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The irrepressible communicative power of pride Shariff, Azim Fayaz 2010

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   ABSTRACT   How do we decide who merits social status? According to evolutionary theories of emotion, the nonverbal expressions of pride and shame play a key role in this process, functioning as automatically perceived status signals. In this view, observers cannot avoid making status inferences on the basis of these expressions, even when contradictory contextual information about the expresser’s status is available. In twelve studies, my colleagues and I tested whether the nonverbal expression of pride sends a functional, automatically perceived signal about a social group member’s increased social status and whether implicit and explicit status judgments and corresponding decisions are influenced by this signal even contradicted by the context or situation. Results indicate that emotion expressions powerfully influence both implicit and explicit status judgments, at times neutralizing or even overriding situational knowledge, and this holds for implicit and explicit judgments of a target’s status, as well as more behavioural status-based decisions (i.e., whether to hire a target). These findings demonstrate the irrepressible communicative power of emotion displays, and the specifically, the pride expression’s function to uniquely communicate the high status of those who show it. Moreover, they indicate that status judgments can be informed as much(and often more) by automatic responses to nonverbal expressions of emotion as by rational, contextually bound knowledge. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for functional theories of emotion expressions.     iii	
   TABLE OF CONTENTS  ABSTRACT...................................................................................................................... ii TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................. iii LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................................................................. x CO-AUTHORSHIP STATEMENT................................................................................. xi Chapter One: Introduction ................................................................................................ 1 Expressions of Emotion ........................................................................................ 2 Why Self-Conscious Emotions? ............................................................... 5  The Evolution of Status Signals – A Hypothesis .................................................. 7 The Present Research .......................................................................................... 11 Knowing Who’s Boss ............................................................................. 11 (Implicitly) Judging a Book by its Cover ............................................... 12 References........................................................................................................... 15 Chapter Two: Knowing Who’s Boss .............................................................................. 19 Introduction......................................................................................................... 20  Perceptions of Status and the Pride Expression ...................................... 20 The Present Research .............................................................................. 22 Study 1 ................................................................................................................ 24 Method..................................................................................................... 25  Participants and Procedure ............................................................... 25  Stimuli .............................................................................................. 25  Expressions.................................................................................. 26  Words .......................................................................................... 26 Results and Discussion............................................................................ 26  Study 2 ................................................................................................................ 28 Method..................................................................................................... 28 Results and Discussion............................................................................ 28  Study 3 ................................................................................................................ 29  iv	
   Method..................................................................................................... 29 Results and Discussion............................................................................ 29  Study 4 ................................................................................................................ 30 Method..................................................................................................... 30 Results and Discussion............................................................................ 31  Study 5a and 5b................................................................................................... 32 Method..................................................................................................... 32 Results and Discussion............................................................................ 33  Study 6 ................................................................................................................ 34 Method..................................................................................................... 34 Results and Discussion............................................................................ 34  General Discussion.............................................................................................. 34   Implications ............................................................................................. 35   Limitations and Future Directions........................................................... 37  Acknowledgments............................................................................................... 40  References .......................................................................................................... 45 Chapter Three: (Implicitly) Judging a Book by its Cover .............................................. 51 Introduction......................................................................................................... 52  The Emotion Expressions of Power ........................................................ 52  The Power of Emotion Expressions ........................................................ 54  The Present Research .............................................................................. 56 Study 1 ................................................................................................................ 58 Method..................................................................................................... 58 Results and Discussion............................................................................ 61  Study 2 ................................................................................................................ 62 Method..................................................................................................... 63 Results and Discussion............................................................................ 64  Study 3 ................................................................................................................ 66 Method..................................................................................................... 67 Results and Discussion............................................................................ 68  Study 4 ................................................................................................................ 70  v	
   Method..................................................................................................... 70 Participants and Procedure ............................................................... 70 Materials........................................................................................... 71 Results and Discussion............................................................................ 72  Study 5 ............................................................................................................... 73 Method..................................................................................................... 76 Participants and Procedure ............................................................... 76 Materials........................................................................................... 76 Results and Discussion............................................................................ 78  General Discussion.............................................................................................. 80   The Unavoidable Inference of Status ...................................................... 81   Theoretical Implications.......................................................................... 83   Limitations and Future Directions........................................................... 84 Acknowledgments............................................................................................... 87 References .......................................................................................................... 94 Chapter Four: Discussion................................................................................................ 99  Summary of Main Findings .............................................................................. 100  Theoretical Implications.................................................................................... 101  Future Directions............................................................................................... 105  Conclusion......................................................................................................... 108  References ......................................................................................................... 109 Appendix A................................................................................................................... 112 Appendix B ................................................................................................................... 113 Appendix C ................................................................................................................... 114 Appendix D................................................................................................................... 116   vi	
   LIST OF FIGURES  Figure 2.1 ..........................................................................................................................41 Figure 2.2 ..........................................................................................................................42 Figure 2.3 ..........................................................................................................................43 Figure 2.4 ..........................................................................................................................44 Figure 3.1 ..........................................................................................................................88 Figure 3.2 ..........................................................................................................................89 Figure 3.3 ..........................................................................................................................90 Figure 3.4 ..........................................................................................................................91 Figure 3.5 ..........................................................................................................................92 Figure 3.6 ..........................................................................................................................93  vii	
    ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS   Thanks to Ara. Thanks to Jess. Couldn’t have done it without you.  viii	
    CO-AUTHORSHIP STATEMENT  In accordance with the rules for UBC doctoral dissertations, it should be noted that despite the generous and greatly appreciated contributions of my co-authors, Jeffrey Markusoff, and especially Dr. Jessica Tracy, to the research included in this dissertation, I was the primary contributor. I was responsible for the originating idea for the research, as well as the bulk of the methodological design, programming, data analysis and manuscript preparation. The research itself was performed by Markusoff and research assistants involved with Tracy’s lab.  	
            Chapter One Introduction 	
   The recognition that that our mental lives are driven, not by fully transparent and controlled conscious directions, but instead by bizarre machinations of a mind largely hidden from introspection and intervention, has commanded much of psychology’s public appeal since the time of Freud (1901/1965). It has also, in many ways, justified the work of the psychologist – from early psychoanalysts who held the keys to the injurious unconscious to the modern cognitive neuroscientist whose imaging techniques can see behind the view from self-reflection. The comparable project for social psychologists, meanwhile, has been to reveal the complex set of biases and illusions that filter and distort our world, and thereby reveal to us how we are misled—however adaptively—by our own minds (see e.g. Wilson, 2002). The current research—an attempt to unmask the hidden social communication behind emotion expressions— is an incremental step in this revolution of self-understanding. By using the examples of pride and shame, my co-authors and I sought to investigate how individuals unknowingly digest the meanings that they observe in prototypical emotion displays. How do people unconsciously react to the expressions of pride and shame? To what degree do these expressions shape judgments and decisions about the people who display them? How does this information fit within what we know about these emotions? In answering these questions, we seek to inform evolutionary theories about the form, function and origins or emotion expressions, as well as the manner in which everyday social interactions are affected by emotion expressions. Expressions of Emotion The study of emotion expressions has a storied history within psychology. However, for much of it, the emotion expressions have always been less interesting, in and of themselves, than they have been as tests and examples of larger research aims. 	
   As with On the Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man (1871), Darwin’s seminal book The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) was spun out of the original manuscript for The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, his massive 1868 book detailing his experiments, observations and theories about variation in organisms. Whereas Origin was a short version of his theories, rushed to press under pressure from Wallace’s similar ideas (Darwin & Wallace, 1858), The Descent of Man and The Expressions of Emotions in Man and Animals begun as a chapter where Darwin’s theories were applied to human beings. Having grown too long for the book, this chapter became an essay on the topic, and the essay eventually became the two volumes, published back to back in 1871 and 1872. Darwin’s description of the similarities between the expressions of humans and those of non- human animals—which included a direct comparison between the human pride expression and the dominance displays of the animal kingdom—was thus meant as an illustration of how the theory of natural selection replaced the qualitative division between man and animals with a quantitative one. Emotion expressions, like finches, were just a vehicle for a larger point. A similar point could be made for Ekman’s landmark cross-cultural work on emotion expressions (Ekman, Sorenson & Friesen, 1969). Following the theories of discrete emotional responses laid out by Tomkins (1963), Ekman’s findings showed consistency in the recognition of facial emotion expressions across preliterate and literate cultures in New Guinea, Borneo, The United States, Brazil and Japan. This work provided evidence for the existence of six basic emotions—happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise and disgust—which were recognized across the disparate cultures, and likely universal. While these findings were interesting with regard to theories of emotion expressions, especially insofar as they supported the then controversial theories of Tomkins, Ekman himself admitted that the most important effect of this work was “to contribute to the reawakening interest in emotion... much [of which] rightfully does not focus on 	
   the face” (Ekman, 1993). But the effects had ramifications well beyond the study of emotion; the project was arguably most interesting as a study in human universals—perhaps evolved universals. Indeed, in many ways, this work laid empirical groundwork for the rise of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, and the fall of competing theories that see human beings as ‘blank slates’ fully shaped by their respective cultures (theories that will be falling any minute now; Pinker, 2002). More recently, Ohman and Mineka have used fear expressions to make a compelling argument for the existence of an evolved module for fear learning in social animals (see Ohman & Mineka, 2001, for a review). Perhaps the most interesting in the extensive work they and their colleagues have done on the topic is an experiment showing that lab-reared rhesus monkeys, previously unafraid of snakes, rapidly developed this requisite and historically adaptive fear upon seeing other rhesus monkeys (who had been raised in the wild) fearfully react to snakes. Importantly, the monkeys did not develop the same fear when witnessing the same fearful reaction in response to neutral objects (Cook et al., 1985; Mineka, Davidson, et al., 1984). This set of experiments reveals a notable level of sophistication in how social animals can respond to emotion expressions of conspecifics. The fear expression is the first expression for which strong evidence for social communication has emerged. Given how important danger avoidance is to an organism’s reproductive fitness, it would not be surprising if it was the first to emerge phylogenically, as well. Ohman and Mineka’s research, again, is a case where emotion expressions serve as powerful research examples for making larger points about evolutionary psychology. The intention behind the current work is similar – to employ the emotion expressions of pride and 	
   shame to learn more about (a) the evolution of the emotions underlying the displays, (b) status perception in humans, and (c) unconscious social communication. Why Self-Conscious Emotions? No emotion has enjoyed the level of neurological research as has fear (see, e.g. LeDoux, 2000). This fact, coupled with the immediate fitness advantages that it commands, made fear an ideal candidate for Ohman and Mineka’s work. The self-conscious emotions, on the other hand, have not been the objects of anywhere nearly as much research as fear, or indeed any of the basic emotions; Tracy and Robbins (2004) reported that, at the time of writing, only two of the 66 articles (3%) published thus far in APA’s specialized journal Emotion discussed self-conscious emotions. Since then, the number of total articles published in Emotion has risen to 555, but the proportion of articles focusing on self-conscious emotions has remained small. In fact, it has become smaller; only eight articles list one or more self-conscious emotions as a keyword (1.5%), one of which is part of this package, and three of which involve its co-author (for comparison, 138 articles (25%) listed at least one of the basic emotions as a keyword, including 53 (10%) for fear alone). Given the relative paucity of research on these emotions, why choose one of them—pride—over more mainstream, and better understood, emotions in order to study the communicative power of emotion expressions? To answer that question, it is necessary to visit the compelling, if speculative, evolutionary history of how universal emotion expressions may have developed.  A number of theorists, including Darwin, have suggested that facial emotion expressions may serve an adaptive function for the sender that is quite removed from social communication (Darwin, 1872; Frijda, 1986; Susskind et al., 2008). According to this theory, most facial emotion expressions thus began as behavioural facial responses evoked to deal with relevant stimuli. Examples include the 	
   constriction of the eye muscles and nasal cavities during the disgust response in order to restrict the inhalation of noxious chemicals, or, in contrast, the widening of the eyes and nasal cavities during the fear response to increase sensory acquisition. By directly measuring volume differences in air intake and visual-field changes between the two expressions, Susskind and colleagues (2008) have confirmed the simple behavioural utility of these expressions—again, totally removed from their communicative value. Since these facial ‘responses’ evolved as standard, predictable reactions to common elicitors, conditioned associations would have developed between the observance of the facial response and the situation. These implicit associations would have represented the first stirrings of ‘meaning’ being attached to facial expressions. Mind-reading abilities that developed over the last 6 million years (Mithen, 1996; Baron-Cohen, 1999) would only have strengthened the ability to determine the experiential (i.e. emotional) state that lay behind each facial response (i.e. emotion expression). Once these expressions began being used as social communication, they may have become ‘ritualized’ exaggerated versions of their utilitarian precursors. This theoretical account of the evolutionary history of emotion expressions involves behavioural responses, initially adapted for surviving the physical environment, being exapted for navigating the social environment. It suggests that the expressions associated with the more evolutionarily ancient emotions had deeper utilitarian roots, whereas those expressions associated with the more recently evolved emotions, such as the self-conscious emotions, may have developed for more purely communicative functions, thereby making them better candidates for study on this function. Furthermore, despite their narcissistic label, the self-conscious emotions are, fundamentally, social emotions. Self-conscious emotions are defined as those emotions that 	
   relate directly to an individual’s sense of self, and to that individual’s awareness of other people’s reactions to the self. As such, guilt, shame, embarrassment and pride all developed to regulate interpersonal relationships (Tracy & Robins, 2004), not navigate the physical world. Associated expressions, thus, would have little reason to regulate sensory acquisition, or air intake, or whatever. The visible facial responses that are elicited by recurrent social situations could, then, be a byproduct of the emotional response (which itself is meant to only signal something to the self), or could serve some social function (i.e. send a standardized message to others). Finally, the emotions of pride and shame have interesting and already established theoretical links with social status in humans (Fessler, 1999; Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). This allows for the current research to test existing theories about the functions of shame and pride, as well as explore specific new hypotheses about what kind of social message their expressions transmit. These predictions are discussed in the next section. The Evolution of Status Signals – A Hypothesis Social status hierarchies are found among most Great Ape species, and across all human societies (Dunbar 1988; Fried, 1967). By dividing groups into dominant and submissive individuals, these hierarchies facilitate group coordination and reduce interpersonal aggression (Bales, 1950; Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980; Ellis, 1995, Maynard-Smith, 1974; Hand, 1986). Indeed, research on what is termed dominance complimentarity shows that people in dyadic encounters tend to find both their tasks and their task partner more pleasurable and comfortable when a dominant/submissive relationship is formed, even if they find themselves on the submissive side (Dryer & Horowitz, 1997; Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). Thus status hierarchies 	
   can be considered natural, useful and, to some degree, desirable (Tiedens, Unzueta & Young, 2007). Despite the desire for complimentarity among both parties, there are certainly benefits that come with high status1 (Sapolsky, 2004). High status individuals enjoy privileged access to coveted resources (i.e., high quality food, shelter and mates), greater authority over group members and influence over group decisions, and better health and life expectancy (Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980; Sapolsky, 2004. Finally, those who ascend to the top of social status hierarchies ultimately attain greater reproductive fitness (Hill, 1984). High-status individuals are afforded these benefits and paid deference by other group members through one of two routes—dominance or prestige (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Attaining dominance occurs via fear and intimidation. Status, in this case, could be said to refer to the assurance to others that they may face some form of punishment should due deference not be paid. Prestige operates 	
   1 Though, interestingly, whereas high status appears to be unquestionably positive for human beings, it can be a prominent and often fatal source of stress for other apes (Sapolsky, 2004). The difference may be due to the decoupling of prestige from dominance in human status (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) – a decoupling which may emancipate high status humans from the brute physical demands (and neurotoxic levels of circulating testosterone) of being atop a hierarchy that is based on strength-based demonstrations of intimidation, violent confrontations, and constant vigilance. Tracy, Cheng and colleagues (Cheng, Tracy & Henrich, 2010; Tracy, Shariff & Cheng, 2010) have recently argued that the division between status and dominance in humans can be neatly mapped onto the a similar division in the experience of pride—between authentic pride and hubristic pride—both of which have different personality correlates, behavioural tendencies, and, importantly, interpersonal outcomes in modern society (Ashton-James & Tracy, 2009; Cheng et al., 2010; Tracy & Robins, 2007; Tracy, Cheng, Robins, & Trzesniewski, 2009; Tracy et al., 2010).  The behavioural outcomes of those high in dominant status, appears to be inversely related that for high prestige individuals—they are less educated, hold lower-status professions (when they are employed) and earn lower incomes (Dabbs, 1992). It is tempting, then, to draw a closer comparison between the stress-filled, ambiguously beneficial dominance seen in the other apes and the ill-serving, perhaps anachronistic, form of hubristic dominance seen in humans. That the two forms of dominance share certain elements may help explain why high status in apes is not as uniformly positive, in terms of health outcomes, as is prestige-based status in humans. Still, one should be careful not to equate the two too much. One major difference is that though dominant non-human apes share the same aggressive, assertive, confrontational, and violent traits of dominant humans (e.g., Dabbs, Carr, Frady, & Riad, 1995; Kouri, Lukas, Pope, & Oliva, 1995), they are nonetheless at the top of their hierarchy, whereas dominant, hubristic humans, though successful in some circles, tend to find themselves closer to the bottom of the larger hierarchy in modern industrialized societies.   	
   through admiration and imitation. An individual high is prestige exhibits a degree of domain- specific or generalized competence that compels other group members to learn from or defer to the prestigious individual’s superior skill. Status, in this case, could be seen as a heuristic indicating to others that deference to the high-status individual can lead to rewards. Thus, the concept of status is a multifaceted one that subsumes both of these sides—power and competence, intimidation and admiration, dominance and prestige. Both play an important part in human social interactions. The utility and necessity of status hierarchies thus established, how are these status positions—and movement between them—communicated? In the absence of the wealth of material status symbols and explicit rankings (e.g. Nosek et al. 2010) that characterize modern life, status levels needed to be communicated behaviourally. One possible avenue was via the ritualized affective and behavioural responses to events relevant to status, such as important successes or public failures. For status to be communicated via emotions expressions, humans and our ancestors would have needed to develop two complimentary adaptations for social communication: One, on the ‘sender’ side, to spontaneously display prototypical expressions of pride and shame, and another, on the ‘observer’ side to automatically interpret them. What support is there for this hypothesis? A growing collection of research supports the existence of the ‘sender’ adaptation. First, the pride and shame displays share considerable morphological similarity with the dominance and appeasement displays exhibited throughout the animal kingdom. The features that characterize the pride expression—a slight smile, head titled back, expanded chest, and arms extended out from the body (Tracy & Robins, 2007)—resemble those found in the “bluff” displays exhibited by dominant chimpanzees (de Waal, 1989; Martens, Tracy, Parr, & Cheng, 2010). Likewise, the similarity between the appeasement displays found 	
   throughout mammalian species, and the human shame expression, which involve a downward gaze and generally orienting the body inward so as to appear smaller, is not coincidental (Keltner, 1995; Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008)2. Second, the pride and shame expressions are, as predicted, spontaneously displayed following successes and failures (Lewis, Sullivan, & Allesandri, 1993; Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). Moreover, this finding replicate across disparate cultures, including both communal and individualistic cultures and, perhaps most compellingly, holds for the congenitally blind who would have never had an opportunity to visually mimic the display (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). This is strong evidence for these displays to be considered innate responses. There is considerably less research supporting the proposed ‘observer’ adaptation. Some evidence shows that pride expressions can be accurately identified (i.e. abstractly labeled) across disparate cultures (Tracy & Robins, 2008; Tracy, Shariff, Zhao & Henrich, 2010), however, no evidence currently exists showing that pride conveys a unified message, let alone one of status. In other words, it is well established that people display shame and pride when experiencing an event that may change their social status, but it has yet to be demonstrated that these displays in turn affect observers’ status perceptions of the individual displaying them. The hypothesis that the pride and shame expressions evolved, in part, for this function—nonverbally communicating social status changes—rests on this currently unsupported second half of the equation. This is the motivation for the current work. 	
   2 Nor, of course, are the contrasting features of the pride and shame expressions (or dominance and appeasement displays) a coincidence. Following Darwin (1872), Susskind and friends (2008) calls this the principle of antithesis in form; the differences between expressions representing opposite meanings (e.g. pride and shame, or happiness and sadness) become exaggerated in their differences to facilitate discrimination.  	
   The Present Research  The two manuscripts that follow present 12 studies aimed at testing the theories and hypotheses laid out above. Specifically, the first manuscript, Knowing Who’s Boss: Implicit Perceptions of Status From the Nonverbal Expression of Pride investigates whether the pride and shame expressions actually do send social status messages. The second manuscript, (Implicitly) Judging a Book by its Cover: The Unavoidable Inference of Status from Pride and Shame Expressions follows this up with an exploration of how effective, and powerful, these implicit status messages actually are. Knowing Who’s Boss In seven studies, using three different implicit association methodologies, the first paper aims to test whether photos of targets expressing pride are implicitly associated with status. Evidence for such an implicit association would be the first to support the prediction that the pride expression sends specific social messages and serves as a reliable status signal. The initial investigation made use of the Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT is a widely used tool that measures implicit associations between two pairs of dichotomous concepts (e.g. summer/winter and pleasant/unpleasant) by comparing people’s reaction times when they are instructed to ‘sort’ one combination of pairings (e.g. summer with good, and winter with bad) against their reaction times when they ‘sort’ the opposite pairing (e.g. summer with bad, and winter with good). The sorting of the variables involves pressing one computer key for words or images relating to one conceptual pairing (summer/good) and another for stimuli associated with the other pairing (winter/bad). Participants are instructed to sort these stimuli as fast as possible. Faster reaction times at one 	
   combination of pairings suggests a cognitive bias for that combination’s associations (e.g. summer/good & winter/bad), compared to its opposite (e.g. summer/bad & winter/good)3. To measure the status associations of the pride expression, photos of the expression and the opposing shame expression were paired with words pertaining to high and low status (Study 1). Subsequent studies used different formats of the IAT to directly test the  unique effect of the pride expression (Studies 2 & 3). The findings were then replicated using an entirely different implicit association measure—the Affective Misattribution Paradigm (Payne, Cheng, Govorun & Stewart, 2005)—in order to ensure that the findings were not an artifact of the particular IAT methodology (Study 4). Finally, to test whether the implicit status associations that emerged from the pride expression were merely products of the expression’s positive valence, power, or appearance of expanded body size, three more IATs were run which compared the pride expression against that of happiness and anger (Studies 5a & 5b), and then against photos showing the actor extending his arms, but not displaying the other features of the pride expression (Study 6). (Implicitly) Judging a Book by its Cover The second paper follows directly from the findings of the first. Having established that the pride expression does indeed send implicit status signals, the logical next step is to ask what these status signals do. How do the signals affect status-related judgments? How do these implicitly and automatically interpreted status cues stack up against status-relevant information that is consciously deliberated upon? In other words, how powerful are these cues? The five studies in this paper attempted to answer these questions. 	
   3 For more information on the IAT, and to run a demonstration of the task, visit http:// implicit.harvard.edu.	
   The first three studies used the same IAT paradigm as was used in the first paper. However, instead of presenting decontextualized images of targets showing the pride and shame expressions, contextual information about status was added such that the two sources of status information were in direct competition. The pride-displaying target was given a contextual narrative that painted him as low status, while the context described the target that displayed shame as high status. These context-incongruent emotion expressions treatments were then compared against conditions where the contextual information remained the same, but both targets only displayed neutral expressions. This method allowed us to measure exactly the contribution of the pride and shame expressions, and measure it against that of the context. Studies 4 and 5 switched to explicit measures in order to determine what effect the implicit status signal sent by the pride expression has on predictions about status related behaviour (Study 4), and social decision making related to status hierarchies (Study 5). It is worth giving some explanation as to why the bulk of these studies made use of implicit methods as opposed to simply collecting explicit judgments about the status of the targets. The theory laid out above holds that emotion expressions send meaning-laden messages that are instinctively interpreted, without the need for conscious reasoning. Thus for initial tests of the theory, it is necessary to bypass this reasoning as much as possible, lest participants consciously revisit their initial automatic responses and replace them with something that seems more appropriate. Implicit methodologies such as the IAT were designed specifically to achieve this aim—revealing underlying cognitive biases, while mostly resisting conscious interference or revising (Fazio & Olson, 2003, though see Payne, 2005). By demanding rapid responses, adding cognitive load and using cleverly indirect questioning, these methods reduce the opportunity and motivation for deliberation, and can thereby reveal automatic responses in their raw, pre- conscious form. Indeed, the differences that emerge between implicit and explicit measures that 	
   emerge in the experiments results of the second manuscript speak to the utility of measuring these judgments at different levels of processing. 	
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   Tiedens, L. Z., Unzueta, M. M., & Young, M. J. (2007). An unconscious desire for hierarchy? The motivated perception of dominance complementarity in task partners. Journal of personality and social psychology, 93, 402-14. Tomkins, S. S. (1963). Affects, imagery, consciousness. New York: Springer. Tracy, J. L., & Matsumoto, D. (2008). The spontaneous display of pride and shame: Evidence for biologically innate nonverbal displays. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105, 11655-11660. Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2008). The nonverbal expression of pride: Evidence for cross- cultural recognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 516-530. Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2004). Putting the Self Into Self-Conscious Emotions : A Theoretical Model. Psychological Inquiry, 15, 103-125. Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2007). The psychological structure of pride: A tale of two facets. Journal of Personality and. Social Psychology, 92, 506−525. Wilson, T. D. (2002). Strangers to ourselves: Discovering the adaptive unconscious. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 	
          Chapter Two Knowing Who’s Boss: Implicit Perceptions of Status from the Nonverbal Expression of Pride4          	
   4 A version of this chapter has been published. Shariff, A.F., & Tracy, J. L. (2009). Knowing who's boss: implicit perceptions of status from the nonverbal expression of pride. Emotion, 9(5), 631-9. The version here is reprinted with permission. 	
   While the bulk of research on emotion expressions has examined how these expressions are recognized and distinguished from one another (e.g., Keltner & Ekman, 2000), an equally longstanding but less well extensively researched line of inquiry has examined the ultimate function of each expression (see, e.g. Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1992; Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). In this vein, most expressions have been assumed to serve a communicative function; fear, for example, transmits a rapidly and universally interpreted signal informing onlookers of important environmental events (Ohman, 2002). Indeed, the large body of cross-cultural recognition data on emotion expressions (e.g., Ekman et al., 1987; Ekman & Friesen, 1971) is consistent with the claim that these expressions serve communicative functions. However, relatively little empirical work has addressed the question of what, precisely, each expression communicates, beyond knowledge of the emotion displayed. From an evolutionary perspective, humans should be expected not only to show accurate and quick recognition of the particular emotion expressed (e.g., “fear”), but they should also be able to decode what each expression means (e.g., “Danger!”). Those studies that have examined the meaningful content conveyed by emotion expressions have largely focused on the broad distinction between positive and negative expressions, demonstrating that the former typically send approach-oriented messages, and the latter more avoidance-oriented messages (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1999). Further research has shown that these approach/avoidance messages can be perceived even when expressions are displayed subliminally, suggesting a non-conscious perception process (Winkielman & Berridge, 2003).  Perceptions of Status and the Pride Expression Several researchers have suggested that the “self-conscious” emotion of pride evolved, in part, to convey information about an individual’s social status (Fessler, 1999; Tracy & Robins, 2007a; Tracy, Shariff & Cheng, 2010). Given the importance among group-living primates of effectively navigating 	
   one’s social environment, the ability to communicate and identify status hierarchies is likely to be highly adaptive (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997). In particular, individuals who can effectively communicate that they deserve increased social status may be more likely to receive the benefits associated with high status, including access to scarce resources, increased influence, and higher-quality mates. In addition, the ability to ascertain which others in one’s social group deserve high status would facilitate power maneuvering, cooperation, and generally smoother social interactions (e.g., displaying appropriate deference, making worthwhile alliances; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; Schmid Mast, & Hall, 2004). Although no studies have directly examined whether the nonverbal pride expression is associated with high status, several lines of research are consistent with this expectation. First, high-status individuals have been found to report greater momentary feelings of pride than low-status individuals, after succeeding at the same task, suggesting an experiential association between high status and pride (Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000; Tiedens, Ellsworth & Moskowitz, 2000). Second, pride feelings have been shown to motivate behaviours that make high status particularly likely; individuals induced to feel pride exhibit greater perseverance on difficult tasks, which in turn may promote achievement and consequent high status (Williams & DeSteno, 2008; 2009); in fact, a recent study found that individuals manipulated to experience pride were subsequently perceived as behaving in a dominant manner in a group task (Williams & DeSteno, in press). Third, individuals across cultures have been shown to respond to socially valued achievements—events that likely increase one’s status—by displaying a distinct nonverbal expression that is reliably and cross-culturally associated with pride (Lewis, Alessandri & Sullivan, 1992; Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008; Tracy & Robins, 2004; 2008a; Weisfeld & Beresford, 1982). This behavioural response to success, which includes an expanded posture, head-tilt back, and arms extended out from the body, seems to be biologically innate, based on evidence from congenitally blind individuals (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). Moreover, the morphological similarity of the pride expression to the dominance displays of non-human primates (e.g., de Waal, 1989; Tracy & 	
   Robins, 2007b), suggests that it might have evolved from earlier displays that served a similar function in establishing status hierarchies. Despite this growing body of circumstantial evidence, however, no previous research has directly examined whether the nonverbal expression of pride promotes perceptions of high status in those who show it.  The Present Research Seven studies using (a) the implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), (b) the “single-target IAT” (Penke, Eichstaedt, & Asendorpf, 2006), and (c) the affect misattribution procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), tested whether the pride expression functions as an automatic signal of high status. The standard IAT, used in Studies 1, 4, 5, and 6, assesses implicit associations between pairs of dichotomous stimuli by measuring reaction times for categorizing stimuli across pairings. The results of these IATs are necessarily relative; that is, if pride is associated with high status, the IAT will reveal this by demonstrating that the association between pride and high status is stronger than associations between some other target and high status. These standard IATs were thus supplemented with the non-relative single-target IAT and the AMP, both of which can demonstrate an implicit association between pride and high status irrespective of other associations. Responses to all three of these tasks can be considered automatic associations insofar as they meet the criteria for two of the “four horsemen” of automaticity: lack of intention and lack of control (cf. Bargh, 1994). Given that participants in these tasks are specifically instructed to respond in a way that would yield null differences between conditions (see procedure descriptions below), any significant differences that emerge can be assumed to have occurred without intention or control. Furthermore, response differences that emerge in the AMP can be further claimed to lack some level of awareness, because AMP study participants are unaware of the influence of the target stimuli (in this case, the pride expression; see procedure description below) on subsequent judgments– a necessary precondition for any misattribution 	
   (Payne et al. 2005). In addition to providing the first test of whether the pride expression is an automatic signal of status, this research extends previous findings in several ways. First, these studies test whether distinct positive emotion expressions serve distinct functions. If the pride expression is associated with a status- relevant signal that is not conveyed by happiness, it would support claims that pride and happiness have distinct expressions that serve divergent functions (e.g., Tracy & Robins, 2004). Such a finding would provide a more nuanced understanding of the previously documented broad association between power and positive affect (Keltner, Anderson, & Gruenfeld, 2003), and would raise challenges for the argument that most of the distinctions made among various positive emotions, and among various negative emotions, are purely cognitive conceptualizations (Barrett, 2006; Russell, 2003). Second, this is the first research to test whether emotion expressions underlie the automatic communication of status. Given the predominance of status hierarchies in everyday life, and the frequency and ease with which individuals perceive and respond to status differences (Schmid Mast & Hall, 2004), it is likely that humans infer others’ status rapidly and automatically. However, it is unclear how this is performed. The pride expression may provide one answer, having evolved as part of an adaptive system for signaling and detecting status increases. If this is the case, findings from the present research would highlight the nonverbal behavioural and emotional mechanism that underlies the conferral of status in many everyday social interactions. A third contribution of this research is its novel application of the IAT and the AMP to examine the signaling function of an emotion expression. Both methods have previously been used to examine a wide range of attitudes and preferences, including implicit prejudice (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998), self-esteem (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), consumer preferences (Maison, Greenwald & Bruin, 2004), and political voting behaviour (Payne et al., 2005); but neither has been used to test a functionalist account of emotion expressions. Given the lack of previous studies on the functions of 	
   distinct emotion expressions, this application may prove a promising innovation for future research.  Study 1 Study 1 examined whether the nonverbal expression of pride is more strongly associated with high status than are the nonverbal expressions of two other self-conscious emotions—shame and embarrassment. Shame and embarrassment expressions may function to signal low status (e.g., Fessler, 1999; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Keltner, 1995) so, theoretically, the pride expression should be more strongly associated with high status than these other expressions. If no difference is found between the expressions of pride and embarrassment/shame in their respective associations with high status, it would challenge our account of pride as having evolved to uniquely signal high status. Participants completed an IAT that paired photographs of pride expressions or photos of shame and embarrassment expressions with words representing high or low status, and we compared the speed of their responses to presumed congruent vs. incongruent pairings. If participants are faster to respond to the presumed congruent pairing (pride with high status and shame/embarrassment with low status) than to the incongruent pairing (pride with low status and shame/embarrassment with high status), it would indicate a stronger implicit association between the pride expression and high status than pride and low status, or between shame/embarrassment expressions and low status than shame/embarrassment and high status, or both. One benefit of this approach is that participants are told to categorize all stimuli as quickly as possible, so, if pride is associated with high status, individuals’ responses will demonstrate this fact despite their conscious efforts not to do so, indicating that the pride-signaling process occurs without intention and cannot be controlled.  Method Participants and Procedure 	
   Twenty undergraduate students (80% female) participated in exchange for course credit. Participants were seated at a computer with a 17” monitor, and viewed onscreen three photos of an actor displaying the pride expression, then three photos of the same actor displaying the shame or embarrassment expression. The three pride expressions were explicitly labeled “Position A”, and the three shame/embarrassment expressions were explicitly labeled “Position B”. Shame and embarrassment expressions were included within a single set because these two expressions may not be distinct cross- culturally (Edelstein & Shaver, 2007; Haidt & Keltner, 1999), and they likely serve a similar signaling function which is opposite to that of pride. Participants were given no indication that the “Positions” conveyed emotion expressions. Participants next completed an IAT pairing these photos with words representing either high or low status. They categorized the photos into the appropriate position [A or B], and the words as either high or low-status, by pressing one of two keys (accuracy rate for single-categorization tasks = 93% for photos, 95% for words). In one critical testing block, pride photos and high-status words shared a key, and shame/embarrassment photos and low-status words shared a key. In the critical comparison block, these pairings were reversed (i.e., pride and low-status shared a key, and shame/embarrassment and high-status shared a key). The order of these pairings was counterbalanced between subjects. Stimuli Expressions. Photographs depicted a Caucasian male showing three variations of pride, one variation of shame (the only expression known to reliably convey shame), and two variations of embarrassment. All variations have been demonstrated to reliably convey pride, shame, and embarrassment, respectively (Tracy & Robins, 2007b; Keltner, 1995; Haidt & Keltner, 1999). Words. The high-status words presented were commanding, dominant, important, powerful, and prestigious, and the low-status words presented were humble, minor, submissive, unimportant, and weak. We derived these words by obtaining 27 synonyms or antonyms for “high status” and “low status” 	
   from an on-line thesaurus (Kipfer, 2005), and asking 9 upper-level undergraduate psychology students to rate each word for its relevance to high and low status, separately, using 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (“I definitely would not call this high/low status”) to 5 (“I definitely would call this high/low status”; alphas = .96, .93, for high and low-status ratings, respectively). The five highest and lowest status words, all of which had mean ratings of 4.5 or greater on the high- or low-status scales, respectively, were retained. Note that the words very explicitly included the concepts for both the prestige (prestigious & unimportant) and dominance (dominant & weak) sides of the broader status concept. Inclusion of words directly relating to both components of status made it more likely that any resulting associations would be with the broader concept of status.  Results and Discussion We calculated implicit associations in accordance with the scoring algorithm proposed by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). Specifically, we first excluded responses that exceeded 10 seconds, given that participants who responded this slowly were likely not attending to the task. Second, because error rates vary systematically with implicit associations, we added a 15ms time penalty to the mean trial time for each incorrect response (rather than simply excluding trials where expressions or words were incorrectly categorized). We then calculated difference scores for each individual from these error-adjusted means, by dividing the difference between their mean reaction times for the two pairings of interest by their overall standard deviations for the two pairings. As a result, each participant was given a difference score representing the strength and direction of his/her implicit association. We conducted one-sample t-tests to determine whether these d-scores differed significantly from zero— which would suggest that differences in reaction times between pairings were meaningful. For all studies, we report mean d-scores (Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji, 2003) across participants, one sample t- test statistics, and more traditional Cohen’s ds which indicate the overall sample effect sizes. 	
   In Study 1, participants showed a strong implicit association, with substantially faster reaction times when pride expressions were paired with high-status words and shame/embarrassment expressions were paired with low-status words than when pride expressions were paired with low-status words and shame/embarrassment expressions were paired with high-status words, d-score = 0.66, t (19) = 5.56, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 2.55 (see Figure 2.1). Given that this difference emerged despite participants’ conscious efforts to respond as quickly as possible on every trial, it suggests that, at an implicit level, the pride expression is more strongly associated with high status than the shame/embarrassment expressions, or that the shame/embarrassment expressions are more strongly associated with low-status than the pride expression, or that both associations exist. To determine whether an association between pride and high status was responsible for the effect that emerged in Study 1, we conducted Study 2, in which we paired the same high and low status words with either pride expressions or a set of three photos of ‘other’ emotions, not representing pride, shame, or embarrassment. If reaction times are still faster when pride is paired with high-status words, we can conclude that the results of Study 1 were at least partly due to an association between pride and high status, given that the ‘other’ emotions are not theoretically associated with low status.  Study 2 Method Forty undergraduates (20 in each study; 80% female) participated in exchange for course credit. The method was the same as in Study 1a, except that pride expressions were paired against three photos of the same actor displaying disgust, fear, and happiness expressions (accuracy rate for photo categorization = 96%). These three expressions were chosen because they represent a mixture of positive and negative emotions that likely send messages distinct from each other and from pride, and none of the three is theoretically associated with high or low status. 	
    Results and Discussion A strong implicit association emerged between the pride expression and high status. Mean reaction times were faster when pride expressions were paired with high-status words and ‘other’ expressions were paired with low-status words than the reverse pairings, d-score = 0.60, t (19) = 4.72, p < .05, d = 2.36 (see Figure 2.1). This finding indicates that the implicit association that emerged in Study 1 was at least partly driven by an association between the pride expression and high status, and not entirely by an association between shame/embarrassment expressions and low status. However, given the necessarily relative nature of the standard IAT, we cannot be certain that the effect found here is due to pride, per se. It remains possible that the ‘other’ emotion set was implicitly associated with low status, and this association accounted for the differences that emerged. Although we included three fairly different expressions in the ‘other’ set, the inclusion of fear—an expression that may signal submission—could have been salient enough to ‘drown out’ any opposing impact of happiness and disgust, and promote a low-status association with the set as a whole. Thus, in Study 3, we used the non-relative, single-target IAT (Penke, et al., 2006) to assess whether pride is associated with high status irrespective of any comparison stimulus.  Study 3 Method Twenty undergraduate students (80% female) participated in exchange for course credit. Procedures were the same, except that instead of the standard relative IAT, participants completed a single-target IAT. As with standard IAT, the single-target IAT used the dichotomous attribute categories of high and low status, but included only one target variable – photos of the pride expression. Scores were obtained by comparing reaction times between trials where pride was paired with high-status 	
   words and trials where pride was paired with low-status words.  Results and Discussion The scoring of the single-target IAT was virtually identical to the scoring of the standard IAT. Error corrected mean reaction times for pride-high status pairings were subtracted from error-corrected means for pride-low status pairings, and the difference was divided by the standard deviation of the reaction times of both trials. Positive d-scores, therefore, indicate relatively higher (slower) reaction times for pride-low status pairings compared to pride-high status pairings, and thus a stronger (faster) relationship between pride and high status. A strong positive mean d-score of 0.22 emerged t (19) = 4.41, d = 2.02 p < .05. Given that the pride expression was not compared to any other expression in this study, these results suggest that the pride expression implicitly evokes the concept of high status irrespective of any other emotion. Furthermore, given that even low status words are associated with the broader concept of ‘status’, we might have expected no difference, or at least a weaker effect, in this study. The fact that the effect size remained large highlights the strength of the specific association between pride and high status. Although this study addresses one of the most prominent shortcomings of the standard IAT—its necessarily relative nature— other limitations remain. Most of these concerns (e.g., fake-ability, the impact of individual differences in executive control; Tierney, 2008; Payne, 2005; but see also Blanton et al. 2009) are more relevant to studies assessing undesirable biases (e.g., racism) or individual differences in implicit associations than they are to the present research goals. Nonetheless, we conducted an additional study using a non-IAT method for assessing implicit responding, to more firmly establish the implicit association between pride and high status. Specifically, in Study 4, we sought to replicate the results of Studies 1, 2, and 3 using a measure of implicit associations that has been shown to ameliorate these concerns: the affect misattribution procedure (AMP; Payne et al. 2005). 	
    Study 4 Method Thirty-five undergraduate students (80% female) participated in exchange for course credit. As in Studies 1, 2, and 3, participants were seated at a 17” computer monitor, and all task instructions appeared onscreen. The AMP was developed to measure implicit preferences by creating a situation where participants might reveal such preferences (e.g., attitudes toward African Americans) by misattributing them to an otherwise neutral stimulus (e.g., Chinese ideographs; Payne et al, 2005). In the present study, instead of focusing on affective liking or disliking responses, we used the AMP to measure a more complex misattribution—high status. Using the standard AMP procedure, we tested whether participants would misattribute their status associations with the pride expression to a neutral stimulus. To our knowledge, no previous published study has used the AMP to assess associations other than preferences. Participants were briefly but supraliminally (75ms) primed with a photo of the actor showing the pride expression, or with a photo of a neutral control stimulus (a grey box) and then, again briefly but supraliminally (100ms), shown an image of an abstract painting (see Figure 2.2). Each image was followed by a visual mask, consistent with Payne et al. (2005; see Figure 2.2). After viewing the abstract painting image, participants were asked to press one key if they felt the painting was “lower status than average,” and another key if they felt it was “higher status than average”. Following Payne et al. (2005), participants were given explicit instructions before the task began to ignore the priming photos (pride expressions or neutral images), and to base their status impression solely on the abstract art. Of note, typical AMP studies use Chinese ideographs as the neutral stimulus on to which participants are led to misattribute their preferences (e.g., Payne et al. 2005), but we were concerned that a number of our participants (students at the University of British Columbia, which has a high Asian population) would 	
   be familiar with the meaning of these ideographs and thus have prior, non-neutral, associations which would interfere with the AMP’s intended purpose. Thus, we instead used computer-generated abstract paintings, which were similar to the work of Jackson Pollack. If the pride expression is implicitly associated with high status, the logic behind the AMP predicts that this association be misattributed to the paintings, such that paintings following the pride expression would more frequently be perceived as high status than paintings following the control (grey box) prime.  Results and Discussion To calculate a pride-high status association score, we subtracted the proportion of times paintings following the control stimulus were perceived as high status from the proportion of times paintings following the pride expression were perceived as high status; this yielded a score between 1 and -1 for each participant, where 0 represents chance—meaning that participants were equally likely to rate paintings following either target stimulus as high status. Positive scores indicate a greater association between pride and high status, with a maximum score of +1 indicating that every painting following the pride expression was rated as high status, and every painting following the control stimulus was rated as low status. The mean score across all participants was +.17, which was significantly greater than chance based on the one-sample t-test, t (34) = 3.98, d = 1.37, p < .05. Furthermore, as can be seen from Figure 2.3, the large majority of participants (76%) showed a positive score, indicating an association between the pride expression and high status. Thus, using the AMP, we again found a strong implicit association between the pride expression and high status, and, together, these four studies converge to provide robust support for an implicit association between the pride expression and high status. However, given that pride is a positively valenced emotion, it remains possible that shared associations between high status and positive valence account for the association. Although happiness 	
   was included in the ‘other’ set of expressions contrasted with pride in Study 2, its positivity may have been overwhelmed by the negativity of the two other expressions in that set. Thus, it remains possible that the high-status association with the pride expression is not unique to pride, but rather is shared by other positive emotion expressions such as happiness. It also remains possible that pride is one of several high-power, status-related emotions, along with anger—another emotion known to convey a sense of power or competence (Tiedens, 2001). If this is the case, the high-status implicit associations of the pride expression would not be due to a unique signaling function, but rather to a broader dimensional property of pride (Knutson, 1996). Thus, we conducted Studies 5a and 5b to examine whether the pride expression has a stronger implicit association with high status than do the happiness (Study 5a) and anger (Study 5b) expressions.  Studies 5a and 5b Method Forty undergraduates (80% female, twenty per study) participated in exchange for course credit. We used the standard IAT methodology, as in Studies 1 and 2, but pride photos were compared with three photos displaying the happiness expression (Study 5a; accuracy rate for pride/happy photo categorization = 96%), or with three photos displaying the anger expression (Study 5b; accuracy rate for the pride/anger photo categorization = 96%). All expressions were posed by the same actor.  Results and Discussion In both studies, strong implicit associations emerged between the pride expression and high status. In Study 5a, reaction times were significantly faster when pride expressions were paired with high-status words and happiness expressions were paired with low-status words than the reverse pairings, d-score = 0.65,t (19) = 5.44, d = 2.50, p < .05 (see Figure 2.4). This finding suggests that pride is more strongly 	
   associated with high status than is happiness, and that the association between pride and high status is not solely due to positive valence. If the association was due to shared positivity, then happiness should have been equally (if not more) strongly associated with high status, compared with pride. In Study 5b, reaction times were significantly faster when pride expressions were paired with high-status words, and anger expressions were paired with low-status words, than the reverse pairings, d-score = 0.45,t (19) = 4.42, d = 1.93 p < .05. It is unlikely that this effect was driven by an association between anger and low status, given previous findings that anger expressions convey competence and that anger is a “high-status” emotion (Knutson, 1996; Tiedens, 2001). The findings from Studies 5a and 5b thus suggest that pride is likely to have a uniquely powerful expression association with high status, or at least a stronger one than any other measured emotion—even those known to convey positivity and power. However, there remains an additional alternative explanation for the pride-high status association. In two of the three pride photos included, the actor’s arms were extended out from his body, making him appear larger. In fact, increased largeness may be part of why the pride expression includes extended arms; size may be a heuristic for dominance or high status (Tracy & Robins, 2007b). However, one could appear larger yet not show the pride expression (for example, by waving one’s arms); if the pride expression evolved as a gestalt signal of status, then it should convey status above and beyond other displays that also make individuals appear larger. To determine whether the effects found are artifacts of the expanded size in the pride expression, we conducted an additional study in which we compared pride expressions with photos of the target extending his arms out from his body, but showing no other components of the pride expression. If the pride-high status association is due to increased largeness or to the use of a heuristic involving extended arms, then including this comparison should remove the implicit association between pride and high status.  	
   Study 6 Method Twenty (80% female) undergraduates participated for course credit. Using the standard IAT methodology, photos of the pride expression were paired against three photos of the actor displaying a neutral facial expression while extending his arms in three different positions (accuracy rate for pride/arms photo categorization = 95%).  Results and Discussion A strong implicit association emerged between the pride expression and high status. Reaction times were significantly faster when pride expressions were paired with high-status words and extended- arms photos were paired with low-status words than the reverse pairings, d-score = 0.45,t (19) = 4.40, d = 2.0, p < .05 (see Figure 2.4). This finding suggests that the previously documented implicit association between the pride expression and high status cannot be attributed solely to the extended arms or expanded size conveyed as part of the pride expression.  General Discussion  Together, these six studies provide strong support for a robust implicit association between the pride expression and the concept of high status. The association between pride and high status emerged when pride was compared with low-status emotions – shame and embarrassment – and when it was compared with a set of other emotions not theoretically relevant to status (disgust, fear, and happiness). This association also emerged when pride was directly compared with happiness and anger expressions, suggesting that the association cannot be accounted for by positive valence or a more general association between a range of emotions, including pride, and the dimension of power or status. Our final study 	
   comparing the pride expression with expressions in which the actor extended his arms out to appear larger demonstrates that the association between pride and high status is not the result of an artifact of the expression’s appearance, such as expanded body size or outstretched arms. Moreover, the finding of a strong association between pride and high status emerged from studies using three different methodologies, including one (the AMP) which assesses implicit associations without relying on reaction times. In all studies, the association between pride and high status was large- -all Cohen’s ds exceeded 1.0 and most were greater than 2.0-- suggesting that the pride expression is a strong signal of high-status.  Implications The first major implication of this research is that the pride expression appears to be a fairly specific signal of high status. Given the findings from Study 6, the pride display may be best viewed as a gestalt signal in which the sum of various parts (expanded body posture, small smile, head tilt back, arms extended) transmits an automatically interpreted message. However, it is also possible that the pride expression is more strongly associated with high status compared with the extended arms displays, or the happiness display, because it includes a greater number of pride-prototypical components. Future studies might address this issue by examining which components of the pride expression are necessary and sufficient to signal high status. A second implication is that the pride expression sends a message that is distinct from that of happiness, consistent with a growing body of research suggesting that distinct positive emotions, such as pride and happiness, may have evolved to serve distinct functions (e.g., Shiota, Campos, Keltner, & Hertenstein, 2004; Williams & DeSteno, 2008). This finding challenges the view that distinctions within the category of positive emotions are cognitive conceptualizations not likely to be manifested in behaviour (Barrett, 2006; Russell, 2003). 	
   Third, the high status association with the pride expression also appears to be distinct from any association made with anger. Previous research has shown that displays of anger lead observers to judge individuals as more professionally qualified than individuals displaying sadness (Tiedens, 2001). Thus, anger seems to convey a sense of power or competence, at least relative to a low power (and presumably low status) emotion such as sadness. Yet, the present findings suggest that the anger expression does not convey high status to the same extent as pride; in fact, when compared with pride, anger was relatively more associated with low status. This distinction, between pride and anger expressions in conveying status, may relate to the specificity of the message. Whereas the anger expression may represent a ‘quick and dirty’ way of communicating aggression—a message that indirectly informs observers of the expresser’s power and possible status—the pride expression may send a more distinct message of earned status, which could be based on aggressive power or on more affiliative behaviours such as leadership or task competence (Tracy et al., 2009). As a result, the overall message sent by anger is likely quite different from that sent by pride—observers may learn that the angry individual is powerful, but they will also be motivated to avoid him/her. Pride, in contrast, sends a clear message of high status and thus is unlikely to motivate avoidance; in fact, observers may choose to seek out proud individuals as valuable social group members. Future studies are needed to further address this issue by examining the responsive behaviours elicited by each expression, but the present research indicates that there is a distinction between the status associations of the two expressions.  Moreover, in contrast to Tiedens’ (2001) finding that angry individuals are explicitly viewed as competent, the current results demonstrate that high-status perceptions of the pride expression are unelaborated and automatic. Indeed, this is the first research to suggest that our ability to rapidly and involuntarily assess social status may be due, in part, to our ability to automatically recognize and interpret displays of pride (Tracy & Robins, 2008b). In the five IAT studies we conducted, participants faced conditions in which they viewed high status words and expressions of pride, and were instructed 	
   to respond as quickly as possible to all stimuli. Yet, across studies, participants had markedly more difficulty inhibiting the association between pride and high status than inhibiting associations between pride and low status, and between other emotions (including anger and happiness) and high status. This suggests that understanding and interpreting the high status message sent by the pride expression cannot be controlled. Thus, given that status is likely automatically perceived in many everyday social interactions, the present findings provide insight into how this process may work. Individuals may grant status to others implicitly, on the basis of their pride expressions, even in cases where perceivers may wish to avoid doing so. The resultant knowledge and understanding gained, of the relative status of social group members, is likely an important part of interpersonal perception. Finally, these studies suggest a novel application of the IAT and the AMP: the examination of functional signals sent by distinct emotion expressions. Given the strength of the effects found here, these methodologies hold promise for future research on emotion expressions. For example, researchers have long assumed that both anger and fear signal threat; implicit association studies could be used to determine whether this association is equally strong for both expressions. Studies could also examine how motivational state influences the way individuals perceive the messages sent by particular expressions; for example, does the association between the anger expression and threat depend on whether participants feel powerful vs. weak?  Limitations and Future Directions Researchers planning on using these implicit measures for studying emotion expression associations should, however, bear in mind several limitations. In Study 4, we followed Payne and colleagues (2005) in using the neutral grey box as the AMP’s control stimulus. This decision introduces the possible alternate explanation that a picture of any person—regardless of expression—is more associated with high status than a neutral box. However, since we were already changing the attribute on 	
   which the painting were rated from simple liking or disliking to the more complex concept of status, we elected to match the other elements of the study to the original AMP as closely as possible. Nonetheless, future research should consider using a neutral but human image as a control. Another caveat to be aware of is that for all future studies using similar methodologies as well as for the present research we cannot know whether the message sent by a particular expression is attributed to the sender, or whether any complex interpersonal judgment has been made. These measures only indicate that an implicit association exists between the expression and the message. Several other issues limit the conclusions that can be drawn from this research, and should be addressed in future studies. First, all target photos featured the same individual: a 24 year-old white male. By including the same expresser across studies, we were able to make comparisons between conditions and studies. However, these findings should be replicated using female expressers and individuals of other ethnicities. Given that previous research has shown that status cues differ for males and females, and that pride recognition rates vary slightly depending on the gender and ethnicity of the individuals who show these expressions (Schmidt Mast & Hall, 2004; Tracy & Robins, 2008a), it is possible that the influence of these displays on perceived status may also be moderated by gender or ethnicity; furthermore, we might expect target by perceiver interactions. No perceiver-gender differences emerged in the present research, but this may have been due to the considerably fewer male participants included. Second, all of the present studies relied on static and decontextualized images of emotion expressions. Although this format was chosen to maximize internal validity, future studies are needed to test whether the status associations of these expressions would be maintained under more externally valid conditions, where individuals have access to a greater bandwidth of sensory cues as well as additional contextual information (such as whether the expresser has experienced a success or failure). In conclusion, the present research suggests that the pride expression possesses a strong 	
   association with high status, and is consistent with the suggestion that pride evolved to serve this purpose. However, alternative explanations for the present findings remain. It is possible, for example, that the pride-high status association has become implicitly entrenched through cultural learning, although the recent finding that pride is spontaneously displayed following status-increasing events (i.e., achievement) even by the congenitally blind, who are unlikely to have learned the expression from cultural models, argues against this (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). Nonetheless, evolutionary arguments for the pride-high status association will be considerably strengthened if the present findings generalize across cultures. Given the pan-human universality of status hierarchies (Buss, 2001) and the finding that the pride expression is reliably recognized in isolated non-literate cultures (Tracy & Robins, 2008a), the door is open for future studies to more directly address this issue.  	
   Acknowledgments We are grateful to the Social Sciences Research Council of Canada for supporting this research (File #s 767-2006-1980 and 410-2006-1593). We also thank Lara Aknin, Vanja Alispahic, Emma Buchtel, Joey Cheng, Lesley Duncan, and Christine Prehn for their helpful comments on the paper, and Jeff Markusoff for his help with the study design, data collection, and comments on the paper. 	
  Overall error-adjusted mean reaction times across participants, separately for Studies 1, 2, and 3. Note. Higher (i.e., slower) reaction times indicate a weaker association. These means should be treated as a crude measure of IAT effects because, unlike the d-scores reported in text, they do not account for individual variability, although they do account for errors. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. ‘Hi Pride/Lo ShameEmb’ refers to the condition in which pride expressions were paired with high-status words, and shame/embarrassment expressions were paired with low-status words. This condition was compared with the ‘Hi ShameEmb/Lo Pride’ condition, where shame/embarrassment expressions were paired with high-status words and pride expressions with low-status words. ‘Other’ refers to the combination of disgust, fear, and happy expressions. The corresponding d-scores of all three comparisons are significant. 	
  Sequential order of the priming procedure used in Study 4. Participants viewed  the brief but supraliminal image of either the pride expression (top left) or a neutral grey box (top right). The abstract painting, which participants were asked to classify as high or low status, was then displayed between two masks.  	
  Distribution of scores on the affective misattribution procedure. Each data-point represents one participant. Positive scores indicate a greater proportional likelihood of classifying a painting as “higher status than average” following the brief presentation of the pride expression, compared to the brief presentation of a neutral stimulus. Twenty-six of 34 participants scored (76%) above zero, indicating a greater implicit association between the pride expression and high status than between the neutral stimulus and high status.  	
  Overall error-adjusted mean reaction times across participants, separately for Studies 5a, 5b and 6. Note: Higher (i.e., slower) reaction times indicate a weaker association. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 'Happy' refers to happiness expressions; ‘Angry’ refers to anger expressions; ‘Arms’ refers to neutral expressions with extended arms; and ‘Hi’ refers to high- status words; ‘Lo’ to low-status words. Thus, ‘HiPride/LoArms’ refers to the condition in which pride expressions were paired with high-status words, and photos of the target with extended arms were paired with low-status words. This condition was compared against the ‘HiArms/LoPride’ condition where the pairings were reversed. The corresponding d-scores of all three comparisons are significant. 	
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         Chapter Three (Implicitly) Judging a Book By Its Cover: The Unavoidable Inference of Status from Pride and Shame Expressions5    	
  55 A version of this chapter will be submitted for publication. Shariff, A., Markusoff, J.L & Tracy, J. L. (2010). (Implicitly) Judging a Book By Its Cover: The Unavoidable Inference of Status from Pride and Shame Expressions	
   “The world more often rewards the appearance of merit than merit itself.” François de la Rochefoucauld (1999/1664) How do people choose whom to listen to, respect, and follow? On what bases, and with how much deliberation, do individuals decide to dole out that most precious capital—social status? Are these decisions made on the basis of a collection of facts, diligently sorted through? Or are they guided more by implicit and unavoidable cognitive reflexes, leading us to make snap judgments based on shallow criteria? How, in the end, do we actually decide who gets power? The Emotion Expressions of Power Status hierarchies are a central and universal feature of human cultures (Fried, 1967). The division of groups into dominant and submissive individuals facilitates group tasks and builds a stronger base for group cooperation (Bales, 1950; Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980; Ellis, 1995). Of course, though individual differences in status streamline group interaction, the benefits of status differences are unequally distributed among the hierarchy; high status individuals benefit by commanding greater power over others, more influence over group decisions, greater access to coveted resources, and better health, longevity, and, ultimately, reproductive fitness (Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980; Sapolsky, 2004; Hill, 1984). Thus, although the group as a whole benefits from belonging to a group with a clear status hierarchy, high-status group members tend to benefit more than their lower-status conspecifics Recent research suggests that nonverbal behaviours—in particular, the nonverbal emotion expressions of pride and shame—play a key role in communicating social status. These two reliably recognized expressions (Izard, 1971; Keltner, 1995; Tracy & Robins, 2004) expressions are morphologically similar to the dominance and appeasement displays of non-human animals, 	
   in form, antecedent elicitors, and function. In particular, the pride display, which includes a slight smile, head titled back, expanded chest, and arms extended out from the body (Tracy & Robins, 2007), shares features with the “bluff” displays known to be characteristic of dominant chimpanzees (de Waal, 1989; Martens, Tracy, Parr, & Cheng, 2010). The shame display involves a head-title toward and eye-gaze downcast, as well as slumped shoulders (Keltner, 1995; Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008)—behaviours similar to those shown by a range of non-human animals across the mammalian species (Keltner & Buswell, 1996). The pride expression has been found to be spontaneously elicited in status-relevant success situations, such as winning an Olympic judo competition or succeeding at an experimental task (Lewis, Sullivan, & Allesandri, 1993; Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008), and the shame expression tends to occur in response to failure or social transgressions that could result in status declines (Keltner, Young & Buswell; Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). Further, these effects have been shown to occur across a wide array of cultures, and even by congenitally blind athletes who could not have learned to show the display through visual modeling (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). On the observer side, researchers have revealed both of these displays to be recognized by individuals from a range of cultures, including traditional small-scale societies in Burkina Faso and Fiji (Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Tracy & Robins, 2008; Tracy, Shariff, Zhao & Henrich, 2010). Most of the literature investigating emotion expressions from the observer side is of this type, focused on the human facility to reliably identify a small set of decontextualized expressions (see Keltner & Ekman, 2000). This research can reveal much about the universality of emotions, but little about its function. A handful of studies have, however, moved beyond the question of recognition, and instead begun examining the functional social messages these expressions send. Rather than ask whether particular expressions are recognized and labeled as particular emotions, 	
   these studies assess the meaning behind expressions, and thus their broader communicative value (Mineka & Ohman, 2002; Shariff & Tracy, 2009; Ames & Johar, 2009). The Power of Emotions Expressions This functionalist perspective has its roots in evolutionary theories suggesting that humans developed two complimentary adaptations: one for displaying a core suite of distinct, pan- culturally recognizable expressions, and another for automatically interpreting the meaning behind these expressions. By viewing the emotion expression as a potent, pre-linguistic form of social communication, these theories predict that an expression’s functional message is automatically processed outside of conscious control and awareness (Ohman, 2002). With reference to pride and shame, specifically, recent experiments have used implicit cognition methodologies to reveal an implicit and automatic link between the expressions of pride and shame and the concept of social status (Shariff & Tracy, 2009). Using three separate implicit association measures—the traditional Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwarz, 1998), the single-target IAT (Penke, Eichstaedt & Asendropf, 2006)and the Affective Misattribution Paradigm (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun & Stewart, 2005)—these studies examined the automatic associations between status concepts and a host of emotion expressions including those pride, shame, happiness, sadness and anger. In each study, pride showed large implicit associations with high status. In direct comparisons against the happiness and anger expressions, as well as posed expressions mimicking only certain elements of the pride expression, the pride expression consistently showed stronger high status associations, thus indicating that the high status association is not merely an artifact of the positivity or power of pride, nor of the expanded body size featured in its expression. The shame expression did show significant associations with low status, but no more so than the similar expression of sadness. 	
   These studies provide empirical support for the functionalist claim that the pride display, at least, serves the role of an automatically interpreted signal of social status. However, these studies, like most studies on emotion expressions, presented emotion expressions in an entirely decontextualized form. The relative influence of context has been a matter of some debate within the research on emotion recognition. Some research has found that when adding other contextual cues, people nonetheless continue to use the emotion expression, and largely ignore the other cues, in determining the target’s emotion (e.g. Nakamura, Buck & Kenny, 1990; Meeren, van Heijnsbergen, & de Gelder, 2005). Other research has however shown that judgments about a target’s emotion are heavily influenced by contextual cues, often more so than the expressions themselves (e.g. Carroll & Russell, 1996; Aviezer et al. 2008). Thus there remains no clear consensus on the relative effects of expression and context on emotion recognition. For studies that move beyond the question of recognition to examine instead the social messages that recognized expressions convey, ignoring context may be even more problematic. Though the IAT studies discussed above clearly indicate that the pride and shame expressions communicate an implicit message of status, in reality these messages almost always occur in a broader social context, and are interpreted along with numerous other cues. If observers paid no attention to context and relied only on the cues sent be emotion expressions, then power-hungry status seekers exploit the easily faked pride display to receive status benefits without obtaining actual achievements. Observers must, therefore, draw on other sources of knowledge (i.e., does the individual legitimately merit high status?), rather than award status simply on the basis of an expression. But to what degree? If we go by the research on emotion recognition, there are two schools of thought. One line of research shows that context cues are processed very quickly and actually 	
   shape the message sent by the emotion expression (Aviezer et al. 2008; Carroll & Russell, 1996). By this logic, one would expect that in the case where contextual information contradicts the pride expression’s high-status message, context should take precedence (i.e. if an observer knows an individual is low-status—perhaps he just lost his job, or was publically humiliated—this information should be more relevant to predicting the individual’s status than an emotional display. Contrary to longstanding theoretical accounts emphasizing the centrality of emotion expressions to nonverbal communication (e.g., Ekman, 2003), as well as the functionalist account discussed above (Ohman, 2002; Shariff & Tracy, 2009), this line of thought disputes the idea that emotion expressions send pre-prepared meaning-laden signals. Despite the prominent role that emotion expressions have played in psychological science (Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005), this issue remains unresolved. The level of influence that clearly contradictory emotion expression and context cues have on person perception and social interaction, remains an open question. How then do emotion expressions stack up against non- emotionally derived knowledge? The Present Research In order to test these competing hypotheses, we sought to measure the relative strength of the pride and shame expressions compared to clear-cut contextual information about an individual’s status, in situations where expressions and context were incongruent. We addressed this question at two levels of processing—implicit and deliberative. If emotion expressions evolved as pre-linguistic, pre-conscious forms of communication, their functional messages should be best perceived using low-level cognitive processes (Greenwald, 1992; Bargh, & Pietromonaco, 1982). In contrast, higher-level cognitive adaptations (e.g., deliberative reasoning) might facilitate the use of context to override a faked expression (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 	
   1989). Few studies have explored how context influences the social impact of emotion expressions (but see Aviezer et al., 2008; Hugenberg & Baudenhausen, 2003; Masuda et al., 2008), and none we know of has examined how competing contextual information affects the meaning inferred from an expression beyond the specific emotion conveyed. Furthermore, we know of no studies that have taken a dual-process approach to this issue, exploring how context and expression shape person judgments under conditions of both implicit and explicit processing. Studies 1-3 addressed these issues using two different measures of implicit cognition, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwarz, 1998) and the Affective Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun & Stewart, 2005). These studies examined the extent to which implicit inferences of an individual’s status are made on the basis of rapidly perceived pride and shame expressions, or on rationally derived knowledge about the person and situation. Studies4 and 5 addressed the same question at explicit levels of processing, asking whether emotion expressions that are incongruous to situational context influence important status related decision-making. Studies 1-4 used static images of individuals posing pride and shame expressions to examine the degree to which expressions and context influence status-relevant perceptions of a target, while Study 5 made use of dynamic videos, portraying actors displaying pride and shame expressions while engaging in a face-to-face interaction, to measure the influence of expressions and context on explicit status judgments and hiring decisions. Overall, this research uses both implicit and explicit methodologies to address the critical question of whether observers automatically grant status to those displaying the pride expression, and remove status from those displaying shame, even when available contextual information tells them they should not. 	
   Study 1 In our first study, we sought to determine whether conflicting contextual information would influence participants’ automatic status associations of target individuals showing pride and shame. Previous research suggests that pride sends a strong automatic signal of high status, but it is not clear whether this would occur if the target showing pride was known, via non- emotional contextual information, to merit low status. This study thus measured implicit status perceptions when emotion expressions and contextual information were directly pitted against each other. To do so, we used the IAT to compare implicit associations between targets and social status for two groups of participants. One group saw the targets express an emotion expression that was incongruent with the context information that was provided, while the other group received the same context information, but the targets displayed neutral emotion expressions throughout. Method Sixty-eight undergraduates (73% female) participated in exchange for course credit. Seated at a computer workstation, participants viewed, on a 17” monitor, two photos of a college-age male of European descent displaying a neutral expression, in one case wearing a green t-shirt, and in the other a blue t-shirt. Participants were informed that these two photos in fact portrayed two different individuals—twin brothers. By using the same target individual across expression and context conditions, we were able ensure that any differences found between conditions were not due to physiognomic features of the targets. Two cues were used to convey a contextually based status difference between the “twins”. First, alongside the photos, textual information explained that one twin, Mark, is well-respected as the top player and captain of a successful 	
   soccer team, while the other twin, Steve, is a poor player who doubles as the team’s waterboy.6 Second, in all photos the twins wore different coloured t-shirts emblazoned with “Captain” or “Waterboy” (see Figure 3.1). As a manipulation check, and to ensure that contextual information was correctly encoded, after reading this information and viewing the neutral-expression photos, participants rated the status of each twin on a Likert-scale ranging from 1 (“very low status”) to 7 (“very high status”). Participants were next randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects experimental conditions: a neutral-expression condition, or a context-incongruent expression condition. They then completed a task designed to familiarize them with the stimuli they would be viewing in the IAT. Specifically, participants in the neutral condition viewed two photos of each twin displaying neutral expressions and categorized them as either ‘Mark’ or ‘Steve’ (accuracy = 94%). Participants in the context-incongruent condition completed the same categorization task, but instead of viewing photos of the twins displaying neutral expressions, these participants viewed three photos of Mark, the captain, displaying the shame expression, and three photos of Steve, the waterboy, displaying the pride expression (categorization accuracy = 95%). All participants next categorized ten words previously validated to convey high and low status (Shariff & Tracy, 2009) as ‘High Status’ or ‘Low Status’ (accuracy = 91%). Participants next completed the IAT. The IAT assesses	
   6 The full text and images are available at: http://www.psych.ubc.ca/~azim/shariffmarkusofftracy/emotionscenarios.html	
  participants completed two practice blocks, followed by two counterbalanced test blocks of 40 IAT trials. In one block, they were asked to press one key if presented with either a high-status word or a photo of Mark, the captain, who, depending on experimental condition displayed either shame or a neutral expression, and another key if presented with a low-status word or a photo of Steve, the waterboy, who displayed either pride or a neutral expression, again depending on condition. In the alternate block, these pairings were reversed, such that the captain was paired with low status and the waterboy with high status. Participants were instructed to respond as rapidly as possible while keeping errors to a minimum. For the participants in the neutral condition, a comparison of mean reaction times between the two blocks—specifically, the degree to which participants were faster to pair the captain with high status and the waterboy with low status than they were to make the opposite pairings— reveals the strength of participants’ implicit status associations with each twin, associations formed by the contextual knowledge provided about the twins’ roles as captain and waterboy. This effect size can then be compared to that emerging for participants in the context- incongruent condition, to reveal the impact of the context-incongruent emotion expressions on the implicit status associations with each twin. Given that the presumably high-status captain displayed shame, and the presumably low-status waterboy displayed pride, we would expect any implicit high-status associations with the captain over the waterboy to be markedly reduced from 	
   the neutral condition, if these emotion expressions do influence person-perception even in the context of incongruent status information. Following the IAT, participants were asked to enter demographic information regarding their age, gender, and ethnicity and were then debriefed and dismissed Results and Discussion Participants’ initial explicit status ratings confirmed the effectiveness of the context manipulation; the captain was rated as substantially higher status than the waterboy, Ms = 5.74 vs. 3.13, t (47) = 10.76, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 3.14. For the implicit measure, IAT d-scores were calculated within each experimental condition (i.e., separately for neutral-expression and context-incongruent expression participants) following Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003).7 Positive d-scores represent lower (faster) reaction times for the context-congruent captain/high status and waterboy/low status pairings than the reverse incongruent pairings, indicating a positive implicit association between status and the context manipulation. Within the neutral expression condition, implicit status judgments matched the pattern found in the explicit ratings; a one-sample t-test showed that the mean d- score that emerged, 0.58, significantly differed from zero, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 1.71, indicating that participants were significantly faster at categorizing the captain when he was paired with high-status words and the waterboy when he was paired with low-status words, compared to the reverse pairings. Thus, consistent with explicit ratings, the context manipulation had the predicted effect on implicit status judgments. 	
   7 15ms penalties were assigned to each incorrect response. For each participant, error-adjusted mean-reaction times for expression-congruent pairings were then subtracted from error-adjusted mean reaction times for context-congruent pairings. This difference was divided by the standard deviation of both trials to yield a d-score. 	
    The corresponding d-score for the context-incongruent condition was -.21. Based on paired and one-sample t-tests, this figure is not only significantly different from that found in the neutral condition, t (65) = 5.52, p < .05, d = 1.37, but also significantly below zero, t (34) = 2.42, p < .05, d = .82. This finding, that the d-score reversed direction from that in the neutral condition, indicates that participants in the context-incongruent condition were faster to categorize the shame-displaying captain with low status and the pride-displaying waterboy with high status than they were to perform the reverse pairings, despite the fact that this meant making associations that contradicted the strong status information provided about each. Thus, the incongruent expressions not only notably reduced the effect of context on implicit status judgments, but in fact, overpowered the incongruent contextual information in shaping judgments. Implicit judgments were driven more by emotion expressions than by context. These findings provide initial support for the power of emotion expressions in status judgments, in particular, and in person-perception, more broadly. However, the traditional IAT is a necessarily relative method; it can only measure the strength of particular associations as compared to particular other associations. This limitation prevented us from determining whether one of the two emotion expressions—pride or shame—was more (or even solely) responsible for the effects found. Study 2 addressed this issue by using a different measure of implicit responding, the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne et al., 2005), which allowed us to compare both emotions with a neutral control. Study 2 In Study 2, we sought to replicate and expand the findings of Study 1 by using a different implicit association measure—the AMP—that allows for comparisons of both shame and pride against a control, rather than just with each other. The AMP, also uses a misattribution paradigm 	
   rather than reaction-time differences to measure implicit associations, and shows superior reliability to the IAT (Payne et al, 2005), a factor in the IAT that has drawn some criticism (Schnabel, Asendorpf & Greenwald, 2008; Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Tierney, 2008). Using a different implicit measure (which operates on a different rationale) from that of the first study, thus allows us to more robustly test our hypothesis without relying exclusively on the popular but controversial IAT. Participants briefly but supraliminally shown a target stimulus (i.e., the pride-expressing waterboy, shame-expressing captain, or neutral grey box as a control) followed by a neutral ambiguous stimulus (i.e., an abstract art painting), and are then asked to rate the latter on a particular attribute (i.e., status), while ignoring the former. Thus, if the pride expression influences implicit judgments of high status even in the face of contradicting contextual information, the ambiguous abstract paintings appearing after the pride-expressing waterboy should receive more high-status judgments than the abstract paintings appearing after control images and images of the shame-expressing captain. In contrast, if context is more important than expression, paintings appearing after the shame-expressing captain would receive the most high-status judgments. Method Sixty undergraduates8(70% female) participated in exchange for course credit. As in Study 1, prior to completing the implicit task, participants provided explicit status ratings of two “twin” targets. They viewed the same photos of the captain and waterboy showing neutral expressions, 	
   8 Four other participants with mean reaction times under 500ms were removed due to suspicion of random responding. Their inclusion does not meaningfully change the results.	
   accompanied by the same contextual information, and rated the status of each twin on a 7-point Likert-scale. Participants then completed 72 trials of the AMP in randomized order. Target images (proud waterboy, shamed captain, or a neutral grey box as a control) were presented for 75ms each, and were immediately followed by a 125ms visual mask. Abstract paintings9were then shown for 100ms, and followed by a visual mask, which remained on screen until the next trial began (see Figure 3.2). In each trial, after viewing the abstract painting, participants were prompted to indicate whether the painting was “higher or lower status than average”. Following Payne et al. (2005), they were explicitly instructed, prior to the task, to ignore the target photos and base status judgments solely on the paintings. Although judging the status of a painting is a somewhat odd task, participants did not indicate any difficulty in completing it, and previous research demonstrated the effectiveness of this method in uncovering the implicit status- associations of emotion expressions (Shariff & Tracy, 2009). Following completion of the AMP, participants were asked to enter demographic information regarding their age, gender, and ethnicity, and were then debriefed and dismissed Results and Discussion Explicit ratings again confirmed the effectiveness of the manipulation; the captain was rated higher status than the waterboy when both showed neutral expressions, Ms = 5.67 vs. 3.27, t (59) = 10.72, p < .05, d = 2.79. These figures are nearly identical to those found in Study 1. 	
   9 Typical AMP studies use Chinese ideographs as neutral stimuli (e.g., Payne et al. 2005), but we used computer-generated abstract paintings (see http://www.jacksonpollock.org) instead, due to the large number of Chinese-speakers in the population from which our sample was drawn. These paintings were compiled and validated by Eva Zysk for use in AMP studies conducted by the UBC Psychobiological Determinants of Health Laboratory.	
   In the AMP, a significant difference emerged in the proportion of high- to low-status judgments made following the three target stimuli, F (2,180) = 4.30, p < .05. Based on planned contrasts, abstract paintings following the pride-expressing waterboy were more frequently judged as high status (59%) than those following both the shame-expressing captain (46%), t (63) = 2.49, p < .05,d = 0.63, and control images (48%), t (63) = 2.36, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 0.59. Judgments following the shamed captain and control images did not significantly differ, t (63) = .34, p > .05 (see Figure 3.3). These results replicate those of Study 1 in showing that, at an implicit level, the pride expression signals high status even in the face of contradicting contextual information. Indeed, it appears that in certain circumstances the information sent by pride has a greater impact on social judgments than does context. The low-status message sent by shame appears to be somewhat less powerful, but the shame expression nonetheless clearly conveys some indication of low status. Though the shame expressions did not overwhelm the contextual status information in the way that the pride expression did, the finding that the paintings following images of the shame- expressing captain were judged no higher status than those following the control stimulus suggests that the low status information sent by the shame expression nullified the impact of the contextual information. Together, the results of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that expressing pride or shame has a powerful impact on the level of status an individual is automatically perceived to have, regardless of his/her actual deservedness of status. Furthermore, social observers cannot avoid inferring status on this basis, and may not even be aware of doing so. However, one limitation of these studies is our use of a single context manipulation, which may simply be weaker than the emotion manipulation. We manipulated context using the captain/waterboy distinction because it 	
   clearly represents two opposing ends of a team’s status hierarchy—a hierarchy readily understood by our undergraduate sample. However, though this distinction does approximate the kinds of status comparisons people make on a daily basis (e.g., boss vs. employee, bully vs. wimp), using a still wider status differential would provide a stronger test of whether incongruent emotions influence implicit judgments in such circumstances. A related limitation of Studies 1 and 2 is the asymmetry between the modalities used to communicate emotion expression information and contextual information. Emotion expressions were presented in pictorial format, allowing for a clear visual difference between the manipulated expressions. Contextual information, in contrast, was presented verbally, first by a written description of the two targets and, second by the printed words emblazoned on their t- shirts. Thus, the stronger effects that emerged for emotion expressions may have been byproducts of the differential processing of text and images (Glaser, 1992). Study 3 addresses both of these limitations by replicating the methodology of Study 1 using a context manipulation that is stronger and more visually obvious: the distinction between a businessman versus a homeless vagrant. Study 3 To test whether the effect of the pride and shame expressions on implicit status inferences in the face of contradicting contextual information would be as strong when contextual status information was even stronger, in Study 3 we used a new set of status-relevant context cues. Instead of twins whose roles placed them at opposite ends of their team and social circle’s status hierarchy, we used twins whose roles place them at opposite ends of our larger societal status hierarchy. Specifically, we compared the implicit status associations of one twin who was a well- dressed businessman, and the other a homeless beggar dressed in dirty rags and blankets. The 	
   more extreme status differential between these two targets provided a more stringent test of the power of the pride and shame expressions’ influence. Furthermore, with these targets we were able to directly convey the relevant contextual information through readily apparent visual information (see Figure 3.4), allowing for greater symmetry in the way that both sources of information—context and emotion expression—were processed. Method Forty undergraduates (70% female) completed an IAT similar to that used in Study 1, in exchange for course credit. All participants viewed photos of identical twins, accompanied by a passage explaining that one twin, Mark, worked in finance, while the other, Steve, was homeless.1 As in Studies 1 and 2, the actor portraying both Mark and Steve was a college-aged Caucasian male. Both twins displayed neutral expressions in these pre-test photos, but, in contrast to Study 1, the visual differences between the twins were quite pronounced. Mark wore an expensive blazer and was clean shaven, while Steve wore torn and dirty clothing, carried an old, tattered blanket, and appeared to be unwashed (see Figure 3.4). Following exposure to these initial stimuli, participants completed the same explicit status measure used in Studies 1 and 2. They then completed the familiarization tasks from Study 1, in which they sorted images of the targets into categories bearing their names (accuracy = 97%), and sorted status words into low-status and high-status categories (accuracy = 94%). They then completed two counterbalanced blocks of 40 IAT trials in the same manner as in Study 1. Half the participants were randomly assigned to a neutral-expression condition, in which they completed the IAT with both targets showing neutral expressions, and the other half to an expression-incongruent condition, in which they completed the IAT with each target displaying a context-incongruent expression; that is, the businessman showed shame and the homeless man 	
   showed pride (see Figure 3.4). Following the IAT, participants were asked to enter demographic information regarding their age, gender, and ethnicity and were then debriefed and dismissed Results and Discussion Based on initial explicit status ratings, the context manipulation had the intended effect; the businessman was explicitly rated substantially higher in status than the homeless man when both displayed neutral expressions, Ms = 4.70 vs. 1.90, t (38) = 8.85, p < .05, d = 2.87. Computing d-scores within each experimental condition separately, we found, first, that within the neutral-expression condition participants were powerfully swayed by context, showing substantially faster reaction times when pairing the businessman with high status and the homeless man with low status than the reverse pairings, d-score = .70, t (19) = 12.76, p < .05, d = 5.85. This finding replicates that from Study 1, but the difference here is considerably stronger, suggesting that we were successful in creating a context manipulation with a stronger impact on implicit status inferences than that of the waterboy/captain distinction. We next compared this mean d-score to that in the expression-incongruent condition. As predicted, the large effect of context on implicit status associations was markedly reduced for in this condition, t (38) = 3.85, p < .05, d = 1.25. A one-sample t-test revealed that the d-score that emerged in this condition, 0.09, did not significantly differ from zero t (19) = .63, p > .50; though emotion expressions did not overwhelm contextual information to the same extent as they did in Study 1, they nonetheless had a powerful enough impact to nullify the effect of context (see Figure 3.4). In other words, the contradictory status signals sent by the emotion expressions, on the one hand, and the visually obvious and very strong context manipulation, on the other hand, effectively cancelled each other out, leading the shame-displaying businessman to be implicitly perceived as equally high in status to the pride-displaying hobo. The complete dissipation of the large 	
   difference effect that emerged in the neutral condition demonstrates the powerful influence of emotion expressions on implicit status judgments. Studies 1-3 have examined how implicit status judgments are affected by competing cues—contextual information about a target individual’s actual deserved status, on the one hand, and the status-signaling emotion expressions of pride and shame, on the other. Given evidence that pride and shame communicate status implicitly (Shariff & Tracy, 2009), our focus has been on the question of how these cues compete to influence implicit status inferences. However, we do not know whether these implicit associations inform actual, real-world status judgments, and explicit inferences. In other words, it is possible that a proud homeless man may send an implicit message of high status to observers, but these observers will nonetheless use their conscious, deliberative resources to override that message and explicitly judge the individual as low-status, and undeserving of status-related rewards and resources. If this is the case, it would suggest that emotion expressions influence person perception in fairly limited circumstances—in situations where only low-level, unconscious processing is possible. Given that many status-related judgments and decisions, such as questions of whom to hire, fire, or promote, whom to vote for, and whom to work, play, and mate with, are made with conscious, deliberative resources, the findings from Studies 1-3 leave open the question of whether emotion expressions influence real- world judgments and decision-making, when those expressions conflict with available contextual cues. The goal of Studies 4 and 5 was to address this issue by examining the impact of competing context and pride/shame expressions on explicit judgments of the targets’ status (Study 4) and explicit decisions about whether the targets should be hired for a high-status position. 	
   Study 4 In Study 4, we examined how, and whether, context-incongruent emotion expressions influence status judgments when deliberative processing is possible. Specifically we presented participants with images of the same targets used in Studies 1 and 2 (the waterboy/captain twin- brothers), and asked them to make explicit judgments about the likelihood of each target completing a series of status-relevant behaviours. We again manipulated the targets’ emotion expressions (neutral vs. context-incongruent) between participants, allowing us to again separately compare the naked effect of the context manipulation on our dependent variable against its effect when combined with the incongruent pride and shame expressions. Method Participants and Procedure Fifty undergraduates (80% female) completed an online questionnaire in exchange for a monetary compensation of $5 and a chance to win a $25 prize. The study began with all participants viewing the same neutral expression photos of Mark, the captain, and Steve, the waterboy, used in Studies 1 and 2, and reading the same text-based contextual information as was provided in those studies. We elected to use the captain/waterboy context manipulation, rather than businessman/homeless man manipulation, because its greater ecological validity (i.e., people more typically make explicit status comparisons between targets in the same social circle than those in completely different social circles) fit with Study 4’s aim of simulating real-world status judgments that students would plausibly make. Following the context manipulation, participants were randomly assigned to either a neutral expression condition, or a context-incongruent expression condition. In both conditions, they 	
   were instructed to judge which of the twins would be more likely to fit each of a series of 20 statements about an individual’s behaviour. Throughout this questionnaire, those in the neutral condition viewed photos of both twins displaying neutral expression, while those in the context- incongruent condition viewed photos where the captain displayed shame and the waterboy displayed pride. This particular procedure, of responding to the question while exposed to either neutral or context-incongruent photos, was employed in order to roughly emulate the IATs used in Study 1, with the notable differences that judgments were made with conscious deliberation, and dealt with status-related behaviours rather than implicit status concepts. After completing the status judgments, participants were asked to enter demographic information regarding their age, gender, and ethnicity. Materials The explicit judgment questionnaire contained 20 items for which participants were instructed to indicate which twin each item best described. Twenty research assistants pre-rated the 20 statements for relevance to high or low status on a scale from -7 to +7, with 0 indicating no relation to either (interrater alpha = .95). The top five behaviours, which all had mean ratings above 3 or below 3, were included as status-relevant behaviours (e.g. Is approached by his friends for personal advice). The single low-status item rated in the top five was reversed scored to match the other four high-status item. The bottom five, which all had means between -1 and 1, were analyzed as status-irrelevant (e.g., Has a deep interest in 20th century literature). The remaining 10 statements were retained as fillers (e.g. Is a great cook. Especially of Chinese food. All 20 items are included in Appendix B). To ensure that participants were motivated to carefully deliberate over their judgments, they were told that there was a correct answer for each item, and they would earn additional 	
   entries into the $25-prize lottery. Photos of the twins were embedded within the online survey, appearing on screen directly below every fourth items such that participants were always able to view the images while responding to the items.  Results and Discussion For each participant, we sought to calculate a score similar to the IAT’s d-score, which would provide an index of the extent to which they tended to judge one of the targets as more likely to do high-status behaviours than the other. Thus, we calculated the proportion of high- status items and status-irrelevant items attributed to the captain over the waterboy, for each participant, yielding scores between 0 and 1, with .5 indicating that items were split evenly. Confirming the effectiveness of the context manipulation, within the neutral condition the captain was chosen for significantly more high-status items than was the waterboy, M = 0.84, t (23) = 7.59, p < .05, d = 3.17. The captain was also selected for more high-status items than status-irrelevant items, which did not differ between the captain and waterboy, Ms = 0.84 vs.0.49, t (23) = 4.80, p < .05, d = 2.00. In the context-incongruent expression condition, judgments were again predominantly based on contextual information; the shame-displaying captain was selected for more high-status items than was the pride displaying waterboy. M = 0.65, t (26) = 2.76, p < .05, d = 1.08). However, this proportion was significantly lower than that in the neutral condition, t (48) = 2.69, p < .05, d = .78 (see Figure 3.5). Moreover, in this condition there was no difference between the proportion of high-status and status-irrelevant items attributed to the captain or waterboy, Ms = 0.64 vs. 0.61, t (27) = 0.29, ns. Thus, these findings suggest that when individuals were 	
   encouraged to deliberate, contextual information was a more important predictor of status judgments than were emotion expressions. However, based on the comparison between conditions, emotion expressions still had a marked influence on these judgments, suggesting that under conditions of conscious deliberation and motivated processing, individuals may give precedence to context, but are nonetheless swayed by even contradictory emotion expression. The focus of Studies 1-4 has been to examine the relative strength of context and emotion expression cues when both cues come into conflict. To maximize the internal validity in these experiments, the studies have coupled hypothetical scenarios for context with static images of actors displaying the respective emotion expressions. When put into incongruent opposition, the findings have indicated that emotion expressions can nullify and sometimes override the influence of context on implicit status judgments (Studies 1-3) and maintain a significant impact when observers have the opportunity to consciously deliberate over explicit judgments. The degree to which expressions affect implicit and explicit status judgments raises the question of how much of this effect translates into real-world status-based decisions. Thus, in Study 5, we attempted a more externally valid test of our hypothesis, moving beyond the artificial within- subjects ‘twin’ comparisons, using video stimuli instead of static images, and probing real status- related social decisions in addition to raw status judgments. To do so, we had participants each evaluate a single potential job candidate using a résumé and a video interview as cues.  Study 5 Status may play an important role in a number of important social decisions ranging from mate choice to the selection of political candidates to employee firing and hiring. This last 	
   example represents a situation where the impact of the pride and shame displays on status may be particularly pernicious; job candidates are typically evaluated on the basis of their record of accomplishment (a contextual indicator of status), and their performance in a face-to-face interview (during which emotion expressions likely come into play). The fact that a typically small amount of interaction time in job interviews tends to be weighed so heavily in hiring decisions (Graves & Karren, 1996) make these interviews a powerful window for studying the impact of emotion expressions on person judgments and decisions. Study 5 thus made use of a staged job interview situation to examine the relative impact of contextual cues and emotion expressions on decision-making (i.e., the decision to hire a job candidate), an ecologically valid social situation. To do this, we asked participants to imagine themselves in the position of a corporate employer, seeking to determine whether to hire a particular candidate. They were shown the candidate’s résumé, and watched a short video of the candidate being interviewed for the position, and expressing a dynamic version of the pride or shame expression throughout the interaction. The design of Study 5 allowed us to address several of the limitations of the previous studies. First, all participants viewed only a single target, showing a single emotion expression (pride or shame) throughout the duration of their interview. This fully between-subjects design reduced the threat of potential demand characteristics that could have affected the results of Studies 1-4. Since participants made judgments about one target only, we can be confident that their responses are based on absolute judgments of the target, rather than on comparisons they may have felt they were supposed to be making. 	
   Second, we communicated the context differential via realistic résumés rather than through the obviously constructed scenario about identical twins used in Studies 1-4. This not only adds to above point in reducing demand characteristics, it also increases both the quantity of context information that the participants have access to (see Materials) and the real world generalizability of the employed manipulation. Third, by manipulating emotion expressions displayed during a videotaped interview, rather than in still photos, we were able to examine the impact of emotion expressions as they typically occur and are observed. One criticism that has been leveled against much of the large body of research on emotion expressions is this literature’s overreliance on static, decontextualized images (Carroll & Russell, 1997; Scherer & Ellgring, 2007). Though many real-world person judgments are made on the basis of a static, decontextualized image (e.g., online social networking and dating), in the majority of human social interactions, emotions are expressed dynamically, and repeatedly over the course of an interaction. Thus, by having targets display expressions during a real interaction, we can extend the generalizability of our findings. Finally, we added a post-decision questionnaire that asked participants to make a series of judgments about candidate’s intelligence, friendliness, and status. By assessing these judgments alongside hiring decisions, we were able to examine which judgments most influenced the decision, and whether the respective impacts of either the emotion expression or context are mediated by different judgments.    	
   Method Participants and Procedure 122 undergraduates (71% female) participated for course credit. Participants were brought into the lab and seated at a computer workstation with a 17” monitor. They were told to imagine that they were responsible for evaluating a candidate for the position of Branch Manager at a local bank. They then viewed onscreen the candidate’s résumé, then a 3-minute video of an interview conducted with the candidate. . The order of the résumé and video was counterbalanced between subjects and no order effects emerged. After viewing both the résumé and the video, participants were asked to use these sources of information to make a decision about whether to hire the candidate. They were subsequently asked to make several other make several judgements about the candidate’s intelligence and status. Both the résumé quality and interview emotion expressions were manipulated to create a 2 (context: qualified vs. unqualified candidate) x 2 (emotion expression: pride vs. shame) between subjects design. Thus, participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: strong résumé-pride, weak résumé-pride, strong résumé-shame, weak résumé-shame. Materials Context was manipulated using two résumés, which were identical in format and amount and type of information provided, and differed only in whether the candidate was conveyed as being highly qualified for the position, or not well qualified (see Appendix C). In the ‘strong ‘ résumé condition, the candidate was described as having graduated with honours and an A+ grade point average from the University of Toronto, a prestigious Canadian university that all participants (undergraduates the University of British Columbia) would be familiar with, and as 	
   having prior experience as a Head Bank Teller, being actively involved in community service, and possessing numerous skills including language fluency and varsity athletics. In contrast, in the ‘weak’ résumé condition, the candidate was described as having graduated with a C average from a local community college, having limited prior experience as a bank teller, no community service involvement, and possessing a generally poorer set of skills (e.g., played ‘pick-up’ sports in contrasts to the strong candidate’s varsity athletics, and had ‘some’ knowledge of French compared to the strong candidate’s French fluency). To ensure that participants attended closely to the résumés, they appeared onscreen for 45 seconds before participants could proceed to the next screen (pre-testing verified that this was more than adequate time for even a slow reader to carefully read the entire résumé). After 45 seconds, participants could either continue reading the résumé or press the spacebar to continue to the next screen. Emotion expressions were manipulated using digital videos of acted interviews between a male or female actor portraying a job candidate and an off-screen male voice. Each participant was matched with a candidate of the same sex, and no sex differences emerged. The candidate was seated at a desk in what appeared to be the interviewer’s office. All videos were identically scripted and differed only in the emotion expressions shown by the candidate. In the shame condition, the candidate sat with his/her shoulders slumped, head tilted downward, and a downcast gaze, and lifted his/her head and eyes occasionally to answer questions. His/her voice was soft. In the pride condition, the candidate sat upright with his/her posture expanded, and head titled slightly upwards. His/her arms were extended out from the body, either gesturing to make a point, resting comfortably on the desk in front of him/her, and/or with one arm akimbo with a hand on the hip He/she spoke clearly, in a confident tone.10 	
   10 Videos are available for viewing at http://www.psych.ubc.ca/~azim/pridevideos.html	
   Participants’ judgments and behavioural responses toward the targets were assessed by items that appeared on-screen following the video and résumé. Specifically, they were instructed to indicate how likely they would be to hire the applicant for the Branch Manager position on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from “definitely not hire” to “definitely hire”. They then completed a candidate-evaluation questionnaire, which asked them to rate each candidate on the 10 status related words used in the IATs (validated in Shariff & Tracy, 2009; see Appendix A), as well as intelligence, friendliness, and likeability. For each item, participants first provided a rating of the degree to which the attribute “applied to the candidate”, using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much”, and then a rating of the degree to which this attribute “factored into their hiring decision”, on the same 7-point scale. Finally, participants were asked to enter demographic information regarding their age, gender, and ethnicity. Participants were then debriefed and dismissed. Results and Discussion By including measures of participants’ perceptions of each candidate’s status and intelligence, we were able to confirm the effectiveness of the manipulation. The mean of the five high-status items were added to the mean of the reverse-scored five low-status items to form a single aggregated status item that ranged from -7 to +7 (M = -0.11; α for the 10 items = .87). We conducted a 2 (context) x 2 (emotion) multivariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) on this status scale and the intelligence item, and found a significant effect of emotion on status, F (2,119) = 94.46, p < .05, ηp2 = .45, but not on intelligence, F (2,119) = 0.18, ηp2< .01, ns., suggesting that participants who viewed the ‘pride’ interview judged the candidate to be significantly higher status than those who judged the shame interview (Ms = 1.75 vs. -1.8), but no different in intelligence (Ms = 4.63 vs. 4.75). Conversely, there was a significant main effect of context on 	
   intelligence, F (2,119) = 12.46, p < .05, ηp2 = .10, but not on  status: F (2,119) = 1.02, ηp2< .01, ns, indicating that participants who viewed the qualified résumé judged the target to be significantly more intelligent than did those who viewed the unqualified résumé (Ms = 5.17 vs. 4.21), but no different status (Ms = -0.22 vs.0.15). Thus, the context and emotion expression manipulations had the intended effects on participants’ explicit judgments of the targets’ intelligence and status. Our primary question of interest, however, was about the extent to which these different cues affect hiring decisions. A 2 (context) X 2 (expression) ANOVA showed that there was no significant two-way interaction between the variables on the willingness to hire the candidate. Furthermore, the résumé variable—our context manipulation—did not significantly affect hiring decisions, F (2,119) = 2.33, p < .05, ηp2 = .02. In contrast, there was a significant effect of the interviews—our expression manipulation, F (2,119) = 11.61, p < .05, ηp2 = .09 (see Figure 3.6). Thus, when both emotion expression and context cues were present, and either congruent or incongruent, only emotion expressions had a demonstrable effect on hiring decisions. In other words, the status cues sent by the display of pride versus shame expressions were more important predictors of participants’ decisions than were the academic and professional credentials of the two candidates. We next examined participants’ reports about which characteristics factored into their hiring decision. A t-test revealed that participants implicated intelligence as a significantly more important factor in their decision than status, t (119) = 3.14, p < .05, d = .58. These beliefs seem at odds with the results above. Indeed, both the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) and bootstrapping mediation analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) indicate that while status ratings fully mediated the effects of emotion expression condition on hiring decisions (Sobel test t = 2.60, p < .05; 95% 	
   confidence intervals for bootstrapping range from .07 to .34), intelligence ratings did not (Sobel test t = .98, p > .05, ns; 95% confidence intervals for bootstrapping range from-.02 to .10) Thus, although participants felt (or at least reported) that the intelligence information they derived from the résumés drove their hiring decision, these results suggest that they were perhaps unknowingly, swayed more by the status signals sent by the pride and shame expressions that the targets displayed in the interviews.  General Discussion Five studies using both implicit and explicit assessment methods demonstrate that the emotion expression of pride powerfully conveys high status, so much so that it can neutralize and, in certain cases, override contradicting contextual information in determining implicit status judgments. Study 1 showed that the pride and shame displays had a more powerful implicit association with status than did the provided contextual cues. Study 2 replicated this effect with a different test—the Affective Misattribution Paradigm—and showed significant separate effects of pride and shame. Though the pride expression had a stronger impact on implicit judgments, effectively reversing the effect of context, the shame expression was nonetheless influential enough to negate the contextual effect. Study 3 sought to use a more extreme context manipulation to test the boundaries of emotion expressions’ influence on implicit status judgments. The homeless man/businessman manipulation indeed produced a stronger context effect. However, this effect was still significantly reduced by the influence of incongruent context expressions. Studies 4 and 5 demonstrated that the effects that the pride and shame expressions have on implicit status judgments translate into explicit, deliberated judgments, where individuals have the time and cognitive resources to give due weight to contextually based 	
   knowledge. Context-incongruent expressions significantly influenced explicit status judgments in Study 4, and, when presented in video interviews in Study 5, had an even stronger effect for status-related hiring decisions. Together, the results consistently show that the pride and shame expressions powerfully influence perceptions of status and corresponding social decisions. Thus, though holding one’s head high cannot turn a pauper into a prince, it appears to be at least enough to make him the equal of a shameful businessman—at least at an implicit level. Even in important decisions requiring deliberation, showing one’s pride seems enough to surmount one’s surrounding context such as a weak set of employment qualifications. These findings provide new theoretical insights about the perception of emotion expressions, support evolutionary accounts of these expressions, and inform ongoing debates within emotion research. More practically, these results expose how emotions influence status judgments; they reveal that people may grant status to others—even undeserving others— without realizing they are doing so.  The Unavoidable Inference of Status Status appears to be inferred from the pride and shame expressions through an automatic cognitive process—specifically, it seems to occurs without intention, outside of awareness, and cannot be controlled—three of Bargh’s (1994) ‘four horsemen’ of automaticity (though see Sherman, et al. 2008) . The present findings suggest that individuals may be constantly and unknowingly influenced by automatically decoded emotion expressions, and they may use these expressions to inform their judgments and social decisions, even when other pertinent, and discrepant, information is available. 	
   The fact that in these studies, emotion expressions, typically understood to convey information about ephemeral affective states, influenced judgments about an enduring dispositional characteristic (i.e., status). This finding speaks to the disproportionate influence that the pride and shame expressions, and, in all likelihood, nonverbal expressions of emotion more broadly, have on unconscious person perception. An individual known to have plummeted in status—perhaps due to a public failure or exposure of a poignant weakness—may nonetheless retain his or her high status in the eyes of others (or in their implicit judgments) by showing the pride expression. This is especially likely given that, unlike the distinction between social and more genuine smiles (Frank, Ekman & Friesen, 1993), there is no evidence that observers can differentiate an exaggerated or hubristic pride display from a more authentic one (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Furthermore, as was shown by Studies 4 and 5, even when observers deliberate over their decisions, and are motivated to make the most accurate choices, they are still influenced by easy-to-fake emotion expressions. The participants in Study 5 believed themselves to be making their decisions on the basis of the information about intelligence provided by the résumés, but were nonetheless being more heavily swayed by the emotion expressions. Thus, one implication of these findings is that important status-related decisions, such as the hiring and promotion of employees, selection of romantic partners, and even election of public officials, may be unconsciously influenced by the display of emotion expressions, genuine or otherwise, even when individuals feel they are rationally deliberating on less superficial information derived from the surrounding context.    	
   Theoretical Implications These findings also provide insights on the likely intertwined evolution of status communication and pride and shame displays. Several researchers have suggested that the dominance and submission displays seen throughout the animal kingdom may share evolutionary origins with the human pride and shame expressions (Darwin, 1872; Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Tracy, Shariff & Cheng, 2010). The seemingly inseparable connection between status and pride that emerged in the present research is consistent with this view. If the pride expression functions in humans as a somewhat modified and more nuanced dominance display, which we have inherited from our pre-linguistic and even pre-conscious evolutionary ancestry, then we would expect it to maintain these automatically interpreted signaling qualities. The present findings— coupled with recent cross-cultural evidence showing implicit connections between the pride expression and status among traditional Fijian villagers (Tracy et al., 2010)—add to the small, but growing collection of evidence supporting this evolutionary theory. A more immediately practical implication of these findings is that they suggest that status can be faked through deceptive use of the pride expression. Given the automatic nature in which status is granted without—and even despite—additional information about whether or not it is deserved, humans may be quite vulnerable to such deception. Indeed, this vulnerability may be one of the reasons why boastful pride is so discouraged via cultural norms across the world (see e.g. Proverbs 18:16, Lao Tzu, 1997, 24:3). These norms may have emerged over the ages as an organic means of resisting the deceptive effects of the expression by discouraging such displays of pride, altogether. A third implication is methodological in nature. Studies 1-4 indicate that static, decontextualized emotion displays, widely used in emotion research, are likely to be highly 	
   communicative even though they may lack some degree of external validity. Given the extent to which nonverbal expressions of pride and shame were shown to influence social judgments over and above discrepant contextual information, these findings suggest that emotion expressions have a high level of communicative value regardless of the context in which they appear. Indeed, the results garnered from the studies using static images were largely consistent with those that emerged in Study 5, where more face-valid dynamic versions of the expressions were employed in the video interviews. This may allow for greater confidence in conclusions drawn from previous studies using similar nonverbal displays in absence of contextual content. Limitations and Future Directions One of the challenges in comparing the relative strength of status signals sent by emotion expressions on one hand and status-relevant information gleaned from context, on the other, is the difficulty of matching these two sources of information in strength and weight, when the modalities produce major differences. Is the waterboy-captain status distinction of the same magnitude as the pride-shame distinction? To some degree, we are making quantitative comparisons between apples and oranges. We aimed to minimize this concerns with two strategies: exaggeration and relevance. In Study 3 we used the strongest status distinction we could conceive of—that between a homeless man and a businessman. This is an exaggerated context difference, which nears the edge of how widely people range in status in modern society. Second, in Study 5, we used a form of demarcation that is very socially relevant—professional résumés. Despite whether or not this manipulation was as strong (or stronger) than the expressions conveyed in the interviews, the manipulation represents a common and accepted form of making judgments about and distinguishing between individuals’ qualifications and even professional worth. The findings in both studies that pride and shame expressions still influenced 	
   automatic status judgments when incongruent with these potent contextual cues allows confidence in the meaningfulness of the effects. Another limitation of the current research is that we focused specifically on the expressions of pride and shame, because of their clear connection to status (Shariff & Tracy, 2009), but future studies are needed to examine whether the present effects generalize to other emotion expressions. Given that self-conscious emotions are particularly complex (Lewis, 2000; Tracy & Robins, 2004), it is likely that more basic-emotion expressions, such as fear or anger, would override contradicting contextual information just as powerfully, if not more so. Future research may make fruitful use of this novel application of the IAT and AMP to test this prediction. Future studies should also examine whether explicit judgments and decisions made in the context-incongruent conditions of Studies4and 5 were unknowingly influenced by the presence of incongruent emotion expressions, as we assume, or whether participants might have used those cues strategically. Participants’ decisions in these conditions may have been partly shaped by demand characteristics of the experimental situation (e.g., an assumption that they were supposed to use emotion expressions), and thus not completely reflect behaviours outside the lab. Our incentivizing of accurate responses in Study 4 likely circumvented this issue to some extent, and the findings of Studies 1-3 indicate that emotion expressions do have an implicit effect on status judgments. Furthermore, the finding from Study 5 that participants thought they were basing their hiring decisions on perceived intelligence—which was inferred from the résumés and not the interviews—suggests that participants were not intentionally weighting the interviews more heavily. Nonetheless, further studies should look specifically at how these automatic implicit interpretations of emotion signals lead to explicit judgments and decisions in 	
   naturalistic settings. Doing so would further clarify how emotion expressions affect our everyday social interactions. Finally, in retrospect, in addition to the inclusion of intelligence and status ratings of the job interview candidate in Study 5, it would have been useful to have also included a subjective rating of competence to go along with the hiring decision. Such a measure could have been affected by both manipulations; though the resume differences between the candidates were extreme, participants could have found that the candidate’s demeanor, exhibited in the interview, to be an equally important factor for the job. To some degree, the findings that participants implicated intelligence (which was unaffected by the interview manipulation) to be a significantly more important factor than status (affected by both manipulations) argues against this, nonetheless including the competence rating would have given us more information on which to draw specific conclusions. In conclusion, the present findings have important implications for the cognitive processes that underlie many everyday judgments, some of which lead to highly consequential decisions. This is especially true given that individuals tend to assume that their decisions are based on rational, reflective processes, and to neglect the impact of implicitly perceived emotion expressions. These implicit associations may promote potentially erroneous judgments, as individuals fail to appreciate how their unconscious minds lead them to judge a book by its cover. 	
    Acknowledgments We are grateful to the Social Sciences Research Council of Canada for supporting this research (File #s 767-2006-1980 and 410-2006-1593), and to the Michael Smith Foundation for Health Research [CI-SCH-01862 (07-1)]. We also thank Lara Aknin, Emma Buchtel, Joey Cheng, Lesley Duncan, Lauren Human and Christine Prehn for their helpful comments on the paper. We especially thank the UBC Psychobiological Determinants of Health Laboratory, and Eva Zysk in particular, for developing and validating the abstract painting stimuli used in Study 2. 	
   Figure 3.1 Mean Implicit Association Test (IAT) reaction times in Study 1. The graph shows that, in the neutral-expression condition, reaction times were lower (faster) for the captain/high status and waterboy/low status pairings than for the captain/low status and waterboy/high status pairings, whereas the inverse pattern emerged in the context-incongruent expression condition, where the captain displayed the prototypical pride expression and the waterboy displayed the prototypical shame expression. *s indicate that the corresponding d-scores are significantly different from 0, at the p < .05 level.  	
   Figure 3.2. The Affective Misattribution Procedure (AMP). Primes and abstract paintings were briefly displayed and followed by visual masks. Participants judged whether each painting was higher or lower status than average. They were explicitly instructed to ignore the primed images when judging the paintings.  	
   Figure 3.3. Mean proportion of abstract paintings rated as ‘higher status than average’, depending on the target stimuli that immediately preceded them. The grey box was used as acontrol stimulus. Status misattributions were more affected by emotion expressions than situational context. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. The red line indicates chance responding—where means should fall if responses to the paintings were random.   	
   Figure 3.4. Mean Implicit Association Test (IAT) reaction times in Study 3. The graph shows that when both the businessman and homeless man wore neutral expressions, participants responded several hundred milliseconds faster when the businessman was paired with high- status and the homeless man with low-status, than in the reverse pairings. In contrast, when both targets displayed emotion expressions incongruent with the contextual information, neither pairing led to significantly faster response times. *s indicate that the corresponding d-scores are significantly different from 0, at the p < .05 level. 	
   Figure 3.5. Mean proportion of high-status and status-irrelevant items attributed to Mark, the captain rather than Steve, the waterboy. The captain was significantly less likely to be judged as high status when contextual information was accompanied by incongruent (rather than neutral) emotion expressions. No differences emerged for the status-irrelevant items in either condition.  	
   Figure 3.6. Mean hiring rates across both manipulated variables – résumé (context) and interview video (emotion expression). The interview, but not the résumé, significantly affected hiring rates. There was no significant two-way interaction between the variables.  	
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            Chapter Four Discussion 	
   Summary of the Main Findings In 12 studies, we tested for the existence and strength of implicit status signals sent by the emotion expression of pride. Three different tests of implicit associations showed a tight and consistent implicit relationship between the images of the pride expression and of the concept of high status (MS 1, Studies 1-4)11. In fact, the pride expression showed a stronger relationship with high status than any other tested emotion (MS 1, Studies 1, 2, 5a & 5b). In addition, there was no evidence of this relationship being an artifact of the pride expression’s positive valence, power, or body size expanding properties (MS 1, Studies 5-6). With the addition of context information which provided competing, incongruent status cues to the emotion expressions, the expressions nonetheless maintained a strong influence on implicit status judgments—overriding the effect of moderate context cues (MS, Studies 1-2), and battling extreme context cues to a draw (Studies 3). When participants were incentivized to deliberate over explicit status judgments, the expressions still had a significant effect on these judgments, but context was used as the primary cue (MS 2, Study 4). Finally, when both expressions (in the form of video interviews) and context (in the form of professional résumés) were manipulated in a 2X2 between-subjects design, the expressions, but not the context, significantly affected hiring decisions (MS 2, Study 5). This occurred even though participants implicated using information about intelligence (shown to be derived from résumés but not expressions) more than information about status (shown to be derived from both expressions and résumés, but primarily the former). 	
   11 Though not reported in the manuscript, additional studies were conducted to address the role of the shame expression in status perception. Though the shame display did show an association with low status, it did not send a unique signal in the way that the pride display did. The shame expression did not significantly differ from the similar expression of sadness in its implicit association with low status (Shariff & Tracy, 2010).	
   Together, these twelve studies strongly suggest that the pride expression sends an implicit and automatically decoded status signal (Manuscript 1). Moreover, the findings indicate that this signal is powerful enough to influence implicit status judgments and explicit, consciously deliberated social decisions, even when contradicted by competing contextual cues (Manuscript 2). Theoretical implications The research was conducted, in part, to test an evolutionarily-based hypothesis about the adaptive functions of the pride and shame expressions. It was theorized that the pride and shame expressions evolved in our pre-linguistic ancestry in order to communicate valuable information about social status. This development would have relied on two complimentary adaptations; one to spontaneously display the pride or shame expression in response to an eliciting status-relevant event, and one to automatically interpret the status connotations of this displayed expression. A compelling and established body of literature already supports the first mechanism (see e.g. Keltner, 1995; Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008), however the present studies are the first treatment of the ‘observer’ adaptation. What, then, can we conclude from the results? The findings are a consistent, but incremental, step in support of the hypothesis—necessary but not sufficient to claim that the status signaling nature of the pride expression is a naturally selected adaptation. The experiments were set up to falsify the evolutionary hypothesis. Had participants shown null relationships between status and the expression, the hypothesis that the pride display acts as an evolved status signal would have been severely challenged. Instead, the evidence confirms that observers do have an implicit, automatic status-relevant reaction to viewing the pride display. However, these results, and indeed the employed methodologies, are not able to discount the alternative explanation that these associations were culturally learned, 	
   rather than innately programmed. The implicit methodologies, though effective at avoiding demand characteristics and demonstrating the implicit, automatic, and unavoidable nature of the pride expression/high status association, do not speak to that association’s evolved nature (Barrett, Frederick, Haselton & Kurban, 2006). In order to be more confident about claiming an evolutionary basis for the association, the evidence would need to meet a similar standard as does that for the sender’s display of pride. Specifically, the alternative cultural learning explanation would need to be, if not wholly refuted, then at least sufficiently discredited. To this end, the main experiments from the first manuscript were followed up with a cross-cultural replication conducted in a traditional, small-scale village on the Fijian island of Yasawa (Tracy, Shariff, Zhao & Henrich, in prep). This village is isolated from Western culture, with no access to television, internet, newspapers or magazines. Thus, cognitive associations shared between our North American and Fijian samples could not be explained by cultural transmission or imitation. Moreover, unlike North American norms emphasizing confidence and status-seeking (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999), displays of pride are discouraged among Fijians. Indeed, the vast differences between the two cultures make the comparison an ideal test of the evolutionary hypothesis. If the Fijians exhibit similar automatic associations between pride expression and high status, despite their cultural isolation, their pride-discouraging norms, and the pronounced differences from North American culture, it is reasonable to conclude that this similarity is attributable to underlying evolved similarities. The Fiji field study made use of the same IAT paradigm used in the first manuscript, modified slightly to be more intuitive for participants inexperienced with computers. In total, three sets of IATs were run, comparing the pride display against that of shame, happiness, and a 	
   neutral expression. Each participant only completed one set, by within each set ran two different IATs—one which used the Caucasian target used throughout the studies presented here, and one which used a target of African descent. A separate group of UBC students also completed each of these tasks, using the modified IAT, in order to make clean comparisons. Results of the Fiji field study were largely consistent with those in the current studies. The IATs comparing the status associations of the pride expression against shame and neutral expressions showed large effects indicating a tight implicit relationship between the pride display and high status. Fijian villagers, like North American students, automatically interpreted signals of status from the expression of pride, even in targets from different ethnicities, with which they had had limited contact. One interesting cultural difference did, however, emerge. Whereas North American samples showed significantly stronger associations between pride and high status, and happiness and low status, than the opposite pairings, this was not the case with the Fijians. The d-score for the pride and happiness expression comparison in Fiji did not significantly differ from zero, meaning there was no evidence that the two expressions differed at all in terms of their association with high status. This is an interesting difference, almost certainly due to the cultural norms discouraging the expression of pride. Indeed, paper and pencil ratings show that the Fijians explicitly rate the happiness expression as more indicative of high status—and as much more socially acceptable—than the pride expression. Despite this difference, the overall findings confirm that the implicit pride/high-status association is not unique to North American populations. More broadly, these findings favour the evolutionary explanation for these associations over the alternative cultural construction 	
   argument. When taken in concert, there is compelling evidence to suggest that the pride expression is an evolved adaptation for signaling social status. One of the most interesting topics that almost inevitably emerges from the theories and findings presented, is the question of ‘faking status’ using the pride expression. This topic was briefly raised in the second manuscript, but deserves a longer treatment.  The threat of having one’s bluff called, via a physical challenge has kept this kind of status overclaiming in check among non-human animals–limiting the reproductive success of those who would use the dominance displays undeservedly (Dunbar, 1998; Maynard Smith, 1974; Maynard Smith & Price, 1973). This mechanisms still applies for humans, however the much more sophisticated theory of mind, coupled with a much more complex array of status hierarchies, afford greater opportunities for Machiavellian deception for members of our species. Furthermore, studies demonstrate that while, among senders, facial expressions are the most easily controlled nonverbal signal (Nakamura, Buck & Kenny, 1990), perceivers are surprisingly inept at detecting deception in them (Frank & Ekman, 1997; Ekman, 1985). Thus, despite the importance of cheater detection in the recent evolution of human social intelligence, in the case of nonverbal expressions of emotion these mechanisms remain impoverished, leaving humans vulnerable to being deceived (Schmidt & Cohn, 2001; DePaulo, 1992). The real danger of being duped by undeserved status claims, then, may have prompted the gross suspicion and derogation of pride across cultures. That is, the vulnerability of human psychology to automatically granting status to pride-displaying individuals may have been addressed by the emergence of cultural, and especially religion norms to discourage all displays of pride. Buddhism considers pride to be one of the ‘ten fetters’ which bind individuals to samsara – the end endless cycle of suffering (Akira, 1990). Lao Tzu wrote that “those who 	
   glorify themselves have no merit, those who are proud of themselves do not last” (Tzu, 1997; 24:3). In the Christian tradition, pride has frequently been cited as the worst of all sins by a number of figures including Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Pope Gregory and, of course, Dante (O’Donnell, 2005; Pope, 2002; Baasten, 1986; Alighieri, 2003). Finally, the prohibitions on pride may reach their most extreme in Islam, which takes its very name from the aslama, the Arabic word for submission. Muhammad is reported to have said, “Whosoever has in his heart, even a atom of pride he will not enter paradise” (Nawawi, 2009) and the Qu’ran notes, in uncharacteristic bluntness, that “[Allah] does not love the proud ones” (16:23). One can only speculate, but it is not beyond the realm of possibility that these normative proscriptions may have developed as a cultural response to the evolutionary problem introduced by the effective, easily-faked, status display of pride. Recent theories have suggested that providing cultural solutions to destabilizing evolutionary problems may have been a key factor in the development and design of cultural institutions such as religion (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). Though the present findings suggest that they can nonetheless garner some degree of status, the consequence of this cultural response is that those who ignore these norms and conduct themselves in a prideful, arrogant manner fear being disliked and rejected. Faking pride thus may be a last-ditch strategy adopted by individuals who lack the competencies to genuinely merit prestige, but would rather attain some level of power—however short-lived—than be denigrated to a low rung of the social hierarchy. Future directions One of the major goals of the second manuscript was to provide a more realistic exploration of how the status cues sent by the emotion expressions actually operate. Though static, decontextualized images have been the workhorses of emotion expression research since 	
   Ekman’s earliest work (e.g. Ekman, Sorenson & Friesen, 1969; Ekman & Friesen, 1971), they trade a considerable amount of external validity for their internal control and convenience. In reality, emotion expressions are nearly always observed and interpreted while embedded in a situational context, and surrounded by a number of other informational cues. The addition of contextual information in all five studies, and the move to dynamic video representations of the expressions in Study 5 were meant to capture more of this reality. That said, though these studies achieved their aims, there is no question that they still possess the hallmarks of artificiality characteristic of most lab-based social psychology experiments. No participant could have actually believed that Mark and Steve were twins. No one mistook the videos in Study 5 for actual, candidly captured interviews. Further research would thus benefit from taking another step outside the laboratory to examine how these expressions actually function in real life. There are several ways this could be done – each of which strikes its own balance between realism and experimental control. 1. Actual videos. We used staged interviews for our emotion expression manipulation because we wanted them to be identically scripted, and precisely matched on all other factors (actor, dress, etc.) so that only the emotion expression differed between the videos. However, videos of genuine expressions of pride and shame would make for more realistic stimuli. Tracy and Matsumoto (2008) used genuine pride and shame displays of Olympic judo competitors albeit in the form of still photos. Capturing dynamic video of these or similar events would not prove too much more difficult. Care would need to be taken, though, to (a) isolate the expression from context so as to avoid conflating the status signals sent by the two cues, and (b) adequately disguise the experimental aims so as to avoid demand effects. 	
   2. Experimental confederates. Another strategy, which may be less vulnerable to those last two concerns, is to plant stooges within the experiment itself, who could then pose the expressions. For example, real participants could find themselves in a dyadic or group task with a confederates who, for half the participants, displays pride and for the other half, displays shame. Participants would then be required to make a status-related decision regarding the confederate, and comparisons could be drawn between the two conditions. Building on the theoretical connections between pride, prestige and imitation (Cheng, Tracy & Henrich, 2010; Tracy, Shariff & Cheng, 2010), these experiments could even borrow from the classic Asch (1951) social conformity paradigms, and use social influence as an indirect, downstream measure of status perception. Using confederates has several advantages. For one, by keeping participants naïve about the manipulation and its dependent measure, it prevents them from adjusting their behaviour. Second, precise experimental control over how differently the actor behaves in both conditions, is maintained. The disadvantage, though, is that these studies return to posed, rather than genuine, displays of the expressions. 3. Naturalistic observation and field studies. To ensure maximal confidence that the effects of pride on status are not artifacts of experimental methods, the best strategy is, of course, naturalistic observation. Quantitative data can be collected in any number of real world scenarios where pride and shame expressions coexist with status-related judgments (e.g. political elections, or actual job interviews). Obviously, the major downside of this tool is that in the absence of manipulating variables, establishing a causal relationship between expressions, on the one hand, and status perceptions and related judgments, on the other, is impossible—a particularly problematic fact for variables such as these for which one would expect bidirectional relationships . 	
   Though these methods each come with their own limitations, these weaknesses are often non-overlapping with those of lab-based paradigms, as a result, these types of studies can provide an effective compliment to more controlled experiments. The present findings suggest that everyday social interactions may be, quite unbeknownst to the individuals involved, constantly being swayed by automatically elicited and interpreted emotion expressions. Given the potentially significant effect that this phenomenon may be having on even the most mundane and fleeting interactions, there is considerable value to using these types of experiments to replicate the present findings outside the lab, and in the venues in which social communication is most relevant. Conclusion In their theoretical article on the topic, Bargh & Chartrand follow previous researchers in noting that “this question of how much conscious control we have over our judgments, decisions, and behaviour is one of the most basic and important questions of human existence” (1999, p. 463). It is certainly one of the central questions of psychology—a field whose central endeavour is scientifically exploring aspects of the human mind and behaviours that people are unable to access and grasp themselves. Whatever practical, perhaps Machiavellian, benefits that may emerge from this research, its primary motivations was to be a part of the answer to this question. The present research is a piece of the puzzle—revealing the existence and consequences of automatic judgments unknowingly made in everyday social interactions. Recognizing the occurrence of these types of processes allows us another small peek behind the curtain, offering us a slightly fuller view of the engines that propel us through our mental and social lives, and granting us an ounce more self-knowledge. 	
     References Alighieri, D. (2003). The Divine Comedy. Trans. by J. Ciardi. New York: New American Library. Asch, S. E. (1951) Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments. In Harold Guetzdow (ed.), Groups, leadership, and men. Carnegie Press: New York. Baasten, M. (1986). Pride According to Pope Gregory the Great: A Study of the Moralia. Lewinston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press. Bargh, J., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. American Psychologist, 54, 462-479. Barrett, H. C., Frederick, D. A., Haselton, M. G., & Kurzban, R. (2006). Can Manipulations of Cognitive Load Be Used to Test Evolutionary Hypotheses ? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 513-518. Cheng, J. T., Tracy, J. L., & Henrich, J. (2010). Pride, personality, and the evolutionary foundations of human social status. Evolution and Human Behavior, 31, 334-347. DePaulo B.M. (1992). Nonverbal behaviour and self-presentation. Psychological Bulletin, 111, 203–243. Ekman, P., Sorenson, E. R., & Friesen, W. V. (1969). Pan-cultural elements in facial displays of emotion. Science, 164, 86-8. 	
   Fessler, D.M.T. (1999) Toward an understanding of the universality of second order emotions. In A. Hinton (Ed.), Beyond nature or nurture: Biocultural approaches to the emotions (pp.75- 116). New York: Cambridge University Press. Freud, S. (1965). The psychopathology of everyday life (J. Strachey, Ed. & Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work published 1901) Frijda, N.H. (1986). The Emotions (Cambridge University Press, New York. Haidt, J., & Keltner, D. (1999). Culture and facial expression: Open-ended methods find more expressions and a gradient of recognition. Cognition and Emotion, 13, 225–66. Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1999). Is there a universal need for positive self-regard? Psychological Review, 106, 766-794 Henrich, J., & Gil-white, F. J. (2001). The evolution of prestige: Freely conferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission. Evolution and Human Behavior, 22, 165−196. Maynard Smith, J. (1974). The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts. Journal of theoretical biology, 47, 209-21. Maynard Smith, J. & Price, G.R. (1973) The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246, 15–18. Nawawi, I. (2009). The Complete Forty Hadith. Ta-Ha Publishers: London. Schmidt, K.L., & Cohn, J.F. (2001). Human facial expressions as adaptations: evolutionary questions in facial expression research. Yearbook of Physical Anthropology, 44, 3–24 	
   Shariff, A., & Norenzayan, A. (2008). The origin and evolution of religious prosociality. Science, 322, 58. O’Donnell, J. J. (2005). Augustine: A New Biography. New York: Ecco. Pope, S. J. (2002). The Ethics of Thomas Aquinas, Moral Tradition Series. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Shariff, A.F. & Tracy, J.L. (2010) Unpublished manuscript about the shame expression. The University of British Columbia. Tracy, J. L., & Matsumoto, D. (2008). The spontaneous display of pride and shame: Evidence for biologically innate nonverbal displays. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105, 11655-11660. Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2008). The nonverbal expression of pride: Evidence for cross- cultural recognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 516-530. 	
   Appendix A Status words used for the IAT in Studies 1-3, 5 & 6 in Manuscript 1, and in Studies 1-3 of the Manuscript 2. These words were also used for the candidate evaluation in Study 5 in Manuscript 2. These words were validated in Shariff & Tracy (2009) by obtaining 27 synonyms or antonyms for “high status” and “low status” from an online thesaurus (Kipfer, 2005), and asking nine upper level undergraduate psychology students to rate each word for its relevance to high and low status, separately, using 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (I definitely would not call this high/low status) to 5 (I definitely would call this high/low status;αs = . 96, and .93, for high and low-status ratings, respectively). The five highest and lowest status words, all of which had mean ratings of 4.5 or greater on their respective scale, were retained.  High Status  Low Status  Powerful  Submissive  Important  Weak  Dominant  Humble  Prestigious  Unimportant  Commanding  Minor  	
   Appendix B Explicit status-related, status-unrelated, and filler judgments from Manuscript 2, Study 4.  Gets treated better by servers at restaurants and bars. Is approached by his friends for personal advice Is NOT being considered for inheriting control of the family business. Was voted most likely to succeed by his High School class. Dates the head cheerleader Often gets bumped up to business class when flying. Mark Interns at a finance firm. Had straight A's in High School Always tells the truth Tends not to command much respect from strangers. Works at a Foot Locker athletics store. Plays the piano. Intimidates his co-workers. Is a great cook. Especially of Chinese food. Is a whiz at computers Is a huge Guns'n Roses fan. Is better at parallel parking. Has tattoos on his upper arms, chest and back. Showers every morning in cold water Has a deep interest in early 20th century literature.     Status-­‐Related	
   Appendix C ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ resumes for the interview candidates in Manuscript 2, Study 5 (the name for the male candidate was Kenneth Dyson) Good Resume    	
   Bad Resume  	
    Appendix D    The University of British Columbia Office of Research Services Behavioural Research Ethics Board Suite 102, 6190 Agronomy Road, Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z3 CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL- MINIMAL RISK RENEWAL  PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: DEPARTMENT: UBC BREB NUMBER: Jessica Tracy UBC/Arts/Psychology, Department of H08-00883 INSTITUTION(S) WHERE RESEARCH WILL BE CARRIED OUT: Institution Site UBC Vancouver (excludes UBC Hospital) Other locations where the research will be conducted: Subjects will also be recruited online (e.g., on message boards such as craigs list) and in public areas (e.g., local beaches in Metro Vancouver).  CO-INVESTIGATOR(S): N/A SPONSORING AGENCIES: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) PROJECT TITLE: Perceptual Judgment Task Perceptual Judgment Study Does the pride expression function as a signal of social status? EXPIRY DATE OF THIS APPROVAL:  March 2, 2011 APPROVAL DATE:  March 2, 2010  The Annual Renewal for Study have been reviewed and the procedures were found to be acceptable on ethical grounds for research involving human subjects.   Approval is issued on behalf of the Behavioural Research Ethics Board Dr. M. Judith Lynam, Chair Dr. Ken Craig, Chair Dr. Jim Rupert, Associate Chair Dr. Laurie Ford, Associate Chair Dr. Anita Ho, Associate Chair file:///Users/azim/Downloads/certificate.html 1 of 1 10-06-09 3:23 PM


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