UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

A tale of two curses : the economic, political, and developmental effects of dependency on foreign aid… Thomas, Edward 2013

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
24-ubc_2014_spring_thomas_edward.pdf [ 696.98kB ]
Metadata
JSON: 24-1.0165659.json
JSON-LD: 24-1.0165659-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 24-1.0165659-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 24-1.0165659-rdf.json
Turtle: 24-1.0165659-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 24-1.0165659-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 24-1.0165659-source.json
Full Text
24-1.0165659-fulltext.txt
Citation
24-1.0165659.ris

Full Text

	 ?A	 ?TALE	 ?OF	 ?TWO	 ?CURSES:	 ?THE	 ?ECONOMIC,	 ?POLITICAL,	 ?AND	 ?DEVELOPMENTAL	 ?EFFECTS	 ?	 ?OF	 ?DEPENDENCY	 ?ON	 ?FOREIGN	 ?AID	 ?AND	 ?NATURAL	 ?RESOURCES	 ?	 ?	 ?by	 ?	 ?Edward	 ?Thomas	 ?	 ?B.A.	 ?(Hons.),	 ?Trinity	 ?College-??University	 ?of	 ?Toronto,	 ?2008	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?A	 ?THESIS	 ?SUBMITTED	 ?IN	 ?PARTIAL	 ?FULFILLMENT	 ?OF	 ?	 ?THE	 ?REQUIREMENTS	 ?FOR	 ?THE	 ?DEGREE	 ?OF	 ?	 ?	 ?MASTER	 ?OF	 ?ARTS	 ?	 ?in	 ?	 ?The	 ?Faculty	 ?of	 ?Graduate	 ?and	 ?Postdoctoral	 ?Studies	 ?	 ?(Political	 ?Science)	 ?	 ?THE	 ?UNIVERSITY	 ?OF	 ?BRITISH	 ?COLUMBIA	 ?(Vancouver)	 ?	 ?	 ? November	 ?2013	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ??	 ?Edward	 ?Thomas,	 ?2013	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? ii	 ?	 ?Abstract	 ?	 ?This	 ?paper	 ?provides	 ?a	 ?first	 ?look	 ?at	 ?the	 ?intersection	 ?between	 ?the	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?and	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?curses.	 ?In	 ?doing	 ?so,	 ?it	 ?proposes	 ?that	 ?the	 ?economic,	 ?political,	 ?and	 ?developmental	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?are	 ?influenced	 ?by	 ?similar	 ?factors.	 ?While	 ?to	 ?date	 ?much	 ?of	 ?the	 ?literature	 ?on	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?resource	 ?curses	 ?have	 ?tended	 ?not	 ?to	 ?engage	 ?one	 ?another,	 ?it	 ?is	 ?shown	 ?that	 ?through	 ?a	 ?political	 ?economy	 ?model	 ?of	 ?political	 ?survival,	 ?important	 ?commonalities	 ?can	 ?be	 ?drawn	 ?out	 ?with	 ?respect	 ?to	 ?the	 ?cause	 ?and	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?both	 ?curses.	 ?Accordingly,	 ?this	 ?paper	 ?argues	 ?for	 ?the	 ?necessity	 ?of	 ?no	 ?longer	 ?studying	 ?the	 ?two	 ?phenomena	 ?in	 ?isolation,	 ?and	 ?instead	 ?presents	 ?a	 ?common	 ?theoretical	 ?model	 ?allowing	 ?for	 ?a	 ?unified	 ?approach	 ?to	 ?understanding	 ?the	 ?implications	 ?of	 ?unearned	 ?income.	 ?A	 ?preliminary	 ?quantitative	 ?analysis	 ?is	 ?also	 ?presented,	 ?which	 ?suggests	 ?at	 ?the	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?in	 ?natural	 ?resource-??dependent	 ?countries.	 ?Important	 ?implications	 ?not	 ?only	 ?for	 ?academic	 ?research,	 ?but	 ?also	 ?importantly	 ?for	 ?policy	 ?making,	 ?follow	 ?from	 ?the	 ?findings	 ?herein.	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? iii	 ?Preface	 ?	 ?The	 ?research	 ?contained	 ?herein	 ?in	 ?its	 ?entirety	 ?was	 ?proposed,	 ?explored,	 ?and	 ?presented	 ?by	 ?the	 ?author,	 ?between	 ?April	 ?2013	 ?and	 ?November	 ?2013.	 ?Desktop	 ?literature	 ?review	 ?was	 ?conducted	 ?between	 ?April	 ?2013	 ?and	 ?July	 ?2013	 ?using	 ?source	 ?material	 ?available	 ?in	 ?print	 ?and	 ?electronically	 ?through	 ?the	 ?UBC	 ?Library	 ?system.	 ?Theoretical	 ?and	 ?quantitative	 ?modeling	 ?was	 ?undertaken	 ?between	 ?July	 ?2013	 ?and	 ?October	 ?2013.	 ?The	 ?thesis	 ?was	 ?presented	 ?by	 ?the	 ?author	 ?in	 ?a	 ?public	 ?defence	 ?at	 ?the	 ?Liu	 ?Institute	 ?for	 ?Global	 ?Issues	 ?in	 ?November	 ?2013.	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? iv	 ?	 ?Table	 ?of	 ?Contents	 ?	 ?Abstract	 ?.........................................................................................................................................................................................	 ?ii	 ?Preface	 ?...........................................................................................................................................................................................	 ?iii	 ?Table	 ?of	 ?Contents	 ?......................................................................................................................................................................	 ?iv	 ?List	 ?of	 ?Tables	 ?................................................................................................................................................................................	 ?v	 ?List	 ?of	 ?Figures	 ?.............................................................................................................................................................................	 ?vi	 ?Acknowledgements	 ?................................................................................................................................................................	 ?vii	 ?Introduction	 ?.................................................................................................................................................................................	 ?1	 ?1.	 ? Early	 ?Thinking	 ?on	 ?the	 ?Aid	 ?and	 ?Natural	 ?Resource	 ?Curses	 ?...............................................................................	 ?2	 ?2.	 ?	 ? Explaining	 ?Between-??Country	 ?Variation:	 ?a	 ?Turn	 ?Toward	 ?Political	 ?Considerations	 ?............................	 ?6	 ?3.	 ? A	 ??Striking?	 ??Historic	 ?Coincidence?	 ?-??	 ?Yet	 ?Still	 ?Worlds	 ?Apart	 ?............................................................................	 ?8	 ?4.	 ? Toward	 ?a	 ?Meta	 ?Model:	 ?Institutions,	 ?Incentives,	 ?and	 ?the	 ?Curse	 ?of	 ??Unearned	 ?Income?	 ?......................	 ?9	 ?5.	 ? Testing	 ?the	 ?Model:	 ?the	 ?Effects	 ?of	 ?Simultaneous	 ?Resource	 ?and	 ?Aid	 ?Dependency	 ?...............................	 ?15	 ?Conclusion:	 ?Policy	 ?Implications	 ?........................................................................................................................................	 ?21	 ?Works	 ?Cited	 ?...............................................................................................................................................................................	 ?23	 ?Appendix	 ?A.	 ? Sample	 ?Countries	 ?..................................................................................................................................	 ?26	 ?Appendix	 ?B.	 ? Data	 ?Sources	 ?...........................................................................................................................................	 ?28	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? v	 ?List	 ?of	 ?Tables	 ?	 ?Table	 ?1.	 ?OLS	 ?results,	 ?change	 ?in	 ?maternal	 ?mortality	 ?or	 ?GDP	 ?growth	 ??	 ?full	 ?(151	 ?country)	 ?sample.	 ?.......	 ?17	 ?Table	 ?2.	 ?Regression	 ?results,	 ?categorical	 ?by	 ?volume	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid.	 ?....................................................................	 ?18	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? vi	 ?List	 ?of	 ?Figures	 ?	 ?Figure	 ?1.	 ?Natural	 ?resource	 ?exports	 ?and	 ?economic	 ?growth.	 ?From	 ?Frankl,	 ?2010.	 ?............................................	 ?3	 ?Figure	 ?2.	 ?Natural	 ?resource	 ?exports	 ?and	 ?GDP	 ?growth.	 ?From	 ?Torvik,	 ?2009.	 ?......................................................	 ?3	 ?Figure	 ?3.	 ?Natural	 ?resource	 ?exports	 ?and	 ?per	 ?capita	 ?economic	 ?growth.	 ?From	 ?Warner,	 ?2009.	 ?...................	 ?4	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? vii	 ?Acknowledgements	 ?Acknowledgements	 ?and	 ?thanks	 ?are	 ?owed	 ?to	 ?Peter	 ?Dauvergne,	 ?Yves	 ?Tiberghien,	 ?Beth	 ?Hirsh,	 ?and	 ?Sarah	 ?DiPoce	 ?for	 ?valuable	 ?comments,	 ?insights,	 ?and	 ?support	 ?in	 ?the	 ?development	 ?of	 ?this	 ?paper.	 ?	 ?	 ? 1	 ?	 ?	 ?Introduction	 ?	 ? Both	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?and	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?have	 ?been	 ?seen	 ?as	 ?potential	 ?catalysts	 ?of	 ?development,	 ?providing	 ?substantial	 ?amounts	 ?of	 ?much	 ?needed	 ?financial	 ?resources	 ?to	 ?tackle	 ?poverty,	 ?facilitate	 ?economic	 ?growth,	 ?and	 ?solidify	 ?political	 ?reforms.	 ?Yet,	 ?in	 ?too	 ?many	 ?instances,	 ?developing	 ?countries	 ?have	 ?struggled	 ?to	 ?do	 ?better	 ?by	 ?these	 ?resources;	 ?instead	 ?of	 ?enjoying	 ?prosperity	 ?and	 ?growth,	 ?many	 ?countries	 ?have	 ?spiralled	 ?further	 ?into	 ?poverty.	 ?Zambia?s	 ?first	 ?president,	 ?Kenneth	 ?Kaunda,	 ?once	 ?famously	 ?remarked	 ?on	 ?his	 ?country?s	 ?economic	 ?under-??development	 ?that	 ??this	 ?is	 ?the	 ?curse	 ?of	 ?being	 ?born	 ?with	 ?a	 ?copper	 ?spoon	 ?in	 ?our	 ?mouths?	 ?(Boschini,	 ?Pettersson,	 ?and	 ?Roine	 ?2007:25).	 ?Such	 ?realities	 ?have	 ?fed	 ?a	 ?substantial	 ?volume	 ?of	 ?research	 ?on	 ?the	 ?economic	 ?and	 ?political	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?both	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resources.	 ?Both	 ?areas	 ?of	 ?scholarship	 ?have	 ?evolved	 ?considerably	 ?over	 ?the	 ?last	 ?30	 ?years,	 ?and	 ?now	 ?offer	 ?richly	 ?detailed	 ?explanations	 ?of	 ?how	 ?either	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?or	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?wealth	 ?may	 ?in	 ?fact	 ?be	 ?more	 ?of	 ?a	 ?curse	 ?than	 ?a	 ?blessing.	 ?Interestingly,	 ?despite	 ?considerable	 ?similarities	 ?between	 ?the	 ?two	 ?phenomena,	 ?there	 ?has	 ?been	 ?little	 ?effort	 ?given	 ?to	 ?examining	 ?the	 ?possibility	 ?that	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?curses	 ?might	 ?best	 ?be	 ?explained	 ?holistically	 ?under	 ?one	 ?theoretical	 ?paradigm.	 ?Furthermore,	 ?despite	 ?the	 ?growing	 ?focus	 ?today	 ?on	 ?the	 ?role	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?in	 ?developing	 ?countries,	 ?few	 ?attempts	 ?have	 ?been	 ?put	 ?forward	 ?to	 ?investigate	 ?what	 ?might	 ?happen	 ?should	 ?resource-??dependent	 ?countries	 ?find	 ?themselves	 ?the	 ?beneficiaries	 ?of	 ?large	 ?flows	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid.	 ?	 ?This	 ?gap	 ?in	 ?the	 ?scholarship	 ?is	 ?made	 ?all	 ?the	 ?more	 ?urgent	 ?given	 ?recent	 ?announcements	 ?by	 ?donor	 ?countries	 ?intending	 ?to	 ?allocate	 ?substantial	 ?new	 ?disbursements	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?to	 ?assist	 ?countries	 ?struggling	 ?to	 ?manage	 ?their	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?(CBC	 ?2013).	 ?	 ?In	 ?this	 ?paper,	 ?I	 ?will	 ?provide	 ?an	 ?initial	 ??first	 ?glance?	 ?at	 ?the	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?a	 ?simultaneous	 ?dependency	 ?on	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?and	 ?foreign	 ?aid.	 ?In	 ?so	 ?doing,	 ?I	 ?seek	 ?to	 ?advance	 ?two	 ?related	 ?arguments.	 ?First,	 ?both	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?and	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?affect	 ?the	 ?socioeconomic	 ?development	 ?of	 ?countries	 ?in	 ?similar	 ?ways,	 ?and	 ?for	 ?similar	 ?reasons;	 ?accordingly,	 ?it	 ?is	 ?desirable	 ?to	 ?study	 ?both	 ?curses	 ?through	 ?the	 ?same	 ?theoretical	 ?framework,	 ?which	 ?I	 ?will	 ?begin	 ?to	 ?develop	 ?herein.	 ?Second,	 ?in	 ?countries	 ?already	 ?economically	 ?dependent	 ?on	 ?natural	 ?resources,	 ?the	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?is	 ?of	 ?limited	 ?added	 ?benefit,	 ?and	 ?may	 ?potentially	 ?manifest	 ?deleterious	 ?effects	 ?on	 ?socioeconomic	 ?welfare.	 ?The	 ?examination	 ?of	 ?these	 ?arguments	 ?is	 ?structured	 ?in	 ?5	 ?parts.	 ?In	 ?the	 ?first	 ?and	 ?second	 ?sections,	 ?I	 ?survey	 ?the	 ?literature	 ?on	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?curses,	 ?showing	 ?how	 ?the	 ?two	 ?have	 ?evolved	 ?in	 ?parallel	 ?(but	 ?in	 ?isolation)	 ?to	 ?one	 ?another,	 ?ultimately	 ?landing	 ?on	 ?many	 ?of	 ?the	 ?same	 ?findings.	 ?The	 ?third	 ?section	 ?considers	 ?the	 ?existing	 ?scholarship	 ?that	 ?has	 ?examined	 ?both	 ?curses	 ?simultaneously;	 ?while	 ?there	 ?are	 ?a	 ?limited	 ?number	 ?of	 ?existing	 ?contributions,	 ?on	 ?the	 ?whole	 ?a	 ?unified	 ?research	 ?agenda	 ?for	 ?both	 ?curses	 ?has	 ?failed	 ?to	 ?materialize.	 ?The	 ?fourth	 ?section	 ?is	 ?the	 ?theoretical	 ?contribution	 ?of	 ?this	 ?paper,	 ?presenting	 ?a	 ?political	 ?economy	 ?model	 ?that	 ?may	 ?hold	 ?key	 ?insights	 ?into	 ?both	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?curses	 ?at	 ?once.	 ?Complimenting	 ?this,	 ?the	 ?fifth	 ?section	 ?presents	 ?what	 ?is,	 ?to	 ?my	 ?knowledge,	 ?one	 ?of	 ?the	 ?first	 ?econometric	 ?analyses	 ?of	 ?the	 ?twin	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?dependency	 ?and	 ?substantial	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?flows	 ?on	 ?socioeconomic	 ?welfare.	 ?Finally,	 ?the	 ?conclusion	 ?emphasizes	 ?the	 ?urgency	 ?of	 ?additional	 ?contributions	 ?in	 ?line	 ?with	 ?the	 ?theoretical	 ?and	 ?empirical	 ?findings	 ?of	 ?this	 ?paper.	 ?This	 ?paper,	 ?as	 ?one	 ?of	 ?the	 ?first	 ?of	 ?its	 ?kind,	 ?is	 ?meant	 ?to	 ?be	 ?the	 ?launching	 ?point	 ?for	 ?a	 ?new	 ?round	 ?of	 ?scholarship	 ?on	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?resource	 ?curses;	 ?the	 ?results	 ?are	 ?not	 ?intended	 ?to	 ?be	 ?the	 ?last	 ?word	 ?on	 ?the	 ?matter,	 ?but,	 ?rather,	 ?illustrative	 ?of	 ?where	 ?gaps	 ?exist	 ?today	 ?and	 ?where	 ?future	 ?research	 ?might	 ?fruitfully	 ?be	 ?directed.	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? 2	 ?1.	 ? Early	 ?Thinking	 ?on	 ?the	 ?Aid	 ?and	 ?Natural	 ?Resource	 ?Curses	 ?	 ? Amongst	 ?the	 ?existing	 ?literature	 ?surveys	 ?on	 ?the	 ?economic	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?or	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resources,	 ?nearly	 ?all	 ?have	 ?focused	 ?exclusively	 ?on	 ?one	 ?or	 ?the	 ?other	 ?(Frankel	 ?2010;	 ?Hansen	 ?and	 ?Tarp	 ?2000;	 ?Torvik	 ?2009).	 ?I	 ?will	 ?revisit	 ?some	 ?of	 ?the	 ?landmark	 ?observations,	 ?providing	 ?a	 ?synopsis	 ?of	 ?the	 ?co-??evolution	 ?of	 ?thinking	 ?around	 ?the	 ?(economic	 ?and,	 ?later,	 ?political)	 ?effect(s)	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resources.	 ?Generally,	 ?three	 ?observations	 ?stand	 ?out:	 ?(1)	 ?that	 ?the	 ?literature	 ?on	 ?the	 ??aid?	 ?and	 ??natural	 ?resource?	 ?curses	 ?have	 ?developed	 ?in	 ?parallel,	 ?but	 ?largely	 ?in	 ?isolation,	 ?to	 ?one	 ?another;	 ?(2)	 ?that	 ?scholarship	 ?on	 ?both	 ?curses	 ?has	 ?moved	 ?away	 ?from	 ?pure	 ?economic	 ?models,	 ?with	 ?greater	 ?attention	 ?on	 ?political	 ?considerations;	 ?and,	 ?(3)	 ?despite	 ?commonalities,	 ?there	 ?has	 ?been	 ?little,	 ?if	 ?any,	 ?attempt	 ?to	 ?develop	 ?a	 ?theoretical	 ?foundation	 ?for	 ?understanding	 ?the	 ?socioeconomic	 ?development	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?simultaneous	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?wealth	 ?and	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?receipts.	 ?With	 ?respect	 ?to	 ?foreign	 ?aid,	 ?the	 ?scholarship	 ?that	 ?initially	 ?emerged	 ?in	 ?the	 ?1960s	 ?showed	 ?a	 ?positive	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?on	 ?economic	 ?growth	 ?(Hansen	 ?and	 ?Tarp	 ?2000).	 ?The	 ?majority	 ?of	 ?research	 ?during	 ?this	 ?time	 ?was	 ?based	 ?on	 ?simplistic	 ?economic	 ?models,	 ?linking	 ?aid	 ?to	 ?growth	 ?through	 ?a	 ?savings	 ?effect	 ?(Chenery	 ?and	 ?Strout	 ?1966).	 ?However,	 ?these	 ?early	 ?models	 ?were	 ?quickly	 ?scrutinized;	 ?Papanek	 ?famously	 ?referred	 ?to	 ?many	 ?preceding	 ?publications	 ?as	 ?being	 ??curiously	 ?na?ve,?	 ?owing	 ?to	 ?their	 ?reliance	 ?on	 ?outmoded	 ?growth	 ?models	 ?(Papanek	 ?1972).	 ?Responding	 ?to	 ?this,	 ?research	 ?from	 ?the	 ?mid-??1970s	 ?was	 ?informed	 ?by	 ?more	 ?complex	 ?theories	 ?of	 ?economic	 ?growth	 ?(Newlyn	 ?1973).	 ?That	 ?said,	 ?irrespective	 ?of	 ?the	 ?growing	 ?sophistication	 ?of	 ?economic	 ?growth	 ?models,	 ?scholarship	 ?through	 ?to	 ?the	 ?1980s	 ?remained	 ?confident	 ?in	 ?the	 ?positive	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?on	 ?growth.	 ?Natural	 ?resources,	 ?on	 ?the	 ?other	 ?hand,	 ?have	 ?long	 ?been	 ?represented	 ?by	 ?a	 ?confounding	 ?narrative	 ?of	 ?wealth	 ?and	 ?poverty:	 ?"resource-??abundant	 ?countries	 ?constitute	 ?some	 ?of	 ?the	 ?richest	 ?and	 ?some	 ?of	 ?the	 ?poorest	 ?countries	 ?in	 ?the	 ?world?	 ?(Torvik	 ?2009:242).	 ?From	 ?the	 ?1980s,	 ?a	 ?number	 ?of	 ?scholars	 ?had	 ?taken	 ?note	 ?of	 ?the	 ?significant	 ?variation	 ?of	 ?economic	 ?experiences	 ?between	 ?different	 ?resource-??endowed	 ?countries.	 ?While	 ?some	 ?found	 ?a	 ?weakly	 ?positive	 ?correlation	 ?between	 ?resource	 ?wealth	 ?and	 ?growth,	 ?others	 ?found	 ?a	 ?slightly	 ?negative	 ?relationship	 ?(cf.	 ?Figures	 ?1-??3,	 ?below;	 ?also,	 ?Frankel	 ?2010;	 ?Torvik	 ?2009;	 ?Warner	 ?2006).	 ?Contrary	 ?to	 ?expectations	 ?that	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?would	 ?fuel	 ?economic	 ?development,	 ?no	 ?study	 ?was	 ?able	 ?to	 ?definitively	 ?conclude	 ?that	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?were	 ?universally	 ?beneficial	 ?for	 ?economic	 ?growth.	 ?Similar	 ?results	 ?have	 ?been	 ?noted	 ?for	 ?the	 ?inconsistent,	 ?if	 ?not	 ?slightly	 ?negative,	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?on	 ?various	 ?measures	 ?of	 ?human	 ?development	 ?(Warner	 ?2006:11).	 ?Describing	 ?the	 ?confounding	 ?nature	 ?of	 ?these	 ?results,	 ?Torvik	 ?observed,	 ??the	 ?most	 ?interesting	 ?aspect	 ?of	 ?resource-??abundant	 ?countries	 ?is	 ?not	 ?their	 ?average	 ?performance,	 ?but	 ?their	 ?huge	 ?variation?	 ?(2009:242).	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? 3	 ? Figure	 ?1.	 ?Natural	 ?resource	 ?exports	 ?and	 ?economic	 ?growth.	 ?From	 ?Frankl,	 ?2010.	 ?	 ?	 ? Figure	 ?2.	 ?Natural	 ?resource	 ?exports	 ?and	 ?GDP	 ?growth.	 ?From	 ?Torvik,	 ?2009.	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? 4	 ? Figure	 ?3.	 ?Natural	 ?resource	 ?exports	 ?and	 ?per	 ?capita	 ?economic	 ?growth.	 ?From	 ?Warner,	 ?2009.	 ?	 ? From	 ?the	 ?outset,	 ?much	 ?of	 ?the	 ?literature	 ?on	 ?the	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?curse	 ?was	 ?interested	 ?in	 ?explaining	 ?not	 ?whether,	 ?but	 ?why	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?can	 ?lead	 ?to	 ?economic	 ?decline.	 ?For	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?and	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?alike,	 ?all	 ?signs	 ?pointed	 ?to	 ?the	 ?influence	 ?of	 ?macroeconomic	 ?policies.	 ?In	 ?the	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?literature	 ?of	 ?the	 ?1980s	 ?and	 ?1990s,	 ?this	 ?entailed	 ?a	 ?vigorous	 ?discussion	 ?on	 ?the	 ??Dutch	 ?disease?	 ?(Gylfason,	 ?Herbertsson,	 ?and	 ?Zoega	 ?1999;	 ?Krugman	 ?1987;	 ?Mehlum,	 ?Moene,	 ?and	 ?Torvik	 ?2006b;	 ?Morrison	 ?2010:54;	 ?Sachs	 ?and	 ?Warner	 ?1995,	 ?1999;	 ?van	 ?Wijnbergen	 ?1984).	 ?Similarly,	 ?in	 ?the	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?literature	 ?of	 ?the	 ?1990s,	 ?research	 ?focused	 ?on	 ?the	 ?interaction	 ?between	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?macroeconomic	 ?policy	 ?(Burnside	 ?and	 ?Dollar	 ?1997,	 ?2000;	 ?Durbarry,	 ?Gemmell,	 ?and	 ?Greenaway	 ?1998;	 ?Hadjimichael	 ?1995).	 ?The	 ?most	 ?influential	 ?-??	 ?Burnside	 ?and	 ?Dollar	 ?-??	 ?marked	 ?a	 ?new	 ?nexus	 ?between	 ?scholarship	 ?and	 ?policy;	 ?an	 ?article	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Economist	 ?interpreting	 ?the	 ?Burnside-??Dollar	 ?findings	 ?suggested,	 ??rich	 ?countries	 ?should	 ?be	 ?much	 ?more	 ?ruthless	 ?about	 ?how	 ?they	 ?allocate	 ?their	 ?largesse,	 ?whether	 ?earmarked	 ?or	 ?not	 ?(?)	 ?But	 ?mainstream	 ?aid	 ?should	 ?be	 ?directed	 ?only	 ?to	 ?countries	 ?with	 ?sound	 ?economic	 ?management?	 ?(Hansen	 ?and	 ?Tarp	 ?2000).	 ?The	 ?distinctive	 ?focus	 ?on	 ?macroeconomic	 ?effects	 ?within	 ?research	 ?on	 ?both	 ?curses	 ?began	 ?to	 ?change	 ?by	 ?the	 ?late	 ?1990s,	 ?first	 ?with	 ?a	 ?number	 ?of	 ?papers	 ?critiquing	 ?the	 ??fragility?	 ?of	 ?the	 ?modeling	 ?presented	 ?in	 ?Burnside	 ?and	 ?Dollar	 ?(Collier	 ?and	 ?Hoeffler	 ?1998;	 ?Dollar	 ?and	 ?Pritchett	 ?1998;	 ?Easterly,	 ?Levine,	 ?and	 ?Roodman	 ?2003;	 ?Hansen	 ?and	 ?Tarp	 ?2000;	 ?Stiglitz	 ?2003).	 ?Similarly,	 ?in	 ?the	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?literature,	 ?the	 ?inability	 ?to	 ?explain	 ?why	 ?some	 ?countries	 ?were	 ?able	 ?to	 ?overcome	 ?Dutch	 ?disease-??like	 ?conditions	 ?called	 ?into	 ?question	 ?the	 ?models	 ?presented	 ?by	 ?Sachs	 ?and	 ?Warner	 ?and	 ?their	 ?contemporaries	 ?(Boschini,	 ?Pettersson,	 ?and	 ?Roine	 ?2003).	 ?	 ?Paying	 ?greater	 ?attention	 ?to	 ?the	 ?specificities	 ?of	 ?developing	 ?countries	 ?in	 ?which	 ?the	 ?resource	 ?and	 ?aid	 ?curses	 ?were	 ?most	 ?pernicious,	 ?explanations	 ?turned	 ?to	 ?the	 ?issue	 ?of	 ?how	 ?rents	 ?were	 ?captured	 ?and	 ?utilized.	 ?This	 ?drove	 ?a	 ?large	 ?body	 ?of	 ?research	 ?on	 ?rent	 ?seeking	 ?behavior	 ?and	 ?patronage	 ?politics	 ?(Bhattacharyya	 ?and	 ?Hodler	 ?2010;	 ?Mehlum	 ?et	 ?al.	 ?2006b;	 ?Tornell	 ?and	 ?Lane	 ?1999;	 ?Torvik	 ?2002,	 ?2009).	 ?Yet,	 ?despite	 ?valuable	 ?contributions,	 ?the	 ?literature	 ?on	 ?rent	 ?seeking	 ?behaviour	 ?fell	 ?short	 ?in	 ?a	 ?few	 ?respects.	 ?As	 ?with	 ?the	 ?Dutch	 ?disease	 ?literature,	 ?rent-??seeking	 ?models	 ?posited	 ?a	 ?monotone	 ?effect,	 ?unable	 ?to	 ?explain	 ?how	 ?some	 ?countries	 ?managed	 ?this	 ?wealth	 ?beneficially	 ?while	 ?others	 ?do	 ?not.	 ?Equally,	 ?these	 ?models	 ?were	 ?not	 ?able	 ?to	 ?account	 ?for	 ?negative	 ?economic	 ?growth/decline	 ?accompanying	 ?resource	 ?wealth	 ?or	 ?aid;	 ?rather,	 ?they	 ?generally	 ?accounted	 ?only	 ?for	 ?suboptimal	 ?yet	 ?positive	 ?growth	 ?(Torvik	 ?2009).	 ?All	 ?the	 ?same,	 ?the	 ?rent-??seeking	 ?literature	 ?did	 ?mark	 ?an	 ?important	 ?re-??focusing	 ?on	 ?political	 ?variables,	 ?including	 ?incentives	 ?and	 ?elite	 ?interests.	 ?This	 ?was	 ?likely	 ?informed	 ?by	 ?advances	 ?in	 ?the	 ?wider	 ?disciplines	 ?of	 ?international	 ?relations,	 ?development,	 ?and	 ?comparative	 ?politics,	 ?which	 ?saw	 ?greater	 ?emphasis	 ?on	 ?new	 ?political	 ?economy	 ?models	 ?matched	 ?with	 ?more	 ?robust	 ?econometric	 ?approaches.	 ?	 ?	 ? 5	 ?In	 ?summary,	 ?thirty	 ?years	 ?of	 ?research	 ?suggested	 ?that	 ?both	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?resource	 ?wealth	 ?should	 ?have	 ?positive	 ?impacts	 ?on	 ?growth;	 ?yet,	 ?this	 ?has	 ?proven	 ?inconsistent	 ?in	 ?reality.	 ?More	 ?common	 ?has	 ?been	 ?a	 ??pattern	 ?of	 ?temporary	 ?success	 ?that	 ?too	 ?often	 ?deteriorates	 ?to	 ?the	 ?original	 ?level	 ?of	 ?mediocre	 ?performance?	 ?(Brautigam	 ?2000:6).	 ?Much	 ?of	 ?the	 ?research	 ?through	 ?to	 ?the	 ?late-??1990s	 ?has	 ?been	 ?generalized	 ?as	 ??a	 ?long	 ?and	 ?inconclusive	 ?literature	 ?that	 ?was	 ?hampered	 ?by	 ?limited	 ?data	 ?availability,	 ?debates	 ?about	 ?the	 ?mechanisms	 ?through	 ?which	 ?aid	 ?would	 ?affect	 ?growth,	 ?and	 ?disagreements	 ?over	 ?econometric	 ?specification?	 ?(2003:1).	 ?Increasingly	 ?attention	 ?has	 ?turned	 ?to	 ?the	 ?political	 ?economy	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?(Smith	 ?2008:993).	 ?Reflecting	 ?this,	 ?Hansen	 ?and	 ?Tarp	 ?aptly	 ?conclude	 ?that	 ??in	 ?sum,	 ?the	 ?unresolved	 ?issue	 ?in	 ?assessing	 ?aid	 ?effectiveness	 ?is	 ?not	 ?whether	 ?aid	 ?works,	 ?but	 ?how	 ?and	 ?whether	 ?we	 ?can	 ?make	 ?the	 ?different	 ?kinds	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?instruments	 ?at	 ?hand	 ?work	 ?better	 ?in	 ?varying	 ?country	 ?circumstances?	 ?(Hansen	 ?and	 ?Tarp	 ?2000).	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? 6	 ?2.	 ?	 ? Explaining	 ?Between-??Country	 ?Variation:	 ?a	 ?Turn	 ?Toward	 ?Political	 ?Considerations	 ?	 ? By	 ?the	 ?end	 ?of	 ?the	 ?1990s,	 ?the	 ?spotlight	 ?had	 ?shifted	 ?to	 ?the	 ?importance	 ?of	 ??good	 ?governance?	 ?(Keefer	 ?and	 ?Knack	 ?2002;	 ?Mauro	 ?1995;	 ?Rodrik,	 ?Subramanian,	 ?and	 ?Trebbi	 ?2002).1	 ?Kofi	 ?Annan	 ?remarked	 ?during	 ?this	 ?period	 ?that,	 ??good	 ?governance	 ?is	 ?perhaps	 ?the	 ?single	 ?most	 ?important	 ?factor	 ?in	 ?eradicating	 ?poverty	 ?and	 ?promoting	 ?development?	 ?(UNDP	 ?2002;	 ?also,	 ?Knack	 ?2001:311).	 ?While	 ?the	 ?relationship	 ?between	 ?governance	 ?and	 ?growth	 ?remains	 ?subject	 ?of	 ?much	 ?debate,	 ?it	 ?is	 ?generally	 ?understood	 ?that	 ?good	 ?governance	 ?is	 ??crucial	 ?for	 ?the	 ?sustained	 ?and	 ?rapid	 ?growth	 ?in	 ?per	 ?capita	 ?incomes	 ?of	 ?poor	 ?countries?	 ?(Knack	 ?2001:311).	 ?Good	 ?governance	 ?is	 ?also	 ?almost	 ?certainly	 ?a	 ?requisite	 ?of	 ?democratization	 ?and	 ?socioeconomic	 ?development;	 ?as	 ?Brautigam	 ?observed,	 ??the	 ?influence	 ?of	 ?high	 ?quality	 ?public	 ?institutions	 ?may	 ?exceed	 ?the	 ?impact	 ?of	 ?good	 ?economic	 ?policies	 ?in	 ?explaining	 ?development	 ?performance?	 ?(Brautigam	 ?2000:6).	 ?	 ?That	 ?revenue	 ?from	 ?aid	 ?or	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?might	 ?have	 ?a	 ?relationship	 ?with	 ?the	 ?quality	 ?of	 ?governance	 ?is	 ?almost	 ?intuitive.	 ?Indeed,	 ?as	 ?Brautigam	 ?posits,	 ??although	 ?we	 ?know	 ?that	 ?norms,	 ?informal	 ?rules,	 ?and	 ?other	 ?institutions	 ?do	 ?not	 ?change	 ?quickly,	 ?ten	 ?years	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?dependence	 ?is	 ?likely	 ?to	 ?deeply	 ?affect	 ?the	 ?operations	 ?of	 ?a	 ?government,	 ?and	 ?the	 ?incentive	 ?structure?	 ?(Brautigam	 ?2000:15).	 ?A	 ?political	 ?economy	 ?perspective	 ?presents	 ?governance	 ?as	 ?a	 ?non-??excludable	 ?public	 ?good,	 ?subject	 ?to	 ?the	 ?accompanying	 ?problems	 ?of	 ?collective	 ?action	 ?(Br?utigam	 ?and	 ?Knack	 ?2004;	 ?Brautigam	 ?2000).	 ?The	 ?most	 ?comprehensive	 ?explanation	 ?of	 ?this	 ?is	 ?by	 ?Brautigam:	 ?	 ? ?Providing	 ?these	 ?public	 ?goods	 ?[that	 ?is,	 ?governance]	 ?involves	 ?solving	 ?significant	 ?collective	 ?action	 ?problems:	 ?reducing	 ?corruption	 ?and	 ?patronage-??based	 ?procurement,	 ?terminating	 ?ineffective	 ?public	 ?sector	 ?employees,	 ?instituting	 ?meritocratic	 ?recruitment,	 ?shifting	 ?scarce	 ?social	 ?sector	 ?funding	 ?from	 ?more	 ?vocal	 ?to	 ?more	 ?needy	 ?recipients,	 ?implementing	 ?an	 ?effective	 ?and	 ?fair	 ?tax	 ?system,	 ?etc.?	 ?(2000:7).	 ?	 ?	 ? Accordingly,	 ?a	 ?range	 ?of	 ?actors	 ??	 ?political	 ?elites,	 ?government	 ?bureaucracies,	 ?interest	 ?groups,	 ?and/or	 ?managers	 ?in	 ?aid	 ?agencies	 ?(or	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?firms)	 ??	 ?all	 ?have	 ?an	 ?interest	 ?in	 ?shifting	 ?the	 ?rules	 ?of	 ?distribution.	 ?Proponents	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?have	 ?latched	 ?on	 ?to	 ?this,	 ?suggesting	 ?aid	 ?could	 ??facilitate	 ?the	 ?survival	 ?of	 ?reform-??minded	 ?governments?	 ?(Knack	 ?2001).	 ?Similarly,	 ?the	 ?possibility	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?having	 ?a	 ??corrective?	 ?effect	 ?on	 ?governance	 ?has	 ?been	 ?the	 ?logic	 ?behind	 ?arguments	 ?for	 ?aid	 ?conditionality	 ?to	 ?encourage	 ?reform.	 ?Yet	 ?providing	 ?public	 ?goods	 ?involves	 ?risk,	 ?trade-??offs,	 ?and	 ?sacrifice,	 ??in	 ?particular	 ?from	 ?those	 ?who	 ?stand	 ?to	 ?lose	 ?the	 ?private	 ?goods	 ?provided	 ?by	 ?the	 ?current	 ?system?	 ?(Brautigam	 ?2000:7).	 ?Accordingly,	 ?it	 ?is	 ?believed	 ?that	 ?aid	 ?dependency	 ?will	 ?create	 ??incentives	 ?and	 ?informal	 ?rules,?	 ?which	 ?ultimately	 ??make	 ?it	 ?more	 ?difficult	 ?to	 ?overcome	 ?the	 ?collective	 ?action	 ?problems	 ?involved	 ?in	 ?building	 ?a	 ?more	 ?capable	 ?and	 ?responsive	 ?state?	 ?(Brautigam	 ?2000:8).	 ?It	 ?is	 ?no	 ?surprise	 ?that	 ?a	 ?substantial	 ?volume	 ?of	 ?research	 ?has	 ?pointed	 ?to	 ?the	 ?pernicious	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?or	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?on	 ?quality	 ?of	 ?governance.	 ?For	 ?example,	 ?increased	 ?levels	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?have	 ?led	 ?to	 ?more	 ?authoritarian	 ?political	 ?regimes	 ?(Ross	 ?2001)	 ?as	 ?well	 ?as	 ?greater	 ?corruption	 ?and	 ?less	 ?government	 ?accountability	 ?(Leite	 ?and	 ?Weidmann	 ?1999).	 ?In	 ?the	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?literature,	 ?Knack	 ?(2001)	 ?found	 ?that	 ?when	 ?aid	 ?rises	 ?by	 ?25	 ?percentage	 ?(as	 ?a	 ?share	 ?of	 ?GNP),	 ?the	 ?ICRG	 ?index	 ?(a	 ?widely	 ?used	 ?quality-??of-??governance	 ?measure)	 ?will	 ?fall	 ?by	 ?about	 ?3	 ?percent;	 ?this	 ?decrease	 ?in	 ?quality	 ?of	 ?governance	 ?is	 ?estimated	 ?to	 ?lead	 ?to	 ?a	 ?1	 ?percent	 ?drop	 ?in	 ?economic	 ?growth	 ?(Knack	 ?2001).	 ?Similarly,	 ?Brautigam	 ?(2000)	 ?observed	 ?that	 ?a	 ?35	 ?percent	 ?increase	 ?in	 ?aid	 ?(as	 ?a	 ?share	 ?of	 ?government	 ?expenditure)	 ?reduces	 ?the	 ?ICRG	 ?index	 ?by	 ?1	 ?point.	 ?	 ?A	 ?number	 ?of	 ?papers	 ?have	 ?provided	 ?excellent	 ?surveys	 ?on	 ?the	 ?variety	 ?of	 ?mechanisms	 ?linking	 ?aid	 ?or	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?dependencies	 ?to	 ?economic	 ?outcomes	 ?through	 ?political-??economy	 ?                                                1	 ?Good	 ?governance	 ?in	 ?this	 ?sense	 ?is	 ?understood	 ?as	 ??the	 ?form	 ?of	 ?institutions	 ?that	 ?establish	 ?a	 ?predictable,	 ?impartial,	 ?and	 ?consistently	 ?enforced	 ?set	 ?of	 ?rules	 ?for	 ?investors?	 ?(Knack	 ?2001:311).	 ?	 ?	 ? 7	 ?characteristics	 ?(Brautigam	 ?2000;	 ?Frankel	 ?2010;	 ?Torvik	 ?2009).	 ?Some	 ?of	 ?the	 ?more	 ?widely	 ?developed	 ?channels	 ?between	 ?aid/natural	 ?resources,	 ?governance,	 ?and	 ?economic	 ?outcomes,	 ?include:	 ?increased	 ?corruption	 ?and	 ?cronyism	 ?(Knack,	 ?2001;	 ?Aslaksen,	 ?2006);	 ?moral	 ?hazard	 ?and	 ?reduced	 ?pressure	 ?for	 ?reform	 ?(Brautigam	 ?2000:24;	 ?Knack,	 ?2001;	 ?Aslaksen,	 ?2009);	 ?distorted	 ?labour	 ?markets	 ?and	 ?weakened	 ?bureaucratic	 ?capacities;	 ?and,	 ?(related),	 ?a	 ?multiplicity	 ?of	 ?donor	 ?agencies,	 ?each	 ?with	 ?different	 ?priorities	 ?and	 ?processes,	 ?and/or	 ?highly	 ?volatile	 ?commodity	 ?prices,	 ?leading	 ?to	 ?incoherence	 ?and	 ?instability	 ?in	 ?national	 ?budgets	 ?(cf.	 ?Knack,	 ?2001:5;	 ?Brautigam,	 ?2000:38-??42).	 ?On	 ?this	 ?latter	 ?point,	 ?anecdotes	 ?are	 ?not	 ?difficult	 ?to	 ?find.	 ?For	 ?example,	 ?in	 ?the	 ?1980s,	 ?officials	 ?in	 ?Malawi	 ?were	 ?managing	 ?nearly	 ?200	 ?projects	 ?funded	 ?by	 ?50	 ?different	 ?donors;	 ?meanwhile,	 ?in	 ?the	 ?1990s,	 ?Kenya	 ?and	 ?Tanzania	 ?each	 ?had	 ?nearly	 ?2000	 ?donor	 ?funded	 ?projects.	 ?The	 ?burden	 ?of	 ?trying	 ?to	 ?manage	 ?these	 ?different	 ?projects	 ?and	 ?relationships	 ?with	 ?so	 ?many	 ?donors	 ?has	 ?led	 ?to	 ?what	 ?some	 ?observers	 ?described	 ?as	 ??institutional	 ?destruction?	 ?as	 ??these	 ?coordination	 ?tasks	 ??	 ?strain	 ?administrative	 ?capacity?	 ?(Brautigam	 ?2000:25).	 ?The	 ?challenge	 ?with	 ?many	 ?of	 ?the	 ?mechanisms	 ?described	 ?above	 ?is	 ?the	 ?vagueness	 ?of	 ?causation	 ?in	 ?their	 ?underlying	 ?theories.	 ?With	 ?respect	 ?to	 ?foreign	 ?aid,	 ?Knack	 ?cautions	 ?that	 ?existing	 ??theory	 ?is	 ?ambiguous	 ?with	 ?respect	 ?to	 ?aid?s	 ?impact	 ?on	 ?the	 ?quality	 ?of	 ?governance?	 ?(Knack	 ?2001).	 ?Responding	 ?to	 ?this	 ?theoretical	 ?and	 ?methodological	 ?uncertainty,	 ?a	 ?number	 ?of	 ?papers	 ?have	 ?pointed	 ?to	 ?the	 ?nature	 ?more	 ?broadly	 ?of	 ?political	 ?institutions	 ?(rather	 ?than	 ?the	 ?narrow	 ?focus	 ?on	 ?quality	 ?of	 ?governance).	 ?This	 ?marked	 ?a	 ?major	 ?shift	 ?in	 ?the	 ?methodological	 ?approach,	 ?away	 ?from	 ?cause-??and-??effect	 ?correlations	 ?toward	 ?the	 ?interaction	 ?between	 ?key	 ?variables.	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? 8	 ?	 ?3.	 ? A	 ??Striking?	 ??Historic	 ?Coincidence?	 ?-??	 ?Yet	 ?Still	 ?Worlds	 ?Apart	 ?	 ? Surprisingly,	 ?despite	 ?considerable	 ?co-??evolution	 ?of	 ?theories,	 ?models,	 ?and	 ?findings,	 ?some	 ?scholars	 ?have	 ?described	 ?the	 ?prospect	 ?of	 ?directly	 ?comparing	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?resource	 ?curses	 ?as	 ??initially	 ?seem[ing]	 ?strange?	 ?(Morrison	 ?2010:53).	 ?This	 ?is	 ?interesting,	 ?given	 ?the	 ?almost	 ?certainty	 ?that	 ?the	 ?two	 ?curses	 ?will	 ?co-??exist:	 ?a	 ?number	 ?of	 ?the	 ?most	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?dependent	 ?countries	 ?happen	 ?to	 ?also	 ?be	 ?some	 ?of	 ?the	 ?poorest,	 ?and	 ?are	 ?recipients	 ?of	 ?substantial	 ?aid	 ?flows.	 ?Confirming	 ?this,	 ?one	 ?paper	 ?notes,	 ??twenty	 ?one	 ?countries	 ?in	 ?the	 ?sub-??Saharan	 ?African	 ?region	 ?(over	 ?half)	 ?are	 ?already	 ?sizable	 ?oil,	 ?gas	 ?or	 ?mineral	 ?exporters.	 ?Yet	 ?many	 ?of	 ?the	 ?same	 ?countries	 ?are	 ?failing	 ?to	 ?progress,	 ?or	 ?progressing	 ?too	 ?slowly,	 ?to	 ?meet	 ?multiple	 ?development	 ?goals	 ?(including	 ?the	 ?MDGs)	 ?and	 ?are	 ?thus	 ?potential	 ?recipients	 ?of	 ?the	 ?increased	 ?aid?	 ?(Warner	 ?2006:65).	 ?	 ?The	 ?idea	 ?fifty	 ?years	 ?ago	 ?that	 ?either	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?or	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?could	 ?be	 ?the	 ??big	 ?push?	 ?catalyst	 ?for	 ?growth	 ?and	 ?development	 ?have	 ?given	 ?way	 ?to	 ?decades	 ?of	 ?evidence	 ?on	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?resource	 ?curses	 ?from	 ?countries	 ?that	 ?have	 ?seen	 ?the	 ?deleterious	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?both	 ?these	 ??windfalls?	 ?(on	 ?the	 ?'big	 ?push',	 ?Sachs	 ?and	 ?Warner	 ?1999).	 ?Individually,	 ?the	 ?same	 ?three	 ?mechanisms	 ??	 ?Dutch	 ?disease/macroeconomic	 ?policy,	 ?revenue	 ?volatility,	 ?and	 ?political	 ?deterioration	 ??	 ?have	 ?been	 ?identified	 ?as	 ?being	 ?operative	 ?in	 ?both	 ?curses	 ?(cf.	 ?Morrison	 ?2010:58-??59).	 ?Yet,	 ?despite	 ?the	 ?similarities,	 ?few	 ?scholars	 ?have	 ?taken	 ?note	 ?of	 ?the	 ?possible	 ?overlap	 ?between	 ?the	 ?twin	 ?curses	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?and	 ?foreign	 ?aid.	 ?Morrison	 ?calls	 ?attention	 ?to	 ?this,	 ?noting	 ?how	 ??the	 ?literature	 ?analyzing	 ?the	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?describes	 ?very	 ?similar	 ?effects	 ?as	 ?those	 ?in	 ?the	 ??resource	 ?curse?	 ?literature,	 ?though	 ?this	 ?body	 ?of	 ?work	 ?tends	 ?to	 ?get	 ?much	 ?less	 ?attention?	 ?(2010:53).	 ?	 ?A	 ?handful	 ?of	 ?scholars	 ?have	 ?taken	 ?first	 ?tentative	 ?steps	 ?in	 ?the	 ?middle	 ?ground	 ?between	 ?the	 ?two	 ?cures.	 ?Both	 ?Brautigam	 ?(2000)	 ?and	 ?Therkildsen	 ?(2002),	 ?for	 ?example,	 ?compare	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?to	 ?other	 ??non-??earned?	 ?revenue	 ?sources,	 ?noting	 ?similarities	 ?with	 ?an	 ?abundance	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?which	 ?lead	 ?to	 ?rentier	 ?states.	 ?Related	 ?to	 ?this,	 ?Knack	 ?draws	 ?comparisons	 ?on	 ?rent	 ?seeking	 ?effects	 ?from	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?from	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?such	 ?as	 ?coffee	 ?and	 ?oil	 ?(2001:314).	 ?Meanwhile,	 ?Morrison	 ?(2010)	 ?draws	 ?attention	 ?to	 ?the	 ?way	 ?in	 ?which	 ?considerations	 ?such	 ?as	 ?Dutch	 ?disease	 ?and	 ?political	 ?deterioration	 ?are	 ?implied	 ?in	 ?both	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?resource	 ?curse	 ?literature.	 ?Finally,	 ?one	 ?of	 ?the	 ?most	 ?detailed	 ?comparisons	 ?comes	 ?from	 ?an	 ?ODI/UNDP	 ?paper,	 ?which	 ?draws	 ?heavily	 ?from	 ?the	 ?literature	 ?on	 ?the	 ??aid	 ?curse?	 ?to	 ?offer	 ?possible	 ?prescriptions	 ?for	 ?managing	 ?rents	 ?from	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?exports	 ?(Warner	 ?2006:63?67).	 ?However,	 ?the	 ?ODI/UNDP	 ?observations	 ?are	 ?largely	 ?hypothetical,	 ?lacking	 ?any	 ?detailed	 ?explanation	 ?of	 ?the	 ?logic	 ?behind	 ?the	 ?prescriptions	 ?and	 ?failing	 ?to	 ?offer	 ?much	 ?conclusive	 ?evidence	 ?to	 ?support	 ?their	 ?assumptions.	 ?	 ?On	 ?balance,	 ?it	 ?is	 ?apparent	 ?that	 ?in	 ?recent	 ?years,	 ?the	 ?theories,	 ?models,	 ?and	 ?empirical	 ?observations	 ?underlying	 ?of	 ?each	 ?developed	 ?in	 ?parallel.	 ?The	 ?similarities	 ?between	 ?the	 ?two	 ?bodies	 ?of	 ?scholarship	 ?have	 ?been	 ?described	 ?as	 ??striking?	 ?and	 ?as	 ??a	 ?new,	 ?and	 ?potentially	 ?historic,	 ?coincidence?	 ?(Morrison	 ?2010:58;	 ?Warner	 ?2006:65).	 ?There	 ?is	 ?a	 ?clear	 ?imperative	 ?for	 ?better	 ?understanding	 ?how	 ?a	 ?twin	 ?dependency	 ?on	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?might	 ?affect	 ?a	 ?country?s	 ?economic	 ?and	 ?political	 ?development.	 ?Yet	 ?it	 ?is	 ?possible	 ?that	 ?part	 ?of	 ?the	 ?reason	 ?this	 ?question	 ?has	 ?received	 ?so	 ?little	 ?attention	 ?is	 ?that	 ?a	 ?model	 ?does	 ?not	 ?exist	 ?which	 ?can	 ?comfortably	 ?incorporate	 ?both	 ?the	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?dependence	 ?on	 ?political	 ?and	 ?economic	 ?change.	 ?Or	 ?does	 ?it?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? 9	 ?4.	 ? Toward	 ?a	 ?Meta	 ?Model:	 ?Institutions,	 ?Incentives,	 ?and	 ?the	 ?Curse	 ?of	 ??Unearned	 ?Income?	 ?	 ? A	 ?decade	 ?ago,	 ?Bruno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?colleagues	 ?(2003)	 ?presented	 ?a	 ?model	 ?on	 ?the	 ?political	 ?economy	 ?of	 ?the	 ?rise	 ?and	 ?fall	 ?of	 ?politicians	 ?in	 ?office,	 ?drawing	 ?emphasis	 ?to	 ?the	 ?preferences	 ?of	 ?political	 ?elites	 ?and	 ?the	 ?role	 ?of	 ?institutions.	 ?The	 ?Bueno	 ?des	 ?Mesquita	 ?et	 ?al	 ?(hereafter	 ??BDM?)	 ?model	 ?of	 ?selectorate	 ?politics	 ?has	 ?become	 ?one	 ?of	 ?the	 ?most	 ?influential	 ?political	 ?economy	 ?models	 ?addressing	 ?elite	 ?behavior,	 ?incentives,	 ?and	 ?principal-??agent	 ?relations	 ?(Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2009a,	 ?2010;	 ?Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?et	 ?al.	 ?2003;	 ?Dunning	 ?2005;	 ?Smith	 ?2008;	 ?Wright	 ?2008).	 ?The	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?represented	 ?an	 ?important	 ?turn	 ?away	 ?from	 ?a	 ?focus	 ?on	 ?macro-??level	 ?economic	 ?factors,	 ?toward	 ?a	 ?political	 ?economy	 ?model	 ?oriented	 ?at	 ?the	 ?micro	 ?level;	 ?in	 ?other	 ?words,	 ?a	 ?shift	 ?from	 ?a	 ?focus	 ?on	 ?systemic	 ?forces	 ?toward	 ?the	 ?role	 ?and	 ?behavior	 ?of	 ?actors	 ?within	 ?the	 ?system.	 ?The	 ?influence	 ?of	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?quickly	 ?spread,	 ?particularly	 ?into	 ?the	 ?area	 ?of	 ?development	 ?studies.	 ?I	 ?would	 ?argue	 ??	 ?and	 ?intend	 ?to	 ?show	 ??	 ?that	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?is	 ?one	 ?of	 ?the	 ?only	 ?political	 ?economy	 ?paradigms	 ?that	 ?offers	 ?promise	 ?for	 ?addressing	 ?the	 ?various	 ?critiques	 ?examined	 ?thus	 ?far.	 ?Though	 ?initially	 ?presented	 ?as	 ?a	 ?means	 ?for	 ?explaining	 ?political	 ?elite(s)?	 ?response	 ?to	 ?the	 ?risk	 ?of	 ?being	 ?unseated,	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?in	 ?fact	 ?captures	 ?all	 ?the	 ?behaviours	 ?familiar	 ?to	 ?the	 ?resource	 ?and	 ?aid	 ?curse	 ?literature	 ?(Smith	 ?2008).	 ?The	 ?central	 ?axiom	 ?of	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?speaks	 ?to	 ?the	 ?preferences	 ?of	 ?political	 ?elites:	 ?all	 ?leaders	 ?are	 ?self-??interested,	 ?desire	 ?political	 ?(and	 ?personal)	 ?survival,	 ?and	 ?ultimately	 ?wish	 ?to	 ?maximize	 ?control	 ?over	 ?government	 ?revenue	 ?and/or	 ?policy	 ?(Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2009b:171).	 ?Three	 ?sources	 ?of	 ?threats	 ?challenge	 ?a	 ?leader?s	 ?tenure	 ?in	 ?office:	 ?(1)	 ?rival	 ?elites;	 ?(2)	 ?domestic	 ?mass	 ?movements;	 ?and,	 ?(3)	 ?foreign	 ?enemies	 ?(Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2009b:171).	 ?It	 ?is	 ?the	 ?milieu	 ?of	 ?political	 ?institutions	 ?and	 ?the	 ?nature	 ?of	 ?government	 ?finance	 ?that	 ?set	 ?the	 ??rules	 ?of	 ?the	 ?game,?	 ?shapes	 ?political	 ?and	 ?economic	 ?constraints,	 ?and	 ?determines	 ?resources	 ?available	 ?to	 ?leaders.	 ?Based	 ?on	 ?these	 ?institutional	 ?and	 ?resource	 ?arrangements,	 ?leaders	 ?(attempt	 ?to)	 ?craft	 ?the	 ?optimal	 ?distribution	 ?of	 ?public	 ?and	 ?private	 ?goods,	 ?so	 ?as	 ?to	 ?lengthen	 ?their	 ?tenure	 ?in	 ?office.	 ?The	 ?fulcrum	 ?on	 ?which	 ?these	 ?interactions	 ?balance	 ?is	 ?the	 ?nature	 ?of	 ?the	 ??winning	 ?coalition?;	 ?that	 ?is,	 ?the	 ?number	 ?of	 ?supporters	 ?(either	 ?other	 ?elites	 ?or	 ?members	 ?of	 ?the	 ?citizenry)	 ?required	 ?to	 ?ensure	 ?survival	 ?in	 ?office.	 ?	 ?Though	 ?skeptics	 ?may	 ?get	 ?caught	 ?up	 ?in	 ?the	 ??game?-??like	 ?nature	 ?of	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model,	 ?fundamentally	 ?it	 ?is	 ?an	 ?examination	 ?of	 ?public	 ?policy,	 ?agent-??principal	 ?relationships,	 ?institutional	 ?design,	 ?and	 ?government	 ?revenue.	 ?In	 ?other	 ?words,	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?above	 ?all	 ?else	 ?explains	 ?how	 ??governments	 ?allocate	 ?resources	 ?and	 ?how	 ?resources	 ?and	 ?political	 ?institutions	 ?interact	 ?to	 ?influence	 ?policy	 ?choices?	 ?(Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2009b:171).	 ?It	 ?can	 ?be	 ?employed	 ?to	 ?interpret	 ?conditions	 ?across	 ?a	 ?tremendous	 ?cross-??section	 ?of	 ?countries,	 ?without	 ?becoming	 ?snagged	 ?on	 ?discrete	 ?characteristics	 ?such	 ?as	 ?the	 ?oft-??cited	 ?democracy	 ?vs.	 ?autocracy	 ?divide.	 ?It	 ?is	 ?for	 ?precisely	 ?this	 ?reason	 ?that	 ?it	 ?has	 ?great	 ?potential	 ?for	 ?incorporating,	 ?together,	 ?both	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?resource	 ?curses.	 ?Furthermore,	 ?the	 ?influential	 ?nature	 ?of	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?across	 ?the	 ?fields	 ?of	 ?comparative	 ?politics	 ?and	 ?development	 ?studies	 ?means	 ?that	 ?many	 ?particular	 ?niche	 ?insights	 ?into	 ?the	 ?resource	 ?and	 ?aid	 ?curse	 ?are	 ?easily	 ?reconciled	 ?with	 ?the	 ?fundamental	 ?tenets	 ?and	 ?axioms	 ?of	 ?BDM.	 ?Accordingly,	 ?I	 ?intend	 ?use	 ?the	 ?structure	 ?of	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?to	 ?present	 ?a	 ?unifying	 ?theory	 ?of	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?resource	 ?curses.	 ?The	 ?central	 ?pillars	 ?of	 ?this	 ??meta?	 ?theory	 ?are:	 ?(1)	 ?the	 ?nature	 ?and	 ?role	 ?of	 ?institutions;	 ?(2)	 ?elite	 ?incentives	 ?and	 ?preferences;	 ?and,	 ?(3)	 ?the	 ?impact	 ?of	 ?different	 ?forms	 ?of	 ?government	 ?income.	 ?	 ? (a)	 ? Institutions	 ?	 ?Building	 ?from	 ?initial	 ?insights	 ?in	 ?the	 ??good	 ?governance?	 ?literature,	 ?institutional	 ?context	 ?is	 ?understood	 ?to	 ?effect	 ?political	 ?and	 ?economic	 ?outcomes	 ?through	 ?an	 ?interaction	 ?with	 ?the	 ?dependency	 ?on	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?or	 ?natural	 ?resources.	 ?On	 ?this,	 ?Ahmed	 ?observes,	 ??domestic	 ?political	 ?institutions	 ?(and	 ?the	 ?incentives	 ?they	 ?generate	 ?for	 ?governments)	 ?mediate	 ?the	 ?impact	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?remittance	 ?inflows	 ?on	 ?the	 ?quality	 ?of	 ?governance	 ?and	 ?the	 ?endurance	 ?of	 ?governments	 ?in	 ?autocracies?	 ?(emphasis	 ?added,	 ?Ahmed	 ?2012:164).	 ?Similarly,	 ?with	 ?respect	 ?to	 ?natural	 ?resources,	 ??the	 ?overall	 ?impact	 ?of	 ?resource	 ?booms	 ?on	 ?the	 ?economy	 ?depends	 ?critically	 ?on	 ?institutions	 ?since	 ?these	 ?can	 ?determine	 ?the	 ?extent	 ?to	 ?	 ?	 ? 10	 ?which	 ?political	 ?incentives	 ?map	 ?into	 ?policy	 ?outcomes?	 ?(Robinson,	 ?Torvik,	 ?and	 ?Verdier	 ?2006).	 ?Robinson	 ?et	 ?al	 ?present	 ?one	 ?of	 ?the	 ?first	 ?formal	 ?political	 ?economy	 ?models	 ?on	 ?the	 ?relationship	 ?between	 ?institutions	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resources,	 ?finding	 ?that,	 ??low	 ?quality	 ?institutions	 ?invite	 ?bad	 ?policy	 ?choices	 ?since	 ?they	 ?allow	 ?politicians	 ?to	 ?engage	 ?in	 ?inefficient	 ?redistribution	 ?in	 ?order	 ?to	 ?influence	 ?the	 ?outcomes	 ?of	 ?elections.	 ?High	 ?quality	 ?institutions	 ?make	 ?such	 ?political	 ?strategies	 ?infeasible	 ?or	 ?relatively	 ?unattractive?	 ?(Robinson	 ?et	 ?al.	 ?2006).	 ?In	 ?a	 ?similar	 ?approach,	 ?Mehlum	 ?et	 ?al	 ?(2006)	 ?show	 ?that	 ?formal	 ?and	 ?informal	 ?institutions	 ?(such	 ?as	 ?property	 ?rights	 ?and	 ?corruption)	 ?create	 ?different	 ?incentives	 ?that	 ?shape	 ?the	 ?actions	 ?of	 ?private	 ?agents.	 ?With	 ??grabber	 ?friendly?	 ?institutions,	 ??natural	 ?resources	 ?may	 ?stimulate	 ?predation,	 ?rent-??seeking,	 ?and	 ?other	 ?destructive	 ?and/or	 ?non-??productive	 ?activities,	 ?in	 ?turn	 ?creating	 ?negative	 ?externalities	 ?for	 ?the	 ?rest	 ?of	 ?the	 ?economy?	 ?(in	 ?Tovrik,	 ?2009).	 ?In	 ?one	 ?econometric	 ?study,	 ?Torvik	 ?found	 ?the	 ?top	 ?20	 ?percent	 ?of	 ?countries,	 ?in	 ?terms	 ?of	 ?quality	 ?of	 ?institutions,	 ?had	 ??no	 ?resource	 ?curse?	 ?and	 ?instead	 ?a	 ?resource	 ?dependency	 ?had	 ?positive	 ?effects	 ?on	 ?economic	 ?growth	 ?(Torvik	 ?2009).	 ?On	 ?the	 ?other	 ?hand,	 ?in	 ?countries	 ?with	 ?the	 ?worst	 ?possible	 ?quality	 ?of	 ?institutions,	 ??resource	 ?abundance	 ?is	 ?very	 ?damaging	 ?to	 ?growth?	 ?(Torvik	 ?2009;	 ?similar	 ?to	 ?Mehlum	 ?et	 ?al	 ?2002;	 ?Robinson	 ?et	 ?al	 ?2002;	 ?Boschini	 ?et	 ?al	 ?2003).	 ?One	 ?of	 ?the	 ?most	 ?substantial	 ?areas	 ?of	 ?debate	 ?with	 ?respect	 ?to	 ?institutions	 ?deals	 ?with	 ?whether	 ?they	 ?are	 ?endogenous	 ?(influenced	 ?by	 ?the	 ?aid/resources	 ?curse)	 ?or	 ?exogenous	 ?(ex	 ?ante	 ?to	 ?the	 ?curse,	 ?themselves	 ?conditioning	 ?the	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?or	 ?natural	 ?resources).	 ?In	 ?line	 ?with	 ?early	 ?thinking	 ?on	 ?the	 ?impact	 ?of	 ?quality	 ?of	 ?governance,	 ?a	 ?number	 ?of	 ?influential	 ?papers	 ?subscribed	 ?to	 ?the	 ?latter	 ?perspective,	 ?establishing	 ?a	 ?relationship	 ?between	 ?initial	 ?institutional	 ?context	 ?and	 ?the	 ?subsequent	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?the	 ?aid/resource	 ?curse:	 ?institutions	 ??mediate	 ?the	 ?impact	 ?of	 ?unearned	 ?foreign	 ?income?	 ?(emphasis	 ?added,	 ?Ahmed	 ?2012;	 ?also,	 ?Boschini	 ?et	 ?al.	 ?2003;	 ?Brunnschweiler	 ?2008).	 ?This	 ?interpretation	 ?tends	 ?toward	 ?defining	 ?institutions	 ?according	 ?to	 ?discrete	 ?variables,	 ?such	 ?as:	 ?property	 ?rights	 ?and	 ?corruption	 ?(Brunnschweiler	 ?2008;	 ?Mehlum,	 ?Moene,	 ?and	 ?Torvik	 ?2006a;	 ?Mehlum	 ?et	 ?al.	 ?2006b),	 ?factors	 ?related	 ?to	 ?investment,	 ?openness,	 ?and	 ?corruption	 ?(Papyrakis	 ?and	 ?Gerlagh	 ?2004),	 ?or	 ?categorical	 ?measures	 ?such	 ?as	 ??rule-??based,?	 ??outcome-??related,?	 ??property	 ?rights,?	 ?and	 ??contracting?	 ?institutions	 ?(Boschini,	 ?Pettersson,	 ?and	 ?Roine	 ?2011).	 ?Two	 ?problems	 ?emerge	 ?from	 ?the	 ?exogenous	 ?approach	 ?to	 ?institutions.	 ?First,	 ?it	 ?goes	 ?against	 ?the	 ?intuitive	 ?understanding	 ?that	 ?dramatic	 ?changes	 ?in	 ?the	 ?economic	 ?conditions	 ?of	 ?a	 ?country	 ?-??	 ?e.g.	 ?from	 ?increase	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?or	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?rents	 ?-??	 ?should	 ?likely	 ?have	 ?some	 ?sort	 ?of	 ?effect	 ?on	 ?the	 ?political	 ?institutions	 ?of	 ?that	 ?country.	 ?Second,	 ?while	 ?attempts	 ?at	 ?parsimony	 ?are	 ?useful	 ?for	 ?econometric	 ?tests,	 ?there	 ?is	 ?clear	 ?disagreement	 ?amongst	 ?scholars	 ?as	 ?to	 ?which	 ?institutions	 ?matter,	 ?and	 ?how	 ?to	 ?best	 ?define	 ?and/or	 ?measure	 ?them.	 ?Accordingly,	 ?the	 ?exogenous	 ?approach	 ?to	 ?institutions	 ?is,	 ?though	 ?valuable,	 ?only	 ?half	 ?the	 ?truth.	 ?On	 ?the	 ?reverse,	 ?this	 ?is	 ?not	 ?to	 ?suggest	 ?that	 ?the	 ?early	 ?interpretations	 ?of	 ?exogeneity	 ?were	 ?fully	 ?accurate	 ?either:	 ?many	 ?of	 ?the	 ?findings	 ?in	 ?early	 ?seminal	 ?papers	 ?positing	 ?that	 ?initial	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?levels	 ?would	 ?determine	 ?institutional	 ?outcomes	 ?have	 ?been	 ?repeatedly	 ?refuted	 ?(Boschini	 ?et	 ?al.	 ?2007:16).	 ?	 ?A	 ?new	 ?and	 ?more	 ?robust	 ??third	 ?way?	 ?has	 ?emerged,	 ?with	 ?greater	 ?consideration	 ?to	 ?the	 ?interactive	 ?relationship	 ?between	 ?institutions,	 ?resource/aid	 ?rents,	 ?and	 ?economic/political	 ?outcomes.	 ?While	 ?extant	 ?political	 ?institutions	 ?often	 ?predate	 ?the	 ?onset	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?or	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?dependency,	 ?the	 ?influx	 ?of	 ?substantial	 ?new	 ?revenue	 ?streams	 ?will	 ?have	 ?such	 ?a	 ?distortionary	 ?effect	 ?on	 ?the	 ?economy	 ?as	 ?to	 ?necessarily	 ?have	 ?some	 ?implication	 ?on	 ?institutions.	 ?For	 ?example,	 ?when	 ?public	 ?income	 ?is	 ?derived	 ?from	 ?natural	 ?resources,	 ?political	 ?elites	 ?will	 ?have	 ?an	 ?incentive	 ?to	 ?block	 ?institutional	 ?development	 ?in	 ?order	 ?to	 ?maximize	 ?their	 ?control	 ?over	 ?distribution	 ?of	 ?these	 ?rents	 ?(Acemoglu	 ?and	 ?Robinson	 ?2006).	 ?Such	 ?a	 ?model	 ?of	 ?institutions	 ?is	 ?presented	 ?in	 ?detail	 ?in	 ?Andersen	 ?(2012).	 ?For	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?curse,	 ?very	 ?similar	 ?modeling	 ?is	 ?shown	 ?in	 ?Knack	 ?(2001).	 ?With	 ?incentives	 ?and	 ?elite	 ?behaviour	 ?subject	 ?to	 ?examination	 ?in	 ?more	 ?detail	 ?below,	 ?the	 ?key	 ?point	 ?here	 ?is	 ?that	 ?institutions	 ?are	 ?not	 ?static;	 ?they	 ?both	 ?influence	 ?and	 ?are	 ?influenced	 ?by	 ?other	 ?structural	 ?factors	 ?in	 ?the	 ?political	 ?	 ?	 ? 11	 ?economy	 ?(Acemoglu	 ?and	 ?Robinson	 ?2006;	 ?Andersen	 ?2012;	 ?Knack	 ?2001).	 ?This	 ?is	 ?complimentary	 ?to	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model:	 ??in	 ?addition	 ?to	 ?determining	 ?the	 ?mix	 ?of	 ?goods	 ?leaders	 ?use,	 ?institutions	 ?determine	 ?how	 ?much	 ?policy	 ?leaders	 ?produce	 ?and	 ?how	 ?easy	 ?it	 ?is	 ?for	 ?them	 ?to	 ?survive?	 ?(Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2010:937).	 ?A	 ?key	 ?distinction	 ?in	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?is	 ?that	 ?political	 ?institutions	 ?refer	 ?broadly	 ?to	 ?all	 ?the	 ?factors	 ?that	 ?come	 ?together	 ?to	 ?determine	 ?the	 ?necessary	 ?size	 ?of	 ?the	 ?winning	 ?coalition	 ?and	 ?the	 ?composition	 ?of	 ?the	 ?overall	 ?selectorate	 ?(cf.	 ?Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2010:937).	 ?This	 ?contrasts	 ?other	 ?conceptualizations	 ?of	 ??institutions?	 ?that	 ?focus	 ?on	 ?discrete	 ?categorizations,	 ?such	 ?as	 ??corruption?	 ?or	 ??rule	 ?of	 ?law.?	 ?In	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model,	 ?a	 ?small	 ?coalition	 ?system	 ?generates	 ?institutions	 ?that	 ?favour	 ?a	 ?focus	 ?on	 ?the	 ?distribution	 ?of	 ?private	 ?goods,	 ?to	 ?be	 ?used	 ??as	 ?discretionary	 ?resources	 ?by	 ?the	 ?leader	 ?or	 ?doled	 ?out	 ?as	 ?private	 ?benefits	 ?for	 ?the	 ?leader?s	 ?supporters?	 ?(Smith	 ?2008:781).	 ?The	 ?opposite	 ?holds	 ?for	 ?large	 ?coalition	 ?systems,	 ?which	 ?engender	 ?institutions	 ?that	 ?encourage	 ?the	 ?provision	 ?of	 ?public	 ?goods.	 ?	 ?A	 ?key	 ?advantage	 ?of	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?conceptualization	 ?of	 ?institutions	 ?is	 ?that	 ?it	 ??allows	 ?comparison	 ?across	 ?all	 ?regimes,	 ?rather	 ?than	 ?between	 ?categorizations?	 ?(Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2010:937).	 ?The	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?understands	 ?institutions	 ?as	 ?a	 ?spectrum	 ?along	 ?which	 ?different	 ?sizes	 ?of	 ?selectorate	 ?and	 ?winning	 ?coalition	 ?can	 ?be	 ?placed.	 ?This	 ?is	 ?commensurate	 ?with	 ?a	 ?number	 ?of	 ?influential	 ?papers	 ?that,	 ?taking	 ?a	 ??systems?	 ?approach	 ?to	 ?institutions,	 ?have	 ?observed	 ?differences	 ?in	 ?how	 ?public	 ?goods	 ?are	 ?distributed:	 ?democracies	 ?(as	 ?opposed	 ?to	 ?autocracies)	 ?and	 ?parliamentary	 ?systems	 ?(as	 ?opposed	 ?to	 ?presidential	 ?systems)	 ?are	 ?likely	 ?to	 ?spend	 ?more	 ?on	 ?the	 ?provision	 ?of	 ?broadly	 ?targeted	 ?public	 ?goods	 ?(Acemoglu	 ?and	 ?Robinson	 ?2006;	 ?Ahmed	 ?2012;	 ?Persson,	 ?Roland,	 ?and	 ?Tabellini	 ?2000).	 ?The	 ?broader	 ?point	 ?here	 ?speaks	 ?to	 ?the	 ?importance	 ?of	 ?focusing	 ?not	 ?on	 ?individual	 ?features	 ??	 ?like	 ?property	 ?rights,	 ?risk	 ?of	 ?expropriation,	 ?or	 ?rule	 ?of	 ?law	 ??	 ?or	 ?on	 ?dichotomous	 ?categorizations	 ?(e.g.,	 ??democracy-??or-??autocracy?)	 ?but	 ?instead	 ?on	 ?the	 ?broader	 ?political	 ?institutional	 ?environment,	 ?as	 ?in	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model.	 ?The	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?is	 ?amongst	 ?the	 ?first	 ?to	 ?draw	 ?these	 ?various	 ?observations	 ?on	 ?institutions	 ?into	 ?a	 ??unified	 ?theoretical	 ?approach?	 ?(Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2009b:170).	 ?	 ?	 ?(b)	 ? Incentives	 ?Importantly,	 ?the	 ?preferences	 ?of	 ?political	 ?elites	 ?interact	 ?with	 ?the	 ?above-??described	 ?political	 ?institutions	 ?to	 ?shape	 ?an	 ?incentive	 ?structure	 ?that	 ?has	 ?conditioning	 ?effects	 ?on	 ?elite	 ?behaviour.	 ?A	 ?new	 ?wave	 ?of	 ?political	 ?science	 ?literature	 ?has	 ?recognized	 ?that	 ??political	 ?leaders	 ?are	 ?not	 ?the	 ?guardians	 ?of	 ?the	 ?state;	 ?they	 ?are	 ?self-??interested	 ?actors	 ?who	 ?implement	 ?policies	 ?to	 ?secure	 ?their	 ?survival	 ?in	 ?office,	 ?not	 ?to	 ?promote	 ?societal	 ?welfare?	 ?(Smith	 ?2008:792).	 ?Equally,	 ?recall	 ?the	 ?central	 ?axiom	 ?of	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model,	 ?that	 ??political	 ?leaders	 ?are	 ?motivated	 ?first	 ?to	 ?gain	 ?and	 ?retain	 ?political	 ?power	 ?and,	 ?conditional	 ?on	 ?meeting	 ?that	 ?goal,	 ?to	 ?maximize	 ?their	 ?discretionary	 ?control	 ?over	 ?government	 ?revenue?	 ?(Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2009b:171).	 ?	 ?The	 ?introduction	 ?of	 ?rent-??seeking	 ?models	 ?into	 ?scholarship	 ?on	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?resource	 ?curses	 ?carried	 ?an	 ?implicit	 ?belief	 ?that	 ?political	 ?leaders	 ?had	 ?very	 ?short	 ?time	 ?horizons,	 ?and	 ?that	 ?they	 ?steeply	 ?discounted	 ?the	 ?future.	 ?Olson?s	 ?(1993)	 ??roving	 ?bandit?	 ?describes	 ?a	 ?leader	 ?who	 ?seeks	 ?to	 ?maximize	 ?consumption	 ?of	 ?all	 ?available	 ?resources	 ?in	 ?the	 ?present	 ?period,	 ?with	 ?deleterious	 ?macroeconomic	 ?effects	 ?in	 ?the	 ?next	 ?period.	 ?While	 ?there	 ?is	 ?no	 ?shortage	 ?of	 ?examples	 ?of	 ?leaders	 ?making	 ?off	 ?with	 ?their	 ?countries?	 ?wealth,	 ?this	 ?in	 ?fact	 ?rarely	 ?happens	 ?overnight.	 ?Rather,	 ?in	 ?the	 ?near	 ?term,	 ?many	 ?authoritarian	 ?leaders	 ?actually	 ?supplied	 ?considerable	 ?amounts	 ?of	 ?goods	 ?and	 ?services	 ?to	 ?their	 ?people	 ?(Wright	 ?2008).	 ?Short	 ?time	 ?horizons	 ?are	 ?not	 ?universal,	 ?even	 ?for	 ?dictators.	 ?Accordingly,	 ?the	 ?range	 ?of	 ?potential	 ?time	 ?horizons	 ?dramatically	 ?affects	 ?a	 ?leader?s	 ?incentives	 ?(Yuichi	 ?Kono	 ?and	 ?Montinola	 ?2009).	 ?	 ?The	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?explains	 ?such	 ?time	 ?horizons	 ?in	 ?terms	 ?of	 ?incentive	 ?structures	 ?for	 ?elites,	 ?as	 ?shaped	 ?by	 ?political	 ?institutions	 ?(formal	 ?and	 ?informal).	 ?Both	 ?the	 ?literature	 ?on	 ?leader	 ?time	 ?horizons	 ?and	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?acknowledge	 ?that	 ??incumbent	 ?political	 ?leaders	 ?want	 ?to	 ?reduce	 ?the	 ?size	 ?of	 ?their	 ?coalition?	 ?they	 ?want	 ?to	 ?purge	 ?members?if	 ?they	 ?can?	 ?(Brautigam	 ?2000;	 ?Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2009b:183;	 ?Wright	 ?2008).	 ?However,	 ??those	 ?outside	 ?the	 ?winning	 ?coalition	 ?prefer	 ?increases	 ?in	 ?	 ?	 ? 12	 ?the	 ?inclusiveness	 ?of	 ?political	 ?institutions	 ?because	 ?of	 ?the	 ?public	 ?goods	 ?focus	 ?it	 ?induces?	 ?(Smith	 ?2008:792).	 ?	 ?Accordingly,	 ?incentive	 ?structures	 ?alter	 ?the	 ?distribution	 ?of	 ?public	 ?goods	 ?to	 ?be	 ?provided.	 ?As	 ?described	 ?earlier,	 ?the	 ?provision	 ?of	 ?such	 ?public	 ?goods	 ?often	 ?leads	 ?to	 ?collective	 ?action	 ?and	 ?free	 ?rider	 ?problems,	 ?moral	 ?hazard,	 ?and	 ?a	 ?tragedy	 ?of	 ?the	 ?commons	 ?(cf.	 ?Br?utigam	 ?and	 ?Knack	 ?2004).	 ?Whereas	 ?long	 ?time	 ?horizons	 ?encourage	 ?investment	 ?in	 ?public	 ?goods,	 ?short	 ?time	 ?horizons	 ?(indicative	 ?of	 ?challengers	 ?to	 ?the	 ?regime)	 ?encourage	 ?the	 ?diversion	 ?of	 ?public	 ?funds	 ?to	 ?three	 ?private	 ?uses:	 ?repression,	 ?pay	 ?offs,	 ?and	 ?personal	 ?aggrandizement	 ?(Wright	 ?2008).	 ?Put	 ?differently,	 ??unstable	 ?autocrats	 ?who	 ?face	 ?short	 ?time	 ?horizons	 ?have	 ?an	 ?incentive	 ?to	 ?use	 ?aid	 ?money	 ?to	 ?pay	 ?for	 ?repression	 ?or	 ?buy	 ?off	 ?potential	 ?threats	 ?to	 ?the	 ?regime	 ?in	 ?a	 ?time	 ?of	 ?crisis	 ?(?)	 ?The	 ?short	 ?time	 ?horizon	 ?these	 ?autocrats	 ?face	 ?forces	 ?them	 ?to	 ?raid	 ?any	 ?available	 ?revenue,	 ?including	 ?foreign	 ?aid,	 ?in	 ?an	 ?effort	 ?to	 ?repress	 ?or	 ?pay	 ?off	 ?challengers	 ?to	 ?the	 ?regime?	 ?(Wright	 ?2008:975).	 ?Even	 ?for	 ?dictators,	 ?two	 ?aid	 ?(or	 ?resource)	 ?curse	 ?scenarios	 ?are	 ?equally	 ?possible,	 ?according	 ?to	 ?incentive	 ?structures:	 ??Autocrats	 ?who	 ?face	 ?short	 ?time	 ?horizons	 ?would	 ?likely	 ?use	 ?foreign	 ?assistance	 ?for	 ?personal	 ?consumption,	 ?whereas	 ?those	 ?who	 ?face	 ?long	 ?time	 ?horizons	 ?should	 ?invest	 ?aid	 ?in	 ?public	 ?goods	 ?that	 ?grow	 ?the	 ?economy	 ?so	 ?the	 ?autocratic	 ?regime	 ?can	 ?take	 ?from	 ?a	 ?larger	 ?pie	 ?in	 ?the	 ?future?	 ?(Wright	 ?2008:974).	 ?Precisely	 ?the	 ?same	 ?point	 ?is	 ?made	 ?in	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model;	 ?in	 ?terms	 ?of	 ?public	 ?policy,	 ??leaders	 ?choose	 ?between	 ?a	 ?public	 ?goods	 ?or	 ?a	 ?private	 ?rewards	 ?policy	 ?focus	 ?depending	 ?upon	 ?how	 ?many	 ?supporters	 ?they	 ?need	 ?to	 ?survive	 ?in	 ?office	 ?(the	 ?winning	 ?coalition	 ?size)?	 ?(in	 ?Smith,	 ?2008:780;	 ?for	 ?detailed	 ?discussion	 ?on	 ?public	 ?and	 ?private	 ?goods,	 ?cf.	 ?Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2009b:172).	 ?In	 ?summary,	 ?the	 ?incentive	 ?structures	 ?and	 ?preferences	 ?of	 ?leaders	 ?are	 ?determined	 ?by	 ?the	 ?(a)	 ?desire	 ?to	 ?remain	 ?in	 ?office,	 ?(b)	 ?the	 ?time	 ?horizon	 ?of	 ?the	 ?leader	 ?(not	 ?always	 ?short,	 ?even	 ?for	 ?dictators),	 ?and	 ?(c)	 ?the	 ?necessary	 ?mixture	 ?of	 ?public	 ?and	 ?private	 ?goods	 ?to	 ?be	 ?provided	 ?(conditions	 ?set	 ?by	 ?the	 ?nature	 ?of	 ?political	 ?institutions,	 ?e.g.	 ?the	 ?structure	 ?of	 ?the	 ?selectorate	 ?and	 ?winning	 ?coalition).	 ?	 ? (c)	 ? The	 ?curse	 ?of	 ??unearned	 ?income?	 ?The	 ?analysis	 ?thus	 ?far	 ?has	 ?focused	 ?on	 ?the	 ?way	 ?in	 ?which	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?of	 ?political	 ?survival	 ?provides	 ?a	 ?unified	 ?theory	 ?of	 ?institutions,	 ?incentives,	 ?and	 ?elite	 ?preferences.	 ?Yet,	 ?what	 ?is	 ?it	 ?precisely	 ?about	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?or	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?that	 ?cause	 ?such	 ?pernicious	 ?economic	 ?outcomes?	 ?Why	 ?do	 ?countries	 ?which	 ?already	 ?had	 ?such	 ?poor	 ?institutional	 ?quality	 ?and	 ?weak	 ?economic	 ?performance	 ?find	 ?themselves	 ?so	 ?much	 ?worse	 ?off	 ?after	 ?the	 ?discovery	 ?of	 ?significant	 ?oil	 ?or	 ?mineral	 ?deposits,	 ?or	 ?following	 ?a	 ?large	 ?influx	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid?	 ?To	 ?answer	 ?this,	 ?we	 ?must	 ?look	 ?in	 ?large	 ?part	 ?to	 ?the	 ?nature	 ?of	 ?government	 ?revenue,	 ?with	 ?important	 ?insights	 ?from	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?converging	 ?with	 ?observations	 ?elsewhere	 ?in	 ?the	 ?literature	 ?(e.g.	 ?Morrison	 ?2010).	 ?Simply	 ?put,	 ?governments	 ?obtain	 ?revenues	 ?either	 ?through	 ??taxation	 ?on	 ?productive	 ?economic	 ?activities	 ?[or	 ?through]	 ?resources	 ?derived	 ?independent	 ?of	 ?the	 ?citizens?	 ?willingness	 ?to	 ?engage	 ?in	 ?the	 ?economy?	 ?(emphasis	 ?added,	 ?Smith	 ?2008:781).	 ?The	 ?latter	 ?are	 ?often	 ?described	 ?as	 ?unearned	 ?income	 ?(or,	 ?elsewhere	 ?labeled	 ?nontax	 ?revenue,	 ?sovereign	 ?rents,	 ?or	 ??free?	 ?or	 ??slack?	 ?resources),	 ?which	 ?are	 ?defined	 ?as	 ??income	 ?generated	 ?from	 ?outside	 ?a	 ?country?s	 ?border	 ?that	 ?can	 ?change	 ?(either	 ?directly	 ?or	 ?indirectly)	 ?a	 ?government?s	 ?revenue	 ?base?	 ?(Ahmed	 ?2012:165).	 ?Similarly,	 ?Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?describe	 ?unearned	 ?government	 ?income	 ?as	 ?absolving	 ??the	 ?government	 ?[of	 ?the	 ?need]	 ?to	 ?provide	 ?conditions,	 ?such	 ?as	 ?high	 ?levels	 ?of	 ?public	 ?goods,	 ?that	 ?are	 ?conducive	 ?to	 ?economic	 ?activity	 ?by	 ?residents	 ?in	 ?order	 ?to	 ?generate	 ?revenue?	 ?(2009:172).	 ?Though	 ?slight	 ?differences	 ?apply,	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?are	 ?the	 ?most	 ?substantial	 ?forms	 ?of	 ?such	 ?unearned	 ?income;	 ?both	 ??are	 ?paid	 ?by	 ?foreign	 ?actors;	 ?(?)	 ?are	 ?often	 ?substantial	 ?and	 ?accrue	 ?directly	 ?to	 ?the	 ?state;	 ?and	 ?only	 ?few	 ?people	 ?in	 ?the	 ?recipient	 ?government	 ?are	 ?involved	 ?in	 ?generating	 ?them,	 ?while	 ?many	 ?are	 ?involved	 ?in	 ?using	 ?and	 ?distributing	 ?them?	 ?(Therkildsen	 ?2001:2;	 ?Beblawi	 ?1987	 ?in	 ?Morrison	 ?2010).	 ?Unearned	 ?income	 ?often	 ?induces	 ?discretionary	 ?spending	 ?practices	 ?by	 ?governments,	 ?with	 ?less	 ?corollary	 ?requirement	 ?for	 ?public	 ?accountability.	 ?It	 ?is	 ?known	 ?with	 ?rentier	 ?states	 ?that	 ?oil	 ?(and	 ?foreign	 ?aid)	 ?have	 ?harmful	 ?effects	 ?on	 ?government	 ?accountability	 ?through	 ?the	 ?government?s	 ?reduced	 ?reliance	 ?	 ?	 ? 13	 ?on	 ?taxation	 ?(Ahmed	 ?2012;	 ?Morrison	 ?2010;	 ?Ross	 ?2004a,	 ?2004b;	 ?Therkildsen	 ?2002).	 ?As	 ?Brautigam	 ?notes,	 ??when	 ?the	 ?flow	 ?of	 ?revenue	 ?does	 ?not	 ?depend	 ?on	 ?the	 ?taxes	 ?raised	 ?from	 ?citizens	 ?and	 ?businesses,	 ?there	 ?is	 ?less	 ?incentive	 ?to	 ?be	 ?accountable	 ?to	 ?them?	 ?(Brautigam	 ?2000:25).	 ?Equally,	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?addresses	 ?the	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?government	 ?revenue	 ?on	 ?public	 ?accountability,	 ?noting,	 ??leaders	 ?who	 ?rely	 ?on	 ?taxing	 ?productive	 ?economic	 ?activity	 ?to	 ?generate	 ?the	 ?resources	 ?needed	 ?to	 ?reward	 ?their	 ?coalition	 ?find	 ?suppressing	 ?public	 ?goods	 ?to	 ?be	 ?unattractive.	 ?However,	 ?leaders	 ?with	 ?access	 ?to	 ?abundant,	 ?essentially	 ?labor-??free	 ?resources	 ??	 ?such	 ?as	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?rents	 ?or	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?can	 ?suppress	 ?[public]	 ?goods	 ?with	 ?little	 ?if	 ?any	 ?damage	 ?to	 ?their	 ?revenue?	 ?(Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2010:937).	 ?The	 ?implication,	 ?then,	 ?is	 ?the	 ?importance	 ?not	 ?(only)	 ?of	 ?a	 ?country?s	 ?total	 ?wealth,	 ?but	 ?the	 ?source	 ?of	 ?that	 ?wealth:	 ??if	 ?leaders	 ?need	 ?to	 ?tax	 ?productive	 ?economic	 ?activities	 ?to	 ?generate	 ?revenues,	 ?then	 ?the	 ?prospects	 ?for	 ?democratization	 ?are	 ?much	 ?stronger	 ?than	 ?if	 ?leaders	 ?gather	 ?resources	 ?without	 ?having	 ?to	 ?generate	 ?policies	 ?that	 ?encourage	 ?people	 ?to	 ?work?	 ?(Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2010:949).	 ?Related	 ?to	 ?the	 ?lack	 ?of	 ?accountability	 ?surrounding	 ?unearned	 ?incomes	 ?is	 ?the	 ?fungibility	 ?(or,	 ?elsewhere	 ?labeled	 ?as	 ??appropriability?	 ?or	 ??lootability?)	 ?of	 ?rents	 ?from	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?and/or	 ?foreign	 ?aid.	 ?Fungibility	 ?and	 ?the	 ?concomitant	 ?lack	 ?of	 ?accountability	 ?permits	 ?actors	 ?to	 ??engage	 ?in	 ?certain	 ?behavior	 ?that	 ?would	 ?not	 ?be	 ?possible	 ?in	 ?the	 ?absence	 ?of	 ?these	 ?funds?	 ?(Ahmed	 ?2012:149).	 ?This	 ?is	 ?particularly	 ?observed	 ?in	 ?the	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?literature;	 ?given	 ?the	 ?considerable	 ?sums	 ?of	 ?money	 ?at	 ?stake	 ?-??	 ?between	 ?1960	 ?and	 ?1990,	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?contributions	 ?topped	 ?roughly	 ?US$1.7	 ?trillion	 ?-??	 ?and	 ?the	 ?relatively	 ?lackluster	 ?results,	 ?there	 ?is	 ?concern	 ?that	 ??development	 ?assistance	 ?earmarked	 ?for	 ?critical	 ?social	 ?and	 ?economic	 ?sectors	 ?is	 ?being	 ?used	 ?directly	 ?or	 ?indirectly	 ?to	 ?fund	 ?unproductive	 ?expenditures?	 ?(Devarajan	 ?and	 ?Swaroop	 ?1998:2).	 ?Case	 ?studies	 ?have	 ?shown	 ?that	 ??that	 ?external	 ?assistance	 ?intended	 ?for	 ?development	 ?purposes	 ?merely	 ?substitutes	 ?for	 ?spending	 ?that	 ?governments	 ?(?)	 ?would	 ?have	 ?undertaken	 ?anyway;	 ?the	 ?funds	 ?freed	 ?by	 ?aid	 ?are	 ?spent	 ?on	 ?non-??development	 ?activities	 ?and	 ?administrative	 ?services	 ?in	 ?particular?	 ?(Devarajan	 ?and	 ?Swaroop	 ?2000:10).	 ?This	 ?is	 ?an	 ?area	 ?of	 ?research	 ?gaining	 ?traction	 ?in	 ?the	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?literature	 ?as	 ?well	 ?(Boschini	 ?et	 ?al.	 ?2007).	 ?Generally	 ?speaking	 ?(and	 ?in	 ?line	 ?with	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model),	 ?institutions	 ?are	 ?more	 ?decisive	 ?when	 ?the	 ?government?s	 ?revenue	 ?stream	 ?is	 ?more	 ?fungible	 ?(and	 ?less	 ?accountable)	 ?(Boschini	 ?et	 ?al.	 ?2007:4;	 ?Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2010:939).	 ?That	 ?unearned	 ?income	 ?may	 ?have	 ??amplifying?	 ?effects	 ?on	 ?institutions	 ?is	 ?reflected	 ?in	 ?a	 ?growing	 ?number	 ?of	 ?papers	 ?on	 ?the	 ?topic	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resources,	 ?many	 ?of	 ?which	 ?resonate	 ?closely	 ?with	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?(e.g.	 ?Dunning	 ?2008	 ?in	 ?Morrison	 ?2010;	 ?Morrison	 ?2009;	 ?Wright	 ?2008).	 ?Dutta	 ?et	 ?al	 ?(2013)	 ?present	 ?a	 ?groundbreaking	 ?paper,	 ?in	 ?which	 ?they	 ?argue	 ?that	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ??neither	 ?causes	 ?democracies	 ?to	 ?become	 ?more	 ?dictatorial	 ?nor	 ?causes	 ?dictatorships	 ?to	 ?become	 ?more	 ?democratic.	 ?It	 ?only	 ?amplifies	 ?recipients?	 ?existing	 ?political-??institutional	 ?orientations?	 ?(emphasis	 ?added,	 ?Dutta	 ?et	 ?al	 ?2013).	 ?The	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?accepts	 ?the	 ?proposition	 ?of	 ?such	 ?an	 ?amplification	 ?effect,	 ?noting	 ?that	 ?where	 ?mass	 ?public	 ?mobilization	 ?is	 ?likely	 ?(either	 ?through	 ?elections	 ?or	 ?revolution),	 ?additional	 ?volumes	 ?of	 ?free	 ?resources	 ?in	 ?large	 ?coalition	 ?systems	 ?encourage	 ?leaders	 ?to	 ?expand	 ?the	 ?supply	 ?of	 ?public	 ?goods.	 ?The	 ?opposite	 ?(a	 ?contraction	 ?of	 ?public	 ?goods)	 ?holds	 ?in	 ?small	 ?coalition	 ?(e.g.	 ?more	 ?autocratic)	 ?institutional	 ?contexts	 ?(cf.	 ?Smith	 ?2008).	 ?Supporting	 ?the	 ?amplification	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?unearned	 ?income	 ?on	 ?institutions,	 ?recent	 ?studies	 ?have	 ?found	 ?unearned	 ?income	 ?to	 ?be	 ?associated	 ?with	 ?lower	 ?likelihood	 ?of	 ?regime	 ?transition	 ?(Morrison	 ?2009),	 ?an	 ?increase	 ?in	 ?corruption	 ?where	 ?extant	 ?institutional	 ?quality	 ?is	 ?weak	 ?(Bhattacharyya	 ?and	 ?Hodler	 ?2010),	 ?and	 ?a	 ?negative	 ?effect	 ?on	 ?growth	 ?where	 ?institutional	 ?capacity	 ?is	 ?low	 ?(Boschini	 ?et	 ?al	 ?2007	 ?in	 ?Morrison	 ?2010).	 ?Andersen	 ?shows	 ?how	 ?elites	 ?strategically	 ??invest	 ?in	 ?de	 ?facto	 ?political	 ?power	 ?in	 ?order	 ?to	 ?gain	 ?favorable	 ?economic	 ?institutions?	 ?(Andersen	 ?2012).	 ?Moreover,	 ?this	 ??investment	 ?in	 ?de	 ?facto	 ?political	 ?power	 ?also	 ?indirectly	 ?increases	 ?the	 ?probability	 ?of	 ?non-??democratic	 ?de	 ?jure	 ?political	 ?institutions	 ?in	 ?the	 ?next	 ?period,?	 ?and,	 ?therefore,	 ?to	 ?the	 ??persistence	 ?of	 ?political	 ?institutions?	 ?(emphasis	 ?added,	 ?Andersen	 ?2012).	 ?Described	 ?earlier,	 ?Wright	 ?shows	 ?that	 ?free	 ?resources	 ?(unearned	 ?income)	 ?tend	 ?to	 ?be	 ?turned	 ?into	 ?public	 ?goods	 ?where	 ?leaders	 ?have	 ?long	 ?time	 ?horizons	 ?(more	 ?stable	 ?regimes),	 ?	 ?	 ? 14	 ?but	 ?equally	 ?tend	 ?to	 ?be	 ?diverted	 ?toward	 ?malfeasance	 ?when	 ?time	 ?horizons	 ?are	 ?short	 ?(regimes	 ?are	 ?less	 ?stable)	 ?(Wright	 ?2008;	 ?Yuichi	 ?Kono	 ?and	 ?Montinola	 ?2009).	 ?	 ?	 ?(d)	 ? Summary:	 ?Insights	 ?from	 ?a	 ?meta	 ?theory	 ?Although	 ?scholarship	 ?to	 ?date	 ?has	 ?paid	 ?little	 ?attention	 ?to	 ?the	 ?similarities	 ?between	 ?the	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?and	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?curses,	 ?it	 ?is	 ?reasonable	 ?to	 ?suggest	 ?that	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?of	 ?political	 ?survival	 ?represents	 ?a	 ?unifying	 ??meta?	 ?theory	 ?capable	 ?of	 ?bringing	 ?together	 ?many	 ?influential	 ?contributions	 ?on	 ?each	 ?of	 ?the	 ?curses.	 ?The	 ?central	 ?tenets	 ?of	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?are	 ?increasingly	 ?reflected	 ?in	 ?the	 ?logic	 ?structures	 ?of	 ?most	 ?of	 ?the	 ?recent	 ?literature	 ?on	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?curses	 ?(Ahmed	 ?2012;	 ?Smith	 ?2008;	 ?Torvik	 ?2009).	 ?In	 ?short,	 ?while	 ?the	 ?pursuit	 ?of	 ?political	 ?survival	 ?is	 ?logical	 ?at	 ?the	 ?micro	 ?level,	 ?it	 ?often	 ?results	 ?in	 ?pernicious	 ?effects	 ?for	 ?macroeconomics	 ?and	 ?public	 ?welfare,	 ?owing	 ?to	 ?the	 ?distribution	 ?of	 ?public	 ?and	 ?private	 ?goods	 ?it	 ?induces.	 ?The	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?explains	 ?how	 ?strategies	 ?of	 ?elite	 ?/	 ?regime	 ?survival	 ?have	 ?direct	 ?implications	 ?for	 ?macroeconomic	 ?performance,	 ?political	 ?liberalization,	 ?and	 ?potential	 ?socioeconomic	 ?welfare	 ?gains.	 ?The	 ?political	 ?institutions	 ?of	 ?a	 ?country	 ?influence	 ?and	 ?determine	 ?the	 ?policies	 ?required	 ?by	 ?a	 ?leader	 ?to	 ?survive	 ?in	 ?office,	 ?and	 ?equally	 ?for	 ?the	 ?strategies	 ?of	 ?opponents	 ?to	 ?challenge	 ?the	 ?incumbency;	 ?the	 ?model	 ?shows	 ?that	 ??incumbents	 ?are	 ?most	 ?likely	 ?to	 ?survive	 ?when	 ?they	 ?are	 ?beholden	 ?to	 ?only	 ?a	 ?small	 ?coalition	 ?of	 ?supporters	 ?and	 ?when	 ?they	 ?have	 ?access	 ?to	 ?resources	 ??	 ?such	 ?as	 ?oil	 ?and	 ?aid	 ??	 ?that	 ?do	 ?not	 ?require	 ?significant	 ?economic	 ?participation	 ?by	 ?the	 ?citizens?	 ?(emphasis	 ?added,	 ?Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2010:936).	 ?As	 ?with	 ?many	 ?other	 ?influential	 ?papers	 ?on	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?resource	 ?curse,	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?posits	 ?the	 ?nature	 ?of	 ?government	 ?revenue	 ?to	 ?be	 ?central	 ?to	 ?understanding	 ?the	 ?public	 ?policy	 ?choices	 ?made	 ?by	 ?political	 ?elites.	 ?Under	 ?certain	 ?institutional	 ?contexts	 ?(specifically,	 ?large	 ?winning	 ?coalitions	 ?settings,	 ?e.g.	 ?more	 ?pluralistic	 ?systems),	 ?political	 ?elites	 ?are	 ?likely	 ?to	 ?transform	 ??the	 ?resource	 ?bonanza	 ?associated	 ?with	 ?the	 ?discovery	 ?of	 ?a	 ?readily	 ?exploitable	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?or	 ?an	 ?influx	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?into	 ?economic	 ?development	 ?and	 ?improvements	 ?in	 ?societal	 ?welfare?	 ?(Smith	 ?2008:781).	 ?However,	 ?in	 ?other	 ?institutional	 ?settings,	 ?elites	 ?are	 ?likely	 ?to	 ?divert	 ?substantial	 ?parts	 ?of	 ?the	 ?rents	 ?from	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?and/or	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?toward	 ?personal	 ?and	 ?cohort	 ?survival,	 ?with	 ??insidious	 ?effects	 ?on	 ?political	 ?and	 ?economic	 ?development?	 ?(Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2010:949).,	 ?Accordingly,	 ?it	 ?is	 ??institutions	 ?and	 ?the	 ?level	 ?of	 ?free	 ?resources	 ?[that]	 ?determine	 ?which	 ?policy	 ?best	 ?enhances	 ?the	 ?leader?s	 ?prospects	 ?for	 ?survival?	 ?(Smith	 ?2008:782);	 ?equally,	 ?I	 ?would	 ?suggest	 ?that	 ?together	 ?these	 ?variables	 ?determine	 ?the	 ?manifestation	 ?of	 ?the	 ?resource	 ?and/or	 ?aid	 ?curses.	 ?The	 ?distortionary	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?unearned	 ?government	 ?income	 ?on	 ?the	 ?allocation	 ?of	 ?public	 ?and	 ?private	 ?goods	 ?leads	 ?to	 ?suboptimal	 ?macroeconomic	 ?effects	 ?(e.g.	 ?Boschini,	 ?Pettersson,	 ?and	 ?Roine	 ?2003).	 ?An	 ?increase	 ?of	 ?unearned	 ?income	 ?revenues	 ?worth	 ?10%	 ?of	 ?GDP	 ?will,	 ?in	 ?the	 ?institutional	 ?context	 ?of	 ?a	 ?small	 ?winning	 ?coalition,	 ?reduce	 ?the	 ?chance	 ?of	 ?a	 ?leader	 ?being	 ?deposed	 ?by	 ?20-??50%	 ?(Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2010;	 ?see	 ?also,	 ?Brautigam	 ?2000;	 ?Smith	 ?2008;	 ?Ahmed	 ?2012;	 ?Besley	 ?and	 ?Persson	 ?2009).	 ?In	 ?Ahmed	 ?(2012),	 ?unearned	 ?income	 ?is	 ?expanded	 ?to	 ?include	 ?remittance	 ?flows;	 ?the	 ?findings	 ?hold,	 ?with	 ?similar	 ?effects	 ?on	 ?regime	 ?survival.	 ?In	 ?particular,	 ?Ahmed	 ?notes	 ?that	 ??the	 ?combination	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?remittance	 ?inflows	 ?received	 ?in	 ?more	 ?autocratic	 ?polities	 ?reduces	 ?the	 ?likelihood	 ?that	 ?governments	 ?will	 ?be	 ?ousted	 ?from	 ?power,	 ?experience	 ?incidents	 ?of	 ?major	 ?political	 ?discontent,	 ?and	 ?undergo	 ?regime	 ?collapse?	 ?(Ahmed	 ?2012:148).	 ?	 ?Finally,	 ?observations	 ?from	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?are	 ?largely	 ?in	 ?line	 ?with	 ?the	 ?institutional	 ??amplification?	 ?and	 ??persistence?	 ?effects	 ?presented	 ?in	 ?Andersen	 ?(2012)	 ?and	 ?Dutta	 ?et	 ?al	 ?(2013).	 ?The	 ?negative	 ?interaction	 ?between	 ?institutions	 ?and	 ?nature	 ?of	 ?government	 ?revenue	 ?appears	 ?greater	 ?in	 ?the	 ?context	 ?of	 ?small	 ?winning	 ?coalitions	 ?and	 ??free?	 ?resources;	 ?in	 ?other	 ?words,	 ?the	 ?more	 ?democratic	 ?a	 ?country,	 ?the	 ?less	 ?negative	 ?effect	 ?aid	 ?or	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?appear	 ?to	 ?have.	 ?Further	 ?keeping	 ?with	 ?the	 ?amplification	 ?effect,	 ?it	 ?is	 ?noted	 ?that	 ?unearned	 ?income	 ?in	 ?a	 ?country	 ?with	 ?a	 ?large	 ?winning	 ?coalition	 ?size	 ?may	 ??accelerate	 ?the	 ?expansion	 ?of	 ?coalition	 ?size?	 ?or,	 ?in	 ?other	 ?words,	 ?support	 ?political	 ?liberalization	 ?(Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2010:946).	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? 15	 ?5.	 ? Testing	 ?the	 ?Model:	 ?the	 ?Effects	 ?of	 ?Simultaneous	 ?Resource	 ?and	 ?Aid	 ?Dependency	 ?	 ?	 ?Having	 ?discussed	 ?the	 ?theoretical	 ?foundations	 ?for	 ?a	 ?model	 ?that	 ?can	 ?encompass	 ?the	 ?twin	 ?curses	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?and	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?dependencies,	 ?I	 ?next	 ?turn	 ?to	 ?exploring	 ?the	 ?implications	 ?of	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?resource	 ?curse	 ?co-??existing	 ?simultaneously.	 ?The	 ?purpose	 ?is	 ?more	 ?to	 ?be	 ?illustrative	 ?than	 ?definitive;	 ?it	 ?is	 ?outside	 ?the	 ?scope	 ?of	 ?this	 ?paper	 ?to	 ?provide	 ?a	 ?far-??reaching	 ?quantitative	 ?analysis,	 ?and,	 ?instead,	 ?what	 ?are	 ?presented	 ?are	 ?preliminary	 ?interpretations.	 ?I	 ?focus	 ?on	 ?one	 ?possible	 ?relationship	 ?involving	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?that	 ?has	 ?received	 ?surprisingly	 ?little	 ?attention:	 ?the	 ?socioeconomic	 ?welfare	 ?effects	 ?in	 ?a	 ?country	 ?that	 ?has	 ?an	 ?economy	 ?largely	 ?dependent	 ?on	 ?the	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?sector	 ?and	 ?which	 ?is	 ?also	 ?the	 ?recipient	 ?of	 ?significant	 ?foreign	 ?aid.	 ?	 ?While	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model	 ?gives	 ?some	 ?sense	 ?that	 ?both	 ?curses	 ?operate	 ?according	 ?to	 ?a	 ?familiar	 ?logic,	 ?it	 ?remains	 ?undetermined	 ?what	 ?the	 ?formal	 ?modeling	 ?of	 ?this	 ?relationship	 ?might	 ?look	 ?like.	 ?Recent	 ?world	 ?events	 ?may	 ?have	 ?offered	 ?an	 ?answer:	 ?greater	 ?attention	 ?in	 ?the	 ?last	 ?decade	 ?on	 ?the	 ?potential	 ?bonanza	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?for	 ?many	 ?developing	 ?countries	 ?has	 ?simultaneously	 ?provided	 ?great	 ?optimism	 ?as	 ?well	 ?as	 ?a	 ?renewed	 ?concern	 ?about	 ?the	 ?resources	 ?curse.	 ?Following	 ?this,	 ?many	 ?developed	 ?countries	 ?have	 ?pledged	 ?a	 ?new	 ?round	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?to	 ?their	 ?Southern	 ?peers	 ?to	 ?manage	 ?the	 ?dependency	 ?on	 ?natural	 ?resources.	 ?Accordingly,	 ?it	 ?seems	 ?appropriate	 ?to	 ?propose	 ?an	 ?econometric	 ?model	 ?that	 ?examines	 ?the	 ?lagged	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?increased	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?flows	 ?to	 ?already-??resource-??dependent	 ?countries.	 ?Other	 ?relationships	 ?are	 ?possible:	 ?for	 ?example,	 ?the	 ?discovery	 ?of	 ?substantial	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?in	 ?an	 ?already	 ?heavily	 ?aid-??dependent	 ?country.	 ?In	 ?keeping	 ?with	 ?the	 ?scope	 ?of	 ?this	 ?paper,	 ?however,	 ?I	 ?focus	 ?only	 ?on	 ?the	 ?first	 ?model,	 ?leaving	 ?alternate	 ?model	 ?specifications	 ?for	 ?others	 ?to	 ?analyze.	 ?With	 ?this	 ?in	 ?mind,	 ?the	 ?following	 ?research	 ?question	 ?and	 ?hypotheses	 ?are	 ?proposed:	 ?	 ? Q	 ?:	 ?	 ? What	 ?are	 ?the	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?a	 ?country?s	 ?dependency	 ?on	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?and	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?on	 ?socioeconomic	 ?welfare?	 ?	 ?H1	 ?:	 ?	 ? In	 ?countries	 ?already	 ?largely	 ?dependent	 ?on	 ?natural	 ?resources,	 ?there	 ?is	 ?a	 ?critical	 ?threshold,	 ?inside	 ?which	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?positively	 ?affects	 ?socioeconomic	 ?development.	 ?	 ?H0	 ?:	 ?	 ? In	 ?countries	 ?already	 ?largely	 ?dependent	 ?on	 ?natural	 ?resources,	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?has	 ?no	 ?effect	 ?on	 ?socioeconomic	 ?development.	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?(a)	 ? Data	 ?and	 ?Measurement	 ?Dependent	 ?variable.	 ?To	 ?measure	 ?the	 ?country-??level	 ?socioeconomic	 ?welfare	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?resource	 ?dependency,	 ?I	 ?take	 ?as	 ?the	 ?dependent	 ?variable	 ?the	 ?change	 ?in	 ?maternal	 ?mortality	 ?between	 ?2005	 ?and	 ?2010	 ?(variable:	 ?mortality).	 ?Previously,	 ?I	 ?had	 ?anticipated	 ?using	 ?change	 ?in	 ?Human	 ?Development	 ?Index	 ?score;	 ?however	 ?it	 ?quickly	 ?became	 ?apparent	 ?that	 ?the	 ?use	 ?of	 ?an	 ?aggregate	 ?index	 ?was	 ?potentially	 ?leading	 ?to	 ?over	 ?specification	 ?in	 ?the	 ?model,	 ?causing	 ?positive	 ?or	 ?negative	 ?changes	 ?to	 ?be	 ?missed.	 ?For	 ?the	 ?purposes	 ?of	 ?an	 ?initial	 ?investigation,	 ?I	 ?believe	 ?maternal	 ?mortality	 ?rates	 ?to	 ?be	 ?a	 ?more	 ?effective	 ?measure	 ?of	 ?the	 ?most	 ?basic	 ?elements	 ?of	 ?socioeconomic	 ?welfare	 ?(furthermore,	 ?this	 ?approach	 ?has	 ?been	 ?used	 ?throughout	 ?the	 ?international	 ?development	 ?literature).	 ?Results	 ?are	 ?reported	 ?in	 ?the	 ?positive;	 ?a	 ?+	 ?sign	 ?indicates	 ?a	 ?decline	 ?(improvement)	 ?in	 ?maternal	 ?mortality.	 ?I	 ?include	 ?only	 ?those	 ?countries	 ?with	 ?a	 ?population	 ?over	 ?1	 ?million	 ?in	 ?2010,	 ?resulting	 ?in	 ?a	 ?sample	 ?size	 ?of	 ?151	 ?countries	 ?(Annex	 ?A).	 ?	 ?	 ? Independent	 ?variables.	 ?The	 ?independent	 ?variables	 ?relate	 ?to	 ?dependency	 ?on	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?(natres),	 ?dependency	 ?on	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?(aid),	 ?and	 ?the	 ?operational	 ?mechanism	 ?through	 ?which	 ?the	 ?curse(s)	 ?are	 ?manifest:	 ?institutions	 ?(agg_instit).	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? 16	 ?(1)	 ?Foreign	 ?aid.	 ?To	 ?measure	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?(aid),	 ?I	 ?use	 ?a	 ?measure	 ?of	 ?official	 ?development	 ?assistance	 ?disbursements	 ?(reported	 ?in	 ?hundreds	 ?of	 ?millions	 ?of	 ?$	 ?US).	 ?Furthermore,	 ?I	 ?use	 ?an	 ?averaged	 ?figure,	 ?over	 ?the	 ?period	 ?2007-??2010,	 ?to	 ?account	 ?for	 ?any	 ?potential	 ?volatility	 ?in	 ?aid	 ?flows	 ?between	 ?years.	 ?In	 ?model	 ?2	 ?(discussed	 ?below),	 ?I	 ?use	 ?three	 ?categories	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?volume:	 ?low	 ?(<US$50m/p.a.;	 ??aidlow?),	 ?medium	 ?($50m-??480m/p.a.,	 ??aidmed?),	 ?and	 ?high	 ?(>	 ?$480m/p.a.,	 ??aidhigh?).	 ?(2)	 ?Natural	 ?resources.	 ?To	 ?account	 ?for	 ??natural	 ?resource	 ?dependency?	 ?(natres)	 ?I	 ?use	 ?a	 ?measure	 ?of	 ?the	 ?value	 ?of	 ?mineral	 ?and	 ?fuel	 ?exports	 ?as	 ?a	 ?share	 ?of	 ?total	 ?exports.	 ?The	 ?logic	 ?behind	 ?this	 ?is	 ?briefly	 ?as	 ?follows.	 ?The	 ?econometric	 ?literature	 ?on	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?wealth	 ?has	 ?confused	 ?a	 ?number	 ?of	 ?conceptualizations	 ?with	 ?subtle	 ?yet	 ?important	 ?differences.	 ?First,	 ?only	 ?certain	 ?types	 ?of	 ?resources	 ?exhibit	 ?pernicious	 ?effects.	 ?This	 ?is	 ?largely	 ?related	 ?to	 ?the	 ?fungibility	 ?or	 ?appropriability	 ?of	 ?the	 ?resource;	 ?for	 ?example,	 ?ceteris	 ?paribus,	 ?agricultural	 ?products	 ?are	 ?less	 ?appropriable	 ?than	 ?minerals	 ?or	 ?oil	 ?(Boschini	 ?et	 ?al.	 ?2003).	 ?	 ?In	 ?keeping	 ?with	 ?this,	 ?I	 ?therefore	 ?focus	 ?on	 ??point-??source?,	 ?sub-??surface	 ?resources:	 ?minerals	 ?and	 ?oil/gas	 ?(Boschini	 ?et	 ?al.	 ?2007;	 ?Isham	 ?et	 ?al.	 ?2005;	 ?Mehlum	 ?et	 ?al.	 ?2006b;	 ?Rajan	 ?and	 ?Subramanian	 ?2005;	 ?Torvik	 ?2009).	 ?Furthermore,	 ?it	 ?is	 ?with	 ?resource	 ?dependency	 ?(as	 ?opposed	 ?to	 ??abundance?)	 ?that	 ?one	 ?observes	 ?the	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?the	 ?resource	 ?curse	 ?(Brunnschweiler	 ?2008).	 ?Related	 ?to	 ?this,	 ?few	 ?papers	 ?measuring	 ?levels	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?acknowledge	 ?the	 ?difference	 ?in	 ?meaning	 ?behind	 ??production?	 ?and	 ??exports?	 ?(Boschini	 ?et	 ?al	 ?[2003]	 ?are	 ?an	 ?exception).	 ?Hence,	 ?I	 ?focus	 ?on	 ??dependency?	 ?as	 ?measured	 ?through	 ?earnings	 ?from	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?as	 ?a	 ?share	 ?of	 ?overall	 ?exports.	 ?Finally,	 ?to	 ?account	 ?for	 ?volatility	 ?in	 ?commodity	 ?prices	 ?and	 ?gaps	 ?in	 ?data,	 ?I	 ?average	 ?these	 ?figures	 ?over	 ?the	 ?period	 ?2000-??2008.	 ?(3)	 ?Institutions.	 ?Finally,	 ?recall	 ?that	 ?both	 ?curses	 ?are	 ?largely	 ?seen	 ?as	 ?the	 ?interaction	 ?between	 ?dependency	 ?on	 ?unearned	 ?income	 ?and	 ?the	 ?institutional	 ?context.	 ?In	 ?measuring	 ??institutions?,	 ?I	 ?depart	 ?from	 ?many	 ?earlier	 ?methodologies,	 ?which	 ?often	 ?focused	 ?on	 ?discrete	 ?variables	 ?such	 ?as	 ?corruption	 ?or	 ?rule	 ?of	 ?law	 ?(e.g.	 ?Boschini	 ?et	 ?al	 ?2003).	 ?In	 ?large	 ?part,	 ?these	 ?earlier	 ?approaches	 ?have	 ?been	 ?refuted	 ?(cf.	 ?Wright	 ?2008:979).	 ?Instead,	 ?recall	 ?that	 ?in	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model,	 ?the	 ?salient	 ?political	 ?institutions	 ?are	 ?the	 ?size	 ?of	 ?the	 ?winning	 ?coalition	 ?and	 ?of	 ?the	 ?selectorate;	 ?this	 ?encapsulates	 ?a	 ?mix	 ?of	 ?regime	 ?type	 ?and	 ?inherent	 ?systemic	 ?stability.	 ?To	 ?proxy	 ?for	 ?this,	 ?I	 ?use	 ?the	 ?POLITY	 ?index	 ?to	 ?describe	 ?institutional	 ?variables	 ?(similar	 ?to	 ?Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?et	 ?al	 ?in	 ?their	 ?2003	 ?model).	 ?As	 ?well,	 ?I	 ?include	 ?the	 ??Underlying	 ?Vulnerability?	 ?index,	 ?which	 ?is	 ?modelled	 ?off	 ?the	 ?Political	 ?Instability	 ?Task	 ?Force	 ?dataset	 ?with	 ?the	 ?addition	 ?of	 ?a	 ?number	 ?of	 ?social,	 ?economic,	 ?and	 ?political	 ?indicators	 ?for	 ?regime	 ?vulnerability.2	 ?I	 ?present	 ?two	 ?aggregate	 ?indices	 ?(agg_instit08	 ?and	 ?agg_instit10),	 ?which	 ?reflects	 ?the	 ?aggregate	 ?of	 ?the	 ?POLITY	 ?and	 ?Underlying	 ?Vulnerability	 ?measures,	 ?averaged	 ?over	 ?the	 ?periods	 ?2000-??2008	 ?and	 ?2007-??2010.	 ?I	 ?believe	 ?this	 ?approach	 ?toward	 ?institutions	 ?to	 ?be	 ?an	 ?acceptable	 ?reflection	 ?of	 ?both	 ?the	 ?nature	 ?and	 ?stability	 ?of	 ?institutions	 ?in	 ?each	 ?country,	 ?generally	 ?in	 ?line	 ?with	 ?the	 ?BDM	 ?model?s	 ?intended	 ?understanding	 ?of	 ?institutions.	 ?Given	 ?that	 ?all	 ?leaders	 ?desire	 ?survival,	 ?this	 ?gives	 ?a	 ?sense	 ?of	 ?de	 ?jure	 ?and	 ?de	 ?facto	 ?institutional	 ?constraints,	 ?which	 ?might	 ?influence	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?and	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?revenues.	 ?The	 ?logic	 ?behind	 ?the	 ?different	 ?date	 ?ranges	 ?is	 ?intended	 ?to	 ?model	 ?the	 ?interactive	 ?nature	 ?of	 ?institutions	 ?vis-???-??vis	 ?the	 ?aid/resource	 ?curses.	 ?The	 ?first	 ?period	 ?of	 ?dates	 ?correspond	 ?to	 ?the	 ?interactive	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?institutions	 ?with	 ?natural	 ?resources;	 ?the	 ?second	 ?period	 ?of	 ?dates	 ?correspond	 ?to	 ?the	 ?interactive	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?institutions	 ?with	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?flows.	 ?	 ?	 ?Controls.	 ?In	 ?keeping	 ?with	 ?convention,	 ?I	 ?include	 ?a	 ?handful	 ?of	 ?controls	 ?to	 ?account	 ?for	 ?the	 ?extraneous	 ?influence	 ?of	 ?other	 ?factors.	 ?In	 ?the	 ?first	 ?model	 ?(models	 ?[1a-??d),	 ?I	 ?include	 ?as	 ?controls:	 ?GDP	 ?(gdp);	 ?human	 ?capital,	 ?measured	 ?as	 ?%	 ?of	 ?adult	 ?population	 ?that	 ?is	 ?literate	 ?(literacy);	 ?and,	 ?country	 ?population	 ?(population).	 ?In	 ?the	 ?second	 ?model	 ?(models	 ?[2a-??c]),	 ?I	 ?include	 ?only	 ?gdp	 ?and	 ?population;	 ?I	 ?drop	 ?literacy	 ?as	 ?a	 ?control	 ?in	 ?the	 ?second	 ?model	 ?as	 ?I	 ?found	 ?it	 ?to	 ?be	 ?statistically	 ?less	 ?helpful	 ?and	 ?less	 ?                                                2	 ?After	 ?reversing	 ?the	 ?direction	 ?of	 ?scores	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Underlying	 ?Vulnerability	 ?index	 ?and	 ?re-??scaling	 ?them	 ?from	 ?the	 ?original	 ?0	 ?to	 ?+10	 ?to	 ?a	 ?new	 ?-??5	 ?to	 ?+5	 ?scale,	 ?I	 ?then	 ?add	 ?together	 ?the	 ?new	 ?Underlying	 ?Vulnerability	 ?scores	 ?and	 ?POLITY	 ?scores	 ?to	 ?create	 ?an	 ?aggregate	 ?index	 ?to	 ?proxy	 ?for	 ?institutional	 ?context.	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? 17	 ?logical	 ?to	 ?the	 ?model.	 ?Unlike	 ?some	 ?studies	 ?on	 ?the	 ?curses,	 ?I	 ?do	 ?not	 ?use	 ?instrumental	 ?variables	 ?to	 ?address	 ?for	 ?possible	 ?endogeneity.	 ?This	 ?is	 ?in	 ?keeping	 ?with	 ?critique	 ?identified	 ?in	 ?Wright	 ?(2008),	 ?Torvik	 ?(2009),	 ?and	 ?elsewhere.	 ?	 ?	 ?(b)	 ? Model	 ?Specification,	 ?Results	 ?and	 ?Interpretation	 ?	 ? Initial	 ?Observations.	 ?For	 ?natural	 ?resources,	 ?half	 ?the	 ?countries	 ?in	 ?my	 ?151-??country	 ?sample	 ?derived	 ?less	 ?than	 ?one-??quarter	 ?of	 ?their	 ?export	 ?earnings	 ?from	 ?natural	 ?resources.	 ?However,	 ?nearly	 ?40	 ?countries	 ??	 ?which	 ?range	 ?in	 ?political,	 ?economic,	 ?and	 ?social	 ?context	 ?from	 ?as	 ?far	 ?afield	 ?as	 ?Australia	 ?and	 ?Norway	 ?to	 ?Iran	 ?and	 ?Libya	 ??	 ?derive	 ?two-??thirds	 ?of	 ?total	 ?exports	 ?from	 ?natural	 ?resources.	 ?On	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?dependency,	 ?half	 ?of	 ?the	 ?countries	 ?received	 ?more	 ?than	 ?US$150m	 ?per	 ?year,	 ?and	 ?the	 ?top	 ?quartile	 ?(nearly	 ?40	 ?countries)	 ?received	 ?US$450m	 ?or	 ?more	 ?per	 ?year	 ?in	 ?foreign	 ?aid.	 ?Clearly,	 ?for	 ?both	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resources,	 ?there	 ?is	 ?a	 ?substantial	 ?group	 ?of	 ?countries	 ?dependent	 ?on	 ?large	 ?sums	 ?of	 ?external	 ??unearned?	 ?income.	 ?	 ?	 ?Formal	 ?Model.	 ?I	 ?present	 ?the	 ?results	 ?of	 ?two	 ?models	 ?(Tables	 ?1	 ?and	 ?2).	 ?In	 ?the	 ?first,	 ?I	 ?explore	 ?the	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?and	 ?foreign	 ?aid,	 ?individually,	 ?on	 ?maternal	 ?mortality	 ?rates.	 ?Given	 ?the	 ?dearth	 ?of	 ?previous	 ?research	 ?on	 ?the	 ?socioeconomic	 ?welfare	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?the	 ?two	 ?curses,	 ?this	 ?first	 ?step	 ?is	 ?important	 ?to	 ?confirm	 ?that	 ?the	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?different	 ?forms	 ?of	 ?unearned	 ?income	 ?on	 ?outcomes	 ?extend	 ?beyond	 ?macroeconomic	 ?growth	 ?and	 ?political	 ?variables.	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ??	 ?maternal	 ?mortalitynatres	 ?=	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?+	 ?institutions2008	 ?+	 ?[natural	 ?resources	 ?*	 ?institutions2008]	 ?+	 ?[controls:	 ?literacy,	 ?gdp,	 ?population]	 ? (1a)	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ??	 ?maternal	 ?mortalityaid	 ?=	 ?aid	 ?+	 ?institutions2010+	 ?[aid	 ?*	 ?institutions2010]	 ?+	 ?[controls:	 ?literacy,	 ?gdp,	 ?population]	 ? 	 ?(1b)	 ?	 ?Second,	 ?I	 ?investigate	 ?the	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?different	 ?levels	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?on	 ?maternal	 ?mortality,	 ?in	 ?resource-??dependent	 ?countries.	 ?The	 ?interest	 ?here	 ?is	 ?in	 ?the	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?different	 ?volumes	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?flows,	 ?in	 ?a	 ?country	 ?that	 ?has	 ?a	 ?pre-??existing	 ?dependency	 ?on	 ?natural	 ?resources.	 ?Formally:	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ??	 ?maternal	 ?mortality	 ?=	 ?natural	 ?resources2008	 ?+	 ?institutions2008	 ?+	 ?population	 ?+	 ?gdp	 ?+	 ?[low	 ?aid2010,	 ?medium	 ?aid2010,	 ?high	 ?aid2010]	 ? (2)	 ?	 ?Table	 ?1.	 ?OLS	 ?results,	 ?change	 ?in	 ?maternal	 ?mortality	 ?or	 ?GDP	 ?growth	 ??	 ?full	 ?(151	 ?country)	 ?sample.	 ?	 ? (1a)	 ? (1b)	 ? (1c)	 ? (1d)	 ?	 ? Effect	 ?on	 ?maternal	 ?mortality	 ? ?	 ??	 ?GDP	 ?growth	 ?natres	 ? -??100.72	 ?(0.01)	 ? -??-??-??	 ? -??2.18	 ?(0.53)	 ? -??-??-??	 ?aid	 ? -??-??-??	 ? 1.28	 ?(0.47)	 ? -??-??-??	 ? 0.24	 ?(0.11)	 ?agg_instit08	 ?	 ?(or)	 ?agg_instit10	 ? -??4.19	 ?(0.00~)	 ? -??2.21	 ?(0.00~)	 ? 0.11	 ?(0.14)	 ? 0.10	 ?(0.05)	 ?natres	 ?*	 ?agg_instit08	 ? 4.46	 ?(0.01)	 ? -??-??-??	 ? 0.08	 ?(0.57)	 ? -??-??-??	 ?aid	 ?*	 ?agg_instit10	 ? -??-??-??	 ? 0.06	 ?(0.59)	 ? -??-??-??	 ? -??0.02	 ?(0.01)	 ?	 ? Results.	 ?In	 ?my	 ?econometric	 ?modelling,	 ?simple	 ?OLS	 ?regressions	 ?present	 ?intuitive	 ?preliminary	 ?results	 ?(Table	 ?1).	 ?Foreign	 ?aid	 ?has	 ?a	 ?positive,	 ?albeit	 ?small,	 ?effect	 ?on	 ?maternal	 ?mortality	 ?(column	 ?B);	 ?	 ?	 ? 18	 ?however,	 ?the	 ?interactive	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?institutions	 ?does	 ?not	 ?reach	 ?statistical	 ?significance.	 ?The	 ?opposite	 ?results	 ?arise	 ?for	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?(column	 ?A),	 ?which	 ?have	 ?a	 ?negative	 ?baseline	 ?effect,	 ?with	 ?a	 ?positive	 ?interaction	 ?with	 ?institutions.	 ?These	 ?results	 ?are	 ?intuitively	 ?in	 ?line	 ?with	 ?what	 ?we	 ?would	 ?expect	 ?to	 ?see,	 ?and	 ?accord	 ?with	 ?observations	 ?elsewhere	 ?in	 ?the	 ?literature.	 ?For	 ?aid	 ?to	 ?be	 ?effective	 ?in	 ?reducing	 ?maternal	 ?mortality,	 ?the	 ?government	 ?(and	 ?the	 ?nature	 ?of	 ?political	 ?institutions)	 ?need	 ?not	 ?necessarily	 ?be	 ?part	 ?of	 ?the	 ?causal	 ?path.	 ?Often	 ?aid	 ?agencies	 ?have	 ?been	 ?known	 ?to	 ?circumvent	 ?governments	 ?through	 ?project-??based	 ?approaches.	 ?Indeed,	 ?as	 ?Brautigam	 ?observed,	 ??as	 ?aid	 ?dependence	 ?increases,	 ?donors	 ?increasingly	 ?ignore	 ?rules	 ?that	 ?exist	 ?for	 ?aid	 ?to	 ?be	 ?channeled	 ?through	 ?the	 ?government,	 ?and	 ?instead	 ?provide	 ?their	 ?aid	 ?off-??budget	 ?and	 ?with	 ?little	 ?input	 ?from	 ?the	 ?bureaucracy	 ?in	 ?its	 ?programming?	 ?(Brautigam	 ?2000:24).	 ?	 ?	 ?On	 ?the	 ?other	 ?hand,	 ?the	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?revenues	 ?on	 ?reducing	 ?maternal	 ?mortality	 ?requires	 ?government	 ?involvement	 ?(and	 ?therefore	 ?implicate	 ?institutional	 ?context),	 ?since	 ?it	 ?is	 ?governments,	 ?not	 ?third-??party	 ?agencies,	 ?which	 ?translate	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?revenues	 ?into	 ?public	 ?(or	 ?private)	 ?goods.	 ?The	 ?negative	 ?baseline	 ?coefficient	 ?shows	 ?that	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?initially	 ?have	 ?a	 ?negative	 ?effect	 ?on	 ?socioeconomic	 ?development,	 ?but	 ?this	 ?effect	 ?becomes	 ?positive	 ?at	 ?high	 ?levels	 ?of	 ?institutional	 ?quality,	 ?as	 ?indicated	 ?by	 ?the	 ?positive	 ?interaction.	 ?As	 ?we	 ?know,	 ?depending	 ?on	 ?institutional	 ?considerations,	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?rents	 ?channelled	 ?through	 ?the	 ?government	 ?may	 ?be	 ?diverted	 ?away	 ?from	 ?public	 ?goods	 ?provision	 ?(e.g.	 ?addressing	 ?maternal	 ?mortality)	 ?toward	 ?either	 ?private,	 ?patronage	 ?goods,	 ?or	 ?to	 ??white	 ?elephant?	 ?projects.	 ?Across	 ?all	 ?specifications,	 ?there	 ?is	 ?little	 ?change	 ?in	 ?effect	 ?when	 ?controls	 ?for	 ?population	 ?size,	 ?GDP,	 ?and	 ?literacy	 ?are	 ?introduced.	 ?	 ?	 ?Table	 ?2.	 ?Regression	 ?results,	 ?categorical	 ?by	 ?volume	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid.	 ?	 ? (a)	 ? (b)	 ? (c)	 ?	 ? Effect	 ?on	 ?maternal	 ?mortality	 ? ?	 ??	 ?GDP	 ?growth	 ?	 ? Full	 ?Sample,	 ?n=151	 ? Nat.	 ?Res.	 ?Dep.,	 ?n=60	 ? n	 ?=	 ?60	 ?natres	 ? 5.84	 ?(0.64)	 ? 30.65	 ?(0.29)	 ? -??2.18	 ?(0.43)	 ?aidlow	 ? -??32.28	 ?(0.003)	 ? -??37.92	 ?(0.08)	 ? 3.67	 ?(0.07)	 ?aidmed	 ? -??-??-??	 ? -??-??-??	 ? -??-??-??	 ?aidhigh	 ? 40.94	 ?(0.00~)	 ? 26.68	 ?(0.17)	 ? -??1.48	 ?(0.41)	 ?agg_instit08	 ? -??0.78	 ?(0.23)	 ? 1.12	 ?(0.30)	 ? 0.19	 ?(0.07)	 ? My	 ?second	 ?set	 ?of	 ?results	 ?pertains	 ?to	 ?the	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?different	 ?volumes	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?in	 ?resource-??dependent	 ?countries.	 ?I	 ?reduce	 ?the	 ?sample	 ?to	 ?those	 ?countries	 ?that	 ?derive	 ?>40%	 ?of	 ?export	 ?earnings	 ?from	 ?mineral	 ?wealth.	 ?This	 ?subset	 ?consists	 ?of	 ?60	 ?natural	 ?resource-??dependent	 ?countries.	 ?	 ?Moving	 ?from	 ?the	 ?full	 ?sample	 ?to	 ?only	 ?those	 ?countries	 ?dependent	 ?on	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?exports	 ?leads	 ?to	 ?interesting	 ?changes	 ?in	 ?the	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?on	 ?maternal	 ?mortality.	 ?In	 ?short,	 ?the	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?being	 ?a	 ?low	 ?aid	 ?recipient	 ?country	 ?are	 ?more	 ?negative	 ?for	 ?resource	 ?dependent	 ?states;	 ?on	 ?the	 ?other	 ?hand,	 ?there	 ?is	 ?much	 ?less	 ?added	 ?benefit	 ?to	 ?being	 ?a	 ?high	 ?aid	 ?recipient	 ?in	 ?resource	 ?dependent	 ?countries.	 ?This	 ?effect	 ?persists,	 ?to	 ?a	 ?lesser	 ?degree,	 ?even	 ?with	 ?five	 ?influential	 ?outlier	 ?states	 ?(Iraq,	 ?Yemen,	 ?South	 ?Africa,	 ?Zimbabwe,	 ?and	 ?Angola)	 ?removed	 ?(not	 ?shown).	 ?This	 ?result	 ?clearly	 ?shows	 ?that	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?has	 ?an	 ?effect	 ?on	 ?socioeconomic	 ?welfare	 ?that	 ?differs	 ?in	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?dependent	 ?countries	 ?from	 ?those	 ?less	 ?dependent;	 ?accordingly,	 ?the	 ?null	 ?hypothesis	 ?(H0)	 ?can	 ?be	 ?rejected.	 ?As	 ?for	 ?the	 ?principal	 ?hypothesis,	 ?the	 ?results	 ?are	 ?not	 ?as	 ?immediately	 ?apparent,	 ?though	 ?I	 ?would	 ?suggest	 ?they	 ?lean	 ?in	 ?favour	 ?of	 ?supporting	 ?the	 ?argument	 ?that	 ?there	 ?is	 ?a	 ?threshold	 ?between	 ?which	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?is	 ?most	 ?optimal	 ?to	 ?supporting	 ?socioeconomic	 ?development.	 ?First,	 ?we	 ?see	 ?that	 ?for	 ?the	 ?151-??country	 ?sample	 ?there	 ?is	 ?a	 ?penalty	 ?of	 ?-??32	 ?maternal	 ?deaths	 ?per	 ?100,000	 ?births	 ?when	 ?a	 ?country	 ?	 ?	 ? 19	 ?drops	 ?from	 ?medium	 ?aid	 ?volume	 ?to	 ?low	 ?aid	 ?volume	 ?(ref.	 ?col.	 ?A);	 ?that	 ?is,	 ?a	 ?country	 ?has	 ?32	 ?more	 ?maternal	 ?deaths	 ?per	 ?100,000	 ?births.	 ?However,	 ?for	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?dependent	 ?countries,	 ?this	 ?penalty	 ?increases	 ?to	 ?nearly	 ?-??38	 ?maternal	 ?deaths	 ?(col.	 ?B;	 ?a	 ?difference	 ?between	 ?the	 ?two	 ?samples	 ?of	 ?15%).	 ?Accordingly,	 ?receiving	 ?a	 ?medium	 ?volume	 ?of	 ?aid,	 ?as	 ?opposed	 ?to	 ?a	 ?low	 ?volume,	 ?is	 ?all	 ?the	 ?more	 ?important	 ?in	 ?a	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?dependent	 ?country.	 ?Second,	 ?similarly	 ?observe	 ?the	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?moving	 ?from	 ?being	 ?a	 ?medium	 ?volume	 ?aid	 ?recipient	 ?to	 ?a	 ?high	 ?volume	 ?recipient.	 ?For	 ?countries	 ?in	 ?the	 ?full	 ?sample,	 ?the	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?receiving	 ?more	 ?than	 ?US$480m/year	 ?in	 ?aid	 ?is	 ?a	 ?reduction	 ?of	 ?maternal	 ?mortality	 ?by	 ?nearly	 ?41	 ?deaths	 ?per	 ?100,000	 ?births	 ?(col.	 ?A),	 ?as	 ?compared	 ?to	 ?being	 ?a	 ?medium	 ?volume	 ?aid	 ?recipient.	 ?However,	 ?for	 ?resource	 ?dependent	 ?countries,	 ?this	 ?effect	 ?is	 ?only	 ?a	 ?reduction	 ?of	 ?27	 ?deaths	 ?per	 ?100,000	 ?births	 ?(col.	 ?B;	 ?a	 ?difference	 ?between	 ?the	 ?two	 ?samples	 ?of	 ?35%).	 ?Again,	 ?being	 ?a	 ?medium	 ?volume	 ?aid	 ?recipient	 ?appears	 ?more	 ?optimal	 ?for	 ?resource	 ?dependent	 ?countries,	 ?whereas	 ?being	 ?either	 ?a	 ?low,	 ?or	 ?especially	 ?a	 ?high,	 ?volume	 ?aid	 ?recipient	 ?is	 ?more	 ?optimal	 ?for	 ?less	 ?resource	 ?dependent	 ?countries.	 ?While	 ?not	 ?conclusive,	 ?this	 ?suggests	 ?there	 ?may	 ?be	 ?a	 ??threshold?	 ?effect,	 ?in	 ?line	 ?with	 ?the	 ?primary	 ?hypothesis	 ?(H1)	 ?presented	 ?earlier.	 ?While	 ?the	 ?scope	 ?of	 ?this	 ?paper	 ?is	 ?limited	 ?to	 ?offering	 ?a	 ?preliminary	 ?analysis,	 ?I	 ?do	 ?undertake	 ?a	 ?few	 ?simple	 ?robustness	 ?checks	 ?(beyond	 ?the	 ?aforementioned	 ?inclusion	 ?of	 ?control	 ?variables)	 ?to	 ?verify	 ?that	 ?the	 ?model	 ?has	 ?been	 ?correctly	 ?specified	 ?and	 ?the	 ?general	 ?accuracy	 ?of	 ?the	 ?econometric	 ?results.	 ?In	 ?terms	 ?of	 ?general	 ?OLS	 ?assumptions,	 ?the	 ?models	 ?passed	 ?most	 ?conventional	 ?hurdles;	 ?p-??values	 ?reported	 ?in	 ?brackets	 ?below	 ?each	 ?result	 ?were	 ?mostly	 ?significant	 ?to	 ?conventional	 ?levels	 ?(p=<0.1).	 ?In	 ?terms	 ?of	 ?goodness	 ?of	 ?fit,	 ?each	 ?had	 ?acceptable	 ?R2	 ?and	 ?F-??statistic	 ?values.	 ?Furthermore,	 ?in	 ?moving	 ?across	 ?samples	 ??	 ?from	 ?151	 ?countries	 ?to	 ?60,	 ?then	 ?with	 ?the	 ?removal	 ?of	 ?5	 ?influential	 ?outlier	 ?countries,	 ?the	 ?results	 ?persist.	 ?	 ?(c)	 ? Interpretation	 ?and	 ?Discussion	 ?	 ? Returning	 ?to	 ?the	 ?central	 ?focus	 ?of	 ?this	 ?paper	 ??	 ?the	 ?twin	 ?curses	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ??	 ?these	 ?findings	 ?may	 ?support	 ?the	 ?existence	 ?of,	 ?and	 ?interaction	 ?between,	 ?the	 ?two	 ?curses.	 ?To	 ?check	 ?the	 ?robustness	 ?of	 ?this	 ?assertion,	 ?I	 ?substitute	 ?changes	 ?in	 ?GDP	 ?growth,	 ?in	 ?place	 ?of	 ?maternal	 ?mortality,	 ?as	 ?the	 ?dependent	 ?variable;	 ?this	 ?is	 ?intended	 ?to	 ?show	 ?the	 ?breadth	 ?of	 ?effect	 ?that	 ?different	 ?volumes	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?have	 ?in	 ?resource-??dependent	 ?countries.	 ?The	 ?effects	 ?mirror	 ?what	 ?is	 ?observed	 ?for	 ?maternal	 ?mortality.	 ?In	 ?short,	 ?we	 ?see	 ?that	 ?in	 ?resource	 ?dependent	 ?countries,	 ?low	 ?volumes	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?may	 ?have	 ?a	 ?positive	 ?effect	 ?on	 ?GDP	 ?growth	 ?rates,	 ?while	 ?high	 ?volumes	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?have	 ?a	 ?harmful	 ?effect	 ?on	 ?GDP	 ?growth	 ?(Table	 ?1c,d	 ?and	 ?Table	 ?2c).3	 ?This	 ?is	 ?line	 ?with	 ?much	 ?earlier	 ?research	 ?on	 ?the	 ?macroeconomic	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid.	 ?When	 ?interpreted	 ?alongside	 ?the	 ?maternal	 ?mortality	 ?data,	 ?I	 ?believe	 ?this	 ?suggests	 ?that,	 ?above	 ?a	 ?certain	 ?level,	 ?unearned	 ?income	 ?is	 ?diverted	 ?toward	 ?malfeasance,	 ?with	 ?deleterious	 ?economic	 ?and	 ?social	 ?welfare	 ?effects.	 ?	 ?Aid,	 ?though	 ?a	 ?form	 ?of	 ?unearned	 ?income	 ?and	 ?certainly	 ?quite	 ?fungible	 ?in	 ?many	 ?instances,	 ?is	 ?less	 ?appropriable	 ?than	 ?rents	 ?from	 ?the	 ?export	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resources.	 ?With	 ?the	 ?latter,	 ?most	 ?of	 ?the	 ?rents	 ?end	 ?up	 ?passing	 ?through	 ?government	 ?coffers,	 ?whereas	 ?aid	 ?money	 ?can	 ?often	 ?be	 ?channelled	 ?around	 ?the	 ?government.	 ?Across	 ?the	 ?full	 ?sample,	 ?aid	 ?is	 ?achieving	 ?its	 ?intended	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?reducing	 ?maternal	 ?mortality	 ?rates;	 ?hence,	 ?we	 ?see	 ?the	 ?large	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?moving	 ?from	 ?low	 ?to	 ?medium	 ?to	 ?high	 ?volumes	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?(a	 ?total	 ?change	 ?of	 ?+73.22	 ?in	 ?Table	 ?2,	 ?col.	 ?A).	 ?Likewise,	 ?in	 ?a	 ?resource	 ?rich	 ?country,	 ?aid	 ?plays	 ?a	 ?critical	 ?role	 ?for	 ?supporting	 ?public	 ?goods	 ?(e.g.	 ?improving	 ?maternal	 ?health)	 ?up	 ?to	 ?a	 ?certain	 ?point.	 ?Supporting	 ?these	 ?findings,	 ?in	 ?a	 ?comparison	 ?oil	 ?booms	 ?and	 ?added	 ?aid	 ?flows,	 ?Collier	 ?discovered	 ?that	 ?certain	 ?aid	 ?modalities	 ?had	 ?significant	 ?added	 ?value	 ?for	 ?economic	 ?growth,	 ?unlike	 ?oil	 ?booms	 ?(Collier	 ?2006).	 ?	 ?However,	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?curse	 ?is	 ?at	 ?work	 ?in	 ?resource	 ?rich	 ?countries	 ?too.	 ?In	 ?these	 ?countries,	 ?beyond	 ?a	 ?certain	 ?point,	 ?the	 ?added	 ?impact	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?drops	 ?off	 ?quickly;	 ?comparing	 ?col.	 ?A	 ?and	 ?B,	 ?the	 ?drop	 ?from	 ?                                                3	 ?Supporting	 ?my	 ?finding,	 ?a	 ?study	 ?by	 ?Wright	 ?(2008)	 ?observed	 ?that	 ?in	 ?unstable	 ?regimes	 ?an	 ?increase	 ?in	 ?aid	 ?equivalent	 ?to	 ?1.5%	 ?of	 ?GNI	 ?led	 ?to	 ?a	 ?2%	 ?decrease	 ?in	 ?growth.	 ?	 ?	 ? 20	 ?40.94	 ?to	 ?26.68	 ?on	 ?the	 ?variable	 ??aidhigh?	 ?may	 ?suggest	 ?the	 ?fungibility	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?in	 ?resource-??rich	 ?countries.	 ?Similarly,	 ?Collier	 ?(2006)	 ?also	 ?found	 ?that	 ?add	 ?was	 ?subject	 ?to	 ?fast	 ?diminishing	 ?returns.	 ?Equally,	 ?if	 ?there	 ?were	 ?any	 ?doubt	 ?that	 ?aid	 ?was	 ?a	 ?curse	 ?in	 ?resource-??dependent	 ?countries	 ?(and	 ?not,	 ?as	 ?the	 ?counter-??argument	 ?may	 ?go,	 ?that	 ?it	 ?is	 ?simply	 ?the	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?curse	 ?accounting	 ?for	 ?100%	 ?of	 ?the	 ?malfeasance),	 ?the	 ?results	 ?in	 ?Table	 ?2	 ?col.	 ?C	 ?convincingly	 ?shows	 ?that	 ?beyond	 ?a	 ?certain	 ?threshold,	 ?aid	 ?also	 ?takes	 ?on	 ?a	 ?negative	 ?economic	 ?effect.	 ?This	 ?is	 ?supported	 ?in	 ?earlier	 ?findings	 ?by	 ?Djankov	 ?et	 ?al	 ?(2008),	 ?who	 ?discovered	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?curse	 ?to	 ?have	 ?larger	 ?observed	 ?effects	 ?than	 ?the	 ?curse	 ?of	 ?oil.	 ?In	 ?summary	 ?then,	 ?together	 ?I	 ?believe	 ?the	 ?two	 ?models,	 ?reported	 ?in	 ?Tables	 ?1	 ?and	 ?2,	 ?demonstrate	 ?two	 ?key	 ?(albeit	 ?tentative)	 ?findings:	 ?(1)	 ?that	 ?between	 ?certain	 ?levels,	 ?aid	 ?has	 ?an	 ?important	 ?effect	 ?on	 ?improving	 ?socioeconomic	 ?welfare;	 ?and,	 ?(2)	 ?above	 ?a	 ?particular	 ?level,	 ?excess	 ?amounts	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?in	 ?resource-??rich	 ?countries	 ?lead	 ?to	 ?the	 ?simultaneous	 ?existence	 ?of	 ?an	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?resource	 ?curse,	 ?with	 ?suboptimal	 ?effects	 ?on	 ?human	 ?development.	 ?	 ?That	 ?being	 ?said,	 ?it	 ?should	 ?be	 ?repeated	 ?that	 ?these	 ?are	 ?preliminary	 ?results	 ?and	 ?not	 ?intended	 ?to	 ?reflect	 ?an	 ?exhaustive	 ?econometric	 ?analysis;	 ?that	 ?would	 ?simply	 ?be	 ?far	 ?beyond	 ?the	 ?remit	 ?and	 ?scope	 ?of	 ?this	 ?paper.	 ?Note	 ?that	 ?throughout	 ?this	 ?analysis	 ?my	 ?intent	 ?has	 ?not	 ?been	 ?to	 ?interpret	 ?the	 ?size	 ?of	 ?effect,	 ?but	 ?rather,	 ?as	 ?a	 ?first	 ?perspective	 ?on	 ?the	 ?data,	 ?to	 ?simply	 ?query	 ?the	 ?direction	 ?of	 ?effect	 ?and	 ?statistical	 ?significance.	 ?The	 ?preliminary	 ?results	 ?do	 ?raise	 ?a	 ?cautionary	 ?flag,	 ?suggesting	 ?that	 ?considerable	 ?additional	 ?attention	 ?is	 ?warranted	 ?in	 ?order	 ?to	 ?better	 ?understand	 ?the	 ?relationship	 ?between	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?socioeconomic	 ?development	 ?in	 ?resource-??rich	 ?countries.	 ?These	 ?initial	 ?results	 ?appear	 ?to	 ?suggest	 ?that	 ?countries	 ?which	 ?are	 ?underdeveloped	 ?yet	 ?rich	 ?in	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?may	 ?be	 ?able	 ?to	 ?harness	 ?these	 ?natural	 ?endowments	 ?toward	 ?improvements	 ?in	 ?socioeconomic	 ?welfare,	 ?so	 ?long	 ?as	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?income	 ?remains	 ?below	 ?a	 ?certain	 ?threshold.	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? 21	 ?Conclusion:	 ?Policy	 ?Implications	 ?	 ? This	 ?paper	 ?has	 ?presented	 ?a	 ?first	 ?look	 ?at	 ?the	 ?co-??existence	 ?and	 ?interaction	 ?between	 ?the	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?and	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?curses.	 ?While	 ?the	 ?existing	 ?areas	 ?of	 ?research	 ?on	 ?both	 ?curses	 ?have	 ?individually	 ?developed	 ?into	 ?theoretically	 ?and	 ?empirically	 ?rich	 ?bodies	 ?of	 ?scholarship,	 ?there	 ?has	 ?been	 ?surprisingly	 ?little	 ?effort	 ?to	 ?link	 ?the	 ?two.	 ?Yet,	 ?in	 ?reality,	 ?it	 ?is	 ?rarely	 ?possible	 ?to	 ?separate	 ?the	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?dependency	 ?on	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?and	 ?on	 ?foreign	 ?aid;	 ?many	 ?developing	 ?countries	 ?now	 ?find	 ?themselves	 ?endowed	 ?with	 ?both.	 ?Accordingly,	 ?I	 ?have	 ?set	 ?out	 ?to	 ?present	 ?an	 ?initial	 ?contribution	 ?to	 ?this	 ?relatively	 ?novel	 ?research	 ?agenda,	 ?by	 ?offering	 ?a	 ?theoretical	 ?framework	 ?built	 ?off	 ?the	 ?foundations	 ?of	 ?a	 ?widely	 ?respected	 ?political	 ?economy	 ?model	 ?of	 ?elite	 ?behaviour,	 ?followed	 ?by	 ?a	 ?preliminary	 ?quantitative	 ?analysis	 ?of	 ?the	 ?likely	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?flows	 ?into	 ?a	 ?natural	 ?resource-??dependent	 ?country.	 ?Together,	 ?the	 ?theory	 ?and	 ?empirics	 ?suggest	 ?that	 ?the	 ?two	 ?curses	 ?do	 ?indeed	 ?operate	 ?accordingly	 ?a	 ?familiar	 ?logic,	 ?largely	 ?influenced	 ?by	 ?institutional	 ?context	 ?and	 ?the	 ?nature	 ?of	 ?government	 ?income.	 ?In	 ?resource-??rich	 ?countries,	 ?additional	 ?receipts	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid,	 ?while	 ?beneficial	 ?at	 ?first,	 ?ultimately	 ?have	 ?a	 ?deleterious	 ?effect.	 ?These	 ?findings	 ?have	 ?policy	 ?implications	 ?that	 ?extend	 ?beyond	 ?academia.	 ?Until	 ?now,	 ?the	 ?policies	 ?suggested	 ?for	 ?addressing	 ?these	 ?curses	 ?have	 ?differed	 ?according	 ?to	 ?whether	 ?one	 ?was	 ?discussing	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?or	 ?foreign	 ?aid.	 ?Morrison	 ?provides	 ?a	 ?very	 ?insightful	 ?comment	 ?on	 ?this,	 ?noting	 ?how,	 ?	 ??the	 ?general	 ?thrust	 ?of	 ?the	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?literature	 ?has	 ?been	 ?to	 ?take	 ?the	 ?money	 ?out	 ?of	 ?the	 ?hands	 ?of	 ?the	 ?government,	 ?or	 ?at	 ?least	 ?attempt	 ?to	 ?change	 ?the	 ?way	 ?the	 ?government	 ?uses	 ?it.	 ?In	 ?the	 ?aid	 ?community,	 ?by	 ?contrast,	 ?the	 ?movement	 ?has	 ?been	 ?toward	 ?ensuring	 ?governments	 ?have	 ??ownership?	 ?over	 ?the	 ?way	 ?they	 ?spend	 ?the	 ?resources?	 ?(2010).	 ?	 ? With	 ?respect	 ?to	 ?managing	 ?national	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?wealth,	 ?many	 ?of	 ?the	 ?approaches	 ?being	 ?championed	 ?by	 ?the	 ?international	 ?community	 ??	 ?including	 ?policy	 ?conditionality	 ?and	 ?project-??based	 ?assistance	 ??	 ?mirror	 ?the	 ?unsuccessful	 ?directions	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?policy	 ?in	 ?the	 ?1980s	 ?and	 ?1990s.	 ?In	 ?the	 ?last	 ?3	 ?to	 ?5	 ?years,	 ?the	 ?stakes	 ?for	 ?addressing	 ?the	 ?overlap	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?wealth	 ?have	 ?become	 ?much	 ?larger.	 ?Improved	 ?terms	 ?of	 ?trade,	 ?driven	 ?by	 ?growing	 ?demand	 ?from	 ?emerging	 ?markets,	 ?means	 ?many	 ?developing	 ?countries	 ?are	 ?receiving	 ?substantial	 ?windfall	 ?revenues	 ?from	 ?their	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?(Warner	 ?2006).	 ?Many	 ?developed	 ?countries	 ?have	 ?responded	 ?by	 ?pledging	 ?substantial	 ?new	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?allotments	 ?to	 ?countries	 ?struggling	 ?to	 ?turn	 ?their	 ?resource	 ?wealth	 ?into	 ?the	 ?engine	 ?for	 ?socioeconomic	 ?development.	 ?This	 ?is	 ?happening	 ?despite	 ?a	 ?serious	 ?lack	 ?of	 ?evidence-??based	 ?research	 ?on	 ?the	 ?likely	 ?impact	 ?of	 ?these	 ?new	 ?aid	 ?flows	 ?in	 ?resource-??dependent	 ?countries.	 ?Few	 ?donors	 ?have	 ?acknowledged	 ?that	 ?aid	 ?may	 ?be	 ?harmful	 ?to	 ?the	 ?policy	 ?environment,	 ?as	 ?tentatively	 ?drawn	 ?out	 ?from	 ?the	 ?findings	 ?here;	 ?in	 ?some	 ?instances,	 ?it	 ?has	 ?actually	 ?been	 ?shown	 ?to	 ?have	 ?been	 ?beneficial	 ?to	 ?reduce	 ?aid	 ?flows	 ?at	 ?critical	 ?moments	 ?(cf.	 ?Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?and	 ?Smith	 ?2010:946).	 ?While	 ?we	 ?have	 ?increasingly	 ?rich	 ?understandings	 ?of	 ?which	 ?aid	 ?policies	 ?(e.g.	 ?Smith	 ?2008:791;	 ?Knack	 ?2001)	 ?and	 ?which	 ?policies	 ?toward	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?wealth	 ?(e.g.	 ?Boschini	 ?2006;	 ?Morrison	 ?2010:63)	 ?might	 ?work,	 ?the	 ?lack	 ?of	 ?deliberate	 ?attention	 ?on	 ?both	 ?revenue	 ?streams	 ?simultaneously	 ?has	 ?hampered	 ?any	 ?attempt	 ?to	 ?provide	 ?useful	 ?policy	 ?guidance	 ?for	 ?countries	 ?struggling	 ?with	 ?both	 ?concurrently.	 ?	 ?This	 ?paper	 ?has	 ?sought	 ?to	 ?provide	 ?an	 ?important	 ?first	 ?step	 ?toward	 ?addressing	 ?this.	 ?By	 ?placing	 ?different	 ?forms	 ?of	 ?unearned	 ?income	 ??	 ?be	 ?they	 ?rents	 ?from	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?or	 ?from	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ??	 ?under	 ??one	 ?roof,?	 ?the	 ?theoretical	 ?model	 ?presented	 ?herein	 ?gives	 ?some	 ?renewed	 ?indication	 ?of	 ?the	 ?importance	 ?of	 ?institutions,	 ?leader	 ?incentives,	 ?and	 ?the	 ?fungibility	 ?of	 ?certain	 ?forms	 ?of	 ?government	 ?revenue.	 ?Unlike	 ?some	 ?of	 ?the	 ?more	 ?narrowly	 ?prescribed	 ?policy	 ?directions	 ?given	 ?for	 ?improving	 ?the	 ?effectiveness	 ?of	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?(and,	 ?more	 ?recently,	 ?for	 ?addressing	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?wealth),	 ?these	 ?early	 ?findings	 ?suggest	 ?the	 ?need	 ?to	 ?consider	 ?institutions	 ?from	 ?a	 ?political	 ?economy	 ?perspective	 ?that	 ?	 ?	 ? 22	 ?pays	 ?careful	 ?attention	 ?to	 ?the	 ?factors	 ?driving	 ?regime	 ?stability	 ?and	 ?leader	 ?survival,	 ?and	 ?particularly	 ?on	 ?the	 ?nature	 ?of	 ?each	 ?country?s	 ??winning	 ?coalition.?	 ?From	 ?here,	 ?we	 ?are	 ?encouraged	 ?to	 ?think	 ?about	 ?policies	 ?that	 ?may	 ?lead	 ?to	 ?more	 ?pluralistic	 ?(though	 ?not	 ?necessarily	 ?democratic)	 ?institutions	 ?that	 ?would	 ?incentivize	 ?leaders	 ?toward	 ?the	 ?provision	 ?of	 ?public,	 ?rather	 ?than	 ?private,	 ?goods.	 ?Finally,	 ?it	 ?should	 ?be	 ?repeated	 ?that	 ?the	 ?conclusions	 ?presented	 ?here	 ?represent	 ?only	 ?the	 ?first	 ?in	 ?what	 ?needs	 ?to	 ?be	 ?a	 ?rigorous	 ?and	 ?deliberate	 ?research	 ?agenda	 ?for	 ?studying	 ?the	 ?simultaneous	 ?receipt	 ?of	 ?large	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?flows,	 ?in	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?dependent	 ?countries.	 ?A	 ?research	 ?agenda	 ?is	 ?required	 ?that	 ?comprehensively	 ?marries	 ?together	 ?the	 ?development	 ?of	 ?a	 ?robust	 ?theoretical	 ?model	 ?(likely	 ?building	 ?from	 ?the	 ?foundational	 ?work	 ?of	 ?Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita	 ?et	 ?al),	 ?tested	 ?through	 ?rigorous	 ?econometric	 ?modelling	 ?and	 ?analyzed	 ?and	 ?confirmed	 ?with	 ?a	 ?series	 ?of	 ?detailed	 ?multi-??country	 ?qualitative	 ?case	 ?studies.	 ?The	 ?initial	 ?findings	 ?presented	 ?herein	 ?hint	 ?at	 ?the	 ?fruitfulness	 ?of	 ?such	 ?a	 ?turn	 ?in	 ?direction	 ?for	 ?research	 ?on	 ?the	 ??curse?	 ?of	 ?natural	 ?resources	 ?and	 ?foreign	 ?aid.	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? 23	 ?	 ?Works	 ?Cited	 ?	 ?Acemoglu,	 ?D.,	 ?and	 ?J.	 ?A.	 ?Robinson.	 ?2006.	 ?Economic	 ?origins	 ?of	 ?democracy	 ?and	 ?dictatorship.	 ?New	 ?York:	 ?Cambridge	 ?University	 ?Press.	 ?Ahmed,	 ?Faisal	 ?Z.	 ?2012.	 ??The	 ?Perils	 ?of	 ?Unearned	 ?Foreign	 ?Income:	 ?Aid,	 ?Remittances,	 ?and	 ?Government	 ?Survival.?	 ?American	 ?Political	 ?Science	 ?Review	 ?106(01):146?65.	 ?Andersen,	 ?Dana.	 ?2012.	 ??Natural	 ?Resources	 ?and	 ?Persistent	 ?Political	 ?Institutions.?	 ?1?40.	 ?Retrieved	 ?(http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~danderse/Site_3/Home_files/NRPPI.pdf).	 ?Bhattacharyya,	 ?Sambit,	 ?and	 ?Roland	 ?Hodler.	 ?2010.	 ??Natural	 ?Resources,	 ?Democracy	 ?and	 ?Corruption.?	 ?European	 ?Economic	 ?Review	 ?54(4):0?43.	 ?Boschini,	 ?Anne,	 ?Jan	 ?Pettersson,	 ?and	 ?Jesper	 ?Roine.	 ?2007.	 ??Resource	 ?curse	 ?or	 ?not:	 ?A	 ?question	 ?of	 ?appropriability.?	 ?The	 ?Scandinavian	 ?Journal	 ?of	 ?Economics	 ?109(3).	 ?Boschini,	 ?Anne,	 ?Jan	 ?Pettersson,	 ?and	 ?Jesper	 ?Roine.	 ?2011.	 ??Unbundling	 ?the	 ?Resource	 ?Curse	 ?and	 ?its	 ?Reversal.?	 ?Retrieved	 ?(http://www.hhs.se/SITE/Staff/Documents/Unbundling.pdf).	 ?Brautigam,	 ?Deborah.	 ?2000.	 ?Aid	 ?Dependence	 ?and	 ?Governance.	 ?Stockholm:	 ?Almqvist	 ?&	 ?Wiksell	 ?International.	 ?Br?utigam,	 ?Deborah	 ?A.,	 ?and	 ?Stephen	 ?Knack.	 ?2004.	 ??Foreign	 ?Aid,	 ?Institutions	 ?,	 ?and	 ?Governance	 ?in	 ?Sub-??Saharan	 ?Africa.?	 ?Economic	 ?Development	 ?and	 ?Cultural	 ?Change	 ?52(2):255?85.	 ?Brunnschweiler,	 ?Christa	 ?N.	 ?2008.	 ??Cursing	 ?the	 ?Blessings?	 ?Natural	 ?Resource	 ?Abundance,	 ?Institutions,	 ?and	 ?Economic	 ?Growth.?	 ?World	 ?Development	 ?36(3):399?419.	 ?Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita,	 ?B.,	 ?A.	 ?Smith,	 ?R.	 ?M.	 ?Siverson,	 ?and	 ?J.	 ?D.	 ?Morrow.	 ?2003.	 ?The	 ?Logic	 ?of	 ?Political	 ?Survival.	 ?Cambridge,	 ?MA:	 ?MIT	 ?Press.	 ?Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita,	 ?Bruce,	 ?and	 ?Alastair	 ?Smith.	 ?2009a.	 ??A	 ?Political	 ?Economy	 ?of	 ?Aid.?	 ?International	 ?Organization	 ?63(2):309.	 ?Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita,	 ?Bruce,	 ?and	 ?Alastair	 ?Smith.	 ?2009b.	 ??Political	 ?Survival	 ?and	 ?Endogenous	 ?Institutional	 ?Change.?	 ?Comparative	 ?Political	 ?Studies	 ?42(2):167?97.	 ?Bueno	 ?de	 ?Mesquita,	 ?Bruce,	 ?and	 ?Alastair	 ?Smith.	 ?2010.	 ??Leader	 ?Survival,	 ?Revolutions,	 ?and	 ?the	 ?Nature	 ?of	 ?Government	 ?Finance.?	 ?American	 ?Journal	 ?of	 ?Political	 ?Science	 ?54(4):936?50.	 ?Burnside,	 ?Craig,	 ?and	 ?David	 ?Dollar.	 ?1997.	 ??Aid	 ?spurs	 ?growth-??in	 ?a	 ?sound	 ?policy	 ?environment.?	 ?Finance	 ?and	 ?Development	 ?(December).	 ?Burnside,	 ?Craig,	 ?and	 ?David	 ?Dollar.	 ?2000.	 ??Aid,	 ?policies,	 ?and	 ?growth.?	 ?American	 ?economic	 ?review	 ?847?68.	 ?CBC.	 ?2013.	 ??Harper	 ?announces	 ?new	 ?transparency	 ?rules	 ?for	 ?energy,	 ?mining.?	 ?CBC,	 ?June	 ?12.	 ?Retrieved	 ?(http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/harper-??announces-??new-??transparency-??rules-??for-??energy-??mining-??1.1305236).	 ?Chenery,	 ?HB,	 ?and	 ?AM	 ?Strout.	 ?1966.	 ??Foreign	 ?Assistance	 ?and	 ?Economic	 ?Development.?	 ?The	 ?American	 ?Economic	 ?Review	 ?56(4):679?733.	 ?Collier,	 ?Paul.	 ?2006.	 ??Is	 ?Aid	 ?Oil?	 ?An	 ?Analysis	 ?Of	 ?Whether	 ?Africa	 ?Can	 ?Absorb	 ?More	 ?Aid.?	 ?World	 ?Development	 ?34(9):1482?97.	 ?Collier,	 ?Paul,	 ?and	 ?Anke	 ?Hoeffler.	 ?1998.	 ??On	 ?economic	 ?causes	 ?of	 ?civil	 ?war.?	 ?Oxford	 ?Economic	 ?Papers	 ?50:563?73.	 ?Devarajan,	 ?S.,	 ?and	 ?V.	 ?Swaroop.	 ?1998.	 ??The	 ?Implications	 ?of	 ?Foreign	 ?Aid	 ?Fungibility	 ?for	 ?Development	 ?Assistance.?	 ?World	 ?Bank	 ?Policy	 ?Research	 ?Working	 ?Papers	 ?(October).	 ?	 ?	 ? 24	 ?Djankov,	 ?Simeon,	 ?Jose	 ?G.	 ?Montalvo,	 ?and	 ?Marta	 ?Reynal-??Querol.	 ?2008.	 ??The	 ?curse	 ?of	 ?aid.?	 ?Journal	 ?of	 ?Economic	 ?Growth	 ?13(3):1?32.	 ?Dollar,	 ?David,	 ?and	 ?Lant	 ?Pritchett.	 ?1998.	 ?Assessing	 ?Aid:	 ?A	 ?World	 ?Bank	 ?Policy	 ?Research	 ?Report.	 ?Washington,	 ?D.C.	 ?Dunning,	 ?T.	 ?2005.	 ??Resource	 ?Dependence,	 ?Economic	 ?Performance,	 ?and	 ?Political	 ?Stability.?	 ?Journal	 ?of	 ?Conflict	 ?Resolution	 ?49(4):451?82.	 ?Durbarry,	 ?Ramesh,	 ?Norman	 ?Gemmell,	 ?and	 ?David	 ?Greenaway.	 ?1998.	 ?New	 ?Evidence	 ?on	 ?the	 ?Impact	 ?of	 ?Foreign	 ?Aid	 ?on	 ?Economic	 ?Growth.	 ?University	 ?of	 ?Nottingham:	 ?Centre	 ?for	 ?Research	 ?in	 ?Economic	 ?Development	 ?and	 ?International	 ?Trade.	 ?Dutta,	 ?N.,	 ?PT	 ?Leeson,	 ?and	 ?CR	 ?Williamson.	 ?2013.	 ??The	 ?Amplification	 ?Effect:	 ?Foreign	 ?Aid?s	 ?Impact	 ?on	 ?Political	 ?Institutions.?	 ?Kyklos	 ?66(2).	 ?Easterly,	 ?W.,	 ?Ross	 ?Levine,	 ?and	 ?David	 ?Roodman.	 ?2003.	 ??New	 ?Data,	 ?New	 ?Doubts:	 ?Revisiting	 ??Aid,	 ?Policies,	 ?and	 ?Growth?.?	 ?Center	 ?for	 ?Global	 ?Development	 ?Working	 ?Paper	 ?26.	 ?Frankel,	 ?Jeffrey.	 ?2010.	 ??The	 ?Natural	 ?Resource	 ?Curse:	 ?A	 ?Survey.?	 ?National	 ?Bureau	 ?of	 ?Economic	 ?Research	 ?15836:1?55.	 ?Gylfason,	 ?Thorvaldur,	 ?Tryggvi	 ?Thor	 ?Herbertsson,	 ?and	 ?Gylfi	 ?Zoega.	 ?1999.	 ??A	 ?Mixed	 ?Blessing:	 ?Natural	 ?Resources	 ?and	 ?Economic	 ?Growth.?	 ?Macroeconomic	 ?Dynamics	 ?3:679?733.	 ?Hadjimichael,	 ?Michael	 ?T.	 ?1995.	 ?Sub-??Saharan	 ?Africa:	 ?growth,	 ?savings,	 ?and	 ?investment,	 ?1986-??93.	 ?118th	 ?ed.	 ?edited	 ?by	 ?Michael	 ?T.	 ?Hadjimichael.	 ?Washington,	 ?D.C.:	 ?International	 ?Monetary	 ?Fund.	 ?Hansen,	 ?Henrik,	 ?and	 ?Finn	 ?Tarp.	 ?2000.	 ??Aid	 ?Effectiveness	 ?Disputed.?	 ?Journal	 ?of	 ?International	 ?Development	 ?12:375?99.	 ?Isham,	 ?J.,	 ?Michael	 ?Woolcock,	 ?Lant	 ?Pritchett,	 ?and	 ?Gwen	 ?Busby.	 ?2005.	 ??The	 ?Varieties	 ?of	 ?Resource	 ?Experience:	 ?Natural	 ?Resource	 ?Export	 ?Structures	 ?and	 ?the	 ?Political	 ?Economy	 ?of	 ?Economic	 ?Growth.?	 ?The	 ?World	 ?Bank	 ?Economic	 ?Review	 ?19(2):141?74.	 ?Keefer,	 ?Philip,	 ?and	 ?Stephen	 ?Knack.	 ?2002.	 ??Polarization,	 ?Politics	 ?and	 ?Property	 ?Rights:	 ?Links	 ?between	 ?Inequality	 ?and	 ?Growth.?	 ?Public	 ?Choice	 ?111(1/2):127?54.	 ?Knack,	 ?Stephen.	 ?2001.	 ??Aid	 ?Dependence	 ?and	 ?the	 ?Quality	 ?of	 ?Governance?:	 ?Cross-??Country	 ?Empirical	 ?Tests.?	 ?Southern	 ?Economic	 ?Association	 ?68(2):310?29.	 ?Krugman,	 ?Paul.	 ?1987.	 ??The	 ?Narrow	 ?Moving	 ?Band,	 ?The	 ?Dutch	 ?Disease,	 ?and	 ?the	 ?Competittive	 ?Consequences	 ?of	 ?Mrs.	 ?Thatcher.?	 ?Journal	 ?of	 ?Development	 ?Economics	 ?27:41?55.	 ?Leite,	 ?C.	 ?Da	 ?Cunha,	 ?and	 ?J.	 ?Weidmann.	 ?1999.	 ??Does	 ?mother	 ?nature	 ?corrupt?	 ?Natural	 ?resources,	 ?corruption,	 ?and	 ?economic	 ?growth.?	 ?IMF	 ?Working	 ?Paper	 ?85.	 ?Mauro,	 ?P.	 ?1995.	 ??Corruption	 ?and	 ?Growth.?	 ?The	 ?quarterly	 ?journal	 ?of	 ?economics	 ?110(3):681?712.	 ?Mehlum,	 ?Halvor,	 ?Karl	 ?Moene,	 ?and	 ?Ragnar	 ?Torvik.	 ?2006a.	 ??Cursed	 ?by	 ?Resources	 ?or	 ?Institutions??	 ?The	 ?World	 ?Economy	 ?29(8):1117?31.	 ?Mehlum,	 ?Halvor,	 ?Karl	 ?Moene,	 ?and	 ?Ragnar	 ?Torvik.	 ?2006b.	 ??Institutions	 ?and	 ?the	 ?Resource	 ?Curse.?	 ?The	 ?Economic	 ?Journal	 ?116(508):1?20.	 ?Morrison,	 ?K.	 ?M.	 ?2010.	 ??What	 ?Can	 ?We	 ?Learn	 ?about	 ?the	 ??Resource	 ?Curse?	 ?from	 ?Foreign	 ?Aid??	 ?The	 ?World	 ?Bank	 ?Research	 ?Observer	 ?27(1):52?73.	 ?Morrison,	 ?Kevin	 ?M.	 ?2009.	 ??Oil,	 ?Nontax	 ?Revenue,	 ?and	 ?the	 ?Redistributional	 ?Foundations	 ?of	 ?Regime	 ?Stability.?	 ?International	 ?Organization	 ?63(1):107?38.	 ?Newlyn,	 ?Walter.	 ?1973.	 ??The	 ?Effect	 ?of	 ?Aid	 ?and	 ?Other	 ?Resource	 ?Transfers	 ?on	 ?Savings	 ?and	 ?Growth	 ?in	 ?Less-??developed	 ?Countries:	 ?A	 ?Comment.?	 ?The	 ?Economic	 ?Journal	 ?867?70.	 ?Olson,	 ?Mancur.	 ?1993.	 ??Dictatorship,	 ?democracy,	 ?and	 ?development.?	 ?American	 ?Political	 ?Science	 ?Review.	 ?	 ?	 ? 25	 ?Papanek,	 ?GF.	 ?1972.	 ??The	 ?effect	 ?of	 ?aid	 ?and	 ?other	 ?resource	 ?transfers	 ?on	 ?savings	 ?and	 ?growth	 ?in	 ?less	 ?developed	 ?countries.?	 ?The	 ?Economic	 ?Journal	 ?82(327):934?50.	 ?Papyrakis,	 ?Elissaios,	 ?and	 ?Reyer	 ?Gerlagh.	 ?2004.	 ??The	 ?resource	 ?curse	 ?hypothesis	 ?and	 ?its	 ?transmission	 ?channels.?	 ?Journal	 ?of	 ?Comparative	 ?Economics	 ?32(1):181?93.	 ?Persson,	 ?T.,	 ?G.	 ?Roland,	 ?and	 ?G.	 ?Tabellini.	 ?2000.	 ??Comparative	 ?politics	 ?and	 ?public	 ?finance.?	 ?Journal	 ?of	 ?Political	 ?Economy	 ?108(6).	 ?Rajan,	 ?RG,	 ?and	 ?Arvind	 ?Subramanian.	 ?2005.	 ??Aid	 ?and	 ?growth:	 ?What	 ?does	 ?the	 ?cross-??country	 ?evidence	 ?really	 ?show??	 ?The	 ?Review	 ?of	 ?Economics	 ?and	 ?Statistics	 ?90:643?65.	 ?Robinson,	 ?James	 ?a.,	 ?Ragnar	 ?Torvik,	 ?and	 ?Thierry	 ?Verdier.	 ?2006.	 ??Political	 ?foundations	 ?of	 ?the	 ?resource	 ?curse.?	 ?Journal	 ?of	 ?Development	 ?Economics	 ?79(2):447?68.	 ?Rodrik,	 ?Dani,	 ?Arvind	 ?Subramanian,	 ?and	 ?Francesco	 ?Trebbi.	 ?2002.	 ??Institutions	 ?Rule:	 ?The	 ?Primacy	 ?of	 ?Institutions	 ?Over	 ?Geography	 ?and	 ?Integration	 ?in	 ?Economic	 ?Development.?	 ?National	 ?Bureau	 ?of	 ?Economic	 ?Research	 ?Working	 ?Paper	 ?9305.	 ?Ross,	 ?Michael.	 ?2001.	 ??Does	 ?oil	 ?hinder	 ?democracy??	 ?World	 ?Politics	 ?53(April):325?61.	 ?Ross,	 ?Michael	 ?L.	 ?2004a.	 ??How	 ?Do	 ?Natural	 ?Resources	 ?Influence	 ?Civil	 ?War?	 ?Evidence	 ?from	 ?Thirteen	 ?Cases.?	 ?International	 ?Organization	 ?58(1):35?67.	 ?Ross,	 ?Michael	 ?L.	 ?2004b.	 ??What	 ?Do	 ?We	 ?Know	 ?about	 ?Natural	 ?Resources	 ?and	 ?Civil	 ?War??	 ?Journal	 ?of	 ?Peace	 ?Research	 ?41(3):337?56.	 ?Sachs,	 ?Jeffrey	 ?D.,	 ?and	 ?Andrew	 ?M.	 ?Warner.	 ?1995.	 ??Natural	 ?Resource	 ?Abundance	 ?and	 ?Economic	 ?Growth.?	 ?National	 ?Bureau	 ?of	 ?Economic	 ?Research	 ?Working	 ?Paper	 ?5398.	 ?Sachs,	 ?Jeffrey	 ?D.,	 ?and	 ?Andrew	 ?M.	 ?Warner.	 ?1999.	 ??The	 ?big	 ?push,	 ?natural	 ?resource	 ?booms	 ?and	 ?growth.?	 ?Journal	 ?of	 ?Development	 ?Economics	 ?59(1):43?76.	 ?Smith,	 ?Alastair.	 ?2008.	 ??The	 ?Perils	 ?of	 ?Unearned	 ?Income.?	 ?The	 ?Journal	 ?of	 ?Politics	 ?70(3):780?93.	 ?Stiglitz,	 ?Joseph	 ?E.	 ?2003.	 ??Whither	 ?reform?	 ?Towards	 ?a	 ?new	 ?agenda	 ?for	 ?Latin	 ?America.?	 ?CEPAL	 ?Review	 ?80.	 ?Therkildsen,	 ?Ole.	 ?2002.	 ??Keeping	 ?the	 ?state	 ?accountable?:	 ?is	 ?aid	 ?no	 ?better	 ?than	 ?oil??	 ?ids	 ?Bulletin	 ?33(3):1?17.	 ?Tornell,	 ?Aaron,	 ?and	 ?Philip	 ?R.	 ?Lane.	 ?1999.	 ??The	 ?Voracity	 ?Effect.?	 ?The	 ?American	 ?Economic	 ?Review	 ?89(1):22?46.	 ?Torvik,	 ?R.	 ?2009.	 ??Why	 ?do	 ?some	 ?resource-??abundant	 ?countries	 ?succeed	 ?while	 ?others	 ?do	 ?not??	 ?Oxford	 ?Review	 ?of	 ?Economic	 ?Policy	 ?25(2):241?56.	 ?Torvik,	 ?Ragnar.	 ?2002.	 ??Natural	 ?resources,	 ?rent	 ?seeking	 ?and	 ?welfare.?	 ?Journal	 ?of	 ?Development	 ?Economics	 ?67(2):455?70.	 ?UNDP.	 ?2002.	 ?Human	 ?Development	 ?Report,	 ?2002.	 ?New	 ?York:	 ?United	 ?Nations.	 ?Warner,	 ?M.	 ?2006.	 ?Meeting	 ?the	 ?Challenge	 ?of	 ?the	 ??Resource	 ?Curse.?London:	 ?ODI.	 ?Retrieved	 ?(http://commdev.org/files/695_file_ODI_Extractive_UNDPResCurse.pdf).	 ?Van	 ?Wijnbergen,	 ?Sweder.	 ?1984.	 ??The	 ?Dutch	 ?Disease:	 ?A	 ?Disease	 ?After	 ?All??	 ?The	 ?Economic	 ?Journal	 ?94(373).	 ?Wright,	 ?J.	 ?2008.	 ??To	 ?Invest	 ?or	 ?Insure?:	 ?How	 ?Authoritarian	 ?Time	 ?Horizons	 ?Impact	 ?Foreign	 ?Aid	 ?Effectiveness.?	 ?Comparative	 ?Political	 ?Studies	 ?41(7):971?1000.	 ?Yuichi	 ?Kono,	 ?Daniel,	 ?and	 ?Gabriella	 ?R.	 ?Montinola.	 ?2009.	 ??Does	 ?foreign	 ?aid	 ?support	 ?autocrats,	 ?democrats,	 ?or	 ?both??	 ?Journal	 ?of	 ?Politics	 ?71(2).	 ?	 ?	 ? 26	 ?Appendix	 ?A.	 ? Sample	 ?Countries	 ?	 ?Afghanistan	 ?Albania	 ?Algeria	 ?Angola	 ?Argentina	 ?Armenia	 ?Australia	 ?Austria	 ?Azerbaijan	 ?Bahrain	 ?Bangladesh	 ?Belarus	 ?Belgium	 ?Benin	 ?Bolivia	 ?Botswana	 ?Brazil	 ?Bulgaria	 ?Burkina	 ?Faso	 ?Burundi	 ?Cambodia	 ?Cameroon	 ?Canada	 ?Central	 ?African	 ?Republic	 ?Chad	 ?Chile	 ?China	 ?Colombia	 ?Congo,	 ?Dem.	 ?Rep.	 ?Congo,	 ?Rep.	 ?Costa	 ?Rica	 ?Cote	 ?d'Ivoire	 ?Croatia	 ?Cuba	 ?Cyprus	 ?Czech	 ?Republic	 ?Denmark	 ?Dominican	 ?Republic	 ?Ecuador	 ?Egypt,	 ?Arab	 ?Rep.	 ?El	 ?Salvador	 ?Eritrea	 ?Estonia	 ?Ethiopia	 ?Finland	 ?France	 ?Gabon	 ?Gambia,	 ?The	 ?Georgia	 ?Germany	 ?Ghana	 ?Greece	 ?Guatemala	 ?Guinea	 ?Guinea-??Bissau	 ?Haiti	 ?Honduras	 ?Hong	 ?Kong	 ?SAR,	 ?China	 ?Hungary	 ?India	 ?Indonesia	 ?Iran,	 ?Islamic	 ?Rep.	 ?Iraq	 ?Ireland	 ?Israel	 ?Italy	 ?Jamaica	 ?Japan	 ?Jordan	 ?Kazakhstan	 ?Kenya	 ?Korea,	 ?Rep.	 ?Kuwait	 ?Kyrgyz	 ?Republic	 ?Lao	 ?PDR	 ?Latvia	 ?Lebanon	 ?Lesotho	 ?Liberia	 ?Libya	 ?Lithuania	 ?Macedonia,	 ?FYR	 ?Madagascar	 ?Malawi	 ?Malaysia	 ?Mali	 ?Mauritania	 ?Mauritius	 ?Mexico	 ?Moldova	 ?Mongolia	 ?Morocco	 ?Mozambique	 ?Myanmar	 ?Namibia	 ?Nepal	 ?Netherlands	 ?New	 ?Zealand	 ?Nicaragua	 ?Niger	 ?Nigeria	 ?Norway	 ?Oman	 ?Pakistan	 ?Panama	 ?Papua	 ?New	 ?Guinea	 ?Paraguay	 ?Peru	 ?Philippines	 ?Poland	 ?Portugal	 ?Qatar	 ?Romania	 ?Russian	 ?Federation	 ?Rwanda	 ?Saudi	 ?Arabia	 ?Senegal	 ?Serbia	 ?Sierra	 ?Leone	 ?Singapore	 ?Slovak	 ?Republic	 ?Slovenia	 ?South	 ?Africa	 ?Spain	 ?Sri	 ?Lanka	 ?Sudan	 ?Swaziland	 ?Sweden	 ?Switzerland	 ?Syrian	 ?Arab	 ?Republic	 ?Tajikistan	 ?Tanzania	 ?Thailand	 ?Timor-??Leste	 ?Togo	 ?Trinidad	 ?and	 ?Tobago	 ?Tunisia	 ?Turkey	 ?Turkmenistan	 ?Uganda	 ?Ukraine	 ?United	 ?Arab	 ?Emirates	 ?United	 ?Kingdom	 ?United	 ?States	 ?	 ?	 ? 27	 ?Uruguay	 ?Uzbekistan	 ?Venezuela,	 ?RB	 ?Vietnam	 ?Yemen,	 ?Rep.	 ?Zambia	 ?Zimbabwe	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? 28	 ?Appendix	 ?B.	 ? Data	 ?Sources	 ?	 ?Variable	 ? Source	 ?agg_instit08	 ? Polity	 ?project	 ?&	 ?Economist	 ?Intelligence	 ?Unit	 ?(Underlying	 ?Vulnerability	 ?index)	 ?agg_instit10	 ? Ibid	 ?	 ?aid	 ? OECD	 ?gdp	 ? WB	 ?GDP	 ?growth	 ?	 ? WB	 ?literacy	 ? UNESCO	 ?	 ?maternal	 ?mortality	 ?	 ? WB	 ?natres	 ?	 ? UNCTAD	 ?	 ?population	 ? WB	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
http://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.24.1-0165659/manifest

Comment

Related Items