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Instituting power : power relations, institutional hybridity, and indigenous self-governance in Bolivia Tockman, Jason 2014

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    INSTITUTING POWER:  POWER RELATIONS, INSTITUTIONAL HYBRIDITY, AND INDIGENOUS SELF-GOVERNANCE IN BOLIVIA   by   Jason Tockman  B.S.S., Ohio University, 1994 M.A., Simon Fraser University, 2008   A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  in  The Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies  (Political Science)     THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)    October 2014  © Jason Tockman, 2014   ii Abstract   Scholars have long observed that institutions and power relations are cyclically constitutive, as institutions shape a given polity’s power relations, and the latter influence the design of institutions. This dissertation unveils how indigenous agents interact with each other, and with the state’s bureaucrats and consultants to create divergent institutional trajectories in a new institutional environment: the construction of 11 pilot institutions of indigenous self-governance in Bolivia, as provided by the 2009 Constitution. The combinations of institutional forms have most significantly been shaped by local relations of power among differently identifying indigenous agents, and by the state-determined socio-territorial boundaries that are the site of institutional construction. Each new “indigenous autonomy” combines liberal and indigenous norms, constituting a hybrid model of indigenous autonomy. Within that model we can discern a bifurcation in which some institutions are more liberal and others are more communitarian.  These observations contribute to our understanding of democracy and citizenship in contemporary Latin America as states respond to popular pressures for more rights and inclusion, in what many have called “left turns.” In terms of democracy, this study illustrates how electoral representation is complemented by communitarian democratic forms in ways that enhance Bolivia’s historically exclusionary democracy, yet how elaboration of communitarian democracy is also constrained by the party-based system of representation. Meanwhile, the Constitution’s expansion of rights has contributed to what some observers have called “post-liberal” citizenship. This investigation indicates that state-society relations in Bolivia are not well-characterized as populist, liberal or corporatist; rather, they are concomitantly plural, cyclical and reactive – which I conceive of as interest intermediation by “contentious bargaining.”  The contradictions in the construction of these “indigenous autonomies” are a consequence the changing character of the ruling party. As the Movement toward Socialism and its leader, Evo Morales, have shifted from an oppositional force to elected government, they have contended with a complex correlation of social forces and pursued a development program of resource nationalism that responds to widespread calls for economic growth and poverty reduction. In Bolivia’s contentious context, the state’s disposition with regard to indigenous self-governance has been contradictory, simultaneously enabling and constraining indigenous rights.            iii Preface  This dissertation is an original and unpublished intellectual product of the author, J. Tockman. The fieldwork reported throughout the dissertation was covered by UBC Ethics Certificate number H11-01875.   iv Table of Contents  Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ii  Preface ........................................................................................................................................... iii  Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... iv  List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. v  List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... vi  List of Acronyms ......................................................................................................................... vii  Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... x  Dedication ................................................................................................................................... xiv  Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1  Chapter I. Theoretical framework, conceptual issues ............................................................. 20 Institutions, power and hybridity .................................................................................................. 22 Indigenous peoples, rights and identification ............................................................................... 42 Diverse democracy ........................................................................................................................ 62 Citizenship: form and content ....................................................................................................... 77  Chapter II. Empirical description of indigenous autonomy in Bolivia .................................. 91 Historical context .......................................................................................................................... 93 The post-2009 legal framework for indigenous autonomy ......................................................... 103 Institutional-procedural changes underway in relation to indigenous autonomy ....................... 110 Indigenous autonomies – case studies ........................................................................................ 114 Primary cases .............................................................................................................................. 117 Secondary cases .......................................................................................................................... 191  Chapter III. Comparison of the autonomy statutes ............................................................... 208 Bolivia’s first eight indigenous autonomy statutes ..................................................................... 209 A model of indigenous autonomy, with two subtypes ................................................................ 228  Chapter IV. Analysis of indigenous rights in Bolivia ............................................................ 232 Indigenous autonomy .................................................................................................................. 233 The Constitution and secondary legislation ................................................................................ 260 The TIPNIS ................................................................................................................................. 272 Whither indigenous rights ........................................................................................................... 279  Chapter V. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 284 Institutions, power and hybridity ................................................................................................ 284 Diverse democracy ...................................................................................................................... 290 Citizenship by contentious bargaining ........................................................................................ 293 Indigenous rights ......................................................................................................................... 298 Looking forward ......................................................................................................................... 303 Lessons for the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ....................................... 304  Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 308  Appendix: Methodology and research considerations .......................................................... 332  v List of Tables    Table 1. Causal factors in the construction of indigenous self-governance ................................... 8 Table 2. Timeline of key events related to indigenous autonomy .............................................. 104 Table 3. Bolivian municipalities converting to indigenous autonomy ....................................... 116 Table 4. Socio-economic indicators of primary cases ................................................................ 119 Table 5. TIOCs of Charagua ....................................................................................................... 176 Table 6. Socio-economic factors of municipalities converting to AIOC .................................... 195 Table 7. Geography and resources of municipalities converting to AIOC ................................. 195 Table 8. Deliberative organs in autonomy statutes ..................................................................... 210 Table 9. Comparison of approved autonomy statutes ................................................................. 227 Table 10. Characteristics of indigenous autonomy in Bolivia .................................................... 229      vi List of Figures    Figure 1. Map: 11 municipalities converting to AIOCs ............................................................. 115 Figure 2. Map: AIOCs, Minerals and Hydrocarbons .................................................................. 196 Figure 3. Means of selecting authorities, by AIOC .................................................................... 216 Figure 4. Indigenous autonomies, on communitarian-liberal continuum ................................... 230  List of Acronyms  AIOC    Autonomía Indígena Originaria Campesina    Indigenous First Peoples Peasant Autonomy  ALP   Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional    Plurinational Legislative Assembly  APDHB  Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de Bolivia    Bolivian Permanent Assembly on Human Rights  APG   Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní    Assembly of Guaraní Peoples  CIDOB  Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia    Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia  CIPCA  Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado    Centre for Peasant Research and Promotion  CONAIOC  Coordinadora Nacional de Autonomías Indígena Originario Campesinas    National Coordinator of Indigenous First Peoples Peasant Autonomy  CONAMAQ  Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu    National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu  CONISUR  Consejo Indígena del Sur    Indigenous Council of the South  CPE   Constitución Política del Estado     Political Constitution of the State  CPEMB  Central de Pueblos Étnicos Mojeños del Beni    Central of Ethnic Moxeño Peoples of Beni  CPESC  Coordinadora de Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz    Coordinator of Ethnic Peoples of Santa Cruz  CPIB   Central de los Pueblos Indígenas de Beni    Central Indigenous People of Beni  CSCB   Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia    Confederation of Unionized Colonists of Bolivia  CSUTCB  Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia    United Confederation of Peasant Workers’ Unions of Bolivia  FNMCB-BS  Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas de Bolivia – Bartolina Sisa Bartolina Sisa National Federation of Peasant Women Workers of Bolivia   HDI   Human Development Index   viii ILO   International Labor Organization, United Nations  INE   Instituto Nacional de Estadística    National Institute of Statistics  INRA   Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria    National Agrarian Reform Institute  LMAD  Ley Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización     Framework Law of Autonomies and Decentralization  LPP   Ley de Participación Popular    Law of Popular Participation  MACOAS  Marka de Ayllus y Comunidades Originarias de Arax Suxta    Marka of Ayllus and First Peoples Communities of Arax Suxta  MACOJMA  Marka de Ayllus y Comunidades Originarias de Jesús de Machaca    Marka of Ayllus and First Peoples Communities of Jesús de Machaca  MAS   Movimiento al Socialismo    Movement toward Socialism  MBL   Movimiento Bolivia Libre    Free Bolivia Movement  MNR   Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario National Revolutionary Movement  MST   Movimiento Sin Tierra    Landless Workers Movement  OEP   Órgano Electoral Plurinacional    Plurinational Electoral Organ  PDCR   Proyecto de Desarrollo Concurrente Regional    Concurrent Regional Development Project  PDM    Plan de Desarrollo Municipal    Municipal Development Plan  SIFDE  Servicio Intercultural de Fortalecimiento Democrático    Intercultural Service for Strengthening Democracy  SVI   Social Vulnerability Index  TCO   Tierra Comunitaria de Origen    Ancestral Community Lands  TCP   Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional    Plurinational Constitutional Court   ix TIOC    Territorio Indígena Originario Campesino     Indigenous First Peoples Peasant Territory  TIPNIS  Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure    Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park   TSE   Tribunal Supremo Electoral    Supreme Electoral Court  TSJ   Tribunal Supremo de Justicia     Supreme Court of Justice   UNDP   United Nations Development Program  VERDES   Verdad y Democracia Social    Truth and Social Democracy     x Acknowledgements    Many people, organizations and agencies have provided me with the crucial support and guidance to carry out this research project and write this dissertation. My deepest gratitude goes to my academic supervisor, Max Cameron, who has been both patient mentor and friend throughout my doctoral studies. His tireless and punctual feedback, ceaseless advocacy, funding support, and six years of shrewd insights have made this dissertation possible, and account for a great many of its strengths. Committee members Eric Hershberg, Lisa Sundstrom, and Sheryl Lightfoot provided critical guidance and advice throughout the proposal and writing process, and each helped strengthen the text’s analysis over the course of multiple drafts. In the course of field research and subsequent publications, John Cameron has served as a tremendous and thoughtful collaborator, continuously making introductions, sharing documents, and aiding me in the nuanced interpretation of complicated political and cultural phenomena. The University of British Columbia’s Department of Political Science has provided excellent institutional support to carry out this research project. Canada’s Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) generously provided research funding, as did UBC’s Department of Political Science and Max Cameron. In Bolivia, I am thankful for the institutional backing of the Centro de Estudios Superiores Universitarios of the Universidad Mayor de San Simon (CESU-UMSS) in Cochabamba, and the kind assistance of CESU-UMSS associates Fernando Mayorga and Manuel De La Fuente.  In La Paz and Sucre, the Fundación TIERRA provided extensive support over the course of my research, sharing office space, technical documents, analysis of the construction of indigenous autonomy, and numerous key contacts with whom I conducted interviews. Among the many talented staff members of the Fundación TIERRA, I note the valuable assistance and  xi collaboration of Paulino Guarachi, Wilfredo Plata, Gonzalo Colque, Juan Pablo Chumacero, Eusebio Cordero Rodríguez, María Elena Mamani Gonzáles, Jorge Salgado, Carmen Gonzales, Efrain Tinta Guachalla, and Juan Aguilar Durán. Important support was also offered by the Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA), especially Xavier Albó and Magaly Gutiérrez. Numerous others received me cordially and were very generous with their time, including Maria Teresa Zegada and Pablo Regalsky, as well individuals from municipalities converting to AIOC but whose identity remains confidential due to the ethical guidelines to which this research project is committed. The research that informed this dissertation was undertaken through the free, prior and informed consent of local indigenous authorities in each of the municipalities where research took place: Tarabuco, Mojocoya, Jesús de Machaca, Charagua, and Curahuara de Carangas. This dissertation also owes a debt of gratitude to the 72 people that granted me interviews, as well as 11 individuals who provided constructive feedback on my preliminary findings in October and November of 2013 (research ethics guidelines preclude my identification of these participants). I am tremendously grateful to the many mid- and high-level officials at Bolivia’s Ministry of Autonomies that were extremely generous with their time, and provided useful insight into the subject of this research project, as well as access to key documents. As detailed throughout this text, their task of overseeing not just the construction of indigenous autonomy but the other territorial entities as well is immensely complex, yet under-resourced and frequently besieged by multiple critics; however, they generally made themselves available for interviews, and shared data and resources with surprising transparency. Understanding the specificities of Bolivian politics would not have been possible without the observations of numerous Bolivians and Bolivianists. Linda Farthing, the late Ben Kohl, and  xii Félix Muruchi, friends who have for more than a decade explained aspects of Bolivian life and politics to me, returned once more to hone my understanding of contemporary events in the present investigation. Those fortunate enough to have known Ben’s wit, creativity, extraordinary kindness, and passion for Bolivia mourn his unexpected passing in July of 2013.  For their camaraderie in Cochabamba as I undertook field work, I thank Ben McKay, Isaac Gray, Lilian Mihaić, Christian Rodrigo Morales, and Mareika Winchell. I enjoyed illuminating discussions, alongside the friendship, of Cecilia Chacón, Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, Sarah Hines, Pere Morell i Torra, Rachel Godfrey Wood, Paul Hilborn, Stewart Prest, and Elise Gadea. Jonathan Alderman kindly shared numerous useful observations about Charazani. Santiago Anria, Alexandra Tomaselli, Agustín Goenaga, and Adrian Gurza Lavalle each provided constructive feedback on iterations of my writing that eventually made its way into this text.  My dearest friends Cedar Morton and Myka Tucker-Abramson paired sustained emotional support with intellectual critique of my research, from their neighboring disciplines; and I appreciate Cedar’s spontaneous, post-defence offer to generate the high-quality map that appears on page 115. Reflections from the backcountry trails of British Columbia and Washington state, usually a few paces from Cedar, Myka, or Randall White, brought needed balance to long hours behind a computer screen. In the front country, the endless love and nourishment of Chelsey Blair served as constant inspiration to generate the pages of this dissertation; completion would have languished many months later without her support. Finally, underlying this research endeavor and the normative questions of equality and rights for which this text seeks to shed light, is the lifelong encouragement and progressive social critique of my Mother, Peg Meis.  As Pierre Bourdieu reminds us, “the stuff of the social is made of relations, not individuals.” A dissertation, as a social product, cannot be conceived outside of the communities and milieu  xiii inhabited by the author. In this case, the people and organizations mentioned above contributed in innumerable ways to the development of this text. As the author, I am indebted to each of them – grateful for the privilege of translating their inputs into this dissertation. Of course, any errors in fact, observation or analysis are mine alone.    xiv        To Ben Kohl, Linda Farthing and Félix Muruchi, who kindly welcomed me to Bolivia and helped me to understand the social worlds in which I found myself.    1 Introduction  “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please in circumstances they choose for themselves; rather they make it in present circumstances, given and inherited. Tradition from all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they appear to be revolutionising themselves and their circumstances, in creating something unprecedented, in just such epochs of revolutionary crisis, that is when they nervously summon up the spirits of the past, borrowing from them names, marching orders, uniforms, in order to enact new scenes in world history, but in this time-honoured guise and with this borrowed language.” Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (2002: 19-20)  As Marx professes, agents and the power relations between them emerge from institutions (or circumstances), but they also shape them. That institutions structure and reconfigure relations between key social groups, including state agents, has been demonstrated by extensive social science research.1 What is less well established, and is the focus of this dissertation, is how the social agents acted upon by a society’s primary institutions and the power dynamics between them return to influence the character of future institutions. This dissertation illustrates the cyclic constitution of institutions and power relations. It also unveils how distinct indigenous agents interact with each other and with the state – including, importantly, government bureaucrats and consultants – to create divergent institutional trajectories. These two socio-political processes are examined in a novel institutional environment: the construction of new institutions of indigenous                                                 1 The capacity of institutions to configure power dynamics can be read – albeit from quite different theoretical orientations – through Karl Marx’s general class analysis and, more specifically, his depiction of commodity fetishism (1867); Émile Durkheim’s notion of a “social solidarity” that binds together society’s groups, and, in what he saw as a threat to that solidarity, his account of how the disintegration of established class and caste institutions can give rise to “miserable squabbling” or “class war” (1984 [1893]: 310-311); Max Weber’s Protestant ethic thesis (1930); Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of habitus (1977); Douglass North’s broad oeuvre on institutions (see, especially, North 1990), Ruth and David Collier’s study of the legacy of labour incorporation in Latin America (1991); Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio’s work on “new institutionalism” (1991); and Robert Putnam’s writing on social capital (1993).   2 self-governance in Bolivia.2 Contrary to rationalist views of institutions as “given” or efficient mechanisms that reward utility maximization behaviour and tend to produce equilibrium outcomes, institutions are revealed by this study as taken-for-granted and culturally specific rules or symbolic systems that provide agents with interpretive frames that shape social behaviour, and which operate, as Marx observed (1867), “behind the backs” of the those that reproduce, revise or construct them. Historical institutionalist accounts of “critical junctures” and “path dependencies” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Collier and Collier 1991; Mahoney and Snyder 1999) are useful in depicting patterns of institutional durability and change; however, the most relevant factors in institution (re)formation are the particular cultural rules or symbolic systems which find expression in shared “cognitive scripts” that are imbued with meaning and  define for agents the social world in which they find themselves (Meyer and Rowan 1991 [1977]; DiMaggio and Powell 1991). In other words, new institutional structures that are generated tend to reflect and reproduce agents’ mental structures (Bourdieu 1977).                                                  2 My conception of the term “indigenous” largely follows James Anaya’s definition: “the term indigenous refers broadly to the living descendents of preinvasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest” (1996: 3). Anaya’s conception uses much of the same phraseology as that of the Cobo Report – which has been accepted by the United Nations and various scholars (Xanthaki 2007: 9) – although he gives greater attention to historical and present-day power relations between indigenous peoples and non-indigenous people. The only modification I make is that Anaya’s definition does not recognize that in some cases the social relations of land ownership and inhabitation are more complicated than is captured by the characteristic of “now dominated by others.” This is particularly the case in a region or country, such as the highlands and central valleys of Bolivia, where the majority of the population is descended from pre-invasion inhabitants. In this text, when referring to indigenous communities, I privilege the term indigenous peoples, rather than people or indigenous populations, as the former generally implies “a greater and more positive recognition of group identity and corresponding attributes of community” (Anaya 1996: 48), and the “right to self-determination under international law” (Deer 2010: 19). The term peoples has been embraced by many indigenous people, scholars, and advocates, and has factored significantly into international and intrastate efforts to advance the right to self-determination to include not just sovereign states but also indigenous nations, while states have historically resisted applying the term peoples to indigenous and other ethnic groups out of concern that it could permit a greater degree of self-determination than they wish to concede, or even, allegedly, secession (Anaya 1996; Lâm 2000; Thornberry 2002). Chief Ted Moses of Grand Council of the Cree elaborates: “They [governments] have called us populations, ‘communities’ ‘groups’, ‘societies’, ‘persons’, ‘ethnic minorities’; now they have decided to call us ‘people’ in the singular. In short, they will use any name they can think of, as long as it is not peoples with an ‘s’. They are willing to turn universality on its head to avoid recognizing our right to self-determination.” (quoted in Thornberry 2002: 41-42). According to Ronald Niezen, there are an estimated 300 million indigenous people from around 4000 “distinct societies” (2003: 4).  3 In contemporary Bolivia, novel institutions of indigenous self-governance are being constructed by indigenous agents who are mobilizing, adapting, and combining inherited institutional forms, consistent with Émile Durkheim’s postulation that “it is a very general fact that new institutions are shaped initially in the mould of previous institutions” (1984 [1893]: 138). However, the particular combinations of institutional forms, this dissertation finds, reflects local relations of power among indigenous agents, as well as the state-determined socio-territorial boundaries that are the site of institutional construction. More broadly, as elaborated below, these institutional transformations provide important insights into the quality and dimensions of democracy, the character of citizenship, and the implementation of international indigenous rights norms in contemporary nation-states that have a legacy of colonization and in which there exists significant contestation over plural sovereignty.3  Institutions and power in Bolivia’s indigenous politics 4 More than any other part of the world, in the past two decades Latin America has experienced social upheavals that have changed states’ relations with indigenous peoples. Partly linked to what some have called “left turns” (Cameron and Hershberg 2010), an array of insurgent social groups – often appealing to indigenous rights and ways of being – have challenged the free market doctrine of neoliberalism,5 and demanded greater space for democratic participation and                                                 3 By “plural sovereignty,” I refer to those national contexts in which the unitary claim of state sovereignty is now contested by multiple indigenous nations that exist within, or across, official national boundaries; see Lightfoot (2013). 4 As elaborated in Chapter I, my conception of power comes closest to that of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault: as a productive and relational force that pervades society, transmits meaning, and enables groups to realize their interests. 5 The ideology of neoliberalism draws upon classical formulations of economic liberalism (i.e. Adam Smith, David Ricardo) and places them into a global context. Neoliberalism views the individual as the central unit of society and the private sector as the primary arbiter of political and economic affairs. David Harvey characterizes it as a “…theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private  4 political inclusion. Indigenous peoples have mobilized to secure greater self-determination and control of territory and natural resources, have demanded a shift away from elite-based democratic practices, and, frequently, have called for greater state control over natural resource extraction toward developmentalist and redistributionist ends. Pressures from below have, to varying degrees and with differing outcomes, pushed Latin American countries to experiment with a range of novel mechanisms of democratic participation, means of recognizing indigenous rights, and strategies for achieving more equitable economic development. These experiments entail both the reformulation of existing institutions and the creation of new forms of democratic participation (Cameron, Hershberg and Sharpe 2012).  One of the most interesting cases that captures each of these transformations is Bolivia – recently renamed the Plurinational State of Bolivia –  in which social movements prevailed in December 2005 by electing as President Evo Morales, a coca growers union leader who claims an indigenous Aymara identity, breaking with an elitist, pacted democracy that had prevailed since the country’s 1982 return to democracy, following almost two decades of dictatorship. At the centre of Bolivia’s social, political and economic reforms, a new Constitution, approved in 2009 by 61% of voters, authorizes the construction of novel institutions of indigenous self-governance called “indigenous autonomies.” Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution (Constitución Política del Estado, CPE) created a new possibility for indigenous self-governance by which municipalities and indigenous territories can convert into a government-sanctioned “territorial                                                                                                                                                        property rights, free markets, and free trade… State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit.” (2005: 2). Attendant policy prescriptions include fiscal austerity, privatization, deregulation, liberalization of foreign investment, and free trade of goods, services and capital.  5 entity” known as autonomía indigena originaria campesina, AIOC.6 Eleven municipalities have chosen this option for greater self-governance, seven of which have completed the legally specified process of drafting and approving “autonomy statutes,” local-level texts that elaborate novel structures, processes and names of local government. Meanwhile, most of Bolivia’s municipalities with an indigenous majority – more than 200 (Albó and Romero 2009; Colque 2009) – have thus far not pursued indigenous autonomy.7 This dissertation is based upon 10 months of field work in the municipalities undergoing conversion (detailed in the Appendix), complementing those positive cases with an examination of why most majority-indigenous municipalities have not opted to convert – at least, not as of the time of this study.  At the centre of its analysis, this dissertation studies these new institutions of indigenous self-governance, the multiplicity of agents involved in initiating and carrying out the processes of constructing them, and the political agendas of participants in these processes. It asks three principal questions about the construction of indigenous autonomy in Bolivia:  1. In the design of institutions of indigenous autonomy, what are the existing models and practices upon which these new institutions draw?   2. What are the emergent forms or trajectories of local indigenous self-governance, and what factors most significantly account for observable variations.  3. Why is the implementation of indigenous self-governance, and the exercise of indigenous rights more generally, being simultaneously enhanced and impeded in Bolivia?                                                   6 Throughout this text, I use the terms indigenous autonomy, autonomía indigena originaria campesina, and AIOC interchangeably. AIOC translates into English as Indigenous First Peoples Peasant Autonomy. 7 As elaborated in Chapter IV, seven other municipalities endeavored to convert to indigenous autonomy in 2009, but were unable to complete the requirements to initiate the process (Tockman, Cameron and Plata 2012). In 2013, two additional municipalities, San Miguel de Velasco and Gutiérrez, initiated conversion to indigenous autonomy (Fundación TIERRA 2013a).   6 In terms of institutional design, this analysis finds that those municipalities that have begun conversion combine liberal conventions and indigenous norms and procedures, normas y procedimientos propios, in varying ways that have produced distinctions in institutional trajectories. What all of the incipient AIOCs share is a combination of those norms, constituting a hybrid model of indigenous autonomy. However, one of this dissertation’s central findings is that within that single model, we can discern a bifurcation as some indigenous autonomies have emerged as more liberal and municipal,8 incorporating mechanisms for universal secret balloting and maintaining an executive authority whose power is not offset by a deliberative assembly based on pre-colonial indigenous norms;9 while others are more communitarian, embracing more collectivist governance structures and processes and prioritizing a communal development orientation. I characterize the resulting indigenous autonomies as constituting two subtypes which occupy distinct positions along a continuum from more liberal to more communitarian.  Why do we see this variation in institutional trajectories? As depicted in Table 1, this bifurcation can be traced back through (1) local relations of power among peoples with varying modes of indigenous identification, and (2) Bolivia’s internal socio-territorial boundaries, to the critical juncture of state-making – the 1952 National Revolution.10 That major state project of                                                 8 “Liberal” refers to both the Lockean values of liberty, individual rights and private property, and the set of political institutions and practices that have come to be associated with liberalism, namely the separated powers of executive, legislative and judicial authority, political parties, majority rule, and universal secret balloting. “Municipal” refers to Bolivia’s system of municipalities, as created by the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (LPP) and subsequently modified by constitutional and legal reforms. 9 In Bolivia, the creation of 250 new municipalities under the 1994 LPP was the point of entry of liberal political institutions at the local level; thus, the terms “liberal” and “municipal” are frequently linked in this text – sometimes hyphenated as “liberal-municipal.” The intention here is not to conflate the two, or suggest that the proliferation of municipalities across rural Bolivia signifies a simple implementation of liberal principles. The decentralizing reforms of the LPP were complex and served many purposes, not all of which were liberal. While the LPP did bring to rural Bolivia “certain standardized and westernized notions of development and government procedures,” it also recognized 15,000 community organizations and established mechanisms by which those groups oversaw local government activities in ways that can be characterized as more collective than individualistic (Kohl and Farthing 2006: 137). However, the pairing of liberal and municipal is useful here because decentralization had a strongly liberal character, and because both contrast sharply with communitarian norms and procedures. 10 As Centellas notes, the 1952 Revolution is “the reference point for transformative politics in Bolivia” (2013: 92).  7 the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) party, its attendant nation-building efforts to assimilate indigenous peoples into Bolivian society, interpellating11 them as peasants (campesinos) with a common national mestizo identity,12 combined with the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (LPP) that dramatically expanded Bolivia’s system of municipalities, have significantly shaped the indigenous preferences for and practices of self-governance being expressed today. Here, paraphrasing Marx (2002), we observe indigenous peoples making their own history, yet doing so in circumstances of particular and consequential historical contexts. The principal circumstances, or causal mechanisms, that have most influenced the institutions of indigenous self-government are: (1) relations among the indigenous peoples with varying modes of identification – principally as peasants or indigenous peoples – which shaped the correlation of local political forces, and (2) specific socio-territorial geographies – most significantly, the municipal boundaries that were constructed through the decentralization policies of the Law of Popular Participation.13 In other words, identity-based power relations and geography have significantly shaped the varying observable institutional forms of indigenous self-governance.                                                        11 As elaborated in Chapter I, the concept “interpellation” was popularized by French philosopher Louis Althusser, who employed the term to describe processes through which agents develop a self-awareness as subjects. Althusser saw agents’ perceptions and identities as “hailed” by ideologies that are embedded within political institutions (or state apparatuses). He illustrates this with the example of the subjectification that occurs when a police officer commands, “Hey, you there!” (1971: 174). 12 The MNR’s state-building project sought to incorporate indigenous peoples as campesinos – an officially prescribed identity that was inconsistently accepted by indigenous peoples across the country’s central valleys and Western highlands, the altiplano. 13 Bolivia’s political geographies were also significantly shaped by the 1996 Agrarian Reform Law (Ley INRA), which created indigenous territories (Tierras Comunitarias de Origen, TCOs, renamed Territorios Indígenas Originarios Campesinos, TIOCs, by the 2009 Constitution). TIOCs, like municipalities, can convert to indigenous autonomy under the 2009 Constitution; however, the process for TIOC conversion is still incipient, and thus not a central part of this dissertation’s analysis.  8 Table 1. Causal factors in the construction of indigenous self-governance14    Critical juncture Causal factor 1 Causal factor 2 Outcomes    State reform Relations of power among Socio-territorial Institutional form  local groups with varying boundaries  indigenous identities   State-making and  Modes of identification of Political geographies Preferences for   major state                   à  indigenous agents, and               + at time of establishment      à  indigenous autonomy,   programs and  consequential correlation of of new institution of and structures and   projects local forces indigenous self- processes of   government self-governance   In Bolivia   MNR nation building  Identification by local Geographical boundaries  Preference for AIOC   project – construction  agents as either campesino established by the or municipality, and  of the campesino          à or indigenous/originario,           + municipal system                à varying outcomes  and peasant unions and resulting balance of under the Law of Popular among AIOCs  within corporatist  power among local authorities Participation (1994)     structure (1952)   Identity-based and socio-territorial factors – especially the latter – also help explain why AIOC conversion has not been undertaken in most majority-indigenous municipalities, where indigenous peoples had already effectively gained control of municipal government after the 1994 reforms, rendering less appealing what is revealed to be a lengthy and uncertain process of constructing indigenous autonomy, to which the government has grown increasingly ambivalent. Further, this analysis suggests that, rather than a fixed set of practices, a particular indigenous community’s preferences for self-governance, specific structures and processes of “communitarian democracy,” and the names given to institutions and authorities are a consequence of the indigenous group’s engagement with the longue durée of state-making and major state projects. In other words, contrary to essentialized or romantic assumptions about indigenous systems of governance, this investigation finds contemporary indigenous self-                                                14 The sequencing I have delineated illustrates the relative timing of causally significant events, and is not intended to suggest that they only took place during that moment of time (nor that trends are irreversible, or that teleological forces are at play). For example, the negotiation of indigenous versus peasant identities is an ongoing process for many people and communities, occurring both before and after of the 1952 Revolution, and it continues today. What is key here is that the dominant configuration of identities had crystallized into a particular correlation of social forces, prior to the time that the new institutions of indigenous autonomy were established.  9 governance to be historically and culturally contingent, surely informed by pre-colonial norms and procedures, but also, and importantly, emerging through processes that are negotiated between indigenous peoples and the states in which they live.15  A recurrent observation of this thesis – which informs the related literatures on democracy, citizenship, institutional change, and indigenous rights – is that the new institutions of indigenous autonomy being constructed in Bolivia express a hybridization of liberal conventions and indigenous norms and procedures – although these processes are, in general, highly contested. The observation of syncretism by itself is not particularly remarkable to scholars of indigenous politics; indeed, cultural and institutional hybridity have been the subject of considerable scholarly analysis (e.g. Bhabha 1994; García Canclini 1995; Goodfellow and Lindemann 2013). The more intriguing contributions of this dissertation arise from the possibility of studying how and why distinct hybridized institutional forms materialize in a novel environment, providing the investigator with an experimental context in which to study institutional design. Two important findings about institutions emerge. First, the “new” institutions are based on existing ones, which, in their general structure, combine communitarian (indigenous and/or peasant) and liberal-municipal norms to create varying hybridized forms – but, for reasons discussed below, always with a preponderance toward the latter. In a country awash with what Guillermo O’Donnell (1996a) and Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky (2004) describe as “informal” institutions, we observe indigenous peoples fusing what have until now been institutions at the margin of the state – thus previously informal – with those already sanctioned, expressing an institutional hybridity. Yet, by their legal design these “new”                                                 15  Such a conception of self-governance is quite distinct from most notions of sovereignty, as well as a “maximalist” conception of self-determination, falling closer to what Xanthaki (2007) and Lightfoot (2013) describe as a “political” definition of self-determination in which the right to determine the political status of indigenous peoples is negotiated with the state or states in which they live.   10 institutions incorporate many key functions of the state; as such, indigenous autonomy governmentalizes indigenous protagonism, in a Foucauldian sense, toward the state’s ends. Ministry officials, government-funded consultants (técnicos), and accompanying non-governmental organizations (NGOs) participated extensively in the processes of elaborating indigenous statutes of autonomy, entering into local debates over autonomy as the privileged bearers of a specialized type of knowledge – a state-sanctioned understanding of highly complex constitutional and legal provisions – which conferred upon them a powerful influence into local deliberations. In so doing, government and NGO representatives served, sometimes unwittingly, as the front-line agents of transmission in the state’s ambitions to harmonize the incipient indigenous autonomies and to implant state functions within the autonomy statutes.  Second, the finer-grained distinctions in institutional form are a consequence of the socio-territorial frontiers and identity-based local relations of power mentioned above. In terms of the former, the decentralization and municipalization of the LPP have been consequential in reconfiguring the political horizons of today’s leading political agents, which has for some created the particular local context in which institutions of self-governance are designed, and for others attenuated interest in conversion to indigenous autonomy. The latter question of identity and power relations illustrates how indigenous self-understandings shape the forms that new institutions take by framing, in culturally specific ways, the options that are opened or closed. Power relations work through these interpretive processes, through the discourses they enable or hinder. In those municipalities where the dominant identity group is indigenous (indígena) or First Peoples (originario), institutional structures and processes are designed with deliberative assemblies at their core and communitarian development is prioritized; in contrast, in those municipalities where peasant identities dominate, the design of indigenous self-governance  11 reinscribes the influence of the peasant unions, maintains a strong local executive authority, and expresses broader priorities for development, not as focused on the communitarian. The specifics of institutional design emerge as influenced more by existing cognitive scripts, or mental structures, of the agents involved in the processes of construction, than by purposive intent, the motive of utility maximization, or the achievement of a functional equilibrium. Moreover, the correlation of forces among agents vying for local power also proved to be the most explanatory factor in determining the relative rate of statute elaboration, against rival hypothesis such as cultural-demographic, geographic, or socio-economic variation. In the realm of democratic theory, this investigation contributes to an understanding of the coexistence of representative, participatory and communitarian dimensions of democracy, which has been characterized by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2004) and José Luis Exeni (2012) as “demodiversity,” demodiversidad. However, Santos and Avritzer (2005) argue that with the proliferation of liberal democracy since the 1970s, demodiversity has been declining, and that a low-intensity liberal democracy has become established as globally hegemonic due to its compatibility with neoliberalism. The complementarity and tensions of these dimensions of democracy are evident in Bolivia, where we see that the three forms of democracy exist not merely at different levels of government, but overlap with one another. This is illustrated by some of the AIOCs’ combination of representative and communitarian modes of selecting authorities, as well as seven indigenous circumscriptions in the Plurinational Legislative Assembly (formerly, Bolivia’s Congress) that are chosen by indigenous peoples, albeit through a process mediated by a non-indigenous state apparatus and political parties. While the system of representation – of elected officials, based on universal secret balloting and competition between political parties – continues to account for most policy outcomes, representation is  12 complemented by communitarian and participatory forms in ways that enhance Bolivia’s historically exclusionary democracy. However, it is evident in the elaboration of indigenous autonomy that communitarian democracy is also constrained by the political party-based system of representation. This is most apparent in the efforts by the ruling party of President Morales – the Movement toward Socialism (MAS), a self-conceived “instrument” of Bolivia’s social movements – to maintain its influence at the local level, including by running its own candidates against those chosen through local assemblies according to normas y procedimientos propios, as well as in the MAS’s interventions into the selection of the candidates that fill indigenous circumscriptions. The Bolivian narrative affirms Santos and Avritzer’s claim of the dominance of representative democracy, and suggests that, despite the compatibility of dimensions of democracy, tensions are likely to materialize in cases where the communitarian is being reasserted.   With regard to citizenship, novel rights and responsibilities have been codified in most of the autonomy statutes that have been elaborated to date. The expansion of citizenship at the level of the AIOC reflects and is consistent with the commonplace official pronouncements of “plurinational” citizenship, yet it is important to emphasize both the gains and limitations of that discourse. To be sure, the Constitution’s broad recognition of indigenous rights,16 their incorporation into a new citizenship regime that discursively elevates the indigenous as the “paradigmatic citizen” (Canessa 2012b: 204), and the acceptance of asymmetrical rights and responsibilities are important advances in indigenous rights, and the government’s declared commitment to these goals creates new expectations with likely future effects. However, this                                                 16 The centrality of indigenous autonomy to plurinationalism has often been emphasized by government officials, such as former Vice Minister of the Ministry of Autonomies, Gregorio Aro, who frequently stated that “without indigenous autonomies there is no plurinational state” (John Cameron 2011, from seminar at CESU-UMSS, November 24, 2011).  13 dissertation finds that actually existing plurinationalism bears an unexpectedly strong resemblance to the multiculturalism of the 1990s, in that cultural recognition is extended, while the newly opened spaces for political participation are progressively constrained within the government’s “predefined limits to what can be achieved” (Medeiros 2001: 419), that is to say, within parameters that do not challenge the dominant party’s hegemonic aspirations or prevailing economic interests. While features like asymmetrical rights and responsibilities speak to some movement away from a strictly liberal frame and suggest something of a “post-liberal” citizenship, it is difficult to conceive of Bolivia’s emergent state-society relations as either communitarian or corporatist.17 However, nor does the specter of populism seem an adequate description of Bolivian politics, owing to both the numerous social movements organized from below that have managed to sidestep the mobilizational influences of the country’s charismatic leader, and the MAS’s permeability to “popular input in areas where civil society is strong and has mechanisms to arrive at collective decisions” (Anria 2014).18 Eluding easy characterization, the form of interest intermediation in contemporary Bolivia remains a disorderly affair that is concomitantly plural, cyclical and reactive, which I will characterize as “contentious bargaining,” to borrow a term from Santiago Anria (2010: 104). This brings us to the third question posed above: why is the construction of indigenous autonomies, and the exercise of indigenous rights more generally, simultaneously being enhanced and impeded in Bolivia? This study finds that contradictions evident in the                                                 17 Corporatism, in contrast with pluralism, is a system of interest intermediation that vertically links officially sanctioned and controlled interest groups to the institutions of the state. These class-based “peak associations,” most commonly including business, labour and peasant groups, are exclusive channels for involvement in state’s decision making and receipt of subsidies, while they provide support and legitimation for the state. Implemented in most Latin American states in the middle decades of the 1900s, the corporatism model faded from the region’s politics in the 1980s and 1990s, deliberately replaced by neoliberalism’s “more atomized or individuated set of state-society relations” (Yahsar 2005: 57), and as a consequence of the surge of broader, non-class-based social movements.  18 I follow Kenneth Roberts in his conceptualization of populism as not linked to any particular socioeconomic policy set, but as “the top-down political mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge elite groups on behalf of an ill-defined pueblo, or ‘the people’” (2007: 5).  14 implementation of indigenous autonomy are most significantly a consequence the changing character of the MAS Party as it has shifted from an oppositional force to the government itself. It traces how union leader Evo Morales and his political party capitalized on sustained social movement mobilizations against Bolivia’s neoliberal program and won the Presidency in 2005 on an anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist platform. The campaign promises and subsequent discourse of the Morales administration and the MAS have prominently featured, inter alia, the promotion of citizenship rights and democratic inclusion for Bolivia’s long-marginalized indigenous majority.19 However, in the course of two terms in office, Morales and the MAS have shifted away from many of the central demands articulated by social movements, especially indigenous social movements, enacting Marx’s lament that appears in this chapter’s epigraph. This has occurred for two reasons: (1) the electoral imperatives of being no longer an oppositional social organization but an elected government that wants to retain power in a diverse and conflictual political terrain, and (2) the party’s development program, which attempts to respond to widespread calls for economic growth and poverty reduction. In response to what Marx called an epoch of “revolutionary crisis” – in this case dramatic and protracted social movement mobilizations that “swept away an atrophied neoliberal political order” (Hylton and Thomson 2007: 144) –, we observe Morales and the MAS “summon up the spirits of the past” (Marx 2002: 19) both in their discursive borrowing of names from pre-colonial indigenous vocabularies, and in their reenactment of much of the “national-popular” state-led development program of the MNR following the 1952 Revolution (see Zavaleta 2008[1986]). Having secured                                                 19 Bolivia’s population is frequently characterized as more than 50% indigenous, both within the country and by international observers; however, this question is contentious, especially within Bolivia, and will be discussed at length in Chapter II.  15 political hegemony, the MAS, rather than returning to the ayllu20 or a seeking to implement a socialist utopia, has pursued the next phase of development of a popular and more productive capitalism – this time with an Andean inflection. In this context, the party’s development agenda and electoral imperatives sometimes conflict with a project of indigenous autonomy. Thus, the new institutions that indigenous peoples demanded, and for which they won early discursive and some material support from the “plurinational” state, are now being constructed in a political arena in which the correlation of forces – both locally and nationally – is distinct from that which existed a decade ago. This study suggests that one of the greatest determinants of the implementation of indigenous autonomy will be whether the MAS and its leadership promotes, impedes, or merely ignores its elaboration. In the context of the contentious bargaining that defines Bolivian politics, the disposition of the MAS will depend, to a large extent, on whether indigenous social movements prevail in their mobilizational efforts and convince the party and its leadership to enhance indigenous self-determination.  Outline of the dissertation Chapter I commences with an exposition of key theoretical debates related to indigenous institutions of self-governance and the power relations that are constituted by and consequently shape them, and in the process addresses several conceptual and contextual issues. My theoretical starting point is the literature on institutions and institutional change, which includes a brief review of concepts such as critical junctures and path dependency that will be used throughout the thesis (North 1990; Collier and Collier 1991; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Hall and Taylor 1996; Schmidt 2008; Thelen and Mahoney 2009). That foundation sets the stage for                                                 20 In the Andes, the ayllu is a kinship- and territory-based socio-political form of pre-colonial origin. Historically, many ayllus were geographically discontinuous and spanned several ecological zones, which contributed to the maintenance of food security in the face of the adverse environmental conditions (Colque and Cameron 2010).  16 an important contribution of this text: although existing institutions – both formal and informal (O’Donnell 1996a; Helmke and Levistky 2004) – are key to understanding the emergent indigenous autonomies, institutional hybridity (Goodfellow and Lindemann 2013) better explains why indigenous self-governance looks the way it does in contemporary nation-states. The exploration of institutions next turns to the dissertation’s central question of how they shape and are shaped by power relations, both in terms of state-society relations, and relations among various social sectors, drawing especially on Marx (1867), Bourdieu (1977), and DiMaggio and Powell (1991). I then place the institutional scholarship in dialogue with questions of sovereignty, self-determination and self-governance from the indigenous rights literature (Stavenhagen 2000; Xanthaki 2007; Lightfoot 2013), arguing that what we see in Bolivia is best understood as accentuated self-governance, rather than indigenous sovereignty. It is farther still from self-determination. Along the way, these discussions will intersect with: sociological and cultural studies scholarship on hybridity (e.g.; Bhabha 1994; Hall 1994; García Canclini 1995; Rivera Cusicanqui 2012) and identity (DuBois 1969 [1903]; Foucault 1978; Calhoun 1995; Connolly 2002; Canessa 2012); critical analyses of projects of state formation (Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Scott 1998); studies of geography and territory and the effects of decentralization on local institutions (Cameron, J. 2010a; Ó Tuathail 2010; Diaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose 2011); and some broad sociological questions posed by Durkheim and Pierre Bourdieu. All of the above, finally, sets the stage for specific debates within the literatures on the quality and diversity of democracy (O’Donnell, Vargas Cullell and Iazzetta 2004; Santos 2004; Seele and Peruzzotti 2009; Cameron and Luna 2010) and citizenship (Marshall 1950; Yashar 2005) as they speak to questions of institutions of indigenous self-governance, as well as how democracy and citizenship are being modified by observable practices of indigenous self-governance.   17 From that theoretical and conceptual foundation, the historical and descriptive Chapter II then elucidates the particular context in which new institutions of indigenous self-governance are unfolding in Bolivia. A brief historical overview is provided to situate the narrative of the contemporary changes that are taking place in that country, the locus of which is the 2009 Constitution. The novel legal framework derived from the Constitution is then reviewed, with careful attention to the procedural and institutional changes underway in relation to indigenous self-governance. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of what I assess are the most instructive cases – Jesús de Machaca, Mojocoya, Tarabuco, Charagua, and Curahuara de Carangas – and a more cursory analysis of seven secondary cases.21 Methodologically, this chapter is grounded in process tracing, by which I seek to elucidate the key causal mechanisms that led to particular outcomes in each case (George and Bennett 2004). Chapter III then provides a deeper empirical investigation into the new institutions of indigenous self-governance by comparing the autonomy statutes elaborated to date. This involves a close textual reading of eight autonomy statutes – those of Mojocoya, Charagua, Pampa Aullagas, Totora, Chipaya, Charazani, and two from Jesús de Machaca – followed by an assessment of the variations and commonalities among them. From this inductive process, I conceive of the emergent institutions of indigenous self-governance as constituting a hybrid model of indigenous autonomy that draws on both liberal and municipal foundations and indigenous norm and procedures. As noted above, I locate each of the statutes elaborated thus far along a continuum, from more liberal to more communitarian.                                                 21 As elaborated in Chapter II, I employed two criteria in the selection of primary cases for this study: (1) I chose municipalities in which recent or historical political events indicated a likelihood of offering salient insights into the construction of indigenous autonomy, e.g. Mojocoya’s rapid approval of their autonomy statute, and Curahuara de Carangas’s rejection of a referendum on autonomy, and (2) I sought to ensure a range of cases across ethnic and geographic difference, i.e. including municipalities in which the majority of residents are varyingly Aymara, Quechua, or Guaraní, and ensuring representation from each of Bolivia’s major regions – the altiplano, central valleys, and Eastern lowlands.  18 The empirics of the previous two chapters inform a critical analysis of indigenous rights in Bolivia since 2005 – looking both at and beyond the novel elaboration of statutes and construction of AIOCs to a more holistic assessment of the state of indigenous rights. I undertake this in Chapter IV, which also incorporates two new elements: (1) a broader analysis of the 2009 Constitution and secondary legislation, and (2) a specific focus on the debate over highway construction through the Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS). Together, these analyses enable us to triangulate the official discourses and practices around indigenous rights, showcase how they have been simultaneously enhanced and constrained, and indicate the specific mechanisms that impede indigenous rights in Bolivia.  In the dissertation’s conclusion, I return to the broader theoretical questions of indigenous rights, democracy, citizenship and the overarching theme of institutions and power relations, as outlined in Chapter I. There, I further refine my argument of the historical and cultural contingency of constructing institutions of indigenous self-governance; discuss the tensions between dimensions of democracy (in the present case, principally representative and communitarian); and comment on plurinational citizenship in Bolivia. I reflect on some possible outcomes of the present-day transformations that Bolivia is navigating. Noting the results of the 1994 Law of Popular Participation, by which local power was devolved but not always in the manner anticipated by the party that initiated that devolution (the National Revolutionary Movement), it is important to acknowledge that the consequences of the political program being advanced by the MAS will be varyingly intended and unintended. I suggest that although the MAS has often acted to limit the very spaces of indigenous self-governance that it played a key role in opening, the expectations that have been engendered by the political reforms since 2006 can be expected to fuel new rounds of contestation over indigenous rights that may move the  19 political field toward greater inclusion and representation, or, alternatively, circumscribe indigenous rights. Finally, I highlight what this study indicates about countries’ fulfillment of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in particular with regard to issues of territorial geography, natural resources, and the rights of consultation and consent, and discuss the exogenous and endogenous origins of Bolivia’s politicized indigeneity.  Though the present study focuses on the construction of and changes in indigenous institutions of self-governance in Bolivia, these findings speak more broadly to a range of contemporary nation-states with both colonial histories and contemporary struggles over plural sovereignties – a contentious politics observable in much of Latin America. It is within that tension that the dissertation’s title, Instituting Power, is intended to encapsulate the dual nature of much of the region’s contemporary political change. Placing the inflection on “instituting” emphasizes its adjective form – an institutionalizing type of power. Instituting power, in this reading, characterizes a technology of government by which the state implements institutional reform to reorient power in society: to assert new “rules of the game” and construct a correlation of social forces toward new or renewed goals (e.g. economic development, the centralization of authority, the redistribution of rents), either by imposing those goals on society or by soliciting a broad range of social sectors to accept and reproduce them in a sort of Foucauldian governmentality. When “instituting” is cast as the present participle verb form, the focus shifts to one of instituting power, which describes the efforts of indigenous and other social forces to mobilize from below and prevail upon the state to create novel institutions that respond to their historical demands for rights and political inclusion. In this double sense, the state and indigenous peoples can be seen as recursively reshaping institutions and power relations from both above and below.  20 Chapter I. Theoretical framework, conceptual issues   This dissertation asks three preliminary questions about the construction of new institutions of indigenous self-governance, and then poses what the findings of that analysis signify for democracy, citizenship, and indigenous rights in Bolivia. Numerous bodies of literature are crucial for this undertaking, and it is necessary to explain how several concepts are being used. This chapter provides a theoretical and conceptual overview for each of the questions of this study. First, this dissertation asks what are the existing models and practices upon which these new institutions draw upon in the design of institutions of indigenous autonomy? Answering that requires an exploration of scholarship on institutions and institutional change, and an explication of norms and procedures that are of either a pre-colonial indigenous or liberal origins. Second, I investigate the emergent forms and trajectories of local indigenous self-governance, and those factors most significantly account for observable variations. In addition to the institutional literature, this calls upon theorization around questions of identity, hybridity, spatiality and territoriality, state formation, and the relationship between institutions and power. Third, I pose the question of why the implementation of indigenous self-governance, and the exercise of indigenous rights more generally, is being simultaneously enhanced and impeded in Bolivia. This question builds upon those literatures already mentioned, supplemented by scholarship on indigenous rights and the diffusion of international norms. In the realm of democracy, this study enters into dialogue with writing on the quality and diversity of democracy. The engagement with citizenship turns to the literatures on the form and content of citizenship, as well as conceptualization of  21 multiculturalism, plurinationalism, (post)liberalism, and (post)neoliberalism. This theoretical chapter will be followed by two largely empirical sections, Chapters II and III, and then a shift from description to analysis in Chapter IV, before returning to address these various bodies of theory in the Conclusion.  This discussion could begin by looking at diverse conceptions of democracy, the diffusion or localization of international norms of indigenous rights, or contrasting notions of citizenship (multicultural and plurinational). However, I have chosen instead to ground the present debate in theories of institutions and institutional change. To some, it will appear counterintuitive to begin to theorize processes and structures of indigenous self-governance, with their roots in pre-colonial oral traditions and processes such as the rotation of authority, by looking at theories of institutions, but I take the approach for several reasons. Most significantly, over the past three decades, the literatures on institutions has been richly developed in the social sciences, and has been effectively employed to account for changes in structures and processes. Thus, I expect that thinking about institutions and how they are created and modified will contribute to an explanation of the changes in local self-governance in Bolivia. Moreover, numerous observations during my fieldwork indicated that informal institutions and the combination of distinct institutional forms are a significant part of the story, and the extensive literature on institutions has explored these themes. Lastly, I expect that an institutional change foundation will open fruitful lines of debate that can then be picked up in the other literatures. As the following discussion illustrates, thinking about institutions, institutional change, and institutional hybridity provides both a useful theoretical point of departure, and helps explain the construction of indigenous autonomy in Bolivia.   22 Institutions, power and hybridity  Institutions and institutional change have been extensively theorized in the social sciences, and in particular in political science, to explain social phenomena and the behaviour of social agents.22 As Hall and Taylor (1996) and Thelen (1999) have outlined, we can conceive of at least three major schools of thought that have developed around the theme: rational choice, (structural-) historical, and sociological institutionalism.23 A fourth body of institutional literature – discursive institutionalism – has also emerged in recent years. Each of these are described below, followed by an integrated discussion of their utility in relation to the themes of this study.  Rationalists focus on micro-level human agency and see institutions as functional constraints that influence human behaviour. Writing from a rationalist perspective, Douglass North has offered an influential definition for institutions, which serves as a constructive starting point for conceptualizing institutions: “the rules of the game… the human devised constraints that shape human interactions” which, in turn, “structure incentives in human exchange” (1990: 3).24 For                                                 22 My use of the terms “agent” and “social agents” in place of the more common term in political science, “actor,” throughout this dissertation is deliberate, principally a consequence of an ontological position that views social structures and relations as more explanatory than individuated and strategic notions of actors generally assume, and which find their ultimate expression in rational actor theories. I concur with Bourdieu in his perception that the dispositions and preferences embodied in the “individual” agent cannot be separated from practice, that is to say from the “objective structures” that constrain and condition an agents’ “perceptions, appreciations, and actions” (1977: 85). The term is also used by O’Donnell to describe citizens in a democratic system: “In a democratic regime, citizens have the right to vote and to be elected and are thus legally defined as agents. That is, they are attributed the capacity to make choices that are deemed sufficiently reasonable as to have significant consequences, in terms of the aggregation of votes and of the incumbency of governing roles, and the capacity to exercise these rights and their correlated obligations. Moreover, this legal attribution of agency is the result of a universalistic and institutionalized wager.” (2007: 15).  23 As Hall and Taylor (1996) note, each of these aggregations is fairly broad and contains internal disagreements, thus those falling within each group are far from homogenous in their view of institutions. Moreover, many scholars have theorized across these schools of thought, bringing together rationalist, structural-historical and sociological explanations of human behaviour: Bates et. al. (1998) unite rationalist and historical institutionalism; Tarrow (1998) combines rationalist and cultural perspectives; Reno (1999) intertwines rational choice and structural world system approaches; and Spruyt (1994) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) merge rationalist with structuralist orientations.  24 Although North believes that efficient institutions create positive environments for goals such as economic growth, he does not assume that institutions are always efficient in their design; indeed, he argues that institutions  23 rationalists, institutions are key in explaining how benefits and sanctions are conveyed to “actors,” with institutions often, but not always, seen as promoting efficiency in human decisions. Rationalist perspectives are almost always deductive, making generalizations about human motivations and behaviour, such as the belief that actors are motivated by utility maximization and intentionality. As such, agents’ preferences are typically held exogenous to rationalist analyses. Meanwhile, power relations and dynamics are, for the most part, ignored or downplayed. Historical, or structural-historical, approaches scale up their understanding of institutions to processes and norms that are embedded in large, persistent structural edifices, such as political organizations, the state’s form of political economy, and global systems (i.e. centre and peripheral positions in the global economy). They view institutions as effecting human behaviour on a macro-level through social processes that, in the words of Marx (1867), take place “behind the backs” of individuals. Thus, structural-historical institutionalists do not assume human agents to be utility maximizers; rather, they see institutions as existing within power relations, which are nearly always asymmetrical. Change and persistence of institutions and other political phenomena have often been explained by structuralists and historical sociologists through the concepts “critical junctures” and “path dependence” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Collier and Collier 1991; Mahoney and Snyder 1999). Critical junctures were conceived of by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) to describe the multiple branching points that they observed in the formation of European party systems. These points were “foundational moments,” explain James Mahoney and Richard Snyder, when “political action created structures that had persistent causal effects which shaped subsequent trajectories of political                                                                                                                                                        “are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules” (1990: 16).  24 change” (1999: 16). Ruth and David Collier characterize critical junctures as periods of significant change that “dislodge” previous institutional patterns, occurring differently in varying contexts, but which produce distinct legacies (1991: 27-39). “Cleavages” and “crises” are commonly identified as such foundational moments (Collier and Collier 1991: 32). Frequently employed in conjunction with critical junctures, path dependent patterns describe situations in which, following antecedent conditions such as a significant transition or social cleavage, a particular trajectory is established and reproduced from which it is difficult for agents to deviate. This found an early expression in Paul David’s popular aphorism “one damn thing follows another” (1985: 332), but is captured most succinctly in Mahoney and Snyder’s pithy observation: “history binds” (1999: 16). Arthur Stinchcombe (1968) and Stephen Krasner (1999) provide important theoretical insights into the forces at play, attributing the reproduction of a particular path to the establishment of vested interests by powerful players, sunken costs, and capital stock in the form of “information trust and shared expectations” that exist once institutional structures are in place (Krasner 1999: 79).  Sociological institutionalists view institutions as interrelated with culture, defining institutions as symbolic systems or shared “cognitive scripts” – generally taken-for-granted by agents – that are imbued with meaning and which provide “interpretive frames” for understanding social reality (Meyer and Rowan 1991[1977]; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; see also Hall and Taylor 1996). As with structural-historical perspectives, human behaviour is a consequence of broader systems that cannot be reduced to the motives or attributes of individual agents (Meyer and Rowan 1991[1977]; DiMaggio and Powell 1991). This is not to say that individuals do not act rationally, but that rational behaviour itself is constituted socially (Hall and Taylor 1996). Thus, in their seminal sociological essay on institutions in “modern societies,”  25 Meyer and Rowan argue that embedded within institutional rules are “highly rationalized myths” that guide agents’ thoughts and actions in ways that are socially “legitimate” (1991[1977]: 42-44). In the same vein, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977) argued that what is at play is not rationality, but a social structuring of an agent’s perceptions and actions – the durable dispositions that, following Edmund Husserl, he called “habitus.” An agent’s dispositions, he argued, do not reach the level of consciousness, but rather constitute “an intentionality without intention… a practical mastery of the regularities of the world that allows one to anticipate its future without having to pose it as such” (Bourdieu 1988: 783-784).25 Where the dispositions of mental structure (habitus) correspond closely with the social structure (i.e. institutions), there is a strong tendency to reproduce the social structure, and thus achieve the “naturalization of its own arbitrariness” (1977: 164).  Social reproduction of “arbitrary” norms or behaviours takes on the appearance of being natural and self-evident, in what Bourdieu called doxa (1977: 164).26  Lastly, discursive institutionalism brings ideas, discourse, texts and interactive communication to the foreground of institutional analysis, doing so within an agent-centered framework (Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy 2004; Schmidt 2008). Coming closest to sociological perspectives, the discursive one engages with cognitive dimensions of human behaviour; however, it rejects that cognition is taken-for-granted or that it occurs behind agents’ backs.                                                 25 Bourdieu draws significantly from phenomenological theorists, most notably Edmund Husserl. His popularization of the term “habitus” comes from Husserl, who describes a “field” or “network” of “intentionalities” by which agents retain past experiences and incorporate them into their “intuitive expectations” (Lane 2000: 24). Husserl’s articulation of a “‘practical sense” of what constitutes and does not constitute an “objective potentiality” (Lane 2000: 24) is developed by Bourdieu into his explanation of human behaviour being guided by a principle of “intentionality without intention” (Bourdieu 1988: 783). Jeremy Lane likens this to the common action of placing a spoon in one’s mouth, “agents will have only a ‘practical’ sense of what they are doing; they will intuitively anticipate the position of their own mouth, for example, based on practical aptitudes they have picked up through past experience” (2000: 24). Thus, Bourdieu’s habitus is less a matter of cognition than an embodied practice that an agent is “caught up in” (Bourdieu 1997: 143). He invokes Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s analogy of a footballer’s practical knowledge of a field: for the skilled player, the field is not an “object” but an “immanent term of his practical intentions; the player becomes one with it and feels the direction of the ‘goal’” (1963: 168-169). 26 Bourdieu borrows the Greek term doxa, meaning “opinion” or “belief,” to characterize that which is taken for granted. It is “arbitrary” because the world appears to agents as self-evident, yet is only one possible understanding of reality: “the world of tradition experienced as a ‘natural world’ and taken for granted” (1977: 164).   26 Institutions, discursive institutionalists argue, are not “external-rule-following” structures, but are “structures and constructs internal to agents” that provide them with ideational and discursive abilities (Schmidt 2008: 303). Where discursive institutionalism is most distinct is that it takes “a more dynamic view of change, in which ideas and discourse overcome obstacles” of the other three institutionalisms (Schmidt 2008: 304). In this dissertation, I conceive of institutions following structural-historical and sociological approaches. This orientation is based both on a greater coherence with my inductive and empirically based methodological approach, and how productive these theoretical perspectives and the concepts with which they work are for understanding social processes that involve indigenous peoples and institutional design. In terms of methodology, this study’s evidence-driven approach to research design is highly compatible with theoretical approaches that tend toward the inductive, such as structural-historical institutionalism’s analysis of power relations and sociological perspectives’ attention to the symbolic systems that translate to distinct social meanings. Least congruent among the approaches to institutions is rational choice institutionalism, which is more likely to be oriented toward deductive theory demonstration. Relatedly, rationalism’s generalizations and assumptions about human behaviour have a problematic tendency to simplify and flatten consequential human motivations according to utility maximizing, instrumental and intentionalist logic, holding agents’ preferences as exogenous to the analysis. Yet, to the contrary, and without assuming one-dimensional or homogenous models of communal life, it is likely that those living in more collective-based communities are less motivated by the type of utility maximizing analysis assumed in rationalist analyses – including Milton Friedman’s “as if” calculus by which rational behaviour is  27 purportedly rewarded (1953: 21).27 Setting aside the extent to which rational choice modeling is effective in predicting human behaviour in general, it is much less clear that such a system of rationalist rewards operates as such in collectivist contexts. In fact, the reverse might be true. Consider, for example, that responsibilities to the community (e.g. the holding of rotating community positions, cargos) are central to the organization of society, even as they present significant burdens to the family that assumes them. In such a context, self-promoting utility maximizing behaviour may not only not always be rewarded; to the contrary, it may yield detrimental consequences (i.e. diminution of one’s reputation).  With regard to the productivity of these approaches, several observations became clear early in this investigation: that Bolivia’s Revolution of 1952 was paramount in generating divergent trajectories between indigenous people and peasants; that this cleavage has crystalized into distinct culturally based ways of understanding the world, which significantly accounts for the distinctions in the design of new institutions of indigenous self-governance; and that power relations are central to understanding both the character of indigenous autonomy and the external constraints to indigenous self-governance. Sociological and structural-historical explanations offer constructive theoretical frameworks and useful concepts to understand such phenomena. From structural-historical institutionalism, I find particularly useful the concepts of path dependency, critical juncture, and crisis as ways to understand persistence and change.28 From                                                 27 Many rational choice theorists do not assume agents to be one-dimensional actors guided solely by rationalism or utility maximization (see, especially, North 1990), yet some maintain, following Milton Friedman (1953), that because rational behaviour is rewarded in the course of social or economic interactions and irrationally behaviour is negatively sanctioned, individuals’ actions can be explained as if they are rational. In other words, rationality can still be assumed, unproblematically, as the starting point of analysis. 28 The significance of crises in political change was illustrated, for example, by Sacha Llorenti, who in 2005 described the street protests, blockades and hunger strikes that triggered Bolivia’s shift away from a strictly neoliberal form of political economy to a more state-centered mixed economy under political reformer Evo Morales: “This is a political crisis, because right now the government doesn’t represent the interests of the citizens; an economic crisis because the policies of structural adjustment and the processes of privatization have not resolved the situation of poverty, discrimination and social exclusion for Bolivians; and a social crisis because Bolivians now  28 the sociological perspective, I find particularly constructive the attention to shared interpretive frames and symbols that give agents’ actions and preferences meaning. This seems to be the best-equipped orientation to explain the centrality of culture and identity evident in the transformations that swept Bolivian society and politics from 2000-2005, as well as the widespread use of cultural symbols and resource nationalist frames in the official discourse since the 2005 election of President Morales. These two theoretical traditions also maintain a greater coherence with the type of questions raised by collective processes, such as the autonomous assemblies involved in the construction of indigenous autonomies in Bolivia. In other words, group action is better explained by theoretical perspectives that locate human agency above the level of individual motivations.  Rational actor theories are frequently based on functionalist assumptions by which institutions serve to coordinate functions and maintain existing political arrangements, presupposing that purpose can be discerned from outcome. In doing so, they are able to offer useful insights into the persistence of existing institutions, yet the those same assumptions make of rationalist theories less suited for explaining institutional origins (Hall and Taylor 1996). For example, Riker (1980) characterizes institutions as an important force of generating equilibrium in majority rule situations such as in the U.S. Congress. In Weingast and Marshall’s (1988) application of economic theories of contracts and firms to legislative institutions, they show how institutions ensure bargains among members of Congress. Terry Moe (1984), in his analysis of public bureaucracies, employs theories drawn from the economics of organization – principal-actor relations, adverse selection, and moral hazard – to elucidate how bureaucracies work;                                                                                                                                                        are in a much more vulnerable state in social terms than they were ten years ago” (Tockman 2005). Llorenti made this remark during a 2005 interview, during the resignation of pro-market President Carlos Mesa, while he was one of Bolivia’s leading human rights campaigners; at the time of writing, Llorenti is Bolivia’s Ambassador to the United Nations.  29 however, when it comes to explaining how these institutions arise in the first place, he admits that the politicians who design bureaucracies are typically motivated by electoral objectives: their “reelection chances or policy interests” and patronage to their home district (1984: 767). In other words, while rationalist theories seem to be useful in explaining observed relationships, they turn to the realm of power politics when dealing with the questions with which this dissertation occupies itself – the design of new institutions.29 As Thelen argues, rational choice analyses may be useful for sorting out the logic of a situation, but they are not a substitute for a comprehensive process-oriented analysis which “is often the only way to understand how some games came to be nested within others in the first place” (1999: 400).  Discursive institutionalism, meanwhile, may at first blush appear to be a useful approach to study processes as deliberative as the assembly-based elaboration of indigenous autonomy statutes. However, the data gathered in the course of this research project indicates that ideas and interactive communication are less consequential than power and culture. Even where new institutions are being constructed amidst a national discourse of a “process of change,” agents harken back to known institutional forms, revealing greater continuity and institutional “stickiness” than a discursive approach suggests.   Institutions and power This dissertation illustrates how agents and the power relations between them emerge from institutions, yet how agents and power dynamics also shape institutions. In other words, there is a cyclical constitution of institutions and power relations. It also reveals how indigenous agents interact with each other locally to develop divergent institutional trajectories. Culturally specific                                                 29 A latter wave of rational actor theorists took a greater interest in the origins of institutions; see especially Bates et. al. (1998).  30 symbolic systems associated with being either indigenous/First Peoples or peasant are shown to provide agents with the interpretive frames that shape their dispositions, which translates into autonomy statutes that are divergently more communitarian and more liberal. Concepts and theories drawn from historical and sociological institutional literatures make important contributions to understanding these phenomena. In terms of the cyclical constitution of institutions and power relations, historical institutionalists’ notions of critical junctures and path dependencies productively depict key elements of these processes. The 1952 Revolution was the critical juncture that established in Bolivia two durable trajectories, creating distinct subjective senses of being indigenous or peasant. Yet despite attempts by the post-1952 governments of the MNR to construct a homogenous peasant identity for indigenous peoples, indigenous self-identification continued for many, alongside or instead of their state-sanctioned identities; moreover, the line between the two was complicated by the rise of the peasant-Aymara Katarista movement of the late-1960s and 1970s (discussed at the beginning of Chapter II). Nonetheless, from 1952 forward two distinct trajectories emerged among indigenous and peasant peoples, who practiced different norms, adopted different identities, and were organized within different confederations with varying structures. Those distinct paths have proven highly durable, as characterized by Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol’s account of path dependencies: “once actors have ventured far down a particular path, they are likely to find it very difficult to reverse course…The ‘path not taken’ or the political alternatives that were once quite plausible may become irretrievably lost” (2002: 665). Sociological accounts of enduring and constantly reenacted symbolic systems, such as Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, offer alternative plausible explanations of the staying power of these distinct modes of identification.   31 Consequently, as indigenous and peasant agents have been called upon to design new institutions of indigenous self-governance, they have turned to their respective symbolic systems, and produced two distinct subtypes of indigenous autonomy. To understand these processes, as explored in Chapters II and III, it is crucial to analyze the particular symbolic systems employed by the two groups. Here we see that institutions, as symbolic systems, provide agents with cognitive scripts, taken-for-granted interpretive fames that are imbued with meaning and that define for agents their social worlds (Meyer and Rowan 1991 [1977]; DiMaggio and Powell 1991). This is not to say that agents are mechanical rule-following “cultural dopes” (Garfinkel 1967: 68), or that they are incapable of imagining other possible scenarios, but that agents have a tendency to reproduce the institutional forms that have shaped their worlds. Put otherwise, institutions establish “the very criteria by which people discover their preferences” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 11). Such an understanding of institutions was articulated in Shmuel Eisenstadt’s study of the relation of culture and social structure in “historical societies” (imperial, imperial-feudal, city-states, and patrimonial societies), in which he observed, “…different constellations of cultural codes, as carried by different types of elites, generate different institutional patterns in general and patterns of change in particular” (1980: 850). Similarly, Robert Putnam (1993), looking at 20 regional governments in Italy, showed how socio-political differences between northern and southern Italy (legacies of communal republics and a powerful monarchy, respectively, and the consequential level of “social capital”) generated distinct outcomes in institutional performance. Although the national contexts, time-frames and variables evaluated differ considerably, the present investigation into the construction of 11 new indigenous institutions in Bolivia shares Putnam’s observations about the effects of socio-cultural difference on institutional variation.30 Where Putnam found that differences in                                                 30 This dissertation is also reminiscent of Putnam’s project in that it undertakes a comparative study of “a unique  32 democratic institutional performance are linked to the vibrancy of civic engagement in Italy’s north and south, I observe differences in institutional design in Bolivia to be a consequence of the distinct norms, modes of identification, and organizational structures of indigenous peoples and peasants.  Chapter II will also profile how the particularities of new institutional forms reflect relations of power among local indigenous agents.31 Bourdieu’s (1989) conception of “symbolic power” is particularly useful for understanding how power relations operate among local agents. Symbolic power describes the ability of certain social groups – such as, in the case of Bolivia, indigenous peoples and peasants – to impose their view of the world on others. It is a “world-making” power that accrues to those “who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition” (1989: 22-23). Groups have symbolic power when they carry sufficient honor, attention, prestige or reputation to effectively shape how the social world and its array of groups are “classified” – in other words, how each group is conceived within a social order. However, the classification of groups “cannot be a construction ex nihilo,” Bourdieu insists, as it “depends on the degree to which the vision is founded on reality” (1989: 23). Bourdieu’s student and co-author, Loïc Wacquant, explains that the classificatory schemes by which society is actively constructed have a tendency to “represent the structures out of which they are issued as natural and necessary, rather than [as is actually the case] as the historically contingent fall-outs of a given balance of power between classes, ‘ethnic’ groups, or genders” (1992: 14). However, following Bourdieu, he argues, “if we grant that symbolic systems are social products that contribute to making the world, that they do not simply mirror social                                                                                                                                                        experiment in institutional reform” as powers of the central government are devolved to a sub-national level (Putnam 1993: 3). 31 In Bolivia’s contemporary environment, local non-indigenous people have not significantly factored into the pace or success in constituting systems of indigenous self-governance.  33 relations but help constitute them, then one can, within limits, transform the world by transforming its representation” (1992: 14). Thus, those that have secured significant symbolic power – in the present study, indigenous peoples and peasants – may use it as a “power of constitution” of social reality by re-classifying respective social groups as more or less relevant, more or less included in the new social order (Bourdieu 1989: 23). In the struggle over local political power in Bolivia, indigenous peoples and peasants have established sufficient reputation and/or attention through previous struggles to wield significant symbolic power, such that they are able to define the way that social groups are classified in the new indigenous autonomies. One way that this is occurring is through the drafting of autonomy statutes that redefine, reclassify and rename the local political field according to a new schema. Where indigenous peoples are relatively united in a singular organizational structure, that process has advanced more rapidly. Where power relations among local indigenous agents are divided, the construction of new institutions has been slower or completely impeded. Observing the interplay of institutions and power relations helps us not only understand institutional design and change, but also the nature of power itself. Power, as depicted by these processes, appears as more collective and decentered than conventional notions of power, which tend to define power by its instrumental capacity, often individuated, to produce specific effects, usually intended ones, and which are principally concerned with “power over” others (Hobbes 2005 [1651]; Russell 2004 [1938]; Dahl 1957; Lukes 2005 [1974]). In contrast, we see power taking the form of productive, relational and somewhat dispersed forces that pervade society, consistent with conceptualizations articulated by Foucault (1980; 1982) and Bourdieu (1992; 1993). Through what Foucault described as a “capillary form of power” (1980: 39) or what Bourdieu labeled “fields of power” (1989), power is exercised by agents as they negotiate the  34 definitions and meanings of their social world and struggle to realize their interests. Power is located, in this view, not in the human body, but in the social body; as such, power is something beyond physical strength or mental will. In this vein, Hannah Arendt observed, “Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act, but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group” (1970: 44). From this perspective, moreover, power is not the exclusive purview of the sovereign or a repressive juridical formation “from above,” even if, as Foucault argued, “in a certain way all other forms of power relation must refer to” the state (1982: 793). Power is also, and importantly, wielded by classes or groups as they struggle for dominance in social domains (Bourdieu 1993). When power is exercised by social groups and compels the construction of new official institutions, I characterize it as “instituting power.”  Informality versus hybridity One highly productive area of institutional theorizing of particular relevance to the investigation of the changing nature of institutions of local governance in Bolivia is the expanding field of informal institutions. In their seminal work on the topic, Helmke and Levistky argue that, alongside the formal institutions frequently studied by the social sciences, “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” can also be highly consequential to social and political outcomes, at times with effects beyond formal rules, and thus informal institutions should be part of scholarly analysis (2004: 727). Agents may create informal institutions for various reasons, they assert: because formal ones are incomplete or ineffective, because certain goals are considered to be publicly unacceptable, or because actors cannot achieve formal institutional solutions (2004: 730). For example, Todd Eisenstadt (2003) describes how informal “bargaining tables” mitigated conflicts  35 after local elections took place in Mexico, even as formal channels were being constituted in the form of electoral commissions and courts. Therein, he argues, “even well-designed formal institutions may actually be subverted by actors’ political discretion until actor consent is granted” (2003: 27). These formulations are helpful in understanding some of the patterns that will be explored in this dissertation, namely Bolivia’s routinized repertoires of social protest (e.g. blockades, marches) and the practices of indigenous autonomy prior to their sanction by the state.  However, the central focus of this study, indigenous autonomy, is neither accurately characterized as an informal institution, nor does it fit within the typology of formal-informal institutional relations formulated by Helmke and Levitsky (2004). The authors develop a typology of ways that formal and informal institutions can interrelate, describing four possibilities: complementary, substitutive, accommodating and competing. While the complementary category – in which informal institutions “coexist with effective formal institutions, such that actors expect that the rules that exist on paper will be enforced” – comes the closest to describing how new state-sanctioned institutions of indigenous autonomy have been conceived, it does not capture the fusion that appears to be occurring between informal and formal institutions. As Tom Goodfellow and Stefan Lindemann (2013) note, there is an important distinction to be drawn between what Gabi Hesselbein et. al. called “institutional multiplicity” (2006: 1) and institutional hybridity, in that the latter entails a syncretism that incorporates features of both traditions, as opposed to distinct institutions existing parallel to one  36 another.32 The union of institutional traditions shifts us beyond the realm of co-existing, parallel rules that are alternately written and not, officially sanctioned or not.  A more useful way of thinking about the fusing of institutions is through the notion of institutional hybridity. Goodfellow and Lindemann have employed this term, for example, in their study of local authority in the Buganda Kingdom in Uganda to explain the synthesis or union of political systems or principles. There, they define institutional hybridity as “when rules and procedures associated with the state merge in some way with those of other organisations” (2013: 6). Similarly, in his study of chieftains of South Africa, Michael Williams observes the “mutual transformation of both the state institutions and the chieftaincy and the blending together of the different political norms, rules, and processes associated with each” (2010: 3). While these conceptions are helpful in describing the types of institutional patterns under analysis, they assume a conventional conception of institutions that does not account for the symbolic systems that provide frames for understanding and shape human behaviour. Taking a more sociological approach, I characterize institutional hybridity as the mixture of not just rules and processes, but the symbolic systems through which agents understand and act upon their world. Thus, I define institutional hybridity as the fusion of the official rules, procedures and/or symbolic systems that structure human behaviour with those of social groups that wield symbolic power toward the constitution of new shared cognitive scripts that have structural or processual effects. The caveat of those that wield symbolic power is an important element, as it emphasizes that not any social group can act upon and hybridize the institutions of the state; those with such capacity have necessarily already, to a significant extent, imposed their view of the world on society, and have thus constituted social reality according to their vision of it. In other words,                                                 32 Hesselbein et. al. describe institutional multiplicity as: “multiple ‘rule systems’ that confront economic and political actors providing distinct and different normative frameworks and incentive structures in which they act” (2006: 1).  37 through past social action, groups such as indigenous peoples have secured enough public legitimacy to enter the game of institutional design. Hybridity has been extensively theorized by sociologists, anthropologists and cultural theorists, especially in the post-colonial literature (Gilroy 1993; Bhabha 1994; Hall 1994; García Canclini 1995), with one of the most influential – and contentious – works being Néstor García Canclini’s Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity (1995; first published in Spanish in 1990). Problematizing the relations and tensions between the “traditional” and the “modern” in Latin America, García Canclini employs hybridity as a tool to describe the effects of globalization on symbolic systems, by which elements of distinct cultures come into contact and create new combinations (1995: 207).33 In doing so, he challenges binary accounts of social relations (i.e. developmental, modern, liberal, Marxist, and subaltern perspectives), arguing that people’s experience of culture is complex, neither “authentic” nor “impure” – that is to say, not simply either traditional or modern. Yet in this move, questions of political economy and power relations become so obscured that García Canclini effectively surrenders class and ethnic struggles to very the market-industrial forces he seeks to critique.34 Other scholars propose more politicized engagements with hybridity. For example, Stuart Hall uses the concept to explain cultural identities and post-colonial struggles of the “black diaspora”: “The diaspora experience as I intend it here is defined, not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of ‘identity’ which lives                                                 33 García Canclini distinguishes hybridization from mestizaje and syncretism, which he characterizes as generally being inflected with racial and traditional-religious assumptions, respectively (1995: 11). 34 While foundational to discussions about cultural mixing, including the questions explored in this dissertation, García Canclini’s notion of hybridity problematically moves beyond simply posing a descriptive taxonomy of culture to a “normative concept for cultural studies,” shifting the conversation from politics and economy to the domain of culture (Beverley 1999: 126). Although progressive socio-economic concerns apparently underlie the postmodern culturalist perspective for which García Canclini advocates (Rodríguez 1997), by shifting his attention instead to the technology-enabled conversion of high art into mass consumption and the consequences for culture, power relations and inequality are neglected in his postulations.   38 with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity” (1994: 401-402, emphasis in original text). More provocatively still, Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui (2012) directly challenges what she characterizes as García Canclini’s “lite” notion of cultural hybridity. She argues that it is based on a biological concept of intra-species breeding that connotes “infertility” – as with a mule that cannot reproduce – and orients us unconstructively to a fixed point (i.e. mestizo), a cultural cul-de-sac that is unlikely to propel political reform. In place of hybridization, Rivera Cusicanqui creatively proposes the Aymara concept of ch’ixi, which, she likens to René Zavaleta’s notion of sociedad abigarrada – the multi-coloured or motley Bolivian society that the elites cannot homogenize (2008[1986]; see also Wanderley 2005). Ch’ixi, she explains, names something grey, which both is and is not simultaneously: “It is the logic of the included third… [expressing] the parallel coexistence of multiple cultural differences that do not extinguish but instead antagonize and complement each other” (2012: 105). The terminological shift is appealing for its ability to account for the agonistic complementarity of cultural differences – with none of the contributing cultures disappearing in the process (of mestizaje). However, rather than substituting ch’ixi for hybridity in this text, I propose instead that ch’ixi be employed to reconceptualize hybridity. Hybridization can thus be reformulated as the complementary yet often antagonistic fusion of distinct cultural forms, mutually constituting new ideas, norms or material cultural expressions – while not necessarily extinguishing the contributing ones.   Institutions and spatiality Finally, when looking at the changing nature of institutions of local governance, it is important to place the analysis in the context of the specific socio-territorial changes associated with the decentralization of government powers, which were implemented to varying degrees by “almost  39 all Latin American countries” during the 1990s (Eisenstadt 2011: 165), and have been popular across the global North and South over the past four decades (Kohl and Farthing 2006). This is important for two reasons. One the one hand, as various observers have noted, political decentralization has had significant, albeit contradictory, effects on participation by local indigenous and campesino community organizations – as grassroots territorial organizations, GTOs – and the election of grassroots indigenous leaders to municipal and, subsequently, national offices (Medeiros 2001; Kohl and Farthing 2006; Postero 2007). On the other, as some critical geographers such as Gearóid Ó Tuathail (2010) have posited, area studies scholars need to pay closer attention to the complexity of place and internal diversity of agents than has been undertaken by investigations that have assumed a Cold War calculus – that is, an approach that “disaggregates rather than homogenizes” (2010: 257).35  In Bolivia, decentralization was accomplished through the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (LPP), which devolved executive, legislative and bureaucratic authority to the municipal level, assigning 20 percent of the national budget to municipalities on a per capita basis (Centellas 2013).36 The LPP provided mechanisms for local citizen groups (GTOs) to be involved in the oversight of municipal functions, providing new spaces for local participation by indigenous and campesino groups. The creation of 250 new municipalities, largely indigenous, had immediate consequences for indigenous and peasant representation; in the 1995 national elections, 29 percent of public offices (464 out of 1624) were filled by indigenous and peasant candidates across 200 municipalities (Kohl and Farthing 2006). Decentralization also served to reorient                                                 35 Additionally, research has suggested that fiscal and political decentralization have a significant positive effect on agents’ overall happiness, as indicated by Diaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose’s research on European decentralization; they find, further, that “citizens seem to be happier with the actual capacity of their local governments to deliver than with the general principle that they can have a say on their daily politics and policies” (2011: 3). 36 Eisenstadt (2011) characterizes Bolivia’s decentralization program was one of the most comprehensive in Latin America.  40 indigenous social movement energies – including resistance to neoliberal programs – toward local-level political struggles (Kohl and Farthing 2006). The effects of this devolution of powers and reorientation of local political energy is significant in understanding the correlation of local forces that exists as indigenous communities undertake the novel shift from municipality to indigenous autonomy. Yet, as John Cameron (2010a) argues, the outcomes of decentralization in Bolivia and elsewhere in the Andes – in terms of local participation – vary from one municipality to another, depending on the social, economic and political relations of power.37  The question of local and indigenous governance brings us to a Durkheimian observation about the differentiation of functions in social systems of lesser or greater complexity,38 which Bourdieu distinguished as “relatively undifferentiated social formations, in which the prevailing classificatory system encounters no rival or antagonistic principle” (1997: 164) and “class societies, in which the definition of the social world is at stake in overt or latent class struggle” (1977: 169). Without assuming that any society, indigenous or otherwise, constitutes a homogeneous domain, it is useful to inquire as to the differential functions that are necessary in a less differentiated social formation such as an Andean ayllu or Guaraní capitania, as compared to the liberal and municipalist governance functions required in class-differentiated societies. Local indigenous governance structures and processes developed as a consequence of the conditions communities faced – including environmental factors such as the punishing Andes weather and fragile ecological systems (Regalsky 2003) – and minimal division of labour in an agrarian-based society. Thus, ayllus were constituted as a small, oral communities in which conflicts were resolved and collective action taken in deliberative assemblies, in accordance with                                                 37 Cameron (2010a) posits that the particularities of the local power relations in a given municipality are a consequence of ecological contexts and historical factors, such as intervention by outside actors and particular encounters with capitalist development. 38 I am indebted to Maxwell A. Cameron for suggesting a Durkheimian analysis of the distinct forms of governance observed in my research.  41 normas y procedimientos propios. In such a context, the deliberative body in which positions of authority are selected is the same as that which makes decisions about the distribution of land to community members, which is the same as that which rules on matters related to neighboring communities, as well as that which adjudicates transgressions of communal norms. As Zibechi observes, “there is no separation between economy and politics or between society and state,” which “prevents the emergence of a separate power from that of the community gathered in assembly,” and, consequently, there is little or no concentration of power (2010: 16). In other words, the differentiation of social, economic and political functions is considerably less than in, say, the city of La Paz. As the complexity and scale of social and economic life increases – with augmented and diversified population, especially in urban centers and greater sub-national territorial division – there is a more significant need to coordinate collective behaviour, described by Durkheim (1984 [1893]) as organic solidarity. He contrasted this with what he characterized as the mechanical solidarity of “primitive” societies, which is based on a common or collective conscience – in which a “totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society forms a determinate system which has its own life” (Durkheim 1984 [1893]: 38-39). While it is important to avoid – as did Durkheim39 – assumptions that ascribe purpose or cause to effect or observed institutional functions, it is evident that the expansion and durability of specialized areas of legislative, judicial, and executive-bureaucratic competencies through legal and other impersonal means helps to address the needs of class-differentiated societies. Notwithstanding the ethnocentric normative assumptions of Durkheim’s characterization of certain societies as “primitive,” his analysis of differential social structures                                                 39 In The Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim specifies that his choice of the word “function” has the advantage of explaining the need to which the division of labour corresponds, without prejudicing “the question of knowing how that correspondence has been established, or whether it arises from some unintended and preconceived adaptation or from some adjustment after the event” (1984 [1893]: 11).  42 fruitfully suggests that we can understand the observed hybridization of institutions in Bolivia as not only merging two forms of governance  – liberal-municipalist with normas y procedimientos propios – but also bringing together distinct scales of social organization.    Indigenous peoples, rights and identification Theorizing the construction of new institutions of indigenous autonomy compels a series of questions about the agents involved in these processes, their priorities and demands, and the historical processes of which they have been a part. First, what is the international legal, normative and discursive context of indigenous rights in which these transformations are taking place, and how has that context affected local and national debates over indigenous politics? Second, how is it that identities, or forms of identification, carry so much significance that they have evoked the constitutional creation of a new political subject – indigena originaria campesina (indigenous first peoples peasant) – and the constitution of official territorial entities that are centered on indigenous identities? And third, on a more conceptual level, what is meant by indigenous autonomy, and how does it contrast with the related concepts self-governance and self-determination? In what follows, I commence with an analysis of the international context of norms and how they are diffused locally and nationally. In the processes, I address the aforementioned conceptual issues. This is followed by a discussion of questions of identity and indigenous identification. International law governing indigenous peoples and their rights vis-à-vis states has developed substantially since World War II in a manner that has, however reluctantly and imperfectly, supported the demands of indigenous peoples (Anaya 1996). The United Nations has been deliberately chosen by indigenous peoples worldwide as the central forum for making claims  43 toward an improvement of their lives (Xanthaki 2007). In 1957, the United Nations International Labor Organization approved Convention No. 107 (ILO 107), deploying the prevailing assimilative and individualist human rights logic of the mid-twentieth century (Anaya 1996; Niezen 2003).40 The convention encouraged states to take measures to protect the human rights of members of indigenous populations, paying only secondary attention to the protection of group rights (Anaya 1996; Niezen 2003). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s indigenous peoples became significantly more involved in international meetings, most notably the 1977 Conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Populations in the Americas, held in Geneva, which, Anaya explains, was a pivotal moment in the development of a “transnational indigenous identity” (1996: 46). Being involved in these processes helped to establish an expanding pattern of international collaboration among indigenous peoples (Anaya 1996; Xanthaki 2007). This coordination, along with recommendations supportive of indigenous demands elaborated in a series of reports by United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Special Rapporteur José Martinez Cobo between 1981 and 1983, led to the establishment of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1982 (Anaya 1996), which produced the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Stavenhagen 2005) that was eventually approved by the UN General Assembly. In 1989, the International Labor Organization revised its earlier Convention, substituting it with ILO 169, which shifted the discourse around indigenous peoples from an attitude of assimilation to one of respect for indigenous cultures (Van Cott 2000). ILO 169 included the term “peoples” but limited its applicability: “The use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law” (Article 1.3).  On September 13, 2007, following two and a half slow and frustrating decades of work by                                                 40 Indigenous peoples were not significantly involved in the convention’s debates.  44 indigenous peoples, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“the Declaration”) was approved (Stavenhagen 2005; Deer 2010) by a vote of 143 states in favor, 11 abstaining, and 4 against, with 34 members not voting (UNPFII 2007a).41 The Declaration goes significantly beyond ILO 169 and other antecedent conventions, enjoining supporting countries to recognize and protect indigenous peoples’ self-determination and their rights as both individuals and collectives, to protect their rights to land, and to negotiate plural sovereignties (Lightfoot 2010). As noted by Alexandra Xanthaki (2007), the Declaration’s inclusion of self-determination finally affirms the most important claim made by indigenous peoples worldwide. While the Declaration is not an international treaty and is thus non-binding (Stavenhagen 2005, Lightfoot 2010), it is “the most comprehensive and advanced of international instruments dealing with indigenous peoples’ rights” (Charters and Stavenhagen 2009: 10) and signifies an “international consensus on the minimum standard of indigenous rights that states are obligated to recognize and protect – an emerging international indigenous rights regime” (Lightfoot 2010: 84). Among the most significant features of this emergent international consensus, several components stand out, each of which is a central part of the new Bolivian constitutional and legal framework: self-determination, the collective right to land, and plural sovereignty (or plurinationalism).  Three related but distinct terms that describe indigenous rights – and are central to this dissertation – are protected by the Declaration: self-determination, self-government, and autonomy. The UN Declaration brings together the three terms in Articles 3 and 4:   Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. (Article 3)  Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to                                                 41 The four countries that voted against the Declaration are the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia (Deer 2010); all four subsequently reversed their positions and endorsed the Declaration in 2009 or 2010.  45 autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions. (Article 4)    While Article 4 illustrates the overlap of the three terms, it also indicates that self-determination is a much more restrictive term, denoting a more rigorous set of conditions that must be met for its fulfillment.42 Self-determination is understood as including both autonomy and self-government, but its exercise is not limited to them. Put otherwise, both autonomy and self-government can be conceived of as the application of the principle of self-determination. Self-determination has been a central issue and demand for indigenous peoples movements, because it speaks to foundational questions of their relationship to the states within which (and across which) indigenous peoples live, and is based on their pre-existence to those states. It can therefore, be understood as the “heart” and “cornerstone” of the UN Declaration (Xanthaki 2007: 131). “All our rights either flow from or are linked to our right to self-determination,” explains Kenneth Deer, of the Mohawk Nation of Kahnawake, who was involved with developing the UN Declaration (2010: 27). Nonetheless, the question of what constitutes self-determination has not been settled in international law or common usage. Xanthaki (2007) outlines that understandings of self-determination range from minimalist to maximalist perspectives. A state-centred minimalist approach, which essentially equates self-determination with the independence of states in the context of decolonization, has been taken by many states so as to restrict the applicability of the term (Xanthaki 2007). For indigenous peoples, this is a limited and counter-productive proposition, especially considering indigenous peoples seek “their right to determine                                                 42 Although the idea of “self-determination” finds its origins in the French Revolution and American Declaration of Independence, Cassese outlines the term’s evolution in the first half of the twentieth century, from an “animating political ideal” around 1915 – promoted first by Lenin as a critique of Western imperialism and colonialism – to its post-World War II significance as a “legally binding principle” (1995: 4). While a general reference to the “self-determination of peoples” was included in Article 1(2) of the United Nations Charter in 1945, its significance emerged in 1950 in the context of negotiations over the Covenants on Human Rights in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, with the Soviet Union advocating for the right to self-determination of colonized peoples as a precondition for individual rights (Cassese 1995).   46 their own political status,” which often does not involve the creation of newly independent state (Xanthaki 2007: 149). In contrast, she depicts a maximalist approach that is broadly construed to include cultural and economic dimensions such as territorial sovereignty, religious freedom and distinct systems of justice; this approach is often adopted by indigenous organizations in public declarations (Xanthaki 2007). While such conception has the advantage of being both far-reaching in its claims for justice and human rights and is adaptive according to context, Rosalyn Higgins points out that it risks turning the term into “all things for all men” (1994: 128). Somewhere in between a maximalist and minimalist notions, Xanthaki locates a political conception that is flexible and open to a wide range of possible relations between indigenous nations and states: “The scope of the right [to self-determination] is in the political realm, but the right of peoples to decide their political status includes a wide range of possibilities,” including democratic participation, local autonomy, legal pluralism, and indigenous citizenship (2007: 172). Such a political approach to self-determination – which Benedict Kingsbury (2000) calls a “relational approach” – is echoed by numerous scholars of indigenous rights (Harhoff 1988; Kingsbury 2000). Frederik Harhoff, for example, argues that self-determination is “the commonly established term referring to collective rights of indigenous peoples to political control of their future” (1988: 293, emphasis added).  Self-determination is often characterized as entailing two discrete dimensions or domains: internal (i.e. self-government, the right of peoples to choose their political regime and approaches to social and economic development) and external (relations with other peoples or authorities, and political status in the international community) (Cassese 1995; Hannum 1999; Myntti 2000). The distinction has also been observed by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 1996 in its General Recommendation XXI, addressing  47 self-determination (Myntti 2000). In this rubric, Iorns (1992) observes that states are often more accepting of proposals for internal self-determination (e.g. greater autonomy) than external self-determination. Anaya, however, challenges the internal-external dichotomy, arguing that it ignores the many forms of human association that exist in the world and assumes “a limited universe of ‘peoples’ comprising mutually exclusive spheres of community” (1996: 81). He argues instead for discerning between constitutive and ongoing dimensions of self-determination, a framing is that is echoed by Xanthaki, who notes that the external-internal distinction places too much attention on state independence (2007: 160-169).  “Self-government” is a necessary component of self-determination. It is a more general term that can be applied widely to local decision making capacities, and does not carry the suggestion of sovereignty. Illustrating this distinction, Frank Cassidy characterizes self-determination as the right of a group to “choose their own destiny without external compulsion… the right to be sovereign, to be a supreme authority within a particular geographical territory” (1990: 1). This includes but is not limited to self-government, which Cassidy defines as the capacity to “make quite significant choices concerning their own political, cultural, economic and social affairs” (1990: 1). Peoples can have self-government but still lack self-determination, insofar as they are able to make some choices over some internal affairs, but do not have sovereignty. Moreover, Cassidy notes, writing in 1990 about First Nations in Canada, that some forms of self-government can constitute a “denial of sovereignty,” such as where they risk reducing indigenous efforts for self-governance to a municipal model of governance (1990: 7). Similarly, Antonio Cassese, in a