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Renewable energy in oil-intensive jurisdictions : a comparative study of wind energy growth in Texas… Amigo, Jorge 2011

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   Renewable	
  energy	
  in	
  oil-­intensive	
  jurisdictions:	
  a	
  comparative	
   study	
  of	
  wind	
  energy	
  growth	
  in	
  Texas	
  and	
  Alberta	
   	
   	
   by	
   	
   	
   Jorge	
  Amigo	
   	
   	
  B.A.,	
  University	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia,	
  2009	
   	
   	
   A	
  Thesis	
  Submitted	
  In	
  Partial	
  Fulfillment	
  Of	
  The	
   Requirements	
  for	
  the	
  Degree	
  of	
   	
   Master	
  of	
  Arts	
   	
   in	
   	
   The	
  Faculty	
  of	
  Graduate	
  Studies	
   	
   (Political	
  Science)	
   	
   	
   The	
  University	
  of	
  British	
  Columbia	
   (Vancouver)	
   	
   February	
  2011	
   	
   	
   	
  Jorge	
  Amigo,	
  2011	
    	
    	
   Abstract	
   	
    The	
  state	
  of	
  Texas	
  has	
  experienced	
  an	
  enormous	
  growth	
  in	
  its	
  wind	
  energy	
  sector	
  in	
   recent	
   years.	
   By	
   contrast,	
   growth	
   in	
   Alberta’s	
   wind	
   sector	
   has	
   remained	
   comparatively	
   moderate.	
   This	
   study	
   seeks	
   to	
   explain	
   what	
   has	
   caused	
   this	
   relative	
   lag	
   in	
   wind	
   energy	
   development.	
  To	
  do	
  so,	
  this	
  thesis	
  addresses	
  two	
  questions:	
  first	
  why	
  did	
  two	
  similar	
  sub-­‐ national	
  jurisdictions	
  adopt	
  very	
  different	
  policies	
  for	
  wind	
  energy	
  development?	
  Second,	
   did	
  these	
  policies	
  result	
  in	
  asymmetric	
  growth	
  of	
  wind	
  power	
  capacity	
  between	
  Texas	
  and	
   Alberta?	
  On	
  the	
  first	
  question,	
  this	
  thesis	
  argues	
  that	
  a	
  combination	
  of	
  decades-­‐old	
  policy	
   decisions	
   and	
   natural	
   resource	
   endowments	
   played	
   a	
   central	
   role	
   in	
   prompting	
   Texas	
   legislators,	
   but	
   not	
   their	
   counterparts	
   in	
   Alberta,	
   to	
   adopt	
   renewable	
   energy	
   mandates.	
   Specifically,	
   a	
   shortage	
   of	
   coal	
   in	
   Texas	
   led	
   to	
   an	
   increased	
   reliance	
   on	
   imported	
   coal	
   in	
   the	
   1990s,	
  which	
  became	
  a	
  source	
  of	
  concern	
  for	
  Texas	
  officials	
  who	
  had	
  long	
  pursued	
  a	
  policy	
   of	
   energy	
   independence.	
   With	
   near	
   unanimous	
   support	
   from	
   diverse	
   sectors	
   and	
   on	
   the	
   recommendation	
   of	
   state	
   officials,	
   Texas	
   legislators	
   adopted	
   a	
   Renewable	
   Portfolio	
   Standard	
   to	
   mandate	
   development	
   of	
   alternate	
   sources	
   of	
   electricity.	
   Although	
   Alberta	
   also	
   has	
   long	
   pursued	
   a	
   policy	
   of	
   energy	
   independence,	
   the	
   province’s	
   coal	
   industry	
   supplies	
   all	
   of	
  the	
  coal	
  needed	
  for	
  electricity	
  production.	
  Therefore,	
  with	
  weaker	
  incentives	
  to	
  pursue	
   renewable	
   energy	
   and	
   stronger	
   reasons	
   to	
   protect	
   the	
   local	
   coal	
   industry,	
   Alberta	
   politicians	
  have	
  not	
  pursued	
  strong	
  policies	
  to	
  promote	
  renewables.	
  	
   On	
   the	
   second	
   question,	
   this	
   thesis	
   argues	
   that	
   Texas	
   benefited	
   from	
   both	
   a	
   Renewable	
   Portfolio	
   Standard	
   and	
   a	
   generous	
   federal	
   tax	
   credit	
   for	
   renewables.	
   The	
   renewables	
   mandate	
   served	
   to	
   initiate	
   interest	
   in	
   wind	
   energy	
   by	
   forcing	
   utilities	
   to	
   produce	
   energy	
   from	
   renewables,	
   while	
   the	
   tax	
   credit	
   made	
   wind	
   more	
   attractive	
   to	
   investors	
   by	
   making	
   it	
   more	
   competitive	
   with	
   other	
   sources	
   of	
   energy.	
   In	
   the	
   case	
   of	
   Alberta,	
  a	
  weaker	
  federal	
  financial	
  incentive	
  together	
  with	
  a	
  lack	
  of	
  a	
  provincial	
  renewables	
   mandate	
  has	
  kept	
  the	
  wind	
  industry	
  from	
  experiencing	
  comparable	
  growth.	
  	
   	
    	
   	
   ii	
    Preface	
   Primary research for this thesis was approved by the UBC Behavioural Research Ethics Board. The author conducted open-ended and unstructured interviews. The Ethics Certificate number is H10-­‐02092.	
   	
    	
   	
    	
   	
   iii	
    	
   Table of Contents Abstract.......................................................................................................................................... ii	
   Preface........................................................................................................................................... iii	
   Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... iv	
   List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. v	
   List of Figures............................................................................................................................... vi	
   Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... vii	
   Dedication ................................................................................................................................... viii	
   1. Introduction............................................................................................................................... 1	
   2. Methods...................................................................................................................................... 5	
   3. Data: electricity generation...................................................................................................... 7	
   3.1.	
  The	
  rise	
  of	
  wind	
  energy ............................................................................................................. 7	
   3.2.	
  	
  Dirty	
  power:	
  fossil	
  fuels	
  and	
  electricity..................................................................................... 9	
   3.3.	
  Resource	
  endowments............................................................................................................ 15	
   3.4.	
  	
  Opposition	
  to	
  Kyoto ............................................................................................................... 16	
   4. Theoretical approaches .......................................................................................................... 20	
   4.1.	
  	
  Initial	
  hypotheses ................................................................................................................... 20	
   4.2.	
  	
  Policy	
  legacies	
  and	
  path	
  dependence...................................................................................... 22	
   4.3.	
  	
  Issue	
  framing	
  and	
  strategic	
  linkage......................................................................................... 24	
   4.4.	
  	
  Interest	
  groups ....................................................................................................................... 25	
   5. Evidence: the story of wind energy in Texas ....................................................................... 27	
   5.1.	
  	
  The	
  Texas	
  “wind	
  rush”:	
  historical	
  background ........................................................................ 27	
   5.2.	
  	
  Texas	
  considers	
  renewable	
  energy ......................................................................................... 28	
   5.3.	
  	
  Renewable	
  Portfolio	
  Standard:	
  a	
  mandatory	
  approach	
  to	
  renewables ................................... 30	
   6. Evidence: Alberta’s road to wind energy ............................................................................. 35	
   6.1.	
  	
  Brief	
  history	
  of	
  electricity	
  in	
  Alberta ....................................................................................... 35	
   6.2.	
  	
  A	
  rocky	
  road	
  to	
  renewables .................................................................................................... 36	
   6.3.	
  	
  Made	
  in	
  Alberta:	
  a	
  voluntary	
  approach	
  to	
  renewables ........................................................... 37	
   7. Evidence: performance of policy instruments..................................................................... 41	
   7.1.	
  	
  Federal	
  policies ...................................................................................................................... 41	
   7.2.	
  	
  State/Provincial	
  policies ......................................................................................................... 44	
   7.3.	
  	
  Discussion	
  and	
  comparison .................................................................................................... 44	
   8. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 47	
   References.................................................................................................................................... 51	
   Appendix: complementary data ................................................................................................ 54	
   	
    	
   	
   iv	
    	
   List	
  of	
  Tables	
    	
   Table	
  1.	
  Cost	
  of	
  generating	
  electricity:	
  Annex	
  I	
  countries	
  (2003).................................................... 11	
   Table	
  2.	
  Texas	
  electricity	
  trade,	
  million	
  KWh............................................................................................ 13	
   Table	
  3.	
  Alberta	
  electricity	
  trade,	
  MWh ....................................................................................................... 14	
   Table	
  4.	
  Legislative	
  history	
  of	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Production	
  Tax	
  Credit ........................................................... 54	
   	
    	
    	
   	
   v	
    	
   List	
  of	
  Figures	
    	
   	
   	
   Figure	
  1.	
  Wind	
  energy	
  in	
  TX	
  and	
  AB:	
  1997-­‐2010 .......................................................................................7	
   Figure	
  2.	
  Wind	
  capacity	
  as	
  %	
  of	
  total	
  capacity.............................................................................................8	
   Figure	
  3.	
  Wind	
  energy	
  capacity	
  per	
  capita ....................................................................................................8	
   Figure	
  4.	
  Texas	
  electricity	
  capacity	
  by	
  source..............................................................................................9	
   Figure	
  5.	
  Alberta	
  electricity	
  capacity	
  by	
  source ..........................................................................................9	
   Figure	
  6.	
  Texas	
  share	
  of	
  generation	
  capacity	
  by	
  source ....................................................................... 10	
   Figure	
  7.	
  Alberta	
  share	
  of	
  generation	
  capacity	
  by	
  source.................................................................... 10	
   Figure	
  8.	
  Projected	
  electricity	
  generation	
  costs,	
  2005	
  and	
  2020	
  (1999	
  mills	
  per	
  kWh)........ 12	
   Figure	
  9.	
  Wind	
  capacity	
  additions:	
  Texas.................................................................................................... 42	
   Figure	
  10.	
  Wind	
  energy	
  in	
  Alberta:	
  1997-­‐2010........................................................................................ 43	
   Figure	
  11.	
  Price	
  of	
  fuel	
  delivered	
  to	
  electricity	
  producers:	
  TX .......................................................... 54	
    	
   	
   vi	
    Acknowledgements	
  	
    	
   	
   This	
  thesis	
  would	
  not	
  have	
  been	
  possible	
  without	
  the	
  generous	
  support	
  of	
  my	
  supervisor,	
   Dr.	
  Kathryn	
  Harrison.	
  Thank	
  you	
  for	
  your	
  (dozens	
  of)	
  insightful	
  comments,	
  your	
  patience,	
   and	
  your	
  willingness	
  to	
  discuss	
  new	
  ideas.	
  The	
  shape	
  and	
  depth	
  of	
  this	
  thesis	
  is	
  largely	
  a	
   product	
  of	
  your	
  ability	
  to	
  steer	
  my	
  reasoning.	
  	
  I	
  also	
  want	
  to	
  thank	
  my	
  second	
  reader,	
  Dr.	
   Peter	
  Dauvergne,	
  for	
  taking	
  the	
  time	
  to	
  carefully	
  engage	
  with	
  my	
  work,	
  and	
  for	
  creating	
   such	
  a	
  positive	
  atmosphere	
  during	
  my	
  defense.	
  Your	
  encouraging	
  comments	
  truly	
  enriched	
   that	
  final	
  step	
  of	
  this	
  project.	
  	
   	
   I	
  am	
  also	
  grateful	
  to	
  my	
  interview	
  subjects,	
  who	
  shared	
  their	
  valuable	
  time	
  and	
  knowledge.	
   Your	
  expertise	
  proved	
  invaluable	
  to	
  my	
  research.	
  	
   	
   Lastly,	
  I	
  would	
  like	
  to	
  thank	
  my	
  colleagues	
  and	
  friends	
  who	
  in	
  one	
  way	
  or	
  another	
  enriched	
   my	
  life	
  during	
  this	
  research	
  process.	
  Having	
  your	
  constant	
  love	
  and	
  friendship	
  made	
  all	
  the	
   difference.	
  	
    	
   	
   vii	
    	
   Dedication	
   	
   	
   	
   To	
  my	
  mother,	
  Lorenza,	
  for	
  your	
  unconditional	
  support.	
   To	
  my	
  father,	
  Jorge,	
  for	
  your	
  never-­‐ending	
  generosity.	
  	
   To	
  my	
  sister,	
  Loren,	
  for	
  your	
  immeasurable	
  love.	
   	
   Without	
  you,	
  I’m	
  nothing.	
    	
   	
  viii	
    1.	
  Introduction	
   	
    Despite	
   strong	
   international	
   support	
   for	
   the	
   Kyoto	
   Protocol	
   as	
   an	
   initial	
   response	
   to	
   curb	
   anthropogenic	
   climate	
   change,	
   an	
   international	
   agreement	
   with	
   binding	
   targets	
   for	
   greenhouse	
   gas	
   reductions	
   remains	
   elusive.	
   As	
   the	
   effects	
   of	
   climate	
   change	
   become	
   increasingly	
   evident	
   and	
   a	
   majority	
   of	
   climate	
   scientists	
   warn	
   of	
   an	
   impending	
   climate	
   crisis,	
  locally	
  motivated	
  solutions	
  to	
  the	
  climate	
  challenge	
  become	
  increasingly	
  important	
   as	
  a	
  substitute	
  for	
  inadequate	
   national	
   policies.	
  In	
  this	
  light,	
  the	
  purpose	
  of	
   this	
   thesis	
   is	
   to	
   explore	
   how	
   two	
   relatively	
   large	
   and	
   energy-­‐intensive	
   sub-­‐national	
   jurisdictions	
   have	
   responded	
  to	
  the	
  climate	
  change	
  crisis	
  by	
  adopting	
  (or	
  failing	
  to	
  adopt)	
  renewable	
  energy.	
   Specifically,	
  it	
  will	
  compare	
  the	
  policies	
  that	
  have	
  led	
  to	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  wind	
  energy	
  in	
   the	
  state	
  of	
  Texas	
  and	
  the	
  province	
  of	
  Alberta.	
  	
   The	
  comparison	
  between	
  Texas	
  and	
  Alberta	
  derives	
  its	
  coherence	
  from	
  a	
  number	
  of	
   similarities	
   that	
   are	
   relevant	
   to	
   their	
   energy	
   choices.	
   First,	
   both	
   jurisdictions	
   contain	
   the	
   largest	
   fossil	
   fuel	
   extraction	
   industries	
   in	
   their	
   respective	
   countries.	
   This	
   similarity	
   in	
   industrial	
   makeup	
   serves	
   as	
   a	
   common	
   denominator	
   in	
   terms	
   of	
   potential	
   industry	
   opposition	
   to	
   renewable	
   energy	
   policies.	
   The	
   economies	
   of	
   both	
   Alberta	
   and	
   Texas	
   are	
   highly	
   dependent	
   on	
   the	
   oil	
   industry,	
   which	
   is	
   a	
   sector	
   that	
   contributes	
   greatly	
   to	
   the	
   carbon	
   emissions	
   of	
   both	
   jurisdictions.	
   This	
   can	
   imply	
   a	
   similar	
   set	
   of	
   economic	
   and	
   political	
  obstacles	
  to	
  emissions	
  reductions	
  policies	
  that	
  translate	
  into	
  a	
  negative	
  impact	
  on	
   the	
  oil	
  industry.	
  Second,	
  both	
  jurisdictions	
  produce	
  a	
  large	
  portion	
  of	
  their	
  electricity	
  from	
   locally	
   extracted	
   fossil	
   fuels.	
   Moreover,	
   both	
   jurisdictions	
   rely	
   on	
   coal	
   to	
   produce	
   a	
   large	
   portion	
  of	
  their	
  electricity,	
  and	
  coal	
  power	
  plants	
  contribute	
  to	
  a	
  large	
  portion	
  of	
  their	
  GHG	
    	
   	
   1	
    emissions.	
   Third,	
   both	
   jurisdictions	
   strongly	
   oppose	
   the	
   Kyoto	
   Protocol	
   and	
   any	
   federal	
   attempts	
   to	
   impose	
   legislation	
   that	
   would	
   restrict	
   their	
   levels	
   of	
   greenhouse	
   gas	
   emissions.	
   Therefore,	
   their	
   motivations	
   to	
   promote	
   renewable	
   energy	
   have	
   little	
   to	
   do	
   with	
   an	
   adherence	
  to	
  national	
  standards	
  on	
  carbon	
  emissions.	
  	
   Despite	
   these	
   seemingly	
   important	
   similarities,	
   however,	
   Texas	
   and	
   Alberta	
   have	
   taken	
  starkly	
  divergent	
  paths	
  towards	
  promoting	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  wind	
  energy	
  capacity	
   in	
   the	
   past	
   two	
   decades.	
   Texas	
   has	
   enabled	
   a	
   dramatic	
   expansion	
   of	
   its	
   wind	
   energy	
   capacity	
   via	
   a	
   combination	
   of	
   renewable	
   energy	
   mandates	
   and	
   fiscal	
   incentives.	
   The	
   combination	
  of	
  carrot	
  and	
  stick	
  approaches	
  in	
  Texas	
  has	
  been	
  so	
  effective	
  that	
  the	
  state	
  has	
   surpassed	
   every	
   yearly	
   renewable	
   energy	
   production	
   target	
   and	
   is	
   currently	
   producing	
   more	
  than	
  a	
  third	
  of	
  total	
  wind	
  energy	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  States.	
  In	
  other	
  words,	
  the	
  wind	
  energy	
   industry	
   in	
   Texas	
   is	
   thriving	
   and	
   all	
   future	
   projections	
   indicate	
   further	
   (and	
   steeper)	
   growth	
  in	
  wind	
  energy	
  production	
  in	
  the	
  near	
  future.	
  	
  On	
  the	
  other	
  hand,	
  Alberta	
  has	
  shied	
   away	
   from	
   restrictive	
   measures,	
   relying	
   instead	
   on	
   a	
   voluntary	
   approach	
   to	
   renewables,	
   combined	
  with	
  much	
  smaller	
  federal	
  fiscal	
  incentives.	
  Although	
  future	
  projections	
  indicate	
   that	
   the	
   Alberta	
   wind	
   sector	
   will	
   experience	
   substantial	
   growth	
   in	
   the	
   coming	
   years,	
   the	
   growth	
  of	
  wind	
  energy	
  capacity	
  in	
  the	
  province	
  has	
  so	
  far	
  been	
  slower	
  than	
  in	
  Texas.	
  	
   Therefore,	
  this	
  study	
  seeks	
  to	
  explain	
  what	
  caused	
  this	
  relative	
  lag	
  in	
  wind	
  energy	
   development.	
  To	
  do	
  so,	
  this	
  thesis	
  addresses	
  two	
  questions:	
  first	
  why	
  did	
  two	
  similar	
  sub-­‐ national	
  jurisdictions	
  adopt	
  very	
  different	
  policies	
  for	
  wind	
  energy	
  development?	
  Second,	
   did	
  these	
  policies	
  result	
  in	
  asymmetric	
  growth	
  of	
  wind	
  power	
  capacity	
  between	
  Texas	
  and	
   Alberta?	
  	
    	
   	
   2	
    To	
  answer	
  the	
  first	
  question,	
  I	
  argue	
  that	
  none	
  of	
  the	
  following	
  can	
  account	
  for	
  the	
   observed	
  divergence	
  in	
  policies:	
  differences	
  in	
  the	
  public’s	
  concern	
  about	
  the	
  environment,	
   governing	
   parties’	
   ideologies	
   or	
   positions	
   on	
   climate	
   change,	
   or	
   differences	
   in	
   legislative	
   institutions.	
   Instead,	
   I	
   contend	
   that	
   a	
   combination	
   of	
   decades-­‐old	
   policy	
   decisions	
   and	
   natural	
   resource	
   endowments	
   played	
   a	
   central	
   role	
   in	
   prompting	
   Texas	
   legislators,	
   but	
   not	
   their	
   counterparts	
   in	
   Alberta,	
   to	
   adopt	
   renewable	
   energy	
   mandates.	
   The	
   state	
   of	
   Texas	
   had	
   long	
   pursued	
   a	
   policy	
   of	
   energy	
   independence,	
   which	
   had	
   the	
   effect	
   of	
   isolating	
   Texas	
   from	
   the	
   national	
   power	
   grid.	
   	
   That	
   independence	
   was	
   threatened,	
   however,	
   when	
   a	
   shortage	
   of	
   local	
  coal	
  emerged	
  in	
  the	
  mid	
  1990s.	
  Texas	
  faced	
  a	
  choice	
  between	
  increasing	
  reliance	
  on	
   “imported”	
   coal	
   from	
   other	
   states	
   and	
   investment	
   in	
   alternate	
   local	
   energy	
   sources.	
   	
   The	
   latter	
  was	
  not	
  only	
  popular	
  with	
  Texas	
  voters,	
  but	
  also	
  offered	
  the	
  promise	
  of	
  creation	
  of	
   jobs	
   at	
   home,	
   rather	
   than	
   in	
   neighbouring	
   Wyoming.	
   On	
   the	
   recommendation	
   of	
   state	
   officials,	
   Texas	
   legislators	
   adopted	
   a	
   Renewable	
   Portfolio	
   Standard	
   to	
   mandate	
   development	
   of	
   alternate	
   sources	
   of	
   electricity.	
   Although	
   Alberta	
   also	
   has	
   long	
   pursued	
   a	
   policy	
  of	
  energy	
  independence,	
  the	
  province’s	
  coal	
  industry	
  has	
  supplied	
  and	
  can	
  continue	
   to	
  supply	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  coal	
  needed	
  for	
  electricity	
  production.	
  	
  Therefore,	
  Alberta	
  politicians	
  not	
   only	
  lack	
  equivalent	
  incentives	
  to	
  pursue	
  renewable	
  energy,	
  but	
  also	
  face	
  a	
  strong	
  incentive	
   to	
   protect	
   the	
   local	
   coal	
   industry	
   from	
   national	
   policies	
   pursuant	
   to	
   Canada’s	
   ratification	
   of	
   the	
  Kyoto	
  Protocol.	
  	
   On	
   the	
   second	
   question,	
   I	
   argue	
   that	
   Texas	
   benefited	
   from	
   both	
   a	
   Renewable	
   Portfolio	
   Standard	
   and	
   a	
   generous	
   federal	
   tax	
   credit	
   for	
   renewables.	
   The	
   renewables	
   mandate	
   served	
   to	
   initiate	
   interest	
   in	
   wind	
   energy	
   by	
   forcing	
   utilities	
   to	
   produce	
   energy	
   from	
   renewables,	
   while	
   the	
   tax	
   credit	
   made	
   wind	
   more	
   attractive	
   to	
   investors	
   by	
   making	
   it	
    	
   	
   3	
    more	
  competitive	
  with	
  other	
  sources	
  of	
  energy.	
  In	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  Alberta,	
  I	
  argue	
  that	
  a	
  weaker	
   federal	
  financial	
  incentive	
  together	
  with	
  a	
  lack	
  of	
  a	
  provincial	
  renewables	
  mandate	
  has	
  kept	
   the	
  wind	
  industry	
  from	
  experiencing	
  comparable	
  growth.	
  	
    	
   	
   4	
    	
   2.	
  Methods	
   	
    In	
   order	
   to	
   fully	
   comprehend	
   why	
   Texas	
   and	
   Alberta	
   chose	
   such	
   different	
   policies	
   for	
  renewable	
  energy,	
  this	
  thesis	
  explores	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  independent	
  variables,	
  or	
  structural	
   factors,	
   that	
   influenced	
   these	
   policy	
   choices.	
   The	
   first	
   things	
   to	
   analyze	
   are	
   the	
   existing	
   sources	
   of	
   electricity.	
   This	
   helps	
   to	
   determine	
   whether	
   any	
   important	
   differences	
   in	
   the	
   power	
  system	
  could	
  explain	
  different	
  barriers	
  to	
  wind	
  energy	
  development.	
  A	
  second	
  and	
   deeply	
   related	
   structural	
   factor	
   is	
   natural	
   resource	
   endowments.	
   A	
   jurisdiction’s	
   endowment	
  of	
  fossil	
  fuels	
  (especially	
  coal	
  and	
  natural	
  gas)	
  can	
  play	
  a	
  significant	
  role	
  in	
  its	
   choice	
  of	
  power	
  plants,	
  which	
  can	
  affect	
  the	
  choice	
  of	
  non-­‐fossil	
  fuel	
  sources	
  of	
  electricity.	
   Moreover,	
  having	
  large	
  tracts	
  of	
  land	
  with	
  favorable	
  wind	
  patterns	
  is	
  an	
  obvious	
  advantage	
   for	
  the	
  viability	
  of	
  wind	
  farms.	
  Other	
  relevant	
  structural	
  factors	
  to	
  discuss	
  are	
  the	
  power-­‐ trading	
  scheme	
  with	
  adjoining	
  jurisdictions,	
  and	
  the	
  availability	
  of	
  transmission	
  lines	
  that	
   can	
   enable	
   the	
   distribution	
   of	
   wind-­‐generated	
   electricity	
   to	
   the	
   towns	
   and	
   cities	
   that	
   require	
  it.	
  	
   After	
  exploring	
  the	
  structural	
  factors	
  that	
  led	
  to	
  specific	
  policies,	
  this	
  study	
  presents	
   and	
   explains	
   the	
   renewable	
   energy	
   policies	
   that	
   were	
   enacted	
   in	
   each	
   jurisdiction.	
   This	
   elucidates	
   the	
   main	
   differences	
   between	
   government	
   actions	
   aimed	
   at	
   promoting	
   renewable	
  energy.	
  Then,	
  the	
  analysis	
  traces	
  the	
  impact	
  that	
  each	
  policy	
  had	
  on	
  the	
  growth	
   of	
  wind	
  energy	
  in	
  Texas	
  and	
  Alberta.	
  	
   The	
  first	
  section	
  of	
  this	
  thesis	
  presents	
  relevant	
  energy	
  data.	
  This	
  serves	
  to	
  paint	
  a	
   general	
   comparison	
   of	
   energy	
   sources,	
   wind	
   energy	
   capacity	
   growth,	
   energy	
   production	
   costs	
   for	
   competing	
   sources	
   of	
   electricity,	
   and	
   per	
   capita	
   energy	
   use.	
   The	
   second	
   section	
    	
   	
   5	
    presents	
   my	
   hypotheses	
   on	
   why	
   Texas	
   and	
   Alberta	
   chose	
   such	
   different	
   policies,	
   and	
   introduces	
  the	
  theoretical	
  approaches	
  that	
  best	
  explain	
  these	
  policy	
  choices.	
   The	
  third	
  and	
   fourth	
   sections	
   contain	
   the	
   evidence	
   to	
   support	
   my	
   hypotheses,	
   presenting	
   the	
   history	
   of	
   wind	
  energy	
  development	
  in	
  Texas	
  and	
  Alberta,	
  together	
  with	
  the	
  stories	
  of	
  how	
  renewable	
   energy	
   policies	
   were	
   enacted.	
   Then,	
   a	
   fifth	
   section	
   compares	
   the	
   policies	
   enacted	
   in	
   each	
   jurisdiction,	
   and	
   incorporates	
   relevant	
   literature	
   to	
   explain	
   the	
   different	
   policy	
   outcomes	
   and	
  evaluate	
  policy	
  performance.	
  Lastly,	
  the	
  concluding	
  section	
  reviews	
  the	
  arguments	
  and	
   explains	
  which	
  hypotheses	
  best	
  answer	
  the	
  thesis	
  questions.	
   To	
   investigate	
   the	
   hypotheses,	
   this	
   thesis	
   also	
   draws	
   on	
   primary	
   and	
   secondary	
   documents,	
   as	
   well	
   as	
   telephone	
   interviews	
   with	
   wind	
   energy	
   experts	
   and	
   government	
   officials.	
   Four	
   interviewees	
   were	
   chosen	
   for	
   their	
   professional	
   connection	
   to	
   the	
   wind	
   energy	
   industries	
   in	
   Texas	
   and	
   Alberta:	
   Kenneth	
   Starcher,	
   Assistant	
   Director	
   of	
   the	
   Alternative	
  Energy	
  Institute	
  (Texas);	
  Terry	
  Hadley,	
  Communications	
  Director	
  of	
  the	
  Texas	
   Public	
  Utility	
  Commission;	
  Ronald	
  Liepert,	
  Alberta	
  Minister	
  of	
  Energy;	
  Tom	
  Levy,	
  Manager	
   at	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Wind	
  Energy	
  Association.	
  	
    	
   	
   6	
    3.	
  Data:	
  electricity	
  generation	
   	
    3.1. The rise of wind energy 	
   The	
  rise	
  of	
  the	
  wind	
  energy	
  sectors	
  in	
  Texas	
  and	
  Alberta	
  can	
  be	
  traced	
  to	
  the	
  late-­‐1990s,	
   when	
   both	
   jurisdictions	
   began	
   to	
   experience	
   considerable	
   growth	
   in	
   wind	
   energy	
   capacity.	
   However,	
   the	
   difference	
   in	
   wind	
   capacity	
   growth	
   (in	
   absolute	
   terms)	
   between	
   Texas	
   and	
   Alberta	
  is	
  unequivocal.	
  As	
  the	
  following	
  graph	
  illustrates,	
  Texas	
  wind	
  capacity	
  grew	
  from	
   180	
   megawatts	
   in	
   1997	
   to	
   more	
   than	
   10,000	
   megawatts	
   in	
   2010.	
   In	
   the	
   same	
   period,	
   Alberta’s	
  wind	
  capacity	
  grew	
  from	
  20	
  to	
  806	
  megawatts.	
  	
   Figure 1. Wind energy in TX and AB: 1997-20101  	
   However,	
   given	
   the	
   vast	
   population	
   differences	
   between	
   Texas	
   and	
   Alberta,	
   the	
   wind	
   capacity	
   difference	
   seems	
   less	
   pronounced	
   when	
   comparing	
   wind	
   capacity	
   per	
   capita	
   data,	
   or	
   when	
   analyzing	
   the	
   growth	
   of	
   wind	
   capacity	
   as	
   percentage	
   of	
   total	
   electricity	
   capacity:	
   	
   	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   1	
  	
  U.S.	
  Energy	
  Information	
  Administration,	
  "State	
  Energy	
  Profiles:	
  Texas,"	
  http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/state/	
    state_energy_profiles.cfm?sid=TX	
  (accessed	
  January	
  23,	
  2011);	
  Government	
  of	
  Alberta,	
  "Electricity	
  Statistics,"	
   http://www.energy.alberta.ca/Electricity/682.asp	
  (accessed	
  January	
  23,	
  2011).	
    	
   	
   7	
    Figure 2. Wind capacity as % of total capacity2  	
   Figure 3. Wind energy capacity per capita3  	
   As	
  the	
  last	
  two	
  figures	
  indicate,	
  the	
  real	
  differences	
  in	
  wind	
  capacity	
  per	
  capita	
  and	
   wind	
   as	
   a	
   percentage	
   of	
   total	
   electricity	
   capacity	
   started	
   after	
   2007,	
   when	
   Texas	
   experienced	
  a	
  very	
  steep	
  growth	
  in	
  wind	
  energy	
  capacity.	
  For	
  the	
  purposes	
  of	
  this	
  thesis,	
   this	
  implies	
  that	
  if	
  policy	
  differences	
  were	
  responsible	
  for	
  a	
  steeper	
  growth	
  in	
  Texas’s	
  wind	
   capacity,	
   the	
   effect	
   of	
   these	
   policies	
   (in	
   terms	
   of	
   wind	
   energy	
   per	
   capita)	
   was	
   not	
   comparatively	
   significant	
   prior	
   to	
   2007.	
   In	
   other	
   words,	
   the	
   policies	
   that	
   allowed	
   a	
   fast	
   growth	
  of	
  wind	
  energy	
  in	
  Texas	
  had	
  their	
  greatest	
  effect	
  between	
  2007	
  and	
  2010,	
  when	
  the	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   2	
  	
  U.S.	
  Energy	
  Information	
  Administration,	
  State	
  Energy	
  Profiles:	
  Texas	
  Government	
  of	
  Alberta,	
  Electricity	
   Statistics	
   3  U.S. Energy Information Administration, State Energy Profiles: Texas; Government of Alberta, Electricity Statistics; Texas State Library and Archives Commission, "United States and Texas Populations: 1850-2010," http://www.tsl.state.tx.us/ref/abouttx/census.htm (accessed January 12, 2011); Statistics Canada, Annual Demographic Estimates: Census Metropolitan Areas, Economic Regions and Census Divisions, Age and Sex: 2001 to 2006, Statistics Canada, 2007.  	
   	
   8	
    Texas	
  wind	
  sector	
  grew	
  considerably	
  faster	
  than	
  the	
  Alberta	
  wind	
  sector.	
  The	
  reasons	
  for	
   this	
  sudden	
  growth	
  after	
  2007	
  will	
  be	
  explained	
  in	
  the	
  policy	
  analysis	
  section	
  (VI).	
  	
  	
    3.2. Dirty power: fossil fuels and electricity In	
  order	
  to	
  draw	
  a	
  fuller	
  comparison	
  of	
  the	
  Texas	
  and	
  Alberta	
  wind	
  energy	
  sectors,	
  it	
   is	
   important	
   to	
   analyze	
   the	
   energy	
   mix	
   in	
   both	
   jurisdictions.	
   	
   The	
   following	
   graphs	
   help	
   illustrate	
  recent	
  trends	
  in	
  electricity	
  generation:	
  	
   Figure 4. Texas electricity capacity by source4  	
   Figure 5. Alberta electricity capacity by source5  	
   	
   	
    	
    	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
    4	
  	
  U.S.	
  Energy	
  Information	
  Administration,	
  "Electricity	
  Statistics,"	
  http://www.energy.alberta.ca/Electricity/	
    682.asp	
  (accessed	
  January	
  23,	
  2011).	
   5	
  	
  Government	
  of	
  Alberta,	
  Electricity	
  Statistics	
    	
   	
   9	
    Figure 6. Texas share of generation capacity by source6  	
   Figure 7. Alberta share of generation capacity by source7  	
   As	
   the	
   previous	
   figures	
   show,	
   the	
   power	
   sectors	
   of	
   Texas	
   and	
   Alberta	
   share	
   some	
   important	
   similarities.	
   First,	
   fossil	
   fuels	
   have	
   been	
   the	
   main	
   source	
   of	
   electricity	
   in	
   both	
   jurisdictions	
   for	
   the	
   period	
   1997	
   to	
   2010.	
  In	
   the	
   case	
   of	
   Texas,	
   coal	
   energy	
   has	
   remained	
   stable	
   at	
   around	
   20%	
   of	
   total	
   generation	
   capacity,	
   while	
   natural	
   gas	
   has	
   remained	
   at	
   around	
  60%.	
  In	
  Alberta,	
  coal	
  power	
  has	
  decreased	
  its	
  share	
  of	
  total	
  capacity	
  from	
  73%	
  in	
   1997	
  to	
  44%	
  in	
  2010.	
  In	
  this	
  same	
  period,	
  natural	
  gas	
  has	
  increased	
  from	
  10%	
  to	
  40%	
  of	
   total	
  generation	
  capacity.	
  	
    	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
    6	
  	
  U.S.	
  Energy	
  Information	
  Administration,	
  State	
  Energy	
  Profiles:	
  Texas	
   7	
  	
  Government	
  of	
  Alberta,	
  Electricity	
  Statistics	
    	
   	
   10	
    Furthermore,	
  the	
  relative	
  cost	
  of	
  generating	
  electricity	
  with	
  different	
  types	
  of	
  power	
   plants	
   is	
   an	
   important	
   variable	
   for	
   this	
   study.	
   The	
   difference	
   in	
   cost	
   between	
   fossil	
   fuel	
   power	
  plants	
  and	
  wind	
  farms	
  may	
  affect	
  the	
  choice	
  of	
  new	
  sources	
  of	
  electricity.	
  However,	
   due	
   partly	
   to	
   geographic	
   and	
   national	
   variations	
   of	
   factors	
   that	
   affect	
   a	
   specific	
   power	
   system’s	
  generation	
  costs,	
  the	
  literature	
  on	
  this	
  does	
  not	
  present	
  a	
  consensus	
  on	
  the	
  costs	
   of	
   electricity	
   generation	
   across	
   sources.	
   In	
   other	
   words,	
   different	
   studies	
   present	
   cost	
   estimates	
   for	
   a	
   very	
   specific	
   type	
   of	
   energy	
   mix,	
   in	
   a	
   specific	
   location,	
   and	
   with	
   specific	
   transmission	
   constraints,	
   making	
   it	
   difficult	
   to	
   present	
   precise	
   comparisons	
   on	
   the	
   costs	
   of	
   electricity	
   from	
   coal,	
   natural	
   gas,	
   and	
   wind.	
   Also,	
   the	
   volatility	
   of	
   fossil	
   fuel	
   prices,	
   especially	
  the	
  price	
  of	
  natural	
  gas,	
  may	
  render	
  cost	
  estimates	
  unreliable	
  (see	
  Figure	
  11	
  in	
   the	
  Appendix	
  for	
  a	
  graph	
  of	
  fuel	
  prices).	
  For	
  example,	
  a	
  2003	
  study	
  by	
  Sims	
  et	
  al.	
  presents	
   the	
   following	
   cost	
   estimates	
   for	
   electricity	
   generation	
   in	
   developed	
   countries,9	
   showing	
   large	
  variations	
  for	
  each	
  source:	
   Table 1. Cost of generating electricity: Annex I countries (2003)10 Energy	
  Source	
   Coal	
  (pulverized	
  fuel)	
   Coal	
  (integrated	
  gasification)	
   Coal	
  (carbon	
  capture)	
   Natural	
  Gas	
  (CCGT)	
   Natural	
  Gas	
  (carbon	
  capture)	
   Wind	
    Cost	
   4.9	
  cents	
  per	
  kWh	
  	
   3.6	
  to	
  6.0	
  cents	
  per	
  kWh	
   7.9	
  cents	
  per	
  kWh	
   3.45	
  to	
  6.9	
  cents	
  per	
  kWh	
   4.95	
  to	
  8.4	
  cents	
  per	
  kWh	
   3.0	
  to	
  8	
  cents	
  per	
  kWh	
    	
   However,	
   the	
   literature	
   on	
   the	
   viability	
   of	
   wind	
   power	
   in	
   North	
   America	
   does	
   suggest	
  that,	
  in	
  general	
  terms,	
  the	
  cost	
  of	
  generating	
  electricity	
  using	
  coal	
  and	
  natural	
  gas	
   power	
  plants	
  has	
   so	
  far	
  been	
  lower	
  than	
  the	
  cost	
  of	
  wind-­‐generated	
  power.	
  For	
  instance,	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   8	
  	
  Ralph	
  E.	
  H.	
  Sims,	
  Hans-­‐Holger	
  Rogner	
  and	
  Ken	
  Gregory,	
  "Carbon	
  Emission	
  and	
  Mitigation	
  Cost	
  Comparisons	
    between	
  Fossil	
  Fuel,	
  Nuclear	
  and	
  Renewable	
  Energy	
  Resources	
  for	
  Electricity	
  Generation,"	
  Energy	
  Policy	
  31	
   (2003),	
  1321.	
   9	
  Annex	
  I	
  countries	
  under	
  the	
  Kyoto	
  Protocol	
   10	
  	
  Ralph	
  E.	
  H.	
  Sims,	
  Hans-­‐Holger	
  Rogner	
  and	
  Ken	
  Gregory,	
  "Carbon	
  Emission	
  and	
  Mitigation	
  Cost	
   Comparisons	
  between	
  Fossil	
  Fuel,	
  Nuclear	
  and	
  Renewable	
  Energy	
  Resources	
  for	
  Electricity	
  Generation,"	
   Energy	
  Policy	
  31	
  (2003),	
  1321.	
    	
   	
   11	
    Christopher	
  Riti	
  explains	
  that	
  “after	
  factoring	
  in	
  inflation-­‐adjusted	
  credits,	
  wind-­‐generated	
   electricity	
  can	
  cost	
  as	
  little	
  as	
  6	
  cents	
  per	
  kilowatt	
  hour,	
  as	
  compared	
  to	
  the	
  3	
  to	
  5	
  cents	
  for	
   coal-­‐fired	
  electricity.”11	
  Considering	
  that	
  this	
  comment	
  appears	
  in	
  a	
  discussion	
  about	
  a	
  1.8	
   cents	
  per	
  kilowatt	
  hour	
  credit,	
  his	
  estimate	
  places	
  the	
  cost	
  of	
  wind-­‐generated	
  electricity	
  at	
   around	
   8	
   cents	
   per	
   kilowatt	
   hour.	
   In	
   another	
   study,	
   Benitez	
   et	
   al.	
   explain	
   that	
   the	
   cost	
   of	
   wind	
  energy	
  is	
  still	
  higher	
  than	
  coal	
  and	
  natural	
  gas	
  power,	
  but	
  has	
  decreased	
  steadily	
  over	
   time	
  and	
  is	
  becoming	
  competitive	
  with	
  fossil	
  fuel	
  energy	
  costs:	
  	
   With	
   improvements	
   in	
   technology	
   and	
   growth	
   in	
   the	
   market	
   for	
   wind	
   power,	
   the	
   cost	
   of	
   electricity	
  generated	
  by	
  modern	
  wind	
  farms	
  has	
  declined	
  by	
  some	
  80%	
  since	
  1980	
  —	
  from	
   about	
   38	
   cents	
   per	
   kilowatt	
   hour	
   (kWh)	
   to	
   about	
   4	
   cents.	
   Engineers	
   claim	
   that	
   costs	
   will	
   continue	
  to	
  decline	
  so	
  that,	
  with	
  increasing	
  oil	
  prices,	
  wind	
  power	
  will	
  be	
  competitive	
  with	
   fossil	
  fuel	
  energy.12	
   	
    Also,	
   the	
   2001	
   “Energy	
   Outlook	
   Report”	
   by	
   the	
   U.S.	
   Energy	
   Information	
   Administration	
   presents	
  cost	
  estimates	
  for	
  new	
  generation	
  installed	
  in	
  2005	
  and	
  2020	
  that	
  place	
  the	
  cost	
   of	
  wind	
  power	
  above	
  coal	
  and	
  natural	
  gas	
  power:13	
   Figure 8. Projected electricity generation costs, 2005 and 202014 (1999 mills per kWh)  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
    11	
  	
  Christopher	
  Riti,	
  "Three	
  Sheets	
  to	
  the	
  Wind:	
  An	
  Intersection	
  of	
  the	
  Renewable	
  Energy	
  Production	
  Tax	
    Credit,	
  Congressional	
  Political	
  Posturing,	
  and	
  	
  an	
  Unsustainable	
  Energy	
  Policy,"	
  Pace	
  Environmental	
  Law	
   Review	
  27,	
  no.	
  3	
  (2010),	
  793.	
   12	
  	
  Lliliana	
  E.	
  Benitez,	
  Pablo	
  C.	
  Benitez	
  and	
  G.	
  Cornelis	
  van	
  Kooten,	
  "The	
  Economics	
  of	
  Wind	
  Power	
  with	
   Energy	
  Storage,"	
  Energy	
  Economics	
  30	
  (2008),	
  1974.	
   13	
  I	
  chose	
  the	
  2001	
  version	
  of	
  this	
  report	
  over	
  the	
  most	
  recent	
  one	
  (2011)	
  because	
  the	
  latter	
  contains	
  cost	
   estimates	
  for	
  2016,	
  which	
  are	
  not	
  useful	
  for	
  the	
  period	
  analyzed	
  in	
  this	
  thesis.	
  	
   14	
  	
  U.S.	
  Energy	
  Information	
  Administration,	
  "Annual	
  Energy	
  Outlook	
  2001,"	
  (2001),	
  75,	
   http://www.eia.doe.gov.	
    	
   	
   12	
    Given	
  the	
  above	
  data,	
  it	
  is	
  safe	
  to	
  assume	
  that	
  throughout	
  the	
  period	
  analyzed	
  in	
  this	
  thesis,	
   it	
   was	
   more	
   expensive	
   to	
   generate	
   electricity	
   with	
   wind	
   turbines	
   than	
   with	
   fossil	
   fuel	
   power	
  plants	
  in	
  both	
  Alberta	
  and	
  Texas.	
  	
   Another	
   relevant	
   variable	
   for	
   this	
   thesis	
   is	
   the	
   degree	
   of	
   energy	
   independence	
   because	
   a	
   jurisdiction’s	
   degree	
   of	
   reliance	
   on	
   foreign	
   sources	
   of	
   energy	
   may	
   affect	
   its	
   energy	
   choices.	
   Information	
   on	
   energy	
   trade	
   shows	
   that	
   Texas	
   and	
   Alberta	
   generate	
   the	
   majority	
  of	
  the	
  electricity	
  they	
  consume,	
  and	
  only	
  import	
  a	
  small	
  fraction	
  of	
  their	
  power.15	
   The	
  following	
  table	
  presents	
  data	
  on	
  net	
  electricity	
  imports:	
   Table 2. Texas electricity trade, million KWh16 Year	
   Net	
  Interstate	
  Trade	
   International	
  Imports	
   Net	
  trade	
   Total	
   state	
   electricity	
   disposition	
   Imports	
   as	
   %	
   of	
   total	
   disposition	
   Year	
   Net	
  Interstate	
  Trade	
   International	
  Imports	
   Net	
  trade	
   Total	
   state	
   electricity	
   disposition	
   Imports	
   as	
   %	
   of	
   total	
   disposition	
    1993	
   1994	
   1995	
   1996	
   1997	
   1998	
   1999	
   2000	
   -­‐2355	
   -­‐3967	
   -­‐4407	
   -­‐8855	
   -­‐9579	
   -­‐8599	
   -­‐7583	
   -­‐5647	
   0	
   0	
   0	
   6	
   526	
   738	
   204	
   2	
   -­‐2355	
   -­‐3967	
   -­‐4407	
   -­‐8861	
   -­‐10105	
   -­‐9337	
   -­‐7787	
   -­‐5649	
   30204 31114 32204 33781 34642 36465 36673 38339 4	
   7	
   3	
   0	
   5	
   7	
   2	
   1	
   -­‐0.78%	
   -­‐1.27%	
   -­‐1.37%	
   -­‐2.62%	
   -­‐2.92%	
   -­‐2.56%	
   -­‐2.12%	
   -­‐1.47%	
   2001	
   2002	
   -­‐1555	
   5720	
   4	
   80	
   -­‐1559	
   5640	
   37413 37998 9	
   9	
   -­‐0.42%	
   1.48%	
    2003	
   2004	
   -­‐712	
   7583	
   80	
   79	
   -­‐792	
   7504	
   37999 38279 1	
   5	
   -­‐0.21%	
   1.96%	
    2005	
   2195	
   78	
   2117	
   39455 2	
   0.54%	
    2006	
   7157	
   80	
   7077	
   39350 6	
   1.80%	
    2007	
   8589	
   160	
   8429	
   39706 4	
   2.12%	
    2008	
   -­‐246	
   961	
   -­‐1207	
   40599 5	
   -­‐0.30%	
    	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   15	
  Minor	
  seasonal	
  disruptions	
  in	
  electricity	
  generation	
  and	
  delivery	
  may	
  prompt	
  a	
  jurisdiction	
  to	
  import	
  small	
    amounts	
  of	
  electricity	
  from	
  an	
  adjoining	
  jurisdiction	
  (if	
  inter-­‐jursidiction	
  transmission	
  lines	
  exist).	
  Otherwise,	
   rural	
  communities	
  that	
  are	
  far	
  from	
  the	
  main	
  transmission	
  lines	
  and	
  close	
  to	
  a	
  border	
  may	
  have	
  an	
  agreement	
   to	
  buy	
  electricity	
  from	
  a	
  neighboring	
  municipality	
  in	
  another	
  state/province.	
  However,	
  the	
  amount	
  of	
  net	
   imports	
  in	
  both	
  cases	
  is	
  so	
  insignificant,	
  that	
  I	
  have	
  chosen	
  not	
  to	
  investigate	
  specific	
  details.	
  	
   16	
  	
  U.S.	
  Energy	
  Information	
  Administration,	
  State	
  Energy	
  Profiles:	
  Texas	
    	
   	
   13	
    Table 3. Alberta electricity trade, MWh17 	
   Exports	
   Imports	
   Net	
  trade	
   Total	
  electricity	
  disposition	
   Imports	
  as	
  %	
  of	
  total	
  disposition	
    2004	
   130888	
   366611	
   -­‐235723	
   64683989	
   -­‐0.36%	
    2005	
   85686	
   451727	
   -­‐123640	
   64544208	
   -­‐0.19%	
    2006	
   67414	
   209326	
   -­‐141912	
   66377930	
   -­‐0.21%	
    2007	
   154748	
   222902	
   -­‐68154	
   68073392	
   -­‐0.10%	
    	
    The	
   first	
   thing	
   to	
   note	
   is	
   that	
   the	
   unavailability	
   of	
   similar	
   data	
   for	
   the	
   same	
   years	
   makes	
   any	
   comparison	
   between	
   Texas	
   and	
   Alberta	
   difficult.	
   However,	
   the	
   Texas	
   data	
   indicates	
   that	
   the	
   state’s	
   electricity	
   imports	
   varied	
   considerably	
   over	
   the	
   1993-­‐2008	
   period.	
   Texas	
   electricity	
   imports	
   were	
   on	
   the	
   rise	
   during	
   the	
   1990s	
   until	
   they	
   peaked	
   in	
   1997	
  (as	
  percentage	
  of	
  total	
  electricity	
  disposition).	
  Also	
  notably,	
  the	
  state	
  imported	
  more	
   than	
   1%	
   of	
   its	
   electricity	
   from	
   1994	
   to	
   2000,	
   and	
   then	
   imports	
   slowed	
   down	
   during	
   the	
   2000s	
  (during	
  5	
  out	
  of	
  7	
  years,	
  the	
  trade	
  balance	
  was	
  positive18),	
  which	
  is	
  when	
  the	
  new	
   renewable	
   energy	
   policies	
   came	
   into	
   effect.	
   In	
   the	
   case	
   of	
   Alberta,	
   electricity	
   imports	
   accounted	
  for	
  less	
  than	
  half	
  of	
  a	
  percentage	
  of	
  total	
  power	
  disposition	
  from	
  2004	
  to	
  2007.	
  	
   In	
   sum,	
   it	
   can	
   be	
   said	
   that	
   both	
   Texas	
   and	
   Alberta	
   display	
   strong	
   energy	
   independence	
  since	
  the	
  vast	
  majority	
  of	
  its	
  power	
  is	
  generated	
  locally	
  (in	
  both	
  places,	
  more	
   than	
   97%	
   of	
   electricity	
   was	
   locally	
   sourced	
   for	
   every	
   year	
   analyzed).	
   However,	
   Texas	
   displays	
   a	
   greater	
   need	
   for	
   energy	
   imports.	
   Also,	
   Texas’s	
   electricity	
   trade	
   data	
   shows	
   a	
   clear	
   rise	
   and	
   decline	
   of	
   electricity	
   imports	
   during	
   the	
   period	
   analyzed,	
   coinciding	
   with	
   the	
   implementation	
  of	
  restrictive	
  policies,	
  as	
  will	
  be	
  explained	
  later.	
   	
    	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   17	
  	
  Statistics	
  Canada,	
  Electric	
  Power	
  Generation,	
  Transmission	
  and	
  Distribution:	
  2007,	
  2009,	
    http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/57-­‐202-­‐x/57-­‐202-­‐x2007000-­‐eng.pdf.	
   18	
  There	
  were	
  more	
  electricity	
  exports	
  than	
  imports	
  during	
  2002,	
  2004,	
  2005,	
  2006	
  and	
  2007.	
    	
   	
   14	
    3.3. Resource endowments 	
   Another	
   variable	
   that	
   may	
   affect	
   a	
   jurisdiction’s	
   energy	
   choices	
   is	
   resource	
   endowments.	
   The	
  data	
  on	
  natural	
  resource	
  endowments	
  indicates	
  some	
  similarities	
  between	
  Alberta	
  and	
   Texas.	
   First,	
   both	
   jurisdictions	
   benefit	
   from	
   a	
   very	
   large	
   endowment	
   of	
   natural	
   gas	
   reserves.	
   Moreover,	
   all	
   of	
   the	
   natural	
   gas	
   used	
   for	
   electricity	
   generation	
   in	
   Texas	
   and	
   Alberta	
   is	
   locally	
   extracted.19	
   In	
   both	
   jurisdictions,	
   natural	
   gas	
   occurs	
   in	
   public	
   land	
   as	
   well	
   as	
  privately	
  owned	
  land,	
  and	
  gas	
  is	
  extracted	
  and	
  sold	
  mainly	
  by	
  private	
  corporations.	
  	
   	
    A	
  second	
  and	
  important	
  similarity	
  is	
  that	
  both	
  Texas	
  and	
  Alberta	
  have	
  a	
  favorable	
    endowment	
  of	
  wind.	
  According	
  to	
  studies	
  by	
  the	
  Alternative	
  Energy	
  Institute	
  at	
  Texas	
  A&M	
   University	
  and	
  data	
  from	
  the	
  Texas	
  Energy	
  Conservation	
  Office,	
  Texas	
  has	
  excellent	
  wind	
   resource	
   in	
   the	
   state’s	
   Panhandle	
   region.	
   These	
   studies	
   estimate	
   a	
   potential	
   wind	
   power	
   capacity	
  of	
  524,800	
  megawatts	
  (MW),	
  which	
  translates	
  into	
  enough	
  wind	
  energy	
  to	
  power	
   approximately	
   121	
   million	
   homes.20	
   On	
   the	
   Alberta	
   side,	
   according	
   to	
   the	
   Pembina	
   Institute,	
  “Alberta’s	
  wind	
  energy	
  resource	
  is	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  best	
  and	
  most	
  accessible	
  land-­‐based	
   wind	
   resources	
   in	
   Canada”21,	
   with	
   the	
   best	
   winds	
   located	
   in	
   the	
   south	
   of	
   the	
   province.	
   According	
  to	
  this	
  institute’s	
  estimates,	
  based	
  on	
  calculating	
  the	
  suitability	
  of	
  2	
  MW	
  turbines	
   in	
   Alberta’s	
   territory,	
   the	
   province	
   has	
   a	
   potential	
   wind	
   power	
   capacity	
   of	
   64,000	
   MW.22	
   Based	
   on	
   this	
   data,	
   there	
   is	
   no	
   reason	
   to	
   conclude	
   that	
   any	
   of	
   the	
   two	
   jurisdictions	
   has	
   a	
   wind	
  resource	
  advantage	
  that	
  would	
  explain	
  the	
  difference	
  in	
  wind	
  energy	
  development.	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
    19	
  Government	
  of	
  Alberta,	
  Electricity	
  Statistics;	
  Energy	
  Information	
  Administration,	
  State	
  Energy	
  Profiles:	
    Texas.	
   20	
  	
  Texas	
  Comptroller	
  of	
  Public	
  Accounts,	
  "The	
  Energy	
  Report,	
  2008,"	
  http://www.window.state.tx.us/	
   specialrpt/energy/renewable/wind.php	
  (accessed	
  October	
  4,	
  2010).	
   21	
  	
  The	
  Pembina	
  Institute,	
  Greening	
  the	
  Grid:	
  Powering	
  Alberta's	
  Future	
  with	
  Renewable	
  Energy	
  (Drayton	
   Valley,	
  Alberta:	
  The	
  Pembina	
  Institute,[2009]).	
   22	
  2	
  MW	
  turbines	
  require	
  specific	
  wind	
  conditions	
  to	
  operate	
  efficiently.	
  Therefore,	
  this	
  estimate	
  is	
  not	
   comparable	
  to	
  the	
  much	
  higher	
  potential	
  wind	
  power	
  estimate	
  for	
  Texas.	
  	
    	
   	
   15	
    	
    In	
   the	
   case	
   of	
   coal,	
   however,	
   Texas	
   and	
   Alberta	
   face	
   a	
   rather	
   different	
   scenario.	
    Texas	
   relies	
   heavily	
   on	
   imported	
   coal	
   to	
   meet	
   its	
   electricity	
   demands.	
   As	
   the	
   Energy	
   Information	
   Administration	
   explains,	
   “[a]lthough	
   Texas	
   produces	
   a	
   substantial	
   amount	
   of	
   coal	
  from	
  its	
  11	
  surface	
  mines,	
  including	
  five	
  of	
  the	
  50	
  largest	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  the	
  State	
   relies	
   on	
   rail	
   deliveries	
   of	
   subbituminous	
   coal	
   from	
   Wyoming	
   for	
   the	
   majority	
   of	
   its	
   supply.”23	
   To	
   meet	
   its	
   energy	
   demands,	
   the	
   state	
   imports	
   two-­‐thirds	
   of	
   the	
   coal	
   it	
   burns.	
   According	
  to	
  a	
  2008	
  report	
  by	
  the	
  Union	
  of	
  Concerned	
  Scientists,	
  these	
  coal	
  imports	
  make	
   Texas	
   the	
   most	
   coal-­‐dependent	
   state	
   as	
   measured	
   by	
   net	
   quantity	
   of	
   imported	
   coal.24	
   On	
   the	
   Alberta	
   side,	
   all	
   of	
   the	
   coal	
   used	
   for	
   power	
   generation	
   is	
   extracted	
   locally.	
   As	
   Environment	
   Canada	
   explains,	
   “coal-­‐fired	
   sources	
   predominate	
   in	
   Alberta	
   and	
   Saskatchewan,	
   due	
   in	
   no	
   small	
   part	
   to	
   easy	
   and	
   reliable	
   access	
   to	
   abundant	
   coal	
   resources.”25	
   In	
   fact,	
   four	
   fifths	
   of	
   Alberta’s	
   coal	
   extraction	
   is	
   used	
   by	
   the	
   local	
   energy	
   generation	
  industry,	
  and	
  most	
  of	
  the	
  rest	
  is	
  exported	
  to	
  Japan	
  and	
  South	
  Korea.26	
  	
  	
    3.4. Opposition to Kyoto Attitudes	
  towards	
  greenhouse	
  gas	
  mitigation	
  can	
  also	
  be	
  expected	
  to	
  haven	
  an	
  effect	
   on	
   a	
   jurisdiction’s	
   willingness	
   to	
   promote	
   renewable	
   energy.	
   Given	
   the	
   size	
   of	
   the	
   oil	
   industry	
  in	
  Texas	
  and	
  Alberta,	
  and	
  considering	
  their	
  reliance	
  on	
  fossil	
  fuels	
  for	
  electricity	
   generation,	
  the	
  economies	
  of	
  both	
  jurisdictions	
  are	
  intimately	
  tied	
  to	
  industrial	
  processes	
   that	
   generate	
   vast	
   amounts	
   of	
   GHG	
   emissions.	
   As	
   a	
   result,	
   the	
   economies	
   of	
   both	
   Texas	
   and	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   23	
  	
  U.S.	
  Energy	
  Information	
  Administration,	
  State	
  Energy	
  Profiles:	
  Texas	
   24	
  	
  Jeff	
  Deyette	
  and	
  Barbara	
  Freese,	
  Burning	
  Coal,	
  Burning	
  Cash:	
  Ranking	
  the	
  States	
  that	
  Import	
  the	
  most	
  Coal	
    (Cambridge,	
  MA:	
  Union	
  of	
  Concerned	
  Scientists,	
  [2010]).	
   25	
  	
  Environment	
  Canada,	
  National	
  Inventory	
  Report	
  1990-­2008:	
  Greenhouse	
  Gas	
  Sources	
  and	
  Sinks	
  in	
  Canada,	
   2010,	
  http://www.ec.gc.ca/ges-­‐ghg/default.asp?lang=En&n=1357A041-­‐1	
  (accessed	
  November	
  2,	
  2010).	
   26	
  	
  Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  "What	
  is	
  Coal?"	
  http://www.energy.alberta.ca/coal/645.asp	
  (accessed	
  October	
  20,	
   2010).	
    	
   	
   16	
    Alberta	
   are	
   very	
   sensitive	
   to	
   any	
   federal	
   climate	
   change	
   mitigation	
   strategies.	
   Not	
   surprisingly,	
  both	
  jurisdictions	
  strongly	
  oppose	
  compliance	
  with	
  Kyoto	
  Protocol	
  targets	
  or	
   any	
   federal	
   plans	
   to	
   reduce	
   their	
   GHG	
   emissions.	
   Moreover,	
   both	
   Texas	
   and	
   Alberta	
   have	
   repeatedly	
   expressed	
   that	
   emissions	
   reductions	
   place	
   a	
   disproportionate	
   burden	
   on	
   their	
   economies.	
  	
   On	
   the	
   Texas	
   side,	
   opposition	
   to	
   greenhouse	
   gas	
   reductions	
   is	
   expressed	
   as	
   a	
   combination	
   of	
   economic	
   protectionism,	
   states’	
   rights,	
   and	
   climate	
   skepticism.	
   As	
   Barry	
   Rabe	
  explains,	
  “Texas	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  U.S.	
  House	
  and	
  Senate	
  have	
  remained	
  outspoken	
  in	
   their	
   opposition	
   to	
   international	
   greenhouse	
   gas	
   agreements,	
   such	
   as	
   the	
   Kyoto	
   Protocol,	
   […]	
  on	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  anticipated	
  economic	
  repercussions	
  for	
  the	
  state.”27	
  Moreover,	
  Texas	
  is	
   currently	
   attacking	
   President	
   Obama’s	
   environmental	
   plan,	
   by	
   suing	
   the	
   Environmental	
   Protection	
  Agency	
  over	
  its	
  new	
  plan	
  to	
  reduce	
  greenhouse	
  gases	
  by	
  declaring	
  CO2	
  a	
  threat	
   to	
   human	
   health.28	
   The	
   current	
   Governor	
   of	
   Texas,	
   Rick	
   Perry,	
   together	
   with	
   the	
   state’s	
   Attorney	
  General	
  Greg	
  Abbot	
  have	
  expressed	
  their	
  concern	
  that	
  the	
  EPA’s	
  plan	
  is	
  based	
  on	
   uncertain	
  climate	
  science	
  and	
  could	
  put	
  thousands	
  of	
  jobs	
  at	
  risk.29	
  Moreover,	
  Rick	
  Perry	
   argues	
   that	
   unelected	
   federal	
   bureaucrats	
   should	
   not	
   be	
   allowed	
   to	
   regulate	
   a	
   state’s	
   internal	
   energy	
   affairs,	
   and	
   promises	
   to	
   “fight	
   back	
   against	
   this	
   latest	
   encroachment	
   into	
   states’	
   authority,	
   which	
   would	
   effectively	
   strip	
   states	
   of	
   the	
   right	
   to	
   regulate	
   oil	
   and	
   gas	
    	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   27	
  	
  Barry	
  Rabe,	
  Statehouse	
  and	
  Greenhouse:	
  The	
  Emerging	
  Politics	
  of	
  American	
  Climate	
  Change	
  Policy	
   (Washington,	
  D.C.:	
  Brookings	
  Institution	
  Press,	
  2004),	
  50.	
   28  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Endangerment and Cause Or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act," http://epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html (accessed April 15, 2010).	
   29 Katherine Goldstein, "Gov. Rick Perry Sues EPA Over Greenhouse Gas Regulation," The Huffington Post: Feb. 10, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/18/gov-rick-perry-sues-the-e_n_467576.html (accessed April 20, 2010).	
    	
   	
   17	
    exploration	
   and	
   production	
   within	
   their	
   own	
   borders.”30	
   In	
   other	
   words,	
   it	
   is	
   difficult	
   to	
   argue	
   that	
   the	
   Texas	
   approach	
   to	
   renewable	
   energy,	
   however	
   successful	
   in	
   developing	
   wind	
  farms,	
  is	
  fueled	
  by	
  a	
  commitment	
  to	
  greenhouse	
  gas	
  mitigation.	
  	
   In	
   the	
   case	
   of	
   Alberta,	
   the	
   province	
   has	
   consistently	
   opposed	
   federal	
   climate	
   change	
   regulations,	
   displaying	
   a	
   mixture	
   of	
   climate	
   skepticism,	
   concerns	
   about	
   the	
   Alberta	
   oil	
   industry	
  and	
  the	
  local	
  economy,	
  and	
  defensiveness	
  concerning	
  provincial	
  jurisdiction.	
  The	
   province	
  has	
  expressed	
  concerns	
  about	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  climate	
  change	
  mitigation	
  strategies	
  on	
   provincial	
  energy	
  resource	
  revenues,	
  especially	
  now	
  that	
  oil	
  sands	
  production	
  (which	
  are	
   highly	
   carbon	
   intensive)	
   exceeds	
   production	
   of	
   conventional	
   oil.31	
   For	
   instance,	
   prior	
   to	
   Canada’s	
  ratification	
  of	
  the	
  Kyoto	
  Protocol	
  in	
  2002,	
  Alberta	
  Premier	
  Ralph	
  Klein	
  became	
  a	
   prominent	
   spokesperson	
   against	
   Kyoto,	
   recruiting	
   former	
   Premier	
   Peter	
   Lougheed	
   to	
   jointly	
  launch	
  a	
  campaign	
  against	
  the	
  treaty.	
  As	
  Barry	
  Rabe	
  explains,	
  “they	
  regularly	
  gave	
   speeches	
   denouncing	
   ratification	
   as	
   a	
   huge	
   economic	
   threat	
   to	
   Canada	
   and	
   an	
   encroachment	
   upon	
   Constitutional	
   powers	
   over	
   natural	
   resources	
   that	
   belonged	
   to	
   provinces.”32	
   Moreover,	
   they	
   used	
   provincial	
   funds	
   to	
   launch	
   a	
   1.5	
   million	
   dollar	
   advertising	
   campaign	
   to	
   publicize	
   “Alberta’s”	
   opposition	
   to	
   the	
   Kyoto	
   Protocol.33	
   The	
   advertisements	
  explained	
  that	
  Kyoto	
  would	
  cost	
  jobs,	
  raise	
  taxes,	
  and	
  cause	
  a	
  doubling	
  of	
    	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   30	
  	
  The	
  Gov	
  Monitor,	
  "Governor	
  Rick	
  Perry	
  on	
  EPA	
  Denial	
  of	
  Texas	
  Clean	
  Air	
  Petition,"	
  The	
  Gov	
  Monitor:	
    August	
  2,	
  2010,	
  http://www.thegovmonitor.com/world_news/united_states/governor-­‐rick-­‐perry-­‐on-­‐epa-­‐ denial-­‐of-­‐texas-­‐clean-­‐air-­‐petition-­‐36365.html	
  (accessed	
  October	
  30,	
  2010).	
   31 Alastair Lucas, "The Alberta Energy Sector’s Voluntary Approach to Climate Change: Context, Prospects, and Limits," in Canadian Energy Policy and the Struggle for Sustainable Development (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 293-308.	
   32	
  	
  Barry	
  Rabe,	
  "Beyond	
  Kyoto:	
  Climate	
  Change	
  Policy	
  in	
  Multilevel	
  Governance	
  Systems,"	
  Governance:	
  An	
   International	
  Journal	
  of	
  Policy,	
  Administration,	
  and	
  Institutions	
  20,	
  no.	
  3	
  (2007),	
  438.	
   33 CBC News, "Alberta Launches Campaign Against Kyoto," CBC News: September 18, 2002, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2002/09/18/alberta_kyoto020918.html (accessed April 12, 2010).	
    	
   	
   18	
    electricity	
   prices.	
   These	
   actions	
   by	
   the	
   provincial	
   government	
   provide	
   clear	
   evidence	
   of	
   Alberta’s	
  official	
  opposition	
  to	
  policies	
  designed	
  to	
  mitigate	
  climate	
  change.	
   This	
   section	
   has	
   explained	
   some	
   of	
   the	
   main	
   variables	
   that	
   could	
   be	
   expected	
   to	
   affect	
   Texas	
   and	
   Alberta’s	
   choice	
   of	
   electricity	
   sources.	
   Due	
   to	
   similarities	
   between	
   the	
   jurisdictions,	
   we	
   can	
   rule	
   out	
   some	
   of	
   them:	
   wind	
   resources,	
   natural	
   gas	
   endowments,	
   attitudes	
   towards	
   climate	
   change	
   and	
   federal	
   legislation	
   to	
   curb	
   greenhouse	
   gas	
   emissions,	
   the	
  existing	
  energy	
  mix,	
  and	
  the	
  cost	
  of	
  generating	
  electricity	
  across	
  different	
  sources.	
  The	
   remaining	
   variables	
   may	
   explain	
   the	
   policy	
   divergence	
   between	
   Texas	
   and	
   Alberta:	
   coal	
   endowments,	
  and	
  electricity	
  trade	
  (or	
  degree	
  of	
  energy	
  independence).	
   	
    	
   	
   19	
    4.	
  Theoretical	
  approaches	
   A	
  number	
  of	
  theoretical	
  approaches	
  are	
  proposed	
  to	
  solve	
  the	
  first	
  of	
  the	
  thesis	
  questions:	
   why	
  did	
  Texas	
  and	
  Alberta	
  choose	
  different	
  policies	
  for	
  wind	
  power	
  development?	
    4.1. Initial hypotheses 	
   Before	
   discussing	
   the	
   most	
   plausible	
   hypotheses,	
   a	
   number	
   of	
   explanations	
   can	
   be	
   ruled	
  out.	
  First,	
  differences	
  in	
  wind	
  potential	
  between	
  Texas	
  and	
  Alberta	
  do	
  not	
  explain	
  the	
   divergence	
   in	
   wind	
   energy	
   growth.	
   As	
   mentioned	
   earlier,	
   both	
   jurisdictions	
   have	
   a	
   favorable	
   endowment	
   of	
   wind,	
   deemed	
   by	
   experts	
   as	
   an	
   adequate	
   resource	
   for	
   a	
   thriving	
   wind	
  energy	
  industry.	
   	
    Second,	
   voter’s	
   concerns	
   about	
   climate	
   change	
   do	
   not	
   explain	
   Texas’s	
   embrace	
   of	
    restrictive	
   policies	
   towards	
   the	
   development	
   of	
   renewables.	
   In	
   both	
   jurisdictions	
   opinion	
   polls	
  have	
  consistently	
  shown	
  that	
  the	
  local	
  population	
  is	
  skeptical	
  of	
  climate	
  change	
  and	
   climate	
  science.	
  In	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  Texas,	
  a	
  recent	
  poll	
  suggests	
  that	
  only	
  49%	
  of	
  the	
  Houston	
   population	
   believes	
   that	
   climate	
   change	
   is	
   caused	
   by	
   human	
   activities.34	
   In	
   the	
   case	
   of	
   Alberta,	
  less	
  than	
  40%	
  of	
  the	
  population	
  believes	
  that	
  climate	
  change	
  is	
  caused	
  by	
  human	
   activity.35	
  In	
  other	
  words,	
  the	
  support	
  for	
  wind	
  energy	
  policies	
  in	
  Texas	
  does	
  not	
  mean	
  that	
   Texans	
  are	
  more	
  concerned	
  with	
  the	
  environment	
  or	
  with	
  climate	
  change	
  than	
  Albertans.	
   Both	
   jurisdictions	
   remain	
   highly	
   skeptical	
   of	
   climate	
   change	
   and	
   are	
   strongly	
   against	
   compliance	
   with	
   the	
   Kyoto	
   Protocol.	
   Therefore,	
   there	
   is	
   little	
   evidence	
   that	
   the	
   policies	
    	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   34  Bill Dawson, "Texans' Views on Climate Change Aren't so Different, Polls show," Texas Climate NewsAugust 6, 2009, http://www.texasclimatenews.org/FeatureStories/8609Texansarentsodifferentonclimate/tabid/1124/ Default.aspx (accessed April 12, 2010).	
   35 Christina Spencer, "Planet in Peril: Poll," TorontoSun.Com: January 4, 2010, http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2010/01/04/12337176-sun.html (accessed April 12, 2010).	
    	
   	
   20	
    enacted	
   by	
   Texas	
   are	
   a	
   result	
   of	
   politicians	
   acting	
   to	
   please	
   voters’	
   concerns	
   about	
   greenhouse	
  gas	
  mitigation.	
  	
   Third,	
   governing	
   parties’	
   concerns	
   about	
   climate	
   change	
   also	
   do	
   not	
   explain	
   Texas’s	
   policies	
   on	
   renewables.	
   The	
   evidence	
   presented	
   earlier	
   shows	
   a	
   strong	
   aversion	
   by	
   leaders	
   in	
   both	
   jurisdictions	
   towards	
   climate	
   change	
   mitigation	
   measures.	
   The	
   leaders	
   in	
   both	
   jurisdictions	
  openly	
  opposed	
  federally	
  mandated	
  plans	
  to	
  comply	
  with	
  the	
  Kyoto	
  Protocol,	
   and	
   both	
   local	
   governments	
   have	
   taken	
   actions	
   to	
   oppose	
   federal	
   regulations	
   aimed	
   at	
   reducing	
  their	
  emissions.	
  For	
  the	
  purposes	
  of	
  this	
  thesis,	
  this	
  implies	
  similar	
  constraints	
  on	
   the	
   adoption	
   of	
   renewable	
   energy.	
   In	
   other	
   words,	
   there	
   is	
   no	
   indication	
   that	
   one	
   jurisdiction’s	
   position	
   towards	
   greenhouse	
   gas	
   mitigation	
   measures	
   could	
   be	
   an	
   advantage	
   to	
  its	
  promotion	
  of	
  renewable	
  energy.	
   	
    Fourth,	
   differences	
   in	
   legislative	
   institutions	
   do	
   not	
   explain	
   this	
   policy	
   divergence.	
    George	
  Tsebelis	
  argues	
  that	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  veto	
  players	
  in	
  different	
  political	
  systems	
  has	
  an	
   effect	
  on	
  policymaking:	
  systems	
  with	
  more	
  veto	
  players	
  are	
  less	
  likely	
  to	
  pass	
  controversial	
   legislation	
  than	
  systems	
  with	
  fewer	
  veto	
  players.36	
  In	
  this	
  sense,	
  one	
  could	
  argue	
  that	
  Texas	
   and	
  Alberta	
  have	
  a	
  different	
  number	
  of	
  veto	
  players,	
  giving	
  one	
  jurisdiction	
  an	
  advantage	
   over	
  the	
  other	
  with	
  respect	
  to	
  their	
  capacity	
  to	
  produce	
  policy	
  change.	
  Given	
  the	
  separation	
   of	
   powers	
   in	
   a	
   presidential	
   system,	
   one	
   could	
   hypothesize	
   that	
   new	
   renewable	
   energy	
   policies	
   would	
   face	
   more	
   veto	
   players	
   in	
   Texas	
   than	
   in	
   a	
   parliamentary	
   system	
   such	
   as	
   Alberta’s,	
  where	
  the	
  Premier	
  is	
  appointed	
  by	
  the	
  Legislative	
  Assembly	
  and	
  is	
  a	
  member	
  of	
   the	
  legislature.	
  In	
  theory,	
  this	
  would	
  make	
  it	
  easier	
  for	
  Alberta	
  to	
  adopt	
  new	
  policies.	
  This	
   hypothesis,	
  however,	
  is	
  irrelevant	
  because	
  the	
  opposite	
  scenario	
  occurred:	
  the	
  decision	
  to	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
    36	
  	
  George	
  Tsebelis,	
  "Decision	
  Making	
  in	
  Political	
  Systems:	
  Veto	
  Players	
  in	
  Presidentialism,	
  Parliamentarism,	
    Multicameralism	
  and	
  Multipartyism,"	
  British	
  Journal	
  of	
  Political	
  Science	
  25,	
  no.	
  3	
  (1995),	
  289-­‐235.	
    	
   	
   21	
    adopt	
   renewable	
   energy	
   policies	
   was	
   unanimous	
   in	
   Texas,	
   supported	
   by	
   both	
   the	
   governor	
   and	
   the	
   majority	
   of	
   the	
   state	
   legislature;	
   in	
   Alberta,	
   key	
   actors	
   agreed	
   not	
   to	
   pursue	
   restrictive	
  policies	
  to	
  promote	
  renewable	
  energy.	
  	
  In	
  other	
  words,	
  the	
  question	
  is	
  not	
  why	
   there	
  was	
  less	
  opposition	
  in	
  Texas,	
  but	
  rather,	
  why	
  did	
  Texas	
  leaders	
  want	
  policy	
  change	
  in	
   the	
  first	
  place.	
  	
    4.2. Policy legacies and path dependence Policy	
   legacies	
   serve	
   as	
   a	
   central	
   explanation	
   for	
   why	
   Texas	
   leaders	
   chose	
   to	
   suddenly	
   support	
   the	
   development	
   of	
   renewable	
   energy.	
   Specifically,	
   two	
   policy	
   legacies	
   are	
  most	
  important:	
  policies	
  to	
  promote	
  energy	
  independence,	
  and	
  reliance	
  on	
  local	
  fossil	
   fuels.	
  	
   As	
  the	
  data	
  section	
  showed,	
  both	
  jurisdictions	
  display	
  strong	
  energy	
  independence:	
   they	
   generate	
   most	
   of	
   their	
   electricity	
   in	
   local	
   power	
   plants,	
   and	
   thus	
   electricity	
   imports	
   represent	
   only	
   a	
   tiny	
   fraction	
   of	
   the	
   their	
   power	
   needs.	
   However,	
   there	
   is	
   an	
   important	
   difference:	
   in	
   the	
   case	
   of	
   Alberta,	
   all	
   of	
   the	
   fossil	
   fuel	
   sources	
   used	
   for	
   electricity	
   are	
   locally	
   extracted.	
   On	
   the	
   other	
   hand,	
   Texas	
   currently	
   imports	
   two	
   thirds	
   of	
   the	
   coal	
   it	
   uses	
   to	
   generate	
   power,	
   and	
   coal	
   energy	
   represents	
   a	
   large	
   portion	
   of	
   the	
   state’s	
   electricity	
   mix:	
   36.5%	
  of	
  electricity	
  generated	
  in	
  2010.37	
  In	
  other	
  words,	
  about	
  25%	
  of	
  Texas’s	
  electricity	
  is	
   produced	
  using	
  imported	
  coal.	
  Therefore,	
  Texas	
  was	
  not	
  nearly	
  as	
  energy	
  independent	
  as	
   Alberta	
  during	
  the	
  period	
  analyzed.	
  	
   This	
   lack	
   of	
   energy	
   independence	
   was	
   particularly	
   important	
   to	
   Texas	
   leaders	
   during	
   the	
   mid	
   1990s	
   for	
   one	
   reason:	
   the	
   Texas	
   electricity	
   grid	
   was	
   developed	
   separate	
   from	
   the	
   rest	
   of	
   the	
   country’s	
   grid,	
   following	
   a	
   long-­‐held	
   desire	
   for	
   energy	
   independence	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
    37	
  	
  U.S.	
  Energy	
  Information	
  Administration,	
  State	
  Energy	
  Profiles:	
  Texas	
    	
   	
   22	
    and	
  self-­‐reliance.	
  As	
  will	
  be	
  explained	
  later,	
  this	
  historical	
  energy	
  isolation	
  of	
  Texas	
  was	
  a	
   key	
   element	
   for	
   a	
   paradigm	
   shift	
   that	
   occurred	
   in	
   1992	
   when	
   the	
   state	
   became	
   a	
   net	
   importer	
   of	
   electricity.	
   In	
   other	
   words,	
   the	
   lack	
   of	
   important	
   electricity	
   interconnections	
   and	
  the	
  state’s	
  historical	
  energy	
  self-­‐sufficiency	
  prompted	
  a	
  sense	
  of	
  urgency	
  in	
  developing	
   alternative	
  sources	
  of	
  energy	
  when	
  it	
  became	
  evident	
  that	
  energy	
  imports	
  were	
  on	
  the	
  rise.	
   My	
  prediction	
  is	
  that	
  this	
  policy	
  legacy	
  of	
  energy	
  isolationism,	
  together	
  with	
  limited	
  local	
   coal	
   capacity,	
   facilitated	
   the	
   Texas	
   authorities’	
   decision	
   to	
   opt	
   for	
   restrictive	
   measures	
   to	
   promote	
   renewables	
   in	
   the	
   state.	
   When	
   officials	
   in	
   Texas	
   realized	
   that	
   coal	
   imports	
   were	
   rising	
   and	
   threatening	
   the	
   state’s	
   energy	
   self-­‐reliance,	
   integrating	
   renewable	
   sources	
   became	
  an	
  important	
  policy	
  alternative.	
  Thus,	
  the	
  incorporation	
  of	
  renewables	
  was	
  a	
  way	
   to	
  reinstate	
  the	
  state’s	
  energy	
  self-­‐reliance.	
  	
   In	
   this	
   sense,	
   the	
   rise	
   in	
   energy	
   demand	
   in	
   Texas,	
   which	
   suddenly	
   made	
   the	
   state	
   more	
  dependent	
  on	
  imported	
  coal,	
  was	
  a	
  critical	
  juncture	
  that	
  caused	
  a	
  mental	
  shift	
  away	
   from	
  the	
  established	
  energy	
  path.	
  Coupled	
  with	
  diminishing	
  reserves	
  of	
  natural	
  gas,	
  and	
  an	
   increasing	
  preoccupation	
  with	
  energy	
  security,	
  the	
  state’s	
  leaders	
  began	
  to	
  consider	
  other	
   paths	
  for	
  their	
  energy	
  development.	
  Developing	
  a	
  renewable	
  energy	
  industry	
  also	
  held	
  the	
   promise	
  of	
  creating	
  thousands	
  of	
  new	
  jobs	
  in	
  the	
  state,	
  whereas	
  continuing	
  to	
  import	
  coal	
   was	
  a	
  drain	
  to	
  the	
  local	
  economy.	
  This	
  became	
  a	
  powerful	
  reason	
  to	
  pursue	
  a	
  higher	
  degree	
   of	
   energy	
   independence.	
   Therefore,	
   the	
   Texas	
   Public	
   Utility	
   Commission,	
   together	
   with	
   state	
   legislators	
   and	
   the	
   governor,	
   opted	
   to	
   protect	
   the	
   state’s	
   energy	
   independence	
   and	
   enhance	
  the	
  local	
  economy	
  by	
  adopting	
  policies	
  that	
  promoted	
  a	
  more	
  diversified	
  energy	
   mix,	
  prompting	
  the	
  rise	
  of	
  wind	
  energy	
  in	
  the	
  state.	
  	
    	
   	
   23	
    4.3. Issue framing and strategic linkage 	
   	
    Issue	
   framing	
   is	
   at	
   the	
   centre	
   of	
   the	
   Texas	
   success	
   story	
   with	
   wind	
   energy.	
   When	
    developing	
   the	
   set	
   of	
   restrictive	
   policies	
   to	
   promote	
   renewables,	
   officials	
   at	
   the	
   Public	
   Utility	
  Commission	
  (PUC)	
  were	
  very	
  careful	
  not	
  to	
  speak	
  of	
  climate	
  change	
  or	
  greenhouse	
   gas	
  emissions	
  reductions	
  because	
  they	
  understood	
  the	
  climate	
  of	
  denial	
  that	
  existed	
  in	
  the	
   state.	
   Instead,	
   Texas	
   officials	
   presented	
   their	
   case	
   for	
   a	
   Renewables	
   Portfolio	
   Standard38	
   (RPS)	
   to	
   the	
   Governor	
   as	
   an	
   opportunity	
   for	
   diversification	
   of	
   the	
   energy	
   supply.	
   In	
   turn,	
   the	
   Governor	
   promoted	
   the	
   idea	
   to	
   the	
   legislature	
   as	
   an	
   opportunity	
   for	
   economic	
   development	
   and	
   for	
   ensuring	
   the	
   reliability,	
   stability,	
   and	
   self-­‐sufficiency	
   of	
   the	
   state’s	
   energy	
   sector.	
   As	
   an	
   official	
   at	
   the	
   PUC	
   explained,	
   “If	
   we	
   had	
   characterized	
   this	
   as	
   something	
   to	
   do	
   with	
   greenhouse	
   gases,	
   it	
   would	
   have	
   hurt	
   the	
   bill’s	
   chances.	
   So	
   we	
   didn’t.	
   The	
  fact	
  that	
  no	
  one	
  used	
  the	
  term	
  [climate	
  change]	
  to	
  argue	
  for	
  the	
  bill	
  shows	
  it	
  would	
  not	
   have	
  sold.”39	
  In	
  this	
  sense,	
  a	
  measure	
  that	
  has	
  a	
  large	
  potential	
  to	
  reduce	
  greenhouse	
  gas	
   emissions	
   in	
   the	
   state	
   by	
   developing	
   a	
   large	
   renewable	
   energy	
   capacity	
   was	
   negotiated	
   without	
  ever	
  mentioning	
  climate	
  change.	
   Another	
   closely	
   related	
   hypothesis	
   is	
   strategic	
   linkage.	
   When	
   the	
   Public	
   Utility	
   Commission	
   of	
   Texas	
   decided	
   to	
   promote	
   the	
   idea	
   of	
   a	
   Renewables	
   Portfolio	
   Standard	
   in	
   the	
   late	
   1990s,	
   they	
   did	
   not	
   present	
   it	
   as	
   a	
   stand-­‐alone	
   policy.	
   Instead,	
   the	
   RPS	
   was	
   introduced	
  as	
  one	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  electricity	
  restructuring	
  plan	
  that	
  the	
  state	
  began	
  to	
  discuss	
  in	
   1995.	
   In	
   other	
   words,	
   the	
   RPS	
   was	
   linked	
   to	
   wider	
   legislation	
   that	
   sought	
   to	
   change	
   the	
   electricity	
   landscape	
   in	
   Texas	
   by	
   allowing	
   competition	
   in	
   retail	
   electricity	
   markets	
   and	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   38	
  A	
  Renewables	
  Portfolio	
  Standard	
  (RPS)	
  is	
  a	
  regulation	
  that	
  promotes	
  renewable	
  energy	
  by	
  obligating	
    electricity	
  supply	
  companies	
  to	
  generate	
  a	
  certain	
  percentage	
  of	
  their	
  electricity	
  from	
  renewable	
  sources.	
   Details	
  of	
  the	
  Texas	
  RPS	
  will	
  be	
  explained	
  in	
  a	
  later	
  section.	
   39 Rabe, Statehouse and Greenhouse: The Emerging Politics of American Climate Change Policy, 60.	
    	
   	
   24	
    increased	
   consumer	
   choices.	
   I	
   argue	
   that	
   linking	
   the	
   RPS	
   to	
   wider	
   issues	
   of	
   market	
   competition	
   helped	
   to	
   appease	
   the	
   diverse	
   sectors	
   and	
   interest	
   groups	
   that	
   would	
   have	
   opposed	
   a	
   stand-­‐alone	
   mandate	
   on	
   renewable	
   energy	
   that	
   would	
   have	
   affected	
   their	
   interests.	
   	
    On	
   the	
   Alberta	
   side,	
   there	
   is	
   no	
   indication	
   that	
   the	
   issue	
   of	
   renewables	
   has	
   been	
    framed	
   as	
   an	
   opportunity	
   for	
   economic	
   development.	
   There	
   is	
   also	
   no	
   evidence	
   that	
   officials	
  or	
  policy	
  advocates	
  have	
  tried	
  to	
  push	
  for	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  restrictive	
  emissions	
   measures	
   by	
   framing	
   it	
   as	
   separated	
   from	
   climate	
   change.	
   Moreover,	
   due	
   to	
   Canada’s	
   ratification	
   of	
   the	
   Kyoto	
   Protocol	
   and	
   Ottawa’s	
   initial	
   intention	
   to	
   comply,	
   attempts	
   to	
   promote	
   and	
   develop	
   renewables	
   in	
   the	
   country	
   are	
   seen	
   as	
   tied	
   to	
   greenhouse	
   gas	
   reductions.	
   In	
   other	
   words,	
   the	
   ratification	
   of	
   the	
   Kyoto	
   Protocol	
   may	
   have	
   been	
   an	
   important	
  window-­‐shutting	
  event	
  for	
  renewable	
  energy	
  in	
  Alberta.	
  Given	
  that	
  the	
  province	
   strongly	
   opposed	
   Kyoto	
   and	
   any	
   measures	
   that	
   would	
   hurt	
   the	
   local	
   energy	
   economy,	
   renewable	
  energy	
  polices	
  that	
  were	
  perceived	
  as	
  tied	
  to	
  compliance	
  with	
  Kyoto	
  would	
  have	
   faced	
  enormous	
  opposition	
  in	
  the	
  provincial	
  legislature.	
  Therefore,	
  policy	
  framing	
  did	
  not	
   help	
   Alberta	
   to	
   adopt	
   any	
   measure	
   to	
   promote	
   renewable	
   energy.	
   I	
   argue	
   that	
   these	
   differences	
  in	
  the	
  way	
  Texas	
  and	
  Alberta	
  approached	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  renewables	
  gave	
   Texas	
   authorities	
   a	
   political	
   advantage	
   that	
   facilitated	
   the	
   implementation	
   of	
   restrictive	
   policies.	
  	
    4.4. Interest groups 	
   Lastly,	
   I	
   also	
   hypothesize	
   that	
   interest	
   group	
   politics	
   plays	
   a	
   significant	
   role	
   in	
   explaining	
  why	
  Texas	
  was	
  able	
  to	
  implement	
  strong	
  renewable	
  energy	
  policies	
  and	
  Alberta	
   was	
   not.	
   As	
   shown	
   by	
   the	
   data,	
   Texas	
   imports	
   a	
   large	
   portion	
   of	
   its	
   coal	
   from	
   Wyoming,	
   	
   	
   25	
    while	
  Alberta’s	
  coal	
  is	
  all	
  locally	
  mined.	
  Therefore,	
  a	
  policy	
  that	
  increases	
  renewables	
  (and	
   thus	
  displaces	
  existing	
  coal	
  energy	
  or	
  slows	
  the	
  expansion	
  of	
  new	
  coal	
  energy)	
  affects	
  the	
   local	
  coal	
  industry	
  less	
  in	
  Texas	
  than	
  in	
  Alberta,	
  which	
  translates	
  into	
  weaker	
  opposition	
  to	
   renewables	
   by	
   the	
   coal	
   industry.	
   Adding	
   to	
   this,	
   a	
   Texas	
   politician	
   facing	
   a	
   decision	
   of	
   whether	
   to	
   promote	
   the	
   creation	
   of	
   new	
   local	
   jobs	
   (via	
   renewables)	
   or	
   protect	
   imports	
   from	
   another	
   state	
   is	
   likely	
   to	
   choose	
   the	
   direct	
   political	
   benefits	
   of	
   creating	
   local	
   jobs.	
   Moreover,	
   a	
   politician	
   promoting	
   wind	
   energy	
   can	
   promise	
   not	
   only	
   local	
   jobs,	
   but	
   also	
   other	
   positive	
   externalities,	
   like	
   better	
   air	
   quality.	
   Thus,	
   I	
   propose	
   that	
   the	
   issue	
   of	
   imported	
   coal	
   in	
   Texas	
   facilitated	
   legislators’	
   choice	
   to	
   support	
   the	
   new	
   Texas	
   renewable	
   energy	
  policies.	
  	
   	
    In	
   the	
   case	
   of	
   Alberta,	
   the	
   economic	
   growth	
   of	
   the	
   province	
   is	
   largely	
   based	
   on	
   its	
    strong	
   fossil	
   fuel	
   extraction	
   industry.	
   All	
   of	
   the	
   coal	
   and	
   natural	
   gas	
   used	
   for	
   electricity	
   comes	
  from	
  underneath	
  the	
  province’s	
  soil,	
  and	
  most	
  electricity	
  comes	
  coal	
  and	
  natural	
  gas	
   power	
   plants.	
   Therefore,	
   this	
   strong	
   industry	
   sector	
   provides	
   economic	
   wealth	
   for	
   the	
   province,	
   and	
   thus	
   the	
   province	
   has	
   a	
   strong	
   reason	
   to	
   protect	
   it.	
   I	
   argue	
   that	
   Alberta	
   legislators	
   face	
   no	
   political	
   incentives	
   to	
   enact	
   restrictive	
   measures	
   that	
   would	
   pose	
   a	
   threat	
  to	
  these	
  industries.	
  	
   	
    	
   	
   26	
    	
   5.	
  	
  Evidence:	
  the	
  story	
  of	
  wind	
  energy	
  in	
  Texas	
  	
   	
   	
    This	
  section	
  focuses	
  on	
  the	
  historical	
  processes	
  that	
  enabled	
  the	
  adoption	
  of	
  policies	
    to	
  promote	
  wind	
  energy	
  in	
  Texas.	
  It	
  introduces	
  the	
  relevant	
  political	
  actors,	
  key	
  moments,	
   and	
  the	
  resulting	
  policies	
  that	
  support	
  the	
  previously	
  explained	
  hypotheses.	
    5.1. The Texas “wind rush”: historical background Historically,	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  Texas	
  has	
  embraced	
  energy	
  independence	
  by	
  developing	
  its	
   own	
  energy	
  sources	
  and	
  avoiding	
  reliance	
  on	
  other	
  states	
  or	
  the	
  federal	
  government	
  for	
  its	
   energy	
   needs.	
   Before	
   the	
   creation	
   of	
   the	
   Texas	
   Public	
   Utility	
   Commission	
   (PUC)	
   in	
   1975,	
   unregulated	
  state	
  electricity	
  generators	
  made	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  informal	
  agreements	
  to	
  maintain	
   energy	
  independence	
  from	
  other	
  states,	
  and	
  produce	
  electricity	
  only	
  for	
  Texas.40	
  Through	
   this	
   lack	
   of	
   government	
   regulation	
   “the	
   state	
   actively	
   encouraged	
   aggressive	
   energy	
   development	
  alongside	
  a	
  semiformal	
  separation	
  from	
  the	
  remainder	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  American	
   network	
  for	
  electricity	
  distribution.”41	
   	
    This	
   resulted	
   in	
   a	
   very	
   particular	
   geographical	
   separation	
   of	
   power	
   for	
   Texas:	
   the	
    North	
   American	
   electric	
   power	
   grid	
   is	
   divided	
   into	
   various	
   multi-­‐state	
   zones	
   (in	
   which	
   electricity	
   interconnections	
   happen	
   between	
   states	
   within	
   each	
   zone),	
   whereas	
   the	
   zone	
   that	
  operates	
  the	
  electricity	
  grid	
  for	
  Texas	
  adheres	
  mostly	
  to	
  the	
  Texas	
  state	
  boundaries.	
  In	
   other	
   words,	
   most	
   of	
   Texas’s	
   electricity	
   is	
   generated	
   by	
   utilities	
   that	
   sell	
   electricity	
   primarily	
  within	
  Texas	
  and	
  remain	
  disconnected	
  from	
  other	
  parts	
  of	
  the	
  US	
  power	
  grid.42	
  	
    	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   40 41 42  Ibid., 54	
   Ibid., 54	
   Ibid., 54	
    	
   	
   27	
    This	
   self-­‐imposed	
   energy	
   isolation,	
   although	
   fundamental	
   to	
   sustain	
   Texas’s	
   objective	
  of	
  energy	
  independence,	
  became	
  a	
  concern	
  in	
  the	
  late	
  1980s	
  as	
  growth	
  of	
  cities	
   caused	
   an	
   enormous	
   rise	
   in	
   energy	
   demand.	
   Furthermore,	
   by	
   1992	
   Texas	
   became	
   a	
   net	
   importer	
  of	
  energy	
  (mainly	
  coal	
  from	
  Wyoming),	
  consuming	
  twelve	
  percent	
  more	
  energy	
   than	
   it	
   was	
   able	
   to	
   produce	
   with	
   domestic	
   fuels.43	
   At	
   this	
   point,	
   the	
   Texas	
   energy	
   establishment	
  realized	
  that	
  exclusive	
  reliance	
  on	
  fossil	
  fuels	
  for	
  power	
  generation	
  was	
  no	
   longer	
  a	
  viable	
  policy	
  to	
  sustain	
  the	
  state’s	
  future	
  electricity	
  needs.	
  	
    5.2. Texas considers renewable energy The	
  year	
  1992	
  proved	
  pivotal	
  for	
  a	
  second	
  reason:	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  President	
  George	
  H.	
   W.	
  Bush’s	
  National	
  Energy	
  Strategy,	
  the	
  US	
  Congress	
  enacted	
  the	
  Energy	
  Policy	
  Act	
  of	
  1992,	
   calling	
   for	
   a	
   nationwide	
   restructuring	
   of	
   state	
   systems	
   in	
   charge	
   of	
   electricity	
   generation	
   and	
   delivery.	
   This	
   opened	
   up	
   the	
   possibility	
   of	
   new	
   competition	
   in	
   the	
   electricity	
   sector.	
   Specifically,	
   the	
   Energy	
   Policy	
   Act	
   of	
   1992	
   was	
   significant	
   as	
   a	
   promoter	
   of	
   renewable	
   energy	
   because	
   it	
   gave	
   states	
   the	
   ability	
   to	
   redesign	
   their	
   local	
   energy	
   markets,	
   allowing	
   them	
  to	
  integrate	
  and	
  promote	
  investments	
  in	
  renewable	
  alternatives	
  to	
  fossil	
  fuels.	
  	
   	
    More	
  importantly,	
  the	
  1992	
  Act	
  instituted	
  a	
  generous	
  inflation-­‐adjusted	
  Production	
    Tax	
   Credit	
   (PTC)	
   of	
   $0.017	
   per	
   kilowatt-­‐hour	
   to	
   generators	
   of	
   new	
   sources	
   of	
   renewable	
   energy.44	
  It	
  was	
  created	
  for	
  projects	
  initiated	
  between	
  1994	
  and	
  1999,	
  which	
  would	
  have	
   their	
   costs	
   subsidized	
   for	
   ten	
   years	
   after	
   startup.	
   In	
   other	
   words,	
   it	
   was	
   a	
   tax	
   credit	
   to	
   encourage	
  private	
  investment	
  in	
  renewable	
  energy	
  generation.	
  As	
  the	
  data	
  section	
  showed,	
    	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   43  44	
    Ibid., 56	
   Ibid., 9	
    	
   	
   28	
    the	
   amount	
   of	
   the	
   credit	
   made	
   the	
   cost	
   of	
   wind	
   projects	
   more	
   competitive	
   with	
   that	
   of	
   other	
  electricity	
  sources.45	
   	
    The	
   enactment	
   of	
   this	
   Act	
   coincided	
   with	
   the	
   first	
   year	
   in	
   which	
   Texas	
   became	
   a	
   net	
    importer	
   of	
   energy.	
   This	
   revelation	
   shook	
   the	
   Texas	
   energy	
   establishment:	
   it	
   served	
   as	
   a	
   critical	
   juncture	
   in	
   the	
   state’s	
   established	
   energy	
   path	
   by	
   challenging	
   the	
   traditional	
   assumption	
   that	
   Texas	
   had	
   enough	
   energy	
   sources	
   on	
   its	
   soil	
   to	
   remain	
   self-­‐sufficient.	
   In	
   other	
   words,	
   the	
   policy	
   legacy	
   of	
   energy	
   isolationism	
   suddenly	
   became	
   a	
   liability.	
   As	
   a	
   result,	
   the	
   Texas	
   Public	
   Utility	
   Commissioners	
   took	
   action	
   and	
   in	
   1995	
   announced	
   a	
   formal	
   review	
   of	
   the	
   Texas	
   electricity	
   sector,	
   requesting	
   public	
   involvement	
   in	
   the	
   process	
   and	
   launching	
   a	
   program	
   of	
   deliberative	
   polling46	
   to	
   gauge	
   public	
   opinion	
   on	
   different	
   energy	
   policies.	
   	
    This	
   process	
   of	
   deliberative	
   polling	
   proved	
   fundamental	
   to	
   the	
   result	
   of	
   the	
    Commission’s	
  restructuring	
  of	
  Texas	
  energy	
  policy.	
  Texas	
  utility	
  representatives	
  as	
  well	
  as	
   PUC	
  Commissioners	
  were	
  expecting	
  that	
  citizens	
  valued	
  low	
  prices	
  for	
  electricity	
  above	
  all	
   other	
  considerations.	
  However,	
  the	
  results	
  of	
  the	
  deliberative	
  polling	
  indicated	
  that	
  citizens	
   were	
   more	
   interested	
   in	
   reliability	
   and	
   stability	
   of	
   power	
   supply.	
   More	
   importantly,	
   citizens	
   showed	
   strong	
   support	
   for	
   avoiding	
   environmental	
   damage	
   during	
   electricity	
   generation,	
   and	
   were	
   highly	
   responsive	
   to	
   proposals	
   for	
   renewable	
   energy.47	
   Also,	
   the	
    	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   45	
  	
  Riti,	
  Three	
  Sheets	
  to	
  the	
  Wind:	
  An	
  Intersection	
  of	
  the	
  Renewable	
  Energy	
  Production	
  Tax	
  Credit,	
  Congressional	
    Political	
  Posturing,	
  and	
  an	
  Unsustainable	
  Energy	
  Policy,	
  793.	
   46 Contrary to traditional polling, where citizens are asked questions about a topic assuming they understand what is at stake, deliberative polling consists in gathering a diverse group of citizens for a number of days and educating them about a topic. After spending considerable time pondering about the issue and interacting with other participants, the subjects are asked to respond poll questions. 	
   47 R. L. Lehr, W. Guild and D. L. Thomas, Listening to Customers: How Deliberative Helped Build 1,000 MW of New Renewable Energy Projects in Texas (Golden, Colorado: National Renewable Energy Laboratory,[2003]).	
    	
   	
   29	
    results	
   showed	
   that	
   citizens	
   were	
   willing	
   to	
   pay	
   slightly	
   higher	
   rates	
   for	
   renewable	
   energy.48	
  	
    5.3. Renewable Portfolio Standard: a mandatory approach to renewables With	
   the	
   results	
   of	
   the	
   deliberative	
   polling	
   in	
   mind,	
   key	
   officials	
   in	
   the	
   Texas	
   PUC	
   began	
   a	
   series	
   of	
   negotiations	
   with	
   various	
   interests	
   (utility	
  companies,	
  citizen	
  groups,	
   and	
   environmental	
   organizations)	
   to	
   develop	
   a	
   viable	
   renewable	
   energy	
   strategy.	
   After	
   months	
   of	
   deliberations,	
   the	
   negotiators	
   decided	
   to	
   push	
   for	
   a	
   Renewables	
   Portfolio	
   Standards	
   (RPS)49,	
   strategically	
   linking	
   it	
   to	
   the	
   state’s	
   wider	
   push	
   towards	
   electricity	
   market	
   restructuring.	
   The	
   Texas	
   legislature	
   embraced	
   the	
   idea	
   of	
   the	
   RPS	
   in	
   part	
   because	
   of	
   the	
   political	
   incentives	
   given	
   by	
   the	
   deliberative	
   polling	
   results.	
   As	
   Hurlbut	
   explains,	
   “the	
   state's	
   political	
   leadership	
   recognized	
   the	
   relationship	
   between	
   renewable	
   power	
   and	
   a	
   customer's	
   right	
   to	
   choose,	
   to	
   the	
   point	
   that	
   making	
   the	
   RPS	
   part	
   of	
   restructuring	
   was	
   never	
  really	
  in	
  doubt.”50	
  Interestingly,	
  utility	
  companies	
  also	
  felt	
  compelled	
  to	
  satisfy	
  their	
   customers’	
   desires	
   for	
   a	
   larger	
   mix	
   of	
   renewable	
   energy	
   options.	
   In	
   the	
   words	
   of	
   an	
   energy	
   attorney,	
   “companies	
   began	
   to	
   integrate	
   customer	
   values	
   about	
   [renewable]	
   energy	
   choices”51	
  into	
  their	
  strategies,	
  and	
  this	
  influenced	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  utility	
  companies	
  in	
  the	
   legislative	
  debates	
  over	
  Texas	
  energy	
  restructuring.	
  	
   Also,	
  the	
  supporters	
  of	
  the	
  RPS	
  carefully	
  framed	
  it	
  not	
  as	
  an	
  environmental	
  policy,	
   but	
   as	
   an	
   opportunity	
   to	
   increase	
   market	
   competition	
   and	
   consumer	
   choices.	
   As	
   David	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   48	
  	
  David	
  Hurlbut,	
  "A	
  Look	
  Behind	
  the	
  Texas	
  Renewable	
  Portfolio	
  Standard:	
  A	
  Case	
  Study,"	
  Natural	
  Resources	
    Journal	
  48	
  (2008),	
  134.	
   49	
  As	
  previously	
  noted,	
  an	
  RPS	
  is	
  a	
  mandate	
  that	
  obliges	
  electric	
  utilities	
  to	
  produce	
  a	
  certain	
  portion	
  of	
  their	
   electricity	
  from	
  renewable	
  energy	
  sources.	
  	
   50	
  	
  Ibid.,	
  142	
   51 Lehr, Guild and Thomas, Listening to Customers: How Deliberative Polling Helped Build 1,000 MW of New Renewable Energy Projects in Texas, 9.	
    	
   	
   30	
    Hurlbut	
  explains,	
  “the	
  [Public	
  Utility	
  Commission	
  of	
  Texas]	
  implemented	
  the	
  RPS	
  with	
  the	
   intent	
  of	
  making	
  competition	
  the	
  engine	
  of	
  a	
  market	
  transformation	
  process	
  in	
  which	
  clean	
   technologies	
  could	
  grow	
  economically.”52	
  Therefore,	
  by	
  couching	
  the	
  goals	
  of	
  the	
  RPS	
  in	
  the	
   rhetoric	
  of	
  this	
  new	
  paradigm	
  of	
  electricity	
  restructuring,	
  the	
  proponents	
  of	
  the	
  policy	
  were	
   able	
  to	
  gain	
  legislative	
  momentum.	
   However,	
  this	
  policy	
  linkage	
  also	
  led	
  to	
  considerable	
  opposition:	
  consumer	
  groups	
   were	
   opposed	
   to	
   the	
   price	
   increases	
   that	
   come	
   with	
   restructuring,	
   while	
   municipally	
   owned	
   utilities	
   and	
   rural	
   electric	
   cooperatives	
   opposed	
   a	
   mandatory	
   renewables	
   requirement.	
   	
   To	
   solve	
   any	
   problems	
   arising	
   from	
   this	
   opposition,	
   the	
   legislators	
   had	
   to	
   make	
  a	
  political	
  compromise:	
  they	
  excluded	
  the	
  municipally	
  owned	
  utilities	
  and	
  the	
  rural	
   cooperatives	
   from	
   the	
   restructuring	
   bill,	
   exempting	
   them	
   from	
   the	
   obligation	
   to	
   comply	
   with	
  the	
  RPS	
  mandate.	
  	
   On	
   the	
   other	
   hand,	
   a	
   mixture	
   of	
   strong	
   public	
   support	
   for	
   renewables	
   plus	
   a	
   convergence	
  of	
  opinions	
  from	
  various	
  advocacy	
  groups	
  helped	
  to	
  overcome	
  any	
  pressures	
   against	
   the	
   RPS	
   from	
   other	
   interest	
   groups.	
   As	
   Langniss	
   and	
   Wiser	
   explain,	
   “helping	
   to	
   overcome	
   this	
   resistance	
   was	
   the	
   fact	
   that	
   the	
   RPS	
   was	
   only	
   a	
   small	
   part	
   of	
   the	
   overall	
   restructuring	
   legislation	
   […],	
   that	
   public	
   surveys	
   showed	
   overwhelming	
   support	
   for	
   renewable	
   energy”53	
   and	
   that	
   the	
   renewable	
   and	
   environmental	
   communities	
   argued	
   strongly	
   and	
   in	
   unison	
   for	
   the	
   RPS. Moreover,	
   Texas	
   lawmakers	
   at	
   this	
   point	
   agreed	
   that	
   energy	
  source	
  diversification	
  was	
  an	
  important	
  component	
  of	
  electricity	
  restructuring.	
  As	
   Terry	
  Hadley,	
  Communications	
  Director	
  for	
  the	
  Texas	
  Public	
  Utility	
  Commission,	
  explains,	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
    52	
  	
  Hurlbut,	
  A	
  Look	
  Behind	
  the	
  Texas	
  Renewable	
  Portfolio	
  Standard:	
  A	
  Case	
  Study,	
  129.	
   53  Ole Langniss and Ryan Wiser, "The Renewables Portfolio Standard in Texas: An Early Assessment," Energy Policy 31 (2003), 528.	
    	
   	
   31	
    When	
  the	
  electric	
  industry	
  was	
  restructured	
  in	
  Texas	
  in	
  the	
  late	
  90s	
  there	
  was	
  a	
  realization	
   by	
   lawmakers	
   […]	
   that	
   the	
   state	
   would	
   best	
   be	
   served	
   by	
   having	
   a	
   wide	
   variety	
   of	
   fuels	
   to	
   generate	
   electricity,	
   so	
   as	
   not	
   to	
   be	
   dependent	
   on	
   any	
   one	
   fuel	
   source,	
   both	
   for	
   reasons	
   of	
   reliability	
   and	
   potential	
   price	
   spikes.	
   So	
   as	
   part	
   of	
   the	
   overall	
   legislation	
   to	
   restructure	
   the	
   retail	
  electric	
  industry	
  and	
  open	
  it	
  up	
  to	
  competition,	
  a	
  significant	
  component	
  was	
  a	
  RPS.54	
  	
   	
    	
    Moreover,	
  Texas	
  Governor	
  George	
  W.	
  Bush	
  was	
  persuaded	
  to	
  move	
  away	
  from	
  his	
    preference	
  for	
  a	
  voluntary	
  renewables	
  program	
  and	
  instead	
  embraced	
  this	
  idea	
  of	
  binding	
   legislation	
  because	
  a	
  renewable	
  portfolio	
  standard	
  (RPS)	
  would	
  be	
  best	
  to	
  boost	
  both	
  his	
   environmental	
   and	
   economic	
   credentials.55	
   For	
   the	
   Governor	
   it	
   was	
   a	
   win-­‐win	
   situation	
   because	
  the	
  RPS	
  could	
  be	
  promoted	
  as	
  a	
  way	
  to	
  ensure	
  long-­‐term	
  electricity	
  stability,	
  while	
   responding	
  to	
  the	
  public’s	
  demonstrated	
  interest	
  in	
  cleaner	
  sources	
  of	
  energy.	
  When	
  asked	
   about	
  this,	
  Kenneth	
  Starcher,	
  Manager	
  at	
  the	
  Texas	
  Alternative	
  Energy	
  Institute,	
  said:	
  	
   [Bush]	
   was	
   unopposed	
   to	
   it	
   and	
   he	
   realized	
   that	
   it	
   was	
   good	
   potential	
   benefit	
   for	
   the	
   rural	
   communities.	
  We	
  never	
  expected	
  windmills	
  to	
  grow	
  in	
  Dallas,	
  or	
  the	
  major	
  cities,	
  they	
  were	
  always	
   going	
  to	
  grow	
  in	
  rural	
  areas.	
  […]	
  And	
  this	
  was	
  a	
  way	
  to	
  throw	
  benefit	
  to	
  these	
  communities.	
  It	
  was	
  a	
   good	
  political	
  decision	
  made	
  for	
  the	
  right	
  reasons.	
  56	
   	
    On	
  this	
  point,	
  Terry	
  Hadley	
  comments:	
  	
   His	
   support	
   was	
   crucial.	
   Perhaps	
   even	
   more	
   significant,	
   […]	
   when	
   the	
   legislation	
   passed	
   in	
   1999,	
   it	
   was	
   a	
   near	
   unanimous	
   approval	
   from	
   the	
   legislature.	
   That	
   crossed	
   not	
   only	
   party	
   lines,	
   but	
   geographic	
   lines,	
   really	
   statewide.	
   By	
   the	
   time	
   the	
   final	
   legislation	
   had	
   been	
   fashioned,	
  there	
  was	
  very	
  little	
  opposition	
  to	
  the	
  overall	
  legislation,	
  and	
  part	
  of	
  that	
  was	
  the	
   RPS.57	
   	
    Thus,	
  in	
  1999	
  the	
  Texas	
  Legislature	
  enacted	
  Senate	
  Bill	
  7	
  (Restructuring	
  of	
  Electric	
   Utility	
   Industry	
   Act),	
   which	
   forever	
   changed	
   the	
   electricity	
   landscape	
   of	
   Texas.	
   The	
   bill	
   included	
  two	
  landmark	
  provisions	
  to	
  promote	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  a	
  competitive	
  market	
  for	
   renewable	
   energy	
   in	
   Texas.	
   First,	
   the	
   bill	
   established	
   the	
   RPS:	
   utilities	
   were	
   required	
   to	
   generate	
  a	
  certain	
  percentage	
  of	
  their	
  electricity	
  from	
  renewables,	
  aiming	
  for	
  a	
  2000	
  MW	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   54	
  Telephone	
  interview	
   55  Rabe, Statehouse and Greenhouse: The Emerging Politics of American Climate Change Policy, 59.	
    56	
  Telephone	
  interview	
   57	
  Telephone	
  interview	
    	
   	
   32	
    target	
  by	
  2009	
  (which	
  translates	
  into	
  about	
  3%	
  of	
  Texas	
  electricity	
  capacity).58	
  Second,	
  the	
   act	
  established	
  a	
  Renewable	
  Energy	
  Certificates	
  Trading	
  Program	
  (REC),	
  which	
  established	
   a	
   market	
   mechanism	
   that	
   gave	
   utilities	
   great	
   flexibility	
   in	
   complying	
   with	
   the	
   3%	
   standard	
   by	
   allowing	
   them	
   to	
   buy	
   renewable	
   energy	
   credits	
   from	
   other	
   electricity	
   generators.	
   These	
   measures	
   helped	
   to	
   lower	
   the	
   compliance	
   costs	
   of	
   the	
   RPS,	
   rendering	
   it	
   a	
   cost-­‐effective	
   policy.	
  	
   The	
   RPS	
   started	
   in	
   January	
   2002	
   and	
   will	
   end	
   in	
   January	
   2020.	
   Interestingly,	
   it	
   attracted	
   so	
   much	
   interest	
   after	
   its	
   launch	
   in	
   1999,	
   that	
   by	
   2001	
   it	
   had	
   already	
   spurred	
   the	
   installation	
   of	
   915	
   MW	
   of	
   new	
   wind	
   energy.59	
   In	
   other	
   words,	
   a	
   year	
   before	
   the	
   requirement	
   started,	
   Texas	
   wind	
   generators	
   had	
   already	
   met	
   half	
   the	
   2009	
   requirement	
   (new	
  wind	
  projects	
  met	
  the	
  2005	
  requirement	
  4	
  years	
  early).	
  According	
  to	
  Fredric	
  Menz,	
   this	
   was	
   possible	
   thanks	
   to	
   excellent	
   wind	
   resources	
   in	
   West	
   Texas,	
   as	
   well	
   as	
   “key	
   provisions	
   in	
   the	
   RPS,	
   including	
   requirements	
   sufficiently	
   high	
   to	
   trigger	
   market	
   growth;	
   requirements	
   applicable	
   to	
   all	
   electricity	
   providers;	
   flexibility	
   mechanisms	
   [REC	
   trading],	
   and	
  substantial	
  penalties	
  for	
  non-­‐compliance.”60	
   Due	
   to	
   this	
   unanticipated	
   growth,	
   the	
   Texas	
   legislature	
   passed	
   Senate	
   Bill	
   20	
   in	
   2005,	
   expanding	
   the	
   RPS	
   to	
   5,880	
   MW	
   by	
   2015	
   and	
   10,000	
   MW	
   by	
   2025.	
   Today,	
   the	
   RPS	
   is	
   once	
   again	
   well	
   ahead	
   of	
   schedule,	
   with	
   most	
   new	
   renewable	
   energy	
   coming	
   from	
   wind	
   generators.	
   Future	
   projections	
   indicate	
   that	
   the	
   RPS	
   requirements	
   for	
   2025	
   will	
   be	
   achieved	
  next	
  year,	
  and	
  tripled	
  by	
  2020.	
  This	
  overshoot	
  indicates	
  that	
  wind	
  energy	
  grew	
  in	
    	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   58  Langniss and Wiser, The Renewables Portfolio Standard in Texas: An Early Assessment, 528.	
    59	
  	
  Ibid.,	
  529	
   60	
  	
  Fredric	
  C.	
  Menz	
  and	
  Stephan	
  Vachon,	
  “The	
  Effectiveness	
  of	
  Different	
  Policy	
  Regimes	
  for	
  Promoting	
  Wind	
    Power:	
  Experiences	
  from	
  the	
  States,"	
  Energy	
  Policy	
  34	
  (2006),	
  2406.	
    	
   	
   33	
    Texas	
  not	
  only	
  to	
  comply	
  with	
  a	
  mandate,	
  but	
  also	
  because	
  economic	
  incentives	
  made	
  wind	
   an	
  attractive	
  investment.	
  Section	
  VI	
  explains	
  this	
  further.	
  	
   	
    	
   	
   34	
    	
   6.	
  Evidence:	
  Alberta’s	
  road	
  to	
  wind	
  energy	
   	
    6.1. Brief history of electricity in Alberta Historically,	
  the	
  electricity	
  system	
  in	
  Alberta	
  developed	
  in	
  a	
  very	
  different	
  way	
  from	
   other	
   Canadian	
   provinces.	
   Instead	
   of	
   relying	
   on	
   a	
   single	
   Crown	
   corporation	
   with	
   a	
   monopoly	
   on	
   power	
   generation,	
   Alberta	
   electricity	
   developed	
   under	
   a	
   model	
   of	
   three	
   vertically	
   integrated	
   private	
   utilities	
   (TransAlta	
   Utilities,	
   ATCO	
   Electric,	
   and	
   EPCOR)	
   that	
   had	
   a	
   government	
   regulated	
   franchise	
   to	
   generate,	
   distribute,	
   and	
   sell	
   electricity	
   in	
   their	
   assigned	
   region.	
   Similar	
   to	
   the	
   case	
   of	
   Texas,	
   the	
   abundance	
   of	
   coal	
   and	
   natural	
   gas	
   resources	
  allowed	
  this	
  system	
  of	
  electricity	
  to	
  develop	
  in	
  a	
  way	
  that	
  ensured	
  self-­‐reliance	
   for	
  Alberta.	
  	
   	
    In	
   the	
   early	
   1990s,	
   provincial	
   authorities	
   began	
   discussing	
   the	
   possibility	
   of	
    allowing	
   more	
   competition	
   in	
   the	
   electricity	
   sector.	
   The	
   first	
   move	
   towards	
   restructuring	
   the	
   electricity	
   system	
   was	
   the	
   Electricity	
   Utilities	
   Act	
   of	
   1995	
   and	
   its	
   amendments	
   in	
   1998,	
   which	
  effectively	
  changed	
  the	
  way	
  that	
  the	
  power	
  sector	
  in	
  Alberta	
  works.	
  This	
  legislation	
   developed	
   a	
   competitive	
   market	
   for	
   electricity	
   in	
   the	
   province	
   by	
   creating	
   a	
   Power	
   Pool	
   system,	
   which	
   functions	
   as	
   a	
   spot	
   market	
   where	
   all	
   electricity	
   that	
   is	
   bought	
   and	
   sold	
   in	
   Alberta	
   is	
   exchanged.	
   In	
   order	
   to	
   participate	
   in	
   this	
   market	
   as	
   “pool	
   participants”,	
   electricity	
   generators	
   were	
   required	
   to	
   acquire	
   long-­‐term	
   contracts	
   called	
   Power	
   Purchase	
   Agreements	
   (PPAs),	
   (which	
   were	
   auctioned	
  in	
  2000	
  and	
  2001)	
  and	
  then	
  submit	
  bids	
  to	
   the	
   Power	
   Pool	
   to	
   supply	
   energy.61	
   In	
   other	
   words,	
   the	
   Electric	
   Utilities	
   Act	
   opened	
   the	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
    61	
  	
  Government	
  of	
  Alberta,	
  "Power	
  Pool	
  of	
  Alberta,"	
  http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$Department/deptdocs.nsf/	
    all/eng4394	
  (accessed	
  November	
  12,	
  2010)	
  	
    	
   	
   35	
    possibility	
  for	
  new	
  electricity	
  generators	
  (and	
  possibly	
  new	
  types	
  of	
  electricity)	
  to	
  enter	
  the	
   Alberta	
  market.	
  	
    6.2. A rocky road to renewables 	
   Despite	
   the	
   potential	
   opportunity	
   to	
   promote	
   new	
   sources	
   of	
   energy	
   during	
   the	
   restructuring	
   of	
   Alberta’s	
   electricity	
   sector,	
   neither	
   the	
   Electric	
   Utilities	
   Act	
   of	
   1995	
   nor	
   its	
   1998	
  amendments	
  contained	
  special	
  provisions	
  for	
  the	
  promotion	
  of	
  renewable	
  energy.	
  In	
   sharp	
   contrast	
   to	
   the	
   Texas	
   Senate	
   Bill	
   7	
   of	
   1999,	
   the	
   Alberta	
   legislation	
   did	
   not	
   establish	
   a	
   restrictive	
   measure	
   like	
   an	
   RPS,	
   nor	
   did	
   it	
   create	
   a	
   market	
   for	
   renewable	
   energy	
   credits.	
   Even	
   though	
   the	
   Power	
   Pool	
   system	
   was	
   intended	
   to	
   increase	
   competition	
   in	
   the	
   power	
   generation	
   sector,	
   and	
   allow	
   smaller,	
   independent	
   power	
   producers	
   to	
   enter	
   a	
   market	
   dominated	
   by	
   three	
   very	
   powerful	
   electric	
   companies,	
   these	
   reforms	
   did	
   not	
   establish	
   a	
   provincial	
  mandate	
  for	
  renewable	
  energy.	
   According	
   to	
   the	
   Pembina	
   Institute,	
   Alberta	
   does	
   not	
   have	
   a	
   renewables	
   mandate	
   because	
   the	
   provincial	
   government	
   has	
   not	
   committed	
   to	
   promoting	
   renewable	
   energy.	
   Although	
  Alberta	
  relies	
  on	
  market	
  forces	
  to	
  determine	
  what	
  generating	
  assets	
  are	
  built	
  and	
   when,	
  provincial	
  policy	
  and	
  government	
  decisions	
  can	
  still	
  influence	
  investment	
  decisions	
   (and	
  tacitly	
  preclude	
  renewable	
  energy	
  generation).	
  As	
  Pembina	
  explains,	
  	
   Ministry	
   decisions	
   can	
   also	
   affect	
   the	
   choice	
   of	
   technology	
   directly.	
   Examples	
   of	
   actions	
   previously	
   taken	
   by	
   Alberta	
   Energy	
   or	
   Alberta	
   Environment	
   include	
   mandating	
   a	
   cap	
   on	
   wind	
   power	
   development	
   (subsequently	
   rescinded),	
   allocating	
   $2	
   billion	
   of	
   public	
   funds	
   toward	
   CCS	
   [carbon	
   capture	
   and	
   storage]	
   (effectively	
   a	
   subsidy	
   to	
   fossil	
   fuels	
   such	
   as	
   coal)	
   and	
  assembling	
  an	
  expert	
  panel	
  to	
  look	
  at	
  nuclear	
  power.62	
  	
    In	
   other	
   words,	
   instead	
   of	
   promoting	
   renewables,	
   Alberta	
   has	
   singled	
   out	
   coal	
   as	
   its	
   preferred	
   technology	
   for	
   the	
   expansion	
   of	
   the	
   province’s	
   electricity	
   generating	
   capacity,	
   making	
  it	
  difficult	
  for	
  wind	
  energy	
  to	
  penetrate	
  the	
  electricity	
  market.	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
    62	
  	
  The	
  Pembina	
  Institute,	
  Greening	
  the	
  Grid:	
  Powering	
  Alberta's	
  Future	
  with	
  Renewable	
  Energy,	
  14.	
    	
   	
   36	
    	
    The	
   support	
   for	
   carbon	
   capture	
   and	
   storage	
   technologies	
   (CCS)	
   is	
   particularly	
    revealing.	
   In	
   2008,	
   Alberta	
   announced	
   a	
   $2	
   billion	
   CCS	
   fund	
   as	
   part	
   of	
   the	
   provincial	
   strategy	
   to	
   reduce	
   greenhouse	
   gas	
   emissions.	
   The	
   motivations	
   for	
   this	
   program	
   are	
   very	
   straightforward:	
  	
   Alberta	
   has	
   coal	
   reserves	
   with	
   twice	
   the	
   energy	
   content	
   of	
   even	
   its	
   vast	
   oil	
   sands	
   reserves.	
   Sustainable,	
   coal-­‐fired	
   electricity	
   generation	
   is	
   important	
   to	
   Alberta’s	
   continued	
   competitiveness	
   in	
   an	
   integrated	
   North	
   American	
   energy	
   market	
   –	
   but	
   without	
   CCS,	
   the	
   acceptability	
   of	
   power	
   from	
   coal	
   will	
   be	
   far	
   from	
   assured.	
   CCS	
   offers	
   the	
   potential	
   to	
   address	
   coal’s	
  carbon	
  footprint,	
  thus	
  enabling	
  its	
  use	
  in	
  a	
  carbon-­‐constrained	
  future.63	
  	
   	
    Moreover,	
  the	
  province	
  estimates	
  that	
  the	
  storing	
  of	
  CO2	
  will	
  have	
  the	
  additional	
  effect	
  of	
   increasing	
   oil	
   production	
   by	
   1.4	
   billion	
   barrels	
   from	
   conventional	
   reservoirs,	
   effectively	
   doubling	
  Alberta’s	
  conventional	
  oil	
  recovery.	
  	
   In	
   other	
   words,	
   Alberta	
   is	
   comfortable	
   about	
   its	
   energy	
   policy	
   legacies	
   and	
   recognizes	
   its	
   attachment	
   to	
   fossil	
   fuels.	
   The	
   province	
   is	
   set	
   on	
   continuing	
   along	
   its	
   path	
   dependence	
  of	
  pursuing	
  an	
  economy	
  based	
  largely	
  on	
  exploiting	
  its	
  vast	
  fossil	
  fuel	
  reserves.	
   Furthermore,	
   the	
   province	
   has	
   not	
   experience	
   a	
   critical	
   juncture	
   that	
   puts	
   into	
   question	
   these	
   policy	
   legacies	
   and	
   this	
   chosen	
   path	
   for	
   economic	
   development	
   and	
   electricity	
   generation.	
  	
    6.3. Made in Alberta: a voluntary approach to renewables Alberta	
   has	
   yet	
   to	
   enact	
   restrictive	
   legislation	
   promoting	
   the	
   development	
   of	
   renewables.	
   Nevertheless,	
   the	
   province	
   has	
   enacted	
   a	
   number	
   of	
   policy	
   measures	
   specifically	
   designed	
   to	
   promote	
   renewable	
   energy,	
   particularly	
   wind.	
   The	
   following	
   paragraphs	
  explain	
  the	
  context	
  of	
  these	
  measures.	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
    63	
  	
  Alberta	
  Carbon	
  Capture	
  and	
  Storage	
  Development	
  Council,	
  Accelerating	
  Carbon	
  Capture	
  and	
  Storage	
    Implementation	
  in	
  Alberta,	
  Final	
  Report,	
  2009,	
  http://www.energy.alberta.ca/Initiatives/1690.asp	
  (accessed	
   November	
  3,	
  2010).	
    	
   	
   37	
    	
    The	
   current	
   Alberta	
   energy	
   strategy	
   is	
   based	
   on	
   Bill	
   37,	
   the	
   Climate	
   Change	
   and	
    Emissions	
  Management	
  Act	
  of	
  2003,	
  which	
  entails	
  two	
  main	
  parts.	
  First,	
  the	
  bill	
  establishes	
   an	
   emissions	
   intensity	
   objective	
   for	
   GHG	
   reductions,	
   instead	
   of	
   an	
   absolute	
   reductions	
   objective.64	
   Second,	
   the	
   Alberta	
   strategy	
   establishes	
   a	
   framework	
   for	
   voluntary	
   emissions	
   reductions	
  measures,	
  which	
  includes	
  negotiations	
  with	
  various	
  industry	
  sectors	
  where	
  the	
   different	
   industries	
   can	
   choose	
   to	
   voluntarily	
   reduce	
   GHG	
   emissions.	
   This	
   voluntary	
   program	
  has	
  been	
  highly	
  criticized	
  by	
  environmentalists	
  for	
  its	
  lack	
  of	
  accountability	
  and	
   failure	
  to	
  solve	
  the	
  free-­‐rider	
  problem.65	
  Moreover,	
  in	
  2007	
  Alberta	
  implemented	
  the	
  first	
   cap	
  and	
  trade	
  regulation	
  in	
  Canada	
  with	
  its	
  “Specified	
  Gas	
  Emitters	
  Regulation,”	
  meant	
  to	
   reduce	
   the	
   carbon	
   intensity	
   of	
   large	
   polluters,	
   such	
   as	
   electric	
   utilities.	
   However,	
   the	
   methods	
  proposed	
  for	
  emissions	
  reductions	
  include	
  better	
  combustion	
  efficiency,	
  usage	
  of	
   cleaner	
   fossil	
   fuels,	
   and	
   technological	
   advances,	
   but	
   do	
   not	
   include	
   an	
   elaborate	
   plan	
   to	
   switch	
   to	
   renewable	
   energy.	
   In	
   other	
   words,	
   although	
   Alberta	
   has	
   a	
   plan	
   to	
   reduce	
   the	
   intensity	
  for	
  greenhouse	
  gases,	
  the	
  focus	
  of	
  this	
  plan	
  is	
  on	
  adapting	
  existing	
  polluters,	
  not	
   promoting	
  new	
  renewable	
  power	
  sources.66	
  	
   In	
  this	
  sense,	
  Alberta’s	
  approach	
  to	
  renewables	
  is	
  best	
  summarized	
  by	
  the	
  Provincial	
   Energy	
  Strategy	
  statement	
  currently	
  on	
  the	
  government’s	
  website:	
  	
   Should	
   Alberta	
   be	
   looking	
   at	
   alternative	
   energy	
   sources?	
   Yes.	
   Should	
   we	
   promote	
   renewables?	
   Again,	
   yes.	
   But	
  the	
   key	
   question	
   for	
   Alberta,	
   in	
   a	
   world	
   that	
   is	
   going	
   to	
   be	
   counting	
   on	
   energy	
   from	
   all	
   sources,	
   is	
   how	
   we	
   can	
   begin	
   to	
   produce	
   and	
   consume	
   fossil	
   fuels	
  in	
  a	
  far	
  cleaner	
  way."67	
  	
    	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   64	
  This	
  is	
  a	
  fundamental	
  difference,	
  because	
  an	
  emissions	
  intensity	
  objective	
  does	
  not	
  necessarily	
  translate	
    into	
  absolute	
  reductions.	
  For	
  instance,	
  if	
  the	
  GDP	
  grows	
  enormously,	
  emissions	
  can	
  continue	
  to	
  grow	
   substantially	
  while	
  still	
  meeting	
  the	
  target.	
   65 Lucas, The Alberta Energy Sector’s Voluntary Approach to Climate Change: Context, Prospects, and Limits, 300.	
   66	
  Government	
  of	
  Alberta,	
  “Greenhouse	
  Gas	
  Reduction	
  Program,”	
  http://environment.alberta.ca/01838.html	
   (accessed	
  February	
  14,	
  2011).	
   67 Government of Alberta, "Launching Alberta’s Energy Future, Provincial Energy Strategy," http://www.energy.alberta.ca/Initiatives/1509.asp#production (accessed January 10, 2011).	
    	
   	
   38	
    	
    This	
   revealing	
   statement	
   confirms	
   the	
   Pembina	
   Institute’s	
   opinion	
   and	
   helps	
   to	
   reaffirm	
   why	
   the	
   province	
   has	
   not	
   developed	
   any	
   mandatory	
   mechanisms	
   for	
   the	
   development	
   of	
   renewable	
   energy:	
   far	
   from	
   trying	
   to	
   implement	
   restrictive	
   legislation	
   to	
   reduce	
   GHG	
   emissions	
   via	
   alternative	
   sources	
   of	
   energy,	
   Alberta	
   prefers	
   a	
   strategy	
   of	
   “cleaning”	
   fossil	
   fuels,	
   instead	
   of	
   replacing	
   them	
   gradually	
   with	
   wind,	
   solar,	
   hydroelectric,	
   or	
   biomass	
   energy.	
   According	
   to	
   Alastair	
   Lucas,	
   a	
   main	
   reason	
   that	
   Alberta	
   adopted	
   this	
   voluntary	
   approach	
   to	
   renewables	
   is	
   that	
   “it	
   fits	
   comfortably	
   into	
   the	
   historic	
   Alberta	
   partnership	
   model	
   of	
   energy	
   sector	
   regulation,”68	
   where	
   the	
   interests	
   of	
   the	
   fossil	
   fuel	
   extraction	
   industries	
  have	
  dictated	
  policy	
  in	
  the	
  province.	
  	
   	
    Moreover,	
   when	
   asked	
   about	
   the	
   desirability	
   of	
   promoting	
   wind	
   energy	
   via	
   a	
    provincial	
   tax	
   incentive	
   or	
   a	
   subsidy,	
   Ronald	
   Liepert,	
   Alberta	
   Minister	
   of	
   Energy,	
   responded:	
  	
   We	
   have	
   in	
   Alberta,	
   whether	
   it’s	
   in	
   electricity	
   generation	
   or	
   whether	
   it’s	
   taxes,	
   we	
   have	
   a	
   very	
   entrepreneurial,	
   private	
   sector	
   way	
   of	
   approaching	
   things.	
   We	
   don’t	
   have	
   crown	
   corporations	
  like	
  other	
  provinces	
  do,	
  we	
  don’t	
  have	
  subsidies	
  or	
  feed	
  in	
  tariffs	
  to	
  the	
  same	
   extent	
   that	
   other	
   provinces	
   have.	
   We	
   believe	
   that	
   industry	
   has	
   to	
   stand	
   on	
   its	
   own.	
   So	
   we	
   have	
   not	
   gone	
   the	
   route	
   of	
   putting	
   in	
   things	
   like	
   a	
   feed	
   in	
   tariff	
   or	
   subsidy	
   programs.	
   Ontario	
   is	
  the	
  best	
  example	
  of	
  that	
  right	
  now	
  and	
  it	
  is	
  a	
  mess.	
  So	
  that’s	
  just	
  not	
  the	
  way	
  we	
  operate	
  in	
   Alberta.69	
   	
    Thus,	
   the	
   Alberta	
   government	
   displays	
   a	
   strong	
   aversion	
   to	
   measures	
   that	
   interfere	
   with	
   the	
   functioning	
   of	
   the	
   free	
   market.	
   Unless	
   of	
   course,	
   those	
   measures	
   help	
   to	
   bolster	
   new	
   technologies	
   that	
   benefit	
   the	
   fossil	
   fuel	
   sector,	
   like	
   the	
   province’s	
   enormous	
   financial	
   support	
  for	
  innovation	
  on	
  carbon	
  capture	
  and	
  storage.	
  	
   More	
   importantly,	
   although	
   government	
   support	
   through	
   financial	
   incentives	
   is	
   identified	
   in	
   the	
   literature	
   as	
   a	
   crucial	
   factor	
   in	
   the	
   growth	
   of	
   wind	
   energy	
   in	
   Texas	
   (and	
   in	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   68  Lucas, The Alberta Energy Sector’s Voluntary Approach to Climate Change: Context, Prospects, and Limits, 306.	
   69	
  Telephone	
  interview	
    	
   	
   39	
    wind	
   industries	
   worldwide),	
   the	
   Alberta	
   Minister	
   of	
   Energy	
   states	
   that	
   subsidies	
   are	
   not	
   important.	
   As	
   explained	
   above,	
   he	
   considers	
   federal	
   tax	
   incentives	
   an	
   ineffective	
   policy.	
   Moreover,	
  when	
  asked	
  whether	
  a	
  renewables	
  portfolio	
  standard	
  would	
  be	
  a	
  positive	
  policy	
   to	
   promote	
   wind	
   in	
   Alberta,	
   he	
   simply	
   answered:	
   “No,	
   I	
   just	
   haven’t	
   seen	
   where	
   it’s	
   [an	
   RPS]	
  worked	
  anywhere,	
  to	
  be	
  honest	
  with	
  you.”70	
  Given	
  the	
  vast	
  amount	
  of	
  literature	
  citing	
   the	
   positive	
   effects	
   of	
   an	
   RPS	
   for	
   wind	
   energy	
   development,	
   this	
   answer	
   seems	
   more	
   like	
   a	
   convenient	
  excuse	
  to	
  mask	
  the	
  Province’s	
  active	
  support	
  for	
  its	
  strong	
  fossil	
  fuel	
  industries.	
  	
   	
   	
   	
    	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   70	
  Telephone	
  interview	
    	
   	
   40	
    	
   7.	
  	
  Evidence:	
  performance	
  of	
  policy	
  instruments	
  	
    	
   This	
   section	
   addresses	
   the	
   second	
   research	
   question:	
   did	
   the	
   Texas	
   policies	
   result	
   in	
   a	
   larger	
  growth	
  in	
  wind	
  energy	
  capacity?	
    7.1. Federal policies 	
   The	
  most	
  notable	
  federal	
  policy	
  influencing	
  wind	
  energy	
  development	
  in	
  Texas	
  was	
   the	
   Production	
   Tax	
   Credit	
   (PTC)	
   established	
   in	
   1992.	
   The	
   initial	
   validity	
   period	
   for	
   the	
   credits	
  was	
  from	
  1994	
  to	
  1999.	
  Due	
  to	
  the	
  program’s	
  nationwide	
  effectiveness,	
  the	
  PTC	
  has	
   been	
  extended	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  times	
  until	
  present	
  day.	
  However,	
  these	
  have	
  been	
  short-­‐term	
   extensions,	
   lasting	
   either	
   one	
   or	
   two	
   years,	
   creating	
   a	
   climate	
   of	
   uncertainty	
   amongst	
   wind	
   investors.71	
  Moreover,	
  on	
  three	
  occasions,	
  the	
  extension	
  came	
  after	
  the	
  credit	
  had	
  expired,	
   causing	
  a	
  lapse	
  period	
  where	
  the	
  credits	
  were	
  unavailable.	
  These	
  lapse	
  periods	
  happened	
   in	
  2000,	
  2002,	
  and	
  2004.	
  (See	
  Table	
  3	
  in	
  Appendix	
  for	
  a	
  legislative	
  history	
  of	
  the	
  PTC)	
  	
   Perhaps	
  the	
  best	
  way	
  to	
  assess	
  the	
  effectiveness	
  of	
  the	
  Production	
  Tax	
  Credit	
  is	
  by	
   comparing	
   the	
   growth	
   of	
   wind	
   energy	
   in	
   the	
   years	
   when	
   the	
   PTC	
   was	
   active	
   to	
   the	
   years	
   in	
   which	
  it	
  lapsed.	
  As	
  Bird	
  et	
  al.	
  explain,	
  	
   The	
   impact	
   of	
   the	
   tax	
   credit	
   on	
   the	
   [US]	
   wind	
   energy	
   industry	
   is	
   evident	
   in	
   the	
   boom-­‐bust	
   cycle	
  of	
  development	
  in	
  recent	
  years.	
  Wind	
  energy	
  installations	
  have	
  peaked	
  in	
  years	
  when	
   the	
   credit	
   was	
   scheduled	
   to	
   expire	
   (i.e.,	
   1999,	
   2001,	
   and	
   2003)	
   as	
   developers	
   rushed	
   to	
   complete	
  projects	
  in	
  time	
  to	
  take	
  advantage	
  of	
  the	
  credit.	
  In	
  the	
  off	
  years,	
  development	
  has	
   lagged	
  because	
  of	
  the	
  uncertainty	
  surrounding	
  the	
  Production	
  Tax	
  Credit	
  extension	
  and	
  the	
   lead-­‐time	
  necessary	
  to	
  plan	
  and	
  complete	
  projects.72	
   	
    The	
   following	
   figure	
   illustrates	
   this	
   boom	
   and	
   bust	
   cycle	
   of	
   wind	
   energy	
   development	
   in	
   Texas,	
  caused	
  by	
  the	
  three	
  lapse	
  periods	
  of	
  the	
  PTC:	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   71	
  	
  Ryan	
  Wiser,	
  Mark	
  Bolinger	
  and	
  Galen	
  Barbose,	
  "Using	
  the	
  Federal	
  Production	
  Tax	
  Credit	
  to	
  Build	
  a	
  Durable	
    Market	
  for	
  Wind	
  Power	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  States,"	
  The	
  Electricity	
  Journal	
  20,	
  no.	
  9	
  (2007),	
  80.	
   72	
  	
  Lori	
  Bird	
  and	
  others,	
  “Policies	
  and	
  Market	
  Factors	
  Driving	
  Wind	
  Power	
  Development	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  States,"	
   Energy	
  Policy	
  33	
  (2005),	
  1398.	
    	
   	
   41	
    Figure 9. Wind capacity additions: Texas73  	
    Consistent	
   with	
   the	
   above	
   quote,	
   the	
   previous	
   figure	
   shows	
   no	
   growth	
   in	
   wind	
   capacity	
   on	
   the	
   years	
   that	
   the	
   PTC	
   expired:	
   2000,	
   2002,	
   and	
   2004.	
   After	
   this,	
   the	
   Energy	
   Policy	
   Act	
   of	
   2005	
   extended	
   the	
   PTC	
   for	
   two	
   years,	
   which	
   caused	
   a	
   steady	
   growth	
   in	
   2005-­‐ 2006.	
   Then,	
   in	
   mid	
   2006,	
   the	
   PTC	
   was	
   extended	
   until	
   the	
   end	
   of	
   2008,	
   which	
   caused	
   the	
   enormous	
   growth	
   of	
   wind	
   capacity	
   in	
   2007	
   and	
   2008.	
   This	
   is	
   consistent	
   with	
   Bird’s	
   explanation	
   that	
   developers	
   rushed	
   to	
   complete	
   wind	
   projects	
   before	
   the	
   credits	
   expire.	
   Or	
   as	
   Wiser	
   et	
   al.	
   explain,	
   “due	
   to	
   the	
   series	
   of	
   one-­‐	
   to	
   two-­‐	
   year	
   PTC	
   extensions,	
   growing	
   demand	
   for	
   wind	
   power	
   has	
   been	
   compressed	
   into	
   tight	
   and	
   frenzied	
   windows	
   of	
   development.”74	
  	
   In	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  Canada,	
  the	
  most	
  important	
  federal	
  policy	
  has	
  been	
  the	
  Wind	
  Power	
   Production	
  Initiative	
  (WPPI)	
  of	
  2002.	
  This	
  production	
  tax	
  credit	
  offers	
  a	
  financial	
  incentive	
   of	
  1	
  cent	
  per	
  kWh	
  to	
  certain	
  types	
  of	
  wind	
  turbines,	
  for	
  the	
  first	
  ten	
  years	
  of	
  operation.	
  The	
   first	
  phase	
  of	
  the	
  WPPI	
  was	
  intended	
  for	
  wind	
  projects	
  started	
  between	
  2002	
  and	
  2007,	
  but	
   it	
   was	
   suspended	
   in	
   2006	
   when	
   the	
   Harper	
   administration	
   came	
   into	
   power.	
   Then,	
   the	
   program	
  was	
  renewed	
  in	
  April	
  of	
  2007	
  as	
  the	
  ecoEnergy	
  Renewable	
  Power	
  Program,	
  with	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
    73	
  	
  U.S.	
  Energy	
  Information	
  Administration,	
  State	
  Energy	
  Profiles:	
  Texas	
   74	
  	
  Wiser,	
  Bolinger	
  and	
  Barbose,	
  Using	
  the	
  Federal	
  Production	
  Tax	
  Credit	
  to	
  Build	
  a	
  Durable	
  Market	
  for	
  Wind	
    Power	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  80.	
    	
   	
   42	
    an	
   identical	
   tax	
   credit	
   of	
   1	
   cent	
   per	
   kWh.	
   This	
   amounts	
   to	
   half	
   the	
   size	
   of	
   the	
   incentive	
   offered	
   by	
   the	
   American	
   PTC	
   which,	
   adjusted	
   for	
   inflation,	
   was	
   2	
   cents	
   per	
   kWh	
   in	
   2007.	
   Despite	
  this	
  difference,	
  however,	
  Alberta’s	
  wind	
  energy	
  capacity	
  grew	
  the	
  most	
  during	
  the	
   period	
  that	
  the	
  WPPI	
  was	
  active:	
   	
   Figure 10. Wind energy in Alberta: 1997-201075  	
   As	
  the	
  graph	
  shows,	
  wind	
  capacity	
  growth	
  took	
  off	
  in	
  2001	
  and	
  halted	
  abruptly	
  in	
   2007	
   when	
   the	
   WPPI	
   was	
   cut.	
   However,	
   growth	
   resumed	
   after	
   2007,	
   when	
   the	
   Harper	
   administration	
  renewed	
  the	
  program.	
  Judging	
  by	
  this	
  data,	
  it	
  seems	
  that	
  the	
  growth	
  in	
  wind	
   energy	
   in	
   Alberta	
   coincides	
   with	
   the	
   period	
   in	
   which	
   this	
   incentive	
   was	
   active.	
   When	
   asked	
   whether	
  this	
  incentive	
  helped	
  to	
  promote	
  wind	
  energy	
  development	
  in	
  Alberta,	
  Tom	
  Levy	
   of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Wind	
  Energy	
  Association	
  replied:	
  	
   Yes,	
  most	
  definitely.	
  Eco	
  Energy	
  was	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  most	
  successful	
  incentive	
  programs	
  the	
  federal	
   government	
   has	
   ever	
   put	
   out	
   for	
   wind	
   energy	
   […]	
   I	
   would	
   expect	
   with	
   the	
   absence	
   of	
   a	
   federal	
   policy	
  in	
  incentives	
  that	
  there	
  will	
  be	
  some	
  regions	
  in	
  Canada	
  that	
  might	
  have	
  reduced	
  wind	
   build-­‐out	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  a	
  lack	
  of	
  incentives.76	
   	
    Therefore,	
  the	
  evidence	
  suggests	
  that	
  the	
  WPPI	
  was	
  at	
  least	
  partially	
  responsible	
  for	
   growth	
  in	
  wind	
  energy	
  in	
  Alberta.	
  	
   	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   75	
  	
  Government	
  of	
  Alberta,	
  Electricity	
  Statistics	
   76	
  Telephone	
  interview.	
    	
   	
   43	
    7.2. State/Provincial policies 	
   Given	
   the	
   previous	
   evidence	
   of	
   the	
   success	
   of	
   federal	
   policies	
   in	
   spurring	
   wind	
   energy	
   growth,	
  was	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  state	
  policies	
  still	
  important?	
  In	
  other	
  words,	
  the	
  carrot	
  seems	
  to	
   have	
  worked,	
  so	
  was	
  there	
  really	
  a	
  need	
  for	
  a	
  stick	
  (RPS)	
  in	
  Texas?	
   	
    The	
  first	
  thing	
  to	
  note	
  is	
  that	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  growth	
  in	
  wind	
  energy	
  in	
  Texas	
  during	
    the	
  initial	
  period	
  for	
  the	
  PTC,	
  from	
  1994	
  to	
  1999.	
  Wind	
  energy	
  growth	
  in	
  Texas	
  began	
  in	
   2001,	
  a	
  year	
  before	
  the	
  RPS	
  requirements	
  came	
  into	
  place.	
  In	
  other	
  words,	
  in	
  the	
  absence	
  of	
   the	
   RPS,	
   the	
   federal	
   credits	
   did	
   not	
   cause	
   wind	
   energy	
   investments	
   in	
   Texas	
   for	
   nearly	
   seven	
   years.	
   It	
   was	
   only	
   after	
   the	
   RPS	
   was	
   implemented	
   and	
   the	
   mandate	
   on	
   renewables	
   became	
  a	
  pressing	
  reality	
  that	
  investors	
  took	
  advantage	
  of	
  the	
  federal	
  credits.	
  Once	
  the	
  RPS	
   began	
  obliging	
  utilities	
  to	
  build	
  renewable	
  energy	
  capacity,	
  wind	
  energy	
  began	
  to	
  grow	
  in	
   Texas,	
   only	
   interrupted	
   by	
   the	
   lapse	
   periods	
   of	
   the	
   federal	
   credits.	
   However,	
   once	
   the	
   growth	
   of	
   wind	
   energy	
   got	
   under	
   way,	
   the	
   industry	
   surpassed	
   every	
   RPS	
   target.	
   Therefore,	
   investors’	
   interest	
   in	
   wind	
   farms	
   goes	
   beyond	
   the	
   amounts	
   set	
   by	
   the	
   renewable	
   energy	
   mandates.	
  This	
  means	
  that,	
  although	
  the	
  RPS	
  enabled	
  the	
  initial	
  growth	
  of	
  wind	
  energy,	
  the	
   fiscal	
   incentives	
   provided	
   by	
   the	
   PTC	
   appear	
   to	
   be	
   driving	
   this	
   growth.	
   The	
   following	
   section	
  elaborates	
  on	
  this	
  dual	
  responsibility.	
   In	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  Alberta,	
  the	
  province	
  has	
  not	
  developed	
  a	
  provincial	
  strategy	
  for	
  wind	
   energy	
   that	
   includes	
   restrictive	
   measures	
   or	
   renewable	
   energy	
   mandates.	
   	
   Therefore,	
   the	
   growth	
  in	
  wind	
  energy	
  explained	
  earlier	
  cannot	
  be	
  attributed	
  to	
  provincial	
  policies.	
  	
    7.3. Discussion and comparison 	
   As	
  explained	
  above,	
  the	
  growth	
  of	
  wind	
  energy	
  in	
  Texas	
  happened	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  both	
  the	
   Renewables	
  Portfolio	
  Standard	
  and	
  the	
  federal	
  Production	
  Tax.	
  A	
  combination	
  of	
  the	
  stick	
   	
   	
   44	
    provided	
  by	
  the	
  RPS	
  and	
  the	
  carrot	
  provided	
  by	
  the	
  PTC	
  has	
  driven	
  the	
  “wind	
  rush”.	
  This	
  is	
   consistent	
  with	
  the	
  literature	
  on	
  the	
  Texas	
  wind	
  story.	
  According	
  to	
  Langniss	
  and	
  Wiser,	
   This	
   wind	
   power	
   boom	
   is	
   not	
   solely	
   an	
   outgrowth	
   of	
   an	
   effective	
   RPS	
   policy.	
   A	
   developing	
   customer-­‐driven	
  market	
  for	
  green	
  power	
  and	
  the	
  wind	
  power	
  plans	
  of	
  electricity	
  utilities	
  not	
   subject	
   to	
   RPS	
   requirements	
   have	
   also	
   driven	
   some	
   of	
   the	
   development.	
   The	
   federal	
   PTC	
   for	
   wind,	
   favorable	
   transmission	
   rules,	
   and	
   an	
   outstanding	
   wind	
   resource	
   have	
   additionally	
   played	
  important	
  roles.77	
  	
   	
    Moreover,	
   they	
   argue	
   that	
   size	
   of	
   the	
   RPS	
   enables	
   economies	
   of	
   scale	
   for	
   wind	
   projects,	
   which	
   results	
   in	
   deep	
   cost	
   reductions.	
   Then,	
   the	
   PTC	
   allows	
   wind	
   projects	
   in	
   Texas	
   to	
   deliver	
   power	
   for	
   less	
   than	
   3	
   cents	
   (US)	
   per	
   kWh,	
   making	
   them	
   competitive	
   with	
   new	
   natural	
  gas	
  power	
  plants.	
  	
   	
    Similarly,	
  Kenneth	
  Starcher	
  argues	
  that	
  although	
  the	
  RPS	
  is	
  important	
  to	
  initiate	
  the	
    interest	
  in	
  wind	
  energy,	
  real	
  growth	
  in	
  wind	
  energy	
  only	
  happens	
  with	
  the	
  PTC.	
  He	
  uses	
  a	
   winter	
  Olympics	
  analogy	
  to	
  explain,	
  	
   The	
  RPS	
  in	
  Texas	
  was	
  a	
  definite	
  bobsled	
  push,	
  but	
  without	
  the	
  smooth	
  support	
  of	
  the	
  complete	
   track	
  laid	
  out	
  by	
  the	
  federal	
  support	
  to	
  wind	
  energy,	
  the	
  PTC,	
  when	
  they	
  turn	
  that	
  switch	
  off,	
   the	
  industry	
  dies.	
  And	
  that	
  is	
  why	
  no	
  growth	
  2000,	
  no	
  growth	
  2002,	
  little	
  growth	
  03.	
  For	
  five	
   years	
   we’ve	
   had	
   continuous	
   growth,	
   no	
   switch-­‐off	
   (of	
   the	
   PTC).	
   Without	
   federal	
   support,	
   nothing	
   happens	
   at	
   the	
   state	
   level	
   […]	
   Every	
   other	
   federal	
   mandate	
   that	
   gives	
   you	
   an	
   exact	
   target	
  to	
  reach,	
  how	
  often	
  has	
  it	
  been	
  that	
  you	
  have	
  to	
  drag	
  industry,	
  or	
  drag	
  a	
  corporation	
  into	
   compliance?	
   ‘Meet	
   this	
   target	
   or	
   I’ll	
   charge	
   you	
   more	
   penalties´.	
   And	
   this	
   one,	
   we’re	
   3	
   times	
   bigger	
  than	
  what	
  we	
  need	
  to	
  be,	
  10	
  years	
  ahead	
  of	
  schedule.	
  I	
  didn’t	
  do	
  that	
  with	
  a	
  stick.	
  It	
  was	
   the	
   carrot.	
   Again,	
   the	
   bobsled:	
   a	
   little	
   push	
   [RPS],	
   and	
   then	
   everything	
   else	
   took	
   its	
   course	
   [PTC].78	
   	
    In	
   a	
   similar	
   way,	
   Langniss	
   and	
   Wiser	
   explain	
   that	
   the	
   PTC	
   was	
   effective	
   for	
   Texas	
   wind	
   development	
   because	
   it	
   significantly	
   reduced	
   compliance	
   costs	
   with	
   the	
   RPS.79	
   Thus,	
   the	
   RPS	
  provided	
  the	
  initial	
  reason	
  to	
  invest	
  in	
  wind,	
  and	
  then	
  the	
  PTC	
  facilitated	
  the	
  flood	
  of	
   investments.	
   In	
   turn,	
   this	
   flood	
   of	
   investments	
   helps	
   to	
   explain	
   why	
   the	
   RPS	
   targets	
   have	
   been	
  surpassed	
  every	
  time.	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
    77	
  	
  Langniss	
  and	
  Wiser,	
  The	
  Renewables	
  Portfolio	
  Standard	
  in	
  Texas:	
  An	
  Early	
  Assessment,	
  534.	
   78	
  Telephone	
  interview	
   79	
  	
  Ibid.,	
  533	
    	
   	
   45	
    On	
   the	
   other	
   hand,	
   Alberta	
   did	
   not	
   employ	
   a	
   stick	
   to	
   drive	
   the	
   expansion	
   of	
   its	
   wind	
   energy	
  capacity.	
  Instead,	
  the	
  province	
  has	
  experienced	
  a	
  moderate	
  yet	
  steady	
  growth	
  that	
   coincides	
   with	
   the	
   implementation	
   of	
   a	
   carrot	
   mechanism,	
   the	
   WPPI.	
   This	
   moderate	
   growth,	
   however,	
   does	
   not	
   compare	
   with	
   the	
   steep	
   growth	
   displayed	
   by	
   the	
   Texas	
   wind	
   energy	
   industry,	
   especially	
   after	
   2007	
   (figure	
   1).	
   Prior	
   to	
   this	
   year,	
   the	
   per	
   capita	
   data	
   shows	
  that	
  Alberta’s	
  wind	
  energy	
  grew	
  parallel	
  to	
  Texas’s	
  until	
  2007	
  (figure	
  3),	
  and	
  for	
  the	
   period	
  2000-­‐2006,	
  Alberta’s	
  wind	
  capacity	
  as	
  a	
  percentage	
  of	
  total	
  capacity	
  was	
  larger	
  than	
   that	
  of	
  Texas	
  (figure	
  2).	
  	
  In	
  other	
  words,	
  it	
  is	
  only	
  after	
  Texas’s	
  giant	
  leaps	
  during	
  2007	
  and	
   2008	
   that	
   the	
   difference	
   in	
   wind	
   energy	
   capacity	
   between	
   these	
   jurisdictions	
   is	
   truly	
   significant.	
   Therefore,	
   if	
   we	
   consider	
   the	
   steep	
   growth	
   of	
   2007-­‐2008	
   the	
   crown	
   achievement	
  of	
  a	
  successful	
  combination	
  of	
  policies	
  in	
  Texas,	
  then	
  it	
  is	
  clear	
  that	
  employing	
   a	
   renewable	
   mandate	
   together	
   with	
   a	
   strong	
   fiscal	
   incentive	
   was	
   more	
   effective	
   than	
   Alberta’s	
  relatively	
  weak	
  fiscal	
  incentive	
  and	
  no	
  mandates.	
  	
    	
    	
    	
   	
   46	
    	
   8.	
  Conclusion	
   	
   	
    This	
  thesis	
  explored	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  wind	
  energy	
  in	
  Texas	
  and	
  Alberta.	
  It	
  asked	
    the	
  question	
  of	
  why	
  two	
  similar	
  jurisdictions	
  chose	
  very	
  different	
  policies	
  to	
  promote	
  the	
   expansion	
  of	
  their	
  wind	
  energy	
  capacity.	
  It	
  also	
  asked	
  whether	
  those	
  policy	
  choices	
  led	
  to	
  a	
   divergence	
  in	
  wind	
  energy	
  growth.	
   	
    On	
   the	
   first	
   question,	
   this	
   study	
   found	
   that	
   policy	
   legacies	
   played	
   a	
   major	
   role	
   in	
    Texas’s	
   decision	
   to	
   implement	
   a	
   renewable	
   energy	
   mandate.	
   Texas	
   had	
   a	
   longstanding	
   policy	
   commitment	
   to	
   energy	
   independence,	
   reflected	
   in	
   the	
   state’s	
   historical	
   choice	
   to	
   develop	
   a	
   separate	
   electricity	
   grid.	
   However,	
   the	
   state’s	
   energy	
   self-­‐sufficiency	
   came	
   under	
   threat	
  in	
  the	
  mid	
  1990s:	
  a	
  growing	
  dependence	
  on	
  imported	
  coal	
  in	
  response	
  to	
  a	
  rise	
  in	
   energy	
   consumption	
   created	
   a	
   critical	
   juncture	
   in	
   Texas.	
   Then,	
   the	
   choice	
   between	
   continuing	
  to	
  spend	
  vast	
  resources	
  on	
  imported	
  coal	
  versus	
  creating	
  local	
  jobs	
  from	
  a	
  new	
   renewable	
   energy	
   sector	
   prompted	
   officials	
   to	
   propose	
   a	
   Renewables	
   Portfolio	
   Standard	
   (RPS)	
   as	
   a	
   policy	
   option.	
   If	
   the	
   state	
   had	
   not	
   experienced	
   this	
   threat	
   to	
   its	
   energy	
   independence,	
  it	
  is	
  hard	
  to	
  imagine	
  that	
  officials	
  would	
  have	
  found	
  any	
  motivation	
  to	
  begin	
   thinking	
   of	
   ways	
   to	
   stray	
   away	
   from	
   the	
   state’s	
   historical	
   path	
   of	
   generating	
   power	
   from	
   fossil	
   fuels.	
   Alberta	
   also	
   displays	
   a	
   legacy	
   of	
   energy	
   independence,	
   but	
   the	
   province	
   did	
   not	
   experience	
   any	
   similar	
   critical	
   juncture.	
   In	
   other	
   words,	
   both	
   jurisdictions	
   have	
   historically	
   pursued	
  development	
  based	
  on	
  energy	
  independence,	
  but	
  only	
  Texas	
  ran	
  out	
  of	
  cheap	
  local	
   coal.	
   	
   Thus,	
   this	
   interaction	
   between	
   the	
   jurisdictions’	
   resource	
   endowments	
   and	
   their	
   legacy	
   of	
   energy	
   independence	
   is	
   the	
   most	
   compelling	
   explanation	
   for	
   the	
   difference	
   in	
   renewable	
  energy	
  policies	
  between	
  Texas	
  and	
  Alberta.	
  	
    	
   	
   47	
    Moreover,	
  interest	
  groups	
  are	
  intimately	
  related	
  to	
  this	
  policy	
  legacy	
  and	
  resource	
   endowment	
   dynamic.	
   If	
   Texas	
   did	
   not	
   have	
   to	
   import	
   two	
   thirds	
   of	
   the	
   coal	
   it	
   uses	
   for	
   electricity,	
  not	
  only	
  would	
  policymakers	
  not	
  feel	
  the	
  urgency	
  to	
  develop	
  alternative	
  sources	
   of	
   electricity,	
   but	
   they	
   would	
   also	
   be	
   protective	
   of	
   the	
   local	
   jobs	
   in	
   the	
   coal	
   industry.	
   However,	
  faced	
  with	
  growing	
  coal	
  imports,	
  politicians	
  in	
  Texas	
  had	
  the	
  option	
  of	
  pursuing	
   energy	
  independence	
  by	
  promoting	
  a	
  wind	
  energy	
  sector,	
  while	
  creating	
  thousands	
  of	
  local	
   jobs	
   in	
   this	
   new	
   industry.	
   In	
   Alberta,	
   the	
   province	
   could	
   continue	
   to	
   promote	
   its	
   energy	
   independence	
  by	
  supporting	
  present	
  local	
  jobs	
  in	
  the	
  fossil	
  fuel	
  extraction	
  industry.	
  	
  In	
  light	
   of	
   a	
   booming	
   oil	
   industry	
   and	
   sufficient	
   coal	
   reserves,	
   politicians	
   in	
   Alberta	
   faced	
   no	
   urgency	
   in	
   adopting	
   renewable	
   energy	
   policies,	
   and	
   faced	
   the	
   easier	
   choice	
   of	
   simply	
   protecting	
  the	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  local	
  coal	
  and	
  natural	
  gas	
  industries.	
  	
   	
    Once	
   Texas	
   officials	
   decided	
   on	
   a	
   renewable	
   energy	
   mandate,	
   issue	
   framing	
   and	
    strategic	
  linkage	
  played	
  a	
  role	
  in	
  gaining	
  near	
  unanimous	
  support	
  in	
  the	
  state	
  legislature.	
   By	
  avoiding	
  any	
  connection	
  with	
  climate	
  change,	
  and	
  framing	
  the	
  issue	
  as	
  an	
  opportunity	
   for	
   economic	
   development	
   and	
   more	
   consumer	
   choices,	
   officials	
   were	
   able	
   to	
   garner	
   the	
   support	
   of	
   diverse	
   sectors.	
   Then,	
   by	
   linking	
   the	
   RPS	
   to	
   the	
   state’s	
   plan	
   for	
   electricity	
   restructuring,	
   they	
   were	
   able	
   to	
   avoid	
   serious	
   opposition	
   from	
   interest	
   groups.	
   As	
   the	
   literature	
  suggests,	
  if	
  the	
  proponents	
  of	
  the	
  RPS	
  had	
  linked	
  it	
  to	
  climate	
  change,	
  or	
  if	
  they	
   had	
  proposed	
  it	
  as	
  a	
  stand-­‐alone	
  policy,	
  the	
  mandate’s	
  chances	
  of	
  political	
  survival	
  would	
   have	
  been	
  very	
  slim.	
  In	
  contrast,	
  Alberta	
  could	
  not	
  avoid	
  the	
  “climate	
  change”	
  frame	
  given	
   Canada’s	
  ratification	
  of	
  the	
  Kyoto	
  Protocol	
  and	
  the	
  prominence	
  of	
  the	
  issue.	
  Knowing	
  that	
   the	
   Province	
   was	
   openly	
   opposed	
   to	
   Kyoto,	
   the	
   ratification	
   made	
   it	
   even	
   harder	
   for	
   Alberta	
    	
   	
   48	
    officials	
   to	
   even	
   think	
   of	
   proposing	
   renewable	
   energy	
  policies	
  that	
   would	
   be	
   seen	
   as	
   tied	
   to	
   the	
  rhetoric	
  of	
  reducing	
  the	
  province’s	
  greenhouse	
  gas	
  emissions.	
  	
   	
    Nevertheless,	
   the	
   framing	
   issue	
   in	
   Texas	
   would	
   not	
   have	
   mattered	
   if	
   the	
   policy	
    legacies	
  of	
  fossil	
  fueled	
  power	
  and	
  energy	
  independence	
  had	
  not	
  caused	
  the	
  initial	
  stir.	
  In	
   other	
   words,	
   issue	
   framing	
   only	
   mattered	
   after	
   it	
   became	
   clear	
   to	
   policymakers	
   in	
   Texas	
   that	
  the	
  legacy	
  of	
  energy	
  independence	
  was	
  threatened	
  by	
  the	
  rise	
  in	
  coal	
  imports	
  (and	
  the	
   resulting	
   budget	
   drain	
   from	
   importing	
   out-­‐of-­‐state	
   coal).	
   It	
   seems	
   doubtful	
   that	
   framing	
   wind	
   energy	
   as	
   an	
   opportunity	
   for	
   energy	
   independence	
   or	
   diversification	
   of	
   the	
   power	
   grid	
  would	
  have	
  prompted	
  officials	
  to	
  adopt	
  restrictive	
  policies	
  in	
  the	
  absence	
  of	
  the	
  rise	
  in	
   coal	
  imports	
  and	
  the	
  threat	
  to	
  energy	
  independence.	
  In	
  this	
  sense,	
  framing	
  was	
  a	
  tool	
  that	
   facilitated	
   the	
   adoption	
   of	
   a	
   new	
   policy,	
   but	
   only	
   after	
   the	
   critical	
   juncture	
   caused	
   a	
   mental	
   shift	
  in	
  the	
  Texas	
  policymakers.	
  In	
  a	
  similar	
  way,	
  even	
  if	
  Canada	
  had	
  not	
  ratified	
  the	
  Kyoto	
   Protocol,	
   it	
   is	
   hard	
   to	
   imagine	
   that	
   the	
   framing	
   of	
   renewables	
   as	
   a	
   source	
   of	
   economic	
   development	
   would	
   have	
   been	
   successful	
   in	
   Alberta	
   given	
   the	
   economic	
   protectionism	
   around	
  the	
  province’s	
  fossil	
  fuel	
  extraction	
  industries.	
  Therefore,	
  issue	
  framing	
  is	
  the	
  least	
   convincing	
  explanation	
  as	
  to	
  why	
  these	
  jurisdictions	
  developed	
  different	
  policies	
  on	
  wind	
   energy.	
  	
   	
    On	
  the	
  second	
  question,	
  this	
  study	
  found	
  that	
  the	
  federal	
  Production	
  Tax	
  Credit	
  in	
    the	
  U.S.	
  has	
  been	
  very	
  effective	
  in	
  promoting	
  wind	
  energy	
  growth	
  in	
  Texas:	
  new	
  capacity	
   installations	
   coincide	
   with	
   the	
   periods	
   when	
   the	
   PTC	
   was	
   in	
   place	
   or	
   about	
   to	
   expire.	
   However,	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  growth	
  in	
  wind	
  capacity	
  in	
  Texas	
  during	
  the	
  first	
  6	
  years	
  of	
  the	
  PTC,	
   before	
   the	
   RPS	
   was	
   implemented.	
   Once	
   the	
   RPS	
   was	
   in	
   place,	
   Texas	
   wind	
   began	
   its	
   steep	
   rise.	
   Therefore,	
   the	
   Texas	
   “wind	
   rush”	
   began	
   with	
   the	
   stick	
   provided	
   by	
   the	
   RPS,	
   and	
   has	
    	
   	
   49	
    continued	
   thanks	
   to	
   the	
   carrot	
   provided	
   by	
   the	
   PTC.	
   In	
   other	
   words,	
   these	
   instruments	
   worked	
  in	
  tandem	
  and	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  evidence	
  to	
  support	
  the	
  idea	
  that	
  wind	
  energy	
  in	
  Texas	
   would	
   have	
   experienced	
   substantial	
   growth	
   with	
   just	
   one	
   of	
   the	
   policy	
   instruments.	
   In	
   Alberta,	
   wind	
   capacity	
   has	
   grown	
   steadily	
   in	
   recent	
   years,	
   but	
   the	
   lack	
   of	
   a	
   renewables	
   mandate,	
  the	
  province’s	
  focus	
  on	
  “clean”	
  fossil	
  fuel	
  energy,	
   and	
  the	
  smaller	
  size	
  of	
  the	
  fiscal	
   incentive	
  have	
  prevented	
  a	
  larger	
  growth	
  of	
  the	
  wind	
  energy	
  sector.	
   	
  	
   As	
   the	
   reduction	
   of	
   global	
   greenhouse	
   gas	
   emissions	
   becomes	
   a	
   more	
   serious	
   concern,	
   substituting	
   fossil	
   fuel	
   power	
   for	
   renewable	
   energy	
   sources	
   may	
   be	
   humanity’s	
   best	
   chance	
   at	
   mitigating	
   the	
   effects	
   of	
   anthropogenic	
   climate	
   change.	
   Given	
   the	
   current	
   international	
   stalemate	
   on	
   enforceable	
   greenhouse	
   gas	
   reduction	
   mandates	
   for	
   polluting	
   nations,	
   sub-­‐national	
   solutions	
   are	
   an	
   important	
   alternative	
   for	
   achieving	
   substantial	
   greenhouse	
  gas	
  emissions	
  reductions.	
  Hopefully,	
  the	
  analysis	
  presented	
  here	
  can	
  serve	
  as	
  a	
   case	
   study	
   on	
   how	
   an	
   oil-­‐intensive,	
   climate-­‐denying	
   jurisdiction	
   like	
   Texas	
   can	
   successfully	
   develop	
  a	
  strong	
  renewable	
  energy	
  sector	
  and	
  begin	
  to	
  reduce	
  its	
  carbon	
  intensity.	
  	
    	
    	
   	
   50	
    	
   References	
    	
   Alberta	
  Carbon	
  Capture	
  and	
  Storage	
  Development	
  Council.	
  Accelerating	
  Carbon	
  Capture	
  	
   and	
  Storage	
  Implementation	
  in	
  Alberta,	
  Final	
  Report,	
  2009,	
   http://www.energy.alberta.ca/Initiatives/1690.asp	
  (accessed	
  November	
  3,	
  2010).	
   	
   Benitez,	
  Lliliana	
  E.,	
  Pablo	
  C.	
  Benitez,	
  and	
  G.	
  Cornelis	
  van	
  Kooten.	
  "The	
  Economics	
  of	
  Wind	
   Power	
  with	
  Energy	
  Storage."	
  Energy	
  Economics	
  30,	
  (2008):	
  1973-­‐1989.	
   	
   Bird,	
  Lori,	
  Mark	
  Bolinger,	
  Troy	
  Gagliano,	
  Ryan	
  Wiser,	
  Matthew	
  Brown,	
  and	
  Brian	
  Parsons.	
   “Policies	
  and	
  Market	
  Factors	
  Driving	
  Wind	
  Power	
  Development	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  States."	
   Energy	
  Policy	
  33,	
  (2005):	
  1397-­‐1407.	
   	
   CBC	
  News.	
  "Alberta	
  Launches	
  Campaign	
  Against	
  Kyoto."	
  CBC	
  News,	
  September	
  18,	
  2002,	
   http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2002/09/18/alberta_kyoto020918.html	
  (accessed	
   April	
  12,	
  2010).	
   	
   Dawson,	
  Bill.	
  "Texans'	
  Views	
  on	
  Climate	
  Change	
  Aren't	
  so	
  Different,	
  Polls	
  show."	
  Texas	
   Climate	
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  August	
  6,	
  2009.	
   	
   Deyette,	
  Jeff	
  and	
  Barbara	
  Freese.	
  Burning	
  Coal,	
  Burning	
  Cash:	
  Ranking	
  the	
  States	
  that	
  Import	
   the	
  most	
  Coal.	
  Cambridge,	
  MA:	
  Union	
  of	
  Concerned	
  Scientists,	
  2010.	
   	
   Environment	
  Canada.	
  National	
  Inventory	
  Report	
  1990-­2008:	
  Greenhouse	
  Gas	
  Sources	
  and	
   Sinks	
  in	
  Canada,	
  2010,	
   http://www.ec.gc.ca/gesghg/default.asp?lang=En&n=1357A041-­‐1	
  (accessed	
   November	
  2,	
  2010).	
   	
   Goldstein,	
  Katherine.	
  "Gov.	
  Rick	
  Perry	
  Sues	
  EPA	
  Over	
  Greenhouse	
  Gas	
  Regulation."	
  The	
   Huffington	
  Post,	
  Feb.	
  10,	
  2010,	
  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/18/gov-­‐ rick-­‐perry-­‐sues-­‐the-­‐e_n_467576.html	
  (accessed	
  April	
  20,	
  2010).	
   	
   Government	
  of	
  Alberta.	
  “Greenhouse	
  Gas	
  Reduction	
  Program,”	
   http://environment.alberta.ca/01838.html	
  (accessed	
  February	
  14,	
  2011).	
   	
   ———.	
  "Launching	
  	
  Alberta’s	
  Energy	
  Future,	
  Provincial	
  Energy	
  Strategy."	
   http://www.energy.alberta.ca/Initiatives/1509.asp#production	
  (accessed	
  January	
  10,	
   2011).	
   	
   ———.	
  "Electricity	
  Statistics."	
  http://www.energy.alberta.ca/Electricity/682.asp	
   (accessed	
  January	
  23,	
  2011).	
   	
    	
   	
   51	
    ———.	
  "Power	
  Pool	
  of	
  Alberta."	
   http://www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$Department/deptdocs.nsf/all/eng4394	
  (accessed	
   November	
  12,	
  2010.	
   	
   ———.	
  "What	
  is	
  Coal?"	
  http://www.energy.alberta.ca/coal/645.asp	
  (accessed	
  October	
  20,	
   2010).	
   Hurlbut,	
  David.	
  "A	
  Look	
  Behind	
  the	
  Texas	
  Renewable	
  Portfolio	
  Standard:	
  A	
  	
  Case	
  Study."	
   Natural	
  Resources	
  Journal	
  48,	
  (2008):	
  129-­‐162.	
   	
   Langniss,	
  Ole	
  and	
  Ryan	
  Wiser.	
  "The	
  Renewables	
  Portfolio	
  Standard	
  in	
  Texas:	
  An	
  	
  Early	
   Assessment."	
  Energy	
  Policy	
  31,	
  (2003):	
  527-­‐535.	
   	
   Lehr,	
  R.	
  L.,	
  W.	
  Guild,	
  and	
  D.	
  L.	
  Thomas.	
  Listening	
  to	
  Customers:	
  How	
  Deliberative	
  Helped	
   Build	
  1,000	
  MW	
  of	
  New	
  Renewable	
  Energy	
  Projects	
  in	
  Texas.	
  Golden,	
  Colorado:	
  National	
   Renewable	
  Energy	
  Laboratory,	
  2003.	
   	
   Lucas,	
  Alastair.	
  "The	
  Alberta	
  Energy	
  Sector’s	
  Voluntary	
  Approach	
  to	
  Climate	
  Change:	
   Context,	
  	
  Prospects,	
  and	
  Limits."	
  Chap.	
  Chapter	
  12,	
  In	
  Canadian	
  Energy	
  Policy	
  and	
  the	
   Struggle	
  for	
  Sustainable	
  Development,	
  293-­‐308.	
  Toronto:	
  University	
  of	
  Toronto	
  Press,	
   2005.	
   	
   Menz,	
  Fredric	
  C.	
  and	
  Stephan	
  Vachon.	
  “The	
  Effectiveness	
  of	
  Different	
  Policy	
  Regimes	
  for	
   Promoting	
  Wind	
  Power:	
  Experiences	
  from	
  the	
  States."	
  Energy	
  Policy	
  34,	
  (2006):	
  1786-­‐ 1796.	
   	
   Pierson,	
  Paul.	
  "Increasing	
  Returns,	
  Path	
  Dependence,	
  and	
  the	
  Study	
  of	
  Politics."	
  The	
   American	
  Political	
  Science	
  Review	
  94,	
  no.	
  2	
  (2000):	
  251-­‐267.	
   	
   Rabe,	
  Barry.	
  "Beyond	
  Kyoto:	
  Climate	
  Change	
  Policy	
  in	
  Multilevel	
  Governance	
  Systems."	
   Governance:	
  An	
  International	
  Journal	
  of	
  Policy,	
  Administration,	
  and	
  Institutions	
  20,	
  no.	
  3	
   (2007):	
  423-­‐444.	
   	
   ———.	
  Statehouse	
  and	
  Greenhouse:	
  The	
  Emerging	
  Politics	
  of	
  American	
  Climate	
  Change	
   Policy.	
  Washington,	
  D.C.:	
  Brookings	
  Institution	
  Press,	
  2004.	
   	
   Riti,	
  Christopher.	
  "Three	
  Sheets	
  to	
  the	
  Wind:	
  An	
  Intersection	
  of	
  the	
  Renewable	
  Energy	
   Production	
  Tax	
  Credit,	
  Congressional	
  Political	
  Posturing,	
  and	
  	
  an	
  Unsustainable	
  Energy	
   Policy."	
  Pace	
  Environmental	
  Law	
  Review	
  27,	
  no.	
  3	
  (2010):	
  783-­‐821.	
   	
   Sims,	
  Ralph	
  E.	
  H.,	
  Hans-­‐Holger	
  Rogner,	
  and	
  Ken	
  Gregory.	
  "Carbon	
  Emission	
  and	
  Mitigation	
   Cost	
  Comparisons	
  between	
  Fossil	
  Fuel,	
  Nuclear	
  and	
  Renewable	
  Energy	
  Resources	
  for	
   Electricity	
  Generation."	
  Energy	
  Policy	
  31,	
  (2003):	
  1315-­‐1326.	
   	
   Spencer,	
  Christina.	
  "Planet	
  in	
  Peril:	
  Poll."	
  TorontoSun.Com,	
  January	
  4,	
  2010,	
  ,	
   http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2010/01/04/12337176-­‐sun.html	
   (accessed	
  April	
  12,	
  2010).	
   	
   	
   52	
    	
   Statistics	
  Canada.	
  Annual	
  Demographic	
  	
  Estimates:	
  Census	
  Metropolitan	
  Areas,	
  Economic	
   Regions	
  and	
  Census	
  Divisions,	
  	
  Age	
  and	
  Sex:	
  2001	
  to	
  2006:	
  Statistics	
  Canada,	
  2007.	
   	
   ———.	
  Electric	
  Power	
  Generation,	
  Transmission	
  and	
  Distribution:	
  2007,	
  2009.	
   Texas	
  Comptroller	
  of	
  Public	
  Accounts.	
  "The	
  Energy	
  Report,	
  2008."	
   http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/energy/renewable/wind.php	
  (accessed	
   October	
  4,	
  2010).	
   	
   Texas	
  State	
  Library	
  and	
  Archives	
  Commission.	
  "United	
  States	
  and	
  Texas	
  	
  Populations:	
   1850-­‐2010."	
  http://www.tsl.state.tx.us/ref/abouttx/census.htm	
  (accessed	
  January	
  12,	
   2011).	
   	
   The	
  Gov	
  Monitor.	
  "Governor	
  Rick	
  Perry	
  on	
  EPA	
  Denial	
  of	
  Texas	
  Clean	
  Air	
  Petition."	
  The	
  Gov	
   Monitor,	
  August	
  2,	
  2010,	
  http://www.thegovmonitor.com/world_news/united_states/	
   governor-­‐rick-­‐perry-­‐on-­‐epa-­‐denial-­‐of-­‐texas-­‐clean-­‐air-­‐petition-­‐36365.html	
  (accessed	
   October	
  30,	
  2010).	
   	
   The	
  Pembina	
  Institute.	
  Greening	
  the	
  Grid:	
  Powering	
  Alberta's	
  Future	
  with	
  Renewable	
  Energy.	
   Drayton	
  Valley,	
  Alberta:	
  The	
  Pembina	
  Institute,	
  2009.	
   	
   Tsebelis,	
  George.	
  "Decision	
  Making	
  in	
  Political	
  Systems:	
  Veto	
  Players	
  in	
  Presidentialism,	
   Parliamentarism,	
  Multicameralism	
  and	
  Multipartyism."	
  British	
  Journal	
  of	
  Political	
   Science	
  25,	
  no.	
  3	
  (1995):	
  289-­‐235.	
   	
   U.S.	
  Energy	
  Information	
  Administration.	
  "Annual	
  Energy	
  Outlook	
  2001."	
  (2001).	
   	
   ———.	
  "Electricity	
  Statistics."	
  http://www.energy.alberta.ca/Electricity/682.asp	
   (accessed	
  January	
  23,	
  2011).	
   	
   ———.	
  "State	
  Energy	
  Profiles:	
  Texas."	
  http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/state/state_energy_	
   profiles.cfm?sid=TX	
  (accessed	
  January	
  23,	
  2011).	
   	
   U.S.	
  Environmental	
  Protection	
  Agency.	
  "Endangerment	
  and	
  Cause	
  Or	
  Contribute	
  Findings	
   for	
  Greenhouse	
  Gases	
  Under	
  Section	
  202(a)	
  of	
  the	
  Clean	
  Air	
  Act."	
   http://epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html	
  (accessed	
  April	
  15,	
  2010).	
   	
   Wiser,	
  Ryan,	
  Mark	
  Bolinger,	
  and	
  Galen	
  Barbose.	
  "Using	
  the	
  Federal	
  Production	
  Tax	
  Credit	
   to	
  Build	
  a	
  Durable	
  Market	
  for	
  Wind	
  Power	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  States."	
  The	
  Electricity	
  Journal	
   20,	
  no.	
  9	
  (2007):	
  77-­‐88.	
   	
   	
    	
   	
   53	
    Appendix:	
  complementary	
  data	
   	
    Figure 11. Price of fuel delivered to electricity producers: TX80  	
   This	
  graph	
  is	
  meant	
  to	
  illustrate	
  the	
  volatility	
  of	
  fuel	
  prices	
  as	
  something	
  that	
  increases	
  the	
   uncertainty	
  of	
  cost	
  estimates	
  for	
  electricity	
  production	
  across	
  sources.	
  The	
  data	
  for	
  Alberta	
   was	
  unavailable,	
  but	
  since	
  coal	
  and	
  natural	
  gas	
  are	
  commodities,	
  it	
  can	
  be	
  assumed	
  that	
  the	
   price	
  of	
  these	
  fuels	
  delivered	
  to	
  electricity	
  producers	
  in	
  Alberta	
  is	
  similar	
  to	
  these	
  prices	
  for	
   Texas.	
   	
    Table 4. Legislative history of the U.S. Production Tax Credit81  	
   	
    	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
    80	
  	
  U.S.	
  Energy	
  Information	
  Administration,	
  State	
  Energy	
  Profiles:	
  Texas  	
    81	
  	
  Wiser,	
  Bolinger	
  and	
  Barbose,	
  Using	
  the	
  Federal	
  Production	
  Tax	
  Credit	
  to	
  Build	
  a	
  Durable	
  Market	
  for	
  Wind	
    Power	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  79.	
    	
   	
   54	
    

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