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kâ-yôskâtahk ôma nêhiyawêwin : the representation of intentionality in Plains Cree 2008

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        kâ-yôskâtahk ôma nêhiyawêwin: THE REPRESENTATION OF INTENTIONALITY IN PLAINS CREE   by  JEFFREY THOMAS MÜHLBAUER  B.A., The University of Wisconsin. 2001     A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY   in  THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  (Linguistics)        THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA  (Vancouver)     June 2008  © Jeffrey Thomas Mühlbauer, 2008  ii Abstract  This thesis considers the reference system of Plains Cree, an Algonquian language spoken in Canada. I argue that the referential system of this language can be understood as coding distinctions in extentionality; it distinguishes between referents that possess perspectives (‘intentional’) and referents that do not (‘extentional’). With respect to perspectival possession, Plains Cree distinguishes four referential classes: (i) inherently extentional “Inanimate” referents, (ii) contextually extentional “Obviative” referents, (iii) contextually intentional “Proximate” referents, and (iv) unspecified “Animate” referents. I then show that the referential class “Obviative” is decompositional; it is constructed out of components that code referential dependency, which is the confluence of structural ordering and perspectival embedding. Finally, I consider the methodological issues raised by the study of referential types, showing how different data-collection methods interact with the semantics of perspectival possession.                              iii Table of Contents   Abstract ...........................................................................................................................................ii Table of Contents ...........................................................................................................................iii List of Tables ..................................................................................................................................x List of Symbols and Abbreviations ..............................................................................................xii Acknowledgements .....................................................................................................................xiii Citation ..........................................................................................................................................xv  1. Introduction: Making truth happen ...............................................................................1 1.1. Introduction: kâ-yôskâtahk ôma nêhiyawêwin..............................................................1 1.2. How does “truth happen” in Plains Cree? ....................................................................2 1.2.1 The “Calvin and Hobbes” problem in Plains Cree ........................................3 1.2.2 The “6-Degrees of Separation” problem in Plains Cree ............................…5 1.3. Proposal: Individuals related to perspectives ......................................................…....6 1.3.1. Perspective possession .............................................................................….6 1.3.2. Discourse Representation Theory with perspectives ................................…8 1.3.3. Proposal: Four kinds of referents in Plains Cree ....................................... 11 1.3.4. Proposal: Constructing obviation via referential dependency ................…16 1.4. Relation to previous work .....................................................................................….17 1.4.1. Models of subjective meaning ....................................................................17 1.4.2. Perspectives vs. possible worlds .................................................................19 1.5. The Plains Cree language ...........................................................................................21 1.5.1. Sources ..................................................................................................…21 1.5.2. Orthography ................................................................................................23 1.6. Outline of the thesis ...................................................................................................24  2. The Form, Content, and Context of Animacy...............................................................26 2.1. Proposal …................................................................................................................26 2.2. Previous accounts .....................................................................................................30  2.2.1. Syntactic accounts of Plains Cree ...............................................................30  2.2.2. “Inanimate” as semantically specified ........................................................33  2.2.3. “Inanimate” as extentional ..........................................................................34  iv  2.2.4. Animacy is syntactically determined ..........................................................37  2.2.5. The data set........................................................................................…......38 2.3 The form of animacy: Distributed throughout the syntax .........................................38 2.3.1. Animacy is not specified in the nominal......................................................42 2.3.2. Animacy contrasts are not suppletive..........................................................44 2.3.3. The necessity of homophony ......................................................................46 2.3.4. Animacy coding does not determine the distribution of bare nouns...........49 2.3.5. Animacy coding is not asymmetric..............................................................52  2.3.51 Animacy without nominals.............................................................53  2.3.52 Animacy without verbs...................................................................56 2.3.6. Conclusion: Animacy is distributed.............................................................58 2.4. The content of animacy: “Inanimates” are inherently extentional .............................59 2.4.1. Asymmetries in the interpretation of the two classes .................................62 2.4.2. Abstract nominals are always “Inanimate”..................................................64 2.4.3. Extentionality in the verb system: “Inanimates” can’t think, speak, or feel......................66 2.4.31. Expletive arguments must be “inanimate” ...................................67 2.4.32. Psych verbs prohibit “inanimate” arguments................................69 2.4.33. Reflexive verbs prohibit “inanimate” arguments .........................72   2.4.4.  Animates are unspecified ..........................................................................73   2.4.5.  Only the “inanimate” form has specification ............................................75   2.4.6.  “Inanimate” nominals are inherently extentional .....................................79 2.5. The context of animacy: Relativization to individual perspectives............................81 2.5.1. “Inanimates” as preconditions on embeddings ...........................................82 2.5.2. Relativizing to the Speaker: Changes in belief ...........................................84 2.5.3. Relativization to the Hearer: Effects of common ground ...........................86 2.5.4. Relativizing to third persons: Perspective shifts .........................................90 2.6. Conclusion .................................................................................................................97  3.  The Form, Content, and Context of Obviation.............................................................98 3.1. Proposal: Obviation as contextual extentionality ......................................................98 3.2. Previous accounts .....................................................................................................102 3.2.1. Obviation as discourse, not argument structure.........................................102  v 3.2.2. Obviation as a construct, not a primitive...................................................105 3.2.3. “Obviative” is specified, “proximate” is contextually determined............105 3.2.4. The meaning of obviation.........................................................................107 3.2.5. The data set ...............................................................................................108 3.3. The form of obviation: no dedicated “obviative” marking .....................................108 3.3.1. The nominal suffix –a................................................................................110  3.3.11 The traditional view: –a marks “obviative”.................................111  3.3.12 The current analysis: –a marks extentional referents...................111  3.3.13 Modelling the “obviative” effects of –a.......................................114 3.3.2. The demonstrative suffix –ihi....................................................................115  3.3.21 The traditional view: –ihi marks “obviative”...............................117  3.3.22 The current analysis: –ihi marks extentional referents.................118  3.3.23 Modelling the “obviative” effects of –ihi.....................................120 3.3.3. The theme sign –ê–....................................................................................120 3.3.31 The traditional view: –ê– marks “third person interactions”........121  3.3.32 The current analysis: –ê– marks extentional objects....................122  3.3.33 Modelling the “obviative” effects of –ê–......................................126 3.3.4. The predicate suffix –im–..........................................................................127 3.3.41 The traditional view: –im– marks “obviative” objects.................128  3.3.42 The current analysis: –im– marks argument disjunction..............128  3.3.43 Modelling the “obviative” effects of –im–....................................133 3.3.5. The predicate suffix –yi–...........................................................................137 3.3.51. The traditional view: –yi– marks “obviative” arguments ...........139 3.3.52. The current analysis: –yi– marks disjoint subjects .....................139 3.3.53. Modelling the “obviative” effects of –yi–....................................144 3.3.6.  Summary: The derivative nature of obviation.........................................148 3.4. The content of obviation: contextual extentionality ................................................148 3.4.1. Intentional verbs restricted “obviative” reference ....................................154 3.4.11. “Obviative” referents are restricted with psych verbs ................155 3.4.12. “Obviative” referents are restricted with speaking verbs ...........158   3.4.2. “Obviative” referents lack awareness .......................................................161    3.4.21. If contextual absence, referent is “obviative” .............................162    3.4.22. An “obviative” referent that is present is unaware .....................166  vi 3.4.3. The emergence of “proximate” via contrast with “obviative” ..................168 3.4.31. “Obviative” as context for “proximate”.......................................169 3.4.32. Paradigmatic contrast of “animate” with “obviative” .................172 3.4.4. Summary: “Obviative” as contextual extentionality ................................173 3.5. The context of obviation: Speaker knowledge of intentions ...................................174 3.5.1. “Obviative” perspectives force Speaker dissociation ...............................178 3.5.2. “Obviative” perspectives force invented “proximate” ..............................179 3.5.3. Obviation patterns with indirect evidentiality ...........................................182 3.5.31. “Obviative” psych arguments and indirect knowledge ..............186 3.5.32. “Obviative” speakers and indirect knowledge ............................188 3.5.33. “Obviative” referents and the indirect evidential êsa .................196 3.6. Conclusion ...............................................................................................................198  4.  Referential dependency in Plains Cree........................................................................200  4.1. A structural and a semantic condition on referential dependency ...........................200 4.2. Previous work ..........................................................................................................204 4.2.1. Structural conditions on anaphora.............................................................204 4.2.2. Clausal dependency and referential dependency.......................................206 4.2.3. Possession and grammatical obviation .....................................................210 4.2.4. The data set................................................................................................211 4.3. Cross-predicate dependencies and obviation ...........................................................212 4.3.1. Nominal ordering and referential dependency ..........................................213    4.3.11. Nominal orderings in texts ..........................................................215    4.3.12. Elicitation and nominal-nominal ordering ..................................217 4.3.2. The suffix -yi- constructs referential dependency .....................................223 4.3.21. Structural conditions on -yi- ........................................................225 4.3.211. –yi– is c-commanded by its antecedent ........................226 4.3.212. –yi– is linearly preceded by its antecedent....................227 4.3.22. Semantic conditions on –yi– .......................................................231 4.3.221. The antecedent of –yi– must be in previous discourse..232 4.3.222. The antecedent of –yi– must be animate .......................233 4.3.223. The antecedent of –yi– must have a perspective ..........233 4.3.224. Propositional attitude verbs force –yi–..........................236  vii 4.3.23. Conclusion: -yi- constructs referential dependency ....................238 4.4. Predicate-internal dependencies and obviation ........................................................239 4.4.1 Possession as referential dependency ........................................................241 4.4.11. Structural subordination of possessums to possessors ................242 4.4.12. Perspectival embedding with possession ....................................245 4.4.121. “Inanimate” referents cannot be possessors ..................246 4.4.122. Possessors are always existential ..................................247 4.4.123. Possession blocks attitudes towards possessum .......... 249 4.4.124. Possession and speech act participants .........................251 4.4.125. Changing possession changes the Speaker....................254 4.4.13. Conclusion: Possession is referential dependence ......................258 4.4.2. Theme signs and referential dependency...................................................259 4.4.21. The direct theme sign –ê– constructs referential dependency.....262 4.4.211. Structural conditions on –ê– .........................................263 4.4.212. Semantic conditions on –ê– ..........................................265 4.4.2121. –ê– occurs with perspectivally-embedded objects .....................................................266 4.4.2122. –ê– cannot occur when the subject is not a perspective holder ................................272 4.4.213. Conclusion: –ê– constructs referential dependency .....276 4.4.22. The inverse theme –ikw constructs referential dependency ........277 4.4.221. Structural conditions on –ikw .......................................279 4.4.2211. Evidence for IP position of theme sign –ikw...279 4.4.2212. Evidence for structural relations of –ikw ........282 4.4.222. Semantic conditions on –ikw ........................................291 4.4.2221. Semantic restrictions on topic op ....................292 4.4.2222. Perspective-less properties of –ikw .................296 4.4.223. Conclusion: –ikw as referential dependency .................301 4.5. Conclusion ...............................................................................................................301 5.  Eliciting obviation and animacy .................................................................................303 5.1. The place of methodology in linguistic analysis.......................................................303 5.2. Fieldwork in linguistics.............................................................................................303  viii 5.3. Obviation and animacy data fluctuates in elicitation ...............................................304 5.4. A taxonomy of elicitation tasks and their effects on obviation and animacy ..........307 5.4.1. Translation tasks .......................................................................................307 5.4.11. Confounds in translation: Non-correlation and priming .............308 5.4.12. Obviation in translation tasks .....................................................309 5.4.13. Animacy in translation tasks .......................................................310 5.4.2. Judgment tasks ..........................................................................................312 5.4.21. Confounds in judgment tasks: Metalinguistics ...........................314 5.4.22. Judgment tasks and obviation .....................................................315 5.4.23. Animacy in judgment tasks .........................................................316 5.4.3. Supporting judgment tasks: Utterance-in-context tasks ...........................319 5.4.31. Obviation in utterance-in-context tasks ......................................321 5.4.32. Animacy in utterance-in-context tasks ........................................323 5.4.4. Correction tasks  .......................................................................................324 5.4.41. Confounds in correction tasks: Un-noticed corrections ..............325 5.4.42. Obviation in correction tasks ......................................................328 5.4.43. Animacy in correction tasks ........................................................329 5.4.5. Analysis tasks ...........................................................................................331 5.4.51. Confounds: Decontextualizing forms, pseudo-linguistics ..........331 5.4.52. Obviation in analysis tasks .........................................................332 5.4.53. Animacy in analysis tasks ...........................................................333 5.5. Elicitation and impoverished context ......................................................................334 5.5.1. The proliferation of simple animates in elicitation ...................................335 5.5.2. Obtaining “obviative” forms in elicitation.................................................338 5.5.3. Contextless obviation = “Inanimate” ........................................................339 5.6. The consultant as linguist .........................................................................................341 5.6.1. The “experimentalist” position: Consultant as data bank .........................341 5.6.2.  The “cooperative” position ......................................................................342 5.6.3. The two types of fieldwork and obviation data ........................................343 5.7. Conclusion: Elicitation as performance, not competence ........................................346  6. Conclusion and Further Research................................................................................347 6.1. Conclusion: Constructing intentionality in Plains Cree ...........................................347  ix 6.2. Approaches to –a via the verbal suffix –i : Plurality and obviation ........................348  6.2.1. The “plural” reading .................................................................................350  6.2.2. The habitual reading .................................................................................350   6.2.3. The irrealis reading ...................................................................................351 6.2.4. Conclusion ................................................................................................352 6.3. –yi– across Cree........................................................................................................353 6.3.1. All Cree languages have a reflex of –yi–...................................................354 6.3.2. –yi– occurs with “obviative” possessors....................................................354 6.3.3. –yi– occurs with intransitive subjects........................................................355 6.3.4. –yi– occurs with transitive subjects...........................................................355 6.3.5. –yi– is insensitive to animacy....................................................................357 6.4. A comparison of the Plains Cree system to Athabaskan..........................................359   6.4.1. Athabaskan yi-/bi- are pronominals, Plains Cree’s are not........................362   6.4.2. Plains Cree –yi– and Athabaskan yi- code disjoint reference……............364   6.4.3. Plains Cree –yi– and Athabaskan yi- differ in transitivity.........................366   6.4.4. A and A’ dependencies. ............................................................................367  Glossary ....................................................................................................................................370  References .................................................................................................................................377                 x List of Tables  Table 1.1. Two conditions on referential dependency ..................................................................17 Table 1.2. The forms of obviation and their dependencies ...........................................................17 Table 2.1. Summary of animacy coding for verb, demonstrative, and nominal .......................... 39 Table 2.2. Summary of animacy shifting for the Severed Head story ......................................... 43 Table 2.3. Forms commonly found in both animacy classes ....................................................... 46 Table 2.4. Summary of predictions for three hypotheses ............................................................ 59 Table 2.5. Semantic gaps among verbs ........................................................................................ 70 Table 2.6. A summary of “inanimate”/“animate” shifting for the severed head story ................ 91 Table 3.1. No dedicated obviation forms ..................................................................................... 99 Table 3.2. “Inanimate” plural and “obviative” across Algonquian ........................................... 113 Table 3.3.  Canonical demonstrative organization in Plains Cree ............................................. 115 Table 3.4. Demonstrative organization of S2 ............................................................................ 116 Table 3.5. “Inanimate” plural and “obviative” demonstratives across Algonquian .................. 119 Table 3.6. Independent order distribution of -ê- ........................................................................ 125 Table 3.7. No -ê- in conjunct order ............................................................................................ 125 Table 3.8. Distribution of -im- with “obviative” arguments ...................................................... 127 Table 3.9. Distribution of –yi– with “obviative” arguments ...................................................... 139 Table 3.10. Distribution of –yi– with “inanimate” arguments ................................................... 140 Table 3.11. “Obviative” forms and their patterning .................................................................. 148 Table 3.12. Summary for psych verbs built with –êyim/–êyiht/–êyimo ..................................... 157 Table 3.13. Summary of other psych verb forms ........................................................................157 Table 3.14. Summary of preverb forms ......................................................................................157 Table 3.15. A Summary of psych verbs in 3 texts ......................................................................158 Table 3.16. Speaking verbs and obviation ..................................................................................159 Table 3.17. Intransitive itwê- and obviation .............................................................................. 160 Table 3.18. “Obviative” referents and speaking in a text ...........................................................160 Table 3.19. “Obviative” reference shifts when topic event shifts ...............................................163 Table 3.20. Obviated animal in a story .......................................................................................170 Table 3.21. Chart of obviation for modified re-telling .............................................................. 171 Table 3.22. Categorization of “obviative” with psych verbs ......................................................186 Table 3.23. Transitive it- and obviation ......................................................................................190  xi Table 3.24. Transitive wîhtamaw- and obviation ........................................................................191 Table 3.25. Transitive speaking and obviation in a text ............................................................ 192 Table 3.26. “Obviative” referents speaking in a text ..................................................................194 Table 3.27. Obviatiation in an êsa evidential span .....................................................................197 Table 4.1. “Obviative” constructions meet the conditions of referential dependency ................204 Table 4.2. Nominal-nominal ordering meets the conditions of referential dependency .............214 Table 4.3. “Proximate” referring nouns precede “obviatives” in texts .......................................216 Table 4.4. Nominal-nominal ordering patterns in elicitation ......................................................218 Table 4.5. The suffix –yi– meets the conditions of referential dependency ...............................225 Table 4.6. Possession meets the conditions of referential dependency ......................................242 Table 4.7. The inverse meets the conditions of referential dependency .....................................278 Table 4.8. Restrictions on the identity of topic op in Plains Cree ..............................................292 Table 4.9. Restrictions on the identity of the argument introduced by –ikw ..............................296 Table 4.10. Topic operator and Inverse pro are opposites in their properties ............................301 Table 6.1. A summary of the occurrences of –i ..........................................................................349 Table 6.2. A summary of contexts for plurality ..........................................................................353 Table 6.3. Navajo, Dogrib and Dëne Sųłiné pronominal affixes ................................................359 Table 6.4. Comparing Plains Cree –ikw and –yi– to Athabascan yi- ..........................................361 Table G1. Summary of verbal morphology ................................................................................374               xii List of Symbols and Abbreviations  x  y = if x, then y x ↔ y = iff (if and only if) x, then y x ∧ y = x and y ≈ = approximately ≠ = does not equal ∀ = universal quantifier ∃ = existential quantifier λ = lambda operator ψ = perspective  0 = inanimate agreement 1 = first person 1>3 = first person acting on third person 2 = second person 3 = third person 3>1 = third person acting on first person AI = animate intransitive AIT = animate intransitive-transitive ACT = actor AN = animate APPLIC = applicative C1 = changed conjunct 1 C2 = changed conjunct 2 CP = clause phrase DEMP = demonstrative phrase DIM = diminutive DIR = direct DP = determiner phrase DRS = discourse representation structure DRT =  discourse representation theory DS = disjoint subject DSJ = disjoint marker DST = distal EP = epenthetic EXCL = exclamation EXT = extentional EXTP = extentional phrase FUT = future GEN = generic HABIT = habitual HES = hesitation II = inanimate intransitive IN = inanimate INCH = inchoative INTERJ = interjection INT = intentional INV = inverse IP = inflectional phrase LOC = locative LP = local person NEG = negation NOM = nominalizer NP = noun phrase nP = little noun phrase NUMP = number phrase OBV = obviative PERSP = person phrase PL = plural PREV = previous PROX = proximate PRX = proximal R = relation RECIP = reciprocal RED = reduplication RESUM = resumptive RFLX = reflexive RR = relative root SG = singular STAT = stative TA = transitive animate TI = transitive inanimate UP = unknown possessor VP = verb phrase vP = little verb phrase x = variable XP = unidentified phrase XT = extentional y = variable        xiii Acknowledgements  First and foremost, I thank the Plains Cree and Métis people who have contributed their linguistic knowledge to this thesis. This includes Wally Awâsis, who showed up to our first session in an Cleveland Indians jacket (“I’m an Indian – they made the jacket just for me”), Rita Daniels, whose kindness won’t be forgotten, Joseph Deschamps, who has repeatedly provided crucial insights with his knowledge of Cree culture and language, Josephine Small, whose linguistic flexibility and patience has provided many crucial data points, and Dorothy Thunder, who gave me many good questions to ask about the language.  Toni Cardinal’s exceptional linguistic abilities were crucial to the construction of the generalizations that are the backbone of this work. Repeatedly, and over many years of work, she turned her intuitive understanding of the Plains Cree language into clear, concise descriptions that far exceeded any analytic work done on these aspects of her language. In addition, I would also like to thank speakers and community members, including Beverly Crier, Judy Louis, Roy Louis, Barbara MacLeod, Tom McCallum, Jean Okimâsis, Maryann Palmer, Solomon Ratt, Henry Rain, Wayne Roan, Blanche Steinhauer, and Simon Threefingers. I know it is hard to listen to ignorance speaking with unearned authority, and I appreciate your forbearance and compassion. kinânaskomitinâwâw. My supervisor, Rose-Marie Déchaine, is the reason I survived UBC academics, the expert hand behind all my successful grants and any papers you liked, and the main reason my thesis is at all coherently written (You readers think this is bad – you should have seen Draft #2!). From the admissions process until I filed this thesis, I cannot think of any stage that she was not involved in. I am greatly indebted to her for her time, her energy, and her ideas. The other two members of my committee, Guy Carden and Hotze Rullmann have also been of central importance to this work. Guy is one of the great linguists, and his sharp questions and encouragement have been much enjoyed. I am grateful that he took time for me. Hotze has suffered my semantic excesses (and their ensuing chaos) more cruelly than anyone, and any clarity in the final semantic discussion is to his credit. He has given me significant amounts of his time, carefully reading many drafts and patiently trying to pull me from the mud. I would like to thank the four additional members of my examining committee: Andrew Irvine, Katarzyna Jaszczolt, Leslie Saxon, and Geoff Williams for their voluntary and insightful contributions to this work. I would especially like to thank Kasia and Leslie for going through my thesis in such fine detail, and the final outcome has been much improved by their ideas. In addition, Tamina Stephenson was a silent member of my examining committee, and her open mind and flexibility provided me with much help when it was most needed. H.C. Wolfart has suffered through both my theoretical and editorial contortions with much patience (Chris: Please don’t look at the references to this thesis). His scholarship, fueled by a sincere interest in the language, has provided an excellent role-model for what linguistic work on a language ought to be and how it ought to proceed, and his academic manner represents the best standard of what I had hoped Academia would be like. I owe Monica Macaulay a great thank you for introducing me to Algonquian languages. Out of her own good will and entirely on her own time, she spent many hours working through texts, discussing Bloomfield’s grammar, and going through teaching materials, as well as literally driving me up to the reservation. She also gave me much advice about graduate school, and introduced me to fieldwork methodology via Menominee and isiZulu. Thanks to those who shared their language knowledge with me, including Oládiípò Ajíbóyè (Yorùbá), Beatrice and Melinda Bullshields (Blackfoot), Adriano Barbosa (Brazilian Portuguese), Seok Koon Chin (Mandarin, Cantonese, Hokkien), Kerim Demirci (Turkish), Peter Jacobs (Squamish), Bekisizwe Ndimande (isiZulu), and Lena Russell (Blackfoot).  xiv This work has been supported by the Jacobs Fund, Phillips Fund, UBC, and SSHRC. Without Edna Dharmaratne, nothing would have gotten done, I would have never gotten any money, and I would have starved in the rain. All that, and she’s a nice person. Thanks to my teachers at UBC, including Gunnar Hansson, Lisa Matthewson, Doug Pulleyblank, and Martina Wiltschko. Martina’s teaching helped clarify a great deal of syntactic theory to me, and Lisa’s semantic instruction and advising has been of great assistance. Thanks also to the Algonquian scholarly community, including Eleanor Blain, Phil Branigan, Amy Dahlstrom, Inge Genee, Ives Goddard, Marguerite MacKenzie, Jean Okimâsis, Arden Ogg, David Pentland, Marie Odile-Junker, Nicole Rosen, and Arok Wolvengrey. They have sat through my talks, shared their work, offered me help, and have still somehow not given up hope. I am fortunate to have worked with so many talented people. I would like to thank the scholars of ancient languages at the University of Wisconsin, Jack McKeown, Victoria Pagan, Barry Powell, Richard Ringler, and Andrew Wolpert, who gave me a clear picture of the first and best model of linguistic scholarship, and much laughter. Thanks also to my linguistics teachers at the University of Wisconsin, including Marie- Helene Côte, Mürvet Enc, Yafei Li, Matt Pearson, and Manindra Verma. In particular, I have vivid memories of Matt’s brutal tests and Mürvet’s fantastic rants (and fashion sense!). Thanks to my teachers at the University of Wisconsin extension in Marathon County, Harlan Grinde, Theo Koupelis, Keith Montgomery, and Peter Okray, who spent a great deal of time and energy teaching me, and introduced me to ideas that still inform my perspective. Thanks to the graduate student group for putting up with me: Oládiípò Ajíbóyè, Solveiga Armoskaite, Leszek Barczak, Fiona Campbell, Mario Chavez-Peon, Yunhee Chung, Ramona McDowell, Atsushi Fujimori, Diana Gibraiel, Carrie Gillon, Fusheini Hudu, Yoko Ikegami, Peter Jacobs, Masaru Kiyota, Karsten Koch, John Lyon, Calisto Mudzingwa, Nahal Namdaran, Jeremy Perkins, Sugunya Ruangjaroon, Scott Shank, Tanya Slavin, Dominique Quis, Ian Wilson, Rachel Wojdak, and Florence Woo. I share your pain; I’m either glad you’re done or hope it will be over soon.  Ryan Waldie told me about fairies in linguistics and botanical varieties in Vancouver, while also fixing my busted semantics. Better in a gutter than on a pedestal.  Chin Seok Koon 秦淑君 has helped the teacher of thieves (贼夫) out of many of his worst scrapes, and has gracefully endured swashbuckling and barbarity from the Western Pirates.  Many people showed me hospitality and kindness through these years, including Solveiga Armoskaite and family, Joe and Nella Cook, Rita Daniels, Denis Déchaine and family, Lucienne Déchaine, Rose-Marie Déchaine, Joseph Deschamps, the Demirci family, Tom Nook, Poncho, Paola Quintanar, Totakeke, and Juliana Wolfart. For still being willing to admit my acquaintance after 6 years of insanity, I would like to thank Kerim Demirci and David Tang. Kerim provided me with the only real break I had during this work, and David has somehow managed to eat most of my ice cream.  I owe my interests and abilities to my parents, Gerald and Suzanne Muehlbauer, who have steadily tried to support my intellectual interests since I was in three-cornered pants. Topics have shifted from dinosaurs to languages, but I’m not sure much else has changed.  Thanks also to the rest of my family, including Alma Johnson, my grandparents Robert and Elizabeth Muehlbauer, Kathy Ritenour, who has lavished attention on me all my life, Jane “Pufferfish” Ritenour, Ned and Debbie Wicker (and feline and canine housemates), who provided much encouragement over many years, and the Muehlbauer and Klann clans. Thanks for not being academics, and for trying to understand why on earth someone would do such a thing. (Answer: I still don’t know!)  Finally, there’s Clare. You never can tell with porcupines, can you?  xv Citation  ‘Most men will not swim before they are able to.’  Is not that witty? Naturally, they won’t swim! They are born for the solid earth, not for the water.  And naturally they won’t think. They are made for life, not for thought.  Yes, and he who thinks, what’s more, he who makes thought his business, he may go far in it, but he has bartered the solid earth for the water all the same, and one day he will drown.”  – Hermann Hesse Steppenwolf  1 Chapter 1 Introduction: Making truth happen   1.1. Introduction: kâ-yôskâtahk ôma nêhiyawêwin  When I asked a Plains Cree (Algonquian, Northern Plains) speaker about the linguistic structures considered in this thesis, I was told ‘kâ-yôskâtahk ôma nêhiyawêwin,’ literally ‘The Plains Cree language is soft.’1  (1) ᑳ ᔫᐢᑳᑖᕁ ᐆᒪ ᓀᐦᐃᔭᐍᐏᐣ.  kâ-yôskâtahk ôma nêhiyawêwin.  kâ-yôsk=ât      =an-k aw  =ima   nêhiyaw=ê  =win  C2-soft =by.air=II  -0 PRX=IN.SG cree       =AI=NOM  ‘The Plains Cree language is soft.’2  Here, the use of the concept of ‘soft’ (yôsk-) is meant to convey a particular philosophy about the purpose of communication and the way it ought to proceed. As Lightning (1996:62) explains it, the Speaker makes themselves “vulnerable and open” to their audience, not trying to impress their assertions on the audience by force of personality or argument. Rather than speaking to convince (cf. Aristotle’s ‘Rhetoric’), a Plains Cree speaker’s communicative intent is understood as coming from a need to express what they believe is the truth, individualized to the particular audience they are speaking to (Lightning 1996:63). The mechanisms of discourse, then, are organized to set up the proper events for “truth to happen” (Lightning 1996:63). This means that accuracy in representation, both of the Speaker’s beliefs and the beliefs they convey from others, is absolutely crucial to the Speaker’s goals for the discourse; the Hearer(s) must trust the Speaker, and the Speaker must be trustworthy. The Plains Cree language is ‘soft,’ then, because its users prize the “mutual-thinking” (Lightning 1996) that develops between Speaker and Hearer through careful representation, and they value this over the force of logical or charismatic persuasion. This means that, to a speaker of Plains Cree, the grammatical material covered in this thesis relates to how the Speaker “makes truth happen.”    1 Thanks to Joseph Deschamps, ᐅᑭᒫᐤ ᑳᐹᐏᐤ, for this form and discussion of its meaning. ᑭᓇᓈᐢᑯᒥᑎᐣ. 2 Thanks to H.C. Wolfart (p.c.) for help with the composition of this form.  2 1.2. How does “truth happen” in Plains Cree?  This thesis considers the construction and maintenance of “truth happenings” in Plain Cree. By “truth happenings,” I mean the way that a speaker of Plains Cree ties together some proposition (e.g. a sentence) with a means to evaluate it. As is demonstrated in this thesis, Plains Cree possesses a rich set of grammatical mechanisms that the Speaker can manipulate to construct these representations of truth.  I claim that there are two basic ingredients to the “truth happening” process in Plains Cree: (i) A proposition (ii) A thinker. That is, truth “happens” when a proposition is held by someone; without this “someone” there can be no truth. Making truth happen amounts to connecting propositions to thinkers. Truth, then, is the result of relativizing a proposition to a person; it is inherently relational or individualized in the sense of Lightning (1996). If “truth happening” is the process of connecting a proposition to a thinker, we expect that Plains Cree grammar will be concerned with the identification of thinkers, and the linking of propositions to these thinkers. In particular, we expect two kinds of operations to be at play: (i) Identifying thinkers (ii)  Coding the relation of these thinkers to propositions. The first process (identifying thinkers) is the primary of the two; it does not matter what the relation of a thinker is to a proposition if there is not yet a thinker. In studying the process of “truth happening” in Plains Cree, then, we should begin by looking at mechanisms that are used to pick out thinkers. This is the core topic of this thesis. To illustrate these two operations in Plains Cree, let us consider two limited cases of “truth happening.” In the first case, the “Calvin and Hobbes”3 problem (§1.2.1), we see two things: (i) There are grammatical forms that distinguish referents that can “think” from referents that can’t. (ii) These grammatical forms can only be interpreted once a decision has been made about who thinks that the referent can think.  3 The characters and comic strip “Calvin and Hobbes” are copyright Bill Watterson. Its use here is for scholarly and illustrative purposes only, and is thus allowed under “Fair Use” copyright laws.  3 Without this relativization, the grammatical terms still have only the status of propositional elements. In the second case, the “6 degrees of separation” problem (§1.2.2), we see two things: (i) There are grammatical forms that distinguish which referents are thinking in the given context. (ii) These grammatical forms are always relativized to what the Speaker knows. Plains Cree grammar, then, possesses a rich set of devices for discriminating those who can make “truth happen” from those who can’t. The rest of the thesis is concerned with the proper description and modeling of these phenomena.   1.2.1 The “Calvin and Hobbes” problem in Plains Cree  Anyone that has been to a book store or read a newspaper in the last 20 years will be familiar with the comic strip “Calvin and Hobbes” by Bill Watterson. Calvin is a young boy who has a best friend that is a tiger named Hobbes. Being anthropomorphic, Hobbes can walk and talk just like a human, and he goes on many adventures with Calvin. However, at other times in the comic strip, Hobbes is simply an inert stuffed animal. This means that there are two versions of Hobbes presented in the comic strip: (i) Hobbes is an anthropomorphic tiger. (ii) Hobbes is a stuffed toy. This I term the “Calvin and Hobbes” problem – how are we to understand the changing status of Hobbes? In the Plains Cree language, there are two grammatical classes for nominals, let us call them “A” and “B” for now, and these two classes map directly onto the Calvin and Hobbes problem. Consider a context in which Calvin has lost Hobbes out in the woods, and his father went out to look for him. After finding Hobbes, the stuffed animal, out behind some bushes, the father puts it in bed with Calvin. Upon waking, Calvin runs to inform his mother that Hobbes came back from his evening wanderings. In responding, the mother must either mark Hobbes with grammatical category “A” (2a) or grammatical category “B” (2b).4   4 This context is an actual comic strip by Bill Watterson, and was used to elicit the Plains Cree forms.  4 (2) a. CATEGORY A     ᑯᐦᑖᐏᐩ ᑮ ᒥᐢᑲᑦ Hobbes.     kohtâwiy kî-miskam Hobbes.     k-ohtâwiy kî-     m   =isk            -am Hobbes      2-father    PREV-find=by.body.TI-TI  Hobbes      ‘Your fatherAN found HobbesIN.’                (Presented S2)   b. CATEGORY B     ᑯᐦᑖᐏᐩ ᑮ ᒥᐢᑲᐍᐤ Hobbesᐊ.     kôhtâwiy miskawêw Hobbesa.     k-ohtâwiy m   =iskaw          -ê   -w Hobbes-a      2-father    find=by.body.TA-DIR-3  Hobbes-XT5      ‘Your fatherPROX found HobbesOBV.’               (Presented S2)  If the mother marks Hobbes with grammatical category “A,” which is shown by the –isk–am set of suffixes on the verb in (2a), she is saying that Hobbes is a stuffed animal. If she instead chooses grammatical category “B,” which is shown by the combination of the –iskaw–â–w suffixes on the verb and the –a on the noun (2b), she is saying that Hobbes is a walking, talking tiger. For example, if the “A” form is used, subsequent discourse cannot allow Hobbes to speak, walk, or believe anything (e.g. being happy about being found) (3a), while the “B” form can allow Hobbes to talk, walk, and believe things (e.g. being happy about being found) (3b).  (3) a. CATEGORY A     # ᐁᐦᐋ, ᑯᐦᑖᐏᐩ ᑮ ᒥᐢᑲᑦ Hobbes; ᐁ ᒥᐩᐍᔨᐦᑕᒥᕁ.     # êhâ, kôhtâwiy kî-miskam Hobbes; ê-miywêyihtahk.     êhâ k-ôhtâwiy kî-      mi  =sk             -am Hobbes ê-  miyw=êyiht        -am-k     yes 2-father     PREV-find=by.body.TI-TI   Hobbes C1-good=by.mind.TI-TI   -3     Intended: ‘Yes, your fatherAN found HobbesIN; [Hobbes] was happy.’     (Presented S2)   b. CATEGORY B     ᐁᐦᐋ, ᑯᐦᑖᐏᐩ ᑮ ᒥᐢᑲᐍᐤ Hobbesᐊ; ᐁ ᒥᐩᐍᔨᐦᑕᒥᔨᐟ.     êhâ, kôhtâwiy kî-miskawêw Hobbesa; ê-miywêyihtamiyit.     êhâ k-ôhtâwiy kî-      mi  =skaw          -ê   -w Hobbes-a  ê-   miyw=êyiht       -am-yi-t     yes 2-father     PREV-find=by.body.TA-DIR-3 Hobbes-XT c1-good=by.mind.TI-TI-DS-3     ‘Yes, your fatherPROX found HobbesOBV; heOBV was happy.’            (Presented S2)  In this situation, then, the mother must choose between representing her own belief about Hobbes and that of her child; does she use the “A” form, which corresponds to what she herself sees, or does she use the “B” form, which corresponds to what her son thinks of his tiger?  5 For an explanation of ‘extentional’ (XT), see §1.3.1. below.  5  The Plains Cree grammatical categories “A” and “B,” then, do two important things relative to the current discussion: (i) They discriminate between non-thinkers (“A”) and potential thinkers (“B”). (ii) They require that someone think they are non-thinkers or thinkers. As such, these two grammatical categories are intimately involved in making “truth happen” in Plains Cree. These two categories are the focus of Chapter 2.   1.2.2 The “6-Degrees of Separation” problem in Plains Cree  In considering our relation to famous or important people, we sometimes count in terms of our relation to people who have been related to famous people. For example, my uncle once wrestled Hulk Hogan. Counting from The Hulk to me, I can say that I am separated from him by one degree of separation (i.e. my intermediate Uncle Ned). Of course, I can’t say that I “know” The Hulk – only that I know someone who knew him. This game of counting intermediate people has sometimes been done as a logic puzzle – as in the hobby of connecting actors to other actors until one of them has starred in a movie with Kevin Bacon (i.e. the “Six Degrees of Separation from Kevin Bacon” game).  Suppose that I am speaking Plains Cree, and I want to tell you something that Hulk Hogan said to my Uncle. In this language, I have a choice of three ways to present this (4).  (4)  a. ᐁᑯᓯ ᐃᑘᐤ ᓈᐯᐤ. êkosi itwêw nâpêw       êkosi it    =wê-w nâpêw        so     thus=AI -3 man        ‘That’s what the manAN said’    (Volunteered S4, Presented S2,S3)        b.  ᐁᑯᓯ ᐁ ᐃᑘᐟ ᓈᐯᐤ. êkosi ê-itwêt nâpêw       êkosi ê-  it    =wê-t nâpêw        so     C1-thus=AI -3 man        ‘That’s what the manAN said’    (Volunteered S4, Presented S2,S3)         c. ᐁᑯᓯ ᐁ ᐃᑘᔨᐟ (ᐁᓴ) ᓈᐯᐘ. êkosi ê-itwêyit (êsa) nâpêwa       êkosi ê-  it    =wê-yi -t êsa   nâpêw-a        so     C1-thus=AI -DS-3 EVID man   -XT        ‘That’s what the manOBV said’    (Volunteered S4, Presented S2,S3)   6 While the form in (4a) indicates that I heard the Hulk myself, and the form in (4b) is non- committal on how I heard about this, the final form, in (4c), is what I would say if I wanted to make it clear that I wasn’t there to hear Hulk Hogan tell this – it was something he said to someone else, that I’m passing on. By marking the noun nâpêw ‘man’ with the suffix –a, and putting the suffix –yi– in the verb, I am telling you that I don’t know this Hulk Hogan fellow personally, and thus I can’t vouch for this directly. You’d have to go check with my Uncle to make sure that this was really what The Hulk said. Thus, Plains Cree has a way to do this “degree-counting” right in its grammar, by specially-marking the noun and verbs that relate to it.   1.3. Proposal: Individuals related to perspectives  In this thesis, I attempt to model “truth happening” in Plains Cree. In doing this, it is important to remember the distinction between a phenomenon (Greek: φαινóµενον ‘that which appears’) and the model of the phenomenon. I am not claiming that the model I am constructing is, in any sense, ‘real.’ Rather, it is a constructed representation that covers the observable facts and gives us a systematic way to look for new facts to model. In other words, the model is a map, not a territory (cf. Korzybski 1958, Bateson 1971).  1.3.1. Perspective possession  In this thesis, I take “truth happening” to be the relation of individuals to propositions. This is an inherently relativized process; the truth of a proposition is relative to some individual. In particular, the truth of a proposition is relative to the individual’s perspective (in the sense of Kölbel 2002) – the way that individual sees the world. The process of “truth-happening,” then, is the process of mapping a proposition into some individual’s perspective.  Perspectives can be thought of as analogous to other possessed entities (Kölbel 2002); each individual owns one, and uses it to evaluate the truth of propositions. In a sense, it is like a body part that the individual takes with them wherever they go. Parallel to possession, then, we can define a perspective and an individual as being related by possessor relation ‘R’ (Higginbotham 1983).  (5) a. [[John’s dog]] = R(John,dog) = There is a relation between John and the dog.   b. R(x,ψ) = There is a relation between an individual x and a perspective ψ.   7 In most cases, the relation between the possessor and the perspective is unspecified, analogous to normal possession. However, there are ways to further restrict this relation, by introducing predicates that explicitly restrict this unspecified ‘R’ relation, just as with kinship terms (Burton 1995). With perspectives, these predicates are typically called “propositional attitude” predicates (Russell 1918), and comprise predicates like “think,” “feel,” or “say.”  (6)   a. [[John’s mother]] = mother-of(x,John) = There is a mother relation between John and x.                    (Burton 1995)          b. [[John thinks]] = think(John, ψ) = There is a think relation between John and ψ.  A perspective, then, is a domain that an individual possesses with which to evaluate the truth of a proposition. If the ‘R’ relation of perspective possession is further specified by the addition of predicates, we could expect a language to grammatically separate perspective possession from the relation to the perspective. In fact, in Plains Cree, many of these propositional attitude predicates are built off of one element – the suffix –êyiht ‘by mind.’ Thus, to ‘believe’ is tâpwêwakêyihtam ‘to hold it true in the mind,’ while to ‘think’ is itêyihtam ‘to do thus with it in the mind.’  (7) a. ᑖᐻᐘᑫᔨᐦᑕᑦ.     tâpwêwakêyihtam.     tâpwêwak=êyiht         -am     true          =by.mind.TI-TI      ‘S/heAN believes in itIN, holds it to be true.’   b. ᐃᑌᔨᐦᑕᑦ.     itêyihtam.     it     =êyiht         -am     thus=by.mind.TI-TI      ‘S/heAN thinks thus of itIN.’  Plains Cree, then, could be thought of as coding the having of a perspective (-êyiht) and the relation to the perspective (e.g. tâpwê- ‘true’) as separate linguistic elements, which crucially exist in an structurally-conditioned, asymmetric relation to the holder of perspective.6 The concept of perspective possession provides a way to model this pattern.  6 This asymmetry presents challenges for accounts that treat the perspective holder, the perspective, and the relation to the perspective as an undifferentiated triple (e.g. Kamp 1990). While the current account does not provide a full  8  The definition of perspective possession adopted here gives rise to two kinds of individuals: (i) Those that hold a perspective, (ii) Those that don’t. For perspective-holders, I use the term “intentional,” because they have “intentions,” which means that they have mental processes directed at something (Brentano 1874). For individuals that do not possess a perspective, I adopt the term “extentional,” since they do not have mental processes directed at anything.7 “Intentionality,” then, is the property of possessing a perspective.  1.3.2. Discourse Representation Theory with perspectives  To model the contexts for perspective possession in Plains Cree, I employ a modified form of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT: Kamp 1981) that is built off of the work of Farkas (1992) and Smith (2004). In this model, each Discourse Representation Structure (DRS: symbolized by a ‘box’ in the representation) represents a perspective (the domain in which the truth of a proposition is evaluated). This perspective is necessarily ‘anchored’ to an individual (Fillmore 1971, Ruwet 1982, Kölbel 2002, Lasersohn 2005, Stephenson 2007), creating a perspective-individual pair (e.g. R(x,ψ)). This perspective-individual pair is represented in the DRS through the following conventions: (i) The perspective is represented by the ‘box’ of the DRS itself. (ii) The individual that possesses this perspective is marked above the upper-left corner of the box. (iii) The relation between the individual and the perspective is represented by the predicate in angle brackets to the right of the individual.            x <R> (8)  =  R(x,ψ)      model of this asymmetry, it is amenable to future work that considers the compositional nature of propositional attitudes. 7 Thanks to Hotze Rullmann (p.c.) for suggesting this term.  9 Elements embedded within a perspective are thus placed inside the corresponding ‘box’ of the DRS, and variables related to this perspective are introduced in the frame at the top of each ‘box.’  (9) Jeff: The sun feels good.8            Jeff <say>  x =  say(Jeff,ψ)  sun(x)  feel.good(x)   The relation between the individual and proposition is neutrally unspecified If the Speaker wishes to represent the perspective of some other individual, a second layer of embedding can be added.9  (10) Clare: Jeff thinks the sun feels good.            Clare <say>  x Jeff =  say(Clare,ψ)  sun(x)  think(Jeff)      Jeff <think> =  think(Jeff,ψ') x sun(x)   feel.good(x)    Of course, the DRS in (10) is not a complete representation of the utterance in (10); I have abstracted away from places and times. For the purposes of understanding the reference-typing  8 Regarding the argument structure of propositional attitude verbs, Cook (2008) provides evidence that propositions (syntactically CPs) are never the objects of verbs. This is the reason for the treatment of predicates like say in the formalism. 9 Although the implementation here is similar in method to that considered by Kamp (1990), which would model “intentional” as an “external anchor” and “extentional” as an “internal anchor,” the two accounts differ with respect to their ability to model multiple layers (>2) of embedded perspectives, which is crucial for the Plains Cree data considered in Chapter 3.  10 phenomena in Plains Cree, there does not appear to be a need to distinguish between times and places, although a full model of Plains Cree perspectival meanings will necessarily require their inclusion. In the study of obviation phenomena (Chapter 3), I employ the context variable C of Partee (1989), which can be conceived of as a collapsing of place and time together. This is outlined in section 1.3.3 below. The use of a DRS to represent a perspective implicates several alterations to the standard DRT developed by Kamp (1981). In particular, the typical DRT convention of carrying referents into embedded boxes cannot here be maintained; to do so would indicate that any referent known to the Speaker would also be known to the possessor of embedded perspectives. Altering this convention allows for the modeling of differences in perspectives regarding referents. For example, the “sun” in the perspective of Clare in (10) is repeated in the embedded perspective of Jeff. This represents that both Clare and Jeff have the same referent in mind. If the variable of the embedded perspective were switched (e.g. to y), then Clare and Jeff would have different versions of the “sun” in mind, as schematized in (11).  (11) Clare: Jeff thinks the sun feels good.            Clare <say>  x Jeff =  say(Clare,ψ)  sun(x)  think(Jeff)      Jeff <think> =  think(Jeff,ψ') y sun(y)   feel.good(x)    The ban on referents carrying into embedded DRS structures also has implications for existential quantification. In typical DRT frameworks, the referent is taken to exist within the DRS it is located in. In the current framework, this existence only holds of a perspective. For example, consider a context in which Clare and Jeff were walking in the woods together and they saw a  11 large creature run by. Jeff claims this creature was a hodag,10 while Clare thinks it was merely an exceptionally large dog. We can model this as in (12), where the predicate ‘large’ is located in both perspectives, while the predicate ‘hodag’ is located only in the perspective possessed by Jeff.  (12) Clare: Jeff thinks he saw a large hodag.            Clare <say>  x Jeff =  say(Clare,ψ)  think(Jeff)  large(x)      Jeff <think> =  think(Jeff,ψ') x see(Jeff,x)   hodag(x)   large(x)   This represents that Clare is only committing to the referent’s bigness, while the idea that it was a hodag is entirely Jeff’s. Within this model, “Truth-happening” is understood as the process of connecting a proposition to a perspective-individual pairing. This connection provides the means for an individual to evaluate the proposition.  1.3.3. Proposal: Four kinds of referents in Plains Cree  I propose that Plains Cree can be understood to refer to four kinds of individuals, defined in terms of perspectival possession (i.e. intentionality): (i) Individuals that can never possess a perspective. (ii) Individuals that cannot currently possess a perspective. (iii) Individuals that currently possess a perspective. (iv) Individuals unspecified for perspective possession.  10 A ‘hodag’ is a legendary beast that is thought to live in Northern Wisconsin woodland areas, particularly around Rhinelander, Eagle River, Minocqua, and Hayward.  12 The first kind of individuals, those that can never possess a perspective, correspond to the grammatical category used to mark Hobbes as a stuffed animal in example (2). This category is termed “inanimate” in the literature (cf. Wolfart 1973).  (13)  CATEGORY (I) = INANIMATE ᑯᐦᑖᐏᐩ ᑮ ᒥᐢᑲᑦ Hobbes. kohtâwiy kî-miskam Hobbes. k-ohtâwiy kî-     m   =isk            -am Hobbes  2-father    PREV-find=by.body.TI-TI  Hobbes  ‘Your fatherAN found HobbesIN.’                (Presented S2)  Here, the verb is coded with two forms that pick out individuals that never possess perspectives: (i) The suffix –isk ‘done by the body to an inanimate thing’ (ii) The suffix –am ‘inanimate object’ I propose that this category marks individuals that are never able to possess a perspective; they are inherently extentional. This is represented in the formalism as in (14).  (14)  EXT(x) ↔ ∀ψ∀y(R(y,ψ)  x ≠ y) x is Extentional if and only if for all Perspectives ψ and all individuals y, if there is a relation R between individual y with perspective ψ, then x is not y.  As such, referents marked with this category will be unable to speak, think, or feel, since those are predicates that introduce a relation between a perspective and an individual (§1.3.1). Modeling the difference in who believes the referent is extentional thus reduces to a differential embedding of the extentional-marking predicate.  (15) ᑯᐦᑖᐏᐩ ᑮ ᒥᐢᑲᑦ Hobbes. kohtâwiy kî-miskam Hobbes. k-ohtâwiy kî-     m   =isk            -am Hobbes  2-father    PREV-find=by.body.TI-TI  Hobbes  ‘Your fatherAN found HobbesIN.’                (Presented S2)   13 a. CONTEXT 1: EXTENTIONAL W.R.T. SPEAKER11           Speaker <R>  x Hobbes  father(x,Hearer)  EXT(Hobbes)  find(x,Hobbes)   b. CONTEXT 2: EXTENTIONAL W.R.T. HEARER            Speaker <R>   Here, the location of the EXT predicate in the perspective of one or the other perspective represents who conceives of Hobbes as extentional. This category is considered in detail in Chapter 2.  The second kind of individuals, those that are currently unable to possess a perspective, are signified by the structure used to mark nâpêw ‘the man’ in example (4c), termed “obviative” in the literature (cf. Wolfart 1973).  (16) CATEGORY (II) = OBVIATIVE ᐁᑯᓯ ᐁ ᐃᑘᔨᐟ (ᐁᓴ) ᓈᐯᐘ. êkosi ê-itwêyit (êsa) nâpêwa       êkosi ê-itwê -yi -t   êsa  nâpêw-a        so      C1-say-DS-3 EVID man   -XT        ‘That’s what the manOBV said’    (Volunteered S4, Presented S2,S3)  11 I am here treating proper names like other variables. This departs from treatments of proper names as ‘rigid designators,’ in the sense of Kripke (1980), but allows for the modeling of different perspectives on a referent identified by a proper name.  x Hobbes  father(x,Hearer)  find(x,Hobbes)       Hearer <R> Hobbes EXT(Hobbes)    14  Here, the nominal bears a suffix –a, and the verb carries a special suffix –yi–. I propose that this construction codes that the individual is unable to possess a perspective relative to the specified context; the individual is contextually extentional.  (17)  EXT(x,C) ↔ ∀ψ∀y(R(y,ψ,C)  x ≠ y) x is extentional at context C if and only if for all perspectives ψ and all individuals y, if there is a relation R of y with ψ at context C, then x is not y.  This contextual extentionality is always relative to the Speaker’s perspective, and means that “obviative” referents are unable to be assigned a perspective by the Speaker.  (18) a. ᐁᑯᓯ ᐁ ᐃᑘᔨᐟ (ᐁᓴ) ᓈᐯᐘ.     êkosi ê-itwêyit (êsa) nâpêwa           êkosi ê-itwê -yi -t   êsa  nâpêw-a            so      C1-say-DS-3 EVID man   -XT            ‘That’s what the manOBV said’          (Volunteered S4, Presented S2,S3)   b. WELL-FORMED DRS FOR 18A             Speaker <R>  x C  say(x)  man(x)  EXT(x,C)   c. ILL-FORMED DRS FOR 18A            Speaker <R>  x  say(x)  man(x)  EXT(x,C)      x <say>  say(x)    15  Here, the well-formed DRS is one in which there is no perspective assigned to the man, who is marked as obviative (18b). Introducing an embedded perspective for this obviative referent is ill- formed (18c). Modeling “obviation,” then, reduces to modeling a contextual ban on perspective possession. This category is considered in detail in Chapter 3.  The third kind of individuals is those that currently possess a perspective, termed “Proximate” in the literature. This kind of referent is created by contrast between the “Obviative” form and a normal nominal, rather than by anything special about the grammatical forms involved. For example, in (19), the perspective of nâpêw ‘man’ is represented, as shown by the explanation offered by the consultant.  (19)  CATEGORY (III) = “PROXIMATE”  ᐁ ᐚᐸᒫᐟ ᓈᐯᐤ ᐃᐢᑵᐘ ê-wâpamât nâpêw iskwêwa  ê-wâp=am            -â    -t nâpêw iskwêw-a  c1-see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 man     woman-XT  ‘The manPROX sees the womanOBV.’  COMMENT (S2): “In this example, you’re hearing what the man has to say about it.”           Speaker <say>  x y  man(x)  EXT(y)       x <R> y woman(y)   see(x,y)   The “Proximate,” then possess a perspective for the evaluation of the truth proposition. Being a function of contrast with the “Obviative,” this category is also considered in Chapter 3.  The last kind of individuals is the elsewhere case, termed “Animate” in the literature. This kind of individual has neither intentional or extentional properties, as shown by the pair of examples in (20).  16  (20)  CATEGORY (IV)= “ANIMATE”  a. ᓂᐚᐸᒫᐤ ᐊᓇ ᐊᐚᓯᐢ     niwâpamâw ana awâsis      ni-wâpam            -â   -w an=a        awâsis      1- see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 DST=AN.SG child      ‘I seeAN thatAN child / ribbon.’       Comment (S2): “I don’t know if the child knows about this or not.”  b. ᓂᐚᐸᒫᐤ ᐊᓇ ᓭᓇᐹᐣ     niwâpamâw ana sênapân      ni-wâpam            -â   -w an=a   sênapân      1- see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 DST=AN.SG ribbon     ‘I seeAN thatAN child / ribbon.’     Comment (S2): “The ribbon couldn’t know about this.”  I consider this category in Chapter 2.  1.3.4. Proposal: Constructing obviation via referential dependency  Turning from the kinds of individuals coded in Plains Cree to the manner in which these individuals are coded, I propose that the three categories of individuals are not grammatically equal. In particular, I argue that “inanimate” and “animate” are coded by dedicated forms (Chapter 2), while obviation, by contrast is constructed out of other resources available to the grammar (Chapter 3). Animacy, then is a primitive property of Plains Cree grammar, while obviation is not.  In constructing obviation, I propose that Plains Cree recruits elements that code referential dependency (i.e. the process of making one referent dependent on another for its interpretation). This referential dependency can be understood as the satisfaction of two conditions: (i) a structural condition (c-command/linear precedence, shown on the left side of the table) and (ii) a semantic condition (perspectival embedding, shown on the right side of the table).   17 STRUCTURAL CONDITION SEMANTIC CONDITION 1               V            y             V                                 V                        x              V  2            PRED1     PRED2         5   5                y                x     Table 1.1.: Two conditions on referential dependency  Depending on the configuration that an obviative referent is used in, a different piece of this referential dependency system will be recruited. In Table 1.2, we see that there are five different configurations for obviation, and they correspond with five different dependency types.  FORM DEPENDENCY TYPE Noun-Noun Nominal to previous nominal -yi- Subject to previous referent Possession Possessum to Possessor -ê- Object to subject -ikw Subject to Topic Table 1.2.: The forms of obviation and their dependencies  Obviation, then, is just the application of referential dependency operations to animate referents. The more general property of Plains Cree is referential dependency. This is explored in detail in Chapter 4.  1.4. Relation to previous work  In this section, I consider the ways in which the current model relates to previous work on these topics. In addition, each chapter has its second section devoted to previous work specific to those topics (i.e. §2.2, §3.2, §4.2, §5.2).  1.4.1. Models of subjective meaning  Models of meaning in natural language have developed from a philosophical tradition that sought to develop an explicit language for expressing philosophical concepts. Since Aristotle, this philosophical tradition was crucially concerned with constructing arguments that entail  18 contradictions (Hume 1748, Tarski 1944), and numerous proposals were made to pare down linguistic forms to their most abstract, objective forms, in order to reduce ambiguity. Imported into work on non-philosophical language (i.e. natural language), this desire for objective, non- ambiguity was maintained (Cresswell 1985:5). This had the result that semantic analyses of natural language tended to focus on contradiction as a means to define the boundaries of meaning in the formal semantic sense (i.e. “It is raining” entails that “it is not raining” cannot also be true). The judge for these contradictions was taken to be someone external to the speech- act – the knower of “how it actually is” out there in the world (Tarski 1944). While this convenient way of talking about truth has proven useful in the description of meaning in natural language, it has long been noticed that numerous components of the natural languages considered (e.g. English, French, etc.) do not inherently entail contradictions, even when supplied with a specific time and place (e.g. Austin 1962). This includes, minimally, linguistic forms like questions (“May we come in?”), commands (“Open the door!”), and conditionals (“Forget to close the door and you’ll be sorry!”)(Fillmore 1975, Karttunnen 1977). Further, it was noticed that some of these elements in natural language are dependent on a specific individual involved in the speech act (cf. Searle 1965, Cresswell 1985, etc.). For example, an element like the English word “local” could be true when applied to the University of British Columbia for a speaker in Vancouver, but simultaneously untrue for a speaker in Boston (cf. Fillmore 1975, Mitchell 1987). Thus, the move has been away from the calculation of linguistic meaning solely in terms of contradiction-laden, individual-independent “objective” meaning and towards relativized, individual-dependent “subjective” meaning. One attempt at formalizing these “subjective” contexts was Farkas (1992), which focussed on modeling the distribution and meaning of Romance subjunctives. To model these, Farkas (1992) employed a DRT model in which an individual was paired with a world. More recently, Smith (2003) has employed DRT to model point of view effects in English discourse. The current model takes much of its mechanisms from these works, though exchanges worlds for perspectives. Recent work on the formalization of subjective meaning has focussed on predicates that trigger so-called “faultless disagreement” (Kölbel 2002, Lasersohn 2005, Stephenson 2007). These are contexts in which one person can utter a proposition, and the other person can disagree without saying the first person was wrong.12   12 I here cite the judgements of Stephenson (2007). I myself cannot utter “No, it isn’t!” in this context.  19 (21) Speaker A: This cake is tasty.  Speaker B: No, it isn’t!          (Stephenson 2007)  Lasersohn (2005) and Stephenson (2007) analyze these forms by appealing to the notion of a “judge.” This judge is an individual who judges the proposition to be true relative to a time and world. Being thus relativized, these propositions are inherently “subjective.” By employing a parallel relativization mechanism, the current work can be considered an extension of that done by Lasersohn (2005) and Stephenson (2007), but is much closer in its implementation to that of Farkas (1992). In all three accounts, truth evaluation is relativized to a particular individual, although some of the other particulars differ (e.g. perspectives vs. sets of worlds). Setting aside these more minor notational and philosophical differences, the important difference between the current model and these other works is that, whereas these other accounts relativize only certain predicates with respect to an individual, the current account relativizes all propositions to a perspective-holder (minimally, the Speaker).   1.4.2. Perspectives vs. possible worlds  In this thesis, I employ the notion of a “perspective” for the evaluation domain of a proposition’s truth. While this follows Kölbel (2002), it departs significantly from the treatments typically used for the formal semantics of natural language. This means that a comparison of the current theory to other work is in order. It should be noted at the outset that none of the reasons for employing “perspectives” are absolutely vital to the current work, representing instead ontological and philosophical disagreement, and thus a semanticist that uses a possible worlds framework can readily translate the current formalisms into those more comfortable to them (i.e. exchange “perspective of x” for “set of worlds epistemically accessible to x” or “doxastic alternatives of x” and other modifications as necessary).  In most theories of meaning, the domain of evaluation for propositions is a “world” (Hintikka 1962, Kripke 1963). What exactly is in a “world” appears to be a matter of some debate, but the canonical view is expressed by Hintikka (1962): a world contains a truth value for every proposition. Sets of worlds, then, are sets of sets of truth values for propositions. Relevant to our current discussion, this kind of system was used by Hintikka (1962) to model belief. For example, were we playing poker, and I wanted to guess the set of cards in your hand, I could write down every possible set of cards you could have, writing down one possible  20 hand on each slip of paper. As the game progresses, I could continually narrow down this set of papers based on new information, until I restrict the set papers to only one or two slips of paper. These would be the “worlds” that still depict possible states of the cards in your hand (i.e. epistemic alternatives; Hintikka 1962). Belief, then, is modeled as the continual narrowing of the set of worlds, based on additional knowledge. To believe something is to know the set of worlds that are accessible