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Making the New Relationship work : Crown-First Nation shared decision-making in the Great Bear Rainforest Bird, Laura Marie 2011

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MAKING	
  THE	
  NEW	
  RELATIONSHIP	
  WORK:	
  CROWN-­FIRST	
  NATION	
  SHARED	
   DECISION-­MAKING	
  IN	
  THE	
  GREAT	
  BEAR	
  RAINFOREST	
  	
  by	
  	
  Laura	
  Marie	
  Bird	
  	
  B.E.S.,	
  The	
  University	
  of	
  Waterloo,	
  2005	
  	
  A	
  THESIS	
  SUBMITTED	
  IN	
  PARTIAL	
  FULFILLMENT	
  OF	
  THE	
  REQUIREMENTS	
  FOR	
  THE	
  DEGREE	
  OF	
  	
  MASTER	
  OF	
  SCIENCE	
  	
  in	
  	
  THE	
  FACULTY	
  OF	
  GRADUATE	
  STUDIES	
  	
   (Forestry)	
  	
   THE	
  UNIVERSITY	
  OF	
  BRITISH	
  COLUMBIA	
  	
   (Vancouver)	
  	
  	
  December	
  2011	
  	
   ©	
  Laura	
  Marie	
  Bird,	
  2011	
   	
   ii	
   Abstract 	
  Many	
  of	
  the	
  First	
  Nations	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia,	
  and	
  the	
  Province	
  itself	
  through	
  the	
  vision	
  of	
  the	
  New	
  Relationship,	
  are	
  seeking	
  institutions	
  for	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  regarding	
  land	
  and	
  resources.	
  Efforts	
  have	
  faced	
  numerous	
  setbacks,	
  including	
  the	
  cancellation	
  of	
  the	
  proposed	
  Recognition	
  and	
  Reconciliation	
  Act	
  in	
  2009.	
  These	
  setbacks,	
  mirrored	
  by	
  slow	
  progress	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia’s	
  treaty	
  negotxiations,	
  leaving	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  First	
  Nations	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  still	
  in	
  search	
  of	
  an	
  agreeable	
  approach	
  to	
  planning	
  and	
  governing	
  land	
  and	
  resource	
  use.	
  The	
  framework	
  developed	
  between	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  since	
  2001	
  is	
  among	
  the	
  most	
  advanced	
  cases	
  of	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nations	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  and	
  provides	
  insight	
  into	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  principles	
  of	
  First	
  Nations	
  consultation,	
  accommodation	
  and	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  for	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Canada.	
  	
  The	
  objectives	
  of	
  this	
  thesis	
  are	
  two-­‐fold.	
  First,	
  this	
  thesis	
  assesses	
  whether	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  acquired	
  a	
  share	
  of	
  governmental	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  for	
  three	
  types	
  of	
  decisions:	
  land	
  use	
  zones,	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management	
  (EBM)	
  operating	
  rules,	
  and	
  approval	
  of	
  operational	
  plans.	
  Second,	
  this	
  thesis	
  provides	
  an	
  overview	
  of	
  the	
  unique	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  process	
  that	
  evolved	
  for	
  the	
  resource	
  management	
  for	
  British	
  Columbia’s	
  North	
  and	
  Central	
  Coast,	
  and	
  the	
  framework	
  for	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  that	
  has	
  been	
  established	
  between	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  regarding	
  the	
  three	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  decision	
  functions	
  under	
  investigation.	
  	
  This	
  thesis	
  concludes	
  that,	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  agreements	
  under	
  Canadian	
  law,	
  the	
  Province	
  ultimately	
  retains	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  on	
  all	
  three	
  decision	
  functions,	
  but	
  the	
  Parties	
  have	
  committed	
  to	
  making	
  decisions	
  by	
  consensus	
  for	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  three	
  functions.	
  To	
  date,	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  succeeded	
  in	
  reaching	
  consensus	
  on	
  the	
  designation	
  of	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  and	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules,	
  and	
  are	
  now	
  beginning	
  engagement	
  on	
  operational	
  plan	
  approval.	
  Using	
  parallel	
   	
   iii	
   agreements	
  by	
  the	
  Haida	
  Nation	
  for	
  comparison,	
  this	
  thesis	
  concludes	
  that	
  the	
  Haida	
  Nation,	
  a	
  member	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  has	
  acquired	
  a	
  share	
  of	
  governmental	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  that	
  will	
  stand	
  as	
  a	
  closely	
  watched	
  case	
  of	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nation	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia.	
   	
   iv	
   Preface 	
  This	
  research	
  was	
  approved	
  by	
  the	
  University	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  Behavioural	
  Research	
  Ethics	
  Board.	
  The	
  certificate	
  of	
  approval	
  is	
  UBC	
  BREB	
  H10-­‐03164.	
  	
   	
   v	
   Table of Contents 	
   Abstract............................................................................................................................................. ii	
   Preface.............................................................................................................................................. iv	
   Table	
  of	
  Contents ............................................................................................................................v	
   List	
  of	
  Tables ................................................................................................................................. vii	
   List	
  of	
  Figures...............................................................................................................................viii	
   Acknowledgements...................................................................................................................... ix	
   Chapter	
  1:	
  Introduction............................................................................................................... 1	
   1.1	
   Research	
  Questions	
  and	
  Scope..................................................................................................3	
   1.2	
   Methods ............................................................................................................................................6	
  1.2.1	
   Setting	
  the	
  Three	
  Decision	
  Functions..............................................................................................6	
  1.2.2	
   Analysing	
  the	
  Three	
  Decision	
  Functions:	
  Primary	
  Documents	
  and	
  Interviews ...........6	
   Chapter	
  2:	
  Foundational	
  Concepts.........................................................................................11	
   2.1	
   Power	
  vs.	
  Authority ................................................................................................................... 11	
   2.2	
   Statutory	
  Decision-­Making	
  and	
  Fettering .......................................................................... 13	
  2.2.1	
   Sources	
  of	
  Authority	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Legal	
  Context..............................................................16	
   2.3	
   Relative	
  Authority	
  Framework	
   ............................................................................................. 18	
   Chapter	
  3:	
  Literature	
  Review	
  –	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest ...................................................23	
   Chapter	
  4:	
  The	
  Crown-­Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  Governance	
  Structure ..........................31	
   4.1	
   Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 31	
   4.2	
   Background .................................................................................................................................. 32	
   4.3	
   Government-­to-­Government	
  Agreements	
  and	
  Land	
  Use	
  Plans .................................. 34	
  4.3.1	
   The	
  2001	
  General	
  Protocol	
  Agreement .......................................................................................34	
  4.3.2	
   The	
  LRMPs	
  and	
  2006	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements.........................................................37	
  4.3.3	
   The	
  2009	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol..................................................................................................41	
   4.4	
   Relative	
  Authority ...................................................................................................................... 45	
  4.4.1	
   Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  Agreements	
  –	
  Co-­‐management ...........................................46	
  4.4.2	
   Haida	
  Gwaii	
  Management	
  Council	
  –	
  Co-­‐jurisdiction..............................................................49	
  4.4.3	
   Da’naxda’xw/Awaetlala	
  First	
  Nation	
  v.	
  British	
  Columbia	
  (Environment)	
  2011	
  BCSC	
  620	
   ........................................................................................................................................................................51	
  4.4.4	
   Power	
  –	
  The	
  Incentive	
  To	
  Sign	
  On.................................................................................................56	
  4.4.5	
   Own	
  Laws,	
  Policies,	
  Customs	
  and	
  Traditions............................................................................59	
  4.4.6	
   Functioning	
  of	
  the	
  Governance	
  Forum ........................................................................................61	
   	
   vi	
   4.5	
   Conclusions................................................................................................................................... 67	
   Chapter	
  5:	
  Policy	
  Outcomes:	
  The	
  Three	
  Decision	
  Functions ........................................69	
   5.1	
   Function	
  1	
  -­	
  Land	
  Use	
  Zones ................................................................................................... 69	
  5.1.1	
   Conservancies/Protected	
  Areas	
  (28%).......................................................................................73	
  5.1.2	
   Biodiversity,	
  Mining	
  and	
  Tourism	
  Areas	
  (BMTAs)	
  (5%).....................................................74	
  5.1.3	
   EBM	
  Operating	
  Areas	
  (67%)............................................................................................................75	
  5.1.4	
   Mechanisms	
  for	
  Future	
  Amendments..........................................................................................75	
   5.2	
   Function	
  2	
  –	
  EBM	
  Operating	
  Rules	
  (Land	
  Use	
  Legal	
  Objectives) ................................ 77	
  5.2.1	
   Range	
  of	
  Natural	
  Variability	
  –	
  An	
  Example	
  of	
  an	
  EBM	
  Operating	
  Rule .........................79	
  5.2.2	
   EBM	
  Operating	
  Rules	
  Established	
  as	
  Law ..................................................................................81	
  5.2.3	
   March	
  31,	
  2009	
  –	
  EBM	
  Fully	
  Implemented................................................................................84	
  5.2.4	
   Mechanisms	
  for	
  Future	
  Amendments	
  to	
  EBM	
  Rules .............................................................85	
  5.2.5	
   Looking	
  Forward	
  –	
  The	
  Human	
  Well-­‐Being	
  Side	
  of	
  Ecosystem-­‐Based	
  Management	
   ........................................................................................................................................................................87	
   5.3	
   Function	
  3	
  –	
  Approval	
  of	
  Operational	
  Plans	
  (Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Decisions)........ 88	
   5.4	
   Conclusions................................................................................................................................... 96	
   Chapter	
  6:	
  Conclusions ..............................................................................................................98	
   Bibliography............................................................................................................................... 104	
   Appendix	
  A	
  -­	
  	
  Interview	
  Schedule ....................................................................................... 111	
   	
   	
   vii	
   List of Tables 	
  Table	
  2.1	
  	
  	
  	
  Relative	
  Authority	
  of	
  Co-­‐Management	
  and	
  Co-­‐Jurisdictional	
  Bodies .............. 21	
  Table	
  4.1	
  	
  	
  	
  Summary	
  of	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nations	
  Agreements,	
  Parties	
  and	
  Decision	
  Functions.................................................................................................................................................. 44	
  Table	
  5.1	
  	
  	
  	
  Examples	
  of	
  EBM	
  Operating	
  Rules	
  Implemented	
  Through	
  Central	
  and	
  North	
  Coast	
  Land	
  Use	
  Objectives	
  Order,	
  2009...................................................................................... 83	
  	
   	
   viii	
   List of Figures 	
  Figure	
  2.1	
  	
  	
  	
  Forsyth’s	
  (2006)	
  Relative	
  Authority	
  Spectrum ....................................................... 19	
  Figure	
  5.1	
  	
  	
  	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  2006	
  Land	
  Use	
  Plan	
  Map ..................................................... 72	
  Figure	
  5.2	
  	
  	
  	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  Engagement	
  Framework,	
  as	
  of	
  2009 .......................... 95	
   	
   ix	
   Acknowledgements 	
  I	
  would	
  like	
  to	
  thank	
  my	
  supervisor,	
  Dr.	
  George	
  Hoberg,	
  for	
  providing	
  invaluable	
  and	
  constant	
  guidance	
  throughout	
  my	
  entire	
  graduate	
  career,	
  and	
  who	
  has	
  been	
  integral	
  to	
  the	
  design	
  of	
  this	
  research	
  and	
  interpretation	
  of	
  results.	
  I	
  would	
  also	
  like	
  to	
  thank	
  my	
  committee	
  members,	
  Dr.	
  Ronald	
  Trosper,	
  who	
  continued	
  to	
  be	
  available	
  for	
  advice	
  even	
  after	
  beginning	
  a	
  new	
  role	
  at	
  the	
  University	
  of	
  Arizona,	
  and	
  Dr.	
  Murray	
  Rutherford,	
  who	
  joined	
  our	
  committee	
  from	
  Simon	
  Fraser	
  University	
  and	
  has	
  made	
  multiple	
  trips	
  to	
  the	
  UBC	
  campus	
  to	
  meet	
  with	
  me.	
  Drs.	
  Hoberg,	
  Trosper,	
  and	
  Rutherford	
  each	
  offered	
  me	
  unique	
  advice	
  and	
  keen	
  oversight	
  that	
  together	
  were	
  fundamental	
  to	
  the	
  quality	
  of	
  this	
  work.	
  	
  I	
  would	
  also	
  like	
  to	
  thank	
  everyone	
  who	
  agreed	
  to	
  be	
  interviewed	
  for	
  this	
  research.	
  Your	
  considered	
  and	
  candid	
  responses	
  were	
  critical	
  to	
  the	
  completion	
  of	
  this	
  work,	
  and	
  I	
  value	
  the	
  trust	
  you	
  placed	
  in	
  me.	
  I	
  would	
  particularly	
  like	
  to	
  thank	
  Dennis	
  Crockford	
  at	
  the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  Relations	
  and	
  Reconciliation	
  for	
  taking	
  countless	
  phone	
  calls	
  and	
  emails	
  over	
  the	
  course	
  of	
  two	
  years,	
  and	
  always	
  with	
  a	
  smile.	
  	
  	
  Finally,	
  I	
  thank	
  my	
  friends	
  and	
  family	
  for	
  your	
  incredible	
  support	
  and	
  encouragement.	
  	
   	
   1	
   Chapter 1: Introduction 	
  In	
  2005,	
  the	
  government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  announced	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  entering	
  into	
  a	
  “New	
  Relationship”	
  with	
  First	
  Nations	
  “based	
  on	
  respect,	
  recognition	
  and	
  accommodation	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  title	
  and	
  rights;	
  respect	
  for	
  each	
  other’s	
  respective	
  laws	
  and	
  responsibilities;	
  and	
  for	
  the	
  reconciliation	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  and	
  Crown	
  titles	
  and	
  jurisdictions”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009d).	
  As	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  this	
  direction,	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  First	
  Nations	
  Leadership	
  Council	
  agreed	
  to	
  establish	
  institutions	
  for	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  regarding	
  land	
  and	
  resources.	
  In	
  the	
  2009	
  Throne	
  Speech,	
  the	
  Province	
  pledged	
  to	
  implement	
  these	
  principles	
  through	
  legislation	
  that	
  would	
  take	
  priority	
  over	
  all	
  other	
  provincial	
  statutes	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009d).	
  The	
  proposed	
  legislation,	
  however,	
  was	
  resoundingly	
  rejected	
  by	
  First	
  Nations	
  (First	
  Nations	
  Summitt,	
  Union	
  of	
  BC	
  Indian	
  Chiefs,	
  and	
  BC	
  Assembly	
  of	
  First	
  Nations	
  2009).	
  This	
  setback,	
  mirrored	
  by	
  slow	
  progress	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia’s	
  treaty	
  negotiations,	
  leave	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  First	
  Nations	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  still	
  in	
  search	
  of	
  an	
  agreeable	
  approach	
  to	
  planning	
  and	
  governing	
  land	
  and	
  resource	
  use.	
  	
  	
  	
  Despite	
  the	
  setbacks	
  in	
  institutionalising	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  at	
  the	
  provincial	
  level,	
  considerable	
  advances	
  have	
  been	
  made	
  in	
  the	
  6.4	
  million	
  hectare	
  area	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia’s	
  North	
  and	
  Central	
  Coast,	
  known	
  as	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest.	
  What	
  has	
  emerged	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  this	
  decade,	
  in	
  both	
  process	
  and	
  form,	
  is	
  an	
  unprecedented	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  framework	
  that	
  can	
  provide	
  insight	
  into	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  principles	
  of	
  First	
  Nations	
  reconciliation	
  and	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  for	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Canada.	
  	
  	
  The	
  North	
  and	
  Central	
  Coast	
  management	
  area	
  includes	
  the	
  traditional	
  territories	
  of	
  more	
  than	
  two	
  dozen	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  was	
  the	
  centre	
  of	
  intense	
  resource	
  conflict	
  and	
  international	
  anti-­‐logging	
  campaigns	
  in	
  1999	
  and	
  2000.	
  Out	
  of	
  the	
  conflict	
  came	
  a	
  new	
  approach	
  to	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nation	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  in	
  both	
  the	
  formulation	
  of	
  the	
  region’s	
  land	
  use	
  plan,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  its	
  future	
  governance.	
  Underpinning	
  the	
  unprecedented	
  ‘government-­‐to-­‐government’	
  planning	
  process	
  was	
  an	
  agreement	
  to	
  implement	
  a	
  new	
  form	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management,	
  the	
  central	
  feature	
  of	
  which	
  is	
   	
   2	
   a	
  goal	
  of	
  developing	
  a	
  symbiotic	
  relationship	
  between	
  ecological	
  integrity	
  and	
  human	
  well-­‐being	
  that	
  represents	
  both	
  western	
  and	
  traditional	
  knowledge	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2001).	
  	
  	
  In	
  British	
  Columbia,	
  only	
  a	
  small	
  percentage	
  of	
  the	
  land	
  is	
  represented	
  by	
  a	
  treaty,	
  and	
  	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  historically	
  been	
  excluded	
  from	
  both	
  forestry	
  and	
  governance	
  opportunities	
  in	
  their	
  territories.	
  Today,	
  new	
  development	
  pressures	
  emerge	
  from	
  other	
  resource	
  sectors	
  such	
  as	
  mining,	
  oil	
  and	
  gas,	
  while	
  legal,	
  social,	
  and	
  economic	
  pressures	
  are	
  bolstering	
  First	
  Nations’	
  demands	
  for	
  direct	
  participation	
  in	
  natural	
  resources	
  management.	
  Here,	
  First	
  Nations’	
  challenges	
  to	
  their	
  governance	
  exclusion	
  have	
  resulted	
  in	
  pronounced	
  conflicts	
  and	
  become	
  “a	
  common	
  feature	
  on	
  the	
  political	
  landscape”	
  (Low	
  and	
  Shaw	
  forthcoming).	
  As	
  Forsyth	
  (2006,	
  77)	
  expresses:	
  “For	
  many	
  Aboriginal	
  peoples,	
  gaining	
  power	
  and	
  formal	
  authority	
  over	
  management	
  decisions	
  is	
  not	
  just	
  an	
  issue	
  of	
  control,	
  but	
  of	
  exerting	
  cultural	
  and	
  political	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  their	
  traditional	
  territories.”	
  Clogg,	
  Hoberg,	
  and	
  O’Carroll	
  (2004,	
  vii),	
  moreover,	
  find	
  that	
  “when	
  communities	
  are	
  provided	
  with	
  control	
  over	
  decision-­‐making	
  and/or	
  resources,	
  they	
  derive	
  greater	
  local	
  benefit.”	
  	
  	
  The	
  role	
  that	
  First	
  Nations	
  play	
  in	
  resource	
  activities	
  in	
  their	
  traditional	
  territories	
  can	
  vary	
  in	
  degree	
  on	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  variables,	
  including	
  relative	
  authority.	
  Over	
  the	
  past	
  decade,	
  the	
  Province	
  has	
  initiated	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  policies	
  and	
  economic	
  tools	
  to	
  increase	
  Aboriginal	
  access	
  to	
  forestry	
  and	
  resource	
  development,	
  but	
  these	
  have	
  not	
  proven	
  sufficient	
  to	
  reconcile	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nations	
  relations,	
  and	
  do	
  not	
  address	
  title	
  or	
  jurisdiction	
  (Forsyth,	
  Hoberg,	
  and	
  Bird	
  forthcoming	
  2012).	
  	
  	
  Against	
  the	
  backdrop	
  of	
  the	
  New	
  Relationship,	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  First	
  Nations	
  on	
  the	
  coast	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  both	
  assert	
  sovereignty,	
  title,	
  jurisdiction,	
  and	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  to	
  the	
  land,	
  while	
  also	
  seeking	
  to	
  build	
  a	
  lasting	
  shared	
  governance	
  arrangement	
  (see	
  for	
  example,	
  Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Gitga’at	
  First	
  Nation	
  2006).	
  Over	
  the	
  course	
  of	
  more	
  than	
  a	
  decade,	
  they	
  have	
  developed	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  agreements	
  for	
  management	
  of	
  the	
  land	
  under	
  the	
  principles	
  of	
  government-­‐to-­‐ 	
   3	
   government	
  engagement	
  and	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management	
  that	
  seeks	
  to	
  make	
  strategic	
  and	
  operational	
  decisions	
  by	
  consensus.	
  	
  This	
  thesis	
  analyses	
  how	
  well	
  these	
  agreements	
  contribute	
  to	
  meeting	
  the	
  broader	
  goals	
  of	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nation	
  reconciliation	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  internationally,	
  and	
  to	
  the	
  specific	
  goals	
  embodied	
  in	
  the	
  New	
  Relationship	
  in	
  the	
  province.	
  It	
  analyses	
  the	
  governance	
  structures	
  that	
  have	
  emerged	
  through	
  more	
  than	
  a	
  decade	
  of	
  engagement	
  and	
  negotiations,	
  and	
  synthesises	
  the	
  land	
  use	
  policy	
  outcomes	
  that	
  have	
  resulted.	
  This	
  thesis	
  focuses	
  on	
  the	
  relationships	
  developed	
  between	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  the	
  Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  because	
  forest	
  and	
  land	
  matters	
  fall	
  under	
  provincial	
  jurisdiction.	
  The	
  Federal	
  government	
  does	
  have	
  a	
  direct	
  role	
  in	
  treaty	
  development	
  and	
  has	
  jurisdiction	
  under	
  s.91(24)	
  of	
  the	
  constitution	
  over	
  "Indians	
  and	
  lands	
  reserved	
  for	
  the	
  Indians."	
  The	
  Federal	
  government	
  also	
  has	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  relevant	
  matters	
  such	
  as	
  inland	
  fisheries.	
  However,	
  the	
  Federal	
  government	
  has	
  not	
  been	
  intimately	
  involved	
  with	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  agreements	
  under	
  investigation	
  in	
  this	
  research.	
  While	
  this	
  thesis	
  asks	
  pointed	
  questions	
  about	
  precisely	
  how	
  these	
  agreements	
  fit	
  under	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  context,	
  it	
  does	
  not	
  mean	
  to	
  undervalue	
  the	
  advancements	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  made	
  toward	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  in	
  the	
  management	
  of	
  the	
  traditional	
  territories	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest.	
  	
  	
   1.1 Research Questions and Scope 	
  There	
  are	
  three	
  coalitions	
  of	
  First	
  Nations	
  that	
  represent	
  almost	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  First	
  Nations	
  with	
  traditional	
  territories	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  region	
  –	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  the	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council	
  and	
  the	
  North	
  Coast-­‐Skeena	
  First	
  Nations	
  Stewardship	
  Society,	
  which	
  includes	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  members.1	
  This	
  research	
  focuses	
  primarily	
  on	
  the	
  agreements	
  signed	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  whose	
  traditional	
  territories	
  span	
  the	
  majority	
  of	
  the	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  1	
  These	
  coalitions	
  have	
  been	
  previously	
  known	
  as	
  Turning	
  Point,	
  KNT,	
  and	
  Tsimshian	
  Stewardship	
  Committee	
  respectively.	
   	
   4	
   North	
  and	
  Central	
  Coast	
  planning	
  areas.	
  The	
  arrangements	
  developed	
  between	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  other	
  First	
  Nation	
  coalitions	
  are	
  sufficiently	
  different	
  from	
  the	
  other	
  coalitions	
  to	
  merit	
  separate	
  analysis,	
  which	
  could	
  be	
  supported	
  by	
  the	
  framework	
  developed	
  in	
  this	
  thesis.	
  While	
  the	
  focus	
  of	
  this	
  thesis	
  is	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  cases	
  are	
  drawn	
  from	
  adjacent	
  areas	
  to	
  support	
  the	
  analysis.	
  The	
  scope	
  of	
  this	
  thesis	
  will	
  not	
  extend	
  into	
  the	
  internal	
  relationships	
  of	
  the	
  Parties	
  involved	
  in	
  the	
  agreements.	
  	
  	
  The	
  research	
  objectives	
  of	
  this	
  thesis	
  are	
  two-­‐fold:	
  	
   • To	
  determine	
  whether	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  acquired	
  a	
  share	
  of	
  governmental	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  with	
  regard	
  to	
  three	
  types	
  of	
  land	
  use	
  decisions	
  (“decision	
  functions”):	
  i. Land	
  use	
  zones;	
  ii. Ecosystem-­‐based	
  management	
  operating	
  rules;	
  and	
  iii. Operational	
  plan	
  approval.	
  	
  	
   • To	
  provide	
  an	
  overview	
  of	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  processes	
  that	
  evolved	
  for	
  the	
  resource	
  management	
  for	
  British	
  Columbia’s	
  North	
  and	
  Central	
  Coast,	
  and	
  the	
  framework	
  for	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  that	
  is	
  established	
  between	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  for	
  the	
  three	
  decision	
  functions	
  under	
  investigation.	
  	
  	
  Land	
  use	
  zones,	
  operating	
  rules,	
  and	
  operational	
  plans,	
  are	
  integral	
  features	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia’s	
  forest	
  governance	
  system,	
  but	
  have	
  been	
  uniquely	
  adapted	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  to	
  reflect	
  commitments	
  to	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  and	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management.	
  Land	
  use	
  zones	
  are	
  used	
  to	
  assign	
  prohibited	
  and	
  permitted	
  land	
  use	
  and	
  resource	
  development	
  activities,	
  including	
  protected	
  and	
  resource	
  operating	
  areas.	
  Operating	
  rules	
  are	
  the	
  regulations	
  that	
  guide	
  activities	
  within	
  land	
  use	
  zones,	
  set	
  under	
  provincial	
  legislation	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  Land	
  Act,	
  and	
  the	
   Forest	
  and	
  Range	
  Practices	
  Act.	
  In	
  order	
  to	
  meet	
  the	
  objectives	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management	
  on	
  the	
  coast,	
  region-­‐specific	
  operating	
  rules	
  were	
  required.	
  Operational	
  plans	
  are	
  plans	
  that	
  tenure	
  holders	
  are	
  required	
  to	
  develop	
  for	
  forest	
  and	
  range	
   	
   5	
   practices	
  that	
  they	
  intend	
  to	
  carry	
  out	
  on	
  a	
  specific	
  area	
  of	
  land.	
  In	
  British	
  Columbia,	
  Forest	
  Stewardship	
  Plans	
  are	
  the	
  highest	
  level	
  operational	
  plan	
  required.	
  	
  In	
  looking	
  at	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  agreements,	
  this	
  thesis	
  is	
  assessing	
  the	
  allocation	
  of	
  authority	
  in	
  the	
  context	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  system.	
  Investigation	
  of	
  the	
  allocation	
  of	
  authority	
  under	
  these	
  agreements	
  on	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  the	
  traditional	
  laws	
  and	
  governance	
  of	
  these	
  First	
  Nations	
  might	
  find	
  that	
  the	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  retained	
  authority	
  because	
  they	
  do	
  not	
  recognize	
  the	
  authority	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  system.	
  It	
  is,	
  furthermore,	
  not	
  the	
  intention	
  of	
  this	
  thesis	
  to	
  appraise	
  the	
  quality	
  of	
  the	
  framework	
  developed	
  by	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.	
  Indeed,	
  there	
  are	
  at	
  least	
  two	
  First	
  Nations	
  whose	
  traditional	
  territories	
  overlap	
  with	
  those	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  but	
  who	
  are	
  not	
  involved	
  in	
  that	
  decision-­‐making	
  framework	
  -­‐	
  the	
  Lax	
  Kw’alaams	
  First	
  Nation,	
  and	
  the	
  Ulkatcho	
  First	
  Nation	
  –	
  and	
  the	
  Nuxalk	
  Nation	
  joined	
  the	
  2009	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  with	
  pointed	
  reluctance	
  in	
  2010	
  (Nuxalk	
  Nation	
  2010).	
  Similarly,	
  the	
  Haisla	
  Nation	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  signatory	
  to	
  the	
  engagement	
  framework	
  schedule	
  of	
  the	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol.	
  	
  	
  This	
  thesis	
  does	
  adopt	
  the	
  name	
  “Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest”	
  when	
  referring	
  to	
  the	
  region.	
  The	
  moniker,	
  however,	
  is	
  politically	
  contested,	
  particularly	
  among	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  First	
  Nations	
  within	
  the	
  region.	
  One	
  alternative	
  name	
  often	
  used	
  by	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  policy	
  community	
  is	
  the	
  “North	
  and	
  Central	
  Coast”,	
  reflecting	
  the	
  names	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  Coast	
  and	
  Central	
  Coast	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Management	
  Plans	
  developed	
  to	
  guide	
  resource	
  management	
  in	
  the	
  region.	
  Readers	
  can	
  refer	
  to	
  Page	
  (2010)	
  for	
  background	
  on	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  name,	
  “Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest”,	
  and	
  the	
  sources	
  of	
  its	
  politically	
  contentious	
  nature.	
  	
  	
  	
   	
   6	
   1.2 Methods 1.2.1 Setting the Three Decision Functions 	
  The	
  three	
  decision	
  functions	
  under	
  investigation	
  in	
  this	
  thesis	
  are	
  integral	
  features	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia’s	
  forest	
  governance	
  system	
  that	
  clarify	
  what	
  areas	
  are	
  protected	
  and	
  what	
  areas	
  can	
  support	
  resource	
  operations;	
  the	
  rules	
  governing	
  operations	
  in	
  the	
  designated	
  zones;	
  and	
  the	
  tenure	
  holders’	
  operational	
  plans	
  for	
  specific	
  pieces	
  of	
  land.	
  A	
  literature	
  review	
  of	
  the	
  primary	
  documents	
  in	
  the	
  public	
  domain	
  confirmed	
  that	
  these	
  three	
  decision	
  functions	
  were	
  relevant	
  to	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  governance	
  arrangement,	
  and	
  to	
  the	
  implementation	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management.	
  	
  	
   1.2.2 Analysing the Three Decision Functions: Primary Documents and Interviews  	
  The	
  goal	
  of	
  this	
  project	
  is	
  to	
  clarify	
  the	
  mechanisms	
  being	
  used	
  for	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  for	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  three	
  decision	
  functions	
  –	
  land	
  use	
  zones,	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules,	
  and	
  operational	
  plan	
  approval	
  –	
  and	
  the	
  relative	
  authority	
  of	
  the	
  Parties	
  over	
  these	
  decisions.	
  The	
  Crown	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  formulated	
  processes	
  for	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  decision-­‐making	
  for	
  these	
  decision	
  functions	
  that	
  relate	
  to	
  statutory	
  authority	
  and	
  contested	
  assertions	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  jurisdiction.	
  For	
  this	
  reason,	
  and	
  because	
  there	
  have	
  been	
  no	
  publications	
  from	
  external	
  sources	
  that	
  address	
  the	
  research	
  questions,	
  primary	
  sources	
  are	
  the	
  most	
  relevant	
  sources	
  for	
  the	
  crux	
  of	
  the	
  research	
  objectives.	
  This	
  thesis	
  relies	
  on	
  ‘primary	
  documents’,	
  sources	
  that	
  indicate	
  formally	
  agreed	
  to	
  process	
  (e.g.	
  land	
  use	
  agreements,	
  terms	
  of	
  reference	
  for	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  bodies),	
  and	
  legal	
  status	
  (e.g.	
  statutes,	
  Orders	
  in	
  Council).	
  Primary	
  documents	
  can	
  also	
  be	
  literature	
  produced	
  directly	
  by	
  the	
  Crown,	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  its	
  member	
  nations,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  the	
  courts,	
  which	
  indicate	
  the	
  relative	
  positions	
  and	
  understandings	
  of	
  the	
  Parties	
  with	
  regard	
  to	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  and	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority.	
  Interviews,	
  another	
  primary	
  source,	
  have	
  been	
  used	
  to	
  uncover	
  missing	
  primary	
  documents,	
  and	
  to	
  investigate	
  how	
  these	
  decisions	
  are	
  being	
  made	
  in	
  practice.	
  	
   	
   7	
   	
  The	
  initial	
  review	
  of	
  documents	
  revealed	
  the	
  extent	
  of	
  the	
  publically	
  available	
  information	
  and	
  where	
  gaps	
  existed	
  that	
  could	
  contribute	
  to	
  meeting	
  the	
  research	
  objectives:	
  	
  	
   • In	
  terms	
  of	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  and	
  EBM	
  rules,	
  public	
  information	
  indicated	
  the	
  policy	
  outcomes	
  of	
  the	
  negotiations,	
  but	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  information	
  indicating	
  how	
  engagement	
  on	
  operational	
  plan	
  approval	
  has	
  been	
  actualized;	
  	
   • The	
  land	
  use	
  agreements	
  indicated	
  that	
  mechanisms	
  for	
  amending	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  and	
  EBM	
  rules	
  would	
  be	
  developed,	
  and	
  that	
  the	
  engagement	
  framework	
  for	
  operational	
  plan	
  approval	
  would	
  be	
  refined,	
  but	
  no	
  information	
  on	
  advancements	
  was	
  available;	
  	
   • The	
  land	
  use	
  agreements	
  indicated	
  that	
  there	
  would	
  be	
  multiple	
  governance	
  forums	
  but	
  was	
  unclear	
  on	
  if	
  and	
  how	
  they	
  would	
  interact;	
   • The	
  land	
  use	
  agreements	
  included	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  elements	
  that	
  indicated	
  the	
  potential	
  that	
  some	
  authority	
  had	
  been	
  granted	
  to	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations’	
  members,	
  but	
  did	
  not	
  indicate	
  the	
  implications	
  for	
  those	
  elements	
  under	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  context;	
  and	
   • The	
  land	
  use	
  agreements	
  committed	
  the	
  Parties	
  to	
  implementing	
  them	
  according	
  to	
  their	
  own	
  laws,	
  policies,	
  customs	
  and	
  traditions,	
  but	
  provided	
  no	
  indication	
  of	
  how	
  that	
  might	
  work.	
  	
  It	
  was	
  evident	
  that	
  the	
  missing	
  information	
  was	
  unlikely	
  to	
  be	
  publically	
  available,	
  or	
  potentially,	
  even	
  codified.	
  It	
  was	
  decided	
  that	
  missing	
  information	
  could	
  be	
  most	
  effectively	
  found	
  through	
  interviews	
  with	
  those	
  most	
  familiar	
  with	
  the	
  negotiation	
  and	
  implementation	
  of	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  agreements.	
  There	
  is	
  a	
  small	
  set	
  of	
  people	
  who	
  have	
  negotiated	
  or	
  implemented	
  these	
  agreements	
  and	
  who	
  would	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  research	
  questions.	
  An	
  initial	
  list	
  of	
  recommended	
  interviewees	
  was	
  provided	
  by	
  a	
  knowledgeable	
  member	
  of	
  that	
  community,	
  and	
  all	
  of	
  those	
  people	
  were	
  given	
  invitations	
  to	
  be	
  interviewed.	
  This	
  approach	
  represents	
  a	
  purposive	
  sampling	
  method	
  (King,	
  Keohane,	
  and	
  Verba	
  1994).	
  Participating	
  interviewees	
  were	
  asked	
   	
   8	
   whether	
  they	
  could	
  recommend	
  other	
  potential	
  interviewees.	
  Almost	
  all	
  recommendations	
  made	
  by	
  interviewees	
  were	
  for	
  individuals	
  who	
  had	
  already	
  received	
  invitations,	
  confirming	
  through	
  triangulation	
  that	
  the	
  sample	
  group	
  was	
  appropriately	
  defined.	
  Where	
  other	
  potential	
  interviewees	
  were	
  recommended,	
  those	
  candidates	
  received	
  invitations	
  as	
  well.	
  	
  	
  The	
  interview	
  schedule	
  used	
  semi-­‐standardized	
  questions	
  aimed	
  at	
  having	
  the	
  interviewee	
  clarify	
  and	
  share	
  additional	
  relevant	
  primary	
  documents	
  and	
  any	
  examples	
  of	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  in	
  practice.	
  The	
  interview	
  schedule	
  was	
  amended	
  only	
  slightly	
  after	
  each	
  interview	
  to	
  reflect	
  newly	
  uncovered	
  information.	
  Interviews	
  sought	
  to	
  clarify:	
  	
  	
   • how	
  each	
  the	
  three	
  decision	
  functions	
  work	
  in	
  theory	
  and	
  examples	
  of	
  practice,	
  	
  	
   • how	
  the	
  governance	
  forums	
  function	
  in	
  theory	
  and	
  practice;	
  	
   • how	
  Parties	
  may	
  each	
  implement	
  agreements	
  according	
  to	
  their	
  own	
  laws,	
  policies,	
  customs	
  and	
  traditions;	
  	
   • their	
  understanding	
  of	
  the	
  relative	
  authority	
  of	
  the	
  Parties	
  for	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  three	
  decision	
  functions;	
   • what	
  element	
  of	
  the	
  governance	
  arrangement	
  indicated	
  who	
  had	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority;	
  and	
   • direction	
  to	
  any	
  missing	
  supporting	
  documents.	
  	
  A	
  relatively	
  small	
  number	
  of	
  participants	
  were	
  invited	
  to	
  be	
  interviewed	
  because	
  of	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  research	
  objectives	
  and	
  number	
  of	
  individuals	
  who	
  would	
  hold	
  the	
  applicable	
  information	
  –	
  namely,	
  a	
  clarification	
  of	
  how	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  has	
  been	
  designed	
  to	
  function,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  any	
  examples	
  that	
  have	
  occurred	
  in	
  practice.	
  Out	
  of	
  the	
  scope	
  were	
  questions	
  about	
  the	
  merit	
  of	
  such	
  approaches	
  or	
  why	
  certain	
  decisions	
  have	
  been	
  made	
  by	
  the	
  Parties.	
  All	
  government	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewees,	
  at	
  least	
  one	
  of	
  which	
  is	
  now	
  retired,	
  were	
  people	
  who	
  had	
  been	
  given	
  the	
  mandate	
  of	
  their	
  respective	
  Parties	
  to	
  negotiate	
  and	
  implement	
  these	
  agreements.	
  Interviewees	
   	
   9	
   participated	
  in	
  this	
  research	
  as	
  individuals,	
  not	
  as	
  formal	
  representatives	
  of	
  their	
  Parties.	
  	
  Interviews	
  conducted:	
  	
   • Province	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  –	
  4	
  members	
   • Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  –	
  3	
  members	
   • Legal	
  experts	
  –	
  2	
  members	
  	
  Some	
  communication	
  on	
  the	
  research	
  project	
  also	
  took	
  place	
  with	
  members	
  of	
  Rainforest	
  Solutions	
  Project	
  (RSP),	
  who	
  agreed	
  to	
  supply	
  some	
  primary	
  sources	
  that	
  helped	
  address	
  the	
  gaps	
  in	
  information	
  being	
  sought.	
  Preliminary	
  results	
  of	
  this	
  thesis	
  were	
  also	
  presented	
  to	
  RSP	
  representatives	
  in	
  June	
  2011.	
  	
  The	
  assessment	
  of	
  the	
  relative	
  authority	
  of	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  rests	
  in	
  part	
  on	
  the	
  legal	
  standing	
  of	
  the	
  agreements.	
  Since	
  only	
  the	
  Canadian	
  courts	
  can	
  provide	
  definitive	
  certainty	
  about	
  the	
  legal	
  standing	
  of	
  any	
  given	
  agreement	
  under	
  Canadian	
  law,	
  legal	
  expertise	
  was	
  sought	
  for	
  their	
  opinion	
  on	
  the	
  legal	
  standing	
  of	
  such	
  agreements,	
  and	
  what	
  elements	
  indicate	
  that	
  standing.	
  One	
  legal	
  expert	
  interviewed	
  has	
  been	
  directly	
  involved	
  in	
  these	
  agreements,	
  and	
  one	
  has	
  been	
  directly	
  involved	
  in	
  other	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nation	
  and	
  related	
  multistakeholder	
  relations	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia.	
  	
  	
  All	
  interviews	
  were	
  conducted	
  in	
  May	
  and	
  June	
  2011.	
  Locations	
  for	
  the	
  interviews	
  were	
  chosen	
  by	
  the	
  interviewee.	
  Seven	
  of	
  the	
  interviews	
  were	
  conducted	
  in	
  person,	
  and	
  where	
  impossible	
  to	
  meet	
  in	
  person,	
  two	
  by	
  phone.	
  The	
  varying	
  interview	
  settings	
  had	
  no	
  noticeable	
  effect	
  on	
  the	
  quality	
  of	
  interview	
  responses.	
  For	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  interviews,	
  project	
  supervisor	
  George	
  Hoberg	
  was	
  present.	
  The	
  length	
  of	
  interviews	
  varied	
  from	
  45	
  to	
  90	
  minutes.	
  Interviews	
  were	
  digitally	
  audio-­‐recorded	
  and	
  then	
  transcribed.	
  A	
  top-­‐down	
  deductive	
  coding	
  method	
  was	
  used	
  in	
  which	
  passages	
  were	
  assigned	
  codes	
  from	
  a	
  pre-­‐determined	
  list	
  of	
  master	
  codes	
  that	
  directly	
  mirrored	
  the	
  categories	
  of	
  interview	
  questions	
  listed	
  earlier	
  in	
  this	
  section.	
  Interviewees	
  were	
  assured	
  that	
  best	
  attempts	
   	
   10	
   would	
  be	
  made	
  to	
  maintain	
  confidentiality.	
  The	
  interview	
  schedule	
  is	
  included	
  in	
  Appendix	
  A.	
  	
  	
  A	
  framework	
  for	
  classification	
  and	
  evaluation	
  of	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nations	
  relative	
  authority	
  is	
  developed	
  in	
  Chapter	
  2,	
  building	
  on	
  the	
  relative	
  authority	
  spectrums	
  of	
  several	
  authors	
  in	
  the	
  literature.	
  Development	
  of	
  the	
  framework	
  was	
  an	
  iterative	
  process	
  that	
  began	
  with	
  a	
  review	
  of	
  related	
  frameworks	
  in	
  the	
  literature,	
  and	
  was	
  refined	
  with	
  sources	
  about	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  system.	
  Several	
  interviewees	
  indicated	
  the	
  relevant	
  areas	
  of	
  Canadian	
  constitutional	
  and	
  administrative	
  law,	
  and	
  a	
  further	
  literature	
  review	
  was	
  conducted.	
   	
   11	
   Chapter 2: Foundational Concepts  	
   2.1 Power vs. Authority  	
  	
  Hoberg	
  (2008,	
  1)	
  asserts:	
  “At	
  its	
  most	
  fundamental	
  level,	
  governance	
  is	
  about	
  who	
  decides	
  what	
  about	
  the	
  management	
  of	
  our	
  forests.”	
  In	
  British	
  Columbia,	
  the	
  range	
  of	
  actors	
  that	
  are	
  active	
  and	
  visible	
  in	
  the	
  forest	
  policy	
  sphere	
  is	
  considerable	
  –	
  environmental	
  and	
  industry	
  organizations,	
  labour	
  groups,	
  First	
  Nations,	
  the	
  provincial	
  government,	
  and	
  various	
  shifting	
  coalitions	
  of	
  these	
  figures.	
  This	
  section	
  establishes	
  a	
  distinction	
  between	
  power	
  and	
  authority	
  that	
  is	
  critical	
  for	
  analysis	
  of	
  the	
  governance	
  arrangement	
  using	
  the	
  relative	
  authority	
  framework,	
  introduced	
  in	
  Section	
  2.3.	
  There	
  is	
  no	
  formal	
  consensus	
  in	
  the	
  literature	
  on	
  the	
  definition	
  of	
  these	
  two	
  concepts,	
  and	
  it	
  is	
  not	
  in	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  this	
  thesis	
  to	
  wade	
  into	
  the	
  scholarly	
  deliberation	
  surrounding	
  them.	
  Instead,	
  the	
  following	
  articulates	
  a	
  well-­‐supported	
  distinction	
  that	
  will	
  be	
  used	
  throughout	
  this	
  paper.	
  	
  	
  Frequently	
  cited	
  in	
  the	
  political	
  science	
  field	
  (McFarland	
  2001),	
  Dahl	
  (1957)	
  posits:	
  “My	
  intuitive	
  idea	
  of	
  power…is	
  something	
  like	
  this:	
  A	
  has	
  power	
  over	
  B	
  to	
  the	
  extent	
  that	
  he	
  can	
  get	
  B	
  to	
  do	
  something	
  that	
  B	
  would	
  not	
  otherwise	
  do.”	
  McFarland	
  (2001,	
  11937)	
  elaborates	
  that	
  in	
  the	
  political	
  realm,	
  this	
  power	
  refers	
  to	
  causal	
  relationship	
  among	
  people,	
  rather	
  than	
  ‘inanimate	
  forces’	
  affecting	
  human	
  behaviour	
  such	
  as	
  natural	
  disasters,	
  and	
  clarifies	
  that	
  power	
  is	
  extended	
  where	
  the	
  changed	
  behaviour	
  reflects	
  the	
  intention	
  of	
  the	
  powerful	
  actor,	
  as	
  indeed	
  changed	
  behaviour	
  could	
  be	
  contrary	
  to	
  the	
  wishes	
  of	
  that	
  same	
  actor.	
  From	
  this	
  perspective,	
  ‘power’	
  can	
  be	
  considered	
  synonymous	
  with	
  ‘influence.’	
  From	
  that	
  foundation,	
  literature	
  on	
  power	
  extends	
  into	
  consideration	
  of	
  measures	
  and	
  scales	
  of	
  power,	
  but	
  a	
  contrasting	
  definition	
  of	
  authority	
  illuminates	
  the	
  distinction	
  between	
  these	
  two	
  concepts.	
  	
  In	
  the	
  political	
  sphere,	
  authority	
  broadly	
  refers	
  to	
  “a	
  relationship	
  between	
  a	
  superior	
  or	
  overseer	
  and	
  a	
  subordinate,	
  whereby	
  the	
  subordinate	
  relies	
  upon	
  the	
  superior	
  for	
   	
   12	
   specific	
  direction,	
  whether	
  it	
  be	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  expert	
  advice	
  or	
  operational	
  commands”	
  (Wolf	
  2001,	
  973).	
  In	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  context,	
  authority	
  is	
  “the	
  power	
  to	
  develop	
  and	
  enforce	
  rules,	
  backed	
  up	
  by	
  the	
  coercive	
  sanctions	
  of	
  government	
  or	
  the	
  courts”	
  (Clogg,	
  Hoberg,	
  and	
  O’Carroll	
  2004,	
  iii).	
  In	
  Canadian	
  law,	
  the	
  constitution	
  sets	
  out	
  what	
  areas	
  of	
  law	
  fall	
  under	
  the	
  authority,	
  known	
  as	
  ‘jurisdiction’,	
  of	
  either	
  the	
  federal	
  government	
  or	
  the	
  provinces,	
  which	
  then	
  set	
  out	
  statutes	
  to	
  delegate	
  authority	
  to	
  various	
  subordinate	
  actors	
  (see	
  the	
  next	
  section	
  on	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐making).	
  Under	
  the	
  Forest	
  Act	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia,	
  for	
  example,	
  the	
  Chief	
  Forester	
  is	
  assigned	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  set	
  the	
  allowable	
  annual	
  cut	
  for	
  each	
  timber	
  supply	
  area,	
  and	
  that	
  decision	
  must	
  be	
  followed	
  by	
  forest	
  licensees	
  or	
  else	
  face	
  legal	
  sanctions.	
  Similarly,	
  under	
  the	
  Forest	
  and	
  Range	
   Practices	
  Act,	
  all	
  major	
  tenure	
  holders	
  must	
  develop	
  a	
  strategic	
  Forest	
  Stewardship	
  Plan	
  and	
  have	
  it	
  approved	
  by	
  the	
  appropriate	
  government	
  authority	
  before	
  they	
  can	
  fell	
  a	
  single	
  tree.	
  	
  	
  A	
  challenging	
  relationship	
  exists	
  where	
  two	
  or	
  more	
  nations	
  each	
  claim	
  sovereignty,	
  jurisdiction,	
  and	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  over	
  the	
  same	
  issue	
  or	
  geographic	
  space,	
  eliciting	
  considerations	
  of	
  legitimacy	
  (see	
  for	
  example,	
  Wolf	
  2001).	
  What	
  emerges	
  from	
  the	
  literature	
  is	
  that	
  authority	
  is	
  not	
  always	
  clearly	
  held.	
  Instead,	
  it	
  can	
  be	
  questioned	
  and	
  contested,	
  despite	
  remaining	
  connected	
  to	
  contexts	
  where	
  authority	
  is	
  clear,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  duty	
  to	
  consult	
  and	
  accommodate	
  being	
  assigned,	
  within	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  system,	
  solely	
  to	
  the	
  Crown.	
  Defining	
  legitimacy	
  or	
  the	
  ‘source’	
  of	
  authority,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  source	
  of	
  the	
  Crown’s	
  authority	
  over	
  land	
  use	
  decisions	
  or	
  Indigenous	
  law,	
  are	
  the	
  challenges	
  of	
  the	
  legal,	
  judicial	
  and	
  philosophical	
  fields.	
  	
  	
  For	
  the	
  purposes	
  of	
  this	
  work,	
  we	
  can	
  propose	
  the	
  following	
  definition	
  of	
  authority:	
  	
   • If	
  A	
  has	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  X	
  decision,	
  B	
  can	
  neither	
  overturn	
  that	
  decision,	
  nor	
  enact	
  its	
  own	
  decision	
  unilaterally.	
  	
   • If	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  X	
  decision	
  is	
  assigned	
  jointly	
  to	
  A	
  and	
  B,	
  then	
  the	
  decision	
  must	
  be	
  made	
  according	
  to	
  their	
  agreed-­‐upon	
  formula	
  (e.g.	
  consensus)	
  –	
  neither	
  can	
  make	
  a	
  decision	
  unilaterally.	
  	
   	
   13	
   With	
  this,	
  we	
  can	
  re-­‐consider	
  power	
  relative	
  to	
  authority:	
  	
   • If	
  A	
  has	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  X	
  decision,	
  B	
  may	
  have	
  power	
  of	
  influence	
  over	
  A,	
  but	
  that	
  power	
  does	
  not	
  affect	
  A’s	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  X	
  decision,	
  so	
  A	
  can	
  make	
  a	
  decision	
  contrary	
  to	
  the	
  recommendations	
  of	
  B.	
  	
  Environmental	
  and	
  industry	
  actors,	
  then,	
  may	
  have	
  power	
  to	
  influence	
  resource	
  decisions	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  regarding	
  the	
  setting	
  of	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  and	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules,	
  or	
  the	
  approval	
  of	
  operational	
  plans,	
  but	
  they	
  do	
  not	
  have	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  those	
  decisions.	
  The	
  distinction	
  is	
  critical	
  –	
  this	
  paper	
  seeks	
  to	
  clarify	
  the	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  of	
  the	
  government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  regarding	
  the	
  three	
  decision	
  functions,	
  according	
  to	
  the	
  set	
  of	
  agreements	
  they	
  have	
  signed	
  since	
  2001.	
  	
  	
  The	
  power-­‐authority	
  dichotomy	
  dovetails	
  with	
  that	
  of	
  formal	
  and	
  informal	
  dimensions	
  of	
  shared	
  management:	
  	
  “For	
  example,	
  a	
  formal	
  forest	
  management	
  arrangement	
  may	
  specify	
  that	
  the	
  Crown	
  has	
  the	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  a	
  particular	
  decision.	
  However,	
  the	
  Aboriginal	
  group	
  may	
  informally	
  play	
  a	
  major	
  role	
  in	
  making	
  that	
  decision	
  and	
  therefore,	
  will	
  have	
  a	
  higher	
  level	
  of	
  decision-­‐making	
  power	
  than	
  the	
  arrangement	
  formally	
  acknowledges”	
  (emphasis	
  in	
  original)	
  (Forsyth	
  2006,	
  86;	
  see	
  also	
  Howlett,	
  Rayner,	
  and	
  Tollefson	
  2009):	
  Because	
  of	
  the	
  influential	
  role	
  of	
  the	
  informal	
  dimension,	
  this	
  paper	
  does	
  also	
  offer	
  insight	
  into	
  how	
  these	
  elements	
  have	
  functioned	
  informally,	
  as	
  indicated	
  by	
  interviewees.	
  The	
  power-­‐authority	
  distinction	
  will	
  be	
  incorporated	
  into	
  the	
  relative	
  authority	
  framework	
  in	
  the	
  following	
  section.	
  	
  	
  	
   2.2 Statutory Decision-Making and Fettering  	
  This	
  section	
  seeks	
  to	
  clarify	
  the	
  Canadian	
  administrative	
  law	
  surrounding	
  the	
  appointment	
  of	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐makers	
  (sometimes	
  called	
  administrative	
  decision-­‐makers)	
  and	
  their	
  legal	
  requirement	
  to	
  provide	
  unfettered	
  decisions.	
  In	
  researching	
  the	
   	
   14	
   Crown	
  authority	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  agreements,	
  the	
  concept	
  of	
  ‘fettering’	
  was	
  a	
  reoccurring	
  theme	
  raised	
  by	
  both	
  academic	
  writers	
  (Barry	
  2010)	
  and	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  both	
  government	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewees.	
  Fettering	
  is	
  a	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  concept	
  that	
  relates	
  directly	
  to	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority,	
  but	
  is	
  often	
  used	
  incorrectly.	
  Canadian	
  administrative	
  law	
  dictates	
  that	
  whoever	
  has	
  been	
  directed	
  by	
  the	
  government	
  to	
  make	
  a	
  decision,	
  known	
  as	
  the	
  ‘statutory	
  decision-­‐maker’,	
  must	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  make	
  their	
  decision	
  without	
  undue	
  restrictions.	
  Fettering,	
  to	
  put	
  it	
  bluntly,	
  is	
  essentially	
  a	
  prejudging	
  or	
  predetermining	
  of	
  a	
  decision,	
  which	
  is	
  illegal.	
  It	
  is	
  incorrect,	
  however,	
  when	
  law	
  regarding	
  fettering	
  is	
  cited	
  as	
  evidence	
  that	
  a	
  Canadian	
  government	
  (federal	
  or	
  provincial)	
  cannot	
  delegate	
  its	
  supreme	
  authority	
  by	
  conferring	
  authority	
  in	
  a	
  permanent	
  manner.	
  	
  	
  Under	
  Canadian	
  administrative	
  law,	
  governments	
  give	
  direction	
  through	
  statutes	
  that	
  are	
  passed	
  in	
  the	
  federal	
  House	
  of	
  Commons	
  or	
  provincial	
  Legislatures.	
  These	
  statutes	
  also	
  dictate	
  who	
  has	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  decisions,	
  known	
  as	
  the	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐maker	
  (Boyd	
  1995;	
  Gall	
  1995;	
  Fitzgerald,	
  Wright,	
  and	
  Kazmierski	
  2010).	
  This	
  is	
  quite	
  often	
  a	
  Cabinet	
  Minister,	
  but	
  there	
  are	
  many	
  such	
  delegates.	
  A	
  statute	
  also	
  defines	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  the	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐maker’s	
  authority,	
  and	
  the	
  delegate	
  has	
  the	
  ‘discretion’	
  to	
  make	
  any	
  decision	
  within	
  that	
  scope.	
  	
  	
  Anything	
  that	
  requires	
  a	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐maker	
  to	
  exercise	
  their	
  discretion	
  in	
  a	
  certain	
  way	
  illegally	
  fetters	
  the	
  delegate’s	
  decision	
  by	
  constraining	
  their	
  authority	
  (Jones	
  and	
  de	
  Villars	
  2004,	
  192).	
  If	
  a	
  delegate	
  made	
  a	
  particular	
  decision	
  because	
  they	
  were	
  instructed	
  to	
  do	
  so	
  by	
  a	
  superior,	
  that	
  would	
  be	
  an	
  example	
  of	
  fettering.	
  Another	
  example	
  of	
  fettering	
  would	
  be	
  if	
  a	
  delegate	
  was	
  given	
  broad	
  authority	
  but	
  was	
  only	
  willing	
  to	
  make	
  decisions	
  in	
  a	
  particular	
  way.	
  However,	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐makers	
  legally	
  can,	
  and	
  likely	
  need	
  to,	
  develop	
  policies	
  or	
  “rules	
  of	
  thumb”	
  to	
  help	
  guide	
  their	
  decisions	
  (Jones	
  and	
  de	
  Villars	
  2004,	
  192).	
  As	
  one	
  legal	
  expert	
  explains:	
  	
  “It’s	
  not	
  fettering	
  if	
  the	
  Minister	
  says,	
  well	
  look,	
  if	
  you’re	
  the	
  interests	
  involved,	
  you	
  jointly	
  come	
  within	
  the	
  criteria	
  that	
  we’ve	
  set	
  out	
  from	
  the	
  legislation	
  and	
  the	
  regulations,	
  as	
  long	
  as	
  you’re	
  applying	
  that	
  criteria,	
  and	
  you	
  can	
  come	
  to	
  a	
  joint	
  decision	
  on	
  it,	
  then	
  I	
  will	
  implement	
  that.”	
   	
   15	
   In	
  this	
  case,	
  the	
  delegate	
  would	
  be	
  acting	
  legally	
  if	
  they	
  were	
  using	
  a	
  policy	
  of	
  implementing	
  decisions	
  that	
  were	
  made	
  jointly	
  by	
  affected	
  interests,	
  as	
  long	
  as	
  that	
  policy	
  is	
  not	
  rigid	
  (Jones	
  and	
  de	
  Villars	
  2004,	
  192).	
  	
  Canadian	
  administrative	
  law	
  allows	
  federal	
  or	
  provincial	
  governments	
  to	
  delegate	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority,	
  such	
  as	
  to	
  a	
  First	
  Nation	
  or	
  a	
  management	
  board,	
  by	
  employing	
  a	
  statute	
  that	
  outlines	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  the	
  delegate’s	
  discretion	
  (Gall	
  1995;	
  Fitzgerald,	
  Wright,	
  and	
  Kazmierski	
  2010).	
  A	
  government	
  could	
  not	
  confer	
  to	
  an	
  entity	
  veto	
  power	
  over	
  a	
  decision	
  that	
  has	
  already	
  been	
  assigned	
  to	
  a	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐maker,	
  because	
  that	
  veto	
  would	
  certainly	
  fetter	
  the	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐maker.	
  Statutory	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  could,	
  however,	
  be	
  assigned	
  to	
  a	
  body	
  that	
  includes	
  multiple	
  individuals,	
  as	
  with	
  the	
  Haida	
  Gwaii	
  Management	
  Council	
  examined	
  in	
  Chapter	
  4.	
  Still,	
  decisions	
  made	
  by	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐makers	
  are	
  subject	
  to	
  judicial	
  review	
  under	
  Canadian	
  common	
  law	
  (Fitzgerald,	
  Wright,	
  and	
  Kazmierski	
  2010).	
  	
  The	
  notion	
  that	
  the	
  risk	
  of	
  fettering	
  a	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐maker	
  means	
  that	
  a	
  Canadian	
  government	
  cannot	
  delegate	
  or	
  relinquish	
  its	
  supreme	
  authority,	
  however,	
  is	
  inaccurate.	
  As	
  evidence,	
  both	
  legal	
  experts	
  interviewed	
  cited	
  the	
  Charter	
  of	
  Rights	
  and	
   Freedoms,	
  enacted	
  by	
  the	
  Constitution	
  Act	
  1982.	
  One	
  interviewee	
  explains,	
  with	
  the	
  passage	
  of	
  the	
  Charter	
  the	
  Parliament	
  of	
  Canada	
  constrained	
  its	
  paramouncy:	
  “So	
  in	
  fact,	
  the	
  Parliament	
  of	
  Canada	
  gave	
  away	
  its	
  supremacy.	
  It	
  made	
  itself	
  subordinate	
  to	
  the	
  Charter	
  of	
  Rights	
  and	
  Freedoms.	
  That’s	
  probably	
  the	
  most	
  dramatic	
  example	
  in	
  Canadian	
  history	
  of	
  a	
  government	
  devolving	
  or	
  giving	
  away	
  authority.”	
  	
  Aside	
  from	
  constitutional	
  amendment,	
  treaties	
  are	
  another	
  means	
  by	
  which	
  a	
  Canadian	
  government	
  can	
  permanently	
  relinquish	
  authority,	
  this	
  time	
  through	
  the	
  recognition	
  of	
  another	
  sovereign’s	
  authority.	
  Although	
  federal	
  and	
  provincial	
  government	
  still	
  demonstrate	
  reluctance	
  to	
  agree	
  to	
  sovereign	
  Aboriginal	
  self-­‐government	
  through	
  treaty	
  (Dyck	
  2008;	
  Frideres	
  and	
  Gadacz	
  2008;	
  Macklem	
  2001),	
  the	
  treaty	
  process	
  is	
  “a	
  means	
  by	
  which	
  competing	
  claims	
  of	
  authority	
  and	
  rights	
  can	
  be	
  reconciled	
  with	
  each	
  other	
  by	
  each	
  party	
  agreeing	
  to	
  recognize	
  a	
  measure	
  of	
  the	
  authority	
  of	
  the	
  other”	
   	
   16	
   (Macklem	
  2001,	
  155).	
  In	
  Canada,	
  Aboriginal	
  authority	
  over	
  certain	
  elements	
  has	
  been	
  recognized.	
  The	
  Nisga’a	
  Treaty,	
  for	
  example,	
  the	
  first	
  modern-­‐day	
  treaty	
  in	
  Canada,	
  provides	
  that	
  the	
  Nisga’a	
  government	
  has	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  laws	
  as	
  set	
  out	
  in	
  the	
  agreement,	
  and	
  has	
  “a	
  sphere	
  of	
  legislative	
  jurisdiction	
  that	
  can	
  prevail	
  against	
  federal	
  or	
  provincial	
  laws”	
  (Sanders	
  2000,	
  117).	
  As	
  the	
  Nisga’a	
  Treaty	
  is	
  written,	
  its	
  provisions	
  can	
  only	
  be	
  altered	
  through	
  constitutional	
  amendment	
  or	
  by	
  consent	
  of	
  the	
  Parties	
  (Sanders	
  2000).	
  Of	
  course,	
  the	
  frustratingly	
  slow	
  treaty	
  process	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia	
  is	
  partial	
  justification	
  for	
  the	
  emphasis	
  by	
  many	
  on	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nation	
  (‘interim	
  measures’)	
  agreements	
  in	
  the	
  province.	
  	
  	
  	
   2.2.1 Sources of Authority in the Canadian Legal Context 	
  Consideration	
  of	
  fettering	
  and	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  context	
  begets	
  further	
  consideration	
  of	
  the	
  sources	
  Canada	
  draws	
  on	
  as	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  its	
  authority.	
  Of	
  course,	
  many	
  Aboriginal	
  nations	
  do	
  not	
  recognize	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  as	
  a	
  legitimate	
  authority	
  within	
  their	
  traditional	
  territories,	
  but	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Aboriginal	
  Relationship	
  today	
  is	
  in	
  evolution.	
  	
  	
  Canada	
  derives	
  its	
  authority	
  from	
  its	
  constitution,	
  which	
  is	
  derived	
  from	
  numerous	
  sources,	
  primarily	
  the	
  British	
  North	
  America	
  Act	
  1867,	
  the	
  Constitution	
  Act	
  1982,	
  and	
  the	
   Canadian	
  Charter	
  of	
  Rights	
  and	
  Freedoms	
  (Gall	
  1995;	
  Boyd	
  1995).	
  Together	
  these	
  documents	
  establish	
  Canada’s	
  asserted	
  legitimacy	
  to	
  the	
  claim	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  territory,	
  supported	
  by	
  the	
  British	
  Parliament.	
  Under	
  the	
  constitution,	
  there	
  are	
  eleven	
  sovereign	
  legislative	
  bodies	
  in	
  Canada	
  –	
  the	
  federal	
  government	
  and	
  the	
  ten	
  provinces	
  (Gall	
  1995,	
  38).	
  Canada,	
  altogether,	
  defends	
  its	
  claim	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  through	
  the	
  view	
  that	
  Aboriginal	
  nations	
  did	
  not	
  constitute	
  international	
  entities	
  with	
  international	
  rights	
  to	
  their	
  territories	
  (title,	
  jurisdiction,	
  laws,	
  or	
  land	
  rights);	
  that	
  Europeans	
  thereby	
  “discovered”	
  a	
  “legally	
  vacant”	
  land;	
  that	
  all	
  government	
  authority	
  arises	
  from	
  the	
  Crown,	
  as	
  a	
  successor	
  to	
  the	
  British	
  Imperial	
  Crown;	
  and	
  that	
  only	
  laws	
  traceable	
  to	
  Great	
  Britain	
  and	
  France	
  are	
  recognized	
  (Slattery	
  1996).	
  Conversely,	
  it	
  is	
  broadly	
  the	
   	
   17	
   position	
  of	
  the	
  Aboriginal	
  nations	
  of	
  Canada	
  –	
  the	
  First	
  Nations,	
  Inuit	
  and	
  Métis	
  –	
  that	
  they	
  are	
  themselves	
  the	
  original	
  sovereigns,	
  not	
  “beholden”	
  to	
  the	
  Crown	
  for	
  basic	
  rights	
  and	
  status	
  (Slattery	
  1996,	
  103).	
  But	
  the	
  process	
  of	
  balancing	
  these	
  competing	
  claims	
  is	
  still	
  advancing,	
  in	
  part	
  an	
  outcome	
  of	
  the	
  inclusion	
  of	
  sections	
  25	
  and	
  35	
  of	
  the	
   Constitution	
  Act	
  1982,	
  which	
  recognized	
  and	
  affirmed	
  the	
  existence	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  and	
  treaty	
  rights.	
  Slattery	
  (1996)	
  finds	
  that	
  the	
  combination	
  of	
  section	
  25	
  and	
  35,	
  and	
  numerous	
  high	
  court	
  rulings,	
  pave	
  the	
  path	
  for	
  a	
  new	
  conceptualization	
  of	
  the	
  constitution	
  that	
  does	
  not	
  rely	
  on	
  the	
  colonial	
  tenants	
  of	
  Crown	
  supremacy.	
  	
  	
  One	
  legal	
  expert	
  posited	
  that	
  permanent	
  authority	
  could	
  also	
  be	
  shifted	
  from	
  a	
  Canadian	
  government	
  to	
  an	
  Aboriginal	
  government	
  through	
  a	
  court	
  declaration,	
  requiring	
  the	
  Aboriginal	
  government	
  to	
  prove	
  rights	
  or	
  title,	
  but	
  explains	
  that	
  title	
  is	
  not	
  absolute:	
  “You	
  can	
  still	
  justifiably	
  infringe	
  on	
  an	
  Aboriginal	
  right	
  or	
  title…if	
  all	
  the	
  justification	
  criteria	
  are	
  met.”	
  This	
  interviewee	
  (p.11)	
  further	
  articulates	
  the	
  uncertainty	
  that	
  still	
  exists	
  in	
  First	
  Nations	
  rights	
  and	
  title	
  jurisprudence	
  in	
  Canada:	
  “There’s	
  been	
  a	
  lot	
  of	
  debate	
  about	
  where,	
  say,	
  the	
  authority	
  in	
  the	
  Constitution	
  would	
  come	
  from	
  for	
  First	
  Nations	
  law-­‐making.	
  Because	
  it	
  doesn’t	
  come	
  from	
  [sections]	
  91	
  and	
  92	
  of	
  the	
  Constitution	
  Act	
  [B.N.A.	
  1867],	
  because	
  those	
  divide	
  up	
  powers	
  between	
  the	
  provinces	
  and	
  federal	
  government.	
  So	
  a	
  pretty	
  nice	
  answer	
  is	
  it	
  comes	
  from	
  section	
  35	
  of	
  the	
  Constitution	
  Act	
  [1982]	
  that	
  recognized	
  land	
  claims	
  agreements	
  as	
  generating	
  rights	
  that	
  are	
  constitutionally	
  protected,	
  and	
  so	
  therefore	
  would	
  have	
  the	
  power	
  to	
  trump	
  federal	
  and	
  provincial	
  laws…Whether	
  you	
  could	
  show	
  without	
  a	
  treaty	
  whether	
  you’ve	
  got	
  Aboriginal	
  governance	
  rights,	
  that’d	
  be	
  a	
  nice	
  case	
  to	
  test.…But	
  in	
  principle,	
  if	
  you	
  could	
  establish	
  that	
  you	
  had	
  a	
  governance	
  system	
  that	
  included	
  land	
  use,	
  which	
  most	
  First	
  Nations	
  probably	
  could,	
  then	
  it	
  wouldn’t	
  be	
  unreasonable	
  to	
  say	
  that	
  those	
  decisions	
  on	
  land	
  use	
  were	
  an	
  integral	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  distinctive	
  Aboriginal	
  culture,	
  and	
  therefore	
  a	
  protected	
  right	
  under	
  section	
  35,	
  and	
  so	
  therefore	
  trumping	
  federal	
  or	
  provincial	
  land	
  use	
  decisions.”	
  Indeed,	
  the	
  courts	
  are	
  still	
  in	
  the	
  process	
  of	
  articulating	
  the	
  “common	
  law	
  doctrine	
  of	
  aboriginal	
  rights”	
  (Slattery	
  1996,	
  110),	
  and	
  British	
  Columbia’s	
  New	
  Relationship	
  promises	
  reconciliation	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  and	
  Crown	
  titles	
  and	
  jurisdictions”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2005).	
  Macklem	
  (2001,	
  7)	
  succinctly	
  summarizes	
  the	
  present	
  state	
  of	
  constitutional	
  clarity:	
  “Exploring	
  the	
  constitutional	
  status	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  people	
  in	
   	
   18	
   Canada	
  is	
  as	
  much	
  a	
  project	
  of	
  constitutional	
  theory	
  as	
  is	
  it	
  an	
  exercise	
  in	
  legal	
  explanation.”	
  	
   2.3 Relative Authority Framework  	
  Reflecting	
  the	
  direction	
  given	
  by	
  the	
  courts,	
  the	
  Province	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  announced	
  in	
  2005	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  entering	
  into	
  a	
  New	
  Relationship	
  with	
  First	
  Nations,	
  “based	
  on	
  respect,	
  recognition	
  and	
  accommodation	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  title	
  and	
  rights;	
  respect	
  for	
  each	
  other’s	
  respective	
  laws	
  and	
  responsibilities;	
  and	
  for	
  the	
  reconciliation	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  and	
  Crown	
  titles	
  and	
  jurisdictions”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009d).	
  As	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  this	
  direction,	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  First	
  Nations	
  Leadership	
  Council	
  agreed	
  to	
  establish	
  institutions	
  for	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  regarding	
  land	
  and	
  resources.	
  A	
  relative	
  authority	
  framework	
  allows	
  us	
  to	
  analyse	
  the	
  allocation	
  of	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nation	
  authority	
  across	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  decision	
  functions.	
  	
  Through	
  a	
  review	
  of	
  co-­‐management	
  literature,	
  Forsyth	
  (2006)	
  develops	
  a	
  conceptual	
  framework	
  for	
  classification	
  and	
  evaluation	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  forest	
  management	
  arrangements,	
  although	
  it	
  can	
  be	
  adapted	
  to	
  apply	
  to	
  other	
  land	
  and	
  resource	
  decisions	
  (see	
  for	
  example,	
  Ambus	
  and	
  Hoberg	
  2011).	
  To	
  that	
  end,	
  he	
  develops	
  a	
  matrix	
  with	
  a	
  relative	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority2	
  spectrum	
  across	
  the	
  horizontal	
  axis,	
  and	
  categories	
  of	
  decision	
  functions	
  on	
  the	
  vertical	
  axis.3	
  This	
  matrix	
  allows	
  for	
  an	
  illustration	
  of	
  the	
   distribution	
  of	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  across	
  a	
  set	
  of	
  potential	
  decisions,	
  as	
  opposed	
  to	
  the	
  arrangement	
  as	
  a	
  whole,	
  as	
  previous	
  frameworks	
  have	
  proposed.	
  Forsyth	
  (2006,	
  81)	
  describes	
  this	
  as	
  “a	
  more	
  detailed	
  view”	
  of	
  what	
  is	
  happening	
  in	
  a	
  governance	
  arrangement.	
  In	
  application,	
  by	
  placing	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  three	
  decision	
  functions	
  along	
  the	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  2	
  Forsyth	
  uses	
  the	
  term	
  ‘power’	
  in	
  the	
  publication	
  cited	
  here,	
  but	
  adopted	
  ‘authority’	
  in	
  a	
  subsequent	
  paper	
  that	
  has	
  been	
  submitted	
  for	
  publication.	
   	
  3	
  In	
  his	
  analysis,	
  Forsyth	
  used	
  the	
  decision	
  functions:	
  1)	
  Strategic	
  (e.g.	
  strategic	
  planning;	
  cultural	
  and	
  socio-­‐economic;	
  timber	
  supply	
  analysis;	
  tenure	
  allocation,	
  etc);	
  2)	
  Tactical	
  (tactical	
  planning;	
  monitoring	
  and	
  adaptive	
  management);	
  and	
  3)	
  Operational	
  (operational	
  planning;	
  operational	
  activities;	
  manufacturing	
  and	
  marketing)	
   	
   19	
   spectrum	
  independently,	
  they	
  altogether	
  provide	
  a	
  more	
  comprehensive	
  and	
  refined	
  account	
  of	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nation	
  authority	
  relationship	
  than	
  by	
  assessing	
  all	
  decision	
  functions	
  collectively.	
  	
   	
  	
  An	
  initial	
  review	
  of	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  agreements	
  indicates	
  that	
  the	
  relevant	
  categories	
  of	
  interest	
  on	
  Forsyth’s	
  spectrum	
  are	
  co-­‐management	
  and	
  co-­‐jurisdiction	
  –	
  the	
  two	
  categories	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  First	
  Nations	
  jointly	
  produce	
  decisions	
  (Figure	
  2.1).	
  The	
  relative	
  authority	
  spectrum	
  that	
  Forsyth	
  develops	
  for	
  forest	
  management	
  context	
  incorporates	
  multiple	
  elements	
  –	
  “terms	
  of	
  the	
  frequency	
  and	
  context	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  input,	
  the	
  level	
  of	
  consultation	
  and	
  accommodation	
  that	
  has	
  occurred,	
  and	
  the	
  overall	
  level	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  decision-­‐making	
  [authority]	
  based	
  on	
  general	
  obligations	
  of	
  the	
  Crown”	
  in	
  the	
  unique	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nation	
  relationship	
  (2006,	
  84).	
  In	
  terms	
  of	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority,	
  Forsyth	
  (2006,	
  85)	
  distinguishes	
  between	
  the	
  two	
  categories	
  as	
  follows:	
  in	
  co-­‐management	
  arrangements,	
  the	
  “Crown	
  has	
  an	
  obligation	
  to	
  recognize	
  joint	
  decisions,	
  but	
  retains	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  overturn	
  them”,	
  whereas	
  in	
  co-­‐jurisdiction,	
  the	
  “Crown	
  has	
  an	
  obligation	
  to	
  recognize	
  joint	
  decisions.”	
  	
  Forsyth’s	
  definition	
  of	
  co-­‐jurisdiction	
  is	
  in	
  accord	
  with	
  the	
  definition	
  proposed	
  by	
  Clogg,	
  Hoberg,	
  and	
  O’Carroll	
  (2004,	
  vii)	
  as	
  “involving	
  at	
  least	
  equal	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
   Figure	
  2.1	
  	
  	
  	
  Forsyth’s	
  (2006)	
  Relative	
  Authority	
  Spectrum	
   	
   Aboriginal	
  	
   Authority	
  	
  Co	
  -­	
  Jurisdiction	
  Co	
  -­	
  Management	
  Protocol	
  	
  Arrangement	
  Advisory	
  	
  Committee	
  Referral	
  	
  Process	
  Information	
  Management	
  	
   Low	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   Level	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  Decision	
   	
   High	
   Create	
  	
   and	
  joint	
  	
   approval	
  	
   of	
  Plans	
  Create	
  	
  	
  Plans	
  	
  –	
  State	
  	
  Approves	
  Limited	
  	
  participation	
  	
  	
  in	
  portion	
  of	
  	
  Plans	
  Input	
  as	
  a	
  	
  stakeholder	
  	
  prior	
  to	
  State	
  	
  creating	
  	
  	
   Plans	
   Input	
  on	
  	
   completed	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   Plans	
  Receive	
  a	
  	
  copy	
  of	
  an	
  	
  approved	
  	
  	
   Plan	
   Create	
  	
  and	
  	
  approve	
  	
  	
  Plans	
   Low	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   Level	
  of	
  Consultation	
  and	
  Accommodation	
   High	
   	
  	
  	
  Making	
  Authority	
   	
   20	
   between	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  First	
  Nations.”	
  With	
  implementation	
  of	
  EBM	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  specifically	
  in	
  mind,	
  Clogg,	
  Hoberg,	
  and	
  O’Carroll	
  (2004,	
  115)	
  recommended	
  one	
  of	
  two	
  configurations	
  for	
  a	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  management	
  body,	
  which	
  they	
  termed	
  ‘basic	
  co-­‐jurisdictional’	
  and	
  ‘full	
  co-­‐jurisdictional.’	
  The	
  board	
  in	
  their	
  proposed	
  full	
  co-­‐jurisdictional	
  model	
  would	
  be	
  responsible	
  for	
  a	
  larger	
  list	
  of	
  shared	
  decisions	
  than	
  the	
  basic	
  model,	
  and	
  would	
  gradually	
  displace	
  existing	
  institutions	
  over	
  a	
  transition	
  period.	
  The	
  instruments	
  Clogg,	
  Hoberg	
  and	
  O’Carroll	
  (2004,	
  119)	
  propose	
  for	
  giving	
  legal	
  authority	
  to	
  the	
  board	
  include	
  Crown	
  statute	
  or	
  delegated	
  legislation	
  through	
  an	
  Order	
  in	
  Council.	
  	
  While	
  Forsyth	
  has	
  developed	
  a	
  framework	
  for	
  analysing	
  authority,	
  and	
  Clogg,	
  Hoberg	
  and	
  O’Carroll	
  have	
  developed	
  comprehensive	
  models	
  of	
  potential	
  decision-­‐making	
  bodies	
  specific	
  to	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest,	
  what	
  is	
  missing	
  is	
  an	
  overt	
  consideration	
  of	
  the	
  permanence	
  of	
  such	
  a	
  decision-­‐making	
  body.	
  This	
  consideration	
  of	
  permanent	
  authority	
  reflects	
  what	
  Ostrom	
  (2005)	
  terms	
  the	
  ‘constitutional	
  level’	
  in	
  her	
  Institutional	
  Analysis	
  Framework.	
  The	
  constitutional	
  level	
  is	
  the	
  highest	
  rung	
  on	
  the	
  ladder	
  she	
  proposes,	
  wherein	
  players	
  have	
  at	
  least	
  some	
  authority	
  over	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  governance	
  arrangement.	
  As	
  established	
  in	
  the	
  section	
  on	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  context,	
  the	
  Crown	
  can	
  assign	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  to	
  an	
  external	
  body	
  through	
  a	
  statute,	
  but	
  it	
  can	
  also	
  rescind	
  that	
  statute,	
  thereby	
  unilaterally	
  stripping	
  that	
  authority.	
  It	
  would	
  take	
  constitutional	
  amendment,	
  treaty,	
  or	
  perhaps	
  a	
  court	
  order,	
  in	
  order	
  for	
  the	
  Crown	
  to	
  assign	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  that	
  it	
  could	
  not	
  unilaterally	
  affect.	
  A	
  board	
  that	
  makes	
  joint	
  decisions	
  that	
  both	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  First	
  Nation	
  involved	
  have	
  pledged	
  to	
  recognize,	
  and	
  that	
  neither	
  party	
  can	
  overturn,	
  does	
  fit	
  the	
  general	
  definition	
  of	
  co-­‐jurisdiction,	
  but	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  fundamental	
  difference	
  in	
  the	
  extent	
  of	
  that	
  authority	
  that	
  must	
  be	
  recognized.	
  	
  	
  Incorporating	
  the	
  definition	
  of	
  authority	
  established	
  in	
  Section	
  2.1,	
  we	
  can	
  clarify	
  a	
  distinction	
  between	
  levels	
  of	
  authority	
  as	
  shown	
  in	
  Table	
  2.1,	
  while	
  focusing	
  on	
  the	
  three	
  decision	
  functions	
  relevant	
  to	
  this	
  case:	
  land	
  use	
  zones,	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules,	
  and	
  operational	
  plan	
  approval. 	
   21	
   	
   Table	
  2.1	
  	
  	
  	
  Relative	
  Authority	
  of	
  Co-­Management	
  and	
  Co-­Jurisdictional	
  Bodies	
  Co-­‐Management	
   Co-­‐Jurisdiction	
  Both	
  Parties	
  collaborate	
  in	
  decision-­‐making,	
  but	
  the	
  Crown	
  retains	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  overturn	
  decisions.	
  	
   Both	
  Parties	
  recognize	
  the	
  authority	
  of	
  joint	
  decisions	
  –	
  neither	
  can	
  make	
  a	
  decision	
  unilaterally.	
  Multi-­‐party	
  agreement.	
  Does	
  not	
  require	
  statute,	
  treaty,	
  or	
  constitutional	
  amendment.	
  	
  	
  	
   	
   Decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  is	
  granted	
  through	
  statute.	
  Crown	
  can	
  subsequently	
  rescind	
  authority.	
   Decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  is	
  recognized	
  through	
  treaty	
  or	
  constitutional	
  amendment.	
  Crown	
  cannot	
  subsequently	
  rescind	
  authority	
  	
  	
  In	
  a	
  co-­‐management	
  arrangement	
  in	
  the	
  present	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  context,	
  the	
  board	
  would	
  have	
  power	
  to	
  recommend	
  decisions	
  to	
  the	
  Crown,	
  but	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  those	
  decisions	
  would	
  be	
  vested	
  in	
  the	
  Crown.	
  In	
  a	
  co-­‐jurisdictional	
  arrangement,	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  given	
  decisions	
  would	
  be	
  assigned	
  jointly	
  to	
  both	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  the	
  First	
  Nations	
  to	
  make	
  together.	
  If	
  the	
  board	
  is	
  assigned	
  its	
  authority	
  through	
  a	
  statute,	
  then	
  it	
  becomes	
  the	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐maker,	
  and	
  both	
  Parties	
  must	
  recognize	
  its	
  decisions,	
  but	
  the	
  Crown	
  ultimately	
  retains	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  rescind	
  the	
  enabling	
  statute.	
  If	
  the	
  board	
  is	
  assigned	
  its	
  authority	
  through	
  treaty	
  or	
  constitutional	
  amendment,	
  then	
  it	
  can	
  be	
  considered	
  an	
  order	
  of	
  authority	
  higher	
  because	
  of	
  its	
  relative	
  permanence.	
  	
  	
  It	
  should	
  be	
  said	
  that	
  a	
  co-­‐jurisdictional	
  arrangement	
  is	
  not	
  narrowly	
  defined	
  as	
  a	
  board	
  with	
  a	
  single	
  representative	
  of	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  First	
  Nation	
  involved.	
  A	
  management	
  board	
  that	
  includes	
  both	
  Crown	
  and	
  First	
  Nations	
  representatives	
  may	
  include	
  multiple	
  appointments	
  of	
  each,	
  as	
  is	
  the	
  case	
  with	
  the	
  Haida	
  Gwaii	
  Management	
  Council	
  introduced	
  in	
  Chapter	
  4.	
  In	
  such	
  a	
  case,	
  it	
  is	
  not	
  certain	
  that	
  each	
  side	
  will	
  necessarily	
  vote	
  as	
  a	
  block,	
  as	
  the	
  definition	
  for	
  co-­‐jurisdiction	
  may	
  suggest.	
  This	
  definition	
  can	
  equally	
  read	
  that	
  neither	
  of	
  two	
  or	
  more	
  decision	
  options	
  carries	
  any	
  more	
  weight	
  than	
  the	
  other.	
  Consider,	
  for	
  example,	
  a	
  board	
  that	
  contains	
  two	
  members	
   	
   22	
   each	
  of	
  Crown	
  and	
  First	
  Nations	
  representatives	
  and	
  a	
  mutually	
  decided	
  upon	
  tie	
  breaker.	
  This	
  board	
  has	
  a	
  decision	
  formula	
  of	
  majority	
  vote	
  or	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  tie	
  breaker	
  if	
  necessary.	
  If	
  on	
  a	
  given	
  decision	
  the	
  board	
  has	
  a	
  yes	
  vote	
  suggested	
  by	
  one	
  First	
  Nations	
  rep	
  and	
  one	
  Crown	
  rep,	
  and	
  a	
  no	
  vote	
  suggested	
  by	
  the	
  other	
  First	
  Nation	
  rep	
  and	
  one	
  Crown	
  rep,	
  then	
  tie	
  breaker	
  is	
  used	
  to	
  make	
  a	
  decision	
  that	
  no	
  one	
  can	
  overturn	
  and	
  that	
  both	
  parties	
  have	
  pledged	
  to	
  recognize.	
  	
  	
  Finally,	
  it	
  must	
  be	
  recognized	
  that	
  there	
  are	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  definitions	
  for	
  co-­‐management,	
  and	
  the	
  more	
  recently	
  used	
  term,	
  co-­‐jurisdiction,	
  in	
  the	
  literature.	
  Some	
  authors,	
  for	
  example,	
  do	
  not	
  fundamentally	
  distinguish	
  co-­‐jurisdiction	
  from	
  co-­‐management,	
  as	
  this	
  thesis	
  does,	
  but	
  instead	
  consider	
  a	
  co-­‐jurisdictional	
  arrangement	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  higher-­‐level	
  form	
  of	
  co-­‐management	
  (Pinkerton	
  2003).	
  Differentiations	
  between	
  management	
  arrangements	
  can	
  be	
  based	
  on	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  factors,	
  such	
  as	
  access	
  to	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  natural	
  resources,	
  and	
  access	
  to	
  capacity	
  resources	
  to	
  allow	
  for	
  participation	
  in	
  resource	
  management	
  planning	
  (Pinkerton	
  2003).	
  Furthermore,	
  arrangements	
  developed	
  in	
  the	
  literature	
  often	
  include	
  the	
  participation	
  of	
  groups,	
  such	
  as	
  local	
  communities.	
  Non-­‐Aboriginal	
  community	
  groups	
  are	
  fundamentally	
  different	
  in	
  nature	
  than	
  First	
  Nations,	
  who,	
  as	
  do	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nation,	
  assert	
  unceded	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  decisions	
  in	
  question	
  and	
  who	
  have	
  distinct	
  constitutionally	
  protected	
  rights	
  in	
  Canada.	
  The	
  framework	
  used	
  in	
  this	
  thesis	
  isolates	
  the	
  variable	
  of	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  in	
  defining	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nation	
  management	
  arrangements	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  context.	
  	
   	
   23	
   Chapter 3: Literature Review – Great Bear Rainforest 	
  The	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  has	
  not	
  always	
  been	
  defined	
  as	
  a	
  region	
  with	
  an	
  iconic	
  name,	
  or	
  even	
  a	
  definitive	
  boundary.	
  It	
  is	
  not	
  explicitly	
  distinct	
  from	
  the	
  coastal	
  temperate	
  rainforest	
  it	
  borders,	
  nor	
  do	
  its	
  borders	
  precisely	
  reflect	
  the	
  traditional	
  territories	
  of	
  the	
  local	
  First	
  Nations.	
  Instead,	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  has	
  emerged	
  as	
  a	
  defined	
  region	
  because	
  of	
  the	
  cooperation	
  and	
  vision	
  of	
  diverse	
  and,	
  at	
  times,	
  opposing	
  actors	
  –	
  new	
  coalitions	
  of	
  otherwise	
  autonomous	
  First	
  Nations,	
  fiercely	
  determined	
  environmental	
  groups,	
  a	
  powerful	
  forest	
  industry,	
  and	
  a	
  Provincial	
  government	
  whose	
  Premier	
  and	
  key	
  cabinet	
  ministers	
  had,	
  while	
  in	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  the	
  official	
  opposition,	
  been	
  challenging	
  the	
  constitutionality	
  of	
  what	
  was	
  the	
  only	
  modern	
  day	
  treaty	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia,	
  the	
  Nisga’a	
  Treaty.	
  	
  	
  The	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  is	
  defined	
  today	
  by	
  a	
  distinct	
  geographic	
  boundary	
  and	
  a	
  distinct,	
  although	
  inchoate,	
  set	
  of	
  governance	
  arrangements.	
  There	
  are	
  two	
  central	
  forces	
  behind	
  these	
  developments.	
  The	
  first	
  involves	
  the	
  relationship	
  between	
  powerful	
  environmental	
  and	
  industry	
  figures,	
  whose	
  interactions	
  brought	
  provincial,	
  national	
  and	
  international	
  attention	
  to	
  the	
  natural	
  resources	
  management	
  regime,	
  and	
  contributed	
  to	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  the	
  space	
  that	
  allowed	
  the	
  second	
  force	
  to	
  advance.	
  The	
  second	
  force	
  is	
  the	
  contested	
  and	
  unsettled	
  balance	
  of	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  First	
  Nations	
  of	
  the	
  region.	
  While	
  the	
  two	
  forces	
  intertwine,	
  neither	
  is	
  the	
  source	
  of	
  the	
  other	
  –	
  environmental	
  and	
  industry	
  groups	
  use	
  their	
  power	
  to	
  try	
  to	
  influence	
  resource	
  management	
  outcomes,	
  while	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  the	
  Province	
  must	
  engage	
  each	
  other	
  directly	
  to	
  resolve	
  the	
  question	
  of	
  who	
  has	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  those	
  resource	
  management	
  decisions	
  on	
  the	
  land.	
  	
  	
  As	
  this	
  chapter	
  will	
  show,	
  the	
  region	
  has	
  only	
  existed	
  as	
  a	
  discernable	
  entity	
  since	
  environmental	
  groups	
  donned	
  it	
  with	
  the	
  iconic	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  moniker	
  in	
  approximately	
  2000.	
  In	
  2001,	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  a	
  coalition	
  of	
  First	
  Nations	
  in	
  the	
  region,	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  signed	
  a	
  foundational	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  land	
  use	
   	
   24	
   planning	
  agreement	
  that	
  committed	
  the	
  Parties	
  to	
  continued	
  refinement	
  of	
  the	
  governance	
  arrangement	
  to	
  oversee	
  a	
  new	
  regime	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management.	
  Correspondingly,	
  the	
  full	
  body	
  of	
  literature	
  on	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  has	
  only	
  been	
  published	
  over	
  the	
  past	
  decade,	
  and	
  primarily	
  since	
  2004.	
  The	
  remainder	
  of	
  this	
  chapter	
  begins	
  by	
  reviewing,	
  first,	
  the	
  published	
  literature	
  that	
  examines	
  the	
  power	
  struggles	
  of	
  environmental	
  and	
  industry	
  groups	
  in	
  influencing	
  the	
  region’s	
  resource	
  management.	
  Following	
  that	
  review,	
  this	
  chapter	
  considers	
  the	
  literature	
  that	
  examines	
  the	
  region’s	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nations	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement,	
  and	
  demonstrates	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  gap	
  in	
  literature	
  in	
  examining	
  the	
  authority	
  relations	
  and	
  mechanisms	
  for	
  decision-­‐making	
  that	
  have	
  developed	
  in	
  the	
  resulting	
  governance	
  arrangements.	
  	
  The	
  academic	
  literature	
  provides	
  considerable	
  insight	
  into	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  and	
  the	
  forces	
  that	
  brought	
  environmental,	
  industry,	
  government,	
  and	
  First	
  Nation	
  groups	
  to	
  find	
  common	
  ground	
  in	
  a	
  regime	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management.	
  These	
  publications	
  consider	
  the	
  background	
  issues:	
  the	
  actors,	
  this	
  place	
  being	
  called	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest,	
  how	
  the	
  environmentalists	
  penetrated	
  the	
  government-­‐industry	
  relationship,	
  and	
  the	
  challenges	
  by	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  industry	
  to	
  the	
  environmental	
  campaign’s	
  call	
  for	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  “wilderness”.	
  In	
  an	
  elaborate	
  review,	
  Page	
  (2010)	
  uses	
  actor-­‐network	
  analysis	
  to	
  meticulously	
  trace	
  the	
  path	
  to	
  the	
  region’s	
  present	
  character,	
  and	
  credits	
  individuals	
  and	
  organizations	
  in	
  the	
  environmental	
  sector	
  with	
  transforming	
  the	
  region	
  from	
  disengaged	
  or	
  discrete	
  zones	
  (traditional	
  territories	
  of	
  more	
  than	
  two	
  dozen	
  First	
  Nations,	
  timber	
  supply	
  areas,	
  hunting	
  areas,	
  favourite	
  camping	
  spots,	
  etc.)	
  into	
  a	
  space	
  with	
  both	
  boundary	
  and	
  distinct	
  character.	
  Page	
  grounds	
  his	
  analysis	
  in	
  the	
  field	
  of	
  sociology	
  to	
  describe	
  the	
  construction	
  and	
  shifts	
  in	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  frames	
  held	
  by	
  major	
  actor	
  groups,	
  thoroughly	
  documenting	
  influential	
  constructions	
  including	
  “wilderness”	
  ambitions,	
  and	
  the	
  name	
  and	
  boundary	
  of	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  itself.	
  Dempsey	
  (2010)	
  takes	
  a	
  similar	
  approach	
  to	
  Page,	
  tracing	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  grizzly	
  bear	
  in	
  the	
  constructions	
  that	
  are	
  designed	
  to	
  create	
  support	
  for	
  the	
  political	
  objectives	
  of	
  environmental	
  actors	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest.	
  Both	
  Page	
  and	
  Dempsey	
  rely	
  heavily	
  on	
  the	
  frameworks	
  of	
  philosopher	
  and	
  anthropologist,	
  Bruno	
   	
   25	
   Latour,	
  working	
  to	
  highlight	
  the	
  complexity	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  the	
  values	
  and	
  conceptions	
  that	
  have	
  come	
  to	
  be	
  associated	
  with	
  it.	
  	
  It	
  is	
  well	
  documented	
  that	
  the	
  environmental	
  sector	
  sought	
  to	
  meet	
  their	
  objectives	
  by	
  initiating	
  a	
  successful	
  international	
  market	
  campaign	
  in	
  the	
  late	
  1990s	
  that	
  targeted	
  the	
  forest	
  industry,	
  and	
  propelled	
  a	
  reconceptualization	
  of	
  land	
  use	
  for	
  the	
  region	
  (Clapp	
  2004;	
  Karena	
  Shaw	
  2004;	
  Smith	
  and	
  Sterritt	
  2007;	
  Price,	
  Roburn,	
  and	
  MacKinnon	
  2009;	
  Davis	
  2009;	
  Howlett,	
  Rayner,	
  and	
  Tollefson	
  2009;	
  Dempsey	
  2010;	
  Page	
  2010;	
  Low	
  and	
  Shaw	
  forthcoming).	
  Page	
  (2010)	
  and	
  Dempsey	
  (2010)	
  in	
  particular	
  uncover	
  how	
  early	
  environmental	
  actors	
  harnessed	
  the	
  momentum	
  of	
  the	
  environmental	
  movement	
  that	
  had	
  been	
  successful	
  in	
  transforming	
  governance	
  and	
  land	
  use	
  in	
  Clayoquot	
  Sound	
  during	
  the	
  1990s,	
  and	
  turned	
  its	
  focus	
  toward	
  protecting	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  region	
  from	
  forest	
  operations	
  through	
  economic	
  pressures.	
  The	
  literature	
  published	
  to	
  date	
  identifies	
  the	
  international	
  market	
  campaign	
  as	
  the	
  pivotal	
  moment	
  from	
  which	
  emerged	
  the	
  present	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest.	
  Page	
  (2010)	
  alone	
  identifies	
  elements	
  going	
  a	
  few	
  years	
  further	
  back	
  to	
  the	
  mapping	
  projects	
  by	
  environmental	
  groups	
  that	
  solidified	
  its	
  boundaries,	
  and	
  their	
  framing	
  of	
  the	
  ecosystem	
  as	
  coastal	
  temperate	
  rainforest,	
  more	
  globally	
  rare	
  than	
  the	
  temperate	
  rainforest	
  ecosystem.	
  Facing	
  the	
  economic	
  pressures	
  created	
  by	
  the	
  market	
  campaign,	
  industry	
  and	
  environmental	
  groups	
  began	
  working	
  together	
  to	
  seek	
  workable	
  land	
  use	
  plans	
  that	
  would	
  best	
  satisfy	
  their	
  own	
  goals.	
  	
  	
  Shaw	
  (2004)	
  demonstrates	
  that	
  sovereign	
  governments	
  and	
  local	
  politics	
  can	
  be	
  pressured	
  through	
  external	
  forces,	
  directly	
  or	
  indirectly,	
  as	
  was	
  the	
  case	
  when	
  the	
  international	
  market	
  campaign	
  prompted	
  the	
  coastal	
  forest	
  industry	
  to	
  seek	
  common	
  ground	
  with	
  environmental	
  actors.	
  Shaw	
  makes	
  the	
  point	
  that	
  this	
  is	
  particularly	
  true	
  regarding	
  environmental	
  politics,	
  but	
  also	
  examines	
  the	
  challenges	
  confronted	
  by	
  parties	
  that	
  lack	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority,	
  such	
  as	
  to	
  set	
  regulations.	
  	
  	
  The	
  First	
  Nations	
  of	
  the	
  region,	
  however,	
  challenged	
  the	
  environmental	
  groups’	
  early	
  objectives	
  of	
  ‘wilderness	
  protection’	
  that	
  did	
  not	
  recognize	
  their	
  own	
  cultural	
  and	
   	
   26	
   economic	
  relationship	
  to	
  the	
  region,	
  and	
  particularly	
  challenged	
  their	
  exclusion	
  from	
  land	
  use	
  planning.	
  Davis	
  (2009)	
  recounts	
  the	
  tensions	
  and	
  benefits	
  witnessed	
  in	
  the	
  evolution	
  of	
  the	
  relationship	
  between	
  the	
  environmental	
  movement	
  and	
  First	
  Nations,	
  focusing	
  in	
  his	
  work	
  on	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  coalition.	
  Authors	
  like	
  Page	
  (2010),	
  Shaw	
  (2004),	
  Clapp	
  (2004),	
  and	
  central	
  figures	
  Smith	
  and	
  Sterritt	
  (2007),	
  describe	
  how	
  the	
  local	
  First	
  Nations	
  acted	
  as	
  early	
  as	
  2000	
  to	
  advance	
  a	
  coordinated	
  response	
  to	
  the	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  being	
  undertaken	
  by	
  the	
  environmental	
  and	
  industry	
  sectors,	
  demanding	
  a	
  central	
  role	
  in	
  the	
  planning	
  process	
  and	
  future	
  governance	
  of	
  the	
  region.	
  Howlett,	
  Rayner,	
  and	
  Tollefson	
  (2009),	
  explain	
  that,	
  while	
  there	
  were	
  shifts	
  in	
  the	
  region’s	
  governance	
  as	
  industry	
  and	
  environmental	
  group	
  worked	
  on	
  strategies	
  to	
  meet	
  common	
  goals,	
  the	
  Province	
  focused	
  control	
  again	
  through	
  agreeing	
  to	
  work	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  with	
  First	
  Nations	
  toward	
  a	
  vision	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management.	
  Industry	
  and	
  environmental	
  groups	
  were	
  compelled	
  to	
  support	
  this	
  development	
  in	
  governance	
  and	
  land	
  use	
  planning.	
  The	
  Province,	
  First	
  Nations,	
  industry	
  and	
  the	
  environmental	
  movement	
  were	
  able	
  to	
  find	
  common	
  ground,	
  shifting	
  the	
  debate	
  from	
  polarizing	
  frames	
  about	
  ‘unbridled	
  logging’	
  and	
  ‘wilderness	
  protection’,	
  toward	
  a	
  common	
  vision	
  that	
  sought	
  to	
  meet	
  objectives	
  of	
  both	
  environmental	
  integrity	
  and	
  human	
  well-­‐being.	
  	
  	
  In	
  2001,	
  cooperation	
  between	
  all	
  parties	
  resulted	
  in	
  a	
  heralded	
  General	
  Protocol	
   Agreement	
  on	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  and	
  Interim	
  Measures	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.	
  The	
  agreement	
  committed	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  to	
  a	
  new	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  planning	
  process	
  for	
  the	
  region	
  that	
  would	
  advance	
  the	
  principles	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management.	
  Smith	
  &	
  Sterritt	
  (2007)	
  offer	
  the	
  first	
  broadly-­‐accessible	
  documentation	
  of	
  the	
  specific	
  details	
  of	
  the	
  2001	
  agreement,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  contextualization	
  offered	
  directly	
  from	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  (Sterritt)	
  and	
  environmental	
  actors	
  (Smith).	
  The	
  2001	
  agreement	
  established	
  a	
  two-­‐tiered	
  planning	
  process:	
  the	
  Province	
  would	
  re-­‐start	
  their	
  stakeholder-­‐based	
  Central	
  Coast	
  and	
  North	
  Coast	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Management	
  Plans	
  (LRMPs),	
  while	
  First	
  Nations	
  conducted	
  their	
  own	
  land	
  management	
  plans,	
  and	
  then	
  the	
  Provincial	
  and	
  First	
  Nation	
  plans	
  would	
  be	
  reconciled	
  through	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations.	
  Furthermore,	
  as	
  a	
   	
   27	
   result	
  of	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations	
  since	
  the	
  2001	
  foundational	
  agreement	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  subsequent	
  agreements	
  have	
  been	
  signed	
  that	
  refine	
  elements	
  of	
  the	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Management	
  Plans,	
  and	
  evolve	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  relationship	
  going	
  forward.	
  	
  	
  There	
  is	
  a	
  second	
  overarching	
  focus	
  in	
  the	
  literature	
  on	
  the	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nation	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  that	
  resulted	
  from	
  the	
  2001	
  agreement,	
  but	
  among	
  it	
  there	
  has	
  been	
  little	
  review	
  of	
  the	
  authority	
  relationship	
  that	
  has	
  emerged.	
  All	
  of	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  agreements	
  clearly	
  indicate	
  that	
  the	
  intention	
  is	
  to	
  operate	
  through	
  consensus	
  -­‐	
  these	
  were	
  developed	
  by	
  consensus	
  and	
  include	
  dispute	
  resolution	
  processes	
  that	
  seek	
  to	
  maintain	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  reach	
  consensus	
  in	
  management	
  of	
  the	
  land.	
  However,	
  the	
  details	
  of	
  the	
  agreements	
  indicate	
  that	
  both	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  maintain,	
  and	
  recognize	
  the	
  other’s,	
  claims	
  of	
  jurisdiction,	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority,	
  rights	
  and	
  title	
  to	
  the	
  land	
  in	
  question.	
  From	
  the	
  literature,	
  it	
  is	
  unclear	
  who	
  has	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  land	
  use	
  decisions	
  according	
  to	
  these	
  agreements,	
  and	
  whether	
  the	
  Parties	
  themselves	
  have	
  a	
  common	
  understanding	
  and	
  this	
  central	
  governance	
  issue.	
  	
  Spanning	
  both	
  literature	
  headings,	
  Low	
  and	
  Shaw	
  (Forthcoming)	
  specifically	
  recognize	
  that	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  encompasses	
  both	
  the	
  environmental-­‐industry	
  power	
  struggle	
  and	
  a	
  new,	
  elevated	
  involvement	
  of	
  First	
  Nations	
  in	
  land	
  use	
  planning.	
  They	
  reflect	
  on	
  the	
  negotiations	
  that	
  led	
  to	
  the	
  foundational	
  principles	
  guiding	
  governance	
  and	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  in	
  the	
  region,	
  and	
  find	
  that	
  the	
  involvement	
  of	
  First	
  Nations	
  resulted	
  in	
  a	
  “dramatically”	
  different	
  outcome	
  than	
  would	
  have	
  been	
  envisioned	
  by	
  the	
  government	
  and	
  other	
  major	
  stakeholders.	
  Their	
  paper	
  acknowledges	
  that	
  a	
  network	
  of	
  institutions	
  is	
  needed	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  meet	
  the	
  goals	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management,	
  and	
  focuses	
  on	
  two	
  –	
  mechanisms	
  to	
  encourage	
  economic	
  diversity	
  away	
  from	
  forestry,	
  and	
  the	
  format	
  for	
  protected	
  areas	
  that	
  still	
  allows	
  for	
  cultural	
  uses.	
  	
  	
   	
   28	
   More	
  relevantly,	
  Low	
  and	
  Shaw	
  (forthcoming)	
  acknowledge	
  the	
  demand	
  by	
  First	
  Nations	
  that	
  they	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  governmental	
  decision-­‐makers,	
  elevated	
  from	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  stakeholder.	
  They	
  explain	
  that	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  model	
  altered	
  the	
  way	
  that	
  environmental	
  and	
  industry	
  sectors	
  could	
  influence	
  planning	
  outcomes	
  by	
  excluding	
  them	
  from	
  formal	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nations	
  negotiations	
  that	
  refine	
  broader	
  stakeholder	
  plans	
  and	
  recommendations.	
  Low	
  and	
  Shaw	
  characterise	
  the	
  relations	
  of	
  the	
  parties	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  power	
  only,	
  including	
  the	
  power	
  of	
  First	
  Nations	
  to	
  influence	
  land	
  use	
  decisions.	
  They	
  do,	
  however,	
  indirectly	
  acknowledge	
  the	
  difference	
  between	
  power	
  and	
  authority	
  when	
  they	
  consider	
  the	
  how	
  such	
  a	
  governance	
  model	
  may	
  help	
  in	
  bridging	
  to	
  treaty	
  negotiations,	
  where	
  First	
  Nations	
  authority	
  would	
  be	
  settled.	
  	
  	
  Thielmann	
  and	
  Tollefson	
  (2009,	
  117)	
  review	
  the	
  evolution	
  of	
  land	
  use	
  and	
  Aboriginal	
  rights	
  policy	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia	
  broadly,	
  exposing	
  the	
  inadequacy	
  of	
  even	
  the	
  Province’s	
  multistakeholder	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Management	
  Plan	
  model	
  to	
  “address	
  First	
  Nations’	
  concerns	
  or	
  provide	
  the	
  legal	
  certainties	
  that	
  some	
  land	
  use	
  actors	
  sought.”	
  Cullen	
  et	
  al.	
  (2010)	
  surveyed	
  the	
  36	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  LRMP	
  planning	
  tables	
  in	
  2006	
  to	
  evaluate	
  the	
  process	
  and	
  outcomes	
  of	
  the	
  two-­‐tiered	
  planning	
  process.	
  One	
  outcome	
  of	
  particular	
  interest	
  is	
  that	
  66.7%	
  of	
  First	
  Nations	
  found	
  the	
  process	
  to	
  have	
  been	
  successful	
  compared	
  to	
  95.8%	
  for	
  non-­‐First	
  Nations.	
  Furthermore,	
  37.5%	
  of	
  First	
  Nations	
  respondents	
  indicated	
  that	
  they	
  felt	
  sufficiently	
  trained	
  for	
  participation	
  in	
  the	
  process	
  (compared	
  to	
  95.7%	
  for	
  non-­‐First	
  Nations),	
  and	
  33.3%	
  felt	
  that	
  their	
  role	
  was	
  clear	
  (compared	
  to	
  95.8%).	
  Only	
  a	
  handful	
  of	
  First	
  Nations	
  were	
  included	
  in	
  this	
  survey,	
  however,	
  leading	
  to	
  potentially	
  misleading	
  figures.	
  Barry	
  (2010)	
  observes	
  that	
  the	
  original	
  promise	
  of	
  a	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationship	
  was	
  not	
  well	
  defined,	
  and	
  as	
  such,	
  much	
  of	
  the	
  decade	
  has	
  been	
  devoted	
  to	
  outlining	
  the	
  overall	
  governance	
  framework	
  for	
  the	
  implementation	
  and	
  adaptation	
  of	
  plans	
  for	
  the	
  region,	
  rather	
  than	
  the	
  negotiations	
  resulting	
  in	
  a	
  coherent	
  land	
  use	
  plan.	
  	
  	
  Barry	
  (2010)	
  examines	
  the	
  unique	
  characteristics	
  that	
  made	
  political	
  space	
  for	
  the	
  adoption	
  of	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  process.	
  Her	
  work	
  focuses	
  on	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  agreements	
  signed	
  between	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  the	
   	
   29	
   Nanwakokas	
  Council,	
  the	
  First	
  Nation	
  coalition	
  whose	
  traditional	
  territories	
  occupy	
  the	
  southern-­‐most	
  portion	
  of	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest,	
  south	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.	
  Barry	
  (2010)	
  and	
  Howlett,	
  Rayner,	
  and	
  Tollefson	
  (2009)	
  draw	
  attention	
  to	
  the	
  ways	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  process	
  has	
  neither	
  been	
  linear	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  the	
  involvement	
  of	
  affected	
  groups,	
  nor	
  a	
  seamless	
  course.	
  Barry	
  describes	
  the	
  evolution	
  of	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  as	
  “punctuated”,	
  Howlett	
  et	
  al.	
  as	
  “uneven”,	
  and	
  Thielmann	
  and	
  Tollefson	
  (2009,	
  122)	
  describe	
  a	
  transition	
  from	
  pluralism	
  to	
  a	
  state-­‐directed	
  network	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  “a	
  complex	
  interplay	
  between	
  processes	
  of	
  exhaustion,	
  layering	
  and	
  conversion.”	
  These	
  authors	
  draw	
  the	
  same	
  conclusion	
  that	
  the	
  early	
  promise	
  of	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  was	
  calculated	
  by	
  the	
  Province	
  to	
  restrict	
  the	
  actors	
  directly	
  influencing	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  for	
  the	
  region	
  to	
  only	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  First	
  Nations.	
  Thielmann	
  and	
  Tollefson	
  (2009)	
  discuss	
  how	
  this	
  evolution	
  in	
  land	
  use	
  and	
  Aboriginal	
  right	
  policy	
  has	
  led	
  to	
  “unprecedented	
  conflict	
  reduction”,	
  but	
  argue	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  an	
  associated	
  trade-­‐off	
  of	
  increased	
  inconsistency	
  in	
  Provincial	
  policy	
  that	
  is	
  confusing	
  for	
  all	
  sectors	
  to	
  navigate.	
  	
  	
  Takeda	
  and	
  Røpke	
  (2010)	
  examine	
  the	
  many	
  ways	
  that	
  power	
  relations	
  can	
  manifest	
  between	
  parties,	
  particularly	
  so	
  with	
  collaborative	
  planning	
  processes	
  that	
  involve	
  many	
  subgroups	
  and	
  institutions.	
  They	
  consider	
  the	
  Haida	
  Nation,	
  a	
  member	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  but	
  who	
  have	
  established	
  separate	
  agreements,	
  but	
  their	
  data	
  is	
  from	
  2004	
  and	
  2005	
  so	
  does	
  not	
  examine	
  the	
  present	
  arrangement.	
  They,	
  furthermore,	
  do	
  not	
  distinctly	
  differentiate	
  between	
  power	
  and	
  authority.	
  Largely	
  overlooked	
  in	
  this	
  literature	
  and	
  never	
  directly	
  noted,	
  is	
  the	
  distinction	
  between	
  power	
  and	
  authority.	
  When	
  these	
  terms	
  do	
  appear,	
  they	
  often	
  used	
  interchangeably,	
  missing	
  the	
  critical	
  distinction	
  that	
  this	
  thesis	
  exposes	
  in	
  Chapter	
  2.	
  Shaw	
  (2004)	
  touches	
  on	
  this	
  distinction	
  most	
  directly	
  in	
  discussing	
  how	
  the	
  environmental	
  movement	
  exercised	
  power	
  to	
  influence	
  a	
  sovereign	
  authority	
  through	
  the	
  market	
  campaign,	
  but	
  that	
  a	
  lack	
  of	
  authority	
  will	
  leave	
  interest	
  groups	
  faced	
  with	
  the	
  challenge	
  of	
  maintaining	
  the	
  momentum	
  or	
  force	
  of	
  that	
  power.	
  Where	
  Barry	
  (2010)	
  and	
  Howlett,	
  Rayner,	
  and	
  Tollefson	
  (2009)	
  propose	
  that	
  the	
  Province	
  agreed	
  to	
  a	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationship	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  downgrade	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  the	
  other	
  actors	
  in	
  the	
  arrangement,	
  they	
   	
   30	
   are	
  referring	
  to	
  a	
  government	
  attempt	
  at	
  to	
  reduce	
  the	
  power	
  of	
  those	
  actors	
  to	
  influence	
  land	
  use	
  for	
  the	
  region.	
  Barry	
  (2010),	
  Davis	
  (2009)	
  and	
  Cullen	
  et	
  al.	
  (2010)	
  all	
  note	
  that	
  the	
  Province	
  has	
  retained	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority,	
  but	
  none	
  indicate	
  the	
  source	
  of	
  this	
  conclusion,	
  and	
  all	
  make	
  this	
  statement	
  in	
  passing	
  reference.	
  The	
  primary	
  documents	
  on	
  face,	
  and	
  the	
  academic	
  literature	
  developed	
  to	
  date,	
  do	
  not	
  appear	
  to	
  justify	
  such	
  conclusions	
  of	
  supreme	
  Provincial	
  authority.	
  	
  	
  	
  A	
  review	
  of	
  the	
  published	
  literature	
  indicates	
  that	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  has	
  not	
  caught	
  the	
  attention	
  of	
  the	
  legal	
  studies	
  or	
  political	
  science	
  communities,	
  despite	
  being	
  a	
  unique	
  and	
  potentially	
  precedent	
  setting	
  case	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  governance.	
  Over	
  the	
  course	
  of	
  more	
  than	
  a	
  decade,	
  agreements	
  about	
  governance	
  and	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  have	
  been	
  signed	
  directly	
  between	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  First	
  Nations	
  of	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  that	
  aim	
  to	
  make	
  decisions	
  by	
  consensus,	
  while	
  still	
  maintaining	
  each	
  Party’s	
  own	
  assertion	
  of	
  sovereignty,	
  jurisdiction	
  and	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority.	
  A	
  gap	
  in	
  the	
  literature	
  exists	
  that	
  examines	
  how	
  the	
  agreements	
  affect	
  the	
  balance	
  of	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  between	
  these	
  parties,	
  and	
  the	
  mechanisms	
  they	
  have	
  established	
  for	
  making	
  shared	
  land	
  use	
  decisions.	
   	
   31	
   Chapter 4: The Crown-Coastal First Nations Governance Structure 	
   4.1 Introduction  	
  The	
  north	
  and	
  central	
  coast	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  that	
  is	
  commonly	
  known	
  as	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  is	
  a	
  6.4	
  million	
  hectare	
  zone	
  of	
  coastal	
  temperate	
  rainforest.	
  It	
  is	
  home	
  to	
  22,000	
  people,	
  approximately	
  half	
  of	
  whom	
  are	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  ancestry,	
  and	
  includes	
  the	
  traditional	
  territories	
  of	
  over	
  two	
  dozen	
  distinct	
  First	
  Nations	
  (Price,	
  Roburn,	
  and	
  MacKinnon	
  2009).	
  The	
  region	
  is	
  being	
  governed	
  under	
  evolving	
  governance	
  arrangements	
  between	
  the	
  Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  First	
  Nations,	
  and	
  an	
  innovative	
  regime	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management	
  (EBM),	
  which	
  is	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  goal	
  of	
  balancing	
  ecological	
  integrity	
  and	
  human-­‐wellbeing.	
  There	
  are	
  three	
  coalitions	
  of	
  First	
  Nations	
  that	
  represent	
  almost	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  First	
  Nations	
  with	
  traditional	
  territories	
  in	
  the	
  region.	
  This	
  research	
  focuses	
  primarily	
  on	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  whose	
  traditional	
  territories	
  span	
  the	
  majority	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  and	
  Central	
  Coast	
  planning	
  areas.	
  	
  This	
  chapter	
  begins	
  by	
  introducing	
  the	
  series	
  of	
  agreements	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  established	
  between	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.	
  These	
  agreements	
  first	
  define	
  the	
  goals	
  of	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationship	
  and	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management,	
  and	
  then	
  the	
  mechanisms	
  for	
  implementing	
  those	
  goals.	
  Readers	
  can	
  turn	
  to	
  the	
  authors	
  identified	
  in	
  Chapter	
  3	
  for	
  a	
  description	
  of	
  the	
  forces	
  that	
  brought	
  these	
  parties	
  together	
  and	
  the	
  space	
  that	
  was	
  created	
  to	
  allow	
  for	
  this	
  form	
  of	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  and	
  broader	
  stakeholder	
  arrangement.	
  In	
  introducing	
  the	
  agreements	
  here,	
  the	
  source	
  of	
  three	
  decision	
  functions	
  under	
  investigation	
  in	
  this	
  thesis	
  emerge	
  –	
  land	
  use	
  zones,	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules,	
  and	
  operational	
  plan	
  approval.	
  	
  	
  Having	
  introduced	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  agreements,	
  this	
  chapter	
  goes	
  	
  on	
  to	
  its	
  primary	
  purpose	
  of	
  analysing	
  whether	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  acquired	
  a	
  share	
  of	
  governmental	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  with	
  regard	
  to	
  the	
  three	
  decision	
  functions	
  under	
  investigation.	
  The	
  standing	
  of	
  the	
  agreements	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
   	
   32	
   context	
  are	
  revealed,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  the	
  elements	
  that	
  indicate	
  their	
  status.	
  This	
  chapter	
  also	
  examines	
  the	
  first	
  known	
  court	
  ruling	
  on	
  any	
  element	
  of	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationships	
  forged	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  and	
  considers	
  its	
  implications.	
  While	
  this	
  chapter	
  reveals	
  that	
  the	
  authority	
  relationship	
  is	
  indicated	
  by	
  the	
  type	
  of	
  agreements	
  forged,	
  it	
  includes	
  additional	
  information	
  on	
  the	
  functioning	
  of	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  governance	
  arrangement	
  in	
  practice,	
  including	
  the	
  design	
  of	
  the	
  governance	
  forums.	
  The	
  additional	
  information	
  provides	
  added	
  insight	
  into	
  the	
  complex	
  and	
  evolving	
  governance	
  structures	
  and	
  helps	
  resolve	
  questions	
  that	
  may	
  naturally	
  arise	
  among	
  anyone	
  reading	
  the	
  provisions	
  of	
  the	
  agreements	
  themselves.	
  Revealing	
  the	
  specific	
  mechanisms	
  being	
  used	
  to	
  make	
  decisions	
  regarding	
  land	
  use	
  zones,	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules,	
  and	
  operational	
  plan	
  approval,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  the	
  outcomes	
  of	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  on	
  these	
  decision,	
  will	
  be	
  the	
  focus	
  of	
  Chapter	
  5.	
  	
  	
   4.2 Background 	
  The	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest,	
  as	
  it	
  is	
  known	
  today,	
  emerged	
  from	
  the	
  conflict	
  between	
  environmental	
  groups	
  and	
  the	
  forest	
  industry,	
  including	
  a	
  successful	
  international	
  market	
  campaign	
  led	
  by	
  environmental	
  groups,	
  and	
  a	
  subsequent	
  truce	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  a	
  moratorium	
  in	
  2000	
  on	
  both	
  logging	
  and	
  the	
  campaign.	
  Both	
  industry	
  and	
  environmental	
  groups	
  formed	
  their	
  own	
  coalitions	
  that	
  then	
  came	
  together	
  under	
  the	
  Joint	
  Solutions	
  Project	
  to	
  seek	
  out	
  a	
  common	
  vision	
  for	
  the	
  region	
  in	
  what	
  Howlett,	
  Rayner,	
  and	
  Tollefson	
  (2009,	
  388)	
  describe	
  as	
  “an	
  unprecedented	
  display	
  of	
  mutual	
  commitment”.	
  The	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  Joint	
  Solutions	
  Project	
  recognized	
  that	
  management	
  for	
  the	
  region	
  was	
  going	
  to	
  have	
  to	
  include	
  both	
  ecological	
  integrity	
  and	
  human	
  well-­‐being,	
  and	
  they	
  began	
  collaborating	
  on	
  the	
  details	
  of	
  a	
  proposed	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management	
  regime	
  (Mascarenhas	
  and	
  Scarce	
  2004).	
  	
   	
   33	
   When	
  the	
  Joint	
  Solutions	
  Project’s	
  efforts	
  became	
  public,	
  government,	
  First	
  Nations,	
  and	
  indeed	
  communities,	
  were	
  incensed	
  at	
  having	
  been	
  left	
  out	
  of	
  a	
  process	
  that	
  was	
  establishing	
  a	
  management	
  framework	
  for	
  the	
  region	
  (Clapp	
  2004;	
  Karena	
  Shaw	
  2004).	
  At	
  the	
  same	
  time,	
  many	
  of	
  the	
  region’s	
  First	
  Nations	
  began	
  establishing	
  their	
  own	
  coalitions	
  in	
  the	
  interest	
  of	
  working	
  together	
  toward	
  preservation	
  of	
  their	
  lands	
  and	
  culture.	
  In	
  2000,	
  eight	
  First	
  Nations	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  and	
  Central	
  Coast	
  and	
  Haida	
  Gwaii	
  formed	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  (then	
  Turning	
  Point)	
  and	
  signed	
  a	
  declaration	
  committing	
  to	
  support	
  each	
  other	
  in	
  efforts	
  to	
  ensure	
  the	
  well-­‐being	
  of	
  their	
  lands	
  and	
  waters,	
  and	
  “[t]o	
  preserving	
  and	
  renewing	
  our	
  territories	
  and	
  cultures	
  through	
  our	
  tradition,	
  knowledge	
  and	
  authority”	
  (Turning	
  Point	
  2000).4	
  	
  Other	
  First	
  Nations	
  from	
  the	
  region	
  have	
  since	
  formed	
  together	
  under	
  the	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council	
  and	
  the	
  North	
  Coast–Skeena	
  First	
  Nations	
  Stewardship	
  Society.	
  	
  The	
  Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  had	
  begun	
  a	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Management	
  Planning	
  (LRMP)	
  process	
  for	
  the	
  Central	
  Coast	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  in	
  1996,	
  as	
  had	
  been	
  its	
  practice	
  at	
  the	
  time	
  for	
  strategic	
  planning	
  across	
  the	
  province.5	
  The	
  Province	
  may	
  have	
  been	
  frustrated	
  that	
  interest	
  coalitions	
  were	
  establishing	
  a	
  process	
  outside	
  of	
  its	
  own,	
  but	
  it	
  was	
  successful	
  at	
  drawing	
  both	
  Joint	
  Solutions	
  Project	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  back	
  into	
  a	
  revitalized	
  LRMP	
  process	
  by	
  accommodating	
  the	
  vision	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management	
  that	
  was	
  cementing	
  itself	
  as	
  the	
  only	
  widely	
  acceptable	
  form	
  of	
  management	
  for	
  the	
  region	
  (Howlett,	
  Rayner,	
  and	
  Tollefson	
  2009).	
  	
  	
  In	
  2001,	
  the	
  Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  announced	
  the	
  General	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  on	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  and	
  Interim	
  Measures	
  (hereafter	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  4	
  Howlett,	
  Rayner,	
  and	
  Tollefson	
  (2009,	
  388),	
  however,	
  assert	
  that	
  there	
  had	
  in	
  fact	
  been	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  agreements	
  reached	
  in	
  1999	
  and	
  2000	
  between	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  environmental	
  groups	
  “on	
  topics	
  such	
  as	
  strategies	
  for	
  promoting	
  ecologically	
  sensitive	
  development,	
  increased	
  local	
  employment,	
  and	
  an	
  enhanced	
  negotiating	
  role	
  with	
  government.”	
  Any	
  such	
  agreements	
  have	
  not	
  been	
  found	
  publically	
  available.	
  5	
  Related	
  documents	
  and	
  agreements	
  cite	
  both	
  1996	
  and	
  1997	
  as	
  the	
  initiating	
  year.	
  	
   	
   34	
   the	
  General	
  Protocol	
  Agreement).6	
  The	
  agreement	
  solidified	
  the	
  formal	
  process	
  toward	
  implementation	
  of	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest,	
  and	
  re-­‐positioned	
  government	
  and	
  First	
  Nations	
  as	
  the	
  decision-­‐making	
  entities	
  for	
  the	
  region.	
  It	
  also	
  established	
  the	
  foundational	
  principles	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management	
  on	
  the	
  coast,	
  which	
  would	
  be	
  refined	
  and	
  implemented	
  through	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationship.	
  	
  	
   4.3 Government-to-Government Agreements and Land Use Plans 	
  Government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations	
  have	
  culminated	
  in	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  agreements	
  since	
  2001	
  that	
  define	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nation	
  governance	
  arrangement	
  as	
  it	
  stands	
  today.	
  This	
  section	
  introduces	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nation	
  agreements	
  that	
  were	
  signed	
  in	
  2001,	
  2006	
  and	
  2009,	
  and	
  which	
  of	
  the	
  three	
  decision	
  functions	
  are	
  addressed	
  in	
  each.	
  The	
  mechanisms	
  being	
  used	
  to	
  conduct	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  decision-­‐making,	
  as	
  directed	
  by	
  the	
  agreements,	
  and	
  the	
  outcomes	
  of	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  on	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  since	
  2001	
  are	
  the	
  focus	
  of	
  Chapter	
  5.	
  	
  	
  	
   4.3.1 The 2001 General Protocol Agreement  	
  The	
  foundation	
  established	
  through	
  the	
  2001	
  General	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  represented	
  a	
  fundamental	
  shift	
  in	
  governance	
  and	
  strategic	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia.	
  The	
  General	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  had	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  components	
  that	
  Smith	
  and	
  Sterritt	
  (2007)	
  	
  group	
  under	
  five	
  central	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  6	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  signatories	
  in	
  2001	
  included	
  Gitga’at	
  First	
  Nation,	
  Haida	
  Nation,	
  Haisla	
  Nation,	
  Heiltsuk	
  Nation,	
  Kitasoo/Xaixais	
  First	
  Nation,	
  Metlakatla	
  First	
  Nation,	
  Old	
  Massett	
  Village	
  Council,	
  Skidegate	
  Band	
  Council	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2001).	
  Wuikinuxv	
  First	
  Nation	
  and	
  Nuxalk	
  Nation	
  are	
  now	
  members,	
  while	
  the	
  Haida	
  Nation,	
  still	
  a	
  member,	
  has	
  since	
  established	
  agreements	
  independent	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.	
   	
   35	
   principles.	
  First,	
  it	
  was	
  this	
  agreement	
  that	
  recognized	
  First	
  Nations,	
  not	
  as	
  stakeholders,	
  but	
  for	
  the	
  first	
  time	
  as	
  governments.	
  It	
  pledged	
  to	
  secure	
  a	
  strategic	
  plan	
  for	
  the	
  region	
  reflective	
  of	
  all	
  governments’	
  visions	
  by	
  establishing	
  concurrent	
  Crown	
  and	
  First	
  Nation	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  processes	
  that	
  would	
  be	
  reconciled	
  through	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations.	
  What	
  this	
  meant	
  was	
  that	
  the	
  Province	
  would	
  reformulate	
  and	
  restart	
  the	
  two	
  Central	
  and	
  North	
  Coast	
  LRMP	
  tables	
  that	
  included	
  environment,	
  industry	
  and	
  other	
  major	
  stakeholders,	
  while	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  concurrently	
  conducted	
  their	
  own	
  land	
  use	
  plans.	
  Outstanding	
  disparities	
  between	
  the	
  LRMPs	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations’	
  plans	
  would	
  be	
  reconciled	
  through	
  negotiations	
  directly	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.	
  In	
  formal	
  terms,	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  process	
  was	
  devised	
  in	
  the	
  General	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2001,	
  3)	
  as	
  the	
  following:	
  i) Where	
  the	
  Province	
  intends	
  to	
  undertake	
  a	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  process	
  in	
  a	
  designated	
  geographic	
  area,	
  the	
  Province	
  will	
  work	
  with	
  First	
  Nations	
  to	
  define	
  principles,	
  anticipated	
  scope	
  and	
  outcomes	
  of	
  the	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  process.	
  ii) Land	
  use	
  planning	
  recommendations	
  will	
  be	
  developed	
  in	
  an	
  inclusive	
  planning	
  forum	
  in	
  which	
  First	
  Nation(s),	
  British	
  Columbia,	
  communities,	
  [and]	
  stakeholders	
  are	
  all	
  participants.	
  The	
  inclusive	
  planning	
  forum	
  will	
  operate	
  on	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  shared	
  decision	
  making	
  with	
  the	
  objectives	
  that	
  all	
  participants	
  will	
  commit	
  to	
  seek	
  a	
  consensus	
  on	
  land	
  use	
  recommendations.	
  	
  iii) The	
  First	
  Nation(s)	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  their	
  land	
  use	
  plans	
  will	
  be	
  guided	
  by	
  the	
  Ecosystem	
  Based	
  Management	
  Framework	
  and	
  will	
  also	
  use	
  and	
  support	
  the	
  Information	
  Body.7	
  	
  iv) British	
  Columbia	
  will	
  also	
  be	
  guided	
  by	
  the	
  Ecosystem	
  Based	
  Management	
  Framework	
  and	
  will	
  use	
  and	
  support	
  the	
  Information	
  Body	
  for	
  future	
  land	
  use	
  plans	
  covered	
  by	
  this	
  agreement.	
  	
  v) Where	
  a	
  First	
  Nation(s)	
  cannot	
  agree	
  to	
  a	
  recommendation(s)	
  from	
  the	
  inclusive	
  planning	
  forum,	
  a	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  process	
  will	
  be	
  established	
  to	
  attempt	
  to	
  resolve	
  the	
  outstanding	
  matter(s)	
  directly	
  with	
  the	
  Province	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia.	
  vi) Land	
  use	
  planning	
  does	
  not	
  change	
  the	
  jurisdiction	
  and	
  authorities	
  of	
  Parties.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  7	
  The	
  agreement	
  establishes	
  that	
  this	
  Information	
  Body	
  would	
  take	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  the	
  Coast	
  Information	
  Team,	
  elaborated	
  upon	
  under	
  the	
  forth	
  central	
  principle	
  in	
  this	
  sub-­‐section.	
   	
   36	
   Second,	
  it	
  established	
  a	
  commitment	
  to	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management	
  (EBM)	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  balance	
  of	
  both	
  ecological	
  integrity	
  and	
  human	
  well-­‐being,	
  defined	
  in	
  the	
  agreement	
  as	
  follows:	
  “Ecosystem	
  based	
  management	
  is	
  a	
  strategic	
  approach	
  to	
  managing	
  human	
  activities	
  that	
  seeks	
  to	
  ensure	
  the	
  coexistence	
  of	
  healthy,	
  fully	
  functioning	
  ecosystems	
  and	
  human	
  communities.	
  The	
  intent	
  is	
  to	
  maintain	
  those	
  spatial	
  and	
  temporal	
  characteristics	
  and	
  processes	
  of	
  whole	
  ecosystems	
  such	
  that	
  component	
  species	
  and	
  human	
  social,	
  economic	
  and	
  cultural	
  activities	
  can	
  be	
  sustained”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2001,	
  Appendix	
  I).	
  EBM	
  moves	
  beyond	
  conventional	
  forestry.	
  As	
  Smith	
  and	
  Sterritt	
  (2007,	
  6)	
  explain:	
  “This	
  approach	
  is	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  recognition	
  that	
  healthy,	
  functioning	
  ecosystems	
  form	
  the	
  basis	
  for	
  sustaining	
  communities,	
  economies	
  and	
  cultures.	
  Rather	
  than	
  focusing	
  on	
  what	
  resources	
  to	
  extract,	
  [EBM]	
  focuses	
  first	
  on	
  the	
  values	
  that	
  must	
  be	
  maintained	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  sustain	
  healthy	
  ecosystems.”	
  Ecosystem-­‐based	
  management	
  has	
  emerged	
  around	
  the	
  globe	
  in	
  the	
  past	
  couple	
  of	
  decades	
  as	
  a	
  new	
  paradigm	
  in	
  resource	
  management	
  (Price,	
  Roburn,	
  and	
  MacKinnon	
  2009),	
  but	
  it	
  must	
  be	
  adapted	
  to	
  local	
  conditions	
  and	
  considerations.	
  The	
  General	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  includes	
  a	
  set	
  of	
  principles	
  to	
  guide	
  EBM	
  locally,	
  including	
  overarching	
  principles,	
  recognition	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  rights	
  and	
  title,	
  ecological	
  and	
  socio-­‐economic	
  principles,	
  and	
  principles	
  of	
  adaptive	
  management.	
  	
  Third,	
  because	
  the	
  region’s	
  economy	
  centred	
  heavily	
  on	
  the	
  forest	
  timber	
  industry,	
  an	
  EBM	
  framework	
  was	
  going	
  to	
  have	
  to	
  include	
  a	
  mechanism	
  to	
  encourage	
  economic	
  diversification.	
  First	
  Nations,	
  furthermore,	
  wanted	
  support	
  from	
  the	
  Province	
  to	
  “identify	
  opportunities	
  and	
  assist	
  to	
  develop	
  measures	
  to	
  facilitate	
  First	
  Nation	
  involvement	
  in	
  forestry	
  economic	
  development	
  initiatives”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2001,	
  sec.4[i]).	
  Spearheaded	
  by	
  the	
  environmental	
  groups,	
  the	
  parties	
  subsequently	
  agreed	
  to	
  establish	
  the	
  $120	
  million	
  Coast	
  Opportunities	
  Fund	
  in	
  an	
  effort	
  to	
  encourage	
  this	
  diversification,	
  including	
  funding	
  based	
  directly	
  on	
  conservation	
  (Smith	
  and	
  Sterritt	
  2007;	
  Page	
  2010).	
  	
   	
   37	
   Fourth,	
  all	
  parties	
  agreed	
  to	
  establish	
  an	
  independent	
  multidisciplinary	
  scientific	
  body	
  “dedicated	
  to	
  the	
  provision	
  of	
  relevant	
  ecological,	
  socio-­‐economic,	
  technical,	
  traditional	
  and	
  local	
  information”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2001,	
  Appendix	
  II),	
  thus	
  establishing	
  the	
  Coast	
  Information	
  Team	
  to	
  inform	
  the	
  process	
  (this	
  is	
  the	
  “Information	
  Body”	
  noted	
  in	
  the	
  agreement).	
  Finally,	
  the	
  moratorium	
  on	
  logging	
  in	
  highly	
  valued	
  valleys	
  continued	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  minimize	
  conflict	
  during	
  the	
  planning	
  process.	
  	
  	
  To	
  facilitate	
  First	
  Nations’	
  involvement	
  across	
  the	
  region,	
  the	
  Province	
  also	
  established	
  the	
  “Enabling	
  Process”	
  for	
  Central	
  Coast	
  Land	
  and	
  Coastal	
  Resource	
  Management	
  Plan	
  with	
  Kwakiult	
  Discrict	
  Council,	
  Musgamagw	
  Tsawataineuk	
  Tribal	
  Council,	
  and	
  Tlowitsis	
  Nation	
  (was	
  KDC/MTT/TN,	
  	
  then	
  KNT,	
  and	
  now	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council	
  with	
  subsequent	
  membership	
  changes)	
  (CC-­‐LRMP	
  Table	
  2004;	
  Cullen	
  2006),	
  and	
  the	
  Tsimshian	
  Nation	
   Tri-­partite	
  Accord	
  on	
  Lands	
  and	
  Resources	
  with	
  the	
  Tsimshian	
  First	
  Nations	
  (NC-­‐LRMP	
  Table	
  2005).	
  A	
  number	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  are	
  also	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  Tsimshian.	
  The	
  sometimes	
  overlapping	
  traditional	
  territories	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  span	
  almost	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  and	
  Central	
  Coast	
  planning	
  areas,	
  and	
  the	
  Tsimshain	
  First	
  Nation	
  territories,	
  including	
  its	
  members	
  in	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  span	
  the	
  North	
  Coast	
  and	
  continue	
  east	
  of	
  the	
  planning	
  boundaries.	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council	
  territories	
  do	
  not	
  overlap	
  with	
  these,	
  and	
  span	
  the	
  most	
  southern	
  portions	
  of	
  the	
  area,	
  continuing	
  outside	
  the	
  planning	
  boundaries	
  onto	
  Vancouver	
  Island.8	
  	
  	
  	
   4.3.2 The LRMPs and 2006 Land Use Planning Agreements 	
  The	
  2001	
  General	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  characterized	
  the	
  initial	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  framework	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  and	
  the	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  8	
  This	
  is	
  deduced	
  from	
  the	
  traditional	
  territory	
  maps	
  included	
  in	
  subsequent	
  agreements,	
  particularly	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements	
  established	
  in	
  2006-­‐2007,	
  the	
  2006	
  KNT	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreement-­in-­Principle	
  and	
  the	
  2009	
   Nanwakolas/British	
  Columbia	
  Framework	
  Agreement.	
   	
   38	
   foundation	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management	
  for	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest.	
  These	
  principles	
  required	
  further	
  refining	
  through	
  ongoing	
  negotiations,	
  beginning	
  with	
  the	
  reformed	
  Central	
  and	
  North	
  Coast	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Management	
  Plan	
  (LRMP)	
  tables.	
  Unlike	
  other	
  areas	
  of	
  the	
  province,	
  the	
  General	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  specified	
  that	
  the	
  LRMPs	
  were	
  to	
  be	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  principles	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management,	
  namely	
  ecological	
  integrity,	
  human	
  well-­‐being,	
  and	
  adaptive	
  management	
  	
  The	
  LRMP	
  tables	
  included	
  representatives	
  from	
  the	
  major	
  stakeholders,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  insight	
  from	
  First	
  Nations	
  about	
  their	
  own	
  land	
  use	
  planning.	
  The	
  final	
  LRMP	
  reports	
  note	
  that	
  First	
  Nations	
  elected	
  not	
  to	
  participate	
  in	
  their	
  consensus,	
  deferring	
  instead	
  to	
  the	
  subsequent	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations.	
  The	
  LRMP	
  tables	
  concluded	
  with	
  consensus	
  recommendations	
  that	
  were	
  presented	
  to	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  each	
  First	
  Nation	
  by	
  2004	
  and	
  2005.	
  The	
  LRMP	
  recommendations	
  were	
  approved	
  by	
  Cabinet	
  and	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations	
  were	
  initiated.	
  	
  	
  The	
  LRMPs,	
  and	
  the	
  supporting	
  work	
  of	
  the	
  Coast	
  Information	
  Team,	
  presented	
  a	
  comprehensive	
  initial	
  approach	
  to	
  EBM	
  on	
  the	
  coast.	
  Reflecting	
  the	
  input	
  of	
  the	
  full	
  range	
  of	
  direct	
  and	
  indirect	
  planning	
  members,	
  the	
  LRMPs	
  recommended	
  that	
  EBM	
  be	
  implemented	
  through	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  and	
  management	
  objectives,	
  to	
  be	
  established	
  through	
  provincial	
  legislation	
  and	
  regulations.	
  Land	
  use	
  zones	
  denote	
  where	
  various	
  activities	
  would	
  be	
  permitted	
  and	
  prohibited	
  –	
  in	
  other	
  words,	
  which	
  areas	
  would	
  be	
  protected,	
  and	
  where	
  logging	
  and	
  other	
  activities	
  would	
  be	
  permitted.	
  Three	
  land	
  use	
  zone	
  designations	
  were	
  recommended:	
  protected	
  areas	
  (later	
  Conservancies),	
  Biodiversity,	
  Mining	
  and	
  Tourism	
  Areas	
  (BMTAs),	
  and	
  EBM	
  operating	
  areas.	
  Management	
  objectives	
  are	
  explicit	
  goals	
  to	
  be	
  achieved	
  regarding	
  a	
  resource	
  value,	
  such	
  as	
  maintaining	
  the	
  natural	
  diversity	
  of	
  species,	
  genes,	
  and	
  habitat	
  elements	
  at	
  a	
  given	
  planning	
  scale,	
  and	
  include	
  targets	
  such	
  as	
  maintaining	
  a	
  percentage	
  of	
  the	
  natural	
  distribution	
  of	
  old	
  growth	
  forest	
  in	
  an	
  ecosystem	
  type	
  (known	
  as	
  the	
  range	
  of	
  natural	
  variability	
  -­‐	
  RONV)	
  (Coast	
  Information	
  Team	
  2004,	
  5).	
  When	
  established	
  through	
  provincial	
  legislation	
  and	
  regulations,	
  management	
  objectives	
  become	
  EBM	
   	
   39	
   operating	
  rules	
  that	
  go	
  beyond	
  the	
  province-­‐wide	
  legislation	
  governing	
  land	
  use,	
  and	
  would	
  be	
  applied	
  to	
  any	
  zone	
  where	
  resource	
  activity	
  is	
  permitted.	
  	
  Already	
  reflecting	
  adoption	
  of	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  spirit,	
  the	
  LRMP	
  tables	
  were	
  informed	
  by	
  First	
  Nations	
  representatives	
  and	
  considered	
  First	
  Nations	
  land	
  use	
  plans	
  in	
  their	
  formulation	
  (NC-­‐LRMP	
  Table	
  2005,	
  1.2.4).	
  But	
  their	
  final	
  reports	
  acknowledged	
  that	
  inconsistencies	
  still	
  remained	
  between	
  LRMP	
  land	
  use	
  recommendations	
  and	
  the	
  First	
  Nation	
  land	
  use	
  plans	
  (NC-­‐LRMP	
  Table	
  2005,	
  4.2.2),	
  so	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations	
  set	
  out	
  to	
  reconcile	
  these	
  differences.	
  Having	
  considered	
  First	
  Nation	
  input	
  during	
  the	
  LRMP	
  development,	
  and	
  by	
  being	
  informed	
  by	
  the	
  Coast	
  Information	
  Team,	
  the	
  outcomes	
  of	
  these	
  negotiations	
  did	
  not	
  differ	
  greatly	
  from	
  the	
  LRMP	
  recommendations.	
  Instead,	
  the	
  negotiations	
  resulted	
  in	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  agreements	
  that	
  largely	
  focused	
  on	
  governance	
  arrangements	
  and	
  implementation.9	
  	
  	
  The	
  outcome	
  of	
  the	
  negotiations	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  participating	
  First	
  Nations	
  was	
  announced	
  on	
  February	
  7,	
  2006,	
  commonly	
  referred	
  to	
  as	
  the	
  Coast	
  Land	
  Use	
  Plan.	
  The	
  announcement	
  consisted	
  of	
  several	
  components,	
  including	
  a	
  map	
  of	
  the	
  Central	
  Coast	
  and	
  North	
  Coast	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  (see	
  Figure	
  5.1	
  in	
  Chapter	
  5),	
  and	
  a	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  collective	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.10	
  The	
  announcement	
  included	
  a	
  commitment	
  to	
  fully	
  implement	
  EBM	
  by	
  March	
  31,	
  2009,	
  and	
  the	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  comprised	
  an	
  implementation	
  framework	
  indicating	
  milestones	
  toward	
  that	
  date	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2006b;	
  Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2006a,	
  Schedule	
  A).	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  individual	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nation	
  were	
  also	
  finalized	
  shortly	
  after	
  the	
  February	
  announcement.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  9	
  Barry	
  (2010)	
  finds	
  the	
  same	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  the	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council.	
  	
  10	
  Government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations	
  also	
  yielded	
  the	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
   Agreement-­in-­Principle	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  KNT	
  First	
  Nations	
  (now	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council),	
  signed	
  March	
  27,	
  2006.	
  	
   	
   40	
   One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  explained	
  the	
  reasoning	
  behind	
  establishing	
  both	
  the	
  collective	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Protocol	
  Agreement,	
  and	
  the	
  series	
  of	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  individual	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations:	
  while	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  could	
  reflect	
  the	
  specific	
  interests	
  of	
  individual	
  nations,	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management	
  and	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  governance	
  arrangement	
  would	
  only	
  be	
  agreed	
  to	
  by	
  the	
  Province	
  at	
  the	
  regional	
  level.	
  The	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  came	
  to	
  agree	
  that	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  could	
  be	
  negotiated	
  with	
  individual	
  nations,	
  and	
  that	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  would	
  be	
  negotiated	
  regionally	
  by	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.11	
  Map-­‐based	
  conversations	
  can	
  be	
  brought	
  to	
  the	
  communities	
  for	
  feedback	
  and	
  consensus,	
  and	
  the	
  practice	
  of	
  these	
  communities	
  is	
  to	
  have	
  open	
  involvement	
  by	
  members.	
  EBM,	
  on	
  the	
  other	
  hand,	
  involves	
  highly	
  technical	
  planning	
  that	
  does	
  not	
  easily	
  translate	
  to	
  direct	
  community	
  input	
  across	
  over	
  two	
  dozen	
  communities.	
  	
  	
  A	
  remaining	
  challenge	
  in	
  negotiating	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  was	
  the	
  overlapping	
  assertions	
  to	
  territory	
  among	
  the	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.	
  While	
  these	
  nations	
  presently	
  operate	
  as	
  an	
  alliance	
  on	
  strategic	
  issues,	
  they	
  do	
  not	
  wholly	
  agree	
  with	
  the	
  conflicting	
  assertions	
  of	
  territory,	
  nor	
  do	
  they	
  openly	
  share	
  internal	
  cultural	
  information	
  with	
  their	
  neighbours.	
  Mabee	
  and	
  Hoberg	
  (2004)	
  found	
  similar	
  challenges	
  in	
  Clayoquot	
  Sound	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia,	
  where	
  planners	
  were	
  working	
  to	
  map	
  culturally	
  significant	
  areas.	
  The	
  same	
  government	
  interviewee	
  explains	
  that	
  in	
  establishing	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  in	
  areas	
  of	
  overlapping	
  territorial	
  assertions,	
  the	
  Province	
  overcame	
  this	
  by	
  working	
  on	
  common	
  maps	
  for	
  those	
  common	
  areas	
  and	
  leaving	
  it	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  nations	
  if	
  they	
  wanted	
  to	
  engage	
  with	
  each	
  other	
  on	
  those	
  zones.	
  	
  The	
  2006	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Protocol	
  Agreement,	
  then,	
  addresses	
  regional	
  governance	
  and	
  EBM	
  land	
  use	
  planning.	
  To	
  that	
  end,	
  it	
  establishes	
  a	
  governance	
  forum	
  (the	
  ‘Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Forum’)	
  “through	
  which	
  the	
  senior	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  11	
  This	
  government	
  interviewee	
  says	
  that	
  the	
  Province	
  was	
  still	
  open	
  to	
  negotiating	
  what	
  amounted	
  to	
  a	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreement	
  with	
  the	
  those	
  nations	
  who	
  were	
  not	
  part	
  of	
  either	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  or	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council.	
   	
   41	
   representatives	
  of	
  the	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  the	
  Minister	
  or	
  designates	
  will	
  on	
  either	
  Party’s	
  request	
  meet	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  share	
  information	
  and	
  work	
  collaboratively	
  to	
  implement	
  the	
  [Central	
  and	
  North	
  Coast	
  LRMPs]	
  within	
  the	
  traditional	
  territor[ies]	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2006a,	
  3).	
  The	
  agreement	
  also	
  denotes	
  refined	
  EBM	
  management	
  objectives	
  and	
  provides	
  that	
  the	
  Province	
  will	
  implement	
  the	
  management	
  objectives	
  through	
  legislation	
  and	
  policy.	
  	
  The	
  agreement	
  is	
  not	
  signed	
  by	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  organization,	
  but	
  by	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  signatory	
  nations,	
  along	
  with	
  the	
  Province.	
  	
  The	
  series	
  of	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements,	
  on	
  the	
  other	
  hand,	
  delineate	
  the	
  purpose	
  and	
  location	
  of	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  in	
  each	
  nation’s	
  territory,	
  and	
  outline	
  that	
  nation’s	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  governance	
  forum.	
  These	
  agreements	
  also	
  document	
  the	
  evolution	
  of	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relations	
  with	
  the	
  individual	
  nation	
  to	
  that	
  point,	
  and	
  include	
  ongoing	
  assertions	
  of	
  sovereignty,	
  jurisdiction,	
  and	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  by	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  the	
  Province.	
  On	
  the	
  whole,	
  the	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements	
  are	
  almost	
  identical	
  except	
  for	
  the	
  associated	
  maps.	
  	
  	
   4.3.3 The 2009 Reconciliation Protocol 	
  While	
  the	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  and	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  were	
  being	
  negotiated,	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  events	
  taking	
  place	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia	
  spurred	
  a	
  further	
  evolution	
  of	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  on	
  the	
  coast	
  and	
  resulted	
  in	
  another	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  agreement	
  in	
  2009.	
  Recall	
  from	
  the	
  introduction	
  in	
  Chapter	
  1	
  that	
  the	
  Province	
  had	
  announced	
  a	
  ‘New	
  Relationship’	
  in	
  2005	
  with	
  British	
  Columbia’s	
  First	
  Nations	
  that	
  would	
  include	
  processes	
  and	
  institutions	
  for	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making.	
  In	
  2009,	
  the	
  Province’s	
  attempt	
  to	
  formalize	
  this	
  vision	
  through	
  the	
  Recognition	
  and	
  Reconciliation	
   Act	
  failed	
  in	
  part	
  because	
  of	
  opposition	
  by	
  many	
  First	
  Nations,	
  most	
  prominently	
  vocalized	
  by	
  the	
  All	
  Chiefs	
  Assembly,	
  representing	
  the	
  First	
  Nations	
  Summit,	
  the	
  Union	
  of	
  BC	
  Indian	
  Chiefs,	
  and	
  the	
  BC	
  Assembly	
  of	
  First	
  Nations	
  (All	
  Chiefs	
  Assembly	
  2009).	
  A	
   	
   42	
   number	
  of	
  government	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nation	
  interviewees	
  explain	
  that	
  this	
  setback,	
  along	
  with	
  the	
  very	
  slow	
  progress	
  in	
  treaty	
  settlements	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia,	
  helped	
  spur	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol,	
  signed	
  by	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  in	
  December	
  2009.12	
  	
  The	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  further	
  extends	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  decision-­‐making	
  between	
  these	
  Parties	
  -­‐	
  while	
  the	
  2006	
  agreements	
  addressed	
  decisions	
  around	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  and	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules,	
  the	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  includes	
  an	
  Engagement	
  Framework	
  that	
  outlines	
  processes	
  for	
  engagement	
  and	
  making	
  decisions	
  regarding	
  the	
  approval	
  of	
  an	
  extensive	
  range	
  of	
  ongoing	
  operational	
  plans	
  and	
  activities.	
  A	
  ‘Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Decision’,	
  as	
  these	
  are	
  called	
  in	
  the	
  agreement,	
  are	
  defined	
  in	
  the	
  agreement	
  as:	
  “an	
  administrative	
  or	
  operational	
  decision,	
  or	
  the	
  approval	
  or	
  renewal	
  of	
  a	
  tenure,	
  permit,	
  or	
  other	
  authorizations”	
  (Schedule	
  B,	
  s.1.1).	
  	
  Operational	
  plans,	
  interpreted	
  broadly	
  to	
  include	
  other	
  authorizations,	
  are	
  plans	
  for	
  forest	
  and	
  range	
  practices	
  for	
  specific	
  pieces	
  of	
  land	
  that,	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia,	
  are	
  generally	
  prepared	
  by	
  licensees	
  (West	
  Coast	
  Environmental	
  Law	
  2001,	
  3–1).	
  One	
  example	
  of	
  an	
  operational	
  plan	
  that	
  would	
  trigger	
  the	
  application	
  of	
  this	
  agreement	
  is	
  the	
  Forest	
  Stewardship	
  Plan,	
  the	
  highest-­‐level	
  operational	
  plan	
  required	
  under	
  provincial	
  law	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia.	
  Forest	
  Stewardship	
  Plans	
  explain	
  how	
  the	
  tenure	
  holder	
  intends	
  to	
  address	
  all	
  land	
  use	
  regulations	
  applicable	
  to	
  that	
  area,	
  including	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules,	
  and	
  all	
  major	
  tenure	
  holders	
  must	
  have	
  an	
  approved	
  Forest	
  Stewardship	
  Plan	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  operate	
  on	
  the	
  land	
  base.	
  Plans	
  are	
  generally	
  approved	
  for	
  five	
  year	
  periods	
  (BC	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Forests	
  2004).	
  	
  The	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  establishes	
  a	
  specific	
  Engagement	
  Framework	
  as	
  a	
  mechanism	
  for	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  that	
  applies	
  to	
  all	
  land	
  use	
  zones.	
  The	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  12	
  The	
  Nuxalk	
  Nation	
  became	
  a	
  signatory	
  in	
  December	
  2010,	
  and	
  the	
  Haisla	
  Nation	
  are	
  not	
  signatory	
  to	
  the	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  Engagement	
  Framework,	
  Schedule	
  B.	
  The	
  agreement	
  also	
  includes	
  schedules	
  dedicated	
  to	
  carbon	
  offsets	
  and	
  other	
  economic	
  opportunities	
  and	
  strategies	
  “that	
  enable	
  the	
  Nations	
  and	
  First	
  Nations	
  to	
  make	
  progress	
  toward	
  socioeconomic	
  objectives”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2009,	
  Preamble).	
   	
   43	
   framework	
  is	
  based	
  on	
  assigning	
  an	
  impact	
  level	
  to	
  any	
  potential	
  decision	
  that	
  then	
  indicates	
  the	
  appropriate	
  process	
  of	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nation	
  engagement.	
  Since	
  the	
  agreement	
  was	
  signed	
  in	
  2009,	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  been	
  collaborating	
  on	
  a	
  Guidebook	
  that	
  elaborates	
  on	
  the	
  engagement	
  process	
  and	
  role	
  of	
  applicants.	
  The	
  Guidebook	
  is	
  expected	
  to	
  be	
  publically	
  available,	
  but	
  has	
  yet	
  to	
  be	
  finalized	
  by	
  the	
  parties	
  as	
  of	
  the	
  time	
  of	
  writing,	
  fall	
  2011.	
  	
  The	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  also	
  includes	
  schedules	
  relating	
  to	
  carbon	
  offsets,	
  revenue	
  sharing	
  and	
  other	
  economic	
  measures	
  and	
  strategies.	
  	
  	
  Table	
  4.1	
  summarizes	
  the	
  Parties	
  to,	
  and	
  purposes	
  of,	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  agreements,	
  as	
  they	
  relate	
  to	
  the	
  three	
  decision	
  functions	
  under	
  investigation.	
  The	
  outcome	
  of	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations	
  on	
  the	
  three	
  decision	
  functions	
  are	
  the	
  focus	
  of	
  Chapter	
  5,	
  which	
  provides	
  a	
  more	
  in	
  depth	
  look	
  at	
  the	
  examples	
  of	
  each	
  decision	
  function	
  presented	
  in	
  this	
  section.	
  Having	
  introduced	
  the	
  agreements	
  and	
  how	
  they	
  encompass	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  three	
  decision	
  functions,	
  the	
  remainder	
  of	
  this	
  chapter	
  investigates	
  the	
  relative	
  authority	
  of	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  with	
  regard	
  to	
  these	
  decisions.	
  	
   	
   44	
   	
   Table	
  4.1	
  	
  	
  	
  Summary	
  of	
  Crown-­First	
  Nations	
  Agreements,	
  Parties	
  and	
  Decision	
  Functions	
   Agreement	
   Parties	
   Decision	
  Function	
  General	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  	
  (2001)	
   Coastal	
  First	
  Nations:	
  	
  -­‐Gitga’at	
  First	
  Nation	
  	
  -­‐Haida	
  Nation	
  	
  -­‐Haisla	
  Nation	
  	
  -­‐Heiltsuk	
  Nation	
  -­‐Kitasoo/Xaixais	
  First	
  Nation	
  	
  -­‐Metlakatla	
  First	
  Nation	
  -­‐Old	
  Massett	
  Village	
  Council	
  -­‐Skidegate	
  Band	
  Council	
  	
  and	
  Province	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
   Establishes	
   principles	
  of	
   government-­to-­ government	
  and	
   goals	
  for	
  EBM	
  	
   Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements	
  (2006)	
   Individual	
  agreements	
  between	
  each	
  of	
  these	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  members:	
  	
  -­‐Gitga’at	
  First	
  Nation	
  -­‐Haisla	
  Nation	
  -­‐Heiltsuk	
  Nation	
  -­‐Kitasoo/Xaixais	
  First	
  Nation	
  	
  -­‐Metlakatla	
  First	
  Nation	
  	
  -­‐Wuikinuxv	
  First	
  Nation	
  -­‐Nuxalk	
  Nation,	
  although	
  not	
  a	
  member	
  of	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  at	
  the	
  time	
  -­‐Haida	
  Nation	
  negotiated	
  separate	
  agreements	
  	
  and	
  Province	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  	
   Land	
  use	
  zones	
  	
  	
   e.g.	
  Protected,	
   Biodiversity,	
  and	
   Operating	
  Areas	
   Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  (2006)	
   Coastal	
  first	
  Nations	
  	
  -­‐Gitga'at	
  First	
  Nation	
  	
  -­‐Haisla	
  Nation	
  -­‐Heiltsuk	
  Nation	
  	
  -­‐Kitasoo/Xaixais	
  First	
  Nation	
  	
  -­‐Metlakatla	
  First	
  Nation	
  	
  -­‐Wuikinuxv	
  First	
  Nation	
  	
  and	
  Province	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
   EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  	
   e.g.	
  Range	
  of	
   natural	
  variability	
   of	
  old	
  growth	
  forest	
   Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  (2009)	
   Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  -­‐Wuikinuxv	
  Nation	
  	
  -­‐Metlakatla	
  First	
  Nation	
  	
  -­‐Kitasoo	
  Indian	
  Band	
  	
  -­‐Heiltsuk	
  Nation	
  	
  -­‐Haisla	
  Nation	
  (not	
  signatory	
  to	
  Schedule	
  B)	
  -­‐Gitga’at	
  First	
  Nation	
  -­‐Nuxalk	
  Nation	
  (as	
  of	
  2010)	
  -­‐Haida	
  Nation	
  signed	
  a	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  	
  separate	
  from	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  	
  and	
  Province	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
   Approval	
  of	
  operational	
  plans	
  	
   e.g.	
  Forest	
   Stewardship	
  Plans	
  	
   	
   	
   45	
   	
   4.4 Relative Authority 	
  The	
  suite	
  of	
  agreements	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  developed	
  between	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  –	
  the	
  founding	
  General	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  in	
  2001,	
  the	
  2006	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  and	
  set	
  of	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements,	
  and	
  the	
  2009	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  –	
  together	
  establish	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  mechanisms	
  for	
  making	
  the	
  three	
  types	
  of	
  decisions	
  under	
  investigation	
  in	
  this	
  thesis.	
  There	
  are	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  elements	
  in	
  these	
  agreements	
  that	
  speak	
  about	
  the	
  assertions	
  to	
  authority,	
  and	
  give	
  the	
  impression	
  of	
  an	
  elevated	
  legal	
  standing	
  for	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.	
  In	
  the	
  following,	
  each	
  of	
  these	
  elements	
  is	
  considered	
  while	
  answering	
  the	
  core	
  question	
  of	
  whether	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  acquired	
  a	
  share	
  of	
  governmental	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority.	
  This	
  section	
  reveals	
  that	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  relationship	
  is	
  one	
  of	
  co-­‐management,	
  dictated	
  by	
  the	
  legal	
  context	
  of	
  the	
  agreements.	
  Despite	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  authority	
  remains	
  rested	
  in	
  the	
  Crown,	
  according	
  to	
  Canadian	
  law,	
  what	
  emerges	
  unanimously	
  from	
  interviewees	
  is	
  that,	
  informally,	
  the	
  Province	
  wants	
  to	
  make	
  decisions	
  with	
  agreement	
  from	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.	
  Although	
  a	
  member	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  the	
  Haida	
  Nation	
  has	
  established	
  their	
  agreements	
  separately,	
  one	
  of	
  which	
  is	
  considered	
  here	
  for	
  comparison	
  to	
  help	
  clarify	
  the	
  character	
  of	
  the	
  authority	
  relationships	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest.	
  The	
  Crown-­‐Haida	
  Nation	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationship	
  can	
  be	
  classified	
  as	
  co-­‐jurisdictional,	
  and	
  will	
  certainly	
  stand	
  as	
  a	
  case	
  to	
  be	
  monitored.	
  	
  This	
  section	
  employs	
  the	
  relative	
  authority	
  framework	
  established	
  in	
  Chapter	
  2,	
  and	
  is	
  supplemented	
  by	
  the	
  insight	
  of	
  senior	
  level	
  negotiators	
  and	
  related	
  legal	
  expertise	
  obtained	
  through	
  interviews.	
  This	
  section	
  also	
  gives	
  consideration	
  of	
  the	
  first	
  known	
  court	
  ruling	
  on	
  any	
  element	
  of	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationships	
  forged	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest.	
  Finally,	
  it	
  offers	
  additional	
  insight	
  into	
  the	
  functioning	
  of	
  the	
  governance	
  forums	
  established,	
  as	
  revealed	
  by	
  interviewees.	
  	
  	
   	
   46	
   4.4.1 Crown-Coastal First Nations Agreements – Co-management 	
  In	
  the	
  Preambles	
  to	
  the	
  individual	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements,	
  the	
  2006	
  agreements	
  directly	
  between	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  the	
  individual	
  First	
  Nations,	
  each	
  Party	
  asserts	
  authority.	
  Specifically,	
  the	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements	
  outline	
  that	
  the	
  nations	
  assert	
  to	
  their	
  traditional	
  territories	
  Aboriginal	
  rights,	
  including	
  title	
  and	
  other	
  interests,	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  over	
  land	
  use	
  decisions,	
  sovereignty,	
  jurisdiction,	
  and	
  that	
  they	
  have	
  never	
  ceded,	
  sold,	
  or	
  surrendered	
  their	
  traditional	
  territory	
  to	
  the	
  Crown.	
  The	
  Crown	
  too	
  asserts	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  legislative	
  jurisdiction	
  (see	
  for	
  example	
  Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Gitga’at	
  First	
  Nation	
  2006,	
  Preamble).	
  All	
  interviewees	
  agree	
  that	
  these	
  assertions	
  simply	
  reflected	
  the	
  Parties	
  agreeing	
  to	
  disagree	
  so	
  that	
  negotiations	
  could	
  move	
  forward.	
  In	
  the	
  preamble	
  to	
  the	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol,	
  the	
  Province	
  goes	
  further	
  and	
  “acknowledges”	
  Aboriginal	
  title,	
  rights	
  and	
  interests	
  “within”	
  their	
  traditional	
  territories	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2009,	
  Preamble),	
  but	
  one	
  legal	
  expert	
  familiar	
  with	
  the	
  agreements	
  finds	
  these	
  both	
  to	
  be	
  insubstantial	
  in	
  law,	
  and	
  explains	
  that	
  preambles	
  carry	
  no	
  legal	
  force	
  beyond	
  aiding	
  in	
  interpretation	
  (see	
  also	
  Gall	
  1995).	
  	
  	
  A	
  number	
  of	
  other	
  passages	
  in	
  these	
  agreements	
  speak	
  to	
  authority.	
  Each	
  agreement	
  includes	
  the	
  provision	
  that	
  it	
  does	
  not	
  change	
  or	
  affect	
  the	
  positions	
  either	
  Party	
  has	
  regarding	
  their	
  assertions	
  to	
  jurisdiction	
  and	
  authority,	
  nor	
  limit,	
  affirm,	
  or	
  deny	
  the	
  other	
  party’s	
  assertions.13	
  The	
  dispute	
  resolution	
  mechanisms	
  of	
  the	
  agreements	
  include	
  numerous	
  steps	
  that	
  the	
  Parties	
  “may”	
  take	
  to	
  attempt	
  to	
  reach	
  consensus,	
  but	
  never	
  indicate	
  a	
  final	
  authority	
  in	
  the	
  event	
  of	
  a	
  continuing	
  impasse.14	
  Each	
  of	
  the	
  agreements	
  furthermore	
  allows	
  for	
  their	
  unilateral	
  termination	
  of	
  the	
  agreement	
  by	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  13	
  Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Protocol	
  (sec.12.4);	
  SLUPAs	
  (sec.14.10);	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  (sec.15.1).	
  14	
  Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Protocol	
  (sec.7);	
  SLUPAs	
  (sec.12);	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  (Schedule	
  B,	
  sec.6).	
   	
   47	
   either	
  Party	
  with	
  60	
  days	
  notice	
  for	
  the	
  2006	
  agreements,	
  and	
  45	
  days	
  notice	
  for	
  the	
  2009	
  agreement.15	
  	
  	
  Ultimately,	
  however,	
  these	
  agreements	
  are	
  contracts	
  about	
  engagement	
  and	
  process,	
  not	
  about	
  authority.	
  Interviewees	
  universally	
  agree	
  that	
  despite	
  the	
  passages	
  that	
  reference	
  authority,	
  these	
  agreements	
  do	
  not	
  have	
  the	
  force	
  of	
  law	
  to	
  alter	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  system,	
  and	
  were	
  never	
  intended	
  to	
  do	
  so.	
  As	
  established	
  in	
  Chapter	
  2,	
  Canadian	
  administrative	
  law	
  requires	
  an	
  Act	
  of	
  the	
  Legislature	
  that	
  specifically	
  denoted	
  a	
  First	
  Nation	
  as	
  a	
  delegate	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  transfer	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority.	
  The	
  interviewees	
  universally	
  understood	
  that	
  in	
  these	
  agreements,	
  the	
  Crown’s	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐maker	
  maintains	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  decisions,	
  despite	
  recommendations	
  that	
  are	
  delivered	
  through	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement.	
  The	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  can	
  neither	
  overturn	
  that	
  decision,	
  nor	
  enact	
  their	
  own	
  unilaterally,	
  and	
  so	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  relationship	
  is	
  classified	
  as	
  one	
  of	
  co-­‐management	
  using	
  the	
  relative	
  authority	
  spectrum	
  introduced	
  in	
  Chapter	
  2.	
  	
  	
  	
  Both	
  legal	
  expert	
  interviewees	
  explain	
  that	
  a	
  treaty	
  could	
  of	
  course	
  also	
  alter	
  that	
  authority,	
  but	
  these	
  agreements	
  all	
  include	
  statements	
  that	
  they	
  are	
  not	
  treaties	
  within	
  the	
  meaning	
  of	
  sections	
  25	
  and	
  35	
  of	
  the	
  Constitution	
  Act,	
  1982.16	
  Interviewees	
  agree	
  that	
  the	
  present	
  land	
  use	
  zone	
  designations	
  could,	
  in	
  theory,	
  be	
  substantially	
  altered	
  through	
  a	
  treaty	
  agreement.	
  	
  	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  describes	
  these	
  passages	
  about	
  authority	
  as	
  plainly	
  indicating	
  that	
  “the	
  Province’s	
  legislation	
  is	
  still	
  going	
  to	
  prevail,	
  and	
  the	
  [statutory]	
  decision-­‐makers	
  are	
  going	
  to	
  operate	
  that	
  way.”	
  	
  Another	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewee	
  elaborates	
  that	
  when	
  there	
  is	
  an	
  impasse,	
  the	
  Crown	
  takes	
  the	
  position	
  that	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  15	
  Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Protocol	
  (sec.11);	
  SLUPAs	
  (sec.13);	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  (sec.14).	
  16	
  Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Protocol	
  (sec.12.1);	
  SLUPAs	
  (sec.14.8);	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  (sec.15.8).	
  	
   	
   48	
   they	
  are	
  the	
  ultimate	
  authority	
  on	
  the	
  land,	
  which	
  is	
  why,	
  for	
  example,	
  when	
  a	
  response	
  doesn’t	
  come	
  from	
  a	
  First	
  Nation	
  by	
  a	
  given	
  deadline,	
  the	
  Crown	
  makes	
  the	
  decision.	
  What	
  all	
  of	
  this	
  means	
  in	
  effect,	
  is	
  that	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nation	
  consensus	
  decisions	
  are	
  in	
  fact	
  recommendations	
  to	
  the	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐maker.	
  Despite	
  this,	
  the	
  implication	
  of	
  one	
  recent	
  British	
  Columbia	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  ruling	
  is	
  that	
  the	
  Province	
  cannot	
  make	
  unilateral	
  decisions	
  that	
  are	
  inconsistent	
  with	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  protocols,	
  where	
  such	
  agreements	
  have	
  been	
  established.	
  This	
  court	
  case	
  is	
  explored	
  in	
  Section	
  4.4.3.	
  	
  Despite	
  their	
  roles	
  as	
  senior-­‐level	
  negotiators,	
  interviewees	
  were	
  not	
  universally	
  confident	
  about	
  just	
  how	
  far	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  could	
  go	
  in	
  the	
  present	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  context.	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  explains:	
  	
  “I	
  am	
  not	
  quite	
  sure	
  how	
  it	
  all	
  lands	
  legally	
  and	
  constitutionally	
  through	
  the	
  courts.	
  So	
  one	
  good	
  alternative	
  we	
  have	
  found	
  is	
  to	
  share	
  that	
  decision-­‐making	
  responsibility	
  in	
  the	
  way	
  that	
  we’ve	
  done	
  on	
  the	
  coast.	
  Through	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  together,	
  we’re	
  joint	
  landlords	
  of	
  the	
  land,	
  that’s	
  the	
  way	
  we	
  think	
  of	
  it	
  –	
  we	
  share	
  the	
  stewardship	
  of	
  the	
  land	
  and	
  we	
  make	
  decisions	
  in	
  that	
  way.”	
  	
  One	
  legal	
  expert	
  explained	
  that	
  these	
  agreements	
  do	
  give	
  the	
  Province	
  a	
  sense	
  of	
  certainty	
  about	
  the	
  required	
  level	
  of	
  consultation,	
  and	
  remove	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  risk	
  and	
  process	
  of	
  determining	
  acceptable	
  consultation	
  and	
  accommodation	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  Haida	
  test.	
  Indeed,	
  in	
  the	
  Haida	
  ruling,	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  of	
  Canada	
  directed:	
  “It	
  is	
  open	
  to	
  governments	
  to	
  set	
  up	
  regulatory	
  schemes	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  procedural	
  requirements	
  appropriate	
  to	
  different	
  problems	
  at	
  different	
  stages,	
  thereby	
  strengthening	
  the	
  reconciliation	
  process	
  and	
  reducing	
  recourse	
  to	
  the	
  courts”	
  (Haida	
  Nation	
  v.	
  British	
   Columbia	
  (Minister	
  of	
  Forests),	
  2004	
  SCC	
  73	
  para	
  51).	
  The	
  ruling	
  concludes	
  that	
  policies	
  that	
  “direct	
  the	
  terms	
  of	
  provincial	
  ministries’	
  and	
  agencies’	
  operational	
  guidelines…may	
  guard	
  against	
  unstructured	
  discretion	
  and	
  provide	
  a	
  guide	
  for	
  decision-­‐makers”	
  (para	
  51).	
  This	
  legal	
  expert	
  interviewee	
  expressed	
  the	
  sense	
  that	
  the	
  direction	
  coming	
  from	
  the	
  highest	
  level	
  of	
  the	
  provincial	
  government	
  will	
  be,	
  to	
  some	
  extent,	
  driven	
  by	
  the	
  desire	
  to	
  manage	
  that	
  risk	
  through	
  formal	
  efforts	
  to	
  meet	
  consultation	
  and	
  accommodation	
  obligations.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
   49	
   4.4.2 Haida Gwaii Management Council – Co-jurisdiction 	
  The	
  character	
  of	
  the	
  authority	
  relationships	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  agreements	
  is	
  clarified	
  through	
  a	
  comparison	
  with	
  the	
  parallel	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  agreements	
  between	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  the	
  Haida	
  Nation.	
  The	
  Haida	
  Nation	
  has	
  been	
  a	
  member	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  since	
  its	
  inception,	
  but	
  they	
  have	
  negotiated	
  their	
  agreements	
  separately.	
  One	
  of	
  those	
  agreements	
  was	
  the	
  Kunst’aa	
  Guu	
  –	
  Kunst’aayah	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  Haida	
  Nation,	
  signed	
  in	
  December,	
  2009.	
  In	
  June	
  2010,	
  the	
  Haida	
  Gwaii	
  Reconciliation	
  Act,	
  SBC	
  2010,	
  c	
  17	
  (assented	
  to	
  June	
  3,	
  2010),	
  gave	
  effect	
  to	
  the	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  and	
  established	
  the	
  jointly	
  managed	
  Haida	
  Gwaii	
  Management	
  Council.	
  The	
  council	
  was	
  granted	
  “the	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  high-­‐level	
  decisions	
  in	
  key	
  strategic	
  areas	
  for	
  resource	
  management”	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  allowable	
  annual	
  cut	
  and	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  (BC	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  Relations	
  and	
  Reconciliation	
  and	
  Council	
  of	
  Haida	
  Nation	
  2011).	
  The	
  Province	
  and	
  Haida	
  Nation	
  announced	
  that,	
  following	
  the	
  passage	
  of	
  the	
  Act,	
  the	
  Haida	
  passed	
  a	
  stewardship	
  law	
  in	
  their	
  own	
  House	
  of	
  Assembly.	
  	
  	
  In	
  the	
  arrangement	
  created	
  by	
  the	
  Act,	
  the	
  Haida	
  Gwaii	
  Management	
  Council	
  consists	
  of	
  two	
  Haida	
  and	
  two	
  Provincial	
  representatives,	
  and	
  a	
  mutually	
  decided	
  upon	
  tie-­‐breaker.	
  A	
  decision	
  of	
  the	
  council	
  must	
  be	
  made	
  by	
  consensus	
  of	
  the	
  members,	
  but	
  failing	
  consensus,	
  by	
  a	
  majority	
  vote	
  of	
  those	
  members,	
  and	
  finally,	
  by	
  using	
  the	
  tie	
  breaker	
  if	
  necessary.	
  Both	
  Parties	
  recognize	
  the	
  decisions	
  of	
  the	
  Management	
  Council,	
  and	
  neither	
  the	
  Crown	
  nor	
  Haida	
  can	
  enact	
  a	
  decision	
  unilaterally.	
  These	
  provisions	
  meet	
  the	
  criteria	
  for	
  a	
  co-­‐jurisdictional	
  designation	
  established	
  in	
  Chapter	
  2.	
  	
  	
  But	
  the	
  definition	
  of	
  co-­‐jurisdiction	
  includes	
  further	
  consideration	
  of	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  body	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  context	
  –	
  how	
  it	
  was	
  enabled.	
  The	
  Haida	
  Gwaii	
  Management	
  Council	
  was	
  enabled	
  through	
  statute,	
  thereby	
  designating	
  the	
  body	
  as	
  the	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐makers	
  for	
  the	
  specific	
  decisions	
  set	
  out	
  in	
  the	
  Act.	
  One	
  legal	
  expert	
  interviewee	
  confirms	
  that	
  authority	
  in	
  the	
  council	
  is	
  further	
  indicated	
  by	
  the	
  absence	
  from	
  the	
  agreement	
  and	
  the	
  Act	
  of	
  the	
  common	
  provision	
  that	
  the	
  Minister	
  maintains	
   	
   50	
   statutory	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority.	
  Interviewees	
  understood	
  that	
  the	
  Management	
  Council	
  had	
  authority	
  over	
  the	
  decisions	
  assigned	
  to	
  it,	
  decreed	
  both	
  by	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  council	
  and	
  by	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  it	
  had	
  been	
  legislated,	
  and	
  that	
  neither	
  party	
  could	
  make	
  a	
  unilateral	
  decision.	
  However,	
  unlike	
  a	
  treaty	
  arrangement,	
  an	
  Act	
  can	
  be	
  rescinded	
  unilaterally	
  by	
  the	
  Crown	
  (Fitzgerald,	
  Wright,	
  and	
  Kazmierski	
  2010,	
  43),	
  which	
  may	
  restrict	
  the	
  extent	
  of	
  the	
  Haida	
  Gwaii	
  Management	
  Council’s	
  authority	
  –	
  something	
  that	
  would	
  need	
  to	
  be	
  clarified	
  through	
  the	
  courts	
  if	
  it	
  came	
  to	
  that.	
  The	
  evidence	
  suggests	
  that	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  context,	
  the	
  Haida	
  Gawii	
  Management	
  Council	
  is	
  indeed	
  a	
  co-­‐jurisdictional	
  body	
  with	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority.	
  	
  	
  Nonetheless,	
  until	
  the	
  Haida	
  Gwaii	
  Reconciliation	
  Act,	
  the	
  “high	
  watermark”	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia	
  had	
  been	
  co-­‐management	
  bodies	
  that	
  make	
  recommendations	
  to	
  the	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐maker	
  (typically	
  a	
  Minister	
  or	
  the	
  Cabinet),	
  who	
  can	
  either	
  accept	
  or	
  refuse	
  them.	
  One	
  legal	
  expert	
  interviewee	
  describes	
  the	
  Haida	
  Gwaii	
  Management	
  Council	
  as	
  a	
  “meaningful	
  change	
  in	
  government	
  policy”	
  that	
  raises	
  that	
  bar.	
  Indeed,	
  while	
  the	
  Crown	
  may	
  technically	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  rescind	
  the	
  Act,	
  the	
  decisions	
  of	
  the	
  management	
  council	
  are	
  legally	
  binding	
  decisions.	
  	
  This	
  unique	
  elevation	
  to	
  co-­‐jurisdictional	
  status	
  begs	
  the	
  question	
  then	
  of	
  why	
  Haida	
  was	
  able	
  to	
  negotiate	
  such	
  a	
  model	
  while	
  the	
  rest	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  did	
  not.	
  Again,	
  interviewees	
  are	
  in	
  agreement	
  –	
  the	
  Haida	
  was	
  able	
  to	
  negotiate	
  a	
  co-­‐jurisdictional	
  governance	
  arrangement	
  because	
  they	
  have	
  a	
  high	
  strength	
  of	
  claim	
  to	
  rights	
  and	
  title,	
  and	
  very	
  importantly,	
  they	
  do	
  not	
  have	
  competing	
  claims	
  to	
  their	
  territory,	
  as	
  the	
  rest	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  do.	
  Each	
  of	
  the	
  individual	
  2006	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements	
  includes	
  a	
  map	
  of	
  that	
  nation’s	
  asserted	
  traditional	
  territory,	
  illustrating	
  that	
  much	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations’	
  traditional	
  territories	
  are	
  under	
  claim	
  by	
  multiple	
  nations.	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  explains	
  that	
  this	
  challenge	
  stems	
  largely	
  from	
  there	
  being	
  no	
  agreed-­‐upon	
  standard	
  for	
  determining	
  the	
  extent	
  of	
  a	
  First	
  Nation’s	
  territory.	
  Two	
  government	
  and	
  legal	
  expert	
  interviewees	
  confirm	
  the	
  significance	
  of	
  Haida’s	
  sole	
  claim	
  to	
  its	
  traditional	
  territory,	
  explaining	
  that	
  the	
  Province	
  can	
  only	
  assign	
  statutory	
  authority	
  to	
  another	
  party	
  when	
   	
   51	
   it	
  is	
  clear	
  who	
  the	
  other	
  party	
  would	
  be.	
  Where	
  there	
  are	
  overlapping	
  assertions	
  to	
  territory,	
  the	
  Province	
  cannot	
  reasonably	
  assign	
  authority	
  to	
  multiple	
  other	
  (competing)	
  parties.	
  The	
  government	
  interviewee	
  above	
  explains	
  that	
  in	
  such	
  a	
  scenario,	
  the	
  First	
  Nations	
  would	
  have	
  to	
  agree	
  on	
  where	
  the	
  overlapping	
  territory	
  is,	
   and	
  how	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making	
  would	
  work	
  in	
  those	
  overlapping	
  territories	
  –	
  an	
  overwhelmingly	
  complex	
  arrangement.	
  	
  	
  One	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewee	
  gives	
  additional	
  insight	
  into	
  Haida’s	
  negotiation	
  successes.	
  This	
  interviewee	
  notes	
  that	
  the	
  Haida	
  Nation	
  has	
  an	
  established	
  reconciliation	
  table	
  acting	
  in	
  much	
  of	
  the	
  same	
  capacity	
  as	
  a	
  treaty	
  table,	
  and	
  so	
  the	
  Province	
  has	
  been	
  more	
  open	
  to	
  considering	
  arrangements	
  that	
  are	
  closer	
  to	
  treaty	
  agreements.	
  A	
  legal	
  expert	
  interviewee	
  posits	
  that	
  with	
  such	
  a	
  high	
  strength	
  of	
  claim,	
  the	
  Province	
  may	
  instead	
  be	
  seeking	
  to	
  avoid	
  having	
  Haida’s	
  title	
  ruled	
  upon	
  by	
  the	
  courts	
  for	
  fear	
  of	
  being	
  directed	
  to	
  relinquish	
  further	
  authority.	
  Interviewees	
  all	
  agreed	
  that	
  the	
  Haida	
  Gwaii	
  Management	
  Board	
  will	
  serve	
  as	
  a	
  closely	
  watched	
  laboratory.	
  	
  	
   4.4.3 Da’naxda’xw/Awaetlala First Nation v. British Columbia (Environment) 2011 BCSC 620 	
  To	
  date,	
  there	
  has	
  been	
  only	
  one	
  case	
  in	
  which	
  any	
  element	
  of	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationships	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  has	
  been	
  challenged	
  and	
  clarified	
  through	
  the	
  courts.	
  On	
  May	
  27,	
  2010,	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw/Awaetlala	
  First	
  Nation	
  (hereafter	
  Da’naxda’xw17)	
  and	
  Kleana	
  Power	
  Corporation	
  filed	
  a	
  suit	
  against	
  the	
  British	
  Columbia	
  Minister	
  of	
  Environment.	
  With	
  the	
  suit,	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  challenged	
  the	
  Minister’s	
  decision	
  to	
  refuse	
  their	
  request	
  to	
  amend	
  the	
  boundary	
  of	
  a	
  conservancy	
  land	
  use	
  zone	
  that	
  had	
  been	
  established	
  through	
  G2G	
  negotiations.	
  On	
  May	
  10,	
  2011,	
  The	
  Honourable	
  Madam	
  Justice	
  Fisher	
  delivered	
  her	
  British	
  Columbia	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  ruling	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  17	
  The	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  are	
  an	
  amalgamation	
  of	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  and	
  Awaetlala	
  Tribes	
  (para	
  9).	
  	
   	
   52	
   on	
  the	
  case,	
  Da’naxda’xw/Awaetlala	
  First	
  Nation	
  v.	
  British	
  Columbia	
  (Environment),	
  2011	
  BCSC	
  620.	
  	
  	
  The	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  are	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council,	
  whose	
  traditional	
  territories	
  cover	
  the	
  southern-­‐most	
  extent	
  of	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest,	
  and	
  whose	
  agreements	
  are	
  not	
  within	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  this	
  thesis.	
  Still,	
  the	
  ruling	
  provides	
  some	
  valuable	
  clarification	
  as	
  to	
  the	
  legal	
  standing	
  of	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationships	
  that	
  may	
  be	
  applicable	
  across	
  the	
  region,	
  including	
  to	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.	
  The	
  broader	
  implications	
  that	
  are	
  drawn	
  from	
  this	
  case,	
  while	
  prudent,	
  must	
  be	
  recognized	
  as	
  being	
  tentative	
  and	
  uncertain	
  until	
  further	
  clarification	
  is	
  offered	
  by	
  subsequent	
  or	
  higher	
  courts.	
  Without	
  diminishing	
  the	
  importance	
  of	
  the	
  other	
  elements	
  intertwined	
  in	
  this	
  case,	
  and	
  there	
  are	
  a	
  number,	
  the	
  following	
  is	
  a	
  summary	
  of	
  the	
  aspects	
  of	
  the	
  case	
  relevant	
  to	
  this	
  research.	
  	
  	
  Based	
  on	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations	
  to	
  establish	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  in	
  the	
  territories	
  of	
  the	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council,	
  as	
  with	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  conservancies	
  were	
  being	
  legally	
  enacted	
  through	
  the	
  Legislature	
  as	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  plan	
  to	
  fully	
  implement	
  EBM	
  by	
  March	
  31,	
  2009.	
  With	
  the	
  passing	
  of	
  Bill	
  38	
  Protected	
  Areas	
  of	
  British	
   Columbia	
  (Conservancies	
  and	
  Parks)	
  Amendment	
  Act,	
  2008,	
  the	
  Dzawadi/Upper	
  Klinaklini	
  River	
  Conservancy	
  (Upper	
  Klinaklini	
  Conservancy)	
  was	
  enacted	
  through	
  legislation	
  in	
  the	
  traditional	
  territory	
  of	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  (para	
  50).	
  Through	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Province	
  dating	
  back	
  to	
  2006,	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  had	
  	
  “sought	
  an	
  amendment	
  to	
  the	
  southern	
  boundary	
  of	
  the	
  conservancy	
  to	
  remove	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  land,	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  allow	
  a	
  hydro-­‐electric	
  power	
  project	
  to	
  be	
  assessed	
  in	
  an	
  environmental	
  review	
  process.	
  	
  The	
  First	
  Nation	
  considered	
  this	
  project	
  to	
  be	
  an	
  economic	
  opportunity	
  consistent	
  with	
  their	
  cultural	
  and	
  ecological	
  interests”	
  (para	
  1).	
  	
  On	
  March	
  27,	
  2010,	
  the	
  Minister	
  of	
  Environment	
  ruled	
  that	
  he	
  would	
  not	
  recommend	
  an	
  amendment	
  to	
  the	
  boundary	
  to	
  Cabinet	
  (para	
  2).	
  That	
  March	
  27	
  decision	
  is	
  what	
  finally	
  initiated	
  this	
  legal	
  challenge.	
  	
   	
   53	
   The	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  v.	
  British	
  Columbia	
  (Env)	
  ruling	
  details	
  the	
  contentions	
  of	
  the	
  Parties.	
  The	
  position	
  of	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  is	
  that	
  during	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations	
  in	
  2006,	
  while	
  reconciling	
  the	
  LRMP	
  with	
  their	
  own	
  land	
  use	
  plan,	
  their	
  representatives	
  had	
  not	
  agreed	
  to	
  the	
  specifics	
  of	
  the	
  boundary,18	
  that	
  they	
  had	
  contested	
  the	
  southern	
  boundary	
  relating	
  to	
  the	
  Upper	
  Klinaklini	
  River,	
  and	
  that	
  they	
  had	
  understood	
  through	
  discussions	
  with	
  the	
  Minister’s	
  staff	
  that	
  the	
  boundary	
  would	
  be	
  amended	
  to	
  reflect	
  their	
  request.	
  The	
  Da’naxda’xw’s	
  subsequent	
  understanding	
  was	
  that,	
  despite	
  Bill	
  38	
  ultimately	
  not	
  reflecting	
  their	
  requested	
  amendment,	
  the	
  Minister	
  had	
  given	
  his	
  assurance	
  that	
  the	
  boundary	
  would	
  still	
  be	
  amended	
  at	
  a	
  later	
  date	
  to	
  reflect	
  their	
  request.	
  Finally,	
  when	
  the	
  Minister	
  of	
  Environment	
  ruled	
  in	
  March	
  2010	
  that	
  he	
  was	
  not	
  going	
  to	
  recommend	
  the	
  boundary	
  amendment,	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  initiated	
  the	
  court	
  challenge.	
  The	
  ruling	
  outlines	
  that	
  the	
  Minister	
  had	
  ultimately	
  made	
  a	
  statutory	
  decision	
  under	
  section	
  3	
  of	
  the	
  Park	
  Act	
  following	
  the	
  Provincial	
  Protected	
  Area	
  Boundary	
  Adjustment	
  Policy	
  (hereafter	
  Protected	
  Area	
  Policy).	
  	
  	
  The	
  crux	
  of	
  the	
  challenge,	
  as	
  it	
  relates	
  to	
  this	
  research,	
  is	
  in	
  the	
  nature	
  and	
  scope	
  of	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationship	
  between	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw.	
  The	
  ruling	
  articulates	
  that	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  do	
  not	
  dispute	
  that	
  the	
  Minister’s	
  decision	
  was	
  made	
  in	
  the	
  exercise	
  of	
  his	
  statutory	
  authority	
  (para	
  3)	
  –	
  in	
  other	
  words,	
  the	
  question	
  of	
  whether	
  the	
  Crown	
  held	
  ultimate	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  this	
  decision	
  was	
  not	
  being	
  challenged	
  by	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  in	
  this	
  case.	
  The	
  contention	
  of	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  is	
  that	
  the	
  Minister’s	
  decision	
  was	
  in	
  breach	
  of	
  the	
  Crown’s	
  duty	
  to	
  consult	
  by	
  making	
  the	
  decision	
  solely	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  Protected	
  Area	
  Policy.	
  The	
  Crown	
  challenged	
  that	
  “there	
  was	
  no	
  duty	
  to	
  consult	
  in	
  this	
  case,	
  and	
  if	
  there	
  was,	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  breach	
  of	
  that	
  duty”	
  (para	
  4).	
  	
  	
  In	
  a	
  parallel	
  process	
  to	
  that	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw,	
  as	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council,	
  participated	
  in	
  the	
  region-­‐wide	
  negotiations	
  to	
  establish	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  18	
  At	
  the	
  time	
  of	
  the	
  February	
  2006	
  Coast	
  Land	
  Use	
  Plan	
  announcement,	
  including	
  the	
  announcement	
  of	
  the	
  proposed	
  protection	
  areas,	
  “the	
  areas	
  were	
  generally	
  defined	
  and	
  there	
  were	
  no	
  detailed	
  maps”	
  (para	
  13).	
  	
   	
   54	
   processes	
  for	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nation	
  shared	
  management	
  and	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management,	
  including	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  land	
  use	
  zones.	
  As	
  articulated	
  by	
  Madam	
  Justice	
  Fisher:	
  	
  “These	
  [land	
  use	
  zone]	
  designations	
  were	
  made	
  after	
  a	
  lengthy	
  and	
  complex	
  land	
  and	
  resource	
  management	
  process	
  for	
  the	
  central	
  and	
  north	
  coast	
  that	
  involved	
  collaboration	
  between	
  the	
  provincial	
  government	
  and	
  First	
  Nations,	
  industry,	
  environmentalists,	
  local	
  governments	
  and	
  other	
  stakeholders.	
  	
  The	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  participated	
  in	
  this	
  process.	
  	
  They	
  did	
  so	
  on	
  the	
  condition	
  that	
  an	
  acceptable	
  co-­‐management	
  model	
  would	
  be	
  agreed	
  upon.	
  	
  They	
  also	
  did	
  so	
  without	
  prejudice	
  to	
  their	
  treaty	
  negotiations	
  and	
  on	
  an	
  assurance	
  from	
  the	
  government	
  that	
  it	
  would	
  continue	
  negotiations	
  on	
  their	
  specific	
  interests	
  within	
  the	
  proposed	
  protected	
  areas,	
  which	
  could	
  result	
  in	
  changes	
  to	
  a	
  boundary	
  or	
  conditions.	
  Government-­‐to-­‐government	
  consultation	
  with	
  First	
  Nations	
  began	
  in	
  2004	
  and	
  is	
  still	
  on-­‐going	
  “(para	
  12).	
  	
  	
  The	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  claim	
  that	
  “the	
  consultation	
  which	
  took	
  place	
  before	
  Bill	
  38	
  was	
  enacted	
  in	
  May	
  2008	
  was	
  not	
  meaningful	
  and	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  consultation	
  after”	
  (para	
  150).	
  Regarding	
  the	
  duty	
  to	
  consult,	
  the	
  Crown’s	
  retort	
  is	
  two-­‐fold	
  –	
  that	
  it	
  did	
  not	
  have	
  the	
  duty	
  to	
  consult	
  because	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  had	
  a	
  weak	
  strength	
  of	
  claim	
  to	
  the	
  area	
  in	
  question	
  and	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  impact	
  was	
  speculative;	
  and	
  because	
  “the	
  level	
  of	
  consultation	
  provided	
  exceeded	
  any	
  obligation	
  owed,	
  particularly	
  considering	
  the	
  lengthy	
  history	
  of	
  consultation	
  in	
  the	
  LRMP	
  process	
  and	
  the	
  subsequent	
  agreements	
  reached	
  with	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw”	
  (para	
  149)19.	
  The	
  Minister	
  disputed	
  that	
  the	
  boundary	
  amendment	
  was	
  ever	
  in	
  fact	
  assured,	
  noting	
  furthermore,	
  that	
  the	
  he	
  does	
  not	
  have	
  authority	
  beyond	
  making	
  such	
  a	
  recommendation	
  to	
  Cabinet.	
  	
  	
  The	
  Justice	
  rules	
  that,	
  although	
  boundaries	
  had	
  not	
  been	
  finalized	
  at	
  the	
  time	
  of	
  the	
  March	
  2006	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council	
  Agreement-­‐in-­‐Principle,	
  through	
  which	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  had	
  agreed	
  to	
  the	
  conservancy,	
  the	
  proposed	
  amendment	
  was	
  in	
  fact	
  a	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  19	
  The	
  Crown	
  had	
  also	
  argued	
  that	
  their	
  decision	
  to	
  maintain	
  the	
  status	
  quo	
  would	
  not	
  adversely	
  affect	
  aboriginal	
  title	
  both	
  because	
  it	
  would	
  prevent	
  resource	
  development,	
  and	
  because	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  certainty	
  that	
  the	
  proposed	
  hydro	
  development	
  project	
  would	
  receive	
  regulatory	
  approval.	
  The	
  Justice	
  ruled	
  against	
  the	
  Crown	
  on	
  these	
  points	
  (see	
  para.	
  129-­‐142).	
  This	
  is	
  one	
  example	
  of	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  related	
  elements	
  that	
  are	
  clarified	
  through	
  this	
  ruling	
  that	
  are	
  important,	
  but	
  do	
  not	
  quite	
  fit	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  this	
  research.	
   	
   55	
   complicating,	
  “material	
  change”	
  from	
  what	
  was	
  initially	
  agreed	
  to	
  at	
  that	
  time	
  (para	
  17).	
  Nonetheless,	
  the	
  Madam	
  Justice	
  Fisher	
  finds:	
  “That	
  request	
  [for	
  boundary	
  amendment]	
  must…be	
  considered	
  in	
  the	
  broader	
  context	
  of	
  the	
  extensive	
  consultation	
  between	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  in	
  the	
  LRMP	
  process	
  and	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations	
  that	
  created	
  the	
  Upper	
  Klinaklini	
  Conservancy	
  in	
  the	
  first	
  place,	
  the	
  Collaborative	
  Agreement,	
  and	
  the	
  on-­‐going	
  negotiations	
  for	
  a	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  process	
  for	
  managing	
  conservancies	
  and	
  considering	
  boundary	
  amendments.	
  	
  There	
  is	
  no	
  question	
  that	
  the	
  Crown	
  had	
  a	
  duty	
  to	
  consult	
  with	
  respect	
  to	
  the	
  land	
  use	
  designation	
  and	
  the	
  boundaries	
  of	
  the	
  Upper	
  Klinaklini	
  area.	
  	
  I	
  view	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw’s	
  request	
  to	
  amend	
  the	
  boundary	
  as	
  part	
  of	
  an	
  ongoing	
  process	
  of	
  consultation”	
  (para	
  129).	
  	
  Her	
  ruling	
  quashes	
  the	
  Minister’s	
  decision	
  on	
  the	
  basis	
  that	
  it	
  breached	
  its	
  duty	
  to	
  consult	
  by	
  solely	
  following	
  the	
  Protected	
  Area	
  Policy,	
  and	
  directs	
  the	
  government	
  to	
  adequately	
  consult	
  and	
  accommodate	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  in	
  the	
  context	
  of	
  the	
  established	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  consultation	
  protocols	
  (para.	
  234-­‐235).	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  details	
  above	
  that	
  elaborate	
  on	
  the	
  reasoning	
  behind	
  both	
  the	
  proposed	
  amendment	
  and	
  the	
  Minister’s	
  reasoning	
  for	
  rejecting	
  it	
  are	
  meant	
  only	
  to	
  offer	
  some	
  additional	
  clarity	
  surrounding	
  the	
  contentions	
  of	
  the	
  Parties.	
  The	
  relevant	
  factors	
  regarding	
  the	
  legal	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationship	
  are	
  simply	
  that	
  a	
  nation	
  with	
  an	
  established	
  and	
  ongoing	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationship	
  requested	
  an	
  amendment	
  to	
  a	
  decision	
  that	
  had	
  been	
  negotiated	
  in	
  that	
  capacity,	
  and	
  the	
  Minister	
  made	
  a	
  decision	
  about	
  that	
  request	
  independently	
  of	
  that	
  relationship.	
  What	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  v.	
  British	
  Columbia	
  (Env)	
  clarifies	
  is	
  that	
  where	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  consultation	
  protocols	
  are	
  developed,	
  the	
  Crown’s	
  duty	
  to	
  consult	
  is	
  breached	
  where	
  it	
  makes	
  decisions	
  independently	
  of	
  those	
  agreed-­‐upon	
  protocols.	
  The	
  implication	
  is	
  that	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  agreements	
  define	
  sufficient	
  consultation,	
  in	
  the	
  perspective	
  of	
  the	
  courts.	
  One	
  legal	
  expert	
  interviewee	
  articulates	
  their	
  opinion	
  that,	
  furthermore,	
  such	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  consultation	
  protocols	
  effectively	
  dictate	
  the	
  sufficient	
  level	
  of	
  consultation,	
  thereby	
  removing	
  the	
  burden	
  of	
  the	
  Crown	
  to	
  make	
  that	
  determination	
  –	
  “they	
  basically	
  get	
  a	
  free	
  pass	
  around	
  the	
  obligation	
  to	
  assess	
  the	
  strength	
  of	
  claim,	
  to	
  assess	
  the	
  degree	
  of	
  infringement,	
   	
   56	
   which	
  they’re	
  obligated	
  to	
  do	
  under	
  case	
  law.”	
  In	
  ruling	
  that	
  the	
  Minister	
  of	
  Environment	
  had	
  failed	
  to	
  fulfil	
  the	
  ‘honour	
  of	
  the	
  Crown’	
  by	
  inadequately	
  consulting	
  the	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  Fist	
  Nation,	
  Madam	
  Justice	
  Fisher	
  confirms	
  that	
  the	
  force	
  of	
  Section	
  35	
  of	
  the	
  Constitution	
  Act,	
  1982	
  is	
  applied	
  to	
  such	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  agreements.	
  At	
  present,	
  this	
  ruling	
  appears	
  to	
  bring	
  legal	
  force	
  to	
  the	
  procedural	
  aspects	
  of	
  the	
  agreements	
  by	
  binding	
  the	
  Crown	
  to	
  follow	
  the	
  agreed	
  upon	
  engagement	
  processes.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   4.4.4 Power – The Incentive To Sign On 	
  Given	
  that	
  the	
  Crown	
  holds	
  the	
  ultimate	
  authority	
  under	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  arrangements	
  examined	
  in	
  the	
  present	
  research,	
  it	
  begs	
  the	
  question	
  of	
  why	
  First	
  Nations	
  sign	
  on	
  to	
  these	
  agreements	
  while	
  still	
  asserting	
  title,	
  jurisdiction,	
  and	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority.	
  On	
  the	
  one	
  hand,	
  not	
  all	
  of	
  them	
  do	
  –	
  recall	
  from	
  the	
  introductory	
  chapter	
  that	
  the	
  Lax	
  Ka’alaams	
  First	
  Nation	
  is	
  one	
  nation	
  whose	
  traditional	
  territory	
  overlaps	
  with	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  but	
  is	
  not	
  signatory	
  to	
  their	
  agreements;	
  the	
  Nuxalk	
  Nation	
  signed	
  onto	
  the	
  2009	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  with	
  pointed	
  reluctance	
  in	
  2010;	
  and	
  the	
  Haisla	
  Nation	
  is	
  not	
  signatory	
  to	
  the	
  Schedule	
  B	
  Engagement	
  Framework	
  of	
  the	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol,	
  our	
  third	
  decision	
  function.	
  	
  	
  On	
  the	
  other	
  hand,	
  the	
  majority	
  of	
  the	
  nations	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  have	
  signed	
  on.	
  One	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewee	
  bluntly	
  articulates	
  a	
  sentiment	
  that	
  was	
  expressed	
  in	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  interviews:	
  	
  “Well	
  the	
  reason	
  they	
  do	
  it	
  is	
  a	
  pragmatic	
  reason.	
  You	
  get	
  as	
  far	
  as	
  you	
  can	
  today,	
  and	
  you	
  live	
  to	
  fight	
  another	
  day.	
  So	
  you	
  know	
  that	
  legally,	
  politically,	
  and	
  all	
  those	
  other	
  things,	
  the	
  Province	
  won’t	
  go	
  there	
  today,	
  but	
  we	
  can	
  get	
  all	
  of	
  these	
  things	
  out	
  of	
  it.”	
  	
  The	
  other	
  “things”	
  are	
  considerable.	
  The	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationship	
  has	
  secured	
  land	
  use	
  zoning	
  that	
  respects	
  Aboriginal	
  cultural	
  uses	
  and	
  has	
  begun	
  collaborative	
  planning	
  agreements	
  for	
  protected	
  areas;	
  it	
  has	
  initiated	
  engagement	
  protocols	
  around	
  EBM	
  planning	
  that	
  has	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  and	
   	
   57	
   implementation	
  of	
  EBM	
  handbooks	
  and	
  legally	
  entrenched	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules;	
  it	
  has	
  initiated	
  economic	
  development	
  policies	
  and	
  opportunities,	
  including	
  the	
  $120	
  million	
  in	
  Coast	
  Opportunity	
  Funds;	
  and	
  it	
  has	
  provided	
  advisors	
  and	
  technical	
  capacity	
  for	
  these	
  communities	
  to	
  work	
  collaboratively	
  toward	
  common	
  environmental	
  and	
  social	
  objectives	
  that	
  increase	
  their	
  bargaining	
  power.	
  All	
  of	
  this	
  looks	
  much	
  different	
  than	
  during	
  the	
  market	
  campaign	
  spearheaded	
  by	
  environmental	
  organizations	
  only	
  a	
  decade	
  ago.	
  	
  	
  These	
  engagement	
  processes	
  demand	
  a	
  “different	
  type	
  of	
  rigor”	
  than	
  earlier	
  versions	
  of	
  consultation	
  and	
  accommodation	
  engagement,	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  Province	
  would	
  send	
  communities	
  a	
  letter	
  asking	
  to	
  be	
  advised	
  on	
  any	
  issues	
  or	
  concerns	
  around	
  a	
  potential	
  decision,	
  and	
  then	
  would	
  inform	
  them	
  of	
  their	
  final	
  decision.	
  In	
  other	
  words,	
  it	
  does	
  move	
  the	
  Parties	
  further	
  along	
  the	
  relative	
  authority	
  spectrum	
  with	
  regard	
  to	
  land	
  use	
  decisions.	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  adds:	
  “And	
  then	
  if	
  you	
  see	
  something	
  like	
  the	
  Haida	
  one	
  working	
  well,	
  then	
  that’s	
  a	
  target	
  for	
  you	
  to	
  work	
  towards,	
  right.”	
  	
  Even	
  without	
  formal	
  authority,	
  the	
  evidence	
  shows	
  that	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  do	
  have	
  considerable	
  power	
  in	
  this	
  relationship.	
  Informally,	
  interviewees	
  by	
  and	
  large	
  felt	
  that	
  the	
  Province	
  would	
  “bend	
  over	
  backwards”	
  to	
  reach	
  consensus.	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  explains:	
  “We	
  all	
  do	
  it.	
  We	
  wouldn’t	
  dream	
  of	
  moving	
  forward	
  if	
  First	
  Nations	
  were	
  offside.”	
  Other	
  interviewees	
  shared	
  the	
  sentiment	
  that	
  First	
  Nations’	
  recommendations	
  carry	
  great	
  weight.	
  Another	
  government	
  interviewee	
  recounts:	
  	
  “If	
  the	
  Provincial	
  reps	
  and	
  the	
  First	
  Nation	
  reps	
  agree	
  on	
  something,	
  it	
  is	
  highly,	
  highly	
  likely	
  that	
  the	
  decision-­‐maker	
  will	
  come	
  to	
  the	
  same	
  conclusion.	
  And	
  in	
  fact,	
  that’s	
  proven	
  to	
  be	
  true,	
  has	
  it	
  not?”	
  	
  It	
  has	
  –	
  as	
  revealed	
  in	
  Chapter	
  5,	
  interviewees	
  agree	
  that	
  the	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  and	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  have	
  been	
  established	
  by	
  consensus	
  between	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  though	
  not	
  without	
  compromise.	
  Still	
  another	
  government	
  interviewee	
  believes	
  that	
  it	
  would	
  be	
  a	
  “very	
  unusual	
  situation…in	
  today’s	
  environment”	
  for	
  a	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐maker	
  to	
  make	
  a	
  decision	
  that	
  conflicts	
  with	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  a	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nation,	
  and	
  questions	
  how	
  such	
  an	
  action	
  could	
  be	
  of	
  more	
  benefit	
  than	
  cost.	
  This	
   	
   58	
   interviewee	
  anticipates	
  that	
  any	
  such	
  impasse	
  would	
  more	
  likely	
  come	
  at	
  the	
  policy	
  level	
  than	
  from	
  an	
  actual	
  permitting	
  problem,	
  but	
  that	
  even	
  at	
  the	
  policy	
  level,	
  the	
  Province	
  still	
  would	
  not	
  move	
  forward	
  if	
  First	
  Nations	
  were	
  opposed.	
  	
  	
  One	
  of	
  the	
  government	
  interviewees	
  gave	
  another	
  perspective	
  on	
  First	
  Nation	
  support	
  for	
  these	
  agreements,	
  noting	
  that,	
  with	
  the	
  progress	
  in	
  Aboriginal	
  rights	
  and	
  title	
  jurisprudence	
  and	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationships,	
  it	
  may	
  actually	
  be	
  somewhat	
  premature	
  at	
  this	
  point	
  in	
  the	
  evolution	
  to	
  finalize	
  a	
  treaty.	
  A	
  modern	
  day	
  treaty	
  today	
  is	
  likely	
  to	
  offer	
  superior	
  concessions	
  to	
  First	
  Nations	
  compared	
  to	
  one	
  signed	
  150	
  years	
  ago,	
  and	
  it	
  may	
  be	
  advantageous	
  to	
  let	
  the	
  evolution	
  continue	
  before	
  settling	
  a	
  treaty.	
  	
  An	
  important	
  insight	
  gleaned	
  from	
  these	
  interviews	
  is	
  that	
  effective	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making,	
  in	
  practice,	
  is	
  profoundly	
  reliant	
  on	
  the	
  individual	
  people	
  that	
  are	
  involved.	
  Interviewees	
  repeatedly	
  referred	
  to	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  other	
  party	
  by	
  name,	
  as	
  in	
  to	
  say,	
  ‘that	
  person	
  would	
  find	
  a	
  way	
  to	
  reach	
  consensus,’	
  rather	
  than	
  referring	
  to	
  each	
  other	
  as	
  faceless	
  entities	
  –	
  “the	
  government”	
  or	
  “the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.”	
  Indeed,	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations’	
  power	
  comes	
  from	
  the	
  Crown’s	
  duty	
  to	
  consult	
  and	
  accommodate,	
  but	
  part	
  of	
  it	
  comes	
  from	
  the	
  unusual	
  history	
  and	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  relationships	
  between	
  these	
  parties	
  on	
  the	
  coast.	
  	
  	
  Despite	
  the	
  power	
  that	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  secured,	
  any	
  desire	
  of	
  First	
  Nations	
  to	
  have	
  a	
  permanent	
  form	
  of	
  authority	
  that	
  is	
  recognized	
  by	
  Canadian	
  law,	
  is	
  a	
  valid	
  one.	
  Mabee	
  and	
  Hoberg	
  (2006)	
  analysed	
  the	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  of	
  the	
  five	
  Nuu-­‐chah-­‐nulth	
  nations	
  that	
  were	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  Central	
  Region	
  Board,	
  the	
  co-­‐management	
  body	
  established	
  in	
  1994	
  in	
  Clayoquot	
  Sound	
  on	
  the	
  west	
  coast	
  of	
  Vancouver	
  Island.	
  Clayoquot	
  Sound	
  has	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  important	
  features	
  in	
  common	
  with	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  –	
  located	
  in	
  the	
  same	
  coastal	
  temperate	
  rainforest,	
  it	
  too	
  was	
  the	
  centre	
  of	
  high	
  profile	
  conflict	
  over	
  logging	
  and	
  exclusion	
  of	
  local	
  First	
  Nations	
  that	
  resulted	
  in	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  agreements	
  to	
  pursue	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management.	
  There,	
  they	
  found,	
  the	
  co-­‐management	
  board	
  was	
  only	
  designated	
   	
   59	
   authority	
  to	
  make	
  recommendations	
  to	
  the	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐makers,	
  despite	
  it	
  being	
  established	
  under	
  the	
  auspices	
  of	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  “equal”	
  decision-­‐making.	
  Even	
  more	
  relevant,	
  with	
  the	
  expiration	
  of	
  the	
  agreements,	
  the	
  Central	
  Region	
  Board	
  today	
  no	
  longer	
  operates,	
  two	
  of	
  those	
  five	
  nations	
  have	
  independently	
  established	
  a	
  treaty,	
  and	
  the	
  remaining	
  three	
  are	
  not	
  officially	
  working	
  together,	
  nor	
  with	
  the	
  Province	
  (Retzer	
  2011;	
  Bunsha	
  2011).	
  	
  	
  	
   4.4.5 Own Laws, Policies, Customs and Traditions 	
  The	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  agreements	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  demonstrate	
  that	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  offers	
  a	
  further	
  opportunity	
  to	
  observe	
  in	
  practice	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  promises	
  of	
  the	
  New	
  Relationship:	
  respect	
  for	
  each	
  other’s	
  respective	
  laws	
  and	
  responsibilities.	
  The	
  agreements	
  say	
  numerous	
  times	
  that	
  these	
  will	
  be	
  implemented	
  according	
  to	
  each	
  nation’s	
  laws,	
  policies,	
  customs	
  and	
  traditions.	
  Interviewees	
  were	
  all	
  asked	
  to	
  comment	
  on	
  what	
  they	
  understood	
  that	
  to	
  mean	
  in	
  practice.	
  	
  	
  One	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewee	
  reminds	
  us	
  that	
  implementation	
  according	
  to	
  Aboriginal	
  laws,	
  policies,	
  customs	
  and	
  traditions	
  is	
  going	
  to	
  look	
  different	
  for	
  each	
  nation,	
  and	
  even	
  may	
  be	
  conducted	
  at	
  smaller	
  scales	
  in	
  some	
  communities.	
  As	
  a	
  whole,	
  interviewees	
  characterized	
  this	
  as	
  meaning	
  that	
  they	
  will	
  be	
  following	
  internal	
  governance	
  systems.	
  Each	
  community	
  will	
  have	
  their	
  own	
  internal	
  hierarchical	
  structures	
  that	
  they	
  use	
  to	
  make	
  decisions,	
  to	
  talk	
  to	
  their	
  communities,	
  and	
  to	
  bring	
  information	
  back	
  to	
  the	
  table.	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewees	
  said	
  that	
  this	
  may	
  mean	
  as	
  well	
  that	
  the	
  Province	
  will	
  need	
  to	
  speak	
  to	
  different	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  community	
  about	
  different	
  issues,	
  and	
  the	
  agreements	
  commit	
  the	
  Province	
  to	
  honour	
  the	
  direction	
  of	
  the	
  communities	
  on	
  that	
  front.	
  This	
  expression	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  implementation	
  is	
  explicitly	
  included	
  in	
  the	
  2006	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements	
  with	
  the	
  individual	
  nations	
  (sec.7.9),	
  where	
  the	
  Province	
  commits:	
  	
   	
   60	
   “If	
  the	
  [given	
  nation]	
  establishes	
  its	
  own	
  internal	
  management	
  structure	
  to	
  undertake	
  the	
  implementation	
  and	
  monitoring	
  of	
  this	
  Agreement,	
  then	
  the	
  Province	
  will	
  respect	
  that	
  structure	
  when	
  engaging	
  with	
  the	
  [nation]	
  pursuant	
  to	
  this	
  Agreement	
  and	
  the	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Protocol.”	
  	
  	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewees	
  explain	
  that	
  the	
  nations	
  are	
  at	
  different	
  stages	
  of	
  developing	
  the	
  kinds	
  of	
  internal	
  processes	
  that	
  would	
  allow	
  them	
  to	
  implement	
  these	
  agreements	
  according	
  to	
  their	
  own	
  laws	
  and	
  customs,	
  and	
  that	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  entity	
  has	
  a	
  role	
  in	
  supporting	
  that	
  capacity	
  development.	
  	
  	
  This	
  provision	
  of	
  Aboriginal	
  implementation	
  appears	
  multiple	
  times	
  in	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  agreements,	
  but	
  it	
  is	
  also	
  included	
  directly	
  in	
  the	
  dispute	
  resolution	
  process	
  in	
  the	
  2009	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol.	
  In	
  that	
  agreement,	
  the	
  dispute	
  resolution	
  process	
  ends	
  by	
  permitting	
  each	
  party	
  to	
  implement	
  their	
  decision	
  in	
  the	
  event	
  of	
  an	
  ongoing	
  impasse:	
  “…the	
  Parties	
  will	
  review	
  the	
  Representatives’	
  recommendations,	
  and	
  other	
  relevant	
  information,	
  and	
  may	
  process	
  to	
  have	
  further	
  discussion	
  and	
  or	
  make	
  a	
  decision	
  in	
  accordance	
  with	
  their	
  respective	
  laws,	
  regulations,	
  policies,	
  customs	
  and	
  traditions;	
  but	
  before	
  doing	
  so	
  will	
  inform	
  the	
  other	
  Parties”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2009,	
  6.6).	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  explains	
  that	
  these	
  passages	
  are	
  written	
  on	
  the	
  unwritten	
  understanding	
  that	
  on	
  the	
  Provincial	
  side,	
  that	
  the	
  final	
  determination	
  on	
  the	
  land	
  base	
  would	
  be	
  made	
  by	
  a	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐maker,	
  but	
  despite	
  that,	
  “it’s	
  not	
  to	
  suggest	
  that	
  the	
  First	
  Nation	
  has	
  to	
  necessarily	
  live	
  with	
  that	
  decision	
  without	
  being	
  able	
  to	
  do	
  something	
  about	
  it,	
  through	
  the	
  courts	
  for	
  example.”	
  A	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewee	
  notes	
  that	
  being	
  able	
  to	
  implement	
  a	
  decision	
  according	
  to	
  their	
  own	
  laws	
  is	
  not	
  satisfying	
  to	
  the	
  nation	
  they	
  represent,	
  because	
  their	
  laws	
  “do	
  not	
  carry	
  much	
  weight”	
  when	
  directly	
  conflicting	
  with	
  those	
  of	
  the	
  Crown.	
  The	
  First	
  Nations’	
  laws	
  are	
  not	
  codified	
  and,	
  therefore,	
  have	
  no	
  enforcement	
  mechanism.	
  Speaking	
  to	
  a	
  hypothetical	
  case	
  of	
  a	
  community	
  wanting	
  to	
  use	
  their	
  laws	
  to	
  oppose	
  a	
  permit	
  that	
  had	
  been	
  issued	
  by	
  the	
  Crown,	
  one	
  legal	
  expert	
  interviewee	
  explains	
  about	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  system:	
  “There	
  is	
  no	
  Aboriginal	
  court	
  that	
  has	
  jurisdiction	
  to	
  making	
  binding	
  orders	
  against	
  third	
  parties.”	
  	
   	
   61	
   	
   4.4.6 Functioning of the Governance Forum 	
  While	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  entity	
  provides	
  capacity	
  and	
  negotiation	
  support	
  to	
  its	
  members,	
  and	
  had	
  even	
  been	
  delegated	
  to	
  negotiate	
  the	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  provisions	
  on	
  behalf	
  of	
  the	
  member	
  nations,	
  it	
  itself	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  government.	
  Helping	
  clarify	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  all	
  of	
  these	
  Parties	
  in	
  the	
  governance	
  arrangement,	
  this	
  section	
  illuminates	
  the	
  general	
  protocols	
  between	
  the	
  individual	
  nations	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  and	
  between	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  the	
  Province.	
  The	
  information	
  offered	
  in	
  this	
  section	
  does	
  not	
  directly	
  answer	
  the	
  research	
  question	
  of	
  whether	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  acquired	
  governmental	
  authority	
  over	
  the	
  three	
  decision	
  function	
  as	
  envisioned	
  it	
  might	
  at	
  the	
  start	
  of	
  the	
  research	
  process.	
  It	
  does	
  offer	
  insight,	
  including	
  observations	
  from	
  interviewees,	
  into	
  the	
  structure	
  and	
  evolution	
  of	
  their	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  that	
  may	
  serve	
  as	
  instructive	
  to	
  other	
  similar	
  groups.	
  	
  	
  The	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationship	
  is	
  a	
  foundational	
  element	
  of	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nation	
  shared	
  decision-­‐making.	
  Operating	
  on	
  a	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  basis	
  was	
  an	
  essential	
  evolution	
  in	
  the	
  relationship	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  First	
  Nations	
  that	
  recognized	
  First	
  Nations’	
  elevated	
  status	
  as	
  governments	
  rather	
  than	
  stakeholders	
  (Smith	
  and	
  Sterritt	
  2007).	
  The	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationship	
  was	
  first	
  formalized	
  through	
  the	
  2001	
  General	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2001),	
  and	
  has	
  taken	
  further	
  shape	
  through	
  the	
  subsequent	
  agreements.	
  	
  As	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  2006	
  Coast	
  Land	
  Use	
  Decision,	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  agreed	
  through	
  the	
  Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Protocol	
  and	
  the	
  series	
  of	
  individual	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements	
  to	
  establish	
  a	
  ‘Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Forum’,	
  	
  “through	
  which	
  the	
  senior	
  representatives	
  of	
  the	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  the	
  Minister	
  or	
  designates	
  will	
  on	
  either	
  Party’s	
  request	
  meet	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  share	
  information	
  and	
  work	
  collaboratively	
  to	
  implement	
  the	
  [Central	
  and	
  North	
  Coast	
  LRMPs]	
  in	
  the	
  traditional	
  territory	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2006a,	
  3.1).	
  	
   	
   62	
   In	
  other	
  words,	
  the	
  Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Forum	
  is	
  the	
  governance	
  forum	
  in	
  which	
  these	
  Parties	
  meet.	
  The	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Protocol	
  also	
  establishes	
  the	
  organization	
  of	
  the	
  forum,	
  including	
  executive,	
  management,	
  and	
  technical	
  committees	
  to	
  provide	
  guidance	
  and	
  support.	
  The	
  individual	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements	
  (sec.4)	
  outline	
  each	
  nation’s	
  relationship	
  to	
  the	
  forum,	
  agreeing	
  that	
  some	
  aspects	
  of	
  the	
  agreement	
  “may	
  be	
  implemented	
  more	
  efficiently	
  and	
  effectively	
  by	
  working	
  collaboratively,	
  as	
  appropriate,	
  through	
  the	
  Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Forum”	
  including	
  consultation	
  on	
  establishment	
  or	
  changes	
  to	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  and	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  (see	
  for	
  example	
  Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Haisla	
  First	
  Nation	
  2006,	
  4.1).	
  Any	
  First	
  Nation	
  whose	
  traditional	
  territory	
  is	
  in	
  the	
  LRMP	
  area	
  may	
  participate	
  in	
  the	
  Forum,	
  even	
  if	
  not	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  members.	
  	
  	
  The	
  Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  also	
  directed	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  to	
  develop	
  a	
  governance	
  forum	
  Terms	
  of	
  Reference	
  by	
  consensus,	
  which	
  was	
  finalized	
  in	
  June	
  2006,	
  a	
  few	
  months	
  later	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2006b).20	
  The	
  Terms	
  of	
  Reference	
  “identifies	
  the	
  purpose,	
  structure,	
  mandate	
  and	
  operation	
  procedures”	
  (sec.1)	
  and	
  describes	
  the	
  forum	
  as	
  “a	
  key	
  part	
  of	
  an	
  overall	
  governance	
  framework	
  established	
  to	
  guide	
  and	
  monitor	
  the	
  implementation	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  and	
  Central	
  Coast	
  land	
  use	
  decisions,	
  including	
  further	
  development	
  and	
  implementation	
  of	
  EBM”	
  (sec.3).	
  Although	
  the	
  forum	
  aims	
  to	
  reach	
  consensus,	
  it	
  is	
  given	
  a	
  clear	
  mandate	
  by	
  the	
  Terms	
  of	
  Reference	
  as	
  a	
  recommendation	
  body	
  back	
  to	
  the	
  Parties	
  (sec.3).	
  	
  	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  offers	
  an	
  overview	
  of	
  the	
  arrangement	
  in	
  practice:	
  “Within	
  the	
  governance	
  forum	
  we	
  have	
  essentially	
  four	
  levels:	
  the	
  ultimate	
  is	
  the	
  Minister	
  of	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  the	
  Chief	
  and	
  Council	
  of	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.	
  That	
  body	
  has	
  met	
  perhaps	
  once	
  over	
  the	
  past	
  period	
  of	
  years.	
  There’s	
  an	
  executive	
  level,	
  which	
  may	
  comprise	
  Chief	
  and	
  Council	
  of	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  nations,	
  or	
  delegated	
  representative,	
  and	
  the	
  executive	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations;	
  executive	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  Province	
  would	
  be	
  the	
  Deputy	
  Minister	
  or	
  delegated	
  representative	
  (such	
  as	
  an	
  Assistant	
  Deputy	
  Minister).	
  The	
  executive	
  group	
  has	
  met	
  two	
  or	
  three	
  times.	
  The	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  20	
  The	
  Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Forum	
  Terms	
  of	
  Reference	
  lists	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  as:	
  Homalco,	
  Wuikinuxv,	
  Gitga’at,	
  Haisla,	
  Heiltsuk,	
  Kitasoo/Xaixais,	
  and	
  Metlakatla.	
  	
   	
   63	
   bulk	
  of	
  the	
  relationship	
  takes	
  place	
  at	
  the	
  governance	
  forum	
  working	
  group,	
  comprising	
  senior	
  managers	
  from	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  which	
  usually	
  meets	
  monthly.”	
  To	
  get	
  to	
  that	
  point,	
  interviewees	
  explain,	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  regular	
  board	
  meetings	
  with	
  the	
  Chiefs	
  and	
  Council	
  to	
  receive	
  their	
  “sanction”	
  to	
  agree	
  to	
  certain	
  things	
  within	
  the	
  governance	
  forum.	
  In	
  the	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol,	
  for	
  example,	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  is	
  specifically	
  given	
  the	
  mandate	
  by	
  its	
  members	
  to	
  undertake	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  on	
  the	
  issues	
  in	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  that	
  agreement	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2009,	
  4.2).	
  A	
  number	
  of	
  interviewees	
  provided	
  some	
  insight	
  into	
  the	
  protocols	
  guiding	
  engagement	
  and	
  internal	
  decisions	
  between	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  entity	
  and	
  its	
  member	
  nations.	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  explains:	
  	
  “Well,	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  has	
  a	
  board	
  of	
  directors	
  [who]	
  typically	
  acts	
  with	
  unanimity.	
  And	
  the	
  board	
  of	
  directors	
  is	
  one	
  representative,	
  typically	
  the	
  Chief,	
  of	
  each	
  nation.	
  So	
  CFN	
  [Coastal	
  First	
  Nations]	
  in	
  a	
  strategic	
  sense	
  is	
  them	
  –	
  it	
  was	
  meant	
  to	
  be.”	
  	
  Another	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewee	
  explains	
  that	
  the	
  organization	
  develops	
  annual	
  strategic	
  plans	
  that	
  outline	
  the	
  activities	
  that	
  they	
  can	
  undertake,	
  and	
  that	
  they	
  must	
  get	
  a	
  clear	
  mandate	
  from	
  the	
  board	
  to	
  engage	
  in	
  any	
  additional	
  activity.	
  The	
  government	
  interviewees	
  all	
  agreed	
  that	
  when	
  they	
  are	
  directed	
  to	
  engage	
  with	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  they	
  do	
  it	
  with	
  the	
  understanding	
  that	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  does	
  the	
  internal	
  work	
  of	
  getting	
  that	
  mandate	
  from	
  its	
  members.	
  Aside	
  from	
  giving	
  added	
  practical	
  coherence	
  to	
  Crown-­‐First	
  Nation	
  engagement,	
  the	
  existence	
  and	
  operations	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  provide	
  an	
  incentive	
  its	
  members	
  to	
  find	
  common	
  positions.	
  One	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewee	
  explained	
  that	
  the	
  organization	
  does	
  not	
  undertake	
  issues	
  where	
  there	
  is	
  disagreement	
  among	
  the	
  members,	
  but	
  where	
  it	
  is	
  given	
  the	
  mandate,	
  it	
  can	
  offer	
  its	
  members	
  capacity	
  and	
  negotiating	
  strength.	
  Indeed,	
  there	
  may	
  be	
  a	
  practical	
  limit	
  to	
  how	
  much	
  diversity	
  an	
  entity	
  like	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  can	
  tolerate	
  on	
  the	
  inside	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  provide	
  the	
  level	
  of	
  authority	
  that	
  has	
  been	
  acquired	
  in	
  this	
  process.	
  Ultimately,	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  brings	
  recommendations	
  of	
  the	
  governance	
  forum	
  back	
  to	
  its	
  members	
  seeking	
  a	
  consensus,	
  but	
  agreements	
  would	
  be	
  signed	
  between	
  the	
  individual	
  nations	
  and	
  the	
  Province.	
  This	
  can	
  be	
  seen	
  to	
  be	
  the	
   	
   64	
   case	
  with	
  the	
  2006	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  and	
  the	
  2009	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol.	
  	
  	
  Governance	
  forums	
  were	
  also	
  established	
  for	
  the	
  Tsimshian	
  (now	
  North	
  Coast-­‐Skeena)	
  and	
  the	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council,	
  and	
  the	
  Parties	
  agreed	
  that	
  region-­‐wide	
  issues	
  could	
  be	
  addressed	
  through	
  a	
  “Joint	
  Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Forum”	
  that	
  incorporates	
  all	
  three.	
  Interviewees	
  explain	
  that	
  in	
  these	
  early	
  implementation	
  years,	
  the	
  bulk	
  of	
  the	
  issues	
  being	
  decided	
  have	
  related	
  to	
  region-­‐wide	
  EBM	
  planning,	
  and	
  so	
  the	
  joint	
  forum	
  has	
  in	
  fact	
  been	
  the	
  most	
  heavily	
  used	
  governance	
  table	
  for	
  meeting	
  and	
  collaborating.	
  A	
  number	
  of	
  interviewees	
  feel	
  that	
  having	
  all	
  these	
  nations	
  agreeing	
  at	
  a	
  full	
  regional	
  level	
  through	
  the	
  joint	
  forum	
  has	
  served	
  to	
  yet	
  further	
  increase	
  the	
  negotiating	
  strength	
  of	
  the	
  participating	
  nations.	
  	
  	
  	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  notes	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  interest	
  among	
  First	
  Nations	
  in	
  engaging	
  the	
  separate	
  governance	
  forums	
  specific	
  to	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council	
  and	
  North	
  Coast-­‐Skeena,	
  noting	
  that	
  government	
  would	
  find	
  it	
  easier	
  to	
  work	
  with	
  a	
  region-­‐wide	
  joint	
  governance	
  forum	
  “where	
  all	
  three	
  sit	
  together	
  and	
  work	
  together”.	
  One	
  challenge	
  the	
  Province	
  must	
  work	
  through	
  is	
  having	
  to	
  manage	
  relationships	
  differently	
  across	
  associations	
  and	
  individual	
  communities	
  to	
  reflect	
  those	
  communities’	
  negotiated	
  relationships.	
  	
  To	
  facilitate	
  ongoing	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  on	
  operational	
  plan	
  approval,	
  the	
  2009	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  sets	
  up	
  another	
  governance	
  forum	
  that	
  interviewees	
  agreed	
  would	
  serve,	
  at	
  least	
  initially,	
  to	
  augment	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nation	
  governance	
  forum	
  already	
  established.	
  The	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  (sec.5)	
  outlines	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  new	
  forum,	
  which	
  precisely	
  emulates	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  existing	
  governance	
  forum.	
  Interviewees	
  were	
  asked	
  about	
  the	
  reasoning	
  behind	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  multiple	
  forums.	
  Despite	
  being	
  organized	
  similarly,	
  interviewees	
  explained	
  that	
  in	
  the	
  current	
  early	
  implementation	
  stages,	
  the	
  specific	
  commitments	
  related	
  to	
  EBM	
  (i.e.	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  and	
  operating	
  rules)	
  and	
  to	
  operational	
  plan	
  approval	
  are	
  sufficiently	
  different	
  to	
  merit	
  separate	
  conversations	
  –	
  even	
  if	
  they	
  are	
  with	
  some	
  of	
  the	
   	
   65	
   same	
  people	
  on	
  the	
  same	
  day.	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  notes	
  that	
  different	
  players	
  from	
  the	
  government	
  side	
  are	
  involved	
  in	
  implementing	
  EBM	
  and	
  the	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol.	
  	
  The	
  creation	
  of	
  a	
  second	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  governance	
  forum	
  by	
  the	
  2009	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  poses	
  a	
  similar	
  potential	
  communication	
  challenge	
  as	
  the	
  one	
  considered	
  above,	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  Province	
  may	
  find	
  it	
  easier	
  to	
  work	
  with	
  all	
  nations	
  at	
  a	
  region-­‐wide	
  joint	
  governance	
  forum,	
  rather	
  than	
  at	
  multiple	
  individual	
  ones.	
  Here,	
  the	
  government	
  has	
  advocated	
  for	
  an	
  additional	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  governance	
  forum,	
  leaving	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  having	
  to	
  work	
  with	
  two	
  government	
  bodies.	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  indicated	
  their	
  understanding	
  that	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  would	
  prefer	
  to	
  work	
  with	
  one	
  forum,	
  and	
  that	
  the	
  government	
  is	
  trying	
  to	
  reflect	
  that	
  in	
  the	
  administration	
  of	
  the	
  relationship.	
  A	
  number	
  of	
  both	
  government	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewees	
  predict	
  that	
  these	
  two	
  forums	
  will	
  likely	
  meld	
  into	
  one	
  with	
  time	
  as	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  major	
  commitments	
  for	
  both	
  are	
  met.	
  The	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  shifted	
  their	
  emphasis	
  from	
  technical	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management	
  forest	
  planning,	
  to	
  planning	
  for	
  the	
  human	
  well-­‐being	
  balance	
  that	
  interviewees	
  describe	
  as	
  having	
  been	
  put	
  on	
  somewhat	
  of	
  a	
  back	
  burner	
  until	
  more	
  recently.	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  anticipates	
  that	
  nations	
  may	
  find	
  that	
  the	
  new	
  forum	
  is	
  suitable	
  to	
  address	
  human	
  well-­‐being	
  issues	
  related	
  to	
  land	
  and	
  resource	
  decisions.	
  Another	
  government	
  interviewee	
  notes	
  that	
  the	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council	
  is	
  also	
  negotiating	
  human	
  well-­‐being	
  opportunities,	
  and	
  anticipates	
  the	
  need	
  for	
  regional	
  cooperation	
  on	
  some	
  of	
  that	
  as	
  well,	
  similar	
  to	
  planning	
  around	
  EBM:	
  “The	
  thinking	
  is,	
  at	
  some	
  point	
  in	
  time,	
  once	
  the	
  dust	
  settles,	
  you	
  kind	
  of	
  have	
  to	
  manage	
  some	
  of	
  these	
  economic	
  opportunities	
  in	
  a	
  collaborative	
  fashion	
  between	
  the	
  major	
  First	
  Nation	
  groups.”	
  	
  The	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  relationship	
  is	
  a	
  unique	
  and	
  no	
  doubt	
  evolving	
  governance	
  arrangement	
  that	
  one	
  government	
  interviewee	
  describes	
  as	
  “an	
  ever-­‐changing	
  dynamic.”	
  Another	
  government	
  interviewee	
  reminds	
  us	
  that	
  “the	
  relationship	
  that	
  is	
  ongoing	
  between	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  the	
  Province	
  is	
  at	
  the	
  behest	
  of	
  both	
  Parties,”	
  so	
  changes	
  could	
  be	
  possible,	
  but	
  this	
  representative	
  can	
  not	
  foresee	
  large	
   	
   66	
   change	
  any	
  time	
  soon	
  because	
  everything	
  is	
  working	
  well	
  in	
  their	
  perspective.	
  At	
  the	
  same	
  time,	
  still	
  another	
  government	
  interviewee	
  cautions:	
  “It’s	
  an	
  achievement	
  to	
  create	
  and	
  continue	
  a	
  coalition.	
  You	
  can	
  never	
  assume	
  it’ll	
  stay	
  in	
  place	
  forever.”	
  	
  	
   	
   67	
   4.5 Conclusions 	
  The	
  Crown	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  established	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  agreements	
  between	
  2001	
  and	
  2009	
  that	
  establish	
  their	
  governance	
  forums	
  and	
  mechanisms	
  for	
  the	
  implementation	
  of	
  the	
  three	
  decision	
  functions	
  –	
  land	
  use	
  zones,	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules,	
  and	
  operational	
  plan	
  approval.	
  In	
  the	
  context	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  legal	
  system,	
  the	
  agreements	
  can	
  be	
  considered	
  co-­‐management	
  because	
  no	
  statutory	
  or	
  treaty	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  is	
  granted	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  legislation.	
  Nonetheless,	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  its	
  members	
  have	
  proven	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  powerful	
  negotiating	
  force	
  by	
  presenting	
  unified	
  positions	
  on	
  the	
  implementation	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management.	
  Despite	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  still	
  ultimately	
  resting	
  in	
  the	
  Crown,	
  interviewees	
  agree	
  that	
  the	
  Province	
  is	
  extremely	
  unlikely	
  to	
  reject	
  a	
  decision	
  of	
  the	
  governance	
  forums,	
  and	
  moreover,	
  that	
  the	
  relationships	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  forged	
  help	
  in	
  bringing	
  the	
  parties	
  to	
  consensus.	
  It	
  is	
  also	
  revealed	
  that	
  while	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  entity	
  engages	
  the	
  Province	
  directly	
  on	
  behalf	
  of	
  its	
  members,	
  agreements	
  are	
  signed	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  by	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  the	
  individual	
  nations.	
  	
  The	
  Haida	
  Nation,	
  however,	
  has	
  forged	
  co-­‐jurisdictional	
  arrangement	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  Haida	
  Gwaii	
  Management	
  Council	
  is	
  granted	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  over	
  high-­‐level	
  strategic	
  resource	
  management	
  decisions	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  allowable	
  annual	
  cut.	
  The	
  management	
  council,	
  comprised	
  of	
  equal	
  Haida	
  and	
  Crown	
  representation,	
  is	
  what	
  one	
  legal	
  expert	
  interviewee	
  described	
  as	
  a	
  new	
  “high	
  watermark”	
  that	
  will	
  stand	
  as	
  a	
  case	
  to	
  be	
  watched.	
  A	
  number	
  of	
  interviewees	
  agreed	
  that	
  the	
  Haida	
  Nation’s	
  success	
  in	
  securing	
  a	
  co-­‐jurisdictional	
  arrangement	
  is	
  attributable	
  to	
  their	
  high	
  strength	
  of	
  claim,	
  and	
  very	
  importantly,	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  overlapping	
  claims	
  to	
  their	
  traditional	
  territory.	
  The	
  Crown	
  can	
  only	
  assign	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐making	
  authority	
  when	
  it	
  is	
  clear	
  who	
  that	
  statutory	
  decision-­‐maker	
  would	
  be,	
  which	
  is	
  not	
  the	
  case	
  where	
  parties	
  have	
  overlapping	
  claims	
  to	
  territory.	
  	
  This	
  chapter	
  also	
  examined	
  the	
  implications	
  of	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  vs.	
  BC	
  (Env),	
  the	
  first	
  known	
  court	
  ruling	
  on	
  any	
  element	
  of	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationships	
  forged	
  in	
   	
   68	
   the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest.	
  The	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  ruling	
  indicates	
  that	
  where	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  protocols	
  are	
  developed,	
  the	
  Crown’s	
  legal	
  duty	
  to	
  consult	
  is	
  breached	
  where	
  it	
  makes	
  decisions	
  independently	
  of	
  those	
  agreed-­‐upon	
  protocols.	
  The	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  agreements	
  define	
  sufficient	
  consultation	
  in	
  the	
  perspective	
  of	
  the	
  courts,	
  and	
  relieves	
  the	
  burden	
  of	
  the	
  Crown	
  to	
  determine	
  what	
  constitutes	
  appropriate	
  consultation	
  to	
  meet	
  their	
  obligations.	
  	
  	
  Chapter	
  5	
  now	
  delves	
  deeper	
  into	
  the	
  agreements	
  to	
  revealing	
  the	
  specific	
  mechanisms	
  being	
  used	
  to	
  make	
  decisions	
  regarding	
  land	
  use	
  zones,	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules,	
  and	
  operational	
  plan	
  approval,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  the	
  outcomes	
  of	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  on	
  these	
  decisions.	
   	
   69	
   Chapter 5: Policy Outcomes: The Three Decision Functions 	
  We	
  learned	
  from	
  the	
  Chapter	
  4	
  that,	
  under	
  Canadian	
  law,	
  authority	
  ultimately	
  rests	
  with	
  the	
  Crown	
  on	
  all	
  three	
  decision	
  functions	
  under	
  investigation	
  in	
  this	
  thesis	
  –	
  land	
  use	
  zones,	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules,	
  and	
  operational	
  plan	
  approval.	
  Despite	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  decision-­‐making	
  arrangement	
  can	
  be	
  characterized	
  as	
  co-­‐management	
  using	
  the	
  definition	
  developed	
  in	
  Chapter	
  2,	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  the	
  Province	
  have	
  committed	
  to	
  seek	
  decisions	
  by	
  consensus.	
  As	
  this	
  section	
  reveals,	
  the	
  Parties	
  have	
  so	
  far	
  succeeded	
  in	
  reaching	
  consensus	
  on	
  the	
  decisions	
  made	
  toward	
  the	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  and	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules,	
  and	
  are	
  beginning	
  to	
  engage	
  the	
  framework	
  for	
  operational	
  plan	
  approvals.	
  	
  By	
  examining	
  the	
  agreements	
  themselves,	
  and	
  with	
  the	
  support	
  of	
  insight	
  from	
  the	
  interviewees,	
  this	
  chapter	
  provides	
  an	
  overview	
  of	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  process	
  that	
  evolved	
  for	
  resource	
  management	
  for	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest.	
  It	
  emerges	
  that	
  the	
  agreements	
  and	
  planning	
  documents	
  begin	
  by	
  establishing	
  broader	
  goals	
  that	
  are	
  refined	
  through	
  collaboration	
  and	
  negotiation,	
  and	
  formalized	
  through	
  further	
  agreements	
  or	
  legal	
  tools	
  including	
  legislation	
  and	
  regulation.	
  	
  	
  This	
  chapter	
  describes	
  the	
  framework	
  for	
  decision-­‐making	
  that	
  is	
  established	
  between	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  for	
  the	
  three	
  types	
  of	
  land	
  use	
  decisions	
  under	
  investigation,	
  and	
  the	
  policy	
  outcomes	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  delivered	
  under	
  each	
  so	
  far.	
  Moreover,	
  it	
  clarifies	
  exactly	
  what	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  decision	
  functions	
  are,	
  providing	
  in	
  depth	
  examples	
  of	
  the	
  evolution	
  and	
  future	
  of	
  each	
  function.	
  	
   5.1 Function 1 - Land Use Zones 	
  The	
  first	
  decision	
  function	
  under	
  investigation	
  is	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  land	
  use	
  zones.	
  One	
  of	
  core	
  recommendations	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  Coast	
  LRMP	
  and	
  Central	
  Coast	
  LRMP	
  tables	
  was	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  multiple	
  land	
  use	
  zones:	
  Protection	
  Areas,	
  Biodiversity	
  Areas,	
  and	
   	
   70	
   EBM	
  Operating	
  Areas.	
  Protection	
  Areas	
  would	
  disallow	
  logging,	
  mining,	
  and	
  hydro-­‐electric	
  development,	
  while	
  allowing	
  First	
  Nation	
  cultural	
  uses,	
  tourism,	
  and	
  recreation.	
  Biodiversity	
  Areas	
  would	
  disallow	
  logging,	
  but	
  allow	
  mining	
  and	
  related	
  infrastructure,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  First	
  Nation	
  cultural	
  uses,	
  tourism,	
  and	
  recreation.	
  EBM	
  Operating	
  Areas	
  would	
  represent	
  the	
  remainder	
  of	
  the	
  planning	
  area,	
  and	
  allow	
  for	
  full	
  resource	
  use	
  in	
  accordance	
  with	
  EBM	
  principles.21	
  The	
  tables	
  recommended	
  candidates	
  for	
  each	
  land	
  use	
  zone,	
  but	
  final	
  decisions	
  were	
  made	
  through	
  the	
  subsequent	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiation	
  phase	
  (NC-­‐LRMP	
  Table	
  2005,	
  4.2.2).	
  	
  	
  Because	
  the	
  Province	
  agreed	
  to	
  negotiate	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  with	
  the	
  individual	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  as	
  revealed	
  in	
  Chapter	
  4,	
  the	
  outcome	
  of	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations	
  are	
  included	
  in	
  the	
  suite	
  of	
  2006	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements	
  signed	
  by	
  each	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nation.	
  These	
  documents	
  indicate	
  the	
  purposes	
  and	
  excluded	
  uses	
  for	
  each	
  zone	
  type,	
  and	
  boundaries,	
  objectives,	
  indicators,	
  targets	
  and	
  management	
  considerations	
  for	
  each	
  specific	
  zone	
  (see	
  for	
  example,	
  Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Gitga’at	
  First	
  Nation	
  2006).22	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  explains	
  that	
  in	
  negotiating	
  the	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  during	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  phase,	
  the	
  Province	
  wanted	
  to	
  maintain	
  a	
  cap	
  on	
  the	
  total	
  area	
  to	
  match	
  what	
  was	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  21	
  These	
  zones,	
  including	
  their	
  potential	
  contributions	
  and	
  primary	
  purposes,	
  are	
  defined	
  in	
  detail	
  in	
  Section	
  3.2	
  of	
  the	
  Central	
  Coast	
  LRMP	
  and	
  Section	
  4.1	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  Coast	
  LRMP.	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  the	
  three	
  land	
  use	
  zones,	
  two	
  other	
  overlaying	
  zones	
  were	
  created.	
  Grizzly	
  Bear	
  Management	
  Areas	
  are	
  intended	
  to	
  maintain	
  existing	
  population	
  levels,	
  but	
  do	
  not	
  create	
  additional	
  constraints	
  on	
  land	
  tenuring	
  or	
  resource	
  activities.	
  Visual	
  Management	
  zones	
  guide	
  visual	
  management	
  of	
  key	
  tourism	
  and	
  recreation	
  areas	
  (NC-­‐LRMP	
  Table	
  2005;	
  CC-­‐LRMP	
  Table	
  2004).	
  	
  22	
  While	
  the	
  LRMP	
  Tables	
  were	
  completing	
  recommendations,	
  20	
  protection-­‐area	
  orders	
  were	
  established	
  under	
  the	
  Environment	
  and	
  Land	
  Use	
  Act,	
  and	
  17	
  option	
  areas,	
  identified	
  by	
  the	
  LRMP	
  Tables	
  as	
  requiring	
  further	
  scientific	
  research	
  toward	
  their	
  management	
  plan,	
  were	
  ordered	
  under	
  Part	
  13	
  of	
  the	
  Forest	
  Act.	
  The	
  designations	
  allowed	
  the	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Forests	
  (now	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Forests,	
  Lands	
  and	
  Natural	
  Resource	
  Operations)	
  to	
  suspend	
  forest	
  development	
  activities,	
  and	
  the	
  chief	
  forester	
  to	
  reduce	
  the	
  allowable	
  annual	
  cut	
  of	
  timber	
  supply	
  areas	
  and	
  tree	
  farm	
  licences	
  during	
  LRMP	
  planning	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2002).	
   	
   71	
   recommended	
  in	
  the	
  LRMPs,	
  but	
  was	
  comfortable	
  having	
  the	
  zones	
  located	
  to	
  reflect	
  the	
  interests	
  of	
  each	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nation.	
  	
  	
  The	
  2006	
  Coast	
  Land	
  Use	
  Decision	
  included	
  a	
  map	
  (Figure	
  5.1)	
  delineating	
  the	
  North	
  and	
  Central	
  Coast	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  as	
  agreed	
  to	
  by	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  by	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council	
  through	
  parallel	
  negotiations	
  in	
  the	
  southern	
  portion	
  of	
  the	
  region.	
  2.1	
  million	
  hectares	
  would	
  fall	
  under	
  protection	
  from	
  logging	
  -­‐	
  28%	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  would	
  be	
  designated	
  as	
  Conservancies/Protected	
  Areas	
  (9%	
  was	
  existing	
  protected	
  areas),	
  5%	
  would	
  be	
  designated	
  as	
  Biodiversity,	
  Mining	
  and	
  Tourism	
  Areas	
  (BMTAs),	
  open	
  to	
  mining	
  and	
  tourism,	
  and	
  the	
  remaining	
  67%	
  would	
  be	
  EBM	
  Operating	
  Areas.	
  	
  	
  At	
  the	
  time	
  of	
  the	
  Coast	
  Land	
  Use	
  Decision	
  announcement	
  in	
  February	
  2006,	
  and	
  even	
  the	
  signing	
  of	
  the	
  individual	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements	
  in	
  the	
  months	
  following,	
  the	
  boundaries	
  of	
  these	
  areas	
  had	
  not	
  been	
  finalized.	
  The	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  and	
  individual	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements	
  note	
  that	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  would	
  work	
  cooperatively	
  in	
  “confirming	
  protected	
  area	
  and	
  management	
  area	
  boundaries	
  at	
  a	
  more	
  detailed	
  scale”	
  (see	
  for	
  example,	
  Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Gitga'at	
  First	
  Nation	
  2006,	
  sec.7.3[b]).	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  explains	
  that	
  considerable	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  discussions	
  had	
  to	
  take	
  place	
  to	
  turn	
  the	
  recommended	
  zone	
  boundaries	
  into	
  specific	
  notated	
  boundaries	
  on	
  the	
  ground	
  that	
  could	
  then	
  be	
  established	
  in	
  law.	
  	
  	
  Ultimately,	
  interviewees	
  unanimously	
  agreed	
  that	
  the	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  announced	
  in	
  the	
  Coast	
  Land	
  Use	
  Plan,	
  and	
  in	
  place	
  today,	
  were	
  agreed	
  to	
  by	
  the	
  consensus	
  of	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.	
  First	
  Nations	
  did	
  not	
  secure	
  everything	
  that	
  they	
  had	
  sought	
  –	
  to	
  know	
  exactly	
  the	
  difference	
  one	
  would	
  have	
  to	
  contrast	
  the	
  agreement	
  with	
  the	
  land	
  use	
  plans	
  of	
  each	
  First	
  Nation,	
  which	
  are	
  not	
  public.	
  Evidently,	
  however,	
  they	
  were	
  satisfied	
  enough	
  to	
  agree	
  to	
  move	
  forward.	
  	
   	
   72	
   Figure	
  5.1	
  	
  	
  	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  2006	
  Land	
  Use	
  Plan	
  Map	
   	
  Source:	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2011a)	
  	
   	
   73	
   5.1.1 Conservancies/Protected Areas (28%) 	
  During	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations,	
  and	
  acknowledged	
  in	
  the	
  LRMP	
  recommendations,	
  First	
  Nations	
  voiced	
  concern	
  about	
  being	
  barred	
  from	
  traditional	
  uses	
  and	
  economic	
  opportunities	
  in	
  the	
  areas	
  under	
  consideration	
  for	
  protection	
  if	
  they	
  were	
  to	
  be	
  designated	
  as	
  parks	
  under	
  the	
  existing	
  Parks	
  Act	
  legislation.	
  To	
  accommodate	
  First	
  Nation	
  traditional	
  uses	
  and	
  low-­‐impact	
  economic	
  opportunities	
  the	
  Province	
  soon	
  after	
  introduced	
  Bill	
  28,	
  the	
  Park	
  (Conservancy	
  Enabling)	
  Amendment	
  Act,	
  2006,	
  to	
  establish	
  a	
  new	
  “conservancy”	
  designation.	
  The	
  Provincial	
  announcement	
  read:	
  	
  “The	
  purpose	
  of	
  the	
  new	
  conservancy	
  designation	
  is	
  to	
  set	
  aside	
  Crown	
  land	
  for	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  its	
  biological	
  diversity,	
  natural	
  environments	
  and	
  recreational	
  values,	
  and	
  the	
  preservation	
  and	
  maintenance	
  of	
  First	
  Nations’	
  social,	
  ceremonial	
  and	
  cultural	
  uses”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2006a).	
  	
  Speaking	
  to	
  the	
  new	
  designation,	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  executive	
  director,	
  Art	
  Sterritt,	
  noted:	
  “For	
  the	
  first	
  time,	
  provincial	
  legislation	
  has	
  been	
  developed	
  specifically	
  to	
  address	
  First	
  Nations	
  traditional	
  use	
  and	
  enables	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  provincial	
  collaborative	
  management…The	
  legislation	
  is	
  also	
  unique	
  because	
  it	
  respects	
  and	
  acknowledges	
  the	
  Aboriginal	
  Title	
  and	
  Rights	
  of	
  First	
  Nations”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2006a).23	
  By	
  March	
  31,	
  2009,	
  the	
  deadline	
  for	
  the	
  full	
  implementation	
  of	
  EBM,	
  114	
  conservancies	
  had	
  been	
  established	
  and	
  one	
  new	
  Class	
  A	
  park,	
  adding	
  to	
  the	
  18	
  existing	
  Class	
  A	
  parks	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009a).	
  Their	
  establishment	
  ended	
  any	
  previous	
  authorization	
  for	
  designated	
  conservancy	
  areas	
  for	
  commercial	
  logging,	
  mining	
  and	
  hydro-­‐electric	
  power	
  generation,	
  other	
  than	
  run-­‐of-­‐river	
  projects,	
  but	
  permits	
  may	
  remain	
  in	
  place	
  until	
  their	
  stated	
  end	
  date	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Kitasoo-­‐Xaixais	
  First	
  Nation	
  2007,	
  7).	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  23	
  Bill	
  24,	
  Parks	
  and	
  Protected	
  Areas	
  Statutes	
  Amendment	
  Act,	
  2007,	
  established	
  some	
  of	
  these	
  conservancies	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2007),	
  and	
  others	
  were	
  established	
  through	
  Bill	
  38,	
  Protected	
  Areas	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  (Conservancies	
  and	
  Parks)	
  Amendment	
  Act,	
  2008.	
  Additionally,	
  Bill	
  24,	
  the	
  Parks	
  and	
  Protected	
  Areas	
  Statutes	
  Amendment	
  Act,	
  2007,	
  contained	
  amendments	
  to	
  the	
  Park	
  Act	
  and	
  Forest	
  Act	
  that	
  create	
  “a	
  legislated	
  mechanism	
  for	
  the	
  deletion	
  of,	
  and	
  compensation	
  for,	
  forest	
  tenure	
  rights	
  that	
  are	
  displaced	
  by	
  the	
  creation	
  or	
  enlargement	
  of	
  parks	
  and	
  conservancies”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2007).	
   	
   74	
   	
  As	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  protected	
  area	
  planning,	
  Collaborative	
  Management	
  Agreements	
  between	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  individual	
  First	
  Nations	
  are	
  being	
  developed.	
  These	
  agreements	
  will	
  then	
  establish	
  the	
  framework	
  under	
  which	
  subsequent	
  collaborative	
  agreements	
  may	
  be	
  formalized	
  for	
  each	
  individual	
  protected	
  area	
  in	
  that	
  First	
  Nation’s	
  traditional	
  territory,	
  “tailored	
  to	
  its	
  specific	
  circumstances	
  and	
  issues”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2011a).	
  Collaborative	
  Management	
  Agreements	
  may	
  be	
  established	
  either	
  for	
  individual	
  or	
  groups	
  of	
  protected	
  areas	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Kitasoo-­‐Xaixais	
  First	
  Nation	
  2007,	
  6).	
  A	
  number	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  established	
  Collaborative	
  Management	
  Agreements	
  and	
  planning	
  for	
  individual	
  conservancy	
  management	
  agreements	
  is	
  presently	
  underway	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2008a).	
  	
  	
   5.1.2 Biodiversity, Mining and Tourism Areas (BMTAs) (5%) 	
  As	
  envisioned	
  in	
  the	
  LMRPs,	
  these	
  areas	
  prohibit	
  commercial	
  forest	
  harvesting	
  and	
  major	
  hydroelectric	
  development,	
  but	
  permit	
  mineral	
  exploration	
  and	
  development,	
  and	
  some	
  small	
  scale	
  run-­‐of-­‐the-­‐river	
  hydro-­‐electric	
  development	
  may	
  be	
  considered.	
  Twenty-­‐one	
  Biodiversity,	
  Mining	
  and	
  Tourism	
  Areas	
  were	
  established	
  through	
  a	
  Legal	
  Order	
  in	
  Council	
  in	
  January	
  2009	
  comprising	
  300,000	
  hectares.	
  Section	
  3	
  of	
  the	
  Legal	
  Order	
  notes	
  that	
  a	
  BMTA	
  is	
  established	
  primarily	
  for	
  the	
  maintenance	
  of	
  biological	
  diversity	
  and	
  natural	
  environment	
  of	
  that	
  area,	
  social	
  and	
  cultural	
  uses,	
  mining,	
  tourism	
  and	
  recreation,	
  and	
  power	
  development	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009b).	
  Like	
  the	
  conservancies,	
  the	
  Legal	
  Order	
  notes	
  the	
  expectation	
  to	
  have	
  a	
  land	
  use	
  management	
  plan	
  for	
  each	
  area,	
  but	
  with	
  BMTAs	
  there	
  does	
  not	
  appear	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  direct	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  role	
  in	
  establishing	
  management	
  plans.	
  Instead,	
  the	
  Legal	
  Order	
  reads	
  that	
  the	
  Province	
  must	
  “consult	
  with	
  each	
  First	
  Nation	
  that	
  claims	
  Aboriginal	
  rights	
  or	
  Aboriginal	
  tile	
  or	
  has	
  treaty	
  rights	
  to	
  some	
  or	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  [BMTA]”	
  and	
  “consider	
  the	
  interests	
  and	
  role”	
  of	
  each	
  of	
  those	
  First	
  Nations	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009b,	
  4).	
   	
   75	
   5.1.3 EBM Operating Areas (67%)  	
  The	
  remaining	
  areas	
  are	
  operating	
  areas	
  governed	
  by	
  the	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules,	
  and	
  guided	
  by	
  the	
  EBM	
  framework	
  established	
  by	
  the	
  Coast	
  Information	
  Team.	
  The	
  LRMPs	
  recommended	
  management	
  objectives	
  for	
  operating	
  areas,	
  parts	
  of	
  which	
  were	
  augmented	
  through	
  the	
  2006	
  Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Protocol	
  Agreement,	
  and	
  set	
  to	
  be	
  established	
  as	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  through	
  legislation	
  and	
  regulation.	
  At	
  the	
  time	
  of	
  the	
  Coast	
  Land	
  Use	
  Decision	
  Announcement	
  in	
  2006,	
  the	
  management	
  objectives	
  still	
  required	
  further	
  refinement.	
  The	
  Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  stated	
  the	
  goal	
  of	
  the	
  Parties	
  “to	
  achieve	
  full	
  implementation	
  of	
  EBM	
  by	
  March	
  31,	
  2009”	
  and	
  established	
  committees	
  to	
  support	
  achievement	
  of	
  this	
  goal	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2006a,	
  Sched	
  A.	
  s.1.4).	
  	
  	
  	
   5.1.4 Mechanisms for Future Amendments  	
  Land	
  use	
  zones	
  are	
  established	
  after	
  comprehensive	
  strategic	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  processes,	
  and	
  are	
  intended	
  to	
  be	
  stable	
  as	
  a	
  result.	
  Periodically,	
  however,	
  there	
  may	
  be	
  pressure	
  to	
  change	
  a	
  land	
  use	
  zone,	
  such	
  as	
  when	
  developments	
  are	
  proposed	
  in	
  a	
  prohibited	
  area	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2010),	
  or	
  to	
  continue	
  to	
  meet	
  its	
  conservation	
  objectives	
  under	
  changing	
  ecological	
  conditions.	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  explained	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  a	
  “preeminent	
  issue”	
  to	
  confirm	
  that	
  decisions	
  setting	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  did	
  not	
  limit	
  any	
  ongoing	
  or	
  future	
  treaty	
  negotiations,	
  meaning	
  that	
  these	
  zones	
  are	
  technically	
  able	
  to	
  be	
  amended	
  through	
  treaty.	
  Despite	
  this,	
  interviewees	
  agreed	
  that	
  the	
  land	
  use	
  zones	
  are	
  generally	
  not	
  intended	
  to	
  be	
  amended,	
  and	
  a	
  number	
  cited	
  the	
  range	
  of	
  benefits	
  associated	
  with	
  the	
  zones	
  that	
  are	
  dependent	
  on	
  their	
  stability.	
  Interviewees	
  agreed	
  that	
  many	
  of	
  the	
  social	
  and	
  economic	
  development	
  opportunities	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  pursued	
  alongside	
  the	
  ecological	
  planning	
  are	
  reliant	
  on	
  the	
  certainty	
  of	
  the	
  protected	
  areas,	
  including	
  conservation	
  financing,	
  and	
  carbon	
  credits	
  that	
  rely	
  on	
  long	
  term	
  guarantees.	
  A	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewee	
  elaborates,	
  explaining	
  that,	
  not	
  only	
  may	
  individual	
  economic	
  opportunities	
  be	
   	
   76	
   threatened	
  by	
  a	
  proposed	
  amendment,	
  but	
  the	
  integrity	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  association.	
  This	
  interviewee	
  explains	
  that	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationship,	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  highest	
  level,	
  relies	
  on	
  “discipline	
  and	
  working	
  together”.	
  	
  	
  	
  Despite	
  the	
  incentive	
  for	
  stability,	
  interviewees	
  agreed	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  of	
  course	
  the	
  potential	
  for	
  amendments	
  to	
  be	
  proposed	
  in	
  future.	
  The	
  individual	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreements	
  (sec.6)	
  note	
  that	
  the	
  Province	
  “confirms	
  its	
  intention	
  to	
  consult	
  with	
  the	
  First	
  Nation,	
  regarding	
  any	
  potential	
  for	
  the	
  infringement	
  of	
  the	
  First	
  Nation’s	
  interests	
  arising	
  from:	
  b)	
  changes	
  proposed	
  to	
  a	
  Land	
  Use	
  Zone	
  or	
  Management	
  Area.”	
  However,	
  because	
  amendments	
  have	
  not	
  been	
  on	
  the	
  agenda,	
  the	
  Parties	
  have	
  not	
  advanced	
  a	
  specific	
  amendment	
  protocol	
  other	
  than	
  to	
  use	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations	
  through	
  the	
  governance	
  forum.24	
  The	
  Da’naxda’xw	
  ruling	
  confirms	
  that	
  the	
  Province	
  must	
  engage	
  First	
  Nations	
  in	
  good	
  faith	
  in	
  the	
  context	
  of	
  the	
  agreed	
  upon	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  relationship,	
  and	
  cannot	
  rely	
  solely	
  on	
  the	
  Provincial	
  Protected	
  Area	
  Boundary	
  Adjustment	
  Policy,	
  Process,	
  and	
  Guidelines.25	
  	
  One	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewee	
  explains	
  that	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  as	
  an	
  organization,	
  has	
  stated	
  reluctance	
  to	
  negotiate	
  land	
  use	
  zone	
  amendments,	
  and	
  has	
  suggested	
  that	
  members	
  instead	
  seek	
  any	
  proposed	
  amendments	
  through	
  their	
  treaty	
  tables.	
  This	
  interviewee	
  explained	
  that	
  one	
  nation	
  had	
  in	
  fact	
  already	
  tested	
  this	
  process.	
  In	
  that	
  case,	
  the	
  nation	
  was	
  interested	
  in	
  amending	
  a	
  zone	
  boundary	
  and	
  the	
  Province	
  did	
  agree	
  to	
  discuss	
  it	
  at	
  the	
  treaty	
  table.	
  The	
  community,	
  however,	
  had	
  an	
  internal	
  referendum	
  on	
  the	
  proposed	
  change	
  and	
  voted	
  against	
  it,	
  so	
  the	
  decision	
  on	
  the	
  boundary	
  was	
  ultimately	
  made	
  by	
  the	
  community	
  in	
  this	
  case.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  24	
  Again,	
  the	
  Province	
  is	
  still	
  obligated	
  to	
  consult	
  and	
  accommodate	
  any	
  affected	
  First	
  Nation,	
  even	
  if	
  not	
  a	
  member	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.	
  	
  25	
  Policy:	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2010)	
   	
   77	
   5.2 Function 2 – EBM Operating Rules (Land Use Legal Objectives) 	
  The	
  second	
  ‘decision	
  function’	
  under	
  investigation	
  in	
  this	
  research	
  are	
  the	
  decisions	
  that	
  dictate	
  what	
  operating	
  rules	
  will	
  be	
  used	
  to	
  reflect	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management	
  (EBM),	
  as	
  unique	
  to	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  and	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  agreements.	
  As	
  this	
  section	
  reveals,	
  the	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  to	
  date	
  have	
  been	
  instituted	
  through	
  the	
  Land	
  Act’s	
  Land	
  Use	
  Objectives	
  Regulation,	
  terminology	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  documents	
  and	
  interviewees	
  for	
  this	
  research	
  use.	
  	
  	
  Unlike	
  other	
  areas	
  of	
  the	
  province,	
  the	
  2001	
  General	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  specified	
  that	
  the	
  LRMP	
  Tables	
  were	
  to	
  develop	
  land	
  use	
  plans	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  principles	
  of	
  ecosystem-­‐based	
  management,	
  namely	
  ecological	
  integrity,	
  human	
  well-­‐being,	
  and	
  adaptive	
  management.	
  The	
  agreement	
  had	
  also	
  directed	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  an	
  independent	
  multidisciplinary	
  scientific	
  advisory	
  panel,	
  the	
  Coast	
  Information	
  Team,	
  to	
  inform	
  the	
  entire	
  process.	
  The	
  Coast	
  Information	
  Team	
  established	
  advice	
  on	
  EBM	
  implementation	
  consistent	
  with	
  the	
  definition,	
  principles	
  and	
  goals	
  established	
  in	
  the	
  General	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  (CC-­‐LRMP	
  Table	
  2004).	
  These	
  came	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  an	
  EBM	
  Framework,	
  an	
  EBM	
  Planning	
  Handbook,	
  and	
  a	
  complementary	
  Scientific	
  Compendium	
  and	
  Hydroriparian	
  Planning	
  Guide.	
  	
  	
  The	
  Coast	
  Information	
  Team’s	
  materials	
  provided	
  advice	
  on	
  relationships	
  between	
  management	
  objectives	
  and	
  management	
  strategies	
  to	
  achieve	
  those	
  objectives,	
  based	
  on	
  current	
  knowledge	
  and	
  assumptions	
  (Price,	
  Roburn,	
  and	
  MacKinnon	
  2009).	
  Relying	
  on	
  the	
  EBM	
  handbooks,	
  the	
  LRMP	
  recommendations	
  sought	
  to	
  “[d]eliver	
  comprehensive	
  strategic	
  direction	
  on	
  the	
  management	
  and	
  development	
  of	
  lands	
  and	
  resources,	
  clearly	
  describing	
  a)	
  resource	
  use	
  and	
  values;	
  b)	
  general	
  management	
  direction	
  across	
  the	
  plan	
  area;	
  c)	
  management	
  direction	
  applicable	
  to	
  specific	
  geographic	
  areas;	
  and	
  d)	
  any	
  implementation	
  requirements	
  such	
  as	
  recommendations	
  for	
  policy	
  or	
  legislative	
  changes”	
  (NC-­‐LRMP	
  Table	
  2005,	
  7.1).	
  	
  	
   	
   78	
   Recognizing	
  that	
  EBM	
  represents	
  both	
  ecological	
  integrity	
  and	
  human	
  well-­‐being,	
  the	
  LRMP	
  tables	
  recommended	
  that	
  EBM	
  to	
  be	
  flexible	
  enough	
  to	
  meet	
  a	
  range	
  of	
  circumstances.	
  To	
  that	
  end,	
  the	
  Central	
  Coast	
  LRMP	
  report	
  (sec.2.2.3)	
  asserts	
  that	
  “[t]he	
  EBM	
  Framework	
  should	
  provide	
  sufficient	
  clarity	
  to	
  distinguish	
  activities	
  that	
  are	
  EBM	
  from	
  those	
  that	
  are	
  not.”	
  Section	
  2.2.4	
  elaborates:	
  	
  “The	
  [EBM	
  Handbook	
  is]	
  a	
  multiscale	
  planning	
  guide	
  that	
  can	
  be	
  used	
  to	
  plan	
  land	
  based	
  activities	
  such	
  as	
  forestry,	
  tourism,	
  recreation	
  and	
  mining.	
  The	
  expectation	
  is	
  that	
  decision	
  makers,	
  resource	
  professionals,	
  businesses	
  and	
  local	
  people	
  engaged	
  in	
  land	
  and	
  resource	
  management	
  within	
  the	
  plan	
  area	
  will	
  use	
  the	
  Handbook	
  for	
  guidance	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  EBM	
  plans,	
  [forest	
  development	
  plans	
  (FDPs)	
  and	
  forest	
  stewardship	
  plans	
  (FSPs)]26	
  in	
  the	
  region…The	
  Table	
  recommends	
  that	
  the	
  EBM	
  Handbook	
  be	
  considered	
  a	
  living	
  document	
  (i.e.	
  EBM	
  is	
  a	
  process,	
  not	
  an	
  event)	
  intended	
  to	
  change/evolve	
  over	
  time	
  through	
  passive	
  and	
  active	
  adaptive	
  management.”	
  The	
  Coast	
  Information	
  Team	
  reports	
  and	
  the	
  two	
  regional	
  LRMPs,	
  however,	
  only	
  provide	
  recommendations	
  to	
  the	
  Crown	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  regarding	
  how	
  to	
  implement	
  EBM	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest.	
  The	
  LRMPs	
  recommended	
  that	
  elements	
  of	
  the	
  plans	
  and	
  Coast	
  Information	
  Team	
  materials	
  be	
  established	
  as	
  Legal	
  Objectives	
  under	
  relevant	
  legislation	
  (CC-­‐LRMP	
  sec.2.5,	
  NCLRMP	
  sec.3.2),	
  and	
  the	
  2006	
  Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  committed	
  the	
  Parties	
  to	
  work	
  together	
  to	
  this	
  end	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2006a,	
  5.5).	
  	
  	
  North	
  and	
  Central	
  Coast	
  Plan	
  Implementation	
  Committees	
  and	
  an	
  EBM	
  Working	
  Group	
  were	
  formed	
  to	
  support	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  process	
  toward	
  the	
  final	
  recommendations	
  to	
  the	
  Province	
  on	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2006b,	
  3.2;	
  Lambert	
  2006).	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  explains	
  that	
  these	
  committees,	
  which	
  included	
  input	
  from	
  environmental	
  and	
  industry	
  stakeholders,	
  were	
  intended	
  to	
  have	
  a	
  limited	
  life	
  span	
  to	
  support	
  the	
  remaining	
  ground	
  work	
  in	
  refining	
  EBM	
  and	
  determining	
  the	
  initial	
  Legal	
  Objectives.	
  They	
  have	
  since	
  ceased	
  to	
  function	
  as	
  formal	
  entities,	
  but	
  continue	
  in	
  other	
  forms	
  through	
  EBM	
  technical	
  teams.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  26	
  FDPs	
  and	
  FSPs	
  were	
  noted	
  in	
  the	
  equivalent	
  passage	
  of	
  the	
  NCLRMP	
  (sec.3.2.3).	
   	
   79	
   	
   5.2.1 Range of Natural Variability – An Example of an EBM Operating Rule 	
  The	
  range	
  of	
  natural	
  variability	
  (RONV)	
  provides	
  an	
  example	
  of	
  an	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rule	
  that	
  has	
  been	
  uniquely	
  applied	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest	
  region	
  through	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  process.	
  It	
  is	
  also	
  a	
  rule,	
  or	
  indeed	
  set	
  of	
  rules,	
  that	
  has	
  proven	
  to	
  be	
  particularly	
  challenging	
  to	
  conclude	
  (Price,	
  Roburn,	
  and	
  MacKinnon	
  2009),	
  and	
  its	
  impact	
  on	
  ecological	
  integrity	
  and	
  human	
  well-­‐being	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  is	
  being	
  specifically	
  monitored	
  for	
  possible	
  amendment	
  (Carr	
  2009).	
  	
  	
  To	
  guide	
  levels	
  of	
  resource	
  development,	
  the	
  Coast	
  Information	
  Team	
  outlined	
  thresholds	
  of	
  low	
  and	
  high	
  risk	
  to	
  ecological	
  integrity	
  that	
  reflect	
  naturally	
  occurring	
  ecological	
  disturbance,	
  referred	
  to	
  as	
  the	
  range	
  of	
  natural	
  variability.	
  Simply	
  put,	
  the	
  range	
  of	
  natural	
  variability,	
  as	
  applied	
  to	
  the	
  coast,	
  describes	
  the	
  amount	
  of	
  old	
  growth	
  forest	
  in	
  an	
  ecosystem	
  that	
  is	
  retained.27	
  The	
  EBM	
  Handbook	
  explains:	
  “The	
  assumption	
  is	
  that	
  risk	
  [to	
  ecological	
  integrity]	
  increases	
  in	
  proportion	
  to	
  the	
  amount	
  that	
  management	
  causes	
  patterns	
  and	
  processes	
  to	
  depart	
  from	
  their	
  natural	
  range”	
  (Coast	
  Information	
  Team	
  2004,	
  10).	
  Although	
  based	
  on	
  some	
  level	
  of	
  	
  scientific	
  uncertainty	
  (Price,	
  Roburn,	
  and	
  MacKinnon	
  2009),	
  the	
  EBM	
  Handbook	
  prescribes	
  operating	
  under	
  a	
  30%	
  RONV	
  as	
  the	
  threshold	
  before	
  entering	
  into	
  high	
  ecological	
  risk	
  (meaning	
  70%	
  of	
  the	
  old	
  growth	
  forest	
  has	
  been	
  removed),	
  and	
  70%	
  RONV	
  as	
  the	
  threshold	
  for	
  low	
  ecological	
  risk,	
  strongly	
  sought	
  by	
  the	
  environmental	
  sector.	
  These	
  low	
  and	
  high	
  risk	
  thresholds	
  inform	
  resource	
  management	
  objectives,	
  and	
  are	
  cited	
  by	
  the	
  Coast	
  Information	
  Team	
  and	
  LRMP	
  tables	
  as	
  a	
  central	
  component	
  of	
  EBM.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  27	
  “Old	
  forest”	
  is	
  defined	
  as	
  a	
  stand	
  of	
  trees	
  250	
  years	
  or	
  older	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009e;	
  Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009f).	
  Price,	
  Roburn,	
  and	
  MacKinnon	
  (2009,	
  499)	
  explain	
  the	
  rationale	
  for	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  old	
  growth	
  forest	
  as	
  the	
  RONV	
  indicator:	
  “Because	
  old	
  forest	
  dominates	
  natural	
  coastal	
  landscapes	
  and	
  because	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  seral	
  stage	
  most	
  altered	
  by	
  harvesting	
  and	
  with	
  the	
  longest	
  recovery,	
  representation	
  targets	
  focused	
  on	
  old	
  forest.”	
  See	
  their	
  publication	
  for	
  further	
  in	
  depth	
  explanation	
  of	
  the	
  rationales	
  that	
  were	
  used	
  by	
  the	
  Coast	
  Information	
  Team	
  to	
  set	
  RONV	
  thresholds.	
   	
   80	
   A	
  RONV	
  management	
  “target”	
  is	
  the	
  actual	
  numerical	
  RONV	
  objective	
  for	
  each	
  ecosystem	
  type	
  that	
  must	
  be	
  decided	
  through	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations.	
  The	
  Coast	
  Information	
  Team	
  and	
  LRMPs	
  recommended	
  that	
  the	
  targets	
  fall	
  between	
  the	
  high	
  and	
  low	
  risk	
  thresholds.	
  RONV	
  targets	
  are	
  set,	
  and	
  translate	
  differently,	
  across	
  ecosystem	
  types.	
  For	
  example,	
  the	
  LRMPs	
  recommended	
  that	
  very	
  rare	
  ecosystems	
  have	
  a	
  70%	
  RONV	
  target,	
  which	
  means	
  that,	
  assuming	
  a	
  unit	
  has	
  97%	
  old	
  growth	
  forest,	
  then	
  there	
  must	
  be	
  a	
  retention	
  rate	
  of	
  68%	
  of	
  the	
  area	
  (70%	
  x	
  0.97)	
  (Price,	
  Roburn,	
  and	
  MacKinnon	
  2009,	
  500;	
  CC-­‐LRMP	
  Table	
  2004).	
  The	
  RONV	
  thresholds	
  and	
  targets	
  are	
  applied	
  in	
  EBM	
  to	
  multiple	
  planning	
  scales,	
  allowing	
  operational	
  flexibility,	
  referred	
  to	
  as	
  Flexibility	
  Principles,	
  such	
  that	
  higher	
  risk	
  practices	
  may	
  be	
  acceptable	
  at	
  smaller	
  planning	
  scales	
  and	
  shorter-­‐term,	
  as	
  long	
  as	
  the	
  management	
  targets	
  are	
  met	
  at	
  the	
  largest	
  planning	
  scale	
  and	
  longer-­‐term	
  (CC-­‐LRMP	
  Table	
  2004,	
  6.4).	
  	
  	
  The	
  LRMPs	
  explain	
  that	
  the	
  selection	
  of	
  management	
  targets	
  is	
  a	
  “social	
  choice”	
  based	
  on	
  acceptable	
  levels	
  of	
  ecological	
  risk	
  or	
  impact	
  on	
  human	
  well-­‐being,	
  and	
  recommend	
  that	
  the	
  process	
  for	
  establishing	
  these	
  social	
  choices	
  is	
  informed	
  by	
  the	
  EBM	
  Handbook	
  and	
  the	
  Flexibility	
  Principles	
  adopted	
  by	
  the	
  LRMP	
  Tables.	
  The	
  Central	
  Coast	
  LRMP	
  (sec.2.3)	
  and	
  North	
  Coast	
  LRMP	
  (sec.3.2.4)	
  recommended	
  that	
  the	
  thresholds	
  and	
  management	
  targets	
  evolve	
  through	
  both	
  passive	
  and	
  active	
  adaptive	
  management,	
  with	
  changes	
  agreed	
  to	
  through	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations.	
  Both	
  planning	
  tables	
  acknowledge,	
  in	
  fact,	
  that	
  “there	
  may	
  be	
  a	
  more	
  refined	
  approach	
  to	
  establishing	
  representational	
  thresholds	
  at	
  the	
  sub-­‐regional/territorial	
  level	
  that	
  is	
  more	
  effective/efficient	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  concurrently	
  achieving	
  high	
  degrees	
  of	
  ecological	
  integrity	
  and	
  high	
  degrees	
  of	
  human	
  wellbeing”	
  (CC-­‐LRMP	
  Table	
  2004,	
  2.3.1).	
  	
  This	
  detailed	
  example	
  of	
  RONV	
  objectives	
  and	
  targets	
  continues	
  in	
  the	
  next	
  section,	
  which	
  outlines	
  the	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  decided	
  through	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations,	
  and	
  how	
  they	
  have	
  been	
  established	
  in	
  law.	
  	
  	
  	
   	
   81	
   5.2.2 EBM Operating Rules Established as Law 	
  Through	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations,	
  and	
  with	
  the	
  support	
  of	
  industry	
  and	
  environmental	
  stakeholders,	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  recommended	
  by	
  the	
  LRMP	
  tables	
  were	
  initially	
  refined	
  in	
  the	
  2006	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Protocol	
  Agreement,	
  then	
  formally	
  established	
  between	
  2007	
  and	
  2009	
  using	
  the	
  Land	
  Act’s	
  Land	
  Use	
  Objectives	
  Regulation	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009c).	
  The	
  Legal	
  Orders	
  require	
  licensees	
  to	
  implement	
  EBM	
  in	
  the	
  region,	
  and	
  allowable	
  annual	
  cut	
  levels	
  were	
  decreased	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  times	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  to	
  reflect	
  EBM	
  and	
  the	
  protected	
  areas.	
  The	
  Legal	
  Objectives	
  supplement	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  legal	
  enactments	
  in	
  the	
  province,	
  including	
  the	
   Forest	
  and	
  Range	
  Practices	
  Act,	
  Heritage	
  Conservation	
  Act,	
  Wildlife	
  Act,	
  Forest	
  Planning	
   and	
  Practices	
  Regulation,	
  Land	
  Use	
  Objectives	
  Regulation,	
  and	
  numerous	
  others	
  identified	
  in	
  the	
  legal	
  orders	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2008b).	
  	
  	
  	
  Two	
  orders	
  outline	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  in	
  the	
  region:	
  the	
  South	
  Central	
  Coast	
  Land	
  Use	
  Order,	
  and	
  the	
  Central	
  and	
  North	
  Coast	
  Land	
  Use	
  Order.	
  Both	
  became	
  effective	
  March	
  27,	
  2009,	
  and	
  replaced	
  the	
  initial	
  2007	
  and	
  2008	
  incarnations	
  of	
  these	
  Orders.	
  The	
  Orders	
  put	
  in	
  place	
  15	
  categories	
  of	
  Legal	
  Objectives,	
  including	
  	
  objectives	
  that	
  regulate	
  the	
  range	
  of	
  natural	
  variability	
  (RONV),	
  the	
  example	
  of	
  an	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rule	
  being	
  decided	
  through	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  that	
  was	
  introduced	
  in	
  the	
  previous	
  section.	
  	
  	
  The	
  2009	
  Legal	
  Objectives	
  assign	
  RONV	
  targets	
  to	
  landscape	
  level	
  (larger)	
  and	
  site	
  series	
  (smaller	
  ecological	
  communities	
  based	
  on	
  climate	
  and	
  geography),	
  reflective	
  of	
  the	
  rarity	
  of	
  the	
  site	
  series	
  –	
  very	
  rare,	
  rare,	
  modal,	
  common,	
  and	
  very	
  common.28	
  	
  Through	
  the	
  Orders,	
  rare	
  and	
  very	
  rare	
  site	
  series	
  are	
  assigned	
  70%	
  RONV	
  targets,	
  modal	
  site	
  series	
  are	
  assigned	
  50%	
  RONV	
  targets,	
  and	
  common	
  or	
  very	
  common	
  site	
  series	
  are	
  assigned	
  30%	
  RONV	
  targets.	
  The	
  preamble	
  to	
  the	
  Orders	
  read	
  that	
  “the	
  intent	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  28	
  Site	
  series	
  level	
  ecosystem	
  mapping	
  is	
  not	
  yet	
  complete	
  for	
  the	
  entire	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest,	
  so	
  site	
  series	
  surrogates,	
  defined	
  by	
  a	
  combination	
  of	
  forest	
  attributes,	
  are	
  presently	
  being	
  used	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2008b).	
   	
   82	
   is	
  to	
  maintain	
  old	
  forest	
  representation	
  at	
  50%	
  of	
  the	
  range	
  of	
  natural	
  variability	
  across	
  the	
  combined	
  area	
  covered	
  by	
  the	
  South	
  Central	
  and	
  Central	
  and	
  North	
  Coast	
  Orders”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009e).	
  The	
  Orders	
  include	
  a	
  full	
  listing	
  of	
  all	
  landscape	
  units	
  in	
  the	
  region,	
  and	
  assign	
  a	
  RONV	
  target	
  for	
  each	
  between	
  30%	
  and	
  70%.	
  Reflecting	
  “Flexibility	
  Principles”,	
  the	
  Orders	
  allow	
  any	
  site	
  series	
  within	
  those	
  landscape	
  units	
  to	
  be	
  managed	
  at	
  a	
  30%	
  RONV	
  “risk	
  managed	
  target”	
  after	
  information	
  sharing	
  or	
  consultation	
  with	
  the	
  affected	
  First	
  Nation(s),	
  a	
  landscape	
  unit	
  habitat	
  assessment	
  for	
  species	
  at	
  risk	
  and	
  regionally	
  important	
  wildlife	
  is	
  completed,	
  and	
  an	
  adaptive	
  management	
  plan	
  is	
  developed	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009e,	
  14(6);	
  Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009f,	
  14(6)).	
  	
  Environmental	
  alliance,	
  Rainforest	
  Solutions	
  Project	
  (2010,	
  5),	
  cites	
  an	
  “additional	
  700,000	
  hectares	
  of	
  forest	
  set	
  aside	
  from	
  logging”	
  under	
  the	
  regional	
  50%	
  range	
  of	
  natural	
  variability	
  target.	
  Environmental	
  organizations	
  maintain	
  a	
  lobby	
  for	
  “logging	
  regulations	
  to	
  be	
  revised	
  upwards	
  to	
  maintain	
  70%	
  of	
  natural	
  levels	
  of	
  old	
  growth	
  over	
  time”	
  (Rainforest	
  Solutions	
  Project	
  2010,	
  3).	
  One	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewee	
  noted	
  that	
  the	
  forest	
  companies	
  are	
  internally	
  analysing	
  whether	
  they	
  believe	
  that	
  a	
  70%	
  RONV	
  target	
  would	
  be	
  economically	
  feasible	
  for	
  them.	
  If	
  they	
  decide	
  that	
  it	
  is,	
  then	
  it	
  may	
  be	
  that	
  they	
  will	
  offer	
  to	
  support	
  the	
  70%	
  RONV	
  target	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  resolve	
  the	
  environmental	
  sector	
  lobby	
  for	
  low	
  ecological	
  risk	
  and	
  precipitate	
  certainty	
  in	
  the	
  EBM	
  rules	
  governing	
  the	
  land	
  base.	
  Of	
  course,	
  final	
  Legal	
  Objective	
  decisions	
  need	
  to	
  reflect	
  the	
  input	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  through	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations.	
  Through	
  adaptive	
  management,	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  may	
  recommend	
  different	
  RONV	
  objectives	
  than	
  those	
  that	
  are	
  being	
  lobbied	
  for	
  by	
  environmental	
  and	
  other	
  stakeholders,	
  explored	
  further	
  in	
  the	
  sub-­‐section	
  on	
  the	
  human	
  well-­‐being	
  side	
  of	
  EBM.	
  	
  	
  	
  Table	
  5.1	
  provides	
  two	
  further	
  examples	
  of	
  Legal	
  Objectives	
  that	
  were	
  implemented	
  through	
  the	
  2009	
  Central	
  and	
  North	
  Coast	
  Order.	
  	
  The	
  full	
  set	
  of	
  Legal	
  Objectives	
  implemented	
  through	
  the	
  2009	
  South	
  Central	
  Coast	
  and	
  Central	
  and	
  North	
  Coast	
  Orders	
  fall	
  under	
  First	
  Nations	
  resources	
  and	
  heritage	
  features,	
  aquatic	
  habitats,	
  and	
  biodiversity	
  headings.	
   	
   83	
   	
   Table	
  5.1	
  	
  	
  	
  Examples	
  of	
  EBM	
  Operating	
  Rules	
  Implemented	
  Through	
  Central	
  and	
  North	
  Coast	
   Land	
  Use	
  Objectives	
  Order,	
  2009	
   Legal	
  Objective	
   Intent	
  of	
  Objective	
  Objective	
  3	
  (1) Maintain	
  traditional	
  forest	
  resources	
  in	
  a	
  manner	
  that	
  supports	
  First	
  Nations’	
  food,	
  social	
  and	
  ceremonial	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  forest.	
   The	
  intent	
  of	
  this	
  objective	
  is	
  to	
  provide	
  for	
  the	
  maintenance	
  of	
  traditional	
  forest	
  resources	
  thus	
  allowing	
  for	
  continued	
  use	
  by	
  First	
  Nations.	
  The	
  objective	
  directs	
  Licensees	
  to	
  seek	
  information	
  from	
  applicable	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  from	
  other	
  sources	
  regarding	
  identification	
  of	
  traditional	
  forest	
  resources,	
  and	
  to	
  develop	
  and	
  implement	
  management	
  practices	
  that	
  maintain	
  those	
  resources	
  for	
  food,	
  social	
  and	
  ceremonial	
  use.	
  Objective	
  15	
  (1) Protect	
  each	
  occurrence	
  of	
  a	
  red-­‐listed	
  plant	
  community	
  during	
  a	
  primary	
  forest	
  activity.	
  (2) Despite	
  subsection	
  (1),	
  up	
  to	
  5%	
  of	
  each	
  occurrence	
  of	
  a	
  red-­‐listed	
  plan	
  community	
  may	
  be	
  distributed	
  if	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  practicable	
  alternative	
  for	
  road	
  access,	
  other	
  infrastructure	
  or	
  to	
  address	
  a	
  safety	
  concern.	
  	
  (3) Protect	
  at	
  least	
  70%	
  of	
  each	
  occurrence	
  of	
  a	
  blue-­‐listed	
  plant	
  community	
  set	
  out	
  in	
  Schedule	
  6	
  during	
  a	
  primary	
  forest	
  activity	
  or	
  protect	
  at	
  least	
  70%	
  of	
  each	
  type	
  of	
  blue-­‐listed	
  plant	
  community	
  that	
  occurs	
  in	
  a	
  landscape	
  unit.	
   The	
  intent	
  of	
  this	
  objective	
  is	
  to	
  protect	
  and	
  maintain	
  the	
  abundance	
  and	
  distribution	
  of	
  existing	
  rare,	
  threatened	
  and	
  endangered	
  ecosystems.	
  All	
  occurrences	
  of	
  red-­‐listed	
  plant	
  communities	
  (as	
  defined	
  in	
  Schedule	
  5	
  the	
  Orders)	
  are	
  to	
  be	
  protected,	
  while	
  at	
  least	
  70%	
  of	
  the	
  occurrences	
  of	
  blue-­‐listed	
  plant	
  communities	
  (as	
  defined	
  in	
  Schedule	
  6	
  of	
  the	
  Orders)	
  are	
  to	
  be	
  protected.	
  Flexibility	
  is	
  provided	
  by	
  allowing	
  very	
  limited	
  harvesting	
  of	
  red-­‐listed	
  plant	
  communities	
  only	
  when	
  necessary	
  for	
  road	
  access	
  or	
  safety	
  and	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  practicable	
  alternative,	
  and	
  by	
  allowing	
  harvesting	
  of	
  a	
  proportion	
  of	
  blue	
  listed	
  plant	
  communities.	
  Source:(Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009e)	
   Source:	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2008b)29	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  29	
  The	
  Background	
  and	
  Intent	
  Document	
  for	
  the	
  South	
  Central	
  Coast	
  and	
  Central	
  and	
   North	
  Coast	
  Land	
  Use	
  Orders	
  provides	
  non-­‐binding	
  guidance	
  on	
  how	
  to	
  implement	
  the	
  2007	
  and	
  2008	
  Orders,	
  which	
  were	
  then	
  replaced	
  in	
  2009.	
  I	
  have	
  seen	
  a	
  draft	
  version	
  of	
  an	
  updated	
  Background	
  and	
  Intent	
  Document,	
  and	
  there	
  had	
  been	
  no	
  material	
  change	
  to	
  the	
  intent	
  of	
  the	
  objectives	
  as	
  of	
  that	
  draft.	
   	
   84	
   5.2.3 March 31, 2009 – EBM Fully Implemented  	
  On	
  March	
  31,	
  2009,	
  the	
  Province,	
  with	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations,	
  Nanwakolas	
  Council,	
  and	
  environment	
  and	
  industry	
  stakeholders,	
  announced	
  that	
  EBM	
  had	
  been	
  fully	
  implemented	
  in	
  the	
  Great	
  Bear	
  Rainforest.	
  The	
  major	
  accomplishments	
  to	
  this	
  end	
  included	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  land	
  use	
  zones,	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules,	
  governance	
  protocols,	
  and	
  an	
  EBM	
  Adaptive	
  Management	
  steering	
  committee	
  that	
  includes	
  input	
  from	
  stakeholders,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  accomplishments	
  related	
  to	
  economic	
  strategies	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009a;	
  Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  et	
  al.	
  2009).30	
  	
  	
  With	
  the	
  announcement,	
  the	
  Province	
  reported	
  that	
  all	
  First	
  Nations	
  with	
  traditional	
  territories	
  in	
  the	
  plan	
  area	
  were	
  consulted	
  during	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐governments	
  processes	
  following	
  the	
  conclusion	
  of	
  the	
  LRMP	
  recommendations	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2006b)	
  but	
  not	
  all	
  have	
  subsequently	
  finalized	
  land	
  use	
  agreements.	
  By	
  that	
  date,	
  20	
  First	
  Nations	
  had	
  established	
  land	
  use	
  agreements	
  with	
  the	
  Province	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009a),	
  either	
  directly	
  or	
  through	
  coalitions.	
  One	
  outstanding	
  case	
  is	
  the	
  Lax	
  Kw’alaams	
  First	
  Nation,	
  whose	
  traditional	
  territory	
  largely	
  overlaps	
  that	
  of	
  the	
  Metlakatla	
  First	
  Nation,	
  a	
  member	
  of	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations.	
  The	
  Lax	
  Kw’alaams	
  and	
  the	
  Province	
  established	
  a	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  Use	
  Planning	
  Agreement	
  in	
  2008,	
  acknowledging:	
  “the	
  Lax	
  Kw’alaams	
  First	
  Nation	
  Strategic	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Use	
  Plan…which	
  creates	
  certain	
  zones,	
  including	
  Cultural	
  and	
  Natural	
  areas	
  that	
  are	
  not	
  the	
  same	
  in	
  area	
  or	
  permitted	
  uses	
  as	
  the	
  land	
  use	
  zones”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Lax	
  Kw'alaams	
  First	
  Nation	
  2009,	
  Preamble).	
  Also	
  stated	
  in	
  the	
  agreement	
  preamble	
  is	
  the	
  Lax	
  Kw’alaams	
  assertion	
  that:	
  “The	
  Province	
  has	
  duties	
  of	
  consultation	
  and	
  accommodation	
  in	
  respect	
  of	
  the	
  LRMP	
  which	
  have	
  not	
  yet	
  been	
  met.”	
  The	
  Lax	
  Kw’alaams	
  is	
  independently	
  negotiating	
  a	
  treaty	
  with	
  Canada	
  and	
  BC	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2011b),	
  but	
  the	
  2008	
  agreement	
  does	
  commit	
  the	
  Parties	
  to	
  continuing	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations	
  towards	
  a	
  resolution.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  30	
  See	
  also	
  “Definition	
  of	
  Full	
  Implementation	
  of	
  EBM	
  by	
  March	
  31,	
  2009”,	
  July	
  10,	
  2007,	
  Joint	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Forum.	
  	
   	
   85	
   5.2.4 Mechanisms for Future Amendments to EBM Rules 	
  Unlike	
  land	
  use	
  zones,	
  there	
  has	
  always	
  been	
  an	
  understanding	
  that	
  the	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  would	
  be	
  monitored	
  to	
  determine	
  whether	
  ecological	
  integrity	
  is	
  being	
  maintained	
  and	
  human	
  well-­‐being	
  improved,	
  and	
  that	
  EBM	
  rules	
  would	
  be	
  adapted	
  to	
  reflect	
  evolving	
  information	
  and	
  understandings.	
  An	
  adaptive	
  management	
  approach	
  is	
  central	
  to	
  the	
  EBM	
  definitions	
  developed	
  in	
  the	
  2001	
  General	
  Protocol	
  Agreement	
  and	
  by	
  the	
  Coast	
  Information	
  Team,	
  and	
  an	
  EBM	
  Adaptive	
  Management	
  Steering	
  Committee	
  was	
  established	
  in	
  2009	
  to	
  provide	
  support	
  to	
  the	
  Parties	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  et	
  al.	
  2009).	
  The	
  considerable	
  geographical	
  and	
  conceptual	
  scope	
  of	
  EBM,	
  as	
  envisioned	
  for	
  the	
  North	
  and	
  Central	
  Coast,	
  present	
  uncertainties,	
  and	
  “new	
  information,	
  research	
  or	
  improved	
  analysis	
  may	
  be	
  utilized	
  to	
  modify	
  and	
  improve	
  management	
  activities”	
  (NC-­‐LRMP	
  Table	
  2005,	
  3.2.9).	
  	
  The	
  amendment	
  process	
  recommended	
  in	
  the	
  LRMPs	
  is	
  specific	
  to	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  potential	
  amendment.	
  While	
  minor	
  adjustments	
  that	
  do	
  not	
  upset	
  the	
  overall	
  vision	
  of	
  the	
  recommendations	
  may	
  be	
  implemented	
  as	
  they	
  arise	
  and	
  are	
  agreed	
  upon	
  by	
  the	
  Parties,	
  a	
  periodic	
  comprehensive	
  review	
  is	
  recommended	
  to	
  consider	
  all	
  changes	
  and	
  revisions	
  in	
  context.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  Parties,	
  with	
  the	
  support	
  of	
  the	
  environmental	
  and	
  industry	
  associations,	
  have	
  committed	
  to	
  complete	
  a	
  review	
  of	
  the	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  and	
  have	
  any	
  amendments	
  in	
  place	
  by	
  2014	
  (Carr	
  2009).	
  The	
  Parties,	
  including	
  environmental	
  and	
  industry	
  stakeholders	
  have	
  agreed	
  that	
  objective	
  of	
  the	
  review	
  “will	
  be	
  to	
  seek	
  to	
  concurrently	
  achieve	
  low	
  ecological	
  risk	
  and	
  high	
  human	
  well-­‐being	
  and,	
  if	
  this	
  is	
  not	
  possible,	
  seek	
  meaningful	
  increments	
  towards	
  both”	
  (Carr	
  2009,	
  3;	
  Rainforest	
  Solutions	
  Project	
  2010,	
  5).	
  	
  As	
  for	
  the	
  mechanism	
  for	
  future	
  amendments	
  to	
  EBM	
  rules,	
  the	
  2006	
  Land	
  and	
  Resources	
  Protocol	
  had	
  committed	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  to:	
  	
  “undertake	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  discussions	
  through	
  the	
  [governance	
  forum],	
  and/or	
  [supporting	
  technical	
  committees],	
  as	
  the	
  Parties	
  agree,	
  on	
  matters	
   	
   86	
   related	
  to	
  implementation	
  of	
  EBM	
  including:	
  e)	
  assisting	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  procedures	
  to	
  guide	
  the	
  amendment	
  of	
  Management	
  Objectives	
  and	
  Legal	
  Objectives”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2006a,	
  5).	
  	
  Asked	
  whether	
  such	
  procedures	
  have	
  been	
  developed,	
  interviewees	
  confirmed	
  that	
  there	
  have	
  not.	
  Instead,	
  they	
  say,	
  following	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  energy	
  that	
  has	
  gone	
  into	
  establishing	
  the	
  plans,	
  now	
  is	
  the	
  time	
  to	
  allow	
  EBM	
  to	
  function	
  in	
  practice.	
  Having	
  the	
  2014	
  date	
  set	
  takes	
  the	
  pressure	
  off	
  of	
  establishing	
  procedures	
  at	
  this	
  stage	
  beyond	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  negotiations	
  through	
  the	
  governance	
  forums,	
  as	
  was	
  used	
  to	
  establish	
  the	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  to	
  this	
  point.	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee	
  reminds	
  us	
  that	
  the	
  flexibility	
  principles	
  built	
  into	
  EBM	
  also	
  alleviate	
  the	
  pressure	
  for	
  amendments	
  by	
  allowing	
  for	
  “a	
  common	
  system	
  with	
  some	
  minor	
  adjustments	
  at	
  the	
  local	
  level.”	
  	
  Considering	
  the	
  energy	
  that	
  goes	
  into	
  establishing	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules	
  as	
  legal	
  objectives,	
  it	
  may	
  be	
  less	
  desirable	
  for	
  all	
  parties	
  to	
  direct	
  energy	
  back	
  into	
  amendments	
  on	
  an	
  individual,	
  one-­‐off	
  basis,	
  when	
  instead,	
  amendments	
  could	
  be	
  considered	
  broadly	
  at	
  agreed	
  intervals.	
  One	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewee	
  explains:	
  “If	
  a	
  First	
  Nation	
  said	
  we	
  want	
  to…change	
  a	
  legal	
  objective,	
  or	
  this	
  is	
  too	
  onerous	
  for	
  us,	
  and	
  they	
  brought	
  it	
  to	
  the	
  [governance	
  forum],	
  the	
  Province	
  wouldn’t	
  say	
  ‘we’re	
  not	
  going	
  to	
  talk	
  to	
  you	
  about	
  it.’	
  That’s	
  for	
  sure.	
  They	
  would	
  sit	
  down	
  and	
  say,	
  okay	
  does	
  it	
  make	
  sense,	
  they	
  would	
  see	
  what	
  they	
  could	
  do	
  about	
  it,	
  or	
  they	
  would	
  say	
  ‘Look,	
  can	
  you	
  hold	
  off	
  on	
  it?’	
  Often	
  what	
  they’ll	
  do	
  is	
  they’ll	
  say,	
  ‘Look,	
  we	
  just	
  won’t	
  implement	
  that	
  whatever	
  it	
  is	
  you	
  wanted,	
  we’ll	
  wait	
  until	
  2014.’	
  That’s	
  what	
  they’d	
  probably	
  say	
  now,	
  that	
  2014’s	
  coming	
  up,	
  let’s	
  take	
  that	
  on	
  notice	
  with	
  these	
  other	
  changes	
  that	
  are	
  going	
  to	
  come	
  up.”	
  The	
  interviewees	
  agreed	
  that	
  the	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  governance	
  forum	
  is	
  currently	
  less	
  active	
  while	
  the	
  Parties	
  and	
  stakeholders	
  work	
  on	
  their	
  own	
  internal	
  processes	
  in	
  preparation	
  for	
  this	
  next	
  milestone.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
   87	
   5.2.5 Looking Forward – The Human Well-Being Side of Ecosystem-Based Management 	
  Although	
  EBM	
  was	
  always	
  intended	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  dynamic	
  process,	
  the	
  2014	
  review	
  is	
  specifically	
  required	
  to	
  review	
  new	
  information,	
  and	
  to	
  address	
  still	
  unsettled	
  objectives	
  around	
  one	
  ecological	
  pillar	
  of	
  EBM	
  –	
  the	
  range	
  of	
  natural	
  variability	
  (RONV)	
  (Carr	
  2009;	
  Rainforest	
  Solutions	
  Project	
  2010).	
  Interviewees	
  all	
  explained	
  that	
  the	
  emphasis	
  of	
  EBM	
  planning	
  so	
  far	
  rested	
  on	
  ecological	
  integrity,	
  and	
  primarily	
  on	
  determining	
  the	
  RONV	
  for	
  individual	
  landscape	
  units	
  to	
  maintain	
  ecological	
  integrity,	
  but	
  EBM	
  must	
  be	
  a	
  balance	
  of	
  ecological	
  integrity	
  and	
  human	
  well-­‐being.	
  One	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewee,	
  for	
  example,	
  noted:	
  	
  “Well,	
  unless	
  you’re	
  talking	
  about	
  complete	
  protection,	
  if	
  you’re	
  talking	
  about	
  harvesting,	
  the	
  reason	
  why	
  you	
  are	
  leaving	
  enough	
  trees	
  is	
  because	
  you	
  want	
  to	
  protect	
  other	
  values,	
  right,	
  but	
  you	
  may	
  [still]	
  protect	
  those	
  values	
  with	
  less	
  tress.	
  And	
  when	
  you	
  look	
  at	
  the	
  economics,	
  you	
  may	
  leave	
  all	
  those	
  trees	
  and	
  not	
  be	
  economically	
  viable,	
  so	
  can	
  you	
  leave	
  less	
  and	
  still	
  protect	
  other	
  values.”	
  	
  In	
  fact,	
  interviewees	
  agreed	
  that	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  were	
  not	
  entirely	
  comfortable	
  with	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  2009	
  Legal	
  Objectives,	
  despite	
  consenting	
  to	
  them.	
  The	
  concerns	
  of	
  these	
  nations,	
  hinted	
  at	
  in	
  the	
  statement	
  above,	
  is	
  that	
  the	
  human	
  well-­‐being	
  elements	
  have	
  not	
  received	
  as	
  much	
  emphasis	
  as	
  they	
  had	
  hoped.	
  There	
  is	
  a	
  clear	
  understanding	
  among	
  the	
  interviewees,	
  and	
  indeed	
  the	
  environmental	
  sector,	
  that	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  are	
  hesitant	
  to	
  put	
  their	
  support	
  behind	
  higher	
  ecological	
  integrity	
  standards	
  unless	
  human	
  well-­‐being	
  elements	
  are	
  strengthened	
  through	
  economic	
  benefits	
  like	
  job	
  creation.	
  	
  	
  One	
  government	
  interviewee,	
  however,	
  explains	
  that	
  indicators	
  around	
  human	
  well-­‐being	
  are	
  more	
  difficult	
  to	
  establish:	
   	
  “We	
  did	
  some	
  work	
  in	
  the	
  past	
  where	
  we	
  talked	
  about	
  indicators,	
  but	
  they’re	
  all	
  just	
  surrogates	
  on	
  the	
  social	
  side	
  of	
  the	
  equation,	
  you	
  can’t	
  actually	
  do	
  a	
  strong	
  cause	
  and	
  effect.	
  And	
  because	
  it	
  is	
  a	
  real	
  problem	
  to	
  say,	
  well	
  a	
  land	
  use	
  decision	
  causes	
  poor	
  education.	
  You	
  can’t	
  quite	
  get	
  there,	
  even	
  though	
  sometimes	
  intuitively	
  you	
  know	
  that	
  there’s	
  a	
  link,	
  but	
  you	
  can’t	
  put	
  your	
  finger	
  on	
  it.	
  And	
  then	
  how	
  to	
  fix	
  it	
  becomes	
  a	
  whole	
  other	
  question.”	
   	
   88	
   Despite	
  the	
  challenges	
  to	
  developing	
  a	
  clear	
  path	
  toward	
  human	
  well-­‐being,	
  the	
  2009	
  Land	
  Use	
  Legal	
  Objectives	
  do	
  establish	
  one	
  indicator.	
  The	
  preamble	
  to	
  the	
  Land	
  Use	
  Orders	
  reads:	
  	
  “Progress	
  will	
  be	
  assessed	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  ecological	
  and	
  human	
  well-­‐being	
  performance	
  indicators,	
  such	
  as	
  maintenance	
  of	
  high	
  levels	
  of	
  old	
  growth	
  forest	
  representation	
  (i.e.	
  70%	
  of	
  the	
  range	
  of	
  natural	
  variability	
  (RONV))	
  and	
  increases	
  in	
  employment	
  levels	
  (i.e.	
  equal	
  to	
  the	
  Canadian	
  average)”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  2009c).	
  Interviewees	
  anticipate	
  great	
  challenges	
  and	
  considerable	
  time	
  to	
  get	
  the	
  coastal	
  communities	
  to	
  employment	
  levels	
  equal	
  to	
  the	
  Canadian	
  average,	
  but	
  human	
  well-­‐being	
  on	
  the	
  coast	
  relates	
  to	
  a	
  range	
  of	
  social	
  elements	
  such	
  as	
  “access	
  to	
  education,	
  access	
  to	
  health	
  care,	
  health	
  of	
  community	
  members,	
  sense	
  of	
  place,	
  [and	
  a]	
  sense	
  of	
  community”	
  (EBM	
  Learning	
  Forum	
  2008).	
  Nonetheless,	
  maintaining	
  ecological	
  integrity	
  while	
  increasing	
  human	
  well-­‐being	
  will	
  continue	
  to	
  be	
  the	
  driving	
  influences	
  for	
  Crown-­‐Coastal	
  First	
  Nation	
  decisions	
  in	
  the	
  foreseeable	
  future.	
  	
  	
  	
   5.3 Function 3 – Approval of Operational Plans (Land and Resource Decisions) 	
  The	
  third	
  and	
  final	
  decision	
  function	
  under	
  investigation	
  in	
  this	
  thesis	
  are	
  the	
  decisions	
  surrounding	
  the	
  approval	
  of	
  operational	
  plans.	
  West	
  Coast	
  Environmental	
  Law	
  (2001,	
  3–1)	
  describes	
  operational	
  planning	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia:	
  Operational	
  plans	
  are	
  plans	
  for	
  forest	
  and	
  range	
  practices	
  that	
  will	
  be	
  carried	
  out	
  on	
  a	
  specific	
  area	
  of	
  land.	
  A	
  fundamental	
  difference	
  between	
  operational	
  plans	
  and	
  strategic	
  land	
  use	
  plans	
  [e.g.	
  LRMPs]	
  is	
  who	
  prepares	
  these	
  plans.	
  For	
  most	
  of	
  the	
  province,	
  operational	
  plans	
  are	
  prepared	
  by	
  licensees,	
  rather	
  than	
  by	
  government	
  agencies	
  or	
  multi-­‐stakeholder	
  planning	
  tables.”	
  	
  	
  In	
  December	
  2009,	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  the	
  Province	
  signed	
  a	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  that	
  further	
  extends	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  decision-­‐making	
  to	
  include	
  engagement	
  on	
  operational	
  plan	
  approval.31	
  The	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  31	
  The	
  Nuxalk	
  Nation	
  became	
  a	
  signatory	
  in	
  December	
  2010,	
  and	
  the	
  Haisla	
  Nation	
  are	
  not	
  signatory	
  to	
  the	
  decision-­‐making	
  Engagement	
  Framework,	
  Schedule	
  B.	
  The	
   	
   89	
   includes	
  an	
  Engagement	
  Framework	
  that	
  outlines	
  processes	
  for	
  engagement	
  and	
  decision-­‐making	
  regarding	
  an	
  extensive	
  range	
  of	
  ongoing	
  Land	
  and	
  Resource	
  Decisions,	
  defined	
  in	
  the	
  agreement	
  as:	
  “an	
  administrative	
  or	
  operational	
  decision,	
  or	
  the	
  approval	
  or	
  renewal	
  of	
  a	
  tenure,	
  permit,	
  or	
  other	
  authorizations”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2009,	
  Schedule	
  B.	
  1.1).	
  The	
  agreement	
  gives	
  the	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  increased	
  involvement	
  in	
  a	
  broader	
  set	
  of	
  decisions	
  that	
  affect	
  their	
  traditional	
  territories,	
  incremental	
  to	
  standard	
  consultation	
  and	
  accommodation,	
  and	
  may	
  further	
  expand	
  their	
  influence	
  around	
  economic	
  development	
  through	
  increased	
  participation.	
  The	
  agreement	
  also	
  includes	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  economic	
  opportunities,	
  which,	
  one	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewee	
  explains,	
  were	
  being	
  pursued	
  at	
  the	
  time	
  the	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  was	
  first	
  being	
  formulated.	
  	
  	
  The	
  highest	
  strategic-­‐level	
  operational	
  plan	
  in	
  British	
  Columbia	
  is	
  the	
  Forest	
  Stewardship	
  Plan,	
  and	
  is	
  an	
  example	
  of	
  an	
  application	
  that	
  would	
  certainly	
  trigger	
  the	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol.	
  Under	
  the	
  Forest	
  and	
  Range	
  Practices	
  Act,	
  all	
  major	
  tenure	
  holders	
  must	
  prepare	
  a	
  Forest	
  Stewardship	
  Plan,	
  and	
  gain	
  government	
  approval	
  before	
  conducting	
  any	
  operations	
  on	
  the	
  land	
  base.	
  The	
  tenure	
  holder	
  must	
  explain	
  how	
  the	
  plan	
  addresses	
  all	
  land	
  use	
  regulations	
  applicable	
  to	
  that	
  area,	
  including	
  EBM	
  operating	
  rules,	
  using	
  strategies	
  that	
  are	
  measurable	
  and	
  enforceable.	
  Forest	
  Stewardship	
  Plans	
  are	
  generally	
  approved	
  for	
  five	
  year	
  periods	
  (BC	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Forests	
  2004,	
  1).	
  	
  	
  Having	
  established	
  the	
  2009	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol,	
  there	
  was	
  still	
  need	
  for	
  all	
  Parties	
  to	
  have	
  some	
  clarification	
  around	
  the	
  Engagement	
  Framework	
  in	
  Schedule	
  B,	
  displayed	
  in	
  Figure	
  5.2	
  The	
  framework	
  indicates	
  which	
  criteria,	
  referred	
  to	
  as	
  ‘Decision	
  Characteristics’,	
  dictate	
  the	
  appropriate	
  Engagement	
  Level	
  and	
  corresponding	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  on	
  operational	
  plan	
  approval.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  agreement	
  also	
  includes	
  schedules	
  dedicated	
  to	
  carbon	
  offsets	
  and	
  other	
  economic	
  opportunities	
  and	
  strategies	
  “that	
  enable	
  the	
  Nations	
  and	
  First	
  Nations	
  to	
  make	
  progress	
  toward	
  socioeconomic	
  objectives”	
  (Government	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  2009,	
  Preamble).	
   	
   90	
   In	
  the	
  time	
  since	
  the	
  Protocol	
  was	
  signed,	
  the	
  Province	
  and	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  have	
  been	
  developing	
  The	
  Engagement	
  Framework	
  Guidebook.	
  Although	
  the	
  guidebook	
  is	
  still	
  to	
  be	
  finalized,	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  and	
  the	
  Province	
  began	
  implementing	
  it	
  in	
  April	
  2011.	
  Interviewees	
  explained	
  that	
  in	
  the	
  time	
  between	
  the	
  signing	
  of	
  the	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol	
  in	
  December	
  2009,	
  and	
  April	
  2011,	
  the	
  Engagement	
  Framework	
  was	
  not	
  being	
  formally	
  used	
  while	
  elements	
  of	
  it	
  were	
  still	
  under	
  negotiation.	
  One	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewee	
  signals	
  the	
  early	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  framework:	
  	
  “One	
  of	
  the	
  things	
  we	
  want	
  to	
  do	
  with	
  the	
  Guidebook	
  is	
  to	
  assess	
  and	
  evaluate	
  its	
  effectiveness	
  as	
  a	
  management	
  tool.	
  And	
  that	
  this	
  year	
  would	
  be	
  a	
  year	
  of	
  testing	
  it	
  out,	
  learning	
  about	
  it,	
  and	
  determining	
  where	
  we	
  might	
  have	
  to	
  make	
  changes	
  to	
  make	
  a	
  more	
  effective	
  public	
  policy	
  document.”	
  	
  One	
  element	
  of	
  the	
  Engagement	
  Framework	
  still	
  under	
  negotiation	
  relates	
  directly	
  to	
  the	
  extent	
  of	
  First	
  Nations	
  power	
  in	
  decisions	
  regarding	
  approval	
  of	
  operational	
  plans.	
  The	
  Engagement	
  Framework	
  is	
  designed	
  to	
  assign	
  different	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  engagement	
  protocols	
  for	
  each	
  Engagement	
  Level.	
  A	
  critical	
  feature	
  of	
  the	
  decision-­‐making	
  framework	
  is	
  jointly	
  agreeing	
  on	
  the	
  appropriate	
  Engagement	
  Level	
  at	
  the	
  outset	
  of	
  an	
  application	
  process.	
  Without	
  agreement	
  from	
  First	
  Nations	
  on	
  the	
  Engagement	
  Level,	
  the	
  power	
  of	
  that	
  nation	
  may	
  be	
  truncated,	
  and	
  the	
  government-­‐to-­‐government	
  decision-­‐making	
  relationship	
  eroded.	
  One	
  Coastal	
  First	
  Nations	
  interviewee	
  notes	
  that	
  throughout	
  this	
  process	
  there	
  have	
  been	
  concerns	
  on	
  both	
  sides	
  about	
  how	
  Engagement	
  Levels	
  will	
  be	
  decided.	
  According	
  to	
  the	
  Reconciliation	
  Protocol,	
  if	
  the	
  Province	
  proposes	
  an	
  Engagement	
  Level	
  that	
  the	
  applicable	
  First	
  Nation	
  disagrees	
  with,	
  the	
  First	
  Nation	
  is	
  to	
  propose	
  their	
  own	
  suggested	
  level,	
  and	
  the	
  Parties	
  are	
  then	
  to	
  try	
  to	
  reach	
  consensus	
  on	
  this	
  matter	
  within	
  two	
  business	
  days.	
  If	
  consensus	
  isn’t	
  reached	
  in	
  that	
  timeframe,	
  the	
  agreement	
  (ss.	
  3.3-­‐3.4)	
  directs	
  that	
  a	
  third	
  party,	
  agreed	
  to	
  by	
  the	
  Parties,	
  will	
  make	
  a	
  binding	
  decision.	
  As	
  of	
  summer	
  2011,	
  the	
  Guidebook	
  directed	
  that	
  decision	
  to	
  a	
  professional	
  arbiter,	
  and	
  it	
  is	
  this	
  element	
  that	
  the	
  Parties	
  still	
  must	
  resolve.