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Evidentiality in Nuu-chah-nulth Waldie, Ryan James 2012

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Evidentiality in Nuu•chah•nulth by Ryan James Waldie  B.A., The University of Victoria, 2001 M.A., The University of Victoria, 2004  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in The Faculty of Graduate Studies (Linguistics)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) December 2012 c Ryan James Waldie 2012  Abstract This thesis proposes that evidentiality is made up of three factors, a relation between an origo and a situation, a relation between an origo and a proposition, and a relation between a situation and a proposition. This claim is motivated empirically by the set of evidentials in the Ahousaht dialect of Nuu•chah•nulth, a Wakashan language spoken on the west coast of Vancouver Island in Canada. This language has seven evidentials, each of which encodes at least one of the three factors of evidentiality. The thesis begins by laying out the claim (Chapter 1), giving a brief outline of the grammar of Nuu•chah•nulth (Chapter 2), and going over the relevant literature on evidentiality (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 looks at the morphological and syntactic classi cation of the evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth. I show that evidentials occur in several di erent syntactic domains, and are thus able to co•occur. I present a model•theoretic semantic analysis of my proposal in Chapter 5. The notions of origo, situation and proposition are formalized, as are the relations that hold between them. I also give the semantics of each of the evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth. Chapter 6 addresses the question of how the origo is determined. I argue that three mechanisms are involved: 1) matrix•clause mood su xes specify the origo; 2) embedding verbs lexically encode that their subject argument is the origo of their complement clause; and 3) in the absence of either of the previous two mechanisms, the origo is contextually determined. In Chapter 7 I show that the evidential component of meaning in a sentence does not have the same status as the propositional component of meaning. I propose a modi cation to the model given in Chapter 5 to account for this. Chapter 8 looks at the interactions between the semantics of temporal su xes and evidentials. I show that the semantics of sensory evidentials requires them to precede tense, while the semantics of other evidentials do not impose any ordering with respect to tense. Finally, in Chapter 9 I summarize the claims of the thesis and turn to some unresolved questions.  ii  Table of Contents Abstract  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ii  Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  iii  List of Tables  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  x  List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  xii  List of Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  xiii  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  xv  1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.1 Evidential morphemes in Nuu•chah•nulth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1 Origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2 Perspectival status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3 Manner of support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.4 Perceptual grounding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Issues addressed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.1 The morpho•syntactic distribution of evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth . 1.3.2 Model theoretic analysis of the factors of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . 1.3.3 The origo: how it gets its value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.4 Levels of meaning: di erences between the evidential relations and the prejacent proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.5 The perceived situation: interactions between evidentials and temporal morphemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Methodology and data presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Organization of the dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 1 2 5 6 8 8 10 10 11 12 13  14 14 15  2 Some basic facts about Nuu•chah•nulth . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 A user's guide to Nuu•chah•nulth . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Phonemic inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 Consonant inventory: 38 consonants . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Vowel inventory: ve vowels and a length contrast 2.3 Morpho•phonology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Morpho•phonology of stems . . . . . . . . . . . .  17 17 17 17 18 19 19  Acknowledgements  . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  14  iii  Table of Contents  2.4  2.5  2.6  2.7  2.8  2.3.1.1 At the left edge: templatic reduplication and vowel length . . 2.3.1.2 At the right edge: glottalization and lenition . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Morpho•phonology of a xes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2.1 Ghost consonants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2.2 Variable•length vowels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Morpheme order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 The core/periphery distinction and the morpheme template . . . . . . 2.4.2 Second•position e ects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2.1 Peripheral su xes are always in second position . . . . . . . 2.4.2.2 Core su xes are sometimes in second position . . . . . . . . Peripheral su xes in more detail: their status as in ectional morphemes . . . 2.5.1 Mode su xes code modal force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2 Valence and tense su xes: a mixed bunch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2.1 Valency extending: causative -’Ap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2.2 The temporal modi er -’az `now' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2.3 Valency shifting: -’at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2.4 Nominal valency: possessive -uk and -/Ak . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2.5 The past marker -(m)it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.3 Mood su xes are obligatory and de ne paradigmatic contrasts . . . . 2.5.4 Discourse su xes: another mixed bunch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Word order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.1 Canonical word order is VSO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.2 Modi ers precede heads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6.3 Question words (wh•words) are sentence•initial . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clause•typing in more detail: the mood su xes again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.1 Moods that occur only in matrix clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.2 One mood occurs in both matrix and dependent clauses: the absolutive mood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.2.1 The absolutive mood in matrix clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.2.2 The absolutive mood in complement clauses . . . . . . . . . 2.7.2.3 The absolutive mood in adjunct clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.3 Moods that occur only in dependent clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.3.1 The subordinate mood introduces clauses . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.3.2 The purposive mood introduces rationale clauses . . . . . . . 2.7.3.3 The conditional mood introduces if•clauses . . . . . . . . . . 2.7.3.4 The relative and inde nite moods introduce relative clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3 Towards a theory of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Ways of classifying evidentials . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Morphological classi cations of evidentials . . . 3.3 Syntactic classi cations of evidentials . . . . . . 3.4 Semantic classi cations of evidentials . . . . . . 3.4.1 Modal approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1.1 Kratzer's (1981) modal analysis  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  19 21 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 28 29 30 31 31 31 32 33 33 35 36 36 37 38 38 38 40 40 41 42 43 43 44 44 44 45 46 46 46 48 50 50 50 iv  Table of Contents 3.4.1.2 Modal accounts of evidentials . . . . . . . 3.4.2 Perceptual approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3 Origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Pragmatic classi cations of evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.1 Evidentials contribute presuppositions . . . . . . . . 3.5.2 Evidentials contribute sincerity conditions . . . . . . 3.5.3 Evidentials contribute not•at•issue content . . . . . . 3.6 The way forward to an analysis of Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  4 Cataloguing the inventory of Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The origo hypothesis: evidentiality consists of the relations between an origo, a proposition and a situation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 The syntax of Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Two hypotheses about the external syntax of evidentials . . . . . . . . 4.2.1.1 Hypothesis 1: A dedicated position for evidentials: Cinque 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1.2 Counter•example 1: scattered evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1.3 Counter•example 2: paradigmatic heterogeneity . . . . . . . 4.2.1.4 Hypothesis 2: multiple positions for evidentials: Blain and Déchaine (2006, 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials are associated with CP, IP, or VP . . . . . 4.3 Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the CP domain: in ectional mood su xes . . . 4.3.1 Quotative -wA/iS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Indirect interrogative -HAj . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 Dubitative -qAJa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.4 Paradigmatic blocking: CP•domain evidentials do not co•occur . . . . 4.4 Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the IP domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.1 Inferential -matak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2 Past inferential -ckvI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.3 IP•domain evidentials can co•occur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.4 IP•domain and CP•domain evidentials can co•occur . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the VP domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.1 Visual inferential: the derivational su x -Kuk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.1.1 VP•domain -Kuk `visual inference' is related to KuK[RSS] `re• semble' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.1.2 Co•occurence of VP•domain -Kuk `visual inference' with other evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.2 Auditory evidential: the particle na/a:t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.2.1 VP•domain na/a:t `auditory evidence' is related to na/a: `hear' 4.5.2.2 Co•occurence of VP•domain na/a:t `auditory evidence' with other evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.1 Comparing evidentials to predicates that introduce propositions . . . 4.6.2 Comparing evidentials to verbs of saying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51 54 54 56 57 57 57 57 59 59 62 62 62 63 63 63 64 65 66 66 68 69 71 72 73 75 76 77 77 79 80 82 84 84 86 86 88  v  Table of Contents  4.7  4.8 4.9  4.10  4.6.3 Comparing evidentials to predicates that introduce experiencers: verbs of perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6.4 Comparing evidentials to predicates that introduce properties: sensory su xes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7.1 Not all mood su xes are evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7.1.1 Indicative mood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7.1.2 Mirative -JA?aS is not an evidential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7.1.3 Indirect dependent moods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7.2 Evidentials from di erent syntactic domains have di erent semantic properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary of combinatorial restrictions on Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials . . . . . Variation in evidentials in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.1 Dubitative in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.2 Quotative in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.3 Indirect interrogative in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.4 Mirative in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.5 -matak in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.6 -ckvI in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.7 -Kuk in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9.8 na/a:t in Southern Wakashan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5 Modelling evidentiality: a truth conditional analysis . . . . . . . . 5.1 The ingredients of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 Ingredient 1: situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.2 Ingredient 2: origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.3 Ingredient 3: centred proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.4 The types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Relating the origo to the prejacent proposition: perspectival status 5.3 How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support 5.3.1 Perception of a directly supporting situation by the origo . . 5.3.2 Inference of the prejacent proposition by the origo . . . . . 5.3.2.1 The logic of inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2.2 Necessary and contingent inference . . . . . . . . 5.3.2.3 Modelling contingent inference . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3 Reports transmitted to the origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3.1 Reports are independent of the origo's perspective 5.3.3.2 Modelling reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.4 A general support relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 How the origo perceives a situation: perceptual grounding . . . . . 5.5 Modelling Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.1 Inferential evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.1.1 Inferential -matak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.1.2 Past inferential -ckvI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  91 92 93 93 94 95 97 100 101 102 103 104 106 106 108 109 110 111 111 112 112 113 115 117 120 121 124 126 127 128 128 130 131 131 132 133 133 135 135 136 139 vi  Table of Contents 5.5.1.3 Dubitative -qAJa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.2 Perceptually grounded evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.2.1 Auditory na/a:t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.2.2 Visual inferential -Kuk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.3 Reportative evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.3.1 Quotative -wA/iS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5.3.2 Indirect interrogative -HAj . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 Consequences of the analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.1 Evidential relations are speci ed independently . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.2 The e ect of the real•world context on the experiential relations . . . 5.6.3 The perspective in the meaning of evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.3.1 Propositions believed to be true are incompatible with infer• entials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6.3.2 Propositions which the origo is agnostic about are compatible with inferentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.7 A note on contingent inference and modality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 Translations of Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials: a rst pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Determining the origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.1 The origo and similar concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.1.1 Ways an origo can be speci ed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.2 Combination of evidentiality and origo assignment . . . . . . . . 6.1.3 The origo associated with na/a:t must be a speaker . . . . . . . . 6.2 Origos determined by mood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 Speaker as origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1.1 The speaker as origo in indicative mood clauses . . . . 6.2.1.2 The speaker as origo in dubitative mood clauses . . . . 6.2.1.3 The speaker as origo in quotative mood clauses . . . . . 6.2.2 Addressee as origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2.1 Interrogative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2.2 Indirect interrogative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.3 Non•speech•act participant as origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.3.1 Quotative mood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.3.2 Indirect interrogative mood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Origos speci ed by overt arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Context dependent origo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.1 Arguments for context•dependent origos in adjunct clauses . . . 6.4.1.1 The speaker can always be the origo in an adjunct clause 6.4.1.2 Non•speaker origos in adjunct clauses . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.1.3 Ambiguous origos in adjunct clauses . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.1.4 Summary of the argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.2 Modelling origo assignment in adjunct clauses . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Embedded speech contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5.1 Verbs of saying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  140 142 142 144 145 146 146 147 147 148 149 149 152 155 156 158 158 158 158 162 163 164 164 165 168 171 172 173 177 178 178 181 183 190 191 191 193 195 196 196 197 197 vii  Table of Contents 6.5.2 Reportative evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 6.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 7 Beyond a truth•conditional analysis of evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Enriching a truth•conditional analysis with not•at•issue meaning . . . . . . . 7.1.1 The distinction between at•issue and not•at•issue meaning . . . . . 7.1.1.1 The logic of calculating at•issue and not•at•issue content . . 7.1.2 Testing for not•at•issue meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.2.1 The Family of Sentences test shows that Nuu•chah•nulth evi• dentials project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.2.2 Not•at•issue meaning does not address the question under discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Argument 1: Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.1 Negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.2 Interrogative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.3 Antecedent of conditional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Argument 2: Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials do not address the question under discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Revised translations of Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 Consequences of the not•at•issue analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5.1 Evidentials can share a prejacent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5.2 Evidentials need not share a prejacent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  201 201 202 202 205 206 206 207 207 211 215 218 221 223 223 226  8 Evidentials and temporal morphemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 8.1 On the interaction of evidentiality with tense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 8.2 Three assumptions and their predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 8.2.1 Assumption 1: morpheme order re ects semantic composition . . . . 228 8.2.2 Assumption 2: tense saturates a situation argument . . . . . . . . . . . 229 8.2.3 Assumption 3: tense orders utterance, event, and perceived situations 231 8.2.3.1 Temporal ordering of the utterance situation and the event situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 8.2.3.2 Temporal ordering of the utterance situation and the perceived situation (perceived situation = event situation) . . . . . . . . 233 8.2.3.3 Temporal ordering of the utterance situation and the perceived situation (perceived situation event situation) . . . . . . . 234 8.2.4 Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 8.3 Sensory evidentials occur below tense morphemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 8.3.1 Sensory evidentials precede tense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 8.3.2 Non•sensory evidentials can be found preceding or following tense . . 237 8.3.2.1 Non•sensory evidentials which precede tense . . . . . . . . . 238 8.3.2.2 Non•sensory evidentials which follow tense . . . . . . . . . . 240 8.3.3 The particle na/a:t is introduced before the tense su x: excorporation 242 8.4 Tense and perceived situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 8.4.1 Sensory evidentials provide a perceived situation . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 8.4.2 Non•sensory evidentials do not introduce a perceived situation argument 247 viii  Table of Contents 8.4.2.1 Mode su xes are non•sensory evidentials which precede tense 8.4.2.2 Mood su xes are non•sensory evidentials which follow tense 8.5 Evidentials that include a temporal restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 My claims and some unresolved questions . . . 9.2 Are evidentials assertive? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 What is special about sensory evidentials? . . . 9.3.1 Gitksan n'akw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.2 Lillooet lákw7a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4 How are evidentials related to modals? . . . . . 9.4.1 Fixed modal base: English has evidentials 9.4.2 Temporal and aspectual properties . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  247 250 251 253 254 254 256 257 257 258 259 259 260  Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261  ix  List of Tables 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7  The evidential morphemes of Nuu•chah•nulth . . . . . . . . . . . The factors of evidentiality encoded in Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials Translations of Nuu•chah•nulth evidential mood morphemes . . . Translations of Nuu•chah•nulth evidential mode su xes . . . . . . Translation of Nuu•chah•nulth evidential derivational su x . . . . Translation of Nuu•chah•nulth evidential particle . . . . . . . . . . Cast of characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  3 6 12 12 13 13 15  2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8  A sample of su xal verbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mode su xes in Nuu•chah•nulth . . . . . . . . . Ordering of pre•mood su xes . . . . . . . . . . Third•person forms of moods in Ahousaht . . . Discourse su xes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Matrix clause moods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Verbs taking /in•absolutive complement clauses Dependent clause moods . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  27 29 31 34 36 39 42 43  3.1 Examples of attested evidential distinctions (Aikhenvald 2004) . . . . . . . . .  48  4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16 4.17 4.18  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  Syntactic levels in which Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials appear . . . . Matrix clause moods in Nuu•chah•nulth (3rd person forms) . . . . Quotative mood paradigm in Ahousaht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interrogative moods in Ahousaht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dubitative mood paradigm in Ahousaht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nouns derived with -ckvI from Little (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . Co•occurrence of VP•domain evidential -Kuk and other evidentials Co•occurrence of na/a:t `auditory evidence' with other evidentials Nuu•chah•nulth propositional attitude verbs . . . . . . . . . . . . Nuu•chah•nulth verbs of saying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Some Nuu•chah•nulth verbs of perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nuu•chah•nulth sensory su xes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Indicative mood paradigm in Ahousaht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mirative mood paradigm in Ahousaht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Evidential relations and syntactic domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Morphological classes of evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Allowable combinations of evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth . . . . . Kyuquot dubitative mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 213) . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61 65 66 67 68 75 80 84 87 89 91 92 94 96 101 101 102 103  x  List of Tables 4.19 4.20 4.21 4.22 4.23 4.24 4.25 4.26  Tseshaht dubitative mood paradigm (Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 242) Comparison of the dubitative mood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kyuquot quotative paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kyuquot indicative paradigm (Rose 1981, 223) . . . . . . . . . . . . Tseshaht quotative mood paradigm (Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 242) . Kyuquot interrogative inferential mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 219) Kyuquot evidential mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 213) . . . . . . . . Kyuquot inferential evidential mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 222) . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  103 104 104 104 105 106 107 108  5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4  The factors of evidentiality encoded in Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials . Types, variables and constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Properties of evidentiality encoded in speci c evidential morphemes Translations of Nuu•chah•nulth evidential morphemes . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . . .  112 121 148 157  6.1 Combinations of origo assignment and evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 6.2 Acceptability of na/a:t in di erent kinds of clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 6.3 Origos introduced by matrix moods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 8.1 Relative ordering of evidentials and tense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 8.2 Co•occurrence of evidentials with /aqz `future' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 9.1 Typology of evidentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 9.2 Evidentials in Gitksan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257  xi  List of Figures 1.1 Three factors of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6  2.1 Nuu•chah•nulth Consonant inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Nuu•chah•nulth vowel inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18 19  3.1 Willett's classi cation of evidence types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Structure of the sentience phrase (Speas and Tenny 2003, 334) . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Evidential domain hypothesis (Blain and Déchaine 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . .  46 49 49  4.1 Three factors of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Evidential domain hypothesis (Blain and Déchaine 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . .  60 64  5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6  Three factors of evidentiality Three factors of evidentiality Three factors of evidentiality Manners of support . . . . . Three factors of evidentiality Perceptual grounding . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  112 121 124 125 133 134  9.1 Three factors of evidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254  xii  List of Abbreviations abs abs.emph aud.evid aug ben bpg caus cnd comp cond cond.inf cont def dim dir.imp dm dub dur evid evid foc grad hab imp imp.fut inal.poss ind ind.evid ind.imp inder.inter indf indf.inf infII inter irr kin  absolutive mood emphatic absolutive mood auditory evidential augmentative benefactive best possible grounds (Quechua) causative common noun determiner complementizer conditional mood conditional inferential mood continuous aspect de nite diminutive direct imperfective (Tibetan) discourse marker dubitative mood durative aspect evidential (Gitksan) evidential mood (Kyuquot) focus graduative aspect habitual imperative mood future imperative mood inalienable possessive indicative mood indirect evidential indirect imperfective (Tibetan) indirect interrogative mood inde nite relative mood inde nite inferential relative mood inferential II mood (Tseshaht) interrogative mood irrealis kinship su x xiii  List of Figures loc mir mom neg nx.pst obj pass past past.evid pl poss pnd pro prt purp q quot refl rel rel rep shift sim sg stem sub subj super trans vis.evid  locative stem mirative momentaneous aspect negative non•experienced past (Quechua) object marker on quanti ers passive past tense past evidential plural possessive proper noun determiner (Gitksan) pronoun particle purposive mood interrogative (Tibetan) quotative mood re exive stem relative mood relative stem repetetive aspect perspective shift simultaneous singular stem•building su x subordinate mood subject marker in content interrogatives superlative transitive stem visual evidential  xiv  Acknowledgements This dissertation would not be what it is without the help of many people. I thank my consultants, Mary Jane Dick, Katie Fraser and Sarah Webster. Being linguists themselves, Mary Jane and Katie are a fellow linguist's ideal consultants they would volunteer exactly the sorts of examples that I needed, sometimes before I knew I needed them. Thanks also to my supervisory committee. My research supervisor Rose•Marie Déchaine always asked the right sorts of questions (tough ones). Hotze Rullmann read and gave feedback on more drafts than either of us would like to admit. Henry Davis had a keen interest in keeping me active in eldwork, and without him I would not have been able to do the necessary eldwork. My examining committee also has my thanks. My external examiner Christopher Potts gave me considerable constructive feedback. Michael Rochemont and Ori Simchen, my university examiners, got me thinking of things in a di erent way, and I appreciate their feedback as well. Edna Dharmaratne and Shaine Meghji also have my thanks. They helped me out countless times with my problems, whether administrative or not. Many thanks to my fellow students, past and present. I bene ted a lot from discussions with the students in my cohort, and with many others (both on the p•side and the s•side). I also bene ted from discussions in the pragmatics research group. Thanks also to my friends and family for their support, encouragement, and discussions of things that weren't linguistics. Thanks especially to Linda.  xv  The botanists plants are not the owers of the hedgerow Martin Heidegger  xvi  Chapter 1  Introduction 1.1  Introduction This thesis is about evidentiality , and more speci cally about the semantics of evi•  dentiality. To get a sense of what evidentiality does, imagine I say the sentence in (1) below. (1)  There's supposed to be a craft fair at Echo Centre this weekend. In uttering a sentence like (1), I express a proposition namely that there is a craft fair  at Echo Centre this weekend but I also provide information about how I came to know the proposition. For example, I could say (1) if someone told me about it. Now consider the sentence in (2). I could not say this in scenario where I was told about it. I could say it if I saw people setting up a room at Echo Centre in the usual way for a craft fair. (2)  There must be a craft fair at Echo Centre this weekend. Sentences (1) and (2) express the same proposition, namely that there is going to be a  craft fair at Echo Centre this weekend. But (1) and (2) di er in the evidentiality they express: di erent kinds of evidence form the basis of the speaker's knowledge of the proposition. Part of this evidence is a situation that was experienced or observed by the speaker: in (1) I experienced someone telling me about the craft fair, and in (2) I observed a room being set up in a certain way. Thus, evidentiality involves a relation between a knowledge•holder, a situation, and a proposition. In this thesis I will refer to the knowledge holder as the origo (Garrett 2001), the situation as the perceived situation, and the proposition as the prejacent proposition (von Fintel and Gillies 2010). More speci cally, I will show that evidentiality indicates three things: (3)  a. whether the origo believes the prejacent proposition is true b. how the origo perceived the perceived situation c. how the perceived situation supports the prejacent proposition These three factors of the evidentiality of a proposition can be speci ed in di erent  ways. To see how this works, consider more carefully how individual sentences are used in the following two scenarios: 1  1.1. Introduction (4)  Scenario A: Linda told me there was going to be a craft fair this weekend. Scenario B: I saw people setting up a room for a craft fair.  Consider the sentences in (5). While sentence (5a) is only compatible with Scenario A, sentence (5b) is only compatible with Scenario B. In sentences like (5a) and (5b), how the perceived situation supports the prejacent proposition is fully speci ed. But this is not always so. For example, sentence (5c) is compatible with both Scenario A and Scenario B. This shows that, in some sentences, evidentiality is only partially speci ed. (5)  a. There's supposed to be a craft fair at Echo Centre this weekend. Scenario A:  Scenario B: ×  b. There must be a craft fair at Echo Centre this weekend. Scenario A: × Scenario B: c. I guess there's a craft fair at Echo Centre this weekend. Scenario A:  Scenario B:  So, while some sentences specify evidentiality partially, others specify it more fully. But there is yet another possibility: evidentiality might not be speci ed overtly at all, as in (6) below. (6)  There's a craft fair at Echo Centre this weekend.  The sentence in (6) is compatible with a wide range of scenarios, including the ones listed in (7) below. In each of these scenarios the evidentiality is di erent a spoken report, a written report, and being a participant but nothing in the sentence indicates what it is. (7)  Scenario C: One of the people setting up the room told me it was for a craft fair. Scenario D: I read about it in the newspaper. Scenario E: I've been involved in the planning of it. More broadly, evidentiality is present in every clause in every language. This is because,  in every clause in every language, someone is expressing a thought about their experiential relation to the world. The question I address in this dissertation is, how do languages encode evidentiality? To answer this question I examine the morphemes which encode di erent factors of evidentiality in a single language, Nuu•chah•nulth, a member of the southern branch of the Wakashan language family. In particular, I focus on the Ahousaht dialect, a member of the central dialect group, spoken primarily on Flores Island, o the west coast of Vancouver Island.  1.1.1  Evidential morphemes in Nuu•chah•nulth Nuu•chah•nulth has three properties which make it a good language to look at with  a view to answering the question of how languages encode evidentiality; the rst two were pointed out by Jacobsen (1986). First, it has a large number of evidential morphemes which encode a variety of evidential relations. Second, the evidential morphemes do not form a single 2  1.1. Introduction morphological paradigm. They are instead distributed across a number of morpho•syntactic domains. By looking at the commonalities and di erences in the meaning of evidentials across these domains we can more clearly see what their core properties are. Third, some of the evidential morphemes can occur in embedded clauses. Thus, we can also look at the commonalities and di erences in their meaning across di erent syntactic contexts. I focus on seven evidential morphemes in the Ahousaht dialect of Nuu•chah•nulth, which are listed in Table 1.1. I discuss their morphosyntactic and semantic properties more -wA/iS -HAj -qAJa -matak -ckvI -Kuk na/a:t  `quotative' `indirect interrogative' `dubitative' `inference' `past inference' `visual inference' `auditory evidence'  Table 1.1: The evidential morphemes of Nuu•chah•nulth fully in chapter 4, but I introduce them brie y here. The speaker of (8) below is beginning to tell a story she heard from someone else, the story of a mother turning into a bluejay. Anyone hearing this sentence will know that the speaker is not describing anything she witnessed personally. It contains the reportative evidential -wA/iS which indicates that she heard about it from someone else. (8)  mamuukvitwa/iS /um/iiqsu/i mamu:k-(m)it-wa;/iS /um/i-i;q-su-/i; work•past•3.quot mother•kin•kin•def `It is said the mother was working.' Evidentiality can also be speci ed in questions, as it is in (9). Here the speaker wants  to know how the girls got sick, but she is not asking the girls themselves, she is asking someone else, Bill. She assumes that he doesn't know the answer for sure, since he wasn't there with the girls, but he has some idea because he spoke to them earlier. Thus, the speaker assumes the addressee isn't certain and heard about it from someone else. The interrogative reportative evidential -HAj encodes this, and is essentially the interrogative form of the quotative -wA/iS. (9)  /a/aqumitHaj HaatHaakvaz/i qviisaHimitii/al tatipiz Ha:tHa:kva;z-/i; qvis-’a;H-(m)it-(y)i:-/al tatipi(z) /aqa-(m)it-Ha;j do.thus•purp•past•3.indf•pl get.sick.pl what•past•3.indir.inter girl.pl•def `How did the girls say they got sick?' The speaker in (10) below is watching Ken's boat coming in, and she can see that it is 3  1.1. Introduction sitting high in the water. From this fact, and her general knowledge of the world, she infers that he didn't catch any sh. Nevertheless, she is not certain that he didn't get any. The inferential evidential -qAJa indicates that the speaker is not sure, and is inferring that he didn't get any sh. Notice that in both (8) above and (10) below, the speaker is agnostic about the proposition they are presenting. Where these two examples di er is in how the speaker obtained the proposition: in one case from a report, and in the other case from an inference. This is one of four Nuu•chah•nulth su xes which indicate that someone made an inference, but isn't certain of the truth of their conclusion. (10)  /iiHYuuj/iS Ken hiitaPiq, wiKaaHsqaJa /i:H-Yu:j-/i;S Ken hita-[LS]-Piq wik-’a;Hs-qa;Ja big•sticking.out•3.ind Ken loc•grad•in.passing neg•in.vessel•3.dub `Ken's boat is sitting high in the water, I guess he didn't get any ( sh).' The speaker of (11) thinks the food has been on the barbecue for long enough, but  she has not cut into it to see whether it's cooked all the way through or not. The inferential evidential -matak indicates that she is uncertain of the truth, and is inferring from the amount of time that has passed that the food is cooked. Thus, -matak and -qAJa `dubitative' have identical meanings with respect to evidentiality. They are not always interchangeable, however, because -qAJa has additional semantics related to the fact that it is a mood su x, which -matak lacks. (11)  si?ajizmataKaz si?a-Si(z)-matak-’az-0 cooked•mom•ind.evid•now•3.abs `Maybe it's cooked now.' In (12) below, the speaker was not aware that she was hungry until she noticed how  much she had eaten. The use of the su x -ckvI indicates that her being hungry was in the past, and that she was not aware of it at the time, and she inferred it after the fact. Like -qAJa `dubitative' and -matak `inference', it encodes the origo's agnostic state and inference, but -ckvI di ers by also encoding a temporal relationship between what was observed and what was inferred: the observation has to have occured after whatever was inferred. (12)  haWiiqzckvisiS /ayaqzsa haWi:qz-ckvi;-si;S /aya-’aqz-sa hungry•past.evid•1sg.ind many•in.body•1sg.abs `I must have been hungry; I ate lots.' The fourth su x that indicates the origo's agnostic state and inference is -Kuk, which  appears in (13) below. The speaker here is not certain that Ken is drunk, but she can see him staggering, which leads her to conclude that he is. What -Kuk encodes is the origo's agnostic 4  1.2. Proposal state and inference based on something that was observed visually. The other su xes encoding the origo's agnostic state and inference did not specify whether the inference was made on something that was seen, or heard, or tasted, or smelled, or felt. Those other su xes could be used to indicate an inference based on a sound, while -Kuk cannot. It can only be used when the inference is based on something that was seen. (13)  naqjuuKuk/iS Ken, Tii/uk Ken Ti:/uk naqju:-Kuk-/i;S intoxicated•vis.evid•3.ind Ken staggering `Ken looks drunk, he's staggering.' Finally, in (14) below the speaker is inside and has the curtains closed, so she can't see  whether it's raining or not, but she can hear it hitting the windows. The particle na/a:t is used to indicate that the speaker perceived something using her auditory sense, and not her visual sense. This su x di ers from all the other evidential morphemes described so far in that it does not encode the origo's agnostic state. The report and inference su xes can only be used when someone is agnostic about the truth of the proposition. All that na/a:t encodes is that the speaker used something she heard, and did not see, when she obtained the proposition. It is compatible with reports and inferences, with certainty and the origo's agnostic state. The example in (14) involves an inference from the sound to its cause, and the speaker is certain that her conclusion is true (regardless of whether we think she is justi ed in her certainty). (14)  na/aat Mizaa/iS Miz-(y)a;-/i;S na/a:t rain•cont•3.ind aud.evid `It's raining.'  1.2  Proposal Conceptually, we can think of evidentiality as a set of relations between a person (the  origo), the prejacent proposition, and the world, or rather, the small part of the world that the origo perceives. This is illustrated in Figure 9.1. Between the origo and the proposition we have a perspectival status, which indicates whether the origo is agnostic or not about the truth of the prejacent proposition. Between the origo and the world we have perceptual grounding, which indicates which sense the origo is using in relation to the prejacent proposition. Strictly speaking, this is a relation between the origo and a part of the world, a situation (Barwise and Perry 1981, Kratzer 1989). We do not perceive the entire world, we only perceive a small part of it. The nal relation, between the perceived situation and the prejacent proposition, represents the manner in which the situation supports the proposition.  5  1.2. Proposal origo •U  ×× ×× × perspectival × status ××× × ×× × Ó×× prejacent • o  UU UU UU perceptual UU grounding UU UU UU '  • perceived manner of situation support Figure 1.1: Three factors of evidentiality  proposition  There are three separate factors of evidentiality which are highlighted by the descrip• tions given above for the evidential morphemes in Nuu•chah•nulth. Table 1.2 summarizes which of the three factors are encoded in each of the evidential morphemes. Note that most of the evidentials lack encoding of at least one factor. Keep in mind that this only summarizes the evidentiality encoded by these morphemes many of them encode other kinds of meaning as well.  -wA/iS -HAj -qAJa -matak -ckvI -Kuk na/a:t  `quotative' `indirect interrogative' `dubitative' `inference' `past inference' `visual inference' `auditory evidence'  Perspectival status agnostic agnostic agnostic agnostic agnostic agnostic  Perceptual grounding  visual auditory  Manner of support report report inference inference inference inference  Table 1.2: The factors of evidentiality encoded in Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials  1.2.1  Origo Garrett (2001) introduced the notion of the origo in his discussion of Tibetan eviden•  tials to handle phenomena like that exempli ed in (15) and (16) below. Being hungry is an unobservable state, in the sense that only the person who is hungry can observe the hunger directly. In Tibetan, the direct imperfective morpheme •`dug can be used with such a predicate in a declarative matrix clause only if the speaker is the subject, as shown in (15). The addressee or a non•speech•act participant cannot be the subject here.  6  1.2. Proposal (15)  Tibetan (Tibeto•burman) declarative  (adapted from Garrett 2001, 227)  a. nga grod.khog ltogs•gi•`dug I stomach hunger•dir.imp `I'm hungry.' b. *khyed.rang grod.khog ltogs•gi•`dug stomach hunger•dir.imp you c. *kho grod.khog ltogs•gi•`dug he stomach hunger•dir.imp However, in an interrogative matrix clause, •`dug can only be used if the addressee is the subject. The speaker or a non•speech•act participant cannot be the subject here. (16)  Tibetan (Tibeto•burman) interrogative  (adapted from Garrett 2001, 228)  a. *nga grod.khog ltogs•gi•`dug•gas I stomach hunger•dir.imp•q b. khyed.rang grod.khog ltogs•gi•`dug•gas stomach hunger•dir.imp•q you `Are you hungry?' c. *kho grod.khog ltogs•gi•`dug•gas he stomach hunger•dir.imp•q Garrett's claim is that •`dug refers to the the origo, regardless of what kind of clause it occurs in. The origo is the person whose point of view is being represented in the clause, and the person whose point of view is represented in a declarative is the speaker, while in an interrogative it is the addressee. Nuu•chah•nulth provides further evidence for Garrett's approach, because while Ti• betan evidentials can neither 1) be embedded under propositional attitude verbs nor 2) occur in adjunct clauses (Garrett 2001, ch. 5), there are some evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth which can. Nuu•chah•nulth shows that the origo associated with a given clause is determined in speci c ways. Propositional attitude verbs assign the attitude holder, usually their subject, as the origo of their complement clause, while the origo in an adjunct clause is some contextually determined individual. In (17) below, the visual inferential -Kuk is embedded under a proposi• tional attitude verb. Here it is not the speaker who had seen lights on at Ken's house, it is the attitude holder Linda. (17)  Ken] /uqlaamit/iS Linda [walyuuKukq Ken /uqla:p-(m)it-/i;S Linda walyu:-Kuk-q think•past•3.ind Linda home•vis.evid•3.sub Ken `Linda thought Ken was home.' 7  1.2. Proposal In (18) below, -Kuk occurs in an adjunct clause, namely a reason clause. Again, here it is not the speaker who saw bread on the counter, it is Linda. (18)  TaNa saapniqiil] nujHak/iS Linda [/in ?aCikKuKazuk nujHakv-/i;S Linda /in ?aCik-Kuk-’az-uk-0 TaNa sapni:-q-(j)i:l[L] proud•3.ind Linda comp know.how•vis.evid•now•poss•3.abs child bread•stem•make `Linda is proud because it appears her daughter knows how to make bread now.'  1.2.2  Perspectival status The origo has a perspective a point of view on the world (Kölbel 2002). There are  things one origo believes are true that another origo does not. Whether or not a proposition is in an origo's perspective is the perspectival status of a proposition for an origo. Perspectival status is related to certainty, in that if a proposition is in an origo's perspective, that origo is certain the proposition is true. This is the distinction that is often made between direct and indirect evidentials (Willett 1988). If Kay sees Ken drive up, get out of his car, and come up the steps and enter the house, she is considered to have direct evidence for Ken arriving. But if she was in the backyard and heard the car drive up, the car door shut, and the front door shut, and inferred that Ken had arrived, she is considered to have indirect evidence for it. Most of the evidential morphemes in Nuu•chah•nulth specify a perspectival status, namely that the prejacent proposition is not in the origo's perspective (see Table 1.2 above). Thus, most would be classi ed as indirect evidentials. No evidential morpheme in Nuu•chah• nulth speci es that the prejacent proposition is in the origo's perspective: there are no direct evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth.  1.2.3  Manner of support Returning to the scenario from Ÿ1.2.4 where I saw the woodpecker on the apple tree,  what I perceived was a particular situation. That perceived situation is one which supports the proposition conveyed by (19). Witnessing is one manner of support through which an origo is connected to a proposition. (19)  There's a woodpecker on the apple tree. Another manner of support is a contingent inference. Contingent inference is a  kind of default reasoning; that is, reasoning with defeasible or contingent rules, rules that are usually valid, but which may not hold in any particular instance. When I rst heard the woodpecker on the apple tree, I was not certain that that was what it was. What I heard was a particular sound, and from that sound I inferred that it was a woodpecker. But this reasoning is not based solely on logic it was based on my experience of the world. I had seen woodpeckers on the tree in the past, and knew that the noise I heard was most likely an animal pecking at 8  1.2. Proposal wood. My past experience licenses the inference from hearing that sound to there probably being a woodpecker on the apple tree. However, I could have been mistaken: a di erent kind of bird could have been doing the pecking, and there is a also a wooden fence, and a wooden deck in my backyard that could have been on the receiving end of it. I made a contingent inference from the sound to the proposition. Westmoreland (1998) uses a similar concept, deduction , to describe the conditions of use of some evidentials, including the English epistemic modal must. A deduction occurs when the prejacent proposition is not known, but rather is inferred. Westmoreland also argues that deduction needs to allow the use of contingent rules of inference, but it is not clear whether it is limited to inference using contingent rules or can include other processes. For example, he suggests in section 3.3 that it should also include hunches. On the other hand, I take contingent inference to be limited to inferences where contingent rules are used. Modelling default reasoning is also the aim of Kratzer's (1981) use of an ordering source in her analysis of epistemic modal müssen in German, and which she extended to English must in her 1991 article on modality. This ordering source ranks possible worlds according to whether the things that happen in them are what normally happens. In other words, worlds are ranked according to whether some contextually determined contingent rules of inference hold. For Kratzer then, an epistemic modal indicates an inference to a conclusion which may not be true in the actual world. Kratzer's account does not account for the fact that the felicitous use of must requires that the prejacent situation cannot have been directly perceived. While some evidential morphemes encode a contingent inference manner of support, others encode that of a report. Rather than witnessing something myself, I can have someone else tell me about it. The other person may have witnessed it personally, or they could have been told about it as well. In Nuu•chah•nulth a speaker can signify that they are passing along something that they were told by using the su x -wA/iS `quotative'. Reportatives evidentials which encode a report manner of support occur in many languages, including Quechua and Lillooet. Faller (2002) analyzes the reportative in Quechua as a speech act modi er, changing the speech act type from assertion to presenting, and changing the sincerity conditions from requiring that the speaker believe the prejacent to requiring that someone else asserted the prejacent. Matthewson et al. (2007) analyze the reportative in Lillooet as a modal, where the modal base is a contextually determined set of reported propositions. Evidential morphemes in Nuu•chah•nulth which encode a manner of support, either inference or report, also happen to encode the origo's belief state. This does not have to be the case. For example, Faller (2006) gives evidence to show that the reportative •si in Quechua encodes manner of support, but not any particular perspectival status (namely, •si can be used when the origo knows the prejacent is false). 9  1.3. Issues addressed  1.2.4  Perceptual grounding Propositions are about the world, and people are connected to the world by way of  their senses. For example, I know that there is a woodpecker on the apple tree in my backyard because I can see it. I can also hear it, which is how I know to look out the window. There are two perceptual grounding relations between me and the proposition that there is a woodpecker on the apple tree: it is visually grounded, and it is auditorily grounded. Some of the evidential morphemes in Nuu•chah•nulth, namely -Kuk `visual inference' and na/a:t `auditory evidence', indicate the perceptual grounding between the origo and the perceived situation. The others do not specify any particular perceptual grounding.  1.3  Issues addressed I analyze evidentials as encoding one or more of the three factors of evidentiality  perspectival status, manner of support, and perceptual grounding. Perspectival status is a relation between the origo and the prejacent proposition. It indicates whether the origo is agnostic about the truth of it. Manner of support is a relation between the perceived situation and the prejacent proposition. It indicates how the perceived situation supports the prejacent proposition whether it is the situation in which the prejacent holds, or it is an utterance situation in which someone asserted the prejacent, or it gives the origo the means to infer the prejacent proposition. Perceptual grounding is a relation between the origo and the perceived situation. It indicates what sense the origo used in perceiving the situation whether he or she perceived it visually, auditorily, etc. The presence of any one of the three factors is su cient to identify a morpheme as an evidential, but it is also possible for an evidential to encode more than one factor. For example, reportatives universally encode the manner of support, and in some languages, as in Nuu•chah•nulth, they also encode the perspectival status. This accounts for the contrast between languages where a reportative can be used felicitously when the origo believes the prejacent to be false (e.g., Quechua (Faller 2002)) and those where a reportative cannot be felicitously used in such a case (e.g., Lillooet (Matthewson et al. 2007) and Nuu•chah•nulth). Both -si in Quechua and -wA/iS in Nuu•chah•nulth indicate there was an utterance situation perceived by the origo in which someone asserted the prejacent proposition, but while -si can be used when the origo knows the prejacent is false (20a), -wA/iS can only be used when the origo does not know whether the prejacent is true or false (20b).  10  1.3. Issues addressed (20)  a. Pay•kuna•s ñoqa•man•qa qulqi•ta muntu•ntin•pi saqiy•wa•n, mana•má riki (s)he•pl•si I•illa•top money•acc lot•incl•loc leave•1o•3 not•surp right riku•sqa•yki ni un sol•ta centavo•ta•pis saqi•sha•wa•n•chu see•pp•2 not one Sol•acc cent•acc•add leave•prog•1o•3•neg `They left me a lot of money, but, as you have seen, they didn't leave me one sol, not one cent.'  (Faller 2002, 191)  b. /acyuumitwa/iS jakup/i /acyu:-(m)it-wa;/iS jakup-/i; sh•past•3.quot man•def `It is said that a man was shing.' I show that factoring out evidentials in this way receives support from: (i) their syntactic distribution; (ii) their semantic contribution; (iii) their sensitivity to perspectival status; (iv) their ability to co•occur with each other; and (v) their interaction with tense. I consider each of these issues in turn.  1.3.1  The morpho•syntactic distribution of evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth This factorial analysis of evidentiality predicts that a combination of morphemes can be  used to indicate the evidentiality of a particular scenario. For example, in Nuu•chah•nulth, the auditory evidential na/a:t codes perceptual grounding, and can combine with the reportative, which codes manner of support. An illustrative example is given in (21). Here the quotative -wA/iS indicates that the Kay inferred that Ken and his brother left, and the auditory evidential na/a:t adds to this, indicating that Kay's inference is based on something she heard. (21)  Scenario: Kay lives next door to Ken and his brother, and she hears them getting ready to leave for work every morning. After they've left, it gets quiet. One morning she was talking to Bill, and she noticed it got quiet, so she said this to him. wikpi/azqaJa/al/iS na/aat na/a:t wik-piz-’az-qa;Ja-/al-/i;S neg•in.house.mom•now•3.dub•pl•3.ind aud.evid `It sounds like they all left.' The occurrence of multiple evidentials in a single clause, as illustrated in (21) above, is  only possible because the evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth do not belong to a single morpholog• ical paradigm. Rather, Nuu•chah•nulth evidential morphemes are recruited from four distinct morpho•syntactic classes: (i) mood su xes; (ii) mode su xes; (iii) derivational su xes (essen• tially bound verbs); (iv) particles. This multiplicity and heterogeneity is compatible with Blain and Déchaine's (2006) Evidential Domain Hypothesis, which claims that evidentials can occur in a range of di erent syntactic domains. This is discussed further in Chapter 4. 11  1.3. Issues addressed  1.3.2  Model theoretic analysis of the factors of evidentiality In Chapter 5 I present an analysis of the factorization of evidentiality in model the•  oretic semantics. There I give the translations of the Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials, which are summarized brie y below. I begin with the evidential mood su xes, whose translations are given in Table 1.3. Each mood su x is a portmanteau morpheme, marking both clause type and subject agreement (see Ÿ2.5.3 for further details). The dubitative mood -qAJa indicates that the origo can make an inference from the perceived situation to the prejacent proposition. The quotative mood -wA/iS indicates that the origo perceived an utterance situation in which someone asserted the prejacent proposition. The indirect interrogative mood -HAj yields a question which assumes that the answer will be in the quotative mood. The evidential moods also specify who the origo is, with -qAJa and -wA/iS indicating it is the speaker at the time of the utterance situation, while -HAj indicates it is the addressee at the time of his or her response. Evidential  Gloss  Translation  -qa;Ja1  `dubitative'  λpλw[cont.inf(o∗)(s1 )(p) ∧ w = ws1 ]  -wa;/iS1  `quotative'  λpλw[report(o∗)(s1 )(p) ∧ w = ws1 ]  -Ha;j1  `indirect interrogative'  λp[Int(λw[report(o∗∗)(s1 )(p) ∧ w = ws1 ])]  Table 1.3: Translations of Nuu•chah•nulth evidential mood morphemes Mode su xes are in ectional, and include a number of morphemes with modal mean• ings. The two evidential mode su xes have the translations given in Table 1.4. The general inferential -matak indicates that the origo can make an inference from the perceived situation to the prejacent proposition. The past inferential -ckvI also indicates that the origo can make an inference from the perceived situation to the prejacent proposition, but in addition speci es that the prejacent proposition held before the perceived situation occurred. Evidential  Gloss  Translation  -matak1  `inference'  λPλsλoλw[cont.inf(o)(s1 )(P(s)) ∧ w = ws1 ]  -ckvi;1  `past inference'  λPλsλoλw[cont.inf(o)(s1 )(w)(P(s)) ∧ ts < ts1 ∧ w = ws1 ]  Table 1.4: Translations of Nuu•chah•nulth evidential mode su xes The derivation su x -Kuk `visual inference' has the translation in Table 1.5. It indicates that the origo saw the perceived situation, and can make an inference from that situation to the prejacent proposition.  12  1.3. Issues addressed Evidential  Gloss  Translation  -Kuk1  `visual inference'  λPλsλoλw[groundingvis (s)(o)(s1 )(P) ∧ cont.inf(o)(s)(P(s1 )) ∧ ts1 = ts ∧ w = ws ]  Table 1.5: Translation of Nuu•chah•nulth evidential derivational su x Particles are free•standing words which cannot host any a xes. The particle na/a:t `auditory evidence' has the translation in Table 1.6. It indicates that the origo has heard the perceived situation, but does not specify how that situation supports the prejacent proposition. Evidential  Gloss  Translation  na/a:t1  `auditory evidence'  λPλsλoλw[groundingaud (s)(o)(s1 )(P) ∧ speaker(o)(P(s1 )) ∧ ts1 = ts ∧ w = ws ]  Table 1.6: Translation of Nuu•chah•nulth evidential particle  1.3.3  The origo: how it gets its value The origo has functions beyond those involved in evidentiality. It is in e ect a centred  world, in the terms of Lewis (1979), or rather, a centered situation (Stephenson 2010), which Lewis uses to handle the distinction between de dicto and de se attitudes. This is illustrated by the following. Ken hears a car alarm going o , and says I hope someone is stealing his car. What he doesn't realize is that it's his car. He has a de dicto belief about someone who happens to be him as the owner of the car whose alarm is going o . He certainly doesn't mean I hope someone is stealing my car, which would be a de se belief about himself. The origo is thus necessary for the evaluation of the truth of a proposition. Having a belief about oneself as a centring individual is di erent from having a belief about oneself objectively. The origo is also conceptually related to the judge argument of predicates of personal taste (Lasersohn 2005, Stephenson 2007b), which Stephenson (2007b,a) extends to epistemic modals. As I explain in Chapter 5, an origo is a sentient individual paired with a particular situation; a judge is simply that individual. Onions taste horrible is evaluated with respect to an origo, and can be true or false depending on who the origo is. The origo there is the speaker, but it does not have to be, as in Guy Maddin thinks onions taste horrible. Here the truth of the sentence depends on evaluating onions taste horrible with respect to Guy Maddin. In Chapter 6 I discuss the properties of the origo, focussing on how it is determined, and how the readings of evidential morphemes change in di erent environments. As with judges and centred worlds, an origo variable can be bound. For example, in complement clauses 13  1.4. Methodology and data presentation the origo is the subject of the embedding verb.  1.3.4  Levels of meaning: di erences between the evidential relations and the prejacent proposition It is generally assumed that evidential relations do not have the same pragmatic e ect as  the prejacent proposition (Aikhenvald 2004). They instead behave as if they consist of not•at• issue content, projecting through various operators, such as negation Simons et al. (2010). Not• at•issue content is a di erent level of meaning from standard truth•conditional, or at•issue content. While evidentials contribute not•at•issue content, their prejacent propositions are at• issue content. We can therefore compare the semantic contribution of evidential morphemes with that of their prejacent propositions. I look at this in Chapter 7, where I give tests showing that Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials are not•at•issue. I also present a modi cation of the analysis of Chapter 5 which is based on Potts's (2005) treatment of conventional implicatures.  1.3.5  The perceived situation: interactions between evidentials and temporal morphemes A perceived situation is a small part of the world, and it is limited in time. In Chapter 8  I look at the temporal aspect of situations and their interaction with evidential morphemes. Di erent evidential morphemes interact di erently with temporal morphemes, depending on how the evidential morpheme makes use of the perceived situation in its semantics. One evidential morpheme, -ckvI `past inference' also explicitly encodes a temporal relationship between the perceived situation and the time of the prejacent proposition. I argue that sensory evidentials those which encode perceptual grounding must be composed with the predicate before tense because they add a restriction on the situation argument of the predicate. In addition, the situation argument of the function resulting from the composition of a sensory evidential with the predicate is not the event situation, but the perceived situation. This limits the ways in which temporal morphemes and sensory evidentials can interact.  1.4  Methodology and data presentation Most of the data on Nuu•chah•nulth in this dissertation comes from original eldwork  I conducted with two speakers of the Ahousaht dialect. Both elders are women, and Nuu• chah•nulth is their rst language. Together with these consultants I built Nuu•chah•nulth sentences and a scenario where they could be used felicitously (see Matthewson (2004) on eldwork practices for semantics). A scenario is like a small model of the world, containing all  14  1.5. Organization of the dissertation the relevant pieces of information. When I present data, I give both a scenario and a sentence, as in (22) below. I have also standardized the names of people across all scenarios, to help the reader keep track of who is who. In every example the speaker is named Kay, and the addressee is Bill. If Kay has a report, it comes from Linda. Kay Bill Linda Ken/Ann John  speaker addressee embedded speaker/attitude holder main event participant other event participant  Table 1.7: Cast of characters Thus, in (22) below, Linda rst told Kay something like Mizaa/iS `It's raining', and then Kay is telling Bill the sentence given, namely Mizaawa/iS `It's raining (reportedly)'. (22)  Scenario: Kay and Bill were inside, where there were no windows, when she had a phone call from Linda who told her that it was raining out. Afterwards, Kay said this to Bill. Mizaawa/iS Miz-(y)a;-wa;/iS rain•cont•3.quot `It's raining (reportedly).'  The subject of a sentence will be called Ken, or Ann if the context requires a female. When an additional person is required by the scenario, I call him John.  1.5  Organization of the dissertation The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents some  basic properties of Nuu•chah•nulth grammar which will aid the reader in following the examples. Chapter 3 discusses other accounts of evidentials in the literature. Chapter 4 presents the evidential morphemes in Nuu•chah•nulth in descriptive terms, and also contrasts them with similar kinds of morphemes, highlighting the criterial properties of evidentials. Chapter 5 lays out a theory of the semantics of evidential morphemes, and gives the semantics of those in Nuu•chah•nulth. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 each look at how the theory handles certain interactions between evidentiality and other aspects of grammar. In Chapter 6 I look at how the origo is determined in di erent clauses. In Chapter 7 I compare the prejacent proposition and the evidential relations, arguing that the evidential relations are not•at•issue, while the prejacent proposition is at•issue. In Chapter 8 I examine the interactions between evidential morphemes 15  1.5. Organization of the dissertation and temporal morphemes. Finally, I discuss a number of unresolved issues and other areas for further research in Chapter 9.  16  Chapter 2  Some basic facts about Nuu•chah•nulth 2.1  A user's guide to Nuu•chah•nulth This chapter serves two purposes. First, to acquaint the reader with the basic facts of  Nuu•chah•nulth grammar in order to facilitate understanding of the data presented throughout this dissertation. Second, to acquaint the reader with properties of the grammar which will be used to make certain arguments about the nature of the origo (Chapter 6), and about tense (Chapter 8). If any readers wish a broader discussion of Nuu•chah•nulth grammar, I refer them to Swadesh (1933), Rose (1981), Nakayama (1997, 2001) and Davidson (2002). Of these authors, only Nakayama is writing speci cally about the Ahousaht dialect, though much of what the others say holds for Ahousaht as well. Many of the morphological processes are also discussed and analyzed by Stonham (1999) and Kim (2003). A number of works on various sub•parts of the grammar of Nuu•chah•nulth have also been published; see Davis and Wojdak (2007) for a summary. There is a multi•dialect word•list (Nuuchahnulth Tribal Council 1991) as well as a dictionary of the Tseshaht dialect (Stonham 2005).  2.2  Phonemic inventory Nuu•chah•nulth has a relatively large consonant inventory, with a total count of 34  consonants. The vowel inventory is more modest: there are ve vowels, with a length contrast. I present each inventory in turn.  2.2.1  Consonant inventory: 38 consonants The consonant inventory of Nuu•chah•nulth is given in Figure 2.1. In addition to a  plain series of stops /p, t, k, kv, q, qv, ?, //, fricatives /s, S, l, x, xv, X, Xv, H, h/, a ricates /c, j, z/, nasals /m, n/, and glides /y, w/, Nuu•chah•nulth also has a corresponding glottalized series. This includes glottalized stops P, T, K, Kv, glottalized fricatives /C, J, Z/, glottalized nasals /M, N/, and glottalized glides /Y, W/. 17  2.2. Phonemic inventory  a ricates nasals glides  plain glottalized plain glottalized plain glottalized  m M  y Y  glottal  l z Z  kv Kv xv  pharyngeal  lateral  palatal S j J  k K x  rounded  fricatives  t T s c C n N  uvular unrounded  p P  rounded  plain glottalized  unrounded  stops  alveolar  labial  velar  q  qv  ?  /  X  Xv  H  h  w W  Figure 2.1: Nuu•chah•nulth Consonant inventory Glottalized resonants namely the glottalized nasals /M, N/ and glides /Y, W/ are pho• netically realized as a sequence of a glottal stop and a resonant (Carlson et al. 2001, Kim 2003). Note that there is a rounding contrast in the velar and uvular series. The velars/k/ and /x/ contrast with the rounded velars /kv/ and /xv/. Similarly, the uvulars /q/ and /X/ contrast with the rounded uvulars /qv/ and /Xv/. Uvular fricatives are a locus of dialect variation. In Ahousaht (which is the focus of this thesis), unrounded and rounded uvular fricatives namely /X/ and /Xv/ occur in a number of roots and su xes. This contrasts with the Kyuquot dialect, where uvular fricatives are almost entirely absent (Rose 1981, 13).  2.2.2  Vowel inventory: ve vowels and a length contrast Nuu•chah•nulth has a basic ve•vowel inventory, with two high vowels /i/ and /u/ two  mid vowels /e/ and /o/, and one low vowel /a/. In addition, there is phonemic length contrast, so each vowel has a contrasting long and short form. This yields a total inventory of 10 vowels, as shown in Figure 2.2.2. In the orthography, short vowels are written as a single vowel (i, u, e o, a), while long vowels are written as doubled vowels (ii, uu, ee, oo, aa). In addition to phonemic vowel length, vowel length is also a ected by the morphology: some morphological contexts require that the vowel of the target form be short, while other contexts require that the vowel of the target form be long. This gives rise to variable length 18  2.3. Morpho•phonology Short vowels i  u e  o a  Long vowels i:  u: e:  o: a:  Figure 2.2: Nuu•chah•nulth vowel inventory vowels; these are discussed below in Ÿ2.3.2.2. Although Nuu•chah•nulth has a ve•vowel system, the three outermost vowels namely /i/, /u/ and /a/ of the short series, and /i:/, /u:/ and /a:/ of the long series have a privileged status. These outermost vowels are the most common, and can occur in any word. On the other hand, the mid vowels namely /e/ and /o/ of the short series, and /e:/ and /o:/ of the long series are much more restricted in their distribution. For example, the mid vowels occur solely in borrowings (e.g. //e:pinis/ `apple'), interjections and expressive particles (e.g., /ze:ko/ `thank you'). There is also a phonological process in vocatives that changes /i/i:/ to [e:] and /u/u:/ to [o:] (Stonham 1999).  2.3  Morpho•phonology The surface form of stems and a xes is determined by a number of morpho•phonological  processes. Here I brie y survey the processes that a ect the realization of stems (Ÿ2.3.1) and a xes (Ÿ2.3.2).  2.3.1  Morpho•phonology of stems Morphological processes that alter the form of the stem divide into two classes ac•  cording to whether they target the left edge or right edge of the stem. I consider each in turn. 2.3.1.1  At the left edge: templatic reduplication and vowel length  Two processes target the left edge of the stem: templatic reduplication, and templatic vowel•length. They may occur independently of each other, in combination with each other, or in combination with a su x (Kim 2003). An example of templatic vowel•length is given in (23), where graduative aspect is marked by a long short vowel template, i.e. [. . . VV. . . V. . . ]. Observe that in (18a), the vowel melody of `kill' is short long [. . . V. . . VV. . . ]. In contrast, the presence of graduative aspect in (18b) 19  2.3. Morpho•phonology is associated with a long short vowel template: [. . . VV. . . V. . . ]. In the gloss this long short template is represented as [LS]. (23)  a. qaHsaap qaH-sa;p die•mom.caus `kill' b. qaaHsap qaH-sa;p-[LS] die•mom.caus•grad `beat up' Templatically conditioned vowel•length is a pervasive feature of Nuu•chah•nulth su xal  morphology, and many su xes are distinguished from each other only by the vowel template that they condition. For example there are two forms of the su x -(j)il, according to the vowel template it is associated with. -(j)il, `blame' subcategorizes for a long long vowel template with CV reduplication (24a). But -(j)il, `be named' is associated only with CV reduplication (24b). As before, the templatic requirements of the su x are represented in square brackets: [RLL] in (24a), [R] in (24b). The [R] notation indicates that this su x also conditions reduplicative pre xation. Illustrative examples showing how these su xes combine with speci c stems are provided in (25). (24)  a. [RED . . . VV][. . . VV. . . ]•(j)il `blame' b. [RED ]•(j)il `be named'  (25)  a. /uu/uukvil /u-(j)il[RLL] trans•blame `blame someone' b. /u/ukvil /u-(j)il[R] trans•be.named `be called somthing'  (25a) is a context where reduplicative pre xation and templatic vowel length co•occur. But it is also possible for reduplicative pre xation to occur by itself, as in (25b). Nuu•chah•nulth reduplicants most often take the form of a pre xal [CV] syllable, where reduplication copies the rst CV of the base and attaches it to the left edge. This is illustrated in (25a) below, where the locative su x /-Hta/ `at feet' triggers reduplicative CV pre xation. 20  2.3. Morpho•phonology (26)  MaMalHta Mal-Hta[R] cold•at.feet `have cold feet' A smaller number of su xes trigger reduplicative pre xation of CVC*, where C* copies  whatever number of coda consonants are present in the base. If the base lacks a coda consonant, then an epenthetic consonant is inserted. One such su x is progressive aspect /-(y)a;/, which is associated with a long long vowel template and a reduplicative CVC* pre x, (27). Illustrative examples are given in (28). If the base has multiple consonants in the coda, as with /Ti:ck/ `clatter', then they are all copied in the reduplicative pre x, (28a). But if the base has no coda, then the reduplicative pre x contains an epenthetic consonant in the coda, either /z/ (28b), /l/ (28c) or /c/ (28d). (27)  [RED CVVC]•[BASE ...VV... ]•(y)a;  (28)  a. TiickTiicka Ti:ck-(y)a[RLL] clatter•rep `be thundering' b. suuzsuuya CV stem with /z/ epenthesis su-(y)a;[RLL] take•rep `be taking' CV stem with /l/ epenthesis c. JiilJiiya Ji-(y)a[RLL] carve•rep `be carving' d. zaaczaaya CV stem with /c/ epenthesis za-(y)a[RLL] chop•repetitive `chopping (wood etc.)'  2.3.1.2  At the right edge: glottalization and lenition  Two morpho•phonological processes target the right edge of the stem: glottalization and lenition. They are triggered by the addition of particular su xes, and they a ect only the nal consonant of the stem. Glottalization is discussed rst, then lenition. Glottalization, or hardening, is a lexically speci ed process, where a glottalizing su x such as /-’az/ `now' changes a stem• nal obstruent into its corresponding ejective (see Kim 2003). The process is somewhat more complicated than this one•line description suggests, 21  2.3. Morpho•phonology however. There are three cases to consider. First, when a glottalizing su x attaches to a stem ending in a /k/, such as /katak/ `very happy' in (29a), the result is the ejective /K/. One quirk to note here is that a uvular stop becomes a pharyngeal stop [?] as the result of glottalization, as illustrated in (29b). (29)  a. kataKaz katak-’az very.happy•now `be very happy (now)' b. Pusakva?azsiS Pus-(/)a;kv-(q)aq[SS]-’az-si;S tired•dur•aug•now•1sg.ind `I'm very tired now.' Second, when a glottalizing su x attaches to a stem that ends in a vowel, then the stem  vowel may be deleted, leaving only the vowel of the su x (Stonham 1999, 85). This remaining vowel is long if it is in the second syllable (30a), and short if it is in the third or later syllable (30b). This rule generally holds, though there are many cases where a glottal stop is inserted between the two morphemes, as in (30c). (30)  a. /anaaz /ana-’az only•now `only (now)' b. Kaminuzckvaz Kaminu(z)-ckvi;-’az full•past.evid•now `It must have gotten lled (now).' c. waa/az wa:-’az say•now `say (now).' Finally, when a stem ends in a fricative, the e ect of the glottalizing su x depends on  whether it is a peripheral or core su x. (On the peripheral/core distinction, see Ÿ2.4 below). In the context of a peripheral su x such as /-’az/ `now', a glottal stop is inserted, (31a). In the context of a core su x such as /-’aqz/ `in.body', coronal fricatives change to a glottalized palatal glide [Y], while rounded fricatives change to a glottalized labio•velar glide [W]. This is illustrated in (31b) with the stem /hiS-/ `all'.  22  2.3. Morpho•phonology (31)  a. hiinuml/az hi:numl-’az be.born•now `be born (now)' b. hiYaqz hiS-’aqz all•in.body `eat all (of something)' In addition to glottalization, the other process that targets the right•edge of stems is  lenition (or softening), whereby stem• nal fricatives become glides (Kim 2003). The su xes that trigger lenition form a relatively small set. For example, in the context of the locative su x /-‘i?/ `in the house', vowel• nal stems lose their nal vowel (32a), while stems that end in a stop remain unchanged (32b). But if the nal consonant of the stem is an alveolar fricative, then it changes to a palatal glide [y], as in (32c).1 (32)  a. hitiil hita-‘i;l loc•in.house `in the house' b. wikil wik-‘i;l neg•in.house `Ken isn't home.' c. Haayil Ha:l-‘i;l there•in.house `there (in the house).'  2.3.2  Morpho•phonology of a xes There are some su xes in Nuu•chah•nulth whose form is dependent on some property  of the stem. These su xes contain either ghost consonants consonants whose surface real• ization is dependent on the stem or variable•length vowels vowels whose surface realization is dependent on the stem. 1  In the Ahousaht dialect, lenition seems to be limited to a ecting /s/ and /l/ (Kim 2003, 94 96). This contrasts with the Tseshaht dialect, where post•alveolar fricatives also become [y], and rounded fricatives become [w] (Stonham 1999, 71)  23  2.3. Morpho•phonology 2.3.2.1  Ghost consonants  Some su xes in Nuu•chah•nulth begin with a consonant only when they attach to a stem ending in a vowel or nasal (Swadesh 1933). I call these ghost consonants (Waldie 2008), and I indicate them in the underlying forms by enclosing them in brackets. For example, the su x /-(w)a[RLL]/ `speak' surfaces with an initial [w] when it attaches to a stem that ends in a vowel, as in (33a). But when the same su x attaches to a stem that ends in a non•nasal consonant, as in (33b), then the initial [w] of the su x is not retained. (33)  a. /aa/aapHiwa /a:pHi;-(w)a[RLL] friendly•speak `warm friendly greeting' b. quuquu/aca qu:/ac-(w)a[RLL] person•speak `speaking one's own language (First Nations)' There is a single su x• nal ghost consonant in Nuu•chah•nulth, /z/, which occurs only  in momentaneous su xes, such as /-Si(z)/ `momentaneous' and /-pi(z)/ `in the house (momenta• neous)'. It does not follow the same rules as the su x•initial ghost consonants. The only time it does not appear in the surface form is when it is followed directly by a glottalizing su x, such as -’at `shift', in which case a glottal stop appears in its place. In (34a), the su x /-Si(z)/ is word• nal, and so it surfaces with [z]. But in (34b), the same su x is now followed by the glottalizing su x /-’at/ `now': in this context the ghost consonant of /-Si(z)/ is replaced by the glottal stop [/]. (As an aside, observe that in (34b), the non•ghost [z] of the su x /-’az/ `now' does not delete, but rather is glottalized by the following glottalizing mood su x /-’i;/.) (34)  a. waHSiz waH-Si(z) abandon•mom `throw away' b. waHSi/aZi waH-Si(z)-’az-’i; abandon•mom•now•2sg.imp `throw it away'  2.3.2.2  Variable•length vowels  Recall that there are three kinds of underlying vowel in Nuu•chah•nulth: short, long and variable length. Underlying short vowels are indicated by the vowel symbol alone /i u a/ and 24  2.4. Morpheme order always surface as short, unless they are a ected by a vowel lengthening process. Underlying long vowels are indicated by the vowel symbol followed by two dots /i: u: a:/ and always surface as long, unless they are a ected by a vowel shortening process. Variable•length vowels, indicated by the vowel symbol followed by a single dot /i; u; a;/, surface as long if they are within the rst two syllables of a word, and short if they occur in the third syllable or later. One su x that contains a variable•length vowel is the third•person indicative mood /-/i;S/. When this su x occurs in the second syllable, as in (35a) below, the vowel surfaces as long. When it occurs in a later syllable, as in (35b), the vowel surfaces as short. (35)  a. wik/iiS wik-/i;S neg•3.ind `He/she/it isn't . . . ' b. /uuHCi/iS /u-HCi;[R]-/i;S trans•cook.over. re•3.ind `He/she is cooking . . . '  2.4  Morpheme order Nuu•chah•nulth verbs typically consist of multiple morphemes, and these morphemes  are ordered in a particular way. The verb stem is the leftmost element of the verbal complex: it consists of a base, which may sometimes surface with a reduplicative pre x, (36). (See discussion above in (2.3.1.1) for how reduplication pre xation is introduced.) (36)  [VERB.STEM (red) BASEROOT ]  The verb•stem is followed by a succession of su xes. These su xes are traditionally analyzed as falling into two classes: the core su xes versus the peripheral su xes (Nakayama 2001). Swadesh (1933, 1938) calls these two sets of su xes formative and incremental ; these labels are also used in the grammatical description of Sapir and Swadesh (1939).  2.4.1  The core/periphery distinction and the morpheme template Core su xes occur closer to the verb stem, and include derivational and aspectual  su xes. Peripheral su xes occur further away from the verb stem, and include mode, valence and tense, mood, and an assortment of discourse•level su xes. The template in (37) summarizes the relative ordering of the core and peripheral su xes. (37)  [Verb.Stem][•Derivational•Aspectual] •Mode•Valence/Tense•Mood•Discourse  Core Suffixes  Peripheral Suffixes 25  2.4. Morpheme order  2.4.2  Second•position e ects Another di erence between core and peripheral su xes relates to their interaction  with second•position e ects (Nakayama 1997, 2001, Davidson 2002, Werle 2007). Peripheral su xes are invariably in the second position of the clause; as such they behave like second position clitics. In contrast, core su xes are ordinary su xes, in that they usually attach to the stem they are associated with. 2.4.2.1  Peripheral su xes are always in second position  This distributional di erence between core and peripheral su xes is illustrated in (38) below. In (38a) the core su x -qInu(z) `at.head.mom' and the peripheral su xes -(m)it `past' and -/IS `3.ind' (underlined) all occur on the verb, which is the rst word of the clause. In (38b) the core su x remains with the verb when it is not the rst word in the clause, while the peripheral su xes remain attached to the rst word, which is hiikvalSiz `almost' in this case. (38)  a. hisqiinuzit/iS John /uukvil Ken John /u-(j)il[L] Ken his-qi;nu(z)-(m)it-/i;S hit.with.object•on.head.mom•past•3.ind John trans•do.to Ken `John hit Ken in the head.' Ken b. hiikvalSizit/iS /uukvil John hisqiinuz /u-(j)il[L] Ken hi:kval-Si(z)-(m)it-/i;S John his-qi;nu(z) nearly•mom•past•3.ind John hit.with.object•on.head.mom trans•do.to Ken `John almost hit Ken in the head.'  The example in (38b) also illustrates the typical sentence•initial position of adverbial modi ers. I discuss this further in Ÿ2.6 below. Another positional di erence between core/periphery su xes arises in clauses that contain a series of predicates (Nakayama 1997, 2001). In such multi•predicate clauses, each predicate hosts distinct core su xes, but the peripheral su xes occur only on the rst (i.e. leftmost) predicate. This is illustrated in (39), which contains three predicates, from left to right: the focus predicate //uH/, the causative predicate /hiSsiik/ `make all', and the activity predicate /siqiil/ `cook'. The peripheral su xes /-(m)it/ `past' and /-/i;S/ `3sg indicative' attach to the leftmost predicate, namely the focus predicate //uH/. The other two predicates host one core su x each: the causative predicate /hiSsiik/ `make all' hosts the core su x /-si:k/ `complete'; the activity predicate /siqiil/ `cook' hosts the core su xal verb /-(j)i:l[L]/ `make'. (39)  /uHit/iS Kay hiSsiik siqiil sapnii/i /uH-(m)it-/i;S Kay hiS-si:k siq-(j)i:l[L] sapni:-/i; foc•past•3.ind Kay all•complete cooked•make bread•def `It was Kay who cooked all the bread.' 26  2.4. Morpheme order 2.4.2.2  Core su xes are sometimes in second position  Although it is true that peripheral su xes always have the distribution of 2nd position clitics, the distribution of core su xes is more complex. While core su xes usually attach directly to the stem they modify, they do sometimes exhibit second position e ects (Nakayama 1997b, Werle 2007). For example, su xal verbs (Nakayama 1993, Waldie 2004, Wojdak 2008, Stonham 2009) which are usually classi ed as core derivational su xes are hosted either by their argument or by a semantically empty stem //u-/. A representative list of su xal verbs is given in Table 2.1. -’i;c -(j)i:l[L] -na;k -’a;p -(j)il[RSS]  `ingest' `make' `have' `buy' `be named'  Table 2.1: A sample of su xal verbs An example of a su xal verb is given in (40). In (40a), the su xal verb /-/a:p/ `buy' is hosted by the dummy stem //u-/, yielding [/u/aap] as a surface form, though the following past su x /-(m)it/ causes the nal /p/ to nasalize. Observe that the nominal complement /maHTi:/ `house' occurs as an independent lexical item in (40a). This contrasts with (40b), where /maHTa/ `house' now hosts the su xal verb /-/a:p/ `buy', yielding the surface form [maHTa/aap]. (40)  a. /u/aamit/iS maHTii jakup /u-/a:p-(m)it-/i;S maHTi: jakup trans•buy•past•3.ind house man `A man bought a house.'  (Wojdak 2008, 29)  b. maHTa/aamit/iS jakup maHTa-/a:p-(m)it-/i;S jakup house•buy•past•3.ind man `A man bought a house.'  (Wojdak 2008, 29)  Another way in which su xal verbs participate in second position e ects relates to their interaction with modi ers. When they combine with an argument that is itself modifer, the host for the su xal verb is the leftmost element of the nominal phrase. Since a modi er precedes its head (see Ÿ2.6), this means the verbal su xes may sometimes be hosted by adjectives. An example is given in (41).  27  2.5. Peripheral su xes in more detail: their status as in ectional morphemes (41)  /eepinis a. ha/um/ic/iS/al /e:pinis ha/um-’i;c-/i;S-/al tasty•ingest•3.ind•pl apple `They are eating apples'  (Wojdak 2008, 3)  b. /eepiniYic/iS/al /e:pinis-’i;c-/i;S-/al apple•ingest•3.ind•pl `They are eating apples'  (Wojdak 2008, 3)  Su xal verbs have been the topic of a number of formal syntactic accounts. Davis and Sawai (2001), discussing wh•questions, argue that nouns incorporated under su xal verbs have undergone head movement, raising to V. While this works for simple NPs consisting only of an N, Wojdak (2008) shows it is problematic for complex NPs, since it is the leftmost element of the NP, regardless of its syntactic position, which is incorporated. She instead argues for PF incorporation, whereby incorporation occurs for phonological reasons su xal verbs are su xes and thus require a host. A su xal verb attaches to the leftmost element of its complement at PF. Waldie (2004) presents a similar analysis, though attributing the selection of the leftmost element to its higher semantic scope. Woo (2007a) points out that this predicts that modi ers which appear to the right of the noun will be incorporated, contrary to fact. She also notes that adjectives preceded by an adverb are problematic because the adverb, while leftmost in the NP, only has scope over the adjective. Woo (2007a,b) identi es a subset of su xal verbs which she calls prepositional predi• cates, and which she analyzes as light verbs heading a vP. These introduce nominal arguments in particular thematic roles (e.g., /uuHWal introduces instruments). Functional prepositional predicates are similar but introduce nominal arguments in particular grammatical roles (e.g., /uukvil introduces objects). Woo proposes that the vP projected by a prepositional predicate is adjoined to the vP projected by the main verb, allowing either v to raise by head•movement to MoodP. Functional prepositional predicates are treated as complements of the main verb.  2.5  Peripheral su xes in more detail: their status as in ectional morphemes Recall from above that the verb stem is followed by a series of su xes, which sub•divide  into two position classes: the core su xes, and the peripheral su xes. The relative order of these su xes as in (42). (42)  [Verb.Stem][•Derivational•Aspectual] •Mode•Valence/Tense•Mood•Discourse  Core Suffixes  Peripheral Suffixes 28  2.5. Peripheral su xes in more detail: their status as in ectional morphemes Most evidential morphemes in Nuu•chah•nulth belong to the set of peripheral su xes. For the purposes of this discussion, I focus on four classes of in ectional morphemes: those that code mode, tense, mood and discourse•level properties. In what follows, I brie y introduce each of these in ectional morpheme classes.  2.5.1  Mode su xes code modal force The term mode su x was introduced by Rose (1981) for a set of peripheral su xes  which occur in a single morphological location. As shown in (43), these su xes are the leftmost peripheral su xes in the verb complex. (43)  [Verb.Stem][•Derivational•Aspectual] •Mode•Valence/Tense•Mood•Discourse  Core Suffixes  Peripheral Suffixes  Although mode su xes are not all in complementary distribution, they all have mean• ings associated with modals sentences containing mode su xes are often translated with might , must , could , should , will and would . Table 2.2 gives the complete list of mode su xes which I have found in Ahousaht. -matak -ckvi; -/aqz -cum -’a;H  inferential past inferential future deontic irrealis  Table 2.2: Mode su xes in Nuu•chah•nulth This set of su xes is important for us because it contains two evidentials, namely -matak `inference' and -ckvI `past inference'. (These are discussed in detail in chapter 4.) The modal force of the mode su xes is most easily seen with future -/aqz `future', deontic -cum (which also appears as -cim), and the irrealis -’AH. I consider each in turn. The future -/aqz appears in (44) below, where it indicates that the proposition will be true in the future. (44)  hiikval/aqz wiiKitSizsa hi:kval-/aqz-0 wiKi:t-Si(z)-sa[LS] nearly•fut•3.abs not.exist•mom•super `Soon there will be none left.' The su x -cum `should' occurs in (45) in its alternate form -cim. Here it has deontic  force, indicating that in the speaker's opinion, it would be best if the subject saw a doctor.  29  2.5. Peripheral su xes in more detail: their status as in ectional morphemes (45)  /uuStaqyu /ucajizcim /u:Staqyu /u-caji(z)-cim-0 trans•go.to•should•3.abs doctor `He should go see the doctor.' But there are also cases where translating -cum as `should' would be wrong. While it  is the only mode su x used in deontic contexts, it also occurs in contexts which do not seem deontic at all. In both sentences in (46) -cum occurs in a main clause following a clause in the imperative. The clause containing -cum gives what the result will be if the addressee does not take the action indicated in the imperative clause. (46)  a. ha/uKvi, KaSsaapcumsiS kaakanak/itk ha/uk-’i; kakani-/a;k-/itk KaS-sa;p-cum-si;S eat•2sg.imp be.stored•caus•should•1sg.ind toy•poss•2sg.rel `Eat, or I will put your toys away.' b. kuukviis/i, haWiiqzstuzcum/ick ku:k-i;s-’i; haWi:qz-stuz-cum-/i;ck lunch•carry•2sg.imp hungry•become•should•2sg.ind `Take a lunch, you might get hungry.' As for the irrealis mode su x -’AH, it is used in counterfactual conditionals, as shown  in (47) below. Rose (1981) shows that it can be used in other irrealis environments as well in the Kyuquot dialect, but I have no data to con rm this in the Ahousaht dialect at present. (47)  /u/aaPatuKvaHitwa/iS candy na/uukitquuj candy na/u:k-(m)it-qu:j /u-’a;p-’at-uk-’a;H-(m)it-wa;/iS go.along•past•3.cond.inf trans•buy•shift•poss•irr•past•3.quot candy `If he had gone with him, he (his uncle) would have bought him candy.'  2.5.2  Valence and tense su xes: a mixed bunch Going from left•to•right in the verb complex, the next set of in ectional su xes are  the ones that occur after the mode su xes, but before the mood su xes: (48)  [Verb.Stem][•Derivational•Aspectual] •Mode•Valence/Tense•Mood•Discourse  Core Suffixes  Peripheral Suffixes  Other than the fact that they constitute a position class, this set of su xes are quite heterogeneous, and include morphemes that code valency and temporal force. I give here only those for which I have data in the Ahousaht dialect. The su xes are listed in Table 2.3 in their relative order.  30  2.5. Peripheral su xes in more detail: their status as in ectional morphemes -’a;p causative  -’az now  -’at shift  -uk/-/ak possessive  -(m)it past  Table 2.3: Ordering of pre•mood su xes In what follows, I consider each of these su xes in turn, namely causative -’a;p, the temporal modi er -’az `now', the shifter •-’at, the possessive markers -uk and -/ak, and the past marker -(m)it. 2.5.2.1  Valency extending: causative -’Ap  The causative that occurs as a peripheral su x is of interest in the context of the present discussion because it can be used to determine the relative order of su xes. It appears in (49) below. (49)  /uqHsaa/aPi Cistuup Cistuup /u-(q)Hsa;-’a;p-’i; trans•among•caus•2sg.imp string `Put the string among it.' Note that not all causatives are part of this position class. Many causatives are port•  manteau morphemes with aspect, and so occur closer to the stem, where aspectual su xes (which are part of the set of core su xes) are usually found. 2.5.2.2  The temporal modi er -’az `now'  Another su x that is part of this position class is the temporal su x -’az, which is glossed as `now'. But this gloss does not do it justice. It is generally involved in temporal sequencing, relating the time of one clause to another. It is not present tense, as it can occur with the past -(m)it. There is not much more I can say about it now, except that it needs to be studied. As with the causative, I only make use of it in determining su x ordering. 2.5.2.3  Valency shifting: -’at  As for the morpheme -’at, which following Nakayama (1997) is glossed as `shift', much has been written about it. It has been called a passive (Rose and Carlson 1984) and an inverse (Whistler 1985), while Nakayama claims it is neither (see also Muehlbauer and Waldie 2009). It can promote the object to subject, and it is obligatory when a third person acts on a rst person, thus forcing the rst•person subject agreement to appear. Most problematic for a passive analysis, -’at can also appear on intransitive verbs, giving a generic reading. In short, if the grammatical subject is not the underlying subject, this su x will probably be there. 31  2.5. Peripheral su xes in more detail: their status as in ectional morphemes While -’at belongs to the set of peripheral su xes, it is unique among them in its behaviour. Because a peripheral su x occurs on the rst predicate in a clause, it is expected that each peripheral su x can only occur once per clause, on the rst predicate. This is true for all peripheral su xes, with the single exception of -’at, which obligatorily occurs on every predicate in a clause. The reason for this is not clear, but the data is nevertheless robust. Consider the two examples below. In (50), there are two predicates in the main clause, /ayaqH `many' and hiixvatHi `angry', and both are in ected with -’at. Here, the occurrence of -’at marks a generic subject on both predicates, literally `people are many and people are angry'. Observe that the embedded clause in (50) is introduced by the complementizer /in, and that embedded predicate /ayaaKva/ap `destroyed a lot' is not in ected with -’at. The absence of -’at in the embedded clause is consistent with the fact that there the subject of the embedded clause, namely Ken, is both the underlying and surface subject of the embedded clause. (50)  taana Ken /in /ayaakva/ap hiixvatHat /ayaqH/at/iS ta:na Ken /in /aya-(/a)kva-’a;p hi:xvatHi-’at /aya-(q)H-’at-/i;S many•sim•shift•3.ind angry.with•shift Ken comp many•destroyed•caus money `There's lots of people mad at Ken for spending lots of money.'  Now consider (51), where -’at occurs on the matrix predicate kitHSiz `con rm' as well as the embedded predicates. The latter include the adverbial modi er /aanaqH `really' and the main predicate lajiz `let go'. (51)  laji/at /aanaqH/at HaaMiijizuk qvaa/atii /ooo, kitHSi/i laji(z)-’at /a:ni-(q)H-’at Ha:Mi:ji(z)-uk qva:-’at-(y)i: /ooo kitH-Si(z)-’i; oh ring•mom•2sg.imp con rm•poss thus•shift•3.indf really•sim•shift let.go•shift `Oh, phone him and con rm to see if he got let go.'  2.5.2.4  Nominal valency: possessive -uk and -/Ak  The other su x which a ects the choice of subject agreement is the possessive -uk, which has the form -/ak after vowels (Ravinski 2005). When this su x occurs, the subject agreement identi es the possessor of one of the arguments of the verb, either the underlying subject in the unmarked case (52a), or another argument (52b), in which case -’at also occurs.  32  2.5. Peripheral su xes in more detail: their status as in ectional morphemes (52)  /uupakuut a. Cacswii/aksiS /u:paku:t Ca-(c)swi:-/a;k-si;S ow•go.through•poss•1sg.ind coat `My coat got drenched through.' b. KvaYaaPatuksiS Humiis Humi:s Kva-Ya;p-’at-uk-si;S break•caus•shift•poss•1sg.ind red.cedar `He broke my sticks.'  2.5.2.5  The past marker -(m)it  Finally, the past su x -(m)it occurs immediately before the mood su x. It has a ghost consonant /m/, which surfaces when the stem ends in a sonorant (53a). When the stem ends in an obstruent, this /m/ does not surface (53b). In some instances this ghost consonant seems to coalesce with a stem• nal /t/ or /p/, yielding the corresponding nasal consonants, [n] or [m] (53c). This su x plays an important role in Chapter 8, and I discuss its semantics in more detail there. (53)  a. /acyuumitwa/iS jakup /acyu:-(m)it-wa;/iS jakup sh•past•3.quot man `It is said that a man was shing.' b. /uHit/iS Ken /uH-(m)it-/i;S Ken foc•past•3.ind Ken `It was Ken' c. kitHSi/anits Ken kitH-Si(z)-’at-(m)it-s Ken ring•mom•shift•past•1sg.abs Ken `Ken phoned me.'  2.5.3  Mood su xes are obligatory and de ne paradigmatic contrasts Each clause in Nuu•chah•nulth is marked with a single mood a x which, as a peripheral  su x, attaches to the rst predicate of the clause. In terms of position, as shown in (56), mood su xes occur after the mode and valence/tense su xes, but before discourse•conditioned su xes. (54)  [Verb.Stem][•Derivational•Aspectual] •Mode•Valence/Tense•Mood•Discourse  Core Suffixes  Peripheral Suffixes  33  2.5. Peripheral su xes in more detail: their status as in ectional morphemes Mood su xes are the only peripheral su xes that are obligatorily present, and they are in complementary distribution with each other: each clause must have a mood su x, and each clause has no more than one mood su x. These su xes mark both mood and subject agreement. Thus, each mood su x of which there are almost twenty de nes a paradigm, with the cells of each paradigm identifying the person and number of the subject. Moods have various functions in Nuu•chah•nulth, and can indicate illocutionary force (e.g., declarative vs. interrogative vs. imperative), clause•typing (e.g., matrix vs. dependent), a number of interclausal relations (e.g., conditional vs. relative vs. purposive), or evidentiality (see Ÿ2.7). In (55) there are three clauses, each of which is marked with a di erent mood, but all with a rst•person singular subject. The matrix clause is in the absolutive mood, marked by -s `1sg absolutive'. The two dependent clauses are in the conditional, marked by -qu:s `1sg conditional', and the purposive, marked by -’a:Hs `1sg purposive'. (55)  [ha/uk/aqzs [wiKaaHs [wikYuuquus ziHSiz] haWiiqz]] ziH-Si(z) wik-’a:Hs haWi:qz ha/uk-/aqz-s wikYu:-qu:s eat•fut•1sg.abs before•1sg.cond leave•mom neg•1sg.purp hungry `I will eat before I leave, that way I won't be hungry.'  A full inventory of the moods is outside the scope of this dissertation, but I give a list of those I have identi ed in Table 2.4 giving the third•person forms. Declarative  Interrogative Imperative  Dependent clause  indicative quotative* dubitative* mirative* interrogative indirect interrogative* imperative future imperative proximal imperative distal imperative absolutive purposive subordinate relative inde nite relative indirect inde nite relative* conditional indirect conditional*  -/i;S -wa;/iS -qa;Ja -Ja;?aS -H -Ha;j -’i; -’u;m -’ik -ji; -0 -/a:/it -q -/itq -(y)i: -(y)i:j -qu: -qu:j  Table 2.4: Third•person forms of moods in Ahousaht  34  2.5. Peripheral su xes in more detail: their status as in ectional morphemes A number of remarks are in order about the details of the mood paradigm: Evidentiality: Some of these moods, indicated by an asterisk, encode evidentiality, and I give their full paradigms in Ÿ4.3. Imperative mood: Imperative moods have second person subjects, and can be either singular or plural, and they also encode the person and number of the object, where third person is unmarked (transitives with third person objects take the same imperative forms that intransitives take). For the imperative moods in this table the forms given are second person singular with unmarked object. Number marking: Number is not marked in the third•person forms, meaning that the forms in Table 2.4 identify only that the subject is third•person. If a third•person argument (subject or otherwise) is plural it is marked by a separate su x -/al, which follows the mood su x and any other post•mood su xes. Morphological complexity: Many forms appear to be internally complex, with one (or more) part corresponding to the mood, and another to the person and number. Only two paradigms are fully regular in this way, the conditional and the inde nite relative; in other paradigms the regularity is broken in some forms. Nakayama (1997, 2001) gives the forms of most of the moods found in the Ahousaht dialect, and I give the forms of the evidential moods in Ÿ4.3 (see also the appendix in Wojdak 2008).  2.5.4  Discourse su xes: another mixed bunch The nal set of peripheral su xes, which are characterized by their discourse•related  functions, are those that occur at the right•most position of the sequence of peripheral su xes. This corresponds to the position labeled Discourse in (56). (56)  [Verb.Stem][•Derivational•Aspectual] •Mode•Valence/Tense•Mood•Discourse  Core Suffixes  Peripheral Suffixes  The su xes that I have identi ed in this set for Ahousaht are listed in Table 2.5. They include the endearment su x -Xa;X, the iterative su x -za `again', the su x -qva:,2 and the plural su x -/al. Perhaps unexpectedly, the third person plural su x -/al is the outermost 2  The function of this su x is not clear. More work needs to be done to x its meaning.  35  2.6. Word order member of this set. Whereas the rst• and second•person plurals are fused with mood, the third person plural can occur non•adjacent to the mood. -Xa;X `endearment'  -za `again'  -qva: `?'  -/al `plural'  Table 2.5: Discourse su xes  2.6  Word order Nuu•chah•nulth is often described as a predicate•initial language. Here I brie y review  some of the basic word order properties, looking rst at the position of the major clausal constituents (Ÿ2.6.1), of modi ers (Ÿ2.6.2), and of question words (Ÿ2.6.3).  2.6.1  Canonical word order is VSO Nuu•chan•nulth sentences are predicate•initial. And while VSO is the canonical word  order, VOS is sometimes possible. To see how this works, consider the examples in (57) . If both arguments are animate, then VSO is obligatory, (57a). However, if there is an animacy contrast, then either VSO or VOS is possible, as in (57b) and (57c), where the subject is animate (`man') and the object is inanimate (`car').3 (57)  Ken Kay a. /u/uuyuk/iS Ken Kay /u-yuk[RSL]-/i;S trans•cry.for•3.ind Ken Kay = (i) `Ken is crying for Kay.' (VSanim Oanim ) (ii) `Kay is crying for Ken.' (VOanim Sanim )  (Wojdak 2008, 85)  b. kuuWilit/iS jakup huupuuKvas ku:Wil-(m)it-/i;S jakup hu:pu:Kvas steal•past•3.ind man car `A man stole a car.' (VSanim Oinanim )  (Wojdak 2008, 84)  c. kuuWilit/iS huupuuKvas jakup ku:Wil-(m)it-/i;S hu:pu:Kvas jakup steal•past•3.ind car man `A man stole a car.' (VOinanim Sanim )  (Wojdak 2008, 85)  Another common pattern involves the presence of a light verb to introduce the object (Woo 2007b), resulting in a surface order [V S Light.Verb O]. This is illustrated in (41) with the light verb /uukvil `it was done to'. 3  One of my consultants suggests that (57c) is better with the de nite -/I on jakup `man' (jakup/i).  36  2.6. Word order (58)  John Ken /uukvil hisqinzit/iS Ken /u-(j)il[L] John his-qinz-(m)it-/i;S hit.with.object•on.head.mom•past•3.ind Ken trans•do.to John `Ken hit John in the head.' (VS Light.Verb O) Finally, note that with pronominal third person arguments, because there are no overt  third person pronouns, it is quite typical to nd sentences with only a single overt argument the object as in (59). (59)  /uuwinl/iS nuutinum /u-winl[L]-/i;S nu:tinum trans•at.neck•3.ind necklace `He or she has a necklace on.' In terms of general structural properties, Wojdak (2008) argues that there is a subject•  object asymmetry in Nuu•chah•nulth: possessor•raising is only possible from subject position (Ravinski 2005), and only subjects show agreement. Furthermore, Davis et al. (2007a) show that Nuu•chah•nulth exhibits weak crossover e ects, providing further evidence for the subject• object asymmetry. Wojdak (2008) also shows that su xal verbs attach to underlying objects, including the arguments of unaccusatives.  2.6.2  Modi ers precede heads Modi ers precede heads in Nuu•chah•nulth, though this is stricter in the nominal  domain than the verbal domain. In (60a) the adjective ZiiHik `red•haired' precedes the noun Haakvaaz `girl'. Notice that the peripheral su x -/I `de nite' occurs on the adjective; this is because the adjective is the rst word in the noun phrase. Similarly, in (60b) the adverbial hiikval `almost' precedes the verb, and the peripheral su xes -’az `now' and -s `1sg absolutive' both occur on the adverbial, since it is the rst word in the clause. (60)  a. ZiiHik/i Haakvaaz ZiH-(y)ik[L]-/i; Ha:kva;z red•hair•def girl `the red•headed girl.' b. hiikval/azs xaaSxiipSiz hi:kval-’az-s xa:Sxi:p-Si(z) nearly•now•1sg.abs bluejay•mom `I am almost a bluejay' Adverbials often appear clause•initially, in which case word order is typically AdvSVO.  Peripheral su xes will be attached to the adverbial in such cases. For example, /Yu:qva:/ `also' occurs clause•initially in (61), where it is su xed by the peripheral su xes /-ckvi;/ `past 37  2.7. Clause•typing in more detail: the mood su xes again evidential' and /-/i;S/ `3 indicative'. The sentence•initial adverb is followed by the subject, verb and object, in that order. (61)  2.6.3  Yuuqvaackvi/iS Kay NajPiq Natasha Yu:qva:-ckvi;-/i;S Kay Naj-Piq Natasha also•past.evid•3.ind Kay see•in.passing Natasha `Kay must have also gotten a glimpse of Natasha.'  Question words (wh•words) are sentence•initial In a content question (WH•question) the question word (WH•word) will be sentence  initial. If the WH•word corresponds to the subject, it will be su xed with -q, as in (62a). If it refers to a non•subject, it will have a su xal verb on it, for example /-i:c/ `own', in (62b) (Davis and Sawai 2001). A similar pattern holds with quanti ers, though they can also occur non•initially (Woo 2002). (62)  ha/ukSiz jamas/i a. /ajaqitH/al ha/uk-Si(z) jamas-/i; /aja-q-(m)it-H-/al who•subj•past•3.inter•pl eat•mom sweet•def `Who ate the fruit?' b. /ajiickviH Suuwis/i /aja-i:c-ckvi;-H Su:wis-/i; who•own•past.evid•3.inter shoes•def `Who did the shoes belong to?'  2.7  Clause•typing in more detail: the mood su xes again Every Nuu•chah•nulth clause has a mood, which is marked by a portmanteau peripheral  su x that also marks subject agreement. (For details, see Ÿ2.5.3 above.) Syntactically, moods fall into three classes according to whether they: 1. occur only in matrix clauses; 2. occur in both matrix and dependent clauses; 3. occur only in dependent clauses. I discuss each in turn.  2.7.1  Moods that occur only in matrix clauses The moods that can only occur in matrix clauses fall into three semantic sub•classes:  declarative, interrogative, and imperative. Table 2.6 gives the complete list of the matrix clause moods. 38  2.7. Clause•typing in more detail: the mood su xes again Declarative -/i;S indicative -qa;Ja dubitative* -wa;/iS quotative* -Ja;?aS mirative  Interrogative -H interrogative -Ha;j indirect inter.*  -’i; -’im -’i;k -ji;  Imperative imperative future imp. proximal imp. distal imp.  Table 2.6: Matrix clause moods The Ahousaht dialect of Nuu•chah•nulth has four distinct declarative moods: indicative (marked by -/IS), dubitative (marked by -qAJa), quotative (marked by -wA/iS), and mirative (marked by -JA?aS). Representative examples are given in (63). (63)  a. Mizaa/iS Miz-(y)a;-/i;S rain•cont•3.ind `it's raining' b. MizaaqaJa Miz-(y)a;-qa;Ja rain•cont•3.dub `It must be raining.' c. Mizaawa/iS Miz-(y)a;-wa;/iS rain•cont•3.quot `It was raining.' d. MizaaJa?aS Miz-(y)a;-Ja;?aS rain•cont•3.mir `It's raining.' As for the interrogative moods, there are two: the interrogative proper (marked by -H),  and the indirect interrogative (marked by -HAj). Representative examples are given in (64). (64)  a. MizaaH Miz-(y)a;-H rain•cont•3.inter `Is it raining?' b. MizaaHaj Miz-(y)a;-Ha;j rain•cont•3.indir.inter `Is it raining?'  39  2.7. Clause•typing in more detail: the mood su xes again Finally, the imperative mood has four sub•classes: the imperative (marked by -’I), the future imperative (marked by -’um or -’im), the proximal imperative (marked by -’Ik), and the distal imperative (marked by -jI). Representative examples are given in (65). (65)  a. ha/uKvi ha/uk-’i; eat•2sg.imp `Eat.' b. ha/uKvik ha/uk-’i;k eat•2sg.prox.imp `Come and eat.' c. jamiHta/um ha/uk jamiHta-’um ha/uk proper•2sg.fut.imp eat `Eat properly.' d. ha/ukji ha/uk-ji; eat•2sg.dist.imp `Go eat.' The listing of matrix mood su xes in Table 2.6 above reveals that evidential distinc•  tions are present in this part of the mood paradigm. In particular, two of the declarative moods have evidential force, namely dubitative -qAJa and quotative -wA/iS. And, amongst the interrogative moods, the indirect interrogative -HAj has evidential force. See Chapter 4 (Ÿ4.3) for more detailed discussion of these evidential mood su xes.  2.7.2  One mood occurs in both matrix and dependent clauses: the absolutive mood There is one mood that is found in both matrix and dependent clauses, namely the  absolutive mood, which is zero•marked. It is sometimes accompanied by the complementizer /in. 2.7.2.1  The absolutive mood in matrix clauses  Consider rst the example in (66), where is taken from the beginning of a story. The rst sentence, (66a), is in the quotative mood, one of the moods that occurs only in matrix clauses. The second sentence, (66b) is in the absolutive mood. This use of the absolutive in narrative contexts is very typical. 40  2.7. Clause•typing in more detail: the mood su xes again (66)  qu/uSin a. hisiiKvasitwa/iS qu/uSin hisi:kv-’as-(m)it-wa;/iS go.along•on.ground.outside•past•3.quot raven `Raven was walking along.' luucma zulaqaq b. Naatsiiji/az zulaq Na:tsi-Si(z)-’az zul-(q)aq[SS] zul-(q)aq[SS]-(q)aq[SS] lu:cma woman nice•aug•aug see•mom•now nice•aug `He saw a beautiful woman.' The absolutive mood often co•occurs with the complementizer /in. Consider the  clause•sequences in (67) and (68). In each of these examples, the (b) sentences are matrix absolutive clauses that co•occur with the complementizer /in. Such /in•marked matrix abso• lutive clauses typically in contexts where there is some loose causal connection between the two sentences. In (67), the speaker is introducing a question in (67a), and then providing the reason for the question in (67b). And in (68), the speaker is volunteering an observation in (68a), and then providing the reason for the observation in (68b). (67)  ha/ukWiTas a. /aaqinqHk /a:qin-(q)H-k ha/uk-WiTas why•sim•2sg.inter eat•about.to `Why are you going to eat?' b. /in siqiilsa /in siq-(j)i:l[L]-sa comp cooked•make•1sg.abs `(Because) I'm cooking.'  (68)  a. walyuuKukvit/iS walyu:-Kuk-(m)it-/i;S be.home•vis.evid•past•3.ind `It looked like he was home.' b. /in /inKvaHsit /in /inkv-’a;Hs-(m)it comp re•in.vessel•past `(Because) his lights were on.'  2.7.2.2  The absolutive mood in complement clauses  The absolutive mood is also found in complement clauses, where it is obligatorily introduced by the complementizer /in. A representative example is given in (69). Observe that both the matrix clause and the embedded clause are in the absolutive mood. In addition, the embedded clause is introduced by the complementizer /in. 41  2.7. Clause•typing in more detail: the mood su xes again (69)  ?iniiz] /unaak [/in wiksuuk huHtaks ?ini:z /u-na;k /in wik-su:k huHtak-s know•1sg.abs comp neg•2sg.abs trans•have dog `I know you don't own a dog.' The set of verbs that introduce /in•absolutive complement clauses are given in Table 2.7.  Note that these verbs are all propositional attitude verbs. The descriptive generalization is that /in•absolutive complement clauses are only ever introduced by propositional attitude verbs. (But the converse is not true: as we shall see below, there are propositional attitude verbs that do not introduce /in•absolutive complement clauses.) huHtak hayimHi taaqaak puupuuca wawaa /uuqHli /uukvaqHli  `know' `not know' `believe' `dream' `say' `tell' `tell on oneself '  Table 2.7: Verbs taking /in•absolutive complement clauses  2.7.2.3  The absolutive mood in adjunct clauses  /in•absolutive clauses also introduce adjunct clauses, as in (70a). We can see that the /in•absolutive clause is an adjunct and not a complement because the verb nujHak `proud' does not require an /in•absolutive clause, as shown in (70b). (70)  Kyle Suuwis] a. nujHak/iS Haa [/in CuSnaakSiz Kyle Su:wis nujHakv-/i;S Ha: /in CuS-na;k-Si(z)-0 proud•3.ind that comp new•have•mom•3.abs Kyle shoes `She will be very happy that Kyle got new shoes.' b. nujHak/iS Ken nujHakv-/i;S Ken proud•3.ind Ken `Ken is proud'  Other verbs, such as waa `say' obligatory take an /in•absolutive complement clause, as in (71).  42  2.7. Clause•typing in more detail: the mood su xes again a. wawaa/iS Ken [/in maakukvitsuuk jamas] wawa:-/i;S Ken /in ma:kuk-(m)it-su:k jamas say•3.ind Ken comp buy•past•2sg.abs sweet  (71)  `Ken says you bought sweets.' b. *wawaa/iS Ken wawa:-/i;S Ken say•3.ind Ken Unfortunately we cannot use WH•island e ects to con rm the distinction between adjunct and complement clauses. We would expect WH•movement out of a complement clause to be possible, and WH•movement out of an adjunct clause to be impossible. But independently, all movement in Nuu•chah•nulth is clause bound (Davis and Sawai 2001, Woo 2002, 2007b).  2.7.3  Moods that occur only in dependent clauses The set of moods that occur only in dependent clauses are given in Table 2.8. I discuss  each of these in turn in the sections below, giving examples of their use. subordinate purposive conditional relative inde nite relative  -q -’a:/it qu: -/i;tq -(y)i:  Table 2.8: Dependent clause moods  2.7.3.1  The subordinate mood introduces clauses  Some propositional attitude verbs, such as /uqlaap `think' select for the subordinative mood, as in (72a). Observe that the subordinative mood is incompatible with the complemen• tizer /in, (72b). (72)  a. /uqlaamitwa/iS Linda walyuuq Ken /uqla:p-(m)it-wa;/iS Linda walyu:-q Ken think•past•3.quot Linda be.home•3.sub Ken `Linda thought Kay was at home.' b. */uqlaamit/iS Linda /in walyuuq Ken  43  2.7. Clause•typing in more detail: the mood su xes again 2.7.3.2  The purposive mood introduces rationale clauses  Rationale clauses are introduced with the purpose mood: (73)  [ha/uk/aqzs [wikYuuquus ziHSiz] [wiKaaHs haWiiqz]] ha/uk-/aqz-s ziH-Si(z) haWi:qz wik-’a:Hs wikYu:-qu:s eat•fut•1sg.abs before•1sg.cond leave•mom neg•1sg.purp hungry `I will eat before I leave, that way I won't be hungry.'  2.7.3.3  The conditional mood introduces if•clauses  The conditional mood is used mark embedded questions, as in (74a). The conditional mood is also used in the antecedent of a conditional statement (74b). hawii/az] [hiikval/azquuk /um/iiq a. huHtakmaHsa/iS hawi:-’az hi:kval-’az-qu:k /um/i-i;q huHtak-maHsa-/i;S know•wanting•3.ind mother•kin nearly•now•2sg.cond nish•now  (74)  `Mother wants to know if you're almost nished.' suWa maakukjip/aqzs makuWascajiz] siYa b. [na/uukquuk suWa mak-uWas-caji(z) ma:kuk-jip-/aqz-s siYa na/u:k-qu:k go.along•2sg.cond 1sg.pro buy•building•go.to buy•ben•fut•1sg.abs 2sg.pro jamas jamas sweet `If you go to the store with me, I'll buy you something sweet.' 2.7.3.4  The relative and inde nite moods introduce relative clauses  Relative clauses occur in either the relative -/itq (75) or the inde nite relative -(y)i: (76). The di erence between the two is whether the identity of the referent is in the common ground or not, with (y)i: indicating that it is not (Davidson 2002). (75)  /uCaHtaksuuk [hil/iitq Walmart] /u-CaHtak-su:k hil-/i;tq Walmart trans•head.for•2sg.abs be.there•3.rel Walmart `You head for where Walmart is.'  44  2.8. (76)  walSiz] NuWiiq [qviyaazii a. wa/iJazit/ick qviya:z-(y)i: NuWi-i;q walSiz wa/ij-’az-(m)it-/i;ck sleep•now•past•2sg.ind when•3.indf father•kin get.home `You were sleeping when Dad got home.' walyuu Ken] [qvaayii b. huHtakk walyu: Ken qva:-(y)i: huHtak-k know•2sg.inter thus•3.indf be.home Ken `Do you know if Ken is home?' Mizaa] c. /a/aatuumit/iS Ken [qvamitii /a/a:tu:-(m)it-/i;S Ken qva-(m)it-(y)i: Miz-(y)a; ask•past•3.ind Ken rel•past•3.indf rain•cont `Ken asked if it had been raining.'  2.8 In this chapter I provided an overview of Nuu•chah•nulth grammar. My hope is that this allows the reader who is unfamiliar with the language to follow the examples more easily. The morpho•phonological properties I described in Ÿ2.3 above will help the reader understand why the same morpheme occurs in di erent forms in di erent examples. The morphology I described in ŸŸ2.4, 2.5 and 2.7 is very relevant to a study of evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth. As I discuss in the following chapter, evidentials are found in several morphological classes, leading to di erences in their semantics.  45  Chapter 3  Towards a theory of evidentiality 3.1  Ways of classifying evidentials Evidential morphemes have been discussed in di erent terms in the literature. I discuss  these di erent approaches in this chapter. First, I look at classi cations based on morphological criteria (Ÿ3.2). I then turn to syntactic approaches to evidentials (Ÿ3.3). Semantic approaches are discussed in Ÿ3.4, where I discuss modal approaches, perceptual approaches, and the origo. I then discuss pragmatic approaches in Ÿ3.5, and nally lay out the path that Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials themselves suggest (Ÿ3.6).  3.2  Morphological classi cations of evidentials A morphological classi cation of evidentiality is developed by Willett (1988). He  devises a cross•linguistic classi cation of evidential types, shown in Figure 3.1 below. It is based on a survey of 38 languages for which evidentials have been identi ed and discussed, primarily in the volume by Chafe and Nichols (1986). His classi cation is useful in giving a general idea about the types of evidence a language may encode in an evidential, but it also has shortcomings, especially with respect to his classi cation of sensory evidentials as direct evidentials. Types of Evidence ff fffff  f f f f f  ffff Direct  Indirect  ˆ fffff ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ ˆˆˆˆˆ fffff f f f f ˆ ff Inferring  mmm  m m  m m mm  Attested  mmm  m m  m m mm Visual  Auditory  Other sensory  Results  Reasoning  Reported m mmm  m m  m mm Folklore  Hearsay  mmm  m m  m mmm  Second•hand  Third•hand  Figure 3.1: Willett's classi cation of evidence types  46  3.2. Morphological classi cations of evidentials First, there are languages (such as Nuu•chah•nulth, Makah (Jacobsen 1986) and Gitksan (Peterson 2010)) which have visual inferentials. These are evidentials which indicate that an inference was made based on something that was perceived visually. In Nuu•chah•nulth, the visual inferential is -Kuk, and as the example in (77) shows, its use is infelicitous when the origo has seen the rain directly. Thus, while it is a visual evidential, it is not a direct evidential. (77)  Scenario: Kay was looking outside the window and saw the rain. She said this to Bill. #MizaaKuk/iS Miz-(y)a;-Kuk-/i;S rain•cont•vis.evid•3.ind `It looks like it's raining.' Second, Nuu•chah•nulth has an auditory evidential na/a:t, which is compatible with  direct and indirect evidence scenarios. That is, na/a:t can be used where the origo directly witnessed an event, as in (78a), and it can also be used in scenarios where the origo has hearsay evidence (78b), or has made an inference based on hearing something (78c). (78)  a. Scenario: Kay could hear thunder, and when she got a call from Bill in Port Alberni she said this to him. TiickTiicka/iS na/aat Ti:ck-(y)a[RLL]-/i;S na/a:t clatter•rep•3.ind aud.evid `It's thundering.' b. Scenario: Kay and Bill heard that there was a ght the night before, and the police came and put someone in jail, but they didn't know who it was. Linda called Kay and told her that Ken got arrested, and when she got o the phone Kay told Bill this. /uHitwa/iS Ken na/aat mazpiz /uH-(m)it-wa;/iS Ken na/a:t maz-pi(z) foc•past•3.quot Ken aud.evid tied•in.house.mom `It is said it was Ken who ended up in jail.' c. Scenario: Kay and Bill don't usually hear Ken's stereo, but sometimes it gets loud. They gure it is Ken's son turning it up when Ken goes out. One day when she heard the stereo she said this to Bill. wikpizmataKaz/um Ken na/aat wik-pi(z)-matak-’az-0-/um Ken na/a:t neg•in.house.mom•ind.evid•now•3.abs•dm Ken aud.evid `Ken is probably not at home.'  47  3.3. Syntactic classi cations of evidentials Visual inferentials and the Nuu•chah•nulth auditory evidential are problematic for Willett's typology. As visual and auditory evidentials, Willett would classify them as direct (as he does with the visual inferential in Makah), but they are both compatible with indirect evidence scenarios. In other words, they are not actually direct evidentials. Visual inferentials are inferentials, while na/a:t `auditory evidence' is unmarked for directness . Another morphological classi cation is developed by Aikhenvald (2004). She makes a distinction between languages in which evidentiality is encoded systematically, and languages in which the coding of evidentiality is scattered throughout the grammar. Systematic encoding of evidentiality is obligatory, and paradigmatic. Scattered encoding of evidentiality may be optional, and is not paradigmatic. Nuu•chah•nulth is an example of a language with scattered encoding of evidentiality. Aikhenvald further divides languages with systematic encoding of evidentiality based on how many oppositions they encode, and what those oppositions are. Languages may distinguish anywhere between two and ve kinds of evidence, giving rise to four classes of languages with systematic encoding of evidentiality. Aikhenvald claims there are six kinds of evidence which can be encoded, which can be divide up between evidentials in di erent ways. I give one of Aikhenvald's attested systems for each of the four classes in Table 3.1. 2 3 4 5  Visual Sensory Firsthand Direct Direct Visual Non•visual  Inferred  Assumed Hearsay Quotative Non• rsthand Inferred Reported Inferred Reported Quotative Inferred Assumed Reported  Table 3.1: Examples of attested evidential distinctions (Aikhenvald 2004) The morphological approaches to evidentiality described above focus on the attested range of evidentials across languages. Willett focuses on the kinds of evidence that are encoded in morphemes, while Aikhenvald focuses on the distinctions made within a single language, while also distinguishing between systematic and scattered encoding of evidentiality.  3.3  Syntactic classi cations of evidentials Speas and Tenny (2003) propose a cartographic approach to evidentiality. That is, they  propose a structure of functional heads in an exploded CP domain whose speci er arguments can be lled in various combinations yielding di erent meanings. They propose a sentience phrase (SenP), which combines Cinque's (1999) EvidP (as the projection of Sen*) with his higher EvalP (as the projection of Sen) whose speci er gives the point of view role, equivalent to the origo. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Above this structure are speech act projections which 48  3.3. Syntactic classi cations of evidentials they use to model mood. They make no claim about the syntactic position of an evidential morpheme, nor do they make a claim about the possible semantics of evidentials. I discuss their approach to the origo (their seat of knowledge ) in Ÿ3.4.3 below. SenP ll‚‚‚‚‚‚ l l l ‚‚‚‚ l l lll seat of knowledge  Sen  ll‚‚‚‚‚‚ ‚‚‚‚ llll l l l l  Sen  Sen*  l‚‚‚‚‚ ‚‚‚‚ llll l l l ‚ ll  evidence  Sen* ll‚‚‚‚‚‚ l l l ‚‚‚‚ l l lll Sen*  EpisP  Figure 3.2: Structure of the sentience phrase (Speas and Tenny 2003, 334) Blain and Déchaine (2006) propose that evidentials can be integrated into distinct syntactic domains. They call this the evidential domain hypothesis. In particular, they propose the structure in Figure 3.3. Evidentials thus do not belong to a single syntactic category. Within a single language, one evidential may be in the CP domain while another is in the TP domain. Depending on which domain an evidential occurs in, it is expected to have additional properties. For example, evidentials in the CP domain may also encode clause•typing, and those in the TP domain may also encode tense. CP qwwww q q www q q qq TP  qww qqq wwwww q q q        Evidential Force  AspP qqwwwww q q ww q qq ✘ ✘✘  ❤❤❤  vP qwwww q q www q q qq  ❤❤❤❤  DP w ❤❤❤ ❤ ❤ qqqq wwww ww q q q  Figure 3.3: Evidential domain hypothesis (Blain and Déchaine 2006)  49  3.4. Semantic classi cations of evidentials  3.4  Semantic classi cations of evidentials A number of formal semantic approaches have been proposed. Here I divide the dis•  cussion into three groups, modal approaches, pragmatic approaches and perceptual approaches. The modal approaches treat evidentials as epistemic modals, based on Kratzer's (1981, 1991) analysis of modality. The pragmatic approaches focus more on the felicity conditions associ• ated with evidentials, and often include a modal analysis of some evidentials. The perceptual approaches focus on how evidentials indicate the origo's perceptual relation to the prejacent proposition.  3.4.1  Modal approaches Most formal semantic approaches to indirect evidentiality derive from Kratzer's (1981,  1991) analysis of modality. In particular they derive from her analysis of the German epistemic modal müssen and its English cognate must, which has since been considered an inferential evidential (Westmoreland 1995, 1998, von Fintel and Gillies 2011). There is disagreement on what the relationship is between the categories of evidentiality and epistemic modality. de Haan (1999, 2000), Lazard (2001), and Aikhenvald (2004) take the view that evidentiality is distinct from modality. For example, de Haan (2000) considers evidentiality to be the marking of source of information, and epistemic modality to be the marking of the speaker's con dence. de Haan and Aikhenvald admit the possibility of overlap between the two categories, where a single morpheme expresses both source of information and the speaker's level of con dence, but emphasize that not all morphemes which encode evidentiality also encode epistemic modality (and vice versa). This view is also shared by Faller (2002), Matthewson et al. (2007), Murray (2010), Peterson (2010) and Waldie et al. (2009). An opposing view, held by Matthewson (2010), is that all evidentials are epistemic modals and all epistemic modals are evidentials. Following Rullmann et al. (2008), Matthewson does not consider all epistemic modals to mark force (necessity or possibility), which is how de Haan's speaker's con dence is encoded. I turn now to consider di erent modal approaches to evidentiality, beginning with a summary of Kratzer's (1981) account of epistemic modality, and proceeding chronologically. 3.4.1.1  Kratzer's (1981) modal analysis  Kratzer's (1981, 1991) analysis of epistemic modality relies on two sets of propositions, an epistemic modal base and a stereotypical ordering source. An epistemic modal base is the set of propositions, i.e., functions from worlds to truth values, that are known in a given context in a  50  3.4. Semantic classi cations of evidentials given world.4 From the epistemic modal base we can generate a set of worlds the set of worlds in which every proposition in the modal base is true. The stereotypical ordering source is also a set of propositions, and in the case of epistemic modals, it is one which contains propositions about what normally happens. These propositions describe probabilistic relations that usually hold in the world of evaluation. One such proposition could be that if someone walks out of a store with unpurchased merchandise in their pocket, they stole it. This may be true in the actual world or it may not, and this is crucial for Kratzer's analysis, as we will see shortly. The ordering source ranks the worlds in the modal base based on how many propositions in the ordering source are true in them. The best worlds in the epistemic modal base would be those in which all the propositions in the ordering source are true. For Kratzer an epistemic modal like must is a propositional operator. When must occurs with a prejacent proposition p, MUST(p) means that there is a contextually determined epistemic modal base epist(w), consisting of the set of propositions known in the world w. This de nes the set of worlds in which all those propositions are true, ∩epist(w). There is also a contextually determined ordering source os(w) with which we can rank the worlds in ∩epist(w). Finally, MUST(p) means that p is true in all the highest ranked worlds in ∩epist(w). Because the propositions in the ordering source may not be true in the actual world, it is possible for the prejacent p to be false, even though MUST(p) is true. In other words, MUST(p) does not entail p. 3.4.1.2  Modal accounts of evidentials  Izvorski (1997) is the rst to o er a modal analysis of evidentials. She makes use of Kratzer's modal analysis, with some adjustments, in her account of the `perfect of evidentiality' the indirect evidential use of perfect morphemes, including the Turkish perfect •mI³. In her modal analysis, Izvorski proposes using a modal base that di ers from the epistemic modal base, as shown in (79). Instead of being de ned in terms of the entire set of propositions that are known to be true in a world w, it is de ned in terms of the set of propositions which the speaker considers to be indirect evidence for the prejacent proposition in w. (79)  a. epistemic modal base epist(w) = ∩{p : p is known in w} b. indirect evidential modal base ind.evid(w) = ∩{p : in w, p is known and the speaker considers p indirect evidence (for the prejacent proposition)}  (adapted from Izvorski 1997, 230)  Matthewson et al. (2007) give a modal account of several evidentials in Lillooet. In their 4 One might ask who knows these propositions, as Stephenson (2007a,b) asks, but this is a separate issue which I address in Ÿ3.4.3 below.  51  3.4. Semantic classi cations of evidentials analysis, the modal base de nes a set of worlds directly: the set of worlds compatible with the kind of evidence indicated by the evidential. Each kind of evidential inferential, reportative, perceptual inferential, presupposes the existence of a particular kind of modal base. Each of their modal bases is an epistemically accessible set of worlds, and each one restricts the set of worlds to those in which the relevant kind of evidence found in the actual world holds. If in the actual world Linda told Kay that it was raining, the reportative modal base would be limited to the set of worlds in which it is also true that Linda told Kay it was raining. Matthewson et al. do not use an ordering source. Instead, they de ne evidentials as indicating that the prejacent proposition is true in a contextually de ned subset of the worlds in the relevant modal base. This has a similar e ect to that of an ordering source, since it is possible that this subset does not contain the actual world. Matthewson et al. use the contextually de ned subset of worlds to account for the fact that evidentials (and other modals) in Lillooet are not speci ed for quanti cational force. If this subset is equal to the entire modal base, the modal will be equivalent to a strong necessity modal. If the subset is a proper subset of the modal base, the modal will be equivalent to a weak necessity or existential modal. Peterson (2010) presents an analysis of two evidentials in Gitksan which is similar to that of Matthewson et al. (2007), but with the addition of a contextually provided ordering source. The set of worlds compatible with the sort of evidence indicated by the evidential is ordered according to the likelihood that the evidence is trustworthy. In order for the use of such an evidential to be felicitous, there must be at least one highest•ranked world in which the prejacent proposition is true. By using existential quanti cation over worlds rather than universal quanti cation, Peterson allows for the felicitous use of an evidential when the prejacent may not actually be true, in which case the ordering source is empty. When the ordering source is non•empty, the evidential becomes stronger, because the highest•ranked worlds are the ones in which the evidence holds. A di erent modi cation of Kratzer's modal analysis for indirect evidentials was pro• posed by von Fintel and Gillies (2010). They replace the epistemic modal base with what they call the kernel, which is the set of propositions for which there exists direct evidence. Indirect evidentials are then encoded with a presuppositional restriction that the prejacent proposi• tion is not in the kernel. Truth•conditionally, indirect evidentials indicate that the prejacent proposition is true in all the worlds in which the propositions of the kernel are true. Following Westmoreland (1995, 1998), von Fintel and Gillies argue that must is an indirect evidential. In their view, MUST(p) does entail p, but it can only be used felicitously when there is no direct evidence for p. For example, Kay cannot utter the sentence in (80) felicitously if she is out in the rain getting wet. Here the kernel will contain the proposition that it is raining, since there is direct evidence for it Kay and Bill are getting rained on. The presupposition introduced by must, that the prejacent proposition is not in the kernel, is not 52  3.4. Semantic classi cations of evidentials satis ed, and the use of must is infelicitous. (80)  Scenario: Kay and Bill are standing outside in the rain, getting soaked. Kay says this to Bill. #It must be raining. In a revision of her analysis of modality, Kratzer (2012)5 divides modal bases into  realistic ones and informational ones. Realistic modal bases are those which necessarily contain the world of evaluation, while informational ones possibly do not. This division was prompted by the behaviour of reportative evidential sollen in German (and also in Quechua (Faller 2002) and Cheyenne (Murray 2010)), where the use of a reportative is felicitous when the prejacent is known to be false. That is, the a reportative indicates that the prejacent proposition holds in all worlds in an informational modal base, and it is possible that that modal base does not contain the world of evaluation. Matthewson (2011) makes the claim that all evidentials are epistemic modals, and that all epistemic modals are evidentials. She shows that the tests that have been used in the literature to distinguish between evidentials which are modals and evidentials which are speech act operators (see Ÿ3.5.2 below) are inconclusive. The tests, which are also discussed by Faller (2006), Matthewson et al. (2007), Waldie et al. (2009), and Murray (2010), are given in (81). Faller (2011) also takes an evidentials are modals view of Quechua evidentials, which di ers from her previous account (see Faller (2002, 2006); see also Ÿ3.5.2 below). (81)  a. Can the evidential content be challenged? b. Can the evidential content be semantically embedded? c. Can the evidential content take scope over speech act operators? d. Does the evidential content project through negation? e. Can the prejacent be known to be true? f. Can the prejacent be known to be false? Another kind of modal analysis of evidentials is presented by McCready and Ogata  (2007). They note that some evidentials in Japanese are amenable to a modal analysis, and use a probabilistic dynamic semantics to model them, rather than a Kratzerian modal semantics. In their account, the semantic contribution of an inferential evidential is an inferential operator. The inferential operator has an index which identi es the piece of evidence which the origo (in their terminology, the agent) has that supports the inference of the prejacent proposition. This piece of evidence raises the probability that the prejacent proposition is true. McCready and Ogata point out that the use of reportative evidentials in Japan is felicitous regardless of whether the origo has any belief about the truth of the prejacent 5  Kratzer's 2012 chapter on modality was previously made available as a manuscript, dated 2010.  53  3.4. Semantic classi cations of evidentials proposition, as is the case in Quechua (see Faller (2002)). They therefore introduce a hearsay operator which is not probabilistic it simply indicates the existence of hearsay evidence for the prejacent.  3.4.2  Perceptual approaches How perceptual grounding is encoded by evidentials has not been addressed to any  great extent in formal semantics. The sole account is that of Faller (2004), which was also taken up by Chung (2005, 2007). Faller (2004) gives an analysis of an evidential in Quechua, •sqa, which she describes as indicating that the event did not occur in the speaker's perceptual eld. In this analysis, Faller presents the notion of perceptual trace, which contains all the location•time slices that an individual remembers perceiving. In addition to this is the event trace, which contains all the location•time slices in which the relevant event took place. The morpheme •sqa indicates that the speaker's perceptual trace and the event trace do not overlap. Chung (2005, 2007) makes use of Faller's (2004) tools in her analysis of evidentials in Korean, and also adds an evidence trace, which contains all the location•time slices in which there is evidence that the relevant event took place. Since the event is evidence for itself, the evidence trace for a given event will include that event. The indirect Korean evidentials •ess and •keyss indicate that the speaker's perceptual trace and the event trace do not overlap. The evidential •ess also encodes the temporal relation that the event time precedes the time of the evidence perceived by the speaker. Speas (2010) uses situations, rather than location•time slices, to model evidentials. In her view, evidentials encode accessibility relations between situations. The relevant situations are the event situation, a reference situation, and the discourse situation (i.e., utterance situa• tion). The reference situation is the situation in which the relevant evidence is found i.e., the perceived situation. In Speas' account, indirect evidentials encode that the event situation is accessible from the reference situation, while direct evidentials encode that the event situation is included in the reference situation. If we substitute situations for location•time slices, the accounts of Faller (2004), Chung (2005, 2007) and Speas (2010) all describe certain evidentials as encoding the relation between a perceived situation and the event situation of the prejacent. In particular, indirect evidentials encode that these two situations are disjoint.  3.4.3  Origo The origo as the person whose evidence is indicated by an evidential has not been  discussed much. Garrett (2001) rst used it in his description of the evidentials of Tibetan.  54  3.4. Semantic classi cations of evidentials The origo was originally conceived of as a deictic centre (Bühler 1990). The origo is the sentient individual from which a statement is evaluated. The connection between the deictic centre and the evidential origo shows itself when we look at how each behaves in questions (as opposed to declaratives). Fillmore (1975) points out that the referent of this in the two sentences in (82) is not the same. In the declarative sentence this refers to the speaker. In the interrogative sentence this refers to the addressee. In other words, the deictic centre switches from the speaker to the addressee in interrogative questions. (82)  a. This is Ryan. b. Is this Ryan? Garrett (2001) notes the same e ect with the interpretation of evidentials in Tibetan.  The direct imperfective •`dug can only be used with a predicate meaning `hungry' if the subject is the origo. In declarative matrix clauses the origo is the speaker, and so •`dug is only allowed when the subject is rst•person, as shown in (83). Second• or third•person subjects cannot be used as the subject here. (83)  Tibetan (Tibeto•burman) declarative  (adapted from Garrett 2001, 227)  a. nga grod.khog ltogs•gi•`dug I stomach hunger•dir.imp `I'm hungry.' b. *khyed.rang grod.khog ltogs•gi•`dug stomach hunger•dir.imp you c. *kho grod.khog ltogs•gi•`dug he stomach hunger•dir.imp In interrogative matrix clauses, the origo is the addressee, and so •`dug can only be used if the subject is second•person, as shown in (84). First• or third•person subjects cannot be used here. (84)  Tibetan (Tibeto•burman) interrogative  (adapted from Garrett 2001, 228)  a. *nga grod.khog ltogs•gi•`dug•gas I stomach hunger•dir.imp•q b. khyed.rang grod.khog ltogs•gi•`dug•gas stomach hunger•dir.imp•q you `Are you hungry?' c. *kho grod.khog ltogs•gi•`dug•gas he stomach hunger•dir.imp•q 55  3.5. Pragmatic classi cations of evidentials Stephenson (2007a,b) gives us a formalization of the origo (which she calls judge ) by extending Lasersohn's (2005) analysis of predicates of personal taste to epistemic modals, which have been argued to be evidentials (Westmoreland 1995, 1998, von Fintel and Gillies 2010). An epistemic modal like must is evaluated with respect to a judge, just as a predicate of personal taste like taste good is. (85)  a. That pie must be for the party. b. That pie tastes good. For Stephenson the judge is the centre of a centred world. A centred world is a world  paired with an individual who believes that he or she is in that world (Lewis 1979). Under Stephenson's analysis, an epistemic modal base is de ned as the set of centred worlds that are compatible with what the judge knows. Propositional attitude verbs restrict the judge of their embedded centred proposition to being subject.6 In (86) the judge of the embedded clause is Linda. Linda is the person evaluating the taste of the pie. (86)  Linda thinks that pie tastes good. The origo also appears in Speas and Tenny's (2003) work exploring a syntactic expla•  nation of mood, which was described in Ÿ3.3 above (see also Speas 2004, Tenny 2006). They develop an account where speech act participants speaker and addressee are represented syntactically as arguments of a speech act phrase, much as Ross (1970) proposed. In addition to speech•act participants, the seat of knowledge is also represented syntactically as an argu• ment of a sentience phrase (SenP). The seat of knowledge is equivalent to the origo, as it is the person who is evaluating the truth of a proposition.  3.5  Pragmatic classi cations of evidentials Any theory of evidentiality has to address the issue of what kind of contribution an  evidential makes. It is generally agreed that at least some of the meaning the evidence requirement of an evidential projects through negation, interrogatives, etc. (Faller 2002, 2006, von Fintel and Gillies 2010, Matthewson et al. 2007, Peterson 2010, Waldie et al. 2009, also see Chapter 7). The evidence requirement indicates what kind of evidence is being relied upon, whether it is inference or hearsay, visual or auditory, etc. Opinions di er on what the mechanism is that allows that projection of meaning. 6  Strictly speaking, the judge of an embedded centred proposition is a counterpart of the subject of the propo• sitional attitude verb. Lewis (1968) argues that an individual is con ned to a single possible world when I talk about what I might have done, I am talking about what my counterpart in a di erent possible world did in that world.  56  3.6. The way forward to an analysis of Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials  3.5.1  Evidentials contribute presuppositions Izvorski's (1997) modal analysis introduced the idea that the evidence requirement is  a presupposition. Other modal accounts take the same approach (von Fintel and Gillies 2010, Matthewson et al. 2007, Peterson 2010). There is a presupposition that the context provides a modal base of the appropriate sort. As long as this presupposition is satis ed, the modal operator can apply.  3.5.2  Evidentials contribute sincerity conditions Faller (2002) treats the evidential requirement as a sincerity condition (Searle 1975,  Searle and Vanderveken 1985). For any speech act to be performed sincerely, the speaker must have a mental state in which the sincerity conditions are met. Thus, in using, say, a reportative evidential, the speaker must believe that there was a report whose propositional content contained the prejacent proposition.  3.5.3  Evidentials contribute not•at•issue content Murray (2010) analyzes the evidence requirement as being asserted as not•at•issue con•  tent. Not•at•issue content covers all kinds of meaning that project, including presuppositions and conventional implicatures (Simons et al. 2010). A not•at•issue assertion adds a proposition to the common ground, while an at•issue assertion proposes the addition of a proposition to the common ground. Not•at•issue assertions are thus unchallengeable, while at•issue assertions are challengeable. An evidential in Murray's analysis introduces its evidence requirement as a not•at•issue assertion. The prejacent proposition p is not introduced as an at•issue assertion in the case of indirect evidentials. The reportative brings up p, but does not add it to the common ground, while the conjectural adds the modal proposition must(p) to the common ground.  3.6  The way forward to an analysis of Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials The evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth are morphosyntactically heterogeneous (Jacobsen  1986). As I describe in Chapter 4, evidentials are found in the mood su xes, mode su xes, verbal su xes, and particles. These morpheme classes occur throughout the syntax, much in the way outlined by Blain and Déchaine (2006). In Chapter 4 I treat the mood su xes as being in the CP domain, the mode su xes as being in the IP domain, and the derivational su x and particle as being in the VP domain. When I work out the semantics for the Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in Chapter 5, it will turn out that di erent evidentials will be of di erent semantic  57  3.6. The way forward to an analysis of Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials types, depending on which domain they occur in. In addition, I explore the way evidentials in di erent domains interact with tense in Chapter 8. The semantics I use are broadly modal in nature, as I treat propositions as sets of possible worlds. My treatment of inference is closer to that of McCready and Ogata (2007) than that of Kratzer (1981) or those derived from hers. Instead of identifying a set of propositions of a particular kind (say, those which were perceived visually), my semantics for inference makes use of an indexed proposition (or rather, a proposition about an indexed situation). I follow Speas (2010) in making use of perceived situations for the evidentials in Nuu• chah•nulth which deal with perception These evidentials do not indicate non•overlap between the perceived situation and the situation of the prejacent proposition, as in the case of those in Quechua and Korean. Therefore, I do not make use of the analyses of Faller (2002) and Chung (2005, 2007). The origo, as described by Garrett (2001) is central to my analysis of Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials. The way I model the origo is derived from Stephenson, Stephenson's (2007a, 2007b) judge•based analysis of epistemic modals. In Chapter 6 I discuss how the origo is determined by clause type. I argue in Chapter 7 that evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth contribute not•at•issue content, as Murray (2010) does for Cherokee. I use a modi ed version of Potts's (2005) logic for conventional implicatures to do this.  58  Chapter 4  Cataloguing the inventory of Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials Any investigation of evidentials must begin by cataloguing the forms that a particular language uses to express evidential notions, and determining their distribution. In this con• text, the goal of this chapter is to present the inventory and distribution of Nuu•chah•nulth (Ahousaht) evidential morphemes. I begin by introducing the origo hypothesis, which claims that evidentiality always involves a relation between an origo, a proposition and a situation (Ÿ4.1). While this chapter focuses on the syntactic implications of the origo hypothesis; the next chapter (Chapter 5) focuses on the semantic implications. After laying out the predictions that the origo hypothesis makes about the external syntax of evidentials (Ÿ4.2), I show that Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials partition into three syntac• tic sub•types (ŸŸ4.2 4.5): CP•domain evidentials (associated with mood•marking); IP•domain evidentials (associated with mode•marking), and VP•domain evidentials. I then discuss how the origo hypothesis sheds light on the parallels between evidentials and other predicate• types (Ÿ4.6), in particular propositional attitude verbs, verbs of saying, experiencer predicates and sensory predicates. Before closing, I discuss the consequences of the origo hypothesis for the syntax•semantics interface (Ÿ4.7) and a summary of the combinatorial restrictions on Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials (Ÿ4.8). The chapter closes with a discussion of the variation in evidentials between di erent dialects of Nuu•chah•nulth, and between Southern Wakashan languages (Ÿ4.9).  4.1  The origo hypothesis: evidentiality consists of the relations between an origo, a proposition and a situation. I propose the following hypothesis about evidential morphemes:  (87)  The origo hypothesis: An evidential morpheme expresses a relation between: 1.  an origo;  2.  a proposition;  3.  a situation. 59  4.1. The origo hypothesis: evidentiality consists of the relations between an origo, a proposition and a situation. An origo consists of a sentient agent capable of perception and inference paired with a situation. A proposition is a thought that describes some part of the world; these thoughts may be true or false. A situation is a state•of•a airs that holds in particular world at a particular time. (See Chapter 5 for a more precise formalization of these terms). Informally, the origo hypothesis can be represented as in Figure 4.1. origo •U  × ×× × perspectival ×× status ××× × ×× × Ó×× prejacent • o  UU UU UU perceptual UU grounding UU UU UU '  • perceived manner of situation support Figure 4.1: Three factors of evidentiality  proposition  The origo hypothesis predicts that evidential morphemes encode the following pairwise relations. There is a relation between an origo and a proposition; I call this perspectival status, (88a). There is a relation between a situation perceived by the origo and a proposition; I call this the manner of support, (88b). And there is a relation between an origo and a perceived situation; I call this perceptual grounding. (88)  a. Perspectival status b. Manner of support c. Perceptual grounding The origo hypothesis claims that evidential morphemes can be classi ed according to  how they encode perspectival status, perceptual grounding, and manner of support. Here I brie y explain how the story of Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials will unfold. First, syntactically, I es• tablish that the four morphological classes of Nuu•chah•nulth evidential morphemes (discussed in Chapter 2) partition into three syntactic domains, namely CP, IP, and VP. This corresponds to the second column of Table 4.1 below and is the focus of this chapter. With the syntactic analysis in place, I then turn my attention to the rest of the story, namely the semantic analysis, which is developed in Chapter 5. I argue that individual evidential morphemes in Nuu•chah• nulth di er according to how they are speci ed for perceptual grounding, manner of support, and value of the origo. This corresponds to the three rightmost columns of Table 4.1. As indicated in Table 4.1, the Ahousaht dialect of Nuu•chah•nulth has seven distinct evidential morphemes. In (89) below I present these morphemes in a paradigmatic fashion, keeping the propositional content (`it is raining') the same. In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that while in ectional mood su xes, shown in (89a•b•c), are introduced in the CP• 60  4.1. The origo hypothesis: evidentiality consists of the relations between an origo, a proposition and a situation. Morphological class mood su xes  Domain CP  Morpheme  -wa;/iS -Ha;j  mode su xes  IP  -qa;Ja -ckvi;  derivational su x particle  VP  -matak -Kuk na/a:t  Gloss `quotative' `indirect interrogative' `dubitative' `past inference' `inference' `visual inference' `auditory evidence'  Perceptual grounding  Manner of support report report inference inference  visual  Origo speaker addressee speaker  inference inference  auditory  Table 4.1: Syntactic levels in which Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials appear domain, in ectional mode su xes, shown in (89d•e), are introduced in the IP•domain. And su xes that code a sensory percept whether visual or auditory, as shown in (89f•g) are introduced in the VP•domain. (89)  a. Quotative -wA/iS (CP•domain) Mizaawa/iS Miz-(y)a;-wa;/iS rain•cont•3.quot `It's raining, according to what I've been told.' b. Indirect interrogative -HAj (CP•domain) MizaaHaj Miz-(y)a;-Ha;j rain•cont•3.indir.inter `Is it raining, according to what you've been told?' c. Dubitative -qAJa (CP•domain) MizaaqaJa Miz-(y)a;-qa;Ja rain•cont•3.dub `It must be raining.' d. Inferential -matak (IP•domain) Mizaamatak/iS Miz-(y)a;-matak-/i;S rain•cont•ind.evid•3.ind `Maybe it's raining.' 61  4.2. The syntax of Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials e. Past inferential -ckvI (IP•domain) Mizaackvi/iS Miz-(y)a;-ckvi;-/i;S rain•cont•past.evid•3.ind `It must have rained' f. Visual inferential -Kuk (VP•domain) MizaaKuk/iS Miz-(y)a;-Kuk-/i;S rain•cont•vis.evid•3.ind `It looks like it's raining.' g. Auditory evidential na/a:t (VP•domain) na/aat Mizaa/iS na/a:t Miz-(y)a;-/i;S rain•cont•3.ind aud.evid `It sounds like it's raining.'  4.2  The syntax of Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials There are two competing analyses of the syntax of evidentials. On one view, there is  one dedicated position for evidentials; this is the analysis of Cinque (1999). On another view, evidentials can be inserted into a variety of syntactic positions; this is the analysis of Blain and Déchaine (2006, 2007). In what follows, I brie y introduce the two analyses (Ÿ4.2.1), and then discuss the contribution that Nuu•chah•nulth evidential marking makes to this debate (Ÿ4.2.2).  4.2.1  Two hypotheses about the external syntax of evidentials Cinque (1999) and Blain and Déchaine (2006) make con icting claims on the external  syntax of evidentials. Cinque proposes that there is a single position in which evidentials occur (Ÿ4.2.1.1), while Blain and Déchaine propose that evidentials can occur in a number of syntactic domains, and the semantic properties predictably di er according to the syntactic position that they occupy (Ÿ4.2.1.4). 4.2.1.1  Hypothesis 1: A dedicated position for evidentials: Cinque 1999  In his work on adverbs, Cinque (1999) argued that evidentials occupy the speci er position of a single evidential mood phrase (EvidP), dominating IP. An example of such an evidential is the English adverb reportedly. He also allotted a single location speci er of a  62  4.2. The syntax of Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials epistemic modal phrase (EpistP) to adverbs of epistemic modality such as English apparently. This phrase is immediately dominated by EvidP. (90)  [EvidP reportedly [ Evid [EpistP apparently [ Epist [ . . . [IP . . . ]]]]]  The idea that there is a single position for evidentials is also taken up by Speas and Tenny (2003). They propose a sentience phrase (SenP), which combines EvidP with a higher EvalP whose speci er gives the point of view role, equivalent to the origo. As I argue in Chapter 8, the non•mood evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth occur below tense. Cinque's approach does not predict this at all, assuming that tense is in IP. He predicts that all evidentials will occur above tense. There are two reasons to reject the claim that there is a dedicated position for ev• identials. First, scattered evidentiality shows that, within the same language, evidentials need not have a dedicated syntactic position. Second paradigmatic heterogeneity shows that, across languages, evidential paradigms are not associated with a dedicated syntactic position. I consider each in turn, and then introduce an alternative hypothesis. 4.2.1.2  Counter•example 1: scattered evidentiality  Many languages have what Aikhenvald (2004) calls scattered evidentiality . In such languages, evidentials don't constitute a single paradigm; rather, individual evidential mor• phemes occupy distinct morphological or syntactic positions. As Jacobsen (1986) established, Nuu•chah•nulth has scattered evidentiality in the sense of Aikhenvald. Recall that Nuu•chah• nulth evidentials morphemes are drawn from four distinct morphological classes: in ectional mood su xes, in ectional mode su xes, derivational su xes, and particles. See (89) above for illustrative examples. (I return to this below.) 4.2.1.3  Counter•example 2: paradigmatic heterogeneity  Another reason to reject the claim that there is a dedicated position for evidentials comes from the fact that, even in languages that have dedicated evidential paradigms, such paradigms are integrated with di erent parts of the clause structure. As discussed by Blain and Déchaine (2006), in di erent languages, evidential paradigms are integrated with focus• marking, clause•typing, aspect•marking, tense•marking, modality, or predicate•typing. 4.2.1.4  Hypothesis 2: multiple positions for evidentials: Blain and Déchaine (2006, 2007)  To account for heterogeneous expression of evidentiality, Blain and Déchaine (2006) propose that evidentials may be integrated into distinct syntactic domains; they call this the evidential domain hypothesis. In particular, they propose the structure in Figure 4.2. 63  4.2. The syntax of Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials CP qwwww q q www q q qq TP  qww qqq wwwww q q q        Evidential Force  AspP qqwwwww q q ww q qq ✘ ✘ ✘  ❤❤❤  vP  qww qqq wwwww q q q  ❤❤❤❤  DP w ❤❤❤ ❤ ❤ qqqq wwww ww q q q  Figure 4.2: Evidential domain hypothesis (Blain and Déchaine 2006) The approach of Blain and Déchaine (2006) is a much closer t for Nuu•chah•nulth than that of Cinque. In the next section I discuss how the evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth seem to be distributed through the various syntactic levels.  4.2.2  Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials are associated with CP, IP, or VP The Ahousaht dialect of Nuu•chah•nulth has seven evidential morphemes. Six of these  are su xes that are recruited from three position classes. (See Ÿ2.4.1 for discussion of the morphological template.) To see this, consider (91). Reading from left to right, observe that the visual inferential (-Kuk), which is a su xal verb (see Ÿ2.4.2.2), is drawn from a set of derivational su xes that lie very close to the verb stem. As for the past inferential (-ckvI) and the plain inferential (-matak), they are mode su xes (Ÿ2.5.1). And the quotative (-wA/iS), indirect interrogative (-HAj) and dubitative (-qAJa) are drawn from the set of mood su xes (Ÿ2.5.3). All clauses are obligatorily in ected for mood su xes; in the absence of evidential mood marking, non•evidential mood marking is found. (91)  [Verb.Stem][•Derivational•Aspectual] •Mode•Valence/Tense•Mood•Discourse  Core Suffixes  Peripheral Suffixes  Two questions immediately arise regarding (91). First, how does the Nuu•chah•nulth morphological template map onto the syntactic domains postulated by Blain and Déchaine? Second, how does the one non•su xal evidential morpheme namely the auditory evidential na/a:t  t into the syntactic classi cation of Nuu•chah•nulth evidential morphemes? Regarding the correspondence between the Nuu•chah•nulth morphological position  classes and syntactic categories, I propose the following: 64  4.3. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the CP domain: in ectional mood su xes 1. Nuu•chah•nulth mood su xes are part of the clause•typing system, and clause•typing is generally taken to be a property of the C (complementizer) position (Rizzi 1997). I therefore treat evidentials that are mood su xes as instantiating C, i.e. they are CP• domain evidentials. 2. Nuu•chah•nulth mode su xes are sensitive to temporal contrasts; this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. I therefore treat evidentials that are mode su xes as instantiating In , i.e. they are IP•domain evidentials. 3. Nuu•chah•nulth sensory percept evidentials both have verbal properties: the visual in• ferential -Kuk is a verbal su x; the auditory evidential na/a:t is related to the verb na/aa `hear'. I therefore treat them as instantiating V, i.e. they are VP•domain evidentials. Assuming a transparent mapping between morphology and syntax, this yields the right• branching syntactic representation in (92). With this as background, I now turn to a more detailed discussion of each of these syntactic domains. CP•domain evidentials (Ÿ4.3) are discussed rst, then IP•domain evidentials (Ÿ4.4) and VP•domain evidentials (Ÿ4.5). (92)  4.3  [VP•domain [IP•domain [CP•domain]]]  Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the CP domain: in ectional mood su xes In Nuu•chah•nulth, each clause is obligatorily marked with a mood su x. Because  they are obligatory, and because only one mood is allowed per clause (see (4.3.4) for further discussion), I take it that they are syntactic heads. The full set of matrix clause moods, from which evidential moods are drawn, as is given in Table 4.2. (See Chapter 2 for the full set of mood su xes) Since mood su xes are part of the clause•typing system, this means that they are C. Consequently, the evidentials that are mood su xes namely quotative -wA/iS, indirect interrogative -HAj, and dubitative -qAJa are expected to be part of the CP•domain. Declarative -/i;S indicative -qa;Ja dubitative* -wa;/iS quotative* -Ja;?aS mirative  Interrogative -H interrogative -Ha;j indirect inter.*  Imperative -’i; imperative -’im future imp. -’i;k proximal imp. -ji; distal imp.  Table 4.2: Matrix clause moods in Nuu•chah•nulth (3rd person forms) Notice that Nuu•chah•nulth mood su xes are complex morphemes that code mood 65  4.3. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the CP domain: in ectional mood su xes and agreement, and more speci cally the person and number of the subject. I adopt the convention of using the third•person form as the citation form for the mood su xes. I now discuss each of the evidential moods, as follows: quotative -wA/iS (Ÿ4.3.1), indirect interrogative -HAj (Ÿ4.3.2), and dubitative -qAJa (Ÿ4.3.3). For each mood I present the entire mood paradigm, insofar as I have been able to identify it in my own eldwork. In some cases they di er from those reported in Nakayama (2001), so I do not try to ll in any gaps with the forms he gives, since they may not be those used by the speakers I worked with.  4.3.1  Quotative -wA/iS The quotative is a matrix clause mood which is used when the speaker (as origo of a  matrix clause) gained knowledge of a situation by means of a report. In (93) the speaker Kay was told that she won a car. When she talks about the situation of her winning a car, she uses the quotative mood, since she learned about it by report. (93)  Scenario: Kay got a phone call, and it was someone telling her that she won a car in a ra e. Afterwards she told Bill this. hita/apwa/iJas huupuKvas hita/ap-wa;/iJas hu:puKvas win•1sg.quot car `I won a car.' The paradigm for the quotative mood is given in Table 4.3. The second and third  person forms look as though they consist of some su x -wA followed by the indicative mood, but this pattern is broken in the rst person. 1 2 3  sg pl -wa;/iJas -wa;/iJin -wa;/ick -wa;/icu:S -wa;/iS  Table 4.3: Quotative mood paradigm in Ahousaht  4.3.2  Indirect interrogative -HAj The paradigms for the Ahousaht interrogative moods are given in Table 4.4. Notice that  the indirect interrogative is based on the interrogative. The form of the indirect interrogative has three parts to it, at least historically: /Ha;/ followed by /j/ and a subject agreement element. In the second person plural form the /j/ has coalesced with the initial /s/ of the agreement element becoming /c/. 66  4.3. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the CP domain: in ectional mood su xes Indirect interrogative sg pl 1 -Ha;Jas -Ha;Jin 2 -Ha;jk -Ha;cuu 3 -Ha;j  Interrogative sg pl 1 -Hs -Hin 2 -k -Hsu: 3 -H  Table 4.4: Interrogative moods in Ahousaht  The indirect interrogative mood -HAj is another matrix clause mood, and it is used when the speaker believes the addressee has a report which will answer the question. In (94a) the speaker Kay assumes that Bill spoke to their mother, and so she expects that his answer will be in the quotative mood. She could not ask her mother this, since her mother knows which pie is whose, she would instead use the ordinary 1sg interrogative -Hs, as in (94b). (94)  a. Scenario: Kay's mother baked a pie for each of her children, and called everyone to tell them to come pick them up. When Kay got there, her mother wasn't around, but her brother Bill was there. Kay, assuming that he spoke to their mother, asked him this. siYaasHaJas Hil Hil siYa-a:s-HaJas 1sg.pro•poss•1sg.indir.inter this `Is this mine?' b. siYaasHs Hil Hil siYa-a:s-Hs 1sg.pro•poss•1sg.inter this `Is this mine?' Faller (2002) observes that the reportative evidential in some languages, Quechua in  particular, can be used in a question to indicate that the question itself is reported. The indirect interrogative mood in Nuu•chah•nulth cannot have this reading. In (95) the use of the indirect interrogative is infelicitous in the scenario where the speaker is relaying a question and the addressee is expected to have rst•hand evidence for his or her answer.  67  4.3. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the CP domain: in ectional mood su xes (95)  Scenario: Ann and Kay were in separate rooms in the basement with no windows. Kay's room was near the stairs, so Ann told her to ask the next person to come in if it was raining outside. When Bill comes in and comes down stairs Kay can't ask him this. #MizaaHaj Miz-(y)a;-Haj rain•cont•3.ind.inter `Is it raining?'  4.3.3  Dubitative -qAJa The paradigm for the dubitative mood in Ahousaht is given in Table 4.5.  1 2 3  sg pl -qa;Jas -qa;Jin -? -? -qa;Ja  Table 4.5: Dubitative mood paradigm in Ahousaht  The dubitative mood -qAJa is a matrix clause mood, and is used in contexts where the speaker (as origo of a matrix clause) gained knowledge of the proposition by means of contingent inference. In (96), the speaker Kay, who made a pot of tea in the morning, infers that the tea is likely to be cold in the afternoon. (96)  Scenario: Kay made tea in the morning, and in the afternoon she saw Bill going to pour a cup. She said this to him. Mal/aHs/azqaJa Mal-’a;Hs-’az-qa;Ja cold•in.vessel•now•3.dub `It's probably cold now.' The paradigm for the dubitative mood in Ahousaht is given in Table 4.5. I have not  found these forms in any of the published texts in the Ahousaht dialect (Little 2003, Louie 2003). In addition, I have not succeeded in eliciting the second person forms. Finding the appropriate sort of scenarios is di cult, since it would need to involve the speaker telling the addressee about something the addressee has done him• or herself, which is unusual enough, but additionally the speaker is uncertain about the truth of it. This is exactly when an interrogative would be used, in most cases. However, the scenarios in which a dubitative would be used can be distinguished from those in which an interrogative would be used; the dubitative would be 68  4.3. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the CP domain: in ectional mood su xes used when the addressee knows even less about his or her activities than the speaker. Nakayama (2001) gives the forms -qAjk and -qACu: for the second person singular and plural respectively, but these were not recognized by my consultants.  4.3.4  Paradigmatic blocking: CP•domain evidentials do not co•occur Evidential mood su xes are here analyzed as clause•typing elements of category C; as  such, they occur in the CP•domain. In the Ahousaht dialect of Nuu•chah•nulth, each clause contains at least one, and no more than one, mood su x. (See Chapter 9 for discussion of other dialects.) The obligatoriness of mood su xes indicates that clause•typing is always overtly coded in Nuu•chah•nulth. The fact that mood su xes do not co•occur re ects the fact that they constitute a paradigm: the selection of one mood su x blocks the occurrence of another. Consequently, evidential mood su xes predictably do not co•occur. Thus, a clause that is in ected with the quotative mood cannot be further in ected with the indirect interrogative (97a) or the dubitative (97b). (97)  a. *walyuuwa/iSHaj walyu:-wa;/iS-Ha;j be.home•3.quot•3.indir.inter b. *walyuuwa/iSqaJa walyu:-wa;/iS-qa;Ja be.home•3.quot•3.dub The example in (97a), in addition to being paradigmatically blocked, is also blocked  for semantic reasons. As I will discuss see in more detail in Chapter 6, the evidential moods are lexically speci ed for their origo. Relevant to the present discussion is the fact that the quotative has a speaker origo, while the indirect interrogative has an addressee origo. For this reason, they can't combine with each other. As for (97b), although it is blocked for paradigmatic reasons, there are no semantic reasons that prevent it from existing, as both the quotative and dubitative have a speaker origo. In fact, although such examples are not attested in Nuu•chah• nulth, they are attested in other languages. For example, as discussed by Blain and Déchaine (2007), the dubitative and the quotative combine in Plains Cree: (98)  êkwa êtikw âwa môniyâskwêw ês ê•kî•kisipêkinikêt êsa,. . . and.then dubit this white.woman report conj•perf•do.laundry(3) report `and [reportedly] a certain white woman must have been doing her laundry.' Blain and Déchaine (2007) Another logical possibility is for the indirect interrogative mood to combine with  the quotative mood (99a) or the dubitative (99b) mood. Such examples are ruled out on 69  4.3. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the CP domain: in ectional mood su xes both paradigmatic and semantic grounds. Semantically, the indirect interrogative speci es the addressee as origo, while the quotative and the dubitative speci es the speaker as origo. Thus, they can't combine. (See Chapter 6 for details.) (99)  a. *walyuuHajwa/iS walyu:-Ha;j-wa;/iS be.home•3.indir.inter•3.quot b. *walyuuHajqaJa walyu:-Ha;j-qa;Ja be.home•3.indir.inter•3.dub Now consider how the dubitative mood might combine with other evidential moods.  Again, we see that, as a mood, the dubitative cannot be further in ected with another evidential mood. Thus, the dubitative and quotative moods do not co•occur (100a), nor do the dubitative and the indirect interrogative moods (100b). (100)  a. *walyuuqaJawa/iS walyu:-qa;Ja-wa;/iS be.home•3.dub•3.quot b. *walyuuqaJaHaj walyu:-qa;Ja-Ha;j be.home•3.dub•3.indir.inter  The ill•formedness of the examples in (100) is the e ect of paradigmatic blocking, but there is nothing semantically anomalous about these combinations. Recall that the dubitative mood is one of four inferential evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth; as I show in Ÿ4.4 below, the other inferential evidentials freely combine with the quotative and the indirect interrogatives. Finally, it is impossible to combine an evidential mood su x with itself. This is shown in (101) for the quotative mood (101a), the indirect interrogative mood (101b), and the dubitative mood (101c). (101)  a. *walyuuwa/iSwa/iS walyu:-wa;/iS-wa;/iS be.home•3.quot•3.quot b. *walyuuHajHaj walyu:-Ha;j-Ha;j be.home•3.indir.inter•3.indir.inter c. *walyuuqaJaqaJa walyu:-qa;Ja-qa;Ja be.home•3.dub•3.dub 70  4.4. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the IP domain The ill•formedness of stacked quotative mood su xes is, again, the product of paradig• matic blocking. As for stacked indirect interrogative mood su xes, these should in principle also be possible, at least on semantic grounds. However, I have not come across examples of them in the literature on evidentials. And as for stacked dubitative mood su xes which are a kind of inferential these are not possible in Nuu•chah•nulth, but multiple inferentials can be stacked (see Ÿ4.4.1 below, especially example (108)). The two possible orders of -wA/iS `quotative' and -qAJa `dubitative' are illustrated in (102) below. Both are ungrammatical. (102)  a. *walyuuqaJawa/iS walyu:-qa;Ja-wa;/iS be.home•3.dub•3.quot b. *walyuuwa/iSqaJa walyu:-wa;/iS-qa;Ja be.home•3.quot•3.dub The two possible orders of -wA/iS `quotative' and -HAj `indirect interrogative' are  illustrated in (103) below. Both are ungrammatical. (103)  a. *walyuuwa/iSHaj walyu:-wa;/iS-Ha;j be.home•3.quot•3.indir.inter b. *walyuuHajwa/iS walyu:-Ha;j-wa;/iS be.home•3.indir.inter•3.quot Finally, the two possible orders of -qAJa `dubitative' and -qAJa `dubitative' are illus•  trated in (104) below. Again, both are ungrammatical. (104)  a. *walyuuqaJaHaj walyu:-qa;Ja-Ha;j be.home•3.dub•3.indir.inter b. *walyuuHajqaJa walyu:-Ha;j-qa;Ja be.home•3.indir.inter•3.dub  4.4  Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the IP domain In the IP domain, we nd the two mode su xes that have evidential force: -matak  `inference' and -ckvI `past inference'. While the moods su xes are syntactic heads, the mode su xes are modi ers. It is not obligatory for a clause to contain a mode su x, and it is possible for them to co•occur (see Ÿ4.4.3 for discussion). I discuss the two evidential modes in turn. 71  4.4. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the IP domain  4.4.1  Inferential -matak The rst IP•domain evidential I discuss is -matak `inference', which indicates a contin•  gent inference on the part of the origo. In (105) the origo is the speaker Kay, and she is not certain that Ken is asleep, but she can infer that he is based on the fact that he is very likely more tired than usual, and that his lights are out earlier than usual. (105) Scenario: Kay knew Ken worked late one day, and so was probably tired, and when she went by his house after dinner she noticed his lights were already out, and she said this to Bill. wa/ijmatak/iS Ken Ken wa/ij-matak-/i;S sleep•ind.evid•3.ind Ken `Ken must be sleeping.' The example in (105) establishes that inferential -matak can occur in matrix clauses. However, it is more often found in non•matrix clauses, as in (106).7 (106) Scenario: Ken had gone out of town for a while. One day Kay was talking to Linda, who said that Ken might be home, because she saw the lights on at his house. Later, Kay said this to Bill. Ken Linda walyuumatakq /uqlaamit/iS /uqla:p-(m)it-/i;S Linda walyu:-matak-q Ken think•past•3.ind Linda be.home•might.be•3.sub Ken `Linda thought Ken was at home.' The prevalence of -matak in non•matrix clauses is likely due to the fact that there is a dedicated inferential evidential for matrix clauses, namely the dubitative mood -qAJa (see Ÿ4.3.3 above). While -matak `inference' can occur in embedded clauses, the dubitative mood -qAJa cannot, as shown in (107). (107)  Ken a. wawaamit/iS Kay /in walyuumataKaz Ken wawa:-(m)it-/i;S Kay /in walyu:-matak-’az-0 say•past•3.ind Kay comp be.home•ind.evid•now•3.abs Ken `Kay said Ken might be home now.' Ken b. *wawaamit/iS Kay /in walyuu/azqaJa wawa:-(m)it-/i;S Kay /in walyu:-’az-qa;Ja Ken say•past•3.ind Kay comp be.home•now•3.dub Ken  7  Because of its infrequency in texts (-matak does not occur in any texts I collected, and it occurs only twice in Little (2003)) I am basing this statement of frequency on its appearances in the Nootka Texts and Native Accounts (Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 1955). I discuss this when addressing -matak in the Tseshaht dialect in Chapter 9.  72  4.4. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the IP domain Consequently, there are three ways of marking inference in a matrix clause: with the dubitative mood, as in (96) above; with -matak in combination with the indicative mood, as in (105) above; with -matak in combination with the dubitative, as (108). (108) /uHmatakqaJa kuuWiljip Ken taana ku:Wil-ji;p Ken ta:na /uH-matak-qa;Ja foc•ind.evid•3.dub steal•ben Ken money `It was probably him who stole Ken's money.' Morphologically, -matak `inference' is an in ectional mode su x. As such, it is part of the peripheral su xes that attach to the rst predicate of the clause. (See Chapter 2.4.1 for discussion of the linearization of peripheral su xes.) Within the su x string, as a mode su x -matak can co•occur with other mode su xes, including -/aqz `future' and -ckvI `past inference'. (See Ÿ4.4.3 below for details.) Thus, while mood su xes show paradigmatic blocking e ects, mode su xes do not. This distributional di erence suggests that mood su xes are syntactic heads, while mode su xes are modi ers.  4.4.2  Past inferential -ckvI The other evidential mode su x is -ckvI `past inference', which also indicates the origo  has made a contingent inference. It di ers from -matak `inference' in also specifying that the inferred situation occurred before the situation the origo perceived. For example, in (109) it rained during the night, when the origo Kay was asleep, so she could not see it. By morning it had stopped, but since the ground was still wet, she was able to infer that it had rained sometime during the night. The inferred situation occurred during the night, and the perceived situation occurred in the morning, so -ckvI is appropriate. (109) Scenario: It didn't rain at all on Thursday. On Friday at 1:00 a.m. it started raining, and it continued until 4:00 a.m. Kay went to bed on Thursday at 10:00 p.m and woke up at 6:00 a.m. Friday morning. She didn't see it rain during the night, but in the morning she saw the ground wet. When Bill got up she told him this. Mizaackvi/iS Miz-(y)a;-ckvi;-/i;S rain•cont•past.evid•3.ind `It must have rained' The origo of the clause is relevant for determining the scope of -ckvI `past inference'. While it is the speaker making a contingent inference when -ckvI is in a matrix clause, as in (109) above, in embedded clauses -ckvI indicates the matrix subject is making it. This is because the origo in a matrix clause is the speaker, and in an embedded clause it is the subject 73  4.4. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the IP domain of the propositional attitude verb. In (110) Linda, as the subject of the verb /uqlaap `think', is the origo of the clause containing -ckvI, and she is the one making the inference in this scenario. (110) Scenario: Linda told Kay that Ken must have been home because he found her shoes at the door, even though she wasn't around anymore. Kay then told Bill this. /uqlaamit/iS Linda [walyuuckviq Ken] /uqla:p-(m)it-/i;S Linda [walyu:-ckvi;-q Ken] think•past•3.ind Linda [be.home•past.evid•3.sub Ken] `Linda thought Ken must have been home.' As I mentioned already, -ckvI `past inference' is a mode su x. However, -ckvI displays some morphological behaviour unique among the mode su xes, due the fact that it is the only one which is vowel• nal: when a glottalizing or glottal•initial su x immediately follows it, the two su xes coalesce. There are several such su xes that can occur after the mode su xes, including -’ap `causative', -’az `now', -’at `shift', and -/ak `possessive'. I give a couple of examples of this process below. In (111a) -ckvI is followed directly by the glottalizing su x -’az, and the two coalesce resulting in [ckvaz] on the surface. Likewise, in (111b) -ckvI is followed by the glottal•initial allomorph of the possessive, and the two su xes coalesce resulting in [ckvak] on the surface. (111)  a. Scenario: Ann's child was throwing a tantrum, and once she got him calmed down, Ken's child started. Kay said this to Bill. Ann TaNa/isuk/i Ha?uqHckvaz/iS wiiwaakva Ann TaNa-/is-uk-/i; Ha?uqH-ckvi;-’az-/i;S wi:wa:kva take.turn•past.evid•now•3.ind throw.tantrum Ann child•dim•poss•def `It must have been Ann's child's turn to throw a tantrum.' b. Scenario: Ann told Kay she wasn't sure if she had enough food for the feast. At the end of the feast, Kay was helping clean up and she saw that there was some food left over. She said this to Bill. Hayaazckvak/iS ha/um Haya:z-ckvi;-/a;k-/i;S ha/um enough•past.evid•poss•3.ind food `She must have had enough food.' In addition to the past inferential mode su x -ckvI, there is another -ckvI su x  which attaches to nouns to form nouns that denote the result of some activity or the remains of something. Some representative examples from the Ahousaht dialect are given in Table 4.6.8 8  These words, from Little (2003), were not recognized by my consultants.  74  4.4. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the IP domain ZuJumckvi kvickvii CaHwackvi  `mussel shell' ` ling dust' `afterbirth'  Table 4.6: Nouns derived with -ckvI from Little (2003)  4.4.3  IP•domain evidentials can co•occur The two IP•domain evidentials, past inferential -ckvI and inferential -matak, belong  to the class of mode su xes. As shown in the template in (112), these mode su xes are part of the set of peripheral su xes; as such; they cliticize to the rst verbal constituent in the sentence. (See Chapter 2 for details.) (112) [Verb.Stem][•Derivational•Aspectual] •Mode•Valence/Tense•Mood•Discourse Core Suffixes  Peripheral Suffixes  Recall that the evidential mood su xes constitute a paradigm, and so are in comple• mentary distribution. In contrast, evidential mode su xes are not in a paradigmatic relation. Consequently, they can co•occur. Signi cant is the fact that they can occur in either order. For example, in some contexts, evidential -matak can precede or follow the past evidential -ckvI, as in (113). But in other contexts, -ckvI precedes -matak, while the converse order is not accepted, as in (114). It is not clear what the criteria are for selecting one order over another in a given context; and the same speaker can o er di erent orders in di erent sentences. The fact that relative order of -ckvI and -matak is not xed suggests that they are introduced into the IP•domain as adjunct modi ers. (113)  a. /uHaaYasmatakckvi/iS qinHaama qinHa:ma /u-Ha;Yas-matak-ckvi;-/i;S trans•go.and.buy•ind.evid•past.evid•3.ind egg `I think he might have gone to buy eggs.' b. /uHaaYasckvimatak/iS qinHaama /u-Ha;Yas-ckvi;-matak-/i;S qinHa:ma trans•go.and.buy•past.evid•ind.evid•3.ind egg `I think he might have gone to buy eggs.'  75  4.4. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the IP domain (114)  a. haWiiqzckvimatak/iS haWi:qz-ckvi;-matak-/i;S hungry•past.evid•ind.evid•3.ind `He must have been hungry.' b. ?haWiiqzmatakckvi/iS haWi:qz-matak-ckvi;-/i;S hungry•ind.evid•past.evid•3.ind `He must have been hungry.' It is not possible for the same mode su x to iterate. This is shown in in (115a) for  -matak, and in (115b) for -ckvI. (115)  a. *walyuumatakmatak/iS walyu:-matak-matak-/i;S be.home•ind.evid•ind.evid•3.ind b. *walyuuckvickvi/iS walyu:-ckvi;-ckvi;-/i;S be.home•past.evid•past.evid•3.ind  4.4.4  IP•domain and CP•domain evidentials can co•occur In terms of distribution, I have so far shown that while CP•domain mood evidentials  are in complementary distribution, IP•domain evidential can co•occur with each other. In addition, the claim that evidential moods and modes partition into two distinct syntactic domains predicts that it will be possible for IP•domain and CP•domain evidentials to co•occur. This prediction is borne out. First, consider the combination of the evidential moods the quotative, the indirect interrogative, and the dubitative with inferential -matak. The relevant examples are given in (116). The example in (116a) shows that -matak combines with quotative -wA/iS; the example in (116b) shows that -matak combines with the indirect interrogative -HAj; and the example in (116c) shows that -matak combines with the dubitative -qAJa. (116)  a. haWiiqzmatakwa/iS haWi:qz-matak-wa;/iS hungry•past.evid•3.quot `He must be hungry.' b. si?ajizmatakHaj si?a-Si(z)-matak-Ha;j cooked•mom•ind.evid•3.indir.inter `Is it possible that it's cooked?'  76  4.5. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the VP domain c. /uHmatakqaJa kuuWiljip Ken taana ku:Wil-ji;p Ken ta:na /uH-matak-qa;Ja foc•ind.evid•3.dub steal•ben Ken money `It was probably him who stole Ken's money.' Now consider the combination of the evidential moods the quotative, the indirect interrogative, and the dubitative with past inferential -ckvI. The relevant examples are given in (117). The example in (117a) shows that -ckvI combines with quotative -wA/iS; the example in (117b) shows that -ckvI combines with the indirect interrogative -HAj; and the example in (117c) shows that -ckvI combines with the dubitative -qAJa. (117)  a. Mizaackviwa/iS Miz-(y)a;-ckvi;-wa;/iS rain•cont•past.evid•3.quot `It must have been raining (according to somebody).' b. MizaackviHaj Miz-(y)a;-ckvi;-Ha;j rain•cont•past.evid•3.indir.inter `Was it raining?' c. walyuuckviqaJa Ken Ken walyu:-ckvi;-qa;Ja be.home•past.evid•3.dub Ken `I guess Ken was probably home.'  4.5  Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the VP domain Nuu•chah•nulth has two evidentials in the VP domain. One is a derivational su x -Kuk  `visual inference' (Ÿ4.5.1), and the other a particle na/a:t `auditory evidence' (Ÿ4.5.2). Both of these evidentials lexically encode perceptual grounding: -Kuk encodes perceptual grounding in the visual modality; na/a:t encodes perceptual grounding via the auditory modality. In this respect, the VP•domain evidentials contrast with the IP•domain (mode) evidentials and the CP•domain (mood) evidentials. Descriptively, in Nuu•chah•nulth, only VP•domain evidentials code perceptual grounding. As we shall see in Chapters 5 and 8, this has consequences for the semantic analysis. Here I focus on the syntactic distribution of the visual inferential -Kuk and the auditory evidential na/a:t.  4.5.1  Visual inferential: the derivational su x -Kuk The visual inferential -Kuk is used in scenarios such as (118). The origo, here the speaker  Kay, can see things like the sun and people wearing shorts and t•shirts. This allows her to infer 77  4.5. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the VP domain that it is hot outside. There are two crucial properties to this scenario: (i) Kay's uncertainty as to the temperature outside; and (ii) Kay perceiving something via the visual modality that allows her to make an inference about the temperature. (118) Scenario: Kay was inside where the air conditioning kept the temperature at 21◦ C. She looked outside and saw it was sunny and people were wearing shorts and t•shirts, so she said this to Bill. ZupaaKuk Zup-(y)a;-Kuk-0 hot•cont•vis.evid•3.abs `It looks hot out.' With the visual inferential -Kuk, the origo can be, but need not be the speaker. This can be seen by putting the visual inferential in an embedded clause, where the origo is whoever is speci ed as the subject of the matrix verb. For example, in (119), the visual inferential -Kuk is in a clause embedded under the propositional attitude verb /uqlaap `think'. Linda, the subject of the matrix verb, is also the origo of the embedded clause, and she has inferred, because she saw lights one, that Ken must be at home. (119) Scenario: Linda saw lights on at Ken's place when she went by, and later she called Kay and told her walyuuKuk/iS Ken. When she got o the phone Kay said this to Bill. Linda [walyuuKukq /uqlaamit/iS Ken] /uqla:p-(m)it-/i;S Linda [walyu:-Kuk-q Ken] think•past•3.ind Linda [be.home•vis.evid•3.sub Ken] `Linda thought Ken must be at home.' In terms of the Nuu•chah•nulth morphological template (see Ÿ2.4.1 for details), the visual inferential -Kuk is a core su x, and so attaches quite close to the root, before any aspectual su xes. This is shown in (120). (120) [Verb.Stem][•Derivational•Aspectual] •Mode•Valence/Tense•Mood•Discourse Core Suffixes  Peripheral Suffixes  A single clause can contain more than one predicate, where a predicate is a word that can occur clause•initially and host the peripheral su xes. In multi•predicate clauses, peripheral su xes must attach to the initial predicate of the clause, while core su xes can attach to any predicate, including those which are not clause•initial. With this in mind, consider (121), which has two coordinated clauses. Relevant is the fact that the second conjunct contains three predicative elements: qvaaqH `but', /iiqHii `still', and haWiiqz `hungry'. In (121a), -Kuk attaches to qvaaqH `but'; in (121b) it attaches to /iiqHii `still', and in (121c) to haWiiqz `hungry'. 78  4.5. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the VP domain (121)  a. Scenario: Kay saw Ken eat a lot at lunch, and then afterwards he kept going back to the fridge. She said this to Bill. Ken [qvaaqHKuk haWiiqz] /ayaqzaqit/iS /iiqHii Ken [qva:qH-Kuk-0 /aya-’aqz-(q)aq-(m)it-/i;S /i:q-Hi; haWi:qz] many•in.body•aug•past•3.ind Ken [but•vis.evid•3.abs still•dur hungry] `Ken ate real lots and yet he's still behaving like he's hungry.' Ken [qvaaqH /iiqHiiKuk b. /ayaqzaqit/iS haWiiqz] Ken [qva:qH-0 /i:q-Hi;-Kuk /aya-’aqz-(q)aq-(m)it-/i;S haWi:qz] many•in.body•aug•past•3.ind Ken [but•3.abs still•dur•vis.evid hungry] `Ken ate real lots and yet he's still behaving like he's hungry.' c. /ayaqzaqit/iS Ken [qvaaqH /iiqHii haWiiqzKuk] /aya-’aqz-(q)aq-(m)it-/i;S Ken [qva:qH-0 /i:q-Hi; haWi:qz-Kuk] many•in.body•aug•past•3.ind Ken [but•3.abs still•dur hungry•vis.evid] `Ken ate real lots and yet he's still behaving like he's hungry.'  4.5.1.1  VP•domain -Kuk `visual inference' is related to KuK[ RSS] `resemble'  The form of -Kuk `visual inference' is identical to that of another core su x, -Kuk[RSS] `resemble', though it di ers in its e ect on the stem and its semantics. The evidential -Kuk does not cause reduplication of its stem, but the `resemble' one does, and it also causes the rst two syllables to have short vowels. (122) susuPicKuk suPic-Kuk[RSS] sand•resembles `sugar' Though there are often identical pairs of su xes that di er in their meaning and in their e ect on the stem, the similarity in meaning here is quite suggestive. A more typical pair is -(q)Hli[L] `tell' and -(q)Hli[RLL] `do excessively'. The form of the su xes themselves is the same, including the ghost consonant allomorphy, but the one meaning `tell' causes the vowel of the rst syllable of the stem to be long, as shown in (123a) while the one meaning `do excessively' causes CV reduplication of the stem and also causes the vowels of the rst two syllables to be long (123b). (123)  a. waawaa/ijHli/iS/aal/al wa/ij-(q)Hli[R]-/i;S-/a:l-/al sleep•do.excessively•3.ind•hab•pl `They are always sleeping too much.'  79  4.5. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the VP domain TaaquqHli b. wik/iick wik-/i;ck Taqu-(q)Hli[L] neg•2sg.ind truth•tell `You're not telling the truth.' The similarity in meaning between -Kuk `visual inference' and -Kuk[RSS] `resemble', in addition to their similarity in form, suggests that they are both historically derived from a single su x. 4.5.1.2  Co•occurence of VP•domain -Kuk `visual inference' with other evidentials  VP•domain evidentials are not in a paradigmatic relation with each other, and can co•occur. I leave discussion of their co•occurrence until after the auditory evidential na/a:t has been described (Ÿ4.5.2.2). Here I focus speci cally on the co•occurrence of -Kuk `visual inference' with other evidentials, summarized in Table 4.7. I discuss the other VP•domain evidential, na/a:t `auditory evidence', in Ÿ4.5.2.2. The sentences in (124) each contain the  -Kuk  CP domain -qa;Ja -wa;/iS -Ha;j ×  IP domain -matak -ckvi; × ×  VP domain -Kuk na/a:t ×  Table 4.7: Co•occurrence of VP•domain evidential -Kuk and other evidentials VP•domain evidential -Kuk `visual inference' with one of the three CP•domain evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth. The only one which -Kuk cannot co•occur with is -qAJa `dubitative'. The reason for this not clear to me, but it is likely connected with the fact that both -Kuk and -qAJa encode contingent inference as the manner of support. As I show below, -Kuk is also not able to occur with either of the other two inferentials, -matak `inference' and -ckvI `past inference'. (124)  a. *hiixvatHiKukqaJa Ken Ken hi:xvatHi-Kuk-qa;Ja angry.with•vis.evid•3.dub Ken Ken b. hiixvatHiKukwa/iS Ken hi:xvatHi-Kuk-wa;/iS angry.with•vis.evid•3.quot Ken `It is said that Ken looks angry.' c. hiixvatHiKukHaj Ken Ken hi:xvatHi-Kuk-Ha;j angry.with•vis.evid•3.indir.inter Ken `Does Ken look angry?' 80  4.5. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the VP domain In (125) we see that -Kuk is unable to co•occur with either of the IP•domain evidentials -matak `inference' or -ckvI `past inference'. As I mentioned above, the reason for this is unclear, though they are all inferential. (125)  a. *walyuuKukmatak/iS nani nani walyu:-Kuk-matak-/i;S be.home•vis.evid•ind.evid•3.ind grandparent Ken b. *walyuuKukckvi/iS Ken walyu:-Kuk-ckvi;-/i;S be.home•vis.evid•past.evid•3.ind Ken As with all the other evidentials, -Kuk `visual inference' cannot occur twice in a single  clause. This is illustrated by the sentence in (126). (126) *walyuuKukKuk/iS walyu:-Kuk-Kuk-/i;S be.home•vis.evid•vis.evid•3.ind Finally, the sentence in (127) shows that -Kuk `visual inference' can co•occur with na/a:t `auditory evidence'. However, this is an example of -Kuk being used to indicate an inference in general, much like seem or appear in English. How the visual grounding requirement of -Kuk can be removed in such cases is not clear at present. (127) Scenario: Kay lives next door to Ken, and one day after hearing him slam his cupboard door she said this to Bill. walyuuKuk/iS Ken na/aat Ken na/a:t walyu:-Kuk-/i;S be.home•vis.evid•3.ind Ken aud.evid `Ken appears to be home.' The sentence in (128) also illustrates the use of -Kuk as a general inferential. Here the speaker was telling a story, and was unsure if Kvasitum was the word she was looking for. She had no visual evidence for this, but nevertheless used -Kuk to indicate that she was unsure. However, this example is perhaps a metaphorical use of -Kuk. The experience of trying to recall a word is much like seeing something unclearly at a distance. The sentences in (127) and (128) are the only two I have seen where -Kuk is used without the usual visual grounding requirement, and more work is needed to sort out what is going on in them. In the remainder of this dissertation I set these examples aside as unexplained exceptions. (128) Kvasitum /uklaaKuk/iS Kvasitum /u-(j)la;-Kuk-/i;S branch trans•named•vis.evid•3.ind `It seems to me that it is called k'wasitum.' 81  4.5. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the VP domain  4.5.2  Auditory evidential: the particle na/a:t The nal evidential I present is na/a:t `auditory evidence'. There are a few kinds of  scenarios where a speaker would use na/a:t, and what is constant across these scenarios is that the speaker perceived some situation using his or her sense of hearing. The di erent scenarios compatible with na/a:t result in the use of di erent moods. Let's take an example of each, beginning with one in the indicative mood -/IS. In (129) na/a:t `auditory evidence' appears in a sentence in the indicative mood, and it can be used in a scenario where the speaker, Kay, hasn't seen Ken come home, or seen anything to suggest that he has, but has heard him make noise. In other words, she has heard Ken being home. (129) Scenario: Kay lives in the apartment next to Ken's, and Ken had been away for a week. Then she heard a door close in his apartment, so she said this to Bill. walyaqpi/az/iS na/aat Ken wal-yaq-pi(z)-’az-/i;S na/a:t Ken go•having.done•in.house.mom•now•3.ind aud.evid Ken `It sounds like Ken is home now.' In (130) na/a:t `auditory evidence' occurs with the dubitative mood -qAJa. This can be used in a scenario where the speaker Kay has not seen anything that leads her to conclude that Ken is happy, but has rather heard something other than the situation of being happy itself, and from what she heard, she can infer that Ken is happy. In this case Kay heard Linda say that Ken won at lahal the night before, and from that Kay infers that he is happy, since people who win are usually happy. Also note that Linda did not tell Kay that Ken was happy, only that he won. (130) Scenario: Ken was playing lahal one day, but Kay didn't go. The next day Linda called Kay and told her that Ken won. When she got o the phone Kay told Bill this. nujHakva?azqaJa Ken /in hita/ap na/aat nujHakv-(q)aq-’az-qa;Ja Ken /in hita/ap-0 na/a:t proud•aug•now•3.dub Ken comp win•3.abs aud.evid `Ken must be happy that he won.' Finally, in (131) na/a:t `auditory evidence' can occur with the reportative mood, for example in a scenario where the speaker Kay has heard someone say that it was Ken who ended up in jail. Kay cannot have otherwise known that it was Ken, it had to have been a report from someone else, and it had to be verbal, not written, since then she would not have heard it.  82  4.5. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the VP domain (131) Scenario: Kay and Bill heard that there was a ght the night before, and the police came and put someone in jail, but they didn't know who it was. Linda called Kay and told her that Ken got arrested, and when she got o the phone Kay told Bill this. /uHitwa/iS Ken na/aat mazpiz /uH-(m)it-wa;/iS Ken na/a:t maz-pi(z) foc•past•3.quot Ken aud.evid tied•in.house.mom `It is said it was Ken who ended up in jail.' If we change the scenario to one where Kay read it in the paper, na/a:t is no longer felicitous, and Kay will use the reportative alone, as in (132). It should be noted that the mode of perception is left unspeci ed here, and so it can also be used in the situation above, where someone verbally told Kay. (132) Scenario: Kay and Bill heard that there was a ght the night before, and the police came and put someone in jail, but they didn't know who it was. When the newspaper came, Kay read it and there was an article that said Ken was arrested. She told Bill this. /uHitwa/iS Ken mazpiz /uH-(m)it-wa;/iS Ken maz-pi(z) foc•past•3.quot Ken tied•in.house.mom `It is said it was Ken who ended up in jail.' The reader might have noticed that I have not mentioned the origo in my descriptions of the conditions where na/a:t `auditory evidence' can be used, and instead refer to the speaker. This was not an error. As I discuss in Chapter 6, na/a:t requires that the origo associated with it be a speaker. This fact results in restrictions on the kinds of clauses that na/a:t can appear in, but I leave discussion of this to Chapter 6. For now I con ne myself to mentioning that it cannot occur in any interrogative clauses, nor can it occur in the antecedent of a conditional. There are also some limitations on it in embedded clauses, but they are more complicated, so I defer discussion until Chapter 6. Morphologically na/a:t `auditory evidence' is a non•initial particle. As a particle it cannot be in ected, as shown in (133b), and as a non•initial one it can occur anywhere in a clause except the beginning, as shown in (133c).  83  4.5. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the VP domain (133) Scenario: Kay could not see outside, but heard the rain hitting the window. na/aat a. Mizaa/iS Miz-(y)a;-/i;S na/a:t rain•cont•3.ind aud.evid `It's raining.' b. *na/aat/iS Mizaa c. *na/aat Mizaa/iS 4.5.2.1  VP•domain na/a:t `auditory evidence' is related to na/a: `hear'  The form of na/a:t `auditory evidence' appears to be derived from the verb stem na/a: `hear'. The similarity in both form and meaning is too strong to be due to chance. However, I believe the similarity to be due to a single diachronic origin, and not to any shared underlying morpheme. There is no su x -t in Nuu•chah•nulth which could attach to the stem na/a: to produce the form na/a:t. The closest candidate for a su x would be -’at `shift', but the compositional meaning would not be correct for na/a:t. In such a case na/a:t would be a reduced form of na/aa/at (na/a:-’at `hear•shift'), but this would mean something like `he/she/it was heard by him/her/it', or `one hears it'. Given the latter reading, with a generic subject hearing something, we have a plausible historical source for na/a:t in the reduction of na/aa/at. 4.5.2.2  Co•occurence of VP•domain na/a:t `auditory evidence' with other evidentials  The VP•domain evidential na/a:t `auditory evidence' has a di erent range of possible co•occurrences with other evidentials, summarized in Table 4.8 as compared to the other VP• domain evidential -Kuk `visual inference'. This is due to the di erence in its semantics, namely that na/a:t 1) is unspeci ed for a manner of support thus permitting it to co•occur with inferentials and 2) its origo must be a speaker, not an addressee thus disallowing it from co•occuring in an interrogative.  na/a:t  CP domain -qa;Ja -wa;/iS -Ha;j ×  IP domain -matak -ckvi; ×  VP domain -Kuk na/a:t ×  Table 4.8: Co•occurrence of na/a:t `auditory evidence' with other evidentials The sentences in (134) each contain na/a:t `auditory evidence' together with one of the CP•domain evidential mood su xes. It is compatible with both -qAJa `dubitative' and -wA/iS  84  4.5. Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in the VP domain `quotative', where the origo is the speaker. However, it cannot co•occur with -HAj `indirect interrogative' because the origo in an interrogative is the addressee. (134)  a. walyaqpi/azqaJa Ken na/aat Ken na/a:t wal-yaq-pi(z)-’az-qa;Ja go•having.done•in.house.mom•now•3.dub Ken aud.evid `It sounds like Ken is home now.' Ken na/aat b. hiixvatHiwa/iS Ken na/a:t hi:xvatHi-wa;/iS angry.with•3.quot Ken aud.evid `It sounds like Ken is angry.' Ken na/aat c. *hiixvatHiHaj Ken na/a:t hi:xvatHi-Ha;j angry.with•3.indir.inter Ken aud.evid  As I discuss in Ÿ6.5 below, na/a:t can be used when the origo is the speaker in a speech act that is not the root speech act. In other words, since -wA/iS `quotative' and -HAj `indirect interrogative' both implicate another speech act the speech act in which the origo obtained the report supporting the prejacent proposition we expect that na/a:t can co•occur with -wA/iS and -HAj with the interpretation that the speaker associated with the report itself is the origo of na/a:t (that is, we expect that na/a:t can be semantically embedded under -wA/iS and -HAj). I have data to support this for -wA/iS, which I give in Ÿ6.5, but I lack the data to support this for -HAj. In (135) we see that na/a:t `auditory evidence' can co•occur with -matak `inference', but not with -ckvI `past inference'. This is due to the way that na/a:t interacts with the temporal semantics of -ckvI, namely that na/a:t can only occur with a prejacent proposition that holds at the time of the perceived situation, while -ckvI can only occur with a prejacent proposition temporally precedes the perceived situation (see Chapter 8). (135)  a. wikpizmataKaz/um Ken na/aat wik-pi(z)-matak-’az-0-/um Ken na/a:t neg•in.house.mom•ind.evid•now•3.abs•dm Ken aud.evid `Ken is probably not at home.' b. *KaMaqaqaqckvi/iS/al na/aat na/a:t KaMaqa-(q)aq-ckvi;-/i;S-/al be.noisy•aug•past.evid•3.ind•pl aud.evid Recall that na/a:t can co•occur with the visual inferential -Kuk, in which case it the  latter has the force of a general•purpose inferential. The relevant example, which I already discussed above in the context of -Kuk, is repeated in (136) for convenience. 85  4.6. Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings (136) Scenario: Kay lives next door to Ken, and one day after hearing him slam his cupboard door she said this to Bill. Ken na/aat walyuuKuk/iS Ken na/a:t walyu:-Kuk-/i;S be.home•vis.evid•3.ind Ken aud.evid `Ken appears to be home.' I assume this shift in meaning of -Kuk is metaphorical. Note that in English, for example, look can also lose its visual component, as in (137). (137) Scenario: Ken was supposed to meet Kay and Bill at 6:00, but at 5:50 he called Kay and told her he would be late. Kay then said this to Bill. It looks like he'll be late. Finally, as with all the other evidentials, it is not possible to have two instances of the auditory evidential na/a:t in the same sentence. This is shown in (138). (138) *walyuuqaJa na/aat na/aat walyu:-qa;Ja na/a:t na/a:t be.home•3.dub aud.evid aud.evid  4.6  Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings While only evidentials encode one of the three evidential relations, other morphemes  encode relations which are minimally di erent from these. In the remainder of this section I compare evidentials to these other kinds of morphemes. Propositional attitude morphemes like /uqla:p `think' or hayumHi `not know' encode a relation between an attitude holder and a proposition, but the attitude holder is not the origo of the clause the morpheme appears in, it is its external argument. I discuss these in Ÿ4.6.1. Similarly, verbs of saying like wa: `say' encode a relation between a person and a speech act (a proposition paired with a speech context). I discuss these in Ÿ4.6.2. Perception predicates like Naatssijiz `see' and na/aa `hear' encode a relation between a perceiver their external argument and an entity. I discuss these in Ÿ4.6.3. Finally, there are what I am calling entity attitude morphemes like -tuk `sound like', -PUqs `smell like' and -XAX `endearment' which encode a relation between an origo, a property and an entity. I discuss these in Ÿ4.6.4  4.6.1  Comparing evidentials to predicates that introduce propositions A number of propositional attitude verbs encode the perspectival status of a proposition  for an individual, and I list several in Table 4.9. Propositional attitude verbs do not t the 86  4.6. Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings de nition of an evidential morpheme because they do not encode a relation between their own origo and a proposition the individual whose perspectival status is encoded is the attitude holder argument of the verb. All the verbs in Table 4.9 are transitive, taking the proposition /uqlaap huHtak huHtakSiz hayumHi wikWinjiz  `think' `know' `learn' `not know' `forget'  Table 4.9: Nuu•chah•nulth propositional attitude verbs as their internal argument and the individual as their external argument. For the most part, the proposition is contained in a clause in the absolutive mood, optionally introduced by the complementizer /in, but /uqlaap `think' takes a clause in the subordinate mood which cannot be introduced by /in. These two patterns are illustrated in (139), where huHtak `know' takes an /in•clause and /uqlaap takes a subordinate mood clause. (139)  a. Scenario: Ken went and bought $100 worth of food for her brother, even though he doesn't have much money. Kay said this to Bill. /in qvisit suWa huHtakitk /in qvis-(m)it-0 suWa huHtak-(m)it-k know•past•2sg.inter 2sg.pro comp do.thus•past•3.abs `Did you know that he did that?' b. Scenario: Ken has the same kind of shoes as John, and when the two of them came in, Ken went in and took his o in the bedroom. The next morning, he saw John putting on his shoes by the front door, and tells him they are his, and they start arguing. Bill comes in and asks Kay what is going on, and she replies with this. /uqlaap/iS Ken /uucqaa Suuwis/i /uqla:p-/i;S Ken /u:c-qa; Su:wis-/i; think•3.ind Ken own•3.sub shoes•def `Ken thinks the shoes are his.' Both huHtak `know' and /uqlaap `think' entail that their complement proposition is  in the perspective of their subject, and others also entail this, such as Taaqaak `believe', given in a sentence in (140a). Other verbs entail that their complement proposition is not in their subject's perspective. An example of this is hayumHi `not know', illustrated in (140b).  87  4.6. Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings (140)  taananakSiz Ken /in /uH a. Taaqaakit/iS ta:na-na;k-Si(z) Ta:qa:k-(m)it-/i;S Ken /in /uH-0 believe•past•3.ind Ken comp foc•3.abs money•have•mom `Ken believes it was he that received money.' b. hayumHi/iS Linda /in ?aCiKazuk saapniqiil TaNa hayumHi-/i;S Linda /in ?aCik-’az-uk-0 sapni:-q-(j)i:l[L] TaNa not.know•3.ind Linda comp know.how•now•poss•3.abs bread•stem•make child `Linda doesn't know her child knows how to make bread.' The verbs exempli ed above are all stative rather than eventive; the situations described  by these verbs hold over time and have no inherent endpoint. By adding the momentaneous su x -Si(z) to such verbs we get inchoative verbs indicating a change of state, from one where the situation described by the verb does not hold to one where it does. Thus, huHtakSiz means ` nd out' or `learn', while wikWinjiz means forget.9 (141)  /um/iiqsu xaaSxiipSizuk a. huHtakSiz ma/izqac/i /an /aanaqH xa:Sxi:p-Si(z)-uk /um/i-i;q-su huHtak-Si(z) ma/izqac-/i; /an /a:na-(q)H-0 comp really•sim•3.abs bluejay•mom•poss mother•kin•kin know•mom boy•def The little boy now knew that his mother really turned into a blue jay. (Little 2003, 42) walyaqpi/azHuuk b. /o wikWinjizk wal-yaq-pi(z)-’az-Hu:k /o wikWin-Si(z)-k prt forget•mom•2sg.inter be.home•having.done•in.house.mom•now•3.abs.emph `Oh, did you forget he's home now?' The verb Zuu means `remember', as in `don't forget', and as such does not involve a  change in state. /aHkuu (142) ZuujiiPisum /aHku: Zu:-ji;p-’i;sum remember•ben•2sg>1sg.imp.fut this `Remember this for me.'  4.6.2  Comparing evidentials to verbs of saying Verbs of saying indicate that a report occurred, and as such encode something like a  manner of support. However, rather than encoding a relation between a situation perceived by the origo and a proposition, verbs of saying encode a relation between a speaker and a speech act. The speech act (formally a proposition paired with a speech context) is the internal argument of a verb of saying, and the speaker its external argument. I give three verbs of saying in Table 4.10 below. Generally waa is translated `say' while /uuqHli and /iiqHuk are translated 9  The sentence in (141a) has the complementizer as /an instead of /in, which is the form used by my consultants.  88  4.6. Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings waa/wawaa /uuqHli /iiqHuk  `say' `tell' `tell'  Table 4.10: Nuu•chah•nulth verbs of saying as `tell', but all three can occur with an object, especially with -’at `shift'. I go into more detail on each of these verbs in turn, starting with waa. The verb meaning `say' occurs in two forms, waa and wawaa, though it is unclear what the di erence is between them. A reasonable guess is that waa is momentaneous while wawaa is durative, since verbs often occur in a momentaneous•durative pair, but I have not tested this. In narrative texts waa is more frequent than wawaa, while in elicitation contexts I nd the reverse to be true. Whatever the di erence is, it is not relevant to the points I make below. I use waa as a cover term for both forms. We nd waa `say' with both direct and indirect quotes. An indirect quote occurs in an absolutive mood clause introduced by the complementizer /in. The sentences in (143) illustrate the use of waa with an indirect quote. (143)  a. wawaa/iS Ken /in maakukvitsuuk jamas wawa:-/i;S Ken /in ma:kuk-(m)it-su:k jamas say•3.ind Ken comp buy•past•2sg.abs sweet `Ken says you bought sweets.' b. Scenario: Bill told Kay that the kids were hyped up, and then the phone rang and Linda said that they're already asleep. When she got o the phone Kay said this to Bill. wawaa/iS /uH Linda /in wa/iJazHuuk/al wawa:-/i;S /uH Linda /in wa/ij-’az-Hu:k-/al say•3.ind foc Linda comp sleep•now•3.abs.emph•pl `Linda says they're already asleep.'  In (144) we see waa with a direct quote. Note that the direct quote precedes the verb, whereas indirect quotes follow it. (144)  ha hayumHimitsa waa/aZats ha hayumHi-(m)it-sa wa:-’az-’at-s prt not.know•past•1sg.abs say•now•shift•1sg.abs `Huh, I didn't know that she said to me.' The other verbs of saying, /uuqHli `tell' and /iiqHuk `tell' cannot be used with direct  quotes. I give an example of each in (145). They both take clauses in the absolutive mood introduced by the complementizer /in as their complement. 89  4.6. Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings (145)  piiSpiS /in /azanakuk a. /uuqHlanits pi:SpiS /in /aza-na;k-uk-0 /u-(q)Hli[L]-’at-(m)it-s trans•tell•shift•past•1sg.abs comp two•have•poss•3.abs cat /um/iiqsak/i /um/i-i;q-sak-/i; mother•kin•kin.poss•def `He told me that she has two cats.' b. /iiqHukvit/iS Ken Kay /in hinin/az Kyle /i:qH-uk-(m)it-/i;S Ken Kay /in hinin-’az-0 Kyle tell•dur•past•3.ind Ken Kay comp arrive•now•3.abs Kyle `Ken told Kay that Kyle arrived.' The su x -(q)Hli[L] also occurs in the verb PiiSHli `tell something bad', which also  takes an indirect quote complement clause. It is shown in an example sentence in (146). Kay /in /uu/uukvil/anit Ken /uukvil (146) PiiSHlimit/iS PiS-(q)Hli[L]-(m)it-/i;S Ken /u-(j)il[L] Kay /in /u-(j)il[RLL]-’at-(m)it-0 bad•tell•past•3.ind Ken trans•do.to Kay comp trans•blame•shift•past•3.abs kuuWil taana Mary ku:Wil ta:na Mary steal money Mary `Ken told negative things to Kay that she was blamed for stealing money by Mary' The quotative mood -wA/iS contains the element /wa;/, and it is unlikely a coincidence that the verb which means `say' has the form wa: and frequently appears in a reduplicated form wawa:. I believe this to be a historical fact, since this sort of stem•su x pair is extremely rare in the language. As such, I do not propose to analyze -wA/iS `quotative' as containing the verb wa: `say'. Also note that while the second and third persons the second element is the same as the relevant indicative mood form(-/ick `2sg indicative', -/icu:S `2pl indicative' and -/IS `3 indicative'), the rst person forms break this pattern if the pattern held the forms would be -wAsiS for 1sg and -wAniS for 1pl. There is a third morpheme which seems to be related, and that is -(w)a[RLL] `speak'. This su x creates verbs indicating the manner in which someone is speaking. I give three sentences containing this su x in (147) below. Because the /w/ is a ghost consonant, it only shows up in surface forms when the stem it attaches to ends in a vowel or nasal, as in (147b). When this su x attaches to the name of a people, as in (147a), the stem indicates the language or dialect being spoken, and when it attaches to a predicate, as in (147b) or (147c), the stem indicates some characteristic of the subject's speech.  90  4.6. Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings (147)  maamaamalNiqa a. wik/aqzwa/ick quuquu/aca/aqzwa/ick wik-/aqz-wa;/ick mamalNi-q-(w)a[RLL] qu:/ac-(w)a[RLL]-/aqz-wa;/ick neg•fut•2sg.quot white.person•stem•speak person•speak•fut•2sg.quot `You're not supposed to speak English, you're supposed to speak your own language.' Ken /aa/aapHiwat b. hiSaHtaniniS Ken /a:pHi;-(w)a[RLL]-’at hiS-aHta-’at-(m)it-ni;S all•do.to•shift•past•1pl.ind Ken friendly•speak•shift `Ken greeted all of us warmly.' c. kuukuuWaqawa/iS Ken na/aat ku:Waq-(w)a[RLL]-wa;/iS Ken na/a:t Ken aud.evid swear•speak•3.quot `Ken is swearing.'  The historical relationship of these three morphemes is outside the scope of this dissertation, although I will point out that Swadesh (1948) discusses these in the Tseshaht dialect, and favours the view that the two su xes have been derived over time from the verb.  4.6.3  Comparing evidentials to predicates that introduce experiencers: verbs of perception Verbs of perception can indicate the perceptual grounding relation between a situation  that supports the proposition and their experiencer argument. The proposition is the verb's internal argument, and the experiencer is its external argument. Two such verbs are given in Table 4.11 below. Both Naatsiijiz `see' and na/aa `hear' are more often used with nominal Naatsiijiz na/aa  `see' `hear'  Table 4.11: Some Nuu•chah•nulth verbs of perception complements, but can also be used with clausal complements, as shown in (148) below. (148)  a. NaatsiijizitsiS /in hixvatHiqaq Ann luucma Na:tsi-Si(z)-(m)it-si;S /in hi:xvatHi-(q)aq[SS]-0 Ann lu:cma see•mom•past•1sg.ind comp angry.with•aug•3.abs Ann woman `I saw that Ann is a really hot•tempered woman.' b. na/aamits /in /aSXaksulaq Ann luucma na/a;-(m)it-s /in /aSX-(/)aksul-(q)aq[SS]-0 Ann lu:cma hear•past•1sg.abs comp reckless•at.mouth•aug•3.abs Ann woman `I heard that Ann has a fowl mouth as a woman.' 91  4.6. Comparing evidentials to predicates with similar meanings In each of these sentences the verb gives the perceptual grounding relation between their propositional internal argument and their experiencer external argument. The experiencer in (148a) saw Ann yelling, and from this she learned that Ann had a hot temper. In (148b) the experiencer heard Ann swearing, and so learned that Ann had a foul mouth. In both cases the complement proposition is also now in the subject's perspective, and so these verbs specify perspectival status as well as perceptual grounding.  4.6.4  Comparing evidentials to predicates that introduce properties: sensory su xes In Nuu•chah•nulth there is a set of core (derivational) su xes which refer to particular  senses in their meaning; these su xes are listed in Table 4.12 below. Unlike those evidential -a;tuk -Pu;qs -Pal  `sound' `smell' `taste'  Table 4.12: Nuu•chah•nulth sensory su xes morphemes which specify the perceptual grounding between a perceived situation and a propo• sition, these su xes have two arguments, neither of which is a situation or a proposition. The rst argument is a property, such as being nice. The second argument is an entity which the origo deems to have the property given by the rst argument. are illustrated in (149). (149)  nuuk a. zulaatukuk/iS nu:k zul-a;tuk-uk-/i;S nice•sound•poss•3.ind song `His song has a very nice sound to it.' b. ha/umPuqs/azuk/ick ha/um-Pu;qs-’az-uk-/i;ck tasty•smell.of•now•poss•2sg.ind `Yours smells good.' c. CiSPal/azuk/ick suuHaa CiS-Pal-’az-uk-/i;ck su:Ha: unclean•taste•now•poss•2sg.ind salmon `Your salmon has a bad taste now.' d. CiSPalCuqvas CiS-Pal-Cuqva-s dirty•taste•in.mouth•1sg.abs `I have a bad taste in my mouth.' 92  4.7. Consequences These are not evidential morphemes because they do not specify a relation between the origo and a proposition. Take (149a), for example. This sentence does not mean that the song is nice, and the speaker's awareness of this stems from auditory signal. It is instead describing the sound itself as good. The speaker is giving their judgment of the quality of the sound. Likewise in (149b) the speaker is giving her judgment that the way the bread in the oven smells is tasty, and in (149d) the speaker is describing the taste in her mouth, not that there is something bad in her mouth and she knows it by tasting; the taste itself is what she is talking about. Another sensory su x is -Kuk[RSS] `resemble', which I discussed in Ÿ4.5.1 above. This su x di ers in form from the evidential -Kuk `visual inference' in that it causes reduplication and induces short vowel length on the rst two syllables. In terms of meaning, both su xes make reference to the sense of sight, but the non•evidential one creates a predicate which forms the nucleus of the proposition, just as we saw with -Atuk and -PUqs. For example, in (150) -Kuk[RSS] attaches to the stem /um/ic `mother' yielding the verb /u/um/icKuk `resemble one's mother'. Here we also see that this predicate involving resemblance is negated when wik is introduced into the clause. (150) wik/iiS /u/um/icKuk wik-/i;S /um/i-Kuk[RSS] neg•3.ind mother•resembles `She doesn't look like her mother.'  4.7  Consequences In this section I discuss two of the consequences of my de nition of evidentiality and  the evidential domain hypothesis. First, some of the mood su xes which have been described as evidential in the literature on Nuu•chah•nulth (see Swadesh 1933, Rose 1981, Davidson 2002) do not t my de nition of an evidential morpheme. I discuss these in Ÿ4.7.1. And second, because di erent evidential morphemes occur in di erent syntactic domains, they have di erent semantic properties, and I summarize these in Ÿ4.7.2.  4.7.1  Not all mood su xes are evidentials Much like we saw for attitude verbs and verbs of perception, mood markers which per•  form a similar function to evidentials are not necessarily evidential morphemes. Nevertheless, these deserve some discussion. In Ÿ4.7.1.1 and Ÿ4.7.1.2 below I describe the indicative mood -/IS and the mirative mood -JA?aS and argue they are not evidentials. In Ÿ4.7.1.3 I describe the indirect conditional and indirect relative moods. As we will see, these last two moods are more like evidential concord, and do not specify an evidential relation on their own. The mirative mood and the two indirect moods are the non•evidential moods which bear 93  4.7. Consequences the closest resemblance to evidentials the remainder of the moods (the indicative, conditional, relative, subordinate, etc.) I leave without discussion, though I come back to the indicative in Chapter 9, where I discuss the relation between the origo and so•called direct evidentials. 4.7.1.1  Indicative mood  We have seen numerous examples of the indicative mood already. It is used in main clause declaratives, though it is not the most common mood in declarative clauses in texts. For example, in one text about the speaker's personal experiences, only 11 out of 54 clauses are in the indicative mood, while the majority of the declarative clauses are in the absolutive mood. Being a main clause mood, the indicative mood cannot occur in an embedded clause. The indicative mood paradigm is given in full in Table 4.13. 1 2 3  sg pl -si;S -ni;S -/i;ck -/icu:S -/i;S  Table 4.13: Indicative mood paradigm in Ahousaht  Because the indicative mood occurs in sentences where the speaker believes the pre• jacent proposition to be true, and because it is in complementary distribution with evidential moods such as the quotative -wA/iS and dubitative -qAJa, it is tempting to think that the indicative mood is a direct evidential an evidential which indicates that the prejacent is in the origo's perspective. This is not the case, as I argue below. The facts do not support the indicative mood encoding direct evidentiality. For example, in (151) the speaker Kay is the origo of the sole clause in the sentence, and she directly observed Ken going upstairs, and she is certain that he is there. The proposition that Ken is upstairs is in her perspective. The sentence is in the indicative mood and contains no indirect evidentials such as -Kuk `visual inference' or -matak `inference'. (151) Scenario: Kay was sitting out on the front porch, and Bill came up and asked her waasiH Ken `Where's Ken?' She could see the stairs from where she was sitting, and saw him go up earlier. She answered with this. hilaayil/iS hil-a;yil-/iS be.there•upstairs•3.ind `He's upstairs' It may look as though the indicative mood is a direct evidential, indicating that the prejacent is in the origo's perspective, but it is not. If it were, it would not be used in 94  4.7. Consequences scenarios where the prejacent proposition is not in the origo's perspective, as this would be a contradiction. However, the indicative is used in such cases when it is in a clause with a non•mood indirect evidential like -Kuk `visual inference', -matak `inference' or -ckvI `past inference'. In (152) the origo Kay is not sure whether Ken's baby is going to start walking or not, but she can infer it from seeing her standing up and letting go of the table. (152) Scenario: Kay was watching Ken's baby for him, and she saw her standing up, holding on to the edge of the table, and she let go, so Kay said this to Bill. naYaqakuk/i Kay yaayaacataHKuk/iS naYaqak-uk-/i; Kay yac-ataH[RLL]-Kuk-/i;S walk•about.to•vis.evid•3.ind baby•poss•def Kay `It looks like Kay's baby is going to start walking.' Another example of the indicative with an indirect evidential is given in (153), where it occurs with -ckvI. Kay can only use this when she hasn't seen the rain itself, but instead has seen something that allows her to infer that it rained previously. (153) Scenario: Kay woke up, looked outside and saw the ground was wet. When Bill got up she told him this. Mizaackvi/iS Miz-(y)a;-ckvi;-/i;S rain•cont•past.evid•3.ind `It must have been raining.' Sentences like those in (152) and (153) would not be possible if the indicative mood were a direct evidential. Since the indicative occurs in clauses with both direct and indirect evidentiality, it is not an evidential itself. Instead, in cases of direct and indirect evidentiality alike, its semantics only identify the origo as the speaker. The direct evidentiality is an implicature, rather than an entailment of the indicative mood. This implicature arises because sentences in the indicative mood are used to make assertions, and assertions are only felicitous when the proposition asserted is in the speaker's perspective. 4.7.1.2  Mirative -JA?aS is not an evidential  The mirative mood in Ahousaht is another matrix clause mood, which is used to indicate that the speaker, as origo of the matrix clause, is surprised to nd that the proposition is true, and has been for some period of time before he or she realized it. In the example in (154) Kay did not know Bill had moved back and was living at home for at least three weeks until she saw him again. She uses the mirative to signify the fact that there was some time between the start of the situation of Bill living at home and when Kay realized he was. 95  4.7. Consequences (154) Scenario: Bill moved years ago, then one day Kay saw him back in town. She thought he was just visiting, and then she saw him three weeks later, and realized he had moved back, so she said this to him. walya?asji/azJa?ack wal-yaq-’as-Si(z)-’az-Ja;?ack be.home•having.done•on.ground.outside•mom•now•2sg.mir `You're living at home now.' The time the origo was mistaken can be much shorter than the three weeks in the previous example. In (155) the speaker Kay had bingo, but didn't notice it, until Bill pointed it out to her. Here the elapsed time from the point where Kay had bingo to where she realized she did is measured in seconds rather than days or weeks. (155) Scenario: Kay and Bill were at bingo, and Kay had bingo but didn't realize it. Bill noticed it and pointed it out, and Kay said this. hita/aPazJa?aJas hita/ap-’az-Ja;?aJas win•now•1sg.mir `Oh, I've won.' The mirative paradigm is given in Table 4.14. I have not been able to elicit the rst and second person plural forms, nor have I found them in texts. As with other matrix clause moods, the mirative cannot occur in an embedded clause. 1 2 3  sg pl -Ja;?aJas -? -Ja;?ack -? -Ja;?aS  Table 4.14: Mirative mood paradigm in Ahousaht  Like the indicative mood, the mirative mood might appear to be a direct evidential it seems to indicate that the speaker has observed the prejacent proposition itself. However, as with the indicative mood, the mirative mood can also co•occur with an indirect evidential. If the mirative mood were a direct evidential, it would be infelicitous to use an indirect evidential in the same clause. For example, in (156) the past inferential -ckvI occurs in a clause that is in the mirative mood, yet the speaker did not observe the addressee's father being hungry, she has inferred it from the fact that he ate a lot of eggs. Thus, the directness of a sentence in the mirative mood comes from the lack of any indirect evidentials, rather than from the mirative mood itself. 96  4.7. Consequences (156) Scenario: Kay did not know Bill's father was really hungry. She eventually realized that he had eaten a lot of eggs, which probably meant he was really hungry. She said this to Bill. haWiiqzckviJa?aS NuWi /ayaqz qinHaaMa haWi:qz-ckvi;-Ja;?aS NuWi /aya-’aqz qinHa:Ma hungry•past.evid•3.mir father many•in.body egg `Your father must have been hungry, he ate a lot of eggs.' 4.7.1.3  Indirect dependent moods  In Ahousaht there are two moods which can be clearly seen as containing the inferential -j. These are the indirect inde nite relative mood -(y)i:j and the indirect conditional mood -qu:j. I have had much less success eliciting these two moods than any of the other evidentials, nevertheless I report what I have been able to discover about these below. The name `inferential' for -j is inaccurate, since it indicates just that a proposition is not in the origo's perspective, but does not specify the origo's experiential relation to it, as it would if it encoded that the origo inferred that proposition. Since it can be used in scenarios involving report, rather than inference, it would be better called a marker of indirectness. However, I do not treat -j as a separate morpheme, but treat its combination with the two moods as separate moods, the indirect inde nite relative and indirect conditional. It remains to be seen whether one approach is better than the other at accounting for the data. The indirect inde nite relative mood -(y)i:j occurs in the same environments as the inde nite relative -(y)i:, namely in relative clause and in matrix clauses that have an `I wonder...' meaning. The pair of sentences in (157) illustrate the use of the inde nite relative and indirect inde nite relative moods in a relative clause. When the matrix clause is in the indicative mood, we get the inde nite relative mood in the relative clause, as in (157a), and when the matrix clause is in the quotative mood we get the indirect inde nite relative mood in the relative clause, as in (157b). Here the speaker only has a report to the e ect that Ken bought shoes, and that those shoes were really expensive.  97  4.7. Consequences (157)  a. Scenario: Kay was shopping with Ken, and he would only buy really expensive shoes. When she got home she said this to Bill. Ken Suuwis yaqii /ana/amit/iS /iiWaqz /ana-’a;p-(m)it-/i;S Ken Su:wis yaqv-(y)i: /i:H-’aqz only•buy•past•3.ind Ken shoes rel•3.indf big•in.body `Ken only bought shoes that are very expensive.' b. Scenario: Linda was shopping with Ken, and he would only buy really expensive shoes. Later she saw Kay and told her about it, and then when Kay saw Bill she said this to her. /ana/amitwa/iS Ken Suuwis yaqiij /iiWaqz /ana-’a;p-(m)it-wa;/iS Ken Su:wis yaqv-(y)i:j /i:Waqz only•buy•past•3.quot Ken shoes rel•3.indf.inf expensive `Ken only bought shoes that are very expensive.' The indirect inde nite relative can also be used when the origo is uncertain of the  proposition of the relative clause, even though he or she is certain of the proposition of the matrix clause. In (158) the speaker Kay, is the origo of both the matrix clause and the relative clause, and she has direct evidence for the woman walking in, but is not sure if the woman is expecting twins. The relative clause contains -matak `inference' and instead of being in the inde nite relative mood -(y)i:, it is in the indirect inde nite relative mood -(y)i:j. luucma yaqmatakiij KvaaYas (158) hinii/i/az/iS /uuwil hini:/iz-’az-/i;S lu:cma yaqv-matak-(y)i:j /u-awil[L] Kva:Yas enter•now•3.ind woman rel•ind.evid•3.indf.inf trans•expecting have.twins `The woman walked in who might be expecting twins.' It is also possible for the indirect inde nite relative mood to be used without any additional evidentials. The rst line of a story from Little (2003) is given in (159). The speaker Caroline Little is certain about what she is going to do, namely talk about how people got re, but she is not certain about whether this is how people got re, since she was not there. Thus she uses the indirect inde nite relative mood in the relative clause qvisHitiij quu/as hiniip /ink `how people got re'. (159) juu /uuqHli/aqzs qvisHitiij quu/as hiniip /ink ju: /u-(q)Hli[L]-/aqz-s qvis-(q)H-(m)it-(y)i:j qu:/as hina-i:p /inkv okay trans•tell•fut•1sg.abs do.thus•sim•past•3.indf.inf person loc•get re `Ok, I will talk about how people got re.'  (Little 2003, 22)  I now turn to another kind of clause where the inde nite relative mood occurs, and show that the indirect inde nite relative can also occur there. Structurally, these look like 98  4.7. Consequences headless relative clauses, but they are not subordinate to another clause. These clauses get translated as `I wonder . . . ', and often occur with the discourse particle wa, which occurs with statements, not questions, and invites the addressee to agree or disagree with the speaker, much like right in English. Its use is not to ask the addressee to provide an answer, so much as to express the speaker's inability to remember or discover some fact. There seems to be no di erence between such clauses in the inde nite relative or the indirect inde nite relative mood. An example of the ordinary inde nite relative mood in such a clause is given in (160). Kay can't remember how old Ken was when he moved to Victoria, and expresses this with a headless relative clause in the inde nite relative mood. wa (160) quMaq/ijH/azitii wa quMa-q/ijH-’az-(m)it-(y)i: how.much•years•now•past•3.indf prt `I wonder how old he was?' In (161) Kay doesn't know where Bill's aunt lived, and neither does he, and Kay expresses her bewilderment at not being able to nd it with a headless relative clause in the indirect inde nite relative mood. Note that this contains the second person singular form -(y)i:jk, the only form other than the third person -(y)i:j I have found either through elicitation or in texts. (161) Scenario: Kay and Bill were going to his aunt's house, but they couldn't nd it. After walking around for a while, Kay said this to Bill. waaYatHiijk wa na/i waaYatH-(y)i:jk wa na/i where.live•2sg.indf.inf prt aunt/uncle `I wonder where your aunt lives?' The second non•matrix mood I address here is the indirect conditional -qu:j. This mood occurs in the antecedent clause of conditional propositions where the entire proposition is reported, while the consequent clause is in the quotative mood. In (162) the speaker Kay is the origo of both clauses, and she heard that if Ken had gone with his uncle he would have bought him candy. When she passes this information on to Bill, she uses the quotative mood in the consequent clause /u/aaPatuKvaHitwa/iS candy `he would have bought him candy', and the indirect conditional in the antecedent clause na/uukitquuj `if he had gone with him'.  99  4.7. Consequences (162) Scenario: Ken's uncle went to the store but Ken didn't want to go with him. When he got back, he told Ken he would have bought him candy. Kay heard him say this, and when Bill came in and asked why Ken was upset, she said this to him. na/uukitquuj /u/aaPatuKvaHitwa/iS candy na/u:k-(m)it-qu:j /u-’a;p-’at-uk-’a;H-(m)it-wa;/iS candy go.along•past•3.cond.inf trans•buy•shift•poss•irr•past•3.quot candy `If he had gone with him, he (his uncle) would have bought him candy.' The conditional in (162) is an if•conditional, but the indirect conditional can also appear with whenever•conditionals. In (163) the antecedent clause contains -’az and the indirect condi• tional -qu:j, while the consequent clause contains the habitual /a:l and the quotative -wA/iS. The speaker Kay is the origo of both clauses, and she obtained the conditional proposition by report from Linda. (163) Scenario: Ken had been ill, and the last time Kay saw Linda, she asked her how he was. Linda told her yaacpanaJazquu Pus/iiHijiz/iS/aal `Whenever he goes for a walk, he becomes very tired'. Later, Kay saw Bill and he asked her how Ken was making out, and she replied with this. Pus/iiHijizwa/iS/aal yaacpanaJazquuj Pus-/i;Hiji(z)-wa;/iS-/a:l yac-panaj-’az-qu:j walk•randomly•now•3.cond.inf tired•su er.mom•3.quot•hab `He becomes very tired when he goes for a walk.'  4.7.2  Evidentials from di erent syntactic domains have di erent semantic properties Patterns emerge when we look at which evidential relations are encoded in evidentials  in each of the syntactic domains, as shown in Table 4.15. First, inference can can be encoded in evidentials in any domain. Second, reportative evidentials only occur in the CP domain. Third, perceptual grounding is encoded in evidentials only in the VP domain. Evidentials which indicate perceptual grounding are predicted by Blain and Déchaine (2006) to be found in the VP domain, and this is where we nd them in Nuu•chah•nulth. I explore the reasons for this further in Chapter 8. The three evidentials in the CP domain are a mix of two reportatives and an inferential. The CP domain is the only place where we nd reportatives in Nuu•chah•nulth, but it is not the only place where we nd inferentials inferentials occur in all three domains. In the IP domain, the two mode su xes -matak `inference' and -ckvI `past inference' are inferentials, di ering only in the addition of a temporal restriction in the case of -ckvI. 100  4.8. Summary of combinatorial restrictions on Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials Domain CP  IP VP  Morpheme -qa;Ja -wa;/iS -Ha;j -ckvi; -matak -Kuk na/a:t  Gloss `dubitative' `quotative' `indirect interrogative' `past inference' `inference' `visual inference' `auditory evidence'  Inference  Report  Perceptual Grounding  Table 4.15: Evidential relations and syntactic domains The two VP•domain evidentials, -Kuk `visual inference' and na/a:t `auditory evidence' encode particular perceptual grounding relations. And conversely, the only evidentials which encode perceptual grounding are in the VP domain.  4.8  Summary of combinatorial restrictions on Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials As we saw in ŸŸ4.3 4.5 above, evidential morphemes in Nuu•chah•nulth occur in  di erent syntactic positions, rather than a single paradigmatic slot. This was rst pointed out by Jacobsen (1986), and is an example of what Aikhenvald (2004) calls a scattered coding of evidentiality. In Table 4.16 below I summarize the morphological classes of the evidential morphemes introduced earlier in this chapter. Syntactic domain CP  Morphological class mood su x  IP  mode su x  VP  core su x particle  form -qa;Ja -wa;/iS -Ha;j -matak -ckvi; -Kuk na/a:t  gloss `dubitative' `quotative' `indirect interrogative' `inference' `past inference' `visual inference' `auditory evidence'  Table 4.16: Morphological classes of evidentials With the evidential morphemes in separate morphological positions, the possibility arises that they can co•occur. We saw in ŸŸ4.3 4.5 that the evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth can, with some restrictions, co•occur in the same clause. The possible combinations are summarized 101  4.9. Variation in evidentials in Southern Wakashan in Table 4.17. The moods are all in complementary distribution with each other, and so only one can occur in any clause.10 They can occur with the other kinds of evidential, and the others can co•occur with each other as well, with a couple of gaps. No evidential can occur twice in a clause, so setting those cases aside the possibility of co•occurrence between two evidentials depends on what kind of evidentials they are. The broad groups that emerge are reportatives, inferentials, and purely sensory evidentials. Reportative evidentials can occur with any other kind of evidentials. However, since they are moods, they cannot co•occur with other evidential moods. The purely sensory evidential in Nuu•chah• nulth is na/a:t `auditory evidence', and it can occur with any other evidential except for -ckvI `past inference', which is the only evidential to specify that the prejacent situation temporally precedes the witnessed situation. The inferentials have the greatest number of restrictions. -Kuk `visual inference' cannot occur with any other inferential.  na/a:t -Kuk -ckvi; -matak -qa;Ja -wa;/iS -Ha;j  `auditory evidence' `visual inference' `past inference' `inference' `dubitative' `quotative' `indirect interrogative'  na/a:t × × × ×  -Kuk × × × ×  -ckvi;  -matak  -qa;Ja  -wa;/iS  -Ha;j  × × ×  × ×  ×  × ×  Table 4.17: Allowable combinations of evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth  4.9  Variation in evidentials in Southern Wakashan In this section I look at the correspondences between the evidentials in the di erent  dialects of Nuu•chah•nulth, and between those in Nuu•chah•nulth and those in Makah. 10  While this is true for the Ahousaht dialect (Nakayama 1997, 31) it is not for every dialect of Nuu•chah•nulth. In the Tseshaht dialect, more than one mood can occur. For example in (i), from Sapir and Swadesh (1955) and given as analyzed by Davidson (2002, 290), the quotative mood -we/in occurs with the dubitative mood -qAJa. (i) /aa/ayasCaapu/azitwe/inqaJa quu/as /aya-a;sCa-a:pi[LR+S]-uz=’az=(m)it=we;/in-qa;Ja qu;/as person many•on.roof•too•perf•temp•past•quot•dub `Evidently too many people got onto it (the roof ).' (NA 170.28•29)  102  4.9. Variation in evidentials in Southern Wakashan  4.9.1  Dubitative in Southern Wakashan Looking at Kyuquot Rose (1981, 220) notes the similarity in meaning between -matak  `inference' and -qAJa `dubitative', which I also described above for Ahousaht. She further notes that their use di ers depending on whether the speaker tends to agree with the prejacent proposition: -matak implies agreement, while -qAJa does not and can give rise to irony. I have not found this pattern with respect to the two su xes in Ahousaht. In texts I have seen -qAJa used where the speaker is making a guess, and in elicitations -matak occurs in scenarios involving guesses as well.11 The form of the dubitative mood in Kyuquot is slightly di erent from that in Ahousaht due to the reduction of short vowels in the third or later syllables in that dialect. The full paradigm is given in Table 4.18.  1 2 3  sg -qa;c -qa;Jk -qa;J  pl -qa;Jin -qa;cu: -qa;j/al  Table 4.18: Kyuquot dubitative mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 213)  In Tseshaht the dubitative indicates the speaker acknowledges the possibility of a non•future event or situation (Davidson 2002, 290). When the situation is in the future, the speaker can make use of -(w)u:s, a mode su x which is not used in Ahousaht. The dubitative mood paradigm from Tseshaht is given in Table 4.19.  1 2 3  sg -qa;csa -qa;jka  pl -qa;Jin -qa;csu:(wa) -qa;Ja  Table 4.19: Tseshaht dubitative mood paradigm (Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 242)  In Makah, the mood closest in meaning to the durative in Ahousaht is what Davidson (2002) calls the inferential. It is used when the speaker is making an inference from unspeci ed evidence (Jacobsen 1986, 19). (164) dudu;kizXa;S `He'll probably sing.' (cf. dudUKal `He's singing.')  (Jacobsen 1986, 19)  11  In Tseshaht -matak is also used in guessing scenarios, as illustrated in the text Puberty Potlatch for Dick Thlaamahuus' Daughter (Sapir and Swadesh 1955, 234).  103  4.9. Variation in evidentials in Southern Wakashan Ahousaht Nakayama (herein) 2001 Matrix clauses Embedded clauses With other moods Internal structure 1 sg pl 2 sg pl 3 sg pl  × × -qa;-j-’a-agr -qa;-j-’a-s -qa;-j-’a-n ? ? -qa;-j-’a  Kyuquot Rose 1981  × × -qa;-j-’a-agr -qa;-j-’a-s -qa;-j-’a-n -qa;-j-’-k -qa;-j-’-su: -qa;-j-’a  × × -qa;-j-’-agr -qa;-j-’-s -qa;-j-’a-n -qa;-j-’a-k -qa;-j-’-su: -qa;-j-’a -qa;-j-’-/al  Tseshaht Sapir and Swadesh 1939  Makah Jacobsen 1986  × × -qa;-j’-(a)-agr -qa;-j-’-sa -qa;-j-’a-n -qa;-j-’-k-a -qa;-j-’-su:(wa) -qa;-j-’a  ? ?  -Xa;S  Table 4.20: Comparison of the dubitative mood  4.9.2  Quotative in Southern Wakashan Kyuquot has a similar quotative paradigm, which Rose (1981, 229 230) describes as  indicating that the speaker is presenting a report made by a non•speech act participant. She also reports that it cannot occur with mode su xes, a fact which distinguishes it from that in Ahousaht (see Ÿ4.8). The Kyuquot quotative paradigm is given in Table 4.21.  1 2 3  sg -wa;sS -wa;c -wa;S  pl -wa;niS12 -wa;cu:S -wa;talS  Table 4.21: Kyuquot quotative paradigm  Rose (1981, 229) derives the forms in Kyuquot an element /wa;/ followed by the indicative mood. This is similar to what we nd in Ahousaht, though the pattern is entirely regular in Kyuquot, while in Ahousaht it is mixed. They Kyuquot indicative paradigm is shown in Table 4.22. 1 2 3  sg -si;S -a;c -/i;S  pl -ni;S -icu:S -italS  Table 4.22: Kyuquot indicative paradigm (Rose 1981, 223) 12 I have corrected what I assume to be a typo in Rose (1981), where the nal phoneme is given as /s/. Her internal reconstruction ends in /S/, as I indicate here.  104  4.9. Variation in evidentials in Southern Wakashan The form of the quotative mood in Tseshaht is more distinctly di erent from that in Ahousaht. The paradigm is given in Table 4.23. The base form, illustrated in the third person, contains /wa;/, although in Tseshaht there is a regular phonological process causing /a/ to raise to /e/ when it precedes a //i/ sequence. Thus the Tseshaht quotative contains the wa;/ component found in all the forms in Ahousaht and Kyuquot, but it also contains an additional component //in/ which Swadesh (1948) identi es as -’in `so treated', saying he follows Sapir in doing so, though he gives no reference and I have not found the source. On the other hand, Jacobsen (1986) identi es it with -’in which he believes to be a part of -?in `sound of '. The Tseshaht  1 2 3  sg pl -we;/isi -we;/inni -we;/incuk -we;/incu: -we;/in  Table 4.23: Tseshaht quotative mood paradigm (Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 242)  quotative, unlike those in Ahousaht and Kyuquot, can co•occur with other moods, in particular, the conditional. The quotative is still restricted to matrix clauses, as Sapir (1924, 89) notes, and he also notes that the conditional has a past usitative meaning in matrix clauses. The sentence in (165) comes from Kwatyat and the Sunbeam Girls just after a line saying that Kwatyat had asked them many times who their father was. The conditional precedes the quotative here, though according to Davidson (2002) it occasionally follows it. (165) wiKazquuwe/in /iiqHuk HaatHaakvaz/i /i:qHuk Ha:tHa:kvAz-/I wik-’az-qu:-we/in girl.pl•def neg•now•cond•quot tell `The girls would not tell.'  (Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 40)  In addition, Davidson (2002, 266) notes that the Tseshaht quotative can also co•occur with the inferential I mood -JAS, inferential II mood -JA?aS, and the dubitative mood -qAJa, all of which follow -wE/in, and also with the subordinate mood -H, which precedes -wE/in. This latter is not the usual subordinate mood, and Davidson (2002, 274) has not identi ed the conditions on its use, but he has found it only in the second and third persons. It could be related to what I have called the emphatic absolutive -Hu:k, which only occurs with third persons. Regardless of its precise meaning, it appears to be a case where the quotative mood occurs in a non•matrix clause, as it occurs in clauses introduced by the complementizer /ani. In Makah the quotative mood is -wa:t, which Jacobsen (1986, 17) analyzes as a con• traction of wA `say' with -’it `passive'. Jacobsen notes that -wa:t is not compatible with any other moods. An example is given in (166) below.  105  4.9. Variation in evidentials in Southern Wakashan (166) /akyadakwa;tsu `You've got a lot (I hear).' (cf. /akyadawic `You've got a lot.')  4.9.3  (Jacobsen 1986, 16)  Indirect interrogative in Southern Wakashan The indirect interrogative also occurs in other dialects. In Kyuquot, Rose (1981, 219)  calls it the interrogative inferential mood, though it is not clear from her description whether it is purely quotative as in Ahousaht, or also covers inference. It is also not clear whether it can have the reading where the question is on someone else's behalf. The paradigm is given in Table 4.24. 1 2 3  sg -Ha;j -Ha;jk -Ha;j  pl -Ha;jin -Ha;ju: -Ha;jal  Table 4.24: Kyuquot interrogative inferential mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 219)  In Tseshaht the form of the ordinary interrogative is -HA, and Sapir (1924, 102) and Davidson (2002, 288) treat -HAj as synchronically composed of the ordinary interrogative and the quotative -j. Neither source provides a full paradigm. Jacobsen (1986, 18) describes a quotative interrogative in Makah as well. He gives the third person form as -i:Ja, in contrast to the ordinary interrogative -a:l. Davidson (2002) does not provide a paradigm for the quotative interrogative. According to Jacobsen, the quotative interrogative is used to ask about reported information or inferences. (167) ba;qi;daXa;zi;Ja te/iliq `How did he say the sick person is?' (cf. bAqIdaXAl te/iliq `How sick is the person?') (Jacobsen 1986, 18)  4.9.4  Mirative in Southern Wakashan What Rose (1981, 221) calls the evidential mood in Kyuquot shares the mirative  meaning and some of the form of the mirative in Ahousaht. An example is given in (168). Rose describes three parts to its meaning, though it is not clear from her discussion whether they are always all present. The rst is that the speaker has made a discovery of some information, the second that there is direct evidence (e.g. photographs or rst•hand observation) for that information, and the third is that the speaker expects the information to be noncontroversial. These three parts of its meaning are all compatible with the de nition of mirativity I gave above. The surprise associated with mirativity is due to the fact that the speaker is now certain 106  4.9. Variation in evidentials in Southern Wakashan about something which he or she realizes he or she should have been certain about earlier. This realization is what Rose calls the speaker's discovery. The certainty comes from direct evidence, such as rst•hand observation. Finally, since the realization and certainty occur at the time of the utterance, the addressee will be present and have access to the same observations that the speaker has. If the Kyuquot evidential mood is really a mirative, all three parts to its meaning should be present in every instance of its use. (168) CimTu;?S CimTu;-a;?S squirrel•evid `Oh, there's a squirrel!'  (Rose 1981, 221)  The paradigm which Rose (1981, 213) presents for the evidential mood in Kyuquot is given in Table 4.25. Rose does not provide second person forms for this mood, but see the discussion below on the Kyuquot inferential evidential, which she states is used instead of the evidential when the subject is second person (Rose 1981, 222). Another notable feature of this paradigm is that the third person plural element /al/ follows the mood element /a;?S/, while the rst person elements /s/ and /in/ precede it. In other paradigms this plural element occurs in the same position as the other persons, in contradistinction to the plural -/al in Ahousaht, which always follows the the mood/person su xes (Ÿ2.5.4). As for similarity in form, compare  1 2 3  sg -sa;?S  pl -ina?S  -a;?S  -a;?Sal  Table 4.25: Kyuquot evidential mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 213)  the third person forms of the Kyuquot evidential mood -A?S and the Ahousaht mirative mood -JA?aS. Given the vowel deletion process in Kyuquot, the two forms di er only in the initial /J/ found in the Ahousaht mirative. Rose (1981, 222) also describes the inferential evidential mood, which combines the evidential mood with the inferential su x /•j/. This mood is used when the speaker has made a discovery that concerns the addressee, or which contradicts the speaker's previous belief, or which is based on inference rather than rst•hand observation. The paradigm she provides for this is given in Table 4.26. Here we can see that the expected forms for the second person in the evidential mood would be -kA?S and -sUwa?S. We can also see that the form of this mood is even closer to that of the mirative mood in Ahousaht, but the meaning is not. Both the inferential evidential and evidential moods in Kyuquot involve the speaker making a discovery, but the mirative in Ahousaht is used when the speaker is using rst•hand observation, as is the 107  4.9. Variation in evidentials in Southern Wakashan case with the evidential mood in Kyuquot, not when he or she is making an inference, as is found with the inferential evidential mood. 1 2 3  sg -(c)sa;?S -jka;?S -ja:?S  pl -jina?S -cu;wa?S -ja;talS  Table 4.26: Kyuquot inferential evidential mood paradigm (Rose 1981, 222)  Tseshaht has a mood which Swadesh (1933) calls the inferential, and which Davidson (2002) calls the inferential II, and which has a very similar form to the mirative mood in Ahousaht. According to Davidson (2002), the inferential II indicates that the speaker has just discovered the proposition. He further notes that it gets a mirative meaning when it occurs with qvA `thus' (sometimes appearing as -qo:).13 (169) /uu /iqsimsa?aS, waa/aZat /uu /iq-sim-(c)sa;?aS wa:-’az-’at prt still•need•1sg.infII say•now•shift `Oh, I seem to need some more, he says.'  (Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 112)  Makah also contains a mood -a:-..-SKub (with any person marker appearing between the two parts) which according to Jacobsen (1986, 19) indicates that the speaker has only belatedly become aware of a fact or event . Davidson (2002) calls this the mirative mood. (170) JapaCa;SKub `It's a canoe.' (after you nally make out what it is)  (Jacobsen 1986, 19)  4.9.5 -matak in Southern Wakashan Turning to other dialects, -matak is also found in Kyoquot, where Rose (1981, 205) notes it is the most common mode su x. The set of mode su xes consist of more than just -matak and -ckvI, but this still means -matak is more common than -ckvI in Kyuquot, which 13 While Davidson (2002) glosses this qva; as `thus', I suspect he is con ating two separate morphemes. This particular one, which he notes sometimes appears as a su x, is a always su x in Ahousaht. In that dialect there is a post•mood su x -qvaa which precedes the other post•mood su xes, such as the plural -/al as we see in the sentence wa/iJazHqvaa/al `Are they all sleeping?'. I have only found it occurring with either of the interrogative moods, but have not been able to determine its meaning or function. The other morpheme is a stem, qva:, which occurs in relative clauses when the manner is extracted, and in some other relative clauses where a non•argument is extracted. We can see it in the sentence hiSukvaZat huHtaKat qvaa/iitq qu/uSinMit `Everyone knew how Raven was.'. While these two morphemes may be historically related, they currently have very di erent distribution. Since the two morphemes in Tseshaht also exhibits this di erence in distribution, it is likely the case that they are two separate morphemes in that dialect as well.  108  4.9. Variation in evidentials in Southern Wakashan is the opposite of what I have found in Ahousaht. Examining the rst ve texts in each of Little (2003) and Louie (2003), I count -matak occurring four times, compared to -ckvI occurring 27 times (not counting instances where it is nominalizing). In Tseshaht -matak appears to have the same meaning as in Ahousaht. Examples in the Nootka Texts (Sapir and Swadesh 1939) and Native Accounts (Sapir and Swadesh 1955) show -matak in non•matrix clauses, with exceptions in a single text (Puberty Potlatch for Dick Thlaamahuus' Daughter, pp. 230 260), where it appears in matrix clauses in a series of sentences where di erent speakers are guessing a location. Each of these sentences only di ers in the name of the location being guessed. (171) /uHmatakma zimxqaCu waa/az `I think it is Tlimhkatsu, she said.'  (Sapir and Swadesh 1955, 234)  One of the more typical example is given in (172), where -matak is in an embedded clause. Here the main character of the story ?intHtin is looking for Pitch Woman's home, and after searching the area it is supposed to be in, he comes across a path and, following it, a small waterhole. (172) kamatsap ?intHtin [/ani histaawamatakqa /i/iSsu/il Ja/ak] `Mucus•made realized that that was probably where Pitch Woman went for water.'(Sapir and Swadesh 1939, 92) The distribution in Tseshaht also seems to correspond to that in Ahousaht, rather than that in Kyuquot, judging by the relative occurrences of the two su xes in Nootka Texts.  4.9.6 -ckvI in Southern Wakashan In Kyuquot the cognate su x is -ckvA, which has the same evidential meaning -ckvI has in Ahousaht (Rose 1981, 205). However, unlike -ckvI, the Kyuquot form does not always have its past meaning and can occur with temporal su xes such as -(m)it `past' or -/aqz `future'. Rose also notes that -ckvA can be used with either reported evidence or perceived evidence, much like Ahousaht -ckvI. Davidson (2002) does not discuss any evidential meaning associated with -ckvI in Tseshaht. He glosses it as `having been ..•ed' or `having ..•ed' (in addition to `remains of ..' in its nominalizing use), and treats it as a core su x rather than a peripheral su x (in his terminology, a su x, as opposed to a clitic). Jacobsen (1986, 20) notes this su x in Makah as well, where it also has a nominalizing and evidential use. His description of the evidential use is much narrower than those in Nuu• chah•nulth, however, and is limited to scenarios where the evidence is animal tracks or an animal tooth found on the ground. In both cases it has a past component to it, since the speaker is perceiving something when the animal is no longer there. 109  4.9. Variation in evidentials in Southern Wakashan (173) bukwajck/i `It was a deer.' (when seeing the tracks)  (Jacobsen 1986, 20)  The su x which more closely matches the range of meaning of -ckvI in Nuu•chah•nulth is -pi:t (Jacobsen 1986, 12), illustrated in (174). Jacobsen describes it as indicating an ex post facto inference from physical evidence (ruling out reports). He also mentions that the evidence is usually the something resulting from the inferred situation, but from the example in (174) we can see that it can be used when the inferred event does not produce any directly observable physical results.14 (174) we/iJazpi;tid `We must've been sleeping.' (we/ij `to sleep')  (Jacobsen 1986, 12)  4.9.7 -Kuk in Southern Wakashan In the Tseshaht dialect -Kuk without reduplication seems to indicate resemblance, but it is not restricted to visual resemblance. In (175) -Kuk occurs on the stem Ci:q-(y)A `chant' and seems to indicate auditory resemblance, as it is the singing that resembles chanting. This -Kuk still contrasts with -Kuk with reduplication in terms of stem selection: here it is a verb, and it is one action that resembles another, rather than one thing that resembles another. /aH/aa nunuuk CiiqaaKuk (175) hitaCupi/az /aH/a: nunu:k Ci:q-(y)a;-Kuk hita-Cu;-pi(z)-’az be.there•in.container•in.house.mom•now this sing chant•cont•vis.evid hitaCupiz/i hita-Cu;-pi(z)-/i; be.there•in.container•in.house.mom•def `Then someone came out onto the oor and sang as though chanting.' (Sapir and Swadesh 1955, 171) In Makah the evidential that most closely matches the meaning of -Kuk in Ahousaht is -caqil. It is used for uncertain visual evidence, as when trying to make out something at a distance (Jacobsen 1986, 15). The sentence in (176) illustrates this. (176) Tapsjizcaqil `It looks like something dived.' (cf. Tapsjil `He dived in.')  (Jacobsen 1986, 15)  Jacobsen (1986, 22) also notes that Makah has -Kuk, but its evidential meaning only occurs when the subject is a second person. The reduplicating form -Kuk[RSS] is also present, and he gives a number of examples of the names of foods which are derived with it, such as the one in (177) below. 14 Sleep in ones eyes are an exception to this, but I seriously doubt that someone's rst evidence that they have been asleep is nding sleep in their eyes.  110  4.10. Summary (177) CiCisaqKuk `sugar', lit. `looks like sand' (Cisaq- `sand')  (Jacobsen 1986, 22)  4.9.8 na/a:t in Southern Wakashan While I have documented na/a:t `auditory evidence' in the Ahousaht dialect, it does not appear in the published material in either the Tseshaht or Kyuquot dialects. Looking outside Nuu•chah•nulth, it seems to correspond with the su x -Qadi in Makah (Jacobsen 1986), though Jacobsen notes that -Qadi can also be used in scenarios where the speaker does not have auditory evidence for something, but instead some other sensory evidence. An example of -Qadi with its auditory meaning is given below. (178) dudu;kQad/i `I hear him/it singing.'  4.10  (Jacobsen 1986, 13)  Summary This chapter gave an overview of the evidential morphemes which are at the centre  of this dissertation. They were contrasted with two other kinds of morphemes, propositional attitude verbs and sense su xes, which exhibit some similarities to the evidential morphemes. In the descriptions of the evidential morphemes we saw that they appear in diverse morpho• logical classes, suggesting that they may be able to co•occur. Data was presented illustrating the permissible co•occurrences, as well as impermissible ones. Also discussed was the vari• ation in evidential morphemes exhibited between dialects of Nuu•chah•nulth, and between Nuu•chah•nulth and other Southern Wakashan languages. Later chapters (7 and 8) will look at the semantic e ects of multiple evidentials in a single clause, as well as the reasons that some evidentials cannot co•occur.  111  Chapter 5  Modelling evidentiality: a truth conditional analysis 5.1  The ingredients of evidentiality The origo hypothesis posits that evidentiality is composed of three relations which  hold between an origo, a perceived situation and a prejacent proposition, as shown in Fig• ure 5.5. Each of the three relations can be speci ed separately from the others in an evidential origo •U  × ×× × perspectival ×× status ××× × ×× × Ó×× prejacent • o  UU UU UU perceptual UU grounding UU UU UU '  • perceived manner of situation support Figure 5.1: Three factors of evidentiality  proposition  morpheme. For example, as Table 5.1 shows, in Nuu•chah•nulth perceptual grounding is only speci ed in -Kuk `visual inference' and na/a:t `auditory evidence'. Perspectival status and manner of support are speci ed in all the evidentials except na/a:t.  -wA/iS -HAj -qAJa -matak -ckvI -Kuk na/a:t  `quotative' `indirect interrogative' `dubitative' `inference' `past inference' `visual inference' `auditory evidence'  Perspectival status uncertain uncertain uncertain uncertain uncertain uncertain  Perceptual grounding  visual auditory  Manner of support report report inference inference inference inference  Table 5.1: The factors of evidentiality encoded in Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials 112  5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality Before these relations can be implemented in truth•conditional semantics, the origo, perceived situation and prejacent proposition need to be de ned. The simplest of these is the perceived situation, which I model as a situation in the sense of Kratzer (1989) (Ÿ5.1.1). Situations are a basic type in my analysis. I also model origos as a basic type, though it can be mapped to an individual and a situation when necessary (Ÿ5.1.2). The prejacent proposition is a centred proposition a function from origos to uncentred propositions, which in turn are sets of maximal situations (i.e., worlds). I use the term uncentred proposition instead of the standard proposition to make it clear that I am referring to the kind that is a set of worlds, and not something more general. I then describe centred propositions (Ÿ5.1.3), and summarize the semantic types used in modelling these concepts (Ÿ5.1.4). With the ontological status of the origo, perceived situation and prejacent proposition laid out, I turn to modelling the relations between them. First, I discuss the relation between the origo and the prejacent proposition, which I term perspectival status (Ÿ5.2). Perspectival status indicates whether or not the prejacent proposition is in the origo's perspective the set of centred propositions he or she believes. Next, I discuss the relation between the prejacent proposition and the perceived situation, which I term the manner of support (Ÿ5.3). Manner of support indicates whether prejacent propositions holds directly in the perceived situation, the perceived situation allowed the origo to infer the prejacent proposition, or the perceived situation was an utterance situation in which the prejacent proposition was asserted. Finally, I discuss the relation between the origo and the perceived situation, which I term perceptual grounding (Ÿ5.4). Perceptual grounding indicates which sense the origo used in perceiving the perceived situation. With the three evidential relations laid out, I turn to modelling each of the evidential morphemes in Nuu•chah•nulth (Ÿ5.5). I then discuss some of the consequences of the anal• ysis (Ÿ5.6). I discuss how the division of evidentiality into three relations allows evidential morphemes to specify one, two, or all three, and show how the evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth exhibit this. Then I discuss the roles that an origo's memory and perspective play in the use of evidentials. I also compare contingent inference to Kratzer's analysis of epistemic modality (Ÿ5.7). Finally, I list the translations of each of the Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials in a single table, for reference (Ÿ5.8).  5.1.1  Ingredient 1: situation Evidentiality is related to perception many evidentials encode that the origo perceived  something, and some of them encode which sense was used. For example, the auditory evidential na/a:t indicates that the origo perceived something auditorily. The objects of perception are situations. Situations are the parts of the world that we perceive and have attitudes about. For example, when I look out my window and see a junco in 113  5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality the garden, what I am seeing is a situation a situation in which there is a junco in the garden. We can also perceive situations internal to us. When I notice that I am hungry, what I really notice is the situation in which I am hungry. There are two approaches to situations in the literature. Barwise and Perry (1981) describe situations as states of a airs, ranging in size from events up to the world. A world is the sum of all states of a airs. They model situations as functions from relations and individuals to truth values. (Kratzer 1989) likewise considers situations as ranging in size from events up to the world, but models them as partial possible worlds. In Kratzer's approach, situations t into standard modal logic in the place of worlds, so that uncentred propositions are functions from situations to truth values. I will be following Kratzer's approach. I de ne a situation as a partial world at a particular time. In her 1989 paper, Kratzer sets aside the issue of time, but since evidentials interact with tense, it cannot be ignored here. In the following, I rst discuss the partial world component and then time component of situations. Situations range in size from events up to entire worlds. Situations can be related to each other by the part•of relation one situation (say, brushing your teeth) can be part of another situation (say, getting ready for work in the morning). The part•of relation is a partial ordering, meaning it is a re exive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation. (179)  Re exive:  Every situation is a part of itself.  Antisymmetric:  No two distinct situations can be part of each other.  Transitive:  Any situation that is a part of a given situation s is a part of any situation that s is a part of.  For any situation, there will be a maximal situation which it is a part of and which is not a part of any other situation. This situation is a world. Thus, in Kratzer's approach, worlds and situations are objects of the same type, which I designate s. The di erence is simply that a world is a maximal situation a situation which is not a part of any other situation. Sometimes it will be proper to talk about situations, and other times it will be proper to talk about worlds. In particular, it will be useful to be able to refer to the world of which some situation s is a part, or to put it another way, the world which contains s. I use ws to refer to the world which contains s. I follow Kratzer in assuming that any given situation is a part of only one world. (180) ws = world which contains s  Situations are associated with a particular time. They have a duration, and they are ordered temporally with respect to other situations. The situation in which I ll the kettle with water temporally precedes the one in which I pour the boiling water into the teapot. Call these 114  5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality two situations s ( lling the kettle) and s (pouring water into the teapot). I refer to the times of these situations as ts and ts . We can think of t as a function from situations to times, where times are intervals (Bennett and Partee 1978), and use the precedence, identity and overlap relations shown in (181). (181)  temporal precedence: ts < ts temporal identity:  ts = ts  temporal overlap:  ts ◦ ts  To summarize, situations are partial worlds, they are of type s, and they can be mapped to intervals of time. One situation can be part of another situation, and unless it is a maximal situation, it will be part of another situation.  5.1.2  Ingredient 2: origo The second concept necessary for an analysis of evidentiality is the origo (Garrett  2001). The origo is a pair consisting of a judge the person who has the evidence  and a  situation. It is the origo (that is, the judge in a particular situation) who has perceived some situation that supports the prejacent proposition, and it is the origo's perspective that may or may not contain the prejacent proposition. The two main properties of an origo are that he or she has a mind and has senses, and with these senses they perceive things in the world. The origo is involved in more than evidentiality though. When we talk about subjective properties, such as personal taste in the sense of Lasersohn (2005), it is the origo's subjective opinion that is represented. In a declarative sentence, the subjective opinion is that of the speaker, and one might therefore wonder if the origo is an unnecessary concept. For example, if I say (182a) it is my opinion, as the speaker that onions are disgusting. In this case the speaker is the origo. But language can also be used to represent other people's opinions, and in such cases the origo is not the speaker. Thus, while I still think onions are disgusting, I can quite easily say (182b) if, in Ruth's opinion, onions are delicious. In this case Ruth is the origo of the embedded clause. (182)  a. Onions are disgusting. b. Ruth thinks onions are delicious. I de ne the origo as a sentient individual in a particular situation. I call this individual a  judge (adopting the terminology of Lasersohn (2005) and Stephenson (2007b,a)). The relevant situation is the one in which, minimally, all of the judge's mental and internal states hold. We cannot treat the origo as simply a judge, because a judge's mental and internal states change over time. When I was young, I thought if someone was rich that meant they had $100. But 115  5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality now I think that if someone is rich they have more money than that. I am the same individual in both cases, but my perspective has changed the origo is di erent in these two cases. I treat the origo as a primitive of type o. In order to talk about the individual and situation components of an origo o, I use jo (a function from the origo o to a judge) and so (a function from an origo o to a situation). The judge component of an origo is conceptually the same as the judge which Lasersohn (2005) introduced to account for predicates of personal taste such as taste good. Such predicates are inherently perspectival (Kölbel 2002), and the judge (i.e., the perspective holder) varies depending on the clausal environment that the predicate appears in. In matrix clauses, the judge is (normally) the speaker,15 while in embedded clauses the judge is usually the subject of the embedding verb. In (183a), where the predicate taste good occurs in a matrix declarative clause, the speaker is the judge and must think that brussels sprouts taste good in order for the sentence to be true.16 In (183b), where taste good occurs in a clause embedded under the propositional attitude verb think, Darryl the subject of think is the judge and he must be the one who thinks that brussels sprouts taste good for it to be true. The speaker's opinion on brussels sprouts is irrelevant in the second sentence. (183)  a. A: Brussels sprouts taste good. B: Well, they might taste good to you, but not to me. b. A: Darryl thinks Brussels sprouts taste good. B: Well, they might taste good to Darryl, but not to me. #Well, they might taste good to you, but not to me. Stephenson (2007b,a) extends the use of the judge to epistemic modals. Stephenson  points out that the same behaviour described above for propositional attitude verbs holds for epistemic modals. The clausal environment that an epistemic modal such as must occurs in determines whose epistemic state (i.e., whose perspective) is being described. In (184a), where must is in a matrix clause, the speaker is the judge and must have some evidence that it rained during the night. In (184b), where must is in a clause embedded under think, Kay the subject of think is the judge and must have some evidence that it rained last. The speaker does not need any such evidence.  15 There may be cases in some languages where the speaker is not the origo in certain matrix clauses for example, free indirect discourse in English (Schlenker 2004). 16 Whether the truth of a sentence like that in (183a) is evaluated relative to a judge, or to a contextually de ned group is controversial. Lasersohn (2005) and Stephenson (2007b,a) take the truth of such sentences to be relative to a judge, while von Fintel and Gillies (2007) take it to be relative to a contextually de ned (possibly singleton) group. I follow Lasersohn and Stephenson here.  116  5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality (184)  a. A: It must have rained last night. B: Well, you might think that, but I don't. b. A: Kay thought it must have rained last night. B: Well, Kay might think that, but I don't. #Well, you might think that, but I don't.  The behaviour of epistemic modals is relevant for us, since one of them, must, has been argued to be an evidential (Westmoreland 1995, 1998, von Fintel and Gillies 2010). In particular, must indicates the origo has inferred the prejacent proposition. Recall that so is de ned as the situation in which (minimally) the origo's attitudes hold. As with the judge, the value of so varies depending on the type of clause the origo is being evaluated in. In a declarative matrix clause, so is (normally) the utterance situation,17 while in an embedded clause, so is the situation of evaluation of the embedding predicate. If we consider the sentence in (184a) again, where must is in a declarative matrix clause, the speaker is the judge, and must have evidence in the utterance situation. The fact that the speaker had evidence in the past is irrelevant. In (184b), where must is in an embedded clause, Kay is the judge, and must have had some evidence at the time of the situation of evaluation of the matrix clause. The utterance situation is irrelevant in fact Kay may not even be in the utterance situation.  5.1.3  Ingredient 3: centred proposition The third concept necessary for an analysis of evidentiality is the proposition. To  be more speci c, we need to use the concept of a centred proposition an uncentred proposition evaluated from the point of view of a particular person (Lewis 1979). A centred proposition is an uncentred proposition together with an origo (in my terms; a centre in Lewis'). To see the di erence between an uncentred proposition and a centred proposition, consider the two scenarios in (185) and (186) below.18 First, let us assume that the objects of attitudes such as belief are uncentred propo• sitions. The uncentred proposition conveyed by the sentence in (185) is that a particular individual, the guy on the jumbotron, is going to get hit with a ball. This is what Brian believes, and it is true. Nevertheless, since he does not realize he is the guy on the jumbotron, he does not take any action to stop himself from getting hit.  17  See fn. 15. The two scenarios in (185) and (186) are similar to two discussed by Chierchia (1989) in which Pavarotti's pants are on re and Pavarotti sees this in a mirror. 18  117  5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality (185) Scenario: Brian is at a baseball game and is watching the jumbotron. Someone hits a foul ball, and it is heading directly for him, and the jumbotron cameraman is focused on him, hoping to show him catching the ball. However, Brian does not recognize himself on the jumbotron, and because he is watching it, he does not see the ball coming. What he sees on the jumbotron is a person about to be hit with the ball. He says: `Oh no, it's going to hit him.' In the second scenario, the uncentred proposition conveyed by the statement in (186) is the same as that in the rst scenario, namely that a particular individual, the guy on the jumbotron, is going to get hit with a ball. The same individual is about to get hit by a ball in both scenarios. However, while in the rst case Brian takes no action, in this scenario he will likely duck or try to catch the ball. (186) Scenario: Brian is at the game watching the jumbotron, but recognizes himself on it. He sees the foul ball heading in his direction, and realizes that it is going to hit him. He says: `Oh no, it's going to hit me.' As Lewis (1979) points out, when we use uncentred propositions as the objects of attitudes such as belief and desire, we cannot explain why Brian would act in one way in the second scenario but not in the rst. Propositions are true or false, and their truth or falsity is independent of who is considering them. Since the same individual is going to get hit by the ball in both scenarios, the uncentred propositions are the same in both scenarios. Thus, by using uncentred propositions as the objects of attitudes, we are missing something. Lewis' idea is to link uncentred propositions to individuals, yielding the notion of a centred proposition. A centred proposition is an uncentred proposition paired with an individual who believes I am so•and•so . Using centred propositions then, in the rst scenario, Brian believes the guy on the jumbotron is going to get hit, but believes he is not that guy. In the second scenario, he believes the guy on the jumbotron is going to get hit, and believes he is that guy. Brian's beliefs di er in the two scenarios, explaining why he would not try to duck in the rst scenario, and why he would in the second. Formally, an uncentred proposition is a set of possible worlds, where worlds are maximal situations. The truth conditions of uncentred propositions are given as statements in predicate logic. Each lexical predicate minimally takes a situation, an origo, and a world as its arguments. Thus, every predicate is evaluated with respect to a world. An intransitive (i.e., one•place) predicate such as fall will have the form shown in (187). It will rst saturate its entity argument, then its situation argument, its origo argument, and nally its world argument. The situation argument provides the situation in which the predicate holds. In order for the uncentred proposition to be true in the world w, the situation s must be a part of w. The fall relation in 118  5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality (187) is an situationless proposition, a situation•semantics version of a tenseless proposition. (187) λxλsλoλw[fall(s)(o)(w)(x)] With everything but the world argument saturated, we have an uncentred proposition. The denotation of such an uncentred proposition with respect to an assignment g is given in (188). Note that because any situation is part of only one world, this uncentred proposition will be a singleton set of worlds its only member is the world which contains s. (188) [[λw[fall(s)(o)(w)(x)]]]c,g = the set of all worlds which contain g(s) such that g(x) fell in g(s). With the origo o and situation s, we also have a tidy way of handling moods and tense. Moods manipulate the origo, while tense manipulates the situation.19 The denotation of the indicative mood -/IS is given in (189a) below. It is indexical, introducing the origo argument o∗, de ned as the origo whose judge is the speaker and whose situation is the situation of the utterance context.20 The denotation of the past tense -(m)it1 is given in (189b). I treat tense as saturating a situation argument (see Chapter 8 for further discussion). It introduces a free variable si whose index matches that of the su x, and it also has a presuppositional requirement that the time of si precedes the time of the utterance situation t∗. Any time a morpheme has a subscript numeral, it introduces a free variable with a matching subscript. Some morphemes are subscripted with multiple numerals because they introduce multiple free variables. The presupposition in (189b) marked as such by being enclosed in curly brackets and being set after the truth•conditional portion of the content. I maintain this notation until Chapter 7, when I adopt a di erent method for handling not•at•issue content in general. (189)  a. -/i;S ⇒ o∗ b. -(m)it1 ⇒ s1 {ts1 < t∗} In order to see how situationless propositions, centred propositions and propositions  are produced compositionally, consider the sentence in (190a) and the derivation of its se• mantics, given in (190b). The entity argument is saturated rst, yielding the situationless proposition in c . The situationless proposition then has its situation argument saturated by the tense su x -(m)it1 , which also introduces the presupposition that the time of the event situation s1 temporally precedes the time of the utterance situation. In  b  we have a centred  proposition, and this has its origo argument saturated by the mood su x -/IS, yielding the proposition a . 19  Perhaps moods can also manipulate the world variable. I leave this topic for further research. I consider the person•marking associated with moods to be agreement with the verb's argument introduced lower in the tree. I omit the semantics of this agreement in the service of clarity, as it is not relevant to the topic at hand. Another option would be to treat the person•marking as pronominal and any overt noun phrases as adjuncts, in the spirit of Jelinek (1984) and Baker (1996) but see Davis et al. (2007b) for arguments against this. 20  119  5.1. The ingredients of evidentiality (190)  Ken a. /a/apsjikvaqit/iS /ap-sji;kv[R]-(q)aq[SS]-(m)it-/i;S Ken Ken right•say•aug•past•3.ind `Ken was saying something sensible/saying right thing.' b.  a  jjj„„„„„„„ „„„„ jjjj j j j j  -/i;S o∗  b  jj„„„„„„ „„„„ jjjj j j j „ jj  -(m)it1 s1 {ts1 < t∗}  c  j„„ jjjj „„„„„„„ j j j „„ jjj  a  /a/apsjikvaq Ken λxλsλoλw[say.right.thing (s)(o)(w)(x)] k λw[say.right.thing (s1 )(o∗)(w)(k)] {ts1 < t∗}  b  λoλw[say.right.thing (s1 )(o)(w)(k)] {ts1 < t∗}  c  λsλoλw[say.right.thing (s)(o)(w)(k)]  Not all clauses have their origo argument saturated, and therefore some clauses denote centred propositions, rather than uncentred propositions. While matrix clause moods, such as the indicative -/IS above, saturate an origo argument, dependent clause moods do not. A propositional attitude verb such as /uqlaap `think' corresponds to a relation between a situation, an origo, a world, an individual (the thinker), and a centred proposition (the thought), as shown in (191). The origo of the embedded centred proposition has restrictions on it, namely that the judge jo is the subject of /uqlaap and the situation so is the situation in which /uqlaap holds. This is similar to how Schlenker (2003) handles propositional attitudes, though his notation uses an operator which acts as a quanti er over contexts, not origos. I discuss the ways dependent clauses have their origos determined in more detail in Chapter 6. (191) /uqlaap ⇒ λpλxλsλo λw[think(s)(o )(w)(x)(λo[p(o) ∧ jo = x ∧ so = s])]  5.1.4  The types Table 5.2 below shows the types for the concepts I have described above, as well as  that of the context of utterance, which I give here for completeness. The need for handling the context of utterance in the object language is discussed in Ÿ5.3.3.2, where I discuss reported speech. Truth values are of type t, and individuals, or entities, are of type e. Situations are of type s, as are maximal situations (i.e., worlds). The origo is of type o. These are the basic types. All the other types are functions from one type to another. A proposition is a function from 120  5.2. Relating the origo to the prejacent proposition: perspectival status maximal situations to truth values and is of type s,t . A centred proposition is a function from origos to propositions and is of type o, s,t . An situationless proposition is a function from situations to centred propositions and is of type s, o, s,t  .  Table 5.2 also shows the conventional variable symbols I make use of in this dissertation. Any variable x will be of type e, any variable s will be of type s, and so on. I never need to use a variable for either truth values or uncentred propositions The few constants I use to represent people are also given here: Ann is represented as a, Ken as k and Linda as l. In order to keep types and variables distinct in the text, I adopt the convention of putting all types in boldface, and putting all variables in italics. Types truth value individual situation origo uncentred proposition centred proposition situationless proposition  t e s o s,t o, s,t s, o, s,t  Variables  Constants  x, y, z s o  a, k, l  p, q P, Q  Table 5.2: Types, variables and constants  5.2  Relating the origo to the prejacent proposition: perspectival status origo •U  × ×× × perspectival ×× status ××× × ×× × Ó×× prejacent • o  UU UU UU perceptual UU grounding UU UU UU '  • perceived manner of situation support Figure 5.2: Three factors of evidentiality  proposition  The relation between the origo and the prejacent proposition involves the origo's perspective. An origo's perspective is a subjective determination of what they believe (Kölbel 2002). One way to think about a perspective is as a set of centred propositions the set of centred propositions the judge believes. Thus, the perspectival status relation indicates whether or not the prejacent proposition is in the origo's perspective. 121  5.2. Relating the origo to the prejacent proposition: perspectival status Two origos can be distinguished either by having di erent judges or by being in di erent situations. Di erent judges in the same situation will usually not have the same set of centred propositions in their perspective. Perspectives are not shared between individuals. A single judge in di erent situations will not necessary have the same set of centred propositions in his or her perspective. As an origo observes and learns about the world, his or her perspective will change, adding or removing centred propositions. Consider the following scenario. Ken had stopped smoking, but has since started again. Bill knows that Ken started again, but Kay still believes he has stopped smoking. Thus, whenever Kay and Bill speak to one another, their perspectives di er Bill's perspective contains the centred proposition that Ken started smoking again, while Kay's does not. A centred proposition can be added to an origo's perspective when they learn something about the world. For example, Kay's perspective at 3:00 on Wednesday did not include the centred proposition that Ken started smoking again, but at 3:05 she went out back and saw him smoking, and that centred proposition was added to her perspective. Kay now believes that Ken started smoking again. A centred proposition can be removed from an origo's perspective if he or she forgets it, or comes to doubt it. Let us rst look at forgetting. Two days after Kay added the centred proposition that Ken started smoking again, she forgot it, and so that centred proposition was removed from her perspective. Kay no longer believes that Ken started smoking again. To see how doubt can cause a centred proposition to be removed from an orig's per• spective, we will need to look at a di erent scenario. On Thursday, Kay saw Bill's car going through a red light. She added to her perspective the centred proposition that Bill ran a red light on Thursday. However, on Friday she learned that John had borrowed Bill's car several times that week. After learning this, she was in doubt as to whether it was Bill or John who ran the red light, and so the centred proposition that Bill ran a red light on Thursday was removed from her perspective.21 Kay no longer believes that Bill ran a red light on Thursday. Formally, the perspective of an origo is the set of centred propositions that he or she believes hold in a given situation. If a centred proposition is in an origo's perspective, he or she believes it is true. If a centred proposition is not in an origo's perspective, he or she does not have any belief about it. I formalize the perspective as in (192). The perspective Π of an origo o is de ned as the set of all centred propositions p such that the judge of o, jo , in the situation so believes p. (192) Πo ⇔ {p | jo in so believes p is true} A perspective, as de ned in (192), di ers from the notion of perspective used by Kölbel (2002). The two approaches di er with respect to the claims they make concerning 21 Kay could add the centred proposition that either Bill or John ran the red light, unless she thinks that if John had been driving Bill's car, maybe other people had been too.  122  5.2. Relating the origo to the prejacent proposition: perspectival status the role of perspectives. For Kölbel, a perspective is a function from contents (propositions) to truth values, and the truth value of a sentence is dependent on a perspective.22 In my approach, perspectives play no role in determining truth values. Rather, propositions are functions from worlds to truth values. As I discuss shortly, perspectives are nevertheless crucial for felicity conditions. For example, an assertion of the centred proposition p is only felicitous if p is in the origo's perspective. And as we shall see, indirect evidentials are only felicitous if the prejacent proposition is not in the origo's perspective. Another concept that is similar to the perspective is the common ground. The common ground is the set of propositions that the speaker and addressee(s) all have as mutually shared assumptions (Stalnaker 1974). It delimits the range of presupposed propositions, and deter• mines which information is considered new and old. A perspective, on the other hand, belongs to a single individual only. It represents what they personally believe. A further di erence is that the common ground is a set of uncentred propositions (type s,t ), while a perspective is a set of centred propositions (type o, s,t ). The perspective is relevant for the felicity conditions of assertion. For an assertion to be felicitous, its centred proposition must be in the perspective of the speaker (as origo in a declarative clause). In other words, it is felicitous for Kay to utter the sentence in (193) at 3:00 on May 16, 2012 only if her perspective contains the centred proposition that it is raining then in a situation in the actual world.23 But if Bill's perspective contains the centred proposition that it is not raining then, it would be infelicitous for him to utter (193). Of course, only one of them can be right about what is happening in the actual world, but it is their perspective, rather than the actual facts, that determines their use of language. (193) Mizaa/iS Miz-(y)a;-/i;S rain•cont•3.ind `It's raining.' Using the concept of the perspective, we can de ne the relation between the origo and the prejacent proposition the perspectival status. The perspectival status tells us if the prejacent proposition is in the origo's perspective or not. The perspectival status is relevant for evidentials because indirect evidentials indicate that the origo is agnostic about the truth of the prejacent proposition. The agnostic relation is de ned in (194) below. The relation agnostic(o)(p) holds if and only if neither the centred proposition p nor its negation are in the 22  It is true that Kölbel's concept of a perspective is the characteristic function of a set of propositions, and so my notion of a perspective (i.e., a set of centred propositions) is a notational variant of his. However, the role that a perspective plays in determining the truth value of a sentence is not the same in our two approaches. 23 Moore's paradox raises the same issue, namely that you cannot say It's going to rain, but I don't believe it's going to rain. The reason you cannot say this is because an assertion of the rst conjunct, It's going to rain , is only felicitous if the speaker believes it is going to rain, and the second conjunct, I don't believe it's going to rain denies that this felicity condition is met.  123  5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support origo's perspective. (194)  agnostic(o)(p) ⇔ p Πo ∧ ¬p Πo The inferential and reportative evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth are indirect evidentials,  meaning that they are only felicitous if the prejacent proposition is not in the origo's perspective. In other words, inferentials and reportatives in Nuu•chah•nulth encode that the origo is agnostic about the prejacent proposition.  5.3  How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support origo •U  × ×× × perspectival ×× status ××× × ×× × Ó×× prejacent • o  UU UU UU perceptual UU grounding UU UU UU '  • perceived manner of situation support Figure 5.3: Three factors of evidentiality  proposition  Combining a situation with an situationless proposition yields a centred proposition. To put it informally, a centred proposition is about a particular situation. The centred proposition conveyed by the English sentence in (195) is about a particular situation that Kay perceived. There are undoubtably many situations in which a little girl runs up and presses a button to open a door, but there is one particular situation Kay has in mind when she says this sentence. (195) Scenario: Kay was walking up to the library when she saw a little girl run up and press the button to open the door. Later she said this to Bill. A little girl ran up and pressed the button to open the door. The evidentiality of the utterance in (195), although it is unmarked, is such that Kay believes the prejacent proposition (that a little girl ran up and pressed the button to open the door), she visually perceived a particular situation, and that situation was the one the prejacent proposition was about. (196) Perspectival status: Kay (the origo) believes the prejacent proposition (that a little girl ran up and pressed the button to open the door). 124  5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support Perceptual grounding: Kay (the origo) visually perceived a particular situation Manner of support: This situation is the one that the prejacent proposition is about. The manner of support in this case is one of direct support. Kay perceived the situation that the prejacent proposition is about. Direct support is the unmarked manner of support no evidential in Nuu•chah•nulth encodes that the origo perceived the situation the prejacent is about.24 However, there are other manners of support which are encoded by evidentials. In particular, evidentials can encode inference and report. The three manners of support described above are illustrated schematically in Fig• ure 5.4. The origo is indicated by o , the perceived situation by a box, and perception by an arrow −→ . Solid boxes are perceived situations, while boxes with dotted outlines indicate situations that are accessible only by inference (  ) from one centred proposition to another. A  reporter the speaker of the perceived utterance situation is indicate by r , and the utterance itself by the speech bubble. p ⇑ direct support  o −→ q ⇑  inference  p ⇑  o −→ ✎☞  p  report  o −→  ✍ ✆✙  r  Figure 5.4: Manners of support The examples in (197) each involve a di erent manner of support. In (197a), the origo Kay perceived the situation of being hungry itself, though nothing in the sentence encodes 24 Direct support is probably unmarked in any language. Tibetan has a morpheme which seems at rst glance to encode direct support, but Garrett (2001, ch. 3) argues that the so•called direct evidential in Tibetan, `dug, does not encode direct support. The direct evidential can occur in clausal environments in which evidentials cannot appear. In these other clausal environments, the direct evidential lacks evidential force, but maintain a deictic relation between the origo and the event. Garrett therefore argues that the evidential force arises from the interplay of the felicity conditions of assertion and the demonstrative properties of `dug.  125  5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support this.25 In (197b), the origo Kay saw a situation in which Ken was looking in the fridge; she did not see one in which he was hungry. The origo had to make an inference in order to arrive at the prejacent proposition. This is encoded in the dubitative mood -qAJa. In (197c), the origo Kay heard a situation in which Ken said he was hungry; she did not hear the one in which he was hungry. The situation Kay heard was an utterance situation, where a reporter, Ken, said he was hungry. In this way, Kay obtained a report which conveyed the prejacent proposition. This is encoded by the quotative mood -wA/iS. (197)  a. Scenario: Kay was hungry, and she said this to Bill. haWiiqzsiS haWi:qz-si;S hungry•1sg.ind `I'm hungry.' b. Scenario: Kay saw Ken looking in the fridge, and she said this to Bill. haWiiqzqaJa haWi:qz-qa;Ja hungry•3.dub `Maybe he's hungry.' c. Scenario: Ken told Kay that he was hungry, and then Kay said this to Bill. haWiiqzwa/iS haWi:qz-wa;/iS hungry•3.quot `He's hungry (reportedly).' No evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth encode a direct support, though it will be necessary  to talk about support in general when I model perceptual grounding in Ÿ5.4, and direct support is one manner of support. With this in mind, I discuss direct support (Ÿ5.3.1). This leaves inference and report as the two manners of support which must be formalized. I discuss these in Ÿ5.3.2 and Ÿ5.3.3 respectively.  5.3.1  Perception of a directly supporting situation by the origo In the simplest case, an origo can perceive the situation of the prejacent proposition  itself. There is no intervening process between this perceived situation and the prejacent proposition the prejacent proposition holds in the perceived situation. This manner of support is not encoded by any morpheme in Nuu•chah•nulth. Either the indicative mood or 25  While it may appear that the indicative mood encodes direct support, this is not the case. The indicative mood co•occurs with inferential evidentials other than -qAJa `dubitative', such as -ckvI `past inference' and -matak `inference'.  126  5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support the mirative mood can be used when the perceived situation directly supports the prejacent proposition, but neither of these moods encodes this manner of support, as I showed in Ÿ4.7.1. The argument goes like this. If the indicative mood -/IS indicated that the perceived situation directly supported the prejacent proposition, then it would be infelicitous when used in the same clause as an evidential which indicates that the perceived situation does not directly support the prejacent proposition. Inferentials such as -Kuk `visual inference' are infelicitous when the perceived situation directly supports the prejacent. Thus, if an inferential like -Kuk can occur with the indicative mood, the indicative mood must not encode direct support. The example in (198) shows that -Kuk can co•occur with the indicative mood. Therefore, the indicative mood does not encode direct support. (198) Scenario: Kay was watching Ken's baby for him, and she saw her standing up, holding on to the edge of the table, and she let go, so Kay said this to Bill. yaayaacataHKuk/iS naYaqakuk/i Kay naYaqak-uk-/i; Kay yac-ataH[RLL]-Kuk-/i;S walk•about.to•vis.evid•3.ind baby•poss•def Kay `It looks like Kay's baby is going to start walking.' Likewise, the mirative mood cannot indicate direct support, because it can occur with inferential evidentials, as shown in (199). Here the mirative mood -JA?aS occurs with the past inferential -ckvI. Since -ckvI is only felicitous when the perceived situation does not directly support the prejacent proposition, and can co•occur with the mirative mood, the mirative mood cannot encode a direct support. (199) haWiiqzckviJa?aS qinHaaMa NuWi /ayaqz qinHa:Ma NuWi /aya-’aqz haWi:qz-ckvi;-Ja;?aS hungry•past.evid•3.mir father many•in.body egg `Your father must have been hungry, he ate a lot of eggs.'  5.3.2  Inference of the prejacent proposition by the origo Westmoreland (1995, 1998) argues that must in English is an evidential, and more  speci cally, it is an inferential. He also shows that the kind of inferences must indicates are not limited to what I call necessary inferences, following Weiss (1942). Rather, must can also indicate what I call contingent inference, again using Weiss' terminology. First I discuss the properties of inference in general (Ÿ5.3.2.1), and then I discuss the distinction between necessary and contingent inference, and in so doing, show that it is contingent inference that is encoded in inferentials in Nuu•chah•nulth (Ÿ5.3.2.2).  127  5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support 5.3.2.1  The logic of inference  Inferential evidentials indicate a process of human reasoning. A widely cited model of human reasoning is that of Toulmin (2003), and so I rely on his model in the discussion below. Toulmin presents a model of inference as it is used in reasoning, which he calls the pattern of an argument (p. 89). He divides propositions into several categories, based on the role they play in reasoning, and what questions they answer. He ends up with a richer model than the one I describe here. For the purposes of this discussion, I will focus on the simpler model that he lays out at the outset. An inference involves minimally three propositions, a datum, a warrant, and a conclu• sion. An inference is valid if and only if the conclusion is true whenever the datum and warrant are true. For example, in (200) if the datum p1 and the warrant p2 are true, then the conclusion pc is also true, and the inference is valid.26 Bill only sings when he is taking a shower, so if he is singing, he is taking a shower. (200)  p1  Bill is singing.  p2  If Bill is singing, he is taking a shower.  pc  Bill is taking a shower.  An example of an invalid inference is given in (201). It is possible for the conclusion pc to be false when both p1 and p2 are true. Even though Bill sings every time he takes a shower, he might also sing on occasion while he is driving to work, in which case he would be singing but not taking a shower. (201)  5.3.2.2  p1  Bill is singing.  p2  If Bill is taking a shower, he is singing.  pc  Bill is taking a shower.  Necessary and contingent inference  A necessary inference is one in which both the datum (p1 ) and the warrant (p2 ) are true. An example of necessary inference is given in (202).27 I take the warrant p2 to be true and, assuming today is Monday, tomorrow is necessarily Tuesday. There are no exceptions to the warrant in this inference.  26  A warrant needs to express a relationship between two propositions. While the warrant in (200) is of the form p → q, a warrant could also be of the form p ∧ ¬q or even p ∧ q. 27 This example is from Ryle (1950).  128  5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support (202)  p1  Today is Monday.  p2  If today is Monday, then tomorrow is Tuesday.  pc  Tomorrow is Tuesday.  Since there are no exceptions, if both the datum p1 and the warrant p2 are in my perspective, the conclusion pc will also be in my perspective. Thus, when an origo has in his or her perspective a centred proposition that is the conclusion of an inference, the origo has made a necessary inference. A contingent inference is one in which the warrant may not be true. Weiss (1942) calls such a warrant a contingent principle . Since Weiss' principle is equivalent to Toulmin's warrant, I call such a warrant a contingent warrant . It is a warrant which past experience has shown is usually true.28 Consider the inference in (203). A contingent inference can still be valid, since the conclusion is true if the datum and warrant are true, but a contingent warrant is not always true. Consider the following scenario. I've seen Ken reading a book on the bus many times, and while there were a couple of exceptions, he generally reads only mystery novels. From this I form the contingent warrant p2 . When I see Ken reading a book, I know p1 is true, and I can make a contingent inference from p1 and p2 to pc , that he's reading a mystery novel. (203)  p1  Ken is reading a book.  p2  If Ken reading a book, he's reading a mystery novel.  pc  Ken is reading a mystery novel.  It is contingent inference that inferential evidentials encode. Consider the sentence containing -qAJa `dubitative' in (204) below. The datum (p1 ) is that Ken is looking in the fridge, and the conclusion (pc ) is that Ken is hungry. If this were a necessary inference, the warrant must be something like: if someone is looking in the fridge, they are hungry. But this is not true there are many reasons for looking in the fridge when you are not hungry, and the origo Kay can be aware of these other possible reasons and still use -qAJa. This necessary inference is invalid, yet -qAJa is felicitous. Kay is not making a necessary inference, but rather a contingent inference. A contingent inference is valid, but the warrant may not be true.  28 Contingent warrants are what Kratzer (1991) includes in ordering sources in the case of epistemic modals. They are conditional propositions that normally hold.  129  5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support (204) Scenario: Kay saw Ken looking in the fridge, and she said this to Bill. haWiiqzqaJa haWi:qz-qa;Ja hungry•3.dub `Maybe he's hungry.' p1  Ken is looking in the fridge.  p2  If Ken is looking in the fridge, he is hungry.  pc  Ken is hungry.  5.3.2.3  Modelling contingent inference  I will not be using Kratzer's (1981) modal analysis to model contingent inference. It is far more powerful than necessary, and its structure is ill• tted to our present purposes. A modal in Kratzer's analysis is a context•dependent function from a prejacent proposition to a truth value. What we need is a relation between a perceived situation and a prejacent proposition. I will de ne a general purpose contingent inference relation which is just this. I set aside the matter of how the contingent inference is itself modelled. The existence of a contingent inference entails the existence of at least two centred propositions, as illustrated in (205) below: a datum (a centred proposition which is in the origo's perspective) which is directly supported by the perceived situation, and a conclusion (a centred proposition which is not in the origo's perspective). Recall that an situationless proposition Q is of type s, o, s,t  , and when supplied with a situation yields a centred proposition of type  o, s,t . Q(s) is thus a centred proposition. (205)  Q(s)  The ground is wet.  p  It rained.  I start with the conclusion p, since it is the simplest. The conclusion is the prejacent proposition in a sentence with an evidential in it. The only requirement on it as a conclusion of a contingent inference is that it is not in the origo's perspective. This restriction is given in (206), which states that any centred proposition is a possible conclusion if it is not in an origo o's perspective that is, if agnostic(o)(p) is true. (206) p is a possible conclusion in a contingent inference by o if agnostic(o)(p) The datum Q(s) is a centred proposition in the perspective of the origo, and a given evidential may specify how he or she perceived the situation s. All inferentials indicate that the centred proposition Q(s) is in the origo's perspective. A visual inferential adds the restriction that the origo perceived s visually. What counts as a datum will di er between origos in di erent 130  5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support situations, and this is captured in (207) by saying that Q(s) is a (possible) datum for o if Q(s) is in o's perspective, Πo . (207) Q(s) is a possible datum in a contingent inference by o if and only if Q(s) ∈ Πo Contingent inference is represented by the relation in (208), between a perceived situation s and a conclusion p, and is also dependent on an origo o. The origo is relevant because contingent inference entails that the origo is agnostic about the prejacent proposition, and di erent origos may make use of di erent contingent warrants. The denotation of the contingent inference relation, shown in (208), evaluated with respect to an assignment g, is the set of all possible worlds w, such that there is an situationless proposition Q such that Q(s) is in the origo's perspective, and the origo is agnostic about the prejacent proposition p, and the origo can make a contingent inference from Q(s) to p, and p(o) will be true in w. (208) [[cont.inf(o)(s)(p)]]c,g = 1 i there is an situationless proposition Q such that Q(g(s)) ∈ Πg(o) and [[agnostic(o)(p)]]c,g = 1 and jg(o) (in sg(o) ) can make a contingent inference in world wg(s) from Q(g(s)) to g(p), where wg(s) ∈ g(p)(o).  5.3.3  Reports transmitted to the origo Reports give us information about the world that other people have observed. Repor•  tative evidentials are one way to indicate that the centred proposition conveyed in a clause was passed to the origo in a report.29 5.3.3.1  Reports are independent of the origo's perspective  The centred propositions that an origo has obtained by report have a separate status from those in his or her perspective. Reports which are false or misleading in the origo's opinion will not be stored in his or her perspective. Consider the following scenario. On her way to work in the morning, Kay saw Ken smoking a cigarette. Later in the day, she and Bill were talking to Ken, and Ken said he quit smoking and hadn't had a cigarette in over a month. Kay now has a report that contains the centred proposition that Ken hasn't had a cigarette in over a month, but this will not be in her perspective, since her perspective already contains the centred proposition that Ken was smoking a cigarette that morning. These two centred propositions are contradictory, and so she can only believe one of them. While it is not necessary that a centred proposition obtained by report be in an origo's perspective, it is possible. For example, if Kay's father tells her he got a halibut this morning, she now has a report containing the centred proposition that her father got a halibut this 29  Direct and indirect quotes are another way to indicate the centred proposition was passed to the origo in a report.  131  5.3. How situations support prejacent propositions: manner of support morning. She trusts her father, and believes what he says is true, so this centred proposition is also in her perspective. 5.3.3.2  Modelling reports  I treat reports as an ordered pair consisting of an utterance context and a centred proposition, as shown in (209). This represents the context and content of an utterance. Utterance contexts exist in the meta•language, rather than the object•language, and they de ne (minimally) a speaker, an addressee, and an utterance situation. (209)  report: c, p Each origo is associated with a set of reports Ro which contains all the reports that  he or she received. Whether or not the origo was the addressee is not relevant as long as the origo perceived the utterance situation. This set is separate from the origo's perspective, which remains a set of centred propositions. The formulation in (210) also ensures that these reports are those made by people other than the origo, rather than including reports that the origo him• or herself made.30 (210) Ro = { c, p | jo in so believes p was conveyed by the utterance context c, jo perceived the utterance situation of c, and jo is distinct from the speaker of c} Whenever some origo o indicates they are passing on a report (by using direct quotation, indirect quotation, or a reportative evidential), they are indicating that the centred proposition belongs to some pair c, p in Ro . It should also be noted that the same context can be associated with multiple centred propositions, as long as the origo believes they are also conveyed by that utterance context. That is, all the centred propositions pn that are logically entailed by the centred proposition p in c, p are members of reports c, pn in Ro . I can now de ne a relation between an origo o, a situation s, and a centred proposition p, as shown in (211). This states that p is conveyed by some report c, p in o's set of reports Ro , that s is the situation of the report context, and that the speaker of the report context is not the addressee of the context in which the reportative occurs. The latter restriction is needed because reportatives are infelicitous when one of the current speech•act participants was the source of the report. In addition, the use of the reportative evidential in Nuu•chah•nulth (the quotative mood -wA/iS) indicates that the origo does not know whether the prejacent is true or false, and for expedience I add this directly to the report relation. 30 Restricting Ro to reports made by people other than the origo is suitable for reportative evidentials, but this may be too narrow if Ro is needed for other reported speech constructions. However, an analysis of verbs of saying like that of Schlenker (2003) makes do without reference to a set like Ro , so the point may be moot.  132  5.4. How the origo perceives a situation: perceptual grounding (211) [[report(o)(s)(p)]]c,g = 1i there exists a context of utterance c whose utterance situation is g(s), such that there is a report c , g(p) in the origo g(o)'s set of reports Rg(o) in world wg(s) , the speaker of c is not the addressee of c and [[agnostic(o)(p)]]c,g = 1.  5.3.4  A general support relation I have described three distinct manners of support between a situation s and a centred  proposition P(s ) for an origo o. The direct support relation holds when s is identical to s  that  is, when P(s) yields the same centred proposition as P(s ). The inference relation holds when the origo can make a contingent inference from s to P(s ). The report relation holds when s is an utterance situation in which P(s ) was conveyed. (212) Direct support s = s Inference cont.inf(o)(s)(P(s )) Report report(o)(s)(P(s )) It will be necessary to talk about a situation supporting a particular centred proposition when modelling perceptual grounding, so I de ne the general support relation in (213). Here we need to manipulate both s and s , so I break the centred proposition down into its situationless proposition and situation argument. The support relation is therefore a relation between two situations, an origo and an situationless proposition. The  rst situation argument is the  perceived situation, and the second is the situation in which the situationless proposition P holds. (213)  support(s)(o)(s )(P) ⇔ P(s) = P(s ) ∨ cont.inf(o)(s)(P(s )) ∨ report(o)(s)(P(s ))  5.4  How the origo perceives a situation: perceptual grounding origo •U  × ×× × perspectival ×× status ××× × ×× × Ó×× prejacent • o  UU UU UU perceptual UU grounding UU UU UU '  • perceived manner of situation support Figure 5.5: Three factors of evidentiality  proposition  133  5.4. How the origo perceives a situation: perceptual grounding The sense through which an origo perceives a situation is his or her perceptual grounding with respect to it. When the origo perceives a situation, a particular sense was used,31 and evidentials can indicate the use of a particular sense. In Figure 5.6 I give schematics for the ve kinds of perceptual grounding.32 Thus, we have an origo seeing a particular situation, an origo hearing a situation, and so on. o −→ sight  o hearing −→  o taste −→  o smell −→  o touch −→ Figure 5.6: Perceptual grounding The fact that an origo believes he or she perceived a given situation is represented as a relation between the origo and a situation, as shown in (214). This relation states that the origo o believes that he or she perceived the situation s. No centred propositions come into play in this de nition, since it merely indicates the origo o's belief about his or her perceptual relation to some situation s. (214) [[perceived(s)(o)]]c,g = 1 i  the origo ( jg(o) in situation sg(o) ) believes that he or she  perceived situation g(s) in world wg(s) . The two sense•speci c relations necessary for Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials are given in (215). These will be used in the de nitions of visual and auditory perceptual grounding, necessary for the analysis of the visual inferential -Kuk and auditory evidential na/a:t. Other languages may have evidentials which encode other senses, such as taste, smell, or touch. They would therefore require additional perceptual grounding relations to be de ned. 31  Or quite often more than one sense. When I make a pot of soup, I can see the situation in which the soup is simmering, smell it, and also hear it. 32 I give the ve external senses here, but internal senses (pain, heat, etc.) can be described the same way. No evidential in Nuu•chah•nulth speci es an internal sense, so we can safely ignore them at present.  134  5.5. Modelling Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials (215)  a. [[perceivedvis (s)(o)]]c,g = 1 i the origo (jg(o) in situation sg(o) ) believes that he or she saw situation g(s) in world wg(s) . b. [[perceivedaud (s)(o)]]c,g = 1 i the origo (jg(o) in situation sg(o) ) believes that he or she heard situation g(s) in world wg(s) . In order to model sensory evidentials, we need to indicate both that a particular situation  was perceived by an origo, and that that situation supports the prejacent proposition. With this in mind, I de ne the grounding relation in (216) as a relation between an situationless proposition, two situations, and an origo. The prejacent proposition is broken down into its situationless proposition and situation components so that the support relation (de ned in (213) above) can be used. A situation s perceptually grounds a centred proposition P(s ) for an origo o if and only if the origo o perceived s, and s supports P(s ) in o's opinion. Recall that the support relation holds when any one of the three manners of support (direct support, inference or report) holds between a situation and an situationless proposition (see Ÿ5.3.4). (216)  grounding(s)(o)(s )(P) ⇔ perceived(s)(o) ∧ support(s)(o)(s )(P) Because there are visual and auditory evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth, we require a visual  and an auditory version of the grounding relation. These are given in (217a) and (217b), where the relevant senses are indicated by subscripts. Each one speci es that the origo o perceived the situation s with the relevant sense visual in (217a) and auditory in (217b). Auditory grounding also prohibits the origo having perceived the situation visually. (217)  a. groundingvis (s)(o)(s )(P) ⇔ perceivedvis (s)(o) ∧ support(s)(o)(s )(P) b. groundingaud (s)(o)(s )(P) ⇔ perceivedaud (s)(o) ∧ ¬perceivedvis (s)(o) ∧ support(s)(o)(s )(P)  5.5  Modelling Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials I now turn to the semantics of the individual evidentials in Nuu•chah•nulth. In this  discussion I divide them into three groups based on their shared semantic properties. First I discuss the inferentials, -matak `inference', -ckvI `past inference' and -qAJa `dubitative', which all indicate contingent inference without specifying the perceptual grounding (Ÿ5.5.1). Then I discuss the two evidentials that specify perceptual grounding, -Kuk `visual inference' and na/a:t `auditory evidence' ( Ÿ5.5.2 ). Finally, I discuss the reportative evidentials, -wA/iS `quotative' and -HAj `indirect interrogative' (Ÿ5.5.3).  5.5.1  Inferential evidentials The rst inferential I discuss below is -matak (Ÿ5.5.1.1), which is the least speci ed  evidential in Nuu•chah•nulth. It indicates only that the origo has contingently inferred the 135  5.5. Modelling Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials prejacent, and speci es no temporal relations or perceptual grounding. The past inferential -ckvI (Ÿ5.5.1.2) has the additional property of indicating the time at which the prejacent held preceded the situation which the origo perceived. The semantics of the dubitative mood -qAJa (Ÿ5.5.1.3) are closer to -matak, di ering only by additionally specifying that the origo is the speaker (and simultaneously preventing it from being embedded). 5.5.1.1  Inferential -matak  The inferential -matak is a function of type  s, o, s,t  , s, o, s,t  . It acts as a  modi er, taking an situationless proposition as its argument and yielding another situationless proposition, as shown in (218). It indicates that the origo is able to make a contingent inference from the perceived situation s1 to the prejacent P(s), and that w is the world of s1 . The reason it takes an argument of type s, o, s,t  instead of a centred proposition of type o, s,t  is  that it is composed before the situation argument is supplied by tense (see Chapter 8, especially Ÿ8.2.2). Note that the situation argument gives the prejacent situation the perceived situation s1 is provided by a contextually determined indexed situation variable. Each instance of -matak has the same index as this situation variable. (218) -matak1 ⇒ λPλsλoλw[cont.inf(o)(s1 )(P(s)) ∧ w = ws1 ] Since the result of the application of -matak followed by tense yields a centred propo• sition, it can either be embedded, or have its origo supplied by a matrix clause mood such as -/IS. The latter case is simpler, so I look at it rst. The sentence in (219) has the derivation given in (220). (219) Zaa/a/izmatak/iS Za:/a/iz-matak-/i;S go.outside•ind.evid•3.ind `Maybe he went out.' As the derivation below shows, the verbal predicate Zaa/a/iz `go outside' rst has its nominal argument satis ed with the free variable x1 , yielding argument saturated,  d  d.  Then instead of having its situation  becomes the argument of the inferential -matak, resulting in another  function c , which has its situation argument lled by the tense morpheme. I treat the tense argument as a free variable whose value is contextually determined, much like a pronoun (McCawley 1971, Partee 1973) (see Ÿ8.2.2 for further discussion). Finally, the origo is supplied by the mood su x yielding a .  136  5.5. Modelling Nuu•chah•nulth evidentials (220)  a  † hhhh †††††††† hhhh †††† h h h hh  -/i;S  b  hh††††††† hhhh †††† h h h †† hhhh  o∗  03  c  † hhhh †††††††† hhhh †††† h h h hh  s3  -matak2  d  hhh†††††††† λPλsλoλw[cont.inf(o)(s2 )([P(s)]) ∧ w = ws2h]hhhhhhh †††† † hh  Za:/a/iz  01  λxλs λoλw [go.out (s )(o)(w )(x)]  x1  a  λw[cont.inf(o∗)(s2 )(λoλw [go.out (s3 )(o)(w )(x1 )]) ∧ w = ws2 ]  b  λo λw[cont.inf(o )(s2 )(λoλw [go.out (s3 )(o)(w )(x1 )]) ∧ w = ws2 ]  c  λsλo λw[cont.inf(o )(s2 )(λoλw [go.out (s)(o)(w )(x1 )]) ∧ w = ws2 ]  d  λs λoλw [go.out (s )(o)(w )(x1 )]  The proposition in  a  denotes the set of worlds w such that s2 is a part of w, and o∗(the speaker  in the utterance situation) can make a contingent inference from the contextua