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The transformative potential of participatory politics : energy planning and emergent sustainability… Dusyk, Nichole 2013

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The transformative potential of participatory politics: Energy planning and emergent sustainability in British Columbia, Canada by Nichole Dusyk M.S. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 2002 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Doctor of Philosophy in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Resource Management and Environmental Studies) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) April 2013 ? Nichole Dusyk, 2013 ii Abstract This research examines the potential for local engagement in provincial energy planning and the contribution it might make to an energy transition. Combining a social worlds framework with the concept of hybrid forums, I develop the thesis that participation can facilitate sociotechnical change by facilitating the exploration of new identities and the collective reframing of problems and their solutions. This is what I call the transformative potential of participatory politics. I explore and elaborate this thesis using a discourse analysis of the provincial clean energy policy and two case studies of communities in British Columbia: Fort St. John and Dawson Creek. The discourse analysis examines the evolution of the clean energy storyline, introduced in 2007, and how it serves to position actors and technologies in the province. The analysis shows how the storyline, although integrating an environmental imperative into policy discourse, reproduces the trajectory and inertia of historical energy development.  The case study analysis examines municipal energy planning and one large-scale renewable energy project in each of the communities:  the proposed Site C Hydroelectric Project in Fort St. John and the Bear Mountain Wind Park in Dawson Creek. My analysis describes the mechanisms and sites of collective negotiation and how in each case, participatory processes have altered technologies, collective identities, and the framing of energy planning. The case studies support the thesis that participatory politics can contribute to energy transitions by altering the social and material characteristics of energy networks. In so doing, they add nuance to our understanding of what participatory energy governance can contribute and the circumstances in which it is effective. This includes findings that highlight the significance of the institutional, political, and infrastructural context in which participatory governance unfolds leading to the conclusion that participation, although potentially transformative, is not a panacea.  In conclusion, I situate my findings in relation to the concept of procedural sustainability arguing that by making room for collective negotiation, participatory politics can help move beyond the apparent antagonism of implementing renewable energy projects toward a potentially more productive approach of localizing energy projects and collectively constructing sustainability discourses and practices.  iii Preface A version of Chapter 6 has been published elsewhere. Dusyk, N. (2011). Downstream effects of a hybrid forum: The case of the Site C hydroelectric dam in British Columbia, Canada. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Special Issue on Energy 101(4): 871-881. This research project was approved by the UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board Certificate #H08-03074.  All figures are original creations for this project. iv Table of contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................................. ii	 ?Preface .................................................................................................................................................. iii	 ?Table of contents .................................................................................................................................. iv	 ?List of tables ........................................................................................................................................ vii	 ?List of figures ...................................................................................................................................... viii	 ?Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................. ix	 ?Dedication .............................................................................................................................................. x	 ?Chapter  1: Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1	 ?1.1	 ? Research approach and questions ............................................................................................. 4	 ?1.1.1	 ? Limitations ......................................................................................................................... 6	 ?1.2	 ? Thesis outline ............................................................................................................................ 6	 ?Chapter  2: Theoretical framework .................................................................................................. 10	 ?2.1	 ? Energy and environmental governance ................................................................................... 10	 ?2.1.1	 ? Early energy critiques ...................................................................................................... 10	 ?2.1.2	 ? Sustainable development ................................................................................................. 12	 ?2.1.3	 ? The climate change imperative ........................................................................................ 14	 ?2.1.4	 ? Lessons from the literature .............................................................................................. 16	 ?2.2	 ? At the interface of social and material worlds ........................................................................ 19	 ?2.2.1	 ? World-building ................................................................................................................ 19	 ?2.2.2	 ? Arenas, social worlds, and shared infrastructure ............................................................. 21	 ?2.3	 ? Sociotechnical change ............................................................................................................. 24	 ?2.3.1	 ? At the boundaries ............................................................................................................. 24	 ?2.3.2	 ? Situating renewable energy ............................................................................................. 28	 ?2.3.3	 ? The transformative potential of participatory politics ..................................................... 30	 ?2.3.3.1	 ? Hybrid forums .......................................................................................................... 33	 ?2.4	 ? Conclusion: The transformative potential of local engagement ............................................. 35	 ?Chapter  3: Building a legacy: Energy development in British Columbia .................................... 37	 ?3.1	 ? Post-war development (1945-1979) ........................................................................................ 38	 ?3.1.1	 ? Hydroelectricity ............................................................................................................... 38	 ?3.1.2	 ? Oil and natural gas ........................................................................................................... 41	 ?3.1.3	 ? Building a legacy ............................................................................................................. 42	 ?3.2	 ? Regulation, deregulation, and demand-side management (1980-2006) ................................. 46	 ? v 3.2.1	 ? Energy security and a new era of intervention ................................................................ 46	 ?3.2.2	 ? Deregulation and the fight for public power ................................................................... 49	 ?3.2.3	 ? Environmental regulation and streamlining .................................................................... 53	 ?3.3	 ? Conclusion: Regulatory change and infrastructural inertia ..................................................... 56	 ?Chapter  4: Clean energy discourse in British Columbia ............................................................... 58	 ?4.1	 ? Energy and climate change discourses .................................................................................... 59	 ?4.1.1	 ? Carbon control and clean energy ..................................................................................... 63	 ?4.2	 ? Clean versus sustainable energy (1980-2006) ........................................................................ 64	 ?4.3	 ? Creating a future powered by clean energy (2007?2010) ....................................................... 67	 ?4.3.1	 ? Coalition building ............................................................................................................ 72	 ?4.3.2	 ? The contested meanings of clean ..................................................................................... 74	 ?4.3.3	 ? Clean energy narratives ................................................................................................... 77	 ?4.3.4	 ? Intersection of clean energy and local interests ............................................................... 82	 ?4.4	 ? Conclusion: Clean energy in British Columbia ...................................................................... 83	 ?Chapter  5: Investigating local energy .............................................................................................. 85	 ?5.1	 ? Municipalities and provincial energy policy ........................................................................... 85	 ?5.2	 ? The Peace River region ........................................................................................................... 90	 ?5.2.1	 ? Fort St. John ..................................................................................................................... 94	 ?5.2.2	 ? Dawson Creek .................................................................................................................. 95	 ?5.2.3	 ? Case study rationale ......................................................................................................... 96	 ?5.3	 ? Methodology and methods ...................................................................................................... 97	 ?5.3.1	 ? Methods ........................................................................................................................... 98	 ?5.3.2	 ? Analysis ......................................................................................................................... 100	 ?5.3.3	 ? Missing voices and limitations ...................................................................................... 101	 ?Chapter  6: ?We?ve been down that dam road before??: Fort St. John and the Site C Hydroelectric Project ....................................................................................................................... 103	 ?6.1	 ? The Energetic City ................................................................................................................ 104	 ?6.2	 ? Creating a hybrid forum: The original Site C proposal ........................................................ 106	 ?6.3	 ? Avoiding a hybrid forum: The current Site C proposal ........................................................ 114	 ?6.4	 ? Mediating Site C ................................................................................................................... 124	 ?6.4.1	 ? Large hydroelectricity .................................................................................................... 124	 ?6.4.2	 ? The siting perspective .................................................................................................... 125	 ?6.4.3	 ? A history of antagonism ................................................................................................ 127	 ?6.5	 ? Opposition and alternatives in the Energetic City ................................................................ 129	 ?vi 6.6	 ? Conclusion: The old road and the new ................................................................................. 134	 ?Chapter  7: Creating Sustainable Dawson Creek .......................................................................... 138	 ?7.1	 ? Old Dawson Creek ................................................................................................................ 139	 ?7.2	 ? Revising municipal governance ............................................................................................ 142	 ?7.2.1	 ? Enacting sustainability ................................................................................................... 148	 ?7.3	 ? Peace Energy ......................................................................................................................... 151	 ?7.3.1	 ? Cooperative coordination .............................................................................................. 156	 ?7.4	 ? Conclusion: Sustainable Dawson Creek ............................................................................... 162	 ?Chapter  8: From energy planning to emergent sustainability .................................................... 167	 ?Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................... 178	 ?Appendices ......................................................................................................................................... 191	 ?Appendix A List of interviews by participant affiliation ............................................................... 191	 ?Appendix B Final code list for the case study analysis .................................................................. 192	 ?Appendix C Evaluation of the dialogism in Dawson Creek .......................................................... 194	 ?vii List of tables Table 4.1 Policy documents included in the clean energy discourse analysis ...................................... 62	 ?Table 4.2 Narratives supporting the clean energy storyline ................................................................. 78	 ?Table 6.1 Evaluation of the 1981-1982 Site C Hearings (from Callon et al. 2009) ........................... 113	 ?Table 6.2 Evaluation of the 2008 Site Consultation (from Callon et al. 2009) .................................. 120	 ?Table 6.3 Engagement activities undertaken by research participants ............................................... 122	 ?Table 7.1 Cooperative activities undertaken by Peace Energy Cooperative ...................................... 160	 ?Table A.1 List of interviews by participant affiliation ....................................................................... 191	 ?Table C.1 Evaluation of the Dawson Creek case study (from Callon et al. 2009)???????..194  viii List of figures  Figure 2.1 The social worlds framework (adapted from Clarke 2005) ................................................ 24	 ?Figure 3.1 Major electricity generation and transmission in British Columbia (2010) ........................ 43	 ?Figure 3.2 Major oil and gas infrastructure in British Columbia (2010) .............................................. 44	 ?Figure 5.1 British Columbia's Peace River Region .............................................................................. 91	 ?   ix Acknowledgements I would like to thank all of my research participants for generously offering their time and perspectives to this research. Without the trust and cooperation of so many articulate participants this project would not have been possible. The honesty, commitment, and hospitality of the people I encountered in The Peace made conducting this research a powerful and exceptionally rewarding experience. A special thank-you to Ken & Darby Forest and to Bev & Tim Weidman who welcomed me into their homes and graciously shared their knowledge over cups of tea, bottles of wine, and comfortable evenings of conversation.  I am indebted to a fantastic committee that has patiently guided me on my PhD journey?and was nothing but supportive as I became a mother along the way. My supervisor, John Robinson, has encouraged me to pursue this work on my own terms yet continued to challenge and inspire my thinking at every step; Meg Holden has consistently provided astute advice while also having a knack for offering words of encouragement when they were most needed; Andrew Feenberg has kindly and gently supported me as a grapple with theory; Gunilla ?berg has offered a much-appreciated perspective on the practical project of completing an interdisciplinary PhD; and Michael Travers has reminded me of the real-world applications of this research and represented the very best face of BC Hydro.     Many friends and colleagues have travelled with me and helped in large and small ways. I am indebted to Sonja Klinsky, Christina Cook, Alice Cohen, and the rest of the G7; Sylvia Coleman, Christian Beaudrie, and Tom Berkhout. I would also like to thank Jan Atkinson-Grosjean who took me in early on offering paid work and a model of robust qualitative research done with integrity.  This research has been supported by: a CIRS-BC Hydro Student Desk in Community Energy Planning, a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Doctoral Fellowship, a Pacific Century Graduate Scholarship, a UBC Graduate Fellowship, and a UBC Entrance Award.  Kirsten Harma and Melissa Nunes adeptly produced the maps and illustrations contained in the thesis. And finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my family: My parents who always encouraged but never pushed me; Sasha, who reminds me daily of what is most important in life, and Dean, whose love and support has sustained me on this long, winding road.   x  Dedication     For my mom,  Pauline Dusyk  (1948-2008)  who understood the heart of this project  before I did.    1 Chapter  1: Introduction In 2007, the Government of British Columbia introduced a new climate policy with ambitious goals of reducing provincial greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 33 percent (from 2007 levels) by the year 2020 and 80 percent by 2050. The policy was introduced at a time of growing consensus about the anthropogenic causes of climate change and the need for decisive action to avoid catastrophic changes to the global climate. Although bold within the Canadian context, the new climate policy put the provincial government in the company of an increasing number of governments, at the national and sub-national level, attempting to prompt and support the transition to a low-carbon economy.    Accompanying the provincial climate policy was a corresponding clean energy policy. While the climate policy and some of its key features, such as the provincial carbon tax, were at the centre of public attention and political debate, the proposed changes to the provincial energy system were somewhat lower profile. Nevertheless, like the new climate policy, the clean energy agenda introduced strict GHG emissions targets into energy policy. In effect, this has made provincial electricity policy a question of how and how much to scale-up renewable energy production (Jaccard, Nyboer, & Melton, 2012).   On the surface this may appear to have simplified energy policy-making but the story is more complex. A growing literature on renewable and community energy has chronicled the difficultly of new energy development and relatively high rates of public opposition to renewable energy projects (Aitken, McDonald, & Strachan, 2008; Bell, Gray, & Haggett, 2005; Firestone, Kempton, & Krueger, 2009; Haggett, 2010; A. Smith, 2009; Szarka, 2006; Walker et al., 2010; Wolsink, 2010; Wustenhagen, Wolsink, & Burer, 2007). British Columbia (BC) is no exception with a history of opposition to hydroelectric development of all sizes. There are a host of issues that factor into opposition. In BC the loss of valued landscapes and waterways, First Nations opposition, and the development model (specifically private power development) are all high-profile concerns. The planning process is also a point of contention in BC and elsewhere. This may include concerns about the viability, safety, and appropriateness of technologies; the range of options explored and specifically the need for new supply; the environmental assessment process; and the opportunities for meaningful public and stakeholder input in energy planning. At a systems level, opposition to renewable energy projects can stem from disagreement with overall policy agendas, mistrust of decision-making bodies, perceived inequities or injustices, the acceptability of environmental and social impacts, or the distribution of costs and benefits.     2  While perhaps not surprising, the difficulty of getting renewable energy on the ground has frustrated efforts to manage carbon emissions. It has also highlighted the fact that transitioning the energy system does not just depend on technological or economic concerns?it is also a socio-political and cultural transition involving a wide range of stakeholders and publics. In light of the urgency of climate change mitigation, what then is the appropriate role for democratic participation and how might we expect participatory governance to contribute to energy transitions?  This question raises long-standing issues regarding public participation in environmental and technological decision-making. Specifically, what the appropriate balance is between the need and the desire for democratic participation and effective policy-making. This is, to an extent, an instrumental question weighing the legitimacy and support that may be gained from participatory politics against the inevitable messiness of including a range of voices in the decision-making process. However, constructivist theories suggest the possibility of new knowledge, technological designs, or identities emerging from participatory politics (Callon, Lacoumes, & Barthe, 2009; Felt & Wynne, 2007; Fischer, 2000). This moves beyond instrumental questions of legitimacy and support to ask what unique effects or entities might result from meaningful stakeholder and public engagement. This is what I call the transformative potential of participatory politics and it is the primary focus of this thesis.         I engage with the BC energy system at a time of flux when the new clean energy agenda is being developed and translated to concrete policies. Thus, what constitutes clean energy in British Columbia is actively being negotiated and constructed in both policy and infrastructure. At the same time, the opportunities for public participation are also shifting. This is due to the clean energy agenda itself and the institutional changes it has created; the provincial climate policy and its implementation via local governments; and the initiative of local authorities and advocacy groups who are choosing to engage with energy planning and politics.   Within this shifting terrain, my focus is on local actors and how, within a provincial energy network, they are engaged in the negotiation and/or contestation of energy futures. For the purpose of this study, local actors are defined as municipal governments, advocacy groups, or other collective organizations that are seeking to engage with energy policy-making. The constructivist epistemology that informs this work leads to an understanding of the ?local? that is  3 fluid, dynamic and in part created by the activities and identities of the actors involved. Due to my use of municipal case studies, in this study local actors are grounded in specific geographical spaces. Due to the legal definition of municipalities and their regulatory jurisdiction in relation to energy policy, there is also a hierarchical relationship between levels of government. However, all entities are understood to be ?local? in the sense that they are located somewhere (Haraway, 1991) with entities and power dynamics enacted and constructed rather than given (Jessop, Brenner, & Jones, 2008). Thus ?local actors? in BC energy policy are in part constructed in relation to ?provincial actors?, via their connection to specific geographic places, and through their location in the provincial energy network.  The organizing question of the research is if and how local participation in energy planning contributes to sociotechnical change in energy systems. To answer this question, I draw on three academic literatures. The phenomenon of sociotechnical change is approached using theories developed in science and technology studies. To interpret the role of public engagement, I employ the literature on participatory politics specifically as it relates to technological and environmental decision-making. These two literatures form the basis of the conceptual framework introduced in Chapter 2. Finally, the conceptual framework is grounded in the empirical studies of renewable and community energy initiatives that provide lessons on why renewable energy development is controversial and suggest alternative approaches to development.  My findings suggest that current top-down energy policies and development patterns in the province are failing?to reduce carbon emissions at a rate necessary to reach provincial targets but also to enact any form of substantial change in the patterns of energy production and use. Instead the clean energy agenda is, to a large extent, reproducing historical development patterns and the inertia of the incumbent energy system. At the same time, the introduction of a climate mitigation agenda has negatively impacted opportunities for public and local engagement in energy planning. This is contrasted with the two municipal case studies both describing how energy-related participatory events have been the sites of innovation and transformation. The findings point to the importance of open, public processes and the unique contribution that can arise when these processes are initiated and managed at the local level.    From a practical standpoint, this research provides an analysis of current policies and controversies in the British Columbia and the work they are doing to either alter the energy network or reproduce a business-as-usual approach. This includes analysis of the provincial clean  4 energy policy agenda, the proposed Site C Hydroelectric Project, the Bear Mountain Wind Park, and municipal planning initiatives in two northern communities.   The analysis, although focused specifically on British Columbia and on two communities within the province, Dawson Creek and Fort St. John, contributes to general understandings of participatory politics as they intersect with energy policy and planning. Specifically, the research contributes empirical evidence to support the transformative potential of participatory politics and the potential for local energy planning to be a platform for building and mobilizing collective visions of sustainability. It also adds specifics to our understanding of what local participation ?does? in technological decision-making, providing detail on the mechanics of sociotechnical change and specific examples of emergent technologies and social worlds.    1.1 Research approach and questions The research is organized around the activities of local actors engaging in and/or contesting policies or projects in the provincial energy arena. This has led to a methodological approach that emphasizes and situates local perspectives within the broader provincial network. This approach is evident in the structure of the thesis that is divided into two major components the first providing an historical overview and discourse analysis of the provincial clean energy agenda (Chapters 3 and 4) and the second analyzing the activities of local actors in two municipalities: Fort St. John and Dawson Creek (Chapters 5, 6, and 7).    The case studies were chosen for both their intrinsic and instrumental value (Stake, 2000). The Peace River Regional District is the primary energy-producing region in the province. As the two largest cities in the region, Fort St. John and Dawson Creek each have a unique history with energy politics and development. The two communities were chosen to represent different issues and different responses that arise from renewable energy development. In the midst of an oil and gas regime, each community is facing the development of renewable energy on a large scale. In the case of Fort St. John, this is the continuation of the historical development of large hydroelectricity (via the proposed Site C Hydroelectric Project) whereas in Dawson Creek renewable energy development is in the relatively novel form of industrial scale wind development (via Bear Mountain Wind Park) and small scale solar and biomass installations. At the same time, both communities, as signatories to the BC Climate Action Charter, are working towards carbon neutrality in their corporate operations. Dawson Creek is an established  5 provincial leader in this regard while Fort St. John is just beginning down the path of municipal energy planning.    The primary research question asks if and how local participation in energy planning contributes to sociotechnical change in energy systems. To answer this question, I organized my data collection and analysis around three sub-questions.    First, I asked how collective definitions of clean, green, sustainable, and/or renewable energy are being negotiated and contested within the province and the ways that local actors are engaged in the negotiation or contestation. My preliminary analysis revealed three key sites to focus on: provincial policy-making, municipal energy planning, and specific renewable energy developments. My analysis of clean energy discourse addresses the first site while both case studies consider municipal energy planning and large-scale renewable energy projects.  Second, I considered the opportunities and effects of local engagement. In the provincial level analysis I consider the discursive positioning of local actors and of technologies that are relevant to local actors in the Peace Region: namely oil and gas, large hydroelectricity, and wind energy. In the case studies, I interviewed elected city representatives, municipal staff, and energy advocates and collected relevant documents to assess local energy initiatives and controversies. I asked research participants about the major energy-related issues in their communities, how they were seeking to influence those issues, what factors were enabling or constraining them, and what their vision of a sustainable energy system included.  In my analysis, I considered the substance of local initiatives, how they took form, and their relationship to provincial policies and agendas.  Finally, I considered the relationship between participatory politics and collective understandings of renewable energy and sustainability. To answer this question, I focused on the participatory events that took place in the two communities. In Fort St. John, this was public engagement regarding the proposed Site C Hydroelectric Project and community energy planning undertaken by the municipality. In Dawson Creek it was both the on-going municipal sustainability initiative and the activities of the Peace Energy Cooperative in developing the Bear Mountain Wind Park.       I have chosen to undertaken interview-based case study research. This provides descriptive detail and a voice to participants and perspectives that are often marginalized in typical analysis of energy policy. In essence, the methodological (and theoretical) approach was specifically  6 designed to add depth to energy policy discussions that are often focused on technologies or policies in broad application rather than on specific projects and controversies.    1.1.1 Limitations The focus on local actors has contributed to an in depth, place-based analysis of energy policy in British Columbia. However, due to time and resource constraints, this limited my ability to symmetrically analyze provincial energy policy. Indeed, it would be a difficult task to attempt to include the depth of analysis and voice to the provincial policy network that I have been able to achieve in my case studies. Instead, I have provided a historical overview of provincial energy policy and undertaken a discourse analysis of the provincial government?s clean energy policy. While this provides a basis with which to situate the case studies that follow, it is necessarily missing considerable nuance in regards provincial policy-making. For instance, the political and practical interactions between the provincial government and BC Hydro are an evolving and highly complex interaction in their own right. In my account, the provincial government is positioned as the responsible party in regards to energy policy. Negotiations within ministries and departments as well as those with major players, such as BC Hydro and the British Columbia Utilities Commission, are left to further research.    Secondly, this research does not aim to provide prescriptive energy policy advice either in terms of technologies or planning procedures. Rather its contribution lies in providing a descriptive analysis of local and municipal action in the provincial policy arena. Lessons, policy implications, and alternative approaches may be drawn from the analysis but it is not designed to formulate policy recommendations or advice.   Finally, the perspectives of Indigenous communities in northeast BC are a significant omission from this account. This is not an oversight but a result of difficulty gaining access to these communities. Nevertheless, the research would be more complete had it been possible to include these perspectives (see Chapter 5 for more detail on my attempt to be inclusive of local Indigenous government and representatives).   1.2 Thesis outline The chapters of this thesis first establish a theoretical basis and a conceptual framework for the research. They then discuss historical and current provincial energy policy before moving onto detailed discussions of the two municipal case studies.   7  In Chapter 2, I provide a critical review of the literature and develop my conceptual framework. Theoretically, this analysis draws on science and technology studies and theories of participatory politics in environmental and technological decision-making. Addressing local initiatives in the provincial policy context requires an analytical model that can account for action within a provincial energy network but also has the resolution to theorize action occurring at and resonating from specific places/nodes within that network. To accomplish this, I have used the social worlds framework with an emphasis on the interaction of social worlds and shared infrastructure. Within this framework, collective negotiation is one way that actors ?work together? to change the energy network despite divergent discourses and interests. ?Hybrid forums? (Callon et al., 2009) are participatory events where a diverse set of actors can explore and reframe shared worlds and reconfigure collective identities. Thus the transformative potential of participatory politics is the potential for collective negotiation to alter both the material and social fabric of the energy network.   The next two chapters focus on the provincial policy network. Chapter 3 provides a historical overview of BC energy policy ultimately arguing that, despite new discourses and actors, both the infrastructural base and the underlying narratives of energy development have changed relatively little in the past three decades.  Chapter 4 picks up the story in 2007 with the introduction of the provincial clean energy agenda. It argues that despite the integration of an environmental imperative into provincial energy discourse, the emerging clean energy storyline is closely aligned with historical energy development in the province. As result, infrastructural inertia is reproduced (via the positioning of large hydroelectricity and the oil and gas sector) while procedural streamlining has limited the opportunities for public engagement and the negotiation of a shared understanding of clean energy. The implication of these findings is that the clean energy storyline actually serves to make a low-carbon energy transition in the province less, rather than more, likely.   Chapter 5 shifts focus to municipalities and their involvement in energy planning in British Columbia. In addition to providing background and methodological detail on the case studies that follow in Chapters 6 and 7, it provides a general overview of BC municipalities? collective engagement in energy politics via the Union of BC Municipalities. The argument is that provincial climate policy, and particularly the Climate Action Charter, is calling on municipalities to become more engaged in energy demand management but that this expectation has not yet  8 been accompanied by additional jurisdiction or opportunity to become involved in energy production. The result is an uneven devolution that both Fort St. John and Dawson Creek are currently grappling with.    The Fort St. John case study (Chapter 6) focuses on the proposed Site C Hydroelectric project?a project that has been ?next in line? for development for over three decades and has recently been reinitiated by the provincial clean energy agenda. The history of the project includes an extensive public hearing process in 1981-1982 that, despite its limitations and adversarial format, served as a hybrid forum. A key finding from this case study is the potential for public process to contribute to regulatory-initiated change. Comparing this process to the recent (2008) public consultation on the project qualifies this finding. Specifically it highlights the critical importance of institutional and political context and of the hydroelectric legacy in mediating public engagement and the possibilities of sociotechnical change. In contrast to the Site C controversy, but not entirely independent from it, the municipality and BC Hydro are experimenting with community energy planning. The process has opened up possibilities for more collaborative planning with an emphasis on alternative technologies including energy conservation and efficiency?and thus it suggests an alternative path to the conflict and antagonism of Site C.   Chapter 7 presents the Dawson Creek case study. This case study describes the development of a new social world, Sustainable Dawson Creek, emerging from the hybrid forum jointly created by the City of Dawson Creek and the Peace Energy Cooperative. Together, these two organizations have enrolled a range of actors in conscientiously defining and enacting sustainability within the community.  This case study highlights two sites of negotiation: within the community and between the community and other actors in the policy arena. This has allowed for the locally-managed translation of concepts and knowledge and the creation of Bear Mountain Wind Park as a boundary object. This has fostered the emergence of collective meanings that resonate within the community yet remain legitimate in the provincial policy arena. Rather than simply rejecting  or implementing provincial energy policy, Sustainable Dawson Creek, has translated the concepts into a form that is uniquely their own. The findings from this chapter illustrate potential outcomes of local participatory politics, in this case a new social world, Sustainable Dawson Creek, and new technological configurations such as Bear Mountain Wind Park. It also offers specific mechanisms that enabled change specifically locally-managed ?translation? (Callon, 1998) and the creation of boundary objects.     9 In the final chapter I draw together the arguments outlined above and situate them within a discussion of procedural sustainability. Taken together the case studies support the transformative potential of participatory politics. They do so in an instrumental sense by helping to successfully implement new energy projects but also by altering technologies and collective identities. In so doing, participatory politics can be said to have helped to envision and enact new energy futures in British Columbia.   In contrast to the path of provincial policy, that is serving to reproduce historical development patterns and the inertia of the existing energy regime, this research suggests that local participatory politics holds the potential for innovation and change in the provincial energy network. By making room for collective negotiation and world-building, it moves beyond the apparent antagonism of implementing renewable energy projects illustrating the inherent potential of localizing energy projects and collectively constructing sustainability.   10 Chapter  2: Theoretical framework This thesis is based on the question of if and how local engagement in energy planning can contribute to sociotechnical change. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the conceptual tools necessary to address this question. I begin with a very brief overview of environmental governance as it relates to the energy sector. The purpose is to orient the reader to some of the major political and discursive trends that have influenced energy development in the past several decades. I complete this section with a critical review of the literature devoted to understanding renewable energy development and controversies. Second, I introduce a conceptual framework with the explanatory power necessary to analyze sociotechnical change in British Columbia?s energy system. My framework is based on social worlds theory combined with a number of concepts from Science and Technology Studies (STS), including Michel Callon?s concepts of overflows and of hybrid forums. Combining this with the theoretical rationales behind participatory governance, I develop the thesis that participatory politics have the potential to create sociotechnical change by providing the opportunity for a diverse set of actors to collectively explore and reframe shared worlds and identities. Thus the transformative potential of participatory politics is the potential for collective negotiation to alter both the material and social fabric of the energy network. To the extent that collective negotiation includes the perspectives of specific communities, participatory processes can also serve to build cultural rationality and to localize energy projects within those communities.   2.1 Energy and environmental governance 2.1.1 Early energy critiques In North America, the story of local or municipal energy is somewhat circular. Most electricity and gas networks on the continent began as small-scale, privately owned networks servicing cities. As networks and markets grew, distribution systems were consolidated but remained as a patchwork of service provision with substantial populations in un- or under-serviced neighbourhoods and regions. In the years following World War II, many jurisdictions went through a period of centralization and expansion. In Canada, this included the development of provincial public utilities that subsequently bought up smaller networks and expanded service provision in rural areas. Therefore, although a number of small networks remained in the core of cities as unique municipal infrastructure, on the whole Canadian electricity and gas networks became more regional and/or provincial in their physical character and management. The centralization and expansion that characterized this era was dominated by the notion of providing supply to ever-expanding markets typically via large-scale generation facilities (Netherton, 2008).   11  As a result of two ?energy crises? and the emergence of the modern environmental movement, the premise of technocratic, supply-side energy management came under scrutiny in the 1970s. Critiques were rooted in the anti-nuclear movement and the related patterns of large-scale technology and technocratic management (Jamison, 2001). Alternative concepts developed and tested during this period were Amory Lovins highly influential ?soft energy path? (Lovins, 1976, 1977) and the related concept of energy services. These two developments provided a radically different way of conceiving of energy planning and management shifting the focus from building new supply to considering the source of energy demand including energy use and efficiency throughout the supply and demand chain.   Stemming from the critique of large-scale, supply oriented energy management, the concept of community energy was, in a sense, re-invented. Driven in part by philosophical commitments to ?human scale? technology (Schumacher, 1973) advocates and enthusiasts experimented with small scale renewables, home power, and off-grid living (Tatum, 1995). There were also a number of specific experiments with community energy planning. In contrast to European initiatives that were more successful in facilitating the development of district heating systems and other community-scaled generation, in North America, community energy planning initiatives usually translated to municipal efforts to reduce energy demand and increase efficiency (Laurence, 1982).   However, as oil prices fell in the early 1980s, interest in energy planning subsided and many of the conservation and renewable energy related programs and experiments were not successfully institutionalized (Laird, 2001; Robinson & Hooker, 1987). However, the critiques of energy forecasting techniques and new concepts of energy demand did alter utility management practices and, in some cases (such as in British Columbia) resulted in the institutionalization of integrated resource planning and utility-based demand-management.   In addition, as a result of critiques of technocratic energy management and the experimentation with off-grid and building scale energy production and with community energy, a discussion on the role of scale in energy systems emerged. Resonating with Lovins? soft path and with the ?appropriate technology? movement, this prompted investigation of the potential of small-scale energy production and the benefits that could be derived from it. Beginning as a technical argument based on optimizing system efficiency and security, this discussion has remained  12 under-theorized from a social and political perspective often adopting simplified and/or deterministic notions of democratization and social justice1. Regardless, it marks a turning point in energy discussions through an explicit focus on scale and positive associations with the idea of increased public engagement in energy decision-making.   2.1.2 Sustainable development In the mid-1980s, sustainable development discourses began to influence environmental governance. Rising to prominence with the 1987 report Our Common Future (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987), these discourses drew connections between environmental degradation, social equity, and continuing economic development with a resulting focus on win-win-win solutions. The triple bottom line of this approach both increased the breadth of the project and resulted in numerous, often competing interpretations of sustainable development (Mebratu, 1998; Pezzoli, 1997) with, for instance, differing emphasis given to each of the ?three pillars? (Holden, 2011). On one hand, the proliferation of interpretations opened up the concept of sustainable development and the related concept of sustainability to critique, in particular for its lack of clear, substantive goals and for enabling the green-washing of business-as-usual policies via open-ended definitions. On the other hand it emphasized the situated and process-dependent potential of the concept with interpretations and specific goals being open to negotiation and flexible to specific contexts and communities. In the latter case, the contested and ultimately emergent nature of the concept is viewed as a strength that can be utilized to increase its relevance and productivity (Connelly, 2007; Davison, 2001; O'Riordan & Voisey, 1998).   As the concept of sustainable development has evolved into sustainability and been taken up by scholars and applied in practice the tension between process and outcomes has led to two discernible (yet not necessarily exclusive) understandings of the concept, what Thaddeus Miller calls universalist and procedural approaches (2012). A universalist approach focuses on predetermined definitions of sustainability and the production of salient, scientific knowledge to inform appropriate action. A procedural approach posits sustainability as context-dependent and defined through collective processes. Thus the emphasis is on appropriate processes that may allow sustainability to emerge. In this interpretation, scientific knowledge is only one of multiple, potentially relevant forms knowledge. In an example of this argument, John Robinson argues that sustainability provides a ?discursive playing field? where conflicting visions and views can be                                                       1 Some notable exceptions from Canada include (Hooker, MacDonald, Van Hulst, & Victor, 1983; Robinson, 1980)  13 worked out. In this interpretation, sustainability, rather than being a set of scientifically-determined goals, becomes the emergent property of a collective conversation (Robinson, 2004). A procedural view of sustainability is particularly compatible with a transformative view of participatory politics since both rely on the emergent outcomes of collective reasoning. The relationship of the concepts will be discussed further below.    In part due to procedural approaches, sustainable development and sustainability discourses have increased attention to local and participatory initiatives as potential sites for envisioning and enacting environmental and social change. At the international level, this was articulated in Chapter 28 of Agenda 212  that called on local authorities to engage and build consensus in their communities around the concept of sustainable development. Ultimately the implementation of Local Agenda 21 and related initiatives was highly uneven. However it drew attention to scale and participatory politics in enacting change. Like the concept of sustainable development itself, the appropriate scale of action and the level of public engagement that is optimal for facilitating sustainable development remain contested issues that require further empirical evidence (Portney 2005). However, the discussion has yielded two outcomes. First many interpretations of sustainability incorporate an implicit connection to participatory politics. This ranges from specific arguments for grassroots action and community-building to less specified calls for collective or public discussion of sustainability (O'Riordan & Voisey, 1998; Robinson, 2004). Second, local sustainability initiatives and civic engagement have become linked in both theory and practice with civic engagement at times being posited as a necessary step towards sustainability and/or as an outcome of increased sustainability.   Energy, although acknowledged as an important component of a sustainable future, has not been a focal component of sustainable development discourses. For instance, in British Columbia, sustainable development was the guiding principle behind the work of the British Columbia Energy Council in the mid-1990s. However both the Council and the discourse of energy sustainability disappeared in a few short years with minimal long-term impact on patterns of energy production or use in the province (see Chapter 3 for more details). Following from Adrian Smith, one possible explanation is that sustainability posed too significant a challenge to the inherited patterns of energy governance (A. Smith, 2009) with points of conflict in terms of both the content of the discourse as well the authority and jurisdiction of those advocating it.                                                        2 Agenda 21 was the agreement that emerged from the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro  14  Also contributing to the relative absence of sustainable development discourses in the energy sector was the preoccupation with neoliberal concepts of market reform that emerged around the same time as sustainable development discourses. The political economic ideology of neoliberalism promotes reliance on free-market processes over government intervention and regulation. It manifests itself in several distinct but related trends including regulatory streamlining and deregulation, the privatization of public companies and services, and the increasing commodification of resources (Heynen, McCarthy, Prudham, & Robbins, 2007). In the 1990s, neoliberal policies had considerable impact on the energy sector putting the policy focus on privatization and market deregulation. Although these policies were not necessarily incompatible with sustainable development, jurisdictions subject to neoliberal reform, such as the UK, saw little uptake of sustainable development in the ?post-privatized? energy sector (A. Smith, 2009).  In British Columbia neoliberal policies were not as comprehensively implemented as in the UK. However, as will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, neoliberal discourse has been a pervasive and highly contested issue that has recently found new life in the climate change imperative.   2.1.3 The climate change imperative Beginning in the late 1990s, the climate change imperative or ?carbon control? discourse (While, Jonas, & Gibbs, 2010) added an additional layer to environmental governance and regulation. Carbon control is characterized by an increased emphasis on mitigating climate change and transitioning to a low carbon economy. The instrumental focus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions is accompanied by a focus on market mechanisms, on predominately national systems of measurement and accountability, and on ?downstream regulation? that focuses on the point where carbon is emitted as opposed to where fossil fuels are produced (While et al., 2010, p. 82).   The carbon control imperative has led to an increasing focus on energy systems with governments in many jurisdictions setting ambitious carbon reduction goals that often rely heavily on increasing the supply of renewable energy.  These renewable energy policies have led to mixed results. On the one hand, the share of renewable energy is steadily on the increase. Between 2005 and 2011, global renewable energy production grew an average of five percent annually and the rate of growth is expected to increase between 2012 and 2017 (International Energy Agency, 2012). On the other, many jurisdictions have seen considerable public opposition to individual projects and to the policies that support the large-scale roll-out of renewables. The opposition to  15 renewable energy development relates to a number of issues (discussed in detail in the following section) including specific project characteristics, the disruption or loss of valued landscapes, the planning process or issues with the broader policy agenda supporting the individual projects.  On a practical level, community energy has been pursued as one avenue to help make renewable energy projects more acceptable. Walker et al. note a proliferation of community energy policies and projects seemingly in response to public opposition to more conventional development models. Their study of community energy in the United Kingdom found that policies encouraging community energy do in some cases stem from normative commitments to democratic participation. At the same time, they also found community energy being primarily implemented for the instrumental purposes of achieving public buy-in to national policy priorities (Walker, Hunter, Devine-Wright, Evans, & Fay, 2007). The range of community energy projects and the relatively recent interest in them makes it difficult to anticipate whether they will succeed in increasing public support for renewable energy or help realize the implementation of renewable energy (Walker & Devine-Wright, 2008).   Although climate change policies are supporting the development of community energy in some jurisdictions, carbon control and community energy represent specific, not necessarily compatible, ways to reframe energy policy discourse and promote renewable energy production. Carbon control provides a more specific, instrumental agenda with a tendency to emphasize large-scale energy development as a replacement for fossil fuel combustion. Combined with the urgency of climate change mitigation, it may (be used to) sideline alternative goals that might be achieved in rethinking energy policy such as increased energy efficiency or local economic development (Barry & Ellis, 2010; Scrase & MacKerron, 2009). Similarly, the range of possible goals behind community energy, for instance reducing municipal energy expenditures or increasing community autonomy, may mean it is not the most effective means to reduce carbon emissions (Walker & Devine-Wright, 2008). In a general sense, community energy and its potential to align with economic and social outcomes as well as with environmental outcomes would on the surface seem to be more compatible with sustainable development and sustainability even though these discourses are not currently the primary driver behind community energy policies.  This thesis describes instances of both framings. As will be discussed, in British Columbia, carbon control discourses dominate the energy policy arena. Unlike in the United Kingdom, there  16 has not been a proliferation of community energy projects and programs. However, the two municipal case studies describe how carbon control discourse and policy is being merged with, altered, and/or contested based on, among other things, concepts of community energy and local sustainability.  2.1.4 Lessons from the literature In the academic literature, considerable emphasis has been on public opinion and attitudes toward renewable energy technologies. This stems from the ongoing difficulties siting renewables, and in particularly wind energy, despite high levels of in-principle public support. The literature has examined this phenomenon and the Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) designation frequently given to those opposing renewable energy development (Bell et al., 2005; Devine-Wright, 2005; Wolsink, 2006). It has shown how public opposition to renewable energy projects is typically more complicated and dynamic than the self-interested motives of NIMBYism and that regardless of the actual source of opposition, the label of NIMBYism is often used to dismiss and delegitimize opponents (Bell et al., 2005; Walker et al., 2010; Wolsink, 2006). Although arguing that self-interest is a normal and legitimate response (Gross, 2007), these studies have shown the complicated nature of public responses to renewable energy projects. They have found that opposition may be relate to what project is proposed, where it is proposed, and/or how it is proposed and implemented (Devine-Wright, 2010).   The first category, what is proposed, may include the viability and appropriateness of the technology as well as the localized environmental, economic, and social impacts. It may also encompass the model of development and the ownership structure of projects. One study of a Scottish wind project concluded that community ownership served to amplify positive attitudes toward wind energy and suppress negative attitudes (Warren & McFadyen, 2010). Similarly a recent Canadian study found that, ?[i]n Quebec there is no opposition to wind power per se, but a clash of ideas about how this energy should be developed" (Jegen & Audet, 2011). The authors argue that the contested issue was the socio-political configuration of wind development based on the scale and degree of centralization of the proposed projects as well as on provincial versus community versus foreign ownership.   In terms of renewable energy projects, what project is proposed is often closely related to where the project is proposed since projects are often designed for specific windsheds, solarsheds, bodies of water or otherwise situated to be near energy sources. Place-related concerns, the where  17 of energy projects, may include the loss or alteration of valued landscapes, viewscapes, or habitats. This may be exacerbated by what Patrick Devine-Wright calls the dominant ?siting perspective? that seeks to rationalize and objectify proposed development ?sites? and neglects or negates the emotional and symbolic values attached to them (Devine-Wright, 2010). This serves to alienate those with attachments to the place as well as de-legitimizing their position and potential contribution to project assessment.   Finally, the planning and decision-making process, the how of renewable energy projects, may be at dispute. This includes the decision-making structure and the form of public engagement undertaken. The interactions between all involved actors, including project proponents, regulators, government officials, and publics, influence both expectations and responses (Walker et al., 2010). Perceptions of a fair process and fair outcomes contribute to project legitimacy and support (Gross, 2007). Conversely, engagement processes that are felt to be inadequate or insufficiently linked to decision-making processes contribute to project opposition (Haggett, 2008, 2010). Furthermore, opposition may stem from a disjuncture between global or national interests and local interests (Haggett, 2008) or from the anticipated distribution of impacts and risks particularly when those most impacted are not empowered to make decisions. For instance some regions and communities may feel that they are disproportionately impacted by climate change mitigation agendas that are imposed on them by state or national governments.  In light of these concerns, the ?decide-announce-defend? model of project planning is found radically insufficient (Walker et al., 2010) as are models that assume opposition is based on ?information deficits? that can be rectified by information campaigns or making opponents see things more rationally (Owens, 2000). Instead the studies support early and meaningful public and stakeholder participation that is linked to decision-making, accepting of opposition, inclusive of broader policy agendas while being accountable to specific locales and communities. Meaningful engagement is supported by building flexibility into proposals (for instance in regard to location, size, or technology) and/or engaging stakeholders before key decisions are made (Wolsink, 2010). Finally, situating energy technologies and controversies in specific places and histories can both help understand controversy and seek resolution (Devine-Wright, 2009, 2010; Jolivet & Heiskanen, 2010; Parkhill, Pidgeon, Henwood, Simmons, & Venables, 2010). For instance, Patrick Devine-Wright suggests emplacement strategies to help account for emotional and symbolic values and potentially improve the ?fit? of renewable energy projects with the places that are to be developed.    18  In a framework created to analyze the interaction between renewable energy proponents and publics, Walker et al. highlight the need to understand interactions as dynamic with the project characteristics, engagement activities, and the expectations evolving over time (Walker et al., 2010). In a more specific case study, Eames et al. describe how the interpretative flexibility of the hydrogen economy as a visionary concept served to build coalitions of support in the United Kingdom but argue that to be realised the hydrogen economy must ?become grounded in particular actor networks and specific places." (Eames, McDowall, Hodson, & Marvin, 2006, p. 372). This inevitably involves contestation since it requires the implementation of some visions and the exclusion of others. The process of bringing visions ?to ground? can thus been seen as a likely site of contestation but also a place where renewable energy projects and the meanings attached to them are literally and symbolically constructed and might be differently constructed.   Similarly, Walker et al. argue for symmetry in analyzing renewable energy projects. This emphasizes the expectations and responses of all actors, including project proponents, in response to each other and the unfolding process (Walker et al., 2010). Again this emphasizes the constructed nature of renewable energy controversies and moves beyond the idea that it is only or primarily public responses that need to be changed.  The sum of this literature, as it relates to local and participatory energy governance, is to suggest that increasing public engagement and attending to local concerns is important to gaining social acceptance of renewable energy projects. Although local responses may not actually have a significant impact on the decision outcome of individual projects (Aitken et al., 2008), the implication is that transitioning the energy system toward renewables will not be possible if each project becomes a point in a pattern of conflict and opposition. This would not only slow the process of transition but could also significantly influence public trust in and the perceived legitimacy of policy agendas further contributing to opposition. Furthermore, the literature also suggests the potential for broader sociotechnical transformation that may be linked to the deployment of renewable energy technologies. First, the calls for early and meaningful public and stakeholder engagement, for emplacement strategies, and for retaining some flexibility in proposals until there has been an opportunity for local input suggest collaborative model where stakeholders and publics are seen as active contributors in the construction of renewable energy. This is consistent with a transformative view of participatory politics and with a procedural approach to sustainability. Second is the recognition that technical change is linked to  19 institutional and social change (Jolivet & Heiskanen, 2010; Szarka, 2006; van Vliet, Chappells, & Shove, 2005). This is in line with STS theories that suggest that the material and the social are necessarily co-constructed and that technical change via the deployment of renewable technologies will require some degree of corresponding institutional and social change. Interestingly, recent research in the United States suggests that proposing significant transformation, for instance by situating a wind farm as ?the first of many?, actually increases support for individual projects (Firestone et al., 2009). This surprising finding suggests underlying support for large-scale transformation with the implication that if renewable energy projects are positioned as actually contributing to change, publics may be more willing to support them, accept localized impacts, and facilitate rather than oppose social and technological change.   While most of these studies consider individual projects, the aim of this thesis is to consider individual projects within a provincial energy network with an eye toward how network transformation might occur via local participation. This might include the instrumental goal of getting projects on the ground as well as influencing the shape of individual projects. At the same time, it is also concerned with how collective identities and meanings are forged via energy planning and the potential for transformation in the provincial energy arena. Building on the lessons from the renewable energy literature, the following section uses STS theories to create a conceptual framework for the study.   2.2 At the interface of social and material worlds 2.2.1 World-building  There are a number of different STS theories that can help interpret change in patterns of energy development and use. These share in common a constructivist approach whereby technology and society are mutually- or co-constructed. Within this literature historically, geographically, and politically contingent networks of human and non-human elements are referred to as hybrid networks, seamless webs, assemblages, sociotechnical systems, or large technical systems. For the purposes of this research, I use the term network or sociotechnical network to refer to the collection of people, institutions, knowledge, technologies, rivers, regulations, discourses, pipelines, transmission lines, electrons etc. that make up the British Columbia energy system.   Taken together, sociotechnical networks, particularly large, ubiquitous networks such as electricity grids, play an important role in framing and structuring our experience in the world (Davison, 2001; Ihde, 1990). This includes enabling, constraining, or rendering self-evident  20 certain practices, relationships, identities and worldviews. To capture the way that technological artifacts and networks frame collective experience, I use the metaphor of world-building (Davison, 2001; Winner, 1986). World-building is necessarily a collective endeavour since ?[n]o one is in control of infrastructure; no one has the power centrally to change it. [Yet] to the extent that we live in, on, and around this new infrastructure, it helps form the shape of our moral, scientific, and esthetic choices? (Bowker & Star, 1999, p. 319).  Thus as a moral and political activity, world-building translates particular formulations of the good life and of a sustainable world into social and material infrastructures rendering them durable and obvious.  The inscription of commitments into technical artifacts and networks is what Andrew Feenberg calls the technical code (Feenberg, 1999). The technical code embodies technical, political, and moral commitments that appear self-evident because they are masked in technical rationality. Technological controversies and debates over regulation are often struggles over technical codes and the commitments they embody, with advocates seeking to incorporate more just, humane or environmentally benign values into the technical code (Feenberg, 1999). Within a large sociotechnical network, the technical codes become aligned to serve what might be called the technological regime, dominant logic, or techno-normative order. This consists of the rules of the game, the conventions of practice, and/or the paradigms that structure large networks.  For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, many Canadian provinces created large, public utilities to develop and manage hydroelectric resources. In addition to being institutionally and materially structured to support large-scale hydroelectric developments, these were also based on concepts of government-supported economic development, regional development, and providing low-cost electricity to industry and households. Although this model has come under considerable scrutiny, the underlying logic persists embedded in the institutional structure of public utilities, infrastructure that spans the length and breadth of provinces, revenue flows into provincial coffers as well as in expectations and cultural norms surrounding electricity cost and availability.   The dominant logic influences how problems and their proposed solutions are framed or conceptualized. Drawing from the example of economics, the values or effects that are not included in the frame (in economic terms, externalities) are what Michel Callon calls ?overflows? (Callon, 1998). Callon argues that the existence of overflows is not a problem or sign of a poorly functioning frame. Rather overflows are the necessary corollary of any frame?a requirement and a product of the frame being connected to the world. Thus the issue is not whether overflows exist but rather what overflows exist and how they are managed. Reframing a problem or issue requires  21 identifying and integrating previously excluded overflows. The process of reframing contributes to world-building with the specifics of the new worlds depending on who is involved in the process and what overflows are accounted for in the frame.3 Important here is that while science and technology shape collective worlds, the process is typically expert- or bureaucratically-managed and not typically inclusive or participatory. The case for participatory world-building and collective processes for reframing technological controversies is discussed later in this chapter.      Interpreting the mechanics of world-building in a large, geographically dispersed network such as the British Columbia electricity system requires an explanatory model of sociotechnical change. For this I turn to social worlds theory, specifically as it has been taken up by STS scholars (specifically Clarke, 2005; Patton, 2004; Star, 1999).    2.2.2 Arenas, social worlds, and shared infrastructure  The concept of social worlds emerged from symbolic interactionism where it was originally based on geographical communities and used to study the interaction of individual identity in relation to collective practices and discourses. Subsequent interpretations shifted focus from the individual acting in a social world to social worlds themselves as units of analysis, with multiple social worlds interacting within a larger arena of concern. Social worlds are conceptualized as informal communities of practices in which members may not know or interact directly with each other yet share discourses, commitments and/or resources and in the process build individual and group identities as well as ?shared ideologies about how to go about their business? (Clarke & Star, 2008, p. 115). Social worlds are multiple and overlapping such that people belong to multiple worlds and their actions and meaning makings are not limited to a single world or arena. They may evolve from such things as occupations, advocacy groups, ethnic or gender identities, or shared practices and commitments. Similarly, social worlds are heterogeneous with intra-world differences along with inter-world differences in constant negotiation.4 They may be long-standing communities of commitment or they may be short-lived. Similarly social worlds may merge or segment as discourses, meanings, and shared objectives evolve (Clarke, 2005).                                                         3 This is a more general form of Feenberg?s argument regarding technical codes. Feenberg focuses on technologies and the assumed value-neutrality of technical rationality while Callon?s focus is on problem framings and knowledge production.  4 In this sense, social worlds could be understood as the hybrid networks of actor-network theory (Latour, 2005) in that they are not given entities or structures but rather fluid assemblages where meanings and identities are constituted through negotiations within and between worlds.  22  The analytic advantage of social worlds theory is its usefulness as a relational theory at a scale appropriate to this study. Social worlds are in part constituted in relation to other entities (including other social worlds and infrastructure) with negotiations, boundary demarcation, and boundary objects (material or conceptual) serving as key points of interaction. This takes place within a larger arena of concern. In this study the arena of concern is energy policy and planning in British Columbia with involved social worlds working to influence energy policy in specific ways. Key social worlds include, for instance, government agencies, advocacy organizations, regulatory agencies, and public utilities. In this research, in depth discussion of social worlds is limited to the case study analysis (although the term social worlds is used throughout to indicate collective units with shared discourses or work). In both cases, self-identified collective units emerged in the empirical research. In Fort St. John, the social world was based on opposition to Site C Hydroelectric Project and in Dawson Creek it is based around the concept of sustainability. Since I use social worlds as an analytical concept, my purpose is not to prove that these worlds exist?I take participant identification as sufficient proof. Rather, the point is to explore how these social worlds are seeking to influence the energy policy arena (and thus contribute to how energy-related worlds are constructed).   Cutting across multiple social worlds, within the energy policy arena and beyond it, are large technical networks of shared infrastructure. I use the term infrastructure5 to describe hybrid networks, such as the electricity grid, that have been stabilized through the enrolment of substantial, far-reaching, and durable physical components. These appear as primarily technical networks in part because of the scale and reach of their physical attributes but also in part because the connective activities required to hold them together have become unquestioned; they are systems that work or, as Latour would say, they have become ?matters of fact? (Latour, 1992, 2005). Yet work is required to ensure that all elements, human and non-human, remain stable.   In line with social worlds theory and following from Susan Leigh Star, I conceptualize infrastructure as relational in that it takes meaning from interaction (Star, 1999). This occurs in its initial development when, through the enrollment of specific actors and artifacts, it takes on                                                       5 I am indebted to Jason Patton for his definition of infrastructure and his use of it in relation to social worlds even though I interpret infrastructure slightly differently. He uses infrastructure as a context for practice (Patton, 2004) whereas I use infrastructure as a mediator in the Latourian sense?as simultaneously a context for practice, an actor with its own commitments and properties, and an object of action.    23 specific moral and political commitments. Although the materiality of infrastructure may solidify discourses and conventions (Clarke & Star, 2008) and constrain innovation, inertia does not translate to stasis. Meanings may also evolve over time as new understandings are ascribed to and inscribed upon infrastructure through ongoing interaction and shifting networks. In addition to its relational qualities, infrastructure also has a number of characteristics that differentiate it from individual technological artifacts (Star, 1999). First, infrastructure is embedded in practices and structures. People are ?in? infrastructure, although they may be in it in different ways leading to divergent experiences and perspectives. Second, it is transparent in use, in that it need not be relearned with each use yet infrastructure supported work and infrastructure itself becomes visible upon breakdown. Third, it has a reach or scope that often cuts across multiple social worlds and extends through space and time. Fourth, social worlds learn how to maneuver infrastructure as a part of membership and existing infrastructure is related to conventions of practice. Fifth, infrastructure is an embodiment of standards. And finally, it is typically built on an installed base rather than from scratch and it is fixed in modular increments, not all at once or globally.   Ontologically, social worlds, infrastructures and even arenas may all be understood as sociotechnical networks. However, for the purposes of this analysis, focused on change in a large, geographically dispersed network, the relevant properties of social worlds and infrastructures are quite different. The enrollment of large-scale material entities in the form of transmission lines, pipelines, electricity generation facilities, rivers and natural gas reserves, lends the infrastructure at issue unique characteristics. From the general characteristics described above, we see in particular 1) inertia created by the materiality of the infrastructure and the interests and resources that are sunk into it, 2) a range of moral and political commitments embedded in standards and conventions of practice that form the technical code, 3) the necessity for incremental change overlaid on an already well established network, and 4) a wide range of stakeholders due to the reach of the infrastructure.  These will all be important considerations in the analysis of sociotechnical change that follows.     24  Figure 2.1 The social worlds framework (adapted from Clarke 2005)  My conceptual model, illustrated in Figure 2.1, consists of an arena of action containing multiple, overlapping social worlds, each with their own collective commitments and discourses. Cutting across these social worlds are infrastructures that serve as constitutive points within individual social worlds and as points of articulation between social worlds. At the same time infrastructure, and the meanings ascribed to it, are constructed and stabilized in the process.   2.3 Sociotechnical change 2.3.1 At the boundaries Social worlds theory is often focused on the practices or work activities of social worlds (Clarke & Star, 2008) with infrastructure, when addressed, serving as situation or backdrop for practice (Patton, 2004). This study?s focus on sociotechnical change shifts the analytical focus toward the intersection of social worlds and shared infrastructure. It is concerned both with changing infrastructure and how social worlds and their discourses, commitments, and rationalities emerge in and through interaction with infrastructure. In this framing, infrastructure acts as a mediator (Latour, 2005) altering interests and being altered through the action of social worlds. In this  25 sense infrastructure is both an actor and the object of action with multiple evolving and contested meanings. Similarly social worlds are both taking shape (through shared work, discourses, and commitments) and seeking to shape shared objects and infrastructures.   Connections between social worlds are forged through negotiations, boundary objects, and shared infrastructure. A boundary object is an object, either material or conceptual, that spans multiple social worlds and provides a way to coordinate the activities of social worlds despite differing discourses and objectives (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Its meanings are weakly structured across social worlds and strongly structured within social worlds. This interpretative flexibility, or malleability of meaning, allows individual social worlds to attribute different meanings to an object or concept. While interpretative flexibility6 is always possible, the forging of boundary objects is contingent. It requires the working out of shared meanings that are considered legitimate within and across social worlds.  Specifically referring to technology, Andrew Feenberg uses the term ?concretization?7 to describe the process whereby artifacts are made to embody multiple functions and values and therefore to ?fit? with multiple social worlds. ?Concretization?refers not merely to improvements in efficiency [accomplished by the embodiment of multiple functions], but also to the positioning of technologies at the point of intersection of multiple standpoints and aspirations? (Feenberg, 1999, p. 218). The latter point can be interpreted as the making of boundary objects out of technical artifacts with concretization describing how an artifact is made to ?fit? at the intersection of multiple worlds and how it is altered in the process. Spanning multiple worlds, objects that have become concretized serve to connect and coordinate.   In sociotechnical systems ?[c]oordination links heterogeneous actants as well as heterogeneous places, time, and discourses? (Disco & van der Meulen, 1998, p. 341). In the social worlds model, coordination is how actors in the arena of action interact. The typical mode of coordination between social worlds may be dictated by regulations, conventions of practice or embedded in shared infrastructure.  Boundary objects function to allow ?cooperation without consensus? thus                                                       6 In the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) literature, interpretative flexibility decreases over time as closure occurs and the meaning of the artifact is solidified. Following Anique Hommels? recent work on the obduracy of city infrastructure, I assume the possibility for interpretative flexibility remains open although to be ?in play? meanings need to be seen as legitimate by other social worlds in the arena (Hommels, 2005). 7 The concept of concretization originates in the work of Gilbert Simmondon  26 they coordinate by enabling actors to work together without shared values or discourses. However, cooperation is not the only, or necessarily the primary, means of managing conflicting concerns. More antagonistic means of managing conflict and divergent interests include the imposition of representations, coercion, silencing and fragmentation (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Furthermore, Rip and Talma have argued that antagonistic coordination, or the distinction between project opponents and proponents, is a common and stable form of coordinating new technologies (Rip & Talma, 1998). This is in part because the prescribed roles of proponent and opponent help reduce uncertainty by defining and scripting roles.   As will be described, antagonistic coordination is the typical pattern of coordination in BC energy politics. It is so embedded in the energy policy arena that it is difficult to imagine any other format than that of project proponent and project opponents with each seeking to legitimize their own interpretations and interests and to delegitimize their opponents?. This will be described in detail in the discussion of the Site C Hydroelectric project (Chapter 6). However, enabled by the social worlds framework that provides tools to examine and explain how actors work together, this thesis also describes an alternative mode of coordination based on cooperation (Chapter 7).    Like boundary objects, infrastructure at the boundary of social worlds may similarly serve a coordinating function. However, the properties of infrastructure also mean that it does not just coordinate, it also must be coordinated with, and importantly, it serves to structure coordinating activities. Thus it is more than a coordinating tool for the social worlds in question?it is also an active agent with its own properties and inertia. In British Columbia, the existing electrical grid is a prime example. It allows for the physical distribution of electric current. At the same time, all new grid-connected electricity generation is measured against and must be compatible with this infrastructure with the properties and placement of transmission lines dictating the potential for and terms of interconnection. Infrastructure also cuts across social worlds that may have little or no formal role in the arena of concern increasing the range of implicated stakeholders. These ?implicated actors? are typically represented and spoken for in the arena of action, but rarely speak for themselves (Clarke, 2005). Again this is illustrated in the BC electrical grid that reaches into homes and businesses across the province yet does not necessarily afford electricity users a voice in the energy policy arena. The diverse and dispersed set of stakeholders are organized and coordinated via the infrastructure that connects them.     27 As an interactionist theory with elements in the arena taking shape in relation to one another, in the social worlds framework we can expect sociotechnical change to result from changes to individual elements such as the introduction of new social worlds or discourses into the arena. This might include the introduction of internationally circulating discourses, such as the carbon control imperative, that originate outside of the arena or from the changing discourses or practices of already established social worlds. In this study I consider the implications stemming from the introduction of a municipality as an active social world in the energy policy arena. Similarly sociotechnical change may result from infrastructural change. Bowker and Star call infrastructural misalignment, that creates pressure for change and realignment, ?torque? (Bowker & Star, 1999). For instance, proving the viability of wind energy in British Columbia has the potential to create torque on the energy network allowing new wind-oriented social worlds to emerge and/or altering the material properties and management of the provincial electrical grid. Finally, change may result from new forms of coordination prompted by, for instance, new alliances, regulations, knowledge, ideological commitments, procedures, or infrastructures. These might emerge from a specific social world or they may be jointly worked out between multiple social worlds and infrastructures. Theoretically, change stemming from social worlds, infrastructures, or the spaces in between, may remain localized or cascade through other elements in the arena (Gal, Yoo, & Boland, 2004). However, the specifics of when or how change cascades through the energy arena remains an empirical question.   Agency within this model is dispersed. No one has complete control over shared infrastructure or an arena of action although some individuals and social worlds command more power and authority than others?for to govern is to structure the possible actions of others (Foucault, 2003). In the BC energy policy arena, the provincial government has the jurisdiction and authority to implement new policy and infrastructure with a bare minimum of public consultation or support. Yet this power remains limited in practice due to 1) the government?s interest in maintaining public support, its legitimate authority to govern, and the revenues associated with existing conditions and 2) the properties of infrastructure including its inertia, the need for incremental change over an installed base, the conventions and standards of the existing infrastructure, and the range of stakeholders with an interest in energy infrastructure. This becomes evident in examining the history of the BC electricity grid where successive government policies and discourses have resulted in limited infrastructural change (see Chapter 3 for detail). Nevertheless, top-down energy policy is the rule in BC and Chapter 4 examines how this form of policy-making plays out in the introduction of the clean energy agenda.  28  The social worlds model also emphasizes the potential for any actor in an arena to introduce new discourses, practices, or technologies. The case study of Dawson Creek demonstrates how a local energy cooperative acts to introduce specific technologies and discourses into the BC energy policy arena. However, despite the potential for agency, it is also clear that scaling up isolated elements and making them fit with established infrastructures and conventions requires negotiation and coordination. In addition, gaining a voice and legitimacy within the arena of action is not always possible or straightforward.    Approaching sociotechnical change using the social worlds framework has a number of advantages. First, it provides tools to talk about social organization and social change while at the same time not resorting to static, deterministic or a priori interpretations of what the ?social? is. Social worlds are fluid, overlapping, and situational (Clarke, 2005). Similarly, it is compatible with a constructivist interpretation of technology and technological change. As a relational model, it is concerned with the interactions between elements in the arena of concern and thus provides a framework where the social and the technical are intertwined and mutually constitutive. Second, the framework, especially as articulated by Adele Clarke (2005), has the resolution to both theorize sociotechnical change within a network as a whole and at specific sites in the network. Thus we can talk about the energy policy arena in British Columbia as well as specific social worlds, discourses, and infrastructures within that arena. Finally, as a framework that emerged from the grounded theory tradition, it is compatible with the mixed method, qualitative approach of this thesis.    2.3.2 Situating renewable energy My focus is on local actors and how, within a provincial energy arena, they are engaged in the negotiation and/or contestation of energy futures. For the purpose of this study, local actors are defined as municipal governments, advocacy groups, or other collective organizations that are seeking to engage with energy policy-making. The constructivist epistemology that informs this work leads to an understanding of the ?local? that is fluid, dynamic and in part created by the activities and identities of the actors involved. Due to my use of municipal case studies, in this study local actors are grounded in specific geographical spaces. Due to the legal definition of municipalities and their regulatory jurisdiction in relation to energy policy, there is also a hierarchical relationship between levels of government. However, all entities are understood to be ?local? in the sense that they are located somewhere (Haraway, 1991) with entities and power  29 dynamics enacted and constructed rather than given (Jessop et al., 2008).8 Thus, in a general sense, my use of the term ?local? does not necessarily require a geographical community. However, when discussing energy development there are always specific places where energy policy and technology ?come to ground?. As a result, ?local actors? in this study are in part constructed in relation to ?provincial actors?, via their connection to specific geographic places, and through their location in the provincial energy network.  From an analytical perspective, the ?ecological?, social worlds conceptualization allows for analysis of multiple sites that are physically and symbolically connected but that may still produce radically differing collective interpretations of and visions for an object or network (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Applying this model to energy networks, these sites represent different social worlds that are distinct yet share an interest in, and work toward, specific energy futures. The fluidity of social worlds also help move beyond a priori or deterministic interpretations of the local since a social world may represent local interests and perspectives without claiming to be the only local discourse or social world and without being necessarily limited to actors within a geographical community. Thus it may encompass a local perspective without claiming to represent the local in a comprehensive or exclusive sense.   However, additional considerations are necessary based on the far-reaching, geographically-dependent, and material nature of the networks. This includes consideration of the way that policy and infrastructure have shaped specific places and social worlds within the province?the spatially uneven distribution of energy-related impacts. One way to conceptualize both the spatial and temporal dimensions and to connect the creation of specific networks with specific places and histories is with the geological metaphor of sedimentary layering (Day & Murdoch, 1993; Massey, 1984). Economic histories, cultural practices, and, I would add, previous paradigms and infrastructures, are not erased but built upon (Dale & Robinson, 1996). ?Thus something which might be called there and then is implicated in the here and now? (Massey, 2005, p. 139). Within this conceptualization layers are not static nor are they necessarily spatially deterministic but rather ?accretions of meetings?, momentary assemblages that nevertheless shape the local terrain and thus lead to unique places that are differentially affected by moments of change (Massey,                                                       8 There is an extensive literature in geography focusing on the constructed and performed nature of territorial scale and the problems with deterministic and/or a priori interpretations of the local. See for instance (Bulkeley, 2005; Jessop et al., 2008; Moore, 2008). I accept these critiques and use the local as an analytical rather than an ontological category. I do so recognizing that this research further serves to construct the local.   30 2005). Thus the contours of new practices, paradigms, and infrastructure must be situated within this historical terrain and the effects of a common infrastructure cannot be assumed to be universal or equally distributed. Similarly, responses to new proposals and engagement in planning processes are linked to the unique positioning and experiences of individual social worlds and locales. This adds a temporal dimension to the constructed interpretation of the local and provides a more nuanced conceptualization of the ?installed base? (Star 1999).   What then would it actually mean to account for the unique and evolving terrain of local interests and places that are implicated in the energy arena and how could this be accomplished? To answer this, I turn to the literature on participatory governance.   2.3.3 The transformative potential of participatory politics The literature on participatory governance provides theoretical arguments for why participatory politics may be pursued and what they might accomplish. In particular, two rationales for participatory politics, the epistemological and constitutive rationale (described below), explain the transformative potential of participatory politics and how it may be used to ?localize? projects in specific communities, geographic or otherwise.   The literature identifies four rationales for extending democratic participation in environmental and technological decision-making beyond the typical requirements of representative democracy (Fischer, 2000; Innes & Booher, 2004; Laird, 1993; Rydin & Pennington, 2000). The first of these are legal requirements that may structure the type and form of public engagement undertaken. In the BC energy arena, the Utilities Commission Act and the Environmental Assessment Act, when triggered, mandate a minimum step of public notification regarding energy planning activities. Public engagement may also be undertaken for instrumental purposes of facilitating project implementation via increased stakeholder buy-in, minimizing controversy, and/or limiting project delays. Furthermore, appropriate public engagement may increase the legitimacy of projects and planning processes (Owens, 2000). Third, public engagement may be driven by a normative rationale?meaning a commitment to the notion that stakeholders ought to have a say in decisions that affect them and the related belief that stakeholders may be in best position to make value-based judgments.   Finally, and most related to the issue of sociotechnical transformation, the literature identifies an epistemological rationale that suggests inclusive decision-making processes may result in new,  31 potentially more robust, forms of knowledge (Fischer, 2000; Salter, Robinson, & Wiek, 2010). For instance, publics may insist that the terms of a project debate be broadened to include energy efficiency and conservation (Barry & Ellis, 2010) or wider policy agendas (Owens, 2002). They may also be able to bring local perspectives and interests to the debate. Patrick Devine-Wright argues that ?emplacement strategies? for renewable energy projects can help develop and integrate place-specific emotional and symbolic meanings into the projects (Devine-Wright, 2010). Emplacement strategies are premised on early stakeholder involvement so that the project is conceptualized at least partially from a place-based perspective and/or altered to better align with place-based meanings and values. Frank Fischer has used the term ?cultural rationality? to describe a form of reasoning that includes expert and/scientific knowledge but is also grounded in ?personal and familiar experiences? (2000, p. 132). Thus, one possible outcome of forums that allow for the inclusion of place-based or local perspectives alongside expert knowledge, may be a form of cultural rationality.   In addition to the four rationales above, a fifth rationale, related to the epistemological rationale, surfaces from an interpretation of democratic participation as a socially transformative or constitutive activity (Barry, 1996; Sandlilands, 2002). I call this the constitutive rationale since it suggests the potential for individual and collective identities to be changed via participatory politics. These final two rationales, epistemological and constitutive, together create what I call the transformative potential of participatory politics. They suggest that knowledge and subjectivities (collective and individual) may be constituted in and through participatory politics. This is also the underlying premise behind procedural sustainability?the idea that more sustainable forms of life may emerge from collective processes.    These rationales refer to participatory politics or public engagement in a general sense. As a specific form of participatory politics, the value of local participation can be extrapolated from the arguments above. Specifically, to the extent that participatory events allow space for the knowledges and perspectives of particular social worlds or communities, they may help situate renewable energy within those social worlds. In so doing, participatory events may also serve to construct locales and communities. This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that participatory processes are a potential way to account for local experiences and interests and in doing so, they can contribute to sociotechnical change that is informed by and potentially emerges from specific social worlds.     32 However, despite the theoretical reasons for pursing participatory decision-making processes, in practice the relationship between participatory processes and more acceptable, more robust decisions, let alone social transformation, is less certain. While it is known that feeling excluded from decision-making, powerless in the face of external forces, or unduly impacted by projects does often fuel opposition to energy projects, opportunities for public engagement do not necessarily reverse opposition (Devine-Wright, 2005; Haggett, 2010; Walker & Devine-Wright, 2008). The questioned efficacy of participatory processes rests on both conceptual and practical concerns. Conceptually, public engagement and environmentally beneficial outcomes may be conflated when the two actually represent separate, and not necessary complementary, outcomes (Hajer & Kesselring, 1999). Ken Portney?s study of sustainable cities initiatives found this precise issue with sustainability and civic engagement often being implicitly linked together despite a lack of empirical evidence to support a positive relationship (Portney, 2005). This critique is rooted in a substantive or universalist interpretation of sustainability but it does offer a warning against idealistic notions of participatory governance. Second, theoretical models of communicative practices and consensus-making can lead to both idealized expectations as well as a disregard for difference and dissent (Mouffe, 2000; Nader & Grande, 2002). As a result the dynamics of power and the possibility of coercion or silencing of voices may be lost in idealized notions of debate and agreement. In a related critique, theories of deliberative democracy may be at odds with the plurality of meanings embraced by constructivist frameworks (Lovbrand, Pielke, & Beck, 2010)?such as the one adopted in this study. Such a critique points out the assumption of many deliberative models that agreement is possible and desirable. Finally, public deliberation may not be necessary to accomplish the pragmatic work of value change. Adolf Gunderson has argued that private deliberation amongst family and friends can accomplish this work and that public deliberation is an unnecessary exercise (Gundersen, 1995). While a minority perspective, this view can be generalized as a reminder that extensive participatory processes may not be suited to all projects and goals.     Philosophical critiques of consensus as a model for decision-making also have parallel practical concerns regarding the implementation of and follow-up to participatory processes. For instance adding public engagement activities to existing decision-making processes without adequate ways to incorporate stakeholder input, account for the power dynamics at play, include institutional structures, or reflect on a priori assumptions, may render them ineffectual (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Innes & Booher, 2004; Owens, 2000; Rydin & Pennington, 2000; Salter et al., 2010). In addition, negative experiences and interactions can solidify stakeholder cynicism and apathy (Innes &  33 Booher, 2004) or otherwise sabotage effective democratic participation (Felt & Wynne, 2007). Conversely, previous positive experiences may unrealistically raise participants? expectations of the possible or likely outcomes.    While the practical critiques of public engagement rarely lead to the suggestion that participatory processes are not worth pursing, they do raise important questions about the gap between theory and practice and what participatory processes actually accomplish. The theoretical critiques do pose a substantial critique of consensus-based models and the legitimacy of deliberative democratic decision-making. In response to these critiques, this study sets out to explore participatory energy politics on the ground. The emphasis here is not on the types of processes that ought to be pursed but rather on the strategies that actually are pursued and how these strategies are influencing the transformation of collective identities and infrastructures. The reality is that current energy decision-making practices are nowhere near deliberative democratic or consensus-based models. Thus the empirical focus of my research is on the multiple ways that local actors are seeking to engage in energy decision-making, the collective identities and rationalities (i.e. social worlds) that are emerging in the process, and the impact this is having on renewable energy policy and infrastructure in the province. The theory is used to develop a thesis of what local participation might contribute rather than developing a theoretical argument for either deliberative democracy or consensus-building.   2.3.3.1 Hybrid forums To analyze the on-the-ground processes that are underway and may actually be helping to transform shared worlds, I use the concept of hybrid forums (Callon et al., 2009). Hybrid forums refer to the creation of dialogical spaces that allow for the identification of stakeholders and overflows, and via collective negotiation, the integration of overflows and the reframing of problems and issues. ?It is through the exploration of possible worlds that identities are reconfigured, these identities leading in turn to new questions? (p. 232). The back and forth between identities and questions constitutes a dialogical process whereby collective worlds are reconfigured via new knowledge and new collective identities. Hybrid forums are particularly suited to scientific and technological controversies as they support ?technical democracy? in the midst of uncertainty.   Based on the potential for transformation via participation, the concept captures the range of formal or informal participatory spaces where collective learning takes place and possible futures  34 are explored, from advocacy coalitions to formalized citizen juries, with different formats allowing more or less room for collective learning. To evaluate a broad range of potential processes, Callon et al. propose that hybrid forums can be assessed based on the intensity, the openness, and the quality of dialogue that results from any particular forum. These criteria are measured along two axes, knowledge production and the constitution of the collective, where the degree of involvement in producing new knowledge and the emergence and negotiation of new collective identities relates to the transformative potential of the hybrid forum.  In addition, to these evaluative criteria, they also propose three basic implementation criteria: equity of access to the process, the transparency and traceability of debates, and the clarity of organizing rules.   The concept of hybrid forums is useful for a number of reasons. First, it brings together much of the existing literature on participatory governance with an emphasis on its transformative potential?the epistemological and constitutive rationales discussed above. Originating in the STS literature, it serves as a theoretical bridge between sociotechnical change and participatory politics?exploring what participatory processes actually do with an emphasis on facilitating long-term, socio-technical transformation (Joly, 2007). As such hybrid forums push the transformative potential of participatory politics beyond the transformation of new knowledge and subjectivities to also include the potential emergence of new technologies or shared worlds. This is all premised on the concept of including lay-knowledge (non-specialists) in the development and mobilization of science and technology. Second, it is loose enough to capture the informal collective processes that make up the bulk of public engagement in energy decision-making. This is important because conceptualizing public engagement as only formal processes limits the range of analysis and may potentially miss moments where collective visions and identities are forged. Finally the dual emphasis on processes and outcomes?focusing on where and how heterogeneous actors are brought together as well as the implications for shared worlds and infrastructures?allows it to bridge the argument between procedural and substantive. In this conceptualization, both are relevant and can be empirically evaluated.    From a social worlds perspective, hybrid forums might result from enduring changes within the arena of concern such as new social worlds and infrastructures that bring actors together in novel ways or require new points of articulation between elements. They may also result from one-time ?staged intersections? that despite their temporary nature, ?can be highly consequential for the future of all the social worlds involved, for that arena?or beyond? (Clarke & Star, 2008, p. 120). For instance, in the Fort St. John case study, a public hearing serves as the site of a temporary  35 gathering of multiple social worlds. Thus, with an emphasis on the interaction of elements in the energy policy arena, hybrid forums are a way that social worlds, boundary objects, and infrastructure may be reconfigured.   2.4 Conclusion: The transformative potential of local engagement The aim of this thesis is to explore if and how participatory politics and specifically local engagement in renewable energy planning contributes to sociotechnical change in the energy network. This requires analytical tools with the resolution to both theorize sociotechnical change within a network as a whole and at specific sites in the network. In order to do this, I have used a social worlds framework that focuses on the interaction of social worlds and infrastructure within an arena of action.   Social worlds are informal communities of practices that share discourses, commitments and/or resources and in the process build individual and group identities as well as ?shared ideologies about how to go about their business? (Clarke & Star, 2008, p. 115). Social worlds in the provincial energy policy arena all, in one way or another, work towards enacting specific energy futures. Within this framework, negotiation and coordination with other social worlds and with infrastructure (e.g. the electricity grid) is paramount.   I have highlighted two ways that social worlds may work together. First, boundary objects allow social worlds to ?cooperate without consensus? (Star & Griesemer, 1989) and thus may be able to enact change in the energy policy arena. Boundary objects are not necessarily linked to sociotechnical change but, as will be described in the discussion of Bear Mountain Wind Park, this research describes how they can lead to novel technological configurations.    Second, hybrid forums are participatory spaces that bring social worlds together and thus enable negotiation and, ultimately, a collective and inclusive means of world-building. This is accomplished by the dialogical exploration of new knowledge and new collective identities that result in altered networks and worlds. The sociotechnical change emerging from hybrid forums includes new or changed social worlds and new ways of framing technological problems and their solutions.   The underlying premise of this framework is that the transformative potential of participatory politics is the potential for collective negotiation to alter both the material and the social fabric of  36 the arena via new social worlds and new technological configurations. To the extent that collective negotiation is grounded in specific social worlds (in this case geographic communities) it can potentially serve to ?localize? projects and build specific forms of cultural rationality. This suggests both a unique contribution arising from local engagement and the active construction of the ?local? via participatory politics.   At this point, to avoid the risk of descending into a circular argument it is important to return to the purpose and guiding question of the research?specifically the need to transition to low-carbon energy systems. Both a constructivist epistemology and the empirical research on renewable energy controversies suggest that transitioning energy systems is not simply an act of implementing technologies. It involves a complex change process that includes technological, socio-cultural, institutional, and political change. The framework developed above helps explain the interaction of social worlds and shared infrastructure and how complex arena-wide change might emerge from collective negotiation. Although this is not the only way that change may occur in an arena of action, it provides a compelling argument for including diverse publics and local perspectives as a lever for and a means to sociotechnical change.     37  Chapter  3: Building a legacy: Energy development in British Columbia Under section 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867, Canadian provinces have jurisdiction over natural resources. Although this jurisdiction is potentially disputable in the case of hydroelectric resources, in practice, all energy resources including hydroelectricity have been interpreted as falling under provincial authority (Netherton, 2008). The result has been energy policies and infrastructures that are differentiated at a provincial level. Although provincial energy policies are influenced by federal politics and have historically been a lever in federal-provincial relations, in Canada, provincial governments set the agenda for energy, and especially electricity, planning and development.   British Columbia is one of four provinces whose electrical system is based primarily on large hydroelectricity. Not only has this led to characteristic ownership and development patterns (Netherton, 2008), it has also contributed in significant ways to the province?s high per capita energy use and relatively low per capita emissions of greenhouse gases?both due to availability of inexpensive hydroelectricity. The amount of electricity produced in the province varies from year to year depending on such things as industrial activity, water availability in hydroelectric reservoirs, and inter-jurisdictional trade. In 2007, the province produced 71 833 GWh of electricity (Nyboer & Nyboer, 2009). In recent years, the amount of electricity produced in the province is typically just below or just above the amount consumed with any production gaps filled by trade with Alberta and the western US (Hoberg & Sopinka, 2011).  British Columbia is also one of the oil and gas producing provinces in Canada exporting more than three times more natural gas than provincial markets require (Marshall & Newnham, 2004). In 2007, the province produced 1.5 million m3 of oil and nearly 30 billion m3 of natural gas (British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission, 2008) ranking it as the second largest natural gas producer in Canada, surpassed only by Alberta. In recent years, rapid expansion of unconventional gas development (shale gas and coal-bed methane) increased production to over 40 billion m3 in 2011(Canadian Association for Petroleum Producers, 2011).   This chapter provides a brief history of the provincial energy system. The purpose is to describe the BC energy policy arena and, by way of introducing enduring features and persistent narratives in the arena, provide context to the arguments that will follow. In particular this chapter sets the scene for the introduction of the provincial government?s climate and clean energy agenda  38 introduced in 2007 (Chapter 4) with both the content of the new policies and their reception in the province being deeply contingent on the characteristics of the existing energy arena.   The chapter begins in the middle of the 20th century and traces the development of the two main energy sectors in the province, oil and gas and hydroelectricity9. Key to this period was the development of enduring physical infrastructure and the emergence of energy development narratives, both of which continue to shape energy policy-making in the province. Beginning in 1980, after two decades of infrastructure build-out, the BC energy policy arena was dramatically changed by the introduction of new actors, discourses, and regulatory mechanisms. Energy security, neoliberal market reform, and environmental discourses were all introduced into the arena. The new discourses led to the introduction or the reorganization of social worlds.  However, amidst the changes to the policy arena, consistency remains?in part due to the enduring and defining features of the physical infrastructure and the persistence of two underlying narratives that orient energy development in the province.   3.1 Post-war development (1945-1979) 3.1.1 Hydroelectricity Utility provision began in British Columbia, as it did elsewhere in North America, with small municipal and regional gas and electric utilities. BC also had the additional driver of resource development that resulted in utilities established to power mines and resource towns such as Rossland (Mouat, 1997). This era was characterized by unconnected networks that offered uneven access and distribution.  Electrical utilities were seen as natural monopolies and policy was aimed at providing energy for manufacturing, resource industrialization and urban modernization (Netherton, 2008).   The end of World War II ushered in a new era of hydroelectric development in Canada that ?conformed to Keynesian welfare state principles?in that it necessitated a massive state assisted investment program for electrical energy and, at the same time, the systematic continuation of promotional rates? (Netherton, 2008, p. 304). In BC, the development of public power, including the expropriation of private utilities, was a contentious issue that took place in a series of steps over two decades (Evenden, 2004). Early steps in this direction began in 1945, with the creation                                                       9 This division is based primarily on the characteristics of energy production. If viewed from the perspective of distribution networks, electricity and natural gas would be structurally comparable and oil would form its own category.    39 of British Columbia Power Commission. The Commission was mandated to purchase small utilities and expand electrification in nonmetropolitan areas. This initial step toward public power gained momentum under the leadership of Premier William A.C. Bennett and his Social Credit government. Elected in 1952, Premier Bennett was a strong supporter of private resource development. However he also had a grand vision for the province, based largely on the industrialization of northern BC and this vision would ultimately lead to the public development of the province?s hydroelectric resources.  Initially, Premier Bennett partnered with the Swedish industrialist Axel Wenner-Gren to accomplish his vision. In 1956, Wenner-Gren was granted resource rights to an area of land in the northeast of the province (approximately one-tenth of the provincial land area) in exchange for conducting surveys of the area and producing a plan to develop its hydroelectric, forestry, and mineral resources (Loo, 2007, p. 899). When Wenner-Gren?s development plan faltered, Premier Bennett rushed through legislation to enable the public development of the hydroelectric portion of the plan. In August 1961 the government introduced Bill No. 5, The Power Development Act that provided for the takeover of BC Electric and its merger with the BC Power Commission. One year later, BC Hydro and Power Authority was created with the express purpose of developing hydroelectric resources on the Peace and Columbia Rivers.  (Wedley, 1986).   The driver behind this public investment (and ideological reversal) was Premier Bennett?s commitment to northern development in British Columbia and his belief that this vision could be accomplished by harnessing the power of the Peace River (Wedley, 1986). However, since 1944, the federal government had also been in talks with the United States government regarding development on the Columbia River in the southeast interior of the province. Damming the Columbia in Canada would increase the productivity of hydroelectric facilities downstream in the U.S. as well as providing flood control in Canada. Developing the Columbia River would also provide hydroelectricity that, compared with the Peace River, was closer to BC electricity markets and appeared to be the less expensive option (Wedley, 1986). With limited domestic markets and federally imposed constraints on exporting power to the U.S., there was no clear need for power from both the Columbia and the Peace River. If the Columbia project went ahead, it seemed development of the Peace River would be delayed for a decade or more. Rather than allowing this to happen, Premier Bennett used the Columbia River negotiations to enable his two-river policy. As part of the Columbia River Treaty, ratified in January 1964, Bennett negotiated a long-term purchase agreement for the Canadian portion of electricity produced on the U.S. side of  40 the Columbia River. Selling the downstream benefits rather than repatriating the energy provided the capital and the justification to pursue both projects simultaneously since the Peace River development could now be rationalized for domestic markets.    Although era of hydroelectric development was well underway in the in 1950s, the Columbia River Treaty marked the beginning of several decades of large-scale, public development in the province. The development was undertaken almost exclusively by BC Hydro and remained faithful to the two-river policy. The largest of the province?s hydroelectric dams, the 2730 MW W.A.C. Bennett Dam on the Peace River, came on line in 1968. Accompanying the construction of the hydroelectric dam and its 250 km-long reservoir, over 900 km of high voltage transmission lines were constructed to transport the electricity to southern markets. The 694 MW Peace Canyon Dam, constructed downstream of the Bennett Dam, came on line in 1980. Currently the two dams on the Peace River produce 29 percent of BC Hydro?s electrical generation. On the Columbia system, the 1736 MW Mica Dam was completed in 1976 under the terms of the Columbia River Treaty.10  The Revelstoke Dam, 130 km downstream from the Mica Dam with a capacity of 1844 MW, the last large hydroelectric dam constructed in province, was completed in 1984. These two facilities produce 25 percent of BC Hydro?s generation and two other smaller dams on the Columbia system, Kootenay Canal and Seven Mile generating stations, produce another 10 percent. In total, approximately 64 percent of BC Hydro electrical generation comes from the hydroelectric facilities on Peace and Columbia River Basins constructed in the two decades from 1964 to 1984.11   In addition to building the majority of physical hydroelectric infrastructure in BC, this era also saw the building of the public utility BC Hydro and Power Authority (BC Hydro) as the primary energy planning organization in the province. In addition to the hydroelectric facilities it had bought and built, BC Hydro also owned BC gas, a natural gas distribution utility, and BC Rail. Created with the express purpose of developing the hydroelectric potential of the Peace and Columbia River Basins, it had by the end of its first decade established considerable expertise and momentum in large hydroelectric development. Although a crown corporation with access to                                                       10 The Duncan and Keenleyside Dams were also built under the terms of the Columbia River Treaty but did not have hydroelectric generating stations. The Keenleyside Dam was retrofitted with an 185 MW hydroelectric generator in 2002.   11 Although the numbers vary from year to year, in 2009 86.3 percent of electricity production in the province originated from hydroelectric sources, 9.3 percent from biomass sources, and 6.3 percent from natural gas sources (Ministry of Energy Mines and Natural Gas, nd).   41 provincial loan guarantees, BC Hydro was being run with little public scrutiny or oversight. Although opposition existed throughout the hydroelectric build-out phase (Pollon & Matheson, 1989; Wedley, 1986), it began to coalesce in the 1970s, particularly its 1976 application for a water license to build the Revelstoke Dam (Smith, 1988). However, at the time there was very little regulatory structure in the policy arena and therefore, with no requirements for a formal project review and no clear means for government agencies to become involved in energy planning, the application was accepted with some modifications, despite political and public dissatisfaction with the process. By the end of the 1970s,  the need for?regulation was well recognized, as was the behavioral practice requiring attention: the utility?s continued commitment to new capital construction projects, the concomitant fiscal impacts of that program, and a growing disparity in estimates of future supply/demand relationships for the province?s electrical needs. (Smith, 1988, p. 432)   With little, save for direct political intervention, to limit BC Hydro?s supply-oriented approach, there was a growing agreement that a new regulatory approach was required.    3.1.2 Oil and natural gas The oil and gas industry in British Columbia in some ways followed a similar pattern to hydroelectric development. However, with different physical properties and overall less coordination required to establish a working network, it was never considered a monopoly and was not publicly developed. Rather, regulation in the oil and gas sector carried on the long-standing provincial tradition established in forestry and mining that ?resource development should be carried out by private enterprise, but controlled and regulated so as to protect the public interest? (Wedley, 1986, p. 90).   The pattern of development has been almost exclusively concentrated in the northeast corner of the province. Forming the western edge Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin, this region of British Columbia contains substantial, accessible fossil fuel reserves. The first successful exploration in the region occurred in the 1920s. However, the industry was not developed until the post war period when, like hydroelectricity, development was fostered as part of northern development strategies. By 1951-1952 proven natural gas reserves were large enough to warrant a pipeline. These reserves were not developed on any scale until a pipeline was actually built to move the gas to Vancouver and, from there, on to U.S. markets. In 1956, Westcoast Transmission  42 Ltd. completed a 650-mile natural gas pipeline from Taylor (southeast of Fort St. John) to Vancouver. This was subsequently extended northward to capture the substantial gas reserves discovered in the Fort Nelson area. At the request of the Bennett government, in 1961 the gas pipeline was twinned with an oil pipeline as far as Kamloops where it intersected the Trans-Mountain pipeline from Alberta. In both cases, a means to transport the resource led to rapid expansion of the market and steady growth through the 1960s.   As with hydroelectricity, the 1970s brought the first major changes in what had until then been an expansion of the industry supported by generous royalty regimes and public infrastructure development (Wedley, 1986). Rising oil and gas prices, prompted by western response to the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, led to provincial government intervention designed to increase its own revenues. This included the creation of the British Columbia Petroleum Corporation, essentially a way for the provincial government to circumvent federal legislation and raise export prices by becoming the middleman in natural gas exports.12 This strategy worked (for natural gas) in the middle of the decade but by the second spike in oil prices in 1979, the high price of BC gas served to reduce natural gas exports to the U.S. by one third (Jackson, 1989).   3.1.3 Building a legacy The postwar development of British Columbia?s energy sector left an enduring legacy. The most obvious component is the physical legacy of large hydroelectric facilities and transmission infrastructure for both electricity and oil and gas. Infrastructure was shaped by the type and location of energy resources developed?factors that were, themselves, highly influenced by plans to industrialize northern BC. Once built the infrastructure enabled and encouraged further resource development in the same pattern. Figure 3.1 shows current electrical generation and transmission network and Figure 3.2 shows the network of major oil and gas processing facilities and pipelines.                                                             12 Although the provinces own and control natural resources, the federal government retains jurisdiction over inter-provincial and international exports.   43  Figure 3.1 Major electricity generation and transmission in British Columbia (2010) Source: DataBC (http://www.data.gov.bc.ca/)    44  Figure 3.2 Major oil and gas infrastructure in British Columbia (2010) Source: DataBC (http://www.data.gov.bc.ca/)  45 The figures illustrate how in 2010, the physical shape of the energy sector continues to be based on infrastructure built in the middle of the 20th century. In Figure 1., the effect of the two-river policy on electricity transmission remains clear. Both figures, illustrate the north-south patterns of development that establish the northeast corner of the province as a site of production and the southwest as a site of consumption.   Similarly, this period of development established inter-jurisdictional and international relationships that are similarly supported by enduring physical connections and expectations. Long-distance pipelines and transmission lines physically linked Alberta and Washington State to the provincial energy network creating the potential and arguably, the expectation of exporting surplus energy, regardless of the socio-economic and political viability of export (Froschauer, 1999).  The physical linkages built upon and reinforced the energy-related narratives developed in this era. Following the typical path of natural resource development in the province, the development of energy resources, undertaken or highly supported by the provincial government, became a cornerstone of economic development policy. In the oil and gas sector, this was a direct relationship with the sector itself being a primary driver of economic development. For electricity, the relationship was once removed. Large quantities of inexpensively priced hydroelectricity were developed in order to attract industry and further spur natural resource development in the province?s hinterlands. In time, these development patterns and rationale became entrenched in a narrative of energy development serving the public good via economic development.   However this was complicated by the legacy of public involvement that also linked the public good to public energy development?specifically in the electricity sector. Although by the end of the era, BC Hydro was coming under increasing scrutiny for its ambitious supply-oriented development agenda, the idea of a publicly-owned and operated electricity sector had not yet been seriously challenged. From its origins, the public utility had contributed to the public interest by developing province-wide infrastructure and services and by channeling its profits to the crown. Thus, although closely tied to economic development, the public development model produced other social goods that were becoming an expectation of electricity development in the province. To a large degree, this hinged on the low-cost, reliable electricity that BC Hydro had been able to provide?and had become an expectation for industrial, commercial, and residential consumers alike.     46 Therefore, emerging from this era is large-scale infrastructure that helped establish viable energy sources and energy producing regions in the province as well as providing enduring linkages to neighbouring jurisdictions. Simultaneously key social worlds developed including an energy sector accustomed to government support, an industrial sector with the expectation of low-cost electricity, and BC Hydro as an overwhelmingly dominant organization in provincial energy politics. Added to this was a legacy of political control, from the highest levels of government, over energy development in the province. Finally, tied to both institutional structures and infrastructures, is the emergence of two important narratives in the provincial energy system. First energy development was rationalized as a form of, or precursor to, economic development. Second, low-cost, reliable electricity was established as an economic and social necessity. As will be discussed below, the infrastructure and narratives developed in the build-out phase have remained remarkably stable in the intervening decades despite the introduction of new discourses and social worlds.   3.2 Regulation, deregulation, and demand-side management (1980-2006) The pressures of the 1970s, including the attention the two energy crises brought to energy planning and policy-making, led to reformed approaches in many jurisdictions. In British Columbia, changes to energy development and governance began in the early 1980s. These were supported by three discourses that emerged globally, but were enacted in specific ways within the provincial energy arena. The first discourse, emerging from supply-shortages in the 1970s, was based on the concept of energy security. As part of this discourse, new attention was given to developing domestic energy supplies, encouraging fuel-switching, and implementing demand-side management. The energy security discourse had a number of similarities, and at times merged, with a second discourse around environmental regulation that would eventually form a sustainable development discourse. Finally, a neoliberal market-oriented discourse emerged in the 1980s. This discourse rationalized reductions in government regulation and, in many jurisdictions, the privatization of public utilities and services. These sometimes conflicting, sometimes complementary discourses led to the emergence of new social worlds in the BC energy policy arena and, eventually to new forms of coordination through the introduction of policy and regulation.   3.2.1 Energy security and a new era of intervention The BC government responded in two ways to the array of issues that emerged in the 1970s. First, in late 1978 it created the Ministry for Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources (MEMPR), as a provincial department dedicated to managing energy and mining resources. Just over a year later, in February 1980, MEMPR issued the first ever provincial energy plan entitled, An Energy Secure  47 British Columbia: The Challenge and the Opportunity (Ministry of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources, 1980). As the title suggests, this brief statement was primarily concerned with energy security in the wake of two energy crises. However it also served to articulate the government?s energy development objectives and the institutional organization that was intended to achieve these objectives. In regards to electricity, the plan clearly stated that all hydroelectric development in the province, with the possible exception of remote industrial development, would be undertaken by BC Hydro. In an effort to reduce dependence on oil imports, it also supported fuel-switching both to electricity and natural gas and advocated energy conservation?although the latter was not yet taken up as a provincial responsibility. Rather, the plan stated that ?[u]ltimately, the best conservation measures are those that consumers?both industries and individuals?pursue on their own initiative? (p. 11). In this first formal articulation of provincial energy policy, ensuring a secure and affordable energy supply was linked to economic development and the social goods that had become an expectation of provincial energy development. Summarizing this position the plan stated, ?British Columbia is blessed with great energy potential. In the coming decade, we can reap the social and economic benefits of a secure and increasingly self-sufficient energy supply. This is our opportunity? (p. 6).  An Energy Secure British Columbia also announced a regulatory change, the forthcoming creation of the British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC), which would ?be responsible for the full regulation of both the electricity and gas sections of British Columbia Hydro? (p. 9). The objectives of the Act were to regulate BC Hydro, to regulate the environmental impact of energy projects, and to retain Cabinet authority over decision making without direct involvement in the decision making process (Smith, 1988, p. 433).   The effect on the electricity sector was considerable with the Utilities Commission Act (R.S.B.C. 1996 c.473) signaling a significant restructuring and reorientation of electricity planning in the province. It ?formalized a set of institutional arrangements that had begun to evolve in recognition of the need for change in the management of the province?s energy resources and, in particular, in its policy with respect to?BC Hydro? (Smith, 1988, p. 433). Under The Act?s new project review mechanisms, utilities were required to apply for an Energy Project Certificate for new developments with the intent being to demonstrate that all new projects were in the public interest. The BCUC was given a range of review mechanisms including the option of holding public hearings. In the first test of the regulation, an extensive public review was undertaken to evaluate and eventually delay a third  48 dam (Site C) on the Peace River making the Revelstoke Dam the last major hydroelectric facility developed in the province (see Chapter 6 for more detail).   The explicit curtailment of BC Hydro?s supply-oriented development policies had a substantial influence on the way electricity planning was undertaken in the province. The creation of the BCUC was the first step toward more systemic, integrated project review. This included creating opportunities for independent scrutiny and public consultation that, until 1980, had not existed. In addition, as part of the transition in regulatory and institutional procedures, new planning procedures were adopted. This included counting purchased conservation as a resource on the supply-side?a radically new way of managing energy resources. ?Whereas once BC Hydro planning focused on new, large additions to capacity, the emphasis moved to conservation and alternative supply options?? in the 1980s (Kellow, 1996, p. 96). New ways of interpreting energy demand, including the concept of energy services, led to the institutionalization of demand-side management in the form of two conservation initiatives. PowerSmart, a demand- side management program that would go on to garner international recognition, and ResourceSmart, a program to improve the efficiency and performance of existing generation assets, were both introduced in 1989. Two years later, in 1991, the provincial Energy Efficiency Act (R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 114) was passed legislating efficiency standards for appliances and energy using devices sold in the province.  The Utilities Commission Act and the deferment of Site C were also significant in transitioning BC Hydro from an institution that built hydroelectric facilities to an electricity system manager (Jaccard, Nyboer, & Makinen, 1991; Kellow, 1996). The pressure for change came from the BCUC?s new project review and rate setting requirements?which increased the scrutiny of the utility?s practices and put new demands on the organization (Kellow, 1996). As a result, the institutional structure of BC Hydro would change rather dramatically in the 1980s.  Between 1979 and 1989 the organization lost nearly half of its employees through restructuring?nearly one thousand in its engineering division alone?and the sale of the gas and railway divisions. By the 1990s, a radically different organization had emerged with new capacities and priorities (Kellow, 1996).   The reframing of provincial energy planning to include demand-side management was the result of multiple forces. Initially it was prompted by energy crises in the 1970s and the resulting discourse on energy security that dominated the first provincial energy policy. This identified energy efficiency and conservation as an overflow.  Integrating it into the frame was enabled by new understandings of energy demand, new planning techniques, and new regulatory structures that reoriented procedures  49 for energy planning and, ultimately, curtailed BC Hydro?s supply-oriented approach. Significantly, the regulation introduced included requirements for demonstrating that new projects, energy forecasts, and rate increases were justified and in the public interest. For the first time, there were also regulatory requirements and opportunities for public comment and consultation. Finally, organizational restructuring in the provincial utility provided a permanent institutional home that allowed demand-side management to take root in the province.    3.2.2 Deregulation and the fight for public power Throughout the 1980s, a neoliberal discourse began to influence provincial energy policy. The second provincial energy policy, British Columbia Energy Policy: New Directions for the 1990s (Ministry of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources, 1990), describes the shift as ?a consensus?against government intervention in markets and in favour of the determination of energy prices by market forces? (p. 1).   This approach was first enacted in the oil and gas sector. Although the Utilities Commission Act did apply to the oil and gas industry it did not significantly alter the regulation of the sector or its momentum?that was squarely toward minimizing government intervention. The failure of the 1980 National Energy Program, and provincial backlash to it, coupled with the bottoming out of oil prices in 1984-85 led to a 1985 agreement between the federal government and oil and gas producing provinces to deregulate prices. This allowed buyers and sellers to directly negotiate prices, making the British Columbia Petroleum Corporation irrelevant and otherwise reducing government involvement in both domestic and export pricing. Also in response to the trend for governments to remove themselves from the energy sector, the natural gas distribution arm of BC Hydro was sold in 1988 to Inland Gas (now Fortis BC).    In addition, as part of the neoliberal discourse, the assumption of natural monopolies and economies of scale in electricity provision were being challenged (see for instance Jaccard, 2001). Following the lead of United Kingdom and United States, there was growing interest in vertically unbundling publicly owned energy monopolies and increasing competition in the sector. A changing regulatory environment in the United States allowed new opportunities for exporting electricity across the border but also required structural change in the provincial electrical sector to meet new reciprocity  50 requirements introduced in the 1990s.13 In 1988, Powerex was created as the power trading arm of BC Hydro and in subsequent years a number of changes were made to BC?s electricity system, opening up the transmission system (in 1996) and allowing Powerex increased access to U.S. markets (Calvert, 2007; Froschauer, 1999). The new regulatory structures eventually enabled Powerex to not only buy and sell BC electricity and facilitate trade through BC?s system but also to act as an independent trader in U.S. jurisdictions.   The 1990 energy plan, New Directions, as the above quote indicates, downplayed the role for government intervention in energy production and pricing. Although it made no definite statements regarding the role of BC Hydro, it did indicate that the private sector would have an important role to play in meeting domestic electricity requirements. In December 1988 BC Hydro issued its first call for power from private developers and a year later it issued another call. In total these two calls resulted in electricity purchase agreements for just over 2000 GWh of electricity annually.   In addition to BC Hydro contracting electricity purchase agreements with private energy developers, there was also growing interest in more substantive market reform. In 1995, the BCUC released a report advocating for the functional separation of the generation, transmission, and distribution divisions within BC Hydro. It also suggested limited wholesale competition for major industrial users (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1995). In 1997, the provincial government appointed a Task Force on Electricity Market Reform. The task force was unable to reach consensus, but its chair, Mark Jaccard, issued his own report recommending wholesale competition, the separation of BC Hydro?s transmission division into a separate entity, and the formation of a B.C. Power Exchange to operate a provincial energy market (Jaccard, 1998). Thus the 1990s saw the beginning of a debate in the province regarding the role of government intervention in electricity markets and the relative merits of public versus private power development.    As part of this debate, the Independent Power Association of BC (later renamed the Independent Power Producers Association of BC or IPPBC) was formed in 1992 to advocate on behalf of those with interests in private power development in the province. It was an early advocate for electricity export policies, allowing open access to the provincial transmission system, and other electricity                                                       13 Historically, access to U.S. markets (California in particular) depended on negotiating access through the transmission system of the Bonneville Power Administration. Implementation and interpretation of U.S. legislation, specifically the 1978 PURPA legislation and the 1992 Energy Policy Act helped opened up access to U.S. markets, provided that BC was willing to reciprocate.   51 market reform policies aimed at encouraging private power development in the province (Clean Energy BC, 2010). Created as a collective body to advocate and lobby for its members, this organization was a key promoter of the neoliberal, market-reform discourse. It sought transformation of the provincial electricity grid via limits to BC Hydro?s electricity monopoly and the introduction of new actors (its members) in provincial electricity production. As such, it supported the narrative of energy production as a source of economic development linking the public good to a strong industry that could create jobs, contribute to adequate electricity supply, and reduce the risk to public investors.   On the other side of the debate, an advocacy coalition developed that was devoted to retaining public ownership and management of electricity resources and protecting the province?s rivers from the ??gold rush? of privately-owned run-of-river hydro projects? that were being proposed (BC Rivers Alliance, 2007). This coalition included groups specifically formed to advocate for public power in the province, a union representing BC Hydro employees (COPE 378), and environmental groups concerned about the consequences of reduced government oversight and regulation. The coalition?s position was based on the conviction that the public good is best served by public ownership and democratic management of electricity development. The discourse of this social world rested on the premise that the cost-effectiveness and reliability of public power must be surpassed to justify changes to the development model. It did not directly challenge the narrative of reliable, low-cost energy but it did question who should receive the benefits of energy development. Specifically it was concerned about direct and indirect government subsidies to industry (Calvert, 2007). Thus it added considerable nuance to the narrative that economic development was well and appropriately supported by energy development. It also included a strong environmental narrative based on conservation and ecosystem management.   The debate reached new levels when the BC Liberals were elected to government in 2001, under the leadership of Gordon Campbell.  Shortly after being elected, the new government created the Task Force on Energy Policy that issued its report in March 2002. The Task Force?s recommendations formed the basis of the government?s first energy plan titled, Energy for our Future: A Plan for BC (Ministry of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources, 2002). The purpose of the plan was ?to build on B.C.?s strengths to help revitalize the provincial economy and create jobs in an environmentally responsible way? (p. 5). It rested on four key pillars: low electricity rates and public ownership of BC Hydro; secure, reliable supply; more private sector opportunities; and environmental responsibility and no nuclear power sources. Energy for our Future formalized the move toward increased private  52 power generation and market competition. It accomplished this by, first unbundling the generation, transmission, and distribution arms of BC Hydro. Specifically, the BC Transmission Corporation was created to manage the electrical grid independently of BC Hydro?s generation and distribution operations. A number of administrative sections were also separated and sold (to Accenture Business). Second, it prohibited BC Hydro from developing any new generation with the exception of large hydroelectricity, and even here suggested that large hydroelectricity was more harmful and less efficient than smaller, privately developed energy projects (p. 19).   The plan was also notable for its weak environmental standards that opened the door for the introduction of coal-fired electricity generation into the provincial hydroelectric grid.  This rested on its voluntary BC Clean Electricity targets. Framed as a form of renewable portfolio standard (see p. 35) the target of 50 percent of new energy production classified as BC Clean Electricity was presented as a progressive step toward environmental responsibility. However, because the province?s electricity is predominately generated via large hydroelectricity with very little gas and diesel generation and no coal-fired electricity generation, a voluntary incremental target of 50 percent BC Clean Electricity actually worked in the opposite direction of typical renewable portfolio standards allowing for an increased percentage of fossil fuel generation.   Energy for our Future was based primarily on the historical narrative of energy-development as an economic opportunity. It also strongly endorsed energy export as both an economic opportunity and a contribution to ?continental energy security? (Ministry of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources, 2002, p. 14).  In this way it linked the controversial export narrative to the already well-established economic development and energy security narratives. It also drew on a new legacy narrative that at once acknowledged the value of the existing public infrastructure while also emphasizing the government?s interest in ??shifting the responsibility for new power development to the private sector? (Ministry of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources, 2002, p. 19).  The plan was met with considerable opposition from both environmentalists and those concerned with the state of public power in the province (Calvert, 2007; Griffin Cohen, 2002). Coupled with revisions of the Environmental Assessment Act in the same year, it was seen as a major step backward for mitigating the environmental impact of energy development in the province. In terms of promoting private power development, it was a significant step forward. The plan was complemented with calls for power in both 2001 and 2003 resulting in another 2000 GWh/year in purchase agreements. In December 2005, another call was made (referred to as the 2006 Call for power) with  53 the government signing thirty-eight contracts for another 7125 GWh/year of power. The amount of the contracted power, nearly three times the amount requested in the call, and the high purchase price, served as a lightning rod for public power advocates (Calvert, 2007).  While the 1990 energy plan cited ?a consensus?against government intervention in markets and in favour of the determination of energy prices by market forces? (p. 1), in reality there was nothing close to consensus on the issue. Instead the neoliberal market reform agenda can be understood as a new discourse that was strongly supported by groups like IPPBC and, at times, supported by MEMPR and the provincial cabinet. The discourse gained traction with the 2001 election of the BC Liberals who turned a decade of rhetoric into policies that limited public power development, supported expansion of private power development, and, as will be discussed below, encouraged regulatory streamlining.   3.2.3 Environmental regulation and streamlining Mirroring the claim in the 1990 energy plan that a consensus had developed around decreased government intervention in energy markets was the equally contentious claim that a consensus had been reached in regards to sustainable development. Although an emerging environmental movement was demanding more environmental and social accountability, like the case for electricity market reform, the province was far from achieving consensus on the issue. Instead, environmental discourses were taken up in earnest by advocates while support from provincial politicians and regulators, measured by the track record of regulatory interventions, varied over time.   Broadly speaking, environmental regulation, including environmental impact assessment, was first legislated in BC in the early 1980s. Under the 1981 Environmental Management Act (S.B.C 1981, c.14) the Minister of Environment was given broad powers to require an environmental impact assessment if deemed necessary for any project. In 1995 the assessment process that, by then, included a number of specific pieces of legislation was replaced with the first Environmental Assessment Act (R.S.B.C 1996, c.119). In the case of energy projects, additional regulation existed under the Utilities Commission Act that gave authority over project review and approval to the BC Utilities Commission. Under section 45 of the Utilities Commission Act, public utilities must apply for a certificate of public convenience and necessity for new energy projects effectively demonstrating that they are in the public interest. Of note, these two outlets for project review, one explicitly environmental, were also the primary outlets for public comment and consultation in energy planning in the province. Both pieces of legislation specify minimum public notification and  54 consultation requirements while also allowing the flexibility for far more encompassing public engagement processes to be undertaken under the auspices of their respective review processes.   The introduction of environmental and public consultation regulation was also accompanied by the formation of new organizations with a mandate to address emerging environmental and social issues. In 1990, the British Columbia Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy was formed and began advocating for more substantive change to energy planning in the province.  In 1992, the Roundtable released a report titled, A Sustainability Strategy for Energy (British Columbia Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 1992). The report developed the concept of energy sustainability based on seven broad sustainability principles and recommended the creation of an energy planning council to conduct independent, comprehensive energy sustainability planning. In addition to focusing on independent and comprehensive planning, The Roundtable?s position on the role of public deliberation in energy planning was clear.  Public involvement will inevitably become a necessity in the 1990s as energy supply issues become increasingly more complex, involving difficult social, environmental, and economic trade-offs. The public should become part of the decision-making process and have a defined role in deciding what combination of energy supply options are acceptable?. If designed and operated properly, public involvement will not lead to delay but, rather, can provide a more predictable regulatory time path for decision-making processes. (British Columbia Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 1993, p. 22)  Within this interpretation of sustainable development, planning and procedural concerns, including meaningful public involvement, were included alongside environmental protection, ecological carrying capacity, energy efficiency and conservation, and the fair distribution of costs and benefits.   The recommendation to form an independent planning body was taken up and in 1992, the Energy Council Act created the British Columbia Energy Council to ?facilitate comprehensive energy planning for British Columbia? (British Columbia Energy Council, 1994, p. vii). After undertaking an extensive public consultation process, the outcome of the Council was an energy strategy that was radically different from any provincial energy plan before (1980, 1990) or since (2002, 2007).  Titled, Planning Today for Tomorrow?s Energy: An Energy Strategy for British Columbia, the strategy began with the Roundtable?s definition of sustainability and made recommendations that applied to all levels of government and all sectors with a major stake in energy production or use?thus it was a provincial energy strategy rather than a government energy plan. It proposed a reorientation of the provincial energy system away from fossil fuels and toward a more decentralized, diversified,  55 efficient, and lower-impact configuration of energy technologies and uses.  Although the BC Energy Council demonstrated that there was interest in alternative planning objectives and processes in the province, it also spoke frankly about the perceived lack of political will to implement such a radical reframing of energy planning. The strategy itself included recommendations to encourage the change but, ironically, the lack of political appetite for such a reframing was best demonstrated in the short life of the Council?it was dissolved in 1994 upon tabling its strategy.   The political ambivalence regarding sustainable development in BC (even in the narrowest interpretation of environmental sustainability) was also illustrated in shifting regulation and rhetoric in the province. Even as environmental laws and regulations were being enacted, there was pressure to streamline them and facilitate resource development. Regulatory streamlining is a consistent theme in all the provincial energy plans and in the late 1990s significant regulatory restructuring began for this purpose. The 1998 Oil and Gas Commission Act (S.B.C. 1998 c.39) created the provincial Oil and Gas Commission, to oversee exploration, production, reclamation, and monitoring of oil and gas related activities in the province. The Commission was created to simplify the approval and permitting processes and thereby facilitate development and substantially increase production levels.  The Commission, staffed with a group of officers dedicated to the consideration of applications necessary for upstream activity, with single-window authority over all of the principal approvals required for oil and gas development, became the means to achieve a streamlined approval process (Rankin, Carpenter, Burchmore, & Jones, 2000, p. 145).  Similarly, the BC Environmental Assessment Act was revised in 2002 to increase ?procedural flexibility? and ?allow for a more streamlined and efficient review process? (EAO 2003 quoted in Rutherford, 2009).    The implications of regulatory streamlining and its potential to limit public input into controversial projects was illustrated in 2006 when the Squamish-Lillooet Regional District, prompted by considerable public opposition and a concern for the cumulative environmental impacts of multiple energy projects, attempted to use its planning authority to limit the development of privately developed run-of-river hydroelectricity projects in its jurisdiction (Squamish Lillooet Regional District, 2003). The provincial government responded with Bill 30 that removed the requirement for energy projects to seek local and regional planning approval. This was viewed as a reassertion of the  56 government?s energy agenda specifically the clear priority given to economic development over concerns for environmental impacts and public opinion.   Thus again, despite the claims in the 1990 energy plan, no provincial consensus had been reached on the role of sustainable development in energy planning and development in the province. Rather, environmental narratives, often with accompanying demands for social accountability and equity, were introduced into the arena and at times supported through government policy and legislation. This was facilitated by the introduction of new actors into the arena including environmental advocates, the public, and First Nations as legitimate stakeholders in the energy development process. Together, they contributed both to the pressure to enact substantive regulation and to the need to provide consultation mechanisms to help coordinate the range of new voices in the policy arena.   3.3 Conclusion: Regulatory change and infrastructural inertia The initial build-out phase of energy development in the province saw the development of key infrastructure and key energy narratives. This included the large-scale hydroelectric generation facilities and the main transmission infrastructure that still structures the two primary energy sectors. It also saw the establishment of the public utility, BC Hydro, and the two deeply entrenched narratives of economic development via energy development and a need for reliable, low-cost energy.   Between 1980 and 2006, the provincial energy arena became significantly more complex. Three key discourses based on energy security, neoliberal market reform, and environmental regulation, the introduction of new actors, including the public, and new imperatives into the arena all contributed to this complexity. Although economic development remained a key rationale behind energy development in the province, whether it was pursued via public or private electricity development became a controversial debate particularly after the BC Liberals came to power in 2001. Similarly, the relative priority given to environmental regulation and public engagement in regards to industrial development remained an evolving and contested issue.   As a result, both the electricity sector and the oil and gas sector were subject to reform. The latter, already privately-owned, was taken further along its existing trajectory through price deregulation and regulatory streamlining. Reform in this sector served to limit government intervention. In the electricity sector, reform promoted by energy security, neoliberal, and environmental discourses translated to governance and regulatory change. This included the significant restructuring of BC  57 Hydro first in the 1980s, when new planning techniques and demand-side management were institutionalized, and then again in 2002, as it was vertically unbundled.   However, despite a continual evolution of institutional and regulatory structures to accommodate new actors and discourses, the most significant impact on infrastructure in the electricity sector was the effective halt of the build-out. This can be attributed in part to the content of the discourses themselves (that for instance introduced demand-side management, raised concerns about environmental and social impacts, challenged the role of public monopolies etc.) and thus contributed to new approaches to energy management in the province. In addition, new planning approaches combined with (and contributing to) slowed electricity growth rates and excess capacity from the build-out phase reduced the overall need for new supply. Finally, a range of new actors including the BCUC, public power advocates, environmental advocates, and the public, all with their own expectations and interests, increased conflict and disagreement in the energy policy arena. The Utilities Commission Act was the first significant step toward creating new forms of coordination and together with the Site C hearings it did serve to reframe energy planning in the province to include energy efficiency and conservation. The reframing helped halt the build-out but did not significantly alter the underlying narratives of energy development in the province.    In addition, the infrastructure itself, including its physical longevity and the interests sunk into it, appears to have considerable inertia that have resisted reinterpretation and influenced the perceived feasibility of new development. Despite the deep concern of public power advocates, the average production of independent power producers between 2004 and 2009 was only 10 percent of electricity generation (Hoberg & Sopinka, 2011). The slow advance of private power development, despite nearly a decade of government support, illustrates some of the difficulties that have been raised by attempts to reframe and reconfigure the existing infrastructure. Chapter 4 will consider this in more detail as it picks up the story in 2007 as new climate and energy policies are introduced.      58   Chapter  4: Clean energy discourse in British Columbia The purpose of this chapter is to describe the orientation of the clean energy discourse that has emerged in British Columbia and the effect it is having on the energy policy arena.  As will be described, in 2007 the provincial government introduced an ambitious set of climate change mitigation targets and policies. While the climate change agenda has garnered considerable attention and debate, less acknowledged is the corresponding clean energy agenda that was simultaneously introduced. In practice the clean energy agenda represents a significant component of the climate policy and, arguably, the main point of articulation between the BC Liberals? neoliberal policies and the climate change mitigation objective.14  The discourse analysis that follows traces clean energy as an environmental narrative from the first provincial energy plan in 1980 through to its current incarnation. Detailed analysis of the post-2007 clean energy agenda describes the content of the discourse and the top-down approach that the provincial government has taken in implementing and institutionalizing it. Finally, it considers the implications for the provincial policy arena and the positioning of energy sectors, technologies, and actors within the discourse. The argument is that despite introducing ambitious targets for GHG emissions reductions, the discourse is highly consistent with historical development patterns. Thus it serves as an example of how the incumbent energy regime has shaped policy discourse and how, in turn, the policy discourse has reproduced inertia within the same energy system. Furthermore including GHG emissions from electricity production within legitimate policy discourse while limiting the inclusion of other ?overflows? has required limiting debate and negotiation. As a result, the clean energy agenda has resulted in a less-open policy process.    In the context of the thesis as a whole, the analysis shows the direction of provincial energy policy and provides context for the pressures put on actors in the case studies presented in the following chapters. It also provides an example of current model of top-down government energy policy. This case demonstrates the provincial government?s authority to dictate energy policy yet it also points to reasons why, in the modern context, this model has failed to substantially transform the energy system.                                                        14 This analysis includes the provincial climate policy only as a prompt and a driver for the clean energy agenda. It does not analyze the climate change discourse or the content of the climate policy, which itself contained a number of innovative mechanisms including the provincial carbon tax. For more detail, see (Sodero, 2010)    59  4.1 Energy and climate change discourses This analysis15 begins with a definition of discourse as  ?a particular way of representing the world? (Phillips & J?rgensen, 2002, p. 143) or, more specifically as ?an ensemble of ideas, concepts , and categorizations that is produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities? (Hajer, 1995, p. 60). Important to this interpretation is that discourse is more than rhetoric, it has effects and it sets the ?conditions of possibility? (Foucault, 2002, p. 46).   In the social worlds model, discourse helps constitute the elements in the arena and is critical to the negotiation between elements in the arena. Social worlds have been described as ?universes of discourse? (Clarke, 2005, p. 46). That is, discourses, as ways of representing the world, are critical to the meanings and identities forged within a social world and the work it undertakes. Similarly, discourse and infrastructure are mutually constructed with the discourse contributing to the specific form of infrastructure and the materiality of infrastructure influencing discourses (Lovell, 2007). Thus discourse is critical to the elements in the arena and to their interaction, playing an important role in instigating innovation and/or stability.   Maartin Hajer uses the term ?storylines? to describe the simplifying narratives or tropes that reduce complex discursive spaces to manageable form. Storylines serve to overcome fragmentation and facilitate agreement since they allow interpretative flexibility, or multiple meanings to coexist, while simultaneously helping to rationalize a specific approach to a problem (Hajer, 1995). Discourses achieve ?closure? when meanings and orderings become stable and are no longer questioned or contested (Phillips & J?rgensen, 2002). The meaning of closure in the discursive sense is consistent with how it has been used in technology studies; as a metaphorical closing of the black box such that assumptions and alternatives are no longer visible or questioned. Put another way, closure means that the framing of a problem is accepted and ?overflows? are obscured (Callon, 1998). Achieving closure helps mask the political and distributive aspects of discourses making them appear as neutral, common sense descriptions of the world rather than political and inherently implicated in constructing                                                       15 I distinguish the analysis in this chapter from the analysis in the previous chapter based on the type of analysis conducted. This chapter is based on a discourse analysis of energy policy documents. Although the discourse analysis has influenced the language and historical account given in Chapter 3 (particularly in my discussion of energy policies), Chapter 3 is primarily based on secondary research. Hence my introduction of discourse and discourse analysis at the beginning of Chapter 4 and not Chapter 3.     60 the world. Storylines contribute to discourse closure by simplifying problems and overcoming fragmentation; they ?fulfill an essential role in the clustering of knowledge, the positioning of actors, and, ultimately, the creation of coalitions amongst the actors of a given domain? (Hajer, 1995, p. 63). Insomuch as they facilitate coalitions amongst actors (what Hajer calls discourse coalitions), storylines can be seen as potential boundary objects allowing for multiple social worlds to work together despite divergent interests and agendas.   As discourses gain purchase in a policy context, discourse institutionalization occurs when a discourse is translated into concrete policies and institutional arrangements (Hajer, 1995). As with the emergence of dominant storylines, institutionalization may contribute to but does not necessarily result in discourse closure. As will be described, clean energy in the BC context has become institutionalized via provincial legislation.   The lack of closure is part of what makes discourse analysis a productive research method in this case. Analyzing emerging discourses offers a means to evaluate world-building in process?a way to examine infrastructures and policies that are still emerging and whose effects are still taking form.  Analyzing the historical evolution of infrastructure, regulation, and institutions, as done in Chapter 3, can only be undertaken in retrospect. The emergence of clean energy as the dominant discourse in British Columbia is a recent phenomenon and much of the related regulation has yet to be fully implemented. As such, many of its effects are still unknown. However, examining the discourse itself provides a measure of the trajectory of provincial energy policy?the orientation of force, if not the magnitude of force. Of course, discourse is one of many elements that make up the BC energy system and is in no way deterministic. Yet at this early point, an analysis of the evolution of a clean energy discourse in provincial energy policy provides a means to unpack the direction of provincial energy policy and the force it may be exerting on other elements in the policy arena.   Analyzing these dynamics from written text can be difficult. While this analysis does consider ways that interpretations of clean energy evolved and were institutionalized via policy and legislation, it does not attempt to unpack the policy-making process or the multitude of voices, interests, and negotiations that inevitably contribute to the final texts that become provincial energy policy. Rather, it accepts policy texts as formed with the acknowledgement that they represent no single person or perspective in the government (Scott, 2000). This is an analytical simplification that allows for an analysis of the orientation of provincial policy (where it is taking us) without delving into the intentions or power dynamics that inevitably come into play in policy formation.   61  The focus of this analysis is clean energy discourse in provincial energy policy. As such, there is no distinct line between a policy and a discourse since policies are discursively constructed and discourses are in part constructed and promoted through specific policies. One analytic heuristic employed here, is to interpret clean energy policies as part of the process of discourse institutionalization whereby interpretative structures and frameworks become formalized in programs, mandates, regulations, and legislation. Therefore, while shorthand reference is made to energy discourses this should be taken as inclusive of the more formalized energy policies and regulatory frameworks that are also taking form.   The scope of this discourse analysis has been limited to provincial government documents and texts pertaining to energy policy. This includes provincial energy policy documents and legislation, provincial climate action plans; and, as agenda setting documents, the provincial throne speeches that open every session of the legislature. Each of these documents was carefully read and initially coded for the terms clean, green, sustainable, renewable, and alternative as adjectives for energy technologies or sources. These were tabulated to develop an overall sense of when and how terms were being used over time. At the same time, explicit definitions of these terms were collected and put in chronological order. The key documents, including four energy plans, one energy strategy and the Clean Energy Act, were manually coded for the underlying narratives. This was an iterative process that involved multiple close readings and the review of persistent themes and narratives. The emergent narratives were recorded in tabular form and in detailed summary memos for each document.  Table 4.1 below, lists the policy documents analyzed.      62 Table 4.1 Policy documents included in the clean energy discourse analysis  Energy Plans  (1980)  An Energy secure British Columbia: The challenge and the opportunity.   (1990)  British Columbia Energy Policy: New Directions for the 1990s.   (1994)  Planning today for tomorrow's energy: An energy strategy for British Columbia.   (2002)  Energy for our future: A plan for BC.   (2007) The BC Energy Plan: A Vision for Clean Energy Leadership.   Legislation Clean Energy Act (R.S.B.C 2010 c.22)  Climate Action Plan  (2008) Climate Action Plan.   Speeches from the Throne (Parliament of British Columbia) (February 2005) Speech from the Throne opening the Sixth Session of the Thirty-Seventh Parliament (September 2005) Speech from the Throne opening the First Session of the Thirty-Eighth Parliament  (February 2006) Speech from the Throne opening the Second Session of the Thirty-Eighth Parliament  (February 2007) Speech from the Throne opening the Third Session of the Thirty-Eighth Parliament  (February 2008) Speech from the Throne opening the Fourth Session of the Thirty-Eighth Parliament  (February 2009) Speech from the Throne opening the Fifth Session of the Thirty-Eighth Parliament  (August 2009) Speech from the Throne opening the First Session of the Thirty-Ninth Parliament  (February 2010) Speech from the Throne opening the Second Session of the Thirty-Ninth Parliament   The findings from the key documents listed in Table 4.1, were additionally supported with government press releases, websites, and documents produced by advisory groups and other actors in the arena.   Examining only government-produced texts, this analysis can be said to analyze the emergence of the discourse that is currently dominating the energy policy arena. However the approach does have two important limitations. First it does not address how other key players in the policy arena interpreted and acted on the discourse. In some cases, this includes significant actors or social worlds. For instance, the response of BC Hydro to the discourse and accompanying policy is itself a complex issue that is not addressed here. Other research suggests that sections of BC Hydro may have advocated for more emphasis on energy efficiency and conservation (Berkhout, 2013). Similarly, this analysis does not address the competing and alternative discourses that are emerging in the province. This second omission is in part addressed in subsequent chapters that explore the implications of provincial energy policy at the local level as well as some of the alternative discourses and framings that have emerged.   63  4.1.1 Carbon control and clean energy Aiden While and colleagues identify three subsequent, yet overlapping waves of eco-state restructuring in western democracies: pollution control, sustainable development, and carbon control. Each of these waves represents a set of distinguishable ?discourses, rationalities, and practices? that underpin environmental governance even though the specific interpretation and implementation of each wave has varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (While et al., 2010, p. 88). The first wave, pollution control, which the authors identify as spanning roughly the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, focused on regulating capitalism and internalizing the externalities created by large-scale industrialization. From the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, the second wave of sustainable development discourses became overlaid on the pollution control framing. As outlined in Chapter 2, sustainable development drew connections between social equity, environmental degradation, and continuing economic development with a resulting regulatory focus on win-win-win solutions and an ecological modernization strategy that attempted to integrate ecological concerns and limits into mainstream capitalist practices. The carbon control wave began in the late 1990s, adding a third layer to environmental governance and regulation. This wave is characterized by an increased emphasis on mitigating climate change and transitioning to a low carbon economy. The instrumental focus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions is accompanied by a focus on market mechanisms, on predominately national systems of measurement and accountability, and on ?downstream regulation? that focuses on the point where carbon is emitted as opposed to where fossil fuels are produced (While et al., 2010).  In British Columbia, environmental regulation in energy policy aligns with these three waves. Early interpretations of the term clean energy aligned with the pollution prevention wave. This was followed by the introduction of sustainable development into energy policy discourse. Finally, a carbon control framing is evident in the post-2007 clean energy discourse.   The post-2007 clean energy discourse aligned with a carbon control framing but it also drew rhetorical power from the specific terminology chosen. Mary Douglas has argued that cleanliness is a social category and that cleaning is an act of social ordering (Douglas, 1984). As such the term is a socially constructed category that carries heavy moral connotations. Elizabeth Shove has expanded the analysis to energy-related practices, describing how notions of cleanliness are implicated in processes of sociotechnical change and the scaling (up or down) of energy use (Shove, 2003). Although the focus here is at the level of policy rather than everyday practice, the socially constructed  64 and primarily positive connotations of the term clean energy remain relevant as does its implications for sociotechnical change.   First, as a socially constructed term, the meaning of clean energy is malleable and contested. Even when used in a narrow sense to describe carbon neutrality, what counts as clean depends on what emissions are counted, how they are counted, and the specific contexts, activities, and technologies to which they are bound (Lau & Dowlatabadi, 2011). However, as a descriptor of an energy future, there may also be a desire to include a range of environmental and social concerns in definitions of clean. Second, the moral connotations of the term clean can be rhetorically mobilized around the assumption that clean energy technology and policy are morally and environmentally desirable.  In BC, the rhetorical use of the term clean energy is the most obvious in early interpretations. However, the term continues to carry these connotations despite its combination with other energy narratives. Thus clean energy discourse and policy is more than a persuasive rhetorical tactic. It is also infused with political and moral commitments that have specific implications for energy development and use in the province. As will be elaborated, the specific character of these commitments gets worked out on the ground as the discourse moves from abstract meanings and concepts to specific policies and projects. Debate over what clean energy is will inevitably be worked out as the policy is implemented on the ground (Eames et al., 2006). Thus we can expect clean energy policies to be debated at a high level and to be implicit in specific controversies related to the implementation of clean energy policy. This chapter deals with the former while subsequent chapters consider specific cases of the latter.  4.2 Clean versus sustainable energy (1980-2006) Clean energy as a theme in BC Energy Policy first appeared in the 1990 energy plan, British Columbia Energy Policy: New Directions for the 1990s (Ministry of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources, 1990). The plan identified four central themes that were intended to structure energy policy in the coming decade. The first two themes, Energy for the Economy and Secure Energy were consistent with the 1980 energy plan and represented long-standing narratives in provincial energy discourse. The other two themes, Efficient Energy and Clean Energy, were positioned as reflecting new priorities for the government. Boxed text beside the description of the four themes describes the ?building consensus? (p. 3) around the concept of sustainable development and introduces the newly created British Columbia Round Table on the Environment and the Economy?the implication being that the two new themes were the government?s response to sustainable development as it relates to energy.    65 While the theme of Efficient Energy directly aligns with the institutionalization of demand-side management that was underway (for instance via the Energy Efficiency Act (1991) and BC Hydro?s PowerSmart and ResourceSmart Programs (1989)), the treatment of clean energy is more nebulous. In general however, it aligns with a pollution control frame. This is evident in the positioning of Clean Energy as an over-arching category to represent mitigating the range of terrestrial, aquatic, and atmospheric impacts of energy development and use. In addition, Clean Energy is not integrated with either economic development or with affordable, reliable energy. Rather, the approach for the theme of Clean Energy, in this energy plan, is an ?end-of-pipe? or add-on approach to controlling polluting emissions and minimizing the recognized impacts of energy development and use.   Only two years after the release of New Directions, the British Columbia Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy adopted the term sustainable energy in its 1992 report, A Sustainability Strategy for Energy (1992). The report developed the concept of energy sustainability based on seven broad sustainability principles.16 This interpretation was taken up in 1994 by the BC Energy Council in Planning Today for Tomorrow?s Energy: An Energy Strategy for British Columbia (1994). This document defined a ?fully sustainable energy system? as having energy supply and demand options characterized by:  acceptable environmental, social, health and cultural impacts, 2) indefinite, continued availability of the energy supply source. The rate of replacement of the sources must be no less than its rate of use; and 3) demand or supply options not dependent on household or industrial activities that in themselves are not sustainable. (p. 3) This definition, and the strategy in its entirety, provides the most ambitious interpretation of environmentally and socially responsible energy development and use found to date in BC energy policy. In the language of the BC Energy Council, sustainable energy almost entirely replaced clean energy. Whereas the term sustainable energy is clearly defined and used more than two hundred times in the one hundred and forty-four-page document, the term clean energy is not used at all. Clean as an energy-related adjective is used less than ten times, usually to refer to highly specific cases such as clean incineration processes.                                                        16 The seven principles are: 1) limit our impact on the living world to stay within its carrying capacity 2) preserve and protect the environment 3) hold to a minimum the depletion of non-renewable resources 4) promote long-term economic development that increases the benefits from a given stock of resources without drawing down on our stocks of environmental assets 5) meet basic needs and aim for a fair distribution of the benefits and the costs of resources use and environmental protection 6) provide a system of decision-making and governance that is designed to address sustainability and 7) promote values and actions that support sustainability.  66  Given clean energy?s presence in the 1990 Energy Plan and the implicit attempt to equate it with the building ?consensus? on sustainable development, the term?s absence in Planning Today can only be seen as an intentional omission. The discursive shift away from clean energy toward sustainable energy represents the transition from an ?end-of-pipe? regulatory approach toward a sustainable development approach that integrates environmental, social and economic considerations with the aim of fundamentally reorienting how the province planned and used energy. Although it had been acting on a mandate from the government, the BC Energy Council was dissolved immediately after Planning Today was tabled. Appropriately, this signaled the fate of sustainable development as a guiding concept for the provincial energy planning and policy. The provincial government did table a response (in May 1995) but sustainable energy, as defined and envisioned by the BC Energy Council, did not persist within provincial policy discourse.   When the BC Liberals came to power in 2001, they opted for the terms alternative, renewable, or clean energy instead of sustainable energy. The 2002 energy plan, Energy For Our Future: A Plan for BC (Ministry of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources, 2002), reverted back to the term clean energy through its voluntary BC Clean Electricity targets. In the 2002 plan, BC Clean Electricity was defined  as: ??alternative energy technologies that result in a net environmental improvement relative to existing energy production?? (p. 32). Later, in describing BC Clean Electricity as a renewable portfolio standard, the document states that ?[b]y excluding large hydro but allowing other energy sources such as municipal solid waste and cogeneration, the BC goal offers greater regional flexibility in developing environmentally responsible generation? (p. 35).  Official guidelines, issued in April 2004 and revised in September 2005 in order to implement the policy of 50 percent BC Clean Electricity were more specific but the definitions of suitable projects remained broad and open to political discretion. This essentially opened BC Clean Electricity up to any project deemed suitable by the Minister.  As discussed in Chapter 3, BC Clean Electricity was framed as a renewable energy portfolio that nevertheless opened the door to increasing carbon intensive, fossil fuel electricity generation specifically from coal-fired electricity. This version of clean electricity was nearly realized with the province?s first two coal-fired electricity plants approved in July 2006. As is evident from the projects allowed under this interpretation, the use of clean energy in Energy for Our Future is not aligned with either pollution prevention or sustainable development as in previous policies. Instead its use appears to be a rhetorical strategy where the positive environmental connotations of the term are being  67 mobilized to promote and support the expansion of the energy sector including the introduction of coal-fired electricity generation.   4.3 Creating a future powered by clean energy (2007?2010) The provincial speech from the throne delivered on 13 February 2007 signaled a sudden shift in the provincial government?s climate policy. Only three years after the release of its first climate policy that contained no binding targets, the government set an ambitious goal of reducing GHG emissions by 33 percent below 2007 levels in the year 2020. Additional goals of an 80 percent reduction in emissions by 2050 and a carbon neutral public sector by 2010 (later revised to 2012) were added as the policy was elaborated in the following months.   Although it was a reversal in terms of the climate policy, the policies were, from the outset, positioned within the government?s already established neoliberal politics. ?Climate action must be seen and pursued as an economic opportunity as well as an environmental imperative? (Lieutenant-Governor, 2007). Consistent with a carbon control approach (While et al., 2010), the dual goal of economic development and the reduction of GHG emissions was clearly stated in the speech. Fundamental to the merger was the concept of clean energy, which was framed as supporting both policy objectives. For instance, the speech promised to ?unleash our Pacific promise as a budding powerhouse of clean, renewable energy? by pursuing the province?s ?potential as a net exporter of clean, renewable energy? (p. 39).   The speech from the throne was quickly followed by the release of a new energy plan, The BC Energy Plan: A Vision of Clean Energy Leadership (Ministry of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources, 2007b). Like the climate policy, the energy plan was also a departure from previous policies. Although maintaining many of the free-market policies of the 2002 Energy Plan, the plan did an about face on regulating carbon emissions in the electricity sector. It set a number of carbon reduction targets committing to: a 90 percent clean and renewable electricity mix; net-zero emissions for new electricity generation; net-zero emissions by 2016 for existing thermal generation. The targets meant that the two coal-fired generation stations, approved only seven months earlier were no longer in compliance with provincial policy and would not proceed as planned. The plan also made a commitment to electricity self-sufficiency plus ?insurance? by 2016; a continued ban on nuclear power; and 50 percent of new electricity demand supplied through energy efficiency and conservation. In terms of large-scale electricity supply, the plan instructed BC Hydro to phase out the 900 MW Burrard Thermal Natural Gas Generating Station, as per the 2016 goal of net-zero emissions  68 for existing thermal electricity generation, and to reinitiate consultation and feasibility studies for the Site C Hydroelectric Project on the Peace River.   Beyond the focus on clean electricity production, the plan created the $25 million Innovative Clean Energy Fund ??designed to accelerate the commercialization of new, clean and renewable energy technologies? (Ministry of Technology Trade and Economic Development & Ministry of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources, 2008). Although the plan committed to making British Columbia one of the ?most competitive oil and gas jurisdictions in North America? (p. 4), it also made commitments to reduce emissions in oil and gas production by introducing targets for the phase out of routine flaring at wells and production sites.   The plan offered a new clean energy storyline, one that presented clean energy as the cornerstone of provincial energy policy rather than as a rhetorical strategy or as an ?add-on? solution. The centrality of clean energy is indicated by its inclusion in the policy title. In line with a carbon control regulatory regime, the plan set out firm targets for GHG emissions and for conservation and energy efficiency. Taken together, these commitments offered the potential for significant change in energy production and use in the province. Reconfirming the ban on nuclear energy and adding to it a commitment to carbon neutral electricity meant that electricity policy in the province became a question of how and how much to scale up renewable electricity production (Jaccard et al., 2012). However, despite the clear commitment to reducing carbon emissions in the electricity sector, there were still a number of questions about how the policy would be implemented. This included how the government?s ?vision for clean energy leadership? would deal with the tension between reducing carbon emissions and being ?among the most competitive oil and gas jurisdictions in North America? and the relative emphasis that would be given to energy efficiency and conservation versus new electricity supply.   In the year following the announcement of the new climate and energy policies, the provincial bureaucracy went to work developing strategies and tools to achieve the new set of goals.17 For climate policy, this included the creation of detailed targets, a climate action plan that elaborated on the goals and strategies to achieve them, and a set of tools to deliver on the legislated targets including a new provincial carbon tax. This was a highly centralized process, overseen by the                                                       17 Stephanie Sodero?s research describes the unexpected about face taken by the Premier on climate change mitigation (Sodero, 2010). By her account, the new policy was publicly announced before the provincial bureaucracy was notified and well-before policy specifics and implementation strategies had been developed. Coming on the heels of the new climate policy, the 2007 energy plan was likely already in development and quickly altered after the announcement of the new climate policy.  69 Premier?s Office with a select group of advisors and bureaucrats included in the discussion (Sodero, 2010).   Similarly, for the clean energy agenda, the policy objectives established by the provincial government had to be translated into practice. An important step toward integrating the new policy into energy planning in the province was the development of BC Hydro?s Long Term Acquisition Plan (LTAP). Regulatory requirements dictated that the LTAP, created by BC Hydro, be reviewed and approved by the British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC). In a surprising turn of events, on 27 July 2009, the BCUC rejected BC Hydro?s LTAP.  The overall decision was based on the rejection of four key proposals18 in the plan, three of which were judged by the BCUC to have insufficient evidence to support them. However the fourth component rejected was the proposed phase-out of the Burrard Thermal Plant. As one of only a handful of fossil fuel generators in the British Columbia electrical grid, the Burrard Plant was used to help meet peak electricity demand and to help manage transmission in the lower mainland. Debate over the fate of the plant was based on whether the cost and environmental impact of replacing it was worth the emissions reductions achieved by phasing it out. This was particularly salient if BC Hydro chose to keep it operational for its transmission benefits. Although not stated as such, rejecting the phase-out of Burrard Thermal Plant suggested at least some opposition to the government?s proposed approach to eliminating all fossil fuel electricity generation (Hoberg & Jung, 2009). Specifically, it raised questions about what were reasonable costs for ?cleaning up? the provincial electricity grid.   The BC government responded to the BCUC in its August 2009 speech from the throne by stating that the Commission would receive special direction and that it intended to proceed with its plan of reducing reliance on Burrard Thermal Plant and pursuing all of its clean energy objectives (Lieutenant-Governor, 2009).   This exchange signaled the ramping up of clean energy discourse in the province. The focus on clean energy had gained urgency with the global economic downturn that began in December 2008. While remaining committed to carbon emissions reductions, the rhetoric around economic development and of the export potential of clean energy was increasing. In particular, the intent to export clean                                                       18 The commission ruled that BC Hydro had not sufficiently addressed the province?s self-sufficiency obligation (policy obligation); it rejected BC Hydro?s Demand-side Measures for not being sufficiently supported by analysis; it did not support a specific request for the 2008 Clean Power Call; and it rejected BC Hydro?s plan to reduce reliance on Burrard Thermal Plant.  70 electricity became more directed and explicit in 2009 (Hoberg & Sopinka, 2011). The exchange also fleshed out some of the nuances of the clean energy storyline with clear emphasis on the ?cleanliness? of electricity generation and on downstream rather than upstream emissions in the oil and gas sector.   In November 2009 the Green Energy Advisory Task Force was appointed to ?recommend strategic action for turning British Columbia?s clean power potential into real economic, environmental and social benefits for British Columbians? (Green Energy Advisory Task Force, 2010, p. 1). The introduction of the Task Force?s summary report states that ?[o]ne of the government?s highest priorities is developing B.C.?s clean and renewable energy resources, with the intent of making B.C. a leading clean energy powerhouse? (p. 1). Although named the Green Energy Task Force, the mandate of the group was limited to clean electricity generation (with the possible exception of bioenergy) leaving the oil and gas sector outside the scope of review and recommendation.   By this point the ?powerhouse? metaphor had become pervasive in government discourse and the central metaphor in the clean energy storyline. Providing another link to provincial government?s previous market-oriented policies, the metaphor actually predates the 2007 policy shift and was amended to a ?powerhouse of clean, renewable energy? in the 2007 speech from the throne. It is a utilitarian image that emphasizes the electricity sector and production of new supply and serves to position the province?s resources (and the province as a whole) in relation to other jurisdictions. Underpinning the metaphor are the narratives of economic development based on energy development and the opportunity to export British Columbia?s energy resources.     Although the province has long been an exporter of electricity, historically this was rationalized as an economically efficient way to deal with energy surpluses from generation that was built for domestic consumption (Froschauer, 1999). Building generation capacity for export has been and remains a controversial issue in the provincial energy arena (Calvert, 2007; Froschauer, 1999; Hoberg & Sopinka, 2011). The clean energy storyline included export as a formal policy objective and thus, for the first time, export became an explicit rationale for the development of new supply.   Slightly revising the powerhouse metaphor, the February 2010 speech from the throne (Lieutenant-Governor, 2010) declared ?a future powered by clean energy? and stated the government?s intent to ?launch a comprehensive strategy to put B.C. at the forefront of clean energy development?.  The strategy included several components including a decision to move forward with the Site C  71 Hydroelectric project on the Peace River, aggressive promotion of the province?s energy resources, and the introduction of new legislation.   The clean energy strategy was more fully articulated in May 2010, when the government tabled the Clean Energy Act (R.S.B.C 2010 c.22). Since its re-introduction in 2007, the rhetoric around clean energy in the province had being growing and the Act was the culmination and formalization of the government?s clean energy agenda. It revised and legislated many of the objectives and commitments that had preceded it since 2007, increasing the target for energy efficiency and conservation to 66 percent of new electricity demand and also raising the required amount of clean and renewable electricity to 93 percent. In a list of energy objectives it mandated electricity self-sufficiency with 3000GWh insurance (in critical water years) and formalized its stated intent to export ?clean and renewable? electricity.   The Act also made some significant regulatory and institutional changes. First, the British Columbia Transmission Corporation was reintegrated into BC Hydro. In addition, the system planning authority was transferred from BCUC to the provincial Cabinet with only domestic rate-setting left under the purview of the BCUC. Furthermore, a list of nine projects was exempt from review under sections 45 to 47 and 71 of the Utilities Commission Act. This meant that all nine projects would be exempt from the process of acquiring a certificate of public convenience and necessity under the Utilities Commission Act.  Included in the list of exempt projects was the Site C Hydroelectric Project that on 19 April 2010, had been formally advanced to Stage 3 (Environmental and Regulatory Review) in its five-stage development process.  The project was simultaneously rebranded as the Site C Clean Energy project; the stated rationale being that the project was itself a source of clean energy and would support the further development of clean energy in the province. ?As a source of firm energy, Site C will facilitate the development of clean energy projects by providing additional capacity to back up intermittent resources, such as wind, run-of- river hydro and solar? (Office of the Premier, 2010).   Declaring Site C, and all large-hydroelectricity, as clean energy is required to uphold the vision of creating a clean energy powerhouse since large hydroelectricity accounts for the majority of electricity generation in the province. However, as a project that is economically feasible only as a public development, the decision to go ahead with the Site C development is one of the major  72 reversals of a government previously opposed to further public energy development. Discursively, this reversal was managed by calling on the legacy of existing hydroelectric infrastructure. British Columbia is already a world leader in the use of clean and renewable electricity, due in part to the foresight of previous generations who built our province?s hydroelectric dams. These dams?now British Columbians? ?heritage assets??today help us to enjoy 90 per cent clean electricity, one of the highest levels in North America? (Ministry of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources, 2007b, p. 12).  The legacy narrative aligns the public good with the existing energy infrastructure and projects it forward into the future. It situates clean energy as both the province?s past and its future, directly referencing the province?s natural resources as well as its political, cultural and infrastructural history.   Proceeding with the Site C project was one of a number of recommendations from the Green Energy Task Force that were evident in the evolving clean energy strategy. However the Task Force?s complete reports were never released to the public and a number of recommendations, including recommendations for regional planning and for First Nations and community involvement in clean energy development were not included in the Clean Energy Act.   Also missing from the Clean Energy Act, were any targets or regulation pertaining to the oil and gas industry. Thus the clean energy storyline, as institutionalized, positioned the electricity sector, already defined as 90 percent clean and renewable, as the object of clean energy policy while the oil and gas sector became increasingly peripheral in the storyline.  4.3.1 Coalition building The provincial government acted quickly to institutionalize the clean energy storyline via the Clean Energy Act. However it also gained purchase through the enrollment of actors willing to take on and promote the storyline. The primary coalition of support was found in the energy industry. This was most clearly demonstrated through the CleanWorks BC advertising campaign that was launched during the 2010 Olympic Winter Games. The promotional video on the CleanWorks BC website19 begins,   You are here in the windy, sunny, hydroelectric, geothermic, hydrogen-celled, bio-energetic heart of the clean energy future?.This is a place with energy, a province fuelled by ingenuity, powered by nature, and energized by a $100 billion dollar investment opportunity. An opportunity to build a global clean energy powerhouse.                                                        19 http://www.cleanworksbc.com/ (last accessed on November 13, 2010)  73  The video goes on to promote renewable energy in the province claiming a potential of  ??37,000 MW from renewable sources?enough to power over 16 million homes, more than every residence in California? and to promote the province?s natural gas industry, ?BC is rich in transition fuel, natural gas. Over a hundred companies have invested 36.7 billion dollars from 2001 to 2008?. The campaign highlights the province?s greenhouse gas mitigation targets, its intellectual capital and universities, its environmental record for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games, and its ?multi-billion dollar cleantech sector?. It also promotes Vancouver as a livable city, with low taxes and a high life-expectancy. It concludes by stating that  more than $15 billion dollars in new [clean energy] projects are ready for active development?.You are here, at Canada?s Pacific gateway, the green light at the clean energy intersection between Europe, China, and California.    Produced by a coalition of business organizations (BC?s Clean Tech CEO Alliance, the Independent Power Producers Association of BC, the BC Technology Industry Association), the campaign was also, evidently, supported by the Province of British Columbia, the University of British Columbia, and Vancouver Economic Development. The language of the promotional material matches the provincial discourse, including the use of key narratives and the ?powerhouse? metaphor?revised to a ?global clean energy powerhouse?.  Although clearly targeted at international markets and investors20, the language is nearly identical to the language found in provincial policy plans and documents, indicating a shared storyline.  This collection of supporters represents the formation of a  ?discourse coalition? (Hajer, 1995) that is focused on the storyline of clean energy as an economic opportunity and export commodity. In some cases, clean energy serves as a boundary object allowing cooperation between social worlds. For instance, the University of British Columbia (that is not an active member of the provincial energy arena) has evidently endorsed the storyline and aligned it with their own interests of attracting students and research funding. For other social worlds it goes further, suggesting not only a way of working together but also shared agendas. Significantly, a few months after the launch of the                                                       20 The value and viability of electricity exports to U.S. jurisdictions is in part tied to state-level requirements and criteria for renewable energy purchases. In particular, California?s Renewables Portfolio Standard requires hydroelectric projects be 30MW or smaller. The CleanWorks BC campaign, and the clean energy agenda as a whole, was no doubt part of an on-going attempt to have all BC electricity generation qualify under California?s standards.   74 CleanWorks BC campaign, the Independent Power Producers Association of British Columbia (IPPBC) formally changed its name to the Clean Energy Association of British Columbia (Clean Energy BC, 2010) illustrating its complete buy-in and support for the clean energy storyline. Although it is unclear how much of the content of the discourse originated with each party, the clean energy storyline illustrates the convergence of agendas of provincial policy-makers and private power advocates.  4.3.2 The contested meanings of clean As a boundary object, a storyline simplifies the problem framing but maintains interpretive flexibility so that multiple groups can prescribe their own specified meaning to it. However the clean energy storyline, as the overriding energy narrative in the province, left little room for negotiation in its content or via the policy-making process used to implement it. The economic and export narratives underpinning the storyline are rhetorically supported by extending the boundaries of clean energy to all existing and future electricity production in the province. This tactic is seen in both the formal and regulatory definitions of clean energy. At the same time, broad definitions of clean energy have been prescribed in the Clean Energy Act and these have been left open to ministerial discretion. The prescription of definitions, even broad ones, has limited the interpretive flexibility and the space for deliberation, contestation, and negotiation.  When it first appeared in the 1990 Energy Plan, clean energy was used as an encompassing policy category without a clear definition. By 2002, the meaning of clean energy had shifted from a general policy theme to a description of a specific form of energy?that which would fill the 50 percent renewable energy portfolio. In the 2002 plan, BC Clean Electricity was defined as: ??alternative energy technologies that result in a net environmental improvement relative to existing energy production?? (p.  32).   Meanwhile, in its 2005 Integrated Energy Planning process, BC Hydro provided the following distinction between clean and green energy.  While green energy is seen as a subset of clean energy, clean energy is more broadly defined and includes large hydro, cogeneration and energy efficiency projects, where green would not normally include these resources?. A commonly supported definition for "green energy" is low-impact, renewable energy?.In B.C., the approach taken is to focus on "Clean" technologies rather than "Green" technologies. (British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, 2005)   75 In this interpretation, BC Hydro takes clean energy to be a broader category than more common understandings of green energy?supporting the breadth of official definitions. Of note, this explanation not only attempts to distinguish between clean and green energy, it also explicitly includes energy efficiency, neither of which is done in the definitions produced by the provincial government.   Rather, guidelines produced for the 2007 Energy Plan remained essentially the same as previous versions.  However, instead of omitting large-hydro as did the 2002 Energy Plan, all hydroelectricity was included in the storyline. The definition of ?clean or renewable? included a list of technologies but gave the Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources discretion to designate other projects as clean or renewable (Ministry of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources, 2007a).   The Clean Energy Act uses the same definitional formula specifying that a ??clean or renewable resource? means biomass, biogas, geothermal heat, hydro, solar, ocean, wind or any other prescribed resource?. It also states that the minister may prescribe ?resources for the purposes of the definition of ?clean or renewable resource? in section 1(1)?.21 Of note, the formal definition does not include energy efficiency and conservation as a clean resource as did the BC Hydro definition above. This mirrors the focus of the clean energy storyline that, although setting specific targets for energy efficiency and conservation, retains an overall emphasis on energy supply.   The broad definition of clean energy might be interpreted as a way to avoid the controversy that now typifies provincial energy policy-making?a way to enhance the interpretive flexibility of the storyline and enroll supporters. However, in practice the content of the storyline was not open to negotiation. Rather, the broad definition was used to designate a range of the province?s energy resources as part of the clean energy future. This was signaled by prolific use of the word ?clean? as an adjective, particularly for resources that might not typically be associated with clean energy. For instance, the 2007 Speech from the Throne makes reference to natural gas as ?one of the cleanest-burning fossil fuels?; to converting ?landfill gas into clean energy?; to using ?bio-waste to produce clean energy?; to turning ?waste wood into clean fuel?; and to supporting ?clean thermal power production? through the export of wood pellets.  The implication is that all of the province?s existing                                                       21 Although beyond the period of analysis of this research, the implications of allowing ministerial discretion in prescribing clean energy resources was made clear in 2012. In an Order in Council, natural gas burned in a liquid natural gas plants was officially designated as clean energy. This legislative amendment was made to enable the provincial government to endorse the construction of liquid natural gas facilities without violating the Clean Energy Act.  76 and future electricity generation should be reinterpreted as a potential component of the provincial ?clean energy powerhouse??that the energy system is already and will continue to be clean.   While the definition of clean energy has brought on side a number of corporate interests, as illustrated in the Clean Works BC coalition, it has not been as successful in recruiting environmental and public power advocates. For environmental groups, the narrow focus on climate change is missing attention to broader cumulative environmental and social impacts that have been experienced in the province but so far excluded in the clean energy framing. In December 2009, prompted by early discussions of the anticipated Clean Energy Act, a coalition of high profile environmental groups issued Recommendations for Responsible Clean Electricity Development in British Columbia. They summarized the key issues with the current discussion as follows.  While government energy and climate policies have stimulated a rapid increase in the rate of development of green electricity projects, public support for this development has not kept pace. Projects have frequently been opposed due to concerns about social, environmental, and economic costs. Governments have been criticized for a lack of land-use and regional planning; for excluding public participation in decision-making; for deficient project assessment and monitoring requirements; for concerns over project licensing; for perceptions of weak energy conservation efforts; for negative impacts on BC?s long-term planning and electricity security needs; and for restructuring BC Hydro and restricting its ability to directly produce power. (David Suzuki Foundation, Pembina Institute, Watershed Watch Salmon Society, & West Coast Environmental Law, 2009, p. 1)   Although supporting immediate and concerted action to mitigate climate change, their concern stemmed from the uncritical expansion of supply without appropriate attention to the cumulative impacts of energy development, comprehensive planning, or public debate.   For public power advocates, the issue was also in the fine detail of supply development. Here the concern was the continued support for private power and fundamental doubt that any amount of privately-owned development would be in the public interest (Shaffer, 2010). Although both public power and environmental advocates may have agreed with some components of the clean energy storyline, for instance strict limits on GHG emissions or the development of the Site C Hydroelectric Project, there remained fundamental reservations about the planning process and the models of development that underpinned the storyline. Each group identified ?overflows? that were not acknowledged in the clean energy storyline. Accounting for the overflows would require negotiating  77 a more nuanced and qualified definition of clean energy development than was contained in the government?s storyline.   However there was little opportunity for public debate in the reframing of the objectives of electricity policy and the new emphasis on building electricity supply for export (Hoberg & Sopinka, 2011). Somewhat ironically, the government?s response to critiques?many directly related to the lack of debate and negotiation in regards to the specific parameters of clean energy in BC?was to prescribe its own storyline in the Clean Energy Act. This included mandating its own definitions and objectives as well as streamlining controversial projects that embody the clean energy storyline. In addition, the institutional and regulatory reform included in the Clean Energy Act, eliminated the independent scrutiny and opportunity for public input via the BCUC project review process. Although the Act was debated for several days in the provincial legislature, ?the Opposition focused on high level issues and no section-by-section debate of the provisions of the bill was conducted" (Hoberg & Sopinka, 2011, p. 18). Thus calls for revision and negotiation of the clean energy storyline were met with specific, prescriptive legislation and resulted in the closing down rather than opening up the planning process.   4.3.3 Clean energy narratives Underpinning the clean energy storyline are five narratives that serve as rationales for clean energy development. These include the narratives of: 1) economic development, 2) maintaining reliability and affordability of electricity, 3) creating an enduring legacy, 4) benefitting from export, and 5) being environmentally responsible. These narratives with supporting examples and a discussion of their historical consistency are presented in Table 4.2.     78 Table 4.2 Narratives supporting the clean energy storyline The narratives/rationale behind clean energy development Quotation from the 2007 Energy Plan Relationship to historical narratives  Economic opportunity This narrative is primarily economic but it may also have moral/practical implications in terms of leadership. It is about economic benefit, ?wining? the competition, being out-front, and positioning the province in a global market. It is a key narrative behind the powerhouse metaphor.  Today, demand for economically viable, clean, renewable and alternative energy is growing along with the world?s population and economies. Consumers are looking for power that is not only affordable but creates minimal environmental impacts. Fortunately, British Columbia has abundant hydroelectric resources, and plenty of other potential energy sources (p. 14).   Consistent historical narrative altered only to suggest increased economic opportunity from ?clean, renewable? energy.    Maintain reliability and affordability of electricity This narrative is linked to impending energy shortages, energy security, or over reliance on other jurisdictions. In BC it is closely tied to economic and legacy storylines by the historical availability of inexpensive and abundant energy resources.   Achieving electricity self-sufficiency is fundamental to our future energy security and will allow our province to achieve a reliable, clean and affordable supply of electricity. It also represents a lasting legacy for future generations of British Columbians (p. 10).  Consistent historical narrative with the parameters of energy security revised. In the clean energy narrative, the gap between electricity production and use is highlighted and energy security is based on electricity self-sufficiency.    Create an enduring legacy This narrative draws linkages between cultural identity and our physical/natural environment. It has implicit and explicit historical character as it is linked to natural history, cultural history, and existing infrastructure. It serves to temporally position the province, its people, natural resources, and heritage infrastructure.   Just as the government?s energy vision of 40 years ago led to massive benefits for our province, so will our decisions today. The BC Energy Plan will ensure a secure, reliable, and affordable energy supply for all British Columbians for years to come (p. 1).   The legacy narrative has been used consistently since 2002 typically to highlight the value of existing infrastructure while simultaneously suggesting new development models are necessary. The clean energy discourse revises the narrative to more directly align itself with past governments and justify expansion of both private and public power production.    79 The narratives/rationale behind clean energy development Quotation from the 2007 Energy Plan Relationship to historical narratives  Benefit from export This narrative has long been a component of energy policy but building electricity for export has, for the first time, been made explicit in the clean energy discourse. It draws on the historical abundance of natural resources in BC and serves to position the province in relation to other jurisdictions. It is a key narrative behind the powerhouse metaphor.   The combination of renewable alternative energy sources and conservation will allow us to pursue our potential to become a net exporter of clean, renewable energy to our Pacific neighbours (p. 1).  Electricity export has been a consistent narrative in the province. Initially justified as an economically efficient way to handle surplus electricity, in the 1990s the narrative began to explore the economic opportunities and necessities of closer grid integration with US jurisdictions. The clean energy discourse revises the narrative to make building new capacity for export an explicit policy objective.    Environmental responsibility This narrative is explicitly linked to climate change and to discourses of environmental responsibility. It supports a moral/social obligation or responsibility to act as stewards, protect future generations, and utilize (even share) our natural resources.   As stewards of the province, we have a responsibility to manage our natural resources in a way that ensures they both meet our needs today and the needs of our children and grandchildren. We all have to think and act differently as we develop innovative and sustainable solutions to secure a clean and reliable energy supply for all British Columbians (p. 1).  Environmental narratives have historically been a minor or rhetorical aspect of provincial energy discourse. The clean energy discourse represents a significant revision particularly from the previous policies of the BC Liberals. Although continually evoked through the terms ?clean? and ?renewable?, this narrative is used the least as a rationale for clean energy development.    There is considerable overlap between the clean energy storyline and historical energy narratives.  The lineage is the strongest in the first two narratives of economic development and the need to provide low-cost, reliable energy. These have been consistently present in provincial energy policy since the 1980 energy plan. Both the legacy narrative and the export narrative, although aligning with historical policy narratives and practices in the province, are interpreted slightly differently through the clean energy discourse. In both cases, the narratives are more directly translated into policy objectives and concrete projects than in the past.   The metaphor of a clean energy powerhouse brings together a number of these narratives. Predating the 2007-clean energy storyline, it is an important link to the BC Liberals? first energy plan and its emphasis on private power development and export. In 2007 the metaphor was altered by the addition  80 of an environmental narrative?it became a ?powerhouse of clean, renewable energy?. Prior to this point, environmental narratives were present in provincial energy discourse but have, with the exception of the short-lived sustainable development discourse, been only weakly connected to the other narratives. Instead, they have tended to be either ?end-of-pipe? approaches or rhetorical devices. Thus, a significant contribution of the post-2007 clean energy storyline is the reframing of provincial energy discourse to integrate the environmental imperative of mitigating GHG emissions from electricity production.   Using the adjective of ?clean? lends urgency to the storyline via its connection to climate change mitigation. The tone of the storyline also draws on the moral connotations of the term clean, with the implication that all clean energy is environmentally and socially benign. Willingness to develop clean energy on a vast scale suggests there are no environmental, social or political problems associated with it. At the same time, discourses ?fix meaning by excluding all other meaning potentials? (Phillips & J?rgensen, 2002, p. 190) and the adjective clean narrows the scope of environmental and social goods that are explicitly attended to with the focus squarely on carbon emissions. This is a literal exclusion since the government?s clean energy objectives have been formally institutionalized in legislation. Thus while GHG emissions targets and low-electricity prices are explicitly mandated, other (potentially competing) environmental and social goods are excluded from the institutionalized version of the discourse. Similarly, the emphasis on electricity supply limits the range of options available for changing energy production and use in the province. Although the storyline as institutionalized mandates energy efficiency and conservation targets that could be transformative (Dusyk, Berkhout, Burch, Coleman, & Robinson, 2009), the potential (and indeed some of the justification) for demand-management are lost in its emphasis on clean energy supply and the opportunity to export clean energy to other jurisdictions.   Thus via the clean energy storyline, provincial energy policy narratives have been extended to account for the overflow that is GHG emissions in electricity production. But at the same time, the provincial government has sought to limit any additional overflows from the debate. Yet overflows occur at the points of connection with the world (Callon 1998) and the existing energy regime brings a number of, at this point, well-known overflows into view. Environmental and public power advocates have argued for more comprehensive, participatory- and regionally-based planning processes that better account for cumulative impacts of all energy development and prioritize the protection of sensitive ecosystems. Thus, reframing energy discourse to include GHG emissions from electricity production while keeping other overflows out of the debate has required considerable  81 effort. This has included controlling definitions of clean energy, limiting open debate and negotiation between social worlds, and quickly institutionalizing a specific storyline via the Clean Energy Act.   The result is that the clean energy discourse for the most part reproduces existing patterns of development in the province. The vision of BC as a clean energy powerhouse creates a focus on electricity supply with an emphasis on export. The electricity sector continues to be an object of government control and environmental regulation while the oil and gas sector remains largely outside of climate change policy and debate. This allows for the continued expansion of both sectors. For the electricity sector, expansion is once again via large hydroelectricity, and specifically the Site C hydroelectric project.   But why the effort to control the framing and why has it succeeded? While one obvious explanation is that the government is acting to protect its interests, a discourse analysis can add nuance to the ?interests? explanation (Hajer, 1993).  For instance the historical consistency of narratives can be in part explained via the need to align all new narratives with core government imperatives such as economic development or national security (Scrase & Ockwell, 2010). The strong economic and export-oriented framing of the clean energy storyline (i.e. the clean energy powerhouse) thus explains the momentum behind it, as compared to sustainable energy in the 1990s.  The consistency between the  pre- and post-2007 economic development narratives also helps explain the composition and mobilization of the clean energy coalition as it was already well-established in the provincial energy arena.  Another explanation for why the framing held is that the physical inertia of infrastructure, and the narratives and interests embedded within it, have resisted change. This resonates with my conclusion in Chapter 3 that suggested the inertia of existing infrastructure has limited the reorientation and reframing of energy planning in the province. However, my analysis of the clean energy storyline, suggests a more mutually constructive relationship between infrastructure and policy discourse (Lovell, 2008).  Making the storyline consistent with the incumbent energy regime has required specific interpretations of clean energy. For instance, large hydroelectricity must be designated as clean since it constitutes the majority of electricity produced in the province. Similarly, the oil and gas sector needs to be positioned outside of clean energy regulations in order to maintain the viability and internal consistency of the policy. At the same time, the discourse has also revised the meanings of  82 the existing infrastructure. As part of the clean energy storyline, large hydroelectricity moves from a legacy no longer worth pursuing to a cornerstone of clean energy in the province. The impact of this reframing is substantial?it has led to the resurfacing of the Site C Hydroelectric Project. Similarly, in line with a carbon control regime, the discourse also enacts a distinction between upstream and downstream carbon emissions via the expansion of the natural gas sector and the simultaneous prohibition of Burrard Thermal Plant. Thus infrastructure has shaped policy discourse but also been shaped by policy discourse.   Moreover, the fate of the Burrard Thermal Plant also illustrates that in constructing and positioning infrastructure, policy discourse also acts on its inertia. Even as a ?working? infrastructure, Burrard Thermal Plant was discursively and legally rendered obsolete and unnecessary via the clean energy storyline. The implication is that a strong government position can make infrastructure more or less malleable. Thus, in addition to being a material property, the inertia of infrastructure is shown to be sociopolitical and discursive (Hommels, 2005). Like other ?matters of fact?, the inertia of a natural gas plant can be remade (Latour, 2005).   Thus the framing matters and policy discourse plays an important role in stabilizing or changing the framing. The clean energy storyline is an example of how the material and social elements of the energy policy arena are constructed, literally and discursively. In this case, the work being done by the storyline is primarily conservative in that the incumbent infrastructure and interests are, for the most part reproduced.  In addition, the inertia of the incumbent regime is reproduced. Thus, this analysis suggests that rather than facilitating a low-carbon energy transition, the clean energy storyline actually reduces the likelihood of such a transition occurring.  4.3.4 Intersection of clean energy and local interests Beyond providing the provincial policy context that local actors must work within, clean energy discourse intersects with local interests and specifically with the interests of local actors in the Peace Region in a number of ways. Within the energy policy arena, local actors are typically what Adele Clark calls ?implicated actors? (Clarke, 2005)?they have a stake in provincial energy policy and may be spoken for in the energy policy arena but are rarely allowed to speak for themselves. The sidelining of public debate and deliberation regarding the clean energy agenda and via the clean energy agenda contributes to this phenomenon as it limits the formal opportunities for local actors to engage in the energy arena. Furthermore, the Clean Energy Act has also removed the possibility of appealing to the BCUC project review process for individual projects. At the same time,  83 environmental and social values that they stand for may be silenced by the current interpretation of clean energy with its overriding focus on GHG emissions. As the following case studies will illustrate, this is significant for the specific projects and values that actors in the Peace River region wish to promote or contest.  4.4  Conclusion: Clean energy in British Columbia The above analysis describes the evolution of clean energy discourse in BC. It follows the pattern of eco-state restructuring outlined by While et al. (2010), with clean energy first being used to signify pollution prevention, then being replaced with a discourse of sustainable development, only to have clean energy reintroduced as a rhetorical strategy. Finally, in 2007, clean energy is modified to enact a carbon control framing. This framework offers a high-level view of the energy policy discourse in the province?providing a sketch of the global discourses that are influencing BC policy and politics. However, as they are taken up in policy and regulation, each discourse must be translated to the BC context.   The majority of the above analysis describes how, after 2007, a carbon control framework has ?come to ground? in the BC policy arena via the clean energy agenda. I have discussed two interrelated aspects of this translation: the content of the discourse and how the provincial government has sought to define and institutionalize clean energy.    In regards to the former, I have argued that clean energy discourse is a supply- and export-oriented discourse. This orientation is particularly evident in the key powerhouse metaphor that is used to describe the government?s clean energy vision. This has foregrounded the electricity sector, particularly large hydroelectricity, and backgrounded the oil and gas sector, allowing the continued expansion of both. Although it includes some restrictions, clean energy discourse, as it has come to ground, is both rooted in historical development patterns and continues to promote energy development that is consistent with these patterns. Thus although it does integrate an environmental imperative into provincial energy discourse, it is primarily a discursive reframing of the existing patterns of energy development.   Reframing the policy discourse to include GHG emissions from electricity production while continuing to exclude other overflows has required avoiding negotiation and debate. The approach to defining and institutionalizing the clean energy storyline has been largely top-down with the provincial government retaining authority over what constitutes clean energy and seeking to  84 institutionalize their vision via the Clean Energy Act. This approach has limited the opportunities for negotiating shared meanings and therefore limited the acceptance of the storyline by groups with established but divergent agendas for energy development in the province. From the perspective of participatory governance, this approach has also limited the sociotechnical transformation that may have resulted from a more participatory approach.   The heavy-handed approach is not unique to the energy policy arena. Development of the climate policy was similarly centralized and, many would argue, for the better since it allowed the government to institute the controversial carbon tax (Sodero, 2010). However, this analysis suggests that in the case of the energy policy arena, that has entrenched interests, extensive infrastructure, and a number of active social worlds, the established centralized practice is failing to provide the impetus for change.  Although it might be the government?s prerogative to develop and implement energy policy in an authoritative manner, this analysis shows how this approach appears to be contributing to the inertia of the incumbent energy regime and failing to initiate substantive change in the patterns of energy production and use in the province. As such, it provides an example of how policy discourse can contribute to the inertia of energy systems potentially making a low-carbon energy transition less, rather than more, likely.   The analysis illustrates how clean energy in British Columbia and the range of actors, technologies and values it includes, is quite literally being worked out in policy and infrastructure.  This chapter has focused on policy debate regarding what clean energy is and what it is not. Subsequent chapters will consider the Site C Hydroelectric Project as a specific example of controversy stemming from the implementation of the clean energy agenda.    85 Chapter  5: Investigating local energy The purpose of this chapter is to provide context for and outline the methodology used in the remainder of the thesis. It begins with a discussion of local energy initiatives in British Columbia and the changes that have been prompted by provincial climate policy. In Chapter 4, I outlined the trajectory of the provincial clean energy policy from 2007 to 2010 arguing that among other things it has limited room for negotiation and public debate of the formal and informal definitions clean energy. This chapter takes this streamlining argument and applies it more specifically to municipalities in British Columbia. To get a general sense of how municipalities have and currently are being positioned in relation to provincial energy policy, I briefly outline some of the related issues that have been raised by the Union of BC Municipalities (UBCM).  The argument is that recent policy, and particularly the Climate Action Charter, calls on local authorities to become more engaged in energy management. This amounts to an uneven devolution of responsibility that requires them to become more knowledgeable and active in regards to energy use and GHG emissions but, as of yet, has not substantially increased either municipal control over energy development or opportunities for local input into provincial energy policy-making.  The remainder of the chapter sets up the empirical case study research that follows. The purpose is to move from a general overview of how municipalities are engaged in energy planning in the province, to the specific municipal case studies presented in the final two chapters.  To this end, the final sections provide a brief introduction of the Peace River Region and discuss the rationale for selecting case studies within the region. It then moves into a detailed discussion of the methodology and methods used in the case studies that follow in Chapters 6 and 7.   5.1 Municipalities and provincial energy policy Falling within the jurisdiction of the province and long dominated by provincial organizations like BC Hydro, British Columbia energy policy and planning has historically been a province-wide activity. As a result, local authorities and advocacy coalitions have had no formal role in provincial energy policy-making and little presence in the energy policy area (see Chapter 3 for more detail).   However, for at least the last decade, BC municipalities have shown interest in local energy and climate initiatives. This has in part been driven by municipalities, supported through national and international networks such as the Cities for Climate Protection program, taking the initiative on sustainability planning and climate change mitigation where higher level governments have not. In British Columbia, local authorities have also sought to influence specific energy developments in  86 their jurisdictions. Until 2006, this was possible through local or regional zoning authorities. More recently, provincial climate policy has provided both regulatory requirements and incentives encouraging energy and GHG emissions reductions.   On behalf of local governments, the Union of British Columbia Municipalities has been engaged in climate change and energy policy recommendations going back as far as 1991. The resolutions put forward and passed include recommendations encouraging provincial or federal governments to take action on energy or climate change issues; opposing specific policies that would negatively impact local authorities; encouraging policy change to enable action at the local level; or supporting provincial policy and identifying further ways for related local or regional action. This indicates an on-going interest in provincial energy policy on the part of local authorities with an understanding that they are often influenced by such policies yet still have limited capacity and jurisdiction to become involved.   The work of the UBCM has also extended beyond developing resolutions and recommendations. It has also partnered with the province to build capacity and resources and otherwise encourage local energy initiatives. For instance, in 1995, the provincial government and the UBCM signed a memorandum of understanding formalizing the BC Energy Aware Committee and giving it the mandate of raising ?local government awareness with respect to energy efficiency, community energy planning and relationship building? (Community Energy Association, 2008). In 2003, the committee became the Community Energy Association (CEA) with an updated mission to ?support local governments throughout British Columbia in accelerating the application of energy efficiency and renewable energy in all aspects of community design, infrastructure and community engagement for sustainability? (Community Energy Association, 2008). Currently, the CEA is a registered charity whose members and partners include the UBCM, provincial and federal governments, BC utility companies, Translink, and the Planning Institute of British Columbia.   However the complexity of the issues at stake has meant that the relationship with the province has also led to conflict. This reached a climax in 2006 with the controversial ?Bill 30? titled the Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act. The actual controversy was over Section 56 (later changed to Section 53) of the Act that gave independent power producers the status of public utilities if they held an energy purchase agreement from BC Hydro. This exempted them from having to adhere to local  87 bylaws and zoning regulations, effectively eliminating municipal or regional district councils? ability to intervene in energy development.22  The controversy stemmed back to the 2002 Provincial Energy Policy that limited BC Hydro?s ability to build new generation and, in lieu, supported new supply from independent power producers (IPPs). Controversy erupted over run-of-river projects, particularly those in the Squamish-Lillooet Regional District on BC?s southern coast. The regional district, faced with a number of run-of-river power projects and considerable local concern over specific projects and the cumulative impact of all the projects taken together, attempted to intervene in the management and planning of energy development in the region. As early as 2003, the Squamish-Lillooet Regional District Council was developing strategies to integrate and regulate IPP development in their region.  In 2004, the UBCM signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the province regarding Independent Power Projects. The purpose was to establish ?Means through which local governments and the Province can co-operate and collaborate to realize the common goals?. This included fostering co-operative inter-governmental relations; recognizing the jurisdiction and accountabilities of both orders of government; facilitating the responsible development of clean, renewable energy sources to meet the energy needs of British Columbians; and providing efficient and effective IPP review and approval processes for both orders of government (Government of British Columbia and the Union of BC Municipalities, 2004).   However, in April 2006 faced with the possibility that the Squamish-Lillooet Regional District would deny permits to some of the projects in question, the provincial government introduced and passed Bill 30. It was rationalized using the ?one decision-maker? model of streamlining natural resource development that was already represented in, for instance, the provincial Oil and Gas Commission. However it was perceived by many, including the UBCM, as a loss of autonomy for local and regional governments and a breach of trust given the 2004 MOU.23   The evolving role of local and regional authorities took another turn the following year with the introduction of the provincial climate policy. To achieve its legislated goal of a 30 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 and an 80 percent reduction by 2050, the province initiated a                                                       22 The possibility for intervention still remains if the land under dispute is part of the Agricultural Land Reserve, although this route offers a less direct and comprehensive possibility for intervention in energy planning.  23 Legislative Debate, British Columbia Legislative Assembly, 15 May 2006.  88 suite of policies and regulatory changes aimed at encouraging action on the part of local governments. In particular, the Local Government (Green Communities) Statutes Amendment Act was introduced in April 2008 ?to support local governments in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, conserving energy and working towards creating greener, more sustainable communities? (Government of British Columbia, 2008). The bill required municipalities to implement carbon reduction policies and altered the community charter to further enable municipalities to implement these changes with its ultimate aim being to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.   In addition, the province and the UBCM drafted the BC Climate Action Charter, to encourage local and regional governments to commit to carbon neutrality in their operations by 2012. In exchange for the commitment to carbon neutrality and buying offsets to compensate for remaining emissions, the province agreed to return to signatories the money paid out in the new carbon tax (under the Carbon Action Revenue Incentive Program). First proposed in September 2007, within a year nearly all municipalities (133 of 160) had signed on to the charter although many were a long way from achieving the target of carbon neutrality. To support their efforts, the province created the Community Action on Energy and Emissions (CAEE) Initiative to provide ?policy, financial and technical support to local governments and First Nations to undertake innovative community level energy efficiency, energy conservation and emissions reductions measures through new policy and planning tools? (Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Natural Gas, 2013). Part of the work undertaken through CAEE involved developing baseline emissions inventories for each municipality. 24  The new climate imperative, with significant financial stakes for signatories of the Climate Action Charter, added to the complex relationship between municipalities and the provincial governments. The close relationship between energy use and emissions reductions meant that municipalities were being actively encouraged, and even legislated, into more explicit and deliberate management of energy-related practices in their communities. As anticipated, this had a demonstrated impact on municipal energy and climate initiatives. According to a 2008 survey of BC Municipalities, in 2006 the primary driver for energy planning in municipalities was energy costs. In 2008, energy costs, the                                                       24 In September 2008, the provincial government also created seven, regional Citizens? Conservation Councils on Climate Action. The councils? mandate was to ?advise government on the best ways to encourage individuals, groups and communities in their regions to learn more about climate change, participate in climate action initiatives and reduce greenhouse gas emissions? (Government of British Columbia, 2007). As part of this research several members of the Northeast Council were interviewed and, although the councils received considerable media attention the consensus from those participants was that the 18 month initiative was not a highly effective mechanism.    89 Climate Charter, and providing leadership were all equally cited as rationales for pursing energy planning (Community Energy Association, 2009).  However, despite the encouragement stemming from the provincial climate imperative, the Bill 30 controversy made it clear that the provincial government was not interested in local and regional governments? involvement in energy policy and planning when it diverged from its own policy imperatives.   Taken together, the provincial climate and energy policies led to an uneven devolution of responsibility to local authorities. Embedded within this devolution were a number of tensions. First is the tension between energy efficiency and conservation and clean energy production. While the climate policy both encouraged and relied on municipal reductions in energy and emissions, energy policy left little room for local governments to engage in energy production either in a management capacity or as a producer themselves. While the latter is technically possible, as the previous chapter discussed, the new clean energy discourse provides no explicit encouragement or incentive for municipal or community-based energy production. Evidence suggests that local or community-based renewable energy production remains a challenge for municipalities. The 2008 survey of BC municipalities found that, at the local level, ?[r]enewable energy (electricity, heat, or cogeneration) stands out as being the area of least progress in both bylaws and policies, and projects and operations? (Community Energy Association, 2009, p. 17).  This tension reveals a deeper contradiction between the provincial climate and energy policies. As discussed at length in Chapter 4, clean energy policy is a supply-oriented policy that both emphasizes the streamlining of clean electricity production and removes oil and gas development as an object of environmental regulation. Both of these points are, to some extent, at odds with the provincial climate policy?the latter for obvious reasons but the former because of its focus on supply to the exclusion of demand reduction. Furthermore, I have argued that the new clean energy policy is fundamentally conservative in the narratives and development patterns it encourages. Yet, the climate policy and the associated targets require changes in patterns of energy production and use in the province.   For municipalities these contradictions play out on the ground. The climate policy requires concerted energy-related initiatives while provincial energy policy and imperatives continue to limit their effectiveness. Although it may not be intentional on the part of the provincial government, it would appear that significant responsibility for demand management is being downloaded to local authorities while supply remains the prerogative of the province?a detriment to integrated planning to say the least.   90  One municipal employee explained the contradiction as felt at the municipal level,  It's been very, very good for particularly our community to have the provincial government's general direction. It very quickly became apparent that one of the things that the provincial government calls for is a sort of integration of planning, which they seriously lack themselves. (Participant #29) The current policy regime requires municipalities to engage in integrated energy planning yet provides neither an example nor the tools to navigate that role.  Yet, as municipalities gain capacity and expertise, their demand for greater input and more integrated planning approaches is likely to increase. And, as the following case studies illustrate, so too does their ability to effectively critique provincial policy and propose viable alternatives. Whereas municipalities have traditionally been implicated actors in the energy arena with minimal ability to influence energy policy, they are increasingly gaining a voice. The purpose of the case studies that follow is to investigate how local actors are making their voice heard and how they might contribute to the provincial energy arena.  5.2 The Peace River region The Peace Region is at the heart of energy production in the province. Arguably, there are few better places in the province to witness provincial energy and climate policy at work?with all of its tensions and contradictions. Here the tensions between production and conservation; between fossil fuel and renewable energy development; and between local concerns and distant government priorities are deeply embedded in the economy, the geography, the politics and the culture.  Named after the river that flows from west-to-east through its centre, the Peace River Regional District is located in Northeast British Columbia (see Figure 5.1).     91  Figure 5.1 British Columbia's Peace River Region   The area is the traditional home of First Nations from two linguistic groups: Athapaskan, spoken by the Beaver, and Algonquian, spoken by the Cree. A truce between the two groups, who were both being pushed westward by colonial expansion, was struck in the 1700s and the great river they called Unchagah (Peace) became the boundary between their hunting territories (Clare, 1998). An era of fur trading began in the late 18th century. Over the next century, several forts and missions were built on the BC side of the Peace Region, but it was not until the early 20th century that significant numbers of European settlers began homesteading in the area.   Currently, the population is mainly dispersed in the agricultural lands along the Peace River. The original European farming communities experienced significant growth with the building of the Alaska Highway in 1942. This produced an initial influx of workers and in the following decade and a half, resulted in a more than doubling of the permanent population in northeast British Columbia. In addition to its farming base, industry in the region includes forestry, mining, and the two primary energy sectors in the province, hydroelectricity and oil and gas.  92  In the mid-20th century, the Peace River was extensively mapped for its hydroelectric power potential as part of a plan to industrialize northern BC (Loo, 2007). In 1968, the 2730 MW W.A.C. Bennett Dam, the first and largest dam on the Peace River, came on line creating the massive Williston Reservoir, 250 km in length. In 1974, only three years after the Williston Reservoir had completely filled, work began on a second hydroelectric dam. The 700 MW Peace Canyon Dam, 22 km downstream from the Bennett Dam, was completed in 1980.  The construction of the two hydroelectric dams profoundly changed the physical and cultural landscape along the Peace River. Accompanying the physical transformation (of submerged land, altered climate, new flow and ice cover patterns) was a process of socio-cultural transformation. At the time of construction, the dams were not considered controversial yet firsthand experience on the worksite and on the land, the temporary boom in the community of Hudson?s Hope, the treatment of displaced people, and the inconsistent record of promises regarding local employment and economic development was instructive to local residents (Pollon & Matheson, 1989). These two projects resulted in new knowledge and new meanings regarding the river itself and mega project construction in the region.   Hydroelectricity was a major employer and economic driver only while hydroelectric facilities were being constructed. In this sense both hydroelectric projects on the Peace River contributed to the cyclical nature of the resource economy but also helped to smooth over some of the troughs. For both dams, the bulk of the impact was on the community of Hudson?s Hope but residents of surrounding communities also found work on the projects. Construction on the Bennett Dam was in full swing from 1964-1968.  In the sixties, I think what overshadowed the oil and gas around here, was the building of the WAC Bennett Dam. ?see ?cause the oil patch wasn't doing that well.?So people were looking for work. And, a lot of people went up to the dam. (Participant #18) In the early 1970s work began on the second, smaller Peace Canyon Dam. Although it did not provide the same boom as the Bennett Dam, construction began during a slump in the oil and gas sector and therefore, provided much needed jobs in the community.   The hydroelectric development also created new lines of connection and expectation between the region and the rest of the province. The hydroelectric capacity on the Peace River forms a core  93 component of the province?s hydro-based electricity system. Together, these two dams produce approximately 29 percent of BC Hydro?s annual electricity generation (British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, 2009a) and the generating station at the Bennett Dam remains the single largest source of electricity in BC. These material and non-material lines of connection serve as an interface between events in the region and the province as a whole. The existing infrastructure and its actual and perceived value, have also become rationales for further development of a third hydroelectric facility, Site C. Chapter 6 discusses the history of this project and the controversy surrounding it, in detail.   Beginning in the 1950?s the region also began to develop its petroleum and natural gas resources. And, in fact, British Columbia?s oil and gas production comes entirely from the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin (Marshall & Newnham, 2004) which is situated east of the Rocky Mountains, beneath the Peace River Regional District and extending northward to the Yukon border. The pipelines that were built from the region to Vancouver and the US border in 1956 (natural gas) and 1961 (oil) helped develop the industry and provide a market for the emerging industry.   In the decade between 1992 and 2002 oil production increased by 25% and natural gas production increased by 85% (Marshall & Newnham, 2004). The last decade has seen another boom in non-conventional natural gas?this includes significant resource finds in the Montney Basin (south of the Peace River) and the Horn River Basin (near Fort Nelson). In 2007, the province produced 1.5 million m3 of oil and nearly 30 billion m3 of natural gas (British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission, 2008) ranking it as the second largest natural gas producing province in Canada.   Although it is the largest regional district in the province comprising 119 200 km2, or 13 percent of provincial territory, it is home to only 1.5 percent of the population (approximately 60 000 of the province?s 4.4 million people). The Peace River Regional District is governed by a board with representatives from its seven municipalities (mayors or elected officials) and four electoral areas (elected directly by residents living outside of municipalities). Fort St. John and Dawson Creek, the cities used as case studies in this research, are the two largest municipalities in the region. In addition to their official population, both cities also act as service centres for significant numbers of rural residents that live outside of their municipal boundary?thus effectively expanding the reach and responsibility of each of the two municipalities.      94 5.2.1 Fort St. John The city of Fort St. John has been deeply affected by energy policy in British Columbia. Its identity as the oil and gas capital of the province, or the Energetic City as it calls itself, began in 1957. Until then, the early oil and gas industry was based out of Dawson Creek, the largest community in the region. However, in 1957 the bridge over the Peace River, on the Alaska Highway, collapsed. The impending difficulty of moving people and equipment between Dawson Creek and the primary drilling sites on the north side of the river prompted the industry to move to Fort St. John. This forever changed the character of the community.   Originally a frontier town, the community had seen a number of population booms, first with the arrival of the fur trade and then as a klondike town at the turn of the 20th century.  The economy although technically balanced, with relatively equal activity in oil and gas, agriculture, and forestry, has become aligned with the boom-bust cycle that characterizes the oil and gas industry. Hydroelectric development on the Peace River has also contributed to the economy, at times smoothing out the peaks and troughs, at times exacerbating them.    This is reflected in population statistics. Between 1976 and 1981, the population grew over 35 percent to a total of 13, 891. This was followed by a devastating economic bust that saw the population of the community decline dramatically. By 1986, the population had begun to recover and, at 13 355 permanent residents, was nearly back up to its 1981 level. With more long-term oil and gas production (versus exploration) in the region, the population of permanent residents grew steadily to 20 408 residents in 2011.  The history of energy development in the region including the cyclical economics and the transient nature of the work has also deeply impacted the culture of the community. This is partly described as a continuation of the frontier mentality, with the oil and gas industry at its helm. As one longtime resident put it, ?[o]il and gas drives almost everything around here? (Participant #8). It has also led to deep divisions in the community that are evident in energy development controversies such as the proposed Site C Hydroelectric Project. The dynamics at work in the city, particularly those surrounding the proposed Site C Hydroelectric Project, make for an interesting study because they illustrate both the impacts of provincial energy and climate policy and the evolving response to it in a resource-based town. As Chapter 6 will discuss in detail, this project in conjunction with commitments to reducing carbon emissions illustrate the complexity of renewable energy debates especially when they involve megaprojects like the existing and proposed hydroelectric developments  95 on the Peace River. It also highlights the ways that renewable energy development is inevitably situated in specific places and histories. Finally, it describes the transformative potential of participatory politics including the possibility that public debates about individual projects contribute to broader system critique and change.  5.2.2 Dawson Creek Located south of the Peace River, the City of Dawson Creek has a very different history from its neighbour, Fort St. John. The community experienced a large increase in population in 1942 with the building of the Alaska Highway and, after its completion, Dawson Creek became a transportation hub. The collapse of the Alaska Highway Bridge in 1957 resulted in the community being insulated from the boom-bust cycle and the transiency that has historically characterized Fort St. John. In addition, being further from the hydroelectric developments on the Peace River, Dawson Creek was also less directly impacted by the construction of the WAC Bennett and Peace Canyon Dams and by the controversy surrounding Site C. Thus, until recently, the community has not as directly experienced the impacts of provincial energy policy.   Instead, Dawson Creek has historically been a stable farming community. By the mid-century, the population had reached nearly 11 000 people where it remained, with little fluctuation through to 2006. The community began changing in the mid-1990s with the introduction of first a forestry industry and then the rapid expansion of the natural gas industry in the immediate vicinity of Dawson Creek. The new industrial development has brought considerable resources to the region and raised the average household income of the community above the provincial average. It also resulted in a small increase in population with 12 257 residents recorded in the 2011 census.   As the case study in Chapter 7 will discuss, development in the immediate vicinity of the community has increased the imperative for sustainability planning as well as contributing resources to local energy and sustainability initiatives.  As a case study, Dawson Creek is interesting for its success and leadership in municipal energy and sustainability planning. The community also hosts the first industrial scale wind development in the province?a project that was initiated by a locally-based cooperative, Peace Energy Cooperative. Together these activities illustrate the emergence of a new social world, based on a collective interpretation of sustainability, and the development of boundary objects. It provides an example of the potential for communities to effectively engage in energy planning and to develop situated alternatives that both resonate with the local population and complement provincial priorities.  96 5.2.3 Case study rationale Case studies may be chosen for either their intrinsic or instrumental value (Stake, 2000). Communities in Peace River Regional District offer both. Although located in a relatively remote region of the province and representing a small portion of the province?s population, the district is at the centre of the province?s energy sector. It produces approximately one quarter of the province?s electricity and, if built, the proposed dam at Site C would increase this to over a third. In addition, it is at the core of the province?s oil and gas sector. In combination with these historical energy activities, its communities are responding to provincial climate policy and, in different ways, are attempting to orient themselves toward sustainability. How energy-related commitments and challenges are negotiated at the local level in the Peace River Regional District and the degree to which this incorporates participatory processes is, in itself, an interesting study.    At the same time, being at the nexus of competing energy possibilities makes the district a useful case from which to explore the issues that the province as a whole faces. More specifically the future and relative share of energy sources given the provincial climate policy, the opportunities for public input and engagement in energy policy-making, and the balancing of local and regional interests against provincial policy-making are all being negotiated in tangible ways in the district. Because the region is so central to energy production in the province, the specifics of how they are negotiated within the region and the policies, technological configurations, and rationalities that emerge carry potential ramifications for the entire province.   Within the district, the separate case studies of Dawson Creek and Fort St. John offer examples of how even within a region, communities and populations are differently impacted by provincial energy policy and develop divergent responses and alternatives. The two communities were chosen to represent both different issues and different responses that arise from energy development. Amidst an oil and gas regime, each community is facing the development of renewable energy. In the case of Fort St. John, this is the continuation of the historical development of large hydroelectricity whereas in Dawson Creek, renewable energy development is in the relatively novel form of industrial scale wind development and small scale solar and biomass installations. At the same time, both communities, as signatories to the BC Climate Action Charter, are working towards carbon neutrality in their corporate operations. Dawson Creek is an established provincial leader in this regard while Fort St. John is just beginning down the path of municipal energy planning.     97 As the case studies will demonstrate, the layers of cultural, economic, and infrastructural history are highly significant in the responses and alternatives that are developed in a given community. Thus direct comparison is not the purpose. Instead the point of two case studies is to learn from the experience from each and to evaluate what their divergent experience can tell us about energy policy and planning in the province, the transition to renewable energy production, the potential for and implications of participatory planning, and the broader goal of creating more sustainable communities. Taken together, they demonstrate the potential and, arguably, the need for integrating local initiatives and values into provincial energy planning.    5.3 Methodology and methods In Chapter 2, I introduced the social worlds framework as a means to examine sociotechnical change. Originating in the symbolic interactionist tradition, this relational framework provides the analytic tools necessary to interpret action that affects the arena as whole, action specific to a single social world, and action emerging in the interaction of social worlds and shared infrastructure. It is also compatible with an STS approach that considers the construction of knowledge and technological networks and, unlike other network approaches, such as Actor Network Theory, its ?ecological? approach leaves space to consider the perspective of non-dominant or silent actors (Clarke, 2005; Star & Griesemer, 1989).   Recent proponents of social worlds theory suggest its use as a ?theory-methods package? since the theory-building approach presupposes detailed, empirical research based on the methodology of grounded theory (Clarke & Star, 2008). Grounded theory is a highly inductive approach (often but not necessarily associated with qualitative research) that aims to develop theory from close and detailed analysis of empirical data. It advocates a flexible and evolving research design where data collection, analysis, and theory building all occur simultaneously (Clarke, 2005; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). As concepts and theories are constructed, theoretical sampling (i.e. deliberate data collection) is used to test and further elaborate the emerging concepts. The relatively flexible approach used in this study was designed to make use of these techniques.   This research is divided into two major components: a discourse analysis of provincial energy policy and case study research. The former, including a discussion of methodology and methods, is included in Chapter 4, while the discussion that follows below, discusses the methods and analysis used in the case study research.    98 5.3.1 Methods The case studies presented in Chapters 6 and 7, based on Fort St. John and Dawson Creek respectively, are based primarily on qualitative interviews and supplemented by reviews of policy documents, grey literature, websites, and news articles, as appropriate.   The majority of data collection occurred during three field visits in 2009 and 2010. My initial visit to the Peace River Region was in April 2009. This trip was one month in duration with two weeks spent in each of the two communities. The second and third field visits in July 2009 and January 2010 were each two weeks in duration, again with the time split evenly between each of the two communities.   In each community, I conducted interviews with two groups: a selection of officials and staff in municipal government and with community members engaged in energy-related advocacy. For the first group, I explicitly sought interviews with the mayor of each community and with three (of six) of the city councilors based on recommendations (from other councilors or staff) of who would be most able to speak to energy issues and initiatives in the community. If appropriate, I also attempted to represent a range of views on city council. I also sought out key staff members engaged in energy management or sustainability planning and in both case studies conducted interviews with the city manager. These staff and officials were approached directly and asked to participate in the study in their professional/official capacity.   The second group of interview participants comprised community members who were engaged in energy-related issues. This group of participants was found working initially from key contacts and then using a snowball sampling method. Potential participants were found by forwarding my contact information and research summary through a mutual acquaintance or by sending a request through the organization rather than approaching individuals. On several occasions, my request for interviews was forwarded via email listservs. At least one representative from each identified organization was sought although in some cases, such as the Peace Energy Cooperative, multiple members holding different positions in the organization were interviewed. With the exception of people serving in paid positions (such as the Executive Director of Peace Energy Cooperative) participants were interviewed from their personal experience rather than as representatives of their organization. All participants were given the option of remaining anonymous and/or reviewing and altering the transcript of their interview.    99 During my final field visit I met informally with key sources. Although I did not interview them a second time, I discussed the state of issues identified previously and asked for updates or opinions on emerging issues. Notes from these meetings are recorded as field notes. In addition, on my final visit, I asked several contacts if there were additional people or organizations I should contact. That nearly all suggestions had been contacted for an interview, served to verify the completeness of my sample.   Two participants that were unavailable for an interview during my field visits were interviewed via telephone. A list of interviews identifying affiliation only is included in Appendix A.   I used semi-structured interviews approaching the process as ??a conversation that has a structure and a purpose? (Kvale & Brinkman, 2009, p. 3). Before beginning the interviews, an interview template was drawn up outlining key questions although this was, before each interview, tailored to the participant. Typically, all interviews began by asking participants to identify the top energy issues in their community and ended by asking, what a sustainable energy system would look like to them. Using a methodology based on grounded theory, the introductory question was particularly important in my initial interviews in each community as I learned the relevant and/or pressing issues from the local perspective. The responses were then used to tailor my investigation. For instance, initially the Site C Hydroelectric Project was a known issue of concern however through my interviews, particularly in Fort St. John but also in Dawson Creek, it quickly became apparent that the project was central to energy planning and advocacy in the region and it needed to take a central role in my analysis. Similarly, participants regularly discussed the oil and gas industry for a number of reasons. Although I chose to limit the scope of my research to renewable energy and municipal energy management, it became obvious that this is necessarily set against the backdrop of oil and gas production in the region. Thus, I began asking explicitly about interactions (e.g. partnerships or landowner negotiations) with the industry.   In addition to interviews, I also collected municipal policy documents, materials meant for public consumption (e.g. press releases, position papers, cartoons, documentaries), project and consultation documents, websites and news commentary. This data was used in a complementary fashion and was not systematically analyzed.       100 5.3.2 Analysis Situational analysis is an approach to grounded theory developed by Adele Clarke, a student of Anselm Strauss. Clarke has taken Strauss?s grounded theory ?around the postmodern turn? (Clarke, 2005) by incorporating Foucauldian post-structuralism, explicitly including material and non-human actors, and insisting on a situated, reflexive analysis. This approach insists that rather than investigating action within a context (or processes within structures), ?the situation of inquiry itself broadly conceived is the key unit of analysis? (Clarke, 2005, p. xxxv). This is a way of downplaying and minimizing predefined categories in the analysis and of opening it up to unexpected or silent actors. Clarke has developed a method of analytical mapping to help researchers understand and analyze what is happening within a situation, who and what are shaping discourses or social worlds, and how elements and actors are positioned in relation to each other. This approach is particularly suited to my research sites since the analytic boundaries (of British Columbia, the Peace River Regional District, and the municipalities of Dawson Creek and Fort St. John) are complex and fluid with actors, policies, technologies and negotiations traveling across and within these boundaries.   I used situational maps early in my fieldwork to identify elements (e.g. actors, controversies, technologies, policies, processes) within my analysis and to identify major themes that emerged. As with the exploratory questions used in the interviews, this was used to tailor further investigation including developing my interview lists and collecting relevant documents.    The second point of analysis was to develop timelines for key processes and projects. This included detailed timelines for provincial energy and climate policy, the Site C project, the Bear Mountain Wind project, and for each municipality. This drew heavily on project and municipal documents and websites with interview data being used only to direct my searches or fill gaps.   The interviews were transcribed, cleaned, and coded using the data analysis software Atlas Ti. Since coding took place late in the analysis, an initial code list was developed from the literature and from themes that emerged in preliminary analysis. This was modified in the coding process to introduce new codes, merge codes that were redundant, or eliminate codes that were not used. Appendix B contains the final list of codes.   Throughout the analysis, including reading documents, reviewing transcripts, and coding, descriptive and analytic memos were used to identify emerging themes and concepts (Clarke, 2005; Maxwell,  101 2005; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Memos were kept as word documents or as internal memos in Atlas Ti  5.3.3 Missing voices and limitations This research was designed to specifically include a perspective that is often missing from provincial energy policy discussions?that of municipalities and local advocacy groups. However, in making this a manageable project, the focus on local actors came at the expense of including more detailed data collection and analysis at the provincial level. This has made the research somewhat asymmetrical and constrained my ability to speak about the interactions and activities occurring at the provincial level. This decision was influenced by the fact that my data collection was taking place as the provincial climate and clean energy policies were unfolding and with the knowledge that frank or reflective interview data may be difficult to obtain while the policies under question were still emerging. This prompted my use of discursive analysis of policy documents to capture the emphasis and trajectory of the provincial clean energy agenda. Although I believe this to be the best option given the unfolding policy dynamics and my own research schedule, I am limited in my ability to symmetrically analyze provincial and local dynamics.     The effect of politics on the research process became quite obvious in my attempts to collect information on the Site C Hydroelectric Project. While many participants were very open to discussing their position on the project, I was unable to negotiate access to two key groups.   First was the BC Hydro Site C Consultation Office. Although this research received funding from BC Hydro, my attempts to interview members of the consultation team were unsuccessful. I began by introducing myself and my research to the Fort St. John Site Consultation Office and requesting an interview at the working level. This interview was initially scheduled under the condition that more senior members of the project team be present. In addition a list of my questions was requested in advance. Although I complied with these requests, the interview was subsequently rescheduled with multiple project team members in Vancouver and eventually the interview was cancelled. In lieu of an interview, I did make contact with the Site C office and was able to get a staff member to verify factual information.   Second, I was unable to gain access to Indigenous groups affected by the Site C project. My research plan treated the Treaty 8 Tribal Association similarly to the other local governments involved in the project. I approached the Association and requested interviews with both staff members and  102 representatives from affiliated bands. My requests for interviews were turned down. I was not given an explicit reason, but in one instance it was clear that the fact that I was receiving funding from BC Hydro was an issue for the participant in question. This was complicated by the fact that individual bands were in the midst of Stage 2 Consultation with BC Hydro and were, as communities, actively developing positions on the project as well as negotiating as an Association to ensure that Indigenous rights were respected throughout the project. On my last two field visits, I again made contact with the Association and suggested alternative formats whereby I, as researcher, would have minimal control over the content and participants as individuals or as groups would have final editorial power on the data in the form of notes or summaries. These alternative formats were not accepted. I was presented with the opportunity to pursue individual interviews with community members but this fell beyond the scope of my research ethics approval and my own sense of ethics in pursing Indigenous participants for this research. In the end, I chose to explicitly omit the Indigenous perspectives from this research rather than attempting to represent them with what I felt was inadequate consent. In Chapter 6 I do make some use of public documents to describe, in a general way, the positions of the Treaty 8 Tribal Association. However, this is far from an adequately nuanced representation of the concerns or positions of the communities in question.   Both of these exclusions speak to the degree of conflict, caution, and outright mistrust that have developed in regards to the Site C project. I am comfortable with my choice of how to approach these organizations and when to back away. However they remain missing pieces in the story that follows, particularly in Chapter 6.    103 Chapter  6: ?We?ve been down that dam road before??: Fort St. John and the Site C Hydroelectric Project The city of Fort St. John has been deeply affected by energy policy in British Columbia. This is true in a historical sense but, arguably, it is also the community in British Columbia that is most profoundly impacted by recent provincial energy and climate policy. The city itself is at the center of the provincial oil and gas industry and the surrounding area has a dense network of extractive infrastructure both for conventional oil and gas production and, more recently, shale gas and coalbed methane production. At the same time, the two large hydroelectric impoundments on the Peace River have altered the socio-cultural and physical landscape and further change is threatened if the Site C25 Hydroelectric project (herein referred to as Site C) proceeds as planned. Finally, like most communities in the province, the municipality is working to achieve its commitment to carbon neutrality under the Climate Action Charter and thus, more than ever before, is becoming engaged in energy planning and policy.  This chapter focuses on the latter two issues, the proposed Site C project and the City of Fort St John?s initial steps into municipal energy planning activities. It explores the extent to which Site C project review and public engagement have facilitated change in the energy policy arena. The analysis draws on the concept of hybrid forums as dialogical spaces that help identify and account for overflows and thus enable the reframing of energy problems in the province. Outcomes of hybrid forums include of new knowledge and/or new collective identities as shared worlds are collectively explored and negotiated.   The concept also provides a framework for evaluating participatory forums based on the intensity, openness and quality of the debates as well as on the procedural criteria of access, transparency, and the clarity of rules (Callon et al., 2009). These criteria are used to evaluate and compare two events in the history of the Site C project: the public hearings in 1981-1982 and the public consultation in 2008. The 1981-1982 hearings served as a hybrid forum through the ?staged intersection? of social worlds with the result being significant change to the provincial policy arena. The 2008 public consultation has not been as effective. The analysis reveals structural issues with both public engagement processes and highlights the importance of the institutional context in enacting meaningful                                                       25 In the mid-20th century the Peace River was mapped for potential hydroelectric sites. These were named generically as Sites A, B, C, etc. and Sites 1, 2, etc.. Upon completion, hydroelectric impoundments and generating stations are each given formal names.   104 engagement and transformative change. In addition, it identifies three other factors relating to British Columbia?s ?hydroelectric legacy? (the sturdiness of large hydroelectricity, the difference in perspective between policy-makers and local actors, and the history of antagonism) that have all played a role in public response to the project and how public engagement has unfolded. Finally, it describes tentative steps on the part of the City of Fort St. John and BC Hydro to pursue an alternative, collaborative path.   6.1 The Energetic City Fort St. John?s identity as the oil and gas capital of the province, or the Energetic City as it calls itself, began in 1957. Until then, the early oil and gas industry was based out of Dawson Creek, the largest community in the region. However, in 1957 the bridge over the Peace River, on the Alaska Highway, collapsed. The impending difficulty of moving people and equipment between Dawson Creek and the primary drilling sites on the north side of the river prompted the industry to move to Fort St. John.   While the Alaska Highway had, since its completion in 1942, provided access to the wilderness and resources in the northeast corner of the province, the oil and gas industry ??changed the face of it? (Participant #18). As a frontier town, the community had seen population booms, first with the arrival of the fur trade and then as a klondike town at the turn of the 20th century. Through the years however, it had also developed a small, stable agricultural community many of whose members homesteaded along the fertile banks of the Peace River. The oil and gas industry brought volatility in the form a new population of short-term and seasonal workers comprised mainly of young, single men. Since the drilling season was in the winter, it also sourced labour from the local farming community who could work during the freeze-up and farm throughout the remainder of the year. Although technically a balanced economy, with fairly equal activity in oil and gas, agriculture, and forestry, the nature of the work meant that many farming households drew income from work in the oil fields?the most volatile of the three industries.   In time, the local economy became aligned with the boom-bust cycle that characterized the industry?with the most striking cycle occurring from the late 1970s until the mid-1980s. Between 1976 and 1981, the population grew over 35 percent to a total of 13 891. The city was also being overbuilt in anticipation of two major energy developments that were to be constructed in the vicinity: the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline and the Site C Hydroelectric project (Pollon & Matheson, 1989). Following the boom was a devastating economic bust that saw the population of the community decline dramatically. ?One of our worst time periods that I can remember around here was the early  105 eighties, from about '82 to '86. This town was literally a ghost town. There were the people here that had to be here but everybody else was gone? (Participant #18).  By 1986, the population had begun to recover and, at 13 355 permanent residents, was nearly back to its 1981 level. With more long-term oil and gas production (versus exploration) in the region, the population of permanent residents grew steadily to 20 408 in 2011.  The history of energy development in the region including the cyclical economics and the transient nature of the work has deeply impacted the culture of the community. This is partly described as a continuation of the frontier mentality, with the oil and gas industry at its helm. As one longtime resident put it, ?[o]il and gas drives almost everything around here? (Participant #8).  This has helped create a culture that is described as both beholden to the industry and based on quick economic gain.  And there's interesting cycles in the psychology too because?when the oil and gas industry.?left this community high and dry?that made people absolutely paranoid and insanely frightened of the oil and gas industry and its ability to jerk the legs out from under the community. Or in fact, elect all the politicians. And that happens. The industry does buy the politicians here, with the odd exception. (Participant #7) In a pragmatic sense, the transient population has made it difficult to attract long-term residents and foster a commitment to the community.  Fort St. John has historically been the oil and gas industry right? It's a whole different mentality. The oil has been in the ground for ten million years but it's got to come out tomorrow?And [it is] more transient?so, in some ways, less commitment to the community often. But the people that have committed to the community have done very well. (Participant #12) And many of the long-term residents, regardless of what brought them to the region, are deeply devoted to the place, particularly the ecological and outdoor recreational qualities of the region. Recounting her first encounter with the region in the late 1970s, one resident described the draw of the landscape,  ?when I first came to Fort St. John?I said this is not my kind of town and then I saw the Peace River Valley and I thought I'm a lifer here. And this Valley, this region is something, it really gets into your blood?(Participant #6)  106 The different priorities of these populations has contributed to divisions in the community. In the past, these have come to a head over controversial issues such as the Site C project, that offer jobs and economic development in exchange for the loss of beloved landscapes and landowner autonomy.   To a large extent, the story that follows is the story of the people who have ?committed to the community? because they are the ones involved in local politics and advocacy. But it is also the story of the community as a whole that is showing signs of being in a transition. As one participant put it, ??I think some of the rough edges in Fort St. John are also changing.?So we're starting to create that other part of the community that makes people think  ?I could live here, stay here, want to be here because it's not only a good living but it's also a good life?? (Participant #12). This is a transition that is necessarily rooted in past and current energy developments but that also shows signs of fostering a new form of energy politics.  6.2 Creating a hybrid forum: The original Site C proposal From 1964 to 1980 two major hydroelectric facilities were built on the Peace River.  The WAC Bennett Dam and the Peace Canyon Dam transformed the landscape and the communities in the region. New knowledge of the river and of the social and political forces at work resulted from technical studies and from firsthand experience with project construction and management (Loo, 2007; Pollon & Matheson, 1989). Yet, this was far from what could be called a hybrid forum. The projects were planned and built by the provincial utility, BC Hydro, with little or no public debate. It was not until a third hydroelectric dam was proposed in the mid 1970s26 that overflows were identified and publicly debated.    There was definitely no opposition against the WAC Bennett dam because in those days, you just did what you were told. Site 1 [Peace Canyon], pretty much the same thing. When Site C came along in the mid-seventies, people were understanding a little more what dams actually do, to the environment,?to the landscape and everything else (Participant #18). At the time, growing awareness of the environmental impacts of hydroelectricity and new expectations regarding public input into decision-making, coupled with questions regarding the expansion and financial integrity of provincial power utilities were creating concern about the BC energy planning regime (Smith, 1988). On the Columbia River, the 1976 application to build the Revelstoke Dam had created considerable public opposition but the regulatory process was not                                                       26 Early discussions with landowners began in 1975. (British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, 1991)  107 designed for either comprehensive project review or extensive public input. ?This initial flourish of public opposition to B.C. Hydro's expansion plans was unsuccessful but stimulated increased public awareness of electric power planning in the province." (Smith, 1988, p. 432).  To address the increasingly recognized overflows from electricity development and the related public discontent, in 1980 the provincial government passed the Utilities Commission Act (R.S.B.C 1996, c. 473) creating the British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC). The BCUC was given a mandate to review major energy projects and to regulate public utilities and the petroleum industry in the province. The intent of the regulation was threefold: to regulate BC Hydro, to regulate the environmental impacts of energy projects, and to remove Cabinet from direct involvement in decision-making while retaining Cabinet authority over the process (Smith, 1988).   As a result of the new regulatory regime, BC Hydro was required to apply for an energy project certificate for all new developments. The application for the Site C Hydroelectric Dam was submitted on 29 September 1980 only two weeks after the Utilities Commission Act came into effect. The application was for the construction of a 900 MW hydroelectric generating station and associated transmission facilities at Site C on the Peace River. The proposed facility would be 93km downstream from the Peace Canyon Dam and 7 km southwest of Fort St. John. Like the Peace Canyon Dam, Site C could make use of the energy potential stored upstream in the Williston Reservoir, and therefore have a reservoir that was considerably smaller than Williston. Yet, Site C would still create a reservoir 85 km long and flood approximately 5340 hectares (with 6000 ha affected) between the communities of Fort St. John and Hudson?s Hope (British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, 2007).  It would also require transmission lines to the Peace Canyon Dam and an upgrade of the existing transmission lines from Williston Reservoir to Kelly Lake.   Under Section 2 of the Utilities Commission Act, the application was referred to the newly created BCUC and in April 1981 a special panel of the BCUC was appointed to review the application. The panel interpreted its terms of reference as directing it ??to assess the Site C project, not from the viewpoint of any particular entity, person or group of persons but from the viewpoint of the province as a whole? (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1983, p. 43) with attention paid to the provincial government?s priorities as stated in the 1980 Energy Plan.    In addition to a number of pre-hearing meetings to discuss the format of the hearing process, the Commission planned both formal hearings and less formal community hearings. Formal hearings  108 began on Nov 24, 1981 in Fort St. John and ended in Vancouver on Nov 2, 1982. The community hearings provided an opportunity for residents of the region to participate in a less structured setting that did not involve cross-examination. There were six community meetings held in the region. In addition, at the request of the Treaty 8 Tribal Association, special meetings were held with the Saulteau, West Moberly, Blueberry, Doig, and Halfway River bands (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1983, p. 47).  In total there were 116 days of formal hearings where 80 individual or panels of witnesses were heard. The hearings involved presentation and cross-examination of evidence. The professional testimony of BC Hydro staff was heard along with the testimony of consultants, supporting both the proponents and the opponents of the project, and officials representing various provincial ministries. Interveners included local residents, municipalities, The Treaty 8 Tribal Association representing affected First Nations Bands, and advocacy organizations such as the newly formed Peace Valley Environment Association and the Society Promoting Environmental Conservation. To encourage access to the process, registered interveners could apply to have their costs covered by the Commission (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1983, p. 45).   To avoid duplication, the Commission hired its own consultants to produce reports on each major phase of the hearing for distribution to all parties. In addition to the reports and maps prepared by BC Hydro and its consultants, the panel reviewed various artifacts submitted by other interested parties and individuals including: maps, copies of correspondence between landowners and BC Hydro staff, a partial transcript for a film chronicling First Nations in the region, and even four vials of soil from the Peace Valley.27    The key issues raised at the hearing were to the overall need for the project, its place in the system plan, and its long-term impact. During the project justification stage, three basic questions were addressed:  i) Does society in British Columbia value the benefits of further hydroelectric or other electrical energy by an amount at least as great as its total social cost? ii) When will new electricity supply be required or be of benefit to the Province, in light of future demand relative to supply? iii) Is Site C the appropriate source of supply to meet new power requirements from a broad provincial perspective? (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1983, p. 49)                                                       27 In total 442 exhibits were catalogued. See the British Columbia Utilities Commissions Resource Library http://www.bcuc.com/SearchLibrary.aspx for a complete list.  109 Beyond evaluating the project justification, the Commission focused on assessing and determining adequate compensation for the social and environmental impacts of the project. Considerable care was taken to assess the impacts of the project with the Commission relying on new quantitative assessment techniques (such as willingness-to-pay assessments) that were just beginning to be utilized in the province. At the same time, the Commission viewed its mandate as pertaining only to the public compensation, with private losses and compensation to individual landowners lying outside of its purview.  Nevertheless a range of issues were voiced, and despite its official mandate which informed its overall decision process, the Commission heard and commented on a range of issues.   In the project justification phase of the hearings, considerable attention was paid to BC Hydro?s load forecasting techniques, its approach to conservation, and the extent to which it considered alternatives to the Site C project. The Commission also reviewed the technical design of the project. Based largely on the experience with the Williston Reservoir, interveners expressed concerns about how the reservoir would be cleared before flooding and the amount of debris that would collect on the surface. It was also known that Williston had exceeded its preliminary flood lines and that a major landslide within the boundaries of the proposed Site C reservoir had occurred within the past decade. This caused concern about the boundaries and bank stability of the new reservoir and how this related to such things as the proposed relocation of the highway. However, particularly in the community hearings, the Commission noted that many speakers? were only able to make general comments on these technical matters?the implication being that concerns not framed in technical terms were given less weight in deliberation. In its final report, the Commission ruled that the design of the project was sound.   Following the review of the project justification and technical design, the Commission turned its attention to the environmental and social impacts of the project including the impact on Indigenous communities. The environmental impacts reviewed included the effect on fisheries, wildlife, forestry, recreation, and agriculture. Of these,  [t]he uniqueness of the land in Site C for agricultural production was discussed at length. It was pointed out that the alluvial soils are ideal for vegetable production and that the Site C valley is warmer, has a longer growing season, less wind, more productive soils and access to water year-round. (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1983, p. 168).  The social impacts discussed included the loss of heritage sites along the river valley and the impact on communities of Fort St. John and Hudson?s Hope. In particular the impacts on infrastructure and  110 social services as well as the direct impact of the reservoir on the land and tax-base of Hudson?s Hope were discussed. The extent of local hiring and the exacerbation of the boom-bust cycle in the affected communities were also discussed. Again, reference was made to experience with the WAC Bennett and Peace Canyon Dams.   Although not within its mandate, the Commission also heard testimony on the impact of landowners in the valley including the impacts of the flood reserve and BC Hydro?s contentious land acquisition process. ?The Commission heard a good deal of evidence on these impacts, including the loss of homes and enforced changes in lifestyle, and believes that such disruptions constitute the most significant direct social impact of the project? (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1983, p. 238). However, despite the sympathetic statement and the acknowledgement that such losses cannot be mitigated, it recommended that such matters be dealt with via individual negotiations with BC Hydro and, ultimately, ruled the project was in the overall public interest.   The Commission also reviewed the impact on indigenous communities. At the formal hearings, the Treaty 8 Tribal Association argued against the project for three reasons: the survival of the Indigenous subsistence economy in light of Site C and the cumulative impacts of all development projects; the protection afforded First Nations by Treaty 8; and proposed mitigation and compensation for the project (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1983, p. 241). At the special meetings with First Nations Bands, community members felt that Site C was a threat to ??their way of life and livelihood. The perception of this threat resulted in unanimous opposition by native speakers to the Site C project? (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1983, p. 275). Like the other social and environmental impacts raised in the hearings, these concerns were largely rooted in previous experience with development projects in the region and particularly with the distribution of impacts and benefits from the previous two hydroelectric projects.  The Halfway Reserve, which has no electricity, expressed wonder that Hydro could build huge towers and transmission lines to supply the Lower Mainland and the U.S. yet could not provide a nearby reserve (which is bearing a large proportion of the project?s adverse impacts) with power (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1983, p. 277). Although ruling that the cumulative impacts of development and the substance of Treaty 8 were out of its jurisdiction, the Commission recommended that the potentially significant impacts on Indigenous communities be subject to the proposed monitoring program.    111 In addition to the arguments for and against the project itself, there was also discussion of the adequacy of the knowledge presented with BC Hydro being scrutinized, at times by other government ministries, and ultimately evaluated by the Commission. The critique of knowledge and of the assessment processes employed were also, in some instances, extended to the hearings themselves. For instance, in regard to the assessment of lost forestry resources, ?Mr. Rutledge [a resident of the valley] also pointed out that the values of forest land for wildlife, recreation, fuel, and as a climate modifier have not been accounted for in any of the estimates? (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1983, p. 177). Although noted by the Commission in its final report, in the main, the Commission did not attempt to assess values, such as these, that were not readily quantifiable.    On 3 May 1983 the panel issued its recommendation stating that, ?The evidence does not demonstrate that construction must or should start immediately or that Site C is the only or best feasible source of supply?in the system plan? (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1983, p. 10). This ruling was based on both the lack of demonstrated need for the electricity as well as on the inadequate evaluation of alternative projects and resources. Following the recommendation, the provincial cabinet rejected the application for the energy project certificate.  Although the Commission did rule that the project was in the overall public interest and suggested reevaluating the project in one year, the ruling effectively delayed Site C for decades. The project was revisited six years later, in 1989, but despite another round of public consultation, it was not pursued (British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, 1991). Although the flood reserve remained on the Peace Valley, shaping land-use practices, and the project remained as an option for the public utility, it was not seriously considered again for another decade and a half.    The public hearing model has a number of limitations including its expert-oriented, adversarial format that limits the accessibility of the process and the potential for two-way dialogue (Innes & Booher, 2004). In addition, although a number of individual residents and local organizations participated in the hearings, the type of knowledge brought to the processes appears to have not always been acceptable or credible to the Commission in part because of its non-technical or qualitative nature.   Despite these limitations however, hybrid forums can emerge from public inquiries (Callon et al., 2009). This is indeed the case for the Site C hearings that served as a kind of hybrid forum, providing a gathering place for heterogeneous actors and allowing implicated actors to speak for themselves. The core questions asked in project justification fundamentally questioned the project rationale and  112 participants were offered the opportunity to publicly respond, on the record, to these concerns before an independent body. Although the extent to which non-technical and qualitative knowledge was integrated is questionable, the hearings served as a much-needed outlet for identifying stakeholders and for collective identifying overflows related to the project and to electricity planning in the province.   Thus, the hearings served as a forum to investigate new collective worlds?specifically an energy arena where alternatives to large-scale hydroelectricity were evaluated, the potential for energy conservation was taken seriously, and the provincial public utility?s planning practices and project rationale were independently and publicly scrutinized. The hearings also experimented with the composition of the collective allowing for the identification of stakeholders and giving them the opportunity to participate in the provincial energy planning processes in a way that had not previously been possible. Callon et al. offer six criteria for evaluating hybrid forums, each ranked as strong/high or weak. Table 6.1 below evaluates the hearings based on these criteria.      113 Table 6.1 Evaluation of the 1981-1982 Site C Hearings (from Callon et al. 2009) Evaluation Criteria (of dialogism of procedures) 1981-1982 Site C Hearings Intensity 1. Earliness of involvement of     laypersons 2. Intensity of concern for the collective 1. Public engagement from the formal start of the process; no input into the mandate of the review process (medium) 2. Not explicitly part of the hearings but hearings test a new configuration of the collective (strong) Openness 1. Diversity of groups consulted and the degree of their independence vis-?-vis established groups 2. Control of representativity (degree to which groups can change their identities and expectations in the process) 1. Diversity of participating groups is high (strong) 2. Little room for changing positions and identities during the hearings (weak)  Quality 1.Seriousness of voice 2.Continuity of voice 1. At formal hearings (strong); at community meetings (weak) 2. Process occurred over a defined period and ended with the BCUC?s ruling (weak) Implementation Criteria  Equality of access to debates Interveners in the formal hearings, including individuals, could apply for funding based on need and potential contribution. Hearings were still expert-oriented and not, in practical terms, open to all interested stakeholders (medium) Transparency and traceability of debates Transcripts made publicly available; reasoning of the BCUC outlined in their final ruling (high) Clarity of rules organizing debates Rules, mandate, and procedures clear (high)   As the table illustrates, this was far from an ideal dialogical processes. It was weak on a number of criteria primarily related to the chosen format of a public hearing and the bias towards quantitative and expert knowledge. However, the ultimate impacts of this hybrid forum were significant. Even though the hearings themselves did not have the mandate to evaluate energy planning writ large in the province, it became a key concern at the hearings. Arguably, the identified overflows expanded the scope of the hearings beyond the question of Site C and turned the forum into system hearings (Smith 1988). In a regulatory sense, it tested the Utilities Commission Act as a coordinating mechanism and, to a certain extent, led to the reassertion of political oversight in energy planning in the province (Smith, 1988). Institutionally, it contributed to the reconfiguration of BC Hydro playing a role in its transition from a supply development organization to an electricity management organization (Kellow, 1996; Smith, 1988). The fate of Site C also marked the end of the large hydroelectric build-out in the province.   114  In testing the new regulation, the hearings also experimented with participatory politics in a way not previously undertaken in the provincial energy arena. They demonstrated on all fronts the potential impact of broad stakeholder engagement in energy planning and management and the opportunities it affords to question policy and to reframe the prevailing trajectory. This resulted in a reassertion of political influence in provincial energy planning as well as a scaling back of future public inquiries held by the BCUC (Smith, 1988).  The hearings were also a learning opportunity for opponents of the project. Specifically, they created a contingent of local residents who familiarized themselves with energy planning, with effective forms of intervention, and developed a shared discourse and rationally based on opposition to the project. Prior to the hearings, the Peace Valley Environment Association (PVEA) formed as a locus for local opposition to the project. As one landowner put it,  ??when your house is about to be, or could potentially be flooded, it focuses your attention?.and I guess after that I just started keeping on top of it?  (Participant #5). This meant not only studying provincial energy policy but also keeping informed of international politics and trends, and remaining involved in local and provincial organizations. Thus, emerging from this hybrid forum, was a new social world grounded in opposition to the project. This world drew on the experiential knowledge of the people who have lived in the region and could offer firsthand experience with such things as the movement of wildlife, the cultural effect of boom-bust cycles, the local particularities of climatic conditions, and the individual and collective impacts of previous energy developments. In addition, through members? affiliations and training, this social world gained fluency in provincial, national, and international energy politics. However the explicit connections between this social world and the provincial policy arena were a product of the public inquiry and remained only in an ad hoc sense.  Thus, prompted by new regulatory coordination via the Utilities Commission Act and the BCUC, this hybrid forum had a considerable impact on the provincial energy arena and the socio-cultural and physical landscape of the Peace Valley.   6.3 Avoiding a hybrid forum: The current Site C proposal In 2005 BC Hydro again initiated investigation on the Site C Hydroelectric Project by undertaking a high level review of existing data and reports to determine if the project remained a viable electricity option for the province. In 2007, as part of its new clean energy agenda the BC government instructed BC Hydro to ??enter into initial discussions with First Nations, the Province of Alberta and  115 communities?to ensure that communications regarding the potential project and the processes being followed [were] well known.?(Ministry of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources, 2007b, p. 4).  Thus began the third incarnation of the project.28  As in previous decades, there is considerable opposition to the project and much of the rationale against it remains the same. However the changes to the energy policy arena have also created new concerns. For instance, while the loss of agricultural land and the effect on wildlife remain central issues, there is also suspicion that, in an attempt to reduced carbon emissions, the power from Site C will be used to electrify the region?s rapidly expanding oil and gas sector.29   In addition, new actors, discourses and regulation had changed the dynamics of energy policymaking. Some regulatory, institutional and infrastructural features in the energy arena related directly to the original Site C hearings. Others (discussed in Chapter 3) reflected the evolving discourses and philosophies of the provincial governments. Significantly, since the last large hydroelectric facility came on line in the mid-1980s, most new supply in the province has come from private power producers and, due to the economics of large-hydroelectricity this has not included any new impoundments.   However with the introduction of the clean energy agenda, and its focus on electricity supply and export, large-hydroelectricity is once again in the foreground of energy policy. The clean energy agenda (discussed in detail in Chapter 4) positions the existing supply of large hydroelectricity as the backbone of provincial clean electricity with new supply from Site C rationalized as both a source of electricity and support for intermittent renewables (Office of the Premier, 2010). Thus the $7.9 billion Site C project is promoted as a large block of firm, clean, and, over its lifetime, inexpensive energy.30 The project literature cites a domestic need for the energy?an anticipated electricity gap?although this was in part constructed by the decision to phase out the Burrard Thermal Plant and the new policy requiring electricity self-sufficiency by 2016. The project is also rationalized in part due to the                                                       28 The second time the project was investigated was in 1989.  29 This suspicion has since been confirmed with ?clean electricity? being recruited to support the expansion of natural gas, and specifically liquid natural gas processing, in the province ( as outlined in Ministry of Energy Mines and Natural Gas, 2012).   30 New design specifications for Site C were published in spring 2011. The technical specifications were updated and the capacity increased from 900 MW to 1100 MW. The cost estimate was also increased from $6 billion to $7.9 billion. I have provided here the updated information although during the consultation process all available information including cost estimates were based on the original 900MW design.   116 existing infrastructure, including the long-distance transmission lines and the potential energy stored upstream in the Williston Reservoir. ?As the third project on one river system, Site C would gain significant efficiencies by taking advantage of water already stored in the Williston Reservoir. This means that Site C would generate approximately 35 percent of the energy produced at the W.A.C. Bennett Dam with five per cent of the reservoir area? (British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, 2012, p. 4).  The intervening years also witnessed the evolution of public consultation in environmental decision-making. Although, in Canada, there remains considerable discretion in the implementation of the existing environmental regulation (VanNijnatten, 1999), formal consultation processes have become an expected component of assessing energy development. Therefore, unlike the original proposal, a structured, five-stage development process was established for the project. Stage 1, Review and Project Feasibility, was completed in 2007 with Stage 2, Consultation and Technical Review, beginning in late 2007 and completed in 2009.  Following these two stages, are Stage 3, Environmental and Regulatory Review, Stage 4, Detailed Design and Procurement, and Stage 5, Construction.31   Stage 2 consultation included three phases: pre-consultation (December 4, 2007 to February 15, 2008); Round 1 (May 1, 2008 to June 30, 2008); and Round 2 (October 1, 2008 to December 3, 2008). The consultations included stakeholder meetings and public open houses. Participants were able to submit structured feedback forms or unstructured comments via mail, fax, telephone, or electronically. One community consultation office was opened in Fort St. John for the duration of the consultation and, at the request of participants, a second office opened in Hudson?s Hope for Round 2. Counting all of these formats, 687 people were involved in the pre-consultation, 936 in Round 1, and 909 in Round 2 (British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, 2009b, p. 1).   The pre-consultation phase of Stage 2, asked ??British Columbians how they wanted to be consulted about the Site C project, and what topics they would like to discuss during a consultation program for Site C" (British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, 2008, p. 1 emphasis in original). The topics covered and the format of Round 1 and Round 2 were influenced by input received in pre-consultation. For instance based on participant input, Round 1 included a comparison between Site C and other energy options (British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, 2008). Nevertheless, the                                                       31 The fieldwork for this project took place as Stage 2 was nearly completion but before the project had been advanced to Stage 3.  117 consultation literature and feedback were structured around project definition?or the impacts of the project and the mitigation of and/or compensation for such impacts. Although this had much in common with the original Site C hearings, missing from the 2008 consultation was consideration of project justification and evaluation of the project in regards to the overall public interest. The former was addressed in Stage 1 of the project, that involved no stakeholder engagement, and the latter was left to the BCUC review process (that the project was later exempt from in the 2010 Clean Energy Act). Thus the scope of the Stage 2 consultation was significantly narrower than the original hearings.   In the wake of the original Site C hearings, the 2008 consultation process became a focal point of opposition. Although BC Hydro is the project proponent, decision-making authority, including incrementally moving it from one stage to the next, rests with the provincial Cabinet based on recommendations from BC Hydro. However despite the clear line of authority, two fundamental process-related issues remained unarticulated throughout the consultation process: how participant input would feed into BC Hydro?s recommendation to Cabinet and the extent to which the final decision would consider input from the consultation process.32    As a result of the narrow scope of the consultation, many participants in this research felt that the consultation was not addressing the primary issue of whether or not the Site C project should be built and instead focused on insignificant details such as access roads and recreational use for the new reservoir. Participants in the pre-consultation and Round 1 requested more substantive discussion about Site C as an option. As a result, in Round 2 a question was included measuring support for the project. In the Peace River Region, 47 percent indicated support and 47 percent indicated opposition33 (Kirk & Co. Consulting Ltd. and Synovate Ltd., 2009). However gauging public support does not substitute for an open debate of project justification.34                                                        32 Underlying these two questions is the question of who the ultimate project proponent is: although BC Hydro would build the project and is undertaking the consultation and review, the extent to which they are being directed by the provincial government and the extent of their autonomy in determining the review and consultation process remains unclear.  33 This is compared to results for all provincial respondents that indicated 57 percent supporting and 40 percent opposing the project.  34 Opponents also expressed concerns with the wording of the question since it implied more extensive project justification and evaluation of alternatives than they felt had occurred. The question read, ?Site C should be considered if conservation, refitting existing equipment and investments in new sources, including sustainable energy, were not going to be enough to meet the energy demands of consumers and business in B.C.?  118 There was also considerable concern that the consultation was being led by BC Hydro, the project proponent, rather than by an independent body such as the BCUC. Even though energy project consultation is typically led by project proponents, opponents were deeply concerned over the apparent lack of an impartial arbiter.35 When asked what kind of process would be adequate for affected landowners, one landowner responded,  There should be an independent review. And I guess one of the first questions should be do we want the dam in our valley? That's not even raised. One of the first things they bring up in the meetings that we've had is, what's their word for bribery?benefits. What benefits do you want to see from this? (Participant #4)  Because of the decision-making structure there was widespread concern that the decision to go ahead with the project was a political one that had already been made before the consultation began. As a member of Fort St. John city council put it,  My personal view, held long before I got into municipal government and totally unchanged by anything that's happened since, is that Site C is a sell job. The decision to build Site C was made already?.instead of coming forward and making a good strong business case for building this dam which can generate electricity for sale, they hid it with a smoke and mirrors game. (Participant #9) Contributing to participant frustration was the absence of key political representatives at the consultation process?both to hear the concerns of stakeholders and to answer to the political priorities of the provincial government.  So when you have someone standing up pouring their heart out like that, it cannot get transferred onto paper the way it should. So that is why Neufeld, Lekstrom, [provincially elected officials] and the main decision-makers, should be listening?. (Participant #3) These concerns about the format and independence of the process were combined with concerns about the availability and accessibility of knowledge. This in part related to the timing of the consultation that took place before many planned studies were completed or, in some cases, started. And, unlike the original hearings, no studies were Commissioned explicitly to inform the consultation process. Similarly, several people questioned the knowledge of the representatives sent to the consultation and their willingness and/or ability to speak frankly.                                                        35 Concern over project proponents undertaking consultation or of biased assessment on the part of the BC Environmental Assessment Office was not limited to this project. It was for instance also heard in regards to the Bear Mountain Wind Project. However, the fact that the last major review was undertaken by an independent body (the BCUC) also likely contributes to the conviction of these arguments?the implication being that the original hearings were more fairly organized than the current consultation.   119 I watched so many really good, rational people here in this community, well educated people, just come unglued at those meetings because the lack of information?.In the end, I think I really began to think that the team members were, it wasn't that they were na?ve, it was that they were very skilled at stonewalling tactics?.It was insulting. (Participant #6) BC Hydro did respond to these critiques. For instance, in later consultation meetings, a key staff member responsible for electricity system planning was present to respond to the provincial energy planning issues that were being raised.  ...you know they do have some good people on their panels like that [name]?They parachuted him in pretty quick because they realized they needed someone good in there. But it just keeps falling back on the government's policy?.This is the policy of the government has put forward and we have to follow it. (Participant #4) But issues about the overall consultation, including the independence of the process and the scope of the issues consulted on were not revised. In a 26 May 2009 letter to the BC Ombudsman, the Peace Valley Environment Association summarized their concerns with the consultation as follows,  BC Hydro?s management of the public consultation process for Site C has grossly violated basic principles of administrative fairness, objectivity, and transparency. Specifically this complaint notes: inadequate treatment of project justification and acceptability, a lack of critical information, failure to answer written correspondence, inequitable resource allocation, a lack of critical knowledge within the Site C team, and the absence of any intrinsic appeal procedures (p. 6).  Thus concerns regarding the consultation ranged from the overall structure of the process including its linkages to political decision-making to the actual conduct of the consultation meetings and the on-going interaction between project proponents and stakeholders.   BC Hydro?s formal position on the consultation process noted its comprehensiveness and its adherence to internationally accepted best practices (personal communication).   Table 6.2 provides an evaluation of the consultation processes based on Callon et al.?s evaluation criteria.      120 Table 6.2 Evaluation of the 2008 Site Consultation (from Callon et al. 2009) Evaluation Criteria (of dialogism of procedures) 2008 Consultation Intensity 1. Earliness of involvement of     laypersons 2. Intensity of concern for the collective 1. Public consulted on the ?how they would be consulted? but not included in Stage 1 feasibility study (medium) 2. Little concern for reformulating roles and identities; process reinforces the authority of the provincial government (weak) Openness 1. Diversity of groups consulted and the degree of their independence vis-?-vis established groups 2. Control of representativity (degree to which groups can change their identities and expectations in the process) 1. Diversity of participating groups is high (strong) 2. Little room for changing positions and identities during the consultation (weak) Quality 1.Seriousness of voice 2.Continuity of voice 1. Public engagement not transparently linked to decision-making process (weak) 2. Process occurred over a defined period and ended at a predefined time (despite First Nations claims that consultation was not complete) (weak) Implementation Criteria  Equality of access to debates No funding provided for participants; No access to decision-makers via consultation process (weak) Transparency and traceability of debates Summaries not transcripts released to the public; No access to rationale of decision-makers (weak) Clarity of rules organizing debates Consultation procedures clear; overall purpose of the consultation unclear (medium)   Like the original hearings, this is far from an ideal participatory format. Although engaging a diversity of participants and groups, all three evaluative criteria were compromised by the lack of integration with decision-making and the lack of space for exploring alternative options and scenarios. Overall this scores lower than the original hearings primarily because of the weak implementation criteria including the lack of encouragement for participation. Significantly, only some of the weaknesses identified are attributable to the specific design of the consultation. Rather, it was the fact that it was a consultation rather than a public hearing or an independent project review that led to it scoring lower than the original hearings. Thus a number of the problems were related to the larger institutional and political context and how the consultation was integrated with decision-making.  As consultation goes, it may have met international standards of best practice but still it failed to address the issues that mattered most to local stakeholders and to adequately or transparently link public input to project decision-making.   121  Nevertheless, it was the only official process for residents to voice their opinions. Frustrated with the process, opponents sought out alternative forums to debate the project. In an attempt to get answers to questions that were not addressed or answered in the consultation meetings, some residents wrote to BC Hydro and to their elected representatives posing questions regarding project justification and the rationale behind provincial energy planning. A number of websites and blogs were developed and at least two documentary films made. Local advocates appeared on provincial and national radio and television programs and wrote newspaper editorials to spread the rationale against the project beyond the region. Although the First Nations communities in the region were involved in a separate consultation process, the Peace Valley Environment Association was invited into a number of communities to present their views and share information. In addition, they sought and gained the support of a number of provincial environmental groups.   Table 6.3 lists the various attempts to engage and advance the Site C debate that were undertaken by participants in this research.    122  Table 6.3 Engagement activities undertaken by research participants Engagement Activity Serving as representatives on boards (e.g. BC Hydro, PVEA) Membership in advocacy organizations Participating in Site C consultation Participating in BC Hydro Integrated Energy Planning consultation Rallies and demonstrations Commissioning documentary films Maintaining blogs & websites Writing letters to the editor or full-length articles in newspapers Building alliances and partnerships with other organizations Presentations to local, regional, and First Nations governments Radio and television interviews Sending detailed questions and alternative proposals to BC Hydro Sharing and publicizing responses to questions and correspondence Contacting elected representatives Movie nights & coffeehouses Petitions Appealing to the provincial Ombudsman   With the exception of the formal consultation process, these forms of engagement represent attempts to expand the public debate, both in content and in geographical range, and to fill the perceived gaps in the official public engagement on the project.   Despite a distinct, parallel consultation process, the argument of an inadequate process without sufficient knowledge to support informed discussion also extended to a number of First Nation bands in the region. The Treaty 8 Tribal Association, representing some (but not all) affected Indigenous communities officially expressed concerns about the consultation process and the Stage 2 Consultation Agreement they entered into with BC Hydro. In an appendix to the BC Hydro Stage 2 Summary Report, the Association asserted that their Stage 2 consultation had not been completed and the government could not make a fair and informed decision to go ahead with Stage 3 until it had been (Treaty 8 Tribal Association, 2009).   123  Nevertheless, on 19 April 2010 the BC premier flew to the community of Hudson?s Hope to announce that the government had reviewed the findings from Stages 1 and 2 and had decided to proceed with Stage 3, Environmental and Regulatory Review.  A press release responding to the announcement further reiterated the concerns of impacted First Nations stating that,  The Council of Treaty 8 Chiefs are outraged with British Columbia's decision to give BC Hydro the green light to move forward to the Stage 3 regulatory phase of the Site C hydroelectric dam project?.The Treaty 8 First Nations are very concerned with the integrity of the regulatory processes and whether they can meaningfully address the undeniable impacts of the project on our Treaty rights. (Council of Treaty 8 Chiefs, 2010)  Shortly after, in June 2010, the provincial government passed the Clean Energy Act (S.B.C. 2010, c. 22). The Act officially stated the government?s intent to export ?clean and renewable? electricity and, by way of legislating requirements for electricity self-sufficiency plus ?insurance? energy and limiting the use of the Burrard Thermal Plant, created a domestic need for the block of electricity that Site C would provide. More significantly, the Act circumscribed the role of the BCUC, transferring planning oversight to the provincial cabinet and, in the case of Site C, removing the requirement for regulatory review under sections 45-47 and 71 of the Utilities Commission Act. This exempts the project from the regulatory requirement of acquiring a certificate of public convenience and necessity and thus of explicitly and publicly demonstrating that the project is in the overall public interest. In effect the Clean Energy Act further reduced the opportunities for independent scrutiny and public debate regarding Site C, virtually eliminating any possibility of repeating the 1981-1982 public hearings.36   In energy developments, policy contexts are "...important in determining the drivers of, and funding support for, project development; shaping the discourses, legitimation and engagement strategies that are employed and determining the processes and boundaries of decision-making..." (Walker et al., 2010, p. 12). The structure of the Site C public consultation combined with the regulatory                                                       36 Further public consultation will occur during the Environmental Assessment process. However environmental assessment is generally not used to evaluate project justification and it is exceptionally rare for projects to be cancelled as a result. In fact, as of 2011 only one project (of 219 reviewed or in the process of being reviewed under the BC Environmental Assessment Act) has be denied an Environmental Assessment Certificate (Westcoast Environmental Law, 2011)  124 streamlining of the Clean Energy Act suggests that provincial decision-makers were attempting to contain public debate on the project and on its overall policy agenda. This was reflected in the 2008 consultation which lacked an open discussion of project justification and transparent linkages between public consultation and decision-making processes. While in theory a less adversarial format than the original public hearings, the consultation appears to have created conflict and controversy rather than providing means to collectively negotiate. Opponents were frustrated by their inability to meaningfully and transparently influence the decision-making process and, in return, questioned the legitimacy of the consultation process, the project and the project proponents.   Nevertheless, opponents continued to call for and attempted to create alternative forums that, at minimum, might generate the type of public scrutiny and debate that accompanied the project the first time around. To some extent they succeeded, enrolling individuals and organizations as allies and expanding the range and the breadth of their social world. However, their efforts were frustrated by the lack of open, public dialogue regarding the Site C project and its place in the clean energy agenda and by their tenuous links to the provincial policy arena.    6.4 Mediating Site C Local opposition to the Site C project is related to both the design of the engagement process and to the institutional and policy context that has limited the transparency of decision-making and the opportunities for engagement. At the same time, opposition to the project has also been mediated by the hydroelectric legacy that includes technological characteristics of large hydroelectricity, the perspective from which the project was viewed, and a long history of antagonism..   6.4.1 Large hydroelectricity Part of the opposition to Site C included objections to the technology itself as an unsustainable or outdated technology. For instance, one participant argued that building large hydroelectric impoundments is, ??not a 21st-century model at all? (Participant #23). There were also issues with the technology in the Peace Valley. Concerns about bank stability and loss of unique landscapes reflected the position that large hydroelectricity was inappropriate in this specific place.   More fundamentally however, the physical characteristics of the technology, as it is developed in British Columbia, have contributed to opposition and conflict. Specifically, the issue is the inherent difficulty in scaling down, modifying, or reframing the technology. It would be overly deterministic to suggest that the technology of large hydroelectric power generation caused the conflict. However  125 the sturdiness37 of the technology and the way that it has historically been developed in the province (i.e. the hydroelectric legacy) have limited the opportunities for local input or a negotiated compromise. Thus the values embedded within Site C, and the hydroelectric legacy are, in a sense, non-negotiable. Moreover, the sturdiness of the hydroelectric legacy has been reinforced by the Clean Energy Act that both streamlines this project and prohibits other large hydroelectric development in the province. As a result Site C has become the only possible way to advance the hydroelectric legacy.   The lack of flexibility and fluidity in the technology supports for-or-against, or antagonistic, positioning since negotiating or reframing the project is not an option. When viewed this way the limitations of the engagement processes, both current and historical, are better contextualized. As a mediator between social worlds, this infrastructure at the boundary has influenced interactions between worlds and the possibilities for boundary negotiation. More specifically, the antagonistic characteristics of large hydroelectricity are reflected in, and reproduced via, the public engagement process.  6.4.2 The siting perspective Compounding the issues with the consultation process and the sturdiness of the hydroelectric legacy is a difference in vantage between proponents and opponents that also forms part of the hydroelectric legacy. Patrick Devine-Wright argues that, in regard to energy development, the ?siting perspective? emphasizes the objective features and tends to play down the subjective features of a place (Devine-Wright, 2010). In the controversy over Site C, provincial policy and local actors illustrate different ways of reasoning for or against the project.  At the provincial level, Site C is rationalized based on its contribution to provincial clean energy objectives, including the type and amount of power it would produce; its logical place in relation to existing infrastructure; the domestic need for additional power; and the legacy of inexpensive, reliable hydroelectricity built in the 1960s and 1970s. Even its name?Site C?is objective, utilitarian, and sequential, limiting the associations to the Peace River and to the environmental and social impacts that the project would have. Thus, from a provincial perspective, Site C becomes a rational, logical addition to the hydroelectric legacy.   However, the hydroelectric legacy looks different from the Peace Valley. Historically the benefits of economic development have been projected to the local level by way of local employment and                                                       37 As opposed to fluidity (de Laet & Mol, 2000)  126 economic development created by provincial energy development projects. And, in the past, this has been enough to garner considerable local support, including municipal support, for energy development. However, the layers of history and experience have, and continue to be, brought to bear on the Site C controversy and the view from the valley although acknowledging the provincial hydroelectric legacy, reveals additional overflows.   Opponents of the project repeatedly point to the multiple uses and values of the undammed valley that, they argue, should be weighed against any proposed development. These include the high potential for agriculture, the heritage sites scattered along the valley, the ecological and wildlife habit values present in the valley, as well as the recreational and intrinsic values of the river itself. The problem is that these overflows are experienced locally and not provincially, and, in any case, they are difficult to quantify and abstract. As Leo Rutledge argued in the original Site C hearings ??the intrinsic values of the Peace Valley cannot be broken down into individual resource components and cannot be assigned monetary values? (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1983, p. 264). Yet they do form the basis of the rationale against the project. In contrast to the provincial legacy narrative that rationally positions hydroelectricity as a public good and the Peace River as already part of the provincial energy system, the view from the valley requires weighing the value of an undammed river against the value of a dammed river. This form of rationality is a defining feature of the social world opposed to the project.  Furthermore,  engagement strategies based on [the siting] perspective have a limited range of issues brought forward and tend to play down or ignore emotional and symbolic associations; it also promotes a hierarchical, expert-driven approach in which local publics have limited expertise and therefore limited ability to contribute to the issues on the table. (Devine-Wright, 2010, p. 60). The impact of the siting perspective is evident in the analysis of the original hearings, where non-quantifiable, non-technical knowledge and private impacts (to for instance landowners) were omitted from the decision process. Although a range of overflows were identified in the hearings, only those that could be quantitatively measured and were assessed to be affecting the provincial public interest were accounted for. The siting perspective also explains some of the frustration over the 2008 consultation process specifically the feeling that the consultation failed to capture and represent the concerns of local actors. Again, locally perceived overflows, and thus local actors and their knowledges, were marginalized in the official consultation process.    127  6.4.3 A history of antagonism  The engagement processes, both historical and current, the technology of large hydroelectricity, and the siting perspective have all limited boundary negotiation. Added to this is a history of antagonism that has shaped expectations of local actors.    Even before Site C was on the table, the history of hydroelectric development on the Peace River had created hard feelings for many residents particularly if they had friends or family who were directly impacted by previous developments.  Part of this was also the handling of compensation, the treatment of displaced people, and the inconsistent record of promises regarding local employment and economic development (Pollon & Matheson, 1989). ?the way the compensation was handled around the Bennett dam was really poor. It was typical of [BC] Hydro at the time and it happened not only here but also in the Columbia system. It left a sour taste in a lot of people's mouths. And a number of people that are dealing with Site C have some history related either through families or local knowledge. (Participant #11) This sentiment was particularly acute in Indigenous communities that were impacted by hydroelectric development. During the original Site C hearings, Indigenous speakers raised concerns about the legacy of the previous two dams.  Some speakers expressed resentment over their treatment by Hydro during construction of the Site One [Peace Canyon] and Bennett dams. The natives had signed ?Treaty 8? with the Federal government which they believed provided them hunting and trapping rights and ownership of the land in perpetuity, yet their land was confiscated without compensation by the provincial government?They claimed that Hydro had not kept its promise to hire native labour for the construction of the Site One and Bennett dams. (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1983, p. 276)  The Site C proposal became an additional layer to this history that had already fostered mistrust and opposition. As one resident summarized, ??Hydro's track record, on what they say and what they do, is not that great? (Participant #4). These sentiments were supported with examples such as BC Hydro?s highly contentious process of land acquisition for Site C, that although decades past, is still known in the community. In the original Site C hearings, ?Hydro frankly acknowledged that the system employed at Site C was not a success and created unnecessary apprehension in the community? (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1983, p. 240). Speaking about the flood reserve and the politics of opposition, one landowner described the situation as follows,  128 ?it has haunted the Valley since it's been put on there and everybody's just getting so bitter about the whole thing that the old-timers are getting fed up with the fight. They're not fighting it now like they were because they're just tired of the same old stuff?. (Participant #3) Thus, early interactions regarding Site C added to the conflict and mistrust, created by previous hydroelectric development. This no doubt influenced the fact that affected landowners became some of the most vocal opponents to the project.    Because the project has not changed substantially and many of the original opponents or their families remain in the valley, the social history of Site C remains as an undercurrent to current opposition.  And if you talk to people who were really involved in the battle in the Valley, you can go back and look at their testimony. And you may as well scratch off the word [19]80 and put now. It's still the same arguments. Not all, but a lot of it is. Some of the people have moved on or they're just tired. Some are still fighting. (Participant #4) Emphasizing this point, in 2010, two residents of the Peace Valley mused that between the two of them, they had 70 years of experience fighting Site C.38 For local opponents, all the reasons not to build the dam remain basically the same as they were in 1980. Thus, there is the feeling of having ??been down that dam road before?? (Participant #18).   While BC Hydro is a significantly different institution than it was in the 1960s and 1970s?and the provincial energy arena is itself a different network?the public utility is still the face of the project in the valley. While the cohort of provincial actors, including current staff at BC Hydro do not share the past history of Site C, this history remains linked to them via the accumulated experience of residents of the Peace Valley.  This has shaped the expectations of local stakeholders, their reception of Site C, and their understanding and involvement in the consultation.   The "? linkage between expectations and engagement activities is not one-off but iterative and accumulative? (Walker et al., 2010, p. 8). In the case of Site C, three decades of antagonistic interaction has influenced expectations of local actors?with a lack of continuity and consistency at the provincial level feeding into their frustration.                                                         38 This discussion occurred on 21 May 2010 on the national radio program, The Current aired by Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.  129 Susan Leigh Star has argued that infrastructure must be built on an installed base (Star, 1999). In this case of Site C, the installed infrastructural base is the rather sturdy hydroelectric legacy, a province-wide vantage that supports the siting perspective, and a history of antagonism. For a framing to succeed, it must be connected to the world yet these connections are also the site of overflows (Callon, 1998). This analysis illustrates how the installed base upon which Site C is necessarily built (as a project as well as a proposal under investigation) is also a source of controversy. Located at the boundary of social worlds and acting as a mediator between worlds, it has shaped the local response to the project and the dynamics of public engagement.  More specifically, it has introduced overflows that further extend the gap between project proponents and opponents.   6.5 Opposition and alternatives in the Energetic City The Site C project has been divisive issue in the community of Fort St. John. From the outset, in the 1970s some residents were clearly opposed to the project. Local opponents formed the Peace Valley Environment Association (PVEA), and were in favour of the hearings, participating both as members of PVEA and as individuals. As one founding member of the PVEA put it,  First it was rumoured that they were going to build Site C, and then [BC] Hydro started having their little softening-up meetings. We said, ?Hold it, there?s got to be a forum.? So the first thing we went after, some of us, was a hearing. (quoted in Pollon & Matheson, 1989, p. 310) This was granted in the form of the BCUC hearings however it did not sit well with many residents who were anxious for the promised employment and economic development. In the community of Fort St. John, the protest over Site C hit at a bad time. The hearings fell right as the local boom economy was going bust and for many, they seemed to be an unnecessary delay in a project that would help remedy the situation. Considering the recent boom, some residents just wanted work, some new residents wanted a reason to stay and some were explicitly biding their time between the completion of the Peace Canyon dam and the beginning of the Site C dam.  Thus a ?Stop the hearings, start the dam? campaign formed in support of Site C. An April 22, 1982 news release from BC Hydro summarized a large public meeting in Fort St. John  ?more than 500 people enthusiastically voiced support for the proposed Site C hydroelectric project. Two people who tried to speak against the project at the pro-dam rally were drowned out by boos. Posters and bumper-stickers were distributed proclaiming ?Stop the Hearing, Start the Dam??.Brian Palmer, mayor of Fort St. John, said the province needs power now and will need it in the future (cited in P&M, p318).    130 The City of Fort St. John also served as an intervener in the hearings and  ??generally supported the project subject to adequate compensation for project-induced infrastructure costs? (British Columbia Utilities Commission, 1983, p. 229). The city council was satisfied with BC Hydro?s offer of a $1.1 million dollar upgrade to the municipal water system and an additional $400, 000 to cover administrative costs incurred by the city. However, it did argue that an effort to maximize local benefits should be made and that a monitoring program should be implemented to identify unexpected impacts of the project. The city?s intervention illustrated its reliance on and support for provincially-led energy development initiatives regardless of its own ability to influence them. However, controversy and campaigns both for and against the project had little impact on the BCUC ruling which was based on the provincial public interest rather than the balance of support or opposition within the region.   When consultation was reinitiated the sitting city council took a position not unlike their position in the early 1980s?indicating general support for the project provided the City receive adequate support and compensation. However the municipal elections in the fall of 2008 changed the balance of opinions enough to change the council?s tone and approach to the project.   While some council members openly opposed the project, at least one viewed  ??a Hydro dam?as being a source of sustainable, green energy? (Participant #17). But even this support was qualified with concern regarding the impact on infrastructure and services and the concern was echoed by other council members regardless of their position on the project. With the council divided on the issue, it opted out of taking an explicit stance on the project and instead chose to advocate for the interests of the city.  First of all, this council has not taken a stand on Site C. And it's not our decision to make but if it does happen, it is going to impact this community big time. (Participant #10)  So I believe that we should argue against Site C for all the reasons that I've just mentioned. That's my personal view. By the same token, you make the argument but if you are going to lose the argument, it makes sense to also be positioning yourself to get the most benefit for your community as you can?.Like I would guess there's probably something close to a 50/50 split on Site C now. Two years ago, I think the survey was done, mind you it was done by Hydro, but anyway, I think it was probably something like 80/20 in favour of Site C, back then. So it's shifting. And I think council will need to revisit it because of that shift. And we have more of our citizens asking for a position. Hudson's Hope has already taken a position publicly against it, as a council. (Participant #9)  131 With momentum changing in the community, the council was feeling pressure to take a stand, presumably in opposition to the project. However, unlike the nearby community of Hudson?s Hope, they opted against taking an official position. A media release following the announcement that the project would proceed to Stage 3 stated the city?s position as follows:  Fort St. John City Council has neither formally supported nor opposed this project, although Council is pleased to hear that the Province has finally made a decision on this project as it has been in discussion for the past 30 years. This decision now allows the City to enter into formal discussion with the Province and BC Hydro about the impacts that the project will have on the community?.This project will have a substantial impact on Fort St. John?. (City of Fort St. John, News Release: Announcement of BC Hydro?s Site C Project. April 20, 2010).  This course of action was a step away from the antagonistic (for/against) politics that had dominated the debate for decades and that previous councils had become party to. Instead, the city leadership chose other avenues to effect change in their city?moving forward with a number of conservation and livability initiatives. The justification for these initiatives and their content was influenced by several factors.   First, public support for environmental or green initiatives had been gauged in two participatory visioning exercises. The 2020 visioning process was initiated in early 2008 to help the city develop a strategic plan. Results of the process found that first among public priorities was managing growth development and infrastructure, second was health in the community, and third was environmental issues. Simultaneously, the city worked with Envision Sustainability Tools to undertake a 40 year participatory vision using the MetroQuest visualization tools. This allowed participants to select planning options and then visualize their impacts with the end result of identifying participants? collective planning priorities. Running in tandem, these two processes helped the city identify ?green? community priorities and to identify where municipal action might be acceptable and effective. It also helped justify the integration of such activities into the municipality?s official community plans.  Second, the city had signed onto the Climate Action Charter and committed to becoming carbon neutral in its operations by 2012 or paying for carbon offsets. This economic incentive was complemented with the more principled concern of suffering the impacts of the Site C project. Specifically, the city manager lobbied to become one of three communities in BC Hydro?s pilot program for developing community energy plans. As the city manager described it,  ?.I was the one who said ?Well, it's you impacting us with the Site C, I think we should be one of the three communities that you pick.? ?because it's a three legged  132 stool that we're talking about with Site C. One is we need additional hydroelectricity, we need conservation, and we need independent power producers. So.?you can work with us and then at the end of the day, if we still need Site C, that's the third leg on your stool, then it will fit in. But you've got to show us what you're doing for us on the other two as well. So, that was an argument that I used. And they were receptive to it. BC Hydro, apart from any agenda they may have, has been very good to work with. They provided monies towards that study, they provided money for an energy manager, fifty percent wages for two years but they're doing that for other communities as well. But I think it's because communities such as Fort St. John were really pushing hard on it because we are being affected? (City Manager). Thus in addition to its on-going corporate energy plan (still in development as of writing), the city undertook the development of a community-wide energy plan to address energy use and emissions in the community at large.   The process began in fall 2009 and the resulting plan was launched in March 2010. It included baseline greenhouse gas emissions and energy usage and established a business-as-usual scenario to the year 2030. From here it established two key targets of a 12 percent reduction in GHG emissions from 2007 levels by 2030 and an 18 percent reduction in electricity use in the same time frame (or 37 percent and 48 percent respectively from the business-as-usual forecasts for 2030). To achieve these targets, five categorical goals were developed, each supported with one or more strategies for achieving the goal. The goals include: creating vibrant, sustainable neighbourhoods through energy efficient planning, design and construction; ensuring alternative forms of transportation are a viable and attractive choice for residents; improving the energy efficiency of buildings in Fort St. John, considering the life cycle impacts of purchasing decisions and working towards becoming a waste free community; and advancing implementation of alternative technologies to ?truly position Fort St. John as ?The Energetic City?? (Sheltair Group, 2010, p. ii).    In contrast to the contentious Site C consultation process, the city?s community energy planning process emphasized public engagement selecting consultants in part because of the comprehensive public engagement process that they proposed (personal communication). In addition to the typical surveys, the process included coffeehouses, movie nights, and forums where non-structured feedback was elicited. Although focused on local energy and emissions reductions, this provided opportunities to tie local action to provincial, national, and international issues.  Well, you can't talk about your community energy emissions plan without talking about Site C?.and?I thought it was really great of the UN to arrange the Copenhagen summit around us, and our community energy plan. (laugh) Cause one rolled smoothly into the other. (laugh) ? so you go from a local level to a global  133 level in one discussion and then back down again. That sense of being really interconnected between decisions in Copenhagen, I mean, I felt them personally. And I think a lot of people did. It was like we were at the table making these decisions?.And our voice, or Canadians, as a whole, their voice was heard. And there was lots of opportunity to do that. (City Manager)  Thus the community energy planning process helped serve as another alternative forum where residents of Fort St. John could become engaged in energy decision-making?linking knowledge and issues in a way that resonated with their priorities. The forum, structured as an open, participatory event, has resulted in experimenting with new initiatives and new roles. In particular the city is exploring its role as a facilitator and leader of energy management and BC Hydro, rather than acting as proponent for large hydroelectricity, is playing a new role in the community acting as a facilitator and partner in municipal action.  In a practical sense, the partnership has directly contributed to this exploration through the development of the community energy plan and by building expertise and capacity within the city via financial support for a dedicated, municipal energy manager.  As noted above, Fort St. John?s community energy plan suggests tentative steps away from an antagonistic form of coordination, with the municipality refusing to be for or against Site C and instead working with BC Hydro to develop alternatives and to foster cooperative community action. The evolving rationality in the community shows an increasing concern for mitigating the boom-bust cycle of provincial energy development and a growing interest in long-term planning within the city, including active involvement in local energy planning and conservation. That the city is no longer satisfied being a ?project affected community? represents a rather significant change for a municipality that has historically been supportive of provincially-led energy development based on its anticipated economic benefits.   There is no clear causal chain for this transition but it certainly has been influenced by provincial policy in the form of the city?s commitment to the Climate Action Charter and by proximity to the proposed Site C including the discourse of the social world opposed to the project. Momentum for the transition has also been bolstered by city?s success in water conservation, which was cited by many city leaders as a sign that the municipality could and, indeed, was undergoing change.   The city?s actions demonstrate an alternative path and the possibility of enacting change in an arena where they continue to have little jurisdiction. Of note, was both the prompt that Site C process  134 provided to these initiatives as well as the ultimate necessity of stepping outside the history of conflict and antagonism surrounding the Site C project in order to move forward on an alternative path.  6.6 Conclusion: The old road and the new Prior to 1980, energy infrastructure in British Columbia was constructed with minimal public participation. The 1980 Utilities Commission Act changed that by creating an independent regulator, the BC Utilities Commission, and giving it a mandate to hold public hearings. The changes to the energy policy arena were first tested on the review of Site C. Despite the format?s limitations, the public hearings in 1981-1982 served as a hybrid forum bringing together multiple social worlds in a ?staged intersection? (Clarke & Star, 2008) that allowed for the identification of stakeholders and of overflows and for the reframing of energy planning in the province. This was a result of integrating the previously unaccounted for potential for demand-side management and alternative energy sources. Resulting changes to the provincial energy arena included institutional and regulatory changes to electricity planning in the province and the effective halt of the hydroelectric build-out. At the local level, not only was the Peace River Valley tentatively spared but a new social world emerged that was grounded in opposition to the project. Thus we see provincially-initiated regulatory change that was encouraged and shaped via the Site C review processes. While it is not possible to parse out the precise contribution of the Site C hearings, arguably in becoming a  ?system hearing? (Smith, 1988) it was the collective forum where the changes initiated by the Utilities Commission Act came to ground and were worked out in practice. Thus it served as a site of collective negotiation and world-building.   The outcome suggests that it is not necessary to have ideal conditions to create a hybrid forum?that an independent, public forum that is transparent and clearly linked to decision-making can suffice as a lever of change. It also illustrates the transformative potential of participatory politics including the potential for broad system critique and long-term sociotechnical change to emerge from the exploration of individual energy projects. The combination of regulatory change followed by an extensive participatory event appears to have been particularly effective in reshaping the energy arena. Finally, the original hearings point to the potential impact of projects that are not built and the change that can result from the delay or cancellation of projects. The implication is that transitioning the energy system is not simply a matter of getting renewable energy projects on the ground but rather getting the ?right? projects on the ground.   135 Despite efforts on the part of advocates, the most recent round of consultation has not provided the same opportunity to identify and account for overflows. Since it has been a recent event, the full range of outcomes from the 2008 consultation may not yet be evident and in time it may prove to have long-term effects on the policy arena. However, this analysis has highlighted issues that make that seem unlikely. When the consultation is evaluated using Callon et al.?s criteria for hybrid forums we find that although the public consultation included a diverse set of actors, the quality and the intensity of debate was limited. This was due both to the structure of the public engagement processes that did not provide opportunities to publicly discuss project justification or the content of the clean energy agenda and to the institutional and political context that limited the transparency of the process and specifically the linkages between public input and decision-making.  Although, like the previous round, the Site C evaluation and consultation coincided with regulatory change initiated by the provincial government, the trajectory of the Clean Energy Act (2010) was quite different from the Utilities Commission Act thirty years before it. As argued in Chapter 4, the content of the Clean Energy Act in effect perpetuated historical development patterns including promoting rather than regulating large hydroelectric development. The regulatory streamlining undertaken via the Clean Energy Act would also suggest that the provincial government was attempting to avoid public debate of Site C and the clean energy agenda of which it was a part. The attempt at containment is reflected in the structure and content of public engagement that also limits the range of issues addressed and masks the decision-making rationale. Thus the political context and the trajectory of regulatory change were important differences between the two rounds of public engagement that help explain both the form of public engagement undertaken and its outcomes.   The hydroelectric legacy also mediated interactions between proponents and opponents?in 1981 and in 2008. One contributing factor is the sturdiness of large hydroelectricity as it has been developed in BC. Specifically, its lack of fluidity contributes to an antagonistic (for-or-against) debate with little opportunity to reframe the technology or its meanings. Another contributing factor is a history of antagonism that has accumulated around hydroelectric development on the Peace River and the proposed Site C project in particular. This has deeply influenced local stakeholders and their expectations of BC Hydro and the public engagement process. Moreover, the continuity of actors in the Peace Valley meant that the 1981-1982 hearings were active in the 2008 consultation influencing how local actors understood the issues and the possibilities and limitations of public engagement. Finally, the legacy of hydroelectricity is viewed much differently from the provincial vantage. Specifically, the rational, ?siting perspective? that abstracts Site C from the Peace Valley and  136 positions it as a block of clean energy in the provincial energy grid limits the integration of local values and the potential contribution of local stakeholders. Taken together, the mediations of the hydroelectric legacy highlights the reality that renewable energy projects are necessarily constructed in a place and on an installed base that makes the project possible but also contributes to overflows. Furthermore, as infrastructure at the boundary of multiple social worlds, this base is critical in how the project is received and to how public engagement unfolds. In this case, a number of characteristics of the hydroelectric legacy contributed to the ongoing antagonism surrounding the project. The fact that the original hearings were transformative despite the hydroelectric legacy suggests that the structure of the consultation and its institutional and regulatory context were critical for creating a transformative participatory process.   This analysis highlights problems with both rounds of public engagement. Neither was an ideal participatory forum by any stretch of the imagination. At the same time, in the early 1980s linking a participatory process with regulatory change in the policy arena added to the momentum of the regulatory change and led to transformation of social worlds, knowledge, and collective understandings of energy development. The implication here is that, if allowed, open participatory processes could help realize the transformative potential embedded in energy policy and regulation.   While supporting the potential for participatory politics, this analysis also describes how local actors and overflows have been continually marginalized in the Site C engagement processes. Neither public engagement processes found adequate ways to account for and integrate local experience, values, or priorities. Furthermore, the ?staged intersection? of worlds that the 1981-1982 public hearing allowed was a temporary event that has not been repeated. Thus, while local social worlds have been altered by the proposed project, they remain as implicated actors with little voice in the energy policy arena. As a result, overflows that are locally experienced also continue to be marginalized in the provincial policy arena. Individuals have gained access to the arena by for instance participating in advisory boards but the collective voice of local advocates remains marginal. The reality that locally identified overflows remain unaccounted for in the framing and rationalization of Site C has fed into conflict and perpetuated the antagonism surrounding the project.    Although evidently still built on the installed base that is Site C and the hydroelectric legacy, the path being pursued by the municipality and BC Hydro offers an alternative way forward. Callon et al. argue that ??if no compromise can be found, the return to research may bring to light new options and result in new proposals? (p. 147). Municipal energy planning in Fort St. John is, in a sense, a  137 return to first principles in regards to energy planning where multiple options are up for debate and roles remain negotiable. Furthermore, it is premised on early and on-going public participation. As such, it offers an example of how a localized, participatory form of energy planning might unfold and how the history of top-down, antagonistic energy planning might be altered.   138 Chapter  7: Creating Sustainable Dawson Creek The City of Dawson Creek is located 73km from Fort St. John, south of the Peace River. Despite its proximity to Fort St. John, the story in Dawson Creek is quite different than its neighbour?s?largely due to a different experience with energy development. Historically, a stable farming community and the administrative centre of the region, Dawson Creek did not experienced the boom-bust cycles, the ?boot-camp mentality? or the transiency that have typified Fort. St. John.  Only recently, with the development of unconventional gas in the Montney Basin, has the community been significantly impacted by oil and gas activity. And, significantly, this development has been matched by a concerted effort to develop renewable energy and foster a culture of sustainability in the community. Specifically, the actions of the local government and of the Peace Energy Cooperative have led to the creation of the first industrial scale wind facility in the province and put Dawson Creek on the map as a leader in municipal sustainability. As such, this is a story about grassroots innovation and local intervention in energy planning and management.    The argument presented below is that the combination of community energy initiatives constitute a long-standing hybrid forum. Unlike the staged intersection of worlds discussed in Chapter 6, the forum in Dawson Creek has provided multiple, informal opportunities for engagement over a sustained period of time. This has provided the citizens of Dawson Creek an accessible, public space to negotiate shared meanings and collectively explore new energy futures for the community. Out of this forum has emerged a new social world, Sustainable Dawson Creek, that is based on a locally-grounded understanding of sustainability.   Examining the formation of Sustainable Dawson Creek illustrates two sites of negotiation, within the emergent social world and between Sustainable Dawson Creek and other social worlds in the arena. Negotiation within the community has led to the ?translation? (Callon, 1986) of knowledge and technology such that it is situated within the local context. This has been critical to the development of Sustainable Dawson Creek. Negotiation with actors from other social worlds has also been critical in bringing expertise and resources to community energy initiatives and ensuring that both Sustainable Dawson Creek and the initiatives that emerge from it are relevant and legitimate in the provincial policy arena. Boundary objects have both emerged from and enabled such cooperative action. Although not a perfect model, the case of Sustainable Dawson Creek illustrates the transformative potential of local energy planning and how it can contribute to envisioning and enacting cultures of sustainability in the form of new social worlds.     139  7.1 Old Dawson Creek The City of Dawson Creek has historically been a stable farming community. Chosen as the starting point (mile zero) of the Alaska Highway and serving as a base for construction crews, the community experienced a large increase in population in 1942. With the completion of the highway, the city became a transportation hub. Although at the time, it was the largest city in the region, the collapse of the Alaska Highway Bridge in 1957 resulted in the early oil and gas industry relocating to Fort St. John?a move that saved the community from the boom-bust cycle that has impacted its neighbour. By 1961, the community had reached nearly 11 000 people where it remained, with little fluctuation through to 2006.39  As one participant who grew up in Dawson Creek but now lives in Fort St. John described it,  Dawson Creek has been mainly an agriculturally based community, there isn't the transient nature, people are there for the long-term. So there's a different level of commitment or a different type of commitment to the community than in Fort St. John. (Participant #16) The history of the community and particularly its connection to farming is also linked to a self-described ?redneck? or frontier culture that includes both a desire for self-sufficiency and independence as well as a strong connection to the land. As described by long-term residents, ?I think in our region, it actually comes from that ruggedly independent either Northern or... often quite right wing, I think there's a very strong right wing, but also just that independent core of living in the North. (Participant #21) There's also that sort of pioneer ethic up here, where people want to be independent. They want to generate their own power. They want to be off the grid and unplug and have their own photovoltaic array and their own wind generator. Because they don't want to have to pay the bills to the big corporations. They'll say up yours, we'll generate our own electricity and we'll grow our own food.( Participant #23) As these quotes describe, the connection between the local culture and independent energy production is evident.  ?energy is something that we're keenly aware of, it's literally in our faces, both the positive and negative. We are also in a somewhat isolated part of the province. Up until not that many years ago we were just kind of left on our own here. So people developed a keen understanding of sustainability principles, leaving something for the next year. You know I think that the connection between that and agriculturally-based community, energy and self-sufficiency go well together. People understand                                                       39 The 2011 census registered 12 257 residents, a modest increase in population likely due to the increased resource activity in the area.   140 that, you know they can just look at their lagoon and sort of know how they're going to be that year. (Participant #29)   The knowledge of the land and desire for self-sufficiency have played a role in the development of a new social world in Dawson Creek?what some participants in this research referred to as ?New Dawson Creek? or ?Sustainable Dawson Creek?. Similarly, the changes that have taken place in the community over the last several decades have also influenced change in the community. Located in the resource rich Peace River Region, the community has more recently witnessed the development of non-agricultural industries. In the mid 1990s, an aspen-based forestry industry developed. More significantly however, the increasing production of unconventional natural gas (shale gas) in the Montney Basin, surrounding the city, contributed to a natural resource boom at the turn of the millennium.  We had previously been a transportation hub because the highways cross here, and a farming community. And not an industrial community in any way, shape or form. And so our institutions were informed that way and our persons of influence were informed that way; they saw the world in those terms. And it was a difficult transition for the whole community to make, to the new model of economic vibrancy, transient populations? (Participant #32) The new model had significant impacts on the community. First, it has increased the revenue of the community with average household income jumping from below the provincial average in 1995 to above average in 2005. Since the industrial activity is not within municipal boundaries, the revenue does not directly flow through to the municipality. However, the increased household income, the expansion of complementary industries, and the development of partnerships have all contributed to the municipality?s resources.   Less desirable were the changes to the local landscape and culture. Specifically, the agricultural and recreational values of the landscape were threatened by the density of gas extraction and the related impacts such as increased traffic and flaring at well sites. This has created conflict with landowners over related health and lifestyle issues. A resident in the nearby community of Tomslake described the changes to the landscape as follows, And so I've seen our nice, little farmland mature into oil rigs and pipelines and compressor stations and flaring and traffic beyond control. When I first moved out there, if you saw a vehicle, you'd think ?Oh, someone actually lives out here?? And now, as the years have gone by and you think, we have 350 vehicles an hour on that road. And it doesn't matter what time of the day or night. (Participant #37)  141 This conflict escalated when several natural gas facilities, belonging to Encana, were bombed in six individual incidents from October 2008 to July 2009. Following the bombing, threatening letters were sent to a local paper demanding that the extractive activities cease. The official response was an aggressive policing campaign that included investigators from the Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSET), the Canadian anti-terrorism response unit (250 News, 2008).The impact on the community at large has been significant with locals reporting increased surveillance and intrusions on their privacy. As a result, there has also been a growing reluctance to voice concern over gas extraction for fear of falling under suspicion.   The police response has been rationalized by appealing to public safety and particularly the health and safety risks of a gas leak or explosion?although none of the bombs resulted in injuries or significant leaks. Participants in this research contrasted the aggressiveness of this response with industry and government response to the health and safety concerns of everyday operations in the natural gas industry.40   Like the previous chapter, this one focuses on municipal energy initiatives and a single large-scale renewable energy project, Bear Mountain Wind Park. Although it does not delve into the politics of fossil fuel extraction, energy development activities in the region are deeply interconnected and any discussion of renewable energy or municipal sustainability planning must be situated within the larger context, particularly the on-going industrialization of the rural landscape, the lack of public outlets for influencing this change, and the conflict and tension that have resulted. In the case of Dawson Creek, the conflict that has arisen over natural gas extraction is both a starting point and a counterpoint to the development of the social world, Sustainable Dawson Creek. It has provided the resources and the imperative for developing a more cooperative and sustainable energy future.                                                          40 One example that was widely discussed during my fieldwork was a pipeline failure that occurred on November 22, 2009. An Encana pipeline ruptured sending out a cloud of sour gas (H2S) 12km south of Dawson Creek, near the village of Pouce Coupe. The pipeline?s emergency shut-off valve failed and it was several hours before Encana responded and stopped the leak. In the absence of outside emergency response, eighteen residents evacuated themselves and reported the incident to RCMP. A subsequent report by the provincial Oil and Gas Commission found that Encana was at fault for the leak and that the company did not follow their own emergency protocols. Requests for a public inquiry into the incident were refused although in 2011, the Premier agreed to investigate the health effects of oil and gas development near residences. (West Coast Environmental Law, March 28, 2011)   142 7.2 Revising municipal governance According to the city manager, in the mid-1990s, citizens were requesting that the city council take a more active role in the management of the community. Early concerns revolved around economic development, the industrialization of the landscape from forestry, oil and gas, and mining, and, given the lack of options to keep young people in the community, cultural sustainability. There was also a contingent of local residents who were advocating for environmental conservation and the promotion of renewable energy.  All of those elements, classic four pillars of sustainability[including cultural sustainability], were not things that council got out of a visit from a consultant or watching a program on TV; they were being pushed by the citizens, saying ?We've seen this go wrong elsewhere. We saw it go wrong up the road. We want you to do something about this. (City Manager) At first, the economic and environmental sustainability agendas were distinct and the latter was not always understood or well received. Recounting a presentation on wind energy one of the founding members of the Peace Energy Cooperative described the reception at city hall.  I remember making a presentation to city Council saying, ?City Council, Mayor, listen, this is coming. We need to think about this as a city. We need to position ourselves as a renewable energy center. We need to think about how we can shift our whole persona as a community. Because it's going to happen??. It was received with blank stares and incomprehension. I remember [title] after my first presentation to Council coming up to me afterwards and going, you know?this is never going to happen here. This is ranching, and oil, and gas....but wind, it's not going happen here?.They just didn't understand. They didn't see wind as a resource. (Participant #23) While as a whole, city hall and city council were not yet interested in renewable energy, there was in fact some empathy on city council, as one councilor described it, ?We had had one, or at most two councilors along the way who are thinking about sustainability and social consciousness and those community things but there was no tipping the scales of balance?? (City Councilor). However, the arrival of the gas industry served as a catalyst bringing both a number of problems, such as the need to expand  infrastructure and policing, and money to address those problems. As a result, the council elected in 2002 began responding to the issues that the citizens had been bringing forward.   One of the initial steps in the transition was to consider how city council functioned including its responsibilities and jurisdiction. In addition, a handful of councilors made a point of learning more about what their role in municipal governance could be.    143 Because if you're running on what your staff knows or what three or four old councilors know, it's not like you're meaning to cheat or be disrespectful or whatever, that's just the way it runs. And then you find out that no, that's not the way it runs...?And the new councilors come on, no one tells them how things are done, you just sit there trying to figure it out.?we've learned that you need to have, within four weeks of the new council being in place, a strategic planning session. First?sessions about how local government runs and what the roles and responsibilities are. A proper and written physical orientation to the physical plant, to the employees, and how that place is run. And a briefing on the major projects that your corporation is dealing with. And then a strategic plan based on all of that with the new council?.And so I brought that in as a motion, three years ago I guess. And I said I want that in place before the next election?because you know I had a set of keys thrown on my counter and you know to this day, I don't know what those keys are for, no one bothered to tell me. (City Councilor) This led to a number of changes being made to city governance including orientation for newly elected members of council to build governing competencies and replacement of the portfolio system with meetings of the whole so that all councilors were briefed on all the major issues. The council and city administrator also began addressing the issue of capacity within the city and began strategically hiring individuals that were ?imaginative and flexible? (Participant #21) enough to help the city transform the way it did business. These strategic hires eventually proved vital to proposing new approaches and initiatives and to finding funds to enact further study.  The result was a growing cohort of city staff and councilors interested in sustainability as well as a governance structure that was slowly evolving to enact new forms of planning. Specific changes were also made to the substance of planning for the municipality such as development of a social plan and the council motion that all sustainability planning needed to be oriented around social and cultural goals as well as environmental and economic sustainability?what the city called ?Planning for People?. In 2003 an extensive visioning process undertaken by the city helped inform the council?s strategic planning and also contributed to the city?s four pillar approach to planning that included economic, environmental, social, and cultural sustainability.   In 2005, towards the end of the council?s three-year mandate, a community energy planning process was undertaken to develop a baseline and options for the municipal operations. Contracted out to the Pembina Institute, a national non-profit organization, the initial study was largely justified by the nearly $1 million the city paid annually for energy. The baseline report, completed in August 2005, made seven recommendations including undertaking a retrofit study of municipal buildings, installing solar hot-water units on city hall, and right-sizing the municipal vehicle fleet to minimize energy use in transportation. The Director of Corporate Planning and Sustainable Development estimated that the  144 recommendations in the report were all acted on within eighteen months of the report being tabled. As a result of these actions the city enacted infrastructural changes, such as installation of solar hot-water heaters and LED traffic lights, and realized financial savings of reducing energy expenditures. Less tangibly, it also increased its own knowledge of its operations, the energy management expertise at the city, and the overall momentum in the community.    The initial actions to address energy management were quickly followed by two major events in the municipality. The first was the 2005 election that resulted in Calvin Kruk being elected mayor. A councilor since 1999, Kruk had been an energetic member of city council advocating on behalf of environmental sustainability and the arts community. With his election as mayor, the then emerging vision for Sustainable Dawson Creek quickly gained momentum and in a few short years, the city became well-known provincially as a leader in sustainable development. For instance, for its early efforts to increase the solar capacity in the community, Dawson Creek was asked to co-chair the ?10,000 Solar Roofs? initiative, a province-wide campaign to promote the installation of solar thermal units in the province. In addition to promoting the city within the province, Kruk also sought to enroll other local actors including members of council who had not yet been convinced of the necessity of municipal sustainability planning. As one long-time councilor openly admits, he first doubted Calvin Kruk?s vision and his leadership ability but his mind soon changed and by the next election he ran explicitly to continue the work that Kruk helped initiate.   The second major step, taken in January 2007, was to initiate sustainability planning. This included revising the city?s vision and mission based on the 2003 visioning process with the ultimate goal of becoming ?a visionary community that works together for innovative social, cultural, economic and environmental vitality? (City of Dawson Creek, nd). As part of the process, intended to ?ensure that all policies, plans and actions are in accordance with Dawson Creek's principles of sustainability? (City of Dawson Creek, nd), the city held a two-day, in-house training based on the Natural Step to help create a common understanding of the principles of sustainability amongst staff and councilors. This framework would eventually be used to update the city?s planning documents, such as the Official Community Plan, and to guide the priorities and decision-making of council.   With the initial framework established, the city continued to evaluate the potential for new projects and partnerships to advance its goals. Specifically, looking at energy and GHG emissions (although social and cultural sustainability were also being actively pursued) analyses were completed on the wind potential in the region, the solar potential in the region (and specific solar opportunities for  145 resident and commercial buildings), and on the bio-energy potential of the region. An energy audit was completed of the community?s major events centre and the energy efficiency potential in the residential building stock was evaluated. Within the city?s own operations, green operating practices were established for municipal buildings and vehicle fleets.   Frequently consultants from outside of the city, such as the Pembina Institute, were hired to conduct studies but the established sustainability framework allowed the knowledge produced to be grounded in the geography of the community and its articulated sustainability goals. For instance, the bio-energy study stipulated a number of highly specific criteria for determining sustainable bio-energy sources including that the source or sources be residues (not grown specifically as an energy crop); that it not compete with other industries, with food crop production, or harm biodiversity in the region; that it be both economically and environmentally sustainable; that it be non-GMO and suited to growing in the region; and that it minimize the carbon foot-print by requiring minimal fertilizers and petroleum for cultivation (Timmenga & Associates Inc. & Zbeetnoff Agro-Environmental Consulting, 2008). This led to the conclusion that fescue straw, the residue of a locally-grown crop that is typically burned as a waste product, would be ideal for biomass energy generation. Not only would it contribute to locally produced, carbon-neutral energy production, it could also provide a new revenue source for local farmers from one of their existing waste products.  And we identified fescue grass straw because grass seed has been produced in the Peace country for 40 or 50 years. The straw needs to be harvested and it essentially costs money to most producers to dispose of it. It has very little or no nutritional value. So you would turn the waste into a commodity for the farmer. In a cooperative, the farmers would pelletize it. They would deliver it to various facilities throughout the community. They would burn it in the most efficient way. And all that money would stay in our community. Which currently is a dream. We spend, as a community, $50-$70 million a year on energy. And very little if any of it stays here. (Participant #29) This approach was also effective in drawing in new actors to the municipality?s sustainability agenda. A city employee, recounting an incident where she asked a farmer for some fescue straw bales for a test burn, described how ?instantly, he was interested and he said ?I'll give you ten straw bales.? ? I knew right away, that the excitement, ? it's like a domino effect because once you get someone's interest perked about something then everybody wants to get on board. And I know that we're not going to be paying big bucks but the whole idea is that people do value [the resource], why burn it? (Participant #28)     146 With a suitable source of biomass locally available, further studies were undertaken to establish that the city could build biomass-fuelled district heating systems in three clusters throughout the city to reduce its reliance on natural gas and electricity, lower its corporate carbon emissions, and further demonstrate leadership in enacting sustainability. This project would later become a key component of the City?s energy and emissions reduction plan (and was still in the planning phase at the time of writing).   Similarly, a neighbourhood design charrette undertaken in June 2008 was used to develop new knowledge of the sustainability potential and priorities in the community. It was also a means to bring in residential developers who, until that point, had not engaged with the city?s agenda.  The two big developers who want to [develop the proposed neighbourhood] were at the charrette. The farmer who owns [the land]. And all of our staff?And you know what, those same guys that while they were coming to that meeting, the developers, were developing across the street, the regular, 3000 square foot, double, triple, quadruple garage cement things. They got so excited by day three and were so into it, they said it answered a lot of their questions because they know that they have flooded the market with those houses?It was quite exciting, they could see a market opening up. (Participant #21) Thus over time, as the range of activities pursed and of active participants increased, so too did the locally-situated knowledge and the community buy-in.     When the provincial government announced its climate change mitigation targets in 2007, Dawson Creek had already done the groundwork necessary to assess its carbon footprint and develop a strategy to become carbon neutral, as it committed to in signing the Climate Action Charter. A community-wide Climate Action Plan was released in Spring 2008 basically providing an overview of the existing studies and the opportunities for action and for further study. In March 2009, when many municipalities were still struggling to develop carbon mitigation strategies, Dawson Creek released its corporate climate plan, which indicated a potential to reduce GHG emissions by 54% from 2007 levels by 2012. The plan included three main actions, energy efficiency upgrades, the development of biomass district heating systems, and wind power supplies for municipal buildings. The plan also proposed a carbon fund whereby the city pays into its own fund based on their carbon emissions. Meant to mimic and minimize the cost of carbon offsets, the accumulated funds would be used to further reduce emissions. In 2011, Dawson Creek became the first municipality in the province to create a climate change mitigation fund of this sort.     147 For its efforts, the municipality has received numerous awards?that have brought both prestige and additional resources. Through the recognition and the personal connections cultivated between the municipal actors and provincial actors, the municipality has taken on a leadership role, although at times it exceeds the expertise of the city?s staff and elected officials. As the city manager described it,  One of the things that surprised the community, surprised my council?was that because we moved in such concerted fashion on many of the sustainability initiatives and became known for it, provincially and nationally, suddenly we're asked to take positions on matters that no one would have cared what Dawson Creek thought before, or have thought to ask Dawson Creek before.?But that makes it very tough for my council because they are being asked constantly to comment on things that they're not very familiar with as though they were sustainability experts. Whereas they're not. They're experts in this community and they're doing sustainability because this community wants it. (City Manager)  Calvin Kruk?s sudden and untimely death near the end of his first term as mayor, in October 2008, was a major loss to the community. Just over a year later, one of the pivotal staff members throughout the transition moved to another community in the province. While the loss of these two community leaders was potentially a setback for the community, the momentum that had been established in the community and the efforts that had been made to institutionalize the vision have not been lost.   In this context, the election just one month after Calvin Kruk?s death was a decisive one in the community. It pitted a slate of candidates representing ?Old Dawson Creek? against candidates representing the new vision for the community. And the decision was a clear one endorsing Sustainable Dawson Creek. ?It was a huge battle. Are the rednecks going to carry-on or are the greenies going to get in? Well guess what, the greenies got in. And it was because of many years of awareness-raising and that base ground work of green people who are already here. And we just built on that? (Participant #23).  While the 2008 election was seen as a decisive mandate to proceed with sustainability planning, in January 2010, a borrowing referendum limited the city?s ability to finance new capital projects. Despite a very small margin of victory, the successful constraint of government borrowing was seen as resistance to the Sustainable Dawson Creek concept and a failure of the city to effectively communicate with the community as whole (personal communication). However, based on his belief that the citizens of Dawson Creek have driven the transition and will continue to demand sustainability planning within the community, the city manager felt, ??absolutely confident, it doesn't matter how many referendum outcomes there are, we will not be abandoning this initiative  148 because you can't stay in those chairs in there. You'll be a one term councilor if you were to try? (City Manager).  7.2.1 Enacting sustainability Enacting local climate action can require overcoming regulatory obstacles such as lack of enabling legislation or limited jurisdiction; addressing structural and operational limitations including limited capacity, expertise and resources; the concerted effort of a cohort of committed individuals that can provide leadership, help create political will and align conflicting agendas; and the institutionalization of environmental priorities and stand alone initiatives into the administrative structure (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; Burch, 2010; Rutland & Aylett, 2008).   The City of Dawson Creek has sought to address all of these and in many respects it has been quite successful. The leaders in city hall, explicitly worked to integrate sustainability into the city?s business by ensuring that the staff were on board and capable of handling the file and by considering the role of city council in long-term planning and visioning. Thus, sustainability planning has been institutionalized in the business of the city through the enrollment of new actors, the creation of institutional capacity within the city, the development of a framework for decision-making and, ultimately, the transformation of the terms of municipal governance.   The city has also negotiated across boundaries by enrolling a range of partners and being careful not to antagonize or create conflict. When discussing partnerships with the gas industry, a city employee explained, We can't do it without them. From day one it's never been renewable versus fossil fuels. It's never been us versus them?it just doesn't make sense, to say wind projects are better than natural gas projects. We never get into those discussions, period?. Altagas are putting over $200 million into a hill [Bear Mountain Wind Park]?BP has invested hundreds of thousands of dollars into Northern Lights College to train wind turbine maintenance folks, to train solar hot water installers, to train electricians on PV installations. Encana is very active on their large consumption of water?. (Participant #29)  And, as this employee explained, this approach has served to even further enroll actors and expand sustainability initiatives to, for instance, the local community college that is developing renewable energy certification training programs and thus building capacity in the community as a whole.    149 To remain in touch with residents, the city also established networks and relied on organizations already involved in issues, such as Peace Energy Cooperative, to act as stakeholder groups. It also adopted strategies such as sending both councilors (to account for decision-making) and staff members (to provide expertise) to local community meetings. This helped ensure that the community questions were addressed as comprehensively as possible and that elected officials and staff were aware of each other?s public communications. Open houses and public forums were not abandoned, but complemented with these alternative forums.   The size of the community and the embeddedness of elected officials and city staff within the community also contributed to the successful transition of the community?as everyone involved also had his or her own personal network to draw on and the possibility of ?on the street? interaction with constituents was high. However the 2010 borrowing referendum did signal that perhaps the reliance on informal and stakeholder based communication also needed to be complemented with a more explicit communication plan to ensure that City Hall?s actions and the actual costs of those actions were reaching a broader range of community members (personal communication).   Like other municipalities, initial successes in energy management helped develop expertise within the city and provide a rationale and the resources for further initiatives (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003). Thus what began as a somewhat narrow exercise to address the city?s corporate energy use has been rolled into a broader sustainability agenda on which the municipal elections in 2008 were largely based. Key to this were concerted action and visible signs of progress, such as the solar installations on municipal buildings and the numerous awards the city has received. As one councilor stated ??we never hired one report without acting on it. And we never went to one workshop without coming back and having an action that came out of it. A bylaw or change or something? (Participant #21). The highly visible and on-going progress has boosted civic pride and provided momentum by demonstrating the potential efficacy of a community that sets its sights on sustainability and acts accordingly.   Less successful have been the city?s attempts to influence regulatory change. For instance it has lobbied for a provincial feed-in tariff?preferably one that would provide additional incentive to municipal or community-based renewable energy production. It has also attempted to obtain the authority to levy local improvement charges for residential energy efficiency upgrades and to require new residential units to be solar-ready.  We've had no problem at all accessing cash from this government. They are a whole lot less receptive to giving up any jurisdiction of theirs or providing any incentives to  150 local government to get into these kind of projects. The BC government is substantially behind the Ontario government in several things that would make a key difference to us?. We're seeing really good signs about the local improvement charges but they're from a staff level. It hasn't reached a political level yet?. (Participant #32) Despite a good relationship with the province that has led to recognition and resources, this relationship appears to have its limits with the province acknowledging the need for municipal action to meet its climate goals but, as of yet, being unwilling to increase the authority or jurisdiction of local and regional governments. Referencing these power asymmetries, one city hall staff member wryly noted that, ?we?ve noticed that we are not in a position to bargain with the provincial government? (Participant #32).   Although Dawson Creek?s success most certainly relates to the size and stability of this particular community, the cultivation of a culture of sustainability has not been an accidental phenomenon; the city has explicitly worked to situate knowledge within the local context by, for instance, undertaking regionally-specific studies to understand the renewable energy potential of the surrounding area. The knowledge produced has helped translate abstract concepts into locally supportable actions and to further enroll actors such as farmers and residential housing developers who would otherwise remain outside of sustainability initiatives in the community.  Local leaders have also learned how to translate the often unpopular climate change imperative into a rationale that resonates within the local culture of self-sufficiency. As one councilor described it,  ? my experience has been [that] talking about the solutions is a really positive thing. And everybody is so interested in learning about how they can reduce their impact...but, you don't want to say that it's because of climate change?.how they want to save money, how they want to reduce pollution, they're all about that here. (Participant #25) The experience in Dawson Creek demonstrates that ?localizing? abstract concepts such as climate change and sustainability at the local level is indeed a discursive act of ?reframing? (Betsill, 2001) but that it is also facilitated by producing new knowledge that is well-grounded in the goals, values, and geography of a community. Michel Callon uses the concept of ?translation? to refer to the changes to actor-networks as new actors are enrolled and their interests are mobilized (Callon, 1986). In this case, we see the process of translating local interests such that they are mobilized around the city?s interpretations of renewable energy and sustainability. But this was not a case of implementing a defined vision. Rather, making renewable energy and sustainability ?make sense? in Dawson Creek also defined what they were in Dawson Creek. Thus, a ?cultural rationality? (Fischer, 2000), or a  151 locally-grounded form of judgment, was brought to bear on initiatives while simultaneously constructing the (or a) local interest in regards to renewable energy and sustainability as well as how specific projects were envisioned and enacted. This iterative process could not have succeeded in a top-down manner?as it depended on the careful management of local actors and on broader negotiation of what sustainability meant to the citizens of Dawson Creek. Thus, demonstrating that public values do not lie outside of municipal governance but rather are constructed through it, this case supports the need to move beyond the implementation of best practices at the local level and the importance of collectively negotiating situated discourses, knowledges, and infrastructures that promote sustainability.  7.3 Peace Energy British Columbia contains significant wind energy resources but as of 2011 the province had only 247 MW of grid-connected wind capacity. Completed in October 2009, the 102 MW Bear Mountain Wind Park, located just outside Dawson Creek, stands out as the first industrial scale wind development in the province. This notable first was in part the responsibility of the Peace Energy Cooperative (Peace Energy) and the community engagement that the grassroots organization provided. As this analysis will describe, Peace Energy and the cooperative values that the organization adopted helped establish Bear Mountain as a boundary object and allowed the development to embody multiple value sets. This was aided by the still nascent wind energy regime in the province that, although posing some challenges, also helped avoid the now familiar situation in the BC energy arena of established interests in antagonistic confrontation. This enabled the project to become the first industrial scale wind development in BC as well as an important symbol of Sustainable Dawson Creek and what it can accomplish.   The Peace Energy Cooperative, a for-profit cooperative, was first established in 2003. In the midst of a resource rush in the region, a small group based in Dawson Creek had begun meeting the previous year to see how they might promote the development of renewable energy. As one of the founding members of Peace Energy described it,  I guess it was about eight years ago?. we started conversations about renewable energy and cooperative models and you know community ownership and all that kind of stuff. And the next thing we knew, we were planning?a renewable energy cooperative here?.We knew that the Peace region was rich in renewable energy, right. There's no question?.The idea seemed to be an idea whose time had come?.it seemed to psychologically be time because it just took off. A volunteer board just kind of fell into place and brilliant people helped us raise money and get grants, write  152 grants so that we could actually become a proper registered certified cooperative, a for-profit cooperative. (Participant #23) The cooperative did take off in the community with the appeal relating to both the potential to engage in positive change and the familiarity of the model. As one of the early members described his family?s decision to invest in Peace Energy,  ?we've lived here and with the oil and gas in the area, and the dam, and everything else. And everything goes out?we know that renewable energy is coming to the area. We know it's windy here; we've grown up here. We need to be involved in this and have, not just some say, but also some investment in it. (Participant #34) Indeed, even the structure of the cooperative fit within the culture of the farming community that had a long-established history of cooperative organizations.   That's why the co-op model works so well here. Because this is co-op world. There's co-ops for everything. I mean there has been at one time, seed co-ops and seed cleaning co-ops and food co-ops and fuel co-ops and now there's an energy co-op. It just fits. And people know the model, they understand it, they just get it, they already belong to several co-ops?( Participant #23) With community interest piqued and a growing list of members that, not incidentally, included key staff and councilors with the city, the cooperative began looking for appropriate renewable energy projects.   The resource rush at the turn of the millennium included both the rapidly expanding unconventional gas industry as well as a rush to secure wind development permits on the many high-quality, crown-owned wind sites in the region. Contributing to the ?wind rush? was the release into the public domain of wind monitoring data collected by BC Hydro. The public utility had monitored eighteen high potential wind sites from 2000 to 2004 but provincial policy, introduced in the 2002 Provincial Energy Plan, did not allow BC Hydro to develop wind generation itself. Therefore the data that had been collected, including the location of high potential sites and the wind quality at those sites, was publicly released (British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, nd).   One of the sites that had been monitored for about a year and was proving to have high potential for development was Bear Mountain, a popular recreational site within view of Dawson Creek. Bear Mountain was an attractive site for a number of reasons. Not only did it appear to have high wind energy potential, but unlike many sites, it was not in a remote location and therefore had readily available access to the existing electrical grid as well as an access road from a major highway. For Peace Energy, its close proximity to Dawson Creek also held symbolic value. The cooperative began  153 investigating the site and looking into the possibility of obtaining an Investigative Use Permit, the first tenure required for wind development on crown land. Their hopes of developing the site were nearly dashed when another company moved first and secured the permit for the site. However, with the help of their provincial representative, Blair Lekstrom, the cooperative was able to contest the permit and subsequently won the tenure rights, putting them in a position to bargain with development companies.41   As a relatively new, volunteer-run organization with little in the way of assets, save for the right to investigate a world-class wind energy site, Peace Energy began to interview prospective partners. The company they chose to work with was Aeolis Wind Power Corporation (Aeolis), a small company with two employees based out of Sidney, British Columbia. They were selected because of previous experience with an energy cooperative in Ontario and because they were amenable to Peace Energy?s values.  We chose Aeolis because they were coming from a cooperative background.? And some of the developers we interviewed, because we just asked them, ?what's the first thing you'd do when you go up there? Well, clear cut it, get rid of all the trees, that can increase your profitability right away?. And we go, ?okay next please?. And Aeolis said, ?you have a beautiful recreational value up there??.Anyway they were perfect fit for us so we partnered with Aeolis. And we worked with them for the next two or three years promoting it. We were the people on the ground. We were the local connection. We were the public communications department?.While they took care of the technical. (Participant #23) The two fledgling organizations formed the Bear Mountain Limited Partnership to develop the site. As described by an Aeolis employee, the relationship was, ?interesting and?slightly tricky?because currently you can't sell or trade or dispose of a tenure.?So Peace Energy Co-op held the underlying tenures for the project, Aeolis stepped in, Bear Mountain Limited partnership was the company that actually was formed as the operating company. But Bear didn't actually hold the asset, I mean, it didn't hold the underlying tenures, so there was a trust relationship that we had to set up?.What that meant, effectively, was that in terms of all of this work, so the environmental, the social, the economic, the cultural, the technical, the energy purchase agreement from BC Hydro, the wind energy monitoring, the manufacturing contract with Enercon, all of that was something that we took responsibility for and made sure was in place. We also took responsibility for the public consultation. Peace [Energy] provided space in their facility for a Bear Mountain Wind person?But it was good because it was a very local, very grounded,                                                       41 The permit was contested based on the fact that the company that held it did not, at the time it acquired it, have an office in British Columbia, as dictated in provincial regulations.   154 mostly I think, in touch organization that was really excited about seeing this happen.? (Participant #15) Early work was completed proving the site and undertaking initial regulatory requirements. At this point, a decision was made to bring another partner in to provide the financial backing for the project. At this time Altagas Limited entered the partnership and took over full ownership of the project. Peace Energy and Aeolis both negotiated royalty agreements and remained partners in Bear Mountain partnership. Thus, the two-way relationship became an even more complicated three-way partnership.   There were all sorts of other wrinkles that hadn't been contemplated that people had to do, entirely above board and completely legal, but slightly gymnastic-like maneuvers to get through, because it was just, you're trying to merge the interests and experience of a public company, which is Altagas, a private company, which is Aeolis and a co-op, all of which are run by very well meaning people but none of whom, necessarily have any experience with any of the other models. (Participant #15) Peace Energy continued to act as the on-the-ground contact for the project, providing a physical location for the project within Dawson Creek and with the cooperative?s executive director paid on an hourly basis to undertake public relations activities.   In July 2006, Bear Mountain was one of three wind projects in the province awarded an energy purchase agreement through BC Hydro?s Green Power Call. The 25-year agreement guaranteed a market for the power produced at the site and allowed the development to move forward. The environmental assessment application was filed in November 2006 and an Environmental Assessment certificate granted in August of the following year.   During the development of Bear Mountain, British Columbia?s wind energy sector was still in its early days. While the projects initiators, Peace Energy and Aeolis, were developing as organizations, so too were the regulatory coordinating mechanisms. The provincial Wind Energy Policy was first drafted in 2005 and continued to evolve throughout the project?s development with the existing 40dB sound setback policy only established in 2007, when Bear Mountain was well into the development stage.42 The evolving regulatory environment and the novelty of wind development in the province provided both opportunities and challenges for the project.                                                         42 Other wind projects, like the Wartenbe Wind Project and the Dokie Wind Project had previously been awarded Environmental Assessment Certificates, but were for various reasons delayed.  155 On one hand, it allowed the Bear Mountain partners an opportunity for input into the emerging regulations since they were being developed as the project developed. On the other hand, the lack of regulatory framework led to uncertainty and inconsistent treatment by the regulatory agencies charged with overseeing the licensing and assessment of the project.   The novelty of wind energy in the province also contributed to public opposition. And despite the support within the community of Dawson Creek, there was active opposition to the project?primarily from residents living on or near Bear Mountain. Residing outside the jurisdiction of Dawson Creek, these residents were concerned with the impact that the project would have on their health, their property values, and on their view and overall enjoyment of their properties. The lack of regulation added a level of uncertainty since it was unclear what noise, environmental, and consultation standards the project would be held to. In addition, the novelty of the technology in British Columbia, let alone in the region, meant that there were a number of unknowns particularly to a population that, although familiar with energy development, was unfamiliar with wind technology. This also complicated Bear Mountain Wind?s position since they had to adapt to evolving regulations while the project was underway?which raised the suspicions of opponents. They were also still in the process of developing regionally-specific research and had no local examples with which to refute the opponents concerns about the impact of wind turbines.  The lack of an established wind regime in the province also meant that not only was the regulatory regime being developed, but that there was no established set of interests nor a clear group of proponents and opponents. Those opposed to the project looked to the regional district, their local authority, and were able to enroll a number of regional district directors to their cause. However, working on the side of the Bear Mountain Partnership a number of municipal and provincial officials were keen to see wind energy succeed in the region and in the province and therefore advocated specifically for this project. One such example was the city?s support for the controversial Bill 30?that would effectively eliminate local and regional governments? zoning authority over energy projects (see Chapter 5 for more detail). The City?s support for the bill was provided explicitly to help ensure that the regional district board did not derail Bear Mountain. While the epicenter of the Bill 30 controversy was focused on run-of-river projects in southwestern British Columbia and likely had little explicit relationship to this particular project, it is one example of the evolving nature of the wind regime and how regulations and interests were still being established?in part through the Bear Mountain project. In the end, the passing of Bill 30 eliminated the regional district?s threat to Bear Mountain but also left project opponents little recourse.   156  Construction began in late 2007 and the 34, 3MW Enercon-E82 wind turbines began arriving from Germany in Spring 2009. Although opposition persisted, as the wind turbines were installed overall support in the community grew.43 Completed and grid-connected in October 2009, Bear Mountain Wind Park became the first industrial scale wind project in the province. It was spring 2011 before the second project (Dokie Wind project) was completed.   7.3.1 Cooperative coordination Energy cooperatives are rare in Canada and cooperatives with a stake in an industrial scale energy project even more so. There were a number of factors, relating to both the timing of the project and to the cooperative action of Peace Energy and its formal and informal partners that enabled Peace Energy to remain as an active player in the project. This in turn helped ensure community support and contributed to the embodiment of locally-relevant values in the project.  First, by securing the Investigative Use Permit, with the support of their elected representative, Peace Energy became an ?obligatory passage point? (Callon, 1986) meaning that anyone wishing to develop Bear Mountain had to negotiate with the cooperative. This was most certainly the result of acting quickly when the wind potential in BC was just beginning to be realized and it gave Peace Energy the power to be selective in its partnerships. This in turn enabled them to choose a partner with shared values, including the cooperative values at the root of Peace Energy.  Ultimately, the choice of Aeolis as a partner was a fortuitous one, as Aeolis offered the initial resources and technical expertise required to pursue the project. They also helped keep Peace Energy as a legitimate stakeholder. And that's another thing that was really good about Aeolis,?because this is complicated, amazingly complex corporate stuff? And Aeolis was great coming up here?and explaining things to us?.until we finally began to understand what the hell was going on here and what part we could play in it. And they brought forward ideas in how we could continue to be a player in this rather than just being bought out? (Participant #23)                                                       43 During a field visit in July 2009, when the turbines were just being installed, the excitement in the community was palpable. On a number of occasions, I overheard casual conversations about the project and about going to Bear Mountain to see the progress. In contrast, it was during this visit that I also interviewed opponents of the project whose position was not softening as the project proceeded.   157 As a result of their active engagement with the project, Peace Energy was able to ensure that the project embodied their values. For instance, Bear Mountain was already an important recreational site and maintaining those recreational values was one of their goals.  It quickly developed into a wind park instead of wind farm. And that was our concept. ?[a] wind farm is just something where you're harvesting the wind, it's a farm. A wind park you're doing that, but you're also combining park values and recreational values or other values into the same land base. (Participant #23) Similarly, providing a collective opportunity to support and financially profit from alternative energy was part of the mandate of the cooperative?its successful involvement with the project, even though they did not retain an ownership share, ensured that these values were included alongside the more common corporate values of providing share-holder value and even the government?s goals of increasing clean electricity production.  Even though the cooperative model resonated with community and offered a unique opportunity to allow members to participate in the energy policy arena, it was a difficult model to coordinate, given typical energy development in the province. As a member of Peace Energy and employee in the wind sector described the cooperative, It's rooted in the grass (laugh) and it means that there's all sort of collective, and consensus related support behind it when you make decisions. But that does not necessarily bode well for quick or flexible or necessarily I guess even business related decisions and the sort of the cutthroat manner that business is defined as up here. And the energy business is defined as generally. (Participant #15) It was not just the speed of the decision-making that was at issue, it was both the philosophical and the legal differences between the business models of the Bear Mountain partnership.  It was really tough, because as a cooperative you had certain reporting requirements to the government and to your members. Altagas is an income trust fund; they have certain requirements for trading and to their shareholders?.and then Bear Mountain Wind was a limited company, so between the three entities, there was a lot problems on what could or couldn't be said; information that could or couldn't be given out. And as members, we wanted to know, ?Well, if we're investing in Bear Mountain Wind, what does that mean? What's it going to look like? And where's the prospectus and everything else?? And?we didn't get any of that information. The cooperative invested in Bear Mountain Wind, with the board of directors knowing the inside details. They can't tell us any of those details and then we invest our money, the co-op, to support what the board has decided. (Participant #34)   158 Although the cooperative offered a way to engage in the typically inaccessible energy policy arena, in a format that resonated with community, the model was not an immediate fit with the typical way of doing energy development in the province. Compromise was necessary and that compromise came primarily from the cooperative itself (with help from Aeolis) so as to fit with the typical corporate business model of private power development in the province.   Peace Energy also informally partnered with the City of Dawson Creek, with each supporting the other?s projects and initiatives.  For instance, the City actively advocated for Bear Mountain at the regional district and provincial levels while Peace Energy provided public education and advocacy for renewable energy projects within the region. The shared task of enrolling new actors and providing novel opportunities to participate in energy development helped establish the shared meanings and collective that supported both Peace Energy and the City?s goals and were instrumental to building a new social world. It also helped ensure that those goals were compatible and contributing to broader change in the community. However, the mutual support established between the City and Peace Energy may have also served to marginalize those who fell outside of it. As one of the opponents of Bear Mountain stated, ?The biggest problem we had, is there was nobody to turn to?.nobody would even ever listen? (Participant #31).   In addition, Peace Energy has taken a principled cooperative stance on public advocacy. This translates to support for projects it agrees with and a refusal to comment on any project that is either controversial to or opposed by its membership. This stance, although questioned by some members, was rationalized as follows.  We've done surveys of our membership. People join the cooperative because they want to be part of something that is building a better world. We do not attract people who are against things. We attract people who are wanting to be part of building a better world. They're not in it for the money particularly although they would like to see some return on money.?We can't do it on our own. There's power in people getting together and working together towards common goals. And the common goal of our cooperative is a clean energy world. (Participant #23) On one hand, given the conflict surrounding natural gas extraction in the community, this stance was a way to avoid alienating the cooperative?s membership and its corporate partners. As such it was a means to promote inclusivity. On the other hand, it side-stepped debate by addressing only the positive side of complex issues and allowing little room for concerns about the impacts of renewable energy to be voiced. Thus although serving as a point of engagement for local actors, Peace Energy?s conflict avoidance may also have simplified the renewable energy discourse and contributed to  159 hegemony in defining a ?clean energy world? and the type of projects and values that constitute such a world.   Table 7.1 below, outlines the various form of cooperation undertaken by Peace Energy and its partners, how each form served to coordinate action, and contributed to the construction of the project.     160 Table 7.1 Cooperative activities undertaken by Peace Energy Cooperative Cooperative Activity Coordinating Functions Project Implications of the Cooperative Activity Cooperative ownership & investment (Membership) 1. Provides access to an unfamiliar and inaccessible arena 2. Alternative model of participation that resonates with local culture and identity  1. Contributes to community buy-in and investment 2. Incorporation of Peace Energy?s values (economic, cultural, recreational) as well as corporate and government values 3. Required compromise of cooperative model because of novelty and incompatibility with existing infrastructure and conventions   Mutual Support (Municipality) 1. Shared task of enrolling new members 2. Expands networks and access 1. Supports collective rationality and identity formation  2. Contributes to mutual and collective learning 3. May limit the outlets for expressing dissent   Partnership (Wind Developers) 1. Provides access to industrial scale development regime 2. Introduces new development model into this regime 1. Incorporation of Peace Energy?s values (economic, cultural, recreational) as well as corporate and government values 2. Wind technology introduced with minimal conflict 3. Required compromise of cooperative model with typical development pattern largely unchanged  Positive Advocacy (Cooperative?s Leadership) 1. Minimizes conflict with potential partners 2. Provides an alternative model of action within a climate of conflict and mistrust 1. Increases range of participating actors 2. Simplifies discourse and position  3. Collective exploration of options occurs but is limited 4. May ignore differences and dissent   Antagonistic coordination results in technological debates being divided into proponents and opponents and structured as for-or-against propositions (Rip & Talma, 1998). As previous chapters have illustrated BC energy developments tend to be antagonistic?with camps forming in support of projects and against them. The effects of pursuing cooperative coordination are worth tracing, in part,  161 because they represent an alternative and unique form of development within the provincial energy arena. ??Peace Energy has broken ground in British Columbia in the way that we do things and the way we've grown? (Participant #22).   The case of Bear Mountain Wind demonstrates an alternative form of coordination?a strategic middle-ground between antagonistic, technocratic coordination and consensus-based decision-making. Moreover, Peace Energy chose to cooperate with a range of actors including the diverse range of actors that constitute its membership.  This choice was significant since the cooperative approach resonated locally and also did the important work of allowing a grassroots initiative to ?fit? into existing practices and infrastructures (Seyfang & Smith, 2007). The work done to negotiate cooperation, as a philosophical stance and as a member-driven organization, can be understood as a form of coordination at the boundaries?managing or negotiating the work of multiple social worlds and infrastructures in the arena. This included coordinating relationships with other social worlds, such as other members of the Bear Mountain Partnership and with the shared infrastructure of the provincial electricity grid and the dominant development patterns and interests embedded within it. This coordination was required to allow Bear Mountain to work as a functioning component of the grid while simultaneously creating space where local values and interests could be negotiated into the established pattern of energy development in the province.    Like any form of coordination, the cooperative approach was productive, helping to construct the relationships and technologies of the Bear Mountain project. In particular, it contributed to the concretization of Bear Mountain?allowing it to embed a range of values and be something that multiple social groups and organizations supported in principle and in practice. Significantly, it embodies local economic (local profit, cooperative ownership), cultural (independence and land stewardship), and recreational (it is a wind park not a wind farm) values while also ?fitting? into typical model of independent power production in the province. The concretization of the technology both resulted from and enabled the wind park to function as a boundary object. The significance of creating Bear Mountain, as boundary object, is illustrated by the fact that it was the first major wind development in the province and the high level of community support for it. Thus it evidently works with the electricity grid and for the community at large as well as working for the Bear Mountain Partnership.  Finally, via Bear Mountain, the physical shape of the provincial electricity grid has been altered by the introduction of wind energy in a relatively non-controversial way. It also gave an energy  162 cooperative in northern BC an opportunity to profit from electricity which represents a small but significant departure from the existing development pattern of channeling energy related economic gain through the provincial government or independent power producers. Through its community-based investment model, it has also managed to move beyond the entrenched debate regarding public versus private power development?instead it is a private development with public support and community investment. And, although it may still be below the radar, it has provided a provincial example of what grassroots action can mean for successful energy development  Peace Energy Cooperative made a choice to pursue cooperative rather than antagonist coordination on several levels. This was based on a philosophical stance that, not-insignificantly, was deeply rooted in the community and thus had cultural resonance.  On a pragmatic level, the need to coordinate with existing infrastructure, conventions of practice, and accepted development patterns required partnership and compromise. It was not, and probably is still not possible for a grassroots cooperative to accomplish this on its own. Finally cooperative coordination was a strategic choice in the sense that energy conflict was pervasive in the community. Peace Energy was seeking to offer a different model of action and an outlet for community frustration but for this model to exist in this situation, compromise was essential.  7.4 Conclusion: Sustainable Dawson Creek Over the last half-decade a sustained hybrid forum has formed in the community of Dawson Creek. Due to the efforts of both Peace Energy and the City, the range of actors involved in collective world-building and the range of issues addressed has increased contributing to the evolution of locally-grounded, collective understandings of renewable energy and sustainability. Thus, emerging from the hybrid forum is a new social world?Sustainable Dawson Creek?that is both a highly significant grassroots initiative and an active social world in the provincial energy policy arena. Despite being called a ?social? world, Sustainable Dawson Creek is sociotechnical. It comprises collective visions and understandings of sustainability that are enacted and made durable via specific artifacts and technologies. For instance, the City?s sustainability framework enacts and enables the reproduction of a specific form of rationality in municipal decision-making. Similarly, the solar-thermal collectors installed on the roof of city hall serve to prove the technology ?works? in Dawson Creek but also to prove that Sustainable Dawson Creek is a reality.     Based in local culture, the rationality and discourse of Sustainable Dawson Creek are distinct from provincial discourse and agendas. For instance climate change remains a controversial issue within  163 the community so, rather than framing initiatives as climate change issues, local leaders have framed them around self-sufficiency and independence. ?Rooted in the grass? (Participant #15), this rationality is seen as a departure from provincial discourse and policy. Not only is it discursively different, stepping away from climate change as a guiding rationale, it is also substantively different. As one Peace Energy member put it,  Our lobby would say get the price of electricity up as high as possible as quickly as possible to encourage conservation and to pay people like wind farms and solar panel people?a fair price for what they are producing. BC Hydro does not want to pay a penny more for clean energy than they will for dirty.?other than a policy that says they have to produce so much renewable....they certainly don't give us any premium for clean energy. So they're not providing any incentives that we can see, whatsoever for conservation or anything else. They want to build big dams and keep the price of power really low and that can attract business and do all the right things... well, it was a great model in 1958 but it's a terrible model now. It's not a 21st-century model at all. And they do not get that. As far as we can tell anyway. Maybe they do, I don't know. But isn't the proof in the pudding? (Participant #23)  The social world that has emerged in Dawson Creek represents an alternative rationality within the provincial energy policy arena. It is not at odds with provincial policy and in many cases it is supportive of and supported by provincial climate and energy policy. However, localizing sustainability has gone beyond mere implementation creating identities, rationalities and technological configurations that are unique to the community and distinct from provincial agendas.   Critically, the case of Dawson Creek provides an example of the mechanics and possible outcomes of a locally-based hybrid forum. Specifically, it draws attention to the points of negotiation and the process of forging shared meanings both within the emergent social world and outside of it. This allowed for both local translations and the creation of boundary objects between Dawson Creek and other social worlds in the energy policy arena.   First, by situating concepts, knowledge and technologies in the community, local officials and advocates made them relevant to local priorities and undertook the process of translating local interests. Thus the formulation of problems, the generation of knowledge specific to the local environment, and the realization of projects were all undertaken in the local interest whilst simultaneously constructing the local interest and defining what renewable energy and sustainability meant ?on the ground? in Dawson Creek. This was accomplished by drawing on outside expertise while also generating knowledge of the local environment and explicitly integrating it with local  164 interests and priorities. For instance, the process of creating Bear Mountain Wind Park depended on the integration of Peace Energy?s economic, recreational, and cultural values with the expertise and values of independent power producers. Similarly, the City of Dawson Creek hired consultants to generate knowledge of renewable energy potential in the region yet applied its own sustainability framework to determine the options that should be pursued.   For the translations to be successful they had to make