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Climate governance and the welfare state : a cross-national comparison Groenewegen, Tracy 2012

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CLIMATE GOVERNANCE AND THE WELFARE STATE: A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON by Tracy Groenewegen  B.A. (Hons.), The University of Manitoba, 2010  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF ARTS in The Faculty of Graduate Studies  (Sociology)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  August 2012  © Tracy Groenewegen, 2012  Abstract This thesis explores the theoretical and empirical connection between the welfare state and national-level climate governance, drawing together the concepts of the ecological state, ecological modernization, and varieties of capitalism. It is argued that the eco-state represents the latest evolutionary phase of the modern state, though no state has achieved full eco-state status. In its nascence it has thus been layered on top of institutional structures that characterize earlier phases, namely welfare and production regimes. As a result, 'eco-state regimes' – differential degrees of eco-state development – have begun to take shape, mapping onto these two foundational regimes such that coordinated market economies with social democratic welfare states are the vanguards of ecological modernization, a discourse that dominates environmental policy arenas across the advanced capitalist world but that these particular countries have embraced with especial gusto and have the institutional and governance capacities to make a reality. It is proposed, then, that this ‘family of nations’ would exhibit comparatively strong climate governance from an ecological modernization perspective. Using available data, I assess the empirical relevance of this theoretical framework and suggest how it might be strengthened. A basic quantitative analysis of scores on the Climate Change Performance Index provides some support for the theory but the existence of two substantially discrepant cases – the United Kingdom and Finland – indicates that it is overly simplistic. I explore these two cases further in considerable depth using an interdisciplinary, comparative case study approach, which brings to light a range of influential extra-theoretical factors, including climatic, geographic, demographic, economic, political, historical, and geopolitical factors. My findings therefore highlight the importance of a broader conception of national context to a fuller understanding of variation in national-level climate governance and suggest an additional, alternative evolutionary path for countries with liberal market economies and liberal welfare states. However, the findings also call into question the possibility of a fully developed eco-state, and the likelihood of ecological modernization as a definitive solution to global climate change, in the context of globalized capitalism. .  ii  Table of Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................ ii Table of Contents ............................................................................................... iii List of Tables ........................................................................................................v List of Figures ..................................................................................................... vi List of Boxes ....................................................................................................... vii 1  Introduction ...................................................................................................1  2  Literature .......................................................................................................3  3  4  2.1  The Importance of National-Level Analysis................................................................. 3  2.2  The Evolution of the Modern State ............................................................................... 4  2.3  Eco-State Variation ....................................................................................................... 7  2.4  A Critical Look at Ecological Modernization ............................................................. 15  2.5  Research Questions ..................................................................................................... 18  Methodology ............................................................................................... 19 3.1  The Climate Change Performance Index .................................................................... 19  3.2  Comparative Case Analysis ........................................................................................ 22  3.2.1  Case Selection ....................................................................................................... 23  3.2.2  Comparative Procedure ......................................................................................... 24  Results ..........................................................................................................27 4.1  Analysis of the CCPI .................................................................................................. 27  4.1.1 4.2  Discrepant Cases ................................................................................................... 30  The United Kingdom: An Unlikely Climate Leader................................................... 33  4.2.1  Explaining Strong Climate Governance in the United Kingdom ......................... 35  4.2.2  Accounting for the UK’s Progressive Climate Policy .......................................... 47  4.3  Finland: An Unlikely Climate Laggard ...................................................................... 51 iii  4.3.1  Comparison with Sweden ............................................................................ 55  Comparison with Denmark .......................................................................... 63  4.3.2  5  6  Explaining Finland’s Relatively Weak Climate Governance ............................... 52  Accounting for Finland’s Relatively Weak Energy Policy................................... 67  Discussion .....................................................................................................70 5.1  The Importance of Broad National Context................................................................ 70  5.2  Toward a Conceptualization of Family-Specific Evolutionary Paths......................... 72  5.3  Limitations of Ecological Modernization and the Eco-State ...................................... 73  5.4  Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research ...................................................... 76  Conclusion....................................................................................................78  References ...........................................................................................................80  iv  List of Tables Table 1 CCPI Scores of Countries in each Family ................................................................ 27 Table 2 Family Means and Standard Deviations on CCPI Indicators ................................... 29 Table 3 Scores of Key Countries on CCPI Indicators ........................................................... 31 Table 4 The UK Compared to Canada and the US on Key Variables ................................... 33 Table 5  Finland Compared to Sweden and Denmark on Key Variables ............................... 51  v  List of Figures Figure 1 Scattergram of CCPI Scores by Family of Nations .................................................. 28  vi  List of Boxes Box 1  Construction of the Climate Change Performance Index.......................................... 20  vii  1 Introduction Global climate change is perhaps the greatest collective challenge ever faced by humanity. It is an extensively discussed and debated topic in the mass media and popular discourse, and the scale, complexity, and far-reaching effects of climate change make it an increasingly indelible issue on the political agenda of most industrialized nations. Although even the most progressive climate strategies are not contributing sufficiently on a practical level to the goal to avoid dangerous climate change and keep the increase in global temperature below the 2 degrees limit, some countries are performing much better than others (Germanwatch 2011a). Research on environmental policy has shown, for example, that countries with highly developed welfare states have been leaders in developing climate change mitigation policies (Dryzek 2008; Groenewegen 2010). In this thesis I explore the theoretical and empirical connection between the welfare state and national-level climate governance, drawing together the concepts of the ecological state, ecological modernization, and varieties of capitalism. I use available data to assess the empirical relevance of the theory, which pertains to how the modern state is evolving and which kinds of countries are the vanguards of this development, taking as my point of departure the most recent results of the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI). A basic quantitative analysis of scores on the index provides some support for the theory but the existence of two substantially discrepant cases – the United Kingdom and Finland – indicates that it is overly simplistic. I explore these two cases further in considerable depth using an interdisciplinary, comparative case study approach. My findings highlight the importance of a broad conception of national context to a fuller understanding of variation in national-level climate governance, and thus suggest that the theoretical framework might be strengthened through the incorporation of more  1  explanatory factors and contingencies. However, the findings also call into question the possibility of a fully developed eco-state, and the likelihood of ecological modernization as a definitive solution to global climate change, in the context of globalized capitalism. This thesis is organized as follows. I begin, in the literature chapter, by explaining why inquiry at the national level is warranted, before proceeding to construct the theoretical framework used to guide the empirical analysis. I then introduce my research questions, and in the third chapter outline the methodology used to address them. Next is the results chapter, which presents the findings from the CCPI analysis and comparative case analysis. Finally, before concluding the paper I discuss the theoretical implications of the findings, discuss the limitations of the study and make suggestions for future research on the topic.  2  2 Literature 2.1 The Importance of National-Level Analysis The following discussion of the link between social protection and climate protection can begin most usefully with a consideration of why it is important to focus on state efforts at the national level. Indeed, while the welfare state – the system of public social provision in a country comprising “an intricate web of income security payments, social insurance, universal and targeted cash transfers, a wide range of in-kind goods and services (including housing, education, and health care), and several related laws and regulatory measures” (Olsen 2002:22) – is inherently a national-level concept, ‘climate governance’ has conventionally been understood as a matter of international cooperation (Obereke, Bulkeley, and Schroeder 2009). It is commonly – and correctly – argued that climate change is a global phenomenon that will require a global effort to overcome. However, given that climate governance refers to “all purposeful mechanisms and measures aimed at steering social systems toward preventing, mitigating, or adapting to the risks posed by climate change” (Jagers and Stripple 2003:385), it is crucial to expand our conceptualization “beyond the international regime” (Okereke, Bulkeley, and Schroeder 2009:59). Indeed, what remains largely absent in the climate debate is “serious consideration of the institutional capacities of various national and subnational governments to develop and implement policies that could actually stabilize or reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (Rabe 2007:424). Questions about national policy approaches and their effectiveness are particularly relevant today, given that [t]he weakness of international agreements to elicit the needed responses has turned the spotlight of inquiry upon the dynamics of national socio-political response to global climate change. The solution must be global, but to craft workable global agreements, there exists a critical need to understand the societal and cultural bases of national responses to global climate change (The COMPON Project 2009). 3  Indeed, the United Nations Climate Conference in Copenhagen in late 2009 was by many accounts a failure, producing only a weak outline of a global agreement to reduce global carbon dioxide emissions (Vidal, Stratton, and Goldenberg 2009). While the Climate Conference in Cancun the following year “placed UN talks back on track after the disaster at Copenhagen,” the deal that was reached likewise failed to establish legally binding targets for emissions reductions (The Telegraph 2010). Thus national efforts at climate change mitigation are currently more dynamic than international negotiations (Germanwatch 2010:4). Further, “[d]espite changing patterns of societal interaction, increased international economic interdependence, and some surrender of sovereignty to supranational institutions, states remain the most important centers of political power in the modern world” (Meadowcroft 2009:2; see also Pierre and Peters 2000). They are the intermediaries between the international and domestic spheres, they formulate and enforce domestic policy, and decide whether to sign, ratify, or reject agreements at the international level (Meadowcroft 2005:13). In addition, no other organization mobilizes collective resources for dealing with societal problems more effectively than the state, as illustrated by the many stimulus packages created in response to the financial crisis in late 2008 (Meadowcroft 2009:2). However, as will be demonstrated further on, it also important to take into account the national context in which state policies are formulated and implemented.  2.2 Evolution of the Modern State Some scholars argue that the modern state is undergoing a process of environmentalization (Dryzek 2008; Dryzek et al. 2003; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000a; 2000b; Meadowcroft 2005; 2008). Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer (2000a; 2000b) assert that this process is being driven by the global institutionalization of the relatively new principle or cultural understanding that environmental protection is a basic state responsibility. Similarly, 4  Meadowcroft (2008) examines “the gradual accretion of the environmental functions of the modern state” (331). Although governments have been involved in conservation, natural resource management, and pollution control for over a century, it was only forty or fifty years ago that national states began to establish comprehensive environmental governance regimes (331; see also Lundqvist 1974). Since the founding of environmental ministries and agencies and the enactment of national air and water pollution laws across the advanced capitalist world during the late 1960s and early 1970s, successive waves of reform have built up “highly complex systems of environmental rule” (Meadowcroft 2008:331). These systems employ a wide range of policy instruments to manage the burdens of industrial civilization, including regulation, fiscal policy, agreements, action plans, and subsidies. Further, like Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer (2000a; 2000b), Meadowcroft recognizes that environmental protection is now understood to be a fundamental part of what legitimate states do. In light of these developments, some suggest that we are witnessing the very beginnings of an environmental state or ‘eco-state’ – a state that places ecological considerations at the core of its activity (Meadowcroft 2008:331; 2005). Schnaiberg, Pellow, and Weinberg (2002) put forth a more precise conceptualization of the environmental state as one which gives considerations of ecological impacts equal weight with considerations of private sector profits and state sector taxes in government decision-making. Of course, most advanced capitalist states fall far short of this standard, as "it is increasingly true that any environmental policy-making is subject to more intensive economic scrutiny, while economic policies are subject to less and less environmental assessment" (Schnaiberg, Pellow, and Weinberg 2000:9). Nonetheless, some states – mainly in Europe – give more consideration to ecological conditions than do others and  5  are thus further along the evolutionary path of eco-state development than others, although no state has achieved full eco-state status. In a slightly different vein, Dryzek et al. (2003) argue that the evolution of the modern state has been influenced by a number of core imperatives that constrain state action. First, the capitalist state was created as a result of the emergence of the ‘economic imperative’, which democratized the state by including the bourgeoisie in its core, allowing their interests to be represented (164). Second, the emergence of the ‘legitimation imperative’ – the legitimacy of the state was in danger due to the “unplanned, humanly harmful and system-threatening effects of the commodification of labour” (Gough 2008:327) – further democratized the state by incorporating the organized working class in its core, creating the welfare state (Dryzek et al. 2003:164-5). The emergence of an ‘environmental conservation imperative’, then, would draw environmentalists into the core, creating the ‘green state’ (165). However, given that this new imperative would require a re-conceptualization of both economic and legitimation imperatives – the former “with an eye towards synergy with natural processes,” and the latter “with an eye towards the need for public reflection on continued technological modernization” (165) – the green state is no more extant than the eco-state discussed above. In other words, so far environmentalists have generally been unable to attach their defining interest to both core state imperatives, although, again, they have had some success in a small handful of European countries. On the other hand, the development of an environmental state may not depend solely on the ability of the environmental movement to penetrate the state’s core,1 but on the severity –  1  Further, the green state conceptualized by Dryzek et al. (2003) constitutes a particular variant of ecological modernization – “reflexive ecological modernization,” which emphasizes social learning, new social movements, cultural politics, and new institutional arrangements (Mol and Spaargaren 2000:20) – in that its creation would involve a route for connecting movement goals and state imperatives specifically suggested by Ulrich Beck’s (1992;  6  perceived or otherwise – of the ecological issues themselves. Indeed, it has more recently been argued that the conservation imperative is largely based on concern about global climate change: just as the “social question” fostered the development of the welfare state, now the threat of runaway global warming is fostering the rise of the eco-state (Gough 2008:327). Meadowcroft (2005; 2008) draws a number of parallels between the welfare state which developed during the twentieth century and the eco-state which is taking shape today across the advanced capitalist world: Both are political responses to long-term societal change related to industrialization, urbanization and democratization. Both have been called into being to wrestle with issues which cannot adequately be addressed by markets and voluntary action. And both shift patterns of ‘normal’ economic interaction (through regulation, fiscal transfers, and so on), while operating within significant economic and political constraints (Meadowcroft 2008:331). However, given that the eco-state is only at the beginning of its developmental path, it is not nearly as strongly institutionalized as its social policy counterpart. Rather, environmental functions have been “grafted onto” pre-existing state structures – those developed for nonenvironmental purposes like welfare provision (331). In other words, these nascent national environmental states are “strongly coloured by what has gone before” (332).  2.3 Eco-State Variation Since different kinds of countries have different types of state structures, it follows that the environmental state would take different forms in varied national contexts. Although currently there is no “elegant” typology of eco-states to refer to (Meadowcroft 2008:332),  1994; 1999) risk society thesis. This thesis posits “a legitimation crisis in the context of risk that can be met by new forms of ‘sub-politics’ that effectively engage the citizenry in the selection, allocation, distribution, and amelioration of risks” (Dryzek et al. 2003:164). However, there is another variant of ecological modernization – “technocorporatist ecological modernization,” wherein ecological reform is a techno-administrative affair (Mol and Spaargaren 2000:20) – that is far more manifest than the reflexive variant and thus of more interest in the present paper.  7  according to the argument above eco-state regimes2 should map roughly onto welfare regimes in a systematic fashion. The most widely used and influential welfare state typology is that devised by Gøsta Esping-Andersen. This classification scheme, which developed out of an endeavour to understand the conditions under which “the class divisions and social inequalities produced under capitalism can be undone by parliamentary democracy” (Esping-Andersen 1990:11), recognizes three ideal-typical models – liberal, conservative, and social democratic – that nations tend to approximate according to their established patterns of welfare provision, and, consequently, the extent to which they are ‘market-supporting’ or ‘market-usurping’. At one extreme, the liberal welfare regime, which can be described as residual and market-oriented, encourages private provision and provides relatively modest benefit levels and standards (Esping-Andersen 1989; 1990). The countries that ‘cluster’ in this regime generally include the Anglophone nations – the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (Olsen 2002:71). At the other extreme, the social democratic model is characterized by universal state provision, generous benefit levels, a wide range of social services, and low reliance on the private sector (Esping-Andersen 1989; 1990). This regime type is approximated by the Nordic countries: Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland (Olsen 2002:75). Between these two extremes is the conservative welfare regime, which includes Austria, France, Germany, as well as several Mediterranean European countries, recognizes social rights but upholds and reproduces existing class differences and traditional gender roles (Esping-Andersen 1989; 1990; Olsen 2002:77).3 Thus, in theory, welfare leaders – countries with 2  Since no state has attained full eco-state status, the term 'eco-state variation' simply refers to the differential positions of countries on the evolutionary path of eco-state development, with 'eco-state regimes' referring to such differential positions. 3 Alternative classifications, as well as re-configurations of Esping-Andersen’s typology, are plentiful (see Leibfried 1992; Castles and Mitchell 1993; Siaroff 1994; Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997; Korpi and Palme 1998), but they consistently place the Nordic nations and the Anglo nations in separate categories of provision, designating the former as ‘welfare leaders’ and the latter as ‘welfare laggards’ (Olsen 2011:121).  8  social democratic welfare states – should be leaders on climate change as well, while welfare laggards or countries with liberal welfare states should be climate laggards.4 As mentioned previously, there is some empirical support for this idea (Dryzek 2008; Groenewegen 2010). However, the eco-state has been “layered on top of” not just welfare state types but “well-established economic variants” or forms of capitalism (Meadowcroft 2008:332).The wellknown ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach developed by Hall and Soskice (Hall 2007; Hall and Soskice 2001; Soskice 2007) analyzes how capitalist production takes place in two very different national institutional contexts, which confer different kinds of competitive advantage. Focusing on several “principal spheres of firm endeavour” (Hall and Soskice 2001:22), including industrial relations, corporate governance, and inter-firm relations, the authors establish a dichotomous typology of capitalist production systems. In liberal market economies (LMEs) firms coordinate their activities primarily through hierarchies and market arrangements, relying for advantage on the allocative efficiency of the market (8). Because their institutional environment consists of weakly regulated labor markets and financial systems that impose shortterm investment horizons but allow high risk-taking, they tend to compete based on low cost and radical product innovation (Campbell and Pedersen 2007:310). Conversely, in coordinated market economies (CMEs) firms depend more heavily on collaborative, non-market relationships to coordinate their activities, garnering their advantage from their capacity to engage in strategic interaction with other firms and actors (Hall and Soskice 2001:8). The institutional capacities of CMEs – cooperative industrial relations systems within firms, coordinated wage bargaining between firms, nationally coordinated vocational training programs, and financial systems that conduce to long-term investment – enable firms in this environment to compete more based on 4  Allan Schnaiberg puts forth a roughly similar argument, asserting that while all states are essentially ecologically unsustainable, progressive or "equality fostering" states are doing less poorly than regressive or "inequality magnifying" states (see Schnaiberg 1975).  9  quality and incremental innovation (Campbell and Pedersen 2007:310). Thus eco-state regimes should map roughly onto production regimes, in addition to welfare regimes. Dryzek (2008) suggests that CMEs are further along the evolutionary path of eco-state development than LMEs, and therefore lead the way in terms of climate governance. 5 The explanations for this are structural as well as ideational: CMEs have the institutional capacities to realize the beliefs and assumptions that tend to underlie policy formation in these countries. Specifically, they have adopted the discourse of ‘ecological modernization’ – essential for ecostate development given that its core notion is that environmental protection and restoration are compatible with economic growth (see Redclift and Woodgate 1997). Although 'ecological modernization' describes the dominant environmental policy discourse of advanced capitalist countries in general (Hajer 1995), the power of the presumption is particularly strong in a handful of European countries, where it leads to state efforts to find solutions that satisfy both the economic and conservation imperatives (Dryzek 2008:336). Since ecological modernization requires a conscious, coordinated effort – “the invisible hand of the market is not expected to do the trick”– only the governance capacities of CMEs are sufficient to translate this discourse into a material achievement (335). As a theory of social change, ecological modernization posits that environmental degradation has been caused by a ‘structural design fault’ in the modernization project, but that this fault can be repaired without abolishing the core institutions of modernity (Mol and 5  His main focus here is on the advantaged position of such countries to navigate the potential challenges presented by climate change to the welfare state, such as a possible demand for re-allocation of government expenditure to compensate its victims, to finance projects to offset the effects of climate change, and to support "climate refugees" (Dryzek 2008:334). Since the effects of climate change and other environmental issues are not distributed evenly across geographical or social landscapes, the context within which Dryzek (2008) conceptualizes the connection between climate governance and the welfare state is closely tied to an environmental/climate justice framework. These topics are engaged by a great deal of literature (e.g. see Cole and Foster 2001; Hayward 2007; Fox 1999; Mohai, Pellow, and Roberts 2009; Paavola and Adger 2006; Pellow 2000; Tsosie 2007) but are beyond the scope of the present paper.  10  Spaargaren 2000:19)6. Rather, the industrialized production system, the capitalist organisation of the economy, and the centralised state can be re-worked to internalize care for the environment. It is argued that environmental factors should not only be taken into account, but “structurally anchored” in the reproduction of modern institutions such that production and consumption are not only economically rational, but ecologically rational: We see a whole new area of concepts emerging, which try to give this ecological rationality social, economic and political impact: environmental accounting and bookkeeping, annual environmental reports, green GNP, environmental efficiency, environmental productivity, environmental auditing, etc. It is these kinds of concepts that establish a link between ecological modernisation as a general theory of societal change on the one hand and...a political programme or policy discourse on the other (27-28). This type of restructuring, then, goes beyond simply pricing things that were previously regarded as external costs; the market alone is not capable of such a fundamental transformation. Indeed, Buttel (2000) emphasizes the critical role played by political processes and practices in enabling environmental phenomena to be incorporated into the modernization process (see also Mol 1995). Thus LMEs, wherein market institutions provide the means for coordinating the activities of economic actors, are not up to the task of ecological modernization. CMEs, on the other hand, are better equipped because they rely more heavily on “non-market modes of coordination” (Hall and Soskice 2001:8) and tend to be more corporatist – characterized by a relatively high level of integration between the state, capital, and organized labour – in orientation. Thus policy in these countries is often made by agreement between the executive branch of government and business and worker federations (see Dryzek et al. 2003:8; Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). Interestingly,  6  However, Buttel (2000) maintains that ecological modernization is indistinct as a social theory, pointing out that the term has at least four different referents: an identifiable school of thought, a descriptor of dominant environmental policy discourses, strategic environmental management, and almost any environmental policy innovation (see Scheinberg 2003 for a wider array of interpretations). Thus he argues that ecological modernization rapidly rose to prominence for largely extra-theoretical reasons, having developed in part as a much-needed response to the dire argument that radical action was necessary to combat environmental degradation, as suggested by the renewal of the environmental movement during the 1980s.  11  corporatism has been linked to positive environmental performance (see Jahn 1998; Scruggs 1999; 2001). The capitalist production regime typology devised by Hall and Soskice and EspingAndersen’s welfare regime typology overlap substantially in delineating “families of nations”; CMEs either have conservative or social democratic welfare states, and LMEs invariably have liberal welfare states (henceforth referred to as LME/LWS) (Schroder 2008). While, as discussed above, CMEs are in a better position to ecologically modernize than LMEs, this is particularly the case with CMEs that have social democratic welfare states (henceforth referred to as CME/SDWS). This ‘family of nations’ – which includes Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Norway (Schroder 2008:27) – tends to see “economic and ecological values as mutually reinforcing” (Dryzek 2008:334). In other words, CME/SDWS countries have adopted an ecological modernization discourse with particular vigour. In fact, research suggests that environmental concern – a prerequisite, one would assume, for adopting this discourse – may stem more from the welfare state feature of this family of nations than from the production regime attribute. For example, in their study on public support for environmental priorities, Gerhards and Lengfeld (2008) found that countries with social democratic welfare states “exhibit the highest approval rating for environmental protection” (341), which they argue would be consistent with specific attitudes about climate policy (338). Similarly, Schaffrin (2011) demonstrates empirically that social democratic welfare states, through their redistributive effects, foster higher levels of individual concern for climate change: First, increasing social security and support of the new middle class by the welfare state creates an interest in or reduces vulnerability towards CC (policies). Second, a historically unprecedented degree of economical and physical security in early childhood, facilitated by intensive welfare programs, socializes a basic postmaterialist value orientation that captures concern for CC (15).  12  Public concern for climate change should, in theory, have a bearing on climate governance at the national state level since democratic governments rely on electoral support (see Marquart-Pyatt 2007)7. Thus it may be suggested that the social policy arrangements in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Norway provide for the ideational explanation as to why CME/SDWS countries are the vanguards of eco-state development, while their institutional context of production provides for the structural explanation. Moreover, welfare states are part of the structural explanation as well because they constitute an aspect of the institutional environment within which firms act. Thus whereas LMEs tend to propagate neoliberal policies that enhance market competition such as deregulation, privatization, decentralization of government authority, and rolling back the welfare state, CMEs tend to adopt policies that reinforce actors’ capacities for non-market coordination by supporting corporatist bargaining and codetermination, which for labor requires a well-developed welfare state (Campbell and Pedersen 2007:311). Thus social democratic welfare states complement CMEs in a number of different ways. Firstly, once benefits exceed a minimum level trade union organizations often form in order to administer extensive welfare schemes, and this can spur a similar coordination of employers’ organizations; the “associational structure that is necessary to coordinate an economy can therefore be induced by extensive welfare arrangements” (Schroder 2008:28; see also Manow 2001a; 2001b). Secondly, high and universal benefit levels make it easier for firms to cooperate by ‘levelling the playing field’ between them – “poaching by company-centered welfare schemes becomes more difficult when these are dwarfed by public  7  While concern for the environment does not necessarily foster a commitment to ecological modernization, as mentioned it is in fact the dominant environmental policy discourse in the advanced capitalist world, particularly in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Norway. Given the constraints on state action posed by the economic imperative (see Dryzek et al. 2003), and the ecological modernization notion of a ‘positive-sum game’ between economy and ecology (Hajer 1995), the reign of this discourse is hardly surprising.  13  benefits” (Schroder 2008:29; see also Martin and Swank 2001; Swenson 2002; Thelen 2000). Thirdly, generous wage replacement rates provide an incentive for workers to learn specialized skills, which are important for CMEs but often restrict workers’ employability to certain firms or industries; relatively high income maintenance transfers help protect workers in case of layoffs (Schroder 2008:29; see also Iversen and Soskice 2006; Soskice and Iversen 2001). Many more examples abound (see Schroder 2008). Therefore social policy arrangements actually support competitive advantage (Mares 2001a; 2001b). It is little wonder, then, that Mol (1995) sees the existence of a welfare state as a prerequisite for ecological modernization (54). However, ecological modernization theorists have generally focused on the advanced industrialized world without paying much attention to the capitalist diversity within it. As discussed above, countries vary in terms of arrangements for production and welfare distribution. These differences, it has been argued, are likely to bear on eco-state variation such that CME/SDWS countries are further along the evolutionary path of eco-state development or, put differently, have ecologically modernized to a greater extent than LME/LWS countries. To reiterate, this is for both structural and ideational reasons; the well-developed welfare state of countries in the first family has fostered higher levels of environmental concern in these countries and – the desire for continued modernization, in particular economic growth, being a constant across the advanced capitalist world – they have therefore more wholeheartedly embraced the discourse of ecological modernization. Further, their institutional context of production, of which a well-developed welfare state is a vital part, affords these countries greater capacity and ability to turn ecological modernization into a material achievement. Given the focus here on climate change, it might be posited that CME/SDWS countries would exhibit  14  stronger climate governance than LME/LWS countries from an ecological modernization perspective.8  2.4 A Critical Look at Ecological Modernization Before proceeding to analyze the cross-national variation in climate governance, it is important to critically examine ecological modernization as a theory and take stock of the empirical support for the idea that it is in fact happening, as it is by no means met without skepticism. Indeed, critical political economists argue that modernization processes – particularly economic growth and urbanization – almost invariably lead to escalating environmental degradation due to the profit maximization imperative of capitalism and the relentless pursuit of growth at all costs (Clausen and York 2008; see also Foster 1992; O’Connor 1994; 1998; Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and Gould 1994). One of the most significant debates within environmental sociology is that between ecological modernization and a particular political economic model called the 'treadmill of production' thesis, developed primarily by Allan Schnaiberg in the 1980s. According to this view, as articulated by Schnaiberg and Gould (1994), the modern socioeconomic system is characterized by increasing accumulation of wealth through ownership of economic organizations that use ecological resources to continually expand production and profits. More and more of this wealth is re-invested into new technologies that can increase efficiency and thereby generate more profits for owners of productive property in order to sustain and expand their ownership amid growing competition. The state facilitates capital accumulation in order to ensure a sufficiently large tax revenue base for its expenditures, which are allocated either to investors or workers and other ‘dependents.’ Simply put, then, the  8  I.e. climate governance in the context of commitment to continued modernization, most notably economic growth and development.  15  treadmill is built around the interaction of two processes – the inclination on the part of investors, workers, and the state toward economic growth and the expansion of technological capacity. The net effect of these processes is a growing need for the ‘withdrawal’ of ever more resources and ‘additions’ of ever more chemicals, waste, and other pollutants in order to uphold a given level of social well-being. Therefore industrial societies, by virtue of their operating logic, create ecological destruction. Further, since an instrumental view of nature is the dominant one across society, achieving environmental protection requires an “enduring conflict with the treadmill of production” (70). Thus Schnaiberg and Gould (1994) argue that the problem with modernity is not its deficient technologies that pollute, but the “competitive logic of maximization of share values without limits” (53). Using simple arithmetic, they demonstrate that no matter how much technology may reduce ecological additions or withdrawals per unit output, the gains are likely to be offset by the pressures to expand production in order to maximize returns on investment. Although this perspective has received considerable empirical support (e.g. Clausen and York 2008; Clement 2009; Cole and Neumayer 2004; Obach 2007; Pellow, Schnaiberg, and Weinberg 2000; Shi 2003), the scope of its applicability has been questioned by some (Mol and Spaargaren 2005). Certainly, studies have also provided some evidence for the idea that a ‘positive-sum game’ between the environment and the economy is possible (e.g. Christoff 1996; Janicke 1992; Porter and Linde 1995; Schofer and Granados 2006; Weidner 2002). For instance, with respect to economic growth, investment, and the size of industrial and service sectors, pro-environmental countries tend to fare better than those with lax environmental policies (Schofer and Granados 2006:980). In addition, industrialized countries with “relatively favourable rates of change in  16  environmental quality” have been found to have higher levels of employment than countries in which environmental quality has developed less favourably (Janicke 1992:52). Scholars have also found evidence of the unfolding of ecological modernization processes in various contexts, such as the development of municipal urban recycling in the United States (Scheinberg 2003), the implementation of small-scale solid waste management projects in Bulgaria (Scheinberg 2010), the shift to self-regulation in European environmental policy (Neale 1997), the use of economic instruments in Norwegian environmental policy (Reitan 1998), and the transformation of pulp and paper manufacturing in Southeast Asia, the United States, and Australia (Sonnenfeld 2002). However, because critics of ecological modernization theory, such as those working within the political-economic tradition discussed above, can point with equal legitimacy to cases where the opposite – the exacerbation of ecological conditions by continued economic development – is taking place, it is therefore urged that environmental sociologists working in this area of inquiry “work toward greater rigor in identifying conditions under which ‘ecological modernization’ outcomes are more or less likely” (Fisher and Freudenberg 2001:704). The national institutional arrangements of production and welfare provision are two such conditions. Studies have shown levels of environmental concern, responsibility, and performance to be higher in CMEs (Buchanan 2011; Meyer 2011; Mikler 2007; 2009; 2011) and social democratic welfare states (Dryzek 2008; Groenewegen 2010; Jahn 1998). However, research to date has not analyzed the cross-national variation in climate governance from an explicit ecological modernization perspective, and certainly not as a function of national institutional context represented by a given family of nations. This is therefore the line of inquiry I pursue in the present study.  17  2.5 Research Questions The first research question I explore is: Do CME/SDWS countries exhibit stronger climate governance from an ecological modernization perspective than LME/LWS countries? As will be discussed further on, upon conducting the analysis to explore this question, two substantial outliers were detected - Finland and the UK. As marked contradictions to the theoretical framework, these two particular countries are the focus of the remainder of the study. The second research question therefore asks: Why are these two countries discrepant? This question can be broken down into several sub-questions: What specifically makes the UK a leader on climate change and Finland a relative laggard? To what extent can the discrepancies be accommodated by the theory as it is or modified to allow for continuous rather than categorical cross-national variation in institutional set-up? What extra-theoretical factors have contributed to the UK’s strong performance on climate change and to Finland’s relatively weak performance? Finally, what factors account for these countries’ relatively strong/weak climate and/or energy policies? In the next chapter, I detail the methods used to answer these questions.  18  3 Methodology This study uses a combination of two methods to investigate the empirical relevance of the theoretical framework regarding the connection between the welfare state and climate governance developed previously. The first research question is explored primarily through a basic quantitative analysis of the most recent results of Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI). The second research question entertained in this study - Why are Finland and the UK discrepant? - is answered through the use of a comparative case study approach.  3.1 The Climate Change Performance Index To answer the first research question, I conduct a very basic quantitative analysis of the most recent results of the CCPI, which is a tool that “quickly shows who is doing what regarding climate change” (Germanwatch 2010:3) in order to enhance transparency in international climate politics (Germanwatch 2011a:5). Based on standardized criteria, the CCPI appraises and compares the climate protection performance of the 58 countries collectively responsible for more than 90 percent of global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions (5). Eighty percent of the index is based on “objective” indicators of emissions trend and emissions level while the remaining twenty percent is based on national and international climate policy assessments by over 200 “experts” from the respective countries (see Box 1 for methodological details on index construction). While the CCPI is not an explicit measure of the extent of ecological modernization of national climate governance regimes, an argument can be made for its treatment as such.  19  Box 1: Construction of the Climate Change Performance Index The CCPI is composed of thirteen different indicators classified into three categories: Emissions Trend The emissions trend indicators are based on International Energy Agency's data on CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion (2011a). Weighted at 50%, the emissions trend composite indicator measures changes in emissions from the energy, industry, transport and residential sectors. The evaluated time frame consists of two three-year periods spaced by five years (2002-2004 compared to 2007-2009). In the energy category, emissions from electricity generation are considered, weighted at 7%. As a highrisk energy source, nuclear power is taken into account with so called risk equivalents per energy unit. In the transport sector, emissions from road transport and international aviation - excluding international shipping - are evaluated, each weighted at 3 %. Aviation emissions are measured using so-called ‘CO2 equivalents' and are calculated into the index with the IPCC‘s 1999 "best guess" factor of 2.7. The residential sector indicator, weighted at 4%, includes emissions generated through the heating of buildings and the expansion of domestic use water, excluding those from electricity. The industrial sector indicator, weighted at 6%, includes emissions from manufacturing and construction. The renewable energy indicator, weighted at 7%, measures the change in the share of renewable energies in domestic energy production (share in total primary energy supply). The CO2/capita trend, weighted at 5%, measures the change of CO2 per capita emissions from 2009 to 2010. The target performance comparison, weighted at 15%, compares the trend in per capita emissions over the 1990-2008 period with the "desired" development in the same time period, the underlying principle of which is that the most serious consequences of global warming will be avoided if global average temperatures do not exceed 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The development pathways to this target envision a gradual convergence of per capita emissions in industrial, as well as developing and transitional countries to comparable levels by 2050 (see United Nations 1992). Emissions Level The emissions level indicators are based on International Energy Agency's data on CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion (2011a) and the data in BP's Statistical Review of World Energy (2012). The CO2 emissions per primary energy unit indicator, weighted at 15 %, calculates emissions in relation to primary energy use (2009 estimate) The primary energy use per capita indicator, weighted at 7.5%, calculates energy consumption in relation to population size (2009 estimate) The primary energy use per unit GDP, weighted at 7.5%, calculates energy consumption in relation to economic power (GDP in purchasing power parity) (2009 estimate). Due to economic globalization and the consequent spatial division of production and consumption, there are distortions in the measuring of CO2 emissions. So-called "trade emissions" can lead to potential errors, as emissions are registered at the site of production, not consumption. However, the CCPI follows the judgment that precisely following the global shift in emissions through international trade is impossible; acquiring such data is regarded as too complex and intransparent.  20  Box 1: Construction of the Climate Change Performance Index (Cont'd) Climate Policy The qualitative data of this composite indicator is collected annually in a comprehensive research study. Its basis is the performance rating by climate change experts from non-governmental organisations in the countries that are evaluated. Via a questionnaire, they give a judgement and 'score' on the most important measures of their governments in the sectors energy, transport, residential, and industry. Beyond that, current climate policy is evaluated with regard to reduction of deforestation and forest degradation on the basis of support and protection of forest biodiversity. Also, performance/participation at UNFCCC conferences and in other international conferences and multilateral agreements is evaluated. Climate policy has an overall weight of 20%, with national and international policy each making up 10%. Calculating the Index The methodology used for the CCPI’s ranking follows the OECD guideline for creating performance indicators (Freudenberg 2003). To evaluate countries’ scores, the CCPI does not assign absolute values but rather makes an inter-country comparison. The following formula is used to calculate the index:  I: Climate Change Performance Index; Xi: normalised indicator; wi: weighting of Xi , i: 1,...., n: number of partial indicators (currently 13) Score = 100 [(actual value - minimum value) / (maximum value - minimum value)] Zero is the bottom cut off; 100 points are the maximum that can be achieved. A country that is best in a given indicator receives full points in that indicator. The best possible overall score is therefore 100 points. Information obtained from Germanwatch (2011b)  Most significantly, the emissions trend and level indicators are measured in relation to population size, economic power, and primary energy use rather than in absolute terms (see Box 1). Although this is done in order to control for the initial position of a country, these indicators in effect gauge the extent to which a country has been able to decouple population growth and energy consumption from CO2 emissions, and decouple population and economic growth from energy consumption. Indicative of an effort to harmonize environment and economy, these are ecological modernization outcomes.  21  However, treating the policy indicators as measures of ecological modernization is a less straightforward matter because the ambiguity surrounding the methodology (see Box 1) precludes the assumption that what the experts are essentially judging is the extent to which their respective countries have embraced climate policies reflective of ecological modernization.9 Nonetheless, since an index, by definition, is a composition of several different indicators of the same concept, and it has already been established that the emissions indicators do in fact capture ecological modernization outcomes, the obscure measurement of the policy indicators is not terribly prohibitive. At any rate, they comprise only 20 percent of the index. Therefore, the CCPI scores and rankings reflect, at least in a rudimentary way, the crossnational variation in the extent of ecological modernization of climate governance. I compare the CCPI scores of countries in one family of nations – CME/SDWS – with countries in another – LME/LWS. The first family includes Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Norway while the second family includes the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, Ireland, and New Zealand (Schroder 2008:27). I calculate and compare family means and standard deviations with respect to overall CCPI score and scores on the constituent indicators of the index. I also plot on a scattergram the countries' overall scores, grouped by family membership.  3.2 Comparative Case Analysis The index reveals two substantially discrepant cases - Finland and the United Kingdom whose scores on the index are contrary to what would be expected in the context of the present theory. I thus proceed to investigate the UK and Finland in greater detail, using a comparative case study approach to uncover the reasons behind their CCPI scores. Indeed, case-oriented strategies are chiefly concerned with making sense of a relatively small number of cases because 9  Further, I was unable to obtain either blank or completed copies of the expert questionnaires from Germanwatch.  22  they are substantively or theoretically significant (Ragin 1999:1137-8; see also Eckstein 1975; Ragin 1987). Here, the cases chosen for analysis challenge the theoretical framework concerning climate governance and the welfare state (see Ragin 1999; Eckstein 1975). These 'deviant' cases are explored in detail and developed in their contexts using several sources of evidence; analysis then proceeds via systematic comparison (see Ragin 1990).  3.2.1 Case Selection Thus Finland and the UK are chosen for more in-depth analysis because they are discrepant in nature. This is often called the "deviant case method", which selects one or more cases that, by reference to a specific theory or "common sense", demonstrate surprising values (Seawright and Gerring 2008:302). Deviant cases are therefore closely linked to the investigation of theoretical anomalies, which is useful in "disconfirming a deterministic proposition" (302). Indeed, as pointed out by Pearce (2002), investigating anomalous cases can lead to valuable knowledge regarding the shortcomings of theories; through “careful analysis of the cases which do not exhibit the expected behavior, the researcher recognizes the oversimplification of his theoretical structure and becomes aware of the need for incorporating further variables into his predictive scheme” (Kendall and Wolf 1949:153-4). Since the goal in exploring the deviant cases is to identify the differences that are responsible for the discrepancies, and thereby contribute to theoretical development and improvement, it is necessary to compare the deviant cases to those that are not. This approach involves studying "the causally decisive differences between relatively similar objects" (Ragin 1987:47). By using theory or a general understanding of the topic at hand to identify causally relevant differences with respect to the outcome of interest, the investigator can formulate or refine a general explanation of the phenomenon of interest (47). Since pragmatic considerations 23  preclude comparing the two discrepant cases to all others in their respective family of nations, each is instead compared to the two cases in its family of nations which are least discrepant, given their overall scores on the CCPI – the UK to Canada and the US and Finland to Sweden and Denmark. This approach, as advocated by Ragin (1987), is taken in order to maximize the contrasts and thus ensure that the comparative context within which each outlier is examined is as fruitful as possible for the identification of causally relevant differences - explanatory factors of national-level climate governance not taken into account by the theory.  3.2.2 Comparative Procedure Having procured from Germanwatch the country tables which display the breakdown of overall scores, I address the first sub-part of the second research question – What specifically makes the UK a leader on climate change and Finland a relative laggard? – by comparing the UK’s scores on each of the thirteen indicators (see Box 1) to those of Canada and the US and Finland’s scores to those of Sweden and Denmark. I compare the scores on each indicator to determine which categories account the most for the UK’s high score compared to Canada and the US and Finland’s low score compared to Sweden and Denmark. Next, using available data contained in online organizational and government documents and websites, as well as scholarly journal articles, books, and news articles, I determine the "causally relevant" factors (Ragin 1987:47) behind these differences, using a comparative perspective and logical reasoning to infer their influence. First, in addressing the second sub-part of the second research question – To what extent can the discrepancies be accommodated by the theory as it is or modified to allow for continuous rather than categorical cross-national variation in institutional set-up? – I consider the possibility that the outlier countries have simply been misclassified with respect to their welfare and production regimes or that they indeed perform in 24  accordance with the theory if variation in institutional context of production and welfare provision is seen as continuous rather than categorical. Available information and data on the welfare states and variants of capitalism in each of the six countries is reviewed in order to reassess the position of the discrepant cases in comparative context. Secondly, to answer the final two sub-questions, I take a more inter-disciplinary approach, comparing each outlier to its two referent countries along a number of dimensions I deem to be relevant to climate change, including climatic, geographic, demographic, economic, historical, political, and geopolitical dimensions. These are derived by working backwards from the most immediate influences on each outlier’s performance on the CCPI, as determined upon answering the first part of the second research question, to factors at higher levels of abstraction. A certain factor is attributed explanatory value if it is a) present in the outlier country but absent to some extent in the referent countries or b) absent in the outlier country but present in the referent countries. Due to methodological issues I do not entertain the countries’ scores on the CCPI policy indicators at this point in the analysis beyond acknowledging whether they account for some of the difference between the overall scores. As alluded to previously, the policy indicators are much less objective than the emissions indicators because their measurement (see Box 1) involves a number of different “experts” evaluating their own countries’ climate policies based on ambiguous criteria – what constitutes an “important” policy mechanism is likely to vary according to the expert making the assessment, and it would seem that there is an inherent conflict of interest in assessing the policy activities of one’s own country. Further, it makes little sense that policies regarding deforestation would be considered when only carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion are accounted for in the emissions indicators. Or that participation at international climate conferences would be observed while only emissions  25  produced nationally are considered in the emissions indicators. Thus although the two outliers’ scores on the policy indicators account for some of the difference between their overall scores and those of their referent countries, I focus instead on the more objective emissions indicators. To be sure, investigating the factors behind differential emissions levels and trends in both cases leads to a discussion of key policy instruments, but starting with the emissions indicators makes for a more refined analysis of policy – one that focuses on whether or not policies have been effective in reducing CO2 emissions, a more precise criterion than “important”. Further, by taking emissions as my point of departure I am led to consider the effect of policy instruments that are technically outside the purview of climate policy, such as energy taxation. Before endeavouring to uncover the reasons for the outliers’ deviant scores on the relevant emissions indicators, I make a number of calculations using figures from the two documents used by Germanwatch to compute the CCPI scores, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion: Highlights 2011 by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012 (see Box 1). This is done in order to concretize the CCPI scores with actual emissions data (see Tables 4 and 5), as the index only provides an initial indication of how the countries compare on climate change. Thus the scores are not taken at face value but corroborated by my own arithmetic using the same numbers. For example, the UK’s high CCPI score on the PEU/capita indicator relative to Canada and the US is due to the fact that it uses, by a 2009 estimate, 3.29 Million tonnes oil equivalent (Mtoe) of primary energy per one million inhabitants, compared to 9.27 in Canada and 7.17 in the US – figures I calculated using BP (2012) data on primary energy consumption and IEA (2011a) population data.  26  4 Results 4.1 Analysis of the CCPI The table below displays the 2012 CCPI scores and rankings of the countries in each family of nations, as well as the mean score and standard deviation for each family. A higher score indicates a stronger performance on the index and thus stronger climate governance from an ecological modernization perspective. Following the table, a scattergram (Figure 1) is provided to represent the pattern of scores visually.  Table 1: CCPI Scores of Countries in each Family Family of Nations Country  CME/SDWS  LME/LWS  Sweden Denmark Norway Finland United Kingdom Ireland New Zealand Australia United States Canada  Score  Ranking  68.1 63.9 61.9 53.9 67.4 60.9 54.5 49.8 48.5 46.3  4th 12th 15th 37th 5th 17th 32nd 48th 52nd 54th  Mean Score  Standard Deviation  61.95 (N=4)  5.96  54.57 (N=6)  8.16  Data obtained from Germanwatch (2011a).  27  Figure 1: Scattergram of CCPI Scores by Family of Nations 80  70  NO  60  FI  CCPI Score  50  40 Linear (CCPI Score) 30  20  10  0 LME/LWS  Family of Nations  CME/SDWS  As indicated by the higher mean score of the first family of nations, CME/SDWS countries generally perform better on the index than the LME/LWS countries. The smaller standard deviation for this group shows that CME/SDWS countries are also less varied in their performance than LME/LWS countries, which is also evident in the scattergram. Further, the table below displays the mean weighted scores and standard deviations for each family with respect to the thirteen constituent indicators of the CCPI:  28  Table 2: Family Means and Standard Deviations on CCPI Indicators Mean Score Indicator  Standard Deviation  CME/SDWS (N=4)  LME/LWS (N=6)  CME/SDWS  LME/LWS  5.35 4.82 2.42 2.22 2.88 1.43 1.40 7.96  5.59 4.38 2.59 2.54 1.97 2.67 3.17 6.13  1.99 0.52 0.16 0.15 0.85 0.49 1.15 1.39  0.48 0.59 0.23 0.25 0.14 2.53 1.29 2.38  8.70 5.18 6.24  4.22 5.18 6.1  3.68 0.64 0.74  2.38 0.98 1.04  6.76 6.60  5.79 4.23  1.20 2.40  1.78 2.91  Emissions Trend Electricity Industry Road transport International aviation Residential Renewable energy trend CO2 per capita emissions trend Target performance comparison Emissions Level CO2/PEU PEU/capita PEU/GDP Climate Policy National International Data obtained from Germanwatch (2011c)10.  Interestingly, the above table shows that CME/SDWS countries perform, on the average, better than LME/LWS countries on only 7 - just over half - of the individual indicators of the CCPI. Thus although the former generally perform better than the latter on the index overall, they do not exhibit higher average scores on all of the indicators. However, as is shown more clearly in Table 4, the indicators that the first family scores higher on are more heavily weighted in the index than those that the second family scores higher on, accounting for 67.5 percent of the index. Further, the fact that the standard deviations for the CWE/SDWS family are smaller than those of the LME/LWS family on all but three indicators suggests that countries in the former group are indeed less varied in their performance. Thus it is not so much the case that 10  This is a private data source made available to the author by Jan Burck on behalf of Germanwatch on Feb. 10, 2012.  29  CME/SDWS countries perform better on different indicators; rather, they generally perform better 'where it counts'. A notable exception is the electricity indicator, on which LME/LWS countries perform better on average and are less varied in this respect. Nonetheless, these results suggest that CME/SDWS countries, in general, exhibit stronger climate governance from an ecological modernization perspective than LME/LWS countries.  4.1.1 Discrepant Cases On the other hand, as shown in Table 2 and Figure 1, there are some discrepancies. In the first family, Finland scores significantly lower on the CCPI than its fellow CME/SDWS countries, performing approximately on par with New Zealand. In the second family, the United Kingdom scores markedly higher than its fellow LME/LWS countries, although Ireland also scores relatively high. These 'outliers' are substantively important, as they suggest that while the theory is empirically relevant, it is too simplistic. Finland and the UK, especially, do not fit the pattern implied by the theory, indicating, for instance, the existence of factors for which it does not account. Before examining what these factors might be, however, it is necessary to answer the first sub-part of the second research question – What specifically makes the UK a leader on climate change and Finland a relative laggard? – by determining exactly how the two primary outliers are discrepant – which particular indicators that comprise the index account most predominantly for the UK’s success and Finland’s relatively poor performance. The table below compares the weighted scores on each CCPI indicator for the two outliers and their referent countries. The top half of the table compares the scores of the CME/SDWS countries, and the bottom half compares the scores of the LME/LWS countries. On the left side of the table are the indicators; in the middle of the table are the countries’ weighted scores on each indicator; the  30  right side provides some context for the scores by showing the total score possible and the largest difference between the scores shown for each indicator.  Table 3: Scores of Key Countries on CCPI Indicators Indicator Emissions Trend  CME/SDWS  Total points possible  Difference between min &max score  Finland  Sweden  Denmark  6.20 4.68 2.50 2.00 2.08 0.78 0.00  6.55 5.59 2.60 2.23 4.00 1.69 1.07  6.28 4.60 2.23 2.30 2.40 1.90 2.70  7.00 6.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 7.00 5.00  0.35 0.99 0.37 0.30 1.92 1.12 2.7  7.08  9.81  8.22  15.00  2.73  8.36 4.57 5.26  12.41 5.22 6.21  3.77 6.05 7.05  15.00 7.50 7.50  8.64 1.48 1.79  National International  5.90 4.50  6.06 4.69  8.51 7.81  10.00 10.00  2.61 3.31  Total  53.91  68.13  63.8  100.00  14.22  Electricity Industry Road transport International aviation Residential Renewable energy trend CO2 per capita emissions trend Target performance comparison  Emissions Level CO2/PEU PEU/capita PEU/GDP  Climate Policy  LME/LWS Emissions Trend  UK  Canada  US  Electricity Industry Road transport International aviation Residential Renewable energy trend CO2/capita emissions trend Target performance comparison  5.80 4.69 2.75 2.46 2.12 4.90 2.05 9.06  5.74 3.90 2.50 3.00 1.97 0.75 2.32 5.04  5.35 4.41 2.87 2.51 2.10 1.54 1.87 6.27  7.00 6.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 7.00 5.00 15.00  0.45 0.79 0.37 0.54 0.15 4.15 0.45 4.02  4.35 6.13 7.07  6.30 3.94 4.56  4.32 4.19 5.62  15.00 7.50 7.50  0.98 2.19 2.51  7.47 8.59  5.18 1.09  5.14 2.34  10.00 10.00  2.33 7.50  46.30  48.53  100.00  21.14  Emissions Level CO2/PEU PEU/capita PEU/GDP  Climate Policy National International  Total 67.44 Data obtained from Germanwatch (2011c).  31  As shown in the table, the UK scores higher than Canada on all but three indicators – international aviation, CO2 emissions per capita, and CO2 emissions per PEU – and higher than the US on all but two – road transport and international aviation. However, the differences between the UK and the other two countries with respect to some indicators are rather negligible, such as its score on electricity compared to Canada and its scores on international aviation and CO2 emissions per PEU compared to the US. The UK performs particularly well on the renewable energy trend, the target performance comparison, primary energy per capita and per GDP, and both policy indicators. Finland scores lower than Sweden on all indicators, but fares similarly with respect to road transport and policy. Finland performs much worse with respect to policy when compared to Denmark, which scores considerably higher than the other two on these indicators. However, both Sweden and Finland score substantially higher than Denmark on CO2 emissions per PEU. Finland’s scores on the electricity and industry indicators are very similar to those of Denmark. Whereas the UK stands out clearly on several indicators relative to both Canada and the US, Finland performs more poorly on some indicators compared to Sweden, and others compared to Denmark. In other words, Canada and the US appear to be more similar to one another in their performance than do Sweden and Denmark; the latter countries both perform relatively well overall on the index but generally do so on different indicators. Finland is outperformed by Sweden particularly with respect to the residential trend, the target performance comparison, and CO2 emissions per PEU. By contrast, Denmark performs better than Finland most notably on CO2 emissions per capita, primary energy per GDP, and on both policy indicators. Less remarkably, however, both Sweden and Denmark fare better than Finland with respect to the renewable energy trend and primary energy per capita.  32  In the next part of this chapter I explore the two discrepant cases in greater detail, focusing on a number of key indicators for each outlier within a comparative context. The UK is compared to Canada and the US with respect to its renewable energy trend, target performance comparison, and primary energy per capita and GDP. Finland’s residential sector emissions trend and CO2 emissions per PEU are examined relative to those of Sweden; its primary energy use per capita and per GDP relative to those of Denmark, and its target-performance comparison relative to both Sweden and Denmark.  4.2 The United Kingdom: An Unlikely Climate Leader Table 4 below summarizes how the UK compares to its North American counterparts on the variables revealed by the weighted CCPI scores to be particularly relevant in terms of their contribution to the UK’s better overall score on the index: Table 4: The UK Compared to Canada and the US on Key Variables Variable  UK  Canada  US  9.60 8.34 -1.26  15.61 16.54 0.93  19.46 18.33 -1.13  3.29 0.12  9.27 0.31  7.17 0.19  0.83 1.91 1.08  0.71 0.90 0.19  0.82 1.28 0.46  CO2 emissions trajectory (tonnes/capita) 1990 level 2008 level ∆ Energy consumption (2009) PEU/capita (Mtoe/million inhabitants) PEU/GDP (Mtoe/US$B) Share of renewables in TPES (%) Average 2002-2004 Average 2007-2009 ∆ Data obtained from IEA (2011a); BP (2012).  Firstly, the UK performs substantially better than Canada or the US on the target-performance indicator, for which the emissions trajectory variable is a proxy. In other words, the UK 33  witnessed a greater decline in its CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2008 than did Canada or the US, and its emissions levels were already comparatively low in the baseline year. Per capita emissions in the US declined by almost as great an amount as in the UK, but absolute emissions increased over that period by about 14.7 percent; the decline in per capita emissions in the US is likely due in part to the fact that its population grew at a faster rate over that period – having increased by 21.8% (IEA 2011a) – than did CO2 emissions.11 Thus the per capita CO2 emissions trend in the UK is closer to what it should be as a more developed country (MDC) if global average temperatures are to not exceed 2°C above pre-industrial levels. As shown in the table, the UK also has lower rates of energy consumption than Canada or the US, indicating that it uses energy more efficiently in supporting its population and economy than does its fellows across the Atlantic. It is not only the rate of primary energy consumption that bears on emission levels, but also the configuration of sources that make up the supply. Some energy sources, such as fossil fuels, are more emissions-intensive than others, such as wind, geothermal, solar, and biomass. Thus the renewable energy trend is also more favorable in the UK, as it has seen the share of renewable sources in its total primary energy supply (TPES) increase to a greater extent over the reference period 2002-04 to 2007-09 than is the case in Canada or the US. Compared to its North American counterparts, then, the UK is a leader in national-level climate governance from an ecological modernization perspective. It uses energy more efficiently, relies increasingly on renewable sources for energy production, and has witnessed a more promising decline in its emissions levels per capita. The first step toward explaining this discrepancy is to determine whether and to what extent it can be accommodated within the  11  In addition, the financial crisis of 2008 likely contributed to the decline in per capita emissions, which fell from 19.08 tonnes in 2007 to 18.33 tonnes in 2008 (IEA 2011a).  34  present theoretical framework, either as it is or modified to allow for continuous rather than categorical cross-national variation in institutional set-up.  4.2.1 Explaining Strong Climate Governance in the United Kingdom The UK’s performance on the CCPI is much closer to what one would expect from a CME/SDWS than from a LME/LWS. It is thus necessary to re-examine this country’s classification in the latter family of nations. Firstly, although the UK is typically placed in the LME category of the varieties of capitalism typology (for example, see Carlin and Soskice 2009; Casper and Whitley 2004; Kenworthy 2006; Schroder 2008), the associational structure of its economy would seem to allow for a greater degree of non-market-based coordination than is the case in Canada or the US, suggesting that if the typology were instead conceptualized as a continuum ranging from LME to CME, the UK would be situated closer than its North American fellows to the latter extreme. Indeed, while in all three countries the business community is well organized and represented – for example, by the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in the UK, the Business Council and the Business Roundtable in the US, and the Fraser Institute and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE) in Canada – workers are not as well organized or represented in Canada or the US because labour movements have been relatively weak in these ‘new nations’ (Olsen 2011:179). The central labour confederation in the UK – the Trades Union Congress (TUC) – has played a much more prominent role there than the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) has in Canada or the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) has in the US (187). Thus while not as high as in the Nordic countries, union density12 was significantly higher in the UK than in Canada or the US in the first  12  I.e. the rate of union membership relative to the size of the non-agricultural labour force (Olsen 2011:185).  35  few decades following World War II (187). Consequently, it should be easier for firms in the UK to coordinate their activities through collaboration and strategic interaction because one of the central societal actors with whom it must negotiate – labour – is relatively well-organized and unified. However, according to the classification scheme devised by Kenworthy (2006), which measures institutional coherence to capture the degree to which a country’s institutions either conform to the LME or CME types or consist of a more heterogeneous mixture, the UK, Canada, and the US are all deemed to be highly coherent LMEs (77). Further, although the UK scores slightly higher than the US and Canada on the Hicks and Kenworthy (1998) “cooperation index” constructed using data from 1960-89, it does not score nearly as high as any of the Nordic countries. Secondly, while the UK is consistently deemed as having a liberal welfare model in the context of Esping-Andersen’s typology (for example, see Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999; Olsen 2002; 2011; Taylor-Gooby, Larsen, and Kananen 2004; Scruggs and Allan 2006), during the first few decades of the post-World War II period its classification as such was not so unequivocal – “labour’s power resources in the UK more closely resembled those in the Nordic nations and were reflected in declining levels of inequality and a greater commitment to the idea of rights and entitlements and a comprehensive ‘cradle-to-grave’ welfare state” (Olsen 2011:188). Indeed, not only was there a relatively high rate of union membership, but the interests of workers and other organized groups were represented by a ‘left-wing’ political party – the Labour Party, which was founded in 1900 and formed a majority government for the first time in 1945. This party has played an important role as the major opposition to the Conservative party since the 1920s, and has held office several times thereafter, the last of which was between 1997 and 2010 under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. By contrast, in Canada none of the left-wing  36  parties formed in the early twentieth century managed to establish secure roots; neither the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) – a coalition of progressive agrarian, socialist, and labour organizations which came together in 1932 – or its successor, the New Democratic Party (NDP) has ever held power at the national level, although CCF/NDP parties have often assumed office at the provincial level (188). The US, on the other hand, is the only advanced capitalist nation without an electorally viable socialist, social democratic, or labour party (188). However, the Labour Party in the UK has not been nearly as electorally successful as its Nordic counterparts (Olsen 2011:188). Further, by the late 1970s the trend toward greater equality in the UK had begun to be reversed as Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher – mirrored by President Ronald Reagan in the US – advanced a staunch neoliberal agenda, instituting such free market reforms as privatization, deregulation, greater corporate tax breaks and freedoms, and cuts in government spending (7).13 The bargaining power of organized labour was significantly eroded and many public sector social services were contracted out. Although these changes were initiated by the Conservative government, they had a lasting impact on politics in the country more broadly; the 1997 New Labour government continued the trend toward neoliberalism by abandoning the traditional social democratic approach of the party and embarking on a programme of market-oriented welfare state reform (Taylor-Gooby, Larsen, and Kananen 2004). Therefore, if Esping-Andersen’s typology were conceived of as a continuum, the UK would have at one time been distinctly closer than Canada or the US to the social democratic model, but its position since the Thatcher/Reagan era is clearly more in line with that 13  Interestingly, despite her steadfast commitment to such ‘free market fundamentalism’ (Olsen 2011:7), Thatcher delivered a landmark speech in 1989 to the UN General Assembly urging for international cooperation and action to address anthropogenic climate change. Not surprisingly, however, Thatcher’s rhetoric was out of tune with the policies and decisions made by her Conservative government at the time. For instance, just days before the UN address, the UK blocked a proposal at a conference in the Netherlands for a 20 percent reduction in CO2 emissions by 2005 (Monbiot 2005).  37  of its counterparts across the Atlantic. For instance, in 1990 public and mandatory private social expenditure in the UK was 19.8 percent of GDP – closer to the rate in Canada (18.6 percent) and the US (14 percent) than that of Sweden (30.8 percent) or Denmark (29.8 percent) (Kuhner 2007:8). Thus while the UK may have had a somewhat more coordinated economy than Canada or the US during the 1960s, 70’s, and 80s, and, from the mid-1940s to the late 1970s, a more progressive welfare state, it nonetheless fits better in the LWS/LME than in the CME/SDWS family of nations. To be sure, it would be located closer to the latter than would be its North American fellows if, again, the dichotomy were made continuous. However, this relatively small difference in its institutional context cannot account entirely for the highly discrepant nature of the UK’s performance on the CCPI. In other words, there are other factors at work that can help explain the UK’s strong climate governance – those unaccounted for by the present theory. These can most easily be determined by investigating, using a comparative perspective, the more immediate influences on the UK’s renewable energy trend, CO2 emissions trajectory, and energy intensity, and working backwards to uncover factors at a higher level of abstraction. The most immediate causal influence on CO2 emissions is, of course, energy consumption. The UK has a significantly lower rate of primary energy use than either Canada or the US with respect to population and GDP for a number of reasons. Firstly, the geographical extent of the country is not nearly as great as that of Canada or the United States – 243,610 square kilometers compared to 9,984,670 and 3,794,083, respectively. As a result, transporting economic goods within the country requires shorter average traveling distances, and thus less transport fuel and CO2 emissions, than is the case in Canada or the US. Indeed, in 2009 CO2  38  emissions from road transport amounted to 1,936 kg per capita in the UK, compared to 4,670 kg and 5,250 kg in Canada and the US respectively (IEA 2011a). Of course, also contributing to the UK’s lower levels of transport fuel consumption and related emissions are its patterns of urban development. Not only is the UK more densely populated as a whole than Canada or the US – not surprising given its smaller size – but its urban areas are substantially denser, with an average of 4,100 city dwellers per square kilometer compared to 1,150 in the US and 1,550 in Canada (Demographia 2006). Urban population density is one of the most important factors influencing the amount of energy used in private passenger transport, and therefore also has a significant effect on CO2 emissions; with few exceptions the most densely populated cities utilize less energy for private passenger transport and generally have lower emissions per capita (Dodman 2009:193). Thus by a 2005 estimate, average light-duty vehicle (LDV) travel amounts to approximately 13,700 kilometers per year in the UK compared to 17,300 in Canada and 19,200 in the US (IEA/OECD 2009:123). In fact, the latter has the highest level of passenger travel per capita in the world due not only its low urban densities but its low fuel prices, and, in general, a relatively poor public transportation system (see IEA 2011a:10; Timmermans et al. 2003:39) . In addition to its denser urban areas, Canada differs from its southern neighbour in that its urban use planning is more fully integrated with the public transportation system – but not to as great an extent as in the UK, where mass transportation is a relatively efficient, inexpensive, and practical means of travel (Timmermans et al. 2003:39). Indeed, compared to that of its North American counterparts, the UK’s transportation system is quite diverse and comprehensive, complete with a national rail network, well-developed urban rail networks – including rapid transit systems – in London and several other cities, and buses and coaches. Thus according to the 2009 Greendex Survey, 16 percent of  39  citizens in the UK use public transportation every day or most days, compared to 9 percent in Canada and 5 percent in the US (National Geographic and GlobeScan 2009). Thirdly, the UK’s climate is markedly different from that of Canada or the US. Due to the large geographical extent of each of the latter countries their climates are highly variable depending on specific location and the season; both experience extremely wide temperature ranges. Several different types of climate are represented in the US, including humid continental, humid subtropical, and even arctic tundra. And while Canada is known for its particularly cold winters, it also experiences high temperatures in the summer, especially inland. The UK, on the other hand, has a maritime climate – moist and generally cool with a moderate annual range. Cross-national variation in climate is reflected in differential space heating and cooling needs and thus extent of electricity and heat production. In 2009 per capita electricity and heat output in the UK amounted to 6.29 TWh/million inhabitants, compared to 14.02 in the US and 18.14 in Canada (see IEA 2011a). To some extent, then, the UK has lower rates of primary energy use per capita and per GDP than Canada or the US because of its geography, urban development patterns, and climate. As a result, it generally requires less energy to maintain a similar standard of living and level of economic productivity. Further, the structure of the UK’s economy differs from that of Canada – the former’s service and industry sectors account for 77.8 and 21.4 percent of its GDP respectively compared to 71 and 27.1 percent in the case of the latter (CIA 2012).14 Canada is unique in its wealth of natural resources and thus the economic importance of its primary sector – especially the logging, oil, and other extractive industries, which are relatively emissions intensive. Indeed, of the total amount of CO2 emissions produced in Canada (2009 estimate),  14  The US economy is structured similarly to the UK’s, its service and industry sectors accounting for 79.6 and 19.2 percent GDP respectively (CIA 2012).  40  25.1 percent are accounted for by energy extraction and production industries (excluding electricity and heat production), agroforestry, fishing, and commercial and public services, compared to 10 percent and 10.6 percent in the US and UK, respectively (see IEA 2011a). Canada also has a substantial manufacturing sector, responsible for 17.6 percent of its total CO2 emissions, compared to 10.6 percent in US and 10.9 percent in the UK (IEA 2011a). Thus, by comparison, the UK operates at a lower level of energy and emissions intensity than its North American counterparts largely as the result of demographic, climatic, and, relative to Canada in particular, economic factors. Nonetheless, even though per capita CO2 emissions were already lower in the UK in 1990 (9.60 tonnes) than they were in either Canada or the US in 2008 (15.61 and 18.33, respectively), the former has managed to reduce its emissions even further. According to the Governmental Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) in the UK, the country’s CO2 emissions have declined since 1990 primarily as a result of improvements in energy efficiency and structural changes in power generation (2009:20). Despite electricity consumption having increased by 22 percent between 1990 and 2007, CO2 emissions from power stations fell by 13 percent, mainly due to the transition from coal to natural gas as the principal fuel in electricity generation – although gas is a non-renewable fossil fuel resource, it is ‘cleaner’ or less emissions-intensive than coal – but also because of improved performance from nuclear generation15 and an increased use of renewable energy and combined heat and power (CHP) (20). By contrast, electricity generation in the US has continued to rely principally on coal (US EIA 2011b), and the fuel mix of generation in Canada, although  15  However, the share of nuclear power in electricity generation in the UK, which has hovered, as in Canada and the US, around the 20% mark since at least 1990, has begun to decline in recent years (European Commission 2007a; DECC 2009:9). Thus over the next two decades much of the nuclear powered electricity generation capacity of the UK is scheduled for closure (9). On the other hand, generation from renewable sources is projected to grow significantly, more than offsetting the impact of the expected retirement of nuclear plants from the system (69).  41  predominated by hydropower, has remained relatively stable since that time while demand has grown steadily (Canadian Electricity Association 2012:13). Coal has a long history in the UK; it was the main source of power driving the industrial revolution in the 20th century, used to heat homes and factories and to generate electricity to run machinery (Energy Institute 2012). However, in the latter half of the century consumption of coal declined as it became more uneconomical to mine. The discovery of North Sea oil and natural gas, which the country began to transport to the mainland via a pipeline, led to the gradual replacement of coal with these fuels for heat and electricity generation. The UK is now one of the world’s largest producers of oil and natural gas and, until recently, a net exporter of both (US EIA 2011a). Local production peaked in the latter half of the 1990s and has declined steadily since, making the UK a net importer of natural gas and crude oil as of 2004 and 2005, respectively.16 More recently, natural gas prices have declined due to an abundance of supply – vast gas deposits in the US that previously could not be extracted economically are now being tapped through the use of new technologies (Begos 2012) – making it an even more attractive alternative to oil and coal. Nonetheless, the UK Government has developed a number of energy policies to address the declines in domestic production of oil and gas, such as enhanced recovery from current and maturing fields, promoting cooperation with Norway, and investing heavily in renewable energy (US EIA 2011a). Indeed, the decline in the emissions intensity of the electricity sector since 1990 is also due, albeit to a lesser extent, to an increased use of renewable energy sources including hydropower, wind, biomass, and landfill gas (DECC 2009). This increase is largely due to the implementation in 2002 of a policy mechanism targeted at licensed electricity suppliers in 16  The UK imports its oil and gas mainly from Norway, although Russia is becoming a major supplier for oil as well as coal (European Commission 2007a).  42  England and Wales and its equivalents in Scotland and Northern Ireland called the Renewables Obligation (RO), which requires suppliers to source a specific and annually increasing proportion of their output from renewable energy sources (36). Furthermore, as a member of the European Union (EU) the UK is governed by the EU Renewable Energy Directive, in accordance with which the country is responsible for ensuring that at least 15 percent of its energy consumption is from renewable sources by 2020 (6). The RO is designed to enable the UK to meet this target. For each megawatt hour of renewable electricity generated, the administrator of the scheme – the Independent Office for Gas and Electricity Markets – issues a tradable RO certificate (ROC); suppliers can thus meet their obligation by obtaining ROCs or by paying a buy-out price, or both (36). Since the RO has been in place, renewable electricity generation has increased from less than 2 percent in 2001 to 4.9 percent in 2007 (4). The Government has used a number of other policy measures to address climate change that complement the RO, including the Climate Change Levy (CCL), Climate Change Agreements (CCAs), and emissions trading (DECC 2009:36). The CCL, legislated for in the Finance Act 2000 as part of the UK Climate Change Programme, is an energy tax meant to encourage private sector business as well as the public sector to improve their energy efficiency and therefore reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The levy also provides exemptions to promote investment in renewable energy, while CCAs provide a discount of 80 percent from the levy for sectors that commit to meeting particularly challenging targets for improving energy efficiency or reducing emissions (DECC 2009:30). Further, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), established in 2003, places an emissions cap on the large electricity producers and energy intensive industries, creating a carbon price to drive abatement to meet the cap as costeffectively as possible (30). In the UK, the system covers 1,000 installations, which account for  43  about half of the country’s CO2 emissions (33). The National Allocation Plan (NAP) establishes the total quantity of allowances to be issued and the quantity each installation will receive. Installations in the EU ETS can meet their obligations by purchasing allowances from installations in other EU member states, or by purchasing credits from the Kyoto Protocol project mechanisms (33). These and other actions have contributed not only to the 13 percent reduction in per capita CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2008, but a total net reduction in CO2 emissions (including land use and land use change and forestry) of 8.3 percent between 1990 and 2007 (20). Further, the UK witnessed an 18.4 percent reduction in total GHG emissions17 over the same period (3). Given that the UK’s Kyoto target was to reduce GHG emissions by 12.5 percent compared to base-year levels over the period 2008-2012, the country is poised to exceed this commitment. The UK has established a plethora of new targets and policies in recent years, most notably the Climate Change Act of 2008, which outlines a legally-binding, long-term framework for reducing GHG emissions to at least 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050 and to at least 34 percent below that baseline by 2018-2022 (DECC 2009:30). In addition, the UK has developed a new mandatory emissions trading scheme called the Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC), which applies to a number of large businesses and public sector organizations in the country that together are responsible for about 10 percent of domestic emissions, which are outside the scope of CCAs and the EU ETS. The CRC is expected to deliver carbon savings of at least 4.4 million tonnes of CO2 annually by 2020 (42). Further, the UK Government has set a target to reduce GHG emissions from sectors not covered by the EU ETS – to 16 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 (30). While the effect of these new initiatives on CO2 emissions levels and trends in the  17  Those counting towards the UK’s current Kyoto commitment: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbon, perfluorocarbon, and sulphur hexafluoride (DECC 2009:16).  44  U.K. will not be apparent until several years from their implementation, they underscore a level of ambition unparalleled by the climate governance regimes of either Canada or the US. Canada and the US are relatively inactive on the climate change front at both the national and international levels.18 Neither country has passed federal legislation establishing binding emissions reduction targets, and the US neglected to ratify the Kyoto Protocol while Canada renounced it in 2011. The latter initially committed to reducing its domestic GHG emissions to 6 percent below 1990 levels by 2008-2010, but its policy approach to meet this target was relatively weak. Since 1990, Canada has devised a number of largely unenforceable plans and strategies, relying heavily on voluntary initiatives, education, and scientific research. These proved to be rather ineffective, as indicated by the 6 percent increase in per capita CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2008, and the 24.1 percent increase in absolute GHG emissions over the same period (Environment Canada 2010). More recently, the Canadian Government has implemented a number of slightly stronger measures, such as improved energy efficiency and emissions standards targeted at product manufacturers, regulations pertaining to the renewable fuel content of gasoline, investments in support of renewable energy production, incentives for energy efficiency improvements in homes and organizations, rebates for fuel-efficient vehicles, a levy on vehicles with high fuel consumption, and a public transit tax credit (Government of Canada 2010). However, it is doubtful that these newer measures will be substantial enough to counteract the country’s growing emissions levels, especially in light of the accelerated development of the Alberta oil sands.  18  However, in the US since the mid-1990s there has been significant policy action to control GHG emissions at the state level. One-third of American states have created a multitude of policies that show “considerable promise of reducing greenhouse gas” (Klyza and Souza 2008: 256). In Canada, certain provinces have also executed emissions reduction measures, such as B.C.’s carbon tax and Ontario’s “fee-bate” program (Boyd 2003:89).  45  Despite the U.S. having decided not to ratify Kyoto, comprehensive climate legislation has been initiated at the federal level. However, it has since stalled and is unlikely to pass in the new Congress: With a Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives and a diminished Democratic majority in the Senate, the mood of the 112th Congress (2011-2012) regarding climate change is markedly different from that of the 111th Congress (2009-2010). Rather than debating measures to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the focus has been on preventing the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from regulating GHG emissions under its existing authority (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions) The EPA’s policy efforts at reducing GHG emissions have been relatively modest, characterized by the establishment of research and technology programs and the implementation of a whole host of voluntary initiatives to encourage development of cost-efficient clean energy strategies, promote energy efficient products, reduce the environmental impact of power generation, and reduce pollution (EPA 2012). However, the federal government has also invested in and provided tax incentives toward the use of clean renewable energy and energy-efficient technologies (US Dept. of State 2010:3). Further, in 2009 President Obama declared a commitment to develop the first-ever joint fuel economy and CO2 tailpipe emission standards for cars and trucks in the US (3), and in 2010 created an Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage to develop a comprehensive and coordinated federal strategy to hasten the development of “clean coal technologies” (EPA 2012). Again, it will only be apparent in time whether these more recent efforts will have any tangible effect on emissions levels and trends. At any rate, the earlier measures do not appear to have been very effective given the growth in US CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2008.  46  4.2.2. Accounting for the UK’s Progressive Climate Policy Thus far, the UK’s relatively positive performance on climate change has been attributed primarily to its geography, patterns of urban development, climate, as well as to market forces surrounding coal and natural gas, and government policy. However, there are differences between the three countries at a higher level of abstraction that can provide for a more meaningful explanation for the UK’s strong leadership in the way of climate policy. These include its political power structure, international relations, and EU membership. Firstly, whereas both Canada and the US are federal states, the UK is a unitary state. Most simply, federalism refers to “a division of jurisdiction and authority between at least two levels of government” (Jackson and Jackson 2006:189), or, put differently, horizontal fragmentation (Olsen 2002:143). In Canada, power in shared by two constitutionally autonomous levels of government, the federal government and the provincial governments. The federal level is responsible for enacting and implementing laws for the whole country, relying on the national public service for assistance in the formulation and implementation of policy within federal jurisdictions (Makarenko 2008). The provincial governments enact and implement laws within their territorial borders and may exercise their constitutionally recognized powers independently of the federal government. These powers include legislative control over such things as hospitals, asylums, charities, municipal institutions, prisons, and property and civil rights. Importantly, even though the Canadian Government has introduced emissions reduction regulations, according to Lucas and Yearsley (2011) the Constitution limits the federal government’s ability to enact climate change legislation limiting GHG emissions because the provinces have jurisdictional authority over the development and management of non-renewable resources and the generation and production of electricity. Federal jurisdiction with respect to energy is mainly  47  concerned with the regulation of inter-provincial and international trade and commerce, and the management of non-renewable resources on federal lands (NRC 2009). Thus while federalism has many benefits19, it can lead to “paralysis and an inability for government to deal with difficult national issues” (Makarenko 2008). Similarly, in the US authority is divided between the federal government and state governments. As in Canada, the federal government is charged with enacting and implementing policies and laws with the help of various federal agencies and offices (US Dept. of State 2010:9), and the states may generally legislate on all matters within their territorial jurisdiction (Thomas 2008). However, in the US the federal government’s ability to enact climate legislation has been undermined less by the states’ constitutional powers than by its congressional system of “checks and balances” wherein each branch of government – executive, legislative, and judicial – has distinct powers, but each also affects the other two, which holds each accountable and separates the powers to create, implement, and adjudicate laws (US Dept. of State 2010:9). Thus jurisdiction for addressing climate change within the federal government cuts across each of the three branches, making it relatively difficult to pass legislation for the whole country. On the other hand, like its neighbour to the north, jurisdiction for energy policy is shared by federal and state governments. The US therefore still faces the challenges presented by its horizontal fragmentation, though they are perhaps not as significant as those presented by the structure of the federal government – its vertical fragmentation (see Olsen 2002:143). By contrast, unitary states have only one level of government with its own autonomous constitutional authority (Makarenko 2008). While the UK has three devolved administrations –  19  For example, federalism acts as a check on government power, as it is dispersed amongst two or more levels. It can also protect local or regional interests, which is particularly important in very large nation-states with diverse populations (Makarenko 2008).  48  the Scottish Government20, the Welsh Assembly, and the Northern Ireland Executive – that have a degree of autonomous devolved authority, this power is only delegated by the Parliament. These administrations cannot challenge the constitutionality of acts of Parliament, and their powers can be retracted or revoked by Parliament. The UK Government thus has overall responsibility for ensuring that a policy is put in place to ensure that the country meets its Kyoto target, as well as its carbon budgets, and the devolved governments are required to play their part in meeting these goals (DECC 2009:4). This more centralized system of governance makes it easier to formulate and implement policy – especially on issues as highly politicized as climate change – than is the case in federal states like Canada and the US. Indeed, states that are greatly fragmented either vertically or horizontally tend to be weaker, providing many more ‘veto points’ that enable one component of the state system to effectively challenge policy proposals put forward in another part (Olsen 2002:143; see also Immergut 1990). Further, these states allow for greater opportunities for dominant societal actors, such as lobby groups, to influence the policy-making process (Olsen 2002:143). In part because of the UK’s unitary governmental structure, then, it was possible for the 1997 New Labour government to institute progressive climate policies in a timely manner as a strategic political maneuver in light of its concern about being seen as tied too closely to the US given the UK’s central role as a member of the ‘coalition of the willing’ in Iraq: “It was important for Blair to show policy leadership in an area where he could prove his independence from the US and gain a degree of leadership in EU decision-making. To Tony Blair personally, climate change policy was also a tool to regain legitimacy within his own Labor party” (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007:38). Thus when Blair was elected prime minister in 1997 he campaigned on a pledge to reduce CO2 emissions to 20 percent below 1990 levels by 2010, and supported the 20  This may soon change, as the Scottish Government is seeking an independence referendum in late 2014.  49  establishment of an EU-wide target for renewable energy of 12 percent of total energy production by 2010 (38). Now that this agenda has lost salience – the Conservatives relegated Labour to the Official Opposition in 2010 – the UK appears to be stepping back from its efforts on climate change, by, for example, ignoring recommendations of the Committee on Climate Change – an independent body established under the Climate Change Act of 2008 that advises the Government on setting and meeting carbon budgets (DECC 2009:17) – to tighten up the intervening carbon budgets (Germanwatch 2011a:4). Finally, the UK is different from its North American counterparts by virtue of its membership in the EU, a post-war economic and political partnership between 27 European countries that has evolved into an organization spanning all policy areas, including climate change. The EU is based on the rule of law – its activity is based on democratically-derived agreements which are binding and hold member states accountable (Europa). Although membership in such a supranational organization could just as easily account for a member country’s weak policies depending on the orientation of the organization,21 EU leaders have taken a relatively hard line on climate change. They have agreed upon a set of energy – and emissions-related targets which the UK among many others are obligated to observe. The EU ETS is the linchpin of the EU’s climate change strategy, requiring energy-intensive industries within the member countries to surrender allowances every year for every tonne of CO2 they emit. To reiterate, the UK has responded to this mandate by implementing the NAP, which sets the total quantity of allowances to be issued and the quantity each installation in the EU ETS will receive. Canada and the US, on the other hand, are not governed by a supranational authority and  21  Indeed, as discussed further on, Finland was obliged to reform its energy taxation system upon the liberalisation of the Nordic electricity market because its taxes had targeted primary energy producers, which was deemed to be in violation of EU regulations concerning competitiveness.  50  therefore lack the accountability that the EU demands of the UK, as well as the extra political impetus it provides.  4.3 Finland: An Unlikely Climate Laggard Table 5 summarizes how Finland compares to its Nordic fellows on the variables which are of particular importance in terms of their contribution to Finland’s lower overall CCPI score: Table 5: Finland Compared to Sweden and Denmark on Key Variables Variable  Finland  Sweden  10.91 12.23 1.32  6.16 5.07 -1.09  Average 2002-2004 Average 2007-2009 ∆  2.39 2.07 -0.32  3.26 1.12 -2.14  CO2/PEU (tonnes/terajoule)(2009)  39.6  21.9  Finland  Denmark  10.91 12.23  9.81 9.41  5.11 0.18  3.42 0.12  CO2 emissions trajectory (tonnes/capita) 1990 level 2007 level ∆ Residential emissions trend (Mt)  CO2 emissions trajectory (tonnes/capita) 1990 level 2007 level ∆ Energy Consumption (2009) PEU/capita (Mtoe/million inhabitants) PEU/GDP (Mtoe/US$B)  Data obtained from IEA (2011a); BP (2012); European Commission (2011).  Finland’s per capita CO2 emissions trajectory between 1990 and 2007 is less favourable than that of Sweden or Denmark. While all three countries witnessed declines in their emissions between 1990 and 2008, the decline in Finland – from 10.91 to 10.77 tonnes – perhaps only reflects the economic impact of global financial crisis of late 2008, given that the country produced 12.23 51  tonnes per capita the year before, as shown in the table above. Thus compared to Finland, Denmark and (especially) Sweden have emissions trends that are closer to what they should be as MDCs if global average temperatures are to not exceed 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Finland has a worse residential emissions trend than Sweden, as even though its emissions levels in this sector were on average lower than the latter’s in 2002-04, it did not witness as substantial a decline by 2007-09 and consequently fell behind. Sweden also emits less CO2 emissions per unit of primary energy use than does Finland, indicating that the former’s TPES is less emissions-intensive than those of its eastern neighbour.22 Finally, Finland has higher rates of energy consumption than Denmark, indicating its less efficient use of energy in supporting its population and economy.  4.3.1 Explaining Finland’s Relatively Weak Climate Governance Again, the first task in explaining a discrepant case is to try to account for it within the context of the theory used to guide the analysis. Whereas the UK’s performance on the CCPI strongly suggested the possibility of its misclassification as a LME/LWS, however, Finland is not as substantial an outlier as the UK; whereas the latter ranks among the best countries in the index, the former by no means ranks among the worst. Thus it is unlikely that Finland has been erroneously designated as a member of the CME/SDWS family of nations. But there is reason to suggest that it is not as prototypical a member of this family, relative to Sweden especially. Firstly, although Finland is typically characterized as a CME (see Asheim and Coenen 2006; Carlin and Soskice 2009; Kenworthy 2006; Soskice 1999), it underwent a profound and rapid economic transformation following the recession of the early 1990s which, as discussed 22  It is worth noting that Denmark has an unusually low score in this category (see Table 3); in 2009 it produced 60.1 tonnes of CO2 for every terajoule of primary energy used (IEA 2011a:88). This is due to the relatively large share of emissions-intensive fossil fuels in its total primary energy supply: in 2009, oil and natural gas represented 36% and 22% of Denmark’s TPES, respectively (IEA 2011b:4)  52  further on, turned the country into a leading producer of information and communication technologies and altered many of its coordination mechanisms (Oinas 2005). Thus it has been argued that “clear and major changes have moved Finland in the direction of a liberal market economy,” or, more precisely, a hybrid of the two types (Skurnik 2005, cited in Oinas 2005:1237). Two broad segments of the Finnish economy are identified: one which is more internationally visible – the silicon and forestry-based “export-oriented global pole” – and one which is smaller but important – the “home market-oriented pole” (1237). The latter maintains CME features; it consists of cooperative, mutual, and other customer-owned industries and plays a strategic role in creating stability in the small, vulnerable, and export-driven economy as it is domestically-oriented and risk averse. However, the export-oriented global pole increasingly involves features of LMEs; relying more on market-based coordination, it continues to generate a major share of employment in Finland with increased risk, or “vulnerability to outside shocks and loosening of national sovereignty” (1237). The Danish economy has also undergone a process of hybridization. According to Campbell and Pedersen (2007), Denmark has recently adopted some important institutional aspects of the LME type in the areas of labor markets, vocational training, and industrial policy. Thus according to Kenworthy (2006), Denmark and Finland are both “intermediate” in their institutional coherence (76). Sweden, on the other hand, is deemed to be highly coherent and thus a more prototypical CME (see also Campbell and Pedersen 2007). On a varieties of capitalism continuum, therefore, of the three countries Sweden would fall closest to the CME extreme, and Finland and Denmark, both hybrids, would fall somewhere in the middle albeit closer to CME than LME (see Campbell and Pedersen 2007:312). This conceptualization is somewhat consistent with the countries’ relative performances on the CCPI – Sweden performs best,  53  followed by Denmark and Finland. However, the sizeable gap in the scores of the latter two is still left unexplained. Secondly, although the Nordic countries constitute a relatively tight-knit group as far as welfare provision is concerned (see Olsen 2002; 2011), Finland is the “Nordic latecomer in welfare state development” (Kettunen 2001:226). This is in part because Finland industrialized later than even its Nordic fellows and its social structure long remained predominantly agrarian and rural. Whereas most modern welfare states achieved their fullest development during capitalism’s ‘golden age’ in the first few decades after WWII (Olsen 2002:166), in Finland “the great expansion of social security benefits and public services” occurred after the welfare state had been declared to be in crisis in the early 1970s (Kettunen 2001:226), when rates of poverty and inequality were on the rise everywhere, and most welfare states began to experience retrenchment (Olsen 2002:166). Thus even more typically than in other Nordic countries, transformations in Finland have “started late but then gathered momentum” (Kettunen 2001:226). Accordingly, in this country public and mandatory private social spending as a percentage of GDP increased from 18.5 in 1980 to 24.9 in 2001, having remained constant since 1990 (Kuhner 2007:8). By contrast, spending in Denmark and Sweden has remained constant since 1980, at around 29 percent in both countries (8). While Finland is undoubtedly a member of the CME/SDWS family of nations, then, it is perhaps more marginally so than Denmark or Sweden. Again, however, the difference is not substantial enough to account entirely for Finland’s relatively poor performance on the CCPI. Upon further investigation it becomes clear that there are several extra-theoretical factors at play as well; although Finland shares with Sweden and Denmark a set of distinctly Nordic societal characteristics – albeit, perhaps, with a slightly ‘smaller share’ – the country also features a  54  “characteristically Finnish economy and society: outcomes of its own cultural, political and economic history” (Oinas 2005:1228). I begin uncovering these factors by once again working backwards, in a comparative context, from the more immediate influences on Finland’s emissions trajectory, levels of energy consumption, emissions intensity, and residential emissions trend. Comparison with Sweden The difference between Finland and Sweden with respect to the emissions intensity of their primary energy supplies is attributable to the fact that they rely on different configurations of fuels. Finland relies much more heavily on fossil fuel resources than does Sweden; by a 2009 estimate, over 60 percent of the former’s TPES is comprised of oil (36.53%), natural gas (11.81%), and coal (3.38%), compared to just over 30 percent in the latter case (BP 2012). While Sweden does depend a great deal on oil (30.80%), less than 6 percent of its total supply is made up of natural gas and coal combined. Sweden makes much more use of hydropower (31.43%) than does Finland (10.70%), although both rely on nuclear power to a similar degree – 25.11% in the former case and 19.90% in the latter. There is no recovery of fossil fuels in Sweden and therefore its oil, natural gas and coal are imported – mainly from Denmark, Norway, and Russia (OECD 2011a). However, because Sweden has significant domestic supplies of renewable energy in the form of biomass and hydropower, only 36.5 percent of its TPES is imported, compared to the EU-27 average of about 50 percent (European Commission 2007b). Finland also relies on imports for nearly all of its fossil fuel needs – most of which comes from Russia, whose proximity and complementary  55  production structure makes it a natural trading partner for Finland23 – and thus for 54.4 percent of its TPES, as it has fewer renewable energy resources available domestically than does Sweden (OECD/IEA 2008a; European Commission 2007b). Nonetheless, renewable sources – mainly wood-based fuels, hydro power, wind power, and peat – account for over half of Finland’s domestic energy production (European Commission 2007c). Both Sweden and Finland produce nuclear power within their borders. Sweden has naturally good access to watercourses for hydropower production. It has about 40,526 km2 of inland water systems (Swedish Ministry of the Environment 2009:17), compared to 34,300 km2 in Finland (Finnish Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland 2009:35). In addition, the latter’s hydropower capacity is undermined by the low elevation of its lakes; they do not lie very high above sea level. Further, whereas the Finnish climate is characterized by irregular precipitation, with an annual average in southern and central Finland of 600-750 mm (35), Sweden experiences abundant precipitation throughout the year, falling at an annual average of 1000 mm (Swedish Ministry of the Environment 2009:17). This precipitation and run-off to the large rivers in north-western Sweden provides the inflow of water for the production of hydropower, which accounts for almost half of Swedish electricity generation (18), compared to less than a tenth of generation in Finland (Finnish Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland 2009:43). In fact, much of Finland’s hydroelectricity is imported from Sweden as well as Norway (71) Interestingly, up until the 1960s Finnish energy policy relied on hydroelectricity and the extensive use of wood (Finnish Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland 2009:42). 23  Indeed, Finland and Russia share a 1,300-kilometer border (NDPTL) and have very different roles in global production. Finland mainly exports processed and high value-added goods – such as electronics – for the production of which it imports raw materials and energy, and in the global economy Russia acts primarily as a provider of energy and raw materials and purchaser of more refined goods produced abroad (Ollus and Simola 2006:26-7). Thus Russia is a more important export and import country for Finland for other EU countries.  56  Indeed, as detailed by Myllyntaus (2011), although in the nineteenth century Finland – a latecomer to industrialization – had relatively poor living standards, it was among the most bountiful countries in Europe in terms of forest and peat resources and its hydropower resources, while not as plentiful as in some other parts of Europe, were easily harnessed by the technology of the time (33). Thus because of its few but abundant natural resources, especially relative to its population size, Finland was self-sufficient as regards energy, and imports of fossil fuels in the nineteenth century were negligible and remained fairly modest until the 1950s (37). Hence “Finland managed to industrialize its economy and overcome the hardships of the Second World War through the use of indigenous energy” (39). However, by 1952 Finland had paid all of its war reparations to the USSR24 – mostly in timber and other industrial products – and could thereafter focus on further developing its industry and increasing its exports, mainly newsprint, chemical pulp and timber (Myllyntaus 2011:37). The rapid expansion of heavy export industries demanded a substantial amount of raw materials and energy inputs. The rising demand for energy – to which urbanization, including an increase in transport, was also a contributor – was partly solved by importing more fossil fuels. The shift from domestic renewable energy to imported non-renewable energy was rapid, and by the 1980s oil had become the major energy source in Finland. Finland’s exceptionally late and rapid transition to fossil fuels was partly due to the fact that the country’s domestic energy sources were largely exhausted – by 1965, all of the major rivers had been harnessed for electricity generation and stocks of surplus fuel wood had been depleted – but also due to the relatively low post-WWII oil and coal prices in producing 24  As called for by the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Finland, which was signed by the Allied powers in Paris in 1947 and allowed Finland to re-assume its responsibilities as a sovereign state in international affairs and to qualify for membership in the UN. The reparations to the USSR included not only industrial goods, but military equipment and a war indemnity of $300 million (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1947). These reparations later formed a basis for Finnish-Soviet trade.  57  countries on the one hand and rising prices of almost all Finnish tree species on the other (Myllyntaus 2011:40). Accordingly, during the 1950s and 60s the Finnish Government changed its energy policy, which had until then deliberately favoured domestic energy sources at the expense of imported ones. This change was also in line with Finland’s attempt to increase its trade with Western countries and the USSR – with whom it was increasingly difficult to achieve a balance in bilateral trade25 for lack of competitive goods for the Finnish industry and consumers – and concern that its limited domestic timber resources would restrict the exports of the wood-processing industries (41). Thus in order to redress the existing imbalances in bilateral trade with the USSR, meet the latter’s growing demand for Finnish goods, and thereby increase foreign trade – by the 1960s Finland had become the USSR’s biggest Western trading partner – the Finnish Government, in cooperation with the wood-processing industries, found a “creative solution” (41). By increasing imports of Soviet oil, coal and anthracite as well as Polish coal – cheaper than domestic renewable energy sources – and reducing the use of timber for fuel, it was possible to both expand the supply of raw materials for the export-driven wood-processing industries and import something useful from the USSR to balance its bilateral trade. In addition, a gas pipeline from the USSR to Finland was built in 1973 (41). However, the Finnish Government has grown increasingly concerned about the extent of its dependence on its Eastern neighbour for energy – three-quarters of Finland’s imported energy, and all of its natural gas, comes from Russia. Thus in the 1970s domestic peat was added to the energy mix, and the first nuclear unit was taken into use in 1977 followed by three other units in 1979-82, in order to diversify Finland’s energy supply. Accordingly, in addition to that  25  I.e. exclusive barter trade between two states. The particular agreement between Finland and Russia limited the traded goods to those manufactured domestically (see Ollus and Simola 2006). Bilateral trade between Finland and the USSR ended with the fall of the latter in 1990.  58  of natural gas, the absolute amounts of coal, peat, nuclear power, and biofuels in Finland’s TPES have increased steadily since the 1970s, while the absolute amount of oil has remained more stable (OECD/IEA 2011a). By contrast, both the absolute amount and share of oil products in Sweden’s TPES have declined since 1970, a trend connected to the oil crisis of 1973, which resulted in earnest attempts by both the Government and private sector business to reduce their reliance on oil (Swedish Energy Agency 2009:14). An energy policy was introduced around that time to discourage oil use, the key instrument being a high energy tax on petrol and other fossil fuels (Johannson 2000:4). Thus even though Sweden’s per capita CO2 emissions levels were at one time higher than those of Finland – despite the existence in the latter of relatively constant factors contributing to its higher rates of energy consumption, most notably its colder climate26 – by 1980 they had fallen well below those of Sweden’s neighbour to the east. However, the energy tax, although effective in reducing fossil fuel consumption, was not directly connected to the carbon content of the fuel and was therefore complemented by a CO2 tax introduced in 1991. Although Finland was the first country in the world to introduce a CO2 tax, the rate has been relatively low, evolving from 1.12 EUR/tonne in 1990 to 20 EUR/tonne in 2010 (Finnish Ministry of the Environment 2012). Sweden’s carbon tax rate, on the other hand, has increased from an initial 27 EUR/tonne to 110 EUR/tonne in 2010 (OECD 2011b:110) and has thus strongly incentivised a further reduction in fossil fuel use, especially in the household and  26  Indeed, although both Sweden and Finland have unusually mild climates given their northern latitudes due to the warming influence of the Gulf Stream, Finland’s more northern location gives it a humid and cool semi-continental climate overall and a north temperate climate in the southern part of the country, where the majority of its population resides. By contrast, Sweden, whose population is also concentrated in the southern half of the country, has a temperate climate, experiencing mild temperatures throughout the year. Thus in 2009 Finland’s per capita electricity and heat output was 23.23 TWh/million inhabitants compared to 20.28 in Sweden (see IEA 2011a).  59  service sectors and in heat production where the full tax rate is applied (Swedish Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications 2012). Specifically, the carbon tax prompted a shift from oil to district heating, heat pumps and biofuels for residential heating purposes. District heating (DH), an important energy carrier in all Nordic countries except for Norway (NEP 2009:7), supplies heat to a number of buildings or homes from a central heat source through a network of pipes carrying hot water or steam (DECC 2012). Although these pipes can connect to a range of heat sources, Sweden’s energy tax reform in 1991 greatly influenced the relative competitiveness of fuels and immediately made biomass the least expensive fuel in heat production, as it was exempted from the energy and carbon taxes (Ericsson 2009:11). Consequently, the use of fossil fuels in DH production has substantially declined while that of biomass has increased considerably, amounting to more than 62 percent of the total DH fuel supply (EREC 2009:1). There has also been a significant increase in municipal solid waste (MSW) incineration over the past few years, mainly driven by Swedish waste management legislation, which banned the landfilling of combustible and organic waste (Ericsson 2009:11). Thus the DH system has been able to accommodate large amounts of unrefined biomass and MSW, fuels that are inappropriate for use in individual heating (11). The system also makes use of industrial waste heat recovered mostly from pulp and paper mills, the dominant process industry in Sweden (20). Even though DH has a larger share of the heating market in Finland (49%) than in Sweden (40%), oil, coal, and natural gas together account for only about 15 percent of Sweden’s DH fuel mix, whereas in Finland they account for over 60 percent (NEP 2009:8). To be sure, Finland does make use of its domestic supplies of peat and biomass, which together account for over 30 percent of the DH fuel mix. However, biomass is relied on much more heavily in  60  Sweden, not only because of the strong incentives created by its more ambitious energy taxation system, but because the coastal location of many Swedish towns greatly facilitates the importation of additional biomass resources (Ericsson 2009:46). Consequently, CO2 emissions have been declining in Sweden’s residential sector since not only the early 2000s, as detailed earlier, but since 1990 – from 6.22 Mt to 1.03 Mt in 2009 (European Commission 2011:81). By contrast, Finland’s emissions in this sector fell from 3.07 to 2.08 Mt (78). The shift away from fossil fuels in Sweden’s heat production also accounts a great deal for the decline in the country’s overall per capita CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2007, as the energy and carbon taxes have been attenuated in other sectors, most notably industry. In 1993, the energy tax was lifted from industry and the CO2 tax for this sector was reduced to 25 percent of the general tax rate, raised in 1997 to its 1991 level of 50 percent (Johansson 2000), and has since been dropped again to about 21 percent (Sumner, Bird, and Smith 2009:4). Further, particularly energy-intensive industries are granted additional exemptions from the carbon tax, and no carbon or energy taxes are levied on fuels used in electricity production (Ericcson 2009:31). Likely due to concerns about carbon leakage – the idea that a strict energy policy targeted at industry will simply displace CO2 emissions to countries with a more lax policy, thereby undermining competitiveness27 (see OECD/IEA 2008b) – this differentiated taxation system has endured since the early 1990s, though the applied tax reduction percentage has varied over the years (Ericcson 2009:31). As a result, the residential sector is the only sector in which per capita CO2 emissions decreased significantly from 1990 to 2007 (see European Commission 2011:81; IEA 2011a:85). Nonetheless, this sectoral decline has been substantial enough to bring Sweden’s overall per capita CO2 emissions down by 1.09 tonnes over that period.  27  More specifically, it refers to “the increase in CO2 emissions outside the countries taking domestic mitigation action divided by the reduction in the emissions of these countries” (IPCC 2007).  61  Sweden’s neighbour to the east, on the other hand, experienced no such decline. Much of the increase in Finland’s per capita CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2007 is accounted for by the emissions growth in its energy industry sector over that period – from 3.81 to 5.75 Mt/million inhabitants (see European Commission 2011:78; IEA 2011a:85). This is largely due to the fact that total domestic energy production increased by 36 percent (European Commission 2007c), compared to 16 percent in Sweden (European Commission 2007b). Although Finland’s energy industries are primarily and increasingly geared toward the production of nuclear energy, which despite its controversial nature is considered a low carbon energy source (POST 2006), the country’s TPES – which feeds the energy industries – is comprised predominantly of fossil fuels, as discussed earlier. Thus the absolute amounts of oil, natural gas, coal, and peat – considered a fossil fuel by many – in the energy supply increased between 1990 and 2007 (OECD/IEA 2011a). This is at least partially attributable to Finland’s relatively weak energy taxation system, which provides less of an incentive in favour of alternatives to fossil fuel energy than Sweden’s more ambitious scheme. Not only is Finland’s CO2 tax rate comparatively low, but natural gas meets a reduced rate and peat is exempted altogether (Finnish Ministry of the Environment 2012). In 1995 the Finnish energy taxation system was restructured so that a tax based on energy content was imposed on all sources of primary energy – except for wood, wind energy, and waste fuel – and an additional tax based on carbon content was levied on fossil fuels (Sumner, Bird, and Smith 2009). From 1997 until just recently,28 however, the carbon tax was imposed only on traffic and heating fuels while the energy tax was levied on consumption of electricity, irrespective of the fuels used to produce it. This tax structure change was due, in part, to the liberalisation of the Nordic electricity market; prior to 1997, Finland’s energy taxes targeted the  28  The general structure of energy taxation in Finland was changed in January 2011for the first time after the tax reform in 1997.  62  production of primary energy, a state of affairs which undermined the competitiveness of Finnish electricity production and rendered Finland in violation of EU regulations (Hiltunen 2004). In addition to being weakly incentivised, non-fossil energy inputs often tend to be less reliable in Finland, where domestic electricity production greatly depends on imported fuels, including not only fossil fuels but renewable energy sources; net imports of renewables from the Nordic market vary considerably from year to year mainly due to variations in hydro power production in the Nordic countries (Finnish Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland 2009:42). Comparison with Denmark Even though Denmark is a more economically productive country than Finland – with a 2009 GDP per capita rate of 16.0 US$B/million inhabitants compared to 12.17 (see IEA 2011a) – it requires less energy to fuel its economy and support its population than is the case in Finland. The differences between their rates of primary energy consumption can be largely attributed to climatic and economic factors. Firstly, Finland’s climate is colder and more variable than Denmark’s due to its more northern location and larger geographical extent. Whereas Finland exhibits features of both maritime and continental climates (Finnish Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland 2009:38), Denmark has a distinctly coastal climate, with mild, damp winters and cool summers (Danish Ministry for Climate and Energy 2009:49). Both countries, however, are warmer than other regions at their respective latitudes, mainly due to the air flows from the Atlantic which are warmed by the Gulf Stream. Nonetheless, while the annual average temperature in Denmark is 7.7 degrees Celsius (50), the annual average temperature in Finland is 5.5 degrees in the southwest, decreasing towards the northeast (Finnish Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland 2009:38). Accordingly, in 2009 electricity and heat output in Finland was 23.23 TWh/million inhabitants, compared to only 13.22 in Denmark (see IEA 63  2011a). In short, Finland must expend more energy than Denmark simply to keep its population comfortably warm. Secondly, Finland uses more energy than Denmark to produce one unit of economic value. This is due to the fact that the productive activities the former engages in to produce its value are more energy-intensive than those of the latter. Indeed, because Denmark has relatively little in the way of natural resources – other than arable land for farming and North Sea oil and gas – it derives more of its GDP from the service sector, about 77 percent compared to about 68 percent in Finland (CIA 2012). Finland has a larger industrial sector, accounting for just under 30 percent of its GDP compared to just under 20 percent in Denmark (CIA 2012). Further, Finland’s industries, the largest of which are electronics and electrical, forestry, and the metal and engineering industry (Finnish Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland 2009:48), are, combined, more energy-intensive than Denmark’s, the largest of which are food, drink, and tobacco, engineering and electronics, and the chemical industry (Danish Ministry of Climate and Energy 2009:65). This is suggested by the fact that in 2009 industry accounted for 42.1 percent of Finland’s total final energy consumption, while it only accounts for 15.8 percent of that in Denmark (European Commission 2011) – a difference too large to be attributable solely to the fact that Finland derives 10 percent more of its GDP from industry than does Denmark. Thus 14.2 percent of Finland’s total CO2 emissions are produced by the manufacturing and construction sector compared to 7.5 percent in Denmark’s case (European Commission 2011). As implied by these figures, then, Finland’s economy is more energy-intensive than Denmark’s. However, Finland’s industrial sector in 2009 was less energy intensive than it was in 1990, as it underwent a significant structural change following the economic recession of the  64  early 1990s29. Finland’s metal products industry expanded rapidly – growth which has been sustained largely by trade demand for electronics, machinery, transport equipment, and basic metals – and increased the technology-intensity of the country’s manufacturing sector, while decreasing its electricity intensity (Finnish Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland 2009:48). Nonetheless, these energy savings are of course offset by the sheer growth of Finland’s industrial sector as a result of the restructuring. Thus between 1990 and 2007, in which time Finland witnessed an increase of 1.32 tonnes in its per capita CO2 emissions while Denmark’s emissions declined by 0.4 tonnes, Finland’s emissions levels were significantly and consistently higher than Denmark’s in the manufacturing and construction sector, by about 1.57 tonnes/capita in 1990 and 1.15 in 2007 (see European Commission 2011; IEA 2011a). In 2007, Finland’s emissions levels were also significantly higher than Denmark’s in the energy industry sector, at 5.75 tonnes/capita compared to 4.7 (see European Commission 2011; IEA 2011a). Interestingly, the reverse was the case in 1990 – Denmark’s energy industries produced 5.09 tonnes of CO2/capita compared to 3.81 tonnes in Finland. The increase in the latter’s emissions is due mainly to the growth in its domestic energy production, as discussed earlier in relation to Sweden. However, the decline in emissions in Denmark’s energy industries is seemingly paradoxical; Denmark is the second largest oil producer in the EU – with 1.3 million barrels’ worth of proven reserves at the end of 2005 – and a net exporter of energy (European Commission 2007d). Oil production expanded by over 300 percent between 1990 and 2004, and production of natural gas exhibited an increase of 207 percent over the same period. Nonetheless,  29  This recession – the worst seen in any industrialized nation after WWII – was mainly caused by the economic bubble created in the late 1980s, asymmetric financial liberalization, and over-full employment (Ollus and Simola 2006:22). However the fall of the USSR in 1991 and the end of bilateral trade exacerbated the crisis – the Finnish GDP declined over 10% in 1990–1993 of which 6.2% alone was in 1991 (22).  65  while output has increased, production has become less emissions intensive due to the changing mix of input fuels; natural gas and renewables have gradually been replacing coal, peat, and oil in Denmark’s TPES, although these latter fuels still made up about 60 percent of the supply in 2009 (OECD/IEA 2011b). Whereas in Finland the absolute amounts of fossil fuels in the TPES increased between 1990 and 2007, the absolute amounts of oil and coal in the Danish supply fell during that time, while those of gas and renewables increased. To be sure, imported coal is still the most important fuel in electricity generation, but renewable energy such as wind power – Denmark ranks third in the EU in terms of its installed wind capacity – has experienced significant growth and, as of 2007, its share in the country’s energy and electricity mix are above EU averages (European Commission 2007d). Thus although Denmark’s CO2 emissions showed a rising trend from 1990 to 1996, they have fallen since 1997 largely because many power stations have changed their fuel mix from coal to natural gas and renewable energy. This has likely been spurred by Denmark’s ambitious climate and energy policies, which from early on – since the first oil crises in the early 1970s – were designed to encourage energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources. While, like Sweden, Denmark has levied taxes on energy for many years, in 1992 it introduced a carbon tax on all energy use, including fuel use in energy production (DEPA 1999). The general tax rate was set at 13.4 EUR/tonne but made to vary according to the carbon content of the fuel, exempting natural gas and biofuels. Further, carbon taxes on electricity generated by renewable energy sources are offset by subsidies. Although Denmark’s CO2 tax rate was surpassed in 1998 by Finland’s – 17.16 EUR/tonne, reaching 20 EUR/tonne by 2010 – the 1997 tax reform in Finland, previously discussed, significantly weakened the incentive for electricity producers to use non-fossil fuel inputs. In addition, whereas Finland recycles the revenue from its carbon-  66  energy taxation system mainly by lowering income taxes, Denmark earmarks 20 percent of the revenues to help finance energy efficiency measures and upgrade production technology (Andersen 2010). Taken as a whole, then, the latter’s carbon-energy taxation system is more geared toward improving the energy efficiency and lessening the emissions intensity of its energy industries – and industrial production in general – than that of the former.  4.3.2 Accounting for Finland’s Relatively Weak Energy Policy As the above discussion indicates, Finland’s comparatively poor performance on climate change can be attributed mainly to its climate, geography, economic circumstances, historical trade relations with Russia, and government policy. However, accounting for Finland’s relatively weak energy policy is not as straightforward a matter as accounting for the UK’s strong climate policy because, overall, Finland is more similar to Sweden and Denmark than the UK is to Canada and the US. Indeed, in addition to being members of the EU30, Finland and its Nordic fellows have very similar power structures and political systems. All three are unitary states, parliamentary democracies, and have multi-party systems. In each case, members of parliament are elected every four years using a system of proportional representation, and the government is generally formed through coalition among several parties, including a viable social democratic party. To be sure, Finland stands out from Sweden and Denmark in that it is a republic as opposed to a constitutional monarchy; its head of state is not a monarch, but the President of Finland, who is in charge of foreign policy and makes decisions concerning matters of national security (Office of the President of the Republic of Finland 2012). However, other kinds of policy, such as energy policy, are shaped by the parliamentary groups, and, as is the case in 30  Though, unlike Sweden or Denmark, Finland belongs to the euro area or eurozone, an economic and monetary union of the 17 EU Member States that have adopted the euro currency. However, it is not apparent how this factor would have influenced Finland’s energy policy or its energy taxes in particular, especially since the general structure of the country’s energy taxation system did not change in response to the advent of the eurozone in 1999.  67  Sweden and Denmark, parliament is the supreme decision-making authority in Finland (Parliament of Finland). Thus it is unclear as to what, if any, tangible effect Finland’s status as a republic would have on its energy policies. A more important factor in Finland’s relatively weak energy policy concerns the country’s natural resource base. To reiterate, Finland, like Sweden, lacks domestic sources of fossil energy and thus must import its oil, natural gas, and coal. However, Finland has fewer domestic non-fossil energy resources than its neighbour to the west – although they were once abundant – so it also relies on imports of hydroelectricity and other renewable sources of electricity. Thus, as mentioned earlier, the country has a relatively high energy import dependency – 54.4 percent of its total energy demand is met by imports, whereas Sweden imports only 36.5 percent of its primary energy supply and Denmark is a net exporter of energy – which makes the country vulnerable, especially because of its relatively energy-intensive industries and freezing winter temperatures.31 Accordingly, Finnish energy policy is primarily focused on securing a diversified and reliable supply of energy and improving self-sufficiency (Finnish Ministry of the Environment and Statistics Finland 2009:42), which they of course sacrificed in the 1950s and 60s for the sake of foreign trade. By contrast, Sweden’s energy policy is designed to facilitate a transition to a low-carbon society, and Denmark’s similarly encourages the enhanced use of renewable energy sources, especially in electricity generation. These goals are realistic given the energy resources at their disposal – resources for hydropower in Sweden and wind power in Denmark, for example. Comparatively lacking such resources, Finland is understandably more concerned with energy security and has begun to address its high import dependency mainly through the use of high efficiency combined heat and power (CHP)  31  Indeed, Russia halted deliveries of natural gas to Ukraine three times over the course of five years, the last of which was in January 2009 lasting three weeks and causing widespread shortages in eastern and Western Europe.  68  production in district heating, by expanding its nuclear power production, and by making more extensive use of its domestic energy resources such as peat (IEA 2008:2). Therefore its carbon tax rates have from the beginning been relatively low, peat has been exempted, and since the late 1990s the tax has been imposed only on traffic and heating fuels, not on fuels used in energy production.  69  5 Discussion The theoretical argument regarding the link between the welfare state and national-level climate governance constructed in the first part of this paper garners a certain degree of support at the empirical level. As shown by their higher average CCPI score and smaller standard deviation, CME/SDWS countries generally exhibit stronger climate governance from an ecological modernization perspective than LME/LWS countries. However, the index reveals two substantially discrepant cases; contrary to what would be expected in the context of the present theory, the UK performs well and Finland performs relatively poorly. As shown earlier, these discrepancies cannot be fully explained by the extent to which Finland and the UK typify their respective welfare or production regime types. Rather, an in-depth examination of each of these outliers using a comparative, interdisciplinary approach reveals the shortcomings of the theoretical framework and how it might be made more sophisticated.  5.1 The Importance of Broad National Context Most significantly, the simplicity of the theory highlights the limitations of analyzing environmental protection and restoration via “evolutionary models that result almost automatically in the greening of production and consumption” (Mol and Spaargaren 2000:23). Thus it must take several other factors into account – institutional arrangements of production and welfare provision are only two conditions that make ecological modernization more or less likely. Indeed, as illustrated by the case of Finland, the effect of institutional context can be attenuated in the presence of certain debilitating conditions, including climatic, geographic, economic, political, historical, and geopolitical factors. Firstly, like Sweden, Finland is reliant on imports for its fossil energy needs but it has fewer domestic non-fossil energy resources to fall back on – its irregular precipitation patterns and low-lying lakes afford it less hydro power 70  capacity and its forest resources, historically plentiful, were largely exhausted in the 1950s and 60s as a result of paying its war reparations to the former USSR and industrial expansion thereafter. What timber did remain was earmarked for the export-oriented wood-processing industries in order for Finland to balance its bilateral trade with its eastern neighbour and increase foreign trade, in effect solidifying Finland’s dependence on imported fossil energy. Secondly, its relatively cold temperatures and energy-intensive industries make it a greater primary energy consumer than Denmark. Thirdly, Finland’s industrial sector, including its energy producing industries, has been expanding since its restructuring after the recession in the early 1990s, while its energy taxation system has been relatively ineffective at reducing the country’s reliance on fossil-based primary energy inputs. Indeed, because of its high energy import dependency, Finland’s energy policy is more geared toward securing a stable and diversified supply of energy and improving self-reliance than with incentivising the use of low carbon energy. Conversely, as illustrated by the UK’s strong performance on climate change, the effect of institutional context on climate governance can be attenuated in the presence of enabling factors as well, including climatic, geographical, demographic, economic, political, and geopolitical factors. Firstly, the UK functions at a lower level of energy and thus emissions intensity than its counterparts across the Atlantic due to its smaller geographical size, maritime climate, higher average urban density, and patterns of urban development which make more climate-friendly modes of transportation more feasible. Secondly, CO2 emissions from UK power stations have fallen since 1990 largely due to a market-spurred transition from coal and natural gas in electricity generation. Policy mechanisms such as the RO, the CCL, and the EU ETS have also contributed to emissions reductions. Thus a number of more abstract factors  71  influencing policy are also highly relevant, including the UK’s membership in the EU, its political power structure as a unitary state, and its Labour Party, which sought to use progressive climate policy to distinguish the country from the US in the 1990s. Such dynamics highlight the importance of the broader context within which a given country operates – beyond its institutional set-up – in accounting for the calibre of its climate governance. This context includes not only all manner of conditions within a country’s borders but its relations with other countries – such as Finland’s relations with Russia or the UK’s relations with the US. Thus the theory of cross-national variation in climate governance can benefit from the interdisciplinary approach to deviant case analysis taken in the present paper through inclusion of a wider range of factors, which together comprise broadly construed national contexts.  5.2 Toward a Conceptualization of Family-Specific Evolutionary Paths Furthermore, the case of the UK suggests that while it is possible for LME/LWS countries to lead the way on the evolutionary path of eco-state development, they may in fact take a different 'route' than CME/SDWS countries. At present, the theory holds that the latter are more likely to be the vanguards of such development because they have embraced ecological modernization, which their institutional arrangements of production and welfare distribution position them well to actualize. However, the UK did not attain its position near the top of the CCPI out of a genuine desire to reduce its impact on the climate via ecological modernization; for example its switch from coal to natural gas as the principal energy input into electricity generation was largely spurred by market conditions, and sustaining domestic production of oil and gas continues to be a political priority. In addition, many of the UK’s relatively progressive  72  climate policies were formulated as a way to boost the country’s reputation, both domestically and internationally, in light of its geopolitical connection to the US in the 1990s. By contrast, Sweden – the most prototypical member of the CME/SDWS family and a leader on climate change – has shown itself to be more earnest in its pursuit of ecological modernization, as reflected in its heavy energy and carbon taxes designed to push the country toward a low carbon economy. Thus it might be suggested that LME/LWS countries, insofar as their particular national context enables them to ecologically modernize, would be guided down the path toward becoming eco-states more by political-economic concerns than out of an authentic interest in such an evolution. It follows that their evolution would not proceed in as linear a fashion, but rather would ebb and flow as ecological modernization becomes more or less economically and/or politically feasible. Indeed, the UK appears to be stepping back from its efforts on climate change now that a different political party – without Tony Blair’s agenda – is in power and the world is in the midst of an economic downturn. This is not to say that CME/SDWS countries would not incur setbacks or that their evolution would be perfectly linear, but given their more candid motives it would likely be less influenced by the flux of the market, for instance. Of course, as illustrated by the case of Finland, certain contextual factors can hinder even a CME/SDWS country from reaching such a degree of resilience.  5.3 Limitations of Ecological Modernization and the Eco-State Moreover, the attempts of even the most progressive countries to ecologically modernize are undermined to some extent by global integration, as demonstrated by the energy and carbon tax breaks and exemptions given to Swedish industry in order for it to remain competitive in the global market economy. This would appear to resonate with the treadmill of production argument that "economic criteria remain the foundation of decision making about the design, 73  performance and evaluation of production and consumption," an orientation shared by the state, which, despite its varied political interests, often cedes a great deal of power to private sector actors (Schnaiberg, Pellow, and Weinberg 2002:21). This state of affairs calls into question the possibility of a fully-developed environmental state, since under the current global political economic system - wherein some states give more weight to ecological considerations in decision-making than do others - no state can give the same weight to ecological and economic considerations in every instance of government decision-making if they wish to stay afloat in the global economy. In other words, to fully institute ecological modernization on the national level in the context of a global capitalist economy is impractical if not impossible. Consequently, “while environmental states have done something, they have not done nearly enough. Above all, societal development trajectories have not been reoriented so that human activity remains within ecosystem limits” (Meadowcroft 2008:332). Accordingly, no country has made a sufficient effort toward reducing its carbon emissions to play its part in averting dangerous climate change (Germanwatch 2011b). Therefore while some countries are doing better than others - due to a whole host of factors - and therefore may be seen as further along the evolutionary path of ecostate development, it is unclear as to whether they will ever 'get there' if even the so-called 'best practices' in which they engage are unsustainable. Yet the salience of national context to an explanation of variation in climate governance across countries suggests that for all countries to ecologically modernize would be impossible as well. Indeed, suitable climatic and geographical conditions are not evenly distributed across the globe, nor are optimal political and economic climates. For example, Canada, with its wealth of natural resources, is put at a disadvantage by the importance of the energy-intensive primary sector, Finland by its high energy import dependency, and the US by the vertical and horizontal  74  fragmentation of its polity. As recognized early on by Karl Marx, capitalism is based on exploitation for the sake of profit accumulation and expansion. As long as this social and economic system prevails worldwide, some countries will have to serve as sources while others serve as sinks or waste repositories; energy- and emissions-intensive industries, for example, must be located somewhere. Further, the global market economy is supported by an infrastructure of trade agreements, international organizations, geopolitical networks, and global institutions that constrain national state action in some countries more than others. Thus one of the major critiques of ecological modernization at the level of the nation-state regards its applicability outside the more developed world, or even outside of the European countries in which it was created (Fisher and Freudenberg 2001:706; see also Hannigan 1995; Cohen 1998). This critique is particularly salient when focusing on an issue like climate change, which affects the entire biosphere and thus requires a global solution. Indeed, how laudable is a (pseudo) environmental state if the ecological integrity of the planet at large continues to worsen? Put frankly by Schnaiberg and his colleagues, and as suggested by the fact that even socalled climate leaders like Sweden and the UK are not making the changes required to evade the most serious consequences of climate change, "[u]nsustainability is an outcome of this current economic and political arrangement (Schnaiberg, Pellow, and Weinberg 2002:15; see also Schnaiberg 1980, 1994; Schnaiberg & Gould 1994; Gould, Weinberg & Schnaiberg 1993; Weinberg & Gould 1993; Gould, Schnaiberg & Weinberg 1996). Even John Dryzek – one of the scholars whose work provides the building blocks for the theoretical argument developed in this paper – asserts that “[r]esponding painlessly by using the dividend of economic growth to finance environmental expenditures may not work to the extent that CC and other environmental limits call into question the viability of continued economic growth in an ecologically finite  75  world” (2008:334). Indeed, ecological modernization is not likely to be a decisive solution to a global issue like climate change, nor, then, the ultimate path to sustainability.  5.4 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research The most significant limitations of this study pertain to its use of the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI). As discussed previously, there are a number of methodological issues with this instrument, particularly with the climate policy indicators. However, it is the best available comprehensive measure of the extent of ecological modernization of countries’ climate governance, and served merely as a point of departure for the analysis. Nonetheless, future research on the topic would benefit from the development of more precise indicators of ecological modernization as regards climate change mitigation, especially those which capture elements – insofar as they exist to a sufficient degree on the empirical level – of “reflexive ecological modernization,” a variant of the theory which emphasizes social learning, cultural politics, and new institutional arrangements (Mol and Spaargaren 2000:20). One such indicator might be the extent to which 'new social movements' like the environmental movement have managed to align their goals with those of the state (see Dryzek et al. 2003). A second limitation concerns the methodological approach employed to determine the factors accounting for the discrepant nature of the outlying countries. Secondary analysis of reports and articles is appropriate for uncovering such factors as climate, geography, demographics, and even economics, but less appropriate for explaining government policy and policy-making. Although factors such as political power structure, political party influence, membership in supranational organizations, and natural resource base – all of which become evident through document review and analysis – do figure into an account of policy, they do not fully capture the dynamics of policy-making and the intricacies involved in political decision76  making. Thus to reach a better understanding of why, for example, the UK has more progressive climate policy than either Canada or the US, it may be necessary to collect firsthand information by interviewing key politicians and stakeholders in the policy process in each of the three countries. While pragmatic concerns precluded such an approach here, further inquiry into national climate or energy policy would profit from this method. Finally, in its comparative analysis of climate governance, this paper has focused exclusively on climate change mitigation, or, more specifically, action taken by nation-states to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions. However, governments are also involved in climate change adaptation, which involves measures aimed at reducing the vulnerability of natural systems and human populations to the effects of climate change. Because neither the effects of climate change nor adaptive capacity are evenly distributed across different regions and populations, an environmental or climate justice framework (see page 10, note 5 of the present paper) may be most appropriate for comparing and assessing the climate adaptation policies and practices of different countries. Future research might investigate the extent to which countries with more progressive welfare states have more ambitious and 'environmentally just' climate adaptation policies.  77  5 Conclusion This thesis has constructed and entertained a theoretical argument regarding the link between the welfare state and national-level climate governance. Drawing primarily on the work of James Meadowcroft and John Dryzek, this perspective integrates the concepts of the environmental state, ecological modernization, and varieties of capitalism. The eco-state, it was argued, represents the latest evolutionary phase of the modern state, although no state has achieved full eco-state status. In its nascence, then, the eco-state has been layered on top of institutional structures that characterize earlier phases, namely welfare and production regimes. As a result, 'eco-state regimes' have begun to take shape, mapping onto these two foundational regimes such that coordinated market economies with social democratic welfare states are the vanguards of ecological modernization, a discourse that dominates environmental policy arenas across the advanced capitalist world but that these particular countries have embraced with especial gusto and have the institutional and governance capacities to make a reality. It was proposed, then, that this ‘family of nations’ would exhibit comparatively strong climate governance from an ecological modernization perspective. A combination of two methods was employed to assess the empirical relevance of this proposition and suggest how the theory might be improved upon. A simple quantitative analysis of the most recent results of the Climate Change Performance Index provided some support for the theory, but the index reveals two significant outliers – the UK and Finland. A comparative case study of each of these two cases through an interdisciplinary lens brought to light a range of influential factors – climatic, geographic, demographic, economic, political, historical, and geopolitical – not accounted for by the theory. These findings thus highlight the importance of a broader conception of national context to a more complete understanding of variation in  78  national-level climate governance and suggest an additional, alternative evolutionary path for countries with liberal market economies and liberal welfare states. However, the findings also call into question the possibility of a fully developed eco-state, and the likelihood of ecological modernization as a definitive solution to global climate change, in the context of globalized capitalism.  79  References Andersen, Mikael S. 2010. “Europe’s Experience with Carbon-Energy Taxation.”Sapiens 3(2). 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