Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Sailing alone : a historical-cultural explanation why Denmark has not introduced the European common.. Stainforth, Thorfinn Christopher 2008

You don't seem to have a PDF reader installed, try download the pdf

Item Metadata

Download

Media
[if-you-see-this-DO-NOT-CLICK]
ubc_2008_fall_stainforth_thorfinn_christopher.pdf [ 3.49MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 1.0067037.json
JSON-LD: 1.0067037+ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 1.0067037.xml
RDF/JSON: 1.0067037+rdf.json
Turtle: 1.0067037+rdf-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 1.0067037+rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 1.0067037 +original-record.json
Full Text
1.0067037.txt
Citation
1.0067037.ris

Full Text

SAILING A L O N E : A N HISTORICAL-CULTURAL EXPLANATION WHY D E N M A R K HAS N O T INTRODUCED THE EUROPEAN C O M M O N CURRENCY by Thorfinn Christopher Stainforth  A THESIS S U B M I T T E D I N P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T O F T H E REQUIREMENTS FOR T H E DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in  T H E F A C U L T Y O F G R A D U A T E STUDIES  (European Studies)  T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F BRITISH C O L U M B I A (Vancouver)  July 2008 © Thorfinn Christopher Stainforth, 2008  ABSTRACT Denmark is the only country that is participating i n the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM-II), but intending to stay out of the European Monetary U n i o n (EMU). The country meets all of the criteria for membership i n the euro, is denying itself the potential benefits, political and economic, of full membership, yet has effectively surrendered control over its o w n monetary policy. This "halfway" policy is not easy to explain according to many academic approaches, including small state theory, realist politics, and liberal economics. Academics have attempted to explain the reasons for the rejection of the euro, breaking d o w n into four main theories, three of which focus on the referendum results w h i c h led to the Danish public's rejection of the euro. They are, "Second O r d e r " theories, w h i c h explain the referendum outcomes as tangential to the population's actual feelings on E M U or European integration; "Values Oriented" theories w h i c h explain the results based on the values and beliefs of the Danish electorate; "Utilitarian" theories which explain the rejections from a self-interested, utilitarian assessment of voting patterns. A n d a fourth school sees the referendum results as red herrings, believing that deeper structural or economic factors have shaped the country's policy. This paper attempts to form a synthesis of the first three schools, extrapolating on the "Values Oriented" theories, to explain the popular rejection, but elite support for E M U . The historical cultural argument, w h i c h has been developed i n the historical field, and has been used with regard to some other areas of Danish euroscepticism, explains the contradiction. Ultimately, the Danish no-votes, and abstention from full participation i n the E M U stem from the deeply rooted Danish political traditions of Grundtvigian egalitarian smallness and anti-elitism. The ambivalence, and apparent contradiction of the "half-in" policy stems from the eroding importance of these political traditions as a result of globalization and europeanization, as the political elite embraced the European project. This break d o w n of political traditions represents the first significant shift i n Danish political culture since the Second W o r l d War.  Table of Contents Abstract Table of Contents List of Abbreviations Acknowledgements  ii iii v vi  Introduction  1  Chapter II: Current Economie and Political Situation  6  Secured Opt Out through Referendum  6  What are the advantages for Denmark of staying out?  10  What are the disadvantages for Denmark of staying out?  16  Chapter III: Competing Explanations Small State Theory INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS  21 22 22  SWEDEN/UK  23  FINLAND  26  NETHERLANDS  27  AUSTRIA  28  Economic Explanations  29  Utilitarian Explanations  29  "Second Order" Theories  31  Values Oriented/Cultural Explanations  33  Chapter IV: Danish Monetary Policy and the "New Consensus" Monetary/Fiscal Policy History of Denmark  34 35  1950S-1982 KEYNESIANISM A N D T H E EUROPEAN CONSENSUS  36  T H E COLLAPSE OF BRETTON W O O D S  37  EUROPEAN M O N E T A R Y SYSTEM  38  A C H A N G E IN ATTITUDE  38  " E L I T E " ATTITUDE IN D E N M A R K  40  Chapter V : Danish Political Culture as Explanatory Factor  42  LINGUISTIC A N D IDEOLOGICAL SITUATION IN D E N M A R K  43  A S C E N D A N C Y OF T H E PROSPEROUS PEASANTS  44  GRUNDTVIGL^NISM  46  LUTHERANISM  48  FOLKEH0JSKOLER  49  COOPERATIVES  51  POLITICAL POWER SHIFTS  52  SIGNALLING A N D B A N A L NATIONALISM  55  RISE OF T H E W E L F A R E STATE  56  Modern National Identity and Political Culture  57  POWER OF T H E INDIVIDUAL  59  ANTI-ELITISM/ ANTI-POWER  60  SCANDINAVIAN EXCEPTIONALISM  60  Relations with the European Community/Union OPINION SHIFT  Attitude toward the EMU/ECB  61 65  67  Conclusion  71  Bibliography  74  List of Abbreviations CFSP EC ECB ECOFIN EEC EMS EMU ERM ERM-II ESDP EU FDI GDP NATO SGP  C o m m o n Foreign and Security Policy European Community European Central Bank Economic and Financial Affairs Council European Economic Community European Monetary System European Monetary Union European Exchange Rate Mechanism European Exchange Rate Mechanism II European Security and Defence Policy European U n i o n Foreign Direct Investment Gross Domestic Product N o r t h Atlantic Treaty Organization Stability and G r o w t h Pact  Acknowledgements I wish to acknowledge the enormous contributions made by a few people, on top of the fellowship and support of m y fellow students. First of all, m y supervisor. D r . K u r t Hubner, and m y professors. D r . M a d s Bunch and D r . Dietmar Schirmer for their guidance and suggestions. M y m o m and dad for their help, revisions, and support. A n d to Corie for her patience and company on innumerable trips to the library. It wouldn't have been possible without you.  Introduction Most non-Danes are surprised to learn that Denmark is not a member of the European Monetary U n i o n (EMU) and has not adopted the euro. Naturally, most people outside of Denmark are not terribly well informed on political matters i n the small northern European kingdom, so their ignorance is hardly a shock. But even informed observers are often unaware of the reasoning behind Denmark's abstention from full participation i n the Euro. Denmark is not instinctively anti-integrationist, and it is participating i n all the phases of European Monetary U n i o n except the last, unlike the other hold-outs, Sweden and the United K i n g d o m . What accounts for the present Danish diluted participation i n the euro? By many accounts Denmark should participate i n the euro. Even those w h o are sceptical of the euro i n general might well suggest that Denmark should participate fully, rather than engage i n its current policy of making all the sacrifices necessary, only to give up many of the ultimate benefits. Various schools of thought, from liberal economists to realist political scientists,' those subscribing to traditional "small state theory,"^ or functionalist analysts,^ w o u l d  ' See for example, Kenneth Dyson, 'The Euro-Zone in a Political and Historical Perspective/ in Political Aspects of the Economic and Monetary Union: The European Challenge, ed. Kenneth Dyson (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002). ^ See for example, William Wallace, 'Small European States and European PolicyMaking,' in Between Autonomy and Influence: Small States and the European Union Proceedings from ARENA  Annual Conference November 5,1998, ed. (Oslo: ARENA, 1998).  expect Denmark to participate i n the project of monetary union. However, these analyses are unable to fully explain Denmark's current behaviour. Other analysts have attempted to explain Denmark's rejection of E M U . Usually they have focused on individual factors i n the referendum campaigns (primarily on the Maastricht Treaty, w h i c h laid out plans for E M U i n 1992, and on E M U itself i n 2000) that led to the rejection of the euro i n Denmark. This approach has much merit. However, they usually do not take fully into account the broader historical and cultural argument which explains Danish attitudes toward the E U . O n the other hand, broader cultural studies do not make an explicit extended comment on the Danish attitude toward E M U . This paper intends to provide something of a synthesis of broader cultural histories of Denmark, and the immediate political analyses of the issue as it has played out i n Denmark since the issue came to prominence, i n light of the economic argument that participation i n E M U makes little to no difference to the Danish economy at this point. It is informed by an economic-cultural approach to the issue. Ultimately, the Danish no-votes, and abstention from full participation i n the E M U stem from the deeply rooted Danish political traditions of egalitarian smallness and anti-elitism. The ambivalence, and apparent contradiction of the "half-in" policy stems from the crumbling of the old cultural and political norms as a result of globalisation and europeanisation. This paper contends that Denmark has operated under a widely accepted political orthodoxy, w h i c h has  ^ See for example, Francisco Torres, The Long Road to EMU: the economic and political reasoning behind Maastricht,' NIPE Working Paper series 8 (2007).  its roots i n Lutheranism and the mediaeval peasant culture, but was first articulated i n its present form i n the late 19* century. The vast majority of the population has accepted this orthodoxy since at least the Second W o r l d War. The primary tenets of the orthodoxy were a deeply engrained egalitarianism; a deference to the power and w i s d o m of the local, and small, communal decision making units; a reverence for "the small" i n any form; an aversion to power politics, violence, or military engagement; a respect for the individual, and freedom of expression, but an expectation that the community, and communal decisions w i l l be respected; and a deeply rooted anti-elitism. In homogeneous Denmark, this orthodoxy was widely respected, and formed the basis for its institutions and their behaviour." However, since Danish accession to the European Economic C o m m u n i t y (later the EU) i n 1973, and i n the face of other forms of economic and cultural globalisation, this orthodoxy has begun to crumble. It is still very influential, but important constituencies have begun to reject portions of the orthodoxy. Denmark w i l l eventually move to full participation i n E M U as the orthodoxy continues to break down. A s mentioned earlier, outsiders are often uninformed on Danish political matters, and they might ask w h y they should alter that state. In this particular case, the importance, outside of its obvious implications for Denmark itself, lie i n its revelations about the process of globalisation, and more specifically,  * Tim Knudsen, ' A Portrait of Danish State-Culture: Why Denmark Needs Two National Anthems,' in European Integration and Denmark's Participation, ed. Morten Kelstrup (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1992).  europeanisation. Denmark has long been one of the most eurosceptical countries in a club of reluctant Europeans that include the Scandinavian states, the U K , Switzerland, and to an increasing degree many other parts of Europe. It is not, however, reflexively anti-European, and is an active member i n most ways: it has amongst the best rates of "transposition" of European directives," .it has r u n several successful Council presidencies, participates actively and constructively i n most European fora, and has improved its performance, to amongst the best i n the E U , with regard to Internal Market infringement proceedings. A t a time when repeated electoral setbacks present a fundamental challenge to European integration, and some commentators are even calling the whole project into question, the question of public attitudes toward E U institutions is of vital importance. Europe is a trendsetter for the w o r l d i n the matter of regional integration, and Denmark is one of the main "canaries" i n the mine, seemingly setting the trend i n euroscepticism; its tendencies and behaviours should be of some interest abroad. The structure of the paper is as follows: chapter two w i l l discuss current Danish monetary policy and the economic implications of full and partial participation i n E M U . Chapter three w i l l discuss competing explanations for Danish monetary policy. Chapter four w i l l examine the historical development  " Meaning that it is efficient at turning European level directives into national level legislation. Since countries are not strictly required to do so, the European Commission keeps a ranking of how well countries have done at "transposing" EU directives.  of its monetary policy. Chapter five w i l l discuss Danish political, economic, and cultural history as an explanatory factor i n the present policy.  Chapter II: Current Economic and Political Situation A s of 2008 Denmark is a member of ERM-II (European Exchange Rate Mechanism II), along w i t h the three Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) and Slovakia. In theory, ERM-II is a preparatory phase for full participation i n the European Monetary U n i o n i n which the exchange rates are set to float ±15% w i t h the euro. In Denmark's case, the national bank" has set itself the more restrictive range of +2.25%. ^ This means that the national bank of Denmark must design its monetary policy to maintain that exchange rate, whether that means direct interventions or indirectly, by such means as adjusting interest rates. The Danish bank w i l l be forced to take make most of its policy based on the outside actions of the European Central Bank (ECB) since it is the Danish responsibility to match the Danish krone to the euro rather than vice versa.  Secured Opt Out through Referendum A l l members of the E U are expected to join the euro, and as mentioned earlier, ERM-II is meant to be a preparatory phase for full euro membership as it was for Greece, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus." However, Denmark is a special  Denmark's Nationalbank has no official English title, but will be referred to as Denmark's national bank in this paper. ', Exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) between the euro and participating national currencies. http:/ /europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/125082.htm «Ibid.  (accessed 27/03/2008).  case because it negotiated a clause to opt-out of full participation i n the European Monetary Uruon. In 1992 Denmark held a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, the document that laid the framework for E M U . In the event, the population voted " n o " with a majority of 50.7%. Since the Treaty could not be ratified without the acceptance of all member states a compromise amendment package was negotiated for Denmark, called the Edinburgh Agreement. These amendments included four "opt-outs" for Denmark, one of which was an exception from participation i n E M U . The E M U opt-out was subsequently reconfirmed by a referendum i n September 2000, this time by a relatively decisive tally of 53.1%.^ Both the Maastricht Treaty and participation i n E M U were defeated despite support for them by most mainstream political parties, the press, and other large civil society organizations such as labour unions; the "yes" sides also enjoyed strong financial advantages i n both cases.'" Several schools of thought have emerged to explain the result. Some analysts have argued that the rejection of the treaties represent a reaction to issues unrelated or tangential to European integration or E M U rather than a decisive " n o " to Maastricht or European  ' Sara Binzer Hobolt, 'When Europe Matters: The Impact of Political Information on Voting Behaviour in EU Référendums,' Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 15:1 (April 2005): 92. Sara Binzer Hobolt, 'How Parties Affect Vote Choice in European Integration Référendums,' Party Politics 12:5 Oune 2006): 631.  integration." O n the other hand, eurosceptics have tended to characterize the result as a victory for Danish tradition and a clear rejection of integration by the "people", despite the nearly 50% of the population w h o voted "yes."'^ Ascertaining the full truth is difficult, but five important features of the votes seem to indicate that the referenda d i d indeed indicate a rejection of European integration, rather than a reflexive, tangential, or uninformed " n o . " The voter participation rate was high i n both, at 83.1% and 87.8%, indicating real voter interest as well as legitimacy for the vote." Independent observers remarked on the quality of information available, and the intensity of debate i n the time leading u p to both referenda." One study concluded that the 2000 euro referendum was the most intense campaign of any referendum on European integration ever, as measured by polarization, closeness, and media attention; since voter information tends to increase with intensity, this vote likely indicates the most accurate reflection voters' attitudes yet seen.'^ Voting patterns amongst  " See for example: Mark N. Franklin, 'Learning from the Danish case: A comment on Palle Svensson's critique of the Franklin thesis,' European Journal of Political Research 41 (2002). T Pedersen, 'The "No" in the Light of Nordic History,' in When No Means Yes, ed. J.R.T. lackson and N.L Meyer (London: Adamantine, 1993), 69-70. " Although the turnouts were high, they were about average for national votes and referenda in Denmark. Lene Hansen, 'Sustaining sovereignty: the Danish approach to Europe,' in European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States, ed. Lene Hansen and Ole Waever (London: Routledge, 2002), 72. " Hobolt, "When Europe Matters": 104.  declared party supporters tended to reflect a relative lack of loyalty to party positions, particularly i n 1992, indicating a high degree of involvement i n the issue, and no concerted attack on the government."* Besides which, the main opposition parties, and subsequent governments i n both cases endorsed the agreements as well.'^ The 1992 vote was followed by a vote on the Edinburgh agreement, with similar levels of participation, but with the contentious issues regarding European political integration removed, and it received relatively strong support at 56.7%. Fifth, and perhaps most fundamentally, one of the admitted problems for the "yes" side i n this referendum, as i n others, was an inability to frame the debate outside the context of the traditional nation state. Even the most ardent of supporters of integration have been reluctant to frame their arguments i n favour of integration outside of the traditional "inter-governmental" framework, for fear of losing popular support. However, this focuses the debate on the loss of sovereignty and the erosion of Danish traditions. In this atmosphere it has been easy for opponents to draw attention to the traditional conceptions of Danishness  Palle Svensson, 'Five Danish référendums on the European Community and European Union: A critical assessment of the Franklin thesis,' European Journal of Political Research 41 (2002): 742. In 1992 the Social Democrats were in opposition to a Conservative, Liberal (Venstre) government; In 2000 the Social Democrats were in government, while the Liberals and Conservatives were in opposition.  and conduct a rhetorical defence of them.'" This aversion to reframing the debate is a clear indication of the political reality that Danes are sceptical about European political integration. In fact, of the E C / E U referenda, the successful ones have been those i n which the government has been able to portray the issues as primarily of economic rather than political integration or specifically i n Denmark's interests,''* or i n which the public was less engaged.2° In frequently saying "yes" to referenda, the Danish public has indicated a willingness to integrate i n some respects, but the two defeats of the 1990s indicate the real limits of enthusiasm for a fundamental redefinition of the Danish state."  What are the advantages for Denmark of staying out? D u r i n g the 2000 referendum campaign on full participation i n E M U both sides inevitably had to present specific economic and political arguments concerning the euro. Naturally, both the supporters and opponents of E M U presented arguments that best suited their cases, and most of them had some  "* Martin Marcussen and Mette Zolner, 'The Danish E M U Referendum 2000: Business as Usual,' Government and Opposition 36:3 (2001): 382. • ' * Tove Lise Schou, 'The Debate in Denmark 1986-91 on European integration and Denmark's Participation,' in European Integration and Denmark's Participation, ed. Morten Kelstrup (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1992), 337. Hobolt, "When Europe Matters": 104. " Hans Branner, 'Danish European Policy Since 1945: The Question of Sovereignty,' in European Integration and Denmark's Participation, ed. Morten Kelstrup (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1992), 321.  merit. However, the broad range of arguments were often confusing to nonspecialists, and might seem contradictory. W i t h the benefit of hindsight and nine years of actual implementation I w i l l examine these arguments and their relative merits or lack thereof. One of the arguments used by proponents of the euro was that Denmark w o u l d lose its influence i n other areas of E U governance by not participating. A defeat w o u l d indicate to other more committed countries that Denmark was not a serious partner i n the European project and they w o u l d either exclude Denmark from "inner circles" and "informal networks" of the E U as a form of punishment, or look to w o r k w i t h more committed partners. But the historical record has not borne this out. Denmark, as well as the other two nonparticipating countries, continues to maintain the same level of influence i n all of the institutions of the Union.^ In fact, they might even be considered to have above average influence w h e n judged by the number of important positions held by nationals within the institutions, willingness of other states to w o r k w i t h them bilaterally, and participation i n informal networks. Proponents also warned that a rejection w o u l d lead to a situation i n which Denmark w o u l d lose influence at the European Central Bank (ECB), and thus over its o w n de-facto monetary policy. However, since then it has been demonstrated that the national bank of Denmark maintains some real influence i n the committees of the E C B . The Danish government also has some influence i n  ^ Rutger Lindahl and Daniel Naurin, 'Sweden: The Twin Faces of a Euro-Outsider,' European Integration 27:1 (March 2005): 83.  important institutions of the European Council such as E C O F I N , the council of finance ministers. Denmark's excellent economic performance, and strict adherence to the convergence criteria have also given it some leverage, and "ideational" power as a "model European" at least with regard to economic performance.^ A t the same time, it has been hard to demonstrate that euro insiders such as Finland have really maintained a great deal more influence than outsiders simply because they have a single representative on the Governing Council of the ECB.^* Neither has Denmark ever held much power over its o w n monetary policy, having pegged the krone to D-Mark, gold, and the American dollar (defacto) over the past century. The Danish national bank argues that it held some influence through its seat at the European Monetary Institute during the 1980s and 90s, but scholars such as Martin Marcussen argue that ERM-II does not represent any major loss of influence, and i n fact probably represents an increase through Denmark's influence at the other institutions of the E U . ^ One of the indications that a seat at the table of the Governing Council might not be all that important for Denmark's influence at the E C B is the track  " Martin Marcussen, 'Denmark and European monetary integration: Out but far from over,' European Integration 27:1 (March 2005): 59. Marcussen, Denmark and European monetary integration: 61. This leaves aside the issue that national representatives are supposed to represent the interests of Europe as a whole rather than their homelands. As with commissioners, the reality may be somewhat different. ^ Marcussen, Denmark and European monetary integration.  record of eurozone management so far — specifically w i t h regard to the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The SGP was set up to ensure that all member states complied with certain m i n i m u m standards regarding fiscal prudence i n order to maintain the stability of the euro and prevent "rogue" states from free-riding on the fiscal prudence of other members. However, the enforcement of the S G P has been inconsistent since the introduction of the euro i n 1999. Although the SGP has been reformed, and many policy analysts believe that it was poorly designed to begin with,^"* the important point to note here is its inconsistent enforcement. Smaller states, for example the Netherlands and Austria, wanted the pact strictly enforced. However, France and Germany consistently broke the pact's guidelines but were never disciplined or formally warned, despite the fact that Portugal and Greece were both threatened with financial penalties unless they cut their deficits.^' The episode demonstrates the unequal power distribution that exists i n the governance of the euro. Several of the smaller countries are very unhappy with the way that the euro has been governed, but are forced to live w i t h it because they have little leverage within the system. By remaining outside, Denmark can continue to highlight the problems i n the governance structure  Michèle Chang, 'Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact: Size and Influence in E M U Policymaking,' Journal of European Integration 28:1 (March 2006): 107. Chang, 112.  w i t h regard to small states, and does not legitimise the corrupt power structure which appears to do little to enhance the influence of smaller states.^' Despite the Danish national bank's status as a "decision taker" rather than a "decision maker", an entity enforcing overall policy rather than forming it, it still maintains some degree of independence of action.^' It is not a "branch plant" of the E C B as other central banks now are. The Danish krone can still float ±2.25% versus the euro, w h i c h allows for some small degree of monetary adjustment to asymmetrical economic shocks to Europe. In dire circumstances the currency could be revalued by u p to 15% up or d o w n without breaking the official parameters of ERM-II. These are not insignificant policy options, and certainly allow for more flexibility than straight membership i n the common currency. Although Denmark is considerably integrated into the continental European economy, it still displays some characteristics outside the normal for the Eurozone, particularly w i t h regard to bilateral trade as a percentage of G D P w i t h E M U countries, and output co-movement.^ Given this divergence, some independence of action could prove valuable. Indeed, Denmark's inflation rate remains lower than the eurozone as a whole, reflecting the more difficult task of keeping inflation l o w across the diverse economies of the monetary union, and  Marcussen, Denmark and European monetary integration: 61. ^' Marcussen, Out but far from Over: 57. ^ David Barr, Francis Breedon, and David Miles, 'Life on the Outside: economic conditions and prospects outside euroland,' Economic Policy (October 2003): 578.  the success of the Danish National Bank and government i n managing the economy Its success i n fighting inflation is just one sign of the Danish national bank's successful stewardship of the economy. The Danish economy has been one of the strongest i n Europe for many years now. The inflation rate is lower than the rest of the eurozone, unemployment is significantly lower that most of the O E C D , GDP/capita is the second highest i n the E U , wages are high, the government is running a fiscal surplus, the economy is amongst the most innovative i n the world, labour flexibility is high,^^ the economy as a whole has a slightly positive balance of payments, and G D P growth is higher than average for the eurozone. Given the economic problems that have characterized m u c h of the eurozone since the currency's introduction, the country has apparently little to gain economically by joining the common currency. Although Denmark's economic success is not primarily related to monetary policy, there is some danger that a major shift i n the monetary situation could upset the current balance.  '' David G. Mayes, 'Finland: The Nordic Insider,' Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 39(2) (2004): 188. Robert Kuttner, 'The Copenhagen Consensus: Reading Adam Smith in Denmark,' Foreign Affairs 87:2 (March/April 2008): 81.  what are the disadvantages for Denmark of staying out? Although we have seen many reasons for Denmark to be wary of participation, proponents of participation i n E M U have many solid arguments. One of the major advantages of a common currency is its potential to encourage foreign direct investment i n the economy. W i t h the removal of exchange rate risk, cross-border investment becomes m u c h more attractive. In theory, investment should spread across the currency zone, as investors have access to many more opportunities within their acceptable risk parameters. Investors from outside the currency zone w i l l also be more attracted to more marginal areas that they might otherwise have ignored. For example, Canadian companies have said that they are more likely to invest i n eurozone countries than those falling outside if they already have operations i n other eurozone countries." This could be a big benefit, especially to a small country like Denmark without a large capital base. The theory appears to be working out i n practice: studies have shown a slight improvement i n FDI flows across the eurozone, and a slight decrease to the three euro-outsiders, from both within the E U , and outside, although it may be too early to say conclusively that decreased FDI is a result of the common  ^ Dan Lemaire interview by Thorfinn Stainforth, Conference Board of Canada, December 19, 2007. Transcript available on the Institute for European Studies (UBC) website, http:/ / www.ies.ubc.ca.  currency.^ O n the whole the evidence suggests that Denmark is probably missing out on a certain amount of FDI. However, the Danish economy is not dependent on FDI because its competitiveness is based on context-based tacit knowledge.^ That is to say, it is a fairly integrated, developed economy with less need for outside investment and expertise. The economy is based on domestic knowledge networks. Lack of capital is not a big problem. The loss i n FDI does not represent a significant portion of GDP.^ It also seems that the euro has boosted trade volume within the eurozone. In fact, this effect is more pronounced than the FDI effect, and at least one major analysis of the costs and benefits of the euro considers the trade effect to be the most substantial, sustainable economic benefit of currency union so far. However, that same study notes that the benefit for Denmark of a common currency w o u l d still be less than for existing eurozone members, and also for Sweden or the U K , and that it is uncertain how much of the increase i n trade is simply trade diversion from other sources.^^ Various sectors of the economy may be affected differently by the euro. One sector that w o u l d clearly benefit is tourism. Recent surveys have shown a surprisingly strong correlation between growth i n tourism and the adoption of  ^ David Barr, Francis Breedon, and David Miles, 'Life on the Outside: economic conditions and prospects outside euroland,' Economic Policy (October 2003): 601. ^ Klaus Nielsen and Stefan Resting, 'Small is Resilient—the Impact of Globalization on Denmark,' Review of Social Economy LXI: 3 (September 2003): 376. ^ Nielsen and Kesting: 376. Barr, Breedon and Miles, 585.  the euro.^' It is unclear if the positive impact for countries within the eurozone translates into a negative impact for countries outside the eurozone. The effect is economically significant, although again, this does not translate into an enormous difference for the Danish economy as a whole. Politically speaking, the national bank of Denmark is certainly excluded from certain decision-making processes at the E C B . It cannot hold a seat on either the Governing Council or the Executive Board, which are directly responsible for the implementation of monetary policy i n the eurozone. The national bank of Denmark has argued that this is a handicap for Denmark, and that the bank has lost influence i n comparison to previous phases of monetary cooperation.''' It is hard to argue that there is no truth to this, although as discussed earlier, the actual impact appears to be negligible. One amorphous, but significant effect of Denmark's refusal to participate is a setback for European solidarity. By refusing to participate i n the E M U , Denmark is excluding itself from one of most important and significant accomplishments of European integration. Its lack of participation is a notable blow to the solidarity and legitimacy of the project, although it does continue i n spite of this. Nonetheless, Derunark's abstention does give renewed legitimacy to eurosceptics, and the other countries which do not w i s h to participate. A s a country which has benefited from European integration, and whose population  ^ Salvador Gil-Pareja, Rafael Llorca-Vivero, and José Antonio Martinez-Serrano, The Effect of E M U on Tourism,' Review of International Economics 15:2 (2007): 309. Marcussen, Denmark and European monetary integration.  generally professes to aspiring to enhance European cooperation this cannot be ignored. One of the major benefits of entering into the currency union is the security it gives to an economy, especially a smaller one. The euro is m u c h safer from speculative attacks than a small currency such as the Danish krone. Monetary union w o u l d also mean that Danish economic or political problems w o u l d have much less, or no impact on its currency. For example, an extended political crisis, such as occurred i n Belgium after the 2007 elections might have caused serious problems for the Belgian franc. However, as a member of E M U the crisis had no impact on the country's monetary situation. Although a similar crisis now seems unlikely i n Denmark, the possibility for a crisis, especially an economic one, always lurks. By remaining outside the eurozone Denmark remains more vulnerable to these risks. In fact Danish interest rates have this risk premium built into them, and the bank follows a slightly more prudent policy than the E C B has to, representing another potential cost of remaining outside the eurozone."" One example of the more prudent economic policy that Denmark must follow is the case of the current account balance. Some eurozone countries, for example Portugal and Spain, have been running much higher current account deficits than they might have been able to if their countries still maintained their o w n currencies. Because their large current account deficits account for only small increases i n the overall euro area's balance, they can continue to r u n large  ^ Nielsen and Kesting, 373.  deficits without suffering serious devaluations i n their currencies."' Denmark generally runs a slight surplus, so this scenario is currently unlikely, but the theory runs equally, but reversed, for surpluses. The monetary union w o u l d certainly give a small economy like Denmark flexibility i n this regard.  *' Jordi Gual, Building a Dynamic Europe: The Key Policy Debates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 101.  Chapter III: Competing Explanations The economic picture then is perhaps slightly i n favour of joining the euro outright, but not overly compelling one way or the other. A s far as political influence goes there seems to be relatively little to be gained. However, Denmark has made most of the preparations, and all of the real sacrifices required to join the zone. There appears to be no real advantage i n proceeding as far as it has without becoming a full member w i t h all the potential economic benefits and full representation at the ECB. W h y then continue the charade of independence? Different theories abound.. Four broad primary schools of thought exist. Three focus on popular attitudes because the referenda are the main vehicle which has determined the Danish policy stance. Political science is therefore the main explanatory rubric being utilized today, and applies primarily to the first three schools mentioned here. A fourth school is more economically focused, but has far fewer adherents. They are a) "Second O r d e r " theories, which explain the referendum outcomes as tangential to the population's actual feelings on E M U or European integration, b) "Values Oriented" theories which explain the results based on the values and beliefs of the Danish electorate, c) "Utilitarian" theories which explain the rejections from a self-interested, utilitarian assessment of voting patterns. The fourth school sees the referendum results as red herrings, believing that deeper structural or economic factors have shaped the country's policy.  Small State Theory According to classic small state theory, Denmark should be firmly i n favour of improving international multilateralism and building institutions, such as the E M U , which share power between the more powerful states and small states.*^ In this way it could be expected to improve its influence and alter the policies of larger states.*' Indeed, i n most areas, such as participation i n the Nordic Council, N A T O , and the U N , Denmark fulfils this prediction completely. However, i n the case of E M U , and other aspects of European integration such as the common security and defence policy, Denmark does not conform to expected behaviour; small state theory is insufficient to explain the abstention from E M U . A survey of other small states, as well as the other abstaining countries helps to demonstrate the reasoning behind Denmark's behaviour.  International Comparisons Denmark is not the only E U country intentionally opting out of E M U . It is not the only country fundamentally challenged by the European Union, w h i c h is, after all, a radical new form of international organisation. H o w does Denmark's course of action compare w i t h the other opt-outs? H o w does it compare w i t h  Christopher Hill, 'The Actors Involved: National Perspectives,' in Foreign Policy of the European Union, ed. Elfriede Regelsberger et al. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 89. "' William Wallace, 'Small European States and European Policy-Making,' in Between Autonomy and Influence: Small States and the European Union Proceedings from A R E N A Annual Conference November 5,1998, ed. (Oslo: ARENA, 1998), 1.  those w h o chose to participate i n the common currency? These contrasts help to illuminate the reasons behind Denmark's abstention.  Sweden/UK The other two eligible countries to opt-out of E M U are Sweden and the U K . However, their strategy differs from Denmark's i n several important ways. Most significantly they are both staying out of ERM-II. By joining E R M they w o u l d both be required to join E M U . This is how both governments are getting around the legal requirement to join E M U . This legal necessity also has the effect of making their currencies fully independent of the euro. Their independence is much more real, despite the fact that they don't have a formal exemption from E M U . It also means that the choice to stay out has more real implications for their economies. Neither is i n Denmark's peculiar position of being both i n and out. Their reasons for abstaining differ somewhat from Denmark, particularly i n the case of the U K . For the U K the reasons have more to do w i t h their o w n relative power, or perception thereof and the separation that has bred between the U K and "Europe." Britain is really the only country i n the E U that considers itself to be a thing apart from the mass of " E u r o p e " ; " 'with,' not ' o f Europe i n Winston Churchill's classic phrasing.'*' Opposition to the euro is based on the idea of maintaining the U K ' s independence and prestige, fundamental feelings of  ^ Menno Spiering, 'British Euroscepticism,' in Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration, ed. Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2004), 147. ^ Risse: 500.  difference from Europe, and less w i t h fear over democracy or the power of the people, although those issues are certainly not absent from the debate.^ The debate surrounding the ideological regime governing the E C B is also framed considerably differently than i n Denmark."" In the U K it focuses more on the global alternatives to a European Economic and Monetary Union. The U K is also less integrated w i t h continental business cycles and many there fear that the U K economy is not a compatible partner for the currency zone. In Sweden the debate over the euro is similar to Denmark, reflecting the two countries' similar political cultures. The considerable opposition to Europe, and by extension E M U , is based on an idea of Europe as less liberal, less democratic, les social, and essentially inferior.*" However, i n Sweden opposition to the euro is based more on an idea of Swedish strength and size, whereas i n Denmark it is based more on the idea of Danish weakness and diminutiveness.*' This is partially the result of Sweden's self-image as a larger, more important state and "leader" of the Nordic countries. Sweden is bigger, more populous, and is more predicated on large enterprises and centralized state power.  Spiering, 140-41. Andrew Gamble and Gavin Kelly, 'Britain and E M U , ' in European States and the Euro, ed. Kenneth Dyson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 107-9. ^ Milena Sunnus, 'Swedish Euroscepticism: Democracy, Sovereignty and Welfare,' in Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration, ed. Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2004), 202. Mayes: 185.  Another important difference between Sweden and Denmark is that the so-called "sound policy" consensus has not been accepted i n Sweden to the same degree as i n Denmark. Although, much of the policy is uncontroversial i n Sweden as well, certain features such as central bank independence have not been accepted.™ Also, the Swedish krona remains i n a free float with the euro and other global currencies, so the actual policy implications of E M U are much greater and less widely accepted i n Sweden. The Swedish public remains generally more sceptical of the E U and the euro than the Danish. This may reflect the relatively short time Sweden has been a member of the E U , as the country only joined i n 1995, twenty-two years after Denmark. Sweden has also seen less of the neo-liberal agenda implemented than Denmark, which may help to foster a continuing sense of economic nationalism. However, the salient point is that the trends i n Sweden are all more or less the same as i n Derunark, towards increasing acceptance of European integration, and increasing economic interdependence."' The election of a new centre-right government i n 2007 for the first time i n decades is a sign of this trend; the ascendancy of the social democrats is over i n Sweden as well as Denmark.  ""Jupille and Leblang: 769. In fact, the lack of central bank independence is one of the technicalities the Swedish government is using to avoid fulfilling the convergence criteria for joining the third phase of EMU. "' Lindahl and Naurin: 85.  Finland Finland also shares some aspects of Denmark's political culture and is a similarly sized state, but decided to join E M U . The main reasons for this are that the government d i d not hold a referendum on the issue, simply holding a vote i n parliament since adoption of the euro was an integral condition of Finnish membership i n 1995. H a d they held a referendum simply on membership i n the euro at that time it is not likely that it w o u l d have passed.'^ Finland has a couple of complicating factors that make E M U more attractive than for its Nordic neighbours. First among them is the proximity of Russia and the feeling that Finland needs to assert its independence and draw closer to Europe." By participating i n the euro-project Finland clearly signals its belonging to the western group of countries making up the core of the E U . This has security, economic, and cultural implications. Finland has much more a need to assert its Europeanness than Denmark, where membership i n the core of Europe is taken more or less for granted, even if Danes don't trust all aspects of that identity. Today most Finns report that they are happy to be participating i n the euro.'* Interestingly, Finland is participating i n the euro project out of a sense of weakness, while Denmark abstains partially out of the same sense.  Teija Tiilikainen, 'Finland: Any Lessons for the Euro-Outsiders?,' European Integration 27:1 (March 2005): 25. Tiilikainen: 37. ^ Tiilikainen: 40.  Netherlands The Netherlands is, i n many ways, very similar to Denmark. It is a relatively small, open economy, w i t h a high degree of corporatism, a strong welfare state, dependent on exports and the European economy as a whole and with a history of pegging its currency to the D - M a r k . However, on the question of E M U the two have diverged significantly. The Netherlands has been one of the most ardent supporters of the project, and has often tried to p u s h for more ambitious integration targets. E M U is widely popular, facing only m i l d opposition, and membership was accepted as a matter of course by almost all political parties and societal organizations."" The difference between the two countries is very telling i n its exposition of a more fundamental Danish euroscepticism. The Netherlands has consistently been one of the most enthusiastic member states when it comes to projects of European integration. But it is not true that the Netherlands has supported further European integration out of federalist idealism, or a lack of attachment to the Dutch nation."* Their attitude, across the societal spectrum, has always been one of pragmatic support for supranational institutions because they were seen as  "" Amy Verdun, The Netherlands and EMU: A Small Open Economy in Search of Prosperity,' in European States and the Euro, ed. Kenneth Dyson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 245. "* Robert Harmsen, 'Euroscepticism in the Netherlands: Stirrings of Dissent,' in Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration, ed. Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2004), 101.  indispensable for Dutch interests. However, i n the Netherlands no national discourse has been able to dampen that enthusiasm for long, or to a really significant degree, unlike i n Denmark where euroscepticism has long, strong roots.  Austria Austria is not as similar to Denmark as the Netherlands. Although economically similar i n many respects, it has an entirely different cultural and political situation; it d i d not even join the E U until 1995. However, it also illustrates some of Denmark's uniqueness. E M U was relatively uncontroversial i n Austria. Adoption was seen primarily i n practical terms. European integration is popular across most of the political spectrum and viewed primarily i n terms of practical self-interest. The only group to consistentiy oppose European integration is the one group that stands to lose economically, i n the short term at least, from the prospect: generally young, uneducated people.^' This is the primary constituency for the only anti-European party, the far-right Freedom Party. The most common themes of discussion follow the same trend, focusing on expansion to the east and the potential immigration of thousands of l o w skilled workers. Europe as an idea is not particularly controversial.  Harmsen, 122. Anton Pelinka, 'Austrian Euroscepticism: The Shift from Left to the Right,' in Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration, ed. Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2004), 217.  Economie Explanations Other analyses have focused on economic explanations for Denmark's abstention from full participation, more or less ignoring political and cultural factors. For example, Barr, Breedon, and Miles have found that two economic metrics, bilateral trade as a percentage of G D P w i t h the currency zone, and output co-movement w i t h the other participating states are accurate predictors of how likely an economy is to join the eurozone.'' Output co-movement is particularly accurate. Based on these metrics Denmark's reluctance to join is easily understood i n economic terms because of its relatively l o w level of trade with the eurozone (it is i n fact lower than for either Sweden or the U K ) and its low level of output co-movement. According to this school, referendum results are not critical to understanding Denmark's lack of participation, since the economic factors accurately predict the country's abstention.  Utilitarian Explanations Other studies have focused more on public attitudes and cleavages within the country rather than objective national characteristics since the euro was rejected by popular vote and it is here that the decisive decision was taken. One school examines the rejection as a function of individuals' utilitarian self-interest. These analyses focus primarily on demographics. For example, they w i l l examine whether certain personal characteristics such as education, income, profession, or  David Barr, Fraricis Breedon, and David Miles, 'Life on the Outside: economic conditions and prospects outside euroland,' Economic Polio/ (October 2003): 579.  gender makes one more or less likely to be i n favour of the euro. These studies find that i n general a person is more likely to be i n favour of euro membership if they are highly educated or working i n an export dependent industry. This is true across the Union, but analysts do not agree on the main reason for it. Some believe it is simply self-interested since these are precisely the people who stand to gain from increasing integration.**" Others believe it has more to do with their personal experiences abroad and their familiarity w i t h foreigners which predisposes them to accept europanisation." In any case, those w o r k i n g i n export dependent industries i n Denmark w o u l d have no particular incentive to support euro membership knowing that Denmark w o u l d maintain a fixed exchange rate outside of full E M U membership, unlike Sweden for example. Thus, if public service workers harboured any reservations about the political or cultural implications they w o u l d likely not vote yes." Denmark also has a large public service; these public service workers tend to be sceptical about European integration, many believing that it is a "neo-liberal" project that threatens their jobs."  M.J. Gabel, Interest and Integration. Market Liberalzation, Public Opinion and European Union (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998). Russell King and Enric Ruiz-Gelices, International Student Migration and the European 'Year Abroad': Effects on European Identity and Subsequent Migration Behaviour,' International Journal of Population Geography 9 (2003): 325. '^ Joseph Jupille and David Leblang, 'Voting for Change: Calculation, Community, and Euro Référendums,' International Organization 61 (Fall 2007): 772. " Jupille and Leblang, 774.  "Second Order" Theories A third, broad school has focused on individual issues and factors, strictly speaking beyond the rational scope of E M U that may influence the decisions of voters; this is called the "second order" school.*^ One study has noted a definite trend i n favour of popular support for the euro i n countries w i t h a history of very loose monetary policy, for example Italy, which has historically recorded the highest levels of public support for the common currency. Conversely, countries such as Germany w i t h histories of tight monetary policy and strong currencies tend to have more sceptical populations.*^ Denmark has had fairly tight monetary policy for a generation now, and has always been among the more stable economies of Europe based on monetary indicators. Another theory, related directly to the two E M U referenda i n Sweden and Denmark, holds that the results are directly attributable to exchange rate fluctuations. According to this theory people are predisposed to favour strong currencies and w i l l be unlikely to leave one for a weak currency. Despite the dubious economic basis of this reasoning,"* there is strong empirical evidence to  See K. Reif and H. Schmitt, 'Nine second-order national elections: a conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results,' European Journal of Political Research 8:1 (1980), for an explanation of the broader school. ^ Manfred Gartner, 'Who wants the euro- and why? Economic explanations of public attitudes towards a single European currency,' Public Choice 93 (1997): 487-510. ^ Having a "strong" currency is not necessarily in the economic interests of a country, and certainly not of many economic groupings in that country, despite the media spin that often portrays a strong currency as "good," or somehow a victory for the home country.  support the theory that it affects peoples' votes. Tracking long-term support levels for the euro i n both Denmark and Sweden, the authors of one study found a direct link between the weakness of the euro vs. the US dollar and support for the euro i n the case of Denmark, and the strength of the Swedish krona vs. the euro i n Sweden." In fact, the Danish referendum was held at lowest point i n the euro's history vs. the US dollar, meaning that it had very little chance of success. H a d it been held later or earlier it might have passed. A s H e n r i k D a m Kristensen, the director of the goverrmienf s euro referendum campaign said, "the decline i n the value of the euro against the dollar was the single most important reason we lost the referendum."**' The broadest articulation of the second order school links the outcome of E U referenda to attitudes toward national governments.*' This theory sees referenda, along w i t h other "second order" elections such as municipal or regional, as proxies for issues being fought on the national or "first order" level. Voters are not always informed on all aspects of referendum issues and may use the opportunity to express their support or disapproval of a national  Sara Binzer Hobolt and Patrick Leblond, 'Is My Crown Better than Your Euro? Exchange Rates and Public Opinion on the European Single Currency,' Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17-May 19, 2007: 26. Hoboldt and Leblond: 1. *' M . Franklin, C. van der Eijk, and M . Marsh, 'Referendum outcomes and trust in government: Public support for Europe in the wake of Maastricht,' West European Politics 18:3 (1995).  government. Thus the results of referenda may not be an accurate assessment of true public support for an issue. In Denmark both major E U referenda defeats were held i n the dying days of long standing governments, and their defeat could represent rebukes to the government rather than consideration of the issues at hand.'"  Values Oriented/Cultural Explanations M a n y analysts of the Danish decision have emphasized the cultural aspects of the choice.'^ According to exit polls most Danes expressed a reluctance to surrender sovereignty as a reason for voting "no."^ Other studies have shown that economic reasons were not the decisive factor for most " n o " voters,^' and as the indecisive story of economic factors listed above shows, cultural factors seem to be the critical elements of the decision. Cultural explanations are widely cited for attitudes toward the single currency across Europe.'* The distinct cultural factors i n any given country can  '" In 1992 the Conservative-Liberal coalition was defeated six months later, and the social democrats were defeated in turn in November of 2001, a year after the referendum. See, K Siune, P. Svensson, and O. Tonsgaard, —fra et nej til etja (Aarhus: Politica, 1994), for example. Hoboldt and Leblond: 6. '' Martin Marcussen, 'Denmark and European monetary integration: Out but far from over,' European Integration 27:1 (March 2005). '* Thomas Risse, 'The Euro between national and European identity,' Journal of European Public Policy 10:4 (August 2003): 487.  upset the anticipated course of action i n an economic model, and some knowledge of the political and cultural history of a country is required to understand public attitudes. The degrees of patriotism and nationalism are seen as critical to acceptance of the euro, but simple correlations are difficult to make. The explanation for the Danish "half in, half out" policy lies i n the particularities of Danish national and political culture, which make it extremely difficult for even a convinced political elite to sell the project i n Denmark. The present system is a compromise between the hopes of the political elite, those educated, relatively well educated, and politically active people w h o populate the institutions of power, w h i c h gets most of what it wants, while Danish political culture is to some extent maintained, and the wider population placated.  Chapter IV: Danish Monetary Policy and the "New Consensus" The key to understanding Denmark's present E M U policy lies i n the dichotomy between its dominant popular political culture and the " N e w Consensus" on monetary policy w h i c h has existed since the mid-1980s.^" These two strands of political thought push i n opposite directions on the issue of E M U . Each has a strong constituency i n Denmark, but they have some mutually contradictory strands w h i c h make it hard to formulate a truly coherent E M U policy for Denmark. Fortunately, the two have been reconciled for the moment  ^ Martin Marcussen, Ideas and Elites: The Social Construction of Economic and Monetary Union (Aalborg: Aalborg University Press, 2000).  with some success and Denmark does not seem to be suffering for their contradictions.  Monetary/Fiscal Policy History of Denmark Denmark is not a big country and its monetary policy has always been dependent on others. O n this issue it has generally followed the dominant orthodoxies of the day. Interestingly, Denmark participated i n one of the first m o d e m currency unions — the Scandinavian Monetary Union. Sweden, Denmark, and N o r w a y pegged the values of their currencies to gold at the same value, thus making their currencies fully interchangeable. In this way Denmark participated i n the gold standard system of the late 19* century, only leaving the union after the gold standard system collapsed on the eve of the First W o r l d War i n 1914. During the financial chaos of the inter-war years Denmark attempted to participate i n the new gold standard of the time, although it d i d so only from 1927 to 1931. This was an economically difficult time for the country and it led, as i n most European countries, to a determination to build a stable international financial architecture after the Second W o r l d War. A s a result, Denmark participated i n the Bretton Woods System, w i t h the krone effectively pegged to the US dollar. Under Bretton Woods, most of the world's currencies were pegged to the U S dollar, w h i c h was itself guaranteed to be redeemable for gold (for governmental holders only). The US dollar was effectively "as good as g o l d . " A t that time the United States' economy was overwhelmingly dominant i n the capitalist w o r l d and other countries were happy to peg their currencies to the dollar i n order to anchor the w o r l d monetary system. This gave the United States  some advantages and unquestioned leadership i n the economic realm, but also provided stability and helped to prevent the competitive devaluations that had plagued the w o r l d i n the 1930s. The stability of this system helped to underpin the rapid economic growth of the following decades.  1950S-1982 Keynesianism and the European Consensus By the 1950s Denmark had established itself as a relatively interventionist high spending, high tax, welfare state. In line with the capitalist economic orthodoxy of the time, its ruling class governed the economy along Keynesian lines. This involved a monetary policy focused on promoting full employment through demand-side management. Demand-side management involves the government attempting to stimulate aggregate demand i n the economy i n order to maintain the supply side of the economy, and thus improve employment. The government prioritised growth over management of inflation. The government felt it had an obligation to use all of the macro-economic tools at its disposal to improve employment conditions and counter economic downturns without worrying too much about inflation, external debt, deficits, or interest rates.'* This also involved strict capital controls. Most people felt that the government could profitably micro-manage monetary policy i n aid of wider societal economic objectives. During the 1950s and into the '60s the Bretton Woods System was relatively stable, and it held. Denmark and Europe maintained high growth rates  '* Martin Marcussen, 'Denmark and European monetary integration: Out but far from over,' European Integration 27:1 (March 2005): 53.  until the early 1970s. The Keynesian orthodoxy persisted because it appeared to be working well until the stagnation set i n .  The Collapse of Bretton Woods The Bretton Woods system began to strain i n the 1960s. The world economy became stronger, and the United States no longer dominated it to the same extent that it had. The European and Japanese economies grew considerably, and their currencies gained credibility i n their o w n rights. A t the same time, the US financial situation became proportionately weaker. American govenmient spending increased rapidly, both to pay for the war i n Vietnam and for L y n d o n Johnson's "Great Society" programmes.'' The American government paid for these expenses i n part by printing new money. Since other countries were required to buy and sell American dollars i n order to maintain the relative value of their currencies, their central banks were forced to continue buying American dollars even as they glutted the market, i n order to ensure that their o w n currencies d i d not rise too high relative to the dollar. In order to purchase American dollars they sold their o w n currencies, thus flooding the market w i t h their o w n currencies and causing inflation i n their countries.'" W o r l d leaders, for example Charles de Gaulle, resented this American economic power, both for the freedom it afforded the US, and for the apparent  " 0ystein Noreng, The euro and the oil market: new challenges to the industry,' Journal of Energy and Finance and Development 4 (1999): 34. '" David Hammes and Douglas Wills, "Black Gold: The End of Bretton Woods and the Oil-Price Shocks of the 1970s," The Independent Review, v. IX, n. 4, Spring 2005: 504.  indifference it showed to the wishes of other partners i n the Bretton Woods system/' To combat this effect, governments outside the US increasingly started to trade i n their US Dollar reserves for gold, as was their right under the Bretton Woods system. However, it became clear that the American government could not afford to honour its obligations, and on August 15,1971, i n an event k n o w n as the Nixon Shock, the American government announced that it w o u l d no longer trade US dollars for gold. The result was indeed a major shock to the w o r l d economy, involving wide spread inflation and currency readjustments. The new free-floating currency markets required a new governance regime.  European Monetary System A t this time the Keynesian orthodoxy still held. European authorities tried to set up a European system of international currency regulation that w o u l d replace the global Bretton Woods System. However, it was a slow process, filled w i t h difficulties and setbacks along w i t h generalized economic difficulties, high inflation, l o w growth, and rising unemployment. In the process many economic assumptions, including the Keynesian orthodoxy came under attack and it was eventually widely discarded and partially blamed for the economic difficulties.  A Change in Attitude The first years of European monetary cooperation, i n the European Monetary System, were marked by continued adherence to a loose monetary  Niall Ferguson, "Hegemony or Empire?" Foreign Affairs, Volume 82 #5 September/October 2003:154-161.  policy. The system itself underwent several changes and permutations that need not concern us here; the important change comes i n the early 1980s when the consensus among European policy elites changed. The decisive moment seems to have come when the socialist government of François Mitterand i n France was forced to abandon its earlier loose money policy i n the face of economic difficulties and a plummeting franc."" Since the government had come to power on an explicit promise to promote employment and move against the tighter monetary policies of the German Bundesbank, which de facto set the monetary policy of EMS, the change marked a defeat for the proponents of looser monetary policy."' While the French goverrmient was forced to move to afrancfort policy, the governor of the Danish national bank, Erik Hoffmeyer, began a public relations campaign for a similar move i n Denmark. H e wrote many opinion pieces i n the press arguing for stricter monetary and fiscal policy as well as a loosening of capital controls. H e also refused to support the application of the government for a devaluation of the krone. The application for a devaluation i n A p r i l 1982 was rejected by the European Council, partially because of his refusal to assist the government i n lobbying the members of the Monetary Committee, and partially because the ministers were begirming to operate the E M S under a new guiding  "" David Howarth, 'The French State in the Euro-Zone: 'Modernization' and Legitimizing Dirigisme/ in European States and the Euro, ed. Kenneth Dyson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 145. "' Jeffrey Sachs and Charles Wyplosz, 'The Economic Consequences of President Mitterand,' Economic Policy 1:2 (April 1986): 262.  ideology much less favourable to competitive revaluations."^ In earlier times revaluations had not been considered unusual, and a similar request i n 1979 had been approved w i t h minimal consultation.  "Elite" attitude in Denmark Hoffmeyer was pivotal i n moving elite attitudes about monetary policy i n Denmark. H e appeared frequently i n the media, and he was generally well received by the public at large. H e topped lists of the most trusted Danes for years, behind only the Queen."*' H e argued that Denmark was i n a long-term economic decline and that only a switch to more 'monetarist' economic policy could halt the decline permanently. H i s early interventions helped to play a role in the adoption of these policies by the new centre-right government of Poul Schluter i n 1982. W i t h the apparent success of the policies i n Denmark and Europe, the elite consensus i n both Denmark and broader Europe had shifted dramatically by the mid-1980s." This new consensus, ambiguously dubbed the "sound policy" is now considered one of the sacred cows of Danish political discourse (the other is the protection of the welfare state)."" The "sound policy"  Erik Hoffmeyer, Pengepolitiske Problemstillinger 1965-1990 (Copenhagen: Danmarks Nationalbank, 1993), 90. Martin Marcussen, ' E M U : A Danish Dehght and Dilemma,' in European States and the Euro, ed. Kenneth Dyson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 135. ** Marcussen, Ideas and Elites. ^ "Sound Policy Consensus" is Marcussens's term from Ideas and Elites: The Social Construction of Economic and Monetary Union.  consensus surrounds a relatively strict monetary policy based on "responsible" fiscal management, lowering debts, keeping inflation l o w and maintaining good investment conditions. A l l mainstream political parties, even Socialistisk Folkqyarti, running to the left of the Social Democrats, and generally i n favour of state involvement i n the economy, now accept the sound policy consensus as a part of their platforms.***  Martin Marcussen and Mette Zolner, 'Monetarisni and the Masses: Denmark and Economic Integration in Europe,' Cooperation and Conflict 38:2 (2003): 104.  Chapter V: Danish Political Culture as Explanatory Factor Denmark is one of the world's oldest states, but the Denmark that existed before the mid-19* century was very different from the country we know today. Before then, it was a "composite state" i n the feudal European tradition. The Danish crown controlled a series of territories, spread across a vast expanse of geography, united by littie more than their political control from Copenhagen. A t various points it controlled Greenland, Iceland and a variety of smaller N o r t h Atlantic islands, N o r w a y , parts of m o d e m Sweden, Estonia, present-day Denmark, and the primarily German speaking duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Denmark was a middle power i n Europe, on a par w i t h Pmssia and Sweden until the 17* century, when it began a slow decline and lost several of its richest, most important territories: Skane, i n southern Sweden, i n 1656, N o r w a y in 1814, and Schleswig and Holstein i n 1864."' Skane had been widely considered the "heart" of the kingdom, being the richest territories and located just east of the capital. Similarly, Schleswig and Holstein were the richest, most productive territories at the time of their loss. The loss of these territories had a profound impact on the political stmcture of the monarchy and the ideology of its citizens.  "' Uffe 0stergârd, 'Peasants and Danes: The Danish National Identity and Political Culture,' in Becoming National: A Reader, ed. Geoff Eloy and Ronald Grigor Suny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 179.  Linguistic and Ideological Situation in Denmark Until the late 18* century Denmark displayed the typical European cleavage between elites and peasants i n terms of culture and language. Peasants everywhere spoke their o w n dialects while the urban elites tended to use French, German, and to some extent Latin for their communication. Copenhagen was home to a large German speaking community, many of w h o m were skilled professionals of some k i n d w h o had immigrated or even been recruited by the Danish crown. Native Danes who were part of the governing elite tended to write and communicate i n either German or French.*" However, at the close of the 18* century and moving into the 19* century, an elite group of Danes became increasingly aware of their o w n language and began to assert their rights as Danes, as well as the value of their o w n language. This process accelerated after the loss of N o r w a y i n 1814 as the linguistic balance of the monarchy was disrupted. The populations of Norway, Denmark proper, and Schleswig-Holstein had all been approximately equal. W i t h the loss of Norway, the German-speaking portion gained prominence, representing approximately 35% of the entire population."' Danish nationalists, as they could now be called, worried about the German influence i n the kingdom, especially amongst the Copenhagen elite. German-Danish tensions became increasingly  "" Ole Feldbaek, 'Clash of Culture in a Conglomerate State: Danes and Germans in 18th Century Denmark,' in Clashes of Cultures, ed. C.V. Johansen and P.E. Ladewig (Odense: Odense University Press, 1992), 80. "' Uffe 0stergârd, 'The Danish Path to Modernity,' Thesis Eleven 77 (May 2004): 30.  apparent until the loss of Schleswig-Holstein i n 1864 when a strong Danish nationalist movement developed. To some extent this schism marked the beginning of a conflict w h i c h continued for the next century between Danish nationalist "folkists" and more traditional "elitists" w h i c h w o u l d profoundly alter Danish society.  Ascendancy of the prosperous peasants One of the most important developments following the loss of SchleswigHolstein was the increasing domination of the prosperous peasant class. Three primary causes can be identified: land holding reforms beginning i n the 1780s, the abolition of absolutism and adoption of a new constitution i n 1848, and the relatively small size and demoralisation of the urban bourgeoisie i n the late 19* century*" Disputes remain about the relative importance and interdependence of these factors. Land holding and civil reforms i n the late 18* century created the conditions necessary for a strong class of independent and relatively wealthy peasants. In an attempt to forestall criticism and improve the economy, the absolutist government, spurred on by wealthy landowners, enacted extensive reforms, ending the common field system, abolishing what was left of serfdom (primarily i n Holstein), ending adscription (tying peasants to their estate of  0stergârd, Peasants and Danes, 182.  birth), establishing a comprehensive school system, and liberalizing the customs system beginning i n the 1780s." After the European revolutions of 1848 the Danish absolutist monarchy, which had been one of the most centralised i n Europe agreed to a democratic reform. W i t h the transition to a semi-democratic'^ government they cleared the way for the eventual domination of the state by the agricultural population which represented by far the largest portion of the population. The urban population, and elite, constituted an unusually small proportion of the overall population. Copenhagen was the only large city, and Flensborg, the other large city was seized by Prussia i n 1864. A t the same time, many of the urban elite was suffering from ideological demoralisation. The rise of German power and Denmark's apparently relentless decline led many to despair for the future of their country, and some even toyed half-heartedly w i t h the idea of unification w i t h Germany.'' In a democratic system, even a 19* century dual earneral system set u p to favour established interests, those interests were inevitably overwhelmed by the more populous class of rural agriculturalists. The latter half of the 19* century was characterised by a power struggle between the monarchy and its supporters, and the peasants and other democratic interests i n the parliament (folketinget). By  " 0stergârd, Path to Modernity: 29. '^ Semi-democratic is used in the sense that the government became somewhat representative, with some portion of the population enfranchised, but still did not represent universal suffrage. " 0stergârd, Peasants and Danes, 181.  1901 the party of the prosperous peasants, the Liberals (Venstre), had gained control of the government, wresting it from the control of the professional civil servants and agents of the monarchy and aristocracy, and it remained i n the hands of the parliamentary parties ever after that."* A s it turned out, large-scale industrialisation was slow to come to Denmark, beginning i n the 1890s and not finally emerging forcefully until the 1950s. This delayed industrialisation allowed the peasants—or agrarian interests—to establish an ideological hegemony over the country for several generations while the urban working population remained relatively small."'  Grundtvigianism Into this ideological tumult stepped Nicolaj Frederik Severin Grundtvig. He was critical to building a renewed sense of Danishness, initially amongst the prosperous peasants, but eventually across all of Danish society. One biographer has argued that no other man "has meant so much to Denmark as N.F.S. Grundtvig — no one had so much all around significance as he d i d . " * Although Grundtvig is not well k n o w n outside of his homeland, his importance to Danes is such that discussions of Grundtvig and Grundtvigianism, as his ideas are n o w known, are something of a running joke i n Denmark because of their  ** Tim Knudsen, Da demokrati blev til folkestyre: Dansk demokratihistorie I (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag A/S, 2001), 80. "^ Knudsen, demokrati til folkestyre, 105. * Leni Yahil, 'National pride and defeat: A comparison of Danish and German Nationalism,' Journal of Contemporary History 3:4 (September 1991): 454.  pervasiveness and ubiquity. Grundtvig focused and sharpened some of the most prominent ideological trends of his time.'' Grundtvig was a priest and a poet w h o came to prominence early i n the 19* century. Although he was a strong Christian, he rejected the "erilightenment ideology" of rationalism that dominated the Lutheran church at the time, which he felt robbed the church of its soul.'" H e often fought w i t h the Church hierarchy — he was even barred from preaching for a time — but he eventually gained followers and acceptance within the government and church. H e played a role i n writing the new constitution i n 1848." He argued that to be a good Christian, a person had to be profoundly selfaware; i n order to be properly self-aware the believer had to be i n touch w i t h his or her cultural and historical background. H e believed that every people had a unique "folk spirit", through w h i c h its members could find their true nature. This background, or "folk spirit" was expressed most clearly i n traditions such as song, dance, language, literature and so on. H e and his followers valued the eccentricities of local customs, legends (such as Norse mythology), dialects, selfsufficiency, tight communities, and distrusted "foreign" influences such as were often found i n Copenhagen, for example at the university.'™  " Knudsen, demokmti til folkestyre. Buckser, Andrew. "Rescue and Cultural Context During the Holocaust: Grundtvigian Nationalism and the Rescue of Danish Jews," Shofar 19:2 (2001) p. 16. " Ernest Stabler, Innovators in Education 1830-1980 (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1986), 4. Buckser, 17.  Lutheranism Some scholars emphasize the duality of Danish political culture. The duality is aptly symbolized i n the use of two national anthems: one derived from the earlier composite state era, and the other from the post-Grundtvigian, homogeneous Denmark.'" Grundtvig's ideas blended with the pre-existing Lutheran culture of Denmark to create a new culture for the country w h i c h carried forward many existing themes, but also developed new ones w h i c h further differentiated the country both from Scandinavia and from the rest of Europe. The Lutheran culture of Denmark, w h i c h had existed i n a similar form from the time of the reformation until Grundtvig's time, emphasized conformity and social cohesion to an unusual degree. The reformation had been unusually state driven i n Scandinavia, and the " t o p - d o w n " nature of the project had prevented the social fracturing that had occurred i n Germany and the Netherlands. A s a result, state and church were unusually united, helping to develop a strong national consensus w i t h regards to morality, law, and institutions. The resulting mentality i n much of the population emphasized solidarity, but also conformity."'^  '"' Tim Knudsen, ' A Portrait of Danish State-Culture: Why Denmark Needs Two National Anthems,' in European Integration and Denmark's Participation, ed. Morten Kelstrup (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1992), 262. '"^ Henrik Stenius, 'The Good Life is a Life of Conformity: The Impact of Lutheran Tradition on Nordic Political Culture,' in The Cultural Construction ofNorden, ed. 0ystein Sorensen and Bo Strath (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 163.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into all the intricacies of the cultural and political norms of Denmark. However, it is important to note the dominant themes and h o w they have been transferred to the present day through a concrete political programme. Grundtvig was far from u n controversial i n his day, but the ideas he emphasized have been integrated and accepted into Danish society to an unusual degree through institutions such as the "folk high schools", cooperatives, and the emphasis on communal democracy, as well as through literature, song, the reformed church, and the predisposition of Lutheran Denmark to accept a single ideological framework.  Folkehojskoler One of Grundtvig's central premises was a distrust of elite education. H e believed i n a strong and independent system of education for "the people" free from outside influences. H e helped to establish a unique series of schools, w h i c h ran parallel to the official educational system, called "folk high schools" (Folkehojskoler). Grundtvig himself was not particularly involved i n the creation of the schools i n the mid-19* century, but he provided the inspiration. It was Christen K o l d who, after some initial chaos, disagreement, and competition, finally implemented the system of folk high schools that w o u l d become so important to Danish development."" These schools were designed to cater to the  "° Steven M . Borish, The Land of the Living: The Danish Folk High Schools and Denmark's Non-Violent Path to Modernization (Nevada City: Blue Dolphin Publishing, 1991), 186.  wealthy peasants, although real efforts were made to allow less fortunate peasants to attend as well, and their focus became more universal with time. In these schools the children, both boys and girls, were taught practical agricultural subjects, as well as religious instruction, literature, history, art, song, Norse mythology, geography, and what one might call anthropology. The schools' purpose was quite explicitly to help "awaken the irmer spirit" of the Danish peasants; to help them realise their full potential. K o l d explains from a pamphlet he once wrote: The three skills of reading, writing and arithmetic, w h i c h should comprise the second half of instruction for children, take up nearly the whole at the present time. These skills have i n reality only a small value, because they are only means or instruments for the service of the spirit  We have brought things so far, that all  Danish children can read — but there are only a few who can really use it, because all the others are sleeping. A n d it doesn't help a sleeping man to have so many good tools. But we ask: how can this be made to h a p p e n — without waking the spirit of the people to clear and living consciousness, and teaching the people to k n o w its o w n peculiarities so that it can understand itself and its development—without setting the people i n a living connection w i t h its past, so that its present w i l l not appear as a disconnected and therefore unintelligible fragment, but as a link i n the large chain that is the magnificent career of the Danish people?'**  '** Christen Kold. 'De tre faerdigheder: laesning, regning og skrivning,' in Om Berneskolen, ed. Lars Skriver. The Land of the Living: The Danish Folk High Schools and Denmark's Non-Violent Path to Modernization, edited by Steven M . Borish (Nevada City: Blue Dolphin Press, 1991), 90.  These schools had a fundamentally transformative effect, first on the Danish countryside, and then the country. They allowed the self-owning farmers to rise above the limits of their class and participate i n the national discourse at a vital time in the history of the country. Secondly, they created a sense of solidarity i n this class. Thirdly, they created a new class of "democratically educated, independent farmers possessing its o w n distinct tradition and culture."'"" This class came to play a very important role i n the ensuing political struggles and societal transformations."*  Cooperatives One of the most important institutions to arise from Grundtvigian ideas were the agricultural cooperatives. These cooperatives transformed Danish agriculture and society as they served as a model for other institutions to follow. The cooperatives, mainly for the processing of meat and dairy produce, were r u n democratically. Farmers received equal votes, regardless of investment. Although the cooperatives were i n fact not completely egalitarian, and they explicitly excluded the agricultural labourers, they helped to develop the m y t h or idea of equality, which i n terms or popular consciousness, was just as important as fact.'"'  '""Borish, 203. '"* Povl Bagge, 'NationaHsme antinationalisme og nationalfolelse i Danmark omkring 1900,' in Dansk identitetshistorie 3: Folkets Danmark 1949-40, ed. Ole Feldbaek (Copenhagen: Reitzels Forlag, 1992), 456. "" 0stergârd, Path to Modernity, 36.  Political Power Shifts The egalitarian, yet individualist, ideology that gave rise to the cooperatives had permeated Danish society to such an extent by 1913 that the Social Democrats explicitly adopted it as their ideology too.""* Although the original Grundtvigians, and many i n the cooperative movement, d i d not consider urban labourers to be part of the "real" Danish people, their ideas had sufficiently permeated Danish industrial society, w h i c h also relied primarily on small-scale production, that they were essentially co-opted. The Social Democrats, the party of the urban labourer, accepted the power of the prosperous peasants, again reflecting their dominance, but extended their ideology to the whole country, incorporating the urban working class as the "backbone" of the Danish people. Their ideological revision was compatible w i t h Grundtvigianism, and borrowed most of its themes, but was not identical. It stressed the land and the people, but put renewed emphasis on the ability of the people to " b u i l d " their o w n society i n their o w n land."" The two parties worked together leading to the revised 1915 constitution which marked a victory against the elitist school of thought, and a return to the  0stergârd, Path to Modernity, 36. "" Lene Hansen, 'Sustaining sovereignty: the Danish approach to Europe,' in European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States, ed. Lene Hansen and Ole Wcever (London: Routledge, 2002), 60.  spirit of the 1848 constitution after the reactionary amendments of 1866."" The 1915 constitution marked a transition to a more inclusive form of democracy and the beginnings of the ideological hegemony of the "folkist/ Grundtvigian" school. The compromises made by the Social Democrats, and their acceptance of rural power prevented their o w n domination of the state, as i n the case of their sister parties i n Sweden and Norway, but was critical to ensuring social peace for the 20* century.'" The party simply recognized that it w o u l d not be able to hold onto power without reaching some sort of accommodation w i t h the wealthy peasants and the Liberals. Although Grundtvigian style ideas and parties came to ascendancy i n the early 20* century, their ideas were still not uncontested. Until the 1930s at least, the "Right" party {H0Jre), and its successor the Conservative People's Party, representing mainly the landed nobility and other conservative elements, advocated a less "people/folk" oriented vision of Denmark."^ They promoted "the defence movement" which advocated a strong Danish military, capable of fighting Germany long enough for political manoeuvring from great power allies to promote Denmark's objectives, namely the establishment of the Dano-German border at the Ejder River and incorporating large German speaking areas into the  "" In the years after the original constitution, its more radical reforms and provisions were gradually whittled away, and the 1866 constitution marked a victory for conservative forces. "' 0stergârd, Path to Modernity, 37. Tim Knudsen, Da demokrati blev til folkestyre: Dansk demokratihistorie I (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag A/S, 2001), 114.  Danish state, against their w i l l . However, this school of thought gradually lost prominence after the 1920 plebiscite i n Schleswig returned the province to Denmark."' Questions surrounding the Danish state's attitude toward the Duchies after the First W o r l d War had marked the final struggle concerning the nature of the Danish state. The more conservative faction, espousing a preGrundtvigian notion of the nation pushed for a more aggressive attitude, still hoping to re-incorporate largely German speaking areas, for example the relatively large city of Flensborg. The K i n g was sympathetic to this position, and he attempted to intervene by naming a new government, not based on the elected parliament. In the ensuing "Easter crisis" the K i n g was finally forced to recognize the legitimacy of the parliament as the basis of Danish goverrunent, which had so far been a point of contention with the monarchy. This apparent victory for "the people's" Denmark, coming as it d i d through their self determination, and cultural autonomy, contrasting w i t h the military disasters of 1864, convinced many that Denmark should pursue an actively "anti-power politics." This politics of patience, negotiation, and nonconfrontation led to a broad consensus on Denmark's role i n Europe, as well as final acceptance of the Grundtvigian "people" across the political spectrum. The popular slogan adopted after the losses i n Schleswig-Holstein, "What we lost externally, we shall gain internally"'" had had a truly transformative impact  " ' Hansen, Danish Approach to Europe, 58. Knudsen, demokrati til folkestyre, 145. Brincker, 424.  on the Danish state. Final remnants of the old school objections to the new democratic, limited Denmark disappeared during the Second W o r l d War when the monarchy and population rallied behind the symbols of Danish smallness and democracy.""  Signalling and Banal Nationalism One reason for the successful spread of "Grundtvigian nationalism" was a campaign of promoting national symbolism through song, images, literature, and other cultural markers. Starting around the time of the loss of the duchies i n 1864, the Danish flag, for example, was used with unusual frequency i n the most banal situations as a form of "solidarity" with the Danes living i n Germany; today it continues to appear regularly at children's birthday parties, religious festivals of all kinds, blow out sales, flying i n back gardens, decorating celebratory cakes and other food, on kitchen ware, and i n many other every-day places."' In line w i t h Michael Billig's theory of "banal nationalism,"" this flagging has helped to identify "Denmark" with house and home, hospitality, family, local businesses, and other familiar aspects of daily life, reinforcing the power of Denmark as an imagined community. Flagging has helped to familiarize all  "* Henrik S. Nissen, 'Folkelighed og frihed 1933: Grundtvigianernes reaktion pa modernisering, krise og nazisme,' in Dansk identitetshistorie 3: Folkets Danmark 1949-40, ed. Ole Feldbeek (Copenhagen: Reitzels forlag, 1992), 673. " ' Karen Wren, 'Cultural racism: something rotten in the state of Denmark?,' Social and Cultural Geography 2:2 (2001): 149. "" Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism, (London: Sage, 1995).  aspects of the Danish state, to identify it with peoples' lives, and has thereby built an unusually strong sense of national solidarity. The imagined community in Derunark, and the features it developed i n the late 19* century, remains quite strong, thanks i n part to the unusually persistent flagging mechanism at w o r k there. In northern Schleswig, where Danish language teaching was forbidden, and the German state officially tried to Germanize the population, Grundtvigian thought and institutions were crucial i n maintaining Danish feeling until 1920 when a plebiscite returned it to the Danish state. ™ The perceived need to maintain links w i t h Danes outside Denmark i n the late 19* century, and the strategies employed to do so, help to explain some of the effectiveness of nationalist discourses i n Denmark today.  Rise of the Welfare State The ideological congruence between the Social Democrats and the Liberals, and the acceptance of "anti-power politics" starting i n the 1920s established a cultural and political hegemony w h i c h now marks almost all aspects of Danish life. The Social Democrats were successful i n establishing a social welfare state more or less on their terms, and that social welfare state is now strongly associated w i t h the Danish state itself. In fact, hardly any elements of the political spectrum question the fundamentals of the welfare state, although they may attack details of it. It is now seen, by many, as an expression of  ™ Buckser, 19.  solidarity and respect for the individual i n the Grundtvigian tradition. It is also seen, by many, as explicitly superior to rival models i n the rest of Europe.'^"  Modern National Identity and Political Culture One important aspect of Danish political identity is the importance of the local. Although Denmark is a centralized state, municipalities and other local decision making units play an important role. This is more so than i n other Nordic states, especially Sweden or Finland.'" This stems i n part from the longstanding tradition of relatively autonomous churches, w h i c h could, for example, choose their o w n priests. Those priests were then also expected to represent the parish i n the central government, and vice-versa, creating a dialogue between central authorities and local populations, since churches were almost extensions of the state from the time of the reformation until the 19* century. The apparent contradiction between a strong centralised state authority and significant local powers is resolved by the confluence between state, church and morality. Since the church was widely accepted, morality and the state were not widely questioned. Most people were w o r k i n g from the same set of assumptions, and cultural conformity was widespread. A s a result, a certain degree of local autonomy d i d not threaten the state.'^  ™ Richard Jenkins, 'Not Simple At All: Danish Identity and the European Union,' in An Anthropology of the European Union, ed. Irène Bellier and Thomas M . Wilson (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 167. '" Stenius, 170. '^ Stenius, 167.  Once the more individualist, localist split i n the culture and the church arrived i n the mid-19* century, the old consensus cracked somewhat, but as was explained above, came to be replaced by a new Grundtvigian hegemony within a relatively short time. The tradition of local decision making was reinforced by Grundtvigian distrust fro the elite, but the coUectivist power of "the people" still maintained common cultural assumptions to bind the local decision making units together. Darush society is today made u p of thousands of local orgaruzations, associations, municipalities, parishes, trade unions etc... w h i c h are all, even relatively subversive groups such as Marxists, granted a degree of autonomy.'^' However, any subculture w h i c h is seen as falling outside the whole—rejecting the overall consensus culture—is immediately marginalized, and these groups have generally been unsuccessful."^ This may be one explanation for the difficulty i n integrating immigrant groups. The assumption is that all sub-groups w i l l accept the decisions of society as a whole, despite their objections. A n y pragmatic choice of whether to conform to laws and norms or not undermines the overall system. Darush municipalities have gained even more importance since the municipal reform of 1973.'^ Since then the municipalities have had a lot of responsibility for implementing state policy, as well as the means to pay for it. In fact, the national federation of municipalities is so influential that it is sometimes  Borish, 262. Stenius, 171. Knudsen, Da demokrati blev til folkestyre, 152.  considered an unofficial first chamber of parliament.'^* Although questions have arisen over the efficiency or transparency of this system, it is certainly a reflection of a deference to local authority.  Power of the individual Despite the focus o n the collective, and on groups, Danish culture also places a great deal of emphasis o n the individual. The individual must choose to accept or reject society on their o w n . Grundtvig himself was very explicit on this point: that the individual must find his o w n path. This is i n part inspired by Lutheranism and its emphasis on an individual reading and understanding of the bible. However, Grundtvigianism amplified the libertarian aspect of Danish society, because of the peasants' anti-authoritarianism and their need to justify disobedience. Grundtvig's o w n writings were informal and unsystematic, lending them a somewhat chaotic character, w h i c h engendered a flexible interpretation.'^^' Today this can be seen i n the Danes' regard for freedom of expression, notoriously evident i n the M o h a m m e d Cartoons Affair.'^"  '^* Knudsen, Da demokrati blev til folkestyre, 152. '^' 0stergârd, Peasants and Danes: 14. '^^ The Mohammed Cartoons Affair refers to the events surrounding the publication of cartoons of the Islamic prophet Muhammed in Jyllands-Posten in September 2005.  Anti-Elitism/Anti-Power One of the most important points to note about Danish political culture is its unusually high level of anti-elitism.'^" The main point to remember is that Danes do not necessarily distrust their state as such, since it is seen as being the assembly of its parts, but that they w i l l distrust anyone seen as taking too much of a leading role i n this state or society. Similarly, Danes do not trust concentrations of power, private or public. They do not want to participate i n "great power politics" even if it is seen as generally advantageous for them to do so, because it is seen as inherently corrupt and dangerous.""  Scandinavian Exceptionalism Another complicating factor for Danish political culture is Scandinavian exceptionalism and N o r d i c solidarity. M u c h of the history discussed so far is to greater and lesser extents true for most Scandinavian countries. Denmark tends to be the more libertarian and locally centred of the countries, but they all share the same basic traits. It is certainly conceivable that given a slightly different trajectory they could ultimately have formed one country and one nationalism w i t h regional variations. Scandinavism, a movement w h i c h sought political solidarity, even had some success i n pushing for such a move i n the mid-19* century, but i n the end it never happened."'  Borish, 223. Hansen, Danish Approach to Europe, 59. Hansen, Danish Approach to Europe, 57.  However, since then Scandinavians have been fairly active at promoting solidarity among their countries with initiatives such as a common currency (1873-1914), solidarity on foreign policy, free movement of people, the Nordic Council, and legislative cooperation. During the years after 1945 many i n Denmark considered a N o r d i c or Scandinavian U n i o n to be more advantageous than European integration. A s it turned out Denmark d i d not want to isolate itself from the rest of the continent. However, many people i n Denmark have expressed regret over the lost possibilities of Nordic Union, and fears that Denmark is swamping itself i n the larger grouping or turning its back on its Nordic partners. The idea of N o r d i c union represented a realistic alternative to the EC/EU  for large portions of the population as late as the 1 9 7 0 s . T o d a y it is  considered as more of a romantic notion, but the iconography and discourse of a united north is still used to some extent i n anti-European circles.  Relations with the European Community/Union Bearing all of this i n m i n d helps to explain Denmark's history of ambivalence w i t h the E U . It d i d not join the original E C , and only decided to join in 1972 when it became clear that the United K i n g d o m w o u l d also be seeking admission."' Denmark has been a "good European" i n many respects, especially  Henrik K. Nissen, 'Danskeren 1972: Billeder og budskab/ in Dansk identitetshistorie 4: Danmark og Europa 1940-1990, ed. Ole Feldbaek (Copenhagen: Reitzels forlag, 1992), 414-416. " ' Thomas Pedersen, 'Denmark and the EU,' in The European Union and the Nordic Countries, ed. Lee Miles (London: Routledge, 1996), 86.  w i t h regard to the Single Market, but it has also displayed a great reluctance for deeper European integration on many occasions. The most notable instance of this came i n 1992 when the Danish population narrowly rejected a referendum on ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. This result led to something of a crisis i n the European Community (later the EU), and, together w i t h the narrow French "yes" to the same question, is considered to mark a watershed i n popular euroscepticism across Europe."* A l o n g w i t h the U K and Sweden, Eurobarometer polls i n Denmark continue to show a strong scepticism toward further European integration, although not membership itself. The referendum rejection of the euro i n 2000 was just the latest example of pronounced euroscepticism i n Denmark. In a realist account of the situation, Denmark should be an enthusiastic proponent of European integration. Small countries tend to have a vested interest i n mitigating the power of their larger neighbours, and i n constructing rules based international regimes to promote their interests."" Indeed, i n most respects Denmark does follow this predicted behaviour, enthusiastically supporting, for example, the U N , the W o r l d Trade Organisation (WTO), and international development. However, the cultural background discussed above prevents it from taking this enthusiastic stance with regard to the E U .  Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, introduction to Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration, by Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2004), 25. "" Wallace, 1.  Several of the features of Danish national consciousness combine to make European integration unpopular. The most important features are the mental congruence of ethnicity with the traditional Danish state, out of w h i c h flows many of the popular objections to the E U . The other important factor is the traditional aversion to power politics. Denmark's homogeneity has led to a situation where most of the population believes that, A people is happy when it can pass laws on its o w n and then make a commitment to obey them. Elsewhere i n Europe one finds a k i n d of pragmatism where the law is just one thing among others to take into account when choosing a course of action.... In Demnark and Sweden there is a strong pragmatism, but of a different k i n d . The essence of this pragmatism is that society can be changed and that these changes should be brought about i n particular by instituting new laws."* Thus, while the Danish political system has a multitude of actors, they are all bound by the same code. The E U political system appears to many Danes to contravene that code because not all elements ultimately adhere to it. Even the EU's subsidiarity"' principle does not appease Danish concerns, because it does  Stenius, 170. " ' Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the intended action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.  not respect the universality that Danes are used to. Under subsidiarity, responsibility is handed over to local authorities, with little reference to the wider society. Under this model local authorities constitute and element below the over-arching authority, rather than an integral component of it. M a n y i n Dermiark, particularly on the left, view the E U as a super power i n waiting, and although Denmark w o u l d be a part of it, they view all powers w i t h suspicion."* Although Denmark officially abandoned the neutrality that marked the period from 1864-1940 after the Second W o r l d War, most of the population remained deeply sceptical of power politics, particularly w i t h regard to the military. The country became a member of N A T O , but could certainly be considered as one of the most reluctant members during the C o l d War, w i t h a l o w military budget, and a reluctance to commit troops to combat situations. Membership i n N A T O was entirely pragmatic i n the bi-polar C o l d War world. However, large, vocal constituencies were opposed to N A T O . " " The rise of the E U as a super-power, largely controlled by elites i n the rest of the continent is worrying to many of those same constituencies, and leftist parties have capitalized on that fear i n their electoral campaigns."" This fear is not simply that Danes w i l l not have a say i n the new super-power, but that concentrations of power are inherently anti-democratic and " b a d " for "the people."  "" Hansen, Danish Approach to Europe, 70. "" Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, '"What's the Use of It?": Danish Strategic Culture and the Utility of Armed Force,' Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 4):1 (2005): 75. Nissen, 404.  opinion Shift However, public attitudes toward power politics, N A T O , and military engagement are among the most interesting areas that show the shift i n Danish attitudes, paralleling the ambivalence toward E M U . Since the end of the C o l d War, Denmark has become increasingly w i l l i n g to engage i n combat missions around the world, i n the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, something that was largely unthinkable before the fall of the Berlin Wall."" The shift is partially a response to a new strategic situation. In a 1998 white paper the Danish government determined that the main threats to Danish security were "indirect" threats to stability, and that active engagement was required to counter them rather than deterrence.'*^ This shift is, i n a sense, not unusual, as it reflects the broader shift within N A T O itself and the west i n general, since the end of the C o l d War. What is illuminating about this case is the degree to w h i c h popular attitudes have shifted. Initially, the public was sceptical about military deployments. However, since the turn of the century the public has become much more supportive of military engagement, even i n controversial conflicts such as the Iraq War.'« This  Rasmussen: 76. Rasmussen: 78. Rasmussen: 79 The Iraq War was far from controversy free within Denmark, but it was surprising the degree to which different parties accepted the principle of the war. Controversy arose primarily out of disagreements over timing, specific justifications, and the apparent cosiness of the government with the Bush administration in the US.  has made it possible for the government to maintain lengthy and relatively large deployments i n Afghanistan and Iraq. Denmark has not insisted on the same operational restrictions as many other European partners i n Afghanistan, and has one of the largest forces on a per-capita basis. The shift i n attitudes appears to be i n part a response to a popular reassessment of the threats facing Denmark, particularly i n connection w i t h the terrorist attacks i n N e w York, M a d r i d , and London early i n the 21*' century, as well as the response to the M u h a m m e d Cartoons Affair of 2006.'** M a n y people, even on the traditional noninterventionist left, n o w fear for Derraiark's safety, and promote a more active defence policy. The details of Danish defence policies and attitudes need not bother us too much here. Important to note are the initial abandonment of the 20* century peaceful consensus by political elites, pushing for a more active defence policy, engaging w i t h the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), participating i n bombing Yugoslavia i n 1999, and redesigning the armed forces, initially against the tide of public opinion, and sometimes secretly, or only excusing itself symbolically, as i n the case of EMU.'*" Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen summed u p m u c h of elite opinion, " W e must have the courage to break with our  '** Peter Lawler, 'Janus-Faced Solidarity: Danish Internationalism Reconsidered,' Cooperation and Conflict 42:1 (2007): 117. The Muhammed Cartoons Affair refers to popular protests across the world in response to publication of cartoons of the Islamic Prophet Muhammed in fyllands-Posten. '*" Gorm Rye Olsen and Jess Pilegaard, 'The Costs of Non-Europe? Denmark and the Conunon Security and Defence Policy,' European Security 14:3 (September 2005): 348.  inferiority-complex of being a small state. We have to understand that a small country can set an agenda and make itself heard on the international scene. We therefore have to make a strategy for our foreign and security policies which w i l l strengthen Denmark's position i n selected fields."^"^ In more recent years, Danish popular opinion has swung around to strongly support E S D P and foreign military interventions."' The change is quite remarkable, and shows the collapse of the old orthodoxy. The strategic discourse is much more i n line w i t h the rest of Europe than it has been for decades.'*"  Attitude toward the E M U / E C B E M U , like European political integration i n general, large-scale immigration, and foreign military engagement, confronts the assumptions and institutions of centuries of Danish cultural and political tradition. W i t h regard to E M U the primary conflicts arise out of Denmark's cultural homogeneity, and the loose corporatism that that homogeneity has allowed. The institutions of the E U fall outside of the fairly strict web of contact that allows for the "libertarian" and decentralized culture i n Danish society. Similarly, E M U is explicitly elite driven. The political orthodoxy i n Denmark since at least the 1940s has been unusually hostile to elite projects. The  Olsen and Pilegaard: 339. Gorm Rye Olsen, Denmark and ESDP, ed. Klaus Brummer. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007), 28. Rasmussen: 82.  last major division i n Danish political culture was centred around a "people" versus "elite" discourse, w h i c h may be returning to the fore now, centred around relations with Europe and the limits of parliamentary vs. supranational authority, rather than the earlier conflict around relations w i t h Germany, German minorities, and the legitimate source of domestic power. To generalise, this is a new split between a relatively elite group, meaning highly educated, relatively wealthy, urban, white collar workers, w h i c h wants Denmark to cede some of its sovereignty and parliamentary authority to multinational institutions vs. a generally less educated, more blue collar group w h i c h is opposed to globalisation, and its most apparent agent, the European U n i o n . Although the two camps have come to a compromise over E M U for now, the new split represents a fundamental challenge to the political orthodoxy of the last several generations. Attitudes toward the E U and E M U seem to be slowly changing, but opposition is deeply ingrained and w i l l not disappear quickly."" However, evidence exists i n the form of public opinion polling, electoral results, and the change i n policy on issues such as defence and economics, that the Danish orthodoxy is undergoing a fundamental shift. Elements of it remain strong, and w i l l likely endure, but some aspects of Danish culture that have been taken for granted w i l l change, with potentially enormous implications. The reasons for this change stem from two primary causes. One is a changing perception of "the West," or "Europe," or " u s " amongst many Danes, primarily i n response to large-scale non-European, non-Christian immigration,  Hobolt, How Parties Affect Vote Choice, 632.  which is overwhelmingly M u s l i m . The perceived conflicts between Danes and Muslims have served to highlight similarities with other Europeans and Westerners. Global events such as Islamist terrorism, and most notably the M u h a m m e d Cartoons Affair have further served to reframe Danish perceptions of "the other" and their perceptions of threats to Denmark. A second cause appears to be related to the relative success of the Danish economy following accession to the E U , and more importantly, following domestic economic and institutional reforms. A t the same time as these reforms were fairly radical, and were certainly presented as radical, many Danes still perceive their country to be different from the rest of Europe.''" The special character of Denmark has not been lost, and that gives formerly skeptical people a more positive outlook on change, and more confidence i n the Danish model's ability to withstand the pressures of europeanisation and globalization, even if they compromise some of the essential features of the Grundtvigian orthodoxy One of the questions w h i c h w i l l be interesting to examine i n future w i l l be the degree to w h i c h the features of Grundtvigianism and traditional Danish political culture are compromised. The younger generations, especially i n urban areas, appear to be abandoning some of the central tenets of the old orthodoxy, embracing a more competitive, less-egalitarian, consumerist philosophy than w o u l d have been acceptable earlier. The transition to a post-modem, postindustrial society, i n w h i c h blue collar workers are increasingly marginalized, has been spurred on by globalisation. Those w h o benefit, mostly younger urban  "" Kuttner, 93.  people, w i l l conflict w i t h older people for some time to come, but as w i t h all generational struggles, the ravages of time w i l l determine much. A s a result, it appears likely that European projects, E M U for example, w i l l become more and more acceptable as time passes.  Conclusion Denmark occupies a unique position i n the European Monetary constellation: both i n E M U and out. It is clear that the explanation for this position lies i n Denmark's unique circumstances. Although, some economic evidence exists to predict Danish non-participation i n E M U , on the whole Denmark's economic and political position w o u l d suggest a favourable attitude like the Netherlands' or Austria's. However, like Sweden, Danish political history leads to a very strong and deeply held opposition to structures like E M U , outside of Danish society's web of organizations and mutual obligations, and explicitly elite driven. Unlike Sweden, Denmark has been more integrated into the European monetary policy consensus and a full participant i n European integration. The Danish policy elite has long since accepted the basic assumptions governing E M U . Thus, they tend to favour E M U , while the population does not accept all of the assumptions, particularly on the political side. The political construction of E M U is antithetical to the prevailing political orthodoxy that has existed i n Denmark since at least the 1930s. The schism over the issue, along with European integration more generally, may well mark the begirming of the first real challenge to that orthodoxy since then. The foundations of Grundtvigian society appear to be crumbling i n the face of globalisation. Various assumptions, such as the aversion to power politics are being widely rejected; the structure of society is being remodelled, away from the strict egalitarian, communitarian welfare state of the last half of the 20* century. A s these assumption fall aside, Danish society  appears to be splitting again, along lines reminiscent of the elite/Grundtvigian divide of earlier times. A new urbanised, cosmopolitan elite has emerged which rejects the old assumptions. This is because of the pressures of globalisation and europeanisation which are presenting challenges and opportunities which the old assumptions and institutions are not capable of handling. Using the population at large's general ignorance of European level politics, those i n favour of participation i n E M U have been able to integrate Denmark into the E M U system without going all the way, reaping most of the economic benefits without forcing a confrontation on the political side for the moment. A s the population changes, and the generational shift occurs it appears inevitable that w i t h the overthrow of the old political orthodoxies, projects like the euro, and the other Edinburgh opt-out projects w i l l become increasingly accepted. However, if the preceding conflicts are any indication, the old ideas w i l l not disappear quickly, and the conflict w i l l be bitter, as it was earlier i n the 20* and 19* centuries. Interestingly, Sweden so far shows fewer signs of this shift. The new centre-right government led by Fredrik Reinfeldt may, however, be a harbinger. Sweden has always differed from Denmark, i n its heavier corporatism and centralization; it has been i n the E U for less time, and perhaps more sheltered from globalisation and europeanisation. A n t i - E U , anti-immigrant, and anti military discourse is more institutionalized, so its extreme variants are therefore more marginalised. It may simply be a matter of time before these strands explode and follow a similar course to Denmark. In any case, it is clear, as the half and half policy toward E M U demonstrates, that i n Denmark at least, the  cultural and political orthodoxies of Scandinavia are slowly unraveling and reforming, but not disappearing, i n the face of outside pressure.  Bibliography Abrahamson, Peter, and Anette Borchorst. "Money's not Everything — The E U and the Danish Welfare State." In Political Aspects of the Economic and Monetary Union, edited by Dosenrode, Soren, 165-199. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002. Abrahamson, Peter, and Anette Borchorst. Political Aspects of the Economic and Monetary Union. Edited by Dosenrode, Soren. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002. Anderson, Jorgen Goul, "The parliamentary election i n Denmark, February 2005." Electoral Studies 25 (June 2006): 393-398. Bagge, Povl. "Nationalisme antinationalisme og nationalfolelse i Danmark omkring 1900." In Dansk identitetshistorie 3: Folkets Danmark 1949-40, edited by Feldbaek, Ole, 443-467. Copenhagen: Reitzels Forlag, 1992. Barr, David, Francis Breedon, and D a v i d Miles, "Life on the Outside: economic conditions and prospects outside euroland." Economic Policy (October 2003): 573-613. Billig, Michael. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage, 1995. Bislev, Sven, and Henning Hansen. "The Nordic Welfare States and the Single European Market." In The Nordic Countries and the Internal Market of the EEC, edited by Lyck, Lise, 204-223. Copenhagen: Erhvervsokonomisk Forlag S/I, 1990. Bislev, Sven, and Henning Hansen. The Nordic Countries and the Internal Market of the EEC. Edited by Lyck, Lise. Copenhagen: Erhvervsokonomisk Forlag S/I, 1990. Borish, Steven M . . The Land of the Living: The Danish Folk High Schools and Denmark's Non-Violent Path to Modernization. Nevada City: Blue D o l p h i n Publishing, 1991. Bovenkerk, Frank, Robert Miles, and Gilles Verbundt, "Comparative Studies of Migration and Exclusion on the Grounds of "Race" and Ethnic Background i n Western Europe: A Critical Appraisal." International Migration Review 25:2 (Summer 1991): 375-391. Brarmer, Hans. "Danish European Policy Since 1945: The Question of Sovereignty." In European Integration and Denmark's Participation, edited by Kelstrup, Morten, 297-325. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1992. Bruun, Christoffer Emil. " M e d fletningeme i den okonomiske postkasse," Alletiders Historic. Copenhagen. Danmarks Radio P I . 15 June, 2008. Buch, Roger, and Kasper M . Hansen, "The Danes and Europe: From E C 1972 to Euro 2000 - Elections, Référendums and Attitudes." Scandinavian Political Studies 25:1 (2002): 1-26.  Buckser, A n d r e w , "Rescue and Cultural Context D u r i n g the Holocaust: Grundtvigian Nationalism and the Rescue of Danish Jews." Shofar 19:2 (2001): 1-25. Carlsen, Hanne N o r u p , and J.T. Ross Jackson, editors.. London: Adamantine Press Limited, 1993. Chang, Michèle, "Reforming the Stability and G r o w t h Pact: Size and Influence i n E M U Policymaking." Journal of European Integration 28:1 (March 2006): 107120.. Dyson, Kenneth, " E M U as Europeanization: Convergence, Diversity and Contingency." Journal of Common Market Studies 38:4 (November 2000): 645-66. Dyson, Kermeth. "The Euro-Zone i n a Political and Historical Perspective." In Political Aspects of the Economic and Monetary Union: The European Challenge, edited by Dyson, Kenneth, 17-39. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002. European U n i o n . "Exchange rate mechanism ( E R M II) between the euro and participating national currencies." European Union. ittp:/ /europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/125082.htm (accessed 3/27/2008). Feldbaek, Ole. "Clash of Culture i n a Conglomerate State: Danes and Germans i n 18th Century Denmark." In Clashes of Cultures, edited by Johansen, C . V . , and P.E. Ladewig, 80-93. Odense: Odense University Press, 1992. Ferguson, N i a l l , "Hegemony or Empire?." Foreign Affairs 82:5 (September/October 2003): 154-161. Franklin, M . , C . van der Eijk, and M . Marsh, "Referendum outcomes and trust i n government: Public support for Europe i n the wake of Maastricht." Wfest European Politics 18:3 (1995): 101-117. Franklin, M a r k N . , "Learning from the Danish case: A comment o n Palle Svensson's critique of the Franklin thesis." European Journal of Political Research 41 (2002): 751-757. Gabel, M.J.. Interest and Integration. Market Liberalization, Public Opinion and European Union. A n n Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998. Gamble, A n d r e w , and Gavin Kelly. "Britain and E M U . " In European States and the Euro, edited by Dyson, Kenneth, 97-119. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Gartner, Manfred, " W h o wants the euro- and why? Economic explanations of public attitudes towards a single European currency." Public Choice 93 (1997): 487-510. Gil-Pareja, Salvador, Rafael Llorca-Vivero, and José Antonio Martihez-Serrano, "The Effect of E M U on Tourism." Review of International Economics 15:2 (2007): 302-312.  Gual, Jordi. Building a Dynamic Europe: The Key Policy Debates. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Hansen, Judith Friedman. We Are a Little Land. N e w York: A m o Press, 1980. Hansen, Lene. "Sustaining sovereignty: the Danish approach to Europe." In European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States, edited by Hansen, Lene, and Ole Waever, 50-87. London: Routledge, 2002. Hansen, Lene. The introduction to European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States, by Hansen, Lene, and Ole Waever, 1-19. London: Routledge, 2002. Harmsen, Robert, and Menno Spiering. Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration. Edited by Harmsen, Robert, and Menno Spiering. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2004. Harmsen, Robert. "Euroscepticism i n the Netherlands: Stirrings of Dissent." In Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration, edited by Harmsen, Robert, and Menno Spiering, 99-126. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2004. H i l l , Christopher. "The Actors Involved: National Perspectives." In Foreign Policy of the European Union, edited by Regelsberger, Elfriede, and et al., 85-98. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997. Hobolt, Sara Binzer, "Direct democracy and European integartion." Journal of European Public Policy 13:1 (January 2006): 153-166. Hobolt, Sara Binzer, " H o w Parties Affect Vote Choice i n European Integration Référendums." Party Politics 12:5 (June 2006): 623-647. Hobolt, Sara Binzer, " W h e n Europe Matters: The Impact of Political Information on Voting Behaviour i n E U Référendums." Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 15:1 (April 2005): 85-109. Hobolt, Sara Binzer, and Patrick Leblond, "Is M y C r o w n Better than Your Euro? Exchange Rates and Public Opinion on the European Single Currency." Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, Canada (May 17-19, 2007):. Hoffmeyer, Erik. Pengepolitiske Problemstillinger 1965-1990. Copenhagen: Danmarks Nationalbank, 1993. Howarth, D a v i d , "The Euro-outsiders: Conclusions." Journal of European Integration 27:1 (March 2005): 133-140. Howarth, D a v i d . European States and the Euro. Edited by Dyson, Kenneth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. H u g , Simon. Voices of Europe: Citizens, Référendums, and European Integration. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002.  Jenkins, Richard. " N o t Simple A t A l l : Danish Identity and the European U n i o n . " In An Anthropology of the European Union, edited by Bellier, Irène, and Thomas M . Wilson, 159-178. Oxford: Berg, 2000. Jupille, Joseph, and D a v i d Leblang, " V o t i n g for Change: Calculation, Community, and Euro Référendums." International Organization 61 (Fall 2007): 763-82. Kelstrup, Morten. "Democracy, E U and the E M U . " In Political Aspects of the Economic and Monetary Union, edited by Dosenrode, Soren, 121-145. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002. King, Russell, and Enric Ruiz-Gelices, "International Student Migration and the European 'Year Abroad': Effects on European Identity and Subsequent Migration Behaviour." International Journal of Population Geography 9 (2003): 229-252. Knudsen, Tim. " A Portrait of Danish State-Culture: W h y Denmark Needs T w o National Anthems." In European Integration and Denmark's Participation, edited by Kelstrup, Morten, 262-293. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1992. Knudsen, Tim. Da demokrati blev til folkestyre: Dansk demokratihistorie I. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag A / S , 2001. Knudsen, T i m . European Integration and Denmark's Participation. Edited by Kelstrup, Morten. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1992. K o l d , Christen. Om Berneskolen. Edited by Skriver, Lars. Nevada City: Blue D o l p h i n Press, 1991. Kuttner, Robert, "The Copenhagen Consensus: Reading A d a m Smith i n Denmark." Foreign Affairs 87:2 (March/ A p r i l 2008): 78-94. Larsen, Hans Kryger. "Det nationale synspunkt pa den okonomiske udvikling 1888-1914." In Dansk identitetshistorie 3: Folkets Danmark 1949-40, edited by Feldbaek, Ole, 468-511. Copenhagen: Reitzels forlag, 1992. Larsen, Henrik, "British and Danish European Policies i n the 1990s: A Discourse Approach." European Journal of Foreign Relations 5(4) (1999): 451-483. http://ejt.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/5/4/451. Lawler, Peter, "Janus-Faced Solidarity: Danish Internationalism Reconsidered." Cooperation and Conflict 42:1 (2007): 102-126. Lindahl, Rutger, and Daniel Naurin, "Sweden: The T w i n Faces of a EuroOutsider." European Integration 27:1 (March 2005): 65-87. Lundgreen-Nielsen, H e m m i n g . "Grundtvig og danskhed." In Dansk identitetshistorie 3: Folkets Danmark 1949-40, edited by Feldbcek, Ole, 9-187. Copenhagen: Reitzels forlag, 1992. Marcussen, Martin. Ideas and Elites: The Social Construction of Economic and Monetary Union. Aalborg: Aalborg University Press, 2000.  Marcussen, Martin, "Denmark and European monetary integration: Out but far from over." European Integration 27:1 (March 2005): 43-63. Marcussen, Martin, and Mette Zolner, "Monetarism and the Masses: Denmark and Economic Integration i n Europe." Cooperation and Conflict 38:2 (2003): 101123. Marcussen, Martin, and Mette Zolner, "The Danish E M U Referendum 2000: Business as U s u a l . " Government and Opposition 36:3 (2001): 379-402. Mayes, D a v i d G., "Finland: The N o r d i c Insider." Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 39(2) (2004): 185-192. Meier-Pesti, Katja, and Erich Kirchler, "Attitudes towards the Euro by national identity and relative national status." Journal of Economic Psychology 24 (2003): 293-299. Meinander, Henrik. " O n the Brink or In-between? The Conception of Europe i n Finnish Identity." In The Meaning of Europe, edited by Malmborg af, Mikael, and Bo Strath, 149-167. Oxford: Berg, 2002. Merlingen, Michael, "Identity, Politics and Germany's Post-TEU Policy on E M U . " Journal of Common Market Studies 39:3 (September 2001): 463-83. Miles, Lee, "Introduction: Euro-outsiders and the politics of asymmetry." Journal of European Integration 27:1 (March 2005): 3-23. Miles, Lee. Fusing with Europe? Sweden in the European Union. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. Miles, Robert. "The Articulation of Racism and Nationalism: Reflections on European History." In Racism and Migration in Western Europe, edited by Soloman, John, and John W r e n c h , . Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1993. Nielsen, Klaus, and Stefan K e s t i n g , "Small is Resilient—the Impact of Globalization on Deiunark." Review of Social Economy L X I : 3 (September 2003): 365-87. Nissen, Henrik K.. "Danskeren 1972: Billeder og budskab." In Dansk identitetshistorie 4: Danmark og Europa 1940-1990, edited by Feldbaek, Ole, 392420. Copenhagen: Reitzels forlag, 1992. Nissen, Henrik S.. "Folkelighed og frihed 1933: Grundtvigianemes reaktion pa modemisering, krise og nazisme." In Dansk identitetshistorie 3: Folkets Danmark 1949-40, edited by Feldbaek, Ole, 587-673. Copenhagen: Reitzels forlag, 1992. Noreng, 0ystein, "The euro and the oil market: new challenges to the industry." Journal of Energy and Finance and Development 4 (1999): 29-68. Olsen, G o r m Rye, and Jess Pilegaard, "The Costs of Non-Europe? Denmark and the C o m m o n Security and Defence Policy." European Security 14:3 (September 2005): 339-360.  Olsen, G o r m Rye. Denmark and ESDP. Edited by Brummer, Klaus. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007. Pedersen, T. "The " N o " i n Light of N o r d i c History." In When No Means Yes, edited by Jackson, J.R.T., and N.I. Meyer, 69-70. London: Adamantine Press, 1993. Pedersen, Thomas. "Denmark and the E U . " In The European Union and the Nordic Countries, edited by Lee Miles, 15-32. London: Routledge, 1996. Pelinka, Anton. "Austrian Euroscepticism: The Shift From the Left to the Right." In Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration, edited by Harmsen, Robert, and Mermo Spiering, 207-224. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2004. Plaschke, Henrik. "The European Central Bank and Democracy: the Political Framework of Economic Policy i n the E M U . " In Political Aspects of the Economic and Monetary Union, edited by Dosenrode, Soren, 165-199. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002. Rasmussen, M i k k e l Vedby, " " W h a f s the Use of It?": Danish Strategic Culture and the Utility of A r m e d Force." Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 4):1 (2005): 67-89. Reif, K . and H . Schmitt, ' N i n e second-order national elections: a conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results,' European Journal of Political Research 8:1 (1980): 3-44. Rerup, Lorenz. "Folkestyre og danskhed: massenationalisme og politik 18481866." In Dansk identitetshistorie 3: Folkets Danmark 1949-40, edited by Feldbaek, Ole, 337-441. Copenhagen: Reitzels foriag, 1992. Risse, Thomas, "The Euro between national and European identity." Journal of European Public Policy 10:4 (August 2003): 487-505. Risse, Thomas, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, and Hans-Joachim Knopf, "To Euro or N o t to Euro? The E M U and Identity Politics i n the European U n i o n . " European Journal of International Relations 5:2 (1999): 147-187. Schmitter, Phillippe C . " W i l l Monetary Unification Make it Easier of More Difficult to Democratize the European U n i o n . " In Political Aspects of the Economic and Monetary Union, edited by Dosenrode, Soren, 147-164. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002. Schou, Tove Lise. "The Debate i n Denmark 1986-91 on European integration and Denmark's Participation." In European Integration and Denmark's Participation, edited by Kelstrup, Morten, 328-363. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1992. Siune, K., P. Svensson, and O . Tonsgaard, —fra et nej til et ja. Aarhus: Politica, 1994. Sorensen, 0ystein, and Bo Strath. The Cultural Construction ofNorden. Edited by Sorensen, 0ystein, and Bo Strath. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997.  Spiering, Menno, "British Euroscepticism." Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration: 127-149. Stabler, Ernest. Innovators in Education 1830-1980. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1986. Stenius, Henrik. "The G o o d Life is a Life of Conformity: The Impact of Lutheran Tradition on N o r d i c Political Culture." In The Cultural Construction ofNorden, edited by Sorensen, 0ystein, and Bo Strath, 161-172. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997. Strath, Bo. "The Swedish Demarcation from Europe." In The Meaning of Europe, edited by Malmborg af, Mikael, and Bo Strath, 125-147. Oxford: Berg, 2002. Sunnus, Milena. "Swedish Euroscepticism:Democracy, Sovereignty and Welfare." In Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration, edited by Harmsen, Robert, and Menno Spiering, 193-206. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2004. Svensson, Palle, "Five Danish référendums on the European Community and European U n i o n : A critical assessment of the Franklin thesis." European Journal of Political Research 41 (2002): 733-750. Thorkildsen, Dag. "Religious Identity and Nordic Identity." In The Cultural Construction ofNorden, edited by Sorensen, 0ystein, and Bo Strath, 138-160. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997. Tiilikainen, Teija, "Finland: A n y Lessons for the Euro-Outsiders?." European Integration 27:1 (March 2005): 25-42. Trâgârdh, Lars. "Statist Individualism: O n the Culturality of the N o r d i c Welfare State." In The Cultural Construction ofNorden, edited by Sorensen, 0ystein, and Bo Strath, 253-285. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997. Verdun, A m y . European States and the Euro. Edited by D Y s o n , Kermeth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Wallace, William. "Small European States and European Policy-Making." In Between Autonomy and Influence: Small States and the European Union Proceedings from ARENA Annual Conference November 5,1998, edited b y , 11-26. Oslo: A R E N A , 1998. Wren, Karen, " C u l t u r a l racism: something wrotten i n the state of Denmark?." Social and Cultural Geography 1:1 (2001): 141-162. Yahil, Leni, "National pride and defeat: A comparison of Danish and German Nationalism." Journal of Contemporary History 3:4 (September 1991): 453-478. Zank, Wolfgang. " E M U - A Defense Mechanism for the N o r d i c Welfare State." In Political Aspects of the Economic and Monetary Union, edited by Dosenrode, Soren, 221-244. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.  Zolner, Mette. "Remembering the Second W o r l d War i n Denmark: The Impact of Politics, Ideology and Generation." In Myth and Memory in the Construction of Community, edited by Strath, Bo, 351-375. Vienna: PIE Lang, 2000. 0stergaard, Uffe. "Luthéranisme, danskeden og velfaerdsstaten." In 14 historier om den danske velfserdsstat, edited by Petersen, Glaus, 27-36. Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2003. 0stergârd, Uffe, "Peasants and Danes: The Danish National Identity and Political Culture." Comparative Studies in Society and History (1992): 179-201. 0stergârd, Uffe, "The Danish Path to Modernity." Thesis Eleven 77 (May 2004): 25-43. 0stergârd, Uffe. Becoming National: A Reader. Edited by Eloy, Geoff, and Ronald Grigor Suny. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.  

Cite

Citation Scheme:

    

Usage Statistics

Country Views Downloads
United States 15 43
China 10 1
France 3 0
Canada 3 0
Denmark 1 0
Sweden 1 0
Poland 1 0
Germany 1 20
Czech Republic 1 1
City Views Downloads
Unknown 9 22
Beijing 7 0
Ashburn 5 0
Seattle 2 0
Shenzhen 2 1
Clarks Summit 2 0
Copenhagen 1 0
Berlin 1 0
Paris 1 0
Stockholm 1 0
Phoenix 1 2
Hebei 1 0
Mountain View 1 0

{[{ mDataHeader[type] }]} {[{ month[type] }]} {[{ tData[type] }]}
Download Stats

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
http://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.24.1-0067037/manifest

Comment

Related Items