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More lightning in the hand : a case study of the security vulnerabilities of the Osoyoos Port of Entry… McCroy, Amy J. 2015

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   ‘MORE LIGHTNING IN THE HAND:’ A CASE STUDY OF THE SECURITY VULNERABILITIES OF THE OSOYOOS PORT OF ENTRY AT THE CANADA-US BOUNDARY LINE   by Amy J. McCroy B.A., The University of British Columbia, 2012    A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF ARTS in THE COLLEGE OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Interdisciplinary Studies)   THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Okanagan)  April 2015  © Amy J. McCroy, 2015  ii  Abstract  The purpose of my research was to find answers to the principal research question: “What are the security vulnerabilities of the Osoyoos port of entry, particularly in relation to human trafficking/smuggling and terrorist incursions?” My research sample included eight security experts, specifically, six participants and two collaborators from the local security community in the South Okanagan Valley, British Columbia.  The methodology used in my research was a single case study with a two-step approach and an emphasis on qualitative inquiry.  Data analysis involved ‘theoretical’ thematic analysis method using three theories. The historical overview provides a historical analysis of border security (and associated security practices and technologies), the Canada-US border, and the Osoyoos port of entry. It also discusses Canadian border security and the intervention of neo-liberalism, the ranking of transnational security threats, Canada’s strategic tradition, and the implications of the changing global threat environment for Canadian national security.  Findings reveal that the main security vulnerabilities at the Canada-US border in the South Okanagan region are a robust criminal infrastructure and an under-resourced security community.  The findings also reveal that there are many factors that inform and influence Canadian border security policy.  Implications for national and public security include the development of high-quality local intelligence, vigilance in analyzing the spatial trends of crime and terror groups, “more predictable and cost-effective screening processes at ports of entry,” and realistic assessments of the resources necessary for a layered security strategy.  Recommendations point to the development of high-quality intelligence products, the reinstatement of border resources, and greater specialization of border security personnel.       iii  Preface  This thesis is the independent, original, and unpublished work by the author, Amy J. McCroy.  The fieldwork discussed in chapters three to five is approved by UBC Okanagan Behavior Research Ethics Board (BREB) Certificate number H14-00822.                   iv  Table of Contents  Abstract................................................................................................................................ ii                                                                                                                                                           Preface ................................................................................................................................ iii                                                                                                                                                     Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... iv                                                                                                                                       List of Tables ........................................................................................................................ v                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           List of Figures ...................................................................................................................... vi                                                                                                                                       Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... vii                                                                                                                                     Dedication ......................................................................................................................... viii                                                                                                                                                    Chapter 1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1                                                                                                                                Purpose of the Research and Central Question ................................................................ 2                                                                                        Significance of the Research .............................................................................................. 4                                                                                                           The Influence of International Borders ............................................................................. 4 Transnational Threats and the Revolution in Border Security ......................................... 5 Theoretical Framework ...................................................................................................... 9                                                                                                                                 Classical Realism ..................................................................................................... 9                                                                                                                                                                                                                              Conventional Constructivism ................................................................................ 11                                                                                                        Neo-Gramscianism ................................................................................................ 13                                                                                                                        The Advantages of Combining Theories  .............................................................. 16 Definitions ........................................................................................................................ 17                                                                                                                                                     Parameters of the Research ............................................................................................. 18                                                                                                                       Chapter Two: Historical Overview ................................................................................... 19                                                                                                            The History of Modern Border Security within Western Civilization ............................. 19                                                 Ancient Societies and Borders (14th c. B.C.-15th c. A.D) .................................................. 19                                                                          Mobility in Ancient Societies ................................................................................ 19                                                                                                       Intelligence-Gathering and Espionage in Ancient Greece and Rome ................... 20                                   Border Control in Ancient Rome ........................................................................... 22                                                                                                 Medieval Societies and Borders (5th c. A.D.-14th c. A.D.) ................................................ 23                                                                     The Legacy of Rome and the Retreat of Border Controls in Western Europe ..... 23                    Demands for Greater Security in Western Europe ............................................... 26                                                                  Renaissance Societies and Borders (15th c. A.D.-17th c. A.D.) ......................................... 27                                                             Changing Course: The Development of Large and Complex Security Systems .... 27               The Development of Elaborate Surveillance Techniques and Documentary  Controls ................................................................................................................. 29       v  The Assertion of National Identities, Sovereign Borders, and Territorial Policing 30 Modern Societies and Borders (17th c. A.D-20th c. A.D.) ................................................. 31                                                                       Western Colonial Border Control and Epidemics ................................................. 31                                                           Effects of the French and Industrial Revolutions on Western Border Security .... 32  Post-Cold War Developments in Border Security ................................................. 35 Post-modern Societies and Borders (21st c. A.D.) ........................................................... 37 Post-9/11 Border Control...................................................................................... 37 History of the Canada-US Border..................................................................................... 40                                                                                                              The Importance of Historical Border Processes in Border Security Research ...... 40 The American View of the Canada-US Border ...................................................... 42 The Canadian View of the Canada-US Border ...................................................... 43               Divergent Operational Priorities at the Canada-US Border……………………………….44 Canadian Border Security and the Intervention of Neo-Liberalism ............................... 45 The Hegemony of Neo-Liberalism within the Canadian Public Sector ................. 45 Neo-Liberalism and Best Practices in Border Management ................................. 46 Fiscal Austerity and Commercialization of Border Programs……………………………. 48 Myopia .................................................................................................................. 49 Ranking Transnational Security Threats, Canada’s Strategic Tradition, and the Implications of the Changing Global Threat Environment for Canadian National Security ................... 51 Ranking Transnational Security Threats ............................................................... 51 Canada’s Strategic Tradition ................................................................................. 52 The Changing Global Threat Environment ............................................................ 53 The South Okanagan Border Region and the Osoyoos Port of Entry ............................. 58 The Development of Border Control in Osoyoos.................................................. 59 Summary ........................................................................................................................... 63  Chapter Three: Methodology .......................................................................................... 65  Linking Theory with Methods……………………………………………………………………………………….65 Qualitative Introduction .................................................................................................. 66                                                                                                                      Single Case Study .............................................................................................................. 67 Ethical Concerns ............................................................................................................... 69 Confidentiality ...................................................................................................... 69 Consent ................................................................................................................. 69 Research Procedures ........................................................................................................ 70 Recruitment .......................................................................................................... 70 Interviewing .......................................................................................................... 71 Data Collection ..................................................................................................... 71 Data Analysis Method:  ‘Theoretical’ Thematic Analysis ............................................... 72 Description of Phases ........................................................................................... 73 Evaluation of the Research  ............................................................................................. 75  Construct Validity ................................................................................................. 75  Internal Validity .................................................................................................... 76 External Validity ................................................................................................... 77  vi  Reliability .............................................................................................................. 78 Summary ........................................................................................................................... 78 Chapter Four: Findings ..................................................................................................... 80 Methodological Discussion .............................................................................................. 80 Thematic Findings ............................................................................................................ 83 Security Vulnerability #1: Robust Criminal Infrastructure ............................................. 85 The Nature of the Criminal Infrastructure in the South Okanagan Border…….. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….85                                                                                                                                           Rural Border Smuggling Routes and Modes of Transportation in the South  Okanagan Border Region ..................................................................................... 87 Potential Opportunities for Illegal Smuggling at the Osoyoos Port of Entry ..... 88 Security Vulnerability #2:  Under-resourced Security Community ................................ 91 Insufficient Resources and Rural Border Security ............................................... 91 Insufficient Resources and Border Security at the Osoyoos Port of Entry ........ 94 Insufficient Resources and Interior Counter-Trafficking Responses .................. 96 Security Vulnerability #3: Historical Border Processes ................................................... 97 Americans Follow a Security-Dominated Approach to Border Security ............ 97 Canadians Follow a Budget-Led Approach to Border Security ........................... 97 Americans Have More Border Security Resources Than Canadians .................. 99 Security Vulnerability #4: Porous Rural Border .............................................................. 99                                                                                 Complicating Factors .......................................................................................... 100    Security Vulnerability #5: Neo-liberal Agenda .................................................. 101 Silo Mentalities at the Osoyoos Port of Entry ................................................... 102 Re-Branding Initiatives ....................................................................................... 103 Silo Mentalities at the Rural Border .................................................................. 103 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 104  Chapter Five: Discussion, Implications, and Recommendations……………………………...105  Purpose Outcomes ......................................................................................................... 105 Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 106  Strengths and Limitations of My Research ................................................................... 110 Links to the Historical Overview .................................................................................... 111 Implications for National and Public Security ............................................................... 112 Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 116 Recommendations for Further Research ...................................................................... 117   Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 118  Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 120  Appendices ..................................................................................................................... 141 vii  Appendix A : Letter of Introduction. ............................................................................. 141 Appendix B : Research Study Introduction Letter ......................................................... 142 Appendix C : Participant Consent Form ......................................................................... 143                     viii  List of Tables Table 1: Participant Designations .................................................................................... 82                     ix  List of Figures  Figure 1: Conceptual Map ................................................................................................ 83                     x  Acknowledgements The process of completing my thesis involved contributions from many wonderful individuals.  I gratefully acknowledge the financial and intellectual support I received while I was a Master’s student at the University of British Columbia.  In particular, I am grateful for the generous financial support of the College of Graduate Studies throughout my studies.  I am also especially grateful for the intellectual support of my supervisor, my committee members, and other faculty who granted me the opportunity to succeed in creating a Master of Arts thesis.  A special thanks is owed to Dr. Adam Jones, my supervisor, who gave me a free rein throughout, providing splendid direction at crucial moments.  Likewise, both Dr. Ilya Parkins and Dr. Marie Loughlin provided constructive criticism from different perspectives, saving me from numerous errors.  My gratitude extends also to Dr. Carl Hodge and Dr. James Rochlin whose valuable insights helped shape my work.                xi  For My Mother, Cassandra Jean McCroy                     1  Chapter One: Introduction During its history, the Canadian-US border, known as the International Boundary, has, at different times become a signifier of military sovereignty, a customs and immigration checkpoint, a locus of transborder trade, a domain of bi-national communities, a line between political and legal regimes, and even occasionally, something of a battlefield.1 In a world ordered by national borders and an increasingly global economy, the Canada-U.S. border is both an asset and a liability, a critical line of defence and a transnational conduit, a socially constructed institution, and a referent for collective and individual identity, all of which imply consequences for Canadian border security.  The rise of transnational threats over the last few decades, however, has resulted in efforts to bring the Canadian-U.S. boundary line into closer conformity with state goals that recognize the border as a critical line of defence.2 Canada and other western nations, have, for the last decade, pursued credible border policies that make it more difficult for human smugglers/traffickers and terrorists to cross their borders.  Yet, it is also glaringly clear that Canada’s strategic foresight is constrained by the lack of a shrewd and coherent national security strategy,3 and by the persistent might of its economic-dominated approach to border security, which increases its vulnerability to “national security failures of analysis and prediction.”4 In particular, the Canadian government’s current assessment of the resources necessary for deterring and interdicting transnational threats at the Canadian border                                                           1 The Honorable Stockwell Day, “Canada Border Services Agency 2006-2007 Estimates,” CBSA, 3, http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2006-2007/bsa-asf/bsa-asf-eng.pdf;John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, (Cambridge, 2000): 167;Rachael St. John, Line in the Sand, America in the World Series, (Princeton, 2011): 3-6.  http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i9454.pdf. 2 Donnan Hastings and Thomas M. Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation, and State, (Oxford, 1999): 43.  3 Hugh D. Segal, “The Balance of Freedom: A Fresh Strategic Framework,” in David S. McDonough, ed., Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012): 64; Wesley Wark, “Six Ways for Harper to Reclaim the National Security Agenda,” The Globe and Mail, October. 11, 2013:1. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/six-ways-for-stephen-harper-to-reclaim-the-national-security-agenda/article14828339/; Geoffrey Johnston, “Time for a New Defence Policy,” The Whig.Com,September 6, 2014: 1. http://www.thewhig.com/2014/09/06/time-for-new-defence-policy. 4Bill Gertz, “Al-Qaeda Terrorist Threat is Growing,” The Washington Free Beacon, June 19, 2013: 1. http://freebeacon.com/al-qaeda-terrorist-threat-is-growing/html. 2  is inadequate―though its public rhetoric implies that Canada is doing all that is necessary to counter transnational crime and extremist groups.5  Against that view, this research project argues―on the basis of an old Apache saying―for 'less thunder in the mouth and more lightning in the hand,’ regarding border security in the South Okanagan region of the province of British Columbia. It is also argues that since the implementation of a new bi-national border policy in 2011 there is less ground for confidence in the government's ability to improve the odds of deterring and interdicting threats to our communities and to our national security.6 It makes that argument through a case study that identifies the multiple ways in which Canada’s national and public security may be harmed. Purpose of the Research and Central Question The purpose of this research project is to assess the security vulnerabilities of a specific port of entry operating on Canada’s frontier.  The research examines the site-specific enforcement capabilities of the Osoyoos port of entry, and especially its ability to detect illicit transboundary movement.  In addition, this research evaluates the scope and nature of the problem of illicit transboundary movement in the South Okanagan, and the extent to which this nondominant sector of travel destabilizes border management at the Osoyoos port of entry.  The principal research question guiding this research is: “What are the security vulnerabilities of the Osoyoos port of entry, particularly in relation to human trafficking/smuggling and terrorist incursions?”  Significance of the Research The topic of contemporary border security is significant for a variety of reasons that relate to the post-Cold War emergence of multiple transnational threats.  Notably, the identification of a global nexus between human trafficking/smuggling, transnational crime, and substate terrorism presents unconventional challenges for Western states.  For example, one of                                                           5 The Honorable Vic Toews, “Message From the Minister,” in CBSA 2013-2014 Estimates, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/asfc-cbsa/PS35-4-2012-eng.pdf. 6 Todd Hataley and Christian Leuprecht, “Organized Crime Beyond the Border,” 5 National Security Strategy For Canada Series.  MacDonald-Laurier Institute, April.  2013: 10. http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/2013.04.24-MLI-BorderSecurity_F_vWeb.pdf.   3  the main attributes of these new transnational threats is their higher probability, compared to the low probability of nuclear warfare during the Cold War.7 They are also more pervasive, overwhelming traditional security concerns, which focus mainly on bolstering military capabilities for conventional warfare and protecting national borders against military invasion. Although conventional warfare always remains a possibility, the main focus among Western states currently rests on unconventional warfare.8  In terms of their scope and intensity, the new transnational threats are more diverse, making them more difficult to assess, while their consequences involve not just terrorist attacks but also enslaving millions of individuals, displacing populations, shortening life spans, damaging economies, and impeding foreign investment.9 Finally, these threats do not target states as such, but rather individuals and societies, capitalizing on the same means of transportation and technologies that have facilitated the globalization of trade and finance.  More specifically, their ability to transcend national borders “undermines” the traditional security arrangements of an international system based on sovereign nation-states.10 The potential of these transnational threats to inflict disproportionate damage on Western societies, graphically illustrated by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, therefore requires a reconsideration of how security can be achieved―a reconsideration that has also impacted border security policies.11  The Influence of International Borders International borders and boundaries have been found to influence illicit transboundary movement in two specific ways―positively and negatively.12 In a positive sense, research on                                                           7 Elke Krahmann, New Threats and New Actors in International Security, (New York, 2005): 20.  8 E. Margaret Phillips, “National Will From a Threat Perspective,” Military Review Vol. 90. No. 5 (2010): 33.   9 Krahmann, New Threats and New, 20.  10 Ibid.  11 Heather N. Nicol and Ian Townsend Gault, Holding the Line: Borders in a Global World, (Vancouver, 2004): 2.  12 Susan Bradbury, “Irritable Border Syndrome: The Impact of Security on Travel Across the US-Canada Border,” Canadian-American Public Policy Vol. 79, (2012):3; Dr. Margaret Kalacska, “Technological Integration As A 4  the mobility patterns of crime groups has shown that environmental constraints (e.g., borders) shape their activities to a significant degree13―though the degree to which the border acts as a barrier depends on a variety of factors.14 These include the extent of socio-cultural, economic, and political difference present on either side of the border, as well as the experiences and perceptions of travelers and potential travelers regarding what lies at opposite sides of the border, not to mention seasonal weather and climate conditions.15 The more rigid a country’s border policies and entry controls,16 the more likely the border is seen as a barrier―and therefore something to be avoided.17 In security terms, denying territorial access to clandestine individuals, such as terrorists, migrant smugglers, or drug, arms and human traffickers, assists in decreasing the vulnerability of countries in the Western hemisphere to criminal elements or  religiously inspired acts of violence.18 Deterrence therefore is “a real and important consequence of border-security effects.”19 In terms of negative impacts, irrespective of increased border security measures, research suggests that “some will continue to exploit legitimate means to move personnel and commodities across the border,” while others will attempt to cross borders illegally.20 For                                                                                                                                                                                            Means Of Enhancing Border Security And Reducing Transnational Crime,” in Canadian International Council’s Foreign Policy For Canada’s Tomorrow No.2, (2009): 1-13.  13 Carlo Morselli and Mathilde Turcotte, “Transnational Organized Crime and its Associated Threat,” in Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley and Kim Richard Nossal, eds., Evolving Transnational Threats and Border Security (Centre for International Defence Policy: Queen’s University, 2012):74.  http://www.queensu.ca/cidp/index/Martello37E.pdf; Richard M. Medina and George F. Hepner, The Geography of International Terrorism (New York, 2013): 42.  14 Bradbury, Irritable Border Syndrome, 3.   15 Bradbury, Irritable Border Syndrome, 4; Henry H. Willis, “Preface,” in Henry H. Willis, Joel B. Predd and Paul K. Davis, ed., Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Security Between Ports of Entry. (Santa Monica, 2010): 7, 27. 16 Franck Duvell, “Clandestine Migration in Europe.” Social Science Information, Vol. 47. No. 4 (2008): 482.  17 Bradbury, Irritable Border Syndrome, 4.   18 Jennifer Chacon, “Tensions and Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the Era of Immigration Enforcement,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 158 (2009-2010): 1634. 19 Willis, Measuring the Effectiveness, xii.   20Kalacska, Technological Integration as a Means, 2. 5  instance, high volumes of legitimate traveler and commercial movement across international borders and boundaries can be exploited by smugglers and traffickers.21 In addition, it is not unlikely that terrorists will “continue to enter through [legal ports of entry]” based on the perception that border crossings are not foolproof.22 Few terrorists have criminal records and suicide bombers are generally not found on terrorist blacklists, making it easier for them to enter a country such as Canada as students, temporary workers, or legal visitors.23  Yet, it is also true that in an increasingly hostile international environment, transnational terrorists have greater difficulty in crossing international borders as a result of stringent border controls.24 Consequently, to the extent that some terrorists must be able to freely travel across international borders, elusive human smuggling and human trafficking networks have since become increasingly useful for the needs of clandestine terrorist groups.25 Generally speaking, research reveals that border security matters, but the degree to which it deters illicit transboundary movement is not easily determined.26 Transnational Threats and the Revolution in Border Security In North America, governmental responses to transnational threats have involved the formulation of new national security policies and the consolidation of agencies responsible for issues such as emergency preparedness, immigration policy, and border security.27 Bi-national                                                           21 Benjamin Perrin, “Trafficking in Persons and Transit Countries: A Canada-US Case Study in Global Perspective,” in Linda Sheldon, Krishna Pendakur, and Daniel Hiebert, eds., Working Paper Series, No. 10, (University of British Columbia, 2010): 18. http://mbc.metropolis.net/assets/uploads/files/wp/2010/WP10-05.pdf.  22 Demetrios G. Papdemetriou, “The Global Struggle with Illegal Migration: No End in Sight,” Migration Policy Institute, (2005): 5. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/global-struggle-illegal-migration-no-end-sight.   23 James Bissett, “Security Threats In Immigration and Refugee Policies,” in Alexander Moens and Martin Collacott, eds., Immigration Policy and the Terrorist Threat in Canada and the United States 1st ed. (Fraser Institute, 2008): 89.  24 Svante E. Cornell, “The Interaction of Drug Smuggling, Human Trafficking, and Terrorism,” in Anna Jonsson, ed., Human Trafficking and Human Security (New York, 2009); 61. 25 Cornell, The Interaction of Drug, 61.  26 Henry H. Willis, “Preface,” Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Security Between Ports of Entry, ed. Henry H. Willis, Joel B. Predd and Paul K. Davis (Santa Moncia: RAND, 2010): xii.  6  border security policies were also firmly established after the United States and Canada made a joint commitment in 2001 to prioritizing security along their shared border.  Since 9/11, both the American and Canadian governments have invested substantial time, money and effort to make the US-Canada border “smarter” in order to discourage, pre-empt or constrain illicit transboundary movement, while facilitating legal flows of goods and people.28 Although traditional North American security concerns have always involved the protection of national borders, some of the emerging strategies for defending borders constitute a “revolution in border security.”29 This revolution relies not only on technology as a “force multiplier” to maximize the capabilities of border officials, but also on a risk management strategy of “pushing borders out,”30 using information sharing, pre-screening, and enforcement cooperation to minimize risk to the border.31  Consequently, in the post-9/11 era, attention to the border as an object of analysis for policy makers, interest groups, and academics has intensified32― particularly with regard to state security concerns.33 However, academic research on the ports of entry along the Canada-US border in the Pacific Northwest region of British Columbia sometimes referred to as Cascadia is largely limited to economic analyses regarding the shortcomings of Canadian border policies, while security analyses are less common and often limited to governmental or governmental agency reports.                                                                                                                                                                                              27 David Szabo and Todd M. Walters, “The Canada-U.S. Partnership,” Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, (2005): 3. http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Canada-US-Report.pdf. 28 Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu, “Psychoanalytic Theory and Border Security,” European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2012):185.   29 Rey Koslowski, “Smart Borders, Virtual Borders or No Borders: Homeland Security Choices for the United States and Canada,”(2005): 2.  http://www.albany.edu/~rk289758/documents/Koslowski_Smart_Borders_SMU_law_Review05.pdf.   30 Rey Koslowski, “The Evolution of Border Controls as a Mechanism to Prevent Illegal Immigration,” Migration Policy Institute (2011):3. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/bordercontrols-koslowski.pdf.  31 Government of Canada, “Border Management in Canada,” in Customs and Border Management, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/eu-ue/policies-politiques/border-douanes.aspx?lang=eng; Harold Kennedy, “Border Security,” National Defense, Vol. 91, No. 632 (2006):46.   32 Todd S. Hataley, “Constructing Border Security: An Institutional Analysis of the Canada-United States Border”(PhD diss. Queens University, 2006), 21. ProQuest (NR18517).  33 Franck Duvell, Clandestine Migration in Europe, 484.  7  Most notably, there is currently no research that is geared toward identifying the unique challenges or public and national security vulnerabilities along the South Okanagan border,34 an area nested within the Pacific Northwest region.  The present research project supplements the existing literature on the national security vulnerabilities of the Canada-US border.  More precisely, it sits alongside literature that provides moderate but critical perspectives on Canadian border policies.  For example, on February 4, 2011, Prime Minister Stephen Harper and President Barack Obama undertook a new strategy for a new era of bi-national cooperation called Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness―which is widely accepted as being economically advantageous for Canada.35 However, while perimeter security may boost economic security, it does not necessarily make Canada a safer place.  The main premise of Beyond the Border is layered security, that is, it aims to push the perimeter out by way of pre-clearance for customs, in order to reduce the need for enforcement at existing ports of entry at the Canada-U.S. border.  However, when combined with recent spending cuts in critical frontline areas at the International Boundary, such as intelligence, border service personnel, sniffer dogs,36 and significant American border cuts at ports of entry,37 this shift in strategy may actually strengthen intra-continental organized crime, increase illicit migration, and assist extremist groups.38                                                             34 Susan L. Bradbury and Daniel E. Turbeville, “Are Enhanced Trade and Enhanced Security Mutually Exclusive? The Western Canada-US Borderland in a Post-9/11 World,”  The American Review of Canadian Studies, Vo. 38, No. 3 (2008):317-340; Susan L. Bradbury, “An Assessment of the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Program along the Canada-US Border,” Transport Policy, Vol. 17, No. 6 (2010):367-380;  Susan L. Bradbury, “ The Impact of Security Across the Canada-US Border,” Journal of Transport Geography, Vol. 26, (2013): 139-146.   35Hataley and Leuprecht, Organized Crime Beyond, 10.  36 Joanna Smith, “Federal Budget 2012: More Than a 1,000 Job Cuts at Canada Border Service Agency,” Ottawa Bureau, April. 12, 2012. http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2012/04/12/federal_budget_2012_more_than_1000_job_cuts_at_canada_border_service_agency.html/.  37Mark Kennedy, “Delays at Borders, Airports Likely as Canada Set to be Sideswiped by U.S. ‘Sequester’ Cuts, National Post, March. 1, 2013.  http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/03/01/delays-at-border-airports-likely-as-canada-set-to-be-sideswiped-by-u-s-sequester-cuts/.  38 Hataley and Leuprecht,  Organized Crime Beyond, 12. 8  Moreover, this research project moves beyond existing academic research to throw light on the emerging new dynamics of transnational threats and the associated implications that these “distant conflicts and developments” may have for Canada’s public and national security.39 Troubles at the U.S.-Mexico border, for instance, are now linked to new developments along the South Okanagan border, most notably, the increase in Mexican cartel activity.  Meanwhile, the burgeoning power of extremists groups such as the Khorasan Group, a network of seasoned al-Qaeda operatives,40 and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as ISIL), a Jihadist militant group that has called on Muslims to kill Canadians and others whose country has joined the U.S.-led coalition, such as Great Britain, France, and Germany, to fight the group―particularly, “‘their police, security, and intelligence members’”―clearly demonstrates that Islamic terrorism is not, as American President Barak Obama announced during his 2012 presidential campaign, in “terminal decline.”41 Theoretical Framework Classical Realism This research incorporates a theoretically informed interpretation of security―namely, classical realism.  This state-centric perspective will be supported by two alternative theories:                                                             39 James Sheptycki, “Transnational Organized Crime,” in Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley and Kim Richard Nossal, eds., Evolving Transnational Threats and Border Security (Queen’s University, 2012): 66. http://www.queensu.ca/cidp/index/Martello37E.pdf; Franko Aas. “Analysing a World in Motion,” Theoretical Criminology, Vol. 11. No. 2 (2007): 286.  40 Metro, Syrian Airstrikes Foiled ‘Imminent Attack’ on the West by Second Terror Group,” September. 23, 2014. http://metro.co.uk/.  41 Con Coughlin, “Western Embassy Closures Across the Middle East Show the War Against Al-Qaeda is Far From Over,” The National Post, August. 4, 2013. http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/08/04/western-embassy-closures-across-the-middle-east-show-the-war-against-al-qaeda-is-far-from-over/html; Jim Hoft, “On Rememberance Day November 11, 2013, President Obama Again Reiterated That Al-Qaeda Was On The “Path to Defeat.” GateWay Pundit. http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/.html; United States Embassy, “President Obama’s Remarks on Veteran’s Day,” November. 11, 2013. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/11/20131111286220.html#axzz3PP99rB3h;Patrick Cockburn, “War With Isis: The West is Wrong Again in its Fight Against Terror,” The Independent, January. 4, 2015. http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/war-with-isis-the-west-is-wrong-again-in-its-fight-against-terror-9955853.html; Ottawa Citizen, “OPP on High Alert After ISIL Urges its Members to Attack Canada,” September. 26, 2014.  http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/11/20131111286220.html#axzz2mujZPGPz.  9  conventional constructivism and neo-Gramscianism, which further calibrate the issues for inquiry and questioning.  To begin with, classical realism, a normative theory which reaches as far back as Thucydides―an Athenian political philosopher who wrote about political realism nearly 2,000 years ago―is a theory of International Relations which views the state as “a national political community struggling to survive in a condition of constant anarchy.”42 Classical realism is based on the idea that human nature is flawed, which explains conflictual behavior.43  Accordingly, classical realists believe that risks of war and organized violence remain the most salient problems in human existence.  Most notably, because some states (or non-state entities) may at times rely on military force, “all states must be prepared to do so.”44 This reality forces states to be apprehensive about their security.  Since it is impossible to deemphasize such problems,45 the state cannot be assigned a secondary position in relation to security.  Classical realists thus view the state and its protection as a necessary precondition to the attainment of human security.46  Most importantly, classical realism recognizes that human security can be enhanced or imperiled by state policies.  However, it also recognizes that the actions involved in securing some at the same time render others insecure.  Contra the claim of academics and politicians, security is not unlimited:  security is always contested since someone else’s security is always sacrificed or put at risk.47 As a result, defining security broadly has limitations, since international and national security has a “distinctive agenda.”48    Classical realism also typically looks to political science and history49 for evidence and insights to explain contemporary state-level processes.  The theory also has some valuable                                                           42 Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “Paradigms in Conflict,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 41. No. 3 (2006): 296.   43 Colin Elman, “Realism,” in Paul D. Williams, ed., Security Studies (New York: Routledge, 2008): 17.  44 Ibid., 287.   45 Ibid., 290.   46 Fen Osler Hampson, “Human Security,” in Paul D. Williams, ed., Security Studies (New York: Routledge, 2008): 240.   47 Ibid.  48 Ibid., 122.  10  prescriptive features, such as humility,50 “warning against mistaking one’s preferences for the moral laws of the universe,”51 and prudence. While classical realism emphasizes the concept of national interest, it does not glorify war or conflict, nor does it neglect the attendance of ethics in politics or international relations.  Classical realism does not deny the possibility of moral judgment in politics, but it is wary of moralism―that is, abstract moral discourse that disregards political realities52 making it liable to distortion in judgments.53  This distortion in judgment includes the ways in which ideological certitudes, utopian schemes, and absolutist ethics can jeopardize political order and give way to unbridled uses of power.54 Consequently, maximum value is assigned to successful political action based on prudence: the ability to judge the correctness of a given action from a variety of possibilities on the basis of its likely consequence.55 The relevance of classical realism is apparent not only in its practical wisdom and subtleties of reasoning, but also in its capacity to deal with security dilemmas and related concerns.56  More concisely, realism’s greatest strength lies in the fundamental axiom that reality is the arbiter of international relations.  In other words, war and conflict are inevitable and must be prepared for.  It is appropriate, then, that realism should provide the theoretical foundation for an analytical framework in border security.                                                                                                                                                                                             49 Ole R. Holsti, “Theories of International Relations,” in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 6. http://people.duke.edu/~pfeaver/holsti.pdf.  50 Victor C. Romero, “Christian Realism and Immigration Reform,” Scholarly Works, Paper 19 Penn State Law , http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/fac_works /19. eLibrary, Penn State Law (2010):5;  Karuna Mantena, “Another Realism: The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 106. No. 2 (2012): 455.     51Holsti, Theories of International Relations, 38.    52The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. “ Political Realism in International Relations," by W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, Edward N. Zalta, ed., accessed September 13, 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/realism-intl-relations/.  53Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. rev.ed. (New York, 1978): 4-15.   54 Karuna Mantena, “Another Realism: The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 106. No. 2 (2012): 455.  55 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,  s.v. “ Political Realism in International Relations."   56Holsti, Theories of International Relations, 17.   11  Traditionally, classical realists have viewed state borders as the “tough shell of the state that protects the latter from external aggression.”57 As such, borders are primarily represented as essentially objective and territorially bound phenomena.58 Although virtual (e.g., cyberspace) and inland borders (e.g., airports) are equally important in the contemporary era, and although the importance of physical borders has eroded with respect to military aggression, classical realists still see the border as “a rigid reference line, any crossing of which is strictly regulated.”59 Conventional Constructivism Conventional constructivism, though less an International Relations theory than an approach, expands the purview of classical realism by providing a sociological examination of Canada-US border security, which, in highlighting the importance of culture, deepens the analysis of border security.60 Constructivism is best defined in relation to identity insofar as it “treats identity as an empirical question to be theorized within an historical context.”61  Constructivism, for instance, underscores the way in which states construct their national interests and formulate relevant means to address them.62 This approach therefore emphasizes the meanings that are assigned to material objects, such as borders, rather than the mere existence of the objects themselves.63 A constructivist analysis emphasizes the importance of                                                           57 S.V.Golunov, EU- Russian Border Security: Challenges, (Mis)perceptions, and Responses (New York, 2012): 10.  58 Golunov, Russian Border Security, 15.   59 Ibid., 18.   60Holsti, Theories of International Relations, 18, 20; Didier Bigo, “International Political Sociology,” in Paul D. Williams, ed.,  Security Studies (New York, 2008): 120.    61 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations,” International Security Vol 3, No. 1 (1998): 173.  62 Maysam Behravesh, “Constructivism: An Introduction,” E-International Relations, February 3, 2011. http://www.e-ir.info/2011/02/03/constructivism-an-introduction/. 63 Behravesh,  Constructivism: An Introduction. 12  meaning, but assumes the existence of an a priori reality, which places the approach on a middle-ground between realism and critical theory in security studies.64  The mid-1990s work of Alexander Wendt, in particular, is credited with giving currency to the constructivist approach.65 Wendt maintains that the way international politics is carried out is made, not given, since interests and identities are constructed and sustained by inter-subjective practice.66  Conventional constructivism thus centers on identity, which is considered more fundamental than interests; as such, identities provide the basis for interests in any given situation.67 Ideas of self and the environment tailor interactions and are tailored by interactions.68 In this way, social reality is created.  Most significantly, identities not only arise through interactions with others, but they also essentially determine what kind of security environment will prevail.69 Constructivism, for instance, holds that national identity (and cultural context or related historical experience) assists in determining the content of national interest, and, as a result, the way a particular state will behave in international relations.70  For constructivists, identity is relatively stable ―something to be unearthed or discovered through analysis.71  Nevertheless, there are times when collective identity may overcome self-interested identities (which may lead to a change in identity).  In particular security environments, for instance, powerful states may find that it is within their self-interest to establish cooperative-based institutions.  Conventional constructivism’s main strength is its emphasis on national identity in determining the content of national interest, and, in turn, state behavior.  For this                                                           64 Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality (New York, 2002):10.   65 Maja, Constructivism in International Relations, 11.  66 Ibid., 12.  67 Ibid., 12, 14.   68Ibid., 12.    69 Ibid., 14.   70Matt McDonald, “Constructivism,” in Paul D. Williams, ed., Security Studies (New York: Routledge, 2008): 62.    71McDonald, Constructivism, 62. 13  reason, this approach is relied upon to discuss the salience and durability of American and Canadian border trends throughout their respective histories.72 Conventional constructivists generally view state borders as a phenomenon arising out of the social construction of territory.  Wendt, for instance, defines state borders as “historically contingent phenomena that vary in breadth, depth, and degree of completion.”73 In other words, the construction of state borders is an ongoing process.74 Wendt also maintained that borders are not natural but that they were necessary “if territory was to be anything other than land.”75 Neo-Gramscianism Neo-Gramscian theory further expands the purview of classical realism by offering insight into how external factors, such as the hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism, have influenced border management practices and the dynamics of illicit transboundary movement.76 Neo-Gramscianism is based on the interconnection among institutions, ideas, and capabilities in relation to state-building and state processes. It is also firmly grounded in critical security theory,77 which sets itself apart “‘from the prevailing order and asks how that order came about.’”78 Founded on the work of Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci, neo-Gramscian theory, as developed by Robert Cox, has had a considerable impact upon the study of International Relations since the 1980s.79 Unlike classical realism, which reduces hegemony                                                           72 Salter and Mutlu, Psychoanalytic Theory and Border, 185.  73 Nick Vaughn-Williams, Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power (Edinburgh, 2009): 46.    74 Vaughn-Williams, Border Politic: The Limits, 46.  75 Ibid.  76 Pinar Bilgin, “Critical Theory,” in Paul D. Williams, ed., Security Studies (New York, 2008): 95-97.    77 Pinar Bilgin, Critical Theory, 92.   78 Cox, Gramsci, Hegemony and International, 164  79 Randall G. Germain and Michael Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 24 (1998): 3.  14  to economic and military capabilities, neo-Gramscianism broadens the concept, providing rich insights into the social bases of hegemony.80  In particular, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is perhaps the most articulate interpretation of how hegemony is created.  For Gramsci, unity (in relation to the historical bloc) between the economic base and the superstructure within a state gives rise to hegemony. In other words, when there is unity between the relations of production (class) and mode of production on the one hand, and ideology, culture, and institutions on the other. This occurs when the national hegemonic class is able to harmonize its interests “with those of subordinate classes and incorporates these other interests into an ideology expressed in universal terms.”81  Consent, therefore, through concessions, is achieved without either resorting to coercion, or undermining the leadership or the essential interests of the hegemonic class.  Significantly, Gramsci believed it was impossible for an authoritarian regime to endure only through coercion; in order to maintain state power and stability over the long term, consent of society is necessary.82  For example, “[s]tate=political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion.”83 For Gramsci, consent, rather than coercion (which is always latent, but is applicable only to deviants), was the better route to follow when seeking to transform state structures.84 Consequently, Gramsci believed in working within existing state and bourgeois institutions to effect change.85 Hegemony in the Gramscian sense, then, is more than just economic and military dominance; it also involves ideation, institutions, politics, and capabilities.                                                           80 Germain and Kenny, Engaging Gramsci: International Relations, 6.   81 Robert W. Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,” Journal of International Studies Vol. 12. No. 2 (1983): 168.   82Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, in Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, eds., and trans. (New York: International Publishers, 1971): 161-163.  83Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 263.  84Cox, Gramsci, Hegemony and International, 164.  85Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 132, 243. 15  Cox extrapolates Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to the international level, showing how internal consent in the United States spread beyond its borders after World War II to achieve external consent in the international realm, allowing the country to found and protect a new world order based on neo-liberal capitalism.86 More precisely, the American power to shape ideas and establish economic relations enabled neo-liberalism to achieve dominance within the global economy87―though the adoption of such policies within national economies has been tempered by culture.88 For example, as Cox points out, “[i]international institutions and rules [to control state behavior] are generally initiated by the state which establishes hegemony,” by gaining the consent of other less powerful states, including some of the subaltern states in the Global south who may seek to emulate the Global north.89 However, imposed neo-liberal economic re-structuring in the Global south throughout the 1980s exacerbated inequity and class disparities within these nations ‒a replication of the tremendous increase in inequity between the Global north and the Global south. Cox further notes that the lack of consent within subaltern states, mostly in the Global south, results in a reliance on coercion (military dictatorships).90 As such, for neo-Gramscians, the degree to which hegemony has been achieved is measured by the existence or absence of social conflict, and by the extent to which the body politic and social order are legitimized.91   Neo-Gramscianism makes a worthy contribution to extent that it underlines the importance of addressing the pernicious effects of neo-liberal capitalism, such as inequalities, and responding to the needs of the Global south.  Moreover, rather than wallowing in inaction, neo-Gramscianism moves beyond internal resistance and actively pursues change based on                                                            86 Ibid., 170,171.    87 Germain and Kenny, Engaging Gramsci: International, 11, 19; Bilgin, Critical Theory, 97.   88 Adam David Morton, Unraveling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy (London, 2007): 138.  89 Cox, Gramsci, Hegemony and International, 172.   90Ibid., 167.    91 Germain and Kenny, Engaging Gramsci: International Relations, 17. 16  Gramsci’s concept of the ‘war of position’―that is, a form of counter-hegemonic struggle, which is led by “intellectuals,” over ideas, values, morality, and attitudes to establish a new hegemony.92 Gramsci believed counter-hegemonic forces had the ability to “progressively modify the pre-existing composition of forces, and hence become the matrix of new changes.”93  Within the context of border security, this theory is particularly useful in assessing the demerits of neo-liberal policies.  Neo-Gramscian critical notions of state borders, though not explicitly stated, relate to how they are used by the ‘integral’ state to achieve hegemonic goals such as the liberty of markets, (and perhaps, even assist in carrying out hegemonic responsibilities like counter-crime or counter-terrorism).  However, as Neo-Gramscian perspectives point out, achieving hegemonic goals “is not a process open to all interests equally” since some interests, policy forms, and policy issues are privileged over others (and are more likely to be institutionalized).94 As states, for instance, respond to the phenomenon of globalization and the exigencies of free-trade, they attempt to create policies that will allow this process to carry on (e.g., bi-national border security agreements) ―without compromising the dominance of political elites.  Within this context, political elites adopt a more “coercive-hegemonic role” in relation to regulatory policies;95 as such, neo-liberalizing political elites and border management are strongly linked. The Advantages of Combining Theories  There are clear benefits that come from using classical realism, conventional constructivism, and neo-Gramscianism, as a theoretical triumvirate.  For one, the particular weakness of one theory is compensated for by the particular strength of another.96 For                                                            92  Gramsci, Selections from the Prison, 132, 243.  93 Ibid., 109.  94 Harriet Bulkeley, “Beyond State/Non-State Divides,” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 18, No. 4 (2012): 749.  95 Bob Jessop, “Regulation and Politics; The Integral Economy and the Integral State,” Bob Jessop (blog), November 13, 2013.  http://bobjessop.org/2013/11/13/regulation-and-politics-the-integral-economy-and-the-integral-state/.  17  instance, neo-Gramscianism focuses on political economy, or more specifically, how policies reflect political-economic interaction and how, in turn, political and economic institutions are affected, while classical realism, to its own detriment, separates the political sphere from the economic sphere― focusing instead on political or military affairs.  Further still, conventional constructivism focuses on the social construction of reality, whereas classical realism pays much less attention to social contexts. Consequently, different theories identify different problems or issues.  Secondly, relying on a theoretical triumvirate helps to avoid the risk of drawing “atheoretical” conclusions, choosing only data that aligns with theoretical biases.97 Thirdly, the principal strength of a theoretical triumvirate is “its ability to look deeper and more broadly at findings.”98 Relying on only one theory, for instance, can decrease the number of alternative explanations for phenomenon.99 However, there are risks involved in relying on divergent theories if they are not well-defined, which can result in unproductive and confusing analysis.100  Definitions  Definitions of key terms are as follows:  Borders are defined as “a judicial line that both separates and joins states, and agents and institutions of the state, which demarcate and sustain the boundary.”101 Borders usually result in built and observable infrastructure.102 Terrorism is defined as “’the threat of violence and the use of fear to coerce, persuade, and gain public attention.’”103 International law distinguishes between human smuggling and human trafficking.  Human smuggling, defined as “the facilitation, transportation, attempted                                                                                                                                                                                            96 University of Strathclyde, “Triangulation,” accessed February 8, 2015, http://www.strath.ac.uk/aer/materials/2designstrategiesineducationalresearch/unit5/triangulation/.  97 Ibid.  98 UNAIDS, “An Introduction to Triangulation,” (Geneva, Switzerland: UNAIDS, 2010):  23, http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/sub_landing/files/10_4-Intro-to-triangulation-MEF.pdf. 99 Ibid.  100 Ibid., 24. 101 Hataley, Constructing Border Security, 33.   102 Ibid.   103 Paul Rogers, “Terrorism,” in Paul D. Williams,ed., Security Studies, (New York, 2008), 173. 18  transportation or illegal entry of a person(s) across an international border….either clandestinely or through deception,”104 becomes the criminal offense of human trafficking if the elements of force, coercion, or exploitation are present.105 More clearly, human smuggling is voluntary illicit migration that always involves crossing international borders, making it a crime against a nation’s sovereignty, whereas human trafficking is involuntary illicit migration that does not always involve crossing international borders, making it predominantly a crime against the victim.106 National Security is defined as “a matter of guarding national values and interests from internal and external dangers [namely, transnational security threats].”107 Parameters of the Research  The primary geographic focus of this research is the South Okanagan in British Columbia and particularly the Osoyoos port of entry.   The South Okanagan is a part of British Columbia’s Okanagan Valley and is located in the southern interior of the province. It is bordered by the community of Penticton to the North and the US-Canada border to the South.  The area also contains the Osoyoos Indian Band Reserve, which runs along the eastern side of the valley between Oliver and Osoyoos.108                                                                104 US Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Distinctions Between Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking 2006,” Bureau for Diplomatic Security. http://www.state.gov/m/ds/hstcenter/90434.htm. 105Marti Lehti and Kauko Aromaa, “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation,” Crime and Justice, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2006):177. 106 Lehti and Aromaa, Trafficking for Sexual, 177.   107 Don MacNamara, “Canada’s National and International Security Interests,” in David S. McDonough, ed., Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012): 46. 108 Homelessness Okanagan, “The South Okanagan Context,” South Okanagan Homelessness Project 2005,  http://homelessnessokanagan.tripod.com/id12.html. 19  Chapter Two: Historical Overview The History of Modern Border Security within Western Civilization In the interest of a leavening perspective, a substantive descriptive history of modern border security (and associated security technologies) is presented to reinforce the idea that border security is meaningful no matter what kind of political arrangement is in place―whether a Greek polis, a warrior tribe, a colonizing empire, or a sovereign state.109 In security terms, all sovereignties exist in a competitive environment, which drives them to mitigate threats, reduce risks, and exploit or create opportunities to attain and defend what they view as their interest.110  Historically, sovereignties that were unable to defend themselves or secure powerful patrons or strong allies were destroyed.111  Ancient Societies and Borders (14th c. B.C.-15th c. A.D) Mobility in Ancient Societies   Since antiquity there have been borders ―whether lines, zones, strips of wet land, or bands of rugged headlands—which separate, demarcate, and otherwise intervene in migrations and passages.112 In accordance with shifting security environments and varying strategic responses, these “territorial artifacts”113 were used by governments in the Ancient Near East (e.g., Assyria, Babylonia, Persia, Greece, and Rome), the Indian sub-continent, Europe, China,                                                           109 Michael Warner, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence (Washington, 2014): 2; Cornelius Zwierlein, “Security Politics and Conspiracy Theories in the Emerging European State System (15th/16th c.),” Historical Social Research, Vol. 38. No. 1(2013):  68.  110 Warner, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence, 2.   111 Ibid.  112 Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, “Examining the ‘Beyond the Border’ Dialogue within the Contexts of International Relations and Schengen,”  in Border Policy Research Institute, Seminar Proceedings: Perimeter Security and Beyond the Border Dialogue: Perspectives from the PNW-Western Canada Region (Bellingham: Western Washington University, July 2011): 9.   113 Vaughan-Williams, Border Politics: The Limits, 134; Tony Payan, “Theory Building in Border Studies: The View From North America,” Eurasia Border Review, Vol.5. No.1 (2013): 3.   20  and the Americas, to assist or restrict the flow of people and goods.114  In ancient Greece, for instance, unfettered migration was viewed as one of four freedoms separating liberty from slavery―the dominant form of labor.115  Indeed, Athenian law permitted (presumably only wealthy) free men to travel where they pleased and to take their goods with them; as such, in the classical period (500-336 c. B.C.), many affluent Greek citizens enjoyed unfettered mobility.116 As the Mediterranean became a melting pot, however, as a result of migration and the intermixing of the many nations there,117 human mobility came to be seen as a problem in need of regulation.118  Plato, for one, proposed in his Laws certain measures to limit the movement of citizens and to control the entry of foreigners.119 Other governments, meanwhile, sought to encourage mobility in order to build up their military capabilities.  In ancient Rome, for instance, King Servius Tullius (6th c. B.C.) promoted immigration (and its associated benefits) to create a large pool of male citizens who were liable for military service.120  Intelligence-Gathering and Espionage in Ancient Greece and Rome Intelligence-gathering and espionage, which occurred for a variety of military, economic, and political reasons,121 also figured prominently in ancient polities.  In classical Rome, bogus refugees were used by the Romans to subvert their enemies from within enemy                                                           114 New Internationalist (NI), “Simply―The History of Border,” NI, No. 223 (September 1, 1991): 1.   115 A.H.L. Heeren,  Ancient Greece, translated by George Bancroft (London, 1866): 82, 83, 126.  116 Jane McAdam, “An Intellectual History Of Freedom Of Movement in International Law: The Right To Leave As A Personal Liberty,” Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 12 (2011): 6; J.W. Roberts, City of Sokrates: An Introduction to Classical Athens, (New York, 1998): 79.    117 McAdam, An Intellectual History, 6.   118 Claudia Moatti, “Translation, Migration, and Communication,” Classical Antiquity, Vol. 25. No.1 (2006): 122.   119 Moatti, Translation, Migration, and Communication, 121, 122.   120 William E. Dustan, Ancient Rome (Lanham, 2010): 25.  121 Harvey Klehr, “Reflections On Espionage,” Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation, Vol. 21. No. 1 (2004): 144-145; Victoria Erhart and Bruce Vandervort, “Information Gathering in Classical Greece,” Book Review, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 65. No. 2 (2001): 476; Mary Rose Sheldon, Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome, (New York, 2004): 70. 21  territory;122verification of identity was thus a common practice in ancient societies.  Governments and rulers used a variety of means, such as insignia, oaths, written documents, objects, or signatures,123 to verify individual identities―and there is much written evidence in ancient literature that false (or erroneous) identities were prevalent in both Greece and Rome.124 Predictably, given the treacherous nature of espionage and its ability to imperil the well-being of ancient realms or city-states,125 governments relied upon extremely punitive counterespionage measures.126  Captured spies could expect to be shown no mercy by their captors.127 In the case of classical Greece, which lacked both a systematic intelligence and policing system,128 operating instead on an ad hoc basis,129 captured spies were summarily tortured and executed.130 Ancient sources show that governments and rulers who failed to counter espionage activities by maintaining consistent counterintelligence systems, though primitive by modern standards, suffered spectacular setbacks.131 Significantly, commerce and civilization flourished when governments and rulers, such as those in classical Rome, maintained consistent intelligence and counterintelligence services and high border standards.132                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    122 Sheldon, Intelligence Activities in Ancient, 35.   123 Moatti, Translation, Migration, and Communication, 117, 119.  124 Ibid., 9.   125 Klehr, Reflections On Espionage, 142.   126 Sheldon, Intelligence Activities in Ancient, 20, 56, 73.  127 J.A. Richmond, “Spies in Ancient Greece,” Greece and Rome, Second Series, Vol. 45. No. 1 (1998): 2, 7. 1-18.  128 Virginia J. Hunter, Policing Athens: Social Control in the Attic Lawsuits, 420-320 B.C. (Princeton, 1993): 1-5.   129 Harry Sidebottom, “Information gathering in Classical Greece by F.S. Russel,” The Classical Review, New Series, Vol. 51. No. 2 (2001): 431.   130 Richmond, Spies in Ancient Greece, 2.  131 Sheldon, Intelligence Activities in Ancient, xi, xii, 3, 7.   132 Ibid., 278, 279, 284.  22  Border Control in Ancient Rome Foreshadowing later developments in the Modern era, the introduction of large and complex security systems under the Christian Roman Empire in the late classical era resulted in regulated mobilities, 133 firm boundaries, and governmental attempts to establish uniform administrative and taxation systems.134  During this time, sovereignty was invested in the Emperor, who exercised unrivaled power over the territories of the Empire.135 As such, although Roman borders signified a line between those who had been conquered and those who had withstood invasion,136 Roman security was closely connected with the idea of securing a specific space (i.e., sovereign territories).137Claudius (41-54 c. A.D.), for instance, in the interest of state security, required most Roman citizens to maintain residence in their place of origin,138 while Emperor Constantine (309-337 c. A.D.), in the interests of the Roman Empire’s economy, forbade land-bound peasants or serfs (who worked on vast estates in the countryside) to leave their work place.  Firm political boundaries, which marked the end of Roman sovereignty and the beginning of another political community, also resulted in sharp distinctions between those living within imperial borders and those without.139 Germanic warrior tribes, for instance, who themselves relied upon borders―albeit natural borders, such                                                           133 Ibid.  134 New Internationalist, Simply-The History of, 1; Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore, States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries, (Cambridge, 2003): 6; Moatti, Translation, Migration, and Communication, 124.  135 Science Encyclopedia, s.v. “Soveriegnty: Early Concepts,” accessed September 15, 2013, http://science.jrank.org/pages/11316/Sovereignty-Early-Concepts.html.  136 Maria Baramova, “Border Theories in Early Modern Europe,” European History Online (EGO), Institute of European History (IEG) Mainz 2010-12-03. URL:http://www.ieg-ego.eu/baramovam-2010-en URN: urn:nbn:de:0159-2010092137.   137 Zwierlein, Security Politics and Conspiracy, 68.  138 Sheldon, Intelligence Activities in Ancient, 156.  139 Guy Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 376-568 (Cambridge, 2008): 53; Mary Taliaferro Boatwright, Daniel J. Gargola, and Richard J.A. Talbert, The Romans: From Village To Empire (Oxford, 2004): 436, 438; Moatti, Translation, Migration, and Communication, 123-124.  23  as forests, in areas beyond the Roman border―were a constant threat to the Empire.140   Such threats generated sophisticated border controls.  This is demonstrated by the enormous human and material resources that were devoted toward defining and monitoring the Empire’s territorial limits, which covered much of Europe, Asia Minor, North Africa, and parts of Mesopotamia and the Middle East.  The Empire also relied on ‘passports,’ most often documents soliciting safe passage for border crossers.141 The supervision of merchant caravans crossing the frontier, the collection of import and export duties, control of maritime traffic, and the interdiction of smugglers and the impounding of their contraband by Roman border guards provide commonplace examples of the kinds of taxation and security duties that were carried out by those assigned to imperial frontiers.142 Although the extent of Roman border control depended on people, on time period, and on political circumstances,143 the significance and regularity of imperial control and the control of immigration and emigration distinguishes the Roman Empire from earlier governments and rulers.  So, too, does its reliance on written documents (and the control of public documents), internal surveillance of its citizenry,144 and its longstanding vigilance in preventing falsification of official documents through the introduction of technical changes in the first century A.D.145  Medieval Societies and Borders (5th c. A.D.-14th c. A.D.) The Legacy of Rome and the Retreat of Border Controls in Western Europe Following the dismantling of the Roman Empire throughout the fourth and fifth centuries, political boundaries gave way to medieval kingdoms and successive Empires, and the demarcation of Christian and Islamic spheres. To the extent that they maintained the elaborate                                                           140 F. Roy Willis and Robert A. Guisepi, “The Germanic Tribes, and Huns,” History World International, http://history-world.org/germanic_tribes.htm. 141 New International,  Simply-The History, 1.   142 Sheldon,  Intelligence Activities in Ancient, 154, 210, 262.  143 Moatti, Translation, Migration, and Communication, 123, 124.   144 Sheldon,  Intelligence Activities in Ancient, 151.  145 Moatti, Translation, Migration, and Communication, 126.  24  security apparatuses inherited from the Romans, medieval polities wielded considerable influence, and grew wealthy from trade, efficient taxation, and a thriving culture.  In the Byzantine Empire, for instance, which emerged out of the Eastern Roman Empire, and was positioned on the border between Christendom and Islam, groups of soldiers known as akritai, were the successors of the limitanei of the Old Roman Empire.146 Operating under centralized imperial authority, the akritai were responsible for monitoring trouble in the borderlands, for preventing the infiltration of secret agents and enemy spies, and for collecting intelligence of all kinds regarding the enemy and relaying this information to the capital.147 The Byzantine Empire also carried on the Roman customs system, which involved marking imported goods with seals bearing the names of the local custom officers (e.g., commerciarii) and/or the district or location “as proof that the appropriate customs procedures had been followed and the taxes collected.”148 Meanwhile, merchants, long-distance ambassadors and other high-ranking visitors had to obtain either written permission for travel or letters of introduction.149   By contrast, inferior security systems undermined the peace and prosperity of the medieval kingdoms that replaced the Western Roman Empire in Europe―despite overarching political aims of establishing the “Peace of God” (Pax Dei).150   Although, for instance, Germanic medieval kingdoms inherited Roman law, its governmental organization, and its agricultural practices,151 the disintegration of a centralized imperial power led to the total collapse of the Roman border system (i.e., limes).152 Sovereignty, in this era, was invested in the person of the                                                            146 Francis Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services (New Brunswick, 1974): 140.  147 Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services, 140.  148 Neil Middleton, “Early Medieval Port Customs, Tolls, and Controls on Foreign Trade,” Early Medieval Europe, Vol. 13. No. 4 (2005): 318.  313-358.  149 Middleton, Early Medieval Port, 320.  150 Richard Landes, “Peace of God: Pax Dei,” Center for Millennial Studies. http://www.mille.org/people/rlpages/paxdei.html; Zwierlein, Security Politics and Conspiracy 68.  151 Herwig Wolfram, “History of the Goths,” trans. Thomas J. Dunlap (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988):  55; Wolf Liebeschutz, “Cities, Taxes, and the Accommodation of the Barbarians,” in Thomas Noble, ed., From Roman Provinces to Medieval Kingdoms (New York: Routledge, 2005): 309-311.   25  monarch and referred to the monarchy’s divine authority to rule over his or her subjects regardless of the territorial borders of the kingdom153 ―though under these conditions, sovereignty was blunted by numerous lordlings with multiple and overlapping jurisdictions.154  Not surprisingly, post-Roman European borders during the early medieval period can be characterized as vulnerable and volatile due to the shifting political fortunes of “a plurality of Christian kingdoms with ethnic appellations.”155 Political instability in post-Roman Europe led to diminished economic activity, widespread insecurity, restricted mobility,156 low standards of border security, and a relative decline in intelligence gathering.157 Intelligence gathering, in particular, was shunned by Christian Europe as an unworthy pursuit reserved for liars who “skulked in the shadows to betray their betters.”158  Christian Europe, however, did not abandon the Roman policing and customs systems.  Medieval evidence shows that, like the Romans, preserving law and order, regulating the activities of local and foreign merchants by way of collecting tolls (on bridges, roads, or ports), and obtaining privileged access to imported goods were primary concerns of medieval rulers.159 Trade, for instance, was limited to public markets with the intent of ensuring both the public                                                                                                                                                                                            152 Thomas W. Barker, “Origins of Intelligence Services by Francis Dvornik,” Book Review, History of Education Quarterly. Vol. 16, No. 1 (1976): 127.  153 Gabriel Popescu, Bordering and Ordering the Twenty-First Century: Understanding Borders (Lanham, 2012): 14.  154 Science Encyclopedia, Sovereigntly: Early Concepts. 155 Catherine McKenna, “Inventing Wales,” in Walter Pohl, Clemens Gantner, Richard E. Payne, eds., Visions of Community in the Post-Roman World: The West, Byzantium, and the Islamic World, 300-1100 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012): 137, 148; Walter Pohl, “Ethnicity, Religion and Empire,” in Walter Pohl, Clemens Gantner, Richard E. Payne, eds., Visions of Community in the Post-Roman World: The West, Byzantium, and the Islamic World, 300-1100 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012): 3.   156 Zwierlein, Security Politics and Conspiracy, 68; Middleton, Early Medieval Port Customs, 320; Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 21.    157 Joshua Woods, “Medieval Security in the Modern State,” Space and Polity, Vol. 14. No. 3 (2010): 251-269; Gianluca Pastori, “Espionage and Intelligence Agencies,” in Peter N. Stearns, ed., Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008):1.   158 Michael Warner, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2014):15.   159 Middleton, Early Medieval Port, 315. 26  witnessing of sales as well as tax collection.160 Charlemagne (768-814 c. A.D.), for one, the founder of the Carolingian Empire, a Christian, Roman, and Germanic kingdom, placed restrictions on the sale and smuggling of arms and coats of chain mail across its eastern borders.161 Foreign trade was also confined by Charlemagne’s royal decree to specific market towns (or sea ports) at fixed times―merchants who did not abide by these regulations could expect to have their goods confiscated.162 Demands for Greater Security in Western Europe In partial response to higher demands of security, Medieval European kingdoms (often with the assistance of the Catholic Church), became more established in the late middle ages (1000-1300 c. A.D.) Royal administrative capacities increased resulting in the decline of serfdom and feudalism, while cities were revitalized, trade flourished, intelligence gathering rose and state security improved―reducing vulnerability against external threats of all kinds.163 Nevertheless, border systems in frontier areas remained feudal and jurisdictional.164  Private entities, for instance, such as noble landlords, controlled the movement of indentured servants or serfs attached to their rural manors165 as well as other travelers who sought passage through their domains.  Domestic travelers were also often prohibited from leaving medieval kingdoms without the “‘king’s license.’”166 Custom agents, therefore, were more likely to be posted at the gates of cities rather than “along vaguely defined [geographical] borders”167―though they                                                            161 Middleton, Early Medieval Port, 320.   162 Ibid.    163 Barbara A. Hanawalt, The Middle Ages (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998): 71; Pastori, Espionage and Intelligence Agencies, 1; "Feudalism and Serfdom,” Essential Humanities, accessed June 19, 2014. http://www.essential-humanities.net/history-supplementary/feudalism-serfdom/.  164 Edward Muir, “Governments and Bureaucracies,” in Guido Ruggiero, ed., A Companion To The Worlds Of The Renaissance (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002, 2007): 112. 104-123.  165 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport,  8  166 Philip Schaff, “History of the Christian Church, Volume V: The Middle Ages .A.D.1049-1294,” Christian Classics Ethereal Library, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/hcc5.ii.vi.viii.html.  27  played a crucial role in thwarting dangerous economic threats such as animal, plant, and human disease.168  Medieval French city charters, for instance, required all animals crossing city borders to be led on foot to public butcheries or the butcher in order to ascertain the health of the animal before it was slaughtered for meat.169 Similarly, in Florence, Italy, clean-health documents for ships (e.g., undocumented ships were quarantined for 31 days) and individual health passports (e.g., for individuals planning to travel from one town to another) were implemented during the Black Death plague in 1348 as part of the Florentine Board of Health’s quarantine policy.170    Although this era was marked by periods of effective governance followed by periods of less effective governance, which led to overlapping and competing sources of authority in relation to frontiers,171 the capacity to detain people, ships, and goods from elsewhere increased governmental authority over health, commerce, and internal and transboundary mobility.172  The lack of an extensive administrative infrastructure, however, prevented city-states, empires, and other European sovereignties from regulating transboundary movement in “a pervasive and systematic fashion.”173   Renaissance Societies and Borders (15th c. A.D.-17th c. A.D.)  Changing Course:  The Development of Large and Complex Security Systems  The development of strongly centralized European states in the early Renaissance period, following the transition from feudalism to capitalism, not only inaugurated a dramatic change in conceptions of “external” and “internal” territory, it also prompted governments to                                                                                                                                                                                            167 Muir, A Companion To The Worlds, 112. 168 Alan Smart and Josephine Smart, “Biosecurity and Quarantine,” in Thomas M. Wilson, ed., A Companion to Border Studies (New York: Wiley Blackwell, 2012): 356, 357.   169 Smart and Smart, Biosecurity and Quarantine, 356.  170 Ibid., 357.  171 Buchanan and Moore, States, Nations, and Borders, 8.  172 Smart and Smart, Biosecurity and Quarantine, 357.  173 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 7, 8.  28  emphasize the national over the local.174  Local markets, as one illustration, were woven together to create a national economy.175  These developments resulted in powerful governments and rulers176 and official promulgations of nationalism and military sovereignty over clearly defined geographical borders.177  Although the process occurred unevenly throughout Western Europe, the patterns were generally the same as rulers began clearing away some of the “‘medieval underbrush’ that stood between them and the nation-state.”178  With the creation of a new social order based on Roman law,179 wage labour180  and the fostering of national markets,181 people, as well as natural resources, were now regarded as wealth; they were seen as a valuable workforce to be kept inside sovereign borders.  Accordingly, governments and rulers began to promote immigration, extending citizenship and tax breaks, among other benefits, to newcomers,182 which resulted in large-scale migrations.  Because the mercantilist policies pursued by Renaissance states encompassed the general notion that population was analogous to military strength and wealth, rulers had a strong interest in identifying and regulating the movement of their subjects.183 This they sought to do with myriad restrictions on movement that often involved documents as the means of their enforcement.184 Such processes involved the loosening of governmental controls on internal                                                           174 Ibid., 20.  175 Ibid..   176 Stefano De Luca, “The Cartographic Reasoning in the Arctic: Modern Territorial Representations of the State in the Arctic. Strategies of Norway, Russia, and Finland” (master’s thesis, University of Tampere, 2013, 33, https://tampub.uta.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/85063/gradu07096.pdf?sequence=1. 177 Jocelyn Hunt, Renaissance, (New York, 1999):  33, 34.  178 Hunt, Renaissance, 42; Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 17.   179 De Luca, The Cartographic Reasoning, 33.   180 New International, Simply, The History of Borders, 2.   181 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 8.   182 New International, Simply, The History of Borders, 2.   183 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 18.   184 Ibid. 29  movement among local jurisdictions, which subsided in favor of restrictions that concerned national boundaries.185  Other processes that figured prominently in the spatial ordering of national boundaries and the “‘mastery of territory’” were a marked increase in geographic knowledge, the invention of the printing press, and the development of cartography.  Maps, for example, played a leading role in determining political space with clear borders, which allowed fragmented medieval kingdoms to transform themselves into the “‘first prototypes’” of modern states.186 During this age of exploration, which saw the discovery of new continents, maps were also fundamental in developing the concept of sovereignty of the state and in enabling state activities such as resource extraction, militarization, and empire-building.187  The Development of Elaborate Surveillance Techniques and Documentary Controls  The revival of intelligence gathering during the early Renaissance period also resulted in the introduction of enhanced documentary controls of movement, rigorous border control, and extensive networks of spies and agents in many European countries, particularly during times of war.  Throughout the Hundred Years’ War, for example, both France and England maintained large networks of agents and spies in the occupied territories.188 Despite the intensified surveillance of foreign enemies and strangers, however, intelligence-gathering, as in ancient Greece, remained an often ad hoc private enterprise.189  Intelligence agents were mainly nonprofessional figures, such as merchants, travelers, or diplomats, while documentary controls on transboundary movement were not yet enduring enough to identify and respond to                                                           185 Ibid., 9.   186 De Luca, The Cartographic Reasoning, I, 27, 53.  187 James Walsh, “Geospatial Technologies and Border Activism,” Environment and Planning: Society and Space, Vol. 31 (2013): 970.    188 Pastori, Espionage and Intelligence Agencies, 1.   189 Jonathan Dewald, Espionage, Europe 1450-1789: Encyclopedia of the Early Modern World. Volume 2 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2004): 324; Les Johnston, The Rebirth of Private Policing (New York: Routledge, 1992): 8. 30  unauthorized entries on a systematic basis.190 More progressively, in response to the rise of liberal notions regarding human rights, older habits of “‘writing on the body’” were cast aside in favor of new biometric identification practices.  Scarification, branding, or tattooing, for instance, as well as enforced dress codes, were gradually replaced by less invasive means involving anthropometric measurements (e.g., weight and height) and descriptive indicators (e.g., hair and eye color).191 Paralleling this process was the rise of a professional class, especially in Renaissance England, of cryptanalysts and cryptographers―expert in breaking and repairing seals without detection, deciphering letters, and creating false handwriting.192 The somewhat inchoate character of Renaissance states, however, forestalled the development and national institutionalization of intelligence gathering, identity cards, and border security.   The Assertion of National Identities, Sovereign Borders, and Territorial Policing Meanwhile, the ideology of nationalism was spreading throughout European societies, a process which involved the coalescence of a vast range of cultural groups and classes on the basis of loyalty to one’s own country.193 Accordingly, this era is marked by the gradual transfer of sovereignty from the monarchy to the territory of the state, which revived Roman notions of securing a specific space.194 Territorial borders not only came to signify the territorial power of the state, but also determined an individual’s political status.  Under these circumstances, borders represented the end of one state’s social protection policies, legal and taxation systems, and police jurisdiction, and the beginning of another state’s policies.195  Notably, however, no Renaissance government had the bureaucratic or police power to “force consistent compliance with its decrees and decisions.”196 Many unwanted travelers, for                                                           190 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 7, 13.   191 Ibid., 17.   192 Pastori, Espionage and Intelligence Agencies, 1.  193 New International, Simply―The History of,  2.   194 Popescu, Bordering and Ordering, 14;  Zwierlein, Security Politics and Conspiracy, 68.  195 Popescu, Bordering and Ordering, 15.    31  instance, were able to slip across borders and remain undetected with the assistance of others.197  Still, from the sixteenth century onward, as a result of internal consolidation (or nationalization) of social relations,198 Western European governments were able to make extensive use of territorial policing to “fight perceived enemies from within and without”199―which increased law and order to a significant degree.  By the 1700s, national passports, often consisting of a single piece of paper, became a vital means of determining who could come and go, and who could not.200  Modern Societies and Borders (17th c. A.D-20th c. A.D.) Western Colonial Border Control and Epidemics In the colonial era, which involved European conquest and control of other people’s lands and goods in Africa, Asia, and the Americas,201 western imperial governments were more concerned about the transboundary movement of goods rather than people. In time, however, human mobility came to be seen as a problem in need of regulation. 202  Increased transboundary movement, for instance, not only assisted in the spread of infectious and communicable diseases, but they also altered disease ecologies.203   Colonial medicine therefore articulated a “‘spatial conception of disease;’” 204 by the eighteenth century, public health                                                                                                                                                                                            196 Muir, Governments and Bureaucracies, 110.   197 Roger Boase, “The Muslim Expulsion From Spain,” History Today, Vol. 52. No. 4 (2002): 21.  198 Walsh, Geospatial Technologies and Border, 970.    199 Cyrille Fijnaut and Gary T. Marx, “Introduction,” in Cyrille Fijnaut and Gary T. Marx, eds., Undercover: Police Surveillance in Comparative Perspective (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1995): 4.   200 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 13, 53.   201 Ania Loomba, Colonialism-Postcolonialism (New York: Routledge, 1998): 2, 21; Moatti, Translation, Migration, and Communication,122.  202 New International, Simply-The History of, 2; Loomba, Colonialism-Postcolonialism, 4.   203 Francis Dube, “Colonialsim, Cross-Border Movements, and Epidemiology: A History of Public Health in the Manica Region of Central Mozambique and Eastern Zimbabwae and the African Response, 1890-1980” (PhD diss.,University of Iowa, 2009), 2,3, http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/2694/.  32  measures included medical inspections or examinations, surveillance measures, compulsory quarantine, and vaccinations/immunizations to keep borders impermeable to contagion.205  Border movement restrictions thus arose when epidemics threatened the health of either colonized workers or colonial soldiers, since failure to contain infection could have a devastating effect on the international economy.206 Such border restrictions, however, conflicted with the economic need for extremely porous boundaries―making it difficult to impose border controls.  Still, to the extent that epidemics were catastrophic for colonial cities that relied on trade,207 governments became preoccupied with “‘boundaries and frontiers of all kinds.’”208  Effects of the French and Industrial Revolutions on Western Border Security With the onset of the French and Industrial Revolutions, in the late eighteenth century― accompanied by political and social unrest, growing democracy, an emphasis on free-markets, and a rapid increase of transportation, communication, and military technologies―sizable bureaucratic systems were set up to address passport demand and to regulate increased international travel.209  Revolutionary governments in France, for instance, made major advances in developing effective bureaucratic systems capable of systematically controlling the movement of foreigners and distinguishing them from citizens.210  By consolidating existing forms of surveillance, such as registers, visas, and passports, and by expanding (and centralizing)211 bureaucratic and police power, French governments, unlike                                                                                                                                                                                            204 Loomba, Colonialism-Postcolonialism, 2, 21.  205 Smart and Smart, Biosecurity and Quarantine, 358.   206 Ibid.   207 Ibid.  208 Ibid.   209 Justin W. Vance, “Passports,” in Peter N. Stearns, ed., Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008):1.   210 Michael Rapport, Nationality and Citizenship in Revolutionary France (Oxford, 2000): 326.  211 Johnston, The Rebirth of Private, 6,7. 33  earlier Renaissance governments, were proficient in achieving consistent compliance with various orders and decrees regarding transboundary movement.212 Similarly, in the United States―which, as a former British colony, had inherited its bureaucratic traditions from Britain213 ―sophisticated and elaborate filing systems, developed during the Industrial era, played a central role in early attempts to use documents to verify identity at the United States border.  Cross-referenced files, for instance, centralized in Washington, D.C., were introduced as part of an attempt to upgrade communication channels between the Bureau of Immigration and its agents at ports of entry.214 Meanwhile, innovative forms of Western technology, such as typewriters, index cards, file cabinets, and card-reading machines, made it possible to compile databases on entire populations―making it increasingly difficult for foreign spies to move around undetected.215 Previously, official records and record keeping had been constrained by what could be handwritten and scanned with the naked eye.216  In addition, although liberal notions of freedom of movement, stemming from the American and French Revolutions, had relaxed border controls in relation to passports in post-Napoleonic Europe and in North America, most western democratic governments became preoccupied with developing identification documents and identity databases.217  Biometric cataloguing or the method of recognizing humans,218 for example, which included photographs and fingerprints of criminals, became even more efficient with the use of office machines.219 Significantly, the consolidation and                                                           212 Rapport, Nationality and Citizenship in Revolutionary, 325, 326; Muir, Governments and Bureaucracies, 110.  213 Craig Robertson, The Passport in America: The History of a Document (Oxford, 2010):115.  214 Warner, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence, 27.  215 Ibid.  216 Ibid.  217 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 56.   218 Jason Ackleson, “Border Security Technologies: Local and Regional Implications,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 22. No. 2 (2005): 147.   219 Warner, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence, 14. 34  expansion of surveillance, bureaucratic, and police power not only facilitated the transboundary movement of ordinary travelers, but also increased domestic security and shaped the beginnings of an international surveillance system.  For strategic effect, intelligence-gathering became systematized both professionally and institutionally with a clear demarcation between domestic and foreign work.220 Indeed, the devotion to the collection and processing of information for leaders to use (and the surveillance of domestic populations in general) is historically unsurpassed.221 The transformation of military technology also prompted governments to develop professional intelligence and security services.  Foreign spies, for instance, now employed more lethal (and concealable) weaponry, capable of maiming dozens of innocents or important political leaders.  Many foreign spies were also employed by foreign governments, granting them access to the resources of a modern state.  With such power, spies were capable of harming a society on a much larger scale than before.222  For this reason, the British set up a Secret Service Bureau to free the military’s intelligence branch from “‘the necessity of dealing with spies’” and to respond to the domestic security needs of the nation as a whole.223 The development of wireless telegraphy (i.e., radio), telephones, airplanes, and photography also permitted the rapid transmission of real-time intelligence to security or military forces, elevating the national significance of covert operations in relation to the military defense of western nations and their borders.224 In fact, the growing sophistication of modern intelligence systems among western nations resulted in spectacular gains in terms of international power.225 In particular, intelligence cooperation between western nations throughout both                                                           220 Warner, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence, 3,190.  221 Ibid., 14.   222 Ibid.  223 Ibid.   224 Ibid.  225 Ibid., 75.  35  World War I and World War II forged a western intelligence alliance with unprecedented capabilities in defeating or containing enemies within totalitarian states.226  Policing Western Borders in the Post-World War II Era Throughout the twentieth century, the growth of identity and citizenship documents, along with their attendant symbols, seals, and signatures,227 further consolidated governmental authority over immigration and cross-border travel (e.g., visa controls).228  Photographs, for instance, became conventional on passports throughout most of the western world―increasing the authority of the passport as an identification document.229 Preoccupation with national security and border control in Western nations resulted in efforts to bring boundary lines into closer conformity with state goals (e.g., “the centralization of authority for border security”).230  Depending on government policies, border controls, aimed at maintaining territorial integrity, restricted access to some people, animals, and goods, while facilitating the entry of others.231 National visa and exit systems, for one, were developed for non-citizens, such as travelers and migrants, on the grounds that they “excluded people whose admission ‘would be dangerous or contrary to the public interest.’”232 Moreover, in many western nations, customs and immigration officers began working together at ports of entry (set up for the compliant), but they also patrolled rural borders in search of illegal immigrants and smugglers.233 The United                                                           226 Ibid., 124, 125.  227 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 122.   228 William W. Stowe, “The Passport in America: The History of A Document,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 90. No. 1 (2011): 171.   229 Vance, Passports, 1.   230 St. John, Line in the Sand, 6; Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 167; Hastings and Thomas M. Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, 43; Benjamin J. Muller, “Borders, Risks, Exclusion,” Studies in Social Justice, Vol. 3. No. 1 (2009): 67-78.  231 St. John, Line in the Sand, 6.   232 Donald Kerwin, “Book Review: Craig Robertson’s The Passport in America: The History of a Document,” International Migration Review, Vol 45. No. 2 (2011): 491.    233 St. John, Line in the Sand, 6. 36  States Border Patrol, for instance, began deporting illegal Mexican immigrants during and after World War II.234 Meanwhile, American immigration officials had also begun working at European ports in an effort to reduce large-scale passport and immigration fraud.235  Post-Cold War Developments in Border Security By the end of the twentieth century, Western liberal-democratic states, aided by advancements and refinements in communication, security, and military technology, had obtained, if imperfectly, a general monopoly on transboundary movement, surveillance, and intelligence skills and capabilities.236 Technology, for instance, in the form of large computer-based databases, computer chips, thermal and motion sensors, electronic telecommunication networks (i.e., cyberspace), and closed circuit television (CCTV, a form of video surveillance), further enhanced border security capabilities.  Passports also became more sophisticated through the addition of security features.  In 1981, the United States became the first nation to use machine-readable passports, which hold a series of letters and numbers that are read by a machine―a system that is now utilized internationally.237 Furthermore, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, the volume and complexities of international trade―assisted by substantial improvements in the speed of communication and travel, trade liberalization, and lower costs―resulted in greater access to overseas markets and a much larger diversity among entities involved in international trade (i.e., globalization).238 In addition, the internationalization of labor markets in the Global north opened up new opportunities to access a ready supply of both skilled and unskilled workers from the Global south, which                                                           234 Ibid.   235 Kerwin, Book Review: Craig, 492.  236 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 167; Warner, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence, 334.  237 Vance, Passports, 1.  238 David Widdowson and Stephen Holloway, “The National Security Environment: Strategic Context,” in Gerard McLinden, Enrique Fanta, David Widdowson, and Tom Doyle, eds., Border Management Modernization, (Washington: The World Bank, 2011): 301. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2544/588450PUB0Bord101public10BOX353816B.pdf?sequence=1.  37  increased north-bound migration flows.239 Consequently, Western border security was more concerned with expediting the movement of people, goods, capital, and ideas240 with minimal regulation than with intervening in cross-border mobilities―though commercial illegality and public protection from harmful substances and biological threats remained important priorities.241  Post-modern Societies (21st c. A.D.) and Borders Post-9/11 Border Control  The post-9/11 era has brought many changes to immigration, customs, and security arrangements at airports, marine ports, and port of entries, especially in the North American context.242 ‘Smart borders,’ for instance, based on identity management of people and goods, evidenced by the trusted traveler and trusted shipper programs, and the deployment of sophisticated surveillance and information technology, emerged as the dominant western border security policy solution not only to prevent terrorist incursions and illegal migration, but also to maintain legal migration and trade flows—primary drivers of globalization.243 Smart borders, though not a new concept,244 seek to move many of the control activities, such as pre-screening, pre-inspection, international cooperation, and information sharing away from (and, in certain cases, inside) the territorial borders of a nation,245 while immigration, customs, and security forces at the border continue to carry out enforcement activities. New biometric and                                                           239 Rebecca Miller and Sebastian Baumeister, “Managing Migration: Is Border Control Fundamental to Anti-Trafficking and Anti-Smuggling Interventions?” Anti-Trafficking Review, No. 2 (2013): 16. http://www.antitraffickingreview.org/index.php/atrjournal/article/view/29/31.  240 Hastings and Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, 106.    241 Widdowson and Holloway, The National Security Environment, 298.  242 Payan, Theory Building in Border, 15.   243 Ackleson, Border Security Technologies, 138; William Walters, “Border/Control,” European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 9. No. 2 (2006): 187.  244 Victor Conrad and Heather Nicol, “Boundaries and Corridors: Rethinking the Canada-United States Borderlands in the Post-9/11,” Canadian-American Public Policy, Vol. 60. No. 12 (2004): 21.   245 Walters, Border/Control, 193.  38  surveillance technologies, aimed at reducing counterfeit travel documents, such as facial scanning and digital fingerprints, have also burgeoned, while new security features, like iris recognition246 (measurements of a holder’s retina or irises), have been added to passports―though their use is not widespread.  Other biometric techniques include hand geometry and handwriting.  In the modern era, biometric technology at the border has been relied upon to verify, reveal, or discover identity through a comparison of biological information against universal databases.247 Meanwhile, technological changes have also enabled new kinds of border practices in relation to rural areas of the border.  Military-issue Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s), for one, operating on a principle of air sovereignty,248 are now used to secure territorial borders from the air by monitoring areas between ports of entry at the Canada-US border.249   As shown by the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda terrorist attack in New York City and the increase in transnational crime, however, states no longer have a general monopoly on transboundary movement, surveillance, and intelligence skills and capabilities.  Weak states and non-state actors, for instance, now engage in traditional and non-traditional methods of espionage (i.e., cyberespionage) and even covert action against their enemies with modest financial investments and often with minimal risk to themselves.250 Such entities, unlike most other states, are not constrained by budgetary, legal, and regulatory restrictions.251 In the intelligence field, technological innovations have blurred the lines between states and non-state entities, allowing lethal and powerful weapons (including biological agents) as well as                                                           246 Miller and Baumeister, Managing Migration: Is Border, 17.  247 Rosalea Thompson, “When Borders Cross People: Bill C-31 and the Securitization of Boundaries Across Bodies and History,” (master’s thesis, University of Toronto, 2013): 60. http://hdl.handle.net/1807/42651.  248 Doris Wastl-Walter, The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies (Farnham, 2012): 288.  249 Donald K. Alper and James Loucky, Canada-US Border Securitization: Implications for Binational Cooperation (University of Maine: Canadian-American Public Policy, 2007): 10.   250 Warner, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence, 318.   251 Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU), “Economics of Policing,” Committee Report, 1st Session, 41st Parliament, 2013. http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=6583312&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=2&File=54#11.  39  intelligence resources to fall into the hands of private individuals.  Consequently, although intelligence and border security capabilities in western nations have improved dramatically since 9/11, such capabilities can be degraded through terrorist and criminal group adaptation.252 For this reason, international relations is often “based on ways in which power and sovereignty are shared, diluted, pooled, and dispersed in the course of dealing with” transnational crime and terrorism―along with trade, the global provision of services, and epidemics (e.g., SARS, Ebola, Avian Flu).253   To summarize this historical analysis, there is a consistent link between border security (and associated security practices and technologies) and the national and public security of a political community. Unequivocally, the absence of effective border controls in particular historical periods has effectively undermined the security of political communities. Moreover, border security is not a singular feature of contemporary political communities;254 many of today’s border policies harbor characteristics from earlier eras.255 This analysis shows that while there is no absolute standard to follow, to effectively administer any given territory―whether in relation to animal, plant, and human disease, cross-border mobilities, adversaries, or trade―it is necessary to have a certain notion of geographical space and sovereign order.256 This is the case particularly in a world that is “organized politically into nation-states with sovereign governments.”257 To do otherwise, as some critical theorists contend, “to tear down the [borders] of a state,” in relation to western borders, is not to create a more secure world but to create “a [world with a] thousand petty fortresses.”258                                                           252 Brian A. Jackson, Developing Robust Border Security Technologies to Protect Against Diverse and Adaptive Threats (Santa Monica, 2007): 2.   253 Hastings and Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, 58.   254 Payan, Theory Building in Border, 10.  255 Ibid.   256 Payan, Theory Building in Border, 10. 257 David Slater, “Book Review: How Much Do National Borders Matter,” Canadian Business Economics, Vol. 7. No. 4 (1999): 90. 90-96.  40   History of the Canada-US Border The Importance of Historical Border Processes in Border Security Research No border and its border policies can be properly understood without an awareness of its history and evolution.259 Yet it is frequently forgotten, particularly in light of the “revolution in border security,” that contemporary border processes and discourses260 are thoroughly intertwined with the history of Canadian-US relations.  As such, few border security studies advancing critical or even normative perspectives of post-9/11 border functions have emphasized the salience and durability of American and Canadian border trends throughout their respective histories.261 Hataley, however, along with Conrad and Nicol constitute an exception.  In particular, Hataley’s strong historical analysis of the Canada-US border demonstrates the significance of historical border processes. His research shows that a number of post-9/11 academic studies on the Canada-US border reached possibly inaccurate conclusions based on mistaken assumptions.  For instance, some scholars assumed that “US homeland security doctrine and the role of the border in that doctrine [was entirely] new,” prompting them to conclude that American security concerns were not only eroding the border (to the extent that Washington was dictating border policy to Ottawa), but also eroding Canadian sovereignty.262 However, the Canada-US border has figured in American homeland security considerations at many points in the past.263 Militarization of the border, for instance, occurred during the prelude to the War of 1812, when the United States constructed a series of                                                                                                                                                                                            258 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 157  259 Payan, Theory Building in Border, 10.  260 Hataley, Constructing Border Security, 23; Jason Ackleson, “From Thick to Thin (And Back Again): The Politics and Policies of the Contemporary US-Canada Border,” The American Review of Canadian Studies, Vol. 39. No. 4 (2009): 336-351.   261 Salter and Mutlu, Psychoanalytic Theory and Border, 185.  262 Hatley, Constructing Border Security, 23.   263 Ibid., 24.  41  forts along the northern frontier, and eventually organized a force of regulars and volunteers to occupy positions along the border.264  Since then, as will be discussed, militarization and demilitarization of the border has occurred several times within specific contexts.265    Other border studies examined by Hataley raised the idea of an external border.  One author in particular argued that although borders served as first lines of defence, the ideal way to defend them was to implement measures removed from the physical border itself.266 He not only prescribed a risk management strategy that would target high risk goods and people while simultaneously facilitating the flow of low risk goods and people,267 but also proposed a continental approach, involving the exportation of border functions as far away from American soil as possible.  For example, identity verification and border security screening could begin at US consulates in foreign countries.268 However, this was not a new strategy.  In 1924, for instance, the American government, in response to high volumes of uncontrolled immigration from Europe and chaos at its main ports, required all foreign nationals to obtain an entry visa before embarking on a US-bound vessel.269  Furthermore, during the 1980s, the American government, using similar strategies, succeeded in moving drug eradication and drug interdiction away from the border―though this did not necessarily result in a more secure border or state.270 In short, as Hataley shows, Canadian and American border policies harbor characteristics from earlier eras.                                                            264 Ibid., 62.  265 Ibid., 20.   266 Ibid., 24.   267 Ibid.  268 Stephanie Sanok Kostro and Scott F. Mann, “Innovative Immigration and Border Control Reform,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies, July 31, 2012. sis.org/files/publication/130807_Sanok_InnovativeImmigrationBorderControl.pdf. 269 Walters, Border/Control, 195.   270 Ibid., 25.  42  The American View of the Canada-US Border  Historical border processes and discourses also help explain why Americans view the border as a protective institution, while Canadians tend to see it as an economic institution271 ―historical trends that Leuprecht, Brunet-Jailly, and Nicol have emphasized.272  From the American perspective, for example, the northern border that separates the United States from Canada was determined almost entirely by British-American relations. It therefore had little to do with Canada or Canadians, and more to do with containing a British enemy and preserving the balance of power in North America as evidenced by the War of 1812 and subsequent treaties.273 As a result, “the border developed as an instrument of state security, to protect against the sometimes real, and other times perceived, British threat to American territorial sovereignty.”274 After 1871, the border gradually became demilitarized not on the basis of an international agreement, but because there were almost no security concerns between the United States and Canada, its new northern neighbor, and the United States.275  Most importantly, despite Britain’s departure from North America, which resulted in a measure of “strategic relief” along the northern border, “as an institution the character of the border was solidly set in place.”276 This is clearly illustrated by “the war against illegal aliens, 1882-1917; the rum war, 1917-1931; the war on drugs, 1980-2001 and the war on terror, which started in the fall of 2001.”277                                                           271 Benjamin J. Muller, “Borders, Risks, Exclusion,” Studies in Social Justice, Vol. 3. No. 1 (2009):74.  272 Christian Leuprecht, “Introduction,” in Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley and Kim Richard Nossal, eds., Evolving Transnational Threats and Border Security (Queen’s University: Centre for International Defence Policy, 2012): 3, 10.http://www.queensu.ca/cidp/index/Martello37E.pdf;Heather Nicol, “Resiliency or Change? The Contemporary Canada-US Border,” Geopolitics, Vol. 10. No. 4 (2005): 770-771; Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly,“ A New Border?” International Journal, Vol. 67. No. 4 (2012): 969.     273 Hataley, Constructing Border Security, 75.   274 Ibid., 76.  275 Ibid.   276 Ibid.   277 Ibid., 12.  43  The Canadian View of the Canada-US Border In contrast to the United States, Canada inherited a border that, aside from the Alaskan Border, had been established and defended by other actors. 278 Consequently, the Canadian border experience was not based on territorial security;279 rather, it developed almost entirely as a means for generating revenue.  In general, Canadians viewed the border as an instrument that contributed to the public and sometimes private treasuries, instead of as a line of defence.  The collection of customs duties, for instance, as a primary role of border management, extends as far back as the era before Responsible Government (i.e. the early nineteenth century), and lasted until the early 2000s, when a greater emphasis came to be placed on security.280  In fact, in 1841, Customs Services for Canada became the first Canadian law enforcement agency―ahead of the Dominion Police (1868) and the Northwest Mounted Police (1873).281 Although the establishment of Canada’s first Immigration Act in 1906 and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in 1920 resulted in more elaborate border management―for instance, custom inspectors, police constables, and immigration officers now worked together to uphold Canadian sovereignty―the border continued to be viewed as an economic institution.282 Canadian political leaders therefore focused primarily on creating economic development policies that either minimized the effect of the border to protect the development of the Canadian economy, or facilitated the transborder movement of goods. For this reason, the role of the border in Canada’s economic development remains firmly entrenched in Canadian politics.283 This is plainly seen in fluctuating protectionist policies between 1859 and 1950; the States Auto Pact of 1965; the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement                                                            278 Ibid., 94.  279 Ibid., 97.   280 Hataley, Constructing Border Security, 77; Muller, Borders, Risks, Exclusion, 74.   281 Kelly William Sundberg, “Transforming Canada’s Border Services” (PhD diss. Royal Roads University, 2004): 9, MQ93789.   282 Sundberg, Transforming Canada’s Border, 9, 10.   283 Elinor Sloan, “Homeland Security and Defence in the Post-9/11 Era,” in David S. McDonough, ed., Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012): 111. 987-113. 44  (CUFTA) in 1988; and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994.284 The Canada-US Border and Indigenous Sovereignty  The salience and durability of American and Canadian border trends throughout their respective histories also extends to indigenous sovereignty―specifically, the border rights (i.e., mobility) of indigenous people in North America.   Although the foundation of American and Canadian border policy with respect to indigenous border rights is based on the same documents―namely, the 1794 Jay Treaty and the 1814 Treaty of Ghent―both  governments have taken divergent paths with respect to indigenous border rights.285  In 1928, for instance, the American government gave Mohawks living on the American side of the border the right to implement their own border security, while Canada, in 1968, established regulated border crossings and custom stations on Mohawk lands on the Canadian side of the border in an attempt to collect duties on American goods.286   Divergent Operational Priorities at the Canada-US Border   The divergent character of operational priorities at the contemporary Canada-US boundary line is inevitably linked to the way both Canada and the United States were created.  The United States was born out of a belligerent American mentality and a bloody struggle for nationhood, while Canada achieved national independence through a gradual and peaceful process.287 Despite these divergent routes to sovereignty, there is a legacy of a high degree of trust and cooperation that exists at the Canada-US border, which, in itself, may reflect the fact that both nations were born out of the Anglo-Saxon culture.288 Previously one of the most                                                            284 Sloan, Homeland Security and Defence,   94.  285 Joshua J. Tonra. “The Threat of Border Security On Indigenous Free Passage Rights In North America,” Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34. No. 1 (2006): 243, 247.  286 Ibid.  287 Payan, Theory Building in Border, 10.   288 Ibid., 11.  45  “genteel” borders” in existence, the Canada-US border was, until 2001, the longest undefended border in the world.289 Canadian Border Security and the Intervention of Neo-Liberalism  The Hegemony of Neo-Liberalism within the Canadian Public Sector While important, the history (and shared cultural heritage) of the Canada-US border are not the only factors that explain Canadian public policy formulation in the area of border security.290 Contemporary neo-liberalism, for instance, thrives in policies relating to land, air, and maritime frontiers291 ―though “what political strategies are adopted for attaining it varies in different contexts.”292  Neo-liberalism reigned supreme as a political-economic model of the late 1990s and early 2000s,293 and is marked by privatization, financial deregulation, fiscal austerity, welfare reform, free-trade, monetarism, and the punitive policing of the poor.294 Following the mid-1990s transition from Keynesian liberalism―marked by a systemic commitment to social security, trade unions, financial regulation, and public ownership― to neo-liberalism, aggressive corporate rationales have become progressively influential within Western governments.295 In this new neo-liberal corporate context, new public management techniques, which include performance assessments, risk ratings, benchmarks, and the techniques associated with audits, have become firmly entrenched across the upper echelons of government.296 In Canada, new public management and strategies of risk management,                                                            289 Muller, Borders, Risks, Exclusions, 67.  290 Ackleson, Border Security Technologies,139.   291 Brenda Chalfin, Neo-Liberal Frontiers (Chicago, 2010): 2. http://zinelibrary.info/files/[Brenda_Chalfin]_Neoliberal_Frontiers_An_Ethnography.pdf.  292 Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola, “Neo-Liberalizing Border Management in Finland and Schengen,” Antipode, Vol.  45. No. 5 (2012):  1322.   293 Chalfin, Neo-Liberal Frontiers, 2.  294 Matthew B. Sparke, “A Neo-Liberal Nexus: Economy, Security, and the Biopolitics of Citizenship on the Border,” Political Geography, Vol. 25. No. 2 (2006): 154.   295 Prokkola, Neo-Liberalizing Border, 1318.   46  initially developed for the securitization of financial markets,297 play a large role in the private sector, but market logistics have also transformed the public sector.298 Increasingly, neo-liberal corporate management styles and practices provide the basis for Canadian public sector governance.299 Performance-based salaries for senior federal management as well as other dogmatic pecuniary incentives, have, in many cases, resulted in a change in management ethos―one that focuses on short-term financial goals.300 Although popular arguments suggest that neo-liberalism has caused the state to retreat, due to the changing balance of private and public authority within the state, further research has shown that state is not in decline as such― rather, as seems to be the case in Canada, it has become embedded in structural market transformation.301   Neo-Liberalism and Best Practices in Border Management Although neo-liberal corporatization does not always affect all groups and entities within states, the promotion of best practices in border management302 by the Canada Border Services Agency reveals an embedded neo-liberal agenda. CBSA is the primary federal agency for operations at ports of entry along the Canada-US boundary line.  Under the Canada Border Services Agency Act (Bill C-26, 2005), the agency has a dual mandate to render integrated border services that reinforce public safety and national security priorities and that facilitate the free flow of persons and goods (that fulfill all regulatory stipulations).303 The CBSA oversees                                                                                                                                                                                            296 Sparke, A Neo-Liberal Nexus, 154.   297 Wastl-Walter, The Ashgate Companion to Border, 273. 298 D.A. MacDonald, Rethinking Corporatization and Public Services in the Global South (London, 2014):10. http://www.municipalservicesproject.org/userfiles/McDonald_Chap1_Public_Ambiguity_and_the_Multiple_Meanings_of_Corporatization.pdf.MacDonald.   299 MacDonald, Rethinking Corporatization and Public, 12.   300 Ibid.   301 Chalfin, Neo-Liberal Frontiers, 37.  302 Prokkola, Neoliberalizing Border Management, 1323; Sparke, A Neo-Liberal Nexus, 168.    303 “2010 Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada,” Office of the Auditor General of Canada, accessed September 15, 2014, http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201010_08_e_34291.html. 47  roughly 1, 200 service locations throughout Canada, and 39 in other countries.  Border officials offer 24-hour service at 119 land ports and 13 international airports.  To co-ordinate the activities of border officials, CBSA offices are located across the country in seven geographical regions.  Within these regions, border officials administer more than 90 different Canadian laws for a variety of Government of Canada departments and agencies, such as the Criminal Code of Canada, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPS), and the Customs Act.304   As in other Western states, new public management techniques provide the basis for optimizing Canadian border security in terms of cost efficiency, effectiveness, and reliability.305 Border officials no longer just guard borders; their outputs306 are brandished as services to citizens and the community.307 The Vice-President of Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), for instance, has recently stated that the business of border management involves “tangible and real changes to deliver quality services for Canadians.”308 Moreover, ‘Smart Border’ programs “are in turn assessed vis-à-vis their ‘delivery’ of security and economy” by the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG, the central auditing agency for all federal government practices).309 A 2007 audit, for example, encouraged the CBSA to develop an integrated business plan for its internal operations that would allow CBSA to use risk and performance information to guide resource allocation.310 Consequently, despite the fact that many contemporary security threats are not readily quantifiable,311 ‘economy’ and ‘security’ are                                                           304 Rossland News, “Busy Border,” May 24, 2013: 3. http://www.rosslandnews.com/community/208851571.html.  305 Prokkola, Neo-Liberalizing Border, 1319; Muller, Borders, Risks, Exclusions, 72; Wastl-Walter, The Ashgate Research, 266.  306 Sundberg, Transforming Canada’s Border,  14.   307 Prokkola, Neo-Liberalizing Border, 1326;  “2010 Fall Report of the Auditor General,” Office of the Auditor General of Canada.    308 CBSA, “Maturing the Measurement Performance Function-A Journey,” Canada Border Services Agency May, 2013: 4.  http://www.ppx.ca/download/symposiums/2013/Presentations/Sessions/Session_1/Session-1_E.pdf. 309 Sparke,  A Neo-Liberal Nexus, 165.   310 “2010 Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada,” Office of the Auditor General of Canada.  48  assessed as quantifiable objects of government function.312This may lead to misperceptions of security realities and the use of such information as a means of supporting particular positions in relation to public policy.313 Most significantly, the application of risk management techniques at the border “is relatively new and remains poorly understood,”314 yet it has changed the way in which risk is assessed and policed in border areas.315 Fiscal Austerity and Commercialization of Border Programs In Canada, neo-liberal corporatization has led to major cuts within the public sector over the last seven years.316 In 2010, a budget freeze resulted in the loss of 9, 700 jobs, with still  6, 300 left to cut based on 2007-2010 spending reviews, while in 2012, all federal departments, including the Department of Public Safety and its portfolio agencies, which include the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), were told to slash their budgets by five percent or more, which will result in the loss of an additional 19, 2000 to 26,000 jobs by 2015.317  Such aggressive corporate trends have generated publicly owned and operated institutions that behave like private corporations, mirroring business practices and discourses and initiating systems of competition that can assist in “‘hollo[wing] out’” the state.318 Outcomes include a higher level of commercialization, multi-tiered services that are grounded in a “‘responsibility to pay’” (as opposed to an ability to pay), and a service agency that responds to the demands of                                                                                                                                                                                            311 Muller, Borders, Risks, Exclusions, 72.  312 Sparke,   A Neo-Liberal Nexus, 165.   313 Social Policy in Ontario (SPON), “Public Service Cuts: Jobs Slashed in Canada’s Federal Government,” SPON, April 12, 2012. http://spon.ca/public-service-cuts-jobs-slashed-in-canadas-federal-government/2012/04/12/.  314 Michael Hart, “A Matter of Trust,” C.D. Howe Institute, No. 309 (2010):7. http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_309.pdf. 315 Wastl-Walter, The Ashgate Companion to Border, 273.   316 Social Policy in Ontario (SPON),  Public Service Cuts, 1.   317 “Federal Budget 2014: Balancing the Books on the Back of Public Services and Workers Who Provide Them,” Public Service Alliance of Canada, February 15, 2014, accessed February 20, 2014, http://psacunion.ca/federal-budget-2014-balancing-books-back-public-services-and-workers-who-provide-them/. 318 MacDonald,  Rethinking Corporatization and Public, 14.  49  transnational global elites.319 Self-declared market-oriented services, for instance, such as the CBSA’s trusted traveler and trusted shipper programs ―namely, NEXUS, NEXUS AIR, and FAST, the commercial equivalent―320 can be viewed as commodities to be purchased and sold like any other market product.321 These programs, which build on a number of pre-9/11 programs, are designed to expedite cross-border travel with dedicated NEXUS lanes that facilitate the mobility of pre-approved, low-risk travelers (e.g., transnational elites) by helping them to avoid the usual custom and immigration questioning.322 Myopia By definition, all configurations of corporatization engender silos of activity (e.g., isolation) or a silo mentality, but this tendency is especially pronounced under neo-liberalism with its focus on short-term financial performance criteria.323 Under previous aggregated Keynesian public administration, state projects were typically pursued under horizontally organized public service departments. 324 Since the implementation of neo-liberalism, however, and the advent of vertically configured administration structures, public service departments have been physically and legally separated. As a result, corporatized agencies can operate in superb isolation from one another―even when they service the same area and share the same office and equipment.325 In this process, self-centeredness (i.e., silos), which cause people to concentrate insularly on the express mission pursued by their agency,326 can interfere with the                                                            319 Ibid.  320 Muller, Borders, Risks, Exclusions, 75.   321 MacDonald, Rethinking Corporatization and Public, 14.   322 “NEXUS-General Information,” US Customs and Border Protection, accessed February 20, 2014,  https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/227/~/nexus---general-information; Mark B. Salter and Genevieve Piché, “The Securitization of the US-Canada Border in American Political Discourse,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44. No. 4 (2011): 944-945.  323 MacDonald, Rethinking Corporatization and Public, 15.   324 Ibid.   325 Ibid.  50  benefits that may come from information sharing and the pursuit of collective goals.327 While CBSA (and its American counterpart, Customs and Border Patrol or CBP), are primarily responsible for administering border security at the Canada-US boundary line, other agencies, such as the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) and Health Canada (i.e., biosecurity agencies), as well as many other American agencies, continue to carry out specialized mandates at the border.328 Each of these agencies has its own information requirements and corporate culture.329 Consequently, information sharing and worker solidarity and coordination across public services becomes more difficult.330 Overtly, in Canada, there is “a slight cultural aversion to [information] sharing,” which exacerbates the trend toward silo activity. 331Although, for instance, part of the reason behind creating CBSA was to improve intelligence sharing by amalgamating border security and immigration enforcement, the issues associated with myopia still exist between the CBSA and other agencies that administer activities relating to border security, namely the RCMP and the CSIS.332                                                                                                                                                                                                326 Scott D. Pattison, “Eliminating Silos in Government,” Governing, April 5, 2006, http://www.governing.com/columns/mgmt-insights/Eliminating-Silos-in-Government.html 327 MacDonald,  Rethinking Corporatization and Public, 15.  328 Michael Hart, “A Matter of Trust,” C.D. Howe Institute, No. 309 (2010):4.  http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_309.pdf.   329 Hart,  A Matter of Trust, 4.  330 MacDonald,  Rethinking Corporatization and Public, 15.  331 Parliament of Canada,  “Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security Defence,” Parliamentary Business, No. 2, October 31, 2011, http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/sen/committee/411%5CSECD/02EVC-49153-e.HTM.  332 Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, “Standing on Guard for Thee: Ensuring that Canada’s Immigration System is Secure,” House of Commons, 1st Session, 41st Parliament, March 2013, 15. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2013/parl/xc64-1/XC64-1-1-411-07-eng.pdf;  Isabel Wallace, “Time to Reign in Canada Border Services Agency,” Ottawa Citizen, September 10, 2014, http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/time-to-rein-in-canada-border-services-agency; Standing Committee on Immigration and Citizenship, “Evidence,” House of Commons, 1st Session, 41st Parliament, October 24, 2012, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/parl/XC64-1-2-411-54-eng.pdf. 51  Ranking Transnational Security Threats, Canada’s Strategic Tradition, and the Implications of the Changing Global Threat Environment for Canadian National Security Ranking Transnational Security Threats The wide range of factors involved in defining a security threat makes “the ranking of threats a difficult and very political choice.”333 Since governments and international organizations do not have unlimited resources, they must prioritize threats, judging them on the basis of probability, scope, object, and intensity.  In addition, the manner in which threats are perceived differs from country to country, and the ways in which they are processed also vary.334 A transnational trend that contends as a moderate threat to Canada may pose a profound vulnerability elsewhere.335  For instance, there is the perception that the security dimensions of human smuggling/trafficking and terrorism are taken more seriously in the United States than in Canada.336  Moreover, in an age of risk management, security experts must not only understand threats, but also come to terms with competing threat perceptions―which influence the range of available choices and ensuing policy decisions.337 Canada, for example, has a history of not addressing potential threats until they are manifested.338 Consequently, its “security policy has tended to be informed by disproportionate optimism and certainty” (in comparison with countries that are similar in population and economy size).339                                                            333 Elke Krahmann,  New Threats and New Actors, 18.   334 Leuprecht, Introduction, 2.  335 Ibid.  336 Daily Gleaner, “Canada Has to Toughen Up Immigration Policies,” June 7, 2001; Jonathan S. Landay, “Has Canada Become a Base for Terrorism?” Calgary Herald, December 30, 1999.   337 Leuprecht, Introduction, 6.   338 Kostas Rimsa, “Spy Catchers,” in Dwight Hamilton, Kostas Rimsa, and John Thompson, compilers, Inside Canadian Intelligence, 1st ed., (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006): 41.   339 Leuprecht, Introduction, 3.  52  Canada’s Strategic Tradition Relative to transnational threats, government agencies also tend to be seriously under-resourced both in terms of finances and access to technology340―particularly when strategic traditions are characterized by ongoing strategic deficits.341  Many institutions involved in Canada’s security architecture, for instance, are often constrained by Canada’s traditional “penny-pinching” approach to national security.342 Canada’s Border Services Agency (CBSA), a post-9/11 institute charged with securing the Canada-US border at ports of entry;343 the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), a pre-9/11 institute charged with securing areas between ports of entry; and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), charged with guarding against threats to national and public security, are all constrained by budget limitations in providing for Canada’s homeland security.344 Although Canada has historically had the luxury of defending its security abroad345 and its “expeditionary” strategy (i.e., ‘forward defence’) remains relevant, the contemporary global threat environment requires a greater emphasis on the direct security and defence of Canadian waters and territory.346 Significantly, though national security is not as foreign a concept to the Canadian historic reality as some conclude, few Canadian researchers would agree that Ottawa has a history of “strategically sound policy-                                                          340 Papademetriou, The Global Struggle, 4.   341 David S. McDonough, “Introduction,” in David S. McDonough, ed., Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012): 5.   342 McDonough, Introduction, 5.   343 Muller, Borders, Risks, Exclusion, 71.   344 Alliance Against Traffic in Women Canada, “2010 Winter Games Analysis on Human Trafficking,” Public Safety Canada, August 2013: 56-57, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/wntr-gms-2010/wntr-gms-2010-eng.pdf; Tonda MacCharles, “CSIS Says ‘Limited Resources’ Mean it Cannot Track Terrorist Sympathizers ‘all the Time,’” October 20, 2014, http://www.ourwindsor.ca/news-story/4924775-csis-says-limited-resources-mean-it-cannot-track-terrorist-sympathizers-all-the-time-/;Parliament of Canada, “House of Commons Debates,” Edited Hansar, No. 267, 1st Session, 41st Parliament, June 11, 2013, http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=6221431&Language=E&Mode=1; The Huffington Post Canada, “Cross-Border Shopping Officially Ignored As CBSA Struggles With Staffing Shortages,” July 12, 2014.  345 Sloan,  Homeland Security and Defence, 111.  346 Ibid., 98, 111.  53  making” in this area.347 In fact, Canada’s strategic tradition regarding security matters has typically been considered ‘situational,’ ad hoc, and fundamentally ‘reactive’ to world events.348 Indeed, there is a traditional tendency to “tighten the purse strings” of security portfolios at the first opportunity.349 As a result, rather than assessing threats and modifying the budget in accordance with their capabilities, the budget modifies how threats will be assessed and addressed.350   The Changing Global Threat Environment Despite the recurring features of Canada’s strategic tradition, many security scholars argue that it is in Canada’s best interest to seriously consider transnational threats and the changing global threat environment through prudent and far-sighted security measures.351 For many classical realists, the primary role of government, whether of the centre, left, or right, is to ensure public and national security.352 Recent research on the migratory, commercial, and criminal patterns of the global trade in humans, for instance, shows that such trade is continuing to grow. Some criminal organizations that are also involved in multiple criminal trades, such as arms smuggling or drug trafficking, are making use of their long-established routes and methods to incorporate the illicit smuggling of migrants or trafficked persons.  Such organizations also draw on technological advances, specifically computer technologies that facilitate crimes like counterfeiting and fraud, which requires little specialized knowledge and which allows criminals to diversify their criminal activities.353 Furthermore, organized criminals                                                           347 McDonough, Introduction, 4, 6.  348 Ibid., 6.    349 Ibid., 4.   350 Steve Saideman, “A Budget Military,” Canadian International Council (CIC) (blog), February 25, 2013, http://opencanada.org/features/blogs/roundtable/a-budget-military/.   351 McDonough, Introduction, 6  352Segal, The Balance of Freedoms, 67.  353 Alexis Aronowitz, “Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings: The Phenomenon, The Markets that Drive it And The Organisations That Promote It,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Vol. 9. No. 2 (2001):  176.   54  and terrorists are relying on similar activities to fund their operations.354 Some criminal-terrorist hybrid networks, for instance, have already begun to make extensive use of transnational criminal organizations’ resources to cross borders, to provide them with false documentation to facilitate their cross-border movement, to supply them with an assortment of weapons, and to provide them with logistical support in their clandestine bases.355 In Canada, where immigration continues to drive demographic patterns, new trends have suggested that illicit migration from high-risk countries will increase.356 Crucially, the crime-terror nexus is invigorated in areas of the world where the state has minimal presence and means of control, corruption, regional conflicts, and shadow economies.357  The pressure of events in Syria, Iraq, and Mexico, for instance, has not only forced millions of people from their homes, but has also created concerns that terrorist and criminal insurgencies have already, and will continue, to migrate to the United States and Canada.358 The terrorist threat is especially pronounced with regard to its Islamist variants.  Despite the punitive actions against Sunni al-Qaeda central and its affiliates and supporters,359 as well as the death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, and the American desire to shutter the ‘war on terror,’ al-Qaeda is resurgent in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Pakistan, and Syria; and                                                            354 Frank S. Perri and Richard G. Brody, “The Dark Triad: Organized Crime, Terror, and Fraud,” Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 14. No. 1 (2011): 56.  355 Jean-Luc Lottefier, “Italian Mafia’s in Belgium. Past and Present,” in Myrianne Coen, ed., Human Trafficking, Smuggling, and Illegal Immigration (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2011): 76.    356 The Honorable Vic Toews, Messenger from the Minister, 9.  357 Perri, The Dark Triad, 47.  358 Douglas L. Bland and Brian MacDonald, “Canada’s Defence and Security Policies after 9/11: Missions, Means, and Money,” in David S. McDonough, ed., Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012): 234; Trinh Theresa, “Khorasan Group Shows Why Al-Qaeda Is Still A Force To Be Reckoned With,” CBC News, September 30, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/khorasan-group-shows-why-al-qaeda-is-still-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with-1.2778853.   359 Paul Rogers, “President Bush’s War On Terror,” Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 74 (2003). http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd74/74pr.htm.  55  Sunni jihadi offensives are advancing on numerous fronts.360 Similarly, the power of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood has burgeoned in Libya, Tunisia, Syria, Egypt,361 and possibly in Jordan and elsewhere.362 Furthermore, assisted by the Arab Spring, a multitude of regional groups in the Middle East and North Africa have emerged that are not under the control and command of the original al-Qaeda.  Although they maintain a local or regional focus, they share bin Laden’s vision of global jihad and its persistent battle with the West and ‘apostate’ Muslim governments, and some have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda central.363  Perversely, the recent resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq, now known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has allowed this group to establish a caliphate (i.e., mini-state) in the northern areas of Iraq and Syria―though it has yet to defeat either the Iraqi or the Syrian government.  For ISIS, brutality is “a calculated strategy;” one that includes mass executions, beheadings, and crucifixions against anyone who resists its territorial advances, hesitates to follow its religious dictates, or otherwise challenges it.364  Despite an American-led air campaign in the Middle-East, which includes Canadian air force personnel, ISIS continues apace to “celebrate its brutality” against Shiites, Sunnis, ethno-religious minorities, and American and Western citizens.365  ISIS, which no longer has any connection with al-Qaeda central, now competes with al-Qaeda for influence over Islamist extremist groups throughout the world.  As such, Canada, like other Western nations, is further threatened by home-grown terrorism, as seen in the ISIS-inspired attacks in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and Ottawa in October 2014, and                                                           360 Clare M. Lopez, “The War on Terror is Over: Now What?” Gatestone Institute, June 3, 2013, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3743/war-on-terror-over.html.  361 The New York Times, “Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt),” Times Topics, November 13, 2013.  362 Lopez, The War on Terror, 1.  363 Emile Nakhleh, “International Analysis: Resurgent Regional Terrorism — A Sinister Threat,” Peruvian Times, October 26, 2013, http://www.peruviantimes.com/26/international-analysis-resurgent-regional-terrorism-a-sinister-threat/20531/html.  364 Frida Ghitis, “Why is ISIS So Brutal?” CNN,  September 19, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/04/opinion/ghitis-isis-brutality/. 365 Ghitis, Why is ISIS So Brutal?, 1. 56  has many radicalized citizens who have joined the fight overseas.366 Similarly, the Khorasan Group, an elite militant group under the command of al-Qaeda central, has established roots in Syria not to fight Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime or create an Islamic state, but to advance attacks against the West.367 Such events not only demonstrate the innovation and adaptability of Islamic terrorism, but also attest to the group’s uncompromising and ongoing determination to advance its cause on the world stage.368     The criminal threat is particularly conspicuous with regard to Mexican drug cartels― corporation-like drug trafficking organizations that are becoming more decentralized.369  The continual criminal insurgency in Mexico is especially violent and dangerous.370 Mexico, a stable, prospering state until the 1970s, has (in part, as a result of twenty-eight years of neo-liberal economic policies) turned into a corrupt quasi-military state that is supported by drug cartels.371 For decades, Mexicans were primarily involved in transporting Colombian cocaine, or the Colombians would transport it directly into the United States via speedboats or airplanes.372 However, when the United States began choking off Colombia’s main smuggling routes and working with the Colombian government to combat the Medellin and Cali drug cartels, Colombian cartels began to rely on Mexican smugglers, who operated in vast and difficult to monitor border areas and the Eastern Pacific Ocean.373 Within a short time, Mexican cartels had                                                           366 Alex S. Wilner, “Counter-Capability and Counter-Motivation: A Counterterrorism Strategy for Canada,” in David S. McDonough, ed., Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012): 282.   367 Theresa, Khorasan Group Shows, 1. 368 Anar Valiyev, “Urban Terrorism: Do Terrorists Target Cities and Why,” (PhD diss., University of Louisville, 2007), 16, ProQuest (3267111).    369 Kamala D. Harris, “Gangs Beyond Borders,” California Attorney General Report, March 2014, 2. https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/toc/report_2014.pdf. 370 Bland and MacDonald,  Canada’s Defence and Security, 234.  371 James Cockcroft, “Mexico: Failed States, New Wars, Resistance,” Monthly Review, Vol. 62. No. 6 (2010): 28. http://monthlyreview.org/2010/11/01/mexico-failed-states-new-wars-resistance/.  372 Ashley Fantz, “The Mexican Drug Wars: Bodies for Billions,” CNN, January 20, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/15/world/mexico-drug-war-essay/. 373 Fantz, The Mexican Drug Wars, 1.  57  achieved unrivalled dominance of the global drug trade.374 Mexican cartels also benefit from the neoliberal business models adopted by Colombian cartels.  Colombian cartels, for instance, seeking to reduce the risk of interdiction, outsource their distribution routes to other cartels, including Mexican cartels―a business strategy that has proven to be very lucrative for Colombian drug lords.375  While most of the violence has remained in Mexico, where as many as 60,000 people have died over the last eight years, the growing power of Mexican cartels has facilitated the growth of street gangs with cartel ties throughout the United States. These cartels also have very sophisticated transportation methods with respect to ports of entry and their rural borders.376  More recently, Mexican cartel activity has been detected at the Canada-US border.  Mexican cartels, for instance, have recently relied on members of the Alberta Mennonite community to smuggle cocaine across the border.377 Two-way trafficking in the British Columbia border region, in particular, has given rise to gang violence as Canadian gang members fight for control over the importation of cocaine (which is supervised by Mexican cartels) and the export of the province's hydroponic marijuana―British Columbia's third largest industry behind tourism and logging.378  Although these are all crucial developments, Canadian research regarding the effects of such trends and the realities of Canada’s security environment is weak, and the linkage between domestic and transnational networks is rarely acknowledged in academic research.379                                                              374 Ibid.   375 Mike Pottenger, “TheTrue Cost of Cocaine,” The Conversation, February 21, 2013, http://theconversation.com/the-true-cost-of-cocaine-11992. 376 Harris, Gangs Beyond Borders, 38-39.   377 Meghan Grant,  “Mennonite Ties to Mexican Drug Cartels Years in the Making,” CBC, April 30, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/mennonite-ties-to-mexican-drug-cartels-years-in-the-making-1.262631.   378 Borderpol, “Security Matters,” No. 35, July, 2009, 7, http://www.borderpol.org/images/BSM_Issue_35_August_2009.pdf.  379 Sheptycki, Transnational Organized Crime, 65, 66, 70. 58  The South Okanagan Border Region and the Osoyoos Port of Entry The Osoyoos port of entry operates on a rise of desert land amidst rolling, bunch grass hills, the international Lake Osoyoos (“one of British Columbia’s most popular destinations”),380 and the Okanagan highlands of the South Okanagan Valley.  It is one of seventeen ports of entry that operate in the Okanagan and Kootenay District, a sub-region of the Northwest Pacific region.381 The port of Osoyoos is the largest and busiest port in the Okanagan and Kootenay District, offering 24/7 year-round service.  It is a joint Canada-US border facility on Highway 97, serving the interior of British Columbia into the Okanagan Valley on the Canadian side and the central region of Washington State on the American side, and is considered a medium crossing by the CBSA.382  Nearly all the large communities in the Okanagan Valley, such as Kelowna, one of Canada’s fastest growing cities, lie within a two-hour drive of the border, while driving times to major cities, such as Vancouver, Seattle, or Spokane are four and a half to eight hours.383   The port of Osoyoos, like other ports of entry situated along the Canada-US boundary line, is often crowded by a dense procession of traffic, particularly on summer weekends, when long lines of vehicles wait (often for an hour or more) to pass through a regiment of electronic scanners and vehicle barriers and to be inspected by an array of armed Border Services Officers (BSO).384  BSOs perform a broad range of tasks, including the collection of custom duties, reducing cross-border disease spread, and carrying out counter-crime and counter-terror mandates.  Meanwhile, long stretches of empty hills, highlands, and mountains mark the rural border as the built environment of the small resort town of Osoyoos and the Osoyoos Indian Band Reserve gives way to desert scenes of sagebrush, antelope brush, cactus, ponderosa pine,                                                           380 K.C. Mehaffey, “Agents Patrol Lake Osoyoos for Border Crossers,” North Jersey News, August 18, 2013. www.northjersey.com/news/crime_courts/220109911_Agents_patrol_Lake_Osoyoos_for_border_crossers.html?page=all. 381 CBSA, “Distribution of CBSA Offices,” September 2013: 5, http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/menu-eng.html.   382 Truck News, “New Joint Border Facility Opens at 49th Parallel,” October 18, 2003,  http://www.trucknews.com/regulations/new-joint-border-facility-opens-on-49th-parallel-2/1000010679 383 Our Okanagan, “Okanagan Valley Regional Profile,” 2. 1-39. http://www.ourokanagan.ca/assets/files/OK%20VALLEY%20PROFILE.pdf.  384 St. John, Line in the Sand, 1.  59  and cottonwood385―an area monitored by the Osoyoos RCMP “E” Division detachment, the only regional detachment with border enforcement (including marine enforcement on Lake Osoyoos) as a police priority.   Incorporated in 1946, the town of Osoyoos, drawn from ‘Souyoos,’ a Syilx’tsn indigenous name that refers to the natural ford that is now bridged by Highway 3, is a recreational and agricultural hot-spot with a population of approximately 5,000 people.386 The Development of Border Control in Osoyoos  In the early nineteenth century there was no border control in the South Okanagan region, a pocket desert with favorable climatic conditions that has been inhabited by the Silyx’ (Okanagan) people for thousands of years.  Through the Treaty of 1818, both the United States and Great Britain exercised joint occupancy and the right of entry into the area.387 Consequently, long before the border existed as a legal and physical entity,388  missionaries, settlers, Silyx’ people, and fur traders had unfettered mobility throughout the area.  Osoyoos, for instance, under the jurisdiction of the colonial government of British Columbia, was part of a lucrative fur trade that was originally controlled by the Pacific Fur Company; however, in 1821, after a series of mergers, control was transferred over to the Hudson’s Bay Company.389 Once a year, until 1846, when the Canadian-American boundary was determined through the Oregon Treaty process, the Company’s employees rode up and down the long Fur Brigade Trail                                                           385 Dorothy Fraser, “Flora,” Osoyoos and District Museum and Archives, accessed October 30, 2014, http://osoyoosmuseum.ca/index.php/about-us/history-of-osoyoos/a-history-and-description-of-osoyoos?showall=&start=8.  386 Visitor’s Choice, “A Look at Osoyoos,” accessed October 30, 2014, http://www.visitors-info.com/explore-okanagan-valley/articles/osoyoos-features/item/a-look-at-osoyoos.   387 Katy Lacey,  “Osoyoos as a Customs Port,” Osoyoos and District Museum and Archives, accessed October 30, 2014, http://osoyoosmuseum.ca/customs.html.   388 St. John, Line in the Sand, 2.  389 Dorothy Fraser, “The Fur Brigade Trail,” in Osoyoos and District Museum and Archives, accessed October 30, 2014, http://osoyoosmuseum.ca/html. 60  between Fort Okanagan (i.e., Brewster, Washington) and Kamloops390―always stopping at Osoyoos to rest.391   In 1861, gold was discovered at nearby Rock Creek, which drew thousands of miners (and their supplies) from the United States. They were well-armed and often evinced a tendency to take the law into their own hands.392 In response to the influx of miners (as well as the risk of annexation by the United States), Governor James Douglas sought to increase law and order and maintain a government presence in the remote part of the colony.  As such, he sent two members of the Constabulary to the South Okanagan area.  In 1860, a Customs Port of Entry was established in Osoyoos under the direction of Gold Commissioner/Customs Collector J.C. Haynes. Haynes was also responsible for settling the boundaries of Sylix’ land―which had been increasingly encroached upon by ranchers and irrevocably severed by the Canadian-American boundary line in 1846.393  Moreover, based on Governor Douglas’ Southern Boundary Act of 1860, any “‘goods, wares, animals, or merchandise,’” could be imported anywhere along the Canadian-American boundary line as long as a qualified customs officer was paid the applicable duties.394 In 1871, British Columbia joined the Confederation of Canada, and its Customs came under federal control, while its law enforcement remained under the control of the British Columbia Provincial Police―which was eventually absorbed by the federal government in 1950.395  In 1930, Federal Customs operations in Osoyoos began to share its space with the Federal Department of Immigration, created in 1929.  At the same time, improvements in irrigation and the availability of land attracted orchardists to the area, resulting in a flourishing                                                           390 Ibid.   391 Dorothy Fraser, “Ranching Days,” in Osoyoos and District Museum and Archives, accessed October 30, 2014, http://osoyoosmuseum.ca/html.  392 Monashee Almanac, “The World in 1862,” http://monasheealmanac.homestead.com/index.html/2-Copyright.html. 393 Fraser, Ranching Days, 1.  394 Lacey, Osoyoos as a Customs Port, 1.   395 “British Columbia Provincial Police,” Collections Canada, Government of Canada, accessed October 30, 2014, http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/eppp-archive/100/202/300/inditer/2000/07-31/bcpolice/bcp.htm.  61  and rapidly expanding fruit industry―making Osoyoos a regional distribution node.396 In addition, because the Kettle Valley Railway ended ten miles away from Osoyoos, the town remained the South Okanagan Valley’s “bucolic background,” an ideal place for profiteers who smuggled Canadian whiskey into the United States during the Prohibition era (1920-1933).397 Significantly, these smuggling routes, such as the well-known “Whiskey Trail,” lie in close proximity to Osoyoos and continue to be well-used by present-day drug and gun smugglers.398  Smuggling along the Canada-US boundary line was relatively easy given that the American government had few border inspection stations. However, as the government established more stations to increase its anti-smuggling efforts, bootleggers had to adjust to dealing with the U.S. Border Patrol.399  Since 1996, when Canada and the US formed the first integrated border enforcement team (IBET) in British Columbia, border officials from the RCMP, CBSA, US Customs and Border Protection, US Border Patrol, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and US Coast Guard have worked together to combat illicit transboundary movement in the province.400   In 1952, reflecting of the growing importance of the Crowsnest Highway (an extension of Highway 3 east) and Highway 97 for commercial trucking routes, the port of Osoyoos was further developed to include specific lanes for buses, travelers, and trucks, along with warehouse space, cells with barred windows, and search rooms.401 This building served the Osoyoos/Oroville border area until 2003, when under the umbrella of the Canada-United States Accord on Our Shared Border a joint Oroville, Washington/Osoyoos, British Columbia facility                                                           396 D.M. Wilson, “Osoyoos, B.C.: History,” The Virtual Crowsnest Highway, accessed October 31, 2014, http://www.crowsnest-highway.ca/cgi-bin/citypage.pl?city=osoyoos.   397 Monashee Almanac,  The World in 1862, 1.   398 The Keremeos Review, “CN BC: RCMP Provide Border Patrols on the Canadian Side of the 49th Parallel,” November 19, 2009.   399 J. Anne Funderburg, Bootleggers and Beer Barons of the Prohibition Era, (Jefferson, 2014): 257.  400 Tech b.e.a.t, “Ibeting on a Secure Border,” National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center, Fall (2000): 1.    401 Lacey, Osoyoos as a Customs Port, 1.  62  was constructed.  Most notably, the transition from ranching (which relied on Sylx’ labour) to fruit farming402 throughout the 1950’s resulted in a severe shortage of local crop harvesters, leading to the migration of ethnic groups from non-traditional source countries (e.g., Portugual) and eventually the implementation of Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) in 2004403―though the program has been operating in other provinces since 1966.   Since 2004, Canada’s guest worker program has brought some 3,000 workers, mainly Mexican and Jamaican, to British Columbia, with roughly half working in the Okanagan Valley (the remainder is in the Fraser Valley area of Greater Vancouver).404 Meanwhile, Washington State relies less on the United States’ guest worker program, and more on the labour of illegal Mexican migrants.405  Regrettably, such programs, and presumably the presence of illegal Mexican migrants in Washington create new security risks.  Since, for instance, Mexican cartels are focused on infiltrating diaspora communities, illegal Mexican migrants can act as couriers, providing Mexican cartels with greater access to Canadian territory for carrying out their nefarious activities.  Local media reports have noted that Mexican nationals have been caught smuggling cocaine across the rural border from Washington to areas in close proximity to Osoyoos.406 More recently, three drug traffickers, including a Mexican national, were convicted following a 2010 seizure of 97 kilograms of cocaine.  Although the cocaine was intercepted by                                                           402 Wolfgang Depner and Carlos Teixeira, “Welcoming Communities? An Assessment of Community Services in Attracting and Retaining Immigrants in the South Okanagan Valley (British Columbia, Canada), with Policy Recommendations.” The Journal of Rural and Community Development, Vol 7. No. 2 (2012): 78.     403 Royal BC Museum, “VII. The Portuguese: 1955-1960s,” accessed October 31, 2014,  http://142.36.5.21/thomp-ok/ethnic-agri/portuguese.html.  404 Wendy Stueck, “Mexican Labourers Keep BC Wine Flowing,” The Globe and Mail, October 11, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/mexican-labourers-keep-bc-wine-flowing/article4179529/.  405 Lornet Turnbull and Anna Boiko-Weyrauch, “Striking Farm Workers Afraid of Guest-Worker Program,” Seattle Times, July 23, 2013, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2021456869_migrantworkersxml.html; Seattle Times, “Facts About the Washington Farming Industry,” June 18, 2000, http://seattletimes.com/special/mexico/stories/mex1c.html.  406 Osoyoos Times,  “Mexican Man Faces Sentencing in Cocaine Seizure,” May 8, 2014, http://www.omakchronicle.com/news/2014/may/14/man-be-sentenced-cocaine-bust-border/. 63  CBSA at the Vancouver’s International Airport, the drugs were Kelowna-bound and concealed within a fruit-crushing machine.407 In general, increased enforcement at ports of entry at the Canada-US boundary since 9/11, assisted by the centralization of border management and the technological border revolution, has resulted in more remote border areas being used for human traffickers/smugglers― though entry into Canada “is still most often via regular travel routes with migrants posing as tourists.”408 The South Okanagan border region is also not immune to human trafficking/smuggling in more remote areas.  In 2006, an attempt to smuggle ten Korean nationals (eight females and two males) into the United States for the purposes of sex trafficking was intercepted in the Osoyoos border area as a result of information received from the Osoyoos RCMP and IBET.409 Besides ongoing training (mainly online) provided to Border Services Officers at the Osoyoos port of entry, the CBSA is also actively involved in Public Safety Canada programs, such as the National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking and Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy.  However, significant underresourcing at the Osoyoos port of entry and the Osoyoos RCMP detachment curtails the ability of these agencies to carry out their mandates, and is thus a major impediment in relation to counter-terrorism and the interdiction of drugs, arms, and human trafficking/smuggling at the international border―a far-reaching security vulnerability.  Summary This overview has provided a history of modern border security within Western civilization from ancient times to the present day to demonstrate the consistent link between borders and the national and public security of political communities. The historical review of the Canada-US border reveals that while Americans view the border as a protective institution,                                                           407 Sergeant Laura White, “Drug Traffickers Convicted in Kelowna,” Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP),  October 14, 2014, http://bc.cb.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=50&languageId=1&contentId=39148.  408 Perrin, Trafficking in Persons, 33.  409 Osoyoos Times, “Smuggled Koreans Caught at the Osoyoos Border Crossing,” June 21, 2006, http://www.osoyoostimes.com/smuggled-koreans-caught-at-osoyoos-border-crossing/. 64  Canadians sees it as an economic institution, and are therefore more likely to emphasize the economic facilitation element of Canada-US border agreements.  Contrarily, contemporary border-related efforts at the Canada-US boundary line are designed to increase security, but the rise of neo-liberal governance within the Canada Border Services Agency interferes with the allocation of sufficient resources, perceptions of security realities, and broader information gathering.  Canada’s strategic tradition was also discussed to highlight the historical lack of strategic acumen in Canadian security policies, and the need for a greater emphasis on the direct security of Canadian territory in light of the changing global threat environment. Finally, the Osoyoos port of entry was analyzed “to capture the state from below” through a systematic consideration of local security vulnerabilities and through an analysis of local processes of border management.410                                                                       410 Chaflin,  Neo-liberal Frontiers, 46.  65  Chapter Three: Methodology The security environment in which this research was carried out largely determined the methodology chosen for this study.411  Several aspects of this study were highly constrained both by government secrecy regarding transnational security threats and by border operations in general.412  In some cases, there was a notable reluctance to share information regarding border-related security issues.  For this reason, this investigation was conducted primarily through a qualitative research strategy, wherein a variety of factors were examined to produce a contextually appropriate portrait of border-related security vulnerabilities in the South Okanagan that was confirmatory and both descriptive and interpretive in nature.413  Linking Theory with Methods As a starting point, theories offer “a way of looking at the world and of understanding human interaction.”414 The infrastructural power of theories lies in their ability to explain a wide variety of phenomena. More concisely, they assist in answering the how and why questions we have regarding patterns we observe in everyday life.415 Consequently, classical realism, conventional constructivism, and neo-Gramscianism not only assisted in framing my research question, but these theories also provided the basis for my chosen methodology.  More specifically, because each theory operates within different paradigms, “each with its own unique ontological and epistemological perspective,” it was necessary to choose methods that accommodated analytically distinct paradigms.416 To illustrate, classical realism emphasizes deductive knowledge, objectivity, and knowability, while conventional constructivism holds that truth is socially constructed, varying, and constantly changing.  Conversely, neo-Gramscianism                                                           411 Bradbury, An Assessment of the Free, 368.   412Ibid.    413 Hataley, Constructing Border Security, 17; William Gibson, Working With Qualitative Data, Chapter 6,    414 Amy Blackstone, Principles of Sociological Inquiry―Qualitative and Quantitative Methods (Washington, D.C.: Flat World Education Incorporation, 2012): Chapter Two.  415 Blackstone, Principles of Sociological Inquiry, Chapter Two.  416 Ibid. 66  emphasizes inequality, power, and social change.417 Making sense of vulnerabilities in border security therefore was in large part shaped by theoretical assumptions that led to compatible methods. Qualitative Introduction  Qualitative research considers a research problem through worldviews, theoretical lenses and assumptions that explore the meaning that individuals ascribe to diverse experiences.418  It is also appropriate when investigating the nature and scope of transnational threats within a specific geographical area,419 or when detailed information about a complex issue is sought,420 such as the vulnerabilities in border security.  Qualitative research is therefore well-suited to the analysis of border security in relation to human trafficking/smuggling and terrorist infiltration, which exhibit ambiguity, uncertainty, complexity and high volatility.421           For the purposes of this study, statistical information in relation to the number of illicit border crossers is not relied upon as a significant data source.  Numerical significance is outweighed by the inherent unreliability of statistics involving illicit networks, which are estimates at best,422 and by the fact that they cannot measure future or potential threats.  Reliance on such data as a method would be ineffective in identifying the security vulnerabilities of the Osoyoos port of entry in relation to illicit transnational threats; therefore, this study refrained from systematic consideration of quantitative data analysis.                                                           417 Ibid.  418 J.W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, 2007): 15.   419 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research.   420 Ibid.   421 Major Blair S. Williams, “Heuristics and Biases in Military Decision Making,” Military Review, Vol. 90. No. 5 (2010): 40.  422 Khalid Koser, “Dimensions and Dynamics of Irregular Migration,” Population, Space, and Place, no. 16 (2010): 181, 183, 187; Kalacska, Technological Integration as a Means, 4. 67  Single Case Study The qualitative research strategy most compatible with the research objectives of this study was the single case study, which has “a long distinguished history.”423  This is a common research strategy within political science,424 and it helped to overcome some of the limitations of governmental secrecy mentioned above.  As Yin argues, for instance, case study methodology permits the prior development of theoretical propositions to govern the data collection and analysis.425  A single case study is a “highly productive,”426 empirical inquiry which investigates a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context.427 Accordingly, this research strategy considers context to be an essential part of the phenomenon being studied.428  The primary intent behind a case study approach is to understand a problem or an issue “using the case as a specific illustration.”429 More specifically, a case study approach makes it possible to focus on a particular problem or issue within distinct spatial contexts.430 Case study methodology has many strengths, such as the ability to trace changes over time,431 explore contextual conditions,432 and deal with a broad range of evidence,433 including                                                           423 Creswell, Qualitiative Inquiry and Research Design, 73.  424 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd ed. (London, 1988): 1.   425 Robert K. Yin, Case study research: Design and methods, 3rd ed., (Thousand Oaks, CA,2003):13-14.   426 Lyn Richards, Handling Qualitative Data, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles, 2010,2011): 180.  427 Yin, Case Study Research, 13.   428 Robert K.  Yin, “The Case Method as a Tool for Doing Evaluations,” Current Sociology, Vol. 40, No. 1 (1992):128.  429 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research, 73.   430 Ibid., 74.  431 Bradbury,  An Assessment of the Free, 368.   432 Yin, Case Study Research: Design, 3rd ed., 13.    433 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 5th ed. (London, 2013): Third Chapter. J.W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA, 2003): 20; Creswell, Qualitiative Inquiry and Research, 73. 68  observations, physical archives, interviews, documents, quantitative data analysis, audio-visual materials,  and archival records434―most of which were fully pursued in this study.  Geographically limiting this case study to only one of the 132 ports of entry along the Canada-US border was advantageous for a variety of reasons.  First, and most importantly, it made the study easier to manage.  Second, the border and the different types and amount of illicit trafficking and smuggling are markedly different in the western border region compared to the central or eastern border regions, and these differences are important for border operations.435  For example, most human smuggling activity in Canada occurs at border crossings in British Columbia.436 Third, there is no prior academic research on the security vulnerabilities with respect to the Osoyoos port of entry ―despite its long history of intercepting drugs, arms and human trafficking in transit437 and its status as the busiest border crossing in the Okanagan and Kootenay regions.438  Finally, the western border region has a reputation for being committed to “creative problem-solving and innovative perspectives in bi-national cooperation”439―for example, in 1996, Canada and the US formed the first integrated border enforcement team in British Columbia to combat illicit transboundary movement, while British Columbia and Washington State jointly developed the BC-Washington Enhanced Drivers’ License project. Implemented in 2008, this uses enhanced driver’s licenses as a valid alternative to passports at sea and land border crossings.440                                                             434 Robert K. Yin, Case study research: Design and methods, 1st ed. (Beverly Hills, 1984):13; Creswell, Qualitiative Inquiry and Research Design, 75. 435 Kalacska, Technological Integration As A Means, 12; Deborah W. Meyers, “Border Management at the Millennium,” The American Review of Canadian Studies, Vol.30. No. 2 (2000): 255.    436 Benjamin Perrin, Invisible Chains (Toronto, 2011): 47.   437 Perrin, Invisible Chains, 182. Migration Dialogue, “Smartborder Action Plan Status Report,” December 17, 2004, https://migration.ucdavis.edu/.html.  438 Paul Everest, “Local Residents Say More Canada-Bound Lanes Should Be Open At Border,” Osoyoos Times, October 6, 2009, www.news@osoyoostimes.com.html. 439 Bradbury, Are Enhanced Trade, 319.  69  Ethical Concerns    Confidentiality.  I attend to confidentiality throughout all stages of the research process as stipulated by the University of British Columbia’s Behavioral Research Ethics Board Guidelines, which states in Section #8 that “researchers have an ethical duty of confidentiality―an obligation to safeguard information entrusted to them by protecting these data from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, loss or theft.”441 For face-to-face interviews, before the interview date, participants were emailed informed consent forms that explained the principle of confidentiality.  Those who participated by responding to a set of questionnaires via email also received emailed informed consent forms.   Consent. In addition, as senior civil servants, all of the participants received a formal letter of introduction and a research study introduction letter broadly describing the research study via email.442 The introduction letter outlines the purpose of my research, why the Osoyoos port of entry was chosen as a research site, and what academic insights were to be gained from the study.443  See Appendix A and B respectively.  Although participants were well-informed experts who occupy “locally powerful”444 positions with the resources, power, and expertise to control information, each participant also received an informed consent form that emphasized the participant’s risks, benefits, rights and other information that the participant needed to be aware of in order to participate in this research study.445 See Appendix C for a copy of the participant informed consent form.                                                                                                                                                                                            440 Tech b.e.a.t, “Ibeting on a Secure Border,” National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center, Fall (2000): 1; Governor Chris Gregoire and Premier Gordon Campbell, “The British Columbia/Washington State Partnership On Enhanced Driver’s Licences,” Canadian Parliamentary Review, (Spring, 2008): 3, 4. http://www.revparl.ca/31/1/31n1_08e_Gregoire-Campbell.pdf. 2-5  441 UBC, Behavioral Ethics Application Guidance Notes, (July 2013):37. http://research.ubc.ca/ore/breb-forms-guidance-notes.   442 Kenneth Goldstein, “Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviews,” Political Science and Politics, Vol.  35. No. 4 (2002): 671; Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research, 125.  443 Creswell, Qualitative Inquire and Research, 125  444 Sarah Neal and Eugene Mclaughlin, “Researching Up? Interviews, Emotionality, and Policy-Making Elites,” Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 38. No. 4 (2009): 694.  70  Research Procedures Recruitment. The purposive sampling for this research study drew from the security community in the South Okanagan.  Purposive sampling involves selecting participants who meet the criteria needed for the research project.446  The criteria that were used to the extent possible for research purposes, were that the participant must (1) have experience and expertise with border-related security issues; (2) be working within the province of British Columbia or the Okanagan Valley; (3) have at least five years of experience in law enforcement or border-related security issues; and, (4) be working within significant a Canadian or American security or law enforcement agency with border-related missions or duties.  Accordingly, I built a primary sampling frame using the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) websites. From this sampling frame, I located the necessary contact information for the experts in charge of the Osoyoos port of entry, the Osoyoos RCMP detachment, the RCMP Victim Services in the Okanagan, and―as a result of snowball networking447―experts who are a part of the Federal Border Integrity Program with respect to human trafficking and the Federal Serious and Organized Crime (FSOC) branch, as well as a representative from the US Homeland Security Investigations (HIS) agency.  Overall, despite the fact that access was not easily obtained, six senior representatives officially participated in the research study and the criteria were easily met. Two senior representatives consented to face-to-face interviews, while four senior representatives filled out questionnaires via email. I was also able to gain access to important information as a result of personal contacts with expert individuals who carry out senior responsibilities within Canada Border Service Agency at the Osoyoos port of entry.  Since these individuals were not officially                                                                                                                                                                                            445 Irving Seidman, Interviewing as Qualitiative Research, 3rd ed., (New York, 2006 ): 61, 62.  446 Greg Guest, Arwen Bunce, and Lawrence Johnson, “How Many Interviews Are Enough?: An Experiment with Data Saturation and Variability,” Field Methods, Vol.18. No. 1 (2006): 61, 62. 59-82.   447 Kim Sowon, “Network Enablers, Constraints, and Dynamics: A Qualitative Analysis,” Career Development International, Vol 18. No. 2 (2013): 123; Kenneth Goldstein, “Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviews,” Political Science and Politics, Vol. 35. No. 4 (2002): 671.  71  participants, but rather collaborators,448 the information they voluntarily provided is cited as anecdotal evidence.  Anecdotal evidence, which often accompanies case-based research, is compelling to the extent that it offers new insights and opens up new investigative directions.449 Participants are not identified in the final thesis due to the difficulty of gaining access to security experts.  Participants are designated as Respondents, while collaborators are designated as sources of anecdotal information.   Interviewing.  All interviews were semi-structured450 and audio recorded451 with the permission of participants, with written notes also taken to guard against recording mishaps. Before I started the interview, I informed participants of the interview procedures.  After signing the consent forms, the interviews were carried out without any problems.   Data Collection.  This case study used a two-step approach to data collection, which required engagement with the relevant literature and documents for many months prior to conducting on-site observations in and around the town of Osoyoos and expert interviews.452   To assist in both phases of data collection, I kept a detailed notebook to record the dominant themes that emerged from the relevant literature, documents and raw data, and to chronicle my thinking and perceptions throughout the entire research process.453 The second phase consisted of a single, in-depth interview or a single, in-depth questionnaire.  The taped interviews were 30 to 60 minutes long with the use of semi-structured questions.454 During the first phase, and after each interview and the return of each questionnaire in the second phase, I                                                           448 Sandra Kirby and Kate McKenna, Experience, Research, Social Change, Methods from the Margins, (Toronto, 1989): 104.   449 Editorial, “Anecdotal Evidence,” Scandinavian Journal of Management, Vol.9 No. 2 (1993): 86.   450 Neil Stephens, “Collecting Data From Elites and Ultra-Elites: Telephone and Face-To-Face Interviews with Macroeconomists,” Qualitative Research Vol.7. No. 2 (2007): 206.  451 Robert Mikecz, “Interviewing Elites: Addressing Methodological Issues,” Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 18. No. 6 (2012): 488.  452 Yin, Case Study Research 3rd ed., 27-29; Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology,” Qualitative Research in Psychology, No. 3, (2006): 84.   453 Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, 202.  454 Neil Stephens, “Collecting Data From Elites and Ultra-Elites: Telephone and Face-To-Face Interviews with Macroeconomists,” Qualitative Research, Vol. 7. No. 2 (2007): 206. 72  immediately documented all relevant information.  It was only necessary to transcribe one interview, which took roughly six hours, as the other interview lasted only 30 minutes and as the conversation was unhurried, I was able to write everything down beside the written questions I held in my hand. Since the other participants filled out questionnaires and sent them back via email, questionnaires did not need to be transcribed.  Data Analysis Method:  ‘Theoretical’ Thematic Analysis In a single case study, data analysis is an ongoing process that is not distinctly divided from other activities related to the research process, such as developing a research question or collecting data.455  In other words, data analysis is not a “linear” process, but rather a “recursive” process, where movement is back and forth as required.456 Throughout both phases of my research, all data sets were analyzed using ‘theoretical’ thematic analysis with a focus on identifying the explicit meaning of the data.457 ‘Theoretical’ thematic analysis is not only analyst-driven, but also an accessible and flexible form of analysis that is useful within a variety of theoretical frameworks―both normative and critical.458  For instance, thematic analysis uses a deductive approach, which allowed me to analyze the data through the theoretical lenses of classical realism, conventional constructivism, and neo-Gramscianism.  The goal of ‘theoretical’ thematic analysis is to interpret, that is, to theorize the significance of the themes within the data and their broader meanings and implications in relation to previous literature.459 Consequently, this case study used a two-step approach to data analysis, which required engagement with the relevant literature and documents prior to conducting field observations in and around the town of Osoyoos and expert interview and questionnaires.460  First, for                                                           455 Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, 190.   456 Braun and Clarke, Using Thematic Analysis, 86.   457 Ibid., 84.   458 Ibid., 81, 84.   459 Ibid., 84.   460 Yin,  Case Study Research, 3rd ed.,  27- 29.  73  example, data from reliable governmental sources, such as the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) were analyzed to identify national (and bi-national) goals and concerns regarding border security.  Further, literature on the history of the Canada-US border was analyzed to trace aspects of American and Canadian border security that have been  consistent over time.  These datasets were used after the interviews and questionnaires were conducted to determine whether the material and human resources at the Osoyoos port of entry corresponded with the larger goals of the border in relation to illicit cross-border movement.  These datasets also helped guide the specific questions directed toward participants regarding the internal operations of security agencies at the border.  Second, fieldwork was undertaken in the form of expert interviews and questionnaires to obtain facts on the current situation of border management and illicit cross-border movement. General and limited observation of the Osoyoos port of entry and the town of Osoyoos was conducted to re-familiarize myself with the border area―an area that I have often travelled through when my destination is located on the American side of the border.    Description of Phases. Braun and Clarke conduct thematic analysis for both normative and critical theoretical frameworks using six stages.  In my analysis I followed Braun and Clarke’s steps of analysis:  1. Familiarized myself with the data. 2.  Generated initial codes. 3.  Searched for themes. 4. Reviewed themes. 5. Defined and named themes. 6. Produced the report.  Most importantly, overall interpretation of the data was consistent with the theoretical frameworks used in my research study.461 As Braun and Clarke note, “thematic analysis has limited interpretative power beyond mere description if it is not used within an existing                                                           461 Braun and Clarke, Using Thematic Analysis,  95.  74  theoretical framework that anchors the analytic claims that are made.”462 During my data analysis, when I was reading through academic literature, governmental documents, archives, interview transcripts or questionnaires, I would focus on the searching the whole, individual data item for themes relating to my three theoretical frameworks and my specific research question before focusing on the smaller parts of the individual data item to search for sub-themes.  For instance: (1) with respect to classical realism, I could theorize experience, meaning, and the reality of participants in a straightforward manner, since a simple, predominately unidirectional relationship is assumed between language, meaning, and experience;463 (2) with respect to conventional constructivism, experience and meaning are socially constructed, rather than inhering within individuals; thus, my thematic analysis for constructivism focused on the sociocultural context, and the structural conditions that generate the individual accounts of participants;464  (3) with respect to neo-Gramscianism,  which seeks to untangle reality, I focused on how participants make meaning of their experience, and, in turn, how the broader economic context impinges on those meanings.465 As my dataset grew, I continued to look for patterns (themes) across the dataset, but I also searched for inconsistencies within and across data items.466  In general, raw data was analyzed at least twelve times, many times with a different analytic objective to accommodate my three theoretical frameworks.  Overall, I identified five prevalent themes―with prevalence counted in terms of the number of expert participants (and collaborators) who articulated the theme, across the entire data set or within a data item.467                                                               462 Ibid., 97.  463 Ibid., 81, 85.  464 Ibid., 85.  465 Ibid., 81.  466 Ibid., 89.   467 Ibid., 82. 75  Evaluation of the Research Yin provides criteria to assess the trustworthiness of qualitative case studies. Trustworthiness is organized into four, well-defined avenues,468 namely, construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability:  (1) Construct Validity: Construct validity refers to “the extent to which a study investigates what it claims to investigate,” that is, the extent to which a research procedure generates an accurate observation of reality.469  Construct validity is established by using multiple sources of evidence, cultivating a chain of evidence, and having a key informant review the draft of the research study.  In using multiple sources of evidence, the aim is to “amass converging evidence and to triangulate over a given fact.”470 I used six sources of evidence, namely, on-site observations of the town of Osoyoos and the Osoyoos port of entry (both physically and through Google Instant Street View), physical archives (such as the Osoyoos Museum), interviews and questionnaires, documents, audio-visual materials (i.e., photographs and videotapes regarding the South Okanagan), and archival records . Moreover, steps taken to increase construct validity included the creation of an evidence ‘trail’471 or a formal, case-study database throughout the data collection phase, whereby archival documents and records were organized in retrievable form, detailed notebooks were always on hand, and tabular materials, such as American and Canadian conceptual and hierarchical relationship models of border security as well as maps, were posted along one section of my study wall.472 As Yin notes, an evidence ‘trail’ allows a reader to reconstruct how the researcher progressed from the original research question to the final                                                           468 Yin, The Case Study Method as a Tool, 124.   469 Michael Gibbert, Winfried Ruigrok, and Barbara Wciki,  “What Passes As a Rigorous Case Study?” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 29. No. 13 (2008): 1466.   470 Robert K. Yin, “Enhancing the Quality of Case Studies Within Health Services Research,” HSR, Health Services Research, Vol. 34, No. 5 (1999): 1217.   471 Sangeeta Mookherji and Anne Lafond, “Strategies to Maximize Generalization from Multiple Case Studies: Lessons From the Africa Routine Immunization System,” Evaluation, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2013): 296.   472 Yin, The Case Study Method as a Tool, 132.  76  conclusions.473  In addition, although case-study research is perceived as being more subjective than other qualitative research strategies to the extent that researchers have close and direct personal contact with participants and organizations, the security environment in which my research was conducted did not enable me to develop close relationships with participants.  Consequently, it was not difficult to refrain from subjective judgments throughout the research process, which served to greatly improve construct validity.474 (2) Internal Validity:  Internal validity refers to the data analysis phase and how well the researcher provides logical reasoning that is “powerful and compelling enough to defend the research conclusions.”475 Steps taken to strengthen internal validity during this research include an emphasis on qualitative methods, a research framework, pattern matching, and theory triangulation.  First, as Yin notes, qualitative methods can be useful for ruling out alternative explanations or “some other identifiable influence in the contextual environment” and may permit stronger causal inferences.476  Second, my research frame was explicitly derived from security literature, such as CBSA’s Reports on Plans and Priorities, the Ministry of Justice’s Police Resources in British Columbia, IBET Threat Assessment reports, South Okanagan-Similkameen RCMP Detachment Status Reports, and the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security’s (SECU) parliamentary Evidence transcripts, and other relevant documents that pertained to classical realism, conventional constructivism, and neo-Gramscianism.  Third, pattern matching was achieved by comparing empirically observed patterns in phase two of my data analysis with my initial propositions and with predicted patterns identified in phase one of my data analysis.  Fourth, theory triangulation enabled me to verify findings by adopting multiple                                                            473 Yin, Case Study Research: Design, 2nd ed., 102.   474 Riege,  Validity and Reliability in Case Study Research, 80.  475 Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wciki, What Passes As a Rigorous, 1466.  476 Robert K. Yin,  “Validity and Generalization in Future Case Study Evaluation,” Evaluation, Vol. 19. No. 3 (2013): 323.   77  perspectives.477 Finally, another step taken to increase internal validity involved meeting with my supervisor to discuss data collection, which allowed me to ask questions and address any concerns.478  (3)  External Validity:  According to Yin, external validity or ‘generalizability’ is based on the idea that theories must be “shown to account for phenomena not only in the setting in which they are studied, but also in other settings.”479 In other words, the goal is to “generate results that are meaningful and relevant as far beyond [a] study’s focal ‘population’ as reasonable.”480 In accordance with Yin, external validity in my research study is preserved first by meeting the conditions of construct and internal validity,481 and second by using established theory in making analytic generalizations.  For example, by comparing my findings with the related research literature,482  I aimed to increase the explanatory weight of my analysis by not only identifying what the security vulnerabilities were, but also by presenting an explanation about how and why these security vulnerabilities occur.483  Using deductive logic, my “empirically derived” framework identified (1) pre-conditions (i.e., historical border philosophies and processes and neo-liberal economic policies); (2) contextual conditions (i.e., an under-resourced security community and a robust criminal infrastructure); and, (3) drivers (i.e., transnational security threats, such as terrorism and human smuggling/trafficking that drive improvements in border security).484 Based on these                                                           477 Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wciki, What Passes As a Rigorous, 1466.  478 Andreas M. Riege, “Validity and Reliability in Case Study Research: A Literature Review With ‘Hands-On’ Applications for Each Research Phase,” Qualitative Market Research, Vol. 6. No. 2 (2003): 83.    479 Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wciki, What Passes As a Rigorous, 1468.  480 Mookherji and Lafond, Strategies to Maximize Generalization, 285.  481 Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wciki, What Passes As a Rigorous, 1468.  482 Yin, Validity and Generalization in Future, 324; Riege,  Validity and Reliability in Case Study, 78.  483 Robert K. Yin,  Validity and Generalization in Future, 326.  484 Mookherji and Lafond, Strategies to Maximize Generalization,  296; Yin, Validity and Generalization in Future, 326. 78  three factors, I designed a conceptual map as part of my preparations in making analytic generalizations.   (4) Reliability: Reliability refers to the “absence of random error,”485 which allows subsequent researchers to obtain similar insights if they conduct the study again using the same steps.486 As such, reliability is ensured by establishing transparency and replication.  First, transparency is achieved through the establishment of a case study protocol, which involves the clarification of research procedures and careful documentation―organized in a written report that details how the entire case study was conducted.487  Second, replication is achieved by constructing a case-study database, which includes case-study documents, case- study notes and case-study transcripts collected during the study―organized in a manner that facilitates later retrieval by subsequent researchers.488 These procedures are a means of guaranteeing, as far as possible, the validity of the knowledge produced.489 In following these steps, subsequent researchers should have no difficulty in replicating this research by using the various forms of triangulation that were exercised in this research.  Summary Qualitative research is the most appropriate choice (in comparison to other methodologies) for investigating border-related security issues because―most notably, with respect to overcoming government secrecy and the inherent unreliability of statistics involving illicit networks ―the flexibility of qualitative inquiry offers opportunities to be innovative and                                                           485Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wciki,  What Passes as a Rigorous, 1468.  486 Ibid.  487 Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wciki, What Passes As a Rigorous, 1468; Robert K. Yin, “Case Study Protocol,” in Albert J. Mills, Grabrielle Durepos, and Eiden Wiebe, eds., Encyclopedia of Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2010).   488 Yin, Case Study Research 3rd ed., 32-38.   489 Gerard Koenig, "Realistic Evaluation and Case Studies: Stretching the Potential," Evaluation, Vol. 15. No. 9 (2009): 28.  79  to work within researcher-designed frameworks.490 A case study enhances the qualitative strategy by strengthening the goals of providing accurate and comprehensive insights into border-related security vulnerabilities, and, through triangulation and rich thematic interpretation, confirming their significance in relation to national and public security.  As Yin notes, case studies, rich with data,491 are a unique methodology―perhaps unsurpassed by other methodologies.492 Ethical concerns are respected to ensure confidentiality of expert information.  ‘Theoretical’ thematic data analysis involved ongoing data analysis throughout both phases of data collection.  The process I followed is a deductive approach that focuses on the searching the entire data item for themes at the explicit level before focusing on the smaller parts of the individual data item to search for sub-themes.  ‘Theoretical’ thematic data analysis confirmed and supplemented existing knowledge, and contributed to new knowledge regarding security vulnerabilities in the South Okanagan. Evaluation of the research entailed Yin’s standards for trustworthiness, which involve construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability.  By addressing these four evaluation concerns, confidence in the study’s findings is significantly increased.  Most importantly, a rigorous case study provides an opportunity for “ground-breaking insights.”493                                                                   490 Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, 23.  491 Robert K. Yin, “Case-Study Evaluations: A Decade of Progress,” New Directions for Evaluations, Vol. 76 (1997): 70.   492 Robert K. Yin, The Case Study Anthology (New York, 2004):xiv ; Robert K. Yin, “Case Study Methods,” in Harris Cooper et al., eds., APA Handbook of Research Methods in Psychology Vol. 2 (Washington, American Psychology Association, 2012):143. http://psycnet.apa.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/books/13620/009.pdf.   493Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wciki,  What Passes as a Rigorous, 1465. 80  Chapter Four: Findings  As previously mentioned in chapter one, the Canadian government has, since 9/11, implemented credible border policies. However, in 2011, the Canadian government began withdrawing resources from the Canada-US boundary line as part of a layered security strategy (i.e., Beyond the Border) intended to address both security and economic concerns.  Guided by previously analyzed data in step one, I set out to discover the impact that the Beyond the Border (2011) initiative had on border security in the South Okanagan.  Consequently, I hoped that the participants and collaborators would be able to reveal how national and bi-national border policies enabled and/or constrained their ability to carry out their respective federal mandates―which would allow me to identity security vulnerabilities. Through the qualitative interviews and questionnaires, I was able to accurately identify security vulnerabilities and construct a contextually appropriate portrait of South Okanagan border security.   Nevertheless, there are still questions that remain. For instance, I was largely unable to solicit local information regarding Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy in relation to the most recent terrorist insurgencies (e.g., ISIS). I was also unable to discuss the crime-terror nexus in relation to the South Okanagan border region.  Although I was able to obtain some information on local counter-terrorism―for example, some members of the Osoyoos RCMP detachment are trained in counter-terrorism―it was not sufficient enough to draw specific or even general conclusions.   Methodological Discussion The findings chapter may be the most interesting chapter of a thesis for a number of reasons, such as making public the results of “new learning about real-world behavior”494 for others to study.495 The findings chapter of case study research, according to Creswell and Clark,                                                           494 Robert K. Yin, “Case Study Methods,” APA Handbook of Research Methods in Psychology Vol. 2 (Washington, American Psychology Association, 2012):142. http://psycnet.apa.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/books/13620/009.pdf. 495 Bruce D. Friedman,  The Research Tool Kit (New York: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1998): 11, 12. 81  should include descriptive narratives and themes relating to the case.496  It is also the final step of Braun and Clarke’s ‘theoretical’ thematic analysis.  In addition, describing or “sharing the data” can be illuminating and compelling497 to the extent that final results can inform and influence existing knowledge bases.  Consequently, the reporting of final results occupies a special place in research.498   Miles and Huberman’s systematic approach to data analysis includes several concurrent activities, namely, “data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification.”499 Accordingly, data reduction will consist of the themes (e.g., security vulnerabilities) listed below; data display, which depicts the themes, will be presented in Figure 1 in this chapter; and conclusion drawing and verifications will be outlined in Chapter Five: Discussion of Findings and Implications.  The findings are taken from participant interviews and questionnaires and collaborators (presented in Table 1 in this chapter), South Okanagan-Similkameen RCMP Detachment Status Reports, a Canadian Immigration Law blog, the 2013 Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, and Canadian and American local, provincial/state, and national newspapers reporting on border security.                                                                   496 John W. Creswell and Vicki L. Plano Clark, Principles of Qualitative Research: Designing a Qualitative Study, Office of Qualitative and Mixed Methods Research (University of Nebraska, Lincoln, 2004). https://www.andrews.edu/leaderpart/.../2004/.../AU-Qual-Slides-jwc.ppt. 497 Irving Seidman,  Interviewing as Qualitative Research, 3rd Edition, 128, 130.  498 Christine R. Marlow with Sarah Boone, Research Methods for Generalist Social Work,4th ed. (Toronto, ON:Brooks/Cole-Thomson Learning, 2005): 274.  499 Miles and Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: A Sourcebook of New Methods, 2nd edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994): 10.  82  Table 1. Participant Designations  Respondent #1  Security expert at the Osoyoos, BC RCMP Detachment. Respondent #2  Security expert at the Federal Serious and Organized Crime Unit (FSOC) in Kelowna, BC. Respondent #3  Media Branch at Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) in Vancouver, BC via security expert at Osoyoos port of entry. Respondent #4  Security expert at the Federal Border Integrity Program (Human Trafficking) in Vancouver, BC. Respondent #5  Security expert at the RCMP Victim Services in Kelowna, BC. Respondent #6  Security expert at the US Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Agency Media Branch in Seattle, US. Anecdotal information, Collaborator #1  Security expert at CBSA Osoyoos, BC Port of Entry. Anecdotal information, Collaborator #2  Security expert at CBSA Osoyoos, BC Port of Entry.             83  Thematic Findings There are five themes that emerged from the data in response to my principal research question: “What are the security vulnerabilities of the Osoyoos port of entry, particularly in relation to human trafficking/smuggling and terrorist incursions?” These themes are categorized as security vulnerabilities. The five security vulnerabilities are: 1. Robust Criminal Infrastructure  2. Under-resourced Security Community 3. Historical Border Philosophies and Processes  4. Porous Rural Border 5. Neo-liberal Agenda                  84                                         Figure 1. Conceptual Map  Global Threat Environment 1. Transnational Security Threats National Pre-Conditions 1. Historical Border Philosophies and Processes 2. Neo-liberal Agenda Local Contextual Conditions 1. Under-resourced Security Community 2. Robust Criminal Infrastructure 3. Porous Rural Border 85   Security Vulnerability #1: Robust Criminal Infrastructure  The first most prevalent theme that emerged from interviews, questionnaires, and local Canadian and American newspapers and reports speaks to criminal activity along the South Okanagan border region.   The Nature of the Criminal Infrastructure in the South Okanagan Border Region As reported by Respondent #6 from the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HIS), illegal activity in the Oroville/Osoyoos border region represents: “ ... a small fraction of the overall criminal activity traversing the Canada-US frontier, which is generally concentrated near metropolitan areas connected by major interstate highways.”  However, Respondent #6 also asserts that: “Criminals are opportunistic and the types and frequency of illicit activity in the Oroville/Osoyoos border region is largely governed by black-market demand and the ease of crossing the border.”  Consequently, Respondent #6 points out that: “ ... the level of illegal activity in the Oroville/Osoyoos region is a concern to law enforcement.” Respondent #2, for instance, from the Federal Serious and Organized Crime unit in Kelowna reveals that organized crime is the principal threat along the South Okanagan border region: “[o]rganized crime, is a huge umbrella―human smuggling, gun smuggling, Mexican cartel involvement, moving product.  Not so much gang activity, but there are Mexican nationals involved and being arrested.  You look at the presence of Mexican nationals in Canada, right? They come in and help support our fruit industry.  [In general] there has been more Mexican involvement in the last five years.”   Respondent #1 from the Osoyoos RCMP detachment reinforced Respondent #2’s assessment of organized crime:  86  “[t]his area has a long history of being used for drug, gun, and human smuggling by many organized crime and transport groups. I do not have statistics but based on my 9 years policing the border in the Osoyoos area it does appear that Mexican organized crime is becoming more involved in cross border smuggling.  There is a general increase in Mexican nationals in the South Okanagan area due to the migrant worker program and Mexican organized crime is active on the Northern USA border.” Anecdotal evidence also confirmed the statements of Respondent #1, #2, and #6 noting: “[t]he predominance of [cross-border] crime in the area.”  Respondent #6 reinforces the statements of Respondent #2 and Respondent #1: “[d]rugs and money are the primary illicit commodities being smuggled through the area, largely driven by organized crime.” Meanwhile, at the Osoyoos port of entry, the primary illicit commodity being smuggled, according to a local newspaper, The Rossland News, and the CBSA website is: “[w]eapons.” 500  Relatedly, Respondent #5 from the RCMP Victims Services in Kelowna observes that some of the characteristics in the Okanagan Valley that makes it conducive to human/sex trafficking is:  “ ... [the Valley’s] location, high level of organized crime, poor wages, high service area, and a transient population.” Respondent #5 further observed that the Okanagan Valley could conceivably play a significant regional role in sex trafficking, wherein traffickers could establish a track running from the Osoyoos border to Kelowna―which has an international airport for moving victims in and out of the area. Overall, domestic human/sex trafficking in British Columbia, according to Respondent #4 from the Federal Border Integrity Program with respect to human trafficking, is characterized by: “ ... large, national organized networks. In other investigations, it is a localized organized crime network or an individual(s) who is engaging in [human trafficking] solely for their own benefit.”                                                           500 Rossland News,  “Busy Border,” May 24, 2013, http://www.rosslandnews.com/community/208851571.html. 87  According to Respondent #1, crime groups in the Okanagan Valley are both ethnically homogeneous and ethnically heterogeneous: “[b]ased on previous smuggling instances in the South Okanagan area some crime groups appear to be ethnically based while other transportation crime groups appear to work with numerous other criminal groups regardless of ethnicity.” Rural Border Smuggling Routes and Modes of Transportation in the South Okanagan Border Region Regarding the most notorious smuggling routes in the Osoyoos border region, Respondent #1 offered his expert assessment: “There are numerous routes in the Osoyoos area that are known smuggling routes and have been and are actively used [for] smuggling.“ For example, nearby Chopaka is a historic smuggling route, known widely as the “Whiskey Trail.” Respondent #1 explains: “ ... [the “Whiskey Trail”]is well-known to locals and organized crime groups [who] smuggle illicit goods including drugs and firearms.” In addition, as reported by the Pacific Northwest Inlander, an American newspaper based in Spokane, Washington, smugglers also favor Highway 97: “ ...  a two-lane pipeline that runs from Osoyoos, BC, through isolated Okanogan County [“known as “Smuggler’s Alley”], and into, appropriately enough, Weed, Cali[fornia].”501 The Penticton Western News, a local Canadian newspaper, also reports that Osoyoos Lake is frequently used to smuggle drugs and other contraband.502 When asked about the most common mode of illicit transport across the border Respondent #2 stated that most illicit transboundary movement was: “on foot.” However, Respondent #2 also noted that air smuggling was common in areas like Manning Park and the East Kootenay area―which are more difficult to cross on foot.                                                             501 Rick Anderson,  Pacific Northwest Inlander, “Jack-Pot,” December. 20, 2006:1,  http://www.inlander.com/spokane/jack-pot/Content?oid=2128401. 502 Kristi Patton, “Oliver and Osoyoos RCMP Go Separate Ways,” Penticton Western News,  September. 27, 2012:1. http://www.pentictonwesternnews.com/news/171605561.html. 88   Potential Opportunities for Illegal Smuggling at the Osoyoos Port of Entry With respect to Respondent #6’s observation above that criminals are opportunistic, the newest bi-national agreement between Canada and the United States may facilitate illegal cross-border smuggling at the Osoyoos port of entry. For instance, as CBC News, a national Canadian news service based in Toronto, Ontario, reports, the Beyond the Border (2011) initiative may:  “ ... actually make it easier for organized criminals [mainly intra-continental organized crime503] to smuggle drugs and guns in [commercial] truck containers.” Beyond the Border is a risk management strategy that focuses on easing the flow of goods across the border while tightening perimeter security at points away from the border (i.e., “inland enforcement”).504 Respondent #3 from the Canada Border Services Agency Media Branch writes that: “[t]he Risk Assessment program “pushes the border out” by seeking to identify high-risk people, goods and conveyances as early as possible in the travel and trade continuum to prevent inadmissible people and goods from entering Canada.” However, as security experts at the Canadian Macdonald-Laurier Institute―a national public policy think-tank based in Ottawa, Ontario― argue in a recent report, CBSA has since: “[i]ncreased human resources to facilitate various trade and administrative functions…by about 50 percent. At the same time, it has reduced resources for active enforcement activities by 10-50 percent.”505  Consequently, according to the same report:                                                            503 Todd Hataley and Christian Leuprecht, “’Layered Approach to Border Security Skirts Biggest Threat: Organized Crime,” Policy Magazine (Macdonald-Laurier Institute, April, 2013): 2.   504 Christian Cotroneo, “Border Agency Cuts Questioned As Drug Busts Rise,” CBC News, July. 10, 2014. www.cbc.ca.  505 Hataley and Leuprecht, Layered Approach to Border, 6. 89  “the Canadian trucking industry is at risk of being exploited by drug trafficking groups.  In fact, commercial trucks carrying large amounts of illegal narcotics have already been intercepted at the Canada-US border.”506  The report further explains that:  “[w]ith so many trucks crossing the border and only a fraction of them actually inspected, trucks are a ready-made way to transport drugs.”507 In addition:  “[o]rganized crime groups exploit risk management models that facilitate trusted shippers.  Fitting neatly into a trusted-shipper program (i.e., redu[cing] the chances of inspection at the border508), either by appearing as a legitimate trader or by using corrupt officials.”509  For example, it is not uncommon for:  “Mexican drug cartels [to] mov[e] their wares using NAFTA-cleared containers.”510 The Osoyoos Port of Entry, as Respondent #3 states: does not facilitate all the Risk Assessment programs or all Secure and Trusted Partnership programs available at other ports across Canada. However, the ones that are implemented at Osoyoos do contribute positively to border management… [For example,] FAST (Free and Secure Trade), CANPAS [Canadian Passenger Accelerated Service System], Private Boat, and NEXUS/Marine. In response to my question: “What is the dominant traffic profile at the Osoyoos port of entry: commercial or non-commercial?” Respondent #3 wrote that: “The dominant traffic profile at the Osoyoos port of entry is non-commercial.”                                                            506 Ibid., 9.  507 Ibid.  508 Ibid.  509 Ibid., 2.  510 Ibid., 11. 90  Concerning anecdotal evidence, this profile is inconsistent with reality on the ground.  For instance, Osoyoos BSO have found that there is an even split between commercial and non-commercial traffic at the Osoyoos port of entry: “ ... it’s actually more like 50/50. Though a lot of the trucks are empty.”  Respondent #1 acknowledges both profiles, but does not clarify which profile is the more dominant one: The Osoyoos Port of Entry is the first and largest 24 hour border crossing outside of the greater Vancouver area.  It also connects directly with the Highway 3 and 97 commercial trucking routes. There is a mix of commuter traffic from people living in the Okanagan Valley and also people travelling to further destinations and Spokane for air travel. Anecdotal evidence also revealed that referring commercial trucks (as well as vehicles) from primary inspection at the lanes to secondary inspection for further questioning occurs at irregular intervals and is subject to the personal inclinations of border service officers:  “ ... it depends on the people working the shift.”  Standing on information taken from a Canadian Immigration Law Blog, Meurrons on Immigration, authored by an immigration lawyer who works in Vancouver, British Columbia, CBSA officers in the primary lanes have limited access to important databases, while officers at secondary examination have unlimited access: The reason, according to CBSA in Martin-Ivie [Martin-Ivie v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 772], is that the amount of time required to run comprehensive searches in FOSS, ICES, CPIC and NCIC [the four databases which CBSA officers have access to at Ports of Entry] is substantial. It takes approximately two and a half to ten minutes for each search in FOSS, between approximately three to five minutes per search in CPIC and approximately three to eight minutes for each search in NCIC. Each search must be conducted separately. This is a large reason why secondary examination can often take so long.511                                                           511 Steven Meurrens,  “The CBSA Databases – ICES, FOSS, CPIC, and NCIC,” Meurrens on Immigration Law (blog), July 25, 2013, http://meurrensonimmigration.com/. 91  Consequently, as Meurrons on Immigration, reports: BSOs at primary are required to quickly assess whether travelers should be allowed to proceed into Canada or whether they should instead be referred to secondary for further examination. According to the court in Martin-Ivie 90% of referrals – which constitute less than 5% of people who pass through Primary – are the result of suspicious behavior. The evidence also established that the average time taken to process a traveler at Primary is between 30 and 90 seconds.512 Information belonging to anecdotal evidence reveals that the Canadian government is relentlessly preoccupied with ensuring primary processing times at the Osoyoos port of entry.  Senior management, for instance, is required to file “Memorandum of Time” notices regarding “every” wait time that exceeds twenty minutes. As a result, BSOs are under extreme pressure to facilitate cross-border trade and travel.  Ottawa, according to anecdotal evidence, is: “like [a] vultur[e], waiting for us to make a mistake…this has led to very low morale among BSOs.”   Security Vulnerability #2:  Under-resourced Security Community The second most prevalent theme that came up repeatedly in interviews, questionnaires, South Okanagan-Similkameen RCMP Detachment Status Reports, Canadian and American newspapers, and anecdotes regarding border security in the South Okanagan border region pertained to insufficient resources (e.g., manpower, funding, and equipment).   Insufficient Resources and Rural Border Security The CBSA Okanagan and Kootenay District operates 16 ports of entries: five inland airports located in Cranbrook, Penticton, Kamloops, Kelowna, and Prince George, and eleven ports of entry located in Chopaka, Osoyoos, Midway, Carson, Cascade, Paterson, Waneta, Nelway, Rykerts, Kingsgate, and Roosville. The ports range in size from small 9-to-5 operations such as Chopaka to larger 24-7-facilities such as Osoyoos and Kingsgate.  The district is served                                                           512 Meurrens, The CBSA Database. 92  by 165 employees, including a director and administrative support personnel, chiefs, superintendents, and border service officers (BSOs).513  With respect to the rural border, senior experts at the Osoyoos RCMP detachment and the RCMP’s Federal Serious and Organized Crime (FSOC) section in Kelowna, the primary RCMP units charged with the Osoyoos port of entry’s rural border on the Canadian side, indicated that insufficient resources had a far-reaching impact on rural border enforcement.  Members of the Osoyoos RCMP detachment regularly respond to investigate border calls including drug and firearms seizures at the Osoyoos port of entry, child pornography possession investigations at the Osoyoos port of entry, illegal entries into Canada, and illicit gun/drug/human smuggling across the international border in the detachment area.   The Osoyoos RCMP detachment also carries out marine patrols to enhance boat safety and to enforce laws or respond to criminal acts.  Osoyoos RCMP officers, for instance, are responsible for enforcement of federal and provincial laws and statutes, such as Customs and Excise Act, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Criminal Code, Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, Canada Shipping Act, Small Vessels Regulations, and all others, on Osoyoos Lake―an 11-mile long lake that stretches across the Canada-US border.  Marine enforcement demands additional training and course certifications, such as the Inland Water Transport (IWT) certificate.514 Respondent #1, from the Osoyoos RCMP detachment, revealed that the detachment has a fully marked Zodiac Police boat and four trained boat operators.  To the extent that members of the Osoyoos RCMP detachment are not only first responders for border investigations and incidents, but also for general duties in the Detachment area, lack of resources was a persistent concern of Respondent #1 who discussed the impact of insufficient resources on rural border security:                                                             513 Rossland News, Busy Border, 1.  514 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), “South Okanagan-Similkameen RCMP Detachments Status Report,”  1st Quarter, 2014, 8. http://www.rdosmaps.bc.ca/min_bylaws/contract_reports/CorpBd/2014/10May22/ProtectiveServices/RDOSQuarterlyReportQ1_2014.pdf.  93  [b]order related calls do draw the limited resources available from Osoyoos Detachment but being located on the border this is part of the existing policing pressures. Officer safety is an issue as border calls related to smuggling are high risk and as Osoyoos is a small Detachment there are limited options for addressing this risk.  Calls are prioritized and will at times have to wait for additional members to arrive from Oliver Detachment [or RCMP Traffic Services] to assist before Police attendance. Respondent #2 of FSOC in Kelowna, an RCMP unit that is called in to assist primary responders or further border investigations, supports Respondent #1’s statement, noting that:  “[o]verall, we are under-resourced.  We are the national police force and we work with the resources and assets that we have.”  FSOC in Kelowna helps oversee approximately 400 kilometers of the Canada-US rural border stretching from Manning Park to the Alberta border, and relies on 120 officers (i.e., primary responders) in the border detachments located along this section of the border.  The busiest part of the 400 kilometer that FSOC oversees is around the Osoyoos area. Based on combined accounts from Respondent #1, Respondent #2, and The Review, a local Canadian newspaper based in Keremeos, BC, the nature of rural border security in the South Okanagan is largely reactive rather than intelligence-led as a result of insufficient resources. Because Canadian resources are limited with respect to rural border security, the Osoyoos RCMP detachment is largely a reactive unit, meaning it does not monitor the rural border unless a sensor goes off or a phone call is made to the detachment  “[a]t this point border enforcement is one of many policing pressures placed on Osoyoos Detachment and as a small detachment of 8 police officers it is difficult to provide much more than response based policing on the border.” In addition, the Osoyoos RCMP detachment is also responsible for northbound port runners (e.g., individuals who drive evasively through vehicle-stopping points at ports of entry) at the Osoyoos port of entry. As Respondent #3 writes:  “[a]t Osoyoos, the RCMP is relied upon for inland interception.” 94  Limited resources, however, on the Canadian side, are partly offset by American resources on the other side of the border.  Respondent #6, for example, reports that the Okanagan IBET (Integrated Border Enforcement Team) is predominately intelligence-led:   “[IBET is an] intelligence-driven enforcement team that provides participating law enforcement agencies with a force multiplier, maximizing border enforcement efforts between the ports of entry.”  The Okanagan IBET consists of the CBSA, the RCMP (including Osoyoos RCMP detachment), US Border Patrol, OFO-US Customs and Border Protection, and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HIS). Nevertheless, Respondent #1 reports that: “ [a]dditional resources (manpower, funding, equipment) for border Detachments such as Osoyoos and Keremeos would allow for greater enforcement and familiarization with the international border.”   Respondent #1 also emphasizes that local networked intelligence (a crucial function of border security operations in general) in the South Okanagan is not exploited to the fullest extent as a result of insufficient resources:  [g]iven disclosure issues….[certain members] generally handle intelligence information and as Osoyoos is a small and busy Detachment there are many times when the many other Policing duties take priority over attending [weekly] intel meetings [with the RCMP, the Osoyoos port of entry, and US law enforcement, such as Oroville PD, Okanogan County Sherriffs, and others] and the follow up intel sharing. According to Respondent #2 weekly intel meetings are where local intelligence is shared. For example: “[a] local farmer may have reported tracks going through his property.”   When asked what resources would strengthen the security capacity of the South Okanagan border area, Respondents #2 replied that: “[y]ou would be looking at as much technology as you could. Start flying drones over top of the border with surveillance….And an increase in manpower.” Insufficient Resources and Border Security at the Osoyoos Port of Entry 95  With respect to the Osoyoos port of entry, the national Globe and Mail newspaper has reported that the most recent bi-national agreement Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness (2011) has resulted in the inappropriate withdrawal of border resources:    “[Beyond the Border]focu[ses] security efforts more on intelligence and preclearance away from the border rather than directly at crossings [which has led to] deep staff cuts[mainly front-line officers].”515   For instance, the CBSA’s intelligence unit will be reduced by half, which will impact the database information available to front-line border officers.  Significantly, according to anecdotal information, there is an acute shortage of officers who specialize in intelligence and criminal investigations:   “CBSA needs more intelligence officers and more criminal investigators.” Since the 2013 federal cutbacks, CBSA in British Columbia has concentrated most of its resources in the largest areas; as a result, most of British Columbia’s border security resources have been reallocated to Vancouver, despite the fact that the Osoyoos port of entry “is considered a high-risk port of entry.” More specifically, drawing from anecdotal evidence, the shortage of intelligence personnel has resulted in a lower quality of database information, making it more difficult for front-line staff to identify criminals at the port of entries. Currently, there is only one CBSA intelligence officer responsible for the interior portfolio and much of the responsibility focuses on analyzing intelligence rather than gathering local intelligence.  The shortage may also, as The Globe and Mail reports, result in more child pornography entering the country along with more illegal drugs and weaponry.516  With respect to terrorist incursions, BSOs at the Osoyoos port of entry currently receive nearly daily intel briefs on ISIS. And BSOs are very aware that ISIS has issued statements that                                                           515 Bill Curry, “Border Staff Cuts Called Direct Attack on National Security,” The Globe and Mail, April 12, 2012: 1. 516 Curry, Border Staff Cuts, 1.  96  call on Muslims to kill Canadians and others whose country has joined the U.S.-led coalition to fight the group―particularly “‘their police, security, and intelligence members.’” A local American newspaper based in Spokane, Washington, the Spokane Immigration Examiner, also reported that extreme understaffing at the various ports of entry along the Spokane sector (presumably a result of the Beyond the Border (2011) initiative), which includes the Oroville port of entry (a joint facility with the Osoyoos port of entry), was causing Customs and Border Protection Officers (CBPOs) to become physically and mentally exhausted517―though the US Border Patrol, which monitors the rural border remains sufficiently resourced. The article expressed concern that: “ ... [m]enta[l] and physica[l] exhaustion [would lead] to potential errors in [CBPOs] enforcement duties.” The article further emphasized that: “[CBPOs] are tasked with duties which tremendously affect public safety.518  Anecdotal evidence supported the Globe and Mail’s reports insofar as the Osoyoos port of entry is at times extremely understaffed and BSOs are severely overworked as a result of resource constraints.  For example, if a Border Services Officer (BSO) is sick or on leave, other officers are required to fill those extra shifts on top of their regular shifts. On the whole, shifts are roughly 10 hours long and often follow a work pattern of four days on/four days off. However, anecdotal evidence also confirmed that extreme understaffing compromises the ability of BSOs to carry out CBSA mandates.  BSOs, for example, at the Osoyoos port of entry are overworked to the point where physical and mental exhaustion interferes with their duties, which leads to errors in performing their tasks. This also increases CBSA overtime payouts. Insufficient Resources and Interior Counter-Trafficking Responses                                                            517 Bob Wilson, “Severely Understaffed Ports of Entry on Canadian Border Cause for Alarm,” Spokane Immigration Examiner, July 16, 2011: 1.   518 Wilson, Severely Understaffed Ports, 1.   97  Further from the border, Respondent #5, working out of the RCMP-based Victim Services in Kelowna, noted that interior counter-trafficking responses, an important component of maintaining border security, were underdeveloped, under-resourced, and still in the early stages of understanding the scope and character of human/sex trafficking patterns in the Okanagan Valley.   Security Vulnerability #3: Historical Border Philosophies and Processes  The third most prevalent theme that was revealed in interviews, Osoyoos port of entry site visits, the CBSA website, a local Canadian newspaper, and anecdotal information was connected to historical processes. In some cases, the theme of historical processes was less an overt declaration than a subtle indication.  Americans Follow a Security-Dominated Approach to Border Security In reference to anecdotal evidence, American port of entry officers view the Canada-US border very differently from Canadian port of entry officers: “They [American officers] are at war…we [Canadian officers] just worry about enforcement.” Furthermore:  “Americans are a very different culture….their [port of entry] officers are too harsh.” In addition: “American officers won’t entertain complaints [in other words, neither does Washington]…whereas Ottawa takes complaints against BSOs very seriously.” [Unlike the American context,] there is a great amount of disrespect from Ottawa to people in the field.” In other respects, despite significant American border cuts at ports of entry: “They [the Americans] continue to have the resources [to manage their borders properly].They have, for example, 900 dog teams [canine units available for border security at the US-Mexico and US-Canada border], while we have 66 dog teams.   Canadians Follow a Budget-Led Approach to Border Security 98  Significant changes at the Canadian border since 9/11 have resulted in physical changes at ports of entry that resemble militarization.  For example, the Osoyoos port of entry has since 2003, been marked by changes akin to military checkpoints, such as license plate scanners, surveillance cameras, barricades, and increasingly armed BSOs.  However, anecdotal information also revealed that in relation to border security “[t]he federal government wants a lot more for a lot less.” More specifically, Ottawa wants BSOs to be: “jack of all trades, master of none…when what is really needed is more specialization.” This budget-led mentality, anecdotally speaking, interferes with proper management of the border.  New BSOs at Canadian ports of entry, for instance, are not receiving enough training and are considerably unprepared for the complexity of border security duties―though they receive high quality firearms training. Ongoing enhanced training is also inadequate to the extent that additional online training for BSOs is no substitute for hands-on training.  Based on information taken from a report on the CBSA website, Port of Entry Recruit Training (POERT), consists of three parts:  “an online orientation [takes 2-4 weeks to complete], classroom training at the CBSA Learning Centre in Rigaud, Quebec [10 weeks], and an in-service component that is delivered once the BSOs have been deployed in the regions[ BSOs have 12 months to complete the in-service component].”519 Furthermore, the report notes that the annual number of recruits vary according to the government’s budget. For instance, CBSA regional managers state that seat allocation for new recruits “is often reduced once [federal] budget forecasts are available.”520 Canada’s budget-led mentality, based on Respondent #2’s statements, is also one of the reasons for the 2014 federal realignment of the RCMP: “[s]o we looked at it [the Okanagan-Kootenay border area] and a business case was put forward and senior management and the RCMP agreed with the business case...to                                                           519 CBSA,  “Evaluation of CBSA Officer Recruitment and Port of Entry Recruit Training (POERT),” Final Report, November, 2011, http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/reports-rapports/ae-ve/2011/poert-forpe-eng.html. 520 CBSA, Evaluation of CBSA Officer. 99  reallocate all the former IBET members [from Creston and Nelson] to the new office in the Osoyoos area.” Respondent #2 also stated that: “ ... like any other agency we [the RCMP] have to work within our budgets that we receive from the government.”  Americans Have More Border Security Resources Than Canadians According to a local newspaper, The Keremeos Review, the Osoyoos rural border has extremely limited resources in comparison to the Americans who monitor the same border area on the American side: “Canadian resources are limited when compared to those on the U.S. side. U.S. Border Patrol agents outnumber RCMP officers available by about ten to one, so the RCMP must rely on other methods to get the job done.”521 US Border Patrol, like the RCMP, is responsible for the rural border (the areas between ports of entry).  Respondent #2 states that: “Sometimes the Americans will work with Canadians using their [American] technology to address a specific incident or issue.” Similarly, as the The Keremeos Review writes: “The U.S. Border Patrol passes along information gleaned from their work on the American side which can allow the RCMP to pinpoint their [scarce] resources on trouble spots, if need be.”522 Security Vulnerability #4: Porous Rural Border The fourth most prevalent theme identified in interviews, questionnaires, Canadian newspapers, and Canadian Immigration Law Blogs was the porous nature of the rural border in the South Okanagan border region.                                                           521 The (Keremeos CN BC) Review, “CN BC: RCMP Provide Border Patrols on the Canadian Side of the 49th Parallel,” November. 19, 2009:1.   522 The (Keremeos CN BC) Review,  The Review, CN BC: RCMP, 1.  100  The accounts of Respondent #1, Respondent #2, and Respondent #6 support the notion that the South Okanagan border region is relatively porous.  Respondent #1, for instance, points out that: “[The] Osoyoos Detachment regularly responds to in progress border incidents with available on duty resources.” Similarly, Respondent #2, who, as mentioned above, helps oversee approximately 400 kilometers of the Canada-US rural border stretching from Manning Park to the Alberta border, notes that in comparison to areas like Manning Park and the East Kootenay’s it is much “[e]asier to cross the Osoyoos rural border.” Respondent #6 also states that the Oroville/Osoyoos rural border region facilitates illicit activity because “ ...  [it is] ea[sy] [to] cros[s] the border.”  These statements are further supported by local newspaper reports. The Oliver Daily News, for instance, a local Canadian newspaper, reported that after being denied entry into Canada at the Osoyoos port of entry, two illegal immigrants (and their dog) had little difficulty in crossing the Osoyoos rural border: “[b]oth males admitted to crossing into Canada illegally through the mountains just west of Osoyoos.  They crossed on October 23, [2012] approximately 2 hours after being denied entry.”523 The article also pointed out that without the assistance of the local citizenry in phoning the Osoyoos RCMP about the whereabouts of the second male (after the first male was arrested) he would most likely have eluded capture.524 Complicating Factors  In general, as Respondent #6 adds: “[b]order crossings may be complicated by factors such as terrain, weather, tourist traffic and law enforcement efforts.”                                                           523 Oliver Daily News, “…the Mounties “Always Get Their Man”…This Time Sent Back to USA,” October. 30, 2012:1.  524 Oliver Daily News, “…the Mounties “Always Get, 1.   101  Respondent #2 likewise points out that terrain can be a complicating factor, but this does not pertain to the area surrounding Osoyoos: “ … like there are natural boundaries further east, like east of Creston [where there are] a lot of places that are impassable terrain. Manning Park too [is very difficult to cross]…[but] it is easier to cross the Osoyoos rural border.” However, Respondent #2 also points out that while illegal cross-border activity in the South Okanagan border region is not complicated by terrain it is complicated by law enforcement: “ ... I think the enforcement is pretty strong in the Pacific IBET [i.e., Vancouver area] and in the Okanagan IBET. What it has created is to push smugglers further east. Alberta, Saskatchewan…” Combined information from Respondent #1, Respondent #3, and Respondent #6 does not confirm Respondent #2’s statement, but it does confirm Respondent #2’s statement that there is an excellent working relationship between American and Canadian agencies responsible for the Washington-British Columbia border region―the Canada-US border’s most notorious “high-trafficking corridor.”525 Respondent #6, for instance, emphasizes that: “[s]haring of law enforcement information between our agencies is probably one of the most productive parts of our bilateral relationship, in addition to our coordinated enforcement operations.”  However, Respondent #1 also emphasized that coordinated enforcement operations still depend on available resources:  “Osoyoos Detachment participates in joint enforcement operations with US Agencies resources allowing.” Respondent #2 further maintained that after a federal realignment in January, 2014, rural border security in the South Okanagan was better organized and had a bigger and more flexible force behind it.  Yet, he also mentions that these same resources are at the same time relied upon for enforcement in relation to border incidents away from the South Okanagan border region:                                                            525 Hataley and Leuprecht,  Layered Approach to Border, 6. 102  “[r]esources get moved around….[For instance,] issues with the pipeline up North.”  Security Vulnerability #5: Neo-liberal Agenda  The fifth most prevalent theme that was identified in interviews, recent parliamentary reports, and anecdotal information applied to neo-liberalism. Silo Mentalities at the Osoyoos Port of Entry  In general, all configurations of corporatization engender silos of activity (e.g., isolation) or a silo mentality, but this tendency is especially pronounced under neo-liberalism with its focus on short-term financial performance criteria.526 Based on information taken from the 2013 Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, which discusses a general lack of information sharing between the RCMP, CBSA, and CSIS (Canadian Security Intelligence Service):  “ ... the RCMP, CBSA, and CSIS are hampered by silos [i.e., insular activity and mentality] ―in particular institutional and cultural barriers.”527   Silos, as the report notes, reduce information flows when timely and reliable information is needed― which blocks efficiency in carrying out security tasks.528  Judging from anecdotal evidence, operations at the Osoyoos port of entry are also “hampered by silos,” insofar as the different border agencies were specifically described as having a silo mentality “ ...  they are like silos … like separate entities.” The relationship, for instance, between CBSA BSOs at the Osoyoos port of entry and Citizen and Immigration Canada (CIC) is hampered by “bad communication” and they “don’t cooperate with BSOs.” According to anecdotal information this may be a result of cultural barriers insofar as the CIC “is bureaucratic in nature… since senior management are top-career bureaucrats with no background in law enforcement, ” while the CBSA at the Osoyoos port of entry focuses more on “law enforcement.”                                                             526 MacDonald, Rethinking Corporatization and Public, 15.  527 Ibid., 25.  528 Ibid., 24. 103  In addition, the recent outbreak of Avian flu among commercial and non-commercial flocks of US chickens in Washington and Oregon has created some tension between the bureaucratic-minded Canadian Food Inspection Agency’s (CFIA) and the enforcement-minded CBSA BSOs at the Osoyoos port of entry.  Osoyoos BSOs are currently required to enforce a restriction on imported poultry from the US Pacific Northwest, but because BSOs do not have a good working relationship with CFIA, they resent having to carry out additional enforcement on behalf of CFIA when they are already understaffed and overworked: “ ... maybe they should do it [enforce the restrictions on chickens] themselves.” Re-Branding Initiatives  Anecdotal evidence also reveals the nature of CBSA neo-liberal corporate trends, which mirror the business practices and discourses of private corporations: “ ... the CBSA has money in its budget for corporate projects but not for staff [e.g., resources].” CBSA, for instance, has implemented several re-branding initiatives in recent years in an attempt to refurbish the image of CBSA―a common business strategy.  To this end, BSO uniform tags (there are over 5000 BSOs in Canada) have been frequently changed in an apparent effort to improve the image of CBSA.  Anecdotal information further reveals that branding or re-branding initiatives are enormously expensive and that overall “the Osoyoos port of entry is run like a corporation.” Silo Mentalities at the Rural Border Although silos of activity (e.g., isolation) or a silo mentality exist with respect to the agencies responsible for the rural border, there have been, as Respondent #2 points out, recent attempts to reduce this trend: So what happened in 2013, direction came out of Ottawa that they wanted to have a look at the federal enforcement in Canada.  Federal enforcement is broken into a number of…I call them silos: Federal Enforcement Branch, Border Integrity, Proceeds of Crime, and also National Security.  So the difficulty we had, we had these silos that when you work on a project on an organized crime group they don’t just deal with drug 104  trafficking, they deal with smuggling, human trafficking….So all of a sudden you’re using different silos and trying to get the bodies to co-mingle on investigations is difficult.  So, what they did is they had a…what they call a federal realignment that took place…rolled out in January, 2014 in British Columbia.    Respondent #2 further observes that in relation to recent cutbacks the realignment allows the RCMP “to wor[k] at the most significant level that we are able to.”  Summary My role as a researcher was to locate statements that best portrayed the themes as well as the different perspectives of those themes.  The thematic findings were largely anticipated given the case study’s two-step approach to data collection, which required engagement with the relevant literature and documents for many months prior to conducting on-site observations in and around the town of Osoyoos and expert interviews. However, what was not anticipated was that the second phase of data collection would yield such comprehensive insights into border-related security vulnerabilities in the South Okanagan border region.            105     Chapter Five: Discussion, Implications, and Recommendations  Purpose and Outcomes This study began with the assertion that the Canadian government’s current assessment of the resources necessary for deterring and interdicting transnational threats at the Canadian border is inadequate―though its public rhetoric implies that Canada is doing all that is necessary to counter transnational crime and extremist groups.  In keeping with the title of this thesis, the purpose of this research was to show that while Canada has implemented credible border security policies, Ottawa has yet to realize their full potential―due to a variety of factors, including insufficient resources.  Consequently, the primary purpose of this research project is to argue―on the basis of an old Apache saying―for 'less thunder in the mouth and more lightning in the hand’ in relation to the principal research question: “What are the security vulnerabilities of the Osoyoos port of entry, particularly in relation to human trafficking/smuggling and terrorist incursions?” Complementary questions taken from the principal research purpose included: 1. What are the site-specific enforcement capabilities of the Osoyoos port of entry, and especially, its ability to detect illicit transboundary movement? 2. What is the scope and nature of the problem of illicit transboundary movement in the South Okanagan? 3. To what extent does this nondominant sector of travel destabilize border management at the Osoyoos port of entry? First, eight key security experts in formal and informal settings consented to providing information on the different components of border security in the South Okanagan.  These security experts provided crucial information with respect to border security operations and 106  border-related security threats at the Osoyoos port of entry and the areas outside the Port of Entry (i.e., the rural border).  The facts, and in some cases, the candid comments they provided led to an improved understanding of the site-specific enforcement capabilities of the Osoyoos port of entry, and especially, its ability to detect illicit transboundary movement.  Second, the varying perspectives of security experts contributed to a more nuanced understanding of the scope and nature of the problem of illicit transboundary movement in the South Okanagan than would be possible from literary and documentary sources alone.  Third, their detailed description of the architecture of the local border security community, border security operations and border-related security threats, enabled a greater understanding of the extent to which nondominant sectors of travel destabilize border management at the Osoyoos port of entry.   Discussion The thematic findings show that the main security vulnerability at the Canada-US border in the South Okanagan region is a robust criminal infrastructure.  Based on the findings, which are compatible with classical realist assumptions, the growing presence of Mexican cartel activity in the South Okanagan has the potential to increase the level of criminality in the area.  In the view of the local border security community, the primary illicit commodities being smuggled through the rural border area are drugs and money, while weapons are the primary illicit commodity being smuggled through the Osoyoos port of entry.  Profits and weapons are noteworthy to the extent that they may strengthen drug trafficking and human smuggling/trafficking organizations.   Going further, as Respondent #6 points out, a distinctive feature of criminality is “opportunis[m]” without regard for the law.  In other words, criminals are responsive to changes in context and opportunity. Considering the nature of the rural border in the South Okanagan, it is no coincidence that illicit activity is partly governed by, in the words of Respondent #6: “the ease of crossing the border.” Porous borders, along with inadequate interior controls, are a generative force, creating potent opportunities for drug trafficking and human smuggling/trafficking organizations to carry out their illegal activities.  107  There is also a variety of ethnically homogeneous and ethnically heterogeneous crime groups operating in the South Okanagan―presumably ranging in scale and sophistication. Mexican cartels, for instance, are extremely sophisticated transnational crime groups (on a par with sophisticated transnational terrorist groups like al-Qaeda) that are well positioned for growth in the South Okanagan, given the sophistication in cartel transportation methods (e.g., using commercial trucks at legitimate ports of entry), the growing Mexican diaspora (e.g., Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program), the general surge in Canada-bound human smuggling activity in British Columbia, the latest bi-national border agreement between Canada and the United States (i.e., Beyond the Border (2011) initiative), recent American cutbacks at US ports of entry, and  the limited resources of the local border security community.   The findings further reveal that the local border security community, which is responsible for combating cross-border criminality in the South Okanagan, is under-resourced in terms of technology, manpower, and funds. With respect to the Osoyoos RCMP detachment, the primary responder to illicit transboundary movement in the area, police officers face resource limitations and pragmatic considerations that limit the amount and types of security-monitoring they are able to provide while still dealing with quotidian policing duties in the interior, such as traffic accidents, domestic disputes, and regular forms of criminality.  As such, there is not a fully effective law enforcement presence at the rural border.  In fact, security is frequently breached.  On the whole, the Osoyoos RCMP detachment is a reactive unit that relies on technology (e.g., sensors) and intelligence (e.g., phone calls), to monitor the areas outside the Osoyoos port of entry.  As Respondent #1 explains:  [s]hould pre-knowledge exist that a cross-border smuggling event will occur then Osoyoos Detachment partners with US Border Patrol, US HIS, and others to form a coordinated enforcement response. This type of joint operation is also common and ranges in size and complexity. With respect to the Osoyoos port of entry, BSOs face similar limitations which results in less law enforcement, which, in turn, limit their ability to detect illicit transboundary movement.  For one, internal pressures for efficiency, risk management, and accountability are 108  enormous.  Federally mandated time response in this setting has to be extremely rapid (e.g., ideally 30 to 90 seconds) to facilitate the exigencies of cross-border trade and travel― unlike rural border areas, where response times range from minutes to hours.  As we have seen, the Osoyoos port of entry is at times extremely understaffed and BSOs are severely overworked as a result of resource constraints, which interfere with the ability of BSOs to perform their public safety related tasks.  Correspondently, the database information available to BSOs at the Osoyoos port of entry will be significantly degraded as federal government cutbacks proceed―reducing the CBSA’s intelligence unit by half.  Although the majority of non-resident and resident land travelers at the Osoyoos port of entry are compliant with Canadian laws, there is a small fraction that does not comply. Without high quality lookout (i.e., threat) information, front-line BSOs are left unaware and have only their own instincts to fall back on when quickly assessing whether travelers may proceed into Canada.  This is particularly important in relation to terrorism, currently an accelerating threat, since there is still a possibility that transnational terrorists linked to the Islamic world will use legal ports of entry to gain access to Western nations―though it has become much more difficult to do so due to Western counter-terrorism efforts. Any balanced estimate, from a classical realist perspective, of the enforcement capabilities of the local border security community, however, would be incomplete if it did not draw attention to the intelligent use of limited resources.  The recent federal RCMP realignment, for instance, was an innovative attempt on the part of senior RCMP members, including members of FSOC in Kelowna, to try to work within the limited federal budgets that they receive from Ottawa. The Osoyoos RCMP detachment, for instance, as Respondent #1 notes, can now ask for additional assistance from other RCMP units and detachments:  “Osoyoos Detachment members are the first responders for border incidents and investigations. Should a seizure or arrest be done by the Detachment then other units including Regional GIS [General Investigative Section] and or FSOC may be called to assist or further an investigation.” 109  Previously, as reported by Respondent #2, there were: “… little groups of investigators along the border…. So now we don’t just have three people in Creston called border integrity, six people in Nelson, [and] six people in Osoyoos.” Respondent #2 subsequently reports that during the federal realignment border integrity offices in Creston and Nelson were closed and all the former IBET members were reallocated to the Osoyoos RCMP detachment where most of the cross-border smuggling in the Okanagan and Kootenay District occurs.  It is not clear, due to CBSA’s unwillingness to provide detailed information, to what extent CBSA at the Osoyoos port of entry benefits from the Okanagan IBET in relation to intelligent use of limited resources, apart from weekly intel meetings with the RCMP and US law enforcement. Another intelligent use of limited resources on the part of the Osoyoos RCMP detachment is the establishment of an excellent working relationship with the US Border Patrol (US-BP) in Oroville, Washington (among other US law enforcement agencies) as both agencies provide enforcement responses to the rural border―though only the US-BP has the resources to provide consistent law enforcement and surveillance.  In particular, US Border Patrol at Oroville passes on intelligence from their work on the American side to the Osoyoos RCMP detachment, which allows the detachment to concentrate their scarce resources on “trouble spots.”  Nevertheless, the virtue of using limited resources in an intelligent manner is trumped by the reality that the local border security community lacks the capacity and resources to provide consistent law enforcement at the Osoyoos rural border and therefore relies heavily on American intelligence to direct its scarce resources; that the Osoyoos port of entry, already designated as a “high-risk” port of entry, lacks high-quality intelligence products (i.e., reports), is hampered by cultural clashes between neo-liberalizing CBSA bureaucrats in Ottawa and enforcement-minded BSOs in the field, and inter-agency competition (stemming from specialized mandates); and, that the Canadian government sees the border as an economic 110  institution and uses the federal budget to determine how national and public border security threats will be assessed and addressed.   Finally, nearly all aspects of the findings show that there are many factors that inform and influence Canadian border security policy, which, in turn, highlights the relevance of classical realism, conventional constructivism, and neo-Gramscianism in assessing Canadian border policies. Border security policy, for instance, must take into account characteristics of the terrain, operational conditions (e.g., the weather), proximity to urban areas, and the availability of manpower, border patrol equipment (e.g., trucks, UTVs, boats, snowmobiles), and technology (e.g., thermal and motion sensors, surveillance cameras, and so on).  At the same time, border security policy is strongly influenced by the nature and scope of security threats, historical border processes, and neo-liberal corporatization.  Most importantly, though participants differed to some degree on the scale of the vulnerability of the South Okanagan border, the findings revealed that the South Okanagan border security community is clearly calling for more ‘lightning in the hand.’ Strengths and Limitations of My Research  With respect to strengths, this research relied on a case study methodology, which employs various forms of triangulation, specifically theory triangulation and source triangulation.  For instance, with respect to theory triangulation, classical realism allowed me to use the history of border security as a baseline from which to measure changes in border operations and security over time.  Similarly, conventional constructivism’s emphasis on the meanings that are assigned to material objects, such as borders, helped me to explain how and why Canada maintains an economic-dominated approach to border security.  Still further, neo-Gramscianism assisted me in identifying how and why the hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism has influenced border management practices.   Second, qualitative interviews and questionnaires were an effective method for soliciting information in identifying the security vulnerabilities of the Osoyoos port of entry in relation to illicit transnational threats. Third, the criterion for participants was easily met; many of the participants and both collaborators are veteran security experts who hold key positions 111  within the South Okanagan border security community.  Fourth, information solicited from collaborators gave me access (previously denied by CBSA) to detailed information regarding border operations at the Osoyoos port of entry, which allowed me to draw specific rather than general conclusions.  Fifth, the geographic context of my case study was the South Okanagan where I have lived for over eight years. As part of the western horseback riding community, I have spent afternoons riding or hiking in the Osoyoos desert hills and a considerable amount of time attending rodeos in Keremeos, BC, Princeton, BC, Oliver, BC, and Omak, US, which has familiarized me with the Osoyoos/Oroville border region.    With respect to the limitations of this research, several aspects of this study were highly constrained both by American and Canadian government secrecy regarding transnational security threats and by border operations in general.  In some cases, there was a verifiable reluctance to share information regarding border-related security issues.  At times, access was very difficult.  Certain CBSA officers, for instance, were unwilling to discuss border operations at the Osoyoos port of entry or to contribute to my research by allowing me to conduct on-site tours of ports of entry in the South Okanagan, including inland ports like the Kelowna International Airport.  I was also unable to obtain research information from the US Border Patrol (BP) and the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP).  Although both agencies received my emailed questionnaires and forwarded them to their respective legal department, there was no meaningful response―despite many calls and emails to both BP and CBP. As a result, only the US Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the primary investigative arm of the US Department of Homeland Security, participated in my research.    Links to the Historical Overview  In general, the findings correlate well with the historical overview.  The argument that intelligence and border security capabilities in western nations have improved dramatically since 9/11, but that such capabilities can be degraded through terrorist and criminal group adaptation (i.e., opportunism) is confirmed by the findings.  Moreover, the argument that criminal insurgencies have already migrated to Canada, and will continue to migrate is noted in the observations of the participants and collaborators.  The findings further confirm, with 112  regard to the discussion in the historical overview, that historical criminal patterns (e.g., smuggling routes) in the South Okanagan continue to play a major role in illicit transboundary movement―one of the reasons the Osoyoos border region is considered “high-risk.”   The notion that, in accordance with conventional constructivism theory, historical border processes play an important role in border security policy is likewise confirmed by pressmedia and government reports, and by the statements of participants and collaborators.  More specifically, divergent operational priorities and attitudes at the Canada-US boundary line are evident in comments relating to Canadian and American border security resources.  These attitudes, as emphasized by conventional constructivists, essentially determine what kind of security measures will prevail.   The discussion in the historical overview regarding the CBSA’s subtle neo-liberal agenda as a result of neo-liberal corporatization, such as major cuts within the public sector, market-oriented services (e.g., re-branding initiatives), and risk-management techniques is equally confirmed by the research findings― and coincides well with neo-Gramscian assumptions.  Similarly, discussions in the historical overview relating to silo mentalities, inter-agency competition, and cultural clashes under neo-liberalism were confirmed by the findings.  As explained in the historical overview, government agencies also tend to be seriously under-resourced both in terms of finances and access to technology―particularly when strategic traditions are characterized by ongoing strategic deficits.  This is certainly borne out by the findings, which indicate that institutions involved in Canada’s security architecture are constrained by Canada’s traditional “penny-pinching” approach to national security.  Rather than assessing threats, for example, and modifying the Canadian budget in accordance with their capabilities, as classical realists would likely propose, the budget modifies how threats will be assessed and addressed.  Implications for National and Public Security In accordance with the classical realist belief that risks of war and organized violence remain the most salient problems in human existence, this research presents far-reaching 113  implications for national and public security.  To begin with, François Gaudreault, a Canadian intelligence officer with the Canadian Armed Forces, states that: “[i]nvestments and improvements have indeed been made, and the [Canada-US] border is much more secure than it was before the 9/11 attack.”529  However, as this research shows, Canadian security personnel in the South Okanagan are not receiving robust support for activities related to deterring and interdicting unjustified terrorist infiltration, human smuggling/trafficking, and the smuggling of arms, drugs, and money.  Furthermore, while the Beyond the Border (2011) initiative addresses long-standing concerns about the inefficiency of the border with regard to trade and travel, and is thus economically advantageous to Canada, this research shows that the Canadian-US border is meaningful with respect to transnational security threats in a particular border region.   At a local level, this has security implications for the citizens who live in the Okanagan Valley.  To some degree, the citizenry should be made aware of the border’s “opportunities” in relation to criminality, and, in line with Canada’s strategic tradition, the ‘situational,’ ad hoc, and fundamentally ‘reactive’ nature of rural border security in the South Okanagan, since “an unsuspecting and ill-informed public”530contributes to weak enforcement.  Border-related security threats are clandestine crimes, so increasing local awareness will likely contribute to the identification of suspicious activity. The effectiveness of local intelligence, for instance, not only depends on the local security community, but also on the local citizenry and their knowledge of what may be suspicious.  In addition, British Columbia has many characteristics that may be conducive to international sex trafficking operations: (1) it has northern boom towns that are drawing foreign workers in larger numbers than normal, but these boom towns have no support systems in place for foreign nationals― which makes it easier for them to become victims of                                                           529 François Gaudreault, “Security Threat at the Border Between Canada and the United States: A Quest for Impossible Perfection,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2013): 39. http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol14/no1/PDF/CMJ141Ep32.pdf.   530 Richard H Ward. “Critical Issues in Homeland Security,” in Adil Duyan, ed., Defence Against Terrorism (Berlin: IOS Press, 2012):  29.  114  human/sex trafficking); (2) it has access to the Canada-US international border and western seaports; (3) it contains four large urban centers, including Kelowna; and, (4) it has a high level of agricultural production, which encompass large diaspora communities―and increasingly, temporary migrant populations.    This research shows that there are also security implications at the regional and national levels.  Attending to counter-threat preparedness (e.g., counter-terrorism/trafficking/crime) at the Canada-US frontier requires vigilance in analyzing the spatial trends of crime and terror groups.531 The growing presence of Mexican cartel activity at any point along the Canada-US frontier should be a concern to all Canadians, but particularly to the government of Canada.  According to the California Attorney General, Kamala Harris, Mexican cartels are seeking to “expand the geographic scope of their operations.”532 The threat of Mexican cartel activity stems from its sophistication in exploiting the complexities of international trade and commerce, its ability to detect sites of lax law enforcement, its increasing involvement in human/sex trafficking as it seeks to diversify its operations, its focus on infiltrating diaspora communities in Canada, and its move toward decentralization to accommodate the geographic expansion of its operations.533 Many of these traits are also found in transnational Islamic terrorist groups. Within this context, in the coming years, immigration is expected to account for much of Canada’s net growth in relation to its labour market.  Although immigration continues to drive Canada’s growth, national and global demographic patterns suggest the likelihood of increased illicit transboundary movement from high-risk countries.534  This is particularly relevant in relation to the pressure of events in Syria, Iraq, and Mexico―as the historical overview shows.  Canada, for instance, has recently made a commitment to provide safe haven for 13,000 more                                                           531 Breanne Cave, “Counterinsurgency and Criminology: Applying Routine Activities Theory to Military Approaches to Counterterrorism” in Cynthia Lum and Leslie W. Kennedy, eds., Evidence-Based Counter-Terrorism Policy (New York: Springer Publishing, 2012): 334.  532 Harris, Gangs Beyond Borders, 2.   533 Ibid., 38-39.  534 Standing Committee on Immigration and Citizenship,  Evidence. 115  refugees from Syria and Iraq beginning in 2015.  Significantly, “increasing numbers of people from non-traditional countries of origin will bring new security risks and greater demands for new services and faster, more predictable and cost-effective screening processes.”535 This research also presents implications for bi-national and national border security policy―an inherently complex policy area.  For instance, since neither transnational terrorism nor transnational criminalities are isolated or temporary security threats, there is an obvious need to fill policy gaps and challenge neo-liberal agendas that interfere with vital security processes― working, as Gramsci believed, within existing state and bourgeois institutions to effect change.  Such agendas, as the historical overview and findings reveal, cannot take precedence over what is strategically necessary to ensure the security of Canada.  The main premise of Beyond the Border (2011) is to push the perimeter out by way of pre-clearance for customs, in order to reduce the need for enforcement at existing ports of entry at the Canada-U.S. border.   However, as the findings show, shriveling border protection at the physical border and reallocating resources to the North American perimeter in order to “secu[re] the border away from the border”536 has already begun to undermine security at the Osoyoos port of entry and the rural border.  Indeed, the South Okanagan security community has acute ‘on the ground’ needs.  Accordingly, resources should match the “strategic shift in border security.”537 If Beyond the Border (2011) is to be a truly effective policy, there needs to be a realistic assessment of the resources necessary for a layered security strategy (i.e., shifting border functions inland to streamline trade processes at the physical border).538 Without more resources at the physical border, transnational organized crime, particularly intra-continental crime groups that already exist within the perimeter, will seize the opportunity to exploit ports of entry and the areas between ports of entry.539                                                             535 Ibid. 536 Hataley and Leuprecht, Organized Crime Beyond, 14.  537 Ibid.  538 Ibid., 4.   539 Ibid., 8.  116   Recommendations The participants and collaborators clearly provided recommendations for change that are consistent with classical realist, conventional constructivist, and neo-Gramscian prescriptions. In particular, high-quality intelligence products (e.g., the ability to take action on precise information), resources, and greater specialization of border security personnel are some of the areas emphasized by participants and collaborators.  Since criminality is the main threat across the South Okanagan border region, and more broadly, across the entire Canada-US border, a number of changes would bolster the security potential of border security in the South Okanagan and the rest of the Canada-US border.  For one, high-quality intelligence products require more manpower and funds and these should be reinstated to benefit CBSA BSOs at all ports of entry.  CBSA’s own studies have shown that “frontline staff at ports of entry would like more frequent intelligence briefings, and to receive more intelligence products specific to their own port of entry and/or region.”540  Second, Canada should not require IBET Okanagan members at the Osoyoos RCMP to carry out border enforcement and general duties simultaneously.  Like the Americans, Canada should ensure there is a more regularized and consistent law enforcement presence in the areas between the ports of entry. In other words, like the US Border Patrol, IBET Okanagan members should be given the resources to provide law enforcement at the rural border, while Osoyoos RCMP detachment members should be free to concentrate on interior policing.  The findings show that the rural border and marine enforcement have specific needs that require broad familiarity with the international border and that extensive stretches of remote border areas require more technology, such as drones.  Third, CBSA should be given the resources to develop different kinds and levels of expertise in intelligence and criminal investigations that will assist front-line BSOs in carrying out their extensive mandates at the physical border. Intelligence officers and criminal                                                           540CBSA,  “Evaluation of the Intelligence Program-Final Report,” Canada Border Services Agency, April, 2014, http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/reports-rapports/ae-ve/2014/eip-epr-eng.html. 117  investigators can assist in illuminating complex issues, identifying targets, and detecting criminal patterns.541 Intelligence officers and criminal investigators can also help to ensure that increased localized enforcement does not displace criminal activity from one ‘hot spot’ to another.  Overall, this may assist in thwarting the strategies of intra-continental crime groups at ports of entry, which would benefit vital economic processes (e.g., cross-border trade).  If not managed properly, the Canada-US border is a potential liability to Canada’s economic competiveness. Moreover, thwarting strategic behavior may benefit important social processes for First Nation peoples (i.e., cross-border travel) to the degree that their communities have been severed by the Canada-US boundary line.  Long wait times at ports of entry are often related to security issues that require BSOs to probe deeper into their databases. High-quality intelligence would assist in reducing wait times at the border. Recommendations for Further Research   The findings, from a classical realist perspective, point to several thematic areas for future research. One such area is bi-national border security policy.  Future research could seek to discover the effects of the Beyond the Border (2011) initiative on other Canadian ports of entry and the areas between the ports of entry in order to obtain a realistic assessment of the resources needed at the physical border.  Another possible research subject pertains to sex trafficking in the Okanagan Valley.  The research shows that the Okanagan Valley is well-positioned for growth in this area, but very little is known about the nature and scope of sex trafficking in the Valley.  Future research involving community-based victims services, medical staff at the Okanagan Valley hospitals, and other non-governmental organizations that have connections to the sex trade in the South Okanagan, may provide more information about the characteristics and patterns of sex trafficking in this area.   A further possible area of research relates to the imbalance between economic and security analyses of the Canada-US border. Canadian border security research, for instance, often focuses on the economic effects of heightened security at the Canada-US border.  While                                                           541 James B. Bruce and Roger Z. George, Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008). 32.  118  economic analyses are unequivocally justifiable in relation to Canada’s economic security, security analyses should also be given center stage.  Research that identifies gaps in border policy and operations with regard to transnational security threats would not only assist in correcting this analytical imbalance, but might also provide a more balanced and realistic assessment of Canadian border security policies in general.    Conclusion As a novice researcher I place considerable value on the experience I have acquired in completing my thesis. Early on, I realized that the learning was acquired through consistent analysis and reflection of my topic throughout each phase of my research.  There was some difficulty at the outset of my thesis in deciding how to gain a better understanding of transnational security threats in regards to Canada’s national and public security.  However, as I began extensive research of the relevant literature I realized that the Canada-US boundary line was under-researched in relation to shifting border security strategies and current shifts in the strategic behavior of transnational security threats.  Consequently, I was eventually able to narrow my research question to a distinct context and a distinct participant group.  To carry out my research, I chose a single case study methodology with a two-step approach in order to outflank as much as possible government secrecy regarding transnational security threats and border operations in general.  Initially, I was stonewalled by CBSA at the Osoyoos port of entry insofar as senior management was unwilling to support my research because it pertained to national and public security.  Despite this, senior management eventually agreed to forward my questions to the CBSA media branch in Vancouver, BC.  I quickly realized that gaining access to the South Okanagan’s security community was going to require some serious communication skills in the face of such tough resistance.    A primarily qualitative research strategy was a crucial component of my research, which allowed security experts to volunteer information based on their experience and expertise in a specific area of border security.  As security experts, they had limited time to answer questionnaires or participate in interviews, and they were limited in the kinds of information they could volunteer because of the high degree of secrecy associated with transnational 119  threats and border security operations in general.  As such, a qualitative research strategy allowed me to solicit important information in a way that did not challenge security sensitivities or prerogatives.  ‘Theoretical’ thematic data analysis based on classical realism, conventional constructivism, and neo-Gramscianism began before the interviews occurred, which assisted me in formulating my questions, and continued throughout the interview and questionnaire process. Although my research topic is extraordinarily difficult to probe, I was able to network with collaborators in informal settings, which offered new insights and opened up new investigative directions.   How is this research relevant to future research and knowledge? It identifies border-related security vulnerabilities that ultimately impact national and public security.  In addition, to my knowledge, no other research of this type has been conducted in the South Okanagan.  Undoubtedly, more research is required to gain further insight into shifting border security strategies and current shifts in the strategic behavior of transnational security threats. Research that pinpoints the weaknesses of the latest bi-national border agreement in other areas will provide additional insights as will research in sex trafficking in the South Okanagan, and in any future research that focuses on Canadian border policy and operations in relation to transnational security threats.           120   Bibliography Security  Aas, Franko. “Analysing a World in Motion.” Theoretical Criminology, Vol. 11. No. 2 (2007): 283-303.  Behravesh, Maysam.  “Constructivism: An Introduction,” E-International Relations, Feb. 3/11. http://www.e-ir.info/2011/02/03/constructivism-an-introduction/.  Bigo, Didier.  “International Political Sociology,” in Paul D. Williams, ed., Security Studies, 116-129.  New York: Routledge, 2008.    Bilgin, Pinar.  “Critical Theory,” in Paul D. 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Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd ed.. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003.  Yin, Robert K.  Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 5th ed. London: Sage Publications, 2013. Yin, Robert K. “The Case Method as a Tool for Doing Evaluations.” Current Sociology 40/1 (1992): 121-137.  Yin, Robert K. “Case-Study Evaluations: A Decade of Progress,” New Directions for Evaluations, 76 (1997): 69-78. Yin, Robert K.  “Enhancing the Quality of Case Studies Within Health Services Research,” HSR, Health Services Research Vol. 34/5 (1999): 1209-1224. Yin, Robert K. The Case Study Anthology. New York: Sage Publications, 2004. Yin, Robert K. “Case Study Protocol,” in Albert J. Mills, Grabrielle Durepos, and Eiden Wiebe, eds., Encyclopedia of Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2010. Yin, Robert K. “Case Study Methods,”in Harris Cooper, Paul M. Camic, Debra L. Long, A.T. Panter, David Rindskopf, Kenneth J. Sher,edsw., APA Handbook of Research Methods in Psychology Vol. 2. 141-155. Washington, American Psychology Association, 2012. http://psycnet.apa.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/books/13620/009.pdf.  Yin, Robert K. “Validity and Generalization in Future Case Study Evaluation,” Evaluation, 19/3 (2013): 321-332.        141  Appendix A: Letter of Introduction  Amy J. McCroy UBC, MA Student researcher                                                                3333 University Way, Kelowna, B.C., V1V V17 Phone: 250.488.0887    E-mail: amy.mccroy@alumni.ubc.ca Date: July 7, 2014 Immigration and Customs Enforcement Seattle, Washington  Attention: Andrew Munoz, Dear Andrew,   As a University of British Columbia (Okanagan) graduate Master of Arts student I am required to conduct research and present the research process and findings in a final thesis.  I am requesting permission to send a qualitative questionnaire to you as part of my research study.   The purpose of the research study is to explore the security vulnerabilities of border crossings in the Okanagan district, especially in relation to human trafficking/smuggling and terrorist incursions.  This research study is a qualitative study because there is currently no academic research of this kind regarding the security vulnerabilities at the port of Osoyoos. Further, this research seeks to highlight port of entry mechanisms that discourage, enable, or constrain the transboundary movement of human traffickers/smugglers and terrorists. It is hoped that this research will also contribute to an academic understanding of border-related security vulnerabilities in specific areas of Canada’s frontier―namely, the South Okanagan district.   Should you have any further questions or concerns please contact me at the above contact information.    Your support is greatly appreciated,  Amy McCroy, BA, MA Candidate    142  Appendix B : Research Study Introduction Letter      143  Appendix C: Participant Consent Form   ‘More Lightning in the Hand:’ A Case Study of the Security Vulnerabilities of the Osoyoos Port of Entry at the Canada-US Boundary Line Consent Letter  Study Team:  Principal Investigator:   Graduate Student Researcher:   Dr. Adam Jones                                                         Amy J. McCroy Professor, Political Science                                      % University of British Columbia Okanagan  University of British Columbia Okanagan                IKBSAS, Arts Building, 1147 Research Rd. IKBSAS, Arts Building, 1147 Research Rd.             Kelowna, BC, Canada VIV 1V7 Kelowna, BC, Canada V1V 1V7                               Email:   amy.mcccroy@alumni.ubc.bc.ca                                                                                                                                              250.807.9624  Purpose of the study:  The purpose of this research project is to assess the security vulnerabilities of a specific port of entry operating on Canada’s frontier.  The research will examine the site-specific enforcement capabilities of the Osoyoos port of entry―more specifically, its ability to detect illicit transboundary movement.  In addition, this research evaluates the scope and nature of the problem of illicit transboundary movement in the South Okanagan, and the extent to which this nondominant sector of travel destabilizes border management at the Osoyoos port of entry.  The principal research question is: “What are the security vulnerabilities of the Osoyoos port of entry, particularly in relation to human trafficking/smuggling and terrorist incursions?”   Study Procedures: The qualitative research strategy most compatible with the research objectives of this study is the single case study.  Case study methodology has many strengths, such as the ability to trace changes over time, explore contextual conditions, and deal with a broad range of evidence including observations, physical archives, interviews, documents, quantitative data analysis and archival records―most of which are included in this study. Some participants will receive a set of questionnaires via email and some 144  participants will be interviewed. All face-to-face interviews will be semi-structured and audio recorded with the permission of participants, with written notes also taken to guard against recording mishaps.542 Potential Risks and Benefits of the Study: There are no known risks involved in this study.  You may benefit from participation to the extent that you are contributing to academic research.  Study Results: Results from this research study will be reported in a Master’s thesis and may also be published in peer-reviewed journal articles and books. Confidentiality: If you will be identified in the final thesis you will receive a draft copy to provide dissent or clarification of quotes and to confirm whether or not you wish to quoted. With respect to data security, information will be of a non-sensitive and non-personal nature; as such, data will be stored on my laptop, which is protected by a password.  Contacts for Information about the Study: If you have any questions or desire further information with respect to this study, you may contact the researchers carrying out this study. Contact information is provided above.  If you have any concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, contact the Research Participant Complaint Line in the UBC Office of Research Services toll free at 1-877-822-8598 or the UBC Okanagan Research Services Office at 250-807-8832.  It is also possible to contact the Research Complaint Line by email (RSIL@ors.ubc.ca ).  Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you may refuse to participate or withdraw from this study at any time.  Your signature below indicates that you have received a copy of this consent form for your own records. Your signature indicates that you consent to participate in this study and to be recorded and quoted with attribution.   If you are completing a questionnaire, it will be assumed that consent has been given.    Participant signature     Date                                                                 542 May 28, 2014 145                Printed name of the participant signing above.                                                                      

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