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The politics of anger in Roman society : a study of orators and emperors, 70 BCE-68 CE Knight, Jayne Elizabeth 2015

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THE POLITICS OF ANGER IN ROMAN SOCIETY:  A STUDY OF ORATORS AND EMPERORS, 70 BCE-68 CE   by Jayne Elizabeth Knight  B.A., University of Florida, 2008 M.A., University of Florida, 2010   A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Classics)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  August 2015  © Jayne Elizabeth Knight, 2015 ii  Abstract  This dissertation examines the sociopolitical dynamics of anger in Roman public life during the late Republic and early Principate, specifically within the professional contexts of the orator and the emperor. I am interested in Roman thought on the pragmatic functions of anger during this time period. Evidence for how anger was employed by orators and emperors is drawn from a broad range of Roman prose sources. My analysis is both philological and historical in nature. I examine how the Latin lexicon of anger is deployed by authors and consider how diction functions in the representation of political anger. My analysis acquires a chronological shape as I trace the ways in which Roman discourse about the roles of anger in public life changes during the transition from Republic to Principate.  Chapter 1 provides methodological background and contextualizes this project within the subfield of ancient emotion studies. Concepts taken from emotions history are defined and adapted for usage in Roman contexts. Chapter 2 discusses the Latin lexicon of anger and its relationship with ancient philosophical understandings of anger.  Chapter 3 is the first of two chapters on anger in Ciceronian oratory. It features discussions of In Verrem 1, In Catilinam 1-2, Pro Murena, and Pro Milone. These case studies reveal how Cicero approached anger as an advocate and a consul. Chapter 4 examines Cicero’s treatment of anger late in his career in the Caesarianae and the Philippics.  Chapter 5 presents sources on the anger of Augustus and explores how the first emperor developed an imperial emotional persona. I demonstrate that a balance between expressions of anger and displays of mercy was important to this persona. Chapter 6 considers how the remaining Julio-Claudian emperors employed anger in their regimes, with an eye toward their adaptation and/or perversion of the standard set by Augustus. iii   This dissertation expands our understanding of Roman thought on anger, which has traditionally been accessed through the lens of philosophical writings on emotion. It demonstrates that anger is represented in many sources as an essential tool of both public speaking and imperial leadership at Rome.  iv  Preface This dissertation is original, independent, and unpublished work by the author, Jayne E. Knight. v  Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii Preface ............................................................................................................................................ iv Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... v List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ viii List of Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... ix Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... x Dedication ..................................................................................................................................... xii Chapter 1: Toward a History of Roman Anger ............................................................................. 1 1.1 Approaches ........................................................................................................................ 6 1.2 Review of scholarship ...................................................................................................... 16 1.3 Scope and organization ................................................................................................... 22 Chapter 2: Defining Anger ........................................................................................................... 24 2.1 The Latin lexicon of anger .............................................................................................. 25 2.2 Ancient philosophical understandings of anger ............................................................... 31 2.3 A script for Roman anger ................................................................................................ 39 Part 1: The Republican Orator .................................................................................................... 42 Chapter 3: Anger in Cicero’s Pre-Civil War Oratory .................................................................. 54 3.1 In Verrem 1 ......................................................................................................................... 55 3.2 In Catilinam 1-2 ................................................................................................................. 66 vi  3.2.1 In Catilinam 1 .............................................................................................................. 66 3.2.2 In Catilinam 2 .............................................................................................................. 77 3.3 Pro Murena ......................................................................................................................... 85 3.4 Pro Milone .......................................................................................................................... 95 3.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 105 Chapter 4: Anger on the Eve of the Principate: Cicero’s Caesarianae and Philippics .................... 108 4.1 Pro Marcello ..................................................................................................................... 109 4.2 Pro Ligario ........................................................................................................................ 116 4.3 Pro Rege Deiotaro ............................................................................................................... 126 4.4 The Philippics .................................................................................................................. 129 4.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 139 Part 2: The Julio-Claudian Emperor .......................................................................................... 141 Chapter 5: Foundational Anger: Augustus and Earlier Roman Exempla of Autocratic Rule ..... 149 5.1 Earlier Roman exempla of autocratic rule ....................................................................... 150 5.2 Augustus ......................................................................................................................... 161 5.3 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 176 Chapter 6: The Evolution of Ira Caesaris: Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, and Nero .................... 178 6.1 Tiberius .......................................................................................................................... 179 6.2 Caligula .......................................................................................................................... 193 6.3 Claudius ......................................................................................................................... 197 6.4 Nero ............................................................................................................................... 202 6.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 209 vii  Summary and Final Conclusions ................................................................................................ 212 References ................................................................................................................................... 219  viii  List of Tables   Table 2.1 Latin anger vocabulary..................................................................................................30 Table 2.2 A script for Roman anger..............................................................................................41   ix  List of Abbreviations Abbreviations for classical authors and their works follow the Oxford Classical Dictionary (Hornblower, Spawforth, and Eidinow eds. 2012).   OLD Oxford Latin Dictionary (Glare ed. 1982)  OCT Oxford Classical Text           x  Acknowledgements  I am fortunate to have many people to thank for helping me see this project to completion. First, I would like to thank the members of my committee. My supervisor Susanna Braund deserves special recognition for the tireless support and guidance she has provided throughout my studies at UBC. Her enthusiasm for my ideas inspired me to pursue this difficult topic, and her thorough knowledge of Latin literature and Roman culture was invaluable to me as I wrestled with it. Susanna read many drafts of varying quality and responded quickly with helpful and sensitive comments. My conversations with her were a guaranteed source of inspiration. I always left her office buzzing with excitement about my work. I feel privileged to have her as a mentor. Second, I would like to thank Siobhán McElduff for her insightful comments on my chapters, and especially for sharing her expertise on Roman oratory with me. Her course on the Philippics during my first semester at UBC deepened my love for Cicero. Finally, I thank C.W. Marshall for his attentive and critical readings of my work. He challenged me to improve my writing and strengthen my arguments. I am especially grateful for his prudent advice regarding the importance of structure.     Several other professors deserve mention for the support they have offered me along the way. Gwynaeth McIntyre was incredibly generous with her experience and advice on a variety of academic and professional matters. Her spirited encouragement was a great help to me, especially during the final stages of writing. I am grateful to Leanne Bablitz for giving me a well-timed pep talk in her capacity as Graduate Advisor. I thank my MA supervisor Victoria Pagán for providing constant support from afar.    I am grateful to have had the opportunity to share portions of my research at academic conferences. I thank the Department of Classical, Near Eastern, and Religious Studies and the Faculty of Graduate Studies at UBC for providing financial support for my travel. I received helpful responses from colleagues at meetings of the Classical Association of the Canadian West, the Classical Association of Canada, and the Society for Classical Studies. I benefitted enormously from my participation in the 2013 colloquium on ‘Emotions and Persuasion in Classical Antiquity’ at Royal Holloway, which was organized by Ed Sanders and Matthew Johncock. I look forward to future opportunities for collaboration with classicists who are interested in emotions.     I could not have endured this process without the companionship of my friends. I thank Cat Wilson for always being willing to talk about my work, even if we were in a hot tub in Sechelt or a pub in London. Many of the ideas in this dissertation were generated or refined during our many conversations. I thank Justin Bull for his pep talks and pragmatism. I thank Justin Glessner for the warmth of his friendship and his insight. I thank my fellow dissertator Andrew McClellan for sharing his perspective on my topic and for his sense of humor. Blake Fisher deserves special mention for living with me during the final year of writing. He sustained me emotionally with his patience and physically with his grocery trips. He also took care of our cats, Virgil and Dante. xi   Finally, I thank my parents Jay and Molly Knight for providing emotional and financial support throughout my years of study. I am grateful to them for always encouraging me in my intellectual pursuits, even if they took me 3,000 miles away from home.  xii  Dedication      parentibus meis1  Chapter 1: Toward a History of Roman Anger   Tant de gens s’en vont qui se désolent à chaque pas: plus rien à découvrir, paraît-il, dans  des mers trop frayées. Qu’ils se plongent dans les ténèbres de la Psychologie aux prises  avec l’Histoire: ils reprendront du goȗt à l’exploration.1 —Lucien Febvre    In his 1941 article “La sensibilité et l’histoire: comment reconstituer la vie affective d’autrefois?” French historian Lucien Febvre, member of the Annales school, proposed that the cure for the malaise that comes from facing the “overly explored seas” of history is to embark upon new modes of historical scholarship, namely those that seek to reconstruct the emotional climates and mindsets of the past by exploring the murky intersections between psychology and history.2 He elsewhere explained the difficulty of this pursuit, which also happened to constitute its necessity: the emotional lives of past peoples were in many ways different than our own.3 This is likewise the premise of David Konstan’s groundbreaking 2006 study The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: “…the emotions of the ancient Greeks were in some significant respects different from our own, and… recognizing these differences is important to our understanding of Greek literature and Greek culture generally.”4 Indeed, the “mers trop frayées” of classical antiquity can be                                                 1 “So many people go around feeling discouraged at every step: there is nothing left to discover, it seems to them, in overly explored seas. Those who plunge themselves into the shadows where psychology mingles with history: they will recover their appetite for exploration.” Translations of French are my own. 2 Febvre 1941: 5. Febvre is widely credited with being the first scholar to issue a call for the development of a history of emotions and his ideas gained contemporary support in Europe. In North America the concept did not fully take hold until the 1980s. See Matt 2011 for a helpful outline of the progress of the history of emotions as a discipline. 3 Febvre 1938. 4 Konstan 2006: ix. What Konstan and others mean by this is not that there cannot be any universal elements of human emotional experience (science has certainly proved that there are through the observation of physiological responses connected with emotions), but rather, as Cairns 1993: 10 explains, “…different cultures will most probably have some or even many emotions in common, but where they differ widely in their conceptualization of the aspects of emotional experience perceived as salient, it is reasonable to regard their distinct emotion concepts as distinct emotions.” It is generally accepted among psychologists, anthropologists, and other emotion theorists that emotions are to some extent culturally constructed (the extent to which they are is a matter of debate). 2  navigated anew with a course set to understand the rich emotional cultures5 of those civilizations. This dissertation participates in the rapidly growing field of ancient emotion studies6 by investigating the political dynamics of the emotion of anger (Lat. ira) in Roman public life during the late Republic and early Principate.   ‘Emotion’ and ‘anger’ are elusive concepts that immediately demand a working definition. In this study I adopt the view of ancient theorists on the nature of emotions: they are a product of a cognitive process of evaluation.7 Aristotle, Cicero, and the younger Seneca define anger as a perception of an unjust slight that is accompanied by a desire for revenge.8 For these authors, being angry involves sociocultural knowledge about what justice is, what slights are, and what revenge entails. A person experiencing anger must then make a decision about how to act based on their evaluation of the situation. Understanding emotions as “intelligent responses to the perception of value”9 allows us to anticipate how they could be considered valuable social tools from an ethical standpoint. In order to understand how anger functioned as a pragmatic tool in Roman political life, I ask the following questions about my sources: What purpose does anger serve in the text, and is it a political purpose? What views about the value of anger are being communicated by the text? What can the text tell us about how anger was employed in Roman politics?                                                 5 I use the term “emotional culture” as it is defined by González 2012: 3: “a culture marked by an increasing presence of emotions in public life that both positively evaluates the manifestation of emotions and, at the same time, stresses the need for an adequate ‘emotional management.’” 6 Major contributions to this field include Cairns 1993; Williams 1993; Nussbaum 1994, 2001; Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen 1998; Braund and Gill 1997; Braund and Most 2003; Konstan 1997, 2001, 2006; Harris 2001; Sternberg 2005; Graver 2007; Fitzgerald 2008. 7 Modern cognitivists believe that emotions arise from a sensory perception that is then evaluated by the brain. This view of emotions is advocated by, for example, Solomon 1993 and Nussbaum 2001. Most emotion theorists currently hold that cognition plays a significant role in emotion. To be sure, emotions also involve physiological responses, but ancient literature does not yield as much information about those elements. Cf. Chaniotis and Ducrey 2013: 10-11.  8 See chapter 2, section 2.2 for discussion of ancient theoretical definitions of anger.  9 Nussbaum 2001: 1.  3   Before I begin to outline the specific aims and approaches of this project further, I need to address some of the issues raised by the study of ancient emotions. Douglas Cairns remarks that the cross-cultural study of emotional language “raises the fundamental issues of the universality or cultural specificity of the emotions and of the contribution made by linguistic labels and categories to the construction of emotions as cultural phenomena.”10 Some elements of anger appear to be universal, while others are culturally constructed. Emotion theorists frequently include anger in lists of “basic emotions,” which implies that the emotion is fundamental to human psychology and physiology,11 and some have argued that anger is one of the emotions that can be observed in babies.12 But there are cultural differences as well: the occasions on which it is socially appropriate to display anger, the situations that give rise to anger, and the ways in which anger is evaluated are all culturally specific.13 These are the aspects of Roman anger that we can learn about from texts.14   Even if we conclude that we are generally15 only able to view the culturally constructed aspects of anger in texts, the question remains: can we make any assumptions of similarity between Roman ira and our own experience of anger? Douglas Cairns, in a chapter on Homeric anger, issues this statement regarding our ability to understand the emotions of ancient cultures:                                                 10 Cairns 2003: 11.  11 Ortony and Turner 1990 provide a brief overview of the concept of “basic emotions” as employed by modern emotion theorists as well as arguments for why the concept should be challenged. Note the frequent occurrence of anger and rage in the selected lists of basic emotions in Table 1, p. 316. See Ekman 1992 for a counter argument supporting the validity of the term “basic emotions” when used to describe emotions that have biological bases that are evidenced by universals in physiology and expression. On the side of ancient theorists, Aristotle includes anger in lists of emotions in several places, e.g. Eth. Nic. 2.5, 1105b21ff; De An. 1.1, 403a16-17; Rh. 2.1, 1378a20-3. 12 Ekman 1980: 73-101 argues that anger, fear, sadness, happiness, surprise, and disgust are observable in infants. Lewis 2000: 265-80 states that babies start exhibiting anger shortly after they reach three months of age. 13 Cf. Cairns 2003: 12-14.  14 Cf. Chaniotis and Ducrey 2013: 10-11: “[ancient sources] do have access to the external stimuli that generated emotions. They also have information concerning the various factors that determine the manifestation of emotions.” I discuss the limitations of linguistic labels and textual evidence in general in chapter 2.  15 Cairns has successfully incorporated science and folk understandings of physiology into his work on ancient emotions. See for example Cairns 2011 and Cairns 2013: 85-107. 4   …all cultures exhibit points of overlap and contact that make them mutually  intelligible; and all cultures have been formed and inhabited by a species which  evolved its capacity for the creation of culture under a broadly uniform set of  environmental pressures. The possibility for dialogue between ancient cultures and our  own exists; we must attempt it in a way which avoids both the naïve assumption of shared  humanity and unsustainable strategies of alienation.16   Our goal to understand the emotions of the past is then not entirely impossible, but we must be cautious about how we go about it, especially in terms of how we conceptualize our relationship with our subjects. My position as a woman living in Canada in the 21st century is strikingly different than that of an elite Roman male living during the late Republic or early Principate, but two thousand years is a very short time in terms of human evolution, and the same biological equipment governs my emotions. My education and training assist my efforts to study the elements of emotional experience that are culturally constructed and thus visible in texts. I do not believe that we can fully reconstruct the emotional experiences of our ancient subjects, nor is that my goal, but I maintain that we have much to gain from examining the emotions of ancient cultures on their own terms.   As Angelos Chaniotis and Pierre Ducrey point out, “The question no longer is whether students of classical antiquity should consider emotions in their research...classicists have no other choice but to attempt to reconstruct the emotional background of their sources.”17 I have set out to uncover some of the emotional background of the politics of the late Republic and early Principate by examining how anger is conceptualized in prose sources as a pragmatic tool in the contexts of public speaking and imperial leadership. I arrived at this question after researching previous scholarship on ancient anger. In general, ancient Greek emotions have received more                                                 16 Cairns 2003: 12.  17 Chaniotis and Ducrey 2013: 9.  5  attention than Roman,18 and poetic and and philosophical works have been used as sources for information about ancient emotions more often than other genres.19 Braund and Most’s volume Ancient Anger, William Harris’ Restraining Rage, and Kalimtzis’ Taming Anger represent the most concentrated efforts to expand our knowledge of anger in antiquity,20 but there remain aspects ancient anger that have yet to be investigated.21 The politics of anger in Roman society is one of these topics.   In his study of history in Ovid, Syme remarks that “The use of ‘ira’ and ‘iracundia’ in political contexts affords instruction and entertainment—and deserves a disquisition.”22 Harris too notes the potential for productive work on the politics of ancient anger: “Of all kinds of anger, political anger is probably the least difficult for a historian to study.”23 Sources that describe political scenarios give us a window into the emotional dynamics of public life. When emotions are expressed in public contexts and later recorded, they have a clear communicative purpose.24 The specific messages that anger conveys are dependent upon context.25 For example, when Cicero calls Antony iratus he is saying, “this man is a danger to society,”26 but when he                                                 18 Harris 2001 features much more analysis of ancient Greek material than Roman. Recent studies on Greek emotions include Cairns 1993, Koziak 2000, Konstan 2006, Chaniotis 2012, Sanders, Thumiger, Carey, and Lowe 2013, and Sanders 2014.  19 Cf. Sanders 2012: 153: “...attention has generally focused on certain genres (epic, lyric poetry, tragedy, and philosophy) that only very indirectly reveal how emotions worked in real life, and to a much more limited extent on such genres as historiography, oratory, and biography that, under certain conditions, may be a better source of information for the part played by emotions in social, political, legal, religious, and cultural communication.”  20 Braund and Most 2003; Harris 2001; Kalimtzis 2012. 21 Cf. Braund and Most 2003: 3: “It is our hope that our publication, taken together with that of Harris, will set a new agenda for the study of ancient anger and will provoke and inspire work by many other scholars both within and beyond the field of classics.” 22 Syme 1978: 224.  23 Harris 2001: 21. 24 Cf. Chaniotis and Ducrey 2013: 11: “...the study of emotions in Greek and Roman history and culture means first and foremost the study of contexts of communication and of emotional communities.” 25 Tavris 1982: 45 uses the phrase ‘human hiss’ to describe the communicative function of anger. She offers examples of the messages anger can convey: “Pay attention to me. I don’t like what you are doing. Restore my pride. You’re in my way. Danger. Give me justice.” 26 E.g. Phil. 3.30: quid hic faciet, si poterit, iratus qui, cum suscensere nemini posset, omnibus bonis fuerit inimicus? 6  refers to his own iracundia as laudanda,27 he is announcing, “I have a moral imperative to be offended.” Because social, cultural, and political factors determine the ways in which anger is used in various contexts, it is important to develop a method for reading emotional content in texts that is sensitive to the historical circumstances that produced them.   1.1 Approaches  Although it is easy to justify an inquiry into the history of anger, it is difficult to decide how to go about it. 28 Barbara Rosenwein explains this difficulty in her introduction to a volume of essays on anger in the medieval west:   For writing about anger is not merely a matter of isolating a topic and setting out to  research it; the history of anger does not follow an “agenda” for research the way, for  example, the history of women has done. This is so for two reasons. First, we don’t know  what anger is… Second, anger begets anger. That is, it is an emotional subject, tied  directly to the ways in which people (including historians) think about themselves, their  societies, and their values.29  Aware of these obstacles, I have attempted to create a methodology that is honest about the limitations facing the study of ancient anger yet optimistic about how we can benefit from pairing philological approaches with relevant concepts from other disciplines to reach a greater understanding of emotions in antiquity.   Rosenwein’s article “Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions”30 provides a roadmap for the potential historian of emotions by outlining some of the major problems of the field and offering strategies for the study of emotions in history. Her concept of “emotional                                                 27 Sest. 4: neque iracundia magis ulla laudanda <est> quam ea quae me inflammat eorum scelere qui cum omnibus meae salutis defensoribus bellum esse sibi gerendum iudicaverunt. 28 Rosenwein 2002 is a good starting point for beginning to think about the need for this kind of study. Matt and Stearns 2013 provide a very thorough overview of the discipline, describe ways in which emotions history is being done, and stress the importance of this kind of work.  29 Rosenwein 1998: 1-2.  30 Rosenwein 2010. 7  communities” has been especially helpful to me for thinking about how certain social groups (in the case of this study, elite Roman men of the late Republic and early Principate) within Roman society may have had their own set of ideas about the value of anger. She lucidly describes emotional communities in this way:  Emotional communities are largely the same as social communities—families,  neighborhoods, syndicates, academic institutions, monasteries, factories, platoons,  princely courts. But the researcher looking at them seeks above all to uncover systems of  feelings, to establish what these communities (and the individuals within them) define and  assess as valuable or harmful to them (for it is about such things that people express  emotions); the emotions that they value, devalue, or ignore; the nature of the affective  bonds between people that they recognize; and the modes of emotional expression that  they expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore.31  This definition isolates the pieces of information about anger that I look for in my sources beyond the purely literary functions of the emotion. I am interested in what made orators and emperors angry, how they assessed the value of anger itself, how anger functioned within their relationships, and what modes of anger expression were encouraged and which were discouraged by them and for them.   Rosenwein outlines a series of research steps for emotions historians to follow.32 I have followed many, but not all, of them. I list them below and explain how I have adapted them for the purposes of this project.  • Gather a dossier of sources for each emotional community.  • Problematize emotion terms.  • Make use, where possible, of theorists of emotions from the relevant time period. • Weigh the words and phrases to establish their relative importance.                                                 31 Rosenwein 2010: 11.  32 Rosenwein 2010: 12-24.  8  • Read the silences, metaphors, and ironies. • Consider the social role of emotions. • Trace changes over time.  The decision to focus on anger in the practices of oratory and imperial leadership defines the emotional community under study: elite Roman men. This group is likewise the focus of Kaster’s study of Roman emotions and Edwards’ work on the Roman politics of immorality.33 The elite are privileged over other groups because the majority of the available sources were written by, and mostly about, them. This is not a great problem for the purposes of this study, however. The fact that the Roman elite wrote about anger further substantiates the idea that they were interested in the construction and maintenance of emotional norms within their group. As Rosenwein advises, “Historians interested in the characteristics of particular emotional communities need to consider which emotions were most fundamental to their styles of expression and sense of self.”34 I have isolated anger as a fundamental aspect of specific operations of the Roman elite, and an important element in the construction of their identity.35 My dossier of sources for this community includes Cicero’s writings (mainly his speeches, but also some of his letters and philosophy) and works by Livy, Velleius Paterculus, Claudius, Seneca, Plutarch, Tacitus, Suetonius, and Cassius Dio. This dossier of sources represents a very large amount of material, and thus each source does not receive a comprehensive treatment. I have judiciously selected passages from the sources that clearly showcase or discuss the use of anger by orators and emperors who lived during my time period.                                                  33 Kaster 2005; Edwards 1993. 34 Rosenwein 2010: 15.  35 Edwards 1993 takes a similar stance on the importance of representations of immorality to the Roman elite, also with respect to the negotiation of their identity as Romans.  9   Chapter 2, “Anger Defined,” is dedicated to problematizing anger terminology. This chapter provides essential background for the discussion of anger narratives in the selected sources. It discusses the Latin lexicon of anger and presents the definitions of anger provided by contemporary theorists of emotion. I address some of the issues involved in the translation of Latin anger terms into English and the difficulties in mapping philosophical thought on emotion onto historical narratives. I provide a “script” for Roman anger based on Kaster’s model that allows us to identify anger in texts that do not feature anger vocabulary. I did not find it necessary to do a formal word occurrence analysis for the purposes of this study because the contexts in which anger terms are used are more important than how many times anger terms are used.   I have been cautious about drawing conclusions about anger from reading the silences in texts. There have been a few instances, however, when I have found the silence of a text on emotional matters relevant to our understanding of the text. Augustus’ Res Gestae is the most important example of this, as it glosses over the emotional dynamics of Augustus’ rise to power, elements which are thoroughly treated by other authors writing about Augustus. The uses of metaphor to denote emotions are much steadier grounds for research.36 Ancient Greek and Roman authors frequently used metaphors to refer to anger,37 and these metaphors most often involve ideas of heat, sickness, and animalistic wildness. Cognitive theorists have argued that these metaphors tell us much about how people conceptualized emotions. Anger metaphors are more commonly used in poetry than in prose texts, so they do not feature heavily in my discussions.                                                  36 For the analysis of emotional metaphors see Cairns 2008. 37 See Harris 2001: 67-9. 10   This dissertation’s focus on the sociopolitical dynamics of anger in late Republican and early imperial Rome satisfies the final two elements of Rosenwein’s list. I am interested in how Roman authors represented anger in public contexts because we gain a more complete and richer understanding of Roman society and politics of this period when we understand the role that emotions played in them. I trace changes over time by considering how Roman discourse surrounding the use of anger in public life changes during the transition from Republic to Principate.   William Reddy’s The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions38 provides a lucid overview of the ongoing dialogue between the disciplines of psychology and anthropology on theories of emotion and proposes a theory of emotions that is historically sensitive and politically engaged. Reddy’s concept of “emotional regimes” has been valuable to this thesis. He defines an emotional regime as “The set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and ‘emotives’ that express and inculcate them; a necessary underpinning of any stable political regime.”39 This term complements Rosenwein’s “emotional community” but further politicizes it. Reddy views rules about emotions as important to the stability of a political system. He also considers the implications of emotional regimes: they are often at the expense of the emotional liberty of the people. This concept influenced my thinking about the effects of the establishment of the Principate on emotional norms in elite Roman society.    My ideas about the pragmatic roles of anger in Roman public life have found support in the recently published psychology volume entitled The Positive Side of Negative Emotions40 edited by W. Gerrod Parrott. This volume includes a chapter by Ursula Hess entitled “Anger Is a Positive                                                 38 Reddy 2001. 39 Reddy 2001: 129.  40 Parrott 2014.  11  Emotion.”41 As a whole this collection examines the role of ‘negative’ emotions in social interactions and relationships and discusses how these emotions are expressed and evaluated differently across cultures. While this is not the first modern work to suggest that anger can be positive, it does provide fresh perspective on how emotions that are traditionally considered negative can have positive manifestations in certain societies and cultures. Works like these have enhanced my ability to examine Roman sources with an open mind toward how they represent emotional dynamics and the value of emotions in social scenarios. With a subject so universal and abstract as emotion, it can be difficult to approach the topic objectively and without interference from your own cultural milieu, but becoming familiar with anthropological and psychological approaches has been very helpful in allowing me to overcome this.   Unlike the cultural anthropologist who is able to live among her subjects and directly observe the roles of emotions in daily life, I am restricted to the investigation of pieces of emotional culture that are preserved in the literary remains42 of a long dead civilization. This dissertation therefore does not seek to make claims about how Romans felt anger, or to reconstruct how Romans used emotions to a standard of historical accuracy; rather it analyzes texts that describe how Romans felt and expressed anger in sociopolitical scenarios and illuminates discourses about the value of anger as it pertained to the practices of oratory and imperial leadership. From there we can begin to think about how these discourses of anger can inform our understanding of how emotions functioned in Roman public life.                                                  41 Hess 2014: 55-75. 42 I should note that this topic would be enriched by the inclusion of material evidence. If I extend the scope of this project in the future, I will be very interested in examining the emotional content of Roman material culture, particularly in public buildings and inscriptions.  12   In the context of oratory, anger is primarily a rhetorical tool. Emotional engagement of the audience is a crucial element of successful public speaking, and ancient theorists of rhetoric explicitly note that the ability to arouse and direct an audience’s anger is an invaluable skill in the orator’s toolbox. The political implications of this mode of persuasion have not been given due consideration. Examining the ways in which anger rhetoric is deployed can shed light on Roman emotional norms as they pertained to political life. I am also interested in the ways in which Cicero, in particular, constructs Roman identity through his use of anger in his speeches. If Cicero is able to use rhetoric successfully to persuade his audience of elite Romans that they should be angry at a certain object, it gives us some insight into shared views about anger among the elite. From the information about anger provided in Cicero’s works we can also make inferences about the emotional regime under which he lived, and we can attempt to determine if its features changed over time. It becomes clear that the multidirectional anger that we see at work in Republican oratory is transformed into a unidirectional emotional hierarchy of emperor and subject in imperial sources.   In order to understand the significance of historical narratives about the anger of emperors, I began by thinking broadly about the literary significance of anger. The power of anger to incite action is one of the many reasons why the emotion fascinates authors and readers.43 In lived experience and within the context of a historical narrative, anger can serve as motivator for sociopolitical action. In Livy’s history, ira is the means by which Romulus                                                 43 See Fisher 2002: 172: “Anger is the necessary bridge between a purely internal account of the passions and an interest in action, because it is with anger that the aroused state in the soul or spirit has the most immediate links to the physical acts of our fists or our body in the outer world.” 13  establishes his status as founder of Rome.44 The simplest (but not always the best) explanation for why ancient historians wrote about anger is that juicy stories about angry emperors are entertaining to read. Emotions contextualize the actions of actors within a narrative; they endow the records of the past with a human dimension.  The fact that many of these anger narratives constitute anecdotes and are therefore historically unreliable does not mean that they are without value.45 When historians write about how, for example, subjects interpreted and responded to the emotional output of emperors, this material could provide information about the role an emperor’s emotions played in his leadership. It also informs us about what the historian thought about the role of anger in leadership, or contemporary ideologies surrounding the use of anger in leadership.46 As Catharine Edwards explains, “Whether these incidents actually happened or not is impossible to ascertain and considerably less important…than the fact that people told the stories and their reasons for doing so.”47   Using historical anger narratives, we can also think about the reasons why the anger of certain emperors is emphasized, what actions are attributed to anger versus other emotions, and the language used to denote and describe anger. We can observe how an author’s representation and evaluation of anger relates to contemporary philosophical thought on the emotion. We can consider the well-established Roman preoccupation with morality and how this plays out in                                                 44 Liv. 1.7.2. The traditional narrative of Roman history is punctuated by anger at several crucial junctures. The establishments of the monarchy, Republic, and Principate are all framed by anger.  45 See Saller 1980: 82 for a discussion of the use of anecdotes as historical evidence for the principate. He addresses the difficulty of using anecdotes as evidence, but also offers guidelines for how to use them: “Rarely serving as evidence for what actually happened, anecdotes should be evaluated and interpreted according to whether they reflected ideology or beliefs about reality. Once these distinctions are made, the interesting question of how ideology, realistic belief, and behavior influenced one another can be addressed.”  46 Tacitus’ professed aim to write history sine ira et studio (Ann. 1.1) did not prohibit him from writing about the ira of the subjects of his narrative.  47 Edwards 1993: 11.  14  stories about anger and relates to conceptions of Roman identity.48 These are only some of the possible lenses through which to study sociopolitical anger in imperial historical narratives, and they have all informed my analysis of anger episodes in literature to some extent.  The works of Fergus Millar, Richard Saller, and J.E. Lendon have had a significant impact on my approach toward reading imperial sources in this thesis. These scholars have driven discussion of how the Roman imperial government functioned. In The Emperor in the Roman World,49 Millar seeks to elucidate the role of the emperor in Roman society. He shows that the emperor had a relationship with and responded to the needs of his subjects, often in the form of favors. The focus is on subjects who had personal access to the emperor, however, so the role of the emperor in the lives of those who did not have direct contact with him is not treated. My case studies which involve subject-emperor relationships are also generally confined to those who had direct engagement with the emperor. This is because of both the topic and the sources – emotional scenarios require that the people involved interact with each other either directly or indirectly (through messengers, edicts, etc.).   Saller’s Personal Patronage Under the Early Empire50 builds on Millar’s ideas by investigating the social milieu that created the system of favors and relationships in imperial Rome. Saller demonstrates that the Roman empire was not governed by a rational bureaucracy with strict administrative policies, but it was driven instead by social concerns and the negotiation of relationships. This leaves room for emotion to become heavily involved in imperial administration. Saller’s perspective on this way in which Roman society and politics functioned                                                 48 See Edwards 1993: 2: “Conceptions of immorality were central to the way elite Romans (the only ones whose views survive) thought about themselves, both as a people and in relation to those who were not Romans and as individuals in relation to the state and to one another.”  49 Millar 1977. 50 Saller 1982. 15  in the early imperial period supports my ideas about the importance of emotions and especially anger in emperor-subject relationships. I believe that his views on the Roman lack of bureaucracy also apply to late Republican society and politics—it is clear from Cicero’s forensic speeches that personal interests, relationships, and emotions often take precedence over the strict word of law.   Finally, Lendon continued the discussion of Millar and Saller with Empire of Honour: The Art of Government in the Roman World.51 This book argues that representatives of the Roman government were seen as moral agents and not as “professional puppets jerked about by their official duties, pursuing policies emanating from their job descriptions.”52 This lends support to my arguments about the importance of emotional conduct to orators and emperors: if emotions are understood to be connected with morality (as they were by philosophers), then public figures had to be worried about their emotional performance.53 Lendon attributes the workings of the Roman government not to people adhering to a set of bureaucratic duties, but to a concept of honor. According to Lendon, a person’s honor was connected with their power or status in the community, and honor can be understood as a kind of common currency between individuals that facilitated the relationships of patronage that Millar and Saller described. Lendon’s book further promoted the conception of the Roman government as one driven by interpersonal                                                 51 Lendon 1997. 52 Lendon 1997: 18.  53 Throughout this dissertation I use the term “performance” to refer to displays of emotions by orators and emperors as they are described in my sources. Because of limitations of scope, I have chosen to focus on the literary representation of emotional performances, which means that I am primarily interested in the diction that authors use to describe episodes of anger. There are other important aspects of emotional displays that I do not address in detail. For example, orators and emperors would have also used gesture and landscape to convey emotions. These elements are more difficult to reconstruct from textual sources alone, but they are necessary for a complete understanding of the pragmatics of anger in Roman society.  16  relationships, giving credence to the idea that Rome was in many ways not a bureaucracy, but a sentimentocracy (my term).   1.2 Review of scholarship  We are at present experiencing a florescence of emotional topics in classical studies. This project situates itself as a response to two important publications in particular: Harris’ Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity and Kaster’s Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome.54 These books paved the way for a number of subsequent studies on emotions in classical antiquity. Harris’ monograph is a rich and comprehensive survey of ancient Greek and Roman anger control texts. This leaves the question of discourses on the use of anger. The possibility that anger could be used pragmatically to socially beneficial ends is not given adequate consideration. Kaster’s work on the other hand lays the groundwork for studying ancient emotions in the context of the social scenarios in which they occur. Kaster’s innovative construction and usage of emotion “scripts” demonstrates that a richer understanding of ancient emotional culture can be gained by viewing emotions as the product of cognitive processes that are dependent upon the setting in which they occur. The emotions that Kaster examines are those which function in an opposite manner to anger; he describes them as feelings that do not “…move me to lash out, to take vengeance by wounding or annihilating some offending other (feelings of “anger,” “hatred,” or the like), but those of a generally quieter, socially useful strain                                                 54 Harris 2001; Kaster 2005.  17  that, by exerting a normative pressure, aim to prevent or correct the offense.”55 Kaster follows Cairns56 in asserting that these kinds of emotions played a role in ancient ethical thought.   Harris’ monograph is an ambitious and thoroughly researched work that seeks to survey and assess the ideology of anger control in classical antiquity. This is accomplished primarily through the analysis of literary sources; additional types of evidence would have perhaps doubled the already large (419 pp. excluding indices and bibliography) volume’s size. The discussions of Roman material seem almost an afterthought to Harris’ much more substantial treatment of Greek sources, but this may be because the Romans were not as interested in anger control as the Greeks.57 Harris’ use of all available literary sources to support his claims is admirable, and I have followed this approach to some extent by including a variety of sources in this study.   Harris is more interested in specific writers’ attitudes about anger than about how anger actually functioned in ancient societies. He is also, as evidenced by the title, more interested in rage than anger (the level of intensity is important), and restraint rather than active employment. In his review of the work, Konstan notes that “A positive view of anger, however, may have persisted longer than Harris allows. It was always a legitimate, indeed obligatory, response to wrong doing, as was pity for the victim.”58 The gaps left by this book illuminate the path for further inquiries into the status of anger in the ancient world.   Kaster’s approach in Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome focuses on a set of Roman emotions, although as I mentioned previously, his are of a different sort than anger.                                                 55 Kaster 2005: 4.  56 Cairns 1993.  57 Plutarch’s comment in De cohibenda ira 456f suggests to me that anger was being used actively in public life during his day: ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ ταρακτικὸν αὐτοῦ πρακτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπειλητικὸν εὐθαρσὲς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀπειθὲς ἰσχυρόν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὠμότητα μεγαλουργίαν καὶ τὸ δυσπαραίτητον εὐτονίαν καὶ μισοπονηρίαν τὸ δύσκολον οὐκ ὀρθῶς τίθενται, “the majority of people believe that anger’s tumult is pragmatic, its threatening nature courageous, its disobedience mighty, its cruelty magnificent, its insatiability strong-willed, and its intractability hateful of evil.”  58 Konstan 2003: 234. 18  Kaster is more interested in what emotions do rather than what they are; his focus is thus more on the practical or cognitive aspects of emotions rather than their theoretical definitions. This perspective influenced my approach toward understanding how anger functioned in Roman politics. I have found Kaster’s integration of emotions into Roman ethical behavior especially illuminating. His discussion of invidia (roughly translated as ‘envy’) in particular was relevant to this project, as invidia (literally ‘looking against’) is the emotion of his selected group that is most closely related to ira. Kaster’s presentation of analytical distinctions between emotions is also very useful; for instance he distinguishes between “dispositional” and “occurrent” forms of emotion, which in this study would pertain to iracundia (irascibility) and ira (anger) respectively. Kaster’s book proves that the study of emotions in Roman society and politics can yield exciting results. His focus on emotions that have a restraining action upon the individual and community leaves room for further investigation of emotions like anger that compel individuals to act upon their feelings.   Two works apart from Harris’ study have focused specifically on anger in classical antiquity. Braund and Most’s volume entitled Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen59 offers essays on a wide variety of texts, although the epic genre receives the most attention (six out of eleven essays are on epic anger). D.S. Allen’s essay on anger in Athenian oratory makes observations that apply to my arguments about the role of anger in Roman oratory and politics.60 She argues that anger was desirable in Athenian oratory and essential to Athenian political life, but because of the potentially destructive nature of the emotion, its scope was limited and its expression regulated. Braund and Gilbert’s essay on epic ira elaborates upon Agathe Thornton’s                                                 59 Braund and Most 2003.  60 Allen 2003: 76-98.  19  argument that the moral value of anger is dependent upon its context.61 The authors make a convincing case that anger in epic is not always represented as a negative emotion. This more complex view of ira as an emotional concept with many context-dependent connotations is an important tenet of my approach to studying anger in this thesis.   In Taming Anger: The Hellenic Approach to the Limitations of Reason,62 Kostas Kalimtzis traces the development of ancient Greek thought on the nature of anger through the analysis of poetic and philosophical texts. Kalimtzis presents his work as a response to Harris; he challenges Harris’ viewpoint that ancient thinkers were in agreement concerning the negative value of anger. Kalimtzis shows that in the ancient Greek mindset (as represented by Homer, Aristotle, and Plato), anger was an emotion that could be tamed through education and practice, and not one that required eradication or strict concealment (which seems to have been an exclusively Stoic and Christian standpoint).63 Kalimtzis paints a nuanced picture of anger as an emotion that was understood to have potential for both positive and negative sociopolitical outcomes.   Kalimtzis makes compelling observations about the ways in which anger was considered useful in ancient Greek life, for instance he demonstrates that it was important for Aristotle’s concept of friendship and that it helped people understand and treat injustices. The final chapter looks at how the ethical framework for anger changed with the arrival of Christianity and the introduction of the “wrath of God” paradigm. Kalimtzis argues that there was a “retooling [of] honor to achieve indifference”64 that encouraged the devaluation of one’s sense of honor and thus eliminated one’s right to become angry at injustices. The only righteous anger was the wrath                                                 61 Braund and Gilbert 2003: 250-85.  62 Kalimtzis 2012. 63 Kalimtzis argues that most theorists did not believe that complete control over anger was possible.  64 Kalimtzis 2012: 138.  20  of God, and human anger began to be understood as a sin because it was connected to an individual’s sense of pride. This portion of the book represents an exercise in emotions history as Kalimtzis essentially traces a change in an emotional regime over time. His observations complement my arguments about the ways in which the Roman emotional regime changed during the transition from Republic to Principate.   Braund and Gill’s volume The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature65 remains one of the only books to focus exclusively on Roman emotions. The editors state that the volume is interested in “intense, problematic emotions” that are termed “passions” when connected with Stoic emotional theory.66 Several of the chapters deal with anger, specifically the significance of Aeneas’ anger at the end of the Aeneid. Braund contributes a chapter on anger in Juvenal’s 13th satire, and Elaine Fantham’s essay examines hatred in Statius’ Thebaid.67 The majority of essays in this volume are concerned with the ways in which Hellenistic philosophical theory on emotions is reflected in Roman sources. The privileging of philosophical sources found in studies of Greek emotions is also present here; philosophical sources are again used to supplement analyses of other kinds of texts. The essays in this volume draw attention to some of the ways in which emotions can be studied in Roman sources, but it is sometimes difficult to see what is Roman about an emotion when Greek theorists comprise the framework for analysis. Roman emotions deserve more attention in the form of extended investigations, and our understanding of them can be enhanced with the employment of new approaches.    Several important works on ancient Greek emotions have been published over the last two decades. Douglas Cairn’s Aidôs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek                                                 65 Braund and Gill 1997.  66 Braund and Gill 1997: 1. 67 Braund 1997: 68-88; Fantham 1997: 185-212. 21  Literature68 represents one of the first attempts to bring a multidisciplinary approach to the study of an emotion in ancient literature. Cairns considers the place of shame in Greek ethical thought and examines its occurrence in a variety of literary genres in order to demonstrate how the concepts of shame and honor operated in Greek cultures and societies on a broader scale. Many subsequent works on Greek emotion have also focused on the ethical and political implications of emotional concepts, for example Barbara Koziak’s Retrieving Political Emotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender69 examines Aristotle’s treatment of thumos and argues that emotion held an important place in ancient political life. She cautions that unless we turn our attention to the roles of emotions in politics, “we will continue to be blind to the emotional dimensions of political life and their need to be normatively theorized.”70 Koziak’s reliance on Aristotle for information about emotions is also reflected in David Konstan’s Emotions of the Ancient Greeks.71 Konstan’s work is seminal in that it establishes a procedure by which classicists can employ emotional analysis to ancient texts. Emotions of the Ancient Greeks challenges common assumptions about specific emotions like jealousy and gratitude through its close analysis of Aristotle’s definitions and the ways in which they are manifested in literature. Konstan’s exposition of several prominent Greek emotions makes it a sourcebook and an excellent starting point for scholars interested in examining a specific emotion in more detail. Ed Sanders’ Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens: A Socio-Psychological Approach72 expands upon Konstan’s work on ancient Greek jealousy/envy or phthonos. Sanders makes use of Kaster’s approach of isolating “scripts” that describe the antecedent conditions that produce specific emotions. Sanders also presents evidence that suggests that there was “good” phthonos and                                                 68 Cairns 1993.  69 Koziak 2000. 70 Koziak 2000: 177.  71 Konstan 2006.  72 Sanders 2014.  22  “bad” phthonos depending on the scenario that gave rise to it. These works provide valuable exempla of how to study emotions in ancient social and political spheres through the use of literary evidence. Their illuminating discussions of how ethical and emotional concepts were blended in ancient Greek thought further highlight the need for similar studies to be done on Roman emotions.   1.3 Scope and organization  The chronological scope of this study is from the time of Cicero’s speeches In Verrem to the end of Nero’s Principate: 70 BCE to 68 CE. This boundary creates a manageable body of sources from which to draw material and also allows for an argument concerning the ways in which the dynamics of anger in Roman public life changed during the transition from Republic to Principate. This period was rife with social, political, and emotional turmoil, which led to an increased interest in emotional management through rhetoric and philosophy. Imperial sources show a concentrated effort to regain stability through the promotion of a discourse on the appropriate use of anger by rulers.   I have limited my focus to prose texts for two reasons. Anger in classical poetry73 has received significantly more attention from scholars than anger in prose genres, and poetry comes with its own set of generic concerns that need to be considered before claims about sociopolitical significance can be made. Although it is equally important to consider the generic background of works of historical prose, the connection between a historian’s account of Augustus’ anger and imperial politics is clearer than, for example, what the anger of Virgil’s Aeneas has to do with                                                 73 Satire has been a particularly fruitful area for the study of Roman poetic anger. Incidentally this genre is the only one that Romans considered to be wholly their own (i.e. not derived from a Greek precedent). See Quint. Inst. 10.1.93: satura quidem tota nostra est. “Satire, at least, is totally ours.”  23  Augustus’ anger. Catharine Edwards further cautions against using historical texts as uncomplicated evidence:   We cannot use these texts, these fragments of a vanished and largely alien world, to  reconstruct the behaviour of particular individuals or to explore personal idiosyncrasies.  Yet neither can we see them as entirely independent of the material world which  produced them. While it is not possible to determine the motives of individual Romans…we can, I think, speak of the interests of a social group or sub-group.74   Even when historical narratives feature the anger of a specific person, and even when, for example, Cicero himself writes about his own anger, we cannot take for granted that these texts represent truths about the emotional experiences of individuals. They more reliably represent ideologies and discourses about anger that can be used as evidence of Roman interest in the political uses of anger.   I have organized the discussion chapters into two parts. Part 1 “The Republican Orator” (chapters 3-4) focuses on the politics of anger in Cicero’s oratory. Part 2 “The Julio-Claudian Emperor” (chapters 5-6) examines how anger is represented in the regimes of the Julio-Claudian emperors (Augustus, Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, and Nero). The prefaces to each part discuss issues raised by the source material.                                                      74 Edwards 1993: 11-12. 24  Chapter 2: Defining Anger  What is anger? And more specifically, what was ira to elite Roman men of the late republic and early empire? It is especially important when approaching a topic of this nature to respect the distance between ourselves and our subjects, and to recognize that much about emotions, even one as seemingly universal as anger, is idiosyncratic to an emotional community. Anger is, I think, especially prone to assumptions. As Philip Fisher remarks,   For our therapeutic, post-Freudian culture our keenest interest lies in controlling anger or  understanding the roots of anger, or learning how displacement has concealed from us  the actual target of our visible anger, which is often in modern culture imagined to  be about something else, often some experience long ago in childhood. We need to step  back from these twentieth-century topics of displacement, unconscious motive, and the  preference for moderate as opposed to vehement states if we wish to explore an  understanding of this passion that made it not only ethically desirable but a model for the  impassioned state itself in its most positive versions.75  Perhaps our modern, therapeutic approach toward anger motivated William Harris to write his book about the restraint of anger in antiquity rather than its active usage. There certainly were strains of thought in the ancient world that promoted a therapeutic or restricting approach to anger, which Harris’ work thoroughly explores, but Harris observes at several points that the Romans do not seem to have been as interested in controlling anger as the ancient Greeks were.76 This suggests that there was a kind of anger that Romans did not think required eradication, and that seems to demand analysis. In this chapter, then, I aim to present an objective picture of what ira and its related emotion terms meant to our emotional community of elite Romans, with an eye toward the varieties of anger that are most common in our sources,                                                 75 Fisher 2002: 172.  76 Harris 2001: 210; 216; 218; 225. 25  namely those that played an active role in Roman public life. This will provide crucial background for our close readings of ancient texts that feature anger.   Anger has a physiological component that may be shared universally among humans.77 Still, much about anger is variable: for example, the words that we use to connote angry states, what situations give rise to anger, and when, how, and to whom is it appropriate to display anger are all dependent on social, cultural, and historical factors. I tackle the first category in that list by surveying the Latin lexicon of anger and discussing some of the contemporary philosophical definitions of anger that may have bearing on how anger is represented in our sources. I have also constructed a partial taxonomy of Roman anger in the style of Kaster’s “scripts”78 to aid our understanding of how political ira was conceptualized. The remaining questions concerning Roman triggers for anger and display rules are addressed in the subsequent chapters.   2.1 The Latin lexicon of anger  Susan Matt summarizes the lexical difficulties that emotion historians face:  We do not know quite what an emotion is, nor do we know what the words to describe  particular feelings meant to earlier generations. We may have different words or no words  for emotions and concepts that earlier cultures thought central, and vice versa.79   Modern English speakers actually have more words at their disposal to describe particular feelings than the Romans did. Translators must avoid making assumptions about what a Latin emotion term like ira connotes without considering the context in which it is used, but our inability to map an English term directly onto an ancient Greek or Latin term does not significantly hinder our ability to learn about emotions from ancient texts. Kaster explains that,                                                  77 See chapter 1, n. 7. 78 Kaster 2005. 79 Matt 2014: 43-4. 26   …any emotion-term is just the lexicalized residue of what happens when the data of life  are processed in a particular way through a sequence of perception (sensing, imagining),  evaluation (believing, judging, desiring) and response (bodily, affective, pragmatic,  expressive) to produce a particular kind of emotionalized consciousness, a particular set of  thoughts and feelings.80  An emotion term is essentially meaningless without an understanding of the psychosocial process that produces it, and when reading literature these must often be inferred from context. Many of the passages that I have selected for discussion in this study do employ Latin anger terms, but in order to understand the social dynamics of anger, I must go beyond purely lexical analysis. I am interested in the full context of the emotional scenario: what is the source of the anger, how is it represented by the author, how is it expressed by the subject, and what are the results of the anger? Despite the limitations of emotional terminology, it is important to take stock of the Latin anger terms that were available to our authors and to account for their semantic ranges.   Harris offers a helpful chapter on the Greek and Latin terminology of anger, but his discussion of Latin anger vocabulary is restricted to two pages out of twenty.81 Latin is poorer in anger vocabulary than ancient Greek, which partially explains Harris’ uneven treatment of the languages.82 The Oxford Latin Dictionary gives “anger, rage, indignation” as the first definition of ira, which highlights the use of the word as an umbrella term for many different emotional states, some of which would be considered more negative than others. In English, anger is a neutral term for the emotion, whereas rage has a negative connotation and indignation a positive one (it is often used to refer to “righteous” anger). Sometimes ira is modified with adjectives that serve to                                                 80 Kaster 2005: 8. 81 Harris 2001 50-70.  82 Harris 2001: 68 suggests that Latin’s sparse anger vocabulary is the reason why anger “absolutists” like Cicero and Seneca occasionally equivocate about it.  27  clarify its value; for example, there are three occurrences of iusta ira in Livy (6.31.6; 23.25.6; 30.36.10).    Latin has furor and indignatio to refer specifically to states of rage and indignation. The OLD gives “violent madness, delirium, brainstorm” as the first definition of the noun furor, but its connection with anger is noted in OLD 2b: “hostile rage, fury, anger.” I do not believe that furor should be translated as “anger” nor do I think that ira should be labeled “rage” unless there are sufficient contextual factors to justify those translations. Furor carries with it a sense of mindlessness and uncontrollability, whereas ira implies a cognitive process or judgment (I discuss the nature of this process in the sections below). Indignatio is first defined as “anger aroused by a sense of wrong, indignation, resentment”, but it is also used in rhetoric to refer to a speech or part of a speech that is meant to arouse indignation (OLD 2). Although it is frequently translated as “envy”, invidia83 can also mean “indignation” (OLD 2) and it is frequently used by Cicero in his speeches to refer to the collective public anger of the Roman people. For example, Cicero pairs invidia with iracundia  in a statement in De Domo Sua 88: Ac si me populus Romanus, incitatus iracundia aut invidia, e civitate eiecisset..., “And if the Roman people had cast me out of the city stirred up by anger or indignation...” Kaster notes that there is a distinctly Roman construct of righteous invidia that sets it apart from the related Greek emotional concepts of phthonos and nemesis. Kaster also observes that this form of invidia is the most common type of invidia referred to in extant Roman literature.84 Invidia as a form of righteous anger is especially relevant to political scenarios because it involves the judgment that someone is using their position in a way that is shameful.85                                                 83 See Kaster 2005: 84-103 for a fuller discussion of the semantics of invidia. 84 Kaster 2005: 90.  85 See Kaster 2005: 97.  28   Kaster uses the terms “occurrent” and “dispositional” to distinguish between emotion terms that refer to an experience of the emotion and those that describe a tendency to feel the emotion.86 For anger, ira is the occurrent form and iracundia is the dispositional form. Iracundia is used to mean “proneness to anger, hot temper, irascibility” (OLD 1), but it is occasionally used as a synonym to ira meaning “anger, passion, resentment” (OLD 2). Both Cicero and Seneca distinguish ira from iracundia with an analogy to the difference between a drunk person and a drunkard (Tusc. 4.27.12; De ira 1.4.1). Suetonius reports that Claudius issued an edict about his ira and his iracundia that promised that his ira would be brevis and innoxia and his iracundia would not be iniusta (Claudius 38). This reference highlights the difference between anger and irascibility, and also connects anger with the concept of justice. Cicero also calls his own iracundia iusta in Pro Sestio 3. Positive anger is often associated with iustitia in Roman sources, as we can see in these two examples and in the references to iusta ira mentioned from Livy above.    In their philosophical works, Cicero and Seneca attempt to define and describe different kinds of anger. In his Tusculan Disputations Cicero provides distinctions between ira, excandescentia, odium, inimicitia, and discordia (4.9.21):  ut ira sit libido poeniendi eius qui videatur laesisse iniuria, excandescentia autem  sit ira nascens et modo existens…odium ira inveterata, inimicitia ira ulciscendi  tempus  observans, discordia ira acerbior intimo animo et corde concepta.  Anger is a desire to punish a person who is thought to have harmed one unjustly. Heatedness is anger at its inception, when it has just come to be…hatred is old anger. Enmity is anger biding its time for revenge. Soreness of heart is a more bitter anger which has its birth in the depths of mind and heart.   Ira, odium, and inimicitia (but especially the latter two) are used in political contexts. Excandescentia is only used here by Cicero and once by Apuleius in De Platone et Eius Dogmate (1.18).                                                   86 Kaster 2005: 16.  29   Seneca comments on the Latin lexicon of anger in De ira 1.4.2: Cetera quae pluribus apud Graecos nominibus in species iram distinguunt, quia apud nos uocabula sua non habent, praeteribo, etiam si amarum nos acerbumque dicimus, nec minus stomachosum rabiosum clamosum difficilem asperum, quae omnia irarum differentiae sunt; inter hos morosum ponas licet, delicatum iracundiae genus. Quaedam enim sunt irae quae intra clamorem considant, quaedam non minus pertinaces quam frequentes, quaedam saeuae manu uerbis parciores, quaedam in uerborum  maledictorumque amaritudinem effusae; quaedam ultra querellas et auersationes non exeunt, quaedam altae grauesque sunt et introrsus uersae: mille aliae species sunt mali multiplicis.   I shall omit the other varieties of anger, which the Greeks distinguish by various names,  because we have no distinctive words for them in our language, although we call men  bitter and harsh, and also peevish, frantic, clamorous, surly and fierce: all of which are  different forms of angers. Among these you may place sulkiness, a refined form of  irascibility; for there are some sorts of anger which go no further than noise, while some  are as lasting as they are common: some are fierce in deed, but inclined to be sparing of  words: some expend themselves in bitter words and curses: some do not go beyond  complaining and turning one’s back: some are great, deep-seated, and brood within a  man: there are a thousand other forms of a multiform evil.  Seneca claims that Latin is rich in anger adjectives although it lacks sufficient nouns to correspond to the Greek concepts of mênis, cholos, thumos, and orgê. As Stoics, Cicero87 and Seneca represent anger in all of its forms as a negative, socially destructive emotion. In the next section I unpack the theoretical standpoints of the Peripatetic, Epicurean, and Stoic schools, but for now an observation of Cicero and Seneca’s lexical comments will suffice.   The semantic range of anger is populated by a few other Latin words that do not receive systematic treatment by Cicero or Seneca in their philosophical discussions of the emotion. Below I offer a table of Latin anger vocabulary. The words are arranged by part of speech and in approximate order of increasing intensity.                                                   87 In the Tusculan Disputations Cicero shares his views on anger with the Stoics, so I call him a Stoic here. He tends to draw from a number of different schools when forming his philosophical viewpoints.  30  Table 2.1: Latin anger vocabulary Nouns Adjectives Verbs  dolor indignatio inimicitia invidia animus stomachus bilis ira iracundia odium furor   commotus percitus iracundus (sub + per) iratus saevus  irascor suscenseo ardeo excandesco fervor stomachor furo saevio   Looking at this table we can begin to see some of the ideas that the Romans associated with angry feelings: heat, and sometimes motion (in the case of commotus and percitus) or sickness (bilis). In my analysis of passages I consider why a certain term is used; for instance, why is Augustus described as commoto similis instead of irato similis in Suetonius Aug. 51? Even though anger vocabulary is relatively scarce in Latin, there are enough words available that a choice of ira over furor or indignatio over odium can be understood as significant.   A few of the words in this list have specific political connotations which are analyzed by J. Hellegouarc’h in Le Vocabulaire Latin des Relations et des Partis Politiques sous la République.88 Inimicitia, odium, and invidia are discussed in a chapter devoted to “L’expression de l’opposition politique.”89 All three terms are used in various Latin expressions to denote political hostility. Hellegouarc’h observes that inimicitia is not the simple opposite of amicitia: “l’état d’inimicus ne comporte pas des obligations et des devoirs comme celui d’amicus: l’inimicus est seulement celui qui manifeste des                                                 88 Hellegouarc’h 1963. 89 Hellegouarc’h 1963: 186-201. 31  sentiments hostiles à l’égard de quelqu’un.”90 Inimicitia is used as a broad term for political hostility, and Hellegouarc’h suggests discidium (discord/disagreement) as a synonym in some expressions (e.g. inimicitiae sunt inter aliquos).91 Hellegouarc’h states that odium is the most general term for political hostility.92 Odium can be provoked by earlier acts of inimicitia.93 Invidia is a more narrow term that usually denotes political envy. Hellegouarc’h explains the difference between invidia and odium: “Invidia est donc davantage lié à la position sociale ou politique que l’odium, sentiment plus personnel et instinctif.” Invidia and odium occur together frequently, especially in Cicero.94 Invidia, when used alone, has a more formal, political sense than odium, which can be used to denote both politically motivated anger and everyday interpersonal anger. Inimicitia, odium, and invidia are especially important terms in my chapters on Cicero’s speeches because they appear in oratory much more frequently than other anger terms. They can be understood to represent a more distinctly political vocabulary for anger, at least in Republican sources. Words like ira and iracundia are more common in our sources for imperial politics. For a broader understanding of how our emotional community of elite Romans understood the mechanism of anger we must now turn to the Greek philosophers.   2.2 Ancient philosophical understandings of anger  The Peripatetic, Epicurean, and Stoic schools of philosophy each had their own understanding of what anger was and how it worked. From our time period we have Cicero and Seneca’s writings on the Stoic stance on anger (Tusculan Disputations 4 and De ira) and Philodemus’                                                 90 Hellegouarc’h 1963: 186.  91 Hellegouarc’h 1963: 187.  92 Hellegouarc’h 1963: 191.  93 Hellegouarc’h 1963: 192.  94 E.g. at De Or. 2.228: et invidia et odio populi tum Galba premeretur.  32  Epicurean treatise on anger (De ira). A dialogue De cohibenda ira (Moralia 452E-464D) by Plutarch survives, but he does not provide a formal definition for the emotion in the text.95 While we do not have a contemporary Peripatetic treatise on anger, Cicero vehemently combats the Peripatetic perspective in the Tusculan Disputations, and it is clear that the views on anger that he disagrees with are those set out in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Because of the profound influence of Aristotle’s treatment of anger on the theorists of our time period, it is worth going over his claims.   Aristotle provides the most comprehensive theoretical treatment of anger in his Rhetoric96 and as Harris notes, the majority of definitions of anger given by later authors are simplified adaptations of Aristotle’s version.97 In the De anima Aristotle describes the ways in which different occupations will attempt to define anger (1.1, 403a16-32):  Anger must be defined as a movement of a body, in a particular case aroused by such a  cause, with such an end in view. This at once makes it the business of the natural  scientist to inquire into the soul…But the natural scientist and the dialectician will in  every case offer different definitions, for example in answer to the question “What is  anger?” The latter will call it a desire for revenge or something like that, the natural  scientist will call it a boiling of the blood which is about the heart.98   Indeed, in the Rhetoric Aristotle dons the dialectician’s mantle and offers this definition of anger (2.2, 1378a31): “Anger (ὀργή) is a desire for revenge accompanied by pain, for some perceived slight to oneself or one’s own, when the slight is not appropriate.”99 Aristotle also explains that people become angry with others who prevent them from doing something, e.g. from drinking when they are thirsty (2.2, 1379a12-19; this is mildly different from the perception of a slight). He                                                 95 This may be because Plutarch wrote a treatise De ira that contained a formal definition. It does not survive. See van Hoof 2007: 64-5. 96 See Konstan 2003: 99-120 for a discussion of Aristotle’s views on anger and how they reflect ancient Greek social norms.  97 Harris 2001: 61.  98 Translation by Harris 2001: 56.  99 ἔστω δὴ ὀργή ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἤ τι τῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος. 33  adds that there is also an attendant feeling of pleasure that comes from the hope for revenge (1370b10-32; 1378b1-3). For Aristotle, a person cannot feel ὀργή toward someone who is more powerful (1.11, 1370b13-15), or toward someone of whom they are afraid (2.3, 1380a32-34). The anger that Aristotle theorizes here is understood in terms of a disposition to action; his definition is essentially an etiology for the action of revenge. This understanding of anger as an agent of action is particularly relevant to this study’s emphasis on sociopolitical anger; the only kind of anger that our authors write about is anger that has some kind of sociopolitical significance and perceivable result. Aristotle does not address varieties of anger that are not connected with the pursuit of revenge. Because later theorists also consider a desire for revenge a requisite feature of anger, we can expect that this was a part of how our emotional community of elite Romans conceptualized anger.100   Another relevant aspect of Aristotle’s treatment of anger is the way in which he associates the emotion with a concept of honor or social status. He writes that people become angry when they are slighted in front of five classes of people (2.3, 1380a9-1380b29): “their rivals, those whom they admire, those whom they wish to be admired by, those they are in awe of, and those who are in awe of them.”101 This suggests that public spaces and the political scenarios that take place within them would be especially fertile grounds for anger. David Konstan summarizes Aristotle’s representation of anger as a means of preserving one’s social status:   Aristotle envisages a world in which self-esteem depends on social interaction: the  moment someone’s negative opinion of your worth is actualized publicly in the form of a  slight, you have lost credit, and the only recourse is a compensatory act that restores your                                                 100 cf. Harris 2001: 59: “It is not to be doubted that orgē, and ira too, very commonly included a frank desire for revenge.” 101 Translation by Harris 2001: 60.  34   social position. Anger is just the desire to adjust the record in this way—the internal  correlative to the outward loss of respect.102  Expressions of anger in Roman public life were likely guided by concerns for social status as well. Roman society was hierarchical and status-conscious, so it is possible that Roman anger functioned in a similar way to what Konstan describes above. I expect to find perceptible (if subtle) differences between Aristotle’s vision of anger’s role in society and the ways in which anger is represented in my Roman sources.   Cicero and Seneca offer definitions of anger that are similar to Aristotle’s. In the passage quoted in the preceding section (Tusc. 4.9.21) Cicero states that ira is a libido poeniendi—a desire to punish someone who appears to have harmed one unjustly (laesisse iniuria). Lactantius quotes a lost passage of Seneca’s De ira in which Seneca provides the following definitions of ira (De ira dei 17.13):   ira est cupiditas ulciscendae iniuriae aut, ut ait Posidonius, cupiditas puniendi eius  a quo  te inique putes laesum. quidam ita finierunt: ira est incitatio animi ad nocendum ei qui  aut nocuit aut nocere voluit. Aristotelis finitio non multum a nostra abest; ait enim iram  esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi.    Anger is a desire for avenging an injustice, or, as Posidonius says, a desire for  punishing the person by whom one thinks one has been harmed unjustly.103 Some defined  anger as follows: anger is an impulse of the mind to harm a person who has harmed or  wanted to harm. Aristotle’s definition is not far from ours. For he says that anger is a  desire to return pain.                                                  102 Konstan 2003: 114. 103 A curious feature of Seneca’s exposition of anger is that he attempts to distinguish between “emotions” (adfectus) and “beginnings preliminary to emotion” (principia proludentia adfectibus). I use Graver’s translations here (2007: 96). According to Seneca, if one merely feels angry without taking concerted steps toward revenge, it is not anger that one experiences, but an involuntary preliminary feeling that stops short of anger (De ira 2.2-3). Seneca further explains this at De ira 2.3.1: Ergo adfectus est non ad oblatas rerum species moueri, sed permittere se illis et hunc fortuitum motum prosequi, “Emotion, then, is not when one is moved upon receiving impressions of things, but when one entrusts oneself to them and follows up this chance movement.” See Graver 2007: 94-99 for discussion of this part of Seneca’s philosophy of anger.  35  The primary differences between Aristotle’s definition of anger and those of the Stoics is that for the Stoics, anger is not attended by pain (the Stoics class anger under a larger heading of “Desires”; c.f. Tusc. 4) and the notion of injustice replaces the perception of a slight. The addition of the concept of injustice to the definition of anger brings the emotion firmly into the human (and political) realm. Seneca comments on the distinctly human nature of anger in De ira 1.3.4:  Sed dicendum est feras ira carere et omnia praeter hominem; nam cum sit inimica  rationi, nusquam tamen nascitur nisi ubi rationi locus est. Impetus habent ferae, rabiem  feritatem incursum, iram quidem non magis quam luxuriam, et in quasdam uoluptates  intemperantiores homine sunt. Non est quod credas illi qui dicit:  non aper irasci meminit, non fidere cursu  cerua nec armentis incurrere fortibus ursi.  Irasci dicit incitari, inpingi; irasci quidem non magis sciunt quam ignoscere.   But it must be said that wild animals—and all creatures save the human being—are  without anger: though anger is reason’s enemy, it comes into being only where reason  resides. Wild animals have impulses—frenzy, ferocity, aggression—but they no more  have anger than they have luxury, even though they’re less self-controlled than  humans when it comes to certain pleasures. There’s no reason to believe the person who  says:  The boar forgets to grow angry, the hind, to trust  in flight, the bear to attack hardy herds.   By “grow angry” he means “be stirred up,” “be goaded”; they no more know how  to “grow angry” than they know how to “forgive.”104  Although the Stoics argue against the Peripatetic view that anger can be pragmatic, their understanding of anger as a response to injustice speaks to the presence of ira in Roman political and legal scenarios, i.e. those in which the orator and emperor would be engaged.   The greatest difference between the Stoic and Peripatetic understandings of anger is in their evaluation of the emotion. In the Nicomachean Ethics (1125b31-32) Aristotle advocates a mean for anger, stating that “we praise a man who feels anger on the right grounds and against the                                                 104 Translation by Kaster 2010. This passage is an example of a pairing of ira and the notion of clementia (here expressed with the verb ignoscere). The relationship between ira and clementia as binary emotional dispositions of the emperor is taken up in the preface to Part 2.  36  right persons, and also in the right manner and at the right moment and for the right length of time.” He does not approve of anger without qualification, but believes that it is possible to experience and express anger in a moderate and socially beneficial manner.105 Aristotle also denounces a complete lack of anger in a person (1125b26-29). He states that this deficiency of anger has no name in Greek (he offers the term ἀοργησία), but it is a very undesirable condition nonetheless (1126a3-8):  ἡ δ᾽ ἔλλειψις, εἴτ᾽ ἀοργησία τίς ἐστιν εἴθ᾽ ὅ τι δή ποτε, ψέγεται. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ᾽ οἷς δεῖ ἠλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μηδ᾽ ὅτε μηδ᾽ οἷς δεῖ: δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός, τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες.   The deficiency—a sort of inirascibility or whatever it is—is blamed. For people who are  not angered by the right things, or in the right way, or at the right times, or toward the  right people, all seem to be foolish. For such a person seems to be insensible and to feel no  pain, and since he is not angered, he does not seem to be the sort to defend himself. Such  willingness to accept insults to oneself and to overlook insults to one’s family and friends is  slavish.106   Cicero and Seneca oppose this view, arguing that anger can have no positive outcomes and that it should be avoided completely by everyone. And perhaps, for them, anger was not useful—Cicero wrote the Tusculan Disputations around 45 BCE, at the height of Caesar’s power, and the De ira was composed by Seneca sometime in the middle of the first century CE, probably just after the end of Caligula’s bloody reign. Viewing these works in their specific sociopolitical contexts leads me to believe that Cicero107  and Seneca’s proposals for the eradication of anger are less indicative of a wider Roman misgiving about the emotion and more of an attempt to                                                 105 Cicero states that the Peripatetics deny that someone who does not know how to be angry is a real man: virum denique videri negant qui irasci nesciet (Tusc. 4.43). In the Peripatetic mindset, then, anger is crucial to the concept of virtus.  106 Translation by Griswold 2012: 96.  107 Cicero was not able to follow his own advice, at least not in his private life. Cf. Att. 14.21.3: legendus mihi saepius est ‘Cato maior’ ad te missus. amariorem enim me senectus facit. stomachor omnia, “I must read my ‘Elder Cato’ more often which is dedicated to you. For old age is making me bitter. I get angry at everything.” This letter is dated to May of 44. 37  come to grips with the regimes under which they lived.108 As we shall see in chapters 5-6, the establishment of the Principate changed how anger was used in Roman public life. The emperor’s anger (ira Caesaris) took precedence, and subjects were unable to express or act upon their own anger without negative consequences. We can see the beginning of this process in Cicero’s Caesarian speeches, which are analyzed in chapter 4. It therefore makes sense that Cicero and Seneca would urge their elite audiences to restrain their anger under increasingly autocratic regimes.   Finally, the Epicurean understanding of anger as represented by Philodemus in his De ira is worth noting.109 It is more difficult to grasp than the previously discussed theories, partly because Philodemus’ text is the most substantial surviving source for Epicurean thought on anger (it might not be representative of an Epicurean consensus on anger), but also because Philodemus tries to have it both ways with anger. He represents himself as occupying the median between Stoic views on anger (that anger is always bad) and Peripatetic views on anger (that anger is necessary), but as Annas observes, his treatise does not actually strike a compromise between these opposing sides.110 He frames his discussion of anger in terms of what an Epicurean wise man would do. According to Philodemus, a wise man can become angry on occasion, but this anger will be brief and measured (40-41; 43.50-45.14). He argues that anger and punishment should not be pleasurable (countering Aristotle’s statement that the hope for revenge is accompanied by pleasure). For the Epicurean wise man, a reaction of anger is natural when one                                                 108 There are of course other explanations, but because I am focusing on the politics of anger during the Late Republic and early Principate, a political explanation seems most relevant.  109 Work has been done on the relationship between Philodemus’ Epicurean theory of emotions and Virgil. See, for example, Galinsky 1988, 1994; Gill 2003: 213-16; and the essays in Armstrong, Fish, Johnston, and Skinner 2004.  110 Annas 1989: 147: “Philodemus, however, is not in fact compromising between different views. His discussion is conducted throughout in terms of what the Epicurean σοφός would or would not do; the views he seems most concerned to refute in detail are those of rival Epicureans with differing interpretations of the Master’s words.” 38  has been deliberately harmed (41.28-42.14), but no slight is harmful enough to merit extreme anger (42.23).   Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Philodemus’ discussion of anger is his description of Epicurus’ pseudo-anger (34.31-35.5):  In general, we should know that the person who is purely unangered will give the  appearance of an angry person, but not for long, and if he gives it for longer is not  deeply [angry], but just not such as he seems to be. Thus those who have the completely  opposite disposition [from an angry person] give the appearance to such an extent that  even a wise person such as Epicurus gave some people the appearance of being like that  [an angry person].111   Annas notes that at this point in his treatise Philodemus is engaging in controversy with other Epicureans over the place of anger in the life of a wise man.112 The meaning of this passage and its relationship with the ideas about anger presented elsewhere in the treatise is difficult to construe, but the idea presented here, that the performance of anger (without an inner experience of the emotion) can be the activity of a wise man, has parallels in Roman literature.113 This form of “fake” anger is not formally treated elsewhere, except in Cicero’s discussion of the performance of anger by the orator in Tusc. 4.55, in which he states that it is not appropriate for an orator to be angry, but it does suit him to pretend to be angry: oratorem vero irasci minime decet, simulare non dedecet.114 Quintilian disagrees with Cicero on this point, arguing that the orator’s emotions cannot be fake if they are to be effective.115   Zoltán Kövecses comments on an unnamed variety of anger in a linguistic study of English metaphors:                                                 111 Translation by Annas 1989: 163.  112 Annas 1989: 163.  113 A very clear example of this is found in Pliny Ep. 9.21 and 9.24, in which Pliny instructs his addressee Sabinianus to use the appearance of anger to correct the behavior of a miscreant freedman.  114 See Graver 2002 for discussion of Cicero’s views on emotion as they are expressed in Tusc. 3-4. 115 Inst. 6.2.28. I elaborate on this issue a bit more in the preface to Part 1.  39   There appears to be a recognizable form of anger for which there are no conventional  linguistic expressions, so far as we can tell. We will call this a manipulative use of anger. It  is a case where a person cultivates his anger and does not attempt to control it, with the  effect that he intimidates those around him into following his wishes in order to keep him  from getting angry. This can work either by fear or by guilt. The people manipulated  can either be afraid of his anger or may feel guilty about what anger does to him. This  form of anger is fairly distant from the prototype and it is no surprise that we have no  name for it.116  The kind of anger described here can be considered akin to the type described by Philodemus in that it is exhibited in order to influence people to do something. Christopher Gill reads Epicurus’ pseudo-anger as described by Philodemus as a mechanism of “stimulat[ing] someone into leading a life shaped by true goals.”117 But there are less benevolent uses for pseudo-anger, as we shall see in the following chapters.  All of the above ancient philosophical understandings of anger attribute a cognitive element to the emotion; anger involves a judgment on the angry person’s part. For Aristotle, the judgment is that a slight has been committed against you. For the Stoics, you must perceive that an injustice has been done to you. For Philodemus, you must believe that someone has deliberately harmed you in order to become angry. According to these mindsets, anger is not antithetical to reasoning; it is something that arises out of a reasoning process. The Stoics set themselves apart from the other schools by concluding that anger is the product of an incorrect judgment.   2.3 A script for Roman anger  Because it is not uncommon for there to be inconsistencies between the representation of anger in, for example, Cicero’s speeches and his philosophical writings on the emotion, I have                                                 116 Kövecses 1986: 35.  117 Gill 2003: 216.  40  used caution when applying philosophical arguments about the value of anger to narratives about anger in public life. But the structural understanding of anger that the philosophers develop is helpful for the construction of “scripts” for anger. Kaster describes scripts as “the narratives that we enact when we experience an emotion.”118 He proposes that thinking in terms of scripts   necessarily stresses the specifically cultural content of any given emotion, because it  compels us to give due weight not only to the psychophysical feelings the emotion  engenders or the responses to which it might lead—the usual centers of attention when  talk turns to emotions—but also to the evaluations from which it proceeds; and that the  ways in which a given culture’s scripts interact reveal the structure and dynamics of its  assumptions about emotion—how emotional energy is expressed, understood, and  harnessed to do various kinds of cultural work.119   Below I have sketched a script for Roman anger by combining the philosophical frameworks and the lexicon presented in the above sections. This script can help us understand the subtle differences between the Latin anger terms that are defined in a theoretical context. Sometimes this script holds up when mapped on to a Roman anger narrative, but not always. Authors were not bound by the lexical constraints that philosophers used to delineate different kinds of anger in their works. The most fundamental takeaway from this chapter is that the Romans thought of anger as an emotion that caused a desire for action, and as such, it could be considered very useful in the business of politics.                                                      118 Kaster 2005: 85.  119 Kaster 2005: 85.  41   Table 2.2: A script for Roman anger Upon perceiving that I, my associates, or my state has been harmed/slighted/treated unjustly (received iniuriae, etc.), I desire to seek vengeance/punish,  immediately,  later, with possibility of restraint with no possibility of restraint With respect to restoring my/my associates’/my state’s dignitas by directing political hostility at you when the time is right with no specific timeline ira iracundia furor indignatio inimicitia invidia odium inimicitia odium  42  Part 1: The Republican Orator  The Independent published an article on June 9, 2010 that addresses President Obama’s lack of anger at BP over the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April of that year.120 The article, written by Rupert Cornwell, begins in this way:  For America, measuring the extent of Barack Obama’s anger at BP over the Gulf  crisis  has become almost as important as measuring the extent of the spill itself. But on one  thing everyone is agreed: while the latter is far too high, the former remains too low. Try  as he may to ratchet up the public show of fury, a President celebrated for his cool  demeanor never seems to do enough.  Cornwell comments on the American public’s dissatisfaction with the president’s rhetorical strategy, which has earned him the nickname “No Drama Obama.” He explains, “From the start, Mr. Obama has struggled to match his perceived emotions to those of the country.” Obama’s inability to perform emotionally in his public speaking is, according to Cornwell, deleterious to his authority: “Implicitly, it saps at his authority every day, violating the assumption that the man in the Oval Office is omnipotent.” This example from recent history shows that discourse about the value of political anger is alive and well today. Obama’s example is especially relevant to our analysis of anger in Cicero’s speeches because the president’s success as a leader is evaluated at least in part by his performance as a public speaker. Cicero did not risk appearing emotionally neutral to those who would be enemies of Rome. While this example certainly also pertains to our interest in the anger of emperors, we must remember that the emperor did not have to negotiate his power with speech.121   Cicero was aware of the importance of emotional performance to his career as an advocate and politician. His awareness is evidenced by his discussion of the orator’s art in De                                                 120 “‘No Drama, Obama’ style of leadership is no match for this crisis.” The Independent, June 9, 2010. (Web) This article is also quoted by Chaniotis 2012: 19.  121 He was judged on his public speaking ability, however. See chapters 5-6, and especially section 6.3 on Claudius. 43  Oratore,122 in which he has Crassus name emotional persuasion as the maxima vis of the orator (1.12.53).123 In this passage Cicero gives a list of emotions that an orator must be able to arouse, and all three terms in the list are in the semantic range of anger that was discussed in chapter 2: ira, odium, and dolor. Cicero’s interest in anger as a tool of oratory is also reflected in the rhetorical treatises of Aristotle and Quintilian. Aristotle explains the necessity of anger in his Rhetoric (1380a.1-5):   δῆλον δ᾽ ὅτι δέοι ἂν κατασκευάζειν τῷ λόγῳ τοιούτους οἷοι ὄντες ὀργίλως ἔχουσιν, καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους τούτοις ἐνόχους ὄντας ἐφ᾽ οἷς ὀργίζονται, καὶ τοιούτους οἵοις ὀργίζονται.  Clearly the orator will have to speak so as to bring his hearers into a frame of mind that will dispose them to anger, and to represent his adversaries as open to such charges and possessed of such qualities as do make people angry.124   Quintilian comments on the rarity of an orator who is able to make a judge angry (Inst. 6.2.3-4):  qui vero iudicem rapere et in quem vellet habitum animi posset perducere, quo dicente  flendum irascendum esset, rarus fuit. Atqui hoc est quod dominetur in iudiciis: hic  eloquentia regnat.   He is rare indeed who can seize the judge and lead him to adopt the state of mind  which  he desires, and cause him to become angry or weep with his words. And yet it is this  power that dominates in the courts: here eloquence reigns supreme.  Ira, then, is a technical tool of the skilled orator. He must be able to arouse it, to mitigate it, to perform it, and to direct it. “Righteous” anger can be part of a speaker’s ethos, and he can attribute destructive anger to his opponent.   Opinions differed on whether or not the orator’s expressions of anger needed to be genuine. In the Tusculan Disputations, Cicero argues that it is appropriate for orators to simulate                                                 122 Fjelstad 2003: 40 argues that Cicero “insists an orator display emotions relevant to the performance while responding to the need of listeners to hear emotional expression against a backdrop of relative calm.” Cicero’s ideal orator must avoid excess and employ restraint in order to tailor his emotional performance to the needs of the case and the audience.  123 Quis enim nescit maximam vim exsistere oratoris in hominum mentibus vel ad iram aut ad odium aut ad dolorem incitandis vel ab hisce eisdem permotionibus ad lenitatem misericordiamque revocandis? 124 Translation by Roberts 1924. 44  anger, but they should not actually feel the emotion (Tusc. 4.55). Seneca agrees with Cicero, but goes further to argue that simulated emotions are sometimes even more effective than real ones (De ira 2.17.1):  ‘Orator’ inquit ‘iratus aliquando melior est.’ Immo imitatus iratum; nam et histriones in pronuntiando non irati populum movent, sed iratum bene agentes; et apud iudices itaque et in contione et ubicumque alieni animi ad nostrum arbitrium agendi sunt, modo iram, modo metum, modo misericordiam, ut aliis incutiamus, ipsi simulabimus, et saepe id quod veri adfectus non effecissent effecit imitatio adfectuum.  “An orator is sometimes better when he’s angry.” No, when he’s acting angry: for actors, too, move their audience, though they’re not angry when delivering their lines but are acting angry. So too, before a panel of judges and at a public assembly and wherever we must move other people’s minds according to our will, we will ourselves make a show of anger, now of fear, now of pity, to instill those feelings in others. Often simulated passions have achieved what actual passions would not.   Quintilian disagrees, opining that the orator’s emotions must be genuine if they are to be believed by the audience (Inst. 6.2.28).125 It was most important for the orator’s performance of emotions to appear authentic in order to incite a genuine emotional response from his audience. This is the view that Cicero expresses in De oratore 2.189: Neque fieri potest ut doleat is, qui audit, ut oderit, ut invideat, ut pertimescat aliquid, ut ad fletum misericordiamque deducatur, nisi omnes illi motus, quos orator adhibere volet iudici, in ipso oratore impressi esse atque inusti videbuntur. Quod si fictus aliqui dolor suscipiendus esset et si in eius modi genere orationis nihil esset nisi falsum atque imitatione simulatum, maior ars aliqua forsitan esset requirenda.   In fact, it is impossible for the hearer to grieve, to hate, to envy, to become frightened at anything, to be driven to tears and pity, unless the self-same emotions the orator wants to apply to the juror seem to be imprinted and branded onto the orator himself. Now if, for instance, the grief that we must assume would somehow be unreal and pretended, and if this mode of speaking would involve nothing but deception and imitation and feigning, then we would probably require some quite powerful art.126                                                   125 Primum est igitur ut apud nos valeant ea quae valere apud iudicem volumus, adficiamurque antequam adficere conemur, “Consequently the first essential is that those (emotions) should prevail with us that we wish to prevail with the judge, and that we should be affected ourselves before we attempt to affect (our audience).” 126 Translation by May and Wisse 2001.  45  In order to convincingly perform emotions, an orator needed to possess sociocultural knowledge of how anger was expressed in varying scenarios and toward different objects. For example, an expression of anger toward a political rival who passed objectionable legislation would appear different than an expression of anger toward someone who had attempted murder. If an orator appeared too angry at too trifling a cause, he would probably fail to sway the audience’s emotions to that same extreme.   When approaching and evaluating Cicero’s employment of anger in his judicial speeches, we must take note of the differences between ancient and modern practice. Although emotion has a place in modern courts of law, its role is downplayed and lawyers are discouraged from using emotional rhetoric to influence jurors. This was not true of Roman courts; jurors were, for example, not given instructions on how to judge a case, and the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” was not in effect.127  Emotional appeals and character assessments were considered legitimate arguments. This meant that Roman orators had great freedom in their choice of argument, and as evidenced by Cicero’s speeches, emotional persuasion was often preferred to other types of argumentation.  The topic of emotional persuasion in ancient oratory has received scholarly attention. Like other topics in ancient emotion studies, Greek sources have been privileged over Roman.128 The role of emotion in Roman oratory has been considered by Jon Hall in his chapter entitled “Oratorical Delivery and the Emotions: Theory and Practice” in the Blackwell Companion to                                                 127 Craig 1995: 411 humorously and insightfully notes that Roman courts often operated under the principle of “innocent until proven obnoxious.” 128 For emotions in Greek oratory, see for example Sanders 2012: 151-73, Rubinstein 2004: 187-203, and Rubinstein 2013: 135-65. 46  Roman Rhetoric.129 This piece focuses on the use of emotion through tools such as gesture and voice, which are important features of a complete understanding of how Romans experienced and practiced oratory. My reading of Cicero’s speeches focuses primarily on his diction and the political rhetoric he builds around anger. This is admittedly a narrow approach, but I am presently limited by space. Language was not the only tool that Cicero had at his disposal for communicating anger. Gesture and physical appearance were crucial to the performance of emotions in oratory,130 and Cicero made ample use of these tools to imbue his statements with emotional weight.131   In my discussion of the speeches, I ask the following questions: What words does Cicero choose to refer to his anger, his opponents’ anger, and the audience’s anger? How does Cicero’s treatment of anger in his speeches reflect the ways in which anger was employed in Roman public life? Do his speeches provide a picture of the emotional dynamics of the late Republic, and is there a perceptible shift in the way in which anger is discussed and expressed in public contexts as time progresses? Late Republican oratory is an excellent source for the study of political anger among the Roman elite. If we are to believe that anger was important to the political atmosphere of this time period, we can expect to find evidence for it in oratory.    It is important to study the emotional content of Roman oratory on its own terms because the ways in which Cicero treats anger would be tailored to his audiences and the political situations in which he found himself. Oratory provides information about the values of its                                                 129 Hall 2007: 218-34.  130 Cf. Cic. Brut. 278-9. The orator Calidius is criticized for not showing any physical signs of emotion during his description of an emotional event: nulla perturbatio animi, nulla corporis, frons non percussa, non femur; pedis, quod minimum est, nulla supplosio. itaque tantum afuit ut inflammares nostros animos, somnum isto loco vix tenebamus, “There was no visible disturbance of your mind, no (movement) of your body, no striking of the thigh or the forehead, nor even a stamping of the foot, which is the bare minimum (that you should do). You were therefore so far from exciting our passions, that we could barely keep our eyes open at that point.”  131 See Aldrete 1999: 6-17 for the use of gestures to communicate emotions in Roman oratory.  47  audiences, so we can glean information about the status of anger in the Roman value system of the time period from Cicero’s speeches. As Catherine Steel remarks, “The importance of oratory made it…both the vehicle of and the focus for sustained critiques of the behavior and values of Rome in general and the elite in particular.”132 In Cicero’s oratory we see what Robert Kaster calls “the zesty blend of personal enmity and principled outrage that flavored much of Roman politics” in action.133 As the most prolific and influential orator living during one of the most socially and politically turbulent times in Roman history, Cicero’s oeuvre offers a wealth of material for this topic.134 Cicero was invested by necessity in an understanding of the hierarchy of Roman relationships because of his personal circumstances as a novus homo and his lofty political goals. I am aware of the limitations of using Cicero’s speeches as representative sources for the emotional conventions of Roman political life of the late Republic when he is only one man.135 But the sheer volume of his output and the variation in the sociopolitical scenarios in which he was involved, along with the other arguments for his utility mentioned above, make him a very rich source for the dynamics of anger in Roman public life.   One of the problems facing the use of Cicero as a source for information about anger is that the views he projects are not necessarily consistent through time and through different genres of discourse. The upside of this is that it allows us to see him display and use anger in a number of situations. We should take into account the effort that he made to influence how we                                                 132 Steel 2006: 45.  133 Kaster 2006: 5. 134 See Steel 2006: 34: “The sheer quantity of Cicero’s surviving speeches, and the paucity of those from other orators, make him the central case study in looking at the writing practices of Roman orators during the Republican period.” 135 Oratory itself has limitations as a historical source. For example, the extant text of speeches may not be identical to the speeches that were actually delivered. While this is an important issue to consider, I don’t believe that it is a significant hindrance to my study. I would argue that Cicero’s edited versions of his speeches may represent a more concentrated effort to employ rhetoric that adhered to contemporary Roman emotional norms. See also Steel 2006: 26-7. 48  read the emotional content of his works. Cicero made this effort in retrospect in his late philosophical work Tusculan Disputations (c. 45 BCE). We may wish to engineer a reconciliation between Cicero’s extensive employment of anger in his speeches with his rejection of the utility of the emotion in this work.136 Cicero anticipates that those looking back on his life and works might think that he was angry when he spoke against enemies of Rome when he writes at Tusc. 4.52 Nescio ecquid ipsi nos fortiter in re p. fecerimus: si quid fecimus, certe irati non fecimus, “Whether I myself have done anything bravely for the Republic, I don’t know at all. But what I have done, I certainly did not do it while angry.” He attempts to draw a distinction between speaking “vigorously” and “emphatically” and being angry (Tusc. 4.55):  An tibi irasci tum videmur, cum quid in causis acrius et vehementius dicimus? Quid? cum  iam rebus transactis et praeteritis orationes scribimus, num irati scribimus?   Do I seem angry to you, when I speak vigorously and emphatically during trials? What?  When proceedings have been finished and completed and I write down the speeches, do  you think that I’m angry when I write them down?   It is clear that Cicero was self-conscious about having the emotion of anger attributed to him. This self-consciousness is also apparent in De Haruspicum Responsis 3 (56 BCE), when Cicero argues against those who think that he was angry when he spoke against Publius Clodius the day before:   Sed tamen mei facti rationem exponere illis volo qui hesterno die dolore me elatum et  iracundia longius prope progressum arbitrabantur quam sapientis hominis cogitata  ratio postulasset. Nihil feci iratus, nihil impotenti animo, nihil non diu consideratum ac  multo ante meditatum.   But still I want to explain the reasoning behind my behaviour to those who thought that I  was carried away yesterday by resentment, and that I went further out of anger than the deliberate prudence of a philosopher required. I did nothing in anger, nothing with a                                                 136 Lévy 2012: 76 concludes that despite Cicero’s interest in philosophy, “the profound belief in the superiority of practical life over a purely theoretical life never really left him.”  49  headstrong spirit, I did nothing that I had not contemplated and meditated upon for a long time before.   Cicero’s chief problem with anger here seems to be that it can make a man appear like he has not thoroughly planned and contemplated his actions. For Cicero, at least at this stage in his career, anger implies a lack of control. It will be useful to keep Cicero’s post reditum137 and late career concern about being seen as angry in mind when analyzing his treatment of anger and his consular ethos in 63 BCE.   Cicero’s evasiveness about his own anger appears elsewhere in his corpus. He sometimes uses the verb subirascor to refer to his own anger. The sub prefix lessens the force of the anger, and perhaps Cicero used it to appear more in control of the emotion. In a letter to Atticus from 49 BCE, Cicero confesses that he was a little angry that Atticus did not invite him to his villa in Epirus (Att. 9.7): In Epirum quod me non invitas, comitem non molestum, subirascor. sed vale, “I was a little angry that you didn’t invite me to Epirus, when I wouldn’t have been an annoying guest, but farewell.” In De finibus 2.12 (45 BCE), Cicero states that he tends to get a “little angry” when people tell him that he does not know what Epicurus meant by “pleasure”:  itaque hoc frequenter dici solet a vobis, non intellegere nos, quam dicat Epicurus  voluptatem. quod quidem mihi si quando dictum est—est autem dictum non parum  saepe—, etsi satis clemens138 sum in disputando, tamen interdum soleo subirasci. egone non intellego, quid sit ἡδονή Graece, Latine voluptas? utram tandem linguam nescio?   And so this is often said by you Epicureans, that we don’t understand what  Epicurus meant by pleasure. Whenever this is said to me, and it is said fairly often,  even though I am a mild enough debater, I am still accustomed to get a little angry  sometimes. Do I not understand the meaning of ἡδονή in Greek, or voluptas in Latin? Which of these languages don’t I know?                                                   137 After his return from exile. One exception to his characteristic denial of anger is found in Pro Sestio 4 where he announces that his iusta iracundia has prompted him to defend Sestius. 138 Note the opposition between Cicero being clemens and subiratus. The relationship between clementia and ira will appear again in chapters 5-6 on imperial anger.  50   In a letter to Gaius Trebonius (Fam. 10.28) Cicero writes that he is happy that Caesar has been assassinated (and wishes he could have taken part in the plot), but he is a little angry that Trebonius prevented Antony from being murdered as well by escorting him away from the scene:   quod vero a te, viro optimo, seductus est tuoque beneficio adhuc vivit haec pestis,  interdum, quod mihi vix fas est, tibi subirascor; mihi enim negoti plus reliquisti uni  quam praeter me omnibus.   The fact that he was indeed led away by you, the best of men, and that by your  kindness that pest still lives, sometimes, although I scarcely have the right to feel this way,  I am a little angry with you; for you have left behind more trouble for me alone than for anyone other than me.  This example draws attention to the social hierarchical constraints on anger in Roman public life; Cicero needs to have the right (fas) to become angry with someone, which he does not possess in this case because Trebonius is his superior. In his personal life and in his philosophical persona, we see a Cicero who is aware of the political implications of expressing anger. In my analysis of his speeches, I will demonstrate that Cicero’s relationship with anger in his public life changes over time, depending on his position in society.   Cicero’s own anger is only one of the subjects of inquiry in the following two chapters on his oratory. We are also interested in his portrayal of his clients’ anger, his opponents’ anger, his audience’s anger, and the anger of elite Roman society as a whole. The final category is of particular interest, because one of the questions of this dissertation is how anger fits into the creation of identity in Roman self-presentation among our emotional community of elite Romans—what did they consider distinctly Roman about ira? I address this question by emphasizing Cicero’s role as a teacher of “Romanness” through his treatment of anger in his 51  speeches.139 Hölkeskamp aptly describes Cicero’s approach to performing this role: “A particular sort of rhetoric, the ‘rhetoric of emphatic direct address’, is omnipresent: the Roman people are addressed as part of, and partner in, an “imagined community” of the Quirites sharing a common universe of ‘Romanness.’”140 Cicero frequently draws a connection between circumstantially appropriate anger and the status of being Roman. This identity is of course restricted to elite males, who were the primary consumers of Cicero’s oratory.141 Cicero constructs a dichotomy of anger: good Romans feel anger in response to certain culturally appropriate stimuli, and bad Romans are either angry for the wrong reasons or not angry when they should be.142 Cicero also creates emotional and sometimes completely imaginary “ingroups” of Romans who are angry at the same object for the same reasons, which creates pressure for the audience to be members of this group.143 I propose that this “righteous” and pragmatic anger, as it is orchestrated by Cicero in his speeches,144  represents a type of anger that was unique to elite                                                 139 Corbeill 1996 also explores Cicero’s role as a teacher of Roman identity, but he examines how Cicero teaches appropriate Roman triggers for laughter instead of anger. Corbeill reads many of Cicero’s attacks on his opponents as humorous, and argues that Cicero uses humor to unify the audience against his opponent, much in the same way that I believe Cicero uses anger. I think it is likely that Cicero used a multifaceted approach, sometimes relying more heavily on laughter, and at others times on anger (with anger being preferred especially in the case of more terrorist-like figures such as Catiline or Clodius). 140 Hölkeskamp 2013: 11. 141 Although Cicero’s audiences were relatively homogenous in that they were male and mainly upper class, they also frequently consisted of non-specialists and people who were not necessarily interested in the matter at hand. His rhetoric therefore needed to be accessible and convincing to a diverse audience. See Powell in Clackson 2011: 384-407 for more on the non-expert language that characterized much of Roman oratory. 142 Kaster 2005: 96-7 refers to the use of the contio (assembly) as a formal space for arousing the emotion of invidia (an emotion similar to “spiteful or contemptuous envy”), and provides a list of examples of “managed performances, the more or less stylized and ritualized forms of behavior by which one person seeks to arouse shaming invidia against another,” some of which are the same passages that I identify as performances directed at arousing ira.  143 See Brewer 1999 and Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadron 1994 for social psychological perspectives on the dynamics of ingrouping and outgrouping.  144 By presenting himself as an authority on elite Roman values (despite being a novus homo), Cicero follows in the footsteps of the elder Cato. Cf. Sciarinno 2011 124: “Cato articulated an aristocratic code of speaking and behaving that allowed the Roman elite to culturally subjugate their ‘others’ and to redefine themselves as an aristocracy ruling over an ever expanding world.” 52  Roman society. The features of this variety of ira that make it righteous correspond to elite Roman values surrounding the expression and employment of anger in Roman public life.   In my analysis of passages from Cicero’s speeches, I also examine the nature of the ad hoc emotional communities that the orator constructs. I take account of the kinds of stimuli that Cicero suggests should anger his Roman audiences and examine how he employs these triggers to make his audiences angry. As I progress chronologically through his corpus, I consider the ways in which Cicero’s employment of anger as a tool of his profession changes over time.   Tacitus identifies the Verrines, the Catilinarians, Pro Milone, and the Philippics as the   speeches that made Cicero famous as a magnus orator (Dialogus de oratoribus 37.6). These speeches provided the turbulent circumstances which, according to Tacitus, most easily showcase the orator’s talent: ut subinde admoneo, quaestionis meminerimus sciamusque nos de ea re loqui, quae facilius turbidis et inquietis temporibus existit.   As I repeatedly stress, we should be mindful of the matters at hand and know what  kind of art we are talking about, an art which arises more easily in tumultuous and  troubled times.145   In addition to these speeches, I have selected case studies from Pro Murena (another consular speech) and the Caesarianae (Pro Marcello, Pro Ligario, and Pro Rege Deiotaro), which Cicero delivered before Caesar in 46 BCE. From the Verrines I have selected In Verrem I, from the Catilinarians, In Catilinam 1-2, and from the Philippics, 1-4. This body of twelve speeches features a wide range of political situations and rhetorical strategies; it includes prosecution speeches, defense speeches, panegyric, and invective. While Cicero’s other works may offer additional information about how anger was used in Roman oratory, I must limit myself to a selection here. I have divided this                                                 145 Tacitus explains here why Cicero’s speeches against Verres, Catiline, and Antony and for Milo have won him more fame than his more mild mannered speeches like the Pro Archia.  53  material into two chapters; the first discusses speeches delivered prior to Caesar’s civil war (In Verrem 1, Cat. 1-2, Pro Murena, and Pro Milone), and the second examines the post-civil war Caesarianae and Philippics. I have organized the speeches in this way because I intend to show how Roman discourse surrounding the use of anger in public life evolved with the changes to the political regime.          54  Chapter 3: Anger in Cicero’s Pre-Civil War Oratory  This chapter features readings of three courtroom speeches (In Verrem 1, Pro Murena, and Pro Milone), one senatorial speech (In Catilinam 1), and one speech that was delivered at a contio (In Catilinam 2). Before I begin my discussion of the political dynamics of anger in these speeches, it is important to point out that different conditions of delivery demanded different rhetorical strategies. As Powell and Paterson note, “the primary function of a lawcourt speech is to make the best possible case, and preferably to win. Other considerations, political or literary, take second place.”146 So we should first consider how anger functions as a persuasive mechanism in courtroom cases like In Verrem 1, Pro Murena, and Pro Milone. Anger operates in different ways according to the individual circumstances of the case, but the overarching goal of emotional rhetoric in courtroom cases is to persuade the judges to a desired opinion. Cicero’s goals when he spoke before the senate about the threat of Catiline were also persuasive. In In Catilinam 1, Cicero attempts to convince the senate that Catiline is a real danger to society. This setting demanded a more formal style of speaking than a courtroom case,147 and Cicero’s use of anger would need to appeal to elite emotional norms. Finally, public meetings or contiones were occasions for delivering addresses on a variety of political matters.148 Emotions were integral to these performances; in a section of De oratore on modes of delivery appropriate for contiones, Cicero remarks that “the greater part of a speech must be devoted to exciting the emotions of the audience, at times inciting them, by direct exhortation or by some reminder...”149 The audience at a contio was                                                 146 Powell and Paterson 2004: 1.  147 Cf. Dyck 2008: 12.  148 Mouritsen 2013: 69 states that the contiones “provided a platform for launching policies, attacking enemies, responding to opponents, and simply making official statements, often of a routine nature.” 149 De or. 337: maximaque pars orationis admovenda est ad animorum motus non numquam aut cohortatione aut commemoratione aliqua... 55  always addressed as the “Roman people” no matter what the actual composition of the crowd was.150 Speeches delivered at contiones therefore had ideological weight.151 Speakers at these meetings hoped to gain popular support for their political policies, so they would tailor their rhetorical strategy to a popular audience. We would therefore expect Cicero’s treatment of anger in In Catilinam 2 to be in sync with wider Roman emotional norms.   Other factors apart from conditions of delivery influenced Cicero’s rhetorical approaches toward anger. I begin my discussion of each of these speeches with its political and historical circumstances, because factors such as preexisting political hostilities would influence how Cicero chose to use anger. I present the speeches in chronological order in order to determine if Cicero employed anger differently during various stages of his career. If he did, it would suggest that the use of anger in Roman public life was tied to political and social standing.   3.1 In Verrem 1  Our starting point is the speech that launched Cicero’s brilliant career as an orator.152 He had only recently started his ascent on the cursus honorum, but his political aptitude was already being noticed. His performance as quaestor of Sicily in 75 BCE was so well received by the Sicilian population that they asked him to lead the prosecution against their ex-governor Gaius Verres in 70. This was a high-profile case; Verres possessed extreme wealth and influence at Rome, and Cicero’s main opponent in speaking was Quintus Hortensius Hortalus, the most                                                 150 Cf. Mouritsen 2013: 74. The crowd composition at a contio varied from one meeting to the next, but the sources suggest that the audience was almost always sympathetic to the speaker. This implies that in general, people would only choose to attend contiones if they supported the speaker.  151 Cf. Hölkeskamp 2013: 11: “The contio as discourse is based on, and indeed largely consists in, the construction or negotiation, recreation or affirmation of Roman identity or identities, of the exclusiveness of being a Roman, the rôles and privileges, demands and burdens involved in being a true Roman citizen.” 152 The earliest extant speech by Cicero is Pro Quinctio of 81 BCE, but the Verrines won him his reputation for being a talented orator. See Vasaly on Cicero’s early speeches in May 2002: 71-112. 56  prominent Roman orator at the time and consult-elect for the following year. Verres also had the advantages of being able to bribe witnesses and officials, and he attempted to derail the case by creating procedural hiccups.153 The chief charges levied against Verres by the angry Sicilian delegation were corruption and extortion, although the Verrines suggest that his misconduct was not merely financial in nature. Cicero was extraordinarily successful in his prosecution; he delivered one short speech (In Verrem 1) before Verres was advised to go into voluntary exile by his defense team. I have chosen to discuss In Verrem 1 here because it is the only one of the six published speeches against Verres that was actually delivered.   In Verrem 1 seeks to direct public anger towards a single figure by addressing his character flaws and actions which violate the mos maiorum. Instead of outwardly expressing his own personal anger against Verres, Cicero opts for presenting evidence against Verres that will arouse anger in his audience. The case is complicated by the fact that Cicero’s audience is almost as guilty as Verres himself, but he circumvents the issue by suggesting that Verres alone is deserving of anger and promising that the praise that the judges will receive for bringing him to justice will soften the invidia they have earned for their previous corrupt decisions.  Because this is a prosecution speech against a public figure, we might expect to find Cicero attempting to direct public anger against Verres by means of an invective, or a personal attack.154 Powell comments on the use of invectives as means of expressing anger: “a spoken or                                                 153 Verres and his defense team took several measures to rig the case, none of which were successful. First they arranged for Quintus Caecilius Niger to request to prosecute Verres, which required Cicero to make a speech on why he should be selected as prosecutor instead (Divinatio in Caecilium). They then attempted to postpone the case until the next year in order to secure a more amenable praetor urbanus to preside over the case as judge. Verres also tried to bribe the jury, but according to Cicero, the jurors who had been chosen by lot were not prone to corruption, and this too failed (Verr. 1.16).  154 See Powell 2001: 1-2. The Latin verb invehi, from which the English word invective derives, is used for attacks against causes and ideas as well as attacks against individuals, but in English, “invective” is used primarily to refer to personal attacks. The Verrines are not easily categorized as pure invectives because they contain few direct insults, and  57  written invective, as a deliberate public display of anger and hostility, was regarded as a legitimate and acceptable method of pursuing a political grudge.”155 The Verrines contain elements of invective, but we will see that Cicero mainly relies on subtler methods to sway his audience’s reaction to Verres’ crimes.156 Cicero’s limited implementation of the invective mode in this speech may have been a consequence of his relationship with Verres. Cicero himself does not necessarily have a grudge against Verres, but he is acting as a patron of the Sicilian people. He is essentially a channel for their anger against Verres. His job is to grant legitimacy to the Sicilians’ grudge against their ex-governor in a Roman court of law, and in order to accomplish this, he denounces Verres’ character and behavior in a way that inspires righteous indignation in his Roman audience. The statements he uses to condemn Verres contain some of the Roman triggers for anger that recur in later speeches, most importantly the character trait of audacia.157 Cicero’s strategy in this speech involves convincing his audience that they have a reason to be angry with Verres, even if they are not aware of it yet. Cicero may have also been inclined to take this approach because of his relatively modest social status at the time. It would have been a riskier move to involve his own anger in this case, because the fact that he, a new man in politics, was angry would not necessarily convince the senatorial judges that they should be angry too.                                                                                                                                                         Verres’ misdeeds are for the most part presented in a third person narrative with limited direct address to Verres. Seager 2001: 25 explains, however, that “invective is not a strictly delimited genre, rather a mode of discourse to be employed whenever the occasion demands.” 155 Powell 2001: 3.  156 Powell 2001: 9. Powell makes the point that the Verrines are not strictly invectives by comparing them to In Pisonem, a speech in which Cicero also denigrates his opponent’s career, but includes many abusive vocatives and direct insults. Powell is rather conservative about the speeches that he labels invectives. According to his criteria, the Second Philippic is the only speech among those selected for this study that qualifies as a true invective.  157 For the political significance of audacia see Wirszubski 1961.  58   Because audacia is an important element of Cicero’s argument in this speech and recurs as a trigger for audience anger in many of Cicero’s other speeches,158 it is worth noting here the significance of the concept in Roman ethical thought. Audacia possesses both positive and negative connotations in Latin, but Cicero almost always uses the term in a negative sense,159 as it is defined by OLD s.v. audacia 2a: “(in a bad sense) audacity, presumptuousness, impudence, recklessness, rashness.” Kaster comments on the relationship between shamelessness (impudentia) and audacity in Roman thought, specifically in the context of Cicero’s works:  The many passages where Cicero, for instance, attacks his opponents’ shamelessness, impudentia, readily convey the impression that audacia was impudentia’s even nastier twin, and unambiguously evil: over and over and over again audacia is denounced as the raw expression of individual will trampling on the communal sense. It seems the very lifeblood of the shameless—and yet we know that was not true: to be bold, audax, was also a virtue, in fact one of the core components of virtus in its radical sense, the quality of being a real man.160  While boldness can be a virtue, destructive boldness that has no regard for societal principles is a capital vice for elite Romans. This is the kind of audacia to which Cicero returns when he intends to direct political anger (usually in the form of invidia or odium161) against someone. When elite Roman men abuse their status and exhibit audacia, they risk incurring political anger because they have harmed the res publica and damaged the reputation of their group. This type of anger is most likely to be expressed as invidia, because as Kaster explains, invidia often involves the perception that someone is enjoying a good in a way that affronts some general societal principle.162                                                  158 For example, Cicero bemoans Catiline’s audacia in the opening of In Catilinam 1: Quem ad finem sese effrenata iactabit audacia? 159 See McDonnell 2006: 59-60. McDonnell states that audacia is exclusively negative in Cicero’s works, but has varied connotations in Caesar. He considers audacia an opposite of virtus when used in a negative sense.  160 Kaster 1997: 16.  161 As I noted in Chapter 2, invidia and odium are frequently used to denote politically motivated anger.  162 Cf. Kaster’s taxonomy of invidia (2005: 87). 59   In Verrem 1 begins in a surprising way. Cicero does not begin with the target of his invective, as he does in the first two speeches against Catiline. His first topic is invidia vestri ordinis—the public resentment facing the senatorial order (Verr. 1.1): quod erat optandum maxime, iudices, et quod unum ad invidiam vestri ordinis infamiamque iudiciorum sedandam maxime pertinebat, id non humano consilio sed prope divinitus datum atque oblatum vobis summo rei publicae tempore videtur. inveteravit enim iam opinio perniciosa rei publicae vobisque periculosa, quae non modo apud nos sed apud exteras nationes omnium sermone percrebruit, his iudiciis quae nunc sunt pecuniosum hominem, quamvis sit nocens, neminem posse damnari.163  Jurors, it seems that at this crisis of our Republic it is not a human but a divine plan that has handed you the very thing you should hope for: a unique opportunity to dismiss the hatred of our class and the infamous reputation of our courts. These days one can hear everywhere—and not just among the Roman people but even among foreign tribes—the comment that our current courts will never convict a rich man no matter how guilty he may be. This opinion damages the Republic and endangers you.164  Cicero presents this case as an opportunity for the judges to rehabilitate their reputation and mitigate the invidia that they face for being corrupt and accepting bribes from wealthy criminals like Verres. Although Cicero does not explicitly state that he personally believes that the judges are corrupt and incompetent, he suggests that this is the opinion of everyone at home and abroad.  By beginning this way, Cicero can arouse shame165 in the judges without making himself a target of their anger. He connects the outcome of the case with the health of the res publica, a strategy that he will employ in many of his subsequent speeches. Cicero here suggests that the integrity of Rome’s judicial system is weakened by the corruption of the judges, and this not only                                                 163 Text is from Peterson’s 1917 OCT edition.  164 Translations of In Verrem 1 are by McElduff 2011. 165 See Kaster 2005: 92-6 for the connection between invidia and pudor (shame). According to Kaster, invidia can be a response to “the gaining or use of an advantage in a way deemed socially destructive and discreditable.” If the senators are made to feel shame about their own corruption (that is, their use of their privileged position as judges to acquire wealth instead of dispense justice), this can cause the invidia to dissipate.  60  affects their personal reputations, but also that of the Republic as a whole. He claims that he was motivated to take the case so that he could restore the senate’s reputation (Verr. 1.2): huic ego causae, iudices, cum summa voluntate et exspectatione populi Romani actor accessi, non ut augerem invidiam ordinis, sed ut infamiae communi succurrerem. adduxi enim hominem in quo reconciliare existimationem iudiciorum amissam, redire in gratiam cum populo Romano, satis facere exteris nationibus possetis.  Jurors, cheered on by a hopeful Roman people, I undertook to act in this case, not to increase the hatred of our class, but to help you fight against the infamous reputation that affects us all. I am prosecuting a man whose case will enable you to win back the now vanished good opinion of the courts, to return to the good graces of the Roman people and to make amends with foreign nations.   The issue of the judges, their reputation, and their allegiances is an important one because they constitute Cicero’s primary audience in this case and they are the individuals whose anger he must manage. The case was tried before a quaestio perpetua, a jury drawn from a predetermined panel of jurors who were available for selection at any time. This process was first put in place by the lex de rebus repetundis of 149, and the selection criteria for jurors were continually reformed and manipulated by politicians after the law’s inception.166  In 80 a lex Calpurnia was passed that granted the senatorial class a monopoly in the juries by stating that judges must only be selected from that class. In 70 (the same year as this trial) another law concerning judicial reform was enacted by Lucius Aurelius Cotta, the lex Aurelia, which stated that juries must be selected equally from three classes: the senators, equites, and tribuni aerarii (Vell. 2.32.3). This law was probably passed after Cicero’s successful prosecution of Verres. Vasaly argues that Cicero’s emphasis on the senate’s reputed corruption and the ineptitude of judges in                                                 166 Richardson 1987: 1. Quaestiones perpetuae were set up for a variety of crimes in the late Republic, beginning with the quaestio de repentundis (extortion). Quaestiones perpetuae were later established for other crimes; the most important to this study is the quaestio de vi (public violence) under which Sestius, Caelius, and Milo were tried. 61  this speech played a part in the successful passage of the new law.167 Cicero indeed warns that if the judges make the wrong decision in this case, the people will demand that juries be selected from a different order (Verr. 1.20; 49). Cicero achieves a balance between pointed social commentary and flattery in this speech by arousing anger against the corruption that Verres represents and encouraging the judges to disassociate themselves from it by praising their inherent excellence as Romans of high social status. He offers the judges a means of allaying the dangerous invidia that they face.168  He suggests that if they respond with an appropriate level of anger toward Verres’ audacia (which would result in his punishment), they will be able to restore their own reputations.    Part of Cicero’s strategy for arousing anger in this speech consists of providing information that gives his audience permission to be angry with Verres. Because Verres himself is a powerful member of the elite, Cicero must employ rhetoric of exclusion to separate Verres from the herd, so to speak. For example, Cicero presents Verres’ ill-gotten wealth as a key element of his deplorable character. But the idea of wealth itself would not make a Roman audience angry, especially a jury composed of wealthy senators, so Cicero must present Verres’ riches in a way that distinguishes his wealth from that of his audience members. Near the end of the second section of the speech, Cicero describes Verres as a depeculatorem aerari, vexatorem Asiae                                                 167 Vasaly 2009. Vasaly’s argument suggests that Verres’ case was tried before the passage of the law that year. 168 Vasaly 2009: 114 posits that Cicero’s insistence that the outcome of this case will restore the senatorial judges’ reputation for justice is disingenuous, since they gave Verres imperium in the first place. While that is a reasonable argument to make from hindsight, the more important issue here is whether the judges would perceive his comments as disingenuous, and if this would affect their feelings toward Cicero and Verres. Vasaly suggests that with this speech Cicero was forcefully inserting himself into an ongoing political debate concerning judicial reform, and that other scholars have ignored this aspect in favor of reading oratory as serving only the immediate purpose of persuading judges to an opinion. Part of Cicero’s genius, however, is his ability to multitask. By taking into account the immense rhetorical and political success of Cicero’s performance in this case, we can reasonably assume that he not only managed to persuade the senatorial judges to an opinion without offending them and losing their support, but he also succeeded in making a name for himself as a political player to his secondary audiences. 62  atque Pamphyliae, praedonem iuris urbani, labem atque perniciem provinciae Siciliae, “an embezzler of the treasury, the tormenter of Asia and Pamphylia, the looter of Rome’s legal system, and the curse and cancer of Sicily.” (Verr. 1.2) The spatial nouns emphasize the wide-reaching impact of Verres’ financial irresponsibility. He acquired his riches by being a depeculator, vexator, praedo, labes, and pernicies.169 By describing his acquisition of wealth in this way, Cicero differentiates Verres from his audience of wealthy senators, which facilitates their ability to be angry with him.   In order to further provoke his audience’s anger, Cicero zeroes in on Verres’ characteristic of audacia in the following sections of the speech. He comments on Verres’ audacity in this way at Verr. 1.5: quodsi quam audax est ad conandum tam esset obscurus in agendo, fortasse aliqua in re nos aliquando fefellisset; verum hoc adhuc percommode cadit, quod cum incredibili eius audacia singularis stultitia coniuncta est.  If he were as secretive in his actions as he is reckless in his efforts, perhaps he would have deceived me sometime or somehow. But it turns out quite nicely that his exceptional recklessness was combined with incredible stupidity.  According to Cicero, Verres made no attempt to conceal his theft of money or his efforts to bribe the judges, derail the proceedings against him, and interfere with Cicero’s investigation of his crimes in Sicily. While these actions are already criminal, Cicero suggests that doing them openly with no fear of consequences and no desire to preserve one’s reputation is even more offensive, because in so doing you damage the reputation of the Roman people and the Roman elite as                                                 169 Cicero’s argument benefits from Verres’ notorious personal history of plundering; he embezzled with Dolabella as quaestor in Cilicia in 78, but he was pardoned after providing testimony to convict the former. Although the senate had been complicit in Verres’ access to power (and thus they might be inclined to feel guilty about what they have allowed to happen), he had gained most of his initial influence through the involvement of Sulla. 63  well. Audacia is a trigger for anger in Roman sociopolitical contexts is because it harms the very idea of what an elite Roman man should be. At all costs, he should strive to appear virtuous.170   Verres exhibits audacia by neglecting to cover his tracks, but Cicero also adds a contrasting element of conspiracy to his condemnation of Verres. Walter Spencer points out some of the similarities between Cicero’s approach in the Verrines and the Catilinarians, remarking how language of conspiracy is used in both sets of speeches to condemn Cicero’s target.171 The idea of conspiracy, like audacia, is one of the Roman cultural sensitivities that Cicero exploits to arouse anger in his audiences.172 But as Spencer observes, Verres’ case does not perfectly fit into the mold of a conspiracy narrative.173 In many ways the speech reverses the usual features of conspiracy: Verres does not act in secret, and he is primarily motivated by private financial gain, not political revolution. But in his description of Verres’ offenses, Cicero suggests that his crimes have the potential to achieve the same effect as political conspiracy, i.e. the destruction of the Republic. He describes Verres’ plans as insidiae nefariae that not only affect Cicero, but also the senate, the people, Rome’s allies, and other nations (Verr. 1.4). Again, the wide reaching impact of Verres’ criminal behavior is emphasized. Cicero attempts to convey that Verres not only conspires to harm Cicero, the praetor, the Roman people and their allies, and the senatorial class, he is also doing it with audacia, out in the open. While elite Romans would have been angered by the idea of someone plotting in secrecy against them, Cicero’s approach here suggests that it would be even more offensive for someone to openly conspire without fear of punishment.                                                  170 Many have noted the externality of traditional Roman ethics and the importance of performed morality in Roman society, for example Roller 2001: 78; 83. Edwards 1993: 2 understands criticism of immorality (and hence the perception of morality) as a characteristically Roman activity.  171 Spencer 2011. 172 For more on Roman conspiracy see Pagán 2004. Pagán mentions fear as an emotional element of Roman conspiracy narratives. It is very likely that anger was also a part of how elite Romans responded to conspiracies. Psychologists have noted a close relationship between anger and fear as defensive mechanisms, e.g. Danesh 1977.  173 Spencer 2011: 122.  64   Cicero elaborates on Verres’ audacia in Verr. 1.6-7: nunc homo audacissimus atque amentissimus hoc cogitat. intellegit me ita paratum atque instructum in iudicium venire ut non modo in auribus vestris, sed in oculis omnium sua furta atque flagitia defixurus sim; videt senatores multos esse testis audaciae suae, videt multos equites Romanos, frequentis praeterea civis atque socios, quibus ipse insignis iniurias fecerit.  Here is what that absolutely brazen-faced lunatic is thinking. He understands that  I am so prepared and equipped with evidence for this trial that I shall nail him with his thefts and crimes, not just in your hearing but in everyone’s sight. He sees that many senators are witnesses to his reckless behavior, he sees many of the equestrian class crowding around; in addition, there are Roman citizens and allies here whom he has greatly injured.  Cicero’s emphasis here is on the visible nature of the many iniuriae that Verres has committed against the Sicilians. He downplays Verres’ amentia with a series of verbs that indicate that Verres knows exactly what he is doing (cogitat; intellegit; videt; videt). He must still convince the jury that the Sicilians are not the only ones who suffer iniuriae from Verres. He accomplishes this by suggesting that Verres has a low opinion of the judges, believing that they are easily corrupted by money (Verr. 1.8):   ...usque eo de omnibus bonis male existimat, usque eo senatoria iudicia perdita profligataque esse arbitratur, ut hoc palam dictitet, non sine causa se cupidum pecuniae fuisse, quoniam in pecunia tantum praesidium experiatur esse.  ...his opinion of all decent men is so low and he considers the senatorial courts so  ruined and corrupt that he repeats endlessly in public that there was a good reason he was greedy for money, since his own experience is that only money gives one such great protection.  Cicero’s point is that the senators have more to lose from acquitting Verres than they have to gain from accepting bribes from him. He labels Verres’ efforts to rig the trial as insidiae (Verr. 1.4; 17)—if the judges fall into these traps, they will put their reputation and fortune at risk (Verr. 1.17: famae fortunisque) and incur even greater invidia.   Once he has established that Verres’ actions constitute iniuriae to the Sicilians and to the senatorial judges that he has attempted to bribe, Cicero provides an overview of Verres’ criminal 65  actions at each stage of the cursus honorum to illustrate how he has harmed the Republic through his abuse of his offices (Verr. 1.11). Cicero suggests that Verres has undermined the entire Roman political system by mismanaging his responsibilities and extorting money at every turn. By acting as an ineffective and destructive magistrate, Verres has violated the mos maiorum, the unwritten Roman moral code. This could be understood as harmful to Roman society itself, especially since Verres has served a representative of Rome abroad. The specific ways in which Verres violates the mos maiorum apart from extortion include corruption of the justice system, executing Roman citizens, disrespecting local religious practices, and raping his provincial subjects (Verr. 1.5). These actions all communicate disregard for the sanctity of officium and imperium in Roman society.    The remainder of the speech gives a more detailed account of Verres’ pre-trial attempts at bribery and corruption and continues to return to the idea that a judgment against Verres will restore the senate’s reputation for justice and allow them to maintain a judicial monopoly. Cicero offers up Verres as a scapegoat for the trend of corruption that has plagued Roman politics, inviting those previously involved in it and those who have suffered from it to focus their anger exclusively on Verres. He expresses his hope that no one will be judged at fault (improbus) except for Verres (Verr. 1.50).174 Cicero additionally pledges that he will continue to prosecute improbitas even if it means that he will become the object of political anger (inimicitiae).   Cicero concludes the speech by summing up his accusations against Verres (Verr. 1.56):  dicimus C. Verrem, cum multa libidinose, multa crudeliter, in civis Romanos atque socios, multa in deos hominesque nefarie fecerit tum praeterea quadrigentiens sestertium ex Sicilia contra leges abstulisse.                                                  174 primum ab dis immortalibus, quod sperare mihi videor, hoc idem, iudices, opto, ut in hoc iudicio nemo improbus praeter eum qui iampridem inventus est reperiatur, “It is for this reason I look first to the immortal gods; I think they hope for the same as I do: that no one finds in this court any disloyal person, except for someone who has long had a reputation as such.” 66  We allege that Gaius Verres committed many lecherous and cruel actions both against Roman citizens and allies, many unholy ones against gods and men and extorted 40 million sesterces from Sicily.  Here Cicero again communicates that there are many victims of Verres’ iniuriae, and the implication is that they all have a right to be angry with him. Cicero relies heavily on the capacity for Verres’ actions to inspire anger in his audiences, but his case is also strengthened by the simple fact that what Verres has done is contra leges.   This speech illustrates some of Cicero’s early strategies for arousing and directing an audience’s anger at an individual target. His rhetorical approach in this case was informed by his sensitivity to what information would have the potential to make his audience angry at one of their own. He took advantage of his audience’s anxiety about their own reputations by suggesting that Verres’ abuse of his political authority undermined their entire class. Cicero encourages them to respond to this iniuria with anger—and a guilty verdict.   3.2 In Catilinam 1-2 3.2.1 In Catilinam 1  I now move forward in time to Cicero’s consular year, 63 BCE. Cicero called a meeting of the senate on 8 November to address the growing body of evidence that Lucius Sergius Catilina was the leader of a conspiracy to destroy the Republic through the enactment of revolutionary political measures. The goals of the conspiracy included redistribution of offices, cancellation of debts, and new proscriptions (mostly of current leading citizens and nobles).175 About a month earlier, Cicero had presented anonymous letters to the senate that warned of                                                 175 See Dyck’s introduction to his 2008 edition for a fuller discussion of the background of the conspiracy. Catiline’s plans were particularly appealing to disgruntled Sullan veterans, unsuccessful yet ambitious politicians, and those heavily in debt.  67  incipient attacks on the city, but when the attacks did not occur on the date that Cicero specified (27 October), senators began to doubt that Catiline was truly a threat. Soon afterwards, news reached Rome that Gaius Manlius, Catiline’s henchman, had gathered troops and initiated a revolt at Faesulae, a rural town north of Rome. Catiline was then indicted under the lex Plautia de vi, but he publicly maintained his innocence.176 He personally attended the senate meeting on 8 November, still feigning ignorance of any revolutionary plots. Cicero delivered a scathing deliberative speech to compel Catiline to depart the city, which he did after an unsuccessful attempt to respond to Cicero’s invective. Catiline’s actions after this meeting seemed to confirm his guilt, and Cicero went on to quash the conspiracy and be celebrated as the pater patriae. In Sallust’s account of the conspiracy, Cicero’s vehemence in speaking against Catiline is attributed to either fear or anger.177 In this section I will of course focus on his use of anger.   Because Catiline himself was in attendance on 8 November, much of Cat. 1 is addressed directly to him. Emotions play a central role in this speech as Cicero expresses his righteous anger against Catiline and condemns Catiline’s inappropriate and destructive anger against Rome and the mos maiorum. In the middle of the speech, Cicero points out that no one wanted to sit next to Catiline, as the seats around him were left empty (Cat. 1.16). He asks disparagingly, quo tandem animo hoc tibi ferundum putas?⎯“how do you think you should feel about this?” Throughout the speech Cicero attempts to emotionally torment Catiline, labeling him as an outcast among a                                                 176 The lex Plautia de vi condemned violence against individuals or the state. It was passed probably less than a decade prior to the Catilinarian events. Trials for vis became common in the late Republic. See Gruen 1974: 224-33 and Riggsby 1999: 79-119 for more on the history of vis in Rome and legislation against it. 177 Sall. Cat. 31: Tum M. Tullius consul, sive praesentiam eius timens sive ira conmotus, orationem habuit luculentam atque utilem rei publicae, quam postea scriptam edidit, “Then the consul Marcus Tullius, either fearing his presence or moved by anger, gave a brilliant and advantageous speech for the Republic, which he wrote down afterwards.” 68  group of senators who are angry with him. The circumstances of this speech provide a perfect scenario for observing Roman anger in action.   Cicero begins by assuming an exasperated tone and asking Catiline a series of rhetorical questions (Cat.1.1): Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra? quam diu etiam furor iste tuus nos eludet? quem ad finem sese effrenata iactabit audacia?, “Answer me, how long, Catiline, will you abuse our patience? How much longer will this madness of yours mock us? To what purpose will your unbridled insolence fling itself again and again?”178 Catiline’s furor, his unbridled rage, is the emotion that makes Catiline dangerous according to Cicero. I noted in chapter 2 that furor is distinct from ira in Latin: it is intense anger that cannot be controlled, and thus it has far greater negative connotations than ira. Furor cannot be pragmatic because a person experiencing it has lost their ability to think rationally and restrain themselves from destructive behavior. From the start, Cicero establishes Catiline’s improper relationship with anger. He also points to Catiline’s audacia, the offensive quality of shameless disregard for consequences that he also criticized in Verres’ character. The type of audacia that Verres exhibited was a luxurious sort, dangerous in that it undermined the moral righteousness of elite Roman society. Catiline’s audacia, on the other hand, implies a threat of violence.   Cicero outlines Catiline’s lack of proper emotional response to the hostile situation he faces. He is unmoved by the patrols who have been put in place, the obvious fear of the Roman people, and the expressions of the senators around him (Cat. 1.1). Despite the presence of so many signs that his plans have been detected, he still chooses to show his face at this meeting. These remarks serve a dual purpose of compelling Catiline to give up his ruse of ignorance and elevating the senate’s anger against him. It is important for Cicero to continually build up anger                                                 178 Translations of In Catilinam 1-2 are by McElduff 2011. 69  against Catiline and his supporters in these speeches because his end goal is to use a senatus consultum ultimum to execute the conspirators. Cicero attempts to create a heightened emotional state in his audiences179 that he can later use to execute the conspirators without a trial; the fading of that state later helped Cicero’s enemies secure his exile.180   In order to provide further justification for anger against Catiline, Cicero describes the serious iniuriae that Catiline intends to commit against Cicero himself and his audience. Since Catiline’s most heinous crimes are still in the plotting stage, Cicero must convince the senate that, if given the chance, he will follow through with his plans and cause them personal and financial harm. Cicero claims that even as he sits in the meeting, Catiline is plotting to murder individuals (Cat. 1.2): notat et designat oculis ad caedem unum quemque nostrum. Cicero attempts to transfer his own fear and anger towards Catiline to his audience. He states that he survived an assassination attempt ordered by Catiline at his home the morning before (Cat. 1.9). Cicero attempts to persuade the senators that they could be the next target of Catiline’s furor.   In addition to offering reasons why Catiline should be feared and hated, Cicero must also argue against statements made in defense of Catiline. One of the main arguments for why Catiline should not be condemned is the fact that he comes from illustrious family, so Cicero demonstrates that there is a precedent for executing high born citizens who have proven themselves to be dangerous to the Republic (Cat. 1.3). Cicero suggests that such citizens have essentially perverted what it means to be Roman, and the fact that they are high born only makes the offense worse. Men who fit this description could easily inspire invidia because they would be                                                 179 Cf. Quint. Inst. 6.2.24: Namque in hoc eloquentiae vis est, ut iudicem non in id tantum compellat in quod ipsa rei natura ducetur, sed aut qui non est aut maiorem quam est faciat adfectum, “For the force of eloquence is such that it not merely compels the judge to the conclusion toward which the nature of the facts leads him, but awakens emotions which either do not naturally arise from the case or are stronger than the case would suggest.” Translation by Butler 1922. 180 The animosity of Publius Clodius Pulcher toward Cicero was also an important contributing factor. 70  abusing their social status in order to acquire personal gain at the expense of the Republic. As in the first speech against Verres, Cicero frames this case as an opportunity for the senate to restore their reputation for virtue and justice, which they can achieve by appropriately experiencing and expressing anger at Catiline and the disruption that he represents.   In Cat. 1.11-12, Cicero elaborates on the threat Catiline poses to the Republic as a whole. He says that what appeared to be a personal conflict between Catiline and himself was in reality a much greater threat (Cat. 1.11-12):  Cum proximis comitiis consularibus me consulem in campo et competitores tuos interficere voluisti, compressi conatus tuos nefarios amicorum praesidio et copiis nullo tumultu publice concitato; denique, quotienscumque me petisti, per me tibi obstiti, quamquam videbam perniciem meam cum magna calamitate rei publicae esse coniunctam. Nunc iam aperte rem publicam universam petis, templa deorum inmortalium, tecta urbis, vitam omnium civium, Italiam denique totam ad exitium et vastitatem vocas.  When at the most recent consular elections you wished to kill me (the consul!) and your rivals, I checked your unholy efforts with guards and an army of friends without provoking a public commotion. In short, as often you have attacked me I have thwarted you, although I saw that my own destruction would mean the Republic’s absolute downfall. But now you take open aim at the entire Republic, you call to catastrophe and devastation the temples of the immortal gods, the houses of the city, the life of every citizen, and finally, all of Italy.  The final sentence of this passage communicates that Catiline’s plans for destruction now extend beyond Cicero. His actions have an impact on not only the city of Rome, but all of Italy. Cicero attaches the adverb aperte to stress Catiline’s inappropriate lack of shame for what he is doing. Cicero’s approach toward inspiring anger here is simple: he creates a vision of reality in which Cicero and his audience are decent Romans who respect tradition, and Catiline is someone who has a vendetta against everything they care about. If this fails to make the senators angry, the implication is that there is something wrong with them. 71   Halfway through the speech Cicero describes what he himself would do if he were in Catiline’s shoes (Cat. 1.17): et, si me meis civibus iniuria suspectum tam graviter atque offensum viderem, carere me aspectu civium quam infestis omnium oculis conspici mallem; tu cum conscientia scelerum tuorum agnoscas odium omnium iustum et iam diu tibi debitum, dubitas, quorum mentes sensusque volneras, eorum aspectum praesentiamque vitare?   If I saw myself wrongly suspected and so offensive to my fellow-citizens, I would prefer to be out of their sight rather than be the focus of their hostile eyes. Since the guilty awareness of your crimes ensures you understand everyone’s justified, overdue hatred, do you hesitate to avoid the sight and company of those whose minds and feelings you torment?  Cicero claims that he would leave the city even if people were unjustly angry with him, but Catiline remains in public view despite his obvious guilt. Later in the speech, however, Cicero says that he believes that invidia earned by virtus is not invidia at all, but gloria (Cat. 1.29). Cicero’s argument here assumes then that Catiline could not possibly conceive of his actions as products of virtus, and therefore he should respond to the righteous invidia he faces by retreating from public view. Cicero suggests that by being present in the senate house, Catiline is responding inappropriately to the anger that is being directed against him, but only because his guilt is visible. Cicero emphasizes the extent of this anger by personifying the patria and saying that it hates and fears Catiline (Cat. 1.17: odit ac metuit). This passage again illustrates the importance of appearance and perception in Roman ethics: a man’s public reputation carried more weight than anything else when it came to evaluating his morality.    At Cat. 1.31, Cicero shifts his attention from Catiline to his co-conspirators who would remain in Rome. He uses a metaphor of disease to describe what would happen if the senate were to punish Catiline alone (Cat. 1.31):  Quodsi ex tanto latrocinio iste unus tolletur, videbimur fortasse ad breve quoddam tempus cura et metu esse relevati, periculum autem residebit et erit inclusum penitus in 72  venis atque in visceribus rei publicae. Ut saepe homines aegri morbo gravi cum aestu febrique iactantur, si aquam gelidam biberunt, primo relevari videntur, deinde multo gravius vehementiusque adflictantur, sic hic morbus, qui est in re publica, relevatus istius poena vehementius reliquis vivis ingravescet.  If he is the only one removed from this pack of outlaws it will look for a brief time as if we are relieved from worry and fear, but the danger will linger, buried deep in the Republic’s blood and guts. Just as when men are seriously ill and are racked with a fever’s heat, they often seem to be relieved at first if they drink cold water, but then are afflicted more seriously and more violently, so this sickness which infects the Republic will grow worse if the rest remain alive, even if it will be relieved by Catiline’s punishment.  Here Cicero appeals to the senate’s experience of cura (anxiety) and metus (fear) to convince them that they should pursue and punish everyone involved in the conspiracy. This passage illustrates the emotional cocktail approach that Cicero is famous for. People rarely feel emotions in a vacuum, and they can experience them in rapid succession⎯anger can be punctuated by fear, and anxiety can permeate the experience of any emotion. Cicero motivates his audience to associate negative emotions with Catiline, whether they be feelings of anger, anxiety, fear, or disgust. I believe, however, that anger is his most powerful emotional weapon against Catiline because anger incites action, whereas emotions like fear and anxiety can encourage inaction or even retreat.181  Cicero’s treatment of Catiline in this speech has a somewhat autocratic flavor which manifests in tension between the concepts of ira and clementia. The balanced performance of anger and mercy will be a major theme in imperial anger narratives, as I shall show, so it is interesting that Cicero engages with it here as consul. Cicero self-consciously expresses a desire to exhibit                                                 181 I grant that the senate’s anxiety over the potential financial implications of Catiline’s conspiracy also played a part in spurring them to action. For a modern psychological study on the difference between the effects that anger and fear have on people’s risk perception (specifically in the context of terrorism) see Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, and Fischhoff 2003. The results of the authors’ experiment were that “anger activated more punitive preferences, and fear enhanced preferences for conciliatory policies and investment in broadly applicable precautionary measures.” (2003: 150) 73  clementia toward Catiline, but he states that his desire not to appear negligent in such a state of emergency is stronger than his inclination towards mercy (Cat. 1.4). He suggests that this situation not only merits anger, but demands it. A more mild reaction could be seen as weak by his audience, and he would run the risk of incurring the same criticism as President Obama in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.182 Conversely, at Cat. 1.16 Cicero proclaims that he will speak with Catiline as if he is moved by pity instead of anger: Sic enim iam tecum loquar, non ut odio permotus esse videar, quo debeo, sed ut misericordia, quae tibi nulla debetur, “For I shall now speak with you that I shall not appear to be provoked by hatred—as is my right—but by pity, not a scrap of which you deserve.”183 Cicero portrays himself as in a position to exhibit either odium or misericordia towards Catiline, but the content of this speech suggests that odium was the only genuine sentiment among the two.  Although his primary objective in this speech is to arouse anger against Catiline, Cicero also engages in positive self-fashioning in order to avoid being on the receiving end of anger later on for taking drastic measures against the conspirators.184 He predicts that he will not be accused of being too cruel in his punishment of Catiline, but rather too late to act (Cat. 1.5): Si te iam, Catilina, comprehendi, si interfici iussero, credo, erit verendum mihi, ne non potius hoc omnes boni serius a me quam quisquam crudelius factum esse dicat.185 It is possible that passages like this were added later                                                 182 See the preface to Part 1 for this modern analogue. 183 This statement lends support to the argument that Romans considered anger appropriate in certain situations, since Cicero here states that he has a right to feel odium towards Catiline.  184 There is disagreement over whether the passages in the Catilinarians that address Cicero’s fear of backlash were added later (i.e. when the backlash had already happened). See Kennedy 1972: 177 and Primmer 1977: 38 for arguments that they may have been added later. Dyck 2008: 107 suggests that some of Cicero’s references to hypothetical invidia make sense (e.g. at Cat. 1.22-23), because Cicero wants Catiline to believe that going into exile would harm Cicero (because Catiline would not be doing what Cicero told the senate that he would do, i.e. join Manlius in arms). 185 “I imagine, Catiline, that if I order your arrest or execution now, what will happen is not that all decent men will say that I acted too late, but that not a single person will say that I acted with uncalled for cruelty!”  74  when the speeches were published, but it is equally possible that Cicero had some amount of foresight about the potential for arousing public anger for his treatment of Catiline and his co-conspirators.   In Cat. 1.22-3 and 1.28-9, Cicero discusses the possibility that he will incur invidia in the aftermath of this crisis. In Cat. 1.22 he remarks that if Catiline goes into banishment instead of joining the rebel forces of Manlius, Cicero will be the object of a tempestas invidiae: tametsi video, si mea voce perterritus ire in exilium animum induxeris quanta tempestas invidiae nobis, si minus in praesens tempus recenti memoria scelerum tuorum, at in posteritatem impendeat. Sed est tanti, dum modo ista sit privata calamitas et a rei publicae periculis seiungatur. Sed tu ut vitiis tuis commoveare, ut legum poenas pertimescas, ut temporibus rei publicae cedas, non est postulandum. Neque enim is es, Catilina, ut te aut pudor umquam a turpitudine aut metus a periculo aut ratio a furore revocarit.  Still, I see that even if in terror at this speech, you made up your mind to go into exile, how great a storm of ill-will threatens to rain down on me—not now because of the fresh memory of your crimes, but later. However, I would still consider this worthwhile, provided that it is just my private catastrophe and is separate from the dangers to the Republic. But we must not expect you to be swayed from your vices, to dread legal punishment or yield to the needs of the Republic! Catiline, you are not a man to allow a sense of shame to pull you back from indecent behavior, or fear from danger or reason from insanity.  Cicero says that he is willing to incur invidia if it means that the Republic will ultimately be safe from Catiline. He contrasts his self-awareness and devotion to the Republic with Catiline’s disregard for Roman values, laws, and emotional norms. Pudor and metus have no effect on Catiline’s behavior, and he does not possess ratio to help him restrain his furor. Cicero continues his discussion of possible backlash against him in Cat. 1.23, directly exhorting Catiline to leave the city and make Cicero the object of invidia:  75  Quam ob rem, ut saepe iam dixi, proficiscere ac, si mihi inimico, ut praedicas, tuo conflare186 vis invidiam, recta perge in exilium; vix feram sermones hominum, si id feceris, vix molem istius invidiae, si in exilium iussu consulis ieris, sustinebo. Sin autem servire meae laudi et gloriae mavis, egredere cum inportuna sceleratorum manu, confer te ad Manlium, concita perditos cives, secerne te a bonis, infer patriae bellum, exsulta impio latrocinio, ut a me non eiectus ad alienos, sed invitatus ad tuos isse videaris.  This is why you should leave as I keep telling you to, and if you wish to fan hatred  for me as your enemy—as you declare you do—go directly into exile. Surely I shall hardly be able to endure men’s gossip if you do so or sustain the weight of ill-will if you go into exile at a consul’s order! However, if you want to help my reputation, leave with your vicious gang of criminals, take yourself off to Manlius, stir up ruined citizens, separate yourself from the decent ones, wage war on your country, relish your treacherous, outlaw life. Then it will not look as if I exiled you to live among strangers, but that your own people invited you to live with them.   Cicero suggests to Catiline that he will be doing greater harm to Cicero if he decides to leave the city without incident because Cicero will incur invidia for making the senate believe that Catiline was a threat. Cicero implies, with no shortage of irony, that he will suffer a loss of auctoritas, his authority in speaking. Lincoln defines auctoritas as “the capacity to produce consequential speech, quelling doubts and winning the trust of the audiences whom [the speakers] engage.”187 This negotiation attempt by Cicero, although insincere, may illustrate some of the emotional dynamics of Roman political relationships. Because Cicero is inimicus188 to Catiline, Catiline’s anger with Cicero should be satisfied if Cicero becomes a target of invidia and suffers a loss of his auctoritas. If we recall the definition that Cicero provides for inimicitia in Tusc. 4.9.21, that inimicitia is anger biding its time for revenge, we can read this passage as Cicero making a show of himself presenting Catiline with the occasion for revenge that he has long awaited. This could serve to                                                 186 Dyck 2008: 108 notes that conflare has the senses of  “to forge” or “form” and “to arouse, stir up engineer” and Cicero uses the verb with invidia as its object five times in his speeches.  187 Lincoln 1994: 4. 188 Epstein 1987b is a study of inimicitiae in Roman politics. Epstein maintains a one-sided view of politics that focuses solely on hostile personal relationships and neglects the impact of ideology and policy on political behavior. His book would have been more satisfying if he had better integrated the concept of inimicitiae with Roman political ideology. This study attempts to show how anger as an emotional concept is part of Roman political discourse, not that anger was the sole (or even most important) motivating factor of Roman political behavior.  76  further characterize Catiline as a bloodthirsty plotter in the eyes of the senators. On another level, Cicero may have intended to suggest to the senate that he was willing to sacrifice his own reputation in order to save them from the threat of Catiline.  In Cat. 1.27-9, Cicero has a conversation with the personified patria, which asks him a series of questions about problems that might stop him from acting against Catiline, including the possibility that he will incur invidia (Cat. 1.28-9):  An invidiam posteritatis times? Praeclaram vero populo Romano refers gratiam, qui te, hominem per te cognitum nulla commendatione maiorum tam mature ad summum imperium per omnis honorum gradus extulit, si propter invidiam aut alicuius periculi metum salutem civium tuorum neglegis. Sed, si quis est invidiae metus, non est vehementius severitatis ac fortitudinis invidia quam inertiae ac nequitiae pertimescenda. An, cum bello vastabitur Italia, vexabuntur urbes, tecta ardebunt tum te non existumas invidiae incendio conflagraturum?  Maybe you fear posterity’s hatred? Naturally! Repay the remarkable favour you owe the Roman people for raising you—a man famous through his own efforts and not those of his ancestors—at such a young age through each successive political office, until you reached their apex, by neglecting the safety of fellow-citizens because you fear danger or being hated. But if you have some fear of being hated, is hatred which you have incurred through rigour and courage something you should fear more deeply than that which comes from being lazy and worthless? Or, when Italy is devastated, her cities ravaged and her houses burned by war, do you think that you will not then be consumed by a fire-storm of hatred?  This passage, along with the other discussions of invidia in this speech, informs us that the possibility of incurring public anger in the form of invidia was a concern of Roman public figures of the late Republic. Cicero’s response to the patria explains why he is willing to punish Catiline with death even if he risks invidia (Cat. 1.29):  ...certe verendum mihi non erat, ne quid hoc parricida civium interfecto invidiae mihi in posteritatem redundaret. Quodsi ea mihi maxime inpenderet tamen hoc animo fui semper, ut invidiam virtute partam gloriam, non invidiam putarem.  ...surely I should not fear that any hatred will overwhelm me after this murderer of  his fellow-citiens is killed. But even if this should threaten me, I have always been of the mind that hatred born from a courageous act is in reality glory. 77   Dyck argues that Cicero’s remark that invidia earned by virtus is equivalent to gloria is not an empirical statement, but rather a normative one.189 Even if no one praises an act, it can still be praiseworthy (cf. Off. 1.14: etiamsi a nullo laudetur, natura esse laudabile). Gloria and invidia are also connected in that they are two possible results of an act, and gloria can sometimes arouse invidia.190 Cicero’s point is that he would be happy to be an object of invidia if it is because he acted virtuously for the sake of the Republic.   Cicero ends this speech with a final exhortation to Catiline to leave the city, and a short but vehement prayer to Jupiter to ensure that Catiline and his associates are met with eternal punishment (Cat. 1.33). Cicero’s techniques in this speech are similar to those he employed in his first speech against Verres, but as consul Cicero more openly involves his own anger in his rhetoric. We can also see Cicero acting as a teacher of Roman identity in a time when that concept was changing in the minds of many citizens.191   3.2.2 In Catilinam 2  Cicero amplifies his performative aggression against Catiline in the opening of the second speech. Now that Catiline has been driven out of Rome, perhaps by the senatorial anger roused against him in the first speech, Cicero’s next task is to similarly sway the emotions of the people in order to ensure support for his plan of action against the conspirators. He begins with a venomous description of Catiline as furentem audacia, scelus anhelantem, pestem patriae nefarie                                                 189 Dyck 2008: 118.  190 See Kaster 2005: 87 for a taxonomy of invidia. Script 2 pertains to invidia felt because you are experiencing a good. 191 See n. 141.  78  molientem, vobis atque huic urbi ferro flammaque minitantem (Cat. 2.1).192 Furentem, a participle from the verb furo, “to rage,” suggests to the audience that Catiline feels an inappropriate and destructive form of anger. Cicero connects Catiline’s furor with his audacia here, doubling up on anger triggers. The second participial phrase scelus anhelantem suggests unrestrained criminal behavior, and this idea is intensified by the penultimate element in the series, nefarie molientem. Cicero ends the series by being very explicit about the threat Catiline poses to the people of Rome. This opening description serves to encourage anger against Catiline, but as we have seen elsewhere in Cicero’s prosecution speeches, fear is added to the emotional prescription that he writes for his audience.193 Cicero’s description of Catiline is intended to hit every nerve—his words have the potential to arouse anger, fear, and disgust in his audience.    Throughout the speech Cicero uses vivid and hyperbolic imagery and metaphor to characterize Catiline and his relationship with the city of Rome. This contrasts with his relatively even-keeled political approach in the first speech in the senate. Cicero describes Catiline’s psychological state to his audience in this way (Cat. 2.2):   Iacet ille nunc prostratus, Quirites, et se perculsum atque abiectum esse sentit et  retorquet oculos profecto saepe ad hanc urbem, quam e suis faucibus ereptam esse  luget; quae quidem mihi laetari videtur, quod tantam pestem evomuerit forasque  proiecerit.  Now he lies in the dust and understands that he is beaten, rejected; I am sure he often twists his gaze back to Rome and laments that she was snatched from his jaws. When I look at Rome, she looks as if she is rejoicing because she vomited up and spat out such a great cancer.  Cicero here personifies the Republic, imagining that its emotional state has improved with the ejection of Catiline. His words serve to create an emotional hierarchy, prioritizing and                                                 192 “...raving with recklessness, panting out crime, scheming unholy ruin for his country and threatening you and Rome with fire and the sword.”  193 Cf. Cat. 1.31. For fear mongering in late Republican Rome, see Fields 2012.  79  legitimizing what he imagines as the emotions of the Republic (which are closely related to his own and to what he recommends for the audience) and subordinating the emotions of Catiline and his followers. This kind of rhetoric works to inspire anger in the audience against Catiline by defining him as someone whose emotions are out of line with Roman norms and hence destructive and worthy of contempt.194 Cicero constructs a different kind of anger for the audience that is sanctioned by Roman values and customs. This tactic of creating an emotional ingroup and outgroup is very effective for creating and maintaining animosity.195   Cicero again performs anticipation about incurring invidia for allowing Catiline to leave the city instead of arresting him and having him executed (Cat. 2.3). He states that this would have been the course of action required by himself et mos maiorum et huius imperii severitas et res publica, but he adds non est ista mea culpa, Quirites, sed temporum. By blaming his inability to execute Catiline on the deficient morals of the times, Cicero again creates an ingroup of himself and his audience, who still work to maintain traditional Roman values, even though the moral fortitude of others is in decline. He emphasizes this notion by stating that there were many who out of stupidity (propter stultitiam) did not believe him, and others who even actively supported Catiline because of their improbitas. Cicero confirms that if his audience is smart, they will agree with him. Cicero implies that in order to deserve to be called Quirites, they must be appropriately outraged at the behaviors of people who threaten the Republic and everything for which it stands. Cicero provides a model in himself for this kind of emotional bond with the Republic.                                                  194 Political ira functions in a similar manner to the nemesis-invidia that Kaster delineates. Cf. Kaster 2005: “If nemesis-invidia is at work, it will attempt not to divide but to create an ethical consensus, unifying a group of “right-thinkers” who can also see themselves as “right-feelers,” mobilized to isolate and bring shame upon a highhanded renegade and thereby reaffirm the values of equity and community (invidia can also, as we have seen, do all of the above at once).” 195 Rubinstein 2004: 188-89 refers to ingrouping and outgrouping as a common one for rousing anger in Athenian oratory. See Richlin 1992 for ingrouping and outgrouping in the context of Roman sexual humor.  80   Cicero models the contempt his audience should feel for Catiline and his  followers in Cat. 2.5:   ...magno opere contemno collectum ex senibus desperatis, ex agresti luxuria, ex rusticis decoctoribus, ex iis, qui vadimonia deserere quam illum exercitum maluerunt.  ...I thoroughly despise his army of desperate old men, cloddish wasters and country bankrupts, consisting of people who have chosen to forfeit their bail rather than positions in his army.  Cicero characterizes this group as being made up of every kind of undesirable member of elite Roman society. He elaborates upon this theme again in Cat. 2.7 by listing all of the criminal types that Catiline’s conspiracy has attracted: quis tota Italia veneficus, quis gladiator, quis latro, quis sicarius, quis parricida, quis testamentorum subiector, quis circumscriptor, quis ganeo, quis nepos, quis adulter, quae mulier infamis, quis corruptor iuventutis, quis corruptus, quis perditus inveniri potest, qui se cum Catilina non familiarissime vixisse fateatur?   Can we find in any part of Italy any poisoner, any gladiator, any outlaw, assassin, parricide, forger of wills, con-man, glutton, prodigal, adulterer, woman without a decent name, corrupter of the young or corrupted loser who does not confess that he was intimate friends with Catiline?  By including every sort of common criminal here, Cicero taps into his audience’s anger toward other groups and attempts to channel it against Catiline. Cicero’s approach in this speech is more polemical and exaggerated than before, in part because Catiline seemed to have proven his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by departing to join Manlius after the first speech, and also because the conditions of delivery at the public assembly allowed for a more bombastic style.   In Cat. 2.11 Cicero describes to the people the type of enemy that they face in Catiline, and presents himself as their dux:  domesticum bellum manet, intus insidiae sunt, intus inclusum periculum est, intus est hostis. Cum luxuria nobis, cum amentia, cum scelere certandum est. Huic ego me bello ducem profiteor, Quirites; suscipio inimicitias hominum perditorum; quae sanari poterunt, quacumque ratione sanabo, quae resecanda erunt, non patiar ad perniciem 81  civitatis manere. Proinde aut exeant aut quiescant aut, si et in urbe et in eadem mente permanent, ea, quae merentur, expectent.  But an internal war remains, there is treachery at home, a pent-up danger—an enemy. We must go to war against excess, insanity, against crime. Citizens, I declare myself your general in this war. I take up this feud with ruined men. I shall cure what can be cured however I can. I shall not allow what must be cut away to remain and ruin our community. So then, let them leave or be peaceable. And if they stay in the city while keeping their own frame of mind, they should expect to get what they deserve.   Cicero here uses the abstract nouns luxuria, amentia, and scelus to denote the “values” that the Catilinarian conspiracy represents. The implication is that the opposite qualities identify “good” Romans: modesty, sound mental health, and obedience to laws and customs. With luxuria Cicero may be attempting to stir up class resentment among the poorer people who probably make up a part of Cicero’s audience here. Amentia is an important concept because it recalls Cicero’s discussions of Catiline’s furor and lack of proper emotional responses to the hostile political situation he faces. Cicero implies that Roman men should be kept in check by emotions like pudor, but Catiline does not possess a healthy mind, and he therefore fails to experience appropriate emotions. This unpredictable emotional nature makes him a danger to Roman society. This is an important concept in many of Cicero’s invective speeches; it is especially potent in the Pro Milone.   In Cat. 2.25 Cicero elaborates on the theme of Catiline’s status as a moral outsider. In this passage he provides a lengthy series of binary oppositions in the Roman value system:  Ex hac enim parte pudor pugnat, illinc petulantia; hinc pudicitia, illinc stuprum; hinc fides, illinc fraudatio; hinc pietas, illinc scelus; hinc constantia, illinc furor; hinc honestas, illinc turpitudo; hinc continentia, illinc lubido; denique aequitas, temperantia, fortitudo, prudentia, virtutes omnes certant cum iniquitate, luxuria, ignavia, temeritate, cum vitiis omnibus; postremo copia cum egestate, bona ratio cum perdita, mens sana cum amentia, bona denique spes cum omnium rerum desperatione confligit. In eius modi certamine ac proelio nonne, si hominum studia deficiant, di ipsi immortales cogant ab his praeclarissimis virtutibus tot et tanta vitia superari?  82  On our side, the combatants are a sense of shame, decency, honesty, loyalty, resolution, honor, self-control; on theirs, shamelessness, indecency, deceit, betrayal, insanity, dishonor and permissiveness. So, justice, moderation, courage, wisdom and all the virtues struggle against injustice, excess, cowardice,  recklessness and all the vices. In short, plenty collides with poverty, good principles with corrupt, sanity with insanity and high hopes with complete despair. Surely, in a contest or battle of this sort, even if human enthusiasm were to flag, the immortal gods would ensure that so many great vices were overcome by these splendid virtues?  Furor is paired with constantia, a Roman virtue that pertains to the qualities of steadiness, perseverance, and loyalty. This opposition reinforces the reason why furor is such a problem in elite Roman society; it makes a person’s behaviour unpredictable and is likely to cause them to disregard the values that they would normally hold when not under the influence of furor. Catiline’s furor can be seen as the root of the rest of his vices; it contributes to his amentia and leads him to engage in activities that only an insane person (in Cicero’s opinion) would find acceptable. This contrasts with the righteous ira that Cicero encourages his audiences to feel.   In this speech Cicero again forecasts his own possible transformation into an object of public hatred.196 He again uses the word invidia to describe the emotion that would be levelled against him in the event that Catiline fails to follow through with his plans.197 He supposes that if Catiline abandons his plans to wage war upon the city, people will call him a tyrant for banishing an innocent citizen (Cat. 2.14). He says that he is prepared to suffer the negative reactions that may occur if Catiline ends up surrendering without a fight, but promises that it will not turn out that way (Cat. 2.15):  Est mihi tanti, Quirites, huius invidiae falsae atque iniquae tempestatem subire, dum modo a vobis huius horribilis belli ac nefarii periculum depellatur. Dicatur  sane eiectus esse a me, dum modo eat in exilium. Sed, mihi credite, non est iturus. Numquam ego ab                                                 196 Cicero’s frequent anticipation of invidia may be a result of his previous experiences as an object of it. Cf. Sall. Cat. 23.5-6. Sallust writes that the nobility felt invidia toward Cicero when he was to assume to consulship because they thought the office was being polluted by a novus homo. Their feelings changed when danger threatened the state.  197 See OLD s.v. invidia 3a: “aroused against an opponent, as a way of contributing to his defeat.”  83  dis inmortalibus optabo, Quirites, invidiae meae levandae causa, ut L. Catilinam ducere exercitum hostium atque in armis volitare audiatis, sed triduo tamen audietis.  Citizens, I am happy to accept this groundless hatred and injustice if it means I can avert the threat of unholy, horrific war from you. He can be called ‘exiled’—provided that he goes into exile. But—trust me with this—he has no intention of going. I shall never hope that, just to lessen people’s hatred of me, the immortal gods make it so you hear that Catiline is flying to his weapons and marching at the head of an enemy army. Yet within three days you will hear this.  Cicero here anticipates future invidia for his treatment of Catiline, but makes sure to say that it would be falsa and iniqua. Cicero’s triumph over Catiline would be a feather in his cap, but some members of the public may feel invidia for him in response to his success. This invidia could follow either one of the two scripts for the emotion that Kaster delineates: it could either be envy at the fact that Cicero in particular is enjoying a good, or it could be “righteous” invidia, envy felt because Cicero is enjoying a good in a way that offends a societal principle.198 Cicero probably means to refer to this second type of invidia, but his argument is that if anyone feels that emotion, it will be false and unjust because he has not actually violated a societal principle.   At the end of this speech, Cicero shifts to a more professional and confident tone. He abandons his hyperbolically venomous attacks for somber, authoritative assurance. He has finished the part of the speech that serves to arouse anger, and now his task is to satisfy it with the promise of vengeance for the (intended) injury done to the Roman people by Catiline and his supporters. One notable aspect of Cicero’s closing of this speech is the inclusion of a promise of leniency toward the conspirators (Cat. 2.28):  Quod ego sic administrabo, Quirites, ut, si ullo modo fieri poterit, ne inprobus quidem quisquam in hac urbe poenam sui sceleris sufferat. Sed si vis manifestae audaciae, si inpendens patriae periculum me necessario de hac animi lenitate deduxerit, illud profecto perficiam, quod in tanto et tam insidioso bello vix optandum videtur, ut neque bonus quisquam intereat paucorumque poena vos omnes salvi esse possitis.                                                 198 Kaster 2005: 87.  84   I shall manage all this so that—if it is at all possible—not even a disloyal citizen of  Rome will suffer the punishment his crime deserves. But if the enormity of his open recklessness or the danger threatening our country forces me from my previous gentleness, I am still sure I shall achieve the near impossible: that no decent citizen will die and the punishment of a few men will make all of you safe.   We know that Cicero’s lenitas animi did not last long, as he had the conspirators in Rome executed less than a month later. To be merciful is a desirable quality in a Roman authority figure, but certain offenses require retaliation. To weigh the consequences of mercy and punishment seems to have been a regal activity in the Roman mindset, as we will see that the ability of a princeps to balance the two was a preoccupation of imperial authors. The backlash that Cicero received for executing the conspirators was probably exacerbated by the way he fashions himself into a sort of autocrat in this speech.199   This speech along with Cicero’s first speech against Catiline provides excellent examples of character assassination as a method of arousing anger in an audience. The interplay between the anger Cicero attempts to create and the anger that he anticipates will be directed toward him is also an intriguing element of Cicero’s rhetorical strategy in these speeches. I will now move on to a defense speech from Cicero’s consular year, Pro Murena.                                                   199 Although Cicero probably did not intend for his speeches against Catiline to have autocratic undertones, we know that Cicero’s enemies interpreted his consular activities and attitudes as regal; cf. Att. 1.16.10, where Cicero quotes Clodius calling him a king: “Quousque,” inquit, “hunc regem feremus?”, “How long, he said, must we tolerate this king?” and Pro Sulla 22, where Cicero states that Sulla’s prosecutor had snidely called him a king: Tarquinium et Numam et me tertium peregrinum regem esse dixisti, “You called me Tarquin, and Numa, and the third foreign king (of Rome).” Cicero was mainly labeled a tyrant because of his decision to execute the conspirators without trial, but I believe that this action followed from the consular ethos that he performed. This ethos combined with his punishment of the conspirators fueled his enemies’ insults.  85  3.3 Pro Murena  Pro Murena, delivered in the final days of November of 63, provides an answer to the question of whether or not philosophy (and thus concern about the moral value of anger) has a place in the pragmatic spheres of Roman oratory and politics.200 Murena had been charged with ambitus, electoral fraud, in the consular election for the following year.201 The case was brought by Servius Sulpicius, a prominent jurist, who had dropped out of the election and promised to charge the winners with bribery. Cicero’s interest in the case is related to his ongoing concern about the Catilinarian conspiracy; at this point Catiline, the other loser in the election, had fled Rome and formed an army with Manlius. Cicero believed that the Republic would need two consuls in office at the beginning of the year to deal with this ongoing threat, and therefore Murena’s possible guilt was less important than the need for political stability at this time.202   The last and most important speaker for the prosecution in this case was Cato the Younger, a staunch proponent of Stoic philosophy, who had already gained a reputation for moral authority and rectitude although he was only 32 years old and just beginning his political career. Cato’s interest in the case stemmed from his outrage at the rampant corruption that characterized Roman politics. Because of Cato’s flawless reputation and amicable relationship with Cicero, Cicero does not employ his usual methods of character assassination in this speech. Instead of attempting to rouse the audience’s anger against his opponent, he challenges Cato’s                                                 200 Elaine Fantham published the first English language commentary on this speech in 2013.  201 See Ayers 1954 and Nótári 2008: 13-42 for the legal and political background of the case. Cicero himself had passed a law against ambitus earlier in the year, the Lex Tullia de ambitu. This law increased penalties for electoral fraud to a decade of exile and prohibited certain campaigning practices.  202 Murena and the other candidates were almost certainly guilty, as it was common practice to use extralegal campaigning methods (cf. Lintott 1990). Cicero does not address the charge itself until section 56 (over halfway through the speech), and he does not begin to argue against the charges until section 67.  86  ethos as a prosecutor by lampooning his strict philosophical principles. Cicero’s treatment of anger in this lampooning is of primary interest to us in this case study.   Cicero spends the first half of the speech praising Murena’s character, stressing the importance of his incipient consulship to the Republic, outlining his military accomplishments, and comparing his qualifications to be consul with those of Sulpicius. He mentions some of what Cato has said about Murena’s character, some elements of which recall Cicero’s attack on Verres. Cato has called Murena a saltator, a dancer (Mur. 13). This is a loaded term that implies immoderate feasting and sexual licentiousness, but Cicero points out that Cato has called Murena a dancer without specifically charging him with any of the attendant behaviors. The time that Murena spent in Asia fighting the second Mithridatic War prompted charges of luxury and decadence from Cato (Mur. 12). Cicero’s discussion of what Cato has said against Murena shows us that similar tactics for arousing audience anger were employed by Cato.   Cicero comes to the actual charge late in the speech, which forms the segue into his discussion of Cato’s Stoicism and his relationship with anger (Mur. 54). Instead of proclaiming Murena’s innocence, he laments his situation with respect to his accusers (Mur. 56):  Quae cum sunt gravia, iudices, tum illud acerbissimum est quod habet eos  accusatores, non qui odio inimicitiarum ad accusandum, sed qui studio accusandi ad inimicitias descenderint.203  Painful as this may be, gentlemen, the most bitter blow of all is to have as his accusers not men who have sunk to prosecuting him from political enmity but men who have become enemies out of their eagerness to launch a prosecution.204  This comment suggests that political hostility was a common cause of accusations (and indeed it probably was at this time). Cicero presents this as the format of a legitimate case. He describes                                                 203 Text is from Clark’s 1905 OCT edition. 204 Translations of Pro Murena are by Macdonald 1977. 87  the prosecution’s unemotional approach to the trial as a venue to defend the idea of moral righteousness as irregular and unfair to Murena. Cicero here promotes the concept of the courtroom as an arena for people to express their anger and to seek vengeance by official means, not for impersonal and abstract philosophizing.   Cato is deemed the fundamentum ac robur totius accusationis, a description which serves not only to emphasize his importance to the prosecution’s case, but also to dehumanize him into a stiff and utterly inhuman oak tree (Mur. 58). Cicero confesses that he is more afraid of Cato’s authority than he is of the charge that he brings. He asks the audience to avoid being affected by Cato’s reputation and influence, and states that it is unjust for an accuser to use his personal power to condemn a citizen (Mur. 59-60). Cicero suggests that the first problem with Cato being the prosecutor is that he has no angry feelings against Murena himself, only moral outrage at the state of Roman politics in general.205 The second problem is that he has no feelings at all, at least not the kind that would make him a suitable person to participate in juridical situations such as this.   Cicero begins his discussion of Cato’s philosophical convictions with comprobatio for the judges206 (Mur. 61):  et quoniam non est nobis haec oratio habenda aut in imperita multitudine aut in aliquo conventu agrestium, audacius paulo de studiis humanitatis quae et mihi et vobis nota et iucunda sunt disputabo.   Seeing, too, that I do not have to address an ignorant crowd or some gathering of rustics, I shall be a little more venturesome in discussing the liberal studies which are so familiar and agreeable to us both.                                                 205 We will later see Cicero reverse this approach in the Pro Milone, in which the personal enmity of the accusers is considered a weakness and illegitimating factor.  206 Craig 1986: 230-31 believes that it is unlikely that Cicero would be able to use such an unconventional and ludicrous strategy for his defense successfully (i.e. lampooning Cato’s Stoicism instead of proving Murena’s innocence) without already being on familiar terms with the members of the jury. 88   The suggestion that agrestes are ignorant of philosophy secures the attention of the judges in the following discussion. It encourages them to show that they are privy to the philosophical tenets that Cicero intends to discuss (and mock). It is, however, important to keep in mind that throughout the speech Cicero employs tactics to avoid arousing Cato’s anger against him. Quintilian praises his ability to do this (Inst. 11.1.70):  Quam molli autem articulo tractavit Catonem! cuius naturam summe admiratus non ipsius vitio sed Stoicae sectae quibusdam in rebus factam duriorem videri volebat, ut inter eos non forensem contentionem sed studiosam disputationem crederes incidisse.   And with what a light touch he deals with Cato! He has the highest admiration for his nature and desires to show that the fact that in certain respects it has become severe and callous is due not to any personal fault, but to the influence of the Stoic school of philosophy; in fact you would imagine that they were engaged not in a forensic dispute, but merely in some philosophical discussion.207  Cicero thus does not attribute Cato’s impractical severity to his intrinsically flawed character, but rather to his education by Stoic teachers. If any anger were aroused in the audience on account of hearing about the ridiculousness of Stoicism, it would not be directed at Cato himself, but to the foreign teachers of philosophy. An orator must be able to direct anger as well as arouse it and quell it. As I will show, Cicero’s most effective means of directing anger against Stoics is to emphasize the foreign and fundamentally un-Roman nature of their beliefs.208  In Mur. 61 Cicero gives a summary of Stoic tenets, emphasizing their extremeness:209  Sapientem gratia numquam moveri, numquam cuiusquam delicto ignoscere; neminem misericordem esse nisi stultum et levem; viri non esse neque exorari neque placari; solos sapientes esse, si distortissimi sint, formosos, si mendicissimi, divites, si servitutem serviant,                                                 207 Translation by Butler 1922. 208 Craig 1986: 233-234 notes that Cicero intends the discussion of Stoic philosophy to play to the anti-Greek sentiments of his audience. Foreignness or Greekness is another recurring Roman cultural trigger for anger (cf. De Or. 2.4: Crassus and Antonius agree that an orator must not appear to be a lover of things Greek).  209 Cicero is obviously exaggerating the tenets of Stoicism for persuasive purposes, but his comments about the need for anger bear further discussion.  89  reges; nos autem qui sapientes non sumus fugitivos, exsules, hostis, insanos denique esse dicunt; omnia peccata esse paria; omne delictum scelus esse nefarium, nec minus delinquere eum qui gallum gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum qui patrem suffocaverit; sapientem nihil opinari, nullius rei paenitere, nulla in re falli, sententiam mutare numquam.  The wise man is never moved by favor, never forgives anyone’s misdeed; only the  fool or the trifler feels pity; a real man does not yield to entreaty or appeasement; only the wise man is handsome however misshapen, rich however needy, a king however much a slave. We who are not wise are by their account runaways, exiled, enemies or even madmen. All misdeeds are equal; every misdemeanor is a heinous crime. The casual killing of a cock is no less a crime than strangling one’s father. The wise man never supposes anything, never regrets anything, is never wrong, never changes his mind.  With this characterization, Cicero portrays Stoics as enemies of all non-Stoics. He suggests that they are incapable of feeling compassion for others and consider those who do not subscribe to their philosophy fugitivi, exsules, hostes, and insani (Cicero cleverly uses the first person plural to include himself and the judges in this group). All of these words suggest an ingroup/outgroup dynamic, similar to the one which we saw Cicero construct between Catiline and his followers and moral Romans in Cat. 2. Cicero’s Stoics hold such extreme and severe views that they cannot be considered part of mainstream Roman culture. By suggesting that the Stoics look down upon regular Romans, Cicero attempts to arouse anger in his audience by including them in the group that has been insulted by members of this school.   Cicero moves on to address Cato’s personal involvement with Stoicism (Mur. 62): hoc homo ingeniosissimus, M. Cato, auctoribus eruditissimis inductus adripuit, neque disputandi causa, ut magna pars, sed ita vivendi, “Marcus Cato with his outstanding intellectual gifts was induced by the teaching of these savants to seize upon this doctrine not just as a topic for discussion, as do most people, but as a way of life.” Praise is alternated with gentle mocking. Cicero suggests that philosophy is meant for debating, not for living. This again lends support to the idea that the Roman sociopolitical scenarios that are the subject of this study were not necessarily burdened by the 90  restrictions philosophy places on emotion. Studying anger narratives on their own terms (i.e. by not strictly reading them through the lens of philosophical views on anger) is likely to yield a richer and perhaps more accurate understanding of how anger worked in Roman sociopolitical contexts.   Cicero elaborates on why Stoicism is impractical for Roman public life in Mur. 62. He gives an account of Cato’s original promise that he would bring a charge after the election in an improvised dialogue between Cato and himself:  Hac ex disciplina nobis illa sunt: ‘Dixi in senatu me nomen consularis candidati delaturum.’ Iratus dixisti. ‘Numquam’ inquit ‘sapiens irascitur.’ At temporis causa. ‘Improbi’ inquit ‘hominis est mendacio fallere; mutare sententiam turpe est, exorari scelus, misereri flagitium.’  It is from teaching like this that we get: “I said in the Senate that I would prosecute a consular candidate.” You spoke in anger. “The wise man,” he says, “is never angry.” Well, you said it as a matter of expediency. “To deceive by lying is dishonest, to change one’s mind shameful, to allow oneself to be prevailed upon a crime, to feel pity a disgrace.”  Cicero considered Cato’s declaration to the senate that he would bring a case against the winners of the election an angry outburst, and thus not a plan that Cato would carry out once he had calmed down. Cato’s automatic response to the suggestion that he was angry would be that a sapiens is never angry, and that it would be immoral to change his mind on the matter. This dialogue illustrates a disconnect between Cato’s internal principles and how his emotional demeanor is received. Cato can claim that he is not angry, but if he shows signs of being angry (either verbal or physical), he will be perceived as such. And perception is important. Cicero is clearly making fun of Cato’s devout application of Stoicism in his public life. Cicero humorously suggests that it disqualifies him from participating in the practical arena of politics. Roman 91  statesmen should be emotional human beings who occasionally experience anger and change their minds, as Cicero soon explains.   Cicero shifts the focus of the discussion to other schools of philosophy in order to contrast their qualities with Cato’s brand of Stoicism (Mur. 63): Nostri autem illi—fatebor enim, Cato, me quoque in adulescentia diffisum ingenio meo quaesisse adiumenta doctrinae—nostri, inquam, illi a Platone et Aristotele, moderati homines et temperati, aiunt apud sapientem valere aliquando gratiam; viri boni esse misereri; distincta genera esse delictorum et disparis  poenas; esse apud hominem constantem ignoscendi locum; ipsum sapientem saepe aliquid opinari quod nesciat, irasci non numquam, exorari eundem et placari, quod dixerit interdum, si ita rectius sit, mutare, de sententia decedere aliquando; omnis virtutes mediocritate quadam esse moderatas.  My masters—for I shall admit, Cato, that I too in my youth distrusted my natural  ability and sought the support of philosophy—my masters, the schools of Plato and Aristotle, men who do not hold violent or extreme views, say that favor can on occasions influence the wise man; that a good man can feel pity; that there are different degrees of wrongdoing and different punishments; that there is a place for forgiveness in a man of principle. The wise man himself often “supposes” something that he does not know for certain, is angry at times, yields to entreaty and appeasement, sometimes alters what he has said if it is better so and sometimes changes his mind; all virtues are saved from excess by a so-called mean.   Here Cicero characterizes Stoicism as a fringe group populated by extremists whose views do not reflect Roman values. Indeed, Cicero tells Cato not to violate the instituta maiorum with his severity (Mur. 75): Qua re noli, Cato, maiorum instituta quae res ipsa, quae diuturnitas imperi comprobat nimium severa oratione reprehendere, “Do not then, Cato, condemn in too harsh terms the customs of our ancestors which are vindicated by experience and by the longevity of our government.” Plato and Aristotle are described as our philosophers, philosophers whose ideas are more realistic and suited to situational pragmatism. In Mur. 76, Cicero illustrates the nuanced Roman way of thinking,210 contrasting it with the black-and-white approach of Stoicism:                                                 210 See Langlands 2011 for the importance of situational ethics and exempla in Roman thought.  92  Odit populus Romanus privatam luxuriam, publicam magnificentiam diligit; non amat profusas epulas, sordis et inhumanitatem multo minus; distinguit rationem officiorum ac temporum, vicissitudinem laboris ac voluptatis.  The Roman people loathe private luxury, but they love public splendor. They do not like extravagant banquets but much less do they like shabbiness and meanness; they take into account the variety of obligations and circumstances and recognize the alternation of work and pleasure.  While not explicitly about anger, this exposition sheds some light on the nature of the relationship between Roman identity and anger. Certain modes of anger were considered useful and even praiseworthy, while others were frowned upon as vice and madness. The value of an emotion, like anything else, must be determined on a case by case basis. Cicero adds further support to this view, illustrating the differences between the ideals of philosophers and his own practical perspective (Mur. 65-6): Etenim isti ipsi mihi videntur vestri praeceptores et virtutis magistri finis officiorum paulo longius quam natura vellet protulisse ut, cum ad ultimum animo contendissemus, ibi tamen ubi oporteret consisteremus. ‘Nihil ignoveris.’ Immo aliquid, non omnia. ‘Nihil gratiae causa feceris.’ Immo resistito gratiae, cum officium et fides postulabit. ‘Misericordia commotus ne sis.’ Etiam, in dissolvenda severitate; sed tamen est laus aliqua humanitatis. ‘In sententia permaneto.’ Vero, nisi sententiam sententia alia vicerit melior.  Indeed, those tutors of yours and your teachers of ethics have, I think, extended the bounds of moral duty a little further than nature intended in order that our efforts of will to achieve perfection should bring us at least to the standards that we should attain. “Never forgive!” No: not on every occasion, but do forgive sometimes. “Never show favor!” No: stand out against it when obligation and good faith require. “Do not be moved by pity!” Certainly not, if you are going to relax discipline; but there is some merit in sympathy. “Stand by your opinion!” Yes, of course, so long as a better opinion does not replace it.   Cicero here suggests that philosophical theory does not always work when applied practically. He stresses the importance of having the ability to gauge a situation and act accordingly.  Cicero pokes fun at the notion that philosophy is at all useful to a mature statesman by admitting that he himself was interested in it as a youth. These comments seem even more ironic 93  when Cicero’s future philosophical endeavors are taken into account, especially his staunch support for Stoic theory of emotions in Tusc. 3-4. Cicero’s use of Cato’s philosophical tenets to discredit his prosecution of Murena in this speech is a rhetorical strategy, and the speech need not necessarily reflect Cicero’s personal views on Stoicism.211 But these passages may very well illustrate what Cicero thought about Stoicism and its ideas about the emotions at this point in his life, and his thoughts (or what he publicly represented as his thoughts) changed as his political power declined. We have already seen differences in Cicero’s rhetorical approach toward anger in In Verrem 1 and In Catilinam 1-2: in a relatively modest position of power, Cicero aroused anger by presenting anger-inducing evidence, and as consul he  openly modeled righteous anger against his target. Cicero’s professed views about philosophical rejections of anger in Pro Murena can be understood as products of his political power. He is inclined to reject these principles because he recognizes anger as a powerful political tool. Because he is consul, his employment of anger in public contexts has the potential to achieve significant results. He has no reason to represent himself as a Stoic sapiens at this time.   Toward the end of the speech, Cicero turns his attention to the person whom he considers the only true enemy present: Catiline. He reveals that his strongest motivation for taking the case is the threat posed by Catiline and the need to have two consuls in office at the beginning of the year (Mur. 78-9). Cato apparently minimized this threat in his speech, but Cicero warns of the extent of the conspirators’ plans (Mur. 80): Inita sunt in hac civitate consilia, iudices, urbis delendae, civium trucidandorum, nominis Romani exstinguendi, “Plans have been laid in this State, gentlemen, to destroy the city, slaughter the citizens and obliterate the name of Rome.”  Murena is needed to take the place of Cicero as defender of the Republic during this time of                                                 211 See Gotoff 1993: 290 for Cicero’s use of oratorical personae.  94  imminent danger. His military experience is particularly valuable in this situation, to the extent that Cicero praises military honors over achievements of oratory as more useful to the consulship (Mur. 24; 30). Cicero closes the speech by pleading for pity for Murena, rousing anger against Catiline, and promoting fear of his potential war on Rome (Mur. 84-90).   Pro Murena offers clarification on a few problems facing readers of oratory and students of Cicero and ancient emotion. Cicero’s remarks about the impracticality of philosophy in sociopolitical situations and the incompatibility of Stoic philosophy with Roman ideals and traditions frees us from the need to reconcile what happens with anger in Roman oratory and other historical genres with contemporary philosophical principles. It most clearly resolves the conflict with Stoicism, the school which takes the harshest stance against anger as a practical emotion. Rex Stem makes the case that the speech is valuable because it shows Cicero working as an orator, politician, and philosopher all at once. 212 This approach leads Stem to argue that all of the hats that Cicero wears represent a unified and consistent personal perspective. I maintain that Cicero follows his own advice, and molds his opinions and approaches to whatever best suits the situation at hand. Gotoff expresses this succinctly: “The sincerity and truth of what each artist says is to be measured only by its effectiveness on the day of the performance.”213 In Pro Murena, Cicero presents this procedure as the Roman way. This explains the varying and often contradictory applications of anger in his works.                                                   212 Stem 2006.  213 Gotoff 1993: 290. 95  3.4 Pro Milone  Cicero’s defense speech for Titus Annius Milo (Pro Milone) in 52 BCE concludes my examination of the dynamics of anger in Cicero’s pre-Civil War oratory. I have chosen this speech as a case study of Cicero’s approach to anger after his return from exile in 57 BCE. Milo was charged and convicted of vis (public violence) after Publius Clodius Pulcher was killed in a street fight that broke out between his entourage and that of Milo on the Appian Way.214 Milo was Cicero’s political ally and a candidate for the consulship, and Clodius was a candidate for the praetorship and a longtime personal enemy of both Cicero and Milo. Clodius spearheaded the movement to exile Cicero in 58 for his execution of alleged conspirators without trial, and Milo played a key role in securing his return in 57. Cicero’s anger toward Clodius features in several of his post reditum speeches,215 and the text of Pro Milone suggests that Cicero’s grudge was not satisfied with the death of Clodius.   The city of Rome was a very hostile place during this time; public anger and the violence that it inspired were points of concern for both politicians and private citizens.216 We know more about the circumstances of this speech because the commentary by Asconius survives.217 In the aftermath of Clodius’ death, the senate house was burned down by the Clodian mob (along with the houses of Milo and the interrex Marcus Lepidus), and a series of interreges were appointed because the consular elections could not be held amidst the violence (Mil. 33-4C). Pompey was                                                 214 Milo was charged under the newly passed lex Pompeia de vi. Pompey was appointed sole consul and tasked with restoring order to the city in the tumultuous aftermath of Clodius’ murder. He used this position to pass laws to prevent further violence between political factions. See Fotheringham 2006 and 2013 for more on the political and historical circumstances of the speech. 215 De domo sua, De haruspicum responsis, Pro Caelio, Pro Sestio, De provinciis consularibus, In Pisonem, Pro Milone.  216 Gang violence between political rivals was common during this time, and Clodius’ murder resulted in his followers burning down the curia by cremating his body within it. Asconius claims that this act created more public indignatio than Clodius’ murder itself (Mil. 33C). The first law against public violence, the lex Plautia de vi, had been passed c. 70 BCE.  217 See Lewis’ 2006 commentary. 96  ordered by the interrex to recruit troops to create a protective force for the city, and armed guards were stationed in the forum and in all of the nearby temples during the trial (Mil. 34C; 30C). This setting must be kept in mind as we consider Cicero’s treatment of anger in this speech.   The text that survives is an edited version of the speech that was originally delivered by Cicero in the forum. Dio reports that Cicero sent the final version of the speech to Milo in exile, to which Milo replied that if Cicero had delivered that speech in the first place, he would not be eating the red mullet of Massilia, his place of exile (40.54.3-4). Asconius considers the published version of Pro Milone Cicero’s best speech (Mil. 42C).218 We can understand the surviving version as the defense that Cicero would have given under ideal circumstances.219 Anger is an important theme of this speech. The text is replete with the Latin lexicon of anger; it contains eight instances of forms of ira, ten of odium, six of invidia, six of dolor, and six of furor.220 I will now discuss how these forms of anger function in Cicero’s defense of Milo, and consider what this speech as a whole can tell us about the politics of Roman anger during this time.   There is tension in this speech between two strategies for expressing anger: violence and public speaking. It was normal for political rivals to become angry with one another, and to attack each other by formal means of invective. As Powell notes, “a spoken or written invective, as a deliberate public display of anger and hostility, was regarded as a legitimate and acceptable method of pursuing a political grudge.”221 Cicero suggests at the opening of this speech that men                                                 218 scripsit vero hanc quam legimus ita perfecte ut iure prima haberi possit. Asconius says that the delivered version was recorded as well, but the published version is superior because when Cicero spoke he had been afraid of the surrounding soldiery, and the fear negatively affected his delivery.  219 Lewis 2006: 247 notes that although many of the published versions of Cicero’s speeches probably differ from those that he delivered, the differences between the published and delivered versions of Pro Milone may have been “particularly striking.”  220 Ira: 33, 35, 42, 56, 63, 86, 99; odium: 35, 51, 63, 79, 56; invidia: 40, 75, 82, 91, 98; dolor: 16, 35, 57, 99, 103; furor: 3, 27, 32, 34, 35, 77.  221 Powell 2001: 3. 97  are now more likely to pursue their grudges with armed men than with oratory (Mil. 2). He describes the setting of the trial: Pompey has arranged for the forum to be surrounded by armed guards to fend off violent mobs that threaten the proceedings (Mil. 1-3). Cicero acknowledges that those guards are there for his protection, but the supporters of Clodius still pose a threat to the stability of Roman society (Mil. 3): Unum genus est adversum infestumque nobis, eorum quos P. Clodi furor rapinis et incendiis et omnibus exitiis publicis pavit,222 “Only one type of person is opposed and hostile to us, he whom Publius Clodius’ madness fattened with looting, arson and everything devastating to the community.”223 Even though Clodius is dead, the power of his furor to incite violence persists. Cicero argues that Milo has always opposed this violent faction, and therefore he should be acquitted.   Cicero characterizes Milo and Clodius as opposing forces of good and evil. According to Cicero, Milo has always stood up for the good against the bad (Mil. 5: pro bonis contra improbos). Clodius is consistently portrayed by Cicero as a criminal instigator and perpetrator of wanton violence.224 Cicero does not deny that Milo killed Clodius. He argues that the act was committed in self defense, and asks that citizens be allowed to defend themselves against violence (Mil. 6): ...obsecrabo obtestaborque vos, iudices, hoc saltem nobis ut relinquatur, ab inimicorum audacia telisque vitam ut impune liceat defendere, “...I shall beg you, jurors, even if we have lost everything else, to leave us with the right to defend our lives, without fear, against wild attacks.” Cicero again points to audacia as a fundamental element of bad character. Cicero offers a list of exempla of Roman men who were judged to have lawfully killed someone, and argues that Milo’s murder of Clodius                                                 222 Text is from Clark’s 1918 OCT edition. 223 Translations of Pro Milone are by McElduff 2011. 224 See Rundell 1979 for a discussion of Cicero’s credibility regarding the character of Clodius. For a biographical treatment of Clodius’ career see Tatum 1999.  98  should be in this category (Mil. 7-8). His final exemplum is Orestes, who famously killed his mother in order to avenge his father and was acquitted by the gods. Cicero points out that Roman law permits killing in many scenarios (Mil. 9-11). He asks, Insidiatori vero et latroni quae potest inferri iniusta nex?, “But what death can be unjust when inflicted on a conspirator and robber?”225 (Mil. 10) Here again Cicero refers to the idea of insidiae in order to arouse anger in his audience. Cicero claims that Milo killed Clodius because Clodius had laid a trap intending to murder Milo (Mil. 30). Asconius remarks that Clodius’ defense team made the opposite argument, namely that Milo ambushed Clodius, but Asconius himself believes that the two actually met by chance.   At Mil. 32 Cicero begins to substantiate his argument that Clodius planned to ambush and kill Milo in the road. He suggests that Clodius’ character and the fact that he had much to gain politically from Milo’s death will support his case (Mil. 32): Satis est in illa quidem tam audaci, tam nefaria belua, docere magnam ei causam, magnam spem in Milonis morte propositam, magnas utilitates fuisse, “It is enough to demonstrate in the case of that reckless, evil monster that he had a strong motive, great hopes and that he gained considerable advantage from the death of Milo.” By eliminating Milo, Clodius would be able to gain more influence as praetor and pass laws that he would not have been able to pass under Milo’s consulship. According to Cicero, Clodius had a clear motive for killing Milo. This is not to suggest that murder was a normal means of overcoming political rivals; Cicero emphasizes Clodius’ furor and poor character to demonstrate that this is the kind of thing that he would do, even if it violates Roman morals.                                                 225  On Cicero’s use of the word latro see Habinek 1998: 72-3. Habinek explains that in its earliest occurrences in Latin, latro is used to refer to “those who drain the public treasury, such as mercenary soldiers or bodyguards of the king.” Because Clodius had bodyguards, Cicero may be reviving this usage of the term here to take advantage of its political and economic connotations.  99   During this argument, Cicero suddenly shifts his attention to Sextus Cloelius, Clodius’ scribe, who led the mob that cremated Clodius’ body in the senate house and consequently burned it down.226 Cicero claims that Cloelius is in possession of these laws that Clodius intended to promulgate. He derides the content of the laws227 and directly addresses Cloelius with a question (Mil. 33): Quid? tu me tibi iratum, Sexte, putas, cuius inimicissimum multo crudelius etiam poenitus es, quam erat humanitatis meae postulare? Tu P. Clodi cruentum cadaver eiecisti domo, tu in publicum abiecisti, tu spoliatum imaginibus, exsequiis, pompa, laudatione, infelicissimis lignis semiustilatum, nocturnis canibus dilaniandum reliquisti. Qua re, etsi nefarie fecisti, tamen quoniam in meo inimico crudelitatem exprompsisti tuam, laudare non possum, irasci certe non debeo.  What? Do you think that I am angry with you, Sextus? You punished my bitterest  enemy far more cruelly than my sense of human decency could demand. You dragged out the bloody corpse of Publius Clodius from his home. You flung it into public view. You stripped it of the masks of his ancestors, mourners, the funeral procession and the eulogy. You left his corpse half-burned by cursed wood, to be ripped apart by dogs in the night. Although I cannot praise you, I certainly should not be angry even if what you did was unholy, since you put your cruelty to use against my enemy.  This ironic address may have been intended to turn the Clodians against each other. By explaining his lack of anger with Cloelius in this way, Cicero suggests that those who should be angry with him are Clodius’ supporters. It more likely functioned to further criticize the Clodians’ destructive behavior, however. Read in a different way, this passage may also offer a glimpse of the dynamics of political anger. Cloelius has committed an impious act, but because he has done it to the detriment of Cicero’s greatest enemy, Cicero has no reason to be angry with him. Although he disapproves of Cloelius’ actions, he does not perceive that any iniuriae have                                                 226 Asconius notes that Clodius’ wife Fulvia played a major role in stirring up the invidia that led to the arson (Mil. 32C): Augebat autem facti invidiam uxor Clodi Fulvia quae cum effusa lamentatione vulnera eius ostendebat, “Clodius’ wife Fulvia was bent on inflaming anger at the deed by displaying his wounds with effusive lamentations.” Translation by Lewis 2006.  227 The laws pertained to widening the voting rights of freedmen.  100  been done to him; he has personally benefitted from the event. This scenario suggests that Cicero was angry with Clodius, and that Cloelius’ disrespect of Clodius’ corpse satisfied Cicero’s longstanding desire for vengeance.228 Although the language of inimicitia is used here, it is unlikely that most inimici would be pleased with the desecration of their rival’s corpse, hence the reason why Cicero labels Clodius inimicissimus at the beginning of the passage. Cicero refers to Clodius with the stronger word hostis elsewhere in the speech in order to make the point that Clodius was more than just inimicus to Cicero, he was hostis to Rome.229   Having established that Clodius had a motive to ambush and kill Milo, Cicero moves on to argue that Milo had no motive to do the same to Clodius. Cicero claims that Milo’s candidacy was actually assisted by Clodius’ continued existence because the people could not imagine Clodius’ praetorship without a strong man like Milo as consul (Mil. 34). In the same section he also remarks that Milo was constantly acquiring gloria for crushing the furores Clodiani. He concludes that Clodius’ death hinders Milo, because Clodius supplied Milo with occasions to display his virtus. Cicero next supplies some motives for Milo that others have suggested and argues against them (Mil. 35):  ‘At valuit odium, fecit iratus, fecit inimicus, fuit ultor iniuriae, poenitor doloris sui.’ Quid? si haec non dico maiora fuerunt in Clodio quam in Milone, sed in illo maxima, nulla in hoc? quid voltis amplius? Quid enim odisset Clodium Milo, segetem ac materiem suae gloriae, praeter hoc civile odium, quo omnis improbos odimus? Ille erat ut odisset, primum defensorem salutis meae, deinde vexatorem furoris, domitorem armorum suorum, postremo etiam accusatorem suum: reus enim Milonis lege Plotia fuit Clodius, quoad vixit. Quo tandem animo hoc tyrannum illum tulisse creditis? quantum odium illius, et in homine iniusto quam etiam iustum fuisse?  ‘But his hate made him do it.’ ‘He did it in anger.’ ‘He did it because he was his enemy.’ ‘He did it to get justice for an injury.’ ‘To get revenge for his private grievances.’ What? If I do not just say that these were stronger motives for Clodius than Milo, but that for                                                 228 Cf. Cicero’s definition of inimicitia in Tusc. 4.9.21: ira ulciscendi tempus observans. 229 Mil. 39; 56; 78. Hostis is commonly used to denote enemies of the state (OLD s.v. hostis 2b). 101  Clodius these were everything, for Milo nothing—what more will you ask for? Why should Milo have hated Clodius, who gave him such fertile ground and raw material for fame, beyond, that is, the hatred a normal citizen has for all perverse men? But Clodius had reason to hate Milo. First, Milo protected my well-being, tormented his madness, tamed his weapons, and finally, even prosecuted him: as long as he lived, Clodius would be in danger of prosecuting by Milo under the lex Plotia. Tell me, how you do you think the tyrant took that? How great and how justified was his hatred, even for a man without any sense of justice?  Cicero anticipates that the argument will be made that Milo was angry with Clodius, and that this anger led him to commit murder. Cicero supplies this hypothetical sentence with several words from the Latin lexicon of anger: odium, iratus, inimicus, iniuriae, and dolor. He does not expect that people will accuse Milo of being furatus, however; furor is reserved for Clodius. Cicero claims that Milo only felt the odium civile which everyone feels towards improbi men. Cicero tries to keep Milo’s anger in the realm of everyday political hostility.230 At the end of this passage Cicero asks the audience to imagine Clodius’ emotional state towards Milo. He suggests that any odium that Clodius would have felt towards Milo would have been iustum because Milo would have continually barred Clodius from acting as a tyrannus. Cicero suggests that it is possible to accurately imagine what Clodius’ feelings would have been based on the common understanding of what triggers odium. This differs from his approach to Catiline’s emotions, which he portrayed as unpredictable and situationally inappropriate.   Cicero contrasts the nature of Clodius’ violent behaviour with Milo’s. He argues that Milo tried to pursue his grudge with Clodius by lawful means, whereas Clodius resorted to extralegal violence (Mil. 36-38). Any vis that Milo has committed has been for the sake of the Republic and in line with Roman values (Mil. 30: oppressa virtute audacia est), and he only used force because Clodius was able to avoid being brought to trial (Mil. 38):  cuius vis omnis haec semper fuit, ne                                                 230 Recall that Hellegouarc’h 1963: 191 describes odium as the most general term for political hostility. See chapter 2, section 2.1. 102  P. Clodius, cum in iudicium detrahi non posset, vi oppressam civitatem teneret, “This was always the aim of Milo’s ‘violence’: stopping Publius Clodius, since the courts could not deal with him, from controlling a state overwhelmed by his violence.” Cicero argues that Milo had many better occasions on which to kill Clodius if he had really intended to do so. This would have been a particularly unsuitable time for Milo to plan a murder: since he was running for the consulship, he would have wanted to avoid any bad press. On this point, Cicero describes the emotional state of men who are running for office and suggests that they must avoid incurring the ira of the people, whose feelings are capricious (Mil. 42):  Nihil est enim tam molle, tam tenerum, tam aut fragile aut flexibile, quam  voluntas erga nos sensusque civium, qui non modo improbitati irascuntur candidatorum, sed etiam in recte factis saepe fastidiunt.  For nothing is so fragile, so delicate, so brittle and so easily altered as the goodwill  and feelings our fellow-citizens have for us: they do not just get angry with candidates’ scandalous acts but are often even offended by proper ones.  Cicero portrays Milo as a man who is sensitive to the emotions of the public. At Mil. 63 he says that even people who were not familiar with Milo’s character expected that Milo would leave Rome if he had killed Clodius in anger:  Sive enim illud animo irato ac percito fecisset, ut incensus odio trucidaret inimicum, arbitrabantur eum tanti mortem P. Clodi putasse, ut aequo animo patria careret, cum sanguine inimici explesset odium suum.  They said he would not return to Rome, as—whether or not he had acted in an angry and desparate state of mind, and butchered an enemy while enflamed with hatred—he thought the death of Clodius so important he would be resigned to exile because he had gorged his hatred on the blood of an enemy.  According to Cicero, Milo would have departed from Rome if he felt that he had done anything illegal, even if it were for the benefit of the Republic. If Milo had murdered Clodius for the purpose of exacting revenge, he surely would have known better than to remain in the city, given 103  the hostility of Clodius’ supporters. Cicero’s point is that Milo killed Clodius in self-defense, and that is why he is in Rome standing trial.   At Mil. 72 Cicero begins to argue that Clodius’ murder was a service to the state. He proclaims that he is not worried about being perceived as too angry to be telling the truth because his hatred of Clodius is shared by everyone (Mil. 78): Non, timeo, iudices, ne odio inimicitiarum mearum inflammatus libentius haec in illum evomere videar quam verius. Etenim si praecipuum esse debebat, tamen ita communis erat omnium ille hostis, ut in communi odio paene aequaliter versaretur odium meum. Non potest dici satis, ne cogitari quidem, quantum in illo sceleris, quantum exiti fuerit.   Jurors, I am not afraid that I will look as if I am spewing these charges with more enthusiasm than fairness, enflamed by personal hatred for Clodius. Even if that should be beyond the norm, he was such an enemy to everyone that my hatred was almost equalled by everyone else’s. One cannot speak or even reflect enough about the sheer volume of crime and destruction contained in that man.  Cicero admits that his hatred of Clodius may be stronger than the average citizen’s, but he states that there was also a commune odium shared by all that further justifies his negative feelings towards the man. At this point in the speech, Cicero seems to suggest that the fact that someone who was the subject of so much public anger has been killed should be celebrated, no matter what the circumstances of his murder were. Cicero argues that the senate would not want to bring Clodius back to life even if they could (Mil. 79), and they therefore should honor Milo for his service to the state (Mil. 80). He makes the point that Milo, like Cicero himself, was willing to face invidia for the sake of his country (Mil. 82).  In his conclusion to the speech, Cicero makes an emotional appeal to the jury. He narrates to the jury what he would say to Milo (Mil. 99):  “Te quidem, cum isto animo es, satis laudare non possum; sed, quo est ista magis  divina virtus, eo maiore a te dolore divellor. Nec vero, si mihi eriperis, reliqua est illa tamen ad consolandum querella, ut eis irasci possim, a quibus tantum volnus accepero. Non enim 104  inimici mei te mihi eripient, sed amicissimi; non male aliquando de me meriti, sed semper optime.”  I cannot praise you enough; but the more superhuman your heroism, the greater the pain I feel at being torn from you. Nor, if you are ripped from me, will complaints—all I have left—be able to console me; I cannot be angry with those who gave me such a blow. For it is not my enemies that rip you from me, but my closest friends; they are not men who ever deserved evil from me, but always the best.  Cicero laments that he will not even be able to be angry with the people who condemn Milo, since they are amicissimi to him. This passage reinforces the idea that anger was a regular feature of relationships of inimicitia. It also suggests that amici were unlikely to express anger with each other publicly. Because the men of the jury are friends of Cicero, he implores them to spare Cicero emotional turmoil and to pardon Milo (Mil. 99-100). Cicero ends the speech because he can no longer speak through his tears at the thought of losing Milo. He urges the judges to do what is right (i.e. acquit Milo), and reassures them that Pompey will approve of their decision (Mil. 105): Vestram virtutem, iustitiam, fidem, mihi credite, is maxime probabit, qui in iudicibus legendis optimum et sapientissimum et fortissimum quemque elegit, “Believe me: Pompey, who in selecting jurors chose the best, the wisest and the bravest, will particularly approve of your courage, justice and integrity.”   This speech is a fascinating case study for the dynamics of anger during the final years before Caesar’s civil war. During the speech Cicero encourages the jury to consider the unrestrained furor of Clodius, his own lack of anger towards Cloelius, the odium civile of Milo, the odium commune of the people, and the different ways in which Milo and Clodius conducted themselves in a relationship of inimicitia.    105  3.5 Conclusion  In these speeches we see Cicero build a career on the promotion of a political discourse of anger. For Cicero, ira was more than an emotion that an orator arouses in his audience in order to persuade them to an opinion. We can view the features of Cicero’s political anger discourse by separating his rhetorical strategies into three categories: (1) his management of his audiences’ anger, (2) his treatment of his opponents’ or targets’ anger, and (3) his expression of his own anger (which is combined in many cases with category (1)). In his first speech against Verres, Cicero focuses almost exclusively on category (1). In In Verrem 1.2, 4, 5, 8, 11, and 50 Cicero invites his audience of senatorial judges to make Verres, one of their own class, a target of their anger. Cicero implies throughout the speech that by exhibiting anger toward Verres, the judges can rid themselves of invidia and regain a reputation of moral integrity. Anger, therefore, can be a means of performing ethical behavior in Roman public life. Cicero attempts to persuade the judges that if they express this kind of anger and punish Verres, they may have a chance of maintaining the political power that their monopoly over the courts supplies.   Cicero broadens his approach when he speaks against Catiline as consul. In his speech to the senate (In Catilinam 1), Cicero attempts to provoke his audience’s anger by describing the ways in which Catiline intends to harm them and the Republic as a whole (Cat. 1.2, 5, 9, 12, 15-16). He also employs strategies in category (2). He develops a method for attacking political movements that involves denouncing the emotional motivations behind them. For example, he characterizes Catiline’s anger as destructive, and he encourages his audience to imagine the damage that it could do to the status quo. Cicero uses the idea of inappropriate anger (furor) to frame Catiline’s political aspirations (Cat. 1.1-2, 15, 22, 25, 31). He adopts this approach before the people as well in Cat. 2.1, 19, 20 and 25. Because he is in a position of political authority, 106  Cicero is able to speak freely and forcefully about the nature of Catiline’s (and his followers’) emotions, and he portrays them in a way that separates him and his supporters from mainstream elite Roman society. We learn from this that there was a risk involved in exhibiting anger in Roman public life: it could be interpreted as righteous anger or destructive rage depending on who evaluated it and what their political motivations were. His technique is similar in Pro Milone when he speaks of the dangers of Clodian furor (Mil. 3, 14, 34-5, 77-8), but Cicero loses the case, perhaps in part because that strategy was better suited for someone in a position of greater power.   Cicero uses his consulship as a platform to define the proper uses of anger in public life. When he speaks on behalf of Murena, he criticizes Cato’s prosecution because it was not inspired by anger (Mur. 56, 62-3). This strategy belongs to category (2) because Cicero’s focus is on his opponent’s relationship with anger. Cicero characterizes Cato’s Stoic lack of anger as non-Roman, and thus unsuited to participation in Roman public life (Mur. 61, 76). He remarks that more practical schools of philosophy recognize that a wise man sometimes gets angry (Mur. 63). Cicero’s treatment of Cato’s Stoicism in this speech is definitely humorous in tone, but my reading suggests that it has political implications as well. Performing anger in public contexts was a means of communicating one’s Romanness as well as one’s moral views and social status.   Cicero does not frequently refer to his own anger (category (3)) in these speeches, at least not in explicit terms. His anger is most often implied in his attempts to arouse his audience’s anger.231 There are nevertheless a few places where Cicero directly mentions his own anger. In Cat. 1.16 he states that he has the right to appear angry with Catiline, but he will opt for pity                                                 231 The gestures, expression, and tone that Cicero used in these instances would have been enough to suggest that he was angry. 107  instead. In another example, he expresses his own contempt for Catiline’s followers, providing an emotional model for his audience (Cat. 2.5). Cicero’s ability to discuss and express his anger in this way in order to achieve political results is connected to his prominent position in society. Eleven years later, Cicero announces during his speech on behalf of Milo that he is not afraid of appearing excessively angry toward the Clodians because his anger is shared by everyone (Mil. 78). The fear of seeming too angry is a concern of post-exile Cicero, who no longer has the authority to represent his own anger as a model for his peers. At Mil. 33 he states that he is not angry with Clodius’ scribe for burning down the senate-house, and at Mil. 99 he laments that he cannot be angry with Milo’s prosecutors because they are his friends. Cicero’s diminished status prevents him from being able to accomplish much politically with his own anger, but he still makes heavy use of strategies from categories (1) and (2) in an attempt to secure Milo’s acquittal.   The following chapter examines how Cicero adapts his anger discourse for use under different political circumstances. In the Caesarianae, his three categories merge into one as he focuses on the topic of Caesar’s ira. In the Philippics, he revives his old techniques for deployment against Antony in a last-ditch effort to save the Republic.         108  Chapter 4: Anger on the Eve of the Principate: Cicero’s Caesarianae and Philippics   In 46 and 45 BCE, Cicero delivered three speeches before Caesar, Pro Marcello, Pro Ligario, and Pro Rege Deiotaro. Because they are directly addressed to Caesar as the sole judge, these speeches are collectively called the Caesarianae. Pro Marcello was delivered as a thanksgiving speech (sententia) to Caesar for granting clementia to one of his most outspoken political enemies. Pro Ligario and Pro Rege Deiotaro aim to secure clemency for supporters of Pompey after Caesar’s victory in the Civil War. Cicero’s rhetorical technique in these speeches represents a departure from the modes of persuasion seen earlier. He relies heavily on panegyric in addition to emotional appeals. Plutarch comments on the effectiveness of Cicero’s technique in Cic. 39 when he remarks that when Cicero spoke on behalf of Ligarius, Caesar’s face changed color and it was clear that all of his emotions were being affected (πάσας δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τρεπόμενον τροπὰς κατάδηλον εἶναι), and when the orator reached the part about Pharsalus, Caesar’s body shook so much that he dropped documents on the floor. Not only does Cicero attempt to praise Caesar’s clementia and sway his emotions in favor of his clients in these speeches, he also speaks about Caesar’s management of his anger. These speeches show Cicero in a unique and delicate position: the ways in which he handles Caesar’s emotions, and especially his ira, would have been important for his success as an advocate, but Cicero was likely aware that his performance could also affect Caesar’s continued tolerance of Cicero’s presence on the political stage.   The political circumstances of the Caesarianae were unusual; at the time of their delivery, Caesar had been appointed to his third dictatorship for a ten-year term, and Cicero had not spoken in public since he had been pardoned by Caesar. Cicero had to develop a technique appropriate for speaking before an absolute ruler, and it is significant that he chose to discuss 109  Caesar’s emotions in this scenario. In this chapter I analyze Cicero’s treatment of Caesar’s anger in these speeches and consider how the Caesarianae serve to develop the concept of ira Caesaris as it is found in later imperial sources.232   4.1 Pro Marcello  At a meeting of the senate in September of 46, Caesar unexpectedly announced that he planned to recall Marcus Claudius Marcellus from exile at the request of the senate.233 As consul in 51 Marcellus had staunchly opposed Caesar at every turn. He proposed to terminate Caesar’s command in Gaul and elect a successor a year early, he opposed Caesar’s request to run for the consulship in absentia, and he had a senator from the colony of Novum Comum in Transpadane Gaul whipped publicly to display his anger with Caesar for granting citizens’ rights to the colonists there.  Marcellus left Rome in 49 and followed Pompey to Pharsalus. He chose to go into voluntary exile at Mytilene after Pompey’s defeat. Marcellus was a close friend of Cicero; he received oratorical training from him and supported him during the Catilinarian crisis of 63. They also worked together defending M. Aemilius Scaurus in 54 and Milo in 56 and 52. It was clearly surprising that Caesar would pardon one of his most outspoken enemies, and the event inspired Cicero to break his public silence and deliver the impromptu sententia Pro Marcello in the Senate.234                                                 232 In chapter 5 I discuss how the binary concepts of clementia Caesaris and ira Caesaris are further developed during Augustus’ Principate.  233 Cf. Cic. Fam. 4.4.3. 234 In a letter to Aulus Caecina (Fam. 6.6), Cicero remarks upon Caesar’s good qualities, citing his pardon of Marcellus as evidence of his clemency and equanimity. 110   The adulatory tone of this speech has generated a variety of readings because it seems a stark departure from Cicero’s politics.235 In the early 19th century, F.A. Wolf went so far as to question its authorship.236  Since then more persuasive interpretations have been proposed.237 Many of them hinge upon Cicero’s intentions: what is the true sentiment behind his hyperbolic praise of the dictator?238 In a chapter on the interpretation of ambiguities in Pro Marcello, John Dugan rightly dismisses the question of intent as unknowable, noting that “...there was no authentic freedom of speech under Caesar’s domination of Rome. The lack of such libertas inevitably raises suspicions that political speech cannot be taken as reflecting a speaker’s intentions, whether these doubts are founded or not.”239 In the following sections I read the Caesarianae as political texts that engage in a discourse about ira Caesaris and clementia Caesaris. I do not dismiss the potential for irony in Cicero’s statements, but because these speeches were delivered to Caesar under Caesar’s dictatorship, I suspect that they cohered with Caesar’s wider efforts to promote his public image.  In Marcell. 8 Cicero associates Caesar’s military prowess with his ability to master his own   emotions:                                                  235 For discussion of the history of interpretation of Pro Marcello, see Dugan 2013: 211-25. 236 Wolf 1802.  237 E.g. that it is praised mixed with admonition (Cipriani 1977); that it is a sincere speech of thanksgiving (Winterbottom 2002); that it is figured speech inviting the senatorial class to commit tyrannicide (Dyer 1990).  238 Connolly 2011: 164 urges scholars to put aside the unanswerable questions of Cicero’s intentions and sincerity. She defends the speech against those who dismiss it by pointing out the complex effects of Cicero’s hyperbole. She concludes in this way (2011: 178): “Cicero summons up images in which each part of his partisan audience may invest in different ways; he stages emotions that some will watch with pleasure and some with pain, including the glee of Caesarian triumph, and Pompeian grief at defeat and even vengeful rage at the victor, the object of praise. It is Cicero’s inclusive acknowledgement of these various mental and political states that makes his speech worthy of study, because it reveals the accommodations Cicero believes both losers and winners must make in order to live under the new conditions of Caesarian domination.” I think that Cicero’s treatment of ira Caesaris plays a role in this. When he talks about Caesar’s anger in front of Caesar and the senate (in the case of Pro Marcello), Cicero carefully navigates the new emotional hierarchy, perhaps with the effect of showing that it is possible to play a role in shaping a discourse about ira Caesaris that limits the scope of its use.  239 Dugan 2013: 223. 111   Animum vincere, iracundiam cohibere, victo temperare, adversarium nobilitate, ingenio, virtute praestantem non modo extollere iacentem sed etiam amplificare eius pristinam dignitatem, haec qui fecit, non ego eum cum summis viris comparo, sed simillimum deo iudico.240   To conquer one’s pride, to contain one’s anger, to control oneself in the time of  victory, to not only lift up a defeated adversary, eminent in birth, genius, and virtue, but  also to amplify his original dignity—he who does these kind of things, I do not compare  him to the greatest men, but I consider him to be most similar to a god.   Cicero’s statement here suggests that Caesar possesses iracundia, but that he is able to “hold it together.” The choice of iracundia over ira communicates that Caesar’s anger is a reoccurring emotional state, an angry disposition rather than a single episode of anger. Caesar has iracundia at his disposal, but it is under his control (like everything else at this time). Cicero describes this behavior as godlike, perhaps because of the omnipotence it implies.241 Harris comments that Caesar’s ability to restrain his anger at this time would have seemed remarkable “because civil war is preeminently a time of iracundia.”242   Cicero then compares Caesar’s military glory and the fame he receives from his acts of clemency. He says that Caesar’s victories in battle will be celebrated forever, but his mildness will be even more memorable (Marcell. 9):   At vero cum aliquid clementer, mansuete, iuste, moderate, sapienter factum—in  iracundia praesertim, quae est inimica consilio, et in victoria, quae natura insolens  et superba est—audimus aut legimus, quo studio incendimur, non modo in gestis  rebus,  sed etiam in fictis, ut eos saepe, quos numquam vidimus, diligamus!                                                  240 Texts of the Caesarianae are from Clark’s 1918 OCT edition. 241 The gods of ancient myth do not often control their anger in this way. Perhaps it is significant that Cicero does not name the god to which Caesar is similar. Although he probably did not intend to foreshadow Caesar’s eventual apotheosis, he may have been drawing upon Caesar’s self-association with the goddess Venus. Cicero would have been familiar with Caesar’s ideology and iconography. For Cicero’s involvement in the planning of Caesar’s public works (which included a temple to Venus Genetrix) see Ulrich 1993. The connection between a powerful man experiencing anger and being like a god is taken up by Ovid in his exile poetry in a way that is more consistent with mythical accounts: Augustus is compared to Jupiter in the severity of the consequences of his anger. 242 Harris 2001: 209.  112   But indeed when we hear or read about anything done with clemency, with mildness,  with justice, with moderation, and with wisdom, especially in anger, which is hostile to  deliberation,243 and in the time of victory, which by nature is insolent and proud, with what zeal do we burn, not only when things have been done, but even when they have been made up, so that we often love those whom we have never seen.   Cicero implies that Caesar’s clemency is made even more remarkable by the fact that he grants it in iracundia. It does not even matter if the events did not actually happen as described: the stories about Caesar’s clementia in iracundia are so marvelous that people cannot help but be moved by them. Cicero does not suggest that Caesar should never act upon his iracundia in a more aggressive manner; he simply argues that clementia is more effective than ira in gaining support from the people, even if it is by virtue of the element of surprise.   In Marcell. 15 Cicero claims that despite his eventual victory in the civil war, Caesar, like Cicero, was always a proponent of peace for the Republic. According to Cicero, Caesar defended peace by showing his anger at those who threatened it:   Ex quo nemo iam erit tam iniustus existimator rerum, qui dubitet quae Caesaris de bello  voluntas fuerit, cum pacis auctores conservandos statim censuerit, ceteris fuerit iratior.   From this no one will be so unjust a judge of matters as to doubt what Caesar’s desire  regarding war was, when he immediately decreed that the supporters of peace should be  saved, and was very angry at the others.   Cicero expresses approval of Caesar exhibiting his anger at those who threaten the safety of the Republic. This statement suggests that Caesar knows when ira is required and when clementia is preferable; the Pompeians who ask for reconciliation with Caesar now that the war has been won do not (in Cicero’s view) pose a threat to the Republic. There is a time, place, and context for ira                                                 243 Cf. Caesar’s speech in Sall. Cat. 51. 113  Caesaris, and Caesar is portrayed as having the sensitivity required to know when a display of anger is needed.   In Marcell. 17 Cicero displaces responsibility for the loss of citizens after the civil war was over from Caesar to the god of war, Mars. He remarks quos amisimus civis, eos Martis vis perculit, non ira victoriae, “Those citizens who we lost, the force of Mars struck them down, not the anger of victory.” Cicero frequently associates ira with victoria and implies that Caesar’s victoria, and thus his ira, ended with the termination of his battles (vidimus tuam victoriam proeliorum exitu terminatam). He claims that Caesar would raise people from the dead if he could, since he has tried to preserve all of the Pompeians that he can.244 He follows this statement with a remark about the other side in the war (Pompey’s): Alterius vero partis nihil amplius dicam quam (id quod omnes verebamur) nimis iracundam futuram fuisse victoriam, “I will not say anything more about the other party however, than that which we were all afraid of, that their victory would have been too angry.” Cicero at this point has drawn a strong connection between ira/iracundia and victoria, but he has emphasized Caesar’s remarkable ability to manage his anger in the hour of victory (Marcell. 9). Cicero’s point is not that Caesar did not ever feel and display ira, but rather that Caesar’s anger is deployed in limited contexts and that he only uses it when it is necessary. Cicero’s Caesar has essentially found the Aristotelian mean of anger. In the Nicomachean Ethics the philosopher states, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι: τὸ δ᾽ ᾧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον: διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν, “So also anybody can become angry—that is easy, and so it is to give and spend money; but to be angry with or give money to the right person, and to the                                                 244 Plut. Caes. 46-8 describes how Caesar was saddened by the slaughter of Pompeians and claims that he wept when he heard that Pompey had been killed.  114  right amount, and at the right time, and for the right purpose, and in the right way—this is not within everybody’s power and is not easy; so that to do these things properly is rare, praiseworthy, and noble.”245 The association Aristotle makes between spending money and exhibiting anger speaks to the pragmatism of anger in certain situations—anger is a kind of emotional currency.  Toward the end of the speech, Cicero summarizes Caesar’s emotional behaviour post-victory, subtly contrasting it with Pompey’s hypothetical reaction to victory (Marcell. 31):   Perfuncta res publica est hoc misero fatalique bello: vicit is qui non fortuna  inflammaret odium suum, sed bonitate leniret; neque omnis quibus iratus esset  eosdem etiam exsilio aut morte dignos iudicaret.    The Republic is finished with this miserable and fatal war: the man has won who did not inflame his hatred with good fortune, but alleviated it with good will, and did not judge all those with whom he was angry as worthy of exile or death.   Here Cicero allows that Caesar possessed both odium and ira during the war, but he chose not to act upon his feelings in a destructive manner after he had won. Caesar is able to pass lenient judgments on citizens with whom he was previously angry instead of making use of his new power to obtain revenge on his former enemies.   Cicero had referred to Caesar’s anger, although in hypothetical terms, nine years prior to his delivery of Pro Marcello in his invective speech In Pisonem (55 BCE, six years before the civil war officially began). He says (Pis. 81.8):   Si mihi numquam amicus C. Caesar fuisset, si semper iratus, si semper aspernaretur  amicitiam meam seque mihi implacabilem inexpiabilemque praeberet, tamen ei, cum  tantas res gessisset gereretque cotidie, non amicus esse non possem…perfecit ille ut, si  montes resedissent, amnes exaruissent, non naturae praesidio sed victoria sua rebusque  gestis Italiam munitam haberemus.246                                                  245 Translation by Rackham 1934. 2, 1109.a27. 246 Text is from Clark’s 1909 OCT edition. 115   If Gaius Caesar had never been friendly to me, if he had always been angry, if he had  always scorned my friendship and shown himself as irreconcilable and implacable  towards me, I would still not be able to be unfriendly to a man who had done such great  things and was doing great things daily…he has made it so that, if the mountains fell  down, and the rivers dried up, we would have Italy protected, not by the guard of nature,  but by his victory and the great things he has done.   Cicero explains here that Caesar’s successes are more important than the emotions that he displays. His victoria would be laudable with or without ira. This was of course before the war had broken out, and Caesar’s power was still growing. I have included this passage to show that Cicero was already thinking and talking about Caesar’s anger before it became one of his primary political concerns.   Caesar provides a narrative of his own iracundia in Bellum Civile 1.8. Here he records what a messenger from Pompey reported to him (Caesar’s commentaries are written in the third person):   [dicit] velle Pompeium se Caesari purgatum, ne ea, quae rei publicae causa egerit, in  suam contumeliam vertat. Semper se rei publicae commoda privatis necessitudinibus  habuisse potiora. Caesarem quoque pro sua dignitate debere et studium et iracundiam  suam rei publicae dimittere neque adeo graviter irasci inimicis, ut, cum illis nocere se  speret, rei publicae noceat.247   [He says that] Pompey wishes to excuse himself to Caesar, that he should not turn  those things which were done for the sake of the republic into an affront on himself. That  he had always considered the needs of the republic more important than private  necessities. That Caesar too on account of his high status should put aside his zeal and his  anger for the benefit of the Republic and not be so seriously angry with his enemies, that  he hurts the Republic when he hopes that he is hurting them.  Caesar then writes that even though this message did not lessen the severity of the injustices done to him (iniuriae),248 he decided that he would send a reply to Pompey through this messenger (1.9).                                                 247 Text is from Klotz’s 1950 Teubner edition. 248 The description of Caesar’s feelings in this passage is a textbook example of Aristotelian anger as a response, accompanied by pain, to a perceived unjust slight. Cf. chapter 2, section 2.2. Fantham in Griffin 2009: 142 states  116  He is to tell Pompey that Caesar, too, always put the needs of the Republic before his own, and that he was hurt (doluisse) when a benefit conferred to him by the Roman people had been taken away from him by his enemies. He was being barred from running for the consulship in absentia (Marcellus had a hand in that), which would force him to return to Rome and give up the last six months of his command in Gaul. This is what had made him angry, but he says that he has tolerated this insult to his honor with calm feelings (instead of displaying his anger) for the sake of the Republic: Tamen hanc iacturam honoris sui rei publicae causa aequo animo tulisse. The implication of this statement is that Caesar’s emotions have power over the res publica: his ira has sociopolitical consequences. This kind of rhetoric was employed by powerful men long before ira Caesaris and clementia Caesaris were represented as imperial powers under Augustus.   4.2 Pro Ligario  Cicero delivered the Pro Ligario in the forum just two months after the Pro Marcello. He was tasked with the defence of Quintus Ligarius, another former Pompeian. Caesar fully exercised his prerogative as dictator in this case; he decided whether the case should be tried, appointed himself as the sole judge, and heard the case publicly in the forum. Unlike the Pro Marcello which took the form of a sententia of thanksgiving, the Pro Ligario is a true defense speech aimed at the pardon and recall of Ligarius. It is not, however, without complications.249 There are many issues that face the interpretation of the speech. In his commentary on the Caesarianae, Harold Gotoff notes that the central problem for our understanding of the speech is the possibility that the                                                                                                                                                        that “there is no evidence that the young Caesar took any interest in philosophy.” Harris 2001: 208 n. 21 disagrees, arguing that “...his behavior and language with respect to anger suggest informed calculation.” Emphasis is in Harris.   249 Gotoff 1993: xxxii-xxxvii provides a good outline of the circumstances of the speech and its relation to the Pro Marcello. 117  outcome of the trial was predetermined.250 Many who have written on the piece have concluded that the trial was rigged in favor of Ligarius and was staged as an advertisement for Caesar’s clementia.251 An anecdote in Plutarch contradicts this view, claiming that Caesar had been determined to convict Ligarius, but he was so emotionally moved by Cicero’s eloquence that he was compelled to acquit him (Cic. 39.6-7). This account is usually rejected, but perhaps for the wrong reasons.252 Gotoff and Johnson both point out that scholars object to Plutarch’s description of Caesar’s extreme emotionalism.253 D.T. Benedikston explains away the dictator’s display of emotions by proposing that the passage describes an epileptic seizure.254 But Gotoff rightly observes that the argument that we should reject Plutarch’s account based on the opinion that Caesar was not an emotional man is specious. He writes, “…in a highly rhetorical society like that of Rome, men of wit and discernment must have kept a delicate balance between an intellectual appreciation of the techniques of oratory and a willingness to be moved emotionally by the effects of those techniques.”255 The debate about whether or not Caesar displayed emotions during Cicero’s performance is certainly germane to our topic, but here we are chiefly interested in what this speech has to tell us about Caesar’s anger and anger under Caesar.   In order to discuss how Cicero treats anger in this speech, we must first make note of the circumstances surrounding the case. Ligarius went to Africa in 50 BCE as a legate to the                                                 250 Gotoff 1993: xxxiv. 251 For example, Craig 1984: 195 calls the speech an “exercise in clemency [that] has as its vehicle a legal proceeding.” This stance is questionable, as the Pro Ligario was delivered just months after the Pro Marcello—was there already a need for more public praise of clementia Caesaris? 252 Craig 1984: note 1 surveys opinions on this issue. Walser 1959 and Kumaniecki 1967 maintain that Caesar’s acquittal of Ligarius was a piece of propaganda and the outcome was predetermined and premeditated between Cicero and Caesar. Craig agrees that the acquittal had certain political motivations, but argues that Cicero may not have conspired with Caesar before the trial. The orator could have simply understood what kind of speech the situation required. 253 Johnson 2004: 381; Gotoff 1993: xxxiv 254 Benediktson 1994.  255 Gotoff 1993: xxxiv-xxxv.  118  provincial governor C. Considius (Lig. 2). Considius left the province to run for consulship at Rome, leaving Ligarius in his place. After the civil war began, Attius Varus, a lieutenant of Pompey, took control of the province and Ligarius served as a legate in his government. Ligarius took part in the battle of Thapsus and was later captured at Hadrumetum (Bell. Afr. 89). Caesar secured the province in January of 46 and pardoned his surviving opponents, but Ligarius was ordered to remain in exile. His brothers, who had been Caesarians during the conflict, asked Cicero to petition Caesar for his recall (Fam. 6.13-14). His chances for pardon were looking good until Quintus Aelius Tubero charged him with treason256 on the grounds that he was part of an alliance with King Juba of Numidia and continued to fight against Rome even after Pharsalus.257   Cicero claims that the real motivation for the charge was ira—according to Cicero, Tubero held a personal grudge against Ligarius for not allowing him and his father to enter the province and take control of it when they had received a senatorial order that granted them the post. This incident is what Cicero sees as the origin of the ira and thus the criminal accusation: hinc in Ligarium crimen oritur uel ira potius (Lig. 22). The case is further complicated by the fact that the Tuberones also fought on Pompey’s side; if they had acquired the province, they would not have given it to Caesar (Lig. 23-25).258 Cicero stresses that Tubero is also guilty of being on the wrong side in the war, but because Caesar does not consider that a crime, both Ligarius and Tubero are free of guilt. Tubero, however, is more deserving of blame than Ligarius because he nurses an unnecessary grudge. Cicero does not address the main part of Tubero’s accusation,                                                 256 The actual charge is a subject of debate—was it perduellio, which seems archaic by this time, maiestas, or something else? Most scholars are in favor of perduellio. Johnson dismisses this question along with others for which there is no supporting evidence. 257 Quint. Inst. 11.1.80. Quintilian presents this case as an example of someone charging someone else with an offense that they themselves have committed, since Tubero was also in Africa at the time of the war. Quintilian, like Cicero, seems to ignore the part of the charge concerning alliance with Juba.  258 Cicero describes Africa as natam ad bellum contra hanc urbem gerendum (Lig. 22).  119  namely that Ligarius colluded with Juba and continued to fight against Rome, but instead he frames much of his speech as a deprecatio for Caesar’s mercy and focuses on criticizing Tubero’s motivations. Cicero may have chosen this strategy because C. Vibius Pansa had already spoken on Ligarius’ behalf, and he probably refuted the charges during his speech.259   Two aspects of Cicero’s strategy in this speech pertain to anger and the new emotional regime being constructed under Caesar. He contrasts Tubero’s anger with Caesar’s emotional moderation and he draws attention to the emotional implications of Caesar’s elevated political position. At Lig. 29 Cicero questions Tubero about the nature of his anger, and admonishes him about his expectations concerning Caesar’s emotional reaction:   Nunc quaero utrum vestras iniurias an rei publicae persequamini? Si rei publicae,  quid de vestra in illa causa perseuerantia respondebitis? Si vestras, videte ne erretis qui Caesarem vestris inimicis iratum fore putetis, cum ignoverit suis.    I ask now whether you are seeking vengeance on account of your own injuries or those  of the Republic? If those of the Republic, how you will respond regarding your  perseverance in that other [i.e. Pompey’s] cause? If your own, make sure that you’re not making a mistake in thinking that Caesar will be angry with your enemies when he has pardoned his own.    Remember that the theoretical definitions of anger discussed in chapter 2 included a sense of injury as a part of the emotion; by referring to Tubero’s sense of injury, Cicero attributes anger to him. Cicero here makes a distinction between anger that benefits the state and anger that only has the potential to benefit an individual. At this point Cicero has already defined the charge against Ligarius as ira seemingly in order to diminish it, but it is important to recall that Cicero does not categorically reject ira as a cause of legal proceedings. In the Pro Murena he denounces Cato as a prosecutor because of his lack of anger, and in Pro Sestio he confesses that he himself has                                                 259 As Montague1992: 561 observes, Cicero minimizes or leaves out points that could have significantly bolstered his defense, e.g. that Ligarius was subordinate to Varus and was probably just following orders when he denied the Tuberones entry. 120  been motivated by iusta iracundia to take up Sestius’ case. Anger is a regular and expected feature of Roman legal proceedings, but it is open to assessment by the participants in the case—is the anger justified, does it seek appropriate (i.e. not too harsh or too lenient) punishment, has the angry party otherwise acted morally? Cicero invalidates Tubero’s anger by pointing out that it has nothing to do with the welfare of the Republic, and it has as its origin a desire to occupy a province—a position that would have been used to continue to fight against Caesar, who as decisive victor now enjoys possession of the moral and emotional high ground.260 Whereas Tubero’s anger over this incident may have had some weight before the civil war, Caesar’s anger takes precedence over everyone else’s. Cicero however softens this reality throughout the Caesarianae by reiterating that despite having so much power, Caesar often chooses not to act on his anger. Thus Cicero states that Tubero would be wrong to expect Caesar to be angry at Ligarius when he is in the habit of pardoning his enemies.    Sections 29 and 30 contain the bulk of evidence for the political dynamics of anger during Caesar’s dictatorship. After warning Tubero that he should avoid counting on Caesar’s anger to punish Ligarius, Cicero asks Caesar a question, introduced by num to expect a negative response: Itaque num tibi videor in causa Ligari esse occupatus, num de eius facto dicere, “So I don’t seem to be busy with Ligarius’ case, do I? I don’t appear to speak about his deed, right?” With this remark Cicero draws attention to his unusual strategy; he has spent little time speaking about what Ligarius did or did not do. He follows up this question with a declarative statement describing the nature of his performance: Quicquid dixi, ad unam summam referri volo vel humanitatis vel clementiae vel misericordiae, “Whatever I have said, I wish to refer it to the main point of your humanity or clemency or                                                 260 In Lig. 11-12 Cicero argues that Tubero is seeking capital punishment for Ligarius, which would be unprecedented for this kind of charge. 121  compassion.” Cicero undermines the importance of his arguments by dismissively referring to his speech with quidquid dixi and places emphasis instead on the importance of Caesar’s merciful disposition. Here we see Cicero addressing an unusual kind of judge; he does not appeal to Caesar’s sense of justice, his intellect, or his rationality, but instead to his humanitas, clementia, or misericordia.261 This is made even stranger by the fact that Cicero at this point has not ascribed guilt to Ligarius for any crime that would require mercy.262 The point that Cicero is making is that the shift in political power that has changed Caesar’s judicial role has affected Cicero’s job as an advocate. Here Cicero suggests that emotional persuasion is no longer one method of pleading a case, it is now the only viable method.  These are the implications of his statements, but on the surface they appear to simply praise Caesar’s clementia.   Jeffrey Johnson singles out Lig. 29-30 for the striking dilemma it offers to Caesar.263 The dilemma is relevant to our discussion of Caesar’s newly acquired position in the Roman emotional hierarchy as it pertained to legal cases. I quote the entirety of 30 below:  Causas, Caesar, egi multas equidem tecum, dum te in foro tenuit ratio honorum  tuorum, certe numquam hoc modo: ‘Ignoscite, iudices; erravit, lapsus est, non  putavit; si umquam posthac.’ Ad parentem sic agi solet, ad iudices: ‘Non fecit, non  cogitavit; falsi testes, fictum crimen.’ Dic te, Caesar, de facto Ligari iudicem esse; quibus  in praesidiis fuerit quaere: taceo, ne haec quidem conligo, quae fortasse valerent etiam  apud iudicem: ‘Legatus ante bellum profectus, relictus in pace, bello oppressus, in eo ipso  non acerbus, totus animo et studio tuus.’ Ad iudicem sic, sed ego apud parentem loquor:  ‘Erravi, temere feci, paenitet; ad clementiam tuam confugio, delicti veniam peto, ut  ignoscatur oro.’ Si nemo impetravit, adroganter: si plurimi, tu idem fer opem qui spem  dedisti.                                                  261 Gotoff 1993: 164. Gotoff notes that Cicero seems to search for the right word or imply that all of these words could be used interchangeably. When Cicero provides a list of words like this, it does seem to suggest that he is implying that they are synonymous, or at least very close in meaning. When he uses only one word, I am inclined to think that he chose it carefully.  262 At Lig. 9, 17, and 22 Cicero makes the point that the charge against Ligarius does not amount to a crime. Cicero continually refers to the charge as fuisse in Africam and ignores the part about colluding with Juba.  263 Johnson 2004: 388. 122   Many cases indeed have I pleaded with you when the nature of your career kept you in  the forum. But I never pleaded in this way: ‘Forgive, judges! He made a mistake, he  slipped, he didn’t mean it! If ever again…’ One speaks with a parent like that. But to  judges one says, ‘He didn’t do it; he didn’t intend it! The witnesses are false and the  charge is made up!’ Say, Caesar, that you are a judge in Ligarius’ case, and investigate in  which camp he was. I am silent! Indeed I do not assemble arguments which might  perhaps be strong even before a judge: ‘He set out before the start of war, he was left  there in peace-time, he was surprised by the war, and in the war itself he was not keen;  and now he is completely yours in heart and zeal.’ That’s how you would plead before a  judge. But I am pleading before a parent. ‘He made a mistake, he did it rashly, it grieves   him. I throw him on your mercy, I seek pardon for his mistake, I ask he be forgiven.’ If no  one has succeeded in that kind of plea, then I am using it presumptuously. But if very  many, then grant help in the same way you’ve granted hope.264   This passage has been subjected to a number of different readings, most of which are concerned with the possibility that it has subversive implications. Does Cicero seek to invalidate Caesar’s position as judge in this case (with dic te, Caesar, iudicem esse)?265 Or does he showcase the uselessness of pleading a case in the traditional way before a dictator like Caesar?266 Johnson shifts the focus away from Caesar, saying that “Cicero denies not the legitimacy of Caesar as judge, but the status of the charges as criminal…to sum up, Cicero’s argument in § 30 is not ‘I wouldn’t normally plead this way’, but rather ‘I wouldn’t normally plead this way for an innocent man.’”267 But the position of this passage following the list of Caesar’s virtues and the language used within it suggests that the spotlight is still on Caesar, not Ligarius.   Johnson concludes his analysis of the passage with the argument that Cicero gives Caesar the option to choose a role of iudex or pater; this is the dilemma.268 If Caesar acts as judge, he must                                                 264 Johnson 2004: 389. All other translations in this chapter are my own, but Johnson’s here very adroitly captures the sense of this passage. 265 Montague 1992 and Ramos 1994 read this passage as calling into question Caesar’s status as judge.   266 Gagliardi 1997: 74-5 takes this view, arguing that Cicero’s list of Caesar’s virtues in 29 (humanitas, clementia, and misericordia) serves to expose the dictator to indignation by comparing him to a king: “…le addita all’indignazione come caratteristiche di un sovrano, collegandole all’idea dell’inutilità, ormai, dei processi repubblicani, di fronte all’arbitrio di un signolo (quanto mai indicative ad unam summam).” 267 Johnson 2004: 391.  268 Johnson 2004: 398. For more on Ciceronian dilemma, see Craig 1993.  123  acquit Ligarius on the grounds that he has done nothing wrong, but if he would condemn Ligarius as an offended parent (for fighting against him in the war), Cicero asks for mercy. Although Caesar was not officially granted the honor parens patriae until the following year, it is possible that the title was already being discussed, and that this is what Cicero provocatively alludes to.269 The practical implications of Caesar claiming to have patria potestas over the Roman people are eloquently expressed by Weinstock:   The consequences were far-reaching. His relation to his fellow citizens was completely  changed. They all were now bound to him, like the son to his father, by pietas, began to  pray for his welfare and to swear by it, to worship his Genius as if it were their own. And  conversely those who had broken this bond and were excluded from the community, the  exiles, were not allowed to show themselves in his presence, just as a banished son was not  allowed to return to the house of his father. It was the first step towards the introduction  in Rome of a relationship which existed in the Greek world between the ruler and his  subjects.270   In light of Caesar’s eventual assassination, it is likely that this dynamic was not palatable to many of the elite. Regardless of whether or not Cicero privately approved of Caesar’s new parental role, his maneuvers in the Caesarianae show him discovering what it meant to be an orator in an autocracy. Anger and mercy became crucial concepts for the orator. Appeals to these aspects of the father’s nature were the only safe way to sway him.    Cicero draws attention to the opposition between anger and mercy many times in the Pro Ligario, referring to the fact that some people (like Tubero) want Caesar to be angry with his opponents instead of lenient. At Lig. 10 he asks, Quorum igitur impunitas, Caesar, tuae clementiae laus est, eorum ipsorum ad crudelitatem te acuet oratio?, “Will you allow the speech of those people whose                                                 269 See Weinstock 1971: 200-5 for a discussion of the development of the title parens patriae. Cicero himself was granted the title pater patriae for his actions during the Catilinarian conspiracy, but as Weinstock remarks, “Caesar was the first for whom the title meant more than glory.” Caesar’s elevated political position along with this title had real consequences for Roman citizens.  270 Weinstock 1971: 204-5.  124  impunity is the glory of your clemency to provoke you to cruelty?” He elaborates this point with a series of exclamations at Lig. 15:   Quam multi enim essent de uictoribus qui te crudelem esse uellent, cum etiam de victis  reperiantur! Quam multi qui cum a te ignosci nemini uellent, impedirent clementiam  tuam, cum hi quibus ipsis ignouisti, nolint te esse in alios misericordem!   How many there are from the victorious party who would have wanted you to be cruel,  when some can be found even from the conquered party! How many who, since they  wish no one to be pardoned by you, would have obstructed your clemency, when those  men whom themselves you have pardoned, don’t want you to be merciful to others.   According to Cicero, if Caesar acted on his anger in this situation, it would amount to crudelitas. Yet he claims that many of Caesar’s followers and even some ex-Pompeians like Tubero think that he should do so. Cicero puts these words into Tubero’s mouth at Lig. 16:   ‘Caue ignoscas!’ Haec nec hominis nec ad hominem uox est; qua qui apud te, C.  Caesar, utetur, suam citius abiciet humanitatem quam extorquebit tuam.   “Make sure that you don’t pardon him!” This is not the tone of a human to a  human; he who uses it before you, Caesar, will sooner throw away his own  humanity before he will tear away yours.   Cicero now equates punishment with a lack of humanity. As Gotoff notes, Cicero is not saying that a “real man” grants clemency, but rather “anyone partaking of basic human feeling” pardons those who deserve it.271 Seneca employs this same idea of casting off one’s humanity (abicere humanitatem) in his definition of crudelitas in De Clementia 1.25.1, when he writes that cruelty is to delight in punishment and abiecto homine in silvestre animal transire (“to transform into a wild animal with one’s human shell cast off”). Both ira and clementia get a hyperbolic treatment from                                                 271 Gotoff 1993: 143.  125  Cicero in the Caesarianae; the idea is that as much as Caesar’s clemency can save us all, his potential anger could destroy us all.272   Perhaps Cicero’s strongest argument in response to the demand for Caesar to act upon his ira is his allusion to Sulla at Lig. 12:   At istud ne apud eum quidem dictatorem qui omnis quos oderat morte multabat,  quisquam egit isto modo. Ipse iubebat occidi; nullo postulante, praemiis inuitabat;  quae tamen crudelitas ab hoc eodem aliquot annis post, quem tu nunc crudelem esse  vis, vindicata est.   But even in the time of that dictator who punished with death everyone whom he  hated,  no one ever conducted matters in this way [i.e. no one behaved like Tubero]. He himself  ordered men to be killed, without anyone asking him; he encouraged men to kill with  rewards; and his cruelty was avenged some years afterwards by the same man whom you  now want to be cruel.   Cicero offers Sulla as an example of a different kind of dictator, one who acted on his odium273 to harshly punish his enemies with death.274 Cicero remarks at Lig. 18 that ex-Pompeians cannot be too miserable because Caesar is their conqueror. His suggestion is that if you must have someone in a position of absolute power, it is best if they show an inclination to mercy. Cicero expresses the view that a policy of clemency is good for both the people and the dictator. He takes an advisory tone near the end of the speech, stating that mercy is the best way to win the people’s favor (Lig. 37): Nihil est tam populare quam bonitas, nulla de uirtutibus tuis plurimis nec admirabilior nec gratior misericordia est, “Nothing is so popular as benevolence, none of your many virtues is more admirable or pleasing than your compassion.” Because Ligarius was acquitted and Caesar continued to promote his virtue of clemency, it is likely that Caesar agreed with this argument. Unfortunately for Caesar, this instance of clementia did not make him popular with Ligarius.                                                 272 See for example the closing sentence of Pro Ligario: tantum te admonebo, si illi absenti salutem dederis, praesentibus te his daturum. 273 Recall Cicero’s definition of odium at Tusc. 4.21 as ira inveterata, “old anger.”  274 Seneca also offers Sulla as an example of cruelty in action in De Clem. 1.12.2. 126  Plutarch reports that Ligarius never forgave Caesar for pardoning him and resented Caesar’s power, feelings which caused him to join Brutus in the assassination plot.275  4.3 Pro Rege Deiotaro  The final Caesarian speech was delivered by Cicero in the intimate setting of Caesar’s home in 45. Deiotarus, king of Galatia, had been a supporter and friend of Cicero during his proconsulship in Cilicia in 52. Like Cicero’s other defendants, he had sided with Pompey during the war. After securing victory in Egypt, Caesar met Deiotarus in Galatia, and the king subsequently asked to be pardoned. Caesar allowed him to continue his rule and departed to defeat Pharnaces at Zela.276 He then returned to Galatia and kept Deiotarus on the throne with a diminished realm. The king sent an embassy to Caesar during his Spanish campaign seeking return of his former possessions and support in a power struggle against his daughter’s husband, Castor. Castor’s son soon brought a case against Deiotarus, accusing him of plotting against Caesar’s life. This speech is not as complex as the Pro Ligario or as rich as the Pro Marcello in material concerning ira Caesaris, but there are still a few points to be made about Caesarian anger in this speech.   Cicero alludes to preexisting animosity between Caesar and Deiotarus (probably emanating from his support of Pompey during the war), arguing that the king’s accusers hope that Caesar will hold on to his anger and believe the specious accusation (Deiot. 8):  Iratum te regi Deiotaro fuisse non erant nescii; adfectum illum quibusdam  incommodis et  detrimentis propter offensionem animi tui meminerant, teque cum  huic iratum, tum sibi  amicum esse cognoverant, cumque apud ipsum te de tuo periculo dicerent, fore putabant  ut in exulcerato animo facile fictum crimen insideret. Quam ob rem hoc nos primum                                                 275 Plut. Brut. 11. See Epstein 1987a for a discussion of the individuals who were angered by Caesar’s clemency.  276 Cf. Plut. Caes. 50.  127   metu, Caesar, per fidem et constantiam et clementiam tuam libera, ne residere in te  ullam partem iracundiae suspicemur.    They were not ignorant that you were angry with king Deiotarus. They recollected that  he had been already exposed to some inconvenience and loss on account of the  displeasure with which you regarded him; and while they knew that you were angry with  him, they had recognized that you were friendly to them. And as they would be speaking  before you of a matter involving personal danger to yourself, they thought that a fictitious  charge would easily lodge in your mind, which was already festering. On which account,  Caesar, first of all by your good faith, and wisdom and firmness, and clemency deliver us  from this fear, and prevent our suspecting that there is any part of anger lurking in you.   Cicero likewise described Tubero in the Pro Ligario as an opportunistic accuser who was counting on Caesar’s anger to satisfy his grudge. Here Deiotarus’ grandson has made the accusation in order to gain an advantage over Deiotarus in an ongoing struggle over the distribution of the provinces. We are again presented with the notion that clementia Caesaris was not the only disposition of Caesar’s under discussion—ira Caesaris was also a point of concern, both for its potential consequences for an individual and an individual’s enemies. According to Cicero, Deiotarus’ accusers thought that Caesar would surely be angry at someone who was plotting to kill him; the only problem, Cicero argues, is that the accusation was false.   In Deiot. 15 Cicero denounces the charge against Deiotarus by arguing that if it were true, it would be an act of madness or rage (furor) on the king’s part. Cicero argues that Caesar could not reasonably believe the accusation unless he thought Deiotarus was furiosissimus, that he possessed ferocitas, and that he would commit an act of such furor that he would be willing to gain the whole world as enemies. For Cicero, furor is distinct from ira. There is a suggestion running through the Caesarianae that to display or act upon ira that one has for Caesar would amount to furor, as in Lig. 27 Cicero says that Tubero did not go to Caesar after being refused entry to the province ne iratus videretur, “lest he should seem angry.” To be angry at Caesar was not an option for a reasonable man, even before Caesar had won a decisive victory. We can see from these 128  examples that the emotional hierarchy that the Principate entailed was already under construction during Caesar’s rise to power.   During the peroratio of the speech, when emotional appeals are usually employed without restraint, Cicero talks about his role (or lack thereof) in the manipulation of Caesar’s emotions (Deiot. 40):   Non debeo, C. Caesar, quod fieri solet in tantis periculis, temptare quonam modo  dicendo misericordiam tuam commovere possim; nihil opus est: occurrere solet ipsa  supplicibus et calamitosis, nullius oratione evocata. Propone tibi duos reges et id animo  contemplare, quod oculis non potes: dabis profecto id misericordiae quod iracundiae  denegavisti.    I ought not, Caesar, to try, as is often done by men in such danger as this, to move  your compassion by my language. There is no need for me to do so. It is accustomed to  come to the aid of suppliant and unfortunate men, without being summoned by the  eloquence of anybody. Place before your eyes two kings [i.e. Deiotarus and his son], and  contemplate with your mind what you cannot see with your eyes. You will surely yield to  your feelings of compassion what you denied to your anger.   This amounts to a praeteritio, and Cicero adopts the same attitude at Lig. 31. Despite producing three speeches that actively seek to promote Caesar’s clemency, Cicero repeatedly suggests that Caesar is in control of his own emotions, but that they are naturally influenced by the situation of the defendants. The final sentence of this passage creates an opposition between Caesar’s ira and misericordia. Even though Cicero is not issuing an imperative to Caesar to choose mercy instead of anger, his use of profecto is mildly coercive. Cicero concludes this speech with the idea that Caesar’s decision will affect the success of his foreign policy; Caesar’s treatment of Deiotarus could have an impact on Rome’s relationships with client kings. According to Cicero, to convict Deiotarus would be crudelitas, and to acquit him would be an act suitable for Caesar’s clementia (Deiot. 43). Deiotarus was ultimately acquitted by Caesar and allowed to continue his rule.   129  4.4 The Philippics  Cicero composed a series of fourteen speeches in 44 and 43 BCE that are collectively called the Philippics because they bear resemblance to Demosthenes’ speeches against Philip II of Macedon. Cicero’s Philippics are invective speeches that aim to condemn Marc Antony and his administration following the assassination of Caesar, and as such, anger is a central theme.277 The Philippics show Cicero departing from the careful panegyric mode that he adopted in the Caesarianae and embracing his newfound power as a protector of the Republic and defender of the integrity of the Senate. Cicero’s elevated political position at this point in time allowed him to employ anger in the active way that he did as consul. In these speeches, Cicero seeks to direct public anger at Antony, and he accomplishes this in part by using Antony’s anger against him.  While Cicero praised Caesar’s ability to manage and direct his anger appropriately, he characterizes Antony as a man who cannot control his temper, and whose misguided and inappropriate anger is a danger to Rome itself. The Philippics demonstrate how anger featured in Cicero’s final effort to assert himself on the Roman political stage. Here I offer an analysis of the First Philippic, with shorter discussions of the Second, Third, and Fourth Philippics.   Cicero delivered the First Philippic in the Senate on 2 September 44 BCE. He had arrived in Rome the day before after an extended absence,278 and his failure to attend the meeting of the Senate that day due to fatigue angered Antony.  This anger caused Antony to attack Cicero verbally and make threats against his house. Cicero reports this behavior at Phil. 1.12: At ille, vobis audientibus, cum fabris se domum meam venturum esse dixit. Nimis iracunde hoc quidem et valde intemperanter,279                                                 277 For Cicero’s use of invective in his oratory, see Booth 2001. Useful commentaries on the Philippics include Ramsey 2003 and Manuwald 2007.   278 See Ramsey 2003: 1-10 for the historical background of the Philippics.   279 Texts of the Philippics are from Clark’s 1918 OCT edition. 130  “But this man, while you all were listening, said that he would come to my house with a demolition crew. He said this too angrily and without any self control.” The First Philippic is Cicero’s response to Antony’s outburst. The speech fostered further enmity between the two men. Antony delivered a retaliatory invective against Cicero on 19 September, and Cicero responded to that affront with the scathing Second Philippic.  Cicero begins the First Philippic by describing what Antony has done correctly to manage the upheaval following Caesar’s assassination. He, together with his colleague Dolabella, appeared to manage Caesar’s affairs with transparency and integrity in the days following the Ides of March (Phil. 1.2-5). In Cicero’s mind, their greatest act was the abolishment of the Dictatorship from the Roman constitution (Phil 1.3). He praises Dolabella’s animadversio when he dealt with the angry mobs that threatened the city (Phil 1.5). But now, Cicero says, things have changed. Antony and Dolabella have begun to pass measures per populum as opposed to per senatum (Phil. 1.6). This bypassing of the Senate caused Cicero to leave Rome until the Senate was scheduled to reassemble. Cicero explains that he decided to return to Rome when he received news that Antony had dismissed his bad advisors and planned to restore authority to the Senate (although he now thinks that this part was embellished) (Phil 1.8).   At Phil. 1.11, Cicero begins to address the threats that Antony made on the previous day. He states that Antony committed an iniuria against him by threatening to tear down his house, even though Cicero is amicus towards him (and thus Antony should have no reason to be angry with Cicero). Cicero explains that he considers it his officium to be friendly to Antony because he has received services from him in the past. Here Cicero begins to invalidate Antony’s anger by describing the state of their relationship as friendly and based in reciprocity. According to Cicero, 131  he has a right to be angry because he has now received an iniuria from Antony, but Antony is being unreasonably hostile toward Cicero given the circumstances.   Cicero emphasizes the severity of Antony’s reaction to his absence from the Senate on 1 September. The usual punishment for absence is no more than a fine, but Antony has gone so far as to threaten personal injury (Phil. 1.12). We get the impression that it is Antony’s iracundia that is prompting him to take extreme measures against Cicero. At Phil. 1.28 Cicero remarks that he has been warned by Antony’s friends that Antony is greatly offended by anyone who speaks against his policies, even if their words are not insulting (etiam si nulla inest contumelia). This reaction is understood by his friends to be part of Antony’s natura. In a letter to Atticus from June of 44, Cicero refers to Antony as an iracundus homo (Att. 15.8): scripsi ad Antonium de legatione, ne, si ad Dolabellam solum scripsissem, iracundus homo commoveretur. Cicero is not the only voice to criticize Antony’s angry nature; in Fam. 11.3, dated 4 August 44, Brutus and Cassius reprimand Antony for his inability to control his anger and refrain from publicly censuring them for the death of Caesar (non potuisse continere iracundiam tuam, quin nobis de morte Caesaris obiiceres). Brutus and Cassius, like Cicero, emphasize the fact that they have not committed a slight against Antony (nos, Antoni, te nulla lacessimus iniuria), and therefore he should not be angry with them. Brutus, Cassius, and Cicero appear to share the view that political opposition does not amount to an iniuria, and thus it is not a just cause for anger. They portray Antony’s understanding of what merits ira as much different than their own. This idea is key to Cicero’s treatment of Antony’s anger: its nature sets him apart from the rest of elite Roman society.   Cicero elaborates upon why Antony should not be angry over his absence. The Senate convened that day to hear a motion to grant posthumous supplications to Caesar (Phil. 1.12-13). In Cicero’s view, this was impious, as it would amount to treating Caesar like a god. Had he been 132  present to hear the motion, he would have vehemently and persuasively opposed it, so it is better for Antony that he was not there to speak against him (because that, according to Antony’s natura, would have made him really angry). Cicero states that the Senate voted for it under compulsion, but if he had been present, he would not have been afraid to speak his mind (Phil. 1.14). Cicero represents Antony’s iracundia as a menacing force that hangs over the Senate and undermines senators’ ability to express dissenting opinions openly. The existence of a man of immense authority whose anger has political currency threatens the survival of the Republic. Caesar had also posed this threat, but his assassination gave Cicero hope that the Republic could be restored. It also helped Cicero’s cause that Caesar was himself a proponent of clementia over ira, but Antony does not seem to share Caesar’s anger management skills.   At Phil. 1.27 Cicero provides further commentary on Antony’s anger, and attempts to negotiate with him to set terms for the expression of anger. In the first half of the section, Cicero directly tells Dolabella that he and Antony should not be angry with him for wanting to defend the Republic by speaking his mind:  Irasci quidem vos mihi, Dolabella, pro re publica dicenti non oportebit. Quamquam te  quidem id facturum non arbitror—novi facilitatem tuam—collegam tuum aiunt in hac  sua fortuna, quae bona ipsi videtur—mihi, ne gravius quippiam dicam, avorum et  avunculi sui consulatum si imitaretur, fortunatior videretur—sed eum iracundum audio  esse factum. Video autem quam sit odiosum habere eundem iratum et armatum, cum  tanta praesertim gladiorum sit impunitas.   It is certainly not proper, Dolabella, for you and your colleague to be angry with me for  speaking in defence of the Republic. Although I do not think that you yourself will be  angry; I have known your easy-going nature. They say that your colleague, in this fortune  of his, which seems good to him, but which would seem more fortunate to me (lest I say  something too harsh) if he were to imitate the consulship of his grandfathers and his  uncle, but I hear that he is made angry. I see, however, how unpleasant it is to have the  same man angry with me and armed, especially when men can use their swords with such  impunity.280                                                  280 Translations of the Philippics are adapted from Yonge 1903.  133   Antony has a reputation for being iracundus, which strains his political relationship with Cicero. Antony’s anger is made even more dangerous by the fact that he is in the habit of using violence to get his way (this is echoed by Brutus and Cassius in Fam. 11.3). In the second half of the passage, Cicero makes a proposal to Antony concerning his anger:  sed proponam ius, ut opinor, aequum, quod M. Antonium non arbitror repudiaturum.  ego, si quid in vitam eius aut in mores cum contumelia dixero, quo minus mihi  inimicissimus sit non recusabo; sin consuetudinem meam quam in re publica semper  habui tenuero, id est si libere quae sentiam de re publica dixero, primum deprecor ne  irascatur; deinde, si hoc non impetro, peto ut sic irascatur ut civi.   But I will propose a condition which I myself think is fair, and which I do not think  Marcus Antonius will reject. If I have said anything insulting against his way of life or  against his morals, I will not object to his being my bitterest enemy. But if I have  maintained the same habits that I have already held in the republic, that is, if I have  spoken my opinions concerning the affairs of the republic freely, in the first place, I beg  that he will not be angry with me for that; but, in the next place, if I do not obtain this  request, I beg that he will show his anger in the way that is proper towards a fellow- citizen.   Cicero argues that Antony does not have cause to be inimicissimus to Cicero because he has not yet slighted Antony’s vita or mores (which will become his main objective in the Second Philippic). If Antony cannot prevent himself from becoming angry at Cicero for speaking on behalf of the Republic, Cicero asks that he show his anger ut civi, as he would to a fellow-citizen, and not to a foreign enemy. Here Cicero suggests that there are different ways in which to express and act on anger, one that is appropriate for cives, and one that is not. It is likely that Cicero’s conception of civilized anger follows the definition he gives in the Tusculan Disputations. His repeated insistence that he has not committed a slight against Antony corroborates this. His focus on Antony as armatus is also important; anger is a feature of Roman political dialogue, but its expression should be limited to words, and violence should not be used unless it is mandated by the laws.  134   One of the problems with Antony being iratus and armatus is that he acquires power by means of fear, and not through gaining the affection of the people, which Cicero believes is a superior method of leadership. Cicero uses a quote from Accius’ tragedy Atreus to demonstrate his point (Phil. 1.34): quod videmus etiam in fabula illi ipsi qui ‘oderint, dum metuant’ dixerit perniciosum fuisse. Seneca employs this same quote in Clem. 1.12.4 and 2.2.2 to dissuade Nero from ruling by fear, and Suetonius reports that the phrase was uttered by the “bad” emperors Tiberius (Tib. 59) and Caligula (Calig. 30). The frequent use of this quote suggests that the Roman elite considered it important for a man in power to want to avoid being the object of public anger. This is part of what made Pompey an attractive ally.281 Cicero asks a rhetorical question of why he should attempt to convince Antony of the pitfalls of ruling by fear when the example of Caesar should be convincing enough (Phil. 1.35): sed quid oratione te flectam? si enim exitus C. Caesaris efficere non potest ut malis carus esse quam metui, nihil cuiusquam proficiet nec valebit oratio, “But why should I seek to make an impression on you by my speech? For, if the end of Gaius Caesar cannot influence you to prefer being loved to being feared, no speech of any one will do any good or have any influence with you.” Cicero urges Antony to change his approach to gaining influence through threats of anger and violence and adopt more peaceful strategies.   Cicero closes the First Philippic by addressing the Senate and pledging his dedication to the Republic. His final words suggest that he is somewhat in fear of his life (Phil 1. 38): mihi fere satis est quod vixi vel ad aetatem vel ad gloriam: huc si quid accesserit, non tam mihi quam vobis reique publicae accesserit,                                                 281 Cf. Dio 41.54: γνώμῃ μὲν γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἀλλήλων διέφερον ὅσον Πομπήιος μὲν οὐδενὸς ἀνθρώπων δεύτερος, Καῖσαρ δὲ καὶ πρῶτος πάντων εἶναι ἐπεθύμει, καὶ ὁ μὲν παρ᾽ ἑκόντων τε τιμᾶσθαι καὶ ἐθελόντων προστατεῖν φιλεῖσθαί τε ἐσπούδαζε, τῷ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔμελεν εἰ καὶ ἀκόντων ἄρχοι καὶ μισοῦσιν ἐπιτάσσοι, τάς τε τιμὰς αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ διδοίη, “In temper they differed from each other to this extent, that Pompey desired to be second to no man and Caesar to be first of all, and the former was anxious to be honoured by a willing people and to preside over and be loved by men who fully consent, whereas the latter cared not at all if he ruled over even an unwilling people, issued orders to men who hated him, and bestowed the honours with his own hand upon himself.”  135  “I have lived long enough for the course of human life, or for my own glory. If any additional life is granted to me, it shall be bestowed not so much on myself as on you and on the Republic.” Perhaps the implication is that if Cicero were concerned about himself and his own survival, he would not challenge the anger of Antony, but he would instead try to placate and direct it like he did with Caesar. But at this point, he realizes the gravity of the situation, and is willing to risk his life to defend the safety of the Republic.  Antony’s anger was further inflamed by the First Philippic and he delivered a retaliatory invective against Cicero on 19 September. Cicero responded with the famously vituperative Second Philippic. It was not delivered; it was likely circulated as a pamphlet. It contains two references to Antony’s anger, the first of which is somewhat intriguing.282 At Phil. 2.76, Cicero writes that Antony is looking at him and appears to be angry:   At etiam aspicis me283 et quidem, ut videris, iratus. ne tu iam mecum in gratiam redeas, si  scias quam me pudeat nequitiae tuae, cuius te ipsum non pudet.   But even now you look at me, and indeed you seem angry. Surely you would be  reconciled with me if you knew how ashamed I am of your worthlessness, which you  yourself are not ashamed of.   We may wonder why Antony would reconcile with Cicero if he were aware of the shame Cicero felt for him. Ramsey explains that “if Antony realized the shame that Cicero felt on his behalf (as a friend would be bound to feel for a friend), Antony could not treat Cicero as someone deserving his hatred.”284 Cicero again characterizes Antony as someone who does not follow the emotional rules of Roman relationships. He becomes angry without suffering iniuriae and he feels anger toward people who only have his best interests in mind.                                                  282 The second reference at Phil. 2.80 criticizes Antony for stating while iratus that he as an augur had the authority to hinder the comitia.  283 This phrase maintains the fiction that the speech was delivered in the Senate. 284 Ramsey 2003: 269-70.  136   Cicero delivered the Third and Fourth Philippic on 20 December, the former in the morning to the senate and the latter in the afternoon to the public assembly. Both of these speeches seek to further condemn Antony’s character and impede his ability to consolidate more power. In the Third Philippic Cicero urges the Senate to support Octavian and Brutus against Antony, and in the Fourth Philippic he characterizes Antony as a public enemy and stresses that it is not possible to acquire peace from him. Antony’s anger features briefly in both speeches.  At Phil. 3.4, Cicero refers to Antony’s slaughter of three hundred centurions from Caesar’s legions. When four of these legions arrived at Brundisium from Macedonia, three of them refused to follow Antony to Rome. This angered Antony and he had the centurions from those legions killed in front of him and his wife. Cicero argues to the senate that nothing is stopping Antony from using the same kind of violence against them:   hac ille crudelitate imbutus, cum multo bonis omnibus veniret iratior quam illis fuerat quos trucidarat, cui tandem nostrum aut cui omnino bono pepercisset?   Who is there of us, or what good man is there at all, whom a man stained with this cruelty  would ever have spared; especially when he arrived here much more angry with all  virtuous men than he had been with those whom he had massacred there?  According to Cicero, Antony’s anger is a liability. He is angrier with the Senate than he was with the centurions, so they should be even more wary about him. Here Cicero uses fear mongering to persuade the Senate that Antony is a serious threat. This is a departure from his mode in the Second Philippic which seems to be directed at arousing public anger against Antony by showcasing the depravity of his character.   At Phil. 3.30, Cicero again warns the Senate about the potential of Antony’s anger to harm them and the Republic: 137   quid hic faciet, si poterit, iratus qui, cum suscensere nemini posset, omnibus bonis  fuerit  inimicus? quid hic victor non audebit qui nullam adeptus victoriam tanta scelera post  Caesaris interitum fecerit?   What will this man do while angry, if he gains the power, he who, when he is unable  show his anger against any one, has been the enemy of all good men? What will he not  dare to do as a victor, who, without having gained any victory, has committed such  crimes as these after the death of Caesar?   Cicero illustrates what the senate can expect from Antony’s rule if he manages to seize control of Rome. The concessive clause cum suscensere nemini posset emphasizes the unwarranted nature of Antony’s ira. He has no justifiable reason to be angry with anyone, and yet he is the enemy of all good men. This passage recalls Cicero’s discussion of ira and victoria in the Caesarianae. Anger is often associated with victory, but Caesar had the ability to restrain his anger as a victor in the civil war because his opponents were fellow citizens. Cicero suggests that Antony will not have this same restraint, since he has acted angrily against citizens even without winning a victory. Cicero follows this with a long list of abominable acts that Antony has already committed. The Third Philippic was successful in that the Senate responded by passing a motion to honor Brutus for his efforts in the interest of the public and approved an initiative that allowed him to defend his province against Antony’s forces.   In the Fourth Philippic (delivered at a contio on the same day as the Third Philippic) Cicero goes even further to characterize Antony as a destructive force. He begins by alerting the assembly that Antony has been declared a hostis by the Senate, nondum verbo sed re, “not yet in words, but in effect.” Cicero emphasizes Octavian’s role in defending the Republic from Antony (Phil. 4.2-4). He announces that Octavian has made a plan to gather an invincible army and turn Antony’s furor away from Rome (Phil. 4.3):  ...hoc insperatum omnibus consilium, incognitum certe ceperit, ut exercitum invictum ex paternis militibus conficeret Antonique furorem crudelissimis consiliis incitatum a 138  pernicie rei publicae averteret. ut exercitum invictum ex paternis militibus conficeret Antonique furorem crudelissimis consiliis incitatum a pernicie rei publicae averteret.   ...this young man adopted the design which none of us had ventured to hope for, which beyond all question none of us were acquainted with, of raising an invincible army of his father’s soldiers, and so hindering the rage of Antony, spurred on as it was by the cruelest counsels, from the power of doing mischief to the Republic.  At Phil. 4.4 Cicero describes Antony as ardens odio vestri—he burns with hatred for the Roman people. Antony’s emotional volatility has now gone beyond unwarranted ira and has entered the realm of insanity. At Phil. 4.11 Cicero warns the people that Antony is not a typical hostis:   Non est vobis, Quirites, cum eo hoste certamen, cum quo aliqua pacis condicio esse  possit. Neque enim ille servitutem vestram ut antea, sed iam iratus sanguinem concupivit.  Nullus ei ludus videtur esse iucundior quam cruor, quam caedes, quam ante oculos  trucidatio civium.   You are not fighting an enemy, Romans, with whom any condition of peace is  possible. For he does not desire you to be slaves as he did before, but now he is angry and  thirsts for blood. No game seems more pleasant to him than gore, than slaughter, than  the massacre of citizens before his eyes.   Cicero chooses to describe Antony as iratus here instead of efferatus, rabidus, saevus, or another more severe word. Perhaps he uses iratus because Antony’s irascibility and its consequences were already well known to his audience. When Cicero suggests that murdering citizens is Antony’s favorite pastime, Antony’s implied emotional state certainly seems to go beyond the scope of ira and into furor territory.   In the penultimate section of the speech, Cicero remarks that Antony is in the habit of bragging about his resemblance to Catiline (Phil. 4.15). Cicero suggests that Antony is actually inferior to Catiline because Catiline was able to throw together an army when he did not have one, but Antony lost the army that he took over. He reassures the people that he, together with the senate and armies of Octavian, will defeat Antony in the same way in which they defeated 139  Catiline. He ends the speech with a promise to continue to work toward securing freedom for the Roman people.  The remaining ten Philippics continue the theme of Antony’s rage against the Republic. Antony’s anger is made all the more threatening because it is baseless. The only situation in which his anger would make sense is if he were an absolute ruler. We will see in the following chapters how Roman writers living under the Principate dealt with the problem of being subject to a man who could be both iratus and armatus.  4.5 Conclusion  Cicero’s post-civil war speeches display the orator’s attempt to navigate changing political and emotional regimes. No longer in a position of real authority, Cicero positions himself as an advisor on Roman morality rather than an enforcer of it in the Caesarianae. After the death of Caesar, Cicero reprises his role as a director of anger in an effort to weaken Antony’s political position in the Philippics.   The Caesarianae represent a bridge between the conventions of Cicero’s Republican oratory examined in the previous chapter and the anger discourse of the imperial period that will be presented in the following two chapters. In his triple stance as advocate, advisor, and flatterer, Cicero launched a discourse of ira Caesaris and clementia Caesaris that was taken up by later authors. He developed a language of admonitory praise that allowed authors such as Seneca to 140  advise autocrats about their emotions safely.285 While those subordinate to Caesar (and Caesar himself) were invested in promoting his mercy, his anger was also up for discussion.  Cicero’s treatment of Antony’s anger in the Philippics further illustrates that anger was an important feature of Roman politics and elite interactions at this time. It is important to note that Cicero does not insult Antony merely for being angry. He condemns Antony’s use of anger because it does not conform to standards for emotional conduct in Roman public life. Cicero describes Antony as being angry with virtuous men who have not committed iniuriae against him (Phil. 1.27; 2.76; 3.4). He has also become violent in his anger, to the extent that Octavian needs an invincible army to fight his furor (Phil. 4.3). Antony’s anger is depicted as destructive rather than constructive (Phil. 3.30; 4.11). Anger was an emotion that could be employed pragmatically in Roman politics, but Cicero suggests that Antony does not know (or chooses to break) the rules that dictate how it should be displayed.286 In chapters 5-6 I discuss in more detail what these rules were and how they pertained to imperial leadership.                                                 285 The relationship between the Caesarianae and De clementia is the subject of my MA thesis, The Influence of the Caesarianae on Seneca’s De Clementia (Knight 2010). The connection between the panegyrical tactics of Cicero and Seneca is also noted by Braund 1998: 71-2. 286 Safdar et al. 2009: 1 describe display rules in this way: “These rules influence the emotional expression of people from any culture depending on what that particular culture has characterized as an acceptable or unacceptable expression of emotion.” 141  Part 2: The Julio-Claudian Emperor  gravis ira regum semper.287 —Seneca, Medea 494   On February 4, 2015, the Washington Examiner published an article by Byron York about the emotional reaction of a king during a political crisis.288 King Abdullah of Jordan reportedly reacted with anger after a Jordanian pilot whose plane was downed in combat was burned to death by members of the Islamic extremist group ISIS. York reports on what transpired during a meeting between the U.S. House Armed Services Committee and King Abdullah:  In a private session with lawmakers, the king showed an extraordinary measure of anger—anger which he expressed by citing American movie icon Clint Eastwood.    “He said there is going to be retribution like ISIS hasn’t seen,” said Republican Rep. Duncan Hunter Jr., a Marine Corps veteran of two tours in Iraq and one in Afghanistan, who was in the meeting with the king. “He mentioned Unforgiven and he mentioned Clint Eastwood, and he actually quoted a part of the movie.”    “He’s angry,” Hunter said of King Abdullah. “They’re starting more sorties tomorrow than they’ve ever had. They’re starting tomorrow. And he said, ‘The only problem we’re going to have is running out of fuel and bullets.’”  This modern example illustrates the ongoing discourse about the employment of anger in leadership roles. King Abdullah’s performance of anger is interpreted here as a show of strength against his enemies. Sometimes displays of anger by world leaders are not viewed as positively; for instance, Tom Flanagan, a former advisor of Prime Minister of Canada Stephen Harper, wrote this about Harper’s temperament: “He can be suspicious, secretive, and vindictive, prone                                                 287 “The anger of kings is always serious.” 288 “After ISIS execution, angry King Abdullah quotes Clint Eastwood to U.S. lawmakers.” Washington Examiner, February 4, 2015. (Web) 142  to sudden eruptions of white-hot rage over meaningless trivia, at other times falling into week-long depressions in which he is incapable of making decisions.”289   Roman emperors were subject to this same kind of emotional analysis from imperial authors. Anger could be the means by which a princeps enforced his authority or it could be the quality that earned him public ridicule.290 Harris explains the role of anger in Roman imperial ideology:  The control of inappropriate anger had become part of the ideological basis of    that peculiarly ideological kind of rule which was that of the Roman emperors. At   the same time, an emperor needed to be thought capable of anger against     contumelious or corrupt subordinates: the Roman Empire was no kindergarten.291   Chapters 5 and 6 present sources that illustrate the political dynamics of anger in the regimes of the Julio-Claudian emperors. Through analysis of the ways in which Roman authors represent the anger of emperors, I aim to demonstrate how anger functioned in the construction of the public identity of the princeps. I also consider how the discourse surrounding the employment of anger in Roman public life evolved during the early years of the Principate.   The nature of the sources    In chapters 3 and 4 I discussed the various ways in which anger operated in the political climate of the late Republic through the lens of Cicero’s oratory. Our sources for imperial anger are less substantial in volume than Cicero’s speeches, but they are more varied in genre. We do not have to rely on one author or genre for perspectives on the anger of emperors, but we have very limited verifiable first-person commentary on anger from emperors themselves.                                                 289 Excerpt from Flanagan’s 2014 book Persona Non Grata: The Death of Free Speech in the Internet Age, quoted in “Elections bill illustrates Harper’s vindictiveness, pragmatism: Tom Flanagan.” The Canadian Press, April 28, 2014. (Web) 290 For Claudius, it was both. See Suet. Claud. 30 and Claudius’ Letter to the Alexandrians 79-82. 291 Harris 2001: 249.  143  Historiography, biography, philosophical treatises, and epistolography will provide the majority of case studies in chapters 5 and 6. It should be noted that Roman poetry offers a wealth of material relevant to this topic, but I have restricted myself to prose sources in this study, because the nature of verse introduces additional variables and expands the available corpus of material to a point where it is no longer manageable.292    Livy acknowledges the usefulness of Roman historiography to a study of this nature in his preface:   Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te    exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei    publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu foedum exitu quod vites.293   This here is an especially beneficial and productive reward gained from the study    of history: that you see every kind of exemplum set in an illustrious literary     monument. You may take away what you and your state should imitate from    these examples, and also what, undertaken in disgraceful circumstances and    disgraceful in results, you should avoid.294   According to Livy, the study of history is an advantageous pursuit primarily because of the exempla that it offers its readers. The concept of Roman exemplarity is essential to my approach to reading historiography for information about anger.295 Literary history served as a primary vehicle for the commemoration of emperors’ characters and actions, and as Matthew Roller explains, commemoration is one of the four main features of exemplary discourse, the others                                                 292 Augustan poetry is especially abundant in imperial anger discourse. Two examples that I find particularly compelling are Vergil’s Aeneid and Ovid’s exile poetry. The end of the Aeneid is a fascinating and perplexing case of ira seemingly triumphing over clementia in the character of Aeneas. The debate concerning the significance of this is ongoing, and it has been the subject of several pieces by Galinsky (1988; 1994) and Putnam (1990; 1995) in particular. For an enlightening discussion of the role of anger in the final lines of the Aeneid see Wright in Braund and Gill 1997: 169-184. Harris 2001: 246-7 also weighs in on Aeneas’ anger.  293 Text is from Conway and Walters’ 1955 OCT edition. 294 Liv. Preface 10.  295 Many have discussed the ways in which exemplarity functioned in Roman culture. See especially the essays in Bell and Hansen 2008 along with Matthew Roller’s important 2004 article cited below. See also Skidmore 1996: Chapter 2 and Edwards 1993: 21 “Roman authors generally refer to figures from the mythologized past of their own city as models for behavior rather than the theoretical writings of Greek philosophers.” 144  being actions, an audience, and imitation.296 Roman historians of the imperial period provide both positive and negative exempla of imperial anger. A reader of historical narratives could select which elements of emperors’ characters to imitate and which to avoid (or which to encourage and which to discourage). We can therefore use historiographical narratives to shed light on Roman attitudes about the roles of anger in imperial leadership and government.   Imperial philosophical treatises are useful because they directly (although sometimes abstractly) engage with ideas of anger, emotion, and proper public behavior, and they often take a protreptic tone towards their audience by presenting attitudes and modes of behavior that the author considers appropriate for a wise man. These sources also offer exempla, but they differ from historiography in that they have a more explicit goal of shaping contemporary behavior. This goal is most visible in Seneca’s treatises De clementia and De ira. De Clementia directly engages with Nero on the subject of the employment of clementia and ira, while De Ira highlights the need for imperial subjects to restrict their anger in an autocracy.   Philosophical sources, however, are not free of complications. We must be mindful of their historical contexts and intended audiences and use caution about how much stock we put in them as reflections of widespread cultural attitudes and sociopolitical realities.297 Stoic tenets in particular may appear to compromise an argument concerning the important role of anger in Roman emotional culture at this time. Stoicism gained popularity during the time period under study in this project and had very prolific adherents, including two of the most important authors featured in this study, Cicero and Seneca.298 Stoicism actually ran counter to traditional Roman                                                 296 Roller 2004: 4-5. The other primary vehicle for commemoration was of course monumental architecture. 297 Cf. Harris 2001: 214: “The political and civic consequences of these philosophically based criticisms of anger at Rome were in a sense nil.”  298 For the nature of Roman Stoicism see Reydams-Schils 2005. For Stoic theory on the emotions see Graver 2007. 145  ethics.299 It makes sense that traditional Roman ethics would come to be questioned by the elite during a time when they were rapidly losing power: those ethics no longer served them when their authority and the means by which they were accustomed to achieve it had effectively been transferred to the princeps.    The Roman aristocracy was subject to a new emotional regime under the Principate that prioritized the emotions of the emperor over their own. This shift played an important role in the growing popularity of Stoicism during this period. The emperor, however, was still able to employ traditional Roman ethics to strengthen his elevated position in Roman society, as the case studies in this chapter will demonstrate. Traditional Roman ethics centered on ideas of external and performed virtue; this is reflected by the importance of exempla in Roman history, which I mentioned above. This kind of ethical system values results and pragmatism (qualities that can be perceived by others), rather than internal virtue, which is the focus of Stoicism. It is therefore easy to comprehend why anger as a practical, performed emotion held a position in traditional Roman ethics and why it became an essential tool of a public political figure like the emperor.    Epistolography provides another importance source: the first-person perspective that letters provide is invaluable. Again we must consider whether the letters were philosophical exercises (e.g. Seneca’s Epistulae Morales), interpersonal communication (e.g. Cicero’s or Pliny’s letters), or public letters issued to communities (e.g. Claudius’ letter to the Alexandrians). In all cases, letters may not provide unfiltered access to the author’s emotions, but they do typically purport to be straightforward and candid representations of the author’s thoughts. Letters can                                                 299 See Roller 2001: 64-126. Roller discusses possible ways in which Seneca’s Stoicism may have been intended to help the aristocracy reclaim lost power under the Principate. I think that Stoicism served as an emotional coping mechanism for the elite during the late Republic and early empire.  146  provide information on both public and private discourses on anger, but because many surviving letters were intended and edited for publication, we can consider the evidence they contain primarily reflective of public discourse on anger.   Ira, clementia, and official emotions under the Roman Principate   In these chapters I will argue that emotional conduct, and specifically the careful balance of ira and clementia, was an important part of the Roman conception of the ideal princeps.300 I assert that imperial emotions operated on a different scale than those of private citizens: while Roman emotional culture in general was focused on the performance of emotions, the emotions or emotional dispositions of emperors (especially anger and mercy) assumed an “official” role that distinguished them from the feelings of individuals. The development of imperial cult at Rome furthered elevated and publicized the personality and emotions of the emperor. The ideal princeps therefore performed emotions that helped fulfill the duties of his office, and these emotions may or may not have aligned with his personal sentiments.    Although much work has been done on the Roman cultural preoccupation with ideas of character and morality, most of these studies have neglected to investigate how emotions fit into those paradigms.301 The performative nature of elite Roman society is well understood, but the connection between anger and performance in official sociopolitical contexts has not yet been thoroughly examined. The imperial virtue (and occasionally vice) of clementia302 has enjoyed                                                 300 Harris 2001: 214 alludes to the role of ira and clementia in establishing the Principate: “But ira, like clementia, became a weapon in the propaganda wars which accompanied the long painful transition from republic to monarchy, and as such probably had some effect.” 301 Braund and Gill 1997 and Kaster 2005 stand out as works that address the importance of emotion to Roman ethics.  302 Clementia secured its place in Roman discourse on virtues thanks to the efforts of Julius Caesar to promote his own tendency toward clemency, an agenda which was later adopted by Augustus. Konstan 2005 combats on several  147  increased scholarly attention in recent years, but the relationship between anger and mercy in Roman autocracy has not been considered at length.303 Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate how authors writing about emperors (and in a few cases, the emperors themselves) promote a policy of mixed ira and clementia.    Melissa Dowling’s book Clemency and Cruelty in the Roman World traces the paired development of discourses of clementia and crudelitas, an approach which is somewhat similar to what I am suggesting here regarding the relationship between clemency and anger. Ira, however, unlike crudelitas is not a “foil and mirror” to clemency as much as it is a reason why a policy of clemency can succeed.304 Dowling’s discussion of the quality of severitas and how it was considered more pragmatic than clementia after Caesar’s assassination is relevant to my discussion of the development of ira Caesaris as a tool for emperors. Ira as an emotional term, however, is more flexible than the dispositional qualities of severitas, clementia, or crudelitas; it can be viewed as a functional element of severitas or as a precursor to or feature of crudelitas depending on the context and manner in which it is used.305 Romans did not necessarily think about clementia and severitas or                                                                                                                                                        fronts the widespread scholarly opinion that Caesar’s famed clementia was considered degrading by his contemporaries due to its regal and tyrannical implications. One important takeaway from Konstan’s comprehensive if truncated discussion is that clemency has been considered negative by scholars because they have confused it with pity (misericordia), which is an “emotion or caprice” as opposed to a “habitual trait or disposition.” (2005: 342) He supports this claim with the Latin usage of clementia compared to misericordia: clemency is exercised and exhibited, while pity is aroused or elicited. The status of clementia as a recurring disposition is further echoed in the common phrase clementia Caesaris. This ties in to my argument that “good” or positive/pragmatic ira in the context of emperors is not an emotion, but a disposition, and specifically, it is the necessary tempering flipside of clementia. Clementia loses its power in the absence of a possibility for ira. Ovid’s usage of the phrase ira Caesaris offers support for this relationship between ira and clementia as dual dispositions of an ideal emperor: perhaps by praising the power of ira Caesaris, the poet hoped to experience clementia Caesaris.  303 Harris 2001: 243-263 surveys the ideology of anger control concerning Roman emperors ranging from Augustus to those of the late fourth century CE. Braund 2012: 79-98 notes the importance of anger and mercy in Seneca’s representations of autocracy.  304 Dowling 2006: 27. I would suggest that ira is not even necessarily at odds with the practice of clementia, as one can verbally perform anger or feel interpersonal anger and still officially grant clemency.  305 Ira alone cannot be equated with cruelty, although a crudelis person is likely to use ira inappropriately. Ira is difficult to pin down in part because it does not traditionally inhabit the discourse of virtues, although Seneca’s De ira draws it closer to the realm of vices. 148  clementia and ira as binary qualities, even though some authors do occasionally polarize clementia and ira.306    The connection between Roman anger and mercy can be seen further in the development and usage of the terms ira and clementia. While ira appears to have been originally a term used exclusively for the emotion of anger, it acquires new connotations under the Principate, especially in the form of the phrase ira Caesaris. Clementia likewise did not acquire its full political force until very late in the Republican period, and it became a mainstay of imperial discourse at the start of Augustus’ reign when the senate dedicated a golden shield to his clemency and other virtues. Clementia and ira are also alike in that they must both have a target, and they both are only effective when used by a superior against an inferior.307 It is easy to understand clementia as a sociopolitical tool rather than an emotion, but ira too attains administrative connotations under the Principate that distance it from its usual meanings.                                                   306 E.g. Tacitus at Ann. 3.22 says of Tiberius adeo vertit ac miscuit irae et clementiae signa, and Ovid focuses on ira Caesaris during his efforts to gain clementia Caesaris in his exile poetry. 307 Seneca draws attention to the hierarchical nature of both clementia and ira, e.g. Clem. 2.3.1: Clementia est temperantia animi in potestate ulciscendi vel lenitas superioris adversus inferiorem in constituendis poenis.; De ira 2.34: Cum pare contendere anceps est, cum superiore furiosum, cum inferiore sordidum. Seneca does not recommend anger in the De ira, but anger between equals is the only dynamic that he does not harshly condemn as madness.  149  Chapter 5: Foundational Anger: Augustus and Earlier Roman Exempla of Autocratic Rule  This chapter traces developments in Roman discourse on the use of anger in the consolidation and exercise of absolute power. I first consider some literary representations of three men who wielded absolute power prior to the establishment of the Principate: Romulus, Sulla, and Julius Caesar. Romulus offered a formative model of kingship for the early Roman emperors, which is made clear by the fact that Octavian considered taking the name “Romulus” before ultimately settling on Augustus.308 Sulla’s status as an exemplum for autocratic rule is confirmed by his presence in Seneca’s kingship treatise De clementia.309 Suetonius’ inclusion of Caesar in his De vita Caesarum suggests that Caesar’s position in Roman society could be considered equal to that of the later emperors. In the second section of this chapter, I examine how authors represent the employment of anger by Augustus as princeps. I demonstrate that Augustus is depicted as being keenly aware of the political ramifications of his anger at various stages in his career. With a particularly close analysis of Suetonius’ portrayal of Augustus, I highlight the ways in which Augustus is shown to establish a standard for the judicious usage of ira and clementia Caesaris for the Principate.  My analysis of how anger features in narratives about these figures has yielded four criteria that describe successful autocratic employment of anger:  (1) The cause(s) of a ruler’s anger should be clearly communicated to his subjects;                                                 308 Suet. Aug. 7 reports that Romulus was suggested as a possible honorific name for Octavian because he was acting as a second founder of Rome. In Suetonius’ account ‘Augustus’ is chosen because of its broader implications. Dio 53.16 states that Octavian was very eager to be called ‘Romulus’, but he ultimately backed down from that choice because of its regal associations. See Scott 1925 for the multitude of evidence that points to Augustus’ association with Romulus.  309 Clem. 1.12.1-3. Cf. Alföldy 1988: 79: “Sulla’s autocracy was in reality the first decisive step on the road to monarchy in the Roman state.”  150  (2) The anger of a ruler should only be aroused by offences that his subjects would deem appropriate triggers for anger, and the consequences of the anger should not outweigh the offence; (3) The ruler should be able to decide whether an offence demands a display of anger or mercy;  (4) When a ruler’s position is secured, his employment of anger should become more moderate in proportion to his power.  These criteria allow us to better understand how Roman authors evaluated the employment of anger by rulers. Later, Chapter 6 considers how authors represent the failures of Augustus’ successors to meet these standards and discusses what the sociopolitical consequences of those failures were.   5.1  Earlier Roman exempla of autocratic rule  Romulus is perhaps the most intriguing example of a Roman ruler who consolidated his power through the use of anger. In Livy’s traditional account, anger is attributed explicitly to Romulus as he takes vengeance on his brother for jumping over his city walls.310 Romulus establishes his monarchical power by acting upon his anger, which results in the death of his twin brother Remus.311 To a modern audience, Romulus’ means of founding the city seem morally questionable at best, and some Romans struggled with the details of the story as well.312 A few authors even choose to omit the killing of Remus from their allusions to Romulus (e.g. Cicero in                                                 310 Liv. 1.7.2. The tradition of a quarrel over the city walls is at least as old as Ennius. Cf. Skutsch 1985: 238-41. 311 Ogilvie 2003: 54 notes that only Ovid makes significant changes to the standard account of the death of Remus provided by Livy. In Fast. 4.837-52 Ovid ascribes grief to Romulus after Remus is killed by Celer, a watchman who had been ordered by Romulus to kill whomever crossed the walls. Instead of mourning the loss of his brother, Romulus “sets a strong example” (exemplaque fortia servat) by publicly declaring that these will be the consequences for hostes who dare to cross his walls (Fast. 4.847-8). By concealing his personal feelings about the event and implying that his brother had become a hostis, Ovid’s Romulus appears to perform anger. See Barchiesi 1997: 159-64 for discussion of Ovid’s portrayal of Romulus’ ability to dissimulate in this episode. 312 Horace, for example, disapproves of Remus’ murder in Epod. 7.18-20. Horace views Rome in this poem as cursed by Romulus’ original act of fratricide to endlessly suffer from civil war. Wiseman 1995: 125 however points out that most versions present the killing of Remus as an exemplary tale. Ogilvie 2003: 54 notes that Ovid and Virgil tried to minimize the criminal aspect of Romulus’ killing of Remus in response to Augustus’ comparison of himself to Romulus.  151  De Re Publica 2).313 When Remus’ death is included, the act is committed by Romulus, or a man named Celer, or an unknown assailant.314 I will focus on Livy’s account of the killing of Remus here because its publication coincided with Octavian’s rise to power,315  and it therefore can be considered more reflective of the emotional culture of the late Republic.   Livy gives two versions of Remus’ death. The first involves a certamen irarum over the interpretation of the twins’ augury during which Remus is killed in turba by an unknown assailant (Liv. 1.7.2). The second account, which Livy describes as volgatior, ascribes clear agency to Romulus, who kills his brother after he mockingly jumps over his freshly constructed city walls. Remus is immediately killed ab irato Romulo, “by an angry Romulus,” and he is turned into a negative exemplum when Romulus exclaims sic deinde, quicumque alius transiliet moenia mea, “So it shall be from now on, for whoever else jumps over my walls.” The anger in this passage is striking. Livy did not need to describe Romulus as iratus in order to imply anger, because by jumping over the walls Remus had committed an iniuria against his brother, which prompted a desire for                                                 313 Although Cicero does not mention Remus’ death in Rep. 2, he does comment on it in Off. 3.40-1 and assigns guilt to Romulus. He says that Romulus killed Remus under the guise of utilitas, but his actions were merely a species honestatis, an illusion of honor. Habinek 1998: 85 does not acknowledge this reference when he remarks that “Cicero’s omission of Remus in all his allusions to Romulus is therefore a silence that speaks louder than any words.” Habinek makes a compelling argument for an association between Cicero and Catiline and the figures Romulus and Remus in Cicero’s speeches against Catiline, and Cicero’s decision to condemn Romulus in a philosophical work from the last year of his life need not compromise an argument concerning his consular speeches.  314 Ancient authors note that there are several versions of the story in circulation and that it is impossible to determine the veracity of any of them, cf. Plut. Rom. 10, Dionysius Ῥωμαϊκὴ Ἀρχαιολογία 1.87. See Wiseman 1995: 13 for a helpful diagram that shows the variants of the narrative.  315 See Luce 1965 for the dating of the first decade of Livy’s history. Luce concludes that Livy began writing around the time of the Battle of Actium in 31 BCE, and completed the first pentad by 27 BCE, the year that Octavian was given the title Augustus. Luce therefore cautions against calling these books ‘Augustan’, but remarks that “It is true, however, that in many significant ways Livy’s views in the first pentad coincide with Augustus’ program of religious, social, and moral reform.” He suggests that scholars should consider how Livy’s representation of the Roman past affected Augustus’ approach to leadership rather than how Augustus’ rule affected Livy’s writing. Burton 2000: 446 and Stem 2007: 438 n. 14 agree with Luce that Livy composed his account of Romulus before it was clear that Octavian was to become sole ruler of Rome. 152  revenge.316 I propose that Livy’s explicit reference to the powerful ira that Romulus employs in his second account of Remus’ death contributes significantly to the development of Roman discourse about the ideal ruler’s emotional conduct during this time period. When Octavian considered taking the name Romulus instead of Augustus,317 Livy’s account was in circulation.318 One of the  implications of this narrative is that a Roman ruler needed to be thought capable of anger, and specifically capable of employing that anger to punish malefactors. Romulus exhibits this quality in his willingness to kill his own brother for the sake of posterity.319   What did Livy intend to convey by acknowledging the role of ira in Romulus’ act of fratricide?320 Does this narrative reveal anything about Roman thought on the use of anger by rulers? Harris suggests that the angry kings in Livy’s history confirm “his contemporary reputation for republicanism or something like it.”321 But there is no reason to assume that an author such as Livy made kings angry in order to critique the institution of kingship,322 especially in the case of the legendary founder of Rome. Livy’s text gives no indication that he considers                                                 316 See Table 2.2 for my script for Roman anger which outlines the cognitive processes that produce ira and related emotional states.  317 Octavian had been drawing connections between himself and Romulus as early as 43 BCE when he was elected consul. After elected, he took the auspices and saw twelve vultures, the same number that Romulus counted (Suet. Aug. 95; Dio 46.46.2). Cf. Galinsky 2005: 184-5 and Ogilvie 2003: 55 n. 7.1. 318 Syme 1959: 28 notes that Livy dominated as a source for later Roman historians, at least for history up to the battle of Actium. Syme 1959: 75 claims that Livy’s early imperial history was less well regarded because his account of Augustus’ rule amounted to “joyful acceptance of the new order” instead of somber critique in the style of Sallust or Tacitus.  319 Wiseman 1995: 140 remarks that one of the implicit meanings of the legend is “for the security of the city wall, even a brother must be sacrificed.” 320 Wiseman 1995: 11 calls the angry dispute over Romulus’ walls “somewhat childish” and suggests that this version of the story was not necessarily the most acceptable to an ancient audience even though it now overshadows other versions. I agree that this version of the legend may not have taken precedence in the minds of all Romans in all time periods, but at the time when Livy was writing, this version may have been the most poignant to a Roman audience. A significant portion of Livy’s audience would have lived through the urban violence that characterized the late Republic, and Livy’s account of the angry squabble between brothers likely resonated with them on a deeper level.  321 Harris 2001: 217. To illustrate Livy’s republicanism Harris points to a sentence in Tac. Ann. 4.34.3 that says that Livy eulogized Pompey with such enthusiasm that Augustus called him “Pompeianus.”  322 See Feldherr 1998: 187-8 n. 84 for Livy’s ambivalent attitude toward the institution of kingship. Feldherr explains that while Livy portrays libertas as preferable to regnum, he represents monarchy as a necessary stage of development.  153  Romulus’ foundational acts to be reprehensible.323 Further evidence for Livy’s approval of Rome’s legendary past is found in his preface. In Pref. 6 he explains that circulating mythologized narratives like the story about Romulus and Remus serves to make the origins of the city seem more dignified (augustiora). Livy’s perspective on Roman foundational narratives was that they did not tarnish or challenge the moral superiority of Rome, but rather they glorified and celebrated it. Compelling evidence does not exist to suggest that his presentation of Romulus was intended to communicate a negative exemplum.324 Romulus’ anger, therefore, can be understood as part of his positive characterization.325   Although I am in agreement with Stem and Vasaly regarding Romulus’ status as a positive exemplum of Roman kingship, I do not intend to suggest that all readers of Livy would have come to the same conclusion about the righteousness of Romulus’ anger. As Stem explains,  The fact that Livian exempla have moral ends, however, does not mean that they are morally simple. Unambiguous figures can be found in Livy’s history, but most of his heroes and villains possess good and bad qualities in varying measure. Different readers will evaluate the balance of those qualities differently, but the readers’ judgment of these figures as exempla is crucially dependent on the presentation of their defining qualities by the historian.326   So how would Roman readers react to Romulus’ ira as it is presented in Livy’s narrative of Remus’ death? It is significant that Livy does not use a more pejorative word like furor to describe                                                 323 Cf. Stem 2007: 440: “[Livy] never directly allows that any of Romulus’s deeds were morally wrong or politically unwise. Likewise, Livy never presents Romulus’s actions as undertaken for his own enrichment, but always out of devotion to his city and for the betterment of his citizens. The reader is thus invited to resolve the moral difficulties in Romulus’s favor, and the result is a figure of strength and decisiveness worthy of being the founder of Roman power.” Vasaly 2015: 37 agrees: “...Livy, although he has not ignored the moral complexities inherent in the traditional stories, has told them in such a way as to allow the reader to maintain the belief in Romulus as a strongly positive exemplar of kingship.” 324 Miles 1995: 154 suggests that Livy at the very least “keeps alive the questions” about Romulus by acknowledging alternate representations of his character.  325 Livy portrays the ira of the senate and the Roman military in a positive light elsewhere in his history. For the senate’s anger, see 2.5.1, 23.25.6, 44.35.4. For military anger, see 4.14.9, 10.5.2, 38.25.16. Cf. Harris 2001: 216-17. Harris connects Livy’s occasional approval of anger to his patriotism.  326 Stem 2007: 436.  154  Romulus’ emotional state and that Romulus is not shown to be out of control. Instead he immediately issues a statement about the purpose and meaning of what he has done, and in an authoritative manner, refers to his ownership of the city’s fortifications. In this moment Romulus exhibits his ability to clearly communicate the cause and consequences of his anger, which will become an important category for the evaluation of emperors’ employment of anger. If we accept the argument that Livy offers Romulus as an exemplary figure, then Romulus’ ira can be understood as pragmatic. Remus had to be removed from the scene in order for Roman history to progress,327 and Romulus was able to use his heightened emotional state to do what needed to be done (and what would not be done under other emotional circumstances).328 This reading is supported by the fact that Livy does not mention negative consequences in the aftermath of the killing; Romulus goes on to be an effective Roman ruler (although he sometimes resorts to morally questionable tactics, e.g. during the rape of the Sabines) and he even comes to be recognized as a god.329 Later Roman laws and customs would not have permitted the murder,330 but certain actions had to be taken during Rome’s primordial moments in order for those laws and customs to be established. This is how Romulus’ anger may have been interpreted by readers like Augustus, who were interested in how anger performed during periods of civil strife could secure and increase authority. The fact that Livy does not depict Romulus in a negative                                                 327 Barchiesi 1997: 161 offers this interpretation of Ovid’s account of Remus’ death in the Fasti. It works for Livy’s narrative as well. The idea that one king must be eliminated in the presence of two kings is also found in the fourth book of Virgil’s Georgics about beekeeping (4.88-90).  328 Harris 2001: 201 admits that the angry killing could have positive implications: “ could be given a positive cast: Romulus was willing to kill even his brother, such was his determination to defend the new city wall.” Emphasis is in Harris. 329 Liv. 1.16. Virgil associates Augustus with the deified Romulus (Quirinus) by placing them next to each other in the parade of heroes in Aen. 6.777-807. Cf. Ovid Met. 15.858-70.  330 Augustus himself introduced a law that allowed for crimes of passion. The Lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis of 17 BCE permitted fathers to kill their daughters and their partners and husbands to kill their wives if they were found committing adultery.  155  light for killing his brother does not prove that all readers of Livy would not question the morality of his act of fratricide,331 but it does demonstrate that Roman literature during this time period actively engaged with moral ambiguity and invited readers to weigh the consequences of Roman pragmatism. Although it cannot be termed Augustan,332 Livy’s representation of Romulus is compatible with what Galinsky calls Augustus’ mode of “storytelling.”333 According to Galinsky, “Augustus...displayed an uncanny ability to invest the major themes of his principate with multiple meanings so that everyone could find some significance in them.”334   Plutarch, a Greek author and Roman citizen writing more than a hundred years after Livy, provides a different perspective on the morality of Romulus’ anger. Plutarch compares Romulus’ anger towards Remus with Theseus’ anger towards Hippolytus in his Comparison of Romulus and Theseus (3.1-2): εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ τὰ δυστυχηθέντα μὴ παντάπασι ποιεῖσθαι δαίμονος, ἀλλ᾽ἠθικὰς καὶ παθητικὰς ζητεῖν ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφοράς, θυμοῦ μὲνἀλογίστου καὶ τάχος ἐχούσης ἄβουλον ὀργῆς μήτε τις ἐκεῖνον ἐν τοῖςπρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀπολυέτω μήτε τοῦτον ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὸν υἱόν ἡ δὲκινήσασα τὸν θυμὸν ἀρχὴ μᾶλλον παραιτεῖται τὸν ὑπὸ μείζονοςαἰτίας ὥσπερ ὑπὸ πληγῆς χαλεπωτέρας ἀνατραπέντα. Ῥωμύλῳ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ βουλῆς καὶ σκέψεως περὶ κοινῶν συμφερόντων διαφορᾶς γενομένης οὐκ ἄν ἠξίωσέ τις ἄφνω τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν τηλικούτῳ πάθει γενέσθαι: Θησέα δὲ πρὸς τὸν υἱόν, ἃ πάμπαν ὀλίγοι τῶν ὄντων διαπεφεύγασιν, ἔρως καὶ ζηλοτυπία καὶ διαβολαὶ γυναικὸς ἔσφηλαν. ὃ δὲ μεῖζόν ἐστιν, ὁ μὲν Ῥωμύλου θυμὸς εἰς ἔργον ἐξέπεσε καὶ πρᾶξιν οὐκ εὐτυχὲς ἔχουσαν τέλος, ἡ δὲ Θησέως ὀργὴ μέχρι λόγου καὶ βλασφημίας καὶ κατάρας πρεσβυτικῆς προῆλθε, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα φαίνεται τῇ τύχῃ χρήσασθαι τὸ μειράκιον. ὥστε ταύτας μὲν ἄν τις ἀποδοίη τῷ Θησεῖ τὰς ψήφους.335   Again, if the misfortunes of men are not to be attributed altogether to fortune, but to the different habits and passions which will be found underlying them, then no one shall acquit Romulus of thoughtless wrath or hasty and ill-advised anger in dealing with his                                                 331 This episode was likely interpreted differently by those who were on the receiving end of anger during the civil wars of the late Republic.   332 Cf. n. 304 above.  333 Galinsky 2005: 218-33.  334 Galinsky 2005: 219-20. 335 Text is from Perrin’s 1914 Loeb edition. 156  brother, nor Theseus in dealing with his son, although the cause which stirred his anger leads us to be more lenient towards the one who was overthrown by a stronger provocation, as by a heavier blow.  For since the difference between Romulus and his brother arose from a deliberate investigation of the common welfare, there could have been no good reason for his flying into such a passion; while Theseus was impelled to wrong his son by love, jealousy, and a woman’s slanders, the overmastering power of which very few men have escaped. And what is more important, the anger of Romulus vented itself in action and a deed of most unfortunate result; whereas the wrath of Theseus got no farther than words of abuse and an old man’s curse, and the rest of the youth’s calamities seem to have been due to fortune. On these counts, therefore, one would give his vote of preference to Theseus.336  Plutarch concludes that Theseus’ anger is more easily excused than Romulus’ because the cause is more understandable (Phaedra’s accusation that Hippolytus had raped her), and the results of Theseus’ anger were less severe (Hippolytus does not die immediately as a result of Theseus’ curse). Plutarch cannot comprehend (or at least appears to not comprehend) why anger would arise in what seemed to be a strictly political situation. He considers the death of Remus the result of Romulus’ angry outburst, and not the foundation of Rome. Plutarch here provides somewhat of an outsider’s perspective on Romulus’ anger, which draws attention to the uniquely Roman nature of the narrative.337  As Stadter points out, Plutarch’s fundamental moral outlook in his Parallel Lives is Greek in nature338 (specifically Platonic and Aristotelian), so his evaluation of Romulus’ anger is understandably different than those articulated by Roman authors writing from different moral and political perspectives. I will now move on to consider the anger of two inheritors of Romulus’ example, Sulla and Caesar.                                                 336 Translation adapted from Perrin 1914.  337 See Jones 1971 and Stadter 2014: 13-31 for Plutarch’s attitude towards Rome. Both argue that Plutarch felt positively towards Rome and Roman rule.  338 Stadter 2014: 21.  157   My next pre-imperial autocrat is Lucius Cornelius Sulla. I want to briefly mention him here because his legacy as an inappropriately angry339 and unmerciful dictator influenced Caesar as he considered how to manage displays of anger and mercy during his dictatorship. Sulla appears in Roman literature as a negative exemplum of leadership because of his cruelty towards his fellow citizens while acting as dictator in 81 BCE. Cicero frequently refers to Sulla’s tyranny in his speeches to the people in order to invoke public indignation,340 and Seneca (Clem. 1.12.1-3) labels him a tyrant because he delighted in cruel rage (saevitia).341 Seneca argues that good kings put people to death when it is for the good of the state, but Sulla ordered executions because he personally enjoyed them.342 At Clem. 1.12.3, Seneca promises to talk about Sulla at a later point when he plans to discuss appropriate displays of anger towards fellow citizens: sed mox de Sulla, cum quaeremus quomodo hostibus irascendum sit, utique si in hostile nomen cives et ex eodem corpore abrupti transierint, “But we will discuss Sulla later, when we pose the question of how we should feel anger towards our enemies, especially if citizens—even persons from the very same body as ourselves—have broken away and passed into the category of public enemies.”343 Sulla’s example demonstrates that it was not enough for a Roman ruler to communicate his anger clearly to his subjects—the                                                 339 Sulla’s destructive anger is mentioned in Plut. Sull. 5.2, 9.7, 13.1, 23.4. 340 Good examples of this are found in his consular speeches De Lege Agraria.; e.g. Leg. Agr. 1.21; 2.82; 3.5. 341 Seneca also refers to Sulla in De ira 2.2.3 when he mentions historical events that make people feel angry: Hic subit etiam inter ludicra scaenae spectacula et lectiones rerum vetustarum. Saepe Clodio Ciceronem expellenti et Antonio occidenti videmur irasci. Quis non contra Mari arma, contra Sullae proscriptionem concitatur?, “This sensation comes upon us even when we’re watching shows at theatrical games and reading ancient history: we often seem to become angry with Clodius as he drives Cicero into exile, or with Antony as he orders his death. Who’s not stirred when faced with Marius’ arms or Sulla’s prescriptions?” Translation by Kaster 2010.  342 Seneca describes Sulla as a man who ruled by fear. In De ira 1.20.4, he remarks that the phrase oderint dum metuant, “let them hate as long as they fear”, was written during Sulla’s time and indeed used by the dictator. Sulla is characterized by his lack of concern about incurring public odium.  343 Text and translations of De clementia are by Braund 2009. Seneca never fulfills this promise, perhaps because he took up the topic in the missing third book of the treatise. I expect that Seneca used Sulla as an example of how not to express one’s anger at fellow citizens who have become hostes. It is unfortunate that this discussion is lost, because it would have been useful to know Seneca’s thoughts on how to express justified anger appropriately.   158  causes of his anger must also be justifiable, and his reaction to the emotion must not exceed the severity of the offence.   I conclude my discussion of the anger of pre-imperial autocrats with Julius Caesar. In chapter 4 I examined how his relationship with anger was positively interpreted by Cicero in his Caesarian speeches. His exemplum must be kept in mind when considering his adoptive son Augustus’ choices concerning emotional performances and self-fashioning.344 Caesar is responsible for the promotion of clementia as an administrative policy, and he is associated in historical texts with rejection of ira-based political decisions.   A clear example of Caesar’s rejection of ira in favor of clementia is found in his speech concerning the conspirators in Sallust’s Bellum Catilinae. In this text Caesar combats Cato’s argument that the conspirators should be kept at Rome to face harsh punishments instead of being granted the option to go into exile (Cat. 51). He begins his speech with the statement Omnis homines, patres conscripti, qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, amicitia, ira atque misericordia vacuos esse decet, “All men, fathers of the senate, who deliberate difficult matters, ought to be free from hatred, friendship, anger and pity.”345 Caesar here argues that decision making should be an unemotional process.346 Despite his staunch Stoicism, Cato rejects Caesar’s proposal to put aside anger towards the conspirators, and his opinion that they should be executed prevails in the end (Cat. 52). The takeaway from Cato’s rebuttal to Caesar is that Caesar should not be concerned about appearing too angry toward the conspirators when deliberating                                                 344 See Levick 2009: 209-23 for Caesar’s political and military legacy to the emperors.  345 Text is from Ahlberg’s 1919 Teubner edition. This passage shows the pairing of ira and misericordia (pity), an emotion which is closely associated with the disposition of clementia.  346 Sallust’s Caesar seems to believe in a division between rationality and emotion. I maintain that although this is a popular rhetorical stance in ancient and modern thought, it does not reflect the way in which human psychology actually works. On this topic I follow Bailey 1983: 24: “The dichotomy between reason and emotion is part of our overt culture; that is, it is part of the shield of falsification by which we make life comprehensible.”  159  their punishment. According to Cato, the threat that they pose is too great to be worried about such things. In this narrative Sallust illustrates Caesar’s attempts to avoid being seen as a leader whose anger results in the unjustified executions of Roman citizens. But in his effort to avoid being another Sulla,347 Caesar loses sight of the pragmatism of ira in certain situations.  Another example of Caesar’s attachment to a policy of clemency is found in Velleius Paterculus’ account of a telling incident involving a diadem. When two tribunes removed a diadem that Caesar’s supporters had placed on a statue of him, Caesar took action by stripping the tribunes of their offices (2.68):  ...notetur immodica et intempestiva, libertate usos adversus C. Caesarem Marullum Epidium Flavumque Caesetium tribunos plebis, dum arguunt in eo regni voluntatem, paene vim dominationis expertos. In hoc tamen saepe lacessiti principis ira excessit, ut censoria potius contentus nota quam animadversione dictatoria summoveret eos a re publica testareturque esse sibi miserrimum, quod aut natura sua ei excedendum foret aut minuenda dignitas.348      I should note the intemperate and untimely display of independence shown towards Caesar by Marullus Epidius and Flavus Caesetius, tribunes of the plebs, who in charging him with the desire for the kingship came near feeling the effects of his absolute power. Though Caesar was constantly provoked by them, the only outcome of the leader’s anger was that he was satisfied to brand them through the employment of his power as censor, and refrained from punishing them as dictator by banishing them from the state; and he expressed his great regret that he had no alternative but to depart from his customary clemency or suffer loss of dignity.349                                                   347 Caesar explicitly states that he will avoid imitating Sulla’s cruelty in a famous letter to Oppius and Cornelius dated to March of 49 (Att. 9.7C): temptemus hoc modo si possimus omnium voluntates reciperare et diuturna victoria uti, quoniam reliqui crudelitate odium effugere non potuerunt neque victoriam diutius tenere praeter unum L. Sullam quem imitaturus non sum. haec nova sit ratio vincendi ut misericordia et liberalitate nos muniamus., “Let us try in this way if we can recover the good will of all men, and enjoy a lasting victory; for others, owing to their cruelty, have been unable to avoid arousing hatred, or to maintain their victory for any length of time, with the one exception of Lucius Sulla, whom I have no intention of imitating. Let this be our new method of conquering—to fortify ourselves by mercy and generosity.” Translation adapted from Shuckburgh 1909. 348 Text is from Shipley’s 1924 Loeb edition. 349 Translation adapted from Shipley 1924. 160  Caesar is depicted as being very self-conscious about how his displays of mercy or anger will be received, and Velleius here notes that Caesar always tried to default to mercy when possible.350 This anecdote, like the one from Sallust above, reflects Caesar’s effort to be seen as a different type of dictator than Sulla. This passage again illustrates the connection between absolute power and ira in Roman thought. Caesar chose to use the powers of his censorship instead those of his dictatorship to punish the tribunes, which suggests that ira was considered a tool specific to autocratic offices.351 Velleius’ description of Caesar as saepe lacessiti implies that Caesar was often angered, but that he was in the habit of pardoning those with whom he was angry. This narrative reveals another important feature of Roman discourse on the employment of anger in leadership: rulers must be able to distinguish between situations that merit anger and those that demand mercy.  The examples of Romulus, Sulla, and Caesar demonstrate that anger was an important topic in Roman discourse surrounding the arts of statecraft and leadership. Octavian’s rise to power and eventual elevation to the position of princeps reinvigorated the conversation about the roles of anger in a Roman autocracy. In the following section of this chapter I examine evidence for the political dynamics of anger in Augustus’ regime. I consider not only how authors represent Augustus as a ruler who employed anger to consolidate and maintain his power, but also the emotional implications of his autocracy for his subjects. Augustus is generally shown to meet all of the criteria that I listed for the successful use of anger by rulers at the beginning of this chapter. Narratives about the anger of Augustus add the final element to the list of standards for                                                 350 Augustus claims to have exhibited mercy when it was safe to do so in Res Gestae 3. Augustus’ standards for the safe practice of clementia were higher than Caesar’s; he was much more willing to use ira. 351 Seneca suggests that ira is associated with kings at De ira 3.16.3. Pliny uses the phrase principis ira in his panegyric for Trajan (27.1): nec inter insanabiles morbos principis ira numeratur, “nor is the anger of the ruler numbered among incurable diseases.” Pliny’s point is that Trajan’s subjects do not have to worry about his ira causing them harm.  161  the use of anger by Roman rulers: when a ruler’s position is secured, his employment of anger should become more moderate in proportion to his power. Augustus gradually curbs his employment of anger in favor of mercy as he gains security in his position as an absolute ruler, and Roman authors consider this an admirable progression.352  5.2 Augustus  I take a stanza of the imperial poet Horace as my starting point for my discussion of the anger of Augustus. In the final poem of Odes 4, Horace names Augustus as the defender of Rome against public anger (4.15.17-20):  Custode rerum Caesare non furor  civilis aut vis exiget otium,      non ira, quae procudit enses          et miseras inimicat urbes.        With Caesar as guardian of our affairs, no civil rage  or violence will drive out peace,      nor anger, which sharpens swords          and makes enemies of unfortunate cities.   The fourth book of the Odes was published in 13 BCE, eighteen years after Octavian’s victory at Actium. Horace’s words suggest that at this point in his reign, it seemed reasonable to proclaim Augustus a safeguard against furor and ira and not the instigator of them. Horace here however does not say that Augustus will curb furor or ira principis, but rather furor civilis—the anger of citizens. The existence of the emperor as a figure whose emotions held official connotations                                                 352 The obvious exception to this is Augustus’ exile of the poet Ovid late in his reign in 8 CE. Ovid directly attributes his exile to ira Caesaris in his Tristia and Epistulae ex Ponto. He refers to ira seventy-eight times in these works, and by McGowan’s calculation (2009: 193), only five of those instances do not refer to the anger of the emperor. We do not know what Ovid’s offence was, so it is uncertain whether Augustus’ anger with Ovid would be perceived as justified or not. The problem of interpretation is compounded by the fact that no contemporary accounts of Ovid’s exile survive. It is briefly mentioned in the 4th century text Epitome de Caesaribus (1.24). 162  subjected the Roman people to an emotional hierarchy that limited their ability to express and employ anger, at least in the public sphere.353 This was the effect that Augustus’ absolute power had on Roman emotional regimes that governed the use of anger in public life. But in order to understand how this emotional hierarchy was built, we must start at the beginning of Octavian’s career.   Octavian did not begin his political career as an expert on official uses of emotion. Some comments on his early years include negative allusions to an angry temperament; it was not until later that he would embrace his adoptive father’s policy of clementia.354 This is why Seneca in his treatise De clementia presents the figure of Augustus to Nero as an exemplum with reservations. Seneca warns at Clem.1.11, [Augustus] in adulescentia caluit, arsit ira, multa fecit ad quae invitus oculos retorquebat, “ his youth [Augustus] was hot-headed, he blazed with anger, and he did many things which he later looked back on reluctantly.” We cannot know if Augustus truly had an innate tendency toward anger or if he regretted his early displays of the emotion, but we can be sure that anger characterized Octavian’s rise to power in the minds of many authors. His anger was most often understood in the context of revenge: he had a motive to perform righteous anger to avenge the death of Caesar.355 As I discussed in chapter 2, anger and vengeance were intimately connected in ancient thought on emotion, and both Stoic and                                                 353 Hence the decline of oratory under the Principate. Kenty 2014 argues that although the changing power structures of the late Republic and early empire presented challenges for Romans who hoped to exert political influence through speech, the role of oratory in self-fashioning remained constant in the early Principate.  354 For example, in the 4th c. text Epitome de Caesaribus, Augustus is described as “slightly irascible” (21: leniter iracundus). In Plut. Mor. 207c (Apophthegmata Romana, Caesar Augustus no. 7)  Augustus receives advice on managing his anger from Athenodorus. He punishes the philosopher for giving unsolicited advice by not allowing him to retire. Cf. Harris 2001: 245. See Dowling 2006: 29-75 for discussion of Octavian’s shift in focus from crudelitas to clementia. Many of Dowling’s points are complementary to my argument, but her discussion is centered on the development of official clementia while mine examines the development of official ira.  355 Suet. Aug. 10.1: omnium bellorum initium et causam hinc sumpsit: nihil convenientius ducens quam necem avunculi vindicare tuerique acta, “In all cases his reason for embarking on civil war was the following: he held that his foremost duty was to avenge the death of his great-uncle and protect his achievements.” Text of Suetonius is from Ihm’s 1908 Teubner edition. Translations of Suetonius are by Edwards 2000.  163  Peripatetic schools define anger as a desire for revenge after receiving a slight.356 Octavian was able to use anger to justify his use of violence and legitimize his claims to power in part because of the ripe political circumstances of the time, but also because his anger at Caesar’s assassination was deemed moral and appropriate according to Roman emotional culture. The excessive anger that Seneca criticizes in Augustus’ youth is precisely what helped him navigate his ascension to absolute power.   While Seneca laments Augustus’ youthful ira, Dio describes the skill with which young Octavian navigated the emotional climate at Rome in the wake of Caesar’s assassination. Dio narrates how Octavian carefully calculated his emotional performance upon entering Roman public life during this turbulent time (45.5-6):    πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ μόνῃ τῇ τοῦ κλήρου διαδοχῇ, καὶ ἰδιωτικῶς καὶ μετ᾽ ὀλίγων, ἄνευ ὄγκου τινός, ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἐσῆλθεν: ἔπειτ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἠπείλει οὐδενὶ οὐδέν, οὔτε ἐνεδείκνυτο ὅτι ἄχθοιτό τε τοῖς γεγονόσιν καὶ τιμωρίαν αὐτῶν ποιήσοιτο. τόν τε Ἀντώνιον οὐχ ὅσον οὐκ ἀπῄτει τι τῶν χρημάτων ὧν προηρπάκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐθεράπευε, καίτοι καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀδικούμενος: τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα ἐκεῖνος καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ αὐτὸν ἐκάκου, καὶ τὸν νόμον τὸν φρατριατικὸν ἐσφερόμενον, καθ᾽ ὃν τὴν ἐσποίησιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐς τὰ τοῦ Καίσαρος γενέσθαι ἔδει, αὐτὸς μὲν ἐσπούδαζε δῆθεν ἐσενεγκεῖν, διὰ δὲ δημάρχων τινῶν ἀνεβάλλετο, ὅπως, ὡς μηδέπω παῖς αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ὤν, μήτε τι τῆς οὐσίας πολυπραγμονοίη καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἀσθενέστερος εἴη. ἐπ᾽ οὖν τούτοις ὁ Καῖσαρ ἤσχαλλε μέν, οὐ μέντοι καὶ ἀσφαλῶς παρρησιάσασθαί τι δυνάμενος ἠνείχετο, μέχρις οὗ τὸ πλῆθος, ὑφ᾽ οὗ τὸν πατέρα αὐξηθέντα ἠπίστατο, προσεποιήσατο. ὀργήν τε γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τῷ ἐκείνου θανάτῳ ἔχοντας εἰδώς, καὶ ἑαυτὸν ὡς καὶ παῖδα αὐτοῦ σπουδάσειν ἐλπίσας, τόν τε Ἀντώνιον διά τε τὴν ἱππαρχίαν καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν σφαγέων οὐ τιμωρίαν μισοῦντας αἰσθόμενος.357    In the first place, he entered the city as if for the sole purpose of succeeding to the inheritance, coming as a private citizen with only a few attendants, without any display. Again, he did not utter threats against any one nor show that he was displeased at what had occurred and would take vengeance for it. Indeed, so far from demanding of Antony any of the money that he had previously plundered, he actually paid court to him, although he was insulted and wronged by him. For Antony did him many injuries both in word and deed, particularly when the lex curiata was proposed by which the transfer of                                                 356 Cic. Tusc. 4.21; Arist. Rhet. 2.2, 1378a. 357 Text is from Cary’s 1925 Loeb edition. 164  Octavian into Caesar’s family was to take place; Antony himself pretended to be doing his best to have it passed, but through some tribunes he kept securing its postponement, in order that the young man, not being as yet Caesar’s son according to law, might not meddle with the property and might be weaker in all other ways. Caesar was vexed at this, but as he was unable to speak his mind freely, he bore it until he had won over the multitude, by whom he understood his father had been raised to honor. For he knew that they were angry at Caesar’s death and hoped they would be devoted to him as his son, and he perceived that they hated Antony on account of his conduct as master of the horse and also for his failure to punish the assassins.358  This passage describes Octavian observing the emotional ambience in Rome before making important decisions about his own emotional performance, a performance which he knew would shape his public persona going forward. In this narrative he plans to use preexisting public anger against Antony to his advantage, and he decides to wait to reveal his anger to the people until he knows what their feelings are. Octavian’s early ability to judge a situation and decide when and how to use anger (both his own and that of the populace) in the public sphere foreshadows his success at implementing anger as emperor.  The interpersonal anger between Octavian and Antony and their respective supporters oscillates several times during the years prior to Actium and culminates with Octavian’s physical, emotional, and ideological victory.359 Suetonius describes how Octavian first decided to align with the cause of the nobles because he knew that they hated Antony, even though it meant that he would be lending aid to Caesar’s assassins (Aug. 10). After defeating Antony at Mutina by assisting the troops of Decimus Brutus, however, he quickly changes allegiances and forms the second triumvirate with Antony and Lepidus. The reasons Octavian cites for abandoning the nobles’ cause are triggers for anger (Aug. 12):                                                  358 Translation adapted from Cary 1925.  359 The figure of Antony is an epicenter of anger in other texts as well, most notably in Cicero’s Philippics.  165  ...causam optimatium sine cunctatione deseruit, ad praetextum mutatae voluntatis dicta factaque quorundam calumniatus, quasi alii se puerum, alii ornandum tollendumque iactassent, ne aut sibi aut veteranis par gratia referretur.  ...he renounced the optimates’ cause without delay, alleging as the pretext for his change of side the words and acts of certain men, some of whom called him a boy, while others pronounced that he should be honored then disposed of, so that neither he nor the veterans would need to receive their due.   Suetonius here provides insight into Octavian’s decision making process regarding the pragmatism of anger in a specific sociopolitical context. Octavian decides that performing anger would make his change of side understandable to those around him, so he cites a series of slights that serve to justify his experience of the emotion. Octavian is depicted here as possessing the ability to alter his performance of anger according to what best suits his political goals at the time.   Ancient authors also describe how Octavian expressed his anger liberally on the battlefield. Suetonius describes his victory at Philippi in this way (Aug. 13):  nec successum victoriae moderatus est, sed capite Bruti Romam misso, ut statuae Caesaris subiceretur, in splendidissimum quemque captivum non sine verborum contumelia saeviit; ut quidem uni suppliciter sepulturam precanti respondisse dicitur iam istam volucrum fore potestatem...  He was not restrained in victory but sent the head of Brutus to Rome to be thrown at the foot of Caesar’s statue, and was savage in his treatment of the most prominent of the captives, not even sparing them insulting language. When one begged him piteously for burial he is said to have replied that the birds would decide.  Suetonius reports that this behavior earned Octavian vicious insults from the conquered  party (foedissimo convitio coram prosciderunt).360 Octavian’s displays of anger in victory received anger in return from those whom he conquered, but learning from Caesar’s mistakes, he did not default                                                 360 “[they] openly reviled Octavian with the most insulting abuse.” 166  to clemency in these situations. He is described as being brutal in his victory at Perusia as well (Aug. 15):  Perusia capta in plurimos animadvertit, orare veniam vel excusare se conantibus una voce occurrens, ‘moriendum esse.’ Scribunt quidam, trecentos ex dediticiis electos, utriusque ordinis ad aram Divo Iulio extructam Idibus Martiis hostiarum more mactatos.  After the capture of Perusia, he inflicted punishment on a large number of people, responding to all those who begged for mercy or sought pardon with the same words: “You must die.” Some people record that three hundred senators and equestrians were selected from those who had surrendered to be slaughtered like sacrificial victims on the Ides of March at the altar dedicated to the Divine Julius.   These portrayals suggest that Octavian believed that it was important to craft a public image of himself as a powerful military leader, one to be feared and respected because of the dire consequences of provoking his anger. His choice to send Brutus’ head back to Rome communicated this intention. He would eventually carry this attitude over to his battles against Antony and his supporters.   In these accounts of merciless victories, Suetonius illustrates Octavian’s efforts to perform foundational anger in the style of Ro