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Changing faces in the Chinese Communist revolution : party members and organization building in two Jiaodong… Wu, Yang 2013

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   CHANGING FACES IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION:   PARTY MEMBERS AND ORGANIZATION BUILDING IN TWO JIAODONG COUNTIES 1928-1948.   by   YANG WU   A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  in  THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND  POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES  (History)   THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Vancouver)   December 2013   ? Yang Wu 2013ii  Abstract  The revolution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from the 1920s to the late 1940s was a defining moment in China?s modern history. It dramatically restructured Chinese society and created an authoritarian state that remains the most important player in shaping the country?s development today. Scholars writing to explain the success of the revolution began with trying to uncover factors outside of the party that helped to bring it to power, but have increasingly emphasized the ability of party organizations and their members to direct society to follow the CCP?s agendas as the decisive factor behind the party?s victory.   Despite highlighting the role played by CCP members and the larger party organization in the success of the revolution studies have done little to examine how ordinary individuals got involved in the CCP at different stages and locations. Nor have scholars analyzed in depth the process of how the CCP molded millions of mostly rural people who joined it from the 1920s to the 40s into a disciplined force to seize control of China. Through a study of the CCP?s revolution in two counties of Jiaodong, a region of Shandong province in eastern China during this period my dissertation explores this process by focusing on their local party members. It also expands on the subject of how the CCP became a cohesive organization by looking at how the party dealt with the issue of localism. This latter subject is very pertinent to understanding the CCP?s development, since the party managed to become an effective national organization in a country whose populace was heavily divided by regional and local ties.    My study concludes that local ties were major impediments to cohesion in the CCP, and that the party?s central leaders imposed their authority in Jiaodong by weakening these ties down through purges, ideological education and class struggle. These programs made the CCP in Jiaodong a top down organization that was dependent on the directions from Mao Zedong, the CCP?s paramount leader and his loyalists. They also sowed the seeds for the next thirty years of constant Maoist political campaigns.  iii  Preface  This dissertation is an original and unpublished work. It is the product of years of research that I have conducted in three archives in China as well as several other institutions, such as the United States National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, the Harvard Yenching Library, Hoover Institution of War and Peace in Stanford University and the National Library of China in Beijing. All figures and maps in my dissertation are either original creations that I made or modifications of maps found in works published in the People?s Republic of China or Taiwan, which are not subject to copyright restrictions.                     iv  Table of Contents Abstract .............................................................................................................................. ii Preface ............................................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. iv List of Figures, Maps and Illustrations ......................................................................... vii Glossary .......................................................................................................................... viii List of Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... xi Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ xiii Dedication ....................................................................................................................... xiv Chapter 1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 1 1.1 The Evolution of a Party Member-Based View of the CCP's rise to Power in China .......... 2 1.2 An Approach in Need of Study ............................................................................................. 9 1.3 My Study and its Treatment of Party Members and Organization Development ............... 10 1.4 Methodology, Sources and the Layout of the Thesis .......................................................... 13 Chapter 2: Violent Beginnings: Young Men and the Emergence of Revolutionary Politics in Haiyang/Rushan ............................................................................................ 21 2.1 People Behind the Attacks: The Story of Yu Xingfu .......................................................... 21 2.2 Yu Xingfu's Homeland ........................................................................................................ 24 2.3 A Time of Turmoil .............................................................................................................. 26 2.4 Troubles: Convulsions of Violence ..................................................................................... 31 2.5 Great Turmoil: 1928-1929 .................................................................................................. 32 2.6 Decline of Old Leadership, Rise of Young Men: An Analysis of the Protests ................... 35 2.7 Aspiring Revolutionaries .................................................................................................... 40 2.8 "Revolution" in the Midst of Turmoil ................................................................................. 45 2.9 A New Order ....................................................................................................................... 49 2.10 Shaping of Revolutionaries: Basis for CCP Development ................................................ 50 Chapter 3: Tough Start: A History of the Early CCP ................................................. 53 3.1 Birth of the Party and Tensions in the Process.................................................................... 53 3.2 Violent Teachers: Causes Behind the Rise and Fall of the Early Haiyang/Rushan CCP.... 55 3.3 Weak Ties with the National CCP, Growing Government Persecution .............................. 57 3.4 Beginnings of the CCP: Western Haiyang and the Background to the Party?s Spread ...... 59 3.5 Quarrels Between Young Men and the Implosion of the East Laiyang Organization ........ 60 3.6 The CCP?s Spread into Western Haiyang ........................................................................... 62 3.7 Expansion of Followers and Radicalization of Party Activists During the Great Turmoil of 1928-1929 ................................................................................................................................. 63 3.8 Beginnings of the CCP: Eastern Haiyang/Rushan .............................................................. 66 3.9 Teaching Ties: Connections and the Linking of Local and Provincial Parties: 1931-1932 67 3.10 Linking of Radicals: Eastern Haiyang and Southern Muping ........................................... 69 3.11 Linking of Radicals: Western Haiyang ............................................................................. 70 3.12 Troubled Expansion: 1932-1933 ....................................................................................... 72 3.13 Failed Unrest in Eastern Haiyang: Late 1932 ................................................................... 74 3.14 Heyday and Collapse: Western Haiyang and Laiyang, 1933 ............................................ 75 3.15 Last Stand: Eastern Haiyang and Southern Muping: 1934-1935 ...................................... 82 v  3.16 Journeys ............................................................................................................................ 90 Chapter 4: War and the Remaking of the Local Party ............................................... 94 4.1 Rebirth of the Haiyang and Rushan Area Party .................................................................. 94 4.2 Initial Activities in Haiyang and Rushan: the Backdrop ..................................................... 95 4.3 Initial Bid for Power: 1938 ................................................................................................. 98 4.4 Opportunity for Action ...................................................................................................... 100 4.5 Collapse of the Endeavour ................................................................................................ 101 4.6 Expansion: Early 1939 ...................................................................................................... 102 4.7 Seizure of Power: 1940-1941 ............................................................................................ 103 4.8 Effects of War: A New Party ............................................................................................ 107 4.9 Dynamics Behind the Changing Membership .................................................................. 108 4.10 A Case Study of the Impact of War on the CCP in One Village .................................... 111 4.11 "Faces" of the New Membership .................................................................................... 112 4.12 An Entity Thrown Together by Circumstance ................................................................ 115 Chapter 5: Becoming an Organization: The Emergence of a Permanent Jiaodong Party with Ties to the CCP Centre. ............................................................................. 121 5.1 Basis for the Emergence of CCP Power in Jiaodong: A Brief History of the Party in Yexian, Huangxian and Penglai ........................................................................................................... 123 5.2 Seizure of Power: Spring 1938 ......................................................................................... 126 5.3 Consolidating Control: Spring and Summer 1938 ............................................................ 129 5.4 Unifying Party Leadership in Jiaodong: Gathering of Local Organizers and Connecting with the Party Centre ............................................................................................................... 131 5.5 Strengthening Central Leadership: First Purge of Local Leaders ..................................... 132 5.6 Significance of Wang's Purge ........................................................................................... 137 5.7 Retreat and Expansion: 1939-1941 ................................................................................... 138 5.8 Establishment of the Jiaodong Base Area ......................................................................... 141 5.9 Mechanisms of Control: A Theoretical Analysis .............................................................. 142 5.10 Mechanisms of Control: Origins ..................................................................................... 145 5.11 Mechanisms of Control: Initial Phase, 1938-1940 .......................................................... 146 5.12 Mechanisms of Control: Expansion, 1940-1942 ............................................................. 151 5.13 Mechanisms of Control: Further Expansion Through Ideological Study, 1944 ............. 159 Chapter 6: Consolidating Local Power, Grassroots Party Control and Domination of Rural Society ............................................................................................................. 168 6.1 Grassroots Party Expansion in Rushan and Haiyang: Patterns and Background Prior to Late 1942 ......................................................................................................................................... 169 6.2 Challenges in Building Local CCP Power: 1940-Early 1943 ........................................... 172 6.3 Consolidating CCP Power................................................................................................. 178 6.4 Manufacturing of Class Identity: Party Organizations ...................................................... 183 6.5 Imposing Class on Society: Class struggle ....................................................................... 187 6.6 Shift Towards a More Radical Stage of Class Struggle .................................................... 194 6.7 Restructuring Village Society ........................................................................................... 202 Chapter 7: Mobilization and Purges: CCP Organizations in Rushan and Haiyang and the Party?s War for National Power, 1945-1948................................................. 206 7.1 Initial Stage of War Mobilization: 1945 ........................................................................... 208 7.2 Machinery of Mobilization ............................................................................................... 211 7.3 Mobilizing for War ........................................................................................................... 216 7.4 Limitations of the System: Complexities Created by Social Reality ................................ 219 7.5 Limitations of the System: Tensions Between Party Members and Society ..................... 222 vi  7.6 Challenge by the Party?s Enemies ..................................................................................... 225 7.7 New Consolidation of Local Power .................................................................................. 225 7.8 Effects of the New Push for Power ................................................................................... 232 7.9 Land Reform ..................................................................................................................... 235 7.10 Moderate Phase of Land Reform: 1946 .......................................................................... 238 7.11 Shift Towards A Radical Stage of Land Reform ............................................................ 241 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 248 Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 259 Appendices ..................................................................................................................... 272 Appendix 1. A List of Disruptions to the Shandong Provincial Party, 1928-1933 ................. 272 Appendix 2. Education Levels of Party Members in Haiyang in June 1943 and The Years That they Entered the Party ............................................................................................................. 274 Appendix 3. List of CCP Party Secretaries in the Haiyang/Rushan area, 1937-1941 ............ 275 Appendix 4. Some of the Worst Japanese Atrocities in Haiyang/Rushan 1940-1945 ............ 276 Appendix 5. Biographies of Key CCP Leaders....................................................................... 277                              vii  List of Figures, Maps and Illustrations  Figure 1  Yu Xingfu .......................................................................................................... 22 Figure 2  Map of Haiyang ................................................................................................. 25 Figure 3  New Boundaries of Rushan and Haiyang .......................................................... 27 Figure 4  Topography of Rushan and Haiyang ................................................................. 28 Figure 5  Duan Chengzhai ................................................................................................ 38 Figure 6  Early CCP Leadership (1928) ........................................................................... 60 Figure 7  Area of Initial Party Development in Western Haiyang ................................... 65 Figure 8  Spread of the CCP and its Core Leadership in Rushan and Eastern Jiaodong .. 68 Figure 9  Spread of the CCP in the Rushan area............................................................... 70 Figure 10 Key leaders in Laiyang and Western Haiyang and Their Relationship Circles 71 Figure 11 The Motor Road System in Jiaodong ............................................................. 105 Figure 12 Haiyang and Rushan: 1941-1942 ................................................................... 106 Figure 13 Yexian, Huangxian and Penglai in 1937 ........................................................ 124 Figure 14 Topographical Map of the Jiaodong Interior in Meters Above Sea Level ..... 140 Figure 15 New Administrative Boundaries in Jiaodong Under the CCP ....................... 153 Figure 16 Shandong?s Courier System at the Height of its Operation in 1946 .............. 163 Figure 17 Haiyang and Rushan, 1941-1942 ................................................................... 170 Figure 18 Routes Used By CCP Forces in Shandong to Enter Manchuria, 1945 ........... 210 viii  Glossary   Changjiazhuang ??? Chang Zijian ??? Chen Xizhou ??? chudeng wenhua ???? basic literacy Dasongwei ??? Date Junnosuke????? Daze ?? Dazhongbao ??? Ding Futing ??? Duan Chengzhai ??? Fang Yongchang ??? Fengcheng ?? funong luxian ???? rich peasant line Gao Ziming ??? gonganyuan ??? Public Safety Officer Haiyang ?? Han Fuju ??? huaidan ?? bad egg Huangxian ?? Hujiacun ??? Jiang Dongsheng ??? Jiang Futang ??? Jiang Zunyi ??? Jiaodong tewei ???? Jiaodong Special Committee jijifenzi ???? activist Ji Shouzhi ??? Kang Sheng ?? kongsu ?? accusation Kunyu ?? Laiyang ?? Laiyang zhongxin xianwei ??????Laiyang Central County Committee lianzhuanghui ??? Village Federation Li Boyan ??? Li Jianwu ??? Li Junde ??? Li Qi ?? liumang ?? wandering young men, troublemakers Li Yu ?? Li Zhongxiang ??? Lin Hao ?? Liu Jingsan ??? Liu Mengxi ??? Liu Zhennian ??? Liu Zhongyi ??? Luo Ronghuan ??? ix  Luo Zhufeng ??? Ma Baosan ??? Muping ?? Penglai ?? Pingdu ?? poluo ?? economically fallen poxie ?? broken shoe qiuling ?? dirt hills qu ? ward Rao Shushi ??? Rongcheng ?? Rushan ?? shan ? rock hill shehuibu ??? Social Affairs Department Shen Honglie ??? Shidao ??  Shimatantou ???? Shi Zhongcheng ??? Song Haiqiu ??? Song Haiting ??? Song Hechu ??? Song Jixian ??? Song Sikun ??? Song Xuanwen ??? Song Zhuting ??? suanjiuzhang ??? settling old accounts suku ?? speaking bitterness Sun Jiesan ??? Sun Mingrui ??? tuan Shandongsheng gongwei ?????? Shandong Provincial Youth League Work Committee tuoli shengchan ???? left production Wang Jingsong ??? Wang Ruowang??? Wang Wen ?? Wang Zhifeng ??? Wang Zhongshan ??? Wendeng ?? Xiaze ?? xidamen ??? Big Western Gate Xin Ruiting ??? Xu Shiyou ??? Xu Yuanpei ??? Xu Yuanyi ??? Ya ? Yang Shuping ??? Yexian ?? Yu Dianjun ??? Yu Jianzhai ??? Yu Mei ?? Yu Xingfu ??? Yu Yunting ??? Yu Zhenxi ??? Zhan Zhuoyun ??? Zhao Baiyuan ??? x  Zhao Baoyuan ??? Zhao Sentang ??? Zhang Jialuo ??? Zhang Jianan ??? Zhang Jianxun ??? Zhang Jingyuan ??? Zhang Jinming ??? Zhang Liangzhu ??? Zhang Weizi ??? Zhang Zongchang ??? Zhao Guodong ??? Zheng Tianjiu ???xi  List of Abbreviations  Corporate Authors and Names of Organizations  HDFB        Haiyangshi dangshi fangzhi bangongshi  HDSBW    Haiyangshi difang shizhi bianzuan weiyuanhui  HJW          Haiyangxian jiuji weiyuanhui  HMA         Haiyang Municipal Archives  JDDY        Jiaodongqu dangwei diaocha yanjiushi  PSDY        Penglai shiwei dangshi yanjiushi RDB          Rushanshi dangshizhi bangongshi  RJW          Rushanxian jiuji weiyuanhui RMA         Rushan Municipal Archives  SHXBW    Shandongsheng Haiyang xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui  SPA           Shandong Provincial Archives SRDSBW  Shandongsheng Rushanshi difang shizhi bianzuan weiyuanhui  USDSCC   United States Department of State, Chefoo Consulate  ZHX          Zhonggong Haiyang xianwei  ZHZ           Zhonggong Huadong zhongyangju  ZLKSDY   Zhonggong Longkou shiwei dangshi yanjiushi ZLSDY      Zhonggong Laixi shiwei dangshi yanjiushi  ZRX           Zhonggong Rushan Xianwei ZRXZ        Zhonggong Rushan xianwei zuzhike  ZSSDY      Zhonggong Shandong shengwei dangshi yanjiushi  ZYSDZZYW      Zhonggong Yantai shiwei dangshi ziliao zhengji yanjiu weiyuanhui   Abbreviated Titles of Works  JZSSTG    Jiefang zhanzheng shiqi Shandong de tudi gaige SGLWH     Shandong geming lishi wenjian huiji xii  SJJ            Shandong de jianzu jianxi  ZJDD       Zhonggong Jiaodongqu dangshi dashiji                              xiii  Acknowledgements  I would like to express special thanks to several people for their role in my dissertation writing process. My deepest appreciation goes out to my supervisor, Dr. Diana Lary, for her encouragement of my work, insightful suggestions on its development, tireless advocacy for my career and personal benefit and critical support in helping me mature as a scholar over the years. Dr. Lary always saw the potential in me and tried to nurture it, and I owe my recovery from a long physical illness and the completion of my program in two years after it to her efforts. I am also very grateful towards Drs. Steven Lee and Jeremy Brown, my other committee members, for all their valuable comments on my dissertation and critical role in editing and proof reading it for defense submission. Also playing important roles in my dissertation are Drs. Alexander Woodside and Bruce Rusk, my examiners, and I am very thankful for their thoughtful questions and comments during my dissertation defense and suggestions on turning my work into future publications. I would, in addition, like to thank Dr. Ronald Suleski, my external examiner for his detailed reading of my work and many useful directions for preparing it for publication.  Research for my dissertation would not have been possible without financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), and the Canadian Graduate Scholarship it has awarded me. This grant has allowed me to travel the world to carry out my research, and I am deeply appreciative towards the council for its generous contribution. My work has also been funded by various scholarships from UBC, to which I am also very grateful for. I would also like to thank my friend and fellow UBC graduate Dominic Meng-Hsuan Yang for sharing his insights on dissertation defense and preparing my work for final submission. Last but not the least, I would like to express profound appreciation towards my parents, Joe and Grace. Their years of self-sacrifice and dedication towards my wellbeing has helped me reach this point.    xiv  Dedication     To my parents  1  Chapter 1. Introduction  Liu Zhongyi, Yu Xingfu, Song Zhuting and Zhang Weizi were not famous figures in Chinese history. Born in the countryside of Haiyang and Rushan, two counties in Jiaodong (Shandong's eastern peninsula), they often came from impoverished backgrounds, died in obscurity, and are remembered only in local histories that few people even in their native places have read. But these men, along with tens of thousands of others, played a major role in shaping the course of China's 20th century developments. Early members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), they founded party organizations both in their home counties and in Jiaodong and used them to mobilize hundreds of thousands for the party's cause from the 1920s to the 1940s, something that played a critical role in the CCP's seizure of national power from its Guomindang (GMD) rival in 1949. Implementing and interacting with the policies of Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Kang Sheng and other major Communist party figures, they also helped to create and shape a party state that dominated Chinese society in the next few decades, and remains in control of China to today.     How the CCP came to power in China is a topic that has fascinated historians, particularly in the English speaking world, for decades. Scholars, seeing the Communist party-state in China survive even after abandoning its revolutionary ideology over the last thirty years, have also become increasingly fascinated with the issue of how it emerged and became a major instrument of change in China's modern history. A factor that is central to both these issues is the party's network of members and leaders (also known as cadres), particularly at the regional, county and sub-levels. Party members, their relationships with each other and society, as well as the power they built up in local areas, have often been seen as a critical force in how the CCP came to power and how it has maintained it. The lower members have, at the same time, been seen as a liability for the party. Central leaders of the CCP have often viewed lower members as lacking ideological commitment and have accused them of not properly carrying out the party's larger agendas. Lower members, rightly or wrongly, have often been the first to be blamed by society for problems in the party state.  2  Scholars are still trying to understand the CCP's party structure; much of its inner workings are unknown. In looking at the stories of men such as Liu, Yu, Song and Zhang, the local party organizations that they set up, and their interactions with higher CCP levels, my thesis explores the origins of this system, its early evolution, its role in bringing about the party's victory in 1949, and the people involved in this process. Recently available sources, such as archival materials from Rushan, Haiyang and Shandong, have allowed party organizations and members to be examined in ways not previously possible, from a more human-centered perspective. My study analyzes a number of questions related to these subjects, which have been raised by scholars but never thoroughly explored: How was the system of party members, with levels extending down from the CCP's top leadership to grassroots society, established? Who were the people who staffed each of these levels? How did senior party leaders assert control over the myriad of local and regional networks in this apparatus? Did the backgrounds of members at different levels influence interactions within the party-state and its cohesion? Was party organization the decisive factor in the CCP's victory in 1949? Did the evolution of that party prior to 1949 influence the policies of central leaders towards lower members later on? 1.1 The Evolution of a Party Member-Based View of the CCP's rise to Power in China   By looking at the CCP victory from a membership-centered perspective, I seek to approach a subject that has not been adequately addressed. Research on the CCP's victory in China has viewed the issue of how the party came to power from two angles: whether the party succeeded because of external factors favoring it; or if internal factors gave it a critical edge over the GMD. Early works, such as Chalmers Johnson's Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: the Emergence of Revolutionary China (1962) and Mark Selden's The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (1971) viewed the subject from an external perspective, arguing that there were developments in China that helped the party and its agendas, and that it adjusted its policies successfully to take advantage of them. Johnson argued that China's 1937-1945 war against Japan, often known in China as the War of Resistance, was a crucial catalyst for CCP victory. The war, Johnson contends, 3  broke down the structure of society in rural China through the damage and social dislocation it caused. It also induced a nationalist mind-set amongst Chinese, who began to link the fate of their nation with their personal survival. Johnson asserts that the CCP won because it successfully appealed to this sentiment with its propaganda, and presented itself as a better way for peasants to resist the Japanese than the GMD.1  Selden, from a similar assumption but with a different focus, argues that war with Japan was not the decisive factor in the CCP's success. He asserts that the party's victory was driven by widespread poverty in the countryside in the early 20th century and the party's ability to alleviate it. Selden contends that the CCP won over peasants because of its class-based economic policies, such as progressive taxation, rent reduction and engaging peasants to form labour cooperatives had revitalized the rural economy. He also argues that the CCP rallied large numbers of peasants because it was more responsive to their economic needs than its rivals.2 These explanations were questioned almost immediately after they were made. Scholars raised doubts on Johnson's claim that war with Japan in 1937 created widespread social breakdown in China. Voicing skepticism on Selden's rural poverty argument, some have also noted that he chose to study the party's activities in northern Shaanxi, one of the poorest regions of China and a place whose economy was distinct from many other parts of the country. These critiques are in many ways encapsulated by Tetsuya Kataoka's 1974 work, Resistance and Revolution in China: The Communists and the Second United Front. Kataoka challenges Selden's assertion, noting that many areas where the CCP was successful in building power and organizing large numbers of peasants did not have significant economic decline. Contradicting Johnson's point on social collapse and the emergence of peasant nationalism, he also notes that the CCP co-opted traditional organizations, such as secret societies and Red Spear local defence groups, in many places during the war with Japan. These groups, part of the old social structure, were only interested in protecting their native areas rather than fighting to defend the Chinese nation. They were not swept away by the social dislocation of war as                                                  1 Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 2-14. 2 Mark Selden, The Yenan Way Revisited (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 220-221.  4  Johnson alleged. Kataoka points out that peasants turned to them first in the wake of Japanese attacks rather than the CCP.3  Kataoka, instead, argues that the CCP succeeded because it had built a more cohesive administrative and party and government apparatus than the GMD. Though he does not discount the benefits of the CCP's economic programs for peasants, Kataoka contends that their main purpose was to strengthen the party's control over rural society, weakening old elites who might challenge the party through attacking their economic power. Kataoka asserts that the war with Japan did create the basis for CCP victory in 1949. The Japanese invasion, he argues, collapsed GMD power in large parts of China but did not replace it with an alternative government. This created a political vacuum that allowed the CCP to take over and consolidate its power in many areas, and to build up military forces to defeat the GMD after the war. However, Kataoka argues that the CCP's success in this was not guaranteed, and depended on the war and the political vacuum it created lasting long enough for the party to generate sufficient military and political power to ensure national victory. Kataoka contends that the advantageous political situation that the CCP enjoyed nearly collapsed several times prior to 1942, as the Japanese and the GMD pondered a peace that would have allowed both sides to target the Communists, but was upheld by the failure of the two to reach an agreement. Successful political maneuvering by the CCP helped to ward off such a peace, as did the outbreak of war between Japan and the US.4    These arguments raised more questions than they answered, and pushed research of the subject in several directions. Kataoka challenged Johnson and Selden's assertions of widespread social breakdown and rampant poverty in rural China and offered counter evidence in many places. This motivated a number of scholars to engage in more localized studies of CCP activities, to test the applicability of Johnson and Selden's explanations of CCP success in different areas of China. Though noting that the CCP co-opted traditional groups in many places, Kataoka was ambiguous on their overall relationship with the party, and whether these groups supported its agendas. This led to                                                  3 Tetsuya Kataoka, Resistance and Revolution in China: The Communists and the Second United Front (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 101-114, 310-311. 4 Kataoka, Resistance and Revolution, 141-142, 143-228, 240-260, 308-310.  5  studies that pursued the interactions between the CCP and the traditional structure of Chinese society further. By pointing out that the CCP's fortunes were constantly threatened by the prospects of a GMD/Japanese peace during the first few years of the war, Kataoka also raised the prospects that external events had at best a contingent relationship with CCP victory, providing the party with opportunities at certain times but also threatening at others rather than paving way for Communist victory. More importantly, by noting that the CCP built stronger organizations than the GMD, he suggests that this might have been a critical factor in the rise of the Communists to power. Research, moving along these lines over the next twenty years largely supported Kataoka's arguments, stressing superior organization as a crucial factor in the CCP?s victory. Scholars began with the relationship between the CCP and rural society, and the question of whether old social organizations were receptive to the party. They also examined whether the war with Japan had produced conditions favorable to it. Some scholars, such as Ralph Thaxton, in his 1983 and 1997 works China Turned Right Side Up and Salt of the Earth, have argued that there were developments favorable to the CCP. Thaxton contends that some areas of rural China were experiencing a community-based rebellion against the GMD state and local elites affiliated with it, and that a shared enemy forged an alliance between the CCP and old community organizations against the GMD. Fitting his observations in to the framework of James Scott's "moral economy" model of social behavior in modernizing societies, Thaxton argues that the onset of modern state building broke down the relationship between the GMD-led government and the rest of society. It led the former to abandon a long-accepted tradition of governance in China, which called for low taxes and respect for the right of peasants to survive in favor heavy taxation to fund modern bureaucracies and armies. State-building, Thaxton contends, united villages in defence against the predations of government forces and their allies, and led many to form coalitions with the CCP, which had economic and tax policies that were similar to old practices of governance in China for survival.5                                                   5 Ralph Thaxton, China Turned Right Side Up (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 220-233; Thaxton, Salt of the Earth: The Political Origins of Peasant Protest and Communist Revolution in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 319-332. 6  Thaxton's studies, however, were based on a small area of China that covered only five counties. Most works on the issue, such as Elizabeth Perry's 1980 book Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945, David Paulson's unpublished Stanford University dissertation, "War and Revolution in North China: The Shandong Base Area, 1937-1945" and Odorick Y. K. Wou?s 1994 study, Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan, have noted that traditional social organizations in rural China were inherently conservative, insulated from outside influences and reactive to larger events shaping the country rather than actively responding to them. They were also led by elites who were often hostile to the CCP's class-based economic programs. Perry, Paulson and Wou contend that the CCP were largely unsuccessful in forging long term alliances with such groups, and often attacked and destroyed them if it had a military advantage.6  Rather than being motivated by a sense of nationalism or won over by the appeal of the CCP's economic programs, studies, such as Kathleen Hartford's 1980 dissertation "Step by Step: Reform, Resistance and Revolution in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region", Ch?en Yong-fa?s 1986 book Making Revolution: The Chinese Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, and Wou's work have noted that peasant behavior was often unpredictable and fluctuated according to circumstances. They were not necessarily moved by the appeal of CCP policies, even when seeing the benefits of such. Neither were peasants always inclined to support the party after receiving benefits from its programs. Hartford, Ch'en and Wou also point out that Japanese attacks on the Chinese countryside, rather than creating a desire for national resistance, often discouraged peasants from supporting the CCP for fear of provoking retaliation from the invader. The three works also argue that the unpredictability of peasant behavior meant that the party never had complete, committed support from them, and that it was often very difficult for it to control peasants and steer them towards the CCP's agendas. Perhaps most importantly, they point out that the areas that the party was successful in prior to 1949 were a complex patchwork of economies, some of which were wealthy or did not stand to                                                  6 Elizabeth Perry, Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), 208-247; David Paulson, "War and Revolution in North China: The Shandong Base Area, 1937-1945" (Ph.D dissertation, Stanford University, 1982), 26-30; Odorick Y.K. Wou, Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 371-386.  7  benefit much from the CCP's economic policies. The war with Japan often affected different areas in different ways, raising further doubts about the notion that it created a universal impact that fostered widespread nationalism.7  These observations shifted the focus of research on how the CCP took power in China from external to internal factors. Scholars abandoned the search for larger developments supporting the party's victory. They also argued that the CCP's economic policies and patriotic appeals were not enough by themselves to win peasant support or secure its victory. Studies, instead, turned to the party's management techniques, its ability to survive in different environments and gain compliance from society through means other than simple appeals. Many, in doing so, have concluded that CCP organization, namely its party networks, was the decisive factor in its success. Hartford, Paulson, Ch'en and Wou argue that the party won because its organizations were highly active in people's lives, and penetrated their control deep into society. Party organizations overcame social antipathy to the party by developing a range of tactics, from gentle persuasion to group pressure and outright coercion, and applied them constantly to channel peasants into participating in the CCP's agendas and to neutralize and eliminate elites and other potentially hostile elements to the party. They were also highly effective in artificially generating appeal for the party's economic policies, adapting them to suit different economic environments and linking them to unrelated local issues in many places to induce popular cooperation. CCP organizations, more importantly, responded effectively to changing political developments in different areas, taking advantage of opportunities presented in some of them to build political and military power while carrying out measures that minimized loss during difficult times. 8   The emphasis on CCP management techniques assumes that the party was a force independent of rural society, and studies have often highlighted the urban, intellectual origins of the CCP and of its higher leadership. Scholars behind this approach also saw                                                  7 Kathleen Hartford, "Step by Step: Reform, Resistance and Revolution in the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region" (Ph.D dissertation, Stanford University, 1980), 35-39; Ch'en Yong-Fa, Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 500-517; Wou, Mobilizing the Masses, 371-386. 8 Hartford, ?Step by Step,? 41-43; Ch'en, Making Revolution, 500-505, 515-516; Wou, Mobilizing the Masses, 371-386. 8  the party as a unified entity. These perceptions, however, were challenged by Joseph Esherick in the 1990s. Esherick, in his 1994, 1995 and 1998 articles, "Ten theses on the Chinese Communist revolution", ?Deconstructing the construction of the party-state: Gulin County in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region? and ?Revolution in a ?Feudal Fortress?: Yangjiagou, Mizhi County, Shaanxi, 1937-1948?, supports the argument that the organization was the crucial factor behind CCP success. However, he questions the separation of internal party and external factors behind it and most other explanations of Communist victory. Esherick, instead, argues that the CCP was a historical and social construction. It was able to survive and consolidate control in many areas because it recruited local inhabitants, who understood their native places and were able to adapt larger party policies to better manage society. Esherick argues that the CCP was not insulated from the uneven commitment of rural society for this very reason, since many of its leaders were peasants whose interests did not always align with those of the party. Esherick also points out that the party was not one entity, but had a number of levels, ranging from Mao and central leaders to grassroots members, and hypothesizes that levels of commitment to the CCP's larger agendas became less and less from the highest level downwards because members at lower levels were more connected to society, less ideological and further away from the disciplinary reach of higher leaders.9   Understanding CCP success, Esherick argues, entails an examination of the interactions between different levels of the party, the backgrounds of people who staffed it at each level, why they joined, and how top-down discipline needed to carry out the party's larger policies was established. Esherick links this latter question to another issue, how the CCP fostered commitment amongst its members, linked them to its agendas, and proposed a framework for exploring these subjects. He called on scholars to "deconstruct" the CCP party-state, uncovering how its hierarchy of levels was created. Esherick also emphasized a need for studies to conduct a "political anthropology" of the CCP, charting how members at different levels were recruited and how rituals and                                                  9 Joseph Esherick, "Ten Theses on the Chinese Communist Revolution," Modern China, 21, no. 1 (1995): 61-69; Esherick, "Deconstructing the Construction of the Party-State: Gulin County in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region," China Quarterly 140 (December 1994): 1052-1079; Esherick, ?Revolution in a ?Feudal Fortress?: Yangjiagou, Mizhi County, Shaanxi, 1937-1948,? Modern China 24, no. 4 (1998): 339-377. 9  relationships binding them together and fostering a collective party identity were formed.10   1.2 An Approach in Need of Study  Esherick's works were intended mainly to outline a method for studying how the CCP came to power in China; they left much unanswered. His studies did not specifically discuss what rituals and relationships made the party a cohesive entity, only suggesting that rectification, a process involving ideological study, mutual-and self-criticism and threat of punishment for those who did not conform to tenets of the CCP's ideology, was crucial in enforcing intra-party discipline. Esherick also argues the CCP fostered loyalty and commitment amongst its members by recruiting many of them during the most radical stages of its class programs, and targeting those who were the biggest beneficiaries of these policies.11 These assumptions, however, have not been tested by in-depth studies. Research, on the whole, has ignored this important subject. This lack of attention is likely due to a number of reasons. Scholars did not yet have a wide range of internal party documents on members and on CCP policies regulating them. Interest in the subject of revolution was also fading as China was shifting into the high gear of a rapid capitalist economic boom, something that in many ways contradicted the goals of the revolutionary-era party. China's revolution was largely a rural one, and scholarly attention on China by the late 1990s was moving towards the cities and the great urban expansion in the country since reform.    However, an important legacy of the Communist revolution in China is the extensive system of party officials and members it created. Corruption and abuse of power by this group are becoming endemic problems in present-day China. They dominate speeches of party leaders at the CCP's 18th congress, and are in danger of undermining the country's economic growth. The source of corruption is the power and connections of party cadres. They are forcing the higher CCP leadership to critically assess the role of party members in society, their relationships with each other and measures the party's senior echelons has taken to regulate them. How the CCP deals with                                                  10 Esherick, "Deconstructing the Construction," 1079.  11 Ibid., 1066-1068, 1072-1073.  10  these issues could affect both its future and that of China, and it is critical that scholars gain a better understanding of the inner workings of the party, its different levels and the people who staff them. The CCP is shaped by its past. Much of its history is about members trying to draw lessons from previous experiences or retreating from past extremes; decisions on policy issues are also influenced by events from earlier times. To understand the state of relationships, norms and disciplinary control in the current day CCP, it is necessary to explore their development over the long run, starting with the party organizations that helped to bring the CCP to power over six decades ago.  1.3 My Study and its Treatment of Party Members and Organization Development  These issues add importance to Esherick's approach. My work will apply and expand on its framework of analysis through a case of party organizations and members in Rushan, Haiyang and Jiaodong. Esherick's works provide a good start on how to understand the formation of relationships, roles and disciplinary measures in the CCP, but they are limited in their analysis. These studies do not deal with the relationships between the party centre and local organizations across China. Esherick bases his observations on northern Shaanxi, an area where central party leaders such as Mao Zedong were present during the mid 1930s to the late 1940s, and were in a position to closely watch over and direct local party development. The situation was very different in most of the areas where CCP organizations developed, which were often long distances away from the party centre, and had limited contact with it. It is from these places, rather than northern Shaanxi, that the CCP mobilized enough men and resources to take over China. The interactions between them and the party centre need to be studied.  Carrying out such a study requires doing several things. The means of communication between the party centre and areas beyond its Shaanxi base, and how much central leaders were able to interact with them over time, need to be examined. Researchers must also consider the issue of regionalism and localism when looking at interactions between the party centre and different parts of China. This issue is important because local identity has always been a part of Chinese culture, and shapes social ties in many ways. Local and regional connections and solidarities, politically, have often 11  created insider/outsider tensions that hampered integration between different parts of China; governments over the country's history have constantly had to deal with them in their administrative strategies. Understanding how the CCP handled local and regional identities prior to 1949 may also shed light on the party's later developments. While scholars have acknowledged that the party won because of its local and regional organizers, research by some, such as Keith Forster, have noted that the higher CCP leadership became increasingly suspicious towards them during the 1950s, and ultimately carried out purges that replaced many important native cadres in different parts of China with outsiders.12 Was this phenomenon already happening prior to 1949? Did experiences from the party's rise to power, and the attempt by Mao and other central cadres to draw lessons from them create a distrust towards native CCP leaders?    I chose Rushan, Haiyang, their region and Shandong specifically to answer these questions. Shandong has a strategic military significance in China, and its CCP organizations played a major role in bringing the party to power in 1949. Traditionally seen as connector between the north and south of the country, the province saw two important railways built in the early 20th century.13 Its eastern coastline also provided quick access to Manchuria, China's most industrially developed and resource rich region during the republican period. Men from Shandong were also known for their martial prowess, and often formed the core of successful armies. CCP organizations in the province also played a critical role in the party?s rise to national power. They mobilized over eight million men, women and children for military service or support duties in the party's final conflict with the GMD from 1945 to 1949, more than any other place in China, and sent them to fight not only in Shandong but also in Manchuria during the early stages of the war.14 Large numbers of Shandong troops allowed the party to build a stronghold in Manchuria, and CCP forces in the province itself also tied up more GMD                                                  12 Keith Forster, "Localism, Central policy, and the Provincial Purges of 1957-1958: The Case of Zhejiang," in New Perspectives on State Socialism of China, ed. Tony Saich and Timothy Cheek (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 113-125.  13 James Z. Gao, ?From Rural Revolution to Urban Revolutionization: A Case Study of Lu Zhongnan,? Journal of Contemporary China 10 no. 27 (2001): 235-236.  14 Wang Dongming, Shandong renmin zhiyuan jiefang zhanzheng shi (History of the Shandong People's Support of the Liberation War) (Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 1991), 58. 12  troops than anywhere else during the civil war.15 Victory by these same forces in HuaiHai, an area that covers parts of southern Shandong and neighboring Jiangsu province in late 1948 and early 1949, effectively sealed Communist victory. It isolated GMD forces in northern China, leaving them to be picked off by Communist forces, and left the GMD's political centre in central China exposed to CCP attack.  Shandong also serves as a good case study of interactions between the party levels before 1949 and their role in the CCP's victory in China. The province, due to its location, was considered a major area of concern by Mao Zedong. Central party leaders paid close attention to Shandong, and frequently sent key figures there during this time to oversee party and policy development. Kang Sheng, one of Mao's most trusted confidants, for example, was sent in 1947 and ultimately took over leadership of the province. However, the party centre had not been able to assert control over the CCP in the province before the 1940s; organizations there had developed largely without its guidance. Shandong, due to this absence, provides a good case study of how the highest reaches of the party interacted with fairly autonomous local organizations.   The CCP built an extensive network of party organizations across Shandong during the 1930s and 1940s. My study will focus on Jiaodong and two counties in it for several reasons. David Paulson, in his thesis, has argued that Shandong is actually several regions, each with their own distinct geographies, economies and social structures rather than a coherent entity.16 Jiaodong is one of these regions. Shandong, prior to the late 1930s, did not have a strong provincial party leadership. Organizations in the various regions of Shandong were frequently left on their own, and developed independently. Studying one part of Shandong will provide a more detailed analysis of localism in CCP organizations and their influence on interactions within the party. I chose Jiaodong because the region contributed the most to the CCP's rise to power. Party organizations in the Peninsula recruited 285,839 soldiers and more than a million labourers during the CCP's final conflict with the GMD from 1945-1949, more than any part of Shandong.17                                                   15 Xiang Lanxin, Mao?s Generals: Chen Yi and the New Fourth Army (Lanham: University Press of America, 1998), 135.  16 Paulson, "War and Revolution," 9-15.  17 Wang, Shandong renmin, 95, 154. 13  Rushan and Haiyang are important to my study in several ways. Originally one county, they were the first places in rural Jiaodong to have communist activities. Members from the two counties helped to found regional party organizations that brought the CCP to other parts of Jiaodong, and became leading figures in them. Those who remained at home were also instrumental in the CCP's rise to power. They created large local party networks, and organized most of the population in their native places to support the CCP's military efforts. In Haiyang alone party organizations sent 170,000 individuals, nearly half of its population, to fight for or carry out logistical services for CCP forces from 1945 to 1949.18 Rushan's contribution was less spectacular, but it also played a crucial role in supplying the party with critical manpower and resources for its national victory. The development of the CCP membership in the two counties is a window into how the party in the region emerged, how it spread, the type of people that joined it, and how a hierarchy of levels reaching deep into society was created. It also offers a look at how the authority of the party centre was asserted to regional levels of the CCP hierarchy, the interactions of higher party agendas with local ties and identities, and what types of intra-party relationships were behind the CCP's 1949 victory.   1.4 Methodology, Sources and the Layout of the Thesis  A study of the CCP membership in Haiyang and Rushan is first and foremost an examination of the people who joined the party. My thesis will begin with what Joseph Esherick has called a "political anthropology" of the CCP, looking at the personal backgrounds of Haiyang and Rushan members, why they joined the party, and how it evolved over time as the CCP networks in the two counties expanded. This analysis runs throughout my thesis. I will also slowly trace the formation of party levels and organizations in the two counties and Jiaodong, their linking up with higher CCP levels and the development of norms and disciplinary measures in them. Since party members are also members of society, they and their entrance into the CCP was also influenced by events outside the party. My thesis will address the impact of larger developments in                                                  18 Shandongsheng Haiyang xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (hereafter cited as SHXBW), Haiyang xianzhi (Haiyang Gazetteer) (Haiyangxian: Shandongsheng xinwen chuban guanliju, 1988), 120.    14  China, such as the war with Japan, on the behavior of members. The role of these events on CCP development has long been dominated by the theories of Chalmers Johnson and other earlier scholars. My thesis will engage with them, but will also explore the specific impact of greater events on the Jiaodong region.  For my analysis I have assembled a large number of sources, some of which have never previously been available to scholars outside China. The most important of these are CCP archival materials. In 2006 and 2007 I visited the archives of Rushan and Haiyang and the Shandong Provincial Archives in Jinan, and gathered several thousand pages of inner party documents from the two counties, as well as the Jiaodong CCP prior to 1949. These records, a mixture of inner party directives, reports, personnel records, and correspondence between organizers, give insight into how the CCP in Jiaodong functioned, the interactions between its different levels, how the higher party attempted to impose its agendas on regional and local organizations, and how CCP organizations have tried to regulate their members. To further explore the workings of the CCP in Jiaodong, I have supplemented my archival sources with a large number of published documentary compilations from the People's Republic of China on the Shandong party, which contain additional materials from the period.  I use the archival materials mainly to explore the development of CCP organizations. In order to examine the backgrounds of the people who staffed them I gathered a large number of written personal recollections by party members from Haiyang and Rushan. These sources are not without their flaws. They give a distorted telling of historical events. Most of the important party figures in the two counties had passed away long before I began my study, and many of their recollections were written during the Maoist period. These works were often composed according to an ideological narrative praising the CCP?s revolution, and portray the history of the party in the two counties, particularly in the early stages, as a heroic struggle against oppressive government officials, elites and the Japanese. The revolutionaries who wrote them also tend to exaggerate support among the residents of Rushan and Haiyang for their activities, their roles in certain events; they portray early members as either martyrs or traitors.   However, these sources contain a good deal of personal information, such as the education level of members and comments about their families, which are often told in a 15  non-politicized way. They, along with many of the archival documents I have collected, are also written in a crude style, with poor grammar and word usage; these provide fascinating insights into the type of people who joined the CCP in Jiaodong prior to 1949. I use these sources mainly to uncover the personal backgrounds of members, and have supplemented them with unpublished memoirs, found in local archives, which are less ideological in their recounting of personal history and party activities. My work also uses documents from the Haiyang and Rushan's organization departments, the branch of the local CCP in charge of registering and regulating members, which gives often critical assessments of the activities of party members to gain a more balanced understanding of the people who joined the CCP over time.     Since my study is about a small part of China and some of the sources on the CCP that I use contain strong biases, it is important to develop a good understanding of the social structure, history and economic context of Rushan, Haiyang and Jiaodong in order to more objectively examine party development in them. To do so I have consulted several types of materials. One is official revolutionary histories and gazetteers produced by local governments in Jiaodong. Such works were commissioned by CCP authorities, but they are also reflections of local identity, and record events that the populace in different parts of the Peninsula felt strongly about. They often pay lip service only to party ideology, and include a great deal of information that either does nothing to praise the CCP or even negates its efforts. My thesis taps official CCP histories and gazetteers for background knowledge of Rushan, Haiyang and Jiaodong. I supplement them with non-CCP sources to verify the information that they provide. Among them are local gazetteers produced prior to 1949 and dispatches from the American consulate in Yantai, a major port in the Jiaodong area, which made constant reports on the political situation and economic conditions of the Peninsula from the 1920s to 1941. I also looked at Shandong wenxian (Shandong memorabilia), collected recollections of Shandong inhabitants who fled to Taiwan in 1949, which contains many personal reflections by people from Jiaodong.  My study is divided into three sections and six body chapters. Its three sections each cover a period in the CCP?s history in Rushan, Haiyang and Jiaodong prior to 1949, and have a different focus. The first is composed of Chapters Two, Three and Four and 16  looks at the years 1928 to 1941. It is centered on exploring how the CCP in Rushan, Haiyang and Jiaodong emerged and the types of people who became its initial party members. The second section, made up of Chapters Five and Six covers the years 1938 to 1945, and focuses on the establishment of intra-party discipline in the Jiaodong CCP, from higher levels of the Peninsula?s party to organizations in the village, the lowest level of society. The third section, containing Chapter Seven, explores how the CCP used its organizations in Rushan, Haiyang and Jiaodong to mobilize rural society for war during its military struggle for control of China. It covers the years 1945 to 1948.  I chose this periodization and division of chapters for several reasons. CCP organizations in Rushan, Haiyang and most Jiaodong were largely without sustained contact with higher levels of the party prior to 1941, and functioned essentially as autonomous groupings. A study of party development from 1928 to 1941 gives a good insight into the people who made up the CCP membership during the 1940s, their motivations for entering the party and the issues that higher leaders had to deal with when they tried to impose discipline over this group. Leaders from the party?s centre began to arrive in Jiaodong from 1938 on, and they slowly asserted their authority and tried to foster discipline over organizations in different parts of Jiaodong, reaching to the lowest levels of the CCP in the Peninsula by 1945. This makes the years 1938 to 1945 a distinct period in the Jiaodong CCP?s development. The years 1945 and 1948 were the most crucial for the CCP in the pre-1949 period. It was a time when the party was engaged in a life and death struggle with the GMD for control of China. Studying party organizations in this period provides an in-depth analysis of whether organization was a decisive factor in the CCP's national victory in 1949. The different chapters of my work are arranged to explore these issues. Chapter two covers a short period from the summer of 1928 to mid-1929 and examines the conditions that helped the CCP in Rushan and Haiyang emerge. It also explores what types of people were motivated to join the party through a focus on one person, Yu Xingfu, an early party member. The third chapter looks at the rise and fall of the CCP in Haiyang, Rushan and Jiaodong from 1928 to 1936, and examines problems in the party caused by its early membership. My forth chapter looks at the role of China?s 1937-1945 war with Japan in shaping the CCP?s fortunes in Rushan and Haiyang, and the type of 17  party members it created. Chapters Five and Six take a different tone, and focus less and less on actual party members. They cover a time when the CCP membership in Jiaodong dramatically expanded, making members more faceless, only statistics in party sources. The 1938 to 1945 period also saw a significant effort by leaders from the party centre to assert discipline amongst party members in Jiaodong at the expense of the individual. The two chapters focus more on the policies of the party, particularly its mechanisms for controlling and fostering cohesion amongst party members, but they also explore the impact of these measures on individual party members through a few case studies.  Chapter Five analyzes the assertion of discipline at higher levels of the Jiaodong party. The sixth chapter looks at how the party created a more cohesive and disciplined membership at the lower levels of the CCP, and uses Rushan and Haiyang as a case study. It also explores how the CCP began to strengthen the control its organizations had over society. I argue that this was closely connected with fostering intra-party cohesion, since doing both involved breaking down old social ties in society and establishing new class identities in rural society. The last chapter of my thesis analyzes the role played by party organizations in the CCP?s national victory. It explores how the newly reorganized party in Rushan and Haiyang mobilized society to support the CCP?s military actions in both Shandong and Manchuria during the 1945 to 1949 civil war.  My study uses two theoretical frameworks to study party members in Jiaodong and the efforts of higher leaders to discipline them. In carrying out a ?political anthropology? of the CCP in Rushan and Haiyang I use a specific framework of analysis, Martin C. Yang's concept of intersecting circles in rural society. First articulated in his 1945 study A Chinese Village: Taitou, Shandong Province, an anthropological work on a village in Jiaodong, Yang argued that rural society in the area was held together by several layers of circular networks of relationships and associations, with the family household being the primary and most tightly knit circle, and lineages, status and religious groups, and villages and market towns forming ever larger, increasingly less cohesive networks.19 I use Yang's framework for several reasons. It is based on research of rural society near my area of study. Yang's model is also flexible. Many later scholars,                                                  19 Martin C. Yang, A Chinese Village: Taitou, Shandong Province (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), 2-3.  18  such as William Skinner and Prasenjit Duara, have used his model loosely to construct theories on rural marketing and religious networks in rural China. I plan to modify and add to Yang's framework to build a new understanding of the CCP?s development in Jiaodong.  Yang's model also argues that its various circular networks and their cohesion were in constant flux, breaking down over issues such as personal rivalries and economic decline sometimes but also becoming stronger again over time.20 This latter assertion is very valuable to understanding the formation and spread of the CCP in Jiaodong. The Peninsula, for much of the first half of the 20th century, was a dynamic and unstable place. Intrusion by foreigners into northern and eastern China from the end of the 19th century on led to the sudden development of two modern cities, Qingdao and Yantai, and brought new forms of education, technology, transportation and trade to what had previously been a less populated and economically backward part of both Shandong and China. Foreign intrusion also provided economic opportunities for Jiaodong residents by stimulating the development of Manchuria, something that prompted many of them to go to the nearby region as migrant labourers. Jiaodong also bore the brunt of political instability in China during the period, such as militarist struggles, Japanese intrusion and invasion, and a succession of governments from the 1920s to the 40s, which fostered constant disorder as well as social and economic breakdown in its rural areas.  These developments had several effects on society in the Peninsula. They periodically broke down important circular networks linking rural inhabitants and the authority and social order they fostered. The emergence and expansion of cities, modern education and travel also brought radical political ideas into the Jiaodong countryside, and spread them to those who felt most alienated by the disruption of key circular networks. CCP revolutionaries emerged out of the interaction between social breakdown and the spread of political radicalism, and they used still cohesive circular networks, such as lineages, to expand their numbers. The surviving circular networks had a strong influence on revolutionaries, producing local sentiments and insider/outsider tensions which hampered intra-party cohesion and made the establishment of discipline and collective norms by higher CCP levels a difficult task.                                                   20 Yang, A Chinese Village, 133-142, 157-172. 19  In examining how the larger national party fostered commitment amongst party members in Jiaodong I draw some insights from political scientist Kenneth Jowitt and his writings on Leninist parties, of which the CCP is a variant. Jowitt analyzes mainly Leninist parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but I chose him because he is specifically focused on the question of how Communist parties make people devoted members, and the means that they use to do so. Many of Jowitt?s assertions also apply to the process of how the higher CCP leadership imposed discipline on party members in Jiaodong. Jowitt contends that Leninist parties, despite their differences, have one similar quality. Most of these parties emerged and took power in countries where society was organized into corporate groups, such as kinship organizations, communities and families. He asserts that Leninist parties foster commitment among their members by breaking down their attachment to these groups and ultimately weakening the influence of these groupings over society in general. Jowitt argues that Leninist parties do so through two steps, imposing ?impersonal? organizational procedures, formal practices in an organization that reject personal favouritism between its members, and class struggle in wider society. Both these concepts, Jowitt asserts, were new to societies where Leninist parties emerged, since they were mostly organized along corporate group lines rather than economic ones, and were held together more by informal ties between kinsmen, family members and friends rather than by impersonal procedures. However, Jowitt contends that Leninist parties used the two concepts in a distinct and creative way that broke down old identities and placed its members and society into new corporate groups and identities, such as the party organization and class groups led by the administrative apparatuses of the parties.21  These assertions apply in many ways to society in pre-1949 Jiaodong, which was based on kinship, community and family units. The larger process in which higher CCP leaders fostered commitment amongst party members in the Peninsula is also in many ways a conflict between existing social identities and the imposition of impersonal norms and class conflict. My thesis will explore in detail this conflict through an analysis of                                                  21 Kenneth Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 10-21, 27-29. 20  party evolution in Haiyang, Rushan and Jiaodong. It also looks at the precise mechanisms that party leaders used to foster commitment to the CCP and impose class identity.  Analysis of CCP development in Jiaodong using these two frameworks builds up to the conclusion of my thesis, where I discuss the implications of my findings for understanding CCP evolution prior to 1949 and how intra-party discipline and cohesion were established between the party?s central leadership and organizations in different parts of China. I will also examine how my case study relates to the development of the CCP and its larger treatment of party members during the Maoist period.                    21  Chapter 2: Violent Beginnings: Young Men and the Emergence of Revolutionary Politics in Haiyang/Rushan   On the night of June 17, 1928, Chen Xizhou (???), a member of the local elite in eastern Haiyang (??) woke up to noises. Chen was grabbed by several young men who had climbed the wall of his home and was beaten to death by them shortly after. Over the next few days these young men attacked and ransacked several police stations in Haiyang and two surrounding counties, with several groups of others. Armed with a small number of firearms captured from the raids, they made three attempts to seize the county towns of Haiyang and Muping, the county bordering it from late June to early July.1  2.1 People Behind the Attacks: The Story of Yu Xingfu   These incidents were the start of several months of rebellious violence by a group of disgruntled young men in Haiyang and Rushan. The rebellion was the product of a turbulent time in the Jiaodong Peninsula during the early 20th century, in which bad weather and political turmoil were creating economically fallen families with frustrated sons. Rebels organized themselves through traditional ties, but they were influenced by a radical disrespect for all forms of authority in their communities, which was caused by their marginalized social status and detachment from their families through long distance work and study. Work and study in faraway places was a fairly new phenomenon in Jiaodong, and they exposed some young men to revolutionary ideas that made them express their frustrations through violence. The rebels took action during a time of extreme political instability and collapse of local order in Jiaodong. Their actions, along with the consequences of turmoil in the Peninsula would turn some rebels into                                                  1 Cao Zhongmin, Bandao fenghuo (Tales of the Peninsula) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 2004), 68, 70-79.  22  communists and pave the way for the spread of the CCP to Haiyang and Rushan. The rebellion began with the attack on Chen, but its roots go back a year earlier, when Yu Xingfu (???), a main figure in the killing of Chen Xizhou, returned to his native village after eight years of work in Manchuria. Yu, according to a recollection of his life written prior to his death in 1979, was born in a village in eastern Haiyang in 1904. His family was once prosperous and give him six years of traditional education, but had to send him off as a labourer to Manchuria at the age of 15 because of poverty.    Figure 1  Yu Xingfu  Source: Cao Zhongmin, Bandao fenghuo (Tales of the Peninsula) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 2004).   Yu left in a year when Haiyang was in the grip of a major drought, but with help from family members in Manchuria was able to find a variety of work in eastern Liaoning Province. He notes that he was a coolie hauling ships upstream on the Yalu River, carted wood, earth and other materials for a workshop, and was finally employed in a bookstore in Dandong, a small city near the Korean border. Yu?s story was not unique, and he was among the tens of thousands of men from Jiaodong who travelled to Manchuria in search of work each year during the 1910s and the 1920s. However, Yu was never happy during his time there. Nor was he interested in work. Yu notes in his recollections that he spent much of his time in the book store secretly reading books and 23  newspapers. He came back to Haiyang in 1927 even though his older brother had fled to Manchuria a couple of months earlier, claiming to him that it was impossible to survive in their native county.2  Yu wrote his story from the perspective of someone who later became a revolutionary. He argues that the experience of Manchuria led him to communism, and notes that he came into contact with the idea of revolution while secretly reading an article of Shenbao at work in 1926, which praised Sun Yatsen. Yu contends that he was drawn to Sun's principles, as well as his revolutionary vision for China "like a thirsty man to water" afterwards, and started on the path of revolution. We can only guess what he might have felt at the time. Sun's calls for revolution might have excited Yu's sense of adventure at a time when he faced nothing but the monotony of work. Studies of Manchurian migration, such as Thomas Gottschang and Diana Lary's 2000 work Swallows and Settlers: The great migration from north China to Manchuria, have argued that it was a part of family strategies for survival rather than individual choice. Migrants felt no sense of drama or opportunity and could only take pride in their ability to endure hardship. Perhaps Sun's vision of national unity also fed into Yu's search for belonging. Gottschang and Lary assert that most migrants accepted the experience of Manchuria out of a sense of attachment to their families, the only source of emotional comfort and social security in early 20th century China.3 Yu, however, didn?t feel these sentiments. His parents had passed away while he was gone, and he was alone in his community after his brother fled. He had nothing but harsh words for his relatives, claiming that they usurped his inheritance, and accusing neighbours of encroaching on his family land and cutting down a tree on it. What ever the reasons, he returned home with several copies of Sun's works, including The Three Principles of the People, Declaration of the First Congress of the GMD, and the Letters of the 76 Martyrs, bought in Dalian.4                                                    2 Yu Zhou, "Yuzhou zizhuan," (Autobiographical tale of Yu Zhou) in Jiaodong zhiguang (Light of Jiaodong), ed. Zhonggong Weihai shiwei dangshi ziliao zhengji yanjiu weiyuanhui (Weihai?: Shandongsheng xinwen chubanju, 1990), 337-338.  3 Diana Lary and Thomas Gottschang, Swallows and Settlers: The Great Migration from North China to Manchuria (Ann Arbor: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 2000), 9-10. 4 Yu Zhou, "Yuzhou zizhuan," 338. 24   It did not seem that Yu was looking for revolution, or even knew where to find it. He returned to tend his family farm even though there was a revolutionary civil war going on in China. However, possession of books by Sun Yatsen, which Yu sometimes lent to friends, attracted several young men to his home. One of these was Yu Shoutang (???), a member of his lineage from a nearby village. Yu Shoutang, like Yu Xingfu, had also worked for many years in Manchuria, and had been a store clerk in Heilongjiang. He was more successful, earning enough money to start a business upon his return, but by 1927 he was falling on hard times. Yu Shoutang had been introduced to the GMD a year earlier by his cousin Yu Yunting (???), who became a GMD member while studying in Beijing and brought Yu Shoutang into the party during a brief trip home. Another was Zhang Jianan (???). Zhang, from the same village as Yu Shoutang, was introduced to the GMD by a lineage member who studied in Yantai. Yu Xingfu was subsequently made a GMD member by him.5  2.2 Yu Xingfu's Homeland  Yu Xingfu speaks of all this in idealistic terms, and notes that he and the other men formed a peasant association that attracted growing numbers of locals by the spring of 1928.6 However, his environment was hardly ideal. Established in 1735, Haiyang was formed out of a coastal defence outpost, the garrison town of Dasongwei (???) and two nearby counties, Laiyang (??) and Muping (??).7 The county, during the Qing and the early Republic, was shaped like a foot, with its heel and toes facing the sea, and its ankle in the north. It had a varied and complex geography, dotted with low rocky hills (?), large dirt mounds (??), and patches of flatland with various small rivers running through them. Its southern, coastal areas were largely composed of plains, with the landscape becoming more hilly and mountainous further to the north.                                                    5 Yu Zhou, "Yuzhou zizhuan," 339; Cao, Bandao fenghuo, 65. 6 Yu Zhou, "Yuzhou zizhuan," 339.  7 SHXBW, Haiyang xianzhi, 2 (see introduction, n. 18). 25   Figure 2  Map of Haiyang  Source: Created based on a map from: Haiyangxian minzhengzhi biancunzu, Haiyangxian minzhengzhi (Administrative Gazetteer of Haiyang) (Neibu, 1987).   Though politically under one territorial boundary, life in Haiyang was actually organized along commercial, geographical and other divisions. The county can be separated into four main landscapes, east, west, north and south. Its east and west, formerly belonging to Muping and Laiyang, were composed of patches of flatland surrounded by hills and some small rocky outcrops. Its northern section was rugged and made up of chains of large, rocky hills, and its south coast, where the county seat, Fengcheng (??) (formerly Dasongwei) was located, was largely flat.8 Western and eastern Haiyang shared a similar landscape with eastern Laiyang and southern Muping, and were further connected to these areas in commerce and kinship networks by main roads linking Fengcheng with the seats of nearby counties, which are divided into those                                                  8 Ibid., 56-57.  26  going east, west and north.9 Eastern Haiyang and southern Muping, in fact, formed a natural geographical entity, being separated from other areas by rocky hills in the east and west. 10  Geography, commercial ties and other differences in the county would influence later administrative divisions. Haiyang lost its east, where Yu lived, in a redrawing of county borders by the CCP in 1941, and a large part of its north in late 1944. Its eastern portion, along with southern Muping, were merged into a new county, Rushan (??), named after a landmark in the southern part of the area.11  2.3 A Time of Turmoil  Haiyang, like much of Jiaodong, was normally prosperous. The county, located in a coastal area, had a temperate climate, with plentiful rain during the summers and mild winters. This beneficial weather pattern made Haiyang very productive agriculturally. A modern gazetteer for the county, published in 2004, notes an old local saying, that "All areas within nine li of a river are fertile, and frost never exceeds three cun during the winter." Haiyang was not the wealthiest part of Jiaodong, but its location and climate gave it a diverse and bustling economy. Many Haiyang products, such as soy and black beans, sorghum, black onions, tobacco and taro, were prized across Shandong. The county, like many other places in Jiaodong, was also a major centre for growing peanuts and producing peanut oil. Haiyang enjoyed busy sea trade with Manchuria and many places along China?s eastern coastline because of its products, and developed over 30 major market towns by the late Qing/early republic.12                                                    9 Ibid., 347. 10 Rushanshi minzhengju, Shandongsheng Rushanshi dimingzhi (Gazetteer of Place Names in Rushan City, Shandong Province) (Jinan: Shandongsheng ditu chubanshe, 2008), 3.  11 Haiyangshi difang shizhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (hereafter cited as HDSBW), Haiyangshi zhencun jianzhi (Brief Gazetteer of Haiyang City's Townships and Villages) (Beijing: Zhongguo chubanshe, 2004), 5. 12 HDSBW, Haiyangshi zhencun, 11, 13, 18, 20. 27   Figure 3  New Boundaries of Rushan and Haiyang  Source: Created based on maps from: Haiyangxian minzhengzhi biancunzu, Haiyangxian minzhengzi (Administrative Gazetteer of Haiyang) (Neibu, 1987); Rushanshi dangshi shizhi bangongshi, Zhonggong Rushan difangshi (CCP Local History of Rushan) (Xianggang: Tianma chubanshe, 2005).    Despite these conditions, however, life in Haiyang during the late 1920s was anxiety-driven and tension-filled. The county, as well as much of Jiaodong, was stifling under militarist Zhang Zongchang (???)'s rule, which fostered instability in many ways. One of these was taxes. The number of miscellaneous taxes and surcharges to the land tax in Shandong had been rising since the last years of the Qing, but the province under Zhang's governorship from 1925-1928 saw an explosion in their number. Seeking to support his vast army building program and for personal gain, Zhang added a growing list of surcharges to existing taxes. Surcharges on land tax alone went from three in 1924 to 15 in 1928, with 1928 surcharges exceeding by more than ten times the actual tax itself.13                                                    13 Yu Qingpan and Song Xianzhang, Muping xianzhi (Muping Gazetteer) (Taibei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1936, 1968), 565-567.  28   Figure 4  Topography of Rushan and Haiyang  Source: Created based on maps from: Yantaishi jiaoyu kexue yanjiuyuan, Yantai dili (Geography of Yantai) (Beijing: Xinshijie chubanshe, 2006); Royal Prussian Land Survey, <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~chgis/maps/hist/sd_29.html>   Increased taxation did not create social tensions on its own, but did so in tandem with armed, ravenous state forces to be unleashed upon rural society. Rapidly expanding tax burdens, the growing inability and unwillingness of society to pay them and pressure from Zhang led governments to increasingly turn to the police to collect taxes, and to resort to ever more aggressive practices in using them. Such men, part of a formal government bureaucracy at the county level and above that emerged only during the early 20th century, brought a menacing presence previously unknown in rural society. They were quick to use force to achieve their aims. Often poorly paid, they frequently used their roles to prey on the local populace with fines and additional charges.14 This process bred popular resentment towards those in county government and people with                                                  14 Cao, 34-35. Caos work gives many examples of extortion by local police forces in Jiaodong. 29  connections to police and government officials. Some of the latter served in the new bureaucratic institutions, and were seen as either behind the police abuses, or evading taxes, being able to do so due to their connections. Predatory taxation also marginalized sub-county leaders and local elites without government connections. Such men had traditionally collected taxes and served as brokers between state and society. However, they were increasingly sidelined in the tax collection process, and often became the first victims of the police, who saw them as having wealth to be squeezed.    The growing police presence in the countryside did little to improve basic security. Bandits operated in much of rural Jiaodong. They had long been a problem in the area, where the abundance of rocky hills provided many places to hide, but banditry was made worse by Zhang Zongchang's erratic army-building from 1925-1928; he suddenly raised an army of as many as 400,000 men but just as quickly disbanded most of it. Large numbers of marginal young men were recruited, given military training and weapons, but quickly found themselves unemployed, causing many to turn to banditry.15 Bandits were not purely predatory. Phil Billingsley, in his 1988 book Bandits in Republican China, has noted that they naturally seek to create a viable environment for their activities, and often do so by integrating themselves into existing power structures.16 Jiaodong bandits were a parasitic group, adept at exploiting the weaknesses of their environment to achieve maximum gain while minimizing risks to themselves; they frequently shifted between the roles of brigands, state brokers and mercenaries. Many used the poor security in the countryside to establish extortion spheres, forming a new layer of power between state and society. Bandits often settled in temples, at times with the connivance of local religious leaders who sought to gain a cut of their earnings. They used brutal violence to intimidate surrounding areas into paying tribute, but were also known to take up legitimate functions later on.17 One bandit in southern Muping, according to an official                                                  15 Ibid., 15, 25-26.  16 Phil Billingsley, Bandits in Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), xvii, 151.  17 Li Yuting, "Yi minchu Jiaodong shehui gaikuang" (Remembering Society in Jiaodong During the Early Republic), Shandong wenxian (Shandong Memorabilia) 12, no. 3 (1986-1987): 83. Examples of bandit strategies can be seen in the recollection of Li Yuting, a resident of the border area between northern Haiyang and nearby Qixia County who later moved to Taiwan. Li notes that a group of bandits first settled in a local temple, extorting 30  local history, developed good ties with the county's magistrate, and served as litigation agent for locals in law cases.18 Bandits punished communities as a whole for defiance, but often did not treat them as a whole when it came to extortion to avoid triggering backlashes from the entire population. Dispatches from the US consulate in Yantai in 1928 noted that bandits often targeted the rich, at times even dividing communities into different wealth groups, demanding higher amounts from those with more money. 19 Bandits raided official forces for weapons when sensing that they were weak, but were also known to join them when promised arms and wages, sometimes even rising to senior political and military office. Bandits, like the police, added another menacing, exploitive presence in the lives of rural people, further raising tensions. Their collusion with official forces and different social groups also increasingly blurred the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate public behaviour, state and outlaw, and local leader and predator.    Man-made instability was compounded by natural calamity. Though normally good for agriculture, the weather was not kind to Jiaodong during the early 20th century. Haiyang saw five major droughts alone from 1904-1935, compared to seven in the previous two centuries combined, as well as numerous smaller weather disturbances on a near yearly basis. 20  Droughts in Jiaodong never caused mass deaths, since its close proximity to Manchuria and access to the sea facilitated migration to areas where jobs and alternative means of survival were available. However, they added to the hardships of its inhabitants, and created a constant angst about poor harvests which often affected the behaviour of locals more than the famines themselves.                                                                                                                                                   money from nearby villages and demanding that they pay up within three days. They burned down two villages that refused to pay but spared others who gave in to their demads.  18 Cao, 69.  19 United States Department of State, Chefoo Consulate (hereafter cited as USDSCC), Political Report, April 4th, 1928, p. 2-3; Vol. 199, January 7, 1928 - December 31, 1928; United States Consular Records for Chefoo, China, 1854 - 1942; Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, 1788-1991, Record Group 84; United States National Archives, College Park, MD. 20 SHXBW, 92.  31  2.4 Troubles: Convulsions of Violence  Fear of starvation and ruin, combined with an insecure and violent atmosphere created by taxation, predatory police, government officials and bandits often led to frenzied behaviour by rural communities directed at perceived oppressors. Sporadic violent anti-government outbursts had been common in many parts of Jiaodong long before Zhang's rule. Haiyang saw two major disturbances. The first of these, in the spring and summer of 1910 began when a group of village heads in the east of the county protested the growing number of miscellaneous taxes under the Xinzheng reforms. The group, using Song Xuanwen (???), a lower degree holder from the area as their representative, refused to collect taxes, and demanded a reduction of taxation in the county, which was in the midst of a major drought. They also accused several members of the gentry in the county who had close ties to the magistrate of tax evasion, placing fiscal burdens on the rest of society, and pocketing taxes that were collected to finance the new police force. Haiyang's magistrate first ignored the leaders, but in June of that year arrested Song. This response caused the heads to organize thousands of peasants to attack the county seat in early June. The group took the magistrate's forces by surprise, seizing the city and freeing Song, and went on a rampage over the next few days, looting grain from and destroying the property of suspected tax-evading gentry. The situation was eventually resolved by Song Xuanwen, who managed to negotiate an agreement with the magistrate for a temporary suspension of some taxes, and for the county gentry to collectively distribute grain to needy peasants. The fall of some rain in July of that year made many peasants feel that the drought was over.21  The second uprising, in 1919, also began in a drought year. It was a reaction to the establishment of salt police stations in the western part of the county, and was triggered by the shooting death of three local men by the police, who suspected that they                                                  21 Che Jianji, "Song Xuanwen lingdaode Haiyang nongmin kangjuan douzheng" (Haiyang Peasant's Anti-tax Struggle Under the Leadership of Song Xuanwen), in Xinhai gemingqian LaiHaiZhao kangjuan yundong (Anti-tax Movement in Laiyang-Haiyang-Zhaoyuan Prior to the Xinhai Revolution), eds. Qi Qizhang, Liu Tongjun and Jin Fuzhai (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1989), 401-407; Haiyang xianzhi bangongshi, "Nao xiangsheqi fengchao" (Ruckus Against Xiang and She Elders), in Xinhai gemingqian, 407-412.  32  were salt smugglers. Thousands of inhabitants from Haiyang and western Laiyang attacked and destroyed several salt police stations in the county. They killed more than a dozen policemen, along with several local elites that they saw as having close ties with the salt police. Rioters even fought off a police unit led personally by the Haiyang magistrate to rescue the salt police, but dispersed when rain fell on the county on June 10th.22   2.5 Great Turmoil: 1928-1929   Instability created by Zhang Zongchang would produce a Peninsula-wide outburst of protest and violence in 1928-1929. Violence was triggered by a convergence of factors. In April of that year Zhang's forces were decisively defeated by the armies of the GMD. Zhang fled the province on April 30th, abandoning its western areas. GMD forces took Jinan, Shandong's provincial capital, on May 1st 1928, but were humiliatingly pushed out a week and a half later by Japanese forces, who feared that the GMD presence would harm Japan's interests in the city.23 Chiang Kai-shek, stunned by the event, abandoned                                                  22 SHXBW, 703-704; HDSBW, 10; Jiaodong tewei, "Guanyu Jiaodong de baogao" (Report Regarding Jiaodong), in Shandong geming lishi wenjian huiji (Collection of Documents on Revolutionary History in Shandong) Volume 6,  ed. Shi Lianquan and Xin Jundai (Beijing: Zhongyang danganguan, 1994-1996), 268 (hereafter cited as SGLWH);  Wang, Pixu and Liang Bingkun, Laiyang xianzhi (Laiyang Gazetteer) (Taibei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1935, 1968), 1626-1627.  23 Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: the Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 193-205; C. Wilbur Martin, "The Nationalist Revolution: from Canton to Nanking, 1923-1928," in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 12, part 1, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 703-706. Scholars who have written about the subject in English, such as Akira Iriye and C. Martin Wilbur, argue that the incident was caused by two factors, nationalistic behaviour of GMD troops and an attempt by the Japanese army to hijack its country's foreign policy. GMD troops, during the northern expedition, had often attacked foreign interests, something that led Japan's government to dispatch an expeditionary force to protect its large civilian population and many businesses in Shandong in April of 1928. Japanese troops were ordered to safeguard the country's interests in Qingdao, but army commanders, acting on their own initiative, moved forces to Jinan at the end of the month, claiming to protect Japan's 2,000 civilians in the city. These troops quickly came into conflict with GMD forces in Jinan, something that played into the hands of the Japanese army. It launched an offensive against the Nationalists, and pressured the Japanese government to send reinforcements. Reinforced Japanese units quickly 33  Shandong. The province was left outside direct GMD control, something that would have disastrous consequences for Jiaodong over the next two years. Large numbers of Zhang's troops used the GMD withdrawal to move to the Peninsula where, in the absence of a master, they began to fight amongst themselves. A number of coups, mutinies, intrigues and small wars broke out during the summer and fall of 1928. Eventually Liu Zhennian (???), a subordinate of Zhang?s, seized control of the Peninsula after defeating several rivals.24 Liu pledged allegiance to the GMD, but was forced into a life and death struggle in early 1929, when Zhang launched an attempt to retake power in Jiaodong. With help from the Japanese, Zhang triggered major defections among Liu's commanders and brought many of the bandits in Jiaodong to his side. Using these forces Zhang launched two efforts to take back the Peninsula in January and March 1929, but was defeated by Liu by May.25   All this was done with an utter disregard for local residents. Military commanders, caught in a bitter contest for survival and dominance following Zhang Zongchang's departure, began to extort "army contributions" and fines on top of already heavy taxes, leading to more predatory behaviour by local police. Political instability gave bandits free reign over the Peninsula. Many roamed around, searching for more profitable extortion zones, while others, exploiting the chaos further, claimed to be units of various warring factions or even of the GMD, demanding tribute in the name of military contributions and brutally punishing communities that refused their demands.26 Fighting between Zhang and Liu Zhennian also devastated the county towns of several counties in Jiaodong; dozens of civilians were killed and hundreds of houses destroyed in Muping alone during twenty some days of fighting in March and April 1929.27 These developments took place                                                                                                                                                  delivered a humiliating defeat to the GMD. Wilbur and Iriye argue that the Jinan incident marked the start of the Japanese army's efforts to destabilize GMD China, something that led to Japan's seizure of Manchuria in 1931 and the outbreak of full scale war between the two countries in 1937.     24 USDSCC, Political Report, June 2nd, 1928 - October 1st, 1928; Vol. 199, January 7, 1928 - December 31, 1928.  25 Cao, 16-22; Lu Weijun et al., Minguo Shandongshi (Shandong History During the Republican Period) (Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 1995), 365-373.   26 Wang Pixu and Liang Bingkun, Laiyang xianzhi, 1628-1634.  27 Yu and Song, Muping xianzhi 1540-1541.  34  at a time when many parts of Jiaodong were facing drought, and spurred violent responses from aggrieved peasants, which led to even greater violence towards them.   The future Rushan area was the site of one of the largest uprisings in August 1928. Police from Muping, under pressure to meet the taxation demands of Fang Yongchang (???), one of the military commanders vying for power in the Peninsula, began to round up village heads in the southwest of the county to hold them for ransom. On August 22nd they abducted 29 village heads. The police held the village heads in a market town, beat them repeatedly and demanded that their families or communities pay ransoms for their release. This act triggered a violent response by Duan Chengzhai (???), one village head in the area. Duan had been arrested by the police a month earlier for the same purpose. Enraged by the arrest of so many leaders in one day, he first sent a messenger to Shi Zhongcheng (???), another former Zhang Zongchang subordinate whose troops were camped in northern Haiyang, asking him to arrest the Muping police. Shi agreed, but later demanded payment for the action, something that caused Duan to take action into his own hands. Working with a group of young men from his village and nearby areas, Duan launched a surprise attack on the police in the early morning hours of the next day. His group overwhelmed the police, rescuing the village heads. In a fit of rage he afterwards executed more than a dozen captured policemen.28    Realizing what they had done afterwards, Duan and other leaders held a discussion in Fengjiaji, and decided that they had no choice but to rebel. In the last days of August they called on all able bodied men from Fengjiaji and surrounding areas to take up arms, and marched on the county town. The force grew to thousands upon reaching the city. They burnt the homes of and killed several local elites with close ties with government officials on the way, but found Muping under a new magistrate appointed by Liu Zhennian, who had just ousted Fang Yongchang's forces from the area. Liu, whose troops were still weak at the time, disassociated himself from Fang's policies, and promised the rebels amnesty and tax exemptions. Rebel villagers, hearing this, began to scatter, and Duan and other leaders also withdrew.                                                   28 Cao, 95-112; Yu and Song, 470-471, 1537.   35  However, they had been tricked by Liu, who was busy winning over remnant Zhang forces and securing his hold over Jiaodong. When this was accomplished in early October, Liu struck at rebel leaders. On the night of October 12th, Liu's forces raided the villages of Duan and several other leaders. They burned these communities down, destroying dozens of houses, killing over 60 villagers, and took 100 others to Fengjiaji for the purpose of torturing them into revealing the whereabouts of rebel leaders. Liu's forces left a few days later, executing eight of the captured men, and pillaging the market town. Duan managed to escape and fled to Manchuria.29 2.6 Decline of Old Leadership, Rise of Young Men: An Analysis of the Protests  Rural protests in the Haiyang/Rushan have been viewed in various ways. CCP local histories presented them as part of the revolutionary tradition in the counties, for their opposition to government and elites.30 Roxanne Prazniak, in her 1999 book Of Camel Kings and Other Things: Rural rebels against modernity in Late Imperial China, takes another view, placing them into a moral economy framework. Looking at the 1910 Haiyang outburst, she argued that it was an assertion of traditional moral concerns and community structures against modern state building. Prazniak argues that the protest was triggered by two issues, breakdown of the traditional support for peasant subsistence from the state and its affiliated elites, and the creation of a new administrative apparatus that was centered at the county town. The new governing structure, which included modern bureaucratic institutions such as the police, gave the handling of many local matters, such as the management of taxes largely to elites with affiliation to the magistrate and higher officials, with no input from other local leaders. It also encouraged corruption amongst these elites, which, along with high taxes triggered a collective                                                  29 Cao, 112-133; Yu and Song, 472-473. 30 Rushanshi dangshizhi bangongshi (hereafter cited as RDB), Zhonggong Rushan difangshi (Local History of the CCP in Rushan) (Xianggang: Tianma tushu chubanshe, 2005), 3-7. 36  backlash demanding adherence to old moral traditions, which was organized by disenfranchised sub-county leaders and village chiefs.31    Prazniak asserts that the protest represented the emergence of a collective, native place-based moral consciousness against administrative mismanagement and disregard for the right of locals to survive. 32  However, an examination of protests in Haiyang/Rushan over the longer term points to change in another direction: the collapse of traditional native place leadership, moral concerns and community solidarity over time, and the replacement of traditional leaders in some places by a new, younger, more volatile type of leader. The uprising of 1910 was organized largely by men in their 50s and 60s, who had long held leadership positions in their communities.33 They initiated the conflict by protesting against high taxes, refusing to collect them when demands were not met, and they turned to violence only when pushed. Protest leaders also organized through their communities, using their positions to demand collective participation in the unrest.34   This is in sharp contrast to the 1919 and 1928 protests. Both of them were triggered by reactions to abuses by official forces rather than by social movements with clear demands. The 1919 unrest was largely spontaneous. Accounts, from Republican Era gazetteers to sympathetic CCP sources, mention no major leaders or demands. The differences between Duan Chengzhai's 1928 protest and its late Qing predecessor are even more startling. Unlike 1910 leaders, Duan was only 32 at the time of the protest, and had become a village head only a few months earlier. Duan led a revolt largely of young men, many of whom were only in their 20s. Many of them were only vaguely connected to their communities, and had spent years away in military service or other types of work. A number of older local leaders did take part in the uprising, but they played no central role, and some were coerced rather than willing participants. Duan, in one case, was said                                                  31 Roxanne Prazniak, Of Camel Kings and Other Things: Rural Rebels Against Modernity in Late Imperial China (New York: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 10-11; 29-39, 79-84.  32 Prazniak, Of Camel Kings, 40.  33 Qi, Liu and Jin eds., Xinhai gemingqian, 446, 452. Ages of the two main figures in the uprising, Song Xuanwen, who was 57 at the time, and Gao Qiwang, who was 62, reflect this. 34 Ibid., 453. 37  to have had his followers forcibly occupy a local leader's house for three days, eating all his grain as a form of intimidating him and his community into joining the revolt.35 His group had no well-defined agenda for the protest, and drifted around between rescuing captured village leaders, revenge and overthrowing the county government. They appealed to community solidarity in building up the rebel force, but did not rely on it as the main form of mobilization. Duan instead gathered his force through a variety of means, including recruiting young men from local martial arts schools and having other leaders call together youth from their lineage. The youth of the leaders, combined with the lack of a clear motive for the revolt, made it highly unstable. The unrest nearly turned on itself following Duan's decision to withdraw after hearing about Liu Zhennian's promise of amnesty. The move was highly unpopular with a group of the leaders, and caused them to seize some of Duan?s close associates as hostages briefly, sparking a short standoff between the rebels.36   These aspects of the protest suggest that they were not the emergence of a moral community trying to restore traditional moral behaviour, but simply ways of coping with the breakdown of such behaviour. Coping, which became increasingly aimless, violent and less based on old forms of organization, indicates that the decline of public concerns had spread down from government and elites to the lower levels of society over time. Jiaodong, by the late 1920s, was a very different place from 1910, becoming an increasingly Hobbsian world in which all previous social distinctions and roles were collapsing. Protesters in 1910 had faced a still stable state that had provided a working social order, and had traditionally aided rural society during hard times. This state, by 1928, had fallen into a variety of competing militarist factions, driven by both desperation and greed to plunder society mercilessly, and bandits who had in some cases become part of the local political order. Political instability especially targeted the local leadership. Leaders were subjected to predatory actions by official forces, and some of the functions they performed were even taken over by bandits. This, along with the unpopularity of collecting taxes, would have likely discouraged people with high social                                                  35 Du Xinghua, "Duanjia baodong shimo" (History of the Duan Family Village Revolt), Muping wenshi ziliao (Materials on History and Literature in Muping) 3 (1990): 130.   36 Cao, 114, 124-125.  38  standing or any wealth to lose from either taking part in local leadership or playing an active role in it.     Figure 5  Duan Chengzhai  Source: Cao Zhongmin, Bandao fenghuo (Tales of the Peninsula) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 2004).   Not even elites with government connections, often vilified by society as being insulated from government abuses, were spared. Such men in 1910 had enjoyed a number of powers under the Xinzheng reforms, including the management of taxes and institutions like the police. However, they, by the late 1920s, were increasingly becoming victims of militarists who monopolized power. Unlike other parts of China, Shandong never had the practice of having locals as magistrates during the Republic. Influential Jiaodong elites had to deal with a succession of militarist-appointed outsiders, who were gradually abandoning any accommodation with local interests and often saw them as the best sources to extort wealth.37 The years 1928 to 1929 were especially hard for elites, as political struggles led to quick turnovers of magistrates in many parts of the Peninsula.                                                  37 USDSCC, Political Report, June 2nd, 1928, p. 6; Vol. 199, January 7, 1928 - December 31, 1928. The American consulate in Yantai noted in June 1928 that newspapers in the city lamented the lack of locals in senior government positions in the Peninsula and demanded all government officials leave and give power to Jiaodong elites.  39  Magistrates increasingly became lackeys of militarist rulers, and they preyed on the wealthiest first to meet the demands of their masters. Duan Chengzhai, during his rebellion, had vowed to kill a number of Muping elites with strong government connections, including Yang Shuping (???), deputy head of the county's chamber of commerce.38 However, Yang himself was already in trouble, and was bankrupted not long after Duan's unrest by extortion from Muping's Liu Zhennian-appointed magistrate, a former bandit.39  Disorder affected not only individuals who had been traditional leaders, but also places that promoted collective solidarity, where leadership was exercised. Protest leaders in 1910 had organized their assault on the county town in a local temple.40 Studies, such as Prasenjit Duara's 1988 work, Culture, Power and the State, have noted that temples were places where rural communities interacted with each other, formed multi-village associations, and worked out cooperation on matters of collective importance. Temple rituals gave social legitimacy to multi-village associations, their leaders, as well as cooperative activities between rural communities. 41  These places, by 1928, however, were increasingly used as bandit lairs. As a further sign of the collapse of traditional order, religious figures who maintained them were at times also accused of colluding with bandits in the extortion and robbery of nearby communities.    These developments led to several things. Communities were increasingly without effective leaders and less able to organize in traditional ways. They were also frequently dominated by men with more physical power than authority, who asserted themselves largely through force. These included bandits and police, but also men from rural communities, who were younger, tougher, less rooted in their native place, and possibly due to this, more willing to confront their turbulent world and its risks. Duan was one such figure. It is not known if he had a family, and Duan was said by an official history to be largely uninterested in and barely doing any work at a joint business venture he owned with a friend in Fengjiaji. He was also hot tempered and rebellious, and had been kicked                                                  38 Cao, 121. 39 Yu and Song, 915.  40 Qi, Liu and Jin eds., 454. 41 Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China 1900-1942 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 31-28, 40.  40  out of middle school in his youth for making trouble.42 The chaotic environment of late 1920s Jiaodong favoured the aggressive over the tame. It also made the distinction between different groups often hazy. Duan's activities, such as robbing and intimidating local leaders and punitive violence, though done for a different reason, were not unlike those of police or bandits.  Effects of the turmoil during the period, such as the weakening of the old order, the shifting of power from older to younger men, and the increasing use of violence were also having another effect, of empowering those who hated the traditional social structure and were influenced by radical political beliefs. Among those taking part in Duan's rebellion were some of the same men who were responsible for the violence described at the start of the chapter, who were GMD members. Duan, himself, according to some local histories, was also driven to embrace radical political ideas by his violent experience in 1928. According to these sources, he became a CCP member while in exile in Manchuria. Though it was never proven, he was arrested after coming back to southern Muping during the mid 1930s, and was executed for being a Communist party sympathizer.43 It was from toughs like him that revolutionaries would emerge.  2.7 Aspiring Revolutionaries  Yu Xingfu makes no mention of these events, but evidence from his recollections and local party histories suggest that he and his associates were of the same breed of men that were dominating the countryside. They were young, mostly in their 20s, and loosely connected to their communities. Some, like Yu, had no family, while others were either estranged from their families or not under their control. Song Hechu, a member of Yu's group, for example, dominated his family after the death of his father in 1927, and would bankrupt it in the next few years by sending himself and his brothers to schools that he saw as having radical political leanings.44 Yu's group did not share a similar background                                                  42 Cao, 98.  43 RDB, Zhonggong Rushan, 6.  44 Song Zhuting, "Hanxin ruku yuxinren sheshen wangsi weigeming: ji wode yijia" (Endurance of Suffering Builds a New Man, Forgetting the Body and Death to Serve the Revolution: Remembering My Family), in Qingdao qingyunshi yanjiu (Research on the 41  of family wealth, but had a similar degree of education, having gone either to primary school, middle school, trade middle school or having some traditional learning. However, none of them was educated beyond a basic level, suggesting that they were not born into very poor backgrounds but were not very wealthy either. Like Duan Chengzhai, many were also idle, or like Yu, facing economic despair.   These shared qualities, despite differences in family wealth between Yu and other members of his group, were likely shaped by two factors: family decline, caused by partition of land and self-indulgent behaviour of members; and the larger political turmoil in Jiaodong. Yu was likely a victim of family decline, and he notes that other associates, such as Zhang Jianan, were also from "fallen" (??) families. Some in his group, such as lineage member Yu Shoutang, had also owned small businesses.45 Small merchants were hit particularly hard by the events of the late 1920s, and their predicament was noted by a report of the US consulate in Yantai in 1927. The report commented that the predations of Zhang's government, along with banditry, had affected businesses in a variety of ways. They caused a shortage of money and credit crucial to commerce, as money lenders and the wealthy often sent their money out of the province or hid it to avoid being extorted. Rampant banditry also led to constant transportation and trade stoppages, causing price fluctuations. These disruptions proved most harmful to small businesses, which lacked capital to stay afloat and were already hurt by heavy taxation. The 1927 US consulate report noted that many were either forced into bankruptcy or shut down to avoid losses.46  Bankruptcy, along with the rebellious behaviour of some of the members of Yu's group, likely caused their idleness and poverty; the similarities between Yu and his associates suggests that they were a mixture of social misfits, semi-outsiders in their communities, and victims of circumstance. They were in many ways prime candidates for making trouble for the existing order. Some were among the unlucky and marginalized,                                                                                                                                                  Youth Movement in Qingdao), Volume 1, ed. Qingdaoshi qingnian yundongshi gongzuo weiyuanhui (1988), 182-184. 45 Yu Zhou, "Zai shibai he cuozhe zhong zhaodao gongchandang" (Finding the CCP in the Midst of Defeat and Setback), in Jiaodong fengyunlu (Recollections of Jiaodong Tales), ed. Yantai diqu xingzheng gongshu chuban bangongshi (Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 1981), 55. 46 USDSCC, Review of Commerce and Industry in the Chefoo District, September 30th, 1927, p. 5, 27; Vol. 190.  42  being not born poor but put into destitution by developments beyond their control. They were, due to the lack of family or estrangement from it, not subject to one of the most basic forms of authority in Chinese society, and a key institution for anchoring individuals to legitimate society.   Yu and his associates found a call for rebellion in the slogans of the GMD, but they were only vaguely ideological. The GMD in Shandong during the 1920s was a weakly organized and poorly integrated entity, whose ideology often varied between different groups. Its activists were also heavily persecuted by Zhang Zongchang and often on the run. Members of Yu's group began as individuals who had been introduced to the party by friends and kinsmen. They came into contact with a more organized GMD presence in early 1927, through the efforts of activists in Yantai. These men were Jiaodong natives who had received training from the GMD in Guangdong. They had radical political leanings, and began to expand into the Rushan and Haiyang area through several men from Muping they recruited in the city. GMD members from Muping contacted Yu Xingfu's associates and a number of other young men in southern Muping through friends and lineage connections, and gave them some training in GMD ideology. However, this training was rudimentary, and not long after contacting Yu?s friends the Yantai party was broken up by Zhang Zongchang's police in the spring of that year. Most GMD activists from Yantai were arrested or fled.47   Members of the Yantai GMD group who managed to escape arrest returned a couple of months later. One of them, Yu Zhenxi (???), came back to southern Muping and eastern Haiyang to recruit party members. This marked the real expansion of the southern Muping/eastern Haiyang GMD group, but the GMD in Yantai continued to suffer disruption of its activities. It was also devastated by two events in the summer of 1928. 48  On June 13th, Shi Zhongcheng, head of Zhang Zongchang's army in Yantai, declared his allegiance to the national GMD. Shi permitted the Yantai party to operate freely, something that prompted Yu Zhenxi to travel to the Muping county town and                                                  47 Ding Weifen, "Shandong gemingdang shigao, shiyi" (Draft History of the Revolutionary Party in Shandong, Part Eleven), Shandong wenxian 4, no. 1 (1978-1979): 155-157; Yu and Song, 469.  48 Ding, "Shandong gemingdang," 157; Yu and Song, 470.  43  demand that the magistrate do the same.49 He was arrested by the pro-Zhang Zongchang magistrate, and did not hear from his group until after calm had been restored to Jiaodong in the fall of 1929.50 Yu's arrest led to the loss of a key go-between for the Yantai GMD and rural Jiaodong and severed contact between it and Muping/Haiyang members. Party activities in the county collapsed a month later, when Shi Zhongcheng was ousted from Yantai by a pro-Zhang Zongchang rival; this forced the GMD group in the city to flee for fear of persecution.51   Knowledge of the Muping/eastern Haiyang members about the GMD, under these conditions, was minimal. Yu Xingfu, in his memoir, states that he was brought in during the summer of 1927 largely because of the GMD ideological texts that he owned, since other members of the party in eastern Haiyang had poor knowledge of the party and wanted to learn more from these works.52 Accounts of members in Muping and Haiyang in local histories and recollections also suggest that the so-called GMD group and its peasant association was actually a loosely organized entity, whose rank and file were often temporary participants in its activities, recruited through kinship ties and martial arts schools; they were barely aware of its concepts and agendas. Peasant association members often shared a single surname, particularly in individual villages, suggesting that they were either related or members of the same lineage. Many men were skilled in martial arts; several were local instructors. 53  The looseness of their organization is perhaps best demonstrated by the description of Jiang Futang (??? ), a minor participant in the June 1928 unrest on the mobilization behind one of the raids,   On the afternoon of one day in the fifth month of the old lunar calendar my martial arts teacher Teng Zhenfang [a peasant association member] came to me in my village. He told me to organize people to join a "plain clothes squad". I didn't know what this meant or what the squad did, so I asked him. He said he didn't know what that was either. Only later did we find out. I gathered six men from my                                                  49 USDSCC, Political Report, July 2nd, 1928, p. 4; Vol. 199. 50 Yu and Song, 473.  51 USDSCC, Political Report, August 6th, 1928, p. 1-3; Vol. 199; Ding, 157.  52 Yu Zhou, "Yuzhou zizhuan," 339.  53 Cao, 49.  44  village, Jiang Mingkai, Jiang Mingjun, Jiang Mingyou, Jiang Mingjie and myself. At the time there was Jiang Zhaolan, who was only fourteen or fifteen. We didn't want him, but he just kept on following behind us crying, and came along.54    Loose organization, along with connections through martial arts schools, suggest that the eastern Haiyang/southern Muping group was more rooted in the values of local society, particularly those of young men, than any modern ideology. Martial arts was a major part of the culture of young men in traditional China, particularly in Shandong. Many young men in the province were practitioners, and men who were well versed in martial arts often taught classes to others. Martial arts was a tradition with many sides. Society in China celebrated prowess in the practice and linked it with social justice. Great martial arts masters were given honourable mentions in gazetteers, and stories of wuxia, virtuous men who used force against unjust government officials and elites, were a major part of popular culture.55 Martial arts, however, also had a less legitimate side. Some who practiced it were liumang (??), wandering young men who were detached from their families and considered self-serving trouble makers by society. These men often used their martial arts prowess to prey on the weak and terrorize communities, and they were also mercenaries for hire to any cause.56    Many of the young people involved in the upheaval of 1928-1929 in Haiyang and Southern Muping were somewhere between these two sides of the martial arts tradition. Duan Chengzhai and his followers, for example, were motivated by a sense of fighting injustice, but they also included a number of young men who were never closely attached to their communities and had once been wandering mercenaries. One of Duan?s chief allies, for example, was a deserter from Zhang Zongchang?s army who was well versed in martial arts and had spent a great of time away from home.57 GMD rebels, such as Yu                                                  54 Ibid., 71.  55 Wang Pixu and Liang Bingkun, 1046-1051. This was particularly the case in Jiaodong, as seen with Laiyang?s gazetteer. 56 Chen Baoliang, Zhongguo liumangshi (History of Liumang in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1993), 30-31.  57 Cao, 95-112 45  Xingfu, were also alienated from their communities. Their activities, along with Duan?s, also bordered between making trouble in society and rebelling against injustices.  2.8 "Revolution" in the Midst of Turmoil  Perhaps the breakdown of social order, personal frustration and a sense of adventure welded the more traditional values of the young men in the eastern Haiyang/southern Muping group to the glimmers of ideology spread by the Yantai GMD activists. Yu Xingfu's recollections and local histories suggest that they learned one message, to overthrow all forms of authority in the countryside, from militarists and local elites to "superstitious" beliefs influencing local people. Peasant association members spread slogans, and by the spring and summer of 1928 began to act on their message, desecrating local temples and taking some over for their own use.58 Temples might have suited the initial rebellious urges of the group. They were places where the community leadership gathered. The actions of eastern Haiyang/southern Muping members alarmed Chen Xizhou, the local elite who was killed by Yu Xingfu and his associates, and whose death was the first act of Yu?s rebellion. Chen, an older man with some official connections, might have sought to defend local religious practices, but likely also saw a parallel between the activities of the GMD/peasant association members and bandits, who were occupying temples at the same time.59 He alerted county authorities, who launched a raid on the houses of Yu Xingfu and several other activists in mid June.60   The raid missed the group, but this, along with Yu Zhenxi's arrest several days earlier triggered the attack on Chen and other episodes of unrest. Yu Xingfu, in his recollections, characterized the actions of his association as a failed ?revolution.? However, his descriptions and local histories from China suggest that they were a number of poorly planned outbursts by groups of young men. The revolutionaries did not have a coherent organization. Nor did they always work as one. Rebels were divided into two factions, one in eastern Haiyang composed of Yu Xingfu and his friends, and another in                                                  58 Ibid., 66.  59 Yu Zhou, "Nanwangde suiyue" (Hard to Forget Times in My Life), Rushan wenshi ziliao 3 (1993): 4. Yu Xingfu describes Chen as a Xiucai degree holder during the late Qing, which suggests he was likely to be at least in his 40s. 60 Cao, 67.  46  southern Muping who were been recruited separately by the Yantai GMD. They both agreed to rebel, but at first went their own way. Members in Muping, after seizing a number of weapons from raids on police stations, marched on the county town. They claimed to be representatives of the GMD, demanding to be let in to form a new government. Muping's magistrate, backed by a battalion of pro-Zhang Zongchang troops, scoffed at them, calling the association members bandits and warning them to disperse. In Haiyang, Yu notes that his group heard false rumours that the county's magistrate had fled due to the disorder in Jiaodong. They organized several hundred men and marched on Fengcheng, Haiyang?s county town, in late June, but were turned back when several shots fired by the police garrison panicked the group.61   Rebuffed in both counties, the rebels agreed to work together, and spent the next two weeks preparing a more planned assault on Haiyang. They also allied with a group of Laiyang bandits who had wandered into Haiyang to increase their numbers.62 Peasant associations, backed by bandits, reached Fengcheng on July 10, 1928, and caused a great commotion. Nearby peasants, according to Yu, believing that the county's fall was imminent, flocked to join the fight or came as spectators, swelling rebel numbers to thousands. The attackers surrounded Fengcheng on the first day, but got no further due to the lack of any heavy weapons to breach the city walls. They attempted to use primitive cannon, but these did not have the range to even hit the walls. Cracks also emerged with bandits allied with the rebels, who were fearful that an attack on the city would be too costly, and the lack of progress caused many peasants to disperse. Haiyang's county government, seeing the rebels falter, sent representatives offering negotiation in an effort to weaken their resolve.  Two events on the third day of the assault doomed the whole venture. An accident involving the firing of a primitive cannon badly burnt a member of the Muping peasant association. Other members, concerned about their friend, left to find him medical attention. They departed without telling the Haiyang association members, creating confusion. Laiyang bandits taking part in the assault on Fengcheng were also enticed by                                                  61 Cao, 68, 74-76; Yu Zhou, "Yuzhou zizhuan,? 341.  62 Yu Zhou, "Yuzhou zizhuan,? 341.  47  the county government into switching sides, and launched a sudden attack on the rebels with help from the county police, sending them fleeing in panic.63     A number of rebels, including Yu Xingfu, were arrested in the aftermath of the rebellion. Haiyang's police, seeking revenge for the attack, also launched a raid into the eastern part of the county, burning some houses in villages where peasant association members had come from. 64 However, the repression was brief. County forces, having just witnessed a major revolt and seeing the disintegration of order in Jiaodong at the time, refrained from mounting further intrusions. The attack on the Haiyang county town, though a failure, had caused a retreat by government authorities in the eastern side of the county. The attackers were mixed with many local onlookers, and it was difficult for the county government to determine who was a rebel. Many arrested rebels, including Yu Xingfu, were quickly released because of the police could not figure out if they had taken part in the attack.65 Few peasant association members were killed in the attack, and they continued their activities in the countryside of Muping and Haiyang.   The sudden departure of the southern Muping rebels from the Haiyang assault created animosities between them and Yu Xingfu?s group, and the two factions went their own ways afterwards. The Muping rebels answered Duan Chengzhai's call for revolt in August and September and marched on the county town with him.66 In eastern Haiyang the disorder in Jiaodong and the destruction of local police stations left Yu Xingfu?s group essentially in charge of the area. Eastern Haiyang rebels, according to Yu, confiscated the property of some elites and paraded local religious figures through the streets to humiliate them. The activities of the Haiyang group caused some members of the local elite to flee, and made others attempt to appease peasant association members by donating to their organization and even demanding to join the peasant association.67 News of the exploits of Yu's group also spawned what seemed like a copycat movement in western Haiyang.                                                   63 Cao, 79-82; Yu Zhou, "Zai shibai," 52-53.  64 Cao, 82-83.  65 Yu Zhou, "Yuzhou zizhuan," 342.  66 Cao, 69-70. 67 Yu Zhou, "Nanwangde suiyue," 9. 48  These actions, however, produced a backlash in late 1928 and early 1929. In November 1928 Liu Zhennian?s forces attacked villages that supported Duan Chengzhai?s rebellion. GMD rebels in southern Muping were targeted for their role in Duan?s uprising, and most were forced to flee.68 In Haiyang, the actions of Yu and his associates also caused a reaction by local elites. In early 1929 Song Sikun (???), a wealthy peasant in eastern Haiyang, started a movement against the rebels. He was soon joined by a number of other socially-prominent men from the area. Song and his allies offered an alternative to the Haiyang GMD group, a new mechanism for community defence in the form of a Big Knife Society. They formed a militia, called on men from their home villages to participate, and united them using religious rituals that promised militia members invulnerability to weapons.69  Song's society began to attack peasant association members in February 1929. They killed some, forced others to join the Big Knife Society or work towards rebuilding temples, and took over control of rural communities in many parts of eastern Haiyang. Big Knife Society followers caught the peasant association by surprise, collapsing it by April. Several leaders fled the county. Yu escaped to western Haiyang, making contact with the small peasant association there.70   Yu did not mention much about what happened after this, only noting that he became the head of a ward militia in 1930, after crushing Song's Big Knife Society. However, a local history notes that he and others in the peasant association were saved by an unlikely source, Liu Zhennian. In the summer of 1929 Liu's troops swept into Haiyang as part of a larger effort to eradicate local resistance to his rule. Liu had already begun this effort at the end of 1928 but was hampered by Zhang Zongchang's comeback effort.                                                  68 Ding Weifen, "Shandong gemingdang shigao, shier" (Draft History of the Revolutionary Party in Shandong, Part Twelve), Shandong wenxian 4. no. 2 (1978-1979): 120. 69 USDSCC, Political Report, February 4th, 1928, p. 4-5; Vol. 199. Big Knife Societies, or Red Spears, were often named after the weapons that they most commonly used. These groups emerged in Jiaodong during the breakdown of social order during the 1920s. Big Knife Societies followed rituals that were traditionally used by rebel groups who were either uprooted from or outside the bounds of community, such as the Boxers, but adapted them to give blessing to community and multi-village defence. A report by the United States consulate in Yantai in early 1928 gives a detailed description of such societies in Jiaodong. 70 Yu Zhou, "Zai shibai," 54-55.  49  Forces belonging to Liu saw Song Sikun's Big Knife Society and other rural armed groups as a threat. They attacked and dispersed it, and arrested a number of Haiyang elites associated with the society. Yu and some remaining leaders of the peasant association offered their services to Liu's troops, helping them hunt down members of the Big Knife Society. Liu established a new system of rural administration, dividing the county into ward units (?), each covering three to four dozen villages. He made these the main form of administration and tax collection, and established a militia in each. The arrangement, meant to co-opt armed groups more sympathetic to Liu while keeping them under the watchful eye of the state, benefitted former peasant association leaders. With many of county's eastern elites either weakened or arrested by Liu, Yu became the head of a ward militia. He spent the last months of 1929 eliminating remaining Big Knife Society members who went into hiding after Liu's sweep, capturing and executing Song Sikun at the end of the year. Militia members, who included a number of former peasant association men, returned to the Big Knife Society members the treatment they had received earlier, robbing, beating, and holding some of them for ransom. Yu admits this, but claimed that it was done by others in the group, and that he quickly put an end to such actions.71  2.9 A New Order   The death of Song marked the end of an effort to reassert community solidarity in the Haiyang/Rushan area, backed by men who been traditionally prominent. Unrest in Jiaodong did not sweep away old leaders and the elite, and some would recover their power and positions in the community over the next few years. However, in the immediate term the destruction of the Big Knife Society marked the low point of a string of humiliations suffered by these older men. It ushered in a new political order in Haiyang and Muping. Liu Zhennian's power was based in Yantai, and he kept most of his forces in the counties immediately surrounding it, such as Muping. Forces loyal to Liu, along with several magistrates appointed by him, continued to harass locals with extortions and fines, much of which was paid by the wealthy and socially prominent.72                                                  71 Cao, 86; Yu Zhou, "Yuzhou zizhuan," 345.  72 Yu and Song, 916-917. 1541-1542.  50  Viewing GMD members with suspicion because of their role in Duan Chengzhai's rebellion, Liu excluded them from the political order, and continually disrupted the party's activities in the county.73 However, in Haiyang as well as many other parts of Jiaodong, the lack of significant garrison forces lead him to rely on newly created ward governments and militias. These were an imposed form of local authority, and in eastern Haiyang benefitted Yu Xingfu and other members of his GMD group. Yu remained a ward militia head in 1930, and his kinsman Yu Shoutang also became a senior official in his ward. 74  Others, such as Zhang Jianan, rose to become officials in the county government.   Yu Xingfu and his associates began as rebels, but due to a twist of fate caused by the chaotic environment of late 1920s Jiaodong, became part of the government establishment. They would lead Haiyang's GMD. Shandong's GMD became more cohesive under a pro-Chiang Kai-shek provincial organization by the fall of 1929. Representatives of the provincial GMD began arriving in Muping and Haiyang in the last months of that year, with a goal of purging radicals from local party ranks.75 However, possibly because of the power positions acquired by Yu and some of the other key figures of the Haiyang GMD group, they kept all the local leaders in the party.    2.10 Shaping of Revolutionaries: Basis for CCP Development  We can only guess how the actions of the GMD rebels were viewed by society. Yu Xingfu and other leaders had taken a variety of roles, from revolutionaries, to protectors of communities from the forces preying on them to brutes and thugs for hire who allied themselves with these same forces. Despite this, they were no different from many other men who dominated society during the period. Political chaos and the desire for a better future had also stirred up another phenomenon: almost utopian rumours about a new order under the GMD. Yu Xingfu noted that during a brief police incarceration after his failed 1928 siege of the Haiyang county town that all the inmates with him kept on asking when the GMD would take charge of the county, believing that they would all be set free                                                  73 Ibid., 474.  74 RDB, 294.  75 Cao, 87.  51  and their crimes forgiven.76 The GMD was a mystical hope for many in Jiaodong in 1928-1929, and this was corroborated by the recollections of some of the Peninsula's inhabitants who fled to Taiwan in 1949. In fact, even Liu Zhennian was seen as a saviour figure for his allegiance to the GMD.77   The violent radicalism of Yu and his GMD group might have been accepted in a tension-filled, explosive and rumour-filled society. Many forms of authority attacked by Yu and his associates, such as government, elites, or religious figures, were becoming increasingly corrupt, destructive or feeble, and this likely made the actions of Yu and other GMD leaders in Haiyang/Muping seem justified. This chaotic world in Jiaodong, however, was fading by 1930. The Peninsula was now under the firm grasp of Liu Zhennian. Taxes, though still high, were also receding from the peak under Zhang Zongchang.78 These developments, along with the absence of Liu?s predatory forces from most parts of the Peninsula, cooled tensions. This was reflected in the decline of radicalism amongst most of the men in the Haiyang/Muping peasant associations. Few of the leaders and followers of the 1928-1929 movement continued with the radical and violent political activism they had engaged in during those years. They no longer found a justification for such behaviour, since the national GMD, by this time, had renounced all the political radicalism they had learned from party members in Yantai.   The experience of 1928-1929 had inspired a small number of individuals. For Yu Xingfu, chaos during those years must have stimulated his sense of adventure and contempt towards the existing order. A disgruntled, downtrodden young man, he had over a brief period attacked and destroyed literally all forms of authority around him. More importantly, he had not only survived, but risen to an important position in the                                                  76 Yu Zhou, "Yuzhou zizhuan," 344. 77 Li, "Yi minchu Jiaodong," 84. Li Yuting, the former Jiaodong resident living Taiwan noted in his recollections that there were number of popular songs and slogans praising Liu Zhennian's forces in 1928-1929. 78 Yu and Song, 567-569. While certain areas of Jiaodong still experienced extortion from Liu Zhennian's forces, official tax rates were dropping. Taxes varied per year depending on the needs of Liu Zhennian's government, but they were generally much lower than under Zhang Zongchang. The land tax and its surcharges, for example, fell to between half to one third of the 1928 rate from 1929-1932. Muping?s gazetteer gives a full description of tax rates during the period.   52  political order. Perhaps this proved the validity of committing to a radical cause, and contributed to Yu's eventually becoming the first CCP member in eastern Haiyang/Rushan. The prospects of achieving a new order led by young men must have also seemed a real possibility to him and a few others in Haiyang who took part in the 1928-1929 movement. Yu, without necessarily knowing it in 1928-1929, had helped to create the basis for the spread of the CCP in Haiyang. The actions of his group, inadvertently, had also awakened a dormant communist group in the western part of the county. In Muping, Liu Zhennian's betrayal angered several key figures in the 1928-1929 GMD group who were forced into exile. Though they eventually returned to the county, anger and desire of revenge towards the government remained. Exile also fostered their rebellious natures, by taking them further away from home and established society. Yu and the story of the 1928 uprising also highlights the immaturity, unstable commitment, brute nature and even opportunism of would be revolutionaries. All this would impact the early history of the CCP in Haiyang and Rushan.    53  Chapter 3: Tough Start: A History of the Early CCP  3.1 Birth of the Party and Tensions in the Process   Song Haiting (???) (1892-1984), was a man with a mixed history of service to the CCP. Born in eastern Laiyang, Song came from a poor but educated family. He was pulled into radical politics after being sponsored to study in a specialized middle school in Jinan by a wealthy friend. Song joined the GMD while a student there in 1924, and the CCP in 1925. Under orders from the CCP's Shandong Provincial Committee, he returned to his native county at the end of the year, and worked as a teacher near its border with Haiyang. Song used this position as an opportunity to carry out activities for the party, and worked with the county's GMD members to build peasant associations. This cooperation, however, broke down in the summer of 1927, when the First United Front collapsed. Song's identity was discovered by county authorities, who issued a notice for his arrest. Frightened, Song fled Laiyang, never to return. He spent the next 11 years traveling across Shandong, working as everything from teacher to tree cutter, without contacting the party. Song joined the CCP again in 1938, and eventually became a senior party official in western Shandong. He retired from all positions in 1956, and spent the next three decades petitioning various levels of the party to recognize him as an active member from 1927-1938. Song finally received this in 1981, three years prior to his death.1   Though his early involvement with the CCP was not one of heroic commitment, Song would help establish the first Communist organizations in Haiyang/Rushan. Song was only a fleeting figure in the history of the CCP in the area, but he was not unlike                                                  1 Haiyangshi dangshi fangzhi bangongshi (hereafter cited as HDFB), Zhonggong Haiyang difangshi (Local History of the CCP in Haiyang) (Haiyang: Zhongguo Chubanshe, 2007), 333-334; Zhonggong Laixi shiwei dangshi yanjiushi (hereafter cited as ZLSDY), Zhonggong Laixi difangshi (Local History of the CCP in Laixi) (Qingdao: Qingdao chubanshe, 2000): 17-19. 54  many of the members that followed him. Many of them, in fact, would take a path similar to his. The early history of the CCP in the two counties was not a story of determined, ideologically-driven figures committed to serving the party over the long term, but individuals whose understandings of, and adherence to communism, was poor, and who often came and went from local organizations. Early members, like Song, were mainly a group of economically-marginalized, somewhat educated young toughs, who were largely detached from their families and communities. Such men were driven to rebellion by their lack of family, or were estranged from their families due to personal conflicts and long periods away from home for work and schooling. This detachment from family and community is perhaps best seen by the fact that early members often came and went from their villages, at times never coming back. Detachment, along with the overall impoverishment and low standing of party members, also likely made them feel little obligation to abide by the rules of their communities.  The nature of the early party membership and the spread of the CCP into Haiyang and Rushan were the product of three developments. One of these was an increasing practice of travel for work and study by marginalized young men in Jiaodong during the early 20th century. Being away from home increased the detachment between these men and their communities. It also exposed them to radical ideas and individuals associated with the CCP, making them rebellious. Another factor shaping the outlook of early members was the pro-GMD unrest in eastern Haiyang and southern Muping during 1928-1929. Many leaders of the early CCP in the two counties were participants in the unrest. They were encouraged to join the party by their involvement in violent and radical political activities during the political chaos of 1928-1929, and ties between these men played an important role in shielding early party members from government persecution. Early party members were also influenced by the expansion of modern teaching, a profession that was fairly new in both China and rural Jiaodong during the late 1920s and 30s. Not all initial leaders in Rushan and Haiyang were teachers, and early CCP organizations recruited through a variety of ties linking rural society in Jiaodong, such as family, lineages, and market town activities. But nearly all leaders became involved in modern education during the early 1930s, and teachers served as both the nucleus of 55  party leadership and the main linkage between local party organization and higher CCP levels in this period.  3.2 Violent Teachers: Causes Behind the Rise and Fall of the Early Haiyang/Rushan CCP  Cong Xiaoping, in her 2007 article, "Planting the seeds for the rural revolution: Local teachers' schools and the re-emergence of Chinese Communism in the 1930's," has noted that CCP success from 1937-1949 was driven by rural teachers. Such men, Cong contends, were ideal revolutionaries. They had great knowledge of their local areas, and commanded respect through their status to rally society towards certain political causes. Teaching was also a profession that attracted moderately educated but poor young men without means of advancement or other job opportunities, but its low pay made many disgruntled with the status quo and predisposed towards radical causes like communism. Cong points to a correlation between the growth of rural teachers in north China during the 1930s and the increase of CCP members in the region during the same time, and attributes this to the educational reforms of the Nanjing decade, particularly the decision to transform all provincially funded county middle schools in China into teacher training facilities after the Second National Conference of Education in 1930. She asserts that teacher training schools formed out of this decision radicalized the teachers they produced. Entrance to the schools was highly competitive. They offered students free tuition and living stipends, but gave them little future other than low paying teaching positions, making many discontented with the existing order. Such schools also allowed leftist urban intellectuals, many of whom were Communist party members, to enter the countryside by serving as their instructors, and to convert students into party members.2   The experience of Haiyang and Rushan both validates and challenges Cong. Most of the young, marginalized men who formed the core CCP leadership in the two counties during the 1920s and early 30s were or became teachers. Entering the profession of teaching did not necessarily transform these men into communists, since many were already radicalized before becoming teachers. However, teaching positions, and                                                  2 Cong Xiaoping, "Planting the Seeds for the Rural Revolution: Local Teachers' Schools and the Re-emergence of Chinese Communism in the 1930's," Twentieth Century China 32, no. 2 (2007): 135-37, 141-149, 150-157.    56  relationships between educators and teacher training schools established during the 1930s provided them income and cover while they carried out communist activities. Ties between teachers and schools also played a major role in spreading the CCP in two ways. Schools, like martial arts associations, were places where young men congregated, making them sites for party recruitment. Teaching ties, as well as teacher training schools also allowed party members to interact with and recruit individuals who lived far beyond their native place. Early communists in Haiyang and Rushan were forged by the political turbulence in Jiaodong during the late 1920s, but their ability to organize was fostered by the expansion of the teaching profession in Jiaodong during the 1930s, a sign of the more stable environment in the Peninsula during the Nanjing Decade.   Cong, however, makes a simple linkage between teaching, marginalized men and CCP success. Though teachers were the core of local CCP leadership, they did not foster the successful spread of the party, or popular acceptance of communism, before or after 1937. Cong's argument does not take into account a number of local factors in party development. Many early communists in Haiyang and Rushan were not only poor and marginalized, but were also young men who were beyond many of the basic forms of authority in Chinese society due lack of family, estrangement from family members or long periods away from home. They were also influenced by a world in which social order was collapsing and violence was becoming the norm, particularly in asserting public agendas and settling disputes. Though early communists recruited through associations between teachers, which tied together people from large geographical areas, they also had a habit of banding together with people closer to their native place, such as friends and lineage members, forming subgroups within larger CCP organizations.   These aspects of the early party had a disastrous effect on its development. CCP members, being outsiders, were not used to authority being asserted over their behaviour, or were downright contemptuous of it in general. This made it difficult for them to accept authority within the party. Party members were also little connected with economic and social realities of their villages because of their estrangement from family and community, and their tendency to use violence to achieve radical political agendas often made them pariahs in society and damaged the CCP's public image. The forming of subgroups in the party along narrow lines, such as friendship, lineages and native place, also led to 57  frequent disputes between them, and the reluctance of members to accept leaders from outside their native areas or small group. Party members, conditioned by the chaos of the 1920s, were also violent and often opportunistic in their behaviour, quick to use force to enforce their aims on society and settle disputes with others in their ranks. Violence, disregard for authority and group tensions made the early CCP in Rushan and Haiyang a fragile and unstable network, frequently torn apart by deadly internal conflicts, whose members often participated according to their own personal interests and group agendas, and were prone to flight or betrayal when faced with risk. The early party, due to these factors, never expanded membership beyond marginalized young men.  3.3 Weak Ties with the National CCP, Growing Government Persecution  The instability of the local party was also shaped by its sporadic ties with higher CCP levels. The provincial party committee, the main link between local CCP organizations in Shandong and the party centre, was an organization that was repeatedly destroyed during the late 1920s and early 1930s. It suffered ten major disruptions from 1928 to 1933 due to defection and arrest, and completely collapsed by 1934, leaving the province without a central coordinating body for the next three years. (see Appendix 1.) 3 Destruction of the provincial party was in many ways caused by the policies of the Comintern-directed CCP centre, which repeatedly pushed Shandong organizations to launch armed uprisings and large labour protests, and chastised them for the lack of action in these areas. Frequent attempts to engineer urban protests and rural uprisings brought organizers to rural areas like Haiyang and Rushan, and to a degree stimulated the expansion of the CCP in the two counties. However, these actions led to repression by militarist authorities in Shandong, and made the provincial party committee, which was located in places of urban protest like Qingdao and Jinan, particularly vulnerable to arrest. Frequent interruptions of the                                                  3 An Zuozhang et al., Shandong tongshi: Xiandaijuan (Collective History of Shandong: Modern History Volume) (Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 1994), 482-487; Zhonggong Shandong shengwei dangshi yanjiushi (hereafter cited as ZSSDY), Zhonggong Jiaodong difangshi (CCP Local History in Jiaodong) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2005), 52-72, 78-82.  58  Shandong party made organizations in Rushan and Haiyang function largely as autonomous entities prior to 1937, only vaguely aware of larger policies and ideology.   Sporadic attempts by higher party levels to intervene in the affairs of the counties only added tensions to already unstable ties between local members. Higher party leaders were often unaware of the localized and unstable nature of CCP activists and their groupings, and made decisions on leadership and disputes that exacerbated tension between members. The Haiyang/Rushan CCP, by 1933, was facing an even greater problem. The local party was a product of social breakdown and disorder. It was also given cover in its activities after 1929 by Liu Zhennian's co-opting of revolutionary young men in Haiyang and its surrounding areas, many of whom joined the party. This situation, however, was changing by 1933, with the rise of Han Fuju (???). Shandong, following the 1928-1929 unrest, was divided between three factions, Feng Yuxiang's northwest army in the west, Manchurian militarist Zhang Xueliang in Qingdao, its most prosperous city, and Liu Zhennian in Jiaodong. Han, a subordinate of Feng Yuxiang, seized the western part of the province following the disintegration of the northwest army during Feng's ill-fated 1930 rebellion against Chiang Kai-shek. Taking advantage of developments elsewhere in China, he seized the whole of Shandong in 1932. Han used the weakening of Zhang Xueliang's forces after the Japanese takeover of Manchuria to force him into an agreement to jointly rule Qingdao, and in a quick military campaign in September and October of that year battered Liu Zhennian's forces and pushed him out of Jiaodong.4   Han's rule marked a dramatic change for Shandong. Unlike Liu Zhennian and Zhang Zongchang, Han was a formidable ruler who combined cunning and ruthlessness to achieve his aims with administrative savvy. He was credited with eradicating banditry, initiating a program to reduce the number of taxes and reassess local tax burdens, and engaging in a number of experimental programs to improve local security and governance.5 Han's administration was popular and he was even celebrated for his crude                                                  4 Lu et al., Minguo Shandongshi, 380-388 (see chap. 2, n. 25). 5 Chen Zhen, "Han Fuju zhulu qinian zhi shuzheng" (Han Fuju's Seven Year Popular Rule), Shandong wenxian 14, no. 1 (1988-1989): 70-74; Prasenjit Duara, "State Involution: A Study of Local Finances in Rural North China, 1911-1935," Comparative Studies in Society and History 29, no. 1 (1989): 153.   59  humour. Rule by Han ushered in a greater degree of civility and order to Jiaodong, in many ways contradicting the violent and rebellious ways of the CCP and further discrediting the party. Han was also a leader bent on stopping all opposition, who constantly asserted himself in local matters and showed no mercy towards his enemies, something that would not bode well for CCP activists.  3.4 Beginnings of the CCP: Western Haiyang and the Background to the Party?s Spread  The western Haiyang CCP began with Song Haiting. Song, during his short period in Laiyang during the 1920s, introduced several lineage members from his village and surrounding areas to the CCP. He also took up work at an advanced primary school in Wandi (??), a town not far from his village. Wandi was one of the major market towns in eastern Laiyang and western Haiyang. Its school, a higher level modern educational institution, served many communities in the two counties, giving Song the opportunity to connect with the network of teachers in the area, and to recruit among them, their students and their family and kinsmen. Song brought a total of 20 people into the CCP prior to his flight in 1927, most of whom were teachers. Like Song, many of these men had only a brief flirtation with the party, and lost touch with it after he fled. Some were also GMD members in the county, who abandoned their CCP affiliations after the two parties split. However, several members, led by Song Haiqiu (???) a teacher in the Wandi school and a member of Song Haiting?s lineage, remained interested in the party and actively carried on his work. The group maintained connections with Song Haiting's contact in the CCP provincial committee in Jinan after he departed, sending letters to the organization. Song Haiqiu also went to meet the committee in Jinan several times, bringing home various party propaganda materials.6                                                    6 ZLSDY, Zhonggong Laixi, 17-19; Cao, 54.  60   Figure 6  Early CCP Leadership (1928)   The group also expanded its activities beyond the network of teachers, students and their personal circles in Laiyang and western Haiyang. Taking advantage of the winter season, when the local populace was idle and flocked to Wandi for leisure activities, Song Haiqiu joined and later took over leadership of a local opera troupe in late 1927. He had the troupe perform plays and music with political themes in the market town, attracting a number of young men affected by the turmoil in Jiaodong. Song Haiqiu later transformed the troupe into a secret peasant association, which claimed some 150 members in 30 villages by the spring of 1928.7 3.5 Quarrels Between Young Men and the Implosion of the East Laiyang Organization  Members of Song Haiqiu?s group blended these activities with violence against local elites and the wealthy. They began in the fall of 1927 with attacks in Song Haiqiu?s village, burning the crops of six wealthy individuals at night in one case, and beating a local elite in another.8 However, these incidents, along with a conflict with another group                                                  7 Cao, 54. 8 Ibid., 55.  61  of CCP members, doomed the eastern Laiyang party. In January 1928 the eastern Laiyang group made contact with a CCP organization in the western part of the county headed by Li Boyan (???). Born in 1905, Li became a CCP member while studying at a university in Shanghai in 1926. He came back to western Laiyang, his native place, with orders from the Shandong Provincial Committee to carryout the directive of the CCP's August 7th emergency conference, to organize armed uprisings across China and seize political power in any place possible. Li returned home in late 1927. He formed a small party organization near his village, and used his authority to integrate organizations in the east and west of the county into one party committee with himself as the head. He also met Song Haiqiu.9 Following the directive of the August 7th conference Li spent most of early 1928 trying to foment an armed uprising in Laiyang. Sensing the breakdown of order in Jiaodong in late May of 1928 he devised a daring plan. Working with two bandits in the area, Li planned an assault on the Laiyang's county town.10   This plan, however, went wrong immediately. On May 20th, 1928, Li arrived in eastern Laiyang to brief members of Song Haiqiu's group on plans for the attack on the county town. A tense debate soon erupted. Official party histories and memoirs of surviving leaders usually attributed this to the actions of a small group of eastern Laiyang members who were said to have opposed Li's plan out of cowardice. However, an unpublished recollection in the Haiyang archives, written by a party member who claimed to have heard from participants at the meeting, notes that Li was in dispute with many key eastern Laiyang members, including Song Haiqiu.11 Leadership rivalries might have played a role in the disputes, since Li, a relative newcomer from the other side of the county, had suddenly taken over command of the eastern Laiyang party. Li also had an educational difference with the eastern party leaders. He was the only party member to                                                  9 "Sun Kaishan 1960 nian guanyu Li Shuxin, Sun Yaochen he jianli qianbao Nushancun dangzhibu de huiyi" (Sun Kaishan's Recollections in 1960 on Li Shuxin (Li Boyan), Sun Yaochen and the Establishment of the Party Branch in Nushancun), in Laixi dangshi ziliao (Party History Materials on Laixi), Volume 2, ed. Zhonggong Laixi xianwei dangshi bangongshi (1988), 10; Sun Xiebang and Sun Xiefang, "Tan Sun Yaochen" (Discussing Sun Yaochen), in Laixi dangshi, Volume 2, 12. 10 ZLSDY, 29-30.  11 Liu Zhongyi, "LaiHai bianqu dangde fazhan zhengshi" (Correct History of CCP Development in the Laiyang/Haiyang Border Area), Haiyang Municipal Archives (hereafter cited as HMA), 1-1-14. 62  have gone to university, and this could have made him unpopular or an object of jealousy. The meeting lasted into the early morning of the next day without yielding a consensus. In a sudden turn of events, Li went missing on the 21st.12 His body was never found, but suspicions began to circulate that Zhao Baiyuan (???), an eastern Laiyang member who was sheltering Li in his home, had murdered him.   Zhao had been a vocal critic of the plan to take the Laiyang county town, but western Laiyang members soon came to believe that Song Haiqiu and most of other key eastern leaders in the county were also responsible for Li's disappearance.13 Song was threatened with death by these men, and fled the county. 14  This, along with Li's disappearance, had a sudden and detrimental impact on the CCP in Laiyang. Li Boyan, since late 1928 had been the county's main link with the higher party organization. Party members lost the only other person who had communications with levels above when Song fled. Adding to the CCP's troubles, Li Boyan?s bandit allies, claiming to be communists, attacked the county town two weeks later, briefly seizing it before being driven out.15 This made local authorities hunt for communists afterwards, something that led many other leaders in Laiyang to flee. With all the main leaders of the movement gone, the Laiyang party effectively collapsed. 3.6 The CCP?s Spread into Western Haiyang   The eastern Laiyang party, despite its dismal demise, would bring the CCP to western Haiyang. Song Haiting, before he fled Laiyang in 1927, had recruited Sun Jiesan (???), a teacher in western Haiyang as a CCP member. Sun briefly taught in the primary school in Wandi, where he met Song Haiting and was introduced into the CCP. He had a minor role in the activities of Song Haiqiu, Song Haiting?s kinsman, and took part at the                                                  12 Song Yuncheng, "Tan Li Boyun" (Discussing Li Boyun), in Laixi dangshi, Volume 2, 19-21.  13 Song Xinuo, "Tan Li Boyan zuzhi Laiyang dang duidi douzheng qingkuang" (Discussing the Situation of Li Boyan's Organization of the Laiyang Party in Struggle Against the Enemy), in Laixi dangshi, Volume 2, 18.  14 Liu, "LaiHai bianqu."  15 Ibid.  63  meeting at which Li Boyan disappeared.16 Expansion of the CCP into western Haiyang, ironically, was also helped by the collapse of the Laiyang party. Most party leaders from eastern Laiyang escaped to Manchuria, but one of them, Yu Dianjun (???), briefly hid in Haiyang. Yu came to Xiaze (??), Sun Jiesan?s village. A charismatic individual, Yu Dianjun worked with Sun to recruit locals from the village and its surrounding areas, and created a party cell of 16 people, who were mostly young men in the summer of 1928.17 One of these was Sun Mingrui (???), a kinsmen of Sun Jiesan. Sun Mingrui was the son of a failed scholar. He was said by later CCP biographies to be a knowledgeable but rebellious man, versed in Chinese classics, May 4th literature and foreign poetry; he also had great martial arts training and despised authority.18 He became a major figure the early western Haiyang CCP.  3.7 Expansion of Followers and Radicalization of Party Activists During the Great Turmoil of 1928-1929  These efforts were unofficial, since neither Yu Dianjun nor Sun Jiesan had any connections with higher party levels at the time. Yu, like Song Haiting earlier, had an ambivalent relationship with the CCP. He, along with many other leaders who fled, did not re-establish contact with the party, and it is not known what happened to them after 1928. After a short stay in Xiaze Yu departed for Manchuria, and the party cell he set up in the village quickly fell apart afterwards.19 However, Yu Dianjun and Sun Jiesan?s efforts radicalized a number men in western Haiyang, whose penchant for violent, revolutionary action were reignited by the activities of GMD members in eastern Haiyang in late 1928. News of the activities of Yu Xingfu's group in the summer and fall of that year acted as a call to action by these men. Sun Jiesan and Sun Mingrui reorganized their party cell at the end of 1928. They were joined by a similar movement set up by youths                                                  16 ZLSDY, 18; Song Yuncheng, "Tan Li Boyun," 20.  17 HDFB, Zhonggong Haiyang, 19-20.  18 Yantaishi minzhengju, Yongdui qiangu: Jiaodong liegan shijixuan (Forever Immortalized: Collection of Deeds of Jiaodong Cadre Martyrs), Volume 2 (Neibu, 1991), 225-226.  19 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai dangde gongzuo jianjie" (Summary of Six Years of Party Work), 1 July 1944, HMA, 1-1-14. 64  from nearby villages, led by Wang Zhifeng (???) (1911-1936). From Shimatantou (????), a village close to Xiaze, Wang came from a poor but educated family, and was introduced to the GMD in Jinan while studying at an advanced primary school in the city. Wang received training on establishing peasant associations; working with several local friends, he began to carry out radical activities in Haiyang in late 1928.20  Compared to eastern Haiyang, activities of radical young men in the western part of the county were considerably smaller in scale. They were also quasi-legal. Government authorities in Jiaodong, following Liu Zhennian?s takeover of the Peninsula in the fall of 1928, were in theory loyal to the GMD. Due to their pre-occupation with the turmoil in Jiaodong, they did not respond to the actions of the western group. Sun Jiesan, Sun Mingrui and other activists found cover by working with Wang Zhifeng, and were strengthened in their legitimacy by a brief stay by Yu Xingfu in their area in the spring of 1929, who gave many of the western Haiyang radicals GMD membersship.21 They began their radical activities in late 1928 with an attack on the principal of Xiaze's primary school, where Sun Jiesan worked. The principal, an elderly local elite, was subjected to repeated criticism from teachers and class boycotts; he was intimidated into resigning in March 1929. Sun Jiesan became principal of the school, with Sun Mingrui as its manager. Xiaze's school became a centre for organizing radical actions.22 Sun Jiesan, Sun Mingrui and Wang Zhifeng followed their takeover of the school by holding rallies against superstition in the spring and summer. They gathered hundreds of students and young men from Xiaze and its surrounding villages, gave speeches denouncing religious worship, gambling, opium smoking, incense burning, kowtowing and even wailing during funerals, and went around enforcing this agenda. In Xiaze the radicals smashed the local temple, and dragged out and publicly humiliated two other members of the local elite in the village.23   Activities in 1929 gave the group a fearsome reputation over the next few years. Sun Mingrui became a local power figure, and took the position of the head of the township encompassing Xiaze and several surrounding villages in 1932. Continuing in                                                  20 HDFB, 339.  21 Yu Zhou, "Zai shibai," 55 (see chap. 2, n. 45). 22 HDSBW, 712.  23 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai.? 65  his radical agendas, Sun sought to improve modern education in Xiaze and use it to combat traditional beliefs. He used this authority as township head to demand Xiaze residents pay for the construction of a new building for the village school, and began a more covert effort to expand support for his CCP group, by organizing local hired labourers to demand higher wages from their employers.24     Figure 7  Area of Initial Party Development in Western Haiyang  Source: Created based on a map from: Haiyangshi dangshi fangzhi bangongshi, Zhonggong Haiyang difangshi (Local History of the CCP in Haiyang) (Haiyang: Zhongguo Chubanshe, 2007).   These actions, however, doomed the group. In July 1933 Sun Mingrui and several of his supporters were arrested by county authorities after Xiaze residents complained about their actions. Reasons for this were summed up in a document from the Haiyang party committee on local CCP history, written in 1944. It notes that Sun Mingrui had alienated the community through the tax levy he imposed to fund the new school building, which few people in Xiaze could afford to send their children to. Sun Jiesan, Sun Mingrui                                                  24 Yantaishi minzhengju, Yongdui qiangu, Volume 2, 227-228.  66  and their supporters, the document noted, had also abused their power. In one case, they arbitrarily cut down the tree of a man who lived near the new school site, and imprisoned him in the school after he complained. This led the man to commit suicide. Locals in Xiaze were also incensed by the anti-superstition campaign waged by the two Suns, and angered by the methods they used to organize labourers against their employers, which included burning the crops of employers who did not give into wage demands, and destroying their farm tools. This would have offended many labourers themselves, whose wages were dependent on the crop sales of their employers; they used the tools in their work.25     Sun Mingrui was taken to a prison for suspected Communists in Jinan. Sun Jiesan escaped. He lived as a fugitive for two years in various parts of Jiaodong, but was caught and joined Sun Mingrui in prison in 1936. The two were not released until the outbreak of the war with Japan in 1937. Sun Mingrui would remain a Communist, but Sun Jiesan gave up on the party after being released. He went to find work in other places, and never returned to Haiyang. The outcomes of Sun Jiesan and Sun Mingrui's stint in radical politics were mixed. The CCP document noted that Xiaze inhabitants remembered them as "bandits", and accused the two and their supporters of leaving a bad reputation for the party in the village. To what extent they can be considered party members is also open to question, since Sun Jiesan and Sun Mingrui had operated for much of the 1928-1933 period without any contact with any party level. However, Sun Mingrui and Sun Jiesan, like Song Haiting, Yu Dianjun and Yu Zhenhai before them, had radicalized a group of young men who would be activated with the arrival new party organizers.26 3.8 Beginnings of the CCP: Eastern Haiyang/Rushan  In the winter of 1930 Yu Xingfu, working as a militia head in eastern Haiyang, met someone he thought was a mercenary hired by the local government to train the force. The man, Zheng Tianjiu (???), turned out to be a CCP underground worker. From southeastern Shandong, Zheng was a veteran of the Northern Expedition. Yu, in his life story, notes that Zheng introduced him to the CCP. Perhaps Zheng's military background                                                  25 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai.? 26 Ibid. 67  and revolutionary credentials excited the rebellious and adventurous side of Yu, who was now settled into an increasingly dull and routine job of maintaining local peace. He was made a party member by Zheng in early 1931. Zheng left soon after, but maintained contact with Yu through mail. Yu decided to follow Zheng in late 1931. He quit both the GMD and his post as militia head in eastern Haiyang, and went off to find his mentor, who was serving as a teacher in a middle school in Beiping. Under Zheng's tutelage, Yu spent a long time studying Marxism-Leninism and began to familiarize himself with the CCP. He would later return to his native county.27   3.9 Teaching Ties: Connections and the Linking of Local and Provincial Parties: 1931-1932    The CCP presence in Haiyang, up to late 1931, had been a number of rebellious young men vaguely inspired by the party and having essentially no contact with its organizations and agendas. Two events around the end of that year changed this situation and brought local party activists into interaction with higher CCP levels. They were made possible by ties between teachers and participants of the 1928-1929 uprising in Haiyang. One of these occurred at a rural school in Qingdao. Song Jixian (???), a young man from eastern Laiyang who had recently found work at the school, discovered that its principal, Zhang Jingyuan (???), was a CCP underground worker. Song was from the same village and lineage as Song Haiting, and had been one of the men given CCP membership by Song Haiting prior to his flight. He engaged in communist activities with Song Haiqiu and Song Yuncheng in 1928, but lost contact with the party after Li Boyan's disappearance that year. Song soon developed a friendship with Zhang.28                                                   27 Yu Zhou, "Yuzhou zizhuan," 346-347 (see chap. 2, n. 2).  28 Li Zhonglin, "Guanyu Laiyang dangde jianli yu fazhan qingkuang de huiyi" (Recollections on the Creation and Development of the Laiyang Party), in Laixi dangshi, Volume 2, 23.  68   Figure 8  Spread of the CCP and its Core Leadership in Rushan and Eastern Jiaodong    The other event occurred in eastern Haiyang. Song Zhuting (???), a young man from the area, met Yu Yunting (???), the new principal of the Shandong Village Teacher's School Number Seven in Wendeng (??), an institution in a county near Haiyang that had been created following the Second National Conference of Education. Both men were connected to the 1928 uprising in eastern Haiyang. Yu, a GMD leftist, had helped to give birth to the upheaval by inducting his relative Yu Shoutang into the GMD. Becoming a CCP underground worker later on, Yu was sent by the provincial party to build up organizations in eastern Jiaodong. Song was the younger brother of Song Hechu (???), a participant in the uprising. Radicalized by his brother, Song became involved in patriotic demonstrations while studying at a middle school in Baoding, Hebei following the Japanese takeover of Manchuria in 1931.29  He tried to continue these activities after returning home from his studies at the end of that year, organizing several anti-Japanese protests in market towns near his village with friends.                                                  29 Song Zhuting, "Hanxin ruku," 182-184 (see chap. 2, n. 44).  69  This caught the attention of Yu Yunting, who paid a visit to Song and soon made him a CCP member.30   3.10 Linking of Radicals: Eastern Haiyang and Southern Muping  Yu tasked Song with recruiting members in eastern Haiyang and southern Muping. Song, through ties provided by Yu and his brother, began to rally supporters from two often interconnected channels, networks of teachers in the area and local GMD members. Among these were Yu Shoutang, Haiyang's GMD propaganda head, and Yu Jianzhai (???), an early Muping GMD member who had taken part in the 1928 revolt. None of the men officially joined the CCP, but used their influence in the GMD to shield members. Yu Jianzhai, a well known teacher in Muping, also found employment for party operatives, giving them money and cover to carry out their activities. Song became the main contact person between party organizers in the Rushan area in mid-1932. Through information provided by Yu Yunting he established regular correspondence by mail with the CCP Shandong Provincial Committee. Song's home, which was located near main roads in eastern Haiyang and Muping, became a resting place and safe house for party operatives in the area.31 With support from provincial party leaders he established a party committee in eastern Haiyang and southern Muping in August 1932 and served as its organizational department head.32                                                    30 Song Zhuting and Yu Shoukang, "Hailai diqu dangde zaoqi huodong," (Early Party Activities in the Haiyang/Laiyang Area) in Jiaodong fengyunlu, 9. 31 Song Zhuting and Yu Shoukang, "Hailai diqu," 9-11; Song Zhuting, "Hanxin ruku," 184.  32 Song Zhuting and Yu Shoukang, 11.  70   Figure 9  Spread of the CCP in the Rushan area  Source: Created based on maps and descriptions of pre-1949 roads in the counties from: Rushanshi dangshizhi bangongshi, Zhonggong Rushan difangshi (Local History of the CCP in Rushan) (Xianggang: Tianma tushu chubanshe, 2005); Yu Qingpan and Song Xianzhang, Muping xianzhi (Muping Gazetteer) (Taibei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1936, 1968), 705-707; Shandongsheng Haiyang xianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, Haiyang xianzhi (Haiyang Gazetteer) (Haiyang: Shandong sheng xinwen chuban guanliju, 1988), 347-348.  3.11 Linking of Radicals: Western Haiyang  At the same time a number of events in Qingdao would lead to the expansion and rebirth of party organizations in eastern Laiyang and western Haiyang. In the spring of 1932 Zhang Jingyuan fled to Laiyang. Zhang had been involved in organizing a worker strike at a Japanese-owned factory in the city. The strike, ordered by the Shandong party in keeping with the party centre's line of organizing CCP-led labour movements and unrest across China to support rural soviets in the southern part of the country, dangerously exposed party organizations in Qingdao, leading to the arrests of many of its leaders 71  during May and June of 1932.33 Zhang, his cover blown and wanted by the Qingdao police, fled to Laiyang at the invitation of Song Jixian.34    Figure 10 Key leaders in Laiyang and Western Haiyang and Their Relationship Circles    Song introduced him to Zhao Guodong????), a member of Laiyang's GMD party committee. Zhao, a former teacher from the eastern part of Laiyang, was a man of mixed political leanings. A friend of Song Haiting's, he had worked with early CCP members to build peasant associations in the county in 1926 and 1927, and was given CCP membership. Zhao was caught in a dilemma after the CCP/GMD split. He at first considered siding with the CCP, but withdrew his support for Song Haiting after seeing most of the county's GMD reject Communists.35  However, Zhao still held pro-CCP sympathies, and suspecting that Zhang was a Communist, quickly befriended him. Support from Zhao shielded Zhang and his activities from the suspicion of local                                                  33 ZSSDY, Zhonggong Jiaodong, 78-80.  34 HDFB, 24. 35 Sun Wenchen and Liu Yonglu, "Bosa geming huozhong de ren - Song Haiting" (Man Spreading the Flames of Revolution - Song Haiting), in Bandao shuguang (Dawn in the Peninsula), ed. Zhonggong Yantai shiwei dangshi ziliao zhengji yanjiu weiyuanhui (Jinan: Shandong xinwen chubanju, 1989), 327. 72  government authorities, and Zhao also introduced Zhang to many teachers in the Laiyang area, some of whom were later recruited by Zhang to the CCP.36   Zhang, with support from Song Jixian, also came into contact with another circle, students and graduates of the Shandong Village Teachers? School Number Two in the Laiyang county town. Song was a recent graduate of the school, and one of its students would bring Zhang to Haiyang. Attending School Number Two was Wang Zhifeng, one of the leaders of the 1928/1929 unrest in the western party of the county. Wang was soon inducted into the CCP by Zhang, and through a friend managed to find him a job in the advanced primary school in Shimatantou, his home village.37 He also introduced Zhang to Sun Jiesan and Sun Mingrui in nearby Xiaze, re-establishing the link between radicals who had been formed by turmoil four years earlier.38  3.12 Troubled Expansion: 1932-1933  Mid-1932 to late 1933 marked the highpoint of CCP activities in Haiyang and Rushan prior to 1937, but also the start of their decline. Shandong's provincial party committee, in July of 1932, had directed party organizers across the province to use anti-Japanese agitation to infiltrate and increase party membership among students, workers and soldiers in both rural and urban areas, and to organize rural guerrilla forces and uprisings to support Red Army units in the south.39 Organizers on both sides of Haiyang attempted to fulfill the directive. In the east, Yu Jianzhai, following directions from the provincial party, took up the job of inspector of the education department in Muping's government, and used the position to recruit teachers and students in the county. In eastern Haiyang, Yu Shoutang used his position as head of the county GMD propaganda department to give Song Zhuting work in Fengcheng, Haiyang?s county seat. Song was hired as a GMD propaganda worker, and worked secretly to produce and distribute CCP party materials                                                  36 Jiaodong tewei, "Guanyu Jiaodong de baogao," 271 (see chap. 2, n. 22). 37 Ibid., 271. 38 Song Zhuting and Yu Shoukang, 15.  39 Zhonggong Shandong shengwei, "Guanyu bayi fandi zhanzhengri de jueyi" (Decision Regarding the August First Anti-Imperialist War Day), in SGLWH, Volume 6, 346-347.  73  using the county?s GMD party press. He also recruited urban students and artisans in the city.40  Compared to eastern Haiyang/Rushan, activists in western Haiyang were more rural-based and less reliant on GMD connections. Though some members, such as Wang Zhifeng had GMD membership, western organizers lacked connections with senior local GMD leaders. Zhang Jingyuan had a reluctant relationship with Zhao Guodong, his main GMD contact in Laiyang and Haiyang. Though reliant to a degree on Zhao, Zhang was suspicious of him on account of Zhao's senior position in the GMD and previous record with the CCP. He tried to keep Zhao in the dark about his activities and true identity, and relied mainly on students and graduates from Shandong Village Teachers? School Number Two. These young men recruited largely through friendship, family and lineage ties, and spread the party to a number of villages across Laiyang and western Haiyang. Among those they attracted to the CCP were a number of young men who worked as government functionaries or militiamen, something eastern members were unable to do at the time. The Laiyang/Western Haiyang group claimed among its members and sympathizers four ward government assistants, some of whom later became ward heads, and three ward militia members by September of 1932.41   A chance encounter in the summer of 1932 would establish contact between the two groups. Song Zhuting, on a trip to western Haiyang for the GMD propaganda department, met Liu Songshan, an erstwhile friend who was also a GMD member. Liu, a student at the Shandong Village Teachers? School Number Two, had taken part in the 1928-1929 unrest in western Haiyang, and was introduced into the CCP by Zhang Jingyuan. The two soon discovered each other's identities, and informed their groups.42 Organizers in eastern and western Haiyang communicated regularly after that, but worked separately. They were both receiving directions from the provincial committee through different contacts, and carried on independently from each other.                                                   40 Song Zhuting and Yu Shoukang, 11-12. 41 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai?; Song Zhuting and Yu Shoukang, 17; Jiaodong tewei, "Guanyu Jiaodong de baogao", 272.  42 Song Zhuting and Yu Shoukang, 14-15.  74  3.13 Failed Unrest in Eastern Haiyang: Late 1932  CCP organizers in Laiyang/western Haiyang and Rushan, up to the fall of 1932, had focused on finding recruits. This, along with their degree of cooperation, began to change in late September of 1932, when Han Fuju's campaign to seize Jiaodong reached Laiyang. Han's forces caused a panic among Laiyang's inhabitants, sending large numbers fleeing for fear of being caught up in the fighting. Liu Zhennian's remnant forces hunkered down in the county town, and began to rob and extort grain and livestock from areas of Laiyang they still controlled to prepare for a long siege. Han and Liu's war reached Haiyang on September 26th, when several hundred of Liu's troops from Laiyang went rogue and headed east. They burnt down a village in western Haiyang, and for a while terrorized parts of the county.43   Party members from both sides of Haiyang received an emergency order from the provincial committee, calling on organizations all over Jiaodong to take advantage of the fighting between Han and Liu to step up propaganda work and begin guerrilla war.44 In western Haiyang and Laiyang, members of Zhang's group began the first of a number of attacks, raiding local militias and wealthy households to obtain weapons and cash to fund the creation of a guerrilla force. Activists in eastern Haiyang planned something even bigger. Using the presses of the county's GMD propaganda department, they produced and distributed large numbers of materials denouncing Liu, Han and Chiang Kai-shek. On the night of November 6th they carried out an ambitious effort to coincide with the 15th anniversary of the Russian Revolution the next day. With a number of teachers and students in Fengcheng, party activists filled the city's streets with posters praising the CCP, and even managed to sneak large amounts of communist materials into the magistrate's yamen.45   Organizers had gambled on Liu and Han's war to produce widespread disorder and political uncertainty. They sought to use this to create cover for their activities.                                                  43 Wang Pixu and Liang Bingkun, 1635-1636.  44 Zhonggong Shandong shengwei, "Jinji tongzhi - fandui Han-Liu junfa hunzhan yu tusha minzhong" (Emergency Order: Oppose Han and Liu's Warlord In-Fighting and Slaughter of the People), in SGLWH, Volume 6, 390-392.  45 Song Zhuting and Yu Shoukang, 12.  75  However, local party leaders grossly miscalculated. In late October Han and Liu, through mediation by the national government in Nanjing, came to an agreement for the peaceful handover of power in Jiaodong; this called for Liu's troops to leave the Peninsula unmolested and for Han's forces to be pulled back to certain areas.46 This agreement prevented the further spread of fighting to Haiyang, and left its government intact. The commotion caused by Song led the county government to launch a crackdown on Communists. Song?s activities in the Haiyang GMD had also caused unease amongst some GMD leaders who were not sympathetic to the CCP. These men gave Song?s name to county authorities, forcing him to flee.47 Song would not return to Haiyang until 1937, and many of the people he recruited in eastern part of the county were arrested in the government crackdown, collapsing the party activities in the area. Though several members, led by Yu Jianzhai, continued to carry out party activities in Muping, operations in Rushan reached a low ebb.   3.14 Heyday and Collapse: Western Haiyang and Laiyang, 1933   The situation in Laiyang and western Haiyang, however, was different. Liu and Han's troops did not depart until early December of 1932. Though the two sides did not engage in serious fighting, damage caused by their pillaging and the dislocation to local society was great. This created a great deal of chaos, and militia and government forces in eastern Laiyang and western Haiyang were also occupied in much of late 1932 and early 1933 with rooting out Liu's rogue soldiers.48 These developments gave cover to activists, who had sympathizers in local militias. CCP activists in Laiyang and western Haiyang were also helped by another favourable development. Han Fuju, following his conquest of Jiaodong, did not immediately replace government leaders in the Peninsula with his own supporters. He, instead, took a wait-and-see approach on their loyalty. Han?s initial treatment of government officials in Jiaodong left the political connections the CCP in Laiyang had built intact.                                                   46 Lu Weijun et al., 387-388.  47 Song Zhuting and Yu Shoukang, 12-14. 48 Wang Pixu and Liang Bingkun, 1636.  76   Largely unopposed, organizations in Laiyang and western Haiyang grew to become the largest in Jiaodong by mid 1933. They established, according to later recollections and local party histories, village branches in 29 villages in western Haiyang, expanded membership to all parts of Laiyang, and claimed 1,000 members by June of that year.49 Activists in Laiyang and western Haiyang became more militant in 1933, launching a growing number of violent attacks on local militias and the wealthy in the two areas.50   This success was short lived. By the spring 1934 the group had collapsed, its leader Zhang Jingyuan dead at the hands of a fellow member. Recollections of surviving leaders and party histories often attributed the collapse to fierce repression by Han Fuju and the actions of a few traitors within the group, but the few documents from the time suggests something far more complex. Members of the western Haiyang/Laiyang group were in many ways set on a path of self destruction by their relationships, behaviour and sudden growth of recruits. A report on their activities in 1934, written by Wang Zhifeng, highlighted a number of problems. The document notes that the group operated largely as an organization of young men detached from society. Though a small number of members were militiamen, they lacked the weapons or skills to successfully take on local forces or powerful individuals, and in large part robbed from the moderately wealthy, stealing weapons from them to build a guerrilla force and in some cases even holding people for ransom. Many members had a blurry understanding of class struggle, seeing it as robbing from or destroying the property of wealthy individuals; they at times kept what they stole for themselves. Despite their aim to overthrow the existing order, party members were heavily dependent on it. Attacks were carried out only in areas where they did not have supporters in the militia; they were afraid to bring trouble to sympathizers.51   These problems were compounded by personal conflicts between the group's leaders. As the Laiyang/western Haiyang party grew tension was brewing between Zhang Jingyuan and two other leaders, Zhan Zhuoyun (???) and Xu Yuanyi (???). Zhan,                                                  49 HDFB, 28; Jiaodong tewei, "Guanyu Jiaodong de baogao," 274. 50 HDFB, 33-35. Haiyang?s local party history claims that CCP members in the western part of the county attacked ward militias, attempted to assassinate officials, and even killed some local elites, such as Sun Yuelan, the ousted principal of the Xiaze school.  51 Jiaodong tewei, "Guanyu Jiaodong de baogao," 277-278.  77  a ward assistant in Laiyang, was one of the original party members recruited by Song Haiting. He was the most senior CCP figure from western Laiyang. Zhan felt he deserved more power in the rapidly growing local party, and was angered by Zhang's reliance on members from eastern Laiyang. Little is known about Xu, but he was said to be a teacher and one of the first members Zhang recruited in Laiyang.52 Xu, like Zhan, was also ambitious, and he ran afoul of both Zhang and Zhan by seducing a female student, who happened to be Zhan's niece. Hounded by Zhang, his allies and Zhan, Xu left Laiyang in the fall of 1932. He found work in the nearby county of Qixia, and over the next few months built up an organization of his own with more than 100 members in the southern part of the county and northern Laiyang. Xu and his followers rejoined Zhang's group in the spring of 1933. He found himself a pariah; Zhan had spread many malicious rumours about him during his absence.53   A number of developments in 1932 and 1933 exacerbated these conflicts. In mid November 1932 the western Haiyang/Laiyang group lost contact with the provincial party. Zhang undertook a long trip to find the provincial committee, finally linking up with them in late December. He discovered that the committee had been devastated by the arrest of two key leaders, and had virtually lost track of all local organizations.54 Zhang, seeing the situation, proposed a method of improving communication, integrating all party organizations in rural Jiaodong under the control of one body. This was approved by the committee, and Zhang, in early 1933, formed the Jiaodong Special Committee (???? ), with himself as its secretary. Zhang chose to locate the committee in Muping, close to the major port of Yantai and in a more central location in the Peninsula. He took over leadership of the remnants of the southern Muping/eastern Haiyang group, and spent much of the winter of 1933 travelling to find other party organizations in Jiaodong.55                                                   52 Li Zhonglin, "Guanyu Laiyang dangde," 23. 53 Ibid., 272-273. 54 "Zhonggong Shandong linwei fuzeren Ren Zuomin gei zhongyang de baogao" (Report by Ren Zuomin, Person Responsible for the Shandong Temporary Provincial Committee to the Party Centre), in SGLWH, Volume 6, 425-430.  55 Jiaodong tewei, "Guanyu Jiaodong de baogao," 272; RDB, 43-44 (see chap. 2, n. 30). 78   Zhang's long periods of absence opened further rifts in Laiyang. While he was away Zhang had handed over the management of the party in Laiyang/western Haiyang to several eastern Laiyang organizers. This further aroused Zhan, who was feeling left out. Zhan also ran afoul of Zhang during his absence by admitting Zhao Guodong into the CCP. Zhao, long kept in the dark about local CCP activities by Zhang, finally discovered the truth about Zhang's group after much prying in early 1933. He confronted Zhan, who was a friend, claiming to know everything and demanding to be let in. Zhan was pressured into agreeing, but this angered Zhang; on his return in the spring of 1933, he immediately expelled Zhao from the CCP.56   Unstable contacts with the provincial party also deepened conflict between Zhang and Xu. Not long after his return to Laiyang Zhang found that he had lost contact again with the provincial party. After another long trip he learned that the Shandong provincial committee in Jinan had been completely destroyed by arrests, and that a temporary one had been set up in Qingdao by Li Junde????), the city's party secretary.57 This shift in the provincial party's centre benefited Xu. His younger brother Xu Yuanpei (???), a student in the city, was a Communist underground worker, and had become the main relay person between the provincial committee and the lower levels. Xu Yuanpei sent messages from the provincial committee only to his brother, and Xu Yuanyi attempted to use this as leverage to improve his position in the Laiyang party.58  All this upheaval began to impact the CCP in Laiyang and western Haiyang in a disastrous way in the summer of 1933. In July of that year Sun Jiesan and Sun Mingrui, who had sought to enforce the CCP's class policy by destroying and looting the property of the wealthy in their village, were informed on by locals. This triggered a number of                                                  56 Zou XX, "Guanyu Laiyang zuzhi gaikuang, paibie qingxing deng wenti gei zhongyang de baogao" (Report to the Party Centre Regarding the Organization of the Party in Laiyang, the Situation of its Factions and Other Questions), in SGLWH, Volume 7, 138-139; Jiaodong tewei, "Guanyu Jiaodong de baogao," 272-273. 57 An Zuozhang et al., Shandong tongshi, 487.  58 Li Zhonglin, 25; Song Zhuting and Yu Shoukang, 18. 79  raids by county and ward authorities in western Haiyang, leading to more arrests and forcing many of its leaders, such as Wang Zhifeng to flee to Laiyang.59  At the same time, a cycle of leadership rivalries, disagreements and violent reactions, which had brought down the Laiyang CCP in 1928, was repeating itself in the county. Around the same time that the Haiyang members fled Zhang Jingyuan had created a Laiyang Central County Committee (?????? ) to manage party organizations in southern and central Jiaodong. Xu was excluded from leadership, and in response refused to hand over messages from the provincial committee. He later left Zhang's group altogether, forming a separate Laiyang county committee not under the control of the Jiaodong Special Committee. Zhan, during the spring and summer of 1933, convinced many members from western Laiyang to abandon Zhang. He accused Zhang of being an absentee leader whose long periods away from the county made him out of touch with its reality.60    The crisis point came with the arrival of Li Zhongxiang (???), a Qingdao student sent by Li Junde to resolve the leadership crisis in the late summer. The mediation was bungled from the start. Li, having no prior contact with Zhang, came first to Xu, whom he had known before. He then met Zhan, and contacted Zhang last. Li?s order of meeting the three leaders was seen as a snub by Zhang and his supporters, and he was not accepted as a legitimate higher party representative by them until three meetings later.61 He was instructed by Li Junde not to take sides, but to point out the faults of all the groups, help work out their differences, and gradually integrate the three sides into a unified organization. Li Zhongxiang attempted to do this, but was suddenly recalled to Qingdao by Li Junde. Prior to his departure, Li Zhongxiang made a quick decision, that the Laiyang/Haiyang party should be reunited under Zhang, with Xu as one of his deputies, angering the latter.62                                                   59 "Guanyu Laiyang de paibie, zuzhi, jilu ji gongzuo jihua deng wenti de baogao" (Report Regarding the Factions, Organization, Discipline, Work Planning and Other Questions in Laiyang), in SGLWH, Volume 7, 145-146.  60 Jiaodong tewei, "Guanyu Jiaodong de baogao," 273-274. 61 Ibid., 275.  62 Li Junde, "Zhonggong Qingdao linwei shuji Li Junde guanyu ganbu zhuangkuang, waixian gongzuo qingxing deng wenti gei zhongyang baogao" (CCP Qingdao Temporary Committee Secretary Li Junde's Report to the Centre Regarding the Situation of Cadres, 80   A development in Qingdao further stoked animosities in Laiyang/Haiyang. Li Zhongxiang had been called back because Li Junde had lost contact with the CCP party centre in Shanghai. Li Junde, desperate to re-establish links with the centre, hurriedly left in search of it, and placed Li Zhongxiang in charge in Qingdao. Li Zhongxiang was quickly embroiled in a conflict with Xu Yuanpei, Xu Yuanyi?s younger brother. Xu Yuanpei had been ordered by Li Junde to temporarily take over his responsibilities until Li Zhongxiang arrived. Believing that Li Junde had put him in charge for the whole trip, Xu Yuanpei refused to relinquish his duties, and even tried to keep information from Li Zhongxiang, leading the latter to write to Li Junde for confirmation of his leadership. Li Junde's sent a reply directly to Li Zhongxiang, supporting him. This letter, however, was intercepted by the younger Xu and forwarded to his brother. Xu Yuanyi, already angered by Li Zhongxiang's siding with Zhang, was enraged by the message.63 Believing that the higher leadership was in league with Zhang, he decided to take revenge.   Xu used the deteriorating situation in western Haiyang to plot Zhang's demise. Zhang had wanted to go to Haiyang to see if there were still party members left following the arrest of key party leaders. Fearful of being caught in the crackdown against Communists in the county, he went to Xu to borrow a gun. Zhang was lured into a remote place by Xu and killed.64 Xu attempted to hide Zhang's death, but Zhang's associates became increasingly suspicious. In November Zhang's body was discovered, something that led his allies to quickly take revenge. Accounts of Xu's death varied, but they suggest that he was killed in a way similar to Zhang.65                                                                                                                                                   Outside County Work and Other Matters), in SGLWH, Volume 7, 125; Jiaodong tewei, "Guanyu Jiaodong de baogao ", 275.  63 Li Junde, "Zhonggong Qingdao linwei," 125. 64 Zou XX, "Guanyu Laiyang zuzhi gaikuang," 140.  65 Jiaodong tewei, "Guanyu Jiaodong de baogao," 275; Yu Shoukang, "Yu Shoukang yi Laiyang zhongxin xianwei de jianli yu fazhan" (Yu Shoukang?s Recollections on the Creation and Development of the Laiyang Central County Party Committee), in Laixi dangshi, Volume 2, 80. Details of Xu?s death come from these two sources. The first, written during the 1930s claims that Xu was betrayed by a member of his group, who tricked him into an ambush with several of Zhang's supporters and later executed him. However, the second source noted that Zhang's supporters wanted to hold Xu until others from the group arrived, but were forced to beat him to death when Xu attempted to escape.  81   The consequences of Zhang?s and Xu's deaths within a short time were disastrous. Members of the Laiyang party were severely demoralized. Xu, according to one document, had stoked further tensions prior to his death by attacking Li Zhongxiang in front of other party members, accusing him of being a GMD spy and in league with Zhan. This, along with the disillusionment after the deaths, raised suspicions towards the higher leadership amongst local party members, and deepened animosities between factions in the county.66    The crisis within the Laiyang CCP coincided with an effort by Han Fuju to root out Communists in the county. Alerted to the activities of Zhang's group, Han made a methodical effort to hunt down Communists in the first half of 1934. Suspecting infiltration of local government and militias, he first replaced its Liu Zhennian appointed magistrate with a trusted aide, and transferred all ward and militia heads out of Laiyang, replacing them with those from nearby counties. This effectively removed any cover enjoyed by party activists, and Han then ordered the new heads to conduct a thorough investigation of Communist activity in the county. 67 Han's repression caught the local CCP at a time when it was already weakened by internal divisions. Rivalries between the different party factions further exposed CCP organizers to persecution, with captured members from different groups giving their rivals away to seek revenge.68 Damage from factional rivalries had an impact that extended beyond Laiyang. Xu Yuanpei, learning of his brother's death, defected to Han Fuju's authorities in Qingdao, resulting in the destruction of the temporary provincial committee and the arrest of Li Zhongxiang and much of the provincial and municipal party leadership.69    Party organizations in Laiyang effectively collapsed in the spring of 1934, with its leaders all under arrest or on the run. Zhan Zhuoyun, the only leader of the three factions to survive, made a daring escape, shooting two militiamen sent to arrest him. He never re-contacted the party. 70  Wang Zhifeng, most senior of the western Haiyang leaders, managed to flee and link up with the Jiaodong Special Committee. He carried out a                                                  66 Jiaodong tewei, "Guanyu Jiaodong de baogao ", 275. 67 Song Zhuting and Yu Shoukang, 19.    68 Jiaodong Tewei, "Guanyu Jiaodong de baogao ", 276-277.  69 An Zuozhang et al., 487. 70 Li Zhonglin, 34. 82  variety of work for the party in Jiaodong, but was arrested when he tried to re-establish party organizations in western Haiyang in 1936 and later executed.71  The actions of western Haiyang and Laiyang organizers ended in murderous personal conflicts and a grim fate for its leaders. However, they had inadvertently saved the Jiaodong party. Though Zhang's absence in 1933 had fostered local animosities, he had established a unified party organization in the Peninsula that survived and continued to work after the demise of the provincial committee. The attention brought to Laiyang also distracted Han?s attention from western Haiyang, allowing the survival of a small number of its members. Activities in Haiyang and Jiaodong were shifting east, and were increasingly led by leaders from the future Rushan area.  3.15 Last Stand: Eastern Haiyang and Southern Muping: 1934-1935  On the night of November 28th, 1935, more than a hundred young men gathered for an attack on the market town of Xiacun in eastern Haiyang. They were similar to the rebels of 1928, who had stormed the same town that year and seized weapons from government forces in it. However, the rebels in 1935 were confronted by a well-armed ward militia, and one of their members had defected several hours later, warning the local ward head about the planned assault. The ward head attacked the rebels even before they struck, driving them off.72 Their plan foiled, the group wandered around eastern Haiyang over the next three days, robbing the local wealthy.73 They massed again for a new assault on a ward office in Muping on December 2nd, but were ambushed by Han Fuju's troops and slaughtered.74   This event marked the destruction of a CCP organization led by eastern Haiyang/southern Muping natives, which for two years had carried out revolutionary                                                  71 HDFB, 340-341.  72 RDB, 50.  73 Li Qi, "Jiaodong tewei shuji Li Qi tongzhi gei geji dang tongzhi de yifengxin" (Letter from Comrade Li Qi, Secretary of the Jiaodong Special Committee to Party Comrades at All Levels), in SGLWH, Volume 7, 437-438. The rebels were supposed to burn all rental and debt contracts in the villages they entered, and to distribute the grain of the wealthy to the poor, but a report in 1936 by survivors noted that they rarely did this. Some participants were also accused of yelling at and attacking poorer peasants.  74 RDB, 51.  83  violence across the eastern part of Jiaodong. Despite the events of late 1932, CCP activities in the future Rushan area revived the next year. This was made possible through the efforts of several individuals who were connected to or part of the uprising of 1928, Yu Shoutang in Haiyang, Yu Jianzhai in Muping and Yu Yunting in Wendeng. The three, who all held important positions in the political or education establishment of eastern Jiaodong, were pillars of the southern Muping/eastern Haiyang party, providing job opportunities and cover for organizers. Undetected by local authorities, they gave covert support for CCP development.  However, these men had many responsibilities associated with their jobs, and often could not travel or organize activities. Leadership of the party in eastern Jiaodong was increasingly taken over by young men who were less rooted. Among these was Liu Jingsan (???), a teacher in southern Muping. Liu's background was an exception among early party members. His father owned a prosperous business in the county town, and was the head of the township encompassing their village. Some documents from the 1930s referred to his family as "gentry".75 However, Liu shared many similarities with other members. He had spent years away from his family for schooling and on business for his father in Manchuria. He was also a rebellious man and a victim of the turmoil in Jiaodong. As a wealthy man, Liu was harassed by Liu Zhennian's forces in 1930, and was bold enough to make a complaint directly to Muping's magistrate. This made him a wanted man, and he fled to Manchuria for a year.76   Working as an administrator in a middle school in 1932, Liu was recruited into the CCP by Yu Jianzhai. He came into contact with Zhang Jingyuan through Song Zhuting later that year, and played a major role in establishing the Jiaodong Special Committee. Liu created a contact point for the committee in early 1933 by obtaining the use of an abandoned temple near the Muping/Haiyang border owned by the kinsman of a friend. He financed a poultry business in the temple, giving cover to the activities of the committee, and worked as a liaison between different local parties and the provincial                                                  75 RDB, 266; Jiaodong tewei, "Guanyu Jiaodong de baogao," 288.  76 "Renyuan dengjibiao" (Personell Registration Form), in Xuerande tudi (Blood Soaked Earth), ed. Zhonggong Rushan xianwei dangshi ziliao zhengji yanjiu weiyuanhui (Neibu, 1987), 21; RDB, 266.  84  committee in Zhang Jingyuan's absence.77 Liu, following Zhang's death also undertook a trip to re-establish contact with the larger party.78 His efforts ensured that the Jiaodong Special Committee survived following the Laiyang/western Haiyang fiasco, and that it had a Rushan and eastern Jiaodong leadership.    CCP activities, up to the end of 1933, had been limited to the Muping side of Rushan. This changed in the spring of 1934 in part due to the efforts of a figure long absent from the area, Yu Xingfu. Yu had spent much of 1932 in Beiping through support from Zheng Tianju. He returned to Jiaodong late that year, and found employment under clansman Yu Yunting in Wendeng's teacher school. Yu Yunting gave Yu Xingfu work as an administrator in the school, and assigned him to manage the student party cell. Yu Xingfu did so until 1934, when a conflict between Yu Yunting and a student member collapsed the CCP organization at the school. Scolded by Yu, the student went to the local authorities; this resulted in Yu being arrested and various party members fleeing. Taking quick action, Yu Xingfu brought several teachers who were party members at the school back to eastern Haiyang, and with help from Yu Shoutang found them work in schools near his home village. He later returned and began to rebuild the party organizations in the eastern part of the county.79   Yu Xingfu claimed that he made a living by starting a fruit orchard, but his account and the 1944 Haiyang county committee report suggest that Yu's previous government ties played a critical role in sustaining both himself and the eastern Haiyang party. Not too long after Yu returned, Zhang Jianan, Yu's former associate in the 1928-1929 pro-GMD unrest, who was serving as the head of Haiyang's GMD and its county government construction bureau, was murdered. Zhang, unlike Yu, was never sympathetic to the CCP, and the 1944 report claims that he was poisoned by a subordinate in league with Yu Xingfu and other Communists, who were in the county GMD. Yu's accomplice soon took over Zhang's position, and used it to secretly transfer                                                  77 "Xiaolongsi jiya gongsi: ji Jiaodong tewei de mimi lianluozhan" (Xiaolong Temple Chicken and Duck Company: Remembering the Jiaodong Special Committee's Secret Contact Station), in Xuerande tudi, 36-38.  78 Liu Jingsan, "Liu Jingsan de baogaoshu" (Report by Liu Jingsan), in Xuerande tudi, 18.  79 Yu Zhou, "Huiyi zai Wendeng xiangshi de rizi" (Remembering Days in the Wendeng Village Teacher School), Wendeng wenshi ziliao (Materials on History and Literature in Wendeng) 4 (1989): 78-84.  85  funds from the county government to local Communists.80  Activists in eastern Haiyang also had several government sympathizers, including the militia head of Xiacun, and Yu notes that he had ties with the county police through a member of his lineage.81   Membership in Muping and eastern Haiyang reached over 700 by the late summer of 1934, but in early 1935 the group had been battered, its numbers greatly reduced; it was on the verge of collapse.82 The Rushan party was in many ways doomed from the start, pulled apart by many factors it could not control. The most immediate cause behind its destruction was the militant actions of party activists. Members in eastern Haiyang and Muping in 1934 had continued following the Comintern line passed down by higher levels, which called on members in North China to organize armed uprisings and create guerrilla forces. In mid 1934 they launched a number of attacks against local militias, elites, officials and the salt police in Muping, eastern Haiyang and Wendeng, and with the help of a few surviving members in western Haiyang, began to mount raids into the area. In this part of the county they had the greatest success, surprising and over-running a salt police station in August and seizing a considerable number of firearms. However, they lacked cohesion. Participants in the salt police raid, numbering a hundred, left soon after for a rocky range of hills in northern Haiyang, hoping to start a guerrilla force. They split up only two days afterwards, when most members deserted. 83  Aspiring revolutionaries from eastern Haiyang and Muping also faced fierce resistance from ward militias, who, after a few losses, were becoming increasingly active in hunting them down. One raid in the summer of 1934 was foiled after militiamen figured out where the CCP members were planning to gather and surprised them. Another raid ended disastrously when participants ran into a militia out hunting bandits; this sent them running in wild panic.84 Increased persecution by late 1934 had destroyed all remaining                                                  80 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai.?  81 Yu Zhou, "Yuzhou zizhuan," 349-350. 82 Jiaodong tewei, "Guanyu Jiaodong de baogao," 280-283.  83 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai.? 84 Jiaodong tewei, "Jiaodong tewei tongxin erhao: guanyu gongzuo qingxing, jiesan youjidui jingguo deng" (Jiaodong Special Committee Letter Number Two: Regarding the Situation of Work, Disbanding of Guerrilla Forces etc), in SGLWH, Volume 7, 293-294.  86  CCP presence in western Haiyang, and was closing in on organizations in the eastern part of the county and Muping.85   Documents from higher party levels in late 1934 and 1935 blamed the failure of guerrilla operations on poor ideological training of local party members and their disconnection from the wider society. These sources repeatedly accused local leaders of not building guerrilla war on the basis of class struggle, targeting militias and police while turning attacks on the wealthy into robbery by party members rather than involving the greater "masses" to settle their grievances and arousing them through the process to support the CCP.86 The Haiyang party committee's 1944 document also placed blame on party members, who it said were mostly brutal, unreliable "liumang".87 However, these sources reveal many factors working against the Rushan party. Organizations in southern Muping and eastern Haiyang, since early 1934, had been filled with members from outside the area. This was caused in large part by the collapse of the Laiyang and western Haiyang parties, which sent large numbers of party activists fleeing. Muping and eastern Haiyang, home to the Jiaodong Special Committee and close to the city and port of Yantai, was chosen by many members seeking means of survival, a way out of Jiaodong and support from the larger party. CCP organizations in the Rushan area were also running out of money, related to the influx of fugitive outsiders. Party leaders frequently complained of an inability to "feed comrades", and even requested in August 1934 financial support from the CCP centre.88 Money difficulties were made worse by the collapse of the party cell in Wendeng's Village Teacher's School following the arrest of Yu Yunting; the CCP teachers and students had given a good part of their income and living stipends to finance party operations in eastern Jiaodong.89                                                   85 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai.? 86 Liu Yizhao, "Guanyu Shandong gongzuo de baogao" (Report Regarding Work in Shandong), in SGLWH, Volume 7, 365; Shandong shengwei, "Gei Jiaodong tewei de zhishixin" (Directive Letter for the Jiaodong Special Committee), in SGLWH, Volume 7, 393-397.  87 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai.? 88 Jiaodong tewei, "Jiaodong tewei tongxin erhao," 292-293; Liu Yizhao, "Guanyu Shandong," 366.  89 Yu Zhou, "Huiyi zai Wendeng", 79-80.  87   Destruction of the party in the school also greatly reduced communications between party organizations in eastern Haiyang and southern Muping and their ability to provide ideological education to their members. Students from the Wendeng teacher?s school, who were from around the Peninsula, were often used as couriers, passing down information to local party members.90 The school's press was also used to reproduce party materials for study. The collapse of the school's CCP organization scattered its members. 91  This, combined with the desperation of many outsider members, made ideological training, often emphasized by higher documents, difficult. The outsiders weakened the ability of the Jiaodong Special Committee to direct local action, and contributed to a vicious cycle. Large numbers of outsiders furthered the disconnection between local CCP organizations, already composed of many rebellious young men, and wider society. Money problems, along with the need to survive, also encouraged the brutal and opportunistic side of members, leading to bandit-like behaviour. Repression brought about by the actions of members likely made them feel more desperate, militant and willing to strike back at local forces, inviting greater persecution. From this mindset attacks on militias and police likely made more sense. These hated forces had large numbers of weapons, which could be used to carry out further violence. They also collected taxes or had the right to levy their own maintenance fees, making their offices even greater targets for CCP members desperate for money.    These difficulties unfolded amid rivalries between leaders in the Jiaodong Special Committee and their superiors. Members of the committee, after the disaster that resulted from Li Zhongxiang's mediation in Laiyang, were reluctant to contact party leaders in Qingdao, and sent Liu Jingsan on a trip to establish links with higher levels. Liu met up with the CCP Northern Bureau in Tianjin in early 1934, but was directed to the Shandong Provincial Youth League Work Committee (??????) in Qingdao, an organization formed after the collapse of the provincial committee in late 1933, which handled all CCP operations and liaison between party levels in the eastern part of the province. The Northern Bureau also dispatched Chang Zijian (???), a Shaanxi native, to serve as the                                                  90 Ibid., 80-81. 91 Chang Zijian, "Guanyu Jiaodong zhengzhi jingji he dang zuzhi zhuangkuang xiang zhongyang de baogao" (Report to the Party Centre Regarding the Political, Economic and Party Organization Situation in Jiaodong), in SGLWH, Volume 7, 216. 88  head of the Jiaodong Special Committee.92 Over the course of the year conflict developed between the Jiaodong members of the committee and Chang. Jiaodong members accused Chang of being inattentive to party matters, and by August requested that he be replaced with someone more competent. However, deeper issues were at work behind these tensions. Chang was an outsider to Jiaodong, and did not know any of the leaders in Haiyang and Muping before. Unlike other outsiders, such as Zhang Jingyuan, he was not invited, but was imposed as the senior CCP figure in Jiaodong by party leaders elsewhere. Animosities were also worsened by another problem, Zhang's poor grasp of the Jiaodong dialect, which he even admitted in his dispatches to higher levels.93   A leadership struggle ensued in the fall of 1934, when Liu Jingsan and two other members of the committee, carrying important party documents, were arrested by a ward militia. What happened following their arrest was controversial. Later party histories recorded that Liu had made a heroic sacrifice, admitting that he was a senior party leader and that the other two committee members were merely travelling companions, something that got them released. The Youth League Work Committee, however, accused the three of being careless with documents. It also suspected that Liu had defected, and cast doubt on the story of the two released committee members. Chang fled to Qingdao, claiming that Liu had given away his location in Muping to Han Fuju's authorities.94 This led the Youth League Work Committee to withdraw recognition of the Jiaodong Special Committee, and to place local parties in the Peninsula under its direct control.95 The conflict was not resolved until early 1935, when the Youth League Work Committee backed down and affirmed Zhang Liangzhu (??? ), a teacher from Wendeng county and one of the two leaders released, as the head of the committee.96   Local organizers, caught in leadership confusion, escalated their attacks and robberies following Liu Jingsan's arrest, with disastrous consequences. A report from the                                                  92 Liu Yizhao, 364-365. 93 Jiaodong tewei, "Jiaodong tewei tongxin erhao," 292-293.  94 Liu Yizhao, 365.  95 Qingdao tuangongwei, "Qingdao tuangongwei gei dang zhongyang de xin: guanyu Jiaodong tewei bei puohuai deng wenti" (Letter from the Qingdao Youth League Work Committee to the Party Centre: Regarding the Question of the Damage of the Jiaodong Special Committee), SGLWH, Volume 7, 324-325.   96 RDB, 47.  89  Youth League Work Committee in late 1934 noted that many members in Muping and eastern Jiaodong had died as a result, and that hundreds had fled to Manchuria.97  Those who remained found their ranks thinned, their capacity for attacks severely weakened, and local authorities increasingly on to their activities. The Jiaodong Special Committee also lost contact with the higher party in April of 1935 when the Youth League Work Committee was destroyed by defection and arrest.98   These developments precipitated the raid in November of that year. The Haiyang Party Committee's 1944 document claimed that the insurrection was caused by increasing enemy pressure and loss of members, which led organizations to take drastic action.99 Plans for the revolt, as described by party histories, also highlighted desperation, and even included having participants fight their way out of Jiaodong.100 The decision for the uprising was contentious. Recollections of surviving leaders, such as Yu Xingfu and some local party histories, noted that many eastern Haiyang members strongly resisted the plan.101 Yu claimed that he opposed the revolt out of a cautious assessment of the situation at the time, but sources, including his own writings, suggest a rift between the eastern Haiyang membership and the rest of the Jiaodong party. Eastern Haiyang members, because of their sympathizers in government, enjoyed greater cover, and were financially far less desperate than their counterparts in Muping.   Hot-headedness, combined with divisions between members, doomed the uprising. The failed raid on Xiacun was only one part of a larger revolt involving all remaining organizations in eastern Jiaodong. The rebels planned simultaneous attacks against two market towns, Shidao (??) in Rongcheng (??) County, further east of Haiyang and Muping, where the local police department and salt bureau were located, and Xiacun, one of the most prosperous commercial communities in eastern Haiyang. The raids, which meant for eastern Jiaodong organizers to seize large numbers of weapons and wealth from elites to create a guerrilla force that would find a new sanctuary, grossly under-estimated the cohesion of party members and the opposition they faced. The raid on                                                  97 Liu Yizhao, 366-367.  98 RDB, 57.  99 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai.? 100 RDB, 49; ZSSDY, 89.  101 Yu Zhou, "Yuzhou zizhuan,? 349; HDFB, 42.  90  Shidao was poorly organized. Several party members who were assigned to take part in it were also arrested by local authorities a few days before the planned attack. The arrested members, frightened, gave away the whole plan of the raid to government leaders. Local forces were on the alert when the attack happened, and they also contacted Han Fuju?s army for back-up. Activists heading towards Xiacun thought that they would be aided by the local militia head and several party members in the force. However, their plan was foiled when an eastern Haiyang member of the militia, possibly against the raid, defected and gave the secrets of the operation to local authorities shortly before the attack. The rebels had walked into their own doom.102  3.16 Journeys  The uprising of 1928 in eastern Haiyang/southern Muping had given birth to a wave of revolutionary activism led by young men. Events of late 1935 would mark their end. Of the CCP members that took part in the raids, most were either killed or captured. Many in the second category, including Jiaodong Special Committee secretary Zhang Lianzhu, who led the attack on Shidao, were later executed.103 For the few fortunate enough to escape, a long journey as fugitives began. This journey would lead some back to the CCP, others not. What happened to Yu Jianzhai, one of the pillars of CCP activities in the Rushan area is not known. He disappeared after the 1935 uprising, and never contacted the party. Leaders in eastern Haiyang, likely due to their opposition to the revolt, did not play a major role in it. Their decisions saved them. Yu Shoutang, who had provided cover for CCP members in eastern Haiyang, remained at his position in the local government. He fled after the revolt, fearing that his cover was blown. Yu Shoutang went to Manchuria, where he had earlier sojourned, and stayed there until 1939. He linked up with the CCP again when he returned to eastern Haiyang at the end of that year, and served as an official in various Jiaodong counties from the 1940s to 1960s, including as deputy magistrate of both Haiyang and Rushan.104                                                   102 Wang Liang,"Huiyi yiyisi baodong" (Remembering the One, One, Four Uprising), in Jiaodong fengyunlu, 80-82, 89-90.  103 Wang Liang,"Huiyi yiyisi baodong," 87-89, 91. 104 RDB, 293.  91   Yu Xingfu was more directly involved in the uprising, but was not part of the raid on Xiacun. He was assigned to an auxiliary group of party members who provided covert assistance to the attack on Xiacun, and lost contact with the party after it failed.105 Yu travelled to various places in Shandong after this, searching for the party, and finally linked up with party leaders in Jinan in early 1936. He spent the next three years working for the party in western Shandong. Yu returned to Jiaodong in late 1939, and became an important party official in the eastern Peninsula, serving in various senior positions, such as mayor of Weihai following its seizure by the CCP in 1945. Yu went on to become party secretary of the Shanghai railway bureau after 1949, and ended his career as a senior official in the national railway ministry in Beijing.106   Several other members from southern Muping and Haiyang who had been arrested or fled earlier, also had a similar fate. Song Zhuting, who fled eastern Haiyang in 1932, remained in contact with the party. He was involved in CCP activities in various parts of Jiaodong and Shandong from 1933 to 1949, and ended his career as a senior party official in Zhejiang province. 107  Yu Yunting, head of the Wendeng Teachers? School, was released in mid 1934 with the help of friends in Shandong's provincial education department. He continued work as a CCP underground worker after this, carrying out activities for the party while serving in various education positions in Shandong as well as other parts of China over the next two decades; he ended his career in the late 1970s as the deputy chairman of the Jinan People's Political Consultative Committee.108  Those who remained in the CCP, like Song Haiting, who had paved the way for the formation of the Haiyang/Rushan party, became part of a mobile mid level CCP leadership in Shandong and later across China. Their survival was helped in large part by the detachment of these men from their communities, which made them willing to travel to look for the party or to take up work in many different places for it. However, they                                                  105 Yu Zhou, "Yuzhou zizhuan," 349.  106 Ibid., 264.  107 Ibid., 264-266.  108 Zhonggong Jinan shiwei dangshi yanjiushi, Jinan zhonggong dangshi renwu (Figures in the CCP Party History of Jinan), Volume 2, (Jinan: Jinanshi xinwen chubanju, 1998), 308-309.  92  were only a few among the hundreds who joined the party in Haiyang and southern Muping, and integration between these men and the higher CCP was not always easy. Survivors of the CCP in Rushan and Haiyang often found that the party they met at the end of their journeys was a top-down organization that demanded total obedience from members over its agendas. It was often brutal towards dissenters and non-conformists, and had a habit of using their personal backgrounds and earlier activities with the CCP against them if they did not obey, accusing them of being traitors and purging them.  The case of Liu Jingsan, the party leader from southern Muping who was arrested by Han Fuju's government in late 1934, creating a conflict between the Shandong provincial party and local Jiaodong members, is an example. Liu, according to an autobiography that he wrote in 1937, was released from prison in 1935 after his family paid a large sum of money to bribe officials in Han's government. He decided to link up with the CCP after this and ended up in Yan?an, where official histories claimed that he drowned while swimming in a river.109 However, Liu's account of himself was written as part of an investigation on him by party officials in Yan?an, aimed at scrutinizing his past record and determining if he was a loyal member, and his death seemed somewhat suspicious.110 He was denounced in some documents in the 1940s as a traitor, and was not made into a major figure in the early history of the Rushan CCP by party historians until the 1980s.111 It is possible that Liu drowned himself because he did not like the party he saw, or that he was afraid that it would use controversial events in his past against him. Fear of having his past used against him might have also been what motivated Song Haiting, the founder of the Haiyang CCP, to spend thirty years trying to clear up his party record, petitioning higher party levels to declare him a member from 1927 to 1938 even though he had abandoned the CCP during that period.  Young men who made up the early CCP in Haiyang and Rushan had also failed to successfully spread the party locally. Being socially marginalized, combined with estrangement from family and community, drew many young men to the party. However, the immaturity, unstable commitment, and brute nature of early CCP members,                                                  109 RDB, 267. 110 Liu Jingsan, ?Liu Jingsan,? in Xuerande tudi, 23. 111 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai." 93  something that was caused in large part by their backgrounds, also prevented them from building a viable party or reaching further into the society. These qualities, by the mid 1930s, were also running against the tide of developments in Jiaodong, which, though at times turbulent, was returning to political stability. The creation of a large grassroots party encompassing a greater part of society was blocked. This would change during the war with Japan.         94  Chapter 4: War and the Remaking of the Local Party  4.1 Rebirth of the Haiyang and Rushan Area Party   In the dying days of 1937 two men returned to the Haiyang/Rushan area. Both were veterans of the communist movement in the two counties. One was Song Zhuting, who helped to found the CCP in eastern Haiyang. The other, Liu Zhongyi (???), had taken part in Wang Zhifeng's radical unrest in western Haiyang in 1928/1929. He also led a number of raids on police and local elites in 1933-1934.1 Arrested for their activities in 1934-1935, Song and Liu had been imprisoned just weeks earlier, but were released by Han Fuju?s authorities as China's War of Resistance against Japan reached Shandong.2   Song and Liu hurried back to their native places at the directions of Li Qi (??), the new secretary of the Jiaodong Special Committee. Li, a native of Henan, had come to Jiaodong at the initiative of several survivors of the 1935 revolt. These party members, from Wendeng came upon a local who did business in Henan at the end of that year, and through him managed to contact the CCP in the province. They persuaded the Henan party to send Li, who also had contact with the CCP Northern Bureau. Li revived the Jiaodong Special Committee in the spring of 1936, but was captured by Han Fuju's forces several months later, and spent nearly a year in a prison in Jinan.3 Released as part of the United Front agreement in the fall of 1937, Li linked up with Li Yu (??), head of the newly established Shandong provincial party committee. Li Yu was in many ways like Li Qi. From Hebei, he was sent by the northern bureau to rebuild party organizations after CCP activists in western Shandong, devastated by arrests by Han Fuju?s government,                                                  1 Liu Zhongyi, "Yi shinian de geming douzheng shenghuo" (Fourteen Year Experience in Revolutionary Struggle), Haiyang wenshi ziliao 1 (1984): 1, 6-10.  2 Liu Zhongyi, "Yi shinian," 10-11, 19; RDB, 265 (see chap. 2, n. 30). 3 Li Zhuanmin and Li Qingshan, Jiaodong Fenghuo (Tales of Jiaodong) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2005), 133-134, 138-139, 149-150.   95  contacted the Hebei provincial party for help.4 Li Qi, under instruction from Li Yu, searched Jinan's prisons for party organizers who could assist in the reconstruction of the CCP in Jiaodong.5   Among those Li found were Song and Liu, and he put them to work quickly, seeking to take advantage of the rapidly changing political situation in Shandong. In October of 1937 Japanese forces entered the province. Their advance put Han Fuju in a great dilemma. More concerned with maintaining his military strength and hold over the province rather than national resistance, Han put up a half hearted defence while pondering his next step. As Japanese pressure on Shandong increased, he made a fateful decision in December, fleeing the province with his forces. Han calculated this to be in his best interests, but he grossly misunderstood the growing patriotic mood in China caused by the war, and the response of Chiang Kai-shek towards his actions. His flight from Shandong turned him into a pariah in the eyes of the larger Chinese public, and led to swift reaction from Chiang. Chiang had Han arrested during a conference of national leaders on the war in January 1938, and executed him not long afterwards. 6  Han's departure and sudden death decapitated a system that had become increasingly built around personal allegiance to him, causing it to immediately collapse. This was something that Li sought to exploit to the CCP's benefit.   4.2 Initial Activities in Haiyang and Rushan: the Backdrop  Song and Liu returned to an environment that was without government, militarized but orderly. Following the flight of Han political authority broke down in the Jiaodong Peninsula. Magistrates, who were largely appointed by Han Fuju and not natives of the areas they governed, fled across Jiaodong, leaving a power vacuum. However, the collapse of government, unlike in 1928, did not bring about a breakdown in basic social order. This was due in large part to Han Fuju's policies prior to the war. Han had eradicated most of Jiaodong's bandits and given local elites an important role in rural                                                  4 Li Yu, Li Yu huiyilu (Autobiography of Li Yu) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1992), 84-86.  5 Liu Zhongyi, "Yi shinian," 19-20.  6 Diana Lary, "Treachery, Disgrace and Death: Han Fuju and China's Resistance to Japan," War in History 13, no. 1 (2006): 76-82. 96  governance through two systems. The first of these was "village federation" (???) militias. Unlike the previous ward militia system set up by Liu Zhennian, which had state appointed heads and was either funded by county governments or given the right by local officials to collect taxes for their own maintenance, the village federation system called on groups of rural communities to form self-sustaining militias. Militias in the system were meant to be generated by locals, who funded them on their own informal initiative, and had only supervision from the state rather than direct appointment of their leaders.7 Village federation militias became the main form of rural security in Jiaodong by 1937, as Han Fuju scaled back ward militias and other forces.8  Han, secondly, had introduced Liang Shuming's rural reconstruction program to Jiaodong in 1936-1937. This system, an alternate form of governance below the county level, scrapped old forms of government and replaced them with "township schools", quasi-educational and bureaucratic institutions that provided Confucian-based moral instruction to the populace as well as administrative functions.9 Accounts by residents of Jiaodong who fled to Taiwan in 1949 credit both systems with bringing about order in the Peninsula before the war. However, they also suggest that the two systems significantly benefited wealthy, socially prominent men, including many who had been sidelined by the breakdown of order in the 1920s. Village federation militias and reconstruction schools were often funded by elites. Young men from wealthy and influential families also led Liang's reconstruction program, and in some cases used it as well as militias to co-opt and place under supervision those from more marginal backgrounds, who had previously been a source of disorder. Poor young men were hired as minor functionaries in township schools, and were sometimes even forced to join militias.10 Empowered by                                                  7 Lu Weijun et al., 407 (see chap. 2, n. 25).  8 Ibid., 407-408.  9  SHXBW, 674 (see introduction, no. 18); Guy Alitto, The Last Confucian: Liang Shuming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 246-253. The degree to which Liang's program was implemented across Jiaodong varied. The first of these schools in the Rushan/Haiyang area was established in February 1937. A more detailed description of Liang's program and its structures can be found in Guy Alitto's 1979 work, The Last Confucian. 10 Liu Guohua, "Kangzhanqian Laiyang xianzhang Liang Bingkun xiansheng zhengji" (Political Accomplishments of Mr. Liang Bingkun, Magistrate of Laiyang Prior to the Resistance War), Shandong wenxian 15, no. 1 (1989-1990): 106-107; Zhan Qinghui, 97  the two programs, native elites in Jiaodong took over government following the departure of Han's officials. Many assumed magistracy of counties and merged existing militias into larger local protectionist forces.11   Jiaodong, up to mid 1938, had also been a peripheral front in the war in China. Japanese forces entered the Peninsula in December 1937, seizing the main cities of Qingdao, Yantai and Weihai, but did not move to occupy the countryside.12 They were focused on chasing Chiang Kai-shek's national government in central China and sought to take over Jiaodong through less direct means. What followed in the first few months of 1938 was a number of informal negotiations and coalition-making efforts by elites to reconstitute county governments, and between them and larger political forces on the loyalty of specific areas. Seeking to win over the Peninsula's elites, the Japanese dispatched Zhang Zongyuan (???) (Date Junnosuke?????). Date, a Japanese agent going by a Chinese name, had once been military advisor to Zhang Zongchang, and claimed to be his adopted brother. He knew Jiaodong intimately and managed to persuade a number of local elites, as well as former government officials and military officers with                                                                                                                                                  "Laiyang kangzhan chuqi qingshi yu baofa zhanyi jingguo jishi" (The Situation in Laiyang at the Start of the Resistance War and a Record of the Developments During its Initial Stages), Shandong wenxian 11, no. 1 (1985-1986): 106. This was particularly the case in Laiyang, which was designated the test county for rural reconstruction work in Jiaodong by Liang Shuming and Han Fuju. Members of the rural reconstruction program, led by Han's appointed magistrate Liang Bingkun launched a "round up hooligans" campaign in 1934, grabbing idle young men for militias and reconstruction school training.  11  Li Xianliang, Luqing kangzhan jishi (Record of the Resistance War in Shandong-Qingdao) (Taibei: Jindai zhongguo chubanshe, 1994); Li Mengjiu, Shandong xiangmin duiri kangzhan ji fangong jishi (Record of the Shandong Townspeople's Resistance War against Japan and Opposition to Communists) (Taibeishi: zongjing xiaohuagang shucheng, 1981). This process is described in detail at the regional and local levels by the autobiographies of two figures, Li Xianliang, head of the GMD in Jiaodong during the war, who integrated many of these militias into the Nationalist side, and Li Mengjiu, a militia commander in Pingdu, a county not too far from Haiyang who later went to Taiwan. None of these works deal specifically with Haiyang, but I use them as larger reference in understanding the situation in the Haiyang/Rushan area during the early phases of the War of Resistance. 12 ZSSDY, 166 (see chap. 3, n. 3). This work, a local party history noted that there were no more than 1,100 Japanese soldiers in the whole of Jiaodong outside Qingdao prior to the fall of 1939. 98  ties to Zhang Zongchang to go over to the Japanese side.13 Jiaodong elites were also courted by GMD loyalists under the overall leadership of Shen Honglie (???). Shen, the commander of Zhang Xueliang's navy, had ruled Qingdao jointly with Han Fuju since 1932. He acquired a reputation for being a good administrator in the city, and became a hero in both China and Shandong in late 1937 for destroying Qingdao's many Japanese- owned factories as the Japan's army closed in on the city. Shen took over as GMD governor of Shandong following the departure of Han. He established a headquarters for the new provincial government in the south part of the province, and attempted to create a pro-GMD coalition out of remnant troops and local forces.14   Song and Liu, under guidance from Li Qi, attempted to insert the CCP into these negotiations and gain local control through them. Li, following directives from the Shandong provincial committee, had plotted a number of power seizures across eastern Jiaodong, in which CCP activists would take over counties and build armed forces.15 The plan, in practical terms, involved several parts. It called for winning over local elites and their forces, penetrating these with party activists who would slowly take over leadership, manipulating elite rivalries to eliminate competitors to CCP authority, and for members to launch revolts to seize power in specific areas on their own if necessary. Li departed for Jiaodong with Liu, Song, and a number of other released local activists in late 1937. He established a centre of operations for this venture in Wendeng, the county in the Peninsula that he had most familiarity with, and assigned Liu and Song the tasks of taking power in Haiyang and Muping.16     4.3 Initial Bid for Power: 1938  Liu and Song, upon their return, quickly sprang into action to implement Li's plan. They began by recruiting party activists who could serve as the basis of seizing local power, and soon met up with a number of pre-war CCP members who had either managed to hide from Han Fuju?s persecution or were recently released from captivity. Among these was Sun Mingrui. In prison since 1933, Sun was released in late 1937. He came home,                                                  13 Ibid., 157-158.  14 Li Xianliang, Luqing kangzhan, 5, 24-25. 15 ZSSDY, 109-110. 16 Ibid., 110.  99  and soon linked up with Liu Zhongyi.17 Liu and Song also found a sympathetic ear with Li Jianwu (???), a prominent local elite in western Haiyang. Li was an odd ally. A champion of social stability in the county, he had long opposed radical politics, and even funded the Big Knife Society of Song Sikun, who had tried to destroy Yu Xingfu's GMD group in 1929.18 However, Li was a promoter of modern education who built and funded various schools in western Haiyang, which put him in touch with some party members in the county who were teachers, and his concern for social stability led him several times to support individual Communists.19 Li, for example, hid several local CCP members in his area in early 1936 as Han Fuju's forces combed through the countryside following the failed 1935 revolt, fearing that awareness of the their presence might bring in unruly troops from Han?s army and damage the lives of local residents.20 He was also motivated by a strong sense of paternalism to protect all those in his lineage, which led him to intervene on county authorities and save several young clansmen who were party members prior to the war with Japan.21   Li warmed up to the CCP again in early 1938, not out of support for its cause, but of concern for maintaining local order. Seeking to prevent the county from descending to anarchy, he integrated several local militias into a "peace preservation" force at the start of the year, but ran into conflict with Ji Shouzhi (???), a former official in Han Fuju?s government who had organized a similar force. Li felt that Ji was a menace to local society, and began to solicit support to neutralize him. Liu Zhongyi knew Li through a clansmen of Li's who was a CCP member, and approached him with the offer of getting rid of Ji. A secret dialogue between the two soon ensued.22                                                    17 Liu Zhongyi, "Yi shinian de geming douzheng shenghuo," 20; RDB, 86. 18 Cao, 84.  19 HDSBW, 782 (see chap. 2, n. 11).   20 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai" (see chap. 3, n. 19).  21 Sun Yusheng, "Li Jianwu, Liu Songxia, Zhang Shulian xiansheng" (Mr. Li Jianwu, Liu Songxia and Zhang Shulian), Haiyang wenshi ziliao 8 (1992): 213.  22 Liu Zhongyi, "Yi shinian," 20.  100  4.4 Opportunity for Action  Several events in mid February 1938 presented what seemed like an opening for the CCP to take power. In southern Muping, Song Zhuting, with help from a sympathetic instructor from a local reconstruction school, raided the facility. He and several party members made off with over 30 firearms from the school armoury, giving the local CCP some firepower.23 Around the same time Song heard another story that elites in Muping's county town had decided to give their allegiance to the Japanese. This angered Zhang Jianxun (???), a local elite with a large militia, who plotted to take the county town. CCP members in Rushan quickly entered into negotiations with Zhang, offering support from their newly-armed group in this endeavour. They also alerted Li Qi in Wendeng, who took most members of his eastern Jiaodong group to Muping to support the attack.24 Liu Zhongyi, around the same time, also reached an agreement with Li Jianwu, in which he and other western Haiyang members would take part in a joint raid with Li's men to disarm Ji Shouzhi's force. Liu and Li planned to form a new United Front government in Haiyang after this, with Li as county magistrate.25   The plan to take power in both counties at first seemed to go well. In the early hours of February 12, 1938 Li Qi and Song Zhuting, backed by Zhang Jianxun's militia, stormed the Muping county town. They surprised and disarmed without bloodshed the militia of the city's elite, but the attack quickly went awry. CCP activists soon ran into a company of Japanese marines sent from Yantai to investigate the situation. A fierce, bloody gun battle ensued, in which many activists, including Li Qi, were killed.26 In Haiyang Liu Zhongyi and Li Jianwu's agreement also suddenly collapsed when Li was enticed into an alternative agreement by Ding Futing (???), a local elite and former military officer who had organized the largest militia in the county.27   Left without a leader, party members in Muping decided to head west in the hopes of establishing contact with the provincial party. Most members, including Song Zhuting,                                                  23 RDB, 97.  24 ZSSDY, 133-134.  25 Liu Zhongyi, "Yi shinian," 20.  26 ZSSDY, 135-138.  27 Liu Zhongyi, "Yi shinian," 21. 101  departed. They left only a few activists behind.28 In Haiyang, Liu Zhongyi, reeling from the breakdown his agreement with Li Jianwu, made a foolhardy decision to take power by force in mid-March. Hoping to emulate the raid on Muping, Liu, along with a number of western Haiyang members attempted to raid a militia loyal to Ding Futing. They were brutally put down, and several CCP leaders, including Sun Mingrui were killed or executed after capture.29 Elites in Haiyang and Muping formed new county governments in March, excluding the CCP, and pledged their allegiance to Shen Honglie's pro-GMD coalition by the fall of 1938.  4.5 Collapse of the Endeavour   Remaining party members in Haiyang scattered, but were saved by a surprising twist of events. In late March Liu Zhongyi, a fugitive, suddenly showed up in Haiyang's county town, demanding negotiations with its reconstituted government. Liu claimed to be the leader of the local CCP, and insisted that the new elite coalition in the county release all Communist prisoners and abide by the provisions of the United Front agreement. Haiyang elites surprisingly agreed. They set free all captured party members, gave the CCP legal status to operate in the county, and even allowed it to establish an "Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association" to spread propaganda.30   Why Haiyang elites did this, after just crushing the CCP's failed uprising, is an open question. Liu, in his later reflections, took credit for the successful negotiations, and claimed that the reputation built by the party following the Muping raid also made an impact on local elites.31 However, Haiyang's elite coalition was likely motivated by a number of pragmatic reasons. Its members were still uncertain of the true strength of the CCP in eastern Jiaodong after Li Qi's attack on Muping, and might have feared that a large Communist force was nearby. Some local elites might have sought to make their choices for making alliances more open by including the CCP, and Li Jianwu, who was noted by Liu to have played a major role in the negotiations, might have also wanted to use the party?s members as leverage against his coalition partners, which included Ji                                                  28 ZSSDY, 144-146.  29 Liu Zhongyi, "Yi shinian," 21-22.  30 Ibid., 22. 31 Ibid., 22-23. 102  Shouzhi.32  This alliance, however, was short-lived. Elites in the county soon turned against the CCP as it became apparent that it was of little use to their interests. A number of propaganda rallies held by the Haiyang CCP in May were brutally broken up by various militias, with numerous activists killed or detained.33 In July 1938 Liu Zhongyi himself was detained by the head of a reconstruction school for carrying out party activities, and was held for more than 40 days.34 Remaining members of the Haiyang CCP fled or went into hiding after this, and the party's activities in the county ebbed.35  4.6 Expansion: Early 1939    Events in Jiaodong, however, would quickly give the CCP in Haiyang and Rushan a new opportunity. In the fall of 1938 alliance building in Jiaodong had produced three factions: Date Junnosuke's collaborationist coalition; local elites and some remnant Han Fuju forces in the Peninsula loyal to the GMD; and a CCP area in northern Jiaodong, which was formed by a group of local activists in Yexian, Huangxian and Penglai in early 1938 and joined by the survivors of Li Qi's group in the summer. Date's coalition, which was funded in weapons and cash by the Japanese army, initially held the advantage. It built a powerful collaborationist army, and in the fall of 1938 brought large scale warfare to Jiaodong by launching an attack on CCP and pro-GMD areas. Date seized most of northern and western Jiaodong by late 1938, and was poised to move on the southern Peninsula, including Haiyang/Rushan when Zhao Baoyuan (???), a key lieutenant, turned on him. Zhao was a seasoned officer in Zhang Zongchang's army, and his betrayal severely weakened Date by taking away thousands of his best collaborationist soldiers. Over winter and spring 1939 Zhao formed a coalition with the CCP, Jiaodong elites and several pro-GMD military units. They managed to recapture much of the territory lost to Date, and in early June dealt him a crippling defeat near Laiyang's county town. Date, wounded during the battle, faded from Jiaodong, and his collaborationist coalition fell apart shortly after.36                                                   32 Ibid., 22.  33 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai"; RDB, 91. 34 HDFB, 75 (see chap. 3, n. 1).   35 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai." 36 ZSSDY, 144-146, 158-159, 175-176, 179.  103   Haiyang and Rushan elites sided with the Zhao Baoyuan/CCP/GMD coalition and permitted Communists to operate in support of their activities. Unlike the previous year CCP members did not contest power with local elites, but worked with their efforts against the Japanese. Some joined elite militias and pro-GMD forces, while others engaged in propaganda in their native areas to encourage enlistment by young men and donations to the war effort. CCP members, some of whom were former teachers with training in propaganda work or had served in militias, were well-suited to these tasks, and they tapped into the general mood of the county, which was very patriotic at the time. This created what the Haiyang party committee?s 1944 report has called the first great expansion of membership in the war. In Xiaze, home of Sun Jiesan and Sun Mingrui, for example, active propaganda work by several party veterans recruited over 90 men into the CCP in the first few months of 1939.37   4.7 Seizure of Power: 1940-1941  Party membership grew to hundreds by the end of 1939, but the spirit of unity that sustained this growth was short lived. Soon after defeating collaborationists Zhao Baoyuan, his allies and the CCP began to fight over the spoils. In late June 1939 Zhao expelled all Communists from his force, accusing them of trying to undermine it from within. Settling in the county seat of Laiyang, he also began a hunt for local CCP activists, resulting in the deaths of some 200 and their sympathizers.38 Anti-communist sentiments began to reach Haiyang in the fall of 1939, as Zhao and some local elites in southern Jiaodong formed a new coalition to oppose the CCP under the banner of the GMD, but the local party was saved by an unexpected development.39 In early February 1940 a large force of Japanese troops swept into the county. This event was caused by the defeat of Date Junnosuke the year earlier, which led the Japanese to abandon relying on collaborationists to tame Jiaodong in favour of a more direct military occupation. Tens of thousands of Japanese troops poured into Jiaodong's interior in the winter of 1939-1940, something that marked the start of a more brutal phase of the war in the Peninsula.                                                   37 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai." 38 ZSSDY, 190-191.  39 HDFB, 109.  104   The Japanese build-up had an immediate effect, severely disrupting the activities of Zhao Baoyuan and his allies in southern/eastern Jiaodong and easing pressure on local Communist party organizations. In Haiyang Japanese troops unleashed a torrent of violence which exceeded any in its already turbulent history. This violence, compared to earlier actions, was often random and inexplicably atrocious. In one case Japanese troops massacred 62 people in a village after hearing several gunshots near it, stabbing the heads of four men into bloody pulp with bayonets, chopping off the hands of a little girl before killing her, and even cutting open a woman in labour, ripping out her unborn child and smashing it on the ground.40 These actions caused a panic in a county that had not yet experienced war, collapsing some militias, driving others out, and sending many socially-prominent figures fleeing.41   Hundreds of inhabitants were killed, maimed or raped, but the Japanese did not establish a new order. Despite the large military showing, they lacked the commitment or troops to fully occupy Jiaodong, and concentrated on securing major transportation routes and urban locations near them. The Japanese troops that entered Haiyang were on a mission to seize Fengcheng, a point in the larger system of motor roads in Jiaodong, which had its origins in the early 1920s and had been expanded by various militarist rulers for transporting troops.42 Fengcheng was merely a small, dead-end stop in this system, created only a few years earlier through Han Fuju's road-building program.43 Japanese forces, sensing no significant resistance from nearby areas, withdrew most of their troops from Haiyang at the beginning of March 1940, leaving only 70 some soldiers and a few hundred collaborationist troops huddled in the county town. They decided to                                                  40 HDFB, 80-84; RDB, 139-140.  41 HDFB, 85.  42 USDSCC, Motor Highways in China (Shandong), June 26th, 1928, p. 108-112, Vol. 202; Guo Dasong and Zhang Fenglei, "Kangzhan qiande Yantai jiaotong yunshu" (Transportation and Communications in Yantai Prior to the Resistance War), Shandong wenxian, vol. 12, no. 1 (1986-1987): 15-16. I call these motor roads rather than highways because roads linking different urban centres were often constructed very differently, with some being paved asphalt highways while others were merely expanded dirt roads that were wider than traditional ones.  43 USDSCC, Political Report, March 6th, 1935, p. 3; Vol. 260, January 7, 1935 - December 31st 1935.  105  abandon the town altogether at the end of 1940, shifting to several blockhouses in south-western Haiyang to protect more important motor roads in nearby counties.44     Figure 11 The Motor Road System in Jiaodong  Source: Modification of a map from: Shandong wenxian (Shandong Memorabilia) 1, no. 1 (1975).   This gave CCP activists in the Haiyang/Rushan area a reprieve from persecution, and some time to regroup. Zhao and some of his allies returned to Haiyang in late 1940, and wasted little time hunting Communists. They launched a number of raids on villages in January and February of 1941, killing and kidnapping anyone suspected of having ties with the CCP, but were soon hit with an even more ferocious attack by Communist forces from the north.45 This turn of events was influenced by larger national developments. In 1939 Mao Zedong had made Shandong a major target for CCP expansion, sending most of the Eighth Route Army's 115th Division and elements of the 129th Division, along with several veteran military commanders to the province. One of these men, Xu Shiyou                                                  44 SHXBW, 669.  45 HDFB, 110; RDB, 119.  106  (???), a regimental commander in the 129th Division, made his way into Jiaodong in late 1940. Xu, a brilliant tactician in the CCP, quickly rallied the party's fledgling forces in northern Jiaodong, and in March 1941 launched a sudden invasion of southern and eastern Peninsula. His troops surprised and defeated the much larger units of Zhao Baoyuan and his allies in Haiyang, and by July 1941 had fought off several attempts by Zhao and his allies to retake what they had lost.46      Figure 12 Haiyang and Rushan: 1941-1942  Source: Created based on descriptions from: Rushanshi dangshi shizhi bangongshi, Zhonggong Rushan difangshi (CCP Local History of Rushan) (Xianggang: Tianma chubanshe, 2005); Haiyangshi dangshi fangzhi bangongshi, Zhonggong Haiyang difangshi (Local History of the CCP in Haiyang) (Haiyang: Zhongguo Chubanshe, 2007).     Zhao Baoyuan never recovered from this defeat. His coalition, previously dominant in Jiaodong, fell back from many places. However, they were far from finished,                                                  46 Xu Shiyou, Xu Shiyou shangjiang huiyilu (Recollections of General Xu Shiyou) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2005), 236-250.  107  and in Haiyang still controlled the county town. Zhao, backed by local strongman Ding Futing and several pro-GMD commanders, fortified the town and several market towns near the coast. These troops, still numbering in the thousands, managed to hold these areas until CCP forces from northern Jiaodong, assisted by local party organizations, dislodged them through a number of drawn-out sieges in the spring and summer of 1942. Japanese forces, now seeing the CCP as the main threat in Jiaodong, also carried out two major mopping-up operations in 1942, both of which swept into and caused great damage in Haiyang and Rushan. The Japanese abandoned large scale operations against the CCP in 1943-1944, but they still threatened Haiyang from their fortified positions in the southwest of the county, and launched periodic raids into western Haiyang throughout those years. However, CCP forces more or less controlled the larger area, and by May 1941 had established two county administrations, Rushan in the east and Haiyang in the west.47    4.8 Effects of War: A New Party  The CCP in Haiyang/Rushan started the war with Japan in 1937 as small group of revolutionary survivors, with a shared background of mobility, loose connections to their families and communities, involvement in radical politics at a young age, and years of suffering as a result of it. Communist activities, as in the previous years, were also concentrated in the western parts of Haiyang and eastern Haiyang/southern Muping. The party, however, evolved into a very different entity by the early 1940s. The shift is highlighted by a survey of party membership by Haiyang's party organization department in June 1943. The first ever internal investigation of party membership in either county, it shows a number of startling changes in the composition of members. Membership, firstly, had grown to a number unimaginable in the prewar period. The survey notes that there were 3,982 members in the new boundaries of Haiyang alone. These members, secondly, were also dispersed across almost all corners of the county. Membership in Haiyang, thirdly, was composed of and led almost entirely by newcomers. The organization department survey notes only four members in the county who were recruited prior to                                                  47 HDFB, 85-88, 118-142; RDB, 118-120, 123-126, 140-143, 157.  108  1937. With the exception of party secretary Liu Mengxi (???), a member with a minor role in party activities in western Haiyang prior to 1937, these revolutionary survivors did not hold senior positions in the county CCP. Of the remaining members, 3,350 joined the party from the spring/summer of 1941 on, following the CCP's seizure of power in the county. (see Appendix 2.) 48   Two other documents, the 1944 Haiyang party committee report on local CCP history and a report on party branches by the Rushan organization department in 1945, highlighted even greater contrasts between the pre-war and wartime parties. Unlike the pre-war party, which was largely composed of young men, the 1944 document complained of too many old members in some villages. In one community in south-western Haiyang, the document notes that 17 out of the 22 members were in their 40s and 50s.49 Rushan's organization department document makes a similar complaint, pointing out that in one village, 13 out of 27 members were between ages 36 to 60.50 In a further reversal from pre-war trends, both documents cited a lack of teachers as members, especially at the village level. The 1944 Haiyang document, in fact, notes that teachers were often excluded from recruitment in many villages, particularly in 1941-1942.51 4.9 Dynamics Behind the Changing Membership  This shift was due to many factors. Most pre-1937 members in Haiyang and Rushan left following the death of Li Qi. Fom late 1938 to early 1941, they made defending and consolidating the party's hold over northern and western Jiaodong a priority. They used periods of stability for the Haiyang/Rushan party, such as the first half of 1939 and 1940, to pull out most remaining veterans from the area for this task. Among those who left                                                  48 Haiyangxian zuzhibu, "Haiyangxian zuzhi zhuangkuang tongji diaochabiao" (Collective Survey Sheet of the Organizational Situation in Haiyang County), 30 June 1943, HMA, 1-1-14. 49 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai." 50 Zhonggong Rushan xianwei zuzhike (hereafter cited as ZRXZ), "Shang bannian zuzhi gongzuo zongjie" (Collective Summary of Organization Work in the First Half of the Year), 11 September 1945, Rushan Municipal Archives (hereafter cited as RMA), 001-01-0036-001.  51 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai"; ZRXZ, "Shang bannian.?  109  during this period was Liu Zhongyi, who was called north in the spring of 1939.52 The withdrawal of veteran organizers was so common that the Haiyang area went through a succession of seven party secretaries from late 1938 to the spring of 1941. (see Appendix 3.) 53 Being a party member in Rushan and Haiyang from 1938 to 1941, as in the pre-war years, was dangerous, and several veterans of the pre-1937 period met a grim fate. Desertion from the CCP, given the continual threat faced from local elites, was also not uncommon. Travel to Manchuria for work or to escape persecution was possible throughout the war, and documents note that this was frequently practiced by party members.   Large numbers of older men, combined with the lack of teachers in the party in many areas, were, to an extent, the result of natural reasons, and the basic impact of the war. Some veteran party leaders, by the late 1930s and early 1940s, had reached their early 40s, and might have recruited from their own age group. War, particularly from 1940 to 1942, had also led to the closing of many schools in Rushan and Haiyang. Party leaders during wartime also lacked educational institutions, such as the Laiyang or Wendeng Village Teacher Schools, to connect with and recruit from educators.   These changes, on a deeper level, do reflect the shifting nature and composition of the party during the war. Party members, up to 1941, were still made up largely of mobile young men detached from their families. Disruptions caused by the initial stages of the war, along with the CCP's anti-Japanese propaganda work in 1938 and 1939, in fact, fostered this. The Japanese invasion drove many such young men home, and made them susceptible to patriotic appeals put out by CCP propagandists. Zhang Weizi (???), the man who became Haiyang's first CCP magistrate following the party's seizure of power, is an example. From western Haiyang, Zhang had spent years away from the county for schooling. Forced to return home from his studies at a Hebei middle school by the war in late 1937, Zhang first became a local teacher. He was involved in creating patriotic                                                  52 Liu Zhongyi, "Yi shinian," 24.  53 Zhonggong Shandongsheng Haiyang xianwei zuzhibu, Shandongsheng Haiyangxian shizhiguan and Shandongsheng Haiyangxian danganguan, Zhongguo gongchandang Shandongsheng Haiyangxian zuzhishi ziliao, 1926 nian-1993 nian (CCP Organization History Materials, Haiyang County, Shandong Province, 1926-1993) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1995), 21-23.   110  propaganda while in this position, and later joined Li Jianwu's militia, which was sympathetic to the CCP and secretly allowed several members to join its ranks. This put him in contact with CCP members who were teachers or members of the militia, and he was inducted into the party by late 1938.54   Members like Zhang added to the pool of young men who later became mid-level leaders in Jiaodong and across China. They dominated the county CCP leadership in Haiyang and Rushan during the war, and like members recruited prior to 1937, frequently rose to positions in the Jiaodong and Shandong party. Some, such as Zhang, also left the Peninsula after 1949, and became senior officials in other provinces.55 Recruitment prior to 1941 did not dramatically increase the total membership in the two counties, neither did it expand CCP presence beyond areas of the county that had been the cradle of the party prior to 1937. Young men recruited also made little impression on their communities. Often poorly attached to their native villages, they usually came and went. Some left to join CCP forces. Others fled their communities when faced with persecution. A number of party members also went to support party activities in other places. Surveys of village parties done in the later 40s often found that residents in specific communities had little recollection of their early members, or saw them only as a nuisance.    This changed following the CCP?s military conquest. Seizure of the counties in 1941 gave the CCP a degree of governing authority, and its members began to use the guise of carrying out administrative functions to expand membership to new villages. The 1944 Haiyang party committee document notes that leading activists often went to villages claiming to be county government representatives. They initially did not disclose their party membership, but asked for local help in creating mass associations and militas to resist the Japanese, and used this to work with and convert those willing to take part.56 Recruitment into the party was also fostered by another development, the increasing brutalization of local society caused by the worsening situation of the war. Following the conquest of Haiyang and Rushan party members in some villages began to attack and kill those loyal to Zhao Baoyuan's coalition. CCP forces, by early 1942, also began to cut                                                  54 HDFB, 351-352. 55 Zhang, for example, became a senior official in the Fujian government after 1949.  Ibid., 352. 56 Haiyang xianwei, "Liunian lai." 111  trade off from towns controlled by Zhao and his allies as a prelude to besieging them. Taking revenge, Zhao-affiliated forces mounted raids into villages seen as pro-Communist. They first killed or kidnapped suspected CCP members for ransom, and as the situation in the areas they controlled became worse, started to rob many communities in an increasingly indiscriminate way for supplies to withstand sieges.57  Villagers in some parts of Haiyang and Rushan also faced Japanese soldiers, who sometimes brutalized their communities, and in other cases demanded grain, livestock and men for use in forced labour. (see Appendix 4.) 58 Outside intrusion fostered moments of unity in various villages, and brought many from various backgrounds to join CCP mass associations and later the later the party. They also transformed the CCP, previously a marginalized group, into a community-based organizations with greater participation by locals in many places.  4.10 A Case Study of the Impact of War on the CCP in One Village  Shimatuantou, a market town in western Haiyang, is in many ways an example of all these developments. The native place of early party leader Wang Zhifeng, it was one of the first villages in the area to have a CCP presence. Examining party history in this community in depth allows for an analysis of how the CCP expanded its membership over time, the types of people that joined it, and what factors made it successful in recruiting members.  Early party members in Shimatantou were mostly rebellious young men. They were students, teachers and migratory workers who were never fully considered insiders in the community, and they often did not stay in the village for long. Organizations formed by early members were frequently broken up when such men had to leave for study, work in Manchuria or to escape government authorities, and they made little impression on most villagers. A report on the village done by the county's organization                                                  57 HDFB, 121-123; RDB, 119-120. CCP local histories note that pro-Zhao forces killed hundreds of Communists and their sympathizers in raids, and in one case even wounded Zhang Ziwei, Haiyang's first CCP magistrate. 58 HDFB, 140-141.  112  department in 1947, in fact, notes that loca