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Illegal and unreported fishing : global analysis of incentives and a case study estimating illegal and.. Ganapathiraju, Pramod 2012

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ILLEGAL AND UNREPORTED FISHING: GLOBAL ANALYSIS OF INCENTIVES AND A CASE STUDY ESTIMATING ILLEGAL AND UNREPORTED CATCHES FROM INDIA by Pramod Ganapathiraju B.Sc., Andhra University, 1994 M.Sc., Annamalai University, 1997 MMM., Dalhousie University, 2005  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Resource Management and Environmental Studies)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)   March 2012 ? Pramod Ganapathiraju, 2012  iiAbstract Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing has been identified as one of the important drivers affecting sustainable management of fish stocks worldwide. Although, Governments have initiated regulations and institutions to address these concerns, over the years little progress has been achieved in controlling drivers of illegal fishing. In the post UNCLOS era, countries adopting progressive laws like the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, FAO Compliance Agreement and FAO International Plan of Action on IUU fishing have not backed them up with adequate monitoring and surveillance assets, leading to low compliance. Most countries within the new legal framework lack adequate institutional and enforcement infrastructure to improve fisheries compliance.  The thesis employs three approaches to identify and evaluate the drivers of illegal and unreported fishing worldwide. First, a case study approach using a questionnaire was used to determine adequacy of monitoring control and surveillance in fisheries of 41 countries. Results demonstrate that monitoring control and surveillance is poor, with both developing and developed countries having problems in this area. The second approach used 1211 illegal fishing penalty cases in 109 countries to show that low penalties provide economic incentives for IUU fishing to persist in many EEZs. Finally, a detailed case study of the Indian EEZ exemplifies the problems of developing countries by evaluating various stages where illegal and unreported catches occur in commercial and small-scale fisheries.  The study found evidence of serious decline in mesh size in several net fisheries. Significant evidence of the abuse of joint venture tuna fisheries also reveals that only 20% of the actual catch is reported; with unreported by-catch as large as the actual tuna catch. Results from each of the maritime states in India (including the remote  iiiAndaman and Nicobar Islands) reveal that 45000 to 60000 tonnes is taken annually by illegal foreign fishing vessels, while 1.2 million tonnes of discards and 293,000 tonnes remain unreported in the small-scale and commercial trawl fisheries.  ivPreface I am the sole author on chapters 1, 3, and 7. I am the senior author on all chapters and I assume primary responsibility for the design, implementation, analysis, and writing. The contributions of co-authors for chapters 2, 4, 5, and 6 are summarized below. Tony Pitcher contributed editorial oversight and guidance on all the chapters.  Chapter 4, 5, and 6 received approval from UBC Ethics Research Board in 2008. Approval for the IUU Study questionnaire was done under the UBC ORS ethics certificate (H08-00618), UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board, prior to undertaking the study in India.  Chapter 2 is based on conceptual model developed in Sumaila et al., (2006) paper (Sumaila, U. R., Alder, J., & Keith, H. (2006). Global scope and economics of illegal fishing. Marine Policy, 30(6), 696-703). The original paper used 16 incidents, whereas in the current work all the information for 1211 incidents in 109 countries was retrieved from GIUFI (2010) database, which was developed and owned by senior author (Pramod Ganapathiraju).  I collected all the information, and wrote the manuscript. Rashid Sumaila provided edits, and guidance during all stages of the work. Tony Pitcher contributed editorial oversight.     A version of case studies for marine fisheries in 41 fishing countries has been published as Pramod, G. (2011). Evaluations of Monitoring, Control and Surveillance in marine  vfisheries of 41 countries, MCS Case Studies Report, Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, Canada, May 2011, 222 p.  A version of chapters 4 and 5 has been published as field report (Pramod, G. (2010). Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Marine Fish Catches in the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone, Field Report, Policy and Ecosystem Restoration in Fisheries, Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, BC, Vancouver, Canada, 30 pages). I conducted all the interviews and wrote the entire manuscript. Tony Pitcher contributed editorial oversight and guidance on all stages of the work.  Daniel Pauly gave overall comments for chapters one to seven.  viTable of Contents Abstract???????????????????????????????. ii	Preface???????????????????????????????... iv	Table of Contents???????????????????????????. vi	List of Tables????????????????????????????.. xiii	List of Figures????????????????????????????.. xv	List of Symbols and Abbreviations???????????????????. xvii	Acknowledgements??????????????????????????. xx	Dedication?????????????????????????????. xxiii	Chapter  1: Incentives to illegal and unreported (IUU) fishing????????? 1	1.1	 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1	1.2	 Discussion of the definition of IUU fishing ........................................................ 4	1.3	 Incentives to illegal and unreported fishing ........................................................ 8	1.4	 Thesis structure ................................................................................................. 12	1.5	 Chapter 1 summary ........................................................................................... 13	Chapter  2: The global illegal fishing penalty regime: why efforts to control illegal fishing are not working?................................................................................................. 15	2.1	 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 15	2.2	 Methods ............................................................................................................. 18	2.3	 Benefits from illegal fishing activity ................................................................ 18	2.4	 Expected penalty drivers ................................................................................... 20	2.4.1	 Detection likelihood driver ........................................................................... 20	2.4.2	 Avoidance driver ........................................................................................... 20	 vii2.4.3	 Penalty driver ................................................................................................ 20	2.4.4	 Moral and social drivers ................................................................................ 21	2.5	 Formal penalty model ....................................................................................... 22	2.6	 Risks in illegal activity (costs and benefits) ..................................................... 23	2.7	 Components of penalty table ............................................................................ 23	2.7.1	 Arresting country .......................................................................................... 24	2.7.2	 Vessel/ gear ................................................................................................... 24	2.7.3	 Illegal catch / fishery ..................................................................................... 24	2.7.4	 Number of vessels ......................................................................................... 24	2.7.5	 Catch ............................................................................................................. 25	2.7.6	 Catch value .................................................................................................... 25	2.7.7	 Expected revenue .......................................................................................... 27	2.7.8	 Variable cost ................................................................................................. 28	2.7.9	 Theta (?) value .............................................................................................. 28	2.7.9.1	 Calculation of ??? value in the current work ........................................ 28	2.7.10	 Fine ............................................................................................................... 31	2.7.11	 Expected penalty ........................................................................................... 32	2.7.12	 Total cost ....................................................................................................... 32	2.7.13	 Total cost / Expected revenue ....................................................................... 32	2.7.14	 New fine ........................................................................................................ 32	2.8	 Results ............................................................................................................... 32	2.9	 Discussion ......................................................................................................... 39	2.10	 Chapter 2 summary ........................................................................................... 40	 viiiChapter  3: Plugging the leaks: an assessment of monitoring control and surveillance (MCS) in the marine fisheries of 41 countries?????????? 42	3.1	 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 42	3.2	 International laws relevant to monitoring control and surveillance in fisheries 44	3.3	 Definition of monitoring control and surveillance in fisheries ......................... 45	3.4	 Tools for monitoring control and surveillance in fisheries ............................... 47	3.4.1	 Importance of surveillance infrastructure in fisheries .................................. 48	3.4.2	 Importance of vessel monitoring system in the fisheries sector ................... 49	3.4.3	 Why is an observer scheme needed in fisheries? .......................................... 52	3.4.4	 Importance of sea based patrols in fisheries ................................................. 53	3.4.5	 Importance of aerial patrols in fisheries ........................................................ 53	3.4.6	 Importance of dockside monitoring in fisheries ........................................... 55	3.4.7	 Importance of coastal patrols ........................................................................ 55	3.4.8	 Importance of monitoring transhipments at sea ............................................ 56	3.4.9	 Importance of fishing gear inspections ......................................................... 57	3.5	 Methods ............................................................................................................. 57	3.6	 Results ............................................................................................................... 59	3.6.1	 Scoring compliance with surveillance infrastructure .................................... 59	3.6.2	 Scoring compliance with MCS human resources ......................................... 60	3.6.3	 Scoring compliance with monitoring of high seas fleet ................................ 62	3.6.4	 Scoring compliance with vessel monitoring scheme .................................... 63	3.6.5	 Scoring compliance with observer scheme ................................................... 64	3.6.6	 Scoring compliance with inspections at sea .................................................. 65	 ix3.6.7	 Scoring compliance with adequacy of aerial patrols .................................... 67	3.6.8	 Scoring compliance with dockside monitoring ............................................. 68	3.6.9	 Scoring compliance with coastal patrols ....................................................... 69	3.6.10	 Scoring compliance with monitoring transshipments at sea ......................... 70	3.6.11	 Scoring compliance with fishing gear inspections ........................................ 71	3.7	 Discussion ......................................................................................................... 72	3.8	 Comparisons among questions ......................................................................... 75	3.9	 Chapter 3 summary ........................................................................................... 78	Chapter  4: Illegal marine fish catches in the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone?.. 81	4.1	 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 81	4.2	 Categories of illegal and unreported catches assessed in the 2008 field trip .... 82	4.2.1	 Illegal fish catches categories in the Indian EEZ .......................................... 82	4.2.2	 Unreported fish catches categories ............................................................... 82	4.3	 Interview methodology ..................................................................................... 87	4.4	 Brief reports of the study areas for assessment of illegal catches ..................... 90	4.4.1	 Gujarat ........................................................................................................... 91	4.4.2	 Maharashtra ................................................................................................... 94	4.4.3	 Karnataka ...................................................................................................... 95	4.4.4	 Kerala ............................................................................................................ 96	4.4.5	 Tamil Nadu ................................................................................................. 102	4.4.6	 Andhra Pradesh ........................................................................................... 103	4.4.7	 Orissa .......................................................................................................... 104	4.4.8	 West Bengal ................................................................................................ 106	 x4.5	 Illegal fishing by Indian trawlers in inshore waters allocated to artisanal fishers in coastal states of mainland India .............................................................................. 107	4.6	 Illegal fishing in offshore waters off India?s EEZ .......................................... 113	4.7	 Discrepancies of foreign joint venture chartered tuna longliners ................... 117	4.8	 Fishing in disguise: LoP tuna longliners in Indian waters .............................. 119	4.9	 Troubled waters: Indo-Sri Lankan illegal fishing problem ............................. 122	4.10	 Incursions of Sri Lankan vessels into the Indian EEZ .................................... 125	4.11	 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 127	4.12	 Chapter 4 summary ......................................................................................... 131	4.12.1	 Internal displacement .................................................................................. 132	4.12.2	 Displacement to foreign waters .................................................................. 132	Chapter  5: Unreported marine fish catches of mechanised and small-scale fishers in the Indian exclusive economic zone??????????????????? 136	5.1	 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 136	5.2	 Discards ........................................................................................................... 137	5.2.1	 Discards by Indian fishing vessels .............................................................. 137	5.2.2	 Discards estimates from the current study .................................................. 145	5.2.3	 Discards estimates from chartered LOP tuna longliners and Indian deep-sea trawlers .................................................................................................................... 147	5.3	 Bait fish used in small-scale and mechanised sectors in Indian fisheries ....... 150	5.4	 Post-harvest losses .......................................................................................... 152	5.5	 Subsistence fisheries catches .......................................................................... 153	5.6	 Dryfish landings .............................................................................................. 160	 xi5.7	 Glut catches ..................................................................................................... 161	5.8	 Unreported molluscan catches ........................................................................ 162	5.9	 Take home catch of artisanal fishers ............................................................... 166	5.10	 Why traditional management measures are not working? .............................. 169	5.11	 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 169	5.12	 Chapter 5 summary ......................................................................................... 173	Chapter  6: Illegal and unreported fish catches in the Andaman and Nicobar  Islands??????????????????????????????... 176	6.1	 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 176	6.2	 Interview methodology ................................................................................... 178	6.3	 Monitoring control and surveillance in Andaman and Nicobar Islands ......... 179	6.4	 Fisheries regulations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands ............................ 181	6.5	 Nature of poaching activities in Andaman and Nicobar waters ..................... 182	6.5.1	 Extent of poaching by foreign fishing vessels ............................................ 184	6.5.2	 Incentives for domestic Indian poachers in the islands .............................. 186	6.6	 Estimation of illegal fish catches in the Andaman and Nicobar islands ......... 187	6.7	 Unreported domestic catches in Andaman & Nicobar Islands ....................... 188	6.7.1.1	 Sea shell fisheries in Andaman and Nicobar waters ........................... 188	6.7.1.2	 Fish consumption among indigenous tribes ........................................ 189	6.7.1.3	 Consumption of fish in tourist resorts and local hotels ....................... 190	6.7.1.4	 Take home catch of island fishers ....................................................... 191	6.7.1.5	 Baitfish used by domestic vessels in the islands ................................. 195	6.8	 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 195	 xii6.9	 Chapter 6 summary ......................................................................................... 203	Chapter  7: Conclusion????????????????????????. 206	7.1	 Main findings .................................................................................................. 206	7.1.1	 Incentives that allow illegal fishing to persist in the world?s EEZs ........... 206	7.1.2	 Is monitoring control and surveillance adequate in world?s fisheries? ....... 207	7.1.3	 Are illegal fishing penalties a significant deterrent to poachers? ............... 208	7.1.4	 Factors driving illegal and unreported catch in the Indian EEZ ................. 208	7.1.4.1	 Weak governance ................................................................................ 209	7.1.4.2	 Controlling illegal catches from chartered foreign tuna longliners .... 210	7.1.4.3	 Overcapacity in trawl and artisanal fisheries ...................................... 211	7.1.4.4	 Influence of peer behavior .................................................................. 213	7.2	 Future directions ............................................................................................. 215	Bibliography????????????????????????????.. 217	Appendix A: Cost benefit analysis for 1211 illegal and unreported fishing penalty incidents in 109 countries. .......................................................................................... 257	Appendix B: Questionnaire for the study evaluating monitoring control and surveillance in 41 fishing countries. ........................................................................... 309	Appendix C: List of countries scored for MCS analysis: Catches and rank order ..... 312	Appendix D: Ease of access to data for monitoring, control and surveillance in 41 fishing countries .......................................................................................................... 314	Appendix E: Indian trawlers arrested for illegal fishing in Orissa?s territorial waters and marine sanctuaries. ............................................................................................... 316	Appendix F:  Median values of Total cost / Expected revenue for 109 countries. ..... 318	 xiiiList of Tables Table 4.1: Interviews conducted and places visited for estimation of IUU catches in the Indian EEZ. ....................................................................................................................... 85	Table 4.2: Violation of Marine Fisheries Regulation Acts by Indian trawlers in the artisanal zone. ................................................................................................................. 108	Table 4.3: Estimates of illegal catches by Indian trawlers in the artisanal zone ............ 109	Table 4.4: State-wise allocation for small-scale fishing craft in India. .......................... 112	Table 5.1: Discard estimates in the Indian maritime states from the present study. ....... 143	Table 5.2: Estimated discards by foreign-chartered trawlers and tuna longliners in the Indian EEZ. ..................................................................................................................... 149	Table 5.3: Bait fish used in commercial hook and line fisheries along the Indian coast. 151	Table 5.4: Bait fish used in pelagic small-scale fisheries using motorized boats. .......... 152	Table 5.5: Subsistence fish landings from major estuaries, backwaters and mangroves.157	Table 5.6: Annual reef based subsistence fish catches along the mainland Indian coast. ......................................................................................................................................... 160	Table 5.7: Unreported molluscan catches from estuaries, backwaters and creeks in the Indian EEZ. ..................................................................................................................... 165	Table 5.8: Artisanal take home catches along the Indian coast. ..................................... 167	Table 5.9: Unreported catches from mechanised trawlers and gillnetters. ..................... 168	Table 5.10: Unreported catches quantified from 2008 Indian field trip in the mainland EEZ. ................................................................................................................................ 170	Table 6.1: Estimates of fish consumption by indigenous tribes in Andaman and Nicobar Islands. ............................................................................................................................ 190	 xivTable 6.2: Household consumption of fish among fishermen communities of Indian origin in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. .................................................................. 193	Table 6.3: Total estimate of illegal and unreported catches in the EEZ of Andaman and Nicobar islands. ............................................................................................................... 196	Table 6.4: Sea cucumbers, gastropods and corals seized by Andaman and Nicobar Police. ......................................................................................................................................... 199	  xvList of Figures Figure 1.1: Illegal and unreported (IUU) fishing patterns. ................................................. 6	Figure 2.1: IUU penalties in 109 countries. ...................................................................... 34	Figure 2.2: Median values of the reciprocal of Total cost / Expected revenue in 109 countries. (Contd.., on page 38). ....................................................................................... 37	Figure 2.3: Median values of the reciprocal of Total cost / Expected revenue in 109 countries. ........................................................................................................................... 38	Figure 3.1: Number of fishing vessels equipped with Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) in 53 maritime nations. ..................................................................................................... 51	Figure 3.2: MCS compliance scores for surveillance infrastructure. ................................ 60	Figure 3.3: MCS compliance scores for human resources. .............................................. 61	Figure 3.4: MCS compliance scores for high seas fleet monitoring. ................................ 63	Figure 3.5: MCS compliance scores for vessel monitoring system. ................................. 64	Figure 3.6: MCS compliance scores for observer scheme. ............................................... 65	Figure 3.7: MCS compliance scores for inspections at sea. ............................................. 66	Figure 3.8: MCS compliance scores for aerial patrols. ..................................................... 68	Figure 3.9: MCS compliance scores for dockside monitoring. ........................................ 69	Figure 3.10: MCS compliance scores for coastal patrols. ................................................ 70	Figure 3.11: MCS compliance scores for monitoring transshipments at sea. ................... 71	Figure 3.12: MCS compliance scores for fishing gear inspections. ................................. 72	Figure 3.13: Bar chart showing number of ?good? and ?fail? compliance ratings. ........... 75	Figure 3.14: MCS grid showing number of ?good? and ?fail? scores for each question by country. ............................................................................................................................. 77	 xviFigure 4.1: Map of India. .................................................................................................. 86	Figure 4.2: Number of Pakistani fishing boats arrested in Gujarat (India). ...................... 94	Figure 4.3: Estimated total illegal catch taken by foreign fishing vessels in the Indian EEZ. ................................................................................................................................ 114	Figure 4.4: Sri Lankan fishing vessels arrested in the Indian EEZ (1981-2010). ........... 126	Figure 4.5: Map showing migration of fishing crew to Middle East countries. ............. 134	Figure 5.1: Information from IUU interviews in 2008 showing displacement of Indian fishers due to overfishing. ............................................................................................... 175	Figure 6.1: Map showing mainland India and its island territories. ............................... 178	Figure 6.2: Number of tourists visiting Andaman & Nicobar Islands. ........................... 191	Figure 6.3: Estimates of sea cucumbers catch taken by illegal foreign fishing vessels in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands. .................................................................................... 197	Figure 6.4: Estimates of illegal trochus catch taken by foreign fishing vessels in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. ....................................................................................... 200	Figure 6.5: Estimates of illegal finfish catch taken by foreign fishing vessels in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. ....................................................................................... 201	  xviiList of Symbols and Abbreviations AFJ   Japan Fisheries Agency ALC   Automatic Location Communicator ANI   Andaman and Nicobar Islands BOBP   Bay of Bengal Programme BPL   Below Poverty Level CCTV  Closed Circuit Television CCRF   Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries CMFRI Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute CPUE   Catch Per Unit Effort DAHD  Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries, India EC  European Commission EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone EU   European Union FAO   Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FFV  Foreign Fishing Vessel FMC   Fisheries Monitoring Centre FRP   Fibre Reinforced Plastic Boat GIS   Geographic Information System GPS   Global Positioning System GIUFI   Global Illegal and Unreported Fishing Incidents Database GT   Gross Tonnage HP   Horse Power  xviiiHSTF   High Seas Task Force ICCAT  International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas ICG   Indian Coast Guard ICGS   Indian Coast Guard Ship ICTSD  International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development IEZ   Inshore Exclusion Zone IGO   International Governmental Organization IMO   International Maritime organization INS   Indian Naval Ship IOTC   Indian Ocean Tuna Commission IPOA   International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing IRBn   Indian Reserve Battalion IUCN   International Union for Conservation of Nature IUU   Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing JCG   Japanese Coast Guard LoP   Letter of Permission MCS   Monitoring, Control and Surveillance MFRA  Marine Fisheries Regulation Act MPA   Marine Protected Area MPEDA  Marine Products Export Development Authority MST   Mid-Sea Transshipment MZI   Maritime Zones of India Act NAFO  North Atlantic Fisheries Organization  xixNEAFC  North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission NEERI  National Environmental Engineering Research Institute NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation OAL   Overall Length OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PIN   Penalty Infringement Notice PMF   Andaman Police Marine Force RFMO  Regional Fishery Management Organization SAR   Synthetic Aperture Radar SPC   Secretariat of the Pacific Community SRFC   Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission UN   United Nations UNCLOS  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNFSA  United Nations Fish Stock Agreement UNGA  United Nations General Assembly UNPSMA  United Nations Port State Measures Agreement USD   United States Dollar VDS   Vessel Detection System VMS   Vessel Monitoring System  xxAcknowledgements I thank my supervisor Tony, J. Pitcher without whom this work would not have been possible. I wish to thank him for the support, encouragement and wise advice. I express my sincere gratitude for his mentorship, editorial oversight, and his spirit to dig on new ideas and explore the possibility of converting them into worthwhile research.   Special thanks are owed to my parents, who have supported me throughout my years of education, both morally and financially. I would like to especially thank my mother for substantial funding during work on Chapter 2, Chapter 6 and logistic support during the Indian IUU trip. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 were made possible through funding from MRAG, U.K. (through DEFRA); Cecil and Kathleen Morrow Scholarship for the year 2007. Partial funding for Chapter 2 on illegal fishing penalties was provided by Rashid Sumaila through Research Assistantship for 3 months, with main support from student loan in India. I sincerely thank the authorities in State Bank of India for providing the student loan.  I would like to thank Daniel Pauly for providing funding (Research Assistantship for one year) through the Sea Around Us Project for the work on FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries for 18 countries during the year 2006.   My special thanks to all the academics and scientists from Europe, Africa and Pacific islands who provided information on illegal fishing and MCS aspects in Chapters 2 and 3.    xxiIn India, I thank gracious assistance provided by Prof. Ramachandran Nair, Panangad Fisheries College; J. Santhana Kumar, National Institute of Ocean Technology (NIOT), Chennai; Dr. S. K. Chakraborty, and MSc students G.B. Srikanth, Himanshu, Debabrata Panda (CIFE), Mumbai; Paramita Banerjee Sawant, CMFRI, Mumbai; Prof. S.M. Shivaprakash, Karnataka Veterinary, Animal and Fisheries Sciences University; Jitin Ghosh, Subiksha Trading Services, Cochin; Dr. J.K. Patterson Edward, Director, Suganthi Devadason Marine Research Institute, Tuticorn; Dr. S. Bragadeeswaran and Dr. S.M. Rafi (Asst. Professors, CAS in Marine Biology, Annamalai University, Parangipettai); Research Assistants: Srinivas, Kakinada; Mantha Gopikrishna, Chennai ; Ramu, Santosh, Harish (College students, Visakhapatnam) ; Dinakar Varma, Srinivas Rao (Andhra University), Dinesh, Sushank Deb, Kolkata ; Dinesh Patel, Ashish Sawant, Gujarat.  I would also like to acknowledge my colleagues and mentors on various papers included here: Kaija Metuzals, David Agnew, John Pearce, Jennifer Jacquet, Reg Watson and Katherine Short.  I thank Carie Hoover, Roseti Imo, Divya Alice Varkey, Rajeev Kumar, Brett van Poorten, Mike Hawkshaw, Megan Bailey, Jennifer Jacquet, Shawn Booth, Chiara Piroddi, Colette Wabnitz, Dawit Tesfamichael, and Ahmed Khan for their intellectual insights at UBC. I would also like to thank David Agnew, Duncan Copeland and Kaija Metuzals whose penetrating questions taught me to probe more deeply the issues related to illegal fishing.  xxiiI also offer my enduring gratitude to the faculty and staff at the UBC, who have inspired me to continue my work in this field. I owe special thanks in particular to Carol Pollock and Kathy Nomme at the Department of Zoology for providing me an opportunity to work as Lab Instructor in the Biology 140 programme.  I would also like to thank Kyle Sullivan, Janice Doyle, Ann Tautz, Grace Ong and Marina Campbell for bearing with my incessant requests and helping me with the administrative requirements.   Finally, I would like to acknowledge my wife Deepti for proofreading my thesis, patience for bearing with my odd work schedules, and for ensuring sanity during the writing of the thesis.    xxiiiDedication   To my parents Ganapathiraju Perumalla Raju, Rama Devi & my wife Deepti 1Chapter  1: Incentives to illegal and unreported (IUU) fishing   1.1 Introduction Coastal states are bestowed with an intrinsic responsibility to ensure sustainable management of marine resources from both domestic and foreign fishing vessels operating in their 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This responsibility is clearly stated in Article 61 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 ?The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific evidence available to it, shall ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation?. In this context, enforcement of national and international fisheries laws assumes immense importance and countries require adequate regulatory, financial and human resources to control access to their fisheries resources. However, in the post-UNCLOS era, many countries lack the means to effectively control and regulate fishing effort in this vast new expanse. Problems in tackling Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fish landings are particularly acute in developing countries that possess meager patrolling and surveillance assets (SOFIA 2008, page 73; MRAG 2005; Mwikya 2006).  The intent of this thesis is to look at global incentives such as illegal fishing penalties and monitoring control and surveillance (MCS) in chapters 1 to 3; while the goal of chapters 4 to 6 using a regional approach, is to get an accurate estimate of illegal and unreported fish catches in Indian exclusive economic zone (EEZ).                                                  1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, (http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm).  2Although the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea remains the overarching legal document governing optimum utilisation of global fish resources, subsequent fisheries laws like the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (FAO 1995a), UN Fisheries Compliance Agreement (FAO 1993), International Plan of Action (IPOA) to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU Fishing (FAO 2001) and the UN Agreement on Port State Measures (FAO 2009a) have all tried to plug the gaps in management of coastal, straddling and high seas fish stocks. Several of these instruments have important provisions to address IUU fishing through coastal states within their EEZ and through Regional Fishery Management Organizations (RFMOs) in the high seas.   The declining state of global fish stocks2 (SOFIA 2009, 2010) and growing demand for fish (Pinstrup et al., 1997; Delgado et al., 2003, see also FAO 2004) necessitate measures to tackle this problem on a war footing more than ever. The fifty-ninth session of United Nation General Assembly (UNGA) attributes declining state of global fish stocks to four factors namely ?failure of States fully to implement and enforce the range of international fisheries instruments and related instruments; illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing in                                                  2 According to SOFIA (2008) three quarters of world?s fish stocks are fully exploited, overexploited or depleted and that calls for better management of fish stocks.  3violation of internationally agreed rules; overcapacity in international fishing fleets; and gaps in data and scientific knowledge to inform fisheries management decisions?3.  In 2007, the impacts of excess fishing capacity and its implications through IUU fishing were also highlighted in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/1774. The Twenty-seventh FAO-COFI session highlights the need for controlling IUU fishing through better port state control and improvement of Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS) measures through constant vigilance, cooperation and commitment to combat illegal fishing (FAO 2007a). In 2001, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations had coined a new terminology of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing5 to define issues associated to the conditions of these problems.                                                  3 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution A/59/298, Fifty-ninth session, Report of the Secretary-General, Para 7, Review of main developments in areas covered by General Assembly resolution 58/14 from September 2003 to July 2004.  4 United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-second session, Resolution 62/177, Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments, A/RES/62/177.  5 IPOA-IUU, International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 24th Session of COFI, March 2, 2001.   41.2 Discussion of the definition of IUU fishing Throughout this thesis, when referring to a global definition of illegal fishing:  Illegal fishing5 is defined as fishing (Paragraph 3.1 of IPOA-IUU Fishing): ?3.1.1   conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State, without the permission of that State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations;  3.1.2   conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant regional fisheries management organization but operate in contravention of the conservation and management measures adopted by that organization and by which the States are bound, or relevant provisions of the applicable international law; or  3.1.3   in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken by cooperating States to a relevant regional fisheries management organization.?  Unreported fishing is defined as fishing activities (Paragraph 3.2 of the IPOA-IUU Fishing): ?3.2.1   which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national authority, in contravention of national laws and regulations; or  3.2.2     undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management organization which have not been reported or have been misreported, in contravention of the reporting procedures of that organization.  Unregulated fishing is defined as fishing (Paragraph 3.3 of the IPOA-IUU Fishing): ?3.3.1   in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries management organization that are conducted by vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of a State not  5party to that organization, or by a fishing entity, in a manner that is not consistent with or contravenes the conservation and management measures of that organization; or  3.3.2   in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no applicable conservation or management measures and where such fishing activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent with State responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources under international law.?  Although the FAO?s IPOA features some aspects of IUU fishing it does not go far and deep enough to cover many issues relevant to illegal, unreported and unregulated fish landings. The legalese of the UN ignores many nuances of these and related terms such as discards, which are legal, but not reported and unreported fishing is actually a category of illegal fishing, leading to considerable confusion. A brief description of these terms under the three categories of illegal, unreported and unregulated fish catches is given below in Figure 1.1.  6 Figure 1.1: Illegal and unreported (IUU) fishing patterns. The figure shows different components of IUU Fishing not covered under the conventional UN definition. Boxes in Yellow show different stages of fish landings from the fisheries grounds where fish are caught to the consumer. The fish landings data is mostly collected through electronic log reports at sea or catch reports submitted at ports, which in turn is processed by national governments and submitted to FAO each year. Boxes numbered 1 to 3 show various stages where the formal catch inspection scheme fails to assess illegal catches. The boxes numbered 4 to 10 show various categories of unreported catches, which are not assessed under the formal, catch inspection schemes in many countries. These categories are assessed in the fieldwork in India reported in Chapter 4, 5 and 6.   7A) Illegal catches6 also include transshipping catches contravening national and international regulations by landing them in foreign ports without the consent of national authorities; illegal transshipments from licensed vessels to foreign vessels at sea (Fegan 2003; Gillett and McCoy 2006; McCoy 2007; Gianni and Simpson 2005); fish caught through joint venture which should be landed in national ports but is landed elsewhere (Willoughby et al., 1997; Butcher 2004; Fegan 2003, 2005; Pramod 2010); misreporting or underreporting catches from licensed vessels to disguise quota violations (Fegan 2003; Pitcher et al., 2002; Nadeau 2007; Bremner et al., 2009; ICES 2010; Ohlen 2011; European Commission 2011a); illegal sale of recreational fish catches; illegal sale of food fishery catch to individuals / restaurants / food outlets (Gezelius 2004; e.g. New Zealand, Australia); catches from destructive fishing techniques (dynamite and cyanide fishing) which are sold along with catches from other commercial landings (e.g. Indonesia, Philippines); compressor diving for illegal fishing in Indonesian waters (Soeda and Djohani 1998; Erdmann 2001).  B) Unreported catches include take home catch of small-scale fishers and crew of commercial fishing vessels (Pramod 2010); discards (Kelleher 2005); landings sold by fishermen directly to tourist resorts and restaurants (Pramod 2010); errors in weighing fish at landing centers (Willoughby et al., 1997; Pramod 2010); non-recording of fish sold through non-government markets (Willoughby et al., 1997); beach gleaning (Pramod 2010; Willoughby et al., 1997); trans-national landings where fish caught in one country?s EEZ and                                                  6 Two categories of illegal and unreported catches discussed here (Chapter 1) from a global perspective. In chapters 4 to 6, which use a regional approach more detailed explanation of illegal and unreported catch categories is discussed in section 4.2, in the context of tropical fisheries in India.  8landed in another country as catch caught in the high seas (Pramod 2010; Willoughby et al., 1997; Butcher 2004); landings during glut periods (Pramod 2010; Willoughby et al., 1997). Declining landings of commercial fish species has also resulted in increased level of seafood mis-labeling where less expensive fish are sold as expensive species (Buck 2007; Garcia-Varquez et al., 2011; Wong and Hammer 2008).  There is a good argument for using ?unreported? to cover ALL these categories. See Pitcher et al., (2002) for more discussion on these aspects. In this thesis a substantive discussion to justify many of these definitions is given in chapters 1, 4, 5 and 6.  1.3 Incentives to illegal and unreported fishing The UNGA Resolution A/RES/60/31 (Para 33, 2006) highlights the rising threats from IUU Fishing as ?one of the greatest threats to marine ecosystems [that] continues to have serious and major implications for the conservation and management of ocean resources.? Overfishing and declining state of world?s fish stocks (SOFIA 2008, 2010) coupled with range of incentives like low operational costs of IUU vessels (Hatcher 2004); corruption (Standing 2008; Tsamenyi and Hanich 2008); territorial disputes (Anwar 2006); higher revenues from IUU operations (Sumaila et al., 2006), subsidies (Beddington et al., 2007; Sumaila et al., 2008; Knigge and Thurston 2011), flags of convenience (Gianni and Simpson 2005), uncertain catch estimates (ICCAT 2010); weak governance (Mora et al., 2009; Agnew et al., 2009; Pitcher et al., (2008, 2009), inadequate port state control (Flothmann et al., 2010) and Monitoring Control and Surveillance (Schmidt 2005) have aggravated the suite of problems associated with IUU fishing.  IUU fishing is widespread and also prevalent in the  9high seas (Anon 2008a) and regional fishery management organization (RFMO) jurisdictions where IUU catches appear to be on the rise (HSTF 2006; Agnew et al., 2009; ICIJ 2010). Even among many developed countries in the European Union that have access to good MCS resources, poor compliance and a low level of sanctions (European Commission 2008) have compromised the benefits expected from this investment in MCS. Commercialization of small-scale fisheries and the subsequent breakdown of social structure have contributed to an increase in use of illegal fish gear and boats in Indian waters (Pramod 2010).  Globally, fisheries management efforts have largely been inadequate in spite of the declining catches (Mora et al., 2009; Pitcher et al., 2009). Progressive legislative instruments like the US Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006 and the more recent European Commission Council Regulation [(EC) No. 1005/2008] to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing are steps in the right direction, but their implementation has been plagued by non-compliance in many domestic commercial fisheries in both continents (King and Sutinen 2009; European Commission 2008; Anon 2008b).  Clearly, the prevalence of IUU fishing is not restricted to some countries. A recent study by Pitcher et al., (2008, 2009) has shown that 30 of the 53 top fishing countries perform poorly in controlling illegal fishing.   Enforcement assumes importance here, as the sovereign rights to sustainably exploit a resource also require the means to effectively patrol it. In this regard Article 73 of the UNCLOS explicitly gives each coastal state ?sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such measures,  10including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention?. However, the growing fleet capacity (Anon 2005a; Pauly et al., 2002) and technological sophistication of global fleets to operate beyond the EEZ, means that coastal states should be prepared to ensure compliance from domestic fleets while confronting incursions of illegal foreign fishing vessels violating the 200 nm EEZ. In circumstances, where the coastal state wishes to license foreign fishing vessels to fish surplus stocks in its EEZ, such agreements should require adequate MCS assets to get long term economic benefits and optimum long term harvest of the resource. Such measures have been stated in Paragraph 4 of Article 62 in UNCLOS which requires coastal states authorizing fishing by foreign fleets to ?determining the species which may be caught, and fixing quotas of catch, whether in relation to particular stocks or groups of stocks or catch per vessel over a period of time or to the catch by nationals of any State during a specified period; regulating seasons and areas of fishing, the types, sizes and amount of gear, and the types, sizes and number of fishing vessels that may be used?.   Growing demand for fish in emerging economies such as China has also caused a spike in the use of destructive fishing techniques. For example growing demand for live reef fish in Hong Kong, China and Taiwan has caused an increase in use of destructive fishing in Philippines and Indonesia (Cesar et al., 2000; OECD 2004). The mobile nature of the distant water fleets also warrants attention as both licensed and illegal vessels can deplete a resource and move at a much faster pace to new fishing locations (Berkes et al., 2006; Bentley 1999; Johannes and Riepen 1995). In Indonesia, early intervention to protect marine habitats from destructive  11fishing has been shown to be more cost-effective than trying to rehabilitate damaged habitats after blast fishing (Haisfield et al., 2010). The scale of illegal catches from larger IUU vessels (>50 GT) operating in the EEZ [41,000 tonnes of fish are trafficked in Yemen every year (Anon 2009a)] and high seas [10,000 tonnes of groundfish were illegally caught in the North Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) convention area in 2001 (OECD 2003)] are difficult to control due to the large jurisdictions covered by these fleets and the changing nature of fishing operations (Chapter 3 of this Thesis).   In the Philippines, Chinese poachers are often apprehended and released later due to diplomatic pressure or pardon from government authorities (Anon 2010b). In a nine year period (1998-2007) close to 600 Chinese poachers were apprehended and released in Philippines with only one conviction in 2005 (Anon 2006, 2007a; Anon 2008c). As aptly stated by one government official in Philippines ?Demand is only once side of the coin, illegal fishing by locals was triggered by government inaction. Until the mid-nineties most of reef fish caught in our waters was only marketed in local markets.  In my regency, we started encountering more Chinese boats stealing reef fish from our waters. In the initial period (1990-2001) the government stated lack of patrolling resources and from 2002 onwards they caught and often released the Chinese poachers, citing diplomatic pressure. Nowadays, I would say that more illegal boats frequent our waters and land it as their own in Hong Kong markets. Government inaction has emboldened Chinese poachers and we are the one to suffer? (Anon, pers. comm. 2007; Anon 2007b).  As the above case in Philippines illustrates, weak government stewardship triggers a cyclic process of localized illegal fishing as disgruntled fishers unhappy with local governance and government, drive faster depletion of  12the resource, leading to long term economic losses for both fishers and the government.  The economic incentives to fish illegally are discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. A more rigorous account of economic incentives is provided in (Charles et al., 1999; Sumaila et al., 2006).  1.4 Thesis structure Chapter One highlights some of the existing problems with control on illegal fishing. The chapter looks at major incentives to illegal and unreported fishing in coastal waters, high seas and RFMO jurisdictions. A brief background of the IUU fishing is provided, followed by a review of legislative instruments to deal with the problem. Among the incentives identified for IUU fishing two major aspects a) IUU Penalties and b) Monitoring Control and Surveillance in Fisheries were selected for detailed analysis in the Thesis.   Chapter Two reviews the economic incentives for illegal fishers, through risks and costs associated with engaging in IUU fishing. Data on IUU Fishing Penalties for 109 countries during 1980-2009 were analyzed using 1211 IUU prosecution cases.   Chapter Three reviews the status of Monitoring Control and Surveillance using a questionnaire approach. 41 countries landing 87% of world?s fish catches were evaluated for the study using the technique of Pitcher (1999).  A detailed analysis of eleven questions namely 1) Surveillance infrastructure, 2) MCS Human Resources, 3) High seas fleet management, 4) Vessel Monitoring System coverage, 5) Observer coverage, 6) Inspections at Sea, 7) Aerial patrols, 8) Dockside monitoring, 9) Coastal patrols, 10) Monitoring of  13Transhipments and 11) Fishing gear inspections was conducted to explore MCS capabilities in world`s fisheries. This is perhaps the first attempt to quantify management effectiveness of MCS resources in the fisheries sector.  Chapter Four provides a detailed estimation of illegal catches in India`s Exclusive Economic Zone using 203 confidential interviews from a visit to India in 2008, while Chapter Five provides a detailed estimation of unreported fish catches from small-scale fisheries, subsistence catches, discards and take home catches. Chapter Six looks at illegal and unreported catches from remote offshore island territories of India in Andaman and Nicobar islands.   Chapter Seven synthesises the results of the thesis and looks into the adequacy of measures to control IUU fishing globally and identifies gaps in existing management framework. The chapter recommends adoption and strict implementation of national and international laws to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal fishing.  1.5 Chapter 1 summary Chapter 1 of the dissertation reviews the incentives and disincentives to illegal and unreported fishing worldwide. In addition, the chapter provides a preview of aspects such as illegal laundering of catches at sea, which are not covered under the current definition of IUU fishing (FAO 2001).  The context for the thesis was set by; (1) showing different stages at which IUU landings can occur in marine fisheries, from the point when the fish is first caught at sea to the point until it reaches the end customer; (2) exploring different categories of  14unreported catches in tropical and temperate fisheries which need attention for better reporting of fish catches to United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. Several incentives (such as subsidies, corruption, overcapacity etc.) and disincentives (better laws and adequate MCS infrastructure) to curtail illegal and unreported fishing are also discussed. Chapter 1 also introduces the other chapters in the thesis.  15Chapter  2: The global illegal fishing penalty regime: why efforts to control illegal fishing are not working?  2.1 Introduction Illegal fishing, for long, has been recognized as a major problem afflicting sustainable utilization and management of global fish stocks (Agnew et al., 2009).  Illegal fishing is conducted by domestic and foreign vessels that contravene national and international obligations of the state while fishing within their EEZ and the high seas (FAO 2001). This chapter explores the economic incentives for illegal fishers, through risks, costs associated with poaching, avoidance and apprehension. It also explores whether illegal fishers take monetary costs and benefits into account while engaging in illegal fishing (Sumaila et al., 2006).  Data from GIUFI (2010) database with information from more than 1000 illegal fishing incidents (from time of occurrence to final prosecution in the courts) was used for assessment of the adequacy of IUU penalties in 109 countries.    Illegal, fishing occurs both within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and on the high seas when activities are not adequately monitored and regulated under State laws.  Illegal catches also undermine management and conservation of fish stocks by depleting the resource and decreasing the catch allocated to licensed fishers (Agnew et al., 2009; Pitcher et al., 2002). Illegal catches can come from a wide array of areas like unreported transshipments at sea, under or misreported catches, fish from closed areas, etc. (Pitcher et al., 2002), with their extractions varying from year to year, by fishery and jurisdiction (Agnew et al., 2009; GIUFI 2010). Illegal catches also affect stock assessments as reported catch and effort data often  16used in absence of such data result in distortions of available catches (Pauly et al., 2002; Patterson 1998; Bremner et al., 2009).   The illegal fishing problem has been receiving more attention in recent decades since the coming into effect of UNCLOS7, and several international instruments like FAO?s International Plan of Action (IPOA)8, FAO Compliance Agreement9, UN Fish Stocks Agreement10 and the more recent FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing11 emphasizing the need to regulate activities of fishing vessels both within and outside the EEZ.  The problem needs                                                  7 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December, 1982.  8 FAO International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, Rome, FAO. 2001. 24p.  9 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. New York, 4 December, 1995.  10 The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (in force as from 11 December 2001).  11 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, FAO, November 22, 2009.   17due attention as new forms of corporate (AAD 2003; Griggs and Lugten 2007) and organized crime (Gastrow 2001; Putt and Anderson 2007; Le Gallic and Cox 2006) have made their way into illegal fishing activities.   Penalties for illegal fishing differ by country, region, value of the resource targeted, national and international regulations signed by the country and more importantly by the penalty levied on illegal fishing activity (GIUFI 2010). Even within political entities / countries having a common fisheries policy like the European Union, wide variations in penalty have been observed. The average penalty for breach of fishing laws in Finland in 2001 was only EUR 84, while a similar offence attracted a penalty of EUR 12,700 in Ireland.  Further, Ireland imposed an average fine of EUR 7470 for 32 cases in 2001, while France imposed average fines of EUR 2483 for 35 cases, and with Spain imposing even lower penalties at an average of EUR 928 for 2803 cases during the same period (Siggins 2003). These discrepancies in penalties are sufficiently large to suggest a case for harmonization of monetary penalties at least within the European Union (Sloley 2008). Variations in the legal penalties for similar crimes are known to be culture dependent, and derive from events and trends in the history of different peoples (Nunn 2009), but differing penalties for illegal fishing are unhelpful in an increasingly globalized seafood market (Berkes et al., 2006). Wide variations in penalty by fishery, country, jurisdiction (See Appendix A for variations in penalty by fisheries in each country) and management areas provide financial incentives for illegal fishers and distant water fleets to target operations in such regions. Hence, results from the present study will throw light on the effectiveness of penalties to deter illegal fishing.  182.2 Methods Becker (1968) developed the first economic model to predict incentives for people to engage in a criminal activity. Subsequent works by other scientists assert that criminals engage in an illegal activity if the expected profits from that activity exceed profits that can be made from a legal activity (Stiegler 1971; Sutinen and Anderson 1985; Milliman 1986; Vincent and Ali 1997; Kirkwood and Agnew 2004).  This argument that financial incentives are the main drivers of illegal fishing activity propelled the emergence of deterrence models (Kuperan et al, 1998; Charles et al., 1999).  Recent work in this field has also looked at moral, institutional and social drivers that compel individuals to engage in illegal activity (Sutinen et al., 1999; Tyler 1990; Stiegler 1971).  The model developed by Sumaila et al., (2006) considers five drivers of IUU fishing a) benefits from engaging in illegal activity; b) likelihood of detection; c) penalty faced by fisher when caught; d) cost to the fisher while engaged in such an activity; and e) the degree of moral and social standing of a fisher in the society. The conceptual model developed in the current Chapter follows the assumptions of Sumaila et al., (2006) as it appears to be holistic taking into consideration all the economic, social and moral drivers that explicitly motivate an individual to engage in IUU activity. (See Sumaila et al., (2006) for more information on the formal model).  2.3 Benefits from illegal fishing activity According to Le Gallic (2008) two major drivers of illegal fishing activity are overcapacity of the world?s fishing fleets, which provide incentives for vessel operators to move their operations to distant waters to reduce operational and labour costs. The second driver is the weakness of international legal frameworks, which allows the continuance of flags of  19convenience fishing practices (Le Gallic 2008). Globalization of the fishing industry and increasing range of the distant water fleets also aggravate problems associated with illegal fishing (Berkes et al., 2006). Institutional drivers such as weak monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) and low penalties can also drive these activities (See Chapters 2 and 3). Poor MCS coupled with low penalties can reduce the risks faced by IUU operators (Le Gallic 2008), while subsidies (Thurston 2010) can transfer excess capacity to foreign country EEZs, where monitoring is poor.   The current model (in this chapter) assumes that the ability to make profit from an illegal fishing is one of the main incentives for an individual to engage in illegal activity. According to Sumaila et al., (2006), there are three possible scenarios under which an individual would want to engage in illegal fishing activity. First, if a fisher is making profit from legal activity, then the probability of him engaging in cheating is low, however, if the fisher?s income is declining from legal activity and if he/she can generate profit from illegal activity the probability of cheating will increase. Second, if the fisher is making profit from a licensed activity the incentives to engage in illegal activity are low. The third category of fishers would include fishers who make profit from legal activity but still engage in illegal activity to increase their profits. Other factors that might influence an individual?s decision to engage in illegal activity include catches, CPUE, price and cost of fishing (Kirkwood and Agnew 2004; Sumaila et al., 2006).     202.4  Expected penalty drivers 2.4.1 Detection likelihood driver When the probability of getting apprehended is higher, there are fewer incentives for a fisher to cheat. Among others, this driver is influenced by three factors namely (a) capabilities of MCS agencies; (b) social acceptance of violations in fishers community; (c) awareness of regulations; (d) level of funding and involvement of non- governmental organizations in detecting infringements (Sumaila et al., 2006; Nielsen and Mathiesen 2001). In Quebec, fisheries violations were found to be most sensitive to changes in likelihood of detection, with increase in fines producing greater deterrence (Furlong 1991). Compliant fishers can also engage in opportunistic illegal fishing if the probability of detection is low (Nielsen and Mathiesen 2001). 2.4.2 Avoidance driver A fisher engaged in illegal activity will take certain measures to avoid being noticed by enforcement agencies (such as engaging in activity at night or at times of the day when patrolling is less (Anderson (1989); Crawford et al., (2004); Anon, pers. comm. (2007), illegal transshipment of catch (Anon 2005c; Heazle and Butcher 2007), choosing locations less frequented by enforcement officers (Salmon poachers in British Columbia, Canada (Anon, pers. comm. 2008), which are all referred to as avoidance activity (GIUFI 2010). 2.4.3 Penalty driver Severity of penalty is also one of the important drivers, which motivates or discourages an individual to cheat.  The more the penalty, the less would be the likelihood of cheating. This driver is linked to the detection driver, as absence of enforcement negates the severity of a strong penalty.  For example, in Philippines and Tanzania, minimal penalties in the coastal  21reef fishery meant that there are more repeat offenders as fishers get away with a nominal fine in most cases (GIUFI 2010; Anon 2009c). Penalties can range from (i) amount of the fine; (ii) confiscation of catch; (iii) confiscation of gear and other fishing equipment; (iv) cancellation of license for a temporary period; (v) exclusion from the fishery for the rest of the fishing season; (vi) exclusion of repeat offenders from fishery with restrictions on access to fishing grounds; (vii) putting vessel captain and owners into jail.  In the Australian state of Victoria, first time offenders are given a Penalty Infringement Notice (PIN), with repeat offenders penalized through seizure of catch, imprisonment and more serious offences processed through courts.  In Western Australia, fisheries regulations allow mandatory penalties of 10 times the value of catch for protected species like abalone and rock lobsters, with serious cases warranting cancellation of fishing licenses (Western Australia Department of Fisheries 2008). In the US Northeast groundfish fishery, deterrence effect of enforcement was weak as benefits from violating fishing regulations were nearly 5 times the economic value of penalties (King and Sutinen 2010). South Africa has brought in new racketeering laws (leader of an abalone smuggling syndicate was sentenced to 10 years), which allow long jail terms to deter new individuals from participating in such activities (Anon 2004a). 2.4.4 Moral and social drivers Some recent studies on small-scale and artisanal fisheries have also shown that an individual?s behavior is strongly influenced by community (Hatcher et al., 2000). These kinds of drivers need special attention in developing countries where small-scale fisher?s land the bulk of catches and where examination of compliance issues needs examination of both  22fisher and the community. Breach of fisheries regulations would depend on three levels of violators (i) chronic violators; (ii) moderate violators; and (iii) non-violators (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998).  Among these three categories of fishers, chronic violators engage in illegal activities under any set of circumstances while moderate violators will only contravene regulations if the potential for profit exceeds penalty and probability of being caught (Sumaila et al., 2006). Secondary triggers that affect the decision of a fisher to engage in illegal fishing include the perceived legitimacy of regulations, and the general moral code of fishers and their communities (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Tyler 1990; Sutinen et al., 1990; Keane et al., 2008).  2.5 Formal penalty model Using the conceptual framework discussed in Sumaila et al., (2006), a global penalty model with far more detailed estimates of penalty by country, fishery, fleets and location was developed using incidents from GIUFI (2010) database. Some of the assumptions made in the model developed by Sumaila et al., (2006) are reflected below. The model assumes that a fisher will try to maximize economic gains from the illegal activity, with his actions moderated by moral and social pressure. In cases when a fisher is engaged in an illegal activity with no regulation, he exhibits less avoidance as the probability of being caught and expected penalty are close to zero. An IUU fisher will choose the illegal activity such that marginal revenue from the activity equates sum of marginal cost of fishing together with the marginal cost of moral and social factors associated with that activity. In scenarios where a fisher partakes in an illegal activity in the presence of enforcement, the fisher will choose the  23level of activity such that marginal revenue is equal to or greater than sum of marginal cost, and a potential marginal fine when he is caught while engaged in illegal fishing.   2.6 Risks in illegal activity (costs and benefits) Appendix A is a visual representation of the model in Sumaila et al., (2006), excluding moral and social components as these drivers are poorly reflected in the data given by enforcement authorities for prosecutions and penalties. Implicit assumptions were also made in the model that avoidance activity of vessel will be incorporated in the vessel?s variable cost (See Appendix A), and the benefit from such activity is to reduce MCS effectiveness (reduce ???) of the vessel.  Appendix A lists vessels that have been arrested while fishing illegally in EEZs of 109 countries and their offshore island territories.  First entry in the table (page 232) shows vessels arrested by Country (Canada), number of vessels detained (2), its illegal catch (1.7 tonnes), its estimated market value (691) in USD, and its fine in (14614) USD during that year. The ?fine? column uses information from the original data.  In most cases information for both ?catch? and ?fine? was available in the source (GIUFI 2010)  2.7 Components of penalty table The various components of the penalty table (Appendix A) are given below and were modified from Sumaila et al., 2006.12                                                  12 Calculations for all the variables (in italics) in Appendix A follow the method described in Sumaila et al., (2006). When more detailed changes or different method was followed this is described, since the IUU incidents in Sumaila et al., (2006) used 16 IUU cases where as the current study uses more than 1000 IUU fishing incidents from EEZs of 109 countries and overseas island territories in the GIUFI (2010) database. Incidents  242.7.1 Arresting country Country arresting the illegal vessel within its EEZ (e.g. Canadian Coast Guard vessel apprehending a fishing vessel 23 nautical miles within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for fishing illegally contravening its national laws. All the incidents mentioned in this chapter (Appendix A) are for fishing vessels arrested within the country?s EEZ. 2.7.2 Vessel/ gear The vessel implicated in the illegal activity (trawler, longliner, purse seiner, dragger, squid jigger, fishing boats, catamaran, gillnetter, crabber, sport fishing vessel, refrigerated cargo ship, fish carrier, etc.). In the case of certain fisheries such as abalone and shellfish, fishing gear (e.g. Dive Gear) was used in the column instead of fishing vessel. 2.7.3 Illegal catch / fishery This column represents the total illegal catch confiscated for the specific illegal / unreported fishing incident. A generic category of ?Finfishes nei? was used when a detailed breakdown of species is not available OR when the illegal catch comprised of several species of fish and invertebrates. In cases, where specific species comprised the illegal catch in its entirety, its details were given (e.g. Salmon, Atlantic Cod, Anchovies etc.). 2.7.4 Number of vessels This column contains the number of illegal fishing vessels implicated in the illegal activity.                                                                                                                                                            derived from GIUFI used multiple sources for each IUU incident tracking illegal fishing cases from time of arrest to the period or fine to jail time thereby increasing the reliability of the information.  252.7.5 Catch This column contains the illegal / unreported catch for one or more illegal vessels in each incident. Weights for all the species in the illegal catch were converted into ?tonnes? in this column (e.g. pounds, kilograms, etc. were converted into tonnes). 2.7.6 Catch value In the ?catch value? column, value of the illegal catch was calculated using information provided in the original source and other sources mentioned below. The catch value was converted from the respective country?s currency into United States Dollars (USD $) for that year using World Bank exchange rates. In cases where the value was mentioned (in USD) in the incident, it was used as a direct source of catch value instead of the exchange price for that year. It is pertinent to note that for most of the incidents in the GIUFI database catch value in U.S. dollars ($) was mentioned, as each incident in the GIUFI database has information from several sources (tracking information from time of arrest, value displayed in court cases, auction value of illegal catch, international market price for the illegal catch, species etc.). In specific cases, where the illegal catch (e.g. Ribbon fish sold within country (India) or regional markets (when it is exported to China), price of the IUU catch from regional markets was used. Fish prices in national or regional markets (e.g. North America, Asia, Europe, etc.) were only used when price of the species was not available in international markets). In cases, where the IUU catch has international market price, like for tuna, sharks, lobster, abalone etc. the international market price was always used for assessing the value of illegal catch.      26In cases where catch was comprised of mixed species, price of illegal catch was calculated using average fish price of all species that can be caught within the EEZ. This was necessary as it was not possible to predict with certainty whether illegal catch on the vessel came from one fishing area or a broader EEZ / High Seas area. In some cases, when illegal catch by different species or common name were available for the total illegal catch, value of each species was calculated separately and then added to the value of other illegally caught species to derive the value of total IUU catch. (e.g., 220 tonnes Bluefin tuna, 12 tonnes Skipjack tuna, 2 tonnes Swordfish (total IUU catch: 236 tonnes). In cases, where the value of the illegal catch was not available for that country?s EEZ, the value of similar species in neighboring EEZ?s or value of the catch during that year in an importing country was used (e.g., tropical lobsters in Brazil imported by USA).    In cases, where illegal fishing vessels were arrested for minor violations such as use of illegal gear or illegal fishing for certain duration in a closed area, average catch of the vessel / day / fishery for that year was used to calculate a more accurate estimate of illegal catch onboard. (e.g., an Alaskan Pollack fishing vessel fishing for 2 days in a closed area, average catch of vessel / day / season for that fishery during that year was used to calculate illegal catch for the 2 day period, with information of flag, tonnage and average catch by vessel in that fishery derived from GIUFI database).  In situations when illegal catch was mentioned in number (e.g., 21 lobsters), average weight of the specific species was used to calculate total weight of the illegal catch. In some cases, where illegal catch was mentioned in quantity of body parts (e.g., 100 tonnes shark fins), the average weight of shark fins was assumed to be 2% of total body weight (IUCN 2003). In cases, where illegal catch was mentioned as confiscation of  27catch from fishing gear (e.g., catch from 50 lobster traps), average catch of lobster traps during that period (by fishery and country) was used to calculate the total illegal catch.  In the ?fine? column when the penalty was given as jail term to crew members, average income per month of all crew members was used to calculate equivalent monetary value for the fine (e.g., captain jailed for 2 years, 15 crew members jailed for 1 year, then monthly wage of skipper and crew members by their nationality were multiplied with the duration of the jail term to calculate total fine in USD).   In cases where the value of the ?fine? column was given in national currency, it was converted into USD using computed data at (http://www.st.nmfs.gov/commercial/landings/gc_runc.html) for global fish prices. In most cases the value of catch was provided in prosecution reports and information dossiers of documents. In cases where only the quantity of illegal catch was available, the value of catch was calculated using prices in GIUFI (2010), and the Global Fish Prices Database (Sumaila et al., 2007). Information from Lery et al., (1999); GIUFI (2010) was used to calculate variable cost of fishing (as percentage of landed value). The formal model used in this analysis is described in Sumaila et al., (2006). 2.7.7 Expected revenue Expected revenue = ?*0 + (1- ?)*catch value. This captures the revenue to the country when apprehended catch from illegal fishing activity is usually confiscated. This value is given in USD ($).     282.7.8 Variable cost Variable costs are the cost of operating the illegal vessel as distinct from the fixed costs of acquiring it. Variable costs were derived from NOAA (1993); Lam et al., (2010) and information derived from GIUFI (2010) database in specific cases where more information was available.  2.7.9 Theta (?) value Data in ??? column denotes the probability of detection of an illegal fishing vessel in the relevant jurisdiction, and is used for calculating cost and benefits of the risk involved while engaged in IUU fishing13. Although there is scarcely any actual data to calculate value for ??? column, Sumaila et al., (2006) state that it would be reasonable to say that the probability of detection value would be below 0.2 with a 1 in 5 chances of being detected. Consultations were also conducted with 14 maritime experts familiar with fisheries and monitoring control and surveillance capabilities in respective countries to adjust the ??? values accordingly. Most experts consulted agreed that an average ??? value of 0.1 is likely to be applicable to most fisheries in world?s EEZs.  This issue is further discussed below.  2.7.9.1 Calculation of ??? value in the current work In the current work, 0.1 was used as a conservative value for probability of detection, but in cases where data suggested higher chances of being apprehended, a higher value in the range of 0.2 to 0.3 was used (GIUFI 2010; See Chapter 3 for more information). For example, abalone poachers in Australia (? = 0.3) have higher chances of detection compared to fishers                                                  13 It is pertinent to note here that for the current economic analysis of penalties information only from illegal and unreported fishing incidents in the GIUFI (2010) database were used.  29in other commercial fisheries, as enforcement and monitoring are far better in this sector. Other fisheries with higher probability of detection include squid fisheries in the Argentine EEZ, which would have a ??? value of 0.2 compared to hake fisheries which would have a lower ??? value within the same EEZ (GIUFI 2010).    ??? value also signifies the probability of being detected, arrested and convicted for illegal fishing activity in each incident. In each country for the two time periods of 1980-1994, and 1995-2009, for each specific fisheries such as abalone, scallops, crabs, Finfishes nei, etc., the level of fisheries enforcement was checked to get ??? values. Drivers of low or high ??? values included patrolling effort in relation to EEZ area, MCS infrastructure (See chapter 3), number of illegal fishing prosecutions, fisheries patrols at sea, aerial patrols, dockside patrols, market inspections etc. Then accordingly values of 0.1 or less, or a higher value of 0.2, were given for specific fisheries in each EEZ. These ??? values were then adjusted after consultations with maritime experts familiar with fisheries management and enforcement in these countries. Most maritime experts suggested that the ??? value might not exceed 0.2 in global marine fisheries, with the exception of very few well patrolled jurisdictions, due to the fact that efficiency of patrolling relies on availability of good modern technology such as adequate government budgets, coastal radars, vessel monitoring systems, good surveillance infrastructure, level of resources allocated to fisheries management in domestic (provincial fisheries) and federally managed fisheries etc. Further, the experts stated that the time allocated for fisheries patrolling which is often perceived as a non-traditional threat, in relation to other threats such as maritime security, smuggling and drug peddling etc. also influence low ??? values in many fisheries. Likelihood of being caught also differs for both  30domestic and offshore fisheries within a same EEZ. For example, in the case of salmon fisheries in the west coast of Canada, patrolling might be relatively good in the Pacific Ocean, but the low likelihood of being caught and extent of poaching in coastal waters, recreational and subsistence fisheries in rivers etc. would drive the ??? value down.  To elaborate on this discussion, I will now use Figure 4.3 in Chapter 4 as an example to explain how the ??? value might vary between different time periods from 1980-2009 (see page 112), in India?s marine fisheries. During 1980s, the Indian Coast Guard had only 1 patrol aircraft, 2 frigates stationed in Mumbai, 2 patrol boats in Chennai, and 3 patrol boats in Andaman Islands (Anon pers comm., 2008); This patrolling infrastructure, which was grossly inadequate in relation to the area of EEZ that needs to be patrolled for illegal fishing by foreign vessels. So, during the 1970-1980 time period, the ??? value would be 0.05. In the next decade, in relation to the relative increase in MCS infrastructure, fisheries inspections, number of patrols, etc. ??? value increased to 0.07 in 1990s, and 0.1 in the 2000-2009 time periods. Hence, for the current analysis, a theta value of 0.1 is used for Indian fisheries for the 1995-2009 time period (See Appendix A: Cost benefit analysis of illegal fishing penalties).  The above ??? value was finally used after consultations with maritime experts, and using additional data such as the 2008 IUU interviews with enforcement personnel and fishers which served as leverage to adjust the ??? value to 0.1 in India?s fisheries. In the case of India, although the patrolling by Coast Guard has relatively improved in recent decades, poor compliance and fisheries enforcement in state managed fisheries within 0-12 nautical miles also drives the ??? value to 0.1 or less.   31The value of ??? would also be influenced by the number of fishing vessels, with countries like India and China that operate large fishing fleets having a lower ??? value as the probability of being searched by patrolling agencies becomes less for most fisheries in these countries. Using these variables, an analysis was done to explore the question of whether potential benefits of engaging in IUU fishing will be greater than potential costs when the ??? value is between 0.05 - 0.3, using value of fine, catches and variable costs of fishing.  A second question explored in this analysis was what fines should have been imposed on each of the cases in Appendix A to make costs equivalent to benefits for risk aspects of an MCS activity when the probability of detection ??? value lies between 0.05 to 0.3. 2.7.10 Fine Fine is the financial penalty imposed by the country for the illegal fishing activity in USD ($). In cases where information of ?fine? was available but information for ?catch? was inconclusive or absent, ?illegal catch? from vessels of similar flag and tonnage caught for illegally fishing within same region (e.g. fishing ground, EEZ) and time period were used to estimate the illegal catch of the vessel (In such cases a conservative estimate of catch was drawn from other illegal fishing incidents). For example, if the illegal fishing vessel was from Spain caught for illegally fishing in Canadian EEZ, information on catch confiscated from 2-10 Spanish vessels arrested in this jurisdiction for illegal fishing in that respective year was taken and average catch for the 10 incidents was taken to arrive at an estimate of illegal catch for one Spanish IUU vessel. Similarly if the vessel was penalized for fishing in a closed area using aerial surveillance or VMS signals, the illegal catch of the vessel for the presumed period, i.e. couple of hours to 1-2 days was estimated to get conservative estimate of value of the illegal catch.  322.7.11 Expected penalty It is the product of the probability of detection (in this study, value ranged from 0.05 - 0.3) and the fine imposed. Its value is given in USD ($). 2.7.12 Total cost The sum of variable cost and expected penalty expressed in USD ($). 2.7.13 Total cost / Expected revenue It is the ratio of the potential total cost of illegal fishing to the potential value of engaging in illegal fishing. A value of 1 and above implies engaging in the illegal activity is not a profitable proposition. 2.7.14 New fine The number of times the reported fines need to be multiplied by in order to make the potential gain equal to potential cost of engaging in illegal fishing when ??? = 0.05, 0.1, 0.2 or 0.3.  2.8 Results Globally, calculations for 109 countries using 1211 Illegal and Unreported (IUU) penalty cases show that on average for the 1980-2009 period (Figure 2.1) the ratio of potential costs to expected revenue was less than 1, i.e. 70-100% profitability14 for IUU operators  (shaded                                                  14 See Total Cost / Expected Revenue column in Appendix A for more information. Figure 2.1 is a visual representation of the Total Cost/ Expected Revenue value, and it looked at number of times the value was less than 1 (in the Total Cost/ Expected Revenue column) for IUU Penalty cases.  For example in 1980-2009 period for the country Canada, the value of Total cost / Expected revenue was less than 1 for 54 out of 90 cases, which shows that it was 60% profitable for IUU operations, alluding to moderately adequate penalties for commercial  33in red) in 34 countries (Russia, Brazil, China, South Korea, Philippines, Trinidad and Tobago, Vietnam, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Palau, Vanuatu, Fiji, Kiribati, Micronesia, Cook Islands, Tuvalu, New Caledonia, Solomon Islands, Mexico, Ireland, Spain, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Georgia, Morocco, Gambia, Ghana, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Falkland Islands, South Georgia, Heard and McDonald Islands and Chagos Islands), while it was 40-70% profitable to engage in illegal fishing in the EEZs of 19 countries (Canada, USA, UK, France, Norway, New Zealand, India, Indonesia, Marianas Islands (US Overseas Island territory), Papua New Guinea, American Samoa, Peru, Nicaragua, Bahamas, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Somalia and Kerguelen Islands). Six countries: Australia, Argentina, Japan, Malaysia, Seychelles, Guinea Bissau, and one British Crown dependency (Isle of Man) had consistently high penalties and are heading in the right direction with less than 40% profitability making it uneconomical for vessels to engage in illegal fishing. Figure 2.2 (reciprocal plot) shows that although the median values of Total cost / Expected revenue for more than half of the countries in the analysis lie below 1, the ranges suggest that poachers may still make a profit even in countries with a relatively low index score. Appendix F shows the actual median values of total cost / expected revenue used in this plot.                                                                                                                                                        fisheries in this country. The ratio of potential costs to the expected revenue is high when the value is below 1 (i.e it is profitable for the IUU operator), and it is uneconomical for an IUU vessel when the Total cost / Expected revenue value is greater than or equal to 1.  34 Figure 2.1: IUU penalties in 109 countries. IUU fishing penalties in 109 countries and offshore island territories between 1980-2009 (See values for Total Cost / Expected Revenue column in Appendix A ? Cost benefit analysis of illegal fishing penalties table for 1211 cases). Red colour shows that it was 70-100 % profitable for IUU operators. Orange colour shows that it was 40-70% profitable for IUU operators in these countries EEZs, while green shows that existing penalties are profitable for less than 40% of IUU operations. Grey colour denotes that more information is needed for penalties in these countries before arriving at any conclusion. White colour denotes the countries had no data or that were not covered in the current analysis. Please refer to Appendix A for more information, as many penalty cases in island countries in Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Ocean are not obvious in the map.  The results from the analysis in Figure 2.1 clearly show that countries shaded in red are more profitable for IUU vessel operators, as potential benefits of illegal operations are more in these countries even if they are caught. No concrete conclusions can be arrived for IUU penalty deterrence in 49 countries (data is available for less than or equal to 3 IUU penalty  35incidents per country ? shaded in grey colour in Figure 2.1)15 and more information is needed for IUU prosecution cases in these countries (Sweden, Maldives, Malta, Croatia, Tunisia, Eritrea, Congo, Nigeria, Tanzania, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Liberia, Mauritania, Sudan, Yemen, Qatar, Bahrain, Madagascar, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Latvia, Cuba, Jamaica, Ecuador, Guyana, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, El Salvador, Belize, St. Vincent Islands, Comoros Islands, Greenland,  Tonga, French Polynesia, Niue, Tromelin Island (France Overseas Territory), Howland and Baker Islands (United States Minor Outlying Islands), Guam (United States Island Territory), St. Paul Island (French Southern Antarctic Territories), British Virgin islands (Offshore British Island Territory), Channel Islands (British Crown Dependencies), Marshall Islands, Nauru, Crozet islands (French Southern Antarctic Territories), Shetland Islands (Offshore British Island Territory), Madeira islands (Portugal Offshore Island Territory), Azores (Portugal Offshore Island Territory), and Clipperton Island (France Overseas Territory)). Every effort was made to contact relevant ministries and national enforcement agencies to get best available information on IUU cases and the present attempt would achieve more success if more countries come forward to share such information.                                                   15 In Appendix A, IUU penalty incidents have been split under two 15 year blocks from 1980-1994 and 1995-2009, due to the fact that significant improvements have been made in MCS during these two periods and ??? value has increased between the two periods, for many commercial fisheries. So, results from Figure 2.1 give a holistic view of the IUU penalty regime from 1980-2009, as data is scarce for many developing countries in the first time period during 1980-1994. More detailed analysis by decade is possible when more data sources become available in future.  36It is pertinent to mention that more information on penalties is needed, as IUU case dossiers on penalties are not easily accessible in many countries.  Several hurdles to accessing such information remain due to out of court settlements, reasons of confidentiality or prolonged judicial process. For example, in the case of Japan, information on penalties was not publicly available as ?When Agency of Fisheries (AFJ) or Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) arrest illegal fishing vessels, they ask for deposit money to release these vessels. Then, AFJ or coastal guard releases the vessel and takes legal proceedings. For most cases, these vessel owners /fishers never come back to Japan to appear in courts. AFJ or the Coast Guard then confiscates their deposits as penalties. There is a rule to decide the amount of deposit money, but this is treated as confidential? (Anon, pers. comm. 2010). In stark contrast, most of the apprehended illegal foreign vessels are rarely prosecuted in India, with vessel and crew members regularly released due to intervention by the federal government on the pretext of improving bilateral relations with neighbouring countries (See Chapter 4).     370.1 1 10 100 1000 10000El?SalvadorIrelandGhanaTanzaniaMaldivesMarianas?IslandsMozambiqueEgyptRussiaVanuatuAmerican?SamoaMadeira?IslandsPhilippinesSri?LankaBritish?Virgin?IslandsCosta?RicaIndonesiaMauritaniaCroatiaSt.Paul?IslandFijiRepublic?of?KoreaCameroonMexicoCambodiaNiueMaltaCook?IslandsBangladeshShetland?IslandsEritreaTrinidad?&?TobagoBahrainMyanmarVietnamFederated?States?of?MicronesiaSpainChannel?IslandsGuyanaNauruEquatorial?GuineaBulgariaGuamNew?CaledoniaNigeriaGreenlandTuvaluSolomon?IslandsSwedenPalauFrench?PolynesiaAzores?IslandsClipperton?IslandsLatviaGuatemalaExpected?Revenue/Total?Cost Figure 2.2: Median values of the reciprocal of Total cost / Expected revenue in 109 countries. (Contd.., on page 38). Shaded bars show average values, while solid lines show the range of the values. Values above 1 indicate that profit can be made from illegal fishing. The Total cost / expected revenue is plotted on a logarithmic scale, values above 1 indicate that profit can be made from illegal fishing. The above figure shows that although the median value of more than half of the countries in the analysis lie below 1, the ranges (solid lines) suggest that poachers may still make a profit even in countries with a relatively low index score. Appendix F shows the actual median values of total cost / expected revenue used in this plot.  380.1 1 10 100 1000 10000ArgentinaJamaicaPeruSeychellesIsle?of?ManCrozet?IslandsGuinea?BissauTunisiaCongoComoros?IslandsQatarMadagascarBahamasLiberiaMalaysiaIndiaSt.VincentMarshall?IslandsCubaFranceNew?ZealandAustraliaJapanSomaliaMoroccoBelizeKerguelen?IslandsKiribatiHeard?&?McDonald?IslandsBrazilSouth?GeorgiaHowland?&?Baker?IslandsUkraineUSAAngolaFalkland?IslandsSudanSouth?AfricaCanadaEquadorNorwayGeorgiaNicaraguaPapua?New?GuineaChinaGambiaChagos?IslandsPanamaSierra?LeoneTongaYemenUnited?KingdomNamibiaTromelinExpected?Revenue/Total?Cost Figure 2.3: Median values of the reciprocal of Total cost / Expected revenue in 109 countries.  Shaded bars show average values, while solid lines show the range of the values. Values above 1 indicate that profit can be made from illegal fishing. The Total cost / expected revenue is plotted on a logarithmic scale, values above 1 indicate that profit can be made from illegal fishing. The above figure shows that although the median value of more than half of the countries in the analysis lie below 1, the ranges (solid lines) suggest that poachers may still make a profit even in countries with a relatively low index score. Appendix F shows the actual median values of total cost / expected revenue used in this plot.    392.9 Discussion  Le Gallic (2008) recommends use of higher tariffs to prevent imports of fish products from countries supporting IUU fishing as a measure to discourage illegal vessel operators. Other measures suggested include catch documentation and labeling schemes to aid in traceability of fish products; making IUU operations unviable by refusing port access which will increase fuel costs and streaming time for IUU vessels (Le Gallic 2008). Illegal fishing can also cause a negative impact on the socio-economic status of fishers employed on illegal fishing vessels through labour and human rights violations (ITF 2006).  Illegal foreign fishing can have far reaching effects altering ecosystem integrity with potential economic impacts through decline of fish stocks targeted by domestic fishers (Pascoe et al., 2008). Often gains from illegal fishing outweigh the risks when fishers target high value fish like tuna and toothfish (Anon 2008a; Anon 2010d). A survey of fines imposed on IUU fishing in OECD countries showed that existing penalties have little impact on IUU catches, as penalties are not a sufficient deterrent compared to high value of the catches (Schmidt 2005). Few countries like New Zealand and Australia have taken serious action in this direction by legislating laws which allow confiscation of fishing vessel, gear and catch implicated in IUU fishing within their EEZs (Anon 2005b; Anon 2000a). Other attempts to control illegal fishing include long jail terms to keep repeat offenders and smuggling rings away from poaching activities (Anon 2004a).   Economic incentives for IUU fishing include fleet overcapacity (European Commission 2011b), lack of port state control, low MCS effort, and shortcomings in enforcement of flag state responsibility (Sutinen and Anderson 1985; Warner-Kramer 2004; HSTF 2006; also see  40Chapter 4 of this thesis). Fishers can also engage in IUU practices by transferring illegal catches at sea, which are difficult to detect in the absence of regular surveillance (Anon 2005c). Non-compliance with quota can also occur through mis-reporting where vessels report catches of quota species while fishing for other valuable fish (Angel et al., 1994); and under-reporting of landed catches (Anon 2009b; Polacheck and Davies 2008). IUU catches in the high seas are difficult to detect in the absence of regular patrols and aerial surveillance, which provides gaps for vessels to operate with impunity (Bours et al., 2001; Agnew 2000; Kirkwood and Agnew 2004).  Spiraling costs of fisheries enforcement have also led to the advent of new programs like North Pacific Ground Fishery Observer Program, where observers are required to report violations that they witness at sea (NOAA 2003).  2.10 Chapter 2 summary Chapter 2 of my thesis explored illegal fishing penalties in 109 countries using 1211 IUU prosecution cases using the conceptual model of Sumaila et al., (2006).  In comparison to 16 cases used in Sumaila et al., (2006) paper, in the current analysis 1211 illegal and unreported fishing incidents for 109 countries were evaluated. The current analysis in Chapter 2 is perhaps the most comprehensive work done so far globally to evaluate effectiveness of illegal fishing penalties to deter illegal fishing. Appendix A shows a wide variety of fisheries and fishing fleets that were explored for the analysis in each country to provide a diverse perspective on illegal fishing penalties in each country.  Results from the current analysis can be used to address low penalties in specific fisheries and increase enforcement to prevent occurrence of such incidences in future. Research in this direction needs attention as globally many fish stocks are witnessing a decline and with estimates of illegal fishing ranging  41between $10 bn and $23.5 bn annually (Agnew et al., 2009), this issue needs more focus than any time ever.   Using the Total Cost / Expected Revenue values in Appendix A, a detailed overall comparison of adequacy of illegal fishing penalties in developed and developing countries is discussed in terms of profitability below (also see Figures. 2.1 and 2.2). Among European countries, it was moderately profitable (40-70%) for IUU operators in jurisdictions of France, UK and Norway, while it was highly profitable (>70%) in Spain, Ireland, Ukraine, Georgia and Bulgaria. Among other developed countries, Canada, USA and New Zealand showed moderate profitability (40-70%) for IUU operators, with Australia and Japan being the only two countries with low profitability (<40%). Among developing countries in Asia, Malaysia was the only country with low profitability (<40%), while China, Philippines, Vietnam and South Korea showed high profitability (>70%) for illegal fishing operators in these jurisdictions.   Among Pacific island countries and territories Papua New Guinea, American Samoa and Marianas Islands (US Overseas Island territory) were moderately profitable (40-70%), while Fiji, Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia, Cook Islands, Tuvalu, Palau, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and New Caledonia jurisdictions were highly profitable (>70%) for IUU operators. In the Southern Antarctic territories, the British territories of Falkland Islands and South Georgia had high profitability (>70%); French Antarctic territories of Kerguelen Islands showed moderate profitability (40-70%); and the Australian territories of Heard and McDonald Islands showed high profitability (>70%) for illegal fishing operators.   42Chapter  3: Plugging the leaks: an assessment of monitoring control and surveillance (MCS) in the marine fisheries of 41 countries  3.1 Introduction The United Nations Convention for Law of the Sea16 (UNCLOS) was perhaps the biggest recent advance for coastal States in terms of increasing jurisdiction and economic opportunities for exploitation of living and non-living resources. The sovereign rights that it brought with it also increased responsibility for monitoring and control of this extended territory. Perhaps one of the most intriguing questions is how many countries at that point of time in 1982 possessed adequate monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) capabilities to control resources over a 200 nautical mile maritime zone often with meagre maritime patrolling infrastructure. Thirty years down the line, progress has been achieved in many coastal nations in terms of increasing maritime preparedness for confronting and managing threats for longer distances from the shore. In parallel, one also needs to recognise the increase in number, size and technological sophistication of distant water vessels, necessitating better monitoring of fishing activities beyond the EEZ (Hatcher and Robinson 1998; Kwon 2000; Haward and Bergin 2000; Goldstein 2009). Increase in capacity of new high seas fishing vessels from countries such as China also deserves due attention (Xue 2006).                                                   16 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982.  43Globally, lack of adequate enforcement has been identified as one of the major impediments to sustainable utilisation and management of fisheries resources (Sutinen and Anderson 1985; Sutinen 1988; Peterson and Teal 1986; Olson and Morgan 1985; Montgomery 2000; Kelleher 2002). Although some countries like Indonesia have enacted better fisheries laws, their enforcement remains weak (SCS 1981). In Indonesia, efficiency of enforcement operations was impacted by equipment, number of operations, poor coordination of law agencies and reduced capabilities of law enforcement agencies at sea (Sutinen 1988). It is interesting to note that a neighbouring country Malaysia performs better for compliance with international laws and fisheries management aspects (Pitcher et al., 2008). According to Sutinen (1988) the main purpose of surveillance and enforcement is to act as deterrent to violations of fisheries regulations and other maritime laws. Several studies have discussed impacts of illegal fishing on national and regional economies in the absence of adequate MCS (Sutinen et al., 1992; Coulter 1996; Gordon 1997; Flewwelling 2001; Ganesan 2001; Butcher 2004; Anwar 2005; Agnew et al., 2009). Studies in marine protected areas (MPAs) have shown that successful management requires effective enforcement to accrue benefits from such efforts (Guidetti and Claudet 2009).  Fisheries is one the major activities within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of any coastal nation and management of its operations needs a strategic policy to ensure compliance with national and international laws. The Coast Guard and the Navy are the principal agencies involved in monitoring control and surveillance of fish stocks within this extended jurisdiction in most maritime countries. However in this context, one also needs to draw attention to the fact that monitoring of fisheries resources is one among the multitude of  44duties that enforcement agencies undertake within a country?s EEZ. Very few jurisdictions have exclusive fisheries patrol vessels to monitor their fleets on a regular basis; notable few include South Africa, Namibia, China, UK, Iceland, Taiwan and Falkland islands. Shortage of patrolling assets and inadequate MCS can aggravate poaching problems due to lack of ability to monitor large numbers of distant water and domestic vessels operating within a country?s EEZ. With the exception of Flewwelling (2001) study in 11 South Asian Countries; Pitcher?s (2008, 2009); and Mora et al., (2009) studies in recent years, no major attempt has been made to quantify MCS related issues in the fisheries sector.  3.2 International laws relevant to monitoring control and surveillance in fisheries Since the advent of United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea many new international instruments like UNFSA17, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries18, and the                                                  17 Article 5(l) of UNFSA urges coastal fishing states to ?implement and enforce conservation and management measures through effective monitoring, control and surveillance?.  18 Article 7.1.7 of the FAO code of Conduct for responsible fisheries ?States should establish, within their respective competences and capacities, effective mechanisms for fisheries monitoring, surveillance, control and enforcement to ensure compliance with their conservation and management measures, as well as those adopted by subregional or regional organizations or arrangements?.   45international Plan of Action on IUU Fishing19, have dealt with the necessity to undertake effective monitoring, control and surveillance in global fisheries. International laws like UNCLOS, UN Fish Stocks Agreement, and FAO Compliance Agreement discuss issues on necessity of measures to ensure compliance of fishing vessels both within and outside the EEZ. Article 18(1) of the United Nations Fish Stock Agreement (UNFSA) requires signatory nations to ensure that vessels flying their flag do not undermine conservation measures. Article 18(2) of UNFSA requires nations to grant authorisation to fish on the high seas ?where it is able to exercise effectively its responsibilities in respect of such fishing vessels?. Article 18(3)(b)(iv) of UNFSA requires flag states to expand existing regulations ?to ensure that vessels flying its flag do not conduct unauthorised fishing within areas under the national jurisdiction of other states?.   3.3 Definition of monitoring control and surveillance in fisheries The definition for fisheries monitoring control and surveillance developed by a MCS Conference of Experts in 1981 was used for this study (FAO 1981). As per this definition  Monitoring is defined as ?the continuous requirement for the measurement of fishing effort characteristics and resource yields? The monitoring component receives, integrates and verifies data submitted by licensed vessels; at sea inspections and sightings; observers, VMS, satellite images, radar; port                                                  19 Paragraph 24 of the IPOA on IUU Fishing ?States should undertake comprehensive and effective monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) of fishing from its commencement, through point of landing, to final destination.....?  46inspections logbooks, dockside monitoring, landing reports; and data from aerial surveillance (Flewwelling et al., 2002). Control is defined as ?the regulatory conditions under which the exploitation of the resource may be conducted? The control component addresses five key issues i) responsibilities of all fisheries personnel for effective coordination of MCS operations ii) ensure compliance with international agreements like UNCLOS, UN Fish Stocks Agreement, FAO Compliance Agreement etc. iii) control activities of domestic fishing vessels; stipulate terms and conditions for fishing vessels (vessel identification, catch reporting requirements, transhipping, flag state responsibility) iv) draw regulations to devise appropriate penalties for violators (Flewwelling et al., 2002). Surveillance is defined as ?the degree and types of observations required to maintain compliance with the regulatory controls imposed on fishing activities? Success of surveillance requires fisheries personnel to concentrate on both data collection and involve stakeholders in participatory conservation activities (Flewwelling et al., 2002). The basic infrastructure required for surveillance include: a) national headquarters for coordinating fisheries operations with links to regional field offices; b) central operations room to check current status of fishing operations; c) communications system to landing centres and mobile patrols in the field for coordinating operations; d) computerised data entry and control system; e) surveillance equipment including aircraft, vessels, sea and air surveillance, VMS, radar, satellite technology, GIS and land transportation (Flewwelling et al., 2002).   473.4 Tools for monitoring control and surveillance in fisheries MCS mechanisms are not a panacea for all fisheries related problems, but can act as a good management tool if used effectively. According to Flewwelling et al., (2002) fisheries MCS activities receive low priority among military agencies, and allowing a single agency such as a Fisheries Ministry / Coast Guard to play the lead role can enhance their effectiveness. Some of the key MCS tools needed for fisheries management include enforceable legislation, control through licenses; data collection through dockside monitoring, observers, sea and port inspections; communication structure through a Fisheries Monitoring Centre (FMC); patrol vessels with capability to stay for extended durations at sea; availability of aircraft for rapid deployment with the ability to search vast areas; use of new technology such as VMS, radar, video and infra-red tracking; bilateral, regional and sub-regional co-operation with other MCS components ; and professional staff (Flewwelling et al., 2002). Several studies have been conducted evaluating law enforcement effectiveness in the fisheries sector (Fidell 1976; Sutinen and Anderson 1985; Blewett et al., 1985; Sutinen 1985; Sutinen et al., 1990; Flewwelling 2001; Kelleher 2002).  Flewwelling et al., (2002) state that effective MCS requires a two-pronged strategy of preventative approach which includes encouragement of voluntary compliance through enhancement of community / fisher awareness; participatory management; peer pressure towards voluntary compliance; system of accurate data collection; surveillance and verification of compliance. A secondary parallel deterrent / enforcement approach is also necessary to ensure compliance by flagrant violators whose activities might harm activities of legal fishers. The approach should include inspections, investigation and prosecutions  48through courts (Flewwelling et al., (2002). MCS needs effective co-ordination of land, sea and air components, with its effectiveness largely determined by inter-agency synchronization mechanisms in place for fisheries management in the respective country. The land component is the most important element of any MCS system and entails port inspections (to check accuracy of catches, transhipments), dockside monitoring and trade of seafood products. The sea component includes radar, sonar and vessels used in enforcement of regulations in EEZ and high seas. A major chunk of resources for the sea component is allocated to at-sea patrols, while other ?no force? techniques such as observers, vessel registers and Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) serve as deterrents to fisheries violations. The air component includes use of aircraft, satellites and VMS signals to track activities of vessels at sea. This is perhaps one of the best methods to track fishing activities over a large area within a short period and can help in optimising enforcement efforts to areas where vessels are fishing and where violations are detected during patrols. The air component can also serve as precursor of illegal activity to trigger MCS action and gather crucial evidence through photographs and video evidence of illegal activities (Flewwelling et al., 2002).    3.4.1 Importance of surveillance infrastructure in fisheries Continuous monitoring through surveillance infrastructure serves as an important management tool to ensure compliance with fisheries laws and to ensure that interests of the government and licensed fishers are not compromised by infractions from domestic and foreign vessels operating within a country?s EEZ. Such infrastructure in the fisheries sector could include a wide array of tools from sea based patrol vessels to smaller Fibre Reinforced Plastic (FRP) craft, speedboats for patrolling shallow waters, aerial patrolling aircraft and  49surveillance vessels chartered through regional fisheries agreements. Land based infrastructure would include 4 wheeler vehicles, land based Fisheries Monitoring Centres linked to satellites, and Radar stations for data collection and monitoring. Some countries like Senegal have used ?no force? mechanisms such as network of coastal radars to serve as early warning for intrusions of industrial vessels into their 6 nautical mile coastal inshore zone (Flewwelling et al., 2002). Maldives has used satellite images along with VMS to track activities of licensed vessels operating within their EEZ (Flewwelling et al., 2002). Coastal Radar system is more effective in developing countries where large number of vessels operating in inshore waters can be effectively tracked, while offshore industrial vessels can be tracked through VMS. Some of the constraints in electronic tracking using radar include difficulty in proving disputes regarding such violations in the courts, especially when such evidence is used to initiate a chase and seizure of an illegal fishing vessel (McKenna 2004). According to FAO (2007b) AIS transmitters placed on coastal fishing vessels can be used to detect fisheries violations for vessels operating within 50 nautical mile zones. Several studies have discussed use of space based synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to enhance fisheries surveillance (Freeberg 1995; Montgomery et al., 1998; Clemente-Colon et al., 1998). Space based SAR with their all-weather; day and night capability can also provide valuable intelligence during certain seasons when sea based patrols are affected (Montgomery 2000).  3.4.2 Importance of vessel monitoring system in the fisheries sector The advent of vessel monitoring system certainly transformed the way fisheries is managed globally with some nations in the Pacific and European Union solely relying on this technology to track their vessels activities inside and outside the EEZ. According to  50Flewwelling et al., (2002) VMS has the potential to provide cost effective MCS and a viable alternative to traditional enforcement at-sea. Many international instruments such as the FAO Code of Conduct (Article 7.7.3), UN Fish Stocks Agreement (Article 5(j), 18(3)(e) and g(iii)), IPOA on IUU Fishing (Paragraph 24.3) advocate the use of VMS. Article 9 of NEAFC Scheme of control and enforcement and IOTC resolution dated 06/03 adopted on May 26, 2006 require vessels of both contracting and non-contracting parties to use VMS on transhipment vessels (FAO 2007b).    According to Flewwelling et al., (2002) use of VMS is ideal for industrial fishing vessels rather than artisanal fisheries where their sheer numbers make them difficult to control. Further the authors state that each state wishing to use satellite based MCS must require (i) installation of automatic location communicators (ALC) as part of the licensing system; (ii) vessels have to be clearly marked for identification to allow comparison of patrol sighting data to satellite VMS data; (iii) require vessels to report their position at regular intervals along with information on their activities and catches; (iv) require landings / transhipments to take place in designated ports or in presence of observers; (v) ensure confidentiality of information and use collected  data for enforcement purposes only (Flewwelling et al., 2002). Several studies have stressed on the need to integrate VMS data with other MCS tools to enhance enforcement capabilities in the fisheries sector (FAO 2005; FAO 2007b).   5101000200030004000500060007000USARussiaTaiwanSpainIndonesiaCanadaIcelandMexicoPeruFranceUnited KingdomGreeceJapanAustralia ChileArgentinaNorwaySouth KoreaNamibiaPapua New?SwedenIrelandNew ZealandSeychellesMozambiqueChinaPanamaSenegalGhanaEstoniaCosta RicaMalaysiaFalkland?ItalyBrazilMaltaPhilippinesThailandBangladeshIndiaSri LankaCambodiaMyanmarGuatemalaVietnamKenyaSomaliaGambiaSierra LeoneEgyptIranNigeriaNumber of vessels with VMS Figure 3.1: Number of fishing vessels equipped with Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) in 53 maritime nations.  Data for the number of vessels covered through VMS was collected through Question 4. (Vessel monitoring system) in the MCS case studies for 41 fishing nations (see Pramod 2011). Data for remaining 12 countries was collected from GIUFI (2010) database. The figure shows that although many developed countries have installed new technologies such as VMS to monitor their fishing vessels, most of the developing countries (with the exception of Indonesia) are yet to catch up with such modern technology and currently very few fishing vessels from these countries are equipped with VMS to monitor their fleets at sea. This problem assumes importance especially in countries such as China with huge distant water fleets, which currently have very low VMS coverage.  In South Pacific countries, surveillance efforts through VMS assume immense importance as exploitation of tuna stocks by distant water fleets contributes to economic viability of these nations (Bergin 1988). In Iceland, several enforcement cases were successfully prosecuted based entirely on VMS data (FAO 2007b). In Madagascar, all industrial fishing vessels are  52required to be fitted with tracking devices to monitor zoning incursions in the inshore shrimp fishery (FAO 2007b). In Seychelles, all foreign fishing vessels that offload catches in its ports are to be fitted with VMS and transmit their position reports during their presence in Seychelles EEZ (FAO 2007b). Such initiatives can be replicated in African countries where the scale of such incursions by foreign fishing vessels into the Inshore Exclusion Zone remains very high (GIUFI 2010). Although the technology has its advantages, incidents of tampering with equipment through blocking of antenna and switching off power supply have been documented in several countries (FAO 2007b). In such countries, VMS reports can be verified with satellite imagery and radar through Vessel Detection System (FAO 2007b).   3.4.3 Why is an observer scheme needed in fisheries? Fisheries observers can serve as deterrent to fisheries violations by their mere presence onboard fishing vessels, while collecting scientific data for fisheries management at the same time. Observers can also serve as enforcement assets when they are required to report fisheries violations witnessed at sea (Porter 2010). While dockside inspections can detect some violations for port landings, at sea violations such as discards, high grading, retention of prohibited species and retention of non-quota species can be better detected through observers at sea (Anderson 1989; King et al., 2009). From 2000-2002, observers in the US North Pacific groundfish fisheries reported 590 violations alluding to their importance in fisheries enforcement system (Porter 2010). Placement of observers on fishing vessels can also serve as secondary source of data to countercheck bias in data submitted by fishing vessels (Furlong and Martin 2000; Allard and Chouinard 1997). However, fisheries violations reported by observers cannot promote compliance unless active investigation and  53prosecutions follow them by enforcement agencies (Porter 2010). Analysis of NMFS observer data showed that observer reported incidents were prosecuted less often in US Fisheries (Porter 2010). Porter (2010) states that prosecutors many not enforce fisheries violations reported by observers as these cases are less severe than traditional enforcement cases.  3.4.4 Importance of sea based patrols in fisheries Patrol vessels by their mere presence on fishing grounds act as deterrent to fisheries violations, and help to gather critical intelligence on fishing activities. Boarding?s through at-sea patrols provide information on accuracy of data and provide checks on use of legal gear, catch logs, radio reports and logbooks (Sutinen 1988). They are also the principal means of conducting inspections of fishing fleets at sea (Sutinen 1988). According to Sutinen (1988) enforcement effort by patrol vessels depends on number of previous sightings / encounters with fishing vessels, with their efficiency determined by path of patrol boat, time spent at sea and how widely fishing vessels are distributed at sea.  3.4.5 Importance of aerial patrols in fisheries Aerial patrols provide strategic picture of fishing activities and provide tactical data for patrol vessels with information on locations of fishing vessel activity, their movements and indirectly through data on fish migrations (Sutinen 1988).  However, in the absence of legal or administrative sanctions, vessels sighted by patrol aircraft have limited or no impact on level of violations (Kelleher 2002).  Armacost (1992) has discussed about level of aerial patrols required for fisheries law enforcement in relation to fishing activity in US waters. In  54the absence of national monitoring programme, countries like Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Senegal rely on joint air and sea surveillance provided by Sub-regional fisheries commission (SRFC) for monitoring licensed and unlicensed fishing vessels operating within their EEZs (Flewwelling et al., 2002). South Korea has used combination of surveillance instruments such as Radar, Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras and GPS receivers to monitor illegal fishing activities within their EEZ (Lee and Kim 2004). The Korean system is effective in targeting poaching activities as radar positions of vessels are compared to GPS position reports to counter check accuracy of reporting (Lee and Kim 2004). In countries like Denmark, Argentina, USA, and New Zealand, CCTV on fishing vessels have been used to monitor compliance with fishing rules and cut discards at sea (Anon 2009d; McElderry 2008; Bonney et al., 2009).   Satellite images (Radarsat) can serve as vital sources of information for poaching activities of smaller vessels in the 15-20 metres range which can go unnoticed during routine air patrols (McKenna 2004). Using Radarsat satellite images a geographical location can be observed 2-3 times / week, and can capture 300 km wide by 3000 km long area (McKenna 2004). Other suggested technologies include tracking devices like ?shiploc? which use GPS to transmit vessel?s position to a satellite 15 times / day and have been used by IMB to track ships captured by pirates (McKenna 2004). Other emerging technologies such as Satellite imagery, lights emitted by fishing vessels have been used to determine fishing intensity of squid vessels off Argentine coast can be used in fisheries enforcement (Waluda et al., 2002).    553.4.6 Importance of dockside monitoring in fisheries  Although several international instruments such as FAO Code of Conduct, FAO Compliance Agreement, UN Fish Stocks Agreement, IPOA on IUU Fishing and the more recent UN Post State Measures Agreement advocate implementation of port state control to prevent influx of illegal fish shipments, implementation of these measures remains lukewarm in several countries. To overcome the problem of illegal transhipments at sea, countries which do not have adequate infrastructure for at-sea monitoring and enforcement can bring forth laws which mandate presence of dockside observers and authorise transhipments only at ports. The need for proper dockside controls is further validated in light of recent evidence on large scale of ?black fish? landed in UK (Anon 2010e) and Ireland (Anon 2007c). Dockside monitoring is an important management tool to monitor catches offloaded from fishing vessels, tallying vessel catch rates against its quotas, and to check fisheries violations of non-quota species.  3.4.7 Importance of coastal patrols Coastal fisheries patrols assume immense importance in developing countries with large small-scale fleet landing catches in discrete locations along the coastline. Often, these patrols would look at compliance with use of legal fishing gear, illegal fishing in protected areas and destructive fishing practices. However, this problem is even prevalent in developed countries through under-reporting/overfishing in the recreational and subsistence sectors (Pramod et al., 2008). Coastal patrols also assist in providing deterrence and enforcement of laws against destructive fishing practices, execution of zone limits for trawlers and fishing boats etc. Coastal patrols also assume high importance in tropical countries where small-scale fisheries  56land bulk of nation?s fish catches, and adequate enforcement in these waters can ensure sustainable exploitation of coastal resources.  3.4.8 Importance of monitoring transhipments at sea Paragraph 34 of the UNGA Resolution 59/25, 17 January 2005, directly acknowledges the problems related to Illegal transhipments ?common means of conducting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing involves the unreported or misreported transshipments of fish at sea?. Transshipments at sea are difficult to track unless there is a certain degree of regular enforcement through aerial patrols and VMS tracking of vessels. However, transhipment is used by plethora of nations to legitimately transfer catches at sea to avoid loss of valuable fuel and cruise time while undertaking fishing operations. However, transhipments also provide opportunity for illegal operators to transfer illegal catches in EEZs of foreign countries as well as to disguise quantity of fish taken by vessel in quota fisheries. Illegal transhipments also make it difficult to track fishing locations and transfer of catches from flags of convenience vessels (GIUFI 2010; Gianni and Simpson 2004). ICCAT regulations advocate monitoring of all transhipments by observers at sea and necessitate all transhipments to occur in ports unless special provisions under Section 2 of 06-11 apply (Hurry et al., 2008). However, the recent annual reporting of ICCAT member states on port state measures shows that inspections at ports are random and inconsistent, alluding to poor application of rules even in well-established RFMOs (Hurry et al., 2008).     573.4.9 Importance of fishing gear inspections Regular inspections of compliance with fishing gear help in enforcing mesh size regulations, preventing zoning conflicts, reducing by-catch, and to prevent capture of juvenile fish and other invertebrates. Inspections on a regular basis can also help to minimise damage through lost or discarded fishing gear (Macfadyen et al., 2009) and help in proper disposal of damaged ones through shore collection system. Inspections help to ensure proper tagging of fishing gear for help in identifying owners to minimise gear conflicts and illegal gear at sea. Moreover, they prevent misuse of multiple gears in a single license fishery in tropical small-scale fisheries in the developing world (Pramod 2010).  3.5 Methods In this study, an evaluation was conducted using a case study approach to evaluate the management effectiveness of patrolling agencies to monitor and control fisheries resources within the 200 nm exclusive economic zone. The Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of 41 maritime countries landing 87% of the world?s fish catch were assessed using a rapid appraisal technique for 11 questions designed by the author using the ?Rapfish? method outlined in Pitcher and Preikshot (2001).    The questionnaire (See Appendix B) lists the themes and international laws relevant to MCS in Fisheries. The 11 questions are grouped under two fields a) MCS Infrastructure and b) Vessel inspections.  Each question was scored on a scale of 0 to 10, to indicate the scale of compliance with each attribute, where 10 indicates perfect compliance. Uncertainty in each score is clearly reflected in the score range for each question. The eleven questions were  58designed using aspects derived from international laws like UNCLOS, UNFSA, PSMA, FAO-CCRF and the IPOA on IUU Fishing (See Appendix B). Appendix C shows the percentage of world fish catch (in tonnes) landed by 41 countries in the evaluation (the 41 countries landed 87% of the world?s fish catches in 2005). The 41 country reports for MCS evaluation20, containing 538 references and 209 pages is published separately as Pramod (2011), which provides detailed text and scores for the 11 questions in the analysis. However, lack of information posed a persistent problem for many aspects such as inspections at sea, aerial patrols etc., despite every effort to contact national and regional enforcement agencies to gather information for the relevant aspects. Gaps in access to information for MCS study for each country were evaluated and are provided in Appendix. D. Information in Appendix D, shows the extent of information available through various sources such as government records, journals to academic literature and internet for the present study.  In this chapter an attempt has been made to quantify compliance with international laws relevant to MCS aspects. ; The aim of this study was to explore MCS capabilities of coastal nations to enforce national and international fisheries laws within their maritime zone (EEZ) and the high seas [9 questions relevant to MCS compliance within the EEZ and 2 Questions (Q.3 & Q.4 Field 1) for the high seas]. The present study does not reflect a nation?s management effectiveness for facing other maritime threats such as terrorism, security,                                                  20 Pramod (2011) Evaluations of Monitoring, Control and Surveillance in marine fisheries of 41 countries, MCS Case Studies Report, Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, Canada, May 2011, 222. ftp://ftp.fisheries.ubc.ca/CodeConduct/CountriesCodePDF/MCS%20Case%20Studies%20in%2041%20Fishing%20Nations.pdf  59human trafficking, drugs, etc. A clear distinction on this aspect is essential as fisheries is one among several activities monitored by enforcement agencies in a country?s EEZ, with priority being afforded to it depending on the country?s location, it?s EEZ area, defence priorities, number of agencies involved, coupled with financial, administrative and regulatory allocation of patrolling and manpower assets. It is important to mention that the present study does not attribute efficiency of MCS operations within a country?s EEZ to one single agency as often such operations often rely on co-ordination between large number of enforcement agencies21 and so usually no single agency can be held accountable for good or bad scores for questions in the survey.  3.6 Results Analysis of key questions relating to monitoring control and surveillance is given below. 3.6.1 Scoring compliance with surveillance infrastructure The first question in the analysis looks at the extent of patrolling and surveillance infrastructure available for monitoring fishing activities within a nation?s EEZ.  The analysis (Figure 3.2) reveals that of the 41 countries, 13 (31%) received scores within the ?good? range of 7- 10 and have adequate infrastructure for regular patrolling of fisheries resources within their EEZ. All these countries have consistently invested substantial legal, financial and administrative resources to ensure optimum utilisation of patrolling assets through regular apprehensions of illegal fishing vessels and higher detection rate of violations within their EEZs (GIUFI 2010). Five countries (12%) have acceptable scores above 6/10 (Sweden,                                                  21 Fisheries enforcement duties in many coastal states are shared between one or more of these agencies such as Coast Guard, Navy, Marine Police, Customs, Fisheries Ministry etc.   60China, South Africa, Taiwan and Mauritania). However, 14 countries (34%) received ?fail? grades of 4 and below (Peru, Myanmar, Madagascar, Sri Lanka Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Guinea, Nigeria, Cameroon, Ghana and Sierra Leone) making these countries highly vulnerable to illegal fishing.   0246810AustraliaIcelandCanadaNorwaySouth Korea USAJapanArgentinaNamibiaNew_Zealand UKMalaysiaFranceSwedenChinaSouth AfricaTaiwanMauritaniaIndiaChileRussiaMexicoEcuadorAngolaThailandMoroccoBrazilSri LankaMadagascarPeruMyanmarBangladeshIndonesiaCambodiaNigeriaPhilippinesGhanaGuineaCameroonSierra LeoneViet NamScore /10Surveillance Infrastructure Figure 3.2: MCS compliance scores for surveillance infrastructure. Bar chart showing compliance of 41 fishing countries for Question 1. Surveillance infrastructure. Shaded bars show the average compliance scores while error bars are derived from upper and lower score limits for each question and country (See Appendix B for details related to how questions were scored); Scores below 4/ 10 indicate a ?fail? rating; scores between 6 to 7 are considered a ?pass? rating; and scores above 7/10 denote ?good? rating.   3.6.2 Scoring compliance with MCS human resources The second question in the analysis evaluates the availability of trained officers available for monitoring the fisheries sector. The analysis reveals that 25 countries (61%) have low compliance scores, which fall within fail grades of less than 4 (Madagascar, Mexico, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Russia, Morocco, Angola, Mauritania, Guinea, Ghana,  61Nigeria, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, India, Bangladesh, Philippines, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia and Vietnam). The worrisome trend is that even developed countries like Iceland have only passable scores of 6.5/10. Developed countries like Namibia, Sweden, France, Iceland, UK, USA, Canada, Malaysia and China (22%) have moderate scores of 5.5/10, with a range of 3-7, alluding to need for improvement in these countries (See Figure 3.3). Two countries (Argentina, and India) achieved compliance scores of 3.5/10, in spite of having good surveillance resources. A majority of developed countries in the analysis perform poorly due to shortage of manpower in monitoring both nearshore and recreational sectors while developing countries appear to have shortage in both small-scale and industrial sectors. Almost all the countries have shortage of manpower for monitoring shipments from their ports as well as for checking vessels transiting through their ports. 0246810NorwayNew_ZealandAustraliaIcelandTaiwanMalaysiaNamibiaSwedenFrance UK USACanadaChinaJapanSouth KoreaSouth AfricaBrazilPeruRussiaMoroccoMauritaniaArgentinaIndiaIndonesiaMadagascarAngolaChileEcuadorThailandMexicoCambodiaSri LankaCameroonSierra LeonePhilippinesMyanmarGuineaViet NamBangladeshNigeriaGhanaScore /10MCS Human Resources Figure 3.3: MCS compliance scores for human resources. Bar chart showing compliance of 41 fishing countries for Question 2. MCS Human Resources. Shaded bars, error bars and symbols are explained in Figure 3.2.     623.6.3 Scoring compliance with monitoring of high seas fleet The need for monitoring high seas fleets has been explicitly stated in many international laws like the FAO Compliance Agreement, UN Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA), UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the IPOA on IUU Fishing.  Q.3 deals with this aspect looking at whether each country has taken appropriate measures to monitor its fishing vessels operating beyond its EEZ, and if such activities are licensed with proper reporting procedures to prevent illegal and unreported fishing in high seas and RFMO jurisdictions. Analysis of Figure 3.4 reveals that of the 41 countries only 4 (10%) received good grades above 7/10 (Iceland, USA, New Zealand and Australia). One country (Mexico) received passable score of 6/10, while 9 out of 41 countries (22%) received moderate scores in the range of 4 to 6 (Peru, Chile, Canada, Norway, Japan, Namibia, Sweden, France and UK). However, 27 countries had completely unsatisfactory grades of less than 4/10 (Malaysia, South Korea, Argentina, Angola, Ghana, Brazil, Madagascar, Morocco, Sri Lanka, China, Russia, South Africa, Philippines, Cameroon, Indonesia, Taiwan, Ecuador, Bangladesh, Thailand, India, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Nigeria, Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam). Lack of control for fleets from China, South Korea and Taiwan with a huge high seas presence has severe implications in controlling IUU fishing and conserving migratory stocks in the EEZs of foreign countries and the high seas.   630246810New_ZealandIcelandAustralia USAMexicoCanadaNorwayPeruJapanNamibia UKSwedenFranceChileSouth KoreaMalaysiaArgentinaAngolaMoroccoGhanaBrazilMadagascarIndonesiaChinaSri LankaRussiaSouth AfricaPhilippinesCameroonTaiwanEcuadorBangladeshThailandIndiaMauritaniaSierra LeoneGuineaNigeriaMyanmarCambodiaViet NamScore /10High Seas Fleet monitoring Figure 3.4: MCS compliance scores for high seas fleet monitoring. Bar chart showing compliance of 41 fishing countries for Question 3. High Seas Fleet Monitoring. Shaded bars, error bars and symbols are explained in Figure 3.2. Fifteen countries, South Africa to Vietnam got ?0? scores for this question and hence there are no bars in the above figure for these countries.  3.6.4 Scoring compliance with vessel monitoring scheme The analysis reveals that 7 countries (17%) have ?good? scores within the range of 7/10 (Iceland, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Madagascar, UK and USA) for monitoring major portion of their fishing fleet through vessel monitoring system (Figure 3.1 & Figure 3.5). All these countries have active VMS programmes backed by progressive legislations to monitoring their fleets on a continuous basis. A further, 4 countries (France, South Africa, Argentina and Chile) have passable score within a range of 6/10, and increasingly are making VMS an integral part of many new fisheries. However, no less than 22 countries have unacceptable low compliance scores (4 or less); these include Indonesia, Mauritania, Taiwan, Cameroon, Ghana, Brazil, Sweden, China, South Korea, Morocco, Malaysia, Philippines,  64Guinea, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Nigeria, India.  0246810IcelandNamibiaNew_ZealandMadagascarNorway UK USASouth AfricaFranceArgentinaChileEcuadorPeruCanadaAustraliaRussiaAngolaMexicoJapanSwedenIndonesiaMauritaniaTaiwanCameroonGhanaBrazilChinaSouth KoreaMoroccoMalaysiaPhilippinesGuineaMyanmarThailandCambodiaSri LankaSierra LeoneViet NamBangladeshNigeriaIndiaScore /10VMS Coverage Figure 3.5: MCS compliance scores for vessel monitoring system. Bar chart showing compliance of 41 fishing countries for Question 4. Vessel Monitoring System (VMS). Shaded bars, error bars and symbols are explained in Figure 3.2. Seven countries namely Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Nigeria and India got ?0? scores for this question and hence there are no scores and error bars in the above figure for these countries.  3.6.5 Scoring compliance with observer scheme Figure 3.6 shows that only one country (Namibia) has good score of 8.5, with three countries having passable scores in the range of 6/10, and upper confidence limits above 7 (Australia, Norway, and USA). Canada, Madagascar, Argentina and New Zealand have a wide range of scores above 4.5/10, so their estimates are uncertain. However, 32 of the 41 countries (78%) have ?fail? grades on the observer coverage issue, of which Angola, Sweden, UK and Peru have made some improvements on this aspect and are planning to include more fisheries  65under observer scheme. The remaining 28 countries (68%) have unequivocal ?fail? scores (Iceland, Japan, Mexico, Chile, Ecuador, Philippines, Myanmar, Russia, Taiwan, France, south Korea, Brazil, Sierra Leone, Morocco, Mauritania, Guinea, Cameroon, Indonesia, Ghana, China, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Nigeria and India.  0246810NamibiaAustraliaNorwayUSACanadaMadagascarArgentinaNew_ZealandSouth AfricaAngolaSweden UK PeruIcelandJapanMexicoChileEcuadorPhilippinesMyanmarRussiaTaiwanFranceSouth KoreaBrazilSierra LeoneMoroccoMauritaniaGuineaCameroonIndonesiaGhanaChinaMalaysiaThailandCambodiaSri LankaViet NamBangladeshNigeriaIndiaScore /10Observer Coverage Figure 3.6: MCS compliance scores for observer scheme. Bar chart showing compliance of 41 fishing countries for Question 5. Observer Scheme (VMS). Shaded bars, error bars and symbols are explained in Figure 3.2. Eleven countries namely Indonesia to India received ?0? on score for this question and hence there are no scores and error bars in the above figure for these countries.  3.6.6 Scoring compliance with inspections at sea Figure 3.7 shows that of the 41 countries only two countries (USA and Norway) had good scores on this question, while three other countries (7%) had scores within passable range of 6/10 (Namibia, Malaysia and Canada). However, 24 countries had unacceptable low scores of 4 or less; these are Madagascar, Peru, Sierra Leone, Mexico, Thailand, Russia, Indonesia,  66Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Cameroon, Morocco, Ecuador, Brazil, India, Angola, Cambodia, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Guinea, China, Philippines, Ghana, South Korea, Nigeria and Chile. 15 countries (37%) received scores in the intermediate score range between 4 to 6, with their upper confidence limits reaching passable scores of 6, so their estimates are uncertain (Malaysia, Taiwan, South Africa, Namibia, Canada, South Korea, Mauritania, Sweden, UK, Australia, Iceland, Russia, France, New Zealand, Argentina and Japan). The reliability of the scores for this question can only increase when more information on inspections at sea is readily available, as most of the countries except Canada, USA, Namibia, Norway and Malaysia do not provide any reliable estimates on number of fisheries inspections by their patrol vessels at sea.  0246810NorwayUSANamibiaAustraliaCanadaMalaysiaIceland UKFranceSouth AfricaTaiwanSouth KoreaMauritaniaSwedenNew_ZealandRussiaArgentinaJapanPeruMexicoThailandIndonesiaSri LankaBrazilMyanmarCameroonMoroccoEcuadorIndiaMadagascarSierra LeoneAngolaCambodiaViet NamBangladeshGuineaChinaPhilippinesChileGhanaNigeriaScore /10Inspections at Sea Figure 3.7: MCS compliance scores for inspections at sea. Bar chart showing compliance of 41 fishing countries for Question 6. Inspections at Sea. Shaded bars, error bars and symbols are explained in Figure 3.2.   673.6.7 Scoring compliance with adequacy of aerial patrols Figure 3.8 illustrates that only one country (Australia) has good score of 7.5, while UK and New Zealand receive passable scores within the range of 6/10.  Countries like India, Iceland, Japan, USA and Namibia (12%) having scores of 5.5 and upper confidence limits in the passable range of 6/10. Countries like Peru, Norway, France, Malaysia, have scores in the intermediate 4.5 to 5 range, although their upper confidence limits are in the passable score of 6, so their estimates are uncertain. These discrepancies can be attributed to lack of information on aerial patrols in these countries or due to degree of information that is publicly available for such content in these countries. Many countries in the analysis had shortage of information for aerial patrols so more information is needed before drawing any concrete conclusions. However, 26 countries (South Korea, Mauritania, Angola, Chile, Thailand, Sweden, China, Madagascar, Ecuador, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Morocco, Taiwan, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Mexico, Bangladesh, Philippines, Cambodia, Vietnam, Ghana and Cameroon) had completely unacceptable scores below 4/10, which must be considered a poor performance on an important prerequisite for monitoring offshore fishing incursions and transhipments.    680246810Australia UKNew_ZealandNamibia USAJapanCanadaIndiaIcelandFranceNorwayPeruMalaysiaSouth AfricaArgentinaSouth KoreaChinaMauritaniaAngolaChileSwedenThailandMadagascarEcuadorBrazilRussiaTaiwanIndonesiaMoroccoNigeriaSri LankaMyanmarGuineaMexicoBangladeshSierra LeonePhilippinesCambodiaViet NamGhanaCameroonScore /10Aerial Patrols Figure 3.8: MCS compliance scores for aerial patrols. Bar chart showing compliance of 41 fishing countries for Question 7. Aerial Patrols. Shaded bars, error bars and symbols are explained in Figure 3.2. Three countries namely Vietnam, Ghana and Cameroon received ?0? scores for this question and hence there are no scores and error bars (Ghana and Cameroon) in the above figure for these countries.  3.6.8 Scoring compliance with dockside monitoring Four countries receive ?good? scores above 7/10 (Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden), while two developed countries USA and Canada received passable scores above 6/10 (See Figure 3.9). Most countries (27, 66%) fall under the ?fail? grades for dockside controls (Argentina, Malaysia, South Korea, Peru, Chile, Morocco, Japan, Mexico, Angola, Myanmar, Brazil, Indonesia, Ecuador, Nigeria, China, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Taiwan, Guinea, India, Vietnam, Russia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Thailand and Cambodia). The recent global study by Flothmann et al., (2010) on lack of accountability and transparency in port state control appears to strengthen results from the present study, which show poor performance by most countries.  690246810IcelandNew_ZealandNorwaySwedenCanada USA UKAustraliaSouth KoreaMauritaniaFranceSouth AfricaNamibiaMadagascarTaiwanArgentinaMalaysia PeruChileBrazilJapanMoroccoMexicoRussiaAngolaMyanmarIndonesiaEcuadorNigeriaChinaSri LankaPhilippinesBangladeshCameroonGuineaIndiaViet NamSierra LeoneGhanaThailandCambodiaScore /10Dockside Monitoring Figure 3.9: MCS compliance scores for dockside monitoring. Bar chart showing compliance of 41 fishing countries for Question 8. Dockside Monitoring. Shaded bars, error bars and symbols are explained in Figure 3.2. Two countries namely Thailand and Cambodia received ?0? scores for this question and hence there are no scores and error bars (Cambodia) in the above figure for these countries.  3.6.9 Scoring compliance with coastal patrols The analysis reveals that of the 41 countries, 3 (7%) received good scores within the range of 7/10 (New Zealand, Norway and Namibia).  Further, Sweden, Iceland and South Korea received passable score within the range of 6/10 (See Figure 3.10). However, 30 countries (73%) have low compliance scores of 4 or less (South Africa, Canada, Chile, Taiwan, France, Morocco, Angola, Madagascar, Brazil, Bangladesh, Mauritania, Peru, Thailand, Mexico, Indonesia, Ghana, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Ecuador, China, Russia, Philippines, Argentina, Cameroon, Nigeria, Guinea, Sierra Leone, India, Cambodia and Vietnam).   700246810New_ZealandNorwayNamibiaSwedenSouth KoreaIcelandAustraliaJapanCanadaMalaysia USA UKSouth AfricaChileTaiwanFranceMauritaniaBangladeshMoroccoAngolaMadagascarBrazilPeruThailandMexicoIndonesiaGhanaSri LankaMyanmarEcuadorChinaRussiaPhilippinesArgentinaCameroonNigeriaGuineaSierra LeoneIndiaCambodiaViet NamScore /10Coastal Patrols Figure 3.10: MCS compliance scores for coastal patrols. Bar chart showing compliance of 41 fishing countries for Question 9. Coastal Patrols. Shaded bars, error bars and symbols are explained in Figure 3.2. Five countries namely Guinea, Sierra Leone, India, Cambodia and Vietnam received ?0? scores for this question and hence there are no scores and error bars (Cambodia and Vietnam) in the above figure for these countries.  3.6.10 Scoring compliance with monitoring transshipments at sea Results from the current analysis (Figure 3.11) reveals that only one country (Namibia) achieved a score above 7/10. However, two countries (New Zealand and Norway) received passable scores of 6.5 with their upper confidence limits in the 7/10 ranges. Two countries (Canada and Sweden) received scores in the range of 5 to 6, with upper confidence limits in passable range of 7 leaving their estimates. 29 countries received low compliance scores of (less than 4); these are Mauritania, Japan, Madagascar, Guinea, Angola, Russia, Morocco, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Cameroon, Sri Lanka, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Taiwan, Ghana, Sierra Leone, China, Philippines, India, Cambodia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand.   710246810NamibiaNew_ZealandNorwayCanadaSwedenChileFranceAustraliaIcelandMalaysiaSouth KoreaSouth Africa UK USAMauritaniaJapanRussiaMadagascarGuineaMoroccoPeruEcuadorArgentinaAngolaCameroonSri LankaBrazilMexicoNigeriaTaiwanGhanaSierra LeoneChinaPhilippinesIndiaCambodiaIndonesiaBangladeshMyanmarViet NamThailandScore /10Unreported Transshipments at Sea  Figure 3.11: MCS compliance scores for monitoring transshipments at sea. Bar chart showing compliance of 41 fishing countries for Question 10. Unreported Transshipments at sea. Shaded bars, error bars and symbols are explained in Figure 3.2. Seven countries namely India, Cambodia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand received ?0? scores for this question and hence there are no scores and error bars (Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand) in the above figure for these countries.  3.6.11 Scoring compliance with fishing gear inspections  Namibia and Sweden are the only two countries to get good scores in the analysis for fishing gear inspections (Figure 3.12), with scores above 7/10. One country South Korea, received passable score of 6.5, showing that it is headed in the right direction. Eight countries (New Zealand, Canada, USA, France, Madagascar, Australia, Iceland, and Malaysia) had scores in the range of 4 to 6, with wide variation in their confidence limits between 4 and 7 making their estimates uncertain. More data would be needed to arrive at any concrete conclusions for these countries. However, 31 countries (75%) in the analysis received unacceptable low scores below 4/10 (Japan, UK, Argentina, Chile, South Africa, Peru, Mexico, Mauritania, Morocco, Ecuador, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Norway, China, Angola, Thailand, India,  72Cambodia, Vietnam, Taiwan, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Guinea and Russia).  0246810SwedenNamibiaSouth KoreaIcelandNew_ZealandAustraliaCanada USAFranceMalaysiaJapan UKBrazilArgentinaChileSouth AfricaMadagascarBangladeshRussiaPeruMexicoMauritaniaEcuadorPhilippinesCameroonMoroccoNorwayChinaAngolaThailandIndiaCambodiaViet NamTaiwanGhanaSierra LeoneNigeriaIndonesiaSri LankaMyanmarGuineaScore /10Fishing Gear inspections Figure 3.12: MCS compliance scores for fishing gear inspections.  Bar chart showing compliance of 41 fishing countries for Question 11. Fishing gear inspections. Shaded bars, error bars and symbols are explained in Figure 3.2. Sixteen countries namely Morocco to Guinea received ?0? scores for this question and hence there are no scores and error bars (India, Cambodia, Vietnam, Taiwan, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Guinea) in the above figure for these countries.  3.7 Discussion  The declining state of world fish stocks (FAO 2009a) necessitates the enhancement of capacity of nations to derive benefit from their fishery resources through better monitoring and enforcement of regulatory laws. In many developing countries international and national laws are not backed by sufficient regulatory and legal sanctions (Pramod 2010). The effectiveness of enforcement programs is influenced by: deployment strategies, capabilities  73and capacity of surveillance units, types of fisheries violations, distribution of fishing activity, time of the year, and surveillance priorities of monitoring agencies (Millar 1995). According to Sutinen (1988) enforcement effectiveness can be maximised and costs minimised through high penalties. MCS system is also likely to be more successful when countries can assert the same level of sovereignty on resources at sea as they do on land. Developing countries with scant patrolling resources can increase chances of apprehending illegal fishing vessels through intelligence provided by artisanal fishermen and optimising use of MCS assets through regional fisheries co-operation with other countries.   Effectiveness of co-operative surveillance in combating illegal fishing has been effectively demonstrated by France and Australia in Sub-Antarctic Island territories and can be replicated elsewhere (Gullett and Schofield 2007). Increasingly, poachers are resorting to new strategies such as communicating position of enforcement vessels to other poaching vessels to avoid capture necessitating use of new technological tools for monitoring distant water fleets (Baird 2004). To avoid cloning of fishing permits, countries like Mexico have started using new technology for commercial fishing permits which have better security features such as visible and invisible optical fibers, high security micro-prints and modified images which can be read using special reading equipment (Anon 2010f). Technologies such as these can be used by enforcement agencies in other developing countries like Indonesia and Malaysia where foreign fishing vessels are repeatedly caught using cloned / forged fishing permits (GIUFI 2010).   74In developing countries it has often come to notice that absence of authority or political intervention in arrest cases of foreign fishing vessels affects the morale of enforcement personnel. As aptly stated by one enforcement officer in the Indian Ocean ?How do you expect me to take action on foreign poaching vessels when I spend my valuable manpower and patrolling assets to apprehend a foreign fishing vessel after chasing it for several miles with great effort to bring it to the nearest port, only to be informed later that the vessel was merely fined a couple of hundred dollars or that it was left on intervention from some politician in the federal government. The morale of me and my crew is utterly devastated and the next time I see poaching vessels I merely chase them away instead of apprehending them? (Anon pers comm., 2008).  Absence of statutory authority also affects the ability of enforcement agencies to affect an arrest during resource protection duties (Letts 2000). Low enforcement assets in relation to extent of geographical area to be patrolled affect fisheries protection in countries like Philippines and Indonesia (Viswanathan et al., 1997). Deployment of MCS resources in UK, Canada and Indonesia also appears to be affected due to shortage of funds (Millar 1995; Sihaloho 2009).  Figure 3.13 shows compliance of countries by counting the number of ?good? and ?fail? grades for all the 11 questions. Twelve countries (29%) (Myanmar, Cambodia, Cameroon, Guinea, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Philippines and Ghana) received fail grades in all parts of the analysis. Three countries (7%) Namibia, Norway and New Zealand received good scores on 6 out of 11 questions, with moderate scores in range of 4-7 for the remaining 5 questions. Malaysia was the only developing  75country to receive a good compliance score for 1 out of 11 questions, but failed to show good performance for nearly 40% of the overall questions.    Figure 3.13: Bar chart showing number of ?good? and ?fail? compliance ratings. Ratings for the top 41 fishing countries against 11 questions expressing compliance with MCS attributes. Green bars indicate the number of ?good? compliance ratings across the 11 questions; for each country, shaded grey bars denote moderate scores in the range of 4 to 7, while red bars denote the number of ?fail? compliance ratings across the 11 questions. Hence, for each country the three colours in it?s bar show the number of scores in each category. Country bars are sorted by number of good and bad scores for the 11 MCS questions in the analysis.  3.8 Comparisons among questions Grades given for the 11 questions (Figure 3.14) reveals that only one question (Surveillance infrastructure) received ?good? compliance score for 13 countries.  Of the 41 countries, 12 developing countries received fail grades on all the 11 questions. It is also disturbing to note that almost half of the countries had a bad performance on 9 out of 11 questions in the analysis. Overall comparison of results shows that both developing and developed countries  76have problems in compliance with MCS issues even after three decades of economic progress in the post UNCLOS period. The analysis also reveals poor compliance with drafted fisheries regulations for most of the developing countries, although developed countries with better resources and infrastructure should have shown better performance. The results from the current study are in agreement with Mora et al., (2009) study which revealed that only 17% of the world?s EEZs have proper enforcement in fisheries.    77Infrastructure Vessel inspections AllNew_Zealand 7 7 9 8 5 5 6 9 9 7 6 7Namibia 7 6 5 9 9 7 6 5 8 8 7 7Iceland 8 7 9 9 3 6 6 9 6 5 6 6Australia 8 7 8 5 7 7 8 6 6 5 6 6Norway 8 7 6 8 7 7 5 8 8 7 0 6USA 8 6 7 7 7 7 6 7 5 4 6 6Canada 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 6 6 6Sweden 7 6 5 4 4 5 4 8 7 5 8 5UK 7 6 5 7 4 6 7 6 5 4 4 5France 7 6 5 7 2 6 5 5 4 5 5 5South Korea 8 5 4 3 2 5 4 6 7 5 6 5Japan 8 5 5 5 3 4 6 3 6 4 4 4South Africa 7 5 0 7 4 6 5 5 4 5 3 4Malaysia 7 6 4 2 0 6 5 4 6 5 5 4Argentina 8 4 4 7 5 5 5 4 2 3 3 4Chile 6 3 4 6 3 2 4 4 4 5 3 4Peru 4 4 6 6 4 4 5 4 3 3 2 4Madagascar 4 3 3 8 5 3 3 5 3 4 2 4Mauritania 6 4 0 4 2 5 4 5 4 4 2 3Mexico 5 3 6 5 3 4 1 3 3 3 2 3Brazil 5 4 3 3 2 4 3 4 4 3 4 3Taiwan 7 6 0 4 2 5 3 4 4 1 0 3Russia 6 4 1 5 2 5 3 3 2 4 2 3Angola 5 3 4 5 4 3 4 3 3 3 0 3Ecuador 5 3 0 6 3 3 3 2 2 3 1 2Morocco 5 4 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 1 2China 7 6 2 3 0 2 4 2 2 1 0 2Indonesia 3 4 3 4 0 4 2 2 3 0 0 2Sri Lanka 4 3 2 0 0 4 2 2 2 3 0 2India 6 4 0 0 0 3 6 1 0 0 0 2Myanmar 4 2 0 1 2 4 2 3 2 0 0 2Cameroon 2 2 0 4 0 4 0 2 2 3 1 2Thailand 5 3 0 1 0 4 3 0 3 0 0 1Philippines 2 2 0 2 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 1Ghana 2 1 3 3 0 1 0 1 3 1 0 1Bangladesh 3 2 0 0 0 2 1 2 3 0 2 1Guinea 2 2 0 2 2 2 1 1 0 4 0 1Nigeria 2 1 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 2 0 1Sierra Leone 2 2 0 0 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 1Cambodia 3 3 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1Viet Nam 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 11 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  Figure 3.14: MCS grid showing number of ?good? and ?fail? scores for each question by country.  41 fishing countries were rated against 11 questions in two fields for expressing compliance with MCS issues. Green indicates ?good? compliance rating, orange denotes moderate scores, while red denotes ?fail? compliance ratings. The numbers 1 to 11 at the bottom of the figure show the 11 questions that were scored for compliance with MCS issues. Rightmost column shows overall MCS rating.    783.9 Chapter 3 summary In chapter 3, I used a rapid analysis approach to identify compliance with monitoring control and surveillance in marine fisheries of 41 nations. I designed a questionnaire with 11 questions for this purpose. Attributes for the design were derived from a wide range of international laws such as UNCLOS, FAO Code of conduct for responsible fisheries, UN fish stocks agreement, UN Fish compliance agreement and the IPOA on IUU fishing. 41 countries landing 87% of the world?s fish catches were evaluated in this chapter.   Of the 41 countries landing 87% of the world?s fish catches, none received ?good? scores of 70% and over, with only three countries (Namibia, New Zealand and Norway) achieving ?good? scores for more than 50% of the MCS questions. Three developed countries (Iceland, Australia and USA), received good scores for 37% of the MCS questions, and have taken bold initiatives in recent decade to improve MCS compliance in the fisheries sector. Twelve countries (Cambodia, Bangladesh, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines and Vietnam) received ?fail? grades on all the questions. Most of the developing countries showed poor performance (?fail? grades), with Malaysia being the only exception to show good performance for some questions. Further, the current study shows that even among the developed countries, issues such as high seas fleet monitoring, dock-side monitoring, fishing gear violations and unreported transshipments have been poorly addressed.  Limitations in the current work were overcome by contacting regulatory and monitoring agencies to get information for areas that had no publicly available information. However,  79some countries had shortage of information for attributes like number of dockside inspections per year, number of aerial and sea based patrols per year. Accuracy of scores and reliability would increase once such information is provided for research similar to mine. Confidentiality has been cited as one the reasons but many developed countries like USA, Australia and New Zealand stand as good examples, which provide information, related to MCS in fisheries and other countries can replicate such measures. Access to data and reliability of scores due to access are given in Appendix C.   In an ideal setting, monitoring control and surveillance act as deterrence to illegal activities such as smuggling, drug trade and illegal fishing. However, it would be impossible to achieve this level of MCS effort as these operations rely on military assets, which have different priorities in different jurisdictions during different periods of the year. Rarely, can a country?s navy or coast guard use 100 per cent of its assets for one particular sector or marine resource crimes like illegal fishing. MCS is an expensive endeavor (Arnason et al., 2000) and many developing countries with low affordability and meager patrolling assets can rarely patrol beyond a few miles from the shore (Pramod 2011).   According to one MCS expert (Respondent 199), costs of enforcement vary with government budgets, which vary by year, by sector and by how much money they make from sectors like fisheries. To minimize costs, such as rising fuel and manpower costs, patrols at sea are prioritized depending on previous sightings of illegal fishing vessels in different jurisdictions or use at-sea patrols in such jurisdictions when aerial patrols detect any violations (Anon pers comm., 2010).  Research on fishers behaviour can also be of immense help as their decision  80to comply with rules can be influenced by plethora of factors such as regulations, sophistication of their boats, market prices and abundance of fish stocks (Ludwig et al., 1993; Wilen et al., 2002). Cases of accidental incursions by small artisanal craft from neighbouring countries need to be treated with utmost sensitivity and the recent agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia (accidental breach of maritime borders by traditional boats of 5-10 gross tons will not be prosecuted) is a step in the right direction (Satriastanti 2011).    81Chapter  4: Illegal marine fish catches in the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone  4.1 Introduction This chapter sets out the interview methods used to assess illegal and unreported fish catches in the field trip to India. Then illegal catch issues in each state from Gujarat in the Arabian Sea to West Bengal in the Bay of Bengal are reviewed in detail. Subsequent sections describe estimates of a number of categories of illegal fishing, namely - Illegal fishing by Indian trawlers in inshore waters allocated to artisanal fishers; Illegal fishing in offshore waters off India?s EEZ; and illegal catches by foreign joint venture chartered tuna longliners.   Taking advantage of previous local contacts, language and knowledge of the coastal areas of India, in a 7?month field visit22 from May - November 2008, information that may be used to make a complete estimate of fishery extractions, including illegal and unreported landings was undertaken. Nine of the ten coastal states of India were visited, including the Andaman Islands. Methods used were over 200 confidential interviews, gathering of grey literature reports and direct observations.  The purpose of the field trip was to get estimates of illegal and unreported catches from India?s long and often inaccessible                                                  22 The trip was sponsored by the UBC Cecil and Kathleen Morrow Scholarship for 2007, by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), UK Government, as part of global analysis of illegal fishing, with partial funding by MRAG (UK, as relating to a core area of interest) and partly by NSERC (through Prof. Tony Pitcher).  82coastline to improve current estimates of total catch statistics from both mechanised and subsistence fishery sectors.   4.2 Categories of illegal and unreported catches assessed in the 2008 field trip Overall definitions of the various categories of illegal and unreported catches are provided in Chapter 1, pages 4 to 8. These are expanded here for the particular case of Indian marine fisheries. 4.2.1 Illegal fish catches categories in the Indian EEZ Illegal fish catches in the Indian EEZ, come from three categories of fleets and these estimates are discussed in detail in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Illegal catch categories discussed in chapters 4 (Indian mainland) and 6 (Andaman and Nicobar Islands) include: (a) Indian trawlers fishing illegally in the 0-8 km coastal zone allocated to artisanal fishers in the eight coastal states; (b) Illegal fishing by foreign fishing vessels in the Indian EEZ; (c) Illegal fishing by Chartered foreign fishing vessels operating under License of permission (joint venture agreement with Indian companies); (d) Illegal fish catches through use of illegal fishing gear in the mechanised sector (Use of illegal mesh size in trawl fishing gear and fishing in closed areas), and small-scale fisheries (use of illegal fishing gear in various small-scale sector such as gillnets, fishing within marine protected areas, fishing during closed seasons etc.). 4.2.2 Unreported fish catches categories  Unreported fish catches in the Indian EEZ, come from both mechanised and non-mechanised categories of fleets and these estimates are discussed in detail in chapters 5 (Indian mainland EEZ) and 6 (Andaman and Nicobar Islands). A brief discussion of  83various categories of unreported catch is provided here with more detailed explanation is given in chapter 5.  Unreported catches discussed in chapters 5 and 6 include: (a) Discards23 from commercial trawlers and chartered foreign joint venture tuna longliners (part of the fish catch from each haul that are not retained onboard trawlers, and discarded at sea due to small size or low market prices); (b) Post harvest losses (catches that are dumped due to spoilage after landing, due to heat, pest infestation, during processing or transportation of fish to the markets); (c) Subsistence fisheries catches from coastal habitats (catches by fishermen in inshore habitats such as beaches, estuaries and creeks for consumption at home each day, without intention to make a profit through sales); (d) Glut catches (Catches during certain seasons or part of year, when landings are plenty and catch is thrown at landing centres due to low market demand); (e) Molluscan catches (Shellfish catches for meat consumption, ornamental trade and for use in lime industry for cement production); (f) Take home catches of trawler crew (Catch that is divided among crew after each trip at fishing ports as an incentive and taken for consumption at home); (g) Fish consumed by trawler crew at sea (Portion of the fish caught at sea that is consumed by crew at sea during 1-12 day fishing trips); (i) Take home catches of artisanal fishers                                                  23 Although Regulation 5, of the Maritime Zones of India Rules 1982, states that the ?crews may not discard surplus catch,? this regulation is never enforced in Indian fisheries. In the current study of illegal and unreported fish catches in Indian EEZ, discards are unambiguously treated as a category of unreported catches, as government officials in both Federal and State Government of India, stated during interviews in 2008, that discards are not considered ?illegal?, but rather as a category of unreported catches.   84(portion of the landed catch that is taken home after each fishing trip for consumption at home); (j) Reef based subsistence fish catches (Catches caught in coral reefs and reef based habitats for consumption at home and survival on a daily basis); (k) Bait fish catches (Fish that are brought for use as bait for catching tuna and sharks in the longline; hooks and line gear sectors); (l) Fish gleaned at landing centres (Fish that is dumped at landing centres due to depredation by sharks and other predatory fish); (m) Dryfish landings (Dryfish that is dried on top of fishing trawlers and landed after each fishing trip in fishing ports); and (n) Fish directly sold to tourist resorts and restaurants (Fish that is sold by fishers to restaurants and tourist resorts directly without formal reporting at landing centres in Andaman islands).   As the 6 million fisherfolk (Ministry of Agriculture, India, website, 2006) are spread over approximately 8100 km of coastline, the main foci of the interviews were to (a) derive estimates for subsistence catches in the small-scale sector, and (b) in the mechanized sector estimates of discards, fish meal landings and take home catches of crew members. Illegal catches by foreign fishing vessels as well as domestic trawlers were also estimated through interviews with trawler crews and enforcement officers. Literature was also collected from State fisheries departments, central government agencies, industry records, fisheries journals and newspapers. Special emphasis was given to collecting grey literature as well as publications of IGO?s like the Bay of Bengal Programme.       85Table 4.1: Interviews conducted and places visited for estimation of IUU catches in the Indian EEZ24. The only maritime state not covered through the field visit was Goa and the union territory of Daman and Diu. Information from Lakshadweep islands is under review and not covered in this thesis.  State Name of small-scale and mechanized fish landing centers / fishing ports Number of Interviews conducted Small-scale Mechanized Gujarat Porbandar, Veraval, Jamnagar, Kutch, Bhavnagar, Okha 10 12 Maharashtra Mumbai, Thane, Ratnagiri, Raigad, Malvan 9 9 Karnataka Malpe, Mangalore, Karwar 12 14 Kerala Cochin, Kasargod, Kannur, Neendakhara, Munambam, Trivandrum, Kovalam 11 18 Tamil Nadu Tuticorn, Chennai, Pulicat, Rameshwaram, Pamban, Mandapam, Nagapattinam, Cuddalore, Kanyakumari 11 14 Andhra Pradesh Suluru, Nizampatnam, Kakinada, Machilipatnam, Visakhapatnam, Bheemunipatnam 18 12 Orissa Paradeep, Chandipur, Chatrapur, Puri, Bhittarakanika 11 11 West Bengal Calcutta, Roychowk, Digha, South Parganas 11 9 Andaman islands Port Blair, Diglipur, Wandoor, Mayabundar 7 4                                                                 Total 100 103                                                  24 Table 4.1 provides a list of places visited during the IUU trip, but several interviews were also conducted with government officers and enforcement personnel to get an in-depth picture of the extent of IUU catches in Indian EEZ. Data from such sources is cited as (Anon, pers. comm.) or Respondent No: X, etc. for confidentiality reasons.  86 Figure 4.1: Map of India. Map showing nine coastal states and offshore islands (Andaman and Nicobar Islands). The thin grey line outside the map represents the EEZ boundary.  Image Source: (Hand drawn: Pramod Ganapathiraju). Image not to scale.       874.3 Interview methodology A semi-structured questionnaire25 was used to determine the amount of illegal and unreported fish caught and landed by artisanal fishers (hook and line, gill nets, traditional gears) and mechanized trawlers in India. The illegal catches estimation looked at infringement of trawlers into the 5-12 mile fishing zone, which is reserved for the artisanal sector by the Government of India?s Fisheries Laws. Interviews through the questionnaire helped to determine the total percentage of illegal and unreported catch in India?s marine fisheries sector. For example, any fish caught by a mechanized trawler within 5 nautical miles from the shore is illegal as this zone is reserved for artisanal fishers. However, it is pertinent to mention that although fish catches in the artisanal zone are illegal, it is not categorized as unreported in this study as all this catch is landed in Indian fishing ports and forms part of reported catch through CMFRI and FAO. Interviews with artisanal fishers regarding activity by trawlers in their 5-8 km zone helped in determining illegal catches from the industrial sector (See Table 4.2 and 4.3 for results of this analysis). For the artisanal sector, interviews with fishermen on take home catches (any fish catch not sold and retained for consumption at home after fishing trip), recreational catch by part-time fishermen and catches from remote fish landing centres which are presently poorly monitored by government officials were used in determining unreported catches. The latter are not illegal, but are rarely reported correctly.                                                    25 Approval for the IUU Study questionnaire was provided in 2008 by UBC ORS Ethics certificate (H08-00618) from UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board awarded prior to undertaking the study in India.  88A snowball approach was used in contacting fishers. Since most of the fish landing centres are in remote locations.  I worked with 1-3 field assistants in each state?s port/ fishing location (both mechanised and artisanal landing centres). Myself and field assistants went to the main fish landing centres in each village and asked people engaged in fishing randomly whether they would be willing to participate in this survey. If they agreed, we informed them the purpose of our study through oral consent, as most of the fishers are illiterate. If they gave us permission, we then asked them the questions in the questionnaire. Each maritime state has designated fish landing sites for small-scale fisheries and fishing harbors for large mechanized trawlers operating beyond 5-12 nautical miles. For small-scale fisheries in each State there are numerous landing centers at district level. Interviews with small-scale fishers were conducted in at least 10 per cent of landing centers in each district. The landing centers were chosen randomly along the coastline to give a broader picture of fishing activity in each district. For example, if there are 16 designated small-scale landing centers numbered 1 to 16 from South to North, landing centers numbered 1, 5, 10, 15 were chosen for the study to uniformly cover required number of interviews throughout the coastline. Some of the constraints in choosing landing centers included access by road, and ability to get there at least on a two-wheeler.  Each participant was interviewed for approximately 30-60 minutes once during the survey26.                                                   26 Chapters 4 and 5 provide illegal and unreported catch estimations from the Mainland Indian EEZ (which includes the nine coastal states from Gujarat on the West Coast to West Bengal on the East coast of India). Illegal and unreported catches for Andaman and Nicobar islands is presented separately in Chapter 6.  89The present study also shed light on the extent of poaching by foreign trawlers in Indian EEZ from 1960 to 2009. Interviews with boats skippers from Gujarat, Maharashtra, Kerala, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal gave estimates of illegal fishing by Thai, Pakistani, Sri Lankan and Taiwanese trawlers in the Indian EEZ. These estimates are of immense value, as very few paper records exist of poaching especially during the 1960-1980 period. On the East Coast of India (Bay of Bengal) interviews with deep sea fishing vessel skippers revealed the locations of Thai and Taiwanese poaching vessels with certainty as foreign trawlers were frequent invaders of Indian coastline, fishing as close as 3-9 nautical miles of Orissa, West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh during the 1970-1985 period. Estimates of number of poaching vessels arrested and average catch per illegal vessel were derived from apprehended vessels in the GIUFI database. A conservative estimate of illegal fishing was derived using Government and media reports (Anon 1976; Anon 1980; Rao 1981; Dan 1982; Anon 1990; Rao 2009) during 1970-1980, with estimates from arrested vessels and vessels observed poaching in the GIUFI (2010) database giving more reliable and independent illegal catch estimates for 1970-2009. Interviews from my survey in 2008 served as anchor points for estimates of illegal fishing vessels observed in different jurisdictions during the 1980-2008 periods.   For estimations of illegal catches by foreign fishing vessels (FFV) illegal catch found onboard apprehended FFV?s was used (Number of vessels arrested / year X mean illegal catch per vessel (by flag) = Total illegal catch for arrested FFVs. This estimate was in turn multiplied with number of vessels that were observed poaching per year (Vessels observed poaching but were not arrested). Finally estimation of illegal transshipments by  90Chartered LoP (License of Permission) tuna vessels was added to get total illegal fishing catches in mainland Indian EEZ / year from 1960-200927. The upper and lower confidence limits were derived from interview data and enforcement records collected during the 2008 trip28.  4.4 Brief reports of the study areas for assessment of illegal catches  West coast (Arabian Sea): 52 interviews were done with trawler crew and 42 with small-scale fishermen in the coastal states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Kerala. Interviews were undertaken by primary author (Pramod) and field assistants hired and trained by him for this purpose. A total of 14 field assistants were hired for this period29. In the small-scale sector, interviews were conducted with fishermen operating gillnets, hook and line, trammel gill nets, and Cast nets. In the mechanized sector interviews were conducted with skippers and crew of demersal trawlers, longliners, and gillnetters.                                                  27 The illegal catch provided here represents IUU Fishing estimates for Mainland Indian EEZ in Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. Estimation of IUU fishing catches for Andaman and Nicobar islands is presented separately in Chapter 6.   28 Pramod, G. (2008) Field trip to eight maritime states and offshore island territory of Andaman and Nicobar islands for estimation of illegal, and unreported marine fish catches in the Indian EEZ, May to November 2008.   29 See Pramod (2010) for names of Field Assistants.   914.4.1 Gujarat Gujarat has 1600 km30 coastline with 164,183 km2 continental shelf supporting 18,369 mechanized vessels and 11,784 non-mechanized vessels. The State has 263 marine fishing villages, with 59,889 fisherfolk operating along its coastline.  Trawlers, gillnetters and dol-netters are the main fishing craft in the mechanized sector while plank-built boats and canoes figure more prominently in the artisanal sector (CMFRI 2005a). Trawlers target sciaenids, ribbonfish, lobsters, shrimps, etc., and contribute 71% of the total catch, while gillnetters target pomfret, seerfish, tuna and sharks; and dol-netters (tidal bag-net) land 19%, with the remaining 10% are landed by dugout boats and canoes with outboard motors and non-mechanized boats using gillnets (Zyundheen et al., 2004). A good account of marine fisheries in Gujarat is given in Shiyani (2002); Johnson (2001); Praveen et al., (1998) and Devaraj et al., (1998).   Fishermen in Porbander and Veraval stated that they are forced to go further and take risks in Pakistani waters as most of Gujarat?s coastal waters are polluted leaving fishermen with no option but to go farther offshore to catch fish or trawlers which fish along northern Gujarat waters where waters are relatively unpolluted with more catches per each haul, but this as such leaves them vulnerable to arrests in Pakistani EEZ (As Respondent 5, 11, 9, 10 state: when there is little fish in local waters and no GPS or other                                                  30 ?All coastline distances are quoted with a feature size of 1 km?. The feature size of kilometre (km) was used in chapters 4 to 6, as length of the coastline are measured in km in most of the Indian government documents. See (Weisstein, Eric W. "Coastline Paradox." From MathWorld--A Wolfram Web Resource.  http://mathworld.wolfram.com/CoastlineParadox.html).  92equipment it is hard to say whether we are in Indian waters, it is important to know that we use landmarks as guidance points for locating fishing grounds and we were rarely caught for intruding into Pakistani waters in the past; nowadays we are forced to go offshore as far as 4-8 hours away from shore to catch fish and with no visible landmarks it is hard to say where you are when you are arrested. We often see Indian coast Guard vessels guiding us away from maritime boundary waters, but they can?t guide us throughout the year.?   Respondents 9, 11 and 14 stated that some fishers do inadvertently cross Indian waters as Pakistani waters are relatively unpolluted and less trawled compared to Indian waters ?Most of Indian boats that fish along Indian maritime border are trawlers while bulk of the observed fishing activity along Pakistani waters is conducted through gillnetting, so their waters are more rich with fish like ?Lal Pari? (Nemipterus species; Threadfin breams) which fetch higher price in the Indian markets31.? Respondent 3 stated that the disputed nature of maritime boundary along the Indo-Pak border also often confuses fishermen as there are several cases where local boats from Indian side near Rann of Kutch were apprehended far inside Indian waters barely a kilometre from the fishing port. Respondent 14 stated that there were several instances in the past where several innocent                                                  31 Most of the apprehended Indian trawlers and boats were from Jakhau, Porbandar and Okha. In the last decade most of the fishing activity has moved north due to pollution and declining catches in central and southern Gujarat waters. Operating in close proximity to the Indo-Pak border exposes them to apprehensions by Pakistan?s Maritime Security Agency, especially due to disputed nature of Indo-Pak maritime boundary in Rann of Kutch.  93Indian fishing vessels were reportedly detained by Pakistan?s Maritime Security Agency (MSA) whenever Pakistani fishing boats were arrested in Indian waters, alluding to reciprocal arrests.  Gujarat ranks second among the top three marine fish producers in India. The bulk of the catch is exported due to low local demand in the state. The Gujarat Fisheries Act, 2003 is the primary legislative act responsible for protection, conservation and development of fisheries in territorial waters of the state. Section 4(a) of the Act prohibits use of fishing gear with less than 40 mm mesh size at the cod end portion. However, interviews with fishers revealed that almost all trawlers (95%) use one of the smallest mesh sizes in the cod end of trawl net (8-18 mm) essentially resulting in recruitment overfishing.  A recent study by Mohamed et al., (2010) shows similar trends with cod end mesh size of Gujarat trawlers as low as 20 mm indicating poor compliance with fisheries regulations. Estimates of illegal catches by trawlers in the 5 nautical mile artisanal zone give an estimate of 740 to 1,130 tonnes for Gujarat. Intrusions by trawlers into the artisanal zone were reported in Kutch, Jakhau, Jamnagar, Bhavnagar, Bharuch and Valsad districts. Fig 4.2 provides details on the number of Pakistani fishing boats detained for illegal fishing in Gujarat waters (Indian EEZ).    94051015202530351975 1976 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009Number  of  vessels  arrestedYear Figure 4.2: Number of Pakistani fishing boats arrested in Gujarat (India). Number of Pakistani vessels detained for illegal fishing in Indian waters (1975-2008), Source: GIUFI Database (2010).  4.4.2 Maharashtra Maharashtra has 720 km coastline with a continental shelf of 111,512 km2 supporting 23,508 fishing crafts of which 13,053 are mechanized, 3382 were motorized and 7073 non-motorized. The State has 406 marine fishing villages with 65,313 fisherfolk operating along its coastline. Trawlers, gillnetters and dol-netters are the main fishing crafts in the mechanized sector (CMFRI 2005b).   Small-scale fishermen in Thane and Mumbai districts have reported illegal incursions by multi-day trawlers into dol-net fishing grounds. Fishermen reported that such illegal incursions have resulted in declining catches of pomfrets, shrimps and Bombay duck in recent years. Estimates drawn from interviews with fishermen reveal that illegal catches  95by trawler intrusions into inshore traditional grounds amount to loss of 1100 to 1800 tonnes each year for the artisanal sector.   Maharashtra notification Section 4 of the Maharashtra Marine Fishing Regulation Act, 1981 dated October 13, 1999 states that purse seine gear should not been operated by any mechanized vessel within 12 nautical miles from shore. However, fishermen reported that compliance with this notification is lackluster due to absence of enforcement by state government agencies. Moreover, Maharashtra Notification dated 12th December 1997 affirms that no trawl gear should have less than 35 mm mesh size for trawlers operating in territorial waters of Thane, Mumbai, Raigad and Sindhudurg district. However, it was reported during interviews that most of the vessels operate trawl gear with mesh size between 15?25 mm, which is far less than the regulatory requirements.   4.4.3 Karnataka Karnataka has 300 km coastline with continental shelf of 27,000 km2 supporting 15,655 fishing crafts of which 7577 were traditional non-motorized craft, 3705 were motorized and 4373 mechanized vessels (2515 trawlers; 1254 gillnetters) CMFRI (2005c). Trawlers, gillnetters and purse seiners are the main fishing vessels in the mechanized sector while plank built boats and canoes are the main fishing craft in the artisanal sector.   No previous estimates were available for comparison with the above estimates hence estimates from the current IUU trip are the best available estimates for discards in Karnataka. The Karnataka Marine Fisheries Regulation act requires all mechanized  96trawlers operating along the coast to use a cod end mesh size of at least 30 mm. However, most of the trawlers were using 10-15 mm cod end mesh size resulting in indiscriminate capture of juveniles of fish and shrimps. This has also contributed to substantial discards during the monsoon season. Illegal fish catches by trawlers in the inshore traditional zone result in annual loss of 1200 - 1950 tonnes (based on interviews with small-scale fishermen along Karnataka coast).   4.4.4 Kerala Kerala has 590 km coastline with continental shelf of 36,000 km2 supporting 29,177 fishing crafts of which 5504 vessels were mechanized, 14,151 motorized and 9522 non-motorized fishing crafts. Of the vessels operating along the Kerala coast, trawlers comprised (72%), ring seiners (8%) and gillnetters (7.8%) in the mechanized sector (CMFRI 2005d).   Since the early eighties overfishing in coastal waters has been witnessed in both mechanised trawl and motorized boat sectors (Kurien 2005). Further, unsustainable exploitation in backwaters and inshore fishing grounds is pushing both subsistence and motorised fishermen towards destructive fishing practices (Kurien and Achari, 1990; Harikumar and Rajendran 2007).  Dynamite fishing has also been reported in some jurisdictions (Lal Mohan 1991). Previous studies also indicate that there are several gaps in collection of landings data. ?There is no organized system of collecting landings and effort data, and the available estimates seem so very crude. ?The present scale of unregulated fishery in the backwaters could be gauged from the quantity of young  97shrimps being caught at various points by the filtration fishery (Chemmeen kottu)? (Kalawar et al., 1985). The exact number of vessels being inducted into the fishery in the mechanised and motorized sectors also remains uncertain as large numbers of them are being constructed without permission from the authorities (Harikumar and Rajendran 2007).  Under Notification No. 448, dated February 18, 1986 of the Kerala Marine Fishing Regulation Act, 1980 the use of mid water trawl and bottom trawl gear with less than 35 mm stretched mesh is prohibited while fishing in territorial waters of the State (Kerala Government, 1986). Kerala Gazette No.10, dated March 11, 1986 also prohibits use of bottom trawl gear from sunset to sunrise in specific areas of the coast. Kalwar et al., (1985) reported that random inspection of mesh size from trawlers operating in Shaktikulangara revealed that most trawls were operating 20 mm mesh size in the cod end. A recent study by Kurup and Radhika (2004) found that 80% of trawlers engaged in shrimp trawling use cod end mesh size of 18 mm, while the remaining 20% used mesh size varying from 20-25 mm.   In this fieldwork it was found that shrimp trawlers use a mesh size of 10-20 mm, which indicates a further decline in cod end mesh size to target even smaller sized juveniles of shrimps and fish. Violations by trawlers into waters less than 20 m depth (reserved for traditional fishermen since 1980) have been reported since the inception of inshore artisanal zone (Kalwar et al., 1985). In the late eighties, mini trawlers were using a cod end mesh size of 10-12 mm, against the required mesh size of 20 mm (Vijayan et al.,  981990). In this fieldwork, enquiries with crew of mini-trawlers revealed that they are now using cod end mesh size of 8-12 mm, which indicates a further decline in mesh size for the 4000 mini trawlers operating along the Kerala coast. Stake nets are using mesh size of 10-12 mm and ring seines use 7-9 mm, which further illustrates a drastic decline in mesh size, resulting in recruitment overfishing of both fish and shrimps in their nursery grounds. Estimates of illegal catches by trawlers in the 5 nautical mile artisanal zone give an estimate of 2100 to 3320 tonnes for Kerala. Intrusions by trawlers into artisanal zone were reported in all the coastal districts with higher frequency of violations in Allepey, Ernakulam, Kozhikode, Kollam and Kasargod districts.  A ban on purse seining was initiated in the eighties to prevent loss of livelihood for traditional fishers, which led to design of an improvised new gear called ?ring seine?, which works in a similar fashion was developed from a traditional seine gear. The new net is 450 to 1000m long and employs up to 50 crew. This also led to development of larger plank built boats32 (?Kettu Vallam?), which were fitted with up to 3 outboard motors of 40 HP (40x3 =120 HP). Although these boats are far larger than the specifications for a traditional motorized fishing boat as per KMFRA 1980, they continue to operate ring seines during the monsoon ban, under the traditional motorized sector. Blatant violation of mesh size regulations is evident in both mechanized and traditional                                                  32 These boats were largely improvised for use in small-scale fisheries to catch sardines during fishing ban period for larger trawlers and purse seiners operating from fishing harbours. Although the scale of fish catches and size of fishing vessels are quite high with bulk of operations taking place on a commercial scale, the Kerala Government has done little to prevent misuse and overcapacity in the ring seine fishery.  99sectors, with purse-seiners, ring seine (Statutory requirement 20 mm), and bottom trawlers (Statutory requirement 35 mm) having a mesh size of 8-15 mm, which is far less than the statutory requirements under the Kerala Marine Fishing Regulation Act, 1980.  Of the 1727 stake nets operating in Cochin backwaters, 794 are licensed stake nets and 933 are illegal stake nets in operation (Thomson and Berkes 2006). Reliable estimates of unlicensed nets are hard to determine as several reports in the past also indicate that unlicensed nets are up to three times the number of licensed nets operating in Cochin backwaters (Kalawar et al., 1985; Anon 2007d; Pramod 2010).   Using estimates from this fieldwork, it was found that if we take the legal statutory requirements of the Kerala Government, almost 90 % of the 1727 stake nets are engaged in illegal fishing33, as majority of these nets do not follow the distance and mesh size34 requirements as well as illegal operation of nets during high tide35. Removal of illegal stake and Lift nets (also called Chinese dip nets or Cheenavala in Kerala) by the Fisheries Department has been met with stiff resistance by fishers in backwaters, so in recent years no action has been taken on illegal nets in operation. According to Thomson (2003) there                                                  33 Section 19 of Government water rules 1974 regarding fishing in Government waters stipulates that the distance between two stake nets in a stake line shall not exceed four meters and distance between two stake line shall not be less than 50 meters.  34 As per Travancore- Cochin Fisheries Act (1950) allowed mesh size of stake nets is 20 mm.  35 Section 22 of the Government Water Rules 1974 ?ruled that stake nets should not operate during flow tide (high tide)?.  100are more illegal nets (stake and Chinese dip nets) than licensed nets. Using catch information of average stake net catches/year, it is estimated that around 1119 to 3732 tonnes of illegal shrimps and fish are landed by these (assuming 933 illegal nets are in operation) stake nets within Cochin backwaters. This figure of illegal catch can range from 1864 to 6216 tonnes if we assume that 90% of nets are operating illegally in Cochin backwaters (adding illegal catches from mesh size, distance and operational requirements defaulters calculated for 1554 illegal stake nets in operation).   According to Vijayan et al., (2000) there are 17,724 stake nets in the state of Kerala and 90% of the stake nets have cod mesh size of less than 13 mm (George et al., 1998) against statutory requirement of 20 mm. Assuming that 54% of stake nets operating in Kerala are illegal and unlicensed from the above figure (Thomas and Berkes 2006), this would give an estimated illegal catch figure of 11,484 to 38,280 tonnes per year for 9570 illegal stake nets in the State. The State Fisheries Department is responsible for monitoring and enforcement of fisheries regulations in backwaters, but it is neither equipped with the appropriate infrastructure or manpower for these tasks. According to stake net fishermen, Fisheries Department officials never inspect or enforce any rules within backwaters. The history of non-compliance with fisheries regulations in backwaters goes back to several decades, with as many as 3131 unlicensed dip nets operating against 1692 licensed nets; 3887 unlicensed versus 12900 stake nets in the year 1989 (Nair 1989; Pauly, 1991; Srinivasan 2006). Fisher?s in many sections of the backwaters stated during interviews that they do comply with informal rules governed by Sanghams (Fisheries Society), which prevent them from using stake nets at high tides.  101However, Thomson (2003) states that most of nets located near bar mouth, Thevara and Aroor operate even during high tides.   Previous studies also indicate that there are several gaps in collection of landings data. ?There is no organized system of collecting landings and effort data, and the available estimates seem so very crude. The present scale of unregulated fishery in the backwaters could be gauged from the quantity of young shrimps being caught at various points by the filtration fishery (Chemmeen kottu)? (Kalawar et al., 1985). The exact number of vessels being inducted into the fishery in the mechanised and motorized sectors remains uncertain as large numbers of these vessels are being constructed without permission from the authorities (Harikumar and Rajendran 2007). Low penalties coupled with corruption and lack of regular monitoring has been cited as major reasons for continuance of illegal fishing in Cochin?s estuaries (Srinivasan 2005).  East Coast (Bay of Bengal): 61 interviews were conducted with trawler crew and 51interviews were done with small-scale fishers in the coastal states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, West Bengal and the island territories of Andaman Islands. A total of 16 field assistants were hired for conducting interviews during this period. In the small-scale sector, interviews were conducted with fishermen operating gillnets, hook and line, trammel gill nets, and cast nets. In the mechanized sector interviews were conducted with skippers and crew of demersal trawlers, longliners, and gillnetters.     1024.4.5 Tamil Nadu Tamil Nadu has 1076 km coastline with continental shelf of 41,000 km2 supporting 54,420 fishing crafts of which 24,448 were traditional non-motorized craft, 22,312 were motorized and 7618 mechanized vessels (5256 trawlers; 2361 gillnetters, purse seiners, liners, dol-netters) CMFRI (2005f). Catamarans (63%), plank built boats (34%) and dugout canoes (3%) are the main fishing craft in the artisanal sector.   With the exception of mesh size violations in the mechanised and small-scale sector and inter-sectoral conflicts between trawlers and artisanal craft, the majority of other fishery regulations are enforced well for fishing vessels operating in Tamil Nadu waters. Similar observations were made by Bavinck et al., (2008) who state that the closed season is implemented well in Tamil Nadu due to close co-ordination between mechanised boat owners association and the Fisheries Department. Interviews with fishermen in Rameshwaram, Mandapam and Tuticorn revealed widespread use of destructive gear such as inshore trawling gear ?Irratai Adi? which has caused immense damage to inshore reefs and sea grass beds.   Estimates from this fieldwork on illegal catches by Indian trawlers in the 3-mile artisanal zone give an estimate of 460 to 1220 tonnes for Tamil Nadu. Intrusions by trawlers into artisanal zone were reported in Nagapattinam, Rameshwaram and Tuticorn districts. Fishermen often complained that compensation for damages of artisanal gear is very minimal or none in many cases. Small-scale fishermen complained that the mechanised boat owners associations do not compensate them unless they provide some evidence  103such as vessel name, registration number and area of incident. Often the compensation paid does not even for the travel expenses from their fishing village to fishing harbor, hence in many cases fishermen do not complain to the authorities, except the village councils. Overall analysis for all the districts in TN reveals that compensation is available for only 10-35% of the reported incidents, and the compensation is far less than the costs of actual damage to the gear and boats.  4.4.6 Andhra Pradesh Andhra Pradesh has 974 km coastline with continental shelf of 33,000 km2 supporting 41,039 fishing crafts of which 24,386 were traditional non-motorized craft, 14,112 were motorized and 2541 mechanized vessels (1802 trawlers) CMFRI (2005g). Trawlers and gillnetters are the main fishing vessels in the mechanized sector while catamarans (64%), and plank built (34%) are the main fishing craft in the artisanal sector.  Illegal catches within this state waters are difficult to analyze, as fishermen are apprehensive about the use of information given to scientists. Estimates from this fieldwork on illegal catches by trawlers in the 8 km artisanal zone give an estimate of 1300 to 2600 tonnes for Andhra Pradesh. The exact number of unregistered mechanised trawlers operating in state waters is uncertain, but interviews with fishermen revealed that around 40-60 such mechanised trawlers operate in the state?s waters. Each unregistered trawler (10-14 metres OAL) catches around 66 tonnes fish per year (3 tonnes of fish per trip; 22 trips per year); so 50 trawlers would land around 3300 tonnes of fish per year.   104The State Fisheries Department has arrested some unregistered vessels in recent years (Anon 2008d).   4.4.7 Orissa Orissa has 480 km coastline with continental shelf of 26,000 km2 supporting 23,740 fishing crafts of which were traditional non-motorized craft, 4719 were motorized and 3577 mechanized vessels (1340 trawlers) CMFRI (2005h). Previous studies have not given any estimates on discards in Orissa?s marine fisheries. Hence, estimates of discards from the current trip are the best available estimates for this state. Illegal fishing violations ranged from mesh size violations, inter-sectoral conflicts between motorized fishing vessels and trawlers due to incursions into inshore artisanal zone. Estimates from this fieldwork on illegal catches by trawlers in the 5 km artisanal zone give an estimate of 2100 to 4100 tonnes for Orissa.   Although Orissa has very few enforcement assets, the State Fisheries Department, Forest Department and the Indian Coast Guard have coordinated one of the best patrolling efforts along the Indian coastline to patrol and enforce fishing and marine regulations within marine protected areas here. The reason for existence of this level of enforcement in this State, while there is scarcely such effort in other coastal states of mainland India, is due to the presence of huge international and national media every year during the Olive Ridley turtle-breeding season. The coastline of Orissa?s has one of the single biggest Olive Ridley breeding and nesting grounds (locally known as ?arribadas?) in the Indian Ocean. Since mid-nineties, the issue of massive deaths of Olive Ridley turtles each  105year due to trawling in inshore waters esp., during turtle breeding season received huge media attention through conservation non-governmental organisations and government institutions such as Wildlife Institute of India. This led to announcement of several marine protected areas where fishing is banned every year in the stretch where olive turtles congregate to breed and then come ashore to lay eggs along the coastline. Both the state and federal government have announced regulations which prohibit fishing by both mechanised trawlers and motorized boats using gillnets and driftnets in these waters. The Forest Department undertakes patrols on shore and inland in rivers and near estuaries, while Coast Guard undertakes patrols at sea to apprehend any trawlers violating the conservation zone, which extends upto 20 km (The Orissa State Fisheries Department imposes ban on fishing up to 20 km from the shoreline from November 1 to May 31 each year). Majority of the trawlers violate this ban as the turtle-breeding season coincides with shrimp fishing season, so trawlers congregate in coastal areas to catch shrimps.    In recent decades, the Coast Guard has also provided one patrol ship and aerial surveillance during the turtle-breeding season to help the Forest department in apprehending illegal fishing vessels. It is also perhaps the only state where mechanised trawlers are regularly arrested every year for fishing in inshore artisanal zone and Marine Sanctuaries (Gahirmatha marine sanctuary and Rushikulya marine conservation area). Some of the type of violations and arrests of fishing boats and trawlers are given in Appendix E. Majority of illegal trawlers were from Orissa and Andhra Pradesh (Appendix E, GIUFI (2010). Around 60% of arrested trawlers were from Andhra Pradesh, while the remaining 40% were gillnetters and trawlers from Orissa. Figures  106from Appendix E, show that around 50-70 trawlers were arrested in late nineties, with around 40-50 trawlers apprehended by Forest Department, State Fisheries Department and Indian Coast Guard patrol boats each in year during 2000-2009 period. Skippers on vessels arrested for illegally fishing in Orissa?s marine sanctuaries revealed that Coast Guard and Forest Department usually confiscate the catch and gear, before taking them to Paradeep port for prosecution in local courts. In most cases the vessels are kept in port for 1-2 months, and boat owners often have to pay fines ranging from Rs. 50,000 ? Rs. 90,000 (approx. US$ 1100 - 1500) to get their trawlers released, after paying such fines with police and local courts (Respondents 156, 162, 167, 171).    4.4.8 West Bengal  West Bengal has 158 km coastline with continental shelf of 17,000 km2 supporting 18,646 fishing crafts of which 15,444 were traditional non-motorized craft, 1776 were motorized and 6829 mechanized vessels (610 trawlers) CMFRI (2005e). Gillnets, fixed bagnets, and shore seines are the main fishing craft in the artisanal sector.   There is a growing problem due to illegal incursion of Bangladeshi fishing trawlers to fish in the West Bengal?s rich estuarine waters; very few such trawlers have been apprehended due to mangrove and creeks serving as hideouts for such illegal trawlers along Indo-Bangladesh border in the Sundrabans (Respondents: 178, 179, 186).  Illegal fish catches by trawlers in the inshore traditional zone result in annual loss of 802 to 1920 tonnes (based on nine interviews with small-scale fishermen along West Bengal coast).  Fishermen reported that due to intense patrolling by the Coast Guard, in recent years  107Bangladeshi vessels have been observed moving towards Orissa?s territorial waters. Both the Forest Department and the Coast Guard along the Orissa Coastline have arrested many such Bangladesh trawlers in recent years.  4.5 Illegal fishing by Indian trawlers in inshore waters allocated to artisanal fishers in coastal states of mainland India Interviews conducted during the 2008 field trip also revealed the extent of illegal fishing by Indian trawlers in the inshore fishing zone allocated to small-scale motorized and non-motorized fishers under the State Marine Fisheries Regulation Acts (MFRA). It is pertinent to note here that although catches by trawlers in the artisanal zone is illegal, the catches from this vessels are not considered unreported, as catches from all these trawlers is landed in Indian fishing ports and forms part of national fisheries statistics that is reported to UN Food and Agriculture Organisation each year.            108 Table 4.2: Violation of Marine Fisheries Regulation Acts by Indian trawlers in the artisanal zone. Results from interviews with small-scale fisheries in eight coastal states and 2 offshore island territories (Lakshadweep islands, Andaman and Nicobar islands).  State MFRA Mesh size regulations violation rate Illegal intrusions of Indian trawlers into 5 nm artisanal zone  Violations of foreign vessels into Indian EEZ (Number of vessels sighed per year) Small-scale Mechanised trawlers Gujarat - 85% 95% M 6-24 vessels / year Maharashtra Yes 80% 90% H 1-2 vessels / year Karnataka Yes 90% 100% M 1-3 vessels / year Kerala Yes 100% 100% H 1-4 vessels / year Tamil Nadu Yes 80% 95% M 8-16 vessels  / year Andhra Pradesh Yes 85% 95% H 1-5 vessels / year Orissa Yes 80% 85% M 1-2 vessels / year West Bengal Yes 95% 90% M 12-16 vessels / year Andaman and Nicobar Islands No 65% 50% L 10-24 vessels / year Lakshadweep Islands No NA NA NA 2-5 vessels / year  91-100% mesh size violations   80-89 % mesh size violations  50-79% mesh size violations H High (Intrusions observed 76-100% of fishing days in an year) M Medium (Intrusions observed 50-75% of fishing days in an year) L Low (Intrusions observed less than 50% of the fishing days in an year)  Table 4.2 shows result from interviews with small-scale fishers in the eight coastal states and 2 offshore island territories (Lakshadweep islands, Andaman & Nicobar islands). Table 4.4 shows the artisanal zone, which varies from 5- 8 km in the eight coastal states. Table 4.4 also shows the various State fisheries regulations, which prohibit trawling in the inshore artisanal zone.  During the interviews in 2008, small-scale fishers were asked to mention the number of trawlers intruding into their artisanal zone each year (Pramod 2008). Analysis of interviews on illegal intrusions by Indian trawlers reveals that high  109level of incursions took place in Maharashtra, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh, with fishers reporting such incursions at least 75-100% of the fishing days in a year. Moderate level of trawler incursions (50-75% of fishing days in a year) into artisanal zone were observed in Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Orissa and West Bengal.   Table 4.3: Estimates of illegal catches by Indian trawlers in the artisanal zone36 State Illegal catches in tonnes / year Gujarat 740 to 1130 tonnes Maharashtra 1100 to 1800 tonnes Karnataka 1200 - 1950 tonnes Kerala 2100 - 3320 tonnes Tamil Nadu 460 to 1220 tonnes Andhra Pradesh 1300 ? 2600 tonnes Orissa 2100 ? 4100 tonnes West Bengal 820 ? 1920 tonnes Total 9820 ? 17,840 tonnes / year Please refer Table. 4.4. for details on area allocated to artisanal fishermen in each state                                                  36 Please note that although these catches are ?illegal?, they are not assessed as unreported landings in the current study as they are reported through national fisheries agencies to FAO due to the fact that they are landed in Indian fishing ports and form part of national catch enumeration in all the coastal states.   110Estimates of illegal catches by Indian trawlers in the artisanal zone are given in Table 4.3. Data reveals that every year artisanal fishers in the eight coastal states loose around 9820 to 17,840 tonnes of fish catch every year, with Kerala and Orissa facing far higher losses of around 2000-4000 tonnes each year. These incursions not only result in loss of fishing gear and catches but also result in destruction of nursery grounds for smaller fish and shrimps, especially around creeks, estuaries and backwaters (Pramod 2008).   Data collected through interviews with skippers of Indian deep-sea vessels in Table 4.2 also shows the violations by foreign fishing vessels in the Indian EEZ (Pramod 2008). High incursions of foreign vessels were by observed by fishers in Gujarat (6-24 vessels observed each year), followed by around 8-16 vessels observed in Tamil Nadu waters each year.  Mesh size measurements were also undertaken in small-scale and mechanised sectors to see compliance of fishers to state and federal fisheries laws, which specify legal cod-end of the fishing gears (see Table 4.2, column 3 for more details on violation rate). Data from interviews shows that 80% of the fishing trawlers had smaller cod-end mesh size compared to the legal size, while the cod-end mesh size violations was far higher in all the remaining seven coastal states (90-100% of the gears had smaller mesh size than the legally specific size limits).   Eleven respondents (59, 63, 65, 69, 72, 115,118, 124, 131, 156, 164) stated the incentives behind such incursions; intensity of trawling increased in late sixties largely to cater to export demand for shrimps in USA and Europe. During 1970-1990, seasonal incursions into inshore areas were reported during shrimp season when adults migrate to coastal  111waters, largely targeting shrimps for export markets. Due to decline in shrimp catches since 1990s, trawlers have been reportedly increasing fishing in artisanal zones both during post-monsoon season, when shrimps are abundant in coastal areas, as well as to target smaller species of fish and invertebrates for conversion into fish meal in the poultry sector. Prior to 1995, trash fish landed by trawlers along in Bay of Bengal fetched very low price as it was usually sold as fishmeal into poultry sector where demand was very low. Due to spike in aquaculture activity in late nineties, several fishmeal plants came up along the coast hence prices of trash fish landed in fishing ports of Bay of Bengal increased. Smaller trawlers in the Sona and Pablo category (10-15 m overall length) along Andhra and Orissa coast fished in waters within the vicinity of fishing ports (6-8 hour trips) to reduce operational costs and exclusively landed several categories of non-commercial fish and invertebrates for the fishmeal industry.               112Table 4.4: State-wise allocation for small-scale fishing craft in India. Marine Fisheries Rules and Marine Fisheries Regulation Acts mentioned in the footnote provide detailed explanation of zones allocated to artisanal fishers in 8 coastal states.   State Zone allocated exclusively for Artisanal fishermen37 Relevant State Legislations Gujarat 5 nm from shore (9 km from the coast horizontally) 38Gujarat Marine Fishing Rules, 2003 Goa  5 km from the shore Goa, Daman and Diu Marine Regulations Act Kerala Area from the shore up to the 25 fathom line in the sea, along the coast line of the State from Kollengode to Paravoor Pozhikkara for a length of 78 kilometers; and the area up to 18 fathom line in the sea, along the coast line from Paravoor, Pozhikkara to Kovilthottam for a length of 26 kilometers; and the area up to 12 fathom line in the sea, along the coast line from Kovilthottam to Manjeswaram for a length of 486 Kilometers Kerala Marine Fishing Regulation Ordinance, 198039,40 Tamil Nadu 3 nm from the shore; No deep-sea fishing vessels shall operate at depths of 25 fathoms or below. Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Rules, 198341,42 Andhra Pradesh 8 km from the shore (Contravention may lead to fine of Rs. 2,500 /- A.P. Marine Fishing Rules, 199543                                                  37 Trawling by mechanised fishing vessels (trawlers) is prohibited within this zone 38 Gujarat Fisheries Rules, 2003, Gujarat Government Gazette Ex., 15-8-2003, Registered No.G/GNR/2, Vol. XLIV. 39 Government of Kerala Notification dated December 29, 1980, G.O.(P) 156/80/FandPD. 40 Government of Kerala Vol. XXIX No.1055 dated December 3, 1984, G.O. (P) 136/84/PW, FandPD. 41 Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Rules 1983, Directorate of Fisheries, G.O. Ms. No. 993, Forests and Fisheries Department dated August 17, 1983. 42 Tamil Nadu Notification for Regulating Deep-sea Fishing Vessels, G.O. Ms. No. 166 dated 22.8.95.  43 Andhra Pradesh Marine Fishing (Regulation) Rules, 1995, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries Department, Registered No.HSE/49, July 23, 1996.  113State Zone allocated exclusively for Artisanal fishermen44 Relevant State Legislations Orissa Waters up to 5 km from shore allocated only for non-mechanised traditional crafts; Mechanised fishing vessels up to 15 m OAL beyond 5 km from the coast; Mechanised fishing vessels above 15 m beyond 10 km from shore Orissa Marine Fishing Regulation Rules, 198345 West Bengal Non-mechanised vessels up to 9 metres in length up to 8 km from shore (Zone A); Non ? mechanised vessels above 9 metres in length can only operate up to 20 km but not below 8 km from shore (Zone B); Mechanised vessels up to 15 m length are allowed to operate within 20 to 50 km from shore (Zone C); Vessels above 15 m length have to operate beyond 50 km from shore (Zone D) West Bengal Marine Fishing Rules, 199546  4.6 Illegal fishing in offshore waters off India?s EEZ One could say that India?s aspirations to generate economic profits from the marine sector gained momentum in the post UNCLOS period. Illegal fishing has been seen as a persistent threat to its sovereignty and maritime security. Poaching is an incessant problem along India?s coastline with its impact far difficult to assess in earlier decades from 1950 to 1980s due to absence of any concrete patrolling along its vast coastline (Peterson and Teal 1986). Growth in the domestic fisheries sector during eighties was largely hampered by lack of shore based infrastructure and short operational limit of fishing vessels to a few miles from the coast (Rao 1981).                                                     44 Trawling by mechanised fishing vessels (trawlers) is prohibited within this zone 45 Orissa Marine Fishing Regulation Rules, 1983, Government of Orissa, Forest, Fisheries and A.H. Department, Notification dated January 10, 1984. 46 West Bengal Marine Fishing Rules, 1995, Calcutta Gazette, Magha 17, February 6, 1996, West Bengal Government Press, Alipore.  114 Figure 4.3: Estimated total illegal catch taken by foreign fishing vessels in the Indian EEZ. Estimated total illegal catch (t) taken by foreign fishing vessels in the Indian EEZ (1970-2009). The Red dotted line in the figure represents the estimated illegal catch that was confiscated from vessels that were arrested in Indian waters from 1964-2009. The lower and upper bound estimates were derived independently from IUU fishing trip interviews (Pramod 2008), surveillance data in GIUFI (2010), Industry and Government records of vessels that were observed poaching in Indian waters.  Illegal catches for the period 1964-1982 are for foreign fishing vessels observed poaching within 12 nautical miles from shore. India declared six miles territorial water limit from the baselines on March 22, 1956. India extended its territorial limit to 12 miles on September 12, 1967. India passed the Maritime Zones Act on August 25, 1976 to claim a 200-mile EEZ and continental shelf.  A detailed quantitative estimate of illegal catches from these foreign fishing vessels was calculated (Figure 4.3) using illegal catch confiscated from arrested vessels, number of arrested foreign vessels and number of vessels observed poaching by Indian small-scale and deep sea fishing vessel skippers and crew members (Respondents 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 23, 26, 43, 57, 61, 184, 189, 196). During the 1970-1980 period, foreign  115fishing vessels took at least around 15,000 to 50,000 tonnes of fish and shrimps in the Indian EEZ; in the next decade from 1980-1990, foreign fishing vessels illegally caught 35,000 to 90,000 tonnes of shrimp and fish stocks from Indian waters (Respondents 1, 13, 15). Poaching only declined in the post-1995 period (Respondents 13, 19, 23, 57, 64, 97) with catches in last decade from 2000-2009 showing illegal catches in the range of 10,000 to 25,000 tonnes probably as a consequence of improvement in monitoring control and surveillance by Indian Coast Guard limiting such incursions into the Indian EEZ.   Some of the first reports of poaching in the Indian EEZ appear in Anon (1981), which gives a very good picture of extent of poaching by Thai trawlers off Andhra Pradesh Coast. Back then, the Coast Guard with its meager fleet did manage to catch 30 trawlers for the 1981-83 period, but invading trawlers by their sheer numbers truly outnumbered capability of patrolling vessels. The Indian Coast Guard started with a fleet of seven patrol vessels in 1973, before increasing its strength to seventeen vessels by 1983 (Mohan 1984). Some of the other constraints included Coast Guard having only one Fokker aircraft operating from Calcutta to monitor the entire EEZ in the year 1983, leading to severe gaps in air surveillance during this period (Mohan 1984).   A deeper analysis of the illegal fishing vessels arrested and the information in GIUFI (2010) database reveals that during the 1950-1970 period majority of illegal and unregulated fishing occurred in three regions, i.e. the North West coast of India (Arabian Sea), central east coast of India (Bay of Bengal) and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.  116During the 1950-1970 period illegal / unregulated fishing activity on the north-west coast was conducted by Taiwanese and South Korean trawlers mainly targeting shrimp, squids, cuttlefish and sharks off Maharashtra and Gujarat coasts; rock cods and shrimps off Kerala coast; Sri Lankan fishing vessels targeted groupers and sharks of Laccadives, Kerala and Karnataka coasts. During the same period, Thai and Taiwanese trawlers targeted shrimp stocks off Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal, while the Japanese and Korean vessels targeted Yellowfin and Bigeye tuna off Orissa coast. Off the Andaman islands Thai, Korean, Russian and Taiwanese vessels targeted tuna, with each of these vessels (up to 400 GRT) catching up to 90 tonnes in the 2 month period, majority of these vessels operated up to 4 months in the Indian EEZ until 1972 (Respondents 3, 4, 7, 10, 13, 14); (GIUFI 2010).   In the 1970-1990 periods, illegal fishing by Thai and Taiwanese trawlers was more prominent off Orissa and Visakhapatnam coast, manly targeting rich shrimp grounds between Puri (Orissa) and Krishnapatnam off the Andhra coast. (Respondents 15, 17, 19, 23, 26) reported that seasonal incursion of upto 50 Thai and Taiwanese vessels off Orissa and Andaman islands was existent even up to 1990, mainly targeting Yellowfin tuna and sharks. In the post-1990 period the rapid increase in patrolling capacity of Indian Coast Guard and continuous monitoring throughout the year through the Dornier aircraft acted as a significant deterrent in preventing incursions from Thai and Taiwanese trawlers. In the 1990-2009 periods, majority of the incursions were from Sri Lankan driftnetters and Bangladeshi trawlers in the Bay of Bengal, while very few incursions by Pakistani and Sri Lankan vessels have been reported off Arabian Sea. Majority of the Sri Lankan  117vessels targeted tuna in the Bay of Bengal while targeting both tuna and sharks off Lakshadweep islands. Bangladeshi trawlers targeted sciaenid and shrimp stocks off Orissa coast. According to small-scale fishermen frequent presence of Coast guard vessels and aerial patrolling resulted in apprehension of at least 80% of illegal vessels off Orissa coast, while 20% managed to get away as many of the Bangladeshi trawlers look similar to Indian trawlers operating off West Bengal and north Orissa coasts. Fishermen in Orissa reported that Indian coast Guard apprehended 95% of illegal tuna driftnetters cum longliners from Sri Lankan during the last decade, but the release of vessels after arrests provided massive incentives for the Lankan vessels to come back into Indian EEZ in subsequent years.   4.7 Discrepancies of foreign joint venture chartered tuna longliners  Under the Maritime Zones of India Act, of 1981 Indian Coast Guard is the nodal agency responsible for monitoring chartered vessels operating under joint venture Letter of Permission (LoP) with Indian companies. Up to 1995 alone, 800 of these vessels were licensed to operate in Indian EEZ (Kurien, 1995). Management of foreign chartered vessels appears to be a problem for long with past reports stating the extent of the problem ?In India, there is no centrally planned fishery development programme, foreign owned vessels are inadequately supervised? (Peterson and Teal 1986). In recent years as many as 40-60 chartered joint venture tuna longliners have been operating in Indian waters. The joint venture vessels originally came from Taiwan, and operate under an Indian flag while fishing in Indian EEZ, while retaining their original vessel registration in Taiwan. The names of the original vessels are changed while fishing in Indian waters;  118so they have no IMO number and essentially engage in ?flag hopping?. The Association of Indian Fishery Industry has asked various government agencies to take action on the companies and vessels involved (Patnaik, 2008) with little impact as these vessels continue to fish in the Indian EEZ. Violations include dual registration47, under-reporting, illegal transfer of catches, failure to file shipping bills to Indian Customs listing the quantity of catch being taken out while exiting Indian EEZ, and violations of the Maritime Zones of India Act48 (Patnaik 2008; Pramod 2010).   The modus operandi is explained below. The Government of India acquires the deep sea fishing vessels on ?deferred payment? under External Commercial Borrowing / Suppliers Credit. The original tuna vessel owner from Taiwan registers the vessels to a management company, and this company signs an agreement with the Indian company. The tuna vessel is then shown as vessel sold to Indian company on deferred payment. 10% of the down payment is made at the time of issue of the Letter of Permission (LoP) and the balance has to be paid in five equal installments. The conditions for the Indian company are that they should have a paid up capital of Indian Rupees 2,000,000                                                  47 Section 435 of the Marine Shipping Act states that for a vessel to fly an Indian flag it should be registered under ownership of an Indian.  48 As per MZI Act, 1981 an Indian vessel means ? (I) a vessel owned by a Central Act or by a corporation established by a Central Act, or (II) a vessel (i) Which is owned wholly by persons to each of whom any of the following description applies: (1) A citizen of India; (2) a company in which not less than sixty percent, of the share capital is held by citizens of India; (ii) Which is registered under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, or under any other Central Act or any provincial or State Act?.  119(equivalent to US$ 43,478) whereas the amount of 10% payment works out to Indian Rupees 20,000,000 (US$ 434,782). To overcome this shortfall the seller of the vessel advances the money by the way of advance for tuna catch. This rotation of funds is only to get the necessary clearance to operate the vessels in Indian EEZ. In fact, these vessels are presumably operating through buyer and seller agreement on a commission basis, which violates the regulatory process itself (Anon, pers. comm. 2008; Pramod 2010). Interestingly, many of the personal sources (Academics, Government officers, enforcement personnel, captains of fishing vessels etc.) were very willing and keen to share their knowledge and information, but have expressed a clear preference for not being named, i.e., wanting to remain anonymous, usually out of concern for their job security. Throughout this chapter, I treat such concerns seriously, and cite ?anonymous? for such material. I also endeavor to use such information in a manner so as not to make the original source apparent.  4.8 Fishing in disguise: LoP tuna longliners in Indian waters Estimates of illegal tuna fish transshipments by Indian registered and foreign owned longliners was also estimated through interviews in 2008. Foreign-chartered tuna longliners are more than 20-40 metres in length, and well equipped to stay at sea for more 4-6 weeks. The majority of these vessels are Taiwanese owned along with a few Thai registered vessels in recent years. Former crew members from these vessels and Indian deep sea tuna industry officials allege that ?the original registration of these vessels are kept intact and the vessels are registered in some third country such as Tuvalu / Sierra Leone and all necessary documents are submitted to the Indian Registrar of Shipping for  120registering the fishing vessel as an Indian vessel under the Merchant Shipping Act. None of these vessels are registered with IOTC and after completing fishing in the Indian EEZ they claim that they are fishing in the International Waters, this again is a gross violation of the IOTC resolutions? (Respondent: 72).   According to former crew members on LoP vessels, these tuna vessels under-report catches of yellowfin and bigeye tuna through the Indian companies and most of the Indian companies are aware of this plunder. LoP operator?s report US$ 2 / kg as price for tuna caught in Indian waters, while the same Yellowfin and bigeye tuna catch taken by Indian tuna vessels is sold at US$ 6-9 / kg. Further, the LoP operators report no value for by-catch (by-catch contributes 50% of total catch for each haul); while records from Indian tuna vessels show that by-catch fetches US$ 1.5 / kg. Indian tuna vessel operators who process their catch in shore based processing plants (OSP), with 2% hooking rate report that annual catch is around 235 tonnes / small converted tuna longliners, while LoP vessels with far higher capacity which engage in Mid-sea transshipment (MST) with 2% hooking rate can catch upto 576 tonnes / medium sized tuna vessel.   Fishing crew working on LoP vessels (Respondents: 56, 61, 196 and 201) stated during interviews that on an average 24-60 m OAL vessel could fish continuously for 30-45 days. These vessels need to catch 260 tonnes / vessel / year to break-even and any catch above this amount will fetch profits. On an average these vessels catch up to 570-600 tonnes / year even at a hooking rate of 2%, of which the vessels make break even in less than 5 months, with any catch caught above this period fetching them high profits. Crew  121members interviewed during the survey also mentioned that LoP Tuna longliners report only 20% of the actual catch caught during the whole year through the Indian company. The information from interviews with crew on LoP vessels corroborates information from (Rao 2009, page 266.), which shows average 82.3 ? 181 tonnes reported catch / LoP tuna longliner, which does not even cover operating costs of the vessel let alone making profits from these operations. Miyake (2004) states that current economic break-even point for tuna longliners (regardless of fleet) is 250 tonnes of average catch per vessel / year.  Recent reports from Indian Coast Guard in 2009 corroborate the extent illegal tuna transshipments by LoP vessels in Indian waters, with as many as 22 LoP vessels recalled by Coast Guard (Period: Nov 1, 2008 to Jan 31, 2009) for not fulfilling the conditions of LoP license and exiting Indian EEZ without prior clearance from Coast Guard and Indian Customs (Anon 2009e).   According to the Association of Indian Fishery Industries, they have taken up these issues with the concerned investigating agencies and expect the Government to take action on Indian companies shortly. The vessels essentially engage in flag hopping as, they operate under an Indian flag in Indian waters, and use the Taiwanese flag in international waters, where they transship the tuna caught in the Indian EEZ. The tuna is eventually sold as tuna caught by Taiwanese vessels into Japanese markets. Recently, some of these chartered vessels have changed to Indian flag, as reflected by a sudden increase in Indian flagged vessels (Since 2005) in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) authorized vessel list. However, several inconsistencies still exist with illegal transshipments and vessel licensing of Taiwanese tuna vessels operating in Indian EEZ.  122Some of the steps that can be taken to tackle this problem include implementation of observer scheme and vessel monitoring system (VMS) as part of license requirements for all foreign-chartered vessels operating within the Indian EEZ. The VMS can provide much needed information for Coast Guard to check discrepancies in IUU fish catches, while observers onboard the tuna vessels can help to counter check transshipments at sea. This is essential, as bulk of the chartered tuna vessels operating in Indian waters do not land their catches in Indian ports.  4.9 Troubled waters: Indo-Sri Lankan illegal fishing problem No problem has received as much media and political limelight as the Indian trawlers caught for poaching in Sri Lankan waters. The large numbers of trawlers operating from southern Tamil Nadu have contributed to the problem. Increase in capacity did not pose any problem as the shrimp boom on the Indian side of Palk Bay and Gulf of Mannar lasted until the mid-eighties. The export-oriented overseas demand for shrimp led to more investments in building new trawlers, increasing the capacity. But, when the catches declined in late eighties, instead of curtailing the overcapacity trawler operators on the Indian side found rich grounds on the other side of maritime boundary in Sri Lankan waters. As these waters were relatively unexploited due to the Tamil problem in northern Sri Lanka, the Indian trawlers frequently entered Sri Lankan waters and fished for shrimp and finfish. The problem of incursions was widespread with many casualties on Indian side as the Indian trawlers were frequently fired upon by Sri Lankan Navy gunboats trying to prevent these incursions; they saw these trawlers as potential smugglers of fuel and other supplies to the Tamil-controlled northern Sri Lankan territory (Respondents 63,  12365, 66). In spite of frequent casualties, boats continued to operate until late nineties, when the incursions declined due to huge naval presence by both the Indian Coast Guard and Sri Lankan Navy (Respondent: 72).   The Government of India has taken some action in this direction by giving tokens to fishing trawlers from Palk Bay and other northern areas, which requires them to return from fishing within a specific time period, thereby preventing any incursions into Lankan waters. In recent years the problem of incursions appears to be more prominent from trawlers operating from Rameshwaram. There is no quick fix solution to the problem of incursions by trawlers from Rameshwaram due to three reasons. As aptly stated by one crew member on trawlers operating from Palk Bay ?These trawlers are owned by commercial interests and are not worth anything if they don?t fish; no one would buy them for a dime even if they wish to sell them? (Respondent 66). The second incentive for fishing crew to take risks is that their daily incomes are linked to amount of catch they bring after each trip, and as prawns fetch a higher price, occasional incursions into Lankan waters might yield higher returns. The third biggest disincentive in terms of catch per vessel appears to be overcapacity of trawlers, which are more than thrice the number of vessels that can bring in good catches from the shrimp grounds of Palk Bay and Gulf of Mannar on the Indian side.  Estimates from 2008 interviews reveal that around 15-80 trawlers from Rameshwaram entered Sri Lankan waters for up to 3-9 months in a year, especially during lean periods but these incursions have declined since 2006 due to massive naval presence on both sides of the maritime boundary.    124Anon (2004b) and other documents state that up to 150 Indian trawlers might be fishing illegally in Sri Lankan waters for up to 150 days in a year. The Indian trawlers reported in such activities are 28-46 foot long. Vivekanandan (2004) states that up to 2500 Indian trawlers fish illegally in Lankan waters. According to Anon (2004c) the State Government of Tamil Nadu cancelled 4 fishing licenses, imposed fines of Rs. 391,000 and suspended licenses of 603 trawlers for violating the maritime boundary. According to NEERI (2004) around 900 boats (motorized and non-motorized) operated from Rameshwaram on alternate days, and per boat catch ranges from 20-25 kg prawns and 600 kg fish. Interviews with fishermen in Tamil Nadu on the Indo-Sri Lanka maritime border revealed that, previously, illegal fishing was undertaken for profit, mainly targeting shrimp, while in recent times accidental incursions into Sri Lankan waters is for survival due to declining catches in Indian waters, overcapacity and inability of smaller trawlers from Palk Bay to fish in neighboring coastal states of mainland India.   Indian fishers in Palk Bay and Mandapam stated that accidental incursions of fishing vessels from both countries occur on a regular basis into each other?s waters. Based on interviews in the present study (Respondents: 93, 97, 103, 104 and 109), the problem of illegal fishing in Palk bay and Mandapam are likely due to three reasons. Firstly, the government of India has tried to solve the problem of incursions through increased patrolling along the international maritime boundary, instead of controlling the huge overcapacity of Indian trawlers operating along Palk Bay and Mandapam. The trawling grounds along the Palk Bay and Mandapam can hardly sustain fishing pressure from one third of the existing fleet. Fishermen from Palk Bay were of the opinion that since there is  125a narrow border separating India and Sri Lanka, accidental intrusions should be treated with utmost sensitivity through warnings, with crew and vessels being promptly released for such cases.  4.10 Incursions of Sri Lankan vessels into the Indian EEZ Sri Lankan longliners are also frequently caught by the Indian Coast Guard for illegally fishing for tuna and sharks in the Indian EEZ. During the seventies and eighties they were frequently caught off Andaman and Nicobar islands EEZ. During the period 1980-2000, they fished unhindered in Bay of Bengal, as there was virtually no fishing activity in offshore waters by Indian longliners in the Bay of Bengal. Starting in 2000, many Indian built trawlers were converted into tuna longliners to fish for tuna, which brought them in conflict with Indian LoP vessels and Indian owned medium sized longliners (Operating from Visakhapatnam and Chennai). But in recent decades Sri Lankan driftnetters have been caught all along the east coast of India (Bay of Bengal), while illegally fishing for tuna. Owners of Indian longliners who operate between 60-120 km off Andhra and Orissa coasts complain that Sri Lankan drift netters frequently steal their radio buoys, and damage their longlines (Respondent 71).  The Indian Coast Guard frequently hands over apprehended vessels to Sri Lankan navy, but they come back in more numbers year after year to poach for tuna. A common understanding seems to exist between India and Sri Lanka, with illegal tuna vessels from Sri Lanka and illegal Indian shrimp trawlers operating in each other?s jurisdiction being arrested and handed over to each other?s Coast Guard?s on a regular basis.  126 Figure 4.4: Sri Lankan fishing vessels arrested in the Indian EEZ (1981-2010). Source:  GIUFI (2010) Database.  Information from Figure 4.4 shows that the number of illegal Sri Lankan tuna vessels operating in Indian waters has increased drastically, putting Indian tuna vessels at disadvantage. A recent media report suggests that almost all the multi-day Lankan tuna vessels that were caught illegally fishing for tuna in Indian EEZ during 2009 were handed over to Sri Lankan authorities (Anon 2010g). A deeper analysis of illegal fishing vessels arrested (GIUFI 2010) prior to 1990s in Indian EEZ reveals that majority of vessels were confiscated and seldom handed back to Sri Lankan authorities. In recent decades however, almost all the vessels have been released along with the crew although Indian Coast Guard caught them while they were engaged in illegal fishing in the Indian EEZ. A press release from Government of India revealed that 116 Sri Lankan fishing vessels were arrested in 2009 (Anon 2010h). The majority of the arrested vessels were multi-day tuna longliners / driftnetters. Data from GIUFI (2010) database reveals that more than 100 of these apprehended Sri Lankan vessels in 2009 are tuna long liners. So, the Indian  127government has lost (each multi-day Lankan tuna vessel has a current market price of US$ 58,000 per vessel) US$ 5,764,000 from 100 vessels, which were handed over to Sri Lankan authorities after arrests49. Return of illegal fishing vessels on both sides does not stand in good stead as majority of these illegal multiday tuna vessels in Sri Lanka and illegal fishing trawlers from India are owned by commercial interests (Basavaiah 1995; Amarasinghe 2001; Pramod 2010). Handing over of the apprehended crew on both sides is a good move to improving bilateral relations, but governments on both sides should confiscate fishing vessels implicated in illegal fishing to send a strong signal to the vessel operators.  4.11 Conclusion  As aptly stated by India?s founding leader Mahatma Gandhi ?'There is enough for everyone's need but not for everyone's greed? commercialization of fisheries sector with gross disregard to laws and regulations has led to decline in Indian fisheries. There is no dearth of fisheries related regulations in each state (Marine Fisheries Regulation Acts), but implementation of these acts is virtually absent, except in the State of Orissa where serious attempts have been made in the last decade to implement fisheries and environmental laws in marine sanctuaries. The current study presents one of the first                                                  49 Chapter IV of Maritime Zones of India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act, 1981 states that ?13. (1) Where any person is convicted of an offence under section 10 or section 11 or section 12, the foreign vessel used in or in connection with the commission of the said offence, together with its fishing gear equipment, stores and cargo and any fish on board such ship or the proceeds of the sale of any fish ordered to section (4) of section 9 shall also be liable to confiscation?  128estimates of illegal trawler incursions into the artisanal zone reserved for small-scale fishers in India. Moreover, such estimates are very valuable as enforcement responsibility for territorial waters lies with coastal states in Indian waters, with Coast Guard responsible for monitoring waters between 12 to 200 nautical miles EEZ zone. The study revealed that with the exception of Orissa, none of the other states conducted regular patrols or monitoring of 0-6 nm waters. Estimates of illegal fishing gathered from fishermen strengthen data on fisheries violations, as enforcement in these waters has traditionally been very low in Indian waters. Confidential interviews with enforcement staff have strengthened estimates for upper and lower bounds for illegal fishing catches and serve as independent sources for strengthening data estimates collected during the surveys.   Illegal fish catches were very high in island territories, with most violators being foreign trawlers targeting sea cucumbers, trochus, shark fins and reef fish in the Andaman Islands, while shark fins and tuna were the target of poachers in the Lakshadweep archipelago. Patrolling was found to be inadequate in proportion to the length of coastline throughout the Indian coast. Interviews with enforcement staff in coastal states revealed that in some cases foreign poaching vessels possess far better monitoring radar equipment to spot patrol vessels as revealed by equipment on confiscated trawlers.   The Government of India through state governments of respective maritime states implements a fishing ban during the monsoon every year. The ban lasts for 45-60 days with each state using a different time period or criteria such as advancement of monsoon  129as an indicator. Absence of a uniform ban period throughout the coastline has led to fishing trawlers of several states using this legal technicality to fish where fishing ban exists and land in an adjacent state where there is no ban. During interviews (36 Respondents), fishermen in Goa, Karnataka and Maharashtra (West coast), Orissa and West Bengal (East Coast) complained that the very essence of the fishing ban is flawed as vessels from neighboring states continue to catch from one state and land in another, leading to low catches during the post ban period. With most of the coastal states having weak enforcement, due to huge gaps in allocated infrastructure, manpower and monetary resources, illegal fishing persists through domestic fishing vessels in inshore waters. Moreover, it also leads to problems in reported catches where fish caught in one jurisdiction is reported as caught in another location.   Mesh size violations have been prevalent in both commercial trawl fishery and small-scale fisheries along the Indian Coastline since the 1980s (Alagaraja et al., 1986; Anon 2000b), and the interviews from current study show a drastic decline in mesh sizes of fishing gears in all coastal states (inclusive of small-scale fisheries). Enforcement of mesh size regulations is dismal in all states; with Fisheries Departments in all maritime states being ill equipped to carry out surveillance or implementation of regulatory measures. To prevent overcapacity and misuse of trawlers from one state in another, trawlers from one state should not be allowed to operate in another state or use ports of neighboring states during fishing ban in their port of registration. In many cases it has been observed that a single trawler has been fishing in more than 3 states during different periods of the year. Respondents (7, 11, 23, 26, and 32) stated that trawlers often contravene the ban, by  130taking their vessels to neighboring states during ban in their port of registry, and returning after completion of ban period to fish in their state waters. But, most trawler owners rarely realize that this action is leading to depletion of the very stocks that are sustaining profits for them, as the bulk of the pelagic and demersal stocks along the Indian coastline are transboundary in nature. In some coastal states in India, registration is required for trawlers to operate and use port facilities in neighboring states, but vessel skippers often contravene such regulations through landings in small harbours. Since, the vessel monitoring system (VMS) does not exist in Indian fisheries, it is almost impossible for Coast Guard to monitor all the Indian trawlers that operate within its EEZ.   The majority of coastal states, with the exception of Orissa, do not have patrol vessels to enforce a fishing ban. This fact assumes importance since fisheries departments of each maritime state are the primary enforcement authority in territorial waters (0-12 nautical miles). The Coast Guard in its present role is providing supplementary support in some states during ban period, but it is impossible for Coast Guard with its present budgetary constraints to monitor vast number of trawlers operating along the Indian coastline. Illegal fishing by domestic mechanized trawlers in the inshore artisanal zone has been reported in all coastal states of mainland India50. Skirmishes between trawlers and artisanal boats are increasing in most of the coastal states due to declining catches and frequent incursions by trawlers into nearshore waters. Skirmishes between subsistence                                                  50 The area up to 5 nautical miles from shore is reserved for artisanal fishermen (Non-motorised fishing craft) in most coastal states of mainland India under the Marine Fishing Regulation Acts (MFRA).  131and motorised fishing boats have also been reported in the past, often leading to exclusion of one group or the other (Dutt, 1972; Shankar 2001; Aklekar 2011).   Interviews were also conducted with Indian fishermen operating along the Indo-Pakistan and Indo-Bangladesh maritime boundary to understand the reasons for frequent arrests of fisherfolk on both sides of the border. Declaration of 5-10 km, ?no fishing? zones on both sides of border along Indo-Pakistan and Indo-Sri Lanka regions can help in preventing accidental intrusion of small-scale fishers into each other?s jurisdiction. Indian fishermen in Gujarat stated that marker buoys with flags could help in preventing accidental intrusions into Pakistan and vice versa. The no fishing zone along Indo-Bangladesh border along Sundarbans assumes more importance as piracy-related incidents have witnessed an increase on the Bangladeshi side and Border Guards were of the opinion that banning fishing activity along this region would help in controlling such activities and cross-border illegal trade of commodities by sea route. The next chapter extends the IUU analysis based on field interviews to the small-scale sector.  4.12 Chapter 4 summary The 2008 IUU field trip interviews revealed that decline of the fish resources has come at a bad time for most small-scale fishers as they are already under tremendous pressure from industrial development and pollution (due to dumping of sewage and wastes from cities) in the coastal zone. This displacement is two pronged:    1324.12.1 Internal displacement  Phase 1: Faced with declining catches and an uncertain future many fishers have been forced to move to other states to work as crew onboard trawlers. Majority of the displacement had occurred from East coast to the West Coast. Fishermen from Andhra Pradesh nowadays work as crew on trawlers in Maharashtra and Gujarat. The decline of fish resources in one state, and eventual migration to another state has also decreased benefits for crew working on trawlers (for e.g. trawler crew in Gujarat and Karnataka stated that increasingly boat owners do not give them a share of profits from their catch as they have surplus crew available for work on a daily wage basis from East coast).  Phase 2: Declining catches and low income has also increased the number of small-scale fishers who migrate to Andaman Islands in search of stable livelihoods. Interviews in 2008 revealed that displacement and migration to Andaman Islands increased in the past two decades. In the past, most of small-scale fishers who migrated to Andaman Islands were mostly from Northern Andhra (Srikakulam district). However, many fishers reported that net migration from other coastal districts along Andhra coast to Andaman Islands has increased. Although, migration to Andaman Islands from Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Kerala has occurred in the last three decades, interviews in 2008 revealed that some fisher families have moved permanently to Andaman Islands due declining catches along several jurisdictions off the West Bengal and Andhra coast, although very few incidences of such increase in migration was reported along Tamil Nadu coast.  4.12.2 Displacement to foreign waters  Due to easy availability of surplus fishing crew in the southern coastal states, many of these fishermen from Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala have been lured by agents  133to work as fishing crew in Middle East states of Bahrain, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. According to one respondent (23), as many as 18,000 Indians work as low-wage fishing crew in the Gulf States. Although, it is hard to know exactly how many people are employed in these countries. Conservative estimates from one recent source suggests a figure close to 25,000 (Anon 2011). Although, these low wage jobs can be seen a blessing for folks from fishing villages, they seldom work for more than a few years as; first, they have to pay a hefty sum to the agents to secure the job (mostly borrowed from money lenders); once they get a job, they work for an employer in unchartered waters, as they are not familiar about where they are fishing and if they are arrested what kind of action would be taken. In recent years, many such arrests of Indian crew have been reported for illegally fishing in Qatar?s waters while working on Bahraini boats. After arrests, the fishers usually look for help from employer, but since the frequency of arrests and fines levied is so high, employers rarely show interest, so the crew are forced to contact their families back home to pay the fines (Respondents: 32, 35, and 41). In most cases, Indian Embassies in Middle East countries pay the fines to get the crew released and repatriated back to India as their families back home cannot afford to pay fines (Anon 2011).    134 Figure 4.5: Map showing migration of fishing crew to Middle East countries. Red, green and blue lines shows movement of fishing crew from Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala to work as low wage fishing crew in Middle East countries.  Figure 4.5 shows the migration of skilled fishing crew from the three coastal states of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. This migration of fishing crew to Middle East countries is due to loss of jobs associated with huge overcapacity in Indian trawl fishing sector. Many Trawler owners have stopped their operations due to declining profits and high operational costs in recent years. The skippers and crew from these trawlers have found jobs in Middle East countries through agents, as they don?t have alternate job opportunities in other sectors and work abroad to support their families back home.   In the commercial trawl fisheries, political leverage by fishing boat owners coupled with lack of seriousness in prosecuting illegal fishing cases aggravate IUU problems along  135Indo-Sri Lanka and Indo-Pakistan maritime boundary. In cases, where foreign fishing vessels were arrested for illegal fishing, low prosecution rate has been identified as one of the main barriers to deterrence (Pramod 2010). Enforcement officials in India stated that in certain cases when illegal fishing vessels are arrested and taken to local courts, judges often fail to understand the gravity of the crime, and levy smaller penalties (Respondent: 36). Enforcement officials recommended that special tribunals or judges specially trained for environmental resource crimes should be attached to such trials along with a regular judge. Even, in cases where judges levied a heavy penalty to illegal fishing vessels from Sri Lanka, judgments were seldom enforced as a government order superseded the court?s order releasing all the vessels with the crew. ?Think about the plight of Coast Guard officials, who go to great lengths to catch and bring them to ports, but are forced to hand over the very illegal fishing vessels to Sri Lankan authorities without prosecution. They spend more time after arrest to escort them to Indo-Sri Lankan maritime boundary every time. They loose precious patrolling hours for escorting duties every time a Lankan vessel is apprehended. This is truly a mockery of maritime laws?(Respondent: 64). 136Chapter  5: Unreported marine fish catches of mechanised and small-scale fishers in the Indian exclusive economic zone   5.1 Introduction India exhibits a complex fisheries management regime due to numerous boats, fishers and a large EEZ, with varied management strategies employed in each coastal state and offshore island territories. This chapter is an attempt to explore the unreported catches from India?s coastal states using a survey approach. Taking advantage of previous local contacts, language and knowledge of the coastal areas of India, information that may be used to make a complete estimate of fishery extractions, including illegal and unreported landings and discards (IUU) was collected in a 7?month field visit in 2008. Nine of the ten coastal states of India were visited, including the Andaman Islands. Methods used were over 200 confidential interviews, gathering of grey literature reports and direct observations. The purpose of the field trip was to get estimates of illegal and unreported catches from India?s long and often inaccessible coastline to improve current estimates of total catch statistics from both mechanised and subsistence fishery sectors. The fieldwork was carried out over a period of seven months (May - November 2008).    This chapter describes the unreported components of IUU estimated from the fieldwork completed, together with results that suggest a total annual Indian IUU in excess of one million tonnes. A detailed explanation of various unreported catch categories is given in Chapter 4 (see section 4.2, pages 82 to 84). Interview methodology and preview of study areas is provided in Chapter 4.  This chapter sets out the interview methods used to assess  137unreported fish catches in the field trip to India. Then unreported catch issues in each state from Gujarat in the Arabian Sea to West Bengal in the Bay of Bengal are reviewed in detail. Subsequent sections described estimates of a number of categories of unreported fishing, namely ? Discards by domestic fishing vessels; Discards by chartered fishing vessels; Baitfish used in small-scale and mechanised sectors; Post-harvest losses; subsistence fisheries catches from mangroves, estuaries and coastal creeks; Reef based subsistence fish catches; Dryfish landings; unreported Molluscan catches; and Take home catches of artisanal fishers.   5.2 Discards 5.2.1 Discards by Indian fishing vessels Discards51 from domestic Indian trawlers have generally been reported as very low (Kelleher 2005, Bhathal 2005). However, in agreement with Davies et al. 2009, the current study is beginning to reveal that this situation is untrue and total discards may be in excess of 1,000,000 tonnes per annum in Indian marine fisheries. Significant quantities of discards have also been reported for Thai, and other foreign trawlers operating illegally in the Indian EEZ way back in the eighties (Dan 1982; Respondents: 53, 64, 91, 148) and this practice continues even today.  Some recent studies have assumed that no discards exist for domestic                                                  51 Although Regulation 5, of the Maritime Zones of India Rules 1982, states that the ?crews may not discard surplus catch,? this regulation is never enforced in Indian fisheries. In the current study of illegal and unreported fish catches in Indian EEZ, discards are unambiguously treated as a category of unreported catches, as government officials in both Federal and State Government of India, stated during interviews in 2008, that discards are not considered ?illegal?, but rather as a category of unreported catches.  138trawlers in India presumably due to burgeoning trash fish demand in poultry and aquaculture feed sectors in the last two decades. No concrete sources are given for Kelleher?s 2005 estimates; with the only two sources being cited as pers. comm. from Ministry in Delhi and MPEDA, Kochi.   The current work uses information from foreign charter tuna vessels and discards from all maritime states of India. Moreover, previous studies have not taken into account the complex nature of trawling operations along the Indian coastline. Firstly, since the late eighties, there has been a massive increase in number of trawlers operating in all coastal states (See CMFRI 2005 Marine Fisheries Census reports for the eight coastal states); secondly, even within a single maritime state / fishing harbor there are two to five categories of trawlers (single-day, multiday, deep-sea trawlers etc.) which have different discard rates during different periods of the year; thirdly, there is significant discarding of pelagic fish during the monsoon season (glut discards) along different parts of Indian coastline in small-scale fisheries and this factor has not been considered seriously in any previous studies.  Moreover, previous studies have made the assumptions of low discards based on a few case studies from certain maritime states, which have proved to have anomalous, discard rates. Based on my fieldwork, several issues correct these misconceptions: A) a majority of the maritime states do not have estimates of discards from trawlers operating along their coastal jurisdictions; B) a majority of the trawlers operating along Indian coastline do not have a large hold capacity and deck space to store trash fish landed for each haul or for the whole trip; C) declining catches of target species in trawl gears in the past two decades has led to  139increase in duration of each fishing trip, with trips increasing from 2 days to 10 days to compensate for declining catches; D) although the duration of fishing trips has increased, operators continue to use trawlers of the same hull size, so a concurrent increase in hull capacity has not occurred in relation to increase in duration of fishing trips; E) single day trawlers are the only class of trawlers capable of landing the bulk of trash fish caught in each jurisdiction, but they constitute only 15-25% of total trawlers operating along the Indian coastline (Pramod, Personal Observation. 200852).  Regulation 5, of the Maritime Zones of India Rules 1982, is probably the only regulatory source stating how discards would be managed in Indian marine fisheries ?Crews may not discard substantial surplus catch, catch exceeding authorized quantities shall be retained onboard, recorded, and surrendered as required by authorized officers?. However, since its inception mechanized vessels have never abided by this law, and no records exist on huge quantities of discards dumped by trawlers at sea. Moreover, since there is no effective mechanism to monitor fishing vessels at sea, over the last three decades fisheries discards have been assumed to be low.   Discards from marine fisheries sectors vary from one coastal state to another due to different levels of demand, availability of fish meal processing facilities, and variation in fishing days at sea (for mechanized trawlers in each state). Fishermen also reported that there was                                                  52 Pramod, G. (2008) Estimation of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fish catches in India?s marine capture fisheries, Field Trip to eight maritime states and 2 island territories in India, May to November 2008, India.   140significantly high discarding in many states during rainy season compared to other times of the year. Discards for the west coast have been poorly quantified in previous studies. So, discards estimates drawn from the current trip are probably among the best obtained so far. On the East coast previous studies have only estimated discards from Central Bay of Bengal, with other maritime states having very poor or no estimates of discards.  Malhotra and Sinha (2007) also state that there are no reliable estimates of discards in India?s marine fisheries.  During the mid-nineties, discards from bottom trawlers were estimated to range from 15-36% of the total catch in Karnataka; 5-23% in Kerala and 4-14% in Tamil Nadu (Menon et al., 1996). Sathiadas et al (1994) estimate a discard rate of 5% for marine fisheries in India. FAO (2004) estimated that Indian trawlers have a discard rate of 2%, discarding 57,917 tonnes per year, which is very low compared to estimates from the present study.   Discards from the trawl fishery were the least in Gujarat among all the coastal states enumerated in the IUU trip. The probable reason for the low discards is the high demand for trash fish in the local fishmeal industry. Rao and Kasim (1985) described the trawl fishery off Veraval coast.  Discards estimated from Gujarat trawlers during the present survey suggest that only 2.3% of catch is discarded, mostly during the monsoon season (bulk of it coming from trawlers operating in Northern Gujarat), which probably represents the lowest estimate of discards among trawlers operating in India?s maritime states.  Bostock (1986) made a similar note on trawlers operating along the Gujarat coast. His study showed that trash fish comprises 62% of the catch with none of it being discarded. Estimates from the current field trip suggest that trash fish comprised 81% of the total catch landed suggesting an increase in landings of lower value species.  Gujarat sets a good example by landing bulk of the trash  141fish as both trawler owners and fishmeal plants have ensured a higher price for trash fish landed in this state compared to other coastal states in India. But, this study shows that Gujarat figures are not typical for discards in most of India.  Interviews with trawler skippers (9 Respondents) reveal that discards range between 8-15% of total catches landed by trawlers for each trip in Maharashtra. The quantity of discards varies from season to season with substantially higher discards during pre-monsoon and post-monsoon periods when juveniles of fishes and shrimps constitute higher percentage of the catch. No discards have been reported for trawlers operating along the Mumbai coast in previous studies (Chakraborty et al, 1983). Substantially high discards have also been reported along the Raigad coastline due to the presence of plastic waste in trawl catches. Trawler skippers said that the problem is now so acute that they avoid some parts of coastline due to plastic wastes constituting as much as 30-45% of the total catch in every haul. Plastic creates immense problems during sorting as it increases the time afforded for sorting between each haul. Trawler skippers blame disposal of plastic waste into the Arabian Sea in Mumbai district for this serious problem.   Discards estimated from interviews with trawler skippers and crew (14 Respondents) revealed that discards constitute 10-15% of total catches landed in fishing harbours of Karnataka. No previous estimates were available for comparison; hence these are the best available estimates for discards in Karnataka. The Karnataka Marine Fisheries Regulation Act requires all mechanized trawlers operating along the coast to use a cod end mesh size of at least 30 mm. However, most of the trawlers were using 10-15 mm cod end mesh size  142resulting in indiscriminate capture of juveniles of fish and shrimps. This has also contributed to substantial discards during the monsoon Season.   Discards estimated from interviews (18 Respondents) with trawler skippers and crew revealed that discards constitute 15-23% of total catches in Kerala with the discard rate depending on the type of trawler, season and fishing grounds. Reduction in ring seine mesh size has led to glut in catches of juvenile sardines during some periods of the year, when oil sardines frequent coastal waters. Decline in prices during such periods has led to low market demand resulting in substantial fish discards as excess fish which cannot be dried, and are dumped in back-waters (van der Heijden, 2007). Interviews with fishermen (4 Respondents) operating in Cochin backwaters reveals the figure for ring seine discards during glut period of 1.8 - 3 tonnes oil sardines per year. Glut landings are a big problem off the Kerala coastline as its demand depends on domestic consumption, which does not increase much every year. Every 2-3 years there are very good oil sardine catches and during such glut periods, when market demand and price are less the bulk of the catch is discarded either at sea, in backwaters or at landing centres (Respondents: 43,47,48). Since the early eighties overfishing in coastal waters has been responsible for declining catches due to activities of both motorized and mechanized sectors (Kurien 2005). In backwaters and inshore fishing grounds this unsustainable exploitation is pushing both subsistence and motorised fishermen towards destructive fishing practices (Kurien and Achari, 1990; Harikumar and Rajendran 2007; Pramod 2010).  143Table 5.1: Discard estimates in the Indian maritime states from the present study. Estimated from interviews (see text) using number of vessels and discards for each trip in different vessel categories by 8 coastal states.   In Maharashtra, trawlers operating from Mumbai landed 3-12 baskets (each basket is 25-40 kg) of trash fish in each trip with 10-35 baskets landed at Ferry wharf. Interviews revealed that during the monsoon Season from May-June, prawn and commercial fish are given more importance for storage, with 80-90% of trash fish being discarded at Sea during this period. Even for Multi-day trawlers, trash fish from the first 3 days is discarded at sea, and only 11-25 baskets of trash fish is landed at Sassoon dock for each trip. Single-day trawlers landed more trash fish compared to Multi-day trawlers during post-monsoon Season, but discards from these trawlers were also substantially higher during May-June when prawns and bigger sized fish were given more preference for storage onboard. In Gujarat, discards were much State Number of RespondentsAverage annual discards at-sea by mechanised trawlers and fishing boats (tonnes)* Range Lower Limit (tonnes) Upper Limit (tonnes) West Bengal 9 4440 1268 7612 Orissa 11 99247 67076 131,418 Andhra Pradesh 12 207,232 134,826 279,639 Tamil Nadu 14 212,969 179,274 246,665 Kerala 18 429,074 351,778 506,371 Karnataka 14 161,042 111,985 210,099 Maharashtra 9 90037 68807 111,268 Gujarat 12 690 360 1021 Andaman and Nicobar Islands 4  13200 9600 16800 Total 1,217,931 924,974 1,510,893 * Includes discards from Indian deep sea trawlers and chartered LoP trawlers  144less, due to high demand for trash fish in the dry fish industry and the presence of a large number of fish meal plants to process these catches. The high demand for fishmeal also meant that fishermen landing trash fish in Gujarat were paid more money to land these catches, which would otherwise be discarded at Sea. None of the other maritime states in India have such an organized system of trash fish collection and processing as in Gujarat (Fish meal plants also use wastes from sea food processing plants). In fact, overfishing by trawlers throughout the year in large numbers has led to drastic decline in catches of large commercial fish, but fishermen still manage to eke out a living by landing more quantities of trash fish, with trash fish compensating for a decline in commercial fish species.   The development of trawl fisheries along the Andhra Pradesh coast is discussed in Sastry and Chandrasekhar (1986); Rao (1987, 1988). During the mid-eighties for every kilo of shrimp caught, trawlers operating from Visakhapatnam, discarded three kilos (Dwivedi 1987). He further estimated that fishing vessels operating from Visakhapatnam alone discard between 864 to 960 tonnes of fish every year. 60 tonnes of by-catch was discarded every year at Visakhapatnam fishing harbour during the same period (Dehadrai 1987). During mid-nineties, at least 11% of total by-catch was discarded by sona boats (Single day trawlers) operating from Visakhapatnam (Rao 1999). However, the estimate of Rao (1999) suffers from huge gaps as it was derived in an indirect way based on landings of prawns rather than direct data from vessels at sea. Salagrama (1998) estimated that trawlers on the east coast discard 26,000 to 50,000 tonnes each year. In the present study a complete estimate of discards from all trawler categories (Pablo, Sona and Deep Sea trawlers) operating from  145Visakhapatnam and three other fishing harbours and raised by the total fishing ports were derived using interview data.  5.2.2 Discards estimates from the current study Estimates of discards from the current study through interviews in 2008 (see Table 5.1 for detailed estimates of discards in the eight coastal states), suggest that every year around 1.2 million tonnes of fish (0.9 to 1.5 million tonnes) are discarded at sea, which equals to around 45% (Range of 32 to 53%) of the reported catches (India reported 2.8 million tonnes of fish catches to FAO in 2008). Results from Table 5.1 suggest that the state of Kerala had the highest discard rate with 430,000 tonnes every year, followed by Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu with discards of around 200,000 tonnes.   Results from the present study show that discards along the Indian coast have increased for two main reasons. Firstly, the numbers of trawlers operating along the Indian coastline have increased over the past four decades. Secondly, the duration of fishing trips (10-12 day trips) has also increased all along the Indian coastline, with trawlers along the Kerala, Karnataka and Maharashtra coastlines increasingly targeting deep sea stocks at 150-350 metre depth during most of the year. Longer fishing trips in deeper waters means that non-commercial species of fish and shrimps are encountered in larger numbers. Longer fishing trips also create problems for the operators of these trawlers, as they cannot store trash fish from all the hauls during each trip. The expansion of fishing into deeper waters is a positive development in terms of exploiting new fishing grounds. But, crewmembers of these trawlers mentioned that they are increasingly coming in closer range of foreign-chartered vessels operating under  146joint venture in Indian waters, which could lead to operational problems in future. In Kerala, each offshore gillnetter discarded between 3.1 to 3.5 tonnes by-catch / year. In all coastal states, Interviews with skippers and trawler owners revealed that fisheries department enumerators never collect data on discards at sea. Detailed estimates of discards from 8 maritime states and island territories are given in Table 5.1.  Some of the most destructive and unsustainable fishing practices involved harvesting of larval shrimp (?seed?) from estuaries and backwaters along east and west coasts. Collection of shrimp seed was more prominent off Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal compared to other coastal states. Interviews with dealers and shrimp seed collectors revealed the actual extent of catches and discards from this sector. Clearly, in most cases, interviews revealed that the number of people involved in harvesting shrimp seed has tripled or quadrupled in the last decade. This has resulted in more discards of finfish seed and reduction of tiger shrimp seed caught per collector per day, alluding to decline of shrimp seed resources. Although the collection is banned, it is openly practiced in estuaries of most coastal states of Bay of Bengal using push nets, bag nets and scoop nets. Shrimp farmers stated that they often brought wild shrimp seed, as they are more resistant to diseases than hatchery produced shrimp seed. The collection of shrimp seed from mangrove and estuarine areas might also be one the contributing factors to declining shrimp catches and one of the major reasons for failure of annual fishing ban as shrimp seed collection is a year round activity. It is also frustrating to see that neighboring countries like Bangladesh have come with progressive legislative and enforcement actions to ban seed collection in mangrove and estuarine areas,  147while a developed country like India with adequate regulatory and financial resources is merely witnessing the spectacle with little concern to eradicate this destructive practice.   5.2.3 Discards estimates from chartered LOP tuna longliners and Indian deep-sea trawlers During 1982-1983, 110 chartered or joint venture deep-sea trawlers operated in inshore waters along the South West coast, with a catch of 13 tonnes/vessel/day (Devaraj 1987). These vessels reportedly discarded 8 tonnes of catch / vessel / day, as they were targeting shrimps and discarding the bulk of the other catch. Using the above figure, an estimated 202,400 tonnes of fish were discarded by these vessels for 1982 and 1983 years (110 vessels x 230 days in operation x 8 tonnes discard /vessel). Once the limitation of fishing beyond 80 m depth was enforced in 1983, only 12 vessels remained.  120 Mexican trawlers (57!) were operating along the North East coast during the same period, primarily engaging in shrimp trawling in inshore waters. These trawlers likely discarded similar quantities of discards in the Bay of Bengal as they were targeting shrimps and lobsters for the export market. Foreign-chartered pair trawlers also operated in Indian EEZ from 1990 ? 1997, these trawlers also discarded around 100 tonnes of fish every year.   The discards from Tuna longliners (LoP Chartered vessels) are significantly less, but interviews from crew members revealed that for some species like sharks only fins are retained (sharks comprise 5-7% of total catch), while the remaining by-catch species like seer fish, billfish are under-reported through Indian companies although they are transshipped and sold in foreign markets as Taiwanese products. Discards from these vessels ranged from 0.5- 1481.2 tonnes / haul (115 fishing days per vessel excluding transit time) according to crewmembers, which would amount to around 500-1600 tonnes of discards / year. Detailed quantitative estimates of discards by foreign-chartered vessels from 1982-2009 are presented in Table 5.2. which suggest that joint venture tuna longliners (LoP permit holders) discard around 2000 tonnes in the present compared to around 500-600 tonnes in eighties and nineties.                   149 Table 5.2: Estimated discards by foreign-chartered trawlers and tuna longliners in the Indian EEZ.  See section 5.2.3 for methods in the text. Year Stern trawlers Pair trawlers Tuna longliners Total (tonnes) Lower Limit (tonnes)  Upper Limit (tonnes) 1982 328900 - - 328900 261230 456800 1983 239200 - - 239200 124860 298000 1984 35880 - - 35880 23000 39820 1985 17940 - 30 17970 12500 19800 1986 - - 300 300 260 480 1987 - - 150 150 90 230 1988 - - 240 240 160 380 1989 - - 900 900 600 1000 1990 29900 104 1740 31744 21890 38900 1991 38870 78 660 39608 24000 41200 1992 14950 78 690 15718 11900 18420 1993 8970 65 840 9875 7200 11920 1994 23920 65 510 24495 18900 32000 1995 14950 65 540 15555 12000 18420 1996 - - 540 540 360 782 1997 - - 570 570 360 782 1998 - - - - - - 1999 - - - - - - 2000 - - - - - - 2001  - - - - - 2002 - - - - - - 2003 - - 570 570 390 840 2004 - - 1110 1110 980 1460 2005 - - 1710 1710 1420 2100 2006 - - 1650 1650 1290 2980 2007 - - 1050 1050 890 1390 2008 - - 2250 2250 1860 3200 2009 - - 1800 1800 1680 2400  1505.3 Bait fish used in small-scale and mechanised sectors in Indian fisheries Bait fish used in hook and line and longline fisheries also remain unreported in Indian fisheries. In the present study interviews (18 respondents) with small-scale fishing boats and offshore gillnetters cum longliners revealed the actual extent of the bait catches. Kilograms of baitfish used per trip was multiplied into number of fishing trips per year to get total bait fish used in hook and line fisheries for each coastal state. Estimates from current study reveal that 4015 tonnes of baitfish is used every year. Baitfish used includes sardines, mackerels, pony fish, carangids and cuttlefish. Most of the bait fish catch is sourced from families and other fishers within the community. Often, neighbours and friends from within the fishing community gave bait fish as goodwill gesture, but sometimes fisher?s buy fish from other gillnet fishers during lean periods. In the commercial longliners operating from fishing ports, vessel owners paid money to buy bait fish from trawlers at fishing ports. See Table 5.3 and 5.4 for detailed estimates of baitfish used in each coastal state. Estimates from interviews in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 suggest that around 4300 tonnes of bait fish is used in Indian marine fisheries, with bulk of bait fish used commercial longliners from Tamil Nadu (bait fish used: 2900 tonnes); Bait fish use in small-scale fisheries was relatively low at 343 tonnes largely due to seasonal nature of hook and line and longline fishing in the artisanal sector.         151 Table 5.3: Bait fish used in commercial hook and line fisheries along the Indian coast. Estimates based on interviews in eight coastal states of mainland India.  State Number of vessels Bait fish used (tonnes / year)53 Actual estimate LL UL Gujarat 4 8 6 12 Maharashtra 253 546 473 783 Karnataka 28 107 84 130 Kerala 10 108 95 137 Tamil Nadu 781 2905 2014 3701 Andhra Pradesh 20 49 35 64 Orissa 28 73 66 82 West Bengal 66 166 148 188 Total 1190 3962 2921 5097                                                  53 Bait fish used in the commercial and small-scale hook and long line fisheries was calculated by multiplying (X) the number of vessels in each state (X) bait fish used per trip (X) total number of trips per year. The actual estimate as well as upper and lower limits was calculated using data collected through interviews in 2008. The average number of trips was 32 trips per year in commercial longline vessels (>10 m OAL) while it was around 29 trips per year in small-scale hook and line fisheries (using motorized traditional craft or FRP boats). Bulk of small-scale fisheries along Indian coastline use baitfish for catching pelagic fish (scombroids, tuna, sharks, marlins, etc.).  152Table 5.4: Bait fish used in pelagic small-scale fisheries using motorized boats. Estimates based on interviews in eight coastal states of mainland India.  State Number of vessels in small-scale fisheries Baitfish used in small-scale fisheries (tonnes / year) Actual LL UL Gujarat 2 1 0 1 Maharashtra 31 6 4 10 Karnataka 46 5 3 7 Kerala 124 48 34 63 Tamil Nadu 102 33 25 46 Andhra Pradesh 386 222 152 345 Orissa 91 25 11 35 West Bengal 36 3 3 5 Total 818 343 233 512  5.4 Post-harvest losses There are also significant discards due to post harvest losses in fishing harbors? and jetties along the Indian coast. Interviews at 36 fishing harbours along east and west coast of India revealed that 1230 tonnes of fish processing wastes such as shrimp and fish heads are discarded every year (estimates from main fishing harbours only). Interviews with fishers in small-scale fisheries revealed that as much as 32,000 tonnes (see Table 5.10 for detailed estimates of post-harvest losses in Indian fisheries) is lost through pests and spoilage after landings. Such fish catches are buried in excavated pits or dried and used as manure in agricultural lands or as poultry feed. A couple of hundred tonnes of fish is lost in gillnet catches after landings in sardine and mackerel fisheries, where damaged fish are removed from gillnets after landings; which also includes depredated catch (leftover heads or partially eaten fish discarded at shore). Substantial quantities of post-harvest wastes are also discarded in the artisanal fisheries along fishing villages off both East and West coasts of India. For  153example, Immanuel et al., (2003) report that in Kanyakumari district of Tamil Nadu alone 608 tonnes (25-29% of body parts are discarded) of cuttlefish and squid wastes were discarded each year during 1991-93 period.  Interviews revealed that significant losses occur through discards of glut catches during monsoon season (mainly sardines), when excess catches from remote landing centres in small-scale fisheries is discarded due to low market prices. During normal period such excess catch of pelagic fish is sun-dried and then sold in dryfish markets. But, if the monsoon period coincides with glut landings, fish prices go down, so excess catch is discarded as it is not economically viable to sell the fish in fresh fish markets, given the high transportation costs in relation to value of the fish.  5.5 Subsistence fisheries catches The present study is perhaps the first attempt to quantify the contribution of subsistence catches in Indian marine fisheries, while giving a glimpse of how vital they are to sustenance of fisher communities scattered along the Indian coast. Estimates shown in Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.10 suggest that each year, around 6700 tonnes of subsistence catches remains unquantified in Indian marine fisheries. Subsistence catches from mangroves, estuaries and other coastal habitats (See Table 5.6 for detailed estimates) constituted bulk of the unreported subsistence catch at 5200 tonnes, while the remainder 1500 tonnes came from reef based fisheries.  Utmost care was taken during interviews to check with local authorities and fishers on whether their catches are assessed by local Governments or Fisheries Departments to avoid double counting. Often, it came to notice during interviews that subsistence fisheries catches are rarely quantified in India, due to low effort, unpredictable nature of fishing operations by season / year, lack of timing associated with fishing and variability of gears  154used. Interviews with government officials revealed that such catches are never accounted due to shortage of manpower and other reasons cited such as: they are considered as low, due to changing volume of fishers by season and more part-time fishers entering this sector in recent years.   Interviews with fishers is beginning to unravel the true extent of catches from this sector as the survey revealed that traditional subsistence fishers are decreasing, and the existing ones are fishing for more days to compensate for rising food prices, poverty and lack of social security associated with this sector. ?Consumption is one known mean of indirectly assessing subsistence fishing? (Coblentz 1997; Leopold et al., 2004; Labrosse et al., 2006). The present study is also the first attempt to estimate take home catches from subsistence, small-scale, and trawl fisheries in India?s marine fisheries. Consumption of trawler crews at sea was also estimated for the first time through this study.   Globally, subsistence fisheries have been defined and interpreted in different ways depending on the nature, context, harvests, and historical and traditional use of catches associated with this sector (Berkes 1988; Brach et al., 2002; King and Faasili 1998; Sharif 1986; Schumann and Macinko 2007). In the current study subsistence fisheries is defined as ?localized fishing in inshore habitats (backwaters, creeks, intertidal areas) using traditional gears like push nets, cast nets, hooks and line etc. primarily for consumption at home and survival on a daily basis, without intention to generate profit or intended for commercial sale purposes?. Often, subsistence fishers in India engage in fishing on foot without fishing boats, and even the ones that use small dugout/ plank built boats are only able for use them in shallow habitats and can  155rarely accommodate more than one person and a few kilograms of fish. The under-reporting of catches from mangroves, backwaters and estuaries is often ignored and considered insignificant due to lack of proper records of fisheries and other commercial activities in these habitats (Lakshmi and Rajagopalan 2000; Ronnback 1999; Untawale 1986; Macintosh 1982). Often, molluscan, fish and crustacean catches from mangroves and backwater creeks along the Indian coast are under-reported, as majority of these fishers are unregistered (traditional boats); possess no fishing boats; or fish from shore using fishing nets in waist deep waters using traditional gears like shore seine, drag nets, push nets and cast nets. The present study is an attempt to address under-reporting from this sector and provide a preview of degradation, and displacement of subsistence fishers due to conversion of these habitats for development.   In the rapidly evolving Indian fisheries sector, economic benefits are being afforded more priority over the traditional use and long-term viability of coastal habitats like mangroves, salt marsh and backwaters. In coastal states like Gujarat, Kerala, Orissa and West Bengal, subsistence fishers of estuaries and backwater creeks have been displaced due to lack of property rights over these common pool resources. Often these marginal fishers suffer the most due to development activities, as fishing is the only source of livelihood among these communities. Lack of representation of these communities in both local and state agendas has also made them increasingly vulnerable to exploitation in the labour market.  Most of these marginal fishers have stated that the number of people engaged in such activities has decreased in the last two decades due to indiscriminate land reclamation of mangroves and backwaters for industrial development, releasing of effluents leading to decline in catches in  156adjacent coastal waters (Kutch, Godavari, Vembanad Lake, Hooghly-Matlah estuary). Often fishers in these communities catch fish using traditional gears like traps, set nets and cast nets, which requires immense human effort to catch even a few kilograms of fish in a day. When catches are high, a part of it is sold by women in nearby markets and towns, while any remaining fish are dried for consumption during the lean season. Interviews during the survey revealed that prior to 1990; subsistence fishers engaged in fishing throughout the year, while in recent decades they find it difficult to eke out a living from fishing alone and are increasingly compelled to work as manual daily wage labour in construction, agriculture and aquaculture for certain periods of the year54. Often, the level of fishing effort varied by day, month and season.  For example, in the state of Orissa and West Bengal, these fishers work in shrimp farms, with income from fishing in lagoons and intertidal waters during afternoon to evening period during summer. In rainy seasons when there is little shrimp farming, these fishers spend the majority of the time fishing, with occasional income from work in paddy fields during certain days. Women work as domestic help during day, drying fish and selling surplus catch in nearby markets in the evening. Women also engage in collecting shellfish for lime industries during certain days in a month. Children from these fishers work in shrimp farms, as crew on fishing boats and shrimp seed collectors.                                                     54 Subsistence fisheries is also the only sector where I observed more old people engaged in such activities throughout the Indian coastline. Younger fishers hardly considered it as a worthy livelihood source in many coastal states. Most of the other activities in the fisheries sector where more old people were observed included mending of fishing nets and repairing boats.  157Table 5.5: Subsistence fish landings from major estuaries, backwaters and mangroves. Estimates based on interviews in eight coastal states of mainland India.  State Subsistence catches by location in eight coastal states of mainland India  (in tonnes / year)55 Total Catch (t) LL (t) UL (t) Gujarat Kutch (134 t), Jakhau (12 t), Nanalayja (4 t), Mandvi (3 t), Mahi estuary (1.2 t) 184 110 187 Maharashtra Ulhas estuary (1.6 t), Minor creeks and estuaries (2.1 t) 4 3 10 Karnataka Mulki estuary (12 t), Netravati-Gurupur estuary (64.2 t), Kali estuary (6.3 t) 82 61 108 Kerala Cochin backwaters (126 t), Vembanad Lake (82 t), Ashtamudi estuary (14 t), Poonthura estuary (12.6 t), Chettuva estuary (4.6 t), Minor estuaries (124 t) 363 222 520 Tamil Nadu Pondicherry mangroves (3.2 t), Vellar-Coleroon estuary (143 t), Aralar estuary (0.4 t), Kallar estuary (0.6 t), Muthupet backwaters (23.8 t) Manakkudy estuary (0.6 t), Muttukadu backwaters (9.3 t) 181 150 361 Andhra Pradesh Nuvvularevu (9.8 t), Godavari estuary (236t), Kandaleru estuary (3.2 t), Krishna estuary (63.1 t), Pulicat Lake (12.6 t),  325 251 568 Orissa Chilka Lake & Bhitarkanika estuary (838 t), Budhabalang estuary (32 t), Rushikulya estuary (32.6 t)  902 674 1341 West Bengal Sundarbans56 (2913.6 t), Hooghly-Matlah estuary (316 t)57 3230 1888 3727                                                                         Total 5241 3365 6842                                                   55 Subsistence catches are harvested from various habitats such as mangroves, backwaters, creeks, and estuaries. Major seafood commodities harvested include crabs, shrimps, fish and molluscs (Data for unreported molluscan catches is provided in Table 5.7). Data in Table 5.10 includes Shrimp Post Larvae harvested in mangroves and estuarine areas.  56 Preliminary estimates of fresh fish landings only. Dry fish to wet weight conversions are due for many Sundarban wetlands. Such estimates will be published in future studies.  57 Includes combined estimate of both dry-fish and fresh fish landed for consumption in inland estuarine areas.  158In India under-reporting of fish catches can occur at various stages of fish trade from landing centre to retailers. For example during the interviews in 2008, in many small-scale landing centres along the east coast it was revealed that catches were never weighed but sold as lots based on visual grouping of catches, and the catch was never weighed during auction or procurement by fish dealer. Fishermen stated that weighing has never been the criteria, as species in each lot / mounds assumed more or less importance price-wise. Mutual trust and years of tradition in trading catches in this fashion has also meant that fish traders continue to use the same practice even today although weighing facilities are available. This method of quantifying catches can also lead to mis / under-reporting of catches from this small-scale sector. Fishers stated that the whole process of weighing is a time consuming process and due to faster deterioration of catch, hot weather, each person makes more profit by selling catch from one another within shortest possible time as no ice is used for preserving catch in initial stages of landings. The Kerala Govt (2005) report clearly illustrates the problems associated with monitoring brackish water fish landings along the south west coast. Marginal fisheries landings from these coastal towns are rarely monitored as ?there is no organized landing in the brackish water sector and mostly it is being done in their own house or places proximal to markets. The brackish water fishes are directly brought to the markets available in the fringes of these water bodies; however their total number has not so far been enumerated? (Kerala Government 2005).  Often reef-based fisheries catches are largely ignored or under-reported in global fisheries (MacManus 1996; Munro and Fakahau 1993). India is no exception to this problem as reef fisheries all along the Indian coastline are grossly under-estimated (Rajasuriya et al., 2000)  159as landing surveys are mostly restricted to fishing harbors and bigger landing centres. Every effort was made to contact village heads, co-operatives and older fishermen who work on beaches to estimate the number of fishers engaged in such activities, nets used and operational days. Major and minor rocky reefs and coral reefs are found all along the Indian coast in Gulf of Kutch, off Goa, Karnataka, Southern Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Central and northern Andhra Pradesh. Often, gear used in these fisheries include cast nets, hooks and line, traps and trammel gill nets operated at depths between 1-10 metres along the coastline.   Reef-based fisheries evaluated in the present study include catches from hook and line, shore seine, cast nets, traps and trammel nets. The first three gears are operated from shore while the latter are deployed at 4-12 fathoms depth in rocky reef areas using catamarans with 1-2 fishing crew. Data on fishing gears was based on data collected from field trip, as actual estimates of number of these fishing gears remain unknown. Coral reefs are found in Gulf of Kutch, Gulf of Mannar, Andaman and Nicobar Islands while fringing and patch reefs are prominent off Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu coasts. Minor rocky reefs are found off central and north Andhra coast. The average take home catch for reef based fisheries was 0.7 kg / crew member / trammel gillnet / day (2.1 kg/ trammel net /day); while cast nets take home catch per fishermen ranged from 0.1- 4 kg / day; hook and line catch was 0.1 to 0.5 kg/ fishermen / day (31 Respondents). Catches from all four fishing gears were used for consumption at home, with catches during peak periods dried for sale or consumption at home. However, it has come to notice that fishermen sometimes use longer sized trammel gill nets by attaching 2-3 trammel nets during good fishing season. During such seasons, majority of trammel gillnet catch (10-30 kg catch) is sold in nearby markets with some  160percent of catch retained for home consumption, or given to fellow fishers for use as bait in longline fisheries (See Table 5.6 for detailed state-wise estimates of reef based subsistence catches). It is pertinent to note that with the exception of snappers and shrimps most of the other reef fish have less commercial demand, so they are used as bait fish in the longline artisanal fisheries targeting seer fish, billfish and sharks. Other catches such as fishermen diving for conch shells (for sale to bangle markets in Calcutta) off Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh remain grossly under-reported in national fisheries statistics. Interviews with subsistence fishers in the current study revealed actual extent of shellfish and molluscan fisheries in inshore reefs and backwaters.   Table 5.6: Annual reef based subsistence fish catches along the mainland Indian coast. State Total (tonnes / year) Lower limit Upper limit Gujarat 99 68 136 Maharashtra 63 41 84 Karnataka 141 94 212 Kerala 431 326 494 Tamil Nadu 709 642 1024 Andhra Pradesh 73 51 121 Total 1516 1222 2071  5.6 Dryfish landings Drying is an age-old practice for preserving marine fish catches in India. Dry fish are collected and processed at different stages of fish trade. In the mechanised trawl sector, dry fish are landed after each trip, as substantial part of excess catch is dried on the top (roof of the trawler) and landed after each trip (High Grade Dry Fish like Mackerel, Snappers, and Ribbon Fish), with profits from dry fish shared equally among crewmembers and the owners. A certain percentage of trash fish from last 2-3 days of multi-day trawlers is also landed in  161fishing harbours. This catch is then again sorted by women and dry fish traders (Low Grade Dry Fish); in most cases smaller sized fish and crustaceans with high damage are immediately dried for utilization in poultry and shrimp feed industries. Longliners caught higher percentage of sharks as well as dried shark fins per each trip compared to trawlers along the entire mainland coast. These catches are currently under enumeration and will be published in future work. Estimates from interviews in 2008, reveal that although a certain percentage of dryfish from trawlers in reported to state enumerators, substantial under-reporting occurs, as boat owners are scared about tax implications for such sales. Estimates from 2008 interviews, (See Table 5.9 for state-wise detailed estimates) reveal that every year around 56,000 tonnes of dryfish remain unreported from trawlers and gillnetters in Indian fisheries.   5.7 Glut catches In the small-scale and subsistence fisheries, the bulk of fish caught is sold for fresh fish markets and exports. During periods of low fish prices, and low market demand, fish are sent for drying as they command a high price later. Other circumstances include landings during glut periods, nights, or at times when markets are closed. Women and marginal fishers also dry fish when they are unable to sell a certain percentage of their catch at the end of the day. Such catch is salted and sun-dried for consumption during rainy season. Dry fish are sold to dry fish traders who frequently visit landing centres, villages and local towns for procurement to fish meal plants / sale in grocery shops in bigger towns. Anchovies, Acetes shrimps, sardines, pony fish and smaller fish collected from subsistence gears like drag nets, traps and beach seines are also exclusively used for dry fish trade. In states like Kerala  162fishers (Respondents: 84, 93, 102, and 106) stated that prior to 1980, catches of sardines and mackerel were buried in earthen pits to be used as manure for coconut plantations.  However, in recent years most of it is sold to poultry and fishmeal sector after drying due to high prices.   Information from interviews is valuable in understanding the intricate complexities of these marginal fishers where the whole family is engaged in work, to lead a hand to mouth existence on a daily basis. Estimates of fish catches from these fishers would not only help in understanding catches but also highlight weak local governance, their vulnerability to depleted fish stocks and impacts of urbanization and marginalization of these communities due to destruction of mangroves, coastal creeks and dumping of industrial wastes in shallow backwaters. Utmost care was taken to avoid double counting by counterchecking estimates of fish catches from these fishers by inquiring with village heads, co-operatives and local fishery departments and also to check whether such catches are enumerated by local fisheries department. Often the village heads and community leaders stated that catches from these communities are never quantified, as they are considered insignificant or none.   5.8 Unreported molluscan catches In the enumeration of molluscan catches from brackish water lagoons, intertidal areas and estuaries, preliminary interviews were conducted with community leaders, followed by interviews with fishers, and shell trade retailers to counter check any gaps in assessment of catches from this sector. Often, molluscan catches are not adequately quantified due to scattered nature of these activities along the Indian coastline. It also came to notice that the  163Fisheries Departments often placed more emphasis on management issues related to fuel and vessel subsidies in the trawl sector rather than subsistence fisheries landings. Fisheries Department staff in some coastal states mentioned that they don?t have adequate staff or budget to quantify molluscan catches from remote landing centres. In this regard, interviews with stakeholders and village co-operatives twice or thrice a year can yield valuable information on catches from this sector. A wide range of mollusks such as clams, cockles, oysters, mussels and gastropods are exploited in this sector. Until 1990, traditional exploitation of molluscan shells was restricted to production of lime, through collection of dead shells in intertidal and estuarine habitats. Clam and mussel meat was also consumed traditionally in many coastal states such as Karnataka and Kerala, while some meat was used as feed in poultry sector and as manure in agriculture and coconut plantations.   Since the advent of the aquaculture revolution in the nineties, there was a spike in demand for clam meat for feeding shrimp broodstock in tiger shrimp hatcheries along the east coast. A new group of fishers evolved exclusively targeting clams and cockles for meat in these states. Interviews with staff of shrimp hatcheries in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa through phone calls revealed the extent of clam meat used in this sector. Interviews with women in the unorganized clam meat trade in Kerala and Karnataka gave estimate of how many tonnes of clams were harvested in these states. Utmost care was taken to avoid double counting of clam meat catches from landing centres and the meat sold by women traders in the local markets. Fishers reported that clam meat is sold as feed for shrimp farms; preliminary estimates suggest that in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa alone around 100 tonnes of clams are harvested for use as feed in shrimp nursery ponds, although a more detailed survey is  164necessary to estimate complete extent of catches from this sector. These shrimp hatcheries operate for 6-8 months in a year and largely rely on shrimp broodstock supplied by trawlers for producing shrimp post larvae in enclosed brood stock tanks. Clam meat is fed along with bloodworms and squids during shrimp broodstock maturation. Each hatchery on an average uses 16 kg of clam meat / year (160 kg whole weight), which translates to 144 kg of live clams / year. So, the 260 shrimp hatcheries along east coast of India use around 37.4 tonnes of clams / year. Estimates generated from current study reveal a staggering 42,424 tonnes of molluscan catches landed in India (See table 5.7 for detailed state-wise estimates of unreported Molluscan landings in Indian fisheries). However, the reported catches are only 7234 tonnes in 2004 (Government of India, 2007). The Government of India reports export of clams and mussel meat to foreign countries through the Marine Products Export Development Authority (MPEDA), but no data is available on how this data is sourced from processing plants, resource users or through the State Fisheries Departments.             165 Table 5.7: Unreported molluscan catches from estuaries, backwaters and creeks in the Indian EEZ. State Species / Groups exploited Location Clam meat for local human consumption Total mollusks including dead shells58 (tonnes) Mollusk catches59 (tonnes  / year) Source Actual estimate Lower Limit Upper Limit Orissa Clams, Cockles, Gastropods Badapur, Sonapur,  Gopalpur, Haripur, Palur - 437 360 242 536 Panda and Misra (2007) Clams, Cockles Chandipur (406 t), Talsari (14 t) - 1000 420 348 511 Present Study Andhra Pradesh Clams, Cockles, Oysters Godavari (1680 t), Krishna (430 t), Kandaleru (370 t) estuaries; Pulicat lake (36 t) - 8650 2516 1823 3088 Present Study Tamil Nadu Clams, Cockles, Gastropods  Muttukadu (100 t); Vellar estuary (90 t); Coleroon estuary (16 t) - 630 206 168 322 Present Study Gastropods  Tamil Nadu coast (Trawl landings) - - 4245 3689 5320 Present Study Gastropods (Chanks) Gulf of Mannar; South Tamil Nadu coast 4.2 - 430 290 464 Present Study Kerala Clams, Cockles, Oysters, Mussels Ashtamudi estuary (4000 t); Chettuva estuary (160 t); Cochin backwaters (10,200 t) 78 23,000 14360 12672 17264 Present Study                                                  58 Percentage of dead shells vs. live shells depends on location where dead shells are collected from shore / locations where live shells are exclusively collected from intertidal and estuarine shellfish beds.  59 Whole weight catches from live mollusks caught for lime production and clam meat only (does not include catches of clam meat sold to shrimp hatcheries).   166State Species / Groups exploited Location Clam meat for local human consumption Total mollusks including dead shells (tonnes) Mollusk catches                 (tonnes  / year) Source Actual estimate Lower Limit Upper Limit Karnataka Clams, Cockles, Oysters, Mussels Netravati-Gurupur estuary (140 t); Udayavara estuary (90 t); Kali Estuary (500t) 6  5 8000 730  556  905  Present Study Mulki estuary  (2000 t)  12  -  2000  2000   2000   Sasikumar et al., (2006) Aghanashini estuary (16,000 t) 58 22006 16000 16000 16000 Boominathan et al., (2008) Gujarat Edible oysters, Window pane oysters Gulf of Kutch - - 600 420 684 Present Study West Bengal Clams and Gastropods - - - 420 396 528 Present Study Andhra Pradesh, Orissa Clams Clam meat sold to shrimp hatcheries (37 t) and shrimp farms (100 t)60 - - 137 123 346 Present Study                                                                                                     Total (tonnes) 42424 38727 (LL) 47878 (UL)   5.9 Take home catch of artisanal fishers The take home catch has never been formally quantified in any of the coastal states and estimates from the present study are perhaps first such estimates for the entire EEZ covering all small-scale fishing fleets. Estimates from interviews in 2008, revealed that small-scale fishers take around 90,000 tonnes of fish for consumption at home each year (See Table 5.8                                                  60 According to fishermen clam meat is approximately 10% of the total body weight and hence the same conversion was applied for converting clam meat to whole weight utilized in hatcheries.   167for detailed estimates state-wise). When catches are plenty, a certain percentage of the take home catch is also given to friends, community elders and unemployed fishers as a goodwill gesture. Some fish are also dried and retained for consumption during monsoon season when fishing activity is low. Export oriented markets (van Mulekom et al., 2006) have meant that species that were previously kept for consumption at home are now sold at local and foreign markets, due to high demand. Fishers stated during interviews that some species like sardines, mackerels and anchovies that were dried for consumption at home are rarely consumed now, due to high prices of other food commodities such as rice and pulses, compelling them to sell these fish in local markets.  Seafood processing and fishmeal plants, have organized fish collection from small-scale landing centres creating this demand at the expense of food security of these poor coastal communities.   Table 5.8: Artisanal take home catches along the Indian coast. Estimates based on interviews in eight coastal states during the 2008 field trip to India. Number of fishermen household?s data is sourced from Marine Fisheries Census documents  - CMFRI (2005). State Fishermen households Average take home catch / trip (kgs/ trip) Total take home catch / year Average take home catch (in tonnes) LL UL Gujarat 59889 0.6-2.0 2299 6132 4215 Maharashtra 65313 1.2-2.5 4075 8490 6282 Karnataka 30176 1.5-4.2 1357 3802 2579 Kerala 120486 3.2-5.6 12337 29302 20819 Tamil Nadu 203693 0.9-2.6 9166 26480 17823 Andhra Pradesh 129246 1.3-2.6 8400 20679 14539 Orissa 86352 2.1-6.3 7253 21760 14506 West Bengal 53816 3.2-5.6 6544 11452 8998 Total  51431 128097 89761   168Table 5.9: Unreported catches from mechanised trawlers and gillnetters. Estimates based on interviews in eight coastal states during the 2008 field trip to India. State Crew consumption at Sea61 Crew take home catch62 Dry-fish landings63 Average LL UL Average LL UL Average LL UL Gujarat 5871 4227 7515 5167 3288 7045 352 258 470Maharashtra 2083 1499 2666 1833 1166 2499 125 92 167Karnataka 1248 1036 1460 323 238 425 37 25 51Kerala 4796 3700 5892 4385 3151 5892 4659 3426 5892Tamil Nadu 9061 6758 11365 9829 7372 12287 1597 1167 2273Andhra Pradesh 2361 1837 2886 1476 1181 1771 44734 32206 57262Orissa 1355 976 1735 1138 1030 1247 2873 2006 3740West Bengal 712 475 949 567 501 633 1371 949 1793Total 27487 20507 34468 24717 17927 31798 55748 40129 71647                                                  61 Crew consumption at sea was calculated in each state by multiplying the total number of trawlers and longliners (X) into amount of fish consumed by crew at sea per trip (X). This figure was in turn multiplied by number of trips per year.  Trip duration varied by state from 5-14 days.  62 Crew take-home catch was calculated by estimating the amount of fish catch taken by crew of trawlers and longliners after each fishing trip. A certain percentage of catch was shared among crew members as privileges, meant for consumption at home. The skipper of the vessel decided the amount of fish that would be shared between skipper and the crew. A certain kilograms of catch were also kept for the boat owner. The total take-home catch per boat was multiplied by number of vessels, and this figure which was in turn multiplied by number of trips per year / vessel category to get total take home catch for each coastal state of mainland India.   63 Dry-fish landings were calculated in each state by multiplying total dry-fish landed per boat for each trip. This figure was in turn multiplied by number of trips per year / vessel category to get total take dry-fish landings for each coastal state of mainland India. This catch is grossly under-reported in existing catch statistics of fisheries departments / and the federal government. Fishing crew reported that catch enumerators of the state and central governments seldom did such estimations.   1695.10 Why traditional management measures are not working? Firstly, the notion of Indian fisheries policy makers that allocating fishing rights of territorial waters to artisanal fishers and offshore waters (more than 12 nautical mile) to industrial trawlers is beset with problems for several reasons: 1) the artisanal sector has witnessed a massive expansion of fishing effort from coastal to offshore waters, with diversification in use of new fishing gears, mechanization of traditional craft and increased operational range at Sea; 2) availability of cheap Kerosene from BPL (Below Poverty Level fair price shops) along with subsidized Diesel from State Fisheries Departments means that fishers stay for longer durations until they catch sufficient fish; 3) Fishermen no longer buy fishing nets as they are mostly provided by middlemen who finance fishing trips; 4) Increased mobility of the fishermen allowing them to target diverse fish species in different sections of the coast during different periods of the year; 5) Spike in demand for their landings from industrial firms and processing plants which procure species like pomfrets, seer fish and snappers directly from their landing centres through co-operatives leading to higher prices for their catches than the past; 6) increase in depletion of traditional species, with landings of non-commercial species getting modest prices due to demand in fish meal industry; and 7) increasingly during peak fishing seasons, operations targeting tuna, swordfish and seerfish are financed by middlemen and retailers who buy catch directly from their landing centres, saving transportations costs to markets helping fishers to adapt to high fishing trip costs.  5.11 Conclusion Through the present study the actual extent of illegal and unreported catches from both commercial trawl and small-scale fisheries was estimated using data collected from 200 plus  170interviews in India. The study revealed that unreported catches in India?s marine fisheries is around 1.5 million tonnes every year with lower and upper limits of 1.1 to 1.9 million tonnes. Detailed breakup of unreported catches from various sectors is provided in Table 5.6. The latest fish statistics reported to FAO for the year 2008 show that total reported catches were around 2.38 million tonnes. So, if we account for unreported catches from the current study during the same year, the total catch would reach a staggering 3.8 million tonnes (Unreported catches of IUU), of which around 1.2 million tonnes remains unaccounted through discards alone. Along the mainland Indian EEZ itself 287,000 tonnes of marine fish catches remain unreported from mechanised and small-scale fisheries each year with a lower and upper range of 210,000 to 374,000 tonnes.  Table 5.10: Unreported catches quantified from 2008 Indian field trip in the mainland EEZ. Estimates based on interviews in eight coastal states during the 2008 field trip to India. Unreported catches categories Total Lower Limit Upper Limit Unreported Molluscan Catches 42424 38727 47878Discards (Chartered deep-sea tuna longliners) 1800 1420 2160Discards (Domestic Fishing Trawlers and Fishing Boats) 1217931 924974 1510893Trawlers (Fish consumption at Sea) 27487 20507 34468Trawlers (Crew take-home catch) 24717 17927 31798Subsistence catches (Mangroves, backwaters, estuaries) 5241 3365 6842Reef based subsistence fish catches 1516 1222 2071Bait fish catches 4305 3154 5609Artisanal Fisheries take home catch 89761 51431 128097Fish gleaning at landing centres 2175 1364 2986Dry fish landings  55748 40129 71647Post-Harvest Losses 33660 32000 42600                                                                      Total (in tonnes) 1506765 1136220 1887049  171Small-scale fishers all along the mainland coast stated that displacement of fishers has increased during the last decade due to industrial development, pollution and formation of new anoxic dead zones in coastal waters (where fishers could no longer catch fish largely due to dumping of sewage and industrial wastes, release of hot water effluents from thermal power plants in coastal waters and creeks). Small-scale fishermen stated that to compensate for decreasing catches they are using more nets, going further and staying for more days at sea. Another noticeable change according to small-scale fishermen was that more crew works on each vessel, so the profit from each trip is reduced, as the bulk of revenue from each trip is paid to agent who funded the trip, fuel costs and fishing gear. Incomes have declined for fishermen in all coastal states, as fishers earn half the amount of money that they used to earn 10 years ago. This is due to two reasons.  More crew on each boat means that the share per person is less; more time at sea means average income per day is less, and bulk of profit from trip is paid to moneylenders due to indebtedness. Throughout the Indian coast, fishermen reported that younger age classes are dominant in fish catches as smaller mesh sized nets are used in increasing numbers. This has direct implication on their profits as smaller sized fish fetch a lower price, deteriorate faster before reaching landing centres, and are only used in fish meal and dry fish sector.   In the mechanised trawl sector, depletion of local fish stocks has led to migration of crew to other coastal states where they face more risks. For example, during interviews with fishing crew working on trawlers in Gujarat and Maharashtra, it was revealed that most of the crew working on trawlers nowadays is sourced from distant states like Andhra Pradesh and Orissa. This has contributed to decrease in wages for trawler crew in Gujarat, as crews from other  172states are employed on a daily wage basis. In the past local crew from Gujarat working on trawlers used to get certain percentage of profit from each trip, which as stopped since the advent of daily wage system. So, increasingly local crew are reluctant to take the risks to work on trawlers, while trawler crew from Andhra Pradesh are ready to take the risks as they don?t have alternate employment in their home state. So, overfishing in one state is fueling displacement and conflict with fishers from other state due to migration.   Enforcement of mesh size regulations is dismal in all states; with Fisheries Departments in all maritime state?s being ill equipped to carry out surveillance or implementation of regulatory measures. Lack of will to implement existing regulations and poor planning was also evident in all coastal states with blatant violations of gear and fleet regulations. For example, artisanal fishermen in Kerala were of the opinion that every year a narrow stretch of waters between Alleppey and Neendakhara constitutes the breeding ground for the bulk of shrimps caught in the state. But the state has not protected even one quarter of this area from trawlers. Subsistence fishermen in this section of the coast state that they are not left with any other avenue except using smaller sized gillnets to catch juveniles, as larger fish are getting scarce in gillnet catches in recent years. Traditional fishermen in Kerala are also to blame for the decline of fish catches as they have allowed operation of smaller meshed ring seines which catch 0 and 1 size classes of sardines and mackerels in more numbers every year.  Interviews with fishers revealed that unreported catches from unregulated or unlicensed fishing boats in both artisanal and industrial sectors are not quantified or accounted for in the present reported Indian catch statistics. Previous studies have also thrown light on similar  173problems in estimates of fishing crafts taken from various state fisheries departments (Malhotra and Sinha 2007). Fish bartered at sea is substantially less now compared to earlier years.  I undertook a similar survey of trawl fisheries on the northeast coast of Bay of Bengal in 2003-04 (Pramod 2005), when trawler crews used to barter approximately 10-20 kg of fish in each trip at sea in exchange for groceries and alcohol. Presently, only 2-5 kg is bartered for a 10-day trip. This decrease is mainly to compensate for the increase in fuel and trip costs in recent years.  5.12 Chapter 5 summary Developing countries with vast coastlines and meager patrolling assets are usually confounded with the problem of monitoring landings from multiple fisheries in remote locations.  Under-reporting of small-scale catches has also been a huge problem in developing countries (Pitcher et al., 2002; Gu?nette et al., 2006; Pauly 2006; Mills et al., 2011) and India is no exception to this problem.  The dispersed nature of fishing activities and weak institutional capacity have been cited as major reasons for under-reporting in small-scale fisheries of the developing world (de Graaf et al., 2011).  Reliability of subsistence catch estimates can be improved using fish consumption data (World Bank 2010). In chapter 5, a detailed estimation of underreported catches from small-scale fisheries and commercial trawl sectors was done to provide an overview of unreported catches from the Indian EEZ.   In the current analysis a detailed estimation of each gear sector was undertaken to check for unreported catches from India?s EEZ.  In the trawl sector fish consumption at sea was 27,000  174tonnes per year and the trawl crew take home catch was 24,700 tonnes per year (estimated through interviews at major fishing ports in 2008). Conservative estimates of small-scale fisheries revealed that 287,000 tonnes of catches remain unreported in this sector (which included take home catch of small-scale fishers: 90,000 tonnes; Reef based subsistence catches: 1516 tonnes; Landings in shallow creeks, estuaries and backwaters: 5241 tonnes; Bait fish used in hook and longline fisheries: 4300 tonnes; Unreported molluscan landings: 42,000 tonnes; Post-harvest losses: 33,000 tonnes). Discards from trawl and small-scale fisheries were around 1.2 million tonnes alluding to gravity of under-reporting in this sector. This is perhaps the first attempt to quantify unreported catches from marine fisheries in Indian waters. Significant improvement in reporting of small-scale landings centres could take place by handing over such responsibilities to fisheries co-operatives along the Indian coast.   It is pertinent to highlight that interviews with small-scale fishers during the IUU field trip to India in 2008, also gave valuable information on marginalization of fishers and how decline of fish catches has affected fish communities over the last six decades. Figure 5.1 illustrates the problems from their perspective. Interviews revealed that during the first two decades (1950-70) catches were good throughout the year; but with massive vessel, fuel subsidies and construction of new trawlers on a massive scale, catches declined for artisanal fishers due to increased incursions of trawlers for shrimps leading to dumping of massive quantities of fish and destroying inshore breeding and nursery grounds.  During 1970-1980 period, as catches declined small-scale fishers were provided loans for installing outboard engines and buying bigger FRP boats for fishing farther from shore. In the last two decades, with decreasing  175catches are good on a seasonal basis, leading to migration of fishers from Central east coast to Andaman islands to make a living there, as catches are relatively good and under-exploited in Andaman islands. However, the cycle of poverty does not stop for fishers, as market prices for fish are very low in Andaman Islands due to low demand and high cost of living in the islands.  Figure 5.1: Information from IUU interviews in 2008 showing displacement of Indian fishers due to overfishing. (See section 5.11 for detailed explanation).       176Chapter  6: Illegal and unreported fish catches in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands  6.1 Introduction The Andaman and Nicobar (A & N) Islands are one of the two overseas island territories administered through a Lt. Governor appointed by Government of India (other is the Lakshadweep islands in the Arabian Sea). With 572 islands and 1912 km coastline, a diverse range of marine habitats from fringing coral reefs and atolls to mangroves and tidal creeks are found on these islands (Anon 2008e; Ramesh et al., 2010). Pelagic fish resources are largely unexploited as only 39 of the 349 islands are inhabited and even among these around 34 per cent of forested area is inhabited by five indigenous tribes (Great Andamanese, Shompen, Sentinelese, Jarawa, Onge), who are the earliest known inhabitants of these islands (Anon 2004e; Anon 2008e). The islands also stand out in contrast to coastal states of mainland India as they have the highest ownership of fishing boat and gears among fisherfolk (90% of fishers own their boats) (Pramod 2008). Limited human presence allows Burmese poachers to regularly sneak into these remote islands and poach for sea cucumbers, trochus shells, corals and wildlife. With a population of 379,944 (Census of India, 2011 website) and the arrival of new immigrants from mainland (India) every year, natural resources in the islands have also been subjected to tremendous domestic pressure through illegal fishing, encroachment into forest land, wildlife hunting and displacement of indigenous tribes (Pramod 2008). Prior to 1940s there was no organised fishing activity as indigenous tribes were mostly hunter-gatherer societies, with fish forming a minor part of their subsistence needs (Pramod 2008; Rajamanickam 1997). After India?s independence in 1947, the  177Government of India initiated an organised fishing sector in the A&N islands by relocating fishers from West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala through a settlement scheme, with other fishermen moving on their own in recent years (Pramod 2008).   This chapter sets out various categories of illegal and unreported fish catches that were estimated through interviews in Andaman & Nicobar Islands. The chapter begins with an explanation of various fisheries laws that regulate fishing activities in the islands. Next, an explanation of monitoring control and surveillance assets in the islands is provided to identify drivers of illegal fishing in the islands. This is followed by an explanation of poaching activities by domestic and foreign fishing vessels in the islands. Illegal catches estimated in the chapter include (a) illegal finfish catches of domestic and foreign fishing vessels in the A&N islands EEZ (b) illegal sea cucumber catches taken by foreign fishing vessels; and (c) illegal trochus catches taken by foreign fishing boats in the A&N islands. Various unreported catch categories discussed in the current chapter include (i) Sea shell catches for ornamental trade (ii) Fish consumption among indigenous tribes (iii) Fish sold directly to tourist hotels and resorts (iv) Take home catches of domestic fishers of Indian origin (Most of domestic fishers in the islands have been relocated from mainland Indian states of West Bengal, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu) to encourage fisheries development in the Andaman & Nicobar islands.  A detailed explanation of various illegal and unreported catch categories is given in Chapter 4 (see section 4.2, pages 82 to 84). Interview methodology and preview of study areas is also provided in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3, pages 86 to 88).  178 Figure 6.1: Map showing mainland India and its island territories. Map showing nine coastal states and offshore islands (Andaman and Nicobar Islands).  Grey line outside the map represents the EEZ boundary. Image Source: (Hand drawn: Pramod Ganapathiraju). Image not to scale.  6.2 Interview methodology Interviews through a questionnaire helped to determine the total percentage of illegal and unreported catch in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Please refer to interview methodology in Chapter 4 for more information (Section 4.3, pages 86 to 88). Interviews in A&N islands revealed that there is under-reporting of catches by domestic Indian vessels. Respondents (196,199, 201 and 202) stated that the government staff rarely come to landing centres to  179collect fish landings data, instead the fishers are handed paper forms to fill catch data whenever they go to department offices to renew their fishing boat licenses. This leads to submission of catch data that is both erroneous and flawed as assigning random catches for various fish species leads to under-reporting of catch data. Fisheries Department staff in the islands failed to respond to our inquiries regarding the collection of catch data.   6.3 Monitoring control and surveillance in Andaman and Nicobar Islands The Indian Coast Guard (ICG) is the primary monitoring agency responsible for control and scrutiny of fishing vessels operating within the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It is also responsible for boarding and inspection of domestic and foreign deep-sea vessels operating under charter agreements within the Indian EEZ (Indian Coast Guard, 2009). The Maritime Zones of India Act, 1976 and the Coast Guard Act, 1978 give ICG exclusive rights for inspection, protection and management of living and non-living resources within the Indian EEZ. The Andaman and Nicobar Command of Indian Coast Guard is modestly equipped for patrolling the A& N islands.    Remoteness of the islands coupled with sparse population give rise to immense monitoring problems for the A&N Administration, Police and the Indian Coast Guard64. In the first two                                                  64 The Indian Coast Guard has three Fast Patrol Ships (ICGS Akka Devi, ICGS Lakshmi Bhai), with the induction of ICGS ?Durgabhai Deshmukh? in March 2009 (Anon 2009f). The Coast Guard base in Port Blair also received an advanced offshore patrol vessel ?Sankalp? on May 5, 2009. The vessel has an endurance limit of 6500 nautical miles, can operate for 25 days without replenishment at sea and is designed to carry one twin engine ALH helicopter and five high speed boats during maritime patrols (Anon 2009g). The Diglipur base of  180decades after independence from 1950-1970, the Indian Navy had a minimal presence in the islands due to shortage of patrol vessels65 and infrastructure for patrolling the vast coastline (Anon, pers. Comm. 2008). The transfer of surveillance duties from Indian Navy to the Coast Guard in late seventies paved way for a more rigorous patrolling and enforcement in the islands (Anon, pers. comm. 2008; Pramod 2008). To confront growing influence of China in Burmese territory, off Coco islands (North of Andaman Islands) from the year 2000 onwards the Indian Government increased its naval presence in the A&N islands (Das 2010; Anon,                                                                                                                                                        northern Andaman?s received a high-speed interceptor boat (ICGS C-140) on July 12, 2009, which will substantially improve surveillance capabilities of Coast Guard fleet in this region (Anon 2009h). Coast Guard?s enforcement in A&N Islands EEZ is also enhanced through 2 fixed wing aircrafts and 2 helicopters for patrolling 1912 km coastline (Anon 2009f). With 600,000 km of EEZ area (29.4% of Indian EEZ), the Coast Guard?s patrolling abilities are clearly overstretched in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Anon 2008e).   65 In 1984, Coast Guard?s aerial surveillance capability was constrained as only one Fokker aircraft operated from Calcutta to monitor the entire East coast (Mohan 1984). In 1995, the ICG had four inshore patrol vessels and 2 fixed wing aircraft (Anon 1995). During 1999, Coast Guard had 3 inshore patrol vessels, one offshore patrol vessel (Anon 1999). In 2002, they had one offshore patrol vessel, two fast patrol boats, 3 inland patrol vessels, 1 Dornier aircraft and 1 Chetak helicopter. By 2007, the Coast Guard?s patrolling assets in A&N Islands included 1 offshore patrol vessel, 2 fast patrol vessels, 3 inshore patrol vessels, 2 fixed-wing Dornier aircraft and 1 Chetak helicopter (Murthy 2007). Recently, the Police Marine Force (PMF) of the A & N Police received four Fast Interceptor Boats. Each interceptor boat has a speed of 35 knots per hour even with full load and will be deployed at Diglipur, Campbell Bay, Hut Bay and South Andaman (Anon 2010i). The Indian Naval ships, INS Tarasa and INS Battimalv have also assisted in the surveillance and apprehension of foreign fishing vessels in the islands? waters in recent years on an intermittent basis.   181pers. comm. 2008). Since its inception in early 1950s, the Andaman and Nicobar Marine Police has also grown in strength with inception of its own patrol fleet in the last decade (although the Marine Police did not have a single patrol boat until 2002) for safeguarding shallow water creeks, inland waters and strategic points of far flung islands (Pramod 2008). Until 2002, the Marine Police used local fishing boats for patrolling operations, with such operations constrained by daylight, speed of local fishing boats and location of fishing villages. Often such missions were conducted using smaller fishing boats and restricted to shallow waters in the vicinity of police outposts (Pramod 2008).  6.4 Fisheries regulations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Important fisheries regulations in Andaman and Nicobar Islands include: The Andaman and Nicobar Fishing Rules 1939 (Anon 1939); The Andaman and Nicobar Islands Marine Fishing Regulation 2003 (Anon 2004d); and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Shell Fishing Rules 1978 (Anon 1979). Under the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Marine Fishing Regulation 2003, coastal waters are divided into two zones for fisheries activities. Zone A is exclusively allocated for motorised and non-motorised boats and extends up to 6 nautical miles from the baseline (the 0-6 nautical mile zone is allocated for fishing vessels fitted with engine power of less than 30 HP and non-motorised dinghies without engine). Fishing by mechanised trawlers is banned in Zone A. Fishing in creeks is also banned in this zone as per this advisory. Mechanised trawlers are allowed to fish in Zone B, which extends beyond 6 nautical miles from the baseline (Fishing vessels fitted with more than 30 HP are only allowed to fish between 6 and 12 nautical miles from the baseline). Under Section 17(a)(i) of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Marine Fishing Rules, 2004, closed Season is  182implemented for trawlers and shark fishing from April 15 to May 31 every year. Shark fin traders are required to provide a declaration of their stock and get it inspected through the Fisheries Administration before the start of the ban period by April 15 every year (Pramod 2008).   Turban shell (Turbo marmoratus), five-finger chank (Lambis lambis), scorpion shell (L. chiragra), cowries (Cypraea sp.) and pearly nautilus (Nautilus sp.) are the principal species collected by licensed shellfish fishers within A&N Islands (Pramod 2008). The Island?s waters have been demarcated into 9 shellfish zones and each zone is auctioned and leased to the highest bidder for a two-year period (Pramod 2008). Interviews with shellfish traders in Andaman Islands revealed that licensed fishers in the islands land around 500 tonnes of shells, which is never reported in national fisheries statistics (Pramod 2008). Exploitation of Top shell (Trochus niloticus) and Sea Cucumbers (Holothuria sp.) is banned in Andaman and Nicobar Islands as they are classified as endangered under Schedule IV (Trochus sp.) and Schedule I (Sea cucumbers) of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972 (James 2001; Anon 2003). Under Section 3 (ii) of the Andaman and Nicobar Shell Fishing Rules, 1978, a closed Season is also implemented for shellfish extraction every year from May 1 to September 30 (Anon 1979).   6.5 Nature of poaching activities in Andaman and Nicobar waters Foreign poachers target a wide variety of fish and invertebrates in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. Burmese target sea cucumbers, Trochus shells, and corals; Thai boats target reef fish, tuna, sharks, ornamental fish and sea cucumbers; Sri Lankan and Taiwanese vessels target  183yellowfin tuna and sharks; and Indonesian boats target sharks. From 1980-1999, Burmese trawlers were frequently observed fishing in the northern Andaman islands, but due to increasing enforcement by Coast Guard, since late nineties Burmese vessels have been observed poaching further south as far as Tilanchang and Kamorta off Nicobar islands (Pramod 2008). Burmese poachers have also set up settlements in these islands threatening many wildlife species as they often target Trochus and sea cucumbers, but also decimate wildlife (birds, deer, crocodiles) of islands before moving to other islands (Pramod 2008). Crocodile skins can be sold for as much as US$ 20,000, while sea cucumbers can fetch up to 100$ a kilo in Thailand. If their presence is not detected, they continue operations on these islands with impunity for days together leading to immense destruction of wildlife (Pramod 2008). Coast Guard, Andaman and Nicobar Police and Indian Reserve Battalion Force conduct regular patrols to spot and destroy these camps and apprehended poachers are taken to Port Blair for judicial proceedings (Pramod 2008). However, Coast Guard and the A&N Police often face a daunting task searching for poaching activities in a vast maritime area (Das 2010). As one official noted, ?When you are patrolling at sea, chances of apprehending Burmese poachers are high but when you have to look for poacher camps in remote islands with dense forests, it is as hard as looking for a needle in a haystack? (Respondent: 199). Often, data from aerial patrols and information provided by local fishers is conveyed to surface units for physical interception and arrest of poachers (Pramod 2008). Current threats to fishery resources arise from Burmese fishing boats targeting shellfish in coastal waters, while offshore fishery resources are under threat from Thai and Indonesian trawlers (Murthy 2007).    184Interviews in 2008 revealed the extent of poaching by Burmese and Thai fishing boats in the islands. ?During the last two decades we have increasingly seen that Burmese poachers use smaller boats that sneak in at nights and set up camps in remote uninhabited islands, they sneak in from Coco Islands in the north where a supposedly mother boat provides supplies for each trip. While off South Andaman and Nicobar islands, Thai boats that are much bigger, come with more supplies such as onboard compressors and diving equipment for poaching sea cucumbers on 5-10 day trips and they have been occasionally found to set up camps in the islands. Fishermen have also reported witnessing Indonesian fishing boats targeting sharks in Nicobar Islands. The apprehension rate for Burmese boats varied from 5-10 per cent during nineties and 10-20 percent in recent decades. The Coast Guard has increased number of patrols as well as regular operations to apprehend these poachers. This year (2008) they have apprehended up to 25 per cent of the poaching boats from Burma? (Respondent: 193). Reports from other sources also substantiate this information on the extent of foreign fishing vessels arrested by Coast Guard and Police within the Island?s EEZ (Suri 2001; Roy 2007).  6.5.1 Extent of poaching by foreign fishing vessels Existing literature (Kakar 1989; Sharma 1991) and interviews during 2008 revealed that poaching of fish and shellfish was at its peak from 1960-1980. According to interviews, in the mid-eighties after a series of arrests of Taiwanese and Thai trawlers by the Coast Guard, poaching decreased in offshore waters, but Burmese and Thai trawlers continued to poach in northern waters, while Thai and Indonesian boats brazenly fished in Nicobar waters where patrolling was less pronounced (Pramod 2008). Patrolling vessels often found it difficult to  185control poaching as they had very few vessels, and poachers often sneaked in and out of the EEZ with impunity (Pramod 2008). Moreover, according to local officials some of the arrested Thai and Taiwanese illegal fishing trawlers had sophisticated radar to detect patrol vessels as far as 50 km away often leading to evasion tactics to avoid apprehension (Pramod 2008). According to one local official ?during the seventies and eighties, for every one Thai and Taiwanese trawler we arrested around 10 to 20 managed to get away? (Respondent: 196). Since the late nineties active pursuit of poachers and series of successful apprehensions by Coast Guard has sent a strong signal to poachers and most big foreign trawlers have kept away from the Indian EEZ with occasional EEZ incursions observed off Nicobar Islands in recent years (Anon, pers. comm. 2008; Pramod 2008). The issue of security in Andaman and Nicobar Islands received a boost after the visit of Indian Home Minister to the Islands in 2001, where he aptly stated, ?Poaching is an economic issue, but soon it could turn into a security issue? (Suri 2001).   After setting up a permanent Coast Guard base in Port Blair, two additional bases were set up by the Coast Guard, one in Diglipur (North Andaman) and another one in 2010 in Campbell Bay, (Nicobar Islands) in recent decades (Pramod 2008). This has sent a very strong signal, and poaching by big trawlers has declined in the last decade, thanks to increasing fleet strength of Coast guard and presence of Indian Reserve Battalion (IRBn) in the remote islands to provide intelligence and assist Andaman Marine Police (Pramod 2008). Majority of Burmese boat interceptions have been successful in recent years as joint operations with all four surveillance agencies is making it difficult for poachers to escape. In the past, poachers often sneaked into numerous shallow creeks on being sighted by Coast Guard, but  186in recent years, aerial patrol data is passed to nearest Coast Guard ships, A & N Marine Police and IRBn force for active pursuit of poachers even into shallow creeks as the Police and IRBn have the necessary manpower to engage in combing operations inside creeks and forests to destroy camps and arrest poachers (Pramod 2008). Coast Guard?s efforts at sea are also constrained by wooden boats used by Burmese poachers, which are not easy to identify as they have very low physical profile, and small heat signature, which make them difficult to identify on the patrol ship?s radar. Topography of the land is also affecting apprehension of poachers as majority of fishers and active human population is located on the Eastern side of the Andaman Islands, leaving the western side exposed to poachers (Respondent: 199, 201, 202).  6.5.2 Incentives for domestic Indian poachers in the islands Nearly one fourth of cultivable land in the islands was damaged during the 2004 Tsunami. Although the majority of land loss occurred in Nicobar Islands, nearly 2000 hectares of land was submerged due to seawater ingress in Andaman Islands (Pramod 2008). The loss of agricultural land (Subsidence in Nicobar islands and uplift by nearly in one metre in Andaman Islands (Chia et al., 2005), and subsequent increase in food prices has led to more fish consumption in recent years, as fish are cheap compared to other food commodities in the Islands. In this context, it is important to note that majority of food commodities are very expensive in the islands as they are imported from Mainland India (Pramod 2008). Demand for fish has also increased due to spike in number of tourists visiting Andaman Islands from mainland India (See Figure 6.2 for more information).    187Indian registered mechanised fishing boats, which are only licensed, to fish in Zone B (beyond 6 nautical miles from baseline) have been reported illegally fishing in Zone A, adversely affecting catches of motorised and non-motorised fishing crafts (Respondents: 198, 200, 201). Since 2009, local poachers have been caught transferring corals, trochus and sea cucumbers to Burmese boats off northern Andaman?s alluding to a new nexus between Burmese poachers and local trochus smugglers (Anon 2009i; Anon 2010j; Anon 2010k). Local poachers collect trochus shells illegally from the Andaman Islands, and then contact Burmese poachers, who send boats to smuggle the shells from the islands (Anon 2010j). Details of illegally collected trochus shells and sea cucumbers confiscated from Indian poachers in Andaman and Nicobar Islands are given in Table 6.3.   6.6 Estimation of illegal fish catches in the Andaman and Nicobar islands Data from government reports and interviews conducted by the author in 2008 provide estimates of illegal fishing boats operating in Andaman and Nicobar waters (Pramod 2008). Illegal Foreign fishing vessels target a wide variety of fish and invertebrates in the islands. Burmese boats target sea cucumber and trochus; Indonesian boats target sharks for the fin trade; Thai boats target sea cucumbers and ornamental fish in Nicobar waters, while the bigger Thai trawlers target snappers and tuna in offshore waters; Sri Lankan longliners target yellowfin tuna and sharks; Taiwanese trawlers target reef fish, tuna and sharks.   Illegal fishing vessels arrested each year were divided into three categories a) Finfish vessels (illegal catch from trawlers ? by respective flag); b) Trochus vessels (illegal boats from Burma and Thailand); c) Sea Cucumber boats (illegal boats from Burma). The number of  188illegal fishing vessels by respective flag was divided into average illegal catch found onboard the apprehended IUU fishing vessels to calculate total illegal catch for each category. The totals for illegal catch / year were then estimated by adding illegal catch from the above three vessel categories. The upper and lower bounds for the estimates were derived from interviews in the 2008 survey. Interviews with Respondents 196, 198, 200, 201, 202 provided anchor points for number of vessels observed poaching and not apprehended during three decades from 1980-2000.   6.7 Unreported domestic catches in Andaman & Nicobar Islands 6.7.1.1 Sea shell fisheries in Andaman and Nicobar waters Although, sea shell fishing has been existent in islands since early 1920?s, and is licensed by the local Fisheries Administration, none of the gastropod catches (sea shells) are reported in existing government reports (Government of India Handbook on Fisheries Statistics). In 2008, around 36 units were licensed for a period of two years for collection and sale of seashells excluding the ones listed in scheduled IV of Wildlife Protection Act 1972. Shellfish units are required to maintain records by species of the quantities of shells harvested for inspection prior to sale and export to mainland. According to traders in the Andaman Islands licensed fishers in the islands land around 700 tonnes of shells; however none of these figures are reported in existing government catch statistics (Respondents: 196, 198, 201). According to local sources in Port Blair (Respondents: 189,194 and 198) several units continue to operate illegally, collect banned species (Trochus) and smuggle the catches from the islands through Burmese and other avenues. Several people involved in smuggling shells to the Indian mainland have also been caught at ports, but the practice continues unabated  189due to scattered nature of the shellfish extraction and growing nexus between foreign poachers and local communities (Respondent: 196). 6.7.1.2 Fish consumption among indigenous tribes Domestic catches of the five indigenous tribes have also been traditionally unaccounted due to lack of information on their fishing activities. A conservative estimate of their fishing catches was computed using available literature (Sarkar 1993; Rajamanickam 1997; Mishra 2005) and information gathered from NGO?s in the 2008 field trip to the Andaman Islands (Pramod 2008). The average fish consumption per household was multiplied with the number of fishing days to get total fish consumption per tribe per year (Table 6.1).   The Great Andamanese are a hunter-gatherer-fisher society restricted to Strait Island where only 25 individuals remain (Venkateshwar 1999). The Onge catch prawns and fish and even use dugout canoes to fish in inshore creeks and shallow waters (Venkateshwar 1999; Venkateshwar 2004). The Nicobarese tribes are restricted to Car Nicobar, Kamorta and Katchal islands (Gupta et al., 2004) and are known to engage in subsistence fishing. The Shompens number 250 and are only found on Great Nicobar Island and engage in fishing throughout the year using dugout canoes which can carry 2-7 persons (Sharief and Rao 2007; Arora 2010).  The Jarawa tribe is perhaps the only tribe having the highest population among the five tribes and engages in collection of molluscs and fish in shallow intertidal zones (UNESCO 2010). Some of the marine resources consumed by Jarawa include fish, turtle, crabs (Sesarma sp.), prawns (Metapenaeus sp.), Turbo sp. and Trochus niloticus (Trochus shells) (UNESCO 2010). It is interesting to note that when men are away on hunting trips and when there is shortage of food; women rely on molluscs as major source of animal  190protein in Jarawa communities (UNESCO 2010; Pramod 2008). Jarawa men use bow and arrow to shoot fish, while molluscs and other shells are collected by women and children with bare hands, with both men and women relying on shellfish and fish (~37% of daily animal protein) while camping in coastal areas (UNESCO 2010). Nicobarese tribes are reported to use dugout canoes to catch fish, octopus and crabs (Sivakumar and Rajamanickam 1999). Shompe and Onge tribes are also reported to rely on fish and shellfish for their subsistence needs (Venkateshwar 2004; Patnaik 2006; Reddy et al., 1987).  Table 6.1: Estimates of fish consumption by indigenous tribes in Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Sources of information were FSI (2006); Andaman and Nicobar Islands Administration, Port Blair; and information collected through interviews in 2008.   6.7.1.3 Consumption of fish in tourist resorts and local hotels Several sport fishing charters also operate 3-5 day trips from Port Blair, and although the majority has a catch and release policy, a certain quantity of fish is kept for consumption                                                  66 Upper and lower limits of the unreported catch, calculated from interviews in 2008 are given in brackets.  67 Source: Department of Information, Publicity and Tourism, ANI Administration, Port Blair, 2008 Tribe Jarawa Onge Shompen Sentinelese Great Andamanese Nicobarese Total Fish and Shellfish consumption (in tonnes)66 184  (96 - 204) 24 (18-26) 160 (104-174) 22 (20-46) 2.1  (2-6) 1300 (986-1420) 1692 (1226-1876) Population67  241 103 212 100 25 30000 30678 Location Middle and South Andaman Little Andaman, Rutland Island Great Nicobar island Sentinel island Strait Island  Car Nicobar Island Andaman & Nicobar islands   191after each trip (Pramod 2008). There are 179 places to stay for tourists visiting Andaman Islands (private hotels and resorts ? 157; Government Guest Accommodation ? 22: Source- Andaman and Nicobar Administration 2010).  Nine interviews conducted with fishermen supplying private hotels and resorts in Port Blair revealed that annually around 1023 t of fish and other seafood products are sold to resorts directly (Pramod 2008).  0500001000001500002000002500001990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009Number ofTourists visting Andman IslandsYear Figure 6.2: Number of tourists visiting Andaman & Nicobar Islands. Figure showing an increase in number of tourists (domestic and foreign) visiting Andaman Islands (Source: Department of Information, Publicity and Tourism, ANI Administration, Port Blair, 2010).  6.7.1.4 Take home catch of island fishers Interviews with fishermen in the Andaman Islands also revealed that reef-based fish catches using cast nets, traps, hook and line from shore are never accounted as the fisheries department mostly take fish catches from licensed fishing boats and motorised vessels into account in the catch statistics (Respondents: 186, 188, 192; Anon, pers comm. 2008). 9  192interviews with fishermen in Andaman Islands revealed that about 1367 tonnes of fish are consumed in fishing households of Andaman and Nicobar Islands (See Table 6.2). Since the interviews were conducted in Andaman Islands only, estimates of fish consumption from these islands had to be used to extrapolate fish consumption in Nicobar Islands. The number of fishermen households in A & N Islands (FSI 2006) was multiplied with average household consumption per year (Pramod 2008) to get total take home catches in A & N Islands. Average household consumption per year was estimated by multiplying average take home per catch per trip into number of fishing trips per year (Pramod 2008). The totals for each fishing village, by district were added to get total take home catch for the Andaman and Nicobar islands (See Table 6.2).                193Table 6.2: Household consumption of fish among fishermen communities of Indian origin in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.  Source: Interviews with fishers in 2008.  Island group Number of households68 Average Household consumption / Year (t)69 Lower Limit  Upper Limit  Ethnicity70 North Andaman (Mayabundar) 149 53.6 39.5 56.6 Bengali, Tamil, Telugu, Hindi, Indian Burmese  Diglipur 664 285.2 260.3 318.7 Bengali, Tamil, Malayalam, Telugu, Hindi Middle Andaman (Rangat) 870 217.5 174 261 Bengali, Tamil, Malayalam, Telugu, Hindi Neil Island 75 22.5 15 30 Hindi and Bengali Havelock Island 119 42.1 35.7 47.6 Hindi, Bengali, Tamil and Telugu South Andaman     (Port Blair ? Urban) 530 185.5 132.5 331.2 Hindi, Bengali, Tamil, Urdu, Telugu, Malayalam, Punjabi and Uraon (Port Blair ? Rural) 745 284.6 186.2 372.5 Hindi, Bengali, Telugu Little Andaman 311 93.3 77.8 109 Nicobarese, Hindi, Bengali, Tamil, Telugu and Malayalam Baratang 9 3.2 2.7 3.6 Hindi, Bengali, Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam and Uroan Long Island 18 6.4 5.4 7.2 Hindi, Ber Car Nicobar 195 58.5 48.7 68.2 Nicobarese and Ranchi Great Nicobar 45 16 13.5 18 Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Punjabi, Nicobari and Tribal Language of Shompen Nancowry 98 29.4 24.5 34.3 Nicobarese, Tan Campbell Bay 124 44 37.2 49.6 Nicobari, Hindi, Tamil and Telugu Katchal 69 24.5 20.7 27.6 Nicobari, Hindi, Tamil and Telugu Rutland 3 1 0.9 1.2 Hindi, Bengali, Tamil, and Uroan                      Total  4024 1367 (tonnes) 1075 1736                                                   68 Source: FSI (2006). 69 This estimate includes consumption of fish during festivals and dryfish consumed during lean periods. 70 Estimates of fish catches and household consumption of the six indigenous tribes (Jarawa, Onge, Shompen, Nicobarese, Sentinelese, and Great Andamanese) are presented separately in Table 6.1.  194Although, reef based fish catches contribute less into the local economy, they are vital sources of animal protein for many impoverished communities in the islands.  Moreover, in many communities during the monsoon season, when prices of pulses and other food commodities are higher as commercial ships ply less often from mainland, reefs in vicinity of the community are used more often to catch fish, as even the local boats go less often for fishing due to rough weather conditions prevailing at sea (Pramod 2008). Preliminary estimates off Port Blair region alone suggest that 164 tonnes (range of 142-296 tonnes) of fish and invertebrates are taken from intertidal reefs (Respondents 193 to 197)). More studies are necessary to conduct a much deeper analysis of such reef based subsistence catches for remaining jurisdictions in the islands.  Other categories of unreported catches include dried fish, known within the fishermen and local population of islands as ?nappi?, a traditional dish made from dried fish or salted dried prawn relished by the local Burmese community of the islands. Shrimps are caught in lagoons; creeks and mangroves by fishermen in most islands, while carangids, mackerels and sardines are dried for consumption during lean seasons.  In all the islands, boat owners and crew keep a certain percentage of catch for consumption by their families (Pramod 2008). During good fishing trips, fishermen also give part of their catch to elders, widows and impoverished people of the local fishing communities as a goodwill gesture. Fishermen in many communities reported that they also give fish to government officials to get favours such as renewal of license, admission for their children to schools, government work etc. Fishing communities in Port Blair also reported that government officials regularly take fish from them at landing centres without paying any money, and fishermen often do not resist  195such attempts due to fear of government officials. Fish consumption was highest among the Bengali community whose diet was dominated by rice and fish, followed by Tamil, Malayalam, Telugu and indigenous tribes. The annual consumption of mollusc meat, prawns and octopus was highest among indigenous tribes compared to settlers from mainland (Respondents: 198, 199, 202; Pramod 2008) and it ranged from 26-92 tonnes.  6.7.1.5 Baitfish used by domestic vessels in the islands Bait fish used in longliners and motorised boats was also estimated in the current study for the first time. There are 5 mechanised longliners targeting tuna, sharks and reef fish operating from Port Blair and Havelock Island, which use around 80 tonnes (16 tonnes bait fish / boat / year), which is caught through trawl net (Respondent 193). Motorised hook and line boats use around 10-20 kg sardines as bait fish per trip with the quantity used depending on catches from previous trip, giving an average of 47 tonnes of bait fish for 397 boats in the islands (Respondents: 193, 195, 198, 202). Table 6.3 gives the total estimate for bait fish used by fishing vessels in the islands. Fishers in the Andaman and Nicobar islands use 127 tonnes of bait fish every year, and this has been estimated for the first time as such estimates have never been formally quantified in previous studies.   6.8 Conclusion In data poor fisheries, such as in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, this is perhaps the first study to use knowledge of fishermen to provide a comprehensive picture of foreign and domestic illegal and unreported catches. Estimates from this study show an illegal and  196unreported catch of about 40,000 tonnes every year from the Andaman and Nicobar islands EEZ. A detailed explanation of these catches is given below in Table 6.3.  Table 6.3: Total estimate of illegal and unreported catches in the EEZ of Andaman and Nicobar islands. Derived from interviews in the 2008 IUU trip to the Andaman Islands.  Category Illegal or Unreported Total (in tonnes) Lower limit  (in tonnes) Upper Limit  (in tonnes) Molluscan Shell fish catches Unreported 700 520 740Fish consumption among indigenous tribes Unreported 1692 1200 1870Fish sold to Tourist resorts and hotels Unreported 1023 890 1400Fishermen take home catch Unreported 1367 1075 1736Reef based subsistence catch (Port Blair only) Unreported 164 142 296Bait fish fisheries Unreported 127 120 180Illegal Trochus catch by foreign boats Illegal 244 195 294Illegal Sea Cucumbers catch by foreign boats Illegal 247 123 494Illegal finfish catch by foreign trawlers Illegal 34000 16100 44200Total  39564 20365 51200 A detailed quantitative estimate of illegal catches of Trochus, Sea cucumbers and Finfish from foreign fishing vessels was calculated using illegal catch confiscated from arrested vessels, and number of vessels arrested in the islands (GIUFI 2010). The upper and lower limits of illegal catch were estimated using data collected through interviews (Pramod 2008) with fishers operating in the islands waters.     197 Figure 6.3: Estimates of sea cucumbers catch taken by illegal foreign fishing vessels in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands. Estimated total illegal catch (t) taken by foreign fishing vessels in the Andaman and Nicobar islands EEZ (1970-2010). The red line in the figure represents the estimated illegal catch that was confiscated from vessels that were arrested in Andaman & Nicobar waters from 1982-2010. The lower and upper bound estimates were derived from IUU fishing trip interviews (Pramod 2008), surveillance data in GIUFI (2010), Industry and Government records of vessels that were observed poaching in Andaman & Nicobar EEZ territory.  During the 1980-1990 period, foreign fishing vessels (mostly Burmese and Thai boats) illegally took at least 10 to 50 tonnes of sea cucumbers in the Islands EEZ (Figure 6.3). Lack of enforcement encouraged more fishing boats to enter unhindered in the next decade from 1990-2000, increasing illegal sea cucumbers catch to around 170 tonnes every year. In the subsequent decade from 2000-2004 poaching declined in some island territories, before increasing to 247 tonnes in 2010 (Respondents: 193, 195).  Illegal trochus catch (mostly Burmese boats) ranged from 8 to 20 tonnes in the eighties, before increasing to around 40 to 150 tonnes in the nineties (Figure 6.4). Illegal trochus catch  198increased further from 150 to 200 tonnes each year during the last decade. Notably, the increase in trochus catches during the last decade were largely due to change in poaching strategies by Burmese poachers using each boat to target both sea cucumbers and trochus for each trip whereas in prior decades (1980-2000) majority of Burmese boats targeted both trochus and sea cucumbers exclusively using separate boats. A spike in illegal trochus catch in recent years was also due to the ability of Burmese poachers to form nexus with local trochus smugglers of Indian origin in the Andaman Islands (Anon 2009i; Anon 2010j; Anon 2010k). Illegal catch of trochus, sea cucumbers and other marine wildlife products confiscated from arrested domestic poachers at Port Blair port (residents of Andaman & Nicobar islands) was also quantified and presented in Table 6.4. These domestic Indian poachers on the islands smuggle sea cucumbers to India through passenger vessels that commute between mainland and the islands every week. The sea cucumbers are then smuggled to Sri Lanka through Tamil Nadu. Trochus shells are illegally trafficked to Burmese poachers through northern Andaman.            199 Table 6.4: Sea cucumbers, gastropods and corals seized by Andaman and Nicobar Police. Marine products seized from Indian smugglers in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Source: GIUFI (2010). Year Wildlife Product Quantity of illegal shells and Sea cucumbers confiscated 1978 Turbo Shells 2000 Turbo shells 1993 Red Corals 12 bags red corals 1993 Trochus 420 kg Trochus shells 1995 Trochus 600 kg Trochus shells 1997 Trochus 2 bags Trochus shells 1998 Trochus 6 gunny bags Trochus 1999 Sea Cucumbers 150 kg Sea Cucumbers 2001 Trochus 4182 Trochus shells (worth Rs. 2 lakh) 2001 Sea Cucumbers 40 kg Sea cucumbers 2003 Sea Cucumbers 105 kg Sea cucumbers 2003 Trochus 98 kg Trochus shells 2004 Trochus 300 kg Trochus shells 2004 Trochus 244 bags (5.6 tonnes)  2006 Trochus 11 bags Trochus 2007 Trochus 400 numbers Trochus 2007 Sea Cucumbers 95 kg Sea Cucumbers 2007 Sea Cucumbers 3 kg Sea cucumbers 2007 Trochus 2200 kg Trochus 2008 Red Corals 16 kg Red Corals 2008 Trochus 950 kg Trochus shells (worth Rs. 50,000) 2009 Trochus 2560 numbers Trochus shells 2009 Turbo shells 100 kg Turbo shells 2009 Cowries 35 kg Cowry Black shells 2009 Cowries 3 kg Cowry Brown shells 2009 Button Shells 15 kg Button shells 2010 Olive Ridley turtles 5 Olive Ridley Turtles 2010 Trochus 80 kg Trochus 2011 Turbo shells 147 kg Turbo shells   200  Figure 6.4: Estimates of illegal trochus catch taken by foreign fishing vessels in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Estimated total illegal catch (t) taken by foreign fishing vessels in the Andaman and Nicobar islands EEZ (1970-2010). The red line in the figure represents the estimated illegal catch that was confiscated from vessels that were arrested in Andaman & Nicobar waters from 1982-2010. The lower and upper bound estimates were derived from IUU fishing trip interviews (Pramod 2008), surveillance data in GIUFI (2010), Government records of trochus vessels that were observed poaching in Andaman & Nicobar EEZ territory.  Estimates of illegal catches by foreign trawlers targeting finfish such as tuna, sharks and reef fish involved boats of different countries, with their number and illegal catch per vessel depending on their flag, size and tonnage. Foreign trawlers target different species within the Andaman and Nicobar islands EEZ. Indonesian trawlers target finfish while the smaller boats target sharks for the fin trade; Thai boats target sea cucumbers and ornamental fish in Nicobar waters, while the bigger Thai trawlers target snappers, tuna and sharks in offshore waters; Burmese trawlers target tuna and reef fish; Sri Lankan longliners target yellowfin  201tuna and sharks; Taiwanese trawlers target reef fish, tuna and sharks. Further, the illegal catch for each vessel by respective flag differed by season, location and tonnage of the boats.   Figure 6.5: Estimates of illegal finfish catch taken by foreign fishing vessels in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The illegal finfish catch was estimated from number of illegal fishing vessels arrested in the island?s EEZ. Upper and lower limits reflect illegal catch estimates using data of number of boats observed poaching in island waters collected through interviews with skippers of Indian trawlers, crew of LoP longliners and small-scale fishers operating in A & N islands EEZ. The illegal catches for the period 1968-1980 were for foreign vessels observed poaching within 12 nautical miles from the shore.  Illegal finfish vessels caught 20,000 to 85,000 tonnes in the first decade from 1970-1980 (Figure 6.5). Poaching only declined in the post-1980 period, with illegal catch decreasing to a range of 18,000 to 70,000 tonnes alluding to improvement in monitoring control and surveillance by Indian Coast Guard limiting such incursions into the Indian EEZ. In the next decade due to presence of Coast Guard and A&N Marine Police vessels poaching decreased in the northern Andaman waters. During 1990-2000, illegal catch ranged from 23,000 to  20260,000 tonnes, followed by a spike in incursions for tuna and sharks in offshore waters off the islands leading to illegal catch in the range of 40,000 to 84,000 tonnes (Respondents: AN13, AN18, AN23). The finfish catches of illegal foreign fishing vessels are a conservative estimate, as most of the sources were from interviews with skippers of Indian fishing vessels, which seldom operated beyond 20 miles from the islands EEZ. So, there is shortage of reliable estimates of upper and lower bounds for the illegal finfish trawlers operating within the offshore waters of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands EEZ.   According to local sources (Respondents: 196,199), Coast Guard and other surveillance agencies face a daunting task of protecting natural resources in these islands due to five reasons. Firstly, the Coast Guard often finds it difficult to apprehend poachers as they often sneak into shallow creeks and mangrove areas on sighting patrol ships to avoid apprehension, as Coast Guard ships have draught restriction and cannot enter shallow waters. Secondly, the Burmese poachers often hide their boats and contraband in numerous shallow creeks and mangroves making them difficult to sight during routine aerial and sea based patrols. Most of the smuggling of illegal fishing products is undertaken at night, with most interceptions only viable during routine sighting at sea or during transit towards Burmese waters from the Islands (Respondent: 197, 199). Thirdly, poachers routinely construct illegal camps in the forests, making it difficult to stop their operations unless detected during patrols at sea. Fourthly, even if the Coast Guard makes a physical interception at sea, its boats cannot engage in active pursuit if the poachers flee towards inland creeks and mangroves, and often have to wait for reinforcements from Marine Police and IRBn to arrest poachers from the wilderness of the remote islands (Pramod 2008).  203Illegal and unreported catches in Andaman and Nicobar islands were estimated for the first time and interviews with fishers revealed that 40,000 tonnes remain unaccounted each year. Conservative estimates from interviews in 2008 revealed that illegal fish catches by foreign fishing vessels in Andaman Islands were 34,000 tonnes per year and were primarily directed at sea cucumbers, trochus and finfishes. Conservative estimates of unreported catches from five different sectors (See Table 6.3) puts estimate at 5700 tonnes each year (Molluscan shell fish catches: 700 tonnes; Fish consumption among indigenous tribes: 1692 tonnes; Fish sold to tourist hotels and resorts: 1023 tonnes; Take home catch of Indian fishers in the islands: 1307 tonnes; Reef based subsistence catch: 164 tonnes and bait fish catch: 847 tonnes per year).  6.9 Chapter 6 summary Illegal fishing continues to persist in Andaman and Nicobar islands due to loss of deterrence, mainly due to repatriation of Burmese and Thai poachers on a regular basis. Interviews in 2008 revealed that during short prison sentence in the Andaman Islands, poachers come in contact with locals and learn the language to act as contacts for smuggling trochus and sea cucumbers during subsequent illegal trips. The poachers return to continue poaching in the remote islands, with some Respondents (189.192, 199 and 201) stating that poachers know more about local topography and fishing activities of locals and use them to their advantage in coordinating smuggling operations. Respondent 198 stated that people of the northern Andaman Islands (who speak Burmese) often provide local support for Burmese poachers to conduct smuggling operations.   204The Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) comprised of Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard is the only Joint Command, which plays an active role in coordinating surveillance operations with Andaman and Nicobar Marine Police and IRBn to apprehend foreign fishing vessels at regular intervals. However, their efforts can only pay dividends if more stringent action is taken against arrested poachers as they are regularly repatriated by the Indian Government, only to return and continue their poaching operations in the islands. Other issues plaguing enforcement include unavailability of proper patrol boats for apprehending poachers operating in shallow waters. Community based policing and closer co-ordination with marine police can help in better enforcement and protection of islands resources from foreign poachers. Das (2010) attributes continuation of poaching in the islands to three factors, namely underdevelopment of fishing industry, existence of scattered uninhabited islands serving as hideouts for poachers and loss of element of deterrence due to regular repatriation of the Burmese poachers.    Most of the islands in the Andaman and Nicobar islands are densely forested making it difficult to detect illegal poacher camps in remote islands. Most of the remote islands used by Burmese poachers are uninhabited with routine anti-poaching operations at sea and observations of small-scale fishers the only modes to detect violations in the remote islands. Majority of the islands in the northern Andaman, western side of Jarawa tribal reserve are virtually unpatrolled as there are no Indian fisher settlements or any other human settlement in these islands (Respondents: 196,199, 201, 202). During interviews in 2008, people working for NGO?s and researchers in Government establishments noted that Jarawa areas have been plundered on a large-scale by Burmese poachers due to absence of Indian small- 205scale fisheries in these jurisdiction and low physical presence of tribes along the large coastline in central and northern Andaman islands (Respondents: 195, 196). They also noted that Jarawa men often complain about presence of Burmese poachers in their territories during routine food distribution by Government officers, and such information is conveyed to Indian Coast Guard for further action. Often, such information is difficult to comprehend for local government authorities due to presence of few translators (the tribes speak a different language from the local Indians) during food distribution or contact during specific period. 206Chapter  7: Conclusion This thesis is focused on addressing two aspects of illegal and unreported fishing. Chapters 1 to 3 have a global perspective, looking at incentives that drive illegal and unreported fishing, while chapters 4 to 6 are focused on estimating different categories of illegal and unreported catches that are poorly quantified in Indian fisheries.  Chapter 1 provides an overview of different incentives for illegal fishing such as governance, corruption, low penalties, subsidies, organized crime, fleet overcapacity, flags of convenience, poor monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) etc. In Chapters 2 and 3, I chose two of these incentives, namely illegal fishing penalties and MCS for an in-depth global analysis.  For the work in India reported in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I use data collected through field interviews in 2008 to estimate illegal and unreported catches in the Indian EEZ.   I will now summarize the main research findings and discuss the relevance of my results in the context of illegal and unreported fishing. Next, I will discuss limitations of the research and provide suggestions to apply this research in future studies.  7.1 Main findings 7.1.1 Incentives that allow illegal fishing to persist in the world?s EEZs The estimated worldwide extent of losses from illegal and unreported fish catches (excluding discards) ranges from 11 to 26 million tonnes, resulting in economic loss of $10 bn to 23.5 bn annually (Agnew et al., 2009). The dynamics of fishing fleets; gears and people involved in the fisheries sector differ from country to country. These dynamics are influenced by different financial, social and political incentives in each country, which necessitates  207effective management policy for both domestic and foreign fleets operating within their EEZ. My findings from Chapter 1 suggest that the incentives for illegal fishing depend on the efficacy of institutions and MCS assets allocated to address this issue in each jurisdiction. Incentives such as corruption and poor MCS are important drivers in developing countries (other incentives in the developing world include weak governance, subsidies, poverty, indebtedness etc.), while fleet overcapacity and subsidies assume importance in the developed world. In countries where the scale of illegal fishing problems are identified, a range of other factors like low prosecution rate (e.g., India) (Pramod 2010) and lack of accountability (Sembony 2009; Murias 2010; Anon 2010b) in the judicial process (e.g., Tanzania, Peru) have been identified as stumbling blocks to controlling illegal fishing.  The complexities involved in controlling illegal catch within the whole supply chain from vessel, to markets and the buyer need significant improvement in the next step towards efforts in controlling illegal fishing.    7.1.2 Is monitoring control and surveillance adequate in world?s fisheries? My findings in Chapter 3 show that, although major strides have been initiated in developing good MCS infrastructure, such measures have not been backed by effective implementation of national and international laws, leading to poor compliance. My findings also suggest that developed countries with better MCS capabilities might gradually overcome these shortfalls, but developing countries with growing population, large EEZs and poor MCS infrastructure would be the most affected due to pilferage of fishery resources with long-term implications to food security. In the resource rich, yet poor economies of West Africa, findings suggest lack of financial resources as major constraint to deter illegal fishing.  2087.1.3 Are illegal fishing penalties a significant deterrent to poachers? Analysis of illegal fishing penalties in 109 countries over a three-decade period (reported in Chapter 2) shows that current penalties do not pose a significant deterrent to poachers (See illegal fishing cases in Appendix A and Chapter 2) and in many cases the penalty levied on illegal fishing was not even worth the illegal catch found on the offending vessel. On the other hand, for instance, illegal fishing cases in Australia illustrate that confiscation of catch and vessel engaged in the illegal activity can send a strong signal to the IUU vessel operators and to a certain extent would also assist in recovering high costs associated with patrolling vast EEZs. The current analysis is to my knowledge, the first global analysis covering a 30 year period (1980-2009) to track over 1211 illegal fishing cases (Shellfish, Mollusks, Finfishes etc.) from the time of the actual incident to its final prosecution in court, potentially providing valuable data to enforcement agencies. This data can help in identifying shortcomings in the existing penalty framework in many of these countries to improve the penalty regime.  7.1.4 Factors driving illegal and unreported catch in the Indian EEZ The 7-month field trip, during which I interviewed 203 respondents, gave a very good opportunity to look at factors driving illegal and unreported fishing in Indian waters. While the main focus of the interviews was to estimate the quantity of illegal and unreported catches (Chapters 4,5, and 6), interviews also provided information on some of the issues that drive these activities. Some of the main findings are explained below. Categories discussed here include a) Weak governance; b) controlling illegal catches on foreign chartered vessels  209operating in Indian EEZ; c) Overcapacity in artisanal and industrial fisheries and; d) influence of peer behavior.  7.1.4.1 Weak governance Interviews with fishers along the eight coastal states showed that institutional failure is prevalent in all the coastal states, esp., in controlling illegal fishing. With the exception of Orissa, State fisheries departments and Federal government agencies in all the eight coastal states do not have the resolve to implement existing state and federal fisheries legislations. Interviews reveal that existing laws are not being enforced through formal or informal norms leading to poor compliance. The