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The ethics and values underlying the "emulation of natural disturbance" forest management approach in… Klenk, Nicole 2008

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THE ETHICS AND VALUES UNDERLYING THE “EMULATION OF NATURAL DISTURBANCE” FOREST MANAGEMENT APPROACH IN CANADA: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AND INTERPRETIVE STUDY  by NICOLE KLENK B.Sc. McGill University, 1999 M.Sc. McGill University, 2001  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  in  THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Forestry)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver)  August, 2008  © Nicole Lisa Klenk, 2008  Abstract  This thesis aims at bringing about a greater awareness of the interpretive nature of forestry sciences by examining the ethics and values underlying the “Emulation of Natural Disturbance” (END) forest management approach in Canada. The thesis contains four main manuscripts. The first manuscript reports on a mental models analysis of the meaning of the END for academic forestry scientists across Canada. The results of this study indicate inconsistencies and contradictions between scientists’ mental model of the END, which puts into question the utility and appropriateness of the END for forestry policy. The second manuscript discusses the ethics underlying the END and critiques its policy implications from a pragmatic perspective. In the third manuscript the ethics and values underlying the END are put in relation with Holmes Rolston III’s ethics of “Following Nature”. The last manuscript reports on a survey of forestry curricula across North America conducted to ascertain the level of formal training in ethics afforded to professional foresters and natural resource managers. This manuscript contains a proposed course syllabus in forestry ethics. The curricula study complements the other manuscripts in that it is meant as another means by which to promote interdisciplinary dialogue among forestry scientists, environmental ethicists, and social scientists. In this thesis, in addition to trying to illustrate how ethics shape our interpretations of forests, a pragmatic approach is used to dissolve the fact/values and Nature/Culture dichotomies in forestry sciences and to argue for a more democratic approach to forestry policy.  ii  Table of Contents Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... ii Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................... iii List of Tables .......................................................................................................................... vii List of Figures ........................................................................................................................ viii Glossary ................................................................................................................................... ix Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. xii Co-Authorship Statement....................................................................................................... xiv Chapter I: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 1.1 What are Forests (For)? ...................................................................................................... 1 1.2 The “Emulation of Natural Disturbance” Forest Management Approach in Canada ......... 9 1.3 Objectives of the Study ..................................................................................................... 10 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 13 Chapter II: What is the “END” (Emulation of Natural Disturbance) in Forest Ecosystem Management? An Open Question ........................................................................................... 21 2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 21 2.2 Mental Models and Network Textual Analysis ................................................................ 23 2.3 Research Methods ............................................................................................................. 25 2.4 Data Analysis .................................................................................................................... 26 2.5 Results ............................................................................................................................... 28 2.6 Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 29 2.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 32 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 42 Chapter III: Listening to the Birds: a Pragmatic Proposal for Forestry .................................. 47 3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 47 iii  3.1.1 Normative Concerns and a Pragmatic Agenda .......................................................... 47 3.1.2 Listening, Dialogue and Moral Responsibility .......................................................... 48 3.1.3 Listening to Nature, Dialogue and Democratic Process ............................................ 51 3.2 The Silver-Leaf Story ....................................................................................................... 53 3.3 The “END” of Scientific Forestry? ................................................................................... 56 3.4 Listening to the Birds ........................................................................................................ 61 3.5 Listening and Dialogue ..................................................................................................... 64 3.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 67 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 68 Chapter IV: The Ethics of “Following Nature” in Forestry: Forestry scientists in Conversation with Holmes Rolston III ................................................................................... 75 4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 75 4.1.1 The END of Scientific Forestry and Naturalistic Ethics ............................................ 77 4.1.2 Following Nature with Holmes Rolston III ............................................................... 79 4.2 Study Participants and Quantitative Methods ................................................................... 81 4.3 Decision-Making Scenarios .............................................................................................. 82 4.4 Results and Philosophical Discussion............................................................................... 85 4.4.1 Content and Contingency Analysis ............................................................................ 85 4.4.2 Decisive and Indecisive Responses ........................................................................... 86 4.4.3 Intervention and Non-Intervention ............................................................................ 89 4.5 Following Nature in Forestry: A Provisional Conclusion ................................................ 94 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 99 Chapter V: What are Forests for? The Place of Ethics in the Forestry Curriculum ............. 105 5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 105 5.2 Methods........................................................................................................................... 107 iv  5.3 Analysis........................................................................................................................... 107 5.4 Results ............................................................................................................................. 108 5.4.1 Ethics in the Curriculum .......................................................................................... 108 5.4.2 Specific Ethics Courses............................................................................................ 108 5.4.3 Other Courses in which Ethics is Taught ................................................................. 109 5.4.4 Objectives of Forestry Ethics Courses ..................................................................... 109 5.5 Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 111 5.5.1 Results ...................................................................................................................... 111 5.5.2 A Framework for Teaching Forestry Ethics ............................................................ 111 5.6 Tripartite Forestry Ethics Course .................................................................................... 112 5.6.1 Part I: Professional Ethics ........................................................................................ 112 5.6.2 Part II: Environmental Ethics................................................................................... 113 5.6.2.1 Section A: Antropocentric Utilitarianism and its Progeny. .............................. 113 5.6.2.2 Section B: Following Nature? ........................................................................... 114 5.6.2.3 Section C: From Dominion to Partnership........................................................ 114 5.6.3 Part III: History as a Precursor to Judgment ............................................................ 115 5.7 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 116 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 119 Chapter VI: Discussion and Conclusion ............................................................................... 125 6.1 Successes of the Thesis ................................................................................................... 125 6.2 Limitations of the Thesis ................................................................................................ 128 6.2.1 Interpretive Forestry and Stakeholder Democracy .................................................. 128 6.2.2 The Trouble with Dialogue ...................................................................................... 129 6.3 A Critique of the END .................................................................................................... 131 6.4 A Description of Interpretive Forestry............................................................................ 138 v  6.5 In Defense of Pragmatism, Value Pluralism, and Interpretation .................................... 139 6.6 Conclusion: Weaving Multiple Warps Together While Keeping a Straight Selvedge ... 143 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 145 Appendices ............................................................................................................................ 151 Appendix 1: Interview Schedule ........................................................................................... 151 Appendix 2: UBC Research Ethics Board's Certificates of Approval .................................. 155  vi  List of Tables Table 2.1 Types of shared mental maps …………………………………………………….34 Table 2.2 Frequently used concepts in defining the END …………………………………..35 Table 4.1 Number of responses per gender and per discipline ……………………………...97 Table 4.2 The number of prescriptions for each decision-making scenario ………………...97 Table 4.3 The reasons and their frequency of use …………………………………………..98 Table 5.1 Percentage of North American forestry programs that include ethics in their curriculum...………………………………………………………………………………...118 Table 5.2 Percentage of North American forestry programs that offer ethics courses…......118  vii  List of Figures Figure 2.1 Number of concepts, number of statements and density of mental models ...…...36 Figure 2.2 Least complex (density) mental model of the END conceptualization ...………..37 Figure 2.3 Most complex (density) mental model of the END conceptualization ...………..38 Figure 2.4 The intersection of the union of individual mental models with Kimmins ...........39 Figure 2.5 Kimmins’ mental model of the theoretical conceptualization of the END ...……39 Figure 2.6 The percentage of individual mental models the concepts of the shared mental model of the conceptualization of the END occur in………………………………………...40 Figure 2.7 Relative centrality of the concepts occurring in the shared mental model and Kimmins’ mental model of the conceptualization of the END………………………………41  viii  Glossary  Democracy: In this thesis democracy is used in a Deweyan sense. First, democracy is a political process that serves to protect public interests by means of both the election of representatives of citizens and the engagement of citizens in a public deliberation of policies. But Dewey did not simply characterize democracy as a political process; he also argued that democracy should be a social and personal ideal that governs social relations. Individuals should be concerned about serving to protect public interests in their relationship to others.  Second, for Dewey, democracy is a process of social inquiry—public policies are viewed as hypotheses to be tested against experience. What Dewey’s conception of inquiry was aiming at was not certainty in our knowledge of reality or in our choice of public policies, but provisional solutions. Democracy for Dewey should embody a deliberative process and should be modelled after a scientific approach to hypothesis testing and monitoring of policy results. Dewey was a staunch advocate of learning-by-doing and adapting to new problematic (personal and public) situations by systematically exploring and testing ethical principles, value theories, and scientific knowledge.  Ecosystem: The term ecosystem as used in this thesis refers to an assemblage of human and nonhuman beings and non-living entities that is bounded within a particular geographical area. I do not use the term ecosystem to refer to a “natural kind” composed of species and their abiotic environment; rather, I use the term ecosystem as a scientific abstraction, the composition of which is determined by convention, but that remains a useful abstraction for research, planning and policy purposes.  Ethics:  ix  Ethics expansively refers to principles and value theories guiding relationships between humans and nonhumans including the environment. Ethical principles and value theories refer to norms of conduct and character that include such ideas as what is good, right, valuable, worthy of respect, admirable and their opposites. Various principles and value theories have been developed throughout history and within different cultures, which have had differing expectations as to what norms are acceptable or unacceptable to follow in our relationships to humans and to non-humans. Hence, the meaning of the words good, right, valuable, worthy of respect, admirable, and their opposites varies, and we cannot assume at the onset that there exists a shared meaning for these constructs across historical periods or cultures. For the purposes of this thesis, the meaning of ethics refers to norms of behaviour and character that are typified by a concern for the well-being of the other in our interaction with him/her/it, and by extension, a concern for serving to protect public interests (as in Dewey’s conception of democracy).  Pragmatism: For the purpose of this thesis I have used the pragmatist theories of John Dewey and Hilary Putnam. I have chosen to use the work of Dewey because his theory of valuation is a useful framework to analyze the ethical reasoning and moral deliberation of forestry scientists given particular management scenarios (in contrast to theories of moral deliberation modelled on formal practical syllogisms). Dewey’s view was that (moral or non moral) value is determined by a process of deliberation and learning-by-doing. Given a problematic situation, Dewey advised that we thoroughly examine potential plans of action, ethical principles and values, and set out to test the value of this plan of action in practice. If the consequences of acting upon this plan result in what we wanted to happen or in some other results that are satisfactory (at the least to the individuals most affected by the plan and its results), then both the plan of action and the results are satisfactory, good, and valuable.  Dewey, moreover, suggested that problems of public policy should be resolved using a democratic approach to deliberation and a process of learning-by-doing. His view of policy-making was that policies should be treated as hypotheses to be tested against experience. x  Hilary Putnam has commented and built upon Dewey’s pragmatism. I have used Putnam’s work because of his critical realism: the idea that we know reality through intermediaries such as mental constructs and although we cannot be sure that our descriptions are true, we hold them to be true until such time as sufficient doubt arises or new technologies are developed to revise our interpretations of reality. These may be commonplace observations in the social sciences and humanities; however, in my reading of the literature in forestry, there appears to be a need to remind forestry scientists of these observations.  Moreover, Putnam’s reasons for rejecting the fact\value dichotomy in ethics and science are at the root of my thesis. That is, the way we describe reality in science is not neatly divided into two separate categories of statements, those of value and those of fact. Rather, the language we use to describe reality, the metaphors, the analogies and the narratives of sciences, contain both value and factual judgements intrinsically linked. For instance, when we describe what a forest is, if we say that it is simply a distribution of trees, we exclude from its purview many things that may or may not belong within the characterization of forests, such as humans. Hence, this characterization of the forest embodies a value judgment: humans do not belong in forests. The implication of this view that I develop in this thesis is that value judgements that are implemented in forestry policy should be made by a democratic process of public deliberation concerned with protecting public interests rather than on the basis of scientific legitimacy and validity.  xi  Acknowledgements  The person I am most deeply thankful for in guiding me through this doctoral program is my husband, and colleague, Jim MacLellan. Jim, your academic integrity have inspired me and provided a model of scholarly excellence that I have tried to emulate. I am also grateful to my two stepsons, Ben and Koda, who have taught me how to play again. It is amazing how family life has also taught me good time-management skills. I have accomplished more in the last two years living with Ben and Koda, than at any other time in my life. Thanks guys, your presence in my life has truly been a gift!  My supervisor, Dr. Gary Bull, has giving me the freedom I needed to follow through with this PhD, which turned out to be a winding, exploratory journey. Gary, thanks for your patience, support and understanding. I would hope that all professors would embody such values in their supervision of graduate students.  My doctoral committee, which included Dr. Sallie McFague, Dr. Dave Cohen, Dr. Bill Rees, and Dr. Terre Satterfield, have been a wonderful, diverse group of amicable critics who challenged me to question my biases and to become a better scholar. Sallie, thank you for your unwavering support and high expectations. You have been a beacon of light, hope, and strength in what was at times a very dark, lonely journey. Dave, your enthusiasm and sense of humour helped convince me that being an academic does not have to tarnish one’s inner light. Thanks for embodying a different mode of being in academia. Bill, thank you for your tough questions and for insisting that I keep my feet firmly on the ground, rather than float in some imaginary, social construction. I am also grateful to Dr. Terre Satterfield for her guidance in planning my research methods and writing my proposal.  I have also been fortunate to work with Dr. Peter Brown and Dr. Colin Duncan of McGill University during my doctoral program. Peter, your work ethic and your devotion to constructing better, environmental and social ethics to transform the political economic systems we are challenged with, are an inspiration to me. Colin, your love of environmental xii  history is contagious. Thanks for making me read Polanyi and introducing me to the value of historical scholarship for the environmental sciences.  I am also grateful to my mother, father, the rest of my family, and my friends. You have been very supportive even if I have tried to keep you mostly out of the loop. Your pride in me has given me strength, thank you!  My thesis research has been deeply rewarding and I thankful for having had the pleasure to interview more than 80 forestry scientists. Thanks to all of you for your time and for your openness in answering my questions.  I gratefully acknowledge the financial support I have received from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council, the Canadian Forest Service, and from the International Environmental Institute in Japan.  xiii  Co-Authorship Statement  Chapter 2 is co-authored with Dr. Gary Bull and Dr. David Cohen of the University of British Columbia.  Chapter 5 is co-authored with Dr. Peter Brown of McGill University.  Parts of Chapter 6 have been included in a co-authored manuscript with Dr. Gary Bull of the University of British Columbia and Dr. James MacLellan of Environmental Canada.  As the first author for these co-authored manuscripts I had a leading role in the identification and design of the research program and the manuscript preparation. I also performed the interviews and conducted the data analyses.  It should be noted that I use the first person singular throughout the thesis simply to maintain a uniform style.  It should also be noted that because my thesis is manuscript-based, there is some overlap in content across manuscripts, particularly when I introduce the meaning of the END and I described the interviews I conducted. I have decided to maintain the integrity of the original manuscripts so that they make sense to readers who choose to read the manuscripts singly rather than the thesis in its entirety.  xiv  Chapter I: Introduction 1  1.1 What are Forests (For)?  Contrary to conventional wisdom within scientific forestry forests were not always thought to be rows of trees growing according to schedule. Forests were once understood to be the privileged hunting grounds of kings and their professional hunters, which were places not densely covered with trees but rather a mix of woodland, pasture, or heath in which game species such as deer thrived (Rackham, 2003: 129-139). Forests today mean different “things” to different people (Lund, 2002), a state of affairs that incurs serious difficulties for forestry, including how best to interpret what are forests (for)? The multiple spatial and time scales, the various cultural conceptions, the conflicting scientific theories, the ever expanding economic uses, and political ideologies from which and by which forests can be transformed, in effect, work to simultaneously structure and abstract forests into fragmented, partial, and compartmentalized things—isolated and alienated from the ecosocial processes that continually give rise to them. Hence, to ask what a forest is is not a purely academic exercise, irrelevant to the task of managing forests. In fact, before I can introduce the topic of my thesis, that of looking to the past history of forests to better understanding forest ecology and to determine benchmarks for sustainable forest management, it is important to clarify what are the (conceptual and historical) forests appealed to for guidance.  To begin, it is important to clarify what is a definition. A definition is a statement of the meaning of a word; it describes, explains and makes precise the meaning of a concept that is denoted by the word. In contemporary philosophy of science, definitions occupy a middle ground between realists’ definitions that claim to make statements about the “nature” or essence of phenomena and nominal definitions that are thought as only establishing the conventional meaning of a word: 1  A version of this chapter has been submitted for publication. Klenk, N. Interpretive Forestry.  1  Most definitions we use are in fact somewhere in between the extremes of a nominal definition and a “classical” real definition, as they neither refer to something completely “artificial” nor do they grasp the “very nature” (or essence) of phenomena. Instead they try to sharpen the meaning of a concept which already exists, but which exists only in a vague and more intuitively perceived manner. (Jax, 2007: 342-343)  Moreover, we should be wary of the habit to append descriptive statements to the necessary and sufficient conditions under which an object (or phenomena) falls into the class that is formed by the concept: Mixing up these categories leads to false inferences about the properties of physical objects (e.g. a particular forest) subsumed by the concept (e.g. ecosystem). As a further consequence, this inference becomes problematic in terms of theory development and/or the application of ecological concepts for management decisions. (Jax, 2007: 341)  In other words, to define the concept of “forest” we need to decide what to include and exclude from our definition: trees, deer, soil, water, air, humans, etc. This task, however, has more than theoretical and practical consequences on ecology and forest management, it has broader political, social, economic, and ethical implications. Excluded parties from definitions are relegated to the shadow of forests (Harrison, 1992), always present (or extinct) but never given voice in the unfolding evolution of actual forests (Braun, 2002; Braun and Wainwright, 2001). Perhaps when we ask “what are forests?” the question would be better phrased as “what are forests for?” since any definition will represent the purpose of those defining the entity or collective in question. By extension, the question becomes “Whose Forest? Whose Nature?” (Proctor, 1995). Indeed, whichever criteria we choose to define forests involves establishing, justifying, and (when definitions of forests have really serious ramifications for ordering society in important ways) policing norms of exclusion.  For instance, in forestry most definitions of forests use one of three criteria: administrative units (national forests, state forests, industrial forests, etc.), land use (typified by reference to forestry practices), or land cover (various classifications) (Helms, 2002). While Lund (2002) has shown that there are hundreds of definitions of forests used around the world, a forest according to Helms “is fundamentally a particular distribution of trees” 2  (2002: 15). Humans, in this definition of forests, are not welcome; they are literally outsiders but, more importantly, disturbances in the evolution of forests. In other words, the definition of forests as devoid of human agency is normative: human actions within forested landscapes are not desired, not normal, not natural, and not evolutionary; rather they are disturbing intrusions. According to this perspective, human agency changes or destroys the course of development forests ought to follow given evolutionary and ecological theories as well as economic theories of efficiency and productivity maximization. Such a perspective, however, begs the question of whether the enforced conceptual and historical separation of humans from forests has incurred negative impacts on the human-side of the nature/culture dichotomy?  With the rise of scientific forestry came the systematic exclusion of humans from forests, which has profoundly shaped the social, political and economic history of various cultures around the world. Scientific forestry, from its inception in France’s Forest Ordinances of the 14th to the 17th century—legislative measures taken to protect alpine forests from further deforestation and the risks to alpine communities of avalanches and torrents (Brown, 1876)—and its formalisation in Prussia in the 18th century can be characterized very broadly as a double movement (sensu Polanyi, 1944). On the one hand, abstracting actual forests from their localities and systematically isolating them from agents of complexity (human and nonhuman) by means of enclosure (Rackham, 2003), forced organization and simplification (Scott, 1998), commodification (Marchak, 1995; Meiggs, 1982; Perlin, 1991), and enlisting professional wardens to safeguard their economic utility (Hays, 1959; Moon, 1925; Pinchot, 1937). On the other hand, the countermovement of attempting to re-embed forests within particular-place-based networks of humans and nonhumans, is illustrated by numerous peasant, native, and rural peoples resistance movements against their marginalization and alienation from forests (Guha, 1989; Peluso, 1992; Poffenberger, 1990; Whited, 2000), by persistent habitation within forests (Slater, 2002) and the demands of communities worldwide to have a voice in the shaping, use and management of forests , forestry practices, and forestry-related markets (FAO, 1999; Gibson et al., 2000; Lee and Field, 2005).  3  Indeed, forests, as forestry history indicates, are not a mere distribution of trees, abstracted from local places and human agency. Apart from the aforementioned accounts, paleoecological and historical research has provided quite a substantial body of evidence that shows that human agency has been omnipresent in shaping forests in many regions of the world throughout human history (Cronon, 1983; Foster and Aber, 2004; Gillson and Willis, 2004; Goudie, 1996; Hughes, 2001; Marsh, 1864; Pyne, 1982; Russell, 1997). Moreover, as anthropologists have been describing, the human/culture dichotomy structuring forestry’s conception of forests does not hold true in many cultures of the world, i.e. take for instance the Achuar Indians in Amazonia for which the society of nature includes human and nonhuman agents (Descola, 1994). The nature/culture dichotomy’s stronghold on scientific forestry’s conception of nature and, by extension, forests, has also distorted our understanding of scientific practice and knowledge construction and excluded from its purview what has been dubbed “traditional ecological knowledge” of various aboriginal peoples (Scott, 1996). Despite efforts by scholars in various academic disciplines to describe and interpret non-human agency, i.e. fire in Pyne’s Fire in America: a cultural history of wildland and rural fire (Pyne, 1982) or scallops in the now classic study of St Brieuc Bay in France (Callon, 1986), the nature/culture dichotomy structures much of the research done on the actions of humans and non-humans in the planet’s ecology.  Although scientific definitions of forests generally separate the structure and processes of current forest ecosystems from human presence and agency for the practical purposes of explaining non-human population dynamics, nutrient cycles and more broadly the ecological “laws” governing ecosystems, other important reasons include efficient timber production and better control over forest harvesting. This scientific definition of forests as separate and isolated from human agency cannot withstand scrutiny particularly in light of projected climate change—the widespread impact of human agency on all aspects of earthly ecology—rendering forests de facto socialized. What are North-American forests if not continually changing associations of humans and non-humans, including trees that were placed within historical ranges due to millennia of mostly slow and contingent interactions between geological, climatic, and evolutionary processes and the land-use transformations occasioned by human agency (Fagan, 2004; Pielou, 1991)? Perhaps this is too wide a time 4  and geographical scale by which to define forests? At the time scale of climate history, however, human agency might not appear as unnatural as generally maintained.  Even within the mainstream discourse on climate change, the drivers of climate change are construed as “universal properties of greenhouse gases” (Demeritt, 2001)— human induced atmospheric transformations are mostly viewed as a disturbance within the ecology of the earth. The familiar narrative portrays global climate change leading, from the perspective of ecology and conservation, to the destruction of habitat for biological diversity and ecosystem processes. Anthropogenic global climate change, furthermore, goes against the evolutionary pathway or self-organization of ecosystems given a “natural” range of variability.  Few species on this planet have achieved such success in transforming vast reaches of the planetary ecosystem. But cyanobacteria come to mind; they too changed the atmosphere’s chemical constitution, starting at least 3.5 billion years ago, which had the effect of undoing their worldy dominance. Cyanobacteria thrived in an oxygen impoverished atmosphere, but due to their large numbers and their photosynthesis they spewed enough oxygen into the atmosphere as to render their historical habitats inhospitable—cyanobacteria are intolerant to oxygen and they were forced to retreat to oxygen deficient environments such as mud flats and other fetid localities (Mackenzie, 1998: 194). The impact of cyanobacteria on the earth ecology, interestingly, is mostly described in positive terms for the evolution of life on earth. No one questions whether cyanobacteria are natural agents because they changed the course of the history of the planet.  Likewise, the broader group of plants also had massive effects on the earth’s atmosphere. According to a recent review of the role of plants in the evolution of the planetary ecosystem, plant photosynthesis and plants’ acceleration of the weathering of silicate rocks which also consumes carbon dioxide helps explain the plummeting of carbon dioxide levels in the middle to late Paleozoic era, 400 to 350 million years ago: Plants, and their fungal partners below ground, are evidently engaged in a conspiracy of silence as they gradually consume the rocks beneath our feet over the ages. Careful investigations have  5  shown them to dissolve rocks five times faster than normal, irrespective of whether they are tropical rainforests in Hawaii or conifer forests in the Swiss Alps. Through these processes plants have been imperceptibly removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and regulating climate as the millennia ticked away. ...Interestingly, plant evolution generated changes in the global environment that persisted in a legacy to modify subsequent generations. Falling carbon dioxide levels saw the evolution of leafy plants, which in turn accelerated the diversification of terrestrial animals and insects. (Beerling, 2007: 33-34)  In this narrative, plants “facilitated” the evolution of non-plant life but they also precipitated an ice-age, thereby putting themselves at risk of global extinction had the earth’s “thermostat” not kicked in as rock weathering slowed in the cooling climate, carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere decreased and the climate stabilized. Plants have been transforming the earth by appropriating more and more habitats, threatening the extinction of countless species due to global cooling over long stretches of time, but at the same time serving as agents of diversification of more “advanced” non-plant life. Surely plants are natural agents of change even if they have caused global havoc in their own ecological way. They are neither disturbances nor “cancer” on the face of this earth even if their actions incurred part of the relative instability of climates over millions of years.  Looking to the far distant past, we can see that major shifts in terrestrial life, climate change, and geological transformations occurred throughout earth’s history. The late arrival of humans on the scene may have occasioned a more thorough change in the ecology of the planet because humans have extraordinary flexibility in utilizing and creating new habitats— which has prompted some scientists to call the last 8000 years the Anthropocene, a period that began with wide scale agriculture, especially wet agriculture (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000; Flannery, 2005: 64-65; Ruddiman, 2003). But is that sufficient reason to render human agency and its transformative effects on the planet’s ecology unnatural, different in kind from cyanobacteria and plant life?  What makes human action appear unnatural: the  use of tools, the development of language? What justifies the exclusion of humans from our definition of nature—and by extension forests?  6  Perhaps humans’ unique capacity to reflect upon our actions and imaginatively and creatively reconstruct our habitats to suit our purposes makes us more responsible for our actions and their consequences, but this does not explain the difference between the results of our actions as compared to those of other life forms. Why not, as Keller (2005: 1073) suggests, think of ourselves “in the same terms as organisms that shape their environment by their activities, and that build entities extending their functionality, which can accordingly be thought of as extensions of themselves.” Keller provides several examples of other organisms building their environment to better serve their individual needs or social organization: beaver dams, birds’ nests, termite mounds, earthworm tunnels, etc. Ecological processes and so-called natural laws constrain human actions as much as non-humans ones, the difference is that humans have learned to use them with greater success to secure, over social history, better overall, albeit unequally distributed, conditions of life.  In another vein, it is in part for the purpose of securing better and more secure conditions of life (for individuals, households, societies, nations or empires) that forests have historically been utilized (timber, fuel, fodder, etc) —forests are, as Robert Pogue Harrison (1992) has suggested, the “shadow of civilization”. Nevertheless it is in the context of scientific forestry that forests came to be understood as “natural resources” to be produced according to norms of efficiency, order, and simplicity (Scott, 1998). Forests as “natural resources” became “commodities” when they were explicitly produced for exchange. However, the idea that forests are “natural resources” or “commodities” is not self-evident. As Karl Polanyi argued in The Great Transformation (1944), forests (what he called land) are commodity fictions—they are not “natural resources” produced for exchange. Indeed, unplanted forests have mostly been used and destroyed through the ages to provide fuel and timber for individual households, city states, empires and modern nations without being exchanged in markets per se (Meiggs, 1982; Perlin, 1991). As Gordon Hak described in his Turning Trees Into Dollars (2000), the human transformation of non-human entities into things for use does not render the thing in question a commodity—that requires that the thing be given a monetary value: In the beginning, there was the forest, a complex natural phenomenon that included trees. In the physical process, human beings converted this living timber into new forms: trees became  7  shingles, doors, sashes, posts, bridge timbers, tongue-and-groove flooring, pickets, rough lumber, finishes lumber, and spars. The conversion process involved coping with geography and space. Trees had to be felled, moved, and manipulated, and products had to be transported to final users. This was no simple feat. A production system involving human beings, animals, and machines had to be envisioned, realized, coordinated, and managed. Physically transforming and transporting timber and wood captures only part of the process; the real magic was in transmuting these things into cash or its equivalent. Products for use became commodities for exchange in the world of commerce, the world of capitalism. (Hak, 2000: 4-5)  Plantations, as crops of trees planted on lower quality lands unsuitable for agriculture (Moon, 1925), have rendered forests true commodities, i.e. plantations are forests produced for sale. More recently, Polanyi’s “land as a commodity fiction” has been turned on its head: all forested lands on earth have been commodified, in an interesting twist of the imagination, by ecological economists such as Costanza and his colleagues (1998) who argue that forested ecosystems produce “services” such as water filtration, atmospheric conditioning, carbon sequestration, and a slew of social goods such as aesthetic experience, spiritual retreats, and cultural legacies that can be priced, hence be traded in a global market. The definition of forests as natural resources has not been questioned until recently, when such ideas as the non-instrumental value of biodiversity and natural landscapes, i.e. those landscapes deemed little or not transformed by human activities, became more prominent in the way we conceptualize the human relationship to non-human nature (Brown, 2004). This anthropocentrism associated with the concept of forest as a natural resource highlights the inextricable strands of social, cultural, political and economic values that shape how we conceived forests.  My intention in introducing differing perspectives on the definition of forests is to draw attention to how the “necessary and sufficient conditions under which an object (or phenomena) falls into the class that is formed by the concept” reflects human values, ethics, and politics. This historical and conceptual aperçu sets the stage for the purpose of my study, the examination of a current, highly compelling approach to forest management within Canada: the idea of emulating natural disturbance (END) to fit within a historical range of variability to achieve sustainable forest management. The END, as we shall see, 8  looks to the past history of forests to guide current forest management. Given the above, one might question which history and whose history does the END appeal to?  1.2 The “Emulation of Natural Disturbance” Forest Management Approach in Canada  The END is a “coarse filter” approach to biodiversity conservation and forest management (Hunter, 1993). The “coarse filter” approach links the maintenance of biodiversity to silvicultural practices that emulate the size-frequency distribution of non anthropogenic disturbances.  The END is commonly justified by reference to evolutionary reasoning. The ecological premises of the END are (1) that periodic disturbances are inherent to dynamic forest ecosystems (Pickett and White, 1985); (2) that natural disturbances are strong determinants of species composition as well as ecosystems structure and function (White and Walker, 1997), and (3) that forest ecosystems and their species composition have adapted to the disturbances (Bunnell, 1995). The train of argument is that by maintaining stand and landscape compositions and structures similar to those resulting from natural disturbances, we can reduce the negative impacts of timber harvest on biodiversity and maintain essential ecological functions (Bergeron and Harvey, 1997). Scientists have suggested that in practice the objective of the END is to fit within a “historical range of natural variability” (Landres et al., 1999; Morgan et al., 1994; Parsons et al., 1999).  The social and historical components of the END, however, may be lost from sight when the END is technically described using scientific constructs. Take, for instance, Kimmins’ (2004: 13) characterization of the END: Management over ecologically significant temporal and spatial scales that attempts to emulate the ecosystem effects of physical (allogenic) or biotic (biogenic) disturbance events, the frequency and/or severity of which have been changed by human action but which have historically determined the potential pathways, patterns, and rates of autogenic successional development in the ecosystem in question. Such emulation aims to maintain the historical range  9  of variation, or a socially acceptable subset thereof, in desired ecosystem conditions and functions over defined spatial and temporal scales.  Although Kimmins mentions the criteria of social acceptability for the choice of a historical range of variation, this value judgment is largely lost amongst the technical jargon. Indeed, the literature is replete with attempts to articulate, delimit, quantify, and objectify the END, as though the choice of a historical range of variation is simply a matter of getting the science right (see Ecological Applications volume 9, 1999; Forest Ecology and Management volume 155, 2002; and Silva Fennica, volume 36, 2002). In light of the above, my thesis is that the END is a forest management approach that appeals to Nature and Science as authorities in deciding how best to manage forests, all the while embodying a set of ethics and values, i.e. the nature/culture dichotomy and the ethics of “following nature,” that masquerade as objective facts under the name of scientific forestry.  1.3 Objectives of the Study  This study attempts to clarify the ethics and the values underlying the ‘Emulation of Natural Disturbance’ (END) forest management approach and evaluate its implications for forestry policy in Canada. To do so, I have conducted interviews with academic forestry scientists from across Canada (see Appendix 1 for the interview schedule). I chose to interview university scientists because I assumed that their understanding of the END is likely to shape the conceptualization and understanding of the END in the current and future generations of practicing forestry professionals. I used in-depth, semi-structured interviews for the empirical basis of this study for three main reasons, (1) in-depth interviews facilitate a dialogical process between the author and the study participants , (2) in-depth interviews allowed me to produce a network of forestry scientists in dialogue with each other through my written accounts of their interpretations of END, its underlying values and applications to management scenarios, (3) the semi-structured nature of the interview allowed me to put the participants’ voice in dialogue with current theoretical positions in forest management and environmental ethics. As Soss has pointed out (2006: 137): For an interpretive research project, then, in-depth interviewing offers a dynamic method—one that offers flexibility in the interview itself and shifting standpoints over time. It is centered on  10  discursive and dialectical conversations with interviewees. But more broadly, it is an evolving dialogue between fieldwork and framework, mediated by concrete activities of transcriptions, memo writing, purposive reading of literatures, and the like.  The interview transcripts were subjected to several types of analyses that reflect different disciplinary methodological approaches (social-empirical and philosophical) to attaining the following three major objectives of the study.  The first objective was to decipher the meaning of the END for academic forestry scientists. I used textual network analyses to construct mental models of the meaning of the END. Mental models have been used in a number of other resource management studies (Corley, 2004; Hjortso, 2004; Hobbs et al., 2002; Mendoza and Prabhu, 2003; Ozesmi and Ozesmi, 2003; Radomski and Goeman, 1996; Skov and Svenning 2003). The basic idea underlying the concept of ‘mental model’ is that human beings understand the world by constructing working models of it in their minds (Johnson-Laird and Nicholas, 1983). Mental model analysis allows the researcher to analyze and compare respondents’ conceptions of a particular area of knowledge on the basis of the structural analysis of the networks of concepts that figure as mental models.  The second objective was to clarify the ethical dimensions of the END and its policy implications. To do this I used a specific interview as a case study (Setliff, 2002), engaged in a conceptual analysis of the ethical implications of the terms “natural” and “disturbance” and I used an example of a non-scientific interpretation of nature (Dove, 1993) to illustrate the pragmatic value of social practices other than scientific methods and interpretations of nature for environmental policy making.  The third objective was to describe and analyze the ethical reasoning of forestry scientists when confronted with environmental dilemmas that illustrate some of the paradoxical aspects of a naturalistic environmental ethics such as the END which is based on the nature/culture dualism. I used contingency analysis to compare respondent’s ethical reasoning and values to that of environmental ethicists, in particular Holmes Rolston III, the 11  most prominent advocate of the naturalistic ethics of “Following Nature” (Rolston III, 1988). Contingency analysis is a technique that enables researchers to infer associations from patterns of co-occurrences of concepts or ideas in texts. Co-occurrences that are significantly above chance suggest the presence of associations, whereas co-occurrences that are significantly below chance suggest the presence of dissociations. The underlying assumption of the analysis of contingencies is that co-occurrences in texts indicate associations in someone’s mind or cultural practices (Osgood, 1959).  I include in the thesis a tangential study that ascertained the degree of formal training in ethics afforded to Canadian and American professional foresters, natural resource managers and technicians. The first objective of the forestry ethics curriculum study was to indicate the importance of ethics and ethical reasoning skills in forestry as reflected by how and how much ethics is being taught in the forestry curriculum in Canada and the U.S.A.  The second  objective of the forestry ethics curriculum study was to provide a proposed forestry ethics syllabus that could be used to introduce foresters to the types of values and ethics that underlie forest management approaches such as the END.  In the four chapters that follow I present results of the three objectives and the forestry ethics curriculum study respectively. In the last chapter I summarize the results of the entire study, discuss its limitations and critique the “Emulation of Natural Disturbance” approach to forest management in light of the problematic aspects of the nature/culture dichotomy. I also discuss in the last chapter the more general context of this study: interpretive forestry and its pragmatic and ethical implications.  12  Bibliography  Beerling, D. 2007. The Emerald Planet: How Plants Changed Earth's History. Oxford University Press, Oxford.  Bergeron, Y., and B. Harvey. 1997. Basing silviculture on natural ecosystem dynamics: an approach applied to the southern boreal mixedwood forest of Quebec. Forest Ecology and Management 92:235-242.  Braun, B. 2002. The Intemperate Rainforest: Nature, Culture, and Power on Canada's West Coast. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.  Braun, B., and J. 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Cronon, ed. Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature. W.W. Norton, New York. pp. 269-297.  Pyne, S.J. 1982. Fire in America: a Cultural History of Wildland and Rural fire. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.  Rackham, O. 2003. Ancient Woodland: its History, Vegetation and Uses in England. Castlepoint Press, Colvend.  18  Radomski, P.J., and T.J. Goeman. 1996. Decision making and modeling in freshwater sportfisheries management. Fisheries 21:14-21.  Rolston III, H. 1988. Environmental Ethics. Temple University Press, Philadelphia.  Ruddiman, W.F. 2003. The anthropogenic greenhouse era began thousands of years ago. Climatic Change 61:261-293.  Russell, E.W.B. 1997. People and the Land through Time: Linking Ecology and History. Yale University Press, New Haven.  Scott, C. 1996. Science for the West, myth for the rest? The case of James Bay Cree knowledge construction. In L. Nader, ed. Naked Science: Anthropological Inquiry Into Boundaries, Power, and Knowledge. Routledge, New York. pp. 69-86.  Scott, J.C. 1998. Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. Yale University Press, New Haven, NJ.  Setliff, E.C. 2002. The wound pathogen Chondrostereum purpureum, its history and incidence in North America. Australian Journal of Botany 50:645-651.  Skov, F., and J.-C. Svenning 2003. Predicting plant species richness in a managed forest. Forest Ecology and Forest Management 62:1-11.  Slater, C. 2002. Entangled Edens: Visions of the Amazon. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.  Soss, J. 2006. Talking our way to meaningful explanations: A practice-centered view of interviewing for interpretive research. In D. Yanow and P. Schwartz-Shea, eds. Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research and the Interpretive Turn. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York. pp. 127-149. 19  White, P.S., and J.L. Walker. 1997. Approximating nature's variation: selecting and using reference information in restoration ecology. Restoration Ecology 5:338-349.  Whited, T.L. 2000. Forests and Peasant Politics in Modern France. Yale University Press, New Haven.  20  Chapter II: What is the “END” (Emulation of Natural Disturbance) in Forest Ecosystem Management? An Open Question 2  2.1 Introduction  Forest management in much of Canada is moving towards the idea of “ecosystem management”. The stated goal of this type of management is to maintain the ecological integrity and health of the forest (CFS, 1998). To achieve this goal some authors have proposed a “coarse filter” approach to forest ecosystem management, namely the emulation of natural disturbance (END) (Hunter, 1993).  The END is justified by using evolutionary reasoning. Some of the ecological premises of the END are (1) that periodic disturbances are inherent to dynamic forest ecosystems (Pickett and White, 1985); (2) that natural disturbances are strong determinants of species composition as well as ecosystems structure and function (Attiwill, 1994; White and Walker, 1997), and (3) that forest ecosystems and their species composition have adapted to the disturbances (Bunnell, 1995). In other words, it is thought that by maintaining stand and landscape compositions and structures similar to those resulting from natural disturbances, we can reduce the negative impacts of timber harvest on biodiversity and maintain essential ecological functions (Angelstam, 1998; Attiwill, 1994; Bergeron and Harvey, 1997; Bunnell, 1995). In practice, a common objective of the END is to design  2  A version of this chapter has been published. Klenk, N., G. Bull, D. Cohen. (2008) What is the “END”  (Emulation of Natural Disturbance) in forest ecosystem management? An Open Question. Canadian Journal of Forest Research 38(8): 2159-2168.  21  forest management practices that fit within a historical range of variability of “natural” disturbance regimes (Landres et al., 1999).  Despite past efforts to clarify the conceptual meaning of the END (see Ecological Applications volume 9, 1999; Forest Ecology and Management volume 155, 2002; and Silva Fennica, volume 36, 2002), there appears to be no convergence towards a consensus (Landres et al., 1999; McRae et al., 2001). Descriptions of the END differ in their comprehensiveness and conceptual precision (Perera et al., 2004). Kimmins (2004: 13) provides a particularly theoretically comprehensive characterization of the END: Management over ecologically significant temporal and spatial scales that attempts to emulate the ecosystem effects of physical (allogenic) or biotic (biogenic) disturbance events, the frequency and/or severity of which have been changed by human action but which have historically determined the potential pathways, patterns, and rates of autogenic successional development in the ecosystem in question. Such emulation aims to maintain the historical range of variation, or a socially acceptable subset thereof, in desired ecosystem conditions and functions over defined spatial and temporal scales.  Although characterizations such as Kimmins’ strongly anchor the END to theoretical ecology, other characterizations are broader, but less precise: Natural variability is the ecological conditions, and the spatial and temporal variation in these conditions, that are relatively unaffected by people, within a period of time and geographical area appropriate to an expressed goal. (Landres et al. 1994: 1181)  It is uncertain, however, whether such a characterization could align with how forestry scientists actually conceptualize the END. Moreover, given that the END as an approach to ecosystem management and biodiversity conservation has gained some ascendancy in scientific forestry and has even been written into Canadian forestry policy (Boyd, 2003), it is important to know whether or not there are grounds for consensus on the meaning of the END. To find out, I decided to interview forestry scientists from across Canada.  The article is organized as follows: in the next section, I introduce the concept of “mental models” and the textual network analysis method used in this research. In the second section, I describe study participants and interview methods employed; and in the third section, I explain how I analyzed the data. In the fourth section, I report the results and 22  the final section I discuss these results and their implications for the use of the END in sustainable forest ecosystem management.  2.2 Mental Models and Network Textual Analysis  The basic idea underlying the concept of ‘mental model’ is that human beings understand the world by constructing working models of it in their minds (Johnson-Laird and Nicholas, 1983). Mental models have been used in ecology and resource management to improve decision making in sport fisheries (Radomski and Goeman, 1996), to define management objectives in aquatic ecosystem (Hobbs et al., 2002; Ozesmi and Ozesmi, 2003), to predict plant habitat suitability in a forest (Skov and Svenning, 2003), to increase stakeholder participation in forest management (Hjortso, 2004), and to examine a multicriteria approach to sustainable forest management (Mendoza and Prabhu, 2003).  To generate mental models, researchers rely on texts obtained by documents or interviews (Armstrong, 2005). The use of interview transcripts is based on the assumption that an interview captures part of the author's mental model at the time the interview was conducted (Carley, 1993; Carley, 1997; Carley and Palmquist, 1992). By systematically extracting and analyzing the links between words (concepts) in a text, the researcher generates the author’s “mental map” as a network of links between concepts (Carley, 1997; Carley and Palmquist, 1992). In mental models, a concept is a single word or a phrase; a single idea represented by one or multiple words. A pair of concepts form a statement if they are part of a semantic unit such as “forests are dynamic”, “fire is a disturbance”, “organic matter accumulates”. A statement is two concepts related by a link and a map is a network of statements (Carley, 1997).  To conduct analysis there are two common approaches: (1) analyze the content of maps (i.e. the meaning of concepts and their linkages), (2) analyze the structure of maps ( i.e. use a number of quantitative measures) (Carley and Palmquist, 1992). For content analyses, network textual analysis subsumes traditional content analysis because the elaboration of 23  mental models requires the analysis of the presence, frequencies, and covariance of concepts and themes. For structural analyses, researchers have developed a number of different measures: chief among them are centrality, complexity and density. Centrality indicates how important a particular concept is within the map (Armstrong, 2005: 39). The measure of centrality is the number of links directed toward and going out from a particular concept. For example, if a particular concept has a large number of links to other concepts, i.e. greater centrality, it will have a greater importance within the mental model, than a concept poorly linked. Complexity, on the other hand, is a “structural” measure that focuses on the entire mental model (Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2005). Complexity is measured in terms of comprehensiveness and density. The assumption is that the greater the comprehensiveness of the mental model, i.e. the larger the total number of concepts in a map, the more complex is cognition about the domain of knowledge in question (Carley and Palmquist, 1992). Likewise, the density of a mental model reflects the integration of knowledge. A greater measure of density reflects a more thorough integration of the concepts included in a domain of knowledge than a lesser measure of density (Scott, 1991).  Apart from structural analyses of individual maps, comparative techniques have been developed to analyze multiple maps; in effect comparative technique allow researchers to compare mental models across individuals (Carley, 1997).  Researchers have developed the  Hamming metric to determine the extent of similarity between mental models (Carley, 1997; Palmquist et al., 1997). For readers unfamiliar with this measure, in information theory, the Hamming distance between two ordered sequences of symbols of equal length is the number of positions for which the corresponding symbols are different. Comparative analyses can also be used to produce shared mental models; that is, mental models created by combining (union, intersection, lossy intersection) several mental models. Shared mental models assist the researcher in revealing the extent of overlap among individuals’ mental models, which is thought to reflect the extent to which individuals share a similar understanding of a particular domain of knowledge (Mohammed and Dumville, 2001; Mohammed et al., 2000). A shared mental model can be elaborated by creating a number of different maps (Table 2.1).  24  Network analysis is one among many quantitative analyses that can be used to measure meaning structures (Mohr 1998); other approaches include but are not restricted to multidimensional scaling (Krushkal and Wish 1978) and correspondence analysis (Weller and Romney 1990). The analyses I conducted are essentially univariate, i.e. they serve to illustrate the understanding scientists have of the END in the form of mental models without offering explanations for these mental models. Had the purpose of the study been explanatory or predictive, i.e. explore the relationship between the characteristics of the scientists that were sampled and their mental models, search for subgroups of scientists with associated mental models, and so on, the use of bivariate or multivariate techniques such as those mentioned above might have been more appropriate.  2.3 Research Methods  This paper reports on the answer to one open ended question posed during interviews of forestry scientists across Canada: “How would you define the emulation of natural disturbance? ” This question was meant to elicit and probe the participants’ understanding of the END in their own words (Laukkanen, 1998). Each participant was interviewed in their workplace and the interviews lasted from forty minutes to two hours. The interview was conducted in English or in French and French interview transcripts were translated by the corresponding author. The interviews were audio taped with participant permission.  I used a random sampling scheme to examine how the END was defined by a cross section of university forestry scientists in Canada. I used a random sampling scheme because I assumed that at least a minimal level of expertise was uniformly distributed among academic forestry scientists from diverse disciplines (Armstrong, 2005). I base this assumption on the belief that most academic forestry scientists will have some conception of the END from their training, from discussions with colleagues, and from keeping abreast of current forest management approaches debated in professional and academic literature, conferences, and lectures. I also chose to interview university scientists because they are the people who educate foresters and it was assumed that their understanding of the END is 25  likely to shape the conceptualization and understanding of the END in the current and future generations of practicing forestry professionals.  I contacted 209 academic forestry scientists from the official websites of all the accredited forestry schools (Canadian Forestry Accreditation Board) and from forest and natural resources science and management faculty schools by electronic mail (email) twice in a two week interval. A total of 86 forestry scientists were interviewed in the winter of 2004; 17 females and 69 males. The age range was from 30 years to 79 years old with an average age of 50 years old. Most of these forestry scientists worked in the natural sciences including, but not strictly within, soil science, forest nutrition, hydrology, wildlife biology, genetics, ecology, forest management, silviculture, forest operations, forest management, pathology, conservation biology, and entomology, but some also worked in the social sciences including political science, economics, sociology, and ethics. The contact letter spelled out the intent of the interview and research project and was meant to elicit participants that felt knowledgeable about the END forest management approach. The greater number of natural scientists that participated in this study does not reflect a bias against social scientists, but represents a sample of researchers who may be more familiar or interested in discussing the meaning and applications of the END forest management approach.  2.4 Data Analysis  Textual map analyses were conducted using these transcripts with AutoMap 2.5 (Diesner and Carley, 2005). As an output, AutoMap produced mental maps, and the statistical and network measures of the maps’ content and structure. The complete treatment of transcripts for textual analysis of mental models consisted of two steps: pre-processing and concept generation (Carley, 1993). Preprocessing was meant to standardize texts so as to reduce the redundancy of meaning generated by using different words (natural language) with the same or a similar meaning (Laukkanen, 1998). The first step was to delete frequently used words such as “it”, “the”, “a”, “to”, etc. The second step was to replace 26  content bearing words by appropriate concepts, by applying a pre-prepared thesaurus. This step was meant to replace synonymous or closely related concepts with a “canopy concept” such as replacing cut, harvesting, tree removal with the “canopy concept” cut. The resulting list of concepts was “stemmed” so that words with the same root/base would be collapsed into one concept. For example, stemming transforms emulate, emulating, and emulation into “emul”—the root/base of the three previous words. All texts were subjected to the same procedure with the same delete lists and thesaurus lists to assure the standardization of the texts.  Each participant’s answer was analyzed separately with AutoMap 2.5 to generate mental models and network analytic measures of the END. I used UCINET and NETDRAW (Borgatti et al. 2002) to create the graphical representations of the mental models. I used a random layout specification to create the graphs in Netdraw. Only a subset of interview transcripts (53 out of 86 responses) was included in the present analysis. This number of responses was more than sufficient to conduct a mental models analysis given that repeated studies found that 15-20 interviews were sufficient to identify generally held beliefs (Morgan et al. 2002; Palmgren et al. 2004). These 53 interview transcripts were chosen on the basis of the clarity of the answers. Transcripts were omitted from the network textual analysis if the participants did not answer the questions directly (n=18), or declined answering the question for a number of reasons including not feeling familiar enough with the END to give a definition (n=10), or refused to be audiotaped (n=5). The quantitative network textual analyses, however, were supplemented with qualitative analyses of all of the interview transcripts.  Each mental model of the END was compared to all others using the analytical measures of centrality, complexity, and density (see above for explanations). I compared participants’ mental models to a theoretical standard to create a dialogue between forestry scientists’ perspectives and the theoretical literature. After reviewing the literature, I found that Kimmins’ (2004) characterization of the END is more comprehensive and theoretically informed than alternatives (Bergeron and Harvey 1997; Landres et al. 1999). Kimmins’ characterization of the END was written for the purpose of an up-to-date review of the 27  concepts and applications of the END published in the edited volume Emulating Natural Forest Landscape Disturbances (Perera et al. 2004). Hence Kimmin’s characterization of the END represents the most current, informed and thoughtful delineation of its meaning.  Individual mental models were compared to Kimmins’ and from this comparison the most similar and the most different maps from Kimmins’ model (using the Hamming distance) were obtained. Additionally, a union map was generated by combining each individual mental model into a single mental model (see Table 2.1 for explanations on the different types of shared mental models). An intersection map of the union map with Kimmins’ mental model was also created.  2.5 Results  Participants varied widely in the total number of concepts (comprehensiveness), statements, and densities (complexity) of their mental maps of the END (Figure 2.1). Most participants used from 20-29 concepts and used fewer rather than more concepts to define the END (Figure 2.1a). Similarly, the majority of participants had fewer rather than more statements within their mental models of the END with most participants having between 5099 statements (Figure 2.1b). Most participants’ mental models, however, had larger density measures with the most between 5-5.49 (Figure 2.1c). In the 53 mental models, a total of 537 concepts were used by participants in defining the END, with few concepts shared by most participants (Table 2.2). Moreover, the mental models with the greatest and the least density measure (Figure 2.2 and 2.3) indicated a large difference in the extent to which participants integrated the concepts (see above for the definition of density) they used to define the END.  Figure 2.4 represents the intersection of the consolidated mental model (the union of all the individual mental maps) with Kimmins’ (Figure 2.5) mental model and thus represents a shared mental model of the END generated from a cross section of Canadian forestry scientists’ and Kimmins’ mental models. 28  Of the 18 concepts occurring in the shared mental model, few concepts were shared by a large percentage of participants (Figure 2.6). As Figure 2.6 shows, most concepts (12 out of 18) occurred in less than 20 percent of individual mental models and only two concepts occurred in over 60% of individual mental models. Moreover, concepts differed in terms of their centrality (i.e. salience) between the shared mental model and Kimmins’ mental model (Figure 2.7.) As Figure 2.7 shows, although the concepts scale, spatial, ecosystem, and emul are similarly quite central in the shared mental model and Kimmins’ mental model, other concepts such as history is much more central in Kimmins’ mental model in contrast to the shared mental model.  2.6 Discussion  When all individual mental models were consolidated (union map) and then compared to Kimmins’ characterization, a minimally shared theoretical and empirical mental model of the END was generated. Although Figure 2.4 does not originate from a single text, but from the intersection of a union map of 53 texts with Kimmins’ mental model, I can attempt to reconstruct a ‘characterization’ from the concepts appearing in the figure: The END is an attempt to emulate and maintain the frequency and severity of ecosystem disturbance and the function of ecosystems by managing according to socially and historically acceptable spatial and temporal scales.  To compare this shared mental model with Kimmins’ mental model, I used the centrality of concepts (Figure 2.7). This analysis reveals that the most central concepts in the shared mental model (scale, spatial, ecosystem, and emulation), are relatively similarly central in Kimmins’ mental model. Although the greater centrality of the concepts emulation and ecosystem is not surprising because they are basic concepts used in talking about the END, the concepts of spatial and scale offer a precision about what is involved in the END. These two concepts suggest that the END may draw from the “shift” in ecology (Pickett and Ostfeld, 1995) which has given prominence to the idea of spatial scale as a crucial factor in ecological theory (Wu, 1995). 29  Some of the concepts Kimmins uses, however, are more central in his mental model than in the shared mental model (Figure 2.7). For instance, while we can see in Figure 2.5 that the concept of history is contained within Kimmin’s single integrated network, in the shared mental model (Figure 2.4), the concept of history is isolated from the larger network. This result indicates a potential divergence between Kimmins’ theoretical characterization of the END paradigm and the shared mental model. Given the prominence of this concept in the literature (see, for instance, Ecological Applications volume 9, 1999), I might have expected the concept of history to be a central concept of the shared mental model of the END. What this result indicates is that the interest in history attributed to forest ecologists may not be as prevalent as previously supposed (Christensen, 1989).  The question remains, however, whether the shared mental model indicates grounds for consensus about the conceptual meaning of the END. When we look at how many concepts occur in the large majority of mental models, we can see that only 2 concepts (emulation and disturbance) out of the 537 total concepts occur in over 50 % of the individual mental models (Figure 2.6). This result is not surprising because these concepts are used to name the END, hence they are likely to be used by most participants in defining it. Moreover, only 4 out of the 18 concepts (ecosystem, emulation, disturbance, and management) figuring in the shared mental model occur in over 40 % of the individual mental models. In other words, not only did the arrangements of concepts within statements largely differ, but also the concepts used. These results may be an artifact of interview format, but while the interviews generated widely different mental maps, the preprocessing of the transcripts served to standardize texts without changing their meaning (Laukkanen, 1998). To have used more structured interviews may have completely standardized participants’ answers, but I would have lost the richness and detail of individual conceptions of the END.  Nevertheless, my findings may be interpreted as indicating that either the forestry scientists interviewed in this study are not familiar enough with the END to be able to describe it using a minimally shared concepts or that the END cannot be described with a 30  minimally shared standard characterization. The latter interpretation will be discussed further in the implication of this study for the use of the END in forest management.  The shared mental model does not necessarily indicate that there is consensus as to the conceptualization of the END. Indeed, the shared mental model represents the consistency of the mental models between respondents and Kimmins’ mental model of the END, but it begs the question: are there contrasting or contradictory conceptions of the END? To answer this question I must turn to the qualitative analyses of the transcripts.  In keeping with the literature, many forestry scientists defined the END with reference to the conservation of biological diversity (Table 2.2). Forest ecosystems, however, are sometimes thought to be much too complex to be emulated. For some of the participants of this study, this perspective implies that the END means letting nature take its course. According to at least one participant: Science is best used in intensive forest management because we have imperfect knowledge of natural ecosystems and so we either let nature take its course or manage it intensively.  Although many of the participants qualified the practical applicability of the END, other forestry scientists question the basic notion that we can understand forests in such a way as to be able to emulate it. According to the one other interviewee: We are deluding ourselves, we don’t know what nature intended. But certainly as soon as we start managing, that means we are going to have some impact on it. We should ask what is the outcome? I am not sure we are thinking straight when we say we are going to manage this to emulate nature.  From a social and moral perspective, some forestry scientists qualify their enthusiasm for the END. For instance, one participant said: “while the END may be a way to protect biodiversity, biodiversity is but one societal value among others, and it may not be a priority.” Moreover, for some participants the END is an ethical approach to forest management wherein we try to fit within nature. To fit within nature appears to be problematic, however, because anthropogenic disturbances are often perceived as unnatural. One participant interpreted the END as an extension of wilderness ethics where humans are 31  simply not part of nature: “what we want is the American idea of wilderness, nature without humans”. But while some forestry scientists propose a misanthropic interpretation of the END, some deplore the inevitability that human action will change nature and as such, according to one participant, cannot emulate nature: “as soon as we cut trees, we necessarily change forests, we can reduce our impact but we cannot mimic nature.”  In addition to the different scientific, social and moral interpretations of the END, some participants questioned it philosophically. No forestry scientist actually used the terms “naturalistic fallacy” or the “fact/value dichotomy”, referring to “Hume’s Law” that one cannot infer an ought from an is, but implied that it would not be philosophically correct to think that because something exists it ought to exist or that is it valuable (good). For instance, one forestry scientist argued that it is not because nature “does” something (i.e. disturbances shape the structure and function of forests) that we should do the same. According to this individual: “the decision to manage forest in a certain way is based upon human objectives, which may legitimately differ from what nature “does”.  2.7 Conclusion  The wide range of variability between mental models of the END and the lack of overlap between individual maps may be interpreted as an artifact of the interview method and a methodological limitation in this study. In some contexts, standardization of interview questions and answers is more appropriate, but my open-ended question made sense because we wanted to examine how forestry scientists conceptualize the END in their own words. We chose to ask participants an open-ended question which revealed, not the extent to which they agree with a preconception of the END, but the concepts they would use to define the END, i.e. the meaning of the END for participants. The usefulness of network textual analysis is precisely its applicability in analyses of open-ended questions. It allows the researcher to standardize texts without losing all of the qualitative differences of individual conceptualizations.  32  As the qualitative analysis reveals, however, there are contrasting or contradictory interpretations of the scientific, social, moral, philosophical conceptualizations of the END. But while the shared mental model of the END does not necessarily indicate “grounds for consensus”, it does offer at least a minimally shared conceptualization of the END.  Nevertheless, the contrasting and contradictory conceptualizations proposed by the forestry scientists interviewed in this study suggests that we should consider the possibility that the END cannot be conceptualized consistently, and thus may be an ineffective forest management tool without further clarification. Or perhaps some concepts will never be defined consistently even within a particular scientific discipline. And the END might be one of these. Instead the END may have served the purpose of a ‘rallying cry’ for change in how we manage the forest landscape.  This interpretation has serious implications for the use of the END in policy making. Faced with contrasting and contradictory conceptualizations of the END by a cross section of forestry scientists in Canada, policy makers may decide to simply apply an “authoritative definition” of the END in policy making, but this implies covering up the actual state of disagreement over its conceptualization. Another option would be to attempt through dialogue and debate to reach a consensus about the conceptualization of the END. In terms of a democratic approach to policy making, the latter approach is necessarily more promising. If such would be the case, the shared mental model of the definition of the END could be used as a tool to facilitate dialogue.  33  Table 2.1. Types of shared mental maps. Description Types of Mental Maps A union map contains all compared mental maps—it can be interpreted as an all-inclusive  Union Map  mental model. An intersection map represents the minimal  Intersection Map  network of concepts shared by all compared maps. A lossy intersection map contains all those statements that are shared by at least “x” number of individual mental maps. It is the  Lossy Intersection Map  researcher who sets “x” as some cutoff value. The desired degree of overlap is reflected in how many individual maps a statement must occur in before it appears in the team mental model.  34  Table 2.2. Frequently used concepts in defining the END. Concept  Percentage of texts  Concept (Stemmed)  Percentage of texts  (Stemmed)  concept occurs in  concept occurs in  Biodivers  15  Harvest  23  forestri  15  Differ  25  understand  15  Fire  30  sylvicultur  15  Process  32  pattern  17  Not (negation)  34  Similar  19  Ecosystem  40  Human  19  Forest  43  Landscape  19  Manag  49  Maintain  21  Disturb  64  Scale  21  Emul  64  Approach  23  Natur  94  35  Figure 2.1. Number of concepts, number of statements and density of mental models of the conceptualization of the END per individual participant. a)  b)  c)  36  Figure 2.2. Least complex (density) mental model of the END conceptualization.  37  Figure 2.3. Most complex (density) mental model of the END conceptualization.  38  Figure 2.4. The intersection of the union of all the individual mental models of the END with Kimmins’ mental model of the theoretical conceptualization of the END.  Figure 2.5. Kimmins’ mental model of the theoretical conceptualization of the END.  39  Figure 2.6. The percentage of individual mental models the concepts of the shared mental model of the conceptualization of the END occur in.  40  Figure 2.7. Relative centrality of the concepts occurring in the shared mental model and Kimmins’ mental model of the conceptualization of the END.  41  Bibliography  Angelstam, P.K. 1998. Maintaining and restoring biodiversity in European boreal forests by developing natural disturbances regimes. Journal of Vegetation Science 9:593-602.  Armstrong, D.J. 2005. Causal mapping: a discussion and demonstration. In V. K. Narayanan and D. J. 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Moreover, my proposal is an attempt to put into practice what Hilary Putnam has termed the “theses” of American pragmatism (Putnam, 1994: 152): (1) antiskepticism (we must justify that which we doubt), (2) fallibilism (facts are not immune from criticism), (3) there is no fundamental dichotomy between facts and values, and (4) practice is primary.  What sparked this essay is that a number of ecologists have begun to acknowledge an interpretative sensibility in their research (Allen et al., 2001; Robertson and Hull, 2001). For instance, Allen et al. (2001: 475) argue: “science of intrinsic quality needs narratives with explicit values—not just facts—particularly as it faces multiple-level complexity in advising on environmental policy”. Although this is a welcomed shift in epistemological beliefs and norms, these ecologists do not explain the responsibilities that are arise with the acknowledgement that scientific narratives are value-laden. I argue that ecologists and by extension forestry scientists should take moral responsibility because their “ecological narratives” are inherently ethical.  1  A version of this chapter has been published. Klenk, N. (2008) Listening to the Birds: a Pragmatic Proposal  for Forestry. Environmental Values 17: 331-351.  47  3.1.2 Listening, Dialogue and Moral Responsibility  While forestry scientists may deny that ethical judgments are intrinsically linked to their interpretations of nature, this does not absolve them of their moral responsibility towards the beings they interact with. Responsibility necessarily weighs heavily on the shoulders of scientists (Alpert, 1995). Not only do scientists interpret nature by using common rules of logic and other epistemic and aesthetic norms (i.e. what is warranted, what is reasonable, what is plausible, what is coherent, what is elegant and simple, etc.) scientists also judge who and what should be listened to in their interpretations of nature. In effect, the interpretation of nature takes shape by including, excluding, listening and silencing the voices that scientists enter into dialogue with (Haila and Dyke, 2006b). To listen or to silence any (human or non-human) being is to have some control over its flourishing—a power which comes with “strings attached”. In other words, not only do epistemic norms guide scientific interpretations of nature, but also ethical values and responsibilities guide scientific interpretations of nature.  Steven Vogel in his “The Silence of Nature” (2006) argues against the position that humans have an ethical responsibility to listen to nature, that it speaks to us and that by implication when we silence it, we may deny it the respect and consideration it deserves. Vogel’s view is that language and dialogue necessarily involves subjects asserting and justifying claims about the world, yet nature never asserts or justifies anything that can be interpreted as a truth claim (2006: 159). In other words, nature, for Vogel, simply does not speak. Vogel frames his discussion of language and dialogue by using Habermasian discourse ethics which not only offers rules for engaging in dialogue and deliberation, but grounds ethics in the preconditions of the use of the spoken word itself. Discourse ethics, however, draws upon a very narrow interpretation of language and dialogue as a means of adjudicating between competing (truth, value) claims made by rational, human beings. Discourse ethics, therefore, is not an appropriate lens through which to frame the interpretation of meaning generated from the interaction of, and dialogue between humans and non-humans. 48  Dialogue between humans and non-humans involves speech acts in which meaning is reproduced, created, and negotiated by means of utterances, gestures, speech genres, speech prosthesis (Latour, 2004: 67-69) and (perhaps oddly) silences. Sometimes “getting to the truth of the matter” is not only impossible, but irrelevant to those engaged in a dialogue. Instead, we try to understand what someone or something is “saying” to us, the meaning of his/her/its story, plea, witness, confession, commentary, lesson, formal logical syllogism, or presence, etc. Likewise, “getting the story right” is more a question of which interpretation will be most convincing and compelling to a particular interpretive community given its goals, methods, and theoretical presuppositions. That humans are not privy to nature’s own interpretation of our speech acts does not mean that non-humans do not interpret our speech acts and respond to us in meaningful ways. Nor are humans who “translate” nature’s speech acts ventriloquists (Vogel, 2006: 164), they are interpreters of nature whose interpretations are fallible and (should be) open to revision as a result of contestation, negotiation, interaction, and further dialogue with humans and non-humans. If this were not the case, scientific interpretations of nature would be mere fictions created through dialogue among humans, not the result of careful observation, interaction, and dialogue with nature. Given that Vogel presupposes a very narrow view of language as restricted to argumentative conversations between two or more rational humans (2006: 148), he must deny the intelligibility of, and the ethical responsibility arising from listening, speaking and engaging in dialogue with non-humans.  Indeed, moral responsibility begins by listening to the voice of any being we encounter. To silence the voice of another can effectively deaden their presence (Haila and Dyke, 2006a); it can be an act of (intentional or unintentional) negligence—what Michele Moody-Adams terms “affected ignorance” (1997); or it can literally be an act of murder (Levinas, 1998). In the context of ecology, research is another word for encounter. That is to say that scientific interpretations of nature arise from interactions with others (researchers and non-researchers including humans and non-humans). Natural scientists’ first responsibility therefore is to listen to the voice of those beings they interact with.  49  From an “Actor-Network-Theory” perspective (Latour, 2005), moral responsibility is enacted relationally through particular networks of interactions. In his Politics of Nature (2004: 81), Bruno Latour points out the recalcitrance of human and non-human actors in being enlisted into a unified common world. As Latour notes, it is often the case that scientific interpretations of nature are uncertain and disputable because (human and nonhuman) actors interrupt the closure and the composition of our common world—some actors just do not “interact” well or refuse to be “related” to others in particular networks of relationships. Witness the resistance of “weeds” to Round-Up in the human-chemicalindustry attempt to annihilate them and the stark defeat of “roadkill” resulting from too close an encounter with human-car-roadways. Hence some actors are unwelcome but persistently present (“weeds”) while others are definitely excluded (“roadkill”) from our common world.  According to Latour (2004), some scientific interpretations of nature are better understood as “matters of concern” rather than “matter of facts”. A “matter of concern” “agitates, troubles, complicates, and it provokes speech, it may arouse a lively controversy” (2004: 103). Forestry related examples of scientific controversies, i.e. “matters of concern”, abound. Notice, for instance, the interpretation of organic matter as either “friend or foe” (Prescott et al., 2000) in the question over the implications of (the presumed) paludification and forest productivity decline resulting from the interaction of mosses-nutrients-fires in boreal forests (Klenk et al., 2004). Another example is the interpretation of standing dead trees as the “victims”, “spoils”, or “blights” of the climate-mountain-pine-beetle-industrial forestry network of relationships in lodgepole pine forests of British Columbia. To be settled, unified and provisionally accepted as “matters of fact” scientific controversies over the “right” interpretation of nature such as the ones noted above, which are commonplace in environmental policy, require more than the application of scientific epistemological and methodological norms. They require democracy!  50  3.1.3 Listening to Nature, Dialogue and Democratic Process  A democratic approach to interpreting nature or settling “matters of concern” (i.e. environmental policy making) would take shape through a political and dialogic process of deliberation about who and what to include or exclude to settle the matter in dispute—which in effect decides the kind of world we desire to live in. A democratic process does not guaranty that a chosen scientific interpretation of nature will be morally acceptable to all of those affected by it, but then no method of decision-making can offer such guaranty. Yet Latour is right to object to having Science and Epistemology dictate who and what our common world should include or exclude. Scientific interpretations of nature are openended: “matters of fact” may be settled for a long time, until some new network of actors speak, demanding to be taken into consideration in the “re-assembling” of our common world.  Given the iterative and interpretive process of “re-assembling” our common world what is needed is a democratic approach to environmental policy-making that fosters an open-ended method of inquiry and social learning. Dewey’s pragmatic approach to democracy seems germane to the task. Indeed, from a Deweyan perspective, interpretations of our common world such as those encapsulated in environmental policies are better construed as “ends-in-views” or plans. These plans, when acted upon “structure” the assembling and evaluation of our common world. That is, “end-in-views” may be experientially evaluated as “if-then” proposals: “if we do such and such actions applying policy X, we believe such and such results will occur” (Dewey, 1939). The value or merit of using different interpretations of nature (i.e. environmental policies) must be evaluated so that we can learn from our experiences and adapt to the changing world: If ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems are instrumental to an active reorganization of the given environment, to a removal of some trouble and perplexity, then the test of their validity and value lies in accomplishing this work. If they succeed in their office, they are reliable, sound, valid, good, true. If they fail to clear up uncertainty and evil when they are acted upon then they are false. (Dewey, 1920: 90)  51  This open-ended process of re-interpretation and deliberation necessarily involves finding out what environmental policies work and which do not, but despite Dewey’s advocacy for the “scientific method” or what he called the “method of intelligence”, his approach does not imply the use of any particular privileged epistemological and methodological norms. Rather, Dewey held that scientific methods simply exhibit free intelligence operating in the best manner available at a given time (Dewey, 1938: 535). Moreover, as Hilary and Ruth Anna Putnam have pointed out, what Dewey was concerned to argue, early and late, is that democracy is the precondition for the application of intelligence to the solution of social problems (Putnam and Putnam, 1994: 216).  In the following essay I focus specifically with the role of forestry sciences on “assembling the social”—the enlisting of human and non-human actors into a common collective (Latour, 2005). My argument is aimed at the particular “interpretive community” (Fish, 1980) of scientific forestry. With this audience in mind, I use three different interpretations of nature to make three distinct but related points relevant to interpretive forestry. I use an interview I conducted with a forestry scientist to illustrate how ethical norms shape the scientific interpretation of the lifespan of populations of specific trees and its implications for forest management practices. Second I discuss the “emulation of natural disturbance” (END) forest management approach to biodiversity conservation. Unlike the “fine-filter” approach of saving individual (populations of) species, the END is a “coarsefilter” approach to the conservation of biological diversity in forestry—its mandate is to maintain biodiversity by using silvicultural treatments that emulate the size-frequency distribution of natural disturbances. I argue that because ethical norms guide the conception of “natural” and “disturbance”, the decision to use the END in forestry policy cannot be justified solely on the basis of science, despite its broad-cast approach to the protection of biodiversity. Third, I discuss the privileged status of scientific interpretations of nature by using augury as an alternative interpretation of the role of forest birds in natural resource management. I argue that once we recognize that ethics is part of how scientific interpretations of nature are justified, we can no longer choose among conflicting interpretations of nature for environmental policy purposes by brandishing scientific norms. Rather, in the last section, I argue that we should determine which interpretation of nature is 52  best suited for particular forest management situations by following a democratic approach to public deliberation and environmental policy making.  3.2 The Silver-Leaf Story  Ed Setliff is a retired forest pathologist from Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, Canada, who continues to publish by funding his own research and doing most of his writing at home. During his long career, it became increasing apparent to Ed that funding allocation for basic research in forest pathology followed demands set by economic uses of forests as well as the “hot topics” that periodically sweep the field. Neither of which, to Ed’s frustration, appear to give northern hardwoods such as birch their “appropriate due.”  While walking on campus one day, Ed observed diseased leaves on a clump of birch trees. He identified the disease as silver-leaf, a common fruit tree disease. This observation was the seed to a question that took Ed ten years of careful research to answer, at least partially: Is silver-leaf causing the birch die-back in North American forests? When I asked Ed if the birch die-back may have been due to the trees having attained the end of their normal lifespan, Ed not only scoffed at the question, but also at the common belief that the lifespan of birch trees is about 80 years. He is convinced the lifespan of birch could be at least twice that number of years.  Ed’s research suggests that what regulates the lifespan of a plant is not merely genetic determinism, but the result of plant interaction with microorganisms such as disease agents. Ed has investigated the pathological role and incidence of the wound pathogen Chondrostereum purpureum (Pers.:Fr.) Pouz. on trees in damaged forests. In one of his articles, Ed provides a historical report on past research conducted on this pathogen whose incidence was mostly observed in fruit trees of the Rosaceae (Setliff, 2002). Surveys he and others conducted in herbaria in Canada, the United States, and Norway suggests, however, that C. purpureum is more frequently found on Betulaceae and Salicaceae, the birch and willow families respectively. Moreover, mycoherbicide experiments support these claims. 53  Although the silvering symptom is inconspicuous on birch and other non-rosaceous trees, under certain conditions, including stem injuries, environmental conditions conducive for infection, and high levels of basidiospores (inoculum), C. purpureum is an important pathogen with epidemic potential for forest trees, especially species in the birch and willow families. Furthermore, where forest management practices leave large piles of hardwood slash, there is an elevated level of inoculum. In Canada, Ed remarks, “large-scale cutting and logging provide massive amounts of slash ideal for C. purpureum.”  Underlying Ed’s silver leaf research are at least two major normative concerns. The first is political and is implied by his focus on forest pathology. Ed’s research suggests: “the notion that trees in the Betulaceae and Salicaceae are short-lived may be a consequence of their disease susceptibility more so than a genetically determined lifespan” (2002: 648). Ed’s statement is more than a scientific appraisal of the role of disease agents in affecting the lifespan of two particular families of trees, rather his statement reflects his judgment that it is wrong to eclipse research findings from forest pathology with theories of molecular genetics and that forest pathology can and should inform our understanding of ecological and biological processes. From a political standpoint, Ed is contesting the “governance of science” (Fuller, 2000).  In his defense of forest pathology, Ed implicitly appeals to norms of democratic scientific practice. The democratization of inquiry, however, is not realized by applying common epistemic norms. From a pragmatic perspective, the democratization of science requires researchers to produce and test new ideas in cooperation and dialogue with their colleagues (Putnam, 1994: 173). As Steve Fuller remarked, within the republican approach to democracy “people need to act in an environment where there is a good chance that what they say and do will be taken seriously by others, and not simply ignored or become the grounds for the curtailment of their speech and action in the future.” (2000: 19) The implication for Ed is that while molecular genetics has gained ascendancy in the forestry sciences, this is no reason to silence forest pathology by neglecting legitimate scientific interpretations of the lifespan of trees.  54  The second of Ed’s normative concerns is ethical rather than political and it is related to the state of forest management in Canada. Although Ed is careful not to critique Canadian forest logging practices directly in his article, nevertheless his concerns for the disregard of “low-value” hardwoods and the waste incurred by leaving large amounts of residual slash after logging are implicit in his article (2002: 649): In Canada, extensive logging operations continue to be the mainstay of the economy and so there are enormous amounts of woody material for C. purpureum to colonize and use to produce abnormally high numbers of basiodiospores that sweep over the forest. How to address the complex biological and forestry issues this problem brings to bare will require considerable thought and understanding. Better utilization of low-value hardwoods, sanitation practices and stronger forest-protection research programs are recommended.  This passage encapsulates an emphatic plea to acknowledge the plight of “low-value” hardwoods. In our interview, Ed remarked that his ethical duties are to “man and nature” and that these duties are inextricably linked. Hence, the choice of the voices Ed included in his interpretations reflects his ethical point of view. Ed deliberately set out to give a voice to C. purpureum and “low-value” hardwood trees to make an ethical stand against current forestry practices.  Ed’s research is an excellent illustration of how ethical norms shape the content of scientific narratives. By choosing a path of inquiry that has been marginalized and partially silenced by molecular genetics, Ed interpreted the lifespan of trees as the result of treepathogen interaction instead of genetic determinism. Although Ed does not deny that genetics are important to the lifespan of trees, he sees a purely genetic interpretation of lifespan as supporting an ethical point of view which impedes the flourishing of particular populations of hardwoods and denies them a voice in forest management. That particular hardwoods are deemed “low value” may be due to more than forestry economics, it may be due to a bad interpretation of what determines the lifespan of trees. Indeed, what Ed’s silver leaf story reveals is that there are more or less good or bad interpretations of tree lifespan, not only because these interpretations fail to seek guidance from appropriate epistemic norms, but because they lead to morally condemnable behavior or outcomes.  55  Ed’s focus on the birch die-back phenomenon can be understood within the broader issues of forest biodiversity conservation as a “fine-filter” approach to saving individual populations of species. Although Ed does not propose a forest management approach to solve the problem of including the flourishing of birches within forestry practices, he does give a voice to birch in the hope that its fate will not be arbitrarily settled. In the following section I discuss a “coarse-filter” approach to the conservation of forest biodiversity, which contrasts with the “fine filter” approach. The “coarse filter” approach attempts to save most species by giving voice to as many beings as is possible given the enormity and complexity of the task. In other words, the “coarse filter” approach attempts to provide the circumstances for a suite of species to flourish. I argue, however, that because ethical norms shape scientific interpretations of forests, even the choice of using a “coarse filter” approach to biodiversity conservation in forest management cannot be justified by science alone.  3.3 The “END” of Scientific Forestry?  Forest management in much of Canada is moving towards the idea of “ecosystem management”. The stated goal of this type of management is to maintain the ecological integrity and health of the forest (CFS, 1998); however, it is difficult to define ecosystem integrity and health (Simberloff, 1998) and we have a limited understanding of ecosystems (Johnson et al., 2003). Despite these difficulties, the “Emulation of Natural Disturbance” (END) was developed as a “coarse filter” approach to biodiversity conservation and forest management (Hunter, 1993). The “coarse filter” approach links the maintenance of biodiversity to silvicultural practices that emulate the size-frequency distribution of natural disturbances. According to Hunter (1993: 115), the idea at the core of the “coarse filter” approach is: That for any given type of disturbance, small-scale disturbance events usually outnumbered larger events, and that imitating this pattern would maintain spatially diverse forest landscapes that would provide suitable habitat for a wide range of organisms with varying spatial requirements.  56  The END is commonly justified by reference to evolutionary reasoning. The ecological premises of the END are (1) that periodic disturbances are inherent to dynamic forest ecosystems (Pickett and White, 1985); (2) that natural disturbances are strong determinants of species composition as well as ecosystems structure and function (White and Walker, 1997), and (3) that forest ecosystems and their species composition have adapted to the disturbances (Bunnell, 1995). The train of argument is that by maintaining stand and landscape compositions and structures similar to those resulting from natural disturbances, we can reduce the negative impacts of timber harvest on biodiversity and maintain essential ecological functions (Bergeron and Harvey, 1997).  Scientists have suggested that in practice the objective of the END is to fit within a historical range of natural variability (Landres et al., 1999; Morgan et al., 1994; Parsons et al., 1999). The historical range of natural variability is a form of benchmark or reference conditions. Not only does it provide limits to the range of disturbances that could be emulated, but such benchmarks allow researchers to see if the changes occurring in current ecosystem structure and function are due to natural variation or due to management actions (Adamowicz and Burton, 2003). But not all past natural disturbances have been benign from social perspectives (i.e. hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, meteorites); hence it follows that not all past natural disturbances should be emulated.  Since not all natural disturbances are socially benign, the choice of which ones we should emulate has to be justified. Some authors suggest that the historical range of natural variability—which lies somewhere between the heterogeneity generated by nonanthropogenic disturbances and the homogeneity generated by intensive plantation management—should be determined by criteria of social acceptability (Kimmins, 2004; Perera and Buse, 2004). Although many authors acknowledge that the choice of a historical period from which to emulate disturbances is related to what society values, they generally do not acknowledge that the concepts of “natural” and “disturbance” are contested in part because they are shaped by ethical norms that are problematic to at least some members of society.  57  The very concept of “natural” pits humans against non-humans, as if there are clear normative boundaries between humans and non-humans as to what they are and what they can or should be. Clearly this is not an ethically neutral interpretation of “natural”. There is a plethora of examples of entities that transgress the nature/culture dichotomy in their physical bodies (as networks of interacting actors) or in their use of their environment. For instance, medical procedures use animals organs and technology to replace organs in humans; genetic engineers transfer animal genes into plants; the “five kingdoms” of living organisms have always adapted to humanized “non-natural” landscapes, in some cases simply by surviving but in other cases by thriving in new “eco-humanized” niches—witness the squirrel who tore through my screened window to snack on the nuts I had left out on the kitchen table. I do not mean to suggest that there is no valuable distinction between humans and non-humans. Nor am I denying that nature has some autonomy 2 and thus should not be dominated (Katz, 2002), and I am certainly not denying that the actions of humans have caused the extinction of countless non-human species due in part to the elimination of their historical niches. But I resist the temptation to interpret Humanity and Nature as strictly independent naturalized categories—like two self-contained, independent and isolated individuals. Rather, humans and non-humans are what they are through historically situated and embodied relationships—a perspective that Patrick Curry calls “relational pluralism” (Curry, 2003). I have strong objections to using the nature/culture dichotomy to solve problems of biodiversity conservation as it neglects the reciprocal interdependence between humans and non-humans and the cultural, ethical, and political process of (1) defining what it  2  Unlike Katz (2002), I do not believe nature’s autonomy implies its total isolation and independence from  humans: leaving nature alone. When a being or a landscape has been dominated for a long time, its capacity to flourish may not be restored by simply leaving it alone—in fact to do so may cut it off from the very thing it needs to flourish: responsible relationships. To engage in relationships necessarily changes the parties involved. To be closed to change is to protect ourselves and others from the risk of domination but it is also to deny ourselves and others the very real rewards of and opportunities for growth in responsible relationships.  58  means to be human and to be non-human, and (2) assembling humans and non-humans into a common world (Latour 2004).  An additional ethical dimension of the concept of “natural” is its implicit appeal to authority in at least two respects. The first is an appeal to Nature as an authority: which is to argue that the evolution of nature should give us the norms to guide our conduct in nature. The second is an appeal to Science as an authority: which is to argue that only scientists can understand the “true” nature of nature and the “law” of evolution, thus they are the most appropriate individuals to make decisions as to who and what should be included in the concept of “natural”. It is not surprising that contemporary foresters try to evade controversy and moral deliberation by appealing to Nature for norms of action given that forestry has undergone a crisis of legitimacy in the 20th century (Behan, 1966; Luckert, 2006). As Dewey once remarked (2002: 296): “When mythology is dying in its open forms and when social life is so disturbed that custom and tradition fail to supply their wonted control, men resort to Nature as a norm.” Appeal to authority, however, is not a politically legitimate justification for belief (Pierce, 1998).  Neither is the concept of “disturbance” morally neutral as it is both descriptive and value-laden. Unless the concept of disturbance is employed quite loosely, we could not replace disturbance with the concept of change. The concept of disturbance (whether anthropogenic or not) evokes something that disrupts a harmony, stability, or equilibrium (Drury, 1998) irrespective of their “static” or “dynamic” characterization (Botkin, 1990). Ecological disturbance connotes a negative form of interruption of a historical pattern of events, i.e. disturbance stops something from happening that should happen from a historical or evolutionary point of view. One could legitimately ask why should the occurrence of events (or actions) in the landscape due to humans and other agents be deemed disturbances? Is this the only epistemologically correct interpretation of the action of these agents on the landscape or does it reflect a particular ethical point of view?  Indeed, it is not uncommon that those who believe in a (stable/harmonious/constant or multiscalar/hierarchical/dynamic) “order of nature” have derived ethical obligations to fit 59  within this “divine”, “cosmological” or “natural” order (Worster, 1994). Historically, the natural law tradition and the stoics have held such an ethical point of view (Glacken, 1967). These days, many sociobiologists take their cue from nature’s order, albeit from different standpoints. As Ruse and Wilson (1994) argue: “Ethical premises are the peculiar products of genetic history, and they can be understood solely as mechanisms that are adaptive for the species that possess them” (1994: 430). If ethics turns out to be an applied science as Ruse and Wilson would like it to be, then our decision-making would be vastly simplified: no use deliberating about whether particular “evolutionary” values are right or wrong, they are inescapable since we cannot think outside our genetic makeup, i.e. Nature dictates the DNA Text and we should listen to what the DNA Text says (rather than deliberate about our interpretation of it). Hence not to “follow Nature”, or not to listen to Evolution, is from this perspective an act of deviance and transgression with potentially severe political and ecological consequences—and for some it is simply morally wrong (Rolston III, 1988). From the perspective of the proponents of the END, “disturbance” implies deviation from accepted (but not necessarily acceptable) norms, which they have naturalized by an appeal to evolutionary theory.  If we acknowledge that both “natural” and “disturbance” are concepts that are shaped by particular ethical norms what does this mean in the END? Despite the fact that the END is conceived as a “coarse filter” approach to biodiversity conservation and sustainable forest management, as I have illustrated with the Silver-leaf Story, choosing who and what to include in scientific interpretations of forests is guided by ethical evaluative points of view. Unless we agree to have Science and Epistemology through the medium of Evolutionary Theories dictate what our common world should be, I suggest we make these kinds of decisions by public deliberation as to what and how ethical norms should be applied in particular forest management situations.  Yet in the context of public deliberation for policy making, one might question the privileged status of science given that ethical norms guide in part the scientific interpretation of nature. Why should scientific interpretations of nature hold sway, when non-scientific narratives may be just as acceptable ethically and effective pragmatically? In the following 60  section, I discuss the privileged status of science by using a non-scientific interpretation of the role of forest birds in natural resource management. I use the example of augury to argue that non-scientific interpretations of nature should at least be “heard” without scientific prejudice.  3.4 Listening to the Birds  What can and should we do when we are faced with imperfect knowledge, an environment that is indeterminate and when systematic natural resource management strategies have failed in the past? Michael R. Dove’s (1993) ethnological research on the agricultural augury (a ritual practice of divination) of the Kantu’ of West Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) not only provides an effective pedagogical example of a non-scientific interpretation of nature, but also illustrates how such an interpretation can work for a particular natural resource management situation. Although the Kantu’ belief system like the END appeals to natural phenomena to guide environmental action, in contrast to the END’s evolutionary justification, the Kantu’ have a spiritual justification for listening to nature. According to Dove (1993: 148): “Kantu’ divination is based on the premise that the major deities of the spirit world have foreknowledge of human events and that out of benevolence they endeavor to communicate this to the Kantu’ through the medium of natural phenomena.” The Kantu’ have traditionally used augury to select their yearly swidden sites 3. The success of their cultivation is highly variable due to the uncertain amount and timing of rainfall, the extent and timing of riverine flooding, and pest outbreaks. The Kantu’ cultivate their crops in three types of environments with differing associated degree of uncertainties: primary forest, swampland, and riverine floodplain. The augural system mainly randomizes site selection within the most uncertain sites (e.g. riverine floodplain due to the risks of 3  In “Uncertainty, Humility, and Adaptation in the Tropical Forest: The Agricultural Augury of the Kantu’”,  Ethnology,vol. 32, No. 2, 1993, pp. 145-167, Dove reports on the research he conducted among the Kantu’ from 1974-1976. The description of the Kantu’ augural system is drawn entirely from his work.  61  floods, primary forests due to the risk of drought). Each individual household will listen to the birds according to their own arbitrary interpretation and a large number and variety of additional rules and caveats. Dove shows that the practice of augury completely randomizes the Kantu’ swiddens by undermining any possibility of linking their empirical ecological knowledge and experience to the choice of cultivation sites. However, individual risk in the augural system is partially offset by a strong communal redistribution system: when individual household’s harvests fall short, the overall harvest of the households, which generally produces a surplus, is redistributed to provide for the households who did poorly.  The reason I chose the Kantu’s augural system in particular to exemplify a nonscientific interpretation of nature is that Dove makes an insightful critique of the perspective of “government official and development planners” in agroforestry in Borneo, which I believe can also be made of scientific forestry in general. The point is best introduced by quoting an extended passage (Dove 1993: 160): According to the augural system, systematic attempts to decipher and to master the environment can only worsen society’s ability to productively exploit it. According to the development paradigm, productive exploitation of the environment is only achievable through systematic efforts to comprehend and master it. In the augural system, failure may reflect an effort to take too much information into account (viz., through trying to discern and respond to purported environmental patterns). In contrast, failure in the development paradigm is interpreted by its proponents as evidence of insufficient information. Failure in the inderterministic system of augury prompts a call (through cultural rules promoting changes in behavior) for more indeterminism; failure in the deterministic system of development prompts calls for more determinism.  Since its inception in Germany and France modern forestry has relied heavily on science to manage forests. Science afforded a method by which forests could be classified, simplified, and rendered legible (Scott, 1998). Producing more and better science offered greater means of control over the productivity and harvest of trees. Scientific forestry has dominated forestry practices worldwide for several centuries, but growing concerns about the destruction of biological diversity, the depletion and decreased productivity of forests, and environmental justice issues pertaining to the access to and the distribution of forest resources have created more complex, global, policy issues in forestry. This is not to deny 62  that science has been an extremely useful tool for efficiently growing and harvesting trees, but applying more science is not likely (nor desirable) to solve the problem of managing forest ecosystems for competing ethical values.  Although certain ecologists maintain that science should be taken more seriously than other forms of knowledge (Allen et al., 2001: 484) or that its methodological “rigor” bestows it more legitimacy than other contextualized knowledge claims (Robertson and Hull, 2001), it is not necessarily the case that scientific interpretations of nature are the best epistemologically, ethically and practically for resolving all environmental issues. The upshot for an interpretive forestry is that non-scientific interpretations of nature such as the Kantu’ augural system cannot be dismissed a priori for policy purposes because of lack of scientific legitimacy. The use of the epistemic norms themselves do not hold sway unless we have understood and learned to identify with a particular scientific evaluative viewpoint (Putman, 2004, 69). To insist that the Kantu’ should use science to justify their interpretation of nature is to deny the actual randomness of their ritualistic practice. Though I have expressed (translated) its ritualism in terms familiar to ecologists (randomization, uncertainty, indeterminism, and complexity), augury remains entirely non-scientific because it essentially undermines the attempt to link empirical ecological knowledge and experience to the choice of cultivation sites.  Dove (1993) points out that the complete randomization of swidden site selection is an effective strategy for cultivation in the tropical forest because environmental conditions are complex, indeterminate, and uncertain. That is not to say that we could or should practice ritual forms of divination to manage natural resources even though such practices have been successful in other circumstances (Rappaport, 1968), but we can imaginatively adapt them to analogous natural resource management situations. It does not require too much of a stretch of our imagination to think that perhaps sustainable management of forests in other parts of the world may require more of an unintegrated planning process, striving not for an optimal solution but for pluralistic ones (Dove 1993, 162). Nothing but prejudice stops us from considering non-scientific interpretations of nature.  63  Indeed, both the END and Kantu’ augury are justified to a certain extent on the basis of the complexity of ecosystem dynamics and the uncertainty resulting from human practices on the landscape, and both depend on an interpretation of a normative order stemming from nature to guide our actions. But while END proponents “listen” to nature, they seek an integrated and optimal solution rather than a indeterministic approach to biodiversity conservation and sustainable forest management.  Yet, the uncertainties facing forests given  climate change in the near and distant future suggest that perhaps a process of randomizing management practices over the most “complex, indeterminate, and uncertain” parts of the forested landscape may be a sustainable practice and should be considered as a suitable option.  3.5 Listening and Dialogue  A skeptical forestry colleague could say: “it is absurd to think that we have to deliberate about each and every single entity that is going to be included or excluded in our interpretations of nature—the process would be endless and we could never get anywhere because the door would always be open to voices either demanding to be reconsidered or to voices newly discovered!” I would reply that dialogue as to whom and what to include within scientific interpretations of nature occurs all the time even if we do not and cannot pay attention to all possible voices all the time. Nor should we (even if we can imaginatively) doubt all interpretations—criticism and re-interpretations arise because of doubt, but doubt also needs justification (Putman, 1990: 119). Scientists may be busy at work in their lab and at their computers (in dialogue with non-human actors), but they constantly also engage their colleagues in dialogue about each other’s work, theories, projects, hypotheses, and writings (Latour, 1987). These dialogues are an informal vetting system, where the voices of innumerable (assemblages of) actors are being heard and being silenced.  I can easily imagine other forestry colleagues being disturbed by the idea that ethics is intrinsic to interpreting nature and argue that epistemological and methodological norms are sufficient for science’s purpose: to make true statements about nature. From this perspective, 64  even if different interpretations of nature arise within scientific practice, given enough time, scientists will converge on the True interpretation of nature. Ethics has nothing to do with Truth. To such an argument I would reply, what about birch and other “low-value” hardwoods? Should I simply interpret Ed’s story as another step towards revealing the true interpretation of the life-span of trees, or might I question the reasons why Ed did not rest on genetic determinism as a convenient and sufficient interpretation? I believe that what Ed’s Silver Leaf research suggests is that in forestry infatuation with new technological disciplines such as molecular genetics can and does arbitrarily silence the voice of more or less traditional disciplines and the voice of “low value” hardwoods—which not only narrows possibilities of research but can and has arbitrarily curtailed the well being of particular humans and non-humans—an outcome which should not be interpreted as the necessary result of “normal science” (Kuhn, 1970). Indeed, the problem with “normal” science is that it is not a structured process that seeks to systematically explore and expose matters of concern. As Latour (2004) has suggested, there is a lack of due diligence and due process in the scientific attempt to “construct” our common world. Political engagement, or the responsibility to represent those (humans and non-humans) most in need, is not generally the modus operandi of science. Rather than seek out the weakest, those who have the most to lose from particular interpretations of nature, “normal” science develop hypotheses that fit within the confines of the current paradigm—which may totally disregard the fate of “low value” hardwoods, as in Ed’s silverleaf story. Indeed, voices that trouble the current “paradigm” may be ignored, muted, or repressed until such time as their clamour becomes unmanageable. To address this concern, I have proposed that science adopt a democratic process of hypothesis selection and testing. Hence, if we as a collective are to accept that “low-value” hardwoods and forest pathology are not welcome in our common world, then this decision should be the result of public deliberation, which should include the presence of forest pathologists, and representatives of birch and other “low-value” hardwoods such as Ed.  In the realm of policy making, the representation of voices is always selective and its legitimacy is especially problematic for non-humans in deliberative contexts (O'Neill, 2001). However, from a pragmatic point of view, insofar as environmental policies are shaped by 65  ethical interpretations of nature it makes sense to evaluate these policies by a process of democratic deliberation (Castle, 1996; Farber, 1999; Norton, 2005). Nevertheless, democratic deliberation does not have to be restricted to a process of argumentation to convince others to accept the most coherent theory or scientific interpretation of nature in the aim of achieving a consensus (Shotter, 2006: 117; Young, 2000). Given the prima facie legitimacy still afforded to scientific interpretations of nature, the policy arena is not a level playing ground; all do not have equal voice. Rather, public deliberation may be a means of revealing conflicts or the voice of the mute that would ordinarily be hidden, unheard or smothered (O'Neill, 2006: 276).  From a Deweyan perspective, democratic deliberation must (at least) listen to those voices which are most affected by the decision to be included or excluded from our common world. The public aspect of this process ensures that the interests considered are broader and more inclusive than individual private preferences (Goodin, 1996; Minteer, 2005). The deliberative aspect is enlisted as a dramatic rehearsal in imagination of various competing possible lines of action (Dewey, 1922; Goodin, 2000). Moreover, Dewey’s method of social learning through deliberation offers a means to “adjudicate” (Putnam, 1990) between different interpretations of nature based on conflicting evaluative standpoints.  In other words, environmental policies should be evaluated on the basis of public deliberation rather than on the basis of scientific epistemic norms because any interpretation of nature may or may not be appropriate in particular management situations. But this is not to say that environmental policies should necessarily be treated as “hypotheses” to be tested from a narrow (positivistic and scientistic) methodological point of view. For to endorse a scientific approach in forestry policy making as construed, for instance, by Brian Norton in his Sustainability : A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management (2005) emphasizes the evaluative point of view of science and its evaluative criteria (epistemological and methodological norms), often at the cost of denying legitimacy to interpretive or all-together non-scientific evaluative and procedural norms. Rather we should expect evaluative and methodological criteria to evolve as the interpretive and deliberative process responds to the changing world. 66  3.6 Conclusion  Given that scientific narratives are products of encounters with others, these interactions are not subject solely to scientific norms, but to ethical norms as well. How nature is being interpreted, for what purpose, and who and what stands to gain and/or loose from interpretations of nature are ethical questions that not only shape the content and implications of scientific narratives but also contextualize their truth-value.  Ironically, recent moves to acknowledge the partiality and situatedness of ecological knowledge, and its potential to accommodate and justify a plurality of narratives, is offset by a tendency to hold firm the dream (or nightmare) of a single master language (Science) that will resolve all our environmental issues. 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Approximating nature's variation: selecting and using reference information in restoration ecology. Restoration Ecology 5:338-349.  Worster, D. 1994. Nature's Economy. A History of Ecological Ideas. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.  Yanow, D. 2006. Thinking interpretively: philosophical presuppositions and the human sciences. In D. Yanow and P. Schwartz-Shea, eds. Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research and the Interpretive Turn. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York. pp. 5-26.  Young, I.M. 2000. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford University Press, New York. 74  Chapter IV: The Ethics of “Following Nature” in Forestry: Forestry scientists in Conversation with Holmes Rolston III1  4.1 Introduction  Academic forestry scientists are seldom asked what their environmental values and ethics are; nor are they likely to explicitly voice their ethical environmental concerns and prescriptions. The reasons for this state of affairs are varied, but include to be sure the conventional wisdom that science and values are separate. Yet to uphold the fact/value dichotomy within forestry is problematic for at least three reasons. First, it denies forestry scientists’ responsibility for the practical (i.e. political, social and ethical), implications of their science. Second, it conceals the values and ethics that shape forestry scientists’ ecological and management paradigms. Third, it is a subtle means of dissuading interpretive epistemological norms such as, for instance, advocacy, emancipation, critique and transformation, justice (Lincoln and Guba, 2003)—thereby stifling open dialogue about the epistemological norms shaping scientific theories and interpretations of nature. Indeed, while forestry scientists may deny that values and evaluative points of view inform and shape forestry sciences (Shrader-Frechette and McCoy, 1994), denial does not absolve forestry scientists from taking responsibility for their values and ethics however concealed these happen to be within particular scientific forest management approaches. One such approach that merits a closer look is the “emulation of natural disturbance” (END) forest management paradigm. The END appeals to what is “natural” as an authority in deciding how best to manage forests, all the while embodying a set of ethics and values, i.e. the ethics of “following nature” and the nature/culture dichotomy that masquerade as objective, valueneutral facts under the name of scientific forestry (Klenk, 2008).  1  A version of this chapter has been submitted for publication. Klenk, N. (2008) The Ethics of “Following  Nature” in Forestry: Forestry scientists in Conversation with Holmes Rolston III.  75  In terms of my general methodological approach (detailed explanations of the specific quantitative analyses are below), I attempt to integrate the analysis of practical ethical reasoning of forestry scientists in specific decision-making scenarios with the philosophical analysis of a particular value theory and environmental ethics, i.e. “following nature.” It should be noted, however, that social and psychological environmental value elicitation approaches have mostly focused on the elicitation of held values, attitudes and beliefs within individuals and populations (Satterfield, 2002). Value elicitations in forestry have tended to focus on foresters, environmentalists, or broader public perceptions of forest management policies and forestry issues (Manning, Valliere and Minteer, 1999). Several historical and sociological studies have also looked at the institutional and political context of forestry as well as the value orientation of foresters (Langston, 1995; Kaufman, 1960). In addition, a number of studies have been done in environmental ethics and forestry (Davradou and Namkoong, 2001; Irland, 1994). While there have been studies that have focused on moral reasoning in environmental decision-making dilemmas, I am aware of no studies focused on the moral reasoning of forestry scientists (Kortenkamp and Moore, 2001; Swearingen and Pfister, 1995). This is interesting because forestry, as defined by at least one leading figure in the field, is in part applied environmental ethics: Forestry is defined as the art (skill), practice, science, and business of managing forest stands and forested landscapes to sustain the balance of values and environmental services desired by society. This definition requires that forest policies and practices change as society changes the balance of values that it desires, and responding to this change is the first responsibility of forestry. However, a second and equal responsibility is to reject current practices and oppose suggested changes that are not consistent with the ecology and sociology of the new desired balance of values and that will not provide our grandchildren and theirs with the range of values that we think they will want and need (Kimmins, 2004:5).  On the other hand, environmental ethics has been dominated by a concern with more abstract questions of value theory and with problems of concept clarification. There have been few efforts in environmental ethics to integrate philosophical and conceptual analyses with empirical analyses of environmental practitioners’ reasoning about environmental dilemmas. Yet, there is a clear need to bridge environmental ethics with environmental practice—especially in terms of how to analyze, critique, and deploy environmental ethics in 76  current complex decision-making situations. Indeed, in natural resources management, and forestry in particular, ethical deliberation about the role of human beings in nature, the “Land Ethic”, and other environmental ethics and value theories such as “following nature” are at the core of professional practice and their outcomes upon the landscape (Irland, 1994; List, 2000; Klenk and Brown, 2007). From the perspective of environmental professionals, it would appear helpful to engage in dialogue with environmental ethicists to link philosophy to practical reasoning in the field. As for environmental ethicists, this dialogue may be useful in bringing about a greater awareness of the complexities involved in actual decision-making situations in environmental practice and the need for a greater integration of theory and practice in environmental ethics.  From a pragmatic perspective, there are individual and social benefits in engaging in a combined empirical analysis of environmental moral reasoning and conceptual analyses in environmental ethics. Indeed, from a Deweyan perspective, the primary aim of ethicists should be to contribute to the solution of practical problems (Putnam, 2004). Faced with a practical problem, Dewey had this maxim to offer: mind your alternative and mind them in such a way that the act conditioned by judgment will secure the maximum of testing possible under the circumstances and also the maximum of ready re-appraisal (Dewey, 1922: 326). To “mind our alternatives” is to engage in deliberation. While moral deliberation is individual, it is also a social process because the result of deliberation, actions and evaluations, affect others. Hence the use of moral deliberation elicitation can be an effective way of rendering public individual moral reasoning. In forestry, for instance, through the medium of an author (researcher), individual forestry scientists can engage in a conversation about ethics and values with other forestry scientists and environmental ethicists—a conversation that may help integrate environmental ethics more thoroughly within forestry.  4.1.1 The END of Scientific Forestry and Naturalistic Ethics  Forest management in much of Canada is moving towards the idea of “ecosystem management”: “ecosystem management integrates scientific knowledge of ecological 77  relationships within a socio-political and values framework toward the general goal of protecting native ecosystem integrity over the long term” (Grumbine, 1994). To achieve this goal some authors have proposed a “coarse filter” approach to forest ecosystem management, namely the “emulation of natural disturbance” (END) (Hunter, 1993). The END has gained enough ascendancy in scientific forestry to have been written into Canadian forestry policy. The END’s underlying logic is that by maintaining stand and landscape compositions and structures similar to those resulting from natural disturbances, we can reduce the negative impacts of timber harvest on biodiversity and maintain essential ecological functions (Seymour et al., 2002).  The idea of following nature is neither new nor restricted to North American silviculture and forest management. Close-to-nature silviculture has a long history in Europe and is thought to have been spearheaded by Karl Gayer, professor of silviculture at the forestry faculty of Munich in 1880 (Schutz, 1999). The idea that nature is a good model to follow has informed some of the most important and enduring silvicultural systems in forestry, namely the uneven-aged forest system otherwise known as the selection system and has connections with some silvicultural principles of the German Dauerwald (the permanent forest) approach currently espoused by PRO SILVA, a European federation of foresters who advocate forest management based on natural processes (Schutz, 1999).  One interesting question is why are naturalistic forest management approaches such as the END compelling in North American and European forestry? The answer to this question is doubtless complex since the norm of “naturalness” has a long history (Lovejoy and Boas, 1935). “Naturalness” has even been herald by some conservationist as an “imperative for biological conservation” (Angermeier, 2000). What is “natural” is often tied to the ideas of the “order of nature” or the “natural law” which are taken to be normative for human behaviour. That is, humans should conduct themselves in a way that is fitting, that is natural according to the “order of nature” or “natural law”. It is not uncommon that those who look for and believe in an “order of nature” have derived ethical obligations to fit within this “natural” order (Glacken, 1967). Indeed, for some environmental ethicists, not to “follow nature” is simply morally wrong. 78  4.1.2 Following Nature with Holmes Rolston III  Within environmental ethics, a contemporary advocate of “following nature” is Holmes Rolston III. A few of his statements should indicate his commitment to an ethics of “following nature”: What I call larger moral virtue, excellence of character comes in large part, although by no means in the whole, from this natural attunement; and here I find a natural ethic in the somewhat oldfashioned sense of a way of life—a life style that should “follow nature,” that is, be properly sensitive to its flow through us and its bearing on our habits of life. A very significant portion of the meaning of life consists in our finding, expressing, and endorsing its naturalness. Otherwise, life lacks propriety (Rolston, 1979:26).  We are searching for an ethics that appropriately “follows nature.” We want to optimize human fitness on Earth, and to do this morally, we seek a naturalized ethics (Rolston, 1988: XI).  In his career, Rolston has articulated and defended an ethics that appropriately “follows nature” in the “homeostatic”, “axiological” and “tutorial” senses. For Rolston, the “homeostatic sense” refers to the attempt to fit into the stability of ecosystems, thereby acknowledging our dependence on spontaneous nature for sustenance. The “axiological” sense refers to the attempt to make nature’s value one among our goals. That is, according to Rolston, by listening to nature our conduct is guided by it. And lastly the “tutorial” sense means that nature teaches us what is our human role, place and appropriate character in the natural system (Rolston, 1979).  It is important to note that what Rolston is concerned to argue is that science and natural history provide us with the guidance or benchmarks we need when we deliberately set out to minimize our disruption of spontaneous nature or wild nature. Rolston’s environmental ethics is built upon evolutionary theory and natural history, which he interprets as “Earth’s storied achievement.” Rolston’s oft cited theory of “natural value” holds that “nature is a projective system that is intrinsically valuable for its capacity to throw forward (pro-ject) all the storied natural history”(Preston, 2006: 29). In Rolston’s (1988: 79  197) words: “Nature is a fountain of life, and the whole fountain—not just the life that issues from it—is of value. Nature is genesis, Genesis.” Rolston values the “pro-life” direction of “evolution’s arrow”, that is the emergence of an increasing number of species over evolutionary time (1988: 197). Although Rolston is a staunch defender of the conservation of species, he maintains, however, that “species are what they are where they are” (Rolston, 1988: 153). That is, ecosystems may be “more to be admired than any of their components” (Rolston, 1988: 174) and, in some respects, may have a greater moral value than species. As he says: In a holistic ethic, this ecosystemic level in which all organisms are embedded also counts morally—in some respects more than any of the component organisms, because the systemic processes have generated, continue to support, and integrate tens of thousands of member organisms. The appropriate unit of moral concern is the fundamental unit of development and survival. That is the species line. But a species is what it is where it is, encircled by an ecology (Rolston, 2003: 524).  Rolston’s ethics bears some resemblance to the END forest management approach in forestry given his use of an evolutionary justification and his appeal to nature as a norm: “Some human interventions are more, others less natural, depending on the degree to which they fit in with, mimic, or restore spontaneous nature” (Rolston, 1990: 245). The central importance afforded to species and ecosystems is also in line with the conservation of biological diversity imperative that underlies the END and Canadian environmental policy. The fact that in many of his writings, Rolston has offered advice on how to “follow nature” and how to respect “natural value” in environmental policy and decision-making suggests that Rolston’s case-based moral reasoning may be an appropriate standard against which to compare and evaluate forestry scientists’ deliberations given analogous cases.  For the purpose of this analysis, the ethics of “following nature” represents a family of environmental management decisions that includes preserving “ecological integrity” by attempting to emulate ecosystemic patterns, structures, and processes; that let “nature take its course”; that seek guidance from ecological and evolutionary theory; and that reflect the “homeostatic”, “axiological”, and “tutorial” senses ascribed to “following nature” by Rolston. 80  4.2 Study Participants and Quantitative Methods  I contacted 209 academic forestry scientists from all of the accredited forestry schools (Canadian Forestry Accreditation Board) and from forest and natural resources science and management faculties and schools by electronic mail (email) twice in a two week interval. A total of 86 forestry scientists were interviewed in the winter of 2004. For the purpose of the comparative analysis, I grouped participants according to seven disciplines, broad enough to accommodate interdisciplinary research, but exclusive enough to be distinguishable categories: conservation biology, forest ecology and management, forest ecology, ecophysiology, forest management, forest nutrition, silviculture.  Each participant was interviewed once in their workplace and the interviews lasted from forty minutes to two hours. The interview was conducted in English or in French and French interview transcripts were translated by the author. The interviews were audio taped with participant permission.  The content of each response was coded iteratively and a list of reasons used by respondents in response to a particular scenario was recorded. For each scenario, a contingency analysis was conducted for reasons, reasons/gender, and reasons/discipline. Contingency analysis is a technique that enables researchers to infer associations from patterns of co-occurrences of concepts or ideas in texts. Co-occurrences that are significantly above chance suggest the presence of associations, whereas co-occurrences that are significantly below chance suggest the presence of dissociations. The underlying assumption of the analysis of contingencies is that co-occurrences in texts indicate associations in someone’s mind or cultural practices (Osgood, 1959).  For each scenario the total number of responses per gender and per discipline was tallied as well as the number of decisive (pro intervention, against intervention) and indecisive prescriptions. Indecisive prescriptions are qualified and non-conclusive 81  suggestions as to what ought to be done in a particular decision scenario. Respondents’ ethical deliberations are compared to Rolston’s prescriptions in analogous cases and evaluated on the basis of their consistencies and practical relevance.  4.3 Decision-Making Scenarios  The following three hypothetical scenarios were presented to the participants of this study who were then asked to tell me what they thought ought to be done in each case and why. Given the time constraints of the participating forestry scientists, most participants were presented randomly with two out of three scenarios, some with all three and a number of participants were not presented with any of the scenarios because of severe time constraints.  Scenario 1: Bison A group of skiers in Yellowstone National Park have encountered a buffalo that has broken through ice and is unable to get out of the water hole in which it was trapped. The skiers reported the sighting to the ranger who felt unsure as to what should be done despite park policy of letting nature take its course. The skiers voiced their concern about leaving this animal to die when it could be saved. The ranger was torn between letting nature take its course and saving this animal which belonged to an endangered species.  Scenario 2: Deer A herd of deer in a national park has contracted a severe disease which threatens to destroy the herd if action is not taken to treat the disease. The destruction of the deer herd will not severally impact the overall deer population since there is an overabundance of deer in this part of the country. A drug exists which could be administered to the deer by fairly straightforward means and save the herd from destruction. Hunters in the area are strongly supporting the use of the drug while others are arguing that it would be more natural to let the disease take its course and ‘weed out’ the animals who are not fit to survive. Some concerned citizens are arguing that it would be inhumane to let the deer die while others are  82  concerned about the risks involved in releasing drugs in the environment which may somehow lead to more problems in the long-run.  Scenario 3: Root rot A large number of trees dispersed in a national park are plagued with root-rot disease. These trees could be removed to halt any further spread of the disease, but this would entail disturbing the landscape. There are numerous perspectives on this debate, for instance, some stakeholders say that the trees must be removed to preserve the health of the overall forest. Others argue that to remove the trees would have a potentially negative long-term impact on the nutrient capital and productivity of the forest. Still others argue that we should not interfere with the forest’s normal functioning by removing diseased trees.  All three scenarios are set within (specified and non-specified) national parks. The use of national parks offered a means to bound the decision-making problem within a singular and consistent policy context. It is important to note that while forestry policy in Canada falls within individual provincial jurisdictions, national parks are under the jurisdiction of a single agency, Parks Canada. The National Parks Act (2000, c. 32) states that maintaining the “ecological integrity” of the ecosystem is the first priority of the Minister when considering all aspects of the management of parks. Ecological integrity in this Act is defined as “a condition that is determined to be characteristic of its natural region and likely to persist, including abiotic components and the composition and abundance of native species and biological communities, rates of change and supporting processes.” The National Parks Act embodies an ethics of “following nature” because managers often promote the emulation of natural disturbance regimes to maintain the ecological integrity of parks and conserve natural values and indigenous biodiversity (McRae et al. 2001).  The first scenario borrows heavily from Rolston’s thoroughly argued case: the Yellowstone Bison (YB) (Rolston, 1990). I have modified the historical YB account to include species endangerment as an additional factor for forestry scientists to consider when deliberating about what to do in this case. While YB is not officially an endangered species, 83  an evaluation of the status of the species was conducted by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in response to a 1999 petition for the listing of the YB herd as endangered under the Endangered Species Act of 1973. While the Service concluded that the YB herd was not threatened, this decision was made despite the fact that the YB herd met the criteria of discreteness and significance as defined by the Service’s policy on distinct vertebrate population segments. That is, the YB herd is considered discrete because it is the only herd in the lower 48 States that has remained in a wild state since prehistoric times. All bison herds in the United States are reconstituted herds and most are confined with fencing or otherwise range restricted (Davis and Perkins, 2007). Hence, given the uncertainties that plague the scientific evaluation of the status of species as to whether their populations are on a trajectory toward endangerment, YB might become endangered in the future (Lemons, 2006: 206).  Another of Rolston’s argued cases, the Bighorn sheep of Yellowstone inspired the second scenario (diseased deer herd). Rolston’s depiction of the event is as follows: the Bighorn sheep of Yellowstone caught pinkeye—three hundred individuals were injured, blinded and starved and about half the herd perished. Wildlife veterinarians wanted to treat disease but Yellowstone ethicists left them to suffer (Rolston, 1988: 128). Likewise, the deer scenario involves the issues of a herd of animals suffering and the availability of medical treatment.  The third dilemma was meant to adjust for the first two animal-centric decisionmaking scenarios to engage forestry scientists on decision-making involving plants—trees in this case. I am not aware of an analogous case Rolston may have deliberated upon, although Rolston has contemplated the moral considerability of plants. Generally, Rolston argues for the preservation of animals over that of plants, because animals have a higher “intrinsic value magnitude” than plants and microorganisms (Rolston, 1988: 120), but he makes an exception of situations where plants species are endangered and threatened by the presence of exotic sentient animals (Rolston, 1988: 141). Without reference to animals in this case, the root rot disease scenario was developed to include issues of scale of disturbance and forest health; its draws from actual root rot diseases known to be serious agents of disturbances in forests, eg. Laminated root rot and Armillaria root rot in the Pacific Northwest. 84  In the following discussion, I begin by presenting the overall results of the content and contingency analysis. These results suggest that the ethical reasoning of the respondents may not follow strict inductive or deductive moral reasoning. Rather they may represent a more pragmatic attitude to moral deliberation. I explain and discuss this possibility in the section devoted to an analysis of the decisiveness of responses. In the last section of the analysis, I present the results on the prescriptions (intervention/non-intervention) of the respondents and I discuss the relationship between prescription, pluralism and Rolston’s ethics. More specifically, I compare the role of pain in nature and other factors such as aesthetics, politics, and cost-benefit analysis in respondents’ and Rolston’s deliberations. I then discuss the pluralistic attitude that appears to structure respondents’ deliberations and prescriptions and the value of pluralism in the context of real, complex natural environmental decision-making. This discussion is meant to critique Rolston’s position and evaluate his ethics in terms of its relevance to forestry scientists in environmental decision-making scenarios.  4.4 Results and Philosophical Discussion 4.4.1 Content and Contingency Analysis  The content analysis produced five main types of reasons used by respondents: “following nature”, “animal suffering”, “aesthetics”, “politics”, “cost/benefit”, and “education” (Table 3). Results from the contingency analysis indicate that none of the reasons were significantly associated with other reasons, and none of the reasons were more likely to be used by males or females. Some significant relationships, however, were detected between various reasons and disciplines for the deer and root rot scenarios but not in the bison scenario. In the case of the deer herd, respondents from the discipline of forest ecology and management (n= 13) were more likely to refer to the severity of the disease in their deliberation than respondents from other disciplines. Likewise ecophysiologists (n= 9) were more likely to refer to the fitness of species as a consideration, forest nutritionists (n=17) to the educational potential of letting nature take its course, and silviculturalists (n= 6) 85  to aesthetic considerations.  While in the case of the root rot scenario, respondents from the  discipline of forest management (n= 16) were more likely to speak of the importance of aboriginal people in deciding what to do about forest health issues and respondents from forest ecology and management (n= 18) were more likely to consider the size of the park in their deliberations.  While these associations are indicative of some patterns of responses, the limited number of relationships between disciplines and the reasons used by respondents seems to indicate a lack in consistency between members of different disciplines and within disciplines in the appeal to and application of an ethics of “following nature” in management decisions within national parks. On the other hand, that the forestry scientists interviewed in this study appealed to more than nature for guidance in their deliberations about what to do given particular environmental dilemmas may be due to their using a pragmatic approach to decision-making rather than more typical principle-based ethical reasoning. I will discuss this possibility further in the following section.  4.4.2 Decisive and Indecisive Responses  There is a statistically significant relationship between the scenarios and the decisiveness of responses. Decisive answers reflect a degree of certainty and resoluteness about what to do in a particular decision scenario that is lacking in the indecisive answers. The bison scenario had the most number of decisive responses, second was the deer scenario and the root rot scenario had the least number of decisive responses (Table 2). The number of indecisive responses followed the opposite trend.  A possible explanation for these trends appear to be the complexity of issues involved in each scenario and the difficulty of resolving the problematic situations. The lack of decisiveness in the responses to the scenarios may be thought to be the result of poor ethical reasoning skills if ethical reasoning is modeled after practical syllogisms or strict inductive or deductive logical moral arguments premised on particular ethical principles (Grassian, 1992; 86  Thomson, 1999). For instance, in Rolston’s deliberations of analogous cases, his evaluations or prescriptions are generally if not always decisive. Indeed, Rolston’s arguments result from the application of a set of principles he developed in the context of his ethics of “following nature”. Rolston’s work falls within a long tradition in ethics of theory building, i.e. the articulation, justification and advocacy of ethical principles and value systems. Although typically ethical theories are abstract and difficult to apply in practice, Rolston’s does a good job of applying his principles in practical contexts. Some commentators, however, have argued that the general result of Rolston’s ethics is not the facilitation of decision-making in actual, more complex, ambiguous and uncertain situations typical of environmental problems (Lemons, 2006). Nevertheless, others have fruitfully used Rolston’s ethical theory and principles to clarify some of the ethical issues involved in particular problematic situations (Davradou and Namkoong, 2001).  From a pragmatic perspective, real life problematic situations in environmental policy and decision-making generally cannot be solved by reference to a priori arguments and conclusions. Moreover, rarely do environmental problems fit neatly and completely within the bounds of a single environmental ethics and its suite of principles. In fact, as the pragmatic philosopher Hilary Putnam once remarked, when a philosopher “solves” an ethical problem for one, one feels as if one had asked for a subway token and been given a passenger ticket for the first interplanetary passenger-carrying spaceship instead (Putnam, 1990). This remark reflects the quite common assumption, embodied in Rolston’s work for instance, that ethical theories should be treated as incompatible rival systems which must be accepted or rejected en bloc, rather than more or less adequate methods of surveying the problems of conduct (Dewey, 1932). As Putnam argues persistently, “we are not committed to the existence of an unimaginable “absolute perspective” in ethics, an ethical theory that contains and reconciles all the possible perspectives on ethical problems in all their dimensions; we are committed to the idea of better or worse opinions” (Putnam, 1990: 183).  A more useful approach, according to Putnam, would be to use the metaphors of reading and adjudication rather than “solving” of environmental dilemmas. “The metaphors of reading and adjudication makes us think of openness and non-finality—not that there must 87  be a truer reading but that for all we know there may be” (Putnam, 1990: 183). While some might object to the idea that there is a single definitive reading of any problematic situation or text (Fish, 1980), we do think there are better/worse interpretations otherwise what would be the point of discussing and deliberating about our interpretations of problematic situations? Seeing that an adjudication of an ethical dispute is reasonable at a given time, for a given purpose, for a given group of stakeholders and that another is unreasonable is like seeing that one reading is better than another–yet remains fallible (Putnam, 1990: 183).  Moral theories and principles in this view are tools to be used when deliberating about problematic situations, not a priori positions to be defended against rival positions. From a Deweyan perspective, moral theory can generalize types of moral conflicts; state how these conflicts have been dealt with in the past; render personal reflection more systematic, suggest alternatives and encourage consistency (Dewey, 1932). Moral theory does not answer questions but makes reflection more intelligent (Dewey, 1932). Moreover, for Dewey, principles are methods of inquiry and forecast which require verification. In other words, principles are hypotheses to be worked out in practice, and to be rejected, corrected and expanded as they fail or succeed in resolving problematic situations (Dewey, 1920).  From this perspective, respondents’ decisiveness and indecisiveness may indicate a pragmatic approach to environmental decision-making. Indeed, respondents appealed to different values and often asked for more information about the facts constituting the problematic situation. Numerous respondents mentioned the need to consult colleagues, the public, and other stakeholders before they would be willing to make prescriptions on any of the scenarios. It should not be surprising that forestry scientists exhibited the desire to explore alternative possible action plans. Given the long time scales of decision-making in forestry, these norms of practice are some of the cornerstone of forestry as an applied science.  88  4.4.3 Intervention and Non-Intervention  Another statistically significant relationship was detected between the scenarios and the decision to intervene or not in the problematic situation. A much larger number of respondents said they would intervene in the bison scenario rather than let nature take its course (Table 2). The content analysis reveals that most interventions would take the shape of either rescuing the bison or ending its suffering expediently. Several respondents (n=17) mentioned that faced with a single suffering animal, they would be more inclined to help save it or “put it out of its misery” than faced with a more abstract group such as a herd of deer affected by a disease (Table 3). As for the larger number of respondents who would not interfere in the deer and root rot scenarios, these results appear to reflect the level of abstractness of the grouping of the agents suffering or under threat of destruction. Despite mentioning reasons to interfere (Table 3), in the deer and root rot scenarios, more respondents used nature as a norm and appealed to evolutionary and ecological reasons to let nature take its course (Table 3). The appeal to nature in the root rot scenario also reflects the more distant and disengaged attitude some respondents appeared to have towards forest health issues in contrast to the suffering of animals.  To begin, the naturalistic considerations of animal suffering appealed to by respondents are similar to those Rolston’s would use to deliberate about our obligations to animals. To make this argument, I rely on a recent, useful and insightful analysis of Rolston’s perspective on our obligations to animals (Palmer, 2006). It seems that for Rolston there are three key contextual factors to be taken into consideration when evaluating our obligations to animals: (1) how the animal is placed in relation to nature and human culture; (2) whether previous human actions have had an important impact on the animal’s current situation; and (3) whether humans are acting naturally towards animals. However, in the historical case of the bison, Rolston’s endorsed Yellowstone park official’s decision to let the bison die, albeit in the historical case the bison was not considered endangered. Given the hypothetical scenario developed in this study, it is likely that Rolston would have argued to intervene to save the bison too to protect the species from destruction. In fact, Rolston does make this judgment in a related case about a grizzly bear and its cubs stranded on an island 89  (Rolston, 1994: 113). But Rolston would not interfere with the bison on the basis of pain— which was a common reason used by the respondents.  Rolston maintains that the presence of pain in ecosystems is instrumental to the evolutionary development of species. Not only does rescuing the bison work against natural selection, helping wildlife through feeding, medication or otherwise weakens the species by reducing its vigor (Rolston, 1988: 55). There is no human duty to eradicate the suffering of animals, worse, according to Rolston, we are wrong headed to meddle. Within natural ecosystems Rolston claims that “suffering though present has been trimmed to a level that is functional, bearable, even productive” (Rolston, 1988: 57). Rolston argues that the disvalue of pain, when interpreted in a broader, long-term perspective, is transformed into a value: All those who find [pain in] nature to be disvaluable are making objective claims, and they are eventually wrong, not about the form of their claims, for they do try to make objective claims, not altogether about the content of their claims, for they are locally right. Only they are systematically mistaken in evaluating what they describe, because their descriptions are myopic. Both objectively and globally, there is both disvalue and value, and the transmitting of disvalue into value. Such nature is of systemic value, and a better description of what is objectively taking place makes this better evaluation possible, an evaluation that is as objective as is the description (Rolston, 1992: 255).  Does the greater number of respondents willing to go (arguably) against nature by rescuing or alleviating the pain of the bison indicate that the forestry scientists interviewed are adverse to Rolston’s ethics of “following nature” or less biologically informed? I do not think so. Although respondents did appeal to an ethics of “following nature” in the bison case, when it is a question of pain and suffering, other factors may be more significant to respondents than the role of pain in the evolution of species and ecosystems. Indeed, the significance of the presence of pain in nature is not simply addressed by referring to evolutionary theory. In fact little or no significance can be drawn from the results of evolution unless they are interpreted within a broader worldview (i.e. religious, humanistic, etc.) It is important to note that Rolston’s interpretation of disvalues such as pain in nature fits within his larger project of producing narrative about earth’s natural history amenable to Christian values and beliefs (as he understands them) (Sideris, 2006; Benzoni, 1996). 90  Rolston has written extensively on his theological and religious interpretation of nature’s value, evolution’s “arrow”, and the role of pain in nature (Rolston, 1999; 2004; 2006, 2007). Rolston’s “grand narrative” is captured by the following quote: Life persists because it is provided for in the ecological earth system. Earth is a kind of providing ground, where the life epic is lived on in the midst of its perpetual perishing, life arriving and struggling through to something higher. Ultimately, there is a kind of creativity in nature demanding either that we spell nature with a capital N, or pass beyond nature to nature’s God (Rolston, 2007: 312).  Respondents in this study may or may not find Rolston’s “grand narrative” compelling and may be more ambivalent about using nature as the ultimate norm in environmental decision-making. Indeed, while respondents do appeal to nature for guidance, it is interesting to note the extent to which respondents’ ethical deliberations refer to other reasons to make their decisions. It seems fair to say that their faith in nature’s “goodness” or its normative direction is not absolute, but balanced with other sources of values and guidance for environmental decision-making. In fact, many respondents referred to four other types of reasons in their deliberations: animal suffering, aesthetics, politics, and costs and benefits. I have already discussed the weight afforded to animal suffering in the cases of the bison and the afflicted deer herd so I will move on to the other types of reasons.  Aesthetics does not figure prominently within the ethical deliberations of respondents except in the case of the root rot disease (Table 3). The root rot case speaks to the general health of forests, which for anyone who has walked through old growth “decadent” forests, or more poignantly have seen the effects of the mountain pine beetle on lodgepole pine forests of British Columbia, the idea that diseased forests might not be beautiful is not strange. Indeed, public perception of forest health is a growing field of empirical research and nature aesthetics is thought to be an important source of environmental values and ethics (Sheppard and Picard, 2005).  While Rolston does consider aesthetics in his ethical theory (Rolston, 1979; 1988; 1998), as other commentators have shown, from his perspective it remains a subjective form  91  of valuation, which does not help him to make a case for a biologically informed, naturalistic ethics (Carlson, 2006; Hargrove, 2006). In Rolston’s words: Environmental value theory does need to split aesthetic value off from many other values. For some interpreters, beauty is the paradigm case of value, and, finding aesthetic experience to be inevitably subjective, they extrapolate to find all value subjective. Aesthetic experience is indeed a capstone value, but that does not make it a model for all underlying value. Rather, environmental value theory builds a more foundational, biologically based account. An understanding of aesthetic experience needs to be superposed on this more objective account (1988, 233).  For some of the respondents, aesthetics are factors to be considered when deciding upon intervening in forest health problems regardless of the subjective/objective dichotomy which may arise with such considerations. Indeed, the subjective/objective dichotomy appears to hold little weight in deciding what to do about the three environmental dilemmas. Witness how politics figures prominently in the reasoning of respondents with public perception of the problematic situations clearly an important factor to consider in deciding what to do in the three scenarios (Table 3).  One of the most important points to make about respondents’ ethical deliberations is their consistent approach of weighing alternative consideration much like in a cost/benefit analysis (Table 3). Factors to be weighed include economic costs, the remoteness of geographical location of the event in question (stranded bison, root rot), the size of the park, the impact of the event on what surrounds the park (disease of deer herd, root rot disease), the risk of spread of the disease (root rot) outside the park, public safety (falling trees due to root rot) and the impact of forest health on water resources inside and outside the park (Table 3).  This cost/benefit approach seems to indicate a pluralistic approach to ethical reasoning, rather than deliberation from an a priori position. Pluralism in ethical deliberation may be interpreted as the perspective that different moral frameworks may be operable and point to the same conclusion/position, but it may also be interpreted differently as in James Gouinlock’s (1993: 289) perspective: 92  Pluralism is the doctrine that there can be a range of defensible positions regarding a given moral issue. From issue to issue, different persons situate themselves at different points on the spectrum, and there is no ultimate criterion to put the plurality of stations in an unchallengeable order of priority. Though indeterminate, that range varies in scope from question to question, and sometimes it virtually disappears.  What the respondents are doing when approaching decision-making by weighing alternative values and ethics is deliberating about alternative potential lines of action. From a pragmatic perspective, that they do not “follow nature” absolutely, but include economic, social and political reasons for intervening or not in specific environmental dilemmas is a mark of systematic, in-depth reasoning. As mentioned in the introduction, one of Dewey’s recommendation when engaging in deliberation is to mind our alternatives in such a way that our actions will secure the maximum of testing under the circumstances and the maximum of ready re-evaluation. Given that foresters typically have had to deal with social, political and economic as well as ecological restraints on their practices and that foresters have had a long history of successes and failures in their environmental decision-making, it seems as though at least the forestry scientists interviewed in this study have learned to look broadly for direction and guidance when deciding what to do about environmental dilemmas.  On a different note, although “following nature” is an important environmental ethics for respondents, it seems unlikely to be the sole basis for environmental decision-making because it embodies the nature/culture dichotomy which is a problematic perspective to hold in the context of natural resource management. In forestry, for instance, human agency is not solely interpreted within a declensionist narrative of environmental destruction as reflected in Rolston’s comment that “any deliberated human agency, however well intended, is intention nevertheless and interrupts the spontaneous process and is inevitably artificial and unnatural” (Rolston, 1991: 271). The history of forestry, however, includes examples of successful human co-habitation with forests and the creation of important environmental and social values from human modifications of forests—which suggests that some “natural values” in forestry do not arise despite human agency but from an inextricable mix of human and nonhuman agency. Hence, Rolston’s advocacy for the maintenance of the nature/culture dichotomy in his ethics of “following nature” is particularly troublesome in forestry. Indeed, 93  by appealing to “nature” or “natural ecological law” as independent and separate from human agency, Rolston is appealing to precedent and authority—so as to preclude the need for inquiry into the value or disvalue of particular human actions upon the forested landscape.  Rolston’s theory of “natural value” is not determined in and by the process of inquiry into a particular problematic environmental situation, rather Rolston argues from an a priori position, i.e. nature’s intrinsic value. Rolston assumes that certain ends have an inherent value so unquestionable that they regulate and validate the means employed. But as Dewey pointed out, the importation of value/ends external to inquiry make futile all human efforts to produce and regulate change except within narrow and a priori limits (Dewey, 1932; Dewey, 1938). That is not to say that a Deweyan would find the ethics of “following nature” irrelevant, rather a Deweyan would interpret values and principles derived from and ethics of “following nature” as tools to be used when appropriate in particular decision-making situations. As mentioned above, for Dewey, ethical theories must not be accepted or rejected en bloc, but weighed, imaginatively deployed in deliberations, and finally tested against experience.  4.5 Following Nature in Forestry: A Provisional Conclusion  The ethical deliberations of forestry scientists interviewed in this study indicate that “following nature” is an important and current environmental ethics in forestry. But while such a naturalistic ethics is espoused by a majority of respondents, numerous other types of reasons enter their deliberations and suggests that alternative values and ethics are potentially morally, socially, politically, or economically acceptable within forestry.  In a broader context, the idea of applying an ethics of “following nature” in environmental decision-making is problematic for at least three reasons. First, one may legitimately ask “whose nature” should we follow (Proctor, 1995)—Rolston’s, forestry scientists’, or perhaps Christian moralists’? Whichever ecological and evolutionary theory of 94  nature is used as an objective, normative foundation for ethics, we nevertheless have to choose which meaning of nature to “follow”. Nature’s meaning is rarely neutral even if it is based on scientific theories. As Raymond Williams has pointed out: A singular name for the real multiplicity of things and living processes may be held, with an effort, to be neutral, but I am sure it is very often the case that it offers, from the beginning, a dominant kind of interpretation: idealist, metaphysical, or religious (Williams, 1980: 69)  As I argue in this essay, Rolston’s interpretation of the role of pain in nature, for instance, is couched within an attempt to interpret ecological theories within the compass of a Christian perspective. That is not to say that Rolston’s perspective is therefore irrelevant or flawed from the perspective of forestry, but it does indicate that his ethics of “following nature”, however scientifically grounded, should be understood in its Christian context. For those environmental practitioners who do not adopt Rolston’s religious interpretation of nature, his ethics of “following nature” may be of little use, especially in terms of its prescriptions against the alleviation of suffering of individual animals.  Second, the idea that “following nature” could be a straightforward matter of understanding the ecology and evolution of “nature” and devising management strategies that emulate “natural” ecosystem structures and processes requires maintaining the nature/culture dichotomy in a management context that is pervaded by nature/culture hybrids. This inconsistency is reflected in the majority of the deliberations of respondents who, while they adhere to an ethics of “following nature”, also realize that improving upon nature for human benefit is also an appropriate value guiding forest management decisions.  Third, and most importantly from a pragmatic perspective, to the extent that an ethics of “following nature” is advocated as the only, best or most appropriate, ethics to be deployed in every single environmental management decision, it fails to consider actual, complex decision-making situations. From a pragmatic perspective, an ethics of “following nature” is useful to think about, contextualize, and deliberate about potential lines of action in concrete problematic situations. Rolston’s ethics, for instance, would be viewed as a tool for deliberation and his principles, moreover, would have to be considered alongside other principles and values and their applications would have to be contextual. 95  In the context of forestry, applying Rolston’s ethics does not facilitate the difficult and iterative process of adjudicating among various agents demanding a voice and the numerous needs requiring consideration within particular problematic environmental dilemmas—if his ethics is mean to be accepted or rejected en bloc. Rolston’s ethics would have foresters narrow their prescriptions to the imperative of “naturalness” disregarding other values that may be appropriate in particular decision-making contexts. That being said, forestry scientists would stand to benefit from engaging in more sustained and in-depth dialogue with environmental ethicists to gain a more informed and critical perspective on one of the central questions in forestry, that is “what are forests for?”  96  Table 4.1. The Number of responses per gender and per discipline to each decision-making scenario. Respondents Scenario  Male 1  Biological  F. Ecol.  Forest  Eco-  Forest  Forest  Female  Conserv.  Manag.  Ecology  Physio.  Manag.  Nutrition  Sylv.  Total  Bison  37(80)  9(20)  4(9)  7(15)  13(28)  6(13)  5(11)  7(15)  4(9)  46  Deer  36(77)  11(23)  4(8)  6(13)  16(34)  4(9)  6(13)  8(17)  3(6)  47  Root rot  44(77)  13(23)  5(9)  10(18)  15(26)  6(10)  9(16)  8(14)  4(7)  57  1  Percentage of total responses per scenario  Table 4.2. The number of decisive (pro intervention, against intervention) and indecisive prescriptions for each decision-making scenario. Decisive prescriptions2  Responses Scenario  Intervention3 1  Indecisive prescriptions2  Non-Intervention3  Total  7(15)  27(59)  19(41)  Bison  20(43)  Deer  5(11)  11(23)  16(34)  31(66)  Root rot  2(4)  8(14)  10(18)  47(82)  1  Percentage of total responses per scenario  2  Chi-square statistics for Decisive/Indecisive prescriptions: 18,9171; p-value: 0.0001  3  Chi-square statistics for Intervention/ Non-Intervention prescriptions: 32.8141; p-value: 0  97  Table 4.3. The reasons and their frequency of use (%) in the ethical deliberation of respondents for each decision-making scenario.  Types of reasons  Bison  %  Deer  %  Root rot  %  “Following  Natural  24  Natural  72  Natural  81  Nature”  Fitness  20  Fitness  4  Fitness  2  Species endangerment  67  Species endangerment  53  Uniqueness of Park  2  Caused by humans  9  Caused by humans  13  History of Park  7  History of Park  2  Exotic disease  17  Severity  2  Ecological function  9  Predators  28  Educational potential  11  Educational potential  2  Habitat regeneration  9  Research opportunity  4  Educational potential  4  Suffering  11  Aesthetics  23  Public perception  2  Animal suffering  Suffering  28  Individual animal  17  Aesthetics Politics  Cost/Benefit  Public perception  17  Public perception  13  Aboriginal People  2  Economic cost  24  Economic cost  11  Public safety  26  Remoteness  7  Park Surroundings  38  Remoteness  4  Park Size  2  Park size  2  Park Surroundings  32  Water resources  2  Park size  12  98  Bibliography  Angermeier, P.L. 2000. 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A Preliminary Analysis of Environmental Dilemmas and Environmental Ethical Reasoning Among Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Forest Visitors. Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-156. USDA Forest Service. Williams, R. 1980. Ideas of nature. In R. Williams, ed. Problems in Materialism and Culture. Verso, London. pp. 67-85.  104  Chapter V: What are Forests for? The Place of Ethics in the Forestry Curriculum1  5.1 Introduction  The traditional education of foresters and other resource managers has emphasized the natural sciences and technical skills almost to the exclusion of relevant materials from the social sciences and humanities, particularly ethics. Although there are exceptions, these curricula reflect a predominantly positivist approach to science where facts and values are strictly separated and science is viewed as value-neutral (Coufal and Spuches, 1995a). The situation is a profound paradox, for an allegedly value neutral framework, often masquerading under the name “scientific forestry,” is used to decide what to do. Forests and our relations to them present numerous questions of value that include the following: What are forests for? How do commercial values of forests relate to their places as habitat for nonhumans? Are forests’ resources properly thought of in terms such as discounting and substitution? What is their role in climate stabilization? What roles should they play in human cultural life and self understanding? In the positivist tradition of scientific forestry these questions are simultaneously suppressed but are de facto decided.  Given the public scrutiny of forest management, controversy over practices in recent decades, and changing forest values (Bengston, 1994), the complex normative considerations in forestry decision-making have greatly increased the need for supplementing the traditional technical forestry curriculum with competencies in ethics. Traditionally, when ethics is present in the curriculum, it emphasizes professional ethics: duties that one has to an employer or landowner, fair accurate accounting, fair competition, honest practices, and 1  A version of this chapter has been published. Klenk, N. and P. G. Brown. (2007) What are Forests for? The  Place of Ethics in the Forestry Curriculum. Journal of Forestry 105 (2): 61-66.  105  professional obligations of foresters to their profession and to third parties (Coufal and Spuches, 1995b). I hold that these considerations are necessary but not sufficient for a sound education in forestry ethics.  Environmental ethics should be a core component of the ethics taught to foresters. By environmental ethics I understand a discipline that systematically studies the moral relationship of human beings to and the value and moral status of the environment and other species. “Moral” and “morality” expansively refer to a code of conduct governing relationships between humans and nonhumans including the environment, which, given specified conditions, would be followed by all responsible people. To date, few environmental ethics courses in natural resources management curricula have been developed (Spuches and Coufal, 2000).  With a better understanding of ethical traditions, the decision-making process would be more amenable to rational normative discourse. Some authors suggest that environmental ethics could become “the 'common' language that helps to break down barriers to communication and understanding, leading to a more multidisciplinary approach toward problem-solving” (Coufal and Spuches, 1995a: 34). According to one survey, however, on average, both forestry employers and recent practicing forestry graduates said that “the performance of forestry education in these areas [such as communications, ethics, collaborative problem-solving, and managerial leadership] was not commensurate with their importance” (Sample et al., 1999: 9).  Although both the Canadian Forestry Accreditation Board and the Society of American Foresters (SAF) require that ethics be part of the forestry curriculum, there is no standard curriculum in forestry ethics in Canadian and American forestry schools. Teaching ethics in an ad hoc manner may provide flexibility as to what ethical issues are addressed given the different geographic, political, cultural, and economic milieus in which forestry is taught, but it does little in the way of teaching students the skills required to make sound ethical arguments. Moreover, ad hoc discussions of ethics and brief modules may undermine the practice of ethical reasoning if they are taught by untrained foresters under 106  time constraints in their already replete courses. Ethical reasoning skills are best acquired by engaging in a sustained, systematic, and applied study of ethical theories and normative reasoning.  In this article I present the results of an informal survey of ethics content in North American forestry curricula. On the basis of this current portrait of forestry ethics, I propose a framework for teaching forestry ethics based on practical reasoning. I contend that there is a need for a more substantial curriculum that would teach forestry professionals ethics and environmental ethics. I am also mindful that most forestry students will have limited longterm “real world” experience. Therefore, I also advocate the inclusion of historical and sociological literatures that help students form more mature judgments.  5.2 Methods  I contacted by e-mail 90 institutions offering undergraduate, graduate, and technical (generally a two-year degree) forestry programs in the United States and Canada. I have considered only forestry programs accredited by the SAF and by the Canadian Forestry Accreditation Board. I requested any information regarding forestry ethics curricula in their program; in particular, I asked for a copy of course syllabi with relevant content. I sent a second request for information after 3 weeks to the institutions that had not responded to the first e-mail. I elicited a total of 57 responses (a 63 % response rate). For those institutions that did not respond to either request, I searched their university websites to obtain their forestry curriculum, list and description of courses, and syllabi when publicly available. I obtained useful data from a total of 85 programs.  5.3 Analysis  For each institution I tabulated (1) whether ethics was part of the curriculum, (2) if ethics was taught as a separate course, and (3) what the focus of the ethics courses were. I 107  also extracted relevant information provided in the e-mail responses, such as the sorts of courses which included modules or discussion of ethics.  5.4 Results 5.4.1 Ethics in the Curriculum  The results of this survey indicate that 63 out of 85 (74 %) of the accredited forestry programs include ethics in their curriculum (Table 5.1). In all forestry programs (undergraduate, graduate, and technical) that included ethics in their curriculum, 32 % emphasized professional ethics (i.e. referring to professional obligations to clients, conflicts of interests, and others), 13 % emphasized environmental ethics (i.e. referring to ethical standards on how forest should be managed), but the majority, 56 %, emphasized other topics (Table 5.1). For example, other topics may comprise the norms of scientific research; philosophical ethics, i.e. ethical theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism; sociological and economic analyses of the value of natural resources and other environmental values; environmental and forest history; biotechnology; critical thinking; and natural resource science and management approaches.  5.4.2 Specific Ethics Courses  One- third (29 %) of the 85 forestry programs I surveyed offered specific ethics courses (Table 5.2). A majority (56%) of the ethics courses taught in the undergraduate and graduate forestry programs are environmental ethics (Table 5.2). The technical forestry degree programs offer ethics courses that emphasize topics other than environmental and professional ethics, such as philosophical ethics, critical thinking and ethics in scientific research. Hence, only 10 out of the 85 (12%) programs for which I obtained data had a course on environmental ethics, and only 4 out of 85 programs (5%) had a course on professional ethics.  108  5.4.3 Other Courses in which Ethics is Taught  Those forestry programs that include ethics in their curriculum but offer no specific courses in forestry ethics may address ethics in relation to specific subject matter. These courses span the breath of the forestry curriculum: silviculture, forest ecology, timber supply, forest pathology, wood procurement, to name a few. Although some of these may contain relatively formal ethics modules, others simply address ethics in an ad hoc manner.  5.4.4 Objectives of Forestry Ethics Courses  The forestry ethics course syllabi I reviewed contain a wide range of objectives. I have organized these objectives according to the following topics: ethics and public policy, professional ethics, practical reasoning skills, history and sociology, and written and oral communication skills. Although the courses I reviewed did not necessarily contain objectives that pertain to all of these topics, they usually stated objectives that belonged to at least two or three of them.  Under the topic of ethics and public policy, students may be expected to become familiar with the value systems of western and non-western cultures; the concepts and methods of ethics that apply to issues regarding natural resources; the relationship between ethical theory and ethical action; the relationship between management practices and societal needs and values; the theory, procedure and methods by which policy is created; and international problems in forestry such as carbon sequestration, biodiversity preservation, and international trade and poverty.  With respect to professional ethics, course objectives include understanding the role of professional ethics in forest and natural resource management; becoming familiar with the professional codes of ethics of foresters; applying these Codes to the kinds of practical problems that arise in professional practice; critically assess alternative approaches to, and  109  defenses of, professional codes of ethics; understanding issues related to objectivity and the different roles of professionals.  In terms of ethical reasoning skills, students may be expected to understand moral dilemmas; to anticipate, analyze, and evaluate natural resource issues; to explain the ecological, economic, and social consequences of natural resource actions at various scales and over time; to present ethical arguments for and against different contemporary land uses; to be able to define, develop, explain, and evaluate their own beliefs, values, and behavior; to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of policies; to examine influences of social, disciplinary, and institutional culture on personal and professional values; to explore the influences of values and institutional mandates on the treatment of natural resources issues; to apply ecological information in the management of forest ecosystems.  Students may also be expected to understand the sociological and historical roots of values, beliefs, and ethical traditions. For example, specific course objectives include becoming aware of the historical background of environmentalism; the history, scope and applications of environmental ethics debates; the cross-cultural differences in the role of beliefs, attitudes, ideologies, and behavior on the environment; the understanding of how individuals come to hold their values and how values influence the practical activity of different peoples.  Generally, students are expected to develop written and oral skills for the purpose of facilitating ethical reflection and deliberation among their peers as well as among other forest stakeholders. Specific course objectives include developing a written perspective on environmental and professional ethics, working with others on value-laden natural resource problems, and developing an intellectual community among their peers.  110  5.5 Discussion 5.5.1 Results  Results from my survey show that most accredited undergraduate and graduate forestry programs teach ethics in their curriculum informally and do not consider the literature that is available from environmental ethics and history. The few programs that offer a full ethics course, however, tend to focus mostly on different theories of environmental ethics applicable to forestry. These results indicate that forestry ethics is not consistently and coherently covered in forestry curricula; i.e., teaching ethics in an ad hoc manner or focusing strictly on environmental ethics does little to provide foresters with much needed skills in practical reasoning. In other words, students may or may not learn how to evaluate the facts, evidence, and assumptions that shape ethical arguments in forestry. To do this requires a framework for teaching ethics that contends with the current meaning and value of forests, historic debates of proper forest management, and sound ethical arguments to support personal and professional answers to the question, “What are forests for?”  5.5.2 A Framework for Teaching Forestry Ethics  Professional foresters require practical wisdom to act for the good of people (the public and private interests) and for the good of the forest. Aristotle defines practical wisdom “as the virtue by which one deliberates well: i.e., reasons well in a practical way.” (Broadie, 1991: 179). Aristotle’s notion of practical reason requires three main elements: (1) an understanding of the particular circumstances affecting a decision, (2) an understanding of ethical theories, and (3) practical experience in decisionmaking (Hughes, 2001). Thus, a forester’s actions should be decided with a firm grasp not only of professional obligations toward humans (professional ethics) but also what is the right relationship to forests (environmental ethics). The third element, practical experience, is more problematic to obtain in a 4-year program in forestry. How would young professional foresters know what forests are for when they have hardly any long-term experience? How would they know how to 111  avoid some of the pitfalls of the profession, i.e. institutional mandates that conflict with public values, ecological knowledge, economic efficiency, and cultural worldviews? How would they know how to recognize patterns of decision-making that are unwise? I argue that forest history with its in-depth case studies and broad stroke depictions of past forest management decisions would provide at least a surrogate for lived experience as well as provide a necessary longer-term perspective of what forests are for.  In the following section I provide a forestry ethics course template that is available for institutional customization depending on the circumstances at the institution in question.  5.6 Tripartite Forestry Ethics Course 5.6.1 Part I: Professional Ethics  Professional foresters must understand the ethics code of their profession to maintain their professional credibility, legitimacy, and morality. Professional ethics traditionally include topics such as the appropriate scope of professional services; the specification of fees and publicity; conflicts of interests between clients; and obligations to clients, to the profession and to third parties. In the context of forestry, third parties include the public and the forest. In order to avoid confounding the interests of the public with those of the forest, it is critical that we explicitly recognize the conflicts built into the forester’s role itself (Klenk and Brown, 2008). Topics to be discussed include the following: •  Professional standards, principles, and rules [excerpt from Bayles (1981)]. I use Bayles’ Professional Ethics because of its clear description and discussion of professional obligations.  •  Codes of Ethics [excerpt from List (2000)]. List’s book, Environmental Ethics and Forestry, provides several examples of codes of ethics for natural resource professions as well as critiques of codes of ethics for professional foresters. It could be used to discuss the professional obligations foresters have also offers a wide range 112  of articles on professional ethics and environmental ethics in forestry as well as other relevant materials. •  Conflicts with third parties, [entire book of Applbaum (1999)]. Ethics for Adversaries provides a critical analysis of professional relationships and critiques the view that professional duties may be used to set aside the requirements of ordinary morality.  •  Cases [excerpt from Irland (1994)]. Ethics in Forestry offers several articles on professional ethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, and public service and policy.  Suggested additional readings include Callahan (1988), List (2000), and Martin (2000).  5.6.2 Part II: Environmental Ethics  Although professional ethics have typically been the main and/or sole topic of discussion in forestry ethics, they do not provide practitioners with the theoretical guidance they need to make moral decisions about forest management. The following is an outline that covers many of the main issues in this field. 5.6.2.1 Section A: Antropocentric Utilitarianism and its Progeny.  Topics to be discussed include the following: •  Utilitarianism [entire book Mill (1859)]. Because of its foundational impact on forest management and conservation policy in America.  •  Pinchot, The Training of a Forester.  •  Scott, Seeing Like A State, [chapter 1 (1998)]. A critique of centralized government control of resources, using forestry as an example. Economic valuations of natural resources and their ethical implications [Harris (2002) and Tietinberg (2002)].  Suggested additional readings include Hotelling (1931), Hays (1959), Daly (1993), Brown (1994), and Sagoff (2004). 113  5.6.2.2 Section B: Following Nature?  Although Pinchot has had an enduring effect on North American forest management and conservation policy, Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac (1966) provides an ethical foundation of the ecosystem management paradigm.  Topics to be discussed include the following: •  Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac (1966). I also suggest contemporary critiques of Leopold in the following articles: “Thinking Like a Chicken” from Adam’s and Donovan’s (1999) and “Hoping Against Hope: Environmental Justice in the Twentyfirst Century” from Mutz (2002).  •  New Forestry and ecosystem management [excerpt from Boyce and Haney (1997)]. This discussion sets the stage for the next topic: adaptive forest management.  •  Adaptive management as a safeguard against ecological hubris (Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Walters and Holling, 1990).  Suggested additional readings include Walters (1986), Gunderson et al. (1990), Christensen and Emborg (1996), Callicott (1999), and Yaffee (1999).  5.6.2.3 Section C: From Dominion to Partnership  Other more recent environmental ethics e.g., biocentrism, ecofeminism, deep ecology, and environmental justice present important challenges to the former ethics. Knowledge of these radical environmental ethics provide a more critical and comprehensive understanding of human/nature relationships, which would better contextualize decisionmaking.  Topics to be discussed include the following: 114  •  Reverence for Life. Albert Schweitzer, “An Ethic of Reverence for Life” from A Philosophy of Civilization (1923), and Brown’s “Are there any natural resources?” (2004).  •  Ecofeminism. Reinventing Eden by Merchant (2004). This book argues that our attitudes toward nature and women are dysfunctional.  •  Deep Ecology. Drengston and Taylor (1997) and Guha (1994). The deep ecology movement has gained ascendancy since its inception in 1972. It forms the basis of ecoforestry, a soft-touch forest management paradigm in forestry. Guha’s article provides an important argument against the first world’s large consumption rates and wilderness preservation.  •  Environmental Justice. Excerpts from Mutz (2002). The last topic of this section unites all topics discussed so far: the interconnection between social and environmental injustices perpetuated by state controlled, utilitarian, economics-driven forest management practice and policy.  Suggested additional readings include Devall and Sessions (1985), Zerner (2000), and Shrader-Frechette (2002).  5.6.3 Part III: History as a Precursor to Judgment  There are few case studies critically examining the environmental ethics of forest management. This is not surprising given that environmental ethics is mostly an academic discipline—ethicists are not typically part of the environmental and forest management planning and decisionmaking team. Current case studies, however, would help practitioners solve particular ethical dilemmas by providing a surrogate for lived experience. Thus, I suggest that foresters critically examine cases of current ethical issues in forestry. Several volumes are available that provide and critically assess current environmental case studies (Gladwin et al., 1996; Newton et al., 2005; Shrader-Frechette and McCoy, 1993). There is also literature that is specifically focused on environmental ethics in forestry (Coufal and Spuches, 1995c; Davradou and Namkoong, 2001; Irland, 1994). 115  Forest history provides students with experience gained from past forest management decisions and policies (Guha, 1989; Harrison, 1992; Perlin, 1991; Schama, 1995; Totman, 1998; Williams, 1989). I suggest the use of a case study such as Nancy Langston’s Forest Dreams, Forest Nightmares (Langston, 1995; Langston, 2005). , in which historical analysis of the cultural, economic, ecological and other factors that shaped forest management in the past could be critically evaluated in terms of the ethical topics discussed earlier; for instance, professional obligations to third parties, Pinchot and utilitarian-based forest management, uncertainty, and ecosystem management.  5.7 Conclusion  The survey I conducted to ascertain the degree of formal training in ethics offered Canadian and American professional foresters and natural resource managers and technicians, indicate that forestry ethics is not consistently and coherently covered in forestry curricula. Teaching professional ethics in an ad hoc manner or focusing strictly on environmental ethics does little to provide foresters with much needed skills in practical reasoning in the context of forestry, i.e. making wise decisions about how we should manage forests. My approach does not preclude the inclusion of ethics modules within other forestry courses, but it highlights the need for forestry students and faculty members to engage in a sustained and thorough (theoretical and applied) examination of the ethical issues they are likely to encounter in their practice.  I propose a framework for teaching forestry ethics based on practical reasoning. I argue that professional codes of ethics must be supplemented by environmental ethics and forest history. Environmental ethics offers a rich source of material to guide personal reflection, clarify the ethical dimensions of particular management decisions, and offers tools to facilitate normative discourse. However, they lack an integrated consideration of what actually happens. Forest history with its in-depth case studies and broad stroke depictions of  116  past forest management decisions provides a surrogate for lived experience and a long-term perspective.  Although the proposed course is designed for senior undergraduate students, I believe that an early introduction to forestry ethics using a historical case study as a foundation to discuss professional and environmental ethics should be included in the forestry curriculum. This could be done within an introduction to forestry course or as a single credit course in the first year of the forestry program. Moreover, given the extensive amount of readings in the proposed senior forestry ethics course, I suggest an evaluation scheme that would compel students to do the readings diligently, such as frequent quizzes or short essays on the reading material.  I hope that incorporation of these issues in the training of foresters will increase our understanding, in the profession and public alike, of what our planet’s forests are for.  117  Table 5.1. Percentage of North American forestry programs1 that include ethics in their curriculum and the percentage of these programs that emphasize environmental ethics, professional ethics, or a mix of the two and/or other topics in their curriculum. Degree  Undergraduate  Number of  Programs Offering  Programs  Ethics in their  56  and Graduate Technical  All Degrees 1  29  85  Topics Emphasized in Programs Offering Ethics in their Curriculum  Curriculum  Env. Ethics  Prof. Ethics  Other  46  6  18  22  (82 %)  (13 %)  (39 %)  (48 %)  17  2  2  13  (59 %)  (12 %)  (12 %)  (76 %)  63  8  20  35  (74 %)  (13 %)  (32 %)  (56 %)  Canadian Forestry Board and Society of American Foresters  Table 5.2. Percentage of North American forestry programs that offer ethics courses and the percentage of these courses that emphasize environmental ethics, professional ethics, or a mix of the two and/or other topics. Degree  Number of  Number of Programs  Topics Emphasized in Ethics  Programs  Offering a Course in  Courses  Ethics  Env. ethics  Prof.  Other  ethics Undergraduate  56  And Graduate Technical  29  degrees All Degrees  18  10  4  4  (32 %)  (56 %)  (22 %)  (22 %)  7  0  0  7  (24 %) 85  (100 %)  25  10  4  11  (29 %)  (40 %)  (16 %)  (44 %)  118  Bibliography  Adams, C.J., and J. Donovan, (eds.) 1999. Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations. Duke University Press, Durham.  Applbaum, A.I. 1999. Ethics for Adversaries. The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life. Princeton University Press, Princeton.  Bayles, M.D. 1981. Professional Ethics. Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, California..  Bengston, D.N. 1994. 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Columbia University Press, New York.  124  Chapter VI: Discussion and Conclusion 1  6.1 Successes of the Thesis  As stated in the introduction, my thesis is that the END is a forest management approach that appeals to Nature and Science as authorities in deciding how best to manage forests, all the while embodying a set of ethics and values, i.e. the nature/culture dichotomy and the ethics of “following nature,” that masquerade as objective facts under the name of scientific forestry. In my opinion, the four previous chapters successfully illustrated this thesis. To support this statement, however, I will discuss each individual manuscript.  In the first manuscript, “What is the “END” (Emulation of Natural Disturbance) in forest ecosystem management? An Open Question”, I addressed the first objective of my study: to decipher the meaning of the END for academic forestry scientists. Although the END is couched in evolutionary theory and is characterized in the literature as a scientific approach to forest management, the END embodies social values. Indeed, when all mental models of the END were united within a single mental model and overlapped with a theoretical mental model of the END (Kimmins, 2004) the ensuing mental model produced a minimally shared conceptualization of the END. This “shared mental model” can be articulated as: The END is an attempt to emulate and maintain the frequency and severity of ecosystem disturbance and the function of ecosystems by managing according to socially and historically acceptable spatial and temporal scales.  The social and historical facets of the END may be lost from sight when it is technically described as a scientific forest management approach. Moreover, the lack of 1  A version of this chapter has been submitted for publication. Klenk, N., G. Bull, J. MacLellan. (2008) The  “Emulation of Natural Disturbance” (END) Management Approach in Canadian Forestry: A Critical Evaluation.  125  clarity of the meaning of the END suggests grounds for concern for using the END in forestry policy in Canada—policy makers may rely on a “scientific definition” of the END in forestry policy thereby covering up the actual state of disagreement over its underlying values and stifling what could be a productive debate as to its merits and limitations. A more democratic approach to policy-making would be to engage in a dialogue about the meaning and values underlying the END. From this perspective, the shared mental model of the definition of the END could be used as a tool to facilitate dialogue.  In the second manuscript, “Listening to the Birds: a Pragmatic Proposal for Forestry,” I addressed the second objective of my study: to clarify the ethical dimensions of the END and its policy implications. The argument for this paper draws on the pragmatism of John Dewey and Hilary Putnam, on the science studies scholar Bruno Latour’s work in political ecology (2004), and on the augury of the Kantu’ of West Kalimantan of Indonesian Borneo (Dove, 1993).  In this essay I make three distinct but related points relevant to the END and forestry more generally. The first point is that scientific interpretations of nature are products of encounters with others (human and non-human) and these interactions are not subject solely to scientific norms, but to ethical norms as well. To give context to this claim, I discuss the Silver-leaf story based on an interview with Ed Setliff, a retired forest pathologist from Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, Canada. Ed Setliff’s research on the silvering symptoms of northern hardwoods (2002) and its ethical dimensions highlights the importance of asking “Whose nature?” and “Who and what stands to gain and/or loose from the interpretations nature?” to contextualize the truth-value of scientific interpretations of nature. The second point I make is that the END appears as a reasonable scientific approach to forest management and biodiversity conservation, but that, in fact, some of the terms at the core of the END, such as “natural” and “disturbance” embody the nature/culture dichotomy and appeal to Nature and Evolution as authorities in deciding how to manage forests. Hence, I argue that forestry policy should determine which interpretations of nature and ethical norms to include in policy by a process of public deliberation, not by appeal to Nature and Evolutionary Theory as in the case of the END. The final point I make in this essay is that in 126  the context of a more democratic approach to policy making, scientific narratives should be denied a priori privilege over non-scientific interpretations of nature. I weave together some of the insights of Bruno Latour in his the Politics of Nature (2004) and a pragmatic perspective to argue for a plurality of “languages” or interpretations of nature to consider for environmental policy making.  In the third manuscript, “The Ethics of “Following Nature” in Forestry: Forestry scientists in Conversation with Holmes Rolston III”, I address the third objective of my study, that of examining the ethical reasoning of forestry scientists as applied to management scenarios that draw upon some of the paradoxical aspects of the nature/culture dichotomy. I also attempt to broaden the dialogue between the participants in this study and myself by including the perspective of Holmes Rolston, a prominent advocate of a naturalistic value theory. I used three decision-making scenarios inspired by Rolston’s philosophical and advocacy work in promoting his ethics of “following Nature” in my interviews and I analyzed academic forestry scientists’ ethical reasoning and values in light of Rolston’s ethic (1994). I use Rolston’s environmental ethic as a theoretical standard for comparative purposes and I also evaluated its relevance and application in forestry.  The ethical deliberations of the interviewees indicate that “following nature” is an important and current environmental ethics in forestry. But while a majority of the forestry scientists I interviewed more or less espoused “following nature”, they also appealed to various other reasons when deliberating about what to do in each decision-making scenario. These results suggest that alternative values and ethics are potentially morally, socially, politically, or economically acceptable for academic forestry scientists in Canada.  The last manuscript, “What Are Forests For: The Place of Ethics in the Forestry Curriculum”, assessed the importance of ethics in forestry education in North America. The results of this informal survey of ethics content forestry curricula indicate that ethics is not consistently and coherently covered in the curriculum. I take this finding to indicate the lack of importance ethics holds within forestry, which also indicates the need to include ethics in the forestry curriculum if foresters and forestry scientists are to become more aware and 127  critical of the ethics and values underlying the END for instance. Hence, the proposed forestry ethics syllabus is meant as another means by which to promote the awareness of ethics and values in forestry sciences and forest management.  6.2 Limitations of the Thesis 6.2.1 Interpretive Forestry and Stakeholder Democracy  This study explored and illustrated the interpretive nature of forestry sciences by examining the ethics and values underlying a current and compelling forest management approach. But so far, my work has been rather lopsided: to illustrate the interpretive nature of forestry sciences is not to engage in the reinterpretation and reconstruction of nature nor is it to propose principles and values to guide the future generation of forests. I have tried to demonstrate that the END is based on a particular interpretation of nature and that it fails to deal with a number of important voices in forestry. First Nations and other rural inhabitants that have populated and shaped forests in the past and continue to do so in many regions of the world are arbitrarily removed from the dualistic conception of forests as separate from society embodied in the END. Climate change also is given a truncated voice in a forest management approach that tries to perpetuate a snap shot of the history of forests for current biodiversity’s sake. But a crucial aspect of interpretive forestry, apart from the critical component, is to propose ways to better serve current needs in forestry.  What is needed from interpretive forestry is that interpretations of nature give voice to those most in need, most affected and arbitrarily silenced by current policies and forest management approaches. My suggestion in this thesis is that forestry should adopt a pragmatic approach to forestry policy making which would be structured by a process of public deliberation. My proposal is subject to some of the limitations encountered in deliberative and stakeholder democracy. That is, the process of stakeholder deliberation and consensus-making can be costly, time consuming, and may obscure and delay decisionmaking. The issues of representativeness, the influence of stakeholders over the process and decision-making, and the devolution of power in decision-making are some of the most 128  thorny problems that have yet to be solved in deliberative and stakeholder democracy— although many scholars are trying to figure it out (Dryzek, 2005; Fischer, 1990; Goodin, 2000; O’Neill, 2001; Paelhke, 2003; Young, 2000). Indeed, the process of public deliberation and learning-by-doing that I propose in this thesis is a messy, value-laden process which is the opposite of authoritarian, top-down, and/or technocratic management. However, a limitation of my work is that my pragmatic proposal for forestry is highly theoretical and I have not explored how it should be operationalyzed. This is an important question that I will have to address in my future work.  6.2.2 The Trouble with Dialogue  Following Richardson (1998), I consider writing “as a method of inquiry, a way of finding out about yourself and your topic”. As Richardson notes, polyvocal and other experimental texts challenge the traditional “view from everywhere”; these textual productions dispel the myth and the authority of the omnipotent and omnipresent understanding of the researcher (1998). Furthermore, dialogical texts provide multiple avenues of interpretation: they indicate the authors’ interpretations while leaving flexibility for other interpretations to be drawn (Clifford, 1986). The political and ethical implications of engaging in dialogue in scientific practice are manifold, but they include to be sure the risks of the author to dominate the conversation, thereby silencing the voice of the participants to the study which tends to limit and sidestep the dialogical process of producing shared meaning and constructing a better common world.  Furthermore, for a dialogical process to be productive of insights there needs to be reciprocity, openness, and a desire to confront tacit assumptions that prevent the flow of ideas from taking unprecedented paths. A limitation of this study is that I cannot confirm nor even suppose that participants in this study shared my disposition towards dialogue. Hence, I cannot claim that what these people have shared with me is indeed what they actually think about the subject or what they thought I wanted to hear or some agenda they were trying to pursue alongside their response. In fact, the interviews varied in lengths of time and depth; 129  some people, it was clear, readily engaged in a dialogue and genuinely participated in the “spirit” of the study. Others, it was also clear, thought little of the subject, the intent of the study, the methods used, and the shape the results would take—essays are radically different than the normal “deliverables” expected from quantitative research in forestry. These rather doubtful and sometimes negative attitudes towards the project could have biased the results, the quantitative comparisons, and the interpretations of the END I drew from the interviews if participants’ responses embody an adversarial stance.  Another limitation of the study is the potential for confusion when speaking about scientists being in “dialogue” with nature. Dialogue and language may be interpreted in various ways, each having potentially significant implications for the use of these terms outside their human, social context. The work of Bruno Latour (2004), and actor-network theorists more generally, is insightful in this respect. Actor-network theory reinterprets the meaning of agency and Latour, in particular, proposes a number of different metaphors to break down the nature/culture dichotomy and other dualisms that pervade politics and sciences. His work, and that of other actor-network theorists, opens a door to reconceptualizing the meaning of action, language, and dialogue to include the voice of nonhuman actors. This exercise in redefining terms is not simply a matter of inventing a new vocabulary; it is a way to reinterpret what is actually happening— a matter of fact. However, it is to be expected that any change to foundational concepts, such as (arguably) language and dialogue, are likely to be resisted, challenged, and rejected unless the context of their reinterpretation is recognized. Hence, in my thesis, the use of dialogue as a way to describe the interaction between forestry scientists and nature may be objected to on the basis of a strictly human or symbolic perspective. This poses the risk of undermining my efforts to bring a greater awareness of the interpretive nature of forestry sciences by engendering resistance to my message at the onset.  130  6.3 A Critique of the END  The END, which was developed as a strategy to conserve biological diversity, is a strongly compelling idea in forestry: who would question Science and Nature as legitimate authorities in a discipline that prides itself for its scientific rigor and inspiration from nature? A few quotes from classic texts should be sufficient to illustrate the point:  The central task of applied professional forestry is to take a parcel of forestland, decide how to treat it to grow trees and other forest outputs, implement the treatment, and predict when and how much wood and other products will result. Doing this well is the test. If we cannot decide what to do or if we cannot predict what will happen when we implement a treatment, our claim to professional status is more hype than substance. (Davis and Jonhson, 1987: 25)  Adaptive management [of forest ecosystems] is the only logical approach under the circumstances of uncertainty and the continued accumulation of knowledge. Management must be designed to enhance the learning process and provide systematic feedback from monitoring and research to practice. (Kohm and Franklin, 1997: 5)  The majority of the best [silvicultural] choices are imitations of those natural communities that have grown well in nature. (Smith, 1962: 10)  We should remind ourselves, however, that the rise of scientific forestry was tied to centralized-state making initiatives in which the disorderly array of human and non-human nature was contained, separated, and ordered to facilitate state administration of natural resources (Scott, 1998). Historically, Science and Nature in the hands of state policy makers and enlisted professional scientists have been used to maintain the status quo and reinforce destructive, oppressive and unjust social practices and states of affairs in forestry. Such topdown, command and control of natural resource management, the attempt to “control ecosystems and in socioeconomic institutions that respond to erratic or surprising ecosystem behavior with more control”, has been likened to a pathology (Holling and Meffe, 1996).  Indeed, the unreflexive deployment of scientific theories such as the “self-organization of ecosystems” (Holling, 1992) and the “shifting mosaic steady-state” (Bormann and Likens, 131  1979) in forest management has emphasized the role of complexity in engendering the “systematic organization” of forests at the expense of the role of individual agents such as human beings in participating, interacting and transforming so-called natural ecosystems (Keller, 2005). I agree with the geographer David Harvey when he says: The danger here is of accepting, often without knowing it, concepts that preclude radical critique. One of the most pervasive and difficult to surmount barriers is that which insists on separating out “nature” and “society” as coherent entities. What is surprising here is that even the deepest and the most biocentric of ecologists at some level accepts this distinction (or worse still directly appeals to it by depicting society, for example, as a “cancer” let loose upon the planet). By insisting upon a prior dissolution of the problem into freely flowing socio-ecological processes, I do not mean to imply that the particular kind of “permanence” we call “society” has no meaning discursively or practically or that situations do not arise in which it makes sense to isolate that particular permanence for analysis. But I do want to insist that radical critique keep open precisely the way in which this entity (if such it is) gets constituted out of socio-ecological processes. (Harvey, 1996: 140)  In other words, maintaining the Nature/Culture dichotomy in forestry prevents us from partaking in a radical critique of the social, political, and economic processes that have led to the present problematic situations in forestry, including but not restricted to the loss of biodiversity. At the same time, the Nature/Culture dichotomy supports the claim that there are given “natural limits” in ecosystems. The familiar refrain is that ecosystems can resist and restore themselves after disturbance but only within bounds, or alternatively, that only a limited supply of entities, i.e. resources, can be extracted without incurring irreversible changes in ecosystems. “Natural limits” in nature are the equivalent of the “range of natural variability” claimed, by proponents of the END, to be a normative benchmark for forestry practices.  The argument that Nature has limits, an extension of the Malthusian tradition, is often construed ahistorically, apolitically, and asocially. As such it is a misleading interpretation of nature: Nature as a definite and identifiable set of entities, disconnected and reified from the processes that have given rise to it, is threatened by an overabundance of people—either selfish, impatient, and myopic hyperconsumers of the first world or poor inhabitants of the developing world.  From this perspective, if nothing is done now to stop the plundering of 132  Nature, Nature as we know it might collapse and so could our self-organizing market economy. Add to this the danger of losing countless species, rural economies, cultural identities, and possibilities for future generations. But what is missing from this account is how these “natural limits” have changed throughout history, with various social goals, technological advances, under different political and economic systems, and in a vast array of cultures. Hence, interpreting Nature’s limits as given prevents us from recognizing that “limits” are “a social relation within nature (including human society) rather than some externally imposed necessity” (Harvey, 1996: 147). For the END this means that the “natural range of variability” is a social construction, not a set of standards imposed by Nature itself. Indeed, the END arose out of a number of societal relations and responses to non-human nature which resulted in a set of ecosystem conditions having been chosen and normalized from numerous intersecting and differing spatial and time scales, justified and naturalized by appeal to evolutionary theory and non-equilibrium ecological theory for the purpose of protecting a value, i.e. biodiversity.  Likewise, there are good reasons to be suspicious about using Science to justify a particular forest management approach. Science does not create theories to explain Nature in a value-free vacuum—what are sciences if not, in part, the skilful deployment of metaphors to try to grasp a changing reality? Yes, the sciences describe nature, but they do so by the use of language—a powerful yet limited tool. Theories, ideas, concepts, and categories are expressed in words that express what we think reality is, but that do not mirror it. An interpretation of nature is like a seedling that grows out of specific interactions with soil particles, nutrients, fungi, sun rays, and rain drops. The seedling is not the mirror image of soil particles, nutrients, fungi, sun rays, and rain drops even if it is made out of these elements. Moreover, as the seedling grows, not only does it change, but it changes that with which it interacts—reality.  To enlist Science as the arbiter of Truth and Necessity is to deny its interpretive nature. In the context of the forestry sciences, to interpret nature is to assemble cultural resources such as metaphors to understand, explain, predict, and manipulate forests. A short list of key words should indicate the forestry sciences’ metaphorical use of language: productivity, food 133  webs, hierarchy, succession, competition, community, population, gradient, sink, source, etc. It is not given then that forests are eco-systems rather than communities, self-organizing adaptive systems, rather than networks of loosely related actors, and that humans are disturbances rather than agents, etc. A metaphor is a figure of speech in which a descriptive term is transferred to some object different from, but analogous to, that to which it is properly applicable (OED). This does not mean, however, as Lakoff and Johnson (2003) point out, that metaphors refer simply to the ways we speak—a mere matter of words. Metaphor is about conceptualization and reasoning. Thus, some metaphors may be very useful in helping us understand forests, but it is important to remember that the use of metaphor in science is always accompanied by an important disclaimer: scientific metaphors are not mirror images of reality; they are interpretive and constructive heuristics. Hence, the partiality and provisional nature of metaphors in science means that given changing historical contexts and needs, better metaphors can be deployed to better understand forests and in some case, better utilize them. As the pragmatist Hilary Putnam put it, “an essential part of the “language games” that we play in science, in morals, and in the law is the invention of new concepts, and their introduction into general use; new concepts carry in their wake the possibility of formulating new truths.” (Putnam, 2002: 109)  Some metaphors, however, appear to have become deep and permanent ruts in the thought processes of ecological scientists—witness the “balance of nature” metaphor. That may not be surprising for as Egerton (1973) pointed out, the “balance of nature” metaphor has been present in some form or another in most cosmologies. In ecology, this metaphor has been useful in translating the idea of equilibrium in population dynamics, but its positive/negative connotations have coloured what had been a value-neutral idea originally framed in mathematical terms. The mathematical description of the flux amidst the relative constancy of population dynamics became a statement of the desirable and “natural” state of a stable population equilibrium (Cuddington, 2001). But the “balance of nature” metaphor also served to arbitrarily exclude observations of destructive events and other “nonconforming” events: The “balance of nature” metaphor was used to translate the idea of mathematical equilibrium for less mathematically astute ecologists. In the application of this metaphor, some characteristics of  134  mathematical equilibrium were suppressed; ecologists have tended to reject or ignore those types of mathematical equilibrium that don’t cohere well with the “balance of nature” metaphor, such as population extinctions, or extremely large oscillations in [population] density. (Cuddington, 2001: 476).  Despite the fact that the “balance of nature” metaphor has been critiqued extensively (Botkin 1989), it remains a persuasive metaphor for ecologists fascinated with disturbance, the selforganization and the complexity of ecosystems (Bodin and Wiman, 2007).  In a nonequilibrium view of ecosystems, the role of chance events such as disturbances and spatial heterogeneity is emphasized (Pickett and White, 1985; Wu, 1995). In this perspective, ecological systems are considered to be open and controlled by both extrinsic and intrinsic factors. In principle nonequilibrium systems lack a stable equilibrium point as they are shaped by stochastic events. Interestingly, however, even the nonequilibrium view can incorporate the “balance of nature” metaphor when it is interpreted as a “shifting mosaic steady-state”: The “shifting mosaic steady-state” conceptualizes the landscape as a system in which, although the vegetation present at specific points in the landscape is dynamic, the proportion of the landscape in each successional state remains invariant; in other words, the landscape is stationary. (Perry, 2002: 346)  The idea that the landscape may be in a steady-state at a certain scales of observation have proved difficult to test empirically and are deemed at most rare occurrences in landscapes (Perry 2002). Nevertheless, in Canada, it is in the context of a “shifting mosaic steady-state” theory that the END has been conceptualized. Indeed, the END has been highly recommended in fire-prone landscapes such as Canada’s Clay Belt precisely because such a “shifting mosaic steady-state” is assumed to occur. Given that: The statistical distribution of the patch age structure of the landscape mosaic and the time intervals between successive fires may be calculated, it is assumed that the distribution of the return interval and the proportional composition of the landscape remains approximately constant over time. (Perry 2002, 346)  According to Bergeron and his colleagues (2007) there is a “natural mosaic” of forests in or near the Clay Belt which contains more than 50% of forests older than 100 years, and more than 15% of forest older than 200 years. Such a “natural mosaic”, if it were to guide forest 135  management practices, would require achieving by means of silvicultural treatments and reserves a similar amount of “old growth” forests as would be “naturally” occurring.  There seems to be an important assumption underlying the END which easily gets lost from view when we focus on its scientific basis and its technical articulations. The assumption is that the “balance of nature” metaphor holds true for forest ecosystems in fireprone landscapes. But the END frames the evolution of forests within a restricted time scale, a time scale that externalizes disturbances such as the massive ice sheets that once covered the Clay Belt that cannot fit into the neat theoretical idea of a “shifting mosaic steady-state”. Granted, the metaphor of “balance of nature” may be useful in some regards, there is such a “thing” as the boreal forest that is a fire-prone ecosystem with recognizable patterns of structure and function, but these ecosystems conditions are not given, normative benchmarks for forest management, they are a snapshot in a historical continuum of change.  Moreover, although END proponents have been championing the cause of biodiversity conservation in forest management, their discourse serves to maintain the status quo in a crucial respect. Habitat loss and degradation are the primary proximate cause of biodiversity loss worldwide (Wood et al., 2000). Hence, in the context of biodiversity conservation within forestry, one would think that the destruction or encroachment of forest habitat as a result of timber harvesting would be at the core of any proposed management scheme to protect biodiversity. In fact, it is, for the END is concerned with the re-creation of the structural features of “old growth” forests through the proper use of silvicultural techniques to compensate for the loss of old forest habitats by timber extraction. However, the END is an example of the perspective of “having your cake and eating it too”. Indeed, the fact that some of the lead proponents of the END in Canada assure us that the END will incur “negligible impact on timber supply” seems to beg the question of how much forests should be harvested and whether it would be wiser, from a social, economic, and ethical point of view to reduce harvest rates to protect biodiversity rather than invest in the END (Bergeron et al., 2007)? By maintaining the status quo with respect to timber supply, the END internalizes the current politico-economic definition and use of forests all the while naturalizing it. What results is a convoluted attempt to maintain the nature/culture dichotomy 136  within forestry, i.e. assuming the givenness of nature’s limits and human agency as a disturbance, while trying surreptitiously to naturalize silviculture.  The END as the embodiment of the nature/culture dichotomy and an ethics of “following nature” in forestry becomes ironically spurious in the context of climate change. That is, the current climatic transition that is now occurring, due to human agency, has lead to a more thorough investigation of the historical impacts of climates on forests. This longterm interpretation of the earth’s climate and regional evolution of landscapes show a tremendous range of variability within which current conditions are “normal” to the extent that other quick and radical shifts in climate change have occurred in the past (Stromm, 2007: 68). From this perspective, human agency appears not to be unnatural or unprecedented in the earth’s history, for as I mentioned in the introduction, cyanobacteria and plants have transformed the world as thoroughly as we have.  On the one hand, climate change is an excluded voice from our traditional interpretations of forests within forestry, which is now demanding to be taken into consideration in the construction of our common world. Climate change, then, might signal the end of scientific forestry as embodied in the faith (Duerr and Duerr, 1975) that Science has an unmediated access to reality—which so happens to keep apart an entity called Nature from another entity called Society. Climate change is bothersome in another way, it reminds us that our metaphors of nature are truly provisional, that humans have lived mostly in a “hot house” (Fagan, 2004; Stromm, 2007), in which the relative stability of our climate and vegetation could be counted on, but that the near future may require that we deploy other metaphors than the “stability of nature” as a state of affairs remove from human agency.  On the other hand, it is not that we cannot learn about non-human nature as we interact with “it” through scientific practices, learn what has been included or excluded from its purview and learn how the various collectives that historically have been named “nature” have arisen. Clearly, we can gain by looking to the past historical evolution of forests an understanding of how humans and non-humans have interacted and transformed each other in the process, and it would seem wise not to ignore the consequence of past human agency 137  in the planet’s ecology—we might learn to shape and take shape within nature in less destructive ways.  6.4 A Description of Interpretive Forestry  My work, to date, has aimed at bringing about a greater awareness of the interpretive nature of forestry sciences by focusing on the ethics and values underlying the “Emulation of Natural Disturbance” forest management approach in Canada. I have been doing the “leg work” of trying to articulate the ethical implications of choosing to include or exclude particular humans and non-humans from our interpretations of forests. In addition to trying to illustrate how ethics shape our interpretations of forests, I have used a pragmatic perspective to dissolve the fact/values and Nature/Culture dichotomies in forestry sciences and to argue for a more democratic approach to forestry policy. From my point of view, a pragmatic method of deliberation and problem solving in environmental policy is an extension of interpretive forestry.  Indeed, interpretive forestry works with provisional, partial, and contextual scientific theories of nature. As the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Pierce once put it, we do not have or need a firm foundation in science, we are on swampy ground, but that is what keeps us moving (Putnam 2002, 102). In its deployment of universalist claims to knowledge, i.e. forests are adaptive eco-systems, interpretive forestry is mindful that these models and metaphors may need re-interpretation and re-construction if they fail to consider important but neglected actors and do not respond adequately to our interactions with forests. To take the analogy I used above about a seedling being like an interpretation of nature: if the seedling happened to grow in soil conditions that at one time were moist, with abundant nutrients, sunlight, and rain but as it continued to grow its reality started to change, the soil became dry and exhausted, the sun scorching hot, rainfall a fraction of what it used to be— would you say that the now very old stunted tree is adapted to reality? Does it function well? Is it not, rather, merely borrowing time, until “reality” knocks it off what once was a sure footing? In the context of interpretive forestry, it seems that instead of planting one kind of 138  seedling and hope that it will “fit in” with reality in perpetuity, perhaps we should, at least imaginatively, try multiple species of seedlings, evaluate their potential fit with current reality, try to assess how these seedlings would change reality and themselves as they grew, and engage in dialogue and deliberation as to what kind of seedlings we want to live with— since we and the seedlings interact in and shape the same reality?  Interpretive forestry does not begin with a blank slate, an empty landscape in which it can construct whatever interpretations of nature it chooses. We work with past interpretations of nature, embodied in our current landscapes, and within this morass we try to re-interpret and re-construct more suitable landscapes for our purposes, which have, of late, included the interests and voices of non-human nature. But we should remind ourselves that the actions we take today to change current forests conditions will have long lasting effects—stunted trees can persist for hundreds of years before they are forced to collapse. We would do well to “mind our options” as Dewey says, to keep our possibilities open, to learn from the landscape what the consequences of our past actions have resulted in, and when new needs and problems arise we should be prepared to reconstruct better interpretations of nature. To claim, though, that we could construct better interpretations of nature assumes that we seek guidance from some idea of what is good, right, adequate and plausible. Values and ethics are an integral part of interpretive forestry, but as I will argue, their task is also interpretive.  6.5 In Defense of Pragmatism, Value Pluralism, and Interpretation  A common complaint against a process-based, pragmatic approach to decisionmaking is that it lacks a foundation: what ethics and whose values will guide the process? Is it all up for grabs? Is situational ethics the name of the game? The central problem with pragmatism, it is claimed, is that it takes interests for granted: “it doesn’t provide for a way of judging whether they are worth pursuing apart from the consequences of acting on them” (Menand, 2001: 375). The quick and short answer to these critiques is that pragmatism is not meant to construct a foundational system of ethics, in fact pragmatism addresses some of the 139  problems of proposing a unified theory of the Good—the disconnect and inappropriateness of groundless universalistic abstract theories of the Good in dealing with actual problematic situations.  From Dewey’s perspective, at least, wants and interests are not abstract ideas to be imposed on the world because they fit within a universalistic theory of the good (Dewey, 1932). The Good, like Nature, is not a given, a set of values and principles that hold true in all circumstances and in all times. Rather, wants and interests arise from actual historical needs and problematic situations (Dewey, 1938). For Dewey the process of valuation is an inquiry, it requires considering what should be done to resolve a particular conflict of interests by using both factual information and ethical guidelines (Dewey, 1939; Thayer, 1973). But Dewey is not solely interested in finding better more efficient means to achieve ends (resolution of problems), but in inquiring about the ends themselves in relation to factual conditions and values (Putnam 2002, 97). Factual information is what grounds pragmatism in reality, the collective of humans and non-humans we are currently living in. For instance, biodiversity conservation in forestry is not a need that arose from an a priori theory of the good of forests, but by the growing awareness that habitat loss and encroachment was killing species. That the killing of species is considered wrong is not a universal value, an a priori position, but a negotiated and debated societal evaluative response to the consequences of human actions. Biodiversity conservation is one among many values now being held at the core of forestry, but that does not mean it trumps all other values or that new problems will not arise and new needs will not require a reinterpretation of our ethics and values, including biodiversity conservation.  Every generation has to face its problems: persistent challenges or old problems transformed into even greater problems, or unprecedented conflicts of interest. Sometimes there is no way to decide whether a particular problem should simply be condemned or approved without qualification, i.e. biodiversity loss, pollution, anthropocentrism, etc. In these situations, a resolution comes about through adjudication. As Hilary Putnam puts it, seeing that an adjudication of a conflict of interests is reasonable (at a given time, for a given purpose, for a given group of people) and that another is unreasonable is like seeing that one 140  reading is better than another (Putnam, 1990: 183). Moral inquiry, then, can be understood as an interpretive endeavor.  Indeed, many environmental philosophers have re-interpreted political philosophies and traditional ethical theories to face current “environmental” needs and problems including animal suffering, deforestation, pollution, environmental justice, sustainability, and biodiversity loss (Brown, 2001; Norton, 2005; Regan, 1983; Rolston III, 1994; ShraderFrechette, 2002; Singer, 1977; Stone, 1988) or have constructed radically new environmental ethics on the basis of a reinterpretation of feminist, spiritual and other theories of the human place in earth’s ecology (Berry, 1988; Callicott, 1987; Merchant, 2004; Naess, 1995; Taylor, 1986; Zimmerman, 1994). Environmental philosophers have been busy reinterpreting and reconstructing ethics to better serve current needs, but in the process some have come to defend their particular ethical theory as the single best theory or way of life to deal with all “environmental” problems. It is an illusion, however, that a single absolute perspective in ethics or an ethical theory could contain and reconcile all the possible perspectives on ethics problems in all their dimensions (Putnam, 1990: 183). Such a position denies the creative potential of dissent in moral deliberation, the role of practical judgment in resolving ethical dilemmas, the importance of difference in the political process of decision-making (Young, 1990; Young, 2000), and it brings to a stall, without due process, what is in fact an openended endeavour—that of constructing a better common world (Latour, 2004).  From a Deweyan perspective, furthermore, the resolution of conflicts of interest is a process of inquiry. We begin by investigating into its causes and how we can avoid the problem. We then search for novel plans of action that are acceptable to those individuals involved in and affected by the conflict. But the search for alternatives is not an individual activity, because individual claims are implicitly social claims: I cannot consistently demand for a plan of action that will serve myself and incur negative consequences on others and expect others to do the same (Gouindlock, 1972). Hence for Dewey, moral deliberation is a democratic process of inquiry aimed at constructing a better, common world (Gouindlock, 1978). Indeed, Dewey assumes that a social process of deliberation will end with a better common world because the process itself will ensure that individual interests are extended to 141  include common interests that span different time and spatial scales, that the search for relevant and helpful values and ethical principles will be systematic and thorough, hence that inappropriate plans of actions will be restrained, and that the needs and interests of those most affected by the problematic situation, are taken into account. Nevertheless, democracy itself is an experiment, one that could be nefarious to building a better common world if the “silent cry” of those in need are not heard, if majorities become tyrants, or if democratic processes are subverted to protect and justify vested interests such as when basic human rights are denied in the name of securing democracy (Human RightsWatch, 2008) or when a technocratic elite engages in pseudo-dialogue with “environmental stakeholders”, giving voice to “non-experts” all the while retaining strict control on the decision-making apparatus (Fischer, 2000).  Furthermore, pragmatic pluralism holds that different kinds of discourse should have a say in the adjudication of conflicts of interests because it is an illusion that there could be just one sort of language game which could be sufficient for the description of all reality (Putman, 2004: 22). Despite claims to the contrary, pluralism of normative (epistemological and ethical) criteria does not lead to mayhem. But that is not to say that producing ethical theories is wrong-headed per se, they are useful to the extent that they generate standards of reasonableness and knowledge of alternative ways of interpreting moral experience (MoodyAdams, 1997). As Michele Moody-Adams (1997: 139) puts it: “Although the aim of moral inquiry will sometimes be to effect a change in practice as well as in self-understanding, moral reflection can generate reform in practice only if it first encourages self-scrutiny.” This is also the role Dewey would like moral deliberation to have, that of contributing to a form of collective self-scrutiny.  Within the context of interpretive forestry, to live with the tension between the fallibility and the factual reality of our accounts of nature requires careful attention to the deployment of factual interpretations of forests in particular environmental and social decision-making situations and the concomitant need to trust the verity of these factual accounts until reasonable doubt demands a revisioning of our particular universalistic claims. As the philosopher Hilary Putnam has pointed out, from a pragmatic point of view, doubt 142  must be justified, not enlisted to contest every single interpretation of nature. Another way to put Putnam’s point is to abide by the following maxim: when in reasonable doubt, reconstruct or reinterpret. That is, from an interpretivist and pragmatic perspective, forestry scientists are responsible, in dialogue with society and non-human nature, in construing interpretations of forests that are not only true but that work for particular times and for particular purposes. From a broader perspective, the process of producing an interpretation of our common world is one that must remain open-ended if it is to makes sense of the world as it unfolds and make sense in the world as we strive to live within it. My own position is one of working towards a greater democratization of the sciences by establishing a ground for dialogue between ethics, interpretive social sciences, and forestry sciences. My hope is that forestry scientists will learn from the insights of pragmatist such as John Dewey and Hilary Putnam while remaining dedicated to constructing better interpretations of forests— for the good of forests including humans and non-humans.  6.6 Conclusion: Weaving Multiple Warps Together While Keeping a Straight Selvedge  One generally weaves with a single warp, threading the woof carefully and sometimes creating, with accumulated skill, patience, and time consuming preparation, a beautiful piece of art. Throughout the ages though, most of what has been produced by individual weavers are practical objects: cloth, blankets, carpets, etc. Few weavers can work with multiple warps and these days they are assisted by computerized looms. But even with the use of computerized looms, weavers are the ones who manually control the straightness of the selvedge. This is, for the beginner, the source of constant tension, focused attention, and frustration. But in the end, all a weaver can do is to learn by doing.  I began this research with a strong commitment to interdisciplinary dialogue, a participative attitude towards interviewing and writing, a pragmatic and pluralist disposition, a fascination with environmental ethics, science studies, and a strong footing in forestry sciences. It was not long into my program that I realized that I had to tread carefully among different disciplines, learning their languages and epistemological assumptions, patiently 143  (for the most part) trying to engage forestry scientists into a dialogue that questioned some of the fundamental epistemological beliefs in the field and their ethical and policy implications, reaching out to other scholars in environmental values and ethics to join in the conversation all the while focusing my interdisciplinary research on a particularly compelling approach to forest management: the emulation of natural disturbance. Although my computer helped manage multiple literatures, keeping the storyline straight has been challenging. What I came up with is not a finished piece of art, nor a conventional “deliverable”. I have begun a lace tapestry, it has many openings, lots of texture and patterns and above all it tells many stories that may be of help in reinterpreting forestry so it can address its current challenges.  144  Bibliography  Bergeron, Y., P. Drapeau, S. Gauthier, and N. Lecomte. 2007. Using knowledge of natural disturbance to support sustainable forest management in the northern Clay Belt. The Forestry Chronicle 83:326-337.  Berry, T. 1988. The Dream of the Earth. Sierra Club Books, San Francisco.  Bodin, P., and B.L.B. Wiman. 2007. The usefulness of stability concepts in forest management when coping with increasing climate uncertainties. Forest Ecology and Forest Management 242:541-552.  Bormann, F.H., and G.E. Likens. 1979. 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University of California Press, Berkeley.  150  Appendices Appendix 1: Interview Schedule 1. Please tell me how you came to work in your profession. -What are your major intellectual influences or those which have helped you formulate your idea of good forest management practices?  2. How would you describe your profession? How long have you worked in your profession?  In the following questions I am interested in how you understand forests and how you approach forest management.  3. Here is a forest management scenario.  A large number of trees dispersed in a national park are plagued with root-rot disease. These trees could be removed to halt any further spread of the disease, but this would entail disturbing the landscape. There are numerous perspectives on this debate, for instance, some stakeholders say that the trees must be removed to preserve the health of the overall forest. Others argue that to remove the trees would have a potentially negative long-term impact on the nutrient capital and productivity of the forest. Still others argue that we should not interfere with the forest’s normal functioning by removing diseased trees.  I would like you to tell me what management approach you think ought to be followed and why.  4. How would you define the emulation of natural disturbance?  151  5. Are the following forest components appropriate to emulate when designing forest management practices? Why or why not? You may add other components if you wish. -  genetic diversity  -  nitrogen cycling  -  tree species  -  age distribution  -  organic matter accumulation  -  dominant carnivores  -  drainage  -  environmental history  -  carbon storage  6. Here is a second forest management scenario.  A group of skiers in Yellowstone National Park have encountered a buffalo that has broken through ice and is unable to get out of the water hole it was trapped in. The skiers reported the sighting to the ranger who felt unsure as to what should be done despite park policy of letting nature take its course. The skiers voiced their concern about leaving this animal to die when it could be saved. The ranger was torn between letting nature take its course and saving this animal which belonged to an endangered species.  Again: I would like you to tell me what management approach you think ought to be followed and why.  7. What have been the most important changes in forest management as far as you can recall? What do you think are the current approaches and how would you like them to change?  8. Here is a third forest management scenario.  152  A herd of deer in a national park has contracted a severe disease which threatens to destroy the herd if action is not taken to treat the disease. The destruction of the deer herd will not severally impact the overall deer population since there is an overabundance of deer in this part of the country. A drug exists which could be administered to the deer by fairly straightforward means and save it from destruction. Hunters in the area are strongly supporting the use of the drug while others are arguing that it would be more natural to let the disease take its course and ‘weed out’ the animals who are not fit to survive. Some concerned citizens are arguing that it would be inhumane to let the deer die while others are concerned about the risks involved in releasing drugs in the environment which may somehow lead to more problems in the long-run.  Again: I would like you to tell me what management approach you think ought to be followed and why.  Now, in the next few questions I am specifically interested in your values.  9. Would you describe yourself as a spiritual or religious person? What do these terms mean to you? - What spiritual movements or religious groups do you belong to? - What is your level of affiliation with these groups? Your level of participation?  10. What role does religion or spirituality play in your work? What about values and ethics? -What role should they play? - Do you feel you have a higher purpose or a calling in doing what you do?  11. Where would it be appropriate for forestry scientists to be explicit about their values and ethics towards nature?  12. My last question has to do with how you perceive different forested landscapes. Please imagine that you are present in the settings in these pictures. Now, I would like you to sort these pictures in: 153  (1) As many categories as you want but not based on your preferences. Then please tell me why you divided them into these categories. (2) In three categories: forested landscapes that you most like, those you like the least, and those that are neutral to you. Then please tell me why you divided the most and least favorite forested landscapes into these categories. (3) In the last step, let’s take these three categories and divided them following a normal distribution.  Is there anything else you want to add, stress or clarify in your responses in the interview? What is your overall reaction to the things we have discussed today?  To finish, I would like to as you a few demographic questions: What year were you born? What is your ethnicity? What degrees do you hold and where did you obtain them?  154  Appendix 2: UBC Research Ethics Board's Certificates of Approval  155  156  

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