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An ethical inquiry : toward education in an infinite condition Giles, Graham 2014

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   AN ETHICAL INQUIRY:  TOWARD EDUCATION IN AN INFINITE CONDITION    by   GRAHAM GILES B.A., Queen?s University 1986 B.Ed., University of British Columbia 2006 M.A., University of British Columbia 2007    A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY   in   THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES  (Cross-Faculty Inquiry in Education)      THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA  (Vancouver)    January, 2014     ? Graham Giles 2014  Abstract  This study is a philosophical inquiry into the ethical conditions of modernity as these bear upon, and are expressed in, the e ducational project.  In m odernity, the ethical is assumed as both a juridical proceduralism  (of codes of ethics for teachers, or of a broader legal context) and a m oral result (of presupposed good and evil, vested in categories like humanity, liberalism, or difference).  When ethics are assumed as completed in th e form of codes or ideals, that is, as present and already acted upon,  there remains little of an ethics of j ustice in the ancient sense of the pursuit of the right way to live.  Supplanted by imperatives of m anage ment and morality, the ethical conditions of living are no longer vital to education.  The problem  is ontologi cal.  The revitalization of the ethical in education requires inquiry into the logics of being.  These logics are widely im plicated and thus the resources for this inquiry are necessarily historiographical, critical, and speculative.  These are deployed in this study in  three thematic movements:  First to the question of education?s ?em p lacement? within the m odern ethos, or ? of what? is educational thought a consequence in the modern ethical settlement; second, how m ay this be seen to be expressed as ethical thought in contem porar y educational discourse;  and third, and on the basis of the previous tw o, to the question of how it m ay be pos sible to re-think education ethicall y.  The modern ethical topogr aphy is articulated as an oscillation among the ontological form s of conceptual realism  (the constructivist procedure of the adequacy of thought to be ing) and those of ethical idealism  (the transcendental production of wh at cannot be thought).   Expressed as ethics of phronesis (practical wisdom ) and alterity in educational thought, these are contested on the basis of generic ontology, or that of immanent infinite multiplicity, toward a sub j ective ethics in  ii education? one that refuses the idealist corruption of the ?object? where ethics are concerned.  To do so, I propose to educational thought a concept of truth elaborated at the intersection of mathematical formalization (? la Badio u) and comic realism (? la Zupan ?i?).    iii  Preface  As a philosophical inquiry, this study draws upon thought from  a broad array of sources, including literary, philo sophical, and  social scientific.  Its interdisciplinary intervention into education tak es p lace at the level of educational foundations, and it is intended to contribute to discussions about the ways in which education is constituted in discourse, as institution and aspiration, as the th eory that lives in pr actice and the practice of theory.  Its overall design is tha t of a theoretical edifice? a ?theo retical fiction? to borrow from de Certeau?s Freud?of educat ional ethical foundation in modernity with and against which to think in re-im agining a nd re-constituting educa tion in a comp lex er a of transformation and uncertainty.  Some of Chap ter 2 is informed by a study previously published as Giles, G. (2013) The Concept of  Practice, Enlightenm ent Rationality and Education:  A Speculative Read ing of Mich el de Certeau?s The Writing of History. Educational Philosophy and Theory. DOI: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.2011.00816.x  iv Table of Contents ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................... ii PREFACE ..................................................................................................................................................... iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................... v GLOSSARY................................................................................................................................................. vii ACK NOWLEDGEMENTS......................................................................................................................... xiii  CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: A PARADOXICA L VOID........................................................................ 1 1.2  RELATED IN EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT................................................................................................. 4 1.3   THE  TRAJECTORY OF THIS STUDY ....................................................................................................... 8 1.4  THEORETICAL RESOURCES:  ONTOLOGY IN FORMALITY, LOGICS &  THE REAL ................................. 12 1.4.1  The Subject and Formal Inquiry ............................................................................................... 13  1.4.2  New Conditions and the Ethics of Logics.................................................................................. 19 1.4.3  Articulations of the Real ........................................................................................................... 23  1.5   ONTOLOGY AND ETHICS OF RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENT.................................................................... 28 CHAPTER 2  THE CONDITIONS FOR ETHICS IN MODERNITY ........................................................ 32  2.1  INTRODUCTION:  ENGAGING CONDITIONS.......................................................................................... 32  2.2  A ?S OCIALIZE D? ETHOS I.  DEVELOPMENTS:  COOLER HEADS PREVAIL............................................. 34  2.3   A ?S OCIALIZE D? ETHOS II.  THE ELEMENTS OF ?E VERYTHING IN GENERAL? ..................................... 37  2.3.1  Elements I:  Metaphysics .......................................................................................................... 38  2.3.2  Elements II:  Legality................................................................................................................ 45  2.3.3  Elements III:  Morality.............................................................................................................. 50  2.3.4  Elements IV:  Knowledge.......................................................................................................... 58  2.4  CONCLUSION:  EDUCATION IN THE SILENCE OF AN ELEMENTAL DISQUIET........................................ 66 CHAPTER 3  MODERN ETHICAL CONSEQUENCES:  ETHICS &  EDUCATION .............................. 70 3. 1  ETHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE MODERN ADVENT......................................................................... 70 3.1.1  Consequences I:  The (lost) Subject .......................................................................................... 71 3.1.2  Consequences II:  Symbolic Enclosure ..................................................................................... 81 3.1.3  Consequences III:  Relations .................................................................................................... 90 3. 2  A CONSEQUENT CONJUNCTION:  ETHICS &  EDUCATION.................................................................... 95  3. 3   EDUCATION ?E MPLACED? IN A GEOGRAPHY OF HAUNTED ITINERARIES .......................................... 101 3. 4  CONCLUSION:  TOWARD ETHICS FROM THE NIGHT OF THE TIME OF THE LIGHT .............................. 109 CHAPTER 4 MODERN ETHICAL HORIZ ONS IN EDUCATION:  REGIME OF A TENSION .......... 112 4.1  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 112 4.2  DE-HERALDING THE PHRONETIC RETURN OF THE ?T HING?.............................................................. 115  4.2.1  Engaging the Phronetic Inheritance ....................................................................................... 115  4.2.2  The Phronetic Subject ............................................................................................................. 121 4.2.3  The Phronetic World............................................................................................................... 13 1 4.2.4  Phronetic Security Confronted:  The Implicate Anathema ..................................................... 140 4.3   THE ETHICS OF THE ?E THICAL TURN? .............................................................................................. 148 4.3.1  Implication I:  Respect (as Redemption of God) ..................................................................... 15 4 4.3.2  Implication II:  Tolerance (as Redemption of Society) ........................................................... 15 9 4.3.3  Implication III:  The Self (as Redemption of Knowledge)....................................................... 167 4.3.4  Alterity and the Guarantee of Decidability ............................................................................. 175  4.4  CONCLUSION:  ETHICS OF MODELS OF REALITY............................................................................... 178 CHAPTER 5 TOWARD A NEW ETHICS OF THE SUBJECT IN EDUCATION.................................. 181 5. 1  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 181  v 5. 2  NEW ETHICAL CONTEX TS ................................................................................................................ 182 5.2.1  The Subjectification Conception of Education........................................................................ 182 5.2.2  Psychoanalysis and Subjective Impossibility .......................................................................... 191 5. 3   SUBJECTIVE ENLIGHTENMENT: MODERN FORMS OF THE SUBJECT .................................................. 201 5.3.1  The Reactive Modern Subject.................................................................................................. 205  5.3.2  The Obscure Modern Subject.................................................................................................. 210 5.3.3  The Faithful Modern Subject .................................................................................................. 214 5. 4  CONCLUSION:  SUBJECTIVE FORMALISM AND MODERN EDUCATIONAL ETHICS .............................. 217 CHAPTER 6 GENERIC ETHICS AND MODES OF REPRESENTATION............................................ 221 6.1  INTRODUCTION:  ARTICULATING SUBJECTIVITY .............................................................................. 221 6.2  IMMANENT ETHICAL CONDITIONS:  SUBTRACTION AND THE LACUNAL INFINITE ............................ 223  6.2.1  Education in Formal Conversion:  Evental Modernity........................................................... 224 6.2.2  The New Infinities of a New Concept of the Infinite................................................................ 229 6.2.3  A Language of the Lacuna and Subjective Heterogeneity....................................................... 23 6 6.3   SUBJECTIVITY AND THE COMIC MODE OF REPRESENTATION ........................................................... 243  6.3.1  Universalities .......................................................................................................................... 244 6.3.2  Subjective Emergence in the Comic Mode of Representation................................................. 248 6.4  SUBJECTIVITY AND THE TRAGIC MODE OF REPRESENTATION.......................................................... 251  6.4.1  Ethicalities .............................................................................................................................. 25 4 6.4.2  Subjective Emergence in the Tragic Mode of Representation................................................. 25 8 6.4.3  Tragic Consequences .............................................................................................................. 264 6.5   INEXHAU STIBLE SUBJECTIVITY:  ?T HIS CANNOT BE RIGHT . . .? ...................................................... 265  6.6  CONCLUSION:  TO BE A REPETITION THAT DIFFERS......................................................................... 271 CHAPTER 7  CONCLUSION:  EDUCATION AS A PLACE OF EMERGENCE .................................. 280 REFERENCES........................................................................................................................................... 285    vi  Glossary This glossary is intended to assist the r eader with som e of the philosophical term s of this text.  It provides a m axi mally reduced sense of the use of many of the terms that become increasing ly importan t as the work pro ceeds.  Thus, when enco untering th e most substantial contribution of the thought of Alain Badiou to this work, the reader will find here very brief definitions of key term s by which to orient her or his reading as it becomes most philo sop hically dense.  For additional quick  reference, in bracke ts are indicated section numbers and/or  footnotes where the  some of the more discrete concepts may be found elaborated further.  Being?In excess of language, undefined ex istence, which both ?haunts? and ?precipitates? continuous existence, or the ?real.?  Contingency?The constitutive incompletion of  discourse, failure of symbolic totality that Badiou comes to figure ( pace Cantor) as actual infinity, an affirmative subjectiv e condition of truth.  Ethics?The search for the righ t way to live, consis ting of inquiry into  the constitution, and conditions of transformation of, subjects and worlds.  Thus  we have the entailm ent of questions of reality and the re-thinking of multiplicity (diversity, transformation, change, heterogeneity, difference etc.).   vii Education? A facilitative engagem ent in the being and becom ing of  subjects-to -truth?one cast as a responsibility to lead in non-sophistic (non-sta tist) pedagogies and curricula?f idelity to, and languages of, which are concerns  of ethical inquiry in education.  In a Badiouian universe, such is to ?reestablish the link of truth and education . . . as fundamental condition of the very po ssibility of the latter?  (Bartlett, 2011, pp. 5-6).   Event?Disruptive abnorm ality, undecidable on the basis of established knowledge but whose consequence is the subject.  W ithin the resources of a situation, the event generates new situations by way of s ubject ive intervention/invention.  (86, 226, 246, 268)  Formalization?Inquiry into formal cond itions, which adm its both language and mathematics (among infinite other possible media of truth) without subjecting one discourse to another; form al conditions of thoug ht are those which gi ve it structure, and instantiate new conditio ns and subjects ins tigation?as not an opaque foil to ?content,? but rather as ?index of the re al of the act? or where the ne w is ?authorized?).  (1.4.1; 10, 11, 17)    Generic multip le?The  constitutive ir-repr esentable of any situation, basis of its transformation but undecidable/indiscernible with in the resources of the situation itself.  Requires a subject to decl are it and?by way of the praxes of a truth procedure?transform the situation thereby.  (200, 218, 230, 236, 248, 250)   viii Historical (situation)?R egim e of identification that includes the uncounted (the void, or ?exclusive inclusion,? contra ?natural? s ituation).  Predicate of the ontological commitment of evental p hilosophy ; condition of possibility for tru th.  Immanent/Immanency?This refers to designati ons which  resource no extra-s ituational elements; an imm anent ontology is a consequence of the ?not being? of  the ?One,? or the gather ing o f elements (of a giv en situation) within  an implicitly  extra -situational qualifier.  (6.2; 145, 235, 275)  Infinity?A  designation in flux in late m odernity, of a movement from presum ed unending excess beyond lim it (virtual infinity) to one within it (actual infinity).  (6.2.2; 239, 250)  Language? Reference of generic multip licity (not the seat of being, but its refraction).  Venue of the reifying temptation of ontological f initude.  (179, 248, 255, 266)  Null set?M ultip le of nothing or of  the void.  Initial exis tential claim of set theory, and basis of the unfolding of an infinity of further sets.  Meta-ontology?Translation of set theory?s axiom s into philosophical term s.  For exam ple, what th is study conceives as ontologica l is large ly meta-ontolog ical in that it is based on, extrapolated from , the translation into philosophical te rms of mathematical ones.  ix  Natural (situation)?Regim e of identification that admits no excess or rem ainder (contra ?historical? situation).  T his is the predicate of the interc onnectedness, or ?imm easurable? commensurable relation, authoritative in broadly ?statist? philosophy.  Ontology?Form al language of set theory?i n that, for Badiou (2006a) ?m athematics thinks being? (p. 99)?that does not discern the nature of any situation but refers to the structure of its multiplicity (thus for Badi ou philosophy as m eta-ontology is a discourse on the discourses of being). (1.4, 1.5; 35, 145, 155, 226, 230, 236, 243, 266)  Praxis?A s eries of enquiries into a situation (an intervention) made in fidelity to an event.  Truthful praxis in e ducation is instig ating and f acilitating such p raxes as th e mode of subjectiv e emergence.  Philosophy?Reflects and attem p ts to schematize those transform ations happening in contemporary histo rical situations toward th e developm ent of a ?space of  compossibility ? condition of possibility for im possibility (t he new and the sub j ect in co-ex tension).  Real/? real?? Ways to differentiate the signif ication of reality, in the first case as that which structure fails (w hich is not, and cannot be, designated or sym bolized) and in the  second, the image of re ality as substantial, coherent (i.e., the symbol of the real versus that of its incomp letion/obstacle) .  (1.4.3; 6, 11, 30, 35, 52, 54, 143, 146, 155, 157, 207, 264, 266, 291, 293)  x  Set Theory?The ?form al theory of non-unified multiplicities:? Provides ways to  think  ontological constitution without i nherent recourse to transcendental indices (of reductions such as constructive knowledge and its presum ptive lim itation, its finite ?m ysteries?).  (17, 149, 153, 228)  Situation??Presented  multip licity:? A way to think with m athematical ontology of the existent as a set of (discernib le and indiscernible) elements.  This allows for radical thought and subjective interventio n i.e., for thought as utter transformation in the addition of a new elem ent.  (4.2.3; 151, 152, 159)  State?Arrangem ent of knowledges which structure a situation?s representation, subsequent to the one-count of its presentati on, the State is a term to indicate regim es of identification which predicate va rieties of the ?real.?  (2.3.1)  Structure? A unifying ef fect in the presen tation of multiplicity, i.e., w hat renders of the inconsistent in presented being consistent, most rudimentarily for Badiou, as what he  calls the ?count-as-One? of consistency in be ing (existence, objects, concepts, dreams  and other ?entities?).  Structure assigns ?things? to identities.  Subject?Finite trajectory of a truth, or of  a decision to be faithful to prolonged investigatio n of the consequences of an event (as subject-to-truth).  (1.4.1, 3.1, 5.3, 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5; 5)  xi  Subjectivization?Process by which a subject com es to be.  (5.2.1)  Transcendental?Literally that which ?casts aw ay? its referent, for Badiou (2006a) this is the ?tho ugh t of a multiple bein g? on the bas is of ?an ope ration that indicates how its elements derive from another being? (p. 197), commonly in the conscription of extra-situational op erators (God, know ledge, ?ethical? rectitud e etc.) by wh ich to found the simulacrum of truth.  (107, 150, 187, 193, 200, 230, 251, 260, 275, 281)  Truth (procedure)?A ?forcing? (following m athematician P. Cohen) of the existence of a  generic m ultiple with in a situation, which unfolds a new multip le thereby.  (38, 44,  95, 106, 149, 162, 180, 200, 201, 204, 227, 228, 236 (on Cohen), 238, 259, 266)   Void ? Inconsisten t multiplicity.  Dem onstrated in modern set theory as inherent in any existent on tological co nstitution.  Can be thought as the inheren t zero poin t of any structure (concept, object, s ubject).  This, for Badiou (20 05b), is what inaugurates an event in a situation, the evental-site (errant point of  address of the void) thus being where identification fails and new configurat ions emerge. (153, 200, 218, 226, 235, 243, 244, 245, 253, 267, 289)   xi i  Acknowledgements  This work would not be possible wit hout the support and a ssistance of many people.  I w ould first express m y very grea t appreciation to Dr. Anne Phelan for seven years of unstinting intellectual suppo rt and encouragem ent to a fledgling ambition in the searching prom ise of works nascent and as-y et unimagined.  I acknowledge as well with gratitude Dr. W illiam Pinar and Dr. Jo-Anne Dillabough, whose com p lex fidelities to my work have profoundly honoured it.  For the firs t vital nudge toward graduate work I will forever be indebted to Dr. Dalene Swan son, along thereafter w ith the many further encouragem ents and affirmations of so many subsequent colleag ues, teachers and students.  With gratitu de I also acknowledge  the support of the Social Sciences and  Humanities Research Council of Canada as indispensible to  my project.   Special th anks are reserved for my sons Lucas and Spencer, who, along with Julian and Sara and the rest of my family, have forborne in privations and displacem ents on this work' s account.  And finally and foremost, for Cristina I reserve my most empha tic gratitude, above all for her part in the continuance of those fierce sym p athies that drew us together in pow erful common endeavors of love and thought.     x iii Chapter 1  Introduction  I  1.1 Statement of the Problem: A Paradoxical Void  The world was deeply plunged in ?ethical? delirium.  (Badiou, 2001, p. liii)  The heuristic with which I begin is that there is an ethical void in education.  This is to say that ethics have abandoned the educational aspiration (as the becoming of subjects and worlds in the question of what it is to live) and, in the demotion of ethics to the irrelevance of a matter settled, education recapitu lates the ethical vacuity that makes  this abandonment possible.  Th is basic claim of an ethical void I seek to exam ine and put into motion in this work.   To do this I ask a number of questions: W hat is it to be ethical as an educator?   How is this question prefigured  in advance, and to what effects?  In what  ways and to what effects  may this be an affirmative and generative question for educators to ask?   I have undertaken this exploration to  assist those of us who educate others to position  ourselves in the realm of a more vital and rigo rous ethical sensibility, and to provide ways to continue the struggle to do so .  This strug g le is important in o rder to resist the reduction of education to a technical enterprise, that is, one whose ( moral, epistem ological, im aginative, in tellectual, and other) horizons a re, most simply, insufficient to the dimensions of education?s charge.    1 To illustrate, consider how the vocation to locate ourselves ethically may lie at the heart of the educator' s concern.  How is th is to be thought?  One approach would invoke the great existential problem atic of modernity?wherein, broadly, God?s form er province became that of ?Man ??that what is known of living is radically and irrevocably incomplete.  The problem of ethical location here  obtains as a question: Is it not both ?educational? and ?ethical? to find ways to affirm that knowledge, and especially ethical knowledge, as such is always provisional, that it remains within innum erable alternatives constitutively, which is to say by virtue  of their very ex clusion? 1   For ethics this problem atic expresses a condition neither en route to a full understanding of what it means to be ethical, nor guaranteed by any claims to it.2  It is to a condition of the constitutive incomp letion of knowledge that modernity delivers us paradoxically, as both its greatest prom ise and profoundest difficu lty.  Within this condition, the desire to locate ourselves ethically amounts to the assump tion of a para doxical responsibility, to that which m ay only be imperfectly described as new, or for that which subsists as both the productive and suppressive consequence of a f undamental contingency.  For if contingency is established at the very foundation of knowledge (and the various m odes of rationality which install and authorize it), it is also contingency from  which knowledge is renovated, by which it becom es otherwise.  The inherency of the new is thus the                                                   1 ?i?ek (2000) explicates this ?condition? in terms of a Kan tian distinction: ?Ev ery imag ination is already violent in itself, in the g uise of the tension betw een ap p rehension [ Auffassung ]  and comp rehension [ Zusammenfassung ]:  the second can never fully catch up  with  the first.  Consequently, temp orality itself, ?as s uch?, involves a gap  betw een the disp ersed multitude and the synthetic act of comp rehension of the unity of this multitude? (p. 7, emp hases in orig inal). 2 In the first instance as the constructivist ontolog ical p roceduralism I later exp lore?wh ich Nietzsch e calls the ?rai nbow  bridge ? of concept s (over w hich the g ods cross into their new ci tadel) (Arendt, 1978, p . 158)?an d in the second as founded symbolically, that is, in the presumably already morally extant and thereby secured.   2 ubiquitous difficulty of the dream of the moderns, in which, I claim , we who would assume ethicality must accede to p laying a ro le.  The comp lex responsibility of such an ethical location must involve acknowledging, speaking for, representing, and thinking further on the basis of, ?ethical? elem ents (subjects, conditions, id eas, events, desires) whose lack  of referent is less deficient than constitutive, less to be remediated than somehow assum ed as an ethical condition. 3   This is an ethics of a world becom ing otherwise.  The hypothesis in th is understanding is that thinking educatio n in the inherent ambit of new condition s enjoins a new reading  of its obligation and, more difficult still, of thinking an educator?s existing implicat ion in the drama of ethical production and suppression.  W ays to consider how this paradoxical condition?of which the constitutive incomp letion of knowledge is but one elem ent?m ay be articulated and responded to in education are central challenges of  this wo rk.   For I claim that we would not have  education otherwise, but m erely educational policy?support of the unfol ding of a single ?new? world ? in the reassertion of what already is.                                                    3  Badiou' s distinction betw een condition and example is here instructive.  The movement of discourse toward what conditions it is to treat its precurso rs, structuring  ag ents, constituted obj ects, sup ra-metap hysical or ontolog ical ?wo rlds,? and certainly even wh olly imag inary or ideolog ical fictions about itself as in some in-eliminable measure constitutive?as  ?wh at educates? it?an d thus also that by wh ich it is transformed:  Both fix ed and fluid, imag inary and ?real,? con ditions connote how and fro m wh at ethics are incited, disturbed and coalescent.  A discourse which exemplifies, on the other hand, seizes , or is already seized by, this  or that fig uration or commitment, it ?alread y kno ws? eno ugh  to leg islate among p resup po sed commensurabilities, and thus is less a response to than a legitimation of the circularity of a gi ven method (w hich, as such, is a variety of faith).  de Certeau (1988) calls this the ?taut ological tom b? of hag iog rap hic ?ex emp larity?  so comp elling  and discip linary as salvific ?ratio nalist? discourse (p. 269).  Along w ith definition and proposition, what  Lacoue-Labarthe (1989) similarly describes as ?the  closure of ex emp larity? ( p . 144) installs in thoug ht w hat Badiou (2009a) calls the ?d isastrous theme of finitude? ( p . 5 35) .  As such, it may be p hilosoph y of education' s unique oblig ation to refuse the credentialing  blackmai l of ex emplarity and instea d move discourse into new formal conditions, ones faithful to the p lace of emerg ence of new subj ectivities (and indeed also conditions) wh ich I argu e is also education?s most profound et hical charge.   3 1.2  Related in Educational Thought In recent educational theory, many engage d in resourcing a new basis for eth ics, and inventing therefrom novel approaches to teaching and curriculum , have been doing so by way of speculative critique, or the hazarding of new form s of thought. 4  Especially signif icant in this effort has been the elaboration of new ways of realizing as educational problematics such concepts as singularity, truth, re presentation, identi fication, desire, and subjectivity.  In affinity w ith this study, many of these thinkers (e.g., Jagodzinski, 2002, Jagodzinski, 2004, Henderson, 2008, den Heye r, 2009a, den Heyer, 2009b, Taubman, 2010) resource post-Kantian Continental philos ophy, particularly that at the intersection of philosophy and psychoanalysis in the work  of Jacques Lacan and one of his most consequential readers, Badiou.   Jagodzinski (2002) advocates for the pursuit of an ?ethics along a different axis?  (p. 85) from those prevalent in modern  schooling?ones concerned with subjective regulation 5  and production of ?good? citizens, of educated (i nformed) individuals.  Against a socializing ?ethics of recognition?  (p. 96) he posits an ethics of a new subjective relation of the ? sinthome,? which is, for Lacan, the in escapable ?singularity of symp toms? (Jagodzinski, 2004, p. 25) that knots t ogether the subject with the truth of a  condition of radical contingency.  A s radically ?prior to? both discourse and ontology, 6 for Jagodzinski (2002), ethics induces a more truthfully ?e thical pedagogy? (p. 96) in                                                   4 This I elaborate as the third element of the method of this study, after the historiog raph ical and critical. 5  This study uses the term subjective to designate both t hat whic h concerns subjects and whi ch concerns the conditions of p ossibility for subj ectivity as such.  Thus ?sub j ective regu lation? here refers both the regu lation of subj ect and the regu lation of their condition(s) of p ossibility.  The same double usag e may be seen with  respect to  ?eth ics? (as encomp assing  ?th e ethical?) and, more elsewh ere, ?po litics? (and ?the p olitical?). 6 For Jagod zin sk i (2004), a ?pr e-ontolog ical? eth ics of ?th e Real??th at is, one ?b eyond? both lang uag e and the imagination?res ources represse d desire to contest the coex tension of we stern education and rep resentation (p . 24-25 ).  4 generative o pposition  to norms of ? deterministic accountability? (p.  81), such as those based in Kohlbergian moral developm entalism.  As an ethico-moral avocation anterior to both ?phen omenological and critical dim ensions of teaching? (Jago dzinski, 20 04, p. 23)?to both its grounding in (phenom enal) immediacy and its (rationalist) critical disruption as such?Jag odzinski?s Lacanian ed ucational ethics develop the question of desire as the ethical address of constitutive incompletion.  By way of the ?lack? theorized as the (unconscious) base of desire?how it ?pre sents? as absence?is afforded relief fro m the ?illus ionary level of the egoic imaginary ?  (p. 24).  Thus only a subjective ethics (of Lacanian desire) could generatively dislocate, as a condition of subjective possibility, what Jagodzinski regards as ethica l narcissism.  This is seen to be of both the faithful and rational modern ethical enclosures, of both the ?religious? and ?rational? ethical investments from which devolves the destitu tion of ethical thought in edu cation, which is  to say its conscrip tion to diverse, but regulative, idealisms.   This concept of ethical destitution finds a strong resonance in this  study, which derives its  ideologica l gen eses initially instead in the richness of de Certeauian historiography. Taubman (2010) also invites ethical thought  in education to the problem atics of Lacanian desire (to which he adds so me Badiouian considerations).  He would deploy its  ?radical an alysis? as ?ethical act? in order to develo p an ethics of teaching, a  ?pedagogical ethics,? which finds ways to dwell within sym bolic precariousness and contingency.  Like Jagodzinski, Taubm an (2010) does so in resistance to the ?norm alizing approach to ethics? (p. 197) supportive of a conditi on of subjective over-determination he names ?the conditioned lif e? (p. 198).  Against the assum p tion of the (institutional) forms of the given world?the  given being first an institution?Taubman  5 provides a ?counter-balance against the totaliz ation of the new? (pp. 210-211), one which supports th e persis tence of the forms of ethical institutional authority.  Thus, Taubman?s qualified uptake of Badiouian et hics in education pits the question of ethics itself against its passive assum p tion.  Against the disturbing consequences of  such ethical passivity in education? of ethics as merely some combination of a resp onse to ?an a prio ri evil,?  ?the other,? and ?the Law??Taubm an raises the call to ethical thought as a form of ethics:  ? we cannot avoid confronting th e complexity of the unconsci ous and desire? (p. 207) but  rather must ?adhere? to the ?tru th of that comp lexity? (p. 207).  The resonances with this  work are manifold (tow ard a reconception of tr uth in educational ethics, of ethics as the search for ethical conditions), but the nature of the engagem ent with ontology differs substantially.  In this study, the ontological is the indispensible referent or m ode of ethical thought, its psy choanalytic figures (the unconscious, desire) ultimately lack requisite rigour or specu lative ethical force. den Heyer (2009b), in pursuing ?the void at  the heart of enforced schooling? (p. 32), seeks to rethink contem porary subjectiv ity as an element of a new ethic s in education.  With the inspiration of Badiouian  polem ic, he critically re-articulates the purposes of education pursuant to an ethics so  reconceived.  In this he finds he needs to confront the ?logic of  deficit? (p. 31), of  ?hum an-as-victim? (a powerful Badiouian critical theme), which undergirds the ethics  of contemporary educational aspiration, especially in Canada.  Such logics de n Heyer (2009b) finds to be productive of  subjectivity (the ethical condition of possibil ity for students) as ?abstracted object of [educators?] m issionary designs? (p. 38) in a condition essentially of moral panic, which ?works to foreclos e any potential challenge to, or questioning of, the necessity of the   6 [ethical] cage? (p. 33).  To this he contrast s an ethics that forefronts research into curricula re-prem ised on ?(re al) students? capac ities to engag e in truth processes? (p. 39), which is  to say, to ?af firmatively invent realities? (p. 35) by way of the voided in curricular thought, of its specific arrang ement of knowledges for ?and not as ?the appearan ce of truth.  den Heyer is less Lacanian and more Badiouian than Jagodzinski  and Taubman, but the preoccupation is the sam e in re-articulating eth ics in education on the basis of a generativity?of constitutive incompletion, or inherent excess?imm anent to, and misrecognized within, ex tant ethical regim es.  His commitment to Badiouian inspiration is inventive and ex emplary, although he shares with so many of us in this field an aversion to the mathematics that make Badiou?s e thics more than p olemical, which make the m, that is, finally of ontological concer n.  den Heyer?s work is also notable here in its affinity with this study?s com mitment to the ideological status of conte mporary ethics, of their p aradox ical status as both what passes for ethics (to which I colloquially refer as of codes and concepts) and as that which suppresses its in stigation of what ?i?ek (2003a) calls ?the possibility of new possibilities? (p. 73). Henderson (2008) similarly contrives to add a facilitative Badiouian ethical diagonality (of the ?event??a way of thinking the new, or its rearticulating discursive address) 7  to Pinar?s (2007) ?disciplin ary structures? (p. xiv) of verticality?the ?intellectual history of th e discipline? (p. xiii)?and horizontality ?its ?present set of intellectual circumstances? (p. xiv).  As in  this study, a concern for the compulsion of circumstance to the invention of ?a ne w way of being and acting? in  sp ecific (educational) situations is determinate, is indeed generally what com es to be theorized as                                                   7 Diagon ality is a Platonic figure for in commensurability.  7 a condition of subjective em ergence, contra the structural normalization of various ethical dispensation s in education (which I exam ine in some detail as ethics of phronesis and alterity).  While Henderson?s efforts to read Badiouian ethics into a democratic form represents a?perhaps Deweyan?de parture from  the foremost concerns of this w ork, he shares with it strong comm itments to 1) the developing ethical im port of the ethical search itself (ethical ? p erseverance? is the Badiouian phrase he advances for this purpose), and; 2) an emerging domain of ethical thought, esp ecially with regard for its import to educational thought.    1.3  The  Trajectory of this Study At the beginning m y task is a historiogr aphical one.  In considering an ethical domain from which to depart, I draw from  de Certeau' s psychoanalytics of what is essentially Freudian historiog raphy  to consider the comp lexity of how  education has come to be ethically circumscribed within  an advanced liberal modernity. I articulate education?s modern ethical conditions by evoking the im pulses, presuppositions, entailments, and betrayals in discourse of which the concep t of education is in this ? late? modernity an artefact. 8   In elaborating education?s m odern ethical domain, and the questions that flow from and within it, I be gin to inquire conceptually into what B adiou (2008a) calls the ?great philosoph ical category of m odernity? (p. 40):  That of the subject, or new subjectivities and the fo rms of their emergences.  Thus, from  the first I make a                                                   8 In Freudian historiog rap hy the discursive residues of symbolic reconfig urations are the vectors by w hich sensibilities, their structures of intellig ibility and indeed logics ?o f wo rlds? come, or have come, into being.   The ?world? is received as a comp lex knot of discursive problem s that significantly prefi g ure and determine the modes of their ap pr oach, as Cassin (1990) retrieves the critical prob lematic from Aristotle:  ?If one is to destroy the logos, one must surely have a logos ? (p . 111, emp hasis in orig inal).  Ethical inquiry in this reading  is foremost the para doxi cal comp lexi ty of the destruction/ subtraction of logi cs of w orlds.  8 beginning in drawing out this study?s m ain pr eoccupation:  How is the subject of ethics? implication in education to be thought, or what  is the ethical subject in education?   How are to be thought its wo rlds, its ?realities??   What constitutes and impedes such thought?  What are the stakes associated  with the antagonism s that afford or suppress the question of the subject in education?  To what could educators consistently respond in articulating the commitments of their calling as such ?  Th is broad concern is, of course, one no more for educators than anyone else, but with a key proviso.  S ince educators are implicated in, or instrumental to, the uncertain becomings of  everyone else, since institutionally w e are ?producers? of subjects and society, we exist within a posing of the question with a more profound and consequential responsibility.  Perh aps even the stakes and im plications of ethical geneses and conditions requir e further that we be called to give ourselves to it as a matter of thought, as our ethical donation to its ongoing problem atics, which is also to say:  To not be too easily satisfied wher e ethical thought is concerned.  W ith the production and circum scription of the figure of  the subject as of foremost educational concern, this remains a basis of this study throughout. Thus, in chapters 2 and 3, I outline the ?eth ical scene? of modernity in order to posit education' s ?e mp lacement? (de Certeauian term that connotes a pro scribed position within a ge neral order) therein as an ontolog ical matter.  This as a matter of the production of worlds, of the installation an d progression of the honorific ?real? in the grounding of ethics.  This part of the study asks of what educational thought is ethically a  part in m odernity, and especially of what new ethical worlds  it partakes ?which is also to  ask spec ifically how education is modern, how is it ins cribed with  the what I  term the modern ethical and ontological settlement I resource de Certeau to help elucidate.  9 Clearly beginning with a historiographica l impetus, beyond historicism however this study further requires both critical and speculative engagem ents by which to propose conclusions about the destiny of ethics in education.  In affinity with what Bartlett (2011)  calls the very model of ?an education by tr uths? (p. 29), and with  the activist sense Taubman (2010) avows of engaging ethics as its own ?radical analys is,? my approach comp rises the ?double move ment? of a Platoni c method, which consists in ?both staking out a position by which to conceive the ch aracter and constitution of the Athenian state and to subtract from it the rudiments of a new for m of thought? (Bartlett, 2011, p. 29, emphasis in original).  The difference here is that I develop ethics from a de Certeauian edifice of the modern state instead.   From an initial historiographical inquiry into the ethical thought of education in modernity, this is annealed in a more critical inquiry into the nature and effects of modern ethics in contemporary educational et hical thought.  It is my contention that subsequent to historiogr ap hical consideration I will be in a strong position  in chapte r 4 to locate the modern ethical emplacem ent of education as its ?haunted itinerary? within educ ational ethical thought it self.  This is to say, I will be able to consider modernity?s ethical conceits and subj ective implication s effective as ethics in education.  These I discuss as a symptom atic tension?of the m odern ethico-ontological settlement?between phronetic ?realism ? and the idealism of ethics of alterity, or of the ?other,? as proposed in the work of Noel  (1999) and Henderson and Kesson (2004) in the first instance and, paradigm atic of the ?ethic al turn? in educational theory, foremost in that of Todd (2003, 2008) in the second.  By wa y of such critical engagem ent, and on the bases of a study of ethics in educational modernity of what I consid er the conceptually richest po ssible remit, I am able to deep en the ontologic al concern of ethics as an  10 educational matter, and thus direct this concern most profoundly tow ard new ethical articulations. This remit makes possible a unique speculative opportunity  tantamount to rethinking ethics and its subject (s) in education.  To pursue this, in chapters 5 and 6 I raise the matters of new subjectiv e formalisms (or ?ways? the subject is and m ay be thought) consequent to an ethics of ge neric ontology?one I develop with Badiou by threading it into ea rlier movements of this study beginning as early as chapter 2?as an immanent ethical condition, an ? infinite? and voiding con dition of the ? impossible? possibility of the indiscernibili ty of truth.  In transmuting an apparent ethical dead-end?of that which presents precisely as ?not hing??into ethics? most  profound condition of possibility, this inquiry finally offers the means by which to think ethical m odernity in education otherwise, to re-think education et hically.  These means are discussed in terms of the disparate discou rses of mathematical formalism and comic realism.  This is how a study beginning with the ethical thought of education moves through consequent ethical thought in education to finally ethical thought as education in ethics.   In the final chapter I conclude  with a return to this in troduction' s declaration of an ethical void in education to consider how its  attestation is ethically productive, how it may be thought productive of ethics, or of ethos ?or ethic al ?wo rlds?? itself, and especially  how such eth ics may be articulated by educators.  As an exemplary instan ce of its own heuristic avowal, how is a historiogr aphical-critical-specula tive method ethical, and in what, as what ethical form s, may it be thought so for educator s?  W hat languages, and modes of language itself, does it require?   How finally is this, this m ethods? articulations and their subtractions, an instance of an ethics in an infinite condition, I  11 ask, and how m ay (ethical) inquiry and (educational) ethics necessarily align, or necessarily remain disjoint?  For it may well be that only as the  search for ethics itself that education may actively be ethical, rather merely than that which adheres to an ethics.   II  1.4  Theoretical Resources:  Ontology in Formality, Logics & the Real   This introduction is divided into two parts to allow the reader to gain an o verview of the study and its location within  its field, in the first part, bef ore delving into its  conceptual thicket in the second.  T his section provides a valuable introduction to some of this study?s central constructions and philosophical invest ments, which I have divided here into those concerning for m (or formalizat ion), logics (as an ethical m atter), and the ?real? (as ethical precep t).  I propose that these three th ematics are those by which ethics may be rethought within the historiographical, critical, and speculative tr ajectories of this study, outlined in the previous section.  To conc lude I draw these them es together as the concerns of ontology (whose purview is the logics of the forms of the real).   As a work of philosophical inquiry in e ducation, an introductory section of this sort is called for to orient the reader within som e of the perha p s unfamiliar terrain of what follows, to prepare the reader to enter its domain in the audacity that it calls for as instance of its claims.  This is also to say that philos ophical inquiry subsists here in the extension of?here ethical?norm s (abstractions of laws and custom s from practice and  12 tradition) into the medium of their own rec onstitution.  To do this one need name this medium, and thus a philosophical them atics need be introduced at the outset.  1.4.1  The Subject and Formal Inquiry  ?the present form of this world is passing away.   (1 Corinthians 7:31, New Revi sed Standard Version)   To live is to defend a form. (H?lderlin, as cited in ?i?ek, 2003a, p. 95)  Toward the search ing dissatisf action I develop here as the ethic al impetus, this work concerns itself with educational thought in conditions of and for a new subject, or subjectivities.9  By subject, I denote a subjective fi gure of form, or colloquially, the ? who? which is implica ted in the educational pro j ect, produced by  it, conceivable with in and thus subjec t to it.  As a conceptu al matter, subjectivity requisitions the question of formality, for clearly?by virtue of th e abstraction of the catego ry subject itself?as Besana (2010) puts it, we are not ?dealing w ith orig inal entities, but with struc tural results? (p. 45)?these here of concern as of  the ontological predic ations of a prevalen t modern rationality.  Such, in our ?late? liberal modernity specify how the subject                                                   9 I have qualified this w ork  as one of the movement of discourse toward a certain (infinite) condition as an avocation of ethical inquiry.  To do this I draw  up on Alain Badiou' s distinction betw een condition and example (see fn 3) .  It may be p hilosophy  of education' s unique oblig ation to aspi re to move discourse into new formal conditions; and  here I do so into newly m odern ones that I will co me to consider as of the a-theological infinite.  13 (individual, person, child, teacher, student, adm inistrator, and even society as the case may have it) is given in discourse to be figured, or thought.  This is thinking the forms of thought as an ethical m atter.10  In simp le terms, formal ethical inquiry keeps ?tabs on structural reality? (Fras er, 2010, p.  182), by inviting thou ght outsid e its discip linary function as ?rep resentation? of reality and into the question of its function as such.  Further how ever, as the question of a thinki ng that would adequately correspond to its referent (to an objective ?per son-thing,? em blem of a category, instance of a concept) recedes, the formal concern makes possib le, I claim, new ethical opportun ities, speculative ones of ?being?s a ppearing to itself? (Bryant,  Srnicek & Harm an, 2011, p. 17).  Ethical thought as a for mal matter may be construed as the warped existential m irror whose warp  is the ethically germ ane, instead of the collections of elements distorted therein.  Neither grounding nor reflection of empirical ?realities,? the formal concern manifests as what Brassier (2010) calls ?t he paradigm atic instance of a productive experim ental praxis? (p. 66), here as  ethical inquiry in education.   The formal concern advances in this study as ontologization?as  the ethical resource of the address of being, or what  ?warps? the existent (knowledge, objects, languages etc.) by way of i mpasses that im pl icate new approaches to the question of truth.11  Inscribed in the forms of thought, ontology is possible as ethical inquiry as a                                                   10 As Hallw ard (2003 ) advises, ?t he p resent moment is almost entirely dominated by?t he ge neralized  susp icion of formalizatio n?  (p . 248), of the analysis of form as of the order of truth (a susp icion no doubt fuelled by the dismissal of the app arent idealism of Platonic ideal forms).  Philosop hy offers such analysis as a condition of po ssibility, Hallward  ag ain:  ?Th e history of p hilosop hy is precisely th e history of its de-obj ectivation, its subtraction from the myriad emp irical domains initially claimed by Aristotle?s encyclope dic embrace? (p. 243). 11  Badiou (2005 b) pr osaically describes his pi lg rimage t owa rd formalism as a traje ctory from being ?trapped by the universally recog nized  Ang lo-Sax on distinction betw een ?f ormal? and ?e mp irical? sciences? wh ich was i nconsistent with wh at he came to encounter as ?the clear Lacanian doctrine according to which  the real is the impasse of formalizati on.  I had mistaken t he route.?  (p . 5 )  14 consequence of the contingencies of rationality itself, rather than in its particular con tent, as the ?obje ctive? empirical conf irmations of its auto-gene rated idealist ?outsid e.?  This formalist ontological commit ment as an ethical domain is productive irrespective of  the prevalent fo rm-content oppositio n, and rather instead as a species  of contingent realism, of the order of ethico-ontological encounter, of a participation in being w hich accepts  the rigor of a search?the ethica l search?in not ?knowing? itse lf first, or not privileging comp rehension over apprehensi on, as Kant would have it. 12  Formal inquiry requires formal invention; it is the creation of new regions of t hought by which to becom e re-oriented within the received?and, as such , its dialectic (among forms of thought and their contingency) is, accord ing to Bartlett (2010), univers al.  Perhaps insufferably, the  formal is for all. Such a formal concern in educational thought derives from  Plato, whose notion of participation in the encounters of becoming has been mediated by the Aristotelian preceden ce accorded to the emergen ce of innate poten tialities, or already associated qualities.  With Plato we are g iven to think educatio n as a matter of formal transformation, and with Aristotle its terror is  subsequently moderated to a more limited, and manageable, rem it?of ?i mp rovement? (Bartlett, 2011, p. 25). 13   In the distemper of the Platonic commitment, if we, our worlds a nd their logics (or m odes of relatedness), are expressed via impasses in the forms of thought more than as its ideal or empirica l content,                                                   12 As ?op erations of the faculty of the imag ination,? in the Analytic of the Sublime of his third critique, Ka nt (2007) depi cts comp rehension as representative, according to aesthetic  judgm ent whose m ost realized instance he calls the sublime.  Although  this wo rk  does resource the Kan tian concep t of the sublime (with  Zupan ?i? on the comic mode of rep resentation in chap ter 6) its earlier concern for ontological prese ntation derives more from a rethinki ng  of Ka ntian apprehension, w hich, for K ant, is a sensuous incapaci ty of intuition before the ?co lossal monstrosity? of the obj ect (p. 8 2-83). 13  ?o ne is never transformed in Aristotle?it is h is g reatest fear?o ne is only imp roved . . . wh ile for the Platonist, ju stice or g eneric equality is the ax iomatic starting po int?  (Bartlett, 2011, p . 25 ).  15 it falls solely to thought itself to bring this  to light, to assert itself , if only as that w hose absence or lack is dem onstrative, as an ethical domain in the venue of form.   Appropriate to its vocation as a w ork of philosophy of edu cation, this study?s transactions occur therefore where th e triumphs and hum iliations of education are stag ed in advance, and where we are converts  to them whether we know  it or not:  The formal place of the concept.  Co nsider, for exam ple, the notion of freedom:  Can such a concept  really be said to deliver all of its signif icance directly?  Is it ra ther in its form that its significance obtains, in what it  presupposes, excludes, and m ake s possible, even before it arrives to thought?   Does it in fact denote something ?concrete? in the world, or something fi rst abstract that conditions it?   And if the latter, what does its uptake only as  the former deny or displace?  As, in effect, a matter in repr esentationalist accord with  its own referent, the concept of freedom  occludes what Brassier (2010) calls ?the m ateriality of its production? (p. 65). 14  It not only trades in the idealist domain of received forms of the concep t, it asserts as appropriate (as moral) this circumscription by virtue of the  exclusion of the question of for m.  Formal inquiry instead treats a concept as  a model in a formal discursive system (arguably our m ost profound ethi cal inheritance) which, as Bra ssier (2010) observes, is to ?situate its specificity  by transposing it beyond the narrow am bit of the illusions engendered by its ideological recap ture and into the wider . . . space constitu ted by the various models of the system? (p. 70) .  This ?wider sp ace? is where the freedom of                                                   14 Living stone (2012) calls such occlusion the elision of the question ?a bout the nature and structure of reason, thought an d lang uag e? (p . 3 4), wh ich Bertrand (2010) sup p lements w ith the question of the history of forms:  ?Ins tead of referring  rep resentations back  to the real worl d that underlies them, it?s a matter of understanding why  the history of real mutations has take n a [ g iven]  form? (as ci ted in Toscano, 2010, p.  187).  16 freedom is assumed, where its f ormal status is constitutive, even if it is, as such, forever incomp lete. In another ubiquitous instance, should the concept of nature be thought in exclusion of its status as a production of the sec ond term of the famous nature-culture divide? 15   The irony is instructive.  Surely the notion is prolif erate with signification, and effective sig nificance, but, as surely as well,  it is conting ent and incomp lete, and as such is both ethically expressive and suppressive, to perhaps largely unconscious degrees. 16  The point here is threef old:  That form prescribes conditions  against which ?there is no argum ent;? ?logics of worlds? are entirely fo rmal matters; and formal inquiry is thus comp rehensive.   As Brassier (2010) puts th e matter of ethics and formalization:  The problem  is not of confrontation between a ?concrete? and a ?m odel? but one of ?the history of formalization? (p. 70). 17  As a condition of ethical possibility, fo rmal enquiry is also action against submission, as Douglas  (1998) has warned:  ?Find out what any peo p le will qu ietly submit to and you have the exact m easure of the injustice and wrong which will be  imposed on them ? (p. 310).  In this study I insist on asking where the question of the                                                   15  From New Keywords:  A Revised Vocabulary of Culture, Raymond Williams (1983) describes  nature as ?p erhap s the most comp lex  word  in the Eng lish language? containing as em bedded ?an e x traordinary amount of human history?  (as cited by NcNeil, 2005 , p . 23 5 ). 16 In a hap p y coincidence of the tw o ex empl ary concepts  cited here, how?if not as  a matter of form?could be imaginable J ohn Gray?s declaration that ?T he idea that humans are by nature free is one of the most harmful fictions that?s ever been pr omoted anyw here? ( O?Malley, 2013 )?    17 According t o Badiou, Cantor utterly renovates and ex pl odes the history of formaliz ation from wi thin mathematical set theory.  With ethical theory no different in my arg ument, with fo rmalism we move toward  a ?m aterialist account? of theory whic h "c hallenge s both the empiricist assum p tion that scientific theories merely model emp irical reality and the idealist claim that reality is nothing  but an inert sup port for scientific theory" (Brassier, 2010, p. 65 ).    17 form of our thought takes us  in ethics of education.18  What thinking does it m ake possible and im possible, and thence, how we  should think such a division, and what  further may be found there, in what addition al genres of th ought m ay we engage as the ethical search of an ethics?  Such examples are obviously grand notions, but they are ones  I contend education ethically trades in daily as formalities:  As abstractions the like s of which dictate the cast of the reality our efforts to educate necessarily convey.  They typify the s igns that we?so often unwitting, Oedipal 19?deliver in the sem ioses of our practices, as the worlds our form s of thought assum e and enforce.20  They are of the worlds to  which we b ecome subject, and ho w to e thically naviga te this imperilling  subjec tive condition is to where this  work?s f ocus is consistently drawn.  In this f ormal regard, this study?s intim acy, its presence, is so obvious (in the Orwellian sense of that which is most easily overlooked)21 as to be incomprehensib le, an ex it we pass da ily en                                                   18 This may be taken up colloquially with Mark T w ain, inasmuch as it is in the deceptive  shadows of form that lang uag e ?lies,? th at it states something , as de Certeau (1988) put s it, ?by  uttering  something el se? (p . 134).  In this, to condition educational thoug ht in the domain of ethics, of ethical formality, is first to disp el anti-ethical formal igno rance, and indeed the passi on for it, and to stand for a pa rticular sort of j ustice wi th the lik es of Doug las and Tw ain (1885 ), wh o asks a p ropos  of w hich:  ?what  chance has the ig norant, uncultivated liar ag ainst the educated ex pert ? ?  19 K ovacevic (2007) calls ? Oedip al? one wh o ?l ives wi thin the confines of a w orld wh ose part icular conditions (consistencies and inconsistencies) he or she does not wond er about? (p. x ). 20 Semiosis here refers to a pr ocess (w ord, symbol, activity) of the delivery of sig ns to an organi sm, including  the conveying of meaning.  M ohanty (1997) makes a reference relevant to pre sent considerations of ontolog ical ? p roductivity? by w ay of Charles Sanders Peirce's n otion of the interp retant: ?Peirce in fact  showed  that we can  account for the produ ctivity of language (its uncea sing ?sem iosis?) only whe n we have understood how  reference is culturally and historically determined? (p . 19).  The Badiouian ethical sup p lement here is that this p oint of understanding  is only the begi nning  of the real adventure, or that of the Real. 21 To whi ch one should add Ramsey Clark?s ( 1998) observation (ap rop os of the destructiveness of the American Imperium ) that ? ? appa rently we  need more education in the obvious than we  do exam ination of the obscure and unk now n?? thereby also bringi ng  clearly into view  the question of the obvious itself.  18 route to our place of business. 22  It is my hope that this study finds a productive beginning in discussion of these concerns in educational ethical thought, as it reports on what it finds there in ?taking the exit?  for the ancient question of ethics, and then considering the consequences it draws from  its findings with resp ect to what it m ay now m ean to enact ethics in education, and how this indeed m ay be inseparable from  education itself?but, perhaps, only if unbound from  it.  1.4.2  New Conditions and the Ethics of Logics    thought must interrupt repetition.  (Badiou, 2007a, p. 57)   Along with for malism must be taken up th e question of logic, or that of the modes of relatedness of the conceptual forms that populate an  ethos, or the worlds proscribed by presupposed for ms.  Take, for exa mple, the question of freedom inscribed solely within a  movement among statist and personal dim ensions (as what the state secures and as to what the individual aspires) or that of nature confined to oscillation among the ecological and personal (as what is paradoxically at once not human and most human).  Logics prescribe the for mal dynamism that ethical inquiry ought bring into view, for  they proscr ibe intelligib ilities, or the formal conditions of our accesses to what we accord                                                    22 To add a note of psy choanalytic comp lexi ty, for de Certeau (1988), this overlook ed ?o bvious? w ould rather be the not-wante d-to-be-kno wn:  ? Historiographical discourse pr obably ex changes the place of the k ing fo r that of the child in the tale, p ointing  to a truth that everyone feig ns to overlook? (p . 48), one, lik e the method to wh ich this study asp ires, p roductive of ?indiscrete qu estions that must be op ened with in the immense movement of p raxi s? ( p . 49).  19 real.23   Furthermore, in logics, as such, are found the m eans by which ethical regim es in-cohere, disseminate, and become anew:  ?Put ting logic under an onto logical rather than  linguis tic prescrip tion? a condition of a plur ality of logics prevails? (B adiou, 2006a, p. 173).  In this conception of logic, further intimate with subjective/ontological form alism as a renovative domain of ethical thought, th is study is broadly necessitated by the conviction that new co nditions for subjec tivity?thinking  a (or any) new subject?requisition(s) new thinking (new logics and new for ms), and then that new thinking is a far more complex adventure that it may at first seem.  ?New thinking? indicates breaking with given or received logica l-formal structures, while ?n ew conditions? here denotes changes in circum stances for which there is  as yet no referent?m ovements of discourse from the integrity of corre spondence with its objects, di slocations of meaning and knowledge within their own e mergent incons istency, and also the surprisingly complex processe s by which the se come to exist, o r fail, or are pre vented to.24  By bringing a singular compulsion to the question of the new, logic as ethical resour ce in this work can insist prim arily in the establishment of the ontological regim es of constructivist and transcendental logics, as the poles of os cillation comp rising the m odern ethical settlement?s authority.                                                   23  Living ston (2012), in mak ing  the case for the necessity of a ?p olitics of log ic,? argu es for critical and sp eculative relevance of the matter of the ?lo g ical form? o f ?p ractices, institutions and laws? (p. 8) as a common immediacy?h is ex amp le is the Foucauldian notion of biopower?too read ily neg lected in critical theory (or the Enlig htenment?s p roj ect of self-critique):  ?m any ex isting an alyses tak e into account the effects on social life of technology, pro g ressive rationalizatio n, and ?in strumental reasoning .?  Bu t it is a substantial failing  of many of these ex isting  analyses that they do not consider, in any detail, the internal implications of the sp ecific abstract and formal-logical structures  that, on their own ac counts, increasingly  dominate social and p olitical life? (p . 7).  ?It m ay be that critical though t? h e continues, ?m ust now continue exp licitly in a formal mode, if it is to continue at all? (p . 7).  Log ic is thus, for Living ston, a ?form  of life,? itself requiring  a po litics and, as I arg ue here, it is also constitutive of ethics. 24 Of course none of this is to say that the ?n ew? should be adopt ed in any g uise?c ommercial, religi ous, ?spi ritual? or other? whats oever, but rather that, and desp ite and even throug h its travails therein, its inquiry is a k eystone of ethics in education.  20  A pillar of my m ethodological com mitment is thus that attention to ethics of logic  is tantamount to the developm ent, as an educational commitment, of inventive formal thought as rich and indispensible venue in wh ich to re-think subjec tivity as an ethical charge.  By way of consideration of onto-ethi cal logics in the rea lism of the refusal of reifying correlation (of  logics and their objects) 25  and the speculative  fidelity to the instigation of the new, I ela borate an especially modern ethical domain of inquiry.  This first to the question of modernity itself (its historiographical condition of ethical possibility) and then further, in ed ucational thought, with  regard to the conceptual realism of constructivism (as paradigm atically expresse d in educational discourses of phronesis, or practical wisdom ) and the ethical idealism of transcendentalism (as similarly conveyed in the discourses which fou nd ethics in education of alterity, or the otherness of difference).  As ethics of onto-logics (the?constructivist and transcendental?form al logics of being), phronesis and alterity  thus provide in educational thought instances of a broader im pl ication.  In my thesis, it is, however, an implication m ade broader still by the theoriza tion of such onto-logics as sym p toms of a uniquely modern ontological oscillation, or co-a rticulation.  This I will argue (with de                                                   25  The idealist domain of logic as an ethical c oncern? argua bly the only concept ual one whic h refuses the excesses  of idealism? I depl oy for the pu rposes  of my inquiry to both understand ex isting  ethical conditions and to eng ag e in pro cesses of the produ ction of new o nes.  As two central elements that I wo uld not ex clude from any ethics of an educator, these matters here are founded by a refusal that grounds  ethical p ossibility in education:  Of anterior reconciliations of the correlation of thought and being.  This w ork  instead submits them, as logics , to the question of their modes of relatedness, to that of the historiog raphi cal dynamism of their forms.  This is ethically important es pecially inasm uch as such correlation is constitutive of reality (see Meillassoux , 2008), as what Bad iou calls its ?logics o f world s.?   21 Certeau) is a product of a m odern ethical sublimation26 ? whose product is a paradoxical ?cult of finitude??which is, in the most intimate sense, modernity. It is within this com p lex landscape of thought, as a m atter of form and logic, where the ethical stak es of the ?real? m ay obtain, and in whose destiny resides the fate of the subj ect.  For it is within th e pe rvasiveness of form and logic, and by their capacity to articulate and disarticulate being where subjec tive conditions of possibility reside.  And it is here, at this comp lex philosoph ical crossroads, where education a nd educational ethics encounter the true challenge of ?think ing that w hich is new in situations,? 27 where it too (along with philosophy m ore generally, and here in its provocation) m ay yet be a ?guardian of this thought? (Bartlett & Cle mons, 2010a, p. 188).  In questions of for m and logic is deposed that of the ?real,? which is, in the end, the ultimate guarantor of the being of the subject.  Although it rem ains to be seen as this study advances precisely how such is the case, how the subject (as an ethical matter of form and logi c) may wax and wane, may consist and be eclipsed, the language of  such a question may be introduced here.                                                    26 In this study, I use the wo rd sublimation in a literal sense, of the pu shing below th e threshold (sub-limin) and thus unmediated transition (of the movement from one state to another withou t the intermediary, wh ich I p osit as characteristic of the birth of ideolog y, its constitutive side-step p ing  of discourse), wh ich is ex pressly no t to bar its consideration in a Freudian sense (as in, for exa mple, the release of the cre ative libidinal energ ies of modernity by the sublimation of an ex p licit go d). 27 There is, the acute reader may have already ascertained, a neo-Platonic sidestep pi ng of the Ka ntian ap preh ension/ comp rehension distinction at work here . . . to wh ose p urp ose I ultimately marshal the resources of mathematical formalism (viz Cantor via Badiou) and comic realism (viz La can via Z upa n?i?).  22 1.4.3  Articulations of the Real  thought approaches the real through its Idea. (Bartlett & Clem ens, 2010a, p. 188)  That conceptual com p lexes of ethical thought in education becom e naturalized (lik e the modern coex tension of ethics and education developed in the following chapters, and the onto-ethical oscillation underpinning that of phronesis and alterity thereafter) speaks to a need to study their progenitors and emergences.  Thes e invariably reveal cracks?typically parado xical opportunities for new ways forward.  To engage critical and speculative articulation of ontological logi cs and forms as ethical inquiry is to introduce disquiet with in the discursive netw ork s of presupp osition and implication o f the governing sym bolic economies of being? which lend form , or ontological weight, to the legitim acy of modern ethical thought.  As such, this is also to name, and to call something new into  being, within  the log ical and formal orders of ethics.  Consequently, one may show that such engagem ent?as articulation? is also one of disarticulation (inasmuch as the condition for disarticulation is surely articulation itself; its antith esis simp ly silence).  Thus, from articulation of ethical conditions with an eye to what  Toscano (2010) calls the ?sin of  their origins? (p. 233), I am ab le to effect and attend to their immanent disarticulation.  Further still, we com e to articulations of disarticulation by which to develop an ethics of another (immanent) scene in educational thought.  All of this however depends upon bringing into view (articulation) of ontologics and form s, or the structures and operations of fictions of the ?real.?  23 The mode of inquiry I propose and develop is thus a displacem ent of what would otherwise  be ideolog ical critique?a  deliberative reflection of external f orces in thought which presum ably effectuate conditions lik e education, ethics and subjectivity, which ?cause? their lim itations and transgressions, and which, in tur n, exem plif y their theoretical articulations.28  Rather, as the systematic displacem ent of such figures as ontological forms and their ethical logics, this is the movement of ethical discourse toward the void of its foundations (which I declare as an ethical heuristic at the outset and develop in later chapte rs);  it is also the disruption of  their modern critical finitude in accordance with  another, arguably m ore faithfully modern, ethical remit altog ether.  The ethical supposition m ade possible here is the refu sal of the settlements of the ?real,? especially as an ideal matter.  I hold with Bad iou and others who regard ?reality? as received or  somehow com p leted as inadmissible passivity,  an ?u n-ethical? reconciliation with  an assumed single ?world? and the process of its intelligibilit y and legitim acy (which amount to an order of power); accord ing to Kovacevic (2007), this reconciliation amounts to ?birth of ideology? in a ?logic of disavowal,? specifically in the identity, the idealistic identification, of ?a function in the sym bolic regi ster with the reality of physical presence? (p. 195). 29  In this study I designate th is ideological product as the ? real:?  The ontological signification or im p lication that, as Toscano (2010) puts it, ?is fashioned by                                                   28 Such critique arguably part akes of a ?rel igious form of freedom? at tendant to modern reason:  By embodying ?t he alienated freedom of man? (t he contrary of ig norance) in ?som ething  ext ernal to him? (Toscano, 2010, p . 197), the p rofit of critique. 29 The ?sym bolic reg ister? for initial p urpo ses may be figured  as that in and throug h wh ich the ?real? is  constituted, the medium of its mediation as intellig ible, ex tant, p resent, ex istent.  Although  lang uag e is its most power ful and pe rhap s obvious instance, the symbolic?at least in  the inheritance of Lacanian p sychoanalytic ph ilosoph y?may b e though t as any semiosis by which  ?wh at is? become ? w hat is intellig ible? as such, rather than, as in the imag inary reg ister, ?wh at is recogn izab ly imag inable.?  The distinction is subtle, but pro found.   24 representations, m ediations, institutions, languages? (p. 27) as a sort of onto-ethical self-guarantee.  The real, conceived in its contingen t absoluteness, is never so real that it cannot be suspected of being fictitious.  Nothing can testify to the fact that the real is real, other than the fictional system in which it will com e to play the role of the real.  And since the real is fundamentally indifferent to the moral categories of good and evil, th ere is no built-in mechanism to prevent this fictional system  from drawing upon terror as its ultimate means of distinguishing false from  truthful testimony. (Hallward, 2003, p. 288) Another way to think such a play of ontologi cal ?f ictional systems? is that even (or, perhaps esp ecially) in the most basic of instances, ones where the ?real? of being is concerned as ambiguous ethical authority, as Livingston (2012) simp ly puts it, ?we occupy the hom ogenous m edium of norms? (p. 9) .  To engage this onto-ethical condition as a point of departure?rather than one of  foreclosure?I deploy the Lacanian figure of the ?Real? to distinguish the ?real? from  its ethical condition as authoritative fiction.30   The Real may be thought as that which forever prevents reality from  assuming comp letion, from conforming with its im age(s) , and, additionally also, as that which m ay                                                   30  The Real indicates ?the obst acle on account of whic h every Center is always di sp laced,? that ?distorting screen, wh ich always ?falsifies? o ur access to ex ternal reality? an d on account of wh ich ?ev ery symbolizatio n misses its obj ect? (?i?ek , 2003 a, p . 67).  Since Heg el, the rendering  of ?reality? as a th ematic of the Real, as nontransp arent and inconsistent with itself is ?sim p ly to tak e the notion of reality more literally? (p . 66).  As such, the Real can naug ht but subsist as the ?sho rt circuits? in orders of the ?real ? and decisively?for su ch can only be a matter of ethical decision?no t a presup po sed ?d eep er? reality wh ose pr oj ections on the screen of represe ntation are authoritative, and ?i dealistic? realism of disavowed  or ex p licit transcendentals (or surrep titious ?bu ilt-in mechanisms? or ethical g uarantees).  The search for an ethics of the ?Real??title o f a far-reaching  work b y Alenka Zup an?i? (2000) wh ich comes into p lay in the latter p hases of this work?is the consequence of the ?real?/ Real distinction.   25 be marshalled to basic ethical ends in resistance to the sovereignty of the im putation of the ?bu ilt-in mechanisms? of the cited passage,  or those of the ?r ealiza tion? of the ?re al??which I take up as ethics of constructivist phr onesis and those of transcendental alterity. Such mechanisms this study exam ines as modernity, as symp toms of its ideolog ical closure,31  and then in modern educational ethics.  Ethics? immanent other scene as such becomes elaborated where th at Real obstacle subsists (a symptom atic lack  or ex cess), and this I develop in this  study, initially on a historiographical basis,  as the ontological non-coincidence of existing ethics with themselves.32   This ethical domain is then one of the paradoxes o f the ethical governance of tran sformation and becoming, in the vacan cy of their guarantees, and of the infinite and as-yet nameless invitations of being, of its worlds as-yet unknown, to which ethical thought in  education is, in my argum ent, most fundamentally obliged.  In liberal parlance, the domain of ethical inquiry is here that of selfhood and its conditions, in which the conc erns of being are undoubtedly those of becoming (and unbecom ing), and whose domain of conceptual inquiry, as an ethical                                                   31  For Badiou (2005b ), it w as Pascal w ho ?inv ented reading f or symp toms? ( p . 217) as a sort of w ag er of subj ective fidelity, in that he declaimed both the immanent infinite p rop ulsive of modern reason, and its cap acity to utterly rend its own  forms.  Here, wit h modernity tak en as an event (a reconfigu ration of the symbolic coordinates of being ), its ow n status as such is both its condition of incalculable p ossibility and of its ow n immeasurable ideological o bscurity. 32  Toscano (2010) cites Blumenberg ?s considerable understatement to this po int:  ??ther e ex ists a hig h degree of indifference betwee n a concept  and its history?  (p . 23 3 )  26 matter, is that of the emergence of the subject.33   Such is a prom ise of ethical inquiry as philosophy of education.  As the strug g le to think and articulate truth (of the ?real?) as an ethical concern?of the exposures of the for ms of being a nd its subjects?ontology here m ust insist on discourse as its field of reference:  It ?approach es the real through its idea? (Bartlett & Clemens, 2010a, p. 188 ).  With formal conditions as such, their logics, and the question of the ?real? (and indeed the Real of the question) as domains of ethical inquiry in education, this study p roceeds as if in unp recedented fashion, not in the service of the unpreceden ted, not merely to idealize an edu cational input/output called ?subject, ? but rather to profess its instance wherein its m ost profoundly ethical condi tions of possibility obtain:  As idea, one which rem ains, stubbornly, and despite how m uch we m ay come to know, in an infinite cond ition.                                                    33  The German tradition of Bildung  offers an instructive counterpo int to my thesis, one of a soph isticated nex us of the individual and the societal w hich, howe ver, tends to forefront the (conscious) self?s relation with  a society?s high est ideals via the eschewal o f universal narratives.  As outlined by Thomas Mann? and develop ed ag ainst Hitlerism?B ildung (as th e labour of culture) forefronts ?inwardn ess,? ?introspective ness? a nd ?conscience? a g ainst the ? obj ective, political worl d?  (as cited in Bruford, 1975, p. vii).  As develope d here, ag ainst the rather tenuous bulwar k  of inwar dness and conscience, universal narratives are instead that by whic h the subject em erges, as their lacuna l failure rather than their rather neurotic redemp tion, via ethics, their ?o bj ective? frame is wh at is transformed, rather than supp lemented as a matter of fostering  ?cu lture.?  27 1.5  Ontology and Ethics of Radical Enlightenment  The mind is its own beautiful prisoner.  (Cummings, 1966, p. 88)  It is through what is common to all that what is true for me is guaranteed. (Roffe, 2010, p. 125)  To provide for the being of the subject as an educational ethics is to think  subjec tive determination within ethical institu tion otherwise, to dislocate the norm s that prefigure the question of subjective determ ination.34   This I argue requires grappling with voided ontological ?subs tances? with in the place of the alien ?real? ones we take for our own. 35   This is ethics hidden within  the trivial, or disp laced when presu pposed with in formal mechanisms like dilemm a or ambiguity (see Colnerud, 1997). 36   This challenge?which I designate as that of the search for the ethical as an educator?finds its field of study among the form s of thought, the ethical pr oductivity of logics and the contingent                                                   34  Here thinki ng  may be taken  in the Badiouian sense as the invention of form (Mullarkey, 2010, p . 173) , and subj ective determination in the informal sense Hackney (2006) uses, as ?m ak ing u p  p eop le,? or the anterior forms to wh ich subj ectivity is dep osed as conformity, that of the static nominalism Nietzsche (1974) claims causes him ?the greates t trouble?  in that ?? wh at thing s are called is incomp arably more important t han what t hey are?  (p . 58 , emphas is in orig inal). 35  ?i?ek (1989) calls the ev eryday ?alien substa nce? (p. 230) of we bs of ontological presuppositions.  Ontolog y desig nates a field of inquiry into the log ics of being , here as ethical instances and authorities. ?i?ek  is with th is indication design ating  the instantiation of the quotidian, the everyday, emp irical-real (the ?alien ? of the normal, one mig ht say) as a presupp ositional ontolog ical p rimacy of an absence of freedom.  Characteristic of his Hegeli o-Lacanian ilk, suc h freedom would subsist in the split within essence itself, w hereby, at base, its constitutive estrangement becomes the sole means of a subjective freedom wort h the name, the means by whi ch to think, that is, and to partici p ate in a symbolic universe gene ratively.  The immediacy of its alternative comp rises the alien in/of t he everyday.  36  Colnerud (1997) finds that teachers find themselves in a sort of ethical miasma of the invisibility of the ?et hical dimensions?  (p . 63 4) of their wo rk .  A comp lex circumstance, this obtains not the least because of both teachers? lack of a la nguage w ith whic h to articulate the ethical in their work and lives and unwi tting  comp anion theoretical commitment to not seek the  ethical as such within e very element of their work.  28 authority of the ?real.?  These it develops as  the ontological concern for what produces the ethical investments that determine the forms of subjects and our worlds.  I pursue these by way of historiographical, cr itical and speculative m odes of engagem ent with the ethical conditions of modernity?those prescriptive of educat ion and ethics? conjunction, expressed within ethical educati onal thought and also those that could be their conditions of possibility, which could be new form s of ethics in education.  This is why this work is singularly one of philosophy of education, why, as a formal enquiry into logics and their ?real,? it trades m ore in conditions than exam ples, m ore in symptom s than instances, more in ideas and ir-relations than objects and m ethods.37    The ontological language by which I pursue these investigations  to their most productive possibility is not common language.  Its strength and its  difficulty is that, unlike ev eryday speech , its remit is discourse and the forms and logics of its objects.  This is perhaps not as foreign a terrain as it may seem, consider Grigg?s (2005) observation that ?it is not difficult to thin k of m any true sentences for which there is nothing by virtu e of which they are true,? and th e exam ple he of fers:  ?there will nev er be another Napoleon? (p. 60).  Explicitly as well as inexplicitly,  we tr ade in ontological truth daily, we are both haunted by, and expressed as , its forms, the coordinates of the ?real? whose whorl we inhabit.  As an expressly ethical matter how ever, more of us is required, articulation must be hazarded, politics of  abstraction engaged, ethical domains named, extended, subverted.                                                     37  Relevant here to invoke t he domain I wo uld occupy  methodolog ically is Barthes? (1987) ex pl ication of the ?sc rap he ap? of what he calls the ? w ill-to-method:?  ?S ome pe ople  sp eak of method gree dily, demandingl y;  what  they wa nt in w ork  is method;  to them it never seems rigo rous enoug h, formal enoug h.  Method becomes a law?t he invariable fact is that a work wh ich constantly p roclaims its will-to -method is ultimately sterile:  everything has been put into the m ethod, nothing re mains for the writing; the resea rcher insists that his text will be  methodologica l, but this text ne ver comes:  no surer wa y to kill a piece of research and send it to joi n the g reat scrap heap of abandoned pr oj ects than Method? ( p . 3 18).   29 Ethical inquiry by way of ontology engages any discourse  that might further its purchase on being (commonly figured as of th e ?real?), to prom ote generative chem istries among ethical conditions and subjects.  The ?sub traction of sense? this can involve echoes in comp rehensiveness Britzm an?s (2009a, July 14) instigation that we figuratively (formally) will have to ? destroy education to create education.? 38   This study pursues this inspiration by way of a r esistance to ?the ch arms of interpretation? (During, 2010, p. 86)  wherein?as an ?attribute of truth? (Bartle tt & Clem ens, 2010b, p. 162)?it finally com es to be elaborated at the unlikely intersection of mathematical formalizatio n (? la Badiou) and comic realism (? la Zupan ?i?).  From mathematics it conscrip ts the rigo r of ontological equality as ethi cal resource, one where ?onl y mathematics can sup port pluralism , absolutely? (Mullarkey, 2010, p. 175), and in com edy it finds the kindred disjoin t commonality of the truth of language (or the Lacanian S ymbolic), whose condition is also shared, if only in lacunae. In develop ing  such a committed ontologics for ethical thought in educ ation I am relying on w hat Israel (2002) calls ?radical Enlightenm ent? ( p. vi) thought.  He identifies  an insufficiently avowed Spinozis t animus behind much of the most revolutionary pretentions of the Age of Reason, those to have brought us its characteristic confrontations with authority, its scientific temerity and politica l progre ssivism.  While                                                   38  Here how ever Britz man?s declaration?t o enga ge  comp rehensively with th e symbolic (formal) universe of modern education as a critically g enerative commitment?is tak en less as the matter of a critical destruction than as a sp eculative subtraction.  Badiou (2007a) argu es that the destructive remains w ithin the speci fying pre dication of k nowl edge ?i t depl oys log os ag ainst itself, we mig ht say?rath er than allows its ow n immanent condition of finitude its corrup tions, enables a subj ective avowal on  the basis of something  (infinitely) else altog ether.  The subtractive, alternatively, as the intellectual correlate of an ?eth ics of truth,? i s p osed as the ?p rotocol of thoug ht that differs from the pr otocol of destruction? (p . 56 ) for it refuses, from the first, the integrity o f the obj ect w hose ?dest ruction? wo uld be declaimed.  This is tantamount to a formalism of fidelity to material conditions, and ag ainst their bypa ss to the symbologies of concep tual realism (typically and i deologi cally in the enforcement of a ?real? or specific wo rld, a ?kno wn ? wo rld).  30 not drawing  from the well he spe cifically identifies, I would say th at this work  is of radical Enlightenm ent thought in that it takes not the given Enlightenm ent as its inert and implicate starting point, but rather as a condition of possibility for its own vital continuance otherwise.  To such  opportunity we arrive if ethics  may be ontological, if, in the formal enquiry of the ethics of modernity, as educational and tow ard the infinite, ethics may be thought at what Balibar (2 004) calls the ?inc omplete philosophical conjuncture? of the ?history of truth? (p. 22).   In education?and as educational ethics?no less is required, if we are to allow the new worlds we m ay dream, which m ust be dreamt, any chance of coming to be.        31 Chapter 2  The Conditions for Ethics in Modernity  That more knowledge could cause problems, that light might prove another tyranny were not thoughts the philosophers of the Enlightenment were prepared to entertain.  (Tsoukas, 1997, p. 839)   2.1  Introduction:  Engaging Conditions This chap ter and the nex t refine the thesis that education and ethics are first concepts,  discursive effectivities ?bound?  in modernity in particular  ideological configurations. 39  Following Lacan, discourse is both ?a linguistic structure that provides the possibility for . . . subj ects to relate to each other? and speech  ?without wo rds?:  ?W ords are simp ly the means through which a given discourse st ructure produces its m eaning effects? (Kovacevic,  2007, p. 1 25).  In d e Certeau, according to G odzich (198 6), discourse, or discourses, in contradistinction to mere language (as ?object of knowle dge?), constitutes ?for ms of actual social interaction and practi ce? (p. xx).  As such, it is in discourse w here I will ex amine how th e co-ex tension and co-implication of  ethics and education in modernity is both actualized (as necessary intelligibilities ) and suppressed (as delimited contingencies).  In so doing I am  contending with what gives form to the very thought of education (Britzm an, 2009b).                                                     39  For de Certeau (1988), ideolog y pr efig ures the loss of (historiog raph ical) sp ecificity:  "Den ial of the specificity of the place  (of pr oduction) is the very p rincipl e of ideology , all theory is ex cluded" ( p . 69).  For the early Badiou (wh o is the more ex p licit on the question) ideology  ?dec omposes i nto a threefold function of repetition, totalization and placement? exp ressed by ?(a) in stituting  the rep etition of immediate g ivens in a ? system of rep resentations [?] th ereby pro duc[ ing ] an ef fect of recognition [ reconnaissance] rat her than cogn ition [ connaissanse]; (b) ch arg ing th is rep etitional system w ith a unifying sen se of worldh ood and totality wh ile ordaining  it as ?Tru th;? (c) reinscribing  both individuals (as subj ects commanded to ?tak e their place?) and scie ntific concepts  in this represe ntational whole? (a s cited in Fraser, 2007, p. xviii).  32 In question here is the "thinking of education" (Bartlett, 201 1, p. 2, em phasis added)  that, from Plato, begins not in a discreet institutional or epistem ic configuration, but rather in a "general order of thought" (p. 1).  I confront the obscurity which veils such questions with a psychoanal ytic study?such is de Ce rteauian historiography?of what thinks education and its subject?40  To where should we turn in thinking a ?general order of thought? 41 so as to encounter the thinking of education, and ethics therein, anew?and why?    Pursuant to the Badiouian point that ench antment (here ethical) is always recap tured at the point at which it has been obscured (Badiou, 2009a, p. 76), I begin with a ?general order of thought,? with an event, with the advent of Euro-Atl antic modernity (or ?we stern civiliza tion?s? latter day ethos).  This is also an investigation in to the genesis of a sublimation of the ?rea l? within th e orders of modernity?s enforcement.  This, I argue?especially with de Certeau (1986, 1988) and Toulmin (1990)?initially subsists in the reversal effected by the dogm atic cut of now and then (de Certeau, 1988, pp. 10-12), 42 whereby the first great modern fi gure becam e what is known as tradition (as that which                                                    40 This may be thought  at the medium in wh ich contempor ary discourses are founded and authoriz ed, the ?som ething el se? t hat there ? must already be? (Li vingst on, 2012, p.  47) in order for current ones to take form. This is in clear confrontation with what Lacoue-Labarthe (1989) calls the ?d ream nourished by all of the Moderns of a possible auto-conception (in all senses) of the Subj ect? (p. 142), whi ch he contests wi th the psychoanal ytic claim that ?we do not live, but that we are lived ? ( p . 166, emphasi s added). 41 As a ?deri vative phenom enon? bound up in a social order (Kovacevic, 2007 , p. 160) one here may take due care in ap p roaching ?t he pere nnial question? of ? w ho educates educators?  (p . 168). 42 As this chap ter and the nex t will elab orate, in the ?g ig antic machine? of a rational-humanist deliverance, a concep t of history as ?e ndless labour of differentiation?  for de Certeau (1988) p rosecutes the modern p roj ect of desire as to ?secure id entity? with in a ?u nity of consciousness? co mp rehensible thereby (p . 36 -39 ),   33 stands before or behind), and the most paradoxically traditi onal, massively both productive and thereby also blinkered, as the modern.43   It is in the conjectu re,44 which is to say the specula tive historiographical production, of the effectivities of a misapprehended and occluded birth of modernity?as the new ?tradition? that departs f rom, both founds with  and casts at a remove, the ?traditional??that a new purchase m ay be gained in  the study of education and ethics.   2.2  A ?Socialized? Ethos I.  Developments:  Cooler Heads Prevail  According to Toulm in (1990), the ?m odern? commitment to rationality took enduring root during the tum ultuous peri od of 1610-1650.  Early in the seventeenth century, he advises, ?the relig ious conflict triggered by the Reformation took place at the same time when the traditional cosmology?t he Sun and Planets moving around a stable, stationary Earth?at last com e (sic) under sustained attack? (p. 82).  Of interest here is the scope of both the sense of crisis, and that of its p resumed deliverance:  ? if everything in general is under threat at one and the same time, everything in general must be restored and underpinned in a brand new way? (p. 83, em phases in original).  This new  underpinning was the deliverance of the ?rational m ethod? of the ?cooler heads? of  the era:  ?the more acu te the differences between  Protestant and Catholic zealots, the more                                                   43  ?i?ek (20 03a) su pp lements this dep iction of modernity as ?p erversion? in a way wh ich neatly foreshadows so me of the theoretical difficulties ahead and cap tures the theme of desp eration wh ich I tak e up  next :  ? w ith modernity pr op er, we  can no longe r rely on the p re-established Dogm a . . . [a nd]  this is one way  of reading Laca n?s thesis that the big Other no long er ex ists.  Perversion is a double strateg y to counteract this nonex istence:  an (ultimately deep ly conservative, nostalg ic) attemp t to install the law artificially, in the desperate hope that we will then take this self-posited limitation ?seriously,? and, in a comp lementary way, a no less desp erate attemp t to codify the very transg ression of the law?  (p . 5 3 , emphasis in ori g inal). 44 This resonant with  Butler?s (2002) analysis of Foucauldian critique, w hose ?i naugural sc ene? s he argue s, as ?o rigi nary freedom,? i s gi ven ?i n the form of conj ecture? (p . 224).  34 dogm atically they denounced one another, the more urgently did cooler heads em brace the project for a ?rational? m ethod? (p. 82-83). 45   A univocal reason ultimately ascends in the raiment of the relig ious formalities from which it devo lved.  However its op eration is bivalent, it divides as it validates, not at all unlike the troubled  faiths it ostensibly superseded.   Toulmin enumerates some of the more familiar elements of this deliverance.  Derived from a certain reading  of Descartes (to whom  much of this shift is ascribed), an ?idiom  of certainty? (p. 70) is im posed, m odeled on the ?self-guaranteeing character of Euclidian geom etry? (p. 74).  The sixteenth century humanist pro j ect is appropriated and subsequently attributed to seventeenth century rationalism, whose rapier m ethod was deployed ?as a Joker with which to trum p all the inconclusive argum ents of theology ? (p.  79).46  The dawn of m odernity was an advent in sp iring of  faithful excess n o less than any rapturous beginning, but it was different in that it cast itself as somehow exem pt f rom the messiness of absolutes, absolutely. de Certeau submits to an analytic historiography the m anifestations and effectivities of the loss that this paradoxical auto-exem p tion produced. 47  It is my thesis                                                   45  This is not to be take n in a ?m odern? sense, as the hyp ostasis sig nified as ? history? but as import ant p recisely because of its p ersistent effectivity. Barack  Obama (as cited in Lilla, 2010, ?1 ), in one german e instance, laments the resistance of p olitics to ?facts and science and arg ument? wi nning  the day, again st human nature?s ap p arent p ersistent failure in a fearful ?h ard-wi ring ? to  irrationality.  Similarly, and to use another appa rently p rog ressive exam pl e from the American orbit, Brow n (2008) show s the ? dange rous?  and ?p rofoundly anti-democratic? recourse  to ?ratio nality? in how Al  Gore, in The Assault on Reason, argu es that ?d emocracy is in dang er not from neoliberalism, [a] p articular form of rationality?bu t from a multip ly-sourced attack on  reason, truth, and facticity.?   Univocal reason continues to effect its sp litting  (of the rig hteous from the fallen) under the banner of p rog ress and the Good.  de Certeau (1988) wo uld call these a ?p resupp osed p artition wh ose effect is validity? (p . 3 9).  46 Apro po s of the modern humanist citation, Douz inas (2013 ) observes a continuity:  ?The co ncep t ?human -ity? has been consistently used to separate, distribute, and classify p eop le into rulers, ruled, and ex cluded. ?Hum anity? acts as a normative source for polit ics and law ag ainst a backg round of variable inhumanity.? 47 de Certeau (1988) identifies this loss as of both ?t he absolute obj ect? (p . 9), or God, and ?t he integrat ive virtue that the relig ious frame of reference had represen ted until that time? (p . 15 4).  35 that it is to the repressed consequences of  this loss to which we must look for the proscription in the foundati ons of modernity by which have com e to be oriented conceptions of both ethics and education.  In other words, with de Certeau, we can find a way to think m odern ?social? ethics as contingent?and indeed ?repressed??consequences of specific developments in ethical thought, rather than as naturalized ?givens ? of an assumed and formally inert modern world.  As  an ethical aspiration in education, here we m ay find the provocation of  an ethics worthy of the implication of the  term in, and as, the re-foundation of an ethos, its ground of new for ms of being. First among these foundational m ovements? which we can f igure here as flights from the implica tion of a loss, which is to say, as a repression ?is what de Certeau (1988) calls the ?sociocultural localization of religious ideo logies? (p. 134), a sym bolic re-location of what had been God?s (the mystery of being, divine moral authority etc.) orientation toward the figure of the ?social? and thus to human reference as the grounding significan ce (here in both the sense of importance and of signification).  I have written elsewhere 48 of the burgeoning of the ideology of ?practice? as  a consequence of this movement, but what prim arily is of concern here is less the field by which this new metaphysics was referenced and verified than the m eans by which t his was (and is) accomp lished, and the relevant configurations  it spawned?its (uniquely modern) eth ical conditions, that is.  The operational elements of this ? rational? re-sign ification that come to bear most directly on ethics and education are:  Metaphy sics, leg ality, morality and epistem ology.  I p lan to develop this anal ytical organization of  a historiographical discourse to help to char acterize the effectivity of the loss productive within the m odern                                                   48 See Giles, G. (2013) The Concep t of Practice, Enlig htenment Rationality and Education: A Sp eculative Reading  of Michel de Certeau?s The Writing  of History in Educational Philosophy and Theory.  36 advent:  Metaphysics as sublim ating philosophi cal operations, legality as qualifying of their form, morality as their (socializing) function and epis temology as the form  of their confirmation, of the ?body risen? of a m odernist eschatology.  Found in these elem ents is the ?m aterial? of the formal binding conjunction  of ethics and education of modernity, its facilitative p re-specificati on within a deceptive freedom  of finite horizons.     2.3  A ?Socialized? Ethos II.  The Elements of ?Everything in General?  In what Toulm in (1990) calls ?the co llapse of cosm ology and epistem ology simultaneously? arose the urgenc ies of a ?rationalist? will to make anew a foundation to replace the one perceived lost, of ?a fresh cosmology from scratch? (p. 83).  For de Certeau (1988), this becomes a ?m ethodological invention of new system s of signs? (p.  74, emphasis in original) beholden to ?the dr eam of a totalizing taxonomy and by t he will to create instruments proportioned to [a] pa ssion for comp rehensiveness? (p. 74); thus a  great labour of ethical creation (prim arily in writing) establishes its own founding.  An ironic deliverance?because what was being delivered from were the failing referents of deliverance itself?this is m odernity?s founding as  a remove from apparent ethical chaos.  To show how ethics and education in modernity are ?p roje cted from? this ?m ethodological? instance of obscured moral panic, I consider here in what the method, the dream, the will and the pa ssion of a new order found its expressions, and how such  37 ethical elements?of a wholly new ?everything in gene ral??cam e to be.  For to show the point of departure of an et hic is to create the conditions for new e thical depa rtures.49    2.3.1  Elements I:  Metaphysics In the advent of modernity, a closed, ?s ocial,? cosmologics (a new ?real,? or ?everything in general?) of rationalist method is coextensive with a metaphysics at a remove from what they are convoked to overc ome?that is, the early m etaphysics of ?western ? modernity perfor m a splitting func tion, of its method from its objects,  its function from its materials.  In ethnological works, de Certeau  (1988) sees this schismatic repeated hundreds of tim es:  Uncanniness is exteriority, excluded, and ?civil society, in which a truth of m an is always  legible? (p. 219), is  interiority, is ?wha t belongs.?  This ethical division, which holds that  ?nature is w hat is other, while m an stays the same,?  convenes the enclosure of a new ?social sp ace [where] an ethics is developed? (p.  220) upon the predicates of ?Nature? and ?Man? as proscribed by their division.  Thus located, this became an ethics of the ?pro gressive unveiling? (p. 220) of a model, one that becomes its own circum locutory object:  ?society? is dev elope d because a social nature is presupposed, reason is progress because progress m ay now be ?reasonable,? and so on.  Metaphysics is the first elem ent of the speci fically modern ethos by whic h we may c ome                                                   49 My p roj ect, here wi th de Certeau, diverg es from Horkhei mer and Adorno?s (2002) in tw o key  aspe cts, first it eschews th e sense of continuity they discern in the establishment of enlig htenment reason:  ?Human s believe themselves free from fear wh en there is no long er anything  left unkno wn .  This has determined the pat h of demythologi zat ion, of enlig htenment, w hich equates the living wi th the nonliving as m yth has equated the nonliving  with  the living.  En lig htenment is mythical fear radicalized ? ( p . 11).  Modernity in my thesis is not a redep loyment of ? mythical fear? but an ethical re-founding in  new fo rmal coordinates?and wh at is new ab out it, more than wh at is continuous wi thin it is wh at is imp ortant.  Second, wit h resp ect to the ?u niversal taboo?  of p ositivism (wh ich they claim for enligh tenment?s ?u ltimate p roduct?), t hey advise that ?n othing  is allowe d to remain outside, since the mere idea of the ? outside? is the real source of fear?  (p . 11).  Modernity in de Certeau?s thesis precisely retains and orchestrates the idea of an ? outside? to enlig htenment rationality to suit the shifting  p urp oses of veracity.  38 to see education and ethics circumscribed by the particular new discur sive coordinates of a modern ?real.?  The com p lexity give n in their contingency?partiality or incomp leteness, debt to pre-ex isting  forms, reliance on the contigu ity of (ideological) fictions about itself?is  important to  repea t wi th pers istence, for therein lies the inherent plasticity of m odernity?s ethical immanency, its foundational condition of change, its most basic ideological operation as an ethic. Thus the concept of a model?of a new so cial cosmologic?is th e investment that underlies interpretation in m odernity?s founding innovation.  It grants relevance to difference by way of its predicativ e presuppos ition (p. 77 ), of a difference ?already known? or adm itted ?in  form? in advance.  This view of social ideo logy as m odern metaphysics founds a  conservative ethical configuration whereby significance is both an exception to m odel and an effect of method (p. 84).  The presupposition is no longer of  divine (?infinitely? m ysterious) authority but of an ideological (?infinitely? efficacious) one.  The loss of cosmological confidence ins tigates its re-f ounding in  the security of a deeper obscurity, which both generates new fo rms (of life, of knowledge, of thought, of language) and sublim ates the contingency of their genesis.  In  the ?social? reinterpretation of Christianity, the redeploym ent of Christian formalities re-emp laces God into the security of plain sight, with ?r eal? competences a llocated app ropria te only to their object (the ?s tate? of affairs as ?socie ty?), in a landscape of  visibilities which reta ins resonance in later democratic ideology:  ?subversion will u ltimately be rep ressed by ?state po licy,? which will assign to an entire  society the exact place wher e, in the name of the king,  39 everyone can speak? (p. 264). 50   The true subject of this projective m etaphysics?of a ?rational? function, a ?civil? process, of the enforcem ent of a metaphysical m odel?is, according to de Certeau, none oth er than the emerging discursiv e figure of the state:  Initially as in the (new) ?sta te of things.?   In the metaphysics of the rationalist cosm ology of modernity we conf ront a ?social?  delimitation of ?situa tion within a tota lity? ( totality being sim p ly what is without remainder) whose nam e is the social body, or the state (of emerging modern affairs ).  Freighted with  an infinite charge s ublimated in the overcoming of the vicissitudes of belief, such  an implicate order ? repla ces with ? state?  what ?being? represented within the for mer metaphysics? (p. 165).  de Certeau (1988) calls this a substitution by an ?ersatz :?  ?the state (and in theor y, ?state policy?) becom es a substitute (an ersatz) for God-the-Father, who was. . . ?split up? by the wars of  religion? (p. 293, emphasis in original).  Originally then a sort of ontological ?life insurance policy? (p. 299) against the contingencies of  its founding (against the weakness of its totalization ), a new god ?for the fo rmality is no different?of ration al method comes to be naturaliz ed variously, as multiplex guaran tor of the necessity of its order:  As ?the people,? ag glom erate of a new (putatively m ore rational) ?Man, ? and also the self-transparent sovereign individual of subsequent liberalism (the ?free? m an of modernity?s profligacy), and even the child as analogue and instance of a process of developm ent (toward a ?n atural? state as in Rousseau, or a ?m ature? one as in Kant).                                                     50  Modern freedom, in this reading,  is the g rant of this modern order, a no less divine bestow al than the ?sup erstitious obscurity? it founds (as ?trad ition?) in order to sup ersede; it s caveat is that it not be assumed as such, that is, as not a new s p ecies of continge nt belief but instead a methodological totality w hich dispenses with belief, even as it re-founds it.  That a gra nt of this dimension?a new i deology  of freedom?itself would re press  is only paradoxical to t he ex tent that its subliminative character is itself supp ressed.     40 In addition to whatever such m ay variably connote as empirical objects (prim arily ?citizens,? ?individuals? and thei r precursors), they are also metaphysical figures of a new order:  No longer articles of faith, they are its operation.  In the stead of the ficklenes s and violence of belief, new ?prog ressive? imperatives 51  came to be perform ed in the domain of practice, or practices.  As the replacem ent of what de Certeau (1988) calls ?assim ilation of a universal Christian truth? with a ?social gesture?  (p. 130), practice is that into which religion is f ormally reposit ioned such that, beginni ng in the seventeenth century, Practice is a fact which can be observed.  A proof  that makes of  itself, practice is the justifying visibility of a belief that from then on also obeys the imperatives of social utility und er the bias of philanthropy and the defense of order. (p. 129, em phasis added)  From my reading of de Certeau, practic e is an entirely new dom ain of human significance, from  which we m ay hardly now disassociate ourselves (in that it is now ?obvious,? even pass?, such is the genius of its self-sustenance).  The importance of this new m etaphysical field is that it both e mbodies a new social axiom  of action, and acts as a perpetual placeho lder for that toward whic h ?society ? is a ceaseless pedagogy of transit                                                   51  These, for de Certeau (1988), are more effectively signi ficant in the inverse, as the founding of a new  ?g lobal ?h eresy?? (p. 128), one that maintains its order ex clusively, by virtue of the pr oduction of its mystical/irratio nal ?o ther.?  41 (or it is a ?c oncrete? pla ce of deliverance).52   Symbolic referent (identification with th e order of which it is a part) of  ?application,? of  ?u tility? and as the vague instrum entality of ?what works,? no longer doctrine, m odern metaphysics is m erely a sort of motion.53Within the redeploym ents of ?Christian structures? of evangelism , messianism and crusade (de Certeau, 1988, p. 178) we m ay see here articulated a symbolic (cosmological)  and specifically modern ?institution of th e real? (1986, p. 200). 54   In this, ethics assumes the ?soc ializ ing? f unction of the realization of their ontological m odel, guarantor of the new order of the ?supposed real.?  ?Ethical ta sks? as de Certeau puts it, ?are replaced by what is supposed to be the expression of  reality? (p. 200).  These however, are                                                   52  For de Certeau the ?c oncrete? i s metonymic of the ? real,? a historical model? as, more bluntly, also for Badiou (2006a): ?t he concrete is more abstract than the abstract? (p. 79).  For an instance of this, in contemp orary p olitical discourse we find  the notion of the concrete sustaining  a discourse of the pragmatic  instrumentalism of ?w hat wo rk s.?  Ex pr essive of a vaguel y ?c ommonsensical? and p utatively ?no n-ideolog ical? consensus, this instance of a lang uag e of pragmatism, as Worsnip (2012) argu es (ap ropos of Toscano (2010)), conj ures the spect re of ext remism in subtly stifling di ssent:  ?The l ang uage o f p ragm atism is a far cry from ?straig ht-talk ing ;? rather it is a way of depriving citizens of th e lang uag e in wh ich to voice dissent? (em p hasis added).  More p rosaically, Kov acevic (2007) po ints to the ?vu lnerability? o f pragmatic discourse to ?t houg ht?s betrayal in dog ma? ( p . 185) .  From the immediacy of the pr agmatic, p ractical, and concrete, it is a short leap  to the circumscrip tion of a lang uag e of possibility as that whic h induces, and ?ro utinizes? ( pace Weber), the belief that there is no sp ace from w hich to op po se the status quo, no w ay to ?th ink  throug h conditions of p ossibility for emerg ence of sociop olitical [to  wh ich I wou ld add:  subj ective]  formations? (p . 199).   53  de Certeau (1988) ascribes to the new ?rat ional? normality the ?self-sec uring? operations of application?the mercantile log ic wh ereby ?th e assurance of ex istence to who mever ?app lies? a law? (p. 301 )?and utility??th e rule of the utile is impose d everyw here? (p . 173 ).  Tw in sp ecies of a ?m ystifying idealis m,?  these modern imperatives Kovace vic (2007) identifies (in terms of Lacanian discourse theory) in the Master?s ?dem and for rapi d impl ementation? (p . 207) and the Master?s and the University?s p aradoxical putting an e nd to the possi bility of radical change (p. 218)?pa radoxical because they ex press a n imaginary commitment to efficacious change.  These, in effect, deploy and prom ulgate the symbolic efficacy of the instruments of p ower with in the illusion of their surp assing , of progress, at the hig h pri ce howe ver of ?not  being  able to show how its p articular strugg le related to fundamental questioning of t he very order suppo sed to gran t its demands? (p . 211). 54  The real in the sense used by de Certeau is that outlined in the p revious chap ter as the ?real,? i n the sense of an imaginary and ontological di scursive totality (the Lacanian Real, by contrast, is the immanent obstacle to the ?real,? sym p tom of symbolic incomp letion).  42 representations, whose dogm atic status as such is denied.55   Either as the self-coincidence of the lawful character of ethical codes (w hich elide the sovereign  imposition o f their founding, their dependence on exception, that is) 56  or the na?ve reification of ethical concepts,  ethics and reality subsist in unpr ecedented and stifling intim acy in modernity.57   The key m oment of the genesis of this singular ly modern ethical anemia is described in this deposition as an ontological enforcement:  Of a new aff iliation with a ? real,? and not merely the less universal, or imperious, good.  Its function is to imply?to ?m ake us believe??that ?our worlds are adequate to the real? (1988, p.  xxvii).  This im perative is an important backdrop to, and a central elem ent of, the ontological s ettlement that is modernity, and it is important  to discover how, within  this ethical nexus, m odern education is emplaced as agent, bound to its ethical function of ?realizing? being. As thus both deliverance (to an entirely new ?real?) and the sublimated enforcement of its rep ressed terms, the fact that the modern advent consists first in an occluding m etaphysics endows the powerful mo mentum of the modern deliverance of repressive freedom , of liberating ersatz.  Brow n (2005) offers an apropos analytic of ?all speed, no direction,? which ?if analogized to a mental state? would be characterized as ?the truly terrible state? of a profound ?depressive anxiety:?                                                     55  de Certeau (1986) identifies the inherent obscurity of the k not installed by the modern ethical founding:   ?Represe ntations are authorized t o spea k in t he name of the ?real? only if they are successful in obliterating any memory of the conditions under wh ich they were p roduced? (p. 208)?t houg h Alain Badiou wou ld argu e that it is in thought rather than the memory w hich is the ?di sinterring ? mode of historiog rap hical analysis and recovery.  de Certeau regards a  ? new  dogm atism? (p. 200) the resistance to the dis-object iviz ing t hinki ng  that w ould enga ge et hical conditions? continge ncies as such.   56  As Living ston (2012) p uts this p ost-structural commitment:  ?Th e orig inal institution and continuing  force of law  dep ends essentially on a founding  g esture that is both illegal and exceptional with  respect to  the order that it founds? (p . 19). 57  de Certeau (1988) rega rds modernity as such to comp rise a ?new wa y of being decei ved without knowing it? (p . 299) in that it mak es available to the modern subj ect a new way to ? abandon and dedicate himself in order not to be abandoned ?  (p . 3 00, emphasi s in orig inal).    43 you cannot move because of the bleakness but y ou cannot rest because of the anxiety; you can neither seize life nor escape it, neither  live nor die.  There may not be a better appellatio n for our condition, for the bleakness of a seemingly eternal present with  catastrophe lim ning its horizon.  Permanent daylight, Nietzsche (2009)  reminds us, is one with unbroken darkness; the unbearability of both is time stopped, an endless present.  Unbroken tim e is the time of eternity, death?s time. (p. 11) 58It is the occlusion of its repr essive aspect that is m ost ge rmane to my inquiry:  That the modernity we assum e as our own (our appa rent divorce from pre-rational religious obscurantism) is from the first a sublimation (of the contingency of a  methodological totality).  Within the modern rational pro j ect therefore is a masked inaccess ibility (whose product is the ?real?).  This misdirection (of modern reason?s foundation, or guarantee) is, in my thesis, also its most profound condition of possibility.  For here are the m eans by which to o rient, destabilize and  germ inate ethics of the modern ?socia l? proje ct:  Within the occlusion of a contingent foundation, on e of an advent that subverts its own precariousness in the nam e of the freedom it insinuates and guarantees. 59   The interruption  of this contiguity m ay be said to release the rep ressive energ ies of its imperatives to new purposes, especially wher e ethics and the subject? two figures most  perniciously bound in the paradoxical  modern enclosure?are concerned.                                                   58  This Badiou (2007a) calls ?an  inaccessible amalg am of ag itation and sterility, the p aradox  of stagn ant feverishness?  (p. 106).  59  Deleuze (1995) offe rs a help ful addendum to the notion of discip linary po wer b y wh ich to understand the multivalence of ?so cial? normativities.  ?Co ntrol? p ower prescrib es no long er ?a m an confined but a man in debt? (p . 181) to disp ersive ?op en circuits? w hose ostensible ? break dow n? ushers in new sy stems of domination.  44 But this is but one element of the modern ethical founding whose settlem ent proscribes ethics and education.  Again in possession of the m eans by which ?to be  nourished by angels,? hum anity in this modernity of a repressive ?p ractical? rationality may indeed don ?the colour of daylight? (de Certeau, 1988, p. 301) .  Its diurnal law  however is first and foremost the Enlight enment discipline of  unstinting legality.   2.3.2  Elements II:  Legality  Through the law comes the knowledge of sin.  (Romans 3:20)  Here I discuss how the ?real? becom es the law of a ne w modern dogm atism in order to develop the ethical conditions of education in modernity to the end of their assump tion as ethics, and not merely as their obscure dogm a.  The ontological hegemony of the new rational m ethod of an emergent m odern ethic co-extends with a discourse of ?verisim ilitude??as we have seen, o f a new ?institu tion of the real.?  With this ?r ealist? ontological im plication we find modern epistemology?s ?principle of explanation? and ?right to a meaning? (de Cert eau, 1986, p. 220).  Explanation is aprioritized, presupposed as a normality; the ?p rincipled ? legalism  of a metaphysics of practical imm ediacy, it is the guarantee of  meaningf ulness in modernity.  Lik e applica tion and utility, in this modern sense, to ex plain (or to lack exp lanation) is to ex ist:  To exist obl iquely however as part of a repressive ontological process.  In re lation to curricular thought, this singularly modern existential lega lism would construe learning about  the ?world? as induction into an order of emplacem ent and control.  This is simply becaus e its implicate coo rdinates, a  45 ?principle? and a ?right,? are held true as of the ?re al? of which the modern ethic is woven, and on which it is founded.  Such em inently legal form  express the law by which the ostensible truth of a (very particular) world unfolds. 60   Carrying the  implication s of legality  forward m ore clearly, w e need consider that the right to a meaning expresses firs t the subject? s incapac ity before the law; m eaning is to be delivered, received, rather than created or, better, inventively assumed and subverted.  In this element, uncharacteristically perhaps, the rational m ethod may be seen as what de Certeau (1988) de scribes as ?sorcery? (p. 290) .  A ?white space in the  margins ? and dependent on an ? eliminated term,? legality  is here a ?s tructure of limits essential for the establishment of reason and social activity? (p. 290, e mphases in original).  In this authorization, right and principle are the formalities of representative  circumscriptions, the circum scriptions of a m odern mode of representation, and the representations of a uni quely modern (ontological) circum scription.  To the government of ?explanation? and ?m eaning??figures of  the modern metaphysics and one of its symbolic enclosure?these depose being (and surely also its ethics and subjec tivity) to what Badiou calls the ch aracteristic ?cult of fi nitude? of modernity.  They are the terms of its policy, lines by which the lim its of the modern ?real? are enforced.   For de Certeau (1988), the reduction of such forms and their legalism acquires importance in the recog nition that enforcing such delim itation proscribes transgression, reduces it to the recogn izable form s which acco rd with th e transgress ed legalities.  Lim its as such per mit solely their own su rpassing (p. 85), they ?le g itimate? only a very narrow ambit of ethical truancy (what doesn?t explain well enough, or is not sufficiently                                                   60 Kovacevic  (2007):  ?Freedom  is repre ssed, not because its unimp eded ex pressi on woul d lead to the end of culture, but because it would lead t o the end of a speci fic culture? (p. 67).  46 meaningful), and also therefore prescribe a conveniently narrow field of re mediation (educate to explain, or to be meaningful). The transmutation of metaphysics into an attestable field of ostensible immediacies?the social space, its p ractices and subjects?o beys first and foremost the legalities of the legib ility of that space (the pos itivism of its explanatio n and the poetic s of its meaning), so proscribed as a matter of form (or right a nd principle).  It is im portant to note that, for de Certeau (1988) this obedience affords both a ?pol itics of order,? one  based on principles of orga nization and m anagem ent, and also ?the organization and edification of a community? (p. 28 2) as the newly ?realized? social sp ace.61  These?order and community, as they align  with the  leg itimacy of practice, its ?p rincipled rig hts,? following from  the axio matic ontologization of the social space?will m ake a m odern conception of education both possible (as a pill ar of social organiza tion) and, ineluctably, also ethical (as adherence to a modern good, or the consciencization of sociality, politics and knowledge). 62  Within a rigid  and ecumenical ?h eirarchization  of the real? (p. 2 66) education is inscribed, by a law so ubi quitous its status as such is obscure.63   The dogm atic realism? its status as the truth of a lawful m ethod?of ethical  reason in modern metaphysics is predicated in  the establishment and administration of the totality of its purview (the ?socia l? world, the modern world of  ?Man?).  However, this comp rehensive immediacy is also that to which is owed such reason?s legitim acy, and                                                   61  See here also Brow n (2005 ) on ? Freudian civic bonds? by wh ich love is effective in the symbolic identification that underlies community, and also its tenacious chauvinisms. 62 Freire?s (1970) earlier use of the term consciencization, nonetheless refers to a subsequent mode of resistance, of a praxis  of critical consciousness-raising,  whe reas for de Certeau the notion refers to the instig ation, and installation, of conscience as a socio-po litical op erator in modernity. 63  The socialized law of the pr og ressive union of a split or the break?of  an ?inside? (reason, a  social nature) w hose discovery reveals an ? outside? (relig ion, overt faith)?is even  more effective in ruling  than the relig ious moralism it sup erseded.  47 thus modern ethical reason, in this reading, is  ?doubled back,? conscripted to the m orality of the ?necessity? of th e modern ethical circumscription, of the world it presupposes (for as such op erates a law of m ethod of a ?real ?).  In the maintenance of this circuit, education, by virtue merely of its agentic f unction as what variously institutes its ethos, plays a ceaselessly re-f ounding role.  As su ch, where the law of ethical reason is concerned in modernity, to sustain it is to not interrupt it.   As modernity, mediation (in faith) is replaced with what becom es the fact of what de Certeau (1988) calls ?a new delim itation of the relation between reason and the real? (p. 76).  This new delim itation within ethical reason he simply calls ?the law,? an d its necessitarian purview,  characteristic both of the ?eve rything in  general? of its  metaphysical founding and the aprioritization (literally placing-before afforded by modern metaphysics) of efficacy, is what ?e ffectively happens? (de Certeau, 1986, p . 41).  As I discuss as a consequence of the modern ethical founding in the next chapter, it should be emphasized here that this lega lism is a delimitation?of explanation and meaning within a given state (of affairs)?that presuppos es, and thereby enforces, (symbolic) relation in the position of  what was the f ormer (divine) mediator (where by relation was  not necessarily pres upp osed as a theologic al matter).  The legality  of this delimitation is more easily sustained, more available to articulation (as of the ?real? itse lf) because it is one of method, and not of truth.  Even as it installs a particular on tolog ical truth (of the newly realized ?real?),  the law is not this truth in modernity, but merely the means of its ostensible security.  In the co-extension of a m etaphysics of m ethod and the legalism  of its comp rehensive apriorit ization, deliverance becom es discursively automated, a-subjectivized, in that it became something one assumed in conforming to a  48 (discursive or symbolic) law, r ather than chose in acceptance of a (d ivine, imaginary) command.  In this analysis, piety is exacerb ated in the shift to rationalist instruments of social control.  In modernity, one may be faithful withou t having to  do anything about it, without having to do anything, th at is, except abandon one?s cl aim of subjectivity to the state.64Legality, as  the gua rantor of intelligibility (of  the ? real?) and the referents it enforces (explanation, m eaning, order, comm unity), as such becomes ?the central affirmation of the Enlightenm ent? (as cited in de Certeau, 1988, p. 171).  It is attested to in the intractability of the inheritance, the ubiquity of the logos, as in  the ease with w hich, for exam ple, alternatives  to the social model?s continuing unfolding are foresworn in the collapse of som e of their political f orms (e.g. of the famous ?end of history? read as traumatic ap otheosis)65 ?and how pote ntially new ones ar e submitted to the didacticism of an ?inclusive? pedagogics as soon as thei r rupture is legitim ated, or can no longer be ignored.  Here we can witness the patholog ical condescension of the ?western? m edia?s reading of the Arab Spring of 2011, as develo pm ental ?instance? of liberal awakening rather per haps as t he search for new for ms.  The forms are already g iven, as exem plified by wealthy powers; the ir creation is nullified in advance, or consigned to the ghetto s of culturalism. Legality is  therefore the character of the form of the modern settlement, the iron guarantee of its sym bolic identification:  Finally!   A saviour to be trusted!  Afforded to a                                                   64 As Toscano (2010) pu ts this condition (wh ich I discuss in the nex t chap ter as the modern consequence of the (lost) subject), a ?fo rmalism of unconditional [infin ite] su bj ectivity . . . directly contravenes the p recondition of the modern state? (p. 15 7). 65   As the closure of the horizon  of po litical transformation, this Ko vacevic argu es that the ?en d of history?  (Fuku yama, 1992) is the announcement of late-modern ?apo calyp tic? liberalism?s ?n ew sov ereig n?  (Kovacevic, 2007,  p. 201).   49 psychoanalytic historiography, such indeed are the constitutive economies of a modern desire, on condition they remain unavailable to thought.  Modern ontological legalism prescribes  that, like water clo sing ov er a sinking object, ideas that fa il to conform (surely their innumerable majority) drown beneath the smooth semantic surface of what is first a symbolic order (a matter of the forms by which identif ications?concepts?are legitim ated, ?realized?).  A modern ?social? imaginary th ereby governs its contiguity in mastery and possession of a ?social nature,?  a modern ?progress, ? and their ?n atural? equilibria and corporate form 66?and, always neces sarily, a pietistic ?s ecular? morality.  2.3.3  Elements III:  Morality A realignm ent of metaphysics at the advent  of modernity transported the concept of ethics into a moralism of (rational) deliverance, one to the ends of which is successively created and conscripted the entire social project (as exem plar of the presupposed  perpetual m odern dawn,  perenn ial source of leg itimate questions, unit of an administrative modern concern).67  It is in this ethical ? theatre,? or passion play, I would argue (alongside de Certeau), th at education, to the extent to  which it is developed within the circumscription of modern  ethical reason, thereafter plays a centrally reproductive role.  This element of the ulterior binding of ethics and education is especially elu sive,                                                   66 This corpo rate form is meant in the sense of corporeal , of a body, one that, in true Christian fashion, is incorp oration, the assump tion of form, of a new body (the social corp us), founded in the death of an old.  Modern rationalism in this sense ex presses tran substantiation, of a body risen: pu rified, from the sacrificial death of the old.  Its underlying m oral imperat ive is to not betray the sacrifice, and not to contest the (social) order in wh ich its mystery or ?sp irit? resid es.  For Freud, this is the subje ct?s investment in collective structures, socioeconomic reasoning?s  ?re p ressed,? its taboo (de Certeau, 1986, p . 218). 67 Foucault (2001) is lucid on w hat he calls ?th e g reat confinement? o f an administered modernity:  ?B ut in this great confinem ent of the classical ag e, the essential thing ? and the new ev ent? is that men were confined in cities of pu re morality, wh ere the law t hat should reig n in all hearts was to  be app lied with out comp romise, with out concession, in the rigo rous forms of ph ysical constraint.  Morality p ermitted itself to be administered like t rade or economy? (p. 54).  50 prim arily because of its ostensible delega tion to the domain of reason?s other:  Moralism, in the gu ise of a receding Christian  piety (or re-ins istent as the fundamentalist other), having com e to play the role of the dispatched which reason dispenses and overcom es.  Nevertheless, it is precisely into mores where de Certeau  sees deposed  what had  been the province of faith.   Rationalist moralism posits what de Certeau (1988) calls ?a hom ology between mental and social structures? ( p. 131) to displace the m ysterious implications of a divine address with a m ore comprehensive operation.  It is one that makes possible an apparent modern subjective participati on of presupposed inner am enability to the social project.  The ubiquity of the modern founding invests its pedagogies here with the especially blunt force of an alien implem ent (the revelation of a ?soc ial? nature) deployed in the construal of the commonplace (the m odern social delimitation of ontology) fitted to it.  A s with every presupposed delim itation, homology or circum scription of m odern finitude, it is to what I call the m oralism?the ?m aking right? in  advance what m ay then be ever more efficaciously confirmed?of the modern ratio nalist ethos to which I turn here.  For ultimately, as with all of  the elements of the prevalent c onfiguration  of the modern advent, at stake is the very  question of the subject. As the question of revelation gives way to ?practical? answ ers of explanation, application and utility, these la wful necessities?of what de Certeau (1988) calls ?stately duties??in modernity assum e the status of imperatives on the ?battle field? of practical morality (p. 162).  This installation could furthe r be conceived in terms of social subjectification, on the basis of the homologous ?socia l nature,? a formal subsumption of the question of the subject obtains by way of its presupposition in the emergent figure of  51 the autogenic, self-transparent hum anist ?Ma n,? author both of his subjectiv ity and the conditions for it, en route to a condition of (vaguely ep istemic) freedom? this later political (democratic or Marx ist) and economic (mercantile, and latterly neo-liberal).  Split f rom what was f ormerly figured as pie ty, this new m oralism, encoded in terms of social practices?of what is recogn izable, of what is ?shared??appears in every venue in which a common condition is substantialized (in the formalities of shared values, of human nature, of progress, even, as we ha ve seen, of freedom).  Ethical language emerges in the equation of value an d utility, of being and m etaphysical efficacy (o f its ?rea liz ation?).  Such exp ress the imperative to produce of what de Certeau (1988) calls an emerging ?m erchant morality? (p. 173), first in evidence in the writing of history from the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries.  In his view, th is is a sibling imperative  of the processural m etaphysical dogm atism discussed above, which sustains its functioning foremost by way of the m ethodological efficacy it affords, which is furth er to say, which  allows for the s mooth and secure transaction, or functioning, of related elements (here foremost ontological).  W hatever its ex plicit objects (socie ty, knowledge, order, ?rea lity?), a nascent modern morality is inescapably f irst of the re-production of the  rational operations by which the ?real? is objec tified:  To make ?everyday? the ?real? which is their product, dispatched however in to the medium of pretern atural immediacy, into the concretion of the ?real? world of production and exchange, choked in the image of the one that presum ably already exists.   In the sophistications of Enlightenment  evangelism ? the engagem ent of a self-verifying ?will-to-identificati on? whereby efficacy and transa ction may signify the ?good? of freedom as a matter of ?rea lity?? what f ormerly had technical merit and/o r aesthetic  52 beauty (as contingent knowledge  of the ?world?) acquires ethical standing in the founding of an expressly m odern order.  de Certeau (1988) calls moral comp ression of the good and the real the conscription of desire to ?t he p ure will to  signify, whose non-place is a discourse of places? (p. 282).  The practicality of its sim ulacral subjectivism  (as morality is the subje ctive p rescription of  the necessary) is inex tricable from its idealism.  Of a ?world? as a ?rea l? pla ce, the morality of modern reason?s faith is the prac tice of obedience to its method.  This, in other words, is to be now here, to be of the pure will, ideal.  How?   By being som ewhere, ?m odern,? of this world, which already knows where and what it is (for m odernity?s rudimentary ep ochal break establish es its time and place).  This ideal emplacem ent, the symbolic assump tion of wha t had been God?s, is what modernity uniquely erects, and, is so doing, it is  what it also m akes mo ral, or presupposes as good.  In the rise of this figure of purity de Certeau helps us nam e the moralism of an inertia, one paradoxically of prolifera tion (of knowledge and its progress of ?developm ent?), afforded on account of its fig uration, its imaginarization, as tran sitive and expansive.  This is also of course a salvation even more precarious  thereby (for now both the terms of the liberation, and its contingencies,  must be shored up?the latter form erly the deferred province of divine m ystery, and, of course, the structural excesses of ecclesiastical intercession).  The sublimation of its divinity makes m odern moralism more ubiquitous, more pious in opacity.  As the nexus of its propulsive tension, the subject becomes a mere postulate of the new orde r, beholden to the moral ubiquity of an investiture in a new discourse, and not just a new discourse, but ?the? new discourse, the discourse of the new:  The modern.  Modern ethical discourse requisitions institutional  53 support to the m aintenance of its project (for its for m is telic eschatology while its logics are neurotic, split within them selves as paradox ically partial comp rehensiveness).  Where would be deposed the m odern vector of its self-reduplication, enforcer of the ?good? of a new piety of signification and installation of th e new ?social will? in the prolif eration of the signs o f a benevolent identification and its valoriz ations (explanation, utility, application, m eaning, transaction, order, comm ensurability)?  These ar e the didactics of a modern project of education.  As the ?em p lacement? of education within the m odern ethos, I discuss in the next chap ter the exten t to which educa tion is in modernity bound to the social p roject, how it partakes  constitutively of its implicate o rder ideologically , ethically and, most crucial to pr esent purposes of thi nking  the ethical further in education, ontologically. The important point to em phasize here is that the alignm ent of a social metaphysics, the legality of its  p resuppositio n and the morality of its ?sub jective? implications com p rise a comp lex m ovement of repression (whose guise is a paradoxical liberation) arising  from their shared genes is in the birth of a new, modern, order.  I am concerned with th ese as symp toms of a loss:  As displacements, and also thus with symp toms of their systemic character as an ordering of placem ents in a totality, or as totaliz ing im plica tions.68  As such, disp lacements enjoin  the implicate  institutionalization  of ethics of an ostensibly ?realist? m etaphysical edifice (and the educational projections  which advance and develop it).  I am  argui ng here that the broa dly ethical means by                                                   68 The inference of totality is born in the elements themselves, as their ostensible integrity, b y wh ich is ?sup po sed?  a totality, to follow an  argu ment of Badiou (2008a):  ?th e all is that wh ich necessarily p roceeds from the One, once the One is? (p . 14).  In Badiouian terms, de Certeau?s modern repressi ve advent is foremost a ramified and variegat ed retention of ?t he rig hts of the One? wi thin a new c osmology , and new  orders of symbolic identification.  54 which to imagine edu cation in modernity, in odious and remedial instances, are beholden to a p roscribed finitude (the inevitable consequence of repression itself un-displaced) one need confront in order to avow ethical comm itment with the rigor of  a more vital, and less dogm atic, ethicality.69  The movement here to keep in  view is that of a ?progress? whose vast Enlightenm ent investments remain inert with in a motile ?s tory of progress,?  circumscribed, proscribed and wrought up within what today is education as a social project, an ?obvious? func tion and horizons of value? in the ?realization? and socializa tion of the individual (which  hardly differ to the ?pur e will ? of signification), and thereby also those of the societal imaginarie s to which the  modern subj ect owes a c learly neurotic ?freedom ,? of becoming ?different ? by way of ?becom ing? in the sam e way.  Refined in apparent escape from  the vulgar warehouse and factory rhet orics of scientific manage ment, the moralism of utility, transaction and social p roductivity (of the creating  of a place of signification, whos e ?product? is the subject) re mains, latterly replete with the more contemporary legitim acies of neo-liberal commercial rhetorics of accounting  and clientele (in teaching), of owner ship and purchasing (in learning ), and of investment (in education policy).  In both liberal and neolib eral instances, the social progress ivism of the educational function in maintaining the onto logica l ubiquity of a system of social emplace ment is nourished on anxieties character istic of the sublimating m ethod of which it is a constitutive instance:  Of ?falling be hind,? or ?failing?, and  indeed also even ?succeeding? ( following in the place of)? as a recogn izable pr oduct of an order of political (lib eral) or economic (neoliberal) freedom.   Thus the accomp lishment of a form                                                   69 Badiou (2008b) is acute on the charg e to surrender the ethical struggle as a so rt of p iety (w hich he reg ards as ?profession alizatio n? and wh ich could be said the same of education):  ?I m aintain a constitutive hostility to the tendency toward s democratic p rofessionalizatio n of ph ilosoph y and to the imp erative that is ramp ant today and humiliates youth: ?Be littl e, and wo rk  as a team?? (p . 7).  55 of secular salvation is intimate with the edu cational p roject in m odernity.70  de Certeau describes this rise of Enlightenm ent morality (esp ecially in the eigh teenth century when  its investments became more precise and its genesis m ore remote) as a form of a historical translation, that is, in ?the m etamorphosis of Christ ianity into ethics? (p. 178).  He here brings the argum ent to the question of education: The metamorphosis of Christianity in to ethics and, more broadly, into culture can be located ultimately under the sign  of progress.  To be sure, the app earance of this p roblematic issue, essential to all of the latter p eriod of the eighteenth centu ry, emerges from  difficulties and experien ces that had just preceded it.  Thus  the impos sibility of having social reality gain a structural coherence or of identifying language with a logic leads to envisaging reason as a story of progre ss; that is, to categorizing observed phenom ena along the line of a developm ent of reason.  Dates become a means of recovering an order, sin ce exceptions can be ranked am ong resistances and former prejud ices.  Moreover, the role that the ?m ilieu? plays for individuals is envisioned fr om the perspective of a production.  ?Custom ?  is not only a fact, but also a tool: a society acquires through it the power o f endlessly ?perfecting? its elf, of acting on itself, of changing its nature, of constructing itself.  From custom we pass to education: toward the end of the century this  ?m yth? confers upon civilization the form of a conquest binding reason to th e ability to transform man through                                                   70 See Gabbard, (2003) , Education IS Enforcement.  56 the diffusion of the Enlightenm ent, and colouring all action that works toward progress with a moral valu e. (p. 178, emphases in original) In the passage de Certeau (1988) describes, of the moralization of the productivity of custom within a new delim itation of the ?rea l,? education in modernity is formed as participation  in a ?pure will, ? of the enforcement of perf ection without goal.  Custom, now as ?the developm ent of reason,? prescr ibes to ?Man? a divine destination through mechanisms of auto-reconfiguration  or ceaseless reformation, split such  as these are at base between unitary predicates (?perfect? or perfectible m an) and a trajectory of correction (that is, of error).  The subjective legacy of En lightenm ent ?Man? is here a moral postu lation (the production of a subj ect which leg itimates the methods and investments of its production), exem plar y instance of the ?real? b y which a new metaphysical hierarchy is expressed.  As the ?evanescent double of the objective public order,? the subject is a moral orthodoxy,71 the scholasticism of the social project, and conservative pedagogics of the stupendously im poverished bivalency of  the ?subjective? itineraries either of civic morality or occult existence (p . 168-169).  Education in modernity in my thesis arises in the enforcement of the former against the latter, but,  more important, is th e legitim ation of the bind of the division itself, its continuance as an element of the produ ction of the ?real? by  which m odernity delivers itself from the (moral, ontological, ethical) void it both pr esupposes and denies.  As that governing objectivity itself , there is no element with  more exis tential gravity in this new cosmos  than knowledge.                                                   71 Not to be misconstrued and underestimated as a sort of monolithic inertia, orthodox y is rather, pace ?i?ek?s (2003a) Chesterton a ?thrilli ng romance? of ?ordained transgre ssion? based in the fact that ? morality is the most dark and  daring  of consp iracies? (p. 35 -36 ).  57  2.3.4  Elements IV:  Knowledge If the active subject of modernity?s rationalist deliverance is finally the (metaphysical) state 72 or the incorporate social body, and its operations, the discursive and semantic ?legalities? of applica tion, utility, explana tion and meaning are comp rehensive within  the moral immediacy of the ? real? of prac tice and society, of the creation of a place of signification as such, what of its object?   Thinking my concern for the modern founding ?back? from its constitute d object can lend dim ension and reach to a reading of modern ethical cond itions while bringing forward arguably its m ost grounding element.  The question of the object of the modern ethical p redication, or emplacement, of education is important in that it m ay provide new ways  to consider and provoke the  authority this element exercis es over the modern project, and thus  over its unfolding thinking of and in education.  Aside from  its constitution as the ?subject? m atter of education, of what is learned and studied th erein, how should knowle dge be thought as an element of the modern ethos, as a figure in the ontological dram a of modern deliverance, and thence as a perhaps  new condition for m odern ethics?  If the ethical prescriptio n is that of a search, its fertility most obtains wh ere it seems most foreclosed, and it is my contention that nowhere is this m ore the case in the broadly modern ethic than where knowledge, its im age(s) and operations, is concerned. I maintain that we need consider that th e object of the produc tivity and operations of the modern deliverance is objectivity itself, and knowledge is its sign.  Putatively of method itself (product of the ?im p artial? rational method), objective status attends other                                                   72 Its ? p assive? subj ect I have been figu ring  (from de Certeau) as the ?po stulate? of the moralism of the modern metaphysical orde r of an ex acerbated, and repressi ve ?secula r? rationalism.  58 great m odern productions, such surely as so ciety, nation, empire, ?Man,? progress, and, especially g ermane here, knowledge itself.  What I bring to the f ore here is that, in Euro-Atlantic modernity of the broadly Europ ean Enlightenm ent inheritance, gnosticism displaces uncertain and vulnerable faith, of necessity.  de Certeau (1988) asserts that ?when the religious unanim ity of Christendom was broken down . . . knowledge was  needed to take up the slack of belief ?  (p. 26).  T his new mode of knowledge?as part of, we need recall, a com p ensation for the deficiency or deficit of an ethical genesis?then becomes a ?tool of unification and differentia tion? (p. 26), affir mation of the event to which it owed its new status.  Thereafter, epis temic catechisms, paeans to the new status  of knowledge (of ?m odern? science) and the co-extensive rites of initiation (as educational) sustain and verify new urgencies toward the establishment of socio-institutional limits, as analogues of ?objec tive? knowledge itself.  A new m ode of knowledge is intim ate in the provision of a new (ontological) m ode of ?s ociety.?  This is how the social ontology of m odernity is founded, as correlate of knowledge (the object, and the objective, of modern rationalist faith), the firmer stuff that supplants and remediates the vicissitudes of belief.   Participation in knowledge becom es a new form of salvation, and the image of knowledge as rational object com es to enclose the social project w ithin the problem atics of recognition, of the right adjustm ent of a subject to the social  object(ive), now in metaphysical equivalence with th e new law of the ?real.?  For de Certeau howev er, in this mode and function of a ?nonreligious type  of certitude? (de Certeau, 1988, p. 127), and on account of the moralism of its ?realization,? its ontological cooption, especi ally in the repres sion of its initial status as the balm of sickly belief, know ledge is not a delicate  59 project, but rather one ?which  tramples? (p. 234).  As the modern mode of objectivity, object of a new delimitation of the ?real? (see Section 2.3.1), following de Certeau, knowledge tram ples over m ore diverse and creative modes of thinking?its ?infinite iterability? (Livings ton, 2012, p. 17) 73 ?about education and ot herwise; when caught  within the sublim ated mechanisms of modern gnosis, of the recasting of knowledg e within a particu larly modern self-leg itimation, thought is  exempted from  contingen cy by its implication in th e modern ? real,? or ideologic al totality.74  This obje ctive imperativ e?whose object is knowledge?is here  ontological at root, that is , is not a ?value? but a way of formally constituting a ?world ? (as symbolic totality).   For de Certeau, it is impor tant to note that the ?on tologization? of knowledge effected discursively by way of a double m ovement of neutralizat ion:  First in the establishment of the modern ?d isinterested? and ?neutral? fi eld of modern science, and, second, by way of the inversion of  its ?neutralizing effects:? having becom e actual seats of logistic power, scient ific institutions have fitted themselves into the system they serve to rationaliz e, a system that links th em to each other, fixes the d irection of their research, and assures their integr ation into the exis ting  socioeconomic framework.  The se effects of assimilation naturally weigh m ost heavily on those discip lines                                                   73  Recall here the dange rs inherent in the transp ort of ontological form ality (God) into rational method:  The gu arantor becomes imp licit.  What does the gu arantor, here as k now ledg e, do?   It pr escribes the symbolic security of an ethical ope ration (assures the adequacy of our though ts to the w orld).  How ever, as Living ston (2012) observes, this is a hig h stakes gam e if indeed ?t here is no symbolic exp ression that by itself determines how it itself is to be appl ied to any new c ase? ( p . 15 ).  Under such circumstances, infinite iterability of though t in this instance becomes the only effective security wo rthy of the name. 74 This Living ston (2012), who  is acute on the po litics of log ic wh ere the modern critical p roj ect is concerned, calls the ?mistak en re-approp riation of totality in late modernity? (p. 29).  de Certeau wo uld argu e howev er that it was th ere from the first whe re the modern ethos is concerned.  60 which are the least technologically developed. 75   (de Certeau, 1986, p.  215) This double-neutralization (of the activation of a field of scientific knowledge) certainly establishes a ?place? for educat ion, and also for the humanities in general; a dispossession without a ?native? knowledge, their ?place? is effectively nowhere, 76  except wh ere sociolog ical anxieties dem and new pallia tives and provide trans itory legitim acy for ?socia l sciences.?77  There is a weakness here pres cribed to fields with  little or no native knowledge, where ethics m ay yet be seen to subsist in finding new regions of thought, new m odes of conjecture, new pathways of in quiry.  This, in my argument, is a profound condition of possibility  for a field such as education, where a parasitic epis temism (amalga m of social sciences, philosophy, manage ment, (behaviourist) sciences, psychology and ?social? religion) should inspir e less the apologetics of interdisciplinary shallowness than a forthright axiomatics of a mongrel truth.  This figured as one which instantiates the referential space  of a uniquely educational ethical fidelity to subjectivity proper.  Consistent with Freud?s (2010) observa tion of ethics as civilization?s ?sorest                                                   75  Tak e, for ex amp le, here the emp lacement of education itself in the university milieu, and therein the authority of the pu tatively scientific, the ?so cial? sc ientific validity of p sychology  in its thought .  The overbearing  influence of a method both far outw eig hs its pu rchase in the sciences themselves, and the actual substance of what  it presc ribes to education itself.  The assurance of a method here is the neutralization of its own?in Lacanian term s?constitu tive, and genera tive, incomp letion (to a matter of identifiable ?limita tions?) and, foremost, the reassurance of an efficient assimilation?as a formal, rhetorical, matter? w ithin the order of the pr og ress of kn ow ledge. 76 These, in de Certeauian parlance, a re a ?discour se[s]  of non-places ? (de Ce rteau, 1988, p. 68), of k nowledg e po sited in the absence of a p lace, w hich is the very social sp ace convened in modernity for a sort of ontolog ical administration. 77 Admissible especially should they ass ume the ostensible ? obj ective? pr obity of a logi c of accounting a nd a familiar lang uage  of j ournalism (both in common ap peal  to a sublimated romanticism where by reduction to the dimensions of the known is ontolog ically p roductive, and is a form of ethical security).    61 spot? (p. 144), 78 in this we m ay approach the subject  as painf ully latent in the many in-commensurabilities of an interstitial intellectual sp ace of powerful social relevance. Consistent with m odern metaphysics, de  Certeau (1986) w itnesses the conflation of the ?real? and the ?known? in objectivist (linguistic) ?c ontract? consequent to the ?na?ve realism  of the object? (p. 52).  For de  Certeau (1988), this notion of a linguistic contract is ?the very principle of knowledg e? (p. 256):  At once the assignation of a locus in language and the security of an order of sociolinguistic practice.   As its ?non-place? in the modern settlement, it is the installation of the object knowledge (and the objectiv ity it licenses) as the ?pos tulate of all language? in  the form of ?a stab le relation? (p. 256).  This is the comp lexity of the new idealiz ation of knowledge in the modern ethical settlement, in that it plays a deceptive ro le in an ethical re-founding whose ?neutral? figure it b ecomes.  What is its decep tion?  The qu estion is ontological. In the transubstantiating m ovement of an ethic into the security of the absent project that is knowledge 79 ?which itself is itself in a new for mality of ?linguistic contract?? the hitherto intimate figure of th e Other (God) is consigned to an unavowed founding (rather than an avowed, but infinitely m ysterious, one).  Redolent of Freud?s depiction of the prim al scene, de Certeau discusses this rep ression as the reformaliz ation of paternity: The ?father? does not die.  His d eath is only another legend and an aftereffect of his law.  Everything happe ns as if we were ab le at any time                                                   78 Clemens and Grigg (2006) develop F reud in a way  whi ch I think  pe rhap s here help ful:  ?To day we c an say that, in Western societies at least, the therap eutic perspective  has replaced the  moral and the religious pers pective i n the managem ent of the ?s orest spot? that  Freud sp ok e of?  (p . 25 7).  My argu ment is that the sp ot remains, and the subj ect its trouble and oppo rtunity. 79 The disassociation w hich k nowl edge pe rmits is the para g on of ?t he infinity of desire? de Certeau (1988) argues m odernity delegates  to a place ?off and away ? (p. 184)?s ee chapte r 3 for the subjec tive imp lications of this.  62 to kill th is dead one, and as if we be lieved that w e have become conscious of him, that we have exorcised hi m through another power or turned him into an object of knowledge (a cadaver); but th is simp ly means that he has been displaced once again, and that now  he is precisely where we woul d never suppose him  to be, within this very knowledge and within the ?profit? that this knowledge seem s to secure. (p. 302, em phases in origin al)  If hidden w ithin the profit of knowledge is  an exorcised god, shoul d education in the ?knowledge society? of an ?inform ation age? be  thought of as a sort of s?ance, one where ghosts conjured in knowledge are also there by re-interred, and exorcised through ?another power??reason?as object, th e accumulating mat?riel of objectivity?   The disposition of this ?God? em erges to thought as paradox (see Tsoukas, 1997) 80  or symp tom (see Chiesa, 2007), both of the provi sional contingency of knowledge as object, its fa iling status as such. 81   This apprehens ion is in clear contradistinction to the image of  knowledge as insuperable from  a specific content, whose ?exe mplarity ? (or substance) as a knowledge (formal objective in stance) is elisory                                                   80 I have been using t his term mainly to denote the internal contradiction of an ethical advent whe rein a new freedom is p ursued with in the formalities of the repre ssion of its (both propu lsive and constitutive) failure.  If the condition of Enligh tenment is indeed to be though t as liberating , the ethical question of its manifestation as such is one this study draws in to the character of scandal with t he assistance of de Certeauian historiog rap hy. 81 Less to the question of the mode of know ledg e in g eneral in modernity, and more as a p edago gical  consequence thereof, Badiou (2005a ) understands education in gene ral as a question of arrangi ng  ?t he forms of kn ow ledge i n such a way  that some truth may come to pierce a hole in t hem? ( p . 9)? see also den Heyer (2009).  63 of the question of the mode of knowledge itself. 82  A paradoxical and/or sym p tomatic thematics of knowledge?as fail ing objective totality?suggest to their subject however a view of education in m odernity in the paradoxical fantasy of a peripheral centrality:  As that which ?produces? the m odern, but which also installs its necrophilic ord er (a metaphor in which Freud and de Ce rteau lugubri ously align).  The point here is not that certain knowledges are privileged while othe rs are suppressed?though this is certainly the case?b ut rather, and this is not the same point, that knowledge itself assum es a privileging function as an elem ent of a new ontological settlem ent, and that education assumes a sp ecific, and paradoxical,  place ther ein.  Knowledge does not just ?appear out of nowhere? to be delegated to  the innocence of ?developm ent,? it already is a part o f a ramified ideological thrust, one  that wholly pref igures form s of thought as ?of the real,? synonym of the ?known.? In the modern re-formalization, the locu s of knowledge in language and practice (as its ideal object) retains a crucial rem ove from the operation of its production.  Education is thereby projected as knowledge transmission without implication in the infinite difficulties of its production (the question of the finitude of its disp laced contingen cy).  This is not merely to say that a ?transm ission? model persists, but rather                                                   82 For de Certeau (1988), ? w hat is k now n functions as what  is silenced? ( p . 3 26) in the w riting of modernity, such that ? rep ressed is the very principl e of displacem ent? (p. 336) .   We must, in effect, provoke the exposure of the displacement of displacement itself in writing  wh erein the mortuary op eration constitutive and characteristic of this modernity functions.  He cites Joyce?s respo nse to this arcane ubiquity:  ?Nev er will it ev er occur.  And after!  Write it, g oddamn, write  it!  What else can you do? ?  (p . 32 5 ).  Freudian w riting, i n de Certeau?s thesis, is the invention of this g enre, its analytic historiogr ap hy is the ?p rowl er? wh o ? w orks on the edges  of reason,? t he ? fictioneer? who ? fabricates wo rlds of w ords that cannot fit the ends of a p ractical scheme.?  This in contrast to the historian?s dispo sition, wh ich moderates itself from the empire-buildi ng aim  of a ? p aradise of a gl obal history?  to the irrelevance of a circulation among  ?ac quired rationalizat ions? (p . xi ), to a form of incremental readju stment of an historiogr ap hical accounting.  The more ge neral point  here is that the contingency  of kn owledge has  (subjec tive) imp lications far in ex cess of the matter of the correction of its appare nt need for remediation, and the confrontation of its elision as an educational concern, as any other, is no simp le matter.  64 that knowledge itself is a discip linary extension of the m odern ethos, one which effects a discursive pull?with  the force of law, or morality, indeed of the ? real??o n the educational project toward a na?ve faith  in knowledge, and to ward its objectivist fantasy.83   In the anemia of self-sustenance, the objectivis t circuit at work here devolves into the ethical persistence of knowl edge as the object with which a stable relation is retained.  In turn, this devolution makes possibl e a concept of education without defense agains t its conceit, vulnerable to the deontological efficacies of a naive epistem ic faith.  A provision al sufficiency of profe ssionalized  condescension fills the vacuum of a generative problem atics where thinking educ ation ethically is concerned.  Pedagogy becomes policy, education instruction and its administration.  In taking for granted the stable epistem ic relation we are overwhelm ed by its production of referential languages, so many correlates among thought and world(s).  Educational institution is thereby bound ?eth ically? to the role of a staff function to the army of progress:  On e that shores up  supply lines of legitim acy, maintains the discipli ne of established distinctions, and trains recruits (?s ubjects?).  But the f ront lines?exactly where, how, why and in what knowledge is contingent?crucially rem ain elsewhere, unavailable to ethical thought, as indeed is their subject.   The linkage of ontology and subjectivity afforded by the new m odern ?objective? status of knowledge instigates the professionalization of edu cation in the vulgar sense:  As of those who know, who profess the gnostic im plications  of a new order of piety (as a                                                   83  Institutional, or of an (modern, ontolog ical) institution, it ?sn ap s back ? as on e educator p ut it, to ?wh at it has alway s been? (pe rsonal communication, 2012).  65 condition for the subject). 84   As such, epistem ic contractualism is the north star of education?s specific location within what Ba diou (1999) would later call the ?elem ent of its own suppression? (p. 61).  By virtue of  the ostensible means of its liberation (deliverance from ignorance) it suppre sses the subject of its deliverance.   The concerns of this study are clearly the less apparent consequences?those not aligned with narratives of  its deliverance, of progress ?of the repressions of a rationalist salvation.85   For it is these which bind education to the ?ethical?  within the s ocial pro j ect, or, more consequent still, by which it is no longer possible to see the binding of ethics and education.   2.4  Conclusion:  Education In the Silence of an Elemental Disquiet  The comp lex im brications that de Certeau describes as the forms of historiographical m odernity, of history as a discourse about itself, have precise implications and consequences for rethinking what we hav e to consider as ethics for education in a broad sense.  The re-founding of  cosmological order is what, particularly                                                   84  Profession otherw ise may be connotative of the act of professing, of ethics as a decisive and common search, for ex ample?as dis cussed, in one instance, by Derrida (2002a) with res p ect to the ?New Humanities? o f a ?un iversity with out condition?  (p . 232 ). 85  This, of course, leads in the last century to a ? crisis? of kn ow ledge and  consequent attemp ts in educational though t (reconcep tualists, the ?eth ical turn?) to overcome its disappo intments, and destabilize  p ersistent institutional structures of command and control (ex emp lified no better than the behaviourist refinements of scientific manag ement and the Tyler Rationale).  Lacan is p rescient on this institution and its later failing :  ?Th e obj ects of everyday reality are secured for us by the hold modern science has on the w orld.  In p aradox ical oppositio n to the enormous develop ment of technolog y, how ever, not only is the ?o bj ectivity,? th e ?d isinterested p ersp ective,? o f science historically determined but, in our ep och, it also clearly reveals itself to be highl y disap poi nting acc ording  to its ow n (p hilosophi cal) criteria:  indeed, ?we have less than ever the feeling of attaining?the end of kn owledg e, namely the identification by though t of the subject?to the object of his contemplati on?   (as cited in Chiesa, 2007, p . 13 0).  66 in contemporary F rench ph ilosophy, is regarded as an event,86 a transformation by which the symbolic coordinates of exis tence are irrevocably changed, yet? in the absence of a fixed extern al referent? for which there is no sur e measure, no definitive form of ?proof .?  To think the event of  modernity becomes thus to plumb the elements of its own suppression, the operations and stories about itself by which its ev ental character is subdued, incarcerated, brought to h eel of ethical institution in the functioning of an ord er, and the suppression of its thought otherwise.  These elements I have discussed in this chapter as a ?social? ontology, a ?hum anist? metaphysical imm ediacy with practical referents and indices of value, of the inviolable legalism  of its methodologica l instantiation, and the moralism of an object ive ?contractual? prob ity of knowledge.  The traversal of these as a matter of ethical inquiry, their p rovocation toward the  new articulations that would bring them into reli ef as modern ethical institution, is wholly dependent upon a decision to not accept the world of their projections, to refuse auto-conception or self-coincidence in ethics, to find ways to  not accept th eir p remises as a matter of course.  Ethics is the foreign w ithin the given in this construction, the inherent ?open space? of its transfor mation, or that of the ethos.  It provides for a suspension that creates a referential space for the constitu tive dysfunction of the founding paradoxes of                                                   86 This is a comp lex fi g ure variously align ed with  emancip ation, equality and p ost-theolog ical advent for think ers such as Derrida (1994), for who m the future is ??th e very coming  of the event? (p. 28) in the irrup tion of the absolutely sing ular, Deleuze (20 04), ?th e event is sense itself? (p . 25 ), Foucault (2007), who  oppo ses to the discourses of ?leg itimation?  (of scientific rationality and historical discourse) those of ?event ualization? as a s ort of prisi ng a p art of the discursive coercion which sustains adm inistrative ?co nfinement? (p . 5 9) and, most relevant for my pu rp oses, Badiou (2005d) re ga rds the event as a figure of mathematical formalism, as the ?perfect we akne ss? of the predicated (the ? One?) w hich effects a ?p rofound transformation in the log ic of the situation?  (p. 12 9) with  imp lications wh ich ?m ak e it imp ossible for those wh o affirm them to carry on as before? (Hallw ard, 2003 , p. 3) .  67 the modern ethos; it is however a re fusal no more exo tic than think ing .87  No ? mere? abstract challenge, such thinking is rather the ?co ncretion? that obtains at the point where abstraction fails.  This is where ontology becomes an ethical impasse, where th e literality of thought re-induces the restoration of the et hical obligation to its perennial recurrence of seeking to articulate the elem ents of the change an event induces, of assum ing their consequences inventively as ethical impetu s, which is also to say:  Of becom ing a subject, in a decisive and, as I shall later exam ine, infinite sense.  This is how eth ical inquiry, so especially requisite in modernity, engages the stakes of the ?real? itself, its discursive self-image warped in the shimm er of contingency, the void of its foundations, in its infinite conditions as obstacle to itself:  As Real, that is.  Such warps?which provide no ?outside? from  which t o approach  them?I ha ve begun articulating in this chapte r as the immanent symp toms of the ethical elements of modernity, their paradoxical status in the founda tion of a new ethical age. As the suppressed and repressive elem ents of the founding of an ethos, in this chapter I have articulated the elements of the historiog raph ical settlement of the modern advent where possible as its ontological im passe s.  As such, these comp rise the ?gen eral order of thought? from  which follows a num ber of formal consequences of basic import to any subsequent ethical proj ect in education.  I therefore follow m y discussion of ?what  educates? modernity ontologically?the histor iographic al settlement of its metaphy sics,                                                   87 Here Badiou?s (2005 c) simp licity is help ful:  ?No t to resist is not to think? ( p . 8).  This pu rsuant to Badiou?s (2005d ) view  of p hilosophy :  ?p hilosop hy is alw ays the breaki ng  of a mirror.  This mirror is the surface of langua ge? (p. 126).  Language i s a ?circ ulation? within  which thought fi nds a calculus of life (such as the form, logi cs of the ? real? in modernity) determined by security (the modern ethical rep ression of the continge ncy it is founded to depres s) agai nst w hich phi losop hy must op pose  its mere p olyvalence of meaning w ith a pr incip le of interrup tion.  Badiou?s (2007b) view of  the event is as an address to though t by ?th e ontolog ically unfounded:?  ?To  break  with  dog matism, the event must be released from every tie to the One.  It must be subtracted from Life in order to be released to the stars? (p . 42).  68 legalism , morality and objectivis t ep istemologis m?with one which turn s to the question of in what conceptua l or discursive media this ethical institution is sustained, or the consequences of the comprehensive m odern re-founding.  It is, in m y argum ent, the re-engagem ent of the forms of the modern ethical re-founding tha t will prov ide the condition of possibility for ne w ethical thought in educa tion.  For, in the ethical consequences of the modern advent we m ay be gi ven to make m ore specific th e ethical entanglem ent of education with in the modern ethos, to see its predication in action as that by which ethical thought in  education is bound in modernity.  An articulation of the ethical consequences of the modern advent affords this inquiry a historiographical basis from which to develop ethics and education othe rwise.  In  this, to develop a discourse of the conj unctive lineaments of ethics and education in modernity is to think them  togethe r newly apart, to think such consequences as  conditions for further ethical thought, as a further condition for ethics, and indeed as ethics itself, in the continuance of the ethical search to which I argue we ar e obliged in education.  Fo r on no less rests the ethical comp ass of education in a world such as this.  69 Chapter 3  Modern Ethical Consequences:  Ethics & Education   the means of unification is divided.  (de Certeau, 1988, p. 152)  3.1  Ethical Consequences of the Modern Advent  In this chap ter I delineate the three most significant consequences of modernity?s repressive ontological binding of ethics a nd education in the following term s:  The circumscription of the conditions of possibility f or thinking th e subject; the realization of modern ontology as a sym bolic pr oduction; and the advent of ideological totality or the implicit holism of relate dness.  I discuss these consequences for two prim ary purposes.  First, in order to streng then my claim of a modern discursive ?bin ding? of education and ethics within the ontological founding of a ?rati onalist? ethos?to m ore fully articulate the ethical stakes of m odernity?and second, to prep are for the consideration of this binding as ethical thought in education.  Only therea fter will th e articulation of a new et hical discourse?one within new capaci ties of reason to which m odern ethics remain obliged?be possible as an educational concern. Exam ined here foremost as ontological pr escriptions, subjective  deracination (the paradoxical denigration of the thinking of the subject among the proliferation of its forms), symbolic enclosure and relatedness are elaborated as modern ethical symp toms par excellence; logics of m odernity whose echoe s (to paraphrase Lacoue-Lab arthe, 1989)88 enstate in circularity the modern ?real? as also its powerful consequences. W ith                                                   88 Lacoue-Labarthe?s w ork  on modern subj ective deracination?e speci ally The Echo of the Subject  in Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics (1989)?is both incisive and lyrical; see al so Martis? (2005) Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe:  Representation and the Loss of the Subject.  70 the support of m y exploration of a uniquely  modern ethical institution, I draw  the discussion (of this and the previous chapter) of the elements and consequences of the modern ethical advent to a close in this chap ter with reg ard for their constitutive role in what I call the conjunctive entanglement of ethics and education.  In this figuration I  develop what I ca ll their ?haun ted itinerary?89 as a binding within m odern ontological finitude.  The articulation of modern ideological geneses and ontological investm ents as such is intended to donate new critical and speculative resources to the following chapter?s discussion of  the ethical thought in modern educational discourse, and indeed to those of subsequent chapters? as its re-constitution.  Remaining for the tim e being with the modern ethos, and with th e emplacem ent of education therein, this is the trail I continue to clear.    3.1.1  Consequences I:  The (lost) Subject  I am walled round with their vociferations, none will ever know what I am.   (Beckett, 2009, p. 319)  A surreptitious and durable subjectiv e destitution?of a s ubject bound to an object, a figure of knowledge, a sign?is th e first important consequence of the ambivalent ?em p ower ment? of modernity.  A consequence of the elements of the modern founding discussed in the previous chapter, as  what de Certeau (1988) calls ?previous                                                   89 This of an ethical founding inde xe d to the ?real ? (see chapte r 2)? w hich is precisely to say one not app rehended as such, not p resented as ethical founding , but rather as the arrival of a condition (deliverance) from the continge ncy up on w hich ethics (at least those of codes and concep ts) may be seen to founder.  71 forms of the same illness? (pp. 301 -302), the emplaced displacement of subjectiv ity in the modern (and broadly intellectually European) ethos prom ulgates a founding ?pathological? ideologic:  As an idea (the subject a s that to identification) that is predicated o n its disavowal as such. 90  In modernity this relies on a legalism of disavowal whereby "people know the arbitrariness of th eir social codes, norms, and values, but proceed to act as if they did not know" (Kovacevic, 2007, p. 194).  W e ? know? the subject cannot be contained, encoded, adjudged, but are en joined to act as if it were, or, worse, celebrate this paucity as  if it were the f orm of subjec tive freedom itself, of a subject entirely tak en up within its orde rs of determinations, of a subject to the object which is its displacement and deferral.  A field of presuppo sition of a broadly social ethic (wh ose subjec t is the subject-to extant orders), the im peratives of  such an ?ideal  subject? augur much for the possibility for any ethics of  the subject in m odern education.  This especially inasm uch as they make their ques tion inadmissible from the start, they make the question of the subject already answered in a perm itted form:  As an obje ct, a repres entation or narrative.  With this decisive consequence of the modern ethical founding this section is concerned:  How th e subject, and subjec tivity more broadly, becomes a casualty of the apparent dawn of its possibility. For de Certeau (1988), the especially m odern ethical result?the m ovement of discourse on human subjectivity by way of writi ng in m odernity?is that ? man is always legible? (p. 219).  An (em inently moral) ? postulate of knowledge/language? (p. 266), the                                                   90  As what de  Certeau (1988) calls ?law set up by a founding  ex clusion?  (p . 32 3) o ne finds here ?pat hologi cal?? or ?t heist? inasmuch as God denotes that whi ch ? observes the w orld wi thout being  affected? (Luhman n, 1998, p. 51) ?co nnotative of integ rity p redicated on ex clusion;  this Chiesa (2007) considers the traditional po sition of ?W estern morality? as Aristotelian ?elitist morality of the master? (p . 178) whe reby ethics is the pathological masochism whic h ?services  goods? (p. 180).   72 modern subject is paradoxical ly empowered in the progressive discarding of form er theological debates, in the heady possi bility of the modern exodus from ?non-identification to identification? (p. 259), un- freedom to freedom.  The apparent paradox of an itinerary of freedom bound into identification is instructive, even definitive.  While a new subjective destination of liberation a nd entitlement is inaugurated, its ?good news?  is the suppression of the danger of any advent?of anything new 91?now a ?broader? matter of the state to which the subject belongs .  The modern subject is thus a participant  in the modern project by being its passenger, a player on its stage.   The withdrawal of the subject under condi tion of identification (the symbolic purview form erly delegated to God) is, at one and the same time, what I call a deracination, or the withdrawal from  reason of the subject  otherwise.   Modern subjective subjection?of the exodus toward identification, as the subj ect of recognition? is an effect of the binding alliance of a ne w m ode of knowledge (as object) and a new  metaphysics (of the will to identification).  As  participant in a ne w ethical founding, the subjec t is thus obliged :  to recogn ize  (read learn), to identify, to attach (become), with the propulsive exception of the order to which it is subject?and this is a constitutive exception, an extension of the repressive et hical condition of possibility  for modernity itself.  As described in the previo us chapte r, this order is assumed ideologically, as  already-known, as antithesis to relig ious superstition, engine  of techno-scientific progress, avatar of political freedom  and so on.                                                     91 This term I have been using  to denote the signi fication of begi nning, of the new an d the emergent .  A p rovince of the think ing  of the subject in education, it need be rigo rously qualified as an ethical matter to not fall into the obscurities to wh ich it is destined in the ontolog ically conservative modern settlement (see chapte r 4).  73 To understand the grip of the m odern ethical settlement on subjectivity, one by which the  subject is  sacrificed on the altar of its ostensible g uarantee, let us consider the modern subjective guarantee in the inverse.  Were the transport of  the guarantee of the  subject from religious into modern (secular) formalities not accomp lished, the predication of the subject itself would deteriorate toward  the apparent vacancy of the subjective?for such is the undecidability of contingency, the sim p le incompletion of form .  The subject is thus secured, rendered knowable as such, as subject-to, by means that vacate it of that which eludes identification (of contingenc y, of indeterminacy).  The condition of possibility o f such a subj ect is its disassociation from its constitutive conditions, which requires, as of all ideology, th at the haunting of this v acancy itself be vacated, in admissible to thought, o r deracinated.  In the vacancy of the fallibility of identification, the subjective becom es (is lost to, in fact) the wholly neurotic grant of  a comp rehensive order, one riven from within:  Ide ntical with  itself on condition of the denial of its constitutive incomp letion.   The modern ethical repression discussed in the previous ch apter p resents here as the exemption (of itself from its own ethical  condition) that denudes modern subjectivity. 92  This I call deracination because it is the subjective consequence of a literal withdrawal from reason of the thinkability (if the term may be perm itted) of the                                                   92 Butler (1997) describes this analogo usly as ?pr imary dep endency?  whe reby, as a matter of ? p assionate attachment,? subordi nation becomes ?cen tral to the becoming of t he subject.?   Uninterrupted, t his is a dep endency wh ich renders the subj ect (child) ?vu lnerable to exp loitation,? t o the manipu lation of its p assionate attachments to ?u nthink able? ends?fo r the conditions of such subj ection require, as in modernity writ  large , their denial:  ?No s ubject can em erge  wi thout this attachment, formed in depe ndency, but no subject , in the course of its formation, can every fully afford to ?see? it.  Th e attachment in its pri mary forms must both come to be and be denied, its coming  must consist in its p artial denial, for the subj ect to emerg e? (p . 8, emp hasis in orig inal).  Of course, in my submission, Butler has not the last word in the conditions of subj ective emerg ence.   74 contingency of an ethical founding?one of a lacunal condition (of the crumbling of absolutes, paradoxically ?restor ed? absolutely in new forms) .  Presented as such, this ?ethical? operation perm its the untroubled continuing ?rational? produc tion of subjects (to be managed, adm inistered, taught, and deposed  as elements of existing orders).   To help thin k what beco mes of the subject,  or of the subj ective, as its condition of possibility, it m ay be helpful to recall that the ethical moment of the ?event? of m odernity may be thought first as a dispossession (of ethical constitution?of ?trad itional? orders), and next as a deliverance, as, in effect, a compensatory temptation to assume a new order comp rehensively, and thus ideologically, as  advanced in the modern methodological ontologics of ?reason.?  Thought as co-extension, the finitude?sym ptom of comp rehensiveness?im plicate within the foundational elements of the modern ethos93  prescr ibes, as ?sub jec tive? itinerary, the sovereign  automata of modern ethical ?autonom y?:  Of a heterogeneous whole, a presupposed completion.  ?Lost? within the prolif eration of its figures, the forms of the subjective rem ain fixed in the am ber of the event of modernity.  If this is what becom es of the subject,  lost as such in the ethical formalities of modernity, let us ex amine how this subjective conse quence of an ethical transmutation manifests. The story of the fall may be seen to formally pers ist as the mispercep tion of moral choice, of one, like m odern freedom in the ideological sense, wh ich is really a non-choice.  With respec t to the subje ctive pr oscription  of the modern advent?the auto-exem ption by which persists its paradoxical status as riven among liberation (the emancipatio n of identification) and repres sion (of the obstacle of its contingency)?we                                                    93  From chap ter 2, this is modernity?s decisive ? break? w ith the p ast, its law of a m ethod, of a know n (emp laced) subject (t he state) and new m oral status of knowledge.  75 may also see that it is the prior prohibition that creates the sin, and not the choice to then transg ress it.  In this reading, ?free will,? subj ective itinerary of modern autonomy, was not inaugurated in the choice to  accede to temptation (one va lorized in the inverse in modernity:  We now f reely ?ea t the fruit?), but pre-ex ists it as the law that made the ?choice? possible, which thereafter is m erely its consequence.94  In terms of modern subjec tivity, to remain consistent with the m odern subje ctive deracination is to accept its holist exem ption, a con dition without remainder, as its precondition, which is to say:  To ?becom e one? within the new order of th e (symbolic) exile of a dispatched founding contingency.  To ?choose? within this ethi cal order is to accede to the ideology, w hich makes the illusion of  such choice possible ;  to ?b ecome free? on such (abstract) terms is to be subject to the adm inistration of the moral managem ent of ascendant authorities of the state, of society and interest, which is  to say, to p recisely not become free, by way of the conviction that one is.   I am describing here the assum p tion of the modern subjective condition as in the ostensibly pre-m odern fashion, via the prohibition of modern diabolism?of thinking (?of the two?) the scene of i mplicate dis possession?and thereby ?b ecoming a subject? precisely by way of not subjectiviz ing the cons titutive split of  modern rationalism, of working to never ?beco me? its ?em p eror? unclothed, of still working to becom e it instead                                                   94 As ?i ?ek (2003a ) reads Paul?s insight  into the story of the first pr ohibition (as the p erverse Christian strateg y to seduce in order to save), I do so here wit h that of modern ethical advent, to illustrate how subj ectivity is formally enchained by the law of modern ethical founding , as merely that wh ich transg resses p rescribed p arameters (here in the insistence of subj ective freedom with in the repressed  symbolic auto-ex ile of modernity).  My argumen t is not that this should not be undertaken , that freedom in a modern sense should not be articulated and soug ht, but that, gi ven of w hich it consists, it need be undertaken differently if to not recap itulate its ideolog ical pro scrip tion (of a Master, a discursive supra -subj ect, of one sort or another at the helm) at one and the same time.  76 (recognizable, that is).95   The formality changes? from subject fallen by acceding to the temp tation of knowledge, to subject redeem ed (not coincidently in the inverse) thereby?but the op eration remains the same, as acquiescence to the choice (to ?becom e free? in apparent disobedience) is to obey the law which founds it.  Thus we encounter m odern freedom as a subjective m atter of both auto-constitution (an individual subject ?unbou nd? on the itinerary of freedom afforded by the modern exodus to identification) and auto-destitution (a subject, as such, whole, ?m ade free? thereby).  This is the form of a perverse resistance to the ethical encounter uniquely afforded by modernity, its symp tom as an accomp lished modern freedom.  As I will la ter show, this sym p tom of the modern wresting of the m ysteries of symbolization fr om God remains an essential precond ition to furthering any ethical project, to  not first make of it the ne w for ms of acquiescence, that is.  It is my argum ent that we m ust assume the modern sense of education bound within  an ethos of such comp lex subjective divestiture.  Otherw ise, one might say, we have neither an idea of what we are up  agains t, nor of how to resource  it as the ethical opportunity of our ti me.  Ethics in education, in order to be vital, needs to consider that the figuration of modern subj ectivity, as de Certeau (1988) advises, is a way of saying something (?freedom ?) in order to say something else (?unfreedom ?) (p. 134).  The apparen t modern subjective itin erary of freedom, of autonomy, and indeed of conquest, is won at a steep and d eceptive pr ice in this reading.  The benefit of the                                                   95  The metap hor of a labour is here entirely ap pr op riate?as drawn  to g reater detail in chap ter 5  with respect  to modern subjective form alisms?for, as  Badiou (2001) argu es of the ?Immortal? subjective condition of truth (or the ?imman ent break? as constitutive), its denial can consist as nothing  less, nothing  more passi ve, incidental, omissive than an obscure and pe rennial effort:  ?B etrayal is not mere renunciation.  Unfortunately, one cannot simp ly ? renounce? a truth.  The denial of the Immortal in myself is something  quite different from an abandonment, a cessation:  I must alw ays convince myself threat the Immortal in question never existed, and thus rally to op inion?s p ercep tion of this po int?op inion, who se who le p urp ose, in the service of interests, is p recisely this neg ation?  (p . 79).  77 ?tem ptation? of com p rehensibility (of its apriorization as giv en) is the security of identity within a unity of consciousness.  In  an ethical shift toward  the symbolic efficacy that is modernity, a uniquely modern subjective topos is inaugurated.  Subjective security, unity and efficacy were accom p lished by way of the subm ission of the subject to modern ontological conceits?the elem ents, metaphysi cal, legalistic, moral a nd epistem ological, of a new ?real??by which it becomes an entailment:  ?sub jec tivity [ becomes]  a condition of possibility in respect to pol itical or scientific legality? (de Cert eau, 1988, p. 177).  In this relation ?to an elim inated other? (the legalities of  modern metaphysics and epistem ology?whose dom inion is implicit, ?e liminated?) characterized  by de Certeau, the subject is here at once a fo rm of desire (to identify wi th the ?gods? of a new order) and its expurgation (deracination, banishm ent from thought).  As such, as com pulsion of an ?infinity of de sire? (p. 184) m aintained by the tension of the elimination of that by which ontological guarantee is secured, this is the subjectivity of a new m ode of certitude, one not to, but as its deferred prom ise of comp rehensiveness, as its lost guarantee.  In the new absolutes of a brute immediacy and the iron law of its m ethod, a new ?practical reason ? releg ates its subject ?elsewhere,? to a place ?off and away? (p.  184).  It secures subjectivity as that by which the objective m ay remain secured.   The unity and communicability afforded by the modern impetus to th e symbolization of the present?assumption of God?s former province?m ay be seen here as extending together from  a common founding with an im pera tive of inherent subjective self-deferral.  This is the deferral of the subject as not finally the integrity it would appear to be, its assump tion as such, as, in essence, a linguistic product.   The integral subject as product of discourse is an ideal circularity, the subjective product of passive  78 subordination as ontological m odern consequence.  An emaciated subject, this is nonetheless one purposeful, meaningful , legitim ate and correct, one on which ?the th eatre of the identifying power is perform ed? (de Certeau, 1986, p. 41).  Displaced by the new statist social subjectivity  (wherein the subject ?e merges? paradoxically as a postulate of a process of objectif ication, rather than perhaps as  its remainder, or inassimilable element . . . ), what rem ains is entirely objectified su ch that the subj ect has ?no p lace of his ow n? (de Certeau, 1988, p. 333).  As the price of s ubjective security, and along with the desire that would  enliven it ethically, s/he is perennially elsewhere, relegated?and regulated as ?the enem y kept closer??to outside the modern project as the modern project of a new ?Man.?   In the fist of the symbolic totality of the new (sublim ated) order, the subject is  dispatched, is ?written into the language of illusion? (p. 266). 96  Choked in the ?realist? abstraction of an ethic likewise fated, the s ubject becom es an object of  pity, a pathetic and (for later romanticism) tragic f ig ure.97  For lack of a robust subjective im perative (or axiom atics), the ethics of such a subject becomes a pious discourse of adm inistrative elements.  It becomes codes and concepts.  By way of the effort to articulate its subjective securitization, we m ay see that the modern merchant morality of the metaphysical                                                   96  Assuming the ?God?s-eye  view ca pa ble of embracing eve rything?  (Zupa n?i?, 2000, p . 22), this ?h umanist? sub j ect (to obj ectivity) becomes integ ral to wh at Badiou (2007) later calls the martyrolog ical ?to rment? o f the tw entieth century, in ??striv ing  to have done with  the romanticism of the Ideal:  to abide in the abrupt ness of the effectively-real but to do so with  a subj ective means (a dark  enthusiasm, an ex alted nihilism, the cult of war?) t hat remain irrep arably romantic? (p . 15 3).  Romanticism, in this reading, is  both a reincarnation of making  sacred, of sacrificing, and the elevation of that w hich mediates betw een ?reality an d the Ideal,? an  aesthetic relig ion of sorts coex tensive wit h the redep loyment of relig ious formalities de Certeau characterizes in th e gen eses of modernity.  It obtains, in other wo rds, in the trag ic p athos of the demand for a new  (characteristically aesthetic) Master, as if beauty could save the good  via the p athos of its loss/fligh t from the true.   97  Consider in contemp orary p opu lar discourse the metap hors of moral biolog y, of the infantile k now ing ness of the ?gu t? or the ? heart,? the Oedip al figu res of self-stupef action of the orders of modern reason, its p assive subordination to (intuitive) authorities, ones simp ly known.  79 releg ation of the ?real? prescribes  ethics as that which actu ally excludes the subj ective.  This Badiou (2007a) now calls ?the law of our  world? (echoing the ?priestly? m arriage of the categor ies of subjectivity with le gality), one  fully installed as neoliberal piety:  ?what is objec tive must align its costs with the m ark et, whilst what is subjec tive must not exis t as anything other than an unattainable luxury? (p. 72).  It will be important la ter to refer back  to the destitution of the subject when considering a new subjective form alism as an immanent condition of ethical possibility (and impossibility ) of educational thought.  For now, it has b een necessary to consider the modern controls and implicate delim itations of what I have been calling m odernity?s salvific imperatives and  authorities (a metaphysics, legality,  morality and new statu s of knowledge, expressed in a new ?l ocus? in language correlative to ostensibly secular new ?form alities? of practice) as what subordina tes the possibility  for subjective thought, and  as the antecedents of an unconscious and passive subject. 98  It has been further important to observe that these operate as the impoverishment of an ontological finitude, a condition such as obtains in the comp rehensiveness of the modern ethical deliverance, as one without remainder.  This is also one that, as discussed in the second half of the next chapter, even later rom anticism was et hically ill equipped not to com pound.   Subjective destitution as such is an im portant, and necessarily counter-intuitive, consequence of the complexity of  the modern advent.  It obtains in an ethical configuration binding the m odern project with other powerful consequences of relevance here.  What I term symbolic enclosure ?the combination of ubiqu ity and finitude of the process of sym bolization elevated  to the supervision of the ?real? in m odernity?                                                  98 This is indeed also the latent inaugu ration of the formal unconscious, as that wh ich escapes id entification, dark  surpl us of the new  ubiquity of symbolizat ion.  80 facilitates modern subjective destitution as  the second important consequence of the modern advent.  Continuing to  resource de Certeauian historiography, its them atics and the question of their relevance to the projects  of modern education, I move here further toward a rigorous and searching articulation of  an anti-ethical nihilism binding of ethics and education in modernity.99    3.1.2  Consequences II:  Symbolic Enclosure  Symbols in fact envelop the life of man in a network so total that they  join together . . . the shape of his destiny. (Lacan, 2001, p. 75)  Put simp ly, the symbolic enclosure of modern ontology is the m eans by which reality? the new m odes of its availability in the modern ethic?is su stained as intelligible and rep resentable.  As a consequence of ethical modernity, symbolic enclosure has two prim ary modes:  First as convening of an an alogizing space of meaning, and then as the subjective implication of the birth of superegoi c governance.  Contendi ng with these, it is my thesis, will enab le rethinking the trap of sy mbolic enclosure itself, without recours e to the perennial ethical te mptation (of  ?restoration?) to retu rn to the gods what m odernity has wrested  from them.  It will als o continue to help p rovide a theoretical context by which to displace the m odern ethical poverty th at prefigures b oth ethics and education.                                                   99 In contrast to the ?na ught of the will,? or t he efficacy of its void, what  I am describing here  as nihilistic Zupan ?i? (2003 ) bring s into focus as the tension of apparent opposites ? w hose form as the linkage  of a co-articulation is instructive otherwise h ere?wh ich she calls the ?m ortifying  either/or? of th e cap ture of the will (or desire) in  ?th e alternative between  directly Willing no thing (ness) itself and not willin g ?  (p . 66-67).  Nihilism is the sp ace betw een two altern atives wh ich allows t hem to p ersist as such and that, in the terms of this section?s reg ard for modern ?su bj ective nihilism,? is between  assuming  a p roscribed subj ect (the ?free? and  autonomous one) and wo rk ing again st subj ectivity p rop er (in elevating to  ubiquity obj ectivity).  81 As the operant of the divine in m odernity?of being in modern metaphysics (see Section 2.3.1)?the symbolic enclosure of  modern ontology consists first of the  presupposition that reality can be rendered intell igible and is representable.  Not m erely presupposition however, as a consequence of  the deliverance of the modern will-to-identification, symbolic enclosure is its mode of executio n.  This in that it fuels the operations of, and creates the venues for, ethical modernity as symbolic matters, as shared ventures of accessible accord, as of (in the earlier connotation) ?things thrown together? such that they m ay ?stand for . . . something else? (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etym ology, 2012).  From  this Lacan (2001) develops the notio n of symbol as a ?pact? (p. 68), one by which, for de Certeau (1986), ethics in modernity may be vested with the guarantee of  ?a sense of unity and . . . communicability? of a ?theatre of references and common values? (de Certeau, 1986, p. 205). 100  As the inexhaus tible prescr iption of  a therape utic p alliative, we witne ss here the rise of a modern theology  of meaning (as object), su stained? as ? enclosure?? in relation to ?m eaning that allo ws it to be? (de Certeau, 1988, p. 34).   To understand this curious entailment, de Certeau invites us to imagine that the analogical progress of knowledge implicitly ref ers back to a zer o poin t of origin.   This, like the narrative stru cture in which  it is emplaced (th e fabled story of progress ), both anchors fluidity (as the movement of tempora liz ation) and confirms an imaginary totality (in being comprehensively of a single point, origin, source or substance).  These provide the requisite horizon of the fini te cult of ?m eaning,? the abse nt coordinates of symbolic                                                   100 Recall here that modernity, for de Certeau, marks t he redepl oyment, or re-formalization, of Christian ethical structures in the advent of their deposition otherwise.  While its misconstrual is the illusion of their break,  of their surpa ssing  and overcoming by  reason, its event is nonetheless their transformation into symbolic matters, rather than those of the ineffable Real to whi ch they had been consig ned hitherto.  82 enclosure.  What this relation (to lost origin and ineffable destination) perm its is a reassurance of coherence ?of m eaning, of what means.  Akin to r evelation in religious  epistem ology, this is an  order of sig nificance as the necessity of signif ication in making meaningful, of thereby making known, communicable , available and related to, the known?which is also to say to retain existence as not utterly alien, to make of i t a ?hum an? project.   What I have discussed previously as a fo rmally sublimated relig iosity, a sort of symbolic faith?assum ed belief in a ubiquitous symbolization?m ay here be thought of as a secular theism, whose object (m eaning) is traceable to the modern birth of a social order itself (as a discursive or ideological m atter of historiography, and not as the na?ve opacity  the story itself, as historical concretion).101  Entirely because of the metaphysical displacem ent of the Real (? la Lacan) in to the realm of human symbolization and command, what is meaningful becomes true by virtue of participation in the logos, in the rational order of im-mediacy (the p utatively unmediated).  As a subjec tive matter, this consequence of an apparently objective m etaphysical settlem ent allows for the nihilistic formality? a choice among vacancies?of sim ulacral subj ectivity:  While the form of the new ?real? m ay be objective, its ostensible cont ent may be seen as entirely subjective, or  ?relative? w ithin the finitism of its projec tive remit, as of an ?inf initely expans ive?                                                   101 This distinction obtains relevance in that an event, such as that limned in de Certeauian psychoa nalytic historiog raphy  and p ursuant further to the w ork  of such ?t hinke rs of the event? as Alain Badiou, is not, and could never be, kn ow ledg e.  Rather, in a lang uage that I hope  to be becoming more familiar as this study p roceeds, this is its, often p aradox ical, symp tom? wh ich is itself never more than a conj ecture, a ?t heoretical fiction.?  For, lack ing s ome finally reliable ext ernal referent, the dislocations of discursive re-foundations can only be figu red? and beset always b y ign orance and undecidability?as ev ent.  The tracing of an event?s consequences (such as the pa rticular w ork  of this chap ter and the one prec eding) ho we ver is the wo rk  of wh at Badiou (2005 c) calls a ?militan t of truth,? the vocation of the subj ect with in an ontolog y of the event:  ?Militan t is a categ ory with out borders, a subj ective determination with out identity, or wi thout concep t?  (p . 142).  Such I develop m ore fully as a matter of subj ective formalism and modes of represen tation in chap ters 5 & 6 .  83 symbolic universe.  The form of the ?m eaningful? modern subjective supplement (for this is what it p roperly sho uld be called) thus remains entirely a captive o f its ontolog ical object, of the ?real? of its re verberating cosm os of meaning, the poetizing ed ification of identification.  This new cosm os, or ethical settlement, it is always importan t to recall, remains intractably vested with the m anias and dispossessions of the m odern deliverance writ large (as of its new ?rati onal? horizon, even if in the for m of an address from beyond it).  Maintained within the sym bolic enclosure of the ?real,? this closure of ontological  horizons reproduces its con ceit in the forms of the meaningful import of a redolent qualitative totality.  This is to say, it is an order, operative as the projective horizon (of meaning) of the im plicate ?lim it? of a symbolic universe.  In this new (symbolic) space of the ?real, ? symbolic enclosure p rovides for the antecedent domestication of subjectivity  proper.  This is a shoal to which education is too readily called in modernity, its siren song that of the reduction of subjectivity to its ?right m easure? of profundity, to in-articulable resonance with received faith and the cynical allocation of ?depth.?  The well-meant destitution these deliver is of concern here.  Effective in educational thought (inasmuch as it is concerned with the being of subjects) symbolic enclosure operates a s the reassurance of a qualitative venue ag ainst which to deny one?s capture within  neoliberal audit culture, it is an ?inf inite? horizo n of meaning, or inter subjective m edium of plurality, a m ultiplicitous extens ion of what rem ains a duplicitous ratio nality.102I have been describing here sym bolic enclosure as a covert form of hermeneutics, in the repla cement of governance b y ?orig inary revelation? (the sundering of symbolic unities) with a ? meaningful? reality, one secure d within the moralizing probity of wha t de                                                   102 This I discuss in the nex t chap ter as the op eration of the ?im p licate anathema? of Platonism  that underw rites p hronetic ethics (Section 4.2.4).  84 Certeau (1988) calls ?a scien tific concern for upholding the truth of things? (p. 217).  Arriving with what he calls th e ?te merity of a scientific point of view? (p. 235, e mphasis in original), here m ust be acknowledged the violence of another voice, that of ? a birth through the ear ? (p. 235, e mphasis in original).  This?the superegoic?is  a radical exteriority immanent to the new subjective remit, important in th at it pro j ects an ?insurm ountable alterity from which the s ubject?s desire is m odeled? (p. 235-236). Consequent with the birth of the Cartesian ?e go,? the ferocious figure of the superego is  its governance in the modern subjective rem it, itself a hyperbolized subjective symptom of the symbolic enclosure inherent in the onto-logic of m odern rationalism.   As indicated, the dimension of meaning (e ffect of the ostensible ?m ystery? of symbolization) prefigures a ?fall? o f sorts, an exile o r perennial failure, disasso ciation from authorial origin?inasm uch as we don?t make meaning as much as co-make meaning with tha t by which m eaning already means (effect of a given ontological horizon in modernity).  Partic ip ation in meaning as such, as the secreting of a hidde n authority, instantiates the (supe regoic) law that m akes its i llusion possible (as the ?fall? installs the law of  its terms).  Begging perp etual correction? for symboliza tion is alway s ?wrong? in  the sense that its constituent incomp letion always belies its claim s, undermines its referents and destabilizes its  representations?the modern subject to symbolic enclosure is arguably far more gove rned than the (superstitious, ignorant etc.) one it is founded on superseding.  For, in th e broadly modern ethic as I have been describing it, ?m odern? desire?as the disass ociation from symbolic or ideological  85 contingency in representation, identi fication, and their modern objectivism 103 ?is both pivota l and unintellig ible.  As the ?alien ? in the ? alien,? desire is here a literal ontologi cal consequence of a particularly m odern obscurity (of the ?light?).  Part of a process or method?most sim p ly of the deliverance from ignorance, the m odern ?enlightened? edification?desire bef ore the superegoic injunction instantiat ed by symbolic enclosure is typica lly, here following  Lacan, the successful fulfillment of its own unsatisfaction.104  The perpetual need for correction of a ?m eaningful? life, visited upon a forever failing subjective disposition, 105  foremost is the installation of its order, the guarantee of the field of the new ?social? or ration alist order in its most profoundly institu tional and conservative mode.  In turn, this guarantee of a redemp tion delivered in its denial, of desire fulfilled in unsatisfaction, and by virtue of the paradoxical intim acy of its remove, vitiates its constitutive operations.  The im po ssible unity afforded by the banishment of the subjectiv e as a viable source of ethical gen esis and its continuing incar ceration within  a projective horizon of sym bolic enclosure is an ethical consequence in the form of a trap.   This is the form which presupposes that creation itself were somehow m ade, were  ?constructed,? like the ontology (constructivism) whic h licenses it in conformity with human dimensions, ones of obedience to what may be known of the known (rather than its                                                   103  This figu ration of desire is based in the Lacanian one, whi ch elaborates desire as lacunal, the effectivity of a lack, rather than a sort of simp listic correlative cathex is. 104 Chiesa (2003 ) exp lains:  ?the satisfaction  of desire essentially consists of the preservatio n of its ow n unsatisfaction, since a subj ect remains a subj ect only insofar as . . . he is a desiring lack-of-being  that wants-to-be? (p . 15 5 , emp hases in orig inal).  Alternately, in p sychoanalytic terms, an ethics of the real is less one of the (banished) desire I here consider? one Z upa n?i? (2000) describes as ?of fantasy;  of the [he re sublimated] m aster? (p. 254)?t han of w hat Freud first termed the drive ? w hich locates the fantasy and subtracts the subject from it so the subject may emerge as a new frame in the Other (see chapter 6). 105  This is a subjectiv ity in ?n eed? of a redemp tion (recovery of integrity) th e ethos is ?rigg ed? to bar??obj ective? from the first, wit h subj ectivity its ex crescence, the ?filth ? of its institution.  86 symp tomnal status as haunted enigma). 106  Within traje ctories of error and correction of symbolic enclosure, the modern concept of education?for the desire to educate is never exem pt from the orders within whic h it is founded, never unsaturated by its ethos ?is  convened to institutionalize and administer this circuit of a stable production of being.  Central to the reproduction of its ethos, education perpetua lly unseats itself via the shifting vagaries of a supposedly authorit ative meaningfulness,  of faith vested, symbolically identified with, that is , in an obscure and implic it obje ct?a concept or a code, that is.  This anxious circulation of  education?s final purpose, its status as methodological, is vis ited upon the self-leg itimating figure (v ictim/ subject/stud ent/oth er) of an errant unknown (exile from  remediation, from the imprim atur meaningful/real), one thereby ?brought to or der? in advance as subject to the (unheard) command issuing from an exile?s ?hom e.?  Thus education ?brings one home? to somewhere one only belongs by virtue of being its exile.   The vital insurance of the symbolic efficacy of a particu larly modern species  of order is a sublimation enforced (as moral, as ?real?) by the powerfu lly paltry ?subjective? guarantees it generates (the sym bolic imperativ es of superegoic conformity to operative ?eth ical? elements?to be responsib ly ?one?s self? in gratitud e to the obscure mechanics of the known, of state, society, ec onomy, knowledge and, indeed, of  ethics itself).  As the ?prac tical? matters of the discip lining (educatio n) of subjects, these conjoint operations of symbolic enclosure (of meaning and its supe regoic adjun ct) are surely?rather than the                                                   106 This ? rule? of the transp arency of k now ledg e is w hat Plato regar ds as the definition of sop histry, as ?t he rule by wh ich w hat is k now n can be kno wn, and  wh at is not kn own  cannot be k now n?  (Bartlett, 2011, p . 33 ).  It is the very failure of Socrates to follow th is rule?i n being t he only man in Athens w ho ? does not educate?? w hich is his commitment to truth, in the Platonic instance of another education, one w hich clears ?t he soul of this conceit?  (p . 32 ).  87 final authority of the knowledge it d isseminates, or indeed some unimp eachable rectitude of its project?what m ake the purposes of the modern institution leg ible and correct.107  Their social and psych ic momenta thereby become universal, as the new universe  becomes them. My argum ent is that the ?social? con science of the riven modern subject?subject to the command of an unheard voice, within  the quicksand-vague transports of meaning?is ?ethically? com p elled to drive its projects ever onwar d toward the purifying realism it presupposes.  It m ust assume the carrot-on-a-string prom ise of deferred redemp tive legitim ation?m odern rigor?s ab solution?oriented only by the hazy compass of that ersatz subjective injunction by whic h it must perpetually, and forever futilely, correct itself:  To become better what one already is (in the Neo-Aristotelian educational ethical commonplace). 108  As it does so, this ?aggressive ? and ?neurotic? (C hiesa, 2007)109 subjective itinerary hurtles, bound within language ?s system of limits, in Oedipal rapture, toward its  predic ate:  A universe of ?One,? expanding by way of a finitude of the immeasurable proliferations  of its operations? confirm ations (dizzyingly burgeoning                                                   107  We may recall here Derrida' s (2002b) characterization:  ?Teachi ng delivers signs . . . si gni fiers suppo sing  the k now ledg e of a p rior sign ified?  (p . 81) connotative of a transcendental positio n of kn ow ledg e and power in education, whe rein the teacher ?m akes him self the represe ntative of a system of repr oduction?  (p . 75 ). 108 As ?wh at supp orts the p erseverance of any reg ime, correct or incorrect? (Bartlett, 2011, p. 11 ), and if in the accord? of truth and happ iness? constitutive of the highest achievement of that state, education for Aristotle is ?re alizat ion throug h pract ical reason of the truth of one?s nature? (p . 11).  Prope rly pre -modern inasmuch as it retains a ?state? (to  wh ich subj ect is subordinated) to be p erfected as master (sign ifier), this is the retention of the place of God as the virtue of the suppression of the ecstasies of Platonic ?participation,? or any imp lication in ethical founding , by way of an unmediated pract icality.  So resonant still today, this ontolog ical conceit was  contested by Descartes as ke y element of the evental character of the modern founding (of its status as an incalculable break) , the p urp ose of w hose doubt was ? to break wi th the ?d ubiousness of the wh ole superst ructure? and begi n ag ain ? from the very foundations? (as cited in Bartlett, 2011, p . 12). 109  From Lacan, Chiesa (2007) calls this ?radical na rcissistic aggre ssivity? that which ? underlies the actuality of the ph ilanthrop ist, the idealist, the p edagog ue, and the reformer?(P. 20-21) in that they visit upon  themselves the integ rity of an accomp lished ethical prog ram, a radical conquest of the messiness of everyday infinitum in aggressive (exacerbated, al ready sp lit yet integrative) a nd narcissistic in that the resources of deliverance obtain as imagi nary pr oductions of their ?subj ects.?  88 knowledge, the finality of a ?social? just ice, vacuous ?innovations? which reinforce continuity by way of rhetorics of ?diffe rence,? and the para doxical com edy of a ?visionary? m anage ment).   The point of this exposition is not specif ically that in some wa y these are wrong?for I do not avow ideology critique here as my method?but rath er, more ethically powerful in my view, that they are not what they purport or appear to be, that therein they may be said to express the under-thought,  and thus ethically nascent, discursive enclosure of a symbolic totality, of the curious idealism of a meaningf ul modern concept of life.  Consequences of a sublimated order methodological deliv erance, the neurotic command of the unsatisfied satisfaction of an obscure certainty binds, proscribes and delimits?within its pro j ective horiz ons of the ?real??education and ethics.  This is not merely to say that these are conscrip ted to the social p roject, but that th e social project itself is founded within an ontological one, circ umscriptive of the m both.  However, such an ontological binding  is also, in a key pi ece of my thesis, a specifically m odern condition of ethical possibility, articulated so as to disarticulate in new configurations.  What it is not however  is the realist authority of an implicate fi ction of pure freedom presupposed thereby, which need be thought doubly as such:  As a projective im age of an integrative ontological method, and sym bolic pr oduction of an organizing predicate (the  unitary enclosure of a presupposed ?One?). In the enforcement of symbolic enclosure? the mechanisms of the presu pposition  of reality as available to intellig ibility and repres entation, its meaningful discurs ive topos  and supereg oic agency ?and the displacem ent of the enig ma of the subject, the occluded  ?m odern? god of m ethod comes to impoverish th e discourse it would vitalize with respect  89 to the creation of new form s of subjectivity and new regions of thought. 110  This is not merely to say that a sort of instrumentalism attends ethical thought in m odernity, one variously to be overcome by some more ?e nlightened? mode, but rather, and m ore specifically,  that thinkin g  of education in modernity is a consequence of the prosecution (consequential self-reinforcement) of an ethic in symbolic enclosure, one whose subject?s exclusion is its founding precondition, and c ontinuing condition of its paradoxical grant of freedom.  Mine is actually a simpler poi nt than the anti-instrumental commonplace,  one however whose consequences m ay be drawn out to greater eth ical effect if turned toward what I com e to discuss as new immanent eth ical forms.  So too with  the consequence of relation, or the implicate comm ensurability of the figures and operations of the new ?rationalist? order of modernity, to which I now turn.  3.1.3  Consequences III:  Relations  It?s a matter of?the end of?the absence to self of the unrelated.  (Badiou, 2007a, p. 92-93)  A final consequence of the birth of a modern ?Age of Reason? I consider here is                                                    110 Witness, as one eminent ex ample am ong many, Hawking?s  recent dismissal of philosophy (which we  may tak e in the Platonic sense to be the question of the though t of though t) in science?s unsurprisin g ly heroic/ demago g ic k nowl edge:   ?p hilosop hy is dead.  Philosop hy has not kept up wi th modern developm ents in science, par ticularly phy sics.  Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for k now ledg e? ( Hawk ing  & Mlo dinow , 2010, p. 5, em p hasis added), as if the quest p rovides for itself, and, burge oning  wi th self-imp ortance, relies naug ht on how , for exam pl e, it may need un-think  itself to p roceed.  In the pr omised land of a kno w ledg e wh ich finally is arriving to d eliver us from every sp ecies of p enury?on e wh ich ph ilosop hers (esp ecially in the broadly Continental tradition) have been p rovocatively enga ge d for decades and more?i f not having  actually become him, we are fo rmally now fi nally becoming ?O ne? in the go dhead, and need no longe r think  about it.  90 its re-formalization as an ethos of relations?by which, in part, has been enforced an ethical transformation from fractious theological cosm ic contingency to iron law of ?society? (here the ontological fi gure of modern rati onal-humanist ethical finitude).  In parallel with  the centrality of meaning to the modern symbolic enclosure, and the object to the being of the subject (and especi ally its hyperbolized superegoic radical extern alization), de Certeau locates  a partic ularly modern repression in the im plicate consequence of relation:  Subjects and m eanings ? must be grasped in term s of relations (and no longer as som ething hidden-and- seen)? (de Certeau, 1986, p. 175, e mphasis in origin al).  The founding of a m odern ethic relies on the symbolic efficacy of a discursive ? relation to an eliminated other? (de Ce rteau, 1988, p. 40, em phasis added).  The  elimination here is certainly crucial for, unlike the pre-m odern ethic, its ?othe r? is a retroaction, presum ed and then entailed, a creature of symbolic enclosure itself, and no longer its mortifying torm ent, as formerly.  This elimination perm its the installation of new ethical authorities, new li nkages on the m odel of the fundamental one (or those, as we have seen, to th e presupposed ?real,? m odern placeho lder of being).  de Certeau is an  adversarial interlocutor of Foucault, but here he sounds similar:  ?Scientific ?reason? is indissolubly wedded to the reality  that it meets again as its  shadow and its other, at the very moment when it is excluding it? (p. 40).  The correlative consequence of the modern ethical founding, of this curi ous ?wedded exclusion,? is at issue here because its consideration is a means by which to further articulate the finite remit of ethics and education in modernity (indeed also that of their very binding together, as discussed in the next section).    91 By virtue of this mechanism of significan ce, of the implicit lin kage of  relatedness-to an obscurity (the eliminated/repressed other by which modern reason successively proceeds ), the immediacy of ?facts? becom es potent.  They com e to function as indications of meanings, in fulfillment of the circuitry of enclosure among a m ethod and the meanings and objects it conf irms and pr oduces.  This institution also reverses the position s of this institution and its subject , reversing them  as ?the one who speaks.? 111  Of course, voice never obtains to the illegitim ate, but it is codified as subje ctive silence in the presence of a com p rehensive ethic.  The ideologic circuit of re lation consequent to a burgeoning onto-ethical order co mp els de Certeau (1988) to draw the conclusion (with Barthes) that ?the s ign o f History has since become less the real than the intellig ible?  (p. 42), the intellig ible being its offspring, so to sp eak, such th at the ?real? itself is no longer a question.  Relation to an eliminated other both allows  this ethical equation of reality and intelligibility and creates the blind spot that sustain s it.  Blind to this linkage its elf (the other is, after all, eliminated, withdr awn from thought as a sym bolic effect), the consequential ontological m echanism of relation thereafter comes to presuppose further  effaced linkage upon whatever it meets (it is a ?conquest, ? argues de Certeau).  Thus we come to the investiture of the modern ?r eal? in intelligib ly substantializing its  substance as further affinity and commensurability instituted constructively in the very fulcrum of what passes for existen ce.                                                     111 This ex cision of voice is, for de Certeau (1986), more than subj ective emaciation or deracination, it is ?torture? by which is tra nsmuted subjective speec h for ? a confession linke d to adherence? (p. 41) that restores to the law what  effectively happe ns.  The role of education in this mode is to restore to the law of its ethical founding what ostensibly is.  The subj ect in this reading  is incidental supp ort for the ethical institution.  92 Relation, in modernity a humanist conceit, is foremost what organizes sym bolic order.  Symbolic order is what , in displacing the subject to a knowability, an apparent thinkability, assumes a methodical Faustian debt by way of its projective accum ulation of a progressive ?truth? of knowledge and soci ety (a comp lex idealism of m etaphysica l displaced emplacem ent, as discussed in the p revious chapter).  Relation is here not new; indeed it remains a fundamental Aristotelian conceit.  What is new about it in m odernity is its subsumption within pro cesses of symbolic enclosure, its ex acerbation as a sublimated ethical formality.  It is as such that relation becomes binding in m odernity, becomes of the order of that which cannot be refused.  This is ethically consequential in the narrow sense?not solely as of the constitution of worlds, of ? ethos,? that is?i n that the pan tomime of free will is no longer adm issible as such, despite what the m odern subjective p arable insists.  Such freedom is instead ?realized ? as an article of faith, and its precarious ethical status as a performance is overcome merely by virtue of the insistence of its reality?or, m ore precisely, of its basic relatedness to, and implication in, the authoritative modern ?real.?  Arendt (1958), in  my view, m isdiagnoses this authorization as ?the philosophic shift from  action to will-power? (p. 163), as a shift toward abstraction, a sort of Platonic symp tom, rather than a more complex one within abstraction, within the discursive production of wo rlds (always an unavoidably discursive?im aginary and/or sym bolic?and thus philosophical m atter) at the modern advent.  Consequently her recourse to its remediation by ?the psychological power of the imagination ?  is fated.  However, her cha racterization  of the effect of this ethical consequence is brilliantly germ ane, when sh e writes of a displacem ent of ethical actors ?to such an extent that they are no t even admitted as spe ctators to the sp ectacle of self- 93 delusion? (p. 235).  P erversely, of course it is to modern reason?s ?elim inated? but requisite other to which its own auto-infantilism  is deposed, as the im age of the uni -dimensional simp licity that the ethos incarnates, displaces and subordinates?elem ental of the production of the other it m aintains.  In modernity one can no longer ?choose? the devil?s option, one m ust instead be that which prevents its appearance, be of the palpable material of the ?real? which make choice unnecessary (we are already of the order of the true, and no longer need to create it). 112  In ?m oving beyond? here sy in the ontological founding of a new world, one of a m ethod secured by symbolic enclosure and relation, modernity replaces it with apostasy, and?governed by the form  of what it denies?celebrates a new ethical vacancy, a n ew freedom , an ?eth ical? conquest, and the conquest of the ethical.  The conceit of relation, thus installed, further disqualifies in advance?as do subjective deracination and sym bolic enclosure?that which is not m arked by the repressive ontological index of  modernity:  The Unity which  is pred icated on its denial as such.  Reversed, if the means of unification are divided (are themselves symbolic), unity itself relies on a division (of its integrity as ?whole? and its sym bolic formality) whose repression rem ains its very condition of possibility.  Bound w ithin this ethical landscape of authority and repression em erge the m odern discourses of ethics and education, in a                                                   112 Here it is imp ortant to note that the aprio ritiza tion of relation requires innumerable ? others,? uncounted ones who  ?d on?t fit,? to sustain its salvific ecumenicism, to retain the field of the ethical institution?s expa nsion, to save the ethical consequence of relation from exha usting i tself.  The symbolic function of the pre p onderance of ?h umanity? retained in gri p  of an ontology  of symp athy is, I believe, a further consequence of an ethic whose predicat e is relation.  To remain ?related? we requ ire the symbolic effort of the establishment of prior difference.  Here, we are all th e same is the ?sayin g ? (using Levinas? terms) of what pe rmits the ?said?:  we must remain ?d ifferent? (or, our inequality is of more value than the equality who se espou sal is thereby its denial).  94 binding whose lineam ents are important to cons ider in specificity now, before concluding with the elem ents and consequences of the modern ethical settlement.  3.2  A Consequent Conjunction:  Ethics & Education  This section is concerned with the questi on of how to think education and ethics within the m odernity articulated in de Certeauian historiography, and to support m y claim of the necessity of the question?s difficulty as a matter of ethical inquiry.  The difficulty here is that of thinking about their conjunc tive binding within an ethos whose elem ents and consequences are both productive and de nying of it, and whose symptom atic status as such defies our attempts to nam e it, such is the tenacity of its hold on the conventional modern imaginary.  To sum  up preceding argum ents and turn them to key articula tions by which to go forward is the purpose here; a segu e of sorts, from some conclusions drawn about ethics and education in the modern ethos broadly, to ethics constituted as such within m odern educational thought. To this point I have directed a consid erable focus toward evoking and projecting an emergent im age of a  new ethic borne unde r the sign of m odernity.  de Certeauian historiography develops this as  one in which religious energi es were les s overcome than redirected in new (se cular) formalities and po werf ul ethical consequences.  This new ethic conveys truth, as meaning, in to the re-inscription of the wo rd ethics itself.  Formerly  95 entailing a broad sense  of ?dwellin g,? 113  de Certeau figures th e historical movements constitutive of modernity as those by wh ich ethics become directed toward the supervis ion of the implicate f initude of a social function, or the delimited symbolic totality of a human ?real? (for the two are indissoluble) .  Within this comp lex new ethical assemblage?of an event, its precipitations (ethi cal elements), and their consequences within a vast historiographical sophistica tion?w e may discover, I claim, a new reading of the modern sense of education:  As wh at fosters and re-founds an ?ethics? of the  production of a new order, whose ideologically  effaced origin is th e religious figure of deliverance within what Rouss eau (2010) later identified as a civil religion (p. 119).  Ontologica l?in tha t it is of the modern ?real??this d ispo sition demarks a fundamental binding of ethics (in the broad sense as of the production of ?worlds?) and education.  This I refer to as a conjunction, or the conjoining of  figures  within a s ing le whole.  In de Certeau?s analysis of a vast archive, this bound condition may be appreciated as a m atter of the reduplicative m echanics of the silent faith of modernity?of its status as a faith ?within imm ediate (available to both ? utility? and ?m eaningfulness?) indices of ontological weight, of existential substance.  Simply put, education in modernity is bound to deliver an ideologically freighted im age of ?what is.?   Vitally however, this  delivery is also a ?secretion,? a ?m aking s ecret? within the Enlig htenment project.  As the deceptive k ernel which sustains conjunction as I elaborate it, w hat is secreted is what de Certeau (1988) calls a ? linkage? to the presupposed ?real,? enacted am ong                                                   113  While usually connoting ? being -w ith? (Hyde, 2004) around repre sentations of the Good, pre vious senses of the wo rd did not so thoroughl y entail relations among or even necessarily pres uppose  them (w hich I here am calling t he binding of a conjunction); one imp ortant characteristic of such entailments in modernity are the suppressi on of the conting encies of rhetoric in the assurances of technicity, in the leg alism of rep resentation of a rational method?s dog matic ethos (de Certeau, 1986, p . 208).  Affectively, the ?g ood??m aster sign ifier of ?trad itional? ethics??gov erns the release of tension, the inertia or rep etition of psy chic behaviour?  (K ovacevic, 2007, p.  119).  96 the cultural, legendary m anifestations of a time to what, in these leg ends, is already controllable, correctible, or prohi bited by technical practices.  It cannot be identified with its practi ces, but it is produced by what those  practices trace, erase, or confirm in the received language of a given milieu.  The traditional model of a global, symbolizing, an d legitim ating discourse is thus still in evidence here but w orked by instrum ents and controls that belong specifi cally to the productive a pparatus of our society. (p. 220, em phasis added) This secreted linkage  of cultural manifestations and antecedent control, in modernity delegated to a social function, is germ ane here as what de Certeau sim p ly calls a ?representation.? 114  Installation of the ?rea l? as extant im age is  a symbolic idealism akin to Heidegger?s (1938/2007) con cept of ?world-picture:?   The fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as pictu re.  The word ?pictu re? now m eans the formation of presentin g  production.  W ithin this formation, the human fights for the position in which he can be that being that pr ovides the measure for all being, and draws up the guidelines for everything  that is. (p. 221, em phas is added) This is a comprehensive disc ursive form that subsumes discourses unsparingly within modern ethical operations, incl uding?perhaps especially (con cerned as they readily are with the c onstitution of forms of life)?the  discourses of ethics and education.  Inescap ably bound by the secreted linkage of cultural production, of its et hical predicates (those of the ?real? prefigured thereby), this is an ethos subject f rom the first to the                                                   114 Heideg ger ?s notion of ? w orld-p icture? is per hap s derived from Hegel ?s concep t of ? p icture-thinki ng  consciousness? ( as cited in ?i?ek , 2003 a, p. 83 )?c reature of symbolic enclosure in my thesis.  97 authority of (a) representation.  In this  configuration?s production of educational discourse, educators may be seen first to be representation?s representatives, and it our most profound credential.  W hat we  have to contend with here, I m aintain, is what de Certeau calls a ?story perm eated by social practices? (p. 220), as modern myth or, broader, a specifically modern im ag inary.115   This is ethically pr oductive for my purposes foremost by way of the com p rehensiveness of its integrity, w on via the exclusion of the contingency of its production, which is to sa y, by way of t he secreting of the linkage it installs to the authoritative ? real.?  The ethically operative fantasy of ?what is,? the prelim inary repression of m odern ethics, thus repeats th e gestu re of the antecedent cooption of its elem ents?now to be thought of as  inclusive of ethics and education.  In every gestu re marked by its absence, 116 ?what is? excludes its own kernel, precisely to the extent to which the se cretion effective with in the modern ethical settlement (of this linkage and its repressive status in  the modern ethical sublimation) remains itself un-displaced.  As conditions of possibility for a re gion of thought, rather than the region itself, we are contending here with the id eological comprehensiv eness of a ?g lobal discourse articulating practices which it does not talk about but which  it must resp ect, practices  that are at once absent from its narrative yet oversee it? (de Certeau, 1988, p. 220, emphas es added).  We are contending w ith absences, and what they conceal. The operation of conjunction is thus not founded on binding which would be  explic it, or identifiable, within le gitim ating disc ourses.  It is at play rath er in the lacunae                                                   115  The Castoradian concept  of the social ?i magi nary? (Castoriadis, 1991, p . 67) is resonant wi th that of de Certeauian myth, as a p articular rationality?s g rounding of social order in a common intellig ibility.  Ricoeur (1997) similarly discusses ideolog y?as a ?d iscourse of the imag inary constitution of society? (p. 63 )?w hile Jameson (1981) eng ages w ith Lacan?s (not unrelated) g enesis of the term?within  the (essentially ontolog ical) triad Imagi nary/ Symbolic/ Real, fig ured as ?i magi nary resolution of real contradiction? (p . 63 ).  116 The absence I denote here as conting ency, but will, in later chap ters, as actual infinity.  98 of the formality of the thinking th ey expre ss (which is p recisely why thinking f ormality becomes so important to ethical thought).  What this means is that, because of the conjunction?s genesis in the suppression of a transmutation, in the re-formalization of various ethical media (formerly religi ous, and latterly social, practices) as a secretion which authorizes a global representation, the conjunction of ethics and education obtains not on the explicit forbidding of  its unbinding, as one m ay assume.  Rather, the constitutive force of binding in the modern ethos is pred icated instead in a co-articulation effected by never denying the relation of its elements, by simp ly allowing  their presuppositions and co-implication to endure.  Discursive economies of im-plication do just th is:  They place within, within a particular order, and importantly also the h istorical remit proportioned to it. 117   Relation is presupposed, symbolic enclosure effected, subjective d eracination enforced, such that the linkages of conjunction are im plicated, and the imputation ( the mythic ?c ultural production?) of ontol ogical linkages?God?s former domain sublimated?rem ains unheralded, untroubled, ?true.?  The binding here obtains from the implicit prohibition of unbinding, from  the assump tion of this as a condition of participation in the modern deliverance. 118  To a modern heterogeneous reason this is ?obvious,? endlessly reconfirm ed in seemingly unrelated venues?such that a hydra-like ethic sustains itself variously in the implicative operation of ontological                                                   117 This is also w hy Freudian historiog rap hy lik e de Certeau?s is so crucial to modernity.  Unlik e the advent of critical theory, of the Enlig htenment?s ap p arent p roj ect of self-criticism, p sychoanalytic historiograp hy p ermits reading  modernity itself as its ow n symp tom, p ermits its ap p roach by means conditioned not by the ethos? conceits, but via their telling  incomp letions, their authoritative vacancies. 118 In discussing  Badiou?s Platonic critique of soph istry?as ?p redicated on relations that are ling uistically constructed, whose prese nce is poetically attested and that accords ultimately with  pa rticular interests and therefore cannot constitute a way of life? (Bartlett, 20 11, p. 9, emp hases in orig inal)?Bartlett ties such a p rohibition to wh at is lacking in sophistic education, the ?decision for such a ?way  of life? (p. 9); t hat, in ?train ing  the youth in an interest in interest? (p . 10), a clash of universalisms is staged, ?? between  universalism or the rig orous formalism of that w hich is unbound from such pe dago gi cal regi mes, and a false universalism whi ch is pr edicated preci sely on the pr ohibition of unbinding?  (p . 10).  99 acquiescence:  As in, for exam ple, how a particular im age of knowledge, or a legal formalism (of method), or even a sober metaphysical sleight of hand (concealm ent of the idealism of the ? real?), all contribute to conditions which c onstitutively bind ethics and education in modernity.  The modern ethical g enesis obtains here in a p hantomic linkage  of elements (such as education and ethics), a discursive one that?and this is the important point?proscribes as it produces. Clearly the ethical condition of ideologica l modernity proc eeds to many visible advantages?indeed it is ?constructive? ?as knowledges accum ulate, problems are ?solved, ? and ?subjects? liberated ; it is ind eed unpreceden tedly efficacious.  However, its acumen is at one and the same time also suppr essive, it hums with the quietist finitism of its onto-mechanics.  This is the derogation of ethics by way of their ?realization? (assump tion as codes and concepts as we have seen, but also in the failure to confront significant ethical elem ents); it is a ?stupefying poverty? (Badiou, 2005b, p. 247) in this sense, its binding a breathtak ing circum scription of parasitic daring of countless unintellig ible?or ? imp ossible??op portunitie s foresworn, ineligible, null, esp ecially where subjectiv ity is concerned.  What is foresworn is, quite sim p ly, the unimaginable, whose absence is a matter of m oral virtue, or the propriety of the m odern ethical settlement.  Here, the ?untim ely? concerns of ethical inquiry in education obtain as an axiom atic commitment to a search:  To a purs uit within  what is  immutably giv en as ?real,? within its status as such, as  symp tomatic elision, symbolic truth of the ?real? and  not Real truth as symbolic.  Subsequent to the ?pact? of m odernity, conjunction is what de  Certeau (1988) reg ards as an ?inverse of norm ativity? (p. 100).  Ordering what is absent, the predicates of m odern ontology as such ar e established in didactic relation to their  100 subjects:  They instruct in their own order?s  participation, whose ?s ecret,? their denial, exem ption, or m aking-absent, is his/her very essence. As I show as this study proceeds, a histor iograp hical figure such as the ?inverse of normativity? helps constitute thinking in inve ntive encounter with m odern ethical thought in educational discourse (where, in the ne xt chapter,  I consider symp tomatically conjunctive the ethics of phrone sis and alterity).  Its inherent comp lexity I plum b for two important reasons.  First, to do so is to not  ?already partake of the problem  we seek to address? (G odzich, 1986, p. xvii), to not, from the first, recapitu late modern ethical conditions? founding presum ptive operations  (elements) and operative ethical  circumscriptions (consequences). 119  Second, I am motivated as an ethical matter to be able to deploy ethical discourse s otherwise:  R ather than to critically destroy them?by way of their own critical c onceits, their own production of  intellectual ?others? or otherness by which to be secured?to subtract within them toward new articulations immanent therein.  This approach I devel op to discover ways to educate ethically, to wrest m odern educational ethics from its ?eth ical? malaise?oscillation a mong  transcendental temp tation and pos itivist lega lism? and cynical subj ective fatalism, and to inscribe educational thought m ost profoundly and inventively thus.      3.3  Education ?Emplaced? in a Geography of Haunted Itineraries This work m ay now turn toward  the bound emplacem ent of education in ethical modernity, toward its own native ethical invest ments with new theoretical resources.  The                                                   119 This, native uniquely p erhaps to  p hilosophy in  educational though t, Badiou (2008a) calls for as ?t he audacity of though t:?  ?no t to rep eat ?t o the limit? that wh ich is already entirely retained with in the situation wh ich the limit limits? (p . 81).  101 purpose of this section is to direct what  has gone before toward ethical thought in education.  To do so, I make the turn toward  educational thought by considering here its figures and  their ontolog ical affiliations in the modern ethic I have been developing,  and thus I turn specif ically to the conju nction of ethics and education within the m odern settlement.  Expressed in the realist and utopian figures of what I call an ontological oscillation, the conjunction of ethics and edu cation in modernity will be turned to new ethical purposes, new ethical horizons within existing ones.  How the conjunction operates as  specifically educati onal institution w ithin the modern settlement is the theme this section develops.  It does so to bridge  this work f rom the question of the modern ethical founding and consequences to its expressi ons as ethics of education (which I take up in earn est in the nex t chapter as ethics of phronesis and alterity). In this and the prev ious chapters, I h ave gestured toward what m ay be inferred as the binding of education in a new ?social? order of modernity.  Much preparatory w ork having been done, with de Certeau (1988) I may now be m ore explicit, to see that education formalized in modernity  in a ?new m eaning? as ?an instrument of cohesion in a campaign to m aintain or restore unity? (p. 127) .  Such unity, as I have discussed with regard to th e ?organiz ing will? of  symbolic enclosure, is expressiv e of the new social emplacem ent?s legalism , such that, in modernity, a restorationist fervour attends the enforcement of ?rules and social us es [tha t] constitu te the backbone of education ?  (p. 196, fn47).  Assuming a for merly clerical function, educators across the sectors of education (and indeed thereafter also clerics) become ?producers of  society,? or, more precisely, ?the m eans of an axiom atic of the ?production of society? ? (p. 186) itself, to which Christian discourse had formally (and le ss ?form ally?) been turned.  As one may  102 expect given the foregoing, this is a function already bound among its object (the  objective condition of ?soc iety?), its subject (th e state), its op erations (the enforcement of the legalities of  the epistem ic moralism of what becom es for us a ' moderate? Enlightenm ent) and attendant referents (of a statist metaphysics of an available ?world? and an objectivist epistem ologis m of its correlative knowledges).  As ethical operations and figures, 120 these are all marked by the chim era of modernity?s p redominant ethico-ontological motif, one here discussed as produ ctive of the conjunction of ethics and education in modernity:  The withdrawing self-guarantee of their own presupposition.  Such is indeed foremost what a self-occulting discours e is:  A formal arrangem ent of absences whose availability to thought is fo resworn by ethical conditions that m ake such thought untenable, im possible, taboo.  ?Dispe rsed,? as de Certeau (1984) elsew here writes, such  ?insinu ates itself everyw here? (p. xii).  Here it is im portant to no te that education?s assimilationist eschatology?its re p resentation of ?what is? to which it is ontologically bound in abscondito by modern ethics?is riven by what de Certeau  calls an ?insurmountable ambiva lence? (p. 174) in that it awaits what it asserts.121  The guarantee of a re-un ion (of ?Enlightenm ent?) of a ceaselessly differentiating m ethod (of reason and its other) is both prom ise and pres upposition.  This am bivalence is tantamount                                                   120 de Certeau (1988) elaborates a mode of ap p roach to historiogra p hical comp lexi ty as attention to the means of link ag es of its elements rather than, more naively, as somehow t hemselves:  ?the  interdiscipl inarity we l ook t owa rd w ould attemp t to appre hend ep istemologi cal constellations as they recipr ocally p rovide themselves wi th a new delimitation of their obje cts and a new st atus for their p rocedures? ( p . 291). 121 de Certeau (1988) writes tha t, as ?a crusa de of the eighte enth century,? education ?c olonizes t o be sure, but it is also an eschatological  quest:  it awaits the co ming  of the confirmation and the effectivity of wh at it already asserts?  (p. 174).  103 to a constitutive rup ture, one consonant with  that of the exacerba ted mechanism of the modern ethic itself:122The educational task will thus ceasele ssly perfect its m ethods and expand the field of its progress in order to surmount the rupture that keeps reason outside of its own truth a nd forces it to depend on its adversary.  Yet this rupture is a constitutive one.  It  could not be suppressed without obliterating the reason that had been de fined through its establishm ent.  In antithetical but homologous m odes of domination or seduction, the rationality of the Enligh tenment maintains a necessary relation with its other.  (p. 174, em phasis added) The emphas is in the foregoing foreshadows how  the historiographic al moves toward  the speculative in this study,  as it empha sizes ethical them es considered above as proscriptive of the ethos in which education m ay be seen to play a prefigured  and productive part (inasmuch as education is to ?prod uce? society in modernity).  Inextricable f rom the linkages of its ethic more br oadly, this is as an ambivalent evangelism  driven ever onward by inherent tensions?of the existen tial anx ieties of symbolic enclosure, the developm ental neuroses of lost subjectivit y, the redemp tive nostalg ias of relation?in a wholly hyperbolic ex acerbation, insurmountably conjoined by the parad ig matic necessities of an unavowed constitutive ruptur e (of reason and its other), and perpetually displaced by the m ovement of its (ontological) m ethod.  A metaphysically ?social?                                                   122 For de Certeau, this describes both the ?ris k ? and the ?task? o f the Enligh tenment:  ?lo sing th e assurance of a p ast revelation . . . it must dep end upo n w hat the labour of culture already show s? su ch that reason ? must be bound to the ex teriority of its future.?  Thu s ?d etached from the certitude wh ich controlled it in its founding, the e vangelical an d missionary mechanism is exa cerbated.  It becomes its own essence? (pp. 78-79).  104 emplacem ent (meaning of  the ostensibly sole p urview of  the human), this pro j ection insinuates education as ?a m ission . . . that receives its p rivilege  and po wer from itself, that no long er derives from the heavens above? (p. 178, em phasis added).  Myriad considerations of the perm utations of power are of course rele vant here as it falls to ?an elite? to pro p agate a new ethical ad ministration, but my concern with  the re-conceiving of  ethics for education from within the conjunction of education and ethics in modernity requires this study remain close to the ontologically ?modern? as it finds it in de Certeauian historiograp hical comp lexity.  This focus is preparatory  to the further movements of this study, ones?especially as  regards the question of the subject?that continue to resource the domain of ontological thought as const ituted here for the purpose. 123     The symp tom of modern ethical self-dispossess ion?of a constitu tive inability to fully inhabit the ethos installed as comp rehensive?which I advance here to examine further is that of an oscillation, in flight to and from itself, among ethical authorities.  Since the Reformation and Enlightenm ent, education becomes expressive of new ? modes of initiation and transmission? (de Cert eau, 1996, p. 45) within th e modern ethical settlement; as such it sy mptom atically oscillates where eth ical authorities are concerned among two ethical poles, which are ontological at base.  T his, in my argum ent, is the formal ethical topos of education in m odernity.  Extensive of its ?ethical? founding as whole, and yet also within the ?con stitutive rup ture? of modernity, this is the founding of modern project of education within an ethi cal self-dislocation?s continuing displacem ent,                                                   123  Kov acevic (2007), apro po s of p sychoanalysis as critical theory, inadvertently affirms this gest ure well:  ?t he idea that social being  determines consciousness is Marx ian, but social being  is pre determined as w ell? (p . 70).  105 among the organization of absences convened for the purpose, elastic movem ent toward and away fr om at the same time.  As a ?ge ography of haunted itineraries? (p. 45), this eschatologic al oscillation instantiates the bi-valency of a condition of both exile and advance?it is ?not there? and ?t here? at the same time, moving out from and toward at once, so that it rebounds, like a reverse-polarity m agnet, when  it approaches too closely one extrem e, in the maintenance of the conjun ctive arrang ement as a (neurotic) whole.  Its conjunctive binding is found here as the delegation to education of an ethos? prescriptive vocation, characteristic and propul sive of its repressed riven oscillation, of the figures of utopia or realism.   The former projects reform based on ?a fiction of purity? and effects a denial (of  its own status as a m odel of its symbolic ?p erfection? or completion), which thereby also corrupts real alternatives by poi soning the well of their thought.  The latter, perhaps less  duplicitous, is the kernel of conservatism; it is the ?hidd en figure of cynicism , which authorizes power by its ability to gi ve recognition? (p. 45), of knowledge exclusive of what failed in its very production, of  its contingency, in other words.  For de Certeau, in both of these founding em place ments (in the ?r eal? of the utopic or the ?ideal? of  the realist) we m ay find what he ca lls the ?putr escence? of an institution: In the first instance, the institution is the p utrescence that must be reformed by recourse to more orig inary innocence, freedom, and purity.  In the second, rottenness is something orig inary that the institution makes  it profitable to recognize, and at the same time covers up.  (p. 45) Education?s ethical function comes thus to a naturalism of coeval ideals or aspirations, in, on one hand, the beatific (the appropriations of the im ag es of the ang elic child, of the  106 righteous reform er, the ?saintly??Pied Pipe r/Mary Poppins?adult a nd so on) and, on the other, the cynical (the enforcement of an apparently ?real??that  is, known?world of calculable interests, of preparatory responsibilization124).  In actuality however, as a matter of the discourses of modernity and their ontological foundations, in this singularly modern mode, education delivers the one (the beautific/utopian) to the other (the cynical/realist), in th e paradoxical guise of a liberation into.  As one of the g reat confusions of education, in this uneasy settlement, characteristically neither is as it may seem. As important as th is oscillating mechanism  of ethical fig ures is to the ethical pursuit in educational thought, so  equally is the question of the subject to this institution, ?lost? as we have s een, ?already .  . . convinced they are filth? (p.  45), detach ed and displaced within objecthood a nd identification, misappropriate d from the ethical prom ise of subjectivity, its constitutive medium.  A question no longer res iding with in a generative (self-reveal ing and underm ining) form alism, but delivered au fait unto ethical institution, mediated so as to be re-mediated, the subject (as object as such) is denuded, moderated, pacified in advance and entirely paradoxically foreclosed ; free, we m ight say, to be enslaved.125   This is surely a startling and thoroughly counterpunctu al observation of the age from  which we are giv en the Right s of Man!  However, from the bewildered standpoint of such a subject (to a para doxical condition of gnostic liberation and objectivis t governm ent) we m ay begin to disp lace the inviolability of our predication,                                                   124 This is a term I develop  further in the nex t chap ter with reg ard to liberal ideolog y, or the ?realist? m ode of subj ectivation of a statist ontolog y, drawn f rom the wo rk of  Foucault. 125  I wou ld hasten to add here this modern subj ective condition is not one of alienation, for alienation, in de Certeau?s thought , is itself a re-depl oyed relig ious fig ure co-opt ed into the modern pr og ress narrative, as the disassociation of the fallen in the familiar triadic path:  ?past  wholene ss; pres ent disp ersion;  anticipated reconciliation?  (Mark ell, 2003 , p . 49).  107 here by way of the Freudian tale of a ger minal educational project v ested into the discursive topos of the launch of a new and surreptitiou s hermetic modern totality.  As noted, this is a modernity whose first gestur e is to self-distingui sh from any ?before ?126 and thereby preserve the law (a nd its repression) of its ?uni versal? genesis, one properly rather of countless conjunctive entanglem ents, innumerable absences unmarked, of which education and ethics are but one.  Bound in creating a ?place of signification . . . where everyone can speak? and exem pted from  pr oducing history (for it takes on its own ineluctable momenta in the ceaseless dawn of modernity), these entanglem ents are expressive of a discursivity as a ?gigan tic machine? (Chaunu, as cited in de Certeau, 1988, p. 74) of intelligib ilities, of prescrip tive formalities (of the ?real? world, of ?good? behaviour, the proprieties of desire, m odes of developm ent, ?sty les? of learning, varieties  of intelligence, of personality, and on and on . . . ).  By way of the specification of the formalities of the symbolic ? real,? this is the implicit id entificatory po wer of  a new and entirely symbolic cosmology; the refinem ent of a divided unification, of binding to ?unlim ited? horizons.   In this analysis, we m ay see more thoroughly the new region of faith of what de Certeau (1986) calls a ?sel f-occulting discourse? (p. 208), 127 wherein the conjunction of ethics and education is at once (symbolically) extant and didactic.  Unseating its prohibition (of the articulation of  its discursive linkages) is a m ove of radicality that Enlightenm ent thought and the m odern zeal fo r a comp rehensive symbolization at once                                                   126 For de Certeau (1988), this modern p rivilegi ng of the break wi th the ?past ?  is pa rtnered wi th the historiograp hical filling  of lacunae in ?m aintaining , more or less metap horically, an order of structure? (p. 12). 127 This of the p rohibition (or effacing ) of its proh ibition, wh ich is ak in to Gadamer?s (2004) related prescie nce with re spect t o the ?fundam ental pre j udice? of the Enlightenm ent, as ?the pre j udice ag ainst pre j udice itself? (p. 273).  In de Certeau?s (Freudian) method, such ? resurfaces as the presupposition of the models that characterize a type of e xpl anation? (p . 29, emphasi s in orig inal).  108 forbid and make possible.  By it we m ay see that often the most darkening discourses are those whose object is light, and fi nd anew the question of ethics and education in modernity, among the figures of its em place ment bound therein, so as to be able to turn anew to its  express ions as ethics of education.  The stakes of  these inquiries begin and end with the very thought of education, with thought bound in modernity and then expressive of that binding, in order to finally be thought as truly educational, which, for  Plato at least, is resident in ?an unknown capacity for reason? (Bartlett, 2011, p. 7).    3.4  Conclusion:  Toward Ethics From the Night of the Time of the Light From the elements of the modern ethical founding outlined in the previous chapte r, in this one we  witness  the comp rehensive reconfiguratio n of an established discourse of worship an d ideology with in a new zealousn ess, one, in effect, beyond belief.  Within modern consequences of subj ective deracination, symbolic enclosure and the aprioritization of relatedness, and m asked by a reciprocal silen ce ?in m atters concerning the m eaning of [its] faith? (p. 186),  this is indeed a tremendous, and ongoing, ethical accomplishm ent.  The ethical task  of education in modernity as such, pres cribed by the ?haun ted itinerary? of the tension of oscillating on tolog ical fictions, is foremost the legitim ation and maintenance of its predi cates (relatedness, enclosure, objectivism , legalism , ep istemism and so on), the movement of its desire aw ay from its very immanency.  What de Certeau singularly enab les us to think is  that the formal ethical topology of modernity, in which ed ucation plays its haunted part, ideologically presents and reproduces a universali ty, a ?r eal.?  My thesis is that this requires the confrontation of a contesting  universalism as a subjectiv e matter; tha t only a comprehensive counter- 109 theorization of the subjective will suffice to contest this ethical settlem ent.  For, alternately, any spec ifying difference in th e objectiv e edifice play s a co-opted  part?in splitting reason from its other?in  the dissimulative unification of moderate Enlightenm ent rationality.128  The autoimmunity of ideology is not to be underestim ated here, as log os (the structures of intellig ibility of the modern ethics proje ct) pr efigure s the sole medium of its identification? the modern figures of realism  and utopianism  of the ontological oscillation of constr uctivism and transcendentalism.129  In the next chap ters, I explore how this seem ingly herm etic ethical impasse provides for its own conditions of  possibility o therwise.   I will do  so to beg in with in educational ethical though t, with  ethical instances where utopian  and realist figures reside, by nam ing their ethics  and articulating their linkages to  ontological authorities. For it is my argum ent that only an ethical itinerary retrieved from the silences of existing one s will b e ethically effective as an aspira tion of the (displaced) radica lity inherent to the Enlightenm ent.  Resourcing in  educational ethical thought the silence of the repression of the birth of  the modern ethos itself, the absences arrang ed by its                                                   128 de Certeau identifies one of the ope rations of Enlighte nment rationalism as a ceaseless production of difference, in confirmation of its ope rative rectitude, rather than its put ative aim (the movement of kn ow ledg e tow ard a reliable truth, the conceit of its science).  Consequently, the particular is operative as a limit to what may be thought and this is wh y Badiou (2007) later refers to the ?v ain and horrible indifference of part icularisms? (p. 80):  for the prem ise of the pa rticular (as a specificity already withi n the cap ture of a normative order) is already a cap itulation to the universals wh ich g overn it (here a certain concep tion of reason, but also the now  ?gl obal?  assig nations of cap ital, or even the democratic, or the liberal-p arliamentarian? there seem to be no short suppl y of universals from whi ch to ?l et concreteness shine throug h?  (Zup an?i?, 2008, p . 3 7)).  As I will later ex p and, it is among un iversals, their failures and lacunae, that the ethical must be re-though t.  The challenge, esp ecially for education, lies in the align ment of the universal and the subj ective with out recourse to romanticism or relativism;  a wo rthy challeng e to the extent that, de  Beauvoir observed, ?m ediocrity is reserved for those who do not feel ? responsible for the universe?  as a wh ole? (as cited in Hallw ard, 2003 , p.  143 ). 129 The notion of autoimmunity I borrow  from Derrida (2003 ), whi ch he borrow s from immunology , to describe an ? orga nism resp onds ag ainst its ow n . . . compone nts? (David-West, 2009, p . 227), the concept  here relevant to the ideolog ical force of the modern ethical settlement, as an onto-symbolic installation that orchestrates its topo s by way of the absences its figu res obscure.  110 predicates? thought in concert with the recon stituted frag ility of its historicity as an ?event??will provide a trajecto ry that this study bears forth within the disarticulation of the now prisable education a nd ethics, their new status as such, and thus otherwise.   Pursuing de Certeauian historiographi cal method has allowed for seeing modernity otherwise, seeing it  as a ?sight in a tim e wit hout daylight,? without the  investments by which it repressively re-founds its ethical authorities.  Here we join Freud:  ?W hat we take to be our night is offe red to him . . . in total clarity? (de Certeau, 1988, p. 290). 130   To have begun in the night of the time of the light, in the contingency of its denied founding, is to see how it depends  upon shadows in which, as Gallant (1976) writes, ?no one lurk[s]? (p. 707), but agains t which nonetheless ?necessity . . . is what  never ceases to be written? (Lacan as cited in de Certeau, 1988, p. 236).  To this po int I have contended with foundati onal necessities of the elements of the modern cosmological deliverance in order to now be able,  within the terms of their consequences, begin to re-articulate them within the thought of one of its persistent products and effects:  A m odern thinking of education.                                                    130  de Certeau (1989) calls Freud?s historical interventions as the repl acement of ?le g end? with ?edifice ,?  into whi ch ?i t enters dancing ?  (p . 3 09).  Fink  (2011) describes Freud' s exem pl ary ?t heoretical fiction? as such:  ?the  more these terms become vulg arized , one mig ht say, or tak en up in to p arochial discourse, the more they are simp lified at the same time.  So the more these terms are absorbed into a discip line lik e p sycholog y, the less content that remains in any of these terms.  In order to assimilate a term lik e the unconscious you reduce it to something th at it usually is not, or to its barest bones.  We can see this if we j ust look  at certain p sycholog y j ournals that try to p rove if Freud is rig ht or wr ong , for ex amp le, on the issue of wh ether dreams are wish fu lfillment, or if there really is an unconscious.  Of course, in the very p resump tion that the idea must be studied in this emp irical way, th ey end up  reducing the id ea to something that it really is not, attemp ting to ?p rove? i deas that we re never actual hypotheses  of Freud in the first pl ace.  So I wou ld say that lately there has been a sp reading of  Freudianism, w hich essentially tak es away any  po we r this discourse orig inally had.?   For de Certeau (1986), the notion of a theoretical fiction, as the dark ness wi thin the gl are of necessity, simp ly ?bro ught  back t he sorcery in k now ledge?  (p . 8), a movement of return? p lease note? of what is already there.  111 Chapter 4 Modern Ethical Horizons in Education:  Regime of a Tension   reality is precarious.  And it is precisely to the extent that access to it is so precarious that the commandments which trace its path are so tyrannical.  (Lacan, 1997, p. 30)  4.1  Introduction For educators, the theme of the conjunction of education and ethics within a social project expresses a current with in a greater flood, one I exam ine in this study as at base an ontological concern or im passe.  The ques tions that I now pursu e focus precisely on how the conjunction of ethics an d education lives discursively within educational thought, in order to introduce how  an ontological approach has ethical traction as the search for the ethical in educational thought.   For de Certeau, the modern condition is fundamentally one of a repressive linkage of reason and its other, whos e enclosing ?relatedness,? inst alled as a symbolic matter, becomes the formal condition of modern ethical thought.   As outlined previou sly, the formalities of this articulation are those of the ?rea l? these authorize, whose f igures  are realism and utopianism:  Of a constructivist empiricit y, on one hand, and a sort of idealist holism, on the other.  If one of the prevalent figur es of modern ethical thought is that of realism, where  may we see  it expressed in educational thought as an ethical m atter?   Where does this affordance of modern ethical thought live in education, and to what effects?   How is realism an ethical implication in edu cational ethics?  W hat more can we learn abou t the modern ethic in which education  is emplaced from the study of its ?realist? exp ressions, and how may educatio n thereby p rovide a condition, or conditions, of ethicality, of  112 ethical genesis?  To engage  these questions, I discuss phronesis ?especially as exem plified in the scholarship of Noel (1999) and Henderson and Kesson (2004)?in the capacity of a nuanced realist arche-authority in educational ethical thought.  Som etimes called practical wisdom, this is what I ho ld to be a relevant exam ple of an autho ritative ethical discourse in education and educational thought, and, as I will show, it is one which relies on reciprocities characteristic of  the conjunctive bindi ng of modern ideology in its realist cast.131   The entrainment of phronesis to a sort of intuitive and spontaneous ?reality? as the basis for ethica l practice in education quite li terally invests into its work (constructivist) ontological presuppos itions that p erpetu ate, in one foundational instance, the ethical impoverishment of education.  This I discuss in its native scholarship, and then steeped in o ntological concern, in th e first half of this chapter.  In the second half of this chapte r I locate the utopian pole o f the modern ethical oscillation as the alterity of what Badiou calls the ethical ' restoration'  of the ethical turn in recent years.132   This I consider in educational thought as exem plary in the work of  Sharon Todd (2003, 2008), to work with a well-e laborated and argued instance.  W ith the help of a Badiouian critique of its implicati on in a transcendental ontologics, I intend to show how t he figure of the utopian in m odern ethics of alterity or of the ?Other? pa rtakes                                                    131  As Badiou (2009a) pu ts this, and pursu ant to the theme of oscillation established in the p revious chap ter, it is of the order of ?t he established regi me of [a]  tension?  (p. 73 ), a more comp lex di scursivity than gi ven in instrumental logic, whe rein a cause is antecedent and productive .  In the modern ethos, the ge nerative discursivity, as arg ued above, is at once p resup p osed and destinal:  Both fact and pr omise, its movements demand ex eget ical attendance for, as Toscano (2010) p uts it, ?re sistance must be ap pr oached negat ively, throug h the distorting  mirror of dominant ideology ? ( p . 91).  Thus, spec ulative po lemic becomes a condition for the truth it wo uld avow  or, as pu t by Deleuze (2006):  ?Th e po int of critique is not j ustification but a different way o f feeling :  another sensibility? (p . 88). 132  To contex tualize t his, Toscano (2010) describes w hat Badiou is contesting  in this characterizatio n, and by wh ich the ?eth ical turn? gain s much of its ?p acifying  plau sibility? in  the denunciation of the twentieth  century as an ag e in which a bstract princi ple s led to concrete disasters, as the desire for total transformation translated into massacres on an untold scale.  Founded on a neo-liberal evacuation of strong  po litical convictions, the Restoration is at one and the same time ?th e euthanasia of po litical p assions and the apot heosis of interest? (p . 26-27).  113 more of the modern ethical settlement that it may assume.  In this instance, the modern conservative ethical settlement develops an e xplicitly f ormal ethical rebirth (which I call an idealism) upon the methodological presuppositions of a rationalist deliverance such that it ultimately cannot fail to conform to the ?socialized? m etaphysical legalism , morality and their mode of knowle dge (elabo rated at some length here in chapters 2  and 3).  Consistent with the para doxical ethical status of m odernity (of the founding of an order in an element which it subjug ates and rep resses in order to authorize itse lf), the ethical impoverishm ent of education in this second instance of this chapter?s inquiry is  undertaken in the nam e of an ethical restoration. In the contex t of this w ork as a wh ole, the effort in this chapter is to r ead the ethical investments of modernity within educational ethica l thought in order to develop some new e thical conditions of possibility.  To do this, I show how t w o ?venues? of educational ethical thought?and th eir mutual co-extens ion?first  may be seen to ex ist as a matter of a historiography of m odernity.  Then I show how these venues underpin the ethical compass of the work of  education, or the means by wh ich matters may be seen or obscured as ethical by educators, as the activation of their ethicality toward new f orms.  This is the broader purp ose of this chapter :  1) to exam ine some contemporary autho rities of ethical thought in  education in order to better incite their forms of authority; 2) to better understand the genesis of conceptions of ethical subjec tivity available to education in modernity; and 3) to have a sufficiently el aborated theoretical edifice on which to base an ethical alternative in educational thought.    114 I begin with phronesis, with the phronetic return of ' the thing'  (an object of reflection) characteristic, in my argum ent, of a reactionary move at the (constructivist) core of the modern advent.  4.2  De-Heralding the Phronetic Return of the ?Thing?  Realism is a corruption of reality. (Stevens, 1990, p. 195)  it is all too easy to show that a broadly constructivist approach to language and reality remains the ?almost universally accepted? doctrine. (Hallward, 2003, p. 161)  4.2.1  Engaging the Phronetic Inheritance An emphasis of Henderson and Kesson?s (200 4) recent work has been on the encouragem ent and facilitation of ?wise curr iculum decision making in socie ties with democratic ideals? (p. 1).  They see this to  have been diverted in recent years, as ?curriculum  theorists [h ave come to] not suffi ciently consider the p ractical consequences of their critical theories? (p. 8).  This Henderson and Kes son seek to correct with the developm ent of the ?arts of inquiry? of ?dem ocratic curriculum leadership? (p. 41) for  teacher, and teacher educator, profes sional developm ent.  Their work als o seeks to help  curriculum theorists who have not m ade ?the pragm atic turn . . . [to] pr operly deliberate  over the consequences of enacting  their emancipato ry ideas in spec ific educational contexts? (p. 8).  This is a ?turn? they  place within a Deweyan understanding of democracy as ?a way o f life? (p. 9 ), and recover a number of Greek co ncepts for their  115 purpose.  This recovery of the constituents of the ?love of wisdom ? points to the concern of this work with theirs.  Their ?arts of i nquiry? of curriculum wisdom  takes the form of a  ?m ap? of holographic thinking that consists of , and deploys, the concepts of theoria, poesis, techn?, praxis, dialogos, polis and phronesis.  It is the role of the last of these, as the image of thought in the i nner circle of the holographi c model they propose, which I seek to take up, one joined with dialogos a nd praxis at the centre of the ?dem ocratic education? Henderson and Kesson advance.  It is the basis of the democratic middle road I see Henderson and Kesson charting, to deliverance from the ?som nambulism?  (Marshall, 2004, p. v) of public s chooling in th e aging of its late-m odern institution.  This is their wa y between the scientif ic manage ment of Tyler rationale (latterly in the conservative residuum of business, bible and behaviorism) and the reactive tendency within cur riculum ?reconceptua liza tion? of ostensible overcomp ensation within  the proverbial theory/practice divide. 133   With Aristotelian pr actical wisdo m, Deweyan  democratism, and a fidelity to the ?everyday issues faced by practic ing teachers? (p. xix), Henderson and Kesson?s pragm atism is a prof ound condition of possibility for ethical thought. 134Heidegger observes that ?Aristotle m ust be taken as the f irst systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of being with  one another? (as ci ted in Hyde, 2004, p. xviii).  Aristote lian ethics are give n thus as ?the construction of a ? dwelling place?                                                   133  As Marshall (2004) observes, Henderson and Kesson ?s proj ect is to ?coax  institutionally-oriented (i.e. school-based) educators? i nto the po st-reconcep tualist curriculum conversation, wh ich is to say also to bring it in to wh at he calls ?com p lex  p rag matic contex ts? (p. v i.). 134  Of the ?p ragmatic tu rn? as such, Henderson and K esson (2004) p roceed from the (rather American) prem ise that most teachers are pra g matists; they throw i n with the m without  reservation:  ? We are p rag matists to the core?? (p . x iv).  Indeed, theirs is also a hermeneutic consequentialism:  ?we fi rmly believe that the ultimate meaning  of ideas is located in the consequences of enacting  those ideas? (Henderson & K esson, 2004, p . x iv).  As such, Aristotle suits very well th e sort of democratic culture they esp ouse.  116 (ethos) for collaborative and moral deliberation? (p. xvii).   At the intersection of the being of one who m akes this plac e and the means by which to make it is the doctrine of phronesis. 135   The ?deliberating well? of  a ?practical wisdom  . . . apt to act? (Aristo tle, 1998, p. 105), obtains in  a sort of consensually g ood ?nature, ? one derived, accord ing  to Aristotle, ?by exa mining to what kind of pe rsons we in common language ascribe it? (p. 101).  Thereafter, the ordering of  ?contingent matter? (p. 103) subject to the deliberations of practical wisdom m ay bring it in to accord with ?hum an good;? it ?m akes it right,? by which Aristotle adds, it ?attains the true? (p. 108).  Caputo (2 003) observes that, in this is ?pretty m uch the beginning of ethics,? addi ng th at Aristotle observed, anticipating near-endless future difficulty and an amenability to ideological subterfuge in m odernity, ?that when it comes to ethics we are not to  expect too m uch precision? (p. 169). Noel (1999) helps fill out the picture of phronesis or pr actical wisdom  in contemporary education al thought by outlin ing  its varieties along threefold lines :  a ?rationality ?  interpre tation; a ?situa tional perception and insight? interpretation; and a  ?m oral character? interpretati on (p. 275).  The first primar ily concerns the form of reasoning at issue in a s ensitive attunement to the distinctive partic ularity of educational situations, the second concerns the play of generals and part iculars in the discernment of what is at stake and what needs to be done in a given educational situation, and the third is concerned with the m oral virtue required by a practitioner of phronesis?the phronimo.  In a diversity of approa ches, phronesis expres ses the desire in education to engage with situations w ith due care and attention beyond both technical rationality and scholastic ethics.  Anticipating phenom enology, phronesis has m odes of rationality, intersubjective                                                   135  This in contradistinction to sophia, sometimes translated as theoretical wisdom .   117 modalities and subjectiv e moralisms.136   Phronesis thus names the broad attemp t in education toward a kind of responsible enga gem ent with educational particularity, an engagem ent that purports to m uster subj ective resources to deepen and enrich a responsive educational practice.  You see it animating the wo rk of tactful and reflective educators, those who work at th eir craft as if it were the artifice of a formal production, who respect and prize the lessons of experience in the applicati on of a sort of ethical trial and error, as well as theorists like He nderson and Kesson (2004), who worry about the diversion of curricular theory into abstraction.  As a species of  realism, phronesis  conveys the scientism of modernity into a humanist field and this is what I seek to exam ine as an ethical destination in educational thought.  For my purposes, phronesis, or the phroneti c ethic, serves as well to u nderline predicated (or presupposed) sim ilarities inherent to what I have been calling the m odern settlement of the ?conservative? or ideological Enlightenm ent, its conceptual realism and thence, most profoundly?and m utably?its cons tructivist ontologics.  As a means of what Foucault calls the ?responsibilization? 137  to realism, phronesis expresses and prom otes the ethical nexus by which, as we ha ve seen, de Certeau figures education and                                                   136  Founded in what Ca puto calls ?the re versal of the relation of p rincip le to situation?  (as cited in Wyschog rod & McKen ny, 2003 , p. 9), p hronesis since Aristotle has emphasi zed the phe nomenality of ?sensation? a g ainst ?rationali st bias:?  ?? no one can learn or understand anything  in the absence of sense:  sensation is necessary for and subserves the interest of thoug ht?  (Wyschogr od, 2003 , p . 5 9).  The phe nomenolog ical elaboration of such ethical p redication is a modern developm ent of p hronetic ontolog ical p redicates, characteristically in a naturalist dialectic between ?principle s and cases?  (Caput o as cited in Wyschog rod & McK enny, 2003, p . 9). 137  Burchell has used Foucault?s term wi th po tent resonance in thinki ng  the liberal p roject , one useful also for think ing  the connection of liberalism and ethical alterity:  ?re sp onsibilization? here refer to ?t he w ays that forms of liberalism seek  to integrate individuals into the p ractices of their own  go vernment?l iberalism, part icularly in its modern versions, constructs a relationship bet w een g overnment and the go verned that increasingl y depe nds up on way s in w hich individuals are required to assume the status of being th e subj ect of their lives, upo n w hich they fashion themselves as certain k inds of subj ects, upon  the ways in wh ich they p ractice their freedom? (as cited  in Coffey, 2003 , p . 224).  This is subj ectivity as the choice to not only conform but also to administer (as a k ind of p edagog y of sociality), the order of p ower to wh ich it belong s.  118 ethics conjoined, or ontologica lly bound (in that they share the same ?world,? and its presupposed im plicated orders of being) in modernity.  I wish to consider how this bond installs the implicit ?rea listic? metaphysics of immediacy, exclusive legality (the result of the govern ment of that which p hronesis w ould surmount, i.e. in that it succeeds something more odious, and thus rem ains circumscribed by the law of its inverse) and indeed its frequently overt moralism.  Further I am interested in how phronesis edifies a grounding, and accum ulative, knowledge, of ethics itself.  For, in my argum ent, phronesis would thus rem ain thereby participant am ong the consequences of modernity?s symbolic displacem ent (which  we have seen  in the forego ing as th e disp lacement of the Real as the ?real?), its subjective destitution, sym bolic enclosure and the retroaction of relation.  These I consider here briefly from Noel?s overview.  More com p rehensively however I am concerned with phronesis in the work  of Henderson and Kesson (2004), for whom phronesis  is a sort of ethical hermeneutic for educators?o ne falling  roughly am ong the latter two varie ties identified by Noel (the intersubjec tive and the moral)? w hich generatively brings together its them es and lacunae.138   Their w ork is espe cially attentive to educators? concerns (as opposed to Noel ?s, which is more perhaps am ong those of philosophers? of education) and, as such, m ay offer a clearer window into the enactm ent of phronetic ideals.   My argum ent is that the neo-Aristotelian corrective to perceived theoretical excesses of curriculum  theory, and its basis as aspiration to a dem ocratic ontologics (a plural reality grounded in the ?love of wisdo m?), is immanently undermined to                                                   138  Henderson and Kes son?s (2004) theorizat ion of p hronesis draw s on a diversity of thinke rs, especi ally including  Coulter and Wiens (2002), Garrison (1997), McCutcheon (1999) and, more broadly, Dewey  (1916, 1934 ) and Arendt (via Greene (1988)).  119 unanticipated ethical effect. 139   To demonstrate how, I f ollow in this se ction how the amenability of the phronetic rem it has recently been fundamentally challeng ed on two  main grounds.  First, it is underm ined in regard to its putative subject, that being the privileged d evelopm ental subject of experien ce?s accumulative wisdom  (the reward of a sort of right conduct and dispos ition), what we may call the enriched subj ect of wisdo m.  Second, phronetic praxis as ethical authority is dislocated with regard  to its ontological constitution, that is, and drawing especi ally upon the work of Badiou ( 2005b, 2008a) in what has com e to be thought of a situation (a sphere of action) in representation, f rom which to derive and ef fect tactful phronetic jud g ments.  In the sections that follow, I address these grounds in turn to  help better understand phrone tic ethics in education.  I articulate them increasingly in ter ms of their ontologica l predica tes in order to then confront the modern ontology of their form s as the matter of the security which binds them?which I call the implicate anathema of anti-Platonism.  These explications and confrontation I enact foremost in order to create new conditions in  ethical possibility from phronetic onto-ethical predic ates, and also, in concert with m y engagem ent with alterity of the chapter?s second half, to dena ture the broader ethical settlement of which they both are a part.                                                    139  A characteristic exam ple of t his is Henderson and K esson?s (2004) Socrates, who se ?l ove of pr ag matic wisdo m? (p . x ii) they evok e to gu ide their wo rk  in curriculum affairs.  In my submission, this is to misread the signi ficance of the figu re of Socrates.  For upon him , so late in life, was no t forced the fatal choice because he ?l oved wis dom? but because he insisted to the last upon t he immanent undoing of this soph istical p rofession.  This is wh at made Socrates the enemy of the state:  That he managed to m ake t he ? love? of ? w isdom? anathematic immediacy.  Bartlett (2011) adduces this p oint thoroughly:  So crates w as ?con victed of being as nothing t o education? as a ? failure to be ?so p histic?? (p . 3 3 ) whe re sop hism is p recisely here wh at reduces love to the dimensions of the k nown (?wisdom ?).  Thus, the Socratic p osition is actually one of ?b eing p resent to sop histry but not itself soph istic? (p . 30).  The intimacy is easily misconstrued, thence ? unanticipated et hical effect.?   120 4.2.2  The Phronetic Subject Henderson and Kesson (2004) elaborat e phronesis as a m odern ethical disposition, indeed, for them , it is a ?sta ge in the developm ent in the process of application and understanding of dem ocratic decision making? (p. 185), which teachers may assume in p ractice of the ?love of wisdom .?  The phrone tic subjec t is also thus an index of ?cultural m aturity? (p. 199), a nd the ?m ore robust phr onesis? (p. 56) of modernity?a sort of holographic representation  of a ?diverse? or ?plural? dem ocratic virtue?presupposes the ontological sociality  on which its dem ocratic morality is founded.  Indirect, in my submission, in its ethical signif icance, its cant is proverbial:  ?W e are social beings,  and intelligence is a social characteristic . . . we construct ourselves in relation to others and we grow in self-unders tanding as w e reflect upon our relationships with others? (p. 57).  In this sectio n I look m ore closely at the subject of phronesis by contextualizing it ontological ly, by contesting its (unavowed, resisted, sublimated) ontological predic ation as of the conservative ideological settlement discussed in previous  chapters.   As an inadvertent articulation of subjective destitution, the phronetic subject is a s ophistical condition of ethica l possibility in education. In my thesis, phronesis presupposes and m aintains a sufficiently self-transparent subject to retain and cultivate his or her disc ernment, or ? modes of inquiry? (p. 200).  This  foremost so as to p reserve the accord of virtue and deliberation; to re tain, in other words, the pride of place of experience as a form of democratic capita l, or that by which so ciality may be enacted.  Here the phronetic educato r retains an affinity with modernity' s statist deliberation discussed in previou s chapters  (of the state as the subject of practice), and its jurid ical and administrative? destitute?subject (see also Brown, 2005; Cheah, 2010).   121 The (democratic) institution is here ?the one  wh o speaks? in  the voice of the phronetic subject.  My claim  is that phronesis, in educational praxis, is this voice.  One is certainly impelled to ask if  every subjec t is equally ex posed to the  ?real? of phronesis, if  indeed its intersubjective agora ex presses  first the elitism of the consensual essences of Aristotelian morality; if , in the distributions and allocations of what Bourdieu  (1986) calls various (social, economic, cultural) types of capital, phronesis is the guise of a priv ileged consensus.  We m ay assume the answ er is that not all subj ects are so equally endowed, and that different backg rounds and emplacem ents in ?social space? endow cultural and social cap ital asymmetrically, that structural pr edicates prescribe phronetic conditions and thence contribute to the fatalistic exil e from ?the ethical? in its phronetic instance (this in the indices of its implica tion that some societies, communities, and cultures are less mature than others, and that democracy?s less vaunted instance is as an elitist pedag ogy of the ?f ree?).  Even more important in  my view, because of its indexical authority of a (modern democratic) ?re al,? phronesis m ay be of concern as an instrumentality of symbolic control.  To engage productively with this contentious claim, I articulate p hronetic ethics ontologically.   The phronetic ?subjective? regim e is consistent with the m odern repressive conceit in as much as it is a chimerical enforcement of ethical norms, of those of a putatively more subtle and sensitive (intersubje ctive) wor ld, to which  the phronimo is subj ect.  This is not the heart of the ontological concern with phronesis; it is rath er its sophistic deferral, in that it broadly implies that social adjus tments will cor rect ? imbalances? of what is  presupposed to tend toward ?comm unal? equilibrium (Henderson & Kesson, 2004, p. 57), to which phronetic reconcil iations are both response an d symp tom (of democracy?s  122 organicism , its ostensible tendency toward self  correction).  More relevant to considering  phronesis as effective of the m odern ethical settlement is its dependence on identification, its predication in recogn ition, and especially its constitutive  reliance on what Lacan calls the Imaginary.  It is through this  avenue of analysis that I believe a fuller picture of the subjective implications of phronesis m ay be ap proached in  articulating  how the ?s ocial beings? of  phronesis def eat subje ctive possibility  in its name.  This is the argum ent I wish to bring to the fore here. For Lacan, ?all relation s to concrete obj ects in reality are filtered through the Imaginary? (Chiesa, 2007, p. 211) and via its agency are granted a sort of potential for  epistem ic commensurability with the ir fictive ?re al,? or the ideologic al conceit on which their comp letion relies.  Crucially however, one can see th at the Imaginary is also  the ?alienating identification? of a privileged im age, a ? metaphysical m irage? of sorts, and, as such, is a comp ensation for presupposed, or originary, helplessness?this of the divestiture from the Real of the signified, from  the ?final? re ality of the world (em p irical or otherwis e, inasmuch as we are always de aling with sy mbolically mediated reality).  The Imaginary thu s deforms its subject by at once leg itimating its  totality (of the finite screen of its projected ?world?) and  concealing its decep tiveness, its projective gen esis and operations (and here one surely cannot mistake resonan ce with the de Certeauian historiographical genese s of modernity itself).  The concern that think ing  the Lacanian Imaginary donates to thinking phronetic subjectivity  is that phronesis im plicates its projec tive and illusory constitution on the authority of its continuities, or those of identification:  Its reflex ive (cogn itive), narrative (experiential) and social (democratic) validities.  In these, phronesis is a circular wager on its own status as comprehensible,  123 which it vests into ?problem  definitions and solutions? such  that the ?d emocratic frame of mind? (p. 57) m ay engage and am eliorate them (or render them properly com p rehensible, or leg itimate in a democratic sense).  This phronetic investiture thus requires a certain sorcery, which Henderson and Kesson (2004) avow when they de scribe phronesis as having a mysterious ?intuitive dim ension,?  one broadly responsive to hum an ?needs, desires and interests? (p . 56).  Indeed, they cite Dewey' s archly Aristotelian recourse to ?affective intuition? underwriting all inquiry, guided by ?a distinct f eeling for the quality of a situation? (p. 56) as exem plary of phronesis.   While there should be no doubt that the ?em bodied judgm ent? (Coulter & W iens, 2002, p. 15) of phronesis is an attem p t to overcome more unsavory and insensitive alternatives, and indeed also more ?abstrac ted? ones as well, we sho uld also note its perf ect fit with a cons tructivist humanism characteristic of modernity, to the realist pretension of its role in the m odern conjuncti ve ethical oscillation.  The authority of an Imaginary world is here a subjective dispossession as a matter of the intuition and embodiment of social ontology.  Positing explicit subjective destitution (failure of culture to attain the image of the  democratic ideal) is to thereafter discipline its im age of thought to it, as ?self-construction? (Henderson & Kesson, 2004, p. 57) in the im age of the social ideal.  As such, phronesis is a vector of the ?advance? of a sort of  ?soft,? or ?so fter? rationality (indeed of an ostensibly subjective on e), one subject to an  ex ilic obscurity of the far side of the mythic thought /feeling divide.  As a species of realism, in this aspect phronesis shares the ligaments (its immediacy, its deferral) of the binding of education and ethics in the social project of m odernity.  124 In Henderson and Kesson?s (2004) language  of phronesis, it is not difficult to locate obvious markers of a constructivist associ ation.  Constructivism I describe here as the movement along the invisible continu ity of the modern deliverance of its methodological ontology, the im age of progre ss in ordinal succession, an inexorable movement toward. 140   Discussed in previous chapters  as a mode of modern ethical probity, this  is an institutional ?to use de Certeau?s wor d?ethical (and subjective) destitution in that it effects a constriction within operations it presupposes.  Germane here is that, for Henderson and Kesson (2004), there appears a perfect fusion possible of a constructivist predication, one among the intersubjective pro cess of surmounting dualisms (or dispensing anta gonism ) and the production of  functional citizens of democracy (phronetic subjectiv ity being hospitable both to  a wise teacher and a good citizen-student).  Unsurprising  perhaps given what we have seen in de Certeau of the ?f ormalities? of modernity, their lang uage rem ains that of (socialized ) religion: Dualis ms are prom ised ?re integ ration? within  the democratic co-construction of a third, or ?intersubject