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The securitization of terrorism in Indonesia : 2001-2006 Van Damme, Ashley 2008

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THE SECURITIZATION OF TERRORISM IN INDONESIA: 2001-2006.  by ASHLEY VAN DAMME B.A., University of Lethbridge, 2007  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFLLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Political Science)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  DECEMBER 2008  ii  Abstract This thesis looks at the Indonesian government’s strategy for managing the threat of terrorism between 2001 and 2006. Various socio-political factors such as the importance of Islam in Indonesian society and politics, ongoing democratization and important civilmilitary reform all contribute to an environment where counterterrorism efforts are both necessary and politically risky. In order to better address the many complexities of the Indonesian case study, this thesis uses a modified securitization theory framework which gives increased weight to the political and social context in which securitization decisions are made. The modified framework disaggregates the decision of an agent to rhetorically securitize an issue from the decisions behind subsequent policy actions, and considers separately the motivations behind each. When applied to the Indonesian case study this modified framework reveals that between 2002 and 2006, President Megawati Soekarnoputri and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono managed terrorism by employing a combination of securitizing and criminalizing strategies. It additionally reveals that for each president the non-discursive policy action was not solely result of the success or failure of discursive securitization, but was also dependent on the specific political environment each faced.  iii  Table of Contents  Abstract.................................................................................................................. ii Table of Contents ................................................................................................. iii List of Figures....................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements ................................................................................................v Chapter One: Introduction ...................................................................................1 1.1 Securitization Theory..........................................................................4 1.2 The Indonesian Context .....................................................................5 1.3 Terrorism in Indonesia......................................................................14 1.4 Securitization Framework.................................................................17 Chapter Two: Securitizing Terrorism ...............................................................19 2.1 Megawati Soekarnoputri...................................................................19 2.2 October 2002 Bali Bombing ............................................................21 2.2.1 Speech Acts................................................................................21 2.2.2 Audience Acceptance.................................................................22 2.2.3 Motivation behind Discursive Action........................................23 2.2.4 Non-Discursive Action ..............................................................24 2.2.5 Motivations behind Non-Discursive Action ..............................27 2.3 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ............................................................29 2.3.1 Speech Acts................................................................................29 2.3.2 Audience Acceptance.................................................................31 2.3.3 Motivations behind Non-Discursive Action ..............................32 2.3.4 Non-Discursive Action ..............................................................34 2.3.5 Motivations behind Non-Discursive Action ..............................34 Chapter Three: Conclusion.................................................................................38 Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Indonesia since 2006 ......................39 Bibliography .........................................................................................................41  iv  List of Figures  Figure 1 The Copenhagen School Framework .....................................................5 Figure 2 Caballero-Anthony and Emmers’ Approach ...........................................6 Figure 3 Modified Securitization Framework........................................................7  v  Acknowledgments I offer my particular thanks to Dr. Brian Job for his patient direction and remarkable insight in the supervision of this thesis. A special thank you also goes to Dr. Diane Mauzy for contributing her wealth of knowledge on Indonesia. Her comments and suggestions were incredibly beneficial. Thank you to my fellow students and friends for many enlightening conversations, and for their encouragement throughout the year. A special thank you goes out to Shane Barter and Nathan Allen for reading the thesis and offering their comments. Thank you to my family, particularly Erica and Denis for their support over the year, for lots of laughter and for delaying the arrival of Mr. Smingers. I would also like to acknowledge two of my undergraduate professors: Dr. Christopher Kukucha and Dr. Heidi MacDonald. They both played a large role in getting me to graduate school and their encouragement and inspiration will always be appreciated. As always, a special thank you is reserved for my parents whose support is unwavering.  Chapter One: Introduction  Since October 2002, Indonesia has suffered five major terrorist attacks. In the post-9/11 world, these attacks, perpetrated by members of the international terrorist network Jemaah Islamiyah (“Islamic Congregation”), have garnered significant international attention. The implications of Jemaah Islamiyah’s operations in Indonesia, and its known links to Al Qaeda are compounded by the fact that the United States views Southeast Asia as the “second front in the war on terror.” 1 Thus Indonesia faces significant international pressure to address the threat of terrorism. 2 At the same time, Indonesia’s domestic political situation is such that counterterrorism strategies are politically risky. Indonesia is in the process of democratization, so while the government must address terrorism, its actions and rhetoric are scrutinized by a public wary of internal security measures. Many Indonesians fear that excessive internal security policies could undermine hard won civil rights, or cause the Indonesian military to re-engage their authoritarian political role. Additionally, the Indonesian public has largely seen the American-led “war on terror” as an attack on Islam, and is concerned that counterterrorism policies will serve to stigmatize Islam. Indonesia’s domestic politics and the international pressure it faces create an interesting and complex context for addressing terrorism. Thus this paper explores how the Indonesian leadership managed the threat of transnational terrorism (terrorism  1  John Gershman,“Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?” Foreign Affairs 79:4 (July/August 2002):  63. 2  Indonesia was seen as the “weak link” in the international war on terror, and thus faced pressure to implement stronger counterterrorism measures. Brak Batley, The Complexities of Dealing with Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: A Case Study of Jemaah Islamiyah (Canberra: The Australian National University Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, 2003), 46.  2 perpetrated by groups with international links and foreign targets) between 2001 and 2006. It does so using a modified securitization theory framework. Within the field of security studies, securitization theory remains a prominent framework through which to understand how agents, most often state elites, manage both traditional and non-traditional security threats. Securitization occurs when a securitizing agent articulates that an issue poses an existential threat to a security referent. 3 Agents may securitize an issue in order to procure resources or awareness in a bid to manage the threat. Securitization also has the potential to bring about negative consequences such as increased militarization, or the marginalization of alternative, less extreme solutions. 4 From the perspective of the standard securitization framework of Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, the Indonesian government has securitized terrorism. Within this framework, the importance of the securitizing speech act, subsequent audience reaction and the political decision behind the speech act are emphasized. However, this model is unable to explain many of the factors which influenced how and why the Indonesian leadership managed terrorism as it did. In response, this paper offers a modified framework which, by looking at the motivations behind both the decision to securitize and subsequent policy action, can better accommodate the complexities of addressing terrorism in Indonesia. This paper proceeds by first setting out existing securitization theory and then explaining proposed modifications to be applied in this study. It then considers the sociopolitical context in which the Indonesian leadership has addressed terrorism; including 3  Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 25. 4 Amitav Acharya, “Securitization in Asia: Functional and Normative Implications,” in NonTraditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitization, eds. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers, and Amitav Acharya (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 249.  3 the nature of Indonesia’s terrorist threat. The main component of the paper applies the modified framework to the Indonesian case study. In doing so the paper demonstrates that President Megawati Soekarnoputri rhetorically securitized terrorism, but in her subsequent policy action moved to criminalize it. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono also moved to securitize terrorism through speech acts. His securitizing moves, while arguably less successful than those of Megawati, were followed not by criminalization, but rather by securitizing policy action. The paper concludes by arguing that the specific complexities of the Indonesian context affected decisions to securitize terrorism and decisions regarding subsequent policy action differently; thereby warranting the use of a modified framework which disaggregates policy and rhetorical action.  1.1 Securitization Theory: Securitization and desecuritization theory, initially posited by the so-called Copenhagen School of International Relations, is an analytical framework intended to increase understanding about how traditional and non-traditional security threats are perceived and managed, primarily by states. Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde argue that securitization occurs when an agent identifies and communicates an issue as posing an existential threat to a referent object. 5 For Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde this allows an agent, in addressing the threat, to break rules by which it would otherwise be bound. More specifically, securitization moves an issue beyond the scope of public debate and warrants the use of “emergency measures” such as limiting citizen rights, or 5  According to Buzan et al, an existential threat is one which threatens the “essential quality of existence” of a referent object. Thus addressing the threat becomes a priority with supersedes “the normal political logic of weighing issues against one another.” Buzan et al. characterize an existential threat as such: “If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here, or will not be free to deal with it in our own way),” 21&24.  4 reallocating resources. 6 Their framework requires that scholars identify the securitizing agent, referent, speech act, and audience involved in a securitization process. Securitizing agents, while often state governments, can also be NGOs, civil society or political elites. Potential referent objects include the economy, the environment and, most commonly, the state. The audience can be civil elites, politicians, military officers or the general public. Key to the Copenhagen School’s conception of securitization is the understanding that an existential threat is not an objective reality per se; rather, it is the act of articulating an issue as existential which results in securitization. 7 Thus the Copenhagen School places considerable importance on the securitizing agent’s “speech act,” and deems it the starting point in the process of securitization. An act of securitization is successful when the relevant audience is convinced of the existential threat to the referent. 8 Accordingly, successful securitization is a matter of establishing an intersubjective understanding between the agent and audience about the existential nature of a threat.  Figure 1: The Copenhagen School Framework Successful Securitization: Securitizing agent’s speech act.  Audience acceptance of existential threat.  Mely Caballero-Anthony and Ralf Emmers, looking at non-traditional security threats in Asia, build upon the Copenhagen School’s framework in two important ways. 6  Buzan et al., also list secrecy, the levying of taxes, and conscription as examples of actions which could be legitimized through securitization, 24-26. 7 Buzan et al., 26. 8 Ralf Emmers, Non-Traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific: The Dynamics of Securitization (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), 6-7.  5 First, Emmers, taking a more rationalist approach, diverts from the Copenhagen School’s constructivist perspective by emphasizing the material reality of the threat behind the speech act. Therefore, while the Copenhagen School identifies securitization through a speech act, Emmers adds a policy action requirement to the process. He states “a successful act of securitization is said to demand both discursive (speech act and shared understanding) and non-discursive (policy implementation and action) dimensions.” 9 Second, Caballero-Anthony and Emmers argue that it is not enough to ask who securitizes an issue and how. Much can also be learned by asking why states securitize, desecuritize, or refrain from securitizing. It is an inherently political act; therefore their framework seeks to identify the motives and intentions which lead agents to securitize an issue. 10 Figure 2: Caballero-Anthony and Emmers’ Approach Successful securitization: Motivations behind the agents decision . to rhetorically securitize.  Securitizing agent’s speech act.  Audience acceptance of existential threat.  Implementation of non-discursive action.  Through their modification of securitization theory, Caballero-Anthony and Emmers highlight the importance of political context in the process of securitization. Given the social and political complexities surrounding the management of terrorism in 9  Emmers, Non-Traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific: The Dynamics of Securitization, 6. Nondiscursive policy action might include “increased resource allocations; trends in budgetary allocations to certain sectors that bring it on par with defense budgets, which always tend to be in the highest allocation category; bureaucratic/administrative changes: interagency coordination; involvement of the military; creation of new units to deal with various securitized matters.” Mely Caballero-Anthony, and Ralph Emmers, "The Dynamics of Securitization in Asia,” in Studying Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Issues and Trends, eds. R. Emmers, M. Caballero-Anthony and A. Acharya (Singapore: Marshall-Cavendish Academic, 2006), f.n.11. 10 These motives can be political or institutional in nature. Emmers, Non-Traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific: The Dynamics of Securitization, 6.  6 Indonesia these additions allow securitization theory to better explain counterterrorism strategies. However, their framework is still limited because they focus solely on the motives and intentions behind the rhetorical component of securitization. CaballeroAnthony and Emmers’ argue that a securitizing act “creates the kind of political momentum necessary for the adoption of appropriate measures.” 11 In this sense they indicate that the non-discursive element of securitization naturally flows from rhetorical securitization. It is both based upon and indicative of the degree to which an issue has been securitized. 12 This paper builds upon Caballero–Anthony and Emmers’ securitization theory by emphasizing the importance of political and institutional motivations behind not only the securitizing speech act, but also the related non-discursive action.  Figure 3: Modified Securitization Framework Successful Securitization: Motivation to securitize.  Securitizing speech act.  Audience acceptance.  Policy motivation.  Non-discursive action.  Also relevant to the study of securitization are the concepts of politicization and criminalization. A non-politicized issue is one which is not publicly debated or addressed by the state. An issue is politicized when it becomes part of public policy, but remains open to debate and dissent. Criminalization refers to the practice of treating threats as criminal and managing such threats through established legal processes. Securitization,  11  Caballero-Anthony and Emmers, "The Dynamics of Securitization in Asia," 26. Cabellaro-Anthony and Emmers look at indicators such as “resource allocation on trends, military involvement, legislation, and institutionalization” to analyze the degree to which securitization has taken place. “The Dynamics of Securitization in Asia,” 35. 12  7 because it employs the most dramatic means of drawing attention to an issue, is in one sense the most extreme form of politicization. In another sense, securitization can be understood as being opposed to politicization. 13 By evoking the existential nature of a threat, securitization can justify limiting debate around an issue or cause it to become a matter for only a few political elites to manage, effectively muting whatever public engagement politicization initiated. 14 Criminalization can similarly serve to limit open debate, although not to the same extent as securitization. 15 In order to operationalize securitization and criminalization at a policy level, this paper characterizes non-discursive securitization as policies which increase the role of the military in the management of an issue that has been rhetorically securitized and criminalization as policies which cause the involvement of the police. This distinction is consistent with how the securitization literature often distinguishes between securitization and criminalization. Jenny Edkins, in her article on securitizing terrorism in America, notes that moving from securitization to criminalization is mostly a matter of “transferring the rhetoric of war from military to police action.” 16 Similarly, according to Rizal Sukma, the engagement of law enforcement agencies indicates criminalization. 17 Precisely how securitization and criminalization relate remains unclear. In much of the security studies literature, criminalization is presented as a separate, albeit ill-  13  See Buzan et al., 29. Ibid., 29. 15 Jenny Edkins, “Forget Trauma? Responses to September 11,” International Relations 16:2 (2002): 243. 16 Ibid., 251. 17 Rizal Sukma, “The Securitization of Human Trafficking in Indonesia” RSIS Working Papers No. 162 (July 2008): 14, <> (21 August 2008). 14  8 defined, process. 18 For example, Ralf Emmers, in his article on the securitization of transnational crime, identifies criminalization as a possible alternative to securitization. 19 In other cases criminalization is seen as being part of, or derivative of, the process of securitization. Writing on the securitization of human trafficking in Indonesia, Sukma argues “the securitization process is also carried out through the criminalization of trafficking…” 20 This paper argues that under Megawati, the criminalization of terrorism followed rhetorical securitization and was therefore part of a larger process of securitization. Nonetheless, the strategy of criminalization resulted from a distinct political decision and therefore was more than an indication of the success or failure of securitization. It demonstrates that a government’s decision to pursue a strategy of securitization, criminalization or a combination of both is dependent on political context, and in doing so reinforces the importance of understanding the motives behind both the decision to securitize and the following policy action.  1.2 The Indonesian Context: Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim country (roughly eighty-eight percent of the population is Muslim), and while there is a tradition of separating religion and politics, Islam does matter in Indonesian politics. Since the end of President Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998, political Islam has re-emerged, and the number of Islamic  18  Kyle Grayson, Chasing Dragons: Security, Identity and Illicit drugs in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 42. 19 Ralf Emmers, “ASEAN and the Securitization of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review 16:3 (2003): 419–438. 20 Sukma, “The Securitization of Human Trafficking in Indonesia,” 14.  9 political parties has increased. 21 While these political parties predominantly remain committed to secular government, the highly competitive nature of Indonesia’s domestic politics ensures that within Indonesia’s representative assembly, religion is relevant. 22 The importance of religion is further evidenced in the powerful position of Indonesia’s moderate Islamic groups. Sixty-three million Indonesians belong to the country’s two largest Muslim organizations; Nahdlatul Ulema (NU) and Muhammadiyah (MMU). 23 These groups do not necessarily represent voting blocs, but members do tend to support Muslim parties. 24 Moreover, NU and MMU are important because of their ability to effectively organize Indonesians. These groups have a history of being able to exploit nation-wide networks for political purposes. 25 Consequently, Indonesian politicians must prudently be concerned about how their policies will be received by Islamic leaders. Also important for understanding how the Indonesian leadership has grappled with Islamic politics, including terrorism, is the fact that Indonesia is in the process of democratization. From 1967 to 1998, Indonesia was governed by President Suharto’s authoritarian regime. During much of this era, Islamic groups were forcibly de-  21  Indonesia’s constitutional crafters instituted a commitment to pluralism within the National Ideology of Pancasila. During this period Islamic political parties were still present, albeit not dominant, in Indonesian politics. During the Suharto era the four major Islamic political parties were consolidated into the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) and forced to adopt secular Pancasila as their “sole principle”. The party could still support and advocate for personal Islamic values. After the fall of Suharto, political parties were free to adopt Islam as their guiding ideology. Anies Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory” Asian Survey 44:5 (2004): 670-672. 22 Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Indonesia and the Muslim World: Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Suharto and Beyond (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2007), 158. 23 Anthony L. Smith, “Terrorism and the Political Landscape in Indonesia,” in Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia, ed. Paul J. Smith. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 102. 24 Ibid., 100. 25 Following the fall of the Suharto regime, Muslim leaders were able to use their moral authority to mobilize the population in support of democracy. Zachary Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (New York: Routledge, 2007), 20.  10 politicized, 26 political opposition subverted, civil-society movements suppressed, and human rights ignored in the name of national unity and regime stability. This history of repression and the prominent position of Islamic groups within Indonesian society are both particularly relevant for counterterrorism strategies. In regards to counterterrorism measures, Rizal Sukma notes “For the Muslim groups, there was a fear of being suppressed and sidelined again after September 11. This response should also be understood from the psychology of living under an authoritarian regime for more than four decades, prevented from participating in the political process.” 27 Reformasi is occurring, but it is not complete, and Indonesians remain wary of government actions which could return them to the suppressive environment of the New Order. Out of the political oppression of the New Order rose the reformasi movement of the early 1990’s which called for popular elections, accountability for Suharto and the removal of the Indonesian military from the political realm. 28 In 1998, amidst economic crisis and increasing calls for reform, President Suharto resigned, and appointed B.J. Habibie as president. In 1999, the popular election of the Indonesian parliament, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) or People’s Representative Council, marked the beginning of an incremental process of democratization. The next years comprised a period of unstable leadership in Indonesia. This was largely the result of a power struggle between the legislative and the executive branches as they worked through the  26  The forced de-politicization of Islamic groups was a reality during most of Suharto’s New Order. However, near the end of end of his time in power, Suharto enabled Islamic groups to re-politicize in an attempt to legitimize his regime and solicit support in a bid to counter the growing power of the ABRI. Leo Suryadinata, “Democratization and Political Succession in Suharto's Indonesia,” Asian Survey 37: 3 (March 1997): 280. 27 Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia and the War on Terror in Southeast Asia,” Asia Views (June 2004) <> (24 May 2008). 28 Stephen Sherlock, “Struggling to Change: The Indonesian Parliament in an Era of Reformasi,” The Centre for Democratic Institutions (January 2003): 5.  11 constitution’s blurred separation of powers. The MPR, or Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (a body composed of 500 members of the DPR and 200 regional representatives) had the power to appoint and, from 1999, remove the president. For this reason the president needed the support of the MPR in order to ensure the survival of his/her government. 29 After the short transitional presidency of B.J. Habibie, the MPR elected, and two years later impeached and removed, Abdurrahman Wahid as president. Megawati Sukarnoputri succeeded him and while she was able to maintain power for the duration of her mandate, much of her record was marred by inactivity and political deadlock as she sought to maintain sufficient support in the legislature.30 In 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono (known as SBY) became the first directly elected president of Indonesia. Constitutional reform has removed the power of the MPR to appoint the president, and stipulated that the body can remove the president only can if he or she has committed a crime. 31 Another significant component of Indonesia’s democratization process involves civil-military reform. During the Suharto regime, the armed forces (or Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia [ABRI] 32 ) controlled every aspect of Indonesian security. Their role was a constitutionally-based dual function (dwifungsi). One function was to maintain internal and external security, and the second was a political function whereby the armed forces served to oversee and arbitrate government policy. The military’s political role was facilitated by its being an allocated a number of seats in the DPR, by its  29  Ibid., 8. Stephen Sherlock, “The 2004 Indonesian Elections: How the System Works and What the Parties Stand For,” The Centre for Democratic Institutions (February 2004): 5. 31 Sherlock, “Struggling to Change: The Indonesian Parliament in an Era of Reformasi,” 8. 32 Until 1999 the armed forces, comprising the Army, and the small Navy and Air Force, was known as the ABRI. After 1999, the armed forces became known as the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). 30  12 domination of local governments and by its heavy involvement in both legitimate and more questionable business ventures. 33 Given the relatively few external threats faced by Indonesia during this period, the military focused on suppressing internal threats to the regime, and subsequently “became the violent tool of power for President Suharto in ensuring his political supremacy and complete control over society.” 34 Notable is the military’s record of human rights abuses in both East Timor and Aceh. For nearly 25 years Indonesia occupied East Timor, during which time the armed forces committed serious human rights abuses, including indiscriminate killing, rape, and torture. Following East Timor’s declaration of independence, Indonesian forces and paramilitary groups were the perpetrators of more violence and massacres. 35 In Aceh the military is also accused of arbitrary arrests, torture and unfair trials. Since the 1980s the TNI has had a presence in Aceh in an attempt to suppress the Free Aceh Movement, or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) independence movement. While both sides have been accused of human rights abuses, it is the military which is largely blamed for the thousands of civilian deaths. 36 The military’s history of violence makes civil-military reform, and the limiting the TNI’s political influence integral to the reformasi agenda.  33  Damien Kingsbury identifies three sources of military revenue: 1) businesses owned and operated by the TNI, 2) “grey areas” of business (such as charging for military services) and 3) black market business (smuggling or illegal logging). Power Politics and the Indonesian Military (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 194-195. 34 Rizal Sukma, and Edy Prasetyono, “Security Sector Reform in Indonesia: the Military and the Police,” Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ Working Series Paper 9 (February 2003): 15, <> (6 May 2008). 35 Marcus Mietzner, “The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance,” East-West Centre Policy Studies 23 (2006): 18. 36 “Indonesia: Military Tortures Prisoners” Human Rights News (28 September 2004). <> (23 August 2007)  13 Equally important to civil-military reform is the separation of police and military functions. This separation occurred in 1999, when the police were given responsibility for internal security and the military for external security. 37 This distinction is actually somewhat blurred. Following the first Bali bombing, it became apparent that police capacity was underdeveloped and the exact roles of the police and military, in regards to counterterrorism, ill-defined. 38 In the wake of the attacks, Indonesia’s various security bodies postured for a role in counter-terrorism. As one analyst notes, the Indonesian National Police (Polri), Indonesian armed forces (TNI), and the central intelligence agency (BNI) all “sought to use the [Bali] investigations as a means to increase their own funding and influence.” 39 The police were the largest beneficiaries of increased support; receiving international aid, training and expertise. 40 Nonetheless, the military remained a relevant actor in matters of internal security as it played a primary role in pacifying secessionist movements (particularly in Aceh) and moved to increase its role in counterterrorism efforts. 41  1.3 Terrorism in Indonesia: Terrorism in Indonesia takes on a variety of forms. Threats arise from multiple sources including “cells of international terrorist networks operating in Indonesia, 37  Riefqi Manu, “Securitizing Small Arms and Drug Trafficking in Indonesia,” in Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitization, ed. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers, and Amitav Acharya (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 108. 38 Part of the difficulty in separating police and military functions is the fact that the police have always been the poorly funded, poorly trained, poorly outfitted and poorly compensated. International Crisis Group, “Rethinking Internal Security Strategy” International Crisis Group Asia Report no. 90 (December 2004): i & 7. <> (20 February 2008). 39 Bately, 49. 40 Counterterrorism police units received aid and training from American and Australian partners. Additionally, there are reports that the more covert arm of Densus 88 continues to receive training and technological support from the FBI. 41 Mietzner, 41.  14 religious and ethnic conflict, separatist movements, and domestic radical Islamic organizations.” 42 These sources of terrorism share some common history and overlapping ideology. 43 Additionally, certain communal violence and secessionist movements have been linked to international terrorist networks through resource sharing. 44 Nonetheless, it is possible to differentiate between transnational terrorism and domestic terrorism in Indonesia. International and domestic terrorist groups are driven by different agendas and employ different tactics. International terrorist networks tend to focus on Western or American targets in Indonesia, while domestic organizations engage in more targeted attacks motivated by specific, internal goals. 45 This paper, while acknowledging the interconnectivity of terrorism in Indonesia, focuses on the securitization of transnational terrorism. More specifically, the analysis centres on government reaction to attacks perpetrated by the international terrorist network Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Jemaah Islamiyah is a regional terrorist network committed to creating an Islamic community which would span Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Brunei. While the exact origins of JI are contentious, 46 it is generally understood that JI grew out of the Darul Islam rebellions of the 1940s/50s. In its present manifestation, JI  42  Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, “The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics and Power,” (Santa Monica: RAND National Security Research Division, 2002), 81. 43 Ibid., 81. 44 International Crisis Group, “Indonesia Backgrounder: How The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” International Crisis Group Asia Report no. 43 (December 2002): 5. <> (19 February 2008). Robert Eryanto Tumanggor, “Indonesia’s Counter-Terrorism Policy,” Research Unit on International Peace and Security Discussion Papers, no. 15 (October 2007): 104. <> (15 March 2008). 45 Rabasa and Haseman, 81. 46 Adrianus Harsawaskita and Evan A. Laksmana, “Rethinking Terrorism in Indonesia: Lessons from the 2002 Bali Bombings,” Research Unit on International Peace and Security Discussion Papers, 15 (October 2007): 73. <> (26 March 2008).  15 was founded by Indonesian nationals in Malaysia in the 1990s. 47 According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), JI was linked to dozens of attacks across ‘the golden triangle’ throughout the 1990s and early 2000. 48 However, it was not until after the U.S.led invasion of Afghanistan that JI shifted its target from Indonesian Christians to Westerners who, for JI, represented the U.S.-led ‘War on Terror.’ JI’s shift in focus became glaringly evident on October 12, 2002 when 2 bombs exploded outside two Bali nightclubs, killing 202 people and wounding 300 others. Only after this first Bali Bombing did JI garner international attention and links between the organization and Al Qaeda become known. 49 Subsequent attacks occurred in 2003, when on August 5th a suicide bomber detonated a car bomb outside of the Marriot Hotel in Jakarta; on September 29, 2004, when a car bomb exploded outside of the Australian Embassy in South Jakarta; and on October 1, 2005, when 2 restaurants popular with Western tourists were bombed in southern Bali. These attacks killed a total of 42 people and injured 447 others. The bombings of the new millennium were certainly not the first acts of terrorism, but they did represent an increase in intensity and lethality from the attacks of the 1990s. 50 The organizational structure of Jemaah Islamiyah is a complex layering of small, loosely connected and ad hoc cells which operate across four geographic zones and nine levels of subordination. JI’s internal links and command structures are notoriously elusive and difficult to investigate. Communication within the organization adapts and changes, 47  International Crisis Group, “Indonesia Backgrounder: How The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” 1. 48 These attacks were perpetrated primarily against churches and priests amidst communal and religious tensions. International Crisis Group, “Indonesia Backgrounder: How The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” ii. 49 Ibid., i. 50 Harsawaskita and Laksmana, 78-79.  16 making it difficult to track, and operations are compartmentalized so as to protect the top levels of the organization. 51 Lower level operatives, who are often tasked with carrying out attacks, are chosen only shortly before the attacks take place. 52 Further complicating the picture is that fact that JI is an international organization. Funding, recruiting and training operations are all transnational activities; making it difficult to target the group’s support base. 53 An additional factor important for understanding JI is the organization’s position within Indonesian society. Moderate Indonesian Muslims have, in the past, exhibited limited concern regarding JI. Robert Eryanto Tumanggor argues that while moderate citizens do not condone terrorist violence, they are somewhat apathetic towards it. This is because they know moderate Muslims make up the religious majority, and think it unlikely that their religion can be hijacked by a radical minority. Additionally, JI is able to garner some sympathy by exploiting Indonesians’ legitimate grievances over military action against citizens in Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan and manipulating them into anti-Western sentiment. 54  1.4 Securitization framework: Before examining how the Indonesian government has managed the threat of terrorism, it is necessary to establish who are securitizing agents, referents and audiences. For the purposes of this study, the securitizing agent is the state executive, or more specifically, the Indonesian president and members of the political elite who speak on the 51  Batley, 21-23. International Crisis Group. “Indonesia Backgrounder: How The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, i. 53 Batley, 22. 54 Tumanggor, 104-106. 52  17 behalf of the government. The Indonesian state, or nation, is also the security referent. 55 Finally the audience for the securitization of terrorism is the Indonesian public. 56  55  Generally in Asia, the security referent is the state. According to Mely Caballero-Anthony, this is due to that fact that the two most importance security conceptions for Southeast Asian states are regime security and economic stability, both of which require state security. “Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia,” Asian Perspective 28:3 (2004): 161. 56 The Indonesian legislature represents an additional potential audience to the extent that it can block or delay counterterrorism legislation. However because the government’s speech acts are primarily directed to the public and the power of the legislature changes throughout the 2002-2006 period, the legislature is analyzed as part of Indonesia’s political context rather than as a separate audience.  18 Chapter 2: Securitizing Terrorism  2.1 Megawati Soekarnoputri: In the aftermath of the September 2001 World Trade Center attacks, Indonesian President Megawati Soekarnoputri expressed sympathy for the United States of America, and offered Indonesia’s support, albeit non-military, in fighting international terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda. She did not, however, move to securitize terrorism for Indonesians. While her offers of support were welcomed by the United States, they were not well received by the Indonesian public. Almost immediately Megawati was forced to distance herself from American anti-terrorist policy. 57 In a nationally televised speech on October 14, 2001, Megawati stated: Violence should not be answered with violence. Whoever commits terror must be punished, but it is unacceptable that someone, a group or even a government – arguing that they are hunting down perpetrators of the terror – attack another country for whatever reason. 58 Megawati, while acknowledging that terrorism is unacceptable, was clearly more focused on the reactions of foreign governments, specifically the U.S. In her public discourse Megawati steered clear of associating terrorism with security, and was criticized for “refusing to acknowledge the extent of the terrorism problem.” 59 Megawati’s muted approach to terrorism was largely the result of trying to balance international pressure to take strong action against suspected terrorist organizations with domestic political considerations. 57  Smith, 104. As cited in Azyumardi Azra, “The Megawati Presidency: Challenges of Political Islam,” in Governance in Indonesia. Challenges Facing the Megawati Presidency, eds. Hadi Soesastro, Anthony L. Smith and Han Mui Ling (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), 53. 59 Sidney Jones, "The Lessons from the Latest Bali Bombings," The Wall Street Journal (October 4, 2004) <> (28 March 2008). 58  19 Her considerations included the Indonesian public’s growing resistance to America’s “war on terror.” In 1999, a Pew Research poll found that 75% of Indonesians had a favorable view of the United States. However, after the American-led invasion of Afghanistan that number dropped to 61%. 60 For many Indonesians, the “war on terror” was associated with a “war on Islam.” They were skeptical of the correlation between radical Islamic terrorism and 9/11; even to the extent that a number of Indonesians viewed the 9/11 attacks as an elaborate conspiracy by the United States and Israel aimed at discrediting Islam. 61 Consequently any strong action by Megawati against radical groups would be viewed as an assault on Islam. Prior to the first Bali bombings, Megawati was warned by the leader of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (a radical Islamic group) that taking an “un-Islamic” stance meant “playing with fire” and risking social unrest. 62 Thus while international pressure for strong action against suspected terrorist organizations remained, Megawati also needed to convey that she was able to defend “the Islamic interests of Indonesia” 63 Megawati was further restrained from taking a decisive stance on terrorism by the competitive nature of Indonesian politics. Megawati’s political party’s secularist stance and her own questioned Muslim credentials made it necessary for her to look to mainstream Islamic groups for support. Additionally, within the DPR, Megawati needed  60  This number dropped even further to a mere 15% after the American invasion of Iraq. Pew Research Center, “Pew Global Attitudes Project: Image Slips, but Allies Share U.S. Concerns over Iran, Hamas,” Nation Pew Global Attitude Survey 15 (13 June 2006) <> (7 July 2008). 61 Merlyana Lim, “Islamic Radicalism in and Anti-Americanism in Indonesia: the Role of the Internet,” Policy Studies 18 (Washington: East-West Center, 2005), 40-41. “Who are the terrorists in Indonesia? Conspiracy theories over Bali Bombings are rife in Indonesia,” The Observer (27 October 2007) as cited in Smith, 116. 62 Barry Wain and John McBeth, “A Perilous Choice for the Presidents,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 (2002), as cited in Batley, 47. 63 Batley, 47.  20 the support of Islamic political parties if she was to remain in power for the duration of her term. 64 For these reasons, Megawati could not risk offending mainstream Muslims or Muslim political parties by taking action which would be perceived as an attack on Islam. Regardless of how exactly Megawati’s policies are characterized, it is clear that prior to the first Bali Bombing, there is little indication of a speech act or policy action aimed at securitizing terrorism.  2.2 October 2002 Bali Bombing: 2.2.1 Speech acts: Following the October 12, 2002 Bali bombings, the Indonesian government’s strategy for managing terrorism changed. Initially, the government’s message to the public was mixed, with some top government officials continuing to downplay the threat of terrorism, and to deny the existence of JI. For instance, in February 2002, Hassan Wirayuda told reporters that the Indonesian cabinet found laughable the suggestion that radical Islamic groups in Indonesia posed a threat. 65 However, this message soon shifted as the government moved to securitize terrorism through speech acts which emphasized the need to recognize the existence of JI. The police announced that JI was behind the first Bali bombing and Matori Abdul Djalil, the Minister of Defense, publicly admitted to the existence of JI. 66 Additionally, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the then Security Coordinating Minister, on the behalf of the Indonesian Cabinet stated that “[the] 64  Perwita,160. Smith, 110. 66 Dedi Junaedi, Konspirasi di Balik Bom Bali: Skenario Membungkam Gerakan Islam, (Jakarta: Bina Wawasan Press, 2003), 248 as cited in Sapto Waluyo, “Indonesia’s Predicament of Counterterrorism Policy in the Era of Democratic Transition,” Research Unit on International Peace and Security Discussion Papers, no. 15 (October 2007): 120 <> (27 March 2008). 65  21 government urges that statements that are not objective, that there are no terrorists in Indonesia should not be repeated again.” 67 In a clear statement of securitization the Indonesian Defense Minister articulated, “Several times Indonesia has been attacked by an act of terrorism which causes a loss of life. Therefore it is an emergency.” 68  2.2.2 Audience acceptance: The Megawati government was successful in convincing the public of the existential threat of terrorism. Prior to, and immediately following Bali I, the Indonesian public was “skeptical of Jemaah Islamiyah's existence and unconvinced of Bashir's 69 ties to Al Qaeda.” 70 In November 2002, Indonesia’s leading news magazine, Tempo, published a poll asking “do you agree with allegations that Bashir is involved in international terrorist networks?” Twenty-five percent of respondents indicated yes and seventy-five percent – no. 71 Tempo asked the same question in February 2003 and found that sixty percent of Indonesians believed Bashir was connected to Al Qaeda. 72 The public came to accept the existence of JI on Indonesian soil and the organization’s international links. Additionally, for many Indonesians, the problem of international terrorism was initially seen to be a matter of foreign individuals or groups or attacking Western targets 67  “Abu Jibril: Jamaah Islamiyah Is an American Lie,” Tempo (7 January 2003) as cited in Smith,  112. 68  Defense Minister Abdul Djalil, as quoted in Matthew Moore, “Human Rights the Next Casualty,” The Age (16 August 2003). 69 Abu Bakar Bashir, a radical Muslim cleric and alleged spiritual leader of JI, was allegedly involved in the first Bali bombings. He was also accused of having links to Al Qaeda. 70 Sidney Jones, “The Bali Investigation: A Case to convince Indonesians,” The International Herald Tribune (November 21, 2002) <> (12 April 2008). 71 Tempo Weekly New Magazine (November 2002) as cited in Dewi Anggraeni, Who Did This to Our Bali? (Victoria, Australia: Indra Publishing, 2003), 119. 72 Dini Djalal, “Landing the Big Fish” Far Eastern Economic Review (20 February 2003) as cited in Batley, 46.  22 in Indonesia. However, the Marriot Hotel bombing in 2003 claimed the lives of many more Indonesians than foreigners. This reality, plus the arrests and confessions of Indonesians nationals for terrorist activities, contributed to the Indonesian public’s understanding that terrorism in Indonesia was a security concern. 73 Further indicating audience acceptance of terrorism as an existential threat, Tumanggor argues “[t]he recognition of the terrorist threat among the public is high. Security has become a major concern.” 74 Additionally, he contends that the short term solution to terrorist violence is forceful state action, and indicates that this is sanctioned by the Indonesian people: Most Indonesian people agree that it is time for ruthless action against extremism and ruthless action against the root causes of corruption, economic oppression and inertia that have allowed extremism to gain a foothold in Indonesia. It needs the best police and armed forces to operate under democratic control to bring all terrorists operating in Indonesia to swift justice. 75  2.2.3 Motivation behind discursive action: An important motivation for securitizing terrorism is the necessity of gaining public participation for managing terrorism. Long term solutions to managing terrorism (such as addressing socioeconomic causes of political unrest; engaging political Islam; fighting corruption; and ensuring that Indonesia continues on its process of democratization 76 ) require public cooperation with the government. Indonesians were (and continue to be) asked to watch for and report signs of terrorist activity. In order to 73  Sukma, “Indonesia and the War on Terror in Southeast Asia.” Irman G. Lanti, “Indonesia After the Marriot Bombing” IDSS Commentaries no. 32 (August 25, 2003): 2. (8 August 2008). <> 74 Tumanggor, 101. 75 Tumanggor, 106. See Amien Rais, “Indonesia Must Act on Terrorism: Now or Never,” The Jakarta Post (24 October 2002) as cited in Tumanggor, 106. 76 Batley, 69.  23 solicit the required level of public cooperation, the government needed to convince the public of the terrorist threat. Adrianus Harsawaskita and Evan A. Laksmana argue that the historical cynicism of the Indonesian people poses an obstacle for the government in managing terrorism. This cynicism is sourced in past manipulation of Islamic movements, such as Darul Islam, by government institutions and intelligence agencies. Consequently, there is a reasonable reluctance amongst the Indonesian population to believe what the government says about terrorism in the country. 77 In order to push the population beyond their historical cynicism; convince them that the government’s actions against terrorism are legitimate; and solicit their participation in long term counterterrorism measures, the Indonesian government, after the first Bali bombings, securitized terrorism in public discourse.  2.2.4 Non-Discursive Action: While Megawati was successful in securitizing terrorism through discourse, her subsequent policy actions do not reflect a securitization strategy. Instead, through nondiscursive action, the Megawati government sought to criminalize terrorism. The first significant anti-terrorism policies implemented by Megawati were the Perpus 78 1/2002 and 2/2002 (decreed October 18, 2002). The first Perpus created a provision for police to hold anyone “strongly suspected of committing a criminal act of  77  Harsawaskita and Laksmana, 75. Perpus are presidential decrees which, under Article 22 of the Indonesian Constitution, may be issued by the president “in the event of a compelling emergency.” Perpu must be approved by the DPR in the following session Angus Martyn, “The Amrozi Bali Bombing Case: Is Indonesia’s Anti-terrorism Law Unconstitutional?” Department of Parliamentary Research no. 17 (October 7, 2003):1 <> (6 July 2008). 78  24 terrorism” for seven days and a suspect for up to six months. Additionally, the decree enabled prosecutors to use intelligence reports as evidence and judges to freeze the assets of terrorist suspects. 79 The second Perpus allowed for the first Perpus to be applied retroactively to the 2002 Bali bombing suspects (a move which critics considered to be a violation of human rights and the Indonesian Constitution). 80 Megawati’s antiterrorism decrees became law in March 2003, when the parliament passed the acts as law 15/2003 and 16/2003. The extremity of these laws would seem to indicate that Megawati’s policies were part of larger strategy of securitization. However, it is important to note that in all respects, Megawati instituted the primacy of the police in managing domestic security, a move which indicates criminalization over securitization. Another anti-terror measure enacted by Megawati was the reorganization of the government’s counter-terrorism intelligence mechanisms. Presidential Act 4/2002 gave the Minister for Political and Security Affairs the mandate to coordinate law enforcement, intelligence, internal coordination, and public information. It also established the Desk for the Coordination of the Eradication of Terrorism. Presidential Act 5/2002 gave the head of the state intelligence agency the authority to coordinate all of Indonesia’s intelligence agencies in information sharing and gathering. Both of these acts sought to clarify and better organize the roles of the Indonesia’s various security agencies. 81 Since neither act established laws for dealing with terrorism, but rather served to better facilitate the coordination of existing institutions, they also point to the criminalization of terrorism.  79  William Wise, “Indonesia’s War on Terror,”United States-Indonesia Society Reports (August  2005): 37. 80 81  Harsawaskita and Laksmana, 76. Tumanggo, 96-97.  25 A final counterterrorism related policy implemented under Megawati was the formation of a police antiterrorism unit. This unit, called Densus 88, was established with the help of the American and Australian governments. 82 While the creation of a new antiterrorism task force may seem like an extreme and extraordinary measure, thereby implying securitization, the fact that it is a police unit actually indicates a strategy of criminalization. 83 It is important to note that Megawati did make a number of concessions to the military (i.e. returning the post of the TNI commander to the army; leaving the post of minister of defense unfilled for 2 years; and largely leaving the military in charge of its own affairs). She also shared with them a commitment to national unity and territorial integrity, and oversaw the heavy military involvement in Aceh. 84 However, the concessions which Megawati made to the military were aimed more towards procuring their support for her administration within the MPR than instituting a special place for the T.N.I in counterterrorism efforts.85 In fact her counterterrorism policies consistently instituted the primacy of the police 86 and thus indicate criminalization rather than securitization.  2.2.5 Motivations behind non-discursive action: Megawati’s decision to criminalize terrorism through policy was informed by a number of contextual motivations and constraints. One such factor influencing Megawati’s decision was continued wariness on the part of the public regarding both the 82  Waluyo, 127. International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security Strategy,” i. 84 Mietzner, 34. 85 Megawati found it prudent to solicit the support of senior military officials despite assurances from the political elite that the members of the MPR would not move to remove her from office before she served out her term. Ibid., 41. 86 Ibid., 41. 83  26 stigmatization of Islam and the involvement of the military in matters of internal security. 87 The public, although largely convinced of the existence of JI and its links to international terrorism, remained concerned about international pressure to take a hardline approach with Islamic extremists. Public polling from 2006 and analysis of the data by Lembaga Survei Indonesia suggests that Indonesians, while increasingly opposed to violent Jihad, also accepted that extremists turn to terrorism primarily because of a “fear of Western domination in Muslim countries” 88 Additionally there is some evidence to suggest that support for extremism increased with Indonesians’ fear that their “religion is under attack.” 89 For many Indonesians the fear that Islam could be stigmatized in the “war on terror” did not disappear with the realization that terrorism was a security concern. Similarly, the Indonesian public and political elites’ continued suspicion of internal security measures remained an important consideration for Megawati’s government. Anxiety about internal security is, for the most part, related to fears of reengaging the military in a political role, and the memory of the military’s repressive tactics under Suharto’s New Order repression were still fresh. Many human rights and civil society organizations expressed concerns that anti-terror legislation would be used  87  Leonard Sebastian, “The Indonesian Dilemma: How to Participate in the War on Terror Without Becoming a National Security State,” in After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asian eds., Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003), 358. 88 Ary Hermawan, “Survey reveals Muslim ambivalence on terrorism” The Jakarta Post (18 October 2006) as cited in Lembaga Survei Indonesia “Survery Reveal Muslim Ambivalence on Terrorism,” Lembaga Suvei Indonesia <> (24 June 2008). 89 Dr. Christine Fair and Hussain Haqqani have through regression analysis have found that “the single greatest indicator as to why people support suicide terrorism is the degree to which people believe their religion is under attack.” Zachary Abuza, “New Polling Data in Indonesia Shows ‘Significant’ Support for Terrorists,” (16 October 2006); available from <> (15 June 2008).  27 for political suppression. 90 Following the Megawati government’s rhetorical securitization of terrorism, the Indonesian public had come to accept terrorism as a security threat. However, there was a limit to what this acceptance justified in terms of policy. Despite recognizing the need to address terrorism, the public, all too familiar with the negative aspects of excessive internal security, inevitably remained wary of policies which would increase it. 91 Further contributing to Megawati’s decision to criminalize were political factors which constrained Megawati’s actions despite successful securitization. As previously noted, Megawati’s questionable Islamic credentials, difficulties with vocal moderate Islamic critics and contentious relationship with her Vice-President, Hamzah Haz – who openly associated with some of Indonesia’s extremist groups – were political liabilities throughout her administration. 92 While these factors did not limit her action against Islamic radicalism to the same extent after the Bali bombing, Megawati was nonetheless constrained in her action against extremism. She was governing through a political coalition composed of nearly every party in the DPR and depended upon the Islamic parties’ support. 93 These parties were wary of internal security measure which looked too much like a return to the new order or could be seen as anti-Islamic. Consequently, among Megawati’s motivations to criminalize rather than securitize terrorism was the consideration of her administration’s political survival.  90  Sukma, “Indonesia and the War on Terror in Southeast Asia.” Lanti, 2. 92 For instance, Megawati’s Vice-President Hamzah Haz strongly criticized her cooperation with the United States following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and vocally denied the existence of JI in Indonesia. Stephen Sherlock, “The Bali Bombing: What it means for Indonesia,” Information and Research Services Current Issues Brief, no. 4 Australian Department of the Parliamentary Library (2002): 2. 93 Sherlock, “The Bali Bombing: What it means for Indonesia,” 2. 91  28 2.3 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a retired army general and Indonesia’s first directly elected president, was sworn into office on October 20, 2004. Given that SBY was Megawati’s Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, his counter-terrorism strategy demonstrates some continuity from that of the Megawati government. However, it does differ in the fact that the non-discursive policy which he implemented securitized rather than criminalized terrorism.  2.3.1. Speech acts: The Yudhoyono government’s move to securitize terrorism also occurred following a major terrorist act. On October 1, 2005 two bombs exploded in Bali, killing 20 people and injuring a further 100, most of them Indonesian. Internationally, Yudhoyono made securitizing moves by classifying terrorism as an existential threat. Speaking to a group of Australian business executives, Yudhoyono stated, “I declare war against corruption and terrorism for the better of Indonesia.” 94 More significantly, in 2007, Indonesia signed an Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) declaration which labeled terrorism as a security threat. The declaration stated that the ASEAN states were:  DEEPLY CONCERNED over the grave danger posed by terrorism to innocent lives, infrastructure and the environment, regional and international peace and stability as well as to economic development; REITERATING that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever, and by whomsoever, is a profound threat to international peace and security and a direct challenge to the 94  Wise, “Indonesia’s War on Terror,” 44.  29 attainment of peace, progress and prosperity for ASEAN and the realisation of ASEAN Vision 2020; 95 Domestically, Yudhoyono made securitizing moves aimed at convincing the public of the need to increase the role of the TNI in internal security. This represents continuity in discourse and a shift from criminalizing to securitizating non-discursive action. On October 5, 2005 at a ceremony marking the 60th anniversary of the TNI, Yudhoyono asked the TNI to “take part in effectively curbing, preventing and acting against terrorism.” 96 In response, the TNI Chief stated “The government has given us [the T.N.I.] a clear order to participate in the war against terrorism.” 97 Significantly, General Endriartono Sutarto linked the fight against terrorism to the revival of Indonesia’s controversial territorial command structure, or Koter. “First, we will raise the public awareness about the condition of people’s neighborhoods. Second, we will also activate the territorial command up to the village level, and third, of course, we will share intelligence information with other institutions, especially the police.” 98 Koter involves having local, non-commissioned officers report on suspicious activities within their communities. Under the Suharto regime, this function was used to silence critics of the regime. Members of Yudhoyono’s government used even stronger language when addressing the threat posed by terrorism. Vice-President Jusuf Kalla told a group of Islamic Student Association Alumni “Like it or not the government must take measures which are tough and resolute, no different from what was done during the New Order 95  Italics mine. ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism. (12 January 2007) <> (12 April 2008). 96 “Stay in the Barracks” Jakarta Post (10 October 2005). 97 James Balowski “T.N.I. uses Bali Bombing to Reassert Political Role” Green Left Weekly (October, 26, 2005). <> (27 May 2008). 98 Italics mine. National Police Chief General Sutarto as cited in Balowski, “T.N.I uses Bali Bombing…”  30 era.” 99 When asked about the fears of critics that Yudhoyono’s intended anti-terrorism plans would return Indonesia to a New Order oppressive regime, TNI chief General Endriartono Sutarto answered, “Which do you prefer, having such fears or losing lives?” 100  2.3.2. Audience acceptance: Evidence that the Indonesian public was convinced by the Yudhoyono governments’ speech acts is inconclusive. According to a survey by the Indonesian Research Institute, released prior to the second Bali bombing, the majority of Indonesians disagreed with Koter at “district, regional, and provincial levels.” Additionally, the survey found that 82.2% of respondents agreed “the military’s main role was to defend the state from external threats.” 101 Similarly, one reporter suggested “going by media reports, there is indeed a great deal of public resistance to the idea of the military renewing its political role.” However, the same news article also suggests that while remaining wary of the military, “many people acknowledge the TNI could play an important role in the war against terror.” 102 Additionally, some scholars argue that the Indonesian public is becoming more acceptant of an increased role for the military in matters of internal security. 103 This may be an indication of successful rhetorical  99  “Stay in the Barracks” Bill Guerin, “Terror Fight Revives Suharto-era Might,” Asia Times Online ( July 14, 2005). 101 Balowski, “T.N.I uses Bali Bombings…” 102 “Stay in the Barracks.” 103 For Instance, Suzanne Burford argues that the Indonesian public is increasingly acceptant of the military Indonesian security policy. She cites a 2006 poll by LSI which indicated that “a percentage of those surveyed consider the presence of a TNI control structure (Koter) imperative to the maintenance of law and order.” Lembaga Survei Indonesia: The Leading Indonesian Pollster, Publik Merasa Kekuatan Teritorial TNI Masih Penting (Jakarta, 2006), (accessed 6 May, 2006), p. 87 as cited in Burford, “An increasing role for the TNI in Indonesian security policy,” Asia Reconstructed: Proceedings of the16th Biennial Conference of the ASAA, 100  31 securitization or it may simply reflect public nostalgia for the order and economic growth which accompanied the military rule of the New Order.  2.3.3 Motivations behind discursive action: The Yudhoyono government’s strategy of implementing securitizing policy by increasing the role of the military in internal security was potentially motivated by several contextual factors. Critics of Yudhuyono suggest that he used the bombings in Indonesia as an excuse to increase the function and prestige of the military. 104 A retired army general, Yudhoyono spent many years building a promising military career as a moderate reformer. And as one commentator notes “it is difficult to believe that a retired military or police officer has no emotional links or organizational loyalty to their previous institutions” 105 At the same time, Yudhoyono, throughout his political career, has expressed a commitment to democratization. Officially, his announced counterterrorism policies are based on a framework of six general principles. These general principles are; 1) supremacy of the law: all counterterrorist action is based in a legal framework; 2) independence: Indonesia will regard any international intelligence as input, but will reach their own independent conclusion on actions to be taken within the country; 3) indiscrimination: all people will be treated equally before anti-terrorism laws regardless of religion or ethnicity; 4) coordination: the government recognizes the crosssector nature of terrorism and therefore reiterates the importance and mandate of the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs; 5) democracy: the government is 2006, Wollongong, Australia, eds. Adrian Vickers and Margaret Hanlon (University of Wollongong, 2006), 1. 104 See Balowski “T.N.I. uses Bali Bombings…” 105 Razak Imanuddin,“Retired Officers in Cabinet: Assets or Liabilities?” Jakarta Post (28 October 2004) as cited in Mietzner,” 44.  32 committed to balancing democratic rights with government authority and encourages citizen oversight through Parliament, the media, and civil society; 6) participation: the government acknowledges that if they are to have any success in fighting terrorism the Indonesian public must support government initiatives. The government relies on public cooperation and vigilance in fighting terrorism. 106 Additionally, Yudhoyono has implemented other policies (such as a plan to have the military cease business operations by 2009) 107 which demonstrate a commitment to democratization and civil-military reform. 108 Arguably then, SBY’s move to engage the TNI in counter-terrorism efforts may not be an effort to re-activate the military’s political role. Alternatively, Yudhoyono may have turned to the military for help in managing terrorism because he understood them to be better equipped than the police to enforce counterterrorism measures. One member of the government explained that the military has been directed to increase their counterterrorism role because “If we [the government] want the whole country to be protected from any kind of terror threats, then we must empower all elements of this nation to take part in the war on terror. Even regional military commanders should be authorized to arrest terror suspects.” 109 In this sense, there is an understanding that SBY is truly convinced of the need to include the military in matters of internal security.  106  Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “Save Our Country from Terrorism” Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs, (2002), 7 as cited in Tumanggor, 95-96. 107 Damien Kingsbury, “Indonesia in 2007: Unmet Expectations, Despite Improvement,” Asian Survey, 48:1 (Jan/Feb 2008): 44. 108 Yudhoyono also demonstrated a willingness to fire controversial military officers who attempted to bloc his agenda of moderate military reform. Mietzner, 50. 109 Ansja’ad Mbai from the office of the coordinating minister for political, legal and security affairs, as cited in Balowski, “T.N.I. uses Bali Bombings…”  33 2.3.4 Non-Discursive Action: Whether for benign or politically instrumental purposes, Yudhoyono moved to rhetorically securitize terrorism, linking it to the need for more military involvement in counterterrorism strategies. Just how successful his government was in convincing the audience of this necessity is less clear. Nonetheless, his subsequent non-discursive policy action effectively securitized terrorism by increasing the role of the military in internal security. In June 2005, SBY ordered the reactivation of the Regional Intelligence Coordinating Body (Bakorinda), an intelligence network once used to suppress dissent during the New Order regime. Following the 2005 Bali attack, on instruction from President Yudhoyono, the TNI reinstituted Koter by reactivating special counterterrorism teams at each of the military’s 11 regional commands and reviving the military’s villagelevel intelligence unit. 110 Finally, on December 19, 2005, the military announced that the Special Forces unit Kopassus, would begin training with Australian special forces in early 2006, reinstituting a relationship with had been cut in 1999 after the atrocities in East Timor. 111  2.3.5 Motivations behind Non-Discursive Action: That SBY chose to securitize terrorism while Megawati did not has much to do with Indonesia’s changing political context. Ultimately, through the confluence of a combination of factors, Indonesia’s political environment became more conducive to increasing the role of the military in counterterrorism than it was during Megawati’s 110  Tiarma Siboro, “TNI Criticized over Counter-terrorism Desks Policy” Jakarta Post (November  111  Burford, 7.  9, 2005).  34 presidency. First, by the time of Yudhoyono’s election, the public, although still wary of the military, became increasingly willing to allow persons associated with the military some role in Indonesian politics. A 2004 survey of Indonesian voter’s found that 45% favored an active or former general as a president rather than a human rights activist (9%), religious leader (9%) or professional politician (8%). 112 Similarly, a focus group study conducted just before the 2004 election found that a military background would be more likely to aid than hinder a candidate. 113 Significantly, Burford points out “although this perception can be recognized as a somewhat unsubstantiated nostalgia for a past era, it may nonetheless have real consequences in the willingness of civil society to support security policies that grant increased power to the military.” 114 Second, at the time of Yudhoyono’s presidency, the Indonesian public was more likely to accept the idea that the military could play a necessary role in counterterrorism. Following the 2002 Bali bombing, the police were praised for their efforts in combating terrorism, and some Indonesian’s expressed surprise at their ability to catch the perpetrators of the first Bali Bombings. 115 However, Indonesia did suffer more terrorist attacks and in the aftermath the public began to question the police’s ability to effectively combat terrorism. According to one news article, “The national police are coming under increasing fire for a perceived view of terrorism as a routine matter, instead of a real threat to public security.” 116  112  .”Results from Wave XIII Tracking Surveys,” International Foundation for Electoral Systems. (2004) as cited in Mietzner, fn. 49. 113 Jim Della-Giacoma Thomas O. Melia, Stephanie Lynn, The People's Voice: Presidential Politics and Voter Perspectives in Indonesia, ed. Peter Manikas (Jakarta: National Democratic Institute for international Affairs, 2004), pp. 6-7 as cited in Burford, 5. 114 Burford, 5. 115 Lanti, 3. 116 Guerin, “Terror fight revives Suharto-era might.”  35 A final reason why Yudhoyono could implement securitizing policies was that the political position of his government was much less precarious than that of Megawati’s. Yudhoyono’s direct popular election allowed him more freedom of action in his counterterrorism strategies. It eliminated the need to for Yudhoyono “to maintain a majority in the legislature and [gave] the President his/her own mandate and legitimacy.” 117 For Yudhoyono, implementing securitized policy measures did not pose the same threat to his own political survival. One constraining factor which remained as relevant for Yudhoyono as it was for Megawati is the concern that Islam has been or will be stigmatized through counter-terror measures. Most analysts agree that one very effective counterterrorism strategy would be to make membership in JI illegal. 118 For both Megawati and Yudhoyono, this strategy has remained politically dangerous. JI literally means “Islamic community” and thousands of mosques and congregations throughout Indonesia use some or part of the name. 119 If the Indonesian leadership wished to ban JI, they would have to be very careful about articulating which “Islamic Community” it was they were trying to ban. 120 In response to a 2005 request by the Australian government to ban JI, Yudhoyono stated that he would ban JI if it could be proven to exist. 121 Later, a news report revealed that Yudhoyono was advised by an aid to avoid even mentioning JI given the political sensitivity surrounding 117  Sherlock, “Struggling to Change,” 35. Sydney Jones “The Political Impact of the ‘War on Terror,” Asia Research Centre Working Paper no. 116 (November 2004): 5 <> (28 July 2008). Nurfarahislinda M. Ismail, V. Arianti, and Jennifer Yang Hui, “The Surprise Verdict: The Proscription of Jemaah Islamiyah,” RSIS Commentaries (19 June 2008): 2 <> (29 June 2008). 119 “Complications with Banning JI: Dewi Fortuna Anwar,” The World Today Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar (October 4, 2005) <> (18 July 2008). 120 Ibid. 121 Existence in this case is referring the legal ability to prove the existence of JI organizational structure. Yudhoyono was not denying the actual existence of the terrorist network. 118  36 its name. 122 Yudhoyono, despite being better positioned to implement securitizing policy, faced the same limits as Megawati when it came to banning membership in JI because the political costs remained high and unchanged. 123  122  Jones, “The Political Impact of the War on Terror.” SBY, while seen as having better “Islamic credentials” than Megawati, still faces some criticism regarding his commitment to Islam and thus must similarly exercise caution in how he addresses the group. 123  37  Chapter 3: Conclusion  Managing terrorism in Indonesia is unsurprisingly complex. International pressure, concern for the safety of Indonesians, the importance of Islam in Indonesian society and politics, ongoing democratization and important civil-military reform all contribute to an environment where counterterrorism efforts are both necessary and politically risky. Between 2002 and 2006, the Indonesian government negotiated these concerns by employing a combination of securitizing and criminalizing strategies. While this paper is unable to fully explain Indonesia’s counterterrorism strategy, it does demonstrate the importance of the political and social context for securitization decisions. In doing so it necessarily makes a claim about the existing securitization literature; specifically, that the existing theory is unable to accommodate the important contextual factors which make the Indonesian case study so interesting. CaballeroAnthony and Emmers’ modified securitization theory creates some space for contextual factors, but what it fails to do ( and what the further modification seeks to do) is consider separately the decision to securitize and the decision to follow through with a particular policy strategy. There is value disaggregating the analysis of these decisions because similar political and institutional considerations can motivate and constrain discursive and non-discursive action differently. Disaggregating the analysis of decisions involved in the securitization process contributes to securitization theory literature in two ways. First it offers an explanation of the relationship between criminalization and securitization where criminalization is a  38 separate policy strategy rather than simply an indication of the success of rhetorical securitization (although the success of rhetorical securitization may factor into the motivations behind a decision to criminalize). Secondly, looking at discursive and nondiscursive action separately raises important questions about what securitization can actually accomplish. The traditional understanding of securitization is that it causes a shift in priorities as protecting the security referent from an existential threat takes precedent over other policy matters. However, in no situation will securitization warrant complete freedom of action by an agent – even if the audience is convinced that an existential threat exists. There must always be a limit to what securitization can legitimate or justify. What that limit is depends upon what an audience values, and how willing it is to change its priorities.  3.1 Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Indonesia since 2006: Since the 2005 Bali bombing, there have been no major international terrorist attacks in Indonesia. Nonetheless, recent years have seen developments which may affect the government’s future management strategies. In 2007, the ICG released a report on the current status of JI. The report was written in the wake of a significant move against JI by Densus 88, Indonesia’s counter terrorism unit. Based in part on the intelligence gathered in the arrests and the testimony of suspected JI operatives, the ICG found that JI is likely in a process of building and regrouping. The majority of JI’s membership disagrees with the violent bombing campaign of Noordin Mohammed Top, a prominent JI member and one of the men behind the Bali II. The report is quick to point out that dissatisfaction with Top’s methods is not an indication of a more moderate JI. Rather the  39 membership is wary of the increase in Indonesian deaths caused by large-scale bombings as well as the financial costs involved. JI members still believe that non-Muslims and Muslim apostates threaten the existence of Islam and consequently can only be engaged militarily. 124 While there is little evidence to indicate that JI is growing, “the roots run deep.” Indeed the report concludes that JI is well established across Indonesia, and the organizations’ ability to adapt and innovate indicates that it will continue to pose a significant threat. 125 In April 2008, an Indonesian district court passed down the decision to label JI as a “terrorist organization.” The impact of this decision is not immediately known as the government is still reluctant to ban JI, and it is possible that the decision, handed down in a district court, will be ignored at a national level. At the same time, this ruling overcame one of the biggest challenges to banning JI – proving that it exists as an organization. 126 If and how the government will respond to this ruling remains to be seen. Regardless, it represents an important strategic opportunity for the government’s counterterrorism efforts. 127 Another development in the Indonesian counterterrorism strategy is the failure of Indonesia to ratify the ASEAN convention on counterterrorism. According to the ASEAN politics and security director at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the delay is due to  124  International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status,” International Crisis Group Asia Briefing no. 63 (3 May 2007): 4 – 5 <> (2 February 2008). 125 International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status,” 15. 126 The prosecutors did so by using corporate crime charges to prove that JI exists as an organization. Nurfarahislinda et al, “The Surprise Verdict: The Proscription of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 1. 127 Ibid., 1-3.  40 “technical issues” rather than a disagreement over the basic intent of the document. 128 Whether or not Indonesia will ratify this agreement and the message it will send to the international community remains to be seen. Most recently, on November 8, 2008, Indonesia executed three men (Imam Samudra, Amrozi Nurhasyim and Ali Ghufron) charged with planning the 2002 Bali bombings. While it was feared that these executions could spark further attacks and effectively “martyr” the bombers, there has been relative calm in Indonesia in the days immediately following the execution. 129 Demonstrations by Islamist radicals have occurred in the bombers home villages, but most Indonesians support the executions. What the relatively quiet public reaction says about the success of the government’s counterterrorism strategies and the future of JI represents future research opportunities. 130 Further research possibilities include studying the importance of government engagement and cooperation with moderate Muslim groups in promulgating a nonviolent understanding of political religion. Additionally, it is worth considering how the importance of religion in Indonesian society may in fact mitigate the effects of securitization. There is a potential argument that groups like JI, when they present counterterrorism strategies as being in opposition to the interests of Islam, are in effect securitizing religion. Understanding public reaction to extremist groups as the result of  128  The convention calls for joint cooperation on counterterrorism measures such as information sharing, exercising criminal jurisdiction in investigations, and the extradition of prisoners. Lilian Budianto, “Indonesia tentative on ASEAN's counter-terrorism convention,” The Jakarta Post (6 June 2008). <> (8 September 2008). 129 Abu Bakar Ba'asyir gave evocative sermons at the bombers’ funerals and has called for reprisal attacks against the Indonesian state. Zachary Abuza, “3 Bali Bombers were executed today” Counterterrorism Blog (8 November 2008) <> (9 November 2008). 130 According to Abuza , Ba'asyir will lose credibility if he fails to mobilize militants for the attack he has threatened. “3 Bali Bombers were executed today.”  41 competing securitization processes may provide insight into how governments do and/or should engage political Islam as part of a counterterrorism strategy.  42 Bibliography Abuza, Zachary. Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia. New York: Routlege, 2007. Abuza, Zachary. “3 Bali Bombers were executed today.” (8 November 2008); available from (9 November 2008). 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