UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Evidentiality in Nuu-chah-nulth Waldie, Ryan James 2012

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
24-ubc_2013_spring_waldie_ryan.pdf [ 985.28kB ]
Metadata
JSON: 24-1.0073466.json
JSON-LD: 24-1.0073466-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 24-1.0073466-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 24-1.0073466-rdf.json
Turtle: 24-1.0073466-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 24-1.0073466-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 24-1.0073466-source.json
Full Text
24-1.0073466-fulltext.txt
Citation
24-1.0073466.ris

Full Text

Evidentiality inNuuchahnulth by Ryan James Waldie B.A., The University of Victoria, 2001 M.A., The University of Victoria, 2004 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in The Faculty of Graduate Studies (Linguistics) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) December 2012 c© Ryan James Waldie 2012 Abstract This thesis proposes that evidentiality is made up of three factors, a relation between an origo and a situation, a relation between an origo and a proposition, and a relation between a situation and a proposition. This claim is motivated empirically by the set of evidentials in the Ahousaht dialect of Nuuchahnulth, a Wakashan language spoken on the west coast of Vancouver Island in Canada. This language has seven evidentials, each of which encodes at least one of the three factors of evidentiality. The thesis begins by laying out the claim (Chapter 1), giving a brief outline of the grammar of Nuuchahnulth (Chapter 2), and going over the relevant literature on evidentiality (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 looks at the morphological and syntactic classication of the evidentials in Nuuchahnulth. I show that evidentials occur in several dierent syntactic domains, and are thus able to cooccur. I present amodeltheoretic semantic analysis of my proposal in Chapter 5. The notions of origo, situation and proposition are formalized, as are the relations that hold between them. I also give the semantics of each of the evidentials in Nuuchahnulth. Chapter 6 addresses the question of how the origo is determined. I argue that three mechanisms are involved: 1) matrixclause mood suxes specify the origo; 2) embedding verbs lexically encode that their subject argument is the origo of their complement clause; and 3) in the absence of either of the previous two mechanisms, the origo is contextually determined. In Chapter 7 I show that the evidential component of meaning in a sentence does not have the same status as the propositional component of meaning. I propose a modication to the model given in Chapter 5 to account for this. Chapter 8 looks at the interactions between the semantics of temporal suxes and evidentials. I show that the semantics of sensory evidentials requires them to precede tense, while the semantics of other evidentials do not impose any ordering with respect to tense. Finally, in Chapter 9 I summarize the claims of the thesis and turn to some unresolved questions. ii Table of Contents Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1.1 Evidential morphemes in Nuuchahnulth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.2 Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2.1 Origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.2.2 Perspectival status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.2.3 Manner of support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.2.4 Perceptual grounding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.3 Issues addressed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.3.1 The morphosyntactic distribution of evidentials in Nuuchahnulth . 11 1.3.2 Model theoretic analysis of the factors of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . 12 1.3.3 The origo: how it gets its value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.3.4 Levels of meaning: dierences between the evidential relations and the prejacent proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1.3.5 The perceived situation: interactions between evidentials and temporal morphemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1.4 Methodology and data presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1.5 Organization of the dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2 Some basic facts aboutNuuchahnulth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.1 A user's guide to Nuuchahnulth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.2 Phonemic inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.2.1 Consonant inventory: 38 consonants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.2.2 Vowel inventory: ve vowels and a length contrast . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.3 Morphophonology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.3.1 Morphophonology of stems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 iii Table of Contents 2.3.1.1 At the left edge: templatic reduplication and vowel length . . 19 2.3.1.2 At the right edge: glottalization and lenition . . . . . . . . . 21 2.3.2 Morphophonology of axes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2.3.2.1 Ghost consonants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.3.2.2 Variablelength vowels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.4 Morpheme order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.4.1 The core/periphery distinction and the morpheme template . . . . . . 25 2.4.2 Secondposition eects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.4.2.1 Peripheral suxes are always in second position . . . . . . . 26 2.4.2.2 Core suxes are sometimes in second position . . . . . . . . 27 2.5 Peripheral suxes in more detail: their status as inectional morphemes . . . 28 2.5.1 Mode suxes code modal force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 2.5.2 Valence and tense suxes: a mixed bunch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 2.5.2.1 Valency extending: causative -’Ap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 2.5.2.2 The temporal modier -’az `now' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 2.5.2.3 Valency shifting: -’at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 2.5.2.4 Nominal valency: possessive -uk and -/Ak . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.5.2.5 The past marker -(m)it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2.5.3 Mood suxes are obligatory and dene paradigmatic contrasts . . . . 33 2.5.4 Discourse suxes: another mixed bunch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 2.6 Word order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 2.6.1 Canonical word order is VSO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 2.6.2 Modiers precede heads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.6.3 Question words (whwords) are sentenceinitial . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 2.7 Clausetyping in more detail: the mood suxes again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 2.7.1 Moods that occur only in matrix clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 2.7.2 One mood occurs in both matrix and dependent clauses: the absolutive mood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 2.7.2.1 The absolutive mood in matrix clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 2.7.2.2 The absolutive mood in complement clauses . . . . . . . . . 41 2.7.2.3 The absolutive mood in adjunct clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 2.7.3 Moods that occur only in dependent clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 2.7.3.1 The subordinate mood introduces clauses . . . . . . . . . . . 43 2.7.3.2 The purposive mood introduces rationale clauses . . . . . . . 44 2.7.3.3 The conditional mood introduces ifclauses . . . . . . . . . . 44 2.7.3.4 The relative and indenite moods introduce relative clauses . 44 2.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3 Towards a theory of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3.1 Ways of classifying evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3.2 Morphological classications of evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3.3 Syntactic classications of evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 3.4 Semantic classications of evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3.4.1 Modal approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3.4.1.1 Kratzer's (1981) modal analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 iv Table of Contents 3.4.1.2 Modal accounts of evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 3.4.2 Perceptual approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 3.4.3 Origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 3.5 Pragmatic classications of evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 3.5.1 Evidentials contribute presuppositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 3.5.2 Evidentials contribute sincerity conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 3.5.3 Evidentials contribute notatissue content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 3.6 The way forward to an analysis of Nuuchahnulth evidentials . . . . . . . . . 57 4 Cataloguing the inventory of Nuuchahnulth evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4.1 The origo hypothesis: evidentiality consists of the relations between an origo, a proposition and a situation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4.2 The syntax of Nuuchahnulth evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 4.2.1 Two hypotheses about the external syntax of evidentials . . . . . . . . 62 4.2.1.1 Hypothesis 1: A dedicated position for evidentials: Cinque 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 4.2.1.2 Counterexample 1: scattered evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . 63 4.2.1.3 Counterexample 2: paradigmatic heterogeneity . . . . . . . 63 4.2.1.4 Hypothesis 2: multiple positions for evidentials: Blain and Déchaine (2006, 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4.2.2 Nuuchahnulth evidentials are associated with CP, IP, or VP . . . . . 64 4.3 Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the CP domain: inectional mood suxes . . . 65 4.3.1 Quotative -wA/iS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 4.3.2 Indirect interrogative -HAj . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 4.3.3 Dubitative -qAJa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.3.4 Paradigmatic blocking: CPdomain evidentials do not cooccur . . . . 69 4.4 Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the IP domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4.4.1 Inferential -matak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 4.4.2 Past inferential -ckvI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 4.4.3 IPdomain evidentials can cooccur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 4.4.4 IPdomain and CPdomain evidentials can cooccur . . . . . . . . . . . 76 4.5 Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the VP domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 4.5.1 Visual inferential: the derivational sux -Kuk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 4.5.1.1 VPdomain -Kuk `visual inference' is related to KuK[RSS] `re semble' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 4.5.1.2 Cooccurence of VPdomain -Kuk `visual inference' with other evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4.5.2 Auditory evidential: the particle na/a:t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 4.5.2.1 VPdomain na/a:t `auditory evidence' is related to na/a: `hear' 84 4.5.2.2 Cooccurence of VPdomain na/a:t `auditory evidence' with other evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 4.6 Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings . . . . . . . . . . . 86 4.6.1 Comparing evidentials to predicates that introduce propositions . . . 86 4.6.2 Comparing evidentials to verbs of saying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 v Table of Contents 4.6.3 Comparing evidentials to predicates that introduce experiencers: verbs of perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 4.6.4 Comparing evidentials to predicates that introduce properties: sensory suxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 4.7 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 4.7.1 Not all mood suxes are evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 4.7.1.1 Indicative mood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 4.7.1.2 Mirative -JA?aS is not an evidential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 4.7.1.3 Indirect dependent moods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 4.7.2 Evidentials from dierent syntactic domains have dierent semantic properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 4.8 Summary of combinatorial restrictions on Nuuchahnulth evidentials . . . . . 101 4.9 Variation in evidentials in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 4.9.1 Dubitative in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 4.9.2 Quotative in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 4.9.3 Indirect interrogative in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 4.9.4 Mirative in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 4.9.5 -matak in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 4.9.6 -ckvI in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 4.9.7 -Kuk in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 4.9.8 na/a:t in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 4.10 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 5 Modelling evidentiality: a truth conditional analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 5.1 The ingredients of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 5.1.1 Ingredient 1: situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 5.1.2 Ingredient 2: origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 5.1.3 Ingredient 3: centred proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 5.1.4 The types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 5.2 Relating the origo to the prejacent proposition: perspectival status . . . . . . 121 5.3 How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support . . . . . . 124 5.3.1 Perception of a directly supporting situation by the origo . . . . . . . . 126 5.3.2 Inference of the prejacent proposition by the origo . . . . . . . . . . . 127 5.3.2.1 The logic of inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 5.3.2.2 Necessary and contingent inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 5.3.2.3 Modelling contingent inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 5.3.3 Reports transmitted to the origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 5.3.3.1 Reports are independent of the origo's perspective . . . . . . 131 5.3.3.2 Modelling reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 5.3.4 A general support relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 5.4 How the origo perceives a situation: perceptual grounding . . . . . . . . . . . 133 5.5 Modelling Nuuchahnulth evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 5.5.1 Inferential evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 5.5.1.1 Inferential -matak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 5.5.1.2 Past inferential -ckvI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 vi Table of Contents 5.5.1.3 Dubitative -qAJa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 5.5.2 Perceptually grounded evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 5.5.2.1 Auditory na/a:t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 5.5.2.2 Visual inferential -Kuk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 5.5.3 Reportative evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 5.5.3.1 Quotative -wA/iS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 5.5.3.2 Indirect interrogative -HAj . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 5.6 Consequences of the analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 5.6.1 Evidential relations are specied independently . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 5.6.2 The eect of the realworld context on the experiential relations . . . 148 5.6.3 The perspective in the meaning of evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 5.6.3.1 Propositions believed to be true are incompatible with infer entials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 5.6.3.2 Propositions which the origo is agnostic about are compatible with inferentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 5.7 A note on contingent inference and modality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 5.8 Translations of Nuuchahnulth evidentials: a rst pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 6 Determining the origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 6.1.1 The origo and similar concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 6.1.1.1 Ways an origo can be specied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 6.1.2 Combination of evidentiality and origo assignment . . . . . . . . . . . 162 6.1.3 The origo associated with na/a:t must be a speaker . . . . . . . . . . . 163 6.2 Origos determined by mood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 6.2.1 Speaker as origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 6.2.1.1 The speaker as origo in indicative mood clauses . . . . . . . 165 6.2.1.2 The speaker as origo in dubitative mood clauses . . . . . . . 168 6.2.1.3 The speaker as origo in quotative mood clauses . . . . . . . . 171 6.2.2 Addressee as origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 6.2.2.1 Interrogative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 6.2.2.2 Indirect interrogative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 6.2.3 Nonspeechact participant as origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 6.2.3.1 Quotative mood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 6.2.3.2 Indirect interrogative mood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 6.3 Origos specied by overt arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 6.4 Context dependent origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 6.4.1 Arguments for contextdependent origos in adjunct clauses . . . . . . 191 6.4.1.1 The speaker can always be the origo in an adjunct clause . . . 191 6.4.1.2 Nonspeaker origos in adjunct clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 6.4.1.3 Ambiguous origos in adjunct clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 6.4.1.4 Summary of the argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 6.4.2 Modelling origo assignment in adjunct clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 6.5 Embedded speech contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 6.5.1 Verbs of saying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 vii Table of Contents 6.5.2 Reportative evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 6.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 7 Beyond a truthconditional analysis of evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 7.1 Enriching a truthconditional analysis with notatissue meaning . . . . . . . 201 7.1.1 The distinction between atissue and notatissue meaning . . . . . 202 7.1.1.1 The logic of calculating atissue and notatissue content . . 202 7.1.2 Testing for notatissue meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 7.1.2.1 The Family of Sentences test shows that Nuuchahnulth evi dentials project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 7.1.2.2 Notatissue meaning does not address the question under discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 7.2 Argument 1: Nuuchahnulth evidentials project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 7.2.1 Negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 7.2.2 Interrogative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 7.2.3 Antecedent of conditional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 7.3 Argument 2: Nuuchahnulth evidentials do not address the question under discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 7.4 Revised translations of Nuuchahnulth evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 7.5 Consequences of the notatissue analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 7.5.1 Evidentials can share a prejacent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 7.5.2 Evidentials need not share a prejacent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226 8 Evidentials and temporalmorphemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 8.1 On the interaction of evidentiality with tense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 8.2 Three assumptions and their predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 8.2.1 Assumption 1: morpheme order reects semantic composition . . . . 228 8.2.2 Assumption 2: tense saturates a situation argument . . . . . . . . . . . 229 8.2.3 Assumption 3: tense orders utterance, event, and perceived situations 231 8.2.3.1 Temporal ordering of the utterance situation and the event situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 8.2.3.2 Temporal ordering of the utterance situation and the perceived situation (perceived situation = event situation) . . . . . . . . 233 8.2.3.3 Temporal ordering of the utterance situation and the perceived situation (perceived situation , event situation) . . . . . . . 234 8.2.4 Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 8.3 Sensory evidentials occur below tense morphemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 8.3.1 Sensory evidentials precede tense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 8.3.2 Nonsensory evidentials can be found preceding or following tense . . 237 8.3.2.1 Nonsensory evidentials which precede tense . . . . . . . . . 238 8.3.2.2 Nonsensory evidentials which follow tense . . . . . . . . . . 240 8.3.3 The particle na/a:t is introduced before the tense sux: excorporation 242 8.4 Tense and perceived situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 8.4.1 Sensory evidentials provide a perceived situation . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 8.4.2 Nonsensory evidentials do not introduce a perceived situation argument 247 viii Table of Contents 8.4.2.1 Mode suxes are nonsensory evidentials which precede tense 247 8.4.2.2 Mood suxes are nonsensory evidentials which follow tense 250 8.5 Evidentials that include a temporal restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 8.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 9.1 My claims and some unresolved questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 9.2 Are evidentials assertive? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 9.3 What is special about sensory evidentials? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 9.3.1 Gitksan n'akw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 9.3.2 Lillooet lákw7a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 9.4 How are evidentials related to modals? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 9.4.1 Fixed modal base: English has evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 9.4.2 Temporal and aspectual properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261 ix List of Tables 1.1 The evidential morphemes of Nuuchahnulth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2 The factors of evidentiality encoded in Nuuchahnulth evidentials . . . . . . . 6 1.3 Translations of Nuuchahnulth evidential mood morphemes . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.4 Translations of Nuuchahnulth evidential mode suxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.5 Translation of Nuuchahnulth evidential derivational sux . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.6 Translation of Nuuchahnulth evidential particle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.7 Cast of characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.1 A sample of suxal verbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.2 Mode suxes in Nuuchahnulth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 2.3 Ordering of premood suxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 2.4 Thirdperson forms of moods in Ahousaht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2.5 Discourse suxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 2.6 Matrix clause moods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 2.7 Verbs taking /inabsolutive complement clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 2.8 Dependent clause moods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 3.1 Examples of attested evidential distinctions (Aikhenvald 2004) . . . . . . . . . 48 4.1 Syntactic levels in which Nuuchahnulth evidentials appear . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4.2 Matrix clause moods in Nuuchahnulth (3rd person forms) . . . . . . . . . . . 65 4.3 Quotative mood paradigm in Ahousaht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 4.4 Interrogative moods in Ahousaht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 4.5 Dubitative mood paradigm in Ahousaht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.6 Nouns derived with -ckvI from Little (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 4.7 Cooccurrence of VPdomain evidential -Kuk and other evidentials . . . . . . . 80 4.8 Cooccurrence of na/a:t `auditory evidence' with other evidentials . . . . . . . 84 4.9 Nuuchahnulth propositional attitude verbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 4.10 Nuuchahnulth verbs of saying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 4.11 Some Nuuchahnulth verbs of perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 4.12 Nuuchahnulth sensory suxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 4.13 Indicative mood paradigm in Ahousaht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 4.14 Mirative mood paradigm in Ahousaht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 4.15 Evidential relations and syntactic domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 4.16 Morphological classes of evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 4.17 Allowable combinations of evidentials in Nuuchahnulth . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 4.18 Kyuquot dubitative mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 213) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 x List of Tables 4.19 Tseshaht dubitative mood paradigm (Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 242) . . . . . . 103 4.20 Comparison of the dubitative mood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 4.21 Kyuquot quotative paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 4.22 Kyuquot indicative paradigm (Rose 1981, 223) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 4.23 Tseshaht quotative mood paradigm (Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 242) . . . . . . . 105 4.24 Kyuquot interrogative inferential mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 219) . . . . . . 106 4.25 Kyuquot evidential mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 213) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 4.26 Kyuquot inferential evidential mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 222) . . . . . . . . 108 5.1 The factors of evidentiality encoded in Nuuchahnulth evidentials . . . . . . . 112 5.2 Types, variables and constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 5.3 Properties of evidentiality encoded in specic evidential morphemes . . . . . . 148 5.4 Translations of Nuuchahnulth evidential morphemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 6.1 Combinations of origo assignment and evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 6.2 Acceptability of na/a:t in dierent kinds of clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 6.3 Origos introduced by matrix moods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 8.1 Relative ordering of evidentials and tense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 8.2 Cooccurrence of evidentials with /aqz `future' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 9.1 Typology of evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 9.2 Evidentials in Gitksan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 xi List of Figures 1.1 Three factors of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1 Nuuchahnulth Consonant inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.2 Nuuchahnulth vowel inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.1 Willett's classication of evidence types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3.2 Structure of the sentience phrase (Speas and Tenny 2003, 334) . . . . . . . . . 49 3.3 Evidential domain hypothesis (Blain and Déchaine 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.1 Three factors of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 4.2 Evidential domain hypothesis (Blain and Déchaine 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 5.1 Three factors of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 5.2 Three factors of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 5.3 Three factors of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 5.4 Manners of support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 5.5 Three factors of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 5.6 Perceptual grounding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 9.1 Three factors of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 xii List of Abbreviations abs absolutive mood abs.emph emphatic absolutive mood aud.evid auditory evidential aug augmentative ben benefactive bpg best possible grounds (Quechua) caus causative cnd common noun determiner comp complementizer cond conditional mood cond.inf conditional inferential mood cont continuous aspect def denite dim diminutive dir.imp direct imperfective (Tibetan) dm discourse marker dub dubitative mood dur durative aspect evid evidential (Gitksan) evid evidential mood (Kyuquot) foc focus grad graduative aspect hab habitual imp imperative mood imp.fut future imperative mood inal.poss inalienable possessive ind indicative mood ind.evid indirect evidential ind.imp indirect imperfective (Tibetan) inder.inter indirect interrogative mood indf indenite relative mood indf.inf indenite inferential relative mood infII inferential II mood (Tseshaht) inter interrogative mood irr irrealis kin kinship sux xiii List of Figures loc locative stem mir mirative mom momentaneous aspect neg negative nx.pst nonexperienced past (Quechua) obj object marker on quantiers pass passive past past tense past.evid past evidential pl plural poss possessive pnd proper noun determiner (Gitksan) pro pronoun prt particle purp purposive mood q interrogative (Tibetan) quot quotative mood refl reexive stem rel relative mood rel relative stem rep repetetive aspect shift perspective shift sim simultaneous sg singular stem stembuilding sux sub subordinate mood subj subject marker in content interrogatives super superlative trans transitive stem vis.evid visual evidential xiv Acknowledgements This dissertation would not be what it is without the help of many people. I thank my consultants, Mary Jane Dick, Katie Fraser and Sarah Webster. Being linguists themselves, Mary Jane and Katie are a fellow linguist's ideal consultantsthey would volunteer exactly the sorts of examples that I needed, sometimes before I knew I needed them. Thanks also tomy supervisory committee. My research supervisorRoseMarieDéchaine always asked the right sorts of questions (tough ones). Hotze Rullmann read and gave feedback on more drafts than either of us would like to admit. Henry Davis had a keen interest in keeping me active in eldwork, and without him I would not have been able to do the necessary eldwork. My examining committee also has my thanks. My external examiner Christopher Potts gave me considerable constructive feedback. Michael Rochemont and Ori Simchen, my university examiners, got me thinking of things in a dierent way, and I appreciate their feedback as well. Edna Dharmaratne and Shaine Meghji also have my thanks. They helped me out countless times with my problems, whether administrative or not. Many thanks to my fellow students, past and present. I beneted a lot from discussions with the students in my cohort, and with many others (both on the pside and the sside). I also beneted from discussions in the pragmatics research group. Thanks also to my friends and family for their support, encouragement, and discussions of things that weren't linguistics. Thanks especially to Linda. xv The botanists plants are not the owers of the hedgerow Martin Heidegger xvi Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Introduction This thesis is about evidentiality, and more specically about the semantics of evi dentiality. To get a sense of what evidentiality does, imagine I say the sentence in (1) below. (1) There's supposed to be a craft fair at Echo Centre this weekend. In uttering a sentence like (1), I express a propositionnamely that there is a craft fair at Echo Centre this weekendbut I also provide information about how I came to know the proposition. For example, I could say (1) if someone told me about it. Now consider the sentence in (2). I could not say this in scenario where I was told about it. I could say it if I saw people setting up a room at Echo Centre in the usual way for a craft fair. (2) There must be a craft fair at Echo Centre this weekend. Sentences (1) and (2) express the same proposition, namely that there is going to be a craft fair at Echo Centre this weekend. But (1) and (2) dier in the evidentiality they express: dierent kinds of evidence form the basis of the speaker's knowledge of the proposition. Part of this evidence is a situation that was experienced or observed by the speaker: in (1) I experienced someone telling me about the craft fair, and in (2) I observed a room being set up in a certain way. Thus, evidentiality involves a relation between a knowledgeholder, a situation, and a proposition. In this thesis I will refer to the knowledge holder as the origo (Garrett 2001), the situation as the perceived situation, and the proposition as the prejacent proposition (von Fintel and Gillies 2010). More specically, I will show that evidentiality indicates three things: (3) a. whether the origo believes the prejacent proposition is true b. how the origo perceived the perceived situation c. how the perceived situation supports the prejacent proposition These three factors of the evidentiality of a proposition can be specied in dierent ways. To see how this works, consider more carefully how individual sentences are used in the following two scenarios: 1 1.1. Introduction (4) Scenario A: Linda told me there was going to be a craft fair this weekend. Scenario B: I saw people setting up a room for a craft fair. Consider the sentences in (5). While sentence (5a) is only compatible with Scenario A, sentence (5b) is only compatible with Scenario B. In sentences like (5a) and (5b), how the perceived situation supports the prejacent proposition is fully specied. But this is not always so. For example, sentence (5c) is compatible with both Scenario A and Scenario B. This shows that, in some sentences, evidentiality is only partially specied. (5) a. There's supposed to be a craft fair at Echo Centre this weekend. Scenario A: X Scenario B: × b. There must be a craft fair at Echo Centre this weekend. Scenario A: × Scenario B: X c. I guess there's a craft fair at Echo Centre this weekend. Scenario A: X Scenario B: X So, while some sentences specify evidentiality partially, others specify it more fully. But there is yet another possibility: evidentiality might not be specied overtly at all, as in (6) below. (6) There's a craft fair at Echo Centre this weekend. The sentence in (6) is compatible with a wide range of scenarios, including the ones listed in (7) below. In each of these scenarios the evidentiality is dierenta spoken report, a written report, and being a participantbut nothing in the sentence indicates what it is. (7) Scenario C:One of the people setting up the room told me it was for a craft fair. Scenario D: I read about it in the newspaper. Scenario E: I've been involved in the planning of it. More broadly, evidentiality is present in every clause in every language. This is because, in every clause in every language, someone is expressing a thought about their experiential relation to the world. The question I address in this dissertation is, how do languages encode evidentiality? To answer this question I examine themorphemes which encode dierent factors of evidentiality in a single language, Nuuchahnulth, a member of the southern branch of the Wakashan language family. In particular, I focus on the Ahousaht dialect, a member of the central dialect group, spoken primarily on Flores Island, o the west coast of Vancouver Island. 1.1.1 Evidential morphemes inNuuchahnulth Nuuchahnulth has three properties which make it a good language to look at with a view to answering the question of how languages encode evidentiality; the rst two were pointed out by Jacobsen (1986). First, it has a large number of evidential morphemes which encode a variety of evidential relations. Second, the evidential morphemes do not form a single 2 1.1. Introduction morphological paradigm. They are instead distributed across a number of morphosyntactic domains. By looking at the commonalities and dierences in the meaning of evidentials across these domains we can more clearly see what their core properties are. Third, some of the evidential morphemes can occur in embedded clauses. Thus, we can also look at the commonalities and dierences in their meaning across dierent syntactic contexts. I focus on seven evidential morphemes in the Ahousaht dialect of Nuuchahnulth, which are listed in Table 1.1. I discuss their morphosyntactic and semantic properties more -wA/iS `quotative' -HAj `indirect interrogative' -qAJa `dubitative' -matak `inference' -ckvI `past inference' -Kuk `visual inference' na/a:t `auditory evidence' Table 1.1: The evidential morphemes of Nuuchahnulth fully in chapter 4, but I introduce them briey here. The speaker of (8) below is beginning to tell a story she heard from someone else, the story of a mother turning into a bluejay. Anyone hearing this sentence will know that the speaker is not describing anything she witnessed personally. It contains the reportative evidential -wA/iS which indicates that she heard about it from someone else. (8) mamuukvitwa/iS mamu:k-(m)it-wa;/iS workpast3.quot /um/iiqsu/i /um/i-i;q-su-/i; motherkinkindef `It is said the mother was working.' Evidentiality can also be specied in questions, as it is in (9). Here the speaker wants to know how the girls got sick, but she is not asking the girls themselves, she is asking someone else, Bill. She assumes that he doesn't know the answer for sure, since he wasn't there with the girls, but he has some idea because he spoke to them earlier. Thus, the speaker assumes the addressee isn't certain and heard about it from someone else. The interrogative reportative evidential -HAj encodes this, and is essentially the interrogative form of the quotative -wA/iS. (9) /a/aqumitHaj /aqa-(m)it-Ha;j whatpast3.indir.inter HaatHaakvaz/i Ha:tHa:kva;z-/i; girl.pldef qviisaHimitii/al qvis-’a;H-(m)it-(y)i:-/al do.thuspurppast3.indfpl tatipiz tatipi(z) get.sick.pl `How did the girls say they got sick?' The speaker in (10) below is watching Ken's boat coming in, and she can see that it is 3 1.1. Introduction sitting high in the water. From this fact, and her general knowledge of the world, she infers that he didn't catch any sh. Nevertheless, she is not certain that he didn't get any. The inferential evidential -qAJa indicates that the speaker is not sure, and is inferring that he didn't get any sh. Notice that in both (8) above and (10) below, the speaker is agnostic about the proposition they are presenting. Where these two examples dier is in how the speaker obtained the proposition: in one case from a report, and in the other case from an inference. This is one of four Nuuchahnulth suxes which indicate that someone made an inference, but isn't certain of the truth of their conclusion. (10) /iiHYuuj/iS /i:H-Yu:j-/i;S bigsticking.out3.ind Ken Ken Ken hiitaPiq, hita-[LS]-Piq locgradin.passing wiKaaHsqaJa wik-’a;Hs-qa;Ja negin.vessel3.dub `Ken's boat is sitting high in the water, I guess he didn't get any (sh).' The speaker of (11) thinks the food has been on the barbecue for long enough, but she has not cut into it to see whether it's cooked all the way through or not. The inferential evidential -matak indicates that she is uncertain of the truth, and is inferring from the amount of time that has passed that the food is cooked. Thus, -matak and -qAJa `dubitative' have identical meanings with respect to evidentiality. They are not always interchangeable, however, because -qAJa has additional semantics related to the fact that it is amood sux, which -matak lacks. (11) si?ajizmataKaz si?a-Si(z)-matak-’az-0 cookedmomind.evidnow3.abs `Maybe it's cooked now.' In (12) below, the speaker was not aware that she was hungry until she noticed how much she had eaten. The use of the sux -ckvI indicates that her being hungry was in the past, and that she was not aware of it at the time, and she inferred it after the fact. Like -qAJa `dubitative' and -matak `inference', it encodes the origo's agnostic state and inference, but -ckvI diers by also encoding a temporal relationship between what was observed and what was inferred: the observation has to have occured after whatever was inferred. (12) haWiiqzckvisiS haWi:qz-ckvi;-si;S hungrypast.evid1sg.ind /ayaqzsa /aya-’aqz-sa manyin.body1sg.abs `I must have been hungry; I ate lots.' The fourth sux that indicates the origo's agnostic state and inference is -Kuk, which appears in (13) below. The speaker here is not certain that Ken is drunk, but she can see him staggering, which leads her to conclude that he is. What -Kuk encodes is the origo's agnostic 4 1.2. Proposal state and inference based on something that was observed visually. The other suxes encoding the origo's agnostic state and inference did not specify whether the inference was made on something that was seen, or heard, or tasted, or smelled, or felt. Those other suxes could be used to indicate an inference based on a sound, while -Kuk cannot. It can only be used when the inference is based on something that was seen. (13) naqjuuKuk/iS naqju:-Kuk-/i;S intoxicatedvis.evid3.ind Ken, Ken Ken Tii/uk Ti:/uk staggering `Ken looks drunk, he's staggering.' Finally, in (14) below the speaker is inside and has the curtains closed, so she can't see whether it's raining or not, but she can hear it hitting the windows. The particle na/a:t is used to indicate that the speaker perceived something using her auditory sense, and not her visual sense. This sux diers from all the other evidential morphemes described so far in that it does not encode the origo's agnostic state. The report and inference suxes can only be used when someone is agnostic about the truth of the proposition. All that na/a:t encodes is that the speaker used something she heard, and did not see, when she obtained the proposition. It is compatible with reports and inferences, with certainty and the origo's agnostic state. The example in (14) involves an inference from the sound to its cause, and the speaker is certain that her conclusion is true (regardless of whether we think she is justied in her certainty). (14) Mizaa/iS Miz-(y)a;-/i;S raincont3.ind na/aat na/a:t aud.evid `It's raining.' 1.2 Proposal Conceptually, we can think of evidentiality as a set of relations between a person (the origo), the prejacent proposition, and the world, or rather, the small part of the world that the origo perceives. This is illustrated in Figure 9.1. Between the origo and the proposition we have a perspectival status, which indicates whether the origo is agnostic or not about the truth of the prejacent proposition. Between the origo and the world we have perceptual grounding, which indicates which sense the origo is using in relation to the prejacent proposition. Strictly speaking, this is a relation between the origo and a part of the world, a situation (Barwise and Perry 1981, Kratzer 1989). We do not perceive the entire world, we only perceive a small part of it. The nal relation, between the perceived situation and the prejacent proposition, represents the manner in which the situation supports the proposition. 5 1.2. Proposal origo perceived situation prejacent proposition perspectival status perceptual grounding manner of support •         • oo • 777777777777777 Figure 1.1: Three factors of evidentiality There are three separate factors of evidentiality which are highlighted by the descrip tions given above for the evidential morphemes in Nuuchahnulth. Table 1.2 summarizes which of the three factors are encoded in each of the evidential morphemes. Note that most of the evidentials lack encoding of at least one factor. Keep in mind that this only summarizes the evidentiality encoded by these morphemesmany of them encode other kinds of meaning as well. Perspectival Perceptual Manner of status grounding support -wA/iS `quotative' agnostic  report -HAj `indirect interrogative' agnostic  report -qAJa `dubitative' agnostic  inference -matak `inference' agnostic  inference -ckvI `past inference' agnostic  inference -Kuk `visual inference' agnostic visual inference na/a:t `auditory evidence'  auditory  Table 1.2: The factors of evidentiality encoded in Nuuchahnulth evidentials 1.2.1 Origo Garrett (2001) introduced the notion of the origo in his discussion of Tibetan eviden tials to handle phenomena like that exemplied in (15) and (16) below. Being hungry is an unobservable state, in the sense that only the person who is hungry can observe the hunger directly. In Tibetan, the direct imperfective morpheme d̀ug can be used with such a predicate in a declarative matrix clause only if the speaker is the subject, as shown in (15). The addressee or a nonspeechact participant cannot be the subject here. 6 1.2. Proposal (15) Tibetan (Tibetoburman) declarative (adapted from Garrett 2001, 227) a. nga I grod.khog stomach ltogsgi`dug hungerdir.imp `I'm hungry.' b. *khyed.rang you grod.khog stomach ltogsgi`dug hungerdir.imp c. *kho he grod.khog stomach ltogsgi`dug hungerdir.imp However, in an interrogative matrix clause, d̀ug can only be used if the addressee is the subject. The speaker or a nonspeechact participant cannot be the subject here. (16) Tibetan (Tibetoburman) interrogative (adapted from Garrett 2001, 228) a. *nga I grod.khog stomach ltogsgi`duggas hungerdir.impq b. khyed.rang you grod.khog stomach ltogsgi`duggas hungerdir.impq Àre you hungry?' c. *kho he grod.khog stomach ltogsgi`duggas hungerdir.impq Garrett's claim is that d̀ug refers to the the origo, regardless of what kind of clause it occurs in. The origo is the person whose point of view is being represented in the clause, and the person whose point of view is represented in a declarative is the speaker, while in an interrogative it is the addressee. Nuuchahnulth provides further evidence for Garrett's approach, because while Ti betan evidentials can neither 1) be embedded under propositional attitude verbs nor 2) occur in adjunct clauses (Garrett 2001, ch. 5), there are some evidentials in Nuuchahnulth which can. Nuuchahnulth shows that the origo associated with a given clause is determined in specic ways. Propositional attitude verbs assign the attitude holder, usually their subject, as the origo of their complement clause, while the origo in an adjunct clause is some contextually determined individual. In (17) below, the visual inferential -Kuk is embedded under a proposi tional attitude verb. Here it is not the speaker who had seen lights on at Ken's house, it is the attitude holder Linda. (17) /uqlaamit/iS /uqla:p-(m)it-/i;S thinkpast3.ind Linda Linda Linda [walyuuKukq walyu:-Kuk-q homevis.evid3.sub Ken] Ken Ken `Linda thought Ken was home.' 7 1.2. Proposal In (18) below, -Kuk occurs in an adjunct clause, namely a reason clause. Again, here it is not the speaker who saw bread on the counter, it is Linda. (18) nujHak/iS nujHakv-/i;S proud3.ind Linda Linda Linda [/in /in comp ?aCikKuKazuk ?aCik-Kuk-’az-uk-0 know.howvis.evidnowposs3.abs TaNa TaNa child saapniqiil] sapni:-q-(j)i:l[L] breadstemmake `Linda is proud because it appears her daughter knows how to make bread now.' 1.2.2 Perspectival status The origo has a perspectivea point of view on the world (Kölbel 2002). There are things one origo believes are true that another origo does not. Whether or not a proposition is in an origo's perspective is the perspectival status of a proposition for an origo. Perspectival status is related to certainty, in that if a proposition is in an origo's perspective, that origo is certain the proposition is true. This is the distinction that is often made between direct and indirect evidentials (Willett 1988). If Kay sees Ken drive up, get out of his car, and come up the steps and enter the house, she is considered to have direct evidence for Ken arriving. But if she was in the backyard and heard the car drive up, the car door shut, and the front door shut, and inferred that Ken had arrived, she is considered to have indirect evidence for it. Most of the evidential morphemes in Nuuchahnulth specify a perspectival status, namely that the prejacent proposition is not in the origo's perspective (see Table 1.2 above). Thus, most would be classied as indirect evidentials. No evidential morpheme in Nuuchah nulth species that the prejacent proposition is in the origo's perspective: there are no direct evidentials in Nuuchahnulth. 1.2.3 Manner of support Returning to the scenario from Ÿ1.2.4 where I saw the woodpecker on the apple tree, what I perceived was a particular situation. That perceived situation is one which supports the proposition conveyed by (19). Witnessing is one manner of support through which an origo is connected to a proposition. (19) There's a woodpecker on the apple tree. Another manner of support is a contingent inference. Contingent inference is a kind of default reasoning; that is, reasoning with defeasible or contingent rules, rules that are usually valid, but which may not hold in any particular instance. When I rst heard the woodpecker on the apple tree, I was not certain that that was what it was. What I heard was a particular sound, and from that sound I inferred that it was a woodpecker. But this reasoning is not based solely on logicit was based on my experience of the world. I had seen woodpeckers on the tree in the past, and knew that the noise I heard was most likely an animal pecking at 8 1.2. Proposal wood. My past experience licenses the inference from hearing that sound to there probably being a woodpecker on the apple tree. However, I could have been mistaken: a dierent kind of bird could have been doing the pecking, and there is a also a wooden fence, and a wooden deck in my backyard that could have been on the receiving end of it. I made a contingent inference from the sound to the proposition. Westmoreland (1998) uses a similar concept, deduction, to describe the conditions of use of some evidentials, including the English epistemic modal must. A deduction occurs when the prejacent proposition is not known, but rather is inferred. Westmoreland also argues that deduction needs to allow the use of contingent rules of inference, but it is not clear whether it is limited to inference using contingent rules or can include other processes. For example, he suggests in section 3.3 that it should also include hunches. On the other hand, I take contingent inference to be limited to inferences where contingent rules are used. Modelling default reasoning is also the aim of Kratzer's (1981) use of an ordering source in her analysis of epistemic modalmüssen in German, and which she extended to Englishmust in her 1991 article on modality. This ordering source ranks possible worlds according to whether the things that happen in them are what normally happens. In other words, worlds are ranked according to whether some contextually determined contingent rules of inference hold. For Kratzer then, an epistemic modal indicates an inference to a conclusion which may not be true in the actual world. Kratzer's account does not account for the fact that the felicitous use of must requires that the prejacent situation cannot have been directly perceived. While some evidential morphemes encode a contingent inference manner of support, others encode that of a report. Rather than witnessing something myself, I can have someone else tell me about it. The other person may have witnessed it personally, or they could have been told about it as well. In Nuuchahnulth a speaker can signify that they are passing along something that they were told by using the sux -wA/iS `quotative'. Reportativesevidentials which encode a report manner of supportoccur in many languages, includingQuechua andLillooet. Faller (2002) analyzes the reportative inQuechua as a speech act modier, changing the speech act type from assertion to presenting, and changing the sincerity conditions from requiring that the speaker believe the prejacent to requiring that someone else asserted the prejacent. Matthewson et al. (2007) analyze the reportative in Lillooet as a modal, where the modal base is a contextually determined set of reported propositions. Evidential morphemes in Nuuchahnulth which encode a manner of support, either inference or report, also happen to encode the origo's belief state. This does not have to be the case. For example, Faller (2006) gives evidence to show that the reportative si in Quechua encodes manner of support, but not any particular perspectival status (namely, si can be used when the origo knows the prejacent is false). 9 1.3. Issues addressed 1.2.4 Perceptual grounding Propositions are about the world, and people are connected to the world by way of their senses. For example, I know that there is a woodpecker on the apple tree in my backyard because I can see it. I can also hear it, which is how I know to look out the window. There are two perceptual grounding relations between me and the proposition that there is a woodpecker on the apple tree: it is visually grounded, and it is auditorily grounded. Some of the evidential morphemes in Nuuchahnulth, namely -Kuk `visual inference' and na/a:t `auditory evidence', indicate the perceptual grounding between the origo and the perceived situation. The others do not specify any particular perceptual grounding. 1.3 Issues addressed I analyze evidentials as encoding one or more of the three factors of evidentiality perspectival status, manner of support, and perceptual grounding. Perspectival status is a relation between the origo and the prejacent proposition. It indicates whether the origo is agnostic about the truth of it. Manner of support is a relation between the perceived situation and the prejacent proposition. It indicates how the perceived situation supports the prejacent propositionwhether it is the situation in which the prejacent holds, or it is an utterance situation in which someone asserted the prejacent, or it gives the origo the means to infer the prejacent proposition. Perceptual grounding is a relation between the origo and the perceived situation. It indicates what sense the origo used in perceiving the situationwhether he or she perceived it visually, auditorily, etc. The presence of any one of the three factors is sucient to identify a morpheme as an evidential, but it is also possible for an evidential to encode more than one factor. For example, reportatives universally encode the manner of support, and in some languages, as in Nuuchahnulth, they also encode the perspectival status. This accounts for the contrast between languages where a reportative can be used felicitously when the origo believes the prejacent to be false (e.g., Quechua (Faller 2002)) and those where a reportative cannot be felicitously used in such a case (e.g., Lillooet (Matthewson et al. 2007) and Nuuchahnulth). Both -si in Quechua and -wA/iS in Nuuchahnulth indicate there was an utterance situation perceived by the origo in which someone asserted the prejacent proposition, but while -si can be used when the origo knows the prejacent is false (20a), -wA/iS can only be used when the origo does not know whether the prejacent is true or false (20b). 10 1.3. Issues addressed (20) a. Paykunas (s)heplsi ñoqamanqa Iillatop qulqita moneyacc muntuntinpi lotinclloc saqiywan, leave1o3 manamá notsurp riki right rikusqayki seepp2 ni not un one solta Solacc centavotapis centaccadd saqishawanchu leaveprog1o3neg `They left me a lot of money, but, as you have seen, they didn't leave me one sol, not one cent.' (Faller 2002, 191) b. /acyuumitwa/iS /acyu:-(m)it-wa;/iS shpast3.quot jakup/i jakup-/i; mandef `It is said that a man was shing.' I show that factoring out evidentials in this way receives support from: (i) their syntactic distribution; (ii) their semantic contribution; (iii) their sensitivity to perspectival status; (iv) their ability to cooccur with each other; and (v) their interaction with tense. I consider each of these issues in turn. 1.3.1 Themorphosyntactic distribution of evidentials inNuuchahnulth This factorial analysis of evidentiality predicts that a combination of morphemes can be used to indicate the evidentiality of a particular scenario. For example, in Nuuchahnulth, the auditory evidential na/a:t codes perceptual grounding, and can combine with the reportative, which codes manner of support. An illustrative example is given in (21). Here the quotative -wA/iS indicates that theKay inferred that Ken and his brother left, and the auditory evidential na/a:t adds to this, indicating that Kay's inference is based on something she heard. (21) Scenario: Kay lives next door to Ken and his brother, and she hears them getting ready to leave for work every morning. After they've left, it gets quiet. One morning she was talking to Bill, and she noticed it got quiet, so she said this to him. wikpi/azqaJa/al/iS wik-piz-’az-qa;Ja-/al-/i;S negin.house.momnow3.dubpl3.ind na/aat na/a:t aud.evid `It sounds like they all left.' The occurrence of multiple evidentials in a single clause, as illustrated in (21) above, is only possible because the evidentials in Nuuchahnulth do not belong to a single morpholog ical paradigm. Rather, Nuuchahnulth evidential morphemes are recruited from four distinct morphosyntactic classes: (i) mood suxes; (ii) mode suxes; (iii) derivational suxes (essen tially bound verbs); (iv) particles. This multiplicity and heterogeneity is compatible with Blain and Déchaine's (2006) Evidential Domain Hypothesis, which claims that evidentials can occur in a range of dierent syntactic domains. This is discussed further in Chapter 4. 11 1.3. Issues addressed 1.3.2 Model theoretic analysis of the factors of evidentiality In Chapter 5 I present an analysis of the factorization of evidentiality in model the oretic semantics. There I give the translations of the Nuuchahnulth evidentials, which are summarized briey below. I begin with the evidential mood suxes, whose translations are given in Table 1.3. Eachmood sux is a portmanteaumorpheme, marking both clause type and subject agreement (see Ÿ2.5.3 for further details). The dubitative mood -qAJa indicates that the origo can make an inference from the perceived situation to the prejacent proposition. The quotative mood -wA/iS indicates that the origo perceived an utterance situation in which someone asserted the prejacent proposition. The indirect interrogative mood -HAj yields a question which assumes that the answer will be in the quotative mood. The evidential moods also specify who the origo is, with -qAJa and -wA/iS indicating it is the speaker at the time of the utterance situation, while -HAj indicates it is the addressee at the time of his or her response. Evidential Gloss Translation -qa;Ja1 `dubitative' λpλw[cont.inf(o∗)(s1)(p) ∧ w=ws1 ] -wa;/iS1 `quotative' λpλw[report(o∗)(s1)(p) ∧ w=ws1 ] -Ha;j1 `indirect interrogative' λp[Int(λw[report(o∗∗)(s1)(p) ∧ w=ws1 ])] Table 1.3: Translations of Nuuchahnulth evidential mood morphemes Mode suxes are inectional, and include a number of morphemes with modal mean ings. The two evidential mode suxes have the translations given in Table 1.4. The general inferential -matak indicates that the origo can make an inference from the perceived situation to the prejacent proposition. The past inferential -ckvI also indicates that the origo can make an inference from the perceived situation to the prejacent proposition, but in addition species that the prejacent proposition held before the perceived situation occurred. Evidential Gloss Translation -matak1 `inference' λPλsλoλw[cont.inf(o)(s1)(P(s)) ∧ w=ws1 ] -ckvi;1 `past inference' λPλsλoλw[cont.inf(o)(s1)(w)(P(s)) ∧ ts < ts1 ∧ w=ws1 ] Table 1.4: Translations of Nuuchahnulth evidential mode suxes The derivation sux -Kuk `visual inference' has the translation in Table 1.5. It indicates that the origo saw the perceived situation, and can make an inference from that situation to the prejacent proposition. 12 1.3. Issues addressed Evidential Gloss Translation -Kuk1 `visual inference' λPλsλoλw[groundingvis(s)(o)(s1)(P) ∧ cont.inf(o)(s)(P(s1))∧ ts1= ts ∧ w=ws] Table 1.5: Translation of Nuuchahnulth evidential derivational sux Particles are freestanding words which cannot host any axes. The particle na/a:t `auditory evidence' has the translation in Table 1.6. It indicates that the origo has heard the perceived situation, but does not specify how that situation supports the prejacent proposition. Evidential Gloss Translation na/a:t1 `auditory evidence' λPλsλoλw[groundingaud(s)(o)(s1)(P) ∧ speaker(o)(P(s1))∧ ts1 = ts ∧ w=ws] Table 1.6: Translation of Nuuchahnulth evidential particle 1.3.3 The origo: how it gets its value The origo has functions beyond those involved in evidentiality. It is in eect a centred world, in the terms of Lewis (1979), or rather, a centered situation (Stephenson 2010), which Lewis uses to handle the distinction between de dicto and de se attitudes. This is illustrated by the following. Ken hears a car alarm going o, and says I hope someone is stealing his car. What he doesn't realize is that it's his car. He has a de dicto belief about someone who happens to be him as the owner of the car whose alarm is going o. He certainly doesn't mean I hope someone is stealing my car, which would be a de se belief about himself. The origo is thus necessary for the evaluation of the truth of a proposition. Having a belief about oneself as a centring individual is dierent from having a belief about oneself objectively. The origo is also conceptually related to the judge argument of predicates of personal taste (Lasersohn 2005, Stephenson 2007b), which Stephenson (2007b,a) extends to epistemic modals. As I explain in Chapter 5, an origo is a sentient individual paired with a particular situation; a judge is simply that individual. Onions taste horrible is evaluated with respect to an origo, and can be true or false depending on who the origo is. The origo there is the speaker, but it does not have to be, as in Guy Maddin thinks onions taste horrible. Here the truth of the sentence depends on evaluating onions taste horrible with respect to Guy Maddin. In Chapter 6 I discuss the properties of the origo, focussing on how it is determined, and how the readings of evidential morphemes change in dierent environments. As with judges and centred worlds, an origo variable can be bound. For example, in complement clauses 13 1.4. Methodology and data presentation the origo is the subject of the embedding verb. 1.3.4 Levels ofmeaning: dierences between the evidential relations and the prejacent proposition It is generally assumed that evidential relations do not have the same pragmatic eect as the prejacent proposition (Aikhenvald 2004). They instead behave as if they consist of notat issue content, projecting through various operators, such as negation Simons et al. (2010). Not atissue content is a dierent level of meaning from standard truthconditional, or atissue content. While evidentials contribute notatissue content, their prejacent propositions are at issue content. We can therefore compare the semantic contribution of evidential morphemes with that of their prejacent propositions. I look at this in Chapter 7, where I give tests showing that Nuuchahnulth evidentials are notatissue. I also present a modication of the analysis of Chapter 5 which is based on Potts's (2005) treatment of conventional implicatures. 1.3.5 The perceived situation: interactions between evidentials and temporalmorphemes A perceived situation is a small part of the world, and it is limited in time. In Chapter 8 I look at the temporal aspect of situations and their interaction with evidential morphemes. Dierent evidential morphemes interact dierently with temporal morphemes, depending on how the evidential morpheme makes use of the perceived situation in its semantics. One evidential morpheme, -ckvI `past inference' also explicitly encodes a temporal relationship between the perceived situation and the time of the prejacent proposition. I argue that sensory evidentialsthose which encode perceptual groundingmust be composed with the predicate before tense because they add a restriction on the situation argument of the predicate. In addition, the situation argument of the function resulting from the composition of a sensory evidential with the predicate is not the event situation, but the perceived situation. This limits the ways in which temporal morphemes and sensory evidentials can interact. 1.4 Methodology and data presentation Most of the data on Nuuchahnulth in this dissertation comes from original eldwork I conducted with two speakers of the Ahousaht dialect. Both elders are women, and Nuu chahnulth is their rst language. Together with these consultants I built Nuuchahnulth sentences and a scenario where they could be used felicitously (see Matthewson (2004) on eldwork practices for semantics). A scenario is like a small model of the world, containing all 14 1.5. Organization of the dissertation the relevant pieces of information. When I present data, I give both a scenario and a sentence, as in (22) below. I have also standardized the names of people across all scenarios, to help the reader keep track of who is who. In every example the speaker is named Kay, and the addressee is Bill. If Kay has a report, it comes from Linda. Kay speaker Bill addressee Linda embedded speaker/attitude holder Ken/Ann main event participant John other event participant Table 1.7: Cast of characters Thus, in (22) below, Linda rst told Kay something like Mizaa/iS `It's raining', and then Kay is telling Bill the sentence given, namely Mizaawa/iS `It's raining (reportedly)'. (22) Scenario: Kay and Bill were inside, where there were no windows, when she had a phone call from Linda who told her that it was raining out. Afterwards, Kay said this to Bill. Mizaawa/iS Miz-(y)a;-wa;/iS raincont3.quot `It's raining (reportedly).' The subject of a sentence will be called Ken, or Ann if the context requires a female. When an additional person is required by the scenario, I call him John. 1.5 Organization of the dissertation The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents some basic properties ofNuuchahnulth grammarwhichwill aid the reader in following the examples. Chapter 3 discusses other accounts of evidentials in the literature. Chapter 4 presents the evidential morphemes in Nuuchahnulth in descriptive terms, and also contrasts them with similar kinds of morphemes, highlighting the criterial properties of evidentials. Chapter 5 lays out a theory of the semantics of evidential morphemes, and gives the semantics of those in Nuuchahnulth. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 each look at how the theory handles certain interactions between evidentiality and other aspects of grammar. In Chapter 6 I look at how the origo is determined in dierent clauses. In Chapter 7 I compare the prejacent proposition and the evidential relations, arguing that the evidential relations are notatissue, while the prejacent proposition is atissue. In Chapter 8 I examine the interactions between evidential morphemes 15 1.5. Organization of the dissertation and temporal morphemes. Finally, I discuss a number of unresolved issues and other areas for further research in Chapter 9. 16 Chapter 2 Some basic facts about Nuuchahnulth 2.1 A user's guide toNuuchahnulth This chapter serves two purposes. First, to acquaint the reader with the basic facts of Nuuchahnulth grammar in order to facilitate understanding of the data presented throughout this dissertation. Second, to acquaint the reader with properties of the grammar which will be used to make certain arguments about the nature of the origo (Chapter 6), and about tense (Chapter 8). If any readers wish a broader discussion of Nuuchahnulth grammar, I refer them to Swadesh (1933), Rose (1981), Nakayama (1997, 2001) andDavidson (2002). Of these authors, only Nakayama is writing specically about the Ahousaht dialect, though much of what the others say holds for Ahousaht as well. Many of the morphological processes are also discussed and analyzed by Stonham (1999) and Kim (2003). A number of works on various subparts of the grammar of Nuuchahnulth have also been published; see Davis and Wojdak (2007) for a summary. There is a multidialect wordlist (Nuuchahnulth Tribal Council 1991) as well as a dictionary of the Tseshaht dialect (Stonham 2005). 2.2 Phonemic inventory Nuuchahnulth has a relatively large consonant inventory, with a total count of 34 consonants. The vowel inventory is more modest: there are ve vowels, with a length contrast. I present each inventory in turn. 2.2.1 Consonant inventory: 38 consonants The consonant inventory of Nuuchahnulth is given in Figure 2.1. In addition to a plain series of stops /p, t, k, kv, q, qv, ?, //, fricatives /s, S, l, x, xv, X, Xv, H, h/, aricates /c, j, z/, nasals /m, n/, and glides /y, w/, Nuuchahnulth also has a corresponding glottalized series. This includes glottalized stops P, T, K, Kv, glottalized fricatives /C, J, Z/, glottalized nasals /M, N/, and glottalized glides /Y, W/. 17 2.2. Phonemic inventory velar uvular lab ia l alv eo lar pa lat al lat er al un ro un de d ro un de d un ro un de d ro un de d ph ar yn ge al gl ot ta l plain p t k kv q qv ? /stops glottalized P T K Kv fricatives s S l x xv X Xv H h plain c j zaricates glottalized C J Z plain m nnasals glottalized M N plain y wglides glottalized Y W Figure 2.1: Nuuchahnulth Consonant inventory Glottalized resonantsnamely the glottalized nasals /M, N/ and glides /Y, W/are pho netically realized as a sequence of a glottal stop and a resonant (Carlson et al. 2001, Kim 2003). Note that there is a rounding contrast in the velar and uvular series. The velars/k/ and /x/ contrast with the rounded velars /kv/ and /xv/. Similarly, the uvulars /q/ and /X/ contrast with the rounded uvulars /qv/ and /Xv/. Uvular fricatives are a locus of dialect variation. In Ahousaht (which is the focus of this thesis), unrounded and rounded uvular fricativesnamely /X/ and /Xv/occur in a number of roots and suxes. This contrasts with the Kyuquot dialect, where uvular fricatives are almost entirely absent (Rose 1981, 13). 2.2.2 Vowel inventory: ve vowels and a length contrast Nuuchahnulth has a basic vevowel inventory, with two high vowels /i/ and /u/ two mid vowels /e/ and /o/, and one low vowel /a/. In addition, there is phonemic length contrast, so each vowel has a contrasting long and short form. This yields a total inventory of 10 vowels, as shown in Figure 2.2.2. In the orthography, short vowels are written as a single vowel (i, u, e o, a), while long vowels are written as doubled vowels (ii, uu, ee, oo, aa). In addition to phonemic vowel length, vowel length is also aected by the morphology: some morphological contexts require that the vowel of the target form be short, while other contexts require that the vowel of the target form be long. This gives rise to variable length 18 2.3. Morphophonology Short vowels Long vowels i u i: u: e o e: o: a a: Figure 2.2: Nuuchahnulth vowel inventory vowels; these are discussed below in Ÿ2.3.2.2. AlthoughNuuchahnulth has a vevowel system, the three outermost vowelsnamely /i/, /u/ and /a/ of the short series, and /i:/, /u:/ and /a:/ of the long serieshave a privileged status. These outermost vowels are the most common, and can occur in any word. On the other hand, the mid vowelsnamely /e/ and /o/ of the short series, and /e:/ and /o:/ of the long series are much more restricted in their distribution. For example, the mid vowels occur solely in borrowings (e.g. //e:pinis/ `apple'), interjections and expressive particles (e.g., /ze:ko/ `thank you'). There is also a phonological process in vocatives that changes /i/i:/ to [e:] and /u/u:/ to [o:] (Stonham 1999). 2.3 Morphophonology The surface formof stems and axes is determinedby anumber ofmorphophonological processes. Here I briey survey the processes that aect the realization of stems (Ÿ2.3.1) and axes (Ÿ2.3.2). 2.3.1 Morphophonology of stems Morphological processes that alter the form of the stem divide into two classes ac cording to whether they target the left edge or right edge of the stem. I consider each in turn. 2.3.1.1 At the left edge: templatic reduplication and vowel length Two processes target the left edge of the stem: templatic reduplication, and templatic vowellength. They may occur independently of each other, in combination with each other, or in combination with a sux (Kim 2003). An example of templatic vowellength is given in (23), where graduative aspect ismarked by a longshort vowel template, i.e. [. . . VV. . . V. . . ]. Observe that in (18a), the vowel melody of `kill' is shortlong [. . . V. . . VV. . . ]. In contrast, the presence of graduative aspect in (18b) 19 2.3. Morphophonology is associated with a longshort vowel template: [. . . VV. . . V. . . ]. In the gloss this longshort template is represented as [LS]. (23) a. qaHsaap qaH-sa;p diemom.caus `kill' b. qaaHsap qaH-sa;p-[LS] diemom.causgrad `beat up' Templatically conditioned vowellength is a pervasive feature ofNuuchahnulth suxal morphology, and many suxes are distinguished from each other only by the vowel template that they condition. For example there are two forms of the sux -(j)il, according to the vowel template it is associated with. -(j)il, `blame' subcategorizes for a longlong vowel template with CV reduplication (24a). But -(j)il, `be named' is associated only with CV reduplication (24b). As before, the templatic requirements of the sux are represented in square brackets: [RLL] in (24a), [R] in (24b). The [R] notation indicates that this sux also conditions reduplicative prexation. Illustrative examples showing how these suxes combine with specic stems are provided in (25). (24) a. [RED. . . VV][. . . VV. . . ](j)il `blame' b. [RED](j)il `be named' (25) a. /uu/uukvil /u-(j)il[RLL] transblame `blame someone' b. /u/ukvil /u-(j)il[R] transbe.named `be called somthing' (25a) is a context where reduplicative prexation and templatic vowel length cooccur. But it is also possible for reduplicative prexation to occur by itself, as in (25b). Nuuchahnulth reduplicants most often take the form of a prexal [CV] syllable, where reduplication copies the rst CV of the base and attaches it to the left edge. This is illustrated in (25a) below, where the locative sux /-Hta/ `at feet' triggers reduplicative CV prexation. 20 2.3. Morphophonology (26) MaMalHta Mal-Hta[R] coldat.feet `have cold feet' A smaller number of suxes trigger reduplicative prexation of CVC*, where C* copies whatever number of coda consonants are present in the base. If the base lacks a coda consonant, then an epenthetic consonant is inserted. One such sux is progressive aspect /-(y)a;/, which is associated with a longlong vowel template and a reduplicative CVC* prex, (27). Illustrative examples are given in (28). If the base has multiple consonants in the coda, as with /Ti:ck/ `clatter', then they are all copied in the reduplicative prex, (28a). But if the base has no coda, then the reduplicative prex contains an epenthetic consonant in the coda, either /z/ (28b), /l/ (28c) or /c/ (28d). (27) [RED CVVC][BASE ...VV... ](y)a; (28) a. TiickTiicka Ti:ck-(y)a[RLL] clatterrep `be thundering' b. suuzsuuya su-(y)a;[RLL] takerep CV stem with /z/ epenthesis `be taking' c. JiilJiiya Ji-(y)a[RLL] carverep CV stem with /l/ epenthesis `be carving' d. zaaczaaya za-(y)a[RLL] choprepetitive CV stem with /c/ epenthesis `chopping (wood etc.)' 2.3.1.2 At the right edge: glottalization and lenition Two morphophonological processes target the right edge of the stem: glottalization and lenition. They are triggered by the addition of particular suxes, and they aect only the nal consonant of the stem. Glottalization is discussed rst, then lenition. Glottalization, or hardening, is a lexically specied process, where a glottalizing sux such as /-’az/ `now' changes a stemnal obstruent into its corresponding ejective (see Kim 2003). The process is somewhat more complicated than this oneline description suggests, 21 2.3. Morphophonology however. There are three cases to consider. First, when a glottalizing sux attaches to a stem ending in a /k/, such as /katak/ `very happy' in (29a), the result is the ejective /K/. One quirk to note here is that a uvular stop becomes a pharyngeal stop [?] as the result of glottalization, as illustrated in (29b). (29) a. kataKaz katak-’az very.happynow `be very happy (now)' b. Pusakva?azsiS Pus-(/)a;kv-(q)aq[SS]-’az-si;S tiredduraugnow1sg.ind `I'm very tired now.' Second, when a glottalizing sux attaches to a stem that ends in a vowel, then the stem vowel may be deleted, leaving only the vowel of the sux (Stonham 1999, 85). This remaining vowel is long if it is in the second syllable (30a), and short if it is in the third or later syllable (30b). This rule generally holds, though there are many cases where a glottal stop is inserted between the two morphemes, as in (30c). (30) a. /anaaz /ana-’az onlynow `only (now)' b. Kaminuzckvaz Kaminu(z)-ckvi;-’az fullpast.evidnow `It must have gotten lled (now).' c. waa/az wa:-’az saynow `say (now).' Finally, when a stem ends in a fricative, the eect of the glottalizing sux depends on whether it is a peripheral or core sux. (On the peripheral/core distinction, see Ÿ2.4 below). In the context of a peripheral sux such as /-’az/ `now', a glottal stop is inserted, (31a). In the context of a core sux such as /-’aqz/ `in.body', coronal fricatives change to a glottalized palatal glide [Y], while rounded fricatives change to a glottalized labiovelar glide [W]. This is illustrated in (31b) with the stem /hiS-/ `all'. 22 2.3. Morphophonology (31) a. hiinuml/az hi:numl-’az be.bornnow `be born (now)' b. hiYaqz hiS-’aqz allin.body `eat all (of something)' In addition to glottalization, the other process that targets the rightedge of stems is lenition (or softening), whereby stemnal fricatives become glides (Kim 2003). The suxes that trigger lenition form a relatively small set. For example, in the context of the locative sux /-‘i?/ `in the house', vowelnal stems lose their nal vowel (32a), while stems that end in a stop remain unchanged (32b). But if the nal consonant of the stem is an alveolar fricative, then it changes to a palatal glide [y], as in (32c).1 (32) a. hitiil hita-‘i;l locin.house `in the house' b. wikil wik-‘i;l negin.house `Ken isn't home.' c. Haayil Ha:l-‘i;l therein.house `there (in the house).' 2.3.2 Morphophonology of axes There are some suxes in Nuuchahnulth whose form is dependent on some property of the stem. These suxes contain either ghost consonantsconsonants whose surface real ization is dependent on the stemor variablelength vowelsvowels whose surface realization is dependent on the stem. 1In the Ahousaht dialect, lenition seems to be limited to aecting /s/ and /l/ (Kim 2003, 9496). This contrasts with the Tseshaht dialect, where postalveolar fricatives also become [y], and rounded fricatives become [w] (Stonham 1999, 71) 23 2.3. Morphophonology 2.3.2.1 Ghost consonants Some suxes in Nuuchahnulth begin with a consonant only when they attach to a stem ending in a vowel or nasal (Swadesh 1933). I call these ghost consonants (Waldie 2008), and I indicate them in the underlying forms by enclosing them in brackets. For example, the sux /-(w)a[RLL]/ `speak' surfaces with an initial [w] when it attaches to a stem that ends in a vowel, as in (33a). But when the same sux attaches to a stem that ends in a nonnasal consonant, as in (33b), then the initial [w] of the sux is not retained. (33) a. /aa/aapHiwa /a:pHi;-(w)a[RLL] friendlyspeak `warm friendly greeting' b. quuquu/aca qu:/ac-(w)a[RLL] personspeak `speaking one's own language (First Nations)' There is a single suxnal ghost consonant in Nuuchahnulth, /z/, which occurs only in momentaneous suxes, such as /-Si(z)/ `momentaneous' and /-pi(z)/ `in the house (momenta neous)'. It does not follow the same rules as the suxinitial ghost consonants. The only time it does not appear in the surface form is when it is followed directly by a glottalizing sux, such as -’at `shift', in which case a glottal stop appears in its place. In (34a), the sux /-Si(z)/ is wordnal, and so it surfaces with [z]. But in (34b), the same sux is now followed by the glottalizing sux /-’at/ `now': in this context the ghost consonant of /-Si(z)/ is replaced by the glottal stop [/]. (As an aside, observe that in (34b), the nonghost [z] of the sux /-’az/ `now' does not delete, but rather is glottalized by the following glottalizing mood sux /-’i;/.) (34) a. waHSiz waH-Si(z) abandonmom `throw away' b. waHSi/aZi waH-Si(z)-’az-’i; abandonmomnow2sg.imp `throw it away' 2.3.2.2 Variablelength vowels Recall that there are three kinds of underlying vowel in Nuuchahnulth: short, long and variable length. Underlying short vowels are indicated by the vowel symbol alone /i u a/ and 24 2.4. Morpheme order always surface as short, unless they are aected by a vowel lengthening process. Underlying long vowels are indicated by the vowel symbol followed by two dots /i: u: a:/ and always surface as long, unless they are aected by a vowel shortening process. Variablelength vowels, indicated by the vowel symbol followed by a single dot /i; u; a;/, surface as long if they are within the rst two syllables of a word, and short if they occur in the third syllable or later. One sux that contains a variablelength vowel is the thirdperson indicative mood /-/i;S/. When this sux occurs in the second syllable, as in (35a) below, the vowel surfaces as long. When it occurs in a later syllable, as in (35b), the vowel surfaces as short. (35) a. wik/iiS wik-/i;S neg3.ind `He/she/it isn't . . . ' b. /uuHCi/iS /u-HCi;[R]-/i;S transcook.over.re3.ind `He/she is cooking . . . ' 2.4 Morpheme order Nuuchahnulth verbs typically consist of multiple morphemes, and these morphemes are ordered in a particular way. The verb stem is the leftmost element of the verbal complex: it consists of a base, which may sometimes surface with a reduplicative prex, (36). (See discussion above in (2.3.1.1) for how reduplication prexation is introduced.) (36) [VERB.STEM (red)  BASEROOT ] The verbstem is followed by a succession of suxes. These suxes are traditionally analyzed as falling into two classes: the core suxes versus the peripheral suxes (Nakayama 2001). Swadesh (1933, 1938) calls these two sets of suxes formative and incremental; these labels are also used in the grammatical description of Sapir and Swadesh (1939). 2.4.1 The core/periphery distinction and themorpheme template Core suxes occur closer to the verb stem, and include derivational and aspectual suxes. Peripheral suxes occur further away from the verb stem, and include mode, valence and tense, mood, and an assortment of discourselevel suxes. The template in (37) summarizes the relative ordering of the core and peripheral suxes. (37) [Verb.Stem][DerivationalAspectual]︸                               ︷︷                               ︸ ModeValence/TenseMoodDiscourse︸                                                   ︷︷                                                   ︸ Core Suffixes Peripheral Suffixes 25 2.4. Morpheme order 2.4.2 Secondposition eects Another dierence between core and peripheral suxes relates to their interaction with secondposition eects (Nakayama 1997, 2001, Davidson 2002,Werle 2007). Peripheral suxes are invariably in the second position of the clause; as such they behave like second position clitics. In contrast, core suxes are ordinary suxes, in that they usually attach to the stem they are associated with. 2.4.2.1 Peripheral suxes are always in second position This distributional dierence between core and peripheral suxes is illustrated in (38) below. In (38a) the core sux -qInu(z) `at.head.mom' and the peripheral suxes -(m)it `past' and -/IS `3.ind' (underlined) all occur on the verb, which is the rst word of the clause. In (38b) the core sux remains with the verb when it is not the rst word in the clause, while the peripheral suxes remain attached to the rst word, which is hiikvalSiz `almost' in this case. (38) a. hisqiinuzit/iS his-qi;nu(z)-(m)it-/i;S hit.with.objecton.head.mompast3.ind John John John /uukvil /u-(j)il[L] transdo.to Ken Ken Ken `John hit Ken in the head.' b. hiikvalSizit/iS hi:kval-Si(z)-(m)it-/i;S nearlymompast3.ind John John John hisqiinuz his-qi;nu(z) hit.with.objecton.head.mom /uukvil /u-(j)il[L] transdo.to Ken Ken Ken `John almost hit Ken in the head.' The example in (38b) also illustrates the typical sentenceinitial position of adverbial modiers. I discuss this further in Ÿ2.6 below. Another positional dierence between core/periphery suxes arises in clauses that contain a series of predicates (Nakayama 1997, 2001). In such multipredicate clauses, each predicate hosts distinct core suxes, but the peripheral suxes occur only on the rst (i.e. leftmost) predicate. This is illustrated in (39), which contains three predicates, from left to right: the focus predicate //uH/, the causative predicate /hiSsiik/ `make all', and the activity predicate /siqiil/ `cook'. The peripheral suxes /-(m)it/ `past' and /-/i;S/ `3sg indicative' attach to the leftmost predicate, namely the focus predicate //uH/. The other two predicates host one core sux each: the causative predicate /hiSsiik/ `make all' hosts the core sux /-si:k/ `complete'; the activity predicate /siqiil/ `cook' hosts the core suxal verb /-(j)i:l[L]/ `make'. (39) /uHit/iS /uH-(m)it-/i;S focpast3.ind Kay Kay Kay hiSsiik hiS-si:k allcomplete siqiil siq-(j)i:l[L] cookedmake sapnii/i sapni:-/i; breaddef `It was Kay who cooked all the bread.' 26 2.4. Morpheme order 2.4.2.2 Core suxes are sometimes in second position Although it is true that peripheral suxes always have the distribution of 2nd position clitics, the distribution of core suxes is more complex. While core suxes usually attach directly to the stem they modify, they do sometimes exhibit second position eects (Nakayama 1997b, Werle 2007). For example, suxal verbs (Nakayama 1993, Waldie 2004, Wojdak 2008, Stonham 2009)which are usually classied as core derivational suxesare hosted either by their argument or by a semantically empty stem //u-/. A representative list of suxal verbs is given in Table 2.1. -’i;c `ingest' -(j)i:l[L] `make' -na;k `have' -’a;p `buy' -(j)il[RSS] `be named' Table 2.1: A sample of suxal verbs An example of a suxal verb is given in (40). In (40a), the suxal verb /-/a:p/ `buy' is hosted by the dummy stem //u-/, yielding [/u/aap] as a surface form, though the following past sux /-(m)it/ causes the nal /p/ to nasalize. Observe that the nominal complement /maHTi:/ `house' occurs as an independent lexical item in (40a). This contrasts with (40b), where /maHTa/ `house' now hosts the suxal verb /-/a:p/ `buy', yielding the surface form [maHTa/aap]. (40) a. /u/aamit/iS /u-/a:p-(m)it-/i;S transbuypast3.ind maHTii maHTi: house jakup jakup man À man bought a house.' (Wojdak 2008, 29) b. maHTa/aamit/iS maHTa-/a:p-(m)it-/i;S housebuypast3.ind jakup jakup man À man bought a house.' (Wojdak 2008, 29) Another way in which suxal verbs participate in second position eects relates to their interactionwithmodiers. When they combinewith an argument that is itselfmodifer, the host for the suxal verb is the leftmost element of the nominal phrase. Since a modier precedes its head (see Ÿ2.6), this means the verbal suxes may sometimes be hosted by adjectives. An example is given in (41). 27 2.5. Peripheral suxes in more detail: their status as inectional morphemes (41) a. ha/um/ic/iS/al ha/um-’i;c-/i;S-/al tastyingest3.indpl /eepinis /e:pinis apple `They are eating apples' (Wojdak 2008, 3) b. /eepiniYic/iS/al /e:pinis-’i;c-/i;S-/al appleingest3.indpl `They are eating apples' (Wojdak 2008, 3) Suxal verbs have been the topic of a number of formal syntactic accounts. Davis and Sawai (2001), discussing whquestions, argue that nouns incorporated under suxal verbs have undergone head movement, raising to V. While this works for simple NPs consisting only of an N, Wojdak (2008) shows it is problematic for complex NPs, since it is the leftmost element of the NP, regardless of its syntactic position, which is incorporated. She instead argues for PF incorporation, whereby incorporation occurs for phonological reasonssuxal verbs are suxes and thus require a host. A suxal verb attaches to the leftmost element of its complement at PF. Waldie (2004) presents a similar analysis, though attributing the selection of the leftmost element to its higher semantic scope. Woo (2007a) points out that this predicts that modiers which appear to the right of the noun will be incorporated, contrary to fact. She also notes that adjectives preceded by an adverb are problematic because the adverb, while leftmost in the NP, only has scope over the adjective. Woo (2007a,b) identies a subset of suxal verbs which she calls prepositional predi cates, and which she analyzes as light verbs heading a vP. These introduce nominal arguments in particular thematic roles (e.g., /uuHWal introduces instruments). Functional prepositional predicates are similar but introduce nominal arguments in particular grammatical roles (e.g., /uukvil introduces objects). Woo proposes that the vP projected by a prepositional predicate is adjoined to the vP projected by the main verb, allowing either v to raise by headmovement to MoodP. Functional prepositional predicates are treated as complements of the main verb. 2.5 Peripheral suxes inmore detail: their status as inectionalmorphemes Recall from above that the verb stem is followed by a series of suxes, which subdivide into two position classes: the core suxes, and the peripheral suxes. The relative order of these suxes as in (42). (42) [Verb.Stem][DerivationalAspectual]︸                               ︷︷                               ︸ ModeValence/TenseMoodDiscourse︸                                                   ︷︷                                                   ︸ Core Suffixes Peripheral Suffixes 28 2.5. Peripheral suxes in more detail: their status as inectional morphemes Most evidential morphemes in Nuuchahnulth belong to the set of peripheral suxes. For the purposes of this discussion, I focus on four classes of inectional morphemes: those that codemode, tense, mood and discourselevel properties. Inwhat follows, I briey introduce each of these inectional morpheme classes. 2.5.1 Mode suxes codemodal force The term mode sux was introduced by Rose (1981) for a set of peripheral suxes which occur in a single morphological location. As shown in (43), these suxes are the leftmost peripheral suxes in the verb complex. (43) [Verb.Stem][DerivationalAspectual]︸                               ︷︷                               ︸ ModeValence/TenseMoodDiscourse︸                                                    ︷︷                                                    ︸ Core Suffixes Peripheral Suffixes Although mode suxes are not all in complementary distribution, they all have mean ings associated with modalssentences containing mode suxes are often translated with might, must, could, should, will and would. Table 2.2 gives the complete list of mode suxes which I have found in Ahousaht. -matak inferential -ckvi; past inferential -/aqz future -cum deontic -’a;H irrealis Table 2.2: Mode suxes in Nuuchahnulth This set of suxes is important for us because it contains two evidentials, namely -matak `inference' and -ckvI `past inference'. (These are discussed in detail in chapter 4.) The modal force of the mode suxes is most easily seen with future -/aqz `future', deontic -cum (which also appears as -cim), and the irrealis -’AH. I consider each in turn. The future -/aqz appears in (44) below, where it indicates that the proposition will be true in the future. (44) hiikval/aqz hi:kval-/aqz-0 nearlyfut3.abs wiiKitSizsa wiKi:t-Si(z)-sa[LS] not.existmomsuper `Soon there will be none left.' The sux -cum `should' occurs in (45) in its alternate form -cim. Here it has deontic force, indicating that in the speaker's opinion, it would be best if the subject saw a doctor. 29 2.5. Peripheral suxes in more detail: their status as inectional morphemes (45) /ucajizcim /u-caji(z)-cim-0 transgo.toshould3.abs /uuStaqyu /u:Staqyu doctor `He should go see the doctor.' But there are also cases where translating -cum as `should' would be wrong. While it is the only mode sux used in deontic contexts, it also occurs in contexts which do not seem deontic at all. In both sentences in (46) -cum occurs in a main clause following a clause in the imperative. The clause containing -cum gives what the result will be if the addressee does not take the action indicated in the imperative clause. (46) a. ha/uKvi, ha/uk-’i; eat2sg.imp KaSsaapcumsiS KaS-sa;p-cum-si;S be.storedcausshould1sg.ind kaakanak/itk kakani-/a;k-/itk toyposs2sg.rel `Eat, or I will put your toys away.' b. kuukviis/i, ku:k-i;s-’i; lunchcarry2sg.imp haWiiqzstuzcum/ick haWi:qz-stuz-cum-/i;ck hungrybecomeshould2sg.ind `Take a lunch, you might get hungry.' As for the irrealis mode sux -’AH, it is used in counterfactual conditionals, as shown in (47) below. Rose (1981) shows that it can be used in other irrealis environments as well in the Kyuquot dialect, but I have no data to conrm this in the Ahousaht dialect at present. (47) na/uukitquuj na/u:k-(m)it-qu:j go.alongpast3.cond.inf /u/aaPatuKvaHitwa/iS /u-’a;p-’at-uk-’a;H-(m)it-wa;/iS transbuyshiftpossirrpast3.quot candy candy candy `If he had gone with him, he (his uncle) would have bought him candy.' 2.5.2 Valence and tense suxes: amixed bunch Going from lefttoright in the verb complex, the next set of inectional suxes are the ones that occur after the mode suxes, but before the mood suxes: (48) [Verb.Stem][DerivationalAspectual]︸                               ︷︷                               ︸ ModeValence/TenseMoodDiscourse︸                                                     ︷︷                                                     ︸ Core Suffixes Peripheral Suffixes Other than the fact that they constitute a position class, this set of suxes are quite heterogeneous, and include morphemes that code valency and temporal force. I give here only those for which I have data in the Ahousaht dialect. The suxes are listed in Table 2.3 in their relative order. 30 2.5. Peripheral suxes in more detail: their status as inectional morphemes -’a;p -’az -’at -uk/-/ak -(m)it causative now shift possessive past Table 2.3: Ordering of premood suxes In what follows, I consider each of these suxes in turn, namely causative -’a;p, the temporal modier -’az `now', the shifter -’at, the possessive markers -uk and -/ak, and the past marker -(m)it. 2.5.2.1 Valency extending: causative -’Ap The causative that occurs as a peripheral sux is of interest in the context of the present discussion because it can be used to determine the relative order of suxes. It appears in (49) below. (49) /uqHsaa/aPi /u-(q)Hsa;-’a;p-’i; transamongcaus2sg.imp Cistuup Cistuup string `Put the string among it.' Note that not all causatives are part of this position class. Many causatives are port manteau morphemes with aspect, and so occur closer to the stem, where aspectual suxes (which are part of the set of core suxes) are usually found. 2.5.2.2 The temporalmodier -’az `now' Another sux that is part of this position class is the temporal sux -’az, which is glossed as `now'. But this gloss does not do it justice. It is generally involved in temporal sequencing, relating the time of one clause to another. It is not present tense, as it can occur with the past -(m)it. There is not much more I can say about it now, except that it needs to be studied. As with the causative, I only make use of it in determining sux ordering. 2.5.2.3 Valency shifting: -’at As for the morpheme -’at, which following Nakayama (1997) is glossed as `shift', much has been written about it. It has been called a passive (Rose and Carlson 1984) and an inverse (Whistler 1985), while Nakayama claims it is neither (see also Muehlbauer and Waldie 2009). It can promote the object to subject, and it is obligatory when a third person acts on a rst person, thus forcing the rstperson subject agreement to appear. Most problematic for a passive analysis, -’at can also appear on intransitive verbs, giving a generic reading. In short, if the grammatical subject is not the underlying subject, this sux will probably be there. 31 2.5. Peripheral suxes in more detail: their status as inectional morphemes While -’at belongs to the set of peripheral suxes, it is unique among them in its behaviour. Because a peripheral sux occurs on the rst predicate in a clause, it is expected that each peripheral sux can only occur once per clause, on the rst predicate. This is true for all peripheral suxes, with the single exception of -’at, which obligatorily occurs on every predicate in a clause. The reason for this is not clear, but the data is nevertheless robust. Consider the two examples below. In (50), there are two predicates in themain clause, /ayaqH `many' and hiixvatHi `angry', and both are inected with -’at. Here, the occurrence of -’at marks a generic subject on both predicates, literally `people are many and people are angry'. Observe that the embedded clause in (50) is introduced by the complementizer /in, and that embedded predicate /ayaaKva/ap `destroyed a lot' is not inected with -’at. The absence of -’at in the embedded clause is consistent with the fact that there the subject of the embedded clause, namely Ken, is both the underlying and surface subject of the embedded clause. (50) /ayaqH/at/iS /aya-(q)H-’at-/i;S manysimshift3.ind hiixvatHat hi:xvatHi-’at angry.withshift Ken Ken Ken /in /in comp /ayaakva/ap /aya-(/a)kva-’a;p manydestroyedcaus taana ta:na money `There's lots of people mad at Ken for spending lots of money.' Now consider (51), where -’at occurs on the matrix predicate kitHSiz `conrm' as well as the embedded predicates. The latter include the adverbial modier /aanaqH `really' and the main predicate lajiz `let go'. (51) /ooo, /ooo oh kitHSi/i kitH-Si(z)-’i; ringmom2sg.imp HaaMiijizuk Ha:Mi:ji(z)-uk conrmposs qvaa/atii qva:-’at-(y)i: thusshift3.indf /aanaqH/at /a:ni-(q)H-’at reallysimshift laji/at laji(z)-’at let.goshift `Oh, phone him and conrm to see if he got let go.' 2.5.2.4 Nominal valency: possessive -uk and -/Ak The other sux which aects the choice of subject agreement is the possessive -uk, which has the form -/ak after vowels (Ravinski 2005). When this sux occurs, the subject agreement identies the possessor of one of the arguments of the verb, either the underlying subject in the unmarked case (52a), or another argument (52b), in which case -’at also occurs. 32 2.5. Peripheral suxes in more detail: their status as inectional morphemes (52) a. Cacswii/aksiS Ca-(c)swi:-/a;k-si;S owgo.throughposs1sg.ind /uupakuut /u:paku:t coat `My coat got drenched through.' b. KvaYaaPatuksiS Kva-Ya;p-’at-uk-si;S breakcausshiftposs1sg.ind Humiis Humi:s red.cedar `He broke my sticks.' 2.5.2.5 The pastmarker -(m)it Finally, the past sux -(m)it occurs immediately before the mood sux. It has a ghost consonant /m/, which surfaces when the stem ends in a sonorant (53a). When the stem ends in an obstruent, this /m/ does not surface (53b). In some instances this ghost consonant seems to coalesce with a stemnal /t/ or /p/, yielding the corresponding nasal consonants, [n] or [m] (53c). This sux plays an important role in Chapter 8, and I discuss its semantics in more detail there. (53) a. /acyuumitwa/iS /acyu:-(m)it-wa;/iS shpast3.quot jakup jakup man `It is said that a man was shing.' b. /uHit/iS /uH-(m)it-/i;S focpast3.ind Ken Ken Ken `It was Ken' c. kitHSi/anits kitH-Si(z)-’at-(m)it-s ringmomshiftpast1sg.abs Ken Ken Ken `Ken phoned me.' 2.5.3 Mood suxes are obligatory and dene paradigmatic contrasts Each clause in Nuuchahnulth is marked with a single mood ax which, as a peripheral sux, attaches to the rst predicate of the clause. In terms of position, as shown in (56), mood suxes occur after the mode and valence/tense suxes, but before discourseconditioned suxes. (54) [Verb.Stem][DerivationalAspectual]︸                               ︷︷                               ︸ ModeValence/TenseMoodDiscourse︸                                                    ︷︷                                                    ︸ Core Suffixes Peripheral Suffixes 33 2.5. Peripheral suxes in more detail: their status as inectional morphemes Mood suxes are the only peripheral suxes that are obligatorily present, and they are in complementary distribution with each other: each clause must have a mood sux, and each clause has no more than one mood sux. These suxes mark both mood and subject agreement. Thus, each mood suxof which there are almost twentydenes a paradigm, with the cells of each paradigm identifying the person and number of the subject. Moods have various functions in Nuuchahnulth, and can indicate illocutionary force (e.g., declarative vs. interrogative vs. imperative), clausetyping (e.g., matrix vs. dependent), a number of interclausal relations (e.g., conditional vs. relative vs. purposive), or evidentiality (see Ÿ2.7). In (55) there are three clauses, each of which is marked with a dierent mood, but all with a rstperson singular subject. The matrix clause is in the absolutive mood, marked by -s `1sg absolutive'. The two dependent clauses are in the conditional, marked by -qu:s `1sg conditional', and the purposive, marked by -’a:Hs `1sg purposive'. (55) [ha/uk/aqzs ha/uk-/aqz-s eatfut1sg.abs [wikYuuquus wikYu:-qu:s before1sg.cond ziHSiz] ziH-Si(z) leavemom [wiKaaHs wik-’a:Hs neg1sg.purp haWiiqz]] haWi:qz hungry `I will eat before I leave, that way I won't be hungry.' A full inventory of the moods is outside the scope of this dissertation, but I give a list of those I have identied in Table 2.4 giving the thirdperson forms. Declarative indicative -/i;S quotative* -wa;/iS dubitative* -qa;Ja mirative* -Ja;?aS Interrogative interrogative -H indirect interrogative* -Ha;j Imperative imperative -’i; future imperative -’u;m proximal imperative -’ik distal imperative -ji; Dependent clause absolutive -0 purposive -/a:/it subordinate -q relative -/itq indenite relative -(y)i: indirect indenite relative* -(y)i:j conditional -qu: indirect conditional* -qu:j Table 2.4: Thirdperson forms of moods in Ahousaht 34 2.5. Peripheral suxes in more detail: their status as inectional morphemes A number of remarks are in order about the details of the mood paradigm: Evidentiality: Some of these moods, indicated by an asterisk, encode evidentiality, and I give their full paradigms in Ÿ4.3. Imperativemood: Imperative moods have second person subjects, and can be either singular or plural, and they also encode the person and number of the object, where third person is unmarked (transitives with third person objects take the same imperative forms that intransitives take). For the imperative moods in this table the forms given are second person singular with unmarked object. Numbermarking: Number is not marked in the thirdperson forms, meaning that the forms in Table 2.4 identify only that the subject is thirdperson. If a thirdperson argument (subject or otherwise) is plural it is marked by a separate sux -/al, which follows the mood sux and any other postmood suxes. Morphological complexity: Many forms appear to be internally complex, with one (or more) part corresponding to the mood, and another to the person and number. Only two paradigms are fully regular in this way, the conditional and the indenite relative; in other paradigms the regularity is broken in some forms. Nakayama (1997, 2001) gives the forms of most of the moods found in the Ahousaht dialect, and I give the forms of the evidential moods in Ÿ4.3 (see also the appendix in Wojdak 2008). 2.5.4 Discourse suxes: anothermixed bunch The nal set of peripheral suxes, which are characterized by their discourserelated functions, are those that occur at the rightmost position of the sequence of peripheral suxes. This corresponds to the position labeled Discourse in (56). (56) [Verb.Stem][DerivationalAspectual]︸                               ︷︷                               ︸ ModeValence/TenseMoodDiscourse︸                                                    ︷︷                                                    ︸ Core Suffixes Peripheral Suffixes The suxes that I have identied in this set for Ahousaht are listed in Table 2.5. They include the endearment sux -Xa;X, the iterative sux -za `again', the sux -qva:,2 and the plural sux -/al. Perhaps unexpectedly, the third person plural sux -/al is the outermost 2The function of this sux is not clear. More work needs to be done to x its meaning. 35 2.6. Word order member of this set. Whereas the rst and secondperson plurals are fused with mood, the third person plural can occur nonadjacent to the mood. -Xa;X -za -qva: -/al `endearment' `again' `?' `plural' Table 2.5: Discourse suxes 2.6 Word order Nuuchahnulth is often described as a predicateinitial language. Here I briey review some of the basic word order properties, looking rst at the position of the major clausal constituents (Ÿ2.6.1), of modiers (Ÿ2.6.2), and of question words (Ÿ2.6.3). 2.6.1 Canonical word order is VSO Nuuchannulth sentences are predicateinitial. And while VSO is the canonical word order, VOS is sometimes possible. To see how this works, consider the examples in (57) . If both arguments are animate, then VSO is obligatory, (57a). However, if there is an animacy contrast, then either VSOorVOS is possible, as in (57b) and (57c), where the subject is animate (`man') and the object is inanimate (`car').3 (57) a. /u/uuyuk/iS /u-yuk[RSL]-/i;S transcry.for3.ind Ken Ken Ken Kay Kay Kay = (i) `Ken is crying for Kay.' (VSanimOanim) , (ii) `Kay is crying for Ken.' (VOanimSanim) (Wojdak 2008, 85) b. kuuWilit/iS ku:Wil-(m)it-/i;S stealpast3.ind jakup jakup man huupuuKvas hu:pu:Kvas car À man stole a car.' (VSanimOinanim) (Wojdak 2008, 84) c. kuuWilit/iS ku:Wil-(m)it-/i;S stealpast3.ind huupuuKvas hu:pu:Kvas car jakup jakup man À man stole a car.' (VOinanimSanim) (Wojdak 2008, 85) Another common pattern involves the presence of a light verb to introduce the object (Woo 2007b), resulting in a surface order [V S Light.Verb O]. This is illustrated in (41) with the light verb /uukvil `it was done to'. 3One of my consultants suggests that (57c) is better with the denite -/I on jakup `man' (jakup/i). 36 2.6. Word order (58) hisqinzit/iS his-qinz-(m)it-/i;S hit.with.objecton.head.mompast3.ind Ken Ken Ken /uukvil /u-(j)il[L] transdo.to John John John `Ken hit John in the head.' (VS Light.Verb O) Finally, note that with pronominal third person arguments, because there are no overt third person pronouns, it is quite typical to nd sentences with only a single overt argument the objectas in (59). (59) /uuwinl/iS /u-winl[L]-/i;S transat.neck3.ind nuutinum nu:tinum necklace `He or she has a necklace on.' In terms of general structural properties, Wojdak (2008) argues that there is a subject object asymmetry in Nuuchahnulth: possessorraising is only possible from subject position (Ravinski 2005), and only subjects show agreement. Furthermore, Davis et al. (2007a) show thatNuuchahnulth exhibits weak crossover eects, providing further evidence for the subject object asymmetry. Wojdak (2008) also shows that suxal verbs attach to underlying objects, including the arguments of unaccusatives. 2.6.2 Modiers precede heads Modiers precede heads in Nuuchahnulth, though this is stricter in the nominal domain than the verbal domain. In (60a) the adjective ZiiHik `redhaired' precedes the noun Haakvaaz `girl'. Notice that the peripheral sux -/I `denite' occurs on the adjective; this is because the adjective is the rst word in the noun phrase. Similarly, in (60b) the adverbial hiikval `almost' precedes the verb, and the peripheral suxes -’az `now' and -s `1sg absolutive' both occur on the adverbial, since it is the rst word in the clause. (60) a. ZiiHik/i ZiH-(y)ik[L]-/i; redhairdef Haakvaaz Ha:kva;z girl `the redheaded girl.' b. hiikval/azs hi:kval-’az-s nearlynow1sg.abs xaaSxiipSiz xa:Sxi:p-Si(z) bluejaymom `I am almost a bluejay' Adverbials often appear clauseinitially, in which case word order is typically AdvSVO. Peripheral suxes will be attached to the adverbial in such cases. For example, /Yu:qva:/ `also' occurs clauseinitially in (61), where it is suxed by the peripheral suxes /-ckvi;/ `past 37 2.7. Clausetyping in more detail: the mood suxes again evidential' and /-/i;S/ `3 indicative'. The sentenceinitial adverb is followed by the subject, verb and object, in that order. (61) Yuuqvaackvi/iS Yu:qva:-ckvi;-/i;S alsopast.evid3.ind Kay Kay Kay NajPiq Naj-Piq seein.passing Natasha Natasha Natasha `Kay must have also gotten a glimpse of Natasha.' 2.6.3 Questionwords (whwords) are sentenceinitial In a content question (WHquestion) the question word (WHword) will be sentence initial. If the WHword corresponds to the subject, it will be suxed with -q, as in (62a). If it refers to a nonsubject, it will have a suxal verb on it, for example /-i:c/ `own', in (62b) (Davis and Sawai 2001). A similar pattern holds with quantiers, though they can also occur noninitially (Woo 2002). (62) a. /ajaqitH/al /aja-q-(m)it-H-/al whosubjpast3.interpl ha/ukSiz ha/uk-Si(z) eatmom jamas/i jamas-/i; sweetdef `Who ate the fruit?' b. /ajiickviH /aja-i:c-ckvi;-H whoownpast.evid3.inter Suuwis/i Su:wis-/i; shoesdef `Who did the shoes belong to?' 2.7 Clausetyping inmore detail: themood suxes again Every Nuuchahnulth clause has a mood, which is marked by a portmanteau peripheral sux that also marks subject agreement. (For details, see Ÿ2.5.3 above.) Syntactically, moods fall into three classes according to whether they: 1. occur only in matrix clauses; 2. occur in both matrix and dependent clauses; 3. occur only in dependent clauses. I discuss each in turn. 2.7.1 Moods that occur only inmatrix clauses The moods that can only occur in matrix clauses fall into three semantic subclasses: declarative, interrogative, and imperative. Table 2.6 gives the complete list of the matrix clause moods. 38 2.7. Clausetyping in more detail: the mood suxes again Declarative Interrogative Imperative -/i;S indicative -H interrogative -’i; imperative -qa;Ja dubitative* -Ha;j indirect inter.* -’im future imp. -wa;/iS quotative* -’i;k proximal imp. -Ja;?aS mirative -ji; distal imp. Table 2.6: Matrix clause moods TheAhousaht dialect ofNuuchahnulth has four distinct declarativemoods: indicative (marked by -/IS), dubitative (marked by -qAJa), quotative (marked by -wA/iS), and mirative (marked by -JA?aS). Representative examples are given in (63). (63) a. Mizaa/iS Miz-(y)a;-/i;S raincont3.ind `it's raining' b. MizaaqaJa Miz-(y)a;-qa;Ja raincont3.dub `It must be raining.' c. Mizaawa/iS Miz-(y)a;-wa;/iS raincont3.quot `It was raining.' d. MizaaJa?aS Miz-(y)a;-Ja;?aS raincont3.mir `It's raining.' As for the interrogative moods, there are two: the interrogative proper (marked by -H), and the indirect interrogative (marked by -HAj). Representative examples are given in (64). (64) a. MizaaH Miz-(y)a;-H raincont3.inter `Is it raining?' b. MizaaHaj Miz-(y)a;-Ha;j raincont3.indir.inter `Is it raining?' 39 2.7. Clausetyping in more detail: the mood suxes again Finally, the imperative mood has four subclasses: the imperative (marked by -’I), the future imperative (marked by -’um or -’im), the proximal imperative (marked by -’Ik), and the distal imperative (marked by -jI). Representative examples are given in (65). (65) a. ha/uKvi ha/uk-’i; eat2sg.imp `Eat.' b. ha/uKvik ha/uk-’i;k eat2sg.prox.imp `Come and eat.' c. jamiHta/um jamiHta-’um proper2sg.fut.imp ha/uk ha/uk eat `Eat properly.' d. ha/ukji ha/uk-ji; eat2sg.dist.imp `Go eat.' The listing of matrix mood suxes in Table 2.6 above reveals that evidential distinc tions are present in this part of the mood paradigm. In particular, two of the declarative moods have evidential force, namely dubitative -qAJa and quotative -wA/iS. And, amongst the interrogative moods, the indirect interrogative -HAj has evidential force. See Chapter 4 (Ÿ4.3) for more detailed discussion of these evidential mood suxes. 2.7.2 Onemood occurs in bothmatrix and dependent clauses: the absolutivemood There is one mood that is found in both matrix and dependent clauses, namely the absolutive mood, which is zeromarked. It is sometimes accompanied by the complementizer /in. 2.7.2.1 The absolutivemood inmatrix clauses Consider rst the example in (66), where is taken from the beginning of a story. The rst sentence, (66a), is in the quotative mood, one of the moods that occurs only in matrix clauses. The second sentence, (66b) is in the absolutive mood. This use of the absolutive in narrative contexts is very typical. 40 2.7. Clausetyping in more detail: the mood suxes again (66) a. hisiiKvasitwa/iS hisi:kv-’as-(m)it-wa;/iS go.alongon.ground.outsidepast3.quot qu/uSin qu/uSin raven `Raven was walking along.' b. Naatsiiji/az Na:tsi-Si(z)-’az seemomnow zulaq zul-(q)aq[SS] niceaug zulaqaq zul-(q)aq[SS]-(q)aq[SS] niceaugaug luucma lu:cma woman `He saw a beautiful woman.' The absolutive mood often cooccurs with the complementizer /in. Consider the clausesequences in (67) and (68). In each of these examples, the (b) sentences are matrix absolutive clauses that cooccur with the complementizer /in. Such /inmarked matrix abso lutive clauses typically in contexts where there is some loose causal connection between the two sentences. In (67), the speaker is introducing a question in (67a), and then providing the reason for the question in (67b). And in (68), the speaker is volunteering an observation in (68a), and then providing the reason for the observation in (68b). (67) a. /aaqinqHk /a:qin-(q)H-k whysim2sg.inter ha/ukWiTas ha/uk-WiTas eatabout.to `Why are you going to eat?' b. /in /in comp siqiilsa siq-(j)i:l[L]-sa cookedmake1sg.abs `(Because) I'm cooking.' (68) a. walyuuKukvit/iS walyu:-Kuk-(m)it-/i;S be.homevis.evidpast3.ind `It looked like he was home.' b. /in /in comp /inKvaHsit /inkv-’a;Hs-(m)it rein.vesselpast `(Because) his lights were on.' 2.7.2.2 The absolutivemood in complement clauses The absolutive mood is also found in complement clauses, where it is obligatorily introduced by the complementizer /in. A representative example is given in (69). Observe that both the matrix clause and the embedded clause are in the absolutive mood. In addition, the embedded clause is introduced by the complementizer /in. 41 2.7. Clausetyping in more detail: the mood suxes again (69) huHtaks huHtak-s know1sg.abs [/in /in comp wiksuuk wik-su:k neg2sg.abs /unaak /u-na;k transhave ?iniiz] ?ini:z dog `I know you don't own a dog.' The set of verbs that introduce /inabsolutive complement clauses are given inTable 2.7. Note that these verbs are all propositional attitude verbs. The descriptive generalization is that /inabsolutive complement clauses are only ever introduced by propositional attitude verbs. (But the converse is not true: as we shall see below, there are propositional attitude verbs that do not introduce /inabsolutive complement clauses.) huHtak `know' hayimHi `not know' taaqaak `believe' puupuuca `dream' wawaa `say' /uuqHli `tell' /uukvaqHli `tell on oneself ' Table 2.7: Verbs taking /inabsolutive complement clauses 2.7.2.3 The absolutivemood in adjunct clauses /inabsolutive clauses also introduce adjunct clauses, as in (70a). We can see that the /inabsolutive clause is an adjunct and not a complement because the verb nujHak `proud' does not require an /inabsolutive clause, as shown in (70b). (70) a. nujHak/iS nujHakv-/i;S proud3.ind Haa Ha: that [/in /in comp CuSnaakSiz CuS-na;k-Si(z)-0 newhavemom3.abs Kyle Kyle Kyle Suuwis] Su:wis shoes `She will be very happy that Kyle got new shoes.' b. nujHak/iS nujHakv-/i;S proud3.ind Ken Ken Ken `Ken is proud' Other verbs, such as waa `say' obligatory take an /inabsolutive complement clause, as in (71). 42 2.7. Clausetyping in more detail: the mood suxes again (71) a. wawaa/iS wawa:-/i;S say3.ind Ken Ken Ken [/in /in comp maakukvitsuuk ma:kuk-(m)it-su:k buypast2sg.abs jamas] jamas sweet `Ken says you bought sweets.' b. *wawaa/iS wawa:-/i;S say3.ind Ken Ken Ken Unfortunately we cannot use WHisland eects to conrm the distinction between adjunct and complement clauses. We would expect WHmovement out of a complement clause to be possible, and WHmovement out of an adjunct clause to be impossible. But independently, all movement in Nuuchahnulth is clause bound (Davis and Sawai 2001, Woo 2002, 2007b). 2.7.3 Moods that occur only in dependent clauses The set of moods that occur only in dependent clauses are given in Table 2.8. I discuss each of these in turn in the sections below, giving examples of their use. subordinate -q purposive -’a:/it conditional qu: relative -/i;tq indenite relative -(y)i: Table 2.8: Dependent clause moods 2.7.3.1 The subordinatemood introduces clauses Some propositional attitude verbs, such as /uqlaap `think' select for the subordinative mood, as in (72a). Observe that the subordinative mood is incompatible with the complemen tizer /in, (72b). (72) a. /uqlaamitwa/iS /uqla:p-(m)it-wa;/iS thinkpast3.quot Linda Linda Linda walyuuq walyu:-q be.home3.sub Ken Ken Ken `Linda thought Kay was at home.' b. */uqlaamit/iS Linda /in walyuuq Ken 43 2.7. Clausetyping in more detail: the mood suxes again 2.7.3.2 The purposivemood introduces rationale clauses Rationale clauses are introduced with the purpose mood: (73) [ha/uk/aqzs ha/uk-/aqz-s eatfut1sg.abs [wikYuuquus wikYu:-qu:s before1sg.cond ziHSiz] ziH-Si(z) leavemom [wiKaaHs wik-’a:Hs neg1sg.purp haWiiqz]] haWi:qz hungry `I will eat before I leave, that way I won't be hungry.' 2.7.3.3 The conditionalmood introduces ifclauses The conditional mood is used mark embedded questions, as in (74a). The conditional mood is also used in the antecedent of a conditional statement (74b). (74) a. huHtakmaHsa/iS huHtak-maHsa-/i;S knowwanting3.ind /um/iiq /um/i-i;q motherkin [hiikval/azquuk hi:kval-’az-qu:k nearlynow2sg.cond hawii/az] hawi:-’az nishnow `Mother wants to know if you're almost nished.' b. [na/uukquuk na/u:k-qu:k go.along2sg.cond siYa siYa 1sg.pro makuWascajiz] mak-uWas-caji(z) buybuildinggo.to maakukjip/aqzs ma:kuk-jip-/aqz-s buybenfut1sg.abs suWa suWa 2sg.pro jamas jamas sweet `If you go to the store with me, I'll buy you something sweet.' 2.7.3.4 The relative and indenitemoods introduce relative clauses Relative clauses occur in either the relative -/itq (75) or the indenite relative -(y)i: (76). The dierence between the two is whether the identity of the referent is in the common ground or not, with (y)i: indicating that it is not (Davidson 2002). (75) /uCaHtaksuuk /u-CaHtak-su:k transhead.for2sg.abs [hil/iitq hil-/i;tq be.there3.rel Walmart] Walmart Walmart `You head for where Walmart is.' 44 2.8. (76) a. wa/iJazit/ick wa/ij-’az-(m)it-/i;ck sleepnowpast2sg.ind [qviyaazii qviya:z-(y)i: when3.indf NuWiiq NuWi-i;q fatherkin walSiz] walSiz get.home `You were sleeping when Dad got home.' b. huHtakk huHtak-k know2sg.inter [qvaayii qva:-(y)i: thus3.indf walyuu walyu: be.home Ken] Ken Ken `Do you know if Ken is home?' c. /a/aatuumit/iS /a/a:tu:-(m)it-/i;S askpast3.ind Ken Ken Ken [qvamitii qva-(m)it-(y)i: relpast3.indf Mizaa] Miz-(y)a; raincont `Ken asked if it had been raining.' 2.8 In this chapter I provided an overview of Nuuchahnulth grammar. My hope is that this allows the reader who is unfamiliar with the language to follow the examples more easily. The morphophonological properties I described in Ÿ2.3 above will help the reader understand why the same morpheme occurs in dierent forms in dierent examples. The morphology I described in ŸŸ2.4, 2.5 and 2.7 is very relevant to a study of evidentials in Nuuchahnulth. As I discuss in the following chapter, evidentials are found in several morphological classes, leading to dierences in their semantics. 45 Chapter 3 Towards a theory of evidentiality 3.1 Ways of classifying evidentials Evidential morphemes have been discussed in dierent terms in the literature. I discuss these dierent approaches in this chapter. First, I look at classications based onmorphological criteria (Ÿ3.2). I then turn to syntactic approaches to evidentials (Ÿ3.3). Semantic approaches are discussed in Ÿ3.4, where I discuss modal approaches, perceptual approaches, and the origo. I then discuss pragmatic approaches in Ÿ3.5, and nally lay out the path that Nuuchahnulth evidentials themselves suggest (Ÿ3.6). 3.2 Morphological classications of evidentials A morphological classication of evidentiality is developed by Willett (1988). He devises a crosslinguistic classication of evidential types, shown in Figure 3.1 below. It is based on a survey of 38 languages for which evidentials have been identied and discussed, primarily in the volume by Chafe and Nichols (1986). His classication is useful in giving a general idea about the types of evidence a language may encode in an evidential, but it also has shortcomings, especially with respect to his classication of sensory evidentials as direct evidentials. Types of Evidence ffffff ffffff ffff ZZZZZZZZ ZZZZZZZZ ZZZZZZZZ Direct Indirect ffffff ffffff ffff XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXX Attested mmm mmm mmm QQQ QQQ QQQ Inferring mmm mmm mmm QQQ QQQ QQQ Reported mmm mmm mmm QQQ QQQ QQQ Visual Auditory Other sensory Results Reasoning Folklore Hearsay mmm mmm mmm QQQ QQQ QQQ Secondhand Thirdhand Figure 3.1: Willett's classication of evidence types 46 3.2. Morphological classications of evidentials First, there are languages (such asNuuchahnulth,Makah (Jacobsen 1986) andGitksan (Peterson 2010)) which have visual inferentials. These are evidentials which indicate that an inference was made based on something that was perceived visually. In Nuuchahnulth, the visual inferential is -Kuk, and as the example in (77) shows, its use is infelicitous when the origo has seen the rain directly. Thus, while it is a visual evidential, it is not a direct evidential. (77) Scenario: Kay was looking outside the window and saw the rain. She said this to Bill. #MizaaKuk/iS Miz-(y)a;-Kuk-/i;S raincontvis.evid3.ind `It looks like it's raining.' Second, Nuuchahnulth has an auditory evidential na/a:t, which is compatible with direct and indirect evidence scenarios. That is, na/a:t can be used where the origo directly witnessed an event, as in (78a), and it can also be used in scenarios where the origo has hearsay evidence (78b), or has made an inference based on hearing something (78c). (78) a. Scenario: Kay could hear thunder, and when she got a call from Bill in Port Alberni she said this to him. TiickTiicka/iS Ti:ck-(y)a[RLL]-/i;S clatterrep3.ind na/aat na/a:t aud.evid `It's thundering.' b. Scenario: Kay and Bill heard that there was a ght the night before, and the police came and put someone in jail, but they didn't know who it was. Linda called Kay and told her that Ken got arrested, and when she got o the phone Kay told Bill this. /uHitwa/iS /uH-(m)it-wa;/iS focpast3.quot Ken Ken Ken na/aat na/a:t aud.evid mazpiz maz-pi(z) tiedin.house.mom `It is said it was Ken who ended up in jail.' c. Scenario: Kay and Bill don't usually hear Ken's stereo, but sometimes it gets loud. They gure it is Ken's son turning it up when Ken goes out. One day when she heard the stereo she said this to Bill. wikpizmataKaz/um wik-pi(z)-matak-’az-0-/um negin.house.momind.evidnow3.absdm Ken Ken Ken na/aat na/a:t aud.evid `Ken is probably not at home.' 47 3.3. Syntactic classications of evidentials Visual inferentials and the Nuuchahnulth auditory evidential are problematic for Willett's typology. As visual and auditory evidentials, Willett would classify them as direct (as he does with the visual inferential in Makah), but they are both compatible with indirect evidence scenarios. In other words, they are not actually direct evidentials. Visual inferentials are inferentials, while na/a:t `auditory evidence' is unmarked for directness. Another morphological classication is developed by Aikhenvald (2004). She makes a distinction between languages in which evidentiality is encoded systematically, and languages in which the coding of evidentiality is scattered throughout the grammar. Systematic encoding of evidentiality is obligatory, and paradigmatic. Scattered encoding of evidentiality may be optional, and is not paradigmatic. Nuuchahnulth is an example of a language with scattered encoding of evidentiality. Aikhenvald further divides languages with systematic encoding of evidentiality based on howmany oppositions they encode, andwhat those oppositions are. Languagesmay distinguish anywhere between two and ve kinds of evidence, giving rise to four classes of languages with systematic encoding of evidentiality. Aikhenvald claims there are six kinds of evidence which can be encoded, which can be divide up between evidentials in dierent ways. I give one of Aikhenvald's attested systems for each of the four classes in Table 3.1. Visual Sensory Inferred Assumed Hearsay Quotative 2 Firsthand Nonrsthand 3 Direct Inferred Reported 4 Direct Inferred Reported Quotative 5 Visual Nonvisual Inferred Assumed Reported Table 3.1: Examples of attested evidential distinctions (Aikhenvald 2004) The morphological approaches to evidentiality described above focus on the attested range of evidentials across languages. Willett focuses on the kinds of evidence that are encoded in morphemes, while Aikhenvald focuses on the distinctions made within a single language, while also distinguishing between systematic and scattered encoding of evidentiality. 3.3 Syntactic classications of evidentials Speas and Tenny (2003) propose a cartographic approach to evidentiality. That is, they propose a structure of functional heads in an exploded CP domain whose specier arguments can be lled in various combinations yielding dierent meanings. They propose a sentience phrase (SenP), which combinesCinque's (1999) EvidP (as the projection of Sen*) with his higher EvalP (as the projection of Sen) whose specier gives the point of view role, equivalent to the origo. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Above this structure are speech act projections which 48 3.3. Syntactic classications of evidentials they use to model mood. They make no claim about the syntactic position of an evidential morpheme, nor do they make a claim about the possible semantics of evidentials. I discuss their approach to the origo (their seat of knowledge) in Ÿ3.4.3 below. SenP llll llll ll RRRR RRRR RR seat of knowledge Sen′ llll llll ll RRRR RRRR RR Sen Sen* llll llll ll RRRR RRRR RR evidence Sen* llll llll ll RRRR RRRR RR Sen* EpisP Figure 3.2: Structure of the sentience phrase (Speas and Tenny 2003, 334) Blain and Déchaine (2006) propose that evidentials can be integrated into distinct syntactic domains. They call this the evidential domain hypothesis. In particular, they propose the structure in Figure 3.3. Evidentials thus do not belong to a single syntactic category. Within a single language, one evidential may be in the CP domain while another is in the TP domain. Depending on which domain an evidential occurs in, it is expected to have additional properties. For example, evidentials in the CP domain may also encode clausetyping, and those in the TP domain may also encode tense. CP qqq qqq q MMM MMM M TP qqq qqq q MMM MMM M AspP qqq qqq q MMM MMM M Evidential Force vP qqq qqq q MMM MMM M DP qqq qqq q MMM MMM M    hhhhhhhhhhhh Figure 3.3: Evidential domain hypothesis (Blain and Déchaine 2006) 49 3.4. Semantic classications of evidentials 3.4 Semantic classications of evidentials A number of formal semantic approaches have been proposed. Here I divide the dis cussion into three groups, modal approaches, pragmatic approaches and perceptual approaches. The modal approaches treat evidentials as epistemic modals, based on Kratzer's (1981, 1991) analysis of modality. The pragmatic approaches focus more on the felicity conditions associ ated with evidentials, and often include a modal analysis of some evidentials. The perceptual approaches focus on how evidentials indicate the origo's perceptual relation to the prejacent proposition. 3.4.1 Modal approaches Most formal semantic approaches to indirect evidentiality derive fromKratzer's (1981, 1991) analysis of modality. In particular they derive from her analysis of the German epistemic modal müssen and its English cognate must, which has since been considered an inferential evidential (Westmoreland 1995, 1998, von Fintel and Gillies 2011). There is disagreement onwhat the relationship is between the categories of evidentiality and epistemic modality. de Haan (1999, 2000), Lazard (2001), and Aikhenvald (2004) take the view that evidentiality is distinct from modality. For example, de Haan (2000) considers evidentiality to be the marking of source of information, and epistemic modality to be the marking of the speaker's condence. de Haan and Aikhenvald admit the possibility of overlap between the two categories, where a single morpheme expresses both source of information and the speaker's level of condence, but emphasize that not all morphemes which encode evidentiality also encode epistemic modality (and vice versa). This view is also shared by Faller (2002), Matthewson et al. (2007), Murray (2010), Peterson (2010) and Waldie et al. (2009). An opposing view, held by Matthewson (2010), is that all evidentials are epistemic modals and all epistemic modals are evidentials. Following Rullmann et al. (2008), Matthewson does not consider all epistemic modals to mark force (necessity or possibility), which is how de Haan's speaker's condence is encoded. I turn now to consider dierent modal approaches to evidentiality, beginning with a summary of Kratzer's (1981) account of epistemic modality, and proceeding chronologically. 3.4.1.1 Kratzer's (1981)modal analysis Kratzer's (1981, 1991) analysis of epistemicmodality relies on two sets of propositions, an epistemicmodal base and a stereotypical ordering source. An epistemicmodal base is the set of propositions, i.e., functions fromworlds to truth values, that are known in a given context in a 50 3.4. Semantic classications of evidentials given world.4 From the epistemic modal base we can generate a set of worldsthe set of worlds in which every proposition in the modal base is true. The stereotypical ordering source is also a set of propositions, and in the case of epistemic modals, it is one which contains propositions about what normally happens. These propositions describe probabilistic relations that usually hold in the world of evaluation. One such proposition could be that if someone walks out of a store with unpurchased merchandise in their pocket, they stole it. This may be true in the actual world or it may not, and this is crucial for Kratzer's analysis, as we will see shortly. The ordering source ranks the worlds in the modal base based on how many propositions in the ordering source are true in them. The best worlds in the epistemic modal base would be those in which all the propositions in the ordering source are true. For Kratzer an epistemic modal like must is a propositional operator. When must occurs with a prejacent proposition p,MUST(p)means that there is a contextually determined epistemic modal base epist(w), consisting of the set of propositions known in the worldw. This denes the set of worlds in which all those propositions are true, ∩epist(w). There is also a contextually determined ordering source os(w) with which we can rank the worlds in ∩epist(w). Finally,MUST(p) means that p is true in all the highest ranked worlds in ∩epist(w). Because the propositions in the ordering source may not be true in the actual world, it is possible for the prejacent p to be false, even though MUST(p) is true. In other words, MUST(p) does not entail p. 3.4.1.2 Modal accounts of evidentials Izvorski (1997) is the rst to oer a modal analysis of evidentials. She makes use of Kratzer'smodal analysis, with someadjustments, in her account of the `perfect of evidentiality' the indirect evidential use of perfect morphemes, including the Turkish perfect mI³. In her modal analysis, Izvorski proposes using a modal base that diers from the epistemic modal base, as shown in (79). Instead of being dened in terms of the entire set of propositions that are known to be true in a world w, it is dened in terms of the set of propositions which the speaker considers to be indirect evidence for the prejacent proposition in w. (79) a. epistemic modal base epist(w) = ∩{p : p is known in w} b. indirect evidential modal base ind.evid(w) = ∩{p : in w, p is known and the speaker considers p indirect evidence (for the prejacent proposition)} (adapted from Izvorski 1997, 230) Matthewson et al. (2007) give amodal account of several evidentials in Lillooet. In their 4One might ask who knows these propositions, as Stephenson (2007a,b) asks, but this is a separate issue which I address in Ÿ3.4.3 below. 51 3.4. Semantic classications of evidentials analysis, the modal base denes a set of worlds directly: the set of worlds compatible with the kind of evidence indicated by the evidential. Each kind of evidentialinferential, reportative, perceptual inferential, presupposes the existence of a particular kind of modal base. Each of their modal bases is an epistemically accessible set of worlds, and each one restricts the set of worlds to those in which the relevant kind of evidence found in the actual world holds. If in the actual world Linda told Kay that it was raining, the reportative modal base would be limited to the set of worlds in which it is also true that Linda told Kay it was raining. Matthewson et al. do not use an ordering source. Instead, they dene evidentials as indicating that the prejacent proposition is true in a contextually dened subset of the worlds in the relevant modal base. This has a similar eect to that of an ordering source, since it is possible that this subset does not contain the actual world. Matthewson et al. use the contextually dened subset of worlds to account for the fact that evidentials (and other modals) in Lillooet are not specied for quanticational force. If this subset is equal to the entire modal base, the modal will be equivalent to a strong necessity modal. If the subset is a proper subset of the modal base, the modal will be equivalent to a weak necessity or existential modal. Peterson (2010) presents an analysis of two evidentials in Gitksan which is similar to that of Matthewson et al. (2007), but with the addition of a contextually provided ordering source. The set of worlds compatible with the sort of evidence indicated by the evidential is ordered according to the likelihood that the evidence is trustworthy. In order for the use of such an evidential to be felicitous, there must be at least one highestranked world in which the prejacent proposition is true. By using existential quantication over worlds rather than universal quantication, Peterson allows for the felicitous use of an evidential when the prejacent may not actually be true, in which case the ordering source is empty. When the ordering source is nonempty, the evidential becomes stronger, because the highestranked worlds are the ones in which the evidence holds. A dierent modication of Kratzer's modal analysis for indirect evidentials was pro posed by von Fintel and Gillies (2010). They replace the epistemic modal base with what they call the kernel, which is the set of propositions for which there exists direct evidence. Indirect evidentials are then encoded with a presuppositional restriction that the prejacent proposi tion is not in the kernel. Truthconditionally, indirect evidentials indicate that the prejacent proposition is true in all the worlds in which the propositions of the kernel are true. Following Westmoreland (1995, 1998), von Fintel and Gillies argue that must is an indirect evidential. In their view, MUST(p) does entail p, but it can only be used felicitously when there is no direct evidence for p. For example, Kay cannot utter the sentence in (80) felicitously if she is out in the rain getting wet. Here the kernel will contain the proposition that it is raining, since there is direct evidence for itKay and Bill are getting rained on. The presupposition introduced by must, that the prejacent proposition is not in the kernel, is not 52 3.4. Semantic classications of evidentials satised, and the use of must is infelicitous. (80) Scenario: Kay and Bill are standing outside in the rain, getting soaked. Kay says this to Bill. #It must be raining. In a revision of her analysis of modality, Kratzer (2012)5 divides modal bases into realistic ones and informational ones. Realistic modal bases are those which necessarily contain the world of evaluation, while informational ones possibly do not. This division was prompted by the behaviour of reportative evidential sollen in German (and also in Quechua (Faller 2002) and Cheyenne (Murray 2010)), where the use of a reportative is felicitous when the prejacent is known to be false. That is, the a reportative indicates that the prejacent proposition holds in all worlds in an informational modal base, and it is possible that that modal base does not contain the world of evaluation. Matthewson (2011) makes the claim that all evidentials are epistemic modals, and that all epistemic modals are evidentials. She shows that the tests that have been used in the literature to distinguish between evidentials which are modals and evidentials which are speech act operators (see Ÿ3.5.2 below) are inconclusive. The tests, which are also discussed by Faller (2006), Matthewson et al. (2007), Waldie et al. (2009), and Murray (2010), are given in (81). Faller (2011) also takes an evidentials are modals view of Quechua evidentials, which diers from her previous account (see Faller (2002, 2006); see also Ÿ3.5.2 below). (81) a. Can the evidential content be challenged? b. Can the evidential content be semantically embedded? c. Can the evidential content take scope over speech act operators? d. Does the evidential content project through negation? e. Can the prejacent be known to be true? f. Can the prejacent be known to be false? Another kind of modal analysis of evidentials is presented by McCready and Ogata (2007). They note that some evidentials in Japanese are amenable to a modal analysis, and use a probabilistic dynamic semantics to model them, rather than a Kratzerian modal semantics. In their account, the semantic contribution of an inferential evidential is an inferential operator. The inferential operator has an index which identies the piece of evidence which the origo (in their terminology, the agent) has that supports the inference of the prejacent proposition. This piece of evidence raises the probability that the prejacent proposition is true. McCready and Ogata point out that the use of reportative evidentials in Japan is felicitous regardless of whether the origo has any belief about the truth of the prejacent 5Kratzer's 2012 chapter on modality was previously made available as a manuscript, dated 2010. 53 3.4. Semantic classications of evidentials proposition, as is the case in Quechua (see Faller (2002)). They therefore introduce a hearsay operator which is not probabilisticit simply indicates the existence of hearsay evidence for the prejacent. 3.4.2 Perceptual approaches How perceptual grounding is encoded by evidentials has not been addressed to any great extent in formal semantics. The sole account is that of Faller (2004), which was also taken up by Chung (2005, 2007). Faller (2004) gives an analysis of an evidential in Quechua, sqa, which she describes as indicating that the event did not occur in the speaker's perceptual eld. In this analysis, Faller presents the notion of perceptual trace, which contains all the locationtime slices that an individual remembers perceiving. In addition to this is the event trace, which contains all the locationtime slices in which the relevant event took place. The morpheme sqa indicates that the speaker's perceptual trace and the event trace do not overlap. Chung (2005, 2007) makes use of Faller's (2004) tools in her analysis of evidentials in Korean, and also adds an evidence trace, which contains all the locationtime slices in which there is evidence that the relevant event took place. Since the event is evidence for itself, the evidence trace for a given event will include that event. The indirect Korean evidentials ess and keyss indicate that the speaker's perceptual trace and the event trace do not overlap. The evidential ess also encodes the temporal relation that the event time precedes the time of the evidence perceived by the speaker. Speas (2010) uses situations, rather than locationtime slices, to model evidentials. In her view, evidentials encode accessibility relations between situations. The relevant situations are the event situation, a reference situation, and the discourse situation (i.e., utterance situa tion). The reference situation is the situation in which the relevant evidence is foundi.e., the perceived situation. In Speas' account, indirect evidentials encode that the event situation is accessible from the reference situation, while direct evidentials encode that the event situation is included in the reference situation. If we substitute situations for locationtime slices, the accounts of Faller (2004), Chung (2005, 2007) and Speas (2010) all describe certain evidentials as encoding the relation between a perceived situation and the event situation of the prejacent. In particular, indirect evidentials encode that these two situations are disjoint. 3.4.3 Origo The origo as the person whose evidence is indicated by an evidential has not been discussed much. Garrett (2001) rst used it in his description of the evidentials of Tibetan. 54 3.4. Semantic classications of evidentials The origo was originally conceived of as a deictic centre (Bühler 1990). The origo is the sentient individual from which a statement is evaluated. The connection between the deictic centre and the evidential origo shows itself when we look at how each behaves in questions (as opposed to declaratives). Fillmore (1975) points out that the referent of this in the two sentences in (82) is not the same. In the declarative sentence this refers to the speaker. In the interrogative sentence this refers to the addressee. In other words, the deictic centre switches from the speaker to the addressee in interrogative questions. (82) a. This is Ryan. b. Is this Ryan? Garrett (2001) notes the same eect with the interpretation of evidentials in Tibetan. The direct imperfective d̀ug can only be used with a predicate meaning `hungry' if the subject is the origo. In declarative matrix clauses the origo is the speaker, and so d̀ug is only allowed when the subject is rstperson, as shown in (83). Second or thirdperson subjects cannot be used as the subject here. (83) Tibetan (Tibetoburman) declarative (adapted from Garrett 2001, 227) a. nga I grod.khog stomach ltogsgi`dug hungerdir.imp `I'm hungry.' b. *khyed.rang you grod.khog stomach ltogsgi`dug hungerdir.imp c. *kho he grod.khog stomach ltogsgi`dug hungerdir.imp In interrogative matrix clauses, the origo is the addressee, and so d̀ug can only be used if the subject is secondperson, as shown in (84). First or thirdperson subjects cannot be used here. (84) Tibetan (Tibetoburman) interrogative (adapted from Garrett 2001, 228) a. *nga I grod.khog stomach ltogsgi`duggas hungerdir.impq b. khyed.rang you grod.khog stomach ltogsgi`duggas hungerdir.impq Àre you hungry?' c. *kho he grod.khog stomach ltogsgi`duggas hungerdir.impq 55 3.5. Pragmatic classications of evidentials Stephenson (2007a,b) gives us a formalization of the origo (which she calls judge) by extending Lasersohn's (2005) analysis of predicates of personal taste to epistemic modals, which have been argued to be evidentials (Westmoreland 1995, 1998, von Fintel and Gillies 2010). An epistemic modal like must is evaluated with respect to a judge, just as a predicate of personal taste like taste good is. (85) a. That pie must be for the party. b. That pie tastes good. For Stephenson the judge is the centre of a centred world. A centred world is a world paired with an individual who believes that he or she is in that world (Lewis 1979). Under Stephenson's analysis, an epistemic modal base is dened as the set of centred worlds that are compatible with what the judge knows. Propositional attitude verbs restrict the judge of their embedded centred proposition to being subject.6 In (86) the judge of the embedded clause is Linda. Linda is the person evaluating the taste of the pie. (86) Linda thinks that pie tastes good. The origo also appears in Speas and Tenny's (2003) work exploring a syntactic expla nation of mood, which was described in Ÿ3.3 above (see also Speas 2004, Tenny 2006). They develop an account where speech act participantsspeaker and addresseeare represented syntactically as arguments of a speech act phrase, much as Ross (1970) proposed. In addition to speechact participants, the seat of knowledge is also represented syntactically as an argu ment of a sentience phrase (SenP). The seat of knowledge is equivalent to the origo, as it is the person who is evaluating the truth of a proposition. 3.5 Pragmatic classications of evidentials Any theory of evidentiality has to address the issue of what kind of contribution an evidential makes. It is generally agreed that at least some of the meaningthe evidence requirementof an evidential projects through negation, interrogatives, etc. (Faller 2002, 2006, von Fintel and Gillies 2010,Matthewson et al. 2007, Peterson 2010,Waldie et al. 2009, also see Chapter 7). The evidence requirement indicates what kind of evidence is being relied upon, whether it is inference or hearsay, visual or auditory, etc. Opinions dier on what the mechanism is that allows that projection of meaning. 6Strictly speaking, the judge of an embedded centred proposition is a counterpart of the subject of the propo sitional attitude verb. Lewis (1968) argues that an individual is conned to a single possible worldwhen I talk about what I might have done, I am talking about what my counterpart in a dierent possible world did in that world. 56 3.6. The way forward to an analysis of Nuuchahnulth evidentials 3.5.1 Evidentials contribute presuppositions Izvorski's (1997) modal analysis introduced the idea that the evidence requirement is a presupposition. Other modal accounts take the same approach (von Fintel and Gillies 2010, Matthewson et al. 2007, Peterson 2010). There is a presupposition that the context provides a modal base of the appropriate sort. As long as this presupposition is satised, the modal operator can apply. 3.5.2 Evidentials contribute sincerity conditions Faller (2002) treats the evidential requirement as a sincerity condition (Searle 1975, Searle and Vanderveken 1985). For any speech act to be performed sincerely, the speaker must have a mental state in which the sincerity conditions are met. Thus, in using, say, a reportative evidential, the speaker must believe that there was a report whose propositional content contained the prejacent proposition. 3.5.3 Evidentials contribute notatissue content Murray (2010) analyzes the evidence requirement as being asserted as notatissue con tent. Notatissue content covers all kinds of meaning that project, including presuppositions and conventional implicatures (Simons et al. 2010). A notatissue assertion adds a proposition to the common ground, while an atissue assertion proposes the addition of a proposition to the common ground. Notatissue assertions are thus unchallengeable, while atissue assertions are challengeable. An evidential in Murray's analysis introduces its evidence requirement as a notatissue assertion. The prejacent proposition p is not introduced as an atissue assertion in the case of indirect evidentials. The reportative brings up p, but does not add it to the common ground, while the conjectural adds the modal proposition must(p) to the common ground. 3.6 Theway forward to an analysis of Nuuchahnulth evidentials The evidentials in Nuuchahnulth are morphosyntactically heterogeneous (Jacobsen 1986). As I describe in Chapter 4, evidentials are found in the mood suxes, mode suxes, verbal suxes, and particles. These morpheme classes occur throughout the syntax, much in the way outlined by Blain and Déchaine (2006). In Chapter 4 I treat the mood suxes as being in the CP domain, the mode suxes as being in the IP domain, and the derivational sux and particle as being in the VP domain. When I work out the semantics for the Nuuchahnulth evidentials in Chapter 5, it will turn out that dierent evidentials will be of dierent semantic 57 3.6. The way forward to an analysis of Nuuchahnulth evidentials types, depending on which domain they occur in. In addition, I explore the way evidentials in dierent domains interact with tense in Chapter 8. The semantics I use are broadly modal in nature, as I treat propositions as sets of possible worlds. My treatment of inference is closer to that ofMcCready andOgata (2007) than that of Kratzer (1981) or those derived from hers. Instead of identifying a set of propositions of a particular kind (say, those which were perceived visually), my semantics for inference makes use of an indexed proposition (or rather, a proposition about an indexed situation). I follow Speas (2010) in making use of perceived situations for the evidentials in Nuu chahnulth which deal with perception These evidentials do not indicate nonoverlap between the perceived situation and the situation of the prejacent proposition, as in the case of those in Quechua and Korean. Therefore, I do not make use of the analyses of Faller (2002) and Chung (2005, 2007). The origo, as described by Garrett (2001) is central to my analysis of Nuuchahnulth evidentials. The way I model the origo is derived from Stephenson, Stephenson's (2007a, 2007b) judgebased analysis of epistemic modals. In Chapter 6 I discuss how the origo is determined by clause type. I argue inChapter 7 that evidentials inNuuchahnulth contribute notatissue content, as Murray (2010) does for Cherokee. I use a modied version of Potts's (2005) logic for conventional implicatures to do this. 58 Chapter 4 Cataloguing the inventory of Nuuchahnulth evidentials Any investigation of evidentials must begin by cataloguing the forms that a particular language uses to express evidential notions, and determining their distribution. In this con text, the goal of this chapter is to present the inventory and distribution of Nuuchahnulth (Ahousaht) evidential morphemes. I begin by introducing the origo hypothesis, which claims that evidentiality always involves a relation between an origo, a proposition and a situation (Ÿ4.1). While this chapter focuses on the syntactic implications of the origo hypothesis; the next chapter (Chapter 5) focuses on the semantic implications. After laying out the predictions that the origo hypothesis makes about the external syntax of evidentials (Ÿ4.2), I show that Nuuchahnulth evidentials partition into three syntac tic subtypes (ŸŸ4.24.5): CPdomain evidentials (associated with moodmarking); IPdomain evidentials (associated with modemarking), and VPdomain evidentials. I then discuss how the origo hypothesis sheds light on the parallels between evidentials and other predicate types (Ÿ4.6), in particular propositional attitude verbs, verbs of saying, experiencer predicates and sensory predicates. Before closing, I discuss the consequences of the origo hypothesis for the syntaxsemantics interface (Ÿ4.7) and a summary of the combinatorial restrictions on Nuuchahnulth evidentials (Ÿ4.8). The chapter closes with a discussion of the variation in evidentials between dierent dialects of Nuuchahnulth, and between Southern Wakashan languages (Ÿ4.9). 4.1 The origo hypothesis: evidentiality consists of the relations between an origo, a proposition and a situation. I propose the following hypothesis about evidential morphemes: (87) The origo hypothesis: An evidential morpheme expresses a relation between: 1. an origo; 2. a proposition; 3. a situation. 59 4.1. The origo hypothesis: evidentiality consists of the relations between an origo, a proposition and a situation. An origo consists of a sentient agent capable of perception and inference paired with a situation. A proposition is a thought that describes some part of the world; these thoughts may be true or false. A situation is a stateofaairs that holds in particular world at a particular time. (See Chapter 5 for a more precise formalization of these terms). Informally, the origo hypothesis can be represented as in Figure 4.1. origo perceived situation prejacent proposition perspectival status perceptual grounding manner of support •         • oo • 777777777777777 Figure 4.1: Three factors of evidentiality The origo hypothesis predicts that evidentialmorphemes encode the following pairwise relations. There is a relation between an origo and a proposition; I call this perspectival status, (88a). There is a relation between a situation perceived by the origo and a proposition; I call this the manner of support, (88b). And there is a relation between an origo and a perceived situation; I call this perceptual grounding. (88) a. Perspectival status b. Manner of support c. Perceptual grounding The origo hypothesis claims that evidential morphemes can be classied according to how they encode perspectival status, perceptual grounding, and manner of support. Here I briey explain how the story of Nuuchahnulth evidentials will unfold. First, syntactically, I es tablish that the four morphological classes of Nuuchahnulth evidential morphemes (discussed in Chapter 2) partition into three syntactic domains, namely CP, IP, and VP. This corresponds to the second column of Table 4.1 below and is the focus of this chapter. With the syntactic analysis in place, I then turn my attention to the rest of the story, namely the semantic analysis, which is developed in Chapter 5. I argue that individual evidential morphemes in Nuuchah nulth dier according to how they are specied for perceptual grounding, manner of support, and value of the origo. This corresponds to the three rightmost columns of Table 4.1. As indicated in Table 4.1, the Ahousaht dialect of Nuuchahnulth has seven distinct evidential morphemes. In (89) below I present these morphemes in a paradigmatic fashion, keeping the propositional content (`it is raining') the same. In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that while inectional mood suxes, shown in (89abc), are introduced in the CP 60 4.1. The origo hypothesis: evidentiality consists of the relations between an origo, a proposition and a situation. Morphological Perceptual Manner of class Domain Morpheme Gloss grounding support Origo mood CP -wa;/iS `quotative'  report speaker suxes -Ha;j `indirect  report addressee interrogative' -qa;Ja `dubitative'  inference speaker mode IP -ckvi; `past  inference  suxes inference' -matak `inference'  inference  derivational VP -Kuk `visual visual inference  sux inference' particle na/a:t `auditory auditory   evidence' Table 4.1: Syntactic levels in which Nuuchahnulth evidentials appear domain, inectional mode suxes, shown in (89de), are introduced in the IPdomain. And suxes that code a sensory perceptwhether visual or auditory, as shown in (89fg)are introduced in the VPdomain. (89) a. Quotative -wA/iS (CPdomain) Mizaawa/iS Miz-(y)a;-wa;/iS raincont3.quot `It's raining, according to what I've been told.' b. Indirect interrogative -HAj (CPdomain) MizaaHaj Miz-(y)a;-Ha;j raincont3.indir.inter `Is it raining, according to what you've been told?' c. Dubitative -qAJa (CPdomain) MizaaqaJa Miz-(y)a;-qa;Ja raincont3.dub `It must be raining.' d. Inferential -matak (IPdomain) Mizaamatak/iS Miz-(y)a;-matak-/i;S raincontind.evid3.ind `Maybe it's raining.' 61 4.2. The syntax of Nuuchahnulth evidentials e. Past inferential -ckvI (IPdomain) Mizaackvi/iS Miz-(y)a;-ckvi;-/i;S raincontpast.evid3.ind `It must have rained' f. Visual inferential -Kuk (VPdomain) MizaaKuk/iS Miz-(y)a;-Kuk-/i;S raincontvis.evid3.ind `It looks like it's raining.' g. Auditory evidential na/a:t (VPdomain) Mizaa/iS Miz-(y)a;-/i;S raincont3.ind na/aat na/a:t aud.evid `It sounds like it's raining.' 4.2 The syntax ofNuuchahnulth evidentials There are two competing analyses of the syntax of evidentials. On one view, there is one dedicated position for evidentials; this is the analysis of Cinque (1999). On another view, evidentials can be inserted into a variety of syntactic positions; this is the analysis of Blain and Déchaine (2006, 2007). In what follows, I briey introduce the two analyses (Ÿ4.2.1), and then discuss the contribution that Nuuchahnulth evidential marking makes to this debate (Ÿ4.2.2). 4.2.1 Two hypotheses about the external syntax of evidentials Cinque (1999) and Blain and Déchaine (2006) make conicting claims on the external syntax of evidentials. Cinque proposes that there is a single position in which evidentials occur (Ÿ4.2.1.1), while Blain and Déchaine propose that evidentials can occur in a number of syntactic domains, and the semantic properties predictably dier according to the syntactic position that they occupy (Ÿ4.2.1.4). 4.2.1.1 Hypothesis 1: A dedicated position for evidentials: Cinque 1999 In his work on adverbs, Cinque (1999) argued that evidentials occupy the specier position of a single evidential mood phrase (EvidP), dominating IP. An example of such an evidential is the English adverb reportedly. He also allotted a single locationspecier of a 62 4.2. The syntax of Nuuchahnulth evidentials epistemic modal phrase (EpistP)to adverbs of epistemic modality such as English apparently. This phrase is immediately dominated by EvidP. (90) [EvidP reportedly [ Evid [EpistP apparently [ Epist [ . . . [IP . . . ]]]]] The idea that there is a single position for evidentials is also taken up by Speas and Tenny (2003). They propose a sentience phrase (SenP), which combines EvidP with a higher EvalP whose specier gives the point of view role, equivalent to the origo. As I argue in Chapter 8, the nonmood evidentials in Nuuchahnulth occur below tense. Cinque's approach does not predict this at all, assuming that tense is in IP. He predicts that all evidentials will occur above tense. There are two reasons to reject the claim that there is a dedicated position for ev identials. First, scattered evidentiality shows that, within the same language, evidentials need not have a dedicated syntactic position. Second paradigmatic heterogeneity shows that, across languages, evidential paradigms are not associated with a dedicated syntactic position. I consider each in turn, and then introduce an alternative hypothesis. 4.2.1.2 Counterexample 1: scattered evidentiality Many languages have what Aikhenvald (2004) calls scattered evidentiality. In such languages, evidentials don't constitute a single paradigm; rather, individual evidential mor phemes occupy distinct morphological or syntactic positions. As Jacobsen (1986) established, Nuuchahnulth has scattered evidentiality in the sense of Aikhenvald. Recall that Nuuchah nulth evidentials morphemes are drawn from four distinct morphological classes: inectional mood suxes, inectional mode suxes, derivational suxes, and particles. See (89) above for illustrative examples. (I return to this below.) 4.2.1.3 Counterexample 2: paradigmatic heterogeneity Another reason to reject the claim that there is a dedicated position for evidentials comes from the fact that, even in languages that have dedicated evidential paradigms, such paradigms are integrated with dierent parts of the clause structure. As discussed by Blain and Déchaine (2006), in dierent languages, evidential paradigms are integrated with focus marking, clausetyping, aspectmarking, tensemarking, modality, or predicatetyping. 4.2.1.4 Hypothesis 2: multiple positions for evidentials: Blain andDéchaine (2006, 2007) To account for heterogeneous expression of evidentiality, Blain and Déchaine (2006) propose that evidentials may be integrated into distinct syntactic domains; they call this the evidential domain hypothesis. In particular, they propose the structure in Figure 4.2. 63 4.2. The syntax of Nuuchahnulth evidentials CP qqq qqq q MMM MMM M TP qqq qqq q MMM MMM M AspP qqq qqq q MMM MMM M Evidential Force vP qqq qqq q MMM MMM M DP qqq qqq q MMM MMM M    hhhhhhhhhhhh Figure 4.2: Evidential domain hypothesis (Blain and Déchaine 2006) The approach of Blain and Déchaine (2006) is a much closer t for Nuuchahnulth than that of Cinque. In the next section I discuss how the evidentials in Nuuchahnulth seem to be distributed through the various syntactic levels. 4.2.2 Nuuchahnulth evidentials are associatedwith CP, IP, or VP The Ahousaht dialect of Nuuchahnulth has seven evidential morphemes. Six of these are suxes that are recruited from three position classes. (See Ÿ2.4.1 for discussion of the morphological template.) To see this, consider (91). Reading from left to right, observe that the visual inferential (-Kuk), which is a suxal verb (see Ÿ2.4.2.2), is drawn from a set of derivational suxes that lie very close to the verb stem. As for the past inferential (-ckvI) and the plain inferential (-matak), they are mode suxes (Ÿ2.5.1). And the quotative (-wA/iS), indirect interrogative (-HAj) and dubitative (-qAJa) are drawn from the set of mood suxes (Ÿ2.5.3). All clauses are obligatorily inected for mood suxes; in the absence of evidential mood marking, nonevidential mood marking is found. (91) [Verb.Stem][DerivationalAspectual]︸                               ︷︷                               ︸ ModeValence/TenseMoodDiscourse︸                                                   ︷︷                                                   ︸ Core Suffixes Peripheral Suffixes Two questions immediately arise regarding (91). First, how does the Nuuchahnulth morphological template map onto the syntactic domains postulated by Blain and Déchaine? Second, how does the one nonsuxal evidential morphemenamely the auditory evidential na/a:tt into the syntactic classication of Nuuchahnulth evidential morphemes? Regarding the correspondence between the Nuuchahnulth morphological position classes and syntactic categories, I propose the following: 64 4.3. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the CP domain: inectional mood suxes 1. Nuuchahnulth mood suxes are part of the clausetyping system, and clausetyping is generally taken to be a property of the C (complementizer) position (Rizzi 1997). I therefore treat evidentials that are mood suxes as instantiating C, i.e. they are CP domain evidentials. 2. Nuuchahnulth mode suxes are sensitive to temporal contrasts; this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. I therefore treat evidentials that are mode suxes as instantiating In, i.e. they are IPdomain evidentials. 3. Nuuchahnulth sensory percept evidentials both have verbal properties: the visual in ferential -Kuk is a verbal sux; the auditory evidential na/a:t is related to the verb na/aa `hear'. I therefore treat them as instantiating V, i.e. they are VPdomain evidentials. Assuming a transparent mapping between morphology and syntax, this yields the right branching syntactic representation in (92). With this as background, I now turn to a more detailed discussion of each of these syntactic domains. CPdomain evidentials (Ÿ4.3) are discussed rst, then IPdomain evidentials (Ÿ4.4) and VPdomain evidentials (Ÿ4.5). (92) [VPdomain [IPdomain [CPdomain]]] 4.3 Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the CP domain: inectionalmood suxes In Nuuchahnulth, each clause is obligatorily marked with a mood sux. Because they are obligatory, and because only one mood is allowed per clause (see (4.3.4) for further discussion), I take it that they are syntactic heads. The full set of matrix clause moods, from which evidential moods are drawn, as is given in Table 4.2. (See Chapter 2 for the full set of mood suxes) Since mood suxes are part of the clausetyping system, this means that they are C. Consequently, the evidentials that are mood suxesnamely quotative -wA/iS, indirect interrogative -HAj, and dubitative -qAJaare expected to be part of the CPdomain. Declarative Interrogative Imperative -/i;S indicative -H interrogative -’i; imperative -qa;Ja dubitative* -Ha;j indirect inter.* -’im future imp. -wa;/iS quotative* -’i;k proximal imp. -Ja;?aS mirative -ji; distal imp. Table 4.2: Matrix clause moods in Nuuchahnulth (3rd person forms) Notice that Nuuchahnulth mood suxes are complex morphemes that code mood 65 4.3. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the CP domain: inectional mood suxes and agreement, and more specically the person and number of the subject. I adopt the convention of using the thirdperson form as the citation form for the mood suxes. I now discuss each of the evidential moods, as follows: quotative -wA/iS (Ÿ4.3.1), indirect interrogative -HAj (Ÿ4.3.2), and dubitative -qAJa (Ÿ4.3.3). For each mood I present the entire mood paradigm, insofar as I have been able to identify it in my own eldwork. In some cases they dier from those reported in Nakayama (2001), so I do not try to ll in any gaps with the forms he gives, since they may not be those used by the speakers I worked with. 4.3.1 Quotative -wA/iS The quotative is a matrix clause mood which is used when the speaker (as origo of a matrix clause) gained knowledge of a situation by means of a report. In (93) the speaker Kay was told that she won a car. When she talks about the situation of her winning a car, she uses the quotative mood, since she learned about it by report. (93) Scenario: Kay got a phone call, and it was someone telling her that she won a car in a rae. Afterwards she told Bill this. hita/apwa/iJas hita/ap-wa;/iJas win1sg.quot huupuKvas hu:puKvas car `I won a car.' The paradigm for the quotative mood is given in Table 4.3. The second and third person forms look as though they consist of some sux -wA followed by the indicative mood, but this pattern is broken in the rst person. sg pl 1 -wa;/iJas -wa;/iJin 2 -wa;/ick -wa;/icu:S 3 -wa;/iS Table 4.3: Quotative mood paradigm in Ahousaht 4.3.2 Indirect interrogative -HAj The paradigms for theAhousaht interrogativemoods are given inTable 4.4. Notice that the indirect interrogative is based on the interrogative. The form of the indirect interrogative has three parts to it, at least historically: /Ha;/ followed by /j/ and a subject agreement element. In the second person plural form the /j/ has coalesced with the initial /s/ of the agreement element becoming /c/. 66 4.3. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the CP domain: inectional mood suxes Indirect interrogative Interrogative sg pl sg pl 1 -Ha;Jas -Ha;Jin 1 -Hs -Hin 2 -Ha;jk -Ha;cuu 2 -k -Hsu: 3 -Ha;j 3 -H Table 4.4: Interrogative moods in Ahousaht The indirect interrogative mood -HAj is another matrix clause mood, and it is used when the speaker believes the addressee has a report which will answer the question. In (94a) the speaker Kay assumes that Bill spoke to their mother, and so she expects that his answer will be in the quotative mood. She could not ask her mother this, since her mother knows which pie is whose, she would instead use the ordinary 1sg interrogative -Hs, as in (94b). (94) a. Scenario: Kay's mother baked a pie for each of her children, and called everyone to tell them to come pick them up. When Kay got there, her mother wasn't around, but her brother Bill was there. Kay, assuming that he spoke to their mother, asked him this. siYaasHaJas siYa-a:s-HaJas 1sg.proposs1sg.indir.inter Hil Hil this `Is this mine?' b. siYaasHs siYa-a:s-Hs 1sg.proposs1sg.inter Hil Hil this `Is this mine?' Faller (2002) observes that the reportative evidential in some languages, Quechua in particular, can be used in a question to indicate that the question itself is reported. The indirect interrogative mood in Nuuchahnulth cannot have this reading. In (95) the use of the indirect interrogative is infelicitous in the scenario where the speaker is relaying a question and the addressee is expected to have rsthand evidence for his or her answer. 67 4.3. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the CP domain: inectional mood suxes (95) Scenario: Ann and Kay were in separate rooms in the basement with no windows. Kay's room was near the stairs, so Ann told her to ask the next person to come in if it was raining outside. When Bill comes in and comes down stairs Kay can't ask him this. #MizaaHaj Miz-(y)a;-Haj raincont3.ind.inter `Is it raining?' 4.3.3 Dubitative -qAJa The paradigm for the dubitative mood in Ahousaht is given in Table 4.5. sg pl 1 -qa;Jas -qa;Jin 2 -? -? 3 -qa;Ja Table 4.5: Dubitative mood paradigm in Ahousaht The dubitative mood -qAJa is a matrix clause mood, and is used in contexts where the speaker (as origo of a matrix clause) gained knowledge of the proposition by means of contingent inference. In (96), the speaker Kay, who made a pot of tea in the morning, infers that the tea is likely to be cold in the afternoon. (96) Scenario: Kay made tea in the morning, and in the afternoon she saw Bill going to pour a cup. She said this to him. Mal/aHs/azqaJa Mal-’a;Hs-’az-qa;Ja coldin.vesselnow3.dub `It's probably cold now.' The paradigm for the dubitative mood in Ahousaht is given in Table 4.5. I have not found these forms in any of the published texts in the Ahousaht dialect (Little 2003, Louie 2003). In addition, I have not succeeded in eliciting the second person forms. Finding the appropriate sort of scenarios is dicult, since it would need to involve the speaker telling the addressee about something the addressee has done him or herself, which is unusual enough, but additionally the speaker is uncertain about the truth of it. This is exactly when an interrogative would be used, in most cases. However, the scenarios in which a dubitative would be used can be distinguished from those in which an interrogative would be used; the dubitative would be 68 4.3. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the CP domain: inectional mood suxes used when the addressee knows even less about his or her activities than the speaker. Nakayama (2001) gives the forms -qAjk and -qACu: for the second person singular and plural respectively, but these were not recognized by my consultants. 4.3.4 Paradigmatic blocking: CPdomain evidentials do not cooccur Evidential mood suxes are here analyzed as clausetyping elements of category C; as such, they occur in the CPdomain. In the Ahousaht dialect of Nuuchahnulth, each clause contains at least one, and no more than one, mood sux. (See Chapter 9 for discussion of other dialects.) The obligatoriness ofmood suxes indicates that clausetyping is always overtly coded in Nuuchahnulth. The fact that mood suxes do not cooccur reects the fact that they constitute a paradigm: the selection of one mood sux blocks the occurrence of another. Consequently, evidential mood suxes predictably do not cooccur. Thus, a clause that is inected with the quotative mood cannot be further inected with the indirect interrogative (97a) or the dubitative (97b). (97) a. *walyuuwa/iSHaj walyu:-wa;/iS-Ha;j be.home3.quot3.indir.inter b. *walyuuwa/iSqaJa walyu:-wa;/iS-qa;Ja be.home3.quot3.dub The example in (97a), in addition to being paradigmatically blocked, is also blocked for semantic reasons. As I will discuss see in more detail in Chapter 6, the evidential moods are lexically specied for their origo. Relevant to the present discussion is the fact that the quotative has a speaker origo, while the indirect interrogative has an addressee origo. For this reason, they can't combine with each other. As for (97b), although it is blocked for paradigmatic reasons, there are no semantic reasons that prevent it from existing, as both the quotative and dubitative have a speaker origo. In fact, although such examples are not attested in Nuuchah nulth, they are attested in other languages. For example, as discussed by Blain and Déchaine (2007), the dubitative and the quotative combine in Plains Cree: (98) êkwa and.then êtikw dubit âwa this môniyâskwêw white.woman ês report êkîkisipêkinikêt conjperfdo.laundry(3) êsa,. . . report `and [reportedly] a certain white woman must have been doing her laundry.' Blain and Déchaine (2007) Another logical possibility is for the indirect interrogative mood to combine with the quotative mood (99a) or the dubitative (99b) mood. Such examples are ruled out on 69 4.3. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the CP domain: inectional mood suxes both paradigmatic and semantic grounds. Semantically, the indirect interrogative species the addressee as origo, while the quotative and the dubitative species the speaker as origo. Thus, they can't combine. (See Chapter 6 for details.) (99) a. *walyuuHajwa/iS walyu:-Ha;j-wa;/iS be.home3.indir.inter3.quot b. *walyuuHajqaJa walyu:-Ha;j-qa;Ja be.home3.indir.inter3.dub Now consider how the dubitative mood might combine with other evidential moods. Again, we see that, as amood, the dubitative cannot be further inected with another evidential mood. Thus, the dubitative and quotative moods do not cooccur (100a), nor do the dubitative and the indirect interrogative moods (100b). (100) a. *walyuuqaJawa/iS walyu:-qa;Ja-wa;/iS be.home3.dub3.quot b. *walyuuqaJaHaj walyu:-qa;Ja-Ha;j be.home3.dub3.indir.inter The illformedness of the examples in (100) is the eect of paradigmatic blocking, but there is nothing semantically anomalous about these combinations. Recall that the dubitative mood is one of four inferential evidentials in Nuuchahnulth; as I show in Ÿ4.4 below, the other inferential evidentials freely combine with the quotative and the indirect interrogatives. Finally, it is impossible to combine an evidential mood suxwith itself. This is shown in (101) for the quotativemood (101a), the indirect interrogativemood (101b), and the dubitative mood (101c). (101) a. *walyuuwa/iSwa/iS walyu:-wa;/iS-wa;/iS be.home3.quot3.quot b. *walyuuHajHaj walyu:-Ha;j-Ha;j be.home3.indir.inter3.indir.inter c. *walyuuqaJaqaJa walyu:-qa;Ja-qa;Ja be.home3.dub3.dub 70 4.4. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the IP domain The illformedness of stacked quotative mood suxes is, again, the product of paradig matic blocking. As for stacked indirect interrogative mood suxes, these should in principle also be possible, at least on semantic grounds. However, I have not come across examples of them in the literature on evidentials. And as for stacked dubitative mood suxeswhich are a kind of inferentialthese are not possible in Nuuchahnulth, but multiple inferentials can be stacked (see Ÿ4.4.1 below, especially example (108)). The two possible orders of -wA/iS `quotative' and -qAJa `dubitative' are illustrated in (102) below. Both are ungrammatical. (102) a. *walyuuqaJawa/iS walyu:-qa;Ja-wa;/iS be.home3.dub3.quot b. *walyuuwa/iSqaJa walyu:-wa;/iS-qa;Ja be.home3.quot3.dub The two possible orders of -wA/iS `quotative' and -HAj `indirect interrogative' are illustrated in (103) below. Both are ungrammatical. (103) a. *walyuuwa/iSHaj walyu:-wa;/iS-Ha;j be.home3.quot3.indir.inter b. *walyuuHajwa/iS walyu:-Ha;j-wa;/iS be.home3.indir.inter3.quot Finally, the two possible orders of -qAJa `dubitative' and -qAJa `dubitative' are illus trated in (104) below. Again, both are ungrammatical. (104) a. *walyuuqaJaHaj walyu:-qa;Ja-Ha;j be.home3.dub3.indir.inter b. *walyuuHajqaJa walyu:-Ha;j-qa;Ja be.home3.indir.inter3.dub 4.4 Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the IP domain In the IP domain, we nd the two mode suxes that have evidential force: -matak `inference' and -ckvI `past inference'. While the moods suxes are syntactic heads, the mode suxes are modiers. It is not obligatory for a clause to contain a mode sux, and it is possible for them to cooccur (see Ÿ4.4.3 for discussion). I discuss the two evidential modes in turn. 71 4.4. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the IP domain 4.4.1 Inferential -matak The rst IPdomain evidential I discuss is -matak `inference', which indicates a contin gent inference on the part of the origo. In (105) the origo is the speaker Kay, and she is not certain that Ken is asleep, but she can infer that he is based on the fact that he is very likely more tired than usual, and that his lights are out earlier than usual. (105) Scenario: Kay knew Ken worked late one day, and so was probably tired, and when she went by his house after dinner she noticed his lights were already out, and she said this to Bill. wa/ijmatak/iS wa/ij-matak-/i;S sleepind.evid3.ind Ken Ken Ken `Ken must be sleeping.' The example in (105) establishes that inferential -matak can occur in matrix clauses. However, it is more often found in nonmatrix clauses, as in (106).7 (106) Scenario: Ken had gone out of town for a while. One day Kay was talking to Linda, who said that Ken might be home, because she saw the lights on at his house. Later, Kay said this to Bill. /uqlaamit/iS /uqla:p-(m)it-/i;S thinkpast3.ind Linda Linda Linda walyuumatakq walyu:-matak-q be.homemight.be3.sub Ken Ken Ken `Linda thought Ken was at home.' The prevalence of -matak in nonmatrix clauses is likely due to the fact that there is a dedicated inferential evidential for matrix clauses, namely the dubitative mood -qAJa (see Ÿ4.3.3 above). While -matak `inference' can occur in embedded clauses, the dubitative mood -qAJa cannot, as shown in (107). (107) a. wawaamit/iS wawa:-(m)it-/i;S saypast3.ind Kay Kay Kay /in /in comp walyuumataKaz walyu:-matak-’az-0 be.homeind.evidnow3.abs Ken Ken Ken `Kay said Ken might be home now.' b. *wawaamit/iS wawa:-(m)it-/i;S saypast3.ind Kay Kay Kay /in /in comp walyuu/azqaJa walyu:-’az-qa;Ja be.homenow3.dub Ken Ken Ken 7Because of its infrequency in texts (-matak does not occur in any texts I collected, and it occurs only twice in Little (2003)) I am basing this statement of frequency on its appearances in the Nootka Texts and Native Accounts (Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 1955). I discuss this when addressing -matak in the Tseshaht dialect in Chapter 9. 72 4.4. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the IP domain Consequently, there are three ways of marking inference in a matrix clause: with the dubitative mood, as in (96) above; with -matak in combination with the indicative mood, as in (105) above; with -matak in combination with the dubitative, as (108). (108) /uHmatakqaJa /uH-matak-qa;Ja focind.evid3.dub kuuWiljip ku:Wil-ji;p stealben Ken Ken Ken taana ta:na money `It was probably him who stole Ken's money.' Morphologically, -matak `inference' is an inectional mode sux. As such, it is part of the peripheral suxes that attach to the rst predicate of the clause. (See Chapter 2.4.1 for discussion of the linearization of peripheral suxes.) Within the sux string, as a mode sux -matak can cooccur with other mode suxes, including -/aqz `future' and -ckvI `past inference'. (See Ÿ4.4.3 below for details.) Thus, while mood suxes show paradigmatic blocking eects, mode suxes do not. This distributional dierence suggests that mood suxes are syntactic heads, while mode suxes are modiers. 4.4.2 Past inferential -ckvI The other evidential mode sux is -ckvI `past inference', which also indicates the origo has made a contingent inference. It diers from -matak `inference' in also specifying that the inferred situation occurred before the situation the origo perceived. For example, in (109) it rained during the night, when the origo Kay was asleep, so she could not see it. By morning it had stopped, but since the groundwas still wet, she was able to infer that it had rained sometime during the night. The inferred situation occurred during the night, and the perceived situation occurred in the morning, so -ckvI is appropriate. (109) Scenario: It didn't rain at all on Thursday. On Friday at 1:00 a.m. it started raining, and it continued until 4:00 a.m. Kay went to bed on Thursday at 10:00 p.m and woke up at 6:00 a.m. Friday morning. She didn't see it rain during the night, but in the morning she saw the ground wet. When Bill got up she told him this. Mizaackvi/iS Miz-(y)a;-ckvi;-/i;S raincontpast.evid3.ind `It must have rained' The origo of the clause is relevant for determining the scope of -ckvI `past inference'. While it is the speaker making a contingent inference when -ckvI is in a matrix clause, as in (109) above, in embedded clauses -ckvI indicates the matrix subject is making it. This is because the origo in a matrix clause is the speaker, and in an embedded clause it is the subject 73 4.4. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the IP domain of the propositional attitude verb. In (110) Linda, as the subject of the verb /uqlaap `think', is the origo of the clause containing -ckvI, and she is the one making the inference in this scenario. (110) Scenario: Linda told Kay that Ken must have been home because he found her shoes at the door, even though she wasn't around anymore. Kay then told Bill this. /uqlaamit/iS /uqla:p-(m)it-/i;S thinkpast3.ind Linda Linda Linda [walyuuckviq [walyu:-ckvi;-q [be.homepast.evid3.sub Ken] Ken] Ken] `Linda thought Ken must have been home.' As I mentioned already, -ckvI `past inference' is a mode sux. However, -ckvI displays some morphological behaviour unique among the mode suxes, due the fact that it is the only one which is vowelnal: when a glottalizing or glottalinitial sux immediately follows it, the two suxes coalesce. There are several such suxes that can occur after the mode suxes, including -’ap `causative', -’az `now', -’at `shift', and -/ak `possessive'. I give a couple of examples of this process below. In (111a) -ckvI is followed directly by the glottalizing sux -’az, and the two coalesce resulting in [ckvaz] on the surface. Likewise, in (111b) -ckvI is followed by the glottalinitial allomorph of the possessive, and the two suxes coalesce resulting in [ckvak] on the surface. (111) a. Scenario: Ann's child was throwing a tantrum, and once she got him calmed down, Ken's child started. Kay said this to Bill. Ha?uqHckvaz/iS Ha?uqH-ckvi;-’az-/i;S take.turnpast.evidnow3.ind wiiwaakva wi:wa:kva throw.tantrum Ann Ann Ann TaNa/isuk/i TaNa-/is-uk-/i; childdimpossdef `It must have been Ann's child's turn to throw a tantrum.' b. Scenario: Ann told Kay she wasn't sure if she had enough food for the feast. At the end of the feast, Kay was helping clean up and she saw that there was some food left over. She said this to Bill. Hayaazckvak/iS Haya:z-ckvi;-/a;k-/i;S enoughpast.evidposs3.ind ha/um ha/um food `She must have had enough food.' In addition to the past inferential mode sux -ckvI, there is another -ckvI sux which attaches to nouns to form nouns that denote the result of some activity or the remains of something. Some representative examples from the Ahousaht dialect are given in Table 4.6.8 8These words, from Little (2003), were not recognized by my consultants. 74 4.4. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the IP domain ZuJumckvi `mussel shell' kvickvii `ling dust' CaHwackvi `afterbirth' Table 4.6: Nouns derived with -ckvI from Little (2003) 4.4.3 IPdomain evidentials can cooccur The two IPdomain evidentials, past inferential -ckvI and inferential -matak, belong to the class of mode suxes. As shown in the template in (112), these mode suxes are part of the set of peripheral suxes; as such; they cliticize to the rst verbal constituent in the sentence. (See Chapter 2 for details.) (112) [Verb.Stem][DerivationalAspectual]︸                               ︷︷                               ︸ ModeValence/TenseMoodDiscourse︸                                                    ︷︷                                                    ︸ Core Suffixes Peripheral Suffixes Recall that the evidential mood suxes constitute a paradigm, and so are in comple mentary distribution. In contrast, evidential mode suxes are not in a paradigmatic relation. Consequently, they can cooccur. Signicant is the fact that they can occur in either order. For example, in some contexts, evidential -matak can precede or follow the past evidential -ckvI, as in (113). But in other contexts, -ckvI precedes -matak, while the converse order is not accepted, as in (114). It is not clear what the criteria are for selecting one order over another in a given context; and the same speaker can oer dierent orders in dierent sentences. The fact that relative order of -ckvI and -matak is not xed suggests that they are introduced into the IPdomain as adjunct modiers. (113) a. /uHaaYasmatakckvi/iS /u-Ha;Yas-matak-ckvi;-/i;S transgo.and.buyind.evidpast.evid3.ind qinHaama qinHa:ma egg `I think he might have gone to buy eggs.' b. /uHaaYasckvimatak/iS /u-Ha;Yas-ckvi;-matak-/i;S transgo.and.buypast.evidind.evid3.ind qinHaama qinHa:ma egg `I think he might have gone to buy eggs.' 75 4.4. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the IP domain (114) a. haWiiqzckvimatak/iS haWi:qz-ckvi;-matak-/i;S hungrypast.evidind.evid3.ind `He must have been hungry.' b. ?haWiiqzmatakckvi/iS haWi:qz-matak-ckvi;-/i;S hungryind.evidpast.evid3.ind `He must have been hungry.' It is not possible for the same mode sux to iterate. This is shown in in (115a) for -matak, and in (115b) for -ckvI. (115) a. *walyuumatakmatak/iS walyu:-matak-matak-/i;S be.homeind.evidind.evid3.ind b. *walyuuckvickvi/iS walyu:-ckvi;-ckvi;-/i;S be.homepast.evidpast.evid3.ind 4.4.4 IPdomain andCPdomain evidentials can cooccur In terms of distribution, I have so far shown that while CPdomain mood evidentials are in complementary distribution, IPdomain evidential can cooccur with each other. In addition, the claim that evidential moods and modes partition into two distinct syntactic domains predicts that it will be possible for IPdomain and CPdomain evidentials to cooccur. This prediction is borne out. First, consider the combination of the evidential moodsthe quotative, the indirect interrogative, and the dubitativewith inferential -matak. The relevant examples are given in (116). The example in (116a) shows that -matak combines with quotative -wA/iS; the example in (116b) shows that -matak combines with the indirect interrogative -HAj; and the example in (116c) shows that -matak combines with the dubitative -qAJa. (116) a. haWiiqzmatakwa/iS haWi:qz-matak-wa;/iS hungrypast.evid3.quot `He must be hungry.' b. si?ajizmatakHaj si?a-Si(z)-matak-Ha;j cookedmomind.evid3.indir.inter `Is it possible that it's cooked?' 76 4.5. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the VP domain c. /uHmatakqaJa /uH-matak-qa;Ja focind.evid3.dub kuuWiljip ku:Wil-ji;p stealben Ken Ken Ken taana ta:na money `It was probably him who stole Ken's money.' Now consider the combination of the evidential moodsthe quotative, the indirect interrogative, and the dubitativewith past inferential -ckvI. The relevant examples are given in (117). The example in (117a) shows that -ckvI combineswith quotative -wA/iS; the example in (117b) shows that -ckvI combines with the indirect interrogative -HAj; and the example in (117c) shows that -ckvI combines with the dubitative -qAJa. (117) a. Mizaackviwa/iS Miz-(y)a;-ckvi;-wa;/iS raincontpast.evid3.quot `It must have been raining (according to somebody).' b. MizaackviHaj Miz-(y)a;-ckvi;-Ha;j raincontpast.evid3.indir.inter `Was it raining?' c. walyuuckviqaJa walyu:-ckvi;-qa;Ja be.homepast.evid3.dub Ken Ken Ken `I guess Ken was probably home.' 4.5 Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the VP domain Nuuchahnulth has two evidentials in the VP domain. One is a derivational sux -Kuk `visual inference' (Ÿ4.5.1), and the other a particle na/a:t `auditory evidence' (Ÿ4.5.2). Both of these evidentials lexically encode perceptual grounding: -Kuk encodes perceptual grounding in the visual modality; na/a:t encodes perceptual grounding via the auditory modality. In this respect, the VPdomain evidentials contrast with the IPdomain (mode) evidentials and the CPdomain (mood) evidentials. Descriptively, in Nuuchahnulth, only VPdomain evidentials code perceptual grounding. As we shall see in Chapters 5 and 8, this has consequences for the semantic analysis. Here I focus on the syntactic distribution of the visual inferential -Kuk and the auditory evidential na/a:t. 4.5.1 Visual inferential: the derivational sux -Kuk The visual inferential -Kuk is used in scenarios such as (118). The origo, here the speaker Kay, can see things like the sun and people wearing shorts and tshirts. This allows her to infer 77 4.5. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the VP domain that it is hot outside. There are two crucial properties to this scenario: (i) Kay's uncertainty as to the temperature outside; and (ii) Kay perceiving something via the visual modality that allows her to make an inference about the temperature. (118) Scenario: Kay was inside where the air conditioning kept the temperature at 21◦C. She looked outside and saw it was sunny and people were wearing shorts and tshirts, so she said this to Bill. ZupaaKuk Zup-(y)a;-Kuk-0 hotcontvis.evid3.abs `It looks hot out.' With the visual inferential -Kuk, the origo can be, but need not be the speaker. This can be seen by putting the visual inferential in an embedded clause, where the origo is whoever is specied as the subject of the matrix verb. For example, in (119), the visual inferential -Kuk is in a clause embedded under the propositional attitude verb /uqlaap `think'. Linda, the subject of the matrix verb, is also the origo of the embedded clause, and she has inferred, because she saw lights one, that Ken must be at home. (119) Scenario: Linda saw lights on at Ken's place when she went by, and later she called Kay and told her walyuuKuk/iS Ken. When she got o the phone Kay said this to Bill. /uqlaamit/iS /uqla:p-(m)it-/i;S thinkpast3.ind Linda Linda Linda [walyuuKukq [walyu:-Kuk-q [be.homevis.evid3.sub Ken] Ken] Ken] `Linda thought Ken must be at home.' In terms of the Nuuchahnulth morphological template (see Ÿ2.4.1 for details), the visual inferential -Kuk is a core sux, and so attaches quite close to the root, before any aspectual suxes. This is shown in (120). (120) [Verb.Stem][DerivationalAspectual]︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸ ModeValence/TenseMoodDiscourse︸                                                   ︷︷                                                   ︸ Core Suffixes Peripheral Suffixes A single clause can contain more than one predicate, where a predicate is a word that can occur clauseinitially and host the peripheral suxes. In multipredicate clauses, peripheral suxes must attach to the initial predicate of the clause, while core suxes can attach to any predicate, including those which are not clauseinitial. With this in mind, consider (121), which has two coordinated clauses. Relevant is the fact that the second conjunct contains three predicative elements: qvaaqH `but', /iiqHii `still', and haWiiqz `hungry'. In (121a), -Kuk attaches to qvaaqH `but'; in (121b) it attaches to /iiqHii `still', and in (121c) to haWiiqz `hungry'. 78 4.5. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the VP domain (121) a. Scenario: Kay saw Ken eat a lot at lunch, and then afterwards he kept going back to the fridge. She said this to Bill. /ayaqzaqit/iS /aya-’aqz-(q)aq-(m)it-/i;S manyin.bodyaugpast3.ind Ken Ken Ken [qvaaqHKuk [qva:qH-Kuk-0 [butvis.evid3.abs /iiqHii /i:q-Hi; stilldur haWiiqz] haWi:qz] hungry] `Ken ate real lots and yet he's still behaving like he's hungry.' b. /ayaqzaqit/iS /aya-’aqz-(q)aq-(m)it-/i;S manyin.bodyaugpast3.ind Ken Ken Ken [qvaaqH [qva:qH-0 [but3.abs /iiqHiiKuk /i:q-Hi;-Kuk stilldurvis.evid haWiiqz] haWi:qz] hungry] `Ken ate real lots and yet he's still behaving like he's hungry.' c. /ayaqzaqit/iS /aya-’aqz-(q)aq-(m)it-/i;S manyin.bodyaugpast3.ind Ken Ken Ken [qvaaqH [qva:qH-0 [but3.abs /iiqHii /i:q-Hi; stilldur haWiiqzKuk] haWi:qz-Kuk] hungryvis.evid] `Ken ate real lots and yet he's still behaving like he's hungry.' 4.5.1.1 VPdomain -Kuk `visual inference' is related to KuK[RSS] `resemble' The form of -Kuk `visual inference' is identical to that of another core sux, -Kuk[RSS] `resemble', though it diers in its eect on the stem and its semantics. The evidential -Kuk does not cause reduplication of its stem, but the `resemble' one does, and it also causes the rst two syllables to have short vowels. (122) susuPicKuk suPic-Kuk[RSS] sandresembles `sugar' Though there are often identical pairs of suxes that dier in their meaning and in their eect on the stem, the similarity in meaning here is quite suggestive. A more typical pair is -(q)Hli[L] `tell' and -(q)Hli[RLL] `do excessively'. The form of the suxes themselves is the same, including the ghost consonant allomorphy, but the one meaning `tell' causes the vowel of the rst syllable of the stem to be long, as shown in (123a) while the one meaning `do excessively' causes CV reduplication of the stem and also causes the vowels of the rst two syllables to be long (123b). (123) a. waawaa/ijHli/iS/aal/al wa/ij-(q)Hli[R]-/i;S-/a:l-/al sleepdo.excessively3.indhabpl `They are always sleeping too much.' 79 4.5. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the VP domain b. wik/iick wik-/i;ck neg2sg.ind TaaquqHli Taqu-(q)Hli[L] truthtell `You're not telling the truth.' The similarity in meaning between -Kuk `visual inference' and -Kuk[RSS] `resemble', in addition to their similarity in form, suggests that they are both historically derived from a single sux. 4.5.1.2 Cooccurence of VPdomain -Kuk `visual inference' with other evidentials VPdomain evidentials are not in a paradigmatic relation with each other, and can cooccur. I leave discussion of their cooccurrence until after the auditory evidential na/a:t has been described (Ÿ4.5.2.2). Here I focus specically on the cooccurrence of -Kuk `visual inference' with other evidentials, summarized in Table 4.7. I discuss the other VPdomain evidential, na/a:t `auditory evidence', in Ÿ4.5.2.2. The sentences in (124) each contain the CP domain IP domain VP domain -qa;Ja -wa;/iS -Ha;j -matak -ckvi; -Kuk na/a:t -Kuk × X X × × × X Table 4.7: Cooccurrence of VPdomain evidential -Kuk and other evidentials VPdomain evidential -Kuk `visual inference' with one of the three CPdomain evidentials in Nuuchahnulth. The only one which -Kuk cannot cooccur with is -qAJa `dubitative'. The reason for this not clear to me, but it is likely connected with the fact that both -Kuk and -qAJa encode contingent inference as the manner of support. As I show below, -Kuk is also not able to occur with either of the other two inferentials, -matak `inference' and -ckvI `past inference'. (124) a. *hiixvatHiKukqaJa hi:xvatHi-Kuk-qa;Ja angry.withvis.evid3.dub Ken Ken Ken b. hiixvatHiKukwa/iS hi:xvatHi-Kuk-wa;/iS angry.withvis.evid3.quot Ken Ken Ken `It is said that Ken looks angry.' c. hiixvatHiKukHaj hi:xvatHi-Kuk-Ha;j angry.withvis.evid3.indir.inter Ken Ken Ken `Does Ken look angry?' 80 4.5. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the VP domain In (125) we see that -Kuk is unable to cooccur with either of the IPdomain evidentials -matak `inference' or -ckvI `past inference'. As I mentioned above, the reason for this is unclear, though they are all inferential. (125) a. *walyuuKukmatak/iS walyu:-Kuk-matak-/i;S be.homevis.evidind.evid3.ind nani nani grandparent b. *walyuuKukckvi/iS walyu:-Kuk-ckvi;-/i;S be.homevis.evidpast.evid3.ind Ken Ken Ken As with all the other evidentials, -Kuk `visual inference' cannot occur twice in a single clause. This is illustrated by the sentence in (126). (126) *walyuuKukKuk/iS walyu:-Kuk-Kuk-/i;S be.homevis.evidvis.evid3.ind Finally, the sentence in (127) shows that -Kuk `visual inference' can cooccur with na/a:t `auditory evidence'. However, this is an example of -Kuk being used to indicate an inference in general, much like seem or appear in English. How the visual grounding requirement of -Kuk can be removed in such cases is not clear at present. (127) Scenario: Kay lives next door to Ken, and one day after hearing him slam his cupboard door she said this to Bill. walyuuKuk/iS walyu:-Kuk-/i;S be.homevis.evid3.ind Ken Ken Ken na/aat na/a:t aud.evid `Ken appears to be home.' The sentence in (128) also illustrates the use of -Kuk as a general inferential. Here the speaker was telling a story, and was unsure if Kvasitum was the word she was looking for. She had no visual evidence for this, but nevertheless used -Kuk to indicate that she was unsure. However, this example is perhaps a metaphorical use of -Kuk. The experience of trying to recall a word is much like seeing something unclearly at a distance. The sentences in (127) and (128) are the only two I have seen where -Kuk is used without the usual visual grounding requirement, and more work is needed to sort out what is going on in them. In the remainder of this dissertation I set these examples aside as unexplained exceptions. (128) Kvasitum Kvasitum branch /uklaaKuk/iS /u-(j)la;-Kuk-/i;S transnamedvis.evid3.ind `It seems to me that it is called k'wasitum.' 81 4.5. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the VP domain 4.5.2 Auditory evidential: the particle na/a:t The nal evidential I present is na/a:t `auditory evidence'. There are a few kinds of scenarios where a speaker would use na/a:t, and what is constant across these scenarios is that the speaker perceived some situation using his or her sense of hearing. The dierent scenarios compatible with na/a:t result in the use of dierent moods. Let's take an example of each, beginning with one in the indicative mood -/IS. In (129) na/a:t `auditory evidence' appears in a sentence in the indicative mood, and it can be used in a scenario where the speaker, Kay, hasn't seen Ken come home, or seen anything to suggest that he has, but has heard him make noise. In other words, she has heard Ken being home. (129) Scenario: Kay lives in the apartment next to Ken's, and Ken had been away for a week. Then she heard a door close in his apartment, so she said this to Bill. walyaqpi/az/iS wal-yaq-pi(z)-’az-/i;S gohaving.donein.house.momnow3.ind na/aat na/a:t aud.evid Ken Ken Ken `It sounds like Ken is home now.' In (130) na/a:t `auditory evidence' occurs with the dubitative mood -qAJa. This can be used in a scenario where the speaker Kay has not seen anything that leads her to conclude that Ken is happy, but has rather heard something other than the situation of being happy itself, and from what she heard, she can infer that Ken is happy. In this case Kay heard Linda say that Ken won at lahal the night before, and from that Kay infers that he is happy, since people who win are usually happy. Also note that Linda did not tell Kay that Ken was happy, only that he won. (130) Scenario: Ken was playing lahal one day, but Kay didn't go. The next day Linda called Kay and told her that Ken won. When she got o the phone Kay told Bill this. nujHakva?azqaJa nujHakv-(q)aq-’az-qa;Ja proudaugnow3.dub Ken Ken Ken /in /in comp hita/ap hita/ap-0 win3.abs na/aat na/a:t aud.evid `Ken must be happy that he won.' Finally, in (131) na/a:t `auditory evidence' can occur with the reportative mood, for example in a scenario where the speaker Kay has heard someone say that it was Ken who ended up in jail. Kay cannot have otherwise known that it was Ken, it had to have been a report from someone else, and it had to be verbal, not written, since then she would not have heard it. 82 4.5. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the VP domain (131) Scenario: Kay and Bill heard that there was a ght the night before, and the police came and put someone in jail, but they didn't know who it was. Linda called Kay and told her that Ken got arrested, and when she got o the phone Kay told Bill this. /uHitwa/iS /uH-(m)it-wa;/iS focpast3.quot Ken Ken Ken na/aat na/a:t aud.evid mazpiz maz-pi(z) tiedin.house.mom `It is said it was Ken who ended up in jail.' If we change the scenario to one where Kay read it in the paper, na/a:t is no longer felicitous, and Kay will use the reportative alone, as in (132). It should be noted that the mode of perception is left unspecied here, and so it can also be used in the situation above, where someone verbally told Kay. (132) Scenario: Kay and Bill heard that there was a ght the night before, and the police came and put someone in jail, but they didn't know who it was. When the newspaper came, Kay read it and there was an article that said Ken was arrested. She told Bill this. /uHitwa/iS /uH-(m)it-wa;/iS focpast3.quot Ken Ken Ken mazpiz maz-pi(z) tiedin.house.mom `It is said it was Ken who ended up in jail.' The reader might have noticed that I have not mentioned the origo in my descriptions of the conditions where na/a:t `auditory evidence' can be used, and instead refer to the speaker. This was not an error. As I discuss in Chapter 6, na/a:t requires that the origo associated with it be a speaker. This fact results in restrictions on the kinds of clauses that na/a:t can appear in, but I leave discussion of this to Chapter 6. For now I conne myself to mentioning that it cannot occur in any interrogative clauses, nor can it occur in the antecedent of a conditional. There are also some limitations on it in embedded clauses, but they are more complicated, so I defer discussion until Chapter 6. Morphologically na/a:t `auditory evidence' is a noninitial particle. As a particle it cannot be inected, as shown in (133b), and as a noninitial one it can occur anywhere in a clause except the beginning, as shown in (133c). 83 4.5. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the VP domain (133) Scenario: Kay could not see outside, but heard the rain hitting the window. a. Mizaa/iS Miz-(y)a;-/i;S raincont3.ind na/aat na/a:t aud.evid `It's raining.' b. *na/aat/iS Mizaa c. *na/aat Mizaa/iS 4.5.2.1 VPdomain na/a:t `auditory evidence' is related to na/a: `hear' The form of na/a:t `auditory evidence' appears to be derived from the verb stem na/a: `hear'. The similarity in both form and meaning is too strong to be due to chance. However, I believe the similarity to be due to a single diachronic origin, and not to any shared underlying morpheme. There is no sux -t in Nuuchahnulth which could attach to the stem na/a: to produce the form na/a:t. The closest candidate for a sux would be -’at `shift', but the compositional meaning would not be correct for na/a:t. In such a case na/a:t would be a reduced form of na/aa/at (na/a:-’at `hearshift'), but this would mean something like `he/she/it was heard by him/her/it', or `one hears it'. Given the latter reading, with a generic subject hearing something, we have a plausible historical source for na/a:t in the reduction of na/aa/at. 4.5.2.2 Cooccurence of VPdomain na/a:t `auditory evidence' with other evidentials The VPdomain evidential na/a:t `auditory evidence' has a dierent range of possible cooccurrences with other evidentials, summarized in Table 4.8 as compared to the other VP domain evidential -Kuk `visual inference'. This is due to the dierence in its semantics, namely that na/a:t 1) is unspecied for a manner of supportthus permitting it to cooccur with inferentialsand 2) its origo must be a speaker, not an addresseethus disallowing it from cooccuring in an interrogative. CP domain IP domain VP domain -qa;Ja -wa;/iS -Ha;j -matak -ckvi; -Kuk na/a:t na/a:t X X × X × X × Table 4.8: Cooccurrence of na/a:t `auditory evidence' with other evidentials The sentences in (134) each contain na/a:t `auditory evidence' together with one of the CPdomain evidential mood suxes. It is compatible with both -qAJa `dubitative' and -wA/iS 84 4.5. Nuuchahnulth evidentials in the VP domain `quotative', where the origo is the speaker. However, it cannot cooccur with -HAj `indirect interrogative' because the origo in an interrogative is the addressee. (134) a. walyaqpi/azqaJa wal-yaq-pi(z)-’az-qa;Ja gohaving.donein.house.momnow3.dub Ken Ken Ken na/aat na/a:t aud.evid `It sounds like Ken is home now.' b. hiixvatHiwa/iS hi:xvatHi-wa;/iS angry.with3.quot Ken Ken Ken na/aat na/a:t aud.evid `It sounds like Ken is angry.' c. *hiixvatHiHaj hi:xvatHi-Ha;j angry.with3.indir.inter Ken Ken Ken na/aat na/a:t aud.evid As I discuss in Ÿ6.5 below, na/a:t can be used when the origo is the speaker in a speech act that is not the root speech act. In other words, since -wA/iS `quotative' and -HAj `indirect interrogative' both implicate another speech actthe speech act in which the origo obtained the report supporting the prejacent propositionwe expect that na/a:t can cooccur with -wA/iS and -HAj with the interpretation that the speaker associated with the report itself is the origo of na/a:t (that is, we expect that na/a:t can be semantically embedded under -wA/iS and -HAj). I have data to support this for -wA/iS, which I give in Ÿ6.5, but I lack the data to support this for -HAj. In (135) we see that na/a:t `auditory evidence' can cooccur with -matak `inference', but not with -ckvI `past inference'. This is due to the way that na/a:t interacts with the temporal semantics of -ckvI, namely that na/a:t can only occur with a prejacent proposition that holds at the time of the perceived situation, while -ckvI can only occur with a prejacent proposition temporally precedes the perceived situation (see Chapter 8). (135) a. wikpizmataKaz/um wik-pi(z)-matak-’az-0-/um negin.house.momind.evidnow3.absdm Ken Ken Ken na/aat na/a:t aud.evid `Ken is probably not at home.' b. *KaMaqaqaqckvi/iS/al KaMaqa-(q)aq-ckvi;-/i;S-/al be.noisyaugpast.evid3.indpl na/aat na/a:t aud.evid Recall that na/a:t can cooccur with the visual inferential -Kuk, in which case it the latter has the force of a generalpurpose inferential. The relevant example, which I already discussed above in the context of -Kuk, is repeated in (136) for convenience. 85 4.6. Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings (136) Scenario: Kay lives next door to Ken, and one day after hearing him slam his cupboard door she said this to Bill. walyuuKuk/iS walyu:-Kuk-/i;S be.homevis.evid3.ind Ken Ken Ken na/aat na/a:t aud.evid `Ken appears to be home.' I assume this shift in meaning of -Kuk is metaphorical. Note that in English, for example, look can also lose its visual component, as in (137). (137) Scenario: Ken was supposed to meet Kay and Bill at 6:00, but at 5:50 he called Kay and told her he would be late. Kay then said this to Bill. It looks like he'll be late. Finally, as with all the other evidentials, it is not possible to have two instances of the auditory evidential na/a:t in the same sentence. This is shown in (138). (138) *walyuuqaJa walyu:-qa;Ja be.home3.dub na/aat na/a:t aud.evid na/aat na/a:t aud.evid 4.6 Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings While only evidentials encode one of the three evidential relations, other morphemes encode relations which are minimally dierent from these. In the remainder of this section I compare evidentials to these other kinds of morphemes. Propositional attitude morphemes like /uqla:p `think' or hayumHi `not know' encode a relation between an attitude holder and a proposition, but the attitude holder is not the origo of the clause the morpheme appears in, it is its external argument. I discuss these in Ÿ4.6.1. Similarly, verbs of saying like wa: `say' encode a relation between a person and a speech act (a proposition paired with a speech context). I discuss these in Ÿ4.6.2. Perception predicates like Naatssijiz `see' and na/aa `hear' encode a relation between a perceivertheir external argumentand an entity. I discuss these in Ÿ4.6.3. Finally, there are what I am calling entity attitude morphemes like -tuk `sound like', -PUqs `smell like' and -XAX `endearment' which encode a relation between an origo, a property and an entity. I discuss these in Ÿ4.6.4 4.6.1 Comparing evidentials to predicates that introduce propositions Anumber of propositional attitude verbs encode the perspectival status of a proposition for an individual, and I list several in Table 4.9. Propositional attitude verbs do not t the 86 4.6. Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings denition of an evidential morpheme because they do not encode a relation between their own origo and a propositionthe individual whose perspectival status is encoded is the attitude holder argument of the verb. All the verbs in Table 4.9 are transitive, taking the proposition /uqlaap `think' huHtak `know' huHtakSiz `learn' hayumHi `not know' wikWinjiz `forget' Table 4.9: Nuuchahnulth propositional attitude verbs as their internal argument and the individual as their external argument. For the most part, the proposition is contained in a clause in the absolutive mood, optionally introduced by the complementizer /in, but /uqlaap `think' takes a clause in the subordinate mood which cannot be introduced by /in. These two patterns are illustrated in (139), where huHtak `know' takes an /inclause and /uqlaap takes a subordinate mood clause. (139) a. Scenario: Ken went and bought $100 worth of food for her brother, even though he doesn't have much money. Kay said this to Bill. huHtakitk huHtak-(m)it-k knowpast2sg.inter suWa suWa 2sg.pro /in /in comp qvisit qvis-(m)it-0 do.thuspast3.abs `Did you know that he did that?' b. Scenario: Ken has the same kind of shoes as John, and when the two of them came in, Ken went in and took his o in the bedroom. The next morning, he saw John putting on his shoes by the front door, and tells him they are his, and they start arguing. Bill comes in and asks Kay what is going on, and she replies with this. /uqlaap/iS /uqla:p-/i;S think3.ind Ken Ken Ken /uucqaa /u:c-qa; own3.sub Suuwis/i Su:wis-/i; shoesdef `Ken thinks the shoes are his.' Both huHtak `know' and /uqlaap `think' entail that their complement proposition is in the perspective of their subject, and others also entail this, such as Taaqaak `believe', given in a sentence in (140a). Other verbs entail that their complement proposition is not in their subject's perspective. An example of this is hayumHi `not know', illustrated in (140b). 87 4.6. Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings (140) a. Taaqaakit/iS Ta:qa:k-(m)it-/i;S believepast3.ind Ken Ken Ken /in /in comp /uH /uH-0 foc3.abs taananakSiz ta:na-na;k-Si(z) moneyhavemom `Ken believes it was he that received money.' b. hayumHi/iS hayumHi-/i;S not.know3.ind Linda Linda Linda /in /in comp ?aCiKazuk ?aCik-’az-uk-0 know.hownowposs3.abs saapniqiil sapni:-q-(j)i:l[L] breadstemmake TaNa TaNa child `Linda doesn't know her child knows how to make bread.' The verbs exemplied above are all stative rather than eventive; the situations described by these verbs hold over time and have no inherent endpoint. By adding the momentaneous sux -Si(z) to such verbs we get inchoative verbs indicating a change of state, from one where the situation described by the verb does not hold to one where it does. Thus, huHtakSizmeans `nd out' or `learn', while wikWinjiz means forget.9 (141) a. huHtakSiz huHtak-Si(z) knowmom ma/izqac/i ma/izqac-/i; boydef /an /an comp /aanaqH /a:na-(q)H-0 reallysim3.abs xaaSxiipSizuk xa:Sxi:p-Si(z)-uk bluejaymomposs /um/iiqsu /um/i-i;q-su motherkinkin The little boy now knew that his mother really turned into a blue jay. (Little 2003, 42) b. /o /o prt wikWinjizk wikWin-Si(z)-k forgetmom2sg.inter walyaqpi/azHuuk wal-yaq-pi(z)-’az-Hu:k be.homehaving.donein.house.momnow3.abs.emph `Oh, did you forget he's home now?' The verb Zuu means `remember', as in `don't forget', and as such does not involve a change in state. (142) ZuujiiPisum Zu:-ji;p-’i;sum rememberben2sg>1sg.imp.fut /aHkuu /aHku: this `Remember this for me.' 4.6.2 Comparing evidentials to verbs of saying Verbs of saying indicate that a report occurred, and as such encode something like a manner of support. However, rather than encoding a relation between a situation perceived by the origo and a proposition, verbs of saying encode a relation between a speaker and a speech act. The speech act (formally a proposition paired with a speech context) is the internal argument of a verb of saying, and the speaker its external argument. I give three verbs of saying in Table 4.10 below. Generally waa is translated `say' while /uuqHli and /iiqHuk are translated 9The sentence in (141a) has the complementizer as /an instead of /in, which is the form used bymy consultants. 88 4.6. Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings waa/wawaa `say' /uuqHli `tell' /iiqHuk `tell' Table 4.10: Nuuchahnulth verbs of saying as `tell', but all three can occur with an object, especially with -’at `shift'. I go into more detail on each of these verbs in turn, starting with waa. The verb meaning `say' occurs in two forms, waa and wawaa, though it is unclear what the dierence is between them. A reasonable guess is thatwaa is momentaneous whilewawaa is durative, since verbs often occur in a momentaneousdurative pair, but I have not tested this. In narrative texts waa is more frequent than wawaa, while in elicitation contexts I nd the reverse to be true. Whatever the dierence is, it is not relevant to the points I make below. I use waa as a cover term for both forms. We nd waa `say' with both direct and indirect quotes. An indirect quote occurs in an absolutive mood clause introduced by the complementizer /in. The sentences in (143) illustrate the use of waa with an indirect quote. (143) a. wawaa/iS wawa:-/i;S say3.ind Ken Ken Ken /in /in comp maakukvitsuuk ma:kuk-(m)it-su:k buypast2sg.abs jamas jamas sweet `Ken says you bought sweets.' b. Scenario: Bill told Kay that the kids were hyped up, and then the phone rang and Linda said that they're already asleep. When she got o the phone Kay said this to Bill. wawaa/iS wawa:-/i;S say3.ind /uH /uH foc Linda Linda Linda /in /in comp wa/iJazHuuk/al wa/ij-’az-Hu:k-/al sleepnow3.abs.emphpl `Linda says they're already asleep.' In (144) we seewaa with a direct quote. Note that the direct quote precedes the verb, whereas indirect quotes follow it. (144) ha ha prt hayumHimitsa hayumHi-(m)it-sa not.knowpast1sg.abs waa/aZats wa:-’az-’at-s saynowshift1sg.abs `Huh, I didn't know that she said to me.' The other verbs of saying, /uuqHli `tell' and /iiqHuk `tell' cannot be used with direct quotes. I give an example of each in (145). They both take clauses in the absolutive mood introduced by the complementizer /in as their complement. 89 4.6. Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings (145) a. /uuqHlanits /u-(q)Hli[L]-’at-(m)it-s transtellshiftpast1sg.abs /in /in comp /azanakuk /aza-na;k-uk-0 twohaveposs3.abs piiSpiS pi:SpiS cat /um/iiqsak/i /um/i-i;q-sak-/i; motherkinkin.possdef `He told me that she has two cats.' b. /iiqHukvit/iS /i:qH-uk-(m)it-/i;S telldurpast3.ind Ken Ken Ken Kay Kay Kay /in /in comp hinin/az hinin-’az-0 arrivenow3.abs Kyle Kyle Kyle `Ken told Kay that Kyle arrived.' The sux -(q)Hli[L] also occurs in the verb PiiSHli `tell something bad', which also takes an indirect quote complement clause. It is shown in an example sentence in (146). (146) PiiSHlimit/iS PiS-(q)Hli[L]-(m)it-/i;S badtellpast3.ind Ken Ken Ken /uukvil /u-(j)il[L] transdo.to Kay Kay Kay /in /in comp /uu/uukvil/anit /u-(j)il[RLL]-’at-(m)it-0 transblameshiftpast3.abs kuuWil ku:Wil steal taana ta:na money Mary Mary Mary `Ken told negative things to Kay that she was blamed for stealing money by Mary' The quotative mood -wA/iS contains the element /wa;/, and it is unlikely a coincidence that the verb which means `say' has the form wa: and frequently appears in a reduplicated form wawa:. I believe this to be a historical fact, since this sort of stemsux pair is extremely rare in the language. As such, I do not propose to analyze -wA/iS `quotative' as containing the verb wa: `say'. Also note that while the second and third persons the second element is the same as the relevant indicative mood form(-/ick `2sg indicative', -/icu:S `2pl indicative' and -/IS `3 indicative'), the rst person forms break this patternif the pattern held the forms would be -wAsiS for 1sg and -wAniS for 1pl. There is a third morpheme which seems to be related, and that is -(w)a[RLL] `speak'. This sux creates verbs indicating the manner in which someone is speaking. I give three sentences containing this sux in (147) below. Because the /w/ is a ghost consonant, it only shows up in surface forms when the stem it attaches to ends in a vowel or nasal, as in (147b). When this sux attaches to the name of a people, as in (147a), the stem indicates the language or dialect being spoken, and when it attaches to a predicate, as in (147b) or (147c), the stem indicates some characteristic of the subject's speech. 90 4.6. Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings (147) a. wik/aqzwa/ick wik-/aqz-wa;/ick negfut2sg.quot maamaamalNiqa mamalNi-q-(w)a[RLL] white.personstemspeak quuquu/aca/aqzwa/ick qu:/ac-(w)a[RLL]-/aqz-wa;/ick personspeakfut2sg.quot `You're not supposed to speak English, you're supposed to speak your own language.' b. hiSaHtaniniS hiS-aHta-’at-(m)it-ni;S alldo.toshiftpast1pl.ind Ken Ken Ken /aa/aapHiwat /a:pHi;-(w)a[RLL]-’at friendlyspeakshift `Ken greeted all of us warmly.' c. kuukuuWaqawa/iS ku:Waq-(w)a[RLL]-wa;/iS swearspeak3.quot Ken Ken Ken na/aat na/a:t aud.evid `Ken is swearing.' The historical relationship of these three morphemes is outside the scope of this dissertation, although I will point out that Swadesh (1948) discusses these in the Tseshaht dialect, and favours the view that the two suxes have been derived over time from the verb. 4.6.3 Comparing evidentials to predicates that introduce experiencers: verbs of perception Verbs of perception can indicate the perceptual grounding relation between a situation that supports the proposition and their experiencer argument. The proposition is the verb's internal argument, and the experiencer is its external argument. Two such verbs are given in Table 4.11 below. Both Naatsiijiz `see' and na/aa `hear' are more often used with nominal Naatsiijiz `see' na/aa `hear' Table 4.11: Some Nuuchahnulth verbs of perception complements, but can also be used with clausal complements, as shown in (148) below. (148) a. NaatsiijizitsiS Na:tsi-Si(z)-(m)it-si;S seemompast1sg.ind /in /in comp hixvatHiqaq hi:xvatHi-(q)aq[SS]-0 angry.withaug3.abs Ann Ann Ann luucma lu:cma woman `I saw that Ann is a really hottempered woman.' b. na/aamits na/a;-(m)it-s hearpast1sg.abs /in /in comp /aSXaksulaq /aSX-(/)aksul-(q)aq[SS]-0 recklessat.mouthaug3.abs Ann Ann Ann luucma lu:cma woman `I heard that Ann has a fowl mouth as a woman.' 91 4.6. Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings In each of these sentences the verb gives the perceptual grounding relation between their propositional internal argument and their experiencer external argument. The experiencer in (148a) saw Ann yelling, and from this she learned that Ann had a hot temper. In (148b) the experiencer heard Ann swearing, and so learned that Ann had a foul mouth. In both cases the complement proposition is also now in the subject's perspective, and so these verbs specify perspectival status as well as perceptual grounding. 4.6.4 Comparing evidentials to predicates that introduce properties: sensory suxes In Nuuchahnulth there is a set of core (derivational) suxes which refer to particular senses in their meaning; these suxes are listed in Table 4.12 below. Unlike those evidential -a;tuk `sound' -Pu;qs `smell' -Pal `taste' Table 4.12: Nuuchahnulth sensory suxes morphemes which specify the perceptual grounding between a perceived situation and a propo sition, these suxes have two arguments, neither of which is a situation or a proposition. The rst argument is a property, such as being nice. The second argument is an entity which the origo deems to have the property given by the rst argument. are illustrated in (149). (149) a. zulaatukuk/iS zul-a;tuk-uk-/i;S nicesoundposs3.ind nuuk nu:k song `His song has a very nice sound to it.' b. ha/umPuqs/azuk/ick ha/um-Pu;qs-’az-uk-/i;ck tastysmell.ofnowposs2sg.ind `Yours smells good.' c. CiSPal/azuk/ick CiS-Pal-’az-uk-/i;ck uncleantastenowposs2sg.ind suuHaa su:Ha: salmon `Your salmon has a bad taste now.' d. CiSPalCuqvas CiS-Pal-Cuqva-s dirtytastein.mouth1sg.abs `I have a bad taste in my mouth.' 92 4.7. Consequences These are not evidential morphemes because they do not specify a relation between the origo and a proposition. Take (149a), for example. This sentence does not mean that the song is nice, and the speaker's awareness of this stems from auditory signal. It is instead describing the sound itself as good. The speaker is giving their judgment of the quality of the sound. Likewise in (149b) the speaker is giving her judgment that the way the bread in the oven smells is tasty, and in (149d) the speaker is describing the taste in her mouth, not that there is something bad in her mouth and she knows it by tasting; the taste itself is what she is talking about. Another sensory sux is -Kuk[RSS] `resemble', which I discussed in Ÿ4.5.1 above. This sux diers in form from the evidential -Kuk `visual inference' in that it causes reduplication and induces short vowel length on the rst two syllables. In terms of meaning, both suxes make reference to the sense of sight, but the nonevidential one creates a predicate which forms the nucleus of the proposition, just as we saw with -Atuk and -PUqs. For example, in (150) -Kuk[RSS] attaches to the stem /um/ic `mother' yielding the verb /u/um/icKuk `resemble one's mother'. Here we also see that this predicate involving resemblance is negated when wik is introduced into the clause. (150) wik/iiS wik-/i;S neg3.ind /u/um/icKuk /um/i-Kuk[RSS] motherresembles `She doesn't look like her mother.' 4.7 Consequences In this section I discuss two of the consequences of my denition of evidentiality and the evidential domain hypothesis. First, some of the mood suxes which have been described as evidential in the literature on Nuuchahnulth (see Swadesh 1933, Rose 1981, Davidson 2002) do not t my denition of an evidential morpheme. I discuss these in Ÿ4.7.1. And second, because dierent evidential morphemes occur in dierent syntactic domains, they have dierent semantic properties, and I summarize these in Ÿ4.7.2. 4.7.1 Not all mood suxes are evidentials Much like we saw for attitude verbs and verbs of perception, mood markers which per form a similar function to evidentials are not necessarily evidential morphemes. Nevertheless, these deserve some discussion. In Ÿ4.7.1.1 and Ÿ4.7.1.2 below I describe the indicative mood -/IS and the mirative mood -JA?aS and argue they are not evidentials. In Ÿ4.7.1.3 I describe the indirect conditional and indirect relative moods. As we will see, these last two moods are more like evidential concord, and do not specify an evidential relation on their own. Themirativemood and the two indirectmoods are the nonevidentialmoodswhichbear 93 4.7. Consequences the closest resemblance to evidentialsthe remainder of themoods (the indicative, conditional, relative, subordinate, etc.) I leave without discussion, though I come back to the indicative in Chapter 9, where I discuss the relation between the origo and socalled direct evidentials. 4.7.1.1 Indicativemood We have seen numerous examples of the indicative mood already. It is used in main clause declaratives, though it is not the most common mood in declarative clauses in texts. For example, in one text about the speaker's personal experiences, only 11 out of 54 clauses are in the indicative mood, while the majority of the declarative clauses are in the absolutive mood. Being a main clause mood, the indicative mood cannot occur in an embedded clause. The indicative mood paradigm is given in full in Table 4.13. sg pl 1 -si;S -ni;S 2 -/i;ck -/icu:S 3 -/i;S Table 4.13: Indicative mood paradigm in Ahousaht Because the indicative mood occurs in sentences where the speaker believes the pre jacent proposition to be true, and because it is in complementary distribution with evidential moods such as the quotative -wA/iS and dubitative -qAJa, it is tempting to think that the indicative mood is a direct evidentialan evidential which indicates that the prejacent is in the origo's perspective. This is not the case, as I argue below. The facts do not support the indicative mood encoding direct evidentiality. For example, in (151) the speaker Kay is the origo of the sole clause in the sentence, and she directly observed Ken going upstairs, and she is certain that he is there. The proposition that Ken is upstairs is in her perspective. The sentence is in the indicative mood and contains no indirect evidentials such as -Kuk `visual inference' or -matak `inference'. (151) Scenario: Kay was sitting out on the front porch, and Bill came up and asked herwaasiH Ken `Where's Ken?' She could see the stairs from where she was sitting, and saw him go up earlier. She answered with this. hilaayil/iS hil-a;yil-/iS be.thereupstairs3.ind `He's upstairs' It may look as though the indicative mood is a direct evidential, indicating that the prejacent is in the origo's perspective, but it is not. If it were, it would not be used in 94 4.7. Consequences scenarios where the prejacent proposition is not in the origo's perspective, as this would be a contradiction. However, the indicative is used in such cases when it is in a clause with a nonmood indirect evidential like -Kuk `visual inference', -matak `inference' or -ckvI `past inference'. In (152) the origo Kay is not sure whether Ken's baby is going to start walking or not, but she can infer it from seeing her standing up and letting go of the table. (152) Scenario: Kay was watching Ken's baby for him, and she saw her standing up, holding on to the edge of the table, and she let go, so Kay said this to Bill. yaayaacataHKuk/iS yac-ataH[RLL]-Kuk-/i;S walkabout.tovis.evid3.ind naYaqakuk/i naYaqak-uk-/i; babypossdef Kay Kay Kay `It looks like Kay's baby is going to start walking.' Another example of the indicative with an indirect evidential is given in (153), where it occurs with -ckvI. Kay can only use this when she hasn't seen the rain itself, but instead has seen something that allows her to infer that it rained previously. (153) Scenario: Kay woke up, looked outside and saw the ground was wet. When Bill got up she told him this. Mizaackvi/iS Miz-(y)a;-ckvi;-/i;S raincontpast.evid3.ind `It must have been raining.' Sentences like those in (152) and (153) would not be possible if the indicative mood were a direct evidential. Since the indicative occurs in clauses with both direct and indirect evidentiality, it is not an evidential itself. Instead, in cases of direct and indirect evidentiality alike, its semantics only identify the origo as the speaker. The direct evidentiality is an implicature, rather than an entailment of the indicative mood. This implicature arises because sentences in the indicative mood are used to make assertions, and assertions are only felicitous when the proposition asserted is in the speaker's perspective. 4.7.1.2 Mirative -JA?aS is not an evidential Themirativemood inAhousaht is anothermatrix clausemood, which is used to indicate that the speaker, as origo of the matrix clause, is surprised to nd that the proposition is true, and has been for some period of time before he or she realized it. In the example in (154) Kay did not know Bill had moved back and was living at home for at least three weeks until she saw him again. She uses the mirative to signify the fact that there was some time between the start of the situation of Bill living at home and when Kay realized he was. 95 4.7. Consequences (154) Scenario: Bill moved years ago, then one day Kay saw him back in town. She thought he was just visiting, and then she saw him three weeks later, and realized he had moved back, so she said this to him. walya?asji/azJa?ack wal-yaq-’as-Si(z)-’az-Ja;?ack be.homehaving.doneon.ground.outsidemomnow2sg.mir `You're living at home now.' The time the origo was mistaken can be much shorter than the three weeks in the previous example. In (155) the speaker Kay had bingo, but didn't notice it, until Bill pointed it out to her. Here the elapsed time from the point where Kay had bingo to where she realized she did is measured in seconds rather than days or weeks. (155) Scenario: Kay and Bill were at bingo, and Kay had bingo but didn't realize it. Bill noticed it and pointed it out, and Kay said this. hita/aPazJa?aJas hita/ap-’az-Ja;?aJas winnow1sg.mir `Oh, I've won.' The mirative paradigm is given in Table 4.14. I have not been able to elicit the rst and second person plural forms, nor have I found them in texts. As with other matrix clause moods, the mirative cannot occur in an embedded clause. sg pl 1 -Ja;?aJas -? 2 -Ja;?ack -? 3 -Ja;?aS Table 4.14: Mirative mood paradigm in Ahousaht Like the indicative mood, the mirative mood might appear to be a direct evidentialit seems to indicate that the speaker has observed the prejacent proposition itself. However, as with the indicative mood, the mirative mood can also cooccur with an indirect evidential. If the mirative mood were a direct evidential, it would be infelicitous to use an indirect evidential in the same clause. For example, in (156) the past inferential -ckvI occurs in a clause that is in the mirative mood, yet the speaker did not observe the addressee's father being hungry, she has inferred it from the fact that he ate a lot of eggs. Thus, the directness of a sentence in the mirative mood comes from the lack of any indirect evidentials, rather than from the mirative mood itself. 96 4.7. Consequences (156) Scenario: Kay did not know Bill's father was really hungry. She eventually realized that he had eaten a lot of eggs, which probably meant he was really hungry. She said this to Bill. haWiiqzckviJa?aS haWi:qz-ckvi;-Ja;?aS hungrypast.evid3.mir NuWi NuWi father /ayaqz /aya-’aqz manyin.body qinHaaMa qinHa:Ma egg `Your father must have been hungry, he ate a lot of eggs.' 4.7.1.3 Indirect dependentmoods In Ahousaht there are twomoods which can be clearly seen as containing the inferential -j. These are the indirect indenite relative mood -(y)i:j and the indirect conditional mood -qu:j. I have had much less success eliciting these two moods than any of the other evidentials, nevertheless I reportwhat I have been able to discover about these below. The name `inferential' for -j is inaccurate, since it indicates just that a proposition is not in the origo's perspective, but does not specify the origo's experiential relation to it, as it would if it encoded that the origo inferred that proposition. Since it can be used in scenarios involving report, rather than inference, it would be better called a marker of indirectness. However, I do not treat -j as a separate morpheme, but treat its combination with the two moods as separate moods, the indirect indenite relative and indirect conditional. It remains to be seenwhether one approach is better than the other at accounting for the data. The indirect indenite relative mood -(y)i:j occurs in the same environments as the indenite relative -(y)i:, namely in relative clause and in matrix clauses that have an `I wonder...' meaning. The pair of sentences in (157) illustrate the use of the indenite relative and indirect indenite relative moods in a relative clause. When the matrix clause is in the indicative mood, we get the indenite relative mood in the relative clause, as in (157a), and when the matrix clause is in the quotative mood we get the indirect indenite relative mood in the relative clause, as in (157b). Here the speaker only has a report to the eect that Ken bought shoes, and that those shoes were really expensive. 97 4.7. Consequences (157) a. Scenario: Kay was shopping with Ken, and he would only buy really expensive shoes. When she got home she said this to Bill. /ana/amit/iS /ana-’a;p-(m)it-/i;S onlybuypast3.ind Ken Ken Ken Suuwis Su:wis shoes yaqii yaqv-(y)i: rel3.indf /iiWaqz /i:H-’aqz bigin.body `Ken only bought shoes that are very expensive.' b. Scenario: Linda was shopping with Ken, and he would only buy really expensive shoes. Later she saw Kay and told her about it, and then when Kay saw Bill she said this to her. /ana/amitwa/iS /ana-’a;p-(m)it-wa;/iS onlybuypast3.quot Ken Ken Ken Suuwis Su:wis shoes yaqiij yaqv-(y)i:j rel3.indf.inf /iiWaqz /i:Waqz expensive `Ken only bought shoes that are very expensive.' The indirect indenite relative can also be used when the origo is uncertain of the proposition of the relative clause, even though he or she is certain of the proposition of the matrix clause. In (158) the speaker Kay, is the origo of both the matrix clause and the relative clause, and she has direct evidence for the woman walking in, but is not sure if the woman is expecting twins. The relative clause contains -matak `inference' and instead of being in the indenite relative mood -(y)i:, it is in the indirect indenite relative mood -(y)i:j. (158) hinii/i/az/iS hini:/iz-’az-/i;S enternow3.ind luucma lu:cma woman yaqmatakiij yaqv-matak-(y)i:j relind.evid3.indf.inf /uuwil /u-awil[L] transexpecting KvaaYas Kva:Yas have.twins `The woman walked in who might be expecting twins.' It is also possible for the indirect indenite relative mood to be used without any additional evidentials. The rst line of a story from Little (2003) is given in (159). The speaker Caroline Little is certain about what she is going to do, namely talk about how people got re, but she is not certain about whether this is how people got re, since she was not there. Thus she uses the indirect indenite relative mood in the relative clause qvisHitiij quu/as hiniip /ink `how people got re'. (159) juu ju: okay /uuqHli/aqzs /u-(q)Hli[L]-/aqz-s transtellfut1sg.abs qvisHitiij qvis-(q)H-(m)it-(y)i:j do.thussimpast3.indf.inf quu/as qu:/as person hiniip hina-i:p locget /ink /inkv re `Ok, I will talk about how people got re.' (Little 2003, 22) I now turn to another kind of clause where the indenite relative mood occurs, and show that the indirect indenite relative can also occur there. Structurally, these look like 98 4.7. Consequences headless relative clauses, but they are not subordinate to another clause. These clauses get translated as `I wonder . . . ', and often occur with the discourse particle wa, which occurs with statements, not questions, and invites the addressee to agree or disagree with the speaker, much like right in English. Its use is not to ask the addressee to provide an answer, so much as to express the speaker's inability to remember or discover some fact. There seems to be no dierence between such clauses in the indenite relative or the indirect indenite relative mood. An example of the ordinary indenite relative mood in such a clause is given in (160). Kay can't remember how old Ken was when he moved to Victoria, and expresses this with a headless relative clause in the indenite relative mood. (160) quMaq/ijH/azitii quMa-q/ijH-’az-(m)it-(y)i: how.muchyearsnowpast3.indf wa wa prt `I wonder how old he was?' In (161) Kay doesn't know where Bill's aunt lived, and neither does he, and Kay expresses her bewilderment at not being able to nd it with a headless relative clause in the indirect indenite relative mood. Note that this contains the second person singular form -(y)i:jk, the only form other than the third person -(y)i:j I have found either through elicitation or in texts. (161) Scenario: Kay and Bill were going to his aunt's house, but they couldn't nd it. After walking around for a while, Kay said this to Bill. waaYatHiijk waaYatH-(y)i:jk where.live2sg.indf.inf wa wa prt na/i na/i aunt/uncle `I wonder where your aunt lives?' The second nonmatrix mood I address here is the indirect conditional -qu:j. This mood occurs in the antecedent clause of conditional propositions where the entire proposition is reported, while the consequent clause is in the quotative mood. In (162) the speaker Kay is the origo of both clauses, and she heard that if Ken had gone with his uncle he would have bought him candy. When she passes this information on to Bill, she uses the quotative mood in the consequent clause /u/aaPatuKvaHitwa/iS candy `he would have bought him candy', and the indirect conditional in the antecedent clause na/uukitquuj `if he had gone with him'. 99 4.7. Consequences (162) Scenario: Ken's uncle went to the store but Ken didn't want to go with him. When he got back, he told Ken he would have bought him candy. Kay heard him say this, and when Bill came in and asked why Ken was upset, she said this to him. na/uukitquuj na/u:k-(m)it-qu:j go.alongpast3.cond.inf /u/aaPatuKvaHitwa/iS /u-’a;p-’at-uk-’a;H-(m)it-wa;/iS transbuyshiftpossirrpast3.quot candy candy candy `If he had gone with him, he (his uncle) would have bought him candy.' The conditional in (162) is an ifconditional, but the indirect conditional can also appear with wheneverconditionals. In (163) the antecedent clause contains -’az and the indirect condi tional -qu:j, while the consequent clause contains the habitual /a:l and the quotative -wA/iS. The speaker Kay is the origo of both clauses, and she obtained the conditional proposition by report from Linda. (163) Scenario: Ken had been ill, and the last time Kay saw Linda, she asked her how he was. Linda told her yaacpanaJazquu Pus/iiHijiz/iS/aal `Whenever he goes for a walk, he becomes very tired'. Later, Kay saw Bill and he asked her how Ken was making out, and she replied with this. yaacpanaJazquuj yac-panaj-’az-qu:j walkrandomlynow3.cond.inf Pus/iiHijizwa/iS/aal Pus-/i;Hiji(z)-wa;/iS-/a:l tiredsuer.mom3.quothab `He becomes very tired when he goes for a walk.' 4.7.2 Evidentials from dierent syntactic domains have dierent semantic properties Patterns emerge when we look at which evidential relations are encoded in evidentials in each of the syntactic domains, as shown in Table 4.15. First, inference can can be encoded in evidentials in any domain. Second, reportative evidentials only occur in the CP domain. Third, perceptual grounding is encoded in evidentials only in the VP domain. Evidentials which indicate perceptual grounding are predicted by Blain and Déchaine (2006) to be found in the VP domain, and this is where we nd them in Nuuchahnulth. I explore the reasons for this further in Chapter 8. The three evidentials in the CP domain are a mix of two reportatives and an inferential. The CP domain is the only place where we nd reportatives in Nuuchahnulth, but it is not the only place where we nd inferentialsinferentials occur in all three domains. In the IP domain, the two mode suxes -matak `inference' and -ckvI `past inference' are inferentials, diering only in the addition of a temporal restriction in the case of -ckvI. 100 4.8. Summary of combinatorial restrictions on Nuuchahnulth evidentials Perceptual Domain Morpheme Gloss Inference Report Grounding CP -qa;Ja `dubitative' X -wa;/iS `quotative' X -Ha;j `indirect interrogative' X IP -ckvi; `past inference' X -matak `inference' X VP -Kuk `visual inference' X X na/a:t `auditory evidence' X Table 4.15: Evidential relations and syntactic domains The two VPdomain evidentials, -Kuk `visual inference' and na/a:t `auditory evidence' encode particular perceptual grounding relations. And conversely, the only evidentials which encode perceptual grounding are in the VP domain. 4.8 Summary of combinatorial restrictions on Nuuchahnulth evidentials As we saw in ŸŸ4.34.5 above, evidential morphemes in Nuuchahnulth occur in dierent syntactic positions, rather than a single paradigmatic slot. This was rst pointed out by Jacobsen (1986), and is an example of what Aikhenvald (2004) calls a scattered coding of evidentiality. In Table 4.16 below I summarize the morphological classes of the evidential morphemes introduced earlier in this chapter. Syntactic Morphological domain class form gloss CP mood sux -qa;Ja `dubitative' -wa;/iS `quotative' -Ha;j `indirect interrogative' IP mode sux -matak `inference' -ckvi; `past inference' VP core sux -Kuk `visual inference'particle na/a:t `auditory evidence' Table 4.16: Morphological classes of evidentials With the evidential morphemes in separate morphological positions, the possibility arises that they can cooccur. We saw in ŸŸ4.34.5 that the evidentials in Nuuchahnulth can, with some restrictions, cooccur in the same clause. The possible combinations are summarized 101 4.9. Variation in evidentials in SouthernWakashan in Table 4.17. The moods are all in complementary distribution with each other, and so only one can occur in any clause.10 They can occur with the other kinds of evidential, and the others can cooccur with each other as well, with a couple of gaps. No evidential can occur twice in a clause, so setting those cases aside the possibility of cooccurrence between two evidentials depends onwhat kind of evidentials they are. The broad groups that emerge are reportatives, inferentials, and purely sensory evidentials. Reportative evidentials can occur with any other kind of evidentials. However, since they are moods, they cannot cooccur with other evidential moods. The purely sensory evidential in Nuuchah nulth is na/a:t `auditory evidence', and it can occur with any other evidential except for -ckvI `past inference', which is the only evidential to specify that the prejacent situation temporally precedes the witnessed situation. The inferentials have the greatest number of restrictions. -Kuk `visual inference' cannot occur with any other inferential. na/a:t -Kuk -ckvi; -matak -qa;Ja -wa;/iS -Ha;j na/a:t `auditory evidence' × -Kuk `visual inference' × × -ckvi; `past inference' × × × -matak `inference' × × X × -qa;Ja `dubitative' X × X X × -wa;/iS `quotative' X X X X × × -Ha;j `indirect interrogative' X X X X × × × Table 4.17: Allowable combinations of evidentials in Nuuchahnulth 4.9 Variation in evidentials in SouthernWakashan In this section I look at the correspondences between the evidentials in the dierent dialects of Nuuchahnulth, and between those in Nuuchahnulth and those in Makah. 10While this is true for the Ahousaht dialect (Nakayama 1997, 31) it is not for every dialect of Nuuchahnulth. In the Tseshaht dialect, more than one mood can occur. For example in (i), from Sapir and Swadesh (1955) and given as analyzed by Davidson (2002, 290), the quotative mood -we/in occurs with the dubitative mood -qAJa. (i) /aa/ayasCaapu/azitwe/inqaJa /aya-a;sCa-a:pi[LR+S]-uz=’az=(m)it=we;/in-qa;Ja manyon.rooftooperftemppastquotdub quu/as qu;/as person `Evidently too many people got onto it (the roof ).' (NA 170.2829) 102 4.9. Variation in evidentials in SouthernWakashan 4.9.1 Dubitative in SouthernWakashan Looking at Kyuquot Rose (1981, 220) notes the similarity in meaning between -matak `inference' and -qAJa `dubitative', which I also described above for Ahousaht. She further notes that their use diers depending on whether the speaker tends to agree with the prejacent proposition: -matak implies agreement, while -qAJa does not and can give rise to irony. I have not found this pattern with respect to the two suxes in Ahousaht. In texts I have seen -qAJa used where the speaker is making a guess, and in elicitations -matak occurs in scenarios involving guesses as well.11 The form of the dubitative mood in Kyuquot is slightly dierent from that in Ahousaht due to the reduction of short vowels in the third or later syllables in that dialect. The full paradigm is given in Table 4.18. sg pl 1 -qa;c -qa;Jin 2 -qa;Jk -qa;cu: 3 -qa;J -qa;j/al Table 4.18: Kyuquot dubitative mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 213) In Tseshaht the dubitative indicates the speaker acknowledges the possibility of a nonfuture event or situation (Davidson 2002, 290). When the situation is in the future, the speaker can make use of -(w)u:s, a mode sux which is not used in Ahousaht. The dubitative mood paradigm from Tseshaht is given in Table 4.19. sg pl 1 -qa;csa -qa;Jin 2 -qa;jka -qa;csu:(wa) 3 -qa;Ja Table 4.19: Tseshaht dubitative mood paradigm (Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 242) In Makah, the mood closest in meaning to the durative in Ahousaht is what Davidson (2002) calls the inferential. It is usedwhen the speaker ismaking an inference from unspecied evidence (Jacobsen 1986, 19). (164) dudu;kizXa;S `He'll probably sing.' (cf. dudUKal `He's singing.') (Jacobsen 1986, 19) 11In Tseshaht -matak is also used in guessing scenarios, as illustrated in the text Puberty Potlatch for Dick Thlaamahuus' Daughter (Sapir and Swadesh 1955, 234). 103 4.9. Variation in evidentials in SouthernWakashan Ahousaht Kyuquot Tseshaht Makah Nakayama Sapir and Jacobsen (herein) 2001 Rose 1981 Swadesh 1939 1986 Matrix clauses X X X X X Embedded clauses × × × × ? With other moods × × × × ? Internal structure -qa;-j-’a-agr -qa;-j-’a-agr -qa;-j-’-agr -qa;-j’-(a)-agr  1 sg -qa;-j-’a-s -qa;-j-’a-s -qa;-j-’-s -qa;-j-’-sa  pl -qa;-j-’a-n -qa;-j-’a-n -qa;-j-’a-n -qa;-j-’a-n  2 sg ? -qa;-j-’-k -qa;-j-’a-k -qa;-j-’-k-a  pl ? -qa;-j-’-su: -qa;-j-’-su: -qa;-j-’-su:(wa)  3 sg -qa;-j-’a -qa;-j-’a -qa;-j-’a -qa;-j-’a -Xa;S pl -qa;-j-’-/al  Table 4.20: Comparison of the dubitative mood 4.9.2 Quotative in SouthernWakashan Kyuquot has a similar quotative paradigm, which Rose (1981, 229230) describes as indicating that the speaker is presenting a report made by a nonspeech act participant. She also reports that it cannot occur with mode suxes, a fact which distinguishes it from that in Ahousaht (see Ÿ4.8). The Kyuquot quotative paradigm is given in Table 4.21. sg pl 1 -wa;sS -wa;niS12 2 -wa;c -wa;cu:S 3 -wa;S -wa;talS Table 4.21: Kyuquot quotative paradigm Rose (1981, 229) derives the forms in Kyuquot an element /wa;/ followed by the indicative mood. This is similar to what we nd in Ahousaht, though the pattern is entirely regular in Kyuquot, while in Ahousaht it is mixed. They Kyuquot indicative paradigm is shown in Table 4.22. sg pl 1 -si;S -ni;S 2 -a;c -icu:S 3 -/i;S -italS Table 4.22: Kyuquot indicative paradigm (Rose 1981, 223) 12I have corrected what I assume to be a typo in Rose (1981), where the nal phoneme is given as /s/. Her internal reconstruction ends in /S/, as I indicate here. 104 4.9. Variation in evidentials in SouthernWakashan The form of the quotative mood in Tseshaht is more distinctly dierent from that in Ahousaht. The paradigm is given in Table 4.23. The base form, illustrated in the third person, contains /wa;/, although in Tseshaht there is a regular phonological process causing /a/ to raise to /e/ when it precedes a //i/ sequence. Thus the Tseshaht quotative contains the wa;/ component found in all the forms in Ahousaht and Kyuquot, but it also contains an additional component //in/ which Swadesh (1948) identies as -’in `so treated', saying he follows Sapir in doing so, though he gives no reference and I have not found the source. On the other hand, Jacobsen (1986) identies it with -’in which he believes to be a part of -?in `sound of '. The Tseshaht sg pl 1 -we;/isi -we;/inni 2 -we;/incuk -we;/incu: 3 -we;/in Table 4.23: Tseshaht quotative mood paradigm (Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 242) quotative, unlike those in Ahousaht and Kyuquot, can cooccur with other moods, in particular, the conditional. The quotative is still restricted to matrix clauses, as Sapir (1924, 89) notes, and he also notes that the conditional has a past usitative meaning in matrix clauses. The sentence in (165) comes from Kwatyat and the SunbeamGirls just after a line saying that Kwatyat had asked themmany times who their father was. The conditional precedes the quotative here, though according to Davidson (2002) it occasionally follows it. (165) wiKazquuwe/in wik-’az-qu:-we/in negnowcondquot /iiqHuk /i:qHuk tell HaatHaakvaz/i Ha:tHa:kvAz-/I girl.pldef `The girls would not tell.' (Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 40) In addition, Davidson (2002, 266) notes that the Tseshaht quotative can also cooccur with the inferential I mood -JAS, inferential II mood -JA?aS, and the dubitative mood -qAJa, all of which follow -wE/in, and also with the subordinate mood -H, which precedes -wE/in. This latter is not the usual subordinate mood, and Davidson (2002, 274) has not identied the conditions on its use, but he has found it only in the second and third persons. It could be related to what I have called the emphatic absolutive -Hu:k, which only occurs with third persons. Regardless of its precise meaning, it appears to be a case where the quotative mood occurs in a nonmatrix clause, as it occurs in clauses introduced by the complementizer /ani. In Makah the quotative mood is -wa:t, which Jacobsen (1986, 17) analyzes as a con traction of wA `say' with -’it `passive'. Jacobsen notes that -wa:t is not compatible with any other moods. An example is given in (166) below. 105 4.9. Variation in evidentials in SouthernWakashan (166) /akyadakwa;tsu `You've got a lot (I hear).' (cf. /akyadawic `You've got a lot.') (Jacobsen 1986, 16) 4.9.3 Indirect interrogative in SouthernWakashan The indirect interrogative also occurs in other dialects. In Kyuquot, Rose (1981, 219) calls it the interrogative inferential mood, though it is not clear from her description whether it is purely quotative as in Ahousaht, or also covers inference. It is also not clear whether it can have the reading where the question is on someone else's behalf. The paradigm is given in Table 4.24. sg pl 1 -Ha;j -Ha;jin 2 -Ha;jk -Ha;ju: 3 -Ha;j -Ha;jal Table 4.24: Kyuquot interrogative inferential mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 219) In Tseshaht the form of the ordinary interrogative is -HA, and Sapir (1924, 102) and Davidson (2002, 288) treat -HAj as synchronically composed of the ordinary interrogative and the quotative -j. Neither source provides a full paradigm. Jacobsen (1986, 18) describes a quotative interrogative in Makah as well. He gives the third person form as -i:Ja, in contrast to the ordinary interrogative -a:l. Davidson (2002) does not provide a paradigm for the quotative interrogative. According to Jacobsen, the quotative interrogative is used to ask about reported information or inferences. (167) ba;qi;daXa;zi;Ja te/iliq `How did he say the sick person is?' (cf. bAqIdaXAl te/iliq `How sick is the person?') (Jacobsen 1986, 18) 4.9.4 Mirative in SouthernWakashan What Rose (1981, 221) calls the evidential mood in Kyuquot shares the mirative meaning and some of the form of the mirative in Ahousaht. An example is given in (168). Rose describes three parts to its meaning, though it is not clear from her discussion whether they are always all present. The rst is that the speaker has made a discovery of some information, the second that there is direct evidence (e.g. photographs or rsthand observation) for that information, and the third is that the speaker expects the information to be noncontroversial. These three parts of its meaning are all compatible with the denition of mirativity I gave above. The surprise associated with mirativity is due to the fact that the speaker is now certain 106 4.9. Variation in evidentials in SouthernWakashan about something which he or she realizes he or she should have been certain about earlier. This realization is what Rose calls the speaker's discovery. The certainty comes from direct evidence, such as rsthand observation. Finally, since the realization and certainty occur at the time of the utterance, the addressee will be present and have access to the same observations that the speaker has. If the Kyuquot evidential mood is really a mirative, all three parts to its meaning should be present in every instance of its use. (168) CimTu;?S CimTu;-a;?S squirrelevid `Oh, there's a squirrel!' (Rose 1981, 221) The paradigm which Rose (1981, 213) presents for the evidential mood in Kyuquot is given in Table 4.25. Rose does not provide second person forms for this mood, but see the discussion below on the Kyuquot inferential evidential, which she states is used instead of the evidential when the subject is second person (Rose 1981, 222). Another notable feature of this paradigm is that the third person plural element /al/ follows the mood element /a;?S/, while the rst person elements /s/ and /in/ precede it. In other paradigms this plural element occurs in the same position as the other persons, in contradistinction to the plural -/al in Ahousaht, which always follows the the mood/person suxes (Ÿ2.5.4). As for similarity in form, compare sg pl 1 -sa;?S -ina?S 2   3 -a;?S -a;?Sal Table 4.25: Kyuquot evidential mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 213) the third person forms of the Kyuquot evidential mood -A?S and the Ahousaht mirative mood -JA?aS. Given the vowel deletion process in Kyuquot, the two forms dier only in the initial /J/ found in the Ahousaht mirative. Rose (1981, 222) also describes the inferential evidential mood, which combines the evidential mood with the inferential sux /j/. This mood is used when the speaker has made a discovery that concerns the addressee, or which contradicts the speaker's previous belief, or which is based on inference rather than rsthand observation. The paradigm she provides for this is given in Table 4.26. Here we can see that the expected forms for the second person in the evidential mood would be -kA?S and -sUwa?S. We can also see that the form of this mood is even closer to that of the mirative mood in Ahousaht, but the meaning is not. Both the inferential evidential and evidential moods in Kyuquot involve the speaker making a discovery, but the mirative in Ahousaht is used when the speaker is using rsthand observation, as is the 107 4.9. Variation in evidentials in SouthernWakashan case with the evidential mood in Kyuquot, not when he or she is making an inference, as is found with the inferential evidential mood. sg pl 1 -(c)sa;?S -jina?S 2 -jka;?S -cu;wa?S 3 -ja:?S -ja;talS Table 4.26: Kyuquot inferential evidential mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 222) Tseshaht has a mood which Swadesh (1933) calls the inferential, and which Davidson (2002) calls the inferential II, and which has a very similar form to the mirative mood in Ahousaht. According to Davidson (2002), the inferential II indicates that the speaker has just discovered the proposition. He further notes that it gets a mirative meaning when it occurs with qvA `thus' (sometimes appearing as -qo:).13 (169) /uu /iqsimsa?aS, waa/aZat /uu /iq-sim-(c)sa;?aS wa:-’az-’at prt stillneed1sg.infII saynowshift `Oh, I seem to need some more, he says.' (Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 112) Makah also contains a mood -a:-..-SKub (with any person marker appearing between the two parts) which according to Jacobsen (1986, 19) indicates that the speaker has only belatedly become aware of a fact or event. Davidson (2002) calls this the mirative mood. (170) JapaCa;SKub `It's a canoe.' (after you nally make out what it is) (Jacobsen 1986, 19) 4.9.5 -matak in SouthernWakashan Turning to other dialects, -matak is also found in Kyoquot, where Rose (1981, 205) notes it is the most common mode sux. The set of mode suxes consist of more than just -matak and -ckvI, but this still means -matak is more common than -ckvI in Kyuquot, which 13While Davidson (2002) glosses this qva; as `thus', I suspect he is conating two separate morphemes. This particular one, which he notes sometimes appears as a sux, is a always sux in Ahousaht. In that dialect there is a postmood sux -qvaa which precedes the other postmood suxes, such as the plural -/al as we see in the sentencewa/iJazHqvaa/al Àre they all sleeping?'. I have only found it occurring with either of the interrogative moods, but have not been able to determine its meaning or function. The other morpheme is a stem, qva:, which occurs in relative clauses when the manner is extracted, and in some other relative clauses where a nonargument is extracted. We can see it in the sentence hiSukvaZat huHtaKat qvaa/iitq qu/uSinMit `Everyone knew how Ravenwas.'. While these twomorphemesmay be historically related, they currently have very dierent distribution. Since the two morphemes in Tseshaht also exhibits this dierence in distribution, it is likely the case that they are two separate morphemes in that dialect as well. 108 4.9. Variation in evidentials in SouthernWakashan is the opposite of what I have found in Ahousaht. Examining the rst ve texts in each of Little (2003) and Louie (2003), I count -matak occurring four times, compared to -ckvI occurring 27 times (not counting instances where it is nominalizing). In Tseshaht -matak appears to have the same meaning as in Ahousaht. Examples in the Nootka Texts (Sapir and Swadesh 1939) and Native Accounts (Sapir and Swadesh 1955) show -matak in nonmatrix clauses, with exceptions in a single text (Puberty Potlatch for Dick Thlaamahuus' Daughter, pp. 230260), where it appears in matrix clauses in a series of sentences where dierent speakers are guessing a location. Each of these sentences only diers in the name of the location being guessed. (171) /uHmatakma zimxqaCu waa/az `I think it is Tlimhkatsu, she said.' (Sapir and Swadesh 1955, 234) One of the more typical example is given in (172), where -matak is in an embedded clause. Here the main character of the story ?intHtin is looking for Pitch Woman's home, and after searching the area it is supposed to be in, he comes across a path and, following it, a small waterhole. (172) kamatsap ?intHtin [/ani histaawamatakqa /i/iSsu/il Ja/ak] `Mucusmade realized that that was probably where PitchWomanwent for water.'(Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 92) The distribution in Tseshaht also seems to correspond to that in Ahousaht, rather than that in Kyuquot, judging by the relative occurrences of the two suxes in Nootka Texts. 4.9.6 -ckvI in SouthernWakashan In Kyuquot the cognate sux is -ckvA, which has the same evidential meaning -ckvI has in Ahousaht (Rose 1981, 205). However, unlike -ckvI, the Kyuquot form does not always have its past meaning and can occur with temporal suxes such as -(m)it `past' or -/aqz `future'. Rose also notes that -ckvA can be used with either reported evidence or perceived evidence, much like Ahousaht -ckvI. Davidson (2002) does not discuss any evidential meaning associated with -ckvI in Tseshaht. He glosses it as `having been ..ed' or `having ..ed' (in addition to `remains of ..' in its nominalizing use), and treats it as a core sux rather than a peripheral sux (in his terminology, a sux, as opposed to a clitic). Jacobsen (1986, 20) notes this sux in Makah as well, where it also has a nominalizing and evidential use. His description of the evidential use is much narrower than those in Nuu chahnulth, however, and is limited to scenarios where the evidence is animal tracks or an animal tooth found on the ground. In both cases it has a past component to it, since the speaker is perceiving something when the animal is no longer there. 109 4.9. Variation in evidentials in SouthernWakashan (173) bukwajck/i `It was a deer.' (when seeing the tracks) (Jacobsen 1986, 20) The sux which more closely matches the range of meaning of -ckvI in Nuuchahnulth is -pi:t (Jacobsen 1986, 12), illustrated in (174). Jacobsen describes it as indicating an ex post facto inference from physical evidence (ruling out reports). He also mentions that the evidence is usually the something resulting from the inferred situation, but from the example in (174) we can see that it can be used when the inferred event does not produce any directly observable physical results.14 (174) we/iJazpi;tid `We must've been sleeping.' (we/ij `to sleep') (Jacobsen 1986, 12) 4.9.7 -Kuk in SouthernWakashan In the Tseshaht dialect -Kuk without reduplication seems to indicate resemblance, but it is not restricted to visual resemblance. In (175) -Kuk occurs on the stem Ci:q-(y)A `chant' and seems to indicate auditory resemblance, as it is the singing that resembles chanting. This -Kuk still contrasts with -Kuk with reduplication in terms of stem selection: here it is a verb, and it is one action that resembles another, rather than one thing that resembles another. (175) hitaCupi/az hita-Cu;-pi(z)-’az be.therein.containerin.house.momnow /aH/aa /aH/a: this nunuuk nunu:k sing CiiqaaKuk Ci:q-(y)a;-Kuk chantcontvis.evid hitaCupiz/i hita-Cu;-pi(z)-/i; be.therein.containerin.house.momdef `Then someone came out onto the oor and sang as though chanting.' (Sapir and Swadesh 1955, 171) In Makah the evidential that most closely matches the meaning of -Kuk in Ahousaht is -caqil. It is used for uncertain visual evidence, as when trying to make out something at a distance (Jacobsen 1986, 15). The sentence in (176) illustrates this. (176) Tapsjizcaqil `It looks like something dived.' (cf. Tapsjil `He dived in.') (Jacobsen 1986, 15) Jacobsen (1986, 22) also notes that Makah has -Kuk, but its evidential meaning only occurs when the subject is a second person. The reduplicating form -Kuk[RSS] is also present, and he gives a number of examples of the names of foods which are derived with it, such as the one in (177) below. 14Sleep in ones eyes are an exception to this, but I seriously doubt that someone's rst evidence that they have been asleep is nding sleep in their eyes. 110 4.10. Summary (177) CiCisaqKuk `sugar', lit. `looks like sand' (Cisaq- `sand') (Jacobsen 1986, 22) 4.9.8 na/a:t in SouthernWakashan While I have documented na/a:t `auditory evidence' in theAhousaht dialect, it does not appear in the published material in either the Tseshaht or Kyuquot dialects. Looking outside Nuuchahnulth, it seems to correspondwith the sux -Qadi inMakah (Jacobsen 1986), though Jacobsen notes that -Qadi can also be used in scenarios where the speaker does not have auditory evidence for something, but instead some other sensory evidence. An example of -Qadi with its auditory meaning is given below. (178) dudu;kQad/i `I hear him/it singing.' (Jacobsen 1986, 13) 4.10 Summary This chapter gave an overview of the evidential morphemes which are at the centre of this dissertation. They were contrasted with two other kinds of morphemes, propositional attitude verbs and sense suxes, which exhibit some similarities to the evidential morphemes. In the descriptions of the evidential morphemes we saw that they appear in diverse morpho logical classes, suggesting that they may be able to cooccur. Data was presented illustrating the permissible cooccurrences, as well as impermissible ones. Also discussed was the vari ation in evidential morphemes exhibited between dialects of Nuuchahnulth, and between Nuuchahnulth and other SouthernWakashan languages. Later chapters (7 and 8) will look at the semantic eects of multiple evidentials in a single clause, as well as the reasons that some evidentials cannot cooccur. 111 Chapter 5 Modelling evidentiality: a truth conditional analysis 5.1 The ingredients of evidentiality The origo hypothesis posits that evidentiality is composed of three relations which hold between an origo, a perceived situation and a prejacent proposition, as shown in Fig ure 5.5. Each of the three relations can be specied separately from the others in an evidential origo perceived situation prejacent proposition perspectival status perceptual grounding manner of support •         • oo • 777777777777777 Figure 5.1: Three factors of evidentiality morpheme. For example, as Table 5.1 shows, in Nuuchahnulth perceptual grounding is only specied in -Kuk `visual inference' and na/a:t `auditory evidence'. Perspectival status and manner of support are specied in all the evidentials except na/a:t. Perspectival Perceptual Manner of status grounding support -wA/iS `quotative' uncertain report -HAj `indirect interrogative' uncertain report -qAJa `dubitative' uncertain inference -matak `inference' uncertain inference -ckvI `past inference' uncertain inference -Kuk `visual inference' uncertain visual inference na/a:t `auditory evidence' auditory Table 5.1: The factors of evidentiality encoded in Nuuchahnulth evidentials 112 5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality Before these relations can be implemented in truthconditional semantics, the origo, perceived situation and prejacent proposition need to be dened. The simplest of these is the perceived situation, which I model as a situation in the sense of Kratzer (1989) (Ÿ5.1.1). Situations are a basic type in my analysis. I also model origos as a basic type, though it can be mapped to an individual and a situation when necessary (Ÿ5.1.2). The prejacent proposition is a centred propositiona function from origos to uncentred propositions, which in turn are sets of maximal situations (i.e., worlds). I use the term uncentred proposition instead of the standard proposition to make it clear that I am referring to the kind that is a set of worlds, and not something more general. I then describe centred propositions (Ÿ5.1.3), and summarize the semantic types used in modelling these concepts (Ÿ5.1.4). With the ontological status of the origo, perceived situation and prejacent proposition laid out, I turn to modelling the relations between them. First, I discuss the relation between the origo and the prejacent proposition, which I term perspectival status (Ÿ5.2). Perspectival status indicates whether or not the prejacent proposition is in the origo's perspectivethe set of centred propositions he or she believes. Next, I discuss the relation between the prejacent proposition and the perceived situation, which I term the manner of support (Ÿ5.3). Manner of support indicates whether prejacent propositions holds directly in the perceived situation, the perceived situation allowed the origo to infer the prejacent proposition, or the perceived situation was an utterance situation in which the prejacent proposition was asserted. Finally, I discuss the relation between the origo and the perceived situation, which I term perceptual grounding (Ÿ5.4). Perceptual grounding indicates which sense the origo used in perceiving the perceived situation. With the three evidential relations laid out, I turn to modelling each of the evidential morphemes in Nuuchahnulth (Ÿ5.5). I then discuss some of the consequences of the anal ysis (Ÿ5.6). I discuss how the division of evidentiality into three relations allows evidential morphemes to specify one, two, or all three, and show how the evidentials in Nuuchahnulth exhibit this. Then I discuss the roles that an origo's memory and perspective play in the use of evidentials. I also compare contingent inference to Kratzer's analysis of epistemic modality (Ÿ5.7). Finally, I list the translations of each of the Nuuchahnulth evidentials in a single table, for reference (Ÿ5.8). 5.1.1 Ingredient 1: situation Evidentiality is related to perceptionmany evidentials encode that the origo perceived something, and some of them encode which sense was used. For example, the auditory evidential na/a:t indicates that the origo perceived something auditorily. The objects of perception are situations. Situations are the parts of the world that we perceive and have attitudes about. For example, when I look out my window and see a junco in 113 5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality the garden, what I am seeing is a situationa situation in which there is a junco in the garden. We can also perceive situations internal to us. When I notice that I am hungry, what I really notice is the situation in which I am hungry. There are two approaches to situations in the literature. Barwise and Perry (1981) describe situations as states of aairs, ranging in size from events up to the world. A world is the sum of all states of aairs. Theymodel situations as functions from relations and individuals to truth values. (Kratzer 1989) likewise considers situations as ranging in size from events up to the world, but models them as partial possible worlds. In Kratzer's approach, situations t into standard modal logic in the place of worlds, so that uncentred propositions are functions from situations to truth values. I will be following Kratzer's approach. I dene a situation as a partial world at a particular time. In her 1989 paper, Kratzer sets aside the issue of time, but since evidentials interact with tense, it cannot be ignored here. In the following, I rst discuss the partial world component and then time component of situations. Situations range in size from events up to entire worlds. Situations can be related to each other by the partof relationone situation (say, brushing your teeth) can be part of another situation (say, getting ready for work in the morning). The partof relation is a partial ordering, meaning it is a reexive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation. (179) Reexive: Every situation is a part of itself. Antisymmetric: No two distinct situations can be part of each other. Transitive: Any situation that is a part of a given situation s is a part of any situation that s is a part of. For any situation, there will be a maximal situation which it is a part of and which is not a part of any other situation. This situation is a world. Thus, in Kratzer's approach, worlds and situations are objects of the same type, which I designate s. The dierence is simply that a world is a maximal situationa situation which is not a part of any other situation. Sometimes it will be proper to talk about situations, and other times it will be proper to talk about worlds. In particular, it will be useful to be able to refer to the world of which some situation s is a part, or to put it another way, the world which contains s. I use ws to refer to the world which contains s. I follow Kratzer in assuming that any given situation is a part of only one world. (180) ws = world which contains s Situations are associated with a particular time. They have a duration, and they are ordered temporally with respect to other situations. The situation in which I ll the kettle with water temporally precedes the one in which I pour the boiling water into the teapot. Call these 114 5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality two situations s (lling the kettle) and s′ (pouring water into the teapot). I refer to the times of these situations as ts and ts′ . We can think of t as a function from situations to times, where times are intervals (Bennett and Partee 1978), and use the precedence, identity and overlap relations shown in (181). (181) temporal precedence: ts < ts′ temporal identity: ts = ts′ temporal overlap: ts ◦ ts′ To summarize, situations are partial worlds, they are of type s, and they can be mapped to intervals of time. One situation can be part of another situation, and unless it is a maximal situation, it will be part of another situation. 5.1.2 Ingredient 2: origo The second concept necessary for an analysis of evidentiality is the origo (Garrett 2001). The origo is a pair consisting of a judgethe person who has the evidenceand a situation. It is the origo (that is, the judge in a particular situation) who has perceived some situation that supports the prejacent proposition, and it is the origo's perspective that may or may not contain the prejacent proposition. The two main properties of an origo are that he or she has a mind and has senses, and with these senses they perceive things in the world. The origo is involved inmore than evidentiality though. When we talk about subjective properties, such as personal taste in the sense of Lasersohn (2005), it is the origo's subjective opinion that is represented. In a declarative sentence, the subjective opinion is that of the speaker, and one might therefore wonder if the origo is an unnecessary concept. For example, if I say (182a) it is my opinion, as the speaker that onions are disgusting. In this case the speaker is the origo. But language can also be used to represent other people's opinions, and in such cases the origo is not the speaker. Thus, while I still think onions are disgusting, I can quite easily say (182b) if, in Ruth's opinion, onions are delicious. In this case Ruth is the origo of the embedded clause. (182) a. Onions are disgusting. b. Ruth thinks onions are delicious. I dene the origo as a sentient individual in a particular situation. I call this individual a judge (adopting the terminology of Lasersohn (2005) and Stephenson (2007b,a)). The relevant situation is the one in which, minimally, all of the judge's mental and internal states hold. We cannot treat the origo as simply a judge, because a judge's mental and internal states change over time. When I was young, I thought if someone was rich that meant they had $100. But 115 5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality now I think that if someone is rich they have more money than that. I am the same individual in both cases, but my perspective has changedthe origo is dierent in these two cases. I treat the origo as a primitive of type o. In order to talk about the individual and situation components of an origo o, I use jo (a function from the origo o to a judge) and so (a function from an origo o to a situation). The judge component of an origo is conceptually the same as the judge which Lasersohn (2005) introduced to account for predicates of personal taste such as taste good. Such predicates are inherently perspectival (Kölbel 2002), and the judge (i.e., the perspective holder) varies depending on the clausal environment that the predicate appears in. In matrix clauses, the judge is (normally) the speaker,15 while in embedded clauses the judge is usually the subject of the embedding verb. In (183a), where the predicate taste good occurs in a matrix declarative clause, the speaker is the judge and must think that brussels sprouts taste good in order for the sentence to be true.16 In (183b), where taste good occurs in a clause embedded under the propositional attitude verb think, Darrylthe subject of thinkis the judge and he must be the one who thinks that brussels sprouts taste good for it to be true. The speaker's opinion on brussels sprouts is irrelevant in the second sentence. (183) a. A: Brussels sprouts taste good. B: Well, they might taste good to you, but not to me. b. A: Darryl thinks Brussels sprouts taste good. B: Well, they might taste good to Darryl, but not to me. #Well, they might taste good to you, but not to me. Stephenson (2007b,a) extends the use of the judge to epistemic modals. Stephenson points out that the same behaviour described above for propositional attitude verbs holds for epistemic modals. The clausal environment that an epistemic modal such as must occurs in determines whose epistemic state (i.e., whose perspective) is being described. In (184a), where must is in a matrix clause, the speaker is the judge and must have some evidence that it rained during the night. In (184b), where must is in a clause embedded under think, Kaythe subject of thinkis the judge and must have some evidence that it rained last. The speaker does not need any such evidence. 15There may be cases in some languages where the speaker is not the origo in certain matrix clausesfor example, free indirect discourse in English (Schlenker 2004). 16Whether the truth of a sentence like that in (183a) is evaluated relative to a judge, or to a contextually dened group is controversial. Lasersohn (2005) and Stephenson (2007b,a) take the truth of such sentences to be relative to a judge, while von Fintel and Gillies (2007) take it to be relative to a contextually dened (possibly singleton) group. I follow Lasersohn and Stephenson here. 116 5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality (184) a. A: It must have rained last night. B: Well, you might think that, but I don't. b. A: Kay thought it must have rained last night. B: Well, Kay might think that, but I don't. #Well, you might think that, but I don't. The behaviour of epistemic modals is relevant for us, since one of them, must, has been argued to be an evidential (Westmoreland 1995, 1998, von Fintel and Gillies 2010). In particular, must indicates the origo has inferred the prejacent proposition. Recall that so is dened as the situation in which (minimally) the origo's attitudes hold. As with the judge, the value of so varies depending on the type of clause the origo is being evaluated in. In a declarative matrix clause, so is (normally) the utterance situation,17 while in an embedded clause, so is the situation of evaluation of the embedding predicate. If we consider the sentence in (184a) again, where must is in a declarative matrix clause, the speaker is the judge, and must have evidence in the utterance situation. The fact that the speaker had evidence in the past is irrelevant. In (184b), where must is in an embedded clause, Kay is the judge, and must have had some evidence at the time of the situation of evaluation of the matrix clause. The utterance situation is irrelevantin fact Kay may not even be in the utterance situation. 5.1.3 Ingredient 3: centred proposition The third concept necessary for an analysis of evidentiality is the proposition. To be more specic, we need to use the concept of a centred propositionan uncentred proposition evaluated from the point of view of a particular person (Lewis 1979). A centred proposition is an uncentred proposition together with an origo (in my terms; a centre in Lewis'). To see the dierence between an uncentred proposition and a centred proposition, consider the two scenarios in (185) and (186) below.18 First, let us assume that the objects of attitudes such as belief are uncentred propo sitions. The uncentred proposition conveyed by the sentence in (185) is that a particular individual, the guy on the jumbotron, is going to get hit with a ball. This is what Brian believes, and it is true. Nevertheless, since he does not realize he is the guy on the jumbotron, he does not take any action to stop himself from getting hit. 17See fn. 15. 18The two scenarios in (185) and (186) are similar to two discussed by Chierchia (1989) in which Pavarotti's pants are on re and Pavarotti sees this in a mirror. 117 5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality (185) Scenario: Brian is at a baseball game and is watching the jumbotron. Someone hits a foul ball, and it is heading directly for him, and the jumbotron cameraman is focused on him, hoping to show him catching the ball. However, Brian does not recognize himself on the jumbotron, and because he is watching it, he does not see the ball coming. What he sees on the jumbotron is a person about to be hit with the ball. He says: `Oh no, it's going to hit him.' In the second scenario, the uncentred proposition conveyed by the statement in (186) is the same as that in the rst scenario, namely that a particular individual, the guy on the jumbotron, is going to get hit with a ball. The same individual is about to get hit by a ball in both scenarios. However, while in the rst case Brian takes no action, in this scenario he will likely duck or try to catch the ball. (186) Scenario: Brian is at the game watching the jumbotron, but recognizes himself on it. He sees the foul ball heading in his direction, and realizes that it is going to hit him. He says: `Oh no, it's going to hit me.' As Lewis (1979) points out, when we use uncentred propositions as the objects of attitudes such as belief and desire, we cannot explain why Brian would act in one way in the second scenario but not in the rst. Propositions are true or false, and their truth or falsity is independent of who is considering them. Since the same individual is going to get hit by the ball in both scenarios, the uncentred propositions are the same in both scenarios. Thus, by using uncentred propositions as the objects of attitudes, we are missing something. Lewis' idea is to link uncentred propositions to individuals, yielding the notion of a centred proposition. A centred proposition is an uncentred proposition paired with an individual who believes I am soandso. Using centred propositions then, in the rst scenario, Brian believes the guy on the jumbotron is going to get hit, but believes he is not that guy. In the second scenario, he believes the guy on the jumbotron is going to get hit, and believes he is that guy. Brian's beliefs dier in the two scenarios, explaining why he would not try to duck in the rst scenario, and why he would in the second. Formally, an uncentred proposition is a set of possible worlds, where worlds aremaximal situations. The truth conditions of uncentred propositions are given as statements in predicate logic. Each lexical predicate minimally takes a situation, an origo, and a world as its arguments. Thus, every predicate is evaluated with respect to a world. An intransitive (i.e., oneplace) predicate such as fall will have the form shown in (187). It will rst saturate its entity argument, then its situation argument, its origo argument, and nally its world argument. The situation argument provides the situation in which the predicate holds. In order for the uncentred proposition to be true in the world w, the situation s must be a part of w. The fall relation in 118 5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality (187) is an situationless proposition, a situationsemantics version of a tenseless proposition. (187) λxλsλoλw[fall(s)(o)(w)(x)] With everything but the world argument saturated, we have an uncentred proposition. The denotation of such an uncentred proposition with respect to an assignment g is given in (188). Note that because any situation is part of only one world, this uncentred proposition will be a singleton set of worldsits only member is the world which contains s. (188) [[λw[fall(s)(o)(w)(x)]]]c,g = the set of all worlds which contain g(s) such that g(x) fell in g(s). With the origo o and situation s, we also have a tidy way of handling moods and tense. Moods manipulate the origo, while tense manipulates the situation.19 The denotation of the indicative mood -/IS is given in (189a) below. It is indexical, introducing the origo argument o∗, dened as the origo whose judge is the speaker and whose situation is the situation of the utterance context.20 The denotation of the past tense -(m)it1 is given in (189b). I treat tense as saturating a situation argument (see Chapter 8 for further discussion). It introduces a free variable si whose indexmatches that of the sux, and it also has a presuppositional requirement that the time of si precedes the time of the utterance situation t∗. Any time a morpheme has a subscript numeral, it introduces a free variable with a matching subscript. Some morphemes are subscripted with multiple numerals because they introduce multiple free variables. The presupposition in (189b) marked as such by being enclosed in curly brackets and being set after the truthconditional portion of the content. I maintain this notation until Chapter 7, when I adopt a dierent method for handling notatissue content in general. (189) a. -/i;S⇒ o∗ b. -(m)it1⇒ s1{ts1 < t∗} In order to see how situationless propositions, centred propositions and propositions are produced compositionally, consider the sentence in (190a) and the derivation of its se mantics, given in (190b). The entity argument is saturated rst, yielding the situationless proposition in c . The situationless proposition then has its situation argument saturated by the tense sux -(m)it1, which also introduces the presupposition that the time of the event situation s1 temporally precedes the time of the utterance situation. In b we have a centred proposition, and this has its origo argument saturated by the mood sux -/IS, yielding the proposition a . 19Perhaps moods can also manipulate the world variable. I leave this topic for further research. 20I consider the personmarking associated with moods to be agreement with the verb's argument introduced lower in the tree. I omit the semantics of this agreement in the service of clarity, as it is not relevant to the topic at hand. Another option would be to treat the personmarking as pronominal and any overt noun phrases as adjuncts, in the spirit of Jelinek (1984) and Baker (1996)but see Davis et al. (2007b) for arguments against this. 119 5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality (190) a. /a/apsjikvaqit/iS /ap-sji;kv[R]-(q)aq[SS]-(m)it-/i;S rightsayaugpast3.ind Ken Ken Ken `Ken was saying something sensible/saying right thing.' b. a jjjj jjjj jjj TTTT TTTT TTT -/i;S o∗ b jjjj jjjj jjj TTTT TTTT TTT -(m)it1 s1 {ts1 < t∗} c jjjj jjjj jjj TTTT TTTT TTT /a/apsjikvaq λxλsλoλw[say.right.thing′(s)(o)(w)(x)] Ken k a λw[say.right.thing′(s1)(o∗)(w)(k)] {ts1 < t∗} b λoλw[say.right.thing′(s1)(o)(w)(k)] {ts1 < t∗} c λsλoλw[say.right.thing′(s)(o)(w)(k)] Not all clauses have their origo argument saturated, and therefore some clauses denote centred propositions, rather than uncentred propositions. While matrix clause moods, such as the indicative -/IS above, saturate an origo argument, dependent clause moods do not. A propositional attitude verb such as /uqlaap `think' corresponds to a relation between a situation, an origo, a world, an individual (the thinker), and a centred proposition (the thought), as shown in (191). The origo of the embedded centred proposition has restrictions on it, namely that the judge jo is the subject of /uqlaap and the situation so is the situation in which /uqlaap holds. This is similar to how Schlenker (2003) handles propositional attitudes, though his notation uses an operator which acts as a quantier over contexts, not origos. I discuss the ways dependent clauses have their origos determined in more detail in Chapter 6. (191) /uqlaap⇒ λpλxλsλo′λw[think(s)(o′)(w)(x)(λo[p(o) ∧ jo = x ∧ so = s])] 5.1.4 The types Table 5.2 below shows the types for the concepts I have described above, as well as that of the context of utterance, which I give here for completeness. The need for handling the context of utterance in the object language is discussed in Ÿ5.3.3.2, where I discuss reported speech. Truth values are of type t, and individuals, or entities, are of type e. Situations are of type s, as are maximal situations (i.e., worlds). The origo is of type o. These are the basic types. All the other types are functions from one type to another. A proposition is a function from 120 5.2. Relating the origo to the prejacent proposition: perspectival status maximal situations to truth values and is of type 〈s,t〉. A centred proposition is a function from origos to propositions and is of type 〈o,〈s,t〉〉. An situationless proposition is a function from situations to centred propositions and is of type 〈s,〈o,〈s,t〉〉〉. Table 5.2 also shows the conventional variable symbols Imake use of in this dissertation. Any variable x will be of type e, any variable s will be of type s, and so on. I never need to use a variable for either truth values or uncentred propositions The few constants I use to represent people are also given here: Ann is represented as a, Ken as k and Linda as l. In order to keep types and variables distinct in the text, I adopt the convention of putting all types in boldface, and putting all variables in italics. Types Variables Constants truth value t individual e x, y, z a, k, l situation s s origo o o uncentred proposition 〈s,t〉 centred proposition 〈o,〈s,t〉〉 p, q situationless proposition 〈s,〈o,〈s,t〉〉〉 P,Q Table 5.2: Types, variables and constants 5.2 Relating the origo to the prejacent proposition: perspectival status origo perceived situation prejacent proposition perspectival status perceptual grounding manner of support •         • oo • 777777777777777 Figure 5.2: Three factors of evidentiality The relation between the origo and the prejacent proposition involves the origo's perspective. An origo's perspective is a subjective determination of what they believe (Kölbel 2002). One way to think about a perspective is as a set of centred propositionsthe set of centred propositions the judge believes. Thus, the perspectival status relation indicates whether or not the prejacent proposition is in the origo's perspective. 121 5.2. Relating the origo to the prejacent proposition: perspectival status Two origos can be distinguished either by having dierent judges or by being in dierent situations. Dierent judges in the same situation will usually not have the same set of centred propositions in their perspective. Perspectives are not shared between individuals. A single judge in dierent situations will not necessary have the same set of centred propositions in his or her perspective. As an origo observes and learns about the world, his or her perspective will change, adding or removing centred propositions. Consider the following scenario. Ken had stopped smoking, but has since started again. Bill knows that Ken started again, but Kay still believes he has stopped smoking. Thus, whenever Kay and Bill speak to one another, their perspectives dierBill's perspective contains the centred proposition that Ken started smoking again, while Kay's does not. A centred proposition can be added to an origo's perspective when they learn something about the world. For example, Kay's perspective at 3:00 on Wednesday did not include the centred proposition that Ken started smoking again, but at 3:05 she went out back and saw him smoking, and that centred proposition was added to her perspective. Kay now believes that Ken started smoking again. A centred proposition can be removed from an origo's perspective if he or she forgets it, or comes to doubt it. Let us rst look at forgetting. Two days after Kay added the centred proposition that Ken started smoking again, she forgot it, and so that centred proposition was removed from her perspective. Kay no longer believes that Ken started smoking again. To see how doubt can cause a centred proposition to be removed from an orig's per spective, we will need to look at a dierent scenario. On Thursday, Kay saw Bill's car going through a red light. She added to her perspective the centred proposition that Bill ran a red light on Thursday. However, on Friday she learned that John had borrowed Bill's car several times that week. After learning this, she was in doubt as to whether it was Bill or John who ran the red light, and so the centred proposition that Bill ran a red light on Thursday was removed from her perspective.21 Kay no longer believes that Bill ran a red light on Thursday. Formally, the perspective of an origo is the set of centred propositions that he or she believes hold in a given situation. If a centred proposition is in an origo's perspective, he or she believes it is true. If a centred proposition is not in an origo's perspective, he or she does not have any belief about it. I formalize the perspective as in (192). The perspectiveΠ of an origo o is dened as the set of all centred propositions p such that the judge of o, jo, in the situation so believes p. (192) Πo ⇔ {p | jo in so believes p is true} A perspective, as dened in (192), diers from the notion of perspective used by Kölbel (2002). The two approaches dier with respect to the claims they make concerning 21Kay could add the centred proposition that either Bill or John ran the red light, unless she thinks that if John had been driving Bill's car, maybe other people had been too. 122 5.2. Relating the origo to the prejacent proposition: perspectival status the role of perspectives. For Kölbel, a perspective is a function from contents (propositions) to truth values, and the truth value of a sentence is dependent on a perspective.22 Inmy approach, perspectives play no role in determining truth values. Rather, propositions are functions from worlds to truth values. As I discuss shortly, perspectives are nevertheless crucial for felicity conditions. For example, an assertion of the centred proposition p is only felicitous if p is in the origo's perspective. And as we shall see, indirect evidentials are only felicitous if the prejacent proposition is not in the origo's perspective. Another concept that is similar to the perspective is the common ground. The common ground is the set of propositions that the speaker and addressee(s) all have as mutually shared assumptions (Stalnaker 1974). It delimits the range of presupposed propositions, and deter mines which information is considered new and old. A perspective, on the other hand, belongs to a single individual only. It represents what they personally believe. A further dierence is that the common ground is a set of uncentred propositions (type 〈s,t〉), while a perspective is a set of centred propositions (type 〈o,〈s,t〉〉). The perspective is relevant for the felicity conditions of assertion. For an assertion to be felicitous, its centred proposition must be in the perspective of the speaker (as origo in a declarative clause). In other words, it is felicitous for Kay to utter the sentence in (193) at 3:00 onMay 16, 2012 only if her perspective contains the centred proposition that it is raining then in a situation in the actual world.23 But if Bill's perspective contains the centred proposition that it is not raining then, it would be infelicitous for him to utter (193). Of course, only one of them can be right about what is happening in the actual world, but it is their perspective, rather than the actual facts, that determines their use of language. (193) Mizaa/iS Miz-(y)a;-/i;S raincont3.ind `It's raining.' Using the concept of the perspective, we can dene the relation between the origo and the prejacent propositionthe perspectival status. The perspectival status tells us if the prejacent proposition is in the origo's perspective or not. The perspectival status is relevant for evidentials because indirect evidentials indicate that the origo is agnostic about the truth of the prejacent proposition. The agnostic relation is dened in (194) below. The relation agnostic(o)(p) holds if and only if neither the centred proposition p nor its negation are in the 22It is true that Kölbel's concept of a perspective is the characteristic function of a set of propositions, and so my notion of a perspective (i.e., a set of centred propositions) is a notational variant of his. However, the role that a perspective plays in determining the truth value of a sentence is not the same in our two approaches. 23Moore's paradox raises the same issue, namely that you cannot say It's going to rain, but I don't believe it's going to rain. The reason you cannot say this is because an assertion of the rst conjunct, It's going to rain, is only felicitous if the speaker believes it is going to rain, and the second conjunct, I don't believe it's going to rain denies that this felicity condition is met. 123 5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support origo's perspective. (194) agnostic(o)(p)⇔ p<Πo ∧ ¬p<Πo The inferential and reportative evidentials in Nuuchahnulth are indirect evidentials, meaning that they are only felicitous if the prejacent proposition is not in the origo's perspective. In otherwords, inferentials and reportatives inNuuchahnulth encode that the origo is agnostic about the prejacent proposition. 5.3 How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support origo perceived situation prejacent proposition perspectival status perceptual grounding manner of support •         • oo • 777777777777777 Figure 5.3: Three factors of evidentiality Combining a situation with an situationless proposition yields a centred proposition. To put it informally, a centred proposition is about a particular situation. The centred proposition conveyed by the English sentence in (195) is about a particular situation that Kay perceived. There are undoubtably many situations in which a little girl runs up and presses a button to open a door, but there is one particular situation Kay has in mind when she says this sentence. (195) Scenario: Kay was walking up to the library when she saw a little girl run up and press the button to open the door. Later she said this to Bill. A little girl ran up and pressed the button to open the door. The evidentiality of the utterance in (195), although it is unmarked, is such that Kay believes the prejacent proposition (that a little girl ran up and pressed the button to open the door), she visually perceived a particular situation, and that situation was the one the prejacent proposition was about. (196) Perspectival status: Kay (the origo) believes the prejacent proposition (that a little girl ran up and pressed the button to open the door). 124 5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support Perceptual grounding: Kay (the origo) visually perceived a particular situation Manner of support: This situation is the one that the prejacent proposition is about. The manner of support in this case is one of direct support. Kay perceived the situation that the prejacent proposition is about. Direct support is the unmarked manner of supportno evidential in Nuuchahnulth encodes that the origo perceived the situation the prejacent is about.24 However, there are other manners of support which are encoded by evidentials. In particular, evidentials can encode inference and report. The three manners of support described above are illustrated schematically in Fig ure 5.4. The origo is indicated by o, the perceived situation by a box, and perception by an arrow −→. Solid boxes are perceived situations, while boxes with dotted outlines indicate situations that are accessible only by inference ({) from one centred proposition to another. A reporterthe speaker of the perceived utterance situationis indicate by r, and the utterance itself by the speech bubble. direct support o −→ ⇑ p inference o −→ ⇑ { ⇑ q p report o −→ r p  Figure 5.4: Manners of support The examples in (197) each involve a dierent manner of support. In (197a), the origo Kay perceived the situation of being hungry itself, though nothing in the sentence encodes 24Direct support is probably unmarked in any language. Tibetan has a morpheme which seems at rst glance to encode direct support, but Garrett (2001, ch. 3) argues that the socalled direct evidential in Tibetan, d̀ug, does not encode direct support. The direct evidential can occur in clausal environments in which evidentials cannot appear. In these other clausal environments, the direct evidential lacks evidential force, but maintain a deictic relation between the origo and the event. Garrett therefore argues that the evidential force arises from the interplay of the felicity conditions of assertion and the demonstrative properties of d̀ug. 125 5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support this.25 In (197b), the origo Kay saw a situation in which Ken was looking in the fridge; she did not see one in which he was hungry. The origo had to make an inference in order to arrive at the prejacent proposition. This is encoded in the dubitative mood -qAJa. In (197c), the origo Kay heard a situation in which Ken said he was hungry; she did not hear the one in which he was hungry. The situation Kay heard was an utterance situation, where a reporter, Ken, said he was hungry. In this way, Kay obtained a report which conveyed the prejacent proposition. This is encoded by the quotative mood -wA/iS. (197) a. Scenario: Kay was hungry, and she said this to Bill. haWiiqzsiS haWi:qz-si;S hungry1sg.ind `I'm hungry.' b. Scenario: Kay saw Ken looking in the fridge, and she said this to Bill. haWiiqzqaJa haWi:qz-qa;Ja hungry3.dub `Maybe he's hungry.' c. Scenario: Ken told Kay that he was hungry, and then Kay said this to Bill. haWiiqzwa/iS haWi:qz-wa;/iS hungry3.quot `He's hungry (reportedly).' No evidentials in Nuuchahnulth encode a direct support, though it will be necessary to talk about support in general when I model perceptual grounding in Ÿ5.4, and direct support is one manner of support. With this in mind, I discuss direct support (Ÿ5.3.1). This leaves inference and report as the two manners of support which must be formalized. I discuss these in Ÿ5.3.2 and Ÿ5.3.3 respectively. 5.3.1 Perception of a directly supporting situation by the origo In the simplest case, an origo can perceive the situation of the prejacent proposition itself. There is no intervening process between this perceived situation and the prejacent propositionthe prejacent proposition holds in the perceived situation. This manner of support is not encoded by any morpheme in Nuuchahnulth. Either the indicative mood or 25While it may appear that the indicative mood encodes direct support, this is not the case. The indicative mood cooccurs with inferential evidentials other than -qAJa `dubitative', such as -ckvI `past inference' and -matak `inference'. 126 5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support the mirative mood can be used when the perceived situation directly supports the prejacent proposition, but neither of these moods encodes this manner of support, as I showed in Ÿ4.7.1. The argument goes like this. If the indicative mood -/IS indicated that the perceived situation directly supported the prejacent proposition, then it would be infelicitous when used in the same clause as an evidential which indicates that the perceived situation does not directly support the prejacent proposition. Inferentials such as -Kuk `visual inference' are infelicitous when the perceived situation directly supports the prejacent. Thus, if an inferential like -Kuk can occur with the indicative mood, the indicative mood must not encode direct support. The example in (198) shows that -Kuk can cooccur with the indicative mood. Therefore, the indicative mood does not encode direct support. (198) Scenario: Kay was watching Ken's baby for him, and she saw her standing up, holding on to the edge of the table, and she let go, so Kay said this to Bill. yaayaacataHKuk/iS yac-ataH[RLL]-Kuk-/i;S walkabout.tovis.evid3.ind naYaqakuk/i naYaqak-uk-/i; babypossdef Kay Kay Kay `It looks like Kay's baby is going to start walking.' Likewise, the mirative mood cannot indicate direct support, because it can occur with inferential evidentials, as shown in (199). Here the mirative mood -JA?aS occurs with the past inferential -ckvI. Since -ckvI is only felicitous when the perceived situation does not directly support the prejacent proposition, and can cooccur with themirativemood, themirativemood cannot encode a direct support. (199) haWiiqzckviJa?aS haWi:qz-ckvi;-Ja;?aS hungrypast.evid3.mir NuWi NuWi father /ayaqz /aya-’aqz manyin.body qinHaaMa qinHa:Ma egg `Your father must have been hungry, he ate a lot of eggs.' 5.3.2 Inference of the prejacent proposition by the origo Westmoreland (1995, 1998) argues that must in English is an evidential, and more specically, it is an inferential. He also shows that the kind of inferences must indicates are not limited to what I call necessary inferences, following Weiss (1942). Rather, must can also indicate what I call contingent inference, again using Weiss' terminology. First I discuss the properties of inference in general (Ÿ5.3.2.1), and then I discuss the distinction between necessary and contingent inference, and in so doing, show that it is contingent inference that is encoded in inferentials in Nuuchahnulth (Ÿ5.3.2.2). 127 5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support 5.3.2.1 The logic of inference Inferential evidentials indicate a process of human reasoning. A widely cited model of human reasoning is that of Toulmin (2003), and so I rely on his model in the discussion below. Toulmin presents a model of inference as it is used in reasoning, which he calls the pattern of an argument (p. 89). He divides propositions into several categories, based on the role they play in reasoning, and what questions they answer. He ends up with a richer model than the one I describe here. For the purposes of this discussion, I will focus on the simpler model that he lays out at the outset. An inference involves minimally three propositions, a datum, a warrant, and a conclu sion. An inference is valid if and only if the conclusion is true whenever the datum and warrant are true. For example, in (200) if the datum p1 and the warrant p2 are true, then the conclusion pc is also true, and the inference is valid.26 Bill only sings when he is taking a shower, so if he is singing, he is taking a shower. (200) p1 Bill is singing. p2 If Bill is singing, he is taking a shower. pc Bill is taking a shower. An example of an invalid inference is given in (201). It is possible for the conclusion pc to be false when both p1 and p2 are true. Even though Bill sings every time he takes a shower, he might also sing on occasion while he is driving to work, in which case he would be singing but not taking a shower. (201) p1 Bill is singing. p2 If Bill is taking a shower, he is singing. pc Bill is taking a shower. 5.3.2.2 Necessary and contingent inference A necessary inference is one in which both the datum (p1) and the warrant (p2) are true. An example of necessary inference is given in (202).27 I take the warrant p2 to be true and, assuming today is Monday, tomorrow is necessarily Tuesday. There are no exceptions to the warrant in this inference. 26A warrant needs to express a relationship between two propositions. While the warrant in (200) is of the form p→ q, a warrant could also be of the form p ∧ ¬q or even p ∧ q. 27This example is from Ryle (1950). 128 5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support (202) p1 Today is Monday. p2 If today is Monday, then tomorrow is Tuesday. pc Tomorrow is Tuesday. Since there are no exceptions, if both the datum p1 and the warrant p2 are in my perspective, the conclusion pc will also be in my perspective. Thus, when an origo has in his or her perspective a centred proposition that is the conclusion of an inference, the origo has made a necessary inference. A contingent inference is one in which the warrant may not be true. Weiss (1942) calls such a warrant a contingent principle. Since Weiss' principle is equivalent to Toulmin's warrant, I call such a warrant a contingent warrant. It is a warrant which past experience has shown is usually true.28 Consider the inference in (203). A contingent inference can still be valid, since the conclusion is true if the datum and warrant are true, but a contingent warrant is not always true. Consider the following scenario. I've seen Ken reading a book on the bus many times, and while there were a couple of exceptions, he generally reads only mystery novels. From this I form the contingent warrant p2. When I see Ken reading a book, I know p1 is true, and I can make a contingent inference from p1 and p2 to pc, that he's reading a mystery novel. (203) p1 Ken is reading a book. p2 If Ken reading a book, he's reading a mystery novel. pc Ken is reading a mystery novel. It is contingent inference that inferential evidentials encode. Consider the sentence containing -qAJa `dubitative' in (204) below. The datum (p1) is that Ken is looking in the fridge, and the conclusion (pc) is that Ken is hungry. If this were a necessary inference, the warrant must be something like: if someone is looking in the fridge, they are hungry. But this is not truethere are many reasons for looking in the fridge when you are not hungry, and the origo Kay can be aware of these other possible reasons and still use -qAJa. This necessary inference is invalid, yet -qAJa is felicitous. Kay is not making a necessary inference, but rather a contingent inference. A contingent inference is valid, but the warrant may not be true. 28Contingent warrants are what Kratzer (1991) includes in ordering sources in the case of epistemic modals. They are conditional propositions that normally hold. 129 5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support (204) Scenario: Kay saw Ken looking in the fridge, and she said this to Bill. haWiiqzqaJa haWi:qz-qa;Ja hungry3.dub `Maybe he's hungry.' p1 Ken is looking in the fridge. p2 If Ken is looking in the fridge, he is hungry. pc Ken is hungry. 5.3.2.3 Modelling contingent inference I will not be using Kratzer's (1981) modal analysis to model contingent inference. It is far more powerful than necessary, and its structure is illtted to our present purposes. Amodal in Kratzer's analysis is a contextdependent function from a prejacent proposition to a truth value. What we need is a relation between a perceived situation and a prejacent proposition. I will dene a general purpose contingent inference relation which is just this. I set aside the matter of how the contingent inference is itself modelled. The existence of a contingent inference entails the existence of at least two centred propositions, as illustrated in (205) below: a datum (a centred propositionwhich is in the origo's perspective) which is directly supported by the perceived situation, and a conclusion (a centred proposition which is not in the origo's perspective). Recall that an situationless proposition Q is of type 〈s,〈o,〈s,t〉〉〉, and when supplied with a situation yields a centred proposition of type 〈o,〈s,t〉〉. Q(s) is thus a centred proposition. (205) Q(s) The ground is wet. p It rained. I start with the conclusion p, since it is the simplest. The conclusion is the prejacent proposition in a sentence with an evidential in it. The only requirement on it as a conclusion of a contingent inference is that it is not in the origo's perspective. This restriction is given in (206), which states that any centred proposition is a possible conclusion if it is not in an origo o's perspectivethat is, if agnostic(o)(p) is true. (206) p is a possible conclusion in a contingent inference by o if agnostic(o)(p) The datum Q(s) is a centred proposition in the perspective of the origo, and a given evidential may specify how he or she perceived the situation s. All inferentials indicate that the centred proposition Q(s) is in the origo's perspective. A visual inferential adds the restriction that the origo perceived s visually. What counts as a datumwill dier between origos in dierent 130 5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support situations, and this is captured in (207) by saying that Q(s) is a (possible) datum for o if Q(s) is in o's perspective, Πo. (207) Q(s) is a possible datum in a contingent inference by o if and only if Q(s)∈Πo Contingent inference is represented by the relation in (208), between a perceived situation s and a conclusion p, and is also dependent on an origo o. The origo is relevant because contingent inference entails that the origo is agnostic about the prejacent proposition, and dierent origos may make use of dierent contingent warrants. The denotation of the contingent inference relation, shown in (208), evaluated with respect to an assignment g, is the set of all possible worlds w, such that there is an situationless proposition Q such that Q(s) is in the origo's perspective, and the origo is agnostic about the prejacent proposition p, and the origo can make a contingent inference from Q(s) to p, and p(o) will be true in w. (208) [[cont.inf(o)(s)(p)]]c,g = 1 i there is an situationless proposition Q such that Q(g(s)) ∈ Πg(o) and [[agnostic(o)(p)]]c,g = 1 and jg(o) (in sg(o)) can make a contingent inference in world wg(s) from Q(g(s)) to g(p), where wg(s) ∈ g(p)(o). 5.3.3 Reports transmitted to the origo Reports give us information about the world that other people have observed. Repor tative evidentials are one way to indicate that the centred proposition conveyed in a clause was passed to the origo in a report.29 5.3.3.1 Reports are independent of the origo's perspective The centred propositions that an origo has obtained by report have a separate status from those in his or her perspective. Reports which are false or misleading in the origo's opinion will not be stored in his or her perspective. Consider the following scenario. On her way to work in the morning, Kay saw Ken smoking a cigarette. Later in the day, she and Bill were talking to Ken, and Ken said he quit smoking and hadn't had a cigarette in over a month. Kay now has a report that contains the centred proposition that Ken hasn't had a cigarette in over a month, but this will not be in her perspective, since her perspective already contains the centred proposition that Ken was smoking a cigarette that morning. These two centred propositions are contradictory, and so she can only believe one of them. While it is not necessary that a centred proposition obtained by report be in an origo's perspective, it is possible. For example, if Kay's father tells her he got a halibut this morning, she now has a report containing the centred proposition that her father got a halibut this 29Direct and indirect quotes are another way to indicate the centred proposition was passed to the origo in a report. 131 5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support morning. She trusts her father, and believes what he says is true, so this centred proposition is also in her perspective. 5.3.3.2 Modelling reports I treat reports as an ordered pair consisting of an utterance context and a centred proposition, as shown in (209). This represents the context and content of an utterance. Utterance contexts exist in the metalanguage, rather than the objectlanguage, and they dene (minimally) a speaker, an addressee, and an utterance situation. (209) report: 〈c, p〉 Each origo is associated with a set of reports Ro which contains all the reports that he or she received. Whether or not the origo was the addressee is not relevant as long as the origo perceived the utterance situation. This set is separate from the origo's perspective, which remains a set of centred propositions. The formulation in (210) also ensures that these reports are those made by people other than the origo, rather than including reports that the origo him or herself made.30 (210) Ro = {〈c, p〉 | jo in so believes p was conveyed by the utterance context c, jo perceived the utterance situation of c, and jo is distinct from the speaker of c} Whenever some origo o indicates they are passing on a report (by using direct quotation, indirect quotation, or a reportative evidential), they are indicating that the centred proposition belongs to some pair 〈c, p〉 in Ro. It should also be noted that the same context can be associated with multiple centred propositions, as long as the origo believes they are also conveyed by that utterance context. That is, all the centred propositions pn that are logically entailed by the centred proposition p in 〈c, p〉 are members of reports 〈c, pn〉 in Ro. I can now dene a relation between an origo o, a situation s, and a centred proposition p, as shown in (211). This states that p is conveyed by some report 〈c, p〉 in o's set of reports Ro, that s is the situation of the report context, and that the speaker of the report context is not the addressee of the context in which the reportative occurs. The latter restriction is needed because reportatives are infelicitous when one of the current speechact participants was the source of the report. In addition, the use of the reportative evidential in Nuuchahnulth (the quotative mood -wA/iS) indicates that the origo does not know whether the prejacent is true or false, and for expedience I add this directly to the report relation. 30Restricting Ro to reports made by people other than the origo is suitable for reportative evidentials, but this may be too narrow if Ro is needed for other reported speech constructions. However, an analysis of verbs of saying like that of Schlenker (2003) makes do without reference to a set like Ro, so the point may be moot. 132 5.4. How the origo perceives a situation: perceptual grounding (211) [[report(o)(s)(p)]]c,g = 1i there exists a context of utterance c′whose utterance situation is g(s), such that there is a report 〈c′, g(p)〉 in the origo g(o)'s set of reports Rg(o) in world wg(s), the speaker of c′ is not the addressee of c and [[agnostic(o)(p)]]c,g = 1. 5.3.4 A general support relation I have described three distinct manners of support between a situation s and a centred proposition P(s′) for an origo o. The direct support relation holds when s is identical to s′that is, when P(s) yields the same centred proposition as P(s′). The inference relation holds when the origo can make a contingent inference from s to P(s′). The report relation holds when s is an utterance situation in which P(s′) was conveyed. (212) Direct support s= s Inference cont.inf(o)(s)(P(s′)) Report report(o)(s)(P(s′)) It will be necessary to talk about a situation supporting a particular centred proposition when modelling perceptual grounding, so I dene the general support relation in (213). Here we need to manipulate both s and s′, so I break the centred proposition down into its situationless proposition and situation argument. The support relation is therefore a relation between two situations, an origo and an situationless proposition. The rst situation argument is the perceived situation, and the second is the situation in which the situationless proposition P holds. (213) support(s)(o)(s′)(P)⇔ P(s)=P(s′) ∨ cont.inf(o)(s)(P(s′)) ∨ report(o)(s)(P(s′)) 5.4 How the origo perceives a situation: perceptual grounding origo perceived situation prejacent proposition perspectival status perceptual grounding manner of support •         • oo • 777777777777777 Figure 5.5: Three factors of evidentiality 133 5.4. How the origo perceives a situation: perceptual grounding The sense throughwhich an origo perceives a situation is his or her perceptual grounding with respect to it. When the origo perceives a situation, a particular sense was used,31 and evidentials can indicate the use of a particular sense. In Figure 5.6 I give schematics for the ve kinds of perceptual grounding.32 Thus, we have an origo seeing a particular situation, an origo hearing a situation, and so on. o −→sight o −→hearing o −→taste o −→smell o −→touch Figure 5.6: Perceptual grounding The fact that an origo believes he or she perceived a given situation is represented as a relation between the origo and a situation, as shown in (214). This relation states that the origo o believes that he or she perceived the situation s. No centred propositions come into play in this denition, since it merely indicates the origo o's belief about his or her perceptual relation to some situation s. (214) [[perceived(s)(o)]]c,g = 1 i the origo ( jg(o) in situation sg(o)) believes that he or she perceived situation g(s) in world wg(s). The two sensespecic relations necessary for Nuuchahnulth evidentials are given in (215). These will be used in the denitions of visual and auditory perceptual grounding, necessary for the analysis of the visual inferential -Kuk and auditory evidential na/a:t. Other languages may have evidentials which encode other senses, such as taste, smell, or touch. They would therefore require additional perceptual grounding relations to be dened. 31Or quite often more than one sense. When I make a pot of soup, I can see the situation in which the soup is simmering, smell it, and also hear it. 32I give the ve external senses here, but internal senses (pain, heat, etc.) can be described the same way. No evidential in Nuuchahnulth species an internal sense, so we can safely ignore them at present. 134 5.5. Modelling Nuuchahnulth evidentials (215) a. [[perceivedvis(s)(o)]]c,g = 1 i the origo ( jg(o) in situation sg(o)) believes that he or she saw situation g(s) in world wg(s). b. [[perceivedaud(s)(o)]]c,g = 1 i the origo ( jg(o) in situation sg(o)) believes that he or she heard situation g(s) in world wg(s). In order tomodel sensory evidentials, weneed to indicate both that a particular situation was perceived by an origo, and that that situation supports the prejacent proposition. With this in mind, I dene the grounding relation in (216) as a relation between an situationless proposition, two situations, and an origo. The prejacent proposition is broken down into its situationless proposition and situation components so that the support relation (dened in (213) above) can be used. A situation s perceptually grounds a centred proposition P(s′) for an origo o if and only if the origo o perceived s, and s supports P(s′) in o's opinion. Recall that the support relation holds when any one of the three manners of support (direct support, inference or report) holds between a situation and an situationless proposition (see Ÿ5.3.4). (216) grounding(s)(o)(s′)(P)⇔ perceived(s)(o) ∧ support(s)(o)(s′)(P) Because there are visual and auditory evidentials in Nuuchahnulth, we require a visual and an auditory version of the grounding relation. These are given in (217a) and (217b), where the relevant senses are indicated by subscripts. Each one species that the origo o perceived the situation s with the relevant sensevisual in (217a) and auditory in (217b). Auditory grounding also prohibits the origo having perceived the situation visually. (217) a. groundingvis(s)(o)(s′)(P)⇔ perceivedvis(s)(o) ∧ support(s)(o)(s′)(P) b. groundingaud(s)(o)(s′)(P)⇔ perceivedaud(s)(o) ∧ ¬perceivedvis(s)(o) ∧ support(s)(o)(s′)(P) 5.5 ModellingNuuchahnulth evidentials I now turn to the semantics of the individual evidentials in Nuuchahnulth. In this discussion I divide them into three groups based on their shared semantic properties. First I discuss the inferentials, -matak `inference', -ckvI `past inference' and -qAJa `dubitative', which all indicate contingent inference without specifying the perceptual grounding (Ÿ5.5.1). Then I discuss the two evidentials that specify perceptual grounding, -Kuk `visual inference' and na/a:t `auditory evidence' ( Ÿ5.5.2 ). Finally, I discuss the reportative evidentials, -wA/iS `quotative' and -HAj `indirect interrogative' (Ÿ5.5.3). 5.5.1 Inferential evidentials The rst inferential I discuss below is -matak (Ÿ5.5.1.1), which is the least specied evidential in Nuuchahnulth. It indicates only that the origo has contingently inferred the 135 5.5. Modelling Nuuchahnulth evidentials prejacent, and species no temporal relations or perceptual grounding. The past inferential -ckvI (Ÿ5.5.1.2) has the additional property of indicating the time at which the prejacent held preceded the situation which the origo perceived. The semantics of the dubitativemood -qAJa (Ÿ5.5.1.3) are closer to -matak, diering only by additionally specifying that the origo is the speaker (and simultaneously preventing it from being embedded). 5.5.1.1 Inferential -matak The inferential -matak is a function of type 〈〈s,〈o,〈s,t〉〉〉, 〈s,〈o,〈s,t〉〉〉〉. It acts as a modier, taking an situationless proposition as its argument and yielding another situationless proposition, as shown in (218). It indicates that the origo is able tomake a contingent inference from the perceived situation s1 to the prejacent P(s), and that w is the world of s1. The reason it takes an argument of type 〈s,〈o,〈s,t〉〉〉 instead of a centred proposition of type 〈o,〈s,t〉〉 is that it is composed before the situation argument is supplied by tense (see Chapter 8, especially Ÿ8.2.2). Note that the situation argument gives the prejacent situationthe perceived situation s1 is provided by a contextually determined indexed situation variable. Each instance of -matak has the same index as this situation variable. (218) -matak1⇒ λPλsλoλw[cont.inf(o)(s1)(P(s)) ∧ w=ws1] Since the result of the application of -matak followed by tense yields a centred propo sition, it can either be embedded, or have its origo supplied by a matrix clause mood such as -/IS. The latter case is simpler, so I look at it rst. The sentence in (219) has the derivation given in (220). (219) Zaa/a/izmatak/iS Za:/a/iz-matak-/i;S go.outsideind.evid3.ind `Maybe he went out.' As the derivation below shows, the verbal predicate Zaa/a/iz `go outside' rst has its nominal argument satised with the free variable x1, yielding d . Then instead of having its situation argument saturated, d becomes the argument of the inferential -matak, resulting in another function c , which has its situation argument lled by the tense morpheme. I treat the tense argument as a free variable whose value is contextually determined, much like a pronoun (McCawley 1971, Partee 1973) (see Ÿ8.2.2 for further discussion). Finally, the origo is supplied by the mood sux yielding a . 136 5.5. Modelling Nuuchahnulth evidentials (220) a hhhhh hhhhh hhh VVVVV VVVVV VVV -/i;S o∗ b hhhhh hhhhh hhh VVVVV VVVVV VVV 03 s3 c hhhhh hhhhh hhh VVVVV VVVVV VVV -matak2 λPλsλoλw[cont.inf(o)(s2)([P(s)]) ∧ w=ws2 ] d hhhhh hhhhh hhh VVVVV VVVVV VVV Za:/a/iz λxλs′λoλw′[go.out′(s′)(o)(w′)(x)] 01 x1 a λw[cont.inf(o∗)(s2)(λoλw′[go.out′(s3)(o)(w′)(x1)]) ∧ w=ws2] b λo′λw[cont.inf(o′)(s2)(λoλw′[go.out′(s3)(o)(w′)(x1)]) ∧ w=ws2] c λsλo′λw[cont.inf(o′)(s2)(λoλw′[go.out′(s)(o)(w′)(x1)]) ∧ w=ws2] d λs′λoλw′[go.out′(s′)(o)(w′)(x1)] The proposition in a denotes the set of worlds w such that s2 is a part of w, and o∗(the speaker in the utterance situation) can make a contingent inference from the contextually determined situation s2 (the perceived situation) to the centred proposition that a contextually salient individual x1 went out in situation s3 (the event situation). In an embedded clause, such as in (221), the origo associated with the contingent inference signied by -matak is the subject of the matrix clause, here Ken, rather than the speaker (see Ÿ6.3 for arguments supporting this claim). (221) /uqlaamit/iS /uqla:p-(m)it-/i;S thinkpast3.ind Ken Ken Ken walyuumatakq walyu:-matak-q be.homeind.evid3.sub John John John `Ken thought John was at home.' The semantics for -matak allow for such a reading, provided the propositional attitude verb maps the subject of the matrix clause to the judge of the embedded clause. To show how this works, I have divided the derivation into two parts: the rst, in (222), shows the derivation of the meaning of the embedded clause alone, and the second, in (224), shows the derivation of the meaning of the matrix clause. The derivation of the embedded clause proceeds in the same way as we saw in (220) when -matak appears in a matrix clause. First the predicate walyuu combines with its nominal argument, then the result is taken as the argument of -matak. Next the situation argument is supplied by the tense. However, while the indicative mood supplies an origo argument, the subordinate mood -q is an identity function; it is semantically vacuous since its output is the 137 5.5. Modelling Nuuchahnulth evidentials same as its input.33 (222) a ggggg ggggg gggg WWWWW WWWWW WWWW -q λp[p] b ggggg ggggg gggg WWWWW WWWWW WWWW 02 s2 c ggggg ggggg gggg WWWWW WWWWW WWWW -matak1 λPλsλo′′λw′′[cont.inf(o′′)(s1)(P(s)) ∧ w′′ =ws1 ] d ggggg ggggg gggg WWWWW WWWWW WWWW walyuu λxλs′λoλw′[be.home′(s′)(o)(w′)(x)] John j a λo′λw′′[cont.inf(o′)(s1)(λoλw′[be.home′(s2)(o)(w′)( j)]) ∧ w′′ =ws1] b λo′λw′′[cont.inf(o′)(s1)(λoλw′[be.home′(s2)(o)(w′)( j)]) ∧ w′′ =ws1] c λsλo′λw′′[cont.inf(o′)(s1)(λoλw′[be.home′(s)(o′)(w′)( j)]) ∧ w′′ =ws1] d λs′λoλw′[be home′(s′)(o)(w′)( j)] The predicate /uqlaap `think' has the semantics given in (223) below. According to the truth conditions, the origo of the embedded clause is the thinker, x, in the situation of the thinking s. In other words, the subject argument and the situation argument of predicate /uqlaap identify the origo of the embedded clause.34 (223) [[λw[think(s)(o′′)(w)(x)(p)]]]c,g= the set of all w such that g(s) is a part of w, and g(p) is in the perspective of g(x) in g(s). In (224) the translation of the embedded clause, given in e , saturates the centred proposition argument of the think relation. Next, the subject Ken saturates the individual argument of d , yielding the situationless proposition c . The tense morpheme -(m)it3 saturates the situation argument with an indexed variable, adding the restriction that the time of this situation precedes the time of the utterance situation. Finally, the indicative mood sux -/IS saturates the origo argument with o∗, the speaker at utterance time, yielding the translation in a . 33As noted in Ÿ2.7.3, other embedded clauses appear in the absolutive mood, which would also be an identity function of the same type. 34The origo argument of think, o′′, does not have any role to play in the truth conditions of its predicate, but it does play a role in the felicity conditions of an utterance containing a proposition with this predicate in itthe relevant proposition must be in the origo o′′'s perspective in order for the utterance to be felicitous. On the other hand, the truth conditions of other predicates, such as predicates of personal taste, will depend on their origo argument. See Ÿ5.2 for discussion. 138 5.5. Modelling Nuuchahnulth evidentials (224) a ggggg ggggg gggg WWWWW WWWWW WWWW -/i;S o∗ b ggggg ggggg gggg WWWWW WWWWW WWWW -(m)it3 s3{ts3 < t∗} c ggggg ggggg gggg WWWWW WWWWW WWWW Ken k d ggggg ggggg gggg WWWWW WWWWW WWWW /uqlaap λpλxλs′λo′′′λw[think(s)(o′′′)(w)(x)(p)] walyuumatakq John e a λw[think(s3)(o∗)(w)(k)(λo′λw′′[cont.inf(o′)(s1)(λoλw′[be.home′(s2)(o)(w′)( j)]) ∧ w′′ =ws1])]{ts3 < t∗} b λo′′′λw[think(s3)(o′′′)(w)(k)(λo′λw′′[cont.inf(o′)(s1)(λoλw′[be.home′(s2)(o)(w′)( j)]) ∧ w′′ =ws1])]{ts3 < t∗} c λsλo′′′λw[think(s)(o′′′)(w)(k)(λo′λw′′[cont.inf(o′)(s1)(λoλw′[be.home′(s2)(o)(w′)( j)]) ∧ w′′ =ws1])] d λxλsλo′′′λw[think(s)(o′′′)(w)(x)(λo′λw′′[cont.inf(o′)(s1)(λoλw′[be.home′(s2)(o)(w′)( j)]) ∧ w′′ =ws1])] e λo′λw′′[cont.inf(o′)(s1)(λoλw′[be.home′(s2)(o)(w′)( j)]) ∧ w′′ =ws1] Provided that the time of s3 precedes the time of the utterance situation, the proposition in a denotes the set of worlds w such that s3 is a part of w, and in s3 Ken thinks that he can make a contingent inference from the situation s1 (which he perceived) to the centred proposition that John is home in situation s2. 5.5.1.2 Past inferential -ckvI The past inferential sux -ckvI, while having the semantics of an inferential, also adds a restriction that the time of the perceived situation follows the time of the situation of the prejacent proposition. This captures the fact that the past inferential can only be used when the origo made an inference from something they perceived to something that happened prior to then. The translation of a past inferential is given in (225) below. In this version of the translation the temporal relation is not given as a presupposition, or notatissue, as one might have expected. This is because in Chapter 7 the entire translation in (225) will be notatissue, and this keeps the similarity between the two translations more clear. This translation does not refer to the time of utterance, t∗, since it is only possible for the perceived situation s2 to precede or overlap with the utterance situationwe cannot perceive situations that have not yet happened. It makes no dierence whether this relation is specied in the translation or 139 5.5. Modelling Nuuchahnulth evidentials not, and in the spirit of keeping the translations as simple as possible, I leave out the relation ts1 ≤ t∗. (225) -ckvi;1 ⇒ λPλsλoλw[cont.inf(o)(s1)(w)(P(s)) ∧ ts < ts1 ∧ w=ws1] Note that in order to express the relation between the times of the two situations, any past inferential morpheme must be introduced prior to any tense morphemes. I return to this in chapter 8. In (226a) I give a sentence containing -ckvI, and then I give the derivation in (226b). The derivation shows the predicate haWiiqz `hungry' rst merging with its nominal argument, the free variable x1. This yields the function of type 〈s,〈o,〈s,t〉〉〉 indicated in c , which satises the rst argument of -ckvI. We now have the function in b , which receives its origo argument from the mood sux, yielding the translation of the entire sentence a . (226) a. haWiiqzckvi/iS haWi:qz-ckvi;-/i;S hungrypast.evid3.ind `He must have been hungry.' b. a iiii iiii iiii UUUU UUUU UUUU -/i;S o∗ b iiii iiii iiii UUUU UUUU UUUU -03 s3 c iiii iiii iiii UUUU UUUU UUUU -ckvi;2 λPλsλoλw′[cont.inf(o)(s2)(P(s)) ∧ ts < ts2 ∧ w′ =ws2] d iiii iiii iiii UUUU UUUU UUUU haWi:qz λxλsλo[hungry′(s)(o)(w)(x)] 01 x1 a λw′[cont.inf(o∗)(s2)(λoλw[hungry′(s3)(o)(w)(x1)]) ∧ ts3 < ts2 ∧ w′ =ws2] b λo′λw′[cont.inf(o′)(s2)(λoλw[hungry′(s3)(o)(w)(x1)]) ∧ ts3 < ts2 ∧ w′ =ws2] c λsλo′λw′[cont.inf(o′)(s2)(λoλw[hungry′(s)(o)(w)(x1)]) ∧ ts < ts2 ∧ w′ =ws2] d λsλoλw[hungry′(s)(o)(w)(x1)] The proposition in a denotes the set of worlds w′ such that the situation s2 is a part of w′, that o∗ (the speaker in the utterance situation) can make a contingent inference from s2 to the centred proposition that the contextually salient individual x1 is hungry in s3, and that the time of s3 (the situation of being hungry) precedes the time of s2 (the perceived situation). 5.5.1.3 Dubitative -qAJa The dubitative mood is a function from centred propositions to propositions. It indicates that the origo can use the contextually determined situation s1 to make a contingent 140 5.5. Modelling Nuuchahnulth evidentials inference to the prejacent proposition, and it also identies the origo as the speaker in the utterance situation o∗. (227) -qa;Ja1 ⇒ λpλw[cont.inf(o∗)(s1)(p) ∧ w=ws1] To illustrate how this is composedwith its argument, I use the sentence in (228a), which has the logical form shown in (228b). Starting at the bottom, rst the translation of Mal/aHs `cold' combines with the translation of the null pronominal argument01, yielding the function in d . This in turn combines with the temporal sux -’az, which adds a presuppositional restriction on the time of the event situation s′, yielding the function in c .35 The null tense sux -02 then saturates the situation variable, yielding the function in b . This function is the centered proposition argument of the inferential mood -qAJa. Note that the relative position of the evidential and tense diers from the two previously discussed evidentials. All mood suxes combine above tense. The other evidentials all combine below tense. This is discussed further in Chapter 8. (228) a. Scenario: Bill came into the kitchen where Kay was sitting. He got a cup and went to pour himself some tea, but Kay had made the tea over an hour ago. She had not had any recently, so she said this to him. Mal/aHs/azqaJa Mal-’a;Hs-’az-qa;Ja coldin.vesselnow3.dub `It's probably cold now.' b. a ggggg ggggg ggg WWWWW WWWWW WWW -qa;Ja λpλw′[cont.inf(o∗)(s3)(p) ∧ w′ =ws3 ] b ggggg ggggg ggg WWWWW WWWWW WWW -02 s2 c ggggg ggggg ggg WWWWW WWWWW WWW -’az λPλs′λo[P(s′)(o)]{ts′ = t∗} d ggggg ggggg ggg WWWWW WWWWW WWW Mal/aHs λxλs′λoλw[cold′(s′)(o)(w)(x)] 01 x1 a λw′[cont.inf(o∗)(s3)(λoλw[cold′(s2)(o)(w)(x1)]) ∧ w′ =ws3]{ts2 = t∗} b λoλw[cold′(s2)(o)(w)(x1)]{ts2 = t∗} c λs′λoλw[cold′(s′)(o)(w)(x1)]{ts′ = t∗} d λs′λoλw[cold′(s′)(o)(w)(x1)] 35The temporal sux -’az is not well understood. In instances such as this, it indicates that the proposition it appears in holds at utterance time, but did not hold in the past. 141 5.5. Modelling Nuuchahnulth evidentials Provided that the time of s2 is the time of the utterance situation, the denotation of a is the set of worlds w′ such that g(s3) is a part of w′, and o* (the speaker in the utterance situation) can make a contingent inference from s3 (the perceived situation) to the centred proposition that a contextually salient individual x1 is cold in the situation s2. 5.5.2 Perceptually grounded evidentials The auditory evidential na/a:t is unspecied as to whether the prejacent is in the perspective of the origo, and species only that it is auditorily grounded. The visual inferential -Kuk indicates both that the prejacent is visually grounded for the origo and that the prejacent is not in the origo's perspective. 5.5.2.1 Auditory na/a:t The auditory evidential na/a:t has the semantics in (229). It is a function from one situationless proposition of the type 〈s,〈o,〈s,t〉〉〉 to another unsitutated proposition of the same type. The situation argument of the verb is not saturated until later in the derivation, when it can be restricted to the past, for example, allowing a reading where the origo heard a situation in the past. The only temporal restriction associated with na/a:t is between the perceived situation and the event situation. As with the other evidentials, na/a:t is indexed, and it introduces an indexed situation variable whose value is determined by context. The origo is restricted to being the speaker of some context, though the mechanism for this is not worked out here. (229) na/aat1 ⇒ λPλsλoλw[groundingaud(s)(o)(s1)(P) ∧ speaker(o)(P(s)) ∧ ts1 = ts ∧ w=ws] As we will see in Ÿ6.1.3, the speaker(o)(P(s)) relation should be true 1) whenever the origo is the speaker, 2) when na/a:t is in a quotative mood clause, 3) when the origo is the speaker of an embedded utterance context. In other words, speaker(o)(P(s)) is true whenever there was an utterance context in which o asserted P(s). The sentence in (230a) contains the auditory evidential na/a:t. Its translation is given in (230b). The verb ?aaq?aaqa `be hollering' (I set aside its internal structure here) rst has its individual argument saturated with the translation of Ann, a. This yields an uncentered proposition d which then becomes the argument of na/a:t. This yields another situationless proposition c , whose situation argument is satised by -(m)it `past'. Finally, the origo argument is saturated by the indicativemood sux -/IS. The translation of the entire sentence is a , which states that 1) o∗ heard the situation s2, 2) that this situation supports the proposition that Ann was hollering in the situation s1, 3) that s2 and s1 occurred at the same time, and 4) that s2 occurred before the utterance time. 142 5.5. Modelling Nuuchahnulth evidentials (230) a. Scenario: Kay was walking down the road, and when she passed by Ann's house, she heard her hollering inside. When she got home, she told Bill this. ?aaq?aaqamit/iS ?a:q-(y)a[RLL]-(m)it-/i;S yell.atreppast3.ind na/aat na/a:t aud.evid Ann Ann Ann Ànn was hollering.' b. a ggggg ggggg ggg WWWWW WWWWW WWW -/i;S o∗ b ggggg ggggg ggg WWWWW WWWWW WWW -(m)it2 s2{ts2 < t∗} c ggggg ggggg ggg WWWWW WWWWW WWW na/a:t1 λPλs′λo′λw′[groundingaud(s′)(o′)(s1)(P) ∧ speaker(o′) ∧ ts1 = ts′ ∧ w′ =ws′ ] d ggggg ggggg ggg WWWWW WWWWW WWW ?a:q-(y)a[RLL] λxλsλoλw[hollering′(s)(o)(w)(x)] Ann a a λw′[groundingaud(s2)(o∗)(s1)(λsλoλw[hollering′(s)(o)(w)(a)]) ∧ speaker(o∗) ∧ ts2 = ts1 ∧ w′ =ws2]{ts2 < t∗} b λo′λw′[groundingaud(s2)(o′)(s1)(λsλoλw[hollering′(s)(o)(w)(a)]) ∧ speaker(o′) ∧ ts2 = ts1 ∧ w′ =ws2]{ts2 < t∗} c λs′λo′λw′[groundingaud(s′)(o′)(s1)(λsλoλw[hollering′(s)(o)(w)(a)]) ∧ speaker(o′) ∧ ts′ = ts1 ∧ w′ =ws′] d λsλoλw[hollering′(s)(o)(w)(a)] The semantics I have presented here runs into a problem with respect to the co occurance of evidentials. Recall fromŸ4.5.2.2 that when the auditory evidential occurs with the dubitative the two evidentials work in tandem, with na/a:t indicating the prejacent propo