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West African fisheries : past, present and 'futures?' Belhabib, Dyhia 2014

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WEST AFRICAN FISHERIES: PAST, PRESENT AND ‘FUTURES?’ by  Dyhia Belhabib  B.Sc., Institut des Sciences de la Mer et Aménagement du Littoral, 2007 M.Sc., The University of Quebec at Rimouski, 2010  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Resource Management and Environmental Studies)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  December 2014  © Dyhia Belhabib, 2014  ii Abstract  This thesis provides evidence for why more complete fisheries catch estimates should be included in fisheries assessments. West African fisheries suffer over-exploitation, illegal fishing and overcapacity. Certainly, overlooking small-scale sectors and attributing “zero” to existing gaps do not improve the situation. Under-reporting masks fisheries real trends and overcapacity, contributing to intensifying over-exploitation, whose impacts, along with the effects of climate change, could be disastrous.  My research focuses on the fisheries of the Western part of the African continent. I begin by presenting methods to estimate the “invisible” catch through the case study of Senegal. I designed this “catch reconstruction” to illustrate the effects of illegal fishing on small-scale fisheries whose geographical range has increased significantly. I used reconstructed data for small-scale fisheries to quantify their contribution to employment and the economy, their profitability and the evolution of fisher’s income as compared to the national poverty line. I found that people increasingly rely on fisheries despite their low income, now dangerously close to the poverty line. Foreign fisheries also contribute to generating income, but also to income losses. I compare the performance of fisheries by China and Europe in West Africa in terms of reporting, illegal fishing and compensation. It appears that despite the inherent policy differences between China and Europe in terms of their Distant Water Fleet (DWF) operations, they both under-reported catches, fished illegally and undercompensated for fishing agreements. They also both contribute to reducing the biomass of fish available to local fishers, and hence to a reduction fishing opportunities and incomes.  iii Fish stocks, and therefore, fisheries are also affected by climate change. I examine these effects and overlap them with some fisheries socio-economic indicators and found that artisanal fishers were more likely to “follow the fish” by expanding their fishing range, while industrial fishers seem to have more flexible as their range of adaptation strategies appears to be wider.  In summary, the work on West African fisheries refutes the myth of “lack of data”, and I show that sufficient data exist to analyze the effects of current fisheries policy, and by implication, to formulate alternatives.   iv Preface I am the senior author on all chapters. I took primary responsibility for the research contained in the chapters including the design, data collection, analysis. Dr. Daniel Pauly, Dr. U. Rashid Sumaila, Dr. William Cheung and Dr. Philippe Le Billon contributed their expertise and advice with ideas, methods and data interpretation. Except for Chapter 1, all chapters of this thesis have been published, submitted for publication or being prepared for submission.  Chapter 2 has been published in a peer-reviewed journal. The reference is cited as follows: Belhabib, D., Koutob, V., Sall, A., Lam, W.Y. and Pauly, D. 2014. Fisheries catch misreporting and its implications: the case of Senegal. Fisheries Research. 151: 1-11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2013.12.006.  I designed the methods for Chapter 2, conducted the literature review, collected and analyzed the data and drafted the paper. Viviane Koutob conducted interviews on the field. Aliou Sall provided expertise on the discussion part. Vicky Lam provided guidance on the modelling aspect and Daniel Pauly provided advice and guidance throughout the writing of the paper.  Chapter 3 co-authors are U. Rashid Sumaila and Daniel Pauly. This chapter has been submitted for publication in a peer reviewed journal. I collected the data and performed the literature review and drafted the paper. U. Rashid Sumaila provided guidance on the methods and Daniel Pauly helped with the organization of the paper and provided guidance throughout the process of paper preparation.   v Chapter 4 has been accepted in a peer reviewed journal. This chapter is co-authored by U. Rashid Sumaila, Vicky Lam, Dirk Zeller, Philippe Le Billon, Elimane Abou Kane, and Daniel Pauly. I designed the methods, conducted the literature review, analyzed the data and drafted the paper. Elimane Abou Kane contributed with data. U. Rashid Sumaila, Vicky Lam, Philippe Le Billon, Dirk Zeller and Daniel Pauly provided guidance on the methods, and editorial suggestions.   Chapter 5 is being prepared for submission. Chapter 5 is co-authored by Vicky Lam, William Cheung and Daniel Pauly. I collected the data, performed the literature review and drafted the paper. Vicky Lam, William Cheung and Daniel Pauly helped with the interpretation of the results and provided guidance throughout the process of paper preparation.  Part of Chapter 6 relating to data gaps and uncertainties has been accepted in a peer-reviewed journal. I drafted the paper. Viviane Koutob, Aliou Sall, Vicky Lam, Dirk Zeller provided feedback and guidance throughout the preparation process of the paper. The reference is cited as follow: Belhabib, D., Koutob, V., Sall, A., Lam, W.Y., Zeller, D. and Pauly, D. (In press). Counting pirogues and missing the boat: Reply to Chaboud et al.’s comment on Belhabib et al. “Fisheries catch misreporting and its implications: the case of Senegal”. Fisheries Research.  vi Table of Contents  Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ii Preface ........................................................................................................................................... iv Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... vi List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ xi List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. xii Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... xiv Dedication ................................................................................................................................... xvi Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................1 1.1 The West African context ............................................................................................... 2 1.1.1 The three large marine ecosystems of West Africa .................................................... 3 1.1.1.1 The Canary Current Large Marine Ecosystem ................................................... 3 1.1.1.2 The Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem ................................................... 5 1.1.1.3 The Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem ................................................ 6 1.1.2 The fisheries of West Africa ....................................................................................... 7 1.2 Motivation and objective ................................................................................................ 8 1.3 Research questions .......................................................................................................... 9 1.4 Thesis outline ................................................................................................................ 10 Chapter 2: Fisheries catch misreporting and its implications: the case of Senegal ...............17 2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 17 2.2 Materials and methods .................................................................................................. 22 2.2.1 Reconstruction of marine fisheries ........................................................................... 22  vii 2.2.1.1 Artisanal fisheries ............................................................................................. 25 2.2.1.1 Subsistence fisheries ......................................................................................... 26 2.2.1.2 Recreational fisheries ........................................................................................ 27 2.2.1.3 Large scale fisheries .......................................................................................... 27 2.2.1.4 Discards............................................................................................................. 29 2.2.2 Estimation of the landed value and the loss generated by IUU fishing .................... 29 2.3 Results and discussion .................................................................................................. 30 2.3.1 Reconstruction of marine fisheries catches for Senegal ........................................... 30 2.3.1.1 Total catches ..................................................................................................... 30 2.3.1.2 Artisanal catches ............................................................................................... 32 2.3.1.3 Non-commercial sub-sector catches (subsistence and recreational) ................. 34 2.3.1.4 Large-scale domestic and foreign catches ........................................................ 35 2.3.1.5 Discards............................................................................................................. 37 2.3.2 Estimation of the landed value and the loss generated by IUU fishing .................... 38 2.3.3 Response mechanisms to crisis and increasing competition ..................................... 40 2.4 Conclusions and recommendations............................................................................... 44 Chapter 3: Feeding the poor: contribution of West African fisheries to employment and food security .................................................................................................................................48 3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 48 3.2 Methods......................................................................................................................... 51 3.2.1 Definition of poverty................................................................................................. 52 3.2.2 Definition of food security ........................................................................................ 53 3.2.3 Definition of small-scale fisheries ............................................................................ 54  viii 3.2.4 Data collection .......................................................................................................... 55 3.2.5 Employment estimate................................................................................................ 57 3.2.6 Landed value and profitability .................................................................................. 58 3.2.7 Economic impact of West African small-scale fisheries on the economy................ 60 3.3 Results ........................................................................................................................... 61 3.3.1 Small-scale fisheries catches from West Africa ....................................................... 61 3.3.2 Employment generated by West African small-scale fisheries and the dependent population ............................................................................................................................. 61 3.3.3 Economic analysis of West African small-scale fisheries ........................................ 64 3.3.3.1 Landed value ..................................................................................................... 64 3.3.3.2 Profitability ....................................................................................................... 65 3.3.4 Economic impact of West African small-scale fisheries on the economy................ 67 3.4 Discussion and conclusion ............................................................................................ 69 Chapter 4: Euros vs. Yuan: a first attempt at comparing European and Chinese fishing access in West Africa ...................................................................................................................73 4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 73 4.2 Fishing opportunities off West Africa .......................................................................... 75 4.2.1 Study area.................................................................................................................. 75 4.2.2 Foreign access to offshore resources ........................................................................ 77 4.2.3 Importance and impacts of fishing on local communities ........................................ 81 4.2.4 Value of West African fisheries to EU and Chinese distant water fleets ................. 82 4.2.5 Objective of the study ............................................................................................... 83 4.3 Material and methods .................................................................................................... 84  ix 4.3.1 Catches of the EU and China .................................................................................... 84 4.3.2 Landed value of West African fisheries operated by the EU and China .................. 85 4.3.3 Agreement value and landed value: How the EU compares to China ...................... 86 4.4 Results ........................................................................................................................... 89 4.4.1 Catches by Europe and China ................................................................................... 89 4.4.2 Landed value of West African fisheries.................................................................... 92 4.4.3 Agreements value and landed value: How Europe compares to China .................... 95 4.4.3.1 European fishing agreements and equity .......................................................... 95 4.4.3.2 Chinese fishing agreements and equity............................................................. 96 4.5 Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 98 Chapter 5: Overview of West African fisheries under climate change: possible routes of adaptation ...................................................................................................................................103 5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 103 5.1.1 Attributes to assess climate change effects on fisheries ......................................... 106 5.1.2 Attributes to assess the adaptability of fisheries to climate change ........................ 108 5.2 Status of fisheries in West Africa ............................................................................... 118 5.3 Effects of climate change on West African fisheries .................................................. 121 5.3.1 Effects of climate change on fisheries .................................................................... 121 5.3.2 Effects of climate change on the economy and food security ................................ 123 Chapter 6: Conclusion ...............................................................................................................132 6.1 Discussions ................................................................................................................. 132 6.2 Possible futures of West Africa fisheries .................................................................... 137 6.2.1 Sustainability first ................................................................................................... 138  x 6.2.2 Policy first ............................................................................................................... 138 6.2.3 Security first ............................................................................................................ 139 6.2.4 Market first.............................................................................................................. 139 6.3 Data gaps and uncertainty ........................................................................................... 140 6.3.1 Small scale fisheries ................................................................................................ 141 6.3.2 Industrial fisheries ................................................................................................... 144 6.4 Broader implications and future research directions .................................................. 147 Bibliography ...............................................................................................................................150 Appendices ..................................................................................................................................186 Appendix A Materials for estimating the number of small-scale fishers and their dependents in West Africa, 2000-2010 .......................................................................................................... 186 A.1 Materials and methods ............................................................................................ 186 A.2 Results and discussion ............................................................................................ 194 Appendix B Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000-2010 .................................................................................................... 196 B.1 Materials and methods ............................................................................................ 196 B.2 Results and discussion ............................................................................................ 198 Appendix C Methods for the estimation of catch data for West African countries. ............... 211   xi List of Tables  Table 2.1 Landed value of Senegalese fisheries in $ million USD, 1999-2010. .......................... 39 Table 3.1 References used towards estimating the costs of fishing. ............................................. 59 Table 3.2 Employment (artisanal and subsistence fishers) generated by West African fisheries (103) between 1950 and 2010 and the number of artisanal fishers (2010). ......................... 63 Table 3.3 Profitability and fisher's income from West African small-scale fisheries. ................. 67 Table 3.4 Contribution of small-scale fisheries to the economy of West Africa (2010). ............. 69 Table 4.1 Average annual reconstructed and reported catches (2000-2010) by the EU and China from West African waters (t·103). ....................................................................................... 80 Table 4.2 Examples of computations of amount of Chinese payments to West African countries in exchange for fishing access. ............................................................................................ 89 Table 4.3 Estimated average landed value, access value, official and actual compensation by Europe and China from West African countries ................................................................. 94 Table 5.1 Effects of climate change on West African fisheries and fish stocks ......................... 110 Table 5.2 Attributes reflecting the vulnerability and  adaptability of West African industrial and artisanal fishing sectors to climate change. ....................................................................... 113   xii List of Figures  Figure 2.1 Senegal and its Exclusive Economic Zone, also showing (red arrow) some of the lagoons where subsistence fishing occurs. .......................................................................... 18 Figure 2.2 Total reconstructed catches from Senegalese waters by sector, with the catch reported to the FAO; black line. ........................................................................................................ 31 Figure 2.3 Total reconstructed catches of: A) Epinephelus spp. (dashed line) compared to official landing data (solid line); B) Pomatomus saltatrix (dashed line) catch compared to official landing data (solid line). ...................................................................................................... 32 Figure 2.4 Total reconstructed artisanal catches landed in Senegal, with the origin of the migrant fishers` catch, 1950-2010. ................................................................................................... 33 Figure 2.5 Total reconstructed subsistence and recreational catches from Senegalese waters, 1950-2010. ........................................................................................................................... 34 Figure 2.6 Total reconstructed industrial catches and their corresponding discards, 1950-2010; the illegal catches are mainly by Russian vessels. .............................................................. 36 Figure 2.7 Opposite trends in the ex-vessel value of legal and illegal industrial catches taken from Senegalese waters, 1999-2010. ................................................................................... 38 Figure 2.8 Relationship between migrant (artisanal) and illegal industrial catch value, 1999-2010. ............................................................................................................................................. 40 Figure 3.1 Fisher’s income in West Africa as compared to the national poverty line. Dark lines represent the national poverty line in each country; filled circles represent the ‘past’ situation, arrows represent the direction and value of the ‘present’ situation; and empty  xiii circles show the only data point available (‘present’) and how it compares to national poverty line. ......................................................................................................................... 57 Figure 3.2 Total small-scale catches from the waters of 22 West African countries as compared to officially reported data, 1950-2010. ................................................................................ 61 Figure 3.3 Economic indicators for West African small-scale fisheries showing the real landed value of reported and total small-scale catches, 1950-2010. ............................................... 65 Figure 4.1 Exclusive Economic Zone waters of the West African countries considered here, also showing the 2000-2010 average annual catch and landed value of their marine fisheries, incl. distant-water fleets....................................................................................................... 76 Figure 4.2 Total catches by Chinese and EU fleets from the waters of West Africa, 1950-2010. Sierra Lone claimed its EEZ in 1971, Morocco in 1981, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon in 1984, Congo (ex-Zaire) in 1992 and Cameroon in 2000. The 16 other West African countries claimed their EEZ between 1976 and 1980, and hence the location of the transition zone (shaded) from ‘unregulated; to ‘illegal’ catches in the lower panel. .......... 91 Figure 5.1 a) Total artisanal catch and effort from West Africa, and b) average annual CPUE, 1950-2010. ......................................................................................................................... 119 Figure 5.2 a) Total industrial catch and effort from West Africa, and b) average annual CPUE, 1950-2010. ......................................................................................................................... 120 Figure 5.3 Changes in Sea Surface Temperature (SST) within a) the CCLME, and b) the GCLME, 1970-2009. ......................................................................................................... 123    xiv Acknowledgements First and foremost, thanks to my supervisor Dr. Daniel Pauly for his support, encouragement and trust throughout my studies,  for giving me the opportunity to learn from his experience and opening the doors to the brightest minds in the fisheries science field. Thanks to my committee members Dr. U. Rashid Sumaila, Dr. William Cheung and Dr. Philippe Le Billon for precious advice and help. Many thanks to Duncan Copeland for his patience, guidance and contacts particularly while in the field in West Africa. Thanks to Dr. Dirk Zeller and Sarah Harper for their advice and edits on catch reconstructions, a necessary step towards the completion of my PhD research. I would also like to thank Dr. Vicky Lam for her help on the climate change chapter and for editing part of this manuscript. I gratefully acknowledge funding from Pew Charitable Trusts through the Sea Around Us, at the Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia and from the MAVA Foundation. I owe special thanks to my collaborators from West Africa who co-authored chapters of this thesis: Viviane Koutob (Senegal) and Aliou Sall (Senegal) for Chapter 1 and Elimane Abou Kane (Mauritania) for Chapter 3. Thanks to the Department of Marine Fisheries of Senegal and the Department of Fisheries Protection and Surveillance of Senegal for sharing valuable data and contacts, and for the World Wildlife Fund West African Marine Ecoregion (WWF-WAMER) and USAID/COMFISH for their hospitality. I would like to thank Christopher Hoornaert for the beautiful maps, Grace Ong for the administrative support and Pamela Rosenbaum for particular encouragements.  xv Special thanks to Dr. Kristin Kleisner for mentoring me and introducing and recommending me to Dr. Daniel Pauly, which allowed me to begin my journey toward a PhD. Finally, I cannot miss thanking my parents and my husband for their support and patience with me throughout the difficult parts of this journey, my friends and fellow Fisheries Centre staff and students for their support throughout my PhD.   xvi Dedication      I dedicate this thesis to my parents for the countless sacrifices, which made this adventure possible and my beloved husband.    1  Chapter 1: Introduction Fisheries provide food, income and leisure to people around the globe. Around 260 million people in the world are employed within the fisheries sector and the indirect sectors that it generates (Teh and Sumaila, 2013). Fish is also a primary source of protein for at least one billion people and can contribute as much as 80% of the animal protein consumed in parts of the world (FAO, 2009b). In some poor coastal communities that are highly dependent on fisheries, these resources are often bound with traditional rituals and beliefs that are aimed at the preservation and sustainable use of fish stocks, in which case a violation of the rules established by the community can be severely punished (Briones Alonso et al., 2013). For some 121 million people worldwide, marine fisheries are an important source of leisure (Cisneros-Montemayor and Sumaila, 2010) and thus offer significant contribution to the economy. Fisheries can also offer other economic opportunities such as those provided to local authorities through fishing agreements with foreign fishing fleets. In many cases, agreements such as those signed with wealthier countries, are subject to controversy regarding their economic fairness and their impact on the sustainability of local fisheries. This applies particularly to poor countries where fishing is perceived as the last resort to obtain a decent income (Iheduru, 1995, Carevich, 1998, Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002, Alder and Sumaila, 2004, Vidal, 2012a).  Of the 50 million professional fishers worldwide, 44% are employed by small-scale fisheries (Teh and Sumaila, 2013), many of them “live at the margin of subsistence and human dignity” (FAO, 1974) which still occurs today (Béné et al., 2010). Beyond poverty, decreasing fisheries resources (Srinivasan et al., 2010), and thus loss of income often result in desperation of fishers and the pursuit of alternative income sources while still remaining in what they are most 2  experienced in, i.e. fisheries. This results in, e.g., the use of illegal and destructive fishing gear, conflicts at sea (Homer-Dixon, 1994, Beck and Nesmith, 2001, Bavinck, 2005, Bruckmeier, 2005, Pomeroy et al., 2007) including in the form of illegal fishing known as “piracy” (Charles et al., 1999, Sumaila et al., 2006, Agnew et al., 2009), modern slavery (Gorez, 2008) and other issues such as increased sexual trade scope (Seeley and Allison, 2005, Béné and Merten, 2008). The lack of governance which entails low monitoring capacity, often relating in the high occurrence of conflicts, is also an important driver of illegal fishing (Martini, 2013).The latter, in turn, produces devastating effects on coastal fishing communities, loss of fish, decreasing fish biomass (Agnonotícias, 2013), loss of gear and income and in a few cases loss of life, with a bulk of the examples reported from north-west Africa (Anon., 2006c, Dobo, 2009, EJF, 2009, Gorez, 2010).   Besides climate change driven extreme events (e.g., the increasing occurrence of hurricanes, droughts, etc.), fisheries are highly sensitive to climate change itself (Allison et al., 2009b), as climate change drives a shift in the distribution range of fish populations impacted by raising water temperature (Perry et al., 2005, Cheung et al., 2009a). These effects are particularly perceived in West Africa (Allison et al., 2009b, Lam et al., 2012).  1.1 The West African context The western part of the African continent – or West Africa here – i.e., the area comprised between the Strait of Gibraltar in the North and Foz do Cunene at the extreme South of Namibia (i.e., excluding South Africa), comprises some of the wealthiest fisheries ecosystems in the 3  world. The twenty two coastal countries1 of the region are within at least one of the three large marine ecosystems, i.e. the Canary Current Large Marine Ecosystem, The Gulf of Guinea Large Marine Ecosystem and the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem (www.seaaroundus.org).   1.1.1 The three large marine ecosystems of West Africa  1.1.1.1 The Canary Current Large Marine Ecosystem The Canary Current Large Marine Ecosystem (CCLME) is one of the four major Eastern Boundary upwelling regions of the world. This area of West Africa is known for its geographical diversity (Arístegui et al., 2009). The region comprising mostly Francophone or former French colonies, i.e., Morocco (and Western Sahara), Mauritania, Senegal, which along with The Gambia and Cape Verde, makes it a particularly well studied Large Marine Ecosystem notably by the former Office de la recherche scientifique et technique outre-mer (ORSTOM)(Sherman, 2002). The CCLME is particularly known for its high productivity and fisheries wealth (Arístegui et al., 2009). Besides upwellings, which contribute to the 3-fold increase in nutrient concentrations from North to South (Arístegui et al., 2009), the morphology of the coast and the river flows play a major role in enriching these waters along the fact that continental shelves are much wider in the southern parts of the CCLME (Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania and Senegal), than in the north, i.e., the Portuguese sub-region (Arístegui et al., 2009).  The main pelagic resources that populate the CCLME and that are extensively exploited by domestic and foreign fisheries are the sardines (Sardina pilchardus) and horse mackerel                                                  1 Morocco (and Western Sahara), Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Sao Tome and Principe, Angola and Namibia. 4  (Trachurus trachurus) along the Moroccan and Western Saharan sub-regions, characterized by higher abundance. In the Mauritanian-Senegalese sub-region, exploitation and high abundance shifts to sardinellas (Sardinella spp.) and horse mackerel, while demersal species are much more diverse with blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou), sparids, cephalopods and hakes (Merluccius spp.) within the Moroccan and Western Saharan sub-regions and sparids, cephalopods and hakes within the Mauritanian-Senegalese sub-region (Arístegui et al., 2009). The Moroccan sub-region represents an important spawning ground for small pelagic species such as round sardinella (Sardinella aurita) and madeiran sardinella (S. maderensis) and sardines (Ettahiri et al., 2003), whereas the Mauritanian-Senegalese sub-region provides perfect conditions for the spring spawning of round sardinella (Arístegui et al., 2009).  Industrial fisheries along the West African regions of the CCLME have developed as early as 1958 by mainly distant water fishing fleets (Arístegui et al., 2009). It was only in the 1970s that a domestic industrial fleet emerged, accompanied by a “pseudo-industrialization” of the Senegalese artisanal fleet and the introduction and improvement of large scale Moroccan purse-seine fleets, which coincided with the declaration of the Exclusive Economic zones under the United Nations Convention of Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Arístegui et al., 2009). These fleets have since then expanded drastically to cover the entire region.   One of the main issues of the fisheries in the CCLME is the removal of larger sized species, particularly due to uncontrolled fishing which has consequently shifted the top-down predatory control of short lived species, along with long term shift in the distribution range of fish populations notably due to water temperature warming (Arístegui et al., 2009).  5  1.1.1.2 The Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem The Guinea Current large marine Ecosystem (GCLME) is located in Eastern Equatorial Atlantic and comprises 14 countries of West and Central Africa, namely, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Gabon, Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The GCLME is characterized by a relatively wide continental shelf with low lying topography and a large number of estuarine systems and river flows (Ukwe et al., 2003). The northern part of the GCLME is characterized by intensive seasonal upwellings, which support a strong primary productivity and relatively abundant fish stocks, while the southern part depends mostly on river nutrient-rich input as the occurrence of upwellings is significantly less important (Longhurst, 1962).   Important fish stocks within the GCLME, whether locally supporting artisanal fisheries or trans-boundary, represent an important source of food and wellbeing for local people.  Around 120 million people live and depend upon the coastal areas encompassed by the GCLME (Ukwe et al., 2003), and this region experiences one of the highest population growth rates of the world, which puts a severe strain on local fisheries, also heavily targeted by important foreign fleets (Ukwe et al., 2003). This pressure by particularly increasing industrial fleets places fisheries at the risk of collapse. For example, both species diversity and fish sizes have declined (Ukwe et al., 2003). Furthermore, the GCLME encompasses one of the countries most affected by illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) (Godoy, 2010), a curse that spreads thoughtout the region.  6  1.1.1.3 The Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem The Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem (BCLME) is located off the southern coast of West Africa and comprises Angola, Namibia and the Western coast of South Africa. The particular feature of the BCLME that separates it from the other three major Eastern Boundary upwelling areas is that it is bordered in its northern and southern boundaries by warm current systems, the Angola Current system and the Indian Ocean Current System (Shillington et al., 2006). The centre of the BCLME is characterized by a year-round coastal upwelling and a seasonal upwelling (Boyer et al., 2000, Shillington et al., 2006). Benguela Niños, large-scale multiyear climatic variations that occur in the Benguela upwelling region, have been reported to impact fisheries. Hutchings et al. (2009) described the perfect conditions that induce a geographically discrete 3-10 day upwelling system that is “crucial for driving short-term variability in plankton development and fish recruitment”, another feature benefiting the fisheries of the BCLME. The fisheries of the BCLME encompass a wide variety of exploited species; the pelagic fishery targets southern anchovy (Engraulis capensis), south African pilchard (Sardinops ocellatus) and Cape horse mackerel (Trachurus capensis), while the demersal fishery targets mainly hakes (Merluccius capensis and M. paradoxus) and soles (Austroglossus microlepis and A. pectoralis) (Olivar and Shelton, 1993; Sumaila and Vasconcellos, 2000; Sumaila 2004).   These “extremely productive and rich in fishing resources” experienced severe over-exploitation notably by foreign fleets (Crawford et al., 1987; Sumaila and Vasconcellos, 2000), as illustrated by the collapse of several fish stocks during the 1960s and 1970s (Hutchings et al., 2009). A few examples are illustrated by the shift from the sardine to the mackerel fishery, the collapse of the 7  hake fishery which never truly recovered (Hutchings et al., 2009), and the increase of the biomass of jellyfish (Roux and Shannon, 2004).   1.1.2 The fisheries of West Africa Economically, it is difficult to shoehorn the 22 countries of West Africa within one particular profile. However, poverty remains an important common issue as the per capita GDP averages 3,200 $ US·capita-1·year-1 (www.worldbank.org). In this context, in West-Africa, the fishing industry is not only an important source of employment, revenue and social wellbeing (15 to 17% of the GDP and 20% of the primary sector)(Diouf, 1991, Mendy, 2002, FAO, 2006), but it also represents an important source of food as fish constitutes 53% of the animal protein intake on average of the West African population (WorldFishCenter, 2005, Diata, 2007, Chavance et al., 2004). Indeed, the fishing industry can be easily related to food security issues (Jacquet and Zeller, 2007); but also to economic wellbeing (Allison et al., 2009a, d'Aboville, 2010). Despite the importance of fisheries in West Africa, distressing indicators of overfishing are evident.  Scientists have documented a shift in fish populations from lucrative, demersal species to short-lived and emergent invasive species (Barry et al., 2002, Gascuel et al., 2003).  Additionally, many fish stocks off the coast have declined in abundance (Christensen et al., 2002), and biomass in the region has decreased significantly, e.g., by up to 75% since 1950 off the north-western coast (Diata, 2007). In the context of constantly improving technologies over the past half century, fishing agreements with industrialized countries put a further strain on the resource availability for local consumption (Béné and Lawton, 2008). Given its inadequate resource monitoring, the Western African Region is one of the most vulnerable areas to the effects of 8  overfishing and collapsed fisheries in terms of local consumption, food security and economic value.  While fisheries analysis such as stock assessments are data hungry, developing nations have long fed the myth of “fisheries data deficiency” as they suffer from the issue of severe small-scale, short-term fisheries analysis (Pauly, 2010a). Such a lack of data translates into an impossibility to describe long-term trends of fisheries and thus inform policy makers (Pauly, 1998a, Pauly et al., 2002a, Zeller et al., 2007a).  Rapidly increasing animal protein needs as agriculture collapses on the one hand, growing population and poverty lead to increasing the pressure on resources, which in turn are affected by climate change and over-exploitation leading to increasing levels of social unrest and conflicts. Pomeroy et al. (2007) suggest that such “trends are expected to worsen as coastal populations increase”, which leads to the question: is the social well-being of coastal fishing communities expected to worsen?   1.2 Motivation and objective My main motivation at the beginning of my research was the completion of a more accurate catch reconstruction of the fisheries in the Western-African Sub-Area, which consists in establishing a time series of catches and effort from 1950 to present to develop better plans for stock rebuilding. The research was then focusing on the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) countries formed by Senegal, Mauritania, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Cap-9  Verde2, which are working closely with the WWF and the international scientific community to find solutions for responsible management of marine resources. This was motivated by the fact that a more comprehensive and complete estimate of total fisheries extractions is necessary to insure an efficient way of managing fisheries resources and settle the urgent need of answering to food security problems in the area. However, as my curiosity and geographic range of the research grew to include the southern countries, it appeared to me that sustainable management of fisheries goes beyond the evolution of fisheries and their extractions over time, rather the future of West African fisheries will depend upon diverse management plans and the establishment of conservation schemes (e.g., Marine Protected Areas, effort reduction etc.) and has to do with the condition in which they evolve (history and international agreements, conflicts and natural disasters, climate change) and the important role they play in society (contribution of fisheries to the economy and food security). Thus the core objective of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive assessment of West African fisheries to explore future rehabilitation scenarios.   1.3 Research questions 1. What approach can be adopted to estimate unreported catches, and what are the implications of under-reporting on small-scale fisheries? 2. How do small-scale fisheries contribute to the economy and food security on West African countries, and how do they respond to over-exploitation and increasing competition with industrial, particularly, foreign fleets?                                                  2 Sierra Leone joined recently 10  3. How much do West African economies get and lose from foreign fishing in their waters, and how did their affinities towards new partners evolve over time? 4. What is the impact of climate change on West African fisheries and how does the fishing industry adapt to it? 5. What possible futures are there for West African fisheries?  1.4 Thesis outline The thesis consists of four main chapters, the introduction and the conclusion chapters. The first chapter is the introduction. The second chapter deals with and debunks the myth that “no data are available” about West African fisheries and identifies methods of reconstructing comprehensive catch time series by providing the example of a relatively well-monitored fishery. This chapter uses the case study of Senegal. The third chapter highlights the real contribution of fisheries in West Africa to the local economy, employment and food security using more realistic catch estimates and including sectors that were unassessed previously such as subsistence fishing. The fourth chapter will provide a comprehensive comparison in terms of compensation amount, transparency, illegal activities and reporting between the EU-West African countries fishing agreements and those signed between China and West African countries as the EU and China are the two main parties to fishing agreements in the region. The fifth chapter explores the impact of climate change on fisheries in two large marine ecosystems of West Africa and the adaptive capacity of commercial sectors (artisanal and industrial) to the shift in distribution range of fish. The sixth chapter, is the general conclusion.  11  Chapter 1 (introduction) The objective of the first chapter is to highlight the socio-economic importance of West African fisheries and the context within which they evolved. Chapter 2 (Fisheries catch misreporting and its implications: the case of Senegal) The first ‘modern’ studies of the West African fisheries date back to the 1970s. These were interested in both fisheries resources and indigenous forms of exploitation in Western Africa, and  were performed to help justify the development of European marine fisheries (Chaboud and Charles-Dominique, 1991). Scientific prospection campaigns started in the 19th century and resulted in the collection of numerous data based on exploration activities and subsequently on the monitoring and management of the resources. Since that time, West African countries witnessed a series of scientific projects and efforts aimed at the establishment of a realistic evolution of the commercial and artisanal fisheries despite the unavailability of some data and the uncertain quality of the available information (Laurans, 2005). Descriptive studies and catch – effort reconstruction studies of fisheries are rare in the region (Chaboud and Charles-Dominique, 1991, Gascuel et al., 2003). In 2002, the International Symposium organized in Dakar, Senegal, provided a summary of the major analysis aimed at reorganizing the general knowledge of the former state of the resource, on ecosystems, the sub-region fisheries, as well as on changes that have occurred mainly in North West Africa, while central and southern West Africa remain significantly understudied.   Since 1950, fishing effort has increased along with the number of target species and exploited zones in the region (Chavance and Chavance, 2004). This has been accompanied by an overall decrease in nominal catches by 50% by 2010 (Garibaldi and Grainer, 2002, Chavance, 1999, 12  Chavance and Chavance, 2004). These studies have been conducted under the FIAS (Fisheries Information and Analysis System), a major project aimed in part at analyzing and compiling historical data on the fisheries of the Western-African Sub-Area from 1950 to 2000. The main goal of these studies was to assess the current fisheries management issues without addressing stock rebuilding issues. The rebuilding of the fisheries stocks targeted by industrial and artisanal fleets was not considered because of the unavailability of data and/or data of uncertain quality provided by national systems or by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Indeed, comparative studies indicated that data reported by FAO (provided by national systems) do not distinguish between fisheries sub-sectors (Jacquet and Zeller, 2007). FAO data are often judged to be incomplete and rarely applicable or appropriate for the West-African Sub-Region countries. Moreover, in this area, fisheries statistics (both catches and effort) only cover a marginal period of time and do not often take into consideration artisanal catches. Industrial catch data communicated to the FAO are surrounded by uncertainty (Laurans, 2005).   This chapter presents the example of Senegal, a country of West Africa where fisheries were relatively better monitored, and landing and effort data could be comprehensively retraced back to 1950, and explores the impact of misreporting.   Chapter 3 (Feeding the poor: Contribution of West African fisheries to employment and food security) Poverty is induced or directly related to the overexploitation or depletion of fisheries resources (Béné, 2003, Srinivasan et al., 2010), which along with severe deprivation characterize communities that are highly dependent on fisheries. The depletion of marine resources has also severe effects on employment opportunities and thus standards of living of small-scale fishing 13  households. Srinivasan et al. (2010) and Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) (2005) observed that small-scale fishers are increasingly losing access to their traditional source of cheap protein because of declining catches. Yet, studies linking fisheries failure to poverty are lacking (Béné, 2003).  This is particularly true for developing countries, notably those of West Africa, where data on employment, fisheries dependents, and the contribution of small-scale fisheries to the economic output are desperately needed. These will allow the assessment of the real contribution of small-scale fisheries to poverty alleviation and their ability to cope with crisis.   This chapter explores the economic and food security implications of this expansion throughout West Africa by following a four step-approach; first, it will summarize the total small-scale catch (subsistence and artisanal) and compare it to total landings as reported officially through the FAO in order to account for the under-reporting and its extent per country. Second, it provides an estimate of the landed value and profitability where the landed value is calculated as the product of the reconstructed small-scale catch (in contrast to reported landings and thus reported value) and the real deflated ex-vessel price. Profitability is used to assess the ability of West African small-scale fisheries to generate revenues as compared to their costs, measured as the ratio of the net income to the total revenue per month. A main outcome of this second step will be to account for the “salary” received by fishers and compare it to the poverty line. Third, employment is assessed, as the number of full time and part time fishers employed by the small-scale sector and their dependents, which as a total represents the number of people supported by small-scale fisheries in West Africa. Finally, the economic impact of small-scale fisheries on African economies will be assessed in contrast to the landed value. This will account for the secondary 14  activities related to fisheries, in particular the processing activity by women that can add up to 65% to the landed value (Anon., 2003b). Chapter 4 (Euros vs. Yuan: A first attempt at comparing European and Chinese fishing access in West Africa) Industrial vessels operating as part of distant water fleets (DWFs) in developing countries are often poorly reported (Zeller et al., 2007a), because these countries often lack financial means and technology to properly monitor and regulate foreign fishing activities. This results in overharvesting and excessive under-reported and unsustainable catches (Iheduru, 1995, Porter, 1997, Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002).   Moreover, economic weakness and the need of foreign currency often drive West African countries to choose short term perceived benefits through fisheries agreements where fees are negotiated based on the income generated by the foreign fishing capacity rather than, and regardless of, a sustainable catch quota (Iheduru, 1995). Over the course of the last 50 years for example, the number of fishing agreements have increased at least 30 fold (Alder and Sumaila, 2004, Ndiaye, 2011). Yet, the benefits generated by these agreements are often questioned (Iheduru, 1995, Carevich, 1998, Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002, Vidal, 2012a). West African countries have a weak bargaining power and lack monitoring and enforcing capacity. The compensation received, the economic returns on development and the coherence and even the legality of these agreements often raised serious concern but rarely measured the income generated (Iheduru, 1995, Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002, Ilnyckyj, 2007).  15  Increasing Chinese involvement in Africa has drawn significant attention in Europe (Tull, 2008, Blomeyer et al., 2012b) particularly in fisheries, where growing fishing effort by Europe and China over the same resource over time suggests increasing competition to secure access to West Africa fishing grounds (Plage, 2001).    The objective of this chapter is to evaluate a more realistic value of EU and Chinese fisheries off West Africa, then further compare how Europe, under the EU-West Africa Fishing Agreements, is performing compared to its competitor China in terms of compensation arrangements, intensity and pattern of exploitation, and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Economic compensation is assessed in a three-step approach. First, the reconstructed catch by China and Europe will be compared to the data provided to the FAO for twenty West African countries. The main objective of this exercise is to assess the trends of under-reporting and whether or not under-reporting has improved over time for both Europe and China. Second, the landed value of European and Chinese fisheries off West Africa is calculated, including the landed value of reported, unreported and illegal catches. This value is calculated using the catch data and average ex-vessel prices per country (in actual USD per tonne). Third, the compensation amount for agreements by China and Europe will be investigated and compared to the landed value. To estimate the former, I collected compensation amounts from a wide range of sources, including the EU law database (http:\\eur-lex.europa.eu) for Europe and through anecdotal accounts and other sources for China. The compensation received by African countries is reconstructed per country regardless of the publication year within the 2000-2010 time period. The difference between the landed value and the compensation amount (agreement value) represents the 16  minimum economic loss for West African countries as the multiplier effect and the added value are not being taken into account.   Chapter 5 (overview of West African fisheries under climate change: possible routes of adaptation)   The objective of this chapter is to assess the impacts of climate change on West African fisheries. It determines, through a literature review, whether the change in ocean temperature in the Exclusive Economic Zones of the West African countries located within the Canary Current Large Marine Ecosystem and the Gulf of Guinea Large Marine Ecosystem, is related to the change in species composition of the fisheries in these countries by using an index called Mean Temperature of the Catch (MTC) (Cheung et al., 2013c). I use different indicators to then assess the effects of increasing Sea Surface Temperature (SST) on fish distribution (invasions and local extinctions) and the catch potential. I further investigate the socio-economic implications of climate change on fisheries by reviewing the impacts on the economic output and jobs. I then overlap these effects with the evolution of the fishing sector, i.e. changes in gear type, target species, fishing costs, fishing range over time and space with the vulnerability and adaptive capacity of West African countries to determine the direction of fishers’ adaptation to climate change.   Chapter 6 (Conclusion)   The objective of this chapter is to pull together the findings from chapter 2 to chapter 5, discuss the gaps and uncertainties around catch data estimates and use different scenarios to predict different potential futures of West African fisheries.     17  Chapter 2: Fisheries catch misreporting and its implications: the case of Senegal 2.1 Introduction Rapidly developing artisanal fisheries and increasing industrial fishing activities usually lead to conflicts over fisheries resources, a common feature of contemporary fisheries (Bakhayokho and Kebe, 1989, Ruttan et al., 2000, Pauly, 2006a). This competition can result in the artisanal sub-sector growing in capacity, extending its fishing grounds or ceasing to exist. As the last option rarely occurs in Africa, adapting to the former two mechanisms results in overcapacity and the extension of the operating range of the artisanal sub-sector.  This contribution examines the resource competition between industrial and artisanal fisheries through the example of Senegal, which has a number of foreign fleets, i.e., fishing legally and illegally, along with the most developed artisanal fleet of Africa. The latter operates within and outside the Senegalese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This chapter will first draw a picture of Senegalese fisheries by (1) presenting realistic catches by sub-sector and taxonomic groups, and comparing them to official statistics, (2) assessing the extent of the competition between industrial and artisanal fisheries, and (3) presenting the response mechanisms adopted by artisanal fisheries under increasing competition over declining resources.  Senegal is located at the edge of two of the most productive fishing zones in the world, the Canary Current Large Marine Ecosystem and the Gulf of Guinea Large Marine Ecosystem, between 14°40’N and 17°25’W (Figure 2.1). This, along with a strong seasonal upwelling and a 18  relatively wide continental shelf of 23,800 km2, has made Senegal one of the countries with the largest fisheries in West Africa, and consequently in the world (Goffinet, 1992, Pramod and Pitcher, 2006b).   Figure 2.1 Senegal and its Exclusive Economic Zone, also showing (red arrow) some of the lagoons where subsistence fishing occurs.  Senegal’s history was marked by major shifts. Initially a part of the Empire of Ghana, the Jolof Empire, proper to Senegal, was established in the 13th century. Three centuries later, the transatlantic slave trade, initiated early in the 16th century, had grown so much in the area that around one-third of the population was captured and deported to the Americas by competing 19  European powers, mostly the Netherlands, Portugal and Great Britain (Thornton, 1998). This lasted until the area was handed over to France, which, after 1677, used what is now called the Ile de Gorée as a staging point for its slave trade. After almost three centuries of occupation, France granted independence to the ‘Mali Federation’ comprised of Senegal and the ‘French Sudan’ (actual Mali). This contract lasted only a few months, and both Mali and Senegal proclaimed their independence, with Senegal choosing its first president in September 1960. This historical path, and the interest of the colonial power in natural resource exploitation, made Senegal one of the few countries for which scientific data on primary resources were available. For example basic data on Senegalese fisheries were available through the ‘Institut Français (now ‘Fondamental’) de l’Afrique Noire’ (IFAN) for the 1950s (e.g., Doumenge, 1962, Pelissier, 1966), in sharp contrast to, e.g., never-colonized Liberia. Moreover, strong ethnic diversity of coastal communities and fishers’ migrations from different parts of West Africa over centuries, which also lead to increasing coastal ethnic diversity, contributed to Senegal’s long fishing tradition (Goffinet, 1992). Senegal, in 1979, was also the first African country to sign a fishing agreement with the European Union (EU), which aimed to establish a domestic industrial fleet and develop its artisanal fleet. Today, a considerable segment of the Senegalese artisanal fleet is capable of long-distance operations.  Fisheries gained a key role in Senegal in rebalancing the economy after the decline of groundnut and phosphate exports since the 1970s (Pramod and Pitcher, 2006b). The sector now uses approximately 20,000 pirogues, i.e., large wooden canoes (Fontana and Weber, 1982) and 100 large-scale industrial fishing vessels, employs over 600,000 people (about one-fifth of the working population of Senegal) and provides over 75% of animal protein intake of the local 20  population (York and Gossard, 2004). With 36 kg·year-1, Senegal has the second highest per capita fish consumption in Africa (York and Gossard, 2004).   The motorization of the small-scale artisanal sub-sector, the uncontrolled issuance of fishing licenses, expanding market and fishing subsidies at first contributed to raising fish catches and trade (Lenselink, 2002). However, these factors now combine to intensify the decline of Senegalese fisheries (Dahou et al., 2001). Over-expansion in fisheries capacity resulted in the over-exploitation of many fish stocks in Senegal and drove some high-value species, such as groupers to commercial extinction (Thiao et al., 2012). Indeed, all demersal stocks have declined drastically, while the small-pelagic species, which now contribute to the bulk of the fish consumption of the local population, are overexploited (Laurans et al., 2004).   Official data in Senegal refer to two main sub-sectors, one being the small-scale artisanal fisheries, relying overwhelmingly on pirogues. The other sub-sector is industrial and consists of large-scale vessels, i.e., domestic and foreign trawlers targeting demersal fish and especially shrimp (in both shallow and deeper waters), and vessels targeting large pelagic fishes such as tuna and small-pelagic fishes such as sardinella (Samba, 1994).   The official statistics submitted by Senegal to FAO suggest a mean annual catch of about 400,000 t·year-1 for the period from 1997 to 2009, which is lower than the estimated ‘maximum sustainable yield’ (MSY) of 600,000 t·year-1 (CRODT, 2001). Assuming that the latter estimate is correct would imply that either (i) fishing effort is not high enough to extract MSY, or (ii) fishing effort is excessive, and MSY can be reached by reducing fishing effort. The second 21  hypothesis is by far the most likely because of the prevailing overcapacity and the excessive effort that results from it (Diagne, 2005). Nevertheless, the lack of reliable catch statistics for segments of the industrial sub-sector such as foreign fishing, the discarding of by-catch, and the non-consideration of sub-sectors such as recreational and subsistence fishing, all together have led to a situation where overall removals from the Senegalese EEZ are unknown. Hence, issues related to the sustainable exploitation of Senegalese marine resources cannot be addressed straightforwardly (Lenselink, 2002, FAO, 2004, ICCAT, 2004).  Although recent events, such as the expulsion of Russian vessels and the cancellation of the EU-Senegal agreement, suggest that the number of legally operating foreign industrial vessels has decreased, fishers’ accounts and official reports document the presence of illegally operating vessels of different origins . These illegal fishing vessels are widely thought to be a major cause of problems for Senegalese artisanal fisheries (Ferraro and Brans, 2009).  These problems can be summarized in two points: (1) Senegal suffers from over-exploitation of its fisheries resources by legal and illegal foreign distant-water fleets (Niasse and Seck, 2011); and (2) the Senegalese authorities cannot, for obvious political reasons, put a cap on the growth of capacity and effort in its artisanal sub-sector as long as it cannot control, and eventually reduce, legal and illegal foreign distant-water fishing in its EEZ.  Managing the artisanal fisheries independently of the (mostly) foreign industrial fisheries could perhaps be done if the two types of fisheries did not interact, i.e., compete for the same resources; however, they do (Pramod and Pitcher, 2006b). Thus, there are frequent incursions by 22  industrial fishing vessels into artisanal fishing zones, and conversely, a large number of artisanal pirogues operate outside the limits of these legally established zones (Deme and Dioh, 1994, Diallo, 1995, Binet et al., 2012).  These problems are compounded by the absence of reliable information on these fisheries, notably catch data, which are the key to effective fisheries management (Goffinet, 1992). Indeed, in many cases, unreliable catch and related data explain part of the failure of many management and fisheries development programs in the region, including Senegal in the 1990s (UNEP, 2004). In fact, development programs did not result in the expected positive impact on fisheries management. Instead, they increased fishing capacity, particularly of the artisanal fleet (Deme and Dioh, 1994). Thus, these programs intensified the competition and conflicts between the artisanal and the industrial sub-sectors. This contribution attempts, via a ‘reconstruction’ of sectoral catch time series, to (1) document and quantify what the extent of the competition between artisanal and industrial fisheries has been during the period covered in this study, (2) document how the Senegalese artisanal fisheries responded to the effects of this competition, and (3) suggest a solution to the present impasse.  2.2 Materials and methods 2.2.1 Reconstruction of marine fisheries  In Senegal, two national organizations independently monitor the same fisheries using different methods (Barry et al., 2004). The Department of Fisheries (Départment des pêches maritimes, D.P.M.) relies, at least in part, on a system where declarations (by registered fishers) of expected catches are exchanged for fuel subsidy vouchers (Ndiaye, 2013; Najih Lazar, University of 23  Rhode Island, pers. comm.). The method is complemented by on-site surveys designed mostly to obtain fishing effort data. The second national entity is the Centre for Oceanographic Research of Dakar-Thiaroye (Centre de recherches océanographiques de Dakar–Thiaroye, C.R.O.D.T.), which relies on a monthly survey of catch and effort in five major landing sites that are then raised to the national level. Both of these methods have their drawbacks. With the D.P.M. method, catches would appear to be overestimated (because declaring high expected catches may result in more fuel vouchers). However, since only registered fishers can avail of a fuel subsidy, and thus report to the D.P.M., a large number of non-registered fishers is ignored. The C.R.O.D.T.’s approach appears to be statistically more rigorous; however, the extrapolation involved here relies on the registered effort, which strongly under-estimates real effort.   With regards to industrial fisheries, the statistical system relies mostly on declarations by the skippers of vessels in the port of Dakar and a few observers’ reports (when vessel owners are willing to collaborate). Finally, a Cellule d'études et de planification (C.E.P.), created in 2000, collects and harmonizes the data from the D.P.M. and other institutions and then sends the results to international organizations, FAO in particular. Nevertheless, although systems for data collection and harmonization have been elaborated, these systems are heavily dependent on fishers’ willingness to share information. Usually, fishers do not collaborate and this undermines the reliability of the data (Ndiaye, 2013).   The time series data available here on commercial fishing activities, including the artisanal and industrial sub-sectors, originated from four major sources, C.R.O.D.T., D.P.M., C.E.P. and FAO (C.R.O.D.T. data were available only to 1999). Although there were major inconsistencies in the 24  data as well - especially for the industrial sub-sector for some time periods - the effort data were emphasized here in our attempt to create a realistic baseline for the purpose of this catch reconstruction. Non-commercial catches, i.e., subsistence and recreational fisheries, are not covered by the official statistics system (Ba, 2006). Although a few at-sea surveys provide detailed description of the discarding practices of the industrial fleets, discards, as is the case for other countries, are not included either in the data reported to FAO.   Here we estimate: (1) artisanal catches from within and outside Senegalese waters; (2) industrial catches; (3) subsistence catches; (4) recreational catches; (5) illegal catches; and (6) discards. The general approach for reconstructing time series of catches for these fisheries was derived from Zeller et al. (2007a) and consists of six steps:  1. Assemble existing reported catch times series data from different sources, e.g., D.P.M. reports; 2. Identify fisheries, taxonomic groups, time periods, etc. not covered by (1) via literature review and anecdotal documentation; 3. Search for available alternative information sources to complement the missing data in (2), through extensive literature review and meetings with local experts and fishers; 4. Identify data ‘anchor’ points for missing segments; 5. Apply a series of interpolations for the intervening years; and 6. Estimate total catch times series for each segment and taxonomic group.  25  Details on each of these steps, as applied to Senegal, are given by Thiao (2009). Here, we present a brief review of our main sources and approach, by fishery type.   2.2.1.1 Artisanal fisheries Artisanal fisheries catch data were re-assessed using under-reporting factors multiplied by the existing reported data, i.e., a baseline assembled using literature reports (Doumenge, 1962, Gulland and Troadec, 1973, Rieucau, 1984, DPM, 2003, Barry et al., 2004). This factor was derived from the ratio of the reported effort divided by the surveyed effort (Deme et al., 2012). The under-reporting factor was then extrapolated given the different historical trends of the fishing effort. For example, before the C.R.O.D.T. was created, fishing effort was likely to be strongly under-estimated, and thus the under-reporting factor was higher in the past (Deme and Dioh, 1994, Ferraris et al., 1994, Walter, 2006, Ndiaye, 2013).   Artisanal catch data in Senegal include two major components, i.e., catch taken within the Senegalese EEZ and the large (but ill-documented) catch of the Senegalese artisanal fleet from the EEZs of neighboring countries. The latter catches are referred to as ‘migrant fishers’ catches’. Migrant fisheries data were available on the fishing effort used to estimate them (Anon., 1978, Chauveau and Laloe, 1985, Weber and Durand, 1986, Chaboud et al., 1988, Chauveau, 1991, Diop and Thiam, 1991, Baran and Tous, 2000, Ould Abeid and Gaye, 2009, Failler and Binet, 2010, Binet et al., 2012). These catches, taken from Mauritania, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Guinea, were subtracted from total artisanal catches landed in Senegal, which yielded the artisanal catch within the Senegalese EEZ.   26  2.2.1.1 Subsistence fisheries Three types of subsistence fisheries were identified for Senegal:  1.  Subsistence I, which is the catch by recreational fishers who sell part of their catches, and thus overlap with artisanal fishers; 2.  Subsistence II, which matches more closely to the definition of subsistence fishing, i.e., fishing mainly for one’s own consumption, or that of one’s family, encompassing mostly women gleaning; and 3.  Subsistence III, based on Senegalese recreational fishers (‘Sunday fishers’), and which overlaps with the recreational fishery based on foreign tourism (see below).   It is difficult to separate these three categories, but an attempt was made to quantify ‘Subsistence II’. Mollusc fishing is a frequent activity in Senegal, mostly practiced by women. In the past, women were targeting mostly fish species; however, after the 1968 drought, women shifted their fishing activities to bivalves and other molluscs (Grandcolas, 1997). Subsistence catches were estimated as the product of a per capita catch rate, i.e., 3.1 t∙fisher-1∙year-1 (Descamps, 1994, Grandcolas, 1997, Belhabib et al., 2013a) and the number of subsistence fishers (i.e., women ‘gleaning’) in villages where the activity was documented during time periods when the subsistence sub-sector appeared to exist (Gruvel, 1908, Pelissier, 1966, Chaboud et al., 1987, Reizer, 1988, Horowitz and Salem-Murdock, 1993, Cormier-Salem, 1994, Grandcolas, 1997, Deme et al., 2000, Walter, 2006). Although the catch from the study by Grandcolas (1997) referred to ‘oysters’, this author provided a species list which enabled assessing that oysters 27  represented only 43% of the catch, the rest consisting of snail Cymbium spp. (43%), other molluscs (9%) and miscellaneous fish species (5%).  2.2.1.2 Recreational fisheries Catches of the foreign tourist-driven recreational fisheries of Senegal, which began in 1960, were estimated as the per capita (tourist) daily catch multiplied by the number of fishing trips and the number of fishers (tourists fishing). The total number of tourists was first derived from different sources (Tchitou, 2005, Dehoorne and Diagne, 2011, ANSD, 2011, Deiry Diallo, 2011, Index Mundi, 2013). Then, the number of recreational fishers was estimated by multiplying the total number of tourists by 4%, which represents the portion of recreational fishers over the total number of tourists visiting Senegal (Manel, 2008). The daily catch rate used here was the minimum of a range (35 to 350 kg∙tourist-1∙day-1) provided by the Federation for Recreational Fishing for Senegal (M. Mamadou Sow, President, Senegal Federation for Recreational Fishing, pers. comm.), coupled with the assumption that the CPUE was 10% higher in 1950 than in 2010 to account (if symbolically) for the general pattern of resource decline.  2.2.1.3 Large scale fisheries Large-scale industrial fisheries, which began as early as in 1950 for demersal and 1960 for pelagic sub-sectors (Garcia et al., 1979, Chavance and Chavance, 2004), were considered to consist of three segments:   1. A ‘domestic’ segment comprising mostly reflagged vessels (Gianni and Simpson, 2005, Stilwell et al., 2010) of questionable ownership or country of origin (Belhabib et al., 2014c);  28  2. A foreign legal segment, including all vessels flying flags other than that of Senegal and legally entitled to fish in Senegal, but known to under-report catches (Nguyen-Van-Chi-Bonnardel, 1969, Goffinet, 1992, Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002); and  3. An illegal segment including vessels lacking authorization to operate in the Senegalese EEZ, i.e., criminal operations according to INTERPOL (2010).  Domestic fleets were mainly demersal trawlers (and, to a lesser extent, purse-seiners targeting small-pelagic species), while the foreign segments comprised demersal and shrimp trawlers, large freezer trawlers targeting small-pelagic species and tuna vessels. Industrial catches for each segment were estimated based on their average CPUE per unit of vessel capacity power, i.e., 14.8 kg∙GRT-1∙day-1∙vessel-1, as assessed with a Monte-Carlo procedure taking into account vessel and gear type differences, and their annual effort, i.e., the number of vessels x mean GRT x number of days (Belhabib et al., 2014c). Then, catches were disaggregated by fishing country for foreign catches and by country of origin (of the vessels) for domestic catches.   Illegal industrial catches were obtained by multiplying the observed illegal catch in 2011 (i.e., 254,858 t∙year-1) with an annual percentage of change derived from the combination of arrests per recorded infractions and arrests per authorized vessel (Johnstone, 1996, DPSP, 2001, Kelleher, 2002, DPSP, 2012) from 1950 onwards, as we assumed problematic activities to have begun in 1950 (see Belhabib et al., 2014c). Earlier problematic catches were then considered ‘unregulated’ rather than illegal, given that Senegal, like other countries, had no jurisdiction beyond its territorial waters until it claimed an EEZ, which it did in 1984.  29  2.2.1.4 Discards Incentives of industrial fleets to discard their catch include the by-catch limits which Senegalese law sets at 2 to 10% of the landed catch (Pramod and Pitcher, 2006a). All by-catch in excess of these limits results in penalties. As a result, the discard rates of the trawling fishery are high, ranging from 40% to 70% of the total catch (Monoyer, 1980, Gulland and Garcia, 1984, Caverivière and Rabarison Andriamirado, 1988, Thiam and Gascuel, 1994, Kelleher, 2005, Emanuelsson, 2008). The large pelagic trawl fishery has a discard rate of 12% (ter Hofstede and Dickey-Collas, 2006), which was applied to pelagic trawl fishery catches. The demersal trawl discard rates were estimated at 85% in 1974 (Garcia et al., 1979), 72% for 1979-1980 (Gulland and Garcia, 1984), 70% for 1985 and 67% for 1986 (Caverivière and Rabarison Andriamirado, 1988), 62% in 2000 (Kelleher, 2005), 43% in 2005 (Emanuelsson, 2008), and by extrapolation, at 38% for 2010-2012 (Belhabib et al., 2013a).  2.2.2 Estimation of the landed value and the loss generated by IUU fishing Herein, landed value is defined as the ex-vessel value in Senegal of total catches, including unreported and illegal catches, as well as the value of the discards if these were to be landed. This value remains very conservative since catches by illegal fleets flying the flags of China, Japan and Korea were not included in the analysis.   To estimate the ex-vessel value of the catch by all the sub-sectors operating in Senegal (including the potential value of non-commercial sub-sectors, i.e., recreational and subsistence), we used the reconstructed catch data by sub-sector (see Belhabib et al., 2013a), and ex-vessel prices per sub-sector in CFAFr per tonne (t), i.e., EXC $1 US = 500 CFAFr, which was obtained 30  from D.P.M. reports. We assumed that the species-specific ex-vessel price obtained by artisanal fishers is similar to the ex-vessel price of other small-scale fisheries and illegal small pelagic fisheries, and also provided an estimate of the ex-vessel price of discards, had they been marketed. Similarly, we used the industrial catch ex-vessel price for all industrial catches for either foreign or domestic fleets, except for small-pelagic fishes caught by large freezer trawlers. We used the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Senegal to convert prices to actual USD prices per t in 2013 (P(2013)): 𝑃 (2013) =  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ([1999⋮2010]) × (𝐶𝑃𝐼 (2013) ÷ 𝐶𝑃𝐼 [1999⋮2010]) Using ex-vessel prices from a Senegalese perspective enables us to compare landed values among different countries regardless of price differences due to fish demand and supply in foreign fishing countries.   2.3 Results and discussion  2.3.1 Reconstruction of marine fisheries catches for Senegal 2.3.1.1 Total catches Total removals from Senegalese waters were estimated at 45 million t from 1950 to 2010. Of this, around 29.3 million t were caught domestically, while 15.5 million t were caught by foreign fleets from the Senegalese EEZ. Foreign catches represented half of the domestic catch after accounting for the artisanal landings caught outside of the Senegalese EEZ (Figure 2.2). Although total catches showed an increase since the 1950s, under-reported catches, estimated as the difference between domestic catches and those supplied to the FAO, declined from around 4 times the reported catch in the 1950s to 1.55 times in the 2000s (after excluding catches by 31  migrant fishers). Catches, although fluctuating over time, showed initially an increasing pattern from around 100,000 t∙year-1 in 1950, to a first peak of 1 million t∙year-1 in 1980 driven by high small-pelagic catches by Polish vessels, then to a second peak of 1.3 million t∙year-1 in 1996, right before the Russian large pelagic trawler agreement was cancelled. Catches have been declining since then and reached 895,000 t∙year-1 in 2010, which, although low, is well beyond the maximum sustainable levels of 0.6 million t∙year-1 estimated by the CRODT (2001).    Figure 2.2 Total reconstructed catches from Senegalese waters by sector, with the catch reported to the FAO; black line.    Catches were composed of over 250 taxonomic groups, dominated in the past by bluefish (Pomatomus saltatrix), now commercially extinct in Senegal, by the Sparidae family, and by small-pelagic fishes, especially sardinellas (Belhabib et al., 2013a). Thus, in contrast to official landing data, which may be seen as suggesting an increasing trend of domestic bluefish catches 32  (Figure 2.3, solid lines; but see Thiao et al., 2012), our results confirm the over-exploitation pattern observed by Thiam and Gascuel (1994), which had already begun in the 1970s.   Figure 2.3 Total reconstructed catches of: A) Epinephelus spp. (dashed line) compared to official landing data (solid line); B) Pomatomus saltatrix (dashed line) catch compared to official landing data (solid line).  2.3.1.2 Artisanal catches Artisanal catches landed in Senegal were estimated at around 25 million t between 1950 and 2010, of which 14% were caught from outside the Senegalese EEZ (3.6 million t). Artisanal catches represented 74% of the catch caught and landed in Senegal. This high value illustrates 33  the importance of this labor-intensive artisanal sub-sector in Senegal. However, artisanal catches represented less than half (48%) of total removals from Senegalese waters. Artisanal catches landed in Senegal increased from 92,300 t∙year-1 in 1950 to a peak of 656,300 t∙year-1 in 2004, of which about a quarter was from outside Senegal (163,600 t∙year-1 ; see Figure 2.4). Artisanal catches decreased thereafter to 572,100 t∙year-1  in 2010, with 211,700 t∙year-1 taken from outside Senegalese waters (Figure 2.4). Senegalese migrant fishers take most of their catches from Mauritania (with 48% of the migrant fishers catch landed in Senegal), followed by Guinea Bissau (33%), The Gambia (19%) and Guinea (<1%). Guinea contributed a small catch, but it increased by a factor of 100 in less than 20 years, i.e., from 20 t∙year-1 in 1992 t0 around 2,000 t∙year-1  in 2010 (Figure 2.4).    Figure 2.4 Total reconstructed artisanal catches landed in Senegal, with the origin of the migrant fishers` catch, 1950-2010.  The forays of Senegalese pirogues towards other countries not only undermine the notion of adjacency as a definitional attribute of artisanal fisheries (Pauly, 2006), but also increase 34  conflicts with the industrial fleets and artisanal fishers in other countries such as Mauritania, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Guinea. Indeed, these conflicts were vividly recalled by local communities and authorities during our field visit in each of these countries (D.B., pers. obs., April 2013).   2.3.1.3 Non-commercial sub-sector catches (subsistence and recreational) Subsistence catches, taken mostly by women, were estimated at 1.2 million t between 1950 and 2010, and consisted mostly of bivalves and gastropods (90%), with fishes contributing to the rest. Catches increased from around 10,000 t∙year-1 in 1950 to 31,000 t∙year-1 in 1980, then decreased to less than 10,000 t∙year-1 in 2010 (Figure 2.5). Recreational catches increased from zero in 1960, when recreational fishing began, to 1,600 t∙year-1 in 2006, about where they now remain (Figure 2.5).   Figure 2.5 Total reconstructed subsistence and recreational catches from Senegalese waters, 1950-2010.  35  2.3.1.4 Large-scale domestic and foreign catches Large-scale domestic and foreign catches, estimated at 16 million t between 1950 and 2010, increased from zero in 1950 to their first peak of around 400,000 t∙year-1 in 1978 driven by high Polish catches of small-pelagic fishes. After the Polish fleet left, catches decreased by around 100,000 t∙year-1 in 1990, to increase again with the arrival of the Russian small pelagic trawl fleet, peaking at 620,000 t∙year-1 in the late 1990s. Catches have been variable since then, but with an overall decreasing trend for the legal industrial sub-sector and an increasing trend for the illegal industrial sub-sector (Figure 2.6). Catches by unlicensed vessels were considered unregulated prior to the declaration of the Senegalese EEZ in 1984, and illegal thereafter.   Illegal catches were dominated by Russian catches of small-pelagic fishes (mostly sardinella). While apparent Chinese illegal catches, i.e., illegal catches by vessels flying the flag of China were not assessed (but see Pauly et al., 2013), vessels flying flags of convenience or the flags of African countries (such as The Gambia), revealed to be from China caught over 513,000 t over the period from 1991 and 2010, i.e., 13% of total illegal catches.  36   Figure 2.6 Total reconstructed industrial catches and their corresponding discards, 1950-2010; the illegal catches are mainly by Russian vessels.  Although industrial catches seem to be fairly high, the exclusion of a number of tuna vessels in the 1980s, and a large number (150) of Russian and other sub-contracted Eastern European vessels in the early 1980s (Westlund, 1995, Johnstone, 1996), along with the under-estimation of the illegal effort in the 2000s (Belhabib et al., 2013a), suggest that the reconstructed industrial catch is likely to be under-estimated. Furthermore, under-water mortality (i.e., ‘ghost fishing’) resulting from the use of poison, explosives and the wide-spread use of monofilament and multifilament nets prohibited by the Senegalese law (Pramod and Pitcher, 2006a) have not been accounted for. Finally, the number of monthly incursions assumed in estimates here (i.e., 5 per month) were considered fairly low by the D.P.S.P. (Bassirou Diara, D.P.S.P., pers. comm.).  In recent years, illegal catches appear to vary inversely with legal foreign sub-sector catches, as illustrated here by the decrease in the legal foreign catch (due to the limitation of the number of 37  agreements with Senegal), in contrast to a sharp increase in illegal catches (Figure 2.6). This suggests that when countries lack the capacity to monitor their fisheries, reducing the industrial foreign effort may result in the relative increase in illegal catches, as these vessels, in the case of Senegal, operate with or without authorization.  2.3.1.5 Discards Discards by industrial fleet operating in Senegal totaled over 6.3 million t between 1950 and 2010, the equivalent of 40% of the industrial landed catch (Figure 2.6). Discards increased from 500 t∙year-1 in 1950, generated by the foreign fleets, to a peak of around 200,000 t∙year-1 in 1992, following the increase in the number of trawlers and their corresponding trawl catches. Discards decreased thereafter to 80,000 t∙year-1 in 2010 (Figure 2.6), due to the decrease of the number of trawlers. Although discards exhibit the same pattern as industrial catches, suggesting the decrease in discards is related to the decrease in industrial trawl operations, the discarding rate itself is also decreasing over time, from around 60% in the 1960 to less than 20% in 2010, with a peak in the early 1990s when the equivalent of the industrial catch was discarded (Belhabib et al. 2013a, 2014c). This, however, rather than implying an improvement in fishing techniques and gear selectivity, suggests that industrial fleets now favor retaining species that were previously of low commercial value (Mr. Dougoutigui Coulibaly, Association of Ship-owners and Fishing Industries in Senegal, pers. comm.). This accentuates even further the issue of over-exploitation: as the biomass of resources exploited by the industrial fleet decreases, they tend to retain as much fish as possible. This pattern is also observed in other countries of West Africa, where these species are called ‘African fish’, ‘local fish’, ‘African mix’, ‘trash fish’, i.e., Guinea, 38  Guinea Bissau, Liberia, and Ghana (Nunoo et al., 2009, Belhabib et al., 2012a, Belhabib et al., 2013c, Belhabib et al., 2014f).  2.3.2 Estimation of the landed value and the loss generated by IUU fishing Table 2.1 shows the annual landed value by sub-sector in Senegal from 1999 to 2010. While all reconstructed catches were used, this method allows a realistic picture of the value of Senegalese fisheries to emerge, and thus comparisons to be made. These figures show that the artisanal sub-sector, including migrant and non-migrant catches, takes around a third of the landed value, while the overwhelming majority is taken by industrial fleets.    Figure 2.7 Opposite trends in the ex-vessel value of legal and illegal industrial catches taken from Senegalese waters, 1999-2010.  Illegal fleets alone generate 29% of the total value (calculated by dividing the value of illegal fisheries catches by the total value of all removals from Senegal) – which, in this case is lost to 39  Senegal. In contrast to low figures previously suggested by Witbooi (2011), illegal fishing alone generated a loss of $235 million US2013 in 2010. These figures have increased over time while the catch value of the legal industrial fisheries has declined (Table 2.1). Indeed, it seems that these variables are negatively correlated (Figure 2.7).   Table 2.1 Landed value of Senegalese fisheries in $ million USD, 1999-2010. Small-scale Industrial Total Years Within EEZ Migrations Non-commercial Domestic Foreign Legal Discards Illegal fisheries Total (IUU) 1999 204 58 8 238 534 85 31 1,200 2000 171 54 7 279 171 64 34 780 2001 203 60 7 231 143 68 72 574 2002 237 82 8 235 194 91 130 977 2003 222 78 7 214 113 61 95 760 2004 217 72 6 196 72 41 54 712 2005 232 83 6 178 72 50 179 800 2006 259 108 7 254 39 51 147 865 2007 224 109 6 212 20 46 153 770 2008 226 108 6 165 20 30 71 626 2009 271 132 8 161 17 38 127 754 2010 207 121 7 160 17 45 235 792  Similarly, the increasing loss generated by illegal fleets is accompanied by an increase in the catch value generated by migrant fishers (Figure 2.8).   40   Figure 2.8 Relationship between migrant (artisanal) and illegal industrial catch value, 1999-2010.  2.3.3 Response mechanisms to crisis and increasing competition The catches of Senegalese migrant fishers are currently increasing, presumably in response to the ongoing depletion of fisheries resources in the Senegalese waters, to the extent that these fishers have been described as environmental ‘refugees’ (Failler and Binet, 2010, Binet et al., 2012). Indeed, the overlap between the species targeted by the industrial and artisanal fleets (especially sardinella) leads to conflicts over the same fishing zone. This aggravates the problem of over-capacity to an extent that artisanal fishers find it more profitable to fish in neighboring countries. This would imply that the increased targeting of sardinella by the industrial fleet causes increasing conflicts (DuBois and Zografos, 2012), by inducing a decrease in the catch taken by artisanal fishers within the Senegalese EEZ, and forcing them to operate outside of their EEZ. These patterns emerge only when analyzing catches within and outside Senegal separately.  41  Indeed, not including or identifying migrant fisher catch data when analyzing fisheries trends leads to erroneous results, because (1) increasing catches from outside Senegal, if not taken into consideration would mask or reduce the apparent effect of overcapacity; (2) stocks of certain targeted species will be assumed to be still abundant, while their catch originates from neighboring countries, which will bias management decisions; and (3) the fishery will be perceived as generating increasing economic revenues, while the increasing costs of fishing will not be considered.   On the other hand, the increasing size of the artisanal fleet, whose over-capacity forces it to spill over into the waters of Senegal’s neighbors, also puts the very existence of a large reflagged Senegalese fleet in jeopardy. Thus, although reflagging in Senegal has a long tradition (Everett, 1994), foreign vessels based in Dakar were, in the past, also treated like as part of the domestic fleet. The very fact that Senegalese resources are increasingly over-exploited pushes these industrial and so-called ‘domestic’ vessels into seeking agreements with neighboring countries. Thus, vessels reflagged to Senegal, which is a member of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, pay a lower fee than if they were directly from the EU, e.g., as in the case of Italian vessels reflagged to Senegal and fishing in Guinea Bissau (Anon., 2013b), pushing the competition even further towards the new fishing areas.  Contrasting catch trends, similar target species, overlapping fishing areas, declining resources and artisanal and industrial spill-over are all symptoms and drivers of the increasing competition between the artisanal and industrial sub-sectors. This competition may further increase as resource species adjust to increasing ocean temperature by shifting their distribution poleward, 42  i.e., to the north of Senegal as shown by the analysis by Cheung et al. (2013a). This, indeed, defines ideal conditions for a fisheries crisis.   The very evolution of the Senegalese fleet to a new ‘species’ of pirogues illustrates the steps which drove this spillover: step (1) the size and the product weight capacity of pirogues grew from 6-12 m and 0.6-1.2 t of fish (Arnoux, 1961) to 12-16 m and 2.5 t of fish in the late 1970s (Seck, 1980), when the lighter pirogue disappeared after a sharp increase in industrial catches. With the first signs of over-exploitation (Thiam and Gascuel, 1994), fishers increased their fishing capacity with pirogues of 20 m length, which can carry around 25 t of fish; most of these pirogues were motorized (Fontana and Weber, 1982, DuBois and Zografos, 2012). Today, pirogues are up to 24 m long and can carry up to 30 t of fish per trip (M. Gaoussou Gueye, General secretary, Confederation of African Artisanal Fishing Organizations), i.e., up to 900 t annually, which almost corresponds to the catch profile of an industrial trawler (Belhabib et al., 2014c). This increase in the artisanal fishing effort and capacity, a direct result of the heavy presence of illegal fishing fleets directly competing with the Senegalese artisanal fleet, led to step (2), increasing migrations to the waters of the adjacent countries.   This new form of expansion, which emerged in the 1970s (Chauveau, 1991), in contrast to traditional migrations (which followed fish migrations; Chauveau, 1988), is driven by the over-exploitation and depletion of fish stocks in Senegal (Lawson and Robinson, 1983a, Chaboud and Kebe, 1990, Thiam and Gascuel, 1994, Failler and Binet, 2010, Binet et al., 2012). As a result of these migrations, fish that had been depleted from Senegalese waters, such as snappers (Lutjanus spp.), barracudas (Sphyraena spp.) and groupers (Epinephelus spp.), continued to be exported in 43  large quantities from Senegal. The previous taxa (Epinephelus spp., Sphyraena spp. and Lutjanus spp.) are caught in Guinea Bissau (Agnew et al., 2010), which illustrates the compensation strategy adopted by Senegalese artisanal fishers. Another line of evidence for the need to compensate for decreasing domestic catches is provided by the species composition of migrant fisher catches from the traditional migration grounds, i.e., Mauritania and The Gambia, which is not very different from catches within Senegal and includes mostly species that are used for local consumption, such as sardinellas.  Thus, in a sense, the Senegalese artisanal fleet mimics the practices of distant-water fishing fleets. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a high impact by the industrial fleet, often illegal or unregulated, on fisheries resources targeted by the artisanal sub-sector, is a direct cause for its current overcapacity.   On the other hand, the shift of artisanal fisheries towards export-oriented species at the same time as they expanded their fishing zones to Guinea and Guinea Bissau, adds an interesting trend to issues of local food security. It is clear that over-exploitation causes serious threats to the economy. Other concerns are raised regarding fisheries over-exploitation impacts on food security in Senegal, as fish, traditionally important for the Senegalese diet, is the cheapest source of animal protein and a significant source of revenue for local communities. However, higher prices are obtained for fish that is exported, thus partly compensating for increasing fishing costs (Abaza and Jha, 2002).   44  Other processes indicative of resource depletion and driven by both legal and illegal industrial fishing fleets are the recovery of discarded by-catch and the sale of tuna bait by artisanal fishers (DuBois and Zografos, 2012). The deployment of mother-ships (mostly Korean) hiring Senegalese pirogues to leave the Senegalese EEZ and fish elsewhere (Diallo, 1995) is another mechanism allowing industrial vessels to gain access to artisanal fishing zones, usually illegally, and high value species through experimented Senegalese hand-line fishers. Although the destination of these vessels and the recruitment process is fairly monitored by the Senegalese authorities today, little to no information exists about the traceability of their catches (Aliou Sall, pers. obs.). Fishers catch more valuable species and might obtain higher profits, however, they work under poor to inhumane conditions (Gorez, 2008), again illustrating the interactions between the need for artisanal fisheries to overcome the resource depletion in Senegal and the very presence of illegally operating industrial fleets.   2.4 Conclusions and recommendations Our analysis shows that artisanal fisheries are increasingly competing with the industrial sub-sector operating in Senegal including fleets from the EU, Asia and Eastern Europe. The benefits that would have been derived from limiting foreign access to fisheries resources, via the declaration of the EEZ and the reduction of foreign industrial fishing effort have remained elusive in the absence of a proper monitoring strategy. Given the pressure generated by the industrial sub-sector, the artisanal sub-sector is put in jeopardy. Increasing illegal and unregulated industrial fishing activities, the depletion of marine resources, overlapping fishing grounds, rapid development of the artisanal fleet’s capacity and technology have led, in Senegal, to the new generation of distant-water ‘artisanal’ fishing, which then leads to increasing conflicts 45  beyond the industrial sub-sector, to the artisanal fisheries of the neighboring countries. Also, artisanal fishers increasingly shift their activities towards higher value species aimed at exports and found in other fishing grounds. Although this shift towards higher value species allows to cover higher costs of fishing, it decreases the availability of small-pelagic fishes that are within the reach of local communities. This is today reflected in the alarming decline of sardinella in the local and regional markets (Seck, 2012).   These uncontrolled geographical migrations towards new fishing grounds are another feature of the application of Malthusian theory to fisheries (Pauly, 2006). Socio-cultural drivers remain the historical ties of Senegal to its fisheries, along with the role of fish in the Senegalese national dish the, Thie Bou Dien. Nevertheless, migrations as a response mechanism, in the presence of fuel subsidies offered by the D.P.M., are certainly motivating not only the survival, but the growth of the artisanal fisheries. Also, while we deal here only with fisheries-related factors that are the main drivers for the drastic growth of Senegalese artisanal fisheries, fishers may also have to follow fish movements north because of climate change and the shifting range of species distribution as illustrated by Cheung et al.(2009, 2010) and Lam et al. (2012). On the other hand, the need of artisanal fisheries to survive, the absence of other alternatives for artisanal fishers, along with geopolitical boundaries may soon lead Senegalese fishers to a dead end. Furthermore, countries hosting these increasing, and mainly uncontrolled, forays are at the dawn of increasing their monitoring strategies (D.B. pers. obs.). Although budget limited, these countries will have the capacity to monitor near-shore waters targeted by the Senegalese pirogues. Thus, while fuel subsidies have postponed the supply crisis for Senegal by enabling long-range migrations, increasing monitoring of adjacent waters by neighboring countries, ocean warming-induced fish 46  migrations and increasing illegal fishing may not only limit the spillover effect but also jeopardize artisanal fisheries. Thus, if not rehabilitated, the state of Senegal’s declining resources may endanger the whole economy and people’s ability to get 75% of their animal protein intake.     Given the extent of illegal fishing and uncontrolled industrial fishing activities, there is also an urgent need in Senegal to enhance enforcement of fishery laws and regulations, i.e., to boost their Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS) system, while imposing strict limits set on the industrial sub-sector. The loss through illegal fisheries could be redirected towards (a) enhancing MCS capacity of the D.P.S.P. and (b) the rehabilitation of artisanal fisheries through a more participative dialogue with the stakeholders with regards to catch traceability and the excessive fishing effort. Furthermore, Senegal, by working with other West African nations, could tackle illegal fishing at the regional level, given the movement of industrial vessels freely venturing in and out West African nations’ waters. One priority should be given towards resolving the conflicts between artisanal fisheries and industrial fisheries by lowering the competition and re-setting artisanal fishing zones which would be operational if proper monitoring exists.  As for the artisanal fleet, the absence of viable management plans is a key factor in Senegal’s inability to control its increasing over-capacity. Such plans would set priorities for the artisanal fisheries, i.e., regarding issues of food security and poverty alleviation, economic value, sustainability and stock rebuilding. Over-capacity was documented for decades, however, artisanal effort kept increasing and fuel subsidies were and still are offered. While these subsidies should be redirected towards other economic activities that are today growing in Senegal to provide fishers with other livelihood alternatives, the efforts of the Department of 47  Fisheries should focus on reducing the artisanal and industrial overcapacity by, at least, limiting the new entries to the fishery.   One major outcome of this chapter is that it reveals major discrepancies between the data reported to FAO and reconstructed catches for Senegal. The approach adopted here to add to the realism of the official Senegalese and FAO catch data is based on the fact that a large fraction of the catch is actually known by all actors to be ignored (i.e., excluded from the catch data). The issue at hand is thus one of bias, i.e., absence of accuracy. This issue can be resolved – at least in part – by presenting evidence documenting the likely existence of a bias, and an approach for overcoming it. However, while correcting for this bias, we attempted to be conservative, such as not to over-correct. Senegal is only one of the many examples of countries, notably from West Africa, to send grossly under-estimated data to the FAO, which then compiles them and distributes them worldwide through the FAO FishStat as being the “catch” from these countries. These data are then used widely to describe fisheries trends and derive erroneous conclusions such as the ones illustrated by this chapter. Thus, the approach described here should have applications well beyond Senegal.     48  Chapter 3: Feeding the poor: contribution of West African fisheries to employment and food security  3.1 Introduction According to the FAO, all West African fishing grounds are fully or over-exploited (FAO, 2006). Declining stocks, and therefore catches, increase negative impacts on the coastal population of West Africa. Malnutrition prevalence3 in the region reaches over 30% which is often a result of poverty. In many instances the latter, and thus food security, can be related to declining fisheries caused in part by over-exploitation (Béné, 2003, Srinivasan et al., 2010, Béné, 2004). The depletion of marine resources has in turn severe effects on employment opportunities and standards of living of small-scale fishing households, with very limited alternative livelihood opportunities. Through unmonitored fishing agreements, illegal fishing, unsustainable discarding and unmonitored fishing effort (Srinivasan et al., 2010), “the true burden of catch losses falls upon the world’s poorest, the subsistence and artisanal fishers who are losing access to an important source of cheap protein” (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA), 2005). These conditions in turn accelerate environmental degradation (Hardin, 2007) as fishers’ behaviour adapts to declining catches by intensifying and expanding fishing effort. Béné (2003) reported that there was “almost a complete absence of references to fisheries case studies in the current literature on poverty” and how it relates to fisheries with its key fundamental dimensions, i.e., employment and thus food access.                                                    3 Percentages extracted from the World Bank database weighted by the population of each country. 49  West African small-scale fisheries are labor intensive, geographically scattered, mostly unlicensed and difficult to monitor, and thus the employment and the number of people dependent upon them are difficult to assess, which results in the under-estimation of costs and benefits of fisheries (Teh and Sumaila, 2013). This situation challenges the proper understanding  of the implications of increasing effort (i.e., fishing costs) and over-exploitation on poverty. Although, many small-scale fishers are thought to earn less than $ 1 US·day-1 (Béné et al., 2010), it is hoped this situation could change (Kawarazuka and Béné, 2010) and it is still thought that “small-scale fisheries can generate significant profits, prove resilient to shocks and crises, and make meaningful contributions to food security and poverty alleviation” (FAO, 2003b), while 40 years ago, coastal fishing communities were sought to “live within the margins of subsistence and human dignity” (FAO, 1974). Many development projects prioritizing fishing effort expansion in West Africa since the 1950s often turned out to be unsuccessful (Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002). Today, these projects focus mainly on “sustainable” development and increase in productivity with no proper monitoring and enforcement of basic regulations (e.g., Thiao, 2009) which also result in failure. Is the hypothesis that ‘small-scale fisheries can prove resilient to shocks while making meaningful contributions to food security and poverty’ under the current conditions in West Africa and did the poverty situation improve?  The literature generally diverges when presenting numbers reflecting the importance of West African fisheries for food security and their contribution to the economy. Official figures of fish consumption vary between 4.9 kg·capita-1·year-1 in Liberia and 44.6 kg·capita-1·year-1 in Gabon (Béné and Heck, 2005). Similarly, fish contribution to animal protein consumption can be as low as 23% in Liberia and as high as 63.2% in Ghana (Béné and Heck, 2005). While discrepancies 50  exist, they fail to undermine the relatively important role that fish, particularly those caught by the small-scale sector, play in the West African diet across the region (Béné et al., 2007). Moreover, these estimates are often based on the apparent consumption, which is computed from reported catch as opposed to actual landings4. For example, household surveys show that fish consumption estimated from actual catches is between 30% (average for Gabon5 and the Republic of Congo6) and 500 % higher (Guinea Bissau7 and Sao Tome and Principe8) than that based on official landing data.  Similarly, the contribution of West African fisheries to the economy is often taken as the landed value without further consideration for the value added by the down sectors (processing, marketing, etc.). This introduces a downward bias when estimating the contribution of fisheries throughout the economy (Dyck and Sumaila, 2010, Zeller et al., 2007a). Belhabib et al. (2014a)                                                  4 Total catches include sectors that are missing from official landing data. Often these include a large part of small-scale artisanal and subsistence fisheries given their scattered and non-commercial nature, by-catch and recreational fisheries.  5 Gabon: fish consumption rate was derived from the household survey by WILKIE, D. S., STARKEY, M., ABERNETHY, K., EFFA, E. N., TELFER, P. & GODOY, R. 2005. Role of prices and wealth in consumer demand for bushmeat in Gabon, Central Africa. Conservation Biology, 19, 268-274. at 55 kg·capita-1·year-1 and compared to an apparent consumption rate of 44.6 kg·capita-1·year-1 BÉNÉ, C. & HECK, S. 2005. Fish and food security in Africa. Naga, 28, 8.. 6 Republic of the Congo: the consumption rate estimated at 35 kg·capita-1·year-1 was derived from household surveys Anon. 2006b. Enquete congolaise aupres des menages pour l'evaluation de la pauvrete (ECOM 2005). Brazaville, Congo: Ministere du Plan, de l'Amenagement du territoire et de l'Integration economique, BACKINY-YETNA, P. & ZODON, Q. 2009. Profil et perceptions de la pauvreté en République du Congo en 2005. Perspective Afrique, 4, 1-21. and compared to an apparent consumption rate of 25.3 kg·capita-1·year-1 BÉNÉ, C. & HECK, S. 2005. Fish and food security in Africa. Naga, 28, 8..  7 Guinea Bissau: A household survey estimated a consumption rate of 26 kg·capita-1·year-1 DIA, A. K. & BEDINGAR, T. 2001. Fishing sector support project. Republic of Guinea Bissau. Appraisal Report. African Development Fund. compared to an apparent consumption of 3 kg·capita-1·year-1 SUB-REGIONAL FISHERIES COMMISSION 2001. Contexte de la pêche en Guinée Bissau.. 8 Sao Tome and Principe: A fish consumption rate (57.8 kg·capita-1·year-1)was obtained by averaging household survey fish consumption rates obtained for 2002 (53 kg·capita-1·year-1), 2008 (89.9 kg·capita-1·year-1) ESPÍRITO SANTO, S. & PACHECO DE CARVALHO, B. 2010. Food consumption, food chains and market evolution in São Tomé e Principe: a case study in Su-Saharan Africa. Sao Tome: Instituto Suprior Politécnico de São Tomé e Principe and 2007 (30 kg·capita-1·year-1) SCOPA, A., NKAWAMBI, W., DELBAERE, J., SALVATERRA, H. & BONGI, S. 2007. Analyse Globale de la Sécurité Alimentaire et de la Vulnérabilité. Republique democratique de Sao Tome et Principe. Sao Tome: Programme alimentaire mondial, Service de l’analyse de la sécurité alimentaire (OMXF)  and compared to the apparent consumption of 21.4 kg·capita-1·year-1 BÉNÉ, C. & HECK, S. 2005. Fish and food security in Africa. Naga, 28, 8.. 51  for example found that the contribution of Guinean small-scale fisheries to the GDP was 6 times higher than official estimates (Faro et al., 2005). This often results in the neglect of subsistence fisheries, which can be boat-based or conducted from shore (e.g., beach seining or shellfish collecting by women). These often yield substantial catches that are hardly ever included in official statistics.   Small-scale fisheries can contribute to food security through a) a direct contribution to fish consumption (e.g., subsistence fisheries catches), b) increased purchasing power (income and employment in the artisanal sector) and thus diversifying household diet by accessing important food staples. Note that both subsistence and artisanal fisheries employ women, the former as fishers or gleaners, and the latter in the processing of fish, with both generating food and income (Kawarazuka and Béné, 2010, Harper et al., 2013).   This chapter explores the economic and food security implications of the expansion of artisanal and subsistence fisheries throughout the twenty-two countries of West Africa. A secondary objective is to examine whether small-scale fishers income over time has been below or above    the poverty line in the countries studied.   3.2 Methods Here, we follow a four step-approach; first, we compile and summarize a re-estimated total small-scale catch (subsistence and artisanal) and compare it to total landings as reported officially through the FAO; in order to account for the under-reporting. FAO data do not distinguish between industrial and artisanal sectors, thus national data (obtained for short time periods between 1950 and 2010) which differentiates between artisanal and industrial sectors 52  were used to disaggregate FAO data. Second, employment is assessed, as the number of full time and part time fishers (and their dependents) employed by the small-scale sector, which represents the number of people supported by small-scale fisheries in West Africa. Third, we provide an estimate of the landed value and profitability, with the landed value calculated as the product of the reconstructed small-scale catch (in contrast to reported landings) and the ex-vessel price from Sumaila et al. 2007; Swartz et al. (2013). Profitability, defined here as the ratio of the net income (i.e., total revenue minus total cost) to the total revenue per month, is used to assess the ability of West African small-scale fisheries to generate revenues as compared to their costs. A main outcome of this second step will be to account for the “salary” received by fishers and compare it to the poverty line. Finally, the economic impact of small-scale fisheries on African economies will be assessed in contrast to the landed value. This will account for the secondary activities related to fisheries, in particular the processing activity by women that can add up to 65% to the landed value (Roy et al., 2009).    3.2.1 Definition of poverty According to UNDP (1997) Human Development Report, “poverty means that choices most basic to human development are denied – to lead a long, healthy, creative life and to enjoy a decent standard of living, freedom, dignity, self-respect and the respect of others”. This definition highlights mostly the freedom of choice and some aspects of deprivation. Research has shown that poverty is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, which can be measured in terms of income and expenditure levels but can also be perceived in terms of individuals’ social interactions and state of mental well-being (Oduro and Aryee, 2003).   53  Poverty implies restricted access to education attainments, health, safe nutrition and access to food and water resulting in a shorter life span (Sarr, 2008). It should be noted that poverty can be difficult to define in operational terms, one attempt at operationalizing it is through the concept of a ‘poverty line’, which can be absolute, i.e., independent of a society’s standard of living, or relative to it. One economic definition of the poverty line is “the critical level on the welfare scale at which access to basic needs become restricted” (Hagenaars and van Praag, 1985), which is dependent on individual/household income (Callan and Nolan, 1991). The World Bank defines a poverty rate as “the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line”. Globally, the (absolute) poverty line is set at $1.25 USD-12005·day-1 (www.worldbank.org); under this limit, people, e.g., 40-50% of the West African population, is considered poor.   3.2.2 Definition of food security  According to Pinstrup-Andersen (2009), the definition of food security as the fact that “enough food is available, whether at the global, national, community, or household level” is restrictive to the supply side and doesn’t capture the important aspects of access to food, nutritional value and food preferences as required by the FAO definition (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009, Maxwell, 1996). Thus, food security was defined at the 1996 World Food Summit as “a condition when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO, 2005). Food security in a household means that all household members are able to access food (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009), whether directly (e.g., subsistence fisheries) or indirectly, through revenue generation.  54  Ultimately, food security can be measured by a) the amount and quality of food intake relative to an absolute health standard such as those set internationally by the World Health Organization (WHO); b) physical access to food such as direct fish supply from small-scale fisheries; and c) economic access to food through e.g., income generated by fisheries and the related processes (processing, landing, repairs etc.) and thus employment (FAO, 2005). The latter allow for a better and more diverse diet which in turn is strongly related to (a) and (b) above. Assessing food security and the contribution of, e.g., small-scale fisheries to food security, could be made through incomes (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009) and thus employment, if the assumption can be made that a reasonable share of the household income is devoted to food, which is often the case in the developing world, e.g., West Africa (Huppé et al., 2013, Maman Bachir and Ould Hamadi Cherif, 2013, Smith et al., 2006). Indeed, devoting a large fraction of one’s income to food is a common measure of poverty (Maxwell, 1988, Maxwell, 1996).  3.2.3 Definition of small-scale fisheries  There is no definition that can be applicable to all small-scale fisheries world-wide given their very dynamic nature (FAO, 2005). However, the boundaries between small-scale and large scale fisheries could be easily set using a broad range of characteristics that are common to small-scale fisheries.  Teh and Sumaila (2013) characterized small-scale fisheries as aiming towards local consumption (subsistence or sold in local markets), requiring and generating low economic input and output, generally non-motorized, conducted close to shore and which are minimally managed if at all, with traditional beliefs. However this definition would exclude newly developed “small-scale” fishing techniques where fishers motorize their boats to reach further grounds (in some cases well beyond the inshore waters), and the landless farmer and cattle-less 55  pastoralists that have recruited in the small-scale fishing sector in the last decades, notably in West Africa (Pauly, 2006a).  It further excludes small-scale fisheries aimed at export markets as included in the set of characteristics by an FAO working group (FAO and Advisory Committee on Fisheries Research, 2004) which now prevail in some countries, e.g., Senegal, and Mauritania. Therefore, we find it appropriate to broaden this set of characteristics to define small-scale fishers (especially artisanal fishers in West Africa), which should also include other characteristics: - Catches are aimed at local consumption but also export markets;  - Fisheries are labor intensive;  - Fisheries require and generate low economic input and output with fuel costs constituting most of the economic input;  - Fisheries are increasingly motorized, but with lower access to technology; - Fisheries are conducted generally close to shore;  - Fisheries are non-gender discriminative as women are also involved in this sector (Harper et al., 2013);  - Fisheries are multispecies but highly selective;  - Fisheries can be either part time or full time; - Fisheries are usually minimally managed, herein including artisanal and subsistence fisheries.    3.2.4 Data collection  Small-scale catch data per country for the West African region (Figure 3.1) encompassing the 21 countries from Morocco in the North to Namibia in the South were extracted from various catch 56  reconstruction reports9 which estimated the unreported component of small-scale fisheries catches, i.e. the portion of the artisanal catch that is not reported and the subsistence catch (Belhabib et al., 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, Dos Santos et al., 2012, Belhabib et al., Belhabib et al. 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2014f, 2014g, Belhabib and Pauly, 2014a, 2014b, Belhabib, 2014, Belhabib and Divovich, 2014, Nunoo et al., 2014, Etim et al., in press, Seto et al., in press). Catch data are presented by sector (artisanal and subsistence) and cover the period between 1950 and 2010.                                                    9 For Cameroon, data were extracted from the FAO FishStat database and then compared to national (recent) artisanal catch data estimates, which allowed filtering out industrial catches from the FAO dataset. 57   Figure 3.1 Fisher’s income in West Africa as compared to the national poverty line. Dark lines represent the national poverty line in each country; filled circles represent the ‘past’ situation, arrows represent the direction and value of the ‘present’ situation; and empty circles show the only data point available (‘present’) and how it compares to national poverty line.  3.2.5 Employment estimate Employment in small-scale fisheries of West Africa is defined as the number of full time and part time fishers employed by the small-scale sector, which encompass artisanal and subsistence [coastal lagoon and open sea] fishers [boat owners and crew]. The number of boat owners is 58  taken as the number of boats, while the crew is estimated by multiplying the average number of the crew by the number of boats per segment of the fleet. Herein, we used the weighted average equivalent number of fishers for the total artisanal fleet (Appendix A). Finally, the number of lagoon and subsistence fishers was obtained from the above-cited catch reconstruction reports. The number of people supported by West African fisheries (Dt) is obtained as the product of the number of fishers (Ft) and the number of dependents per fisher calculated as the average size per household (Ht) minus 1, to which is added the number of subsistence fishers (St). Thus Dt = Ft(Ht – 1) +St. Ht is obtained from various sources, and interpolated when needed to fill in the gaps (Appendix A).   3.2.6 Landed value and profitability The annual landed value was obtained by multiplying the estimated small-scale catch (Ct) by the ex-vessel price (Pt), which is the value of the fish at landing, i.e., Vt = Ct x Pt. Ex-vessel price data in $ US2005 were extracted from the Sea Around Us/Fisheries Economics Research Unit price database (Sumaila et al., 2007, Swartz et al., 2013). We adjusted nominal ex-vessel prices to obtain 2013 ex-vessel prices using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the World Bank database (www.woldbank.org/ddp/home [2014]). We multiplied 2013 ex-vessel prices by (1) the artisanal reported landings to estimate the reported value for artisanal fisheries; (2) the estimated small-scale (subsistence and artisanal) catch to estimate the total reconstructed small-scale catch value.   Profitability is used to assess the ability of West African fisheries to generate revenue that is over and above the cost of fishing. It represents the ratio of the net income (NI) to the total revenue 59  per month (R)10 i.e., P=NI/R, where NI = R- (Cv + Cf), where Cv denotes variable (i.e., operating costs) and Cf stands for fixed costs. Profitability was estimated across all gears, as costs were averaged to allow for harmonization and extrapolation of costs.   Studies documenting the cost of artisanal fishing were available for West Africa and are summarized in Table 3.1, which allowed us to compare the “past” situation to “present”. We adjusted costs onto current costs using CPI. Table 3.1 References used towards estimating the costs of fishing. Country Year Reference used Morocco 2001 (Malouli Idrissi et al., 2001) Morocco 2009 (ArtFiMed, 2009) Mauritania 1994 (Turay and Verstralen, 1997) Mauritania 2002 (Oceanic Developpement, 2002) Senegal 1974 (Everett, 1976) Senegal 1994 (Turay and Verstralen, 1997, Horemans, 1996b) The Gambia 1994 (Turay and Verstralen, 1997) The Gambia 1995 (Horemans et al., 1996) The Gambia 2010 (Lam et al., 2011) Cape Verde 2010 (Lam et al., 2011) Guinea Bissau 1993 (Kébé et al., 1993) Guinea Bissau 2010 (Lam et al., 2011) Guinea 1990 (Diallo and Fautrel, 1999) Guinea 1997 (Turay and Verstralen, 1997) Guinea  2000 (African Development Bank, 2000) Guinea 2010 (Belhabib et al., 2014a) Sierra Leone 1974 (Everett, 1976) Sierra Leone 2010 (Lam et al., 2011) Liberia 2010 (Lam et al., 2011) Côte d’Ivoire 1994 (Turay and Verstralen, 1997) Côte d’Ivoire 2010 (Lam et al., 2011) Ghana 1977 (Wayo Seini, 1977) Ghana 1995 (Lery et al., 1999) Ghana 2010 (Anderson et al., 2011, Nunoo et al., 2014) (Mensah, 2012) Togo 1994 (Denke, 1997) Togo 2010 (Lam et al., 2011) Benin 1994 (Turay and Verstralen, 1997) Benin 2010 (Lam et al., 2011) Nigeria 1974 (Everett, 1976) Nigeria 2010 (Olaoye et al., 2012) Cameroon 1994 (Turay and Verstralen, 1997) Cameroon 2010 (Lam et al., 2011)                                                   10 The latest data available were for 2010, which we use herein as a baseline expressed in 2013 USD. 60  Table 3.1 References used towards estimating the costs of fishing (Cont’d.). Country Year Reference used Equatorial Guinea 2010 (Lam et al., 2011) Gabon 1994 (Kébé et al., 1996) Gabon 2010 (Lam et al., 2011) Sao Tome and Principe 1994 (Horemans et al., 1994) Sao Tome and Principe 2010 (Lam et al., 2011) Congo (Brazz.) 1986 (Gobert, 1986) Congo (Brazz.) 2010 (Lam et al., 2011) Congo (Ex-Zaïre) 2010 (Lam et al., 2011) Angola 1984 (Krantz, 1984) Angola 2010 (Lam et al., 2011) Namibia 2010 (Lam et al., 2011)   3.2.7 Economic impact of West African small-scale fisheries on the economy Using the landed value as a proxy for the fishery’s economic output ignores the downstream activities related to fisheries (Christensen et al., 2014, Pontecorvo et al., 1980), which in the case of labor-intensive fisheries such as those in West Africa could greatly under-estimate the full economic impact of fisheries. For example, the processing activity by women that adds up to 65% to the landed value in Guinea would not be included (Belhabib et al., 2014a). However, as “indirect and induced multiplier effects of small-scale fishing activities are generally not disaggregated at national level and are often difficult to estimate” (FAO, 2005), the landed value is used to estimate the contribution of small-scale fisheries throughout the economy as percent of the GDP. To account for direct and indirect effects of the marine fishery on the economy, and allows for the estimation of the total output supported throughout the economy at a given fisheries landed value, a fishing output multiplier approach was developed by Dyck and Sumaila (2010). This multiplier accounts for the landed value weighted multiplier (M) and was estimated for West African countries (see Table 3.2), i.e., each dollar of the landed value generated by West African fisheries (V) can be expected to generate M dollars of downstream economic output (E), or E = V x M. 61   3.3 Results 3.3.1 Small-scale fisheries catches from West Africa Total small-scale catches in West Africa include artisanal (86 %) and subsistence (14 %) catches. Total small-scale catches increased from 599,000 t·year-1 in 1950 to a peak of 2.4 million t·year-1 in 2004 after which they plateaued at around 2.3 million t·year-1 in the late 2000s. Of this, only 1.4 million t·year-1 were reported officially, mainly through the partial inclusion of artisanal catches (Figure 3.2).  Figure 3.2 Total small-scale catches from the waters of 22 West African countries as compared to officially reported data, 1950-2010.  3.3.2 Employment generated by West African small-scale fisheries and the dependent population The number of active people within West African marine small-scale fisheries increased from 953,500 in the 1950s to over 1.7 million in 2010, of which over half (905,500) are employed by 0.00.51.01.52.02.53.01950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010Catch (t x 106) Year Sparidae Total artisanal Official data Total subsistence  62  the artisanal sector alone (Table 3.2). Although the total active population within the small-scale fisheries extractive sector (i.e., excluding other activities) represents only 1% of the 2010 total labor force of West Africa, in poor countries such as Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Ghana and Gabon, it is as high as 20% of the labor force and a quarter of the coastal population (Table 3.2). The number of dependents presented in Table 3.2 was estimated at 5 million people, which together with a total employment of 1.7 million people for 2010, represented around 18 % of the West African coastal population. This rate has been increasing since the early 2000s (coastal population 30 million for a total of 4.8 million people depending on marine small-scale fisheries, i.e. 16 %).        63  Table 3.2 Employment (artisanal and subsistence fishers) generated by West African fisheries (103) between 1950 and 2010 and the number of artisanal fishers (2010). Country   1950s   1960s   1970s   1980s   1990s   2000s   2010   Artisanal fishers (2010) Dependents (2010) Labor force (2010) Coastal population (2010) Morocco 7.2 6.8 6.3 8.3 20.5 54.9 75.7 75.6 294.8 11,371.6 7,163.4 Mauritania 1.9 2.4 2.8 3.6 11.0 18.4 19.4 16.7 82.8 1,150.0 478.5 Senegal 7.7 13.3 17.9 43.4 51.9 55.6 58.2 56.8 438.8 5,569.6 4,149.8 The Gambia 0.4 0.7 1.4 2.3 3.5 4.1 4.4 1.4 18.2 10,204.9 950.2 Cape Verde 0.8 1.3 1.5 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.4 3.4 13.2 8,157.9 491.3 Guinea Bissau 100.6 122.0 143.3 161.1 178.6 207.9 226.4 5.9 255.2 673.8 681.6 Guinea 179.5 240.1 311.6 315.6 200.1 89.7 94.5 24.9 289.4 704.6 1,319.8 Sierra Leone 13.1 15.0 17.8 21.5 17.5 30.4 35.2 35.2 172.5 2,232.5 1,440.4 Liberia 4.5 5.6 4.9 5.4 3.7 9.2 14.4 8.0 39.3 1,372.3 993.5 Côte d'Ivoire 11.8 16.2 17.1 14.4 15.2 15.3 14.1 8.3 64.0 221.0 1,963.5 Ghana 484.0 523.8 546.6 535.3 554.1 606.4 636.9 249.7 1,573.2 4,463.8 4,157.6 Togo 4.9 7.0 8.8 6.5 6.0 6.3 6.6 5.0 26.6 2,951.7 1,214.6 Benin 15.1 31.8 46.0 49.9 61.7 71.9 74.2 64.2 263.6 3,917.0 1,618.2 Nigeria 12.8 23.8 34.8 58.2 118.3 152.0 168.0 168.0 621.6 49,706.6 3,746.9 Cameroon 5.0 5.7 12.2 18.9 22.2 22.7 22.7 22.7 77.3 7,442.3 1,833.9 Equ. Guinea 4.4 5.2 4.6 4.7 12.6 9.8 12.2 6.1 29.3 365.8 241.5 Gabon 59.7 58.7 92.1 125.0 158.5 165.2 96.3 10.0 126.3 574.0 783.4 Sao T. & Princ. 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.8 2.8 12.6 62.4 160.7 Congo (Brazz.)  7.1 9.3 12.8 16.8 22.2 28.5 29.5 2.6 35.3 1,677.1 723.5 Congo (ex-Z.) 15.4 16.4 16.9 17.4 18.2 17.6 10.8 3.2 21.5 24,385.9 44.6 Angola 16.3 20.3 23.6 37.0 75.1 110.0 135.0 135.0 540.0 7,111.7 3,612.5 Namibia 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 831.1 102.7 Total 953.5 1,126.8 1,325.1 1,450.4 1,556.4 1,681.8 1,740.9 905.6 4,995.6 145,147.6 37,872.0  64  3.3.3 Economic analysis of West African small-scale fisheries 3.3.3.1 Landed value The economic analysis revealed that ex-vessel prices did not vary greatly during the 1950-1970 time period, oscillating between a minimum of $830 US∙t-1 and a maximum of $1,200 US∙t-1 with however a great variability per country (up to 70%). Ex-vessel prices plateaued at around $2,600 US∙t-1 between the early 1970s and the early 1980s, then decreased to $1,500 US∙t-1 in 1991 due to the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the political situation in Equatorial Guinea and overall highly variable inflation rates, which likely explained ex-vessel price variation noted later on. The landed value of total small-scale catches was estimated at $ 114 billion US between 1950 and 2010, which is twice higher than the value of reported landings ($52.9 billion US). The total landed value was relatively constant in the past, at an average of $ 519 million US between 1950 and 1960, compared to a value of reported landings of $86 million US. The landed value of total small-scale catches increased to a first peak of $3.6 billion US in 1982, before the declaration of most of EEZs of West African countries. The landed value of total small-scale fisheries was then 60% higher than the value of reported landings (Figure 3.3). The landed value of total small-scale fisheries declined rapidly (due to the reasons mentioned above) to less than $1.5 billion US in 1991 and varied later on to plateau at around $3.5 billion US in the late 2000s compared to a landed value of reported catches of $1.7 billion US (Figure 3.3). Thus, this study reveals that the socio-economic contribution of small-scale fisheries in West Africa was under-evaluated.   65   Figure 3.3 Economic indicators for West African small-scale fisheries showing the real landed value of reported and total small-scale catches, 1950-2010.  3.3.3.2 Profitability Overall, the average net monthly income was estimated at $275 ± 91 US∙fisher-1·month-1 for past time periods and decreased to $248 ± 62 US∙fisher-1·month-1 which represents a slight decrease compared to a boat owner net income of $1,753 ± 623 US∙fisher-1·month-1 which increased to $2,073 ± 1,089 US∙fisher-1·month-1 more recently. This disparity is mainly due to operating costs assumed by the crew and the boat owner being higher than depreciation (fixed) costs which given the relatively high age of fleets is negligible. Fuel costs for example represent around 40% ± 10% of total costs. This adds to a sharing system that provides the boat owner with over 52% of the revenues after operating costs are removed. Although boat owner income increased, profitability has decreased from 47% ± 8% to 41% ± 9% as costs increased from $208 ± 187 US∙boat-1·month-1 to $270 ± 178 US∙boat-1·month-1. Although averages provide an overall overview of the profitability of West African small-scale fisheries, the significant discrepancies 0.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.01950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010Landed value (109  US$) Tear Reported catch  Total small-scale 66  in the estimates per country are worth noting. Indeed, although the average fisher’s daily income is well above the international poverty line (NPL) set at $1.25 US·day-1, fisher’s income in Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Ghana, Togo, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe and the Congo (ex-Zaire) has declined over time to be under the nationally set poverty line (Figure 3.1, also see Table 3.3). Small-scale fisher’s income shows a significant improvement in Angola, Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, while despite being well over the poverty line, it dangerously declined in the Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d’Ivoire and Morocco.   It is worth mentioning that the average West African fisher household comprises 6 people, which means that each member of the household receives a net benefit of $1.38 US∙person-1·day-1, which is below the average national poverty line of $1.9 US∙person-1·day-1 estimated herein. Thus, if one assumes fishing is the main activity of the household, this dangerously threatens the livelihood of some 5.9 million people in West Africa.               67  Table 3.3 Profitability and fisher's income from West African small-scale fisheries.  Net Income USD·day-1 Fisher's income USD·day-1 Profitability % Total costs USD·month-1 NPL (USD·day-1) Country Past Present Past Present Past Present Past Present Present Angola 10.6 62.7 1.9 8.2 44 58 121.1 43.6 1.6 Benin 34.3 29.8 5.7 5.7 49 47 46.8 122.4 2.5 Cameroon 12.6 25.3 1.4 5.8 46 53 65.1 142.1 4.9 Cape Verde  816.5  35.3  48  691.0 1.1 Congo (Brazz.) 384.8 224.0 53.5 31.2 59 59 80.2 79.9 1.6 Congo (ex-Zaire)  0.5  0.2  20  46.6 2.8 Equatorial Guinea  9.2  3.2  48  96.9 2.0 Gabon  4.9  1.0  46 69.8 69.8 1.8 Gambia 33.0 48.3 4.9 19.4 56 56 70.8 45.5 2.0 Ghana 112.8 27.9 6.9 1.5 63 45 11.0 523.0 0.7 Guinea 15.0 4.1 2.1 1.7 29 5 793.2 1,790.0 2.7 Guinea Bissau 9.8 9.4 0.6 0.6 68 68 66.9 62.2 1.1 Côte d'Ivoire 41.2 46.1 9.5 5.9 42 41 1.1 34.2 1.1 Mauritania 7.3 1.1 3.0 3.1 11 3 1,355.3 802.8 0.9 Morocco 85.5 54.5 28.2 5.6 67 49 157.2 811.1 1.4 Namibia  0.4    5  280.2  Nigeria 0.9 4.7 0.2 3.8 34 48 27.3 9.2 1.6 Sao T.& Princ.  2.4  1.5  40  53.7 3.1 Senegal 92.2 30.1 7.6 13.5 55% 35 28.5 38.9 1.5 Sierra Leone 19.0 44.0 5.8 18.0 40 43 174.2 98.1 1.3 Togo 51.2 28.8 4.6 2.3 49 49 86.9 35.6 2.2 Liberia  46.1  5.9  41  58.0 1.3 Average 60.7 69.1 91 8.4 47 41 197.2 269.8 1.9   3.3.4 Economic impact of West African small-scale fisheries on the economy  Each dollar produced by the small-scale fisheries of West Africa injects 4.3 $ into the economy. Thus, the total current total landed value estimated at $3.42 billion US generated a potential economic output of $14.7 billion US of which 43 % was generated by the unaccounted value.  The latter could generate potentially $6.3 billion US output towards the economy of West Africa. 68  The total value injected by small-scale fisheries to the economy is equivalent to 6 % on average of the 2010 gross domestic product (GDP) of the 22 West African countries. Higher resolution estimates (per country, see Table 3.3) show that this contribution is highly variable (66 % variability range). Indeed, the lowest contribution to GDP (less than 1%) was observed for Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo (ex-Zaire) and Namibia.   The highest contribution to GDP was estimated for Sierra Leone with almost 40%, Cape Verde with 24% and the Gambia with 20%. Results show also that the contribution of small-scale fisheries to GDP was in countries with no fishing tradition (e.g., Mauritania, Liberia) higher than countries with a fishing tradition such as Senegal with only 3% (Table 3.4).               69  Table 3.4 Contribution of small-scale fisheries to the economy of West Africa (2010).   Revenue ($ million USD·year-1) Economic multiplier  GDP billion ($ billion USD·year-1) Total value ($ million USD·year-1) Contribution to GDP % Angola 360.9 1.37 82.5 494.4 1 Benin 27.1 3.14 6.5 85.2 1 Cameroon 126.4 1.31 24.5 165.6 1 Cape Verde 128.2 3.14 1.7 402.4 24 Congo (Brazz.) 200.1 1.31 13.1 262.2 2 Congo (ex-Zaire) 1.6 1.39 13.1 2.2 <1 Equatorial Guinea 24.0 1.30 12.3 31.2 <1 Gabon 13.0 1.31 14.5 17.0 <1 Gambia 60.1 3.15 1.0 189.4 20 Ghana 341.6 3.15 39.2 1076.0 3 Guinea 63.1 3.14 4.7 198.0 4 Guinea Bissau 14.9 3.16 0.8 47.1 6 Côte d'Ivoire 70.3 3.15 22.9 221.5 1 Mauritania 141.8 3.15 3.7 446.8 12 Morocco 635.5 1.10 90.8 699.1 1 Namibia 0.6 1.10 11.0 0.6 <1 Nigeria 477.2 18.23 228.6 8700.1 4 Sao T. & Princ. 7.9 1.30 0.2 10.3 5 Senegal 339.3 1.20 12.9 407.2 3 Sierra Leone 332.0 3.15 2.8 1045.7 38 Togo 9.2 3.15 3.1 28.8 1 Liberia 42.3 3.14 1.3 132.7 10 Average         6          3.4 Discussion and conclusion This chapter is the first to attempt a comprehensive assessment of the contribution of West African small-scale fisheries to the economy and how this, through employment and income generation, relate to poverty and thus food security.  Overall, small-scale fisheries of West Africa employ 1.7 million people compared to 1 million fishers estimated officially (FAO, 2009b). The reason behind this discrepancy lies in the 70  inclusion in the present study of subsistence fishers as the bottom-up estimation of the number of artisanal fishers resulted in a number slightly (10%) lower than official estimates.  The increasing number of total people relying on fisheries from 16% of the coastal population to 18%, i.e. 2% per decade, illustrates the “staple” role that fisheries play in West Africa as local populations escape climate-induced failing agriculture towards the coast (Sarr, 2008). On the other hand, while the contribution of small-scale fisheries to employment is increasing, the landed value decreasing during the last few years and so did the contribution to the GDP.   However, an overall low contribution to GDP does not come to undermine the important role that small-scale fisheries play in West Africa. Indeed, in Gabon, the Congo (ex-Zaire) and Equatorial Guinea where the contribution to GDP was low (mainly because of the under-developed nature of fisheries and the predominance of other sectors such as the oil industry), almost half of the coastal population relies on fish for their food and livelihood, despite fishers income being below or dangerously approaching the poverty line. This suggests that the key role of fisheries does not lie in their cash value contribution to the economy at large, but rather in it use  as a safety net for established and new fishers and their families (Béné, 2006, Béné et al., 2007).  Also, as opposed to a general perception, the income received by small-scale fishers is generally above the poverty line, as also noted by Pauly (1976)for lagoon fishers in Ghana. However, environmental degradation e.g., over-exploitation, resulted in the expansion of the fishing effort 71  and costs as illustrated above, thus leading to declining fishers income in 50 % of the cases. This in turn has resulted in fisher’s income approaching the poverty line.  At first hand, it appears “small-scale fisheries can generate significant profit” (FAO, 2003b) as illustrated by the profitability analysis herein. However, the hypothesis that they can “prove resilient to shocks and crises” and “contribute to poverty alleviation” (FAO 2003) under the current over-exploitation scheme and other externalities such as illegal fishing is very optimistic, given that their costs are increasing, leading to declining profitability and incomes (Béné, 2004). Indeed, it appears “shocks and crises” in West Africa have surpassed the threshold that would allow further resilience in the only region of the world where hunger and poverty are projected to worsen in the next decade (International Food Policy Researcg Institute, 2002).  The present study illustrates the important role that small-scale fisheries play in West Africa, through employment generation, income, and contribution to the overall economy. Despite being profitable, their declining catches, economic contribution and increasing costs adds a twist to the struggle of artisanal fishers facing over-exploitation and increasing illegal fishing (Belhabib et al., 2014e) and the issue of food security. To overcome this situation, countries of West Africa could invest in more efficient Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS) strategies to tackle illegal fleets in their waters. Artisanal fisheries in Sierra Leone whose industrial fisheries MCS has significantly improved showed improvement through increasing income and profitability and decreasing costs of fishing of artisanal fisheries (Belhabib et al., 2014a). Another strategy would be to monitor the growth of artisanal fisheries which expansion could be revealed to be difficult to manage without proper knowledge, resulting in overcapacity (e.g., Senegal), and finally, the creation of community based MPA may work towards limiting the artisanal effort, and thus 72  reducing the cost of fishers. These MPAs have to be properly controlled and their socio-economic effects properly monitored.    73  Chapter 4: Euros vs. Yuan: a first attempt at comparing European and Chinese fishing access in West Africa 4.1 Introduction Increasing seafood demand, particularly in Europe and Asia, and the depletion of local fish stocks contributed greatly to the growth of heavily subsidized distant-water fleets (DWF) from Europe and Northeast Asia, which have shifted their effort towards the ‘south’, i.e., to the developing world (Bonfil et al., 1998).  Thus, over 70% of the European Union (EU) seafood is now imported from outside EU waters, mostly from the developing world (Pauly et al., 2002a, Swartz et al., 2010, Sumaila et al., 2010, Paquotte and Lem, 2006). It is worth noting that the situation is similar for Japan (Swartz et al., 2010) and likely also for China (Pauly et al., 2013a).  The lack of adequate financial and technical resources often limits proper monitoring, control and enforcement of industrial foreign fishing activities in the developing world, resulting in overfishing and under-reported and unsustainable catches (Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002, Iheduru, 1995, Belhabib et al., 2012a, Porter, 1997). Catch data by DWF, in instances where host countries’ monitoring and surveillance capacity is low, are rarely reliable (Kaczynski, 1989, Pauly, 2009). This often leads to large gaps between reality and official statistics provided to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).  Only a few developing countries have exploited their offshore stocks themselves, due to a general lack of technical, financial and governance infrastructure to develop and maintain industrial fishing vessels. Ghana and Thailand are two exceptions that come to mind, see Atta‐74  Mills et al. (2004) and Pauly and Chuenpagdee (2003), respectively. This constrains most developing countries to selling the so-called ‘surplus’ between the domestically inaccessible maximum sustainable yield and their domestic fisheries landings (Chen, 2010). Indeed, under the 1980s United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), countries shall provide access to this surplus to other countries through diverse access agreements (Article 62.2, UN, 1982). The host country, however, may prioritize the local economy and regional needs before granting fishing access to other countries; yet, this is rarely the case for economically weak countries struggling to obtain foreign currency and service their external debts (Vidal, 2012b). Furthermore, many countries prefer short-term benefits through fisheries access agreements where fees are negotiated based on the income generated by the foreign fishing capacity rather than (and regardless of) a sustainable catch quota (Iheduru, 1995) that is processed at home to generate much needed jobs and added value (Dyck and Sumaila, 2010). Thus, their governments fail to use potential maximum sustainable yields and realistic catch estimates to limit the number and size of foreign vessels that access their fishing grounds.  Another issue is the myth that “there are no data” to consider appropriate and sustainable levels of catches. While it is true that governments of developing countries rarely have sound science-based fisheries policies, this is not really based on a “lack of data”. Rather, it is mostly due to the lack of (support for) scientists to make sense of available data on catch and fishing effort by various fleets, and of ancillary economic data. As an example, we demonstrate that the data available on European and Chinese distant-water fisheries in West Africa are sufficient for inferences on their catch and its value, and for first, if tentative, comparisons between the fees 75  that the EU and China are paying in return for the right to fish in West Africa, all these being items that are highly relevant to fisheries policy.  4.2 Fishing opportunities off West Africa 4.2.1 Study area Here, West Africa (Figure 4.1) refers to the area between the Strait of Gibraltar (36° 8' N and 5° 21' W) and the extreme south of Namibia (17°15'S, 11°48'E), i.e., excluding South Africa. This area, encompassed within FAO statistical areas 34 (Eastern Central Atlantic) and 47 (South Eastern Atlantic) includes the following countries: Morocco (incl. Western Sahara), Mauritania, Cape Verde, Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (ex-Zaire), Angola and Namibia (Figure 4.1). This study excludes Cameroon as the ‘reconstruction’ of the catches in its EEZ (including unreported catches by the EU and China) was not available at the time of writing. [note that Cameroon has a relatively small maritime domain for the region, 14,693 km2 or 0.3%] Namibia catch data included only the EU component before the early 2000s. 76   Figure 4.1 Exclusive Economic Zone waters of the West African countries considered here, also showing the 2000-2010 average annual catch and landed value of their marine fisheries, incl. distant-water fleets.  77  4.2.2 Foreign access to offshore resources  In West Africa, high marine productivity induced by the Canary Current (Arístegui et al., 2009), Guinea Current (Ukwe et al., 2003) and Benguela Current upwelling systems (McGlade et al., 2002, Hutchings et al., 2009), the inability of local fleets to access offshore resources, the depletion of fish stocks in other parts of the world, and increasing global fish demand are all drivers for foreign fishing (Kaczynski, 1989, Goffinet, 1992, Balguerías et al., 2000, Kaczynski and Looney, 2000). Indeed, West Africa has been attractive to developed countries for some time through fishing agreements or illegal fishing (Agnew et al., 2009, Alder and Sumaila, 2004). Fishing agreements are here defined as the right to access living marine resources (here collectively defined as ‘fish’) within a host country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in exchange for financial compensation. Legal access can be under bilateral or multilateral agreements between (a) the host government and an inter-government organization like the European Union (EU), for example, the Fishing Partnership Agreements (FPAs), (b) the host government and DWF flag-country government, and c) a company and the host government, for example under (private) joint venture agreements (so-called ‘second generation agreements’), whose term and conditions are often obscure (Standing, 2008). Second generation agreements generally involve either the charter or the (temporary) transfer of fishing vessels to a third country, which in principle translates into reflagging industrial fleets to the host country. For example, most of the Mauritanian industrial fleet consists of Chinese-Mauritanian joint ventures, and the Senegalese industrial fleet consists largely of EU reflagged vessels (Obaidullah and Osinga, 2010, Belhabib et al., 2012b). Just like China, EU fleets are involved in a large number of joint ventures with, e.g., Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Gabon, Angola and Namibia in 78  West Africa. The latest official estimate of landings and effort was available for 1997 when China landed 57,500 tonnes using around 53 vessels under the flags of West African countries (COFREPECHE, 2000).  Alder and Sumaila (2004) estimated that fishing agreements to access West African fishing grounds increased following the global demand of fish, from 36 agreements in the 1960s to 242 by the 1980s (following the declaration of EEZs based on UNCLOS) and 302 agreements in the early 2000s. These numbers exclude the ‘domestic’ (offshore) fleets, which in most cases consist of reflagged European and Chinese vessels (Pauly et al., 2012, Obaidullah and Osinga, 2010, Belhabib et al., 2012b). Indeed, more recently, figures show that industrial fishing vessels in the West African Sub-Region alone (encompassing 7 countries from Mauritania in the north to Sierra Leone in the south) reached over a thousand vessels, including 700 foreign vessels from the EU, China and South Korea (Ndiaye, 2011). One consequence of this is that fish caught in West Africa contributes about 25% of fish caught by European countries (Alder and Sumaila, 2004).   The political and economic bargaining power of most West African countries is low, and thus, the benefits generated from West African fisheries resources are often not equitably shared between West African host countries and DWF countries (Carevich, 1998, Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002, Iheduru, 1995). Also, many of these West African countries lack the resources for monitoring and enforcing conditions underpinning these access agreements. Terms and conditions accessed at http://eur-lex.europa.eu for West Africa usually (but not exclusively) lie in the offloading of catches in host country ports, reporting catches to host countries, paying for 79  extra capacity, and finally paying a negotiated amount in exchange of access to the resources of West African countries.  More commonly, however, the amount paid covers mostly the access to resources within Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of West African countries, with no consideration [at least in reality] for the state of the resource, human rights or the governance level within the country. This is particularly true when these countries are heavily dependent on access payments for their foreign exchange (Chen, 2010), despite or in violation of international laws and human rights11 issues (Ilnyckyj, 2007, Lamm, 2011), regardless of the state of already fully- or over-exploited resources, and/or under obscure conditions involving, e.g., corruption and blackmail (Pauly, 2009).  Abundant and valuable resources and poor monitoring/enforcement as a result of problem-ridden governance provide perfect conditions for largely unregulated and often illegal foreign fishing off West Africa. Fishing access agreements allowed West African countries to capture part of the value of their fisheries resources, which were accessible to DWF countries for free prior to the declaration of their EEZs (beyond then established territorial waters). However, the financial compensation received, the economical returns on development, the coherence and even the legality of mainly the EU agreements were often questioned, as they are easily accessed. Yet, so far, only a few studies had measured the income generated under these or any other agreements (Acheampong, 1998, Ilnyckyj, 2007, Iheduru, 1995, Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002, Le Manach et al., 2012). France, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy are the main countries acting under public                                                  11 This may include the right to adequate food. The violation of this right is disputable. Indeed, by definition, the right to adequate food is realized when every person has physical and economic access to adequate food; a government may justify foreign fishing access agreement as a tool to ‘ensure’ such right is met rather than as a violation, as fishing access agreements have an economic value. Moreover, the concept of ‘right to adequate food’ itself may be contested by the fact that no government can insure that all its citizens have adequate access to food at all times.  80  EU-Africa agreements. Other countries from Western, Northern and Eastern Europe, Asia, Flag of Convenience countries (FoC) and others also fish extensively in West Africa (see Table 4.1 for references).  Table 4.1 Average annual reconstructed and reported catches (2000-2010) by the EU and China from West African waters (t·103). Country Reconstructed catch (t•103) Reference Reported catch (t•103)  EU China  EU China Morocco 522.4 595.7 (Belhabib et al., 2012c, 2012d) 168.8 42.0 Mauritania 618.7 841.5 (Belhabib et al., 2012b) 143.0 91.2 Senegal 85.7 42.2 (Belhabib et al., 2014d) 23.8 0.9 Cape Verde 19.1 13.9 (Dos Santos et al., 2012) 6.2 1.4 The Gambia 20.8 10.1 (Belhabib et al., 2013b) 6.7 0.8 Guinea Bissau 73.4 88.5 (Belhabib et al., 2014f) 21.8 7.5 Guinea 333.3 49.1 (Belhabib et al., 2012a) 106.8 2.9 Sierra Leone 18.5 19.7 (Seto et al., in press) 5.9 0.2 Liberia 31.3 23.3 (Belhabib et al., 2013c) 4.7 0.8 Côte d’Ivoire 3.0 84.8 (Belhabib, 2014a) 0.9 1.3 Ghana 1.4 11.9 (Nunoo et al., 2014) 0.0 1.2 Togo 11.0 17.1 (Belhabib et al., 2014d) 3.6 0.5 Benin 1.2 2.3 (Belhabib and Pauly, 2014a) 1.2 0.4 Nigeria* 0.0 168.5 (Etim et al., in press) 0.0 0.0 Cameroon** NA NA NA NA NA Equatorial Guinea 9.0 4.9 (Belhabib et al., 2014b) 2.9 0.5 Sao Tome & Prin. 6.6 0.2 (Belhabib, 2014b) 2.1 <0.1 Gabon 25.2 55.2 (Belhabib, 2014c) 8.1 4.7 Congo (Brazz.) 0.0 23.5 (Belhabib and Pauly, 2014b) 0.0 2.1 Congo (ex-Zaire) 0.0 11.7 (Chauveau et al., 2000) 0.0 1.1 Angola 56.3 186.9 (Belhabib and Divovich, 2014) 17.8 19.7 Namibia*** NA NA NA NA NA Total 1,836.9 2,251.0  524.3 179.2 *No documented fishing operations by the EU; ** Reconstructed catches were not available for Cameroon at the time of the study; *** We could not retrace Chinese legal catches from Namibia since all foreign vessels operating in Namibia have to be flagged to Namibia. Having vessel information would have allowed however the identification of the beneficial ownership of vessels; evidence of reflagging to China between 2000 and 2010 was scarce and was not sufficient to estimates the legal catches of Chinese vessels reflagged to Namibia.  Growing Chinese engagement in Africa has drawn significant attention in Europe (Tull, 2008, Blomeyer et al., 2012a, Beuret et al., 2009). In the fisheries sector, increasing fishing effort by 81  Europe and China on the same resources over time suggests increasing competition to secure access to West African fishing grounds (Plage, 2001). In any rational economic market, competition to acquire a limited resource, i.e., in high demand, leads to higher prices for this resource, in this case, access to highly valuable fishing grounds. In West Africa, despite increasing competition between the EU and China (and others), which should imply a high demand for West African resources (particularly those in the north), Europe pays very different compensation to, e.g., Morocco and Mauritania (see agreements at http://eur-lex.europa.eu), which provides evidence of assigning low value to fish that command high demand. On the other hand, the increasing scarcity of fish resources, driven and caused in part by illegal foreign fishing and the expansion of domestic small-scale fishing, creates a vicious circle where, driven by declining stocks, fishing is temporally and spatially expanding to offshore waters by the artisanal fleets (Belhabib et al., 2014e) and near-shore waters by industrial vessels, including into waters frequently legally reserved for the exclusive use of domestic small-scale fishers (e.g., Gorez, 2010).  4.2.3 Importance and impacts of fishing on local communities In West Africa, fisheries account for over 20% of the primary sector (FAO, 2006). Also the jobs provided by the fisheries sector allow people to purchase high calorie staples such as rice and wheat. Growing occurrence and increasing intensity of climate events (e.g., cyclical droughts) drive populations to the coast in search for alternatives to agriculture and pastoralism, leading to increasing domestic fishing pressures (Pauly, 1990, Njock, 2007, Pauly, 2006). In turn, fisheries are sensitive to climate change, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (Allison et al., 2009b), and where food security is highly dependent on fish (Lam et al., 2012b). It is worth considering the 82  conundrum that collapsing fisheries and low income from fishing may result in trapping coastal populations between failing agriculture as droughts occurrence and intensity increase and failing fisheries. Overexploitation of fish stocks, the shift towards higher market value species and export subsidies (e.g., export tax credits) threaten the integrity of domestic food security in host countries (WorldFishCenter, 2005, Kent, 1997). Increasing exports to Europe limit the range of fish available for consumption by local populations to small pelagic species, whose abundance is strongly climate dependent (Lam et al., 2012). This puts further pressure on already heavily exploited stocks (by foreign fleets), thus reducing fish supply at a regional and domestic level (Failler and Samb, 2005).  4.2.4 Value of West African fisheries to EU and Chinese distant water fleets For the purpose of analyzing fisheries policy and foreign trade, landed values of catches are highly relevant. Indeed, these values drive the behavior of the heavily subsidized DWFs. Compensation for West African fisheries would be expected to be low, and the landed value in the international market more important given increasing foreign fishing capacity. Moreover, local governments of West Africa are unable to enhance domestic food security or implement poverty reduction strategies, with increasing competition between DWFs and with unknown or under-reported catches. The compensation received by West African countries under access agreements is often opaque and the conditions under which these agreements are signed are often confidential, except for the EU FPAs. However, even FPAs (or simply ‘fishing agreements’ prior to 2004) were shown to be unbalanced in terms of past and present compensation value (Le 83  Manach et al., 2012), and in terms of overcapacity and reporting (Sumaila and Pauly, 2006)12. Moreover, if foreign fleets under-report their catches, the financial compensation for access agreements or joint ventures will not reflect the actual landed value of foreign catches from West African resources. Here, we define the value of foreign catches as the value of total reported and unreported catches. Thus, the issue of unreported, and potentially illegal catches, is important when assessing the compensation received. Furthermore, it raises the question of accountability at an international level: who is to be held responsible for under-reporting and illegal fishing of these fleets?  4.2.5 Objective of the study The focus of this study is to evaluate and compare the EU-West Africa and China-West Africa fishing agreements with regards to the compensation West African countries receive from the EU and China.  As a first step, we investigate the reliability of fisheries catch data by countries of the EU and China, by comparing official catch data to more comprehensive literature-based reconstructed (sensu Zeller et al., 2007a) fisheries catches by the EU and China. The overall landed value of Chinese and EU fisheries off West African countries is estimated. Then, given the negative European perception of China’s growing engagement with West African countries (Tull, 2008), a per-country analysis will attempt to compare how Europe, under the EU-West African FPAs performs relative to Chinese agreements in terms of a) illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing; b) amount of compensation; and c) patterns of exploitation of resource use.                                                  12 Note that the ‘value’ of the catch taken by foreign fleets is always taken to be only its ex-vessel value, without value-added contributions. This is the reason why host countries often insist on at least some of the catch of DWFs to be landed and processed locally. However, this issue is not dealt with here and requires further research.  84  4.3 Material and methods 4.3.1 Catches of the EU and China We extracted industrial foreign catch data estimated using a bottom-up catch reconstruction approach (Zeller et al., 2007a) for the EEZs of the West African countries listed above, excluding Cameroon between 1950-2010 and Namibia during the 2000s, whose industrial catches are considered domestic (see Table 4.1) and refer to these data as ‘reconstructed catches’. One basic assumption of this method is rejecting zero as a reasonable estimate for a fisheries component that is known to exist, but is not recorded officially (Pauly, 1998a). For example, an illegal trawl fishery, while its catch may be unknown, cannot have a catch of zero. Instead, we make the reasonable assumption that illegal foreign fleets, even where they are subsidized, have to recover a large fraction of the variable cost of their fishing operations, thus providing a baseline enabling the estimation of a minimum catch (Pauly et al., 2013a). Catches reconstructed on this basis therefore include legal (but unreported) and illegal (and unreported) components by fleets from different parts of the world. Herein, we define legal catches as those obtained under legal fishing agreements regardless of adherence to host countries’ fishing regulations. These include catches by licensed foreign vessels fishing in prohibited artisanal fishing areas, using illegal gear, etc., as these catches are accounted for in legal catch estimations and are most likely a matter of domestic regulation violations rather than international crimes (INTERPOL, 2010, UNDOC, 2011).   Official (reported) catch data by DWFs as reported to and by FAO cover the entire Eastern Central Atlantic (FAO area 34) and the Southeastern Atlantic (FAO area 47), and do not refer to specific EEZs. Therefore, to be able to compare the reconstructed catch data to official reported 85  data, we used the catch data allocation approach developed by the Sea Around Us (Watson et al., 2004), which allocated catches to each EEZ in the FAO area studied from 1950 to 2006, updated to 2010 assuming the same spatial allocation for reported catches, i.e. proportionality. This approach allows to allocate landing statistics pertaining to huge FAO statistical areas, to EEZs and thus obtain informative catch distributions. On the other hand, proportionality assumes that unreported catches are correlated with reported catches meaning that the catch of the fleet within a certain EEZ is high, the higher their reported catch will be. The weakness of this approach consists in its inability to address the differences in fleet behavior as it assumes that all fleets behave similarly. We excluded Namibia as Namibian catches were considered domestic after independence. We then compared these reported catches to the reconstructed catches, and analyzed how Chinese and EU-West Africa agreements were performing.  4.3.2 Landed value of West African fisheries operated by the EU and China Landed value is defined herein as the product of the average ex-vessel price and landings (including reported, unreported and illegal landings), and is computed using West African ex-vessel fish prices (see below). Landed value in West Africa is thus an underestimate of potential catch value, as it disregards the potential value of discards by foreign fleets, whose discards usually consist of species that would be marketable on West African markets.   To derive the landed value of the catch taken by EU and Chinese fleets, we used reconstructed catch data by country (Table 4.1), and average ex-vessel prices (in 2005 USD per tonne) extracted from Swartz et al. (2013) for the period 2000 to 2010. We used the World Bank’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) per country to convert real prices to actual 2013 USD per tonne 86  [2013 Price = [2000 to 2010] Price x (2013 CPI/2005 CPI)]. Using ex-vessel prices observed in regional markets to compute the landed value allows comparisons of landed values by foreign countries regardless of price differences due to fish demand and supply on the international (global) market. The landed value is thus obtained as the product of the average ex-vessel prices in 2013 USD times the corresponding reconstructed catch in each EEZ. We conducted the same analysis for EU and Chinese catches (Table 4.1).    4.3.3 Agreement value and landed value: How the EU compares to China For a first comparison of landed value of the catch to the compensation paid by the EU and China under increasing competition to access the West African fishing grounds, we derived the average annual amount received by each of the West African countries listed above (Table 4.1) for 2010 or at the time of the latest fishing agreement prior to 2010.   European FPA data were available from the European Union law database (http://eur-lex.europa.eu). The amounts paid by the EU to access West African fisheries under FPAs (in Euro and including licence fees and other fees) were collected from the EU law database, converted into USD using the annual Euro to USD exchange rate for 2010, and then expressed in 2013 USD using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).   In contrast to the FPAs of the EU, Chinese-West African agreements are often include joint ventures and reflagged vessels, despite the agreements involving government entities. The Chinese agreements considered here are those that fit this condition, i.e., they were inter-87  governmental agreement, rather than agreements between companies, and thus they do not fit the second generation agreement definition.  Although some China-West Africa agreements were documented, the amounts involved are often confidential or expressed in terms of a ‘project value’ provided in exchange for fishing access (e.g., construction of an official buildings in Gabon, provision of military jets in Mauritania, etc.). We consider the value of these projects as the value of the agreement itself when there is direct evidence that the project occurred in exchange for fishing access for the Chinese fleet, rather than as part of a package offered by China for several sectors including fisheries. Here, the value of such projects was assessed based largely on media reports and economic news (see Table 4.2 for examples and Appendix B for a comprehensive account). One transparent example was the 150 million USD (Anon., 2002) that China paid to Morocco between 1988 and 2002 for all fishing access agreements and for joint ventures involving 26 companies13 (Table 4.2). In contrast, Chinese fees paid to Mauritania were too opaque to be identified, other than in the very recent Mauritania-China Agreement, with a compensation of 100 million USD for 25 years (CFFA, 2012, Table 4.2; Cherif, 2011). The low transparency of Chinese fisheries agreements may have introduced a bias in the assessment conducted here. Hopefully, future Chinese agreements (or more detailed studies) will shed more light on this issue. In the meantime, we present our tentative result in the hope that it will contribute to more transparency in the future.                                                   13 Based on an interview of the Chinese ambassador in Morocco, Mr. S. E. M. Gong Yuanxing by the local newspaper Le Matin (June 12, 2008); available at http://ma.china-embassy.org/fra/xwdt/t464813.htm 88  We compare the financial compensation paid by the EU and China for fishing access to the landed value of reported catches which we herein call the "official compensation rate", and to the total landed value by EU member countries and China based on reconstructed catches (“actual compensation rate”). We then estimated the difference between these two compensation rates as the minimum economic loss for West African countries. Therefore, to conduct this exercise, two conditions needed to be present: first, both EU and China had to have an agreement with the country under consideration; second, the amount paid for access (as defined above) had to be documented in some manner (real value, project value or anecdotal account). In the absence of a fishing agreement, catches (that are not under joint ventures or those considered domestic because of reflagging practices by the EU), and therefore their value, are considered illegal. This allowed quantifying the fraction of the landed value that was covered by fishing agreements by both Europe and China.           89  Table 4.2 Examples of computations of amount of Chinese payments to West African countries in exchange for fishing access. Item Country Methods and references Port infrastructure Mauritania Mauritania received a payment of 282 million USD (Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, 2013). We assumed construction period of 4 years, within which the project had to be delivered, the result was then converted to 2013 USD using CPI. Construction of a dam and stadium* Cape Verde China funded the construction of a dam and a stadium, whose value were estimated as Euro 3.5 million and 12 million USD, as assessed by Escobar and Kimbamba Simões (2012). We assumed a construction period of 7 years, i.e., the duration of the project, and thus divided the amount by 7 and converted the result to USD assuming an exchange rate of 1 Euro = 1.33 USD. Then we converted the resulting value to 2013 USD.  Fishing ropes and net processing Ghana China paid 9.1 million USD for the project for one year (African Centre for Economic Transformation, 2009). We converted this value to 2013 USD using the appropriate CPI. Construction of national assembly and senate Gabon China invested in the construction of the national assembly building (73 million USD) and the senate (1.2 million USD) in 2004 (Bignouma, 2007). We converted these amounts to 2013 USD using the CPI. *We found no document stating explicitly that these projects were to compensate for fishing access. However, the Chinese National Fishing Company (CNFC) was directly involved in these projects and, outside of fisheries, we know of no Chinese involvement in the economy of Cape Verde.  4.4 Results 4.4.1 Catches by Europe and China Our bottom-up estimation of Chinese catches from West Africa suggested that they caught on average 2.3 million t·year-1 from 2000 to 2010, which is around 20% lower than the midpoint estimate provided by Pauly et al. (2013a) for the West African region (i.e., 2.9 million t·year-1), but well within its 95% confidence interval, which ranged from 1.84 to 4.30 million t·year-1.  Namibia and Cameroon (EEZ area 12.3% of total EEZ area) were not included in this analysis for the 2000s, which would further reduce the gap between the present estimate and the midpoint 90  estimate by Pauly et al. (2013a). This is comforting, given that these two estimates were obtained using radically different methods.  Catches by Chinese fleets from West Africa increased rapidly after the mid-1980s and were estimated to include 1.4 million t·year-1 of legal, but unreported catches, 761,000 t·year-1 of illegal (or unregulated prior to EEZ declaration) and unreported catches, 20,200 t·year-1 of catches reported to the FAO (FAO data for FAO area 34 and 47 for China) and 159,000 t·year-1 of catches reported as domestic catches by West African fleets, but whose beneficial ownership was Chinese. Thus, only 8% of total catches were reported officially as being caught by China, which is the same as the estimate by Pauly et al. (2013). Under-reporting by China’s legal fleet was at its highest in the 1980s, when China began distant-water fishing operations in West Africa. Under-reporting by China decreased over time with increasing reflagging to West African countries as their catches were reported as domestic, but remained relatively high, as total legal catches were estimated to be, on average, 11 times higher than reported catches between 2000 and 2010 (Table 4.1).  Illegal catches by Chinese fleets were estimated at over 357,000 t·year-1 on average during the 1980s, and increased gradually to around 761,000 t·year-1 on average during the 2000-2010 time period (Figure 4.2).   91   Figure 4.2 Total catches by Chinese and EU fleets from the waters of West Africa, 1950-2010. Sierra Lone claimed its EEZ in 1971, Morocco in 1981, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon in 1984, Congo (ex-Zaire) in 1992 and Cameroon in 2000. The 16 other West African countries claimed their EEZ between 1976 and 1980, and hence the location of the transition zone (shaded) from ‘unregulated; to ‘illegal’ catches in the lower panel.  Catches by legal EU fleets in West Africa were estimated at 155,000 t·year-1 in the 1950s, peaked at 3.5 million t·year-1 in the mid-1970s and declined thereafter to 1.8 million t·year-1 on average over the period from 2000 to 2010 (Figure 4.2), of which only 524,000 t·year-1 were officially reported to the FAO, i.e., 30%. Catches by illegal (or unregulated prior to EEZ 92  declaration) EU fleets, on the other hand, were estimated at 92,000 t·year-1 during the 1960s, increased to around 404,000 t·year-1 on average during the 1970s, were equivalent to Chinese illegal catches during the early 1980s and then decreased to around 224,000 t·year-1 on average during the 2000-2010 time period (Figure 4.2).   European legal catches were relatively prominent, with on average 3.2 million t·year-1 during the 1980s, before China entered the West African fishing grounds, and were equivalent to catches by Chinese legal fleets during the early 2000s (Figure 4.2). The decrease of EU catches from West African waters over time, in contrast to increasing Chinese catches over the 2000-2010 time period would suggest a gradual replacement of European fleets by Chinese fleets. However, another, more realistic scenario would explain the decrease in European contribution to foreign catches by the growth of reflagging practices by EU fleets to West African countries, e.g., Senegal (Belhabib et al., 2014e). Chinese reflagging practices were more readily unveiled, while the nature of the post-colonial relations between EU member countries and some West African countries made it difficult to distinguish between such reflagged fleets and truly domestic fleets.  4.4.2 Landed value of West African fisheries Over the 2000-2010 time period, catches worth 8.3 billion USD were taken by EU (3.7 billion USD) and Chinese (4.7 billion USD) fleets operating in West Africa (Table 4.3). Most of this value originated from Morocco and notably from its southern part, the former Spanish Sahara (68%). Of the value of 3.7 billion USD taken by the EU, 4% was taken illegally (0.2 billion USD), while 1.7 billion USD of the 4.7 billion USD taken by Chinese vessel was deemed illegal (i.e., 40%). Over 90% of the landed value by legal EU fleets were taken from Morocco, 93  Mauritania, Cape Verde and Guinea, while the landed value taken by illegal EU fleets was mainly from Mauritania, Senegal and Liberia (Table 4.3). Similarly, most (over 96%) of the legal landed value by China was taken from the waters of Morocco (including those of Western Sahara), Mauritania, Angola, Cape Verde and the Congo (Brazzaville). Most (87% of illegal landed value) of the illegal fishing activities by China seem to be concentrated around Morocco, Nigeria and to a lesser extent Mauritania (Table 4.3).            94  Table 4.3 Estimated average landed value, access value, official and actual compensation by Europe and China from West African countries  for the period between 2000 and 2010, in 2013 USDx106. EU landed value (USD2013 x 106) China landed value (USD2013 x 106) Total value (USD2013 x 106) Access value (USD2013 x 106) Value of reported landings (USD2013 x 106) Official compensation (%) Actual compensation (%)  Legal Illegal Legal Illegal EU China EU China EU China EU China EU China Morocco 2,592.6 0.0 1,758.9 1,238.6 2,592.6 2,997.5 180.3 9.2 844.9 212.0 21.0 4.0 7.0 0.3 Mauritania 295.7 115.7 508.2 54.7 411.5 562.9 95.2 102.0 95.3 122.1 100.0 83.0 23.1 18.1 Senegal 50.9 10.0 5.8 28.3 60.9 34.1 11.9 0.7 19.2 0.8 62.0 91.0 19.5 2.0 The Gambia 22.3 0.0 6.9 3.9 22.3 10.7 0.2 a 7.4 0.9 3.0   0.9   Cape Verde 277.4 0.0 175.7 32.7 277.4 208.4 0.3 2.0 91.6 21.2 0.3 9.0 0.1 1.0 Guinea Bissau 25.4 2.2 23.9 10.0 27.6 34.0 5.7 2.9 8.6 3.0 66.0 97.0 20.5 8.5 Guinea 157.4 1.3 10.9 11.8 158.7 22.7 1.0 1.3 49.2 1.3 2.0 95.0 0.6 5.6 Sierra Leone 28.0 0.0 2.2 27.6 28.0 29.8 0.0 0.2 8.8 0.5   50.0 0.0 0.8 Liberia 17.8 19.1 9.1 21.6 36.9 30.6 0.0 a 5.9 1.0     0.0   Côte d'Ivoire 4.3 0.0 16.3 126.8 4.3 143.1 0.4 0.7 1.4 1.9 31.0 36.0 10.3 0.5 Ghana 0.0 1.6 12.7 1.6 1.6 14.3 0.0 11.2 0.0 13.7   82.0 0.0 78.2 Togo 4.6 0.0 1.9 5.3 4.6 7.3 0.0 a 1.5 0.2 0.0  83.6 0.0  2.5 Benin 0.3 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.0 a 0.1 0.1 0.0   0.0   Nigeria 0.0 0.0 0.0 160.9 0.0 160.9   a 0.0 0.0         Equatorial Guinea 20.3 0.0 11.2 1.8 20.3 12.9 0.2 a 7.5 1.3 3.0   1.0   Gabon 8.6 0.0 13.4 5.8 8.6 19.2 0.7 10.3 2.8 10.6 24.0 97.0 7.9 53.4 Sao Tome & Prin. 5.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 5.5 0.2 0.5 a 1.8 0.0 27.0   8.6   Congo (Brazzaville) 0.0 0.0 98.0 36.9 0.0 134.9   a 0.0 10.4         Congo (ex-Zaire) 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.3 0.0 1.6   a 0.0 0.2         Angola 37.9 1.8 250.5 31.2 39.7 281.6 10.9 25.3 20.8 23.2 52.0  108.8 27.0  9.0 Namibia 16.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0   Total value  3,549.1 151.8 2,907.4 1,799.9 3,717.2 4,707.3 307.2 165.9 1,166.8 424.4 - - - - Adjusted valueb 3,549.1 151.8 2,778.2 1,569.2 3,717.2 4,347.4 307.2 165.9 1,166.8 410.3 26.0 40.0 8.0 4.0 a) Evidence of an agreement was found, but its value could be not be estimated; b) sum of values for countries that have both catch and compensation values.  95   4.4.3 Agreements value and landed value: How Europe compares to China 4.4.3.1 European fishing agreements and equity Europe paid on average 307 million USD·year-1 for access to West African waters from 2000 to 2010 (Table 4.3).  The highest cumulative access fees were paid to Morocco and Mauritania with 180 million USD·year-1 and 95 million USD·year-1, respectively, followed by Senegal and Angola. Official compensation by the EU, calculated as the ratio between access value and the value of reported landings, was estimated at 26% (Table 4.3). This means that the EU pays back around a quarter of the value EU fleets report as taken from West Africa, which appears to be reasonable, particularly in the case of Mauritania which appears to receive an astonishing 100% of the reported landed value by EU fleets (Table 4.3). However, when the compensation is calculated as the ratio between access value and total landed value, including illegally caught fish (see Table 1), it is much lower at, on average 8% (Table 4.3). This value ranges between 0% (in countries where agreements were absent, but catches were documented, i.e., Benin, Sierra Leone, Togo, Liberia and Ghana) to a maximum of 23% (Mauritania, Table 4.3).   Similarly, although the financial compensation paid by the EU under the EU-Morocco FPAs is fairly high (180 million USD, Table 4.3) compared to other countries in the area, this represented only 7% of the actual landed value of total catches (Table 4.3). In terms of regional disparity, Morocco, for example, represents 28% of the total in catches and 59% in agreement fees, while Mauritania with a third of total catches, received only 30% of the agreement fees. Thus, the EU pays to Morocco around 345 USD·t-1, while it pays 154 USD·t-1 to Mauritania, mainly due to higher prices in Morocco (Swartz et al. 2013). 96  4.4.3.2 Chinese fishing agreements and equity The estimation of access fees paid by China required thorough investigations in which documents such as media and news reports were given particular attention (see Appendix B for comprehensive account). Due to the poor transparency of Chinese agreements, we were unable to spot all cases of Chinese payments, even when there was evidence of an agreement (Table 4.3). We were also unable to fully separate the sums paid for sectors other than fisheries, which would cause an upward bias. We can only hope that these two biases compensate for each other (but see below).  The access fees paid by China were classified under three distinct categories: - Direct monetary payments: China paid on average 1.3 million USD·year-1 to Guinea, 9 million USD·year-1 to Morocco (see Appendix B). Another example is illustrated by the agreement between China and Mauritania for a total value of 100 million USD in 2010 for a period of 25 years. However, this value was not taken into consideration since China did not respect all terms of the agreement (Katsarova, 2013). In this category, there is robust evidence suggesting that fees are paid exclusively in exchange of fishing access, and do not include other sectors. - License fees: In most cases, Chinese fleets reflagged to West African countries pay lower fees. Sometimes these fees are comparable to the fees paid by truly domestic fleets. Our investigation revealed this to be the only method of payment for The Gambia (for which monetary values were not available, however), Sierra Leone for which a value of 0.2 million USD·year-1 was derived (see Appendix B) and Senegal, for which we estimated a total access value of 0.7 million USD·year-1. This method represented only part of the 97  total payments for Mauritania, Guinea Bissau, Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire. There is also strong evidence that fees under this category were paid exclusively in exchange for fishing access and do not involve other sectors. In addition, the fact that this method was the only payment documented for some countries (Senegal and The Gambia) might have introduced a downward bias (when compared to EU FPAs). - Indirect payments (e.g., infrastructure development, military equipment, debt relief, interest free loans and international donations): This method illustrates the practical nature of Chinese access fees as perceived by African countries (Glaesel Frontani and McCracken, 2012), as they tend to contribute directly to the development of various sectors. Examples include a) investments in infrastructure, as port construction and extension (the ‘Quay of Friendship’ extension in Mauritania, reconstruction of fishing harbors in Guinea Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana), social and health infrastructures, including hospitals (Mauritania, Cape Verde), telecommunication network modernizations (Guinea Bissau), sports stadium (Cape Verde) and other infrastructure projects such as Parliament and other buildings (Gabon and Guinea Bissau); b) military aid, e.g., to Mauritania, along with 2 military jets and other items to boost the Mauritanian defense forces; and c) debt relief (Cape Verde) and interest free loans (Côte d’Ivoire) (see Appendix B). These payments are rarely reported and documented officially, and can be inferred only through grey literature and news reports. It is also difficult to apportion a fraction directly related to fishing access, as some of these payments may be for other socio-political or economic reasons not specified by China. However, in most cases, there is evidence pointing at fishing access being provided in exchange for these payments.  98   We estimated that Chinese agreements with West African countries provided 166 million USD·year-1 on average as access fees from 2000 to 2010 (Table 4.3). However, not all access fees by China were available, given the highly non-transparent nature of Chinese fishing agreements (Mallory, 2013). The official compensation rate by China is estimated at 40% compared to an actual compensation rate of 4% when including illegally caught fish and adjusting the value to remove those countries for which access fees could not be documented (see ‘Adjusted values’ in Table 4.3). Thus, the actual compensation rate by China (4%) is half the actual compensation rate by the EU (8%) to West African countries (Table 4.3). A strong regional variation in the agreement value over the same species exists. Indeed, while the agreement amount with Morocco represented 5% of the total, Chinese catches from Morocco represented 26%, which translates into 15 USD·t-1 compared to 121 USD·t-1 paid to Mauritania. Finally, to deal with the bias issue alluded to above, more stringent criteria are applied for considering Chinese project fisheries related. In such case, when projects equivalent to 15 million USD∙year-1 that might not be exclusively related to fisheries are excluded (e.g., 0.67 million for Côte d’Ivoire, 2 million for Cape Verde, 2.74 million for Guinea Bissau and 4 million for Ghana), the 4% Chinese compensation would decline to 3%.  Overall, however, the huge variance around the mean compensation rates estimated for the EU and China imply that they are not statistically different (t-test, p=0.05).   4.5 Discussion The present study shows that the EU increasingly under-reports catches from West African waters, while Chinese under-reporting, although higher, may be declining, which may also 99  highlight the increasing trend toward the reflagging of Chinese fleets. This, in turn, resulted in a higher compensation rate by the EU.  Under-reporting directly impacts local economies and sustainability when it hides over-fishing. For example, European fleets increased their catches from Morocco and Western Sahara by 5% after 1995 despite the agreement by Europe and Morocco to decrease the EU fishing quota by 40% (Belhabib et al., 2012c).  Besides, by threatening the long-term sustainability of fish stocks, foreign fleets preclude the development of domestic fisheries (Ponte et al., 2007). This has led Mauritania for example to exclude octopus from the newly signed EU-Mauritania FPA (EU, 2012) now supposedly only accessed by the strictly ‘domestic’ fishery, which actually encompasses reflagged Chinese and European vessels (Agnew et al., 2010, Mallory, 2012, Gascuel et al., 2007, Obaidullah and Osinga, 2010). Moreover, under-evaluated fisheries catches combined with weak non-collective bargaining power and secrecy around the negotiation of fisheries agreements resulted in major financial arrangement discrepancies (Ponte et al., 2007), particularly in the case of China, with reflagging to domestic fleets contributing to minimizing license fees.    Landed value taken by EU and Chinese fleets from West African waters estimated at 8.4 billion USD·year-1 exclude added value (processing, marketing, etc.), which would increase the landed value by about 40% (Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002, Agnew et al., 2010). This would raise the annual value to $11.8 billion US·year-1, equivalent to the average net (total) development assistance and official aid received from all countries by the West African countries considered here from 2000 to 2010 (www.worldbank.org). Landed values estimated here reflect a small 100  proportion of the total loss experienced by African countries. However, they are probably a reasonable approximation of the realistic gross revenues generated by West African legal fisheries (excluding Cameroon and Namibia). West African governments earned about $0.5 billion, or 6%, the latter however excludes the value of local landing and processing activities and employment, which is relatively low.   Bribing by foreign companies to access local resources leads to abuses of ecological resources and human rights, as the more these countries depend on natural resources for their exports, the more corrupt they would be in selling these resources (Standing, 2008). Sustainability-wise, the difference between domestic catches (i.e., official landings excluding non-commercial sectors and discards) and the potentially sustainable catch justifies agreements under the UNCLOS. However, concerns are raised when components other than landings are accounted for and this surplus exceeded. Also, under the terms of UNCLOS, fishing access agreements should not jeopardize local development and livelihoods.   If we assume that tangible projects (e.g., port developments) are more likely (at least in high-corruption countries) to have more of a positive impact on the economy than cash (which can easily be misappropriated), the Chinese approach to compensating West African countries for access to their fisheries resources appear competitive.  However, both Chinese and EU fishing agreements have negative effects on the food security of the host countries (Kaczynski and Looney, 2000, Belhabib et al., 2012c, Kaczynski, 1989, Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002).  The pattern of Europe paying relatively low fees to developing countries for their fisheries resources, confirmed in this contribution, was documented earlier for African countries, e.g., 101  Madagascar and the Seychelles (Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002, Le Manach et al., 2012, Iheduru, 1995); in fact our estimate of 8% was relatively high when compared to earlier estimates.  On the other hand, although Chinese projects offered in lieu of cash may appear more attracting for highly corrupt countries, their amount being lower than the fees paid by the EU might be related to higher under-reporting, and the fact that the total value of each agreement might not be entirely covered by the present study. Moreover, there are strong regional variations where China has a higher compensation rate than the EU (Cape Verde, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Gabon), which make the overall compensation rates statistically similar.  However, we think that pending more detailed studies, our work suggests that both compensation rates by the EU and China are low.  While Chinese fishing agreements and joint venture practices with host countries are often opaque, China appears to perform similarly to the European countries in terms of under-reporting and illegal practices. As a result of this foreign fishing, stocks are over-exploited, local communities struggle to meet their income and nutritional needs (Belhabib et al., 2012a), and fisheries suffer from imported over-capacity and over-exploitation. These conditions led Senegalese artisanal pirogues to go further afield and fish illegally in Mauritanian waters (Belhabib et al., 2014d), Guinean fishers to increase their costs of fishing, and the Mauritanian government to enforce a closed octopus fishing season to artisanal fishers (Belhabib et al., 2012b, Diop and Kazmierczak, 1996). These negative impacts are not only limited to the socio-economic behavior of fishers but have also disastrous consequences on fish stocks like the decrease in average size of fish, decrease in catch per unit of effort of various species (Pauly et 102  al., 2002b, Gascuel et al., 2009) and in the long run ‘importing’ depletion of marine stocks rather than exporting fisheries resources (Iheduru, 1995, Alder and Sumaila, 2004).   While Chinese agreements with West African countries may be competitive in term of economic development, they never include financial contributions to support monitoring and surveillance and scientific research used, and these items usually fall by the wayside. The EU, which insists on monitoring and surveillance, on the other hand, underpays the fees related to these crucial activities (Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002), as illustrated by the very high presence of illegal vessels in the West African EEZs, including EU vessels. Moreover, EU fleet owners, like most foreign fleet owners, do not allow host country observers onboard. Although Chinese fleets are increasingly responsible for a host of illegal, unreported and unregulated practices in West Africa, including unlicensed fishing, fishing in artisanal areas, use of illegal fishing gear, trans-shipping etc., EU operators are also responsible for relatively high illegal catches.  Our recommendations to improve the fairness, equity and transparency of the access agreements on the one hand and fisheries sustainability on the other hand are few. First, one can apply the principle of Monitoring the Monitor (Barber, 2006), to ensure monitoring fees are used appropriately. Second, increased transparency of agreements and intra-government communications may lead to competition between DWF countries, thus higher fees paid under agreements which will likely improve the negotiating position of West African countries by increasing financial competition for the same resources. Therefore, negotiating regional agreements, by increasing the collective bargaining power of West African countries, could yield better results in terms of value and sustainability, compared to the present situation.  103  Chapter 5: Overview of West African fisheries under climate change: possible routes of adaptation 5.1 Introduction West African fisheries resources are relatively abundant, partly resulting from the higher primary production from the major upwelling systems within the CCLME and the GCLME. The fisheries sector in West Africa supports the livelihood of numerous fishing communities and national economies (Allison et al., 2009c, d'Aboville, 2010). The increasing pressure exercised by foreign fleets and an expanding small-scale artisanal sector contributed to the current overexploited status of fish stocks (Alder and Sumaila, 2004, Atta-Mills et al., 2004).   Climate change is expected to cause further changes to the fisheries. Indeed, studies show that climate change affects both the physical and biogeochemical features of the ocean including ocean temperature, pH (acidity), oxygen content, regional wind patterns and thus circulation and upwelling intensity (Doney et al., 2012). These changes affect ocean primary productivity and the eco-physiology and ecology of marine species and populations  (Pörtner and Knust, 2007, Daufresne et al., 2009, Sumaila et al., 2011, Pauly, 2010b, Pauly, 1998b), leading to shifts in species distribution, phenology species assemblages, ecosystem functions and trophic interactions (Guinotte and Fabry, 2008, Cheung et al., 2011). Poleward shift in distribution (Cheung et al., 2009) and changes in ocean net primary production are projected to lead to large scale redistribution of global catch potential, with higher latitudes benefiting from this trend while tropical regions suffering from a decrease in catch potential (Cheung et al., 2010). Changes in oxygen content along with warming will potentially lead to an average decrease of maximum 104  body size of exploited fish stocks by 14-24% by 2050 relative to 2000 (Cheung et al., 2013b). Moreover, the synergistic effect of fishing pressure may exacerbate the impacts of climate change (Lindegren et al., 2010) as exploitation would alter the structure of populations and ecosystem and hence change the ability and resilience of marine species and ecosystems to respond to climate change (Planque et al., 2010). These will create significant challenges to sustainable fisheries and their management particularly for countries with fewer alternative resources and lower adaptive capacity (Boyd et al., 2014), such as those in West Africa. Rates of change have been accelerating recently and may exceed the current potential future tolerances of many organisms to adapt (Doney et al., 2012). Meanwhile, climate change may cause the increase in bycatch of threatened species as fishing zones grounds are expected to shift towards vulnerable areas which are more productive and are inhabited by threatened species (Munday et al., 2007). Some studies on the impacts of climate change predicted the high incidence of conflicts (Barnett and Adger, 2007, Raleigh and Urdal, 2007) of climate change and climate-induced extreme events (Katz and Brown, 1992). Ultimately, fisheries have to respond to long term changes in the mean conditions and short term extreme events.   Impacts of climate change on the fisheries sectors are still not well-studied (Boyd et al., 2014) and existing knowledge is limited to those regions of the world that are data rich (Sumaila et al., 2011), e.g., the North Atlantic (Perry et al., 2005, Brander, 2010, Cheung et al., 2010). A few studies analyze the impacts of climate change beyond the ecological and biological scope (Roessig et al., 2004, Sumaila et al., 2011, Lam et al., 2012). However, there are significantly fewer studies for developing countries, particularly West Africa.   105  Fishers in West Africa are already affected by the impacts of climate change, with anecdotal information showing patterns of adaptation to declining fish stocks at a very local level (Belhabib et al., 2014e, Njock and Westlund, 2010) e.g., change in targeted species depending on resource availability (Belhabib et al., 2014e, Salas et al., 2004, Cinner et al., 2009b). Moreover, movement of industrial (notably distant water) fleets throughout West African waters is typically flexible (Alder and Sumaila, 2004), which might allow them to adapt to the impacts of climate change.   Studies on the impact of climate change on artisanal fisheries remain speculative and the analysis remains limited to the use of simple impact chains (e.g., Roessig et al., 2004). A few studies explore the impacts of extreme events and climate change-induced migrations of fishers in recent decades (whether related to climate change or not) (e.g., Reuveny, 2007). Studies on the responses of different fishing sectors to climate change focus mainly on understanding adaptive capacity to climate change impacts on food security and fisheries economics and in relation to the effects of over-exploitation (Srinivasan et al., 2010, Lam et al., 2012; Allison et al., 2009c).  Vulnerability framework is one of the most commonly applied approaches to assess climate change impact on fisheries (Allison et al., 2009c). Vulnerability consists of three components: exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. Vulnerability assessments in fisheries often use a set of indicators for exposure (e.g., changes in SST), sensitivity (e.g., relative socio-economic importance of fisheries) and adaptive capacity (e.g., society’s development level) (Allison et al. 2009c, Cinner et al., 2012, Islam et al., 2014). Allison et al. (2009c) found that countries in West Africa were highly vulnerable to climate change, partly because of their heavy dependence on 106  fish for their livelihoods and food security and the limited societal capacity for their national economies to deal with climate change impacts.   This chapter aims to assess the possible impacts of climate change on West African fisheries and their scope for adaptation. Firstly, a literature review is conducted to identify the attributes that would help assess the impacts of climate change on West African fisheries. Secondly, this chapter reviews existing understanding on observed and projected impacts of climate change on fisheries in the EEZs of the West African countries within the CCLME and the GCLME. Thirdly, the chapter summarizes observed responses of West African fishers to these changes, thereby examining the adaptive capacity of fishers in both the artisanal and industrial sectors. Finally, the chapter discusses potential adaptive directions of both sectors, research gaps and potential ways to overcome such gaps. In this chapter, West African countries include 16 countries: Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia for the CCLME, and Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Benin, Togo, Nigeria, Congo, Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea for the GCLME.  5.1.1 Attributes to assess climate change effects on fisheries Climate change impacts on fisheries can be assessed through a combination of attributes related to resources and fishing behavior (Mean Temperature of the Catch, invasions and local extinctions) and fishery dynamics (catch potential, target species and status of fishery). While both categories are inter-linked, assessing impacts of climate change on these indicators separately help capture the importance and severity of such impacts in each country.  107  - The Mean Temperature of the Catch (MTC): this metric is calculated from the average temperature preference of exploited species weighted by their annual catch (Cheung et al., 2013c). Using this indicator, these authors show that the taxonomic composition of fisheries in most of the Large Marine Ecosystems (LMEs) of the world from 1970 to 2006 is significantly related to changes in ocean temperature, with increasing dominance of warm-water associated species.  Here, MTC was used to indicate the effects of ocean warming on species composition of fisheries catch in the Canary Current Large Marine Ecosystem and the Gulf of Guinea Large Marine Ecosystem. Based on Cheung et al. (2013a), an increase (+) or decrease (-) in MTC from 1970 to 2006 were identified for each Large Marine Ecosystem (Table 5.1). Increased MTC means that the dominance of warm-water species in a given region is increasing (tropicalization of catch) while the proportion of subtropical of subtropical species in the catch is declining, and vice versa.  - Invasion and local extinction rates: invasion represents the process under which a species range expands to newly occupied areas, while local extinction occurs when a species ceases to occur in its previous distribution area (Cheung et al., 2009). Cheung et al. (2009b) expressed invasion and local extinction rates as proportion of the initial species richness. Both indicators illustrate the effects of climate change on biodiversity, community structure, ecosystem functions and ultimately fisheries catches.  Here, projected invasion and local extinction rates by 2050 relative to 2000 under SRES A1B scenario are extracted from Cheung et al. (2009). Based on averaged results by Cheung et al. (2009), the invasion rate was divided by three categories, rather than absolute number, to facilitate the analysis. Low invasion rate corresponds to 20% - 26%; 108  medium invasion rate corresponds to 26% - 32% and high invasion rate corresponds to a range of 32% - 38%. Similarly, low, medium and high local extinction rates correspond to 1% - 2.3%, 2.3% - 3.6% and 3.6% - 5%, respectively;  - Catch potential: represents the change in catch potential in each EEZ by 2030 (Lam et al., 2012). This indicator is shown in Table 1 as a percent of change from the actual situation, or as a (-) or (+) when only qualitative data is available;  - Main target species: illustrate all species that represent over 9% of total industrial and artisanal catches from a given EEZ between 1970 and 2010. This indicator illustrates the profile of the fishery and thus fishing fleets (Table 5.1); - Status of fishery: indicates the actual known exploitation status of fish stocks as over-exploitation may exacerbate the effects of climate change.  - Economic impact was illustrated by the potential changes in economic output of fisheries to climate change. This is indicated by the change in the economic contribution of fisheries to the national economy (Lam et al., 2012); - Job potential measures the change in the number of jobs available within the fishing sector (Lam et al., 2012);  5.1.2 Attributes to assess the adaptability of fisheries to climate change Climate change effects on fish distribution and potential production are likely to drive fishers to adapt to these changes in different ways, the extent to which depends on their flexibility. These effects are assessed using two main attributes, the economic impact and the job potential projections for 2030 relative to 2000. However, the adaptability of the fisheries would also depend on the overall vulnerability and adaptive capacity of the country within which the 109  fisheries operate. For example, low adaptive capacity of the countries’ economy (i.e., lacking alternative livelihood choices) will likely prevent fishers from exiting the fishery (Cinner et al., 2009a).   Adaptability of fisheries to climate change will be illustrated by a set of indicators that includes: overall vulnerability of the countries’ economy to climate change, changes in fishing costs, changes in target species, mobility, migration history, fishing costs, fishing fleet types, and artisanal and industrial fishing effort.  - Vulnerability of countries’ eocnomy to climate change through fisheries, which is also related to adaptive capacity, was indicated by the vulnerability index from Allison et al. (2009c). The index was used to represent the exposure of country’s fisheries to physical effects of climate change (defined by the gross indicator of projected levels of climate change). Sensitivity is a composite index of employment and economic dependence on the fisheries sector, Adaptive capacity is indicated by nutritional dependence, health, education, governance and the size of the economy (Allison et al., 2009c). - Mobility: In general, fishers may adapt to the change in marine species composition caused by global warming in two different ways. Some fishers may follow the marine species by moving to the new fishing grounds (Boyd et al., 2014), whereas some other fishers with higher resilience to adapt may change their target species composition by changing their fishing gear types (Roessig et al., 2004). Mobility on the other hand is related or depends on another set of attributes such as migration history, the fishing fleet type, and fishing costs. 110   Table 5.1 Effects of climate change on West African fisheries and fish stocks Country SST MTC Invasiona   Local extinctiona Catch potentialb Main species  Status of fisheryc  Morocco + - High Low - Octopus vulgaris, Sardina pilchardus Over-exploitation W. Sahara + - High Low 8 Octopus vulgaris, Sardina pilchardus Over-exploitation Mauritania + - Medium Low 11 Engraulis encrasicolus, Sardina pilchardus, Scomber japonicus, Trachurus trachurus, Trichiurus lepturus Over-exploited Senegal + - Medium Low 18 Rachycentron canadum, Sardinella spp., Scomber japonicus Over-exploitation The Gambia + - Medium Low 7 Ethmalosa fimbriata, Sardinella spp. Over-exploitation Cape Verde +   Medium Low -6 Acanthocybium solandri, Decapterus macarellus, Katsuwonus pelamis, Thunnus albacares uncertain Guinea Bissau + + Medium Low -3 Octopus vulgaris, Penaeus kerathurus, Pseudotolithus elongatus, Sardinella aurita uncertain Guinea + + Low Medium -9 Ethmalosa fimbriata, Octopus vulgaris, Scomber japonicus, Pseudotolithus spp. Over-exploitaion, uncertain Sierra Leone + + Low Medium -14 Penaeus kerathurus, Pseudotolithus senegallus, Sparus aurata Over-exploitaion Liberia + + Low High -36 Lutjanus agennes, Pseudotolithus senegallus, Sardina pilchardus Uncertain Côte d’Ivoire + + Low High -39 Ethmalosa foimbriata, Sardinella aurita Over-exploited Ghana + + Low High -42 Engraulis encrasicolus, Katsuwonus pelamis, Sardinella aurita, Sardinella maderensis Fully to over-exploited Togo + + Low High -29 Brachydeuterus auritus, Engraulis encrasicolus, Sardinella maderensis,  Fully to over-exploited Benin + + Low High -9 Ilisha africana, Pseudotolithus senegallus, Sardinella maderensis fully to over-exploited Nigeria + + Low High - Ethmalosa fimbriata, Polydactylus quadrifilis Over-exploited Cameroon + + Low Medium - Ethmalosa fimbriata, Sardinella spp., Brachydeuterus auritus Over-exploited, uncertain Equa. Guinea + + Low High - Brachydeuterus auritus, Diplodus bellottii Over-exploited S. Tome & Princ. + + Low High - Cheilopogon melanurus, Katsuwonus pelamis, Prionace Glauca, Thunnus spp. Over-exploited Gabon + + Low High - Ethmalosa fimbriata, Dentex spp., Pseudotolithus spp.  Over-exploited, shrimp uncertain Congo + + High High - Pseudotolithus senegallus, Sardinella maderensis, Sardinella aurita Over-exploited Congo (ex-Z.) + + High High - Aristeus varidens, Parapenaeus longirostris,  Over-exploited a) Cheung et al. (2009a); b) Low range GHG (constant 2000) scenario (Lam et al., 2012, Cheung et al., 2010); c) (FAO and CECAF, 2005). Dash indicates no data.  111  - Fishing fleet types: Distant water fishing fleets have a higher mobility than domestic industrial and artisanal fishing fleets. They are usually expected to have a higher resilience to adapt to climate change as they are less selective in nature, have higher capital and possess an easier access to credit as to manage climate variability (Quentin Grafton, 2010). For example, distant water fleets in the Indian Ocean are expected to adapt easily to the climate-induced shift in tuna distribution in contrast to domestic fleets restricted to EEZ (World Bank, 2000). Similarly, industrial fishers in Peru diversified their fishing techniques during the 1997-1998 El Niño event by shifting their fishing gear from gill-nets and purse-seines to trawls (Badjeck et al., 2010). In contrast, small-scale artisanal fishers are more limited in their geographical scope and have fewer alternative sources of livelihood and income; thus their resilience is often described as low (Quentin Grafton, 2010, Roessig et al., 2004). However, a few studies demonstrate a certain resilience of less technologically advanced fleets to environmental stressors such as declining fish stocks, which adapt by expanding their fishing range, changing gear and targeted species, moving other fishing areas etc. (Morato et al., 2006, Quentin Grafton, 2010, Belhabib et al., 2014e);  - Migration history: migration for the artisanal sector is defined as short time ventures into the waters of another country in contrast to long term migrations where fishers would reside in the country they operate in. An artisanal fleet with a strong migration history has a higher geographic mobility and is thus more likely to be adaptive to changes in fisheries resources (see above); - Fishing cost: this qualitative indicator illustrates whether there was a change in fishing costs from 1970 to 2010. Countries, whose adaptive capacity is low, tend to offer limited 112  alternative livelihood to fishers. The latter tend to , in a scenario where catches are declining, increase fishing costs to be able to expand their fishing range over time and space. Thus, a historical overview of changes in fishing costs indicates, in the case of an increase in costs despite of or because of declining catches, whether fishers have been increasing their fishing range over time and space to adapt to declining catches resulting from either or both the effects of obver-exploitation and climate change; - Artisanal and industrial effort: this indicator represents the change in the number of active pirogues and industrial fishing vessels, respectively, between 1970 and 2010 in each countries EEZ, regardless of their flags and origin. It captures potential future responses, all things being equal, of fishers or the fishing industry to declining catches. Indeed, in many cases, countries with limited alternatives (low adaptive capacity) respond to declining fish supply (through fisheries) by increasing (or subsidizing) the fishing effort. Within the artisanal fishing sector for example, it is not uncommon for boat owners to invest in the acquisition of new fishing boats with the help of the state to compensate for declining catches (Belhabib et al., 2013a), whether caused by over-exploitation, the effects of climate change or both; - Changes in gear type: This indicates whether there is evidence of the ability of fishers to change their gear type in respond to changing resources composition or abundance;     113  Table 5.2 Attributes reflecting the vulnerability and  adaptability of West African industrial and artisanal fishing sectors to climate change. Country Adaptive capacitya  Vulnerabilitya  Economic impactb  Jobs potentialb  Artisanal effortc Fishing cost Change in gear type Migration history  Industrial effort fishing cost Migration history Change in gear type Morocco Low High   301%       65%  Yes, the profile of the fleet has changed to include more efficient vessels (Belhabib et al., 2012c) Yes, within EEZ Yes (Belhabib et al., 2012c) W. Sahara       633%    Yes, and fleets target new species Belhabib et al. 2012c)  No -56%  Yes, through increasing size and reflagging (Belhabib et al., 2012c) Yes, within EEZ (Belhabib et al., 2012c) No Mauritania Very low High 6% 10% 943%  Increase in fishing costs because of increasing fishing range (Belhabib et al., 2012b)  No (Belhabib et al., 2012b) No, but Mauritania is a host country for migrant fishers from Senegal (Belhabib et al., 2014e) -32%  Yes, increase in fishing capacity due to reflagging (Belhabib et al., 2012b)  No Senegal Very low High 11% 18% 283%  Yes, increasing motorization, size of pirogues and fishing range (Belhabib et al., 2014e)  No, except for one major species in the 1970s (Belhabib et al., 2014e)  Yes, increasing fishing range (Belhabib et al., 2014e) -32%     The Gambia Very low High 7% 7% 413% Yes, expanding fishing effort (Mendy, 2002)  Yes (Belhabib et al., 2013b)  No, The Gambia is a host (Belhabib et al., 2014e) 39%  Yes, Increasing capacity (increasing use of chartered vessels) (Belhabib et al., 2013b) No No (Belhabib et al., 2013b) 114  Table 5.2 Attributes reflecting the vulnerability and indicators of adaptability of West African fishing sectors to climate change (Cont’d.). Country Adaptive capacitya  Vulnerabilitya  Economic impactb  Jobs potentialb  Artisanal effortc Fishing cost Change in gear type Migration history  Industrial effort fishing cost Migration history Change in gear type Cape Verde Very low High -7% -6%             Guinea Bissau Very low High -4% -3% 317%  Yes increase in motorization and thus fuel usage and costs (Kébé et al., 1993)  No (Belhabib et al., 2014h)  Host country for migrant fishers who move in and out of EEZ (Belhabib et al., 2014e) 21%     Guinea Very low High -9% -9% 242%  Yes (Belhabib et al., 2014a)  No  No, but increasing fishing range over space and time (Belhabib et al., 2014a) 278%  Yes, increasing capital and fishing capacity (Belhabib et al., 2012a) No No, but change in fishing fleet profile (Belhabib et al., 2012a) Sierra Leone Very low High -12% -14% 86%  Yes, increase in motorization and thus fuel usage and fishing range (Seto et al., In press)  yes, but targeted same species (Seto et al., In press)  No 219%  Yes (Seto et al., In press) Yes within EEZ Yes through the introduction of new fleets targeting different species (Seto et al., In press) Liberia     -19% -36% 117%  Increase in the number of bigger Fanti canoes, and motorization thus costs (Belhabib et al., 2013c)  No (Belhabib et al., 2013c)  No (Belhabib et al., 2013c) 374%  Yes, increase in fishing capacity due to reflagging (Belhabib et al., 2013c) No, domestic fleet is restricted to EEZ (Belhabib et al., 2013c) No, rather the profile of the foreign fleet within the EEZ has changed (Belhabib et al., 2013c) 115  Table 5.2 Attributes reflecting the vulnerability and indicators of adaptability of West African fishing sectors to climate change (Cont’d.). Country Adaptive capacitya  Vulnerabilitya  Economic impactb  Jobs potentialb  Artisanal effortc Fishing cost Change in gear type Migration history  Industrial effort fishing cost Migration history Change in gear type Côte d’Ivoire Very low High -23% -40% 2%       -74%     Ghana Low High -27% -37% 46%  Yes (Nunoo et al., 2014)  No, but expanding fishing effort contributed to targeting new species (Belhabib, 2014b)No, but fleet targeted new species (Nunoo et al., 2014)  Yes 13%  Yes (Nunoo et al., 2014) Yes, Ghanaian industrial vessels shrunk their fishing range from North and South Western Africa to Ghana, more tropical waters  (Atta‐Mills et al., 2004) No (Nunoo et al., 2014) Togo Very low Moderate -26% -30.0% -20%  Yes, notably through the usage of bigger pirogues requiring higher costs, higher motorization rates and longer fishing trips (Belhabib et al., 2014d)  No (Belhabib et al., 2014d)  No 270%  Yes, higher efficiency (Belhabib et al., 2014d) No No, but the profile of the fleet has shifted from pelagic domestic fleets to demersal foreign fleets (Belhabib et al., 2014d)   116  Table 5.2 Attributes reflecting the vulnerability and indicators of adaptability of West African fishing sectors to climate change (Cont’d.). Country Adaptive capacitya  Vulnerabilitya  Economic impactb  Jobs potentialb  Artisanal effortc Fishing cost Change in gear type Migration history  Industrial effort fishing cost Migration history Change in gear type Benin     -8% -8% 66%  Yes (Vogt et al., 2010)  No, increasing retention of juveniles (Belhabib et al., 2014d)  Host country of Fanti, however fishing territory and capacity expanded  (Vogt et al., 2010) 17%     Nigeria Very low High -20% -24% 373%       408%     Cameroon Very low Moderate   56%       52%     Equa. Guinea       238%    No (Belhabib et al., 2014b)  Nigerian and Gabonese fishers left the country (Belhabib et al., 2014b) 988%     S. Tome & Princ. Very low Moderate   49%  Yes, expanding fishing effort and motorization (Carneiro, 2012)  No, but expanding fishing effort contributed to targeting new species (Belhabib, 2014b)  No 22%     Gabon Low Low   400%       Decreased        117  Table 5.2 Attributes reflecting the vulnerability and indicators of adaptability of West African fishing sectors to climate change (Cont’d.). Country Adaptive capacitya  Vulnerabilitya  Economic impactb  Jobs potentialb  Artisanal effortc Fishing cost Change in gear type Migration history  Industrial effort fishing cost Migration history Change in gear type Congo Very low Low   158%  Yes, increase in fishing efficiency translated by the increase in the use of bigger canoes (Koumba, 2012)  No, however Increasing capacity of nets to catch same species (Nguinguiri and Katz, 1996), increase in canoe size (Gobert, 1986, Kibelolo, 2003)  No 168% Yes, bigger boats meaning higher capital as reflagging increasing in the 2000s (Maloueki, 2005) Yes, fleets moved between Gabon and Angola No (Belhabib and Pauly, 2014b) Congo (ex-Z.) Very low High   174%      No      a) (Allison et al., 2009c); b) under the Low range GHG (constant 2000) scenario (Lam et al., 2012); c) methods are summarized in Table 3   118   5.2 Status of fisheries in West Africa Trends in fish catch and effort can be good indicators of fishery performance, with catch per unit effort commonly being used as indicator of stock abundance. Fishers responses to declining catches might be a good indication of their future response to declining catch potential caused by climate change. Thus catch and effort data are important for such assessments. However, the data supplied to the FAO, particularly for West African countries are largely under-reported, particularly for earlier time periods (see Chapter 1). FAO data omit a large fraction of artisanal catches, all subsistence catches, and industrial foreign catches. These data also are not sufficiently disaggregated into species and fisheries sector (see Appendix C for summary of methods). Thus, reconstructed catch data from earlier chapters (Chapter 1, 2) were used, and species that represented over 9% of the total catch each per sector were extracted. These represent the targeted (or most valuable) species caught (contributing 75% of the total), and excluded discards. Effort data in number of reported or known number of fishing vessels and canoes were extracted from several literature sources, as summarized in Appendix C.    Artisanal catches have increased overall from around 274,000 t·year-1 in 1950 to around 1.4 million t·year-1 in 2010, which went along with a 4-folds increase in the number of boats, from 17,700 boats in 1950 to 79,000 boats in 2010 (Figure 5.1 a). However, while the increase may suggest that the catch would increase similarly,  in reality the catch increase was slower, as catch per effort (or CPUE) declined, and reached a minimum of 17 t·boat-1·year-1 in 2010 (Figure 5.1 b).   119   Figure 5.1 a) Total artisanal catch and effort from West Africa, and b) average annual CPUE, 1950-2010.  Industrial catches reached their peak in the early 1990s with 15.8 million t·year-1 in 1987, corresponding to the peak in the number of industrial boats (Figure 5.2a). The decline in the number of boats is likely due to the decline in the CPUE (Figure 5.2b). This has resulted in declining catches which reached 6.6 million t·year-1 in 1997 (Figure 5.2a). Despite an increasing effort between then and the mid-2000s, industrial catches have been declining overall which is 01020304050607080901000.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.41.61970 1980 1990 2000 2010Number of boats (x 103) Catch (t x 106) Year Catch Effort 051015202530351970 1980 1990 2000 2010CPUE (t/boat/year) 120  also illustrated by the decline in the CPUE (Figure 5.2b). The CPUE has declined by 10 folds since 1970 (Figure 5.2b), which is strong evidence of over-exploitation.   Figure 5.2 a) Total industrial catch and effort from West Africa, and b) average annual CPUE, 1950-2010.  01234560.02.04.06.08.010.012.014.016.018.01970 1980 1990 2000 2010Number of boats (x 103) Catch (t x 106) Year Catch Effort 0.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.04.51970 1980 1990 2000 2010CPUE (t/boat/year) Year 121  5.3 Effects of climate change on West African fisheries 5.3.1 Effects of climate change on fisheries Climate change has already been affecting West African fisheries. In West Africa, SST in the CCLME and GCLME increased by 3% and 2%, respectively, corresponding to 0.7°C and 0.6°C between 1970 and 2010 (Figure 5.3, also see Belkin, 2009). Further increases in SST are projected between now and 2050 (Paeth and Hense, 2004). Within the CCLME, climate change is suggested to increase upwelling intensity which in turn increases primary productivity (Pörtner and Knust, 2007, Daufresne et al., 2009). The increased upwelling of colder, deeper water may have favored colder-water species; this may explain the decrease in MTC in this LME from 1976 to 2006 (Table 5.1). This pattern is observed in Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, Senegal and the Gambia where catches are dominated mainly by small-pelagic species (Table 5.1). On the other hand, local extinctions are projected to be low within the CCLME by 2050 relative to 2000, while the rate of invasion (invasive species from tropical areas) is expected to be medium to high. Catch potential is thus projected to decrease slightly as declining catches due to projected low extinctions could be compensated by catches of newly introduced species (Table 5.1). Rising water temperatures appear to produce the opposite effect within the GCLME. MTC increases with the increase in SST, suggesting that the proportion of tropical species is higher. This, along with high projected local extinctions means that the catch potential is likely to decline substantially by 2050 relative to 2000 under the SRES A1B scenario (Table 5.1).  West African fisheries are projected to be strongly affected by climate change, although the direction of changes diverges between modelling approaches. Lam et al. (2012) projected a decline in fish landings by 2050 in the Gulf of Guinea along the Guinea Current Large Marine 122  Ecosystem and a slight increase for the African countries along the Canary Current Large Marine Ecosystem (Table 5.1), while Barange et al. (2014) predicted that the Gulf of Guinea is expected to have one of the largest increases in fish catch potential with 23.9% and a decline of 14.6% in the Canary Current Large Marine Ecosystem under climate change scenarios. The discrepancy in the projections between these two studies may be related to the types of model used. Notwithstanding the differences in projected climate change effects on the fisheries, the ultimate impacts on local communities will depend strongly on adaptive capacity of the fishing communities (Barange et al., 2014). Most fished stocks in West Africa are over-exploited, which is likely to exacerbate the impacts of climate change (Lindegren et al., 2010), as exploitation would alter the structure of populations and ecosystem and hence change the ability of marine species to respond to climate change and the resilience of the ecosystems to climate change (Planque et al., 2010).     123    Figure 5.3 Changes in Sea Surface Temperature (SST) within a) the CCLME, and b) the GCLME, 1970-2009 ( data extracted from Hadley Centre SST climatology).  5.3.2 Effects of climate change on the economy and food security The Mean Temperature of Catch (MTC) highlights the direct effects of increasing ocean temperature on the distribution of marine species and hence the composition of fisheries catches. 21.521.721.922.122.322.522.722.91970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005SST (˚C) Year a 25.525.725.926.126.326.526.726.927.127.327.51970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005SST (˚C) Year b 124  However, the question of whether or not and how fishers will respond to this shift remains unexplored (Roessig et al., 2004), particularly in those areas most dependent on fisheries yet with the least adaptive capacity, for example, West Africa (Allison et al., 2009c). This poses significant threats to the livelihoods of already impoverished populations, putting a further strain on food security in the region (Lam et al., 2012).   Overall, West African countries are highly vulnerable to climate change but have a low adaptive capacity (Table 5.2). Poor fishing communities, such as many of those in West Africa, will be highly vulnerable to climate change (Challinor et al., 2014), their poverty is already increasing and is likely to intensify with climate change impacts and decrease in resource abundance (Boyd et al., 2014; also see Table 5.1). West African countries have also been already vulnerable to many other issues including endemic illegal fishing, poverty, lack of good governance and fisheries monitoring and uncontrolled expanding fishing effort.   Given the sensitivity of marine capture species to climate change, climate change is likely to produce positive and negative outcomes on food production from fisheries (Challinor et al., 2014). Although climate change impacts on subsequent food security issue have higher uncertainty than those on biological and ecological impacts (Challinor et al., 2014), there is a general consensus on the negative expected effects on the economy, human livelihood and food security (Allison et al., 2009c, Sumaila and Cheung, 2010), and on governance  of developing countries under climate change (McIlgorm et al., 2010). Indeed, the shift in the distribution range of fish is broadly recognized to have severe potential impacts on food security (Lam et al., 2012) as altered species distribution and species composition will widen the disparity in food security 125  between developing and developed countries (Pinsky et al., 2013, Cheung et al., 2013b).  In West Africa, climate change is expected to produce a decline in the fisheries economic output of 10% on average, with the highest rates projected for tropical countries (Table 2). Variations exist however, as countries within the CCLME (Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia) are projected to experience increasing economic output under climate change. Similarly, climate change is expected to produce an overall decline in the number of fisheries jobs, mostly within the GCLME with around -30% on average, while the increasing catch potential generated by climate change is expected to increase the number of jobs within the CCLME (Table 5.2).   Direct consequences of climate change on poor communities in West Africa could be disastrous; national economies and coastal communities will have to adapt over time and space but also shift their choices of harvest (MacNeil et al., 2010). At a management level, governments should strive to reduce the vulnerability of fisheries and fishing communities to climate change through increasing resilience and adaptive capacity. Increased adaptive capacity will help to offset climate-change driven impacts through increased flexibility, learning through monitoring and a better social organization (Nelson et al., 2007, Cinner et al., 2009b). Low adaptive capacity along with fisheries expansion and effort-based development projects is expected to put further pressure on resource availability for local consumption (Lam et al., 2012, Allison et al., 2009c).   High vulnerability with low adaptive capacity of national economies of West Africa to climate change produces a situation where alternative livelihoods offered to fishers are limited. Thus, fishers adapt by following a rational that maximizes catch output, while maintaining the traditional elements of their fishing activity. Adaptive capacity may increase by putting an 126  emphasis on the monitoring of the impacts of climate change on social and economic indicators and the use of new management and policy approaches to strengthen the livelihood asset base (Allison et al., 2009c, Badjeck et al., 2010, MacNeil et al., 2010). This can be achieved in part by the understanding of the existing response mechanisms, analyzing and grasping new opportunities brought by climate change and adoption of multi-sector adaptive strategies to minimize negative impacts of climate change (Allison et al., 2009c, Badjeck et al., 2010, MacNeil et al., 2010). Proper fisheries monitoring strategies will potentially allow for a better understanding of past and current trends and state of the ecosystem and ultimately increase in climate resilience through habitat protection and judicious capital investment (MacNeil et al., 2010, Quentin Grafton, 2010).  Adaptive responses of fisheries in West Africa are affected by a variety of different factors. In West Africa, because of the lack of alternative livelihood opportunities, fishers are less likely to exit the fishing industry and their adaptive responses will potentially concentrate on the fishing sector itself. For the artisanal sector, expanding fisheries over time and space, increasing costs and keeping the same gear type over time would be a clear feature of adaptive responses to the effects of climate change. Fishing costs have been increasing overall due to expanding fishing range over time and space (Table 5.2). Indeed, as opposed to the traditional view of ‘lower artisanal fisheries mobility’ an analysis to the fishing effort in West Africa through the number of boats, fishing costs and gear type shows that the overall preference is towards expanding fishing range rather than changing gear type (Table 5.2). Changing gear type occurred only in three countries (Western Sahara, The Gambia and Sierra Leone), due mostly to changing fisheries output towards export-oriented species, i.e., toward a more lucrative market. Thus one 127  hypothesis is that artisanal fisheries seem to adapt to the effects of climate change by increasing their mobility. Fishers would use bigger boats to expand their fishing range, increase boat motorization and thus fuel usage and costs rather than changing fishing gear and targeting new species.   Artisanal fisheries would either migrate towards new fishing grounds within their EEZ, particularly when the EEZ covers the potential migrating route of the species (e.g., Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia) or when the country itself has a strong migrating tradition where fishers reach new fishing grounds in other EEZs (e.g., Senegal, Benin, Togo). In both scenarios, these movements are confirmed by increasing fuel costs and/or a strong migration history. Indeed, the countries considered here have witnessed increasing motorization, fuel usage and thus costs overtime while no significant change in gear type or targeted species was reported. In contrast the artisanal fishers changing their gear type or the species they target, indicate that more tropical species are caught, thus, fishers show a more resilient behavior by either shifting to new species and/or changing fishing gear.   Similarly, expanding fishing range over time and space rather than changing gear type would be a feature of industrial fisheries (MacNeil et al., 2010). Industrial fisheries incurred higher costs, due to increasing vessel capacity and increasing reflagging of foreign vessels to West African countries (Table 5.2). Moreover, changes in gear type are not common as vessels have a relatively high mobility, which allows them to ‘follow the fish’ (Quentin Grafton, 2010). Although changes in fishing costs, gear types and traditional fishing grounds  may be directly generated by climate change, it is often difficult to separate the changes in behavior of fishing 128  fleets due to climate change or other stressors such as the over-exploitation which prevails in West Africa (Table 5.1). However, while climate change and exploitation patterns may be closely related, it is reasonable to assume that the adaptive behavior of fisheries under declining catch potential will be similar to that under over-exploitation. Overall, industrial fishing fleets had a low affinity with changing gear type. This particularly applies in situations where EEZs are wide enough to allow for the industrial fleets to follow the migration path of species rather than targeting new species, as vessels were increasingly bigger and more efficient. Vessels prefer to follow the fish rather than targeting new species, particularly in countries whose reflagging history is strong and where industrial fisheries effort grew strongly. In contrast, changing industrial fishing gear means these fleets were relatively more adaptive as they can shift their efforts to catch new species as fleets improved in efficiency. In the case of Ghana, the fishing range of industrial fleets has shrunk to include only waters that are located south of their former fishing range, i.e. towards the waters of Ghana (closer to tropical areas) as countries of West Africa were declaring their EEZs.   This study reviews the potential impacts and vulnerability of West African fisheries to climate change. The common assumption is that a fish-following pattern would be adopted by industrial fisheries while changing harvesting techniques, gears or preferences would apply to artisanal fisheries (Roessig et al., 2004, MacNeil et al., 2010). This analysis illustrates how artisanal and industrial fleets adapted their fishing behavior to stressors such as declining catches. Assuming, the effects of climate change encompass such stressors, two hypotheses emerge from the above analysis. First, artisanal fishers adapt to climate change effects (notably on catch potential) by ‘following the fish’. Second, domestic industrial fleets tend to change their fishing profile. This 129  particular adaptive response by artisanal fishers might be due to the role traditional species play in the West African diet (e.g., Thorpe et al., 2009) despite increasing costs, and the synergistic effect of over-exploitation and climate change. These hypotheses can be empirically tested by analyzing historically the relationship between the MTC, as a direct effect of climate change, and the fishing effort capacity and fishing costs.    Industrial fisheries usually show more flexibility by adapting different strategies equally as illustrated above. Given a larger fishing capacity, access to international diverse markets and often subsidized access, along the fact that most industrial fleets enjoy “flexible access” to fishing areas within or outside their own EEZs (Alder and Sumaila, 2004, Quentin Grafton, 2010), both strategies are deemed appropriate and illustrate a high flexibility to adapt (MacNeil et al., 2010). However, formerly ‘EEZ stocks’ become trans-boundary, which requires both artisanal and industrial fishers to increase their fishing range and thus costs, or to increase efficiency and target new species (Njock and Westlund, 2010, Morato et al., 2006). While access to international markets is easier for industrial fleets, flexible policies are required and institutions need to put in place adaptive management strategies like agreements which will allow fishers to harvest fish outside their common areas.   This will result in increasing fishing costs (Sumaila et al., 2011), which are in turn likely to lead to reduction in fishing effort and overcapacity and a potential increases in resource rent (Sumaila et al., 2011), a positive direction of the effects of cimate change on fisheries. However, this needs to go in hand with the usage of alternative livelihoods (Boyd et al., 2014). “Livelihood strategies are the range and combination of activities and choices that people make in order to achieve livelihood outcomes. Livelihoods therefore are about how actors can mobilize their 130  capital and capabilities to achieve well-being” (Badjeck et al., 2010). In fisheries, this adds to the set of capital and capabilities fishers tend to acquire to achieve, in the context of climate change, secure well-being. However it has been often demonstrated that in the case of West Africa, alternative livelihood opportunities are limited. On the other hand, the fact that cost related to expanding fishing effort of small-scale fishing communities is too high (Lam et al., 2012), creates a trap wherein fishers are too specialized to allow for livelihood diversification (Coulthard, 2008).  Therefore, beside an urgently needed in depth analysis of the adaptive responses of fishers to climate change, governments should strive to increase the resilience of fisheries to the effects of climate change through diverse strategies. These strategies include: - Restoration of overexploited fisheries and reduction of other stressors; - Lower rates of fishing mortality, larger exploitable biomass of targeted species and increased no-take areas that may provide a buffer stock in the face of unexpected shocks (Quentin Grafton, 2010); - Access to credit and loans to re-build such as those existing in the agricultural sector could be adapted to the fisheries sector (Badjeck et al., 2010), along with education and skills upgrading to allow for a diversification of livelihood opportunities,  - Increasing information on climate risk and changes which will enable fishers to adopt anticipatory adaptive measures (Badjeck et al., 2010).  Despite the qualitative nature of this analysis, a few gaps and thus uncertainty could be discussed. First, there are variations in the potential impacts of climate change at the LME level dependent on the model and/or scenario used, as highlighted above. This is likely to affect not 131  only the intensity of the change but also the direction of the change itself. A decline in catch potential is likely to produce a decrease in the number of jobs in the future and thus the economic output. Moreover, the effects of climate change on the socio-economy and food security of certain West African countries is yet to be assessed.  Another uncertainty relates to the projections themselves as they consider the actual situation to be constant over time, based on the actual effort. Yet, this analysis clearly demonstrates that fishing effort and fishing costs increased drastically and are likely to increase in the future. Thus, a follow-up quantitative analysis including such components is necessary.   132  Chapter 6: Conclusion  6.1 Discussions The statistical monitoring of African economies is generally insufficient and the statistics produced by African countries are often inaccurate (Jerven, 2013). This applies to many sectors, notably fisheries. Indeed, the scattered nature of fisheries, combined with the existence of subsistence, consumption-oriented sectors, invisible discards at sea and illegal fishing activities, predispose fisheries to have their catches underestimated. The implications of unreliable data on fisheries are outlined in Chapter I, which also presented methods that can be used to address the challenge posed by underestimated fishery catches. The pattern of under-reporting observed in Senegal repeats itself all across West Africa as documented in Chapter II and III. Ignoring illegal and much of the foreign catches has resulted in underestimating the impact of industrial fishing on artisanal fisheries. These fisheries grew disproportionately (number and size of pirogues), which led to a tremendous over-capacity. Thus, many Senegalese fishers find themselves obliged to ‘migrate’, i.e., operate in the waters outside the jurisdiction of Senegal.    Jerven (2013) argues that “poor numbers fundamentally shape what we know about development in Sub-Saharan Africa, which in turn shapes how decisions are made”, thus affecting governance, the implementation of national and international policies, and development strategies. In Senegal, for example, despite major policy reforms since the 1990s, e.g., a shift from a policy of maximizing production to a sustainable policy (Kébé, 2008), unreliable data have resulted in the failure of many projects and policies aimed at the sustainable management of fisheries.  Furthermore, the failure of accounting for all sectors in the fisheries is closely related 133  to issues of over-capacity and over-exploitation. Small-scale fishers compensate for declining catches by increasing their fishing effort; as the latter remains uncontrolled, this results in increasing fishing costs.    This is further illustrated in Chapter II where the analysis of the economic performance of small-scale fisheries in 22 West African countries revealed that costs were increasing overall because of over-exploitation. Similarly, employment, and thus the role that small-scale fisheries play in providing livelihood opportunities, has been under-estimated. In most cases, this has resulted in 1.7 million small-scale fishers and the 4.9 million people who depend upon them being poor or dangerously approaching poverty as fishers’ income declines. Small-scale fisheries are resilient and contribute to poverty alleviation. However, their adaptive capacity is not limitless, and the increasing reliance of coastal people on these fisheries could exceed their adaptive capacity. This would lead to grave problems, given that alternative livelihoods are usually declining, as in the case of agriculture (Kurukulasuriya et al., 2006, Lam et al., 2012).  The analysis in Chapter II illustrates that small-scale fisheries are profitable overall. However, as small-scale fisheries started to overexploit their resource base, this gradually changed, especially in countries where they compete against foreign industrial fisheries. This jeopardizes the food security of millions of people in areas of the world where the food crisis is expected to worsen because of global climate changes (International Food Policy Research Institute, 2002, Lam et al., 2012; Sumaila et al., 2011).  134  During the last decades, as foreign investments in the fisheries sector grew, notably through fishing agreements and illegal fishing, West African fisheries struggle, despite improvement (e.g., Belhabib et al., 2013) to enforce proper MCS measures, which - along with poor accounting of artisanal catch data - contributed to the situation highlighted above.   The comparison between the performances of the two major actors with large fleets operating in West African EEZs, i.e., from the EU and China, reveals that despite “good will” by the EU to create more sustainable fisheries policies overseas, the EU, just like China, performance on reporting its catches is questionable. Moreover, while the EU fleet presence in West Africa is declining, China`s presence, and its legal and illegal catches are increasing, without reaching the historic maximum levels of EU catches. Despite being lower in the aggregate, the compensation rate, or the value that is recovered by West African fisheries from China is not significantly different from that of the EU, due to their huge variability between the 22 countries considered here.   In many cases, non-transparency, notably during the negotiations of fishing agreements results in a weak bargaining power, and thus major financial arrangement discrepancies (Ponte et al., 2007). Moreover, it is well recognized that foreign fleets, particularly those that are ‘invisible’ pose a serious threat to the long-term sustainability of fish stocks and undermine the development of domestic fisheries, in particular those that are small-scale (Ponte et al., 2007).  This accentuates the issue of over-exploitation and results in increased competition with domestic and particularly, artisanal fleets (DuBois and Zografos, 2012). As overexploitation is expected to worsen with the effects of climate change, this competition is likely to increase.  135  Climate change effects on fisheries explored in Chapter IV, are illustrated through the effects of Sea Surface Temperature (SST) on the mean Temperature of the Catch (MTC; see Cheung et al., 2013a), the change in catch potential and the potential response of fishers to these effects. Most of the time, artisanal fishers would adapt to the negative effects of climate change by increasing their fishing range through time and space rather than by changing their target species. This behavior is closely related to traditional markets in West Africa. Industrial fisheries, on the other hand, are more flexible and tend to adopt different strategies such as changing the profile of the fleet (from domestic to foreign), changing gear type, changing species targeted and expanding fishing time and range. Overall, these adaptive responses increase fishing costs, which in turn may further enhance the discrepancy between high-investments industrial and small-scale fisheries.   Overall, the ability of fishers to cope with climate change, over-exploitation and increasing competition can be increased under policies that emphasize the rebuilding of fish stocks. The successful implementation of such policy should be closely related to inter-linked factors such as i) political and institutional stability, ii) quality of governance, iii) monitoring capacity, and iii) data quality. Political instability results in a lack of regulatory enforcement and change in priorities (Corten et al., 2012). Moreover, frequent changes in ministries and administrations often expand the timeframe of policy implementation processes at all levels and thus implementation costs increase significantly. On the other hand, inadequate governance and high corruption levels along with high dependency on natural resources results in approaches that does not consider externalities such as  degraded ecosystem or comprised food security (Standing, 2008). 136   National economies of West Africa are also faced with issues whose impacts on fisheries were not included in this thesis. However, their importance and the scope of their impact have been noted in the literature. Soil erosion, for example will have adverse ecological and economic effects as wetlands and the shallow-water nurseries of fish are affected by runoff from degraded lands (Montgomery, 2012); also, these coastal areas are gradually impacted sea level rise (Jallow et al., 1999).  As migrations towards the coast are increasing, urbanization, coastal activities and thus pollution have increased (Beauchemin and Bocquier, 2003, Kuper, 1965, Potts, 2012, Hewawasam, 2002). Despite a dearth of studies on the impacts of pollution on West African fisheries, there is a general consensus on the effects pollution will have on fisheries including a decrease in species diversity, degradation in nursery areas, depletion of fish stocks, decline of fisheries catches and reduction in shellfish population (Shahidul Islam and Tanaka, 2004).  Also, pollution could potentially alter the recruitment levels and the distribution of fish populations (Laurans et al., 2004), hence directly affecting fisheries. Moreover, the fishing sector as a major protein provider in West Africa is likely to be affected by the lower performance of other land-based food producing- sectors, such as inland fisheries, agriculture and bushmeat. Indeed, as the occurrence and intensity of droughts increase under climate change, failing agriculture will drive people towards the coast to find an alternative in fishing (Pauly, 1990, Pauly, 2006). Similarly, the close relationship between increasing bushmeat trade and declining fish demand, illustrates that bushmeat over-exploitation, particularly in central West Africa will result in increasing pressure on fisheries (Brashares et al., 2004).  137  6.2 Possible futures of West Africa fisheries Although this thesis documents a vibrant past of West African fisheries, contrasting to their tormented present, outlining their potential futures under climate change can only be achieved by examining a range of different scenarios under which West African economies may evolve.  The future directions of fisheries were explored for the first time in the 1980s by extrapolating existing trends, i.e. business as usual under different management scenarios (Pope, 1989). Cury and Cayré (2001) predicted in the current context of generalized over-exploitation that fisheries will become a marginal activity focused on luxury items, posing a serious threat to food security. Pauly (2002) predicted the future of fisheries under three scenarios, the first one “Finis mundi” predicts the collapse of fisheries if business as usual is kept; the second one “Benign utopia” assumes that all conservation measures are implemented rapidly such as the abolition of subsidies, the transition to small-scale fisheries, the establishment of MPAs among other measures which would result in the conservation of marine ecosystem and rebuilding of fish stocks; and a third scenario “Muddling through” consists of taking small steps to address symptoms without resolving the underlying market failure and governance issues.   There is a consensus in the literature that a reduction in fishing effort  would help rebuilding fish stocks, while business as usual scenarios with increasing fishing effort result in the depletion of fish stocks (Alder et al., 2007). However, more realistic scenarios should include the socio-economic and political framework within which fisheries evolve, such as the four scenarios developed under the Global Environmental Outlook framework, and which were also used by Pauly et al. (2003) to structure their contribution on “The Future of Fisheries”: 138  6.2.1 Sustainability first The Sustainability first scenario assumes that equitable values are supported by a new collaborative approach aimed at sustainability. The government works closely with all stakeholders to improve environmental and socio-economic conditions (Rothman et al., 2007). Fishing effort is reduced, which leads to the rebuilding of larger and medium sized fish populations (Pauly, 2002, ten Brink, 2010). As alternatives for fishing are lacking and with the decline of agriculture due to climate change (Kurukulasuriya et al., 2006), governments of West Africa strive to find and offer alternative livelihood options. In the long run, this strategy results in higher catches and lower poverty. However, increasing MPA coverage under the sustainability first scenario will lead to a transient decline in fish landings, while seafood demand is still on the rise. Successful MPAs, i.e., those that are properly monitored and enforced such as the Banc d'Arguin National Park in Mauritania (Valadou et al., 2006, Noel and Weigel, 2007), show that in the long run, catches increase and fish stocks may rebuild.  6.2.2 Policy first The Policy first scenario assumes that specific decisions by governments are taken towards specific social and environmental goals. The policy aims at alleviating poverty and protecting the environment at any cost while still emphasizing economic development (Alder et al., 2007). Fiscal incentives are rigorously implemented such as fishing taxes, fishing permits and quotas; international treaties and agreements are enforced ultimately resulting in reducing fishing pressure on selected fish stocks, which will then increase and allow increasing catches, while mitigating biodiversity losses through unselective gear (Pauly et al., 2003). Current domestic US fishery policy aspires to realizing several aspects of this scenario. 139  6.2.3 Security first  The Security first scenario is typical of West Africa as it “assumes a world of striking disparities where inequality and conflict prevail” (Bakkes et al., 2004). In this scenario, the government competes with the private sector stakeholders for control to insure human well-being for select groups (Alder et al., 2007). Conflicts are closely related to the lack of governance, which in turn has significant effects on fisheries sectors. For example, in the presence of conflicts, illegal fishing prevails while artisanal fishing is handicapped (Thorpe et al., 2009, Hendrix and Glaser, 2011). Furthermore, economic disparities will increase between artisanal and industrial fishers (Nunoo et al., In press) further increasing poverty of small-scale communities. This scenario will also accelerate the demand for fish and thus put further pressure on fish stocks. Although illegal fishing will decrease under the Security first scenario due to powerful regulatory interests, the risk of international and inter-sectoral conflicts over fisheries is high, which in turn will have negative implications for the health of aquatic ecosystems (Alder et al., 2007) as is already observed in the field (Doumbia, 1993, Kebe and Ndiaye, 1993, Leon, 1993, Mensah, 1993).  6.2.4 Market first The Market first scenario pursues the maximization of economic growth by the private sector with support from the government as a way to ensure improvement of the environment and human well-being for all categories of society. Globalization and liberalization aim at creating new enterprises and thus offering new livelihood opportunities. Expanding demand undermines policy making efforts towards sustainability (Bakkes et al., 2004). Opinions vary as to the role fisheries subsidies under this scenario. Pauly et al. (2003) saw a decrease of subsidies because they hamper the functioning of markets, the reason why the World Trade Organization has 140  repeatedly attempted to abolish them (Sumaila et al., 2013).  Other authors see subsidies increasing under this scenario, which would  result in the increase of fishing effort which in turn contributes to increasing conflicts (Thorpe et al., 2004). However, self-sufficiency ratio (i.e., supply/requirements) decreases over time and become lower than one, meaning that seafish demand ceases to be met (Bakkes et al., 2004).   Alder et al. (2007) suggest that fisheries catches in West Africa would increase under all GEO-4 scenarios in the long run. Depletion of fish stocks is overall projected to accelerate in South West Africa for all scenarios and under the Policy first and Security first scenarios in the CCLME and GCLME.   6.3 Data gaps and uncertainty Chaboud et al. (2014) opened a debate regarding the published version of first chapter of this thesis (Belhabib et al., 2014e). Specifically, Chaboud et al. (2014) suggested that Belhabib et al. (2014e) had over-estimated the catch of Senegalese pirogues. Their critique also implied that catch reconstruction, as exemplified (Belhabib et al., 2014e),  are not only erroneous and useless, but done without references to the literature on, and local connection to the countries whose fisheries catches were reconstructed. Here, based on Belhabib et al. (2014e), some of their numerous claims are refuted, thus addressing, in the process, data gaps and uncertainties around the fisheries catch and fishing effort estimates form the core of reconstruction and serve as basis for this thesis. 141  6.3.1 Small scale fisheries Chaboud et al. suggest that catch reconstructions do not provide an acceptable alternative to official data such as generated by the Centre de Recherche Océanographique de Dakar-Thiaroye (CRODT) or supplied by other institutions to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). This is true – at least as far as the data FAO receives are concerned. What catch reconstructions are primarily meant to do, indeed, is highlight the need for better statistics, and illustrate the benefit that could be gained by all countries from such better statistics (Pauly et al., 2013b). If Chaboud et al. consider the CRODT to be the provider of Senegal’s ‘official’ data, then their claim is misleading, because CRODT data are not straightforwardly available within Senegal, at least not in the last decade.   The catch reconstruction for Senegal (Belhabib et al., 2014e; Chapter 1) involved contributions from several Senegalese institutions, and their methods, assumptions, data used and results were evaluated and reviewed during a multi-stakeholder workshop held in Dakar in March 2013, and, after some revisions, again in June 2013, in a lengthy session with the Director of the Département des Pêches Maritime (DPM) and his senior staff, at the seat of the DPM. The Minister of Fisheries subsequently used the illegal catch estimate of Belhabib et al. (2014e) in a campaign against illegal fishing which led to the arraignment of a Russian vessel fishing illegally in the Senegalese EEZ14.   Chaboud et al. suggest a lack of information in the reconstructions, and suggest that this has led to “huge overestimates”. Around 90 source references were used and cited, including official                                                  14 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25621864 [Accessed on 12/09/2014]. 142  reports, along with direct interviews with fishers, online material and national databases. The study includes substantial feedback from the Directorate of Fisheries (DPM), USAID/COMFISH staff, the Department of Surveillance (DPSP) and from fishers’ organizations which helped identify issues highlighted in Chapter 1, such as the statistical collection methods that were actually applied in the field. In spite of all efforts, access to recent CRODT data or CRODT library material for the study was not possible. However, earlier CRODT data obtained indirectly were compared to DPM data and information, which suggested that in the past, there were considerable discrepancies between data from both institutions.   Chaboud et al. fear that the proposed catch estimates affect the credibility of Senegalese institutions. As described above, the catch reconstruction work was performed in close collaboration with and with regular feedback from various Senegalese institutions.  This was proper, since the purpose of a reconstruction is not to criticize institutions for not having collected certain data types, but rather to estimate, for the benefit of these institutions, what is missing from official estimates, e.g., due to a lack of financial resources (Barry et al., 2004), or the unwillingness of fishers to share information  (Ndiaye, 2013).   The use the data in Belhabib et al. (2014e) in early 2014 by the then Senegalese Minister of Fisheries, when launching his campaign against illegal foreign fishing, suggests that rather than fearing to lose their credibility, Senegalese fisheries institution have realized that Senegal could lose control of their EEZ to illegal fishing, which is the key problem that the reconstruction addressed.  143  Chaboud et al. explain the sampling methods followed by CRODT, wherein observers collected catch data per fishing trip and gear on every working day. The survey design is described in Ferraris et al. (1994) for earlier years and in Barry et al. (2004), Chavance and Chavance (2004) and other references cited in Chapter 1 for later years. Deme et al. (2012), whose first author is a CRODT staff, show a threefold increase in effort between 2004 (when the effort targeting sardinella was left unsampled) and the 2005 census, due to hundreds of pirogues left uncounted in 2004. Moreover, they highlight that the effort used by CRODT only covered three major fishing areas, but excluded Sine Saloum, which means there is a systematic under-estimation of the effort (per gear) by which the catch sample is being raised. Also, as stressed in Thiao (2009), although the sampling surveys were well designed, data collection relies partly on fishers’ willingness to share their catch data; field interviews strongly suggested the absence of such willingness (also see Ndiaye, 2013).   There is nothing wrong with using the number of pirogue in different years as a measure of effort, as long as the number of trips undertaken per year does not vary strongly between years. What matters here is that the pirogues be counted accurately; however, hundreds of them were unaccounted for (Deme et al., 2012). This is confirmed by a survey funded by the World Bank, whose unpublished results also suggested a massive underestimation of the number of pirogues.  Chaboud et al. do not explain why the approach taken is supposed to be erroneous. The rationale behind the approach taken is that increasing data coverage (in more recent years) implies better reporting (Ferraris et al., 1994, Barry et al., 2004, Deme et al., 2012). The discrepancies illustrated in Thiao (2009), comparing total and artisanal fisheries catch estimates from CRODT and DPM, illustrate that the level of under-reporting was higher in the past when CRODT did not 144  exist, but decreased as coverage by CRODT and DPM increased; this is highlighted by increasing convergence between CRODT and DPM estimates.   Chaboud et al. argue that, as opposed to the suggestion in the first chapter about the unavailability of CRODT data after 1999, the latter were available and easily accessible. More recent CRODT data were indeed obtained near the end of the study; however, the sources of the data firmly insisted on anonymity, and the associated report, which was provided for background only, was not to be cited. Clearly, there is a transparency issue within the CRODT which will have to be resolved by the Senegalese authorities.   6.3.2 Industrial fisheries CRODT relies on catch data supplied by domestic and reflagged vessel operators themselves (Barry et al., 2004), and there are discrepancies between industrial data by DPM and CRODT (Thiao, 2009). Although Barry et al. (2004) and Ferraris et al. (1994) assert that foreign vessels have onboard observers as mandated by the DPSP, at least part of their catch data are not originating with these observers, but were obtained from foreign vessel owners themselves (Operation AMLEP 2012) described in Koutob et al. (2013). It must be also noted that, in Senegal, only vessels over 300 GRT are supposed to have onboard observers, and that many vessel operators deny them access, as documented in Thiao (2009).   Chaboud et al. claim that catch data estimated for tuna vessels were too high when compared to the data by ICCAT, due to overestimated vessel numbers.   145  Vessel numbers were estimated from data in French colonial archives (Rieucau, 1984), and DPM reports; however, the number of tuna vessels was missing for many years, which Chaboud et al. interpret as zero vessels, as demonstrated by their use of an average of “2.5 vessels” from 1950 to 2010. However, an absence of records does not necessarily mean an absence of vessels. In such cases, it is appropriate to interpolate between records (rather than set values to zero), as long as there is evidence that fishing continued. Clearly, such interpolation misses inter-annual fluctuations of vessel numbers. However, an interpolated number of vessels in cases where a fishery is known to have existed is more appropriate than assuming that a fishery that is not monitored does not exist.   Chaboud et al. suggest that the fleets whose catches were estimated using a Monte Carlo approach were too heterogeneous to be pooled in the same analysis and that the variance would be “huge”. Heterogeneity of fleets was accounted for in the Monte Carlo approach, and the coefficient of variation obtained was 28%. The reader can decide whether this variation is huge or not.   Chaboud et al. suggest that “regarding discards, most references used by Belhabib et al. are relative to shrimp trawl […] Thus the proposed discards estimate is then highly overestimated…”. Of the six references listed in the first chapter of this thesis, only two refer exclusively to shrimp trawlers. Thus, for example, Kelleher (2005) uses an average for the trawl fishery (including finfish and shrimps), Gulland and Garcia (1984) and Monoyer (1980) all refer to finfish fisheries, with discard rates that were actually within the same range as shrimp fisheries discards. Hence, 146  the discards presented in Chapter 1 are not over-estimated, and certainly not “highly overestimated”. Indeed, shrimp trawl discards, estimated at around 67% (Caverivière and Rabarison Andriamirado, 1988), were similar to finfish trawl discards (65-72%) for the same time period (Monoyer, 1980).   Chaboud et al. emit an objection as of the “correlation between the decrease of legal landings and increase of illegal catch…” found in Belhabib et al. (2014e).  There is strong evidence that Eastern European and Russian vessels resorted to fishing illegally in Senegal after their access agreement to Senegalese waters was revoked, and in fact, a Russian vessel was arraigned since the contribution by Belhabib et al. (2014e) was published, which contained estimates of their illegal catches. Interestingly, in contrast to what is stated by Chaboud et al., illegal fisheries do not only target small-pelagic fishes. They express in their statement a deeply ingrained, but false notion, also held by the Senegalese public, which is due to the small-pelagic fishery being well covered by local media because it threatens the livelihood of the many artisanal fishers. Koutob et al. (2013) present evidence, however, of the presence of fleets targeting demersal species (notably Chinese vessels, and Flag of Convenience fleets). Chaboud et al. do not appear be aware of these recent developments.  Fisheries research being an applied field, one important issue has to deal with how one can make research work more relevant to policy makers, and their need for strategic information. In the case of Senegal, the issue is not the absolute catch of pirogues in one year or the other, but its trend over the medium and long term, and more specifically, where their catch is being made. Senegalese pirogues increasingly operate in the waters of neighboring countries, but land their 147  catch in Senegal, mainly because the fish stocks they traditionally targeted at home have declined, in part because of foreign illegal fishing. This is the dynamic that Senegalese decision makers must deal with, and for which innovative approaches are needed that attempts to quantify (preferably in economic terms) the parts played by different actors, including illegal fishing vessels, the plague of West Africa, foreign fishing and the performance of small-scale fisheries.  6.4 Broader implications and future research directions Research findings highlighted in the different chapters of this thesis have important implications on grasping a more realistic picture of the evolution of West African fisheries over time and space. Small-scale fisheries are often left unaccounted or only partly accounted for in official assessments which strongly undermine their economic performance and their contribution to food security in the policy making process. Furthermore, providing a clear picture of the performance under fishing agreements of the two main ‘players’ in West Africa (Europe and China) has strong implication on regional cooperation and international policy. Indeed, revealing the variability in the compensation amount received by West African host countries may encourage a better coordinated regional approach towards strengthening the bargaining power of West African countries vis-à-vis the EU and/or China. Ultimately, getting more value from foreign fishing ‘deals’ should lead to a higher capability –at least in financial terms – to enforce strict regulations at all levels. Moreover, understanding the movement of artisanal and industrial fleets under external stressors such climate change should help shift towards more sustainable policy approaches such as those adopted recently in Senegal (Kébé, 2008).  148  Avenues of future research should focus on predicting the adaptive behavior of fishers to climate change under different scenarios – a topic on which quantitative analysis are hardly available for West Africa. Furthermore, as policy is partly shaped by political agendas (e.g., Sarr, 2011), the implications of institutional and political instability on fisheries management scenarios should be analyzed. Moreover, as fisheries are affected by major events such as natural disasters and conflicts (Bavinck, 2005, Gleditsch, 1998, Bruckmeier, 2005, Pomeroy et al., 2007), thus affecting the performance of e.g., small-scale fisheries and their catches (Thorpe et al., 2009), researching and then predicting the effects of such events on fisheries would be most helpful, especially for West African countries known for their high conflict and natural disaster occurrence (Raleigh and Urdal, 2007). A few examples could be highlighted at the light of past, but also very recent events in West Africa. The dictatorship in Equatorial Guinea, for example, imposed a fishing ban around the island of Bioko, which drastically decreased fisheries catches (Belhabib et al., 2014b); The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone reduced the number of marine artisanal fishers in these two countries, contributing to declining fisheries catches and fish supply in local markets (Haakonson, 1992b); The 1989 conflict between Mauritania and Senegal resulted in ending the Mauritania –Senegal agreement on artisanal fisheries, which turned the formerly legal Senegalese fishery in the Mauritanian EEZ into an illegal operation (Belhabib et al., 2012b); the very recent Ebola outbreak in Liberia resulted in establishing a quarantine zone in Monrovia and curtailing fishing Operations (World Food Programme, 2014). This study was a demonstration that “lack of data” on West African fisheries is largely a myth. Overall, enough is known to evaluate policy options for the marine fisheries of West Africa, as long as care is taken to assemble and sift through the literature, and speak with key stakeholders. This is illustrated here by focusing on the need to combat illegal fishing in Senegal. This work 149  also highlighted that small-scale fisheries are primordial for food security and economic wellbeing in West Africa and that urgent measures are needed to foster their resilience to the challenges they will face, notably global warming, predicted to hit tropical and subtropical fisheries particularly hard (Cheung et al., 2010; see also Chapter 5). It is also important to quantify the real value of West African fisheries, so that West African countries can increase their bargaining power in bilateral and international negotiations.  150  Bibliography ABAZA, H. & JHA, V. 2002. Fisheries Sector in Senegal. 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Migration and income diversification:: Evidence from burkina faso. World Development, 36, 625-640. YORK, R. & GOSSARD, M. H. 2004. Cross-national meat and fish consumption: exploring the effects of modernization and ecological context. Ecological Economics, 48, 293-302. ZELLER, D., BOOTH, S., DAVID, G. & PAULY, D. 2007. Re-estimation of small-scale fishery catches for U.S. flag associated island areas in the Western Pacific: The last 50 years. Fishery Bulletin, 105, 266-277. ZELLER, D., BOOTH, S. & PAULY, D. 2007b. Fisheries contribution to GDP: underestimating small-scale fisheries in the Pacific. Marine Resources Economics, 35, 355-374.  186  Appendices  Appendix A   Materials for estimating the number of small-scale fishers and their dependents in West Africa, 2000-2010 This appendix presents the compilation of documents which served towards estimating the total number of artisanal and subsistence fishers in 22 West African countries and their dependents. The data were all accessed between June and July 2014. A.1 Materials and methods We compiled data on the number of artisanal boats, the number of artisanal fishers and the total number of subsistence fishers (including men and women whenever possible) and their dependents for 22 West African countries: Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Congo Dem. Rep., Sao Tome and Principe, Angola and Namibia.  While effort data were mainly extracted from a variety of available reports and documents (including official reports, scientific surveys, database materials, etc.), the number of dependents was assumed to be the number of people in a household minus 1 (the fisher). Thus, we investigated the size of the household for all 22 countries for the period between 1950 and 2010 (Table A.1). To complete the estimate, we performed a series of linear interpolations coupled with the assumption that the most recent and earlier estimate could be carried forward to 2010 and backward to 1950, respectively (Table A.1).    187  Table A. 1 Estimation of the number of dependents per fisher for 22 West African countries between 1950 and 2010.   Country  Year  Household size References  Morocco 1960 4.8 Haut Commissariat du Plan (2012) Morocco 1966 5.9 Mullot (1971) Morocco 1971 5.6 Haut Commissariat du Plan (2012) Morocco 1982 6.0 Haut Commissariat du Plan (2012) Morocco 1994 5.9 Haut Commissariat du Plan (2012) Morocco 2004 5.2 Haut Commissariat du Plan (2012) Morocco 2005 5.2 Haut Commissariat du Plan (2012) Morocco 2006 5.1 Haut Commissariat du Plan (2012) Morocco 2007 5.1 Haut Commissariat du Plan (2012) Morocco 2008 5.0 Haut Commissariat du Plan (2012) Morocco 2009 4.9 Haut Commissariat du Plan (2012) Morocco 2010 4.9 Haut Commissariat du Plan (2012) Mauritania 1977 8.3 Ignegongba (1991) Mauritania 2004 5.8 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Senegal 1955 4.0 Martin (1955) Senegal 1999 9.3 Sow et al. (1999) Senegal 2008 8.7 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Gambia 2003 8.6 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Gambia 1950-2010   Belhabib et al. (2013b) Cape Verde 2006 4.9 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Guinea Bissau 1996 6.9 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Guinea 2004 6.6 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Guinea 1950-2010   Belhabib et al. (2014a) Sierra Leone 1979 5.5 Bailey and Serow (1991) Sierra Leone 1994 5.4 Campbell (1994) Sierra Leone 2008 5.9 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Liberia 1989 6.1 David (1993) Liberia 2008 5.1 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Cote d'Ivoire 1968 9.4 Anon. (1968) Cote d'Ivoire 1988 6.0 Anon. (1991) Cote d'Ivoire 2004 8.0 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Ghana 2006 4.0 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Ghana 1950-2010   Nunoo et al. (2014) Togo 1983 6.3 Gozo (1989) Togo 2004 6.0 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Benin 1979 5.1 Dansou (2005) Benin 1992 5.2 Dansou (2005) Benin 2002 4.3 Dansou (2005) Benin 2002 5.6 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) 188  Table A. 1 Estimation of the number of dependents per fisher for 22 West African countries between 1950 and 2010 (Cont’d.).   Country  Year  Household size References  Nigeria 1968 7.6 Feyisetan and Bankole (2002) Nigeria 2005 4.7 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Cameroon 1976 5.4 Nkom  Pouhe (2010) Cameroon 1987 5.5 Nkom  Pouhe (2010) Cameroon 2004 4.8 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Cameroon 2005 4.5 Institut National de la Statistique (2011) Cameroon 2007 4.4 Institut National de la Statistique (2011) Cameroon 2010 4.4 Institut National de la Statistique (2011) Gabon 1965 4.6 Mouvagha-Sow (2001) Gabon 1989 5.0 Mouvagha-Sow (2001) Gabon 2004 5.0 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Equatorial Guinea 1963 7.0 Carrasco Saiz (1966) Equatorial Guinea 2004 5.9 Albrechtsen et al. (2005) Equatorial Guinea 2011 4.6 MSBES et al. (2012) Sao Tome & Prin. 2004 5.5 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Congo  2000 5.9 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Congo  2007 4.2 CNSEE (2010) Congo, Dem. Rep. 2009 5.3 UNDP (2009) Angola 1980 4.8 Encyclopaedia Britannica (1996) Angola 2004 5.0 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Namibia 1992 6.0 Katjiuanjo et al. (1993) Namibia 1993 5.7 Barnes and Alberts (2008) Namibia 2001 5.1 National Planning Commission (2012) Namibia 2003 4.9 Barnes and Alberts (2008) Namibia 2003 4.9 Encyclopedia Universalis (2014) Namibia 2011 4.4 National Planning Commission (2012)  The methods for the effort, i.e. number of boats, number of artisanal and subsistence fishers are summarized in Table A.2 below.189  Table A. 2 Methods for estimating fishing effort (number of artisanal and subsistence fishers) in 22 West African countries. Country Method Morocco The total number of artisanal boats and the corresponding number of fishers was derived from Belhabib et al. (2012d). The number of subsistence fishers was obtained as the product of the number of subsistence boats (Belhabib et al., 2012d) by 2 fishers per boat. Mauritania The number of artisanal fishing o and the corresponding number of fishers and the number of subsistence fishers were extracted from (Belhabib et al., 2012b). Senegal The number of subsistence and artisanal fishers was extracted from Belhabib et al. (2014e) Gambia The number of artisanal fishing boats was obtained from various literature sources covering the period between 1965 and 2010 (Everett, 1976, Horemans, 1996b, Belhabib et al., 2013b, Mendy, 2002, Anon., 2006a, Lesack and Drammeh, 1980, Mbenga, 1996). We interpolated linearly to fill in the gaps. The number of artisanal fishers between 1965 and 2006 was provided by Everett (1976), Mendy (2009) and (Weber and Durand, 1986). We assumed the number of fishers was constant between 2006 and 2010 and between 1965 and 1950. We interpolated linearly to fill in the gaps. The number of subsistence fishers was obtained from Belhabib et al. (2013b). Cape Verde The number of artisanal fishing boats was obtained from Chavance (2004) for the period between 1950 and 2010. We estimated the total number of artisanal fishers by multiplying the number of artisanal boat by the number of fishers per boat obtained from Weber and Durand (1986). Guinea Bissau The total number of boats was obtained from Chavance (2004), Weber and Durand (1986), Dia and Bedingar (2001), Oceanic Développemen and MegaPesca Lda (2009) and IRD (2011) covering the 1950-2010 time period (gaps were filled by linear interpolations). The number of artisanal fishers was available for 1986 (Weber and Durand, 1986), 1989 and 2000 (Dia and Bedingar, 2001), 1999 (Pires, 1999), and was estimated for 2010 using the number of fishers per pirogue, i.e. 4 fishers per pirogue obtained from Weber and Durand (1986) and Dia and Bedingar (2001). Guinea For artisanal fisheries, we estimated employment using the reconstructed number of pirogues between 1950 and 2010 (Belhabib et al., 2012a) by the average number of fishers each pirogue needed to be operated, i.e., 4.41 fishers in 1985 (Pollnac, 1985) which was assumed constant between 1950 and 1985, 7.2 fishers in 1989 (Chavance and Diallo, 1996), 4.13 fishers in 2004 (N'Dia, 2004), which we kept constant for 2010. We multiplied the average number of fishers by the total number of pirogues and then interpolated linearly to fill in for the intervening years.  Sierra Leone The number of artisanal fishers was extracted from Seto et al. (in press). 190  Table A. 3 Methods for estimating fishing effort (number of artisanal and subsistence fishers) in 22 West African countries (Cont’d.).. Country Method Liberia The number of artisanal Ghanaian (Fanti) fishers (based and operating in Liberia) was derived from the number of boats obtained from various sources covering the 1950-2010 time period (van Pel, 1954, Dixon and Mingle, 1981, Ssentongo, 1987, Smart and Sheves, 1979, Ratcliff and Lindley, 1988, FAO, 2009a) interpolated and then multiplied by 11 fishers (Nunoo et al., 2014)(Nunoo et al. Ghana reconstruction). The number of (Popoh) beach seines was obtained from Haakonson (1992) [assuming it began in 1960] for 1990. We obtained the estimate for 2010 from (Belhabib et al., 2013c). We then multiplied the number of beach seines by 8 (Haakonson, 1992) to estimate the number of fishers per year. The number of subsistence fishers was derived from the number of Kru (subsistence) boats obtained from various sources (Haakonson, 1992, Dioury, 1983, Ssentongo, 1987, Dixon and Mingle, 1981, Smart and Sheves, 1979, Lawson and Robinson, 1983b, Thornes, 1986, Ratcliff and Lindley, 1988, Glasgow, 2008) interpolated and then multiplied by 3 fishers per boat (Dioury, 1983). Cote d'Ivoire The number of boats was reconstructed from various sources covering the period from 1950 to 2010 (Shep et al., 2011, Postel, 1950, Lassarat, 1958, Domingo, 1980, Gerlotto and Stequert, 1978, Cormier, 1983, Collari, 1986, Kébé et al., 1997). We obtained the number of artisanal fishers by multiplying the number of boats by 9 fishers per boat between 1950 and 1978 (Lassarat, 1958) and by 6 for the 1990s and 2000s (Shep et al., 2011). We extracted the number of subsistence fishers from Belhabib (2014a) adapted from (Durand et al., 1978), (Laë, 1992, Verdeaux, 1981) and (Anon., 1981). Ghana The number of boat owners in taken as the number of boats, while the crew is estimated by multiplying the average number of the crew by the number of boats per segment of the fleet provided in Nunoo et al. (2014). We used the weighted average equivalent number of fishers for the total artisanal fleet, including beach seines (estimated at 19.2 fishers per boat, using data by Lery et al. (1999). The number of lagoon subsistence fishers was obtained by dividing the total lagoon catch by the average per capita consumption rate of 37.5 kg∙capita-1∙year-1 (Nunoo et al., 2014). Togo The number of subsistence and artisanal fishers was extracted from Belhabib et al. (2014d).    191  Table A. 4 Methods for estimating fishing effort (number of artisanal and subsistence fishers) in 22 West African countries (Cont’d.). Country Method Benin Literature documented the number of marine pirogues for the years 1983, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1997 and 1999 (Senouvo, 1990, Ssentongo, 1990, Gbaguidi and Meyizoun, 1994, Horemans and Jallow, 1997, Turay and Verstralen, 1997, FAO, 2007) and the number of marine fishers for the early 1980, 1983, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1997, 1999 and 2010 (Chaboud and Charles-Dominique, 1991, Écoutin et al., 1993, Horemans, 1994, Horemans and Jallow, 1997, Turay and Verstralen, 1997, FAO, 2007, Njock and Westlund, 2010, Dessouassi, 2011). We estimated the number of pirogues for 1980 by multiplying the number of fishers (2,500) by the number of fishers per pirogue (5) obtained from 1983 data (Weber and Durand, 1986). The total number of coastal fishers (lagoon and marine) was estimated at 15,300 for 1960 (Anon., 1964), thus to estimate the number of marine artisanal fishers among these, we first obtained the number of lagoon fishers using the ratio lagoon fishers estimated at 11,000 (Lemasson, 1961): Coastal population for 1955, i.e., 3%, multiplied by the coastal population for 1960 and obtained a number of lagoon fishers of 11,939 for 1960. The difference between the total number of coastal fishers and lagoon fishers is the number of artisanal marine fishers for 1960, i.e., 3,361 for 639 pirogues (assuming 5 fishers per pirogue). Similarly, we obtained the total number of coastal fishers as 4% of the coastal population within the primary sector (80% of the coastal population) as documented by Anon. (1964) for 1950, i.e., 11,925 fishers. We then estimated the number of lagoon fishers for 1950 at 10,061 using the proportion of lagoon fishers for 1955, i.e., 11,000 (Lemasson, 1961) over the coastal population for 1955, then multiplied by the coastal population for 1950. We then estimated marine artisanal fishers by subtracting the number of lagoon fishers from the total estimated for 1950, which were then divided by 5 to estimate the number of pirogues. We interpolated to fill in the gaps. Capo-Chichi (2006) estimated the number of subsistence (women) fishers at 9,724 for 2006, which is the equivalent of 16% of the total number of male lagoon fishers. Since these women are most likely relatives of male fishers themselves and directly or indirectly related to them, we assumed this percentage was constant over the 1950-2010 time period and multiplied it by the total number of lagoon male fishers to obtain the total number of female fishers. Nigeria The number of artisanal fishers was obtained from Olomola (1998) for 1985, 1989 and 1991 and was derived from the number of boats and the number of fishers per boat for 2010 (Etim et al., in press). We assumed the number of fishers in 1950 was proportional to the coastal population of 1950.  192  Table A. 5 Methods for estimating fishing effort (number of artisanal and subsistence fishers) in 22 West African countries (Cont’d.). Country Method Cameroon The number of boats was given at 4,302 in 1965 for 4,965 fishers (Laure, 1965), 6,011 and 18,625 fishers for 1983 (Ssentongo and Njock, 1987), and 7,335 boats in 1995 which we conservatively assumed to be constant between then and the 2000s (Nnana Noah, 2010). We obtained the number of fishers for 1995 by multiplying the number of fishers per boat obtained for 1983 (3) by the number of boats for 1995. We then interpolated linearly to fill in the gaps. Gabon The number of boats and the corresponding number of artisanal fishers was obtained from Lagoin and Salmon (1970) for 1967, Everett (1976) for 1974 (number of boats only), Haakonsen (1992) for the number of boats and artisanal fishers for 1983, Kébé et al. (1996) for the number of artisanal fishers in 1987 and 1996, Ijiff (1991) for the number of boats and artisanal fishers for 1990 and Kébé (2011) for the number of boats between 2008 and 2010. Assuming the number of boats was significantly lower in 1950 (Lagoin and Salmon, 1970), we divided the number of boats in 1967 by 2 to obtain the number of boats in 1950. We estimated the number of fishers per boat for 1967 by dividing the total number of artisanal fishers by the number of boats and then multiplied the latter by the number of boats in 1950 to obtain the number of fishers in 1950 (assuming a constant rate). We performed the same operation for the total number of fishers in 2010 using the number of fishers per boat of 1996. We interpolated linearly to fill in the gaps. Equatorial Guinea We obtained the number of fishers and boats from FAO (1986) for 1970, Matthes (1980) for 1980, Villegas (1985) for 1985, Everett (1991) for 1990, Horemans (1996b) for 1994, Flewwelling (1996) for 1996, the number of fishers from FAO (2003a) for 2003, Ministerio de Defensa (2006) for 2006, Anon. (2007) for 2007 and the number of boats for 2010 from (Equatorial Guinea Embassy, 2012). We assumed the number of boats in 1950 was 30% lower than the number of boats in 1970 (Lagoin and Salmon, 1970) and then interpolated linearly to fill in the gaps. We derived the total number of fishers for 1950 as the product of the number of fishers per boat (estimated using 1970 data) and the number of boats. We performed the latter operation to estimate the total number of artisanal fishers for 2010 using the number of fishers per boat derived from 2007 data.   193  Table A. 6 Methods for estimating fishing effort (number of artisanal and subsistence fishers) in 22 West African countries (Cont’d.). Country Method Sao Tome & Prin. The number of boats and corresponding number of fishers were documented by for the period between 1960 and 1970 (Lagoin and Salmon, 1970), for 1993 (Horemans, 1994), for 1995 (Oceanic Développement et al., 2004), and for the period between 2000 and 2010 (Failler et al., 2013, Oceanic Développement et al., 2004, Anon., 2012, Carneiro, 2012). We obtained the number of fishers for 1950 by deriving a ratio number of fishers/coastal population for 1960 which we then applied by the coastal population for 1950. We completed the time series for boats and fishers by interpolating linearly. Congo The number of canoes and the corresponding number of fishers, was rebuilt using different literature sources (Dhont, 1963, Lagoin and Salmon, 1970, Le Gall, 1975, Fontana, 1980, Gobert, 1985, Barro et al., 1989, Chaboud and Charles-Dominique, 1991, Nguinguiri, 1991, Jul-Larsen, 1994, Kébé and Njock, 1995, Kibelolo, 2003, Anon., 2011a, Koumba, 2012). We interpolated linearly to fill in the gaps.   Congo, Dem. Rep. Effort estimates were available for 1967 (Lagoin and Salmon, 1970), 1994 (Horemans, 1996a) and for 2008 (Mavinga Ngembo, 2008). We assumed the effort was 10% lower in 1950 relative to 1967, given a lower number of canoes (Lagoin and Salmon, 1970), and that the effort was constant from 2008 to 2010. We interpolated linearly effort estimates and then multiplied the resulting estimate by 2 fishers per boat given the relatively small-size of boats. Angola The number of artisanal boats and the number of fishers was obtained from various literature sources for 1970, 1979, 1991, 1995, 1998, 2000-2003 and 2010 (Sowman and Cardoso, 2010, Agostinho et al., 2005, Anon., 2003a, Guerra, 1979). The number of fishers for 1950 was estimated using the ratio number of fishers: coastal population for 1970 (assumed constant). We then derived the number of boats for 1950 as the number of fishers for the same year divided by the number of fishers per boat, i.e. 5 (Guerra, 1979). Namibia Barnes and Alberts (2008) reported for 2006 around 150 subsistence fishers. We extracted total population data from the World Bank’s database (www.worldbank.org) and coastal population data, i.e., people living 10 km from the coast, for 1990, 2000 and 2010 (CIESIN, 2012). Coastal population estimates were then converted to percentages of the total population and extrapolated backwards to 1950. We divided the number of fishers for 2006 by the coastal population estimated for the same year and obtained the percentage of subsistence fishers over the coastal population (0.16%); given that this percentage was likely higher in the past, we assumed it was 50% higher, i.e., 0.23% in 1950. We interpolated linearly between these rates, and multiplied them by the coastal population to estimate the number of subsistence fishers from 1950 to 2010. 194  For subsistence fisheries in Gabon, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Angola and Guinea Bissau, we estimated the number of subsistence fishers in 3 steps: 1) We estimated the consumption per capita generated by subsistence fisheries catches by dividing the reconstructed subsistence catch for 2010 by the available coastal population data for 2010, i.e., population living on a range of 5 km from the coast (CIESIN 2012). Since consumption per capita generated by subsistence fisheries was higher in the past, we assumed a linear decrease over time;  2) We estimated the average fish supply of the coastal household for each country from subsistence fisheries by multiplying the number of individuals in each household (average household size) by the per capita fish consumption generated by subsistence fisheries. 3) Since fishing was identified as one of the most common activities of households in coastal of these countries, it is reasonable to assume that each household has at least one fisher supplying the family with fish. Therefore, we obtained the number of subsistence fishers by dividing the total subsistence catch by the household fish supply.  A.2 Results and discussion Overall, the size of the average West African household has declined from 6.5 persons per household to 6 persons per household. However, it increased in Sierra Leone (after the war), Senegal, Gabon, Congo, Dem. Rep. and Angola. Countries with the highest number of people within fishing household are The Gambia, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire with on average 15, 10 and 8 people respectively. Gabon has the smallest fishing household number.   195  The number of artisanal and subsistence fishers has increased over time from 905,900 fishers in 1950, of which 80% were subsistence fishers, to 1.7 million fishers with subsistence fishers representing less than 50%. Ghana had the overwhelming majority of professional (artisanal) fishers, followed by Nigeria and Angola, while, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Gabon had the overwhelming majority of subsistence fishers.   The number of subsistence fishers increased from 729,000 in 1950 to a peak of 1 million fishers in 1980 and then declined to 835,000 fishers in 2010, likely due to the professionalization of the fishery as the number of artisanal fishers increased overall from 177,000 fishers in 1950 to 905,700 fishers in 2010. This further indicates the shift from subsistence to artisanal fishers and the growing number and size of artisanal fishing boats.               196  Appendix B  Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000-2010 These supplementary materials present the compilation of documents presenting evidence of the presence of legal access (agreement) by the People Republic of China to the Exclusive Economic Zones of West African countries, and the value/fees paid under these agreements, as reported in the scientific literature, in the mass media and on the websites of governmental and non-governmental organizations. The data were all accessed between June and July 2014.  B.1 Materials and methods We investigated the legal presence of vessels from mainland China in 21 West African countries: Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Congo Dem. Rep., Sao Tome and Principe, Angola and Namibia. Once evidence of legal access (e.g., joint ventures, inter-government agreements, vessel chartering etc.) was documented for a country, we investigated the value of such access in three steps:  First, we searched for the nature of the payment: Chinese payments were classified in three different categories: a) Category I, Direct Monetary payments: China pays directly for the fishing agreement in which case the monetary value is documented and the duration of the agreement clearly stated. Examples include Guinea (Sidibe, 2003)(Table B.1) and Mauritania (CFFA, 2012). b) Category II, License fees: Chinese vessels pay license fees, particularly when they are chartered or operated under joint ventures. These payments can be exclusive in which case they are the only 197  payment offered by Chinese vessel operators to the West African country such as those in Senegal (Anon., 2013a) and The Gambia (Government of The Gambia, unpub. data) (Table B.1). License fee payments, in a few instances, are complementary to a larger investment in exchange for the presence of the Chinese fleet in the West Africa. Examples include Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Côte d’Ivoire where the Chinese fleet paid license fees in addition to an amount paid by China to access fishing grounds (Table B.1), which usually are classified as a third category (indirect payments); c) Category III, indirect payments: This method means that China pays for the legal access to West African fishing grounds by offering different ‘items’ in exchange. These category is relatively harder to investigate evidence has to demonstrate that the ‘payment’ is aimed in exchange for fisheries access, then the investigation has to reveal the nature of the item (infrastructure building, debt cancellation, military aid etc.), and the value of the item (Table B.1). The payment is considered to be in exchange for fishing access whenever the reference mentions, establishes (or widely interprets as such) the direct and exclusive link between the payment (or the item) and the fishing access, or the fact that the item was directly provided by e.g., the Chinese National Fishing Company. If this mention was not available, we attempted to answer the question of whether or not fishing was the only (or the most important) economic activity of China in the host country (if sectors such as mining, telecommunications, etc. were not involved), e.g., Cape Verde, in which case there would be a strong link between fishing access and the amount paid, despite the possibility of the agreement including other sectors.  Second, once the nature of the payment was established, we searched for the items China paid for and their value, along with the duration of the project/agreement (Table B.1). 198  Third, we converted local currencies and Euros to USD and USD2013 using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) per country (www.worldbank.org) to convert values to USD2013 [2013 Price = [2000-2010] value x (2013 CPI/2005 CPI)].  B.2 Results and discussion The literature review encompassed a wide range of sources and overall, over 33 items within the 22 countries investigated. As the value of 9 items could not be retraced, this represents a total coverage of 73%. Explicit evidence of a direct link of an investment to fisheries was taken as such, while implicit evidence or hints to a potential link was further investigated. For each country, we present the time period covered by the legal presence, the category of the payment, the item paid, the value of the payment converted to current $ US and the method and references.  Results show that the payment Category III (indirect payment) was the most common with 18 projects in 10 countries, followed by Category II (license payments) paid to 8 countries and finally only one instance of direct fishing agreement payment (Table B.1). In 50% of the cases, Category II is complementary to Category III.  While the payment for Cameroon was not taken into account later in the study, payments to Cape Verde (average annual amount 2 million USD), Guinea Bissau parliament reconstruction (2.74 million USD), Côte d’Ivoire EXIM BANK loan (0.67 million USD) and Ghana interest free loan (19 million USD) might also be directly related to other sectors such as mining. The inclusion of the above mentioned amounts of sectors other than fishing might have created an upward bias of 15 million USD when estimating annual average.199  Table B.  1 Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000-2010. Country Years Category Item Cash value (USD)  Cash value (cUSD2013·year-1∙106) Method Morocco 1988-2002 III Not mentioned 150∙106 9.24 Total value of indirect payments provided (Anon., 2002) for the 1988-2002 in USD was divided by the number of years and then adjusted by the CPI. The average for the 2000s was taken assuming it was constant since then. Mauritania 1999 II Licence payment for total Chinese fleet 170,443 0.21 The license value was in USD (IMROP, unpub. data) was converted to USD2013 using CPI.  Mauritania 2000 II 99,037 0.15 Mauritania 2001 II 40,000 0.04 Mauritania 2002 II 12,400 0.02 Mauritania 2006 II 229,531 0.18 Mauritania 2007 II 594,945 0.40 Mauritania 2008 II 661,050 0.44 Mauritania 2009 II 594,945 1.32 Mauritania 2010 II 944,370 0.74 Mauritania 2011 II 4,077,670 3.57 Mauritania 2012 II 3,697,350 3.70 Mauritania 2010 III Donation to boost defense15 2∙106 1.17 This payment value in USD was for one year, the value in USD was converted to Current USD2013 using CPI Mauritania 2010 III Armed forces financial16 support 3∙106 2.40                                                   15 http://china-defense.blogspot.ca/2010/04/china-donates-15-million-to-boost.html [Accessed on 08/6/2013] 16 http://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2011/09/20/mauritania-and-china/ [Accessed on 08/6/2013] 200  Table B.  1 Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000-2010 (Cont’d.). Country Years Category Item Cash value (USD)  Cash value (cUSD2013·year-1∙106) Method Mauritania 2010-2015 III Hospital, commercial centre and housing17 100∙106 13.10 The total payment received in USD was divided by an assumed construction period of 6 years, within which the project had to be delivered, the result was converted to USD2013 using CPI Mauritania 2010-2013 III Port infrastructure 282∙106 55.40 The total payment received in $ million US (Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, 2013) was divided by an assumed construction period of 4 years, within which the project had to be delivered, the result was converted to USD2013 using CPI Senegal 2000-2010 II Licence payment per chartered tuna boat 74,000 0.02 The value per license was given in CFA (2013)/GRT/year for tuna vessels (Anon., 2013a). The number of Chinese tuna boats was given by Belhabib et al. 2014 (IUU) as 1 and the average GRT of Chinese boats was estimated at 308. The product of the GRT, the number of tuna boats and the license fee per boat in CFA, then converted to USD2013 using an exchange rate of 1 USD = 476 CFA                                                    17 http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09NOUAKCHOTT236_a.html [Accessed on 08/6/2013]   201   Table B.  1 Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000-2010 (Cont’d.). Country Years Category Item Cash value (USD)  Cash value (cUSD2013·year-1∙106) Method Senegal 2000-2010 II Licence payment per chartered demersal boat 37,000 0.67 The value per license was given in CFA (2013)/GRT/year for demersal vessels (Anon., 2013a). The number of Chinese demersal boats was given by Belhabib et al. (2014c) as 14 and the average GRT of Chinese boats was estimated at 308. The product of the GRT, the number of demersal boats and the license fee per boat in CFA, then converted to USD2013 using an exchange rate of 1 USD = 476 CFA The Gambia 2004 II Licence payment for total Chinese fleet Not found  There was evidence of licence based agreements and the details of 10 fishing vessels were available in the Gambian government unpublished data, no license fees were available The Gambia 2005 II Licence payment for total Chinese fleet Not found   There was evidence of licence based agreements and the details of 5 fishing vessels were available in the Gambian government unpublished data, no license fees were available    202  Table B.  1 Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000-2010 (Cont’d.). Country Years Category Item Cash value (USD)  Cash value (cUSD2013·year-1∙106) Method Cape Verde 2000-2006 III Dam building (3.5 million Euro) and Stadium building (12 million USD) 17∙106 3.00 The value was documented in real USD (Escobar and Kimbamba Simões, 2012). We assumed a construction period of 7 years which is the duration of the project. We divided the amount by 7 and then converted it to USD assuming an exchange rate of 1 Euro = 1.33 USD and then converted the resulting value to Current USD Cape Verde 2006-2010 III Hospital building 5∙106 0.80 The value was documented in real USD (Escobar and Kimbamba Simões, 2012). We assumed a construction period of 5 years, which is the initial duration of the project. We divided the total amount by 5, and then adjusted by the CPI to convert the values to USD2013. The value for 2006 takes into consideration the annual value for dam building, stadium building and hospital building. Cape Verde 2008 III Debt cancellation 2∙106 0.50 The value was documented in real USD18. This was assumed to be a one year payment, as no further evidence suggested otherwise                                                    18 http://www.capeverde.com/forum/cape-verde-general-forum-f2/china-s-relationship-with-cape-verde-t3169.html [Accessed on 08/6/2013] 203   Table B.  1 Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000-2010 (Cont’d.). Country Years Category Item Cash value (USD)  Cash value (cUSD2013·year-1∙106) Method Guinea Bissau 2007 III Reconstruction of parliament 18∙106 2.74 The value was documented in USD19.  We assumed the duration of the project was one year. We converted USD to USD2013 using CPI. The reconstruction of the parliament was a fisheries related venture. Guinea Bissau 2007 II Licence payment for total Chinese fleet  1.10 Licence fees paid by China were 14% higher than those paid by the EU (223 Euros per GRT), i.e., 254 Euro/GRT20. The Chinese fleet operating in Guinea Bissau had a total of 3,984 GRT. We estimated the total licence fees by multiplying the licence fees for China and then converted these to USD assuming an exchange rate of 1.33. We converted the resulting value to USD2013 using CPI. Guinea 1997-1998 I Direct monetary payments 6 2.27 The value was documented in USD (Sidibe, 2003). The direct value of the agreement was converted to USD2013 using the CPI. Guinea 2001-2002 I 2 0.91 Guinea 2003-2004 I 2 0.61                                                    19 http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/China%E2%80%93Guinea-Bissau_relations [Accessed on 08/6/2013] 20 http://transparentsea.co/index.php?title=Guinea,Bissau:Industrial_fisheries#Fisheries_agreements_with_China [Accessed on 08/6/2013] 204  Table B.  1 Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000-2010 (Cont’d.). Country Years Category Item Cash value (USD)  Cash value (cUSD2013·year-1∙106) Method Sierra Leone 2011 II Licence payment for total Chinese fleet 376,500 0.24 The value was documented in USD (Ahmad et al., 2012). Over 50% of the demersal trawl fleet registered to Sierra Leone in the 2000s was allegedly of Chinese origin. Licence revenues were divided by 2 and then converted the resulting value to USD2013 using CPI. Cote d'Ivoire 2004 II License fee per boat 3,076 0.02 The value was documented in USD21. There were 8 Chines vessels legally operating in Côte d'Ivoire per year (Belhabib, 2014a). Their number was multiplied by the license fee then converted the resulting value to USD2013 using CPI. Cote d'Ivoire 2013 III EXIM BANK loan to Côte d'Ivoire 321∙106 0.67 The CFA (2013) value provided22 was converted to USD assuming an exchange rate of 1 USD = 472 CFA. Cote d'Ivoire 2009 III Renovation of fishing port Not found   This investment23 was related to fisheries; however, its value was not was not found. The access value for Côte d'Ivoire is likely under-estimated.                                                    21 http://www.koffi.net/koffi/actualite/3129-Reportage-Peche-industrielle-Les-bateaux-chinois-coulent-les-armateurs-ivoiriens.htm  [Accessed on 08/6/2013] 22 http://www.gouv.ci/actualite_1.php?recordID=3122 [Accessed on 08/6/2013] 23 http://cabinetpkdconseil.com/a-lassaut-des-entreprises-chinoises330/ [Accessed on 08/6/2013] 205  Table B.  1 Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000-2010 (Cont’d.). Country Years Category Item Cash value (USD)  Cash value (cUSD2013·year-1∙106) Method Ghana 1998 III fishing ropes and net processing project 9∙106 7.00 The value was documented in USD (African Centre for Economic Transformation, 2009). The project was over a one year period. We converted USD to USD2013 using CPI. Ghana 2008 III Construction of a fish pond (CNFC and Lu Ye Fisheries) in 2009 USD24 40∙106 7.00 The value was documented in USD. The project was assumed to be over a 4 year time period. We divided the total amount by 4 then converted USD to USD2013 using CPI. Ghana 2009 III interest-free loan to construct landing sites for fishing communities, provide social services, build schools and hospitals, and continue educational exchanges and scholarships (Glaesel Frontani and McCracken, 2012, African Centre for Economic Transformation, 2009) 99∙106 19.00                                                     24 http://china.aiddata.org/projects/1872 [Accessed on 08/6/2013] 206   Table B.  1 Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000-2010 (Cont’d.). Country Years Category Item Cash value (USD)  Cash value (cUSD2013·year-1∙106) Method Togo 2004 III Not mentioned 4∙106 0.20 The value was documented in USD25. We assumed the investment was over a period of 5 years, as a conservative duration of Chinese agreements. We divided the original value by 5 and then converted USD to USD2013 using CPI. Benin 2002-2010   Not found Not found   Evidence of agreements was found (Vogt et al., 2010) but no value was available. Nigeria 2004-2005   Not found Not found   Evidence of legal access26, but the value could not be traced. Cameroon 2013-undated III Donation for the development of fisheries 60∙106  The value was documented in USD27. The value for Cameroon was not taken into consideration as data on Chinese catches from the EEZ of Cameroon were not yet available. Equatorial Guinea 2005-2010   Not found Not found   Evidence of agreements was found (Bricola, 2008), but no value was available.                                                     25 http://www.farmer.com.cn/wlb/yyb/yy7/200408310521.htm [Accessed on 08/6/2013] 26 http://wenku.baidu.com/view/750b38303968011ca3009138.html?from=related&hasrec=1 [Accessed on 08/6/2013] 27 http://www.investiraucameroun.com/tags/peche [Accessed on 08/6/2013] 207  Table B.  1 Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000-2010 (Cont’d.). Country Years Category Item Cash value (USD)  Cash value (cUSD2013·year-1∙106) Method Gabon 2004 III Construction of the national assembly building (73 million USD) and the senate (1.2 million USD) 74∙106 9.60 The value was documented in real USD28. We assumed these were a one year payment (Bignouma, 2007). We converted USD to USD2013 using CPI. Gabon 2008 II License fee per boat 17,176 0.30 The license value in Euro (2013) applied to national and reflagged vessels. There were 13 Chinese boats reflagged to Gabon (Anon., 2009). We obtained the total license fee value as the product of license fees per boat (Ekouala, 2013) for this category and the number of Chinese boats, converted to USD assuming an exchange rate of 1.33. Gabon 2008 II  51,525 1.78 License value in Euro (2013) applied to foreign vessels (Ekouala, 2013). There were 26 Chinese boats flagged to China and FoC (Anon., 2009). The total license fee value was computed as the product of license fees per boat for this category and the number of Chinese boats, converted to USD, using an exchange rate of 1.33.                                                    28 http://www.agoravox.fr/actualites/international/article/la-chine-un-partenaire-economique-25872 [Accessed on 08/6/2013]  208  Table B.  1 Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000-2010 (Cont’d.). Country Years Category Item Cash value (USD)  Cash value (cUSD2013·year-1∙106) Method Gabon 2009 II  17,176 0.27 The license value in Euro (2013) applied to national and reflagged vessels (Ekouala, 2013). There were 12 Chinese boats reflagged to Gabon (Anon., 2009). We obtained the total licence fee value as the product of licence fees per boat for this category and the number of Chinese boats, converted to USD assuming an exchange rate of 1.33. Gabon 2009 II 51,525 0.96 The license value in Euro (2013) applied to foreign vessels (Ekouala, 2013). There were 14 Chinese boats flagged to China and FoC (Anon., 2009). We obtained the total licence fee value as the product of licence fees per boat for this category and the number of Chinese boats, converted to USD assuming an exchange rate of 1.33. Gabon 2010 II  17,176 0.21 The license value in Euro (2013) applied to national and reflagged vessels (Ekouala, 2013). There were 9 Chinese boats reflagged to Gabon (Anon., 2010). We obtained the total licence fee value as the product of licence fees per boat for this category and the number of Chinese boats, converted to USD assuming an exchange rate of 1.33.  209  Table B.  1 Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000-2010 (Cont’d.). Country Years Category Item Cash value (USD)  Cash value (cUSD2013·year-1∙106) Method Gabon 2010 II  51,525 0.75 The license value in Euro (2013) applied to foreign vessels (Ekouala, 2013). There were 11 Chinese boats flagged to China and FoC (Anon., 2011b). We obtained the total licence fee value as the product of licence fees per boat for this category and the number of Chinese boats, converted to USD assuming an exchange rate of 1.33. Gabon 2011 II 17,176 0.25 The license value in Euro (2013) applied to national and reflagged vessels (Ekouala, 2013). There were 11 Chinese boats reflagged to Gabon (Anon., 2011b). We obtained the total licence fee value as the product of licence fees per boat for this category and the number of Chinese boats, converted to USD assuming an exchange rate of 1.33 Gabon 2011 II  51,525 0.75 The license value in Euro (2013) applied to foreign vessels. There were 11 Chinese boats flagged to China and FoC. We obtained the total licence fee value as the product of licence fees per boat for this category and the number of Chinese boats, converted to USD assuming an exchange rate of 1.33   210  Table B.  1 Materials for estimating the annual value of Chinese legal access to West African fishing grounds, 2000-2010 (Cont’d.). Country Years Category Item Cash value (USD)  Cash value (cUSD2013·year-1∙106) Method Sao Tome and principe 2000-2010   Not found Not found   Evidence of agreement (Oceanic Développement et al., 2004). Congo 2013 II License fee per boat Not found   Strong evidence of the presence of Chinese fleet fishing under license; however values and agreements could not be found. Even the text about the licences is not clear about the licence cost29. Congo, Dem. Rep. 2000-2010   Not found Not found   Evidence of legal access, but value not found (Mavinga Ngembo, 2008). Angola 2004-2010 III Building fishing infrastructure and artisanal and industrial fishing boats 311 25.30 The value was documented in USD (Du Preez, 2009, Campos and Vines, 2008). We assumed the project lasted 7 years as it was still underway in 2008, and divided the total investment value by 7, then converted USD to USD2013. Namibia           Evidence of joint ventures was found for 2013 with a value of N$ 24 million (Immanuel, 2013); however no evidence was found for the period prior to 2013].                                                    29 http://faolex.fao.org/cgi-bin/faolex.exe?rec_id=000084&database=faolex&search_type=link&table=result&lang=fra&format_name=@FRALL [Accessed on 08/6/2013]  211  Appendix C  Methods for the estimation of catch data for West African countries. Table C.  1 Methods used for the estimation of catch data for West African countries. Country Sector Method used Morocco Artisanal Artisanal catch data were estimated based on a catch rate and the number of boats per year (Belhabib et al., 2012d) Industrial Industrial catch data were calculated using official data adjusted by under-reporting rates obtained from various sources (Belhabib et al., 2012c, Belhabib et al., 2012d) Western Sahara Artisanal Artisanal catch data were estimated based on a catch rate and the number of boats per year (Belhabib et al., 2012d) Industrial Industrial catch data were calculated using official data adjusted by under-reporting rates obtained from various sources (Belhabib et al., 2012c, Belhabib et al., 2012d) Mauritania Artisanal Artisanal catch data were estimated using the number of pirogues and the catch rate per pirogue along with official survey data (Belhabib et al., 2012b) Industrial Industrial catch data were obtained from official datasets adjusted by under-reporting rates extracted from the literature (Belhabib et al., 2012b) Senegal Artisanal Catches were reconstructed based on reported data adjusted by an under-reporting rate. Artisanal catches were allocated geographically to different EEZs based on the number of migrant pirogues and their CPUE (Belhabib et al., 2014e) Industrial Catches were calculated based on the CPUE (given in weight per GRT per fishing day), the number of vessels, the GRT per vessels (based on the origin and gear type of the vessel), the number of fishing days per year (Belhabib et al., 2014e).  The Gambia Artisanal Artisanal catch data were obtained by alternating catch estimates from literature sources and CPUE x Effort catch estimates (Belhabib et al., 2013b). Industrial Catches were calculated based on the CPUE (given in weight per GRT per fishing day), the number of vessels, the GRT per vessels (based on the origin and gear type of the vessel), the number of fishing days per year (Belhabib et al., 2013b). Guinea Bissau Artisanal Artisanal catch data were estimated using the CPUE x Effort method for two different categories, small traditional pirogues and Senegalese type pirogues (Belhabib et al., 2014f) Industrial Industrial catch data were obtained by multiplying the number of vessels by a CPUE obtained from different observations (Belhabib et al., 2014f)   212  Table C.  1 Methods used for the estimation of catch data for West African countries (Cont’d.). Country Sector Method used Guinea Artisanal Artisanal catch data were calculated using CPUE rates observed and reported by the literature and a reconstructed effort extracted from literature (Belhabib et al., 2012a) Industrial Industrial catch data were inferred by multiplying the number of vessels per year by the CPUE provided by the literature (Belhabib et al., 2012a) Sierra Leone Artisanal Artisanal catch data were obtained based on a catch rate per fisher and the number of active fishers (Seto et al., In press) Industrial Industrial catches were obtained directly from the literature (domestic) and using the method CPUE x Effort (foreign) (Seto et al., In press) Liberia Artisanal Artisanal catch data were calculated based on an observed CPUE rate and the number of canoes. The CPUE varied based on the canoe type (Belhabib et al., 2013c). Industrial Industrial catch data were inferred by multiplying the number of vessels per year by the CPUE provided by the literature (Belhabib et al., 2013c). Ghana Artisanal Artisanal catch data were obtained based on a catch rate per fisher and the number of active fishers (Nunoo et al., 2014) Industrial Industrial catch data calculated based on different methods depending on the gear type and the origin of the catch. Domestic industrial catch data were inferred by multiplying the number of vessels per year by the CPUE provided by the literature, while tuna fisheries catch data were obtained from official estimates (Nunoo et al., 2014) Togo Artisanal Artisanal catch data were calculated using CPUE rates observed and reported by the literature and a reconstructed effort extracted from literature (Belhabib et al., 2014d) Industrial Industrial catch data were estimated using CPUE rates and effort data compiled from various literature sources (Belhabib et al., 2014d) Benin Artisanal Artisanal catch data were calculated using CPUE rates observed and reported by the literature and a reconstructed effort extracted from literature (Belhabib and Pauly, 2014a) Industrial Industrial catch data were estimated using CPUE rates and effort data compiled from various literature sources (Belhabib and Pauly, 2014a)    213  Table C.  1 Methods used for the estimation of catch data for West African countries (Cont’d). Country Sector Method used Equat. Guinea Artisanal Artisanal catch data were obtained based on a catch rate per fisher and the number of active fishers (Belhabib et al., 2014b) Industrial Industrial catch data were estimated using CPUE rates and effort data compiled from various literature sources (Belhabib et al., 2014b) S. Tome & Prin. Artisanal Artisanal catch data were calculated using CPUE rates observed and reported by the literature and a reconstructed effort extracted from literature (Belhabib, 2014b) Industrial Industrial catch data were estimated using CPUE rates and effort data compiled from various literature sources (Belhabib, 2014b) Congo (Brazz.) Artisanal Artisanal catch data were calculated using CPUE rates observed and reported by the literature and a reconstructed effort extracted from literature (Belhabib and Pauly, 2014b) Industrial Industrial catch data were estimated using CPUE rates and effort data compiled from various literature sources (Belhabib and Pauly, 2014b) Congo (ex-Zaire) Artisanal Artisanal catch data were calculated using CPUE rates observed and reported by the literature and a reconstructed effort extracted from literature (Belhabib et al., 2014g) Industrial Industrial catch data were estimated using CPUE rates and effort data compiled from various literature sources (Belhabib et al., 2014g)  

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