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The social origins of state capacity : civil society, political order and public goods in France (1789-1970)… Goenaga Orrego, Agustín Alonso 2015

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THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF STATE CAPACITY: CIVIL SOCIETY, POLITICAL ORDER AND PUBLIC GOODS IN FRANCE (1789-1970) AND MEXICO (1810-1970)  by  Agustín Alonso Goenaga Orrego   A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Political Science)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  August 2015  © Agustín Alonso Goenaga Orrego, 2015 ii   Abstract  States are expected to raise revenue through taxation, provide security, enforce rights, deliver public services, and build infrastructure. However, contemporary states vary in their ability to perform these tasks. In order to explain variation, I conceptualize state capacity as the ability of the state to coordinate large-scale collective action. I then argue that variation in state capacity is the result of alternative, multi-level and path-dependent solutions that societies adopt to establish political order. At the micro-level, the strategies that individuals use to collectively make demands on political authorities define the ways in which rulers try to remain in power and maintain stability. This in turn determines, at the macro-level, the ability of those authorities to perform other complex coordination tasks associated with collecting taxes, providing security, and delivering public goods and services. The dissertation tests this theory of political development through a comparative historical analysis of France (1789-1970) and Mexico (1810-1970). During the 1920s and 1930s, the political incorporation of the popular classes—workers, peasants, and lower middle classes—meant that the state had to obtain the support of a greater percentage of the people to maintain order. As a result, these states had to expand the size and scope of their activities and thus to coordinate collective action at a much larger scale than before. Their success or failure in facing those challenges can be traced back to the types of organizations that the popular classes adopted to interact with the state before and during the period of incorporation. In France, these groups mobilized through autonomous, impersonal and internally democratic organizations that demanded public goods, monitored authorities, and resisted the capture of the state by private interests. In Mexico, the popular classes were incorporated through personalistic and hierarchical iii   organizations that interacted with the state as subordinate clients demanding rents and privileges. Even though both patterns of incorporation were effective in maintaining order during the 20th century, they had opposite effects on the long-term ability of these states to coordinate other forms of large-scale collective action, such as those posed by the requirements of taxation and public goods provision. iv   Preface  This dissertation is an original intellectual product of the author, Agustín Alonso Goenaga Orrego. None of this material has been published elsewhere. The research project did not require approval from UBC’s Research Ethics Boards.  v   Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ii	  Preface ........................................................................................................................................... iv	  Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................... v	  List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. viii	  List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... ix	  List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... x	  Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... xi	  Dedication ................................................................................................................................... xiii	  Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1	  1.1	   Case Selection: Revolutions, Popular Incorporation and the Evolution of Public Goods in France and Mexico .............................................................................................................. 8	  1.2	   Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 12	  1.3	   Argument: The Organizational Structure of Civil Society, Political Order, and State-Supplied Public Goods .......................................................................................................... 36	  1.4	   Explaining the trajectories of state capacity in France (1789-1970) and Mexico (1810-1970) ..................................................................................................................................... 44	  1.5	   Research Design and Plan of the Dissertation ............................................................. 48	  Chapter 2:  Critical Juncture:  Popular Incorporation,  the Social State  and  State Capacity  ...................................................................................................................................... 53	  2.1	   Introduction .................................................................................................................. 53	  2.2	   Measurement Challenges in the Study of State Capacity ............................................ 57	  2.3	   Conceptualizing State Capacity as Public Goods Provision ........................................ 66	  vi   2.4	   Operationalizing State Capacity as Public Goods Provision ....................................... 71	  2.5	   Critical Juncture: Popular Incorporation and the Social State ..................................... 74	  2.6	   War, Commodity Booms, and State Capacity in France and Mexico ......................... 97	  2.7	   Conclusion: The Puzzle of French and Mexican Political Development .................. 106	  Chapter 3: An Organizational Theory of Political Development ......................................... 109	  3.1	   Introduction ................................................................................................................ 109	  3.2	   Explaining the Effects of Exogenous Shocks: Strategies of Political Order ............. 111	  3.3	   Explaining Strategies of Political Order:  The Organizational Structure of Civil Society ................................................................................................................................. 122	  3.4	   Explaining the Transition from Spoils Systems to Social Contracts: The Transformation of Social Relationships .............................................................................. 143	  3.5	   Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 147	  Chapter 4: The Atlantic Revolutions and the Structural Transformation of Organizational Life .............................................................................................................................................. 151	  4.1	   Introduction ................................................................................................................ 151	  4.2	   France: Revolution and the Emergence of National Popular Movements ................. 154	  4.3	   Mexico: Independence and Parochial Political Organizations .................................. 201	  4.4	   Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 240	  Chapter 5: Organizational Structure, Popular Incorporation and Political Order ........... 245	  5.1	   Introduction ................................................................................................................ 245	  5.2	   France: Organizational Change and Political Instability ........................................... 250	  5.3	   Mexico: Lack of Resources and Political Instability ................................................. 301	  vii   5.4	   Conclusion: Explaining Transitions between Political Systems: Formal Institutions or Organizational Resources ................................................................................................... 338	  Chapter 6: Building the Social State: A Multi-Level Collective Action Problem ............... 342	  6.1	   Introduction ................................................................................................................ 342	  6.2	   State-Supplied Public Goods as a Multi-Level Collective Action Problem .............. 348	  6.3	   France: Civil Society, State Autonomy and Public Goods Provision ........................ 352	  6.4	   Mexico: Clientelism, Corporatism and the Distribution of Private Goods ................ 375	  6.5	   Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 407	  Chapter 7: Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 411	  7.1	   Summary of the Dissertation and Findings ................................................................ 412	  7.2	   Empirical Findings ..................................................................................................... 419	  7.3	   Beyond France and Mexico: Generalizability ........................................................... 422	  7.4	   Capitalism, Democracy and Development ................................................................ 433	  Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 436	  Appendix A ................................................................................................................................ 454	   viii   List of Tables Table 1.1 Causal logic of the Organizational Theory of Political Development .......................... 43	  Table 1.2 Trajectories of state capacity in France and Mexico .................................................... 45	  Table 2.1 Components of the index of state-supplied public goods ............................................. 72	  Table 2.2 Theoretical expectations of Bellicist and Natural Resource Curse theories at the critical juncture ......................................................................................................................................... 98	  Table 2.3 Growth rates in good and bad years, France and Mexico (1936-1970) ...................... 104	  Table 3.1 Types of stable states: strategies of political order as multiple equilibria .................. 113	  Table 3.2 Expected effects of exogenous shocks on different political systems ........................ 119	  Table 3.3 Systemic dynamics of political order and private goods ............................................ 137	  Table 3.4 Systemic dynamics of political order and public goods ............................................. 138	  Table 3.5 Causal logic of the Organizational Theory of Political Development ........................ 148	  Table 3.6 Trajectories of state capacity in France and Mexico .................................................. 149	  Table 5.1 Observable implications of impersonal organizations ................................................ 251	  Table 5.2 Transformation of the logic of political order in France ............................................ 269	  Table 5.3 Causal logic and observable implications of alternative explanations for the successful transition into a social contract ................................................................................................... 289	  Table 5.4 Perpetuation of the logic of political order in Mexico ................................................ 316	  Table 5.5 Causal logic and observable implications of alternative explanations for a failed transition into a social contract ................................................................................................... 327	  Table 7.1 Tax ratios for Western European and Latin American countries (1990 and 2000-2012) ..................................................................................................................................................... 423	   ix   List of Figures  Figure 2.1 Evolution of state-supplied public goods in France (1875-1970) and Mexico (1925-1970) ............................................................................................................................................. 82	  Figure 2.2 Index of state-supplied public goods in  France  (1875-1970)  and Mexico  (1836-1970) ............................................................................................................................................. 83	   x   List of Abbreviations  AFL, American Federation of Labour ARD, Alliance Républicaine Démocratique CANACINTRA, Cámara Nacional de la Industria de la Transformación CFTC, Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens CGOCM, Confederación General de Obreros y Campesinos Mexicanos CGT, Confédération Générale du Travail CGTU, Confédération Général du Travail Unitaire CNC, Confederación Nacional Campesina CNOP, Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares CONCAMIN, Confederación de Cámaras de Industriales CONCANACO, Confederación de Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio COPARMEX, Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana CROM, Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana CTM, Confederación de Trabajadores de México ENA, École Nationale d’Administration FNC, Ferrocarriles Nacionales de México FNMF, Fédération Nationale de la Mutualité Française FNSP, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques FR, Fédération Républicaine IMSS, Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social ISIM, Impuesto sobre Ingresos Mercantiles ISSSTE, Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales para Trabajadores del Estado  NAFINSA, Nacional Financiera NRC, Natural Resource Curse PCF, Parti Communiste Français PCM, Partido Comunista Mexicano PLC, Partido Liberal Constitucionalista PLM, Partido Laborista Mexicano PNA, Partido Nacional Agrarista PNR, Partido Nacional Revolucionario PR, Parti Radical PRI, Partido Revolucionario Institucional PRM, Partido de la Revolución Mexicana SFIO, Séction Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière SOEs, State-Owned Enterprises UCSAF, Union Céntrale des Syndicats des Agriculteurs UIMM, Union des Industries Métallurgiques et Minières WWI, World War I WWII, World War II xi   Acknowledgements  This project would not have been possible without the support, encouragement, and guidance of a large number of extremely kind and generous people. In the first place, I have been very fortunate to work under the supervision of three extraordinary scholars. My deepest gratitude goes to the three of them. Maxwell A. Cameron must have read a couple thousand pages of drafts and outlines, and every time he returned them with meticulous comments that went beyond the dissertation to offer a larger lesson about the art of political science. More than a supervisor, Max has been an intellectual model, a generous mentor, and a close friend. Antje Ellermann’s graduate seminar awakened my fascination with the comparative politics of the state, and ever since then she has been a beacon guiding me through this ever-growing field. Working for Antje as a research assistant also gave me the peace of mind to finish this dissertation while opening new intellectual interests. For many years, I have looked at Mark E. Warren’s writings as an example of the work that I would like to produce one day. I have tried to the best of my ability to learn from his analytical clarity and ability to articulate complex arguments with elegance and precision.   The Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia (UBC) has felt like a home since I began graduate school. This project is the result of dozens of conversations with a vibrant community of professors and students. Alan Jacobs, Christopher Kam, Campbell Sharman, and Yves Tiberghien offered advice and help in numerous occasions. I thank the Institute for European Studies (IES) and its director, Kurt Huebner, for hosting me during the writing stage. Finally, it has been an honour and a pleasure to walk this path with a brilliant group of friends: Jennifer Allan, Priya Bala-Miller, Jan Boesten, Charles Breton, Yana xii   Gorokhovskaia, Conrad King, Jan Luedert, Rebecca Monnerat, Efe Peker, Stewart Prest, Samuel Reed, Chris Tenove, Jonathan Thom, Jason Tockman, Serbulent Turan, and Sule Yaylaci.  A Vanier Canada Graduate Scholarship financed this project from 2010 to 2013. Additional grants were provided by the Department of Political Science and the Liu Institute for Global Issues that made it possible to spend several months in Mexico and France. The Centro de Estudios Sociológicos (CES) at El Colegio de México hosted me from January to June 2012. Since then, Viviane Brachet has been an ally and an enthusiastic teacher. Andrés Lira and Javier Garciadiego taught me to be respectful when approaching the discipline of history as an outsider. In France, the Centre d’études européennes (CEE) at Sciences Po Paris received me as a visiting student from September 2012 to April 2013. During those months, Patrick Le Galès profoundly influenced my thinking about the sociology of the state. The conversations with Stephen Sawyer and Patrick Le Lidec were also very helpful to navigate the enormity of French historiography. I also met brilliant colleagues while I was in Paris: Antonella Coco, Vlad Gross, Léa Haller, Antoine Jardin, Filip Kostelka, Lucas Leemann, Gabriela Méndez, Olga Spaiser, and Beat Stüdli. Colleagues from other universities have also offered valuable input on different parts of the project, especially Sheri Berman, Desmond King, Juan Pablo Luna, Hillel Soifer, and Jan Teorell. Of course, all errors are my own. My family has been an unwavering source of support, even if they not always understood what I was doing and why it was taking so long. My parents, Elsa and Víctor, have taught me about endurance, passion and commitment, and that love can be felt despite long distances. Cristina, Sofía and José María amaze me with their generosity, care, and lightheartedness.  Years ago, Adriana inspired me to finish my first novel. She now teaches me everyday how to live a meaningful and happy life. This dissertation is dedicated to her. xiii   Dedication  For Adriana and to my parents,   1   Chapter 1: Introduction  At bottom, despite the differences in epochs and objectives, the representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy. In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king. Hence the importance that the theory of power gives to the problem of right and violence, law and illegality, freedom and will, and especially the state and sovereignty (even if the latter is questioned insofar as it is personified in a collective being and no longer a sovereign individual).  —Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality    During the 19th century, France participated in several foreign wars, from the expansion of the Napoleonic Empire to the conflict in Crimea and the imperial expeditions in Algeria and Mexico. At the same time, national governments were toppled by popular movements in 1815, 1830, and 1848. In 1871, the government lost control of Paris, which was ruled for two months by the communards, after being swiftly defeated during the Franco-Prussian war. Until the Third Republic, the French state was chronically incapable of maintaining political order and extracting enough revenue to finance its operations. War was financed through debt, not taxation. The entire political system was built upon the principle of the état-à-bon-marché, the cheap state, taxing very little and providing very little in return. It would be during the interwar years, however, in a period characterized by weak and fragmented governments, a massive financial crisis, and a country ravaged by the Great War, that the French state would transform itself, finally consolidating a stable political system after more than a century of instability and revolutionary turmoil. During the 1920s and 1930s, the French state began to expand its fiscal 2   capabilities, as well as the delivery of a wide array of public goods and services. The institutional foundations for the strong state that steered the dirigiste economy of the Trente Glorieuses (1945-1975) were put in place at the dusk of the Third Republic, by weak central governments that were torn apart between a vociferous labour movement, unrelenting conservative forces, and hostile business interests. In France, weak governments engendered a strong state.   Mexican governments were also incapable of creating a stable political system during the 19th century. Local and regional strongmen repeatedly fought to gain access to the depleted public coffers. Foreign invasions destroyed whatever was left of state institutions. Taxation and public services were virtually non-existent. Additionally, the unbridled conflict for power between elites was enhanced by the exclusion of the popular classes from the political arena. Some of this changed, however, with the Revolution of 1910-17, which spawned a party-state under the leadership of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). The new party gathered the victorious warlords of the revolution, organized labour, and the most powerful business interests in the country. The party became so strong that it remained in power for more than 70 years. However, the Mexican state became a cumbersome giant. Taxation did not significantly grow during the 20th century. The state produced an increasing amount of public goods only to watch over their congestion and depletion. Mexican governments pushed forward major transformative projects in the 1930s, including the nationalization of the energy sector and a massive land reform, only to see them fail by the 1970s. In Mexico, strong governments produced a weak state. This is the empirical puzzle that inspired this dissertation: Why did the French state emerge out of the most unlikely conditions of devastation, crisis, and political fragmentation, as one of the strongest states in history, while the Mexican state, despite a long period of strong 3   central governments, continued to be chronically limited in its ability to tax the population, provide security, and supply public services? More generally, what explains the dramatic variation in levels of state capacity across countries during the 20th century? State capacity is a central concern for the study of comparative politics and international development today. It is seen as a key component of good governance and a necessary condition for democracy to matter in citizens’ everyday lives. Since the end of the Cold War, the normative virtues of democratic politics have become insufficient to convince marginalized and oppressed populations that urgently demand efficient services, security and economic well-being. In many parts of the world, this sense of urgency and the inability of many democratic governments to deliver on their material promises have strengthened the arguments of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, from China and Russia to Venezuela and Iran, who justify limiting freedoms and political inclusion for the sake of efficiency. In other parts of the world, non-state actors have capitalized on weak states to carve out spaces of sovereignty and impunity, from religious extremists to criminal organizations and untethered businesses.  Therefore, explaining the processes that shape state capacity is relevant for pragmatic and democratic reasons. Pragmatically, states are today the only actors that can provide essential goods to large populations, such as security (national, public, human), protection of individual rights, and the infrastructural and institutional foundations for economic development. Where states fail to achieve these goals, large numbers of people are vulnerable to natural and social calamities, arbitrary violence, and poverty. Furthermore, democratic reasons also motivate us to care about understanding the causes of variation in state capacity. There is an old liberal and libertarian suspicion against strong states. We have come to think about liberal democratic institutions—the separation of powers, 4   the accountability of elected officials, the rule of law—as checks on the predatory instincts of rulers and state abuse. As a result, this narrative has helped autocrats around the world exaggerate the messiness and gridlock of democracies as signs of unwieldy and inefficient political systems.  However, democratic institutions can be enabling—and not just constraining—in a very specific way: by providing solutions to large collective action problems, such as the ones that plague many of the goods that we expect states to provide. Understanding how states develop the capacity to overcome those collective action problems in order to successfully provide valuable goods and services to their populations can provide us with an additional defense of democratic governance, one that is grounded not only on the moral principles of democracy but also on its functional merits.1  The comparative study of state capacity has matured in the last two decades. Since the 1990s, dominant theories of political development have focused on factors that are exogenous to domestic politics, such as the legacies of warfare2 and high international prices for natural resource endowments3, to explain cross-national variation in state capacity. They have argued that these exogenous factors pose (or remove) the incentives that rulers face to supply public goods, and that in the absence of such incentives rulers do not invest on state institutions. In the Bellicist story, rulers centralize coercive and administrative resources in order to face military pressures, offering in exchange public goods to the population. For Natural Resource Curse                                                 1 See for example the arguments made by Cameron 2013; Thornhill 2013; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2 Bellicist Theories: Peacock and Wiseman 1961; Rasler and Thompson 1985; Thies 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2010; Thies and Sobek 2010; Aghion, Persson, and Rouzet 2012; Besley and Persson 2010; Scheve and Stasavage 2012.  3 Natural Resource Curse Theories: Chaudhry 1989; Karl 1997; Ross 2001; 2004; 2012. 5   (NRC) theories, easy access to rents from foreign markets makes rulers less interested in centralizing coercive and administrative functions or in supplying public goods. Instead, resource rents offer incentives for rulers to focus on securing control of those economic enclaves and maintain power through the distribution of patronage. However, a wave of recent studies has qualified the claims to universal applicability of Bellicist and NRC theories.4 For every example where we observe these causal relationships between exogenous factors and state-building efforts, there is another case where war and natural resources seem to affect state institutions in the opposite direction. Miguel Ángel Centeno (Centeno 1997; 2003) and Jeffrey Herbst (2000) have shown that war does not always build strong states, but often leads to cycles of debt and instability, as in most cases in Latin America and Africa. Similarly, Stephen Haber and Víctor Menaldo (2011), Marcus Kurtz (2009; 2013), and Ryan Saylor (2012; 2014) have argued that natural resource endowments and commodity booms do not always cripple state institutions, as has been the case in Canada, Australia, Norway, and Chile. Why did war strengthen European states but weaken Latin American ones? Why do commodity booms hinder political development in some cases, but push for the expansion of state-supplied public goods in others?  Instituti