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Habermas sans culottes LeBlanc, Ricahrd 2014

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Habermas sans culottes   by Richard LeBlanc   A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of  Master of Arts   in  The Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies  (Germanic Studies)         The University of British Columbia   (Vancouver)     August 2014   © Richard LeBlanc, 2014   ii   Abstract      In   this   thesis   I   formulate   a   critique   of  Habermas’s   reading   of   the  French  Revolution   in   his  book on the Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, in order to argue that the emergence of the public sphere of the French Revolution cannot be limited to written and oral speech, but that it also included material culture such as clothing and its symbolical weight in public debate, as in the case of the sans-culottes.  The   first   part   of  my   thesis   explores   Arendt’s   understanding   of   the  public  sphere  as  a  “space  of  appearance,”  as  it  relates  to  material  culture and to her allusion to the sans-culottes, to show the theoretical limitations   of   Habermas’s   rationalistic   insistence   on  oral  and  written  speech.    The  second  part  analyzes  Habermas’s treatement of clothing as a public manifestation in the Middle Ages, which leads to the third part where I examine how Habermas missed the importance of clothing in  the  public  “space  of  appearance”  of  the  French  Revolution  and how the sans-culottes exemplified the public significance of clothing.  The fourth part takes the example of the sans-culottes’s   red  cap  and  argues   that  considering   this   republican  piece  of  clothing of Roman origin reveals how, in light of Arendt, tradition and modernity stood right beside each other in the French Revolution, which corresponds to a historical reality avoided by Habermas due to his insistence on the modernity of the Enlightenment. iii   Preface  This thesis is original, unpublished, independent work by the student, Richard LeBlanc. iv    Table of Contents        Abstract ................................................................................................................................................. ii Preface.................................................................................................................................................. iii  Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................. iv  Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................v  Introduction ............................................................................................................................................1  Habermas and Arendt: Clothing in the Public Sphere .........................................................................14  Habermas and the Question of Clothing ..............................................................................................30  Habermas's Linguo-centrism and the Public Clothing of the Sans-culottes ........................................34  The "bonnet rouge" and the Tradition in a Revolutionary World........................................................46  Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................................59  Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................67                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        v   Acknowledgements I would like to thank the Fondation Baxter et Alma Ricard for their generous financial support throughout my studies in the M.A. in Germanic Studies at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver from September 2011 to August 2014.     1  Habermas sans culottes Introduction      The title of this thesis is half German, half French.  The German part corresponds to the name of a well-known German contemporary social and political philosopher.  The French part contains   two  words:   “sans”   and  “culotte,”  which  could  be   translated   respectively   as   “without”  and   “breeches,”   or   “pants,”   in   Canadian   French.  Read   literally   the   title   thus   says:   “Jürgen  Habermas, or the German contemporary philosopher, without pants.”    In this phrase, I would like to emphasize two things.  On the one hand, the philosophical style of German philosophy as endorsed by Habermas.  On the other hand, the concreteness of daily situations which involve clothing   such   as   “pants.”      My   goal   is   to   link   these   two   elements   by   posing the question of whether Habermas wears pants when he elaborates his philosophical thought.  This question is relevant in that   Habermas’s treatment of the public sphere in his Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit delves into a series of issues without mentioning that he is speaking from a privileged position where his pants do not pose any problem.  It seems to me that the notion of pants is not talked of  in  Habermas’s  book  especially because he chooses to examine what makes sense to many intellectuals: books, language, knowledge, erudition, prestigious authors, etc.        For instance, Habermas’s  book  talks about the French Revolution as if the French were doing the revolution from their office at the university, writing speeches and taking them back to the assembly, without worrying about which pants they were wearing while having all these thoughts about freedom.  He writes as if the French did the revolution isolated from the material world at the library between two meals, in small groups of academic elites, in a French Frankfurt.  What Arendt describes as the “professional revolutionist,”  arising  from  the  events  of  the   “French   Revolution,”   whose   “essentially   theoretical   way   of   life   was   spent   in   the   famous     2  libraries of London and Paris, or in the coffee houses of Vienna and Zurich, or in the relatively comfortable and undisturbed jails of the various anciens régimes,” who   “enjoyed   special  privileges since his way of life demanded no specific work whatsoever,”  and suddenly appearing in revolutionary politics with   “the   great   advantage” of  “the  professional   revolutionists”  whose  “names   are   the   only   ones   which   are   publicly   known,”1 presents a similarity with Habermas: although Habermas did not become a  “professional  revolutionist,” he still had enough space in his schedule2 to go  to  the  “library”  and  to become a “publically  known”  author without paying much attention to what it means to wear these or those pants.       The French in 1789 onwards were certainly closer to the question of pants in the public sphere of their revolution since  one  of   their  political  movements  was  specifically  called  “sans-culottes.”    However,   I  chose  to  remove  the  hyphen  between  “sans”  and  “culotte”   in my title in order to single out the fact that Habermas speaks as if he literally did not wear pants, as if he was literally “sans  culottes”  or  “without  pants,” that is, as if the question of clothing was not worthy of consideration for understanding the public sphere in modern history.  My title is thus a satirical ad hominem provocation, inspired by the sans-culotte behavior as described by historians.  It is my own way of protesting, from within a certain French tradition of political opposition, and that in a certain way is reminiscent of Pierre Bourdieu, to  Habermas’s  choice  of  accounting for the past only from the point of view of the privileged class(es) to which he belongs.  It is also a way of stressing how important it is for academic researchers, such as myself, to consider the privileged position from which we speak, instead of focussing strictly on                                                           1 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, Introduction by Jonathan Schell, New York, Penguin Books, [1963] 2006, p. 251-252,  italics  in  the  text,  Arendt’s  account is more nuanced, but I only draw from the formulas quoted. 2 In  Jürgen  Habermas,  “On  the  German-Jewish  Heritage,”  in  Telos, June 20, vol. 1980, no. 40, p. 127, Habermas himself  says  that  he  was  “brought  up  in  the  context  of  the  postwar  German  university  and  in  the tradition of German philosophy,” although this could invoke various things, it still points in the direction of what I try to say here.     3  the canonical authors, as if the past was made up of them only,   or   as   if   only   the   “important  people”  were  “important.”           This thesis looks into Habermas’s Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit in order to formulate a critique of his interpretation of the emergence of the public sphere in the French Revolution.  I argue that the publicity of the culture of clothing of the sans-culottes in the French Revolution was an important aspect of the event of the modern public sphere that Habermas missed due to his linguo-centrism and   “bourgeois-centrism.”3  My claim will be that in order to understand what it means to talk about an issue such as the emergence of the public sphere in modernity, one has to take seriously into account the significance of clothing as it relates to the way human identities and political positions are articulated publically.  If it is true to say about the modern epoch  “that  over  all  of  western  and  central  Europe  a  new  ‘curiosity  about  public  affairs’  spread  not  only  among  the  ‘intellectual  elite’  but  also  among  the  lower  orders  of  the  people,”4 I aim to explain in this thesis how the study of sans-culotte clothing is a point of entry into the examination of the modern public sphere in its broader meaning, including these “lower  orders  of people.”      First I examine the concept of the public sphere from the point of view of material culture.  I demonstrate how  Hannah  Arendt’s   theory   of   the   public   sphere   as   a   “space   of   appearance”   is  more suited to considering clothing as a public manifestation than Habermas’s rationalistic public sphere which tends to avoid this issue.  The second part of my development treats Habermas’s account of the prehistory of the public sphere in the Middle Ages.  I show that Habermas considers seriously the dress code of medieval aristocracies as representations of power and how this clothing element is what Habermas mistakenly leaves behind in the rest of                                                           3 I  use  the  expression  “linguo-centrism”  in  order  to  avoid  the  term  “logo-centrism.”    By  “linguo-centrism,”  I  refer  to  the oral and written aspect of language.  4 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, p. 284, note 11, Arendt refers to “Wolfgang  H.  Kraus.”     4  his book about the arrival of a specifically modern public sphere.  The third section of the thesis examines the elements of the public sphere that Habermas fails to grasp by focusing on the oral and written perspective of language, such as literature and dialogic collaboration.  I delve into concrete historical examples and explain how this choice made by Habermas disqualifies a series of highly significant material tools of political struggle that were used in the public sphere of the French Revolution, that is, the clothing culture of the sans-culottes.  The fourth part of the thesis addresses  Habermas’s emphasis on the French Revolution as articulating a notion of a public sphere of oral and written debate that is breaking with the tradition.  I take another significant historical case and show that this approach adopted by Habermas, an approach focused on oral and written language and on the break with tradition, prevented him from taking into account the Roman tradition represented in the “bonnet  rouge” or red cap of the sans-culottes as a cardinal political symbol.      Hannah   Arendt’s   hermeneutic   interpretation of the revolution is the main theoretical anchorage for my analysis of the red cap as a public instance of a traditional heritage at the core of revolutionary modernity.         Many scholars have addressed the question of clothing in the French Revolution.  However, few have made the link between political theories of the public sphere in modernity and the historical situation of clothing in the revolution.  Although studies by Jennifer Harris, Laura Auslander, James Leith, Michel Louve, and Michel Naudin, and Richard Wrigley address clothing during the French Revolution and certainly illuminate thereby the significance of the dress culture of the sans-culottes and other revolutionary movements as public manifestations of political debate, their account does not confront their historical findings with the conceptual work of political theory.5  Even if Wrigley is the author who treats most thoroughly the historical                                                           5 Jennifer  Harris,  “The  Red  Cap  of  Liberty:  A  Study  of  Dress  Worn  by  French  Revolutionary  Partisans  1789-94,”  in  Eighteenth-Century Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, Spring 1981, p. 283-312; Leora Auslander,  “Regeneration  Through  the     5  question of clothing in the revolution, and whose research results I use most substantially, his book does not address significantly the political concepts presupposed in the culture of clothing.  Other historians have also studied the movement of the sans-culottes, but many of them underestimated the reference to clothing in the vocabulary the revolutionaries were using and its relation to the public sphere theorized in political thought.6  Benjamin Nathans mentions quickly the pertinence of the question of clothing in French literary history in a discussion of Habermas’s  political theory, but the issue is not explained.7  Other critics of Habermas and cultural historians make the argument that  Habermas’s   “conception   of   the   public   sphere   is   too   narrow,”   but   the  question of clothing remains unexplored.8  Hannah Arendt refers to the notion of clothing and                                                                                                                                                                                            Everyday?  Clothing,  Architecture  and  Furniture  in  Revolutionary  Paris,”  in  Art History, Vol. 28, No. 2, April 2005, p. 227-247; James Leith, “Images of Sans-culottes,” in C. Hould and J. Leith (ed.), Iconographie et image de la Révolution française,  Actes  du  colloque  tenu  dans  le  cadre  du  59ième  congrès  de  l’Association  canadienne  française  pour  l’avancement  des  sciences,  (15-16 Mai 1989), Montréal, 1990, p. 131-159 (bibliographical information for this document taken from Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances. Representations of Dress in Revolutionary France, Oxford-New York, Berg, 2002, p. 294); Michel Jouve,  “L’image  du  sans-culotte dans la caricature politique anglaise. Création  d’un  stéréotype  pictural,”  in  Gazette des beaux-arts, 6e Période, Tome XCII, 120e Année, 1978, p. 187-196; Michel Naudin, “La  réaction  culturelle  en  l’an  III : la représentation du Jacobin et du sans-culotte dans l’imaginaire  de  leur  adversaire?,” in Michel Vovelle (ed.), Le  tournant  de  l’an  III. Réaction et terreur blanche dans la France révolutionnaire, Paris, Comité des travaux historique et scientifiques, 1997, p. 279-291; Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances. Representations of Dress in Revolutionary France, Oxford-New York, Berg, 2002. 6 François Furet, Claude Mazauric and Louis Bergeron,  “Les  sans-culottes  et  la  Révolution  française,”  in  Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 18e Année, No. 6, Nov.-Dec., 1963, p. 1098-1127;  Ruth Scurr, “Who  Were  the  Sans-culottes?,”  in  Modern Intellectual History, 8, 2, 2011, p. 447-455; Annie Geffroy, “Désignation,  dénégation:  la  légende des sans-culottes (1780-1980),”  in Christian Croisille et Jean Ehrard (actes recueillis et présentés par), avec la collaboration de Marie-Claude Chemin, La légende de la révolution, Actes du colloque international de Clermont-Ferrand  (juin  1986),  Faculté  des  Lettres  et  Sciences  Humaines  de  l’Université  Blaise-Pascal (Clermont II), 1988, p. 581-593; Michael Sonenscher mentions Habermas in his book on the sans-culottes, but he does not criticize his avoidance of clothing, Michael Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem in the French Revolution, Princeton-Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2008, for the reference to Habermas, see p. 362. 7 Benjamin  Nathans,  “Habermas’s  “Public  Sphere”  in  the  Era  of  the  French  Revolution,”  in  French Historical Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3, Spring, 1990, p. 620-644, for the reference to clothing, see, p. 641.  8 Harold  Mah,  “Phantasies  of  the  Public  Sphere:  Rethinking  the  Habermas  of  Historians,”  in  The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 72, No. 1, New Work on the Old Regime and the French Revolution: A special Issue in Honor of François Furet, March 2000, p. 153-182,  for  the  quotation,  see  p.  158;;  see  also  Jon  Cowans,  “Habermas and French History:  the  Public  Sphere  and  the  Problem  of  Political  Legitimacy,”  in  French History, Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 134-160; John  L.  Brooke,  “Reason  and  Passion  in  the  Public  Sphere:  Habermas  and  the  Cultural  Historians,”  in  The Jounral of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 29, No. 1, Summer 1998, p. 43-67,  Brooke’s  article  is  a  book-review essay on cultural history books (focussing on the United States) in which Habermas is used or discussed; Craig Calhoun, “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, The MIT Press, 1992, p. 1-48, particularly p. 33, 38-39, 41, 43 note 11; Seyla Benhabib, “Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 73-98, particularly p. 86, although, as Hohendahl remarks, Benhabib focuses more on “Habermas’s  later  work,”  see  Peter  Uwe Hohendahl, “The Public Sphere: Models and Boundaries,”  in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 100, Hohendahl underestimates    6  addresses theoretically the question of the public space of the revolution and its meaning, but the specific case of clothing is only alluded to and the sans-culottes are mentioned only briefly in The Human Condition.9           The goal of this thesis is to address this gap in the literature on the French Revolution and its relation to political theory and to suggest certain pathways of research and reflection.  The first critical reaction to my thesis could obviously be that Habermas does not treat the sans-culottes simply   because   he   undertakes   to   do   an   “Untersuchung   zu   einer   Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft,” as the subtitle of his book indicates, and not an investigation about the social classes outside the bourgeoisie of civil society.  As critics point out, Habermas himself says explicitly that his theory “vernachlässigt  die   im  geschichtlichen  Prozeβ  gleichsam  unterdrückte  Variante einer plebejischen Öffentlichkeit.”10  There  is  in  Habermas’s  book  an  attempt  to  focus                                                                                                                                                                                             clothing  when  he  criticizes  Habermas’s  restrictive  public  sphere  by  emphasizing  “the  cultural  sphere,”  p.  108;;  Nancy  Fraser,  “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 115-142;;  Keith  Michael  Baker,  “Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France: Variations on a Theme by Habermas,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p.181-211, mainly p. 191-192; David Zaret, “Religion, Science, and Printing in the Public Spheres in Seventeenth-Century England,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 212-235; see  also  on  Zaret  and  Baker  and  a  reference  to  Baker’s  emphasis  on  “popular  culture”  (p.  256),  Lloyd  Kramer,  “Habermas, History, and Critical Theory,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 239-249;;  Mary  P.  Ryan  talks  about  “symbols”  in  the  public  sphere  from  a  feminist  perspective,  but  clothing  is  ignored,  see  Mary  P.  Ryan,  “Gender  and  Public  Access:  Women’s  Politics  in  Nineteenth-Century America,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 266, 270-271, 278, 284, etc; Geoff Eley  also  mentions  the  “wider  domain  of  cultural  activity”  for  the  public  sphere  in  England  without  referring  to  clothing,  Geoff  Eley,  “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 300, see also p. 304-305 for an allusion to the French  case,  and  for  further  criticism  about  the  limits  of  Habermas’s  approach,  see  for  instance  p.  306,  321,  330-331; Harry  C.  Boyte,  “The Pragmatic Ends of Popular Politics,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 341-342,  344;;  Michael  Warner’s  emphasis  on  the  body  in  his  commentary  on  Habermas’s  idea  of  a public sphere does not explore clothing,  see  Michael  Warner,  “The Mass Public and the Mass Subject,”  in  Craig  Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 377-401. 9 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Second Edition, Introduction by Margaret Conovan, Chicago-London, The University of Chicago Press, [1958] 1998; Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought, Introduction by Jerome Kohn, New York, Penguin Books, [1954] 2006; Hannah Arendt, On Revolution; Craig  Calhoun,  “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 5, refers to the link between Arendt and Habermas, but the issue of clothing is not mentioned. 10 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, Neuwied und Berlin, Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, [1962] 1975, S. 8, italics in the text; Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, translated by Thomas Burger, with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence, Cambridge (Mass.), The MIT Press, [1989]  1991,  p.  xviii;;  for  the  reference  to  this  by  critics,  see  Benjamin  Nathans,  “Habermas’s  “Public  Sphere”,”  p.     7  on a specific group of people by avoiding a whole range of other groups active in modern history.  This  made  many  scholars  interpret  Habermas’s  move  as  an   idealizing interpretation of historical reality.11        For Geoff Eley, Habermas’s   “model”   of   a   public   sphere can be seen as “an   extremely  idealized abstraction from the political cultures that actually took shape at the end of the eighteenth  and  start  of  the  nineteenth  centuries.”12  The distance between the tendency towards an ideal public sphere and towards the   empirical   ground   on   which   Habermas’s   project   in  Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit relies, is pointed out by many other scholars.  Craig Calhoun mentions   Habermas’s   attempt   to   reach   “a normative ideal,”13 which recalls the difference between a research strictly based on empirical history and the conceptual aspirations of philosophical inquiry.  Seyla Benhabib talks about “a décalage, a rupture, here between the normative model and the social analysis, which seems to be already implicit in the                                                                                                                                                                                            641  and  Nancy  Fraser,  “Rethinking  the Public Sphere,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 138 note 8; Geoff  Eley  also  refers  to  this  passage  by  Habermas  who  “confines  his  discussion  too much to the  bourgeoisie,”  Geoff Eley, “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 303;;  see  also  Harry  C.  Boyte  who  says  that  “Structural Transformation sought to create a normative  ideal  of  procedural  radicalism  in  the  service  of  democratic  political  critique,”  in  Harry  C.  Boyte,  “The Pragmatic Ends of Popular Politics,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 343 (italics in  the  text);;  Nicholas  Garnham,  “The Media and the Public Sphere,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere,  p.  359:  among  the  critics  of  Habermas  some  show  “That  he  neglects  the  importance  of  the  contemporaneous development of a plebeian public sphere alongside and in opposition to the bourgeois public sphere a sphere built upon different institutional  forms,”  that  “That  he  idealizes  the  bourgeois  public  sphere,”  and  his  “neglect  of  the  link  […]  between  citizenship  and  theatricality,”  although  Garnham  does  not  mention  clothing  in  his  summary  of  the  critique  of  Habermas,  and  his  reference  to  “the  necessary material resource base for any public sphere”  (p.  361)  in  Habermas  still  avoids  the  importance  of  clothing,  even  when  mentioning  “symbolic  forms”  (p.  362); see also Benjamin Lee, “Textuality, Mediation, and Public Discourse,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 415 and  417;;  see  also  the  passage  when  Jürgen  Habermas,  “Concluding  Remarks,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 466, admits that he did not consider “the  exclusionary  aspect  of  established  public  spheres.” 11 Habermas  uses  the  word  “idealization”  when  referring  to  criticism,  see  Jürgen  Habermas,  “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,”  translated  by  Thomas  Burger,  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 424,  and  in  Jürgen  Habermas,  “Concluding Remarks,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 463. 12 Geoff  Eley,  “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 307, Eley  also  talks  about  the  “‘plebeian  public  sphere’”  in  England  but  without  the  notion  of  clothing,  p.  329. 13 Craig Calhoun, “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 39, see also p. 40.    8  Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit,”14 and which is what Keith Michael Baker calls  the  “profound  ambiguity built   in   Habermas’s   definition   of   the   public   sphere.”15 Others for instance discuss Habermas’s  idea  of  a  public  sphere  as  a  “paradigm,”  and the work of “historians.”16  Habermas himself acknowledges that the German reception of his Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit highlighted  the  contradiction  between  “descriptive and normative aspects,” and  that  he  “was  at  least not careful enough in distinguishing between an ideal type and the very context from which it  was   constructed.”17   It is possible in this sense to evaluate  Habermas’s  Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit by singling out the twofold orientation in his book that creates a divide between those who emphasize the theoretical project and others who insist on the concreteness of empirical findings in history.      As Habermas’s  work  on  the  public  sphere  is  contrasted  by  historians  with  new  discoveries in historical research, it is worth citing David Zaret’s   illuminating  comment  where  he says about Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit that  “Critical  commentary enjoys an unfair advantage when it is directed at historical and sociological scholarship published nearly thirty years ago.”18  This is an  “unfair advantage”  from which my argumentation on the sans-culottes clearly benefits.  From this angle, Geoff  Eley  also  mentions  the  “familiar  historian’s  complaint  that  ‘reality’ was more                                                           14 Seyla Benhabib, “Models  of  Public  Space,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 87 (italics in the text). 15 Keith Michael Baker, “Defining the Public Sphere,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 183.  16 Lloyd Kramer, “Habermas, History, and Critical Theory,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 236-239;;  see  also  Stephen  Leonard,  “Concluding Remarks,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 470-471, about  “the  ideal”  and  “the  empirical.” 17 Jürgen  Habermas,  “Concluding Remarks,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 462-463.  18 David Zaret, “Religion, Science, and Printing,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 212; see also about this point in particular, Lloyd Kramer, “Habermas, History, and Critical Theory,”  in  Craig  Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 238 and 249-257, and Geoff Eley, “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 292-293; also John L. Brooke,  “Reason  and  Passion  in  the  Public  Sphere,”  p.  61,  who  refers  to  Habermas’s  text  in  Calhoun’s  book.    9  complicated than that (and too complicated for any theory to be adequate, it is often implied),”19 a   “complaint”   Habermas   recognizes   as   legitimate.20  My project in this thesis certainly emphasizes this criticism coming from the empirically-minded researcher who looks for evidence in historical documentation when general statements about the past are made.  Although I do not rely on primary historical documents but on the research done by historians and other scholars in many other disciplines in humanities and social sciences, I will follow this historical insight in order to widen the perspective from which we understand what happens in the public sphere, that is, in the public sphere that Habermas was fruitfully able to unearth after the wreckage of the first half of the twentieth century.21      One could also explain  Habermas’s  treatment  of  the  French  Revolution  by underscoring the fact that Habermas only talks about French history in a way that  remains  “relatively  sketchy,”22 which would explain his avoidance of the sans-culottes.  Habermas underscores for instance the question  of  “whether  the  format  or  size  of  the  theoretical  frame  of  historical  analysis  is  not  too  extensive.”23  Habermas  seems  to  imply  that  “historical  analysis”  can lead to an infinite debate on historical details when the perspective is too broad and this would prevent a general understanding of the emergence of a modern public sphere.  One   could   also   say   that   “the  preparation of the French hommes de lettres who were to make the Revolution was theoretical in                                                           19 Geoff Eley, “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 307 (italics in the text), see also p. 310.  20 Jürgen  Habermas,  “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 423; see  also  Jürgen  Habermas,  “Concluding Remarks,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere,  p.  471,  where  Habermas  answers  a  question  by  saying  “you  are  completely  right  to  ask  me  why I am engaging in these abstract things, speech-act theory, moral theory, and whatever without entertaining a historically  focused,  straightforward  analysis.    And  this  I  can  take  to  heart.” 21 It is important to single out an outstanding merit  of  Habermas’s  book: Harry  C.  Boyte,  “The  Pragmatic  Ends  of  Popular Politics,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by), Habermas and the Public sphere,  p.  343:  “Habermas’s”  “account  is  meant  in  a  sense  to  prompt  historical  investigation.  This  it  has  certainly  achieved,”  which  could  be  applied  to  my  thesis.  22 Keith Michael Baker, “Defining the Public Sphere,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 189. 23 Jürgen Habermas, “Concluding Remarks,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 465.     10  the  extreme,”24 as well as its reception,25 and   that   this  probably   influenced  Habermas’s  highly theoretical approach to history.   Nevertheless, as it has been done already but from a different perspective,26 I will defend the idea that the historical reality of the public sphere during the French Revolution unveils a non-bourgeois group playing a fundamental role in part by means of its dress culture.  Even if the sans-culottes did not coin the expression of the public sphere and did not attend the salons or literary circles of the bourgeoisie, they were not less important in the space of political debate opened in part by the modern bourgeoisie of the revolution.  My argumentation thus explores what it means to say like Bourdieu that Habermas “réduit   les  rapports  de  force  politiques  à  des  rapports  de  communication  […],  c’est-à-dire à des rapports de « dialogue »”   understood   in   linguistic   terms.27  Even if there was certainly an important component of communication and dialogue in the public sphere for the French Revolution where the sans-culottes participated,28 the   “symbolical   powers,”   as   Bourdieu  would   put   it,   that  were  being exercised by the sans-culottes through their symbolical clothing as well as through their impact on the discourse on clothing constitute an unavoidable reality in the history of the French public sphere.29                                                             24 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, p. 111, italics in the text, see also p. 112-115. 25 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, p. 212.  26 See  for  instance  Benjamin  Nathans’s  remark  in  Benjamin  Nathans,  “Habermas’s  “Public  Sphere”,” p. 626: Habermas  “relies  on  a  Marxist  framework  of  bourgeois-capitalist ascension, an interpretation that has suffered a massive assault in the years since the original publication of Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit”  (italics  in  the  text).  27 Pierre Bourdieu, Médiations pascaliennes, édition revue et corrigée, Éditions du Seuil, [1997] 2003, p. 97-98, unlike  Habermas,  Bourdieu  develops  a  “sociologie  des  rapports  de  pouvoir  symbolique,”  see  p.  98;;  see  also  Craig Calhoun, “Introduction:  Habermas  and  the  Public  Sphere,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 38, note 57, where Bourdieu is mentioned, although the Méditations pascaliennes and the notion of symbolical  power  are  not;;  other  critics  of  Habermas  also  focus  too  much  on  “rational-critical political discourse” in their  definition  of  the  “public  sphere,”  see  for  instance  Michael  Schudson,  “Was  There  Ever  a  Public  Sphere?  If  So,  When?  Reflections  on  the  American  Case,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 143-163; Moishe Postone also missed the importance of symbolical power when criticizing Schudson, see Moishe Postone,  “Political  Theory  and  Historical  Analysis,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 164-177.  28 See about this Claude Mazauric in François Furet, Claude Mazauric and Louis Bergeron,  “Les sans-culottes et la Révolution  française,”  p.  1107-1108. 29 When  Lloyd  Kramer,  in  “Habermas, History, and Critical Theory,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 241,  says  that  historical  criticism  of  Habermas’s book  are  “attempts  to  expand  the  cultural     11       Habermas’s mention   of   “art   criticism” or “freedom   of   opinion” as part of the event of the modern public sphere of the French Revolution, in his response to the critique of his book, will thus be shown to be insufficient when the publicity of clothing in the symbolical realm of politics is accounted for.30  Even his allusions to  “the  ‘plebeian’  public  sphere”  in  the  French  Revolution, or to “the  coexistence  of  competing  public  spheres” and to  the  “processes  of  communication  that  are excluded from the dominant public sphere,”  remain without any reference to examples such as the political and social symbolism of clothing for the sans-culottes.31  Although Habermas writes about  the  contradiction  between  the  “ideal  type”  and  the  “context” that  “the  real  problem  […]  is  something  else,”  I  will  try  to  show  why  “the  real  problem”  posed  by  the idea of a modern public sphere is, in my opinion, still intimately and importantly linked to material political symbols for a group such as the sans-culottes.      This problem that I wish to explore seems to have been pointed out by Habermas himself when he says:  I   think  that  a  public  sphere,   in   the  sense  in  which  I’ve  tried  to  define  it,  only  arose  with the transformation of the split between high culture and popular culture that has been characteristic of premodern societies. A convenient or, in that sense, popular public sphere emerged only in competition with the literary public sphere of the late                                                                                                                                                                                            meaning of the early-modern  European  public  sphere,”  these  attempts  are  similar  to  my  own  enterprise  here;;  for  an  example see Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  5  about  the  French  Revolution:  “the  discourse of appearances, as it was registered through attention to dress, was a crucial element in the lived experience of the various  institutions  and  practices  which  made  up  the  Revolution’s  new  political  culture.” 30 For  Habermas’s  allusion  to  “art  criticism”  in  the  French  Revolution’s  public  sphere,  see  Jürgen  Habermas,  “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 424; allusions  to  “bodily  expressive,  elliptic,  noisy  discussions”  is  unexplained  in  Jürgen  Habermas,  “Concluding Remarks,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 472. 31 For those quotations, see Jürgen Habermas, “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 425,  see  also    p.  426  where  Habermas  mentions  the  “pluralization  of  the  public  sphere,”  etc”,  and  p.  427  where  he  talks  quickly  about  Bakhtin  and  “the  inner dynamics of a plebeian culture,”  (italics  in  the  text),  although  clothing  is  not  mentioned;;  Habermas  also  mentions  “the  necessity  of  taking  into  consideration  cultural  factors”  such  as  “popular  culture,”  but  without  any  reference  to  the  sans-culottes and the French  Revolution,  Jürgen  Habermas,  “Concluding Remarks,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 464.     12  eighteenth century; it can already b[e] observed in late-eighteenth-century France during the revolution.32        However, the Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit does not delve into these historical elements that would enable to include the  significance  of  “popular  culture”  in  politics during the French Revolution.  The case of the sans-culottes   and   of   the   “plebeian”   strata   of   French   society   is  overlooked and leads to the avoidance of cultural symbols of public representation.        It should be mentioned that there are many issues that this paper will not be able to address.  Habermas’s  own  critical   response   in which he says that his “theory  of   communicative   action”  argues  “in  favor  of  an  empirical  approach  in  which  the  tension  of  the  abstract  opposition  between  norm  and   reality   is  dissolved,”33 will not be part of my thesis since this theory comes later in Habermas’s  work and my focus is Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit.  Other important questions such as the role of women or gender in the culture of clothing and in the revolution in general will not be part of my argument.34  The  notion  of  “historical  agency”  in  the  public  sphere  would  be relevant to take into account but will not be brought forth.35  The concept of the performativity of clothing in the public sphere is another theme that would be useful but that will not be explained.36  It will not be possible either to examine the theoretical distinction between the modality of signification of speech and of clothing or of other types of non-linguistic                                                           32 Jürgen  Habermas,  “Concluding Remarks,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 464-465.  33 Jürgen  Habermas,  “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 442-443,  according  to  Habermas,  his  later  work  on  “communicative  action”  is  interested  in  “the  relative structural autonomy and internal history of cultural systems of interpretation (p. 443), which would have been very relevant for my project. 34 See  for  instance,  Benjamin  Nathans,  “Habermas’s  “Public  Sphere”,”  p.  634-636, although clothing is not addressed;;  see  also  on  women  and  clothing,  Jennifer  Harris,  “The  Red  Cap  of  Liberty,”  p.  293-298, and on clothing and gender, Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 246-249 among other sections. 35 See  for  instance  Harold  Mah,  “Phantasies  of  the  Public  Sphere,”  p.  160,  162-163, although clothing is not mentioned by Mah. 36 Harold  Mah,  “Phantasies of  the  Public  Sphere,”  p.  168,  talks  about  “performances”  in  the  public  sphere  but  clothing is not mentioned.     13  expression in the public sphere.37  There are also many types of clothing and conceptual specificities (uniform, dress, cloth, costume, etc.) that will not be accounted for, although these differentiations and specifications would have improved the level of understanding of the issue.  The literature  on   the  subject  of   the  French  Revolution  as  well  as  on  Habermas’s  work   is  more than abundant and a reading of other studies would have widened the scope from which the issue is addressed.                                                                         37 For studies of non-linguistic (or less-linguistic or non-linguo-centric) types of expression, see Leora Auslander, “Regeneration  Through  the  Everyday?,”  p.  227-247; Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances; James Leith, “Images  of  the  Sans-Culotte,”  p.  131-159;;  Michel  Jouve,  “L’image  du  sans-culotte,”  p.  187-196; Jennifer Harris, “The  Red  Cap  of  Liberty,”  p.  283-312; Michel  Naudin,  “La  réaction  culturelle  en  l’an  III,”  p.  279-291.     14  Habermas and Arendt: Clothing in the Public Sphere      In his book Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, Habermas begins his exploration of the concept of   the   “public   sphere”   by   enumerating   the  many   possibilities   of   meaning   that   the   expression  contains.  He then explains what the notion  of  a  “public  sphere” meant in the context of ancient Greece.    After  his  account,  he  writes  that  “Dieses Modell der hellenischen Öffentlichkeit, wie es uns mit der Selbstdeutung der Griechen stilisiert überliefert ist, teilt, seit der Renaissance, mit allem sogenannt Klassischen die eigentümlich normative Kraft – bis in unsere Tage.”38 This statement is followed by a footnote with a reference   to   Arendt’s   book   entitled   The Human Condition.39      The  “normative  power”  of  the  Greek heritage for political thought is certainly perceptible in Arendt’s  book.40  Habermas saw that Arendt uses Greek history to propose normatively a way of understanding what it means to have a public world for speech and action.  He does the same type of normative historical research with modern history by singling out a bourgeois conception of  a  “public  sphere.”        Habermas seems to have been inspired  by  Arendt’s  analysis  of  the  notion  of the public sphere in other respects.  For instance, in the last part of The Human Condition, Arendt links scientific societies in modernity to the situation of the political world.  She then suggests that many aspects of the culture of modern scientific communities had an impact on the                                                           38 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 16; Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 4.  39 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, New Edition, Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,  [2000]  2003,  p.  199,  writes  about  “Habermas”  and  “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere”  that  “Although  the  very  first  pages  of  his  work  reveal  the  centrality  of  Habermas’s  dialogue  with  Arendt, the complexity of their interchange and the magnitude of his intellectual debt to her have not been given their due” (italics in the text), see  also  for  instance  Benhabib’s referene to the interesting parallel between  Arendt’s  earlier  work and Habermas’s  “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere”  (italics  in  the  text)  on  p.  33,  note  33, and p. 20 where note 33 is indicated.  40 However, although Habermas is right, it should be noted that Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, p 193-198, argues about Arendt that  there  is  “a  normative  lacuna  in  her  thought”  (p.  193), and mentions  on  p.  209,  “Arendt’s  work”  and  “the  public”  as  “a  norm  and  a  principle,” and refers  on  p.  166  to  “the normative core of the Arendtian conception of the political”  (italics  in  the  text), etc; however, it will not be possible to address this issue in this thesis.    15  functioning of our modern and contemporary political communities.  Habermas adopts a similar approach when he takes examples of literary associations in modernity, instead of strictly scientific ones, in order to explain the emergence of a modern public sphere.  However, in spite of this parallel between Habermas and Arendt, the way both authors define the public sphere is different in a crucial way.41        Habermas focuses exclusively on  the  history  of  phenomena  such  as  “ein Lesepublikum,” “die Kritik eines räsonierenden Publikums,” “Räsonnement,” etc.42  This development of critical thinking in literature, journalism, or commercial societies is what Habermas interprets as the elements that led to the modern public sphere.43  In this sense, Habermas asserts that “Die  politische Öffentlichkeit geht aus der literarischen hervor,”44 which is  a  way  of  saying  that  “the  world  of  letters”  was extended to the field of politics.45  There is a form of political rationalism in Habermas’s theory of the public sphere, since it is in the public sphere that one can observe “das öffentliche Räsonnement.”46 The public sphere thus understood is conceived as a place                                                           41 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt,  p.  200:  “whereas  Arendt  sees  a  decline  of  the  public sphere under conditions of modernity, Habermas notes the emergence of a new form of publicity in the Enlightenment,  that  is,  the  public  of  private  individuals  reasoning  together  about  public  matters.”  42 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 38- 39; Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 23-25.  43 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, p. 200: Habermas shows how in modern history “the  public  is  increasingly  formed  through  impersonal  means  of  communication  such  as the printing press, newsletters,  novels,  and  literary  and  scientific  journals,”  although Benhabib is right in mentioning this, she did not emphasize enough that  Habermas’s  understanding  of  the  public  sphere  and  written  speech  is  also  rooted  in  the  rationalistic  ideal  of  the  Enlightenment;;  she  uses  the  adjective  “rational”  on  p.  125  about  Habermas,  but  not  about  Strukturwandel der Öffentlicheit and the Enlightenment.     44 Jügen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 46; Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 30-31; since the 1975 German edition is not available to me, I corrected my German mistake with the following edition of the same text: Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, Neuwied, Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1962, S. 43. 45 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 42-75; Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 27-56, p. 30-31 for the expression  “world  of  letters.” 46 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 42, see also S. 43; Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,  p.  27,  see  also  p.  28;;  John  L.  Brooke,  “Reason  and  Passion in the Public Sphere,”  p.  44, 52, etc., uses  the  expression  “rational  discourse” and mentions historians of the Unite States who “agree  that  ‘rationality’  cannot  capture  the  essence  of  life  in  public”  (p.  56),  etc.    16  where arguments formulated rationally by individuals compete against each other.47   The only historical examples Habermas draws on in his book are related to written and oral language guided by human reason, making his rationalism evacuate the importance of how the debate was materialized in an enormous amount of other aspects of historical reality, such as in material culture shared by the whole population of the territories Habermas studies.  His focus is on how people created a culture of rational discussion in community and does not insist on how individuals were actually related to their own social, political, economic, cultural, and national identities when they were participating in these debates.      Arendt on the other hand accentuates another  crucial  element  that  the  notion  of  “publicity”  or  “public   sphere”   expresses and that Habermas avoids.  She writes about the Greeks that “The  polis […]  is  the  space  of  appearance  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  word,  namely,  the  space  where  I  appear   to   others   as   others   appear   to   me.”48  What Arendt emphasizes is the significance of appearance for the definition of a public sphere.49  Before a group of interlocutors in a community can even start to discuss in a rationalistic and critical way, they first have to appear to                                                           47 Although  Enzo  Traverso,  “Adorno  et  les  antinomies  de  l’industrie  culturelle,”  in  Communications, 2012/2 no. 91, p. 58, does not mention the Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, refers to another book by Habermas in his footnote, and refers to a different context than this one, his critical allusion to Habermas is still relevant to mention in this context, when he alludes to “l’optimisme  béat  de  la  seconde génération  de  l’École  de  Francfort  (notamment  les  illusions  d’un  Habermas  sur  les  vertus  de  la  rationalité  communicative).”     48 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 198, italics in the text; Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, p. 115, says something  very  similar  about  “the  philosophes of  the  Enlightenment”  and  their  conception  of  “freedom,”  and  similarly  about  “the  hommes de lettres”  on  p.  115-116 (italics in the text); for the  Heideggerian  origin  of  Arendt’s  “space  of  appearance”  and  of  “The Human Condition”  (italics  in  the  text),  see  Seyla  Benhabib,  The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, chapter 4, p. 107-118  in  particular,  with  the  section  on  “Aristotle,  Arendt,  and  Heidegger”  (p.  114-117),  although  Benhabis’s  book  as  a  whole  shows  the  continuity-discontinuity between Heidegger and Arendt,  see  also  p.  188,  when  she  writes:  “Arendt’s  entire  theory  of  action,  as  it  unfolds  in  the  space  of appearances, presents us with a powerful alternative to the Kantian two-world  theory  of  metaphysics,”  etc. 49 See also Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, p. 126-127:  “It  has  been  rarely  noticed  that  Arendt  frequently  runs  together  the  phenomenological  concept  of  ‘the  space  of  appearance’  with  the  institutional  concept  of  the  ‘public  space’,”  and  p.  167  note  9,  where  Benhabib  mentions  “the  public  sphere  as a space of appearance,”  although  I  will  not  address  the  debate  as  to  whether  we  should  “distinguish”  between  the  two,  since  my  emphasis  is  not  on  what  Benhabib  calls  “Narrative  action”  and  “Agonal  action,” also Seyla  Benhabib,  “Models  of  Public  Space,”  in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere,  p.  78,  uses  Arendt’s  expression, etc.    17  one another.50  The fact of appearance that enables individuals to confirm that they can interact in dialogic collaboration is a condition of possibility  for  a  “reasoning  public,” and thus precedes this rationalistic component of the public sphere.  Individuals  appear  within  a  “space,”  as  Arendt  writes, and this spatial reality of appearing individuals is that which provides the possibility for interaction and discussion.51   Arendt has thus identified a reality on which the modern public sphere described by Habermas depends,   and   this   reality   is   the   “space   of   appearance”   where  actual individuals first introduce themselves physically in order to take action or to discuss issues of common interest.52  The appearance of concrete individuals in a community is still a requirement for public debate since without materially incarnated individuals, whether under an oral, written, or physical form, there would not be any public sphere.           Although   Arendt   underscores   the   importance   of   speech   and   action   in   the   “space   of  appearance”  for public spheres,53 her insistence on appearance is more radical than a theory that would focus only on the linguistic aspect of appearance, where people would appear only                                                           50 This follows a formula by Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, p. xliii-xliv:  “I  suggest  in  this  context  that  ‘public  space’  is  the  socio-political, and historical correlate of a much more fundamental human condition,  which  is  that  of  ‘only  being  actual  within  a  space  of  appearance,”  and  this  is  confirmed  when  Benhabib  quotes  Arendt  on  p.  129,  where  Arendt  says  that  “The  space  of  appearance”  “precedes all formal constitution of the public realm,”  (italics  in  Benhabib’s  quotation),  which  is  a  distinction  that  I  will  not  apply  to  my  argument  since  the  “space  of  appearance”  is  still  active  in  the  “public  sphere”  I  address.  51 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, p.  200:  “whereas  the  Arendtian  conception  of  the  public  sphere  is  bound  to  topographical  and  spatial  metaphors  such  as  ‘space  of  appearance,’  ‘the  city  and  its  walls,’  Habermas focusses on the transformations brought about in the identity of the public with the rise of the printed media.” 52 For the use of this expression see for instance Hannah Arendt, On Revolution,  p.  23:  “that  space  of  appearances  where freedom can unfold its charms and become a visible, tangible reality,”  and  p.  93  and  p.  267;;  as  already  mentioned, Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, p. 200-201, uses the expression; see also Jürgen  Habermas,  “On  the  German-Jewish  Heritage,”  p.  129,  on  Arendt’s  “space of appearance,” which becomes for  Habermas  “the  life-world,”  which  I  will  not  be  able  to  address  here  since  my  focus  is  Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. 53 In addition to her account in The Human Condition,  see  also  her  emphasis  on  “speech” in Hannah Arendt, On Revolution,  p.  9:  the  political  world  of  “appearances,  in  contradistinction  to  physical  matters,  need  speech  and  articulation, that is, something which transcends mere physical visibility as well as sheer audibility, in order to be manifest  at  all”;;  see  also  Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt,  p.  199:  “Arendt  […]  explores  the  ‘linguistic  structure  of  human  action’,” Benhabib on p. 197-198,  writes  that  “Hannah  Arendt  was not just a thinker of political action; she was also a thinker of human culture and institutions, political parties and movements,  individual  and  collective  identities,  historical  trends  and  future  possibilities,”  and  Benhabib’s reference to  “human  culture”  is  that  which  points in the direction of my argument.    18  through   their   speech   or   “reasoned   opinions.”      Since the space where individuals appear as a public lets material appearance manifest itself with all the meaning it can have, an individual can also come to the public sphere with signification attached to his clothing.  As Arendt explains, clothing remains visible to everybody in the space of appearance where individuals encounter each other in person: The decisive role of mere appearance, of distinguishing oneself and being conspicuous in the realm of human affairs is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in the fact that laborers, when they entered the scene of history, felt it necessary to adopt a costume of their own, the sans-culotte, from which, during the French Revolution, they even derived their name.  By this costume, they won a distinction of their own, and the distinction was directed against all others.54      Arendt argues that the importance of appearance in the event of any public debate has an eloquent example in the case of the French revolutionaries who realized that clothing enabled individuals or groups to take position in the debate. 55  Without appearance, political identities would remain abstract and would diminish the concrete relatedness of single individuals debating among each other.  They would be abstract since these political identities would only be related to the meaning of letters on a piece of paper without the direct oral presence of a person who thus introduces himself or herself physically in a community.  Belonging to a political group is intimately, although not necessarily, related to physical presence through appearance, and thereby through material instances such as clothing.  Focusing only   on   “critical   reasoning”   in  literary societies as Habermas does limits enormously the perspective from which we can understand  what  is  “public”  and  political.  Following Arendt, the  “distinction  directed  against  all                                                            54 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 218, italics in the text; Arendt also mentions the sans-culottes in Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, p. 50-51,  although  clothing  is  not  addressed  in  terms  of  “space  of  appearance”;;  this  reference to clothing is different from what Benhabib  calls  “modalities  of  taste  in  dress,”  in  Seyla  Benhabib,  The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt,  p.  28,  since  this  is  a  case  related  to  Arendt’s  notion  of  “the  social”  (italics  in the text), which is an issue that it will not be possible to discuss here. 55 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, p. 200: although it is true that in modernity, as Habermas  shows,  “There  is  a  shift  from  the  model  of  an  ocular to an auditory public; the public is no longer thought of as a group of humans seeing each other, as in the case of the united demos”  (italics  in  the  text),  this  is  a  counter-example  that  shows  that  the  “ocular”  is  still  very  important  in  modern  politics.    19  others”  is expressed by other means than oral and written speech.56  A public debate takes place not only in written documents but in a space of individuals who disclose meaning through the fact of attending an event in person.  This attendance can be accompanied by objects that people bring as symbols in order to signify from the outset their difference in the discussion.  Arendt took the example of the sans-culottes, which is the case I will further examine below, but many other cases could be considered, such as when Arendt refers to the relation between “appearance”  and  “dress”  in  the  public  sphere  of  antiquity.57      Habermas is certainly less sensitive to the appearance of bodily features such as clothing in the public sphere.  While  commenting  on  how  Michael  Warner  addressed  “the  bodily  aspects  of  self-representation   in   the   public   sphere,”  Habermas   concludes   that   “these   are   false   questions”  and   that   “There   is   no   longer   any   attempt   to   link   such an analysis with any remnants of a normative  political  theory.    This  is  okay,  but  one  has  to  distinguish  what  one  is  doing.”58  From this statement by Habermas, one could also conclude that my argumentation on clothing in the public sphere is based on a   “false   question”   since   I   rely   on   cultural   studies   with   a   focus   on  “bodily”  representations  through  clothing59 while discussing problems in political theory, namely the intricate theoretical concept of the public sphere.  Habermas seems to have forgotten that one                                                           56 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, p. 28, mentions that  “in  The Human Condition ‘distinction’  and  ‘difference’  are  said  to  become  private  matters  of  the  individual.    Arendt’s  reflections  and  analyses  as  a  social  and  cultural  historian  show,  however,  that  such  matters  of  ‘distinction’  and  ‘difference’  are never merely individual but always concern the identities and social positions of collectivities,”  (italics  in  the  text), see also p. 26-27, whereas it is in Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 218-219, that Arendt also relates  the  “distinction”  of  the sans-culottes  or  “labor  movement”  to  the  “fact  that  despite  all  the  talk  and  theory  they  were  the  only  group  on  the political scene which not only defended its economic interests but fought a full-fledged political battle,” Benhabib on p. 142 mentions Arendt’s  idea  of  “the  working  class  as  a  political actor”  (italics  in  the  text),  see  also  p.  144-145,  but  does  not  mention  the  notion  of  “distinction”  in  the  sense  of  the  passage  on  the  sans-culottes by Arendt; for  an  historical  example  of  “distinction”  and  clothing in a different sense, see Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 85.  57 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 218, note 53; in a footnote, Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  94,  note  115,  mentions  “Fénelon’s account of the expression of a hierarchy of status in Greek dress.” 58 Jürgen  Habermas,  “Concluding Remarks,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 465.  59 However, one should note the following distinction made by Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 231:  “although  the  body  and  dress  are  intimately  related,  they  are  far  from  being  synonymous,”  Wrigley  talks  briefly  about the body in the revolution, p. 235.     20  of his starting points for his project on the history of the public sphere in modernity was  Arendt’s  analysis of the “space of appearance” in The Human Condition.  Habermas says on the one hand that   Arendt’s   account   of   the   Greek   public   sphere had a normative significance for political theory,  but  when  an  author   like  Warner  addresses  “bodily”  representations   that  clearly  parallel  Arendt’s  idea  of  the  sans-culottes’s  bodily  appearance,  he  seems  to  argue  in  a  contradictory  way.  Arendt’s   reference to bodily representations seems to have worked for him, since he did not formulate any criticism of Arendt in this respect,   but  Warner’s   further development of bodily representations does not.      Moreover, what Habermas does not seem to perceive is that the type of work done in cultural studies by scholars such as Michael Warner provides a very positive starting point for understanding what actually happens in the space of the public sphere.  He then goes on to say about  Warner:  “I  don’t  think  this  can  lead back to a theory of democracy, and to be fair, it is not intended  in  this  way.”60  In this sense, Habermas acknowledges that criticism coming from the field   of   cultural   studies   does   not   necessarily   “intend”   to   develop   a   normative   “theory   of  democracy,” which   is   more   Habermas’s   own   personal   project   as   a   thinker.      However,  understanding what it means to talk about the modern public sphere cannot be limited to what Habermas   calls  a  “theory  of  democracy”  as  Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit itself shows.  In Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit Habermas still dedicates a section to the French Revolution without explicitly elaborating a theory of democracy and uses historical material without mentioning, and perhaps without realizing, the complexity of the task of bringing the concept of Öffentlichkeit into detailed and concrete historical research.      Habermas writes:                                                            60 Jürgen Habermas, “Concluding Remarks,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 466.     21  The concept of the public sphere, Öffentlichkeit, is meant as an analytical tool for ordering certain phenomena and placing them in a particular context as part of a categorical frame.  This concept also has inevitable normative implications, of course, and is related (and this is the confusing part) to certain positions in normative political theory.61   Habermas is explaining in this  passage   that   the   “concept  of   the  public   sphere”   can  be  used   in  historical   research   as   well   as   in   theoretical   endeavors.      However,   the   “particular   contexts”   in  which this concept can be applied seems to have been reduced by Habermas to written documentation and to linguo-centric accounts of or coming from the past.  Unlike  Habermas’s  understanding of the issue, Arendt’s   notion   of   the   public   sphere   as   a   “space of appearance” leaves room for much broader inquiries into history.  It is manifestly broad enough, as Arendt herself indicates by taking the example of the sans-culottes, to include a multiplicity of cultural “phenomena,” to  use  Habermas’s  word, such as clothing and bodily representations, which are excluded in Habermas’s  analysis of the public sphere.  Habermas not only excludes this type of public reality but he dismisses too quickly other accounts in cultural studies,  such  as  Warner’s  text, that widen the way we think about what we understand as public by focussing on bodily reality.      Arendt’s  treatment  of  appearances  in  public  reality  led  her  to  mention  clothing  as  an  example  and she shows thereby a considerable sensitivity to the cultural aspect of the public sphere.  The material element of culture in the public sphere is also emphasized when she talks about the “things”  or  objects  that  create  meaning  in  the  reality  of  political  publicity.  Arendt writes:  Since our feeling for reality depends utterly upon appearance and therefore upon the existence of a public realm into which things can appear out of the darkness of sheltered existence, even the twilight which illuminates our private and intimate lives is ultimately derived from the much harsher light of the public realm.62                                                             61 Jürgen  Habermas,  “Concluding Remarks,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 462-463 (italics in the text). 62 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 51.     22       In   this   sense,   “things”   manifest   themselves   in   the   public   sphere   in   such   a   way   that   these  appearing objects or  “things” at the disposal of the members of the community are part of what entails the  human  “feeling  of   reality.”  Among these things present in the public are clothing, since they usually come along with the presence of any individual in political communities.  The “public   realm”   is   thus   characterized   according   to   Arendt   by   the   appearance   of   not   only  individuals,  but  of  “things,”  which are part of the “space of appearances” in what is considered public and “common to all,”  to  use  Arendt’s  words.  And these things can reach a very high level of signification in the public sphere with clothing as an exemplary case in French revolutionary history.    Arendt  dedicates  a  passage  to  the  importance  of  the  “thing”  that  we  call  clothing for the political group called the sans-culottes, intimately related by name to the “space of appearance” of the public sphere.  This shows how the difference of emphasis in Habermas and Arendt, one on rational critical thought and the other on the space of individual appearance in community, lead the two authors to use different historical material to elaborate their normative theory.       In a passage from The Human Condition, Arendt examines the relation between things human beings fabricate and what can be considered public: [T]he  term  “public”  signifies   the  world  itself,   in  so  far  as   it   is  common  to  all of us and  distinguished  from  our  privately  owned  place  in  it.  […]  it  is  related  […]  to  the  human artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to affairs which go on among those who inhabit the man-made world together.  To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time.63                                                           63 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 52; Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, p. 127, also quotes sections of this passage and other phrases from this page by Arendt, but does not mention the link to clothing.    23       Arendt thus draws on “her   own differentiation   between   work,   labor,   and   action” 64 that structures The Human Condition.  Although it will not be possible to explain these three cardinal concepts  in  Arendt’s  theory,  her  understanding  of  the  notion  of  work  can  be  used  for  an  account  of the material aspect of the public sphere that Habermas did not consider.  In Arendt’s  opinion, human beings produce objects destined to remain durably in reality and this tangible world of things  or  objects  made  by  “human  hands”  provides  a  home  where  individuals  can  interact.    This  “home”  is  in  Arendt’s  terms  the  tangible  “world”  without  which  human  relations  could  not  have  a truly stable reality.  The material product of human work creates a world as the setting in which human action appears in community.  In other words, individuals share a materially fabricated world which is a condition of possibility of the relations between the members of a community, since human beings need a material space, called world, to  “inhabit.”     Among  the  objects   that  can be defined as  being  part  of  the  “things  between”  individuals  is clothing, that is, clothing that people share as their common material culture in the public sphere.  In this sense, clothing as the product of human work takes part in the constitution of the world that Arendt defines literally as public.  The publicness of clothing as   a   “fabrication   of   human   hands”   and   “artifact”   is   an  example that Arendt gives in subsequent sections of her text on the public sphere, which shows how the material appearance of individuals plays a crucial role in the dynamics of modern politics and its history.       Arendt also writes:  The   term   “public”   […]  means,   first,   that   everything   that   appears   in   public   can   be  seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity.  For us,                                                           64 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt,  p.  199,  mentions  that  “Habermas’s  crucial  distinction  between  ‘labor’  and  ‘interaction,’  which  is  at  the  origin  of  his  concept  of  ‘communicative  action,’  is  deeply  indebted  to  Arendt’s  critique  of  Karl  Marx  in  The Human Condition and to her own differentiation between work,  labor,  and  action”  (italics  in  the  text);;  however,  Benhabib  does  not  mention  how  this  “differentiation”  by  Arendt also distinguishes her approach from Habermas, in particular when clothing is considered; see also Benhabib’s  interesting  description  of  “work”  and  the  link  to  Heidegger  on  p.  108,  and  the  quotation  on  p.  109,  although  clothing  is  not  mentioned  explicitly  in  relation  to  clothing,  but  only  “cultural  creations”  (p.  108).    24  appearance – something that is being seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves – constitutes reality.  Compared with the reality which comes from being seen and heard, even the greatest forces of intimate life – the passions of the heart, the thoughts of the mind, the delights of the senses – lead an uncertain, shadowy kind of existence unless and until they are transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized, as it were, into a shape to fit them for public appearance.  The most current of such transformations occurs in storytelling and generally in artistic transposition of individual experiences.65       Arendt   delves   into   the   idea   of   the   public   sphere   by   stressing   that   “the   widest   possible  publicity”  is  one  of  its  characteristics.    Unlike  Habermas who refers to those who know how to read and write, Arendt describes public reality as what is accessible   to   “everybody.”      Her  encompassing perspective on the public sphere is grounded in the notion of reality in general as it is given to human beings and this enables her to include all human beings in the phenomenon of the public sphere.  Arendt even goes further: human   “existence,”   to   use   her word, is something on which we can shed light inasmuch as “publicity,”   to  use  Arendt’s  word again, is granted to it.  The awareness that we can have of human reality and existence stems from this public encounter of things produced by human beings or of individuals who introduces themselves in the world in front of each other as a public reality.  Her broad-ranging conception shows that things   and   individuals   reach   “public   appearance”   simply when   they   are   “seen   and heard.”   This is what allows for an exploration of the material culture of the public sphere present in all strata of a community, since   cultural   products   such   as   clothing   can   be   “seen”   and  interpreted by all.  Therefore,  Arendt’s  conception  of  the  public reality of a community takes into consideration  all  human  manifestations  when  they  are  brought   into  a  space  where  “everybody”  can access them, whether these manifestations correspond to written publications or dress culture.  The whole population of a territory could thus be included in the study of the public                                                           65 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 50; Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, p. 127, also quotes sections of this passage and other phrases from this page by Arendt, but does not mention the link to clothing.    25  sphere  from  Arendt’s  point  of  view,  which  is  a  central  element  that  makes  her  account  different  from the account found in Habermas.66        Although  Arendt’s  insistence on appearance is more promising for historical research on the public  sphere  than  Habermas’s  restricted  conception, since her perspective is broader, she avoids to address or to mention more explicitly the symbolic significance of the appearance of material culture and clothing.  When Arendt mentions that a reified object, which includes clothing as a public instance,  can  be  understood  as  something  that  “transcends  both  the  sheer  functionalism of things produced for consumption and the sheer utility of objects produced for  use,”67 one could expect an exploration of the symbolic weight of material things such as clothing in the case of the sans-culottes that she singles out herself.  However, she does not mention symbolism in politics as it relates to these material objects or things.  The interpretation of symbols in the material culture of politics is certainly something that goes beyond the “function”  of  utility.  This means that the appearance of clothing in the public sphere is not symbolically neutral.  In English, the  word   “symbol”   comes   from   the  Greek  word   “sumbolon.”68  One of the possible meanings contained  in  the  Greek  word  “symbolon”  is  “sign  of  recognition.”69  In this sense, if clothing can be understood as being symbolically significant for the recognition of individuals and thereby non-neutral in terms of meaning, it is possible to assert that this symbolical                                                           66 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, p. 201, does not mention this important point when she  writes:  “When  Arendt  links  the  public  space  with  the  space  of  appearances,  as  she  often  does,  she  primarily  has  in mind a model of face-to-face human interactions,” however, when Benhabib asks on p. 141:  “Is  the  Arendtian  concept of public space sophisticated and rich enough to do justice to the sociological complexity and variety of modern institutions?,” I would tend to answer yes, to some extent, and this is what I try to show below, although Benhabib, in her next sentence, seems to have something different in mind with her question, than my topic. 67 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition,  p.  173,  on  this  page  Arendt  also  writes  “there  is  in  fact  no  thing  that  does  not in some way transcend its functional use, and its transcendence, its beauty or ugliness, is identical with appearing  publicly  and  being  seen.” 68 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles. Volume 2. N-Z, Fifth edition, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press,  [1973] 2002, p. 3148  69 A. Bailly, Le Grand Bailly. Dictionnaire Grec Français, rédigé avec le concours de E. Egger, édition revue par L. Séchan et P. Chantraine, avec, en appendice, de nouvelles notices de mythologie et religion par L. Séchan, Paris, Hachette, [1894] 2000, p. 1821-1822.     26  significance   of   clothing   enables   the   individuals   of   the   public   sphere   to   “recognize”   the   other  members of the community as belonging to this or that group.  Symbols that are part of a clothing apparatus are thus “signs,”  as  the  Greek  word  implies, made by human beings and these signs offer the possibility to represent political positions for those who give meaning to the world of objects and to individuals in the public sphere.  When individuals appear in the public sphere the material things that accompany them, such as clothing, signal a material way of appearing.  This material way of appearing makes a sign to which people give a meaning and thus which produces representations that can have a political connotation and recognition,   as   “‘symbolic forms  of  political  practice.’”70           It seems that in some of his work Habermas is more sensitive to symbols than Arendt.  This can be inferred from the fact that Habermas “argued   that   for  all  sociologists,  and  historians  as  well, the objective domain is constituted by a symbolically prestructured objectification.”71 However, the symbolic world of the public sphere in terms of material culture is still left out from the most part of his Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit.  Habermas seems to refer to his later work  since  the  French  Revolution’s  “symbolically  prestructured  objectification”  is  not part of his analysis.    The  “objective  domain”  of  French  history, a history in which the historian forms and finds his “object” of study, certainly contains symbols. These symbols were structured by the context as they were brought into the world of things appearing in the public sphere, that is, things  or  individuals  made  objects  (as  “objectifications”), but the symbolism of material culture                                                           70 Richard Wrigley (quoting Lynn Hunt) in Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 2, see also p. 5, where Wrigley  writes  that  “attitudes  and  responses  to  dress  are  a  touchstone  for  matters  of  collective  and  self-representation, and the negotiation of questions of identity apprehended through the culturally complex business of the  legibility  of  appearances.” 71 Jürgen  Habermas,  “Concluding Remarks,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 465; see also Habermas  on  Arendt,  Jürgen  Habermas,  “On  the  German-Jewish  Heritage,”  p.  128-130, where Habermas also talks about “cultural tradition,” “the  life-world,”  “symbolic  structures,”  Arendt’s  emphasis  on  “the  symbolic  nature  of  the  web  of  human  relationships”  explained  in  terms  of  “speech,” etc, which I will not address here since my focus is Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit.    27  at work in the dynamics of the public sphere is not considered by Habermas.  His  allusion  to  “the  symbolic place of power – a vacuum since 1789,” to   “identity-conveying   symbolizations,” to “political  culture,”  or  to  “cultural  traditions” remains without elaboration.72      Arendt  writes  that  “even  use  objects  are  judged  not  only  according  to  the  subjective  needs  of  men but by the objective standards of the world where they will find their place, to last, to be seen,  and   to  be  used.”73  Among   the  “use  objects”   that  Arendt   refers   to,  one  can   find  clothing  since clothing can be used in terms of utility and can have a function of utility based on the different  “needs”  of  each   individual  subject.     However,  Arendt stipulates that these objects are also  destined  to  be  “judged”  and  “seen” without any reference to their utility, which means that their  “objective”  presence  can  be  part  of  “standards”  or  conventions of symbolical meaning that do  not  depend  on  the  difference  of  each  individual  subject.    “Beyond”  the  subjectivism  of  each  individual, to write with Arendt, there is a world of material objects such as clothing where these objects are part of a series of cultural manifestations that have conventionally accepted symbolical meaning.74      Since clothing is something that is added to the bare presence of the individual, clothing has a symbolic presence that is public since  it  is  not  located  in  the  private,  that  is,  “within the confines of the body”75 or  within   “the unequaled   privacy   of   having   a   body.”76  Clothing differentiates itself   from   mere   “privacy”   since   it   is   part   of   a   material   world   that   is   shared   by   the   whole                                                            72 Jürgen Habermas, “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 452-453. 73 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 173. 74 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, p. 201, implicitly refers to this, but without the reference  to  material  culture,  when  she  writes  about  Arendt:  “Public  space  […]  is  a  space  in  which  a collectivity becomes  present  to  itself  and  recognizes  itself  through  a  shared  interpretive  repertoire.” 75 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 112.  76 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 115, the paragraph in which this citation is taken addresses the concept of  labor,  which  I  will  not  be  able  to  address  here;;  see  also  about  Arendt’s  laboring  individual  who  “is  imprisoned  in  the  privacy  of  his  own  body,”  and  who  is  thus  “worldless,”  p.  118;;  on  Arendt’s  notion  of  “privacy,”  see  Seyla  Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, p. 211-215.    28  community in the world of objects.  It comes from a process of fabrication, as Arendt would put it, and then is attached to the body.  This attachment creates meaning when it is encountered in the community, as any other object made by human beings extends itself into the symbolical domain when   it   is   “judged,”   “seen,” and   “recognized.”  Arendt talks about fabricated objects, which includes clothing, as that which creates a world in which human beings can inhabit, and writes that “Without  being  talked  about  by men and without housing them, the world would not be a human artifice, but a heap of unrelated things to which each isolated individual was at liberty to add one more object.”77  The world reified by human beings gains meaning when it is “talked  about”  and judged since it is made to be interpreted, just like the clothing of the sans-culottes Arendt refers to was part of a world that has been talked about ever since the French Revolution.  The meaning of the objects of the world such as clothing takes the isolated individual out of his private sphere and creates a symbolical reference point from which individuals interact and recognize themselves publically.  It seems that this is specifically the element of the public sphere that Habermas addressed only too partially in his account, whereas Arendt seems to have opened the door much more significantly to the idea of bringing material culture  into  our  understanding  of  the  “space  of  appearance”  of  the  public  sphere.        Arendt explains that “most   words   and deeds are about some worldly objective reality in addition   to  being  a  disclosure  of   the   acting  and   speaking  agent,”78 and   this  “worldly  objective  reality”   “physically   lies  between   them  and  out  of  which  arise   their   specific,  objective,  worldly  interests.”79 The  “tangible,”  as  Arendt  would  put  it,  between  individuals  points in the direction of the cultural and public manifestation of material culture such as clothing.  The world contains objects that give a material setting for the interaction of human beings.  Clothing as an object of                                                           77 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 204.  78 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 182, italics in the text.  79 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 182.     29  the world is worn by individuals in such a way that  it  “lies  between  them.”    Among  the  “words” that people use to talk about their situation, one will inevitably come across expressions such as “sans-culottes,” “blue  or  white-collar” which contains a clear reference to the world between the individuals of the community and to what   this   material   reality   of   objects,   or   “this   wordly  objective  reality,”  in  Arendt’s  terms,  means  publically.      Habermas’s   rationalistic   public   sphere   detached from what materially “lies   between”   the  individuals is attenuated by the first part of the Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit.  The next section of my argumentation examines  the  treatment  of  clothing  in  Habermas’s book in order to contrast the short section of his book he dedicates to the public sphere in the middle ages with the way he interprets the event of the French Revolution later in his book.  It sheds light on the possibilities that can be opened up when the public sphere is understood as a “space of appearance” in the widest sense of the term,80 that is, on possibilities that Habermas himself examines, although too briefly.                                                                  80 It should be noted that while Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, p. 163, is right in saying  that  in  her  work  on  the  French  Revolution  “Arendt  minimizes  the  new  political  spaces  created  by  the  people  and for the people – the revolutionary societies, the clubs, the municipal councils  and  militia,  women’s  associations,”  Arendt  still  provides  a  conceptual  framework  that  can  be  taken  very  broadly  as  I  try  to  show  here.    30  Habermas and the Question of Clothing       At the beginning of his Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit Habermas refers to the prehistory of the emergence of the public sphere in modern times.  He explains that the distinction between the private and the public that is articulated gradually throughout the development of modernity is not specific to the Middle Ages.  Nevertheless, the notion of the public aspect of the community was still present in some way in medieval Europe.  Habermas notes that the hierarchies at work in the structure of European medieval communities were embodied in different forms of representation.  The distribution of power in society was indicated and signified according to a certain way of representing, through a system of signs, different hierarchical positions in the daily reality of people.  These representations are what can be seen as having publicity or “Öffentlichkeit.”   This means that when certain individuals had more power than others, they had a way to show it publicly so that the population could recognize their authority and status.  Habermas writes about the Middle Ages in Europe:   “Die   Entfaltung   der   repräsentativen  Öffentlichkeit ist an Attribute der Person geknüpft: an Insignien (Abzeichen, Waffen), Habitus (Kleidung,  Haartracht),  Gestus  (Gruβform,  Gebärde)  und  Rhetorik  (Form  der  Anrede, förmliche Rede überhaupt), mit einem Wort – an  einen  strengen  Kodex  ‘edlen’ Verhaltens.”81             The public aspect of the medieval community was thus manifesting itself in the way the aristocracy or   the   “nobles” produced representations of their position of power in their community.  These representations ended up being specific “attributes” proper to the members of the aristocratic class of society.  Some individual persons had “attributes”  that  distinguished  and                                                           81 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 20-21; Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,  p.    8;;  Craig  Calhoun,  “Introduction: Habermas  and  the  Public  Sphere,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere,  p.  7,  underestimated  this  aspect  of  Habermas’s  account  of  the  Middle  Ages by avoiding it in his summary;;  Michael  Warner  also  misses  this  important  point  when  he  writes  that  “In  earlier  varieties of the public sphere it was important that images of the body not figure  importantly  in  public  discourse,”  Michael  Warner,  “The Mass Public and the Mass Subject,”  in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere,  p.  385  (italics  in  the  text),  as  well  as  on  page  388  of  his  text  where  he  emphasizes  the  “body.”    31  marked their importance in the community.  Among the different attributes and modes of representation  of  power  that  Habermas  enumerates,  half  are  related  to  clothing.    The  “Insignien”  are  defined  in  terms  of  “Abzeichen.”    An  “Abzeichen”  can  be  an  emblem  or a badge that can be used on clothing or armor in order to signify that the individual who bears it on his or her clothes belongs to a noble family or group.  It is a representation in the sense that it symbolizes the attachment of an individual to a community of power, a symbol that is shown publicly on the clothes or armor of the individual who bears it.  Habermas adds to the list of attributes the “Habitus”  that  he  defines  in  terms  of  “Kleidung”  and  “Haartracht.”  “Kleidung”  or  “clothes”  thus  invokes the idea of habitus since clothing is an example of the way people appear in the world as physical  bodies.    “Haartracht”  is  a  reference  to  hairstyle  and  is an aspect of the body that can be seen as ornamental and thus potentially symbolical in its use.  Clothing and hairstyle are two cases of representation that enabled medieval aristocracy to put forward their power as recognizable visibly and represent it publicly so that their distinction could be identified and recognized.      Habermas also maintains that this form of publicity through symbols in clothing was more an attempt to single out the virtue and values of the aristocratic families in power or in the struggle for power.  As Habermas explains in the context of medieval society, in the mind of the aristocracy, “Tugend  muβ  sich  verkörpern,  muβ  sich  öffentlich  darstellen  lassen  können.”82  The publicity of the medieval nobles can  be  described  as  “die  Öffentlichkeit  der  höfisch-ritterlichen Repräsentation.”83  In this sense, bringing forth in public the symbols of distinction is something that happened in courtly societies and in the presentation of the knightly community of medieval                                                           82 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 21; Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,  p.  8;;  Michael  Warner  mentions  this  idea  of  “virtue”  and  “embodiment”  in  Habermas  but  clothing  is  avoided,  see  Michael  Warner,  “The Mass Public and the Mass Subject,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 388. 83 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 21; Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 8.    32  society in general.  This was part of traditional aristocratic self-assertion.  Noble family identities and the preservation of hierarchies in society from which they were benefiting were the stakes of this system of representation in clothing.  Habermas emphasises the fact that in the Middle Ages, these assertions of aristocratic distinction in clothing did not constitute a debate in what we would call today a public sphere.        In Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit Habermas is mainly interested in tracing the origin of the idea of a sphere of public debate in modern society, which means that his treatment of clothing in the Middle Ages as a form of publicity aims to show that medieval societies did not have the idea of public debate developed by the Enlightenment.  Habermas is looking for the historical origin of   what   the   Enlightenment   came   to   call   the   “Sphäre   der   politischen   Kommunikation.”84  Therefore, the public aspect of medieval communities involved a display of aristocratic distinction without getting into a culture of communicational exchange about the common good.  On   Habermas’s   reading,   the   publicity of clothing in the Middle Ages was participating in a system of differentiation that did not promote discussion.  The representations endorsed by the aristocracy through clothing were not understood as tools for the articulation of a discourse in debate with other opposing views.      Although Habermas may be right in his historical account of the reality of publicity in the Middle Ages, his narrative about the transformation of the public sphere that follows loses track of the theme of clothing.  In  a  sense,  Habermas’s  forgetfulness  about  clothing  can  be  interpreted  as a logical consequence of his project since he investigates constantly throughout his book the instances of publicity where linguistic exchange is implied.  For that reason, the press, print, parliamentary deliberations, or telecommunications occupies most of the space he has for his                                                           84 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 21; Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 8.    33  research about the public sphere.  This avoidance of the publicity of clothing in the public sphere through the unfolding of modernity is in my opinion highly problematic.  The important case of modern history that pushes me to think that Habermas missed the importance of clothing for the articulation of the reality of what is public and political in modernity is the French Revolution.85        Moreover, it is worth mentioning that Habermas’s   forgetfulness   of   clothing   in   his  interpretation of the French Revolution is surprising when one considers his chronological approach.     He   starts   by   examining   the  medieval   precedents   of  modernity’s   public   sphere   and  pays attention to the role of clothing.86  In spite of that, he does not see the continuity and discontinuity between the importance of clothing before modernity and its importance during modernity as unfolding in the revolution and in its emerging public sphere.                                                                   85 Harold  Mah’s  article  mentions  the  literature  that  criticizes  Habermas’s  avoidance  of  other  public  manifestations  such  as  “rites,  festivals,  satire,  ceremony,  and  carnivals,”  but  clothing  is  not  mentioned  by  Mah,  see  Harold  Mah, “Phantasies  of  the  Public  Sphere,”  p.  164.    Moreover,  Mah’s  account  of  this  section  of  Habermas’s  text  does  not  address the importance of clothing, see Harold Mah, “Phantasies  of  the  Public  Sphere,” p. 165; Brooke also mentions the importance of symbols, “ceremonies,  parades,  reading,  and  demonstrating”  as  well  as  “theatricality,”  in  the  public  sphere,  but  clothing  is  not  mentioned,  see  John  L.  Brooke,  “Reason and  Passion  in  the  Public  Sphere,”  p.  43, 46, 48, 49 (for the first quotation), 50, 53 (for the second quotation), 54, and 56, although Brooke focuses exclusively on discussing cultural history books about American history.   86 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit,  S.  314,  note  43,  alludes  to  the  “Ordnung  der  Kleider”  in  relation  to  “Die  Privatrechtsgeschichte  der  Neuzeit”  (S. 97), also  to  “der  noblesse  de  robe”  (quoted  from  p.  81  of  the  1962 edition I mention in my bibliography); Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 265 note 44, and p. 76, and p. 68 for last quotation; however, Habermas does not elaborate on clothing in politics.     34  Habermas’s  Linguo-centrism and the Public Clothing of the Sans-culottes      Habermas dedicated a section of his book to the French Revolution since this event of modernity cannot be neglected when one wishes to understand the arrival of a specifically modern idea of a public sphere.  Habermas  writes:   “in   Frankreich   ensteht,   allerdings erst seit etwa der Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts, ein politisch räsonierendes  Publikum.”87  Habermas thus found what he was looking for at the heart of modern history instead of in the Middle Ages and he gives eighteenth century France as an example.  The public sphere created in the French context   included   “reasoning”   assertions   in   competition   about   public   reality.     Oral and written language were thus the tools that the participants used to get their message across and retort to their adversaries.     Habermas then stages the French Revolution and makes an important statement  in  respect  to  his  investigation  focused  on  the  written  and  oral  aspect  of  language:  “Die  Revolution schafft in Frankreich über Nacht, freilich auch weniger beständig, wozu in England eine stetige Entwicklung über ein Jahrhundert gebraucht hatte: für das politisch räsonierende Publikum  die  bis  dahin  fehlenden  Institutionen.”88   Habermas’s  treatment  of  the  emergence  of  a  public sphere equipped with institutions suggests that the essential element of the public sphere has to be debated in terms of “reasoning.”     The  rationalism  of  the  Enlightenment  is  interpreted by Habermas as one of the main starting points of the modern idea of this public sphere of debate.          It is from this perspective that Habermas avoids the theme of clothing addressed earlier in his treatment of the Middle Ages and that he puts so much emphasis on things such as the                                                           87 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 87; Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 67; since the 1975 edition is not available to me at the moment, I used the following edition to correct my German mistake: Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, Neuwied, Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1962, S. 81. 88 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 90; Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 69-70.    35  Encyclopedia and its publication, the foundation of journals, literature, or the press, in which debates were held.  I would suggest that Habermas misses the question of clothing because he focuses   on   the   public   sphere   as   a   “space   of   rationality”   instead   of   understanding   the   public  sphere   as   a   “space   of   appearance,”   as   Arendt   would put it.  In his historical research on the culture   of   clothing   in   the   French  Revolution,   Richard  Wrigley  writes   that   there  was   “a   deep-seated   desire   to   institute   a   new   regime   of   appearances.”89 When   Wrigley’s   historical  scrupulousness is combined with Arendt’s  focus  on  appearance as the main characteristic of the public sphere, a whole range of possibilities emerges: the public sphere of appearances in the French Revolution becomes the locus where it is possible to interpret the event of the revolution in a way that includes the whole of the human population that participated in the revolutionary era.  Many significant historical examples illustrate this.         Habermas   quotes   the   “Déclaration   des  Droits   de   l’Homme   et   du  Citoyen”   and  his   analysis  revolves   around   the   importance  of   the   “Schutz  der   freien  Meinungsäuβerung.”90  Habermas is certainly right when he shows the importance of this initiative taken by the French revolutionaries.   To be precise, his account of the public sphere in the French Revolution addresses the question of freedom of expression as concretized in legislation.  However, his presupposition   that   only   “reasoning”   interventions   are   worthy   of   consideration influences the account so that the example of clothing in lawmaking is not identified by Habermas.  Auslander was able to target cases of legislation about clothing in 1792 during the French Revolution,91 which is one example among many other cases.92  This testifies that clothing had an important, articulate relation to politics and to the public sphere.  In the following year in 1793 there were                                                           89 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  80,  see  also  p.  85  where  Wrigley  mentions  “the  creation of a new  regime  of  revolutionary  appearances,”  and  for  the  expression  “régime  of  appearances,”  p.  240,  242,  etc.  90 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 91; Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 70. 91 Leora Auslander, “Regeneration  Through  the  Everyday?,” p. 230. 92 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 59-96, see also the whole book filled with examples.     36  public debates about clothing and its connection to the republicanism of the revolution: this was part  of  the  ideal  of  the  “collective  participation in the construction of a new national – republican – everyday.”93  The participants of the political deliberations of the Jacobins in power in 1793 took  seriously  the  question  of  clothing  and  came  up  with  a  law  on  clothing.    They  “decreed,  at  a  meeting of 8 brumaire (29 October 1793) that freedom of costume was the right of all citizens.”94  The   use   of   clothing   in   public   celebrations   was   debated   in   the   context   of   “the   Festival of Federation in July 1790,” among   other   “Republican   festivals” for which clothing was discussed.95   In addition, as Auslander explains, painters and artists were taking part in this public and contentious redefinition of identity through dress and clothing.  Wrigley mentions for instance  the  debates  on  the  idea  of  “a national  costume”  taking  “place  in  the  Société  populaire  et  républicaine   des   arts   between   March   and   June   1794,”   who   believed   that   “dress”   had   been  wrongly   “used   to   distinguish   between   rank   and   wealth.”96  The revolutionaries were thus bringing clothing into their political and legislative struggles since it had an important public significance.97        Yet, Habermas was not able to perceive how his analysis of clothing in medieval society could also be applied to the context of the French Revolution and to the definition of a public                                                           93 Leora  Auslander,  “Regeneration  Through  the  Everyday?,”  p.  230;;  Richard  Wrigley,  The Politics of Appearances, p.  5,  while  criticizing  Richard  Cobb,  writes  that  he  “would  rather  want  to  define  revolutionary  political  culture  as  something  which  was  as  much  manifest  in  its  quotidian  experience  as  in  matters  of  rhetoric  and  legislation.” 94 Jennifer  Harris,  “The  Red  Cap  of  Liberty,”  p.  311;;  for  other  examples  of  debates  on  clothing  recorded  in  French  political history during the revolution, see for instance Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 60-66, as well  as  his  allusion  to  “the  Convention’s  deliberations  of  freedom  of  dress”  on  p.  79,  and  to  “the  decree  protecting  freedom  of  dress  (8  brumaire  an  II,  29  October  1793)”  on  p.  106  (also  mentioned  on  p.  64),  see  also  p.  244  for  contextual elements. 95 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 83, see also p. 84, 146, 191, and 246. 96 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 79; to give only one other example, see also Jennifer Harris, “The  Red  Cap  of  Liberty,”  p.  304, who  seems  to  refer  to  the  same  “discussion”  of  the  “Société,”  and  adds  a  date. 97 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  7:  there  was  an  “intensive  scrutiny  of  people’s  vestimentary  identity, alert to the crystalisation of new groups, parties, clubs, factions, and allegiances both overt and covert. It is significant that almost all the legislation which directly addressed matters of dress was driven by a desire to impose much-needed control on conflicts arising out of inflammatory disputes and disturbances in streets, theatres, and other public spaces,”  see  also  p.  10  where  “intensive  scrutiny”  is  also  mentioned,  along  with  the  idea  of  “legibility  of  appearances,”  etc,  and  see  also  p.  229.     37  sphere of debate about the common good of the community.  For Habermas, the public debate on freedom of expression in the revolution is restricted to written and oral speech, as if there were no specific physical space of appearance for   the   actual   course   of   the   revolution’s   debate on freedom, as if the physical space of human interaction were not indicating anything about freedom in the public sphere.  As historical research has shown, the public sphere of revolutionary France was concerned with clothing and ended up using dress significantly as a means of revolutionary struggle and expression.98  More precisely, the sphere where the public debate was taking place was also an actual space where human appearances and identities could emerge and affirm themselves: Wrigley writes about  “the  Revolution”  that  “its  evolving  political  culture […] had been given an explicit programmatic vestimentary form.”99  Moreover, he mentions   the   revolution’s   “highly   developed   scrutiny of dress and appearances by journalists, agents, and the inhabitants of public space generally.”100  People  participating  in  the  revolution’s  public debate were paying attention and were “sensitive”  to  what  individuals  were  wearing since clothing was heavily meaningful.  This also means that in the context of the French Revolution and of its culture  of  “official  costume,”  “the  creation  of  new  symbolic  forms  of  dress was taken extremely seriously.”101  There is a culture of clothing in the French public sphere that has to be considered  “seriously”  in  any  account of the French revolutionary debate.102                                                           98 Harold  Mah  also  mentions  the  importance  of  the  “different  forms  of  expression”  in  his  critique  of  Habermas  but the  question  of  clothing  is  not  considered,  see  Harold  Mah,  “Phantasies  of  the  Public  Sphere,”  p.  168;;  Richard  Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  231,  on  clothing  as  “a  metaphorical  means”  in  politics,  also  p.  232.  99 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 271.  100 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 240, see also p. 111: “Scrutiny  of  the  wearing  of  the  cockade  occurred most consistently at the entrance to public spaces and institutions,” also p. 202, where he says about 1794 that  “with  the  establishment  of  a  ubiquitous  régime  of  surveillance,  dress  in  general  had  become  a  site  for  apprehensive  scrutiny,  and  moreover  […]  this  applied  to  the  most  ordinary  items  of  dress,”  and  p.  233  for  the  importance  of  clothing  for  “the  reading  of  identities,”  and  p.  234:  “The  reliability  of  appearances  and  dress  as  a  means  to  signal  identity  continued  to  provide  a  measure  of  the  Revolution’s  political  consolidation.”   101 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 60, and for an interesting example, see p. 201 and note 74. 102 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt,  p.  210:  “The  cultural  construction  of  the  pubic  in  diverse human societies at different points in history offers the most direct access to understanding the self-definition  of  a  collectivity,”  which  is  what  I  try  to  inquire  into  here,  see  also  p.  210-211:  “In  entering  the  public,     38       An obvious historical example that reveals the crucial importance of clothing during the French Revolution is the group called the “sans-culottes,”103 which was already singled out by Arendt  with  her   insistence  on   the  public  sphere  as  a  “space  of  appearance.”  The sans-culottes were   a   revolutionary   group   during   the   French   Revolution   who   shared   a   “pratique   politique  commune.”104  They were thus actors in the public dynamic of the revolution and their name referred precisely to a style of clothing.105  The sans-culottes were those who did not wear the traditional aristocratic costume, which involved a   type   of   pants   called   “culotte.”      To   use  Habermas’s  vocabulary  about  the  Middle  Ages,  the sans-culottes had “attributes”106 expressed in clothing and one of these attributes was expressed negatively: they did not dress up like nobles since they were humbly dressed and were intimately bound to broad-ranging lower-class people.107  Their  choice  of  symbolical  dress  came  to  be  “associated  with   the   intervention  of   le peuple in  political   activities.”108  The reference to clothing without breeches was raised to the                                                                                                                                                                                            every new social, cultural, political group presents its point of view to others, or it re-presents itself to others, in the sense of refashioning itself as a presence in public,” and p. 166:  “Only  when  humans  give  the  space  of  appearance  in  which  all  action  and  speech  unfold  a  visible  and  sable  form,  and  create  institutions,  do  they  create  a  public  space.” 103 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  232:  “In  the  importance  given  to  the  currency  of  liberty  caps  – both as dress and as emblems – and the stylized outfit associated with sans-culottes, as with the primordial emblematic burden carried by the cockade, matters of dress  were  placed  at  the  heart  of  revolutionary  discourse”  (italics in the text).  104 Claude Mazauric, in François Furet, Claude Mazauric and Louis Bergeron,  “Les  sans-culottes et la Révolution française,”  p.  1102;;  see  also  Michael Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 8, where he explains that at the origin “The  phrase  sans culottes […]  belonged  fully  and  firmly  to  the  world  of  the  salon,  where,  well  before  the  French  Revolution,  it  was  simply  part  of  a  joke”  (italics  in  the  text),  and  thus the  expression  “sans-culotte” was not originally a political expression as it became later during the Revolution; Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  213,  alludes  to  “the  earlier  satirical  use  of  the  term  ‘sans  culotte’,”  also  p.  230,  however, it will not be possible to go into the details of these issues since my point is different. 105 On the importance of clothing for the sans-culottes’s  recognisability,  see  Michel  Naudin,  “La  réaction  culturelle  de  l’an  III,”  p.  280,  282,  287-289; on the  origin  of  the  expression  in  relation  to  the  “salons,”  see  Michael  Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 5, 7. 106 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  161,  uses  the  expression  “allegorical  attribute”  when  talking  about the red cap, which was a symbol of the sans-culottes, as will be explained below, see also pages 167-168 for Wrigley’s  use  of  the  expression  “attribute  of  Liberty”  as  the  red  cap,  as  well  as  “allegorical  attributes,” in addition to p.  193  for  “allegorical  attribute,”  etc,  also  p.  242:  people  such  as  “Priests”  also  had  “their  ‘attributes’.”    107 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 201: Their  “outfit”  brought  together  “carmagnole, pantalon, and bonnet rouge, but sometimes only one or two of these elements” (italics in the text), see also p. 215, and for various historical illustrations of the sans-culottes with analysis, see p. 203-214. 108 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  197  (italics  in  the  text),  Wrigley  focuses  on  the  “bonnet rouge”  (italics in the text) in this section of his text on the sans-culottes; Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, p. 50-51, associates the sans-culottes  with  “the  people”  and  with  “the  poor,”  whose  interest,  in  her  opinion,  made  the  revolution  fail,  and     39  title of a highly significant revolutionary emblem,109 where the sans-culottes are singled out significantly in the revolution from 1792.110  The theme of clothing in the public sphere of the revolution shows that the sans-culottes had a name that was reflecting the reality of the publicity of the revolution itself.111  If it is true that the sans-culottes’s  name  reflected  the  dynamic  of  the  public sphere, the public sphere itself was also reflecting the clothing culture of the sans-culottes: the laws concerning “freedom   of   dress”  made in 1793 stemmed from quarrels related to the “wearing   of   the   bonnet rouge,”112 a symbol of the sans-culottes (as will be discussed further below).113                                                                                                                                                                                            Arendt does not mention their symbolical clothing, see also p. 65 and note 18 on p. 280-281, see also p. 71, 81, 84-85, 96, etc; however, in Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 218, Arendt, as quoted above, mentions the “costume”  of    “the  sans-culotte ,”  associates this  “movement”  with  “the  labor  movement”  and  then  on  page  219  says  that  “it  could  represent  the  people  as  a  whole  – if we understand by le peuple the actual political body, distinguished as such from the population as well as from society”  (italics  in  the text); Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt,  p.  144,  quotes  Arendt’s  phrase  “could  represent  the  people  as  whole,”  but  does  not  mention  the  sans-culottes and clothing,  and  on  p.  163  criticizes  Arendt  in  her  book  on  revolution  since  “Arendt  minimizes the new political spaces created by the people and for the people – the revolutionary societies, the clubs, the municipal councils  and  militia,  women’s  associations.”  109 Michael Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 57, 340: the  “emblems  […]  lent  themselves readily to the type of metonymy involved in using the name of a thing or a condition  (like being without breeches)  for  the  name  of  a  person.”  110 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  198;;  also  p.  205:  “The  dramatic end to the monarchy on 10 August 1792 consolidated the political visibility of the sans-culotte and  its  representability”;;  also  p.  202,  where  Wrigley  talks  about  a  “repudiation  of  sans-culottes costume  in  the  spring  of  1794”  (italics  in  the  text),  see also p. 201,  and  p.  215:  “The  vestimentary  ensemble  of  the  sans-culottes had a short career, only being actively adopted between  late  1792  and  the  spring  of  1794”  (italics  in  the  text),  see  also  p.  216  for  a  concise  explanation  of  why  it  was  “discarded”  (i.e. unreliability, no laws protecting it, historical situation of the group), see also p. 229-230 on the importance  of  the  “deceptive”  aspect  of  the  costume  of  “the  sans-culotte”  (italics  in  the  text),  and  p.  234-235; see also  François Furet, in François Furet,  Claude  Mazauric  et  Louis  Bergeron,  “Les  sans-culottes et la Révolution française,” p.  1099:  the  “mouvement  sans-culotte  […]  est  en  contestation  permanente,  jusqu’au  printemps  1794,  avec les groupes qui dirigent la Révolution,  les  maîtres  de  la  Convention  et  des  Comités.”   111 The  word  “sans-culotte”  even  appears  in  political  and  administrative  denominations  and vocabulary in 1792 and 1793, see Michael Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 7, 16, 51, 55, 339; Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  191:  “dress  functioned  as  a  form  of  stylized  shorthand  for  signalling  a  socio-political  allegiance,”  see  also  p.  199:  “Although  a  degree  of  legitimacy  and  accepted  currency  was  achieved  by the term in the wake of 10 August 1792, there was still no formal legislative or official codification of sans-culotte costume”  (italics  in  the  text),  see  also  p.  215. 112 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 106 (italics in the text), see also p. 188, where Wrigley writes that  the  “vestimentary  dimension”  of  the  sans-culottes  “was  a  phenomenon  defined  and  negotiated  in  the  turbulent  public  realm  of  revolutionary  Paris.”  113 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 199: to give another example, speaking publically in certain communities could also involve sans-culottes clothing,  e.g.  “bonnet rouge and  trousers  (‘pantalon’)”  (italics  in  the  text).      40       The point that Habermas missed by focussing on written and oral language is that during the French Revolution clothing was no less a means to participate in the debate in the public sphere than rational debate in linguistic communication.  The individuals without any intellectual background could still call into question the situation of the revolution by expressing themselves symbolically in clothing.  As Richard Wrigley explains, the sans-culottes’s   “versimentary  ensemble functioned as a site for the assertion and challenging of political values.”114 In this sense, “The  virtue  of  publicness  could  materialize  other than by the intellectual transactions of a polite  and  literate  bourgeois  milieu.”115 Those who were silenced by the hierarchical system of the Ancien Régime and still illiterate during the Revolution could find expression outside of the realm of public argumentation pointed out by Habermas.116  The creation of a space of rational debate by the bourgeois class was accompanied by a wider space of appearance where clothing enabled the lower classes to be represented in the debate, in a material language that they knew.  Everybody had a “lived   experience   of reading   identity   through   dress   and   appearances,”117 whereas the intellectually abstract discourse of the bourgeois class was not accessible to everyone.  The representation of the lower classes had its starting point in the symbolical significance of the sans-culottes’s   costume, which appeared in the public arena in a way that                                                           114 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  187,  see  also  p.  87,  as  well  as  Wrigley’s  comment  on  Lynn  Hunt’s  book  on  the  French  Revolution  on  page  2:  “dress  […]  is  treated  as  a  highly  significant  site  for  the  articulation  of beliefs and ideas, and a key ingredient in the consolidation of a new political  culture,”  and  page  7  where  he  mentions  the  notion  of  “public  assertion”  through  clothing,  and  p.  229;;  when  Jon  Cowans  mentions  Habermas’s  avoidance  of  “those  without  property  and  education”  in  the  French  Revolution,  the  use  of  clothing  and  the  sans-culottes  are  not  mentioned,  see  Jon  Cowans,  “Habermas  and  French  History,”  p.  141. 115 Geoff  Eley,  “Nations, Publics,  and  Political  Cultures,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 304; see also Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 114, who writes that the revolution or “new  politics  could  not  be  a  purely  intellectual  phenomenon  as  this  would  ensure  its  popular  inefficacy,”  and  mentions  the  importance  of  “the  language  of  emblems”;;  however,  Wrigley,  on  page  218  note  16, mentions about 1791  that  “the  general  tenor  of  the  participation  in  the  new  revolutionary  political  culture  was  still  predominantly  bourgeois,”  although  it  is  not  clear  whether  Wrigley  talks  only  about  the  “Faubourg Saint-Antoine”  (italics  in  the  text) and 1791 or about the revolution in general; Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, p. 38, mentions the importance of “this  immense  majority”  in  the  French  Revolution  which  was  discredited  in  pre-revolutionary  France  from  “the  public  realm,”  “its  space  and  its  light.”   116 Geoff  Eley,  “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p.  305:  It  will  not  be  possible  to  discuss  why,  as  Eley  explains,  “Habermas’s opposition of ‘educated/uneducated’  and  ‘literate/illiterate’  simply  don’t  work.”  117 Expression used by Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 232, see also p. 271.     41  everyone could understand.  The appearance of such clothing indicated through material representation that the people excluded from educational privileges were not to be forgotten in the public sphere, and that the definition of the French nation by the bourgeois was incomplete without them.        Annie Geffroy explains that people in revolutionary France probably used the expression sans-culottes to include the whole nation.118  The sans-culottes had at their disposal most of the conditions of possibility for imagining their homeland as a nation of equals, for producing representations of their own imagined community, and for using conventions of clothing to define a national identity: they had the press, print, newspapers, a vernacular language, a sense of simultaneity on a large territory, a disarticulation of the monarchy, and a secular discourse.119 Their use of the  press  or  newspapers  was  certainly  different  than  the  educated  bourgeoisie’s  use,  given their low-class origins and their hostile attitude towards the intellectual culture of the time,120 which   is   the   reason  why  Habermas  excludes   them  from  his  “bourgeois-centric”  public  sphere of the revolution.  Nevertheless, the sans-culottes were still able to imagine themselves as                                                           118 Annie Geffroy, “Désignation,  dénégation,” p. 586; however, it is worth quoting Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  7,  who  writes  about  the  French  Revolution  that  “There  was  not  […]  a  single  politics  of  dress,  but  rather  a  spectrum  of  competing,  dissonant  interpretative  ideas  and  beliefs”;;  for  an  example  of  the  relation between the  “nation”  and  the  “sans-culottes,”  see  Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 193, who talks about “Charles  de  Villette”  who  “ensures  that  this  symbol operates on a national level,” the  symbol  being  the  “bonnets de laine”  (italics  in  the text). 119 For an analysis of the origins of modern nationalism and the conditions of possibility of national consciousness, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised Edition, London-New York, Verso, [1983] 2006, p. 1-46; in The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt also notices the link  between  cultural  realities  such  as  “the  rise  of  the  novel,  the  only  entirely  social  art  form”  (p.  39)  and  the  “‘nation’,”  (p.  29),  see  also  the  interesting  remarks  in  Hannah  Arendt,  On Revolution, p. 277-278, note 24, and p. 149-150;;  about  the  relation  between  the  “imagined  community”  and  “‘the  disembodied  public  subject,’”  see  Benjamin  Lee’s  summary  of  Michael  Warner’s  argument  in  Benjamin  Lee,  “Textuality, Mediation, and Public Discourse,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 406-407, although the idea of “embodied  sensibilities”  is  not  explained  in  terms  of  clothing  by  Warner  and  Lee. 120 Louis Bergeron in François Furet, Claude Mazauric and Louis Bergeron,  “Les  sans-culottes et la Révolution française,”  p.  1117;;  see  also  Richard  Wrigley,  The Politics of Appearances, p. 245, where a quotation from a text seems to imply the incompatibility between the sans-culottes  and  “thorough  education,”  although  Wrigley  does  not  elaborate on this point; however, see the  interesting  remark  about  the  fact  that  “many  poor  Parisians  read  novels  and  news-sheets,”  etc  in  Jon  Cowans,  “Habermas  and  French  History,”  p.  142,  see  also  about  “illiterate  citizenry”  and  “symbolism,”  p.  149,  although  clothing  is  not  mentioned.    42  belonging to a nation.121  Despite the fact that the sans-culottes had a variety of social backgrounds,  they  were  still  giving  a  “political  unity”  to  their  movement122 and this unity found a significant ground in the symbolical clothing of the sans-culottes representing the nation in the public sphere.123            Since what the sans-culottes represented symbolically through their clothes was the majority of the population as opposed to the smaller group of aristocrats or bourgeois, they were representing not only the French nation in general but also a national community of equals.  Therefore, what people were debating by coining expressions like “sans-culotte” was more the cultural and political identity of the French nation as an egalitarian society.  As Mazauric says about the sans-culottes: “L’égalitarisme  social est le trait essentiel  de  leur  mentalité.”124  Equality was thus a value that the sans-culottes represented polemically by means of their clothes and this valuation of equality was directed against traditional hierarchies creating social classes.  The                                                           121 Many of them were able to read and write, and to take action through speech, and they were related to a lower bourgeoisie, see Louis Bergeron in François Furet, Claude Mazauric and Louis Bergeron,  “Les  sans-culottes et la Révolution  française,”  p.  1117-1118; Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 123, mentions the importance  of  the  “cockade”  which  also  “continued  to  symbolize an ideal of national unity,” which means that not only the sans-culottes were imagining themselves as representing the nation. 122 Claude Mazauric in François Furet, Claude Mazauric and Louis Bergeron,  “Les  sans-culottes et la Révolution française,”  p.  1104,  1106,  1110.;;  Louis  Bergeron in François Furet, Claude Mazauric and Louis Bergeron,  “Les  sans-culottes  et  la  Révolution  française,”  p.  1116;;  this  confirms  Geoff  Eley’s  idea  that  “Habermas’s  oppositions  of    “educated/uneducated”  and  “literate/illiterate”  simply  don’t  work,”  although  Eley gives different reasons and avoids the  problem  of  clothing  in  the  French  Revolution,  Geoff  Eley,  “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 305. 123 See  in  Harold  Mah,  “Phantasies  of  the  Public  Sphere,”  p.  168,  the  interesting  discussion  of  the  “public  sphere”  as  a  “fiction”  and  “political  imaginary,”  which  is  a  description  that  could  be  compared  to  Benedict  Anderson’s  idea  of  an  “imagined  community,”  even  if  “imaginary”  and  “imagined”  are  not  synonymous,  just  like  “public  sphere”  and  “nation”  overlap  but  are  still  two  very  different  concepts;;  Craig  Calhoun,  “Introduction:  Habermas  and  the  Public  Sphere,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 8, mentions the parallel between Habermas’s  explanation  of  “print  media”  and  “Anderson’s  analysis  of  ‘print  capitalism’”;;  Geoff  Eley  alludes  to  “the  creation  of  local  public  spheres  and  their  articulation  with  a  national  cultural  and  political  arena,”  although without referring to the sans-culottes,  in  Geoff  Eley,  “Nations, Publics,  and  Political  Cultures,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 296; John  L.  Brooke,  “Reason  and  Passion  in  the  Public  Sphere,” p. 46: mentions  “Habermas’s  conception  of  the  public  sphere”  and  “Anderson’s  cognate  framework  of  the  nation  as  an  ‘imagined  community’,”  and  alludes  to “material  symbols,”  although  without referring to the sans-culottes; see also Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  193,  on  the  example  of  the  “faubourg  Saint-Antoine”  and  the  “bonnets de laine”  (italics  in  the  text).   124 Claude Mazauric, in François Furet, Claude Mazauric and Louis Bergeron, “Les  sans-culottes et la Révolution française,” p. 1105; see also on the importance  of  equality  in  “the  sans-culottes both  as  a  name  and  a  political  force,”  see Michael Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 51 (italics in the text).    43  word sans-culottes even became  “a  symbol  of  class  conflict,”125 which invokes the revolutionary aspiration to equality in a hierarchy of classes in conflict.        When Habermas writes about the census in 19th century   France   that   “die   Französische  Revolution  nimmt   ihn  ja  zum  Maβstab  der  Unterscheidung  von  Aktiv- und Passiv-bürgern,”126 clothing as another important marker of social differentiation or equalization is not envisioned.  If it is true that the census was giving information and references for the process of hierarchizing society politically by those who were leading the revolution, it would be restrictive to dismiss the importance of the tradition of symbolical clothing in France in this hierarchizing of individuals between  “active”  or  “passive  citizens.”127  As Wrigley mentions, “dress  […]  became  subject  to  intensive   scrutiny,”128 and   there  was   an   “importance   invested   in   the   public   visibility   of   social  difference,”129 which means that being identified as a “passive”   or   “active   citizen” in the revolution was significantly linked to clothing as it appeared in the public sphere,   since  “dress  was looked to as an already differentiated resource for the reading of identities.”130  Moreover, the costume of the sans-culottes and the meaning ascribed to the expression were used as political means to articulate a discourse of equality against hierarchical distinctions,131 such as                                                           125 Michael Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 342, Sonenscher specifies in parenthesis that  “the  classes  in  question  were  ‘the  bourgeoisie,’  ‘the  mercantile  class,”  or  ‘the  property  owners’  on  the  one  side,  and  ‘the  people,”  ‘the  class  of  workers,’  ‘the  indigent,  useful,  and  laborious  class’  on  the  other.” 126 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 108; Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 85.  127  For example, Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 66, explains that there  was  the  debate  over  “the  Guard”  and the price for “the  acquisition  of  their  uniform, a requirement which immediately highlighted social differences,”  and this problem of exclusion was intertwined with the subsequent abolition  of  “the  distinction  between ‘active’  and  ‘passive’  citizens”;;  see  also  page  102  for  an  allusion  to  “active  citizens”  and  the  “cockade.”   128 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 10, and 232: clothing was important since there was in pre-revolutionary  France  “a  hierarchical  spectrum  of  dress  codes,”  as catalogued  by  an  aristocrat  “in  1777.”  129 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  264,  see  also  p.  86  on  “official  costume”  vs.  “equality.” 130 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  233:  “Dress  was  universally  understood  as  enshrining  a  complex  of  invitingly  explicit  moral  and  social  indicators,”  see  also  p.  10:  “dress  as  an  indicator  of  identity,”  and  on  “The  discourse  of  denunciation,”  “disguise”  and  “dissimulation”;;  Wrigley  also  mentions  for  instance  the  “sans-culotte costume”  (italics in  the  text)  and  “calculated  simulation”  on  p.  215,  also  p.  216,  see  also  p.  232,  etc;;  also  p.  236  for  an  interesting  general  comment  on  “appearances”  and  “denunciation.”  131 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  238:  in  the  spirit  of  “the  ideological rationale for the adoption of sans-culotte costume,”  “The  idea  that  dress  could  neither  conceal  nor  alter  ineffaceable  social  rank  was  politically     44  “Aktiv- und Passiv-bürger.”  The cardinal importance of a movement such as the sans-culottes and of its intertwinement with a tradition of political clothing making distinctions between “active”   and   “passive”   citizens,   between   the   different hierarchical positions ascribed to individuals or groups, reveals how limited Habermas’s tracing of the origins of the modern public sphere is.  The egalitarianism of the sans-culottes symbolized in their clothes is an eloquent example of a public critique of hierarchies.  In this sense, one of the important means that enabled them to assert these values publically is obviously their dress code.      One of the characteristics of the vocabulary related to clothing is that in the French case people used the term “sans-culotte” to symbolically represent an ideal.  Wearing the costume of the sans-culotte meant an affiliation with a conception of the revolution.132  It stopped being an indication of whether someone was really from the low classes or not when someone was wearing the costume.  As  Annie   Geffroy   explains,   “Le   ‘costume des sans-culottes’ part   d’un  vêtement populaire, mais le transforme en symbole; il le fait décoller de ses déterminations sociales.”133  The language and vocabulary of the public sphere itself was rooted in a cultural heritage and tradition that had a sense of clothing differentiation and of its meaning in the process  of  “political  self-identification,”134 which came to be independent of the social origins of                                                                                                                                                                                            repugnant,  in  that  it  challenged  the  abolition  of  hierarchy  that  had  been  achieved  by  the  Revolution”  (italics in the text).  132 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  215:  the  costume  “or  only  some  of  its  overall  set  of  elements  […]  were  enough  to  signify  identification  with  a  position  at  once  political  and  rhetorical.”  133 Annie  Geffroy,  “Désignatino,  dénégation,”  p.  586;;  Richard  Wrigley,  The Politics of Appearances, p. 188, also quotes  this  passage  from  Annie  Geffroy,  see  also  page  7  where  Wrigley  writes  that  “none  of  the  types  of  dress  considered here have a simple, straightforwardly reconstitutable  unitary  identity”;;  see  also  on  the  flexible  or  “abusive”  use  of  the  term  “sans-culottes,”  Michael  Sonenscher,  Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 358-361.  134 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 188;;  see  also  Craig  Calhoun,  “Introduction:  Habermas  and  the  Public  Sphere,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere,  p.  34,  who  refers  to  Habermas’s  “thinness  of  attention  to  matters  of  culture  and  the  construction  of  identity,”  and  by  referring to Baker, says that Habermas  “tends  to  typify  epochs  with  little  regard  to  national  or  other  cultural  specificity,”  see  also  p.  34,  37,  although  clothing  is  not  mentioned  by  Calhoun;;  Habermas  highlights  the  importance  of  “cultural  traditions”  in  the public sphere, but clothing is still not mentioned by Habermas, see Habermas quoted in Craig Calhoun, “Introduction:  Habermas  and  the  Public  Sphere,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 48, note 52.    45  the wearer during the revolutionary era.  In this sense, throughout the revolution and its public debate,   “the   name   sans-culottes”   came   to   be   understood as “a   republican   emblem.”135  This emblem was thus a symbol that was destined to represent a political position without being a reference to the actual reality of the one who was wearing the piece of clothing.  When Wrigley writes that “the  wearing  of  sans-culottes costume was a minority practice,”136 and that, according to  research  done  on  the  revolution,  “the  artisans,  shopkeepers,  servants,  and  petty  officials  who  made up the social core of revolutionary sans-culottes, in fact tended to wear breaches rather than pantalon,”137 it shows the extent to which clothing was used as a highly symbolic “emblem”  more than anything else.138  Instead of being only a piece of clothing, the costume of the sans-culottes   “emblematized”   a   form   of   republicanism   for   which   the   revolutionaries   were   fighting beyond social class origins, and which was also linked to an important traditional element in French culture,  the  “bonnet  rouge.”                                                              135 Michael Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 362 (italics in the text); when Nancy Fraser  mentions  in  her  critique  of  Habermas  the  importance  of  “social  identities”  and  the  “plurality  of  public  arenas  in which groups with diverse values and rhetorics participate,”  clothing  is  not  mentioned,  see  Nancy  Fraser,  “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 125-126; Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  215,  writes  that  in  pictorial  arts  “the  representation of the sans-culotte was  anything  but  consensual”  (italics  in  the  text),  which  confirms  the  extent  to  which  it  was  an  emblem  to  be  debated. 136 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  42,  and  p.  199,  where  Wrigley  mentions  that  “it  is  rare  to find sans-culottes included  in  the  descriptions  of  festival  programmes  and  processions,”  and  writes  a  few  sentences  later  on  one  specific  “festival”  that  “it  is  likely  that  it  was  only  the  caps  which  were  uniform”  for  the  “sans-culottes”  (italics in the text);;  I  will  discuss  the  cap  bellow;;  see  also  in  Wrigley  p.  200  on  the  “sans-culottes costume  […]  probably  confined  principally  to  club  meetings,  and  participation  in  deputations”  (italics  in  the  text),  and  p.  271;;  however, Michael Sonensher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem,  p.  342,  mentions  that  “the  Phrygian  cap  was  widely  adopted,”  which  is  a  statement  that  is  not  specified  by  Sonenscher. 137 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 221, note 42 (italics in the text).  138 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  245,  also  emphasizes  how  it  could  be  a  “disguise.”       46  The  “bonnet  rouge” and the Tradition in a Revolutionary World      The sans-culottes were not only identifying themselves by means of their pants as a symbol of their struggle against the tradition of aristocratic domination represented in clothing.  They also used   the   “bonnet   rouge” or red cap to signify their allegiance in the revolutionary turmoil.139  This hat was a sign of the republicanism that the sans-culottes were advocating.140  Habermas’s  account of the public sphere of the French Revolution does not mention the importance of the republican ideal symbolized publically by the sans-culotte movement and their red cap.  As already mentioned, his accentuation of the heritage of the Enlightenment through the example of the Encyclopedia or  the  French  “philosophes,”  does  so  that  clothing  as  a  traditional  element   in  French society and group self-assertion is overlooked.        Even if the revolution has been a reaction to tradition in the context of modernity as Habermas demonstrates, it is clear that the republican red cap was a reference to the past and its clothing traditions that the French people preserved in the public sphere during the revolution.141                                                            139 On the importance of the red cap for the sans-culotte,  see  for  instance  Michel  Naudin,  “La  reaction  culturelle  en  l’an  III,”  p.  287,  Michael  Sonenscher,  Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 57, and on the historical link  between  the  expressions  “flat-cap”  and  “sans-culottes,”  see  p.  7;; Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p.  135:  the  red  cap  was  “part  of  the  ensemble  of  the  sans-culottes”  (italics  in  the  text), also on the difference between “bonnet de la liberté, bonnet rouge, and bonnet phrygien,”  see  p.  136-149 (italics in the text), and Wrigley also explains that the red cap was also Jacobin for a short period, see p. 150-152, 197, etc, see also p. 229 where he writes  that  “the  bonnet rouge”  was  “adopted  by  Jacobins  in  the  spring  of  1792”  (italics  in  the  text),  and  on  the  general context of clothing as a link to communities or  as  “allegiance,”  see  p.  233. 140 Jennifer  Harris,  “The  Red  Cap  of  Liberty,”  p.  286,  although  Harris  does  not  use  the  term  “republicanism”  in  this  section  of  here  text,  her  reference  to  values  such  as  “liberty”  and  “Rome”  invokes  the  republican  ideal;;  Michael  Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth Century Emblem, p. 273, quotes a French poster from 1793 on which the sans-culottes  are  associated  with  what  is  called  “true  republicans,”  and  as  Sonenscher  remarks,  “a  bonnet de laine”  and  “a  sans-culottes”  “were  used  interchangeably,”  see  p.  341 (italics in the text), see also p. 353; Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  245:  “the  bonnet rouge,  this  quintessentially  republican  emblem”  (italics  in  the  text),  and for the link between the san-culottes  and  the  red  cap  (or  “bonnet  de  laine”),  see  Wrigley  p.  163  and  197-198, 229,  245,  where  he  writes:  “In  so  far  as  the  cap  was  a  separate  item,  it  lent  itself  to  strategies  which  aimed  to  undermine  its  authority,”  etc. 141 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 8-9:  “The  liberty  cap brought with it a considerable historical and symbolic baggage, which sustained its central presence in revolutionary emblematics.  This was primarily classical  in  origin,  but  also  including  an  eclectic  variety  of  historical  precedents  and  parallels.”     47  The tradition in which the red cap took its origin was Roman.142  Jennifer Harris explains that the “bonnet  rouge”  had  “been  worn  in  Rome  by  freedmen  as  a  sign  of  their  new  position.”143  It was the symbol of the ideal of freedom that the sans-culottes were trying to establish in the spirit of ancient Rome.  The sans-culottes became aware of this potential use of Roman history in part through the medium of art, such as in plays and paintings, but also in public speeches.144  Public celebrations and the press were also instances of the public sphere where a certain representation of Roman history appeared, i.e. where the red cap was represented.145  The symbol of the red cap was even understood on the international scene as inextricably bound to the sans-culottes, hence the cardinal importance of the red cap.146  The importance of the red cap is mentioned by Richard Wrigley when he talks about the red cap and the “prodigiously abundant range of comments on it across journalism, pamphlets, discourses, speeches and tracts, and also within different forms of imagery.”147  The presence of the red cap in the culture of revolutionary France cannot be                                                           142 Without  mentioning  clothing,  Michael  Sonenscher  writes  that  “so  much  of  the  political  rhetoric  of  the  period  of  the  French  Revolution  took  its  cue  so  readily  from  ancient  Greece  or  Rome,”  see  Michael  Sonenscher,  Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 63, see the rest of the book for numerous examples, such as the more specific link between the sans-culottes and the heritage of antiquity with allusion to clothing in a text by Mercier on p. 106; see also Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p.  135:  “Although  the  historical  origins  of  the  liberty  cap are Roman, revolutionary commentaries provide a much more diverse – and frequently inconsistent – set of pedigrees  for  the  emblem,”  see  also  Wrigley’s  comment  on  “contingency”  in  history,  p.  167,  a comment with which I agree; also for the sans-culottes  associated  with  the  “Romans,”  and  their  clothes  with  “the  honorific  Roman  toga,”  p.  198  (with  note  55),  and  the  illustration  on  page  205,  where  “Brutus”  (from  Voltaire,  see  p.  206)  is  mentioned,  as  well as the other illustrations from p. 204-210  with  the  “representation”  of  “classical  culture”  (p.  207),  the  “Roman  coiffure”  (p.  209),  etc;;  see  also  for  an  interesting  contextual  element  in  Hannah  Arendt,  On Revolution, p. 27, and 64:  “Roman  antiquity,  in  whose  school  the  revolutionary  spirit  was  thought,”  also  p.  111-112, 114, 150, 188-189, 200-203, 236, etc. 143 Jennifer  Harris,  “The  Red  Cap  of  Liberty,”  p.  286,  and  Harris  adds:  “it  was  also  worn  by  several  different  nations  of antiquity and by various individuals”;;  see  also  the  interesting  allusion  to  the  importance  of  the  “cap  of  liberty”  in  Roman culture according to the 18th century author Wolban, Michael Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 194-195, 340, also p. 341: the expression  of  the  “bonnets-de-laine”  “initially  had  a  far  wider  currency than the better-known sans-culottes, if only because its direct association with the Roman republic made it a  more  immediately  obvious  political  symbol”  (italics  in  the  text). 144 Jennifer  Harris,  “The  Red  Cap  of  Liberty,”  p.  290.  145 Jennifer  Harris,  “The  Red  Cap  of  Liberty,”  p.  290,  does  not  emphasize  the  element  of  republicanism  in  her  account;;  for  the  “name  of  bonnet-de-laine”  and  Prudhomme’s  “press  campaign  to  turn  it  into  a  real  political  force”  (italics in the text), see Michael Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 341. 146 Michel Jouve,  “L’image  du  sans-culotte,” p. 194; Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  161:  “The  cap’s  role  as  a  signifier  of  French identity was consolidated by virtue of the publicity given to its proscription abroad,”  see  also  p.  162. 147 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 9, see for other examples, such as plays, etc., p. 150-153.    48  neglected when  such  an  “abundance”  of   references   is   found   in  historical   research.  The public sphere was thus testifying through various forms of media that the red cap was the object of interpretations in the debate and a means of political and symbolical “assertions,”   to   use  Wrigley’s  term.148  The significance of dress as a dimension of the debate of the public sphere did so that the red cap was an “assertive” symbol in the revolutionary horizon.       The culture of clothing, in which the sans-culottes saw their name and ideology gain their meaning, was compatible with the collectivist aspect of their republicanism: “Dress  was  not   a  matter of individual choice, but rather of collective identification”149 and the red cap became  “a  national  republican  emblem.”150 What defined Roman republicanism was that the Romans of the republic understood freedom as going hand in hand with collective virtue in contrast to the freedom and virtue of one individual, that is to say, of the emperor or the king.151  Wearing the red cap meant that people were ready to fight collectively against tyranny and monarchy just like the Romans had done in the historical past.   The republican heritage of Roman history in the French national imagination was thus used by the sans-culottes when representations of republican freedom were staged.  This republican vision was what they shared with the Romans and  the  significance  of  the  Roman  cap  in  the  public  sphere  appeared  “most  famously  on  20  June                                                            148 See also Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  229,  where  Wrigley  says  that  the  red  cap  was  “an  instrument  of  partisan  provocation.”  149 Leora Auslander, “Regeneration  Through  the  Everyday?,”  p.  231;;  on  the  link  between  republican  Rome,  the  sans-culottes,  and  the  “liberty  cap,”  see  Michael  Sonenscher,  Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 8, and on republicanism and the sans-culottes, see p. 21, 342; see also Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p.  152,  on  the  red  cap  similar  to  the  cockade  “as  a  rallying  sign  for  popular  mobilization,”  and  p.  187  where  he  mentions the link between the sans-culottes  and  “the  use  of  vestimentary  vocabulary  to  identify  a  distinctive  mode  of  collective  political  identity,”  and  p.  203:  “representations  of  ‘le  peuple’  were  always  collective, never individualized.” 150 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  150,  see  also  p.  197  where  Wrigley  writes  that  “bonnets de laine and sans-culottes”  were  “collective  terms”  (italics  in  the  text). 151 Michael Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem,  p.  342:  “the  mixture  of  military  and  civil  service  symbolized  by  the  liberty  cap,  with  its  Roman  republican  connotations”;;  Richard  Wrigley,  The Politics of Appearances,  p.  209,  where  he  mentions  “republican  virtue”  as  it  relates to  “the  idea  of  the  sans-culottes”  (italics  in  the text); Hannah Arendt, On Revolution,  p.  65,  for  a  different  view  on  “virtue,”  which  could  be  debated,  see  also  p.  189,  where  she  writes  that  for  “The  men  of  the  revolutions,”  “the  great  model  and  precedent  […]  was  […]  the  Roman  republic  and  the  grandeur  of  its  history.”    49  1792, when Louis  XVI  was  forced  to  put  one  on.”152  Whether this specific gesture came to be in favor of the sans-culottes or not, the political map of the revolution now included the sans-culottes.153  It is from 1792 that the liberty cap became a well-established symbol in the revolution,154 in  particular  during  the  “festivals  of  Federation.”155  What Habermas missed when referring to this year of 1792 and to the “Sturm  auf  die Tuilerien,”156 is that these actions were revealing once more how central clothing was for the understanding of the public sphere: the public figure par excellence of the Ancien Régime, the king of France, had to participate in the course of the revolution through the dress culture of the public sphere, and the population itself was embracing this dress culture to construct its own public sphere.        Habermas’s   accent  on   the  modern   aspect   of   the  notion  of  public   sphere  prevents  him   from  observing the strong continuity between the Roman traditions of clothing that the sans-culottes exalted with their red cap in the public arena.  For instance, when Habermas selects passages of a constitutional text from 1793 in revolutionary France, he chooses to comment on the break with tradition that the revolutionaries were trying to operate.  Habermas sheds light on the rupture                                                           152 Michael Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 342; the interpretations of this gesture is very diverse and would require too much research and argumentation to take a position in the debate, and therefore, I mention this anecdote to show the importance of clothing in the public sphere, see Richard Wrigley’s  excellent  account  of  “20  June  1792”  in  Richard  Wrigley,  The Politics of Appearances, p. 154-158, 245, and p. 166 where he writes  in  conclusion  that  it  “did  much  to  highlight  the  way  in  which  a  simple  item  of  common  dress  had  come  to  play an intensely complex  role  as  a  touchstone  for  partisan  attitudes  to  the  replacement  of  royal  authority,”  see  also  p. 234, and note 62, on the importance of dress for the other people involved. 153 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  196:  “for  the  Révolution de Paris,  20  June  became  the  ‘Journée  des sans-culottes’.  The  notion  of  sans-culottes as  a  mobilized  collectivity  was  thus  named,  at  least  in  reported  form”  (italics  in  the  text),  see  also  p.  198;;  however,  as  Wrigley  writes  on  p.  229,  the  “claims  to  official  status”  of  the  red  cap  was  “divisive.” 154 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  135:  “Although  present  in  imagery  and  in  emblematic  form  from  1789,  it  was  not  worn  to  any  significant  degree  until  the  spring  of  1792,”  see  also  about  the  importance of the “bonnet rouge”  in  1792,  p.  150,  as  well  as  p.  219  note  25  where  he  talks  about  1792  and  “the  militant  sans-culottes and Jacobins for whom the bonnet rouge had,  by  this  date,  become  a  rallying  sign”  (italics  in  the  text),  see  also  p.  229 for the Jacobins, and p. 241.  155 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  146,  I  use  in  this  sentence  the  expression  “liberty  cap”  since  Wrigley  makes  a  distinction  between  “bonnet de la liberté”  and  “bonnets de laine or bonnet rouge”  (italics  in  the  text), see  also  p.  245  where  Wrigley  writes  that  “the  bonnet rouge […]  was  predominantly  worn  in  specific  quasi-official  locations”  (italics  in  the  text),  etc,  see  also  note  74. 156 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 91, Habermas refers  to  the  “Sturm  auf  die  Tuilerien”  “Im  August”;;  Jürgen  Habermas,  The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 71.     50  with   traditional   monarchy   by   taking   into   account   the   French   conception   of   “der   frischen  Erinnerung  des  Despotismus.”157  Accordingly, the tradition embodied by the monarchy was the element of French society that the revolution wanted to reject.  From this perspective, Habermas seems to assume that the development of a modern public sphere in revolutionary France is strictly an antithesis of tradition.158  However, when one considers the debate about clothing in the public sphere of the revolution as underscored above,159 the link between the modern texts of law and tradition springs up.  The dynamics of clothing in the public sphere is thereby a crucial element that reveals the reassertion of Roman traditions at the heart of modernity and its aspiration to the definition of a public sphere of political debate.  This presence of traditional values in modernity is something Hannah Arendt discovered while alluding to the problem of clothing in the public sphere of the revolution in France.160      Although  Arendt  also  stresses  the  modern  revolutionary  “pathos  of  novelty,”161 she writes that “modern   revolutions   […]   can   be   characterized   by  Marx’s   remark   that   the   French   Revolution                                                            157 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 91; Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 71.  158 When  Geoff  Eley  writes  that  “The  emergence  of  a  bourgeois  public  was  never  defined  solely  by  the  struggle  against  absolutism  and  traditional  authority,”  the  case  of  the  sans-culottes and the French Revolution is not mentioned, see Geoff Eley,  “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 306.  159 Jennifer  Harris,  “The  Red  Cap  of  Liberty,”  p.  311.  160 Seyla  Benhabib,  “Models  of  Public  Space,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 85-86,  although  Benhabib  stresses  other  texts  by  Habermas,  her  account  of  Habermas’s  understanding  of  tradition  is  not criticized nor explained in relation to Arendt and clothing; without any reference to Arendt or clothing, see Keith Michael Baker on the link tradition-modernity-public opinion in French history, in Keith Michael Baker, “Defining the Public Sphere,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 198 and 191-197; see also Lloyd  Kramer’s  account  of Baker on the tradition-modernity  “continuities”  in  respect  to  public  opinion,  Lloyd  Kramer,  “Habermas, History, and Critical Theory,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 243; Habermas does not really account for this tradition-modernity continuity in his treatment of the French Revolution, see Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation, p. 67-71, Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, p. 87-92. 161 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution,  p.  24:  “Only  where  this  pathos  of  novelty is present and where novelty is connected  with  the  idea  of  freedom  are  we  entitled  to  speak  of  revolution,”  also  p.  63,  and  p.  28:  “no  matter  how  much the men of the revolutions might admire the splendour that was Rome, none of them would have felt at home in  antiquity  as  Machiavelli  did,”  see  also  the  reference  to  “clothing”  in  a  quotation  right  after,  and  p.  32,  where  Arendt  mentions  the  “disinclination  for  novelty  which  still  echoes  in  the  very  word  ‘revolution’,” and the use, on p. 27, of expressions  such  as  “the specific revolutionary  pathos  of  the  absolutely  new,” etc.    51  appeared on the stage of history in Roman  costume.”162  Although  Arendt’s  reference  to  clothing  in  the  expression  “Roman  costume”  is  not  part  of  a  study  on  the  history  of  clothing, and although she probably uses the expression as a metaphor with a certain reference to reality, it is striking that the allusion to this Roman costume in its literal sense is completely compatible with her thesis about the continuity between the French Revolution and Roman traditions in France as well as with the tradition of the red cap.  Arendt thus thinks that the revolutionary project of modernity as concretized in the French Revolution took elements of the tradition to fight against what they interpreted as undesirable in the political community.  And more importantly for my argument,  this  “Roman  costume” as a symbol of tradition was a component of the revolution that was  conceivable  on  what  she  calls  “the  stage  of  history.”     By  definition,  a  “stage”  is   the  locus  where  the  actors  of  a  play  “appear,”  as  Arendt  would  put   it.      In  the  case  of  Roman  clothing  in  revolutionary France, it seems clear that Arendt is using   the   expression   “stage   of   history”   to designate the public aspect of the event and thus to the public sphere conceived historically.163  She is saying in her own way that the debate on the public sphere of the French Revolution incorporated the Roman tradition as an authority,164 and as we know, this was done by means of a staged “politics  of  appearances,”  to  use  Wrigley’s  title.  This reasoning can be directly applied                                                           162 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 139; Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, p. 41, also refers to this; Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 52, note 92, writes: “On  the  metaphor  of  dressing  up  in  historical  clothes  as  a  means  of  facilitating  ‘living  the  past’,  and  thereby  confronting  the  problems  of  the  contemporary  world,  see  Stephen  Bann’s  discussion  of  Macchiavelli,  and  Marx’s  assessment,  in  The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon,  of  the  limitations  of  French  revolutionaries’  adoption  of  Roman  costume  and  phrases”  (italics  in  the  text). 163 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, p. 197-198,  uses  the  expression  “stage  of  history,”  also  p.  303  note  39  while  quoting an author;;  Harold  Mah,  “Phantasies  of  the  Public  Sphere,”  p.  175,  quotes  Furet  who  uses  the  expression  “stage  of  history,”  although  the  term  is  not  discussed;;  Richard  Wrigley,  The Politics of Appearances, p. 187, also uses  similar  expressions  such  as  “the  revolutionary  stage,”  or  on  p.  190,  “political  stage,”  or  p.  216,  “the  stage  of  revolutionary  politics,”  although  the  concept  is  not  discussed;;  the  notion  of  “stage”  could  be  a  topic  of  further  discussion,  see  Wrigley  who  writes  about  “the  theater’s  role  as  a  particularly  prominent  aspect  of  public  space”  on  p.  237:  “For  all  the  artifice  associated  with  the  stage,  the  social  and  political  signification  of  the  actors  and  their  costumes was assimilated to, and continuous with, the spectacle of dress-as-identity visible in the street, café, and club,”  and  for  a  link  to  the  sans-culottes, see p. 238; Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, p. 96 also mentions the importance  of  “the  language  of  the  theater”  in  revolutionary  France,  see  also  p.  97-98,  and  p.  188  about  “Roman  antiquity”  and  “the  French  Revolution,  whose  agents  had  indeed  an  extraordinary  flair  for  the  theatrical.” 164 However, this Arendtian perspective can be partly attenuated by the research done by Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 141, who writes that  during  “The  Thermidorian  Reation,”  “Classical  names  had  lost  their  authority  through  having  become  too  familiar  as  alibis  for  butchery  and  disorder.”     52  to the case of the costume and the red cap of the sans-culottes, since they appeared in the public sphere in a very significant way on  the  “stage  of  history”  and thereby on the  “public  sphere.”         Unlike  Habermas’s  account  of  the  modern  public  sphere,  Arendt  deciphers in the narrative of French and Roman history the repetition of the expulsion of the monarchy as a sign of the dependence   of   modernity   on   tradition.      Her   example   of   the   “Roman   costume”   confirms   her  interpretation and the red cap of the sans-culottes strengthens this confirmation.  The red cap as a symbol  of  political  struggle  is  an  attestation  that  “the  revolutions  of  the  modern  age  appear  like  gigantic   attempts   […]   to   renew   the   broken   thread   of   tradition.”165  In light of this, if revolutionaries such as the sans-culottes were trying to redefine their identity and freedoms through political discourse and daily symbols like clothing with reference to antiquity, one can conclude that the revolutionary ideal in France was in search of a tradition that their monarchic authority did not represent legitimately any longer.  For example, in a public celebration during the revolution there   was   a   “political   rhetoric”   indicating that “the   active   role   of   the   ordinary  inhabitants of the faubourg Saint-Antoine was given a dignified cultural legitimacy by reference to  a  Roman  emblem.”166  This can be interpreted as an attempt to represent in their clothing the authority167 of Roman republican freedom as a revitalized tradition.  By virtue of the traditional past of Rome speaking through French history, their revolutionary position was legitimate in the public sphere.                                                             165 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future,  p.  140;;  this  is  something  Jennifer  Harris,  “The  Red  Cap  of  Liberty,”  p.  310, did not emphasize enough; see also Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, p. 146-147, 149. 166 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  193,  the  celebration  was  “the  pantheonization  of  Voltaire”  in  “July  1791”  (p.  192);;  Hannah  Arendt,  On Revolution,  p.  252:  “The  loss  of  authority  in  the  powers-that-be, which indeed  precedes  all  revolutions,  is  actually  a  secret  to  no  one.” 167 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 250: Wrigley links clothing and authority, but does not give examples,  when  he  alludes  to  the  “legislative  attempts  to  restrict  the  wearing  of  the  signs  of  official  authority,” see also Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 241, where he mentions  the  “deviant  badge  and  dress  code”  as  influencing  “revolutionary  authority,”  which  confirms  the  link  between  “authority”  and  “clothing.”    53       Moreover, the general assemblage of clothes selected by the sans-culottes in their will to represent their ideals publically was also in certain public ceremonies a means to criticize the Christian heritage of France.  As is well known, this tradition, like that of the monarchy, did not possess its full legitimacy any longer for the egalitarian and revolutionary sans-culottes.168  But in spite of this critique of Christianity, the sans-culottes fused the red cap as their revolutionary symbol with other symbols of the traditional religion of France in their polemical arts being staged in the public sphere.169  Just as the Romans had done, the sans-culottes’s revolutionary clothes in their political struggle were re-establishing not only the authority of tradition in politics, but also the authority of religious symbols as a traditional stabilizing force in politics.170   To recapitulate, the events led to the adoption of clothing symbols and to the articulation of discourses in the revolutionary public sphere that   took   their   roots   in   “the   Roman   trinity   of  religion,  tradition  and  authority.”171 This shows that a clear point of entry into the examination of the traditional reality of modernity highlighted by Arendt consists in the culture of clothing signified by the sans-culottes and their red cap.  This is the context of the modern public sphere                                                           168 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  199:  “Sans-culotte costume also appears in the carnivalesque festivals and processions associated with dechristianization.  In these, it was often worn under religious vestments which  were  to  be  cast  off,  revealing  the  ‘true’  sans-culotte beneath,”  (italics  in  the  text),  however,  the  link  with  the  context of Roman republican history is not made by Wrigley on this point; see also Michael Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem,  p.  355,  note  179,  on  “examples  of  Christ  as  a  sans-culottes”  (italics  in  the  text); Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, p. 152. 169 James  Leith,  “Images  of  the  Sans-Culottes,”  p.  144,  Leith  gives  examples  in  pictorial  arts  of  “classical  and  Judeo-Christian  traditions”;;  see  also  Richard  Wrigley,  The Politics of Appearances,  p.  24,  who  writes  that  “Daniel  Arasse  has  noted  the  echoes  of  Christ’s  passion  in  descriptions  of  the  cutting  up  of  Louis  XVI’s  jacket,”  which  shows  the  importance of clothing in the public sphere of the Revolution in relation to religion, see  also  p.  198  where  “Christ”  is  mentioned, among other figures, in relation to sans-culotte culture. 170 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, p. 175. If it is true to say that the sans-culottes  represented  “le  peuple,”  as  mentioned above, on can also say that there was  also  “a  deification  of  the  people  in  the  French  Revolution.” 171 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 140; Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, p. 108, see also p. 137, 146, 150-154, 175-184, 186, 188, 190, 192-193, 199; when Claude Mazauric, in François Furet, Claude Mazauric and Louis  Bergeron,  “Les  sans-culottes  et  la  Révolution  française,” p.  1106  says  that  “l’idéologie  sans-culotte se nourrit de  la  croyance  à  l’âge  d’or  d’un  passé  mythique,”  he  fails  to  mention  the Roman tradition; see also Craig Calhoun, “Introduction:  Habermas  and  the  Public  Sphere,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 35,  who  mentions  “Habermas’s  neglect  of  religion,  noted  by  Zaret,”  a  critique  that  Calhoun  applies  to  French  “Enlightenment  thinkers”  on  page 36, although the French Revolution and clothing are still avoided; Seyla Benhabib,  “Models  of  Public  Space,”  in  Craig  Calhoun  (edited  by),  Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 76 quotes a passage  from  Arendt  where  it  is  said  that  “The  loss  of  this  trinity” gives  “a  fragmented past”  (italics  in  the  text)  from  which we can draw as moderns, which could be applied in this paper to the red cap as a historical fragment used in the public sphere.    54  where “Revolutionaries thus built on the old and the new, the discursive and the material, in their efforts to turn monarchists into republicans through dress.”172        The other perspective from which a continuity between the revolution and tradition appears is the tradition of clothing in France.  Calling  publically  a  popular  political  group  “sans-culottes” with  symbols  such  as  the  “red  cap” was extending a tradition that the revolution was endorsing and  trying  to  rearticulate.    As  Auslander  has  noted,  “This  focus on clothing as a political domain was not new with the Revolution; clothing had long been politicized in France.”173 The sans-culottes as a political group had a meaningful denomination as well as meaningful vestimentary tools, such as the red cap, in the context of the modern French revolutionary public sphere especially because of the national tradition in which they arose.  Not only the clothes themselves, but the lexical apparatus of politics related to clothing was itself anchored in the past.174  Wrigley writes   that   there  were  “pre-existing conventions for representing men of the people in the later Ancien Régime and the early Revolution not only feed into the sans-culotte stereotype, but remain  essential  to  its  meaning.”175  The French culture of clothing as a precondition of the sans-culottes provided a general context of significations in which they could use clothing                                                           172 Leora  Auslander,  “Regeneration  Through  the  Everyday?,”  p.  232;;  for  a  stress  on  the  continuity  between  “the  economics  of  the  French  Revolution,”  ancient  republicanism  and  thought,  see  Michael  Sonenscher,  Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 3-4, although clothing is not mentioned; see also Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  9:  “The  liberty  cap  became  a  site  for  the  negotiation  of  variant  meanings,  in  which  past  and  present  are  simultaneously  elided  and  in  collision.” 173 Leora Auslander, “Regeneration  Through  the  Everyday?,” p. 231; see also Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  2,  and  p.  188,  where  Wrigley  mentions  the  “pre-existing  discourse”  and  that  “a  set  of  conventions  for representing men of the people already existed,  which  it  was  possible  to  harness  to  new  political  ends,”  and  p.  232  where  Wrigley  says  that  “dress  had  long  been  read  as  a  sign  of  identity  and  status,”  and  that  the  “importance”  of  clothing  “was  only  possible  because  of  the  existence  of  what  Daniel  Roche  has  termed  the  Ancien  Régime’s  elaborate  ‘culture  of  appearances’.    This  had  provided  an  established  set  of  assumptions  about  the  legibility  of  identity  and  status  through  varieties  of  dress.”   174 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 191: the  “political  language  predominantly  relied  on  changing  the  meaning  of  already  existing  terms.”  175 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 190 (italics in the text), see also p. 3 where Wrigley mentions, when referring to historical scholarship on clothing, that there  were  “transformations  worked  by  the  Revolution  on  the  inherited  ‘vestimentary  system’  of  the  Ancien  Régime.”    55  politically.176  This  “significant  degree  of  continuity  with  inherited  protocols  for  dealing  with  the  representation  of  men  of  the  people”177 in  revolutionary  France,  and  the  continuity  between  “the  Ancien   Régime’s   elaborate   ‘culture   of   appearances’”178 and   the   revolution’s   own   “politics   of  appearances,”  is  what  I  interpret  as  a  central  instance  of  Arendt’s  insistence  on  the  continuity179 between  tradition  and  revolution  through  the  “Roman  costume”  and  its  red  cap  appearing  on  the  “stage  of  history.”    The  way  people  dressed  in  the revolution would not have made sense in the public sphere without a tradition conditioning the actual cultural situation of revolutionary politics.         Therefore,  when  Habermas  said  about   the  Middle  Ages   that  “Tugend  muβ  sich  verkörpern,  muβ  sich  öffentlich  darstellen  lassen  können,”180 it could have been applied as well to the culture of clothing in the French Revolution and its historical preconditions.  The heritage of dress codifications  of  the  “Ancien  Régime,” in  which  virtue  or  “Tugend”  was  “embodied”  in  material  culture, was still used in the Revolution to articulate the direction of events as well as to attribute “meaning” to those events.  It is from this traditional political custom that, in the spirit of the sans-culottes,  “true  patriotic  virtue  could  be  expressed  by  the  adoption  of  a  costume.”181                                                                  176 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances,  p.  9:  “The  coming  into  existence  of the sans-culottes in its new revolutionary  meaning  is,  of  course,  dependent  on  a  more  widespread  politicisation  of  dress”  (italics  in  the  text).  177 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 190. 178 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 190,  Wrigley  also  writes  that  the  revolutionary  “habits  of  surveillance,”  i.e.  those  regarding  clothing,  “are  entirely  consistent  with  police  practices  regularly  employed  in  the  Ancien  Régime.”  179 See  this  interesting  statement  by  Patrice  Rolland,  “Robespierre  ou  la  foundation  impossible,”  in  Le Débat, 1992/1 no.  68,  p.  43:  “La  «  perfectibilité  »  soutenue  par  B.  Constant  privilégie  la  continuité  historique  et  sociologique  sur  la  rupture  politique,”  although  Rolland’s  article  is  not  on the sans-culottes, and mentions Arendt in an another respect.   180 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, S. 21; Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p. 8.  181 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 9, Habermas’s  treatment  of  “badges”  or  “Abzeichen”  during  the Middle Ages as explained in the previous section of my argumentation could be applied to the French Revolution  itself  and  its  public  sphere,  see  Richard  Wrigley’s  account  in  The Politics of Appearances in the first chapters,  where  for  instance,  on  page  16,  he  writes  about  “the  creation  of  a  new  generation  of  revolutionary  badges,  which  replaced  forms  of  official  medal  and  badge  current  during  the  Ancien  Régime,”  see  also  p.  59-61, where he talks about  the  “badge  culture”  (p.  61)  during  the  revolution,  also  p.  71.    56       However, the sans-culottes had a relation to the past that was twofold: they were accepting elements of the tradition but they were also opposing other elements of it.  In one of his formulas describing the red cap, Wrigley puts in apposition the red cap and the idea that it was a “polemical  political  headgear,  associated  with  protest  and  provocation.”182  The red cap was that which could bring together opposition (“protest  and  provocation”) to tradition on the one hand, and retention of this same traditional context on the other, since the red cap came from a tradition.  By means of the red cap oppositional modernity and the traditional past cohabitate on the   “stage   of   history,”   as  Arendt  would   have   it.  The   notion   of   the   “uniform” pointed out by historians can further illustrate this duality brought up by the red cap.      Harris describes the costume of the sans-culottes and their red cap as a phenomenon close to the  idea  of  “a  popular  political  uniform.”183  Given  that  “Uniforms  […]  were  strongly  associated  with  hierarchy,”184 Harris’s  reference  to  the  “bonnet  rouge”  as  a  form  of  “uniform”  implies that the sans-culottes were trying to formulate a symbolical critique of tradition by dissociating the notion   of   “uniform”   from   hierarchies,   or   from   what   could   be   called   the   “hierarchy   of  appearances.”185  As the use of the red cap shows, the dress culture of the sans-culottes replaced the traditional idea of uniform and came to be interpreted as an anti-hierarchical uniform, invoking a nationalistic type of egalitarianism and republicanism.186 However, the uniform still                                                           182 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 158.  183 Jennifer  Harris,  “The  Red  Cap  of  Liberty,”  p.  308;;  see  also  about  the  sans-culottes and the revolutionary army, Michael Sonenscher, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem, p. 55, although clothing is not emphasized by Sonenscher;;  on  the  notion  of  “military  uniform”  during  the  revolution,  see  Richard  Wrigley,  The Politics of Appearances, p. 64-70. 184 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 64, see also p. 266. 185 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 230, Wrigley uses this expression in the following sentence: “In  the  nascent  revolutionary  order,  established  beliefs  in  the  reliability  of  a  hierarchy  of  appearances were profoundly  shaken.” 186 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 74: criticisms about material signs of distinction related to clothing  “are  consistent  with  the  rhetoric  of  virtuous  transparency  and  the  repudiation  of  compromising  external  self-adornment at the heart of the new ideology accompanying the consolidation of the sans-culottes’  political  prominence”  (italics  in  the  text),  although  Wrigley  does  not  address  the  red  cap  in  this  section  of  his  book,  except  for allusions on pages 75 and 76; on the uniform and politics, see also p. 79.     57  has a connotation related to a Roman tradition, but at the same time the red cap as a revolutionary uniform was trying to abolish the hierarchical element of this tradition.187  It was fighting with tradition against tradition: through this uniform, modernity and tradition stood right beside each other in  the  “space  of  appearances”  of  the  public  sphere.  It is from this perspective that the red cap amalgamates the  “Roman  uniform”  of  traditions, against hierarchies in society, and the revolutionary aspiration to modern oppositional politics, also against hierarchized human relations.      However, to come back to Habermas and Arendt’s  “space  of  appearance,” the importance of the sans-culotte  costume  and  its  red  cap  was  intimately  bound  to  a  fundamental  ambiguity.    “The  history of the stereotype of the sans-culotte has shown that, even in the case of this most pungent form of militant socio-political   style,   appearances   could   be   deceptive.”188  As Wrigley notes, dress had been used to hide identities between appearances and this situation of ambiguous signs made politicians react strongly against the notion of appearance in the public sphere.189  The centrality of the   “space   of appearances” as   ambiguous   is   that   which   Habermas’s rationalistic interpretation of the revolution misses, whereas Arendt stresses significantly in The Human Condition the ambiguity of appearances in the public sphere, and although without emphasizing the case of clothing sufficiently, she still delves into historical examples in On Revolution to support   her   convincing   argument   that   “In politics, more than anywhere else, we have no                                                           187 On  the  critique  of  “simplicity  of  dress”  “After  Thermidor”  as  it  relates  to  hierarchies  involved  by  this  “simplicity,”  see  Richard  Wrigley,  The Politics of Appearances, p. 200.  188 Richard Wrigley, The Politics of Appearances, p. 229-230 (italics in the text), see also p. 249, where Wrigley highlights  “the  general  problem  of  making  sense  of  the  fluctuating  and  fragmented  forms  of  publicly  visible  political  culture  as  it  was  experienced  in  terms  of  the  spectacle  of  social  interaction,”  see  also  p.  263,  with  illustrations of clothing, but without the sans-culottes (p. 261-265), and p. 215-216,  Wrigley  uses  expressions  such  as  “exterior  appearances  and  interior  moral  identity”  (p.  246),  here  in  relation  to  “gender”;;  see  also  Hannah  Arendt,  On Revolution, p. 282 note  32,  where  Robespierre  talking  about  “dissimulation”  is  quoted,  although  without  mention  of  clothing, see also p. 86-88, etc.  189 Although clothing is not addressed, see for an interesting analysis  of  Robespierre’s  reaction Patrice Rolland, “Robespierre  ou  la  foundation  impossible,”  p. 44-46, 53-57 in particular, and with a reference to Arendt on page 43.    58  possibility of distinguishing between being and appearance.”190  If the public sphere as a “space  of  appearances”  is  historically  in greater conformity with what actually happened in the French Revolution as an instance of the modern understanding of publicness, Wrigley’s   empirical  research on the other hand did not delve into the theoretical approach that arose from the revolution.                                                                         190 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution,  p.  88,  see  also  the  following  pages  for  Arendt’s  philosophical  elaboration;;  much  more  could  be  said  about  Arendt  and  “appearance,”  for  instance  in  another  text,  she  makes  a  distinction  between  “public”  and  “political”  when  mentioning  “appearances,”  in  Hannah  Arendt,  Introduction into Politics, translated by John E. Woods, in Hannah Arendt, Promise of Politics, Edited with and Introduction by Jerome Kohn, New York, Schocken  Books,  2005,  p.  123,  or  her  reference  to  “a  space  for  appearance,”  “a  space  for  display,”  on  p.  140,  see  also p. 166-168, although I may have read this text by Arendt only for the pages indicated, see bibliography.    59  Conclusion        In   this   thesis   I   have   examined   Habermas’s   notion   of   the   public   sphere   in   relation   to   his  account of the French revolution in his book Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit.  My critique of Habermas takes as its starting point the lack of attention paid by Habermas to political groups that did not belong properly speaking to the bourgeois class, and focusses on the case of the sans-culottes as a counter-example.  The historians who wrote on clothing and that I take into account to evaluate Habermas’s  argument do not include sufficiently the contribution of political theory in their historical research, and the political theorists I also take into account do not go into the details of historical research on clothing satisfyingly.  Even if Habermas himself mentions that he intentionally neglects the plebeian aspect of the event of the modern public sphere, scholars have insisted on the limited perspective from which he considers modern history in Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit.  In this sense, the theoretical and normative element is contrasted by the critics with the empirical element, which points in the direction of my critique that  Habermas’s  account  of  the  public  sphere  is  historically  too  selective.  Moreover, it has been mentioned  in  the  scholarship  that  updated  historical  research  has  an  “unfair  advantage,”  as  Eley  says, but I still explore the possibilities  opened  up  by  Habermas’s  concept  of  the  “public  sphere”  to push it further in light of historical findings.  It is worth noting as well that Habermas talks only briefly about the French Revolution and that there is a strongly theoretical element in the revolution itself, as Arendt would put it, which seems to reappear in Habermas.  In spite of that, I maintain that excluding the non-bourgeois element of modern politics leads to a form of bourgeois-centrism that reduces significantly the realm of the public sphere to linguistic communication.  In this thesis I thus explore how the symbolical dynamic of the public sphere was active through the clothing culture of the sans-culottes, and while acknowledging    60  Habermas’s   critique   of   his   own   book,   I   insist on how he did not perceive the importance of clothing in the French revolutionary public sphere as it relates to the sans-culottes.      The first part of my thesis elaborates a critical comparison between Habermas and Arendt on the public sphere.  Habermas mentions at the beginning of Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit the Greek notion of the public sphere with a reference to Arendt.  Indeed, their accounts of the public sphere contain parallels: they both adopt a normative standpoint and they explore the link between the impact of different types of societies on the modern public sphere.  However, their theories of the public sphere differ significantly: Habermas endorses a rationalistic conception of the public sphere based on the Enlightenment and its culture of rational argumentation, whereas Arendt  describes   the  public   sphere  as  a  “space  of  appearance,”  which   indicates   that   the  public  sphere cannot be reduced to rational argumentation.  Arendt takes the example of the sans-culottes and their clothes to insist on the importance of appearance in the public sphere.  Arendt’s  “space  of  appearance”  includes  the  concrete  fact  that  attending  a  debate  in  person  with  material  symbols  attached  to  the  individual  is  highly  significant,  as  opposed  to  Habermas’s  focus on rational and more abstract argumentation.  The compatibility between this stress on appearance   with   the   example   of   clothing   in   Arendt   and   Warner’s   study   of   “bodily  representations”  is  avoided  by  Habermas,  who  dismisses  too  quickly  the  relevance  of  a cultural studies   approach   to   the   public   sphere.         Habermas’s   notion   of   the   public   sphere   seems   to   be  limited  to  be  a  contribution  to  a  normative  theory  of  democracy,  whereas  Arendt’s  and  Warner’s  accounts suggest a much more broad-ranging perspective for the study of the history of the public realm of human relations.        In  addition  to  the  fact  that  Arendt’s  approach  to  the  public  sphere,  as  well  as  the  approach  of  other authors such as Michael Warner, is more open to understanding the public sphere by    61  considering  cultural  history  and  cultural  studies,  Arendt’s  political  theory  insists  on  the  world  of  material   objects   or   “things”   that   appear   in the public sphere.  Arendt thus elaborates on her notion of publicness by explaining that what exists between individuals in a community consists in part in material objects.  This extends her example of the clothes of the sans-culottes as carrying  significations   in   the  public   sphere.     Arendt’s  conception  of  work   leads  her   to  explain  that fabricated objects have meanings and are part of what makes the worldly space where a public debate can take place, and clothing are certainly among these objects of the human world at the basis of the public sphere.  Unlike Habermas, her emphasis on objects that appear also articulate   the   idea   that   what   is   “public”   is   accessible   to   “everybody,”   which   shows   how  compatible her approach is with a study of the material culture of the public sphere and its relation to the non-bourgeois classes.  In spite of this sensitivity to material culture in Arendt, she does not explore the extent to which material culture and its clothing aspect are bound to symbolical meaning, which is part of how individuals recognize each other.  Habermas himself mentions the importance of what is symbolical, but this is not part of his account of the French Revolution.  Arendt goes on to say that objects made by humans are part of a world of conventions and significations.  This is what can be applied to clothing as meaningful objects providing a material aspect to the public sphere and its debate, since clothing as something that is “talked  about”  brings  the  individual  out  into  the  public  world  to  be  recognized  in  some  way.    The  use of speech in the community is linked to this world of objects including clothing and through speech material culture finds one of its ways to the public realm of political debate.      The second part of my thesis examines how Habermas started his investigation on the public sphere by taking into account the culture of clothing in the Middle Ages.  Habermas explains how hierarchies were represented symbolically and shows that the medieval aristocracy had attributes represented on their clothes, such as emblems, badges, or clothes that were displayed    62  publically.  These symbols gave publicity to their position of power in their community and as attributes they were a means of representation of how power was distributed in society.  Habermas also mentions how these symbolical clothes or elements of clothing were making their “virtues”  and  values public.  However, given that this presence of clothing in the Middle Ages was not part of a culture of public debate through written and oral speech, Habermas leaves behind the issue of public representation by means of clothing.  The case of the French Revolution provides an example that shows how Habermas missed an important aspect of the public importance of clothing.        The third part of my thesis proposes to read Habermas’s  subsequent   analysis  of   the  French  Revolution in order to contrast it with his findings about the Middle Ages.  Habermas totally avoids addressing this tradition of clothing at work in the public sphere of the revolution since he conceives the revolution as a continuation of the rationalistic ambitions of the Enlightenment and its   culture   of   oral   and   written   public   debate.      Habermas’s   public   sphere   takes   the   form   of   a  “space  of  rationality”  instead  of  a  “space  of  appearance,”  to  use  Arendt’s  expression,  which  in  my opinion made Habermas dismiss the question of clothing for his interpretation of modern history.     Arendt’s   emphasis   on   the   space   of   appearance   and  Wrigley’s   historical   study   on   the  revolutionary  “politics  of  appearances”  open  the  way  to  the  investigation  into  the  public  sphere  of the French Revolution in a way that includes more than just the bourgeoisie and written and oral speech.      Habermas   only   comments   on   the   fight   for   the   “freedom   of   expression”   and   its  consequences in legislation, whereas the historical scholarship shows how important clothing was in revolutionary France: it appears in law-making, festivals, societies, debates of the Jacobin club, art, etc.  For that reason, understanding the debate of the public sphere of the revolution requires an account of clothing.  As Wrigley has shown, the importance of clothing in the debate of   the   French   Revolution   cannot   be   dismissed   since   it   was   significantly   part   of   its   “political     63  culture.”    An  eloquent  and  significant  case  of  the  presence  of  a  clothing  culture  of  debate  in  the  public sphere during the revolution that Habermas missed is the sans-culottes.  The sans-culottes identified negatively as non-nobles and thus as wearing no aristocratic pants.  They represented the people in general as opposed to the ruling minority of the higher classes and their clothing was one of the means that enabled them to take part in the public debate.  Through the sans-culottes and their dress culture, the lower uneducated classes were given a voice through the material culture of political symbols, and this method of participation was accessible to everyone.  In this context, clothing was used by the sans-culottes in the public sphere to symbolize the national community to which they felt they belonged, given that the sans-culottes had the cultural conditions to imagine themselves as representing the nation.  Their clothes were also a symbol of their egalitarianism that came along with their nationalism.      Habermas’s  account   of   the   revolution’s debate on equality is limited to the census as a means of distinguishing between   “passive”   and   “active”   citizens,   whereas   this   type   of   hierarchical  distinction also depended on clothing as the egalitarianism of the sans-culottes shows.  However, although the culture of clothing was indicating the political identity of a person, it became an emblem that enabled anyone to endorse that identity, without any link to the social or political origin of the wearer.  The sans-culotte costume was thus a political emblem that anyone could use.      The fourth part of my thesis addresses how the sans-culottes, as important actors in the public sphere, used the republican symbol of the red cap to get involved in the revolution, an element avoided by Habermas.  They took the idea to the public sphere from a certain reading of Roman history where the red cap signified republican freedom.  The red cap was significantly present in the   public   sphere’s  world   of   appearances,   as  Wrigley  mentioned,   and   became   a   symbol   used,  asserted, and interpreted in the debate.  The collectivist aspect of republicanism was contained in    64  the symbolical meaning of the red cap and this was reminiscent of Roman republican history.  The story of the king  being  “forced   to  put  one  on,”   in  Sonenscher’s   terms,   is   an  example   that  illustrates the centrality of clothing in the debate of the public sphere in the presence of the sans-culottes.    Habermas’s  emphasis  on  the  break  with  tradition  initiated  by  modernity  prevented  him  from noticing that this republican red cap of the sans-culottes was actually reasserting an ancient tradition at the heart of a revolutionary modernity.  Arendt stresses this continuity between modernity  and  tradition  by  mentioning  the  “Roman  costume”  in  France’s  revolutionary  “stage  of  history.”    The  revolution  in  France  was  thus  endorsing  in  its  public  sphere,  where  history  found  its  “stage,” the political culture of clothing from ancient Rome.  Moreover, the Roman tradition through clothing was indicating that the sans-culotte’s  importance  was  legitimate  in  the  debate.    The red cap was also connected to the sans-culottes’s   symbolical   and   revolutionary re-articulation of the traditional religion of their own culture.  Therefore, this exploration of the culture  of  clothing  in  the  revolution  confirms  Arendt’s  thesis  on  modern  revolutions  in  which  the  invocation   of   the   “Roman   trinity   of   religion,   tradition   and   authority”   cannot   be   avoided.  The link between tradition and the modernity of revolution is also expressed by the fact that French history carried with it a traditional culture of clothing in politics through language and dress.  This was influencing the world of significations of the revolutionary present for the sans-culottes, which corroborates once  more  Arendt’s  thesis.  The public sphere of the revolution was thus preconditioned to use clothing given its national history.  From this perspective, Habermas’s  analysis of clothing in the Middle Ages could be applied to the French Revolution.  The red cap also expressed a duality between tradition and modernity in the revolutionary public sphere: it was a sign of revolutionary opposition to tradition but it was also a sing of retention of tradition.  Since  scholars  such  as  Harris  mention  the  red  cap  as  a  form  of  “political  uniform,”  one  can  say  that the hierarchical element of the notion of uniform was removed but that tradition was    65  retained since the red cap was traditionally Roman: the red cap shows that modernity and tradition have to be understood together.  However, the importance and significance of clothing in the debate of the French Revolution cannot be separated from the fact that the signification of clothing was ambiguous, which is what Habermas did not perceive due to his rationalistic account of the public sphere.  Since people could use clothing to hide their identity, and since “being  and  appearance”  cannot  be  understood  as  separate in politics as Arendt writes, conceiving the   public   sphere   as   a   “space   of   appearance”   enables   a   broader   understanding   of   the   public  debate of the French Revolution.       It seems that Habermas studies the French Revolution from its bourgeois component because he himself seems to hide his identity behind the appearance of the modern bourgeois.  However, it also seems that Habermas does not pose the question of appearances in politics, as Arendt and Wrigley do, partly because his pants or clothes do not pose any problem.  As an academic, he does not have to think considerably about how he appears with his clothes, since he has enough room in his schedule to think mainly about the next argument.  “The  politics  of  appearances,”  to  use  Wrigley’s   insightful   title,  as   if  he  had  read  Arendt,   is a reality in which Habermas himself has to take position as an author and he takes this position by appearing through his book as an academic interested in literature, philosophy, or rational arguments, just like the bourgeois from modern history, whose appearance can be contrasted with the appearance of the sans-culotte.  However, he seems to forget that, even if behind his appearance there is only probably another appearance, as many philosophers would put it, this other appearance is more multifaceted than Habermas seems to imply.  What I am trying to suggest it that, behind  Habermas’s  appearance as a bourgeois, there is still the appearance of the “normal  guy,”  who  can,  or  should  be  able  to,  see  his own self in the sans-culottes, that is, in the sans-culottes who knew that not only rational argumentation is part of the public sphere, and that taking part in a political debate can also    66  include clothing to signify, to oppose, to express, to reinforce speech, to disagree, to protest, to produce meaning, and to say something about the world.                    67  Bibliography Primary text -Habermas, Jürgen, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, Neuwied und Berlin, Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, [1962] 1975.191 -Habermas, Jürgen, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, translated by Thomas Burger, with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence, Cambridge, The MIT Press, [1989] 1991. 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Woods, in Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics, Edited with and Introduction by Jerome Kohn, New York, Schocken Books, 2005, p. 123, 140, 166-168.192 -Arendt, Hannah, On Revolution, Introduction by Jonathan Schell, New York, Penguin Books, [1963] 2006. -Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, Second Edition, Introduction by Margaret Conovan, Chicago-London, The University of Chicago Press, [1958] 1998. -Auslander, Leora, “Regeneration  Through  the  Everyday?    Clothing,  Architecture  and  Furniture  in  Revolutionary  Paris,”  in  Art History, Vol. 28, No. 2, April 2005, p. 227-247. -Baker, Keith Michael, “Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France: Variations on a Theme by Habermas,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, Cambridge (Mass.)-London, The MIT Press, 1992, p.181-211. -Benhabib, Seyla, “Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 73-98. -Benhabib, Seyla, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, New Edition, Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, [2000] 2003. -Bourdieu, Pierre, Médiations pascaliennes, édition revue et corrigée, Éditions du Seuil, [1997] 2003.                                                           191 Since the 1975 edition of this book is not available to me at this moment, I used the following edition to correct my German mistakes in this reference and above as indicated: Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, Neuwied, Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1962; which I used only for small corrections.  192 I read a text by Arendt in a French translation many years ago, and it is probably the same as the one I quote, however, after reflection, I am not totally sure at the moment if it is the same text, as there may be editorial differences, for instance.  For that reason, I mention only the pages I read fully for the thesis.      68  -Boyte, Harry C., “The Pragmatic Ends of Popular Politics,”   in   Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 340-355. -Brooke, John L., “Reason   and   Passion   in   the   Public   Sphere:   Habermas   and   the   Cultural  Historians,”  in  The Jounral of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 29, No. 1, Summer 1998, p. 43-67. -Calhoun, Craig, “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 1-48. -Cowans, Jon, “Habermas and French History: the Public Sphere and the Problem of Political Legitimacy,”  in  French History, Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 134-160. -Eley, Geoff, “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 289-339. -Fraser, Nancy, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 115-142. -François Furet, Claude Mazauric and Louis Bergeron,   “Les   sans-culottes et la Révolution française,”  in  Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 18e Année, No. 6, Nov.-Déc., 1963, p. 1098-1127.  -Garnham, Nicholas, “The Media and the Public Sphere,”   in   Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 359-376. -Geffroy, Annie, “Désignation, dénégation: la légende des sans-culottes (1780-1980),”  in C. Croisille et J. Ehrard (actes recueillis et présentés par), avec la collaboration de M.-C. Chemin, La légende de la révolution, Actes du colloque international de Clermont-Ferrand (juin 1986), Faculté  des  Lettres  et  Sciences  Humaines  de   l’Université  Blaise-Pascal (Clermont II), 1988, p. 581-593.   -Habermas, Jürgen, et. al, “Concluding Remarks,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 462-479. -Habermas, Jürgen, “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,” translated by Thomas Burger, in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 421-461. -Habermas, Jürgen,  “On  the  German-Jewish  Heritage,”   in  Telos, June 20, vol. 1980, no. 40, p. 127-131. -Hohendahl, Peter Uwe, “The Public Sphere: Models and Boundaries,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 99-108. -Harris, Jennifer, “The  Red  Cap  of  Liberty:  A  Study  of  Dress  Worn  by  French  Revolutionary  Partisans 1789-94,”  in  Eighteenth-Century Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, Spring 1981, p. 283-312. -Jouve, Michel, “L’image   du   sans-culotte   dans   la   caricature   politique   anglaise.   Création   d’un  stéréotype   pictural,”   in  Gazette des beaux-arts, 6e Période, Tome XCII, 120e Année, 1978, p. 187-196.     69  -Kramer, Lloyd, “Habermas, History, and Critical Theory,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 236-258. -Lee, Benjamin, “Textuality, Mediation, and Public Discourse,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 402-418. -Leith, James, “Images of Sans-culottes,” in Hould, Claudette, and Leith, James (ed.), Iconographie et image de la Révolution française, Actes du colloque tenu dans le cadre du 59ième   congrès   de   l’Association   canadienne   française   pour   l’avancement   des   sciences,   (15-16 Mai 1989), Montréal, 1990, p. 131-159.193  -Mah, Harold, “Phantasies  of  the  Public  Sphere:  Rethinking the Habermas of Historians,”  in  The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 72, No. 1, New Work on the Old Regime and the French Revolution: A special Issue in Honor of François Furet, March 2000, p. 153-182. -Nathans, Benjamin, “Habermas’s   “Public   Sphere”   in   the   Era   of   the   French   Revolution,”   in  French Historical Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3, Spring, 1990, p. 620-644. -Naudin, Michel, “La   réaction   culturelle   en   l’an   III : la représentation du Jacobin et du sans-culotte  dans  l’imaginaire  de  leur  adversaire?,” in Michel Vovelle (ed.), Le  tournant  de  l’an  III.  Réaction et terreur blanche dans la France révolutionnaire, Paris, Comité des travaux historique et scientifiques, 1997, p. 279-291. -Postone, Moishe, “Political   Theory and   Historical   Analysis,”   in   Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 164-177. -Ryan, Mary P., “Gender  and  Public  Access:  Women’s  Politics  in  Nineteenth-Century America,” in Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 259-288. -Schudson, Michael, “Was   There Ever a Public Sphere? If So,When? Reflections on the American  Case,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 143-163.  -Scurr, Ruth, “Who  Were  the  Sans-culottes?,”  in  Modern Intellectual History, 8, 2, 2011, p. 447-455. -Sonenscher, Michael, Sans-Culottes. An Eighteenth-Century Emblem in the French Revolution, Princeton-Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2008. -Traverso,   Enzo,   “Adorno   et   les   antinomies   de   l’industrie   culturelle,” in Communications, 2012/2 no. 91, p. 51-63. -Warner, Michael, “The Mass Public and the Mass Subject,”   in   Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 377-401. -Wrigley, Richard, The Politics of Appearances. Representations of Dress in Revolutionary France, Oxford-New York, Berg, 2002.                                                            193 The bibliographical information this document is taken from Richard  Wrigley’s  book  The Politics of Appearances. Representations of Dress in Revolutionary France, Oxford-New York, Berg, 2002, p. 294, since the interlibrary loan system at UBC does not always provide the bibliographical information of the photocopies of articles they provide.      70  -Rolland, Patrice, “Robespierre  ou  la  fondation  impossible,” in Le Débat, 1992/1 no. 68, p. 41-57. -Zaret, David, “Religion, Science, and Printing in the Public Spheres in Seventeenth-Century England,”  in  Craig Calhoun (edited by), Habermas and the Public Sphere, p. 212-235.    

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