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Decentralization, social capital, and capability in environmental management : case study of Tambon Maeta,… Petkanjanapong, Poome 2014

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 DECENTRALIZATION, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND CAPABILITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: Case Study of Tambon Maeta, Chiang Mai, Thailand  by POOME PETKANJANAPONG B.A., Chulalongkorn University, 2009   A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES   (Sociology)   THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  December 2014  © Poome Petkanjanapong 2014 ii   DECNTRCAAAThis research uses social capital concepts to study changes of capability in environmental self-management in Tambon Maeta, Chiang Mai, Thailand, after decentralization. From the macro perspective, this research found that the Maeta social network’s structure was much changed by decentralization, with noticeably greater social capital and capability in environmental management evident following the transition. Decentralization extended the size of the network, increased diversity in the population of Maeta network members, and expanded the number of political resources held by people in the network. In turn, this reshaping of the social network generated greater embedded resources, which are a determinate of social capital. This study found that, at the relational level, people in Tambon Maeta use social linkages as a main channel for resource exchange, both between organizations and between local government and local people. Local organizations’ and local governments’ capabilities in environmental management stem partly from the social capital of their respective leaders, such that their access to embedded resources in the Tambon Maeta social network is determined by the strength of ties between these leaders. The stronger the linkages, the greater the ability of local organizations to receive and share resources. For individuals, ordinary people who have stronger ties with local government officers can receive superior information more promptly, which affects their capability in environmental use and supervision. The results of this research demonstrate that decentralization can promote rural people’s capability in environmental self-management even when a central government has not directly transferred authority over environmental regulations to local governments. In addition, building strong relationships with local environmental groups can increase a local government’s capability in environmental management.  iii  LNIZTRIAA This dissertation is an original product of the author, Poome Petkanjanapong. The fieldwork reported in this dissertation was covered by UBC Ethics Certificate number O,S PBY,VB (MINIMAL RISK).   iv  MTDGIA:ZAa:sCIsCEA DECNTRC…………………………………………………………………………………………...........A ii LNIZTRI………………………………………………………………………………………………….A iii MTDGIA:ZAa:sCIsCE………………………………………………………………………………............A iv etECA:ZAMTDGIE…………………………………………………………………………………………...A v etECA:ZAutTdNTyE……………………………………………………………………………………….A vi etECA:ZALtRCoNIE…………………………………………………………………………………….A vii  Rfs:mGIbdIyIsCE …………………………………………………………………………………….A viii AnsCN:boRCt:sAuIRIsCNTGthTCt:sATsbAaiTsdIAtsAe:RTGAgsltN:syIsCTGAKTsTdIyIsCJAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAaTEI .CobkAZN:yAKTICTAa:yyostCtIErAMiTtGTsb…….……………………………... 1 AaiTUCINA,AAAAAAgsltN:syIsCTGAKTsTdIyIsCAtsAMiTtGTsbATsbAtsAMTyD:sAKTICTJAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAKTRN:ATsbAKtRN: eIlIGEA:ZA sTGkEtE…………………………………….................... 5        1.1: The roles of central government and communities in environmental                   management before and after decentralization……………………………………………….. 5        1.2: Environmental self-management by local people…………………………………………….. 8        1.3: Environmental self-management after the introduction of                decentralization to local governments………………………………………………………... 9        1.4: Basic information of case study and environmental management in Tambon Maeta………… 12        1.5: Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………………….A 26 AAAAAAA aiTUCINAYAA AAAvI GTCIbAa:sRIUCEJAuIRIsCNTGthTCt:srA.:RtTGAaTUtCTGrATsbAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAaTUTDtGtCk tsAgsltN:syIsCTGAKTsTdIyIsC……………………………...................... 28         2.1: Decentralization and changes in social capital and environmental self-management………... 30         2.2: Social capital at macro level: structural changes                 after decentralization and embedded resources………………………………………………. 34         2.3: Social capital at the relational level: linkages and accessibility……………………………… 37         2.4: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………. 39 AaiTUCINASAA AAAaTUTDtGtCkAtsAgsltN:syIsCTGAKTsTdIyIsCATEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAT LoDGtR vIE:oNRI :Z CiIAKTICTAE:RtTGAsICm:Nf……………………………………… 41         3.1: Centralization within decentralization: Extension of Maeta social networks………………... 42         3.2: The increase in individual resources of Maeta social network members                  after decentralization………………………………………………………………………… 63         3.3: Introduction of the TAO and greater diversity in the network……………………………….. 67         3.4: Remark: Social capital in sub network……………………………………………………….. 68         3.5: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………… 70 AaiTUCINAVAA AAA.:RtTGAaTUtCTGATsbAaTUTDtGtCkA:ZACiIAKTtsA RC:NEAtsAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAgsltN:syIsCTGAKTsTdIyIsCAtsAMTyD:sAKTICTATZCINAuIRIsCNTGthTCt:s………...... 71         4.1: Social network and resource exchange……………………………………..……………….. 72         4.2: Social capital and capability in environmental management of Maeta TAO……………….. 73         4.3: Social capital of environmental groups and relationship with the TAO……………………... 78         4.4: Distribution of government resources on social network individual                 social network………………………………………………………………………………… 92         4.5: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………. 97 Aa:sRGoEt:sAAAuIRIsCNTGthTCt:srA.:RtTGAaTUtCTGrATsbAaTUTDtGtCkAtsAgsltN:syIsCTGA.IGZPAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAyTsTdIyIsC ts MTyD:sAKTICTATCAKTRN:ATsbAvIGTCt:sTGAGIlIGE…………………….. 98 A2tDGt:dNTUik……………………………………………………………………………………………A 102 A UUIsbt0A J  KICi:b:G:dkATsbALN:DGIyEA:ZACiIAECobk……………………………………………... 106  v  etECA:ZAMTDGIEA MTDGIAV9,JAHoyDINA:ZAUTNCtRtUTsCEAtsAKo,ATsbAKoFAltGGTdIEAmi:AG:ddIbAmtCi:oCAUINytEEt:s……….……. QBA MTDGIAV9YJAMiIAM (AEoUU:NCEA:ZAZ:oNAtNNtdTCt:sAdN:oUEAtsAMTyD:sAKTICT………...…………………….…. 8c  MTDGIAV9SJAMiIAEoUU:NCATsbAEINltRIACiTCAUTNCtRtUTsCEAtsAKo,ATsbAKoFAltGGTdIEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAANIRItlIAZN:y KTICTAM (……………………………………………………………………………. cS   vi  etECA:ZAutTdNTyEAAutTdNTyAS9,JAg0TyUGIA:ZAE:RtTGAsICm:NfA:ZATAKTICTAR:yyostCkADIZ:NIAbIRIsCNTGthTCt:s……………...…..AVQAAutTdNTyAS9YJAMiIAGtsfTdIEAtsAMTyD:sAKTICT DIZ:NIAbIRIsCNTGthTCt:s………………………………………. FBAAutTdNTyAS9SJAg0TyUGIA:ZAE:RtTGAsICm:NfA:ZATAKTICTAR:yyostCkATZCINAbIRIsCNTGthTCt:s…………………… FFAAutTdNTyAS9VJA2oNIToRNTCtRAGtsfTdIEAtsAMTyD:sAKTICTATZCINAbIRIsCNTGthTCt:s……………………………… F)AAutTdNTyAS9FJAetsfTdIEA:ZAIsltN:syIsCTGAdN:oUEAtsAMTyD:sAKTICTTZC NAbIRIsCNTGthTCt:s………………... FcAAAA Avii  etECA:ZALtRCoNIEAALtRCoNIA,9,JAKTICTA1TGGIkATsbAKo,AltGGTdI……………………………………………………………………. ,VA AALtRCoNIA,9YJAKTICTAUI:UGIATNIAiTNlIECtsdANtRIADkAiTsbE………………………………………………………. Y,AALtRCoNIA,9SJAvIZ:NIECTCt:s…………………………………………………………………………….…………..YS   viii  A Rfs:mGIbdIyIsC A Thank you, Professor Ralph Matthews, for your guidance, support, and unabating patience throughout the entirety my M.A.  This thesis would not have been completed without you.  I am grateful to have had such a wonderful advisor. Of course, a great thank you to Professor Nathan Lauster, co-advisor, for your helpful comments and motivating encouragement.  Thank you very much Maeta people in Chiang Mai, Thailand, who welcomed me into their lives with a warm embrace, tremendous generosity, and of course, unforgettable food.  A special thanks to Pum’s family, my host family, who guided me throughout Tambon Maeta.  My gratitude also goes out to the Thai government who supported me financially, and provided me with all the necessary official letters for this thesis.  Thank you, my family, for your love and faith in me and my work.  Special Thanks to: Professor Pitch Pongsawad, who was there from the start, and had faith in my work even back when I was still collecting data in Thailand.  Aim Sinpeng, PhD., for your useful feedback and reassurance.  Joseph Domenichiello, for your assistance with my English and moral support.   1  nsCN:boRCt:sAuIRIsCNTGthTCt:sATsbAaiTsdIAtsAe:RTGAgsltN:syIsCTGAKTsTdIyIsCJAaTEIA.CobkAZN:yAKTICTAa:yyostCtIErAMiTtGTsbAA  This research arose from the observation that, of the local governments created in Thailand in the wake of political decentralization, very few have fully attained environmental self-management.  In most areas, this task remains largely the duty of the national government or external environmental groups (Wongwilaschai and Ploywulerd, n.d.). The main question of this research is:  How has political decentralization affected local environmental management in Thailand? This research attempts to answer this question by using social capital concepts, and focuses on change of social network structure. In addition, this research also examines relation between the strength of linkages and amount of sharing resources between local acetos in order to understand why different actors gain different capability in environmental management after decentralization.  Decentralization is a political phenomenon that has occurred in several countries in recent history. Although there are various case studies indicating that local governance changes in many respects after decentralization, many of these are influenced by the same  perspective of decentralization (see Blaikie 2006; Agralwal and Ribot 1999; Dufhues et al. 2011). They see the central government as a generator of political power, and study the changes in governance of different issues almost exclusively through this perspective, looking at decentralization solely as 2  the transfer of power from the central government to lower actors and institutions (see. Agralwal and Ribot 1999; Agralwal and Ostrom 2007). After that, they complain that a lack of success in community-based natural resources management is a result of the state’s unwillingness to transfer power to communities ( Blaikie 2006); alternatively, they see the whole process of political decentralization in environmental management as competition between rural and urban people for the state’s power (Dufhues et al. 2011).  It is true that some issues related to decentralization might be explained simply using a structural perspective in which decentralization is seen as the redistribution of power from the central government to local government. However, decentralization is not a united process. There are various issues involved as well as different approaches to dealing with it. It is my argument in this thesis that, for some countries and regions, other approaches might be more suitable. I will argue here that environmental self-management cannot be considered simply in terms of power transference, and demands consideration from a different perspective.  The effects of decentralization differ when environmental self-management is at issue, unlike, for example, the delegation of power with regard to tax collection by which a local authority is delegated by, and receives its legitimacy from, the central government.  Essentially, it is a different situation with regard to environmental management, because the nature of the power required for its processes involves not simply a delegation from on high, but also the articulation of power from below.  That is, under decentralization, the authority of local community leaders to govern environmental regulation and management comes from the relationships that they are able to develop at a less official level in addition to what is conferred upon them by a central government. Local government agencies get power directly from local people who have actually interacted with the ecology and geography of the area. Therefore, to 3  see distributed power from the central government as key to managing the environment might not sufficiently explain the post-decentralization changes in environmental management that are unique to each area of a nation. This research seeks to explain resultant changes in environmental self-management by selective perspectives that focus on the social relations involved in the delegation process.  This research explains changes of capability in environmental management through a concept of social capital and focus on social networks. While the classic notion of decentralization focuses on administrative structure and a static explanation of power distribution, a focus on social networks will allow a closer look at the actors and local social structure at the same time. Decentralization in Tambon Maeta affected social capital on both the macro level and the relational level. On the macro level, decentralization affected the size, private resources of members in Maeta social network, and diversity of the Maeta social network, and this increased the social capital of the whole Maeta society. At the relational level, however, actors gained differing levels of social capital depending on the strength of relational ties they were able to form. Using concepts of linkages and accessibility, I will discuss why some local organizations can gain capability in environmental management after decentralization, despite that fact it does not directly result in local people being endowed with any formal authority in connection with environmental management.  This research uses field work from communities in Tambon Maeta, Ampor Maeon, Chaingmai, Thailand as a case study. The local people of these rural communities are well known for self-regulating their own environment, and their culture, economics, and livelihoods are directly related to the surrounding natural resources. The research focuses on three environmental issues, namely forest, water, and agriculture. The main actors in Tambon Maeta 4  consist of the local government, the environmental groups, and community leaders. The underlying argument of this study is that,  DECNTRCACLEN IZO EZ,LSTP,AZ ITA BZE ITD,NTCLYZN,LVCLE ITV L MCVCLET ZLANC PCRT  AN,PPT EGCT CLEZNCT : CE T P,AZCEasT e,tCYCNST EGCPCT M ZLPT tCNCT L,ETRZPENZudECRTCYCLIaT  V,LMPET  IIT EGCT  AE,NPSTRdCTE,TAG LMCPTZLTEGCTPENCLMEGT ,DTEZCPT uCEtCCLTEGCT AE,NPsT T yLT EdNLST EGZPT  DDCAECRT EGCT A B uZIZEZCPT ,DT EGCT  AE,NPT ZLT NCM NRPT E,TCLYZN,LVCLE ITV L MCVCLESTtGZAGTZLTZEPCIDTZPT TD,NVT,DTP,AZ ITA BZE IsThis thesis does not use the word  AE,NTonly to mean an individual related to the issues, but also to denote a group or an organization. In Tambon Maeta, environmental groups or organizations have main roles in environmental management, although the decisions and social capital of these affiliations is still dependent on an individual leader.  The village chief, or Phuyai Baan, who is not a part of any organization, acts on his own accord in regulating the local environment.  Therefore, it would be misleading to refer to these players as organizations, when it is clear that there are specific individuals who are making these decisions and who own the social capital.   This study contains four chapters, the first of which will examine the history of Thai environmental management and provide basic information about the actors in local level governance. The second chapter is a discussion of why classic decentralization approaches cannot explain the situation of environmental self-management in Thailand, and also presents an alternative theory that will be used in this thesis. In the third chapter, the research will focus on changes in the Maeta people’s capability in environmental self-management as a result of post-decentralization social network changes.  The final chapter will use ‘strong tie versus weak tie’ concepts to explain how, after decentralization, different actors gained different levels of social capital and capability in environmental management.   5  aiTUCINA,AgsltN:syIsCTGAKTsTdIyIsCAtsAMiTtGTsbATsbAtsAMTyD:sAKTICTJAKTRN:ATsbAKtRN:AeIlIGEA:ZA sTGkEtEAA To frame the context of this research, I will begin by outlining some of Thailand’s history and related domestic environmental management problems. This chapter will look at information gathered from previous studies that focus on the role changes of central government and local actors before and after decentralization.  An analysis of the issues regarding lack of power in local government after decentralization will also be presented.  The final section of this chapter will provide basic information about Maeta communities and their environmental self-management. ,9, JAMiIAN:GIEA:ZARIsCNTGAd:lINsyIsCATsbAR:yyostCtIEAtsAIsltN:syIsCTGAyTsTdIyIsCADIZ:NIATsbATZCINAbIRIsCNTGthTCt:sAA Thailand is a very centralized country, where the national government is involved in every public decision, including environmental policies and management, which it has been developing steadily since the early 1900s (following the King Rama V period 1868-1910). After the reconstruction of its administration in 2002, the government’s environmental organizations became specialized, based on the kind of natural resources involved and their usage. The central government set up various organizations, such as the o,a IT f,NCPET mCB NEVCLE, the o,a IT: NZLCTmCB NEVCLE, and the o,a ITyNNZM EZ,LTmCB NEVCLE, to manage the environment, with each agency being responsible for a particular type of natural resource.  Various combinations of these 6  agencies may be operating in the same area; for example, in any given district, the reserved forest is managed byTEGCTo,a ITf,NCPETmCB NEVCLE, forest for recreational purposes is organized by the National Park agency, and the river is managed by the o,a IT: NZLCTmCB NEVCLES while dams in the river are under the control of the o,a ITyNNZM EZ,LTmCB NEVCLE.  This management structure allows Bangkok to control the entirety of Thailand’s environment with great ease. However, managing the environment in this specialized manner clashes with the way in which the local people use the natural resources (Chiangtong 2000). Before the b EZ,L IT nA,L,VZAT  LRT h,AZ IT mCYCI,BVCLET iI LT gy (1977-1981) (Government of Thailand 1977), Thailand never had a real environmental policy. Generally, environmental issues were alluded to only after the damaging effects of development had become apparent. However, in the 1980s after b EZ,L ITnA,L,VZAT LRTh,AZ ITmCYCI,BVCLETiI LTgy, consciousness of environmental protection needs began to rise in Thailand as it did in other parts of the world at this time, and rose to its peak around 1990.  The impetus for this was people’s growing awareness that forests were vitally interconnected with rivers, which are extremely important in rural Thailand (Chiangtong 2000), and eventually the central government became more concerned about environmental protection. However, from the state’s perspective, it was the local people who lived near natural resources who were the main contributors to deforestation. This notion led to the policy that separated local people from the forest (e.g. The Forest Act of 1941; The National Reserved Forest Act of 1964; the National Park Act of 1961). In the 1990s, Thai villagers had to cope with development projects that destroyed their environment, while at the same time extremist environmentalists were preventing them from accessing their natural resources (Ganjanapan 2001b). It would be true to say that, during this 7  period, almost all environmental management or protection was the responsibility of the central government. The work done by NGOs in local communities and the economic crisis in the industrial sector in 1997, which forced mobilized labourers back into the agricultural sectors of their hometowns, triggered Thai society’s increased concern with rural life.  This, in turn,generated discourse heightening the importance of local wisdom and expertise while beginning to cast doubt on the failed technocratic approach of the central government (Santasombat 2001: 47).  In an about-face, Thai society now views rural villagers as the keepers of the environment and recognizes rural lifestyle as harmonious with the environment, attitudes which mark a milestone in Thai history.  With this transition in approach, traditional folkways of people in the countryside have become accepted as a legitimate form of environmental protection, after years of being regarded as a detrimental.  In the aftermath of these changes, there were various public discussions about the relationship between the environment and natural resource-based communities. The interrelation of local people and natural resources involved more than indigenous knowledge systems and the local technology of production, as it also included the people’s norms and daily ways of life (Ganjanapun 2000). The network of resource-based communities joined several movements that tried to push community environmental management rights into policy decisions (Vandergeest 1996; Pintobtang 1998; Hayami 1997). The peak moment for the network was when it was able to forward the l,VVdLZEaTf,NCPETKZII to parliament in 2002. Although the bill was not ultimately promulgated, after that time bureaucratic offices related to the environment started to mention community rights and public cooperation in their policies. Even more significantly, the Thailand 1997 and 2007 Constitutions recognize community rights in environmental management.      8    Community rights over natural resources became solid policy when Thailand’s decentralization started in 1999. Environmental management was placed under the aegis of local government because its relationship with the local people is closer than that of the central government. Since then, local government, especially J Vu,LT .RVZLZPEN EZYCT kNM LZO EZ,LP (TAOs) that govern the rural areas, became a new hope for natural resource-based communities.  However, the central government still limits the power of local governments in environmental issues by putting restraints on local environmental laws (Ganjanapun, 2001a); local governments are restricted to imposing only laws concerned with maintaining environmental cleanliness and waste management (Patamasiriwat 2005; Ratchakitchanubeksa 2013).  However, even without comprehensive local laws, some local governments are still the main actors in environmental management (eg. Wongwilachai and Ploywulerd n.d.). This leads to the hypothesis of this thesis:  JGCTB,tCNT ,DT I,A ITM,YCNLVCLETZLTCLYZN,LVCLE ITZPPdCPTR,CPTL,ETA,VCT ,LIaTDN,VTEGCTACLEN ITM,YCNLVCLESTudET IP,TDN,VTEGCTI,A ITBC,BICT,NT,NM LZO EZ,LPTEGN,dMGTP,AZ ITEZCPTuCEtCCLTI,A ITM,YCNLVCLETIC RCNPrT LRT,EGCNTI,A IT AE,NPsT ,9YJAgsltN:syIsCTGAEIGZPyTsTdIyIsCADkAG:RTGAUI:UGIAEnvironmental self-management by local people in Thailand is not a new issue. Local people managed the environment by themselves before decentralization and the introduction of the TAOs. Many communities in rural areas of Thailand have their own ways of managing their environment, especially those whose livelihoods are based on natural resources. Ganjanapan’s (2000) project, hEdRaT ,LT NCP,dNACT u PCRT A,VVdLZEaT  LRT L EdN IT NCP,dNACPT V L MCVCLET ZLTJG ZI LR, shows that some communities manage the environment by themselves. He discusses that there are two mains activities in environmental-self management by rural people. First, they do self-governance of the natural resources around their communities. Some villagers use their 9  traditions, beliefs, and culture, and others rely on technology, modern contracts, and strategies from NGOs.  Second, these villagers have to deal with external power. For some communities the most important issue in their environmental self-management is reaching compromises with the central government’s agencies. However, none of these methods are officially recognized, and are permitted because they occur in areas in which are out of the national government’s control, being geographically distant from central government offices, overlooked due to a lack of officers, or of negligible size. However, these environmetal self-management activities are still vulnerable to outside forces. Due to there being no laws to protect community rights over natural resources, companies or government offices can easily disturb these local systems. For example, village customs associated with national parks can easily be interrupted if the head of the national park or a policy from the central government forces the village to change its practices.  Likewise, a plantation company might not adhere to water management policies set up by the local people, nor would a modern fishing company be obliged to follow the rules of the local fishery.  The vulnerability of environmental self-management forced NGOs and communities to set about protecting their rights. They required greater consideration from the central government on this issue, and, as already mentioned, the l,VVdLZEZCPTf,NCPETKZII is a good example of the kind of attempts that were made in this regard. It was not until the decentralization process was under way that the Thai government truly began to consider community rights and transfer environmental management power to local governments.   ,9SJAgsltN:syIsCTGAEIGZPyTsTdIyIsCATZCINACiIAtsCN:boRCt:sA:ZAbIRIsCNTGthTCt:sAC:AG:RTGAd:lINsyIsC EAAAs discussed  previously,  environmental  self-management  operated  in  several  10  communities in Thailand before decentralization. Decentralization affected both bureaucratic structure and folkway of local environmental management.  Before decentralization, local environmental self-management operated at the community level and villages shared natural resources in common geographical areas, but after decentralization, the Tambon Administrative Organizations (TAOs) were set up to govern 5-10 communities in the same sub-district (Tambon). To be recognized by the central government, the TAO must then issue a local law that dictates the rights of the communities over natural resources, which shifts local environmental management from the community level to the Tambon level. In the past, even though Maeta communities protested jointly against the central government’s policies, they did not share any rules or participate in environmental management with other communities. Each Maeta community used to carry out environmental management strategies in different ways. However, since decentralization, Maeta communities share the same local laws. If we look from a social network perspective, the changes in the level of environmental management affect the size of social networks in environmental management. In the past, different rules and geography might constrain each community to limit its environmental management social network, but decentralization forced different communities to merge their networks together. The changes of social network size directly affected the embedded resources in the network (Bourdieu 1986: 249), as will be discussed in lG BECNTU. The merging of inter-village social networks did not only extend the size of the network as a whole, but also changed the position of the actors within the networks. While in the past Phuyai Baan, or chiefs of the community were the gatekeepers of each village, decentralization helped build bridges across the structural holes that separated villages in the same Tambon (diagrams 3.4 and 3.5 in lG BECNTU). These network changes can 11  see as increase in density of the local social network which also promote social network in local society. Before decentralization, environmental self-management was based upon traditions, local beliefs, and trust between people within the same community. Even the environmental management practices that the NGOs set up were shaped by these characteristics. However, the central government only recognizes local activities if they are held within a bureaucratic framework such as local laws and official government documentation. Therefore, the local government, a kind of bureaucratic organization, has to manage the environment based on law. This way of managing requires more formalities such as documentation, meetings, and literal regulations, whereas in the past these rules were based solely on verbal agreements. It also requires TAOs to hire people with specific skills, such as lawyers, office administrators, and certified skilled laborers, who in turn increase the diversity of the local social networks and also of the embedded resources, since they introduce new information and strategic methods (Chapter 3). Decentralization also empower local people. Decentralization in Thailand encourage local people become leaders in local government and get involve more in local public policy. Presidents of local governments are from election and have to be local people. As well these president have full authorities over local government officers sent from central government. In other words, the structure of local government allows local people to have power over local government officers. Greater political resources of member in local social network mean greater embedded resource in the network, and we will discuss these issues more in chapter 3.  Nevertheless, as pointed out by Wongwilaschai and Ploywulerd (n.d.), how much of an effect decentralization will have on local communities’ environmental self-management is 12  different in each area.  These authors studied the roles of the local government in environmental management in Northern Thailand, and found that the roles of the local government in each area differed.  Some local governments are the main players in formal environmental regulation, while some support the former traditional organizations of environmental management and still others ignore the environmental issues all together. This research states that different duties of local governments in environmental management are a result of different capability in environmental management that each local government have. Moreover, the capability of local governments in environmental management is dependent on linkages and sharing resources between local governments and local organizations. Chapter 4 will focus on this issues.  The research to be presented in the present study examined a case centered in Tambon Maeta, where the local government became an important actor in environmental management even though there were pre-existing environmental groups or organizations. My research seeks to explain how local government can become the main actor in environmental management in Thailand and examines how decentralization affects local peoples’ capability in environmental management. ,9VJA2TEtRAtsZ:NyTCt:sA:ZARTEIAECobkATsbAIsltN:syIsCTGAyTsTdIyIsCAtsAMTyD:sAKTICTAA: CE TA,VVdLZEZCPvTKNZCDTyLEN,RdAEZ,LT Maeta is the name of a river in Northern Thailand. There are several communities along this river, but the focus of this thesis is on those Tambon Maeta, Maeon district, Chiang Mai, Thailand. It is helpful to note that the government of Thailand uses code names (for example, Mu1) when referring to a village, where “Mu” means village and the number represents a specific village, which is the system of reference that will be used in this thesis.  Tambon Maeta 13  covers 108 km2 and seven communities, namely Ban Ta-Mon (Mu1), Ban Ta-Kam (Mu2), Ban Kor-Klang (Mu3), Ban Huay-Sai (Mu4), Ban Pa-Nod (Mu5), Ban Don-Chai (Mu6), and Ban Mai-DonChai (Mu7).  As mentioned previously, a TAO, or Tambon administrative organization, is a type of local government in Thailand for rural area, and the communities just listed are governed by Maeta TAO. Tambon Maeta is not far from two big cities, the Chiang Mai and Lumpang municipalities, but because it is located in a valley, mountains to the east and west act as barriers to urbanization.   The Maeta River flows through this narrow valley where the Maeta people live and plant their crops. Forests around this area are considered an AA-type forest, meaning that they have a high level of biodiversity, and the central Thai government is attempting to merge them into the Maetakrai National Park. The Maeta River is also an important natural resource for Maeta communities because most plantations in Tambon Maeta use fresh water from the river. The river is managed by the Marine Department, while its tributaries are under control of the Royal Forest Department, and the two reservoirs are under control of the Royal Irrigation Department. The main income of the communities comes from forest-related and agricultural products. Maeta farmers produce the villagers’ staple foods, rice, meat, vegetables and fruits. Sticky rice, planted by almost every family, is meant for domestic consumption, while baby corn is the main commercial product. Other common types of agriculture in Tambon Maeta include livestock, fishing, and fruit plantations. Not as many young people are working in agriculture these days, however, finding employment in the industrial park instead and commuting the up to 40 kilometers from their villages to work. nLYZN,LVCLE ITV L MCVCLETZLTJ Vu,LT: CE TAs in most rural communities in Thailand, Maeta communities are still dependent on  14  iZAEdNCT2s2vT: CE Tg IICaT LRT:d2TYZII MC their natural resources. Food supply and income come from forests, plantation areas, and water sources. Maeta communities have their own ways of environmental management linking to their traditions, culture, and beliefs. Regarding forest management, at three different times in the past there were forest concessions in Tambon Maeta. In those periods the central government gave outside companies’ permission to log the Maeta forests, which led to severe deforestation. However, the villagers protested against the concessions over Maebon forest (near Mu2 and Mu3 villages) because they believed that holy spirits lived there. After the deforestation, Maeta villagers were faced with a big problem—a lack of water—and their plantations suffered.  However, one Maeta river tributary originating in the Maebon Forest (which survived the logging) still contained water all year round, and so the local people looked to the Maebon Forest as a model for rebuilding other forests in Tambon Maeta. After the end of the concessions, the 15  Maeta people began to seriously revive and maintain the forests. Kamnun Anun Dauengkaewrung, an important local leader, together with a community forest group, started the community forest committees around 1992 and they proceeded to regulate and control logging in Tambon Maeta. Although not every community joined this project and some still logged illegally (until confronted and arrested by the park rangers), with withdrawal of the concessions and the start of forest management by the local people, the quality of the Maeta forests improved significantly to the extent that the Royal Forest Department wanted to extend the border of Maetakrai National Park to include Maeta forests. The Maeta people protested this move, and joined with the networks of other communities in order to push the l,VVdLZEaTf,NCPETKZII into parliament between 1990 and 2007. However, the bill was not issued and in 2002 Thailand started its decentralization process. The new laws transferred authority over environmental issues from the central government to local governments, whereupon the Maeta people began to think in terms of environmental self-management in collaboration with the local governments instead of waiting for parliament to set down the l,VVdLZEaTf,NCPET.AEs  It should be noted that during the first period of the Maeta TAO’s jurisdiction (1999- 2003), its members were not concerned with environmental issues to the extent to which environmental groups were. Therefore, in the second election (2004), Korsuk Dauengkaewrung  (the son of Kamnun Anun, the leader of the forest community groups) ran for position of TAO President and won. After that, the Maeta TAO paid more attention to environmental self-management, especially forest management. The TAO issued Tambon Maeta local forest management laws, which permitted the Tambon Maeta Forest Committee to manage forests at the Tambon level. Moreover, the local laws also unified the way in which the forests were regulated by each community and forced Mu6 and Mu7, which had disbanded their forest 16  committees during the centralization period, to set up community forest committees again and pay more attention to forest management.   In regards to water management, most plantations in Tambon Maeta supplement rainfall with water from the Maeta River and its tributaries, . The Maeta farmers use water from the local irrigation system, Meung Fai. Meung Fai is a traditional system developed and shaped by the traditions, beliefs, and culture of non-commercial farmers in Northern Thailand, and currently influences the way of production in local communities. There can be many Meung Fai within any given community, , each operated by a local group of people headed by a Kaemeung. The Kaemeung will control the volume of water in the system, delegate maintenance tasks to members, and manage conflict between members. The way in which the system works today is the same as it did in the past.  There are also two small modern reservoirs constructed by The Royal Irrigation Department, and the shareholders of these two dams choose which committees they want to manage the water.  In agriculture, the main crops in Tambon Maeta have changed over time. The villagers mentioned tobacco as being the most problematic crop, as growing it  required high levels of chemical usage, and forests were cut down in order to create the charcoal that was used to dry the tobacco after harvest. Ultimately, Kamnun Anun convinced the villagers to plant other commercial crops in order to reduce the logging done for tobacco production. Baby corn became a new main crop in Tambon Maeta, but they still needed chemical fertilizers. In the 1980s, some farmers set up organic plantations at the commercial level because they were supported by the NGOs. The organic plantations are practical in Tambon Maeta because they require little investment. Farmers can use local seeds, and use the waste from farms as fertilizer. Moreover, the organic plantations can reduce living costs for farmers because the various kinds of crops 17  they plant for selling are also used for domestic consumption. Another contributor to the establishment of organic traditional plantations is the fact that they require fewer laborers and have lower running costs, which was essential during the movement for the Community Forest Act when many of the village men left to join the demonstration and some families were left short-handed.  .AE,NT LRTo,ICPTZLTJ Vu,LT: CE TnLYZN,LVCLE IT: L MCVCLETT Individual agencies in Tambon Maeta frequently take on more than one role in environmental management. Thus, some actors hold roles at both Tambon and community levels, while some agencies hold roles in both forest and water management. This section will introduce the main actors in Tambon Maeta environmental management, namely Maeta Sustainable Natural Resources and Agriculture Development Institution, Maeta Tambon Administrative Organization (Maeta TAO), Maeta Sustainable Agriculture Cooperative (Maeta Cooperative), Tambon Maeta Forest Committee (TMFC), Phuyai (chief of a villages), and Meung Fai groups.     2sT : CE ThdPE ZL uICTb EdN IToCP,dNACPT LRT.MNZAdIEdNCTmCYCI,BVCLETyLPEZEdEZLT TT Maeta Sustainable Natural Resources and Agriculture Development Institution (MSNRAD) is an informal organization. The leaders of Maeta communities established it after decentralization, through cooperation between Maeta Sustainable Agriculture Cooperative (Maeta Cooperative) and Tambon Maeta Forest Committee (TMFC). The organization acts as a gateway to Tambon Maeta for outsiders who want to study or observe environmental issues there, and consists of two parts, the office and the committee. The main duty of the office is to educate the public about natural resource management and sustainable agriculture in Tambon 18  Maeta. . The office provides home-stay and guides who inform the guests, and also distributes income to the villagers who take part in these activities.   The committee consists of leaders from various groups of people and includes around 105 members. When it was first established, only those from TMFC, Maeta Cooperative [Maeta Sustainable Agriculture Cooperative?], and Maeta TAO were members of the MSNRAD’s committee. However, today it also includes healthcare workers, teachers, monks, and volunteers for disaster protection.  The Institution has extended its influence in areas of interest beyond environmental management.   The role of the Maeta Sustainable Natural Resources and Agriculture Development Institution has shifted over the years where it once operated as a public space where people from different groups could discuss environmental issues, it is now a forum for people to discuss any issue related to Tambon Maeta. When outside projects from the central government or other organizations are proposed, the committee holds a discussion that might end with voting or a consensus, but does not result in any official binding obligation. However, the TAO and other government agencies tend to respect the consensus of the MSNRAD even when its decisions conflict with orders from the central government, which shows how powerful MSNRAD is for local policy decisions.   For environmental issues, the MSNRAD is an important player because every environmental project has to be discussed by its committee. For example, when the central government ordered the TAO to decrease the rate of forest fires, the TAO had to discuss these issues with the committee of the MSNRAD before doing anything, and the MSNRAD committee chose to ignore the central government’s orders. Moreover, because leaders from every 19  organization in Tambon Maeta had to join MSRNAD meetings, the MSRNAD is also the place where the actors of these organizations ask for cooperation from one another.   0sT : CE TJ Vu,LT.RVZLZPEN EZYCTkNM LZO EZ,LT9: CE TJ.kHT The TAO is a local government that consists of two parts:  the TAO council, which has legislative power, and the TAO presidency, which has executive power. Each community elects 2 representatives to the TAO council, which is authorized to regulate local laws in areas under the TAO’s jurisdiction, including environmental management, education, infrastructure, and health care. The TAO council also has to approve the overall TAO budget.  The executive sector is run by an elected president and the TAO office, which is a unit that operates policies directed by the president. A Chief Administrative Executive from the central government heads the TAO office and the other officers are usually external agents because the job positions require specific skills not available locally.        Interestingly, Maeta TAO has a strong level of cooperation between its President, its council, and the communities. In other sub-districts, the TAO president and TAO council operate separately]. In Tambon Maeta TAO, the council members help the president manage many of the issues;  for example, every council member has to also be a member of a community forest committee, and people will tell the council members of their villages when they need supplies to maintain their irrigation systems. Not only is there a great deal of cooperation between the council and the president in Tambon Maeta, but the TAO and the communities put forth strong combined efforts as well. The TAO president always discusses the yearly budget, the local laws, and any policies with other leaders in the MSNRAD, and presents issues at seven community meetings before sending discussion results to the TAO council. This process gives an indication 20  of how much cooperation there is between the TAO president, the TAO council, Maeta civil society groups, and Maeta communities.  The TAO handles environmental management directly in some issues, and [directly, but?] cooperates with other actors in the rest issues. In regards to forest management, the TAO issues forest management laws, with the help of Tambon Maeta Forest Committee. As well, the TAO also intervenes when TMFC and the community forest committees cannot address illegal logging. The TAO also issues TMFC’sAfunding and resources, including seedlings, instruments, and technology. When it comes to water management, the TAO lets each Meung Fai group manage its own irrigation system, but does provide the construction supplies for maintenance and repairs. On occasions when there are funds available specifically for concrete dams, the TAO will ask for suggestion from the Maeta Water Committee.  In the agriculture sector, the TAO controls the use of pesticides and herbicides by prohibiting their advertisement and application in public areas. The TAO also supports the budgets for some of Maeta Cooperative’sorganic plantation projects. Currently, the TAO is developing projects in land planning, community title deeds, and land banks.  UsT : CE ThdPE ZL uICT.MNZAdIEdNCTl,,BCN EZYCT The Maeta Sustainable Agriculture Cooperative (Maeta Cooperative) is the main economic supporter of Maeta farmers, especially organic plantation farmers. The Cooperative allows farmers to borrow money at low interest rates, and provides knowledge about and markets for organic products. Even so, not every Maeta farmer is a member of Maeta Cooperative, and there are noticeably few members from Mu1, Mu6, and Mu7 villages.  Maeta Cooperative has a sub-group called the organic plantation network, which prepares a budget, and supplies information and a market for everyone who is willing to practice organic farming and who can 21  meet the network’s standards. The Maeta Cooperative also works with the TAO in supporting residential (front yard and back yard) organic farming.  iZAEdNCT2s0vT: CE TBC,BICT NCTG NYCPEZLMTNZACTuaTG LRT The Maeta Sustainable Agriculture Cooperative is also involved in other environmental issues through the Maeta Sustainable Natural Resources and Agriculture Development Institution. The Maeta Cooperative has a loud voice because the president of the TAO and the head of MSNRAD are also members of the Cooperative. Maeta Cooperative has also supported demonstrations held by the forest community in the past and has a close relationship with the Tambon Maeta Forest Committee.  T FsT J Vu,LT: CE Tf,NCPETl,VVZEECCT9J:flHT Tambon Maeta Forest Committee is the main actor in Tambon Maeta’s forest management. The Committee is separated into the Tambon level and community level. The community forest committee of each village has 15 members (chosen by the villagers) as well as the permanent members, namely the Phuyai Baan (village chief) and his assistants, and the members of the TAO council. Before decentralization, the power of the forest committee was 22  dependent on the power of the Phuyai.  Each village’s forest committee is structured differently with regards to rules and strictness. Mu1, Mu2, Mu3, and Mu4 villages had forest committees before decentralization, but Mu5, Mu6, and Mu7 villages only set up official forest committees after the TAO issued the Tambon Maeta forest management law. Today, the local law issued by the TAO supersedes the Phuyai’s power, and the seven villages have the same forest committee structure and very similar forest management methods.  Residents of all villages have to complete an official request form before logging, but there are still some differences in forest management according to each village. For example, some allow logging in odd months only, others allow the villagers to cut only 15 trees per month, and still other villages require their Phuyai and TAO council member to be advisors only and not get involved in forest management. When the community forest committees change their forest usage regulations, they have to report the Tambon Forest Committee before they announce it to the villagers. The main duties of the community forest committees are regulating logging, and governing forest protection and maintenance. Thus, villagers have to get permission from their committee before logging; this is only granted for domestic purposes and requires payment of a fee, which is collected as a source of income for the community forest committee. Every year, the community forest committees survey the forests of their particular village, and submit an assessment report to the Tambon Forest Committee. Before the dry season (December – April), the community forest committees lead villagers in creating fire barriers, and during the rainy season (May-November) they are involved in reforestation. In the case of forest fires, it is the committees that organize and supervise villagers for fire-fighting. Tambon Maeta Forest Committee consists of two members from each community forest committee, so there are 14 committee members at the Tambon level. Tambon Maeta Forest 23  Committee manages forests at the Tambon level on the basis of reports it receives from the                                                iZAEdNCT2sUvToCD,NCPE EZ,Lcommunity forest committees, and if there is a problem that the community forest committee cannot handle, it is dealt with directly by  Tambon Maeta Forest Committee. For example, sometimes villagers log without permission and ignore the warnings from the community forest committee. When this happens, TMFC takes control of enforcement. The Tambon Maeta Forest Committee is also a powerful player in MSNRAD—because MSNRAD was established by the Forest Committee and the Maeta Sustainable Agriculture Cooperative—so it also uses MSNRAD to negotiate issues related to forest management, and gets involved in other environmental issues as well. . In addition, the current president of MSNRAD is a past president of TMFC. For the most part, the Tambon Maeta Forest Committee receives help from the TAO 24  in the form of seedlings and receives a small budget for running occasional activities such as reforestation or constructing fire barriers.  QsT iGda ZTK  LT Phuyai Baan is a kind of government officer from the old bureaucratic structure who acts as the official village chief and who would have taken care of all village issues in the past. Despite the current presence of the TAO, Phuyai Baan is still available and is not related to the TAO. Phuyai Baan has always been an elected position, under the direct control of Amphor (District) and the central government. Generally, villagers choose their Phuyai Baan according to power and seniority, and the office was formerly the only powerful, important bureaucratic position in a village. Today, although the TAO is the prominent administrative organization, the Phuyai Baan, as a leader of the community, is still important because they they is able to gather villagers and control the community radio.      Phuyai Baan are also park rangers and, before decentralization, the community forest committee used Phuyai Baan to enforce their regulations.  This meant that forest management used to depend largely on how serious the Phuyai Baan was about environmental issues. Today, according to local forest management law, a Phuyai Baan in Tambon Maeta is only a member of the community forest committee but because of seniority he is still useful for regulating forest usage. When the forest committee needs labourers for their activities, such as constructing fire barriers or reforestation, Phuyai Baan will use the community radio to gather people to participate.   Phuyai Baan has little input in water and agriculture management, because Meung Fai groups are independent. However, Phuyai Baan can sometimes be accessed through the TAO 25  when villagers need help or supplies to maintain the irrigation system. Phuyai Baan are also members of MSNRAD; therefore, they also get involved in environmental management through public discussions. For example, they might ask for new concrete dams in their communities. Moreover, before setting up activities in any villages, both TAO and MSNRAD will ask for permission from Phuyai Baan, and in turn the Phuyai Baan will help them by gathering people or announcing their request to the villagers.   (sT :CdLMTf ZTMN,dBPTNorthern Thailand’s local irrigation systems, which people have used for centuries, are called Meung Fai. They consist of small dams and rustic canals which lead water to each member’s farm. People who share the same system will cooperate by communicating the volume of water used and what maintenance they have performed on the system. Each group’s leader, or Kae Mueng, is chosen by the members. Before the rainy season, the leader will call members of the group together in order to have them maintain and repair the dams and the canals, and conduct the ceremony that is done to show respect to the water spirits. During the planting season, if the canals or dam have broken down, Kae Mueng will call the members to repair them. If a member does not take part in these restorations, then they will have to pay a fee. During the dry season, if there is not enough water in the river for every member, Kae Mueng will distribute it according to a compromise decided upon by the members.   The Mueng Fai groups were the traditional environmental organizations least affected by decentralization and continue to maintain the same water management practices. One reason for this is that this system is dependent on the geography, not on a bureaucratic system.  Also, the members of each group have not changed and have therefore developed a sense of camaraderie. The TAO does not change the management ways of the Meung Fai, but it does make the groups 26  more dependent on the local government in that it provides the supplies needed to maintain the dams and the canals. Moreover, every Meung Fai group wants concrete dams because then the members will not have extensive repairs to do every year. The decision regarding which Meung Fai will get the concrete dams depends upon the TAO and  Maeta Water Committee that the TAO forms by delegating the two Kae Meung of each village.  ,9FJAa:sRGoEt:sAA  Thailand’s central government has been an important player in national environmental management for over 100 years. However, during this centralization period, under the concentration of the centralization, local people also developed their own ways of environmental self-management. Now, after decentralization, the central government still holds most of the authority in environmental management and, if we look only at the macro level or from the structuralism perspective, we might not see any changes in environmental management in Thailand. However, at the Tambon level decentralization does affect local actors’ capability in environmental management through changes in social structure. Decentralization shifted the unit of local governance from the community level to the Tambon level in many issues, including environmental management. The bigger units of management affected the social capital of communities, As well, an increase in formality of local governance promoted diversity and amplified human resource potential in the social network. At the same time, decentralization also empowered local people.  These changes of social networks impacted local communities’ and actors’ capability in environmental self-management . Although the social capital of local communities increased, it must be kept in mind that the post-decentralization differences are also vitally related to the kinds of social ties in existence and the position of the relevant actors.  27   The Maeta people had their own long-standing ways of environmental management and each village differed from the other, if only slightly. It is not surprising that the introduction of local government in the form of the Maeta TAO would affect the structure of traditional self-management regarding environmental issues. From this chapter, we can see how the powers and relationships of Maeta local actors in environmental management changed after decentralization even though the central government has not officially authorized Maeta TAO to oversee environmental management.       In the next chapter, I will discuss sociological concepts and how decentralization and social capital are related, as well looking at the relationship between social capital and local people’s capability in environmental self-management. The concepts will be linked to the context of environmental management in Thailand as discussed in this chapter. At the same time, I will discuss why the structuralism perspective of decentralization cannot explain changes in self-environmental management in Thailand. In Chapters 3 and 4, I will use data from the Maeta communities to show the effect of decentralization on social capital and capacity in environmental management at both the Tambon level and the individual level.      28  aiTUCINAYAAvIGTCIbAa:sRIUCEJAuIRIsCNTGthTCt:srA. RtTGAaTUtCTGrATsbAaTUTDtGtCkAtsAgltN:syIsCTGAK TsTdIyIsC A In this chapter, I will discuss the concepts that relate to this thesis. As stated before in lG BECNT 2, political decentralization in Thailand did not allow for local governments to be granted more power from the central government, and it was assumed that their existing power would be significantly curtailed by the introduction of central government regulations and management structures. However, some local governments still have a significant administrative presence in environmental management, indicating that authority over how environmental issues are dealt with does not come solely from the central government.  This research will take a different perspective on the origins of power, and will show that the ability to engage in environmental management constitutes a form of social capital. I will argue (in lG BECNTU) that a new process has emerged in which the decentralization of authority does not necessarily affect local environmental management directly through altering its bureaucratic structure. The goal of this research is to demonstrate that decentralization impacts local environmental management to the extent to which it is able to operate within the context of local social capital. However, the focus of this chapter is not on presenting empirical evidence to support the statements just made above, but rather on setting forth the concepts dealing with the nature of social ties, social networks and social capital that will be used in the subsequent analysis to be presented in Chapters 3 and 4.  It will be the underlying argument of this thesis that the intrusion 29  of centralized government into environmental management of remote areas of Thailand, actually had an unintended consequence. Before decentralization (or we can say before intrusion from the central government), communities in this region, Tambon Maeta, managed their own environmental resources largely independently. However, the bureaucratic structures of regional management, imposed on local communities from outside, ultimately served to bring communities and community members closer to one another, and in so doing, they began to engage more cooperatively within the new management structures. To understand how this level of local empowerment became possible as a consequence of a series of government initiatives designed to provide more centralized control, it is helpful to employ a sociological framework of explanation around the concepts of networks, social ties, and social capital.  The purpose of this chapter is to present the aspects of that framework that will be used in the subsequent empirical analysis of Tambon community data. Thus, lG BECNT0 will present an overview of the literature on decentralization in other countries, similar to what has occurred in Thailand, and introduce the concepts related to social ties, networks and social capital that will be used here as the primary framework of explanation.  The first section will discuss how a purely structural view of decentralization cannot explain the success of local people in environmental management. Concepts of social capital and related literature will then be introduced, followed by discussion of why the social capital approach is more suitable for studying changes in the capability of local people in environmental self-management. In Section 2.2, I will discuss the concept of social network structure and embedded resources, and will link it to the context of the fieldwork. In Section 2.3, I will discuss how access to embedded resources by individuals is related to the existence of strong social ties, as identified in the literature. 30  Y9,JAuIRIsCNTGthTCt:sATsbARiTsdIEAtsAE:RtTGARTUtCTGATsbAIsltN:syIsCTGAEIGZPyT TdIyIsC A:,YZLMT t aTDN,VTEGCT,IRTBCNPBCAEZYCT,DTRCACLEN IZO EZ,LTDecentralization is the process of transferring power from a central government to lower actors and institutions (Agralwal and Ribot, 1999; Agralwal and Ostrom, 2007) that has been conducted in political realms all around the world throughout recent history.  Carrying with it the hope of greater revenues and more effective political practices as compared to centralization (Gregersen et al. 2005: 13), decentralization changes bureaucratic structure at both the local level and the national level. Concurrently, it typically also affects the social structures of local societies. There are two main kinds of decentralization, the first whereby a central government establishes new local administrative organizations and staffs them with its own officers (administrative decentralization), and the second whereby a local government is elected by local people. The latter process can be called democratic decentralization or political decentralization (Larson 2005). Political decentralization allows the people who will benefit most from the effects of new policies to become more involved in the development and implementation of those policies (Blaser et al. 2005:8). Some studies assert that the involvement of local stakeholders and accountability requirements for local organizations significantly improve the efficiency of environmental self-management in natural resource-based communities1. Moreover, unsuccessful environmental self-management at the local level is frequently the result of a central government’s unwillingness to transfer power to lower institutions (Blakies 2006). Still,                                                           1 See for examples the case studies of environmental self-management in mCACLEN IZO EZ,LSTD,NCPEST LRTNdN ITA,VVdLZEZCPvTi,IZAaT,dEA,VCPTZLTh,dEGT LRTh,dEGC PET.PZ Tedited by Webb and Shivakoti (2007). 31  how can we explain why some local organizations have the ability to manage their environment even when power has not been allocated from a central government to the local people? In Thailand, the national government still reserves power over environmental management, and authorizes local governments to have responsibility only on a very limited number of issues, such as waste management or cleanliness. Local laws about forest management or water management are not recognized by the central government, and they have vague legal status (Rajchakitjanubeksa 2013; Patamasiriwat 2005). However, there are some communities and local governments that can manage the environment without the power given to them from the national government. In other words, decentralization does not always affect the bureaucratic structure of environmental management because local Thai governments cannot officially issue any natural resources management laws or policies. Therefore, this research uses another perspective to explain Maeta TAO’s capability in environmental management; fundamental concepts of social capital and social networks seem best suited to explanation of this phenomenon. h,AZ ITA BZE IT LRTP,AZ ITLCEt,NcTSocial capital is a concept that emerges in various fields of study. Social capital also partly shares some basic elements of other kinds of capital, such as human capital or financial capital. The basic concept of social capital is related to investment and return benefit in social relations (Lin 2001: 30) Study based solely and specifically on social capital also can be separated into two perspectives, the macro level and the relational level. At the relational level, social capital research looks at how individuals access and use the embedded resources in their social network. At the macro level as well, the social capital approach focuses on how groups can create and maintain their social capital, and how it affects the lives of group members (Lin 32  2001: 30-31). There are various issues associated with the study of social capital, such as trust, sanction, and embedded resources. This research will focus on change of social network structure and embedded resources, and strength of linkages and accessibility. Social network analysis is the main research approach used in this study. In the social network approach, each individual or group is seen as a node and each node has ties with other nodes. The nature of social ties between each set of individuals is different, and the linkages between nodes create the complex web of a social network. In other words, social networks constitute the complexity of social relations between individuals or groups in a society. When talking about the resources that an individual takes from the network for their own purpose, we may call that its social capital (Lin 2001: 12). The social capital of each actor in specific situations is dependent on both the level of the resources in the network and the actor’s accessibility to those resources. (Lin 2002: 29). The macro level perspective is the one that this research will use to explain the embedded resources in the network. I will discuss how decentralization changes the size of social networks, injects diversity into the network, and increases the resources of the network members. Section 2.2 will contain further discussion of the concepts behind these changes.  To discuss accessibility, I will explore how the strength of linkages between actors affects individuals’ access to embedded resources. Concepts about linkage will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.3. h,AZ ITA BZE IT BBN, AGT LRTPEdRZCPTZLTCLYZN,LVCLE ITPCID)V L MCVCLETExisting studies point to a positive relationship between social capital and environmental management. Kilpatrick (2007) did research in four communities in Bolivia and found that both human and social capital were prerequisites to succeeding in natural resources management at the local agency level. This is because social capital facilitates people’s collective activities 33  (Kilpatrick 2007). Similarly, farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa also use social networks to access new technology in soil management (Njuki et al. 2008). In South Poland, social capital and historical factors also determine the level of mitigation that is possible at the local community level in alleviating possible flooding (Dzialek, Biernacki, and Bokwa 2013). Thus, these phenomena are not limited to specific location or cultures. The collective environmental management programs that are operated by small groups of people with high levels of trust are successful in many countries (Pretty 2003).  The works just cited show us that a high level of social capital can increase communities’ capability in environmental self-management in various ways. These examples give an indication of the relationship between social capital and the capability that groups of people can have for environmental self-management. It was these studies which motivated me to investigate the relationship between decentralization and capability in environmental management in Tambon Maeta using a social capital approach, and social networks will be the main focus at both the structural level and the linkages level of analysis. There are two reasons why this research focuses on social networks. First, decentralization affects social network structure (lG BECNTU), and local people in Tambon Maeta use social networks to exchange their resources rather than a market-based or bureaucratic system (lG BECNT F). Therefore, the social network approach can show us changes in social capital at the structural level and the relational level. In Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, I will discuss the concepts of social capital and social network at the macro and micro level, respectively. Each section will also link the concepts to the context of the case study.  34  Y9YJA.:RtTGARTUtCTGATCACiI y RN:AGIlIGPAECNoRCoNTGARiTsdIEATZCINAbIRIsCNTGthTCt:sATsbAIyDIbbIbANIE:oNRIEADecentralization does not necessarily bring power in environmental management to local people directly, but it can affect social structure and lead to changes in the social capital of local people. l G BECNTUTof this research will focus on the changes in social capital at macro levels. The macro level of social capital approach demonstrates:  “(1) how certain groups develop and maintain more or less social capital as a collective asset, and (2) how such a collective asset enhances group members’ life chances” (Lin 2001: 31). For the first issue, this research will focus on three changes that occurred in the Maeta social networks after decentralization, namely the size of the communities, embedded resources, and diversity in rural communities. In addition, to study how changes in collective assets affect Maeta people’s lives, the research will look at environmental management in Tambon Maeta. Size of social network is one of the most basic issues in social capital study. The size of the network and capital possessed by members of the networks greatly influence the level of social capital available (Bourdieu, 1986: 249). Essentially, a bigger social network can lead to greater access to social capital. At the same time, a network’s increased density also can lead to greater levels of social capital in a group because the social networks that have high level of density will also have high levels of trust, norms, and sanction. These can promote social capital (Coleman 1990). In Tambon Maeta, the research determined larger social networks at the village level is the same process as a higher density of social networks at the Tambon level. Decentralization affects the size of social networks because decentralization also has a centralization process. At the national level we might see this process as one designed to distribute power to local government. However, if we look from the community’s perspective, 35  decentralization in Thailand requires greater cooperation among neighbouring local communities. In the past, environmental management was an activity that was engaged in out of the national government’s sight. This administrative gap allowed each community to develop its own way of environmental management tied in with local beliefs and geography (Narintrangkul Na Ayuthaya 2000: 55). Since decentralization, local administrations now govern several villages collectively and issue local laws that apply to every community within the same Tambon (sub-district). This change allows local villages to be more dependent on other communities and unites communities in terms of politics and environmental management. Moreover, as a result of the decentralization process, villagers also have greater interaction with people from different communities, which further extends the size of their community networks. This issue will be discussed by case studies in Chapter 3, to show how a larger social network can promote social capital and capability in environmental self-management. It is not only the size of social networks that determine social capital, but also resources held by members of the network which in turn affect the number of embedded resources. Most societies value wealth, power, and status; therefore,  the more of these kinds of resources that members in a social network hold, the greater the amount of social capital held by the group (Lin 2001: 33) Decentralization increases the resources of local people and embedded resources in the network, particularly political power and information. Democratic decentralization, in particular, empowers local people (Tacconi 2007) by allowing them to get involved in policy decisions (Mello 2010). In the case of Thai decentralization, it also empowered ordinary local people directly by allowing them to become government officers, such that it would be fair to say decentralization gave people more political power than they had before. In other words, the personal resources of each member in the network increased as a result of decentralization.  In 36  Chapter 3, I will discuss further how increases in the private resources of local Tambon Maeta people affected social capital and capability in environmental self-management in that area. Diversity in the social network is the last issue related to social network structure that will be discussed in this thesis.  It is a controversial topic for scholars, who are divided on the issue. There are those who argue that, when there is heterogeneity, especially with accompanying differences in social class and ethnic, this can create mistrust and misunderstanding which in turn may hinder social capital development (Blair 1996; Cernea 1989)..  In the other camp are those who insist that diversity can also promote social capital because, when there is diversity of background and affiliation, then members of the same network have varying ties linked to people of different networks and thus have potential access to a wider variety of social capital resources (Pretty 2003). Moreover, from an organizational perspective, a network made up of a variety of people from different backgrounds will bring with it a greater variety of resources, skills, knowledge, relationships, and perspectives (Ancona and Caldwell 1992). In Thailand, rural areas had minimal diversity in race, career, and class. Therefore, when decentralization creates a lot of various job positions, giving new social status to local people, and bringing outsiders to local social networks, diversity in the social network is promoted.  In Chapter 3, I will discuss how changes in network diversity and social capital in Tambon Maeta are related. Changes in size and density, resources of members, and heterogeneity are all social network issues that can determine social capital. However, these three issues only show us the structure level, or macro perspective, of social capital studies. They cannot explain why some actors gain greater social capital and capability in environmental management after decentralization. This is why we must also look at social capital from a perspective that focuses on the relational level. 37  Y9SJA.:RtTGARTUtCTGATCACiIANIGTCt:sTGAGIlIGPAGtsfTdIEATsbATRRIEEtDtGtCkAEven though decentralization might positively affect capability in environmental self-management by promoting social capital in Tambon Maeta, this still cannot explain why different actors gain differing amounts of social capital. A focus at the relational level of social networks is important for this reason. At the relational level, social capital study focuses on how individuals invest in social capital and how they access it (Lin 2001: 31). There are various factors that can determine accessibility; for example, the strategic position of an individual within the network can promote the available resources of that person (Burt 1990), and the type of linkages can determine the number of resources that that individual can access (Granovetter 1973). This research examine how individuals’ ability to access to embedded resources in the network changes according to the strength of their social network linkages. With the social network approach, ‘linkages’ refers to relationships between individuals. Most social capital studies speak of three kinds of linkages:  strong ties (bonding), weak ties (bridging), and linking.  Both strong ties and weak ties refer to linkages between people in the same social class, but the stronger or weaker the tie, the closer or more distant the link between people, accordingly (Babaei et al. 2012). There are several studies that discuss accessibility and strength of ties.  In his often cited work on strong versus weak ties, Granovetter (1973, 1974) argues that weak ties can provide better access for individuals in both job hunting and accessing general resources such as money or information.  However, the literature also contains research that shows empirical data opposite to Granovetter’s position. In some Asian societies, strong ties seem to be an effective means for individuals to access general social capital. For example, in Chinese society, kin ties (delineated as a strong tie) also include people in the communities and clans. Moreover, When formal institutions block ordinary people’s access to embedded 38  resources, kin ties are better gateways for relatives to access political resources in the network than non-kin ties (Lin 2002: 110). In the case of Japanese individuals, there is evidence to suggest that strong ties also include colleagues, and that people tend to keep the dissemination of information limited to those with whom they have this kind of tie (Inaba 2006). In Thailand and Vietnam, strong ties also bring about social benefits to the network’s members (Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi 2004: 547). From these debates we can see that in Asian communities strong ties tend to be an important way by which individuals can access embedded resources in the network. Exchange of resources through social linkages is not limited to individuals. Research performed by Gulati (1995) and Cook (1977) also shows us exchanges of information and other resources through private linkages between agencies of different organizations. Moreover, because trust between partners is important, the partners still retain linkages across the organization even though there are new actors in the field. In the case of Tambon Maeta, even bureaucratic organizations exchange some valued resources with local organizations through the social linkages of the leaders. This is why, when examining an organization’s capability in environmental management on the basis of strength of ties and accessibility to embedded resources, it is important to examine the role of the leaders in linking organizations. These issues will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4. While bonding and bridging ties focus on the interaction of people with the same or similar social status, vertical ties link people to groups and individuals at different social levels, who may have very different types of social capital, e.g. relationships between local people and government agencies or NGOs (Woolcock 2001).  Linking social capital is also important for local actors to access resources from formal organizations (Halpern 2005; 25). As I will 39  demonstrate in Chapter 3, decentralization in Thailand changed linking ties in the communities by prompting local people to be politically active throughout the region. Decentralization also provided access to individuals from outside the local region who had expertise and skills not previously available to local communities and their leaders.  In Tambon Maeta, we can see that people prefer to use their linking social capital instead of contacting the government office directly when they need local government resources. In lG BECNT F, I will discuss this issue further and demonstrate how the strength of a linking tie can determine the resources available to local people. Y9VJAa:sRGoEt:s AIn its investigation of post-decentralization changes in capability in environmental self-management, this research utilizes a social capital perspective instead of the traditional structural view that focuses solely on power under formal organization. There are several studies indicating that decentralization can promote social capital, and that increases in social capital can also lead to local people having greater capability in environmental management. These studies have provided a model for the present research, which uses a social capital concept to examine Thailand’s post-decentralization changes in capability in environmental self-management and explain relationships between decentralization and changes in social capital. At the group level, this decentralization in Thailand actually promoted social capital by extending the size of social networks, increasing embedded resources, and promoting diversity at the rural community level. These changes in social network structure will be discussed in lG BECNTU.  When we analyse social capital at the individual level, it becomes apparent that individuals can gain different levels of social capital after decentralization because of differences in individual access to new 40  network embedded resources. In lG BECNTF, discussion of social network accessibility and each local actor’s capability environmental management will be based on these two concepts.   41  aiTUCINASAAaTUTDtGtCkAtsAgsltN:syIsCTGAKTsTdIyIsCATEATALoDGtRAvIE:oNRIA:ZAACiIAKTICTA.:RtTGAHICm:NfA  This chapter will provide an analysis of social capital and the environmental management of Tambon Maeta, with a focus on the Maeta people’s capability for environmental management before and after decentralization. In this chapter, social capital is analyzed as collective property. Three main issues pertaining to social capital in Tambon Maeta that changed significantly after decentralization are:  the size of the network, the resources of the members, and the diversity of and within the networks.  Existing studies have pointed to a positive relationship between social capital and environmental management (Kilpatrick 2007; Pretty 2003; Njuki, et al. 2008; Pretty and Ward 2001). The main argument put forth in this chapter is that, following decentralization, changes in the social network structures strengthened the Maeta people’s capability in environmental management. The creation of the Maeta Tambon Administrative Organization (Maeta TAO), made a positive contribution to the management of the environment in the following ways. First, Maeta TAO increased interaction within existing social networks while also altering their size.  Second, decentralization empowered ordinary people in Maeta social network. In other words, amount of resources (political power) held by member of Maeta social network increased. Since social capital is determined by the size and capital of the members within each network 42  (Bourdieu 1986; 249), as Maeta social networks grew and local people obtained greater political power, more resources became available within each network.  Lastly, the creation of the TAO promoted more heterogeneity within Maeta networks. There are two modes of thought on this issue, the one being that diversity can promote social capital and the other stating that it hinders social capital.  Heterogeneity, especially in endowment and culture, can create suspicion and misunderstanding, which in turn hinder the development of social capital (Blair 1996; Cernea 1989). At the same time, economic inequality leads to mistrust which can reduce social capital. However, another group of scholars states that when members of the same network have varying, but linked, political positions, more social capital can be created (Pretty, 2003). Moreover, from an organizational perspective, the network whose people come from a variety of backgrounds can offer a wider range of resources, skills, knowledge, relationships, and perspectives (Ancona and Caldwell 1992).  This chapter will discuss the size of the Maeta communities’ social network, increased resources of individuals in the network, and how decentralization promoted heterogeneity within Maeta communities. In addition, each section will discuss how those changes affect social capital and capability of Maeta communities in environmental management.  S9,JAaIsCNTGthTCt:sAmtCitsAbIRIsCNTGthTCt:sJAg0CIsEt:sA:ZAKTICTAE:RtTGAsICm:NfEA  Decentralization in Thailand occurred directly at the Tambon level. As it does with other Tambon Administrative Organizations (TAOs), the central government issues a budget to Tambon Maeta instead to individual villages as in the past.  Maeta TAO also has the authority to establish local laws. This structure forces villages in Tambon Maeta to interact, build connections, and extend their networks. In other words, the different social networks of villages 43  in Tambon Maeta eventually merged after decentralization. This increased the size of the Maeta social network which, in turn tended to increase social capital.       In this section, changes in the post-decentralization size of Maeta communities will be verified. The first subsection will discuss how limited the social network of each Maeta community was before decentralization, and the second will present diagrams to explain these limitations. The third and fourth subsections will discuss, also using diagrams, changes in the size of social networks after decentralization. The last part of this chapter will show how a more extensively linked social network positively affects Maeta social capital and environmental self-management.  DEDECNTRALIZNO,SPRBYNRVNMI,SINARGG:OLSL,aNs,VRB,Ne,A, OSBIZLtISLRON  Before decentralization, environmental management and other activities in Tambon Maeta, except for forest management, were operated almost entirely separately in each community. There was not a great deal of interaction between villages because each had its own temples, schools, and infrastructure (e.g. water supply system). Even today, Maeta villages are governed by the same local government, but each village does not merge completely with surrounding villages.  For example, after the end of the harvest season, Maeta people will gather money from each family within a village, and donate that to the temples in their own village. Each village will have its own parade for this event which is normally only attended by the locals of that village. a,A1tGGTdIN (Mu4): This year, farmers in our village do not get enough money to donate to the temple, so we will have no parade.  nsCINltImINJAAWhy don’t you join the parade of Mu 5?  44  a,AltGGTdIN (Mu4):  Why would I go? I am not a villager of Mu5. We will not join, but if they need our help they will tell our Phuyai (Interview, 11 October 2014).  Although there was a certain amount of contact across the villages, due to kinship or sharing of a common irrigation system for example, people from different villages do not participate in ceremonies or traditional activities in other villages.  Residents of one village might know other people from neighbouring villages, but their actual interactions were few and far between. The types of relationships that did exist between the villages ranged from kinship to slight acquaintance. For example, a man from Mu4 village (C2) who has a farm in Mu5 said “I know a lot of people in this village [Mu 5] because my dad is from Mu5. I’m always drinking with Mu5 people, and half of my kin live here [Mu5]” (Interview, 8 October 2014). Farmers who happen to share the same irrigation system exemplify one   of the weaker types of relationships between the different communities.  In addition to the independent social structure of each village, the governance structure before decentralization also kept Maeta villages distinct. Each village had one leader, iGda ZTK  LSTwhoTgoverned that community exclusively. Interviews with villagers from both Mu5 and Mu1 communities show that before decentralization they had to connect through iGda ZTK  L in almost every kind of activity that related to government, external organizations, and other communities. iGda ZTK  L was the center of the communities.  ,AltGGTdIN (Mu1): In the past, we had to tell Phuyai everything, and he knew everything. I used to see someone do logging in the forest. I told Phuyai immediately. When the government officers or strangers would come here, Phuyai would know. He would tell us not to log or enter the forest when the government officers were here. (Interview, 15 September 2014) 45  2,AltGGTdINA(Mu5): Before we had Tambon Maeta Forest Committee, I asked Phuyai for the permit to do logging every time. I told him so that if the park ranger came here I could run in time. One previous Phuyai was also a middleman who encouraged us to plant crops that he would sell. However, today Phuyai only announces news on community radio or at community meetings.  There are a lot of people who govern other activities that Phuyai used to take care of as well. (Interview, 24 September 2014)    According to these quotes, the iGda ZT K  L was the only formal link for information from outside and between Maeta communities.  According to interviews with C1 participants, when the other communities needed help they would connect through iGda ZTK  L. Not only did each iGda ZThave formal links with other iGda ZTK  L, they also connected to higher government agencies through the 1 VLdL . In one Tambon, there is only one 1 VLdL . TiGda ZTK  LTselected 1 VLdL  by voting among themselves, and 1 VLdL TisTin turn connected with the district level, .VBG,Cs 1 VLdL  and iGda ZT K  L governed Tambon Maeta under the title J Vu,LT : CE Tl,dLAZI. However, the former 1dVL L  and iGda ZT K  L of Mu4 village said that before decentralization, only some iGda ZTK  L cooperated with others on theATambon Maeta council.  A Z:NyINA 4Tysos : Actually in the past Tambon council worked the same as TAO today, but they did not have a budget. The council consisted of a Phuyai from each village, a Kamnun, and a doctor from Huey Sai health care center. When I was a Kamnun, I tried to discuss every issue with the Tambon council before they had formal orders. Anyway, not every Phuyai obeyed me or the council. In the case of Mu6 and Mu7, many years before decentralization their Phuyai used to support community forest, but after they changed to the former Phuyai Noi and Nid [alias], their Phuyai allowed villagers to cut trees and he eventually resigned from the J Vu,L T: CE T f ,NCPETl ,VVZEECC. Mu6 and Mu7 just came back to the committee after appointing a new Phuyai Baan. (Interview, 30 October 2013)  This interview shows that before decentralization, relationships varied among the iGda ZTK  L, with some maintaining only weak ties or rarely cooperating with others at alls Moreover, 46  relationships among iGda ZT K  L also influenced relationships between Maeta villages. For example, when the respectiveTiGda Z K  L  of Mu6 and Mu7 villages decided to separate from J Vu,L  : CE T f ,NCPETl ,VVZEECCT(TMFC), residents of those two villages were also required to resign from participation.  Due to these bureaucratic relations, cooperative inter-village efforts were rarely made in environmental management or other activities.   Before decentralization, there were already environmental organizations at the Tambon level, namely J Vu,LT: CE Tf,NCPETl,VVZEECCT(TMFC), and the : CE ThdPE ZL uICT.MNZAdIEdNCTl ,,BCN EZYCT(Maeta Cooperative), but they were limited to small groups of people.   AGITbINA:ZAKTICTAa::UINTCtlI:  our group started from 10-20 people around 10-20 years ago. At the start, we are just a group of farmers and ranchers.  nsCINltImINJAASo these small groups developed to be Maeta Cooperative, right?   AGITbINA:ZAKTICTAa::UINTCtlI:  No, the outsider, the NGOs think that Maeta people are underdeveloped, so an NGO called Sankampang Rural Development Group supported us to set these groups. In the past, Maeta were underdeveloped and had no infrastructure …..1986 an NGO started the project here, and in 1987 various informal groups were established, not registered to any government.  In 1991, I became a member of the Central Committee that linked different groups together. The committee often had meetings to exchange knowledge and raise awareness of the problems. We discussed every issue including village problems, family problems, and how each group managed budget. Each group had 2 representations in the central committee.  nsCINltImINJAAThat means most group members were farmers?  AGITbINA:ZAKTICTAa::UINTCtlI:  Yes, most of them had the same work, which is why they gathered, but some groups were set by kin or a circle of friends. Tambon Maeta Forest Committee was also a part of this process. In 1993 we didn’t even have water for rice, so we started the forest group.  nsCINltImINJAAHow big were these groups?  47   AGITbINA:ZAKTICTAa ::UINTCtlI:  They varied at around 10-20 per group. (Interview, 18 October 2013). This interview shows that in the past Maeta forest and agriculture related environmental groups were small and without solid organization, linking with other groups via the “Central Committee”.  For water management, Maeta communities had a traditional system called :dCLMTf ZSTconsisting of independent groups that managed water for their members’ agriculture purposes. According to interviews with the leaders of two irrigation groups, representing Mueng Fai group A, Mu1 village (Interview, 16 October 2014) andTMueng Fai group CT, Mu5 village (Interview, 24 October 2014), in order to maintain their irrigation systems each year, the 53 members of Mueng Fai group AA had to provide 50 bamboos, 10-20 plastic sacks, and labour for half a day, while the 15 members of Mueng Fai group C had to provide 100-200 bamboos, 20-40 plastic sacks, and labour for 1-2 days. This example demonstrates the difference in social capital in water management of each Mueng Fai group. Members of the larger Mueng Fai group provided fewer supplies and less labor for maintenance. Also, there was a difference in the capability of each Mueng Fai group to manage water systems. While Mueng Fai group ATspent only half a day on their irrigation system maintenance, Mueng Fai group C had to spendT1-2 days. In regards to agriculture, Maeta farmers planted individually, but kin or close friends in the community helped one another with rice plantation (.t,T :dC  or 4,LMT 1 CM system). Furthermore, only the : CE T hdPE ZL uICT .MNZAdIEdNCTl ,,B N EZYC had members from all the villages, but the majority were from Mu4 village and Mu5 village. At the start, Maeta Cooperative received strategic and marketing help from an outside NGO, but after a few years it was operated entirely  by local people (a leader of Maeta Cooperative, Interview, 18 October 48  2013). In other words, before the centralization period there were multiple small groups of farmers sharing equal capability in plantation, but they were not linked to the whole Tambon Maeta.         DEDuCNdLIyBIGaCNNTRALIZNO,SPRBYaNs,VRB,Ne,A,OSBIZLtISLRONBased on information from the previous subsection, we have generated diagrams that illustrate community relationships. Nodes in the diagrams represent individuals in Maeta communities rather than actual population count, while links between nodes represent the relationships between individuals in the same village. In this chapter, the strength or weakness of a relationship will not be discussed; rather, the diagrams will attempt to demonstrate the different sizes of social networks before decentralization (Diagrams in Subsection 3.1.2) and after decentralization (Diagrams in Subsections 3.1.4).2                                                             2 The diagrams in this chapter are metaphors of the structure of relations among people in Tambon Maeta. Nodes, linkages, and networks in this chapter do not represent the actual people and relations in the communities that were the focus of field work. Rather, these diagrams are representations of people and their relations in the abstract, and re intended only as depiction of the changing relationships within and between communities. In particular they are intended to demonstrate changes in the patterns of leadership ties. 49  Diagram Us2Trepresents the social network of Maeta people at the YZII MCTlevel before decentralization. Node A represents Phuyai Baan or the chief of the village. Circle nodes without letters represent regular villagers. The lines without an arrow represent the relation between people of the same communities, while the arrows represent external linkages.  The internal linkages indicate that everybody in the same village knows one another, even in Mu4 village, which with 291 families is the largest (Baan Huey Sai health care center 2013). 1tGGTdINAa, (Mu4): In Maeta, everybody knows one another. It is not like Krungthep [Bangkok] where you are from. Who’s dead, who’s born, and who gets sick everybody will know in a short time. (Interview, 11 October 2014)  This interview shows that the density of social linkages in each Maeta village is high. The diagram shows this density by having ties between every node.  However, each Maeta community still had a few external linkages with other Maeta communities. Although there were some linkages between people from different communities—such as kinship, irrigation groups (Mueng Fai), and agriculture groups—they were limited to those specific groups. This issue is presented in the diagram where only a few nodes have links to outside nodes. Diagram 3.1 represents the YZII MCTlevel of the Maeta social network and its limitationsat. In diagram 3.2, I will illustrate the social network of Maeta villages at the J Vu,LT level.  Diagram 3.2 shows the whole picture of the Tambon Maeta social network before decentralization in 1997. This diagram was developed from data about each of the villages as represented in diagram 3.1.  It shows seven villages in the same diagram, focusingAon the lack of links between villages in the same Tambon. In diagram 3.2, while density of linkages in the same village is high, there are  few ties between communities. There are at least three important issues 50  51  here. First, as I mentioned before, the social network of the Maeta people was limited, and they did not have various connections to other communities despite being in the same Tambon. Second, the iGda ZT K  L (item A in diagram 3.2) held the position of gatekeeper for each village, especially when villages were linking to or connecting with formal organizations. The interviews with Mu5 and Mu1 villagers (A1 and B1 villagers) substantiate this statement. Third, it can be verified that villages were quite separate from one another before decentralization. Lastly, linkages between Maeta villages are the ties within local groups, such as Maeta Cooperative or irrigation system maintenance groups (see Item C in diagram 3.2 an example), which may link across the villages but still link to limited groups of people. For example, theA: CE ThdPE ZL uICT.MNZAdIEdNCTl ,,B N EZYC only had 1-2 members in Mu1, and Mu6 and Mu7 did not even join TMFC.   Diagram 3.2 was generated based on data presented in the previous subsection and shows us the limitations of Maeta social networks before decentralization. However, after decentralization this situation changed. There are more linkages between communities, which both extended the size of the Maeta people’s social network, and increased the density of Tambon Maeta social networks. Subsection 3.1.4 will present diagrams of post-decentralization data to compare with the diagrams in this subsection.   DED CNofS,OaLRONRVNMI,SINARGG:OLSL,amNaRALIZNO,SPRBYNIn this subsection, I will discuss the extension of the social network of Maeta people after decentralization, as well as the increase in the number of bureaucratic linkages and linkages between and within local organizations. Information from this subsection will provide data for diagrams in the next subsection so that they can be compared with diagrams from the previous subsections.   52  After decentralization, the social network of Maeta communities was extended. Decentralization increased the linkage between Maeta communities, especially formal or bureaucratic links. The new governance organization after decentralization hired more local people to become local government workers, and because of their newfound duties, the local people now have more interaction with those from other villages. At the same time, this has opened up a gateway for regular villagers to connect with those in other Maeta communities. nsCINltImINJAAWhat do you do for Maeta TAO?A1tGGTdINA YA©Ko,jJ I am a Tambon volunteer. I do whatever the TAO asks for.  nsCINltImINJAACan you give me some examples?  1tGGTdINA YA©Ko,jJ  I help with traffic control and as a security guard when there are events.  nsCINltImINJAAHave you ever cooperated with volunteers from other communities?  1tGGTdINA YA©Ko,jJ  Yes, every year we have to go through the training together, and when the TAO needs many workers, the volunteers from one village are not enough. Today, as you can see, volunteers from every Maeta village came here for this meeting. (Interview, 26 October 2014) 1tGGTdINA2YA©KoFj: When my farm flooded last year, I asked the TAO to help me, and they brought me a tractor to clear my land.  nsCINltImINJAAHow did you tell the TAO?  1tGGTdINA2YA©KoFj:  I told Chad (alias), who lives in that house. He is a member of the TAO council.  nsCINltImINJAABefore there was the TAO, if a problem occurred who would you tell?  1tGGTdINA2YA©KoFj: Phuyai. In the past, whatever happened you are obligated to tell Phuyai.  New baby, who died, who enter in the village, he has to know. Actually today 53  you can still ask Phuyai for help, but Chad lives near me, so I told him. (Interview, 11 September 2014) From these two participants we see two important points. There is more interaction between people from different Maeta communities, and iGda ZTK  L is no longer the only bureaucratic link to the outside community. Up until now, we have only discussed the effects that the changed governing process has had on decentralization. However, decentralization also has increased links within local organizations and between regular people. After decentralization, the linkages between people in the same local organization or local group were increased. In the past, most local organizations or groups only had representatives from 2 or 3 villages, such as in the case of Tambon Maeta Forest Committee, Maeta Cooperative, and Mueng Fai groups, as discussed in the previous section. The TAO supports these groups financially, which has in turn motivated local groups and organizations to extend their activities to cover whole Maeta communities. 1tRIALNIEtbIsCA2A: We have a limited budget to support projects of local groups. Therefore, the projects that cover the whole Tambon will be supported first. (Interview, 25 October 2013)  AGITbINA:ZAKTICTAa::UINTCtlI: Although we have very few members in Mu1 village, the 1dNICNLT .NP T iN,©CAE that we co-operate together with the TAO, has a reasonable number of participants from every village including Mu1 village. (Interview, 18 October 2013) These interviews show us that the TAO is happy to support projects that run at the Tambon level. At the same time, the local organizations can also expand their network with these types of support. In other words, the power to allocate the budget of Maeta TAO can force the local environmental groups to explain their social network to every village in Tambon Maeta. 54  Moreover, the TAO not only supplied the budget, but also supported authorities of local organizations.  In the case of TMFC and Maeta Water Committee, they can increase the number of their members or create new linkages with other groups under the aegis of the TAO.   AGITbINA:ZAMKpa : In the past Mu6 and Mu7 refused to join our committee. They said we are NGOs, so they don’t want to join. The park rangers used to come and arrest them [Mu6 and Mu7 villagers] because of logging. nsCINltImINJA But today Mu 6 and Mu7 also joined Maeta Forest Committee, right?  AGITbINA:ZAMKpa : Now that we have the TAO, every village has again had a discussion about Tambon Maeta Forest Committee because the local law will be Tambon law, and every village will have to obey this law. Therefore, they joined our committee again. (Interview, 6 September 2013)  A Vice President of the TAO also said that it is now creating Maeta Water Committee, which allows the head of Mueng Fai groups to exchange information, knowledge and techniques. At the same time, Maeta Water Committee can get involved in policy decisions about water issues as well. Moreover, the TAO also supports people in setting up local groups for specific issues, such as the Maeta Women group (Vice President A, Interview, 23 October 2013). However, this thesis will focus only on the groups that are related to environmental management.   From these interviews we can see that decentralization and the introduction of Maeta TAO effects the social network of Maeta people significantly. The new bureaucratic linkages allow each Maeta villager to have more ties to the outside world. The TAO also supports local organizations having more participation at the Tambon level, which allows local organizations to have more members and linkages to different Maeta communities. The next part of this section will show the diagram of the Maeta social network after decentralization so that it can be compared with the diagrams in Subsection 3.1.2.  55   DEDbCNdLIyBIGaCNTRALIZNO,SPRBYaNIVS,BNe,A,OSBIZLtISLRONN In this subsection, I will provide diagrams to illustrate the Maeta social network after decentralization. The main purpose of this chapter is to compare the social network of Maeta communities before (diagrams in Subsection 3.1.2) and after (diagrams in Subsection 3.1.4) decentralization. As in the previous subsection, the number of nodes in these diagrams does not represent the actual population of Tambon Maeta and neither do the linkages between the nodes represent the kind of relation (strong tie, weak tie, or linking). This Subsection will present 2 kinds of diagrams. The first one will focus on the community level, and the second will focus on the Tambon level. The Tambon level diagram is split into two separate diagrams, one representing the bureaucratic linkages and the other showing the linkages between the local organizations.  Diagram 3.3 presents the example of one Maeta community after decentralization. Node A represents Phuyai Baan or chief of the village. Node B represents local government workers and members of the TAO council. Node C represents members of the local group or 56  organization, such as TMFC, Maeta Water committee, Maeta Cooperative, and the local irrigation groups. Circle nodes without letters represent regular villagers. The lines without arrows represent relations between people in the same communities, and the arrows represent external linkages.   For the internal linkages, the intensity is as great as in diagram 3.1, for the same reason that was pointed out in the interview of the C1 participant stating that in Maeta communities everybody knows each other quite well (Ibid).  The significant change we see to the social network at the village level is that the node has a greater number of external linkages than before decentralization. While in the past iGda ZT K  L was the only gatekeeper of a village, after decentralization TAO workers and member of local organization now also have external linkages. This means that today, regular villagers can connect to outside resources via other nodes and not just through iGda ZTK  L as in the past.  Participant B2, who received help from the TAO via a member of the TAO council, is an example of this change. We can say that at this point the social network of regular villagers has been extended and iGda ZTK  L is no longer the only person able to reach out to external resources.    Now we move on to discussion of post-decentralization effects at the Tambon level. Diagrams 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate the social network of Tambon Maeta:  Diagram 3.4 shows bureaucratic linkages at the Tambon level, while diagram 3.5 shows linkages between environmental groups. Here again, the number of nodes and links in both diagrams do not represent the actual population or the number of relationships in the Tambon Maeta. Also, it should be noted that the node shown in the same position in both diagrams does not mean it represents the same person. 57   58  The linkages that are shown in diagram 3.4 are bureaucratic linkages that are the direct results of social network changes after decentralization. Therefore, diagram 3.4 will not show linkages between ordinary people in different communities or relationships between the various iGda ZTK  L.  At the Tambon level, the center of Tambon is no longer only the 1dVLdLT(item A in diagram 3.2), but now also includes the TAO, and both are also linked to outside government organizations. The number of linkages between Maeta villages also increased. Although diagram 3.4 only depicts one linkage from each village to the TAO, in actuality each community has 2 members representing the TAO council, a varying number of volunteers, and 4 executives for the TAO from Maeta communities (1 president, 2 vice presidents, and 1 coordinator). Therefore, the number of bureaucratic linkages between Maeta communities is greater now than under the old system, which only had linkages between iGda ZT K  L and 1 VLdL . However, after decentralization the iGda ZT K  L)1 VLdL  system is still available, and there is cooperation between the Kamnun and the TAO in addition.   AGITbINA:ZACiIAM (: I always tell everyone in the TAO that when we go to the villages Phuyai and Kamnun is more important than us. We need their help to run TAO’s duties. Maeta TAO always invites Phuyai and Kamnun to our meetings.  In short, from this diagram we can say that decentralization directly affects the number of linkages, especially linkages to the TAO. Moreover, the TAO is the new gateway that connects the Maeta communities to outside resources.   Diagram 3.5 shows that, after decentralization, the linkages of local environmental groups come under the influence of the TAO.  As discussed before in Subsection 3.1.3, the TAO encourages environmental groups to have a member in every community; the linkages to members of the environmental groups are shown in diagram 3.5. Therefore, when comparing  59   60  diagram 3.5 to diagram 3.2, we see few linkages to the environmental groups across different communities (Item C). We can say that the TAO increased social linkages to the environmental groups (Maeta Cooperative, TMFC, and Maeta Water Committee). TMFC that operated in only 4 or 5 communities before decentralization now has members in 7 Maeta communities. Maeta Water Committee that the TAO formed also creates linkages between irrigation groups.  As well, there are also linkages between the TAO and the environmental groups. These linkages is the supports between the TAO and environmental group, while before decentralization There were not support from the local government ( iGda ZTK  LT LRT1 VLdL) to the environmental groups  In short, when we compare diagrams 3.4 and 3.5 to diagram 3.2, we can see that bureaucratic linkages and the linkages of environmental groups both have increased.  This affects the Maeta social network in two ways. First, while in diagram 3.2 villages are quite detached from one another, in diagrams 3.4 and 3.5, they appear to be a much larger amalgamated community. Second, the TAO can be the center of both kinds of linkages, as well a gateway to outside resources. However, while this shows certain changes to the social network structure of Maeta society, it does not show how social capital was altered by decentralization.  In the next subsection, I will discuss how these changes in social network structure as a result of decentralization)] affect social capital and environmental management of Maeta People.   DEDnCNhi,NLOAB,Ia,NLONaRALIZNAIgLSIZNIaNINB,a:ZSNRVNGRB,NLOS,OaLl,NaRALIZNO,SPRBYaNLONSi,NMI,SINARGG:OLSKNNIn the preceding subsections, I explained how the structure of the Maeta social networks changed after decentralization. From the data we can see that because of decentralization, individuals’ social networks were extended, and the overall Maeta social networks have become 61  denser. The following subsection will prove that  T I NMCNTP,AZ ITLCEt,NcTZLANC PCPTEGCT : CE TP,AZCEajPTA B uZIZEaTZLTCLYZN,LVCLE ITV L MCVCLE.  To begin, let us look at how increased social capital within Maeta society enhances its capability for forest management. After the TAO issued the J Vu,LT: CE Tf,NCPET4,A IT4 tTin 2011S the community forest committees began to operate in all Maeta communities under Tambon Maeta Forest Committee (TMFC). The new committee helps foster linkages across the Tambon levels; different subgroups in the greater social networks can exchange experience, data, and technology pertaining to forest management. In the case of Mu5 and Mu6 villages, where there were once unstable the community forest committees and forest regulations, the J Vu, LT:  CE Tf,NCPET4,A IT4 t resulted in the establishment of the community forest committees that are parts of to TMFC. Furthermore, they also use GPS technology from other villages to zone their forests (A leader of the TAO, Interview, 29 October. 2013). These examples demonstrate that a larger social network can increase the people’s capability for forest management in Tambon Maeta. The capability for managing water and agriculture, however, might not have been as significantly affected by the extension of social networks. The social network of water users did not change much because the number of members in each irrigation group is still the same.  Although the TAO has attempted to link the Mueng Fai groups together by creating Maeta Water Committee, only 2 representatives of Mueng Fai groups from each village can join the committee. Some Mueng Fai groups receive support from the TAO by joining the Maeta Water Committee, but a sharing of resources between Mueng Fai groups, such as labor or construction supplies, is not common in J Vu,LT : CE . However, the Maeta Water Committee is also a distributor of knowledge and technology, which is an important kind of social capital.     62  OITbA :ZAKoIsdApTtAdN:oUA2A©Ko,jCTThe TAO asked me to be on the Maeta Water Committee. Mostly, we give them some advice about the irrigation system.  nsCINltImINJAAIs the Maeta Water Committee involved in distributing plastic bags for dam construction?  OITbA:ZAKoIsdApTtAdN:oUA2A©Ko,jCTNo, the TAO manage this by themselves.  nsCINltImINJAHave other Mueng Fai ever asked you for laborers or construction supplies?  OITbA :ZA KoIsdA pTtA dN:oUA 2A ©Ko,jCTNo, Kae Muengs and their members have to provide everything themselves (Interview, 20 October 2014)  OITbA :ZAKoIsdA p TtA dN:oUA ©Ko,j v I asked the TAO to give us (Maeta Water Committee) the budget, and we will construct dams and canals by ourselves. Last year, they gave money for building 7 dams for us, but we could have built 10 dams with that amount. The TAO sends an engineer to teach us how to construct concrete dams, and when other Mueng Fais want to build the concrete dams, we will be their foreman and the TAO will pay us. This way is cheaper than letting outsiders build concrete dams for us (Interview, 24 October 2014).  In agricultural management, the farmers still work individually or jointly with kin.  A leader of : CE T hdPE ZL uICT .MNZAdIEdNCTl ,,B N EZYC pointed out in an interview that its membership did not change much after decentralization. However, the TAO created networks between the farmers in Tambon Maeta by launching new agriculture projects such as organic funds, cow funds, and compost funds.  It should be noted that these projects have only just started and not many farmers have joined yet (Vice President A, Interview, 23 October 2013).  In short, the extension of the social networks of Maeta communities does not affect their capability in water and plantation management as much as it has in the area of forest management. However, the Maeta Water Committee distributes knowledge about concrete dams 63  to other Mueng Fai groups by the support of the TAO, which is also a way to increase social capital.  S9YJAMiIAtsRNITEIAtsAtsbtltboTGANIE:oNRIEA:ZAKTICTAE:RtTGAsICm:NfAyIyDINEATZCINAbIRIsCNTGthTCt:sA Decentralization’s effects on the Maeta people, namely increases in individual resources and individual capital (power and knowledge), have a corresponding effect in Maeta society:  an increase in social capital. Decentralization in Thailand allows local people to elect their administrative leaders, and usually local people win the elections. In the case of Tambon Maeta, since the introduction of the TAO, locals have been elected as TAO presidents, and all of the TAO council members are also Maeta. These local politicians were born in Tambon Maeta, got married there, and still work in agricultural. This gain in political power of the original members of Maeta communities increases political resources in the networks.  nsCINltImINJAAre you originally from Maeta? A AGITbINA:ZACiIAM (:  I was born here. Actually all the executives are Maeta people, except for a Vice President who is from Sankumpang.  nsCINltImINJAADo you farm?   AGITbINA:ZACiIAM (:  Yes. Most workers in TAO have another job and are also TAO executives or TAO council members at the same time. The salary for being TAO is not much. (Interview, 29 October 2013) 1tGGTdINA V ( Mu1): I think having TAO is better. In the past when we had problems, Phuyai could solve only some of them, but after we had the TAO, every problem is better.  nsCINltImINJAACan you give me some examples of these problems?  64  1tGGTdINA V (Mu1): In the past, roads are not very good. We told Phuyai. Phuyai told Amphore, but we can only wait and let Amphore decide if we will have a new road or not. But then we told the TAO in the meeting that the road is our first priority for our village, and now we have it. Forest too, fewer park rangers come here now, I think the last time they came was last year. (Interview, 6 September 2014)  These interviews show that the introduction of the TAO leads to greater power distribution from the central government to the local government and the local people. Plus, Maeta TAO always has public meetings that let regular people voice their demands. Both are  ways to increase the political power of the Maeta people. At the same time, Villager A4 can show us how these political resources were limited to the central government during the centralization period. Through decentralization, Maeta villagers gained not only policy involvement, but also greater power and more knowledge as well. About 2 to 5 people from each Maeta village will be trained as disaster-relief volunteers and have some duties in the village such as managing traffic and reporting water levels to the TAO. The TAO also provides support to Maeta people who want to study in the fields that need more workers, such as education or healthcare (Vice President A, Interview, 23 October 2013). All of these activities increase the individual resources of many Maeta local people. TT Although these political powers are not actually included in environmental policy (because the central government still does not officially allow the TAO environmental management power) EGCT B,IZEZA IT NCP,dNACPT EG ET ZLANC PCT ZLT EGCT : CE T P,A I LCEt,NcT IP,TB,PZEZYCIaT  DDCAET EGCTBC,BICjPTA B uZIZEaTD,NTV L MZLMTEGCTCLYZN,LVCLE. This is most evident when powers from the outside have interaction with Maeta communities. In the case of forest management, some villagers, TMFC, and a Vice President of the TAO agree that the national park officers investigate the forests around Tambon Maeta less often since decentralization. In 65  addition, they formerly sometimes investigated without the permission of the iGda Z, but now they always tell the TAO before they conduct investigations in Tambon Maeta. The interviewees give similar reasons for these changes, generally agreeing that they are the result of an increase in the extent of power held by the Maeta people.  AGITbINA:ZACiIAM (J They [officers from the Royal forest department and the national park] are a bureaucratic organization, and we are local government. Both of us have the Garuda (Thailand coat of arms: author), so before they enter Maeta, they have to tell us. (29 October 2013)  AGITbINA:ZACiIAMKpa :  Because we now have official regulation from the TAO, the park rangers have more confidence in the way Maeta people protect the forest now. In the past they had to come more often to make sure no one was cutting the trees, but now there are local governments with the official law to control it. They have no reason to come. They don’t want to come if it is not a serious situation. There is a lack of workers in the national park. (15 October 2013) 2SAltGGTdINA©KFj:  They [the park rangers] rarely come now. In the past, they came every week...We had to tell Phuyai [Baan] before cutting the tree because Phuyai knows when they were coming… No, Phuyai [Baan] can do anything. Even the previous Phuyai Baan of this village was almost arrested because of logging, but he asked his son to go to the jail instead… The TAO are different. The park rangers have to ask for the permission before coming into Maeta. (Interview, 10 September 2014)     Tambon Maeta Forest Committee (TMFC) does not have authority in environmental management, but it ’borrows’ this power from the TAO, which increases its capability in that it can negotiate with park rangers. Therefore, we can say that TMFC uses social capital (political power) to manage Maeta forests. In the case of water management, before the Marine Department or the Royal Irrigation Department cleans the streams and/or Maeta River, or builds a dam, they must discuss this with the TAO, while in the past they did not require the permission of local people, and sometimes destroyed local farmers’ dams (A leader of Maeta TAO, Interview, 29 October 2013). However, 66  in this case the TAO uses its authority directly, so I will not discuss it as an increase in capability for environmental management because of greater social capital.  Not only can the fact that outside powers have less say in environmental issues increase the Maeta people’s capability for environmental management, but giving the local people more interior control has also contributed to more positive outcomes in environmental issues. Before decentralization, half of the interviewees used to cut trees without telling iGda ZTK  L or the community forest committees.  However, since the establishment of the J Vu,LT: CE Tf,NCPET4,A IT 4 t , they have never cut trees without getting permission from the community forest committees. The villagers think that because of decentralization and local forest management laws, the TAO and the community forest committees have the authority to manage the environment. A SA ltGGTdINA ©Ko,jJ They [the community forest committee] have the law to support them. Phuyai and the TAO also support them, so we have to ask the permission before cutting any trees…If we do not tell them [the community forest committee], other villagers might tell them. We have to pay a fee…so no one dares to cut [trees] without permission. (Interview, 14 September 2014) 2VAltGGTdINA©KoAFjJ I have never cut trees without permission, but someone did that. However, when the villagers told Phuyai Baan and the community forest committee, they left the logs and ran away. It happened several times in our village, so the TAO had to control our forest management. Now the situation is better. (Interview, 9 October 2014) These statements appear to indicate that the local law has given the community forest committees a way to ‘borrow’ some authority from the TAO,Aand in the case of Mu5 village, the community forest committee gained more power from the TAO by asking it to control logging there.  67  In the agriculture sector, the TAO was successful in prohibiting any advertising of chemical supplies for farming in Tambon Maeta public spaces (Vice President A, Interview, 23 October, 2013). In Tambon Maeta there is no advertising of pesticides or herbicides, although such ads can be seen outside Tambon Maeta.  These examples show how Maeta society has more capability for managing the environment as a result of Maeta social network members having greater political resources. We can also see from these examples that the community forest committee conducts forest management using social capital as political representatives of the TAO. Even though each group of people gains a different level of power, Maeta society overall is more effective at environmental management.      S9SJAnsCN:boRCt:sA:ZACiIAM (ATsbAdNITCINAbtlINEtCkAtsACiIAsICm:NfA Because decentralization prompts local people to seek out political positions, diversity in the political power of Maeta society increases. However, the heterogeneity is not changed in other dimensions of Maeta social networks, such as diversity of culture, career, or class. All of the 7 communities conduct planting, have the same level of income, and are of the same race (Tambon Maeta Health Care Center, 2013). In addition, the politicians are similar to regular Maeta people in terms of culture, and endowment. The President of the TAO and members of the TAO Council are also farmers. JGCTV,PETZVB,NE LETD AE,NTA,LENZudEZLMTE,T LZLANC PCTZLT: CE TLCEt,NcTRZYCNPZEaTZPT GCTZLPE II EZ,LT,DTJ.kT,DDZACNP. There are around 20 officers (temporary and permanent), but only 2 are from Maeta villages. Most officers are outsiders who have at least a diploma or bachelor degree, and earn salaries rather than having agriculture as their main source of income (An officer of Maeta TAO, Interview, 10 October 2013). 68      The knowledge and skill of the TAO officers increases the Maeta network’s social capital and capability in managing the environment. Both Vice Presidents of the TAO mentioned many projects where the local environmental groups “borrowed” technology and knowledge from the TAO officers.  The mechanics of the TAO allow TMFC to use the GPS in zoning the forest and generating Tambon land titles. The TAO lawyers play a main role in creating local laws for forest management and the land bank for Maeta farmers. In addition, the TAO officers find outside projects and fund them in order to support Maeta farmers. For water management, TAO engineers teach Maeta Water Committee members how to build concrete dams, so they can build more in order to save on their maintenance budget. These officers also collect data on Maeta River for further research (Vice President A and Vice President B, Interview, 23 and 25 October 2013). These kinds of activities cannot be pursued or engaged in by local Maeta people who lack the specific skills and knowledge to carry them out. The local environmental groups “borrow” knowledge and skill from the TAO officers who join their social network via Maeta TAO.  The introduction of the TAO created diversity in the network which remedies this previous weakness of the Maeta social network. The basic qualifications of a TAO officer as set by the mCACLEN IZO EZ,LT.AE obliges the TAO to hire outsiders or educate local people in various fields. For example, the Maeta TAO has started to support local people financially in studies that are outside the agricultural sector, so that they can work for the TAO in the future (Vice President A, Interview, 23 October 2013). S9VJAvIyTNfJA.:RtTGARTUtCTGAtsAEoDAsICm:NfA This chapter describes and analyzes changes in social capital in Tambon Maeta after people in different villages were linked because of decentralization, and ascertained that social capital, especially pertaining to capability in environmental management, has been increasing. 69  However, a look at the sub-social networks of Tambon Maeta or each village reveals that their social capital did not change as significantly as it did at the greater network level, at Tambon level. Without doubt, a greater social network and more political resources can create more social capital in Maeta society; the Maeta people’s increased capability for managing forests, water, and plantations is evidence of this. At the same time, greater social networking also destroyed some of the social capital. In the case of local irrigation groups, while linkage with the TAO might have increased their economic and knowledge based resources, but cooperative efforts amongst the members of each group are decreasing. 1tRIALNIEtbIsCA : I have to accept that today Mueng Fai groups are weaker. They always ask for help from the TAO when they have problems. In the past, they always thought out and solved the problems together in their groups. (Interview, 23 October 2013) OITbA:ZAKoIsdApTtAdN:oUAa A©KoFjCT: In the past, maintaining the dams and canals was a huge task. Sometimes we spent 3 days to repair the dams…TAO helps a lot today, they provide plastic bags and sometimes when the dams had severe problems a foreman from the TAO helped us with a backhoe loader.  (Interview, 24 October 2014)  The diversity of the Tambon Maeta social network has indeed increased because of the presence of TAO officers, but the diversity of each village has only slightly changed. The TAO officers are mostly commuters who live outside Tambon Maeta. Although there are some officers that move into the villages or get married to local people, this is indeed quite rare and has occurred in only two cases. We can therefore say that overall diversity in each village did not change at all. However, the TAO is now providing for a new generation of villagers to study in fields that were not open to them before decentralization; for instance, to pursue training as healthcare workers. Therefore, in the future the diversity of the social network at the community level might also increase. 70  S9FJAa:sRGoEt:s A Decentralization linked the Maeta villages, making the social network of each community greater and increasing the political resources of the members within their networks. At the same time, the existence of the TAO created connections between the TAO officers, with their advanced skills, and the Maeta people, which increased the diversity of Maeta society. These changes in the networks increased the social capital in Tambon Maeta and the Maeta people’s capability for environmental management as well. The most significant changes after decentralization seem to be in the area of forest management , while the local irrigation and agricultural sectors have seen less of an effect.  At the macro level, however, changes in social capital are not as clearly evident.  At the relational level, we see that change in social capital is more complex in that a certain amount of social capital has been increased for some groups while for others it has decreased, as the reduced cooperation in the :dCLMTf Z groups demonstrates. In the next chapter, I will focus on the changes in social capital of each actor. Moreover, although this chapter can explain and show how the Maeta people’s social capital and capability in environmental management increased after decentralization, the relationship between the two is not very significant at the Tambon level. The next chapter will discuss social capital at the relational level, explain the ways by which resources flow between the TAO and environmental groups through the social networks of their leaders, and examine how increasing capability in environmental management is related to social capital in the case of Tambon Maeta specifically.    71  aiTUCINAVAA.:RtTGAaTUtCTGATsbAaTUTDtGtCkA:ZACiIAKTtsA RC:NEAtsAgsltN:syIsCTGAKTsTdIyIsCAtsAMTyD:sAKTICTAZCINAu IRIsCNTGthTCt:sAAIn the previous chapter, I argued that the Maeta community members obtain greater social capital and capability in environmental self-management because of the changes within their social networks and available individual resources that occurred after decentralization. However, these changes do not affect every actor in Tambon Maeta in the same way. That is, different actors gain different levels of social capital and capability in environmental management. This chapter will show that the strength of linkages between actors is a factor in gaining capability in environmental management of TAO, environmental groups, and individuals.  This chapter will discuss how social networks can bring resources to local actors in Tambon Maeta, and at the same time, show how the varying strengths of their ties affect the sharing of resources among actors. The relationship between the leaders of local groups or organizations will be analysed, and will represent the relationships between organizations. Linkages in social networks and bureaucratic networks will also be analysed. The first section will discuss related concepts that will be used in our analysis in this chapter. The second section will focus on the TAO’s capability in environmental management and the relationship with environmental groups. In the third section, the social capital of the environmental groups and their linkages with the TAO will be analysed. Finally the last section will discuss the tie between TAO and lay people as a factor of local people’s accessibility to natural resources.      72  V9,JA.:RtTGAsICm:NfATsbANIE:oNRIAI0RiTsdIAAAAlthough social capital can be considered as a social and group level process and condition, it is also studied at the individual level. Either perspective on social capital involves three components: the resources in the networks; the linkage of the node to the network; and the purposive action of the actor (Lin 2002: 29). In this thesis, environmental management and environmental usages are purposive actions of the individual actor or node. In Chapter 3, I explained and demonstrated that resources in the social networks of Maeta people increased after decentralization. This chapter will focus on a different kind of linkage, affecting the accessibility of actors to resources in the network.  Chapter 3 demonstrated that organizations in Tambon Maeta tend to exchange their resources through their social linkages. The resources exchanged through the linkages between organizations is an issue that is central to the field of organizational studies. Researchers Gulati and Cook examine exchanges of information and other resources through private linkages between agencies of different organizations. Because trust between partners is important, the partners still retain linkages across the organization even though there are new actors in the field (Gulati 1995; 626, Cook 1977; 68). Other studies that focus on the effect of decentralization suggest that decentralization blurs the boundary between state and society in various ways. This includes an increase in public involvement which serves to empower local people (c.f. Ito 2011:426; Wollenberg et al. 2006). Moreover, this blurred line between state and society sometimes allows some local norms of regional agencies to become integrated into the larger government’s system (Chhotray 2011; XXXVI). The perspectives from organizational studies and political studies helpexplain why social networks become a tool for resource distribution of local government, instead of such distribution of resources being carried out by the   bureaucratic 73  systems of the Tambon Maeta government. Interviews and information from this chapter will show us the linkages between organizations and how they are used for the flow of resources between them.  At the individual level, the perspective that focuses on linking social capital will be used as a main theme to explain why some Maeta villagers receive a greater benefit than others. In the same way as in resource exchanges between organizations, social networks are the main tools for resources distribution of the Maeta TAO. Linkages between government agencies and lay people can be seen as vertical linkages. These vertical ties link people to groups and individuals at different social levels. Such persons may have very different types of social capital, e.g. relationship between local people and government agency, or NGOs (Woodlock 2001). People who have this kind of vertical linkage have greater opportunities to obtain resources, such as information, from formal organizations (Halpern 2005). Thus, the first part of Section 4.4 will show how Maeta people use linking social networks in environmental management.  The second part of both Sections 4.2 and 4.3 will examine how the strength of ties between persons in Marta affect the amount of sharing of resources they engage in. In Asian society, strong ties tend to be a good gateway for every kind of resource, such as power, financial support, and information (e.g. Inaba 2006; Carpenter et al. 2004: 547). This is the main interpretation of why each actor and individual in Tambon Maeta gained different amounts of capability in environmental management and usage after decentralization.   V9YJA.:RtTGARTUtCTGATsbARTUTDtGtCkAtsAIsltN:syIsCTGAyTsTdIyIsCA:ZAKTICTAM (A In this section, I will discuss how social capital of the TAO (Tambon Administrative Organization) leaders is important to the capability of the TAO in environmental management. 74  Moreover, I will discuss how the strength of ties between the TAO leaders and leaders of the environmental groups affect the capability of the TAO in environmental management  Although the capability in environmental management of Maeta TAO is partly derived from the central government, without the support of the local environmental groups, Maeta TAO may not succeed in managing the environment.   AGITbINA :ZACiIAM (: I have to accept that. TAO cannot manage their environment without those environmental groups. Actually, I will not say TAO do this. They did it first. The environmental group started these activities.  We just legalized their environmental activities, and protected them from the upper government. We do not have staff, experience and knowledge to do this. We have only around 20 workers here. No way can we take care of the whole forest. They are experts at what they are doing, so I let them do it. We will ask them to do us a favour sometimes, but we have to discuss it first.  nsCINltImINJ Can you give me some examples?  A GITbINA :ZACiIAM ( JAFor example, this year the central government ordered every Tambon to have a zero rate of forest fires in the dry season. Therefore, we ask Tambon Maeta Forest Committee (TMFC) to pay attention to these issues. Or last week, the central government wanted to see an organic farming program started. We asked Maeta Cooperative to prepare instructors for them. Even the reforestation that you joined on last Wednesday, we also asked TMFC of Mu5 to prepare seedling, workers, and tools. (Interview, 29 October. 2013) According to this interview, The TAO itself does not have enough resources to manage the environment and its leader gives the example of forest management as evidence that the TAO has a lack of personnel in that field. Moreover, in agriculture the TAO also needs staff and information from Maeta Cooperative. This means that the TAO will borrow their resources in terms of workers, knowledge, and skill. However, these resources are not transferred from the 75  environmental group to the TAO as some sort of cooperation between them, but instead are transferred through the private social networks of the TAO leaders.      AeITbINA:ZAKTICTAa::UINTCtlI: The president of the TAO, and I fought together since having demonstrations against the central government. You know, without us [Maeta Cooperative], there is no way the TAO can do as they do now. The previous President of the TAO had never invited us for a meeting. They always decide everything themselves. Finally, they could not survive. They set their own new groups to manage the environment. But you know it is not a real organization like ours, so it didn’t take long for that group to disband.  nsCINltImINJ What kind of help do Maeta Cooperative give to the TAO now?  AeITbINA:ZAKTICTAa::UINTCtlI: Mostly, they ask us to help them when outsiders come to our villages to learn about organic plantations and that stuff. Mostly, outside organizations contact us directly, but government organizations will contact the TAO. Then the TAO asks us to help them because they do not have staff for these kinds of activities. Generally, they ask for staff as I said. Sometimes they ask us to join the meeting to give them some information or opinions. nsCINltImINJAWhat kind of meeting?   AeITbINA:ZAKTICTAa::UINTCtlIJ Such as, should they accept this or that project or not? Should the school buy only organic food? How many farmers have a cow? Which kind of plants they should support. Sometimes it is not a formal meeting, you know. Just a discussion of matters during drinking. (Interview, 18 October 2013)  AGITbINA:ZAKTICTAnsECtCoCt:sE: I will not say that the previous TAO is bad. But they had never governed before. They do not know how to manage forests or other natural resource. But they built a lot of infrastructure— roads, water supplies— all of them were set by the previous president. They had never done any activities around environmental issues before, and they did not ask us or invite us to join them. We did not work together like today. The present TAO started their work when most infrastructures are done already, so they can keep some budget for environmental issues. Moreover, the president 76  used to work in the environmental groups, so he knows what is the problem, and everyone in those environmental groups— Maeta Cooperative, Tambon Maeta Forest Committee, and so on— want to help him.  nsCINltImINJ How do you help the president in environmental management?  AGITbINA :ZAKTICTAnsECtCoCt:sEJA I will just say in my case, I use to be A leader of Tambon Maeta Forest Committee before. When the president told me he wanted to make a local law for forest management, he used our own rules as a reference. The TAO also used data from us for mapping too because to announce the Maeta Tambon forest area they need exact latitude and longitude for that. We started to use GPS a long time ago, so the TAO can use our data for that. (Interview, 30 October 2013)     Both environmental group leaders mentioned how they helped the TAO and the TAO president in the same way. Maeta Cooperative supported the TAO in term of staff, and necessary information. As well, Tambon Maeta Forest Committee (TMFC) also shared their data about forest management to the TAO. These interviews showed that the capability of the TAO in environmental management is made possible through the resources that the TAO borrow from local environmental groups. However, both environmental group leaders mentioned that they helped the TAO because they know the current president well, and they used to work together. This means the environmental groups support the TAO mostly because of who the president is. In other words, these resources are transported to the TAO through the personal network of the TAO president. Therefore, we can say the capability in environmental management of the TAO is partly from the social capital of the person holding the presidential position of the TAO.   However, not every kind of relationship can lead to the same sharing between the TAO and local environmental groups. The strength of relationships between the TAO and the environmental groups is supposed to affect an increase in] the capacity of resources that the TAO 77  can borrow from the environmental groups. The interviews of both TAO and environmental groups support this statement.AnsCINltImINJAWith the last TAO president, did you have cooperation with the TAO?A AGITbINA:ZAKTICTAa::UINTCtlIJ No, They set a new environmental group Maeta Ruk Pa or something like that. I cannot remember. I do not care about them.  nsCINltImINJ That means you have more co-projects with the current TAO?  AGITbINA:ZAKTICTAa::UINTCtlIJAYes. The president used to be a staff member of Maeta Cooperative, and his father and I have fought together on environmental issues for many years. He understands what we are doing and what TAO should do about environmental issues, while the previous TAO don’t do anything about the environment. When they needed a good looking portfolio they set a new environmental group because they cannot work with us. (Interview, 18 October 2013)  A -tEIA yTsJ  Maeta has both good and bad people. This TAO is ok we can work together. Actually, I have worked with his father before. The previous TAO only let their network make decisions in everything. You know environmental management is their duty but they cannot work with Tambon Maeta Forest Committee and Maeta Cooperative, so they create the new group, but it disbanded already. (Interview, 20 October 2013) Both leaders mentioned the same thing about the cooperation between their environmental groups and the TAO. The environmental groups did not help the previous president of the TAO in environmental management.  Contrastingly, the environmental groups share their resources with the present TAO. Both environmental groups give the same reason, that they know the president well because they use to work together and they know the father of the president. From this interview we can say that the present TAO president can access necessary resources for environmental management from the environmental groups because of strong ties between the present president of the TAO and these 2 environmental groups’ leaders. Furthermore, the TAO 78  under the previous president could not access the resources of the environmental groups because he did not have strong relationships with these groups. Therefore, in Tambon Maeta, the strength of ties between the president of the TAO and the environmental groups is a determining factor whether or not the TAO will get resources from the environmental groups for environmental management.    There are two important points in this section.  First, formal authority is not enough for the TAO to adequately manage the environment in Tambon Maeta. Support from the environmental groups is an important factor in Maeta TAO capability for environmental management and the TAO can access the help and resources of the environmental groups via social networks of the TAO president. Secondly, the strength of the ties between the president of the TAO and the leaders of the environmental groups is an important determinate of the level of resources that TAO can access. The closer the relationships between Maeta TAO president and the leaders of local environmental groups, the greater resources the TAO can obtain. V9SJA.:RtTGARTUtCTGA:ZAIsltN:syIsCTGAdN:oUEATsbANIGTCt:sEitUAmtCiACiIAM (A Although I discussed in the previous chapter that the social capital of Tambon Maeta increased after decentralization, different environmental groups gained different level of social capital, and the strength of relationship between them and TAO is an important factor. Moreover, this increased social capital also affects the capability of the environmental groups in environmental management. In this section, I will discuss these issues as they pertain to three main environmental groups— Tambon Maeta Forest Committee, Maeta Cooperative, and the irrigation groups.   bD DECNhIGsRONMI,SINJ RB,aSN. RGGLSS,,NkhMJ.r N The  capability  of  the  Maeta  forest  committee  increased  after  decentralization. 79  Furthermore, Tambon Maeta Forest Committee (TMFC) is a good example to demonstrate how strong ties with the TAO can increase the social capital of an environmental group. At the start I will show how support from the TAO can increase capability in forest management of TMFC. nsCINltImINJAHow long ago did the committee start forest management?AA AyIyDINA:ZAMKpa A©Ko,j : I think it is over 20 years.  nsCINltImINJABefore the introduction the TAO, right?A AyIyDINA:ZAMKpa A©Ko,j : Yes we manage environment for very long. Mu1 joined TMFC the same time as Mu2 and Mu3 nsCINltImINJ Are there any changes after Maeta have the TAO?  AyIyDINA:ZAMKpa A©Ko,j : Actually for Mu1 there was not that much we had to do in the past. But after they [Maeta TAO] set up Tambon Maeta Forest Committee officially, villagers need to fill formal request for logging. They have to tell the purpose, number of trees, and time. They have to get a signature from every member before they can start logging.    1tGGTdINA FA©Ko,jJ In the past, sometimes I ask permission from Phuyai; sometime not. nsCINltImINJ Why did you ask him? 1tGGTdINA FA©Ko,jJ  When the park ranger came he would tell us we had to. If I did not tell him when the park ranger come no one told us to run away.  nsCINltImINJASo, in the past you had never ask permission from the community forest committee, right? 1t GGTdINA FA©Ko,jJ   No, the committee just was set up not that long. I think they were set up after the TAO nsCINltImINJA Is there anything changed after Mu1 has the community forest committee? 80  1tGGTdINA FA©Ko,jJ   Everything is well organized. If you asked for logging, you will know you can do it or not. If not they will tell you why. And the park ranger does not come here as often as before.  From the interview we can see that Villager A5 only noticed the existence of the community forest committee after the introduction of the TAO, although in Mu1, TMFC was set up before the TAO.  Moreover, after the introduction of the TAO, Maeta villagers followed the regulation of the TMFC while, before that time, they did not even recognize the existence the community forest committee. The interview of villager A5 is an example of villagers who noticed the community forest committee and TMFC only after introduction of the TAO. Table 4.1 shows the lack of power and recognition of TMFC before decentralization in Mu1 and Mu5.  Table 4.1: Number of participants in Mu1 and Mu5 villages who logged without permission LTNCtRtUTsCEAosbINECTsbACiTCAMKpa AmTEAEICAoUATZCINACiIAbIRIsCNTGthTCt:sAoEIbAC:Ab:AG:ddtsdAmtCi:oCAUINytEEt:sADIZ:NIAbIRIsCNTGthTCt:sAoEIbAC:Ab:AG:ddtsdAmtCi:oCAUINytEEt:sATZCINAbIRIsCNTGthTCt:sAMu1 (20) 9 4 0 Mu5 (20) 12 7 0 sum (40) 21 11 0  Data in Table 4.1 are from 40 people from Mu1 and Mu5 villages. The information shows that around half of Mu5 and Mu1 villagers believe that TMFC in their own villages were set after decentralization. In both villages, there are some villagers who cut down threes without asking permission from TMFC in the past. However, today no one does this. This table is clear evidence that, before decentralization, TMFC were not be accepted or noticed by some Maeta people.  The number of villagers who cut trees without asking for the committee’s permission shows TMFC’s lack of authorities in forest regulation in the past. As well, we can see that, after decentralization Maeta people noticed the existence of TMFC, and at the same time accept power of TMFC.  81   The increased capability of Tambon Maeta Forest Committee is partly derived from their own authority and expertise.  However, the TAO also supports this environmental group, and the support of the TAO become a strong social resource of TMFC in forest management. This is reflected in the words of both TAO’s and TMFC’s leaders in their interviews with the author.    A GITbINA :ZA CiIA M (: We support Tambon Maeta Forest Committee because environment is one of our main strategies. We support them with seedlings and with some budget for re-forestation. Mechanists from the TAO also teach them how to use the new model of GPS. I mean they already know how to use it, but we have a newer version and TMFC also uses our machine now.  nsCINltImINJA How about Maeta forest law? Did TAO help them to write it?  AGITbINA:ZACiIAM (: Ok. This is a big issue. The community forest committees in each village had their own version of the forest law before we have the TAO. Only Mu6 and Mu7 did not have it. When they create TMFC for forest management at the Tambon level, they thought about how to unite different forest laws from different village into one law. Therefore, we helped them in that process. We setting the meeting and submitted the law to the central government. But, as I told you, they have their own law and the TAO just helped them to make it legalized.  nsCINltImINJA Have the TAO ever attempted to manage the forest directly?  AGITbINA :ZACiIAM (: We try not to do so because TMFC has both experience and workers. Especially Mu2 and Mu3 villages, their community forest committees are very strong, so we do not have to help them, just support them with some budget and GPS. However, for some villages, if TMFC cannot control logging, well we have to get involve.  nsCINltImINJA Can you give me some examples?  AGITbINA:ZACiIAM (:In the case of Mu5, last year a lot of people told me that many  villagers cut trees without permission from TMFC of Mu5. We (the TAO) told them in 82  the village meeting that we will catch anyone who cuts trees without telling TMFC. Now it is better, but we still look at them. (Interview, 29 October 2013)      AGITbINA:ZAMKpa : TAO help us, yes. They prepare seeding and small budget for lunch when we do reforestation. The rest we organize by ourselves.  nsCINltImINJAHow about case of Mu5 villages?  AGITbINA:ZAMKpa :  I am gonna say Mu5 community forest committee is pretty weak. Did you see the head of them there? He is kind of chill. Therefore, the villagers did not obey them. The TAO think it is not ok, so they helped them by telling Mu5 villagers to obey their own community forest committee and the TAO are watching logging in Mu5 village. (Interview, 6 September 2013) From the interviews, we can see that the TAO supported TMFC in term of money, workers, skill and power. The both leaders said that TMFC has the ability to manage the forests, but the support from the TAO is also an important resource for TMFC in their activities to manage the people of the villages.  However, the resources that TMFC get from the TAO is from the private network of its leader and becomes the social capital of the leaders TMFC. This is clearly reflected in the following comments from the interviews:A AGITbINA:ZACiIAM (: I will not say the previous TAO president is not interested in forest management. But in that time they did not have environmental issues in their strategy because they had first to develop other infrastructure. Moreover, they did not hangout or work with us from the start, so they did not understand the importance of forest management. I work with environmental groups so long, so I know everyone. I know which group need helps and which group not, and it is easy for them to tell me. (Interview, 29 October. 2013)  AmtEIAyTs: The previous TAO president created a new forest [management] group and this group has only their own people. They do not know how to do anything because they 83  just started, but the previous president support them [the new forest management group] because they are friends. You know in that time the TAO and we cannot connect with each other. Sometime the previous TAO and we [from TMFC] went to the same outside conference to speak on the same issue. It was such an awkward situation. (Interview, 20 October. 2013) A leader of the TAO tells us that, because he knows TMFC well, he can support the committee better. At the same time, because they have close relationship, TMFC feel comfortable in requesting support from the TAO. In contrast, the wise man told us that the previous TAO president supported only their own networks. In other words, the resources that the new forest management group [mentioned in the interview of the wise man] get from the TAO is from the private relationship between people in this organization. A key reason why the leader of the TAO is willing to give to TMFC is because he knows everybody there very well.  Therefore, we can say that the increase in the capability of TMFC is a result of support from the TAO is actually a kind of social capital of TMFC’s leaders.  These interviews also provide information about the strengthAof ties and resources between the TAO and TMFC. As we have seen, the capability of TMFC is partly due to its social capital.  However, this social capital is the product of an extremely strong and long lasting relationship between the leaders of the TAO and TMFC. Compare the relationship between the present president and previous president of the TAO, and it is clear that the present president has a closer relationship with TMFC at the very top and in long lasting relationships of trust that pre-existed their present positions of leadership.  It is this strong relationship of trust which benefits the capability of TMFC through the extra resources that it is able to obtain from TAO.  TT84  TbD DuCNMI,SIN.RRg,BISLl,N Maeta Cooperative’s capability in agriculture management did not increase as significantly after decentralization as did that of TMFC. However, some relationships between Maeta Cooperative and the TAO increased the capability of the Maeta Cooperative in agriculture management. Like TMFC, help and support from the TAO to Maeta Cooperative came through the social network of the leaders and the level of support very much depended on the strength of ties between these leaders. That is, what support there was between these two organizations again centred around the pre-existing relationships that had developed between their leaders.  According to his statements in our interview with A leader of Maeta Cooperative, Maeta Cooperative does not get a lot of support from the TAO because Maeta Cooperative has stable financial status.  nsCINltImINJA  Can you give me more detail about a co-project between Maeta Cooperative and the TAO?A AGITbINA:ZAKTICTAa::UINTCtlIJAThis project’s name is Kruw Lern Asa. This project supports Maeta people to farm organic plants around their house. If they have a lot of them they can also sell them.  PTT [an outside organization] used to support us. But like other big companies they just want to promote themselves. Thus, they only supported this project for one year. But this kind of project you have to do it all the time if you want it succeed. So I discussed with the president and TAO, and they supported us to do this project after PTT left.  nsCINltImINJA  Are members of this project also members of Maeta Cooperative?   AGITbINA:ZAKTICTAa::UINTCtlIJANo. No. They are separated. To get a membership you need to deposit money with us. But to join this project you just apply. Some of people in this project are our members, but the rest is not.  nsCINltImINJA  What does Maeta Cooperative do in this project? 85   A GITbIN :ZAKTICTA a::UINTCtlIJAMostly, we give them knowledge about organic plantation and money planning. We have meetings twice a month. Yesterday we just have it. Your host mom also came.  nsCINltImINJA Do people in this project apply to be a member of Maeta Cooperative?  AGITbINA:ZAKTICTAa::UINTCtlIJASome of them, but really few. But it is ok. We can create some connection to groups of people who never joined any activities of Maeta Cooperative before. Mu1 is a good example. We have no more than 5 members of Maeta Cooperative there, so people in Mu1 have really few interactions with us. However, around 10 families in Mu1 join Kruw Lern Asa programme, so we can teach non-member people about organic plantation. (Interview, 18 October 2013)  sA :ZZtRINA:ZAKTICTA a::UINTCtlI: I have to accept the fact that we have really few members in Mu1. I think it is because people there do not recognize the importance of cooperatives and organic plantation. However, the project that we cooperate on with the TAO, Kruw Lern Asa, allows us to propagate information about organic planation to the people in Mu1.  AnsCINltImINJA Do you think these people will become member of Maeta Cooperative in the future?   sA:ZZtRINA:ZAKTICTAa::UINTCtlI: Maybe. We have opportunities to tell them that our cooperative supports more than just organic plantation. Actually, some of them started to open accounts with us. If they want to do commercial organic plantation that is good.But to increase organic planting for domestic consumption is the main goal for this project. (Interview, 19 October 2013) According to the interview, the co-project named 1NdtT4CNLT.P  involves cooperation between Maeta Cooperative and the TAO. 1NdtT4CNLT .P  is a project that promotes domestic organic plantation and financial planning in Tambon Maeta.  This project was started by Maeta Cooperative and supported by an outside company. However, today this project is supported by Maeta TAO. Under this project, Maeta Cooperative also has opportunities to promote notions 86  about organic plantation to people who are not their members, and some of them become members. In other words, the TAO supports Maeta Cooperative in terms of budget and size of membership.  Even after over 10 years of operation, Maeta Cooperative still has few members in Mu1 villages (Ten, according to the database of Maeta Cooperative in November 2013, and only 1 participant from 20 participants in Mu1 is a member of Maeta Cooperative). However, developing ties through the organic food program sponsored with the support of the TAO, Maeta Cooperative is in the process of creating new social capital linkages with people who had never joined any activities of Maeta Cooperative before. Furthermore, we also found out that, even though the underlying financial support is from the government organization known as Maeta TAO and uses the government budget, this support does not actually go through Maeta Cooperative as a formal support between organizations. Rather, it flows through private relationship between head of the TAO and Maeta Cooperative. Like TMFC, it is the strength of this tie and the trust that is engendered through it, that is an important factor in the development of cooperatives and cooperative relationships throughout the region.  nsCINltImINJA Except for Kruw Lern Asa, does the TAO support Maeta Cooperative in other projects?A AGITbINA:ZAKTICTAa::UINTCtlI: As I told you, TAO themselves have had a hard time. Their budget is really limited, so we will not ask for helps if it is not serious.  nsCINltImINJA Can you compare the current relationship to the one under the previous president?  AGITbINA:ZAKTICTAa::UINTCtlI:  I really want to say that in the past we do not have any cooperation. Like we lived in different Tambons. As I told you, they created their own groups and support only those groups. They do not care whether those project are good or bad. But this president used to be their staff. We know each other well, so it is easier to cooperate. (Interview, 18 October 2013) 87  To reiterate, in the past Maeta Cooperative had difficulty getting support from the TAO because the TAO supported only the groups that had a close relationship with them. Today, the close relationship with the TAO president also results in Maeta Cooperative getting support from the TAO.   From these interviews, we can say that support from the TAO increased Maeta Cooperative’s budget, but the programs it was now able to sponsor also extended the social networks of Maeta Cooperative in that more people became involved in its sponsored activities. However, it is of note that this support is not formal help between a government organization and an environmental group. Rather, the resources from the TAO pass to Maeta Cooperative through pre-existing informal relationships between their organizational leaders.   bD D CNURAIZNLBBLyISLRONyBR:gaNA While after decentralization, the capability of Maeta Cooperative and TMFC in environmental management increased because of the greater social capital of their leaders, we found a very different situation in the case of irrigation groups. Although capability in water management of irrigation groups increased after decentralization, this was not related to any pre-existing relationship between leaders of irrigation groups and the TAO.   After decentralization, every :dCLMTf Z group (local irrigation groups) was supported by the TAO in term of construction supplies and knowledge, and this made the capability of Mueng Fai in water management increase significantly. OITbA:ZAKoIsdApTtAdN:oUA2  (Mu1):  In the past, it was a big deal to repair Mueng Fai. Every member had to come. The penalty in that time is really bad because to repair our Mueng Fai we spent around 3-4 days. Every member have to bring 100-200 bamboos. We did not have plastic sacks, so we had to weave grasses to be sacks by hand and put 88  rock in it. Then we used bamboos and grass sacks to constructs dams. But that was a long time ago. Then we use plastic sacks from fertilizer sacks, but mostly it was not enough we had to buy sometimes.  nsCINltImINJA How do the TAO help you? OITbA:ZAKoIsdApTtAdN:oUA2  (Mu1):  They provide us with plastic sacks, so we just have to find bamboos. The TAO also upgrade some Mueng Fai to concrete dams and canals so we  do not have to worry about maintenance issues.  nsCINltImINJA Do their supports make you manage water better? OITbA:ZAKoIsdApTtAdN:oUA2  (Mu1):  Of course. At least we spend less time and money to maintain it. And for concrete dams, there is almost no leak of water. Our Mueng Fai is not concrete and we have repair it 2-3 times in each rainy season. (Interview, 20 October 2013)  According to the head of Mueng Fai group B, the TAO provides plastic sacks for every Mueng Fai group, and this support can increase the capability of these irrigation groups in terms of water control as well as a saving of time and money. The TAO also make knowledge and technology available to Mueng Fai groups.   1tRIAUNIEtbIsCA2 : Last year, TAO has provided a budget to build five concrete dams. So we asked Maeta Water Committee to be foremen. We hired an engineer to teach them how to construct concrete dams, and when other Mueng Fai groups need to construct concrete dams, they will be supervisors. This is cheaper than hiring outsiders to construct the dams for us. We have a project with a university to collect data about the level of water in Maeta River. This information can be used to predict the level of water and the time the floods will come each year. (Interview, 25 October 2013)  The TAO supported some Mueng Fai groups by providing them with the budget and workers for concrete dams. At the same time it also educated local people on how to construct concrete dams. The TAO invested in knowledge and technology for water management and this 89  also increased the capability of Mueng Fai groups in water management, as the head of Mueng Fai group A mentioned. In short, we can say that, after decentralization, the capability of Mueng Fai groups in water management increased.  However, unlike TMFC and Maeta Cooperative, Mueng Fai capability in water management is not derived from the social capital of the leaders. Table 4.2 below and the following quotes from our interview with a head of a Mueng Fai group demonstrate this quite clearly. Table 4.2: The TAO supports of four irrigation groups in Tambon Maeta KoIsdApTtAzN:oUAeITbINEA:ZA:CiINA:NdTsthTCt:sATEAAyIyDINE AHoyDINA:ZAyIyDINEA©ZTytGtIEjALGTECtRA.TRfEAa:sRNICIAuTy A -ik AMueng Fai group A (Mu1 village) Kamnun, Vice president of the TAO, TAO council 53 supported /enough Yes Biggest Mueng Fai group in Mu1 village  Mueng Fai group B (Mu1 village) TAO council  5 supported /enough No Remote and Few people Mueng Fai group C (Mu5 village) None 15 supported /enough Yes Share the same dam with 2 other groups Mueng Fai group D (Mu5 village) President of the TAO 35 supported /enough No waiting for the next budget   Data in table 4.2 are constructed from the interviews with 4 Kae Mueng (Heads of Mueng Fai groups) from Mu1 and Mu5 villages. They gave information about the number of members in each irrigation group, the leaders of other organizations in their group, support received from the TAO, availability of concrete dams and reasons for this.  From the table, we can say that four of them get enough support from the TAO by receiving the plastic sacks. Mueng Fai groups A, B, 90  and D have leaders of the organizations as members of TAO, while Mueng Fai group C does not. Mueng Fai groups A and D are considered large, while Mueng Fai groups B and C are small groups. Regarding dams, Mueng Fai groups A and C have concrete dams while the rest still have bamboo and plastic dams. The last column of table 4.2 shows us different reasons why each group either has or does not have concrete dams, according to information from each Kae Mueng.  From the table, we can see that all of the irrigation groups listed get support enough from the TAO in terms of plastic sacks. However, they get different support in terms of concrete dams. Whether any given Mueng Fai group will get a concrete dam or not seems not to depend on there being leaders of other organizations in the group. In other words, linkages between leaders of irrigation groups and TAO leaders is not a factor influencing whether or not an irrigation group will have a concrete dam. Moreover, the following interview with a Kae Mueng clearly shows that the decision about whether or not an irrigation group will obtain a concrete dam involves more decision makers than just those in the TAO. nsCINltImINJA Are anyone in TAO or who are Phuyai members also members of your group?AOITbA:ZAKoIsd ApTtAdN:oUAa  (Mu5): Nope no one.  nsCINltImINJA Does that affect the response when your group asks for plastic sacks or other help from the TAO? OITbA:ZAKoIsd ApTtAdN:oUAa  (Mu5): Not at all. The TAO is just there (points to the TAO office). When we need plastic sacks we just ask anyone there.  nsCINltImINJA Other than plastic sacks, do you get other support from the TAO? OITbA:ZAKoIsd ApTtAdN:oUAa  (Mu5): Yes, last year they built the concrete dams for us. 91  nsCINltImINJA Why did your Mueng fai group get a concrete dam? OITbA:ZAKoIsd ApTtAdN:oUAa  (Mu5): Because here they create only one dam, but we can share it within 3 Mueng Fai groups.  nsCINltImINJA Who decides where they will create a concrete dam? OITbA:ZAKoIsd ApTtAdN:oUAa  (Mu5): The TAO will ask Maeta Water Committee where should they built first because they have limited budget. I am also on Maeta Water Committee. After that, if the village meeting says yes, we can build. But they have no problem generally.  nsCINltImINJA Can you compare, the support for your group between the present president of the TAO and the previous one? OITbA:ZAKoIsd ApTtAdN:oUAa  (Mu5): Nothing different. Both of them provided plastic sacks for us. But Maeta Water Committee was set up last year.  (Interview, 24 October 2013)  The interview with Head of Mueng Fai group C (Kae Mueng C) indicates that, even for a small irrigation group that does not have leaders of any other organization among its members, it is still pretty easy to get plastic sacks. However, to obtain concrete dams there are multiple decision makers— Maeta Water Committee, the TAO, and the village meeting. Furthermore, when asked to compare the support of the previous president and the present president of the TAO, Mueng Fai group is said to get support at the same level. Therefore, we can say that the capability in water management of Mueng Fai groups increased because of the policy of the TAO and not because of the relationship between leaders of the TAO and Mueng Fai groups.  bD DbCNv,ZISLROaiLgNs,SP,,ONaRALIZNO,SPRBYNIOeNAIgIsLZLSKNRVNSi,N,OlLBROG,OSIZNyBR:gaDN The preceding analysis of various environmental groups in Tambon Maeta— TMFC, Maeta Cooperative, and Mueng Fai groups – has shown that their capability in environmental management increased after decentralization. TAO supported these environmental groups in 92  terms of budget, knowledge, and authority. The resources provided by TAO increased their capability in environmental management significantly. However, different environmental groups use different kinds of tools to access new available resources from the TAO.  For TMFC and Maeta Cooperative, the social network relationships of their leaders is an important tool for them to get resources from the TAO. Although the TAO is a government organization, for them the local social network ties of their leaders is more effective than the bureaucratic network.  The way that they see each other as “our” or “other”, as in-group or outsider, is an important factor in whether they will get support from the TAO or not. In other words, transfer of resources from Maeta TAO to TMFC and Maet Cooperative for their environmental management is based to a significant degree on the social capital ties of their leaders. Moreover, we also found that the strength of the linkages between President of the TAO and leaders of these two organizations is a significant determinant of the extent of resources the environmental groups get from the TAO. In the case of irrigation groups, resources from the TAO do not flow through social linkages between Maeta TAO and Mueng Fai group. Every Mueng Fai group obtains the same support regarding plastic sacks. Moreover, there are multiple decision makers for concrete dam construction, so the private linkages between the TAO and Mueng Fai groups are not sources of TAO’s supports.       In the next section, our research will focus more on the individual level. It will do so in order to better understand how social capital effects capability in environmental management at different levels.  AV9VJAutECNtDoCt:sA:ZAd:lINsyIsCANIE:oNRIEA:sAE:RtTGAsICm:NfAtsbtltboTGAAE:RtTGAsICm:NfA At the organization level, we found that part of the resources that are distributed by the  93  TAO flow throughout the social network of local government agencies instead of the bureaucratic system. Individuals’ access to these resources in Tambon Maeta is influenced by their private relationships with the government agency.  As a result, different levels of social capital  that existed before decentralization affects directly the accessibility of local communities to common pool natural resources. The first part of this section will examine more closely how the social networks of local people are used as a tool to access the resources of Maeta TAO. The second part will examine how the strength of ties between local people and government agencies affects  local individuals’ access to common pool natural resources.   bDbDECNULOYLOyNaRALIZNAIgLSIZNl,Ba:aNs:B,I:ABISLANRByIOLtISLRONN After the introduction of the TAO, skilled workers came into Tambon Maeta, and the Maeta people themselves gained more skilled and power as a result. This situation brought more resources to Tambon Maeta.  Although individual people can contact or request help from the TAO directly, this research found that Maeta people prefer to make contact through their friends, kin, or neighbours who work for the TAO. This is demonstrated in the tabulation of our interview findings in Table 4.3.  Table 4.3: The support and service that participants in Mu1 and Mu5 villages  receive from Maeta TAO 1tGGTdIEA vIE:oNRIEAZN:yACiIAM (AA UGTECtRAETRfEAiIGUAZN:yAACiIAM (ATZCINAZG::btsdA eTsbACtCGIAA EfACiIAM ( A EfAZNtIsbEA:NAZTytGkA EfACiIAM ( A EfAZNtIsbEA:NAZTytGkA EfACiIAM ( A EfAZNtIsbEA:NAZTytGkAMu1 (20) 0 19 1 15 17 0 Mu5 (20) 2 18 4 10 20 0   94  Table 4.3 shows the number of participants who asked for assistance directly from the TAO compared to those who asked for assistance through their social network ties.  It also provides information on whether this varies in terms of different kinds of resources. As is clear from these data, most people get help from Maeta TAO for three main issues— plastic sacks for dams and canals, help after flooding, and assistance with land titles. It should be noted that,  in some years, there has been such severe flooding that it destroyed farms. In connection with this the TAO will support farmers with money, or assistance in clearing the land. With regard to land titles, the TAO started issuing Tambon land titles in 2012. In determining the extent of title, the TAO will use GPS to measure land and give the land title to farmers who were previously doing plantation farming on untitled land. Table 4.3 compares the Mu1 and Mu5 peoples’ patterns of seeking assistance from the TAO. From the table, we can see that almost every participant gets plastic sacks from the TAO, but most farmers asked through their friends or family members who work for the TAO. Only 2 persons from Mu5 village sought plastic sacks directly from the TAO office. Similarly, most people also seek help from the TAO after flooding but do so through their friends. Only 1 person from Mu1 village and 4 persons from Mu 5 village directly sought assistance from the TAO office. However, in the case of land titles, each request was made directly to the TAO.    Furthermore, the information in Table 4.3 shows that the people in both communities have quite similar patterns of requesting help from TAO about environmental issues, even though Mu1 is the nearest village to TAO and Mu5 is the farthest. For plastic sacks and recovery after flooding, Maeta people prefer asking their friends or family members to contact the TAO on their behalf. In contrast, land measurement and land title everybody tends to contact the TAO office directly, perhaps because it involves a potential source of conflict with their neighbours 95  over ownership. However, in either case, distance from the TAO is not a factor in the way Maeta people choose to get help from the TAO. Maeta people generally access tangible resources through their networks (in this case, plastic sacks and recovery from flooding).  However, for more intangible resources that may cause some level of local conflict, Maeta people prefer to contact the TAO directly in person.   bDbDuCNULOYLOyNaRALIZNAIgLSIZNl,Ba:aNs:B,I:ABISLANaKaS,GNNAlthough I mentioned in the previous chapter that social capital and capability of Maeta communities with respect to environmental management increased after decentralization, not everybody gained at the same level.  The habits of Maeta people that lead them to access some of the government resources through their individual network ties instead of dealing with the organization directly, means that those who have stronger ties with the government agency end up with an enhanced position of power and influence.  This is reflected in the following interview.  nsCINltImINJA Do you think  that, because you have a daughter working for the TAO, you get some information faster or in more detail than others do?A1tGGTdINA 2F (Mu 5): Yes sometimes. Last rainy season the TAO distributed a lot of seedling Teak trees and other expensive trees, but people did not know about it. I do not know why. Only I got 200-300 seedlings, I am now planting in my farm.  nsCINltImINJA re there other projects like this? 1tGGTdINA2F (Mu 5): My daughter told me a lot of project of the TAO but this is the only one I joined. The Phuyai mostly tell us in the village meeting or on community radio. (Interview, 23 October 2013) nsCINltImINJA council. I wake up and go the other way to my farm, so I do not see them every day. I learned that they Why do you not have Tambon land title?A96  1tGGTdINA VA(Mu1) I don’t know. The first time that they did it no one told me, and my house is far from Phuyai or TAO did land titles when they were measuring a farm next to mine. But I told Phuyai already if the TAO do it next time, please tell me. (Interview, 2 October 2013) From the two examples, it is clear that, because Respondent B5 has a family member who works for the TAO, she can get more information, and this information allowed to obtain seedlings. Contrastingly, Villager A4 did not know about the Tambon land title project because he did not have regular interaction with Phuyai or TAO officers and this led him to lose the opportunity to have Tambon land title in the first round of measurement.   From these examples, we can say that the strength of ties between lay people and the TAO officers make a difference for individuals in obtaining resources from the TAO, and this is especially the case with regard to information about new programs. Moreover, missing some information can reduce Maeta people’s accessibility to other resources.  In the case of forest management, some villagers also think that having strong linkages between the TAO officer and villagers allow some people access to more forest products than others are able to get. The following quote from one respondent goes to the heart of unequal access that may lie at the core of a dependence on network ties: nsCINltImINJA Do you think it is  better after the formation of TAO to get involved in forest management?A1tGGTdINA w (Mu1 village): You can say it is better. But you know they are not much good to use with normal people like me. But if you know those leaders it is easier to get logging permit. And even if they do it illegally who will catch them? No one, because they know leaders. (Interview, 2 October 2013) 97  It is clear that this villager still feels that people who know TAO leaders have special access to forest usages. In other words, linkages with the TAO leaders can bring some power to specific Maeta people, and it allows these people to have more benefits than people who have weaker ties with the TAO staff. People who have strong ties with the TAO officers might gain greater social capital benefits in term of information and power, and access to these may give them significant  advantages in activities to do with planting and forest use.  V9FJAa:sRGoEt:s A Capability in environmental management in Tambon Maeta increased after decentralization. However, different actors potentially gained more and developed greater capacity than others through these new arrangements. This chapter shows that the TAO frequently distributes the resources necessary for environmental management through private social networks of individuals who take positions as TAO leaders. On the other hand, the TAO also receive some resources from the environmental groups through these social networks. At the same time, TAO resources sometimes are distributed through the social networks of TAO officers, environmental group leaders, and villagers, instead of through the formal processes of a bureaucratic system. And because the resources flow through social networks, the strength of ties between nodes in social networks often determines the capacity of actors to engage effectively in environmental management.    98  a:sRGoEt:sAAuIRIsCNTGthTCt:srA.:RtTGAaTUtCTGrATsbAaTUTDtGtCkAtsAgsltN:syIsCTGA. IGZPyTsTdIyIsCAtsAMTyD:sAKTICTATCAKTRN:ATsbAvIGTCt:sTGAGIlIGEAA  Both lG BECNTUT LRTlG BECNTF of this thesis discuss the relationship between capability in environmental self-management and decentralization in Tambon Maeta by using concepts related to social capital. While l G BECNTU sees social capital as collective Maeta community property, lG BECNT F analyses the same issue at the relational level. Both chapters show us that decentralization increased social capital in Tambon Maeta and that this increase led to greater overall capability in environmental self-management.   At the macro level, decentralization changed Tambon Maeta’s social network structure in two ways; it extended the social network of Maeta villages, if we look from a community level, or increased the intensity of the Maeta social network, if we look from the Tambon level. The new linkages between communities allow information and technology to be shared between Maeta communities, especially in the case of forest management. Decentralization increased the political power of the local people and this in turn directly increased the Maeta social network’s embedded resources. Tambon Maeta Forest Committee (TMFC) borrowed authority from the TAO (social capital) and used it to increase their capability in forest management. A third effect of decentralization in Thailand is that it pushed local governments, including Maeta TAO, to hire skilled workers who have since become a valuable part of the Maeta social network, adding to the number of embedded resources and contributing to the network’s diversity. These new 99  people also contribute knowledge and technology to the Tambon’s environmental organizations, which then operate with increased capability in managing waterways, forests, and agriculture. The changes in Tambon Maeta’s social network as described here are a good example of how decentralization has positively affected social capital and Maeta people’s capability in environmental management. However, from the perspective of social capital at the macro level, we cannot see exactly how local environmental groups contributed to Maeta TAO’s improved capacity for managing the environment. Nor can we clearly identify the resources shared between the TAO and environmental groups, because it is not clear whether they are social capital or resources distributed through the bureaucratic system. This study, therefore, turned to an examination on the relational level in search of answers.    When we look at the relational level, we find that organizations in Tambon Maeta prefer to exchange resources through the private social networks of their leaders. Even the TAO, which is a local government organization, distributes its resources through the leaders’ social networks instead of through the bureaucratic system. In other words, organizations’ capacity for environmental management is partly dependent on the social capital of their leaders. Moreover, while not every leader of the TAO and environmental groups can share resources in the same amount, the stronger their ties the greater the number and quality of resources they can share. Tambon Maeta forest and agriculture management indicate that relationships between TAO leaders and these two groups (TMFC and Maeta cooperative) determine the capability in environmental management of Maeta TAO, Maeta Sustainable Agriculture Cooperative, and Tambon Maeta Forest Committee. However, in the case of water management, the resources  NC distributed through the bureaucratic systems, so the strength of any ties with the TAO leaders is not related to the amount of resources that irrigation groups receive. On the other hand, the 100  resource distribution between the TAO and Maeta laypeople does run through social networks. People who have stronger linkages with Maeta TAO agencies can obtain more information more quickly. It would be true to say that strong linkages are important for resource distribution between organizations, and between organizations and individuals as well.    To conclude, decentralization definitely affected social capital and capacity for environmental self-management in Tambon Maeta. We can see this phenomenon more clearly through study at both the macro level and the relational level. Decentralization changed the structure of Maeta social networks, and these changes increased the Maeta community’s social capital. In turn, greater social capital led to better capability in environmental self-management. However, at the relational level, not every member of the Maeta social network is able to build the same number or type of relationship. Strong linkages must be cultivated if individuals want access to necessary resources for environmental management and usage. This research has shown us the benefit that decentralization brought to the Maeta people in terms of environmental management and it has described how Maeta TAO can successfully manage the environment despite receiving no power directly from the central government. . Finally, the research has found that a social network perspective can be used instead of a political perspective to reveal different aspects of decentralization and its effects.   This research agrees with the generally accepted assertion that decentralization blurs the boundary between state and society. The way resources are exchanged between the local governments through a social network of government agencies instead of through the bureaucratic system gives strong support to this statement. Under decentralization in Tambon Maeta, local governments and civil society groups can exchange their resources through the social networks of local agencies. This can be a good case study for educating other local 101  governments that suffer from a lack of power in environmental management. Local governments need not depend solely on authority from the central government, but can also receive important help and resources from local environmental groups. Moreover, these resources can flow more effectively through stronger linkages between individuals. Therefore, a good relationship with local environmental groups also strengthens local governments’ capability in environmental management and might lead to more successful outcomes.   In the case of environmental groups, the local governments can support their capability through the acquisition of resources, despite not having much direct power. These resources can flow better through stronger ties, and therefore, building close relationships with the local governments is also an important means by which environmental groups can strengthen their capability in environmental management.  Clearly, resource distribution is in a reasonably healthy state in Tambon Maeta since decentralization. However, there are also some drawbacks to the processes described in this thesis. No one can say for certain that it is better to distribute state resources through the bureaucratic system or via social networks. Both ways will leave some groups of people the winners and other groups the losers. In Tambon Maeta, when the line between the bureaucratic system and the social network overlaps, people who have stronger linkages with the TAO officer become the winners. Through comparatively easier access to help, they can become more capable in environmental usage and management. In contrast, people who have weaker relationships with the local government staff have access to fewer resources. Ideally, more research and study will lead to the design of political institutions that strike a balance and facilitate better flow of resources both through bureaucratic systems and through social networks such that environmental management is augmented and enhanced.  102  2tDGt:dNTUikAAnsAgsdGtEiAAncona, Deborah G. and David F. Caldwell. 1992. 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Ganjanapan, Anan. 2000. “Rights in resources accessibility: studies and knowledge.” in hEdRaT,LTNCP,dNACTu PCRTA,VVdLZEaT LRTL EdN ITNCP,dNACPTV L MCVCLETZLTJG ZI LR, edited by Anan Ganjanapan. Krung Thep: Samnakngan Ko̜ngthun Sanapsanun Kanwičhai. Ganjanapan, Anan. 2001a. oCPC NAGT,LTA,VVdLZEaTRCYCI,BVCLETZLTJG ZI LRsTPhim khrang rǣk. Krung Thep: Samnakngan Ko̜ngthun Sanapsanun Kanwichai. 105  Ganjanapan, Anan. 2001b. kLTNdN ITA,VVdLZEaTB NEZAZB EZ,LTZLTRCYCI,BVCLET AEZYZEZCPSTBN,uICVPT,DTI LRT,tLCNPGZBST LRTA,VVdLZE NZ LZPVTZLTJG ZI LR. Krung Thep: Samnakngan Ko̜ngthun Sanapsanun Kanwichai. Government of Thailand. 1977. JGCTf,dNEGTb EZ,L ITnA,L,VZAT LRTh,AZ ITmCYCI,BVCLETiI LTgy (1977-1981). Bangkok: Office of Prime Minister.  Narintrangkul Na Ayuthaya, Pratueng. 2000 “Communities and land management in Northern Thailand.” in hEdRaT,LTNCP,dNACTu PCRTA,VVdLZEaT LRTL EdN ITNCP,dNACPTV L MCVCLETZLTJG ZI LR, edited by Anan Ganjanapan. Krung Thep: Samnakngan Ko̜ngthun Sanapsanun Kanwichai. Pintoptang, Praphat. 2541. eZPE,NaT,DTP,AZ ITV,YCVCLEPTuaTNdN ITA,VVdLZEZCPTZLTJG ZI LR. Krung hep: Research textbook production center, Krirk Univercity. Patamasiriwat,  Dereg. 2005. “Environmental management by local government (Kan Kum Kub Dolare Sing Wadlom Doy Ongkornpokrongsuawntongtin)”. : EZAG,L: May 21, 2005. Retrieved April 4, 2013, from http://www.nidambe11.net/ekonomiz/2005q2/article2005june21p2.htm Ratchakitchanubeksa. 2013. m E T,DTI,A ITI t. Ratchakitchanubeksa Retrieved February 8, 2013 from http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/RKJ/index/index.htm Wongwilaschai, Aonarnong and Kristda Ploywulerd. n.d. 4,A IT4 tT LRT4,A ITL EdN IToCP,dNACT: L MCVCLEvTl PCThEdRaTfN,VTJ Vu,LT: CE TJG ZI LRT91,NLdLa REZLMEZLT1duT1 NL© Rc NLThduBN a c,NLE VV AG LRT1,N LCCTJ Vu,LT: CE T.VBCNV C,LT- LMt RTlG ZLMV ZH. n.d. Retrieved April 4, 2013, from http://www.codi.or.th/landresolve/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=167%3A2011-02-15-09-07-14&catid=38%3A2009-08-27-07-27-35&Itemid=33&lang=en Yot Santasombat. 1999.ThEdRaT,LTuZ,RZYCNPZEaT LRTZLRZMCL,dPTcL,tICRMCTD,NTPdPE ZL uICTRCYCI,BVCLETZLTb,NEGCNLTJG ZI LR. Chiang Mai: Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge Research Center for Sustainable Development, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University.    106   UUIsbt0A AKICi:b:G:dkATsbALN:DGIyEA:ZACiIAECobkA  This research uses social capital as the primary concept in explaining changes to capability in environmental management in Tambon Maeta following decentralization. Social capital can be studied at both the macro level level and the relational level (Lin 1999: 31). For the macro level, this research studies social capital changes in Tambon (sub-district) Maeta, and, at the relational level, it examines the linkages between the local government and environmental groups, and the local government and individuals.  Case study is a method of this research. Environmental self- management in Tambon Maeta is a case study, and this research investigate three issues to do with its natural resources: water, forest, and agriculture. Data collection was carried out by means of interviews with three groups of participants, namely the lay people who use the natural resources, leaders in environmental group, and local government officers. For the lay people, interviews were conducted with villagers from Mu1 and Mu4 villages, which are under the same local government, Maeta TAO, but are different in terms of population, their position in policy diffusions, and policy involvement. For leaders, the research focuses on organizations related to environmental management:  Tambon Maeta Forest Committee (TMFC), Maeta Sustainable Agriculture Cooperative (Maeta Cooperative),TMaeta Sustainable Natural Resources and Agriculture Development Institution (MSNRAD), and irrigation groups. Officers from Maeta TAO (Tambon Administrative Organization), as well as Phuyai Baan from Mu1 and Mu5 villages, were interviewed as local government officers.  It should be noted that, because the researcher stayed in Tambon Maeta for two months, some of the information provided in this study comes from participant observation.    107  LTNCtRtUTsCEATsbAETyUGtsdA Layperson participants were recruited from public spaces, such as on the road, in public market, and in temples. Twenty participants from Mu1 village and 20 from Mu5 village were interviewed. Interviews with leaders of environmental groups included representatives from, respectively, the Tambon Maeta Forest Committee, Maeta Sustainable Agriculture Cooperative, Maeta Sustainable Natural Resources and Agriculture Development InstitutionS and various local irrigation groups.  To represent local government officers, interview requests were made to the Maeta TAO President (executive power of the TAO), the officers who were involved in issues surrounding environmental policies, the members of the Tambon Maeta Council (legislated power), and two Phuyai Baan community official leader).  vIEITNRiAgCitREA Data collection for this research was conducted in person with participants. Before starting the interview process, I will provide [I provided] participants with both verbal and written information about the research project and a consent form, which states the right of any potential participant to accept or decline participation. Each participant will receive [received] copies of the information sheets and consent form, and a transcript of their interview. The consent form is in both Thai and English (see Appendix II). Also, permission will be obtained [was obtained] for any sound recording. LN:DGIyEA:ZACiIAZtIGbAm:NfAA Before starting data collection, I needed permission from the local government in Tambon Maeta, but my request had to be sent to the central government. This process was somewhat long, and the permission letter from the central government arrived late. Therefore, I started my data collection at the beginning of September 2013 instead of mid-August 2013. I brought the copy version of the letter from the central government with me, but the TAO had not received a copy and was not expecting me. However, they accepted my copy as verification. I spent my first week introducing myself to leaders of 108  organizations and Phuyai Baan. I stayed in Tambon Maeta for 2 months, so I could form good relationships with villagers.   There were two main problems to overcome in my field work:  the language and trust. Every participant can speak official Thai, but they also have their own dialects. Several times I encountered participants who could not speak fluently in official Thai. I solved this problem by letting them speak their own dialect, of which I could understand around 80 percent, and asking them to clarify when I did not understand. The second problem was about trust. With the villagers, because I stayed in Tambon Maeta for 2 months and tried to join any of their activities where I would be welcome — reforestation, parade, funerals, and drinking— some of the villagers came to know me. In addition, the TAO provided a guide for me, a local man who knew every part of the Maeta well, and many villagers told me that they allowed me to interview them because this man brought me. These were some of the ways I tried to reduce any uncomfortable feelings that participants might have, before I started the interviews. Only one participant refused audio recording during the interview.  With the leaders, because I brought the letter from the central government with me, some of them had doubts about my having hidden agendas. Some leaders did worry that my research might affect their environmental activities because some of their activities do not have legal status. I sought to explain to them in the leader meeting that a main purpose of this research is to promote environmental self-management by local people in Thailand. Finally, they allowed me to start data collection. LN:DGIyEA:ZAbTCTAoETdIAA The first problem here was translation. Because all of the interviews were conducted in Thai, it was hard to keep the exact meaning of the words when I translated the transcripts into English. I solved this problem by keeping longer quotes from participants, and not just the part that I wanted to highlight. I hope that audiences can understand more of the context of the interviews by reading these longer quotes, and thus get a better grasp of the contents as well. The second problem was the safety of participants. It is a feature of decentralization to blur the boundary between state and society. I did not reveal the names of 109  regular Maeta villagers, and I felt that because local politicians and local NGO leaders are also Maeta villagers, I should not show their real names and their exact positions either.  I also had some concerns because the regional and national politics in Thailand were really unstable after a coup d’état in May 2014. National leaders mentioned TAOs several times as useless and corrupt organizations that they wanted to abolish. Therefore, as I composed my research data, I decided it would be safer not to use any of the real names and positions of participants.     


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