Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

A perspective on the Naxalite insurgency in Jharkhand and Bihar : going beyond the grievance argument Prasad, Deborah Y. J. 2015

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata


24-ubc_2015_november_prasad_deborah.pdf [ 1.72MB ]
JSON: 24-1.0165830.json
JSON-LD: 24-1.0165830-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 24-1.0165830-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 24-1.0165830-rdf.json
Turtle: 24-1.0165830-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 24-1.0165830-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 24-1.0165830-source.json
Full Text

Full Text

A PERSPECTIVE ON THE NAXALITE INSURGENCY IN JHARKHAND AND BIHAR: GOING BEYOND THE GRIEVANCE ARGUMENT  by  Deborah Y.J. Prasad  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Asia Pacific Policy Studies) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)   October 2015   © Deborah Y. J. Prasad, 2015    ii Abstract This thesis examines a form of left wing extremism called the Naxalite, or Maoist insurgency in the Eastern Indian states of Jharkhand and Bihar. Deemed the biggest internal security threat to India by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2004, this low level insurgency has been plaguing the country for over fifty years. To date, the government of India has used a two pronged security and development approach to combat the problem, but it still remains a serious issue.  This thesis examines why the Naxalite movement has essentially been restricted to the geographic area referred to as the “Red Corridor”, and also examines why the insurgency has not yet been resolved. A majority of the studies approaches this issue as either a law and order problem or a development problem; however, this thesis scrutinizes the nature and motives of the insurgents themselves. The purpose of this study was to suggest the idea that the insurgents responsible for the violence of the Naxalite insurgency are more often motivated by greed of opportunity and economic gain, rather than genuine grievances. This is not to say that genuine grievances do not exist in this insurgency, rather it is merely to say that it is not a fuelling factor for violence. Lastly, this thesis examines the lack of monitoring and gaps in policy implementation for counterinsurgency, and finds that it is the lack of cognizant monitoring, rather than lack of policy, which has contributed to lack of the resolution of the conflict.      iii   Preface This thesis is an original work by Deborah Y.J. Prasad. No part of this thesis has been previously published.                      iv Table of Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………………....ii Preface………………………………………………………………………….iii Table of Contents…………………………………………………………….. iv List of Figures………………………………………………………………….vi Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………....vii Dedication…………………………………………………………………… viii Introduction……………………………………………………………………....1 Chapter 1 :  Insurgency Typologies And The Naxalite Insurgency In India 3 1.1 Insurgencies……………...……………………………………………3 1.2 Greed And Grievance Theories…………..…………………………...4 1.3 Typologies Of Insurgents………………...………………………………………..…6 1.4 Background To The Naxalite Movement……………………………………….8 1.5 Disconnect Between the Nation And The States……………………13 Chapter 2: Why Hasn’t The Naxalite Movement Galvanized Across All Of India?....................................................................................................................17   2.1 Opportunities That Naxalite Insurgencies Provide…………………..17  2.2 The Lack Of Ideology………...……………………………………...26  2.3 The Factious Nature Of Naxalism In Jharkhand And Bihar……........27 Chapter 3: Why Hasn’t The Naxalite Insurgency Issue Been Resolved?......31  3.1 Dirty Politics………………………………………………………....31  3.2 Corruption And Gaps In Implementation Monitoring………...……..35  3.3 Problems In Policing…………………………………………………40  3.4 The Center And The States Playing A Blame Game………………...44  v  3.5 Potential Solutions…………………………………………………...46 Conclusion………….…………………………………………………………..49 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………51                      vi  List of Figures Figure 1 Map of Naxalite Affected Area (The Red Corridor)………………………….....3 Figure 2 Statistics of Naxalite Violence…………………………………………………11 Figure 3 Newspaper Articles on Naxalite Violence (New Delhi, Mumbai, Ranchi, Patna): May to August 2015……………………………………………………………………..15  Figure 4 Newspaper Articles on Naxalite Violence (New Delhi, Mumbai, Ranchi, Patna):May to August 2015…....……...…………………………………………………16  Figure 5 MGNREGA Statistics for Jharkhand and Bihar 2009-2015...…………………39 Figure 6 Naxalite Surrender Statistics…………………………………………………...40 Figure 7 Police Station Expenditures in Naxalite Areas…………………………………44 Figure 8 Expenditures for Development Policies to Combat Naxalism (2008-2016)...…46              vii Acknowledgements Every great achievement is not accomplished alone; rather, achievements are accomplished with the help of many, or a select few. I would like to thank a number of people for their support, guidance and knowledge through this journey.   Firstly I would like to thank my graduate supervisor Dr. Tsering Shakya for his encouragement and for his faith in my abilities, I am grateful for your calming attitude and your wise perspective on my thesis topic. I would also like to thank Dr. Brian Job for his knowledge, positivity and guidance throughout this thesis. I find myself fortunate to have both your support, and I have a deep respect for you.  In addition, I would like to thank Dr. John Martin Gillroy of Lehigh University for your constant encouragement, guidance and faith in me. Thank you for seeing in me, what I never saw in myself, and for reminding me “if you are not yourself, you are no one.”  I would also like to thank Cindy Ramos for her support throughout my entire transition to academic life. Thank you for always being there for me any time I needed your support, and thank you for believing in me. In addition I would like to thank the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery and the 15th Field Artillery Regiment, Vancouver for awarding me the Captain General’s Diamond Jubilee Bursary.   Lastly, but most importantly, I would like to thank my husband, Roshan. Thank you for your kindness, patience and love. Thank you for always seeing the best in me, and believing, that for me, “the sky is the limit”. I am truly blessed.    viii  Dedication This thesis is dedicated to my husband Roshan. Like the tall oak tree, may we continue to grow not in each other’s shadow, but side by side.                        1  Introduction A quick glimpse of any newspaper, or mainstream media in today’s day and age is bound to mention insurgencies. Current media from the past ten to fifteen years has mentioned well known insurgent groups in the Middle East such as Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and more recently, the Islamic State of Iraq Syria and the Levant (ISIL). Insurgencies are a global phenomenon and impact more regions of the world that are actually highlighted in media. The subject of this thesis is to examine the left wing Naxalite/Maoist insurgency in India and to stress its significance in not only India, but also on a global level.  Some notable insurgencies which are either currently taking place in the world, or which have recently been resolved, include the following: The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Columbia; a growing left wing insurgency not showing any signs of relent, causing major concern for the government of Brazil. In addition to this, as mentioned above, there is ISIL, which has taken the world by storm and is causing grave threats to international security. The Maoists in Nepal were an insurgent group, who ended up crumbling the Nepalese government and setting up their own communist state, run by former rebels. In tune with South Asia, the left wing Tamil Tiger insurgency was recently quashed by the Sri Lankan state, after 25 years of battle.  Speaking just with respect to India, there are approximately 165 active and inactive insurgencies taking place in the country.1 Ranging from Islamic radical insurgents participating in the Jammu and Kashmir region, to insurgents in the North                                          1   2 Eastern Regions of India, to insurgents in the Northern Region of Punjab, who are pursuing an independent religious state of Khalistan, the country is plagued with more internal problems than has been exposed to the rest of the globe. 2                                                           2  3 1. Insurgency Typologies And The Naxalite Insurgency In India 1.1 Insurgencies The current policies and practices in India’s battle against this left wing insurgency not only are applicable to India, but can be used as an example to apply in dealing with various categories of insurgencies all over the world, regardless of the political spectrum they fall under. This thesis will address a unique component of the Naxalite insurgency in the states of Jharkhand and Bihar and involves assessing why the Naxalite movement has not galvanized across India. In addition to this, the thesis will address why, despite being active for nearly 50 years, the issue has not been resolved.                        Figure 1 Map of Naxalite Affected India (The Red Corridor)  image obtained at  4 1.2 Greed And Grievance Theories In order to understand the Naxalite insurgency, it is important to be familiar with the concepts dealing with what insurgencies are, and what in fact causes them. Insurgencies, by definition, are violent rebellions against a constituted authority when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized formally as belligerents. The movement is comprised of insurgents who are guerrilla forces seeking to overthrow the state. 3  There are arguably various causes for an insurgency to take place, but one of the main causes for a rebellion, is unhappiness with the state. When an insurgency takes place, it is deemed unlawful due to the fact that a majority of the time, it has not been sanctioned or recognized by the state. Insurgencies use and promote the use of violence in order to overthrow, in their minds, a repressive, and inadequate state. The problem with an insurgency’s use of violence is that the state holds a monopoly on the use of violence for legitimate means. Aptly discussed by Max Weber “the state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory…..the right to use physical violence is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. Only the state is considered the sole source of the right to use violence.” 4 Often what fuels insurgencies is unhappiness, rooted in exploitation by, or being left behind by the state, which is seen as responsible for taking care of its population. Many times, insurgents feel that the state has treated them unequally or has been the                                          3 Alan Collins, . Contemporary Security Studies. 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 493. 4 Max Weber. “Politics As A Vocation” : Essays in Sociology, (New York : Oxford University Press, 1946): 78  5 cause of a less than satisfactory quality of life. This unhappiness with the state causes actions to overthrow and change the current state.  A theory on greed and grievance by Collier and Hoeffler, explains the cause of wars and insurgencies. The grievance model implies that insurgencies occur because of serious conditions subjected towards groups of people, which are based on race, identity and social class. In other words, populations who feel they have been exploited or treated unfairly in comparison with their fellow state residents, based on societal identity and labels, cause insurgencies.5 An example of a current grievance based situation could be that of the Rohingya people of Myanmar. To date, they are arguably being discriminated against, because of their historical and religious identity, which according to the state of Myanmar, does not belong to them, neither historically nor religiously. The greed model is based purely on economics. Collier and Hoeffler assert that insurgencies and rebellions are also greed based, with the motivation of looting assets. They claim that while the leadership of a rebellion talks of oppression, they are merely using the façade of a grievance in order maximize on economic gains. Their greed analysis showed that regions with young unemployed men, low average incomes, low growth and high export of primary commodities such as oil and timber were prone to civil conflict. 6 Thus, a cause of insurgencies is the fact that it can provide economic gain to those who participate in it. This being said, it should be noted that in the Indian context, grievances are not purely economic, but also are rooted in social issues, which create economic disparities and difficulties for groups and individuals. Social issues like                                          5 Chenoy, Anuradha and Chenoy, Kamal. Maoist and Other Armed Conflicts. (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2010), 11. 6 Chenoy, Anuradha and Chenoy, Kamal. Maoist and Other Armed Conflicts. (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2010), 11  6 caste and creed discrimination, put certain groups in situations of poverty and powerlessness, which in turn motivates individuals to join insurgency movements in order to acquire economic gain.  Some other theories of insurgencies combine greed and grievance and come up with causational factors, which are rooted in grievance, but then transform into greed. Other causes of insurgencies are based on greed, not on financial gain, per say, but on greed for individual power, and agency.   1.3 Typologies Of Insurgents According to authors Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot, there are three types of militants involved in insurgency movements: martyropaths, game-players and opportunists. The martyropaths are “guided by a self annihilating death wish that attests to an unshakeable belief in the justness of the cause defended or, on the contrary, to disillusion and a sense of failure.”7 In essence, the martyropath believes in dying for his or her cause, and believes that their death will positively contribute to the advancement of their cause.  The game player militant is one who goes beyond moral gratification in conducting a just war. Militants find in the organization, a counter-society that allows them to indulge in risky behaviour that involves putting their own lives on the line. The militia is not only a disciplinary institution that exercises strict social control over its militants and society. It is also a game playing community whose members find themselves joined by the feeling of being apart together in an exceptional situation. If this                                          7 Christopher Jaffrelot and Laurent Gayer “Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists” (London: C Hurst and Company Publishing, 2009), 4.  7 dangerous game includes a share of risk, the militants who take part in it derive both private and collective pleasure from it. 8 Lastly, the opportunist militant is guided by designs of material development and symbolic recognition. Private armies enable their members to achieve prestige. Often they are also paid a salary, which allows them to take part in practices of accumulation that, as they become widespread, transform the militias into enterprises of violence. In essence, they consolidate to convert organized force (or violence) into money or other market resources.9 Along similar lines with Gayer and Jaffrelot, Chitralekha specifically categorizes Naxalite insurgents into “Committed, Drifters and Opportunists”. Committed insurgents are those who are driven solely by ideology, and arguably, is grievance based. Drifters are insurgents who join the Naxalite movement as an occupational choice of sorts, taken in the absence of more attractive work/life options. A majority of this group uses the Naxalite party’s clout to resolve land and other petty disputes with relatives, peers or neighbours. Lastly, the opportunist insurgent is one who comes from a middle class household and join with clearly formulated personal agendas, often they are seeking refuge from the law, and aim to join for a short term. 10 With all the above inferences to causational factors for insurgency, it can be concluded that insurgencies are rooted in disappointment and discontent with the current state. After a thorough study of the Naxalite insurgency, a very compelling case can be                                          8 Christopher Jaffrelot and Laurent Gayer “Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists” (London: C Hurst and Company Publishing, 2009), 4. 9 Christopher Jaffrelot and Laurent Gayer “Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists” (London: C Hurst and Company Publishing, 2009), 6. 10 Chitralekha.  “Committed, Opportunists and Drifters’: Revisiting the Naxalite narrative in Jharkhand and Bihar.” Contributions to Indian Sociology, 44, No. 3 (2010): 307.  8 presented to the motivational factor of greed, over grievance. The difference between this motivational factor of greed over Collier and Hoeffler’s model, is that this thesis discusses greed not just for economic gain, but also for opportunity and power. Faced with an environment, which does not provide opportunities for individual growth, or individual agency, the Naxalite insurgents are motivated not just by money, but power and opportunity.   1.4 Background To The Naxalite Movement The origins of the Naxalite (then more familiarly referred to as the Maoist movement), can be traced back to the 1946-1951 period when Indian Communists inspired by Chairman Mao and the Chinese revolution took up an armed struggle in the rural region of Telengana to free peasants from feudal rule. Led by the newly formed Communist Party of India, the uprising was initially organized around demands against the eviction of peasants from their land. Shortly after this, the Nehru government promised to undertake a series of land reforms, which led the Communist Party of India to join mainstream parliamentary politics in 1951. The Naxalite movement started in the village of Naxalbari, West Bengal, India in 1967 as an armed revolt when henchmen of a local landowner assaulted a local tribal sharecropper.  The Tribals retaliated by attacking landlords and claiming their land. This uprising was quickly crushed by the state through the use of force, but the movement spread to other parts of West Bengal, Andra Pradesh, and Bihar, which in the year 2000, was divided to form the new state of Jharkhand.11                                          11 V.R Raghavan, ed. The Naxal Threat: Causes, State Responses and Consequences. (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2011): 23.  9  The movement was led by a breakaway group of hard-core members of the Communist Party of India, while its followers came from poor, bonded, and exploited peasantry. In 1969, the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) was set up and began a series of uprisings and revolts. This movement faced brutal police force due to which it had all but collapsed in 1975. The insurgency revived itself in 1980 and has only grown in number and seriousness since that time.   As the movement was growing in its early stages, it attracted intelligent and idealistic college students, and intellectuals who saw a “flawed” democracy in India. These intellectuals and elite based leaders of the initial stages of the movement aimed to start a communist revolution in India, and were based on Chairman Mao’s principles of communist ideology of empowering the proletariat and bringing about change in the rotten societal system that promoted inequality among the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.12  The ultimate aim of the Naxalites is to capture state power and establish a communist society, which is to be carried out through a Protracted People’s war, but is seen to be incompatible with India’s parliamentary democracy 13 A brief look at this Maoist ideology shows that it is based on violence and armed revolution. Ideology, which fuelled this rebellion, is based on his principles of “strategic defence”, “strategic                                                                                                                           12 Gautam Banerjee. Reign of the Red Rebellion: Observations from Naxal Land. (Atlanta: Lancer Publications, 2013): 39. 13	  CCOMPOSA	  Website	  CCOMPOSA- The Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and the Organizations of South Asia  10 stalemate” and “strategic offensive” all which promote the use of violence as a means to achieve their goals of revolution.14 Today the Naxalite insurgency has been deemed the biggest internal security threat to India and has severely disrupted daily life of many of the regions where it is active. Currently the Naxalite movement is responsible for regular kidnappings, railway line explosions, ambushes and violence in the states of Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Jharkhand and Bihar.  True to the teachings of their Communist ideology, the insurgents are guerrilla fighters who set up camps in the densely forested areas of Jharkhand and Bihar and have established parallel societies. Naxalite guerrillas have a set up of parallel governments, and courts called jan adalats. Their goal is to use violence to overthrow the current state through their “wars” and encounters with the states security forces.  To date the Naxalite insurgency has severely negatively impacted the states of Jharkhand and Bihar. Hundreds of crores15 of rupees has been spent on counter- insurgency operations. In addition to this, the Naxal affected areas in Jharkhand and Bihar remain ungoverned and lawless. The insurgency has made the states of Jharkhand rampant with extortion, armed violence, constant derailment of passenger trains, random kidnappings, explosions of mines and industrial plants and random strikes or “bandhs”, where it is dangerous for citizens to go about their daily lives in fear of being killed by a Naxalite. In addition to this, Naxalites are actively recruiting young people, including young children to work as child soldiers for their insurgency. The movement is highly disruptive and dangerous for those living in Jharkhand and Bihar, as they must live in                                          14 Gautam Banerjee. Reign of the Red Rebellion: Observations from Naxal Land. (Atlanta: Lancer Publications, 2013): 40. 15 1 crore is 10,000,000 rupees.  11 fear, and at the behest of a Naxalite who demands bribes in order to grant them freedom to participate in activities that support daily societal life.   In 2009, the government of India 2009 deemed the Communist Part of India (Maoist), Naxalite group a terrorist organization. Subsequently, all Naxalite/Maoist groups in India have been regarded illegal and terrorist organizations. There are numerous Naxalite organizations active in India today, including the CPI (Maoist) the Figure 2 Statistics of Naxalite Violence (table published on  12 Maoist Communist Center (MCC), and the People’s Liberation Front India (PLFI)- who are very active in the states of Jharkhand and Bihar. In terms of some statistics on the violence caused by the Naxalite insurgency, the movement, to date has been responsible for over 2000 deaths since 2005 in the states of Jharkhand and Bihar. There are landmine blast incidents ranging from dozens to one hundred incidents in Jharkhand and Bihar each year. In addition to this, a majority of those killed are police and security forces. In the year 2014, there have been a total of 1091 incidents, 222 civilians killed, 221 encounters with police, 155 attacks on police, 1680 Naxalite cadres arrested, 546 weapons confiscated and 54 jan adalats held. A majority of these events have occurred in the states of Jharkhand and Bihar. 16 In terms of the demographics, the majority of the insurgency violence comprises young men and women, who are, for the most part, poor, and who have not been able to acquire more than primary level schooling, if that at all. This is a major transformation from the origins of the Naxalite movement, which consisted of a majority of educated and elite. The transformation of the insurgency has moved from ideology based to greed based, as the bulk of insurgents are not motivated by, or attuned to ideology. The transformation took place when the movement began to split into various factions. The individuals who were educated and came from elite homes took the route of forming the official Communist Party of India and focussed on participating in electoral politics and gaining political agency. With their educational background and knowledge of communist principles, they were more attracted to fighting for agency within the political system. The other faction was more attuned to Maoist principles of an armed revolution                                          16 “State Wise Left Wing Extremism Statistics”   13 and violence, and thus relied on an armed struggle rather than ideology. The second faction was more attractive to the common citizen in India, as higher education and understanding of ideology was not something that was attainable by them. By joining this movement, the common person found their own agency, without having to have obtained an elite and urban-based education. As previously mentioned, the Naxalite insurgency has been referred to as the biggest internal security threat to India, and in fact has impacted 1/7th of the population, meaning that 1/7th of the population in India remains, to an extent, ungoverned. This insurgency, along with hundreds of low level insurgencies is a major security problem for India, yet when the common person is asked, they do not know that these insurgencies are currently plaguing India, or that they are causing such grave damage.   1.5 Disconnect Between The Nation And The States Between the months of May to August 2015, I collected data from newspapers in India. The purpose of the data collection was to count how many times a story on the Naxalite insurgency was published in national newspapers. I examined 4 cities in India, including New Delhi, Mumbai, Ranchi, (Jharkhand) and Patna (Bihar). I chose New Delhi because it is the nation’s capital, and would be expected as responsible to announce various issues facing the nation. Mumbai was chosen because it is a highly populated city, and because of its popularity in India. Ranchi and Patna were chosen, because they are capital cities of the states of focus for this thesis. The newspapers chosen were English language newspapers and choice was based on a more centrally, as opposed to righting or leftist political leaning. The choice for English language newspapers was  14 based on the fact that I was unable to read the various vernacular languages of Indian newspapers. I also chose English newspapers because English tends to be the administrative language of India and often addresses pan Indian issues. English is the norm for addressing national Indian issues, rather than local issues, which use their vernacular language.  For the city of Mumbai, I examined the Times of India, while in New Delhi, Jharkhand and Bihar, I looked at the Hindustan Times. Through the 4 month study, I scrolled each of the four newspapers daily for any mention of the Naxalite insurgency, discussing anything related to violence, and tallied the number of articles. (See figures 3 and 4) When the results were tallied, I found that in the four months of study, New Delhi mentioned Naxalite violence 21 times, while Mumbai only mentioned it 12 times. Jharkhand published 200 articles while Bihar published 76 articles. The results reveal a major disconnect between New Delhi/Mumbai and the Naxalite afflicted states. Though articulated by the central government as the biggest internal security threat, there is evidence of a major disjointedness and also a lack of mention in media about the major problem that Naxalism is posing. A possible reason for the lack of mention and highlighting of the Naxalite insurgency could be the fact that, by mentioning the active and problematic insurgencies, the state loses legitimacy and its inadequacies are exposed to the Indian population.    15  Figure 3 News stories on Naxalite Violence: New Delhi, Mumbai, Ranchi, Patna (May- August 2015)  According to the Copenhagen school of security studies, the act of securitization takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. An issue is securitized when articulated by a securitizing actor (government, international organization or civil society actor) as posing an existential threat to a referent object.17 In the same vein, to desecuritize an issue is also political, and its aims are to take attention away from a major security issue, in order to make it appear that the state has been successful in their governing capabilities.                                            17 Mely Caballero-Anthony, and Ralf Emmers ed. 2006. "The Dynamics of Securitization in Asia." In Studying Non-Traditional Security in Asia:  Issues and Trends, (Singapore: Marshall-Cavendish Academic. 2006): 178.   16  Figure 4 News Stories on Naxalite Violence: New Delhi, Mumbai, Ranchi, Patna (May-August 2015)  The results of my newspaper analysis suggest evidence that the lack of mention of the Naxalite insurgency in the capital and in Mumbai are because aims to desecuritize the issue, and to make the government to appear to be in control, even if there is chaos on the ground. In addition to the explanation of desecuritization for the core-periphery disjointedness, perhaps another reason could be that, by not making the problem to appear a national one, the onus of the problem is pushed to the impacted states, even though the problem crosses the state level. By not mentioning the Naxalite issue in the capital and in Mumbai, the problem remains at the state level, and by default, so does the responsibility for its solution.     17 2. Why Hasn’t The Naxalite Movement Galvanized Across All Of India?  2.1 Opportunities That Naxalite Insurgencies Provide  When one thinks of insurgency movements, they usually are aware of groups that represent a nation, and that represent a concern that is at best, a concern for domestic and national security, and at worst, a matter of international security. As previously mentioned, insurgent groups such as ISIL, FARC, LTTE or even the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) are representative of the country that they belong in. These organizations are popular in their country and on the global scale. They are nationalistic in nature, rather than being geographical.  With respect to the Naxalite movement in India, and more specifically in Jharkhand and Bihar, this insurgency remains regional and occupies the location of India called the “Red Corridor”. The Naxalite movement remains confined to the Eastern and Southern regions of India and has not grown to the rest of the regions of India since its birth over fifty years ago. The interesting feature about Naxalism is that it remains confined to the states of Andhra Pradesh (Northern), Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Bihar (up to the Terai Region of Nepal). Even though it has grown as a movement within these sates, it has not spread outside the “Red Corridor” and remains un-galvanized. Going back to motivations for joining an insurgency, a major reason why the Naxalite movement has not galvanized across India is because of factors to do with greed and opportunity. In Jharkhand and Bihar, the primary motive to join and be active in the Naxalite insurgency is because of the individual benefits and opportunities it provides. When individuals join the insurgency for their own benefits, this leads to less likelihood of cooperating with others, which in turn would help galvanize the movement.  18 Financial analysis shows that in Jharkhand and Bihar alone, the Naxalite movement has a profit of between one hundred to 5 hundred crore rupees (approximately $15 million to $77 million USD) a year. 18 Such income is generated primarily from extortion stemming from disruptions to development work, to providing protection for money. In addition to this, a significant amount of profit comes from illicit drug trade.  Jharkhand and Bihar are known for their natural resources of forestry products, iron ore for steel production, and coal mining. Jharkhand and Bihar combined, have reserves over 90 million metric tonnes of coal, while Jharkhand itself has 23,605.47 square kilometers of forest area and iron ore reserves of over 3000 million tonnes. The coal produced in Jharkhand accounts for 63% of India’s energy needs.19 This region, being home to big businesses that are involved in the sale and production of their abundant natural resources, is also very prone to extortion. Corporations are willing to pay a handsome amount in order for business to run without interruptions. Many industrialists regularly pay Naxalites a form of tax or levy as under the table income in order to buy security. 20 In addition to extorting money from big business, the Naxalites also are known to block traffic on highways, and collect taxes called “Rangdaari” in order to let the common man travel.  In addition to extortion-based income, the drug trade in Jharkhand and Bihar are a significant source of income, and satellite imagery has confirmed that Naxalites in                                          18 Gautam Banerjee. Reign of the Red Rebellion: Observations from Naxal Land. (Atlanta: Lancer Publications, 2013): 309. 19 20 Gautam Banerjee. Reign of the Red Rebellion: Observations from Naxal Land. (Atlanta: Lancer Publications, 2013): 265.  19 Jharkhand have cultivated 20,000 acres of poppies. A kilogram of opium poppy costs just 400 rupees ($9) to produce, but has a market value of 25,000 rupees ($550)21 The scope for earing profits, and individual gain in becoming a Naxalite is extremely high. Posing as a Naxalite, or working as a cadre allows an individual to extort money on various levels, and add to an individual’s profit. When given the opportunity, an individual skims off the top and reaps individual benefits rather than paying attention to the need of the group, and thus galvanizing the movement.  Accordingly to a study done on rebel groups, by Beardsley and McQuinn, insurgents with lucrative initial resource endowments are prone to recruit opportunist soldiers who are more likely to exploit their victims. The study also revealed that lootable natural resources enable rebel groups to be less vulnerable to the costs of fighting, and thus susceptible to longer wars. 22  The Beardsley study is applicable to the Naxalite movement’s inability to galvanize because it explains one motivation for becoming an insurgent, which essentially is based on greed. Since there is a higher return on investment, the group does not need to galvanize and garner community and national fame or support in order to sustain their movement. There is enough profit to be made at the small scale, thus galvanizing the movement is not necessary, since galvanizing may not increase outside funding, and also because galvanizing would lessen the profits available to individuals and small groups.                                           21 Prem Mahadevan. “The Maoist insurgency in India: between crime and revolution” (Small Wars & Insurgencies, 23 No. 2, 2012): 216. 22 Beardlsey, Kyle and McQuinn, Brian. “Rebel Groups as Predatory Organizations: The Political Effects of the 2004 Tsunami In Indonesia and Sri Lanka.”  (Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53 No. 4 2009): 626.    20 Naxalite insurgency suggests that the rebels grow operationally stronger due to the profits derived from organized crime, which is built on a self sustaining, illicit economy, akin to that of modern day mafia groups.  This being said, an explanation of the various types of Naxalite insurgents is due. Providing an explanation of the type of Naxalite, will give a clearer perspective on why certain individuals join the movement.  According to Gautam Banerjee, Naxalite groups consist of ideologues, educated and technologically savvy regional leaders, educated and unemployed middle class university students, Tribal inhabitants, and platoons. The last two of this grouping, the Tribals and platoons make up the majority of the insurgents, and are the ones responsible for the acts of violence. The platoon group totals to approximately 11,000 to 14,000 members, and make up the people’s militia. 23 Platoons consist of somewhat literate cadres and are responsible for raising funds, looting weapons, murdering opponents, collecting taxes, carrying out extortion and collecting villagers to lecture them on the Naxalite cause. 24 While the Tribals’ motivation is to get benefits of better living because of their loss of land and traditional rights, the platoons usually come from non-tribal and small service class families. This group is made up of young, and unemployed males and females who have missed opportunities of success and achievement.                                           23 Banerjee Gautam Banerjee. Reign of the Red Rebellion: Observations from Naxal Land. (Atlanta: Lancer Publications, 2013): 265. 24 Gautam Banerjee. Reign of the Red Rebellion: Observations from Naxal Land. (Atlanta: Lancer Publications, 2013): 267.   21 Bearing the above in mind, it is evident that motivation towards insurgent behaviour is based on individuals seeking something self-serving. Motivations are based on greed, rather than ideology, which also explains the lack of galvanization. We can see, alongside the above-mentioned groupings, the committed, opportunists and drifters, also categorizes along similar lines.  Primary motivations to join the Naxalite movement are to do with the opportunities it provides in terms of social security, conflict resolution, personal success, revenge, and the expedient nature of achieving all of the above. In Jharkhand, 18 out of 22 of its districts are run by Naxalites who run a parallel system of administration, justice and policing; this statistic for Bihar state is 32 out of 40 districts. 25  Jharkhand and Bihar remain the most corrupt and poor states in India.26 The national average poverty level in India is 27 percent, while Jharkhand and Bihar are slightly over 40 percent.27 Due to poverty, a large number of the population in these two states lacks access to basic needs of social security such access to food and even conflict resolution.   By becoming an insurgent, young cadres become a part of a group where they are taken care of by the Naxalite organization. Cadres are given uniforms, weapons and food. Although at times, food may not be available because of their transient activity through dense forests, cadres avoid having to starve and be pushed out of their homes by landowners.                                           25 PV Ramana.  ed. The Naxal Challenge: Causes Linkages and Policy Options. (New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley, 2008): 20. 26 Alpa Shah In the Shadows of the State: Indigenous Politics, Environmentalism and Insurgency in Jharkhand, India. (London: Duke University Press, 2010) :192. 27 Gautam Banerjee. Reign of the Red Rebellion: Observations from Naxal Land. (Atlanta: Lancer Publications, 2013): 237.   22 In terms of conflict resolution, this plays a major role in motivating an individual to join the insurgency.  Due to high levels of corruption and huge population, conflict resolution is often more available to those who can afford to go through the legal system. It takes time and money to hire a lawyer, and there is not always a guarantee of a quick or fair resolution. Often, insurgents join the Naxalite movement so that they can bring their cases to the parallel courts called Jan Adalats, in order to resolve a dispute. Jan Adalats make decisions and then assist the seekers of help in resolving their dispute, often through threats of violence and intimidation. When there is a dispute, the Jan Adalat calls the parties together and punishment is given right away. Especially villagers like this expediency in justice because it is also anti landlord and has restored confidence of the Tribals, who are not trusting of the police and the official establishments of the law.28 In relation to conflict resolution, one major motivation to become an insurgent is because it enables individuals to settle scores and act on personal revenge. Many interviews and studies with cadres have found that joining the insurgency has allowed for individuals to inflict revenge on family members for atrocities or insults committed against the victims. For instance, many young males have joined the insurgency to take revenge on family members who have taken away their home and land, or who have insulted them in front of other village people.29 By becoming an insurgent, individuals are given weapons, and in turn, opportunities to settle personal scores against those who have somehow wronged them when they were powerless.                                           28 Bidyut Chakrabarty. Maoism in India: Reincarnation of Ultra-Left Wing Extremism in the Twenty First Century. (New York: Routledge, 2010): 143. 29 Chitralekha.  “Committed, Opportunists and Drifters’: Revisiting the Naxalite narrative in Jharkhand and Bihar.” Contributions to Indian Sociology, 44, No. 3 (2010): 302.   23 The interesting phenomenon in this particular motivation is the inclusion of women in cadres. A significant number of women have joined the Naxalite movement also as a means to settle scores and seek revenge on perpetrators of rape. Often women join the movement to empower themselves enough to settle scores with those who have not only sexually assaulted them, but there are also cases in which women have joined as a means to seek revenge on an abusive spouse. 30 On the topic of women cadres, another common motivation for them to join the insurgency has to do with opportunities. Often, young women cadres come as runaways from families who are forcing them into marriage. Young girls, who do not want to marry, but want to focus on independent aspirations, choose to join the Naxalites as a way to find shelter, security, and a job in the face of family pressure to marry. 31If we delve deeper into this motivation, a young woman who is not inclined to marry early, or at the behest of her family, is most probably interested in a career or in some type of work, which would give her some agency. If family pressure is geared towards marriage, it might not be unreasonable to assume that education and employment or self-sufficiency is something not supported by family. Left with no other way to gain agency, joining as a cadre gives a young woman, who has not been able to obtain much formal schooling, a job, opportunities and her own agency.  The motivation of opportunity and power is also very apparent with young men who join the insurgency. Often these cadres are young men who lack enough education                                          30 Bidyut Chakrabarty. Maoism in India: Reincarnation of Ultra-Left Wing Extremism in the Twenty First Century. (New York: Routledge, 2010): 63. 31 Chitralekha.  “Committed, Opportunists and Drifters’: Revisiting the Naxalite narrative in Jharkhand and Bihar.” Contributions to Indian Sociology, 44, No. 3 (2010): 302.   24 or skills to secure sound employment. Joining the insurgency not only provides them with a job, but also provides them a job in which they are able to succeed and progress in. Joining as a Naxalite cadre gives an individual official titles and also opportunities for leadership. There is room for personal growth and personal achievement, which is challenging in India’s competitive society. With a lack of education and a huge competition for available jobs, joining the insurgency provides an ease of opportunity. This opportunity is not just something that is available for individuals who have not been able to obtain much formal schooling, but it poses a better opportunity in comparison to work available in every day society. The capacity to earn easily is very apparent and the extortion business has become so lucrative that, in many areas, unemployed youth and petty criminals posing as Naxalites are finding it an easy way to make money.32 For example, one of many cadres came from a family who owned more than 35 acres of land, and worked for an entry-level government job secured by paying a bribe of 35,000 rupees ($540 USD). This individual quit his government, job joined the Naxalite movement and within two years was made a deputy commander, and then promoted to the rank of an area commander. His main motivation for joining the movement was the fact that he claimed to make more money than he has ever made in other jobs outside the confines of the insurgency. He is confident that being part of the insurgency is a gold mine with access to even bigger money in his near future. 33 Other opportunities are those that use involvement with the insurgency as a stepping-stone to achieve personal goals.  For example, several Naxalite insurgents in                                          32 PV Ramana.  ed. The Naxal Challenge: Causes Linkages and Policy Options. (New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley, 2008): 75. 33 Chitralekha.  “Committed, Opportunists and Drifters’: Revisiting the Naxalite narrative in Jharkhand and Bihar.” Contributions to Indian Sociology, 44, No. 3 (2010): 307.  25 Jharkhand and Bihar belong to the Yadav caste, and make the best of their connections with political parties with a strong Yadav base, like the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). Some eventually join these parties as office bearers. One particular Yadav MCC platoon commander in Giridih and Koderma (Jharkhand), made enough money to buy properties in both the cities of Khelari and Ranchi, in Jharkhand. When put under the scrutiny of police counter insurgency actions involving a heavy police raid on his residence in 2001, he joined the RJD as their local head.34  Along with opportunity, the motivation of personal power and opportunity plays a crucial role in individual’s decision to join the insurgency. At the outset, young men are given weapons and weapons training in order to conduct their daily duties as insurgents. Young men often claim to find guns and the power that comes from them, undeniably attractive. Many young insurgent cadres, prior to joining, indicated a significant acclimatization to legitimization of violence as a means to an end. Young insurgents felt that the use of violence was an indicator of strength and power. 35  The above motivations ranging from expediency for justice to extreme economic gain to opportunities of agency and power indicate that the foot soldiers who are most responsible for first hand Naxalite violence in Jharkhand and Bihar, engage in this behaviour because of individual needs and personal greed, rather than genuine grievances. Stemming from the basis of greed based motivations for insurgency the idea of galvanization of the movement across India is explained because the motivation is for self-gain, not for protracting the movement into a cause for a larger population.                                           34 Chitralekha.  “Committed, Opportunists and Drifters’: Revisiting the Naxalite narrative in Jharkhand and Bihar.” Contributions to Indian Sociology, 44, No. 3 (2010): 309. 35 Chitralekha.  “Committed, Opportunists and Drifters’: Revisiting the Naxalite narrative in Jharkhand and Bihar.” Contributions to Indian Sociology, 44, No. 3 (2010): 322.   26 2.2 The Lack Of Ideology  In the previous section, the point was emphasized that it was a greed for various things that motivated insurgents, rather than grievances. Tied to this element is the fact that grievances are more related to ideology and fight for an actual cause. One reason why the Naxalite movement has also failed to galvanize across India, is because they are no longer in practice, or even in theory, really in tune with ideology. Although it may be true that forest camps and Naxalite paraphernalia associate with the color red, and with images of Chairman Mao, this is more for aesthetics rather than true identification to ideology. Cadres are given handbooks on rules and regulations about ideology, but if randomly asked, cadres are far removed from ideology.   The current Naxalite movement significantly differs from its origins, which were based on ideology and were mainly comprised of educated elite who were well versed with the communist manifesto. In current times, the top level leadership still uses the nomenclature associated with communism and left wing politics, but they make up a very small portion of the insurgent groups, and more importantly, they are not the leadership who are actively involved in the firsthand violence. Ideology today, plays a small role in the Naxalite insurgency, and thus contributes to the lack of galvanization. If compared to a movement like ISIL, the difference between the two is that ISIL insurgents are well versed with the workings of Sharia law, and adherence to this ideology is what connects ISIL insurgents even as they transcend national borders. It is the lack of ideological fervour and knowledge, which keeps the Naxalite insurgency from leaving the Red Corridor.    27 2.3  The Factious Nature Of Naxalism In Jharkhand And Bihar Along with lack of ideology, galvanization of Naxalism is further halted because of their nature to splinter and to faction into smaller groups. One can pose a counter argument to this by saying that the bulk of the Naxalite movements activities are committed by the Communist Party –Maoist (CPI-M), who came together as a merger between the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) in 2004, but this does not explain the existence of dozens of splinter groups and front groups. For example, in just Jharkhand and Bihar, Naxalite groups include: Communist Party of India-Marxist Leninist-Janashakti (CPI-ML-Janashakti) Tritiya Prastuti Committee (TPC) and the recently growing and active People's Liberation Front of India (PLFI). In addition to this, lack of unity is shown by the sheer fact that there is not one uniform name to identify this group of insurgents. They are often referred to as Maoists, Left Wing insurgents, Naxalites, members of the CPI (Maoist) or still even the PWG or MCC.   To give another example of the lack of national, or even global coordination of the Naxalite insurgency, we can turn to the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA). According to their last press release in 2011 (a product of their last conference), they concluded to “seize power where it is possible, develop ongoing people's wars to higher levels, prepare and initiate people's war where parties exist and build up parties where they don’t - this should be the working orientation of Maoist revolutionaries. It is a declared fact that CCOMPOSA has been formed to unite the Maoist revolutionaries of South Asia and fight Indian expansionist hegemony and imperialism in the region. Apart from accomplishing its responsibility in  28 this region, CCOMPOSA, as a part and parcel of the international communist movement, must discharge its internationalist duties to further the cause of world proletarian revolution. South Asia is ripe for new democratic revolution. They also called upon all Maoist forces in South Asia to join the CCOMPOSA and strengthen it and thus further advance in the common aim of making South Asia a blazing center of world revolution.” 36  This conference happened in 2011, and to date there has been no conference, nor have there been any announcements of an up and coming conference. There is a lot of talk about spreading the insurgency not just throughout India, but also in South Asia itself, however this has not been able to happen because of splinter groups who identify with a smaller group, rather than the larger ones, who have the ability to unite.  The interesting phenomena with the lack of unity also have to do with various factors in many regions of India, which make conditions conducive to an insurgency. Some common characteristics to Naxalite impacted areas are: widespread poverty, unemployment, lack of economic development, poor civil governance, existence of powerful traditional structures of exploitation and an underequipped police force. These conditions are not just applicable to Naxalite areas, but can be applied to many other regions of India, such as the Northeast and also the state of Punjab. Despite other regions having similar conditions conducive for a Naxalite insurgency, this has not happened in all the regions. Splinter groups and factionalism have halted the national unity and spread of Naxalism, and can be explained simply by the greed argument. Smaller splinter groups are able to fulfill their needs of greed rather than genuine grievances or ideological                                          36 COMMPOSA Press release Asia  29 beliefs. There appears to be no net benefit for the individual if an insurgency becomes galvanized.  Popular widespread and large-scale insurgencies of the past had the common feature of a charismatic leader, or a cult of personality. If we think about popular left wing insurgencies, names like Chairman Mao, Che Gueverra, Fidel Castro, Vladimir Lenin and Pol Pot come to mind. These leaders were able to create a cult of personality through their charisma and ability to mobilize masses. The Naxalite insurgency in Jharkhand and Bihar, or even India, for that matter, has not been able to produce a charismatic leader. Lack of unity and galvanization is also attributed to the lack of a figurehead who has been able to mobilize the masses.  With the lack of a charismatic leader comes the fact that the ideology itself has failed to attract the masses. When ideology is something that does not attract people, it deems difficult for even a charismatic leader to market. At best, and as exemplified in the Naxalite insurgency, ideological appeal is localized and remains as such. A major contributing factor to the lack of galvanization in the Naxalite insurgency is the individual and greed based, or opportunistic motivation to participate in the insurgency. The insurgency lacks galvanization because individuals have the capacity to reap more benefits in being an insurgent, than with regular civilian employment. When opportunities and economic gain show higher returns on investment for the individual, then there is less attention paid to ideology, which factors positively towards lack of galvanization. This lack of galvanization can be explained further by a theory in the study of collective action, called the tragedy of the commons.  According to this theory, collective action is often marred by individual self interests and defeats the collective  30 interest. Succinctly put by Elinor Ostrom, “what is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest"37 This theory also proposes that smaller groups also reap bigger benefits, so in application to the Naxalite insurgency, this rings true. Being a greed/opportunity-based insurgency, it is counter productive to galvanize.  The above being said, it is important to note that the Naxalite insurgency in Jharkhand and Bihar in current times is greed based, but is so because of deficiencies of the state. It should be noted that greed based insurgencies in this case are not to be looked at in a negative light, rather the bigger picture of possible state failure to deliver, has seemed to compel individuals to turn to Naxalism. All of the above being said, however, is not to say that there is no existence of a genuine grievance. Rather, those who are more interested in the opportunities it provides, over the very real case they have for a grievance commit the bulk of the violence. In this case, violence is used for personal gain, rather than coercion to believe an ideology, or mobilization for revolution. The next section will give some explanations as to why the insurgency has not been resolved, and will examine the role of the government in their mitigation of the conflict.                                                 37 Elinor Ostrom Governing The Commons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1990): 2  31  3. Why Hasn’t The Naxalite Insurgency Issue Been Resolved? The Naxalite insurgency has been taking place for over 50 years. According to some American counterinsurgency studies, an insurgency has an average life of approximately 10 to 15 years, peaking at 10 years, thus, making the Naxalite insurgency an outlier. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, insurgencies with lucrative initial resource endowments are prone to recruit opportunist soldiers who exploit their victims.  In addition to this, lootable natural resources enable rebel groups to be less vulnerable to the costs of fighting and generate higher returns on investment for fighting, forming a situation which is susceptible to longer wars. 38  3.1 Dirty Politics Often, the Naxalite insurgency has been referred to as a law and order problem. Until a decade ago, the government of India finally officially recognized it as a development related problem as well. The current policy for the Naxalite insurgency in Jharkhand and Bihar has been to use a two-pronged approach of security and development.   On the surface, what spectators of this issue are bombarded with, are stories and images of police brutality and government abandonment of the poor. Supporters and sympathizers of the Naxalite movement in Jharkhand and Bihar have the common complaint that the Naxalite insurgency is a problem because of government and corporations confiscating land from Tribal populations, leaving them without any means to fend for themselves. Another common accusation is that the caste system and social                                          38 Beardlsey, Kyle and McQuinn, Brian. “Rebel Groups as Predatory Organizations: The Political Effects of the 2004 Tsunami In Indonesia and Sri Lanka.”  (Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53 No. 4 2009): 627.   32 divisions, which leave the individuals identified as lower castes and the Tribals (they are distinctly different) in poor social conditions. It is often highlighted that the government has exploited the poor and their only way of dealing with them is to use brute police force. There has often been the complaint that the government lacks policies that can mitigate the grim situation. Despite active counter insurgency activities, involving immense government spending, this issue has not been resolved, and continues to be a serious issue for internal security in not just Jharkhand and Bihar, but also for the entire country. Contrary to popular belief, there have, in actuality, been opportunities for resolution of this conflict between the government and the Naxalites.  One major barrier to such conflict resolution is the fact that both Naxalite leadership and government functionaries fail to come to an agreement in fear that conceding will appear as failure. To further elaborate, by coming to a resolution or agreement, would often make one party look weaker, and thus delegitimize their importance; conceding gives the opposing party the upper hand. This is often the case for the Naxalite leaders, more so than the government. There is reluctance and hesitation to agree to any offers put on the table by the government because coming to a compromise is cause for the Naxalite leader to look powerless and defeated by the government. By keeping a conflict going and intentionally not coming to a resolution, Naxalite “negotiators” maintain a sense of legitimacy. In addition to this, they have constant fuel for the insurgency, by saying that the government is doing nothing to alleviate their struggles. Coming to a resolution would lead towards an end to the conflict, which is  33 something that is not something the Naxalites want because it will mean an end to the insurgency, and with it, the opportunities it provides insurgents. It is beneficial for both Naxalites and government functionaries to keep the insurgency alive in order to legitimate their work. Put simply, the Naxalite insurgency has not been resolved, because the main involved parties do not want a resolution. With respect to government functionaries’ vested interest in the continuation of the insurgency, the individuals who profit most are politicians, bureaucrats and various employees at the state level.  Surprisingly, the very politicians who advocate counter insurgency against the Naxalites are often the ones who benefit most from the insurgency, and who also work hand in hand with the Naxalites themselves. The CPI (Maoist) has been deemed a terrorist organization by the government of India, yet there are umpteen cases where government functionaries and politicians cooperate with and seek assistance from Naxalites in order to reap individual benefits; this is contrary because, in essence, it is opposing the law. According to some scholars, the relationship between Naxalite insurgency in Jharkhand and Bihar and crime is not mutually exclusive. Mainstream political parties reportedly depend on Naxalites to mobilize votes on their behalf during elections, in exchange for a subsequent suspension of counterinsurgency operations. Some, all too common reports in Jharkhand and Bihar go as far as to say that politicians use Naxalite insurgents as a means to eliminate rivals. 39                                          39 Prem Mahadevan. “The Maoist insurgency in India: between crime and revolution” (Small Wars & Insurgencies, 23 No. 2, 2012): 213.  34 Linkages with mainstream political parties not only have helped garner votes for politicians, but they have also helped the Naxalites grow. For example, in a state like Bihar, caste is a major factor in political mobilization, and its impact has been visible in the mobilization of Naxalite groups in that state. The CPI (Maoist) has officially declared that the continuance of the powers of the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) Party was against their interests, but, in the same breath, they admitted that the Naxalites and the RJD share the same social base. It has also been reported that Laloo Prasad Yadav, the party leader had attempted to bribe Naxalite cadres and activists by providing government contracts and projects. 40 Politician Naxalite cooperation is also very apparent in Jharkhand. According to one estimate, the Naxalites have the capacity to influence elections in approximately 54 of the 81 assembly constituencies. Naxalite groups often use their influence to consolidate support for candidates or political formations that would make things easier for Naxalite operations after the elections. Supporting evidence for Naxalite clout and influence in political matters is the high voter turnout (ranging from 49-60 percent) in Naxalite affected areas in Jharkhand and Bihar.41 The conspiring with Naxalites does not end with just the politicians; rather, it extends to government functionaries as well. There are numerous cases where district officers in Jharkhand and Bihar regularly collect bribes in order to not make available, the benefits of various government policies. The inverse of this also occurs. There is considerable evidence that suggests that the Naxalites claim a large cut in government                                          40 PV Ramana.  ed. The Naxal Challenge: Causes Linkages and Policy Options. (New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley, 2008): 75 41 PV Ramana.  ed. The Naxal Challenge: Causes Linkages and Policy Options. (New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley, 2008): 75  35 expenditure through imposing their “levies” on government projects in their areas of dominance. According to various media reports, the Naxalites use the threat of violence to collect the levies, which has resulted in many government officials not reporting to their offices, in fear of the threats. 42  3.2 Corruption And Gaps In Implementation Monitoring Just from the above few examples, it can be well understood that the states of Jharkhand and Bihar are highly corrupt. In fact, they rank as the highest corrupt states in the country, and have gone so far as being named “Bimaru” (translation: sickly, in terms of corruption, poverty and development) states by current Prime Minister Narendra Modi.  At first glance, one could blame the plight of insurgency on the lack of policies, but this is not the case. There are numerous polices in place that not only deal with the security aspect of the insurgency, but also deal with the development aspect. The number of policies to combat Naxalism is astounding, yet has been greatly ineffective in dealing with the insurgency, not because of their nature, but because of the gaps in implementation.  With respect to development policies just to do with left wing extremism, here is a list of them: Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), used for the construction of rural roads; Forest Rights Act 2006, Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), which guarantees 100 days of employment; the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana, which is responsible for rural electrification; the Integrated Child Development Services Program, to address malnutrition among children;                                          42 ibid  36 the National Rural Drinking Water Supply Program; the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (universal elementary education) and lastly, but not ending with, the Indira Awaas Yojana (rural housing) policy. These above policies are currently available and are being pursued to address the issues of poor development in Jharkhand and Bihar, in order to combat Naxalites endeavour to recruit insurgents. 43   In addition to development policies, there are various security related policies to combat Naxalism in Jharkhand and Bihar. At the outset, it should be noted that the costs incurred for these policies are reimbursed to the state government at 100 percent. Some security related policies are the Security Related Expenditure Scheme, which includes insurance, training and funding for operational needs of security forces. This policy also assists in the rehabilitation of surrendered Naxalite cadres, and also in counterinsurgency publicity. 44  The special infrastructure scheme is a policy which has dedicated 500 crore rupees (approximately 80 million USD) to cater to critical infrastructure gaps which cannot be covered in existing schemes. This policy assists in the mobility requirements of security forces through building roads, tracks in inaccessible area, secure camping grounds, helipads, and ungraded weaponry and equipment training. 45 In addition, there is the Central Scheme Assistance to victims, which provides 3 lakh rupees (approximately $4600 USD) to any family who last lost a member due to Naxalism, and one lakh rupee to any family who has been adversely affected by Naxalism.                                           43 Chakrabarty, Bidyut. “Maoism, a Recalcitrant Citizenry and Counterinsurgency Measures in India.”(Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 1 No.3 2014): 309.  44 45  37 Lastly, there is the Naxal Surrender and Rehabilitation policy which encourages a Naxalite insurgent to surrender and leave the activities of the insurgency. The surrender and rehabilitation package includes an “immediate grans of 2.5 lakh rupees (approximately $3800 USD) for higher ranked cadres and 1.5 lakh rupees (approximately $2300 USD) for lower ranking cadres to cadres who surrender before the state government concerned. Also, these surrendered individuals would be provided a monthly stipend of 4000 rupees (approximately $61 USD) for a period of three years for vocational training. In addition, incentives for surrender of weapons/ ammunition etc. are also provided under the said Scheme.”46 As we can see above, there are numerous, good policies in place to combat the problem of the Naxalite insurgency, yet there has been no resolution. The lack of the resolution of the insurgency also, has much to do with the gaps in the implementation phase of the policy. It is evident that there is funding available, and also government commitment available, but the policies are not getting results because of poor implementation and monitoring by the central government.  One example of an implementation gap is to do with the MGNREGA policy, which is to provide 100 days of works to citizens. The MGNREGA policy was most applicable in the states of Jharkhand and Bihar, and is also known to be the government policy, which was plagued with the most corruption. What has been happening with the MGNREGA is that states take the funds allocated for the policy, but do not trickle down the money to citizens. This is done either by not making work available, or by not announcing that such policies exist. In a significant number of villages in Jharkhand and                                          46 Naxal Surrender Policy : Ministry of Home Affairs (Government of India)  38 Bihar, people are not aware of the MGNREGA, and those who are aware, are not able to collect the full amount given to them as officials skim off their pay with the excuse of taxes. Certain studies have shown that the money earned from the MGNREGA is just barely enough to buy food, but nothing else. This is reality, should not be the case, but is, because government officials responsible for the dispensation of funds, take their own “fees”.47 Related to unawareness of the MGNREGA is also the fact that many potential recipients of the benefits do not know that the benefits are available to everyone. Rather most of them have the idea that the works undertaken in MGNREGA are to be selected by the district authorities, and the village leadership is supposed to implement the orders of the district officials. Further, unawareness about the process involved in job application for the 100 days work was also rampant.48 With respect to corruption and poor monitoring and implementation, often, financial documents are altered in order to change numbers, which allows for government officials (often hand in glove with Naxalites) to steal money which has been allocated for development. For example, an office memorandum from the Ministry of Home affairs regarding the processing of grants in Aid/Miscellaneous Sanctions clearly stated that there was document alteration occurring. They stated in their memo, the following:  “Quite often, mistakes like mismatch in amount, payee name, place of pay order (i.e. branch of Bank), amount in words and figure mentioned either incorrectly or incompletely have been noticed. At times correction fluid is used in the sanctions apart                                          47 Banerjee, Kaustav. “The NREGA, the Maoists and the Developmental Woes of the Indian State” (Economic and Political Weekly, 45, No. 28 2010): 44. 48 Banerjee, Kaustav. “The NREGA, the Maoists and the Developmental Woes of the Indian State” (Economic and Political Weekly, 45, No. 28 2010): 44.  39 from unacceptable overwriting. It is also observed that some sanctions are without blue ink attestation of the authorized signatory. These should be avoided.”49       Lastly, another implementation and monitoring gap with policy is the fact that in many cases, the funds and policy allotted for development and security remain unused. Funds for welfare schemes not only fail to trickle down to the poor sections of society, but it has been seen in Bihar, that funds are returned to the centre. 50This is strong                                          49 “LWE Special Infrastructure Scheme” Ministry of Home Affairs (Government of India) 50 Shivpriya, Sitesh. Naxalism: A Challenge In Bihar. (New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2012): 112. Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act-Statistics for the State of BiharYear Available Funds Expenditure of FundsPercentage of ExpenditurePercentage of Households who Completed 100 days employmentAverage Number of Days of Work Per Household2009-2010 2358.2 1816.88 77.04% 7% 282010-2011 2012.22 660.99 32.85% 6% 342011-2012 1762.32 559.41 31.74% 6% 332012-2013 1912.47 1242.08 64.95% 4.01% 422013-2014 2306.9 1889.57 81.91% 8.64% 382014-2015 1297.4 881.78 67.97% 2.36% 32Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act-Statistics for the State of JharkhandYear Available Funds Expenditure of FundsPercentage of ExpenditurePercentage of Households who Completed 100 days employmentAverage Number of Days of Work Per Household2009-2010 1924.52 1379.7 71.69% 8% 492010-2011 1311.41 770.12 58.72% 7% 422011-2012 1310.93 724.53 55.27% 2.00% 322012-2013 1021.49 705.51 69.07% 1.56% 312013-2014 985.94 907.56 92.05% 6.11% 382014-2015 687.9 684.75 99.54% 3.71% 34Note: Funds listed in Crores of RupeesFigure 5 MGNREGA Statistics Jharkhand & Bihar 2009-2015 (data obtained from  40 evidence for poor monitoring and implementation, rather than blaming the government for not caring enough to provide for development. If funds are returned to the center, even though it is so obvious that they are needed, it means that officials and Naxalites pilfer the money, but none of it gets used for its intended purpose.  The same thing can be said about the poor performance of the Naxal Surrender Policy in Jharkhand and Bihar. Rather than surrendering, Naxalite leaders are more inclined to join hands with politicians and keep some of the funds, instead of surrendering. Also, it is a very real possibility that there are gaps in disseminating information about the existence of the policy itself.    3.3 Problems In Policing   Security forces and police play a crucial role in the Naxalite insurgency. Countless numbers of security personnel have been lost in this insurgency, and the number continues to remain somewhat constant. Often, observers of the Naxalite insurgency hear of police brutality and human rights offenses. There are numerous                                                                                                                           State2009 Surrenders2010 Surrenders2011 Surrenders2012 Surrenders2013 Surrenders2014 Surrenders2015 SurrendersAndhra Pradesh 40 66 88 244 86 130 112Bihar 15 2 23 75 3 0 0Chattisgarh 2 2 10 26 23 385 82Jharkhand 0 18 15 8 19 11 9Maharashtra 8 10 22 8 30 21 11Odisha 8 43 50 32 1787 94 103Figure 6 Naxalite Surrender Statistics (data obtained on  41 reports published by Human Rights Watch, which denote the violence protracted by security personnel on the insurgents.  A major contributing factor to the lack of resolution of the insurgency has to do with policing related core- to periphery gaps in implementation. Often what has been found to be the case in counterinsurgency operations in Jharkhand and Bihar is that Central Reserve Police Force will be brought into the state to conduct operations on special task forces. One would imagine that such focussed task forces would be successful in their operations, but they end up unsuccessful due to lack of cooperation of local police. Central police forces need the cooperation of local police forces because of their know how of local terrain and culture, but often cooperation is failed. Often, local level police do not cooperate with central police agencies either due to the fact that they are taking bribes from local Naxalites, or because they have a very low morale and are unmotivated to do their jobs.  Being posted to Naxalite affected areas in Jharkhand and Bihar are extremely dangerous and often unrewarding. One police officer posted in Naxal affected area states the following:” the police force is neither technically or morally strong enough to take on the Naxalites. We are not empowered to open fire on the Naxals on our own; we can only open fire on the grounds of private defense. Police intelligence is a total failure. Therefore, most of the arrests made by the police are false and fabricated. Police force goes for a combining operation just for namesake. It is just a farce because unless and until they (Naxals) open fire at us, we (Police) can’t fire. No one understands. They are armed with automatic weapons and if we wait until they fire on us then they can shoot 30  42 people at one go. This is the reason whenever there us a combining operation; we just go, move around and come back.”51 It is a reality that policemen consider stints in a Naxalite affected areas to be punishment postings, which causes drawbacks such as corrupt practices and demotivation amongst police personnel. One police officer, posted to a Naxalite affected area, very candidly spoke about this lack of motivation by stating, “ why should I take extra care and risk my life while the state government is not keen on solving the problem? Instead I will prefer to wait for my three years to be completed so that I will be transferred to a better place”. 52 If being posted to a Naxalite affected area is looked upon as a punishment posting, then it is hardly expected that morale will be high enough to effectively police the area. In addition to lack of motivation, there is lack of up to date equipment, weaponry and training provided to local police forces that have been posted to Naxalite affected areas. Although as mentioned above, there are polices and funding recently released to enhance local police forces, it remains to be seen whether these funds are properly used.  Currently, Jharkhand and Bihar do not match the national average of 142 police personnel assigned per 100,000 of population. In Jharkhand, there are 174 personnel per 100,000 of the population while in Bihar, this number is only 77. At first, these numbers do not seem to point towards a similar conclusion, but when scrutinized, they can be explained simply. The excess of police personnel does not mean effective policing in                                          51 Bidyut Chakrabarty. Maoism in India: Reincarnation of Ultra-Left Wing Extremism in the Twenty First Century. (New York: Routledge, 2010): 184. 52 Bidyut Chakrabarty. Maoism in India: Reincarnation of Ultra-Left Wing Extremism in the Twenty First Century. (New York: Routledge, 2010): 184.  43 Jharkhand, rather the extreme danger, and lack of sufficient equipment and training can contribute to ineffectiveness. The lack of police personnel in Bihar can stress the need for more personnel, and explain being overburdened and unmotivated to work. In addition to this, not only is the number of police personnel problematic in Jharkhand and Bihar, but there is a lack of infrastructure for them. The Ministry of home affairs report on funds released with respect to fortified police stations shows that Jharkhand and Bihar have been allocated the highest number of police stations. These numbers are slightly misleading because they also show that they have the highest number of police stations, which are still under progress in terms of completion. When looking at the costs of funding, another concerning factor is that the amount of funding has significantly decreased in the year 2014, as compared to previous years. 53 In tune with this, is the fact that in the annual police budget, there are numbers missing for the years 2014-2016 in the demands for grants section for funding towards left wing insurgency infrastructure. 54                                             53 “Fortified Police Stations and State Wide Funds Released” Ministry of Home Affairs (Government of India) 54 “2014 Police Demands for Grants in Annual Budget” Ministry of Home Affairs (Government of India)   44   3.4 The Center And The States Playing A Blame Game It is quite clear that counterinsurgency strategies are not working as effectively as they should. To date, the security counterinsurgency operations are looked upon as rife with human rights violations, corruption and low morale. There is distrust towards the police and government, which seems, is recognized to be a potential problem for the government.   Currently, there has been rigorous advertising of government policies in terms of what they claim to be doing for the poor, and in this case, what measures are being taken to solve the Naxalite problem. For example, in the summer of 2015, Prime Minister Modi announced a release of funds for a policy to do with psychological operations with the Naxalite insurgency. Naming the initiative “Nukkad Natak” (street corner drama), the purpose is to provide funding for Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (Live Art and State Number of Police StationsNumber of Police Stations CompletedNumber of Police Stations in Progress2010-2011 Funding2011-2012 Funding2012-2013 Funding2013-2014 Funding2014-2015 FundingAndhra Pradesh 16 5 11 0.8 8 0 0 14.4Telengana 24 9 15 1.2 12 0 0 21.6Bihar 85 31 51 2 44.75 51.625 26.426 0Chattisgarh 75 17 57 2 39.25 0 33.95 20.55Jharkhand 75 42 33 2 5.6 39.375 16.875 19.4Madhya Pradesh 12 10 2 1 5.5 6.3 6.3 0Maharashtra 10 4 6 0 37.5 0 0 10.5Odisha 70 38 32 1 37.5 30.25 30.25 0Uttar Pradesh 15 0 15 0 8.25 0 0 12.55West Bengal 18 16 2 0 9.9 5.85 5.85 0Note: Funds are in Crores of RupeesFigure 7 Police Station Expenditures in Naxalite Areas (data obtained from  45 Culture for Rural India Division) to produce dramas, film and television programs and songs that discuss the evils of Naxalism.   In addition to aggressive marketing of Nukkad Natak, there is always talk about the MGNREGA (at the national level) and how funds have been released for the further implementation of these policies.  What is most interesting about such vigorous marketing of these various policies is the fact that in comparison to previous years, the amount of funding is actually significantly less. It seems that the current government is talking and marketing more, but actually spending less than in previous years. For example, with respect to the policies and funding for the Naxal Affected Areas budget of the Ministry of Information of Broadcasting, the budget in 2013-2014 was 277 crore rupees (approximately 428 million USD). In the 2014-2015 fiscal year, this number was reduced to approximately 10 crore rupees (approximately 1.5 million USD). The current 2015-2016 budget is merely 3 crore rupees (approximately $463,000 USD).  This same pattern can also be seen with the budgets related to the Ministry of Tribal Development. In the 2012-2013 fiscal year, the budget was 61,110 crore rupees (approximately 9.5 billion USD), while the current 2015-2016 budget is 7490 crore rupees (approximately 1.1 billion USD). (See Figure 8) The point to take with this information is that is exemplifies major core to periphery gaps, and major gaps in policy. This leads to the Naxalite insurgency not nearing any resolution because the government is busy marketing their policies to show legitimacy and a façade of success, when in fact, funding has been reduced. The intention  46 goes from actual concern to combatting the insurgency, to performing speech acts to save face and appear to be in control.  Although many make the valid argument that increased funding only exacerbates the insurgency problem because it only provides funding for large scale corruption, it is still dishonest to appear to be doing more towards the insurgency, when in fact you are still using less money.   Figure 8 Expenditures for Development Policies to Combat Naxalism: 2008-2016 (data obtained from  3.5 Potential Solutions Through the information collected in this study, all potential solutions are rooted in the problem of poor monitoring and implementation of policies. There is a major disconnect between the central and state governments. Released funds are often siphoned off, or remain unused. What needs to be done is to effectively monitor corruption by making all cash transfers to their recipients via electronic banking.  Fiscal YearMinistry of Information and Broadcasting Rural Art and CultureMinistry of Tribal AffairsMinistry of Rural Development2008-2009 4 731.66 56883.542009-2010 600 lakh rupees 819.61 51706.952010-2011 627 lakh rupees 1213.87 66137.862011-2012 600 lakh rupees 1430.00 87800.002012-2013 8 1573.00 76376.00 2013-2014 800  lakh rupees 1762.00 80194.00Revised 2013-2014 no information 1731.86 61810.002014-2015 8 925.16 7502.312015-2016 3 1038.65 7490.00Note: All figures are in crore rupees, except the ones denoted in lakh rupees 47  Recently, the Modi government has claimed their success in getting a record-breaking number of rural and poor citizens to open bank accounts. This was a problem in the past because a majority of Indians did not have bank accounts and kept cash stores in their homes. In addition to this, the adhaar card, which is an electronic identification system, similar to a social insurance card (Canada) has also seen a rise in issuances since the Modi government has come to power. In order to make development policy related government transfers and payments be transferred directly to beneficiaries, a system of linking the adhaar card to bank accounts should be put in place in order to avoid corruption.   In addition to this, the central government should more rigorously advertise their various policies at the village level. For example, the Nukkad Natak is a start, but more can be done via national radio, and television. Posters about available policies to curb poverty should be seen at the village level.   Effective policing can also be a way to combat the insurgency. As described above, police posted to Naxal affected areas lack morale and motivation. Some reports have even gone as far as to say, you can find police playing football in open fields that surround Naxalite areas. In order to boost morale and have police willingly engage in a campaign of winning hearts and minds through engagement with Naxalites, it is important to compensate them sufficiently. A raise in benefits, better equipment, and abolishment of the idea of Naxalite area postings to be a punishment posting need to be present in order to have even a chance at boosting morale.  Lastly, another way in which a resolution to the Naxalite insurgency can be achieved is through adhering to the rule of law. There are many instances where former  48 Naxalites have joined politics and are given governing responsibilities. It seems an extremely dangerous practice in assigning a former Naxalite such duties, when they have in fact disobeyed the law, and have killed people. How is there trust and accountability to be expected of former insurgents? By allowing them to turn into politicians, the cycle repeats itself, and will not see any resolution.   There is not just a disconnect between the core and periphery in the sense that the periphery do not use their funding efficiently, but this disconnect can be equally blamed on the core, for not putting strict monitoring institutions in place. This disconnect is a very big problem, but what is an even bigger problem is the fact that both the core and periphery are spending time and energy blaming each other for a disconnect, rather than actually working out the inefficiencies. By blaming the periphery, the core dodges taking responsibility for the grave security situation, making it a state-related problem, rather than a national problem.             49 Conclusion: The Naxalite insurgency has been a major problem for India, but it has been made to look like a problem, which needs to be fixed at the state level rather than at the national level. By not exposing the Naxalite insurgency as a problem in mainstream national media, this low level insurgency is pushed under the rug in order for the national government to appear legitimate and in control of the chaotic state.   The Naxalite insurgency has been in Jharkhand and Bihar for over 50 years and shows no signs of relenting in the near future because significant evidence points to the fact that there is too much profit and opportunity to be reaped in keeping this insurgency alive.   This can be further evidenced by the fact that the insurgency has remained confined to the Red Corridor and has not galvanized the rest of India. Galvanizing the insurgency would mean a reduction in opportunity and profits for the insurgents and their friends who are also government functionaries. Due to the profit and greed based incentives in being part of the Naxalite insurgency, a once- ideology based movement has moved far from ideology and its principles of armed revolution. The insurgency has not seen any resolution because even the government and its functionaries profit from keeping the movement alive. Politicians can garner votes through Naxalite muscle, and low-level bureaucrats serve to keep their pockets warm through keeping mum about the many policies that the government has put in place.   When asked about the Naxalite situation in Jharkhand, a journalist by the name of Haribans Sharma was pessimistic about any type of resolution. He aptly described the situation akin to a spider web, so full of intricacies and details that any type of resolution  50 is merely an ideal, but far from reality. The intricacies are endless in this particular insurgency, but if there is greater effort towards monitoring the implementation of government benefits, there may be a chance to improve.                      51 Bibliography Alagappa, Mutiah, ed. Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.   Banerjee, Gautam. Reign of the Red Rebellion: Observations from Naxal Land. Atlanta: Lancer Publications, 2013.  Banerjee, Kaustav. “The NREGA, the Maoists and the Developmental Woes of the Indian State” Economic and Political Weekly, 45, No. 28 (2010): 42-49.  Banerjee, Sumanta. “The	  Maoists,	  Elections,	  Boycotts	  and	  Violence”	  Economic	  and	  Political	  Weekly,	  44,	  No.	  18	  (2009):	  8-­‐10.	   Banerjee, Sumanta. “Reflections of a one-time Maoist activist.” Dialectical Anthropology, 33, No.3  (2009): 253-269.  Banerjee, Suparna “The Curious Case of Recruitment In Naxalism” Swarajya Magazine, August 1, 2015. Retrieved August 2, 2015  Beardlsey, Kyle and McQuinn, Brian. “Rebel Groups as Predatory Organizations: The Political Effects of the 2004 Tsunami In Indonesia and Sri Lanka.”  Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53 No. 4 (2009): 624-645.  Beckett, Ian F. W. Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerillas and their Opponents since 1750. London: Routledge, 2001.  Caballero-Anthony, Mely, and Ralf Emmers. 2006. "The Dynamics of Securitization in Asia." In Studying Non-Traditional Security in Asia:  Issues and Trends, ed. R. Emmers, M. Caballero-Anthony and A. Acharya. Singapore: Marshall-Cavendish Academic.   CCOMPOSA- The Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and the Organizations of South Asia Retrieved July 15, 2015  Chakrabarty, Bidyut. Maoism in India: Reincarnation of Ultra-Left Wing Extremism in the Twenty First Century. New York: Routledge, 2010.  Chakrabarty, Bidyut. “Maoism, a Recalcitrant Citizenry and Counterinsurgency Measures in India.” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 1 No.3 (2014) 289-317.  Chakravarty, Sudeep. Red Sun: Travels in Naxalite Country. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2008.   52 Chatterjee, Mohua “Interview With CPI (Maoist) General Secretary Comrade Ganpathy- The Times of India, August 9, 2015.   Chenoy, Anuradha and Chenoy, Kamal. Maoist and Other Armed Conflicts. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2010.  Chitralekha.  “Committed, Opportunists and Drifters’: Revisiting the Naxalite narrative in Jharkhand and Bihar.” Contributions to Indian Sociology, 44, No. 3 (2010): 299-329.  Connable, Ben and Libicki, Martin C. How Insurgencies End. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010.   Collins, Alan. Contemporary Security Studies. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.  Dasgupta, Biplab. “Naxalite Armed Struggles and the Annihilation Campaign in Rural Areas” Economic and Political Weekly, 8, No. 4 (1973): 173-175.  Gayer, Laurent and Jaffrelot, Chrisophe, ed. Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists. London: Hurst and Company, 2009.  Graham, George. “People's War? Self-Interest, Coercion and Ideology in Nepal's Maoist Insurgency.” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 18 No.2 (2007): 231-248. 	  Harriss,	  John.	  “What	  is	  Going	  on	  In	  India’s	  Red	  Corridor?”	  Pacific	  Affairs,	  84,	  No.	  2,	  (2011):	  309-­‐327.	   Kujur, Rajat Kumar. “From CRZ to SEZ: Naxal Reins of Terror” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies No 2271 (2007): 1-2. Retrieved June 20, 2015  Kunnath, George. J. “Becoming a Naxalite in rural Bihar: Class Struggle and its Contradictions” The Journal of Peasant Studies, 33, No.1, (2006): 89-123.  Mahadevan, Prem. “The Maoist insurgency in India: between crime and revolution” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 23 No. 2, (2012):  203-220.  Mohanty, Manoranjan. “Challenges of Revolutionary Violence: The Naxalite Movement in Perspective” Economic	  and	  Political	  Weekly,	  41,	  No.	  29	  (2006):	  3163-­‐3168.	   Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (India) Retrieved September 10, 2015.   Ministry of Home Affairs Left Wing Extremism Division (India) Retrieved September 10, 2015.   53 Ministry of Rural Rural Development India Retrieved September 10, 2015.  Ministry of Finance (India) Retrieved September 10, 2015.  Mukherji, Nirmalangshu. The Maoists in India: Tribals Under Seige. London: Pluto Press, 2012.  Nayak, Girdhari. Neo- Naxal Challenge: Issues and Options. New Delhi: Pentagon Security International, 2011.  Ostrom, Elinor.  Governing The Commons Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1990  Porch, Douglas. Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.  Raghavan, V.R, ed. The Naxal Threat: Causes, State Responses and Consequences. New Delhi: Vij Books, 2011  Ramana, P.V. “A Critical Evaluation of the Union Government's Response to the Maoist Challenge.” Strategic Analysis, 33, No.5 (2009): 745-759  Ramana, P.V. ed. The Naxal Challenge: Causes Linkages and Policy Options. New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley, 2008.  Shah, Alpa. “Markets of Protection The ‘Terrorist’ Maoist Movement and the State in Jharkhand, India” Critique of Anthropology, 26 No. 3 (2006): 297- 314.  Shah, Alpa. In the Shadows of the State: Indigenous Politics, Environmentalism and Insurgency in Jharkhand, India. London: Duke University Press, 2010.  Shivpriya, Sitesh. Naxalism: A Challenge In Bihar. New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2012.  Singh, Manoj and Chaudhary, S.K. Maoist Guerilla: Seeing Red. New Delhi: Surendra Publications, 2010.  Shah, Alpa. “Morality, Corruption and the State: Insights from Jharkhand, Eastern India.” The Journal of Development Studies, 45, No. 3, (2009): 295-313.  Shah, Alpa “The Intimacy of Insurgency: Beyond Coercion, Greed or Grievance in Maoist India.” Economy and Society, 42, No. 3, (2013): 480-506.  South Asian Terrorism Portal Retrieved September 10, 2015.   54 Staniland, Paul. “Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources and Rebellion in South Asia” International Security, 37, No. 1 (2012):142–177.  Suykens, Bert.” Maoist Martyrs: Remembering the Revolution and Its Heroes in Naxalite Propaganda (India).” Terrorism and Political Violence, 22, No. 3, (2010): 378-393.  The Hindustan Times (New Delhi, Ranchi and Patna)  “The Naxal Problem : Understanding the Issues, Challenges and Alternative Approaches.” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, March 2012.  The Times of India (Mumbai) 	  Walz, Kenneth. Man The State and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.  Weber, Max. Essays in Sociology. New York : Oxford University Press, 1946.   


Citation Scheme:


Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics



Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            async >
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:


Related Items