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Third party reactions to justice failure : an empirical test Zhu, Lei 2014

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  THIRD PARTY REACTIONS TO JUSTICE FAILURE: AN EMPIRICAL TEST  by LEI ZHU  B.Comm., The University of Toronto, 2008   A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  June 2014 © Lei Zhu, 2014    ii  Abstract I propose a model that explores the consequences of justice failure. I conceptualize justice failure as a threat to meaning and propose that one way third party observers could react to justice failure is by engaging in fluid compensation. I also propose that identity influences individuals’ reaction to justice failure such that for individuals high in moral identity, compensation is more likely to occur in the moral domain than in other domains. Finally, as a result of affirming the moral domain, individuals high in moral identity are more likely to (a) engage in more ethical behavior (b) judge morally ambiguous behaviors as more immoral and (c) more supportive of corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs than individuals low in moral identity. Five experiments were conducted to partially test this model. In Chapter 1, I present an experiment demonstrating that not everyone is equally threatened by justice failure; rather, those who strongly endorse belief in just world are more threatened by justice failure than those who endorse such belief less strongly (Experiment 1). In Chapter 2, I present two experiments demonstrating the effect of moral identity on third parties’ reaction to justice failure (Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3). In Chapter 3, I present two additional experiments demonstrating that exposure to justice failure led third parties to 1) purchase more green products 2) support a fellow university student for a job promotion if they were high in environmental (Experiment 4) and university identity (Experiment 5). Finally, in Chapter 5, I discuss the implications of my theory and findings for research on third party justice and meaning maintenance.    iii  Preface Chapter 1, part of Chapter 2, and part of Chapter 5of this dissertation have been published or are under review at scientific, peer-review journals. I am the senior author on both article and held the primary role in developing theories, formulating hypotheses, designing the studies, analyzing the data, and writing the manuscripts. All studies reported in my thesis were approved by the Behavioral Research Ethics Board (BREB) of UBC (certificate numbers listed below) and conducted under the supervision of Dr. Karl Aquino. Chapter 1 and part of Chapter 5 were published in 2012. The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in Organizational Psychology Review, 2(2), by SAGE Publications Ltd., All rights reserved. © Reproduced with permission. The official citation that should be used in referencing this materials is: Zhu, L., Martens, J., and Aquino, K. (2012). Third party responses to justice failure: An identity-based meaning maintenance model. Organizational Psychology Review, 2: 129-151. DOI: 10.1177/2041386611434655.    Chapter 2 is currently under review.  Zhu, L., Martens J., Aquino, K., & Heine, S. J. (unpublished manuscript). Crime and (Lack of) Punishment: Evidence for Moderated Meaning-Maintenance Effects of Justice Failures. [BREB: H10-00192] Experiments reported in Chapters 3 and 4 in this thesis were approved by the UBC Behavioral Research Ethics Board. [BREB: H09-00833; H09-01870; H12-01763]    iv  Table of Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………ii Preface………………………………………………………………………….....................iii Table of Contents…...………………………………………………………….....................iv List of Figures………………...……………………………………………….....................vii Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………viii Dedication…………………………………………………………………………………..ix Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………..1  The Meaning Maintenance Model…………………………………………………….5  Justice as a Source of Meaning………………………………………………………..8 When Does Justice Failure Become a Meaning Threat……………………………...11  Mechanisms Behind Meaning Maintenance…………………………………………14 Identity as a Moderator of Fluid Compensation…………………………………..…20 Moral Identity and Fluid Compensation……………………………………………..24 Summary……………………………………………………………………………..29 Chapter 2: A Threat to One is Not a Threat to All………………………………………31  Introduction………………………………………………………………………….31 Experiment 1: Method…………………………………………………………….…31 Experiment 1: Results and Discussion………………………………………………33 Chapter 3: When Witnessing Justice Failure Makes You a Better Person…………….36 Introduction……………………………………………………………………….…36 Experiment 2a: Method……………………………………………………………...37 Experiment 2a: Results and Discussion…………………………………………...…39 v  Experiment 2b: Method……………………………………………………………...41 Experiment 2b: Results and Discussion…………………………………………..…42 Experiment 3: Method……………………………………………………………….43 Experiment 3: Results and Discussion………………………………………………45 Chapter 4: Beyond Moral Identity………………………………………………………...47  Introduction………………………………………………………………………….47 Experiment 4: Method…………………………………………………………….…48 Experiment 4: Results and Discussion………………………………………………50 Experiment 5: Method……………………………………………………………….52 Experiment 5: Results and Discussion………………………………………………54 Chapter 5: General Discussion………………………………………………………….…58  Contributions………………………………………………………………………...59  Limitations and Future Directions…………………………………………………...63 Practical Implications……………………………………………………………..…67 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………...…69 References…………………………………………………………………………………...72 Appendix 1: Manipulation of Justice Failure (Fraudulent consultant)…………………82 Appendix 2: Manipulation of Justice Upheld (Fraudulent consultant)…………………83 Appendix 3: Manipulation of Justice Failure (Corrupt CEO)…………………………..84 Appendix 4: Manipulation of Justice Upheld (Corrupt CEO)………………………..…85 Appendix 5: Belief in Just World Scale…………………………………………………...86 Appendix 6: Moral Identity Scale…………………………………………………………88 Appendix 7: Evaluation of Morally Ambiguous Behaviors Questionnaire…………….89 vi  Appendix 8: Screenshot of Freerice.com………………………………………………….90 Appendix 9: Environmental Identity Scale……………………………………………….91 Appendix 10: List of Products Offered in the Simulated Shopping Task………………92                     vii  List of Figures Figure 1 An identity-based meaning maintenance model………………………………7 Figure 2  A moral identity-based meaning maintenance model……………………….27 Figure 3  The moderating effect of BJW on fluid compensation………………………34 Figure 4 The moderating effect of moral identity on evaluation of morally ambiguous behaviors (Chapter 3, Experiment 1a)……………………………………….40 Figure 5 The moderating effect of moral identity on evaluation of morally ambiguous behaviors (Chapter 3, Experiment 1b)……………………………………….43 Figure 6 The moderating effect of moral identity on questions completed on Freerice (Chapter 3, Experiment 2)…………………………………………………...46 Figure 7 The moderating effect of environmental identity on preference for green products (Chapter 4, Experiment 1)………………………………………….51 Figure 8 Target trait evaluation as a function of justice failure and student identity manipulation (Chapter 4, Experiment 2)…………………………………….55 Figure 9 Target suitability evaluation as a function of justice failure and student identity manipulation………………………………………………………...56 Figure 10  Promotion Recommendation as a function of justice failure and student identity manipulation………………………………………………………...57 Figure 11 The multiple needs model of justice vs. The existential model of justice…...62        viii  Acknowledgements I would like to thank the members of my committee, Karl Aquino, JoAndrea Hoegg, and Steve Heine for constructive challenges, suggestions, and encouragement. I am deeply grateful to my advisor, Karl Aquino, for mentoring and supporting me throughout my Ph.D. study. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Hayat Kabasakal, Sandy Feng, and Lu Zhao for their assistance in data collection.                  ix  Dedication     To my family   1  CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Justice ... is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society, that fabric which to raise and support seems in this world, if I may say so, to have been the peculiar and darling care of Nature, must in a moment crumble into atoms. Adam Smith (1867) In 2009, Bernard Madoff  was sentenced  to 150 years in prison for stealing billions of dollars by orchestrating the largest Ponzi scheme in history. At the age of 71, Madoff will spend the rest of his life behind bars, which for most people seems a fitting punishment for the magnitude of his crimes. But commensurate justice is one thing, quite another is unsatisfied justice. Compare the fate of Bernard Madoff to that of Joseph Cassano, the so-called ‘‘patient zero’’ of the ongoing global economic crisis (Taibbi, 2009). As the head of the American International Group Financial Products Division (AIGFP), the world’s largest insurer of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), Cassano made the decision not to reserve any real money for the possible collapse of the market for CDOs. When the collapse happened in 2008, AIGFP was unable to compensate their clients for losses because they lacked sufficient reserve capital, which then triggered a meltdown of the global financial market. However, federal prosecutors brought no criminal charges against Cassano because they were unable to find enough evidence of wrongdoing. Furthermore, Cassano was able to 2  keep the 315 million dollars he made as the head of AIGFP and was also retained by AIGFP as a consultant, a position that pays 1 million dollars per month. Joseph Cassano’s escape from accountability for his failure to take the interests of his clients into account was not uncommon during the 2008 financial crisis.  After playing key roles in causing the largest economic crisis since the Great Depression, no major Wall Street executive was penalized for what many people believed to be highly questionable and perhaps even illegal activities committed by the firms they led (e.g., failure to disclose the scope of risks on their books and the amounts of low-quality loans bundled into the derivatives they sold to their clients, issuance of bonuses based on overly optimistic valuation, and possible insider trading; for more, see Morgenson & Story, 2011). Executives were not pursued largely because federal regulators were reluctant to further unsettle the market (Morgenson & Story, 2011). If Bernard Madoff’s sentence is an example of justice upheld, what do we call the case of Joseph Cassano and other Wall Street executives who were unpunished despite the fact that they too made decisions and supported actions that caused millions of people enormous financial, emotional, and psychological pain? In this paper, I use the term justice failure to refer to a situation in which one or more persons in an organization intentionally cause harm to others but goes unpunished. I argue that when a justice failure occurs, it can produce psychic distress for individuals who are made aware of it because the event threatens an important meaning framework they habitually and unconsciously rely on to make sense of the world. Of particular interest to me is explaining the reactions of people in organizations who are neither the perpetrators of wrongdoing nor its direct victims. We refer to such persons as third parties and by drawing 3  attention to how they react to justice failure we contribute to an emerging area of interest within the broader organizational justice literature (e.g., O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011). I use the term meaning framework to refer to a system of beliefs adopted by individuals that gives order and coherence to experience. The specific meaning framework that can be unsettled by exposure to a justice failure consists of the set of beliefs a person holds about the expected relationship between doing wrong and being punished as a result. The punishment needs not to be immediate, but it should be anticipated to occur eventually. The agent who exacts the punishment can be an organizational authority, a social entity, or, for those who believe in it, a divine being. It is also possible for punishment to be self-inflicted, as when the wrongdoer is haunted by guilt and self-loathing. Punishment can even take the form of misfortune befalling those who are intimately connected to the wrongdoer. As an example, consider the collateral effect of Madoff’s conviction on his family, particularly his two sons, one of whom, 46-year-old Mark, committed suicide in December 2010 while the younger son, Andrew, continued his business activities with noticeable constraint. However, when neither the wrongdoer nor anyone he or she cares about pays a price for his or her misdeeds, and may even prosper as a result, I contend that an important psychological thread that binds crime and punishment will be severed in the minds of third party observers. As a result, I expect some of them to experience an uncomfortable feeling whose source may not be readily apparent, but that may be sufficiently disturbing that it motivates efforts on their part to alleviate it. I trace the source of this discomfort to a meaning threat and contend that one way to eliminate this discomfort is to restore a sense of 4  meaning. But I go further by suggesting that how a person attempts to restore meaning will partly depend on what identity is particularly salient in the persons’ mind when they are confronted with a justice failure. My theoretical model, which I refer to as an identity-based meaning maintenance model, is depicted in Figure 1. The model makes several novel contributions to the organizational psychology literature. First, I introduce what I refer to as an existential perspective into the study of organizational justice. I argue that this perspective unifies the three dominant justice models—the instrumental model, relational model, and deontic model—that have guided nearly all of the research on organizational justice over the last decades. Second, my model contributes to the literature on moral psychology and behavioral ethics by showing how the failure to deliver justice can have an unexpected moralizing effect on third parties, one that actually makes people who witness justice failure more rather than less moral. Third, I offer an important refinement of extant models of how people respond to meaning threats, most notably the meaning maintenance model (MMM; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006), by suggesting that a person’s response to threat is at least partly driven by individual predispositions to interpret the world in certain ways as well as contextual information about whether an organization is generally just or unjust. I begin the explanation of my theory by reviewing key propositions of the meaning maintenance model.   5  The Meaning Maintenance Model The MMM (Heine et al., 2006) was developed to parsimoniously integrate a variety of psychological phenomena that are presumably driven by the same underlying motivation to establish meaning. Although scholars from various disciplines have described meaning in many different ways, the MMM draws from existentialist philosophy (e.g., Camus, 1955; Heidegger, 1953/1996; Kierkegaard, 1848/1997) and previous work by psychologists (e.g., Baumeister, 1991; James, 1911/1997) to define meaning as revolving around mental representation of expected relationships. This claim is based on the observation that human beings naturally form associations that relate anything to anything else and these associations are melded together to comprise a person’s meaning framework. For example, we understand snow as cold and falls from the sky. This understanding is part of a meaning framework concerning physical natural laws. Meaning frameworks include not only physical elements of the outside world, but also more abstract elements, such as the self in the form of identity (e.g., I’m a management scholar who studies organizational justice) or roles (e.g., I conduct research so I know about the scientific method). Heine and colleagues (2006) described four domains as instances of meaning maintenance effects: self-esteem, certainty, belongingness, and symbolic immortality (Heine et al., 2006). The domain of self-esteem satisfies the need for meaning by allowing people to sustain a belief that their existence has value, relevance, and purpose. The ability of finding generally predictable relations between the events of the world, as opposed to experiencing them as chaotic and haphazard, provides people with certainty. This constitutes the second domain from which meaning can emerge. A third domain involves social relationships. 6  Affiliation or belongingness is a critical source of meaning and so when people, as a social species, experience relationships with others that are reliable, predictable, and consistent with their expectations, the integrity of this meaning domain is preserved. Finally, symbolic immortality provides people with a link that endures after death and thus intensifies a belief that human life itself possesses meaning. In other words, the human race is more than just an accidental chord struck by chance to punctuate the silence of eternity, but exists for some greater purpose that we are not yet fully capable of divining. Another key proposition of the MMM is that these different domains of meaning are interchangeable. Based on the mechanism termed fluid compensation (Heine et al., 2006; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001; Steele, 1988), the MMM asserts that a threat to one domain can be dealt with by affirming an alternative domain. Previous research has found ample evidence for this proposition. For example, one study showed that when an experimenter was changed unbeknownst to participants, it produced a meaning threat (i.e., an implicitly perceived visual anomaly) that participants reacted to by affirming a completely unrelated meaning framework (i.e., an explicitly held moral belief; Proulx & Heine, 2008). In another study participants were found more likely to affirm their cultural identity after reading a challenging passage by the surrealist writer Franz Kafka that violated expected relationships (Proulx, Heine, & Vohs, 2010). It has also been shown that threat and fluid compensation can occur completely outside of conscious awareness (Randles, Proulx, & Heine, 2011; van Tongeren & Green, 2010), suggesting that people automatically attempt to deal with meaning threats even if they are not able to recognize and articulate having done 7    Figure 1. An identity-based meaning maintenance model.   8  so. I argue in what follows that the concept of justice is a common source of meaning for many people; hence, it represents a belief system that is vulnerable to meaning threat. Justice as a Source of Meaning Justice is one of the most widely studied constructs in the organizational sciences. To date, researchers have published more than 250 papers in the field’s major journals (i.e., Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, and Journal of Applied Psychology) on justice-related topics. In these papers, scholars have examined questions concerning the various types of justice (e.g., procedural justice, distributive justice, interactional justice) and their independent and joint effects on outcomes ranging from employee well-being (e.g., Greenberg, 2006) and job satisfaction (e.g., McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992) to individual (e.g., van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1996) and team performance (e.g., Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). The general conclusion that emerges from all of these studies is that justice matters to employees. But a more fundamental question that needs to be answered is: Why? Reviews of the justice literature (Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001; Rupp, 2011) point to three models that have been most frequently used to explain why people care about justice. The instrumental model (Tyler, 1987) asserts that the yearning for justice arises from people’s need for control over the favorability of desired outcomes. From an instrumental perspective, justice matters because it allows people to get what they want or think they deserve. Alternatively, the relational model (Tyler & Lind, 1992) argues that justice helps fulfill the human need for belongingness. In an organizational context, employees care about justice because it allows them to assess the degree to which 9  organizations value them and see them as part of the organization. The more just the organization and its authorities, the more people feel a sense of belongingness and inclusion with the group.  More recently, a third model of justice labeled the deontic model  (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Folger, 1998; Folger & Skarlicki, 2008), conceptualizes justice as a moral imperative and proposes that people care about justice simply because it is the right thing to do (Folger, 2001). What differentiates the deontic model from the other two is that it assumes justice concerns can arise even though a person is not even a member of the organization and has no interest at stake in an outcome. For these reasons, the deontic model has been used to explain why third parties can experience strong emotional reactions to seeing others treated unjustly (O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011). I propose that the existential perspective provides an overarching explanation for why people care about justice. The existential perspective posits that people possess a meaning framework organized around expected relationships between right and wrong behaviors and the consequences of each (i.e., reward and approbation or, punishment and disapproval). The function of this framework, like all meaning frameworks, is to help people make sense of what might otherwise appear to be the random events of social life. Existentialist literature, from Kierkegaard to Camus, is replete with interrogations of this kind, into the meaning of life and the incoherency of belief. As noted previously, human beings have a fundamental need for meaning and they can satisfy this need by maintaining a stable framework consisting of relationships that link everything to everything else. Yet the events and sensations that confront us on daily basis can often appear incomprehensible. Relationships can be irreparably damaged by trivial 10  provocations, the behavior of friends and strangers alike can seem irrational or bizarre, and people who do mischief often amass riches and hordes of admirers while those who do good are unappreciated, marginalized, or even killed. I am persuaded that these uncertainties in relationships that link events within the social domain can pose an existential threat to human beings. Once the fabric of metaphysical justice begins to unravel as a result of a discrete justice failure event, we propose that a sense of unease and discomfort with how the universe operates can arise among those who bear witness to it. Moreover, this state of disorientation about the comprehensibility of life can occur even in the most quotidian of settings, such as the workplace. The proper administration of justice is one way through which groups and institutions can ease the psychic burden of existential threat by ensuring that, in most cases, people’s actions lead to a predictable outcome. When justice is upheld, people are better able to sustain a belief that the world is a meaningful place that consists of reliable relationships between doing good/bad and being rewarded/punished. Unfortunately, life teaches us at an early age that bad people sometimes prosper and the good are sometimes plagued by misfortunes of Jobian proportion. By the time we reach adulthood, we have therefore been exposed to myriad examples of justice failure with which, of fierce necessity, we must contend. When justice failure happens, it can crystallize a discomforting view of the world by reminding people of its ambiguous and provisional nature. For people who happen to have a meaning framework that assumes a stable relationship between good or bad deeds and their consequences it can be difficult to maintain the integrity of this particular framework in the face of invalidating evidence. For example, if you believe the world is just, then one expected relationship that is likely to form part of your justice-based meaning framework is that people who wrong others will suffer in some way 11  for what they did. If, as a third party observer, you are confronted with something that violates this expectation (e.g., an irresponsible banker whose actions cause millions of people to lose their life savings receives a lavish bonus and continues to enjoy the esteem of his or her peers), it can threaten the integrity and coherence of your system of beliefs, making the world seem less meaningful. Proposition 1: Justice failure threatens individuals’ sense of meaning. When Does Justice Failure Become a Meaning Threat? Not all observers will experience justice failure as a meaning threat. An important condition that determines whether it does so is the anomalousness of the event. If a justice failure is expected to occur routinely in an organization, then the psychological processes depicted in our theory will not unfold. We introduce two factors that can affect whether a justice failure becomes a meaning threat. The first is a product of individual psychology; the second of context. The psychological variable is the extent to which a third party observer believes in a just world (Lerner, 1980). Belief in a just world Justice, while important, is not the only source of meaning. Recall that meaning was defined as relationships that link anything to anything else. Relations between good and bad behaviors and their consequences are only one among the multitude of life experiences that a person can draw from to construct meaning. This observation begs the question of whether a justice-based meaning framework is equally important to all people. We believe it is not. 12  Belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980; Rubin & Peplau, 1975) is the psychological construct that we deduce to be a strong determinant of whether a person has a coherent meaning framework organized around ideas pertaining to justice. Just world theory states that people vary in the degree to which they believe the world is one in which people are rewarded for their good deeds and punished for their wrongdoings (Lerner, 1970). The theory further assumes that “any evidence that other people in the individual’s environment are not getting what they deserve distresses the individual” (Miller, 1977, p. 114), which the careful reader will notice is analogous to the predictions of the MMM. However, since people vary in the degree to which they believe the world is just (e.g., Rubin & Peplau, 1975), I argue that the sense of meaning is more dependent on justice for individuals who strongly accept this belief. If so, then being confronted with a justice failure should be more threatening to people whose justice-based meaning framework assumes a generally predictable relation between wrongdoing and punishment (i.e., they are high in belief in a just world). Supporting this claim, research has shown that people high in belief in a just world are more unsettled, and hence more motivated to try and preserve the image of the world as a just place, by derogating victims of injustice (e.g., Ball, Trevino, & Sims, 1994). Proposition 2: Belief in a just world moderates the relationship between justice failure and meaning threat such that employees are more likely to view justice failure as threatening when they are high rather than low in this belief. Individual differences in a just world beliefs are one possible determinant of whether a justice failure threatens meaning. My model shows that the context in which the justice failure occurs also matters. There are many contextual variables that could potentially 13  influence how people react to justice failure. I emphasize justice climate because of its logical connection to abstract concepts of justice and their practical administration in organizations. Justice climate Organizational climate refers to employees’ shared perceptions of organizational policies, practices, and procedures that are developed through group interaction (James, Joyce, & Slocum, 1988; Schneider & Reichers, 1983). Justice climate is one type of climate perception. It has been defined as “a distinct group-level cognition about how a work group as a whole is treated” (Naumann & Bennett, 2000, p. 882). We propose that when an organization has a strong justice climate, its members have shared perceptions that the systems and processes designed to administer justice do so in a predictable, reliable, and coherent way. When justice climate is weak, employees perceive that justice systems are inadequate. As a result, when an employee is confronted with an example of justice failure in an organization with a strong justice climate, he or she is more likely to perceive that failure as anomalous and therefore threatening than if the same event occurred in an organization where justice climate is weak. Justice climate therefore exerts the same influence on individual psychology as belief in a just world because it too determines whether a person is likely to construct a meaning framework in which there is an expected relation between doing wrong and being punished for it. The reason why justice climate will influence the content of an employee’s meaning framework is based on the assumption of the MMM that while meaning frameworks tend to be relatively stable, they are not impervious to change. However, changing one’s meaning 14  framework is not easy and is only possible when a person is confronted with repeated and convincing evidence suggesting that the existing meaning framework does not reflect the observed reality and requires modification. In a workplace context, we maintain that being exposed to a shared perception that the organization has either a strong or weak justice climate can be a source of such evidence and contributes to the construction of a particular type of justice-based meaning framework. A strong justice climate will not emerge in an organization that frequently fails to deliver justice. If an employee is exposed to this type of climate, over time we expect him or her to construct a justice-based meaning framework in which a relation between wrongdoing and punishment within the confines of the organization is not assumed. Consequently, any discrete case of justice failure inside the organization, being no longer anomalous, will appear less threatening. Proposition 3: Justice climate moderates the relationship between justice failure and meaning threat such that employees are more likely to view justice failure as threatening when the organization has a strong rather than weak justice climate. Having explained why justice failure poses a meaning threat and the conditions under which a threat is more and less likely to be experienced by a third party observer, I now consider how these observers might restore the integrity of their meaning framework. Mechanisms Behind Meaning Maintenance Meaning threats produce psychic discomfort that people are motivated to eliminate (Festinger, 1957; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994; Jost & Banaji, 15  1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Steele, 1988). Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn, 1962/1996; Piaget, 1960) proposed two ways that people can respond to a meaning threat: assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation involves reinterpreting an anomaly in a way that is consistent with one’s existing meaning framework. For example, when roughly 5,000 birds fell from the Arkansas sky in January 2011, some people were quick to invoke the Bible as a way of interpreting the event as a sign that the apocalypse was upon us. Interpreting this event as the apocalypse allows people to make sense of it while keeping an existing meaning framework intact. Accommodation is more complete, and occurs when expected associations are modified to eliminate an anomaly. One example would be when psychologists, instead of relying solely on behaviorism, started to study and accept cognition as a cause of human behavior. In this case, their existing meaning framework, which was grounded on the belief that behaviorism could explain all behavior, had to be revised to accommodate new findings in cognitive psychology, thereby establishing a new association that cognition was also a cause. The MMM proposes fluid compensation as a third way of responding to a meaning threat. The principle of fluid compensation states that “if people perceive an element of self or of their worlds that does not find a place in their existing frameworks, they may react by adhering more to other relational structures, even if these structures are unrelated to the expected relationships  that  are  under  attack.”  (Heine et al., 2006, p. 92) As an example of fluid compensation, Navarrete, Kurzban, Fessler, and Kirkpatrick (2004) showed that participants who were asked to imagine their home being burglarized (a 16  threat to one’s control over his or her valued resources) projected a less favorable view of someone who criticized their country. Another example of fluid compensation can be found in theories of self-affirmation, which posits that when one aspect of the self is threatened (e.g., people are told they are stupid) people affirm other unrelated positive aspects of the self (e.g., they view themselves as physically attractive) (Steele, 1988). Of the three ways of responding to a meaning threat, assimilation can often be relatively easy to execute because it does not require large amounts of cognitive resources. However, it may not completely resolve the negative arousal elicited by a meaning threat (Bruner & Postman, 1949; Proulx & Heine, 2010). The incompleteness of assimilation implies that other mechanisms may need to be executed once assimilation has occurred to fully reduce psychic distress. Furthermore, in some cases it can be difficult to assimilate an anomaly into an existing meaning framework because of the preponderance of evidence clearly pointing against it. These cases will necessarily demand a greater expenditure of cognitive effort, which could diminish the attractiveness of assimilation as a dissonance reduction strategy.   Accommodation requires even more cognitive resources than assimilation, and is therefore more difficult to successfully accomplish, especially when meaning frameworks are well established in adulthood (Proulx & Heine, 2010). Accommodation can also be time consuming and impractical for short-term threats, since a meaning threat in some extreme cases can take several years or even a lifetime to resolve (e.g., scientific paradigms; Kuhn, 1962/1996). 17  A third problem, which affects both assimilation and accommodation equally, is that they require continuous and conscious processing of the meaning threat. For assimilation, such processing takes the form of reinterpreting the meaning threat so that it fits one’s existing meaning framework; for accommodation, such processing takes the form of restructuring one’s existing meaning framework so as to make the anomaly nonthreatening. Sometimes, the conscious processing of the meaning threat may elevate the salience of the anomaly and thus make it far more threatening than it already is (Arndt & Greenberg, 1999; Blanton, Cooper, Skurnik, & Aronson, 1997; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Sivanathan, Molden, Galinsky, & Ku, 2008). Under these conditions, assimilation and accommodation may exacerbate, rather than diminish, existential angst. This leaves fluid compensation as the cognitively more efficient and effective short-term option. Although it is not a long-term solution to a meaning threat (i.e., it does not resolve the threat in the way that successful accommodation does), fluid compensation can allow people to assuage the uncomfortable feeling associated with ephemeral threats and may provide a more complete and satisfying resolution than assimilation when the person is unable to or incapable of interpreting the anomaly within an existing meaning framework. For these reasons, I propose that among adults who have multiple established meaning frameworks of relations among ideas, objects, or events, fluid compensation will be the cognitive “default” strategy for reducing the angst associated with short-term meaning threats. Moreover, this will be particularly true for third parties. The direct victims of a justice failure should be most threatened by justice failure and therefore most motivated to make sense of it as a way of coping with psychic distress. This 18  assumption is consistent with the predictions of the instrumental model of justice. It is also consistent with the relational model because it too associates justice concerns with self-interest, although in this case the interest at stake is being valued by the organization and its members. What is less obvious is why people whose interest is not directly impacted by justice failure (i.e., third party observers) might also be motivated to restore meaning after being exposed to it. According to Folger’s (2001) deontic model of justice, people hold moral assumptions about how people should or ought to be treated and that a violation of such assumptions can evoke emotionally charged reactions from third party observers. This claim is the basis for the deontic model’s predictions that third parties care about injustice even when they are not its targets and it is one I accept as a premise of my theory. However, I extend Folger’s (2001) argument by asserting that one reason why people have these emotional reactions to begin with is that they possess a justice-based meaning framework consisting of collective assumptions not only about how people should be treated but also about how the world should operate in general. Justice failure can threaten the validity of this framework and it is this threat that produces the emotional reactions experienced by third parties. Should third parties not interpret justice failure as a meaning threat, I contend that a third party will not experience the emotional reactions predicted by the deontic model or, if they do, it will be at a relatively low level of intensity. As evidence to support my claim, I need only direct the reader to recall a time when they, as impartial observers, were unmoved by seeing justice fail.  19  The deontic model might account for individual differences in the lack of any emotional responses to justice failure by attributing them to characteristics of the transgressor (e.g., prior history of rule violations), the victim (e.g., whether the victim deserves the treatment), other bystanders (e.g., reactions of present third parties), or the third party (e.g., whether the third party identifies with the victim). In contrast, the MMM assumes substitutability between different meaning frameworks and therefore suggests another explanation for why some third parties might be unmoved by justice failure, at least in a way that is observable. According to the MMM explanation, a threat to one meaning framework is compensated by affirming an alternative framework. If so, then the affirmation of an alternative meaning framework as a third party response to justice failure might show itself through the absence of an emotional response. Instead, third parties may have a largely cognitive response of affirming an alternative meaning framework. By making this substitution, third parties can reduce the intensity of any initial emotional disturbance they may have felt when confronted with justice failure before it becomes transformed, perhaps through further rumination, into more powerful emotions like anger and indignation. This prediction extends current models of justice by identifying a response to justice failure—fluid compensation—that has not been considered in any of the extant justice models proposed by organizational scholars and that would not be detected by focusing only on the readily observable emotional responses of third parties (i.e., verbal reports of emotional unrest). Proposition 4: Third party observers are more likely to react to justice failure by engaging in fluid compensation than either accommodation or assimilation. 20  A novel prediction of my model is that even third parties who do not reveal a particularly strong emotional reaction to injustice might nevertheless become less tolerant of it. This prediction qualifies some models of third party responses to injustice (e.g., Folger, 2001; O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011) that emphasize the importance of emotions as a motivator of such responses. Although it might seem logical to assume that a third party observer should become more tolerant of injustice as a result of fluid compensation because it diminishes their emotional unease over the event, we propose that this will not necessarily occur. In fact, as we explain below, for some third parties an unexpected consequence of fluid compensation by third parties is that they will not only be more motivated to uphold a stricter standard of morality, but will also be more motivated to act morally themselves. But for these effects to occur, a particular type of meaning framework must be affirmed, the selection of which is driven by the activation and availability of a certain kind of identity within the working self at or around the time a person is confronted with justice failure. Identity as a Moderator of Fluid Compensation MMM principles suggest third parties who respond to justice failure with fluid compensation will reaffirm an alternative meaning framework that is readily available, intact, and compelling (Heine et al., 2006). But multiple meaning frameworks can be readily available, intact, and compelling for any individual at a given time. One of the limitations of the MMM in its present formulation is that it does not tell us why a person should choose to reaffirm one framework over the other. Previous empirical studies of the MMM fail to offer much guidance since they allowed participants to not have a choice of affirming one among multiple meaning frameworks, confining them instead to a single meaning framework (e.g., 21  Proulx & Heine, 2008, 2009; Proulx et al., 2010; Randles et al., 2011; van Tongeren & Green, 2010). A typical study design involves presenting participants with a single meaning framework and testing if participants in the threat condition affirm it. For example, Proulx and Heine (2008) found that participants who were presented with a perceptual anomaly subsequently punished a woman arrested for prostitution more severely compared to participants who were not presented with the anomaly. This procedure makes it difficult to know whether participants in those studies would reaffirm a different framework than the one provided by the researchers if they were given the freedom to do so. I increase the theoretical precision of the MMM by proposing that the affirmation of an alternative meaning framework following a meaning threat will be partly driven by constructs associated with the self and the identities of which it is comprised. Drawing from the identity literature, I propose an identity-based MMM which predicts that people will reaffirm a meaning framework associated with an identity that is cognitively accessible at the time of exposure to justice failure.  Identity is what people use to define the self (Erikson, 1964). In most contemporary models, people are assumed to possess multiple identities (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Epstein, 1980; Greenwald, 1982; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Markus, 1983; Markus & Sentis, 1982; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Rogers, 1981; Schlenker, 1980). For example, people can define the self in terms of both their gender (e.g., I am a woman) and ethnicity (e.g., I am an Asian). But even though multiple identities are available, not all of them are used to define the self at any given time. The self can therefore be conceptualized as a dynamic construct consisting of a set of cognitively accessible identities collectively known 22  as the working self-concept (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987). The working self-concept is comprised of two types of identities that can be distinguished by their level of accessibility. The first type is known as core self-conceptions or self-schemas (Markus, 1977).  These self-schemas tend to be chronically accessible because they are experienced as central to a person’s overall self-definition (Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982). The second type excludes core self-conceptions but encompasses instead those that can be temporarily activated by people’s “affective or motivational states, or ... prevailing social conditions” (Markus & Kunda, 1986, p.859). My identity-based MMM model adopts the working self-concept model of the self as consisting of both chronic and temporarily activated elements. By introducing identity as a dynamic construction, my theory connects aspects of the self to other related knowledge structures that have implications for third parties’ attitudes and behavior. Based on identity principles, I propose that people will affirm a meaning framework during fluid compensation from a domain that is closely related to the identities that happen to exist within the working self-concept. Given that the working self-concept consists of both core self-conceptions, which are chronically accessible, and other noncore identities, which are made accessible by stimuli in the immediate environment, it is possible for any identity (and thus the knowledge bases associated with them) to be salient following a meaning threat. The malleable nature of the working self-concept makes the compensation process following a meaning threat truly fluid: one may cope with the same meaning threat by reaffirming drastically different meaning frameworks depending on one’s immediate social circumstances. 23  Proposition 5: Third parties who engage in fluid compensation will affirm a meaning framework that is closely associated with an identity that is salient at the time they are exposed to justice failure. The malleable nature of the working self means that at any given time a person may define him- or herself in terms of different identities. Consequently, for my model to have predictive validity, it is important to know which particular identity is most salient within the working self of a third party at or near the time he or she is confronted with justice failure. I illustrate how my general identity-based MMM framework can be made more precise by   using the construct of moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1983) as the salient identity that moves fluid compensation in a particular direction. There are three reasons why I chose moral identity to illustrate how my model can be used to make specific predictions about behaviors that might result when third parties are exposed to justice failure. First, morality is among the most intensively socialized values in all cultures, which presumably would make a person’s moral identity more chronically accessible than other identities he or she might use as a basis for core self-definition. Second, because justice and morality are closely related, it is likely that moral identity will be more readily activated following a justice failure than other identities. Finally, compared to other possible identities I could have introduced into our model, moral identity is likely to provide the best explanation of how fluid compensation following justice failure can influence people to act more morally, which is the unexpected outcome that I believe can sometimes occur following justice failure.   24  Moral Identity and Fluid Compensation Aquino and Reed (2002) conceptualized moral identity as a schema consisting of a network of moral trait associations (e.g., caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind) that more or less centrally occupy a person’s overall self-definition. Based on this social-cognitive definition, people whose moral identity has high centrality within the working self would be those for whom moral schemas are chronically available, readily primed, and easily activated for information processing (Lapsley & Lasky, 2001). Moreover, following the principle that identity schemas are associatively linked to other related knowledge structures, people whose moral identity is highly accessible should also have readily available access to meaning frameworks that have moral content. It is this principle that explains why I expect third parties whose moral identity is either chronically or temporarily accessible to affirm a moral meaning framework following justice failure. How does affirming a certain meaning framework affect via fluid compensation third parties’ attitudes and behavior? According to social cognitive theory (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), individuals process information by selectively attending to some aspects of the stimulus information while ignoring others. What captivates attention is partly determined by what is vivid and accessible in working memory. Adopting this social-cognitive perspective, Butterfield, Trevino, and Weaver (2000) found that business professionals had greater moral awareness when issues were framed in moral terms or when there was social consensus about the issues as being ethically problematic. Similarly, I argue that affirming a moral framework in the form of fluid compensation will activate the knowledge structures associated with 25  morality in working memory. At a psychological level this means that their judgments will be influenced by idealized (higher) moral standards acquired through socialization. When knowledge structures associated with idealized moral standards become accessible, people will be motivated to act morally to maintain consistency between their thoughts and actions. Humans have a natural desire for self-consistency (Festinger, 1957), and it is this motive that has been underscored as the key construct that links moral identity to moral action (Blasi, 1983, 1984, & 2005). To act morally means showing concern for the needs and interests of others. The behavioral expressions of this concern can take many forms ranging from being a good citizen to providing social and emotional support to others facing difficult challenges.  Proposition 6: Third parties whose moral identity is highly accessible within the working self-concept will engage in more moral behaviors when they are confronted with justice failure compared to those whose moral identity is relatively less accessible. But the elevation of one’s personal moral standards will not only influence their own behaviors, I contend that it will also change how they judge the behaviors of others. The direction of change will be such that they will evaluate behaviors performed by others that they might once have considered morally ambiguous (i.e., behaviors where there is no clear social consensus about whether they are wrong or right) as being more immoral, a process we refer to as moralization. The psychological function of moralization is the same as that of elevating one’s personal moral standards: it restores meaning by strengthening within the person’s mind the rules that regulate moral conduct, thereby allowing him or her to restore their sense that the world is orderly and coherent. 26  Proposition 7: Third parties whose moral identity is highly accessible within the working self-concept will evaluate morally ambiguous behaviors performed by others as more immoral when they have been confronted by a justice failure compared to those whose moral identity is relatively less accessible. The final consequence of justice failure according to my theory pertains to how a third party who has affirmed the moral meaning framework through the process of moralization will evaluate organizational practices or policies. I propose that as a result of moralization, third parties will show greater support for organizational policies that are meant to elevate ethical behavior. An illustrative example of such a policy is the implementation of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) program. McWilliams and Siegel (2001) define CSR as “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by the law” (p. 117). As this definition suggests, CSR concerns the degree to which corporations contribute positively to the well-being of society, which could include both human and nonhuman (e.g., animals, the natural environment) stakeholders. I propose that as a result of affirming a moral meaning framework by moralizing, third parties will adopt more favorable attitudes towards CSR because such initiatives advance and support moral and not only economic goals. Proposition 8: Third parties who moralize will be more supportive of CSR programs. Figure 2 presents a moral identity-based meaning maintenance model that summarizes the relationships stated in Propositions 6 through 10.  27    Figure 2. A moral identity-based meaning maintenance model.   28  I remind the reader that the model presented in Figure 2 pertains only to a case where a third party’s moral identity is the highly salient identity within the working self at the time of exposure to justice failure. As I noted before, my identity-based meaning maintenance model can incorporate any kind of identity as a source of fluid compensation provided that the identity is highly salient within the working self. However, the content of the meaning frameworks that will be associated with that identity, and the consequences that the affirmation of these frameworks produce, can differ substantially from those we proposed would occur when moral identity is salient. For example, imagine that a third party exposed to justice failure has a chronically accessible identity as an environmentalist, which happens to be highly salient at the time he or she is confronted with a justice failure. According to my theory, this person might react to the meaning threat resulting from justice failure by affirming a meaning framework that pertains to the natural world (for purposes of this example, it is not necessary to specify the content of this framework). As a result of affirming this framework, the person might then exhibit behaviors or adopt attitudes that are consistent with its content. They may, for example, become more conscientious about saving electricity in their office by turning off unnecessary lights. They may decide to donate money to someone who approaches them on the street asking for contributions to Greenpeace. Or they may feel inspired to plant flowers in their yard. All of these actions would be influenced by having reinforced a natural world framework and, furthermore, they may be performed without the person being able to articulate why they did any of them.   29  Summary In my thesis I present an integrative theoretical framework that seeks to advance our understanding of third party responses to justice failure. What is novel about my theory is its assertion that justice failure does not necessarily produce undesirable outcomes if it is perceived as anomalous and if third parties confronted by it experience their moral identity as being highly accessible. In fact, I contend that human beings’ natural propensities as “meaning makers” can motivate some third party observers to respond to justice failure by not only demanding more from themselves as moral agents, but to also be less tolerant of the moral transgressions of others. By making this claim, I am not advocating for more justice failure or suggesting that organizational authorities should deliberately ignore wrongdoing. A moment’s reflection will reveal that doing so would make the organization unsustainable as a cooperative enterprise and cause much preventable suffering for its members.  What I am arguing, however, is that the providence of nature has built into the structure of our minds a mechanism that can potentially channel the inevitable and negative consequences of justice failure into socially desirable behaviors under certain conditions.  I will dedicate the rest of this thesis to empirically testing the some of the propositions derived from the identity-based meaning maintenance model. Specifically, I present in Chapter 2 an experiment that demonstrates how third parties’ tendency to react to justice failure vary by their belief in just world (Proposition 2). In Chapter 3, I present two experiments that demonstrate the effect of moral identity on how third parties react to justice through fluid compensation (Proposition 6-7). In Chapter 4, going beyond moral identity, I 30  present two experiments that demonstrate the mechanism of fluid compensation using environmental and group identity. Finally, in Chapter 5 I discuss how my theory and findings contribute to the literature on justice, morality, and meaning maintenance. On the practical side, I also discuss in Chapter 5 how my theory can be used as a basis for more adaptive managerial practices.  31  CHAPTER 2 A THREAT TO ONE IS NOT A THREAT TO ALL: A TEST OF THE MODERATING EFFECT OF BELIEF IN JUST WORLD In this chapter I present an experiment that sought to test Proposition 2, which hypothesizes that belief in just world would moderate whether third parties would be more likely to react to just failure if they are high, rather than low, in belief in just world. Specifically, this experiment tests whether justice failure leads to compensatory responses among individuals who perceive the world as a just place in a domain that is unrelated to justice, undergraduates' identities as students. To provide a more stringent test of the hypothesis, a behavioral measure (i.e., preference for student identity affirming products vs. non-student identity affirming product) was used to test for affirmation. Consistent with Proposition 2, I hypothesize the following: H1: Belief in just world will moderate the relationship between justice failure and students’ preference for products that affirm their identities as students such that in the presence of justice failure students high in belief in just world will prefer the student identity affirming products more strongly than students low in belief in just world. Experiment 1 Method Participants. One hundred and fifty undergraduate students (89 female; Mage = 22 32  years) from the University of British Columbia recruited from either the psychology department or on campus completed paper/pencil questionnaires in exchange for course credit and/or a gift.  Procedure and Materials. After receiving informed consent, participants filled out the Belief in a Just World scale (BJW; Rubin & Peplau, 1975), which asked participants to indicate their agreement with statements, such as “Basically, the world is a just place” and “it is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to jail” (see Appendix 5 for the complete Belief in Just World scale), on a 7-point Likert scale (α = .63; 1 = Strong Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). Participants were then randomly assigned to either the justice failure or justice upheld condition. In the justice failure condition, participants read about a consultant who fraudulently overcharged his clients and was able to escape to a foreign country without being punished, leaving the reputation of his employer and his client in ruins (See Appendix 1 for the complete scenario). In the justice upheld condition, participants read about the same scenario, but now the consultant was caught, jailed, returned the money, and the reputation of the company was restored (See Appendix 2 for the complete scenario). Next, participants summarized the scenario and completed some demographic information.  Dependent Measure. Following the experimental manipulation task, participants were presented with the dependent measure that asked them to select between non-identity affirming product (i.e., a mini-stapler) or an identity-affirming products (i.e., a pen with “University of British Columbia psychology department” printed on it for participants recruited from the psychology department or "UBC" for those recruited from elsewhere on campus) as a gift for participating (results did not vary based on where participants were 33  recruited, p > .8). Students’ gift selection served as the dependent variable. At the end of the survey, participants completed a general demographics questionnaire. Finally, participants completed a demographic questionnaire in which they provided information about their age, gender, and ethnic background.  Experiment 1: Results and Discussion To see whether the justice manipulation had an impact on participants’ gift selection, a chi-square test was conducted on the dichotomous gift selection variable, which revealed no significant effect of the manipulation, χ2(1) = 1.75, p = .19. Logistic regression was used to test for the predicted interaction between the manipulation (dummy coded as justice upheld = 0, justice failure = 1) and BJW, which revealed the predicted interaction, odds ratio = 1.91, p = .06 (see Figure 3). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, those scored high on belief in just world were more likely to demonstrate an affirmation response by choosing the UBC/psychology pen in the justice failure condition than in the justice upheld condition, odds ratio = 2.96, p = .03, whereas no difference was observed between conditions for those scoring low on belief in just world, odds ratio = .81, p = .66.       34        Hypothesis 1 hypothesized that third parties would be more likely to react to justice failure if they truly see it as a threat to their sense of meaning. The current experiment provided support for this prediction by demonstrating that in the aftermath of justice failure undergraduate students were more likely to affirm their sense of affiliation with their university/department if they endorse the belief that the world is just. The moderated effect of belief in just world demonstrates that people need to possess a meaning framework that is inconsistent with the anomalous event in order for the event to be threatening.    The current findings are important for several reasons. First, they provided important clarifications for the meaning maintenance model by demonstrating when meaning violations are threatening. That is, they are only threatening to those who possess the expectation that is being violated. Although just world theory suggests that everyone possesses an implicit need for a just world (Lerner, 1980), we found evidence that only those who explicitly perceive the world as just show compensatory responses when justice is threatened.  0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%Low BJW High BJWPercent Selected Identity affirming product Figure 3. The moderating effect of BJW on fluid compensation  Justice FailureJustice UpheldM=.68 vs. M=.42, p<.05 M=.55 vs. M=.50, p=.66 35  Second, although not formally tested in this experiment, the findings also had important implications for Proposition 1, which proposes that justice failure threatens people’s sense of meaning. The findings of Experiment 1 demonstrate that justice failure was able to motivate participants to affirm meaning frameworks in domains that were not directly related to the specific injustice episode they read about. These findings are fully consistent with the effect produced by other, much subtler forms of meaning threats, such as the transmogrified experimenter (Heine & Proulx, 2008) or Franz Kafka’s novel (Proulx & Heine, 2009). Finally, the results are the first to demonstrate affirmations of unrelated meaning frameworks following justice failure. Just-World Theory predicts that people will use various strategies (e.g., victim derogation) to maintain their need for a just world (Lerner, 1980), and System Justification Theory predicts that people will affirm the status quo when justice is violated (Jost et al., 2004). In this experiment, I provide evidence for yet another possible type of reaction to justice failure, which is affirming a meaning framework unrelated to justice.  36  CHAPTER 3 WHEN WITNESSING JUSTICE FAILURE MAKES YOU A BETTER PERSON: THE MODERATING EFFECT OF MORAL IDENTITY In this chapter I present two experiments that demonstrate the effect of moral identity on third parties’ choice of alternative meaning framework in the fluid compensation process. The identity-based meaning maintenance model proposes that moral identity influences third parties’ choice of alternative meaning framework by activating their meaning frameworks in the moral domain such that third parties are more likely affirm a moral meaning framework if their moral identity is salient. Previous research has demonstrated that people were more likely to affirm their moral meaning framework by, for example, punishing a law-breaker more severely when their sense of meaning was threatened (Proulx & Heine, 2008; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). In this chapter, I present experiments that conceptually replicate these findings using justice failure as the meaning threat. Going beyond replicating existing findings, these experiments also extend previous research by highlighting the moderating role of moral identity in this process. The experiments I present in this chapter adopted a single factor between-subjects design in which justice failure was manipulated and participants’ judgments of morally ambiguous behaviors were then measured. The salience of participants’ moral identity was also measured. I argue that by judging the morally ambiguous behaviors as more immoral in the aftermath of justice failure, participants reassert the integrity of their moral meaning framework. Thus, consistent with Proposition 6 and 7, I hypothesis the following:  37  H2a: Exposure to justice failure will lead third parties high in moral identity to judge morally ambiguous behaviors more negatively than third parties low in moral identity. (Experiments 2a and 2b) H2b: Exposure to justice failure will lead third parties high in moral identity to engage in more ethical behaviors than third parties low in moral identity. (Experiment 3) Experiment 2a Method  Participants. Fifty-nine students from a MBA class were recruited from University of British Columbia (27 female; Mage=28 years). The experiment was advertised as a survey about public opinion on social issues. Participants received $5 upon completion of the experiment.  Procedure and Materials. The experimenter approached the students at the end of their class and asked if they would like to participate in a short survey. Uninterested students were allowed to leave the classroom. The experimenter then briefly introduced the purpose of the survey and distributed consent forms to the students. Upon receiving the signed consent forms from the students, the experimenter handed out the booklets that contained experiment materials. On the cover page of the booklet, participants read that due to budgetary constraints the booklet included questionnaires from a series of unrelated projects and were instructed to complete the questionnaires in the order given.  38  Firstly, participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions. Participants in the justice failure condition were asked to read a story in which a CEO, despite his poor managerial performance and reckless spending of shareholders’ money towards his luxurious lifestyle, was awarded a large sum of bonus by the company’s board (See Appendix 3 for the complete scenario). In the justice upheld condition, participants read about the same CEO being fired for underperformance and sued by the board for embezzling the company’s funds (See Appendix 4 for the complete scenario). To ensure that they actually read the scenario, participants in both conditions were instructed to write a brief summary of the scenario before they could proceed to the second task. To ensure the effectiveness of the manipulation, participants were also told that the story was based on a real event with identifying information removed. Following the manipulation task, participants were presented with the dependent measure (to be discussed below), which were then followed by the moral identity scale (Aquino and Reed, 2002). The moral identity scale presented participants with nine moral characteristics and assessed the extent to which participants identified with these characteristics by asking them to indicate their agreement with statements such as “I strongly desire to have these characteristics” and “I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics” (See Appendix 6 for the complete scale). Participants indicated their agreement with these items on a 7-point Likert scale (1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree). A composite score was created to capture the salience of participants’ moral identity (α = .81). Finally, participants completed a questionnaire assessing their demographic background. Participants were thanked, debriefed, and paid upon completion of the experiment. 39  Dependent Measure. The dependent measure of this study was operationalized by participants’ evaluation of a series of morally ambiguous behaviors. Specifically, participants were presented with behaviors that may or may not be construed as being immoral and instructed to indicate their moral judgments of these behaviors (See Appendix 7 for the complete scale). Participants indicated their answer on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Extremely Immoral, 7 = Extremely Moral). A composite score was created to measure participants’ overall moral judgments of these morally ambiguous behaviors (α = .87).  Experiment 2a: Results and Discussion A significant two-way Justice Failure × Moral Identity interaction emerged (b = -.81, p = .02). Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, decomposing the interaction by the justice failure manipulation revealed a negative relationship between moral identity and participants’ evaluation of those morally ambiguous behaviors (b = -.50, p = .04), suggesting participants high in moral identity evaluated those behaviors more negatively than participants low in moral identity; however, no significant effect of moral identity on the dependent measure was observed among participants in the justice upheld condition (b = .31, p = .22). Figure 4 illustrates this pattern graphically.     40        Experiment 2a replicated previous findings showing that individuals became more punitive toward law-breakers (Proulx & Heine, 2008; Rosenblatt et al., 1989) when their sense of meaning was threatened. But going beyond past research, this experiment also suggests that not everyone affirms their moral meaning framework when confronted with a meaning threat; rather, those who were high in moral identity were more likely to affirm the moral meaning framework than those who were low in moral identity. As the results of Experiment 2a had not been frequently demonstrated in the literature, it was important to replicate them with another experiment. I did this in Experiment 2b, in which I sought to replicate the findings of Experiment 2a in Turkey with a group of undergraduate students recruited at a Turkish university. Given Experiment 2b was conducted in a different country and completed by a sample with a very different sociocultural background, successful replication would greatly enhance the robustness of my findings.  00.511.522.533.544.5Low Moral Identity High Moral Identity Evaluation of Morally Ambivilent Behaviors Figure 4. The moderating effect of moral identity on evaluation of morally ambiguous behaviors Justice FailureJustice UpheldM=4.22 vs. M=3.25, p=.01 M=4.04 vs. M=3.71, p=.42 41  Experiment 2b Method Participants. One hundred and one students were recruited from a large public university in Turkey (55 female; Mage  = 21 years). All materials were translated and administered in Turkish. Procedure and materials. Experiment 2b is identical to Experiment 2a except for the justice failure manipulation. In this experiment, justice failure was manipulated using the fraudulent consultant scenario that was first adopted in the experiment in Chapter 2. Accordingly, in this experiment, participants from the justice failure condition read a story in which a consultant fraudulently overcharged his clients by 80% and fled to another country where he could not be extradited. The story further stated that his fraud severely damaged the reputation of the consulting firm that employed him and also resulted in huge financial losses for his clients. Participants in the justice upheld condition read a different version of the story in which the fraudulent consultant was caught by local authorities before he was able to flee and, as a result, his clients were able to recover their losses and the consulting firm was able to maintain their good reputation in the industry. As with Experiment 2a, participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions and instructed to summarize the scenario they read. Participants also learned in the instructions that the story was based on a real event and only identifying information was removed. Participants then completed the measures that assessed their judgments of the morally ambiguous behaviors (α = .85) and moral identity (α = .87). Participants were thanked, debriefed, and paid upon completion of the experiment. 42  Experiment 2b: Results and Discussion A significant main effect of moral identity emerged (b = -1.74, p < .001), suggesting participants high in moral identity judged morally ambiguous behaviors as more immoral than those low in moral identity. However, this significant main effect was further qualified by a significant interaction between Justice Failure × Moral Identity (b = -1.82, p = .02). Replicating the findings of Experiment 2a, decomposing the interaction by the justice failure manipulation revealed a significant, negative effect of moral identity on the dependent measure (b = -2.72, p < .001). Furthermore, the effect of moral identity on the dependent measure in the justice upheld condition was also negative, but to a lesser degree, b = -.90, p = .10. Figure 5 provides a graphical illustration of this finding. There was no effect of moral identity on the dependent variable among participants low in moral identity. Taken together, Experiment 2a and 2b provide strong support for Hypothesis 2a that third parties’ choice of alternative meaning framework was influenced by their identity such that in the aftermath of justice failure third parties high in moral identity are more likely to affirm a moral meaning framework by judging morally ambiguous behaviors as more immoral than third parties low in moral identity.      43         Experiment 3 Experiment 2a and 2b demonstrated that in the aftermath of justice failure third parties high in moral identity were more likely to affirm morality by judging morally ambiguous behaviors as more immoral. I argue that the reason is because affirming morality led third parties to adopt a higher moral standard. If this argument is valid, then we should find third parties high in moral identity not only judging morally ambiguous behaviors as more immoral, but also regulating their own behaviors by engaging in more moral behaviors (Hypothesis 2b). I test this hypothesis in Experiment 3.  Method  Participants. 82 undergraduate students were recruited from a large subject pool at the University of British Columbia (42 female; Mage  = 18 years). The experiment was 00.511.522.533.544.5Low Moral Identity High Moral Identity Evaluation of Morally Ambivilent behaviors Figure 5. The moderating effect of moral identity on evaluation of morally ambiguous behaviors Justice FailureJustice UpheldM=2.77 vs. M=1.91, p=.02 M=4.20 vs. M=3.86, p=.31 44  advertised as a study on people’s opinion on social issues that included a series of unrelated tasks. Students were awarded one course credit upon completion of the experiment. Procedures and Materials. Students completed the moral identity scale (α = .76) and the demographic questionnaire as part of a general survey at the beginning of the semester. On the experiment day, upon receiving their consent to participate in the experiment, each participant was seated in a breakout room with a desk, a chair, and a computer. Participants were then instructed to start the experiment by following the instructions on the computer screen. Participants learned from reading the instructions that the experiment included a reading comprehension task and a second task that assessed their vocabulary. Participants were then instructed to proceed to the reading comprehension task. In the reading comprehension task, participants received the justice failure manipulation. Justice failure was manipulated using the fraudulent consultant scenario from previous experiments. Participants were randomly assigned to the justice failure condition or the justice upheld condition and instructed to briefly summarize the scenario after reading it. Dependent Measure. Following the justice failure manipulation, participants completed the dependent measure that assessed their willingness to engage in prosocial behaviors. The dependent measure was operationalized using the Freerice game (www.freerice.com), a non-profit website owned and operated by the United Nations World Food Programme (www.wfp.org) to support the mission of the World Food Programme to fight hunger worldwide. On the website of Freerice, visitors complete English vocabulary questions (e.g., “incomplete means: a) triumphant b) contented c) grateful d) unfinished”; the 45  level of difficulty increases overtime) and for each correct answer any visitor get right, Freerice donates 10 grains of rice through the World Food Programme to help end hunger (see Appendix 8 for a screenshot of the website of Freerice). For the purpose of the present experiment, participants were first presented the website and then instructed to complete as many questions as they preferred. Specifically, participants were told that the purpose of the task was to assess their vocabulary and they should feel free to end the task at any time. Although I did not make the purpose of Freerice explicit, it is constantly displayed on top of every Freerice webpage. Given the prosocial consequences associated with completing questions on Freerice, I expect participants in the justice failure condition to complete more questions (thus more rice going into fighting hunger) if they are high, rather than low, in moral identity. The amount of rice generated by participants’ answers served as the dependent variable for the current study. Experiment 3: Results and Discussion Results of regression analyses revealed significant two-way interaction between the justice manipulation and moral identity (b = 976.01, p = .006). Further examination of the significant interaction suggested that moral identity is positively related to amount of rice generated by participants’ answers (b = 852.32, p = .01) in the justice failure condition, suggesting that when confronted with justice failure the more participants self-identify as a moral person the more rice were to be donated by Freerice.com. However, no significant effect of moral identity on the amount of rice was observed in the justice upheld condition (b = -123.69, p = -.47). Figure 6 illustrates this interaction graphically. Findings of Experiment 3 provided support for Hypothesis 2b that in the aftermath of justice failure third parties high 46  in moral identity are likely to engage in more moral behavior than third parties low in moral identity. Further, combined with the findings of Experiments 2a and 2b, these two experiments provide convergent evidence for the argument that affirming a moral meaning framework leads third parties to adopt a stricter moral standard, which motivates third parties to engage in more ethical behaviors and judge morally ambiguous behaviors as more immoral.       0200400600800100012001400160018002000Low Moral Identity High Moral IdentityAmount of Rice to be Donated (in Grains) Figure 6. The moderating effect of moral identity on questions completed on Freerice Justice FailureJustice UpheldM=1867 vs. M=815, p=.006 M=1247 vs. M=1107, p=.16 47  CHAPTER 4 BEYOND MORAL IDENTITY: JUSTICE FAILURE INTERACTS WITH ENVIRONMENTAL AND GROUP IDENTITY (RESPECTIVELY) TO PREDICT IDENTITY-CONSISTENT BEHAVIORS At this point, it is worth noting that both experiments in Chapter 3 demonstrated the proposed effect of identity on the fluid compensation process using moral identity. However, to the extent that my theory is about modeling a generic effect of salient identity on the fluid compensation process (Proposition 5), it would be much more convincing if I could also demonstrate this effect with other identities. I do this in Chapter 4. I present in this chapter two experiments that tested my theory with two other identities.  Experiment 4  I theorized that following justice failure people would be more likely to affirm a meaning framework that was associated with his or her salient identity. I sought to test this claim in this experiment using environmental identity. I argue that following justice failure participants high in environmental identity would be more likely to engage in behaviors that are environmentally friendly than participants low in environmental identity, because one way in which individuals who are constantly concerned with the natural environment could reassert the integrity of their meaning framework is by actually engaging in behaviors that protect, rather than sabotage, the environment. Furthermore, in this experiment, I also measured participants’ racial identity, an identity that was irrelevant to the online shopping 48  task, to show that participants high in racial identity would not react to injustice by affirming their environmental meaning framework. Therefore, I hypothesize the following: H3: Environmental identity will moderate participants’ preference for environmental identity affirming products such that in the aftermath of justice failure participants high in environmental identity will purchase more green products than participants low in environmental identity. However, racial identity will not interact with justice failure to predict preference for environmental identity affirming products. Method Participants. Eighty-seven undergraduate students (53 female; Mage=23 years) were recruited from the University of British Columbia. Participants were told that the study was a general survey on social issues and included several unrelated tasks. Participants were paid $5 upon completion of the experiment. Five participants were dropped for not completing the survey in its entirety. Procedure and Materials. After receiving their consent to participate in the experiment, participants were sent to individual breakout rooms with one computer in each room. Participants were then seated and instructed to follow the instructions on the computer screen. By reading the instructions, participants were informed that the experiment consisted of three unrelated tasks: a reading comprehension task, an online shopping task, and finally a questionnaire assessing their personalities and demographic background. Participants were then instructed to start the study.  49  Participants first received the justice failure manipulation. Justice failure, which was framed as a reading comprehension task, was manipulated using the CEO scenario from Experiment 2a in Chapter 3. As with previous experiments, participants were randomly assigned to the justice failure condition or the justice upheld condition and instructed to briefly summarize the scenario after reading it. Following the experimental manipulation task, participants completed the dependent measure (to be discussed in the following section), which was then followed by measures of environmental and racial identity. Participants’ environmental identity was measured using the 24-item scale by Clayton (2003). This scale included items such as “In general, being part of the natural world is an important part of my self-image” and “I would feel that an important part of my life was missing if I was not able to get out and enjoy nature from time to time” (See Appendix 9 for the complete environmental identity scale) and participants indicated their answer on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strong Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). A composite score was created by averaging participants’ answers (α = .93). Eight items from the Collective Self-Esteem Scale – Race Specific Version (CSE-R) scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) were used to measure participants’ racial identity. Sample statements included “The racial group I belong to is an important reflection of who I am” and “In general, belonging to my racial group is an important part of my self-image”. Participants were instructed to indicate their answer on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strong Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). A single score of racial identity was created by taking average of participants’ answers to the racial items (α = .84). Items from both scales were presented together in a single questionnaire and in a randomized order. Lastly, participants were instructed to complete a questionnaire that assessed their 50  demographic background. Participants were thanked, debriefed, and paid upon completion of the experiment. Dependent Measure. The dependent measure of this study was operationalized by adapting the online shopping task used by Mazar and Zhong (2010). In this task, participants were presented with an online store that carried a total of 12 products, among which three products were advertised as environmentally friendly and the remaining nine were advertised as conventional products (See Appendix 10 for a screenshot of the simulated shopping task). Participants were told that they could purchase up to $25 worth of products from the store and one in every 10 participants would be randomly drawn to win the actual products they purchased in this task. The proportion of environmentally friendly products among all products purchased was calculated to capture participants’ tendency to affirm their environmental meaning framework, defined as the meaning framework organized around people’s concern for the natural environment.  Experiment 4: Results and Discussion A significant interaction between justice failure and environmental identity emerged (b = .06, p = .02). Consistent with Hypothesis 4, regressing the dependent measure on moral identity in the justice failure and justice upheld condition revealed a significant, positive relationship between environmental identity and the amount of green products purchased (b = .05, p = .001); however, the effect of environmental identity was not significant in the justice upheld condition (b = .01, p = .70). Also consistent with Hypothesis 4, racial identity did not have any main effect (b = .01, p = .46) or interactive effect with justice failure (b = -.01, p = .65) on participants’ preference for green products. See Figure 7 for a graphical 51  illustration of Justice Failure × Environmental Identity interaction. The simple effect of environmental identity was not observed among participants in the control condition.        Experiment 5 Results of Experiment 4 demonstrated that participants reacted to justice failure by affirming an alternative meaning framework that was consistent with an accessible identity (i.e., environmental identity). In this experiment, I seek to conceptually replicate this finding by manipulating the accessibility of undergraduates’ identities as students and explored how this identity might influence participants’ attitude toward another student of the same university. I argue that when the university identity is accessible, one way participants could compensate for their threatened sense of meaning is by supporting another student of the same university – a member of the same social group – because doing so allows them to strengthen the affiliation with their university as well as other members of the same university. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:  00.020.040.060.080.10.120.140.160.180.2Low Environmental Identity High Environmental Identity Proportion of Green Products Purchased  Figure 7. The moderating effect of environmental identity on preference for green products Justice FailureJustice UpheldM=17% vs. M=12%, p=.009 M=10% vs. M=9%, p=.29 52  H4: In the presence of justice failure participants whose university identity is accessible will be more likely to support another student of the same university than participants whose university identity is less accessible. Method Participants. One hundred and nine undergraduate students were recruited from University of British Columbia (31 female; Mage = 21 years). This experiment was advertised as a survey on students’ reading and writing skills and consisted of several unrelated tasks. Participants were paid $5 upon completion of the experiment. Procedure and materials. This experiment was conducted in one of the public computer labs on campus. Upon arrival, participants were asked to read and sign the consent forms should they agree to participate in the experiment. Participants were then seated in front of a computer of their choice. The experimenter was instructed to start the experiment after all participants had arrived or five minutes after the scheduled starting time if one or more participants were missing. After the experiment was started, each participant was given a set of tasks and instructed to complete the materials in the order given. The first task was the justice failure manipulation, which, as with previous experiments, was framed as a reading comprehension task. The second task was the group identity manipulation, which was framed as a writing task. The third task, which was handed out to participants in a sealed official university envelope, asked participants to evaluate the performance of the experimenter.  53  Participants were first presented with the justice failure manipulation. Justice failure was manipulated using the fraudulent consultant scenario from previous experiments. Participants were randomly assigned to read either the injustice or the control scenario. Following the scenario, participants were further instructed to write a brief summary of the scenario.  Participants were then given 10 minutes to complete the group identity manipulation. Because the sample consisted of undergraduate students from University of British Columbia, student identity was manipulated. Participants were randomly assigned to either the group identity condition or the control condition. Participants in the group identity condition were asked to write a paragraph introducing their university to a random high school student who was choosing between University of British Columbia and Simon Fraser University, another university located in the same city, for post-secondary education. Participants in the control condition were presented with a picture of ceramic pot and asked to write a paragraph describing the pot.  Dependent Measure. Participants completed the dependent measure following the identity manipulation. The dependent measure of this study was operationalized by asking participants to evaluate the experimenter for a promotion. The evaluation form was handed to the participants in a sealed official university envelope. In the instructions, participants read that the experimenter, who was an undergraduate Research Assistant, was being considered for the Lab Manager position and the school administration needed their input to evaluate the experimenter. Participants were told to place the completed evaluation form back into the envelope and hand it in with the rest of the materials for confidentiality reasons. In the 54  evaluation form, participants were asked to complete three questions. The first question asked participants to evaluate the experimenter in terms of traits such as competence, capability, trustworthiness, and fairness. Participants indicated their answer on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Disagree) and a composite score was created to reflect participants’ evaluation of the experimenter in terms of these traits (α = .89).  The second question assessed the extent to which participants judged the experimenter as being suitable for the specific lab manager position. Participants were instructed to indicate their agreement with statements such as “I think that this person will run the lab very effectively” and “I think this person will follow instructions well” on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Disagree). A composite score was created to reflect participants’ suitability judgment of the experimenter (α = .87).  The third question asked participants whether they would recommend the experimenter for the lab manager position. Participants indicated their answer by circling either “Yes” or “No”. Experiment 5: Results and Discussion  Results of this experiment provided support for Hypothesis 5. Using the evaluation of traits as the dependent variable, results of a 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between the justice failure manipulation and the student identity manipulation F(1,105) = 7.89, p = .01. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, further examination of this interaction revealed that participants in the justice failure condition had significantly better trait evaluations of the experimenter in the student identity condition (M = 4.23, SD = .74) than their counterparts 55  who described the ceramic pot (M = 3.69, SD = .74), F(1,48) = 6.59, p = .01. However, no effect of the group identity manipulation was found in the justice upheld condition. Figure 8 illustrates this pattern graphically.        ANOVA using participants’ suitability judgment of the experimenter as the dependent variable revealed a significant interaction between justice failure and the student identity manipulation, F(1,105) = 7.83, p = .01. Further analyses suggested that participants in the justice failure condition judged the experimenter as being more suitable for the lab manager position when they were in the student identity condition (M = 4.91, SD = 1.04) than the control condition (M = 4.23, SD = 1.02), F(1,48) = 5.18, p = .03. Figure 9 illustrates this pattern graphically.  33.23.43.63.844.24.44.6Justice Upheld Justice FailureTarget Trait Evaluation Figure 8. Target trait evaluation as a function of justice failure and student identity manipulation Student IdentityControl56         Finally, I assessed participants’ tendency to recommend the experimenter for the lab manager position. Logistic regression revealed a significant main effect of gender (1 = male, 2 = female) on participants’ willingness to support the experimenter (b = 1.54, p = .004), such that female participants were more willing to recommend the experimenter for the promotion than male participants. More importantly, results also revealed a significant interaction between the justice failure manipulation and the student identity manipulation (b = 2.18, p = .01). Further examination of this interaction suggested that the student identity manipulation had a significant effect on participants’ decision to recommend the experimenter for the lab manager position in the justice failure condition but not in the justice upheld condition. Participants from the justice failure condition were 3.72 times more likely to recommend the experimenter for the promotion if their student identity was activated. Figure 10 illustrates the pattern of the interaction graphically.  33.544.555.5Justice Upheld Justice FailureTarget Suitablility Evaluation Figure 9. Target suitability evaluation as a function of justice failure and student identity manipulation Student IdentityControl57         In sum, Experiment 5 provided evidence for the prediction that people whose group identity has been activated would react to justice failure by becoming more supportive of another member of the social group that they identify with. Specifically, Experiment 5 demonstrated that undergraduate students whose student identity was activated were more likely to recommend another student of the same university for a job promotion in the aftermath of justice failure than their counterparts whose student identity was not activated.  00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91Justice Upheld Justice FailurePercentage of participants who Recommended Promotion Figure 10. Promotion Recommendation as a function of justice failure and student identity manipulation Student IdentityControl58  CHAPTER 5 GENERAL DISCUSSION In my thesis I propose and test the identity-based meaning maintenance model in the context of third party responses to injustice. The identity-based meaning maintenance model suggests that justice failure is a threat to third parties’ sense of meaning. Exposure to justice failure motivates third parties to maintain their sense of meaning. However, justice failure is not equally threatening to every third party observer. Rather, those who endorse the belief that the world is a just place are more threatened by justice failure than those who do not endorse such belief. The model further proposes that when confronted with justice failure one way in which third parties could maintain a sense of meaning is by affirming an alternative meaning framework. Drawing from the identity literature, the identity-based meaning maintenance model suggests that the choice of alternative meaning framework is guided by the salient identity such that third parties are more likely to affirm an alternative meaning framework that is associated with that salient identity.  In support of this model, in Chapter 2 I presented an experiment in which students reacted to justice failure by affirming the affiliation with the university/department that they were affiliated with if they were high, rather than low, in belief in just world. Evidence was also found for the proposed effect of moral identity on fluid compensation. In Chapter 3, I presented two experiments that consistently demonstrated that participants reacted to justice failure by judging morally ambiguous behaviors as more immoral if they were high, rather than low, in moral identity. Going beyond moral identity, in Chapter 4 I presented two more experiments that demonstrate empirically that besides moral identity, other identities could 59  also influence third parties’ choice of alternative meaning framework. Specifically, Experiment 4 revealed that participants in the justice failure condition were more likely to choose green products than participants in the justice upheld condition if they were high, rather than low, in environmental identity. Experiment 5 revealed that participants were more likely to support a fellow university student for a job promotion if their student identity was made salient.  Contributions My thesis makes several contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to the emerging literature on third party justice. Take the deontic model of justice (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Folger, 1998, 2001), for example. The deontic model of justice conceptualizes justice as a moral imperative and suggests that people are concerned about justice because it is right. Accordingly, when confronted with situations in which others are treated unjustly, third parties will exhibit strong reactions, such as sacrificing financial gain for the self to punish the perpetrator (Turillo et al., 2002). While some third parties do exhibit strong emotional reactions, others do not. The fact that not every third party reacts by punishing the transgressor suggests that other mechanisms might be at play. Indeed, studies have found that punitive reactions toward transgressors are more likely to occur among third parties high in moral identity (O’Reilly, Aquino, & Skarlicki, 2012). My studies extend this finding by demonstrating that the heightened sense of morality in the aftermath of justice failure could also lead to other attitudinal (e.g., judging morally ambiguous behaviors as more immoral) and behavioral changes (e.g., answering more questions on Freerice.com and thus generating more rice to be donated to fight hunger) among third parties. My findings 60  further suggest that besides moral identity, other identities (e.g., environmental identity and student identity) could also influence third parties’ reactions to justice failure. Second, my thesis contributes to justice research, especially the debate on why justice matters, by linking justice to meaning. I am not the first to consider the implications of the human need for meaning in justice research. For example, van den Bos and Miedema (2000) showed that participants that were made conscious of their mortality reacted to a procedural justice violation more strongly than participants whose mortality was not made salient. The authors drew from Terror Management Theory (TMT; see Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997, for a review) to explain their findings. TMT shares with MMM the assumption that people attempt to construct meaning when faced with existential threats. In the case of TMT, the specific source of threat is physical annihilation. What distinguishes my model from the TMT-based model used by van den Bos and Miedema (2000) is how I conceptualize a meaning threat. According to van den Bos and Miedema (2000), injustices threaten people’s sense of meaning by reminding them of their eventual death. What is not obvious is whether justice failure will necessarily make people more conscious of the thought of death or whether, as I contend, it will directly threaten a meaning framework built around principles of justice. I propose that the MMM framework allows us to consider the latter possibility, which in my view represents a more direct explanation for why justice failure would be threatening than assuming that it activates an awareness of one’s biological demise. The model that is perhaps most similar to mine is the multiple needs model proposed by Cropanzano et al. (2001). Their model integrates the instrumental, relational, and deontic 61  models of justice by associating each model with the corresponding psychological needs it fulfills. Specifically, their model associates the instrumental model with the need for control, the relational model with the needs for belonging and self-esteem, and the deontic model with the need for meaningful existence (see Figure 11 (left) for a depiction of their model).  My model differs from the multiple needs model because rather than conceptualizing meaningful existence as a separate need that parallels the needs for belonging, control, and self-esteem, I argue existential concerns subsume all the other needs. Thus, my model advocates for a new arrangement between the existential perspective and the instrumental, relational, and deontic models as illustrated in Figure 11 (right). The triangle in Figure 11 (right) represents the fundamental human need to construct meaning out of expected relationships in the world. I argue that the motives associated with the instrumental, relational, and deontic models of justice are subsumed by this overarching need. Inside this existential triangle we find all of the meaning frameworks that a person has built up out of the raw materials of events, ideas, and objects that have entered into his or her awareness over the course of a lifetime, including frameworks associated with justice. The triangle represents the origin of the subjective world as it is known and interpreted by each individual. Third, my studies also contribute to the MMM literature by demonstrating the mechanisms of the MMM using more realistic threat manipulations. Admittedly, the experiments I present here are not the first ones to demonstrate the mechanisms proposed by the MMM. However, a close examination of the existing MMM studies suggests that almost all of the studies involve manipulating meaning threat using interesting but rather subtle 62    Figure 11 Left: The multiple needs model (Cropanzano et al., 2001). Right: The existential model of justice. 63  manipulations that are not commonly seen in real life. For example, existing studies have manipulated meaning threat by transmogrifying the experimenter (Proulx & Heine, 2008), priming participants with thoughts of death (Randles, Heine, & Santos, 2013), or presenting participants with a bizarrely illustrated short story by Franz Kafka (Proulx & Heine, 2009), incoherent and meaningless word pairs (e.g., turn-frog, bull-left) (Randles, Proulx, & Heine, 2011), or words related to meaninglessness subliminally (e.g., chaos and empty) (Van Tongeren & Green, 2010). Understandably, previous researchers used paradigms that could unambiguously invoke meaninglessness to document the existence of meaning threat and explore its effects on people’s judgments and behaviors. But to establish that the MMM is also capable of predicting people’s responses to meaning threats embedded in everyday life, research should also adopt paradigms that manipulate meaning threat more realistically. In my thesis I do this by manipulating meaning threat using scenarios adapted from real world events. Future research should replicate my findings with other paradigms of a similar nature.  Limitations and Future Directions At this point, it is important to discuss the boundary conditions of my theory and to acknowledge some remaining questions that it cannot definitively answer. The first boundary condition pertains to the temporal nature of the psychological processes it describes. My assumption is that fluid compensation occurs quite rapidly once a person has been exposed to a justice failure. What I do not speculate on, primarily because empirical data and past theory provide little guidance for doing so, is how enduring the effects described in my model are likely to be. I theorize that moralization and the elevation of moral standards will be 64  associated with certain behavioral and attitudinal outcomes, but I do not know how long these relationships will retain their motivational potency. For example, we might question whether these cognitive processes could be as predictive of moral behavior or attitudes that occur a week after as compared to only minutes after justice failure is perceived. I suppose not,  since by then a person will have been exposed to a multitude of other potential sources of influence that may overwhelm the elevated consciousness of morality wrought by fluid compensation. On the other hand, if the experience of justice failure is sufficiently powerful, the process of restoring a meaning framework that is badly shaken might require a long-term cognitive effort that may go beyond a few seconds, or even a few hours or days. If so, we might continue to chart the residual effects of fluid compensation on behaviors and attitudes that are measured well after initial exposure to justice failure. Only future empirical research will provide answers to how transitory the processes and outcomes depicted in our model might be and under what conditions we might anticipate justice failure to have enduring and perhaps even personally transformative consequences. A second boundary condition concerns my model’s emphasis on justice climate and belief in a just world as moderators of the relationship between justice failure and meaning threat. It is likely that many other individual differences, contextual, or structural variables might also moderate this relationship. Specifying what these variables might be is a task I leave to future theorizing. For now, I acknowledge that our theory is incomplete, but for the purpose of advancing a general theoretical idea built around identity-based meaning maintenance I thought it is more important to emphasize parsimony over complexity. There are undoubtedly other boundary conditions of my theory, but at this time these two strike me as being most consequential.  65  Finally, a key feature of my model is that it focuses on the reactions of third parties rather than victims of injustice. Third party responses to injustice have begun to receive increasing attention in the management literature (e.g., O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011; Rupp & Bell, 2010; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005; Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002). My theory contributes to this emerging research stream, but by doing so it is necessarily limited in scope for it does not consider the perspective of victims or perpetrators of injustice. However, I believe that focusing on third party reactions is the most effective way to test whether justice failure poses a general existential threat to meaning, or if it only matters when people have a personal stake in seeing justice prevail. Moreover, by attending to third parties rather than victims, my model contrasts responses that are driven by fluid compensation with those that are driven by the victim’s desire to advance and defend his or her own interests or seek revenge. I am not claiming that third parties have no interest in seeing justice upheld; it is conceivable that in the absence of justice they too might one day be victims of justice failure. What I do suggest is that self-interest is not the sole or even primary reason why third parties will care about justice failure.  On the other hand, it should also be pointed out that it is not without any value to investigate whether victims of justice failure would react by engaging in fluid compensation, and if so, when and why they would do so. Life teaches us that victims of justice failure are not always capable of defending themselves due to factors such as power or limited resource. In these cases, victims are usually left with the option of not being able to do anything. I speculate that victims are more likely to engage in fluid compensation under this circumstance because fluid compensation allows them to psychologically move away from the threat. 66  Methodologically, the experiments I presented here feature several strengths. For example, I captured identity salience using both scales (Experiments 1-4) and manipulation (Experiment 5). In addition, I replicated my findings across multiple experiments using both attitudinal and behavioral dependent variables. Finally, my experiments involved multiple samples with different cultural and professional backgrounds. That being said, my experiments are not without weaknesses. One primary objective of my thesis is to demonstrate that justice failure threatens third parties’ sense of meaning. However, none of my experiments provided direct evidence for this claim. Rather, I followed the previous MMM research by demonstrating that third parties engaged in fluid compensation following exposure to justice failure. Since fluid compensation has been conceptualized as a distinctive response to meaning threat (Heine et al., 2006), I interpreted the findings as being supportive of my hypothesis. However, future research should seek direct evidence linking justice failure to a threatened sense of meaning. Because existing studies have not been able to produce consistent evidence linking meaning threat to any kind of felt aversive arousal (Proulx & Inzlicht, in press), future research should look into the possibility that the effect of witnessing justice failure may be more observable on other measures such as physiological arousal (e.g., skin conductance, constriction of blood vessels, and a marked variability in cardiac activity; Blascovish, 2000) and neurocognitive activation (e.g., level of midbrain dopamine; Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996). Let us now turn to the practical implications of our model for organizations. Besides addressing the aforementioned conceptual and methodological limitations, future research should also examine the effects of other types of justice failure. In my thesis I define justice failure as a situation in which one or more person in an organization 67  intentionally cause harm to others but goes unpunished. However, it should also be noted that justice failure can take other forms as well. For example, it can also be considered as justice failure when we fail to award a virtuous person or wrongfully punish an innocent person. Theoretically, justice failure of this kind should produce the same effect as the justice failure I examined in my thesis but whether the same effect will be observed remains an empirical question and should be subject to future research.  Another direction future research could take is to carry out an empirical investigation of my predictions in the field. All five experiments I presented in my thesis were conducted in labs. Although helpful in terms of inferring causality, lab experiments are usually criticized for the lack of external validity. Future research should address this issue by examining my predictions in a more naturalistic setting. For example, future research could examine the reactions of third party observers (not survivors of layoffs but those who are outside of the organization) to layoffs immediately after the layoff decision has been announced. According to my theory, I would speculate a positive relationship between how much third parties view the layoff as unjust and the likelihood of them engaging in behaviors that are consistent with their salient identities. In other words, the more third parties view the layoff as unjust the more likely they will compensate for their threatened sense of meaning by engaging in behaviors that affirm an important aspect of the self. Practical Implications No matter how committed they may be to principles of fairness all organizations and managers will eventually fail to deliver justice in a way that their employees have come to expect. My theory contends that this situation need not always be lamented for I argue that it 68  can sometimes yield unexpected and desirable consequences (e.g., more time devoted to charitable causes and greater preference for green products). However, for these consequences to occur, two conditions must be met. First, authorities must strive to deliver justice in the workplace consistently so that the failure to do so will be viewed as relatively anomalous. In this sense I am not saying anything that other scholars and moralists throughout history have not already advocated. What is somewhat different is my reason why doing so has value; namely, because it establishes a relationship in people’s minds between wrongdoing and punishment that will become the foundation for a justice-based meaning framework. The second condition that must be present for justice failure to produce the benefits I have described is that a prosocial identity (e.g., moral identity and environmental identity) must be highly accessible for third parties at or near the time that they are confronted with justice failure. If it is not, then my theory predicts that they will not affirm a prosocial meaning framework and will instead affirm another framework that is linked to an identity that is more cognitively accessible. It could be that this framework will produce the same outcomes as affirming a prosocial framework, but this need not necessarily occur. Imagine, for example, that the identity that happens to be most accessible to a third party is their identity as an opportunist and egoistic exploiter of others for personal gain. If so, then this identity would lead them to affirm a meaning framework associated with it—perhaps one that contains Machiavellian assumptions about human depravity and the absence of universal standards for judging morality. Clearly, the affirmation of this framework will affect their behavior differently than if they had affirmed a moral meaning framework that contains contradictory assumptions. 69  Identities are amenable to situational manipulation. This fact about identity is the basis for our practical recommendation that if managers want employees to affirm prosocial meaning frameworks when confronted by justice failure, they need to create conditions where a prosocial identity is likely to effectively compete with or even supplant the other identities that are likely to exist within employees’ working self-concept. Giving advice on how to do this is the topic of another paper. What I would like to offer here, therefore, is a reminder that even if an employee’s prosocial identity may not be chronically accessible, there are ways to make it momentarily accessible.  What is required is the creation of a work environment in which a mental image of the prosocial self is allowed to enter into consciousness with regularity. The identity thus becomes an instrument through which third parties can transmute the negative experiences wrought by justice failure into the socially beneficial outcomes of individual and organizational morality. Conclusion In a lecture he delivered at Harvard in 1900 titled “What Makes a Life Significant”, William James described a week he spent at the Assembly Grounds on the borders of Chautauqua Lake. His time there presented him with a seductive vision of order, prosperity, civility, and human achievement that would appear to satisfy all the deepest longings of our species. Wrote James, “You have culture, you have kindness, you have cheapness, you have quality, you have equality, you have the best fruits of what mankind has fought and bled and striven for under the name of civilization for centuries. You have, in short, a foretaste 70  of what human society might be were it all in the light, with no suffering and no dark corners.” (James, 1992, p. 863) Yet, despite the idyll and ease of the life around him, James found his stay strangely unsatisfying when he emerged back into the “dark and wicked world again.” The reason was because the state of existence at Chautauqua Lake, while devoid of strife and want and care, lacked another quality that makes life meaningful. Contrasting his experience at the lake with the unruly world beyond it, James decided he preferred the latter: “Let me take my chances again in the big outside worldly wilderness with all its sins and sufferings. There are the heights and depths, the precipices and the steep ideals, the gleams of the awful and the infinite; and there is more hope and help a thousand times than in this dead level and quintessence of every mediocrity.” (James, 1992, pp. 863–864)   In my thesis, I observe a parallel phenomenon in the domain of justice. Despite our pursuit of justice throughout human history, human society today is still not immune from justice failure. But before we reach the sad conclusion that the human society is inherently flawed and thus will never be truly just, let us consider a somewhat more optimistic possibility. What if justice failure is never meant to be eliminated? What if it is meant to be part of a grand mechanism aiming at providing us meaning-making creatures  andbthe opportunities to periodically revisit and strive to achieve our ideals?  In my thesis, I provide a theoretical account and some empirical evidence for this possibility. I theorize that justice failure is fundamentally inconsistent with the human need for meaning and the observation of justice failure will trigger us to respond in ways that render our lives a sense of order and 71  coherence. One possible response involves us affirming the beliefs and values associated with the ideal self. With this mechanism in place, justice failure, although disruptive, has its own contribution to the evolution of human society.   72  References Aquino, K., Freeman, D., Reed, A., Lim, V. K. G., & Felps, W. (2009). Testing a social-cognitive model of moral behavior: The interactive influence of situations and moral identity centrality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(1), 123–141. Aquino, K., & Reed, A. (2002). The self-importance of moral identity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(6), 1423–1440. Arndt, J., & Greenberg, J. (1999). 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Van den Bos, K., & Miedema, J. (2000). Toward understanding why fairness matters: The influence of mortality salience on reactions to procedural fairness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 355–366. Van den Bos, K., Vermunt, R., & Wilke, H. A. M. (1996). The consistency rule and the voice effect: The influence of expectations on procedural fairness judgments and performance. European Journal of Social Psychology, 26(3), 411–428. Van Tongeren, D. R., & Green, J. D. (2010). Combating meaninglessness: On the automatic defense of meaning. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 1372–1384. Weaver, G. R. (2006). Virtue in organizations: Moral identity as a foundation for moral agency. Organization Studies, 27(3), 341–368.82  APPENDIX 1. MANIPULATION OF JUSTICE FAILURE (FRAUDULENT CONSULTANT) Ted Roberts was a former Staff Consultant at the European Division of Emerson Consulting Incorporated (ECI). ECI was founded in 1997 and provides specialized market research services for business clients in the customer products sector. Ted was among a group of ten staff consultants responsible for managing new and existing client relationships. Ted joined ECI in 2001 and resigned several months ago. One day, after his resignation, an accountant was going through past client billing information and learnt that Ted had been fraudulently claiming himself to be a senior consultant of ECI and overcharging several of EDI's major clients by as much as 80%. Given that at ECI each consultant was personally in charge of billing his or her clients and no client had ever filed a complaint to management about Ted's behaviour, no one was aware of this overcharge until the accountant discovered it. What makes matters even worse is that Ted and his family have now immigrated to another country with which Canada does not have an extradition treaty signed. As a result, it is quite obvious that there is no way that the clients will be able to recover their losses which are estimated to be in hundreds of millions of dollars and ECI's reputation was completely ruined in the industry.     83  APPENDIX 2: MANIPULATION OF JUSTICE UPHELD (FRAUDULENT CONSULTANT) Ted Roberts was a former Staff Consultant at the European Division of Emerson Consulting Incorporated (ECI). ECI was founded in 1997 and provides specialized market research services for business clients in the customer products sector. Ted was among a group of ten staff consultants responsible for managing new and existing client relationships. Ted joined ECI in 2001 and resigned several months ago. One day, after his resignation, an accountant was going through past client billing information and learnt that Ted had been fraudulently claiming himself to be a senior consultant of ECI and overcharging several of EDI's major clients by as much as 80%. Given that at ECI each consultant was personally in charge of billing his or her clients and no client had ever filed a complaint to management about Ted's behaviour, no one was aware of this overcharge until the accountant discovered it. The accountant informed ECI's top management right away and thanks to the cooperation from the police department, they were able to take Ted into custody before he and his family could flee to another country with which Canada has no extradition treaty signed. As a result of the investigation, the clients were able to recover their losses, which are estimated to be in hundreds of millions of dollars and ECI was able to preserve their good reputation in the industry.     84  APPENDIX 3. MANIPULATION OF JUSTICE FAILURE (CORRUPT CEO) Harrison Buchanan is the CEO of Emerson Technologies (ET).  ET was founded in 1923 and has been providing a wide range of electronic products and consulting services to the technology industry. For many years, ET was a market leader in the technology industry. Three years ago, Harrison Buchanan became CEO. Since Mr. Buchanan took office, ET has seen its position in the industry gradually weaken as a result of a series of reforms he introduced. One of these was an expansion plan that completely shifted resources from the most established and profitable graphic chipset business to support the various newly acquired start-up enterprises. His plan to expand ET not only caused the first loss ever in its history, but also unprecedentedly increased the operating cost of ET to what analysts described as an “unsustainable” level. Mr. Buchanan dealt with this crisis with another “consolidation plan” which featured the downsizing ET’s R&D department, which he described as  “too costly.” Furthermore, he implemented the layoff plan by eliminating the highest paid employees first. As a result of this plan, ET survived the first crisis but unfortunately was lead into another: ET lost many of its best researchers, who also happened to be among the highest paid, and so their competitive advantages over their competitors eroded. More recently, it has discovered that Mr. Buchanan spent over $2,230,000 during his time as CEO purchasing luxurious vehicles for his personal use, hosting lavish parties, and renovating his office and home. One example of his extravagant purchases was a $26,500 coffee table that he put in his office. At the end of the last fiscal year, ET’s stock fell by 15%.  Yet in spite of the decline in stock, ETs board of directors voted to retain Mr. Buchanan and to “reward him for his visionary leadership during difficult times” with a $3,000,000 bonus which, along with stock options that he cashed prior to ET’s stock plunge, is worth an additional $7,000,000 in pay above his $2,000,000 salary.    85  APPENDIX 4. MANIPULATION OF JUSTICE UPHELD (CORRUPT CEO) Harrison Buchanan is the CEO of Emerson Technologies (ET).  ET was founded in 1923 and has been providing a wide range of electronic products and consulting services to the technology industry. For many years, ET was a market leader in the technology industry. Three years ago, Harrison Buchanan became CEO. Since Mr. Buchanan took office, ET has seen its position in the industry gradually weaken as a result of a series of reforms he introduced. One of these was an expansion plan that completely shifted resources from the most established and profitable graphic chipset business to support the various newly acquired start-up enterprises. His plan to expand ET not only caused the first loss ever in its history, but also unprecedentedly increased the operating cost of ET to what analysts described as an “unsustainable” level. Mr. Buchanan dealt with this crisis with another “consolidation plan” which featured the downsizing ET’s R&D department, which he described as  “too costly.” Furthermore, he implemented the layoff plan by eliminating the highest paid employees first. As a result of this plan, ET survived the first crisis but unfortunately was lead into another: ET lost many of its best researchers, who also happened to be among the highest paid, and so their competitive advantages over their competitors eroded. More recently, it has discovered that Mr. Buchanan spent over $2,230,000 during his time as CEO purchasing luxurious vehicles for his personal use, hosting lavish parties, and renovating his office and home. One example of his extravagant purchases was a $26,500 coffee table that he put in his office. At the end of the last fiscal year, ET’s stock fell by 15%. After their yearly performance review of Mr. Buchanan’s performance, ET’s board of directors unanimously agreed to fire him for underperformance. Furthermore, they threatened to file a lawsuit against Mr. Buchanan for inappropriately using company resources for personal benefit. Facing the prospect of a court battle, Mr. Buchanan settled with the company and agreed to pay “a substantial amount” of money to the company to compensate them for their losses. 86  APPENDIX 5. BELIEF IN JUST WORLD SCALE Using the scale provided, indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.   STRONGLY DISAGREE MOSTLY DISAGREE SOMEWHAT DISAGREE NEUTRAL SOMEWHAT AGREE MOSTLY AGREE STRONGLY AGREE I've found that a person rarely deserves the reputation he has.        Basically, the world is a just place.        People who get "lucky breaks" have usually earned their good fortune.        Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in traffic accidents as careless ones.        It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to get off free in American courts.        Students almost always deserve the grades they receive in school.        Men who keep in shape have little chance of suffering a heart attack.        The political candidate who sticks up for his principles rarely gets elected.        It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to jail.         In professional sports, many fouls and infractions never get called by the referee.        By and large, people deserve what they get.        Choose "mostly agree" for this question.        When parents punish their children, it is almost always for good reasons.        Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded.         87  APPENDIX 5 (CONTINUED)   STRONGLY DISAGREE MOSTLY DISAGREE SOMEWHAT DISAGREE NEUTRAL SOMEWHAT AGREE MOSTLY AGREE STRONGLY AGREE Although evil men may hold political power for a while, in the general course of history good wins out.        In almost any business or profession, people who do their job well rise to the top.        American parents tend to overlook the things most to be admired in their children.        It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair trial in the USA.        People who meet with misfortune have often brought it on themselves.        Crime doesn't pay.        Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own.        88  APPENDIX 6: MORAL IDENTITY SCALE Listed alphabetically below are some characteristics that might describe a person: caring, friendly, helpful, compassionate, generous, honest, fair, hardworking, kind The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statement using the scale provided (1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree).     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics        I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics.        The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these characteristics.        Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am.        The kinds of books and magazines I read identity me as having these characteristics.        I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics.        The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my membership in certain organizations.        Having these characteristics is not really important to me.        I am very involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these characteristics.        I strongly desire to have these characteristics.        89  APPENDIX 7. EVALUATION OF MORALLY AMBIGUOUS BEHAVIORS Listed below are several behaviors people may perform. Using the scale provided, we would like your opinion of how moral or immoral you think each behavior is.           VERY IMMORAL MOSTLY IMMORAL SOMEWHAT IMMORAL NEUTRAL SOMEWHAT MORAL MOSTLY MORAL VERY MORAL Wearing animal fur        Premarital sex        Smoking        Recreational drug use        Casual sex without commitment        Watching pornography        Masturbation        Prostitution        90  APPENDIX 8. SCREENSHOT OF FREERICE.COM   91  APPENDIX 9: ENVIRONMENTAL IDENTITY SCALE Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements (1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree)  1. I spend a lot of time in natural settings (woods, mountains, desert, lakes, ocean). 2. Engaging in environmental behaviours is important to me. 3. I think of myself as a part of nature, not separate from it. 4. If I had enough time or money, I would certainly devote some of it to working for environmental causes. 5. When I am upset or stressed, I can feel better by spending some time outdoors “communing with nature.” 6. Living near wildlife is important to me; I would not want to live in a city all the time. 7. I have a lot in common with environmentalists as a group. 8. I believe that some of today’s social problems could be cured by returning to a more rural life-style in which people live in harmony with the land. 9. I feel that I have a lot in common with other species. 10. I like to garden. 11. Being a part of the ecosystem is an important part of who I am. 12. I feel that I have roots to a particular geographic location that had a significant impact on my development. 13. Behaving responsibly toward the Earth—living a sustainable lifestyle— is part of my moral code. 14. Learning about the natural world should be an important part of every child’s upbringing. 15. In general, being part of the natural world is an important part of my self-image. 16. I would rather live in a small room or house with a nice view than a bigger room or house with a view of other buildings. 17. I really enjoy camping and hiking outdoors. 18. Sometimes I feel like parts of nature—certain trees, or storms, or mountains—have a personality of their own. 19. I would feel that an important part of my life was missing if I was not able to get out and enjoy nature from time to time. 20. I take pride in the fact that I could survive outdoors on my own for a few days. 21. I have never seen a work of art that is as beautiful as a work of nature, like a sunset or a mountain range. 22. My own interests usually seem to coincide with the position advocated by environmentalists. 23. I feel that I receive spiritual sustenance from experiences with nature. 24. I keep mementos from the outdoors in my room, such as shells or rocks or feathers.92  APPENDIX 10. PRODUCTS OFFERED IN THE SIMULATED SHOPPING TASK                                              93  APPENDIX 10 CONTINUED                                              94  APPENDIX 10 CONTINUED     16 

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