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From rhetoric to inaction : the failure to implement gender norms in the United Nations Organization… Wiseman, Emily 2008

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FROM RHETORIC TO INACTION: THE FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT GENDER NORMS IN THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO  by Emily Wiseman Hon. B.A. University of Toronto, 2007  A THESIS SUBMITfED TN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF ARTS  in The Faculty of Graduate Studies (Political Science) THE U1NJIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) August 2008 © Emily Wiseman, 2008  ABSTRACT Since the 1979 Convention on the Elimination ofailforms ofDiscrimination Against Women, rhetoric on gender has become increasingly prevalent within the United Nations and among member states. In 1999, the International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute made forms of war crimes and crimes against humanity when committed in context of armed conflict. Additionally, in 2001 the United Nations Security Council through resolution 1325 called for the protection of women in conflict and for an inclusion of gender mainstreaming in all peace operations. Discussions on gender norms within the United Nations and among member states reached their peak as fresh and widespread violence, targeted against women and girls broke out in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While this presented an auspicious opportunity for rhetorical norms on gender and peacekeeping to be put into practice within the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), few of these rhetorical norms were successfully implemented. This, then, is a case study of the difficulty of moving from the rhetorical commitment of an international norm to its implementation. In particular, when the actors needed to advance the implementation of the norm have failed to complete the institutionalization and internalization process. It argues that the implementation of gender norms has not been successful in MONUC because of a failure of individual states and the United Nations bureaucracy to institutionalize and internalize these gender norms. Finally, it concludes that member states have failed to provide the resources and training required to implement gender norms, while United Nations bureaucracy has failed to establish a mandate and objectives that effectively respond to the needs of women.  11  TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract  ii  Table of Contents  iii  Acknowledgements  iv  Dedication  v  1  Introduction  1  2  Norm Institutionalization and Internalization  3  3  Gender Policy within the United Nations 3.1 The Evolution of Gender Policy within the United Nations 3.2 Peacekeeping and Gender Mainstreaming  6 6 7  4  Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 4.1 The Deadliest Conflict in Haifa Century 4.2 “War Against Women and Girls” 4.3 The Creation of a Transitional Government and Continuing Violence  11 Ii 11 13  5  MONUC’s Mandate 5.1 Phases of the Operation 5.2 Gender Norms within MONUC  15 15 16  6  International Actors: The Role of Individual States 6.1 Rhetoric vs. Commitment: the Creation and Operation of MONUC 6.2 The Need for a Gender Balance, and Resources 6.3 Promoting a Culture of Impunity: Sexual Exploitation by MONUC Personnel 6.4 Gender Mainstreaming and Pre-Depioyment Training  18 18 21 22 24  7  International Actors: The Role of the UN Bureaucracy 7.1 The Role of the Secretary-General and Secretariat 7.2 The Secretariat: A Failure to Institutionalize and Internalize Gender Norms 7.3 Gender Norms and the Deployment and Operation of MONUC 7.4 Gender Training in MONUC Preventing 7.5 and Investigating Misconduct by Peacekeepers in the Field 7.6 Gender Norms in Post-Conflict Recovery Women and the Peace Process 7.7  26 27 27 28 30 32 33 34  8  Conclusion  36  Bibliography  37  111  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful for having been given the opportunity study within the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. Special thanks to the faculty, who have opened my mind to new ideas and broadened my field of academic studies. I owe particular thanks to Dr. Katharina Coleman for her insightful feedback and guidance this past year. I am especially thankful for all the efforts she has made to help me in the thesis process; her assistance has been invaluable to me. Thanks are also owed to my second reader Dr. Lisa Sundstrom for kindness and advice throughout the year, and her contributions to this work. I am also appreciative of the support I have received from my fellow students. In particular, I thank Kate McElroy for her thoughtful discussion and for giving me encouragement and support this past year. I offer my enduring gratitude to my parents for their guidance, support, and encouragement throughout all my endeavours, in particular my education. Special thanks are owed to my sister Andrea and my brother Evan, for their encouragement and kind words, and for always finding a way to put life’s events into perspective. Further thanks to Asma Bala, Julia Olofsson, Tim Klodt and Cindy Yang for listening to my endless academic whims, and for always providing their insightful feedback. Additional thanks to Dr. Kate MclnturffofPeacebuild, Rachel Logel from World Vision, Gisèle Eva Côté from Rights and Democracy, and Fracoise Ndwimana for providing me with their personal insights and experience on this subject. Finally, thank you to Dr. Robert Campbell for telling me that social constructivism “can be fun” and for aiding me and guiding me throughout my undergraduate and graduate experiences.  iv  DEDICATION  To myfamily  V  “It is more dangerous to be a woman than to be a soldier right now in Eastern DRC.” —  1  Major General Patrick Cammart, former Deputy Force Commander’.  Introduction Raging since 1998, the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is in part  a war against women and girls. Conflicting parties have used sexual violence as a weapon of war on an immense scale with devastating 2 consequences The United Nations (UN) has been . operating in the DRC since 1999 through the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), one of the largest missions in UN history. Established during escalating discussions within the UN system on incorporating gender norms in peace operations and amid reports of widespread violence against women in the DRC, MONUC presents an auspicious opportunity for rhetorical norms on gender and peacekeeping to be put into practice. However, because these norms have not been fully institutionalized and internalized within the UN system, much of the rhetoric and commitments that surround them have yet to be implemented. The result has been a mission that has attempted and largely failed to include a gender perspective and respond to the gender-dimensions of the DRC conflict. This, then, is a case study of the difficulty of moving from the rhetorical commitment of an international norm to its implementation. In particular it analyzes the difficulty of such an act when the actors needed to advance the implementation of the norm have failed to complete the institutionalization and internalization process. This case study concludes that implementation has suffered because of failures by UN member states to provide resources and training, and the UN to establish a mandate and objectives that effectively respond to the needs of women.  ‘IJNDPI, 2008 2 H RW2002, I  I  Section two discusses how social constructivism maintains that rhetorical norms are institutionalized and internalized by bodies like the UN and member states. Section three demonstrates that rhetorical norms on gender mainstreaming and commitments to implement them have been prevalent within the UN. Focusing on gender, section four outlines the dimensions of conflict in the DRC. Section five provides an overview of MONUC’s mandate and attempts at gender mainstreaming. Section six highlights how individual states have failed to institutionalize and internalize gender-mainstreaming norms in peacekeeping operations and the consequences of this failure in MONUC. Finally, section seven conducts a similar analysis although focusing on the UN bureaucracy. Ultimately, it will be shown that despite rhetorical commitments, individual states and the UN Secretariat have not completely institutionalized and internalized gender norms in peace operations, resulting in their poor implementation within MONUC.  2  Norm Institutionalization and Internalization  2  According to social constructivists, a norm is a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity . It is a rule-like prescription that is clearly perceptible to a 3 community of actors and makes behavioural claims upon those actors . Norms by definition 4 symbolize a property of “oughtness” and shared moral judgment. This sets them apart from other kinds of rules because they entail standards of “appropriate” or “proper” behavior, set by the standards of a society . 5 Finnemore and Sikkink seminally described the norm life cycle, which charts the emergence of a norm and its internalization. In the first stage the norm emerges- pushed by norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms. This is followed by a “tipping point” where a norm cascade occurs, involving states, international organizations and networks. Here, socialization, institutionalization, and demonstration are said to occur. In this stage, actors including state -  actors will conform to the norm because of legitimacy, reputation and esteem . They follow a 6 -  logic of consequences wherein individuals adopt a norm, but do not necessarily internalize it . 7 The final stage is internalization, where law, professions, and bureaucracy adopt the norm, and conform to it, following a logic of appropriateness, where the behaviour becomes unquestioned . 8 out of habit and institutionalization This thesis maintains that norm implementation can be the result of institutionalization and internalization occurring either together or separately. Institutionalization occurs when an increasing number of organizations adopt a program or policy reflecting the norm; it thus  6  8  Finnemore and Sikkink. 1998, 891 Finnemore 1993, 566 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 898 Ibid..891 Checkel 1999, 804 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891  3  becomes widely understood as a necessary component of the organizational structure . This 9 institutionalization involves designing institutional mechanisms and drafting legislation to . According to Checkel, the degree of a norm’s institutionalization can be 10 advance the norm measured through its use in international rules and organizations, international law, in bilateral foreign policies, or even in the creation of a body like United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)”. Such institutionalization contributes strongly to norm implementation by clarif’ing what, exactly, the norm is and what constitutes a violation of that . Importantly, institutionalization can take the form of largely rhetorical commitments. As 12 norm such, role-playing can facilitate the institutionalization and the implementation of a norm . 13 However, the more frequently a norm is included in documents and plans, the more natural it becomes for an official to include the norm in all contexts. This can result in internalization’ . 4 Institutionalization is most likely then to facilitate norm implementation if it is combined with internalization. Internalization is the final stage of Finnemore and Sikkink’ s life cycle of a norm. An internalized norm invokes a logic of appropriateness where pro-norm behaviour is so deeply internalized it becomes unquestioned’ . Internalization occurs when agents accept the 5 community’s norms and go beyond conscious role-playing to accept norms as “the right thing to . This implies that agents adopt the interests, or even the identity, of their community, and 6 do” therefore can also involve changes in values and interests at the individual or state level 17  Finnemore 1993, 592 True and Minstrom. 2001,29 “Checkel 1999, 804 12 Finnemore and Sikkink 900 ‘ Checkel 1999, 804 Elgstrm 2000, 472. ‘ Johnston. 2001, 92 16 Checkel 1999, 804 Checkel 1999, 808 ‘°  4  Finally, internalization requires an individual to act in accordance with the norm thereby demonstrating they have internalized the institutional position’ . 8 Many norms, such as the commitment to ban landmines, exist within the T.JN system in rhetoric. What is unclear is how often these norms are both institutionalized and internalized among member states and within the UN bureaucracy to ensure their effective implementation. In the case of MONUC however, it is clear that for the implementation of rhetorical norms to occur, both internalization and institutionalization must occur. Without the success of both processes, implementation of the rhetorical norm is incomplete. By examining this failure in MONUC, this thesis may shed light on the implementation of other rhetorical norms that do not have an institutional body from which to function and disseminate a norm.  ‘  Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 892  5  3  Gender Policy within the United Nations  3.1  The Evolution ofGender Policy within the United Nations Contemporary norms and commitments calling for gender perspectives in international  policy began in 1979 with the Convention on the Elimination ofallforms ofDiscrimination Against Women. This document defined discrimination against women and established an action plan for signatories to institutionalize gender equality in their respective domestic legal . Articulations linking gender equality and peace then emerged during the UN Decade 19 systems for Women from 1976-1985. In 1985 a UN report titled Strategies for the Advancement of Women to the Year 2000 identified the discrimination and violence that women suffer as significant obstacles to the achievement of women’s equality, development, and peace . Several 20 states, including those with poor records on women’s equality adopted bureaucracies to integrate gender equality so as not to be seen as breaking with the norm- indicating the establishment of institutional mechanisms for gender equality, though not internalization . 21 The next significant achievement came in 1995 when 189 countries unanimously adopted the Being Platform for Action, which focused attention on the fact that civilians, mostly women and children, outnumber combatant casualties during war. It also noted that the systematic rape of women is commonly used as a tactic of war and terrorism . Importantly, the document called 22 upon the UN and member states to ensure that where crimes of sexual violence are committed in conflict, all perpetrators, including those in UN missions, are prosecuted . It also set objectives 23 for the UN bureaucracy, which include involving more women in conflict and post-conflict decision-making positions and protecting women living in situations of armed conflict or foreign ‘ T 9 rue and Minstrom 2001,42 Sandis 2006, 372. 21 Ibid. 22 DAW 2001, 106 23 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2006, 54 20  6  . However, while a 1997 ECOSOC resolution endorsed ‘gender mainstreaming’ 24 occupation 25 within the UN, individual states and the UN bureaucracy established few mechanisms within peacekeeping operations that reflected a change in the values and interests of the state by echoing the language of the Platform. Nevertheless, institutionalization did progress through international laws established to prosecute violence against women during conflict. Specifically, the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda issued the first convictions for sexual violence as a crime against humanity . In addition, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 26 provided that rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization and other forms of sexual violence were war crimes when committed in the context of armed . These rulings established precedents upon which the 27 conflict and crimes against humanity Security Council and the Secretariat might institutionalize gender mainstreaming and condemn violence against women in all peace operations.  3.2  Peacekeeping and Gender Mainstreaming A rhetorical commitment exists within the UN to mainstream gender into peace  st operations. On May 31 2000, the Windhoek Declaration: Namibia Plan ofAction on  Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations integrated decades of UN language into a comprehensive plan of action, calling for an institutionalization of a gender perspective in peace operations. The declaration requested that “the initial 24 106 DAW2001, 25 Gender Mainstreaming is defined as “the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels.., so that women and men benefit equally”. Economic and Social Council. 1997. Agreed Conclusions. United Nations, 28. 26 Campbell 2004, 509 27 United Nations Secretariat. 28 June- 23 July 2004. Gender Mainstreaming in the work of the United Nations on Peace and Security. Available from: www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwe!activitiesIE-2004-CRP-3 .pdf, Accessed 16 June 2008.  7  assessment mission [of) any peace support operation include a senior adviser on gender . Additionally it prescribed that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 28 mainstreaming” (DPKO) “provide gender awareness guidelines and materials” to member states for their national training programmes prior to deployment . 29 In October 2000, Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security echoed the Windhoek Declaration when it sought to incorporate a gender perspective in all areas of peacekeeping operations. It also urged the Secretary-General to ensure that field operations include a gender component where appropriate . Furthermore, the resolution called for the 30 inclusion of a gender perspective, and the participation of women at all levels of decision making in peace operations and peace processes; the protection of the rights of women and girls in conflict zones; and gender mainstreaming in the reporting and implementation system of the ’ Finally, 1325 “Emphasized the responsibility of all states to put an end to impunity and to 3 UN prosecute those responsible for genocide, and war crimes, including sexual and other forms of violence against women and girls. [And]... stresse[d] the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions ”. 32 With resolution 1325, a new conception of which gender issues ought to be considered in peace operations was introduced. Institutionalization occurred with the passage of resolution 1325, and was to continue with member states incorporating this norm in their peacekeeping practices. This placed the onus on individual states to take responsibility for promoting gender mainstreaming within peace operations. The case of MONUC will show that this reduced the  28 29  31 32  United Nations Transitional Assistance Group, 2001 Ibid Nations Security Council, 2000 Kirk and Taylor, 2004 International Alert 2002, 15  8  norm’s requirements for implementation among states . 33 Since the adoption of resolution 1325, gender has been unusually present in UN Security Council resolutions, indicating a rhetorical institutionalization of gender in peace operations. Between 2000 and 2004, 14.2 per cent of all resolutions included language that drew attention to women or gender issues and recalled resolution 1325. This included establishing gender units in the mandates of peacekeeping missions such as Liberia, and calls for gender mainstreaming in the mandates of peace operations . Gender advisers, who are responsible for assisting the 34 Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRSG) and senior mission staff in mainstreaming gender in all aspects of a mission’s mandate, were also established in seven peacekeeping operations, including the DRC . However, as will be seen below internalization of 35 the norm has not occurred, as MONUC demonstrates that gender units are established and operate separately from the rest of the mission. These rhetorical commitments have continued, with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pushing the Security Council in June 2008 to unanimously pass resolution 1820, which called for states to halt the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war. This was a landmark document because of its recognition of violence against women in conflict as a threat to the economic, social and political stability and security of a country . However, it is too soon to 36 know how successfully the resolution will be implemented, as interviews with the programme officer for women’s rights at the NGO Rights and Democracy raised concerns that this  Finnemore 1993, 583 Nations, 2004 Ibid...7 UNDPI,2008 36  9  resolution, like 1325, did not come with any specific recommendations for funding or . 37 implementation Thus, it is clear that rhetorical advancements have been made in institutionalizing gender norms within the UN system. It is possible that the more often these concerns are included in documents and plans, the more natural it will become to include them in all peace operations. The case of MONUC demonstrates however, that these norms have rarely been implemented into action because of a failure of states to completely institutionalize and internalize gender norms in their domestic systems, resulting in a lack of resources for MONUC. Meanwhile the UN bureaucracy has failed to do the same in the structures of the UN, resulting in policies within MONUC that are not responsive to the needs of women in the DRC.  Authors interview with Gisèle Eva Côté Rights and Democracy, ,  August  2008.  10  4  Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo  4.1  The Deadliest Conflict in Halfofa Century  Conflict in the DRC was sparked by the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when Hutu militia . The conflict drew in forces and support from seven other 38 sought refuge in the eastern Congo African nations and several non-state actors. In 1996, Rwandan, Angolan, and Ugandan support for the uprising of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) deposed then President Mobutu Sese Seko, replacing him with rebel leader Laurent Kabila. Two years later in July 1998, President Kabila dismissed his Rwandan military advisors and expelled Rwandan forces from eastern Congo . In response, in August 1998 Rwandan troops backing the 39 Congolese rebels, Congolese Rally for Democracy and invaded the DRC along with the Ugandan sponsored Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation and Movement for the Liberation of . President Kabila mounted a defense with troops from the DRC, Zimbabwe, Namibia, 40 Congo Angola, Chad, and Burundian rebels. The result was the creation of one of Africa’s most internationalized and deadliest wars . 41  4.2  “A War Against Women and Girls”  Since 1998 the direct and indirect death toll from the conflict has reached 5.4 million and . Approximately 1,000 people have died each day from fighting and fighting42 continues to rise induced conditions, making this the deadliest conflict since World War II. Few conflicts have caused as much trauma and destruction among civilians as the one in the DRC. Women have  38  From 1971 to 1997 the Democratic Republic of Congo was referred to as Zaire. For the purposes of continuity this paper will only make reference to the country as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC or Congo. Roessler and Pendergast 2006, 236 Ibid...238 40 ‘ HRW 2004, 2 42 Joe Bavier. Reuters. “Over 2,000 raped last month in Congo’s east: Report” July 29, 2008 http://news.yahoo.comls/nm/20080729/wl_nmlcongo democratic_rape_dc  11  suffered unparalleled violence, with Human Rights Watch labeling the conflict “A War Against Women” because of the widespread use of rape as an instrument of war . 43 Within the conflict, women and girls have taken on the roles of combatant, wife, and sexual slave 44 and all sides use rape as a weapon of war on a massive scale. The motives for this tactic include the belief that raping a virgin gives a soldier immunity in combat , revenge, ethnic 45 cleansing, and finally the desire to undermine “enemy” morale by spreading shame, injury, and disease among the population 46 The UN believes that these atrocities aim to achieve the complete physical and psychological destruction of women . These are also committed in a 47 deliberate attempt to dehumanize and destroy entire communities and make villages submissive to the power of rebel groups . 48 Overall, the UNDP estimates that there have been approximately 50,000 cases of rape reported in the east of the country . Most recent reports estimate that 2,200 women were raped 49 in North Kivu alone in June 2008, suggesting that the real number of victims is much higher than 50,00050, The exact number of women affected by sexual abuse is unknown. For every rape that is reported, the UN estimates that between ten and twenty rapes go unreported because women fear stigmatization or lack access to doctors and clinics. Poor infrastructure and the ongoing violence also make obtaining statistics difficult . The former Gender Advisor for MONUC 51  HRW, 2002 HRW, 2004 The Economist, May 2008. Ibid. 46 “ United Nations. July 2007. South Kivu: 4,500 Sexual Violence Cases in the First Six Months of this Year Alone. Available from: http://www.monuc.or/new.aspx?news1D= 1 5065&menuOpened=A.org Accessed 25 May 2008. 48 HRW, 2002 All Africa. July 2008. Congon-Kinshasa: Poursuite des autres des violences sexuelles Available from: http://fr.allafrica.comlstories.20071 I 1080611 .htrnl?viewall=1 Accessed I August 2008. ° Bavier, 2008 The Economist, May 2008 ‘  12  estimated in 2003 that “10’s to 100’s of thousands of women and girls” had already become . 52 victims Women and girls also constitute nearly 75% of the refugee and internally displaced population in the DRC, fleeing violence for the forest or refugee camps, unprotected and combatants Upon reaching refugee camps women have faced . vulnerable to attack by 53 additional sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers, where they are raped or engage in ‘survival’ prostitution- trading sex for food, shelter, and protection . The result is the destruction of 54 communities through rejection and stigma, unwanted children, high rates of HIV/AIDS, and extensive physical and psychological injuries . 55  4.3  The Creation ofa Transitional Government and Continuing Violence As military activities increase in one area, so does the violence against women and girls,  making peace essential for women’s security in the DRC . Following dozens of failed 56 initiatives, on July 10, 1999 the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed by the DRC, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda . It requested that the UN and the Organization for 57 African Unity “constitute, facilitate, and deploy an appropriate a peacekeeping force to ensure implementation of this agreement” . In response a UN liaison mission was created in 1999. 58 Following the assassination of Laurent Kabila in January 2001, further peace negotiations resulted in the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces. A December 2002 peace deal in Sun City, South Africa ushered in a transitional government in June 2003 in which Joseph Kabila 52  Smythe, 2003 MONUC 2005a. Higate 2004, 7. Ibid... 15 HRW 2002 56 Pillay 2006 7 58 Rosseler and Pendergast 2006, 238 ,  13  . This ‘government of national unity’ purportedly ended 59 shared power with four vice-presidents the nine-year conflict, but in many parts of eastern DRC the fighting between armed groups continues with widespread human rights violations . In response to the continuing violence in 60 the east, an additional peace agreement was signed in Goma in January 200861. Although 40 groups signed the agreement, the Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, which had sparked the resurgence of violence leading to Goma, failed to sign, making the treaty’s success unlikely . 62  International Crisis Group. July 2008. Conflict History: DR. Congo Available from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict search&l=1 &t= 1 &c countr y=3. Accessed 5 June 2008. ° HRW, 2002 61 The Economist.com. January 2008. Peace at Last? Available from: http://www.economist.com/worldJafrical Accessed 13 May 2008 62 The Institute for Security Studies. 4 February 2008: Will The Goma Peace Agreement Bring Peace to the Eastern Part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo? Available from: http://www.issafrica.org/static/templates/tmpl html.php?node id=2943&slink id=545 I &slink type=l 2&li nkid=5. Accessed 7 June 2008.  14  5  MONUC’s Mandate  5.1  Phases of the Operation MONUC was established by the UN Security Council to facilitate the implementation of  the Lusaka Accord. With over seventeen thousand troops and a budget exceeding one billion dollars, MONUC is currently the most expensive mission in the DPKO . The mission is 63 financed primarily through assessments from the United States, Japan, and Germany . The 64 Special Representative of the Secretary General for the DRC is Alan Doss from the United , but the majority of military personnel have come from India, (4,372 personnel) 65 Kingdom Pakistan, (3, 551 personnel), Bangladesh and Uruguay, (approximately 1, 300 personnel each) . 66 MONUC has proceeded in four phases. The first phase (1999-2000), sought to implement the Lusaka Agreement, by positioning UN military personnel to liaise with the warring parties . 67 The second phase (2000-200 1) continued to monitor the ceasefire and deployed 500 military observers to oversee the disengagement of foreign forces from the DRC . Throughout these 68 phases there was no specific mandate for civilian protection, nor was MONUC charged with halting violations of humanitarian law, despite the prevalent violence, particularly against women69. The third phase (2001-2003) focused on the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and the reintegration (DDR(RR)) of fighters . During this phase the security 70 vacuums left by the withdrawal of foreign forces in phase two intensified ethnic conflict in Ituri  63  MONUC, 2006b 64 2006a MONUC 65 United Nations. Special and Personal Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary General. Available from: http://www.un.org/News/ossg/srsg/table.htm. Accessed 2 June 2008. MONUC 2006c 66 67 Roessler and Pendergast, 260 68 Ibid..266 69 Human Rights Wwatch, 94 70 MONUC, 2006b  15  and the Kivus, stalling demobilization . In response, the Security Council increased MONUC’s 71 troop levels by more than half but resisted giving MONUC overall Chapter VII authority, which would have authorized MONUC to use all means deemed necessary within the limits of the mission’s capacities and in its areas of deployment to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence . 72 Instability, violence and DDR(RR), continued in the fourth phase (2003-2006) of MONUC, which sought to facilitate the DRC’ s transition to credible elections, won by Joseph Kabila in 2006. Phase four also saw the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) led by France. The IEMF operated in Ituri from June to September 2003 and was granted a full Chapter VII mandate to restore temporary order to the regions MONUC had lost . Since the 2006 elections, MONUC has focused its attention on establishing peace in 74 control the east of the country and rebuilding Congolese institutions such as the judiciary . 75 As will be seen in later sections, throughout all phases of the mission, responding to the gender based violence in the DRC has not been a top priority of MONUC. Few institutional mechanisms have been designed to mainstream gender activities throughout MONUC and even fewer have been implemented, indicating weak institutionalization of the norm through rules, policies, and programs.  5.2  Gender Norms within MONUC The creation of the Office of Gender Affairs (OGA) is one of the few mechanisms  established in MONUC to institutionalize gender norms. Created in March 2002 following the 71  Roessler and Pendergast 266 MONUC, 2006b. MONUC, 2006b 73 Roessler and Pendergast p.284 Ibid. .294 75 72  .  16  recommendations of resolution 132576, the OGA works to ensure gender mainstreaming within MONUC, the peace process, and in the DRC . Recalling resolution 1325, the OGA has 77 attempted to institutionalize and diffuse gender norms in peacekeeping by training UN personnel as well as the Congolese National Police. The goal is to make MONUC personnel aware of the sex-specific issues in the DRC 78 and to train peacekeepers on gender issues, creating a security sector responsible for its acts . Additionally, in line with resolution 1325, the OGA aims to 79 encourage the effective participation of women in the peace process and post-conflict . However, significant obstacles exist, with interviews highlighting that despite 80 rebuilding progress, the results on gender mainstreaming have been weak, due to strategies, means and measures that are not proportional to the needs of women and girls , indicating weak 81 institutionalization.  76  UN Security Council, 2000 MONUC, 2005a 78 MONUC, 2005c MONUC, 2005d 79 80 MONUC, 2005b 81 Interview by Author, Vancouver July 2008.  17  6  International Actors: The Role of Individual States  6.1  Rhetoric vs. Commitment: Obstacles in the Creation and Operation ofMONUC The introduction of gender norms through MONUC’s OGA and UN documents creates  the precondition for bureaucrats and states to see gender norms as appropriate . However, 82 institutionalization and internalization remain incomplete. This is in part because of a lack of resources and political will from member states, which has made the implementation of gender policies largely ineffective. When the Lusaka Agreement requested a UN mission, the permanent members of the Security Council were devoting their attention and resources to missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone . Thus, states were reluctant to create a mission in the DRC. At the Security 83 Council sessions following Lusaka, the Secretary-General refrained from requesting a specific number of troops, but stated that the mission “would have to be large and expensive” . African 84 leaders advocated for 15,000-20,000 UN troops to be deployed immediately, while France requested the immediate deployment of 10,000 peacekeepers, arguing that a comprehensive cease-fire would remain elusive without the presence of UN troops . Despite pushing for 85 MONUC’s creation, the U.S. however, advocated for a maximum of 5,000 troops. The result was resolution 1291 in February 2000, which expanded MONUC from its liaison mission to a force “of up to 5,537 military personnel, including up to 500 observers, or more, provided that the Secretary-General determines that there is a need and that it can be accommodated” . This 86  82  E1gstrm 2000, 472. Roessler and Pendergast 2006, 249 84 Secretary General. 17 January 2000. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Available from: http://www.un.orglDocs/sc/reports/2000/sgrepoo.htm. Accessed 13 July 2008. 85 Roessler and Pendergast 2006, 250 DPKO 2001. MONUNC. 86  18  indicated a lack of will among states to deploy a large, permanent force to quell violence and protect civilians. Weak political will has persisted as MONUC consistently lacks the troops it requires to fulfill its mandate. Even as authorization increased, MONUC faced difficulty reaching full strength. By 2004, MONUC had 385 fewer troops then the 10,700 troops authorized by the Security Council in 2003. In this time, Ituri militia targeted MONUC and dissident forces occupied Bukavu, leaving the mission incapable of protecting civilians, in regions where women face the greatest violence. In response, the Secretary-General requested that the Security Council more than double the number of soldiers in the country by adding 13,100 troops to the 10,415 already present. In October 2004 the Security Council authorized 5,900 additional military personnel, less than half the number requested . The Council also denied the mission the 87 deployment of a brigade planned for the southeastern part of the country , where the UN 88 estimates that at least 25,000 women have been raped. While temporary deployments put the force at 18,347 personnel, the current mandate only authorizes a mere 16,700 troops total. This is well below the 23,000 troops recommended by the Secretary General , denying MONUC 89 resources to protect women and girls. In a vast country like the DRC and with multiple rebel groups and militias engaged in conflict, roughly 17,000 peacekeepers and 500 police are not enough to put an end to the . In contrast, contemporary missions in Cambodia and Bosnia had almost 30,000 and 90 violence . This highlights the willingness of the Security Council 91 60,000 soldiers deployed respectively in previous missions to deploy large volumes of troops in smaller geographic areas and in less 87  MONLJC, 2006d Roessler and Pendergast 2006, 256 89 UN DPKO, 2008 ° The Economist, May 2008 ‘ Diehi, Druckman, and WaIl 1998, 33 88  19  deadly conflicts than the DRC. Thus, the lack of troops in the DRC questions the commitment of states to put an effective end to this conflict and protect women and girls. The former Division Commander of MONUC stated in June 2008 that peacekeepers have played an important role in preventing acts of sexual violence against women in the DRC . Yet, 92 since September 2005 and resolution 1621, the Security Council has twice requested the Secretary-General start downsizing and repatriating personnel . Although this has yet to occur, 93 the request came despite targeted violence against women. At the time of the 2005 request, Medecins Sans Frontieres reported that its teams admitted 1,292 women who were victims of sexual violence and as many again in the first six months of 2006 in the North Kivu province. This represented as little as 10% of the estimated number of cases 94 and is indicative of the Security Council’s failure to conduct a gender analysis, implement 1325, and have concern for MONUC as a whole. Another obstacle preventing the implementation of gender policies in MONUC is the lack of lead country in this mission to streamline policies like gender, as occurred when the U.S. took the lead in Liberia and the U.K. in Sierra Leone . This means that no state has taken on the 95 responsibility of gender mainstreaming within the mission itself or ensured that the needed financial contributions are available, preventing the effective implementation of gender norms.  92 UNDPI,2008 UN DPKO, 2007 Medicins Sans Frontieres. 2006. Democratic Republic of Congo: Rape as a Weapon in North 94 Kivu. Available from: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.orgJnews/2006/07- 1 9-2006.cfm. Accessed 5 July 2008. Pillay 2006, 7  20  6.2  The Needfor a Gender Balance, and Resources The “Memorandum of Understanding” between the UN and troop contributing countries  states that in peace operations the UN cannot make requests based on sex for the composition of contingents. Thus, the composition is determined by member states, which often, especially in the case of MONUC is related to their national armed forces, including few women . In April 96 2003 there were only eleven women out of approximately 500 military observers at MONUC . 97 Figures on the overall mission balance have not been made available since 2003, but as of August 2008 no women occupied the positions of SRSG, Deputy SRSG, Force Commander or Police Commissioner . Furthermore, of the fourteen members of the senior management team, 98 only four are women . Interviews also suggest that there are few women out on patrol in the east 99 of the country where women suffer the greatest violence. Including female peacekeepers facilitates communication with the local population and encourages women to report incidences of violence. In the case of the DRC where men in uniform commit approximately 80% of the assaults against women , including female 100 peacekeepers is additionally important as local women have difficulty approaching male peacekeepers about the violence committed against them or other security concerns . NGOs 101 working to facilitate communication between local women’s groups and MONUC are concerned that as long as a gender imbalance persists, MONUC is unlike to monitor the routes necessary to increase security for women . 102  96  Kent, 2007, 56 Puechuirbal 2003, 125-126 98 United Nations 2008. Facts and Figures. Available from: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/facts.html. Accessed 1 August 2008. MONUC, 2008 99 100 Author’s interview with Gisèle Eva Côté, Rights and Democracy, August 2008 ‘° Puechguirbal 2003, 125-126 102 Author’s interview with Rachel Logel with contributions from World Vision, July 2008.  21  The MONUC case is in contrast to the cases of South Africa where 60% of the IJNOMSA mission forces including the initial force commander were women , and Liberia 103 where the Government of India deployed the first all-female police unit. This latter achievement . The creation of the 04 by India attracted more women to the police force and decreased violence’ all female police unit in 2007 thus represented the fulfillment of resolution 1325’s goal to increase the number of women participating in peacekeeping operations and in post-conflict . In contrast, MONUC highlights where this norm has not been internalized by 105 reconstruction member states as appropriate behaviour with devastating consequences. MONUC has also lacked the resources it requires to implement its mandate. As of January 2001 79.7 million dollars worth of overall contributions to MONUC were . This is particularly problematic for implementing gender norms because the OGA 6 outstanding’° has been forced to operate without a budget’° , limiting its effectiveness and political 7 . Consequently, this has reduced the presence of gender mainstrearning and the 08 viability” reporting of gender-based violence within MONUC. Furthermore, it indicates a disparity between rhetorical claims and real practice.  6.3  Promoting a Culture ofImpunity: Sexual Exploitation by MONUC Personnel  Incidents of misconduct by peacekeepers have become pervasive in the nine years that MONUC has been operating. According to the former Division Commander of MONUC “The political will to end the vicious cycle of impunity does not exist [and] remains a serious  103 104 105 106  107 ‘°  Pillay 2006, 6 Ben 2008, 213 United Nations 2002, 1 Secretary General. 2001. Sixthth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC. Available from: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/200l/sgrep01.htm Accessed 13 July 1008. Pillay 2006, 7 Masson 2005, 506  22  impediment for the prevention of sexual violence’ ”. From December 2004 until October 2005, 09 the Office for Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse conducted 111 investigations into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. Among the punishments issued, thirty MONUC soldiers and ten police members were repatriated on disciplinary grounds”° From these investigations, the office concluded, that there was “zero compliance’ with ‘zero tolerance” and that investigations by the UN into allegations of sexual abuse “did not act as a deterrent to some of the troops, perhaps because they had not been made aware of the severe penalties for engaging in such conduct, nor had they seen any evidence of a negative impact on individual peacekeepers for such behaviour”. In the DRC, it is clear that preventing sexual exploitation has not been internalized by individual peacekeepers. Individual states have also not made clear these zero tolerance polices, indicating incomplete institutionalization through policy and communication. Officially, the UN has a “zero-tolerance” policy” 2 stating that any acts of sexual exploitation and abuse are unacceptable and strictly prohibited’ 13 As of 2008, there have been no reports of repatriated soldiers being prosecuted, despite calls for prosecuting guilty peacekeepers in the Beijing Platform for Action. Here, gender and peacekeeping norms conflict with the institutionalized and internalized norms of state sovereignty, preventing the UN from taking action against soldiers who have committed abuse” 4 The lack of prosecution by individual states indicates that they have not institutionalized and implemented gender norms, nor have states made clear to soldiers definitive legal punishment for breaking these norms, preventing internalization as soldiers fail to conform to gender norms to the detriment of local women.  109  UNDPI, 2008 110 2006d M0NUC Bedont 2005,50 112 Bedont 2005, 86 “ MONUC, 2006e “ Finnemore 1993, 582  23  6.4  Gender Mainstreaming and Pre-Deployment Training States are responsible for the institutionalization of gender norms through the adoption of  policies, and the implementation of gender programmes in pre-deployment training’ . This requires states to see implementing the norm as the right thing to do, diffusing it through institutional mechanisms. Although the UN provides training packages to states, the training sessions implemented by them vary. In Bangladesh, courses only cover the UN Standardized Generic Training Module on Gender issues in peacekeeping, but in Sweden, gender is mainstreamed into all its courses and soldiers are trained on country-specific subjects and on the empowerment of local women 6 Thus, while training sessions institutionalize the UN’s gender ’ 1 norms; implementation remains uneven, hindering MONUCs ability to respond to the needs of women. Ineffective pre-deployment training has translated into soldiers failing to internalize gender norms regarding violence against women. This was evident in pre-deployment training for the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Here, peacekeepers stated that they could not interfere to stop violence against women because ‘wife beating is a part of the local culture’ while simultaneously stating that they ‘wanted to help’ and ‘make a difference” “. This is particularly relevant for the DRC, where peacekeepers face mass movements of displaced people, the majority of whom are women who have been the victims of war crimes. In order to respond effectively and avoid further traumatizing and disempowering local women and girls, peacekeepers need to be trained on gender  8 rm  115  Puechguirbal 2003, 117 116 Myytikâinen 2007, 4 Mjima 117 Mackay 2003, 221 118 Puechguirbal 2003, 122.  24  In sum, it is clear that individual member states have failed to institutionalize and internalize gender norms in peacekeeping, preventing the effective implementation of these norms within MONUC. This is evident by the failure of states to authorize and deploy enough forces to quell the violence and protect women in DRC, to deploy a gender balanced mission, and finally through the failure of states to properly train soldiers and deter acts of sexual violence through the prosecution of those acts.  25  7  International Actors: The UN Bureaucracy  7.1  The Role ofthe Secretary-General and Secretariat Although individual states have failed to provide resources and training to soldiers, the  UN has also prevented the effective implementation of gender norms in peace operations. Specifically there are no institutional mechanisms in place within the UN to diffuse a uniform gender policy among UN bodies and individual states. In the absence of a coordinating body like UNESCO to assert the value of the norm, in peacekeeping, this responsibility has fallen to the Secretary-General and the Secretariat ’ 1  .  The Secretary-General takes on many roles in the establishment and implementation of . Though he frequently consults the Security Council, the 20 UN peacekeeping operations’ Secretary-General’s reports play an independent role by outlining the needs of a mission, recommending action, and requesting the authorization from the Security Council for troops and . Furthermore, the Secretary-General’s office is also responsible for formulating the 21 funds’ budget of an operation, in addition to establishing the mission’s rules of engagement’ . Beneath 22 the Secretary-General’ 23 is the Secretariat, which in peacekeeping operations estimates the dimensions and severity of the developments affecting peace and security and ultimately forms an integral part of determining what the Secretary-General tells the Security Council’ . When 24 formulating the mandate of a mission, these individuals assess its needs and the needs of the local population. As such, it is these individuals that are largely responsible for the norm’s diffusion. Unfortunately, MONUC makes evident the fact that bureaucrats have not internalized  119  Finnemore 1993, 593 Ashi 2 ‘ 0 Akashi 1998, 129 121 Gordenker 2005, 36 122 Shimura 2001, 52 123 United Nations, 2004 124 Gordenker 2005. 36  26  the need to conduct gender analyses and include a gender perspective in peace, hindering the implementation of the norm.  7.2  The Secretariat: A Failure to Institutionalize and Internalize Gender Norms Recognizing the most effective way for gender mainstreaming to become a necessary  component of organizational structure, the DPKO has stated, “A clear commitment to the promotion of gender equality in the entire mission is required from the inception of the mandate until its end... translated into concrete actions in all areas of the mission and should be the responsibility of the mission, particularly senior managers’ ”. Unfortunately, this did not occur 25 in MONUC as the Secretariat failed to advocate a gender responsive mandate. Since liaison officers arrived in 1999, the Secretary-General intermittently reported incidences of gender-based violence in the DRC. However, while specific calls were made for the protection of children, the same were not made for women 126 In June 2001, the SecretaryGeneral’s Eighth Report made the first explicit reference to the targeted violence against women and the need to consider their protection. The report stated, “the enormity of the human rights violations inflicted on women, men and children alike” require the UN to “examine what it can do to help prepare for the situation which may develop following the withdrawal of foreign . Though significant, this statement came after the Security Council made stronger 27 forces” reference to the need to protect women in the DRC, as well as eight months after the Security Council passed resolution 1325, and three years after the Rome Statute recognized rape as a war  125  UN DPKO, 2004 Secretary General. 2000. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Available from: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/sgrep00.htm Accessed 13 July 2008. 127 United Nations Secretary General 2001. Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Available from: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/200l/sgrep0l.htm. Accessed 14 July, 2008 126  27  crime. Thus, despite significant rhetoric, gender mainstreaming and its institutional advancements have not become automatic behaviour within the Secretariat, hindering the implementation of gender policies in MONUC. Thus, even with the necessary resources the absence of a gender-responsive mandate would have prevented the implementation of gender norms. Indeed, despite a 2001 commitment from the Secretary-General to diffuse gender mainstreaming in peace operations, MONUC’s peacekeepers have never been given clear rules of engagement to prevent crimes of sexual violence from occurring among the civilian . The high demands on MONUC’s varied tasks mean that, where protecting women 28 population’ in conflict has not become an internalized norm among peacekeepers, troops “may ignore anything they are not asked explicitly to do” . Further to this point, interviews suggest that 29 women’s groups have requested MONUC increase security in target locations where women are frequently attacked. However, MONUC and the National Congolese Army have been reluctant 1 30• With violence against women increasingly committed by civilians in to listen to such requests addition to men in uniform, a lack of clear mandate represents a real operational problem for the mission and a failure of MONUC to implement the Beijing Platform for Action and resolution l325’’.  7.3  Gender Norms and the Deployment and Operation ofMONUC The urgency that surrounds the origin and deployment of peacekeeping operations  require the Secretary-General and the Secretariat to act quickly to raise and dispatch a mission,  UNDPI, 2 ‘ 8 2008. 29 2008 ‘ HRW 30 interview with Rachel Logel with contributions from World Vision. July 2008 ‘ Author’s ‘‘ United Nations, 2007  28  with no institutional mechanisms requiring the guidance of political organs such as IJNIFEM, which could insist on gender awareness . Compounding the problem, bureaucrats and mission 132 planners perceive there to be no room or time for gender-based analyses as it is believed there are more ‘important’ and pressing tactical and logistical concerns to be addressed than genderbased violence’ . Gender analyses are viewed as ‘harmful’ to the ‘real’ work of saving lives’ 33 . 34 This works against the establishment of institutional mechanisms such as good training and briefings on gender before the mission’s deployment, and extends to poor implementation in the field’ ‘. Cohesive organizations are better able to socialize individuals into new norms by . In I.JN peacekeeping operations however, interventions in crisis36 generating consistent ideas’ affected countries originate in six operational agencies (IINHCR, UNICEF, WHO, WFP, FAO, 37 in addition to the DPKO. Each agency has its own mandate, administrative structure, TJNDP)’  and polices for addressing the needs of women in conflict situations . Women’s groups 138 operating in the DRC have indicated that this has resulted in a lack of coordination among UN agencies, hindering the effective implementation of programmes. Specifically it was reported that in the DRC, one UN agency will create a programme on, for example, sexual violence, and then another agency will arrive and establish an overlapping programme. This wastes the limited . Additionally, conflicts have arisen over which agency 39 money and resources programmes have’  132  Shimur 2001, 47 Raven-Roberts 2005, 57 ‘ Ibid ‘ Ibid..55 136 Hooghe, 2005, 865 Howard 2008, 308 ‘ Raven-Roberts 2005, 48 39 interview with Gisèle Eva Côté, Rights and Democracy, August 2008. ‘ Author’s  29  is responsible for which task, resulting in the ineffective implementation of programs and gaps in . 40 implementation’ Implementation of gender policies has also suffered because the OGA is restricted to five . Additionally, MONUC’s limited resources have been centralized by the DPKO in 41 personnel’ the capital Kinshasa, despite the fact that the majority of violence against women occurs in eastern Congo and away from cities. This reduces the operational and implementation capacity of the UN to support gender equality and rights, as MONUC’s ability to respond and prevent gender-based violence is reduced the further away from the capital the violence is located’ . 42 In 2005, the UN opened a gender section in Bukavu and a team of nine people was established to travel the country and meet with local Congolese to determine local realities’ . 43 Unfortunately, like the office in Kinshasa, the Bukavu team lacked resources. Interviews suggest that with the creation of these offices and their limited staff, the UN has simply been following a logic of consequences, establishing offices that appear to conform to gender norms, but failing to provide them with the necessary resources to implement them. In fact, in the civil branches of MONUC, the UN has been known to maintain that there is a gender office established even . 44 when it does not have any staff jnside’  7.4  Gender Training in MONUC The implementation of training sessions is an indication that a process of institutionalization  of gender principles is in motion, as well as an attempt to socialize soldiers in MONUC to gender norms. It is important that this training occur at the state and field mission level as it ensures that Howd 4 ‘ 0 2008, 308 141 Higate 2004,18 142 Mduwimana. 2006, 28 MONUC, 2006b ‘ Author’s interview with Giséle Eva Côté Rights and Democracy, August 2008 ,  30  all peacekeepers receive the same gender training and are given context-specific information regarding the plight of women in the area of deployment. Unfortunately, while a few individuals such as the SRSG have supported gender training in MONUC, indifference and resistance from those needed to diffuse and internalize the gender norm have challenged this socialization. For example, when the SRSG for MONUC requested the Gender Advisor organize a two-hour concluding session for senior staff in Kinshasa’ , the turnout of senior staff, and heads of units 45 was low, indicating a weak level of institutional support from senior staff for gender mainstreaming within MONUC’ 46 and limiting the effectiveness of training. Additionally, despite the DPKO’s creation of policy guidelines, checklists, and gender manuals to ensure in the field implementation, few mechanisms have been established by the Secretariat to ensure that gender programmes are actually implemented. With no mechanisms to hold managers accountable for not implementing policy, training programmes have not moved beyond rhetorical institutionalization. This has prevented personnel from being educated on gender norms and beginning the process of internalization . For instance, institutionalization 147 began in the field with the “Training the Trainers” package. Unfortunately, the context-specific data on the conditions of local women needed to modify the package to MONUC was not collected’ 48• As a result, implementation suffered, and the impact of the package was limited to a gender awareness-raising tool’ . This, combined with a lack of accountability mechanisms 49 questions how seriously UN personnel in the Secretariat have internalized the need to implement training programmes in the field, resulting in soldiers not being equipped to respond to the needs of the local Congolese population. ‘ 146 147 148 149  Pillay 2006, 119 Puechguirbal 2003, 119 Raven-Roberts 2005, 57 Puechguirbal 2003, 116 Higate 2004, 7  31  7.5  Preventing and Investigating Misconduct by Peacekeepers in the Field  States carry the responsibility of prosecuting soldiers that have been implicated in crimes of sexual abuse and exploitation. It is the responsibility of the UN, however, to establish mechanisms to prevent such exploitation from occurring in the field, as well as mechanisms for women to file complaints, and investigate claims when such reports are filed. When an allegation is made the SRSG usually calls a board of inquiry to investigate. Where the case involves an alleged perpetrator from a national military contingent, the board of inquiry also invites a representative from the contingent to sit on the board’ . The board then 50 recommends appropriate action against the perpetrator’ . However, when foreign civilians in 51 MONUC commit crimes, the poor legal mechanisms in the DRC make the country unable to cope with prosecuting crimes, and MONUC does not have any mechanisms to deal with such civilian abuses’ . Furthermore, despite repeated requests to the UN, interviews suggest that local 52 women are never made aware of the outcomes of investigations or subsequent trials, nor are they granted compensation’ . This creates a situation where there are few institutional mechanisms in 53 place to deter exploitation, spreading a culture of impunity and harming MONUC’s reputation. Abuse by peacekeepers has not been completely unaddressed by the UN. To prevent inappropriate contact between them and local women, MONUC has sought to establish institutional rules and regulations that prohibit peacekeepers from “fraternizing” with the local population by restricting their interactions to certain times of day and 1 locations 54• However, the UN Secretariat has provided few resources to implement these policies and reduce exploitation.  150  152 153  Hampson and Kthara-Hunt. 2007, 206 Jbid..213 Howard 2008, 309 Author’s interview with Gisèle Eva Côté Rights and Democracy, August 2008 Howard 208, 309 ,  154  32  This indicates a failure by the UN to implement the commitments made in resolution 1325 to protect women in girls in conflict zones and institutionalize deterrence mechanisms. As a result, allegations of misconduct continue in MONUC, with investigations being conducted as recently as May 2008, by MONUC’s Office of Internal Oversight’ . 55  7.6  Gender Norms in Post-Conflict Recoveiy The DDR(RR) of former combatants is a main priority of MONIJC. In this process TiN  peacekeepers disarm combatants by directly collecting arms, destroying them, and making efforts to reintegrate fighters to productive endeavours’ . While the government is formally 56 responsible for planning and coordinating the implementation of the DDR(RR) program, MONUC and other UN agencies are heavily involved. UNIFEM has been the main agency responsible for driving the inclusion of gender-specific analyses and programmes in the DDR(RR) process’ Approximately one third of soldiers recruited in the DRC conflict are women. In response to this reality, the UN has made significant advances to alter the traditional TiN DDR(RR) mandate that focused on able-bodied men to institutionalize a gender approach in MONUC . 158 The OGA and the long term Gender and DDR(RR) Technical Group, have tried to introduce practical measures into orientation centres to better identify ex-combatants, with a view to developing a mechanism of identification for dependents’ . Unfortunately, women affected by 59 conflict either as captive “wives” or sexual slaves are considered neither as dependents nor as 155  United Nations-MONUC. 2008. Available from: www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newslD-1 7899. Accessed 4 July 2008 Boothy 2004, 216 156 57 2006, 16 ‘ Nduwimana 58 Vision. Crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Available from: ‘ World http://www.worldvision.org/worldvisionlwvususfo.nsf7stable/globalissuesdrc?open&lid=dr of congo&lp os=lefinav. Accessed 28 May 2008 59 2003d ‘ MONUC,  33  combatants and as such, their needs have not been defined or incorporated into the . Furthermore, MONUC has not been mandated to account the basic needs of 60 programme’ dependents such as transportation, health care, and lodging at the time of DDR(RR)’ . In 61 response the OGA is working in partnership with the MONUC Human Rights division to undertake a study on the living conditions of dependents and ex-combatants. The investigation aims to recommend direct intervention and financing within the national disarmament programme- or even outside the programme’ . Advancements in institutionalizing gender 62 mainstreaming have occurred in DDR(RR), with the gender office attempting to expand this program in a more comprehensive manner. Implementation of this program, like so many others, currently remains limited.  7.7  Women and the Peace Process Women have been victims of catastrophic abuse, but they can also make important  contributions to the peace process. When MONUC facilitated the Goma peace talks in January 2008, there was not a single individual at the peace table directly representing the women of the . This occurred despite the existence of resolution 1325 that called for women to be 63 DRC’ active participants in all peace deliberations, and the fact that women have been the targeted victims of the war that the peace talks were meant to resolve. According to interviews, the UN could do more to include women in these processes. UN officials have influence over the selection of participants, and often when they do include women. However, they invite women that are not connected with the base of women’s groups in the DRC or they bring scholars and  Nduwjmana 6 ‘ 0 2006, 17 UN DPKO 2004, 132-134 162 MONUC, 2005d 163 Lewis, 2008. 161  34  women that do not live in DRC anymore and not connected to the realities that every day women in the DRC suffer’ . 64 The documents produced at Goma included an “Act of Engagement” for an immediate . This was a peace commitment signed amongst the warring parties, yet in the entire 65 ceasefire’ document, the words “rape” and “sexual violence” never appear. Women are mentioned only once, lumped in with children, the elderly and the disabled. The document effectively neglects to recognize any language within the UN system that addresses the needs of women, like resolution 1325 and the Beijing Platform for Action . Furthermore, in direct contradiction with resolution 166 1325, the peace document also grants amnesty to those who have participated in the fighting. Though the document makes a deliberate legal distinction that war crimes or crimes against humanity will not be excused, individual acts of rape and abuse are unaddressed, spreading the culture of impunity’ 67, In sum, while some limited efforts have been made, it is apparent the UN Secretariat has failed to institutionalize and internalize gender norms within MONUC. This is evident by the failure of the Secretariat to conduct a gender responsive analysis of the conflict in the DRC at the inception of the mission, its failure to provide a mandate and the rules of engagement that call for the protection of women in conflict, its failure to implement mechanisms to deter acts of sexual violence by peacekeepers, and finally through its failure to include women in the peace process.  164  interview with Gisèle Eva Côtd Rights and Democracy, August 2008 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. May 14, 2008. ““DRC: After Two Key Deals, What Progress Towards Peace in North Kivu?” http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?Reportld=78205 166 International Crisis Group. “Conflict in Congo” February 2008. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2829 167 Lewis, 2008 ,  165  35  8  Conclusion It is possible that MONUC is the beginning of gender mainstreaming in peace support  operations and could be part of the process that begins the internalization and institutionalization of this norm. At present, however, what this mission has shown is the difficulties of implementing a rhetorical norm into practice when the institutionalization and internalization of the norm has not been complete among states and the UN bureaucracy. MONUC is a case where there has been a failure of states to authorize the necessary resources and deter acts of sexual violence among peacekeepers and the local population. Simultaneously, there has been a separate failure by the UN Secretariat to establish a gender responsive mandate and objectives for MONUC and the women of the DRC. The result is an incomplete implementation of the gender norm within MONUC, which rests with both member states, and the Secretariat. Consequently, women and girls continue to suffer unprecedented violence in the DRC.  36  BIBLIOGRAPHY Akashi, Yasu Ashi. 1998. Managing United Nations Peacekeeping in Un ited Nations Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learnedfrom the Former Yugoslavia Edited by Wolfgang Biermann and Martin Vadest. 1-367. Aldershot: Ashgate. Bedont, Barbara. 2005. The Renewed Popularity of the Rule of Law: Implications for Women, Impunity, and Peacekeeping in Gender, Conflict, and Peacebuilding Edited by: Dyan Mazurana, Angela Raven-Roberts, and Jane Parpart. 1-404. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul Williams. 2004. Conclusion: What Future for Peace Operations? 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