOTC databases (www.iotc.org/data/datasets). 40The fisheries of Comoros primarily consist of a small-scale fleet of over 5,700 pirogues (locally-built wooden canoes) and motor boats, as well shore-based activities (i.e., gleaning) conducted by women (Hauzer et al. 2013a; Doherty et al. in press-a). Early observations of small-scale fisheries in the Comoros archipelago are well-documented by Fourmanoir (1954) and show important catch rates of billfishes, sharks, tunas, and other reef fish species (up to almost 3 tonnes per pirogue annually). However, fishers have observed declines in both catch abundance and mean fish weight/length over the last 20 years (Hauzer et al. 2013b). These observations are not surprising given the strong increase in fishing effort that Comoros' waters have endured. A spatial expansion toward waters farther offshore and neighbouring islands (using more powerful and larger motor boats) has been occurring for the past decades to counter these decreases (Doherty et al. in press-b). 4.4.2 DjiboutiThe Republic of Djibouti (referred to here as 'Djibouti') is a small East African country located northwest of Somalia, across from the Arabian Sea west of Yemen. It possesses one of the smallest EEZs in Africa, with barely 7,000 km2 (Figure 30). This geographic position between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea made it a strategic military and commercial base for France until its independence in 1977 (Devinat 1957).31The important continental shelf, favourable hydro-physical features, and the presence of coral reefs, mangroves, and seagrass beds make the waters of Djibouti productive 31 Nowadays, there is still a French military base, but also a US, a Japanese, and other bases.EEZ BoundaryShelf 0 100 km±NgazidjaMwaliNdzuwaniFigure 29. Comoros and its EEZ.The three main islands of Ngazidja, Ndzuwani and Mwali are shown, as well as the extent of the EEZ (light blue) and inshore fishing area (darker blue).41and diverse to depths of 70 m (Allain 1974; El Gharbi 1987; Bouhlel 1988). Despite this, historically, inhabitants of Djibouti rarely fished; only when immigrants from Yemen settled along Djibouti's coasts did fisheries start to develop (Moal and Grateau 1967; Clouet 1970; Bjoerklund and Walter-Dehnert 1983; Rouaud 1997). Shortly after gaining independence in 1977, the Djibouti Government implemented a plan for fisheries development in order to benefit from these natural resources. Under this plan, however, industrial fisheries have always been forbidden, and only Djibouti citizens can apply for a license for boats smaller than 16 m, using gears other than demersal trawls (Waldstein and Lampe 1988; Darar Djibril 1994; Künzel et al. 1996; Morgan 2006; Darar Djibril and Hosch 2010). By design, Djibouti's fisheries are therefore small-scale and only occur in coastal waters (Colléter et al. in press). 4.4.3 Îles Éparses (France)The Îles Éparses (i.e., 'Scattered Islands') are located around Madagascar, mostly in the Mozambique Channel (Figure 31). Under France's rule since the late 18th-19th century (Malick 1976; Anon. 2011e), they have always been uninhabited, although there has been a small contingent of scientists on the islands since the 1960s. The Navy exerts French sovereignty in Tromelin EuropaJuan deNova 0 500 kmShelfEEZ boundary±GlorieusesBassasda IndiaFigure 31. The Îles Éparses and their EEZs.The islands of Tromelin (managed jointly with Mauritius), Glorieuses, Bassas da India, Europa, and Juan de Nova are shown, as well as the extent of the EEZ (light blue) and inshore fishing area (darker blue).0 50 km±ShelfEEZ boundaryFigure 30. Djibouti and its EEZ.The extent of the EEZ (light blue) and inshore fishing area (darker blue) are shown.42these waters, and deters illegal activities (IUCN 2003; d'Aboville 2007; Anon. 2011e). Consequently, there are no domestic fisheries, although several islands are visited by fishers from neighbouring countries (Le Manach and Pauly in press). 4.4.4 KenyaKenya is located north of the coast of the Mozambique Channel, and although it has a rather small EEZ (110,000 km2; Figure 32), it possesses extensive coral reefs and mangroves (UNEP 1998; Spalding et al. 2001). The most important sector of Kenyan marine fisheries is the small-scale coastal fleet composed of men, mostly active within the inshore fishing area (from the shore to approximately 5 km, with little effort past 2–3 km). These fishers target reef fish, small to large pelagic species, as well as various invertebrates (Okechi and Polovina 1994; Anon. 2007a; Maina and Samoilys 2011), thanks to a variety of gears ranging from spear guns to beach seine-nets, and from traps to boat-operated driftnets (Samoilys et al. 2011). The pelagic component of the small-scale coastal fleet (motorized boats) seems to be increasing due to the decline of reef fish (Le Manach et al. in press-b), although this fleet is mostly active during the North-East Monsoon (when non-motorized boats cannot leave the inshore area; Maina 2012).32 The recreational sector is also developing at a fast pace, and there are currently over 1.6 million tourists visiting Kenya every year (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2010). An estimated one third of these visitors also spend time in 32 Joint ventures have also existed in Kenya, as a small longline fleet operated from Mombasa in the early 1980s (de Sousa 1987). However, it does not appear that this activity was pursued afterward. In 2005–09, two industrial longliners targeting swordfish were also registered in Kenya; by 2010, only one vessel remained (then owned by a Spanish company). This last boat was high-jacked by pirates when it ventured into Somali waters (Anon. 2010d; IOTC 2012a) and was later transferred to the Atlantic Ocean (Nyongesa Wekesa and Ndegwa 2011).0 100 km±Figure 32. Kenya and its EEZ.The extent of the EEZ (light blue) and inshore fishing area (darker blue) are shown, as well as a disputed area with Somalia.43coastal resorts (Williams 1970; Kimani 1995). Sport fishing started to develop in the mid-1980s, with around 60 sport fishing boats registered in the late 1990s (Marshall 1997a). More recently, Ndegwa (2010) reported that about 30 centers were registered along the coast, with an average of nine boats per day at sea at Malindi's resort alone. Sport boats (mainly active from April to August; Abuodha 1999) mainly use hooks and lines to target species of large pelagics such as tuna, billfishes and sharks. They are mostly active around 35 to 55 km offshore, as well as around the more distant Kenyan Banks (Ndegwa 2011). 4.4.5 MadagascarWith a land area of approximately 587,000 km² (Figure 33), Madagascar is the fourth largest island in the world and a biodiversity hot-spot, with approximately 80% of its terrestrial species endemic. However, this biodiversity is heavily threatened by habitat loss (Brooks et al. 2006; USAID 2008). Approximately 70% of Madagascar's population lives below the poverty threshold, and over half of the country's population is dependent on the exploitation of natural resources for their livelihoods (Horning 2008; World Bank 2010). Subsistence fisheries are of prime importance for coastal communities, especially in the south and west of the country, where agriculture is virtually impossible due to the aridity of the land (Le Manach et al. 2011, 2012). Until 2008, Madagascar was unable to target large pelagic species such as tuna and billfishes, apart from small individuals caught by traditional fishers on pirogues. This was mostly due to the absence of a pelagic fleet. However, since the late-2000s, a small fleet of national longliners has been active along the east coast targeting tuna, 0 250 km±ShelfEEZ boundaryFigure 33. Madagascar and its EEZ.The extent of the EEZ (light blue) and inshore fishing area (darker blue) are shown.44billfishes and sharks. This fleet grew from one vessel in 2007 to eight vessels in 2012 (Le Manach et al. 2013b; Rahombanjanahary et al. 2013).4.4.6 MauritiusMauritius is an island of volcanic origin located about 850 km east of Madagascar. With its dependent islands of Rodrigues, Agalega, and St. Brandon, it is part of the Mascarene Archipelago (Figure 34). Similar to the Seychelles (see below), the economy of Mauritius mainly relied on agriculture (i.e., sugar) until independence from the British Empire in 1968. Since then, tourism has rapidly expanded to become one of the most important sectors (FAO 2006), Mauritius is becoming an increasingly important actor with regards to tuna processing due to its canneries (although its processing capacity is still far behind that of the Seychelles, see below; Anon. 2014b). Overall, the economy of Mauritius is among the most stable in the region, along with the Seychelles and South Africa (World Bank 2014b).Unlike in neighbouring La Réunion (the youngest island of the archipelago), the coral reefs of Mauritius and Rodrigues (the oldest island of the archipelago) are extensive (870 km2; Spalding et al. 2001), and the 1.7 million km2 EEZ offers substantial fishing possibilities (FAO 2006). However, the economic impact of fisheries is relatively limited, although it is important in terms of employment and food security for many coastal communities in Mauritius and Rodrigues. This limitation is due in part to the degradation of the reefs around the main island, notably due to sedimentation, blast fishing, and anchoring (Spalding et al. 2001). Most fisheries sectors have remained small-scale and restricted to the inshore area, targeting various species of fish and 0 250 km±MauritiusRodriguesSaya de Malhaand NazarethBanksFigure 34. Mauritius and its EEZ.The main island of Mauritius, Rodrigues, and the distant banks of Saya de Malha and Nazareth are shown, as well as the extent of the EEZ (light blue) and inshore fishing area (darker blue). Tromelin (i.e., the EEZ west of Saya de Malha and Nazareth Banks) is jointly managed with France.45invertebrates with a wide range of boat and gear types (Anon. 2011a; Boistol et al. 2011; FAO 2006). Due to increasing anthropogenic pressure in the lagoon, fishers have recently started to expand further offshore to target pelagic species around anchored fish aggregating devices (a-FADs, similarly to other countries in the region such as Mayotte and Réunion; FAO 2006). Since the late 1990s, a semi-industrial fleet of longliners33 targeting swordfish has also been active (Boistol et al. 2011; Soondron et al. 2013). However, the current number of longliners involved in the swordfish fishery is very low, with around five vessels (Anon. 2011a; Soondron et al. 2013). 4.4.7 Mayotte (France)Mayotte is composed of several islands, with Grande Terre making up most of the 375 km2 land area (Figure 35). They are surrounded by a barrier reef with a productive, yet increasingly threatened lagoon (Biais et al. 1987), which occupies the bulk of the 1,100 km2 inshore fishing area in Mayotte's 63,000 km2 EEZ (www.seaaroundus.org). Unlike Comoros (see above), Mayotte voted to keep its ties to France in a 1976 referendum and was recognized as one of its Overseas Territories (Dumas 2009). In 2011, Mayotte officially became the 101st French Department and France's 5th Overseas Department.The bulk of the fishing effort is carried out by pirogues (78% in 2005; Herfaut 2006) operating in the lagoon and along the barrier reef (Biais et al. 1987; Minet and Weber 1992; Busson 2011). For generations, inhabitants from Mayotte have been fishing in pirogues with handlines in the surrounding lagoon (Fourmanoir 1954; Biais et al. 1987; 33 Joint venture with the Spanish industry (Anon. 2011a).Grande Terre0 100 km±Geyser BankFigure 35. Mayotte and its EEZ.The location of the main island of Grande Terre and the distant bank of Geyser are shown, as well as the extent of the EEZ (light blue) and inshore fishing area (darker blue).46Herfaut 2006; IEDOM 2011). However, perhaps due in part to decreasing catches in the lagoon (Anon. 1994; Guézel et al. 2009), there have been some significant developments over the last few decades, such as the introduction of polyester motorboats, outboard motors, and a-FADs. Consequently, offshore pelagic species have become more prominent in the total catch over time. Since their introduction in the 1980s (Biais et al. 1987), polyester motor boats (locally known as barques) have occupied an increasing percentage of the artisanal effort and catch and replaced the large motorized pirogues. The proportion of the catch derived from trolling has increased dramatically over the years from 6% in 1992 (Maggiorani et al. 1993) to 32% in 2005 (Herfaut 2006), and is likely the result of increased motorization of vessels and an increased effort targeting pelagic species.There is also a rapidly growing and spatially expanding semi-industrial longline fleet targeting swordfish and tuna since 2001 (Kiszka et al. 2010; Bein et al. 2011; IOTC 2011a; Doherty et al. in press-b). 4.4.8 MozambiqueRanked 187th out of 193 with regards to the 2004–2013 per capita gross domestic product (World Bank 2014b), Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world. However, it still benefits from an extensive coast lined with mangroves and coral reefs (1,860 km2 of coral reefs and 925 km2 of mangroves; Spalding et al. 2001; Figure 36) that are able to support important fisheries resources (FAO 2007a).Until the mid-1960s, when it was still a Portuguese colony, Mozambican fisheries were strictly small-scale and limited to inshore areas. The development of Mozambican fisheries is still slow, with the vast majority of 0 250 km±Figure 36. Mozambique and its EEZ in the Indian Ocean.The extent of the EEZ (light blue) and inshore fishing area (darker blue) are shown.47domestic activities still small-scale and restricted to inshore areas (except the industrial shrimp fishery; Anon. 2006b, 2011b, 2014d; FAO 2007a; Jacquet and Zeller 2007; McBride et al. in press).34 In 2011, there was only one longliner involved in large pelagics fisheries (Chacate and Mutombene 2013). However, the Government has developed a new vision for the exploitation of offshore stocks and is planning to build an extensive fleet of vessels to target tuna and billfishes in its EEZ and the Mozambique Channel (Anon. 2013g-j). 4.4.9 La Réunion (France)La Réunion is a 3 million year old volcanic island of 30 km of diameter, located in the Mascarene Archipelago between the east coast of Madagascar and Mauritius (Figure 37). Despite being surrounded by rich waters, inhabitants of La Réunion have never really relied on the ocean to provide their food. Until the early 1980s, the fisheries contribution to the island's economy was solely limited to inshore fisheries and some fisheries on distant banks, but it soon became more important (Bertrand 1985), particularly in the 1990s with the expansion of the tuna and billfish fisheries (Roos et al. 1998), and the development fisheries for Dissostichus eleginoides (Patagonian toothfish) around Kerguelen (Guyomard et al. 2006; Palomares and Pauly 2011), and Jasus paulensis (St. Paul rock lobster) around Saint Paul and Amsterdam (Pruvost et al. in press). These distant fisheries have gradually become of prime importance to the economy of the island; with their inclusion, the fisheries sector is the second largest exporting sector, just behind cane sugar (Méralli-Ballou 2008).34 The shrimp sector consists of joint ventures between Mozambique and Spanish or Japanese companies (FAO 2004, 2007a), and most of the catch is exported to both Japan and the European Union (EU).0 100 kmShelfEEZ boundary±Figure 37. La Réunion and its EEZ.The extent of the EEZ (light blue) and inshore fishing area (darker blue) are shown.48Artisanal fishers started to target large pelagics around the island at the end of the 1980s, when a-FADs were introduced. The aim was to revitalize the small-scale coastal fleet and reduce the pressure on the reef resources (Biais and Taquet 1990; INSEE 1991; Rey 1998). Nowadays, there are 34 active a-FADs around the island, and it is estimated that almost 50% of the time spent fishing by artisanal fishers is around a-FADs (Guyomard et al. 2012). Since the mid-2000s, a fleet of mini-longliners was also developed (Chavance et al. 2012), and since it is also active within the 20 nm zone, conflicts with the artisanal sector have emerged (Chavance et al. 2012). Finally, following the success of the Asian fleet based in La Réunion, a domestic fleet of larger longliners targeting swordfish was also created in the early 1990s (Poisson et al. 1994), and quickly became one of the major sectors of La Réunion fisheries (René et al. 1998). These vessels are active at night, using drifting longlines of 20–100 km to which nylon mono-filaments equipped with hooks are fixed. Each vessel can deploy hundreds to several thousands of hooks per set (Poisson and Taquet 2000; Evano and Bourjea 2012). In 2010, slightly less than 20% of the total registered vessels (i.e., 45) were longliners targeting swordfish (Leblond et al. 2011; Evano and Bourjea 2012). Since its inception, this fleet has gradually expanded towards the Mozambique Canal and now fishes in the entire Western Indian Ocean (René et al. 1998; Poisson and Taquet 2001; Guyomard et al. 2006; Evano and Bourjea 2012). However, the majority of their catch occurs east of Madagascar, particularly southwest of La Réunion (Poisson and Taquet 2001; Guyomard et al. 2006; Le Manach et al. in press-c). 4.4.10 The SeychellesThe Republic of Seychelles (referred to here as 'the Seychelles') is the least populated country in Africa, with around 90,000 inhabitants. It is an archipelago located north of Madagascar, composed of 115 islands including some 42 granitic, mountainous ones of continental origin; the rest being flat and of coralline origin (Figure 38).Victoria hosts the largest tuna hub in the Indian Ocean, with around 80% of the tuna caught in the region transiting every year through its infrastructure, which include the Indian Ocean Tuna cannery (Martín 2011).35 Canned tuna is the main good exported 35 This is one of the largest canneries in the world, with over 90,000 t of tuna processed every year, and this is also a highly efficient one with regards to water use and production by employee (Michaud 2003; Martín 2011).49by the Seychelles (primarily for the European market), although there are also substantial exports of fish meal/oil, as well as dried holothurians (bêche-de-mer) and shark fins36 to Asia (Marshall 1997b; Robinson et al. 2006; SFA 2014). With around 5–6,000 direct and indirect jobs (15% of the total of formal jobs in the Seychelles), the fisheries sector is the main pillar of the national economy, along with the tourism industry. The fisheries sector only started to advance in the mid-1980s with the arrival of European and Japanese funds linked to fishing access agreements, which were used to develop tuna-related infrastructure, such as the port and cannery in Victoria (Michaud 1991, 2003; Robinson and Shroff 2004; Alexis and Chang-Sam 2006; Martín 2011; Marsac et al. 2014). As a result, the Seychelles have become an exception in the region (notwithstanding Mauritius), with high social and economic indexes. Due to the high population and heavy use of coastal resources, coral reefs around the main islands are under high pressure, whereas those farther from these heavily populated areas are relatively well preserved and lightly fished (Spalding et al. 2001). Consequently, most stocks in these areas appear to be under-exploited (Anon. 2004a), compared to inshore fisheries around the main islands, which are fully exploited and likely over-exploited (Mees et al. 1998; Wakeford 2001; Grandcourt and Cesar 2003; Robinson and Shroff 2004). Domestic fisheries have historically been mostly restricted to the large coral areas around the main islands, but have expanded towards open waters to target small and medium pelagic species (Kimani 1995; Le Manach et al. in press-d). Historically, this fleet consisted mostly of pirogues, which were increasingly replaced by other types of boats called whalers and schooners with freezers and inboard motors. Furthermore, plastic and fibre-glass hull outboards were introduced 36 Sharks have been caught in the Seychelles waters for centuries to such an extent that populations were already considered as over-exploited by the end of the 1950s (Marshall 1997b).0 250 km±MahéFigure 38. The Seychelles and its EEZ.The location of the main island of Mahé and its surrounding plateau are shown, as well as the extent of the EEZ (light blue) and inshore fishing area (darker blue).50in the early 1970s, and considerably changed the landscape of the fleet (Bach 1992; Payet 1996). This shift in fleet composition allowed local fishers to expand their fishing grounds by going farther offshore (Bach 1988; de Moussac and Bach 1988). A semi-industrial fleet of small longliners targeting large pelagics (mostly tuna and swordfish) further offshore also started to develop in 1995 with two vessels, and reached ten vessels by the early 2000s (Wendling et al. 2003; Anon. 2004a). These longliners target tuna and swordfish around the Mahé plateau and in the northeastern part of the EEZ. They commonly catch between 200 and 300 tonnes annually (Wendling et al. 2003; Kolody et al. 2011; SFA 2014). 4.4.11 SomaliaThe Federal Republic of Somalia (referred to here as 'Somalia') is located in northeastern Africa and has both an extensive coastline and EEZ (over 830,000 km2, www.seaaroundus.org; Figure 39). This country is known to have been plagued by political instability since the 1991 collapse of the central government (UNEP 2005), although there is some sort of regional governance in place (Menkhaus 2007). Currently, Somalia consists of two independent entities that are not recognized by the international community: Somaliland (in the North West) unilaterally declared its independence from the rest of Somalia in 1991; the rest of the country consists of the semi-autonomous Puntland State of Somalia (in the North East), as well as the unstable southern region that is controlled by terrorists groups (UNDP 2012). Somalia is also considered as one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world, with most indices ranking extremely low (UNDP 2012; United Nations 2013b).0 250 km±Figure 39. Somalia and its EEZ.The extent of the EEZ (light blue) and inshore fishing area (darker blue) are shown, as well as a disputed area with Kenya.51Similarly to Djibouti (see above), Somali people have historically mostly focused on resources provided by the land, due to their nomadic or agro-pastoral culture (Mukhtar 1996; UNEP 2005). In fact, fish has long been considered as unfit for human consumption in many parts of Somalia (Simoons 1974). However, Mohamed Siad Barre came to power in the late 1960s and established a socialist dictatorship, which resulted in numerous fishing co-operatives being set up, with the aim to increase fish catches. In the early 1970s, around 500 mechanized boats were introduced, but the lack of any fishing tradition and poor maintenance resulted in rather poor outcomes (Anon. 1982; FAO 2005a). In the 2000s, the artisanal fleet was composed of around 3,800 boats, 75% of which were small wooden canoes sometimes used with a small engine. The rest of the fleet was composed of slightly larger plastic-/fibreglass-hull boats with larger engines (FAO 2005a). Somali fishers have a long history of targeting large pelagics such as tuna, billfishes, and sharks (Yassin 1981). They commonly use gears such as handlines, gillnets, and longlines to target them (Marshall 1997c; FAO 2005a), and are therefore in competition with illegal foreign fleets.37 4.4.12 South AfricaThe Republic of South Africa (referred to here as 'South Africa') delimits the southwestern boundary of the studied area. It has an extensive EEZ of over one million km2, of which over 2/3 are in the Indian Ocean (Figure 40). South Africa is in the top half of the world's wealthiest countries based on gross domestic product per capita between 2004–2013 (World Bank 2014b). It is also ranked in the 'medium human development' category, and is still plagued with strong inequalities (UNDP 2013, 2014). 37 Since the mid-2000s, this competition is thought to be partly responsible for the surge in piracy at sea, with pirates taking hostages on large carriers and (mostly) illegal industrial fishing vessels (Waldo 2009; Diaz and Dubner 2010; Weldemichael 2012). The extent of such illegal fishing in unknown (UNEP 2005; Persson et al. in press).±0 500 kmFigure 40. South Africa and its EEZ in the Indian Ocean.The extent of the EEZ (light blue) and inshore fishing area (darker blue) are shown.52Several industrial fisheries targeting demersal fishes, crustaceans, and small pelagics have existed for decades (Baust et al. in press), mostly in the productive waters of the Atlantic Ocean. Since the end of the Apartheid in 1994, the access to marine resources for artisanal fishers has increased. In the Indian Ocean, the various fisheries sectors still remain small, as they are limited by the low-productivity waters (FAO 2005b). In this region, fishing is mostly restricted to inshore fishing for rock lobsters in the south, shrimp trawling off Durban, and tuna longlining all along the east coast and further north up the Mozambique Channel (FAO 2005b, 2010a). The latter sector is composed mostly of charter and joint venture companies (essentially with Asian interests) targeting tunas, swordfish, and sharks with a fleet of currently around 40 vessels (West and Smith 2013). These charter companies and joint ventures replaced the historical foreign licenses given to Japan and Taiwan with a view to increasing the locally added value (Ryan et al. 2002; Republic of South Africa 2003, 2013; FAO 2010a). 4.4.13 TanzaniaThe United Republic of Tanzania (referred to here as 'Tanzania'), is located between Kenya and Mozambique. Its territory also includes the islands of Pemba and Zanzibar, and its EEZ extends over 240,000 km2 (Figure 41).Similarly to other countries in the region, the fisheries sector has remained largely artisanal, with inshore fleets of fishers targeting a wide array of reef species and medium pelagics with a diversity of gears (Kimaro 1995; Mngulwi 2006; FAO 2007b). In the late 1980s, Tanzanian fishers started to target shrimp and small pelagics at a semi-industrial scale (Mngulwi 2006; FAO 2007b). It is only in the late 1990s, however, that a small fleet of artisanal vessels PembaZanzibar0 100 k m±Figure 41. Tanzania and its EEZ.The location of the islands of Pemba and Zanzibar, as well as the extent of the EEZ (light blue) and inshore fishing area (darker blue).53using longlines and gillnets started to specialize in targeting tunas and billfishes in farther waters. This fishery is still restricted to nearshore waters, and is still rather under-developed (Igulu and El Kharousy 2013). However, the increasing catches of these species show that spatial expansion is also occurring in Tanzania (Bultel et al. in press). One driver is likely to be the degradation of coral reefs, similarly to Kenya, Mozambique, and other countries in the region (Muthiga et al. 2008).4.5 Interaction with local fisheries and implications for the negotiation of fishing access agreementsBased on the information presented above, interactions between domestic and foreign fleets could be characterized as historically limited for two main reasons: (i) domestic fishers mostly targeted demersal, coastal species until the late 1990s, and (ii) distant-water fleets have almost exclusively targeted large pelagic, offshore species (with a few exceptions). Therefore, this has greatly limited the interaction between the two sectors, and one can argue that if there is no interaction, there is no problem.38 As demonstrated in the section above, there is a strong presence of foreign fleets in the Western Indian Ocean, with high catches of large pelagics. These catches occur throughout the region, although the most important grounds are found in its northwestern part (Figure 27 and Figure 28), i.e., where the density of EEZs is the most important. Given the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations 1982), dozens of fishing access agreements have been established with most countries in the region. These agreements have allowed fleets from Europe, Asia (mostly Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China), but also USSR/Russia (e.g., in Madagascar and the Seychelles; Gilbert and Rabenomanana 1995; Le Manach et al. in press-d), to access these rich fishing grounds. Regarding Europe, publicly-funded agreements exists with all countries in the region except Djibouti (where industrial fishing is prohibited; Colléter et al. in press), Somalia (absence of government; Anon. 2014b), and South Africa (which possesses its own industrial fleet of longliners; Baust et al. in press). Publicly-funded agreements are in place with five of them (i.e., Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, and the 38 At least, no 'ecological problems', but see Section 5 and Section 6 for a discussion on economic and social problems related to historical agreements.54Seychelles; Figure 42), and are under negotiation with two others (i.e., Kenya and Tanzania). With regards to the developing coastal countries, the situation has quickly evolved since the late 1990s as they have started to expand their fishing effort farther offshore. This expansion is occurring in an effort to target large pelagics, in response to declining demersal, coastal resources on the one hand, and increasing domestic demand for fish and increased capability to target offshore stocks on the other hand. As such, the significance of fisheries catch reconstructions (in the case of the Western Indian Ocean) mostly lies in the identification of competing interests, which are summarized in Table 2.TanzaniaSouth AfricaKenyaSomaliaMozambiqueMadagascarDjiboutiLa RéunionMauritiusThe SeychellesEEZEU watersActiveNegotiationEU agreements1  Europa & Bassas da India (Fr.)2  Juan de Nova (Fr.)3  Mayotte (Fr.)4  Comoros5  Glorieuses (Fr.)6  Tromelin (Fr./Mauritius)123456Figure 42. Extent of the publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements in the Western Indian Ocean.Table 2. Summary of the domestic pelagic fisheries in the Western Indian Ocean, as well as potential interaction with foreign fleets.Country Publicly-funded EU agreement Domestic pelagic fisheriesInteraction with foreign fleets aInteractionDirect b Indirect cComoros Yes (since 1988) Artisanal fishery using a-FADs High  Djibouti - Limited Low Îles Éparses (Fr.) EU waters None d None dKenya In negotiation Expanding artisanal fishery Medium  Madagascar Yes (since 1986) • Expanding artisanal fishery• Small fleet of longlinersMedium to high  Mauritius Yes (since 1993) Artisanal fishery using a-FADs Low Mayotte (Fr.) Community waters Artisanal fishery using a-FADs High  Mozambique Yes (since 1987) • Expanding artisanal fishery• Creation of an industrial fleetHigh  La Réunion (Fr.) EU waters • Artisanal fishery using a-FADs• Small fleet of mini-longliners• Big fleet of industrial longlinersMedium The Seychelles Yes (since 1985) • Expanding artisanal fishery• Small fleet of longlinersHigh  Somalia - Artisanal offshore fishery High  55The expansion of local fisheries towards more offshore stocks of large pelagic species is done either by using a-FADs, or by developing entirely new sectors to emancipate the domestic fleets from small-scale limitations. The first case (i.e., fishing around a-FADs) is mostly occurring around the small islands of the region, i.e., in Comoros, Mayotte, La Réunion, and Mauritius. The second case (i.e., developing a new sector)39 seems to be more widespread, as it is occurring in Madagascar (Le Manach et al. 2013b), Mozambique (Anon. 2013g-j), the Seychelles (Anon. 2014e; Le Manach et al. in press-d), La Réunion (Le Manach et al. in press-c), and Mayotte (Doherty et al. in press-b). Potentially, all entities in the region will be willing to develop these new sectors in order to develop their economy and supply their markets, especially in view of recent regulations of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) on future fishing effort limitations (IOTC 2001, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2009a, 2012b). This domestic expansion is different than what is occurring in the three entities of Mayotte, La Réunion, and the Seychelles, which resemble distant fisheries as they host 'foreign-owned' large-scale industrial fleets targeting large pelagics throughout the region. In the cases of Mayotte and La Réunion,40 these 'foreign-owned' fleets consist of European purse-seiners in Mauritius, Mayotte, and the Seychelles, as well as Asian longliners in the Seychelles (mostly from Japan and South Korea; www.sfa.sc/publication.jsp).39 Similarly to what is also occurring in the Pacific Ocean (Ram-Bidesi and Tsamenyi 2004).40 Both are French, but historically, only La Réunion was part of the EU. Since 2012 Mayotte's waters have also integrated the waters of the EU (i.e., 'Community waters'). This means that all French vessels registered in Mayotte are now able to operate in foreign waters under publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements.Table 2. Summary of the domestic pelagic fisheries in the Western Indian Ocean, as well as potential interaction with foreign fleets (continued).Country Publicly-funded EU agreement Domestic pelagic fisheriesInteraction with foreign fleets aInteractionDirect b Indirect cSouth Africa - None e Low Tanzania In negotiation Expanding artisanal fishery Medium  a The interaction was considered higher when the EEZs of the countries and territories studied here were closer to the foreign fleets' fishing grounds. For example, both Mauritius and South Africa have low potential interactions (outside the main foreign fishing grounds), whereas the Seychelles are located where most of the catches occur.b 'Direct' interaction means that both domestic and foreign fleets target large pelagics in the same grounds.c 'Indirect' interaction means that although the foreign fleets do not operate in the fishing grounds of the domestic fleets, they have an direct impact on the regional stocks of large pelagics (highly migratory species), which may result in indirect impact on catches by domestic fleets in other areas.d The only fishery that could potentially interact with foreign fleets is the recreational one occurring around Bassas da India, and mostly involving South Africans on vacation (Le Manach and Pauly in press).e Joint ventures are not considered as domestic fisheries here, as they are foreign-operated.564.6 ConclusionBy expanding towards offshore fishing grounds, developing coastal countries are starting to compete with the foreign fleets. Therefore, although foreign fleets are now required to freeze their fishing efforts, the current increase in the domestic offshore fleet is likely to result in the over-exploitation of the targeted resource and sub-optimal domestic catches (as demonstrated in Section 3). Currently, many stocks of large pelagics in the Western Indian Ocean are already over-exploited or close to be, and many threatened species are not assessed yet (Dulvy et al. 2008; Juan-Jordá et al. 2011; Gopalakrishna Pillai and Satheeshkumar 2012; IOTC 2014). Currently, there are several mechanisms that exist to protect local fleets from foreign fleets and consequent adverse effects. In Mayotte, foreign fleets have been banned from the 24 nautical miles zone since December 2009 (Guézel et al. 2009; Busson 2011), and seiners are banned from the 60 nm zone (with d-FADs banned from the 100 nm zone). Also, several publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements in the region now establish restricted zones or buffer zones around domestic a-FADs (EC 2007f; EU 2010c-d, 2012d, 2013l, 2014f).41 Although they are commendable, these mechanisms are unfortunately likely to be insufficient. Large pelagic species are highly migratory,42 and it is highly unlikely that restricting a small zone to foreign fleets will positively affect the adjacent zone fished by domestic fishers. More importantly, the expansion of domestic fisheries questions the foundations of the fishing access agreements themselves: if developing coastal countries are now willing (and capable) to exploit their pelagic resources, the impetus should be on helping them develop their own fleets and processing infrastructure to facilitate trade agreements, rather than carrying the current 'pay for access' agreements.41 This is not the case for the agreements with Mozambique and Mauritius (EU 2012e, 2014c).42 On that note, it is also important to underline the absurdity of the concept of 'surplus' being negotiated on a country basis. The bare minimum would be to produce regional estimates of surplus and only allocate the 'fair' fraction (see Section 3) to foreign fleets. The IOTC is currently moving in this direction with the regional allocation criteria (IOTC 2013a). This is similar to what was done by the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) for some species.575 The financial aspect of publicly-funded EU fishing access agreementsMany studies have focused on fishing access agreements worldwide, and most have suggested that the fees received by host countries are low compared to the value of what is extracted, irrespective of the origin of the distant-water fishing country (e.g., Kent 1980; Iheduru 1995; Duncan et al. 1999; Gillett et al. 2001; Chand et al. 2002; Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002; Petersen 2006; Xue 2006; Carneiro 2011; Mallory 2013).43 Most of these studies are country- or region-specific, and usually cover a short period of time. For the publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements, these studies have had limited policy implications — although they are important at a local level — since they provided neither long-term trends nor a global analysis of these trends. Additionally, the breakdown of total fees paid by both the EU (i.e., subsidies) and the fishing industry has never been analyzed at a global scale. Here a comprehensive analysis of the 1980–2012 period covered by these publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements is provided.44 5.1 Material and methodsFor all twenty host countries that have been involved at some point in a publicly-funded fishing access agreement with the EU, all related official texts (namely, 'Council Regulations/Decisions', 'Agreements', and 'Protocols') were retrieved from the EU law database (http://eur-lex.europa.eu; also available in print). The following data and information were extracted: (i) EEZ access fees and overseas development assistance (referred throughout as 'sectoral funds'; paid by EU taxpayers); (ii) fishing fees (paid by EU industry, either per tonne of fish or per unit of vessel capacity); (iii) fleets' capacity; and (iv) specific 'quotas' and 'limits of reference' (both referred to as 'quotas' throughout this chapter, although 'limits of reference' can be exceeded in exchange for additional payment), if available. This was done for each gear type or target species, country, and year (see Table 3 for references).43 Several of the assessments commissioned by the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the European Commission (DG MARE) also openly recognize that the publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements are much more beneficial to the EU than they are to the host countries (Anon. 2004b, 2005b, 2006b, 2013k, 2014f), while only a few report a fair sharing of the benefits (see, e.g., Anon. 2006c).44 This chapter was published in 2013, and as such, only includes data until the end of 2012 (unlike the next chapter, which includes data until the end of 2013).58This information was mostly collected from the 'Protocols', although some of this information was only found in the 'Agreements' for the earlier time-period. 'Council Regulations/Decisions' were mostly used to determine whether a renewed agreement was similar to its previous iteration.To produce a harmonized database, the following units were then standardized:• Vessel capacityGross Tonnage (GT) is the unit adopted by the International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships in 1969 and entered into force in 1982. However, the use of this unit has not been enforced, as nearly all EU agreements used Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT). Therefore, a GT to GRT conversion (i.e., GRT is used in this chapter as the common capacity unit)45 was deemed to be the best way to minimize uncertainty 45 GRT is not the best unit for discussing fishing capacity. For example, demersal trawlers are best defined by power of their engine, which drag their gear at the bottom of the ocean, while tuna vessels are better defined by the volume of their hold, which determines how long they can operate. However, GRT was the only unit that could be used here to have a consistent fishing capacity unit, while limiting the number of assumptions and conversions.Table 3. References used to compile information on publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements.Country ReferencesAngola EEC (1987c-d, 1989c, 1990b, 1993a), EC (1994b, 1997d, 2000d, 2001i, 2002a, i)Cape Verde EEC (1990c-d; EC 1995a, 1998g, 2002j, 2004e, 2006i), EU (2011f)Comoros EEC (1988a-b, 1992b), EC (1995b, 1998h, 2001j, 2005d-f), EU (2010c, 2013l)Côte d'Ivoire EEC (1990e-f), EC (1995c, 1998i, 2001k, 2003e, 2005g, 2008d), EU (2013m)Eq. Guinea EEC (1984a-b, 1987e-f, 1990g), EC (1995d, 1998j, 2000e)Gabon EC (1998k, 2002k, 2006j)Gambia EEC (1987g-h, 1990h), EC (1994c)Guinea EEC (1983a-b, 1986c, 1987i-j, 1990i, 1992c), EC (1995e, 1996d-e, 1998l, 2000f, 2002l, 2004f, 2009b)Guinea-Bissau EEC (1980b-c, 1982a-b, 1983c, 1986d, 1987k-l, 1990j, 1991a), EC (1994d, 1996f, 1997e, 2002m, 2006k, 2007g), EU (2011g)Kiribati EC (2003f, 2007h), EU (2012f)Madagascar EEC (1986a-b, e, 1987m, 1989d, 1992d, 1993b), EC (1996g, 1998m, 2001l, 2005h, 2007f), EU (2012d)Mauritania EEC (1987n-o, 1990k, 1993c), EC (1996h-j, 2001m, 2006l, 2008e), EU (2012g)Mauritius EEC (1989a-b, e), EC (1994a, 1997c, 2000c, 2004d)Micronesia EC (2006m), EU (2011h)Morocco EEC (1987p, 1988c-e, 1992e-f), EC (1995f-g, 1996k, 2006n), EU (2011i, 2012h)Mozambique EEC (1987a-b, q, 1990a, l, 1993d), EC (2003d, 2007i), EU (2012e)São Tomé & Principe EEC (1984c-d, 1986f, 1987r-s, 1990m, 1993e), EC (1997f, 2000g, 2002n, 2006o, 2007j-k), EU (2011j)Senegal EEC (1980a, d, 1981b, 1982c-d, 1984e-h, 1985a-b, 1986g, 1987t-u, 1988f, 1990n, 1991b, 1993f), EC (1995h, 1997g, 1998n, 2001n, 2002o)The Seychelles EEC (1984i, 1985c-d, 1987v-w, 1990o, 1993g), EC (1996l, 1999b, 2002p, 2005i, 2008b), EU (2010d, 2014f)Solomon Islands EC (2006p), EU (2010e)59for the three countries whose fleet capacity was given in GT (Morocco from 2006 to present; Côte d'Ivoire from 2004 to present; and Mauritania from 1996 to present for non-tuna pelagic vessels, and then from 2006 to present for all other vessels).Thus, records for which both GT and GRT were given (all countries) were extracted from the EU fleet registry (http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/fleet), and kept records for (i) demersal gears (i.e., 'beam trawls', 'bottom other trawls', 'bottom pair trawls', 'boat dredges', 'mechanized dredges', 'otter twin trawls', 'combined gillnets/trammelnets', 'set longlines', and 'set gillnets'; n = 25,423); and (ii) pelagic gears (i.e., 'Danish seines', 'encircling gillnets', 'pair seines', 'purse seines', 'Scottish seines'; n = 3,175). A linear regression between GT and GRT was then performed for these two categories of gears (Figure 43; residuals were tested for normality in R and are presented in Figure 44), which was used to convert the GT given in the aforementioned agreements into GRT.Figure 43. Regression of Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) on Gross Tonnage (GT).Linear regression of the records collected from the EU vessel registry (http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/fleet) for which tonnages in both GT and GRT were available. Panel A) corresponds to demersal gears (n = 25,423), while B) represents pelagic gears (n = 3,175). In both cases, there is a strong correlation between the two parameters GT and GRT (r2 = 0.94 for demersal gears, and r2 = 0.98 for demersal gears). Note that neither GRT nor GT are normally distributed, as there are fewer vessels with higher tonnages (i.e., the distribution of the tonnage is skewed towards 0). The analysis of normality of the residuals is presented in Figure 44.0 20001200030000GRT = 0.67GT + 3.17r2 = 0.94p-value <0.001F = 2.1n = 25,4230 4000GRT = 0.71GT + 6.15 r2 = 0.98p-value <0.001F = 2.0n = 3,175Gross Registered Tonnage(GRT)AGross Tonnage (GT)GRTB6002000100060Furthermore, most tuna vessel capacities were provided only in number of vessels. To convert these numbers to GRT capacities, the correspondences between these two units provided for the 1980s in a handful of agreement documents were used.46 In order to get an additional anchor point for 2012, the geometric mean of the GRT per seiner was calculated, based on the list of seiners active in 2012 under EU agreements (provided by the Observatoire Thonier, Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, Sète, France) and GRT data available in the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 'fishing vessels finder' database (www.fao.org/figis/vrmf/finder/search/#stats). For liners, for which no such list was available, the geometric mean of the tonnage of the 50 largest EU vessels (deemed to be representative of the EU industrial fleet) from each database of the three Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMO) under which EU agreements operate was instead computed.47 For each vessel type, an exponential regression was then fitted (Figure 45), which was used to convert numbers of vessels to GRT capacities (due to the low number of data points, no analyses of the normality of the residuals were performed).46 Purse-seiners: Guinea 1983 (EEC 1983b), Guinea-Bissau 1983 and 1986 (EEC 1983c, 1987l), Senegal 1988 (EEC 1987u, 1988f), Gambia 1990 (EEC 1987h, 1990h); 'liners', i.e., pole-and-line and longline vessels: Guinea 1983 (EEC 1983b), Guinea-Bissau 1983 and 1986 (EEC 1983c, 1987l), Angola 1989 (EEC 1989c).47 These RFMOs are: the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC; only 47 records).0 1000 2000 3000-4000400200C-2 0 20DResidualsA20Standardized residualsB010000 400 800 1200040Fitted values Theoretical quantiles-4 0 4500602010-10Figure 44. Analysis of the residuals of the linear regression presented in Figure 43.Panel A) and B) correspond to demersal gears (n = 25,423), while C) and D) represent pelagic gears (n = 3,175). Panels A) and C) show that the accuracy of our GRT estimates diminish when GT increases, and the right panels show that the residuals have a distribution that is relatively normal (perfect normality would be obtained if all points were on the horizontal line). Although there are a few residuals that deviate from normality, they did not impact our parameter estimation, given the large sample size (n).61Finally, non-tuna vessel capacity was also provided in 'number of vessels' in seven cases. Correspondences given in other agreements for the same type of gear/species at the same period and, as much as possible, in the same region, were used (Table 4).• FeesTo account for inflation over a given time-period, it is necessary to convert nominal values (i.e., the actual price in a given year) to comparable values. Therefore, values in this chapter are given in 2012 EUR (1 EUR = 1.28 USD), rather than nominal EUR.48From a European perspective, this conversion of the fees from nominal to real values required us to apply a Consumer Price Index (CPI) 'deflator' to nominal values:48 This methodology represents an improvement on the preliminary estimate of Madagascar's income (Le Manach et al. 2013c), as it estimates more accurately what host countries perceive they received over time. It was developed following discussions with DG MARE and several colleagues. However, although this new method provides a more accurate view of what a host country perceives it received, it does not change either the overall trend, nor the discussion implied by such trends (at least in the case of Madagascar; see Figure 46).YearGross Registered Tonnage(GRT)19801500A B01990 2000 2010GRT = 3-10e0.0145.YearR2 = 0.62n = 61980 1990 2000 20104000GRT = 9-23e0.0281.YearR2 = 0.90n = 51000500300200100Figure 45. Trends of EU vessels' Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT).Estimated mean annual capacity in GRT of A) tuna seiners and B) tuna liners (i.e., pole-and-line and longline vessels) deployed by the EU fleets from 1980 to 2012, suggesting that the mean GRT per vessel increases by 1.4% and 2.8% annually, respectively.Table 4. Correspondence between the number of vessels and GRT capacities for non-tuna vessels.Country Period Type of gear Correspondence usedAngola 1996–2004 Pelagic species Mauritania (European Community 1996i)Cape Verde 1991–1994 Cephalopods Mauritania (European Economic Community 1990k)Côte d'Ivoire 1997–2000 Demersal trawlers Angola (European Community 1997d)Madagascar 2007–2012 Bottom longliners, fixed gillnets Cape Verde (European Community 2006i) aMozambique 1990–1991 Demersal trawlers Angola (European Economic Community 1990b) a2003–2006 Shrimp Angola (European Community 2002i) aa In these cases, no correspondence in the same area was available.62Real valuei = nominal valuei / (CPIi/CPI2012)     ...4)where i represents the year for which the nominal value is converted into 2012 real value.Annual CPI data were extracted from the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook (www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/index.aspx) for 'Advanced Economies'.49Estimating the real value of the fees received by the host countries required that one additional step was performed. First, nominal EUR had to be converted to Local Currency Units (LCU; exchange rates extracted from http://databank.worldbank.org; 2012 rates extracted from www.fxtop.com, up to October 2012) via USD, to which the host countries' CPI was then applied, following Equation 5. Because host countries' CPI time-series were not complete in the World Bank database, several interpolations were performed to fill gaps, as presented in Table 5.Finally, global ex-vessel prices for the main species of tuna (yellowfin and skipjack), as well as small pelagics, demersal fish, shrimp and other crustaceans, and cephalopods were also extracted from a worldwide ex-vessel price database for the 1980–2006 period (Sumaila et al. 2007a; Swartz et al. 2012). These ex-vessel prices were only collected for coastal EU countries, as they were assumed to be the ones mainly contributing to/benefiting from publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements. 49 This dataset was preferred to Eurostat's time-series of harmonized CPI for 'Eurogroup' (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/hicp/data/database) as the latter was incomplete.Table 5. Assumptions made to fill the gaps in the CPI time-series.Country Period CommentAngola 1987–1989 Next five years' average annual growth rate applied backward aComoros 1988–1999 -Equatorial Guinea 1984 -Guinea 1983 -Guinea-Bissau 1980–1986 -São Tomé & Principe 1985–1985 -Kiribati 2003–2012 Pacific Small States Developing Islands values appliedMicronesia 2007–2012 -a Complete CPI time-series have a sigmoid behavior over the period considered. Thus we assumed that using the average growth rates would provide us with a reasonable way to estimate missing values of incomplete time-series. In the cases of Comoros and Guinea, our CPI values are therefore likely overestimated (i.e., under-estimates the effect of earlier years' inflation on the 2012 EUR), as the time-series was not yet showing any inflexion point for the available years.63Angola (r=-0.09) Cape Verde (r=0.97*) Comoros (r=0.70*) Côte d'Ivoire (r=0.71*)Eq. Guinea (r=0.98*) Gabon (r=0.35) Gambia (r=0.50) Guinea (r=0.78*)Guinea−Bissau (r=0.86*) Kiribati (r=0.39) Madagascar (r=0.85*) Mauritania (r=0.87*)Mauritius (r=0.95*) Micronesia (r=-0.77) Morocco (r=0.93*) Mozambique (r=0.87*)São Tomé and P. (r=-0.17) Senegal (r=0.08) Seychelles (r=0.68*) Solomon Is. (r=0.95*)010101011980 2010011980 2010 1980 2010 1980 2010YearNormalized subsidies per unit of capacity, in 2012 EUR/GRT (thick) or 2012 LCU/GRT (thin)Figure 46. Trend of EU subsidies by country.Country-breakdown of normalized EU subsidies in real value, seen from the EU's perspective (thick line; 2012 EUR/GRT) and that of the host countries (thin line; 2012 LCU/GRT). The Pearson correlation coefficient r between these two time-series is given for each country (* indicates p-value <0.001). For 13 out of 20 countries, there is a statistically significant, strong correlation (r>0.70) between the subsidies paid by the EU taxpayers (in 2012 EUR/GRT) and what the host countries perceive they received (in 2012 LCU/GRT). The EU has clearly decreased its subsidies to 11 of these countries (at least in the last decade), which also translated into decreasing income for the host countries. Note that the introduction of the convertible Seychelles ruppies in 2008 can explain the gap between the two time-series since then.64These ex-vessel prices, originally in nominal USD, were converted to 2012 EUR using annual USD-EUR exchange rates and Advanced Economies' CPIs (from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, respectively). They were used to estimate the ratio of 'fees paid by the industry/gross revenue generated'.505.2 Results5.2.1 EU subsidiesSome countries or individuals may not consider the fees paid by the EU to be fisheries subsidies. However, they clearly confer a benefit to the fishing industry, thus meeting the WTO definition of subsidies (WTO 1994; Sumaila et al. 2007b). These subsidies — paid by the EU taxpayers for each GRT allowed to fish in host countries' waters — declined by half between 1980 and 1985 (from around 200 EUR/GRT/year [256 USD/GRT/year] to 100 EUR/GRT/year [128 USD/GRT/year]), then further declined to approximately 50 EUR/GRT/year (64 USD/GRT/year) in the 2000s (Figure 47A). The wide ribbon around the median (which corresponds to the limits beyond which any data point would be considered as an outlier, i.e., data points below quartile1 − 1.5 × [quartile3 − quartile2], or above quartile3 + 1.5 × [quartile3 − quartile2]) illustrates the difference in the level of subsidies provided by each of the agreements. This level of subsidies ranges from 11 EUR/GRT/year for Comoros to 1,816 EUR/GRT/year for Morocco (Table 6), and is above the 100 EUR/GRT/year threshold for only four other countries (i.e., Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Angola, Mauritania; all involved in mixed agreements).Figure 46 provides a breakdown of subsidies by country, and shows that the level of EU subsidies increased clearly over the entire time-period only for EU vessels fishing in Angola (agreement stopped in 2004), Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania.51 From the host countries' perspective, the trend is fairly similar, as only Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, 50 They are provided in an online dataset at: www.plosone.org/article/fetchSingleRepresentation.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0079899.s007. This dataset also includes comments to explain specific assumptions when the general methods presented here did not apply to a specific fleet, country and/or year. Given its size, this dataset could not be included in this work as an appendix.51 Another way of normalizing the data could be to divide each value by the average of the series to which it belongs. Thus, it would be possible to visually determine to which extent a series has increased or decreased over time. On the contrary, here, it is only possible to determine in which year each series reached its maximum/minimum (which was the point).65São Tomé & Principe, and Senegal (agreement stopped in 2006) saw their financial income increase (although generally not over the last decade; Figure 46).mixed agreementstuna agreementsYearSubsidies (EUR/GRT)1980200400AYearLevel of subsidies (%)B01990 2000 2010CFP1st reform 2nd reform3rd reform1980 1990 2000 20101007505025Figure 47. Level of public subsidies in EU agreements.Trend of A) the subsidies paid by the EU taxpayers per unit of capacity (2012 EUR/GRT/year) for all agreements; and B) the level of subsidies for both mixed (dark grey) and tuna (light grey) agreements. Panel B) only includes agreements for which there were tuna quotas. In both panels, the solid lines represent the median, while the coloured areas represent the limit beyond which a point is considered to be an outlier [data points below quartile1 − 1.5 × (quartile3 − quartile2), or above quartile3 + 1.5 × (quartile3 − quartile2). The 'smooth.spline' function in R was used (Ripley and Maechler 2012), with a smoothing window 'spar' set to 0.5]. Panel A is based on 397 'country/year' data points, while panel B is based on 157 'country/year' data-points for the tuna agreements and 67 'country/year' data-points for the mixed agreements. The implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and its three reforms are indicated by black arrows (the third reform was completed in December 2013 and implemented in January 2014).Table 6. Mean level of fees received by host countries over the period of their respective agreements, as well as mean fee paid by the industry per tonne of tuna over the 2008–2012 period.Country Subsidies (2012 EUR/GRT/year) Tuna industry fee (2012 EUR/t) aMorocco 1,816 26.2Mauritania 463 33.8Angola 418 -Senegal 247 -Guinea-Bissau 159 31.2The Seychelles 86 35.0Guinea 85 29.2Solomon Islands 63 40.2Kiribati 59 58.3Mozambique 56 39.0Micronesia 52 48.4Equatorial Guinea 36 -Gambia 29 -Côte d'Ivoire 26 36.4Gabon 23 36.7Madagascar 23 36.4Cape Verde 20 36.4665.2.2 EU industry fees5.2.2.1 Tuna agreementsThe comparison of the fees paid by the fishing industry to the landed value allowed us to estimate the revenue of the industry, in the context of increasingly widespread tuna agreements. The fees paid by the industry (i.e., approximately 25% of the total value of the agreements; see section above and Figure 47B)52 consistently represented less than 2% of its gross revenue (i.e., 'ex-vessel price' multiplied by 'quota'). After an initial decrease from 2% in 1985 to around 0.8% in 1995, this percentage again increased to about 2% after the second reform of the CFP (Figure 48). The wider ribbon around the median (which corresponds to the limits beyond which any data point would be considered as an outlier) over the past decade is mainly the result of higher fees negotiated in the Pacific, especially for Kiribati and Micronesia (Table 6). 52 As an aside, note that if the total level of subsidies has declined over time (Figure 47A), and that the subsidies/industry's fee ratio remained stable (Figure 47B), this means that the total industry's fee has also declined over time.Table 6. Mean level of subsidies received by host countries over the period of their respective agreements, as well as mean fee paid by the industry per tonne of tuna over the 2008–2012 period (continued).Country Subsidies (2012 EUR/GRT/year) Tuna industry fee (2012 EUR/t) aSão Tomé & Principe 19 36.4Mauritius 17 -Comoros 11 43.8a Liners usually pay lower fees than purse-seiners. Although purse-seiners catches are higher than that of liners, both gear types were given the same weight here.1980 1990 2000 20101st reform2nd reform3rd reform5432YearIndustry fee/landed value (%)01Figure 48. Cost of tuna agreements for the industry.Ratio of fees paid by the industry relative to landed value for the tuna component of all agreements. This figure only includes agreements for which there were tuna quotas. The solid line represents the median, while the grey area represents the limit beyond which a point is considered to be an outlier [data points below quartile1 − 1.5 × (quartile3 − quartile2), or above quartile3 + 1.5 × (quartile3 − quartile2). The 'smooth.spline' function in R was used [82], with a smoothing window'spar' set to 0.5]. Note that for 2012, we considered the ex-vessel price of tuna to be 2,000 EUR/t, based on historical trends and various sources of information. This graph is based on 218 'country/year' data points. Also note that liners usually pay lower fees, target species/individuals with higher ex-vessel prices, and also have lower catches than purse-seiners; however, both gear types were given the same weight here (the difference between weighted and non-weighted results was minimal). The three reforms of the CFP are indicated by black arrows (the third reform was completed in December 2013 and implemented in January 2014).675.2.2.2 Mixed agreementsFor the demersal component of mixed agreements, it was not possible to globally estimate the historic industry's fee/gross revenue ratio as computed for the tuna agreements ('EU tuna industry fees' section). Indeed, fees were provided in EUR/GRT/year and ex-vessel prices in EUR/t, while quotas were unavailable for virtually all countries and agreements. However, a detailed analysis of the country with the largest remaining mixed agreement, Mauritania, provides some insights (Table 7).53 Over the 2008–10 period, Mauritania received 80–95 million EUR/year of EU subsidies, which resulted in the export of 130–160,000 GRT/year in Mauritanian waters and total landings of 260–330,000 t/year (mainly small pelagics, but also octopus, shrimp, and black hake; [Anon. 2011c, 2013l]). On average, European taxpayers therefore paid 290 EUR/t of landed seafood. On the other hand, the industry paid between 9 EUR/t and 507 EUR/t of landed seafood, for small pelagics and crustaceans other than lobsters and crabs, respectively.54 The value of these catches were estimated ('declared catch' multiplied by 'ex-vessel price' = gross revenue), as well as  the ratio 53 These results will therefore be seen as conservative, as the declared catch corresponds to the actual catch in the best-case scenario. However, there is often an unreported or mis-reported component, therefore understating the benefits received by the fishing sector (e.g., Kaczynski 1989; Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002).54 For certain categories, the industry fee has been considered too high compared to the gross revenue (not for the small pelagics component) for some time (Anon. 2005a). In the newest agreement (EU 2012g), fees have steeply increased, and the EU industry expressed disquiet about this change, claiming this agreement was not worthwhile anymore (Benlahrech 2013; Gorez 2013).Table 7. Baseline data and estimate of the 'total fee/gross revenue' ratio for the mixed agreement with Mauritania over the 2008–2010 period.Name of fishing category Ex-vessel price (2012 EUR/t)Declared catch (t/year)Total fee (2012 EUR) aTotal fee/gross revenue (%)Official In this paperCrustaceans except lobsters and crabsOther crustaceans12,814 3,358 1,601,850 4.0Black hake Black hake 4,041 3,974 290,924 1.8Non-trawlers demersal vessels fishing species other than black hakeDemersal vessels5,183 1,841 192,310 2.0Cephalopods Demersal vessels5,183 10,326 3,486,526 7.5Pelagic vessels (freezer) Pelagic vessels 803 272,440 5,314,779 2.4Crabs Other crustaceans6,562 134 33,694 3.9Pelagic vessels (wet) Pelagic vessels 803 4,384 88,612 1.1a 'Total fee' was calculated by multiplying the fee per unit of fishing capacity (in 2012 EUR/GT) by the amount of capacity (GT) reported to have been used in each fishing category (Anon. 2011c).68of 'fees paid by the industry/gross revenue'. The industry has paid fees representing around 3.2% of their gross revenue in 2008–10 (Table 7), which is almost twice as high as for tuna, but still rather low compared to the gross revenue.5.3 DiscussionOverall, the subsidies spent by taxpayers to grant the EU fishing industry the access to waters of host countries represented approximately 75% of the total value of the agreements for which such a ratio could be estimated (i.e., only agreements with quotas for their tuna component; Figure 47B). It can be argued, thus, that these subsidies allowed the maintenance of high fishing capacity by the EU in foreign waters. The high fishing effort that these subsidies generate is likely to have had detrimental effects on both the fish resources and fisheries development of host countries (Gascuel et al. 2005, 2007a; Sumaila and Pauly 2007; Sumaila et al. 2010; Gagern and van den Bergh 2013). Also, this high level of subsidization essentially means that the European consumer pays for the fish twice: once when it is caught, and again when it is bought.55The estimates of the fees paid by the industry relative to the fees paid by the European taxpayers (i.e., ~25%) and the value of the industry fees relative to gross revenue (i.e., ~2%) should be considered as conservative. First, the industry commonly does not buy all annual fishing rights agreed upon in the agreements (see most assessments of the publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements, e.g., Anon. 2004a-b, 2005b, d, 2006a, d, 2013k, m-n, 2014d), while the EU usually still pays 100% of the EEZ access fees and development aid (European Court of Auditors 2001; Anon. 2011b). Therefore, it can be assumed that the industry commonly pays less than 25% of the total cost of these agreements. Second, there is increasingly widespread commercial use of bycatch and non-targeted species, such as sharks (exclusively targeted for their fins; Anon. 2006a,d, 2007b, 2010b, 2011b, d, 2014d; Standing and Gorez 2012; Le Manach et al. 2013c), which are generally not included in the industry's fee. 55 It could be argued that these agreements provide European consumers with cheaper fish. However, this is likely not the case, since European markets are supplied not only by the fleets fishing under such agreements (By 2030, it is expected that only 20% of the net supply of tropical tuna in the EU will come from the EU fleets — fishing under publicly-funded agreements or not; Failler 2007), and prices of seafood are, to a large extent, globally harmonized in this market. Furthermore, it seems that the EU tuna industry is highly integrated (such as the Saupiquet fleet), with fleets belonging to processors/distributors selling tuna to EU-owned processing factories at higher prices (Guillotreau et al. 2007; Jiménez-Toribio et al. 2010). However, some authors note that this vertical integration is currently eroding, as the fleet is shifting towards specialized boat-owning consortiums (Hamilton et al. 2011; Campling 2012).69Therefore, the industry likely pays less than 2% of the overall landed value.56 Also, current agreements only refer to the major targeted species. Thus, these committees and organizations do not focus on associated species or catches that are either discarded, or increasingly targeted when valuable. In some cases, bycatch species may even constitute an important or major part of total landings, often including over-exploited or threatened resources. This is the case for many Mauritanian demersal fish stocks exploited as bycatch by Spanish shrimp trawlers, but not considered in the agreements and not accounted for in the financial compensation (Gascuel et al. 2007b; EC 2008e; Labrosse et al. 2010; Anon. 2011c; Meissa and Gascuel 2014). Based on recently collected evidence (e.g., records of Mozambican catches landed in South Africa [http://transparentsea.co/images/8/8a/Durban_landings.pdf] and European Commission data for Madagascar and Mozambique [http://transparentsea.co/images/d/dc/DG-MARE_sharks_lettre.pdf]), it appears that such free 'side activities' have become very important for some operators in the Indian Ocean, where Spanish longliners mostly target sharks (e.g., Standing 2009; Anon. 2013o; Le Manach et al. 2013c). This targeted bycatch therefore represents an important part of the industry's gross revenue and should be accounted for during the negotiation of financial compensation.Although there are operating costs that the industry must cover (e.g., wages, fuel, taxes),57 it is expected that the net benefit accrued to the industry represents a sizable part of the gross revenue, hence there is likely some room to raise the industry fishing fees. To assess what would be a 'fair fee' is a political decision requiring better understanding of the profits (i.e., what is left from the turnover once all costs are deducted) made by fishing firms operating under these access agreements. Interestingly, though, a senior representative of the French tuna fleet recently publicly acknowledged that the fee paid by the industry is low and that it would be reasonable 56 The industry may argue here that they often pay licenses for fishing rights they do not use (see, e.g., Anon. 2006b-c, 2007b, 2009a, 2010e-f), but the overall impact on the global fee is likely low. Furthermore, as noted above, there is also often an unreported or mis-reported component that understates the benefit of the industry (e.g., in the mid-2000s for the agreement with the Seychelles; Anon. 2010g), as well as retained bycatch for which no fees are levied (Anon. 2007b). The industry usually buys licenses for the entire region in order to be able to follow the often unpredictable migration pattern of tuna (Anon. 2013b, 2014b).57 On that note, agreements usually require EU vessels to pay taxes (e.g., linked to port activities in cases of landings or transshipments), but they are negligible (Anon. 2006d).70to set it at up to 7% of the gross revenue (Fabrègues 2013; Goujon 2013).58  As an alternative to a flat fee per tonne of target species, the industry seems to be open to a fee indexed to the price of that species (Fabrègues 2013; see the example of the Pacific Ocean, Squires et al. 2006). However, other parameters should be accounted for (e.g., the price of oil) to ensure that the fee agreed upon is fair for both the industry and the host country. Ultimately, the author feels that a 'fair fee' should be indexed to the actual profit of the industry and updated annually, and could be close to the usual interest rates (i.e., around 3%), plus a risk bonus (i.e., it is riskier to be at sea than to put money in a bank account). However, because account books are kept private, it is currently extremely difficult to estimate the industry's profit, thus indirect methods via global fishing cost (Lam et al. 2011) and ex-vessel price databases (Sumaila et al. 2007a; Swartz et al. 2012) are required, as done here.Another thing — and not the least — that must be considered to estimate what should be a 'fair fee', is whether or not a given agreement does have a positive (or negative) impact on the host country's economy, and to what extent. Answering this question requires additional studies (and is not the purpose of this work), but if the answer were to be negative, then a 'fair fee' should account for these negative impacts. For example, if the foreign fleets resulted in lower catches (at least per unit of effort) for the domestic fleets (see Section 4), then, the fee paid by the foreign fleets should compensate for those losses, rather than just account for the fish that they caught.Overall, while one can argue that the amount host countries receive is not always negligible, publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements have clearly benefited the fishing industry more than the host countries. This discrepancy raises concerns of equitability and contradicts stated EU development goals, which suggests benefits from these agreements should be shared between both parties, not mainly directed towards private EU interests (European Commission 2009). The current situation is a result of the 'value for money' requirement by the Court of Auditors (European Court of Auditors 2001), and therefore publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements 58 In approaching this issue, host countries in West Africa and the Indian Ocean could learn from the South Pacific Tuna Treaty (FFA 1987, 1994), in which host countries are organized into a cartel-like organization (Petersen 2006; World Bank 2014a), giving them more leverage to negotiate higher fishing fees from the United States' industry. Such a cartel is legal according to the United Nations Fish Stock Agreement (United Nations 1995; Allen et al. 2010), and can be viewed as similar to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). It is worth noting that Indian Ocean countries engaged in the current discussion about future regional allocation of quotas are heading towards adopting such a system (Noye and Mfodwo 2012; IOTC 2013a).71are business agreements above anything else. Harmonizing regulations among the various Directorate Generals (such as 'Trade' or 'Development', perceived more as creating 'developmental agreements'; Acheampong 1997; Ponte et al. 2007) would allow the creation of strengthened partnership (Gorez 2009), which could in turn help to ensure that host countries are less inclined to replace publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements with more opaque private business agreements or agreements with countries that are less transparent or accountable in their agreements and negotiations (such as China or USSR/Russia; Stilwell et al. 2010; Standing 2011a-b; Pauly et al. 2013).59 Examples of this behaviour can be found, for example, in Mauritania (Anon. 2010a; Cherif 2011) and Senegal (Anon. 2009b).5.4 ConclusionOver the past few years, the EU has reiterated its wish to fish more sustainably and equitably in foreign waters (European Commission 2009), but also to expand its network of tuna agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) countries. As seen in this chapter, however, there is still room for consequent improvements with regards to the financial aspect of the publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements. From the 2012–14 reform of its Common Fisheries Policy (CFP; which was validated by the European Parliament on December 10th 2013 and will be active for the forthcoming decade) it seems that the EU is considering the same options as the ones presented in this chapter, i.e., reducing its contribution in terms of subsidies, and increasing the fee owed by the industry. However, further studies are needed to determine what would be a 'fair fee', for both the host countries and the EU industry.59 Although ignored in this context, joint ventures can, however, be perceived by host countries as more beneficial than foreign fishing access agreements, because they generate more domestic value, for example, through the construction of domestic processing plants and the creation of associated jobs (Niasse and Seck 2011). It could be argued whether or not it would be in the interest of the EU to directly subsidize the development of a domestic fleet or joint ventures, which will in turn negatively impact the fishing opportunities offered to the EU distant fleet. Angola, Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, São Tomé & Principe, and Senegal are some of the many countries that have offered joint venture possibilities to re-flagged or decommissioned European vessels (Anon. 2000a, 2004b, 2005b, e, 2013b; Ilnyckyj 2007; Niasse and Seck 2011). The EU has subsidized such joint-ventures in order to reduce domestic fishing capacity (Le Bail 1994; Anon. 2000a). The most well-known example is the agreement for the joint-exploitation of 130,000 tonnes of Macruronus magellanicus (Patagonian grenadier), Illex argentines (Argentinian shortfin squid), Salilota australis (Patagonian rockcod), and Macrourus whitsoni (roughhead grenadier), signed in 1993 with Argentina (EEC 1993h; EC 1993a-b).72Regarding the other non-financial aspects of publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements, sizable improvements are thought to have already been achieved since the first agreements, for example, through the introduction of provisions related to monitoring, domestic processing, and employment of domestic crew. Most of these improvements occurred with the shift from 'Fishing Agreements' to 'Fisheries Partnership Agreements' in 2004 (Walmsley et al. 2007; Gorez 2009; Stilwell et al. 2010), and were largely inspired by the 1995 FAO code of conduct for responsible fisheries (FAO 1995; Hosch 2009). Section 6 consists of a detailed analysis of these provisions.736 Social and environmental consequences of publicly-funded EU fishing access agreementsIt is often assumed that the social and environmental provisions of the publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements have improved over time, notably due to the transition from 'Fishing Agreements' (until 2004, after the second reform of the Common Fisheries Policy; CFP) to 'Fisheries Partnership Agreements' (Walmsley et al. 2007; Gorez 2009; Stilwell et al. 2010). The gradual introduction of these provisions aimed at reversing the socio-ecological dumping of the first generation of agreements (described as 'pay-fish-and-go' agreements; Failler et al. 2005). The third reform of the CFP, which has been formally adopted in 2013 and is entering into force in 2014, led to a new name: 'Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements'. The aim of this change in nomenclature is clearly to suggest that the goal of these agreements is to promote sustainable partnerships and not just business agreements. However, very little is known about the non-financial side of the agreements (see Section 5 for discussion of the financial side), which encompasses numerous provisions relating to both social and environmental regulations and requirements. In this chapter, an analysis of all agreements since 1980 was performed in a similar fashion to the analysis in Section 5 (see Table 3 for references), with an emphasis on the non-financial provisions and with the goal of determining whether they have improved over time. For the purpose of this analysis, it was assumed that all provisions were fully implemented. This improvement (or lack thereof) was measured using a scoring system, which allowed the quantification of how the benefit to each host country has evolved over time. However, since this analysis was based on the provisions 'on paper', an further analysis of their implementation 'in reality' was necessary in order to relax the strong assumption of full implementation. Such analyses are necessary to understand the magnitude of the benefits provided by fishing access agreements. In turn, they can help address some of the weaknesses before these agreements can earn the 'sustainable' label.6.1 Material and methodsA set of 12 provisions (simple or composite variables) was extracted from the official texts related to publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements (namely, 'Council 74Regulations/Decisions', 'Agreements' and 'Protocols'; retrieved from the EU law database at http://eur-lex.europa.eu). These 12 provisions compose the backbone of the current set of agreements and, as such, were used here as benchmark to score the agreements since their inception.Table 8 lists the 12 provisions (and their various sub-provisions) that are studied in this chapter (see Appendix 1 for details):Table 8. Provisions and sub-provisions of fishing access agreements between the EU and host countries.Provision Sub-provisionBycatch Allowed proportion of bycatchAllowed proportion of discardsEx-vessel priceForbidden speciesLanding requirementsCrew Number of crew-members from Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Group of States (ACP)Number of trainees employed in addition to the ACP crew-membersOrigin of the crewPenalties in case no ACP crew-members were employedEnvironment Programs such as waste reduction and promotion of responsible practices.Inspection Inspections at portInspections at seaLanding Ex-vessel priceFinancial incentivesNotification time-frameQuantitySupervision of landingMonitoring Information to be transmitted when enteringInformation to be transmitted when leavingInformation to transmit on a regular basisNotification time-frame when enteringNotification time-frame when leavingOthersSatellite trackingObservation Fee borne by the EU industryNumber of observersReporting Data input frequencyTransmission time-frameType of informationRestrictions Fish size limitsTechnical limits (e.g., mesh size, prohibition of cod-end doubling)Temporal restrictionsServices Requirements about procurement of services (e.g., fuel and water) at domestic infrastructure75The content of each provision was extracted for each specific fishery included in a given agreement. As a result, numerous entries were created for each agreement (as shown in Figure 49), which resulted in the creation of 470,028 entries covering the 1980–2013 period (i.e., 39,169 entries per provision).Given that the majority of the 12 provisions were qualitative (or, at least, included a qualitative sub-provision), they were quantified using a scoring system. For each sub-provision, a list of unique names was created, and a score was assigned to each entry. A score of zero was assigned when there were no specifications, and +1 was assigned to the specification that was considered to come next in order of increasing benefit to the host country. For example, the lack of requirements regarding the information to be transmitted when entering a given EEZ (i.e., 'Reporting' provision; 'Information included' sub-provision) was automatically assigned a score of zero. The specification that was deemed to come next in order of increasing benefit to the host country was 'notify intention of entering the EEZ', and then 'notify position and time when entering the EEZ'. Therefore, scores of one and two were assigned to these specifications, respectively (see Appendix 1 for rankings of the various provisions). Figure 49. Conceptual diagram of the database for evaluating  change in social and environmental provisions of EU fishing access agreements since 1980.The content of the 12 provisions was extracted for each combination of country, month, target species, type of vessel (or gear), size of vessel, and region. Not all agreements had so many possibilities, but those that did usually had provisions that were all different. As a result, the database contained over 470,000 entries for the 1980–2013 period.Country X Month 1Month 2Month nRegion 1Region 2Region n...Target species 1Target species 2Target species n...Type of vessel 1Type of vessel 2Type of vessel n...Size of vessel 1Size of vessel 2Size of vessel n... ...Table 8. Provisions and sub-provisions of fishing access agreements between the EU and host countries (continued).Provision Sub-provisionTransshipment Data reportingFinancial incentivesInformation to be transmittedNotification time-frameNumber of transshipments (or tonnage)OthersSupervision of transshipmentZone Distance to the coastRestricted areas (e.g., buffer zones around domestic anchored fishing aggregating devices)76In order to give the same weight to each sub-provision and then to each provision as a whole (to remain as parsimonious as possible), scores were normalized for each sub-provision (the sum of which was normalized again). In doing this, each of the 12 provisions eventually varied between zero (no requirements) and one (level deemed to be the most beneficial to the host country). Therefore, these scores are not to be viewed as benchmarks to assess perfection, but rather as a way to compare the agreements with regard to one another (i.e., a score of 1 does not mean that a given sub-provision/provision/agreement is flawless, but rather that it is the best that currently exists). For each provision, the specifications for any given year, target species, and categories of vessels were then matched to the list of unique names and associated scores.Scores were plotted in various ways, and trends were highlighted for different areas or target species (qualitative parameters) using the 'GAM' methods of the ggplot2 and mgcv packages in R (Wickham 2009; Wood 2011). In select cases, ANOVA were performed to analyze the variance in scores among these qualitative parameters. If so, pairwise comparisons between the different levels of the qualitative parameters were also calculated to determine whether any potential differences were statistically-significant. These ANOVA and pairwise comparisons were performed in R, using the aov and pairwise.t.test functions of the stats package (R Core Team 2013).6.2 Results and discussion6.2.1 Performance by target speciesWhen all provisions were taken into account, large pelagics carried the weakest provisions with a median score of 0.24. The median score for demersal species was significantly higher (0.33, p-value < 2e-16), but still lower than the score of the small pelagics component of the agreements (0.42, p-value < 2e-16; Figure 50). The large pelagics components of the agreements have always significantly lagged behind over the successive reforms (although they have more than doubled, from 0.15 to 0.34; Figure 51). After the second reform of the CFP, the components focusing on demersal species caught up with the ones focusing on small pelagics (median of 0.48 and 0.49, respectively; p-value = 0.16; Figure 51C). Therefore, it might seem 77rather worrisome that the EU is currently expanding its network of agreements targeting tuna (the weakest), while phasing out the ones focusing on small pelagics and demersal species (the strongest). Although the score of the tuna component has increased over time, one might wonder why they are still weaker. One possible explanation is that these agreements are targeting migratory species in the open ocean; provisions such as 'Restrictions' may thus be less applicable (e.g., little concerns regarding habitat destruction). 0.00.20.40.6Average scoreLarge pel. Demersal sp. Small pel.A B CLarge pel. Demersal sp. Small pel. Large pel. Demersal sp. Small pel.Figure 51. Evolution of the scores by target species for each version of the CFP, 1980–2013.A), B), and C) show the distribution of the scores by target species, during the first (1983–1992), second (1993–2002), and third (2003–2013) versions of the CFP, respectively. For each target species and version of the CFP, the boxplot includes the average monthly scores of all provisions (nA = 295; nB = 353; nC = 389). The ANOVA and pairwise comparisons were performed in R, using the aov and pairwise.t.test functions (R Core Team 2013).0.20.40.6Average scoreLarge pelagics Demersal species Small pelagicsFigure 50. Overall score by target species, 1980–2013.For each target species, the boxplot includes the average monthly scores of all provisions (n = 1,109). The ANOVA and pairwise comparisons were performed in R, using the aov and pairwise.t.test functions (R Core Team 2013).786.2.2 Performance by region and countrySimilarly to the analysis done above on the performance by target species, average scores were plotted for each region and country. Pacific Islands yielded the highest score. Their median score was 0.44, versus 0.29 for East Africa (p-value < 2e-16), and 0.27 for West Africa (Figure 52). Until the first reform of the CFP (in 1993), West Africa had the lowest scores with a median score of 0.18, which was significantly lower than the score of East Africa (0.24, p-value < 2e-16; Figure 53A). However, after the first and second reforms of the CFP, the scores of these two regions became very close (0.26 and 0.27 for East and West Africa, respectively; p-value < 0.001; Figure 53B); after the second reform, the difference was no longer significant (p-value = 0.27). 0.00.20.40.6Average scoreWest Africa East Africa West Africa East Africa West Africa East Africa Pacific IslandsA B CFigure 53. Evolution of the scores by region for each version of the CFP, 1980–2013.A), B), and C) show the distribution of the scores by region, during the first (1983–1992), second (1993–2002), and third (2003–2013) versions of the CFP, respectively. For each region and version of the CFP, the boxplot includes the average monthly scores of all provisions (nA = 1,121; nB = 1,639; nC = 1,751).The ANOVA and pairwise comparisons were performed in R, using the aov and pairwise.t.test functions (R Core Team 2013).0.00.20.40.6Average scoreWest Africa East Africa Pacific IslandsFigure 52. Overall score by region, 1980–2013.For each region, the boxplot includes the average monthly scores of all provisions (n = 4,577). The ANOVA and pairwise comparisons were performed in R, using the aov and pairwise.t.test functions (R Core Team 2013).79On the other hand, the difference with Pacific Islands was significant (p-value < 2e-16), with a score of 0.44, i.e., 26% higher than the other two regions. Given that Pacific countries are often considered to be 'doing better' (cartel-like organization), this result was expected.Among these regions, the disparity was also high, as Morocco and Mauritania scored substantially higher than any other West African country. On the other hand, Mauritius and Comoros scored substantially lower than any other East African country (Figure 54).6.2.3 Average scores...Overall, the average annual score steadily increased over time from around 0.15 in the early 1980s to a median of over 0.35 after the second reform of the CFP (Figure 55). The median scores of each version of the CFP were significantly different from each other (p-values < 2e-16, except between the pre-CFP period and the first version of the CFP [p-value = 7e-06]). While it seems that the implementation of the CFP has impacted the average annual score (i.e., strong increase around 1984), it does not appear that its two reforms have played a major role (i.e., continuous increase). This increase is 0.00.20.40.61980 1990 2000 2010YearAverage score3rd CFP2nd CFP1st CFPFigure 55. Evolution of overall scores, 1980–2013.Each data point (light grey circles underlying the boxplots) corresponds to the monthly average score of a given country (all provisions included; n = 4,577). The black line and grey ribbon on top of the boxplots correspond to the generalized additive model fitted by the stat_smooth function of ggplot2 and mgcv packages in R (Wickham 2009; Wood 2011). The ANOVA and pairwise comparisons were performed in R, using the aov and pairwise.t.test functions (R Core Team 2013).0.00.20.40.6Average scoreEq. GuineaGambiaMauritiusSenegalComorosCote d’IvoireGabonCape VerdeGuineaSao Tome & P.Guinea-BissauMadagascarAngolaMozambiqueSeychellesSolomon Is.MoroccoKiribatiMauritaniaMicronesiaWest AfricaEast AfricaPacific IslandsFigure 54. Overall score by country, 1980–2013.Boxplots include average monthly scores of all provisions (n = 4,577). The ANOVA and pairwise comparisons were performed in R, using the aov and pairwise.t.test functions (R Core Team 2013).80positive, as it indicates that agreements have improved over time. However, a closer look at each provision independently shows something very different.6.2.4 ...can hide bad things'Observation', the provision that is probably the most important of all, appears to have decreased over time (Figure 56A). This provision relates to whether observers were taken onboard or not. This trend is also worrisome because, despite the overall increase in the aggregated score (Figure 55), it seems that there is no safeguard to ensure that provisions are actually enforced (but see Section 6.3 for discussion on the 'reality' of the enforcement). This is especially true for the provisions related to surveillance and monitoring. More worrisome is the fact that when this overall score is disaggregated by target species (Figure 56B), it appears that the fluctuations in Figure 56A mostly result from the demersal and small pelagic species agreements. The agreements targeting large pelagics display a trend that has declined in the early 1980s, and that has since then remained stable. As highlighted above, agreements targeting large pelagics now constitute the vast majority of European agreements, and the fact that the score 1980 1990 2000 2010Year0.00.51.01980 1990 2000 2010YearAverage scoreA BLarge pelagicsOther speciesFigure 56. Evolution of the score of the 'Observer' provision, 1980–2013.A) shows the generalized additive model fitted (stat_smooth function of ggplot2 and mgcv packages in R; Wickham 2009; Wood 2011) to the monthly 'Observation' scores (n = 39,169), and B) shows the same model disaggregated by target species. In B), the dotted lines correspond to agreements targeting small pelagics, demersal species, and undetermined species, while the black line corresponds to the agreements targeting large pelagics (with the confidence interval in grey).81of the 'Observation' provision has not improved over the past 30 years is rather counter-intuitive. One can wonder why large pelagics agreements score so low for that provision, and one explanation often given by the industry is that EU vessels cannot accommodate everyone by taking national observers onboard, since they follow migratory species and often only spend a few days in each EEZ. Furthermore, host countries usually do not have sufficient funds to cover expenses incurred by the observers (see Section 6.3).Therefore, although the scores for the different provisions can be considered in an additive way, the score for the 'Observation' provision must be used in a multiplicative way. By doing so, overall scores would get penalized or even nullified if the coverage by observers was poor or absent. Figure 57 shows the comparison between the results of Section 6.2.3 (Figure 55), and the results obtained when 'Observation' was used in a multiplicative way. The agreements have lower scores, and they have increased in a less important manner over time.6.3 The agreements 'in reality'According to the information provided above, it seems that many non-financial provisions have improved over time, although there are strong discrepancies depending on the region/country and the target species. Also, the most critical provision — 'Observation' — has eroded. While this demonstrates the situation 'on paper', this work would be incomplete without a brief examination of what is known of the situation 'in reality'. The assessments of the publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements commissioned by 0.40.61990 2000 2010Year3rd CFP2nd CFP1st CFP0.00.21980Average score (Figure 53)Figure 57. Evolution of the overall scores once multiplied by the 'Observation' score, 1980–2013.Each data point (on which the boxplots are based; light grey circles in the background) corresponds to the monthly average score of a given country with all provisions included except 'Observation'. These averages were then multiplied by the score of the latter provision (n = 4,577). The black line and grey ribbon on top of the boxplots correspond to the generalized additive model fitted by the stat_smooth function of ggplot2 and mgcv packages in R (Wickham 2009; Wood 2011). The ANOVA and pairwise comparisons were performed in R, using the aov and pairwise.t.test functions (R Core Team 2013). The dash line corresponds to the model shown in Figure 55 (for comparison). 82the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the European Commission (DG MARE) were used as a proxy. These assessments are a detailed snapshot of the recent enforcement in the field of the different provisions contained in the agreements and, as such, can be used to ponder the results shown above.606.3.1 Monitoring, control and surveillanceDue to the large EEZs of the host countries, and the inherent lack of technical and human means to enforce rules within these waters, monitoring, control, and surveillance of EU fleets (and, in general, foreign and domestic fishing fleets) has usually been considered to be poor (Anon. 2004a-b, 2005a, d, 2006a-d, 2007b, 2010b, 2012a-b, 2013m). In São Tomé & Principe as well as Guinea-Bissau, it was still recently reported that, "implementation capacity in terms of […] fisheries management, monitoring control and surveillance […] are weak to the point of irrelevance" (Anon. 2004b, 2005b). However, in recent years, there have also been drastic improvements in some countries such as Mozambique, Senegal, and the Seychelles. Notably, there has been an increase in human and technical means dedicated to enforcing rules (Anon. 2005d, 2006d, 2010e, g, 2011b-c, 2014d). Starting with the 'Observation' provision, it appears that observer programmes were generally poorly implemented, or not implemented at all; largely because costs associated with getting observers onboard (borne by host countries) are too high.61 Another reason that was often put forward, especially by the tuna fleet, was that vessels only stayed in specific EEZs for short durations and could not accommodate all host countries with regard to their requirements (Anon. 2004a-b, 2005b, d, 2006c-d, 2007b, 2010b, e, g, 2011b, d, 2012a, 2013k, m, 2014d, f, g). In the Indian Ocean, this lack of observers has been increasingly attributed to a third factor: the need of armed guards onboard for protection against piracy, and consequent lack of room for 60 Similar comparisons exist, for example between the effectiveness of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) on paper versus in reality (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly 2010).61 Namibia is an example of successful monitoring partially funded by the industry (Bergh and Davies 2004; Nichols 2004).83observers (Anon. 2013p).62 Regarding former agreements, some concerns were also raised about 'seamen-observers', who seem to have completed their tasks far from optimally, as they were requested to get their reports signed by the captain (i.e., the employer of their 'seamen side') in order to get paid (Anon. 2005b, d).63 However, these specific cases, which only concerned Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania, Senegal, and the Seychelles, disappeared in 2006. On a more positive note, foreign purse-seiners in the Pacific Ocean are now required to be 100% covered by observers (PNA 2008); a measure which seems to have been properly implemented (Anon. 2012b-c).A major innovation in terms of illegal fishing deterrence was the introduction of vessel monitoring by satellite (VMS) onboard foreign vessels in the early 2000s. As such, publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements have gradually included such VMS systems since 2002 (EC 2002q). However, these systems are still not widely implemented to date. This delay is likely due to a lack of infrastructure on land to collect and process satellite data, or incompatibilities between the various VMS systems used by either the EU fleets or host countries (Anon. 2005b, 2006b, 2010b, e, 2012a-b, 2013m).Host countries have also often considered the reporting of catch by EU vessels doubtful,64 and logbooks were sometimes not even transmitted (Anon. 2004a-b, 2005a-b, d, 2006b, 2007b, 2010b-c, e, 2014g). The recent implementation of electronic logbooks should simplify the procedure and limit fraud. However, it was reported that there were some compatibility issues with regards to the software used, e.g., in Cape Verde (Anon. 2013k). Notification regarding the entry and exit of the EEZs is also a provision that seems to lead to reporting issues, as several infractions have occurred over the past decade (Anon. 2006b-c, 2010b, e).Finally, another issue associated with monitoring, control, and surveillance, was the respect of the authorized fishing zones. While restricted areas inside the EEZs seem 62 See the very specific provision in the most recent 'Protocol' to the 'Agreement' with the Seychelles (EU 2014f): "Provisions for observers are as follows, except in case of space limitations due to security requirements". Also somewhat worrisome, the industry is currently developing its own observer programme ('OCUP') in the Indian Ocean, which might prove to be a good example of the 'capture' by the industry of the tools supposed to control and monitor their behaviour (Martimort 1999; Pauly 2011).63 Also, it has been reported that observers sometimes worked as seamen to complement their wages, introducing an obvious bias in their role as observers (Anon. 2005b).64 Under-reporting by EU fleets was demonstrated in some cases (e.g., Seychelles and Mozambique; Anon. 2010g, 2011b).84to have been respected,65 EEZ boundaries have often not been well delimited or were in contradiction with those delimited in the agreements (see, e.g., the examples of Madagascar and Mozambique, which both have conflicting delimitations with the French Îles Éparses; Anon. 2011b, 2014f). This ambiguity has regularly caused some reporting issues (double reporting, or no reporting at all) and statistical processing issues (Anon. 2011b, 2012a, 2013k, m, 2014b, g).The poor monitoring, control, and surveillance capacities of developing coastal countries undermines the fight against illegal fishing that has been occurring for decades, and the lack of harmonized rules and regional capacity largely results in a displacement of the problem rather than in a solution (e.g., re-flagging to a even less strict country, exploration of new fishing grounds, development of a new technology; Erceg 2006; Österblom et al. 2010). While illegal activities might result in increasing short term catch and benefit directed towards the EU, it certainly will not benefit the EU in the long run. Over-fished stocks, but also more wary developing countries (due to forgone revenues and lack of trust) will become more prevalent. One way to fight more efficiently against illegal fishing would be to reinforce port inspections (Erceg 2006). However, although they have become an increasing component of the 'Inspection' provision, they have generally been poorly implemented (e.g., in Mauritania; Anon. 2005a). Importantly, observers also do not currently act as inspectors; they cannot prosecute the captain if they witness an illegal activity.666.3.2 Sectoral and social development, and food securityIn many instances, the requirements regarding local crew employment were not met due to lack of qualification, low attractiveness of the job,67 limited visits in local ports, and short trips inside the EEZ in question (Anon. 2004a, 2006c-d, 2007b, 2009a, 2010g, 2011a-b, 2012c, 2013m-n, p, 2014d). This limited the benefit to the host countries, as employment opportunities remained low. In turn, there was sometimes 65 Although some infractions may have occurred and remain unnoticed due to the poor monitoring and enforcement capacities of most countries.66 See, e.g., Porter (2010) for a discussion on the North Pacific Groundfish Observer Program of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council. These highly educated, trained, and experienced observers gather data that can lead to prosecution.67 Not all opportunities are taken to maximize local added value, e.g., in the Seychelles, where fishing wages are lower than that of the tourism industry, and therefore less attractive (Martín 2011).85a financial compensation when these requirements were not met (Anon. 2013m-n), but not always (Anon. 2006c, 2014d). Fortunately, however, these requirements were fully met or even exceeded in select few cases (Anon. 2004b, 2006d, 2010b-c, e, 2011c-d, 2012a, 2014g).Landings of target or bycatch species also did not meet requirements (where they existed) in many cases, due to limited or even non-existent port infrastructure (Anon. 2004b, 2005a-b, d, 2006b-c,2007b, 2009a, 2010b-c, e, 2011c, 2012b-c, 2013k, m, 2014d, g). Therefore, the contribution to local value added through processing was only limited to a few cases. This was essentially the case of the Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Côte d'Ivoire, where the canneries are located (Anon. 2004a, 2005d, 2006d, 2010g, 2011a, d, 2012a, 2013n, 2014f).68 Such required landings were thought to contribute to food security in even rarer cases due to the landing of 'faux poissons' (i.e., bycatch; Anon. 2005d; Anon. 2012a).69 Only low-value fish were generally landed if there were no local processing factories, e.g., in Guinea-Bissau (Failler et al. 2005). According to some authors, this could be explained by the higher prices fetched on European markets from species of commercial interest, as well as by the vertical integration of the processing in the European industry, which accounts for most of the value added at the end of the value chain (Failler et al. 2005). It is noteworthy that these landings were oftentimes not supervised, due to the lack of human resources (Anon. 2004a), and landing reports were not always transmitted (Anon. 2005a). Finally, fines appear to have been rarely paid when these requirements were not met (Anon. 2005b). This was the case in Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, where the EU industry has been shown to have repetitively preferred to pay fines — which can be considered as the price of an offense (Becker 1968) — rather than alter its route to land catches in local ports (Anon. 2005b, d). This is yet another indication that the fines are not stiff enough to serve as a deterrent (Sumaila et al. 2006).68 These local processing factories often belong to EU interests (Kent 1997), but were moved from France or Spain to coastal developing countries due to attractive labour costs and fiscal advantages (Guillotreau et al. 2007). This may result in limited benefits to host countries, past the positive impact of job creation (Caillart and Henry 2008; Chabrol 2014).69 As an aside, note that bycatch limits were often not enforced (Anon. 2005b, 2007b). When they are enforced, they may have resulted in high discard rates due to inappropriate rules (Anon. 2005a), which was not a positive outcome either. 'Retain-all' policies such as that adopted by WCPFC (2009) and IOTC (2010a, 2013b), and introduced in the new version of the CFP, are expected to result in higher landings of low-value fish, that can in turn supply local markets and improve food security (although there are costs associated with such policies and sanitary risks; see, e.g., Chan et al. 2014; Gorez 2014).86Last but not least, the allocation of EU funds (i.e., the 'subsidies' component in Section 5) remained opaque or inappropriate in most cases due to low accounting on the host countries side, making it more difficult to justify the spending of public money from an European perspective (Anon. 2004b, 2006a-b, 2009a, 2013k, m, p, 2014g). While some of these funds were thought to have been used to fill gaps in general budgets (Vallée et al. 2009), or finance political parties (Cormier-Salem and Dahou 2009), a fraction of  the earmarked funds appears to have been used as intended (Anon. 2006b, 2010b, 2013p).6.4 ConclusionOn paper, publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements appear to have steadily improved over time.70 However, a closer look at the provisions show that this is not the case for the most important provision: 'Observation'. It also appears that tuna agreements are weaker than other types of agreements in terms of the content of their provisions. In reality, this improvement over time is more limited, since most provisions are not implemented. Due to limited interaction with local infrastructure, poor allocation of public funds, and overall little added value, most of the publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements are considered to have benefited the host countries very little in terms of institutional development (albeit sometimes they result in important treasury income and institutional/sectoral support; Stilwell et al. 2010; Binet et al. 2013). This situation was acknowledged in some of the assessments that are available (see, e.g., Anon. 2004b, 2005b);71 thus, the road to 'sustainable' agreements is still long. 70 As an aside, it does not seem that provisions with higher scores reduce the obligation of the EU to pay access fees. Following the suggestion from David Fluharty, average scores by country and year were plotted against the normalized annual subsidies by country (from Figure 46; not shown here). The correlation between the two was very weak, but it appeared that higher subsidies (not adjusted for inflation) may go with 'better' provisions. Surely, this is rather counter-intuitive and should be explored more in depth in the future.71 However, these assessments are only available from 2000 onward, so it can be expected that the situation was likely worse in the past.877 ConclusionFishing access agreements have been criticized from all angles since their inception (Bartels et al. 2007), and they will undoubtedly continue to be scrutinized well into the future. However, these agreements remain a vital tool for foreign fleets to supply their markets and, in some cases, an essential source of income and foreign investment for developing coastal countries (Mulazzani and Malorgio 2015). Therefore, these critiques should be used to improve upon these agreements, in order to make them less questionable and, ultimately, more legitimate.With regard to the particular type of fishing access agreements studied in this thesis (i.e., publicly-funded European agreements), it appears that even though there is a common framework for all agreements, there have always been wide discrepancies between the various countries involved at any given time. This is in line with Gödel (1931), who showed that no logical system (other than a trivial one) can be contradiction-free. In the context of the work presented here, this is for example the case of the fee set for one country that is vastly different than the price set for its neighbour (for a similar gear and target species). Such inconsistencies are not limited to the content of one agreement compared to another, but also relate to other European policies developed by other Directorate-Generals (Acheampong 1997; Anon. 2002; Brown 2005; Ilnyckyj 2007; Slocum-Bradley and Bradley 2010; Mulazzani and Malorgio 2015). The most blatant inconsistency is the aim of fishing access agreements themselves: they are in contradiction with the founding treaty of the EU. This treaty states that:"Community policy in the sphere of development co-operation […] shall foster (i) the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them, (ii) the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy, and (iii) the campaign against poverty in the developing countries" (Article 130u; EEC 1992a).These inconsistencies have consequences that reach far beyond the fisheries realm. For example, the competition with small-scale fleets, rampant over-exploitation of stocks in many developing coastal countries, and consequent disruption of local markets is thought to be a major driver of illegal emigration to Europe (emigration that the EU is increasingly combating; LaFraniere 2008; Sall and Morand 2008; Tull 2008). 88These agreements are much needed by the European fishing industry, as they provide the framework for substantial catches of demersal species, as well as small and large pelagic species. Currently, around 20% of the EU market is supplied by the 700-vessels distant fishing fleet — half of which fishes under access agreements (EC 2008f).72 Without them, the industry would have to conclude costly private agreements.73 On the other side of the European perspective, taxpayers also need these publicly-funded agreements for two main reasons:• They supply the fish market with fresh and canned tuna, as well as demersal and small pelagic species. This contributes to the creation of jobs, local value added, and the provision of animal protein;• They offer a rather transparent framework for extensive economic agreements (at least with regards to their provisions; Cullberg 2009), which — to an unknown extent — contributes to a somewhat controlled use of public funds.74 These points are also important for the other side of the spectrum, i.e., the developing countries with whom the EU has partnered over the past three decades. The transparent framework governing the publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements can potentially ensure that all countries benefit equally from them. As the EU wants to be a trustworthy partner, it also allows developing countries to plan part of their budget in advance, without relying on other less predictable private agreements. It also limits the potential for corruption in countries known to have such tendencies (Anon. 2004b, 2005b, 2006b,d; FAO 2010b; Standing 2011b), which is not the case of the private agreements that would be in place without them (Standing 2011a). In such cases, negotiations would take place between two interested individuals; negotiations are 72 Official figures further suggest that around 3% of the EU market supply come from access agreements, the rest coming from the High Seas. Although providing a trend, these figures must, however, be interpreted with caution, as there are many factors which might blur these statistics. For example, fish caught under agreements can be transshipped and/or processed in host countries, then exported to Europe, therefore becoming 'EU imports'. In this case, they would not be accounted for in the 20% mentioned above, although they should be. EU imports are estimated to represent around 55–60% of all the fish consumed in Europe (Swartz et al. 2010b; European Commission 2014a).73 From the industry's point of view, private agreements are also less desirable because they would result in more complicated administrative work, less secure fishing possibilities, as well as potentially much higher fishing fees (Lequesne 2001; Anon. 2005a, 2006d, 2007b, 2013k,n). Not much is known about these private agreements, although it seems that publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements are doing better, at least on paper (based on the review of all agreements in Madagascar for the 2008–2013 period; unpublished data collected by the author).74 It is, however, clear from many of the assessments of the publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements commissioned by the Directorate General of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs of the European Commission, that accounting can be very poor, let alone existent (see discussion in Section 6, as well as Thurston and Mulvad 2011 for a general discussion on EU subsidies, but not specifically on the ones related to fishing access agreements).89carried out by the European Commission (i.e., supposedly not an interested party) in the case of the publicly-funded agreements. Given the problematic past of some African countries, which are known to have been historically plagued by corruption (World Bank 1989; Ellis 1996), this is a point of paramount importance.Finally, publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements also contribute to potentially larger treasury incomes in exchange for resources, through the existence of the sectoral funds (i.e., subsidies).75 In some cases, the development of local fisheries largely relies on these funds allocated by the EU (Anon. 2005f; Failler et al. 2005). On that note, the need for foreign currency is thought to weaken the leverage of developing coastal countries when facing the highly trained and organized foreign delegations (Anon. 2005f). Some of these developing countries (such as the Seychelles, Kiribati, and Guinea-Bissau) depend entirely on fishing access agreements for their national economy (Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002; Vallée et al. 2009; Guillotreau et al. 2011). Thus, one might argue that they have to continuously renew their various fishing agreements in order to remain economically viable.The previous chapters have highlighted several issues associated with either the legal grounds of fishing access agreements and the associated science, or their content. This final section provides a short review of these issues, as well as potential paths for future improvements that will be required if the aim of 'mutual benefit' reiterated in the new version of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is to be met (EU 2013g).7.1 The basis of the agreements and the science around them surplus versus 'fair surplus'One of the key issues of equity is found in the actual basis of fishing agreements, which is Article 62 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations 1982). This article states that if a given country does not fish its stocks at the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), then it must cede the un-fished part of its stocks (the 'surplus') to other countries. With regards to the estimation of the surplus, the assessments of the publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements that were 75 The sectoral funds have sometimes been criticized as a 'carrot and stick' policy to advance the European political/economic agenda (Bergh and Davies 2004; Ilnyckyj 2007; Slocum-Bradley and Bradley 2010). In fact, it must be acknowledged that fishing access agreements are often perceived by developing countries as an easy way to generate foreign exchange (Witbooi 2008).90commissioned by the Directorate General of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs of the European Commission often acknowledged that most targeted stocks were not assessed, or worse, were already over-exploited (see, e.g., Anon. 2004b, 2005a-b, d, 2006a, 2007b, 2010c, e, 2011c). This contradicts with the FAO code of conduct for responsible fisheries with regard to precautionary approach to fisheries management (FAO 1995; Hosch 2009). It is also in contraction with the precautionary principles that are at the core of UNCLOS (United Nations 1982; Ilnyckyj 2007). The most honest acknowledgment of this issue can be found in the assessment of the agreement with Guinea-Bissau, which states that:"The setting of TACs [Total Allowable Catch] appears to be pointless in the present context, as Guinea Bissau has no means of monitoring total catches. In any case, the crustacean TAC of 3,000 tonnes appears to have no biological basis, and does not indicate specific stocks" (Anon. 2005b). This raises the legitimacy of many past and potential future agreements, as several questions of critical importance come to mind. Among others: should there still be any access agreements when no scientifically-sound data are available? Whose burden is it to carry out stock assessments?76 Although the new version of the CFP once again stated that EU vessels should only catch the surplus of the total allowable catch (EU 2013g), some authors are already suggesting that this will not be the case due to the lack of data (Salomon et al. 2014). Also, it must be noted that most currently targeted species (tuna, billfishes, and sharks) are highly migratory. Therefore, the current estimates of available surplus on a country basis do not work in their current form, as each country distributes an unknown surplus without considering neighbouring countries. Positively, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) is currently working on a regional allocation of the total allowable catch based on historical catches (IOTC 2011b-c, 2013a; Noye and Mfodwo 2012). It was shown in Section 3 that even if the surplus were correctly estimated (and shared among a given region in the case of migratory species), its use would not be justified in terms of stock dynamics. Any additional fishing effort from a foreign country would automatically result in lower fishing catches (per unit of effort and/or total) for 76 Regarding the latter question, in other extractive industries, it is often the industry's role to prove that its activities will not jeopardize the environment and the well-being of future generations.91the country ceding it, and thus in lower profitability. To catch the same amount, this country would have to increase its fishing effort as well, which would result in the over-exploitation of the given stock (an unwanted outcome). Even if the foreign country agreed to catch only a fraction of the surplus, the 'fair surplus', the domestic catch per unit of effort (CPUE) would decline. Therefore, the fee paid by the foreign country should not only be based on the value of what is caught, but at least also account for the decline in CPUE or total catch of the host country. Regarding collaboration, there is very little coordination among countries in West and East Africa,77 even with regards to scientific cooperation (Anon. 2005f). On the political side, such regional cooperation is pushed forward, notably at the European Parliament (Lövin 2012), and it made its appearance in the new version of the CFP (EU 2013g). Countries in West and East Africa as well as in the Pacific Ocean, could build up momentum and increase leverage by sharing human and technical resources as part of a regional coalition (see, e.g., Braxton 2006 for the Pacific Ocean), and by developing minimum regional terms and conditions for foreign fleets (WWF 2005; Mbendo 2012). However, such a coalition (which is not in the interest of the EU) may not work in practice, due to diverging interests from various parties (Munro 1979; Vallée et al. 2009; Anderson and Leonard 2013; Sumaila 2013).78 For example in the Indian Ocean, the Seychelles (which happen to have most of the tuna stock moving through its EEZ annually) may have interests that are radically different from Mauritius (which is located at the extreme east of the Western Indian Ocean tuna fishing ground). The motives for improving monitoring and compliance might also be radically different. 7.2 Accounting for unreported catches and spatial expansionSection 4 showed that another problem related to access agreements was the downward-biased estimation and sectoral mis-allocation of the total catch, and the subsequent mis-estimation of the 'surplus'. In most countries, technical and human means are not enough to fully account for all fishing sectors. This inadequacy is particularly acute in developing countries, and a large part of their catch is missing 77 Several regional organizations deal with fisheries issues, such as the Sub Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) and the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA), but they are obviously not sufficient.78 In the Pacific Ocean, Kiribati has complained about the multilateral agreement with the United States being disadvantageous (Braxton 2006), so this situation may also occur in the case of a regional agreement with the EU.92from official figures. Given the way official statistics are compiled, it is also often not possible to determine the contribution of each fisheries sectors. This is an issue in the case of the artisanal fisheries that have recently started to expand offshore, as they may still be considered as inshore fisheries (i.e., not competing with foreign fleets). Since it is impossible for these developing countries to claim that "there will be no agreement, as domestic stocks are fully exploited", it becomes possible for negotiators from developed countries to insist that "there will be an one, as an important domestic fisheries sector does not exist". Section 4 thus makes the case for an increased monitoring of all fisheries activities, with particular emphasis on the small-scale sectors. Only increased monitoring will allow the development of sustainable policies with foreign fleets. However, methodologies will have to be developed and accepted to estimate MSYs and consequent available surpluses, based on such limited data (i.e., catch-to-MSY approach; Martell and Froese 2012; Pauly 2013; Schiller 2014).7.3 The content of the agreements7.3.1 Shifting responsibility to the industryIn Section 5, it was shown that the EU industry only contributed around 25% of the total cost of the agreements, the rest being paid for by European taxpayers via subsidies. In turn, the industry may have pocketed substantial profits at the detriment of the host countries (given the low fee compared to the gross revenue),79 whereas the developing coastal countries got little value from their fish stocks. In this section, it was argued two things:• Sectoral funds should not be linked to the allowed fishing effort (Grynberg 2004; Cullberg 2009; World Bank 2014a). Currently, the larger the authorized fishing effort, the larger the sectoral fund. However, one could argue that the amount of sectoral funds allocated to any country should be linked to its management needs (e.g., to deter illegal fishing) rather than to the size of its fish stocks (Alder et al. 2006). Furthermore, this creates an incentive for 79 The fact that the agreements keep receiving a strong support from the industry may be a hint.93authorizing an unsustainable level of fishing effort (Anon. 2008a). The new version of the CFP states that these funds should be uncoupled from the business side of the fishing access agreements. However, they still belong to the same package (e.g., EU 2013g);• Fishing access fees (i.e., excluding the subsidies component directed towards sectoral development) should be entirely borne by the industry, notably with a view to decrease the size of the fishing fleets and re-balance the distribution of wealth. This implies that EU fishing access agreements should no longer be publicly-funded, although they should still be negotiated by the European Commission and benefit from the transparent and 'harmonized' framework of its predecessors.Regarding this second point, the results of Section 5 were presented in June 2013 at a round-table organized as part of the biennial forum of the Association Française d'Halieutique (French Fisheries Society; Le Manach 2013). The discussion included representatives from both the French tuna fleets (M. Goujon, Orthongel) and the European Commission (P. Daniel; Unit B3 'Bilateral Agreements and Fisheries Control in International Waters') as panelists. During the discussion, M. Goujon acknowledged that the industry fee was low and that they could consider accepting a fee of 7% of their gross revenue (while Section 5 suggested a current level of 1.5–2%; i.e., over three times lower than the industry's 'acceptance threshold').80 In the most recently renewed agreements (i.e., the Seychelles and Comoros) the fee has increased from 35 EUR/t to 55 EUR/t, with an incremental increase to 70 EUR/t by 2019 in the case of the Seychelles, i.e., twice the current amount (EU 2013l, 2014f).81 Therefore, it can be assumed that there is still room for improving the financial return of publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements in developing countries, in order to ensure that the agreements are equitable, fair, and do not jeopardize the health of fish resources nor artificially channel benefits towards EU industrial beneficiaries. 80 M. Goujon contested these numbers — judging them too low (still acknowledging that the 'real' fee was only corresponding to 3% of the gross revenue) — but refused (for confidentiality reasons) to provide data on the ex-vessel prices at which the tuna fleets he represents actually sell their catch.81 As an aside, note that in the past, the Seychelles reported to prefer a flat rate payment irrespective of where the catch is taken and in which quantity. The rationale was that it would lead to less protracted negotiations and did not need to rely on the industry's honesty (Michaud 2003).94The legitimacy of a flat fee for each tonne of tuna caught was also challenged, and, at the very least, fees should be indexed to the market price of the target species as well as the price of oil. Ultimately, though, fees should represent a share of the profits close to usual interest rates plus a risk bonus.7.3.2 Reinforcing the positive sides of the agreementsSection 6 focused on the socio-environmental provisions of the agreements, and it was shown that although many of them have increased over time, the provision related to the observation of fishing activities has decreased. Tuna agreements, i.e., those that are becoming the norm, were also shown to carry the weakest provisions. It was also shown that the situation in reality was worse, since most of these provisions were not implemented and enforced (Brans and Ferraro 2012), despite the allocation of important sectoral funds.82 The assessments that were profusely cited throughout this section also noted that European benefits were a primary focus, and that the benefits of the developing coastal countries with whom Europe is partnering should be assessed more rigorously (Anon. 2005f).These assessments lead to several points that could be improved upon:• Although the EU (and other funders) have distributed large sums towards monitoring, control and surveillance of foreign fleets,83 this sector must still be radically improved (Grynberg 2004; Bartels et al. 2007). This could be accomplished by reinforcing port state control (Erceg 2006) and increasing the sharing of regional technical and human resources, similar to what is done in the Pacific Ocean (FFA 1992). The implementation of a regional observer programme is also of paramount importance in order to limit illegal activities. Such regional programmes are still largely lacking in both Atlantic and Indian 82 Sectoral funds have been shown to often result in negative outcomes, such as over-capacity (Alder et al. 2006).83 For example through the European Development Fund. Among many examples, such funds have been used in West Africa to encourage the use of radars, and to increase the number of patrols at sea in the Indian Ocean.95Oceans (5% coverage required; IOTC 2009b, 2010b, 2011d; ICCAT 2010).84• Local infrastructure should be developed to favour landings and local processing, in order to increase the local value added (Kaczynski and Looney 2000). Many of the Pacific Islands have started to work toward this goal (Barclay and Cartright 2007).7.4 The future: developing local fleets and commercial partnerships?Despite their economic importance, publicly-funded EU fishing access agreements only represent one side of European policies that control access and supply of fishery products in African-Caribbean-Pacific Group of States (ACP) countries, and guarantee jobs for a substantial part of the EU fleets (Gorez and O'Riordan 2004). Formal economic relationships between EU and ACP countries dates back to the colonial era, with the establishment of preferential trade and aid provisions as part of the 1957 Treaty of Rome (Anon. 1957; Nunn and Price 2004). After independence, very little was changed as part of the Yaoundé Conventions, for which France was criticized for neocolonialism (Anon. 1963, 1969; Nunn and Price 2004). The four successive Conventions of Lomé widened these economic partnerships (Anon. 1975, 1979, 1984, 1989). Despite these preferential trade rules resulting in ACP coastal countries being able to export to the EU much easier, they were also linked to the so-called 'Rules of Origin', which constrained ACP countries to buy fish caught by their own fleets or the EU fleets (Naumann 2004). These Rules of Origin effectively resulted in ACP coastal countries being more highly dependent on the EU fleets to supply their local factories, at premium prices (Failler and Lécrivain 2001; Nunn and Price 2004; Campling and Doherty 2007; Ponte et al. 2007; Campling 2008; Jiménez-Toribio et al. 2010; Hamilton et al. 2011). Therefore, the preferential tariffs could be seen as a financial incentive to convince the ACP countries to establish fishing access 84 Also note that in the Atlantic Ocean, ICCAT requires a higher coverage (up to 100%) of all fishing activities for Atlantic bluefin tuna (ICCAT 2006, 2012a, 2013a), as well as for transshipments at sea (ICCAT 2012b). ICCAT also introduced this regional observer programme for bigeye and yellowfin tune in 2013 (ICCAT 2011), although such programme seems to be absent from the most recent amendment to this resolution (ICCAT 2013b).The poor efficiency of these observer schemes should be noted, though, as even in the case of a 100% coverage case, it would be easier to request the observer to be at one place, when something 'bad' happens somewhere else (i.e., out of sight on a 80m+ vessel). The author suggests to look into CCTV systems, which could be set at various places, with live-feed on the Internet. The risk of getting caught doing 'bad things' at any given time would constitute an excellent deterrent, and this system, besides incurring reasonable fees, would also be incorruptible.96agreements with the EU, in order to process and export fish products. This largely resulted in short-term benefits to these countries by providing easy income (Witbooi 2008), but it excluded them from international markets on the long run (Alder and Sumaila 2004; Failler et al. 2005; Ponte et al. 2007; Guillotreau et al. 2011). The 4th Lomé Convention was replaced in 2000 by the Cotonou Convention (Anon. 2000b), which resulted in the introduction of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA). These EPA became the new commercial tool to comply with the World Trade Organization (WTO) with regards to free-trade requirements (Borrmann et al. 2006a). With this reform, the aim of the WTO was to harmonize the global market and make it fairer for all countries. One way in which this was accomplished was by removing preferential tariffs. The EPA with West Africa was initialled on June 30 2014, and interim agreements are now in place in eastern and southern Africa, as well as in the South African Development Community. Discussions are still ongoing with other regions, i.e., central Africa, Eastern African Community, and the Pacific (European Commission 2014b). However, the Lomé Convention has already been heavily criticized for weakening even more countries with little institutions and infrastructure, as they will become even less able to export seafood (Anon. 2004c, 2008b, 2014c; Borrmann and Busse 2006; Borrmann et al. 2006b; Failler 2007; Ponte et al. 2007; Campling 2008; Tull 2008). Therefore, historical commercial advantages with the EU will fade away, as all countries will benefit from the same tariff regime. This will likely result in less interest by developing coastal countries in solely selling their fish resources (Sumaila et al. 2007b; Guillotreau et al. 2011). Moreover, as detailed in Section 4, it is obvious that developing coastal countries are rapidly expanding their fishing activities toward offshore fishing grounds due to several reasons. The primary reasons are to (i) relieve the pressure on coastal stocks; (ii) increase their total catch; and (iii) establish themselves as pelagic countries with the goal of benefiting from regional allocation of catch shares (Allen et al. 2010).85 85 See, e.g., documents regarding the policy on the allocation of commercial fishing rights in the South African tuna longline fishery (Republic of South Africa 2003, 2013).97Section 4 focused on East Africa, but the case can also be made for West Africa (Scharm 2005). By moving further offshore, they are entering in competition with foreign fleets. The current and future legitimacy of fishing arguments is therefore challenged, as the 'unexploited surplus' argument no longer holds. The combined effect of the reform of trade rules under the leadership of the WTO and the increasingly competitive fleets of the developing coastal countries begs the question: so what? The author does not feel that fishing access agreements, including the publicly-funded ones studied here, can be viable in the long-term. However, there is a need to secure and improve them in the short- to medium-term based on the discussion above. In a more distant-future, one way of overcoming these obstacles that seems obvious and more equitable would be to help developing coastal countries to improve their processing facilities and access to the international market, rather than subsidizing the access of foreign fleets that leave the region with little local value added. One avenue that could be explored is the development of joint ventures or charter companies. Developing coastal states would define fishing regulations in their waters, and foreign fleets would then propose their services at a competitive fee to 'win the prize'. By doing so, the developing coastal states would be able to effectively access international markets by processing the catch of the selected foreign fleet, and trade with their former rulers/economic 'partners' would be reinforced (Bartels et al. 2007). The European Commission could still be involved in the development of the fishing rules and in the funding of monitoring, control, and surveillance of fishing activities. As such, there would be a transfer of technology and skills from developed to developing countries, rather than the further development of fleets in developing countries. Ultimately, this type of reciprocity would not contribute to the global increase in fishing effort, and would result in real equitable partnerships, between the EU and its historical partners. 98BibliographyPersonal references citedBultel E, Doherty B, Herman A, Le Manach F and Zeller D (in press) An update of the reconstructed marine fisheries catches of Tanzania with taxonomic breakdown. 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Official Journal L 40: 1–2.EC (2002h) Council Regulation (EC) No 2323/2002 of 16 December 2002 on the conclusion of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for by the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Senegal on fishing off the coast of Senegal for the period from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2006. Official Journal L 349: 4–5.EC (2002i) Protocol setting out, for the period from 3 August 2002 to 2 August 2004, the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for by the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Angola on fishing off Angola. Official Journal L 351: 92–111.EC (2002j) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Cape Verde on fishing off the coast of Cape Verde for the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004. Official Journal L 47: 25–33.EC (2002k) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for by the Agreement between the European Community and the Gabonese Republic on fishing off the coast of Gabon for the period 3 December 2001 to 2 December 2005. Official Journal L 73: 19–29.EC (2002l) Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Community and the Government of the Republic of Guinea concerning the extension of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Revolutionary People's Republic of Guinea on fishing off the Guinean coast for the period 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2002. Official Journal L 116: 29–30.EC (2002m) Protocol establishing the fishing opportunities and the compensation provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau on fishing off the coast of Guinea-Bissau for the period 16 June 2001 to 15 June 2006. Official Journal L 19: 35–46.EC (2002n) Protocol setting out, for the period from 1 June 2002 to 31 May 2005, the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for by the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe on fishing off the coast of São Tomé and Príncipe. Official Journal L 351: 14–23.EC (2002o) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Senegal on fishing off the coast of Senegal for the period from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2006. Official Journal L 349: 46–65.EC (2002p) Protocol defining, for the period 18 January 2002 to 17 January 2005, the fishing possibilities and the financial contribution provided for by the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Seychelles on fishing off Seychelles. Official Journal L 134: 40–47.EC (2002q) Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the 124conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy. Official Journal L 358: 59–80.EC (2003a) Council Regulation (EC) No 2329/2003 of 22 December 2003 on the conclusion of the Fisheries Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique. Official Journal L 345: 43–44.EC (2003b) Council Regulation (EC) No 1869/2003 of 20 October 2003 on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the extension of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Mauritius on fishing in Mauritian waters for the period 3 December 2002 to 2 December 2003. Official Journal L 275: 1–2.EC (2003c) Council Regulation (EC) No 874/2003 of 6 May 2003 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Kiribati on fishing within the Kiribati fishing zone. Official Journal L 126: 1–2.EC (2003d) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique. Official Journal L 345: 48–63.EC (2003e) Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters extending for the period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004 the validity of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire on fishing off the coast of Côte d'Ivoire. Official Journal L 319: 19–20.EC (2003f) Protocol setting out the fishing possibilities and the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Kiribati on fishing within the Kiribati fishing zone. Official Journal L 126: 5–19.EC (2004a) Council Regulation (EC) No 1927/2004 of 21 October 2004 on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the extension of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Cape Verde on fishing off the coast of Cape Verde for the period 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005. Official Journal L 332: 1–2.EC (2004b) Council Regulation (EC) No 2003/2004 of 21 October 2004 on the conclusion of the Protocol defining, for the period 3 December 2003 to 2 December 2007, the fishing opportunities and the financial compensation provided for by the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of Mauritius on fishing in Mauritian waters. Official Journal L 348: 1–2.EC (2004c) Council Regulation (EC) No 830/2004 of 26 April 2004 on the conclusion of the Protocol defining for the period 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2008 the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Guinea on fishing off the Guinean coast. Official Journal L 127: 31–32.EC (2004d) Protocol defining, for the period 3 December 2003 to 2 December 2007, the fishing opportunities and the financial compensation provided for by the Agreement 125between the European Economic Community and the Government of Mauritius on fishing in Mauritian waters. Official Journal L 348: 3–13.EC (2004e) Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the extension of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Cape Verde on fishing off the coast of Cape Verde for the period 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005. Official Journal L 332: 3–4.EC (2004f) Protocol defining for the period 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2008 the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Guinea on fishing off the coast of Guinea. Official Journal L 99: 12–27.EC (2005a) Council Regulation (EC) No 555/2005 of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion of the Protocol defining for the period 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2006 the tuna fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Democratic Republic of Madagascar on fishing off Madagascar. Official Journal L 94: 1–2.EC (2005b) Council Decision of 20 September 2005 on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the provisional application of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros on fishing off the Comoros for the period from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2010. Official Journal L 252: 8–9.EC (2005c) Council Regulation (EC) No 172/2005 of 18 January 2005 on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the extension of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Islamic Federal Republic of The Comoros on fishing off The Comoros for the period from 28 February 2004 to 31 December 2004. Official Journal L 29: 1–2.EC (2005d) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros on fishing off the Comoros for the period from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2010. Official Journal L 252: 11–26.EC (2005e) Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters concerning the extension of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial compensation provided for in the agreement between the European Economic Community and the Islamic Federal Republic of The Comoros on fishing off The Comoros for the period from 28 February 2004 to 31 December 2004. Official Journal L 29: 22–23.EC (2005f) Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the provisional application of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros on fishing off the Comoros for the period from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2010. Official Journal L 252: 10–10.EC (2005g) Protocol setting out, for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007, the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the agreement between 126the European Economic Community and the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire on fishing off the coast of Côte d'Ivoire. Official Journal L 76: 4–15.EC (2005h) Protocol defining for the period 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2006 the Tuna fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for in the agreement between the European Economic Community and the Democratic Republic of Madagascar on fishing off Madagascar. Official Journal L 94: 5–44.EC (2005i) Protocol setting out, for the period from 18 January 2005 to 17 January 2011, the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for by the agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Seychelles on fishing off Seychelles. Official Journal L 348: 4–25.EC (2006a) Council Regulation (EC) No 2027/2006 of 19 December 2006 on the conclusion of the Fisheries partnership agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Cape Verde. Official Journal L 414: 1–2.EC (2006b) Council Regulation (EC) No 764/2006 of 22 May 2006 on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco. Official Journal L 141: 1–3.EC (2006c) Council Regulation (EC) No 1124/2006 of 11 July 2006 on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters extending the Protocol setting out, for the period 1 June 2005 to 31 May 2006 , the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for by the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe on fishing off the coast of São Tomé e Príncipe. Official Journal L 200: 1–2.EC (2006d) Council Regulation (EC) No 563/2006 of 13 March 2006 concerning the conclusion of the Partnership Agreement between the European Community and Solomon Islands on fishing off Solomon Islands. Official Journal L 105: 33–33.EC (2006e) Council Decision of 7 November 2006 on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters on the provisional application of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Community and the Gabonese Republic on fishing off the coast of Gabon for the period from 3 December 2005 to 2 December 2011. Official Journal L 319: 15–16.EC (2006f) Council Regulation (EC) No 1491/2006 of 10 October 2006 on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the extension of the Protocol establishing the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau on fishing off the coast of Guinea-Bissau for the period 16 June 2006 to 15 June 2007. Official Journal L 279: 1–2.EC (2006g) Council Regulation (EC) No 1801/2006 of 30 November 2006 on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania — Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Official Journal L 343: 1–3.EC (2006h) Council Regulation (EC) No 805/2006 of 25 April 2006 concerning the 127conclusion of the Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Federated States of Micronesia on fishing in the Federated States of Micronesia. Official Journal L 151: 1–2.EC (2006i) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Cape Verde on fishing off the Coast of Cape Verde for the period from 1 September 2006 to 31 August 2011. Official Journal L 414: 8–25.EC (2006j) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Community and the Gabonese Republic on fishing off the coast of Gabon for the period from 3 December 2005 to 2 December 2011. Official Journal L 319: 18–36.EC (2006k) Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the extension of the Protocol establishing the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau on fishing off the coast of Guinea-Bissau for the period 16 June 2006 to 15 June 2007. Official Journal L 2006: 9–10.EC (2006l) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Official Journal L 343: 9–60.EC (2006m) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Federated States of Micronesia on fishing in the Federated States of Micronesia. Official Journal L 151: 8–30.EC (2006n) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco. Official Journal L 141: 9–37.EC (2006o) Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters extending the Protocol setting out, for the period from 1 June 2005 to 31 May 2006 , the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe on fishing off the coast of São Tomé and Príncipe. Official Journal L 40: 19–20.EC (2006p) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and payments provided for in the Partnership Agreement between the European Community and Solomon Islands on fishing off Solomon Islands. Official Journal L 105: 39–53.EC (2007a) Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007. Official Journal C 306(50):1-271.EC (2007b) Council Regulation (EC) No 1446/2007 of 22 November 2007 on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique. Official Journal L 331: 31–32.EC (2007c) Council Regulation (EC) No 893/2007 of 23 July 2007 on the conclusion 128of a Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community, on the one hand, and the Republic of Kiribati, on the other. Official Journal L 205: 1–2.EC (2007d) Council Regulation (EC) No 894/2007 of 23 July 2007 on the conclusion of a Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe and the European Community. Official Journal L 205: 35–35.EC (2007e) 2007/797/EC: Council Decision of 15 November 2007 on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters on the provisional application of the amendments to the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Madagascar on fishing off the coast of Madagascar for the period from 1 January 2007 to  31 December 2012. Official Journal L 331: 3–4.EC (2007f) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Madagascar on fishing off the coast of Madagascar for the period from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2012. Official Journal L 331: 11–30.EC (2007g) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau for the period 16 June 2007 to 15 June 2011. Official Journal L 342: 10–37.EC (2007h) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Kiribati for the period from 16 September 2006 to 15 September 2012. Official Journal L 205: 8–34.EC (2007i) Protocol Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Mozambique on fishing off the coast of Mozambique for the period from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2011. Official Journal L 331: 38–54.EC (2007j) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for by the Agreement between the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe and the European Community on fishing off the coast of São Tomé and Príncipe for the period from 1 June 2006 to 31 May 2010. Official Journal L 205: 40–58.EC (2007k) Corrigendum to Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe and the European Community (OJ L 205, 7.8.2007). Official Journal L 330: 60–60.EC (2008a) Council Regulation (EC) No 704/2008 of 15 July 2008 on the conclusion of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania for the period 1 August 2008 to 31 July 2012. Official Journal L 203: 1–3.EC (2008b) Council Regulation (EC) No 480/2008 of 26 May 2008 on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters on the amendments to the Protocol setting out, for the period from 18 January 2005 to 17 January 2011 , the 129fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for by the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Seychelles on fishing off Seychelles. Official Journal L 141: 1–2.EC (2008c) Council Regulation (EC) No 241/2008 of 17 March 2008 on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. Official Journal L 75: 49–50.EC (2008d) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for by the Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire on fishing off the coast of Côte d'Ivoire for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2013. Official Journal L 48: 46–63.EC (2008e) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania for the period 1 August 2008 to 31 July 2012. Official Journal L 203: 4–59.EC (2008f) Study on the European external fleet. Final report — contract FISH/2006/02, European Union, Brussels (Belgium). 14 p.EC (2009a) Council Decision of 28 May 2009 concerning the conclusion of an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters on the provisional application of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Guinea. Official Journal L 156: 31–32.EC (2009b) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Guinea on fishing off the coast of Guinea for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2012. Official Journal L 156: 35–55.EC (2007) Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007. Official Journal C 306(50): 1–271.European Court of Auditors (2001) Special Report No 3/2001 concerning the Commission's management of the international fisheries agreements, together with the Commission's replies (pursuant to Article 248(4), second subparagraph, EC) (2001/C 210/01). Official Journal C 210. 1–28 p.EEC (1980a) Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the European Economic Community on fishing off the coast of Senegal. Official Journal L 226: 17–27.EEC (1980b) Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Guinea Bissau and the European Economic Community on fishing off the coast of Guinea Bissau. Official Journal L 226: 34–41.EEC (1980c) Protocol between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Guinea Bissau. Official Journal L 226: 42–42.EEC (1980d) Protocol between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Senegal. Official Journal L 226: 28–32.130EEC (1981a) Council Resolution of 3 November 1976 on certain external aspects of the creation of a 200-mile fishing zone in the Community with effect from 1 January 1977. Official Journal C 105: 1–1.EEC (1981b) Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters concerning an interim extension of the Protocol annexed to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the European Economic Community on fishing off the coast of Senegal. Official Journal L 220: 35–36.EEC (1982a) Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters concerning an interim extension of the Protocol annexed to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Guinea Bissau and the European Economic Community on fishing off the coast of Guinea Bissau. Official Journal L 126: 17–18.EEC (1982b) Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters concerning a second interim extension of the Protocol annexed to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Guinea Bissau and the European Economic Community on fishing off the coast of Guinea Bissau. Official Journal L 247: 34–35.EEC (1982c) Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Senegal amending the Agreement on fishing off the coast of Senegal, signed on 15 June 1979. Official Journal L 234: 9–10.EEC (1982d) Protocol establishing the fishing rights and compensation provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Senegal on fishing off the coast of Senegal, for the period 16 November 1981 to 15 November 1983. Official Journal L 234: 11–11.EEC (1983a) Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Revolutionary People's Republic of Guinea on fishing off the Guinean coast. Official Journal L 111: 2–16.EEC (1983b) Protocol defining the fishing rights and financial compensation provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Revolutionary People's Republic of Guinea. Official Journal L 111: 17–17.EEC (1983c) Protocol between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Guinea Bissau. Official Journal L 84: 2–8.EEC (1984a) Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea on fishing off the coast of Equatorial Guinea. Official Journal L 188: 2–5.EEC (1984b) Protocol between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea. Official Journal L 188: 6–6.EEC (1984c) Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Principe on fishing off São Tomé and Principe. Official Journal L 54: 2–4.EEC (1984d) Protocol between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Principe. Official Journal L 54: 5–5.131EEC (1984e) Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters concerning an interim extension of the Protocol annexed to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the European Economic Community on fishing off the coast of Senegal. Official Journal L 37.EEC (1984f) Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters concerning the provisional application of the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Senegal amending, for the second time, the Agreement on fishing off the coast of Senegal, and the new Protocol thereto. Official Journal L 37.EEC (1984g) Draft Protocol establishing the fishing rights and compensation provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Senegal on fishing oft the coast of Senegal for the period 16 January 1984 to 15 January 1986. Official Journal L 37.EEC (1984h) Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters concerning an interim extension of the Protocol annexed to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the European Economic Community on fishing off the coast of Senegal. Official Journal L 37: 47–48.EEC (1984i) Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters provisionally applying the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Seychelles on fishing off Seychelles. Official Journal L 79: 30–33.EEC (1985a) Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Senegal amending, for the second time, the agreement on fishing off the coast of Senegal. Official Journal L 361: 87–87.EEC (1985b) Protocol establishing the fishing rights and compensation provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Senegal on fishing off the coast of Senegal for the period 16 January 1984 to 15 January 1986. Official Journal L 361: 88–88.EEC (1985c) Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Seychelles on fishing off Seychelles. Official Journal L 149: 2–5.EEC (1985d) Protocol between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Seychelles. Official Journal L 149: 6–6.EEC (1986a) Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar on fishing off Madagascar. Official Journal L 73: 26–30.EEC (1986b) Protocol 2 between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar on types of fishing other than those covered by Protocol 1. Official Journal L 73: 32–32.EEC (1986c) Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters on the interim extension of the Protocol annexed to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Guinea on fishing off the Guinean coast for a six-month period as from 8 February 1986. Official Journal L 80: 53–54.132EEC (1986d) Agreement amending for the second time the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau on fishing off the coast of Guinea-Bissau. Official Journal L 261: 22–28.EEC (1986e) Protocol 1 between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar on tuna fishing. Official Journal L 73: 31–31.EEC (1986f) Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters on the extension of the Protocol annexed to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tomé and Principe on fishing off the coast of Sao Tomé and Principe. Official Journal L 344: 29–30.EEC (1986g) Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters concerning an interim extension of the Protocol annexed to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the European Economic Community on fishing off the coast of Senegal for the period 1 to 31 May 1986. Official Journal L 168: 23–23.EEC (1987a) Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on fisheries relations. Official Journal L 201: 2–13.EEC (1987b) Protocol establishing the fishing rights and contributions provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on fisheries relations. Official Journal L 201: 14–14.EEC (1987c) Protocol establishing the fishing rights and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the People's Republic of Angola on fishing off Angola. Official Journal L 341: 13–13.EEC (1987d) Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the People's Republic of Angola on fishing off Angola. Official Journal L 341: 2–12.EEC (1987e) Agreement amending the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea on fishing off the coast of Equatorial Guinea, signed at Malabo on 15 June 1984. Official Journal L 29: 3–7.EEC (1987f) Protocol establishing fishing rights and financial compensation for the period from 27 June 1986 to 26 June 1989. Official Journal L 29: 8–8.EEC (1987g) Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of the Gambia on fishing off the Gambia. Official Journal L 146: 3–9.EEC (1987h) Protocol between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of the Gambia. Official Journal L 146: 10–11.EEC (1987i) Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Guinea amending the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Revolutionary People's 133Republic of Guinea on fishing off the coast of Guinea, signed at Conakry on 7 February 1983. Official Journal L 29: 10–15.EEC (1987j) Protocol establishing fishing rights and financial compensation for the period from 8 August 1986 to 7 August 1989. Official Journal L 29: 16–16.EEC (1987k) Agreement amending for the second time the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau on fishing off the coast of Guinea-Bissau. Official Journal L 113: 3–9.EEC (1987l) Protocol establishing rights and financial compensation for the period from 16 June 1986 to 15 June 1989. Official Journal L 113: 10–10.EEC (1987m) Agreement amending the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar on fishing off the coast of Madagascar, signed at Antananarivo on 28 January 1986. Official Journal C 81: 4–6.EEC (1987n) Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on fishing off the coast of Mauritania. Official Journal L 302: 26–33.EEC (1987o) Protocol setting out fishing opportunities and financial compensation for the period 1 July 1987 to 30 June 1990. Official Journal L 302: 34–35.EEC (1987p) Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters on fisheries arrangements between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Morocco, applicable on a preliminary basis from 1 August to 31 December 1987. Official Journal L 232: 19–20.EEC (1987q) Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the provisional application of the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on fishing off the coast of Mozambique, initialled in Brussels on 11 December 1986, for the period starting 1 January 1987. Official Journal L 98: 11–11.EEC (1987r) Agreement amending the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Principe on fishing off São Tomé and Principe signed at Brussels on 1 February 1984. Official Journal L 300: 34–36.EEC (1987s) Protocol establishing fishing authorizations and financial compensation for the period from 1 June 1987 to 31 May 1990. Official Journal L 300: 37–37.EEC (1987t) Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters on the interim extension of the Protocol annexed to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the European Economic Community on fishing off the coast of Senegal for the period 16 January to 30 April 1986. Official Journal L 75: 29–30.EEC (1987u) Protocol establishing the fishing rights and financial compensation provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Senegal on fishing off the coast of Senegal for the period from 1 October 1986 to 28 February 1988. Official Journal L 57: 3–5.134EEC (1987v) Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Seychelles on fishing off Seychelles. Official Journal L 160: 2–9.EEC (1987w) Protocol on the fishing rights and financial compensation provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Seychelles on fishing off Seychelles. Official Journal L 160: 10–10.EEC (1988a) Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial compensation provided for under the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros on fishing off Comoros. Official Journal L 137: 24–24.EEC (1988b) Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros on fishing off Comoros. Official Journal L 137: 19–23.EEC (1988c) Agreement on relations in the sea fisheries sector between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Morocco. Official Journal L 99: 3–13.EEC (1988d) Protocol 1 setting out fishing opportunities accorded by Morocco and the compensation accorded by the Community for the period from 1 March 1988 to 29 February 1992. Official Journal L 99: 14–16.EEC (1988e) Protocol 2 on experimental fishing. Official Journal L 99: 17–17.EEC (1988f) Protocol setting out the fishing rights and financial compensation provided for in the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the European Economic Community on fishing off the coast of Senegal for the period from 29 February 1988 to 28 February 1990. Official Journal L 137: 3–17.EEC (1989a) Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of Mauritius on fishing in Mauritian waters. Official Journal L 159: 2–6.EEC (1989b) Protocol No 1 on the fishing opportunities accorded by Mauritius and the financial contribution accorded by the Community. Official Journal L 159: 7–7.EEC (1989c) Protocol defining, for the period 3 May 1989 to 2 May 1990, the fishing opportunities and financial compensation provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of Angola on fishing off Angola. Official Journal L 341: 9–18.EEC (1989d) Protocol defining, for the period 21 May 1989 to 20 May 1992, the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for by the agreement between the European Economic Community and the government of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar on fishing off Madagascar. Official Journal L 239: 3–8.EEC (1989e) Protocol No 2 on experimental fishing for crustacea. Official Journal L 159: 8–8.EEC (1990a) Protocol establishing, for the period 1 January 1990 to 31 December 1991, the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on fisheries relations. Official Journal L 140: 4–5.135EEC (1990b) Protocol defining, for the period 3 May 1990 to 2 May 1992, the fishing opportunities and financial compensation provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the People's Republic of Angola on fishing off Angola. 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List of the provisions extracted for the analysis in Section 6, as well as ranking and associated scores of their respective sub-provisions.Provision Sub-provision Rationale Potential value (by order of increasing benefit to host countries) ScoreBycatch Allowed proportion of bycatchStricter regulations encourage the use of more selective gears; a lower proportion of authorized bycatch also limits the commercialization of non-target species (no levied fees)Not clear 1Local legislation 253.5% 3↓   ↓2.0% 25Allowed proportion of discardsStricter regulations encourage the use of more selective gears (less waste)OK if authorized or beyond a 27% bycatch threshold 1OK if authorized or beyond a 37.5% bycatch threshold 2OK if authorized or beyond a 66% bycatch threshold 3Not allowed 4Ex-vessel price More local value added if the bycatch is sold for cheap (e.g., at local market price)Costs of landing borne by local authorities 1To be determined 2Local market prices 3Forbidden species List provided 1Landing requirementsLocal benefits increase with higher proportions of landed bycatchRare species to be delivered to local authorities 1EU vessels should seek to land some bycatch 2Part of the bycatch must be landed 3All bycatch must be made available 4All bycatch must be made available; rare species to be delivered to local authorities5Crew Number of crew-members from Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Group of States (ACP)Higher numbers of ACP crew-members create more jobs in developing countriesPossible to hire ACP crew-members 10.2 ACP crew-members for the entire fleet 2↓   ↓30 ACP crew-members for the entire fleet 180.185 ACP crew-members for each vessel 19↓   ↓16 ACP crew-members for each vessel 35Number of trainees employed in addition to the ACP crew-membersCreates additional local jobs Possible to hire national trainees in addition to ACP crew-members 1Possible to hire two national trainees in addition to ACP crew-members 2Seven national trainees should be hired in addition to ACP crew-members 3Origin of the crew National crew-members are more beneficial than crew-members from all ACP countriesCrew-members can be from all ACP countries 1Crew-members can be from all ACP countries, including the host country 2Crew-members must be from the host country 3167Appendix 1. List of the provisions extracted for the analysis in Section 6, as well as ranking and associated scores of their respective sub-provisions (continued).Provision Sub-provision Rationale Potential value (by order of increasing benefit to host countries) ScorePenalties in case no ACP crew-members were employedIncreasing penalties encourage the hiring of ACP crew-members (if possible, from the country)To be determined 1200 EUR/vessel per crew-member if <35% of total crew 230% of crew-member wage 350% of crew-member wage 460% of crew-member wage 520 USD/day 620 EUR/day 7600 EUR/month 7100% of wage 830 EUR/day 8200% of crew-member wage 9Suspension of license 10Environment Programs such as waste reduction and promotion of responsible practices.More environmental programmes are more beneficial (increases responsibility of industry)Waste reduction programme; responsible fishing 1Bycatch handling; combat IUU 1Waste reduction programme; combat IUU 1Waste reduction programme; responsible fishing; bycatch handling 2Habitat protection; responsible fishing; bycatch handling 2Habitat protection; waste reduction programme; responsible fishing; bycatch handling3Inspection Inspections at port Stronger requirements are more effective (e.g., to control illegal gears)Inspection only on demand of local authorities 133% of vessels must be inspected upon receiving license; additional inspection on demand of local authorities2Inspection mandatory before receiving license 3Inspection mandatory anytime 4Inspection mandatory once a year and after any alteration of the vessel 4Inspection mandatory before leaving the EEZ if not landing locally 5Inspections at sea Stronger requirements are more effective (e.g., to control illegal gears)On demand 1Landing Ex-vessel price Lower prices are more beneficial (lower expenses)International market prices 1Local market prices 2Financial incentives Higher financial incentives encourage local landings (more local value added)Fee discount 1Tax exemption 2Fee discount of 5% if landing more than 25% of catch 3168Appendix 1. List of the provisions extracted for the analysis in Section 6, as well as ranking and associated scores of their respective sub-provisions (continued).Provision Sub-provision Rationale Potential value (by order of increasing benefit to host countries) ScoreFee discount of 2.5 EUR/t if landed locally (+2.5 EUR/t if sold locally) 4Fee discount of 10% if landing more than 25% of catch 5Fee discount of 10% and tax exemption/duty-free 6Fee discount of 10% and tax exemption 6Fee discount of 5 EUR/t if landed locally (+5 EUR/t if sold locally) 7Fee discount of 15% and tax exemption/duty-free 8Fee discount of 25% if landing >65% of total catch (pro rata if only landing between 16% and 65%) and tax exemption9Fee discount of 25% and tax exemption 10Notification time-frameAn intermediate notification time-frame is better (enough time for local authorities to prepare)One day in advance 130 days in advance 22 days in advance 23 days in advance 115 days in advance 25 days in advance 3Quantity Higher landing requirements are more beneficial to host country (e.g., food security, jobs creation, processing)It is possible to land catches locally 1It is encouraged to land catches locally 2A proportion of the catch must be landed locally 3Proportion to be determined 44 t/vessel 5↓     ↓7 t/vessel 824 t total 9↓   ↓12,500 t total 178 landings per year 18↓   ↓20 landings per year 2212 vessels must land their catch annually 23↓   ↓25 vessels must land their catch annually 2530 kg/GRT 26↓   ↓500 kg/GRT 38169Appendix 1. List of the provisions extracted for the analysis in Section 6, as well as ranking and associated scores of their respective sub-provisions (continued).Provision Sub-provision Rationale Potential value (by order of increasing benefit to host countries) Score25% of total catch 39↓   ↓100% of total catch 43Supervision of landingYes 1Monitoring Information to be transmitted when enteringMore accurate information is more beneficial to the host country (improved monitoring of foreign fishing activities)Notify intention to enter the EEZ 1Position/time 2Catch 3Species/catch 4Catch/position 5Catch/position/time 6Species/catch/position 7Species/catch/position/time 8Species/catch/position/presentation of product 9Species/catch/position/time/presentation of product 10Information to be transmitted when leavingMore accurate information is more beneficial to the host country (improved monitoring of foreign fishing activities)Notify intention to exit the EEZ 1Position/time 2Catch 3Species/catch 4Catch/position 5Catch/position/time 6Species/catch/position 7Species/catch/position/time 8Species/catch/position/presentation of product 9Species/catch/position/time/presentation of product 10Species/catch/position/time/number of fishing days 11Information to transmit on a regular basisMore accurate information is more beneficial to the host country (improved monitoring of foreign fishing activities)Position every 3 days 1Position everyday 2Catch/position every 7 days 3Catch/position every 3 days 4Catch/position everyday 5Catch/position/time every 3 days 6Species/catch/position every 3 days 7170Appendix 1. List of the provisions extracted for the analysis in Section 6, as well as ranking and associated scores of their respective sub-provisions (continued).Provision Sub-provision Rationale Potential value (by order of increasing benefit to host countries) ScoreCatch/position every 7 days, 2 days before calling into port, when leaving port, after transshipment, and one day before refuelling8Species/catch/position/date/time/retained and discarded bycatch/presentation of product/number of (un)successful sets every 5 days9Species/catch/position/date/time/retained and discarded bycatch/presentation of product/number of sets/hooks every 5 days9Species/catch/position/date/time/retained and discarded bycatch/presentation of product/number of (un)successful sets every 3 days10Species/catch/position/date/time/retained and discarded bycatch/presentation of product/number of sets/hooks every 3 days10Notification time-frame when enteringMore time between the notification and the entry is more beneficial (enough time for local authorities to prepare)Vague requirement 11 h prior 2↓    ↓36 h prior 8Notification time-frame when leavingMore time between the notification and the exit is more beneficial (enough time for local authorities to prepare)Vague requirement 11 h prior 2↓    ↓60 h prior 9Others The observer is authorized to contact surveillance center twice a week 1Catch must be checked when vessel is leaving the EEZ 2Satellite tracking Yes 1Observation Fee borne by the EU industry aHigher fees are more beneficial (i.e., increased funds for monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing activities)103 EUR/vessel/year 1↓   ↓43,079 EUR/vessel/year 155Number of observersA higher number of independent observers is more beneficial (increased monitoring of fishing activities)One observer must be taken onboard at request, except in case of space limitations due to security requirements1One observer must be taken onboard at request, included in crew-members2One of the crew-members may be designated as 'seaman-observer' 2One 'seaman-observer' at request 2One observer must be taken onboard at request, may be included in crew-members3One observer must be taken onboard at request 4One national scientist must be taken onboard at request 4At least 2 vessels per category must have one observer 5171Appendix 1. List of the provisions extracted for the analysis in Section 6, as well as ranking and associated scores of their respective sub-provisions (continued).Provision Sub-provision Rationale Potential value (by order of increasing benefit to host countries) ScoreMaximum 10 trips per year per category must have an observer 6One observer must be taken onboard at request, shall reach 10% of vessels7One observer must be taken onboard at request, up to 30% of vessels 9One observer must be taken onboard at request, two if necessary 1025% of vessels each quarter must have an observer 11One observer must be taken onboard 13One of the crew-members must be designated as 'seaman-observer' 14One observer must be taken onboard, included in seamen 14One observer must be taken onboard 15One observer must be taken onboard, and one biologist at request 16One observer must be taken onboard, shall reach at least 20% of vessels 17Two observers must be taken onboard 18Reporting Data input frequencyHigher frequency of input is better (higher data quality)Monthly 1Every 10 days 2Daily 3Transmission time-frameHigher frequency of transmission  is better (less time to modify the dataAfter each haul 1Vague requirement ('as soon as possible') 2By March 31st of the following year 3By the end of the year 4By September 30th each year 5Once every 6 months 6By the end of the following month every quarter 7By the end of the third month following the month in question 7Once every 3 months 8Within 2 months of the month in question 9Collected at port or within 45 days after the end of the trip 10Within 45 days after the end of the trip 10Within 45 days of the end of the month concerned 10Within 30 days after the end of the trip 11Before the end of the month after the end of the trip 11By the end of the following month 11172Appendix 1. List of the provisions extracted for the analysis in Section 6, as well as ranking and associated scores of their respective sub-provisions (continued).Provision Sub-provision Rationale Potential value (by order of increasing benefit to host countries) ScoreCollected at port or within 30 days after the end of the trip 11Before the end of the month after returning to port 11Within 3 weeks after returning to port 12Within 3 weeks after the end of the trip 12Within 15 days after returning to port 13Within 15 days of landing 13Within 15 days after the end of the trip 13Within 5 days of landing 14Collected at port or within 14 days after calling into other port, always within 30 days after the end of the trip15Collected at port or within 14 days after calling into other port 15Collected at port or within 7 days after calling into other port, always within 15 days after the end of the trip16Once a month 17Once a month, and before the end of the month after returning to port 1811th, 21st and last day of each month 19Weekly report and within 5 days of landing 20Type of information More accurate information is more beneficial to the host country (improved monitoring of foreign fishing activities)Catch 1Basic catch records 2Complete catch records 3Complete catch records and total discards 4Complete catch records and detailed retained/discarded bycatch 5Complete electronic catch records and detailed retained/discarded bycatch6Restrictions Fish size limits Yes 1Technical limits (e.g., mesh size, prohibition of cod-end doubling)Higher restrictions encourage the use of responsible fishing techniques (e.g., limited fishing effort, low juvenile catches)RFMO standards 1List of prohibited gears 2Limited number of hooks/sets 3Limited number of hooks/sets to be determined 3Mesh/net size limits 3Mesh/net size limits, doubling of (twine) cod-end authorized under specific conditions4Mesh/net size limits, no doubling of (twine) cod-end 5Mesh/net size limits and limit prohibited gears 6173Appendix 1. List of the provisions extracted for the analysis in Section 6, as well as ranking and associated scores of their respective sub-provisions (continued).Provision Sub-provision Rationale Potential value (by order of increasing benefit to host countries) ScoreTemporal restrictionsBiological rest periods are more beneficial than year-round fishingTo be determined 1In accordance with national law 2Biological rest period of 1 month every year 3Biological rest period of 2 months every year in specific zones 4Biological rest period of 2 months every year 5↓    ↓Biological rest period of 6 months every year 8Services Requirements about procurement of services (e.g., fuel and water) at domestic infrastructureLocal procurement of services is more beneficial (local value added)To be determined 1Vessels will be provided with facilities to procure supplies and services locally2Wherever possible, must seek to procure supplies and services locally 3Wherever possible, must procure supplies and services locally 4Must give preference to local supplies and services if same price/quality 5Must give preference to local supplies and services 6Must be obliged to give preference to local services 7Must procure supplies and services locally 8Transshipment Data reporting Shorter time-frame for data reporting  is better (less time to modify the dataVague requirement ('data must be reported') 1By 15th of the month following the transshipment 2Withing 15 days of the transshipment 3Within 24 h of the transshipment 4Immediately after the transshipment 5Financial incentives Weaker incentives are more beneficial (i.e., less incentive to just transship catch)Fee discount of 5 EUR/t 1Fee discount of 15% 2Tax exemption 3Information to be transmittedMore accurate information is more beneficial to the host country (improved monitoring of foreign fishing activities)Intention to transship 1Detailed information regarding transshipment 2Notification time-frameLonger time-frame gives more time to local authorities to prepare24h 1↓     ↓192h 4Number of transshipments (or tonnage)Less transshipments are more beneficial to host countries (i.e., it might, hopefully, result in higher landings)Possible outside ports (i.e., at sea) 115 per year 2174Appendix 1. List of the provisions extracted for the analysis in Section 6, as well as ranking and associated scores of their respective sub-provisions (continued).Provision Sub-provision Rationale Potential value (by order of increasing benefit to host countries) Score3 per year 35% total catch 4Encouraged 5Possible 6Forbidden 7Others 2% contributed to people in need 1Shall hand over non-transshipped catch 2Supervision of transshipmentYes 1Zone Distance to the coastHigher restrictions are more beneficial (i.e., protection of domestic fisheries and fragile habitats)Similar to locals 1Beyond -6 m isobath 2Beyond 1 nm 3↓   ↓Beyond 12 nm 16Beyond 12 nm and -20 m isobath 17Beyond 12 nm and -150 m isobath 18Beyond 15 nm 19↓   ↓Beyond 50 nm 26Beyond -100 m isobath 27Beyond -200 m isobath 28Beyond -650 m isobath 29Specific areas only 303 nm beyond determined line 31↓   ↓33 nm beyond determined line 48Restricted areas Higher restrictions are more beneficial (i.e., protection of domestic fisheries and fragile habitats)List of restricted areas 1Buffer zones around anchored fishing aggregating devices 1List of restricted areas; buffer zones around anchored fishing aggregating devices2a All fees were converted into EUR/vessel/year and were adjusted for Inflation. Therefore, scores are decreasing over time within any given agreement.

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