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The challenges of constructing legitimacy in peacebuilding Higashi, Daisaku 2012

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THE CHALLENGES OF CONSTRUCTING LEGITIMACY IN PEACEBUILDING  by  Daisaku Higashi M.A., The University of British Columbia, 2006  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  in  THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Political Science)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  August 2012 © Daisaku Higashi, 2012  Abstract Observing challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor, and Libya, to name a few, there is no doubt that peacebuilding—international efforts to create lasting peace in post-conflict states — is a critical issue in world politics. It appears to be a widely shared understanding among both scholars and policymakers that it is imperative for the peacebuilders—both international and domestic authorities in charge of creating peace—to obtain legitimacy in reconstructing war-torn states. Surprisingly, however, concrete methods or policies to construct legitimacy in “host states” have not been fully examined by either IR theorists or practitioners. The objective of this dissertation is to develop an understanding of the mechanism of constructing or eroding the legitimacy of newly created domestic governments in the specific context of peacebuilding. The existing accounts basically contend that constructing legitimate governments in post-conflict states largely depends on the level of force and level of resource distribution (or “guns and money”). On the contrary, my argument emphasizes that in addition to those two factors, other factors, such as inclusive governments reconciling with political adversaries and the substantial role of international organizations as a credible third party to establish the fairness and neutrality of the political process, are very critical in building the legitimacy of the domestic governments in the long run. In order to assess this argument, the dissertation conducts detailed process tracing to assess peacebuilding in Afghanistan as a primary case, demonstrating how the legitimacy of the Afghan government has been ii  eroded. The dissertation also assesses the cases of Iraq, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste (East Timor) in more concise fashion. All four cases support my argument about the requirements for an inclusive political process in peacebuilding as well as the important role of the UN which has often been dismissed by its critics. The research suggests important policy implications for peacebuilding and contributes to generating a theory that can be assessed by future studies.  iii  Preface Ethics approval for the interview portions of my research was obtained from the UBC Behavioral Research Ethics Board; UBC BREB certificate number is H08-00043. The part of my research in Afghanistan was published by Higashi, Daisaku. (2008, October). “Challenge of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Case of Afghanistan.” Report to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Available from the UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub, http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org. The research in East-Timor was also published by Higashi, Daisaku. (2009, March). “Challenge of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Case of Timor-Leste.” Report to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Available from the UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub, http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org. My research has been also published as the Japanese book, Higashi, Daisaku. (2009). Heiwa Kouchiku (Peacebuilding): Research in Afghanistan and East Timor. Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho.  iv  Table of Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................... ii Preface.. .................................................................................................................................. iv Table of Contents ................................................................................................................... v List of Tables ........................................................................................................................ viii List of Figures ........................................................................................................................ ix Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ x 1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 Peacebuilding and Legitimacy ........................................................................................................................1 Peacebuilding in the Post-Cold War Era.........................................................................................................3 Two Key Phenomena of Contemporary Peacebuilding.................................................................................4 Theoretical Gap................................................................................................................................................8 Chapter Overview: Arguments and Investigation ........................................................................................11  2 Constructing or Eroding Legitimacy in Peacebuilding ............................................... 14 Legitimacy and Compliance .........................................................................................................................14 Source of Legitimacy.................................................................................................................................17 Building or Eroding Legitimacy: Reciprocal Process ..............................................................................20 The Dilemma of Peacebuilding in Establishing Legitimacy ...................................................................22 My Argument: Four Critical Factors.............................................................................................................23 Existing Literature: Coercive and Resource-Centric....................................................................................25 How Do the Key Factors Influence Legitimacy?.........................................................................................28 Role of the UN ...........................................................................................................................................28 Comparative Advantage of the UN .....................................................................................................32 Inclusiveness of Domestic Factions in the New Government .................................................................35 Avoiding Premature Diagnosis ............................................................................................................37 Resource Distribution (Provision of Peace Dividends)............................................................................40 Inclusiveness Matters Even for Resource Distribution ......................................................................42 Level of Force ............................................................................................................................................43 Who Dispatches Forces Matters for Local Acceptance......................................................................45 From Repeated Compliance to Domestic Legitimate Government ............................................................48 Methodology: Detailed Case Studies in Peacebuilding States ....................................................................50 Data and Analysis ......................................................................................................................................54  3 Compliance and Noncompliance with Disbanding Illegal Armed Groups .............. 58 Background of Afghanistan: History of Fighting against Foreign Troops ..................................................58 September 11 Attack and Bonn Conference in 2001 ...................................................................................62 After Bonn: Implementing the Time Table and Challenges ........................................................................64 v  DDR and DIAG in Afghanistan....................................................................................................................66 The DIAG Mechanism..............................................................................................................................67 Outcomes of DIAG ...................................................................................................................................69 Reasons for Compliance in Kapisa Province ...............................................................................................72 Economic Incentive for Their Communities ............................................................................................73 Credibility of the UN .................................................................................................................................74 Other Factors ..............................................................................................................................................77 Reasons for Noncompliance in Jalrez District in Wardak Province ............................................................81 DIAG Losing Credibility...........................................................................................................................82 Worsening Security....................................................................................................................................84 Delaying DIAG Economic Development Projects and Spreading Mistrust...............................................86 Misguided Identification of DIAG Projects at the District Level ............................................................88 Lack of Personnel to Design Projects, Estimate Costs, and Implement Them .......................................91 Impacts of Delay of DIAG Projects on Credibility of the Afghan Government ........................................92 Implication of DIAG on Legitimacy Construction and Results ..................................................................93  4 Worsening Security Conditions and Reconciliation Efforts: Noncompliance of the Insurgency with the Government and Its Rules ....................................................... 96 10-Year Security Trend ..................................................................................................................................96 Increased Level of the Afghan Security Forces and International Forces ................................................ 102 Analysis on Worsening Security: Coercive-Centric Account ................................................................... 105 Alternative Account: Consistent Gap between Pashtun and Non-Pashtun .............................................. 107 Missed Opportunities? Reconciliation in Afghanistan...............................................................................119 Risk of Premature or Inadequate Diagnosis: Theoretical Implications .................................................... 124 Failure of the Past Reconciliation Program ............................................................................................... 127 No Cooperation by the U.S. Forces ....................................................................................................... 128 Role of the UN and Theoretical Implications .................................................................................. 130 No Alternative Livelihood after Reconciliation..................................................................................... 132 No Political Negotiation Mechanism with Leadership of Insurgency ................................................. 133 Creating a New Reconciliation Framework in Afghanistan ..................................................................... 136 Controversy in Constructing a New Reconciliation Mechanism ............................................................. 141 Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program......................................................................................... 148 Development of Reconciliation after APRP and Current Challenges ...................................................... 154  5 Assessing My Argument with Other Cases: Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste .............................................................................. 162 Aim of This Chapter ................................................................................................................................... 162 Peacebuilding in Iraq .................................................................................................................................. 164 Changes in the Role of the UN in Iraq ................................................................................................... 164 The Authority of Bremer................................................................................................................... 166 Changes in Inclusiveness of the Political Process ................................................................................. 173 vi  Alternative Account? .............................................................................................................................. 176 Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone.................................................................................................................... 180 Constant Efforts for Inclusiveness and Central Roles of the UN.......................................................... 180 Perception about Reconciliation and UN Roles in Sierra Leone.......................................................... 186 Alternative Account? .............................................................................................................................. 190 Peacebuilding in Timor-Leste..................................................................................................................... 196 Unprecedented Role of the UN and Efforts for Inclusive Government ............................................... 196 Political Uprising in 2006 and New UN Mission.................................................................................. 202 Alternative Account? .............................................................................................................................. 206  6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 211 Necessary or Sufficient Conditions? .......................................................................................................... 213 Policy Implications ..................................................................................................................................... 222 First Step...................................................................................................................................................... 226  References ........................................................................................................................... 228 Appendices .......................................................................................................................... 239 Appendix A: My Argument on Constructing Domestic Legitimacy in Peacebuilding........................... 239 Appendix B: Results of Opinion Survey in Afghanistan June 2008 ........................................................ 240 Appendix C: Results of Opinion Survey in Timor-Leste November 2008.............................................. 251 Appendix D: List of Interviews.................................................................................................................. 263  vii  List of Tables Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 6.1  Major Peacebuilding in War-Torn States Since the End of the Cold War (1989-2011).................5 Matrix of Legitimacy ......................................................................................................................10 Average Daily Insurgent-Initiated Attacks (By Province) Jan 1 – April 30, 2009 .................... 108 Opinion Surveys on Security Comparison in Three Different Provinces...................................117 Do You Support the Government’s Reconciliation Efforts with the Armed Opposition? ........ 155 If You Think the UN is More Credible Than Other Foreign States, Why? ............................... 214  viii  List of Figures Figure 4.1 Number of Deaths of U.S. Troops 2001-2010...............................................................................97 Figure 4.2 Recorded Deaths of Civilians in Afghanistan ................................................................................98 Figure 4.1 UN Accessibility Maps for Aid Workers in Afghanistan in 2005 and 2007 ..............................99 Figure 4.2 UN Accessibility Map in 2008 .................................................................................................... 100 Figure 4.3 UN Risk Assessment Map in 2010 ............................................................................................. 101 Figure 4.3 Number of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF = ANA + ANP) ..................................... 102 Figure 4.4 Number of American Troops Deployed to Afghanistan .......................................................... 103 Figure 4.5 Non-American Foreign Troops Deployed to Afghanistan ......................................................... 104 Figure 4.6 Recorded Civilian Deaths in 2010 in Afghanistan by Region ....................................................110 Figure 4.7 Perception of the Security Situation in Afghanistan by Region, 2010........................................112 Figure 4.8 Security Perception in Afghanistan in 2010, by Ethnicity...........................................................113 Figure 4.9 Security Situation in Afghanistan in 2008, by Ethnicity .............................................................114 Figure 4.10 “More” or “Less” Prosperous in 2010 Compared with Taliban Period, by Region .................115 Figure 4.11 “More” or “Less” Prosperous in 2010 Compared with Taliban Period, by Ethnicity...............115 Figure 4.12 “More” or “Less” Prosperous in 2008 Compared with Taliban Period, by Ethnicity ..............116 Figure 5.1 Estimated Iraqi Civilian Fatalities by Year from 2003 to 2011 .................................................. 177 Figure 5.2 U.S. Troops in Iraq ....................................................................................................................... 177 Figure 5.3 Average Hours of Electricity Per Day in Iraq…......................................................................... 178 Figure 5.4 Who, Among Ex-Combatants, Should Be Given Amnesty? ..................................................... 187 Figure 5.5 Will You Accept Ex-Combatants Back into Your Community?................................................ 188 Figure 5.6 Would You Say Your Security Situation Has Improved?........................................................... 189 Figure 5.7 Do You Think UNAMSIL Has Stayed Long Enough? ............................................................. 190 Figure 5.8 Are You Generally Satisfied That the UN Took Over from ECOMOG? ............................... 191 Figure 5.9 Do You Think the Deployment of an African-Led Peacekeeping Force Should Always Be Followed by the Deployment of a Full-Blown UN Peacekeeping Operation? ..... 193 Figure 5.10 Do You Think That UN Soldiers Have Treated People in Sierra Leone with Respect? .......... 194 Figure 5.11 Have UN Peacekeepers or UN Military Observers Tried to Resolve Problems in Your Camp, Town, or Neighborhood? ................................................................................................. 195 Figure 5.12 If So, How Helpful Were They?................................................................................................. 195 Figure 5.13 Do You Support UNTAET and Sergio de Mello SRSG from 1999 to 2002? ......................... 201 Figure 5.14 Who Should Mainly Conduct the Next Election in Timor-Leste? ........................................... 205 Figure 5.15 Which Force Do You Like Better in Timor-Leste ? .................................................................. 207 Figure 5.16 What Do You Hope about ISF and UN Police in Timor-Leste?............................................... 208  ix  Acknowledgements In order to complete this dissertation, I obtained support and advice from people all over the world. I am especially grateful to Dr. Richard Price, Dr. Brian Job, and Dr. Katharina Coleman at the University of British Columbia (UBC) for their academic support and advice . Without their consistent and kind assistance, I would not have been able to complete both my MA and Ph.D. at UBC. I also wish to thank Carolyn McAskie, former UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, who introduced me and my research proposal to numerous UN peacebuilders and key officials in UN missions from 2006 to 2008. In her letter, she endorsed my project as research “which will shed much-needed light on an issue which perhaps more than any other affects the success or failure of international peacebuilding efforts.” Her support was crucial for me to start contacting UN missions in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, as well as experts at the UN Headquarters. Kenzou Oshima, the former Permanent Representative of the Japanese Mission at the UN, and Yukio Takasu, the former Permanent Representative of the Japanese Mission at the UN, also supported my research with written endorsements. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Afghanistan, and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) in Afghanistan also gave me special cooperation to accomplish this research. I especially thank Christopher Alexander, who was a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General at that time and introduced me to every key figure within UNAMA for my research. I also appreciate the cooperation of the Japanese embassy in Kabul, including that of Hideo Sato, the x  Japanese ambassador in Afghanistan at the time. I sincerely thank Fatemeh Ziai, the former acting director of the Best Practices unit at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) for precious advice. I also express special thanks for the continuous support and advice of Christopher Coleman, a director in the policy planning and intermediation section at the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). I am especially grateful to Scott Smith, who was a team leader for Afghanistan in 2008 and gave me special endorsement to realize my research. I also would like to send my many thanks to all UN officials, officials in ISAF, and all Afghans who cooperated with my interviews in Afghanistan. With regard to the research in Timor-Leste, Nelson Santos, Timor-Leste Ambassador to the United Nations, gave me great cooperation to realize my field research. I also deeply appreciate Atul Khare, SRSG for the United Nations Integration Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) at that time, who gave me special cooperation to accomplish this research. I also appreciate the cooperation of the Japanese embassy in Timor-Leste, including the help of Iwao Kitahara, the Japanese ambassador in Timor-Leste, and Ken Inoue, Director of the Democratic Governance Support Unit for UNMIT. I also would like to send my many thanks to all UN officials, officials in ISF (International Stabilization Force), and all Timorese who cooperated with my interviews. I also appreciate government officials in both Iraq and Sierra Leone who responded to my interviews. I deeply appreciate the Toyota Foundation, which funded my field research in Afghanistan and Timor Leste. I also sincerely appreciate my colleagues in the Human Security Program at the University of Tokyo who assisted me in the completion of my dissertation. Takahisa Kawakami, who was a Chief of Staff in UNAMA when I visited Afghanistan twice in xi  2008 to conduct research, gave me special support in providing my visa to enter Afghanistan and all kinds of logistical support for my field research. Takahisa Kawakami transferred to UNMIT as a Deputy SRSG in November 2008, and again he supported my field research in Timor-Leste. It was so shocking for me that he suddenly passed away in 2010 in Timor-Leste. I will never forget his commitment and passion to create peace in post-conflict states. Lastly, I express special thanks to my wife, Masae Higashi, and my son, Taisei Higashi, who left Japan with me in 2004 to support my studies at UBC. This dissertation would never have been realized without them.  xii  1  Introduction  Peacebuilding and Legitimacy Observing challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor, and Libya to name a few, there is no doubt that peacebuilding—whatever you call it, such as post-conflict reconstruction or nation building— is a critical issue in world politics. The success or failure of international interventions like the ones mentioned above have gripped the world’s attention in the last decade; as Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argue, “One of the most important challenges for the international community is how to rebuild state polities in the aftermath of civil war.”1 Because countries with recent civil wars have had an almost 50% chance of relapsing into violence, there is an imperative to study and improve international peacebuilding efforts.2 As Roland Paris emphasized, post-conflict peacebuilding developed into “something of a growth industry in the 1990s.”3 It will probably continue to be so for both international relations (IR) theorists and practitioners in the coming decades.4 Legitimacy in world politics has been the focus of both global attention and scholarly study in recent years, yet its role in peacebuilding has not been well studied. While the detailed definition of legitimacy is discussed in Chapter 2, legitimacy is here defined as “a normative belief by actors that a rule  1  Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 779. Collier et al. report that the typical country emerging from a civil war has a 44% chance of sliding back into conflict within the first five years of peace (Collier et al. 2002, 5). 3 Paris 2004, 3. 4 Sen 2004, 141, 145. 2  1  or institution is to be obeyed.”5 In other words, legitimacy is a normative concept that induces compliance not by coercion but “in a voluntarist mode.”6 It is often remarked in both public and scholarly discourse that legitimacy is critical for successfully creating sustainable peace in war-torn states because intervention by the international community—such as humanitarian interventions or peacebuilding—always faces the danger of being perceived as neo-colonialism by the local people; it then fails to obtain legitimacy in the eyes of local people and local leaders. Minxin Pei, researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, asserts from his statistical analysis that a deep involvement by the United States in nation building reduced the United States to “quasi-colonial rulers” and fomented the resentment of the local populace.7 Contemporary efforts in peacebuilding also demonstrate serious challenges and the critical need for both international and domestic peacebuilders to obtain legitimacy in host states. Larry Diamond, a political scientist who worked as a senior advisor to the American occupational authority in Iraq (Coalition Provisional Authority) in 2004, asserted that “too many Iraqis viewed the invasion not as an international effort but as an occupation by Western, Christian, essentially Anglo-American powers.” 8 He concluded, “The first lesson of America’s experience in Iraq is that… any effort at administration and reconstruction of the post-conflict state must mobilize legitimacy, both internally in the post-conflict country as well as internationally.”9 In 2009, when the Afghan President Hamid Karzai declared his second-term presidency after completing a chaotic presidential electoral process, U.S. President Barack Obama called Karzai to 5 6 7 8 9  The definition of legitimacy comes from Hurd 1999, 381. Franck 1990, 26. Pei 2003. Diamond 2004, 43. Diamond 2006, 34. Emphasis added.  2  work for “a new chapter in the legitimacy of the Afghan government.”10 In fact, the Obama administration continued to emphasize that “for Washington to succeed in Afghanistan it is essential that there will be a legitimate and credible government in Kabul.”11 It appears to be a widely shared understanding among both scholars and policymakers that it is imperative for the peacebuilders—both international and domestic authorities in charge of creating lasting peace—to obtain legitimacy in reconstructing war-torn states. Surprisingly, however, concrete methods or policies to construct legitimacy in “host states” have not been fully examined by either IR theorists or practitioners. There has been no systematic research that has attempted to account for a dynamic process of building or eroding domestic legitimacy in post-conflict states, although it has been a key question for contemporary international efforts. The objective of this dissertation is to develop an understanding of the construction or erosion of legitimacy in the specific context of peacebuilding.  Peacebuilding in the Post-Cold War Era Particularly as the Cold War ended, the international community—especially the United Nations—engaged in international enterprises to assist in the creation of new governments in war-torn states, to prevent a relapse into conflict. During the Cold War era, it was almost impossible for UN member states to adopt the UN Security Council’s mandates, which would assist with the creation of new states by specifying new regimes; the United States would pursue the creation of democratic states and the  10 11  New York Times, “Obama Warns Karzai to Focus on Tackling Corruption,” 3 November 2009. Emphasis added. Reuters, “Afghanistan’s Karzai agrees to election run-off,” 20 October 2009. Emphasis added.  3  Soviet Union would seek to establish socialist states.12 The end of the Cold War created the potential for the international community to utilize the UN framework and to assist with building new states to stabilize regions. As Andy Knight argues, the end of the Cold War “created a need and an opportunity for the United Nations to play a more significant role in international security.”13 Facing this historical opportunity, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General at that time, issued a report titled “An Agenda for Peace” in 1992, which presented a clear-cut definition of “post-conflict peacebuilding” as one of the important tasks for the UN.14 The report defined “post-conflict peacebuilding” as efforts to “identify and support structures which will tend to strength and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”15 In short, peacebuilding is the effort to solidify peace in the aftermath of violent conflicts.16  Two Key Phenomena of Contemporary Peacebuilding Most of the peacebuilding operations in the post-Cold War era can be characterized by two prominent phenomena: (1) strong involvement by international actors such as international organizations and foreign states and (2) attempts to create democratic governments by conducting elections as a way to solidify peace. Table 1.1 lists all major post-conflict peacebuilding efforts since the end of the Cold War.  12  Paris 2003, 15. Knight 2005, 517. 14 Boutros Ghali 1992. 15 Boutros Ghali 1992, 32. 16 Although Boutros-Ghali report defined peacebuilding as a post-conflict activity, UN peacebuilding “can also be practices at a ‘pre-conflict’ stage to forestall the outbreak of violence,” as Knight asserts (Knight 2005, 534.); this dissertation tends to focus on the side of post-conflict activities for analysis. It is also important to note that the term “peacebuilding” is distinguished from other UN peace operations, such as “peacemaking, ” which is defined as “a diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through peaceful means,” or “peacekeeping,” which is defined as “the UN peacekeepers’ presence in the field with the consent of the conflicting parties to implement an agreement relating to the control of conflict,” or “peace enforcement,” “the action to be taken when all other efforts fail, including the use of armed force with authorization provided by the UN Chapter VII.” (UN General Guideline for Peacekeeping Operations, 1995, 5) 13  4  This is the list of major peacebuilding efforts which have as a component creating a new government to solidify peace in post-conflict states since the end of the Cold War. Table 1.1 Major Peacebuilding in War-Torn States Since the End of the Cold War (1989-2011) Host States Namibia (1989-1990)  International Actors Involved UN  Democratic Election (Year) 1989 November  Nicaragua (1989-1992) Angola (1991-1997) Cambodia (1991-1993) El Salvador (1991-1995) Western Sahara (1991-)  UN & OAS UN UN UN UN  1990 February 1992 September 1993 May 1994 March Referendum was planned, has not yet happened.  Mozambique (1992-1994) Liberia (1993-1997) (2003- )  UN ECOWAS  1994 October 1997 July  Haiti (1993-1996) (1997-2000) (2004- ) Rwanda (1993-1996)  UN UN  Bosnia (1995- ) Croatia (1995-1998) Guatemala (1997) East Timor (1999-2005) (2006- )  OECD UN UN UN UN UN UN UN UN UN UN  2006 February Planned (1995) But No Election 1996 September 2000 January 1999 December 2002 April 2007 June 2001 November 1996 February 2002 May 2006 July N/A 2000 October 2010 November 2005 August 2011 Referendum 2004 October (Presidential) 2005 September  Kosovo (1999- ) Sierra Leone (1999-2005) DRC (1999- ) Ethiopia/ Eritrea (2000- ) Cote d’Ivoire (2004- ) Burundi (2004-2006) Sudan South-North (2005 -) Afghanistan (2002 - )  UN UN USA /NATO (Partially UN)  5  Host States  Iraq (2003- 2004) (2004 - ) Libya (2011-)  International Actors Involved  USA (Marginally UN) UN  Democratic Election (Year) (Parliament) 2009 August (Presidential) 2010 (Parliament) 2005 Jan, Dec. 2010 March Election is planned.  Note: Data originated from Paris (2004), Sens (2004), and UN DPKO Web site. Table 1.1 clearly suggests two empirical phenomena of peacebuilding operations. First, in an overwhelming majority of cases, international actors —the UN, other regional International Organizations (IOs), and individual states—are deeply involved in the operations. Due to this nature of peacebuilding, it is important to distinguish two categories of peacebuilders: The first is “international peacebuilders” who conduct peacebuilding activities as outside actors; the second is “domestic peacebuilders” who are local actors in host states, such as domestic central governments, local governments, and transitional (or interim) governments.17 The second prominent phenomenon is that when the international actors are involved, they have almost unanimously been seeking to solidify peace by assisting in the creation or reestablishment of democratic governments by going through electoral processes. Although conducting elections has not necessarily led to consolidating peace, almost all peacebuilding, which has been assisted by international actors, has actually sought to establish democratic governments in the post-Cold War era.18 Observing this  17  It is critical to distinguish these two actors because the legitimacy of these international and domestic peacebuilders might be different depending on peacebuilding states. See Chapter 2 on the argument about “the audience of legitimacy.” 18 Paris 2004.  6  empirical fact, Paris criticizes this practice as the universal implementation of the “Wilsonian model” of peacebuilding.19 Nonetheless, it has become extremely difficult for the international community—especially for the UN as a dominant actor in peacebuilding—to support creating authoritative or totalitarian regimes in the aftermath of military conflicts. Almost all international relations (IR) scholars similarly insist that in the final stages of nation building in war-torn states, democratic governments need to be created by conducting elections.20 While some theorists argue that “rushing democratization” is very harmful for peacebuilding, even IR scholars who criticize contemporary peacebuilding operations unanimously contend that the international community ultimately should seek to—or cannot help but seek to—create new democratic governments through democratic elections at the end of the peacebuilding process.21 While it is totally justifiable to argue that it may be better not to have democratic elections for certain periods of time after military conflicts, it is not so realistic to assume that the international community would support the creation of authoritative or totalitarian regimes. Mark Malloch Brown, the head of the UN Development Program in 2003, claimed, “Recent years have seen a growing conviction among governments and civil society in many member states of the United Nations about the centrality of democratic governance in achieving both sustainable peace and development…democratic governance is vital not just for ensuring sustainable  19  Ibid. Kimberly Zisk Marten, for instance, contends that complex peacekeeping operations “were undertaken in an effort to move war-torn societies on to a liberal democratic path of political development.” (Marten 2004, 4) 21 For example, David Lake argues that it is much better for international peacebuilders to create social order with massive international coercive powers without conducing democratic elections first, but he still asserts that democratic elections should be conducted after social order is established (Lake 2010). Paris argues that the priority for peacebuilding is to establish governance first; thus, the international community should wait even more than 10 years until governance with effective bureaucratic machinery is established. But he still asserts that elections are inevitable (Paris 2004). 20  7  development, but also for sustaining peace within societies.”22 Reflecting on two empirical trends of peacebuilding operations since the end of the Cold War, this dissertation focuses on the question of how legitimacy can be constructed or eroded in the process of peacebuilding in war-torn states when international actors are deeply involved in efforts to create democratic governments. This is the domain of this dissertation.23  Theoretical Gap Although investigating mechanisms of constructing or eroding legitimacy in war-torn states has important policy implications, this research also makes a significant theoretical contribution: to address a theoretical gap between IR theorists and democratization theorists in studying the construction of democratic legitimacy in the aftermath of wars. This theoretical gap comes from the different foci of IR theorists and democratization theorists who study legitimacy. On the one hand, IR scholars have examined the impact of “international legitimacy” on behaviors of states; namely, how international legitimacy, which is often conferred by resolutions of the UN Security Council or international laws and norms, impacts actions of states or cooperation among states.24 On the other hand, democracy theorists often focus on a “regime transition” from authoritarian or totalitarian regimes to democratic regimes by examining domestic factors alone, ignoring the significant 22  Brown 2003, 141-142. Emphasis added. If international peacebuilders started seeking to consolidate peace by creating nondemocratic governments, we would need to research sources of success and failure of such initiatives. 24 See, for example, Erik Voeten, “The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force,” International Organization 59 (Summer 2005), pp. 527-557; Ian Hurd, “After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Andrew Hurrell, “Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared ?,” Review of International Studies (2005), pp. 15-32; Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance,” International Organization 47 (1993 Spring), pp. 175-205; Richard Price, “Nuclear Weapons Don’t Kill People, Rogues Do,” International Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2-3 (2007 March-May: Special issue for Crisis of International Legitimacy); and Martha Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and The Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipolar Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be,” World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (2009 January), pp. 58-85. 23  8  involvement by international actors, especially in the aftermath of wars. For example, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, prominent democracy scholars, present a comprehensive theory of how consolidated democracy can be built as a result of transitions from autocratic or authoritative regimes.25 However, even Linz and Stepan did not account for how consolidated democracy (or legitimate democratic government) can be constructed by international actors in the aftermath of wars.26 Emphasizing this theoretical gap, Charles Call and Susan Cook claim that “the post-conflict peacebuilding community and the democratization community have enjoyed remarkably little dialogue.”27 They add, “Some democratization theorists have emphasized the agency of domestic actors during regime transitions from authoritarianism, underplaying the enhanced opportunities for international actors.”28 Nancy Bermeo, one of the leading democratization theorists, also contends, “The classics in the democratization literature are surprisingly reticent about the links between war and lasting democracy. Most of our theoretical literature on democratic transitions or democratic consolidation leaves the connection to war either wholly neglected or seriously undertheorized.”29 As a result, neither IR theorists nor democratization theorists have adequately attempted to create a theoretical account of the mechanisms of international actors in establishing or eroding democratic legitimacy in war-torn states. In sum, there is a theoretical gap between IR theorists and democratization theorists on the  25  Linz and Stepan 1996. The “consolidated democracy” defined by Linz and Stepan is tantamount to “legitimate democratic governments” defined by this dissertation as they assert, “In short, with consolidation, democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even psychological life, as well as in calculations for achieving success…. democracy becomes the only game in town when no significant political groups seriously attempted to overthrow the democratic regimes or secede from the state” (Linz and Stepan 1996). 27 Call and Cook 2003, 135. 28 Call and Cook 2003, 136. Emphasis added. 29 Bermeo 2003, 159. Bermeo added in the following sentence in the same article that “This is perplexing because so many new and renewed democracies emerge in the context of war. Of the seventy-three democracies founded after 1945 that still exist today, over half emerged either in the immediate aftermath of a war or as a means of bringing an ongoing war to an end.” 26  9  construction (or erosion) of domestic legitimacy in the aftermath of wars, especially when it is supported by international actors. This research is an attempt to fill this gap. Thus, my research will also address how international legitimacy—such legitimacy being something the UN Security Council and its resolutions are widely regarded as conferring—supports or fails to support the construction of local legitimacy in the eyes of local people and leaders. Elucidating this mechanism is theoretically very significant, as the linkage between international legitimacy and local legitimacy is one of the key puzzles in understanding the function of legitimacy in current world politics.30 In an initial attempt to sort out these complex relationships, I have formulated a matrix of legitimacy (Table 1.2) that identifies sources of international and domestic legitimacy for both international peacebuilders and domestic peacebuilders. Table 1.2 Matrix of Legitimacy  International Peacebuilders (The UN, foreign states, NGOs, etc.)  Legitimacy in the eyes of the International Community International legitimacy of international peacebuilders in the eyes of the International Community (IC) Sources: UNSC Resolutions Support by member states etc.  Legitimacy in the eyes of local people and leaders Domestic legitimacy of the international peacebuilders in the eyes of local people or leaders. Sources: Not fully theorized, but opinion poll and interviews with leaders suggest the credibility of the UN as an impartial third party, composition of UN staff, and support by member states, including by UNSC members, as well as UN performances in host  30  I deeply appreciate the insights and suggestions of Katharina Coleman on this point. Many prominent democratization theorists, for example, made a detailed articulation and theoretical account about how democratic legitimate governments can be constructed; for example, Linz and Stepan. But there is little account on whether and how international legitimacy can assist the construction of domestic legitimacy: the linkage between international and domestic legitimacy.  10  Domestic Peacebuilders (Local governments, local interim governments, transitional governments, local NGOs, etc. in host states)  Insurgency  states. International legitimacy of Domestic legitimacy of domestic peacebuilders (such domestic peacebuilders in the as local governments) in the eyes eyes of local people and leaders. of the IC Sources (this is the major focus Sources: Recognition of of this dissertation): members states for a new 1. Roles of the UN in assisting government, as well as local compliance with domestic diplomatic and financial support, peacebuilders. etc. 2. Inclusiveness of new government. 3. Resource Distribution 4. Level of Coercion International legitimacy of Domestic legitimacy of insurgent groups in the eyes of insurgent groups in the eyes of the IC. local people and leaders. Sources: Negotiations with Sources: peacebuilders, financial and Governance in controlled areas, diplomatic support, etc. provision of service and security, (International sanctions are very etc. (almost the same as the negative in this legitimacy) above)  Chapter Overview: Arguments and Investigation This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 presents my argument on constructing or eroding domestic (and democratic) legitimacy in the course of peacebuilding, assisted by international actors. The chapter begins with a theoretical understanding of the relationship between legitimacy and compliance, the sources of legitimacy, and their implications for constructing legitimate governments in war-torn states. Based on this theoretical understanding, I present my argument on critical factors that would have a substantial impact on compliance or noncompliance with key political programs in peacebuilding, such as accepting the results of elections and the contents of new constitutions, and 11  disarmament of local warlords. I also examine existing accounts in the literature on the same question. The existing accounts basically contend that compliance with key political programs and constructing legitimacy in peacebuilding largely depends on the level of force (guns) and level of resource distribution (money) toward people who are governed. On the contrary, my argument emphasizes that in addition to those two factors, other factors, such as inclusive governments reconciling with old enemies, and the substantial role of IOs as a credible third party to establish the fairness and neutrality of the political process, are very critical in inducing repeated compliance and then building legitimacy in the long run. I conclude Chapter 2 with a discussion of the methods used for the dissertation. The subsequent chapters examine the empirical evidence for my argument. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 analyze the case of Afghanistan—the major case of this dissertation based upon extensive field research. Chapter 3 examines how the local warlords in Afghanistan decide on compliance or noncompliance with the government’s request to disarm. The chapter highlights how the credibility of IOs as an impartial third party—especially the UN in this particular case—is crucial in determining the compliance/noncompliance behaviors of warlords. Then, Chapter 4 analyzes compliance/noncompliance behaviors with the new Afghan constitution; the analysis uses security conditions as indicators of compliance with the constitution because insurgent attacks are a clear indication of rejection of the rules defined by the new government. This chapter, with detailed analyses of the insurgency in Afghanistan, shows how the inclusiveness of the political process— reconciliation with former enemies—is critical in motivating compliance with the constitution (and new polity in general) and creating legitimate governments in the long run. In other 12  words, the chapter highlights how excluding reconcilable elements of insurgents can damage the process of constructing legitimate governments. Chapter 5 presents three additional peacebuilding cases—Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste (East Timor)—which are found to consistently support and reinforce my findings of the Afghan peacebuilding case. In Chapter 6, I will conclude the dissertation by presenting the policy implications of the research on practices of peacebuilding, as well as the prospective for further research to strengthen this theoretical framework. My central argument is that coercion and resource distribution are not sufficient in creating legitimate democratic governments in the long run, but two other factors —credibility as being impartial and broader inclusiveness of the new government —are crucial. Although my dissertation might not be able to provide conclusive proof of such a theory by itself, it aims to generate a theory that can be assessed by a larger number of case studies in the future.  13  2  Constructing or Eroding Legitimacy in Peacebuilding  Legitimacy and Compliance This chapter starts with a detailed explanation of the word “legitimacy.” IR theorists seem to share a common definition. Ian Hurd defines legitimacy as “a normative belief by actors that a rule or institution is to be obeyed”; Christian Reus-Smit asserts that when we speak of an institution commanding legitimacy, “we are saying that there is a generalized perception that its normative precepts are rightful, that they warrant respect and compliance for more than self-interested reasons, for reasons of their normative standing.”31 Thomas Franck also argues that “legitimacy exerts a pull to compliance which is powered by the quality of the rule or of the rule-making institution and not by coercive authority. It exerts a claim to compliance in the voluntarist mode.”32 The common feature of these definitions is that legitimacy is a social perception and recognition; this indicates that legitimacy essentially contains cognitive elements, in which different actors judge whether or not rules and the rule-making institutions are fundamentally “right” so that they want to comply with them in a voluntary mode. This definition of legitimacy, in turn, indicates key features of a “legitimate government.” Reus-Smit presents the definition of “being legitimate”: “When legitimacy is ascribed to an actor or institutions, we describe it as legitimate.”33 Thus, “legitimate government” can be defined as a government under which people tend to comply with the government, not because of the coercive powers of the government, nor because of personal calculation of short-term interests, but because of their 31 32 33  Reus-Smit 2007, 159. Franck 1990, 26. Ibid., 159.  14  conviction that the compliance is right.34 For example, the Canadian government and the Japanese government are considered to be legitimate governments because the majority of the people accept the results of elections and do not consider subverting their government by violent methods (they do not even calculate the cost and benefit of subverting the government by violence) when they lose elections. In the context of peacebuilding, the newly created governments would be highly likely to achieve solidifying peace and stability once the governments become fully legitimate in the eyes of local people because a majority of the people would comply with the orders of the governments in a voluntary mode.35 Contemporary IR theorists also present more comprehensive accounts of the relationship between legitimacy and compliance. Ian Hurd argues that social control, which is central to all international relations and to all social life, is achieved by three different mechanisms: (1) coercion, (2) self-interest, and (3) legitimacy.36 In terms of coercion, he claims that “coercion is a relatively simple form of social control, and it is inefficient from the point of view of central power. It does not, in general, provoke voluntary compliance.”37 Thus, “coercion and sanction are costly mechanisms of control.”38 The second possible mechanism is self-interest: When people believe that “compliance in fact promotes their self-interest,” they decide to comply with the rules.39 This view suggests that following any rule is the result of “calculated  34  Migdal, emphasizing that legitimacy is the most potent factor for states to exercise social control, argues that “state leaders want citizens to comply with its authority not from the inertia of unreasoning routines or the utilitarian calculation of personal advantage, but from the conviction that compliance is right” (Migdal 1988, 32-33). 35 In fact, the word “legitimacy” has been studied in the context of establishing order and stability that require compliance of people with rules, authorities, and states. For example, Machiavelli asserts that “political stability depends directly on the legitimacy of government itself….pure power is impotent; its stability therefore depends on voluntary acceptance, and voluntary acceptance depends on legitimacy” (Zelditch 2001, 36). 36 Hurd 1999, 383. 37 Ibid., 384. Emphasis added. 38 Ibid., 385. 39 Ibid., 385.  15  assessment of the net benefits of compliance versus noncompliance.”40 Although Hurd accepts both mechanisms above, he emphasizes that compliance can be motivated by the third mechanism, “legitimacy.” He asserts, “When an actor believes a rule is legitimate, compliance is no longer motivated by the simple fear of retribution, or by a calculation of self-interest, but instead by an internal sense of moral obligation.”41 Though legitimacy is not indispensable to all social control, lack of legitimacy imposes “heavy costs on the controllers.”42 Thus, he concludes that the maintenance of social order depends on rules that are “institutionalized, or considered to be legitimate, by most actors.”43 For Hurd, legitimacy is a critical factor that pulls compliance and achieves social control with lower costs for controllers.44 In conducting research about legitimacy, it is also indispensable to distinguish audiences of legitimacy and actors appealing for legitimacy. There may be actors who claim that their institutions, rules, or actions are “legitimate.” But to be “legitimate,” the actors need to have audiences, who judge whether these actors and their rules are “legitimate.” Reus-Smit uses an excellent metaphor: “An actor can jump up and down, declaring loudly that his or her actions are legitimate, but if nobody accepts this, then they are not correctly described as such, even if he or she is making a legitimacy claim.”45 Regarding people who actually judge legitimacy, Reus-Smit calls them the “constituency of legitimacy,” and Katharina Coleman  40  Ibid., 385. Ibid., 387. 42 Ibid., 388. 43 Ibid., 389. 44 Hurd emphasizes in the same article that it is important to distinguish “self-interest” and “interest.” “Self-interest” indicates the attitudes of persons who continuously assess the payoff of compliance versus noncompliance on every rule they face, without having any sense of moral obligation to rules. “Interest” on the other hand indicates that people take for granted the existing structure of relations and institutions and seek to improve their position within it; thus, it is completely possible for actors to follow the rules because of legitimacy while these actors also pursue their “goals and interests” that are distinct from “self-interest” in the strict sense (Hurd 1999, 386). 45 Reus-Smit 2007, 159. 41  16  calls them “audiences of legitimacy.”46 In studying legitimacy, it is vital to identify the audience who judges the legitimacy; namely, in the eyes of whom are states, authorities, institutions, and their rules legitimate or illegitimate?  Source of Legitimacy Political theorists—both classical and contemporary theorists—have also attempted to address the source of legitimacy: when, how, and in what ways legitimacy can be constructed (leaving alone post-conflict state building). It was Max Weber who presented one of the most prominent and traditional analyses on this question.47 He argues in his book Economy and Society that the validity of the claim to legitimacy may be based on three authorities. 1. Rational Grounds—resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority). 2. Traditional Grounds—resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority). 3. Charismatic Grounds—resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority).48 In addition to those three sources of legitimacy, Weber also specifies “democratic legitimacy” in his analysis; the “plebiscite” (voting in elections) is the key mechanism to confer democratic legitimacy to  46 47 48  Coleman 2007, 24. Weber 1978, 215. Ibid., 215. Emphasis in original.  17  leaders of states. He contends, “the most important transitional type is the legitimation of authority by plebiscite … the plebiscite has been the specific means of deriving the legitimacy of authority from the confidence of the ruled.”49 This classical argument is profoundly valid as every democratic state, including a majority of peacebuilding states that have been assisted by international actors, has conducted elections as a part of efforts to establish legitimacy in the eyes of local people.50 Many contemporary theorists, however, argue that an election is not sufficient to establish democratic legitimacy. Advancing the classic argument by Weber, there are several ongoing debates about the source of legitimacy. One crucial debate is whether legitimacy is derived from fair (or being perceived to be fair) processes of political decisions, or rather political outcomes distributed to the ruled. These two sources of legitimacy have been recently categorized as “input” and “output” legitimacy. Robert Keohane, a founder of neo-liberal institutionalism, recently defined the two sources of legitimacy:51 The sources of organizational legitimacy are conventionally divided into “output” and “input” legitimacy. Outputs refer to the achievement of the substantive purposes of the organization, such as security and welfare. Inputs refer to the processes by which decisions are reached—whether they have certain attributes regarded as important by the audience.52 Hurrell basically follows these two important sources of legitimacy: In terms of “input legitimacy,” he asserts, “The first dimension [of legitimacy] has to do with process and procedure. This is one aspect of what Fritz Scharpf labels ‘input legitimacy.’ It involves the claim that an action or a rule is legitimate to the 49  Ibid., 267. This dissertation takes the “minimalist” approach on the definition of democracy; “Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections” as defined by Adam Przeworski (Przeworski 1991, 10). In other words, democracy is a system in which governments can be replaced by the result of elections. 51 Keohane 2006, 3. 52 Ibid., 3. Emphasis added. 50  18  extent that it has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.”53 As for “output legitimacy,” he states, the “[other] dimension of legitimacy has to do with effectiveness, one crucial aspect of what Scharpf labels ‘output legitimacy’… It is routinely argued that the delegation of authority… is legitimate to the extent to which such delegation provides effective solutions to shared problems.”54 There are different research outcomes and arguments regarding which legitimacy—input legitimacy or output legitimacy—is more critical. Some scholars, like Tom Tyler, emphasizes that procedural fairness—input legitimacy—is the key source of legitimacy.55 Other scholars, like Herbert Kelman, emphasize output-driven legitimacy as a major source of legitimacy.56 However, it is highly plausible that “input legitimacy driven by fair procedures” and “output legitimacy driven by achievement of outcomes” are probably not incompatible, but they both have effects on creating legitimacy. Kelman suggests that input and output legitimacy reinforce each other.57 The question, thus, is how authorities or institutions can create “input legitimacy” by promoting fair decision-making procedures, as well as “output legitimacy” by satisfying the needs of the people. Finally, Andrew Hurrell also presents a controversial and very interesting dimension of legitimacy in his argument on the source of legitimacy. He asserts that in many ways, “giving reasons” or “persuasion” is the most important element because it is here that various sources of legitimacy, such as “input  53  Hurrell 2005, 18. The original term comes from Scharpf in his book Governing Europe: Effective and Democratic? (1999). Ibid., 22. 55 Based on his own empirical studies, Tyler asserts “The roots of legitimacy lie in people’s assessment of the fairness of the decision-making procedures used by authorities and institutions,” while judgments about the favorability of the outcomes have little impact on the evaluation of legitimacy of authorities and institutions (Tyler 2001, 416). 56 Kelman 2001, 57. 57 Ibid., 56. 54  19  legitimacy” and “output legitimacy,” are “brought together into an effective process of legitimation.”58 Even in the case of output legitimacy, Hurrell asserts, “legitimacy has to rely on more than ‘brute facts on the ground’ and depends on a reasoned and accepted argument.”59 According to Hurrell, legitimacy is created by not only effective distribution (output legitimacy) and fair process (input legitimacy), but also the “persuasion” by actors or institutions who attempt to command legitimacy. This dimension of persuasion is particularly interesting in understanding the roles of international actors and their international legitimacy: Do the international actors with international legitimacy in the eyes of the international community have an advantage in persuading the local actors and people that the process is credible and legitimate? I will articulate this dimension in more detail in explaining my argument for creating democratic legitimacy in war-torn states.  Building or Eroding Legitimacy: Reciprocal Process Many scholars who analyze the sources of legitimacy also share the view that the process of creating legitimacy is reciprocal and dynamic; people’s compliance with authorities and their rules will strengthen the legitimacy of these authorities and rules, then it will further induce more robust compliance. In that sense, legitimacy is reinforced by the repetition of compliance. Reus-Smit presents a detailed argument of this mechanism of strengthening legitimacy.60 Actors who command legitimacy are empowered in three crucial ways. First, these actors can increase their legitimacy by the active support of other actors who do more than simply comply with their decision: They actively invest their energies in  58 59 60  Hurrell 2005, 23. Ibid., 24. Reus-Smit 2007, 163.  20  endorsing the projects. Second, they can increase their legitimacy by the “simple compliance of other actors in accordance with their rules, decisions, or commands.” Third, their legitimacy can be strengthened by “low levels of opposition, which reduces the costs of coercion.”61 In sum, legitimacy would be strengthened by (1) active support, (2) simple compliance, and (3) a low level of opposition. Reus-Smit’s account of “strengthening legitimacy” suggests that legitimacy and these factors empowering legitimacy have reciprocal effects: Active support, compliance, and a low level of opposition will strengthen legitimacy, then strengthened legitimacy will pull more support and compliance. On the other hand, weaker support, noncompliance, and a high level of opposition would damage legitimacy, and then the weakened legitimacy would induce more noncompliance that would erode legitimacy in the long run. This reciprocal mechanism of compliance and legitimacy may create a possible concern from some IR scholars who would have a more positivist approach and would argue that positing such a reciprocal process between ideational factors, such as norms and legitimacy, and indicators of behaviors, such as compliance or noncompliance, carries the danger of tautology because one uses as evidence of the strength and weakness of legitimacy the very elements by which legitimacy is defined. Legro criticizes IR norm research in just this manner, demanding instead that “any evaluation of [a norm’s] robustness must measure it independently from the norm’s effect.”62 However, it is impossible to evaluate the strength and weakness of legitimacy without understanding the behaviors of actors, such as compliance and noncompliance, that can be partially 61 62  Reus-Smit 2007, 164. Emphasis in original. Legro 1997, 39.  21  induced by legitimacy; the reason is that it is the reality of such mutually constitutive phenomena that their existence cannot be separated from the ongoing practices regarding compliance that might constitute legitimacy. The requirement is, as Hurd asserts, to investigate and articulate the reasons for compliance.63 In this particular research, the question becomes, “Is compliance caused by a sense of legitimacy or by another mechanism, such as coercion or the calculation of short-term interests?” Identifying the reasons or motives of actors in compliance or noncompliance is always a challenging research task, though it offers an important way to investigate the reciprocal mechanisms of compliance and legitimacy.  The Dilemma of Peacebuilding in Establishing Legitimacy There is no doubt that legitimacy is hugely damaged in war-torn states. Three basic sources of legitimacy, defined by Weber, have often been totally destroyed: traditional authority has collapsed, charismatic authority is absent, and legal authority has also been damaged or even destroyed altogether. Other sources defined by contemporary theorists, such as a fair process of decision making (input legitimacy) or the distribution of political and economic outcomes (output legitimacy), also cannot be expected; it is extremely difficult for war-torn states to create the perception of procedural fairness of political decisions because different factions have fought each other and have accumulated suspicion. War-torn states also will have difficulties satisfying the needs of people because state agencies have often been destroyed by conflicts. As Paris asserts, war-shattered states lack “effective governmental institutions.”64 That is one reason why international actors, such as the UN, other IOs, individual states, and 63 64  Hurd 1999. Paris 2004, 168.  22  multinational forces, so frequently have engaged in assisting the creation of new governments in war-torn territories.65 However, the international actors also cannot escape from a critical problem in obtaining legitimacy among people in the host states. As Pei contends, the interventions of international actors can be perceived as a “quasi-colonial invasion,” and their activities always face a risk of being rejected by local people and actors exactly on that ground.66 Here is the fundamental dilemma of peacebuilding in establishing legitimacy. On the one hand, domestic actors often need to obtain assistance from international actors due to their own inability to provide both “input” and “output” legitimacy. On the other hand, these international actors also face the risk of being rejected due to possible perception as a “quasi-colonial invasion” and cannot effectively support the creation of new local governments. The aim of this research is to attempt to articulate how both domestic and international peacebuilders can tackle this fundamental dilemma and succeed in creating new legitimate governments in war-torn states where the previous legitimacy of authorities or states has collapsed.  My Argument: Four Critical Factors I present here my argument on how legitimate democratic governments can be constructed, or eroded, in the process of post-conflict peacebuilding, especially when international actors are deeply involved in peacebuilding efforts. The argument was derived from the literature on both legitimacy and  Charles Call argues that “At certain moments in a society’s history, the institutional arrangement of the state takes special precedence over capacity. These moments generally occur in the immediate aftermath of state or regime collapse…external actors often have played a crucial role… leading to constitutional conferences or other processes to redesign the state (Call 2008, 10). 66 Pei 2003. 65  23  peacebuilding, as well as contentions by both scholars and practitioners who engage in peacebuilding efforts. In this dissertation, I argue that there are four critical factors that have a substantial impact on determining compliance or noncompliance with key political programs of newly formed governments, such as results of elections, contents of new constitutions, and disarmament of warlords. My argument then assumes that “repeated compliance” with those key political programs will result in the creation of legitimate democratic governments in the long run; contrarily, it assumes that “repeated noncompliance” will result in the erosion of legitimate governments in war-torn states (see Appendix A). According to my argument, the four critical factors that significantly determine compliance or noncompliance with key political programs are (1) the role of IOs, especially the role of UN missions whose mandates are decided by UN Security Council resolutions; (2) the inclusiveness of a new government in a host state; (3) the level of resource distribution to people (the provision of peace dividends); and (4) the level of force controlling dissident political groups, especially insurgency. Appendix A shows how these four critical factors could be linked to compliance and noncompliance with key political programs and, consequently, the creation or erosion of democratic legitimate governments.67 I will explain later how it can be assumed that “repeated compliance” will lead to the creation of legitimate governments in the long run, and “repeated noncompliance” will erode the legitimacy of newly formed  67  In my preliminary work, I also argued that local ownership might have a critical impact on compliance with key programs. But my field research and other case studies suggest that local ownership is neutral for inducing compliance and then building legitimacy because the local authorities need to be monitored or reinforced by international actors in war-torn states; “local ownership” tends to be an important slogan for encouraging the local authorities and local leaders, but their decisions and behaviors need to be supported or monitored by the international actors who provide financial, civilian, and military assistance by creating mutual contracts. I also found that it is extremely difficult to identify the variation of the degree of local ownership as almost all enterprises in peacebuilding have a slogan to “respect local ownership”, although it is often used to avoid the responsibility of international actors who might not achieve their original goals in the process of peacebuilding.  24  governments and be likely to relapse into military conflicts. The policies regarding these four critical factors are mainly decided by peacebuilders—both domestic and international peacebuilders. In other words, the policies regarding those factors can be considered “policy inputs,” which are influenced, although not perfectly controlled, by international actors (international peacebuilders) who engage in supporting domestic peacebuilders (such as local transitional governments). My case studies investigating the argument strongly suggest that the policies regarding these four factors play a crucial role in determining the compliance or noncompliance behaviors of local people and leaders with key political programs.  Existing Literature: Coercive and Resource-Centric Although there is very little literature and research that accounts for the dynamic mechanism of creating or eroding legitimacy in post-conflict peacebuilding—that is why this dissertation is aimed to generate a theory—there are several existing arguments by IR theorists that suggest different accounts about the construction of stable governments in post-conflict states. While they might use various theoretical tools, such as the “security dilemma” or “contract-based legitimacy,” their shared assertion is that the most critical factors that outsiders should bring to create peace and stability in war-torn states is a higher level of coercion and resource distribution to people; neither the international legitimacy conferred by the UN Security Council nor the more inclusive process that some peacebuilders think is crucial are taken seriously as important factors. For example, Barry Posen applies the concept of the “security dilemma” to the special conditions 25  of ethnic conflicts or civil wars. From this analysis, he concludes, “The characteristic behavior of international organizations, especially the United Nations (UN), reinforces the incentives for offensive action” because the UN only protects “the military gains of the winning side, or gives both a respite to recover [from fighting].”68 In short, “the UN does not make peace.”69 Therefore, Posen asserts that solving ethnic conflicts and bringing stability “will require a willingness to commit large numbers of troops and substantial amounts of military equipment to troubled areas for a very long time.”70 Although Posen’s argument mainly targets solving ethnic conflicts—not peacebuilding after the conflict—he explicitly suggests that a larger military presence for a longer time would be the most crucial factor in bringing peace and stability to war-torn states, rejecting the roles of the UN in solving conflicts. David Lake’s paper, “Building Legitimate States After Civil Wars,” might be the most direct account with a sharp contrast with my argument, especially since he focuses not just on stability but, like this dissertation, on the construction of domestic legitimacy. He asserts that it is the level of coercion and amount of resources put into post-conflict states that determine whether or not war-torn states can establish legitimate governments. His assertion comes from his assumption about the construction of legitimacy and compliance of the ruled with the ruler. He asserts, “The ruler provides a social order of benefit to the ruled, and the ruled in turn comply with the extractions (e.g., taxes) and constraints on their behaviors (e.g., law) that are necessary to the production of that order.”71 According to his theory, the more investments the actors put into specific assets, the more they become dependent on the authority that maintains a particular 68 69 70 71  Posen 1993, 33, 34. Ibid., 33. Ibid., 45. Emphasis added. Lake 2010, 30.  26  social order. He concludes, “State builders can secure a social order simply by establishing a coercive presence within a failed state that can protect people, defend property, and adjudicate disputes.”72 On the other hand, according to Lake’s theory, international legitimacy or the role of the UN does not matter at all: He asserts that international trustees can legitimate their own roles and the newly formed states “not by gaining the approval of the United Nations, as is now believed, but by being a critical contributor to the reestablishment of social order.”73 Lake also asserts that traditional ideas emphasizing the “inclusive process” simply cannot work in failed states.74 “In short,” Lake concludes, “Through significantly greater resources and coercive capabilities, international trustees can ‘lend’ credibility to a newly formed state.”75 He concludes, “Coercion is necessary to create social order, and social order then legitimates the state.”76 In sum, the account by Lake suggests that building the legitimacy of newly formed governments in war-torn states largely depends on peacebuilders’ material capabilities in delivering coercion and resource distribution—in other words, “guns and money.” Contrarily, my argument emphasizes that the social contributions of IOs—mainly the UN—and the inclusiveness of newly formed governments are crucial in inducing compliance, then building legitimacy in the long run, in addition to the level of force and resource distribution, which the realists such as Posen and Lake solely focus on. My argument does not negate the importance of resource distribution and coercive methods but stresses that the other two 72  Ibid., 40. Ibid., 31. 74 Ibid., 32-33. Lake asserts that the conventional approach for state-building exercise in the aftermath of wars is typically shown in “writing inclusive rules of political participation and creating a new structure of democratic politics,” as well as implementing “some mechanism for political reconciliation”; then he asserted “this current model is a theory that itself rests on a particular formal-legal conception of authority that is, unfortunately, inappropriate in the context of post-civil war state” (33). 75 Ibid., 31. 76 Ibid. 73  27  factors are also crucial in supporting the creation of legitimate governments in war-torn states. This dissertation seeks to address this critical debate with detailed empirical analysis of case studies.  How Do the Key Factors Influence Legitimacy? In this section, I will examine each key factor, identifying key debates on their significance and their variation in different peacebuilding activities, weighing in with my own arguments.  Role of the UN Although the majority of international peacebuilding operations since the end of the Cold War have been authorized by the UN Security Council, there are substantial differences in the roles of the UN—or the authority of the UN—in the operations. For example, the UN has had only a marginal role in Iraq; in the first year of U.S. occupation in Iraq, the UN played a role only in humanitarian and economic assistance but had no substantial role in political missions.77 In Afghanistan, since the U.S. attack against the Taliban government in 2001, the role of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has been mainly to give the new Afghan authority political and economic advice.78 UNAMA basically has not played any role in commanding international military operations, which have been commanded by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by the U.S. forces and are aimed at stabilizing the country.79 The United States has also been commanding another military operation in Afghanistan called  77  Larry Diamond, a senior advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority led by Bremer, also argues, “Washington—and Bremer in Baghdad—proved unwilling to surrender any significant measure of control to the UN” (Diamond 2004, 46). The UN’s marginal role in the peacebuilding process in Iraq was also stressed by Kieran Prendergast, the Under Secretary-General on Political Affairs at that time (Author’s interview with Kieran Prendergast on 26 May 2006). 78 UN Security Council Resolution 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, etc. 79 Paris 2004, 226; UN Security Council Resolution 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, regarding the authorization of ISAF by the UN Security Council. As I will articulate in detail in Chapter 4, ISAF was consist of international forces dispatched by more than 40 states, but the major forces are U.S. forces, and the commander of ISAF is the commander of American forces in Afghanistan.  28  “Operation Enduring Freedom” that aims to destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.80 In contrast, the UN has had full authority in many other peacebuilding operations, for instance in Timor-Leste (East Timor), Kosovo, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Sierra Leone. In these operations, the UN commanded both international military operations (UN peacekeeping operations) and political and civilian activities under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in the transitional period from military conflicts to the creation of new governments. In addition to the peacekeeping operations, UN international civilian police assumed “full responsibility for law enforcement.”81 The question is whether or not these differences in the roles of the UN make a substantial impact on motivating the compliance of the local populace and leaders with the results of key political programs—such as elections, constitutions, and disarmament of local militant groups—and establishing legitimate governments in the long run. Regarding this question, there has been a debate on whether UN roles have a significant impact on the perception of the local people in accepting international actors’ involvement and complying with new rules. On the one hand, a certain number of researchers argue that the UN enjoys higher legitimacy in peacebuilding enterprises. Pei argued in 2003 that because the UN enjoys higher legitimacy than the United States in the eyes of local populace, it would be better for the United States to ask the UN to play a central role in rebuilding Iraq.82 Richard Caplan concurs: “The legitimacy that an international  80 81 82  Ibid. Caplan 2005, 46. Pei 2003.  29  organization can confer on a transitional administration…may have implications for the ease of attracting donor and other external (especially regional) support and building consent for the operation within the territory.”83 The RAND Corporation examined 16 nation-building cases in the aftermath of conflicts since World War II and concluded that “two-thirds of UN nation-building operations can be categorized as successful at this time, compared with half of such U.S. operations.”84 The RAND study contends further that “The United Nations provides the most suitable institutional framework for most nation-building missions, one with a comparatively low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degree of international legitimacy.”85 Regarding nation-building in Iraq, Diamond became convinced that “Washington’s legitimacy deficit [in the eyes of Iraqis] was so huge that it should have tried….to give the UN overall or co-equal responsibility with the CPA (Coalitional Provincial Authority) for administering postwar Iraq.”86 These scholars claim that the United Nations and its international legitimacy can ease the local populace’s suspicion and enhance compliance with the rules and procedures of key political events in peacebuilding processes. One of my chief contributions in this research is to specify the precise mechanisms by which the domestic legitimacy can be established through repeated compliance, assisted by international legitimacy. Notable IR scholars, on the other hand, contend that the “UN flag” does not have any impact on the compliance of the local populace. As discussed, Lake argues that the perception of international actors largely depends on restoring security and social order and “not by gaining the approval of the United 83  Caplan 2005, 4. RAND News Release 2005, “RAND Study Says UN Nation Building Record Compares Favorably with the U.S. in Some Respects.” Accessed by http://www.rand.org/news/press/2005/02/18.html 85 Dobbins et al. 2005, xxxvii. 86 Diamond 2004, 47. 84  30  Nations, as is now believed.”87 In the context of Iraq, Chandler claims that “it is unlikely that greater UN involvement would make much difference to the people of Iraq,” as the experience of the UN-led nation building in Bosnia suggests.88 James Fearon and David Laitin take a more positive position toward the role of the UN in post-conflict reconstruction, as they claim that the UN post-conflict activities in many areas, such as Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Cambodia, were largely viewed as successful missions. However, they also propose that the UN should not play a central role in post-conflict operations, mainly because the UN dual command structure is ill-suited to be the leading actor for the crisis management that is required for state-building operations.89 Thus, they assert that it should be the regional or major powers with particular national security or economic interests in a collapsed state that play a leading role in a state-building mission.90 This is the way to increase the resource and military capabilities of international trusteeship because “powerful states are most easily recruited as lead agents for peacekeeping/state-building operations when the results are linked to their security interests.”91 This assertion clearly suggests that it is the level of force and resources (again, “guns and money”) that determines the success or failure of state building in war-torn states. Thus, Fearon and Laitin conclude that regional powers having national interests in host states should play a central role in committing peacebuilding operations, and there is no need for international organizations (mainly the UN) to play a role in order to gain the acceptance of the local populace and political actors. In short, the legitimacy of the 87 88 89 90 91  Lake 2007, 3. Chandler 2004, 578. Fearon and Laitin 2004, 31. Ibid., 28. Ibid.  31  UN (or IOs in general) does not matter. Comparative Advantage of the UN My argument in this dissertation is that the United Nations has a comparative advantage in creating compliance with key political programs in the peacebuilding process because the United Nations has an advantage in providing a sense of fairness and impartiality, which is critical in inducing compliance in war-torn states. In order to explain the crucial role of the credibility of fairness and impartiality in motivating compliance, this dissertation challenges accounts of compliance based solely on self-interested calculation. Such accounts miss an important social component, the factor emphasized by Adam Przeworski, who contends that democratic institutions must be “fair” and “effective” for people to accept the results of elections repeatedly, even based on self-interest calculation.92 It is very telling that even for Przeworski, who otherwise suggests that the self-interest mechanism—not legitimacy—is sufficient in explaining compliance with democratic rules (including the results of elections), the fairness of democratic institutions becomes the key condition to make compliance happen. Otherwise, political factions might reject the results of lost elections because they cannot foresee the long-term benefit of compliance. Przeworski argues, “Political forces comply with present defeats because they believe that the institutional framework that organizes the democratic competition will permit them to advance their interest in the future.”93 Additionally, he contends that the fairness of democratic institutions also gives losing political parties the sense of a guarantee for their political rights until the next election: “Democracy does offer one 92 93  Przeworski 1991, 33. Ibid., 19.  32  fundamental value that for many groups may be sufficient to prefer it to all alternatives: security from arbitrary violence.”94 It is intuitive that if defeated political factions perceive that their political rights might be destroyed by the new government and they might be arrested, it will be difficult for them to accept the results of lost elections. Thus, the sense of fairness or impartiality is critical in assuring the possibility of their winning elections next time, as well as protecting their political rights even if they lost past elections. I argue that this sense of fairness or impartiality is something that international peacebuilders are sometimes able, and often expected, to bring to the process of peacebuilding because domestic authorities have extreme difficulties in obtaining the credibility of this fairness or impartiality. This dissertation argues that international organizations, especially the United Nations, have a significant comparative advantage in bringing this sense of fairness or impartiality to the process of peacebuilding, compared with other international actors, notably individual states such as the United States. The important mechanism to understand here is that the UN flag might not induce the direct compliance of local people in war-torn states to the UN as such; for example, regarding compliance with the results of elections, people might not think, “Oh, there is the UN flag; thus, I should accept the results of elections as a moral obligation to the United Nations.” However, people tend to see the elections as more fair and impartial when they realize that the UN is actively involved and acting as a credible third party, and the UN has a comparative credibility advantage over intervening states. I examine the same phenomena of the credibility of the UN as an impartial third party with respect to the disarmament of local 94  Przeworski 1991, 31. Emphasis added.  33  militant groups or warlords. This comparative advantage of the IOs—especially of the United Nations—has important theoretical implications for how international legitimacy can be linked with domestic legitimacy in war-torn states. UN missions, which have international legitimacy conferred by UN Security Council resolutions, tend to have a comparative advantage in creating a sense of fairness and impartiality in the process of creating democratic governments in war-torn states, and this credibility could be crucial in motivating the compliance of local populaces and leaders with key political programs and in creating democratic legitimate governments in the long run. In short, international legitimacy does matter in creating local legitimacy—not necessarily the direct compliance of local people because they perceive the international legitimacy as a motive for compliance, but the comparative advantage that the UN often has because of its credibility as an impartial third party. This provides a potential explanation of how international legitimacy can help build legitimate democratic government in war-torn states; namely, specifying the linkage between international legitimacy and domestic legitimacy. This argument and logic also entails the flipside of the coin: If the UN loses its credibility as an impartial and fair third party, it becomes extremely difficult for the UN to play a positive role in inducing compliance; I examine these dynamics in the chapters that follow. No matter how many times the UN obtains UN Security Council resolutions, which justify the role of the UN and confer international legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, the UN would have difficulty inducing the compliance of local people and leaders once it loses its local credibility as being impartial and fair.  34  Inclusiveness of Domestic Factions in the New Government In every peacebuilding operation, the degree to which the different local groups should be included in the political process—in other words, how broadly the different factions can participate in creating new governments—is one of the most difficult decisions for peacebuilders; many international officials who experienced peacebuilding activities share the view that the decision of this inclusiveness is critical for establishing new legitimate governments. In Afghanistan, the Taliban has been excluded from the peace process since 2001 when the Bonn agreement was established to create the road map for rebuilding Afghanistan after the U.S. attacked the Taliban regime.95 In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was the occupational power led by the United States, excluded Ba’ath Party members and the Iraq National Army, as well as many Sunni political factions, from the political process. The CPA saw those elements as loyal to Saddam Hussein and believed there was no need to include them in creating a new Iraqi state.96 On the other hand, there have been a substantial number of peacebuilding missions that attempted to include almost all political and military factions in the process of creating new governments, such as efforts in Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, and Sudan (South-North Agreement). Theoretically, the argument about inclusiveness is consistent with “input legitimacy” as emphasized by Keohane and Tyler. Treating the people with dignity, respect, and fairness is a critical source of creating legitimacy in the eyes of local people, and the exclusion of important factions from the political process can be a serious impediment to creating domestic legitimacy because the factions excluded from the political process would perceive that they were treated unequally, disrespected, and 95  Interview with Lakhdar Brahimi, the former SRSG of the Afghan UN mission from 2001 to 2004, in the Toronto Star: “Expert Advice on Afghanistan,” 14 September 2006. 96 See the detail in the section on Iraq in Chapter 5.  35  ignored. On the other hand, there are notable theories that suggest that it is better to exclude particular types of political and military factions. Stephen Stedman presents one of the most comprehensive studies about what he calls the “spoilers problem” in the peace process. Spoilers are political groups who attempt to undermine the peace agreement or peace process, and Stedman defines three different types of spoilers: “limited spoilers” who have limited goals, “total spoilers” who pursue total power and exclusive recognition of authority, and “the greedy spoiler” who lies between the limited spoiler and the total spoiler and “hold goals that expand or contract based on calculations of cost and risk.”97 A key argument by Stedman is that international actors who want to defend the peace process need to make a “correct diagnosis of spoiler type” and choose an “appropriate strategy.”98 With limited spoilers, an international custodian should use an “inducement strategy” that induces the spoiler to fulfill its obligations by meeting the spoiler’s demands.99 With greedy spoilers, an international custodian should adopt the “strategy of socialization,” which uses a “material component” that supplies the carrots and sticks to reward and punish the spoilers and encourage them to change their behaviors to adhere to established norms.100 The most controversial issue on managing spoilers may be the strategy of dealing with total spoilers. Stedman asserts, “Total spoilers cannot be accommodated in a peace settlement; they must be  97  Stedman 1997, 10-11. Ibid., 14. 99 Ibid., 12. 100 Ibid., 15. 98  36  defeated.”101 Because the objectives of the total spoilers cannot be changed, strategies are either the use of force or the “departing train strategy,” which aims to leave them behind the peace process and delegitimize them.102 According to Stedman, the only case in which the objectives of total spoilers can be changed is when the leaderships of total spoilers are replaced or altered. 103 That is a clear indication by Stedman that coercive use of force is an effective solution to deal with total spoilers. In short, international actors (custodians) should use force and the “departing train strategy,” which excludes the spoilers from the peace process. This theory by Stedman has very clear-cut policy implications, which can be easily applied to current policies of peacebuilders and other international forces trying to establish a new government in the aftermath of war.104 However, I propose some provisos to his approach below which are important to consider. Avoiding Premature Diagnosis I argue in this dissertation that it is crucial for peacebuilders to make their best effort to include different factions as broadly as possible, especially in the initial phase of the peacebuilding process, without making prejudgments about who is reconcilable or not—in other words, who are the total spoilers. The reason is that once the peacebuilders (both international and domestic) define which groups are not reconcilable and need to be militarily attacked as “total spoilers” without making any efforts to include 101  Ibid., 14. Ibid., 11. 103 Ibid. 104 For example, in terms of Afghan peacebuilding, Seth G. Jones presented policy recommendations in 2008 that urged extending the Afghan governance into rural areas; increasing the security forces of both the Afghan government and the international actors, mainly the U.S.; and capturing or killing jihadists who are hidden in Pakistan, while rejecting the possible reconciliation or political settlement with the Taliban because he made his diagnosis that the leaderships of the Taliban “are strongly motivated by the ideology” (Jones 2008). A more detailed discussion will be elaborated in Chapter 4. 102  37  them into the new political framework, there is a substantial risk that premature or inadequate diagnosis can exclude some reconcilable elements and push them to become decisive insurgents who start fighting against peacebuilders for their own survival. These premature or inadequate diagnoses in the initial phrase of the peacebuilding will substantially endanger the creation of legitimate governments, which can then precipitate a relapse into conflict. The central argument in this dissertation is that the peacebuilders – both international and domestic – need to make every effort to include all major actors who fought before and have the possibility to continue the war in the future (thus are potential spoilers) as long as those actors (or military groups) show their determination to comply with peace agreements without using violent methods. In other words, the promise to renounce violence, at least after agreeing on peace accords, is the crucial criteria. It is vital for peacebuilders not to judge the characters of those potential enemies without talking with them, but to seriously negotiate with those actors and groups without pre-judgment. If some actors continue to reject the invitation to participate in peace talks and keep using violent methods against any attempts to create peace, the peacebuilders who constitute the majority of domestic political factions and international actors might need to fight against those groups. But it is critical for peacebuilders to make the attempt to invite all such factions to the process, at least at first. This contention might be striking especially for those who think that some certain groups should be excluded from the peace process due to their actions during war (for instance, some groups who committed war crimes.) While it is important for peacebuilders to create some reconciliation process (for example, trust and reconciliation committees created in South Africa and East Timor) to make offenders 38  confess their sins and desire to live together in the future, it is vital for peacebuilders, especially in the initial process of peacebuilding, to focus on creating peace by inviting political and military factions to participate in new political structures as broadly as possible. However, it is recognized that there may be cases when inviting those who committed atrocities may, in fact, delegitimize a peacebuilding process in the eyes of other critical participants. Thus, the positive legitimizing impact of inclusiveness must be assessed against the potential negative effects on the legitimacy of the process of involving those who, for example, committed genocide during the conflict. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, my case studies strongly support this general contention of the importance of inclusiveness. The cases such as Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate how peacebuilders, prominently the United States in those cases, made a prejudgment about the motives of the opponents (the Taliban in Afghanistan and Sunni insurgents in Iraq), shut down the possibility of reconciliation with those opponents in the early stages of peacebuilding, and hugely suffered from insurgency in the later stages. On the other hand, the cases such as Sierra Leone and East Timor show how the effort to include the insurgent groups as broadly as possible (even some insurgents such as the Revolutionary Unitary Front [RUF] in Sierra Leone, which was notorious for using child soldiers and committing mass killings) was crucial in inducing political opponents to participate in a new political structure and create a legitimate government in the long run.105  It is also important to remember that in Cambodia, even the Khmer Rouge was invited to participate in the peace process. After the Khmer Rouge decided to renounce violence in the late 1990s, the Cambodian government decided to forgive most of the followers of Pol Pot and allow them to participate in the political and economic reconstruction of the country. Only four leaders of the Khmer Rouge are currently being prosecuted by the international court for Cambodia. This was the critical reason why the Cambodian peacebuilding achieved some success in making sustainable peace in the 2000s (Author’s interview with Mr. Juro Chikaraishi, who was the representative of JICA office in Cambodia). 105  39  These observations indicate a potential pitfall in the application of Stedman’s theory. Peacebuilders have a substantial risk of making premature or inadequate diagnoses about the character of opposition when they do not make any serious efforts to include them in the political process—especially in the initial phase of the peacebuilding—by prejudging that opponents are total spoilers. The criticality of inclusiveness is one of the central arguments in this dissertation in establishing legitimate governments in post-conflict states.106  Resource Distribution (Provision of Peace Dividends) There seems to be a shared understanding by many practitioners as well as scholars that it is critical for peacebuilders in the process of creating legitimacy to achieve efficient resource distribution—or the provision of peace dividends—in improving people’s daily living conditions, such as the provision of water, electricity, medical service, and roads. As Salvatore Lombardo, the country director of UNHCR in Afghanistan in 2008, bluntly asserted, “Legitimacy comes from electricity, not from elections in this fragile state!”107 Emphasis on the provision of social services and economic development to improve basic living  106  Although the issue might be beyond the scope of this dissertation, this proposition of “inclusiveness” certainly is relevant for the question of transitional justice issue in peacebuilding. My temporary position is that peacebuilders should focus on establishing peace by having inclusive polity as broadly as possible, then after peace and stability are established, they might start some transitional justice (not necessarily criminal prosecutions) to advance the reconciliation and satisfy the request for justice between former enemies, as happened in Serra Leone and Cambodia. This issue is also a hot debate in IR academic discourses. For instance, Kathryn Sikkink’s Justice Cascade addressed the sharp debate between scholars who insist that “trials for human rights violations were politically untenable and likely to undermine new democracy” and the proponents who believe that justice for human rights violations will not increase the likelihood of civil wars and future human rights violations. In her book, Sikkink investigated justice trials for human rights violations in Latin America and concludes that “holding prosecutions has not weakened democracy nor led to an increase in violations or conflict in the region” (Sikkink 2011, 26). However, she also admitted that “Seventeen Latin American countries experienced some form of internal or international conflict in the period of 1970-2008. In most cases, judicial proceedings followed rather than preceded violence…We can’t make any causal claims that the rise in prosecutions leads to the decline in conflict; indeed, it could be the other way around, that the decline in conflicts has made it easier for countries to hold human rights prosecutions” (Ibid, 153-154. Emphasis added). This observation seems to be consistent with my position that the focus of establishing peace by including factions as much as possible in the initial phase is crucial, and then to start designing how to deal with justice issues (including truth and reconciliation committees conducted in some prominent cases such as South Africa and Timor-Leste after the conflicts decreased or stopped). 107 Author’s interview with Mr. Lombardo, Country Director of UNHCR in Afghanistan on 20 February 2008.  40  conditions in creating legitimacy for peacebuilders is perfectly matched with the theory of “output legitimacy”; that is, to pull voluntary compliance from people when authorities can satisfy their needs, as asserted by Kelman.108 Hurrell also emphasizes that whether or not authorities can “provide effective solutions to shared problems” is a “crucial aspect” of output legitimacy.109 With regard to the relationship between economic development and sustaining peace, Paul Collier and others argue that “if a country is in economic decline… and has a low per capita income, it is at high risk of civil war” because “low and declining incomes….create a pool of impoverished and disaffected young men who can be cheaply recruited by ‘entrepreneurs of violence.’”110 Thus, Collier asserts, in the context of peacebuilding, “What is most likely required is a coordination of external military peacekeeping for the first few years with a buildup of large aid programs…An integrated approach involving external military support, aid, and policy reform could…take post-conflict countries well out of the zone of high risk.”111 Existing accounts explaining the building of legitimacy in post-conflict states share the emphasis that creating wealth and material services for people is crucial in establishing legitimacy in war-torn states. Lake argues, “Authority becomes more robust—more legitimate—as subordinates acquire more assets that are dependent on that hierarchy.”112 In general, there is consensus that the improvement of economic lives or social services for people (or the ruled) is crucial in building the legitimacy of the new governments. 108 109 110 111 112  Kelman 2001, 57. Hurrell 2005, 22. Collier, Elliot, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, and Sambanis, 2003, 4-5. Ibid., 8. Lake 2008, 23.  41  Inclusiveness Matters Even for Resource Distribution Although my argument basically shares the same view as above, I argue that there is one important additional implication with regard to this resource distribution. This is related to the second key factor of motivating compliance, the “inclusiveness” of peacebuilding. If social and economic development in peacebuilding states is largely biased to certain ethnicities or regions, the frustration of people in underdeveloped ethnicities or regions within a state may push those people to start an insurgency and attack the new governments and international peacebuilders as well. The theory of “horizontal inequalities” proposed by Frances Stewart is very consistent with this proposition. Stewart states that “horizontal inequalities are inequalities between culturally defined groups or groups with shared identities…these identities may be formed by religion, ethnic ties or racial affiliations, or other salient factors which bind groups of people together.”113 And with regard to the relationship between horizontal inequalities and military conflicts, she contends that “conflict is more likely where there are significant political or economic horizontal inequalities or both.”114 Based on case studies in three regions of the world—West Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America—as well as statistical analysis covering 61 nations, Steward concludes in 2009 that when countries have both political inequalities (such as representation in governments) and economic inequalities (such as income levels and access to job opportunities), there is increased likelihood of conflicts in those states because those groups feel that they are discriminated against both politically and economically.115 In short, her research suggests that economic and political inequalities among different ethnic groups will increase the likelihood of 113 114 115  Stewart et al 2009, 12-13. Ibid., 18. Ibid., 18-19.  42  internal conflict, then possible civil war. And my case studies strongly support this argument.116 In sum, I argue that there is a conjunction of key factors for compliance/noncompliance behaviors. Even if overall income in a host state increases, there is a substantial risk of eroding or damaging the legitimacy of the new government if the material benefits are perceived to be biased to certain ethnicities or regions; those biases push certain people to feel excluded from the peacebuilding process. Thus, “inclusiveness” is critical not only in designing political structures (how to make governments) but also in providing economic and social benefits to local people in host states. When the material benefits and social services are perceived to be enjoyed by larger parts of societies, regions, and ethnicities, they can strengthen repeated compliance and build legitimacy in more robust and steady ways.  Level of Force Similar to the factor of “resource distribution,” the level of force by peacebuilders (both international and domestic) is thought to be an important factor to motivate compliance of key domestic actors in peacebuilding states. There is probably no disagreement that when no credible and legitimate governments exist in war-torn states, it is inevitable for both domestic and international peacebuilders to use some level of force in inducing repeated compliance, then create legitimate governments in the long run. The question is what level of force is required and what kinds of force are accepted by local people and local political leaders.  116  For instance, in Afghanistan, there is a substantial gap between the Northern and Western regions (where mainly Tajik and Uzbek live) and the Southern and Eastern regions (where mainly Pashtun live) with regard to both economic and security conditions. Deteriorating living standards continue to push Pashtun people in the Southern and Eastern regions to join the insurgency, which makes the implementation of development and assistance projects more difficult. This vicious circle—which I call “the insecurity and underdevelopment trap”—is the crucial phenomenon in understanding sluggish or reversing peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan (See the detail in Chapter 4). A majority of Sunni people in Iraq also suffered from the same phenomenon, especially in the first few years when the Bush administration judged the Sunni to be a major enemy of rebuilding Iraq (See the detail in Chapter 5).  43  James Quinlivan contended that the number of troops required for establishing an environment orderly enough that most routine civil functions could be conducted “is determined by the size of population.”117 And he suggests from historical analysis that although it is possible to create peace and stability in some occupied states with the external military level of one to four soldiers per one thousand inhabitants (as seen in the Cambodia peacekeeping operations, where the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia had a force ratio of about 2.2 per thousand population), it requires a force ratio of 10 to 20 per thousand population in the states that are combating an insurgency (such as the British campaign that fought against the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland).118 The historical analysis by Quinlivan has a substantial impact on the arguments for force requirements in stabilizing war-torn states. Based on the analysis by Quinlivan, the RAND corporation, an American think tank, estimated in 2003 that the United States needed to have 20 soldiers per thousand population to stabilize Iraq after the 2003 attack by the United States, which meant 500,000 troops on the ground in Iraq.119 Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) in Iraq, contended in retrospect that he did not possess enough U.S. forces to stabilize Iraq in the initial phase of nation building, as the level of U.S. forces was only 130,000 soldiers in Iraq after the occupation.120 In Afghanistan, Seth Jones argued that the level of international forces for stabilizing Afghanistan was too low because the 20,000 U.S. forces and 10,000 NATO forces in Afghanistan in 2005 was “a ratio of only one soldier per  117 118 119 120  Quinlivan 1995. Ibid. Bremer 2006, 10. Ibid.  44  1,000 inhabitants.”121 Who Dispatches Forces Matters for Local Acceptance The analysis by Quinlivan is very important and insightful, especially as his main objective was to warn policymakers that certain levels of external force are actually required in stabilizing states and that “A number of states have a population so large that they are simply not candidates for stabilization by external forces.”122 However, his argument misses one important aspect; that is, who conducts these operations does matter in terms of their acceptance by the local people and local political leaders in peacebuilding states.123 I argue that while it is certain that the peacebuilders need to have some level of force, there seems to be significant comparative advantages for international forces with the authority of IOs—especially of the United Nations—in terms of acceptance by local people compared with other international forces, including the force of individual states such as the United States, in the specific context of peacebuilding.124 This contention may be quite striking, considering the often highly charged perception by both policymakers and scholars that UN peacekeeping is seriously flawed.125 For instance, Maurits Jochems, the Dutch ambassador and a civil representative of NATO in Afghanistan in 2008, emphasized that “For  121  Jones 2008, 24. Quinlivan 1995. 123 Virginia Page Fortna also conducted a statistical analysis about the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Although she analyzed the different types of peacekeeping and their effects (e.g., effects of traditional peacekeeping, those of observer missions, multidimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement on sustaining peace), she did not examine the effects of the difference between UN peacekeepers and peacekeeping conducted by other organizations, including some individual states such as the United States (Fortna 2004). 124 The argument is specifically about peacebuilding activities, as distinct from “peace enforcement operations” for which Katharina Coleman examines the legitimacy of international organizations. More discussion will follow in the following section in this Chapter. 125 From an academic point of view, for example, Stephen Schwartz contends that “the United States must not permit the U.N., with its terrible record in the Balkans, among the Palestinians, in Africa, in Cambodia, and elsewhere, to inflict its incompetence and neuroses on the people of Iraq” in the context of who should play a central role in rebuilding Iraq (Schwartz 2003). 122  45  Dutch MoD (Ministry of Defense), and it is the same for American MoD, British MoD, and quite a few other serious military players, there is no way that they will put their major forces into the command of the UN. Why? Because the UN militarily is not efficient and reliable.”126 Because of the UN’s record, especially in the genocide in Srebrenica in Bosnia, “the Dutch Ministry of Defense will never again allow the UN military to lead.”127 My counterargument is that there is a conjunction of key factors—in this case, between the roles of the IOs (mainly the UN) and the level of force—in motivating compliance, then building legitimacy. Given the better record of peace-building success by the UN over the US documented earlier, this dissertation sought to investigate whether it is the comparative advantage of IOs, especially of the UN, that appears significant in gaining the acceptance of local people for peacekeeping operations, which in turn is almost indispensable for successful post-conflict reconstruction. To preview the findings, this comparative advantage of the UN is a consistent empirical finding in my case studies, including in opinion surveys in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Timor-Leste, and Sierra Leone. At the same time, my argument also needs to clarify the possible different approaches for various activities employed to establish peace. For example, there might be a difference between peacebuilding and “peace enforcement” (which is international intervention to stop civil conflict, atrocity, and violence) with regard to domestic legitimacy in the eyes of the local audience. Although IR scholars have conducted intensive discussions about when the use of force can be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the international community, there are not so many theoretical arguments concerning under what conditions the use of force 126 127  Author’s interview with Maurits Jochems, Ambassador and NATO Senior Civilian Representative, on 19 June 2008. Ibid.  46  by international actors can be seen as legitimate by domestic audiences in host states. Notably, Katharina Coleman makes her argument on this question in the specific context of “peace enforcement.” She argues that the reason why states launch peace enforcement operations through international organizations is that these states are seeking international legitimacy in the eyes of the international community: “The intervening state is likely to perceive the international community of states as its most immediately crucial legitimacy audience at the global level.”128 But in terms of the legitimacy in the eyes of local people, she argues, “Public opinion in the host state is more likely to be swayed by the conduct and effectiveness of peace enforcement than by international assessment of the legitimacy of their deployment.”129 To some extent, I agree with her contention because the comparative advantage of the UN forces in terms of impartiality and credibility can be eroded very quickly if the UN forces cannot achieve the expectations of local people in sustaining peace and stability in the host state.130 It is also important to recognize that her arguments are specific to the context of international peace enforcement operations, not peacebuilding activities. My argument is that in peacebuilding operations, international legitimacy is more significant for acceptance by local audiences, probably because peacebuilding often requires much longer periods of commitment by the international force, compared with peace enforcement operations. Peacebuilding operations require local people and leaders to make repeated compliance with different political programs, such as conducting elections, creating constitutions, and disarming warlords. Thus,  128  Ibid., 26. Ibid., 40. 130 Although it was not UN forces who committed to the program called “Disbandment of Illegal Armed Group” in Afghanistan, the UN agencies who failed to deliver the programs which they promised after the disarmament hugely discredited not only local government officials but also UN agencies engaging in the program, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. The same situation easily occurs when the UN peacekeepers cannot achieve what they promise to people in the host state. 129  47  international legitimacy would play an important role in creating a perception of fairness and impartiality, which are very crucial for the compliance of local people with those political programs. On the other hand, peace enforcement operations tend to complete their missions in a relatively short period of time compared with peacebuilding operations, and they do not require local people to comply with a series of different types of the political programs. That may be a reason why the role of international legitimacy is more marginal for local people in the context of “peace enforcement” operations. Of course, my research does not suggest that UN peacekeeping operations can automatically achieve successful outcomes in creating legitimate democratic governments in the aftermath of wars. It is only a comparative advantage that the UN has, and its credibility can be eroded very quickly when it fails in establishing sustainable peace; thus, it requires political and economic inclusiveness, fair resource distribution, and a certain level of force, as I discussed. However, it is important for world policymakers to recognize the function and the comparative advantage of the United Nations in different phases of international interventions, for different audiences, and for different purposes.  From Repeated Compliance to Domestic Legitimate Government My account of peacebuilding assumes that the repeated compliance of local actors with critical political events is conducive to creating legitimate democratic governments. I contend that compliance with three political programs are the most critical for my analysis: (1) compliance with the results of elections in choosing a national leader (a president, in many cases) and the members of parliament; (2) compliance with a new constitution that defines the rules of law with which every member of the populace 48  is obligated to comply; and (3) compliance with the disarmament of numerous military factions (warlords, in many states), which enables the new government to obtain concentrated coercive powers.131 Those three developments are consistent with the critical procedures of Weber’s “democratic legitimacy,” as the plebiscite becomes the central method to form the democratic government.132 Compliance with the new constitution is also crucial for establishing a legitimate government, when one of the critical challenges of many new states is how to make coherent rules for the entire populace while different factions maintain their own rules, as Joel Migdal argued.133 The disarmament of military factions is also critical in enabling the central government to monopolize coercive powers. Brian Job explicitly contends, “The insecurity dilemmas of Third World states are basically unresolvable as long as the various factions within society are able to compete effectively as security providers.”134 One of the core arguments in this dissertation is that it is difficult to assume that the effective policies of peacebuilders can create legitimate governments in a very short time frame; it requires a number of recurrences of compliance with key political programs, such as accepting the results of elections, complying with the contents of constitutions, and disarming military factions. The more compliance such actors repeat with these key political procedures—no matter how and why they comply 131  Knight argues that “in the most general terms, peace building may be conceived as a two-fold process that involves both deconstructing violence and constructing, or reconstructing, peace…The instruments required for constructing peace (building confidence between formerly warring factions) are different from those required for deconstructing violence (disarmament, demobilization, and the demilitarization of society, economy, and polity). UN peace building aims to remove institutions, norms and practices that nurture conflict while simultaneously helping to build or rebuild those required in a society that supports tolerance, stability, socio-economic development, and enduring peace.” (Knight 2005, 537, emphases are original). 132 Although there may be theoretical arguments that democracies are not suited to creating legitimate governments in war-torn states, it has become normatively difficult for the international community to assist in the creation of authoritative regimes since the end of the Cold War. Every state-building or peacebuilding effort since the end of the Cold War has been conducted with the aim of creating democratic governments (Paris 2004.). 133 Migdal argues, in his book Strong Societies and Weak States, that “there are other societies, where social organizations have been in conflict with one another in proposing different rules of the game…in reality, the conflict is over who had the right and ability to make rules in that society” (Migdal 1988, 29-30). 134 Job 1991, 22.  49  with them in the first place—the more their government becomes legitimate in the eyes of local people in the long run, as “democracy becomes the only game in town,” as Linz and Stephan assert in their theory about the consolidation of democracies.135 Different theoretical insights also indicate that legitimate government can be established by the repeated or iterated compliance with key political procedures.136 On the other hand, it is easily assumed that repeated noncompliance with key political events, using violent methods against a new authority, would erode domestic legitimacy, collapse new governments, and cause relapse into conflict.  Methodology: Detailed Case Studies in Peacebuilding States In order to assess my argument about how legitimate democratic governments are created or eroded in peacebuilding, I conducted fieldwork for a detailed case study in Afghanistan as a critical case for my investigation. There are two reasons that I categorize Afghanistan as a critical case. First, the UN’s role in Afghanistan peacebuilding since 2011 has been substantial in supporting the implementation of political programs such as the disarmament of warlords and the conduct of elections. However, the role of the UN in commanding international forces has been nonexistent as the UN has not commanded any military exercises. Thus, it is possible to examine the how the involvement of the UN enhanced or damaged compliance with political programs, as well as to investigate how the non-role of the UN in military exercises can enhance or damage the international efforts in stabilizing the country. Second, Afghan peacebuilding excluded certain political wings, notably the Taliban, from the political process in 135  Linz and Stephan 1996, 5. Reus-Smit emphasizes the importance of recurrent compliance to strengthen legitimacy (Rues-Smit 2007), while Przeworski also points out that repeated compliance makes democracy the only game in town (Przeworski 1991, 26). 136  50  the first four years of peacebuilding; then it gradually attempted to include some parts of the Taliban with different conditions at different times. In that sense, it is possible to study the process of how these key factors have impacted the compliance and noncompliance behaviors with key political programs, including the acceptance of a new constitution and disarmament. As my central argument is that not only coercion and resource distribution but also the roles of the UN as a credible third party and inclusiveness of new governments are crucial in establishing legitimate governments in war-torn states, the Afghan case is very suitable to investigate two critical factors in my dissertation: the role of the UN (mainly discussed in Chapter 3) and inclusiveness of the new government (mainly discussed in Chapter 4). In addition to conducting a detailed case study to examine the impact of key factors on compliance/noncompliance behaviors in Afghanistan, the dissertation also attempts to examine in more concise fashion three other cases (Chapter 5) to assess whether the same trends can be found in different peacebuilding cases. The first complimentary case is Iraq, where the UN played a very marginal role in the first year of peacebuilding in 2003 but gradually gained importance, especially in establishing a new interim government and conducting national elections after the United States failed in establishing the interim government in 2004. Thus, it is possible to investigate the impact of the UN’s role on compliance at different times under different authorities of the UN. In terms of inclusiveness, the United States had very contrasting policies on political inclusiveness with Sunni insurgents before and after 2007; thus, it is feasible to investigate the impact of this crucial policy change on the overall security and the construction of a legitimate government in Iraq. The second complimentary case is Sierra Leone, where the UN played a central role in 51  peacekeeping together with British forces and took a very inclusive approach to former adversaries, including notorious insurgents such as the Revolutionary Unitary Front (RUF). This approach in Sierra Leone—inclusion of the most notorious insurgency into a new political structure and prominent roles of the UN in exercising both military operations and political programs—shows a huge contrast with the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq; thus, we can assess whether inclusiveness and the role of the UN mattered or not in creating a legitimate government. The third complimentary case is Timor-Leste, where the UN played a central role in both conducting peacekeeping operations and creating a governmental structure and took inclusive approaches throughout the peacebuilding process. This case has additional significance as people in Timor-Leste have experienced both UN peacekeeping forces (1999 to 2005) and International Stabilization Forces led by Australia (2006 - present) deployed and stationed in Timor-Leste; thus, it is possible to assess which forces are perceived as more acceptable in the eyes of local people in Timor-Leste. As a result, those three complimentary cases provide important additional investigations for assessing my arguments in addition to the critical case of Afghanistan, focusing on the dynamic changes of peacebuilding processes in each case. The case studies involved interviews, surveys, and the collection of other data in an attempt to determine the mechanisms that fostered compliance or noncompliance with the key elements of the peacebuilding process. While determining motivations of actors with high levels of confidence is always a fraught enterprise, interviews and surveys provide valuable evidence with which to consider various explanations for dynamics of peace-building. One important methodological perspective for this dissertation is that the research does not aim to 52  identify the numerical portion of the impact of the different key factors on compliance. Rather, it aims to elucidate how the combination of these factors can produce political outcomes, such as compliance or noncompliance with the rules of key political developments—and in the long run, the creation of legitimate democratic governments. Charles Ragin emphasizes that “whenever social scientists examine large-scale change . . . they find that it is usually combinations of conditions that produce change …. Such processes exhibit what John Stuart Mill (1843) called ‘chemical causation.’ The basic idea is that a phenomenon or a change emerges from the intersection of appropriate preconditions.”137 Richard Price and Reus-Smit share this view: When different factors are viewed as mutually constitutive, attempting to measure causal weight as independent variables seems about as fruitful as trying to argue whether a kneecap, hamstring, or lung are more important for a runner competing in marathon. Instead of wrestling with the quantitative connotations of ‘how much’ a norm or institution or ideational structure mattered, constructivist arguments have often taken the form of demonstrating that a given phenomenon was an indispensable/necessary condition for a particular set of practices or events, and placing focus on tracing the process of how it matters.138 Following this approach, my research attempts to elucidate how these four factors matter in pulling compliance from local military and political actors and creating new legitimate governments. My major focus is on how, in addition to the two factors of resource distribution and force levels which the existing accounts also emphasize, the roles of the UN and political and economic inclusiveness matter in inducing compliance and building legitimate governments. 137 138  Ragin 1987, 24. Emphasis added. Price and Reus-Smit 1999, 282. Emphasis in original.  53  Data and Analysis In order to conduct the detailed case study in Afghanistan, I gathered data and information on the behavior of local factions regarding compliance and noncompliance with key political programs. For example, to assess the disarmament of military factions in Afghanistan, I obtained data about the compliance rate of each district in terms of surrendering the weapons possessed by commanders in these districts; that is, the percentage of targeted weapons that have been collected from local commanders. I obtained those data from various officials working for or observing disarmament programs. One useful measure for compliance with the constitution is the extent of insurgencies against both international and domestic peacebuilders, because no constitution allows military factions to conduct military attacks on the government or international actors that are conducting peacebuilding activities. I also collected data about areas that government officials can access without armed guards, as a measure of compliance or noncompliance with the new constitution.139 Although this measure is one of several that could possibly evaluate compliance with the constitution, it is one which can be relatively reliable and give us a clear-cut picture of the compliance of people with the rules established by the new government. One of the critical investigations in this case study is to clarify the motives of local leaders and people in determining the grounds for their compliance or noncompliance with new rules created by new governments. The research attempted to identify why local factions sometimes comply or do not comply with democratic rules and how the perception about international actors influenced their behaviors. Although investigating motives using interviews always faces the risk of unreliable accounts, this just 139  It is striking that in most of the Southern regions of Afghanistan, only 10% or 20% of areas can be accessed by government officials without armed guards. See the detail in Chapter 4.  54  means that this data should be carefully treated and cross-referenced with other sources. To investigate my argument, I also conducted three other concise case studies (Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste) with similar methods where available, including fieldwork in Timor -Leste, though interviews in the former two cases were confined to officials familiar with the operations, rather than fieldwork involving interviews with members of the local communities.140 Because this research is to account for legitimacy construction or erosion in war-torn states, the research attempted to investigate both sides—peacebuilders (including domestic and international) and local people and leaders who make decisions on compliance. In other words, the research investigated the “legitimacy claimers”—domestic and international peacebuilders—and the “audience” who judges the legitimacy of these peacebuilders. In terms of investigating peacebuilders, the strong support of Carolyn McAskie, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, as well as of the Japanese Ambassador to the UN, enabled me to obtain the full cooperation of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). For investigating local people and leaders who make decisions on compliance in Afghanistan, UNAMA coordinated trips to local districts with full protection for me and arranged a whole range of meetings and interviews with political and military leaders in 2008; I conducted intensive research in three provinces (Kapisa, Wardak, and Kandahar), which represents a high compliance rate for both disarmament and constitution (Kapisa province), a low compliance rate (Wardak province), and an extremely low or almost 140  These steps of investigation are highly consistent with the suggestion by Hurd for investigating legitimacy: first, identify the “compliance rate”; second, investigate the “reasons given for compliance”; and third, study the “reasons given for noncompliance,” in other words, “the study of excuses?”(Hurd 1999, 390). The approach is also very similar to the research methods proposed by Johnston (Johnston 2001, 510).  55  no compliance rate (Kandahar province). I interviewed many commanders (both those who surrendered weapons and those who refused to surrender them), political leaders (provincial governors and provincial council members), local government officials, disarmament program coordinators, election coordinators, and numerous political stakeholders in these three provinces. I also interviewed key political leaders at the central level, including four key ministers of the Afghan government (see Appendix D for list of interviews). In addition, I collected the results of 260 individual interviews with local people in these three provinces, by using questions that focused on the four key factors I identify in my argument (see Appendix B). There is also considerable primary and secondary data that indicate the perceptions of local people; for example, Environics, collaborating with the CBC and other Canadian media, conducted a comprehensive opinion poll in Afghanistan in 2007, including how many people support a coalition government with the Taliban.141 The Asia Foundation also conducted interviews with 6,000 local Afghan villagers in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, in a whole region of Afghanistan, and produced striking findings of how people in southern Afghanistan perceived that their living conditions had deteriorated, their political freedom was restricted, and their trust for the government continued to decrease.142 The Asia Foundation provided special cooperation with my research and shared comprehensive data that show the results of each question in different regions and provinces. I was able to combine the results of my own interviews and opinion survey with those surveys conducted by other organizations. 141  Environics 2007. Environics Research launched a public opinion survey of the Afghan people in partnership with three national media sponsors—The CBC, The Globe and Mail, and La Presse—and two academic think tanks at the University of Toronto, the Munk Centre for International Studies, and the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. The survey was conducted between September 17 and 24, 2007 with a sample of 1,578 adult Afghans across all 34 of the country’s provinces. 142 The Asia Foundation 2008.  56  Likewise, in complimentary case studies, I also conducted an opinion poll with 300 local people in Timor-Leste in three different districts (Eastern district, Western district, and the capital; see Appendix C) and conducted interviews with key political players, including several former prime ministers and current ministers in Timor-Leste. With regard to Iraq and Sierra Leone, I conducted interviews with some key political figures and international practitioners who engaged in those peacebuilding efforts and utilized secondary documents. I now turn to the results of this original data collection in the case studies.  57  3  Compliance and Noncompliance with Disbanding Illegal  Armed Groups Background of Afghanistan: History of Fighting against Foreign Troops Afghanistan has a history of fighting against foreign troops. It was in the 18th century that Afghanistan established a dynasty that was sandwiched by the Middle East, Central Asia, and India.143 And in the midst of the so-called “Great Game” in 19th century, Afghanistan continued to face foreign attempts to control its soil. The first invasion was conducted by the United Kingdom (UK) in 1839; the UK decided to invade Afghanistan to stop the influence of Russia, which had been trying to control its northern part.144 In 1840, the UK succeeded in invading and occupying the country, and then the Afghan tribes and military launched a series of spectacular attacks against the UK forces in the fall of 1841 and compelled the UK forces to withdraw from the country at the end of 1842; the UK lost more than 20,000 men, the biggest loss of the UK’s 19th-century military occupations.145 The second Anglo-Afghan war was initiated in 1878; the UK decided to invade Afghanistan when Afghanistan rejected the UK’s demand to establish an Afghan embassy, which was an attempt to stop the Russian ambition to make a special treaty with Afghanistan to exclude the influence of the UK.146 But again, after a relatively easy occupation of one year, the UK forces were defeated by the Afghan  143 144 145 146  Watanabe 2003, 40. Ibid., 60. Ibid., 60-61. Ibid, 61-62.  58  insurgency in 1880 near the city of Kandahar in the Southern region of Afghanistan.147 The UK again decided to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, although the UK obtained the agreement of Afghanistan that it would have foreign relationships only with the UK.148 This special agreement was abandoned in 1919, when Afghanistan became a fully independent country.149 After independence, King Zahir Shah was a prominent leader who modernized Afghanistan; in the forty-year rule of Zahir Shah (1933–1973), “Afghanistan enjoyed relative peace and stability.”150 He sustained neutral policy lines in the Cold War and was successful in obtaining aid from both the U.S. and USSR. He also introduced the 1964 constitution, which adopted a democratic electoral system under the constitutional monarchy.151 Under this constitution, Afghanistan conducted multi-party national elections for a bicameral parliament in 1965 and 1969. They were the first democratic elections conducted purely by Afghan initiatives and the Afghan government.152 However, political instability began to intensify as the political parties fought each other to gain the control of the country. In 1973, King Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Sardar Mohammed Daud, who was “supported by the nascent communist parties inside the country.”153 Changing the traditional neutral policy under the Cold War, Daud pushed Afghanistan toward the Soviet Union, expanding the influence of domestic communist parties. But Daud’s regime was also  147 148 149 150 151 152 153  Ibid. Evans, Manning, Osmani, Tully, and Wilder 2004, 1. Watanabe 2003, 64-65. Ogata 2005, 281. UNDP 2005, 6. UNDP 2005, 7. Rashid 2009, 8.  59  overthrown by a military coup in 1978, and the Afghan political conditions were trapped into chaos.154 Overseeing these developments, the Soviet Union was very concerned that “the United States would attempt to replace the Communist Afghan regime with a pro-Western one.”155 On 24 December 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan with 100,000 soldiers.156 The Soviet invasion transformed the Afghan internal political conflict into a proxy war between the Soviets and the United States and was the beginning of 30 years of military conflict in Afghanistan.157 Escaping from harsh fighting during the Soviet invasion, about 6.3 million Afghans fled to neighboring states such as Pakistan and Iran.158 The Soviets intended to stabilize Afghanistan by dispatching 115,000 soldiers, but it only caused nationwide mujahedeen resistance, together with international “jihad Islamic fighters” who gathered in Afghanistan from all over the world.159 The United States effectively coordinated military and financial assistance to those Islamic resistance groups. As a result, after a ten-year-long devastating war, the Soviet Union was forced to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in 1989.160 The withdrawal of the Soviets was followed by the withdrawal of the United States from the entire region.161 And different groups of the mujahedeen engaged in a destructive civil war, first to expel President Najibullah, who was the last president under the Soviet occupation and who lost his power quickly with the Soviet withdrawal, and then to defeat other mujahedeen groups to dominate Kabul and the country. 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161  Ibid., 9. Ogata 2005, 282. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 277. Ibid., 283. Rashid 2009, 11. Ibid., 11.  60  Although there was a temporary power sharing arrangement to realize a cease-fire among those mujahedeen groups in 1993, civil war resumed and devastated the country. It was the fall of 1994 when the political and military group called the Taliban (Taliban is the word for “students” in Pashto) suddenly emerged in hundreds of madrasa schools in Afghan refugee camps within Pakistan and started breaking down the “stalemate” of the civil war by defeating several prominent mujahedeen groups in southern Afghanistan.162 The Taliban, which is overwhelmingly composed of Pashtun people, expanded its control and occupied Kabul on 26 September 1996; by the end of the 1990s, at least 90% of Afghan territory was controlled by the Taliban.163 The Northern Alliance, officially known as the “United National and Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan,” kept fighting against the Taliban in the northern part of Afghanistan.164 In Taliban-controlled areas, strict rules were imposed with brutal enforcement. The dress code was very strict, forcing women to be shrouded from head to toe and men to abandon Western suits.165 The Taliban also forbade television, videos, music, and games; they even banned women from working and closed girls’ schools and colleges.166 Due to those brutal rules with extreme Islamic fundamentalist ideology, the Taliban regime was recognized as a sovereign state by only three countries: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates (UAE).167  162 163 164 165 166 167  Ibid., 286. Thier 2004, 43. Ibid., 44. UNDP 2005, 8. Ogata 2005, 287. Watanabe 2003, 181.  61  September 11 Attack and Bonn Conference in 2001 The September 11 attacks in 2001 which destroyed the World Trade Center buildings in New York turned the world’s attention to Afghanistan. The United States asked the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden, who was the leader of Al-Qaida, which was believed to have conducted the September 11 attacks. On 7 October, seeing the rejection by the Taliban, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom with the aim of destroying Al-Qaida and ousting the Taliban regime.168 The United States supported the Northern Alliance with cash, arms, and communication equipment, together with massive air campaigns against the Taliban regime.169 Within only five weeks, the Taliban collapsed and the Northern Alliance marched into Kabul on 13 November.170 Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General at that time, appointed Lakhdar Brahimi to start the political preparation for the establishment of an interim Afghan administration.171 Shortly after the Taliban was expelled from Kabul by the coalition of American-led air forces and the Northern Alliance, Brahimi hosted the Bonn Conference in Germany; the conference was to lay out the framework for both a “state-building process” and a “peace-consolidation process” in Afghanistan.172 Four major Afghan groups participated in the Bonn Conference, which was convened from 27 November to 5 December, 2001.173 The Northern Alliance, which was composed of Afghan minority ethnic groups, such as the Tajik, the Uzbek, and the Hazara, militarily controlled Kabul. Thus, the  168 169 170 171 172 173  Thier 2004, 45. Ibid. Ibid. Ogata 2005, 296. Thier 2004, 47. Rubin 2004, 6.  62  representatives of the Northern Alliance played a dominant role in the Bonn Conference.174 The other groups were the “Rome group,” representing exiled King Zahir Shah, and the “Cyprus group,” composed of various factions with close ties to Iran.175 On the other hand, the Pashtun, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, had a very marginal influence on the Bonn conference; there was only one group of Pashtun, called the ‘‘Peshawar group,” who were Pashtun mujahedeen based in Pakistan.176 Responding to this situation, the Bonn Agreement acknowledged that many groups were not “adequately represented at the UN talks on Afghanistan.”177 On 5 December 2001, the four groups of the Bonn conference agreed on the Bonn Agreement, which outlined the key components of a peace-building enterprise in Afghanistan. It would set up an “Interim Authority” on 22 December 2001, with one chairman, five vice chairmen, and 24 cabinet members.178 Within 6 months, an Emergency Loya Jirga would be convened to decide the “Transitional Authority” that would be replaced by a fully elected government with a fair and transparent election no later than two years from the establishment of the Transitional Authority.179 Under the Transitional Authority, a constitutional Loya Jirga would be convened “within eighteen months of the establishment of the Transitional Authority, in order to adopt a new constitution for Afghanistan.”180 Hamid Karzai, the exiled leader of the Pashtun, was selected as the chairman of the Interim Authority, while the key ministers such as defense, interior, and foreign affairs were dominated by the representatives of the Northern 174  Thier 2004, 46. Rubin 2004, 6. 176 Thier 2004, 46. 177 Bonn Agreement (Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions) 2001, 2. 178 Ibid., 3. 179 Ibid. 180 Ibid. 175  63  Alliance.181  After Bonn: Implementing the Time Table and Challenges The time table for creating a new government in Afghanistan defined by the Bonn Conference was largely followed by key political events; in June 2002, the Emergency Loya Jirga established a “more representative” Transitional Authority, replacing the Interim Authority created in December 2001.182 Hamid Karzai was again selected as a head of the Transitional Authority. In January 2004, the Constitutional Loya Jirga adopted the new Afghan constitution.183 Following the adoption of the new constitution, there was a presidential election in October 2004 that selected Hamid Karzai as the first formal president in the new Afghan constitutional government.184 In 2005, the members of the National Assembly—the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) and the Meshrano Jirga (Upper House)—and the members of provincial councils were selected in Afghan national elections.185 The establishment of a presidency and two parliaments became a milestone that demonstrated the end of the political timetable defined by the Bonn Conference. However, security conditions have continued to worsen in Afghanistan, despite a series of political events, as we will examine in detail in Chapter 4. From the beginning of nation-building initiated in 2001, one of the key objectives for the Interim and Transitional Authority in establishing security was to unify Afghanistan’s military groups (warlords) into a central government and monopolize the state’s coercive power.186 And in order to achieve this 181 182 183 184 185 186  Thier 2004, 48. Ponzio 2011, 117. Ibid. Ibid., 118. Ibid. Ibid., 47.  64  objective during the transitional period, the participants of the Bonn Conference asked the UN Security Council to dispatch a “United Nations-mandated force” to assist in stabilizing Kabul and the country.187 This UN-mandated international force in Afghanistan is named the “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).”188 The Agreement also called for the international community to help train the Afghan national army and police.189 One of the biggest challenges for the Bonn Conference with regard to creating an Afghan national army and police that would expand effective controls across Afghanistan was the fact that the Bonn Conference was largely determined by the representatives of the Northern Alliance, while the many Pashtun leaders perceived that “the political and military changes in the year after September 11 left the Pashtuns disenfranchised and under siege.”190 As the Taliban, which mostly consisted of Pashtun, collapsed, “they were replaced by a U.S.-backed, Tajik-controlled government. Many Pashtuns complained that they were labeled Taliban, terrorists, and drug lords.”191 This perception that the majority of the Pashtun was excluded from the Bonn Conference and its subsequent political process —in spite of the fact that the Pashtun Karzai became the leader of the interim authority and the first constitutional president—has been a dominant issue and challenge in Afghan peacebuilding since the Bonn Agreement. It is in this context that the Afghan peacebuilders—both domestic actors such as Afghan leaders of the interim, transitional, and formally elected governments and international actors such as the UN, ISAF, and numerous international donors assisting Afghanistan—needed to achieve one of the biggest challenges 187 188 189 190 191  Bonn Agreement 2001, Annex I (International Security Force). The website of ISAF is http://www.isaf.nato.int. Bonn Agreement 2001, Annex I (International Security Force). Thier 2004, 49. Ibid.  65  in peacebuilding, as previewed in Chapter 2; that is, to disarm numerous warlords, who had been fighting for decades since the Soviet invasion, and to create a central government that effectively monopolized coercive power in Afghanistan.  DDR and DIAG in Afghanistan The disarmament program in Afghanistan started in February 2003, when the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process was initiated at the Tokyo Conference.192 The DDR in Afghanistan mainly targeted soldiers belonging to the Afghan Military Forces, which were a “loose network of military units that had fought against the Soviets and the Taliban” and were brought together under the Ministry of Defense when the Taliban was expelled at the end of 2001.193 This means that disarming the Afghan Military Forces was in reality the same as disbanding the victory forces that fought against the Soviets and the Taliban. The DDR supported the disarmament of 63,380 soldiers, and 55,804 soldiers chose one of the reintegration options: obtaining vocational training, small business opportunities, government jobs, etc.194 The DDR process in Afghanistan was completed in July 2006.195 As the DDR process in Afghanistan targeted the soldiers of the Afghan Military Forces, who were mainly from the Northern Alliance, there was shared recognition that the next disarmament program should be initiated to disarm numerous illegal armed groups (warlords who possess military powers in  192  UNDP DDR Fact Sheet, provided by Afghanistan’s New Beginning Programme, one of the programs by UNDP in Afghanistan. Accessed in September, 2011 at http://www.anbp.af.undp.org/homepage/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17&Itemid=67 193 UN Disarmament, Disbandment, and Reintegration Resource Center: Country Programme, Afghanistan. Accessed in September, 2011, at http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=121 194 Ibid. 195 UNDP DDR Fact Sheet, provided by Afghanistan’s New Beginning Programme, 2011.  66  local areas) to establish security governed by the central government.196 This call for disbanding illegal armed groups and establishing centrally controlled army and police—the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP)—is very consistent with a fundamental quest for creating a state. As Max Weber contends, “a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”197 In order to create this kind of modern state in Afghanistan, the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups program (DIAG) was launched in June 2005, aiming to establish a centrally controlled security sector that would monopolize coercive powers within the state and “reduc[e] the level of violence in the community.”198 Aziz Ahmadzai, the acting director of DIAG (No. 2 Afghan national officer in charge of DIAG), asserts, The DIAG is a central pillar of the entire security reform in Afghanistan. Without DIAG, it is difficult for the central government to establish functioning police and armies that can effectively provide people with security. The reason is that without disbanding illegal armed groups, these groups can switch sides and become insurgents at any moment.199  The DIAG Mechanism DIAG was supervised by the DIAG Joint Secretariat composed of major domestic institutions, such as the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (D &R Commission), as well as international actors, such as the ISAF, UNAMA, and Afghan New  196 197 198 199  Emadi 2006, 432. Weber 1958, 78. Emphasis in original. UNDP DIAG Project Statement, provided by Afghanistan New Beginning Program(ANBP) in 2006. Author’s interview with Aziz Ahmadzai, acting director of DIAG, on 25 May 2008.  67  Beginning Program (ANBP), which is part of the UNDP programs in Afghanistan.200 The DIAG Joint Secretariat first identified about 1700 illegal armed groups (IAG) in the entire country and started disbanding those groups by collecting weapons from some of them. Due to security reasons, DIAG efforts were mainly launched in the relatively secure areas such as the Eastern, Central, and Northern regions in Afghanistan.201 In terms of its actual steps, the Joint Secretariat identified targeted districts in targeted provinces, based on the assessment of security conditions and political support for the program by local influential figures; then, the DIAG committee in each province started persuading commanders identified as leaders of illegal armed groups to surrender weapons. In addition to disbanding illegal armed groups, DIAG also aims to create trust between people and the government. Masoom Stanekzai, the Vice Chairman of the D & R Commission, emphasized the aims of DIAG: “Because there is substantial suspicion among people and tribes toward the government with regard to security, it is critical to create trust through implementing DIAG.”202 A major component of DIAG in creating trust between people and the government was the promise of DIAG to provide development projects to the districts where more than 75% of targeted weapons were collected.203 The DIAG development project was launched with a budget ceiling of 150,000 USD for one district.204  200  UNDP DIAG Annual Project Report 2006, 10. Author’s interview with Aziz Ahmadzai, acting director of DIAG, on 25 May 2008. 202 Author’s interview with Masoom Stanekzai, the Vice Chairman of the D & R Commission, on 18 February 2008 (The Chairman of the D & R Commission was the vice president; thus, Stanekzai was virtually the No. 1 Afghan official who was specifically responsible for DIAG). 203 Ibid. 204 UNDP Concept Paper: Disbandment of Illegal Armed Group 2006, 6. 201  68  This mechanism had two major objectives: one was to give commanders an incentive to surrender their weapons to the government; the second was to create trust between people and the government by “improving both socio-economic and security conditions,” as Stanekzai argued.205 DIAG aimed to give people the perspective that even commanders—who had a long history in controlling their regions—were cooperating with the government so that people would gain more security provided by the government in the future; people also would experience development projects as a result of the compliance of commanders with DIAG. Thus, DIAG was crucial in giving people “the confidence in government’s ability to provide security and development.”206 In order to support these objectives, DIAG was funded by Japan (the top donor, which provided more than 90% of the total budget) and other donors such as Canada, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, UK, and the United States.207  Outcomes of DIAG With regard to the collection of weapons and disbandment of illegal armed groups, the achievement of DIAG did not appear marginal when I conducted field research in Afghanistan in the summer of 2008. As of 31 August 2008, DIAG had collected 41,183 weapons and 30,466 metric tons of ammunition.208 And among 1,700 identified illegal armed groups, 363 had already disbanded.209 Considering the security situation in Afghanistan, David Wilson, the head of the ANBP, which was an international counterpart to the D & R Commission in implementing DIAG, claimed in 2008 that  205 206 207 208 209  Ibid. Author’s interview with Stanekzai on 18 February 2008. UNDP DIAG First Quarter Progress Report in March 2011. UNDP DIAG Implementation Progress Report on 31 August 2008. Ibid.  69  “disbanding more than 300 illegal armed groups within 3 years is not a bad result at all.”210 Although there were some achievements in collecting weapons, especially in the early stage of DIAG, the program faced enormous difficulties in attaining its original objective, which was to enable the Afghan government to establish a monopoly of legitimate use of force within the territory of Afghanistan. First, the deteriorating security and the Taliban’s recovering strength in Afghanistan made DIAG implementation more and more difficult. According to the original goal set in 2006, DIAG aimed to complete disbanding all listed illegal armed groups (about 1,700) in two years.211 But this deadline continued to be postponed. When the mission of DIAG was declared to be finished in March 2011, the total number of weapons collected as a result of DIAG was just 55,164, while Afghanistan is estimated to have 5 to 20 million weapons across the country.212 More significantly, the number of disbanded illegal armed groups was 768, less than half the listed illegal armed groups in Afghanistan.213 Considering the fact that the list of illegal armed groups did not include major Afghan insurgent groups such as the Taliban—the Afghan government thought it was too unrealistic to persuade the Taliban to disband the organization in the framework of DIAG—the result of DIAG is certainly disappointing in terms of disarming the numerous warlords who control local security and order in Afghanistan. This result is a pity when the majority of ordinary people suggested their strong support for DIAG in 2008. According to my opinion survey conducted in June 2008, an overwhelming majority of Afghan ordinary villagers supported DIAG; 97% of villagers surveyed in Kapisa Province (Central Tajik region), 210  Author’s interview with David Wilson, the head of the Afghan New Beginning Program, on 18 February 2008. UNDP Concept Paper: Disbandment of Illegal Armed Group 2006, 6. 212 UNDP Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups First Quarter Progress Report 2011, 1. The estimate of total weapons in Afghanistan was indicated by a UN political affairs officer who covers DIAG, with a condition of anonymity interviewed by author in February 2008. 213 UNDP Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups First Quarter Progress Report 2011, 1 211  70  100% of villagers surveyed in Wardak Province(Central Pashtun region), and 78% of villagers surveyed in Kandahar Province(South Pashtun region) answered that commanders should surrender their weapons to DIAG.214 The major reason is that people want to have economic development projects in exchange for commanders’ surrendering weapons; at the same time, many people also expect that if commanders surrender weapons, the government police would start functioning and providing them with more security. For instance, one villager living in Wardak Province responded, “if commanders surrender weapons, the government police will be stronger than those warlords and give us the security, even though there is no functioning police now.”215 There were many voices who expected the future improvement of security if DIAG was completed in their region. Due to all the reasons above, DIAG enjoyed a substantial level of expectation from ordinary people; thus, the stakes were high. It is crucial to investigate why DIAG made substantial progress in the first few years but eventually failed in achieving its original purpose. Moreover, investigating DIAG may reveal the compliance and noncompliance mechanisms for one of the important political programs in the peacebuilding process: the disarmament of local warlords. In the following sections, I first analyze reasons for compliance by examining two districts, Kohband district and Kohistan 1 district, in Kapisa province.  214  Appendix B, Q23. As I explained in Chapter 2, I conducted opinion survey in three provinces: one is Kapisa province which has a high compliance rate with disarmament program (DIAG) and is relatively secure area.; the second is Wardak province which has a low compliance rate with DIAG and is relatively risky (or dangerous) area; the third is Kandahar province which has am extremely low compliance rate with DIAG (actually no DIAG program has been implemented in Kandahar due to terrible security conditions) and is extremely dangerous area. Due to the worsening security conditions across the country, villagers in three provinces gathered to the provincial center and answered the questionnaires in either Pashtun or Dari language. Each staff read the questions and answers with voices (as half of villagers might be illiterate), and asked villagers to choose one of answers. The author also accompanied researchers at every site of opinion surveys and joined the interviews with an interpreter. The total numbers of collected answers are 108 in Kapisa, 102 in Wardak, and 50 in Kandahar (it became impossible to gather 100 answers in Kandahar as the jail of Kandahar was attacked and more than a thousand of Taliban soldiers were released during my stay in Afghanistan.). The total of collected answers is 260 in Afghanistan. 215 Author’s interview with a villager in Wardak during the opinion survey in Wardak on 16 June 2008. Every interview with villagers during the opinion survey was conducted with a condition of anonymity due to security reasons.  71  Then, I examine reasons for noncompliance by investigating the case of Jalrez district in Wardak Province; finally, I examine how the broken promise of DIAG development projects, combined with worsening security across the country, resulted in an unsatisfactory outcome that failed to achieve the original purposes of DIAG.  Reasons for Compliance in Kapisa Province In order to examine the motives for compliance and noncompliance behaviors with DIAG, I interviewed 10 commanders who faced the request by DIAG to surrender weapons . As for commanders who complied with DIAG, I focused on Kohistan 1 district and Kohband district in Kapisa province. At the time of my field research in 2008, both districts had already reached the DIAG compliance rate, which means that more than 75% of targeted weapons had been surrendered to the government.216 As of 24 April 2008, the rate of compliance for DIAG in Kohistan 1 was 94% (94% of listed weapons in Kohistan 1 were surrendered to DIAG officials), and the 75% threshold had been achieved on 17 March 2008. In Kohband, the compliance rate for DIAG was 100%, and the 75% threshold was achieved on 3 July 2007.217 In short, both Kohistan 1 district and Kohband are “compliance districts with DIAG.”218 The interviews with the commanders in those two districts who complied with DIAG, combined with discussions with other DIAG officers and district governors who persuaded commanders to hand over weapons, suggest that there are two major reasons why they decided to comply with DIAG. 216  Afghan Disarmament & Reintegration Commission (D&R Commission), DIAG Summary Sheet, issued on 24 April 2008. D & R Commission was the Afghan central authority which supervised DIAG. Many Afghan DIAG officials belong to either D& R Commission or ANBP(Afghan New Beginning Program), which is one of UNDP organizations specifically for operation of DIAG and DDR in Afghanistan. 217 Ibid. 218 DIAG officials often use “compliance districts” which imply the district that reached to the threshold where 75 % of listed weapons were collected.  72  Economic Incentive for Their Communities There is no doubt that one of the most important reasons for complying with DIAG was the economic incentive that DIAG provided. According to a guideline of the DIAG program, commanders who surrender weapons are not going to obtain any money or projects in return for their weapons, but the districts they live in gain economic development projects (DIAG development projects) with a budget ceiling of 150,000 USD.219 Although there is no personal monetary gain for commanders who surrendered weapons, this mechanism was a substantial incentive for commanders—heads of illegal armed groups—to hand over weapons and comply with the request by the government. For example, Hassam-u-din, a commander in Kohband district who commanded more than 300 people during the war against the Soviets and the Taliban, surrendered about 600 weapons to the DIAG program. He explained the reasons: “First of all, we are already tired of wars. Second, I realized that if we surrendered weapons, our people in our district would obtain important development projects. As my main concern is always my people, I judged that it was better to comply with DIAG.”220 The other four commanders who complied with DIAG in Kapisa province unanimously responded to me that their first reason for compliance was that they thought it was good to obtain development projects in their districts, even if they would not directly obtain money or other personal benefits .221 In this sense, the strategy by top officials in charge of DIAG was successful. Stanekzai, the Afghan  219  Afghan D & R Commission, Strategy for Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups in Afghanistan, issued in 2006. Author’s interview with Hassam-u-din, a local military commander in Koh Band District in Kapisa Province on 22 June 2008. 221 However, when commanders surrendered weapons, they were doing so for not only altruistic reasons for their communities; commanders also expected that compliance with DIAG was one of the important steps to transform themselves from military commanders to political leaders. All five commanders who complied with DIAG and responded to my interviews in Kapisa did not hide their ambitions to become politicians; they expressed their desires about being candidates for the Provincial Councils or even Parliament in the next election. Thus, even if military commanders would not gain any personal economic benefit, they can still expect gaining some political interest. Five local commanders in Kapisa whom I interviewed are Hassam-u-din, Meraj-u-din, Raees Arab Shah, Mohammad Iasem, and Abdul Rahman Farid (on 22 and 23 June 2008). 220  73  chief of DIAG, asserted that because the collection of weapons by DIAG was not so encouraging in 2006, the DIAG Joint Secretariat changed its implementation strategy: When the DIAG Joint Secretariat identified districts for DIAG implementation, the DIAG officials started discussion with local people to identify possible development projects even before 75% of the targeted weapons were surrendered. Stanekzai asserted, “By starting the discussion with local people about the potential development projects even before commanders surrender weapons, those discussions themselves become big pressure for commanders to surrender weapons.”222 After starting this practice, DIAG gained momentum, and compliance with DIAG drastically speeded up.223 The responses of many commanders who complied with DIAG clearly suggest that this strategy was effective, at least in motivating many commanders to surrender weapons. This motive is strongly consistent with “resource distribution” as the reason for compliance in my hypothesis. Even if DIAG did not provide personal and direct economic benefits to commanders (the heads of illegal armed groups), the resource distribution for the community that those commanders belong to or influence is almost certain to be a strong motive for compliance.  Credibility of the UN Although resource distribution seems a substantial motive for compliance, the commanders suggested one more important mechanism for their compliance. The commanders who complied with DIAG unanimously expressed that one of the main reasons why they trusted the promise of the government was the involvement of the United Nations. In the DIAG implementation process, the ANBP, 222 223  Author’s interview with Masoom Stanekzai on 18 February 2008. Ibid.  74  one of the organizations of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), had been collaborating with the Afghan D & R Commission and the provincial DIAG committees, led by the provincial governors, and they jointly persuaded commanders to surrender weapons. The UNAMA staff also deeply committed themselves to negotiate with key local commanders to enhance the compliance with the DIAG process in many parts of Afghanistan. And all five commanders who complied with DIAG in Kapisa province asserted that the involvement of the UN agencies played a critical role in giving commanders trust in the promise of the Afghan government. For instance, the commander Hassam-u-din was explicit on this point: If only government officials had come to me and persuaded me to surrender weapons, I would never have complied with those requests because I cannot trust the current government. Only because the UN staff came to us and promised that we would obtain development projects for our district if we surrendered weapons, we decided to hand over weapons to DIAG.224 Another commander in Kohistan 1 District, Meraj-u-din, also asserted; “I decided to surrender weapons because I thought our district could gain economic projects in the future, and because it was the UN staff who came to me, I trusted their words.”225 Why did they perceive that the UN staff(including Afghan UN staff) were more credible? Hassam-u-din argued that he and other commanders watched the work of several UN agencies—mainly work by Afghan UN staff—and they thought the UN was making serious efforts to solve their regional  224 225  Author’s interview with Hassm-u-din on 22 June 2008. Author’s interview with Meraj-u-din, the commander in Kohistan 1 District in Kapisa Province, on 22 June 2008.  75  problems.226 This perspective was shared by other commanders, such as Raees Arab Shah and Abdul Fath Shafiq, the commanders in Kapisa Province. One of the important factors for the perception of those commanders was the fact that those views about the credibility of the UN were shared by local ordinary people: In Kapisa Province, 99% of villagers surveyed responded that “the UN is more credible than other foreign states in terms of creating good government in Afghanistan.”227 With regard to the reasons for this credibility, 74% of the respondents answered “because the UN personnel are from many different regions in the world,” 63% of the respondents answered “because the UN is established by the resolution of the UN Security Council,” and 63% of respondents answered “because the UN is neutral to every faction.”228 (Although the answer might seem to some to be too sophisticated for local Afghan people, 70% of all Afghans are said to be listening to radio or watching TV—including BBC news in Pashto and Dari—for their information; their political awareness is very high.)229 This overall perception of the United Nations is also shown in other research ; for instance, a survey by the Asia Foundation in 2004 suggested that 84% of the Afghan people across the country felt favorable or very favorable toward the United Nations (33% of them were favorable and 51% of them were very favorable).230  226  Author’s interview with Hassam-u-din on 22 June 2008. Appendix B, Q14. In other provinces, 95% of the respondents in Wardak province and 80 % of respondents in Kandahar gave the same answer in the survey. 228 See Appendix B, Q15. 229 According to Asia Foundation survey conducted for 6406 villagers across Afghanistan, 44% of Afghan people listening to radio every day or almost every day, and 26% of the Afghan watch TV every day or almost every day. And 72% of the Afghan answered that their main information sources are either radio (47%) or TV (25%). (Asia Foundation 2009, 138-143). 230 Asia Foundation 2004, 30. In 2004, the Asia Foundation conducted opinion survey with 804 persons in 29 provinces out of 32 provinces in Afghanistan. Since 2006, the Asia Foundation has conducted opinion surveys with more than 6000 Afghan people across the country every year. With regard to these “favorable” questions, the Asia Foundation has not asked this type of questions since 2006, due to the difficulty of dealing with 227  76  There is no doubt that the involvement of the UN was crucial in encouraging commanders to comply with the request by the Afghan government to disband because the commanders had the view, which was shared by ordinary Afghan people, that the UN can play a role as a credible third party who would guarantee two important conditions for their compliance: one is the provision of economic development projects for their community, and the second is their physical security, which was supposed to be provided by formal national security institutions such as the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. The fact that a majority of commanders who complied with the government’s request to disband did so because of the involvement by the UN is significant evidence that demonstrates how the role of the United Nations can be crucial in bringing compliance—then legitimacy in the long run—in contrast to some alternative accounts, such as those by David Lake, who rejected the significance of the role of the UN and the international organizations in general. This trust in the United Nations, however, was hugely damaged (together with trust in the Afghan government) when the Afghan government could not provide economic development projects in a timely manner and could not provide enough security, as it deteriorated even in relatively secure areas such as Kapisa in subsequent years. The details will be discussed in the following sections.  Other Factors If the economic incentive (resource distribution) and the role of the UN (as a credible third party) are major factors contributing to compliance, how do the other two factors, coercion and inclusiveness, which are presented in my argument as crucial, function in this compliance mechanism?  those results, according to local staff of the Asia Foundation.  77  As for coercion, commanders in Kapisa province asserted that “they never comply with surrendering weapons by coercion of the government because the government is relatively weak.”231 Their claims seem plausible because even though police in Kohistan 1 and Kohband have relatively high standards, the number of police and military soldiers deployed in 2008 in Kohistan 1 district was 78 and in Kohband district was 93.232 On the other hand, influential commanders such as Raees Arab Shah or Hassam-u-din still have the power to command 300 to 600 former subordinates. In that sense, the coercion by the government seems to play a relatively marginal role in the compliance with DIAG. DIAG also had a principle to implement DIAG not by using coercive powers but by using economic incentives and persuasion; the guidelines of DIAG made this strategy clear by instructing that DIAG officers—members of the D & R Commission, the DIAG Joint Secretariat in Kabul, and provincial DIAG committees—should “seek to achieve voluntary compliance by IAGs (Illegal Armed Groups) through a public information campaign.”233 Although the guidelines state that the government might use the coercive powers of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police as a last resort when there is no compliance by illegal armed groups after long-term persuasion, DIAG actually assumed that the program was essentially dependent on persuasion by DIAG officials to achieve its objectives.234 There has been almost no major military operation against targeted illegal armed groups solely seeking compliance with DIAG .235  231  Author’s interview with Hassam-u-din on 22 June 2008. Author’s interview with Abdul Fatah Shafiq, district governor in Kohistan 1 District in Kapisa Province, on 22 June 2008. 233 Afghan D & R Commission, Strategy for Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups in Afghanistan, issued in 2006, 7. 234 Author’s interview with a Japanese political affairs officer in Kabul Embassy with a condition of anonymity in February, 2008. Aziz Ahmadzai, acting director of D & R Commission at that time, also emphasized that “DIAG is basically the program to seek for the voluntary compliance by using persuasion and economic incentive, not by force”(Author’s interview with Aziz Ahmadzai, acting director of DIAG, on 25 May 2008). 235 Author’s interview with Masoom Stanekzai on 18 February 2008. There was shard consensus on this strategy (avoiding the use of drastic force 232  78  In short, coercion is not a crucial factor in inducing compliance with this disarmament mechanism defined by DIAG. However, the level of coercion certainly influenced the level of overall security conditions in Afghanistan, and the worsening security conditions increased noncompliance behavior, as will be explained in more detail later. With regard to inclusiveness, Kohistan 1 and Kohband districts are Tajik-dominated areas, and commanders tend to be sympathetic to the current government, as these commanders fought against the Taliban as part of the Northern Alliance in the 1990s. Abdul Fatah Shafiq, the district governor in Kohistan 1, said that “Kohistan 1 and Kohband were a focal point for Tajik people to fight against the Taliban.”236 However, this ethnic sympathy seems less related to the compliance with DIAG, as many other districts where Pashtun people dominate also reached 75% compliance; for example, Maidan Shahr district in Wardak province is a Pashtun-dominated district and was controlled by the Taliban during the Taliban regime, but it reached 75% compliance in early 2008. Three commanders who live in Maidan Shahr district and complied with DIAG by surrendering weapons—Haji Abdul Qadim, Gul Rahman, and Aziz Ullah—asserted that they decided to surrender weapons because DIAG’s potential development projects would be beneficial for their districts, and the involvement of the UN agencies helped them to decide in favor of compliance.237 In that sense, inclusiveness seems more directly linked with security situations, and security  for DIAG) by UNAMA staff who cover DIAG in both Kabul Headquarters and regions. As I mentioned before, the major insurgent groups such as the Taliban were not listed in illegal armed groups in DIAG. 236 Author’s interview with Abdul Fatah Shafiq, district governor in Kohistan 1 District in Kapisa Province, on 22 June 2008. 237 Author’s interview with Haji Abdul Qadim, Gul Rahman, and Aziz Ullah on 15 June 2008.  79  situations have a critical impact on compliance with DIAG.238 If commanders feel physical threats from other insurgency or other military groups—including the Taliban—it is difficult for commanders to surrender weapons. And Kohistan 1 and Kohband are two of the safest and most secure districts in the central region of Afghanistan. To obtain specific information about security conditions in the districts I investigated, I accessed one important indicator. In 2006, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, collaborating with UNHCR, conducted more than 8,000 interviews with local people and issued a comprehensive report on “Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan.”239 The Commission gave me data in key districts for my analysis, such as Kandahar City, Kohistan 1, Kohband, and Jalrez in Wardak Province (which I will examine in the section on “reasons for noncompliance”). According to this data, 62 persons responded to the survey in Kohistan 1 and 32 persons responded in Kohband, and there had been only 2 killings that occurred in interviewees’ families during the past 12 months. This security condition is in sharp contrast with Jalrez district in Wardak province, which has almost no compliance with DIAG. In Jalrez, 58 interviewees responded to the survey in 2006, and among them, there were 10 interviewees whose family members were killed during the past 12 months.240 My opinion survey in those districts also indicates the same security situation in different districts; 86% of the respondents in Kapisa Province (Kohistan 1 and Kohband) perceived that “their daily life has  238  Detailed analysis about how inclusiveness impacts security conditions in Afghanistan will be explored in Chapter IV. Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, “Economic and Social Rights in Afghanistan May 2006.” 240 Afghan Independent Human Right Commission, original data for my research in the targeted districts, such as Kohistan 1, Kohband, and Jalrez. (I obtained the data in June 2008). Afghan Independent Human Right Commission gave me special cooperation for this research. 239  80  become safer than their life under the Taliban government.”241 This result has again a sharp contrast with Wardak Province, where 64% of the respondents said that their daily life has become more dangerous than their life under the Taliban government.242 In these dangerous regions, the worsening security conditions prevent commanders from surrendering weapons because they feel physical threats.243 In sum, the investigation in Kohistan 1 and Kohband districts suggests that the key mechanisms for complying with DIAG are (1) economic incentives and (2) the credibility of the IOs, especially the United Nations in the Afghan context. Inclusiveness and reconciliation seem to play key roles in determining security situations, which also have a big impact on compliance with DIAG in the long run. The analysis of DIAG clearly reveals that the credibility (or lack of credibility) of the IOs—especially the UN in this specific context—plays a significant role as a compliance (or noncompliance) mechanism, as suggested in my argument.  Reasons for Noncompliance in Jalrez District in Wardak Province I also examined why some commanders did not comply with DIAG. I investigated Jalrez district, which is located in the valley in Wardak province, next to the capital, Kabul. Even in 2008, the UN officials had no access to a whole area of Jalrez district due to insecurity. In order to interview commanders and people from Jalrez district, I needed to ask people and commanders to come to the provincial center of Wardak province, located in Maidan Shahr district in Wardak; the UN still had access to the provincial 241 242 243  See Appendix B, Q22. Ibid. The detail will be examined in the following section.  81  center of Wardak in June 2008.244 With regard to the compliance with DIAG, as of April 2008, the DIAG Joint Secretariat identified that no weapons from Jalrez had been handed over to the DIAG program; there was no compliance with DIAG.245 Jalrez is one of the few districts that the DIAG Joint Secretariat had targeted for DIAG, but no weapons had been counted.  DIAG Losing Credibility The study in Jalrez revealed a striking finding: Commanders in Jalrez made substantial cooperation with the government by handing over hundreds of weapons in 2005. However, when commanders in Jalrez surrendered weapons in 2005 to the government authority, those weapons were not counted as DIAG handovers, though these commanders believed that their weapons should be counted for DIAG. The reason is that those weapons in Jalrez were handed over to the government just one month before DIAG was formally launched in June 2005. And this missed calculation or missed coordination created a huge mistrust in the government and deprived the commanders of the motive to cooperate with DIAG. Haji Mohammad Hazrat Janan, the Chief of Provincial Council in Wardak province, lives in Jalrez and committed himself to persuade commanders to surrender weapons in the whole DIAG process in Jalrez.246 Janan asserted that he and many commanders in Jalrez at first were very optimistic about  244  A month after this field research was conducted, Wardak province was attacked by the US military operation, and UN officials were prohibited by the UN security clearance section to go to Wardak province, even to the provincial center, in August of 2008. Since then, the access to Wardak province has been very difficult for the UN and the government officials (Author’s interview with UNAMA officials who cover Wardak in August 2010, with a condition of anonymity). 245 Afghan D&R Commission, DIAG Summary Sheet, issued on 24 April 2008 246 Author’s interview with Haji Mohammad Hazrat Janan, Chief of Provincial Council in Wardak, on 29 May 2008.  82  weapons collections because “We were very tired of wars; we thought that weapons collection is a good step for reconstruction and rehabilitation.”247 After Janan talked with DIAG officials and confirmed that Jalrez district could obtain development projects if commanders surrendered more than 75% of targeted weapons, Janan visited every village to persuade commanders to surrender weapons in 2005. As a result, about 600 weapons and 1,000 rounds of ammunition were surrendered to the government.248 But unfortunately, these weapons were not counted by the DIAG program (or not registered as DIAG collection of weapons) because the weapons were released one month before DIAG officially started on 11 June 2005. “That was what I heard from DIAG officials! ”Janan lamented, then added, “Still, I cannot understand why those weapons could not be counted for DIAG when it was only a one-month difference.”249 It seems certain that the weapons were surrendered to the government from Jalrez in 2005; one commander, who used to live in Jalrez and is currently working in a high-ranked position (director level) in the Afghan government, told me that he surrendered about 50 weapons for DIAG, and he even presented to me the certificate by the government, which proved that he surrendered weapons. He asserted, “Many commanders in Jalrez did cooperate with DIAG, but nothing happened after that. It created huge mistrust in the DIAG program.”250 There are several UN officials who were in charge of the DIAG in the region and remember that many Jalrez commanders surrendered weapons to the government.251 The DIAG Joint Secretariat in Kabul, however, adamantly asserted that those weapons cannot be counted for 247 248 249 250 251  Ibid. Ibid. Author’s interview with Haji Mohammad Hazrat Janan, Chief of Provincial Council in Wardak, on 29 May 2008. Author’s interview with a commander who used to live in Jalrez, with condition of anonymity, in June 2008. Author confirmed several UN staff that commanders in Jalrez did surrender some of their weapons in 2005.  83  DIAG weapon collections due to the timing, and no UN staff seriously demanded that the Joint Secretariat change this registration.252 Because of this lack of coordination between the DIAG Joint Secretariat in Kabul and DIAG officials in charge of Jalrez, combined with the insufficient explanation to commanders in Jalrez about why these weapons were not counted, the commanders started to mistrust DIAG. Janan asserted, “Commanders’ trust in DIAG was completely missed in our district when their weapons were not counted, and no commanders in my district wanted to cooperate with DIAG anymore.”253 This lost credibility of DIAG was a huge blow to not only the Afghan authority and the Afghan government in Jalrez district, but also to the United Nations, especially to the ANBP under UNDP, which was in charge of implementing DIAG. The case of Jalrez is a typical example of how a broken promise can deteriorate trust in both peace-builders—the Afghan authority who conducted DIAG and the UN agencies which assisted their implementation.254  Worsening Security The other critical reason for noncompliance seems to be worsening security. One UN official lamented, “Jalrez has become the kingdom of insurgency; we cannot enter their place anymore.”255 According to my opinion survey, 55% of people in Jalrez district answered that their current life has 252  One former Afghan UN officer who used to be in charge of DIAG program in Jalrez told that “nobody seriously attempted to change the decision of the DIAG Joint Secretariat, because it could risk their jobs if they annoyed the DIAG Joint Secretariat.” (Author’s interview with former Afghan DIAG official who worked for Wardak on 28 June 2008.) 253 Author’s interview with Haji Mohammad Hazrad Janan on 29 May 2008. 254 This dysfunctional behavior, especially ANBP’s decision not to count disarmed weapons for DIAG in Jalrez, seems to reflect the famous theoretical assertion by Michael Barnett & Martha Finnemore who claimed in their article, “The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organization”, that “IOs often produce undesirable and even self-defeating outcomes repeatedly,” and one of the reasons for those behaviors come from the attitudes that “rather than designing the most appropriate and efficient rules and procedures to accomplish their missions, bureaucracies (of IOs) often tailor their missions to fit the existing, well-known, and comfortable rulebook.” (Barnett & Finnemore 1999, 701&720. Emphasis added.) 255 Author’s interview with an UN political affair officer on 15 June 2008 with a condition of anonymity.  84  become more dangerous compared with their life under the Taliban government.256 This is very different from Kohistan 1 and Kohband, where an overwhelming majority of people think that their lives have become safer than their lives under the Taliban government.257 Haji Ghulam Mohammed, who used to be one of the most powerful commanders in Jalrez, responded to my interview and asserted that “Jalrez is now totally out of control by the government.”258 Janan also argues that “commanders now believe that if they surrender weapons under the current conditions, their lives will be endangered. And I frankly agree with their claim on this point.”259 One commander, who used to be a commander in Jalrez and currently works in a high-ranked position in the Afghan government, insisted, I used to be a commander in Jalrez and before surrendering weapons I and other commanders were very strong. After we surrendered weapons in 2005, Taliban came to our areas. Now, even I cannot return to Jalrez because it is too insecure. Jalrez is under the control of insurgents and the Taliban.260 This widely shared perception clearly suggests that the Afghan government and the UN agencies failed in providing two important conditions that warlords or commanders believed they would gain by the involvement of the UN or after complying with DIAG: one is the economic development projects for their communities, and the other is the security conditions that the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, and ISAF were supposed to provide to their communities  256  Appendix B, Q22. The Appendix shows data for Wardak province. The date for Jalrez district is original from the survey. 86% of the respondents in Kapisa Province (Kohistan 1 and Kohband) perceived that “their daily life has become safer than their life under the Taliban government (Appendix B, Q22). 258 Author’s interview with Haji Ghulam Mohammed on 15 June 2008. 259 Author’s interview with Haji Mohammad Hazrad Janan on 29 May 2008. 260 Author’s interview with a commander who used to live in Jalrez, with a condition of anonymity, in June 2008. 257  85  after they surrendered their weapons. The lost credibility due to those broken promises is surely a huge impediment to the compliance of military and political leaders with DIAG and political programs in general in the region.  Delaying DIAG Economic Development Projects and Spreading Mistrust The analysis about reasons for noncompliance with DIAG is consistent with what I presented in the analysis about reasons for compliance in the peace-building process. The loss of confidence and credibility in the Afghan government, the United Nations, and the DIAG program in general in Jalrez district due to the broken promises made it very difficult for commanders to trust the DIAG program and to cooperate with it (no trust in the UN as a credible third party). Unfortunately, the phenomenon prominent in Jalrez district—especially the discrediting of the DIAG program among commanders due to the broken promises—was widely spreading in other districts and provinces where DIAG had been implemented. This happened because of extremely slow implementation of DIAG economic development projects after the compliance rate reached 75% in DIAG-implementing districts. This delay of providing the DIAG economic development projects even in “compliance districts” continued to create huge mistrust between the government and people (and commanders in regions), contrary to the objectives of DIAG. My research found this problem in both Kohband and Kohistan 1 Districts in Kapisa province, where commanders surrendered weapons and reached 75% compliance. In those two districts, the 86  implementation of the development projects for DIAG was so slow that commanders who cooperated with DIAG were extremely frustrated and lost their trust in DIAG. In Kohband district, more than one year passed without any implementation of DIAG development projects since commanders’ compliance reached 75% in July 2007, and in Kohistan 1 district, four months passed without any explanation about the progress of the project.261 Hassam-u-din, a commander in Kohband who surrendered more than 600 weapons, emphasized, “We have not seen any progress in DIAG development projects for the last one year. We feel that we were cheated by DIAG.”262 Meraj-u-din, the commander in Kohistan 1, seriously insisted that “I now believe that we were tricked by DIAG and UN officials. Nothing happened after we surrendered weapons.”263 Because of their mistrust and frustration, commanders in Kapisa started creating “commander unions” and started opposing the government. A UN official who covered Kapisa region was very worried about the situation: “It is a very dangerous sign for insurgency in the future. They are powerful people, and losing their trust can be very critical.”264 And this research found that this problem was not unique for Kohistan 1 and Kohband. As for the overall picture, in 40 districts where the DIAG Joint Secretary asked the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) to implement DIAG development projects because more than 75% of listed weapons were collected in those districts, only 2 districts had completed DIAG development projects as of  261 262 263 264  D & R Commission, DIAG Summery Sheet, 24 April 2011. Author’s interview with Hassam-u-din on 22 June 2008. Author’s interview with Meraj-u-din on 22 June 2008. Author’s interview with a UN official, with condition of anonymity, in 2008.  87  31 August 2008.265 It means that an overwhelming majority of compliance districts (38 out of 40 districts) had not obtained any DIAG development projects after they reached 75% compliance. When I conducted research on this issue, the problem of the slow implementation of DIAG development projects was shared by numerous important actors, such as UNDP, ANBP, UNAMA, the MRRD, and the DIAG Joint Secretariat. The case study in Kohband district revealed there were two main reasons for the delay.  Misguided Identification of DIAG Projects at the District Level The key reason for the delay of the projects was misguided identification of DIAG projects: When a district reaches 75% compliance, it is mainly the District Development Assembly in each district that identifies DIAG development projects.266 The District Development Assemblies consist of leaders from the Community Development Councils (CDC), which are community-level development councils. In many districts that faced a delay of projects, the District Development Assembly chose DIAG development projects that were much more expensive than the DIAG ceiling (150,000 USD per district). The Kohband case shows the very typical problems of implementing DIAG development projects. In Kohband, because commanders swiftly cooperated with DIAG, the district started discussion to identify the DIAG development project in early 2007.267 In this process of selecting a DIAG development project, a MRRD official in charge of implementing DIAG development projects in this district showed the list of projects written in the District Development Plan to the members of the District Development Assembly  265  Afghan D & R Commission, DIAG Implementation Progress Report, issued on 31 August 2008. Author’s interview with Masoom Stanekzai, the Vice Chairman of the D & R Commission, on 18 February 2008. 267 Author’s interview with Hayatullah Farhang, Head of MRRD office in Kapisa, who was in charge of DIAG projects in Koh Band, on 25 June 2008. 266  88  and asked them to choose a project from the list.268 The District Development Plan is mainly designed by the MRRD regional offices to identify future development projects for several years to come in each district, and the Plan is, in many cases, authorized by the District Development Assembly in each district.269 The creation of the District Development Plans across Afghanistan is a part of projects by the National Area-Based Development Program (NABDP) implemented by both UNDP and the MRRD.270 A head of the MRRD office in Kapisa used this list to guide the members of the District Development Assembly in Kohband to choose their DIAG projects.271 This action was actually guided by DIAG, as the “DIAG concept paper on Development Component” clearly asks DIAG projects to be linked with existing programs, such as NABDP. It says, “The DIAG development component will be in line with existing development initiatives (such as NABDP)….it is envisioned that DIAG…would employ the NABDP project implementation structure for delivery of some of the community projects.”272 Due to this guidance, it was reasonable for the MRRD officials to use the District Development Plan to guide the District Development Assembly to choose the DIAG project. However, the problem is that the projects on the list of the District Development Plans tend to be much more expensive than the DIAG ceiling because it is the “wish list” to advance development in each region for several years, without a financial basis. A high-ranked UNAMA officer who used to be in charge of DIAG in different parts of  268  Ibid. UNDP NABDP (National Area Based Development Program)Fact Sheet, issued on 1 May 2011. The fact sheet announced that 382 out of 402 districts across Afghanistan established District Development Assemblies, and District Development Plan have been compiled through community consultation process in these 382 districts. The District Development Plan is explained by NABDP website: http://www.undp.org.af/Projects/Report2011/nabdp/Project-NABDP-May2011-factsheet.pdf 270 Ibid. 271 Author’s interview with Hayatullah Farhang, Head of MRRD office in Kapisa, who was in charge of DIAG projects in Koh Band, on 25 June 2008. 272 Afghan D & R Commission, Concept Paper: DIAG Development Component, written in 2006. 269  89  Afghanistan used the metaphor; “the District Development Plan is the shopping list, without financial ground!”273 In April 2007, the District Development Assembly in Kohband decided to request 14 km of road construction, which is vital for their economic activities in Kohband.274 However, after the District Development Assembly chose road construction as a DIAG project, it took about 6 months just to estimate the cost of the project (the slow estimation of the cost is the second important cause for the delay of DIAG projects, as we will see later); then, the MRRD engineer teams finally presented the estimate of the cost for the road construction project and announced that it would cost about 1 million USD, while the DIAG ceiling is 150,000 USD.275 The MRRD officials in charge of the project in Kohband tried to combine the DIAG project with a Counter-Narcotics project to cover the cost, but it was rejected by the officials in charge of Counter-Narcotics because the combination of DIAG and Counter-Narcotics was still much lower than the cost of road construction.276 Giving up the road construction plan with a huge frustration, the District Development Assembly in Kohband then selected the construction of a school, but it was rejected again due to the high cost of constructing schools. In short, Kohband had wasted more than one year just in selecting the development project for DIAG.277 The mistrust among commanders due to this extreme delay of providing DIAG development  273  Author’s interview with UNAMA political affairs officer with a condition of anonymity on 28 June 2008. Author’s interview with Hayatullah Farhang, Head of MRRD office in Kapisa, on 25 June 2008. 275 Ibid. 276 Ibid. 277 I confirmed this process with MRRD officer in Kabul who is in charge of implementing DIAG development project across the country (Author’s interview with a MRRD officer in charge of DIAG development project on 27 June 2008 with a condition of anonymity.) 274  90  projects was further exacerbated by miscommunication about the budget ceiling of DIAG. In the initial stage of identification, the MRRD officials did not show the DIAG ceiling to the members of the District Development Assembly because they thought that “the ceiling of DIAG is too low to encourage the commanders to surrender weapons.”278 This attitude of providing no information about the budget ceiling of DIAG, in combination with presenting the list of District Development Plans as candidates for development projects, is almost tantamount to “cheating commanders.”279 My research also identified that this problem of misguided identification about the project prevailed widely; there were many compliance districts that requested projects with costs higher than the DIAG ceiling, and their requests were rejected after spending several months to estimate the costs; for example, the project identified in Kohistan 1 was estimated to cost 700,000 USD; the project identified in Khuram Wa Sarbagh district was estimated to cost over 1 million USD; the project identified in Bangi district was estimated to cost 400,000 USD.280 There is no doubt that the misguided initial identification was a critical cause for the delay of the DIAG development projects.  Lack of Personnel to Design Projects, Estimate Costs, and Implement Them The lack of staff to implement DIAG economic projects was also serious. It took almost 4 months just to estimate costs of identified projects, while it was possible to complete an estimate in one month in  278  Author’s interview with Hayatullah Farhang, Head of MRRD office in Kapisa, who is in charge of DIAG projects in Koh Band, on 25 June 2008. 279 When I explained this research result in Kapisa to one of the high ranked UNAMA officer, he lamented, “Oh, it is completely cheating commanders!” (Author’s interview with UN high ranked political affairs officer with a condition of anonymity on 29 June 2008.) 280 Author’s interview with a MRRD officer in charge of DIAG development project on 27 June 2008 with a condition of anonymity. This MRRD officer actually documented this situation and presented to a Minister of Rural Rehabilitation Development (Ehsan Zia); authors also accessed this document in the end of June 2008.  91  other programs.281 Thus, what often happened was that 4 or 5 months after commanders fully complied with DIAG weapons collection and districts selected DIAG development projects, commanders heard that DIAG could not implement the projects due to the budget ceiling. Because the MRRD tends to show the list of big-budget projects (such as the District Development Plan) to give commanders an incentive to surrender weapons, commanders and local leaders perceive they have been cheated.  Impacts of Delay of DIAG Projects on Credibility of the Afghan Government The fact that DIAG continued to create this sense of “cheating” and mistrust in the government is very serious because DIAG started the weapon collections in districts where commanders and people tended to be favorable to the government; the government lost the trust and confidence even in areas supportive of the government. Moreover, the slow implementation of DIAG development projects makes it difficult for the DIAG officials to persuade the commanders in newly identified districts to surrender weapons. For example, a DIAG official in charge of persuading commanders to surrender weapons in Kapisa seriously appealed to me, “This slow implementation of DIAG development projects in Kapisa is almost going to kill the whole DIAG process. Commanders in newly targeted districts always told me that ‘We know what happened to compliance districts such as Kohband or Kohistan 1: there is no development project implemented. We will not be cheated by DIAG!’”282 He also lamented, “I am also threatened by  281 282  Author’s interview with a MRRD officer in charge of DIAG development project on 27 June 2008 with a condition of anonymity. Author’s interview with one of the IAG officials in charges of Kapisa, with a condition of anonymity, in June 2008.  92  commanders in Kohband and Kohistan 1 who have already surrendered weapons because there is no project implemented. Those commanders are losing trust and popularity of their people.”283  Implication of DIAG on Legitimacy Construction and Results This practice represents the typical problems of legitimacy construction. The creation of over-expectations without a clear explanation about the budget ceiling, as well as the lack of explanation about the slow implementation of development projects, just keeps eroding the credibility of the domestic government and the international actors in charge of DIAG, making compliance extremely difficult and eroding the legitimacy of the Afghan government in reciprocal ways. When I completed my field research in Afghanistan in 2008, it was obvious that it was urgent to change the practice of implementing DIAG development projects so that DIAG, the Afghan government, and international actors such as the UN agencies might restore the trust of commanders and people. From the analyses above, I recommended the following strategy in my report to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.284 (1) In order to make proper identification in the initial stage, the DIAG Joint Secretariat and the MRRD should create a list of projects that can be implemented within the DIAG ceiling and distribute it to each district so that the District Development Assemblies can choose proper projects in the initial identification. It would also be very beneficial if the MRRD could dispatch one engineer to guide the  283  Ibid. I presented the report titled “Challenge of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Case of Afghanistan” to the Best Practices Section in the Department of Peacekeeping Operation at the UN Headquarters and conducted my presentation in the section on 8 October 2008; the report is currently posted in the website of the Best Practices Section; http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/library.aspx?ot=2&cat=34&menukey=_4_3 (Higashi, 2008) 284  93  discussion of the District Development Assembly and give them proper estimates and suggestions for selecting projects. It is also important to explain the DIAG ceiling from the beginning; the projects might be modest, but it is critical to give an honest explanation and to implement projects very quickly so that it can enhance the creation of trust between the government and local political leaders (and people); that is the ultimate goal of DIAG. (2) In order to speed up the implementation, it is also important to increase the DIAG staff to implement DIAG development projects, including experts in designing projects, estimating costs, and procuring materials for projects. Although the report obtained the attention of a wide range of UN practitioners and Afghan government officials, the recommendation to DIAG was not implemented in a serious manner, except for increasing four staff in MRRD who were specifically responsible for implementing DIAG economic development projects.285 DIAG also increased the budget ceiling from 150,000 USD to 300,000 USD at the end of 2008.286 However, this created another problem as it generated a disparity between the districts with early compliance and the districts with later compliance. As a result, DIAG was completed in March 2011 without achieving the original purpose, which was to monopolize the legitimate use of force within a state. With regard to the “compliance districts,” only 103 districts out of 402 districts in Afghanistan achieved the 75% compliance rate.287 The data demonstrate how the DIAG implementation was delayed and deterred by the bad reputation of DIAG  285  In my report on Afghanistan, I made policy recommendation mainly on two issues; one is about DIAG and the second is about creating a new reconciliation program. The second one was more directly adopted by the international community, including the Afghan government as you will see in the next section. 286 Author’s conversation with DIAG official who was acting director of DIAG in 2010. This practice was also confirmed by the Japan embassy which was a major sponsor for DIAG. 287 UNDP Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups First Quarter Progress Report 2011, 1.  94  concerning the implementation of DIAG economic development projects as well as by the worsening security conditions across Afghanistan. In the first three years of DIAG implementation (from June 2005 to August 2008), 41,183 weapons were collected by DIAG programs; in the next two-and-a-half years (from August 2008 to March 2011), only 13,981 weapons were collected (the total weapons collected by DIAG is 55,164).288 Moreover, out of 103 compliance districts, the DIAG economic development projects were completed in only 33 districts as of March 2011.289 It means that in only 32% of compliance districts the promised DIAG development projects were completed; it is a huge problem how the other 68% of compliance districts will obtain DIAG development projects in the future.290 At the same time, DIAG itself was not planned to change the regaining insurgency in Afghanistan, which has become a critical impediment for the Afghan reconstruction and the creation of legitimate government. As one UN high-ranked official asserted in 2008, “DIAG without reconciliation is meaningless. We need to have a comprehensive approach in advancing DIAG and reconciliation together; otherwise, it cannot work.”291 In order to address this security issue caused by insurgency, this dissertation proceeds to analyze the issue of reconciliation in the next chapter.  288  Ibid. Ibid., 1, 13. 290 MRRD has plan to implement DIAG economic development projects as long as the fund remains; but one of MRRD officer admitted that there is no sufficient fund to implement DIAG economic development projects in all 103 compliance districts. (Author’s conversation with one of MRRD officers covering DIAG, with a condition of anonymity in August 2010.) 291 Author’s interview with a UN high-ranked official, with a condition of anonymity, in June 2008. 289  95  4  Worsening Security Conditions and Reconciliation  Efforts: Noncompliance of the Insurgency with the Government and Its Rules 10-Year Security Trend Since the U.S. attack on Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime in 2001, the security conditions in Afghanistan have continued to worsen. This chapter deals with security conditions as indicators of compliance with the new constitution adopted by the current Afghan government because insurgent attacks are a clear indication of rejection of the rules defined by the new government. While the Afghan people enjoyed relatively stable security conditions across the country for the first two or three years in the aftermath of the 2001 attack, the security situation has deteriorated since then. There are numerous indicators that show this trend. For instance, the number of deaths of U.S. forces has been sharply rising, especially after 2005, as you can see in the graph and data below (Figure 4.1), which shows the 10 years’ trend of security conditions in Afghanistan since 2001:  96  Figure 4.1 Number of Deaths of U.S. Troops 2001-2010292  500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010  Moreover, due to increasing fighting between the pro-government forces (Afghan security forces and international forces led by the U.S.) and the antigovernment forces led by the Taliban, the number of civilian casualties also continues to rise. UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) and the Afghanistan Independent Human Right Commission have been recording the number of civilian deaths across Afghanistan since 2007.293 According to their reports, the number of civilian deaths is shown as below (Figure 4.2):294  292  Brookings Institute, “Afghan Index,” on 31 August 2001, 11. The graph is made by the author. UNAMA and the Afghanistan Independent Human Right Commission published “Afghanistan, Annual Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict” in 2008, 2009, and 2010. The data here comes from those three reports. 294 Ibid. The graph is made by the author. 293  97  Figure 4.2 Recorded Deaths of Civilians in Afghanistan  3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 2007  2008  2009  2010  Several graphic data also demonstrate how rapidly the government-controlled area has been shrinking and how the area controlled by the insurgency has been expanding. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the accessibility by aid workers in 2005 and 2007. 295  295  Senlis Afghanistan 2008, 27.  98  Figure 4.1 UN Accessibility Maps for Aid Workers in Afghanistan in 2005 and 2007  296  By showing these maps, the Senlis Council contended in its 2008 report that “as a leaked United Nations map of December 2007 revealed, the areas considered of ‘extreme risk’ to aid workers have increased considerably since 2005.”297  296  Ibid. Senlis claims that it obtained the leaked UN risk map, which shows the risk to aid workers. Ibid. The author also had a chance during the 2008 field research in Afghanistan to see the UN accessibility maps since 2004 due to the cooperation of the UN political affairs officer and confirmed the same trend shown in these maps. 297  99  Anthony Cordesman and Arleigh Burke published the report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a prominent American think tank, and published the 2008 UN Accessibility Map, as shown below (Figure 4.2).298 Figure 4.2 UN Accessibility Map in 2008  This 2008 UN Accessibility Map explicitly demonstrates how the areas with extreme risk have been rapidly expanding since 2005; by 2008, almost half of Afghanistan—mainly in the Southern and Eastern regions—was not accessible to UN and Afghan government workers; areas of “extreme risk” basically means the places UN or government officials cannot access the area due to a high security threat. Finally, the Wall Street Journal published the UN’s confidential “residual risk accessibility” maps as of March and October 2010, as below (Figure 4.3):299 298  Cordesman & Burke 2009, 21. Wall Street Journal, “UN Map Out Afghan Security,” 26 December 2010. The article is available from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203568004576043842922347526.html (Accessed 18 Oct 2011.) 299  100  Figure 4.3 UN Risk Assessment Map in 2010  In this UN security risk assessment (or accessibility assessment), “very high risk” (or extreme risk) suggests the areas controlled by the Taliban or criminals; “high risk” suggests the areas in which the Taliban or criminals are freely moving and intimidating the population; “medium risk” shows the areas where heavy escort is required and government and aid agencies may face risk in humanitarian operations, except district centers; “low risk” indicates the area where movement in armored vehicles is possible and humanitarian agencies can operate, while escorts might be needed in some areas.300 The Wall Street Journal published in December, 2010 claims that “internal United Nations maps show a marked deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan.”301 Although the publishers are different for each map and the styles may be slightly different, these maps created in different years (2005, 2007, 2008, and 2010)—all of which became public on the Internet—clearly demonstrate how the territory that the Afghan government effectively controls has been shrinking; the area that is accessible by the government officials, international staff, and aid workers has 300 301  Author’s interview with a UN Political Affairs Officer in Kabul with a condition of anonymity in November 2010. Wall Street Journal, “UN Map Out Afghan Security,” 26 December 2010.  101  continued to shrink over the last several years. These accessibility maps, together with numerical data such as the number of U.S. forces killed and the number of Afghan civilian deaths, constantly demonstrates that security conditions have seriously been deteriorating in Afghanistan.  Increased Level of the Afghan Security Forces and International Forces Paradoxically, the level of the Afghan security forces (combining the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police) has been increasing since the Bonn Conference in 2001, and the level of the international forces led by the United States had also constantly increased in the last 10 years until July, 2011. The numbers of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and the total Afghan National Security forces (ANSF = ANA + ANP) are as follows (Figure 4.3); Figure 4.3 Number of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF = ANA + ANP)302 350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0  2003  302  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  Brookings Institute, “Afghanistan Index,” 31 August 2011, 6.  102  Year  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  ANA  6,000  24,000  26,000  36,000  50,000  68,000  100,131  149,533  164,003  ANP  0  33,000  40,000  49,700  75,000  79,910  94,958  116,856  122,000  ANSF  6,000  57,000  66,000  86,000  125,000  147,910  195,089  266,389  286,003  The data and graph below demonstrate (Figure 4.4) American forces deployed in Afghanistan: Figure 4.4 Number of American Troops Deployed to Afghanistan  303  120000 100000 80000 60000  40000 20000 0 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  The figures of American forces above include troops under the command of ISAF (International Security Assistance Forces) and the command of Operation Enduring Freedom (counter-terrorism operation): for instance, in 2010, about 30,000 American forces deployed to Afghanistan were under the command of Operation Enduring Freedom, and the rest (about 70,000) were under the command of  303  Brookings Institute, “Afghanistan Index”, 30 April 2011, 4. The figures are the numbers as of April in those years.  103  ISAF.304 In addition to the Afghan National Security Forces and American troops, there are non-American foreign troops deployed to Afghanistan; as of 2011, more than 40 states have participated in the International Security Assistance Forces.305 Here is the data of the non-American foreign troops deployed to Afghanistan since 2001 (Figure 4.5): Figure 4.5 Non-American Foreign Troops Deployed to Afghanistan306 45000 40000 35000 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  In sum, the increase of pro-Afghan government forces in the last decade is striking. The total number of Afghan National Security Forces (ANA + ANP) and the international forces (U.S. forces + non-American forces) deployed to Afghanistan was approximately 20,000 in 2003; it jumped to 428,000 in 2011.307  304  Brookings Institute, “Afghanistan Index,” 31 August 2011, 5. Brookings Institute, “Afghanistan Index,” 31 August 2011, 5. The exact number of foreign states participating in ISAF varies, depending on the month. In August, 2011, 46 states other than the U.S. participated in ISAF. 306 Brookings Institute, “Afghanistan Index,” 31 August 2011, 4. The number for each year is the number as of April or May (depending on the available data) in that year. 307 Brookings Institute, “Afghanistan Index”, 30 April 2011, 4, 6. 305  104  The question is why security conditions in Afghanistan have worsened so drastically when the number of pro-Afghan government forces has risen so dramatically. The next section will examine this fundamental question.  Analysis on Worsening Security: Coercive-Centric Account One of the prominent arguments about the worsening security in Afghanistan is provided by Seth G. Jones, who asserted in 2008 in the journal International Security that weak governance is the major cause of the rising insurgency in Afghanistan. He argues, “The Afghan government was unable to provide basic services to the population; its security forces were too weak to establish law and order; and too few international forces were available to fill the gap.”308 Jones asserted that the major reason for the increase in insurgency in Afghanistan is poor governance in rural areas.309 Rejecting the arguments that the Afghan insurgency is driven by ethnic grievances or greed, he argued that because the Afghan government cannot extend “governance” (providing essential services, law, and order) into rural areas, the insurgents are increasing in the areas of weak governance—the rural areas in Afghanistan: “the new Afghan government was unable to provide essential services to the population, especially in rural areas of the country. . . . The Afghan government was also unable to provide security outside of the capital.”310 The major beneficiaries of foreign assistance  308  Jones 2008, 8. Ibid., 15-26. On the governance in rural areas, Zenkevicius also asserted by focusing on the Afghan National Police (ANP) that “Most strikingly, more than 50% of the provincial police force is located in the provincial capital, not in the districts and this does not allow ensuring security for vast rural areas…This deployment reflects the trends in the whole ANP deployments in some manner - some 25% of the ANP are deployed in Kabul or areas around Kabul...This is why the ANP deployment is thin at the district level.” (Zenkevicius 2007, 41). Roberts emphasized the need to expand the Afghan army to provide security in the areas from which the Taliban have been expelled, as well as to seek cooperation with local forces and to expand aid and development programs in poor areas in Afghanistan (Roberts 2009, 54 ). 310 Jones 2008, 20-22. 309  105  were “the urban elite,” and “this disparity triggered deep-seated frustration and resentment among the rural population.”311 In sum, the rural population in Afghanistan suffers from insurgency because poor governance in rural areas “increases the likelihood of an insurgency.”312 As a logical conclusion to this assessment, he offered three policy recommendations: (1) to extend the Afghan governance into rural areas; (2) to increase the security forces of both the Afghan government and the international actors, mainly the U.S.; and (3) to capture or kill jihadists who are hidden in Pakistan.313 Jones’s argument resonates with the traditional strategy of the U.S. forces since 2001, which had been dominant in fighting the insurgency in Afghanistan until 2010 when it started considering reconciliation efforts with the insurgency: General David McKiernan, the former U.S. commander in Afghanistan serving from June, 2008 to June, 2009, emphasized the need to improve “governance” at all levels in Afghanistan, to increase “forces” (both Afghan and international forces) to counter the insurgency, and to address “military sanctuaries” in Pakistan.314 These accounts about reasons for the worsening security and policy recommendations by Jones and other U.S. commanders like McKiernan are very consistent with what I call the “coercive and resource distribution-centric approach,” which I presented in Chapter 2. Jones emphasizes the need to extend basic services into rural areas (resource distribution) and to increase Afghan and international forces (coercion) so that the Afghan government can effectively govern the entire populace across the country. In other words, increasing the levels of resource and forces—again, money and guns—is crucial in 311 312 313 314  Ibid., 20. Ibid., p. 17. Ibid., pp. 38-39. McKiernan 2008, 132.  106  establishing a strong government that can control the Afghan people in both rural and urban areas.315  Alternative Account: Consistent Gap between Pashtun and Non-Pashtun I argue that the accounts by Jones and other mainstream coercive-centric analysts missed a critical empirical fact underpinning the insurgency in Afghanistan. In fact, a sharp security divergence exists not between “urban and rural areas,” but between the areas dominated by Pashtun people—who make up 45% to 50% of the Afghan population and mainly live in the southern part of Afghanistan—and the areas dominated by other ethnic groups, such as Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara, who mainly live in northern and central Afghanistan. And it is the Pashtun-dominated areas where people suffer most from both insurgent attacks and general security problems (homicide, looting, arson, etc.), as well as poor basic services. There is much evidence to support this postulated gap. With regard to “insurgent attacks,” the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) published the average daily number of insurgent-initiated attacks in each province from January 1, 2009 to April 30, 2009.316 The data shown in Table 4.1 clearly suggests that the overwhelming majority of insurgent attacks occur in the southwest, southeast, or eastern region where the Pashtun people are the overwhelming majority. 317 All provinces with an average of  315  There are numerous arguments in the literature that emphasize these same three policies to tackle insurgency in Afghanistan. On the level of U.S. forces and its counter-insurgency strategy, see Adam Roberts, “Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan,” Survival, Vol. 51, No.1 (February 2009), pp. 35-37. With regard to the lack of capability of Afghan security forces, including the Afghan National Police, see Gintautas Zenkevicius, ”Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Rebuilding Afghanistan – Is That Post-Conflict Reconstruction?” Baltic Security & Defence Review, Vol. 9 (2007), pp. 41-45. See also William Rosenau, “Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan,” Harvard International Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Spring 2009), pp. 52-56. In terms of a historical analysis of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the safe haven in Pakistan, see Amin Saikal, “Securing Afghanistan’s Border,” Survival, Vol. 48, No 1 (March 2006), pp. 129-142. Regarding general recommendations about the weak government in Afghanistan, see Barnett Rubin & Humayun Hamidzada, “From Bohn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 14, No. 1, (March 2007), pp. 8-25. 316 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 2009, Unclassified Metrics, issued in April 2009, 3. 317 There is no official demographic data in Afghanistan as there has been no national census since 1979. However, it is possible to estimate the dominance of Pashtun people by other sources. For example, the Asia Foundation conducted an opinion survey with 6,593 Afghan villagers by  107  more than one insurgent attack per day are located in these regions. Table 4.1  Average Daily Insurgent-Initiated Attacks (By Province) Jan 1 – April 30, 2009318 Province Helmand Kandahar Kunar Khost Paktika Uruzgan Zabul Ghazni Farah Kunduz Wardak Nangarhar Kabul Herat Badghis Nuristan Lowgar Laghman Paktya Nimroz Kapisa Balkh Faryab Badakhshan Baghlan Takhar Parwan Jawzjan  Region 319 Southwest Southwest East Southeast Southeast Southwest Southwest Southeast West Northeast Central/Kabul East Central/Kabul West West East Central/Kabul East Southeast Southwest Central/Kabul Northwest Northwest Northeast Northeast Northeast Central/ Kabul Northwest  Average Daily Attacks 10.6 4.5 3.9 2.0 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  random sampling in all 34 provinces in 2008 (The Asia Foundation, 2008). I obtained the original dataset of the surveys due to the special cooperation by the Asia Foundation. In all nine provinces in southeast and southwest regions, 84% of respondents used the Pashtun language to answer questions, while only 16% used the Dari language. It suggests that an overwhelming majority in the southern region speak Pashtun as their primary language. (Afghanistan has two official languages: Pashtun that Pashtun people use, and Dari that Tajik people and other ethnic people use. ) It is also commonly understood by Afghan and international officials that the dominant ethnicity in southwest, southeast, and eastern Afghanistan is Pashtun. 318 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 2009, Unclassified Metrics, issued in April 2009, 3. 319 With regard to “region”, I use the regional division introduced by A Survey of the Afghan People in 2008 (Unclassified Metrics by ISAF does not show the regional division in Afghanistan.)  108  Province Ghor Bamyan Sari Pul Day Kundi Panjshir Samangan  Region 319 West Central/ Hazara Northwest Central/ Hazara Central/ Kabul Northwest  Average Daily Attacks 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  On the other hand, all twelve provinces with less than 0.1 insurgent attacks per day are located in the rest of the regions, mainly the north and central regions, where other ethnic people, such as Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara, live.320 In short, the ISAF data on the average number of daily insurgent attacks show that the Afghan people who live in Pashtun-dominated areas are suffering most from the insurgent attacks, while people in the other ethnic-dominated areas tend to be safe from the insurgency. An ABC News/BBC/ARD poll that was announced in February 2009 indicated the same trend.321 Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, published the results of the survey about Afghan experiences of insurgent attacks in critical provinces.322 According to this report, the majority of Afghan people in Pashtun-dominated areas were aware of activities by the Taliban; for example, 90% of respondents in Helmand, 60% in Kandahar, and 51% in Wardak (central but Pashtun-dominated provinces) were aware of bombings by the Taliban.323 On the other hand, only 11% in Kunduz province (northeast) and 4% in Balkh province (northeast) were aware of bombings by the Taliban.324 The different levels of attacks and violence caused by military conflicts also influence the level of civilian deaths in different regions. According to the “2010 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in 320  In these twelve provinces, 97% of respondents answered questions in the Dari language while the other 3% answered in different languages (such as Hazara or Uzbek), but no one used the Pashtun language. 321 ABC News/BBC/ARD POLL 2009, 9. The survey conducted interviews with 1,534 Afghan people across the country. 322 Langer 2009. 323 Ibid. See the section, “Taliban Bombings by Province.” 324 Ibid. See the section, “Taliban Bombings by Province.”  109  Armed Conflict,” there are huge differences among the different regions with regard to civilian deaths caused by military conflicts between pro-government forces and antigovernment forces, as shown in Figure 4.6:325 Figure 4.6 Recorded Civilian Deaths in 2010 in Afghanistan by Region  Central Highlands  North North East West Central East South East South 0  200  400  600  800  1000  1200  1400  Those various data clearly suggest there is a huge divergence between Pashtun-dominated areas and other ethnic-dominated areas with regard to the level of insurgency, violence, and casualties. Additionally, there is a huge gap in the perceptions of general security conditions (including ordinary crimes) between Pashtun-dominated areas and other ethnic-dominated areas in Afghanistan. The data by The Asia Foundation’s surveys in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 clearly suggest this divergence. The Asia Foundation, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (US AID), has conducted more than 6,000 opinion surveys across Afghanistan since 2006 and gives us informative data and trends of the perceptions of Afghan people. Due to the special cooperation from the  325  UNAMA and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 2011, xi.  110  Asia Foundation on this research, I was able to obtain a full data set of the opinion surveys, including the different results by different regions as well as by different ethnic people, such as Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara and others.326 According to the survey conducted in 2010, 34% of people surveyed in the South Western region answered that the security situation in the village they live in is “very bad,” and 29% of them answered it is “quite bad.” (In the surveys by the Asian Foundation, “very bad” is worse than “quite bad”.)327 The trend is the same in the South Eastern region, where 26% of people surveyed answered that their security situation is “very bad,” and 31% of them answered it is “quite bad.” On the other hand, only 8% of people surveyed in the North East region and 5% of people surveyed in the North West regions answered their security situation is “very bad,” and only 18% in the North East and 9% in the North West region answered it is “quite bad.” The graph which shows the responses “quite bad” and “very bad” by different regions clearly shows the divergence of the perception of the security situation in Afghanistan (Figure 4.7).  326  Asia Foundation, “A survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2010”, and “Afghanistan in 2009”, “Afghanistan in 2008”, Afghanistan in 2007”, and “Afghanistan in 2006.” 327 Original data set by Asia Foundation, “A survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2010”. The survey in 2010 conducted interviews with 6467 Afghan people in all 34 provinces in Afghanistan.  111  Figure 4.7 Perception of the Security Situation in Afghanistan by Region, 2010328  35% 30% 25% 20% 15%  Quite bad  10%  Very bad  5% 0%  This gap of perception on their security conditions between Pashtun-dominated areas and other ethnic-dominated areas can also be directly shown in the data about the perception by different ethnic groups: For instance, 28% of Pashtuns surveyed answered that their security is “quite bad,” and 22% of Pashtuns surveyed answered it is “very bad,” while only 16% of Tajiks surveyed answered it is “quite bad” and 6% of them said that it is “very bad.” The results by the four major ethnic groups and the total of other minor ethnic groups are shown below (Figure 4.8):  328  Ibid. “A survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2010” clarifies provinces belonging to each region: “South West” has five provinces named Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz, Uruzgan, and Zabul; “South East” has Ghazni, Paktika, Paktya, and Khost; “East” has Nangahar, Kunar, Laghman, and Nuristan; “Central” has Kabul, Wardak, Logar, Parwan, Kapisa, and Panjsher; “West” has Herat, Farah, Badghis, and Ghor; “North East” has Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, and Badakhshan; “North West” has Balkh, Samangan, Sari Pui, Faryab, and Jawzjan; “Central Highland” has Bamyan and Daykundi.  112  Figure 4.8 Security Perception in Afghanistan in 2010, by Ethnicity329  30% 25% 20% Quite bad  15%  Very bad 10% 5% 0% Pashtun  Very Good Quite Good Quite Bad Very Bad  Tajik  Pashtun 16% 34% 28% 22%  Uzbek  Hazara  Tajik 39% 38% 16% 6%  Other  Uzbek 29% 53% 12% 4%  Hazara 34% 42% 11% 11%  Other 21% 48% 19% 10%  This gap between Pashtun-dominated areas and other ethnic-dominated areas has been consistent in the last several year; here is the graph of “quite bad” and “very bad” by different ethnic groups in 2008 (Figure 4.9).  329  Original data set by Asia Foundation, “A survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2010”. According to this original data, among 6467 respondents to the 2010 survey, 42% of the respondents are Pashtun, 31% of the respondents are Tajik, 9% of the respondents are Uzbek, 10% of the respondents are Hazara. “Other” consists of Turkmen (2%), Baloch (1%), Nuristan (1%), Aimak (2%), Arab (1%), and others. Although there has been no national census in Afghanistan since the 1970s, it seems consistent with the ratio of ethnic groups, as the selection of respondents was strictly random, according to the Asia Foundation.  113  Figure 4.9 Security Situation in Afghanistan in 2008, by Ethnicity330  30% 25% 20% Quite bad  15%  Very bad 10% 5% 0% Pashtun  Tajik  Uzbek  Hazara  Other  By observing this consistent trend, the report of the Asia Foundation in 2008 asserted, “these findings suggest that the security situation in Afghanistan is becoming more polarized with some places feeling secure most of the time and others experiencing a relatively consistent level of insecurity.”331 This consistent security gap appears to be associated with the gap in economic conditions between Pashtun and non-Pashtun regions. The result of the Asia Foundation survey clearly shows a consistent trend: the regions having an overwhelming majority of Pashtun people, such as regions in South West, South East, and East, have more people feeling that their lives are “less” prosperous compared with their lives during the Taliban than people feeling that their lives are “more” prosperous. On the other hand, in the other regions that have a majority of non-Pashtun ethnic groups, more people feel that their lives have become “more” prosperous than their lives under the control of the Taliban. You will see the graph showing the result below (Figure 4.10): 330 331  Original data set by Asia Foundation, “A survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2008”. The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2008, 29.  114  Figure 4.10 “More” or “Less” Prosperous in 2010 Compared with Taliban Period, by Region332 60% 50% 40% 30% 20%  More Prosperous  10%  Less Prosperous  0%  This result can be shown in the data by different ethnic groups too, as demonstrated below (Figure 4.11): Figure 4.11 Ethnicity333  “More” or “Less” Prosperous in 2010 Compared with Taliban Period, by  60% 50% 40% More Prosperous  30%  Less Prosperous 20% 10% 0% Pashtun  332 333  Tajik  Uzbek  Hazara  Other  Ibid. The question also has an option of “about as prosperous” so that the total of “less” and “more” prosperous does not add up to 100%. Original data set by Asia Foundation, “A survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2010.” The graph is made by the author.  115  More prosperous Less prosperous About as prosperous Absent during Taliban/Refused/Do not know  Pashtun 28% 41% 24% 7%  Tajik 51% 33% 10% 6%  Uzbek 53% 33% 10% 3%  Hazara 54% 27% 11% 9%  Other 43% 37% 13% 7%  This trend has been consistent in the last few years since the Pashtun-dominated areas became more risky and dangerous than other regions around 2005 or 2006; here is the result of the same questions in 2008 (Figure 4.12): Figure 4.12 Ethnicity334  “More” or “Less” Prosperous in 2008 Compared with Taliban Period, by  50% 45% 40% 35% 30%  More Prosperous  25%  Less Prosperous  20% 15%  10% 5% 0% Pashtun  Tajik  Uzbek  Hazara  Other  Introducing these results, the Asia Foundation’s 2008 report concludes, “This is a significant indication that [people] in these regions, in which the majority of the population is Pashtun, feel more  334  Original data set by Asia Foundation, “A survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2008.” The graph is made by the author.  116  relatively disadvantaged by the current economic situation than other groups.”335 Although the Asia Foundation surveys have never compared the security situation under the current government with the situation under the Taliban regime, I asked this comparison in my opinion survey conducted in 2008 in three provinces in Afghanistan: Kandahar (central city in Southern region and all respondents were Pashtun), Wardak (central province one hour’s drive from Kabul and all respondents were Pashtun), and Kapisa (other central province and all respondents were Tajik). I asked, “Do you think your daily life has become more dangerous under the current Afghan government, compared with your daily life under the Taliban government?” 74% of the respondents surveyed in Kandahar and 64% of those in Wardak (thus Pashtun) answered “Yes, my daily life has become more dangerous under the current government than under the Taliban,” while only 6% of the respondents surveyed in Kapisa (thus Tajik) answered so; in sharp contrast, 86% of the respondents in Kapisa answered “No, my daily life has become less dangerous (become safer) under the current government than under the Taliban,” as you can see in Table 4.2.336 Table 4.2  Opinion Surveys on Security Comparison in Three Different Provinces  Do you think your daily life has become more dangerous under the current Afghan government, compared with your daily life under the Taliban government? Kandahar Wardak Kapisa (Pashtun) (Pashtun) (Tajik) Yes, my daily life has become more dangerous under the current 73.5% 63.7% 5.6% government than under the Taliban. No, my daily life has become less dangerous (become safer) under the 26.5% 25.5% 86.0% current government than under the Taliban. I feel as safe under the current police and army as under the Taliban. 0 10.8% 8.4% 335 336  The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2008, p. 40. It is the result of Question 22 in Appendix B. (Opinion Survey in 2008 in Afghanistan).  117  These data firmly suggest that there is a substantial gap between people living in Pashtun-dominated areas and people living in other ethnic-dominated areas regarding both security and economic conditions. In fact, the majority of Pashtun people are in what an international security officer calls an “insecurity-underdevelopment trap.”337 Because there is insufficient security for the government and international actors to implement development projects, people in these areas feel more disadvantaged and isolated from the reconstruction process. This isolation and underdevelopment pushes a number of people to be more supportive of insurgent movements, and the increasing strength of the insurgency makes it more difficult for the government to go to these areas and implement development projects. The head of the Kandahar office of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) lamented, It is getting difficult for us to go to rural areas in southern Afghanistan. In Kandahar province, the districts such as Panjawaii, Khakrez, and Maywand are totally shut down and we cannot have any access. . . . As the government cannot implement development projects, more people lose their trust in the government and become more vulnerable to the insurgency. It is a really vicious circle.338 This significant gap between the Pashtun-dominated areas, such as the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, and the non-Pashtun areas, such as the north and central highland areas, in terms of security and development exposes an unexplained aspect of Jones’s argument: Jones’s article claimed that there is a substantial gap between “urban” and “rural” areas due to the weak governance in rural areas; however, the expanding gap in Afghanistan actually exists not between urban and rural but between  337  Author’s interview with a senior UN official in charge of security issues in the southern part of Afghanistan on 8 June 2008. Author’s interview with Engineer Ashna, the head of Kandahar office in Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), Kandahar, on 10 June 2008. 338  118  Pashtun-dominated areas and other ethnic-dominated areas, as examined above. “Weak governance” alone cannot explain why this critical gap exists and continues to expand when the same Afghan government governs both areas. Certainly, people living in Pashtun-dominated areas are suffering from the “insecurityunderdevelopment trap,” compared with the rest of Afghanistan. Why does the level of governance for providing security and development vary so largely within Afghanistan?  Missed Opportunities? Reconciliation in Afghanistan I argue that this gap between Pashtun-dominated areas and the other ethnic-dominated areas is primarily because there was no credible political reconciliation process with the insurgency in Afghanistan. As there was no reconciliation mechanism by the international community and the Karzai government that included the Taliban in the political process of the new Afghan government, the Taliban started a new insurgency and penetrated the Pashtun-dominated areas where people speak the same language and are more easily accessible and influenced by the Taliban, compared with other ethnic groups. As a result, the security conditions keep deteriorating due to the increasing insurgency in Pashtun-dominated areas, and worsening security hampers the Afghan government and international actors from implementing development projects in those regions. This vicious circle makes a number of Afghans less supportive of the government and more cooperative with the insurgency.339  339  There are a few contributions in the academic literature that have called for reconciliation or political negotiation with insurgents in Afghanistan, although none of them has provided a detailed analysis of the existing reconciliation program in Afghanistan (the “PTS program”) as described later in this thesis. With respect to the political terms of reconciliation, Rubin and Rashid argued that a framework for possible political settlement is the agreement that Afghan insurgents prohibit the use of their territory for international terrorism in exchange for an end to the United States and NATO military operation (Rubin & Rashid 2008). On the historical nature of Afghan militants, Christia & Semple asserted, “Changing sides, realigning, flipping – whatever one wants to call it – is the Afghan way of war”; thus, it is effective to offer reconciliation to the majority of insurgents (Christia & Semple 2009, 36). Likewise, Rais concluded that although he believes that military means are necessary to overcome the Afghan insurgency, they need to be complemented by political negotiation with all groups (Rais 2008, 205-216).  119  Surprisingly, a majority of top leaders of the Afghan government and UN officials share the view that they could have reconciled with the insurgency in Afghanistan, including most of the Taliban members, if there had been serious reconciliation efforts in 2002 or 2003. This was when the Afghan people had a strong hope for their future, under much better security conditions when the Taliban was very weak and marginalized. Under those conditions, top officials believe that substantial factions of the Taliban would have surrendered their weapons and participated in the political process, including national elections, and stopped the insurgent attacks. Lakhdar Brahimi, the former UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Afghanistan who was a major architect of the Bonn Agreement in 2001 and served Afghanistan as the SRSG until 2004, expressed in retrospect that it was the biggest mistake for him not to engage with the Taliban in 2002 or 2003. He asserted, “One of my own biggest mistakes was not to speak to the Taliban in 2002 and 2003. It was not possible to get them in the tent at the Bonn Conference because of 9/11. . . . But immediately after that, we should have spoken to those who were willing to speak to us.”340 Regretting that he and the international community did not approach the Taliban after the Bonn conference, he concluded, “if we had gone to the Taliban then [just after the Bonn agreement]—they were demoralized, scattered all over the place—they would have appreciated that and many of them may very well have joined the political process. But we didn’t.”341 I repeated the question on this critical potential missed opportunity to various actors in Afghanistan during my field research. Although there are nuanced differences in terms of the reasons for 340 341  Toronto Star interview with Lakhdar Brahimi, “Expert Advice on Afghanistan,” 14 September 2006. Radio Free Europe interview with Lakhdar Brahimi, “Afghan Bonn Architect Says People’s Needs Have Been Forgotten,” 16 December 2008.  120  would-be reconciliation, there is a striking consensus among leaders of the Afghan government and UN officials that the reconciliation would have been much easier in the earlier stages of Afghan peacebuilding. For instance, Jelani Popal, the Director-General of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), agreed with Brahimi’s assertion: In 2002 and 2003, reconciliation was possible because the government was strong, the security in Afghanistan was good, and the Taliban was very weak . . . Personally, I believe that reconciliation can work only when you are in a strong position. When you are weak, reconciliation is difficult. . . Unfortunately, when the Taliban was weak, we did not make any efforts to include them.342 Eishen Zia, the Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (in 2008), who was very pessimistic about reconciliation with the Taliban in 2008, still asserted, “Brahimi’s argument was valid at that time, I mean, in 2002 and 2003, because at that time, al-Qaida was on the run, and the Taliban was on the run. It was easily possible, but we missed it.”343 Masoom Stanekzai, the advisor to the president and No. 1 Afghan official in charge of Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG)—who later became the minister in charge of the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program, a new reconciliation program established in 2010—concurred in 2008: The timing must be critical for the peacebuilding and reconciliation. One of the biggest lessons from Afghan peacebuilding is that both the Afghan government and the international community did not start the reconciliation effort with the Taliban in 2002, 2003, or even 2004; the international community did not listen to us. . . . It was so easy, for example in 2003, to reconcile or regroup the Taliban. 342 343  Author’s interview with Jelani Popal, the Director-General of Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), on 4 June 2008. Author’s interview with Ehsan Zia, the Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), on 31 May 2008.  121  It was the biggest missed opportunity.344 In fact, there are several pieces of evidence that suggest that there were actual offers of reconciliation from the Taliban leadership in those days. For instance, Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashidjointly wrote that “Senior officials of the Afghan government say that at least through 2004 they repeatedly received overtures from senior Taliban leaders but that they could never guarantee that these leaders would not be captured by U.S. forces and detained at Guantanamo Bay or the U.S. air base at Bagram, in Afghanistan.”345 Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, researchers based in Kandahar following the Taliban insurgency and the history of southern Afghanistan over the past four decades, assert that there was a critical meeting by the Taliban leadership offering reconciliation with the Karzai government in November, 2002, according to the Taliban member who attend the meeting. Linschoten and Kuehn wrote, In November 2002, senior Taliban figures gathered in Pakistan and considered the possibility of political engagement and reconciliation with the new Afghan government. One participant later described the meeting: “Mullah Mohammad Omar was not there, but everyone else was, all the high-ranking ministers and cabinet members of the Taliban. We discussed where to join the political process in Afghanistan or not and we took a decision that, yes, we should go and join the process.”346 According to Linschoten and Kuehn, “one interlocutor who was asked to engage with this group has since stated that this was an important moment for the Taliban leadership; if they had been given some 344  Author’s interview with Masoom Stanekzai, advisor to President & Vice Chairman of Disarmament and Reintegration (D&R) Committee, on 18 February 2008. 345 Rubbin & Rashid 2008, 39. 346 Linschoten and Kuehn 2011, 6.  122  assurance that they would not be arrested upon returning to Afghanistan, he said, they would have come.”347 Unfortunately, however, “neither the Afghan government nor their international sponsors saw any reasons to engage with the Taliban at that time —they considered them a spent force.”348 In addition to the results of those investigations by researchers, I interviewed one of the former Taliban leaders, Abdul Hakim Mujahed, who was Afghan ambassador to the United Nations under the Taliban government and now deputy chair of the High Peace Council, which is in charge of political negotiations with the Taliban. He contended, Reconciliation was totally possible between the Karzai and the Taliban in those ages such as 2002 or 2003. The Taliban leaderships were seeking for the political engagement with the Karzai government at that time. But there were no efforts by the United States and the Karzai government on the reconciliation. The United States and Karzai did not have even consultation with the Taliban on reconciliation in those ages when the Taliban was seriously considering it. And the Taliban leaderships were very threatened by the bombing and arresting. Thus, they were almost forced to take weapons and start insurgency.349 Although it is not clear how seriously the Taliban leadership sent a signal for reconciliation toward the Karzai government at that time, it seems certain that the Taliban leadership had a motivation to seek possible political engagement and join the political process in the early stages of the Afghan peacebuilding. The question then is: Why did the Afghan government and the international community not consider reconciliation with the Taliban in these earlier stages of post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan? 347  Ibid. Ibid. Emphasis added. 349 Author’s interview with Abdul Hakim Mujahed, a former Afghan ambassador to the United Nations under the Taliban regime, and currently deputy chair of High Peace Council in Afghanistan, on 23 November 2010 in Kabul. 348  123  Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi, the Minister of Finance in 2008 when I interviewed him, who agreed with Brahimi’s claim, explained why it was difficult to accept reconciliation with the Taliban in the early stages: Until recently, we actually took it for granted that the peace would continue in Afghanistan. I went to London in 2006 for an international conference on Afghan reconstruction and I was sure that the international community still thought that Afghanistan was a success story. There was no recognition at that time that something very difficult should be done to maintain the security in Afghanistan.350  Risk of Premature or Inadequate Diagnosis: Theoretical Implications There is a consensus among many practitioners and policy makers in Afghanistan who suggest that the lack of reconciliation in the early stage of peacebuilding—in this particular case during 2002 or 2003—was one of the major reasons for the recurring insurgency in Afghanistan. However, Jones’s article, like the Bush administration’s policy, totally neglected consideration of reconciliation or political negotiation with the Taliban and the insurgency in general. This neglect might come from premature or inadequate diagnosis of the motives of the insurgency in Afghanistan, about which I theorized in Chapter 2 as a possible pitfall of Stedman’s theory; in that sense, the Afghan case would suggest important theoretical implications. For instance, Jones asserted that insurgent leaders in Afghanistan are “strongly motivated by 350  Author’s interview with Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi, Minister of Finance, Kabul, on 28 June 2008. He resigned the position in 2009 to run for the presidential election in August, 2009. Michael Barnett also argued in 2006 that the Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002, which selected Karzai as head of the Transitional Authority, and the Constitutional Loya Jirga, which adopted a new constitution, “was accorded tremendous legitimacy…the process is credited with helping to stabilize post-Taliban Afghanistan” (Barnett 2006, 103). But the security situation drastically worsened after 2006.  124  ideology.”351 He claimed, “the Taliban were the largest group and were motivated by a radical interpretation of Sunni Islam derived from Deobandism.”352 This radical interpretation, according to Jones, induced the Taliban to associate with Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaida leaders.353 Some theories, including Stedman’s, predict that when insurgents or rebel groups are motivated by ideology, they cannot be dealt with by negotiation, but must be dealt with by coercion such as military operations. As I introduced in Chapter 2, Stedman has asserted that when insurgent groups or rebels are motivated by ideology and seek “total power”—what he called “total spoilers”—it is impossible to induce them to the peace process because their goals are not changeable; thus, “They must be defeated or so marginalized.”354 The policy prescription of Jones would exactly follow the theoretical suggestion by Stedman when Jones suggests that the Taliban are totally ideologically driven, and he did not mention any possibility of reconciliation or political settlement with the Taliban. However, there is substantial evidence shown above that the Taliban had some motivation, at least in the initial stage of the Bonn process, to start talking with the Karzai government with regard to their possible inclusion into the new political process; it suggests a high possibility that the international peacebuilders, especially the United States , made a premature or inadequate diagnosis when peacebuilders defined the motives of the enemies without serious efforts to reconcile or even talk with them and include them in the political process, especially in the early stage of the peacebuilding. As  351  Jones 2008 27. Ibid., 27. 353 Ibid., 28. 354 Stedman 1997, 14. On the other hand, as I explained in Chapter 2, Stedman argued, if rebels are “greedy spoilers” who possess goals that change on calculation of cost and risk, custodians should attempt to change the behaviors of the spoiler to adhere to a set of established norms by supplying “the carrots and sticks to reward and punish the spoiler,” and for a limited spoiler whose goal is limited, the custodian should use an inducement strategy that “induces the spoilers into joining a peace process by meeting the spoiler’s demands” (Stedman 1997, 12-13). 352  125  Stedeman argues, if they are not total spoilers, “there is at least a possibility of bringing [them] into the peace process.”355 The shared idea by Afghan and international peacebuilders who engaged in peacebuilding since 2001 about missed opportunities to bring the Taliban into the political process in the early stage of the Bonn process is one of the most critical suggestions this dissertation would present for future peacebuilding activities. Peacebuilders—both international and domestic peacebuilders—should include the past enemies and future potential enemies to the political process in order to create a new legitimate government, especially in the initial stage of peacebuilding, by at least talking with them and trying to persuade them to enter the new political system, so that they can avoid premature or inadequate diagnosis of those potential enemies or insurgents.356 Salvatore Lombardo, the country director of UNHCR in Afghanistan in 2008 who has many years’ experience in post-conflict peacebuilding, was asked about the most important aspect of creating legitimate governments in post-conflict states, and said, The timing is crucial. Some observers argue that the first six month is most important, and I agree with it. Because in the first six months of post-conflict situation, you enjoy the atmosphere which would allow you to make a very difficult and critical decision. . . . In these periods of time, you might have political fabric that gave you much more space for difficult decisions, for instance,  355  Stedman 1997, 15. Chapter 5 presents some key cases of peacebuilding in which policies including past enemies in the initial stage of peacebuilding were crucial in creating an inclusive new government which achieved at least peace and stability, which in turn enabled the new government to implement political programs that future strengthened their legitimacy. There is emerging international recognition of the importance of “national reconciliation” in the beginning of peacebuilding; for instance, both domestic and international key actors repeatedly asserted in the beginning of the peacebuilding effort in Libya that it is crucial to have a broad based reconciliation. Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, the leader of the Transitional National Council in Libya issued “a passionate call for national reconciliation in the heart of Tripoli” (International Herald Tribune, 14 September 2011); Jose Manuel Barrosso, European Commission President also emphasized the need for “a broad based reconciliation process which reaches out to all Libyans and enable a democratic, peaceful and transparent transition in the country.” (Speech by Jose Manuel Barroso, European Commission President on 21 Oct 2011). I will summarize those latest developments in the conclusion of this dissertation. 356  126  making reconciliation-typed architecture. And with delay, it became much more difficult to resolve these issues later on.357  Failure of the Past Reconciliation Program After the crucial four years had passed without any reconciliation program or mechanism in Afghanistan since 2001, the Karzai government finally initiated a national reconciliation program in 2005 that they call PTS (in Dari language, “Programme Takhim e Solh” or “Commission for Strengthening Peace and Stability”).358 However, as the insurgency had sharply risen, security conditions had deteriorated, and the government-controlled areas had hugely diminished since then, PTS was largely perceived as a failure at the time of my field research in Afghanistan in 2008. 359 This view is shared by both practitioners and researchers in Afghanistan; the “CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute) Report,” written by an independent research institution that investigated political negotiations in Afghanistan and commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, evaluated PTS and concluded in January 2009, “PTS has had very limited success. . . . the insurgency has steadily gained much strength. As a result, the U.S. and the UK claim that the (PTS) Commission has not been able to deliver results based on its stated goals. ”360 It is vital, though, to learn lessons from this program, and one of the crucial purposes of my field research in 2008 was to investigate this program and create some further policy recommendations.  357  Author’s interview with Salvatore Lombardo, the country director of UNHCR in Afghanistan at that time, at UNHCR office in Kabul, on 19 June 2008. 358 Astri Suhrke, Torunn Wimpelmann Chaudhary, Aziz Hakimi, Kristian Berg Harpviken, Akbar Sarwari, Arne Strand, 2009, 8. The report was published in January 2009. 359 A high ranked UN official in Afghanistan, interview by author, Kabul, June, 2008. Many international officials expressed the same observation to the author in 2008. 360 Suhrke, et al., CMI Report: Conciliatory Approaches to the Insurgency in Afghanistan, p. 8.  127  PTS was defined as “the centerpiece of an official national reconciliation policy” and is led by the former president Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, who is now a chair of the Upper House in parliament, and his son, Najibullah Mojaddedi, the deputy director for PTS.361 The mechanism of the PTS is that an individual soldier sends an application with his or her promise not to conduct any military attacks against the government and to follow the Afghan constitution, as well as the signatures of key local political figures, such as district chiefs of police. The PTS committee will review the application, and if appropriate, the Afghan government sends them a letter promising not to detain or kill those individuals.362 Approximately 6,000 individuals joined PTS by the end of 2008, according to a claim by PTS.363 However, PTS has not responded to the rising insurgency in Afghanistan and has already lost credibility in the view of both the Afghan people and the international community, as the CMI report also contended. According to my field research and analysis, there are three main reasons which I discuss below.  No Cooperation by the U.S. Forces Taliban members who join PTS have no guarantee of safety from international forces, especially from American counterterrorism operations. U.S. forces, especially the U.S. counterterrorism operation under the command of “Operation Enduring Freedom,” did not cooperate with PTS, which was a national program mainly run by the Afghan government authority. There are several prominent cases in which members who joined PTS were attacked by American forces. For example, in Alasay District in Kapisa Province, one former Taliban commander, known as Hafizallah (who has only one name, a common  361  Ibid., 16. Author’s interview with Najibullah Mojadidi, the deputy Director of PTS 17 February 2008. I also obtained the copy of the application by the former Taliban soldiers for PTS program. 363 Suhrke, et al., CMI Report: Conciliatory Approaches to the Insurgency in Afghanistan, p. 16. 362  128  feature for many Afghan people), who controlled about 50 Taliban former soldiers, was invited by the Provincial Council members in Kapisa to join PTS and work for the provincial government because of his cooperative attitude to the new Karzai government. Abdul Wahaab, who is a Provincial Council member in Kapisa living in Alasay District, emphasized that “I talked with Hafizallah to work with us to support the provincial government because he was very cooperative with the Karzai government. And I and the Chief of Provincial Council persuaded Hafizallah to join PTS.”364 As a result, Hafizallah formally joined the PTS in the summer of 2007 and received the letter from the government to prove that he was admitted as a PTS member who reconciled with the government.365 Two months later (in the fall of 2007), he was invited by U.S. forces to come to Graham Base for a meeting and was arrested.366 Wahaab and Hanaitulla Kochai, another Provincial Council member in Kapisa, emphasized that they did not know any reason why Hafizallah was arrested by the U.S. forces. According to them, Hafizallah was supposed to bring his 50 subordinates to join PTS, but after this arrest, those subordinates refused to join PTS.367 Wahaab then asked UN officials as well as the head of the PTS program, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, to ask the U.S. forces to release Hafizallah because “he really cooperated with the government and the Provincial Council in Kapisa.”368 But nothing happened after their appeals.369 In the end, “people in our  364  Author’s interview with Abdul Wahaab, a provincial council member in Kapisa Province, on 3 June 2008. Ibid. This fact is confirmed by the UN official who covered the area. 366 This fact was well known to not only Afghan provincial council members but also UN officials covering the area. 367 Author’s interview with Abdul Wahaab and Hanitullah Kochai, provincial council members in Kapisa Province, on 3 June 2008. The author also confirmed this story from a UN official in charge of this region. 368 Author’s interview with Wahaab in Kapisa on 3 June 2008. Kochi and other provincial council members also agreed with Wahaab on this point. 369 Abdul Wahaab and UN officials confirm this story to the author. 365  129  district do not trust us with regard to PTS anymore,” Wahaab lamented.370 This story was spread all over the central region in Afghanistan. There is also a largely shared view that PTS members were attacked by air bombs of the U.S. or ISAF counterterrorism operations, which sometimes resulted in civilian casualties as well.371 Role of the UN and Theoretical Implications This is the typical example of how the role (or authority) of the UN can influence the political activities, which need to be conducted in a cohesive manner. In a majority of UN peacebuilding operations, the UN mission (or Special Representative of the Secretary-General) can command both political activities—such as reconciliation programs or political negotiation with the insurgency—and military operations—mainly by UN peacekeepers who are basically under the command of SRSG. However, the UN mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) does not have any authority to command international military operations in Afghanistan.372 Thus, the UN cannot stop the American forces’ operations and arrest of the Taliban commanders or soldiers who reconcile with the Karzai government and formally enter PTS. It is a fatal disadvantage if the UN cannot have enough authority to command the international forces when the UN needs to assist the local authorities to advance political programs; here is the disparity between political and military authority.373 One senior Afghan UNAMA official lamented, If UNAMA has UN peacekeepers, we could deploy some of them to keep a 370  Author’s interview with Wahaab on 3 June 2008. Author’s interview with a high ranked UN political affairs official in June 2008. 372 The mandates given by the UN Security Council Resolution request the UNAMA only to “cooperation with ISAF”; for instance, in the UN Security Council Resolution 1974, adopted on 22 March 2011, requests UNAMA to “strengthen the cooperation with ISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative at all levels and throughout the country”. (UNSC Resolution 1974, 5) 373 Dorn Walter, a prominent scholar who studies UN peacekeeping, emphasizes that one of the important merits for the UN peacekeeping operation is that there is a unified command by SRSG who can exercise both “political exercises” and “military operations,” when multinational forces which participate in peacebuilding operation cannot be controlled by SRSG and the UN mission and it create a difficulty of making coherent policies and activities (Lecture by Dorn Walter in Liu Institute at University of British Columbia in January 2008). 371  130  ceasefire of the conflicts at the village-level, which happen all the time in Afghanistan over the land and water. After we managed to bring different fighting tribes to the same table and to solve their conflict issues, we can dispatch the UN peacekeepers; but we cannot do it because there is no UN peacekeeper, but only multinational forces led by the US. We UNAMA cannot have any influence over their activities.374 As I explained in Chapter 2, there is a shared idea by some Western practitioners and politicians, and some theorists, that the UN is fatally flawed in terms of its military capacity. Maurits Jochems, the civil representative of NATO in Afghanistan in 2008, contended that “there is no way that they [U.S. and NATO countries] will put their major forces into the command of the UN. Why? Because the UN military is not efficient and reliable.”375 However, this perception does not adequately take into consideration the risk of separating political and military operations. The fatal failure of coordination between critical political programs like PTS and military operations led by the U.S. counter-terrorism operation in Afghanistan clearly exemplify this risk.376 The lack of coordination between international military operations and the Afghan government, together with the UN mission mandated to support the Afghan government, critically discredited the PTS program. The CMI report concluded, “the [PTS] Commission lacks a system to coordinate political and military activities with other Afghan government partners . . . . as well as international forces and donors.”377 Masoom Stanekzai, an advisor to President Karzai, criticized PTS in 2008, saying, “The  374  Author’s interview with a senior Afghan UNAMA official with a condition of anonymity, on 17 June 2008. Author’s interview with Maurits Jochems, Ambassador and NATO Senior Civilian Representative, on 19 June 2008. 376 In addition to this risk of separating political exercise from international military forces, UN peacekeepers seem to have comparative advantage in terms of acceptance by local people in different peacebuilding states. I will explore this issue more in the conclusive chapter. 377 Suhrke, et al 17. 375  131  government and its international partner offer conflicting messages, and no agreed-upon policy framework exists to pursue reconciliation in a cohesive manner.”378  No Alternative Livelihood after Reconciliation A second reason for the lack of credibility of PTS is that the Taliban who joined PTS had no way to make a living after they cut links to the Taliban, as there was almost no economic benefit from reconciliation through PTS. It was extremely difficult for former Taliban soldiers to make a living after they terminated their salaries from the Taliban, when the overall employment situation in Afghanistan is very harsh. Najibullah Mojaddedi, the deputy director of PTS, asserted with anger, “While the Taliban offers each soldier 100 USD per month for salaries, we cannot give them anything.”379 The deputy Mojaddedi explained in detail about what the Taliban offers to their soldiers: “According to testimonies of former Taliban soldiers, they can obtain 100 USD per month by attacking the government or international forces. If they conduct kidnapping, they can get about 400 USD per month; and if they conduct suicide attacks, their family will gain economic guarantee for their entire lives.”380 According to him, those economic offers are crucial for the Taliban soldiers because “Afghan poor people need to survive and care for their family as other people do in the world.”381 Hanaitullah Kochai, who is the Provincial Council member in Kapisa Province and lives in Tagab District where there are insurgent activities, shared the view about the economic need for the soldiers: “If there are 420 Taliban soldiers in Tagab, 400 are working for the Taliban to obtain 100 USD per month  378 379 380 381  Stanekzai 2008, 12. Author’s interview with Mojadidi on 17 February 2008. Ibid. Ibid.  132  which the Taliban gives them as salary.”382 He bluntly states, “We can at least negotiate with those 400 soldiers and persuade them to the side of the government if the government can provide them with jobs and security.”383 But unfortunately, Kochai emphasized, “People in our district feel the government did nothing for them in the last several years.”384 The local leader who managed PTS also claimed that PTS failed to keep its promise to the reconciled soldiers and lost the trust of the insurgents. Haji Aghalalai, the head of the PTS office in Kandahar Province and one of the Provincial Council members in Kandahar, emphasized that the Afghan authority presented a failed promise that PTS could provide the reconciled with houses, jobs, and other benefits: The government, including the former President Mojaddedi, even promised Taliban soldiers that they would get jobs, houses, and political rights, if they joined PTS. But, unfortunately, we did not follow any of these promises so far. It created a big mistrust among the people who might think about PTS and join it.385 Although it was true that the head of PTS, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, tried to create financial programs to support the former Taliban who joined the PTS, the promise was not realized; the broken promise massively discredited PTS.386  No Political Negotiation Mechanism with Leadership of Insurgency The third reason for the failure of PTS, related to the first one, is that there was no mechanism to 382 383 384 385 386  Author’s interview with Hanitullah Kochai, a provincial council member in Kapisa Province 3 June 2008. Ibid. Ibid. Author’s interview with Haji Aghalalai, the head of PTS office in Kandahar 10 June 2008. Author’s interview with a UN political affairs officer in Kabul who covered PTS, under the condition of anonymity in June 2008.  133  advance political negotiations or settlement with the insurgency, mainly the Taliban, as an organization. The CMI report bluntly assessed that to the U.S. and UK, the PTS “appeared as a national security instrument that could be used to encourage members of the Taliban to surrender and yield intelligence. In this perspective, the [PTS] Commission was not designed for reconciliation.”387 It is true that PTS did not have any mechanism and authority to approach the top leadership of the Taliban and advance political settlement with them. And the major international military actors, such as the U.S. and UK, did not support the idea of negotiating or reconciling with the Taliban as an organization under the PTS framework; for instance, Sherard Cowper-Coles, UK ambassador to Kabul at that time, argued in 2008 that he “supported reconciliation with the Taliban militants on an individual basis, if they renounced violence and were not linked to al-Qaida, but rejected negotiation with the Taliban as a group.”388 A typical phenomenon for this nature of rejecting negotiation with the top leadership—that is, negotiation with the Taliban as an organization—is that even if prominent Taliban leaders who were on the UN Sanction List entered the PTS, those former Taliban leaders were not removed from the list. The “Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanction Committee,” established in October, 1999 by UN Security Council resolution 1267 (thus known as the 1267 sanction committee), has the “Consolidated List” of top leaderships for both Al-Qaida and the Taliban in the first Consolidated List, there were 144 individuals associated with the Taliban.389 Among them, there were about 20 prominent Taliban figures in the Consolidated List who entered PTS, but none of them were removed from the list for almost five years.390 387 388 389 390  Suhrke, et al., 16. Ibid., 35. Emphasis added. Ramsey 2011, 1. Author’s interview with UN Political Affairs Officer with a condition of anonymity on 22 June 2008. Ramsey also reported in 2011 that it was  134  Abdul Hakim Mujahid, the deputy chair of the High Peace Council and a former Taliban ambassador to the UN who reconciled with the government in 2005 and whose name was removed in July, 2010 asserted, The fact that the names of major Taliban leaders who reconciled with Karzai through PTS were not removed from the UN sanction list totally deprived PTS of its credibility. It was so humiliating for the reconciled former Taliban leaders and give the sign to the rest of the Taliban leadership. It exacerbated the confidence between the Karzai government and the Taliban leadership.391 As the de-listing of the UN Sanction List is decided by the members of the UN Security Council (the membership of the UN Sanction committee is the same as that of the UN Security Council), it was difficult to link the reconciliation by some Taliban leaders with the removal of their name from the UN sanction list as long as there was no shared purpose and strategy by both the Afghan government and international peacebuilders, including the United States. As a result, the PTS became very low profile, just increasing the mistrust by the insurgents from the top down against the Karzai government. CMI reports concluded about PTS, If the main purpose was to encourage high-level Taliban to surrender, analysts say, stronger security guarantees and a fuller reintegration package of economic as well as political incentives—and not just a call to surrender—would have been appropriate. Instead, the programme was developed as a low-budget measure, January 2010 that the first name of the Taliban leadership were removed from the sanction list, due to the requests by the Afghan government that have been made five years prior to the decision of the Sanction Committee (Ramsey 2011, 5). On 25 January 2010, the UN Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanction Committee approved the deletion of the top five Taliban individuals from the Consolidated List of Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanction Committee (Press Release by the UN Department of Public Information “Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee Approves Deletion of Five Entries from Consolidated List,” issued on 26 January 2010). 391 Author’s interview with Abdul Hakim Mujahed, a former Afghan ambassador to the United Nations under the Taliban regime, and currently deputy chair of High Peace Council in Afghanistan, on 23 November 2010 in Kabul.  135  expected to deliver military and intelligence benefits, but wrapped in a language of peace and reconciliation.392  Creating a New Reconciliation Framework in Afghanistan After I conducted field research and analyzed the failures of PTS, I was convinced that the inclusive mechanism—a reconciliation mechanism in the context of Afghan peacebuilding—is crucial in restoring peace and stability, which then might lead to the creation of more legitimate government in Afghanistan. I made a policy recommendation on this particular reconciliation issue as follows in my report to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which was posted on the website of DPKO Best Practices Section in October, 2008.393   Set clear goals and strategies by all peacebuilders, including U.S. counterterrorism forces.    Rearrange PTS (National Reconciliation Committee) and establish a new committee composed of Afghan government, UNAMA, ISAF, and U.S. Forces.    Start a massive program to create vocational centers all over the country for both Taliban soldiers who join in the reconciliation and other non-Taliban people.    Pass a UN resolution to remove the Taliban members from the UN Sanction list if they join in the new reconciliation program. It would change the “moderate Taliban leaders.”    Negotiate with the “national Taliban,” who dislike the al-Qaida or Pakistan-driven terrorist infusions; it may open a window to include the “national Taliban” in the government structure. One of the important motives for this proposal was the fact that my research identified that  392 393  Suhrke, et al., 9.16. Higashi 2008, 4.  136  overwhelmingly Afghan people seem to support reconciliation with the Taliban. According to my opinion survey, 94% of the respondents surveyed in Kandahar, 98% of the respondents in Wardak, and 86% of the respondents in Kapisa answered that the first priority for establishing peace in Afghanistan is “reconciliation with insurgent groups, including Taliban.”394 And 98% of the respondents in Kandahar, 98% of them in Wardak, and 69% of them in Kapisa answered that they support “the idea of coalition government between Karzai and the Taliban.”395 It is striking that reconciliation with the Taliban is supported by not only Pashtun people (surveyed in Kandahar and Wardak) but also Tajik (surveyed in Kapisa). It suggests that there is a unified support for reconciliation by Afghan people across ethnicities. After I made a presentation on this proposal to the Best Practices Section of DPKO at UN Headquarters in New York on 8 October 2008, I also published a Japanese book titled Peacebuilding: Research in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste in June, 2009, and made numerous presentations to policy makers in Japan.396 One of the important backgrounds for my proposal was the change of the U.S. government in January, 2009. Under the Bush administration, U.S. policy on reconciliation with Afghan insurgent groups was negative; one UN Afghan officer confessed, “I decided not to work for the reconciliation even if there was the 2008 UN Security Council resolution requesting us to do it because I might be captured by the U.S. forces if I meet insurgents.”397 However, new U.S. President Barack Obama made it clear that he would  394  Higashi 2008, 64. You can also see the result in Appendix B of this dissertation. Ibid. 396 I made several presentations on this proposal to create a new reconciliation program in Afghanistan to congresspersons’ working groups, including the “Asia-Africa Research Study Group by Liberal Democratic Party” on 3 December 2008, the “Foreign Affairs and Defense Working Group by Democratic Party” on 2 July 2009, and the “non-partisan Congressmen’s Peacebuilding Association” on 23 June 2009 in Tokyo. 397 A UN local Afghan officer in charge of political affairs, interviewed by author, Kabul, June, 2008. UN Security Council Resolution 1806, adapted on March 20, 2008, requested the UN to “provide good offices to support, if requested by the Afghan Government, the implementation of 395  137  consider reconciliation with the Afghan insurgency. In his remarks on a “New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” which was announced on March 27, 2009, three months after his inauguration, President Obama explicitly asserted, In a country with extreme poverty that has been at war for decades, there will also be no peace without reconciliation among former enemies. . . . There is an uncompromising core of the Taliban. They must be met with force, and they must be defeated. But there are also those who have taken up arms because of coercion, or simply for a price. These Afghans must have the option to choose a different course. That is why we will work with local leaders, the Afghan government, and international partners to have a reconciliation process in every province.398 Although the Obama administration appeared to target the low-level fighters and mid-level commanders for reconciliation at this particular moment—and no reconciliation with top leadership of the insurgency including the core of the Taliban—this was the first time the U.S. government made an explicit endorsement of reconciliation with the insurgency in Afghanistan. In this context, I was invited for my own presentation in the beginning of September, 2009 by the U.S. State Department Afghan Team headed by Paul Jones, the deputy Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, who read the short version of my proposal.399 After a one-hour discussion with Paul Jones confirming the support of the U.S. government for Japan’s initiative to assist the Afghan government to create a new reconciliation program, I came back to Japan and met several Afghan-led reconciliation programmes” (United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1806, S/RES/1806, March 20, 2008.) The UN Security Council adapted the same provision for Afghan reconciliation in the UN Security Council Resolution 1868 on March 23, 2009. 398 Barak Obama, “Remarks on New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2009,” White House Press Office on 27 March 2009. 399 The presentation was conducted on 2 September 2009 in State Department in Washington DC. My article Paul Jones read was “Creating jobs for Afghan insurgents key to peace” published in International Herald Tribune/ Asahi on 13 August 2009.  138  Director-Generals in charge of Afghan policies in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September as well as Katsuya Okada, the Japanese Foreign Minister on 14 September 2009 to explain my proposal.400 As the Democratic Party won the national election at the end of August, 2009, which terminated the control of the Liberal Democratic Party that governed Japan for almost 60 years, the new government needed to have some alternative policies on assistance to Afghanistan; the top officials of the new government unanimously supported the proposal.401 Thus, in his first meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Foreign Minister Okada informed her of the intention of the Japanese government to assist in creating a new reconciliation framework in Afghanistan, “including a program to provide vocational training and job training for Taliban.”402 Prime Minister Hatoyama, who read my book before the general election, also mentioned to President Obama in his first meeting as a prime minister that with regard to assisting Afghanistan, “he wants to make a positive contribution where Japan is strong,” including the support for creating a reconciliation framework that has a component of vocational training for former soldiers.403 Prime Minister Hatoyama then declared his idea in his address at the General Assembly of the United Nations: It goes without saying that the primary actors in achieving peace in Afghanistan and in advancing national reconstruction are the people of Afghanistan  400  The bilateral meeting between Okada and me was conducted on 14 September 2009, two days before Okada was formally appointed as Foreign Minister, although it was already publicly announced that he would be the Foreign Minister after 16 September 2009 when the new Prime Minister Hatoyama would be inaugurated. 401 New prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, also read my book in Japanese and mentioned to Mizoji Yabunaka, the vice minister of foreign affairs (head of bureaucracy) at that time that he wants to adopt the proposal by the book. Thus, it became easier for me to explain my proposal to those top officials in Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time. 402 Asahi Newspaper, “Okada, Clinton OK Talks on Bases,” 23 September 2009, 403 Asahi Newspaper, “Obama Welcomes Plan to Rebuild Afghanistan,” 25 September 2009. After Prime Minister Hatoyama won the general election in the end of August, 2009, he met the vice-minister in Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the head of bureaucracy in Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in the beginning of September; Hatoyama mentioned that he would like to use Daisaku Higashi’s book in terms of policies for Afghanistan. This conversation was well known in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when I returned to Japan in September, 2009.  139  themselves. As progress is made, reconciliation and reintegration of insurgents will become critical issues. Japan will make vital contributions in these areas, including possible reintegration assistance, such as vocational training aimed at providing means of livelihood to people who have undergone reconciliation.404 Alongside these official meetings, the Japanese special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan discussed this proposal with Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan.405 After this discussion and hearing the address by Prime Minister Hatoyama, Special Representative Holbrooke requested Foreign Minster Okada to lead the working group for reconciliation and reintegration by 14 special representatives to Afghan and Pakistan, co-chairing with the UK; as Okada accepted the offer, it became Japan and the UK which would lead international efforts in assisting the Afghan government to create a new reconciliation and reintegration program. Two weeks later, Foreign Minister Okada made a surprise visit to Kabul and discussed this idea with President Karzai and Kai Eide, Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan, and Karzai and Eide supported the proposal.406 Confirming the support by the Afghan government, Foreign Minister Okada announced on 9 November 2009 “Japan’s New Strategy on Afghanistan” and defined support for reconciliation as one of three key Japanese policies toward Afghanistan; the strategy contends, “For reintegration and long-term reconciliation with the insurgents. . . . Japan, by utilizing our experiences and expertise from DDR and DIAG, will involve ourselves from the planning stage and provide financial  404  Address by Yukio Hatoyama, Prime Minister of Japan at the Sixty Four Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations 24 September 2009 in New York. (He conducted speech in English.) 405 Author’s interview with the official who attended the meeting. Holbrooke read my English article with the proposal and told the Japanese delegate that he would distribute the article to Karl Eikenberry, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, David Petraeus, the U.S. Central Command, and Stanley McCrystal, Commander of ISAF. 406 Asahi Newspaper, “Okada in surprise visit to Kabul,” 12 October 2009,  140  assistance.”407  Controversy in Constructing a New Reconciliation Mechanism After the debacle presidential election in 2009, President Karzai made his inauguration speech for his second term on 19 November 2009. Based on the knowledge about the international political and financial support for reconciliation programs, he put national reconciliation as his first priority in the second term: It is a recognized fact that security and peace cannot be achieved through fighting and violence. This is why the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has placed national reconciliation at the top of its peace-building policy. We welcome and will provide necessary help to all disenchanted compatriots who are willing to return to their homes, live peacefully and accept the Constitution. We invite dissatisfied compatriots, who are not directly linked to international terrorism, to return to their homeland. We will utilize all national and international resources to put an end to war.408 Following this policy statement by President Karzai, six major actors—the Afghan government led by Masood Stanekzai, advisor to the President and No. 1 official in charge of DIAG; International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF); the UN (UNAMA and UNDP); and the UK; Japan; and the U.S.—started discussions on how to create a new reconciliation framework in January, 2010.409 One of the crucial controversies in creating a new reconciliation program was whether the new  407  Japan’s new assistance package to Afghanistan and Pakistan, announced on 9 November 2009. Available from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/strategy0911.pdf 408 President Karzai Inauguration Speech on 19 November 2009, provided by website of Afghan mission to the UN. 409 From December 2009 to December 2010, I worked as a senior political affairs officer in Kabul Headquarters of UNAMA, serving it as a team leader for reconciliation and reintegration in UNAMA; thus I attended almost all meetings in the process of creating this new program.  141  framework should target not only low-level foot soldiers and mid-level commanders but also the top leadership of the insurgency, including the core members of the Taliban. As the Obama strategy showed, the U.S. originally focused on reconciliation and reintegration with the low-level foot soldiers and mid-level commanders, not the top leadership. On the other hand, UNAMA consistently asserted that there is the need to make a political settlement (or at least engage in a political process) with the top leadership of the insurgency as well. For instance, Kai Eide, the SRSG until March, 2010, contended in his interview with the New York Times that persuading low- and middle-level soldiers to stop fighting in exchange for schooling and jobs is useful, but it is “not enough”; thus, he asserted “if you want relevant results, then you have to talk to the relevant person in authority.”410 The reasons the U.S. top leadership wanted to focus on the foot soldiers and mid-level commanders come from their assessment about the nature of the core members of the Taliban. The White Paper announced by the U.S. defense ministry argued, While Mulla Omar and the Taliban’s hard core that have aligned themselves with al-Qaida are not reconcilable and we cannot make a deal that includes them, the war in Afghanistan cannot be won without convincing non-ideologically committed insurgents to lay down their arms, reject al-Qaida, and accept the Afghan Constitution. . . . An office should be created in every province. . .to develop a reconciliation effort targeting mid- to low-level insurgents.411 Again, the influence of the factors key to Stedman’s theory is prevalent; the U.S. defense ministry  410  New York Times interview with Kai Eide, SRSG (the top of UNAMA), in the article “U.N. Seeks to Drop Some Taliban from Terror List,” 25 January 2010. 411 US Department of Defense, White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, March 27, 2009), p. 4.  142  judged that as Mulla Omar and the core part of the Taliban were ideologically committed (thus, total spoilers in Stedman’s theory), they are not reconcilable. This was the firm principle in January 2010 when discussions began for creating a new reconciliation framework. On the other hand, Kai Eide (SRSG, the top of UNAMA at that time) believed that it is critical to have simultaneous approaches with the top leadership of the Taliban and mid-level commanders. There are basically two reasons. First, Eide and many UN officials assessed that there are substantial numbers of the top leadership within the Taliban who can be reconcilable even if they are not fighting for economic reasons but with some political goals. For example, Mullah Baradar, No. 2 commander of the Taliban, started talking with the Afghan government and some UN members about setting up the framework and conditions for peace talks in 2009; however, Baradar was suddenly arrested by the joint operation of ISI (the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan Intelligence Agency) and CIA when he returned from Kabul to Pakistan.412 In August 2010, the New York Times reported that Pakistan officials contended that “they [Pakistan officials] set out to capture Mr. Baradar, and used the CIA to help them do it, because they wanted to shut down secret peace talks that Mr. Baradar had been conducting with the Afghan government that excluded Pakistan.”413 And in the weeks after Mr. Baradar’s arrest, “Pakistani security officials detained as many as 23 Taliban leaders . . . the talks came to end.”414 With regard to this arrest of Baradar, a Pakistan security official said, “We picked up Baradar and  412  New York Times, “Secret Joint Raid Captures Taliban’s Top Commander” on 16 February 2010. New York Times, “Pakistanis Tell of Motive in Taliban Leader’s Arrest” on 22 August 2010. The UN high ranked officials who were involved in the talk also shared the view with the article. 414 Ibid. 413  143  the others because they were trying to make a deal without us.”415 And according to the New York Times, American officials indicated that “they did not know the identity of Mr. Baradar until after the arrest.” Pakistan officials said, “The ISI did not inform the Americans of the identity of the target.”416 The stakes of the incident were high, as a senior Afghan official said that beginning late 2009, the Karzai government “reached out to a number of Taliban leaders to explore the prospect of a deal. Among them were Mr. Baradar.”417 And the discussion with Mr. Baradar and the other Taliban were “promising,” as “their aim was to establish conditions under which formal talks could begin.”418 The real story about the arrest of the Baradar was murky—especially whether or not the ISI arrested Baradar to stop the peace talks without Pakistani involvement. Regardless, it was a clear sign for both some international officials (including Kai Eide) and Afghan government officials who knew about the talks between the Karzai government and Baradar that substantial numbers of the Taliban leadership, most of them believed to be in Quetta Shura in Pakistan, were ready at least to start a dialogue and make a political negotiation with the Karzai government. A second reason for the importance of high-level reconciliation was that without a political deal with the top leadership of the Taliban, it may be difficult for foot soldiers and mid-level commanders to reconcile with the government even if they wish because they will face the danger of retaliation. The experience of PTS indicates the risk; for instance, Aghalalai, chief of PTS in Kandahar argued, “The  415  Ibid. Ibid. 417 Ibid. 418 Ibid. Linschoten and Kuehn also contended in their paper published in February 2011 that “Mullah Baradar was removed from the field by Pakistan’s security services in what seemed to be a calculated move to reaffirm and stress the brokering role that Pakistan seeks for itself in any future political settlement (Linschoten and Kuehen 2011, 9). 416  144  former Taliban soldiers who join PTS hide their documents and go back to their regions. But if these people refuse the request by the Taliban to attack the government, they are in great danger because the Taliban would kill them in retaliation.”419 According to the CMI report, a number of tribal leaders who tried to persuade insurgents to switch sides through PTS were actually “kidnapped or killed.”420 At the same time, there is the reality that all insurgency seems not to be controlled by the one insurgent organization called the Taliban. Thus, a political deal with the head of the Taliban might not guarantee peace and stability in a whole region in Afghanistan; as Eide explicitly argued, UNAMA’s position was that at least two approaches—reaching out to political leadership of the top leadership and persuading mid-level commanders and foot soldiers into reconciliation—should be simultaneously executed. In order to create effective policy recommendations for the Afghan government, especially to the Stanekzai office that was set up to create a new reconciliation program, UNAMA gathered advice from all regional offices across the country and established five key policy inputs; the inputs were endorsed by the top leadership of the UNAMA in March, 2010 and were publicly circulated to the Afghan government, ISAF, and other major donors that were interested in the new framework.421 Those five policy inputs were (1) the Afghan government and the international community should take simultaneous approaches to start political dialogue and negotiations with top leaderships, mid-level commanders, and foot soldiers of the insurgency; political settlement with top leadership is indispensable; (2) Regarding the mid-level 419  Ibid. Suhrke, et al 2009, 16. 421 I was in charge of creating this policy inputs reflecting views from 8 regional offices of UNAMA. With regard to donors, about 15 countries showed interests in participating in the program and attended the donor coordination meetings on reconciliation and reintegration issues hosted by UNAMA in May 2010. 420  145  commanders, provision of the government role at provincial and district levels should be key; (3) With regard to incentives to the tactical level (foot soldiers), community projects should be given to all communities promising national reconciliation within a certain province, regardless whether they fought before or not (this policy input comes from the realization that if the program funded only “fighting communities” for community projects, it would give strong incentive to even “peaceful communities” to start fighting to gain economic projects; thus it is crucial to have equal distribution to all communities, at least in certain provinces or districts); (4) Providing “vocational programs” in sustainable ways so that job training can be useful and fit the community development projects that would create more sustainable income-generating activities in the long run. It is also important to provide job training to not only former insurgents but also normal villagers; at least 50 percent of training should be targeted to normal villagers so that the program will not create “unfairness” among Afghan people at community levels; (5) The community projects for reintegration should be implemented only after the areas and regions are politically stabilized (otherwise, the development projects could fuel conflicts over resources if they were implemented in the middle of fighting; it is also technically difficult to implement those projects due to security concerns.).422 Those policy inputs by UNAMA precisely mirror my theoretical contentions in this dissertation; the first two inputs reflect political inclusiveness, which would create a framework for reconciled insurgents – both top leaderships and mid-level commanders – to join the government structure so that they will be politically included. The next two inputs reflect economic inclusiveness, which I refer to in the 422  Author was drafter for the policy input, although it was endorsed by top leadership of the UNAMA and publicly circulated to major actors.  146  factor of resource distribution that it is critical for peacebuilders to have fair distributions of economic and social resources (such as community projects and job opportunities) along the different ethnic and social groups so that both reconciled insurgents and other citizens will be fairly benefited economically and socially.423 The last input is based on practical experience by UNAMA which witnessed the distribution of economic projects to conflicting regions without political stability can sometimes exacerbate conflicts; it is important to start distribution of economic resources after political negotiations and stability are established, at least to some extent. Although the ISAF Reintegration cell, which was established to support the Afghan government reintegration strategy, was strongly committed to support the creation of the project document for the new reconciliation program, it was the Afghan government who finally decided the final sentences of the project document.424 In final stages, Stanekzai himself committed to finalizing the document; and major donors as well as ISAF and the UN seriously made efforts to establish an effective program for peace in Afghanistan.425  423  This assertion of the importance on political and economic inclusiveness is consistent with the theory of Horizontal Inequalities proposed by Stewart, which I briefly explained in the Chapter 2. One of the central propositions by the theory of Horizontal Inequalities is that when there are inequalities in both political dimension (such as representations in governments) and economic and social dimension (such as income level and job opportunities) among different ethnic and social groups within a state, it is more likely to increase the chances of conflicts. (See the foot note 120 in Chapter 2). 424 The name of “Reintegration Cell” was the reflection of original thoughts by ISAF, headed by the US forces, which insisted that the program should focus on the reintegration with mid-level commanders and foot soldiers. ISAF actually defined the “reintegration” is the approach to the mid-level commanders and foot soldiers, while “reconciliation” is the political settlement with the top leadership of the Taliban. Instead of fighting over the definition of the wording, I concentrated on putting the clear-cut components of reconciling with the top leadership along with UNAMA position and its policy inputs. (I personally thought that “reconciliation” can happen to all levels of insurgents if there is political will to live together with their enemies – in this case the Afghan government – while “reintegration” is the “process” to reintegrate them (at all levels) into the society without violence and fighting.) 425 Masoum Stanekzai was appointed by the Decree by the President Karzai as a head of Secretariat for a new program in June 2010. (The Decree by President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “On the Structure and Implementation of the Peace, Reconciliation and Reintegration Program”, issued on 29 June 2010.)  147  Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program Initiatives in Afghanistan in 2010 sought to address the key ingredients for peace-building that I argue are critical. President Karzai held the “Afghan Consultative Peace Jirga” in June, 2010 by gathering 1500 stakeholders of Afghan society across the country, and obtained the endorsement by the Jirga to start reconciliation with the insurgency, including the Taliban. Afterwards, at the Kabul International Conference, in which more than 70 countries representatives participated, a new reconciliation program called the “Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) was endorsed.426 The trust fund for the APRP was funded by key donors, such as the United States, UK, Japan, Germany, Italy, and Australia.427 With regard to the contents of the program, the project document clearly states that the program takes a simultaneous approach to both the strategic levels (top leadership) and operation levels (mid-level commanders and foot soldiers) of the insurgency. In terms of negotiation with the strategic-level insurgency, the document says, At the strategic and political levels efforts focus on the leadership of the insurgency. This is a complex and highly sensitive issue that requires a subtle approach. The package for these levels may include: addressing the problem of sanctuaries; measures for outreach; an evidence-based process for delisting individuals on the UN 1267 sanction list; ensuring the severance of links with al Qaida and other terrorist groups; securing political accommodation, and potential exile to a third country (when it contributes to peace and individual security); and actively promoting regional and international partnerships to advance peace.  426  BBC News, “Conference endorses Afghan goal for security handover”, 20 July 2010. As of July 2011, the trust fund of APRP was funded by USA, Australia, Finland, Japan, Germany, Italy, Denmark, UK, and Estonia. (APRP Monthly Report, July 2011.) 427  148  These processes will be led by Afghans. However, the support and assistance of the international community, particularly the regional countries and Islamic states is crucial for the success of this process.428 With regard to the operational level, the project document says that “At the operational level the reintegration effort focuses on local peace processes with the foot soldiers, small groups, and local leaders who form the bulk of the insurgency.”429 The Afghan government shares the view with the UN that the government needs to gain political settlement with the top leadership of the Taliban; the document clearly states, “Our peace and reintegration efforts are split between two broad categories that will operate simultaneously to achieve enduring reconciliation and reintegration.”430 This approach clearly reflect the central contention of this dissertation: it is critical for peacebuilders to make every effort to include different factions into the political structures of the new government. Although this approach was begun 10 years after the peacebuilding process started in Afghanistan in 2001, the contents of APRP clearly show the government’s intention to include the Taliban politically.431 Including this simultaneous approach, the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program contained five major components: 1. Reconciliation with Strategic Level (top leaders of the Taliban) As explained above.  428  The Project Document of “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program” (APRP), endorsed in July 2010, 1. The bold characters are original. Ibid. The bold characters are original. 430 The Project Document of “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program” (APRP), 1. 431 The words of “political accommodation” in the project document refer to the possible inclusion of insurgency to political structures of the government. 429  149  2. Demobilization and Transitional Assistance to Individual Insurgents for Reintegration With regard to the transition from reconciliation to obtaining the alternative livelihood—including the top leadership, who might obtain political accommodation, as well as mid-level commanders and foot soldiers, who might gain job training for other job opportunities—the project document says, “Once the individual insurgents agree to live within the law of the country, accept the Constitution, and renounce violence and terrorism, they will be eligible to receive political amnesty.”432 It adds, “the demobilized combatants will then be registered in the APRP and receive an APRP identification card guaranteeing freedom of movement and freedom from arrest for past armed actions against the Government.”433 Their biometric data will be taken and vetted. Their names also will be removed from “ANSF/ISAF targeting lists.”434 By learning the lesson of PTS, the program clearly states that ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) and ISAF will have coordination not to arrest or target the reconciled insurgents who obtain APRP ID card, and the implementation of this provision should be critical for the credibility of the program. This provision reflects efforts to overcome a critical shortcoming of peacebuilders in Afghanistan. As I emphasized in this chapter, as UNAMA has no authority to command the international forces, including the US forces, it has been very challenging to ascertain that the reconciled insurgents are not captured or killed by ISAF (including US forces) after they reconcile with the government. The provision of APRP which make it clear that the names of reconciled insurgents will be removed from the target lists of ISAF and ANSF is a significant step to coordinate political exercises and military operations and to  432 433 434  The Project Document of “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program” (APRP), 6. Ibid. Ibid., 10.  150  keep the credibility of the program. 435 3. Civil Education, Literacy, and Vocational Training The project document claims that ex-combatants and members of their communities are eligible for literacy and civic education for a period of six to twelve months “in support of the demobilization process and transition to peace.”436 Additionally, MoLSAMD (Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled) will continue to “develop market-driven vocational training, especially at district level.”437 The project document also expresses that “MoLSAMD will closely work with other development agencies (both domestic and international) to develop effective linkage between vocational training and community development projects.”  438  The reason that the project document states that not only “ex-combatants” but also “members of their communities” are eligible for the job training is that it is dangerous to give these kind of services to only combatants as it would create a sense of unfairness for local people who comply with the Afghan constitution and are not fighting (and even it might even motivate some local villagers to start fighting). Thus, there was consensus by major actors such as Afghan Stanekzai office, ISAF, and UNAMA that both ex-combatants and normal villagers need to obtain the benefits from the program. I contended that we should have “50 to 50 percent principle,” which means at least 50 percent of beneficiaries for those  435  There has been the question of whether or not this APRP framework can bind not only ISAF operation but also the American counter-terrorism operation under the command of Operation Enduring Freedom; UNAMA made a serious effort to ensure that the insurgents reconciling with the government will not be attacked or arrested by the any foreign military forces; and at least orally, the head of US forces which commanded both ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom suggested that US counter-terrorism operation also will not arrest or attack the insurgents who enter PTS. 436 Ibid., 11. 437 Ibid., 12. 438 Ibid., 12. It was the direct reflection of UNAMA input on job training.  151  individual services such as civic education and job training should be normal citizens.439 Those principles again reflect the central assertion of the dissertation on resource distribution: it is important to benefit different factions of societies as fairly as possible so that most of factions can be fairly benefited economically and socially. 4. National Community Recovery Package The Peace and Reintegration Program will provide “Community Recovery Packages” to 111 targeted districts in principle. Sharing the view with UNAMA policy inputs on community development projects, the project document expresses, The National Community Recovery Package will disburse assistance to entire Districts emerging from conflicts, rather than attempting to fine-tune the program to individual villages. This will prevent conflict emerging between local communities and will reduce the risk of perverse incentives that generate combatants who are motivated by an interest in benefiting from the recovery process.440 It is clear that the document clarifies that it is risky to benefit only “fighters” or “fighting communities,” as UNAMA contended.441 This provision again addresses a factor indicated above that  439  This principle seems to be easily accepted by Afghan government officials because, for instance, the officials in Afghan Ministry of Labor, Social Welfare, Martyrs, and Disabled (MoLSAD) argued that it is normal for MoLSAD to have job training courses combined by both normal citizens and handicapped persons so that they can encourage each other and this principle can be “applicable to this program for ex-combatants.” (Authors’ interview with one of the MoLSAD high ranked officials in 2010). 440 Ibid., 441 The actual operation of this new National Community Recovery Package funded by APRP is little bit complicated. According to the guideline created by MRRD, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, The new MRRD National Community Recovery Program will be driven by the same principles that govern the formation and operation of the Community Development Councils (CDCs) under the National Solidarity Program (NSP) which has been operated since 2003 in Afghanistan. (CDCs projects are often cited as one of the most popular programs among the Afghan. See the answers of the Question 7 in the questionnaire in Appendix B). And according to the MRRD, the Peace and Reintegration Community Recovery Packages will fund the CDC projects in 111 targeted districts which have many communities that have not received the first around of CDC projects due to the security concern. Thus, APRP will facilitate the first around and the second around of the CDC program implementation. The other districts will be covered by the existing NSP fund for its second around of CDC projects. Thus, in the end of two programs (NSP and APRP), every community across Afghan will gain the first around and the second around of the CDC projects, at least in theory. And this framework gives the Afghan government and the international community that in terms of community recovery projects, all communities  152  economic inclusiveness is critical in creating a sense of fairness for resource distribution; in this particular case, it is crucial to provide community projects and benefit people in a fair manner so that the projects can benefit not only reconciled fighting communities or insurgents but also peaceful communities and ordinary citizens. 5. Public Work Corps and Agricultural Conservation Corps The project document envisions the creation of two new Corps to generate employment opportunities quickly for ex-combatants and Afghan youth: “Public Works Corps” (construction of highways, etc.) will be led by the Ministry of Public Works (MoPW), and “Agricultural Conservation Corps” (reforestation, watershed rehabilitation, and irrigation, etc.) will be led by the Ministry of Agriculture (MAIL) in cooperation with MRRD.442 The document argues that it will engage both ex-combatants and non-combatants. This component is the reflection of the need to create job opportunities, which are very challenging for Afghan society to absorb the reconciled soldiers. The project document also defines the program’s institutional framework, which contains the following components: “High Peace Council” (composed only of Afghans), which sets policy and provides political confidence building; “Chief Executive Officer” ( Stanekzai was appointed by President Karzai), who is responsible for implementation of the strategic guidance by the High Peace Council; “A Special Peace and Reintegration Subcommittee” (made up of donors and co-chaired by NAMA, CEO, and the Minister of Finance), which provides policy recommendations to the High Peace Council, CEO, in every district can gain the first and second around of the CDC project regardless they are fighting or not. The guidance of the MRRD also makes it clear that this community recovery package will be implemented only if there is enough security with political stability; thus it can motivate communities to stop fighting. (The guidance of MRRD, “Community Recovery Intensification and Prioritization: Note for ARTF (Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund) Donors,” issued on 14 August 2010.) 442 The Project Document of “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program” (APRP), 13.  153  and the Joint Secretariat; “Joint Secretariat” (made up of relevant Afghan ministries, UNAMA and ISAF), which is responsible for day-to-day operations; and finally the “Provincial Peace and Reconciliation Committee” (led by provincial governors and supported by UNAMA regional offices and ISAF), which oversees political outreach to potential ex-combatants and communities and oversees district and community reconciliation initiatives at the provincial level.443  Development of Reconciliation after APRP and Current Challenges The new reconciliation framework endorsed at the Kabul International Conference seeks to address a number of factors that I have argued are critical for peace building. Thus, although it is too early to make a full assessment about the program, especially when the APRP has at least 5 years’ time framework for implementation, it is worth to attempting some initial analysis on its implementation. First of all, this framework was received by the Afghan people with substantial hope and support as indicated in the 2010 survey by the Asia Foundation, which conducted interviews with 6487 Afghan citizens in the middle of 2010. Asked “Do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree with the Government’s reconciliation efforts and negotiations with the armed opposition?” 85% of Pashtun, 81% of Tajik, 87% of Uzbek, 81% of Hazara, and 83% of the total Afghans surveyed answered that they strongly agree or somewhat agree with the government’s efforts for reconciliation, as shown below (Table 4.3):444  443 444  Ibid., 16. Original data set by Asia Foundation, “A survey of the Afghan People: Afghanistan in 2010.”  154  Table 4.3 Do You Support the Government’s Reconciliation Efforts with the Armed Opposition? Pashtun Strongly agree  45%  Tajik 41%  Uzbek 43%  Hazara  Total  39%  42% 41%  Agree somewhat  40%  40%  47%  42%  Disagree somewhat  11%  12%  8%  12%  11%  Strongly disagree  4%  7%  1%  1%  5%  The Afghan government announced 70 members of the High Peace Council in October, 2010, and former President Burhanuddin Rabbani was appointed as the chair of the High Peace Council, while Stanekzai served it as the Chief Executive Officer.445 The High Peace Council decided that it would seek political negotiation with the top leadership of the insurgency, including the Quetta Shura of the Taliban. Seeing the momentum and policies of the Afghan government, U.S. top officials also started to endorse negotiation with the top leadership of the Taliban. Asked whether the U.S. would support talking with top leadership such as Mullah Omar, U.S. Special Representative Richard Holbrooke claimed, Let me be clear on one thing, everybody understands that this war will not end in a clear-cut military victory. . . It is going to have some different ending from that, some form of political settlements are necessary. . . you can’t have a settlement with al Qaida, you can’t talk to them, you can’t negotiate with them, it is out of the question. But it is possible to talk to Taliban leaders.446 One of the controversies within the Obama administration was whether the Taliban would be ready to talk with the Afghan government when the Taliban perceives that it is winning the war. And  445 446  AFP, “Rabbani elected head of Afghan peace council,” 11 October 2010. Reuter Interview with Holbrooke, “Holbrooke: reformed Taliban in Afghan govt not wrong,” on 7 June 2010. Emphasis added.  155  during 2010, while the Afghan government and President Karzai were willing to start talks with the Taliban any time, the American top officials seemed to believe that the United States needed to regain the “position of winning” to push the Taliban to start negotiations with the Afghan government. For instance, Leon Penetta, CIA Director at that time (and current Defense Secretary) contended in June, 2010 that “we have seen no evidence that they [the Taliban] are truly interested in reconciliation.”447 Thus, he asserted, “serious peace talks were only likely to happen once the Taliban believed that they were going to be defeated.”448 This is the important background of the aims of the United States, which surged the U.S. troops from 70,000 to 100,000 at the peak of summer in 2010; the U.S. tried to gain the winning position by using this surge so that it can push the Taliban into reconciliation with the government.449 Due to this strategy, according to NATO, in the three month before November 11, Special Operations forces had conducted 1,572 operations, through which 368 insurgent leaders were killed or captured. Additionally, 968 lower-level insurgents were killed and 2,477 were captured.450 Some UN analysts argue that these operations in fact give a “confusing message” to the Taliban leadership, but the U.S. was adamant in this strategy until the spring of 2011. Seeing the difficulty of changing the momentum of the Taliban by military operations, however, President Obama made a speech on how to start withdrawal of the U.S. forces in June, 2011 after he succeeded in the killing of Osama Bin Laden in May, 2011. He defined the killing of Bin Laden as a “victory” and said, “We do know that peace cannot come to a land that has known so much war without a 447 448 449 450  Washington Times, “Mullen: Omar could be part of Afghan settlement”, 29 June 2010. Ibid. Linschoten and Kuehn 2011, 9. Ibid.  156  political settlement. So as we strengthen the Afghan government and security forces, America will join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan people, including the Taliban.”451 The killing of Bin Laden may become the good justification for President Obama to start withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan in July, 2011 and then seek political settlement with the Taliban. In the same month, Defense Secretary Robert Gate admitted that the United States began “preliminary talks” with members of the Taliban as part of an effort to end the war in Afghanistan.452 The UN Security Council also decided to split the Taliban and Al-Qaida Sanction Committee, so that the Taliban members and members of Al- Qaida will be treated in different sanction regimes.453 The split of the Taliban and al-Qaida committee, which was requested by the Afghan government, was one of the efforts by the international community to push forward the political process as the split of the regime “will symbolically delink the Taliban from al-Qaida.”454 At the same time, in Kabul, APRP secretariats announced in July, 2011 that more than 2000 insurgent members (mainly mid-level commanders and combatants in the Northern part of Afghanistan) had already reconciled with the government in the first 10 months since the beginning of the program.455 In New York, the UN Security Council decided to remove 14 former Taliban leaders from its sanction list as “part of moves to induce the insurgent group into talks with Kabul on a peace deal in Afghanistan.”456  451  New York Times, “Text of President Obama’s Speech on Afghanistan,” 22 June 2011. Emphasis added. New York Times, “Gates Acknowledges Talk with Taliban,” 19 June 2011. It was also reported in May 2011 that American officials met with a senior aide to the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, at least three times in the past three months “in the first direct exploratory peace talks.” (New York Times, “U.S. Has Held Meetings with Aide to Taliban Leader, Officials Say.” 26 May 2011) 453 On 17 June 2011, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1988 (2011) and 1989 (2011); and “adopting these resolutions, the Security Council decided to split the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanction regime.” (The Website of the Al-Qaida Sanction Committee, accessed on 23 November 2011) 454 Ramsey 2011, 6. 455 Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program “Monthly Report: July 2011” 456 Reuter, “U.N. sanctions panel delists 14 ex-Taliban figures,” 15 July 2011. 452  157  From the Taliban’s side, Taliban school attacks have significantly decreased in 2011 to “an average of about eight attacks per month, less than half the monthly average recorded by the ministry the previous two years.”457 It is reported that Mullah Omar “is believed to have issued a decree in March forbidding his fighters to attack schools and intimidate schoolchildren.”458 While the continuation of some attacks on Afghan schools indicates that the insurgency in Afghanistan is not controlled by one leader of the Taliban, the International Herald Tribune argues that “It was a hopeful sign as the United States and Afghanistan explore peace talks with the Taliban, and may show an effort on the part of the insurgents to portray a more moderate image as those talks continue, even as violence has escalated across the country.”459 The momentum of the peace negotiations with the top leadership of the Taliban was suddenly stopped by the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the chairperson of the High Peace Council, on 20 September 2011. The assassin, who claimed that he was the messenger for the Taliban leadership, met Rabbani, quickly blew himself up, and killed Rabbani and seriously injured Stanekzai, Chief Executive Officer of the High Peace Council and the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program.460 This assassination happened one week after the serious attack on the U.S. Embassy on 13 September 2011. Two days after the Rabbani assassination, Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff of U.S. forces, publicly announced that the Pakistan Intelligence Agency, ISI, was behind the attack on the U.S. Embassy by the Haqqani network, reportedly one of the military arms of the Taliban; Mullen said before a Senate hearing, “The Haqqani network, for one, acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Service 457 458 459 460  International Herald Tribunes, “Taliban school attacks fall sharply,” 11 June 2011. Ibid. Ibid. The Washington Post, “Key Afghan Leader Killed in Kabul Bombing,” 20 September 2011.  158  Intelligence Agency.”461 This statement seriously harmed the relationship between the U.S. government and the Pakistani government. After this dramatic public statement by the U.S., some Afghan government officials, including the head of the Afghan commission to investigate the assassination of Chair Rabbani, stated that the assassination seemed to be linked with Pakistan.462 The leader of the Haqqani claimed that the Haqqani and the Taliban did not kill Rabbani, while the Haqqani claimed responsibility for the attack on the U.S. Embassy; Siraj Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani network, responded to a BBC interview and said, “We have not killed Burhanuddin Rabbani and this has been said many times by the spokesperson of the Islamic Emirate [the self-name of the Taliban].”463 On the other hand, the Pakistani government denied all allegations and agreed with the Afghan government to jointly investigate the murder of Rabbani.464 The assassination of Rabbani suggests one important lesson for the implementation of political negotiations with the insurgency which is consistent with the central contention in this dissertation: that is the need to have a credible third party to mediate the talks between the government and the Taliban. Since the beginning of implementing APRP, the High Peace Council, headed by Rabbani and Stanekzai, conducted bilateral meetings with the representatives of the Taliban, as they had conviction that the process should be “Afghan-led.” While it is true that the Afghan leadership needs to make the final decisions on the terms of a political settlement with the Taliban, the bilateral efforts have a certain limit. For instance, when the person 461 462 463 464  BBC News, “Mullen mauling shows patience wearing thin with Pakistan,” 22 September 2011. AP, “Afghanistan-Pakistan ties frayed by assassination, 4 October 2011. BBC News, “Haqqani network denies killing Afghan envoy Rabbani,” 3 October 2011. BBC News, “Afghanistan and Pakistan agree Rabbani murder probe,” 1 November 2011.  159  who claimed that he was the messenger for the core group of the Taliban (what is called “Quetta Shura,” located in Quetta, Pakistan) met Rabbani and Stanekzai, Rabbani and Stanekzai decided not to conduct a body check of this self-claimed messenger as it can be insulting to an important representative of the Quetta Shura of the Taliban. However, if some credible third party – including the UN or some international organization that is credible to both sides – had been involved in the meetings, they would certainly have checked both representatives to ascertain their safety. This lesson should be learned by the Afghan government and the core group of the Taliban.465 A series of events, starting with the assassination of Rabbani, gave a very pessimistic perspective to the future of peace negotiations with the Taliban. The process is extremely challenging, especially because the initiatives started so late; many international officers believe that reconciliation efforts could have been much more easily conducted if started earlier, as I discussed in the first section of this chapter. In spite of these huge challenges and difficulties, President Obama has already announced that the U.S. will withdraw all combat forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, admitting that military operations alone cannot create peace; in order to prevent civil war after the withdrawal of the U.S. forces—as we saw after the withdrawal of the USSR—there will be little alternative than to advance the political process. Moreover, even if there is an outbreak of civil war after the withdrawal of the U.S. forces, the Afghan authorities and the international community will still need to find a political settlement to create a cease-fire and to establish enduring peace. Thus, current reconciliation efforts need to be continued no 465  There is a shared view among high ranked international officers in Afghanistan that the assign was the low-level insurgent who pretended to be the messenger from the Quetta Shura of the Taliban. The Quetta Shura of the Taliban repeatedly denied their commitment to attack Rabbani and Stanekzai, according to a high ranked political officer in UNAMA; he is convinced that “the bilateral approach is limited; somebody need to be involved as a credible third party which can facilitate the talk.” (Author’s interview with a high-ranked UNAMA political affairs officer with a condition of anonymity in December 2011.)  160  matter how difficult it appears.466 At the same time, 10 years’ Afghan experience since 2001 has given us crucial lessons for future peacebuilding; it is vital to include different political parties as broadly as possible, especially in the first phase of the peacebuilding process, to create legitimate governments in post-conflict states. The extent to which this and the other factors I have identified as critical for peace-building apply to other conflicts will be analyzed in the next chapter.  466  One Afghan adviser to President Karzai, who used to be a minister of the Karzai cabinet, emphasized in Tokyo in December 2011 that the Afghan government continues to have talks with the core group of insurgency, including the Taliban, in spite of the assassination of Rabbani because “we are absolutely sure that there is no military end to the Afghan conflict” (Luncheon with the advisor in Tokyo in December 2011).  161  5  Assessing My Argument with Other Cases: Iraq, Sierra  Leone, and Timor-Leste Aim of This Chapter The purpose of Chapter 5 is to assess the broader applicability of my argument by examining three other prominent peacebuilding cases. My central argument is that in order to induce repeated compliance in post-conflict states and then build legitimate governments, it is crucial to have not only coercion (guns) and resource distribution (money) but also the substantial role of IOs (mainly the United Nations) as a credible third party to ascertain fairness and impartiality, as well as an inclusive political process inviting various political groups into a new political structure. As will be shown, the cases of Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste (formerly known as East Timor) consistently demonstrate the importance of these factors, such as the role of the UN and inclusiveness in peacebuilding. These three cases are selected because of the different roles of the UN in their peacebuilding experiences, as well as the different degrees of inclusiveness in creating new governments. In Iraq, the UN had no political authority in the initial stage of nation building after the Bush administration attacked Iraq in 2003 and started a nation-building enterprise. But U.S. policy drastically changed in 2004, when the U.S. found that it was impossible to create an Iraqi interim government and conduct national elections single-handedly, without the substantial political role of the UN. The U.S. also started rebuilding Iraq by excluding many political wings: The new coalition authority led by the U.S., which governed Iraq for the first year, disbanded the Iraq National Army, affecting 400,000 soldiers who became candidates for 162  insurgency; it also expelled members of Ba’athist parties from the new government and forced the majority of Iraqi Sunni, who had dominated the Ba’athist parties, to perceive that they were politically excluded.467 This policy, again, drastically changed in 2007 when the U.S. found that it was impossible to contain the insurgency by military operations, and therefore initiated massive reconciliation efforts with Sunni insurgents and created a more inclusive political process. Thus, the case of Iraq demonstrates how changes of policy in the role of the UN and inclusiveness can change the course of peacebuilding. On the other hand, Sierra Leone’s peacebuilding, starting in 1999, was consistent in terms of a substantial role for the UN mission, which deployed more than 17,000 UN peacekeepers and took responsibility to support the creation of a new government, including assisting with national elections. The case of Sierra Leone has also shown constant efforts to create political inclusiveness, as the new government reconciled with most of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which was a major insurgent group in Sierra Leone. The case of Timor-Leste also exhibited almost complete authority of the UN mission to govern the newly created state for the first several years, from 1999 to 2005 (the first UN peacekeeping in Timor-Leste was completed in 2005); thus, it is valuable to assess the support and compliance for this UN mission by local people. In addition, Timor-Leste later accepted multinational forces led by Australia for peacebuilding operations in 2006, when there was a political uprising. The Timor-Leste case can demonstrate how people in Timor-Leste think about those two different peacekeeping forces: one is the UN peacekeeping force and the other is the multinational peacekeeping force led by Australia. Timor-Leste also enjoyed a quite high degree of inclusiveness by reconciling with 467  The details will be examined in the following sections.  163  pro-Indonesian militias who destroyed the country in the 1999 national referendum for independence. As I emphasized in the introductory chapter, the four cases (including Afghanistan) might not be sufficient to conduct a full assessment of the argument I present in this dissertation, but this dissertation aims to generate a theory that can be examined more thoroughly in a full range of cases in future studies. The three prominent cases—in addition to the Afghan case—analyzed here exhibit different degrees of UN authority and inclusiveness, providing for good variation, yet all cases strongly suggest the validity of my argument.  Peacebuilding in Iraq Changes in the Role of the UN in Iraq U.S. policies for nation building in Iraq, starting in 2003, reflected ideology held by a neoconservative group within the George W. Bush administration inaugurated in 2001. The neoconservatives—whose agenda is typically explained by the “Project for the New American Century” signed by Vice President Dick Cheney; Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; and Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense in the first George W. Bush administration—evinced a strong ideology to downplay the role of the UN.468 Richard Perle, a prominent neoconservative and chair of the Defense Policy Board, declared that the “UN was dead” when the UN Security Council did not authorize the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. He insisted, “Saddam Hussein’s reign of terror is about to end. He will go quickly, but not alone: in a parting irony, he will take the UN down with him.”469 468  The statement of the principles of “The Project for the New American Century”, which was announced in 1997 and signed by neoconservatives is currently posted on the website of the Project for the New American Century: http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm 469 Perle 2003, 1.  164  Neoconservatives made it a priority to form a new regime in Iraq without the UN’s political role. Another neoconservative, Stephen Schwartz, wrote an article titled “UN Go Home” one week after the Hussein regime collapsed.470 He insisted that the last thing the U.S. should do was to ask the UN to take responsibility and play a leading role in shaping a new Iraq: “The United States must not permit the UN, with its terrible record in the Balkans, among the Palestinians, in Africa, in Cambodia, and elsewhere, to inflict its incompetence and neuroses on the people of Iraq.”471 It took only one month for the U.S.-led coalition to complete its invasion of Iraq and occupy the state. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. started to push members of the UN Security Council to adopt a new resolution regarding the rebuilding of Iraq. After a serious debate in the Council, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1483 on 22 May 2003. Under strong pressure from the U.S., the resolution stated the U.S.-led occupation “Authority” had the “effective administration of the territory”; the Coalition Authority was officially granted the central power to rebuild Iraq.472 It is obvious that with Resolution 1483, the Bush administration showed its strong determination to rebuild Iraq without the role of the UN politically; the resolution conferred the leading role of rebuilding Iraq on the U.S.-led occupying power, not the UN. As Salim Lone, the UN director of communication in the UN mission in Iraq in 2003, contended, “it was the first time in UN history that the UN Security Council authorized an occupying power, not the UN, to have absolute responsibility to rebuild a state.”473  470  Schwartz 2003, 1. Ibid., 10. 472 UN Security Council Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003. 473 Author’s interview with Salim Lone, the former director of communication working for UN Baghdad Headquarters, on 18 March 2004. Emphasis added. 471  165  The Authority of Bremer The absolute power of the Coalition Authority was clearly demonstrated by the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, Paul Bremer, who was appointed administrator of the CPA in May 2003. He articulates his power in his book: “I would be the only paramount authority figure—other than dictator Saddam Hussein—that most Iraqis had ever known.”474 He believed that he was empowered with “all executive, legislative, and judicial functions in Iraq.”475 On the other hand, although Sergio de Mello—one of the most prominent UN figures who worked as Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in East Timor and Kosovo—was selected as SRSG in Iraq in 2003, he did not have any substantial political role in creating a new government in Iraq.476 Responding to the idea of the Bush administration, Bremer had a clear plan to establish the new government. He wrote a memo to the Secretary of Defense on 3 June 2003, insisting (1) the CPA would work to appoint the interim government in two months; (2) the CPA would start a constitutional process at the end of July 2003; (3) the Iraqis could write a new constitution in six months; and (4) national elections might be held in about a year. He wrote in the memo, “a tall order, but a worthy goal.”477 It is obvious that the Bush administration had a strong intention to create a new government in Iraq almost single-handedly, by creating a new constitution and conducting elections in Iraq under the U.S. authority.478 And the Bush administration wanted to establish a new Iraq without the UN’s political role.  474  Bremer 2006, 4. Ibid, 13. 476 Power 2008, 374-420. The detail will be shown later in this section as well. 477 Ibid., 84. 478 In order to achieve this plan, Bremer established the Iraqi Governing Council in July, 2003. All 25 members of the Governing Council were appointed by Bremer; thus it was largely viewed as puppet body for the US agenda, but the CPA asserted that the Governing Council could function as an interim governmental body in Iraq. (Bremer 2006, 90-103) 475  166  Although the UN Secretariat, head by Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Under-Secretary-General Kieran Prendergast for political affairs, accepted their marginal role in the initial stage, they began resisting the U.S. policy in Iraq as the insurgency resulted in the drastic deterioration of the security situation in Iraq. The resistance of the UN Secretariat against the U.S. occupation was triggered by the most serious attack against the UN in its history. On 19 August 2003, a flatbed truck carrying 1,000 kilograms of high explosives detonated outside the UN headquarters in Baghdad. It killed 22 UN staff, including Sergio de Mello, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and wounded more than 150 personnel.479 This suicide attack caused Annan and other UN Secretaries to realize that the UN should withdraw from Iraq unless it could play a substantial political role commensurate with the risk to UN staff.480 Kieran Prendergast, the Under-Secretary-General of Political Affairs and key Secretary who designed UN policy in Iraq at that time, explained, [After the August 19 attack] we had a sustained debate over quite a long period about what was our proper profile, what was our proper presence, what role were we playing? As far as I could see, politically we were playing an extremely marginal role. I do not believe that we were being consulted by the CPA about any matters of substance.481 As Secretary-General, Annan had a unilateral right to stop the dispatch of UN humanitarian workers due to security concerns. In September 2003, he decided to reduce the number of international staff in Iraq from 800 to 80.482 Then, Annan and Prendergast also started to push the Bush administration  479 480 481 482  Report of Secretary-General 5 December 2003, 4. Author’s interview with Kieran Prendergast, former Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs at the UN Headquarters on 26 May 2006. Author’s interview with Prendergast, 6 March 2004. Report of Secretary-General 5 December 2003, 6.  167  to change its policy in Iraq. On 13 September 2003, Annan called the foreign ministers of the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council to Geneva.483 In this meeting, he proposed his own plan and demanded the U.S. and the Coalition change its Iraq policy. Before this meeting, the Bush administration had already proposed a new UN Security Council resolution, which would authorize the creation of a multinational force for Iraq; however, the resolution still assumed the First Bremer Plan, in which the CPA would have primary responsibility to create a constitution and conduct an election. Responding to the policies of the Bush administration, Annan and Prendergast proposed the UN’s alternative plan, aiming to hand over sovereignty to a “new interim government” that would have more inclusive participation by broad Iraqi political groups, followed by the constitutional process, elections, and then the formation of a new permanent government.484 The plan implied that the whole process would be assisted by the UN as a key player, suggesting that the rebuilding of Iraq needed to be conducted by Iraqis, supported by the UN, but not by the CPA. This plan shows the determination of the UN Secretaries to push the Bush administration to follow two principles of peacebuilding: a central role of the UN in the political process and inclusiveness of the local authority. At the 13 September meeting in Geneva, Annan demanded that the P5 states take this proposal into consideration in the new resolution. In front of the foreign ministers of the P5 states he asserted that, The UN Security Council Resolution 1483 placed the UN in a very difficult position. Special Representative [Sergio] Vieira de Mello was unable to fulfill the 483 484  Ibid. 14. Ibid., 14.  168  role the UN should have played… We cannot repeat this error… Especially now, we must be sure to pass the correct resolution, as the bad resolutions kill people.485 Germany, France, and Canada, which opposed the U.S. attack against Iraq in the first place, demonstrated their opposition to the policies of the Bush administration and supported Annan’s plan. Germany’s ambassador to the UN at that time emphasized, “We were fully in agreement with what he [the Secretary-General] had said…. The problem was to fulfill these conditions in order to enable the Secretary-General and the UN to play again the central role in the reconstruction of Iraq.”486 However, when the U.S. submitted the revised draft of the new resolution in October 2003, Annan found that the substance of the U.S. plan had not changed; the CPA was still responsible for creating the constitution and conducting elections in Iraq. Annan and Prendergast took action. The UN Secretaries gathered in Prendergast’s room and wrote a new draft of Annan’s speech for the luncheon meeting on the same day. In front of the 15 states of the UN Security Council, Annan spoke with a harsh tone: If the Coalition Authority had concluded that the best way forward was to keep their original ideas on political transition, the occupying power had a difficult job ahead and was shouldering an enormous burden. In this case, the UN could not play an effective political role: Either the CPA or the UN should be in charge of the political process… Attempting to blur the role of the two is a cause for confusion and could expose the United Nations to risk that is not justified by the substance of its role.487  485  NHK Documentary 2004. The contents of this documentary which was directed by the author are supported by interviews with top leaders such as Annan, Prendergast, Brahimi, and Negroponte (U.S. Ambassador to the UN at that time) as well as minutes of critical meetings. 486 Author’s interview with Gunter Pleuger, the German Ambassador to the UN, on 5 March 2004. Emphasis added. 487 NHK Documentary 2004, based on the minutes.  169  The evocative speech by Annan, who tended to be calm and friendly to the U.S., was broadcast as “the most significant and unprecedented revolt of the United Nations against the United States in the history of the UN.”488 Germany and France expressed their strong support of Annan’s harsh criticism of the U.S. Iraq policy. However, the Bush administration adamantly persuaded the UN Security Council members to adopt Resolution 1511, without substantial changes, on 16 October 2003. Although the Bush administration refused the request by the UN Secretaries at the time, it eventually changed its Iraq policy and asked the UN to play a critical role in forming an interim government and conducting elections in Iraq. The sudden change of U.S. policy was announced on 19 January 2004 in the bilateral meeting between the CPA, headed by Bremer, and the UN Secretariat, headed by Annan and Prendergast, at the UN Headquarters. Before this meeting, the Bush administration faced a critical impasse: First, there was a sharply rising insurgency, which was destroying Bremer’s nation building plans. The average daily number of attacks by insurgents jumped from 8 in June 2003 to more than 30 in November of the same year.489 Secondly, the Iraqi leaders of political factions rejected the CPA plan. Shiite people, who make up between 60% and 70% of the Iraqi population, were opposed to elections conducted by the CPA. Shiite and other Iraqi political factions were very consistent in demanding that the UN should play a central role in conducting elections. Thus, Abed al-Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Shiites and the chairperson of the Governing Council—an interim body created by Bremer—sent a letter to Annan at the end of 2003 and asked the UN to oversee the elections for creating a constitutional  488 489  Asahi Newspaper. 7 November 2003. Ibid., 22.  170  government.490 It was also significant that Ayatollah Sistani—the most powerful Shiite religious leader in Iraq—opposed the Bremer plan and asked the UN to conduct the elections. It is in this context that Bremer said in the meeting with Annan that Ayatollah Sistani and his supporters did not accept the CPA’s electoral plan, and he really hoped the UN would dispatch an electoral investigation team to Iraq with the aim of designing an alternative plan to both create a new interim Iraqi government and conduct elections. Annan responded that the UN would not return to Iraq if it was only to encourage Ayatollah Sistani to follow the U.S. plan, but if the U.S. was ready to accept a UN alternative, he would consider dispatching investigators to Iraq.491 After the meeting, Bremer acknowledged his enthusiasm for the involvement of the UN: “I think the encouraging news from today was that the Secretary-General agreed to consider this request very seriously.”492 It appeared that the U.S. had finally recognized that in order to gain the support of the Iraqi political factions, the U.S. needed to ask for help from the UN. It is sharp evidence that even the most powerful country, the United States, needed to ask the UN to play a critical political role in forming a new interim government and conducting national elections in Iraq. In February 2004, Annan dispatched Brahimi, a special advisor of the Secretary-General on the Middle East, to Iraq. Brahimi met more than 200 leaders of various factions in Iraq, including Ayatollah Sistani, who refused to talk with Bremer but desired to meet Brahimi, and announced an alternative proposal for rebuilding Iraq. According to the Brahimi plan, the first interim government was a “caretaker  490 491 492  Hakim Letter on 23 December 2003. Author’s interview with Kofi Annan in March 2004, as well as a minute of the meeting. Bremer Press conference on 19 January 2004.  171  government” consisting of a much broader range of Iraqi leaders, and Brahimi would assist in its formation by the end of June 2004. This caretaker government was to conduct the first national election in January 2005, which would produce a “new interim government.” This interim government would adopt the constitution and conduct the second national election in December 2005 to create a formal new government.493 The Bush administration welcomed the plan by Brahimi in April 2004. Following the U.S. acceptance, Brahimi led the process of selecting the cabinet members of the “caretaker government” in June 2004. The UN electoral teams also played a major role in the formation of the Independent Electoral Commission in Iraq (IECI).494 The team worked with the IECI to design a proportional representation system for national elections and assist in both the January and December elections in 2005.495 In short, in terms of choosing the caretaker government and designing two elections, the UN played a central role in Iraq. Although it is not largely recognized, the Bush administration would not have achieved even the creation of an interim government—vital for the political process of creating a new government—and would not have conducted two elections to make formal governments in Iraq if it had not asked the UN to play a crucial political role. This historical process demonstrated that the U.S. could not rebuild Iraq because it lacked the legitimacy required to pull the different Iraqi factions to follow the CPA-led process. Larry Diamond, a prominent American democracy theorist and the senior political advisor to the CPA from 2003 to 2004, emphasized later that the U.S. occupation had “a serious legitimacy problem,” and that  493 494 495  The Brahimi recommendation presented to the UN Security Council on 23 February 2004. UN Homepage: Iraq Electoral Fact Sheet. Ibid.  172  pattern changed only when the Bush administration “finally turned to the UN for help.”496 Although the new formal governments were created by two national elections, which were largely supported by the UN electoral team, the chaotic situation in Iraq continued. That is, the role of the UN was indispensable in creating a formal government through the electoral process, but not sufficient to reduce the insurgency and create stability. Dealing with the insurgency required a reconciliation process that started in the middle of 2007; it drastically reduced the violence in Iraq.  Changes in Inclusiveness of the Political Process There is no question that the U.S.-led peacebuilding efforts in Iraq—starting in 2003—excluded many Iraqi groups from the political process and created a large number of insurgents, until the U.S. substantially changed its policy in 2007 and initiated massive reconciliation with a majority of Iraqi insurgents. The process of Iraq’s reconstruction clearly shows how inclusiveness is critical in enhancing compliance, given the fact that other factors were almost constant as the situation changed within the same country over time, as will be demonstrated in this section. After the Bush administration toppled the Hussein government in 2003, the CPA issued two orders regarding the inclusiveness of the new Iraqi authority that are largely perceived as mistakes in retrospect: The first was to expel members of Ba’athist parties from the government.497 The second order was to dissolve the Iraq national army.498 Diamond criticized these two policies as “strategic miscalculations.”499 The de-Ba’athification campaign excluded high-ranked Sunni officials from any substantial role in the  496 497 498 499  Diamond 2004, 45. CPA Order Number 1: De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society, 16 May 2003. CPA Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities, 23 May 2003. Diamond 2004, 43.  173  new government, and most of the insurgent attacks were committed by “Sunni, who turned against the occupation because they believed it excluded them politically.”500 Regarding the dissolution of the Iraqi army, which fired more than 400,000 soldiers, Diamond argued, “by formally dissolving it, the CPA lost the opportunity to reconstitute some portions of it to help restore order, and it left tens of thousands of armed soldiers and officers cut out of the new order and prime candidates for recruitment by the insurgency.”501 In the first years, the Bush administration and the U.S. forces tried to destroy Sunni insurgent groups by capturing, killing, and dispersing them, including the insurgency in Anbar province in the city of Fallujah, which the U.S. forces identified as “the center of the Iraqi insurgency.”502 In spite of harsh military operations in these Sunni insurgent-controlled areas, the security situation worsened until the end of 2006.503 The number of Iraqi civilian fatalities per month kept increasing from less than 1,000 in May 2003, to more than 3,500 in November 2006; the number of persons killed by insurgent bombings was near 700 at the end of 2006, compared with almost zero in August 2003.504 A UN human rights chief in Iraq assessed the situation in 2006 as “endemic breakdown of security for increasing violence,” describing daily life as “chaotic.”505 In order to respond to this security condition in which “insurgent violence appeared to be spiraling out of control,” the Bush administration announced a “surge” of the U.S. forces by dispatching about  500  Ibid., 42. Ibid., p. 44. 502 New York Times, “G.I ‘s Open Attack to Take Fallujah From Iraq Rebels,” 8 November 2004. 503 See Brookings Institution 4 June 2009. Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 504 Ibid., 4-8. 505 BBC News, “Gangs kill freely in Iraq chaos,” 2 March 2006. 501  174  30,000 U.S. soldiers in addition to the 130,000 American forces already deployed and appointed General David Petraeus as the U.S. commander in Iraq.506 However, the insurgent attacks continued to increase and cost 126 American soldiers’ lives in June 2007, the second-highest number of monthly U.S. casualties since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.507 General Petraeus was under “pressure to reduce casualties quickly,” and decided to “strike deals with” Sunni insurgents directly.508 The most critical deal was the payroll for Iraqi insurgents who decided to join “Awakening Councils” (security bodies collaborating with U.S. forces), promised to renounce violence, and cut ties to al-Qaeda.509 The members of the Awakening Councils are largely Sunni, and they started to be referred to as the “Sons of Iraq.”510 The number of “Sons of Iraq” drastically rose as the U.S. forces advanced reconciliation with insurgents. The Brookings Institution estimated that as of June 2008, there were 103,536 “Sons of Iraq,” and the average payroll for a Son of Iraq per month was 293 US dollars.511 Although the Bush administration tended to claim the “surge” was a major reason for the reduction in violence in Iraq after the middle of 2007, many American officers insisted that this Awakening Movement was “the most significant reason for the decline.”512 In some regions, “the American casualties plunged within weeks of the Sunnis joining with American forces.”513 In Anbar province, the number of  506  Simon 2008, 57 & BBC News, “Profile: General Petraeus,” 10 September 2008. Brookings Institution 2009, 15. 508 Simon 2008, 64. 509 Ibid., p. 64. 510 New York Times, “Iraqi Militants Show a New Boldness in Cities”, 1 April 2009. 511 Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, June 4, 2009, p. 11. The New York Times also reported that there were about 100,000 members –largely Sunni – who were getting payroll of about 300 USD per month and belonged to the Awakening Movement (New York Times, “Awakening Movement in Iraq”, 22 September 2008). 512 New York Times, “Awakening Movement in Iraq,” 22 September 2008. 513 Ibid. 507  175  insurgent attacks aimed at Iraqis and Americans “has dropped by more than 90 percent.”514 Simon concluded that this comprehensive reconciliation process “brought about the current drop in violence.”515 One of the tribal leaders in Anbar province lamented the policies of the CPA headed by Paul Bremer: “Paul Bremer disbanded the army, the government, the police…We had nothing left. We had no choice but to resist.”516  Alternative Account? The case of Iraq is also useful to examine alternative accounts, which emphasize the level of coercion and resource distribution in creating a legitimate government, not the inclusive political process nor the substantial role of the UN in advancing political events. Paul Bremer, head of CPA in Iraq from 2003 to 2004 , indicates in retrospect that he could not achieve his objective because the level of U.S. forces was simply too low; he indicated that he needed to have 500,000 U.S. forces deployed in Iraq, as recommended by RAND.517 However, the story I presented in this section clearly suggests that Bremer’s plan was rejected by Iraqi political factions not because of the level of U.S. forces, but because of suspicion by Iraqi political factions concerning the elections conducted by the U.S.; that is why Iraqi political factions unanimously asked the UN (Annan and Brahimi) to dispatch an election investigation team to Iraq and to support conducting the elections. With regard to the reconciliation, although the surge of the U.S. forces (deploying 30,000 more forces to Iraq) happened in January 2007, it was July 2007 when the number of insurgent attacks suddenly  514 515 516 517  New York Times, “U.S. Hands Off Pacified Anbar, Once Heart of Iraq Insurgency,” 2 September 2008. Simon 2008, 64-65. New York Times, “U.S. Hands Off Pacified Anbar, Once Heart of Iraq Insurgency,” 2 September 2008. Bremer 2006, 10.  176  dropped as the U.S. changed its policy and started massive reconciliation with Sunni insurgent groups, as explained. It is also true that insurgent attacks and civilian deaths in Iraq drastically dropped in 2008 and 2009 (see Figure 5.1), but the level of U.S. forces was almost same until 2010 when U.S. started the force reduction (see Figure 5.2). Figure 5.1 Estimated Iraqi Civilian Fatalities by Year from 2003 to 2011518  35000 30000 25000  20000 15000 10000 5000 0 Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  Figure 5.2 U.S. Troops in Iraq519  160000 140000 120000 100000  80000 60000 40000 20000 0 Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012  518  Brooking Institutions 2012, Iraq Index, 3. Ibid., 13. The graph shows the number of U.S. troops in Iraq in May of each year, except for 2012 (since December 2011, the number of U.S. forces in Iraq has been zero). 519  177  In short, as Steven Simon contends—and other leading news agencies such as the New York Times assert—it appears certain that while the surge of U.S. forces might have had some impact on the insurgency, a more significant factor for reducing violence in Iraq after 2007 was the massive reconciliation with Sunni insurgents.520 The dramatic drop in insurgents’ attacks made it possible for the U.S. to withdraw its forces from Iraq; the U.S. military withdrawal was completed in December 2011. The drastic reduction of the insurgency made it possible to deliver more government services to the Iraqi people after 2008; a virtuous circle started. For example, the average hours of electricity in Iraq, one of the important indicators of resource distribution (or quality of economic life), is shown below (Figure 5.3): Figure 5.3 Average Hours of Electricity Per Day in Iraq  521  25  20  15  10  5  0 Year 2005  Year 2006  Year 2007  Year 2008  Year 2009  Year 2010  520  See the detail in the article, “The Price of Surge: How U.S. Strategy is Hastening Iraq’s Demise” in the journal of Foreign Affairs, 2008, 87 (3):57-76, by Steve Simon, as well as New York Times, “Awakening Movement in Iraq,” 22 September 2008. 521 Ibid., 23. The graph uses the data of March of each year, except for of February, 2008, as there was no available data for March, 2008. There was also no concrete data in 2003 and 2004.  178  Access to clean water also has drastically risen since 2008; in February 2008, the percentage of the Iraqi population with access to potable water was only 22%, but it jumped to 70% in 2011.522 The GDP per capita also shows the same trend; Iraqi GDP per capita in 2005 was $951 USD, but it jumped to $3,301 USD in 2011.523 The improved security conditions let Iraqi people enjoy a higher level of economic activity and government services, which increased the support for, trust in, and legitimacy of the government. This bright picture after years of gloomy atmosphere and devastating security conditions suddenly collapsed in December 2011 when Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, representing Shia political factions in Iraq, ordered the arrest of the Sunni vice president, Tariq al-Hashimi, the day after the last U.S. combat troops left Iraq, “accusing him of running a death squad that assassinated police officers and government officials.”524 This ejection of the most influential Sunni leader from the government again created political chaos and insurgency that made January 2012 the bloodiest month for Iraq since 2001.525 The process of Iraqi nation building continues to suggest how crucial it is for peacebuilders to have an inclusive political process in creating governments, as well as to have a substantial role for the UN, especially in the initial stages of advancing key political process, such as creating interim authorities and conducting elections as show in Iraq from 2003 to 2005.  522 523 524 525  Ibid., 25. Ibid., 24. International Herald Tribune, “Political crisis hits Iraq, a day after U.S. troops leave,” 21 December 2011. International Herald Tribune, “As rival factions fray, Iraqi premier consolidated power,” 29 February 2012.  179  Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone Constant Efforts for Inclusiveness and Central Roles of the UN Sierra Leone is a prominent case in which both domestic and international peacebuilders made a determined and consistent effort to include a prominent rebel group, which fought against the government for decades, in a new political structure and succeeded in establishing peace. In this sense, Sierra Leone’s case has a sharp contrast with the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq (especially for the first four years, from 2003 to 2007). Sierra Leone is also a case in which the UN mission continued to play a leading role in providing security, by dispatching a large number of UN peacekeepers, and in supporting the creation of a new legitimate government between 1999 (when the peace agreement, the “Lomé Agreement,” was signed) and 2005 (when the UN mission in Sierra Leone completed its mission). In the course of implementing the peace agreement, the majority members of the former rebel group followed the peace agreement and transformed it into a political party, which complied with the results of the election in 2002; since then, Sierra Leone has enjoyed relatively good security and stability.526 The civil war began in Sierra Leone in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) started a military campaign to topple the government.527 The decade-long civil war killed more than 50,000 people, caused more than 500,000 people to be internally displaced, and resulted in serious human rights violations.528 During the conflict, the RUF was notorious for its brutal actions against civilians; they often  526  Hayner 2007, 29-30. See also International Crisis Groups, Sierra Leone: A New Era of Reform? (Freetown /Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 31, 2008). 527 Paris 2004, 222. 528  Dobbins.et.al, 2005, 134.  180  looted, raped women, and forced children to fight on a massive scale.529 Kenji Isezaki, who engaged in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts in both Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, claimed that “the brutality of the RUF was as much as, or even worse than, the Taliban in Afghanistan.”530 Due to international pressure, the Sierra Leone military government conducted multiparty elections in February 1996; however, the elected president, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, was soon exiled by a military coup.531 To restore the Kabbah government, Nigerian-led military forces, authorized by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), intervened in Sierra Leone, and Kabbah returned to his country as the president.532 But the RUF kept fighting ECOWAS forces (that were called “ECOMOG,” the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) and the government forces. Recognizing the strength of the RUF and weakness of Sierra Leone’s government forces, Nigeria and ECOWAS member states pushed President Kabbah to talk with the RUF and start political negotiations to end the conflict, threatening that ECOMOG forces would withdraw otherwise.533 As a result of international talks that included the UN, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), several African countries, and the United States, the Kabbah government and the RUF reached an historical agreement in July 1999. This peace accord was called the “Lomé Accord,” signed in Lomé, the capital of Togo. The core part of the “Lomé Accord” was to establish reconciliation (power sharing) between the Kabbah government and RUF and to give the UN a central role in supporting implementation of the accord. The Accord defines (1) amnesty for all parties and rebels, including the leader of the RUF, 529 530 531 532 533  Hayner 2007, 8-9. Isezaki 2004. Paris 2004, 222. Ibid., 222. Hayner 2007, 9.  181  Foday Sankoh; (2) power sharing between the Kabbah government and the RUF, awarding the RUF four ministerial posts as well as giving Sankoh the position of vice president and the chairmanship of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction, and Development, a key commission that would direct major financial resources, including diamonds; and (3) disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former guerrilla combatants, including RUF soldiers.534 Although there were mounting criticisms and anger—by both the Sierra Leone people and some international human rights NGOs—against awarding such high-ranked positions and amnesty to the RUF and its leader, “President Kabbah made a critical decision to bring national reconciliation and to achieve lasting peace.”535 It is critical to acknowledge that the parties of the Lomé Accord —both the Kabbah government and RUF—asked the UN “to deploy military observers as soon as possible to observe compliance by the Government forces (ECOMOG and Civil Defense Forces) and the RUF, including former AFRC forces, with this ceasefire agreement.”536 Additionally, the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was also asked to chair a Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (CMC); the UN was asked “to help oversee disarmament and to provide staff to help conduct elections.”537 These parallel very closely the request by the Iraqi political groups that Kofi Annan and the UN Secretariat assist in creating the interim government in 2004 and assist in conducting Iraqi national 534  The Lomé Accord, signed on 7 July, 1999 and Hayner 2004, 22. With regard to the pardon and amnesty, the Lomé Accord states, “In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra Leone shall take legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon. After the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall also grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement.” (Article IX, 1-2) 535 Author’s interview with a high-ranked official of the Sierra Leone government with a condition of anonymity in New York in November, 2008. 536 Lomé Peace Accord Annex1, provision 6. 537 Adebajo and Keen 2007, 257. Also see Lome Peace Accord, Article II.  182  elections in 2005, as discussed in the previous section. The major military factions of Sierra Leone’s civil war (the Kabbah government and the RUF) decided to ask the UN (Kofi Annan, in this case) to dispatch thousands of observers to monitor the ceasefire and assist in the political process to construct a new state, including disarmament of military factions and conducting elections. It is also noteworthy that the Lomé Peace Accord defines ECOMOGS as government forces: the UN was requested to observe the ceasefire between the government forces including ECOMOGS and RUF.538 This provides evidence concerning Sierra Leone peacebuilding that the UN has some comparative advantage—as per my general argument—to be seen as an impartial and credible third party, especially in the eyes of leaders who joined the Lomé Peace Accord. In order to respond to the request by the parties to adopt the Lomé Accord and implement it, the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of UNAMSIL, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, in 1999.539 And UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Oluyemi Adeniji as his Special Representative, who assumed his functions in Sierra Leone on 11 December 1999.540 UNAMSIL was given about 6,000 UN peacekeepers, who took over security responsibility from the ECOMOG forces.541 UNAMSIL was given the mandate to provide security for the country, to implement the DDR process of former fighters including RUF, and to supervise the national election which was planned for 2002.542 There was no doubt that UNAMSIL had a leading political and military role in supporting the creation of a  538  Lomé Peace Accord “Request the United Nations, subject to the Security Council’s authorization, to deploy military observers as soon as possible to observe the compliance by the Government forces (ECOMOG and Civil Defense Forces),” according to Annex 1, provision 6. Civil Defense Forces were pro-government militias in Sierra Leone. 539 Dobbins.et.al, 2005, 29. 540 Ibid. 541 Krasno 2005, 22. 542 Paris 2004, 222.  183  new government in Sierra Leone, defined by the Lomé Accord. In spite of the fact that Sankoh—the leader of RUF and the vice-president of the interim government—obtained lucrative power sharing, Sankoh himself decided not to obey the peace accord; he refused the disarmament of 30,000 soldiers under his control who occupied half of the country before the Lomé Agreement.543 In May 2000, he finally took more than 500 UN peacekeepers hostage.544 When the Sierra Leone people organized a large public march near Sankoh’s house to protest his action, Sankoh’s security guards fired back and killed twenty civilians.545 Backed by the support of the local citizens, the government succeeded in arresting Sankoh a few days after he escaped. Following the event, a British task force was dispatched to stabilize Freetown (the capital of Sierra Leone) and neighboring regions; the UN Security Council also responded by increasing the size of the UN peacekeeper force from 6,000 to 17,500 ; those efforts by the international community restored stability quickly.546 Because Sankoh violated the Lomé Accord after he signed it for reconciliation, his arrest was largely accepted and supported by people in Sierra Leone; he was brought to justice under the International Special Court for Sierra Leone, along with a few of his core members. Sankoh died in custody from natural causes in July 2003.547 The key development in this process was the fact that an overwhelming majority of the other RUF members did not follow Sankoh; they decided to disarm themselves and transform the RUF into a political  543  Dobbins.et.al, 2005, 132. Paris 2004, 222. 545 Hayner 2007, 23. 546 Paris 2004, 222. 547 Website “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: About Foday Sankoh” Accessed by http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/FodaySankoh/tabid/187/Default.aspx 544  184  party called “RUF-P.”548 The new leadership of the RUF and the government concluded the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement on 10 November 2000, and “they affirmed their commitment to Lomé and to UNAMSIL’s central role in overseeing the ceasefire, promised it unimpeded access throughout the country, and pledged to participate in the disarmament and demobilization process.”549 Again, the key actors who decided to comply with the Lomé Peace Accord asked the UN to play a central role in overseeing the critical political events, such as disarmament and demobilization—evidence of the UN’s comparative advantage as an impartial third party in the eyes of local leadership. As a result, more than 24,000 former RUF soldiers were disarmed before the national election in May 2002. 550 The main reason that RUF members followed the peace accord is that they perceived that UN observers could ensure their safety after their disarmament, as well as they perceived the benefits of entering the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) program in Sierra Leone, which was conducted by UNAMSIL and UNDP.551 According to the survey conducted in the summer of 2003 by Macartan Humphreys at Columbia University and Jeremy Weinstein at Stanford University, among 1043 ex-combatants in Sierra Leone they interviewed, 93% received a cash reinsertion benefit and more than 80% participated in vocational training programs, as a result of their surrendering weapons.552 And the approval of ex-combatants regarding the training was very high: 75.8% of the respondents agreed that “the training I received has prepared me well for my work,” 91.5% agreed that “the skills I learned are needed 548  Sesay & Suma 2009. Berman and Labonte 2006, 161. Ibid. 551 As will be shown in the next section, 98% of 872 respondents in Sierra Leone in 2005 responded that “the security situation has improved since UNAMSIL has been in the country,” according to the report by Krasno. It is intuitive that this improving security condition made it easier for RUF soldiers to comply with disarmament, as they did not expect direct violent threats after disarmament (Krasno 2005, 10). 552 Humphreys & Weinstein 2003, 31-32. 549 550  185  by employers in this region,” and 87.1% agreed that “I am better socially because of training I received.”553 It appears certain that the DDR process—that was run by the UNAMSIL and UNDP which contributed to it as credible third parties—was highly evaluated by ex-combatants, including RUF members, and this is the key factor that pushed those members to comply with the peace accord in Sierra Leone. In the 2002 election—supervised by UNAMSIL and its peacekeepers to ensure a free and fair election—President Kabbah won with more than 70% of the votes, and his party obtained 83 of 112 parliamentary seats.554 On the other hand, the RUF political party (RUF-P) obtained only 1.7% of the votes.555 However, the RUF fully accepted the result of elections as it trusted in UNAMSIL which was heavily involved in implementing the election; then the political and military power of the RUF totally collapsed, and Sierra Leone established sustainable peace, which has been largely recognized by the international community as a successful peacebuilding case.556 UNAMSIL and its peacekeeping operations were completed in 2005.  Perception about Reconciliation and UN Roles in Sierra Leone One of the important factors leading to the successful reconciliation was the substantial support by people in Sierra Leone for reconciling with RUF. The opinion survey conducted in Freetown in 2001 by “A Project of the Campaign for Good Governance,” an international NGO promoting democratic governance in the world, showed a clear indication. According to the survey, which interviewed 3,039 residents in Freetown, 45.96% of the respondents surveyed supported amnesty for all of the ex-combatants,  553 554 555 556  Ibid., 35. International Crisis Group 2002, 1. Ibid., p. 1. International Crisis Group 2008.  186  and 37.56% of them supported amnesty for “just followers” of the senior leadership. On the other hand, it was only 14.7% of them who answered that there should be no amnesty for ex-combatants, as you can see below (Figure 5.4):557 Figure 5.4 Who, Among Ex-Combatants, Should Be Given Amnesty for Crimes Committed During the War? Unsure 2%  No Amnesty 15%  Just Followers 37%  All Get Amnesty 46%  The survey also showed critical support for accepting the ex-combatants in their communities. Asked “Will you accept ex-combatants back into your community?” 66.74% of the respondents answered “Yes,” while only 23.78% of them said, “No,” as shown below (Figure 5.5):558  557  A Project of the Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2001, Q3. The survey was conducted in November and December 2001, interviewing 3039 residents in Freetown. 558 Ibid., Q4.  187  Figure 5.5 Will You Accept Ex-Combatants Back into Your Community? Unsure 9%  No 24% Yes 67%  The results clearly suggest high levels of support by the people in Sierra Leone for advancing reconciliation at both leadership and community levels. Another opinion survey demonstrates strong support for the UN peacekeepers who were deployed in Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2005. The opinion survey of 872 respondents across Sierra Leone was conducted in 2005 under the direction of Dr. Jean Krasno, professor at City College of New York. First, the Sierra Leone people strongly perceived that the security situation had improved since UNAMSIL was deployed, as shown in Figure 5.6.  188  Figure 5.6 Would You Say Your Security Situation Has Improved Since UNAMSIL Has Been in the Country? 559 No 2%  Yes 98%  It is obvious that almost all Sierra Leone people thought that their security situation had improved since 1999 when UNAMSIL was deployed. Even more critical for my argument, 71% of the respondents answered that UNAMSIL should stay longer—this shows that a majority of people accepted the deployment of UNAMSIL (see Figure 5.7). Although the data is about the acceptance of UNAMSIL in 2005, it at least shows that after six years’ deployment, a majority of people in Sierra Leone still wanted UNAMSIL to have a presence in their country—this is a substantial difference from perceptions in Afghanistan and Iraq of the major international forces, such as the U.S. forces.560  559  Public Opinion Survey of UNAMSIL’s Work in Sierra Leone 2005, 10. The survey was conducted in January and February in 2005.  560  For instance, in Iraq, only one year after the invasion of the U.S. forces, the Iraqi people drastically changed their perception about the  deployment of U.S. forces. In August 2003 (four months after the invasion), 32% of the respondents in Baghdad answered that the invasion has done more good than harm, while 36% of them answered that it has done more harm than good. In March 2004 (one year after the invasion), 69% of them answered that the invasion has done more harm than good, while only 18% of them responded that it has done more good than harm (Gallup, CNN, USA Today, The Gallup Poll of Iraq 2003-2004). In Afghanistan, 55% of respondents in Kandahar, 69% of them in Wardak, and 42% in Kapisa answered that they do not support use of force by the U.S. and NATO (See Appendix B: Results of Opinion Survey in Afghanistan June 2008, Q12.).  189  Figure 5.7 Do You Think UNAMSIL Has Stayed Long Enough or Do You Think It Should 561 Stay Longer?  Yes, it has stayed long enough 29% No, it should stay longer 71%  Alternative Account? Although there seems to be consensus that reconciliation with RUF was one of the key reasons in stabilizing Sierra Leone (as the peacebuilding process itself was started by the Lomé Accord in 1999), some might argue that it is not the acceptance of the UN peacekeepers by local people but the absolute size of the international forces that contributed to maintaining security conditions in Sierra Leone. It is true that the increase of the UN forces that were deployed from Sankoh’s revolt in 2001 to 2005 (UK task forces withdrew very quickly after stabilizing Freetown) certainly indicates that peacebuilding efforts require some level of coercion to support the establishment of a new government. At the same time—as this dissertation asserts—UN peacekeepers seem to enjoy a comparative advantage, especially compared with other foreign troops such as ECOMOG, with regard to acceptance by local people, and this acceptance  561  Ibid., 10.  190  had a substantial impact on repeated compliance under the UN operation to create a new government.562 The survey in Sierra Leone could be evidence that UN missions can have a comparative advantage over other military organizations (for instance, NATO in the case of Afghanistan and ECOMOG in the case of Sierra Leone).563 Asked whether they were “generally satisfied that the UN took over from ECOMOG,” 94.7% said, “yes,” while only 5.3% said, “no” (see Figure 5.8). Figure 5.8 Are You Generally Satisfied That the UN Took Over from ECOMOG?  564  No 5%  Yes 95%  Although ECOMOG is the monitoring force dispatched by ECOWAS countries, it is largely led by Nigeria. The result shows that UN peacekeepers seem to have comparative advantage, at least compared to ECOMOG in 2005. Although some might argue that the results of the 2005 opinion survey only show the credibility of the UN among people who experienced six years’ performance in Sierra Leone (thus it may be called “performance legitimacy,” almost tantamount to output legitimacy as I defined in Chapter 2), the peacebuilding process and this data in Sierra Leone would not negate the  562 563 564  Some data which shows the acceptance of Sierra Leone people about UN forces will be shown in the next section. The comparison between NATO and the UN will be explained in the following section. Krasno 2005, 17.  191  fundamental contention of this dissertation: the major actors of Sierra Leone peacebuilding such as the Kabbah government and RUF requested the UN to play a central role in maintaining security, demobilizing military factions, and conducting elections, partially because of the comparative advantage of the UN, rather than other possible international actors, including ECOMOG (as I discussed). Six years later, due to some level of success in bringing security and peace, the UN mission was able to maintain its credibility and more than 70% of Sierra Leoneans wanted the UN to keep its presence and more than 90% supported the transition from ECOMOG to the UN peacekeepers . This is a sharp contrast with the decreased credibility of the UN after the failure of DIAG. The comparative advantage of the UN with regard to being the credible third party in the initial phrase can be strengthened by better performance after the deployment. Supporting this argument, a majority of people in Sierra Leone preferred the UN to play a central role in peacekeeping operations, even if it might be followed by the intervention of other military organizations, including African-led peacekeeping forces such as ECOMOG. Figure 5.9 shows the question and the answer for this particular issue:  192  Figure 5.9 In Sierra Leone, UN Forces Took Over from ECOMOG. Do You Think the Deployment of an African-Led Peacekeeping Force Should Always Be Followed by the Deployment of a Full-Blown UN Peacekeeping Operation?565 Did not Answer 2% No 22%  Yes 76%  The data in this opinion survey show how the UN’s credibility was strengthened by its performance after its deployment (i.e., performance legitimacy). For instance, asked “Do you think that UN soldiers have treated people in Sierra Leone with respect?” 49.9% of the respondents answered, “Always,” and 45.2% said, “Sometimes”; only 3.6% said, “Rarely,” and 1.3% said, “Never” (see Figure 5.10).  565  Ibid., 22.  193  Figure 5.10 Respect?  Do You Think That UN Soldiers Have Treated People in Sierra Leone with  Rarely 4%  Sometimes 45%  Never 1%  Always 50%  Those perceptions seem to come from not only trust in the image of the UN, but also the actual conduct of the UN peacekeepers. Asked “Have UN peacekeepers or UN military observers tried to resolve problems in your camp, town, or neighborhood?” 79% of the respondents answered, “Yes.”566 Moreover, most of them thought that the efforts by UN peacekeepers were helpful to resolve the problems that the Sierra Leone people face (see Figures 5.11 and 5.12).  566  Ibid., 15.  194  Figure 5.11 Have UN Peacekeepers or UN Military Observers Tried to Resolve Problems in Your Camp, Town, or Neighborhood?567  No 21%  Yes 79%  Figure 5.12 Have UN Peacekeepers or UN Military Observers Tried to Resolve Problems in Your Camp, Town, or Neighborhood? If So, How Helpful Were They? 568 Not Helpful 6%  Somewhat Helpful 29% Very Helpful 65%  Those perceptions show the high level of acceptance by the local people in host states. The findings also suggest that support for UN peacekeepers is substantially influenced by the actual success (and failure) of their operations.569  567  Ibid., 15. Ibid., 15. 569 This suggestion is consistent with what Katarina Coleman argues on the judgment by local people about legitimacy of the international forces, as discussed in Chapter 2. 568  195  Of course, the UN peacekeepers even in Sierra Leone are not impeccable; for instance, a frequent complaint (201 out of 872 respondents) was that “some peacekeepers had contributed to the encouragement of prostitution among young girls,” and other people complain that the UN peacekeepers drive too fast.570 The general perception, however, is strikingly positive, and those possible comparative advantages of the UN peacekeepers (due to some acceptance by local leaders as an impartial third party in the initial phase) and possible good reputations of the UN peacekeepers (due to perceptions of local people about the performance of the UN) should be largely recognized, especially by Western policymakers, who often have expressed prejudice against the workability of UN forces. In short, the case of Sierra Leone strongly demonstrates the critical role of an inclusive political process—in this particular case, power-sharing and reconciliation with RUF—which is a central contention of this dissertation. It also suggests that the UN seems to have the comparative advantage with regard to support by local leaders for initial deployment and acceptance by local people in the long run, which may help foster repeated compliance with key political events, which in turn eventually leads to the creation of legitimate governments in war-torn states.571  Peacebuilding in Timor-Leste Unprecedented Role of the UN and Efforts for Inclusive Government The peacebuilding in Timor-Leste, which used to be called “East Timor,” is a case in which the  570  Ibid., 6. For instance, UNMISL and UNDP conducted a full scale of DDR process in Sierra Leone; and the 2005 opinion survey shows that 40.8% of respondents answered that the disarmament process in Sierra Leone was “very good”, and 43% of them answered that they are “good” (Krasno 2005, 11). The survey also reported that “many of the participants in this study asked for assurances that the UN will provide and over see substantial electoral assistance and monitoring for the 2007 election.”(Ibid, 7). These results demonstrate that the majority of people in Sierra Leone tend to expect (and support) the substantial roles of the UN in implementing disarmament of rebels and conducting elections. 571  196  UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), established by UN Security Council Resolution 1272 in 1999, enjoyed a definitive leading role and was granted the biggest authority in the history of the United Nations: “UNTAET assumed greater governing powers over East Timor than international agencies had exercised in any previous peace-building mission.”572 Thus, it is valuable to assess the result of this unprecedented UN mission. In addition, when the second UN mission was dispatched to Timor-Leste in 2006 in the aftermath of a political uprising in Dili, the capital, the UN mission (UNMIT) was given UN police but not UN peacekeepers because Australia wanted to maintain command of the multinational force (International Security Forces, ISF). Thus, the case of Timor-Leste can be also valuable in assessing people’s perception of two different types of international peacekeepers. East Timor was a colony of Portugal until 1974, when Portugal attempted to create a transitional government that would determine the future status of East Timor.573 But civil war erupted between people who favored independence and those who desired to be integrated with Indonesia; Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975.574 The resistance by people in East Timor against the occupation by Indonesia continued until 1999, when Indonesia finally allowed “popular consultation” sponsored by the UN.575 An independent report commissioned by the UN in East Timor said “at least 100,000 Timorese died as a result of Indonesia’s 25-year occupation.” In August of 1999, 78% of the Timorese population voted for independence.576 Immediately, pro-Indonesian militia joined by Indonesian security forces started massive burning and looting, which killed about 1,500 people, displaced hundreds of thousands, and destroyed 572 573 574 575 576  Paris 2004, 220. Ibid, 218. Report of the United Nations, Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste 2006, 16. BBC, “East Timor Profile”, updated on 17 January 2012. Ibid., 17.  197  most of the administrative, justice, and economic infrastructure.577 The UN Security Council authorized the creation of an Australian-led multinational force and dispatched them with the acceptance of the Indonesian government, who agreed on the deployment of the UN-authorized forces as a result of negotiation by Kofi Annan.578 The multinational forces expelled the pro-Indonesia militias from the country and stabilized East Timor quickly. Then, in September 1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1272 established UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).579 Under Resolution 1272, the Australian-led multinational force was transferred to the UN peacekeeping force under the command of UNTAET. And during the UNTAET control from 1999 to 2002, Sergio De Mello, the special representative of the Secretary-General, was given authority to enact new laws and to amend the existing ones so that he could establish a central fiscal policy, police system, defense force, and even traffic regulations.580 With his complete power to govern the transitional administrative body in Timor-Leste, though, Sergio De Mello, SRSG of UNTAET, carefully managed his authority and made serious efforts to transfer his power to the local authorities in certain steps and to expand inclusiveness by inviting different local groups and leadership to participate in creating a new political structure. For example, two weeks after de Mello took office as SRSG in East Timor and Transitional Administrator on 17 November 1999, he established the National Consultative Council (NCC), a political body consisting of 11 Timorese and four 577 578 579 580  Paris 2004, 218. Author’s interview with the Spokesman for Kofi Annan on 8 June 2005. UN Security Council Resolution 1272, adopted on 25 October 1999. Paris 2004, 220.  198  UNTAET members (15 in total), which was in charge of overseeing the decision-making process. Although it was a consultative body with no legal authority, de Mello did his best to issue regulations only when they were supported by NCC members.581 In July 2000, de Mello and NCC agreed to establish a “Transitional Cabinet” composed of four East Timorese and four members from UNTAET. In October 2000, the National Council (NC), composed entirely of 36 East Timorese, was established, and the NC had the power to recommend draft regulations or to amend regulations, although the final authority was still given to the Transitional Administrator.582 Collaborating with these interim institutions, de Mello proceeded in important steps to hand over sovereignty to the Timorese. In August 2001, UNTAET conducted a Constituent Assembly Election and created an interim government of Timor-Leste, which drafted and adopted a new constitution jointly with UNTAET.583 UNTAET also made a serious effort to enhance reconciliation between the Timorese interim government and its former enemies—pro-Indonesian militias who attacked the country in 1999. UNTAET supported the interim Timorese national congress (Constituent Assembly) to initiate the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste; the commission collected the statements of more than 7,600 victims and enhanced reconciliation between pro-Indonesian militia members and the victims of the uprising at the community level in the following years.584 The final crucial task for UNTAET was to conduct the presidential election in 2002. In this first presidential election, more than 80% of voters chose as the president of the new government Xanana 581  Power 2008. 307. UNTAET/Regulation NO. 2004/24. On the Establishment of a National Council. 583 Paris 2004, 219 & Fact Sheet on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), 3. 584 You can see the detail in the report titled “Chega, The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste” published in 2005. 582  199  Gusmao, a former resistance leader who fought against Indonesian occupation., .585 Timor-Leste became an independent country in May 2002. My research identified that the efforts by de Mello to promote an inclusive political process had strong support from leaders in Timor-Leste. Estanislau Da Silva, who was the Minister for Agriculture, Forest, and Fishery in the second interim cabinet during UNTAET, asserts that “Sergio de Mello made his best effort to consult with Timorese people and leadership…He avoided making decisions without hearing the voices of Timorese.”586 There seems to be a consensus among policy makers and academic scholars that UNTAET was one of the most successful UN missions in the history of the UN due to its stabilizing a region and creating a new government: “The UN mission to East Timor has been a tremendous, dramatic accomplishment,” commented Jose Ramos-Horta, who became the first foreign minister of Timor-Leste.587 Roland Paris’s scholarly study of such missions also asserts that future peacebuilding should learn a lesson from the achievement of UNTAET.588 Although de Mello’ s management of governing the transitional authority in Timor-Leste might not be seen as impeccable, there seemed to be shared support by local political groups and leaders on his serious effort to advance an inclusive political process in Timor-Leste.589 The data I collected in Timor-Leste also demonstrates the same trend. According to my survey conducted in 2008, which interviewed 319 local people in three different parts of Timor-Leste (105 585  Paris 2004, 219. Author’s interview with Estanislau Da Silva, a former prime minister and current parliament member in FRETILIN on 28 October 2008 587 Paris 2004, 219. 588 Ibid., 227. 589 For instance, Milena Pires, the Deputy Speaker in NC, argues that while de Mello made good efforts to consult with Timorese people, there was a substantial limit; when NC tried to create a “women quota” for the election of the Constituent Assembly, although de Mello was sympathetic to the idea, the opposition from NY Headquarters pushed the final decision to exclude the quota. “It disappointed us, realizing that we do not have a final voice.” (Author’s interview with Milena Pires, Deputy Speaker in the National Council under UNTAET on 30 October 2008.) 586  200  respondents in Liquica District, the western part of the country; 112 respondents in Dili, the capital located in the central part of the country; and 102 respondents in Lautem District, the eastern part of Timor-Leste), 93.3% of respondents in Liquica, 98.2% in Dili, and 81.4% in Lautem answered that they support UNTAET and Sergio de Mello (see Figure 5.13).590 Figure 5.13 Do You Support UNTAET and Sergio de Mello SRSG from 1999 to 2002 in Timor-Leste?  100.00% 90.00% 80.00% 70.00% 60.00%  Yes  50.00%  No  40.00% 30.00% 20.00% 10.00%  0.00% Liquica  Dili  Lautem  One of the major reasons is that “East Timor needed the UN to create a constitution and new state,” as well as “the UN respects the voices of Timorese people.”591 One village leader in Lautem district emphasized that “Sergio de Mello came to our district so often and did excellent meetings with local people to hear their voices and make people understand the policies of UNTAET.”592 One woman in a small village in Liquica district told that “Sergio came to such a small village to have dialogue with us; I still remembered that I was very excited and had hope for our future when we encountered him…. I hope 590 591 592  Appendix C, Q 15. Appendix C, Q16. Author’s interview with one of the villagers in Lautem District on 3 November 2008.  201  the current government has the same attitude.”593 I argue that this perception of local people about de Mello’s efforts to reach people even in rural areas and create a broadly inclusive political process deeply resonates with the principle claims of this dissertation that creating an inclusive political process with the participation of a broad range of local people and groups is crucial in enhancing compliance and creating new governments in post-conflict states. And with the leading role of the UN mission in the transitional authority at his behest, de Mello functioned substantially to advance just such an inclusive political process in Timor-Leste.594 This is in sharp contrast with the situation in Iraq in 2003 when Sergio de Mello was appointed as SRSG in Iraq but had no substantial political role in which he could attempt to advance an inclusive political process, which ultimately resulted in his own sacrifice as a victim of an insurgency attack.  Political Uprising in 2006 and New UN Mission As the security situation was very stable during the deployment of the UN peacekeepers and UN police, the UN Security Council decided to withdraw most of the UN peacekeepers and police from Timor-Leste in 2005. However, the political uprising in February 2006 triggered by 600 petitioners from the Timor-Leste National Army caused conflict, created a security vacuum, and induced 1,000 young gang members to torch houses, burn 10,000 accommodations, and displace more than 150,000 citizens in Dili, who escaped to internally displaced people (IDP) camps.595 Because of the “shared consensus on the support for peacebuilding in Timor-Leste by the  593  Author’s interview with one of the villagers in Liquica District on 8 November 2008. This is the sharp contrast with the situation in Iraq in 2004 when Sergio de Mello was appointed as SRSG in Iraq but had no substantial political role in enhancing inclusive political process, resulted in his own sacrifice attacked by insurgency in Iraq. 595 Report of the United Nations, Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste 2006, 42. 594  202  international community,” the UN Security Council quickly decided to dispatch the second UN-authorized Australian-led multinational force to Timor-Leste at the request of the Timor-Leste government.596 After the situation calmed down, the new UN mission (UNMIT) was established in August 2006, and one of its mandates was to support strengthening the Timor-Leste police as well as to maintain security with about 1,500 UN police officials.597 On the other hand, the multinational force led by Australia, the International Stabilization Force (ISF), was not transferred to the UN peacekeeping operation, largely because the Australian government, which was governed by a conservative party close to the Bush administration, demanded the maintenance of the command of ISF in spite of the fact that the political parties of Timor-Leste strongly opposed long-term ISF operations and asked for its transfer to the UN peacekeeping operation.598 This is very different from the UNTAET established in 1999, when the multinational force led by Australia was transferred to the UN peacekeeping force commanded by SRSG Sergio de Mello. The ISF led by Australia had about 600 members, and the UN police under the command of UNMIT had about 1,600.599 With the support of UNMIT, both presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 2007 to restore confidence in and the legitimacy of the Timor-Leste government. There was a positive side and a negative side to the outcomes of these elections. The positive side was that every political party in Timor-Leste accepted the outcomes of the elections as fair and free, including FRETILIN, the largest  596  Author’s interview with Atul Khare, the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Timor-Leste on 27 October 2008. UN Security Council Resolution 1702, adopted on 25 August 2006. 598 Author’s interview with Mari Alkatiri, former prime minister at the time of 2006 crisis, on 11 November 2008. 599 Author’s interview with Brigadier Mark Holmes, Commander of International Stabilization Force on 8 November 2008. 597  203  opposition party.600 Estanislau Da Silva, a former prime minister and a top leader of FRETILIN contended that “our party decided to accept the results of the election mainly because the UN was monitoring the election process.”601 Again the role of the UN was critical to ascertain the fairness of electoral process. The negative side, though, was that FRETILIN, which obtained the most votes (29%) and seats (21 of 65 seats) in the 2007 election, asserted that the formation of a coalition government without FRETILIN was “unconstitutional.” Mari Alkatiri, the Secretary- General of FRETILIN, asserted that “the current coalition government has no legitimacy because it excluded the party that obtained the biggest votes.”602 On the other hand, the current coalition government led by Xanana Gusmao (the current prime minister), who led the CNRT party in the election, argues that his coalition government with several parties having more than a half of parliament seats excluding FRETILIN is fully constitutional; Zacarias Albano da Costa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, claims that the current government has been constitutional from the beginning and has been “increasing its legitimacy by solving the social problems caused by the 2006 crisis.” 603 He asserts that the government assisted the IDP to return to their villages by providing a recovery package, initiated a pension system for former guerrilla soldiers fighting for independence, and reconciled with 600 petitioners in the Timor army whose petitions and appeals to the government were an initial trigger of the 2006 crisis, and that together these initiatives created the “social stability that  600  FRETILIN stands for “Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente,” which means “Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor” in Portuguese. 601 Author’s interview with Estanislau Da Silva, a former prime minister and current parliament member in FRETILIN on 28 October 2008 602 Author’s interview with Mari Alkatiri, the former Prime Minister and the Secretary- General of FRETILIN on 11 November 2008. 603 Author’s interview with Zacarias Albano da Costa, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Timor-Leste on 25 October 2008.  204  Timor-Leste desperately needs.”604 In fact, as the UN police were deployed and the ISF was stationed, the security condition in Timor-Leste in 2008 was quite good; there were only two incidents of serious crimes such as murder, abduction, and rape per month, on average, across the country.605 Moreover, UNMIT seemed to maintain credibility as a third party that would ensure fairness and impartiality to support important political processes, including conducting national elections. Asked in October 2008 “who should mainly conduct the next election in Timor-Leste,” 52% of the respondents in Liquica, 58% in Dili, and 47% in Lautem (and 52.7% of all respondents) answered that it should be “both the Timor-Leste government and the UN” (see Figure 5.14).606 Figure 5.14 Who Should Mainly Conduct the Next Election in Timor-Leste? 100% 90% 80% 70% 60%  Timor G + ISF  50%  Timor G + UN  40%  Only Timor G  30% 20% 10% 0% Liquica  Dili  Lautem  The results clearly suggest that the majority of local people in Timor-Leste perceive that it is  604 605 606  Ibid. Report of Secretary General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste on 4 February 2009. See the result of Q28 in Appendix C, as well as the graph above.  205  important for the UN to play a substantial role in giving credibility to the political process.  Alternative Account? Although Timor-Leste has been very stable for the last five years since the deployment of UNMIT in 2006, some theorists might argue that it is again the absolute level of coercion that contributes to peace and stability in Timor-Leste – in this case, the international forces, including ISF (International Security Force led by Australia), which deployed about 600 forces, and the UN police, which had 1,600 staff in 2006 and 1,200 as of January 2012 The conservative party in Australia contended in 2006 that it should be ISF, not UN peacekeepers, who would maintain order in Timor-Leste because “the multinational force is more effective and well organized.”607 My argument against this contention is that—as the case of Sierra Leone also shows—the UN peacekeepers seem to have a comparative advantage over other international forces, and this comparative advantage contributes to the acceptance by local people of the international force or police, which functions to maintain security—one of the key conditions in building government functions and a legitimate government in the long run. There is significant evidence on this particular question from the case of Timor-Leste by the comparison between the UN peacekeepers (deployed from 1999 to 2005) and ISF (deployed from 2006 to the present). A survey question asked: “From 1999 to 2005, there were UN peacekeeping forces in Timor-Leste. Now it is the International Stabilization Forces (ISF) led by Australia that is deployed in Timor-Leste. Which force do you like better?” 83.8% of the respondents in Liquica, 77.7% in Dili, and 93.1% in Lautem responded that they like the UN peacekeepers better (see Figure 607  Author’s interview with the top official of the Japan mission to the UN who attended the UN Security Council meeting discussing the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Timor-Leste in 2006, with a condition of anonymity in August 2006.  206  5.15).608 Figure 5.15 Which Force Do You Like Better in Timor-Leste ? 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50%  ISF  40% 30%  UN  20% 10% 0% Liquica  Dili  Lautem  Many Timorese prefer UN peacekeepers “because the UN peacekeepers are not serving the interest of one foreign state,” “because the UN peacekeeping force comes from many different regions,” and “UN peacekeepers are neutral to every political group in Timor-Leste.”609 If we look at other cases, my research in Afghanistan indicates exactly the same trend: 70% of the respondents in Kandahar province (South Pashtun region), 98% in Wardak province (Central Pashtun region), and 98% in Kapisa province (Central Tajik region) responded that “the UN should play a central role in commanding foreign military operations, not NATO or the U.S.”610 In addition to identical results in Timor-Leste and Afghanistan, the result in Timor-Leste on this particular question is very informative because people in Timor-Leste experienced both UN peacekeeping operations and ISF operations, while  608 609 610  The results of Q7 in Appendix C. See the results of Q 8 in Appendix C. See the results of Q13 in Appendix B.  207  the Afghan people experienced only operations by ISAF led by the U.S. and NATO. The staff who asked the question of Timorese people also have no affiliation with the UN; the researchers were Timorese university students who explained to villagers that they were conducting research for a Japanese Ph.D. student. My research also asked Timorese people how long they wanted ISF to stay in Timor-Leste and how long they wanted the UN police to stay. The results in 2008 are shown in Figure 5.16:611 Figure 5.16 What Do You Hope about ISF and UN Police in Timor-Leste?  60.00% 50.00% 40.00% UN  30.00%  ISF  20.00% 10.00% 0.00% Leave Now  Stay for 1year  for 3 years for 5 years  for 10 years  This result clearly suggests the comparative advantage of the UN over ISF regarding acceptance by local people. The research also inquired the reasons why half the respondents answered that ISF should leave now: Among 161 respondents who answered ISF should leave now, 60.2% of them contended that it is “because ISF is staying to get the interest of foreign states, such as Australia,” while 39.1% of them argued that “ISF is not protecting the lives of Timor-Leste people,” and 55.9% of them argued that “the 611  The result of my field research in Timor-Leste in 2008. The detailed results on each district on the questions are shown in the questions of 10, 12 & 13 in Appendix C.  208  Timor Defense Force can protect the lives of the Timor-Leste people.” (Multiple answers were possible.)612 These results in both Timor-Leste and Afghanistan are additional strong evidence that the UN peacekeeping operations at least have a significant comparative advantage with regard to legitimacy in the eyes of local people. Mari Alkatiri, prime minister at the time of the 2006 political crisis and currently Secretary-General of FRETILIN, the biggest opposition party in Timor-Leste, emphasizes, We appreciated the intervention by Australia and its multinational forces to stop the atrocities—it was I who asked for Australia to dispatch forces to Timor-Leste in the 2006 crisis—but the peacekeeping operation should be definitely conducted by the UN because people start thinking that the intervening country will colonize us if they stay in our country for too long.613 Again, my argument is not to deny the importance of coercion to some degree—because the function of local police is extremely fragile, the international police and military have been important in enhancing compliance with rules and creating safe conditions.614 However, there seems no doubt that the “leading role of the UN” in the transitional period, especially with its comparative advantage of acceptance and legitimacy among local people, and the “inclusive political process” that the UN and Timor-Leste government developed together, significantly contributed to building repeated compliance and legitimate government in Timor-Leste. This conclusion is consistent with the findings in the other three cases (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sierra Leone) with regard to the critical importance of the role of the UN and an  612  The result of opinion survey in 2008 in Timor-Leste. The detailed results on each district is shown in Question 11 in Appendix C. Author’s interview with Mari Alkatiri, former prime minister and currently Secretary - General of FRETILIN (the biggest opposition party in Timor-Leste) on 11 November 2008. . 614 In terms of the fragility of Timor-Leste local police, see my report to the UN DPKO on Timor-Leste (Higashi 2009, 8-10). 613  209  inclusive political process in rebuilding post-conflict states.615  615  In this context, 2012 is the “landmark year” that will have a security transition with the UN polices due to leave and a national election. With regard to 2012 presidential election conducted on 17 March 2012, it is reported that “there is a very peaceful atmosphere” at the date of the voting (BBC, “East Timor Holds presidential election,” 17 March 2012).  210  6  Conclusion This dissertation presented my argument on how the legitimacy of newly created domestic  governments can be constructed or eroded in the process of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. The Afghan peacebuilding case (defined as a critical case of this dissertation) was studied in detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, and the three supplementary cases of Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste were investigated in Chapter 5. All cases presented here suggest that not only coercion and resource distribution—namely “guns” and “money”—but also the roles of IOs (especially the UN) as a credible third party and an inclusive political process are crucial in creating repeated compliance with orderly rule, then establishing legitimate governments in the long run. With regard to the role of the UN, international legitimacy—which tends to be conferred by the UN Security Council resolutions—might not induce automatic compliance by local people in post-conflict states; however, the comparative advantage that the UN has as a credible third party can encourage people to comply with key political programs such as the results of elections, contents of new constitutions?, and the disarmament of warlords because democratic institutions need to be perceived as fair to induce repeated compliance (as Przeworski argues), and the credibility of the UN as a third party can have a critical positive impact on this compliance mechanism. At the same time, when the UN loses its credibility in the eyes of local people, it will damage compliance with a new government and will have a crucial impact on eroding the legitimacy of the governments in host states. The critical role of an inclusive political process—in many cases that includes the reconciliation 211  efforts between local authorities and former or current enemies—is another fundamental finding of these studies. All four cases studied in this dissertation constantly demonstrate how crucial for peacebuilders it is to have inclusive political structures that invite different political and ethnic groups, as broadly as possible, to participate in the process of peacebuilding. With regard to resource distribution, the studies are consistent with the argument that it is vital to make resource distribution fair enough so that a specific group of people do not perceive that they are economically (in addition to politically) excluded from peacebuilding benefits, as the theory of “horizontal inequality” (that was introduced in Chapter 2) explicitly indicates. Chapter 4 articulated how the Pashtun people in Afghanistan have perceived that they are economically excluded because they are stagnated by what I call the “insecurity- underdevelopment trap,” in which people suffer from vicious circles of violence and underdevelopment. This perception of exclusion pushed the Pashtun people to be more sympathetic to the insurgency, which consequently kept gaining more control in the country. Thus, inclusiveness is a critical feature not only of the political process but also the provision of economic and social services to people in post-conflict states. As for coercion, although a certain level of coercion is necessary in maintaining security in peacebuilding, the case studies demonstrate that it matters who dispatches or commands those coercive forces (especially international forces) in terms of acceptance and support by local people, and that acceptance can have a substantial impact on the compliance of local people. The comparative advantages that the UN peacekeepers have over other international forces (NATO or U.S. forces in Afghanistan, ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, and ISF in Timor-Leste) regarding the acceptance by and support of local 212  people in host states can have significant merits in inducing people’s compliance under interim security management mainly provided by international forces. The results of opinion surveys in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste clearly suggest this comparative advantage of the UN peacekeepers over other international forces led by powerful countries, such as the United States, Nigeria, and Australia. However, it is again only a comparative advantage that the UN has over the other international forces with respect to acceptance and legitimacy in the eyes of local people; thus it does not mean that the leading role of the UN always guarantees its success in peacebuilding. The opinion survey in Sierra Leone clearly suggests that people tend to support UN peacekeepers when they are helpful in not only maintaining the security but also solving their daily problems. It is important that policy makers recognize this comparative advantage of the UN when deciding how international forces should be deployed to conduct effective peacebuilding efforts.  Necessary or Sufficient Conditions? Although the research in this dissertation may not be sufficient by itself to establish conclusively which factors among the four key factors are necessary or sufficient conditions in creating legitimate governments in all war-torn states, my case studies provide some insights regarding their relative importance. My basic conclusion is that each factor is not sufficient by itself to create a legitimate government in war-torn states. In the long term, it seems necessary to have an inclusive political process that combines different political groups into a new political structure as broadly as possible; resource distribution that provides better services and living conditions; and an adequate level of coercion to 213  facilitate those two factors. It is easier for peacebuilders to undertake each of these activities when they have the role of UN as a credible third party because the UN frequently has a comparative advantage, being more fair or neutral in the eyes of local leaders and people in host states, especially in the initial phase of peacebuilding. As the advantage of the UN is just comparative, if other actors—for example NGOs or some religious groups or organizations in certain places—have higher acceptance and credibility than the UN, those actors might play a crucial role as a credible third party in enhancing compliance in some conflicted states. With regard to the role of the UN, there is much evidence from my case studies about its comparative advantage in terms of its credibility among local political leaders and people. In Afghanistan, the opinion poll that I conducted had a clear result that supports this contention. Asked “Do you think that the UN is more credible than other foreign states in terms of creating good government in Afghanistan?” 80% of the respondents in Kandahar, 95% in Wardak, and 99% in Kapisa responded “Yes, the UN is more credible than other foreign states.”616 With regard to their reasons for thinking the UN is more credible, see Table 6.1 below:617 Table 6.1 If You Think the UN is More Credible Than Other Foreign States, Why? Kandahar Wardak Kapisa Because the UN is established by the resolution of the UN Security Council. Because the UN personnel are from many different regions in the world. Because the UN is neutral to every faction in Afghanistan, as the UN 616 617  24.0%  55.9%  63.0%  22.0%  60.8%  74.1%  32.0%  64.7%  63.0%  See Appendix B, survey in Afghanistan, Q.14. Ibid., Q.15.  214  has no specific interest to support some specific factions. Because the UN is providing much assistance to Afghan people. Other  16.0% 4.0%  50.0% 0  41.7% 1.9%  While the response concerning “assistance to Afghan people” is more related to credibility due to UN performance, a high percentage of responses, such as those indicating “UN Security Council,” “UN personnel are from many different regions in the world,” and “UN is neutral ,” suggest that ordinary Afghan people perceive the UN as being more credible than other foreign states, not only because of its performance but due to its nature. That may be the reason why 70% of the respondents in Kandahar, 98% in Wardak, and 98% in Kapisa answered that it should be the UN that plays a central role in commanding foreign military operations, not NATO or the United States.618 While it is probably impossible for the UN to take military command in a contemporary Afghanistan that is still experiencing high levels of violence, it was highly possible to have the UN peacekeepers in the initial phase of Afghan peacebuilding (starting from 2002), using its higher credibility among the local populace.619 It is important for future peacebuilders to recognize this comparative advantage of the UN if there is no other credible organization that can lend a sense of credibility and impartiality to the local political process. The other complementary case studies consistently suggest the comparative advantage of the UN. In Iraq, as was discussed in Chapter 5, the coalition authority led by Paul Bremer failed in persuading Iraqi political factions to accept his timetable and plan of creating a new government in Iraq in 2003, and Iraqi factions asked the UN to dispatch Brahimi and the UN electoral team to create an interim government and  Ibid., Q13. In my report to the UN DPKO, I argue that if the Afghan peacebuilders started a reconciliation process with the Taliban and the international community deployed the UN peacekeepers from 2002 to 2004, the result of peacebuilding might be very different (Higashi 2008). 618 619  215  conduct national elections, rejecting the role of Bremer. This again demonstrates the comparative advantage of the UN in enhancing compliance, as at least the major Iraqi political factions basically accepted the plan by Brahimi and the UN electoral teams and complied with the results of two national elections in 2005. At the same time, creating peace in Iraq required U.S. forces to change its policy and to include the Sunni insurgents in political structures and provide economic benefits to them. In Sierra Leone, similar to Iraq, the two major political factions at war—the Kabbah government and the RUF—decided to ask the UN to deploy monitoring forces to observe the Lomé Peace Accord signed in 1999. Although we do not have data about the acceptance of local people of the UN peacekeepers when UNAMSIL was dispatched to Sierra Leone in 1999, the data from an opinion survey in 2005 clearly suggests that people in Sierra Leone appreciated the UN playing a central role in creating a new government, compared with other international forces such as ECOMOGS, which was also deployed before 1999. The data may demonstrate support for UNAMSIL due to its performance in Sierra Leone between 1999 to 2005, and there is at least the possibility that comparatively easier acceptance by the Sierra Leone people of the UN deployment enhanced compliance by local actors in the initial phase, and this compliance, in turn, created better security and economic conditions, which promoted more trust in the UN and its local government, as shown in the 2005 data. In Timor-Leste, political leaders asked the UN to dispatch the peacekeepers both in 1999 and 2006; in 1999, it was the UN that had a central command in both governing territory and maintaining security, commanding UN peacekeepers and UN police. In 2006, when there were political uprisings, Timor-Leste political leaders, including Mari Alkatiri (the prime minister at the time), strongly insisted that 216  after the Australian-led international forces stabilized the country, the international forces should be transformed to UN peacekeepers because “if the Australian-led force stays in Timor-Leste, it becomes a colonization force; thus, I strongly insisted that the international forces needed to be transformed into UN peacekeepers.”620 This is further evidence that political leaders in conflicted states tend to support the UN playing a central role, as the UN creates less suspicion than other actors such as individual states (in this particular case, Australia), even given the provision of security forces sufficient in material terms to provide security. As introduced in Chapter 5, the opinion survey of 300 Timorese people shows that the overwhelming majority of people—84% of the respondents in the Western part (Liquica), 78% in the Capital (Dili), and 93% in the Eastern part (Lautem)—answered that they prefer the UN peacekeepers over the International Stabilization Forces led by Australia, although there is not much difference between them in terms of performance in maintaining security. (In the last 10 years, Timor-Leste was stable as long as UN forces or ISF and UN police were present.) Thus, while the comparative advantage of the UN is not by itself sufficient—it requires other key factors such as inclusiveness, resource distribution, and coercion—it is very desirable for peacebuilders to have the UN as a credibly third party in enhancing compliance by local people and political groups, then creating a legitimate government. If it may not be absolutely necessary in every case, such legitimacy lowers the costs of providing the other goods, costs which always seem to be in short supply; thus, for example, comparatively lower levels of coercion might be needed when more people accept the peacebuilding force. 620  Author’s interview with Mari Alkatiri, the former prime minister and the Secretary-General of FRETILIN, on 11 November 2008.  217  With regard to inclusiveness, I argue that my case studies are suggestive that it may well come close to a necessary condition. This dissertation asserts that it is critical for peacebuilders to include local political factions as broadly as possible, including the past enemies and potential enemies, provided that they have renounced violence and are determined to comply with peace agreements (new rules of creating a new government) without using violent methods. And my case studies consistently suggest how dangerous it is to exclude political and military parties that could continue the war and assume that they are not reconcilable and total spoilers. In terms of Afghanistan, as discussed in Chapter 4, there is substantial evidence that the Taliban was ready in the initial phase of peacebuilding from 2002 to 2003 to talk with the Karzai government and to participate in the political process, but the government and international peacebuilders did not even approach the Taliban. It was only in January of 2012, after both the Karzai government and the United States declared that they would seek a political settlement with the Taliban through negotiations (by using the new reconciliation mechanisms such as the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program and High Peace Council) that the Taliban finally announced that it was ready to talk with the Karzai government about a political settlement. Both the United States and the Karzai government support the idea.621 It means that the peacebuilders in Afghanistan lost 10 years until they finally started talking with the Taliban for reconciliation. In Iraq, as discussed in Chapter 5, U.S. forces misjudged the character of many Sunni insurgents and continued to attack them until 2007, when the U.S. forces finally changed its policies and decided to 621  BBC, “Afghan Taliban back Westen proposal for Qatar office,” 3 January 2012; New York Times, “Taliban Opening Qatar Office, and Maybe Door to Talks,” 3 January 2012.  218  include them in the political process, inviting them to participate in the Iraqi Awakening Council in the middle of 2007. Although there are several different arguments on how much of Iraq’s stability after 2007 depended on this new inclusive approach or the surge of U.S. forces, there seems to be a consensus that this policy was vital in changing the course of the war.622 In Sierra Leone, as emphasized in Chapter 5, the inclusion of the RUF, the notorious rebel group who committed mass killing and use of child soldiers, into the political process was very crucial in creating peace and a legitimate government. Although the leader of RUF, Sankoh, did not comply with the peace agreement and was arrested by the government and the international forces, his arrest was accepted as legitimate (because of his noncompliance with the agreement) not only in the eyes of ordinary local people but also in the eyes of other RUF fighters, including other leaders in RUF. There is a consensus in Sierra Leone that the success of converting the RUF into a political party was one of the biggest reasons for the success in peacebuilding.623 In Timor-Leste, the government decided to include almost all pro-Indonesia militias in the political process, while using the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (Chega), motivating thousands of pro-Indonesia militias who committed crimes and attacks during the conflict to confess their crimes and apologize to the victims. Many pro-Indonesia militias were forgiven and able to return to their  622  Professor Keiko Sakai, who is perhaps the most well-known expert on Iraq (as she has studied this country for several decades and her husband is an Iraqi who lives in Iraq), was also confident about her assessment that the reason for declining insurgency in Iraq after the middle of 2007 was clearly the change of strategy of the U.S. forces, including setting up Awakening Councils containing Sunni insurgents, and not because of the 30,000-person surge of the U.S. forces, as it is a relatively small number compared with the existing level of forces (about 150,000 international forces). (Author’s discussion with Professor Keiko Sakai at the University of Tokyo conference “From 911 to Arab Spring: Peace and Reconciliation in the Middle East,” on 14 July 2012.) 623 The details were discussed in Chapter 5, Sierra Leone section.  219  communities after they passed through this process.624 These four cases, especially the first three (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sierra Leone) clearly suggest that it is crucial for peacebuilders to have an inclusive political process and that the rejection of political or military groups who could continue the war, without approaching them, is very risky and dangerous . I argue that this inclusiveness—including potential spoilers, as long as they are determined to participate in the political process without using violence—is a very necessary condition in my case studies, although it is not sufficient. Inadequate or misguided judgment about the character of enemies and rejecting them for the political process can be a fatal mistake in creating a legitimate government in war-torn states. In terms of resource distribution, the four case studies show that resource distribution is key in motivating people to comply with the rules of constructing a new government. For instance, in the mechanism of the DIAG in Afghanistan, resource distribution (provision of development projects in districts) was a critical motivation for commanders to hand over weapons, in addition to the credibility of the UN who offered the program. In Iraq, Sunni insurgents were motivated to participate in the Iraqi Awakening Council not only by the promise of security by the U.S. forces, but also by the offer of pay, as introduced in Chapter 5. In Sierra Leone, RUF soldiers complied with the DDR process, which assisted them to find new jobs. And in Timor-Leste, the provision of oil revenue improved people’s perception of the government, as government officials emphasize.625 Although resource distribution is critical—thus, it should be seen as a necessary condition in 624  Author’s interview with Jastin Valentines, the representative of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in Lautem district on 25 October 2008. (The interview was also introduced in the book by Higashi 2009.) 625 For instance, Joao Goncalves, Minister of Economy and Development, asserts that “it was totally necessary to provide these compensations to solve short-term problems.” (Author’s interview with Joao Gncalves on 13 November 2008; the interview was also introduced in my report to the UN DPKO published in March 2009).  220  my cases—its material provision is not sufficient to create compliance and a legitimate government; its distribution has to be accepted as sufficiently fair. In the DIAG mechanism, the involvement of the UN was critical in providing credibility to the commanders who could not trust the offer by government officials; they decided to comply with DIAG only because the UN officials also asked them to and promised development projects in their communities. It was also true that putting money and resources into insurgent areas, such as the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, without reconciling with the insurgency intensified fighting because the resources were often taken by the insurgency. That was the reason why UNAMA’s five policy inputs recommended the Afghan government “not start community development projects unless there is some political stability in the region.”626 In Iraqi Awakening Councils, the promise of the U.S. forces, which allowed them to resume a normal life (including entering some political processes such as elections) without threat of arrests or attacks by the U.S. forces, was a vital condition for Sunni insurgents to stop their attacks against the U.S. forces. In many cases, inclusiveness and resource distribution often go together. As Stewart theorizes regarding “horizontal inequality,” resource distribution that is perceived to be unfair to some political and ethical factions can increase the likelihood of civil war.627 The last factor, coercion, is also a necessary condition, but not sufficient. For instance, UNAMSIL was very poorly equipped in the first deployment in 1999, with only 6,000 UN peacekeepers; after the hostage-taking of 600 UN peacekeepers by Sankon, the UN Security Council decided to dispatch more than 17,000 UN forces to implement its missions, such as monitoring ceasefires, demobilizing rebels, and 626 627  See the detail in Chapter 4. See the detail in Chapter 2.  221  assisting in conducting elections. Thus, the UN mission also needs to have an adequate level of coercion. This dissertation cannot identify what material level of coercion is necessary—mainly because it also depends on other factors such as the role of the UN and its credibility, inclusiveness, and resource distribution. What the dissertation does show is that there seems to be a comparative advantage of the UN in terms of acceptance of coercive forces by local people (which would suggest that less force is needed than if they were not accepted), as well as the merits of a unified command conducting political programs and military operations, as discussed in the analysis of the reconciliation mechanism in Afghanistan. Although many traditional security scholars tend to focus on the material factors of levels of coercion and resource distribution (guns and money), this dissertation consistently finds that the role of the UN and inclusiveness of the new government are also crucial factors in paving the way for people’s acceptance of coercive forces and distribution of resources.  Policy Implications Although the research in this dissertation is not by itself sufficient to prove my argument, my aim is to generate a theory that can be assessed by future research on different peacebuilding cases. However, this dissertation still has some key policy implications for current world-wide enterprises of peacebuilding. First, in the first decade of the 21st century, the discourse about the UN, especially under the Bush administration, influenced by the neoconservatives, has had a tendency to dismiss the value of the UN and a multinational framework in general. John Bolton, a prominent neoconservative who became the U.S. ambassador to the UN, expressed his famous view: “The (UN) Secretariat building in New York has 38 222  stories….If it lost ten stories, it would not make a bit of difference.”628 However, two major wars by the Bush administration—the Afghan War and the Iraq War—and their consequences on nation-building or peacebuilding sharply highlight the fragility and difficulties of those efforts without the role of the UN. The findings of this dissertation demonstrate the critical importance of the international community making use of the comparative advantage the UN has in supporting the creation of domestic legitimate governments (domestic legitimacy), as well as in mobilizing international support to assist those governments in post-conflict states (international legitimacy). It appears that recognition of the importance of the role of the UN in peacebuilding has begun to be shared by policy makers as well as some researchers, according to their discourses on the latest events concerning peacebuilding. For instance, during the NATO military campaign against Moammar Gadhafi in Libya, the head of NATO, Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who usually praises NATO’s commitment to intervention and nation building, repeatedly asserted that “any follow-up mission in Libya must be dealt with by the UN.”629 The Obama administration also emphasizes the central role of the UN in rebuilding Libya, avoiding the perception that the U.S. is again committing war and nation-building in the Arab states; he declared at the UN Headquarters in 2011 that rebuilding Libya requires “a democratic transition that is peaceful, inclusive, and just. President Jalil has just affirmed the Transitional National Council’s commitment to these principles, and the United Nations will play a central role in coordinating  628  Speech by John Bolton on 3 February 1994. The speech is available in http://www.democracynow.org/2005/3/31/john_bolton_in_his_own_words 629 John Glaser, “NATO’ leadership says any post-Gadhafi mission should be handled by the UN,” Anti. War. Com on 14 September 2011. Associate Press also reported that Rasmussen, NATO Secretary General, “made it clear that any follow-up operation in Libya, such as assisting and training the new army and police, must be led by the United Nations, rather than by NATO.” (AP, NATO Balks at Libya Nation-Building, Policing,” 14 September 2011.)  223  international support for this effort.”630 The rhetoric has a sharp contrast with what the Bush administration defined as the role of the UN in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The other policy implication is the vital role of an inclusive political process. In recent international discourses, the need for inclusive political process began to be frequently mentioned in the context of rebuilding Libya. For instance, when Gadhafi was reported to be killed, top world leaders emphasized the importance of national reconciliation and an inclusive political process; Angela Merkel, German chancellor, said, “Germany will accompany and support Libya on this path to democracy, the rule of law, and national reconciliation.”631 Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, mentioned, “Libya now closes a painful and tragic chapter and starts a new one based on national reconciliation, justice, respect for human rights and the rule of law. At this historic moment I call upon the people of Libya to come together, as they can only realize promise of the future through national unity and reconciliation.632 Trinidad Jimenez, Spanish Foreign Affairs minister, said, “Now is the time to call for reconciliation and unity among all Libyans.”633 These comments of the world’s top leaders suggest there is at least some recognition of the crucial importance of national reconciliation and an inclusive political process in peacebuilding. This chief contention of the dissertation is also emphasized even by the World Bank, which issued its “World Development Report 2011,” focusing on post-conflict peacebuilding. In this report, the World Bank contends, “The central message of the Report is that strengthening legitimate institutions and 630 631 632 633  Remarks by President Obama at High Level Meeting on Libya on 20 September 2011. Emphasis added. CNN, “World leaders speak of Gadhafi victims, new era for Libya,” 20 October 2011. Emphasis added. Ibid. Ibid.  224  governance to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to break the circle of violence.”634 And regarding the concrete methods to strengthen legitimate institution and governance, the World Bank suggests, “The state cannot restore confidence alone. Confidence-building in situations of violence and fragility requires deliberate effort to build inclusive-enough coalitions.”635 Although the report just suggests the key concept of inclusiveness—detailed presentation and analysis is a contribution of this dissertation—the assertion by the World Bank indicates the beginning of recognition of the importance of inclusive political process, even by one of the most important international financial institutions. When we look at Afghan reconciliation, President Karzai declared in February 2012 that the U.S. government and the Afghan government have begun secret three-way talks with the Taliban: “There have been contacts between the U.S. government and the Taliban, there have been contacts between the Afghan government and the Taliban, and there have been some contacts that we have made, all of us together, including the Taliban.”636 The Taliban also admitted for the first time that they started negotiation with the U.S. government and the Afghan government on a political settlement.637 President Obama emphasized “a negotiated peace” in his remarks on Afghanistan in May 2012: We’re pursuing a negotiated peace. In coordination with the Afghan government, my administration has been in direct discussions wi